Title IV.

- SUCCESSION
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is
transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the
testator. (n)
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir, made in a will
executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law. (n)
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession. (n)
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively given by
virtue of a will. (n)
CHAPTER 2
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
SECTION 1. - Wills
SUBSECTION 1. - Wills in General
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part of the
discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a)
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination
of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a
third person. (670a)
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums of
money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the
persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or applied. (671a)
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another person has
to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)

Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers the
description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will
or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when
an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations. (n)
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that he was unacquainted with such technical
sense. (675a)
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n)
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity
of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)
Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had
possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention. (n)
Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest which the testator could device or bequeath
in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he intended to convey a less
interest. (n)
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time
it is made. (n)
SUBSECTION 2. - Testamentary Capacity and Intent
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will.(662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution. (n)
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. (n)
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without the consent of her husband, and without the
authority of the court. (n)

Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate property as well as her share of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property. (n)
Enriquez v. Abadia
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be
his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in
the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which
the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the
three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil
Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry
out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of
law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It
is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in
1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of
wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by
the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because
the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879,
referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing
authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three
of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.

And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the document
are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who
omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not
allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the
lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re
Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when
statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law
for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of
the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under
the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements
of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ.,
concur.
IBARLE v PO
L-5064
TUASON; February 27, 1953
FACTS

- This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half
of a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
- Catalina Navarro sold the entire parcel of land, which was her and her deceased husbands conjugal property of the Canoy Spouses who later sold it to
Bienvenido Ibarle. Both sales were not registered. Catalina subsequently sold as her childrens guardian, one-half of the same land belonging to the children to
Esperanza Po.
ISSUE
WON the sale to Esperanza Po was valid
HELD
- The sale to the Canoy spouses was void. Therefore, when Catalina sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the sellers
children. No formal or judicial being needed to confirm the childrens title, it follows that the first sell was null and void insofar as it included the childrens share.
- On the other hand, the sale to Po having been made by authority of the competent court, was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been
recorded is of no consequence.

This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the
defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been
sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are
thus summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died
on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer
Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;
5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land
to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered
up to the date;
7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza
M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy
and Roberto Canoy.

Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from
the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil
Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of
time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5
Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or
judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and
void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court
was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to
no other cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the
plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as
may be appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in
their favor.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
Palicte v. Hon. Ramolete

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
declaring the deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the
petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owner's
Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to
issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued on February
5, 1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves,
et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the
amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by respondent
Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City;

2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of the Banilad Friad
Lands Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT
No. 27639;
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu, covered by TD No.
010661, with an area of 76-708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac Mactan
Island, with an area of Forty Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square
meters more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a Government lot at Lahug,
Cebu City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central, Cebu City. " (Rollo, p.
40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid for them for
the amount of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded to lone bidder
Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs of the late Don
Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Felipe V.
Belandres and approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-Officio Sheriff, was issued
for these lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, bid at
P20,000.00;
2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete for the transfer to
her name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.

This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled "Pilar Teves, et al. vs
Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal among which, is that movant, Palicte, is
not one of those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R, she
does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the
deed of redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR
ENTITLED TO REDEEM UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE,
OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
B
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER, WHO IS A
DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR
DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS A
DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT
OF REDEMPTION OF CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE
AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE AS THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT DEBT
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION
OF FOUR (4) PARCELS OF LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD
ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL AND VOID
AND INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of
redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:

SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided
in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed
in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the
property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property
sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the property
was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor
or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within
the term "successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276
Fed., 216, 223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for
the purpose of redemption (Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal,
99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20
Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law (XI McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint
debtors who were joint owners of the property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min.
etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her husband's homestead
by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband' title passes to her (Hefner vs.
Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This court has held that a surety can not redeem
the property of the principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the debt
of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and
consequently is not a successor in interest in the property. (G. Urruitia & Co. vs.
Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil., 260, 268). (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was
levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs
in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent's
liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the property is under administration.
(Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of
their shares in the decedent's property even while it is under administration. With more reason
should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an
administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three other co-heirs, the
administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputed parcels
of land. We see no need for such prior approval. While it may have been desirable, it is not

indispensable under the circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced
in the act of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contends that the administrator and the
three other heirs agreed to the redemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such approval. What
is beyond dispute from the records is that they did not disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the
petitioner. There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was not beneficial
to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate pending the order of
distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of
its properties is greater than anybody else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely
holds it for the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent interest were allowed to
exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103
Phil. 889, 892) where a son redeemed the property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs.
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court called
"inchoate right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as successor-in-interest of
her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or mother, is also an
inchoate or contingent interest, because upon the death of the father or the mother or
both, he will have a right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate
interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem a property sold on execution,
then the son is such a successor in interest, as he has an inchoate right to the
property of his father.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator as the judgment
debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the judgment debtor
and the heirs who will eventually acquire that estate should not be prohibited from doing their share
in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to transfer the titles of the
four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon
Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the estate.
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 267, 345346):
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of
Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their

respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1)
there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the
estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2)
such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral
expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the
estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper, (3) besides, such an order is
usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested
party or parties, and not of the court."
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-redemptioners in the
redemption made by the petitioner before the motion to transfer titles to the latter's name may be
granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders declaring the deed
of redemption null and void and denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to
Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the
redemption as stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Nufable v. Nufable

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
November 25, 1995 of the Fifth Division[1] of the Court of Appeals for allegedly being contrary to law.
The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:

Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod,

Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9,
1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and
Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after
due publication and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
(Branch II) issued an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will
and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable (Exhs. B, C and C-1).
On June 6, 1966, the same court issued an Order approving the Settlement of Estate
submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, portions of which read:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

We, ANGEL CUSTODIO NUFABLE, GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR
NUFABLE, and MARCELO NUFABLE, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos, and with
residence and postal address at Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
- HEREBY DECLARE AND MAKE MANIFEST 1. That on August 9, 1965, Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving (a) Last Will and
Testament (marked Exh. G) disposing (of) his properties or estate in favor of his four
legitimate children, namely: Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor
Nufable and Marcelo Nufable;
2. That on March 30, 1966, the said Last Will and Testament was probated by the
Honorable Court, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, and is embodied in the
same order appointing an Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify only if she
put up a necessary bond of P1,000.00;
3. That herein legitimate children prefer not to appoint an Administratrix, as
agreed upon (by) all the heirs, because they have no objection as to the manner of
disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses of the proceedings and
that they have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with
the will;
4. That the herein heirs agreed, as they hereby agree to settle the estate in
accordance with the terms and condition of the will in the following manner, to wit:
a) That the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental
remains undivided for community ownership but respecting conditions imposed
therein (sic) in the will;
xxx xxx

xxx.

(Exhs. E and E-1)

Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina
Nufable mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development Bank
of the Philippines [DBP] (Pre-trial Order, dated January 7, 1992, p. 103, Original
Records). Said mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the mortgaged
property was foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973 (id.).

On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable (who died
on August 29, 1978 [TSN, Testimony of Nelson Nufable, Hearing of August 18,
1992, p. 17]), purchased said property from DBP (Exh. 1).
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the lower court a
complaint dated July 25, 1985 To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet Title and
To Recover Damages against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silnor Nufable and his
mother Aquilina Nufable. Plaintiffs pray:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court that after trial judgment be
rendered ordering:
(a) That the said Deed of Sale (Annex C) executed by the Development Bank of
the Philippines in favor of the defendants be declared null and void as far as the three
fourths () rights which belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;
'(b) That the said three fourths () rights over the above parcel in question be
declared as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth right to each of them;
(c) To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs by way of
actual and moral damages the amount of P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as
Attorneys fees, and to pay the costs.
(d) Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and equitable. (p. 6,
Original Records)
In their Answer, defendants contend:
4. Paragraph 4 is denied, the truth being that the late Angel Nufable was the
exclusive owner of said property, that as such owner he mortgaged the same to the
Development Bank of the Philippines on March 15, 1966, that said mortgage was
foreclosed and the DBP became the successful bidder at the auction sale, that
ownership was consolidated in the name of the DBP, and that defendant Nelson
Nufable bought said property from the DBP thereafter. During this period, the
plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which were public, never filed any third
party claim nor attempted to redeem said property as redemptioners, and that said
Deed of Sale, Annex B to the complaint, is fictitious, not being supported by any
consideration; (pp. 20-21, id.)
The Deed of Sale (Annex B), referred to by the parties is a notarized Deed of Sale,
dated July 12, 1966 (marked as Exhibit H) by virtue of which, spouses Angel and

Aquilina Nufable, as vendors, sold portion of the subject property to herein

plaintiffs for and in consideration of P1,000.00 (Exh. 5).[2]
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the dispositive portion[3] of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as the
rightful co-owners of the subject property and entitled to possession of southern
portion thereof; and defendant-appellee Nelson Nufable to portion.
No award on damages.
No costs.
Defendants-appellees Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals[4] dated October 2, 1996.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the probate of

the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable, the probate thereof not being an issue
in this case;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact that the
Development Bank of the Philippines became the absolute, exclusive, legal, and
rightful owner of the land in question, from whom petitioner Nelson Nufable acquired
the same by purchase and that, therefore, no award can be made in favor of private
respondents unless and until the Development Bank of the Philippines title thereto is
first declared null and void by the court.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failed to take into
consideration the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable bequeathing the subject property to all
his four children.[5] In the present petition, petitioners present the issue of whether or not the Last
Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent probate are pertinent and material to
the question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in
question from, and as acquired property of, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for
short). They contend that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable did not
determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity

or efficacy of the provision of the will.[6] The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable,
an Order dated March 30, 1966 was issued by then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
Branch II, admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the decedent.[7] Thereafter,
on June 6, 1966, the same court approved the Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the
late Esdras Nufable wherein they agreed (T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership but respecting conditions imposed
therein (sic) in the will.[8] In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated that they have no objection as to
the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and
that they have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with the will.
Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on the
disposition of their shares. The probate court simply approved the agreement among the heirs
which approval was necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.[9]
It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the
entire property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel
Custodio with DBP, the other heirs of Esdras - namely: Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo - had
already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because of the principle
contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras
Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was
approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late
Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating that the land situated in
the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in
common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a
house therein.[10] It was therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property should remain
undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years pursuant to Article
870[11] of the Civil Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouse mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March
15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angels right over the subject
property was limited only to pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angels
right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only alienate
his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property.[12]
The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable had no right to
mortgage the subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited
only to pro indiviso share of the property in question.[13] Article 493 of the Civil Code spells
out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall
have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right
to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. As a mere
part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on
the elementary rule that no one can give what he does not have.[14]

Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by petitioners of
the subject property.[15] This being the case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a coowned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the formers
knowledge and consent[16] as in the case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of
the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted.[17]
Furthermore, the Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966 marked as Exhibit H executed by
spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor of respondents Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo
wherein the former sold, ceded and transferred back to the latter the portion of the subject
property bolsters respondents claim that there was co-ownership. Petitioner Nelson himself
claimed that he was aware of the aforesaid Deed of Sale.[18]
Anent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that the Development Bank of the
Philippines acquired ownership of the land in question through foreclosure, purchase and
consolidation of ownership. Petitioners argue that if petitioner Nelson Nufable had not bought
said land from the DBP, private respondents, in order to acquire said property, must sue said
bank for the recovery thereof, and in so doing, must allege grounds for the annulment of
documents evidencing the banks ownership thereof. Petitioners contend that since petitioner
Nelson Nufable simply bought the whole land from the bank, they cannot be deprived of the
ownership of without making any pronouncement as to the legality or illegality of the banks
ownership of said land. It is argued that there was no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity
of the banks acquisition of said land; and that neither was there a finding by the court that the
bank illegally acquired the said property.
As adverted to above, when the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had
no right to mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his pro indiviso share as the
property was subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras. Moreover, in
case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible
only if the seller can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. [19] And in one
case,[20] it was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective unless the mortgagor has title to the
property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining pro indiviso share, the same
was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto,[21] who are the private respondents
herein.
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person
and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication
of law for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise, under Article 1456 of the same Code, if
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. In the case of Noel vs. Court of Appeals,[22] this Court held that a buyer of a parcel of
land at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against a widow acquired only one-half interest on
the land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her
husband became impressed with a constructive trust in behalf of said heirs.
Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the subject
property in its name terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of property is not a means
of acquiring ownership.[23] When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of
DBP, it being the winning bidder in the public auction, DBP merely held the portion in trust

for the private respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property, he merely
stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the DBP should have been impleaded as partydefendant in the case at bar. Petitioners contend that DBP was never impleaded and that due
process requires that DBP be impleaded so that it can defend its sale to petitioner Nelson
Nufable; and that it was the duty of private respondents, and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead
the bank and ask for the annulment of documents evidencing the banks ownership of the
disputed land.
In the Rejoinder to the Reply, private respondents that the non-inclusion of DBP as a
necessary party was not questioned by petitioners from the time the Complaint was filed until
the case was finished. It was only after the adverse decision by the respondent Court of
Appeals that petitioners raised the issue.
At the outset, it should be stated that petitioners never raised this issue in their Answer and
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action, shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants; the
inclusion as a party being compulsory.[24] On the other hand, in case of proper or necessary
parties, i.e., persons who are not indispensable but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be
accorded as between those already parties, the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action
without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such persons.[25] Proper parties, therefore, have been described as parties
whose presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are
so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.[26] Any
claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.[27]
The pivotal issue to be determined is whether DBP is an indispensable party in this case.
Private respondents do not question the legality of the foreclosure of the mortgaged property
and the subsequent sale of the same to DBP. The subject property was already purchased by
petitioner Nelson from DBP and the latter, by such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to
the former. Clearly, petitioners interest in the controversy is distinct and separable from the
interest of DBP and a final determination can be had of the action despite the non-inclusion of
DBP as party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an indispensable party, did not have to be
impleaded in this case.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition
for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes v. CA

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 36955 reversing the consolidated Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Tagum, Davao del Norte in Civil Case Nos. 2326 and 2327.

This petition was originally filed with the Court on June 16, 1997. In a Resolution (of the
Third Division) dated October 13, 1997,[4] the petition was denied for failure to show that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. However, the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners on November 14, 1997 was granted by the Court in its
Resolution dated December 03, 1997[5] and the petition was reinstated.
The antecedents are:
1. Private respondent Daluyong Gabriel, (who died on September 14 1995 and was substituted
herein by his children RENATO GABRIEL, MARIA LUISA B. ESTEBAN and MARIA
RITA G. BARTOLOME) was the registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-17932 of the Registry of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte of a 5,010 square meter parcel
of land situated in Barrio Magugpo, Tagum, Davao del Norte,[6] having acquired the same by
hereditary succession sometime in 1974 as one of the children and heirs of the late Maximo
Gabriel.
2. Because Daluyong Gabriel together with his family was then residing in Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, his sister Maria Rita Gabriel de Rey acted as administratrix of the said parcel
of land and took charge of collecting the rentals for those portions which have been leased to
certain tenants/lessees. One of these lessees is LYDIA DE LOS REYES who by virtue of a
Contract of Lease executed on June 21, 1985 by and between Maria Rita G. de Rey as lessor
and Lydia de los Reyes as lessee, leased a portion of One Hundred Seventy Six (176) square
meters for a term of one year beginning June 15, 1985 renewable upon agreement of the
parties at the rental rate of Two Hundred (P200.00) pesos, per month.[7]
3. Sometime in 1985 Daluyong Gabriel sent his son Renato Gabriel to Tagum reportedly with
instructions to take over from Maria Rita G. de Rey as administrator of the said parcel of
land. Upon agreement of the parties, the June 21, 1985 Contract of Lease covering the one
hundred seventy-six square meter portion of land was novated and replaced by a Contract of
Lease executed on September 26, 1985 by and between RENATO GABRIEL as

Lessor and Lydia de los Reyes as Lessee.[8] The term of the lease was changed to six
(6) years from and after June 15, 1985 or up to June 15, 1991; receipt of the payment
in advance of the total rental amount of Fourteen Thousand Four Hundred
(P14,400.00) Pesos was acknowledged by Lessor Renato Gabriel.
4. Sometime in November 1987, during the effectivity of the lease contract, Lydia de los Reyes
verbally agreed to buy two hundred fifty (250) square meters (including the 176 square
meters leased by her), and thereafter an additional fifty (50) square meters or a total of three
hundred (300) square meters of Daluyong Gabriels registered property, at three hundred
pesos (P300.00) per square meter or for a total amount of P90,000.00. Receipt of the
payment of the purchase price made in several installments by Lydia de los Reyes was
acknowledged by Renato Gabriel as evidenced by official receipts issued and signed by him
dated November 25, 1987, November 26,1987, January 8, 1988, February 10, 1988,
February 15, 1988 and February 29, 1988 all bearing the letter head Gabriel Building. No
deed of sale was executed covering the transaction. Purchaser Lydia de los Reyes however
proceeded with the construction of a two-storey commercial building on the said 300 square
meter lot after obtaining a building permit from the Engineers Office in Tagum.
5. Acting on the information given by his daughter Maria Luisa Gabriel Esteban upon the
latters return from a trip to Tagum that spouses Claudio and Lydia de los Reyes were
constructing a two-storey building on a portion of his land, Daluyong Gabriel, through his
lawyer, sent a letter on August 30, 1989 to the De los Reyes couple demanding that they

cease and desist from continuing with their construction and to immediately vacate the
premises, asserting that the construction was unauthorized and that their occupancy of the
subject portion was not covered by any lease agreement.
6. On September 20, 1989, spouses Claudio and Lydia de los Reyes through counsel sent their
letter reply explaining that the De los Reyeses are the innocent party who entered into the
lease agreement and subsequent sale of subject portion of land in good faith and upon the
assurance made by the former administratrix, Maria Rita G. Rey, her nephew Tony Rey,
Mrs. Fe S. Gabriel and Mr. Daluyong Gabriel himself that Renato Gabriel is the new
administrator authorized to enter into such agreements involving the subject property.
7. Dissatisfied with the explanation, Daluyong Gabriel commenced an action on November 14,
1989 against spouses Claudio and Lydia de los Reyes for the recovery of the subject portion
of land before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tagum, Davao del Norte docketed as
Civil Case No. 2326. In his complaint Daluyong maintained that his son Renato was never
given the authority to lease nor to sell any portion of his land as his instruction to him
(Renato) was merely to collect rentals.
8. Spouses Claudio and Lydia delos Reyes countered that the sale to them of the subject portion
of land by Renato Gabriel was with the consent and knowledge of Daluyong, his wife Fe and
their other children, and filed before the same trial court a complaint for specific
performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 2329 against Daluyong and his children, namely
Renato Gabriel, Maria Luisa Gabriel Esteban and Maria Rita Gabriel Bartolome praying that
the defendants therein be ordered to execute the necessary deed of conveyance and other
pertinent documents for the transfer of the 300 square meter portion they previously bought
from Renato.
9. Civil Case Nos. 2326 and 2327 were heard jointly and on September 10, 1991 the trial court
rendered a consolidated decision, the dispositive portion[9] of which reads:

WHEREFORE premises considered, Daluyong Gabriel, Renato Gabriel,

Maria Luisa Esteban and Maria Rita G. Bartolome are hereby ordered to
execute a Deed of Conveyance and other necessary documents in favor of
Claudio delos Reyes and Lydia delos Reyes over an area of 300 square meters
from TCT No. T-17932 comprising of 5,010 square meters located at Tagum,
Davao which portion is presently occupied by Delos Reyes couple.
SO ORDERED
10.

On appeal by the Gabriels, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court and rendered a new one ORDERING appellee spouses Claudio
and Lydia delos Reyes to immediately vacate the 300 square meter portion of that land
covered by TCT No. T-17932 which they presently occupy and to turn over possession
thereof to the appellants. x x x x[10]

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners came to this Court by
way of petition for review, alleging that:
a. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in overlooking facts extant in the record;
b. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding the document of sale and receipts (exhibits for the
herein Petitioners), as valid and enforceable;

c. The Court of Appeals erred in its apprehension and appreciation of the undisputed facts for
the Petitioners;
d. The Court of Appeals erred in making speculative conclusions on the facts of the case;
e. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court based on
credible, relevant and material evidence adduced by the Petitioners in the lower court.[11]

Petitioners aver that respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it
totally disregarded the oral and documentary evidence adduced by appellees, and in giving
credence to the oral testimonies of appellants, which are replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions. Petitioners cite specifically Exhibits 1 to 19 consisting of a contract of lease
involving the subject property and certain official receipts with the letterhead Gabriel Building
showing payments received (by Renato Gabriel) for the lease and/or sale of portions of subject
real property of Daluyong Gabriel e.g. sale by installment of portion (700 square meters) of land
to spouses Ruben Carriedo and Abdula Sanducan (Exhs. 13, 14, 15 & 16) and lease (Exhs. 3-3BBBB, 5, 6 & 7) and sale (Exhs. 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12) of land made by Renato Gabriel to
petitioners-spouses. In other words, respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in the misapprehension and misappreciation of the facts of the case and in going beyond the
issues involved contrary to the admissions of both the appellants and appellees. And since the
appellate courts findings of facts contradict that of the trial court a thorough review thereof by
the Supreme Court is necessary.
In their Comment, private respondents restated their arguments to support the appellate
courts conclusion that the alleged sale made by Renato Gabriel to the petitioners in 1987
without authority from Daluyong Gabriel is not valid and therefore unenforceable.
Petitioners submitted their Reply to the Comment contending that the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is patently fallacious in that while petitioners payment to Renato Gabriel
of the amount of P90,000.00 as purchase price of the three hundred (300) square meter portion of
subject land was neither denied nor controverted, the appellate courts decision failed to order
private respondent Renato Gabriel to refund or reimburse petitioners the said amount together
with the value of the improvements and the two-storey commercial building which petitioners
constructed thereon in violation of Articles 2142, 2143 and 2154 of the Civil Code and the timehonored principle of substantial justice and equity.
Petitioners allege further that even if Renato Gabriel was not (yet) the owner of the subject
portion of land when he sold the same to petitioners, after the death of his parents Daluyong and
Fe Gabriel, he, as heir, inherited and succeeded to the ownership of said portion of land by
operation of law thereby rendering valid and effective the sale he executed in favor of
petitioners. Petitioners also maintain that on the basis of the facts proven and admitted during
the trial, Daluyong Gabriel appears to have not only authorized his son Renato Gabriel to sell the
subject portion of land but also ratified the transaction by his contemporaneous conduct and
actuations shown during his lifetime.
In their respective memorandum submitted by petitioners and private respondents,
substantially the same arguments/contentions were raised. Petitioners maintain that the sale is
valid or validated pursuant to Articles 1433 and 1434 of the Civil Code and identified the legal
issues involved as follows:

1. Whether or not the sale by respondent Renato Gabriel of the land registered in the name of
his deceased father Daluyong Gabriel, during the lifetime of the latter, in favor of the herein
petitioners, by operation of law, automatically vests title on the latter under the principle of
estoppel as provided for in Arts. 1433 and 1434 of the New Civil Code;
2. Whether or not the sale by Renato Gabriel of the land registered in the name of his deceased
father during the lifetime of the latter, to the herein petitioners is null and void.[12]

On the other hand, private respondents contend that the petition has no legal or factual
basis. It is argued that petitioners changed their theory of the case in that while in the regional
trial court, petitioners claim that the subject property was sold to them by the late Daluyong
Gabriel through his son Renato Gabriel, in the instant petition, they claim that it was Renato
Gabriel who sold the property to them and that although at that time, Renato was not yet the
owner of the property, he is nonetheless obligated to honor the sale and to convey the property to
the petitioners because after the death of Daluyong Gabriel, Renato became the owner of the
subject property by way of hereditary succession. According to private respondents, litigants are
barred from changing their theory, more especially so in the appeal, and that the only issue to be
resolved in the instant petition is whether or not Renato Gabriel can be compelled to convey the
subject property to petitioners. Private respondents maintain that Renato Gabriel cannot be
compelled to convey subject property (to petitioners) because the land never passed on to Renato
either before or after the death of Daluyong Gabriel and that the whole property is now owned by
Ma. Rita G. Bartolome per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68674 entered in the Registry of
Deeds of Davao del Norte on January 10, 1991.[13] In short, Renato Gabriel cannot convey that
which does not belong to him.[14]
Essentially, the issue here is whether or not the verbal agreement which petitioners entered
into with private respondent Renato Gabriel in 1987 involving the sale of the three hundred (300)
square meter portion of land registered in the name of Renatos late father Daluyong Gabriel is a
valid and enforceable contract of sale of real property.
By law[15] a contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. It is a consensual contract which is
perfected by mere consent.[16] Once perfected, the contract is generally binding in whatever form
(i.e. written or oral) it may have been entered into[17] provided the three (3) essential requisites for
its validity prescribed under Article 1318 supra, are present. Foremost of these requisites is the
consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to the contract. The legal capacity of the
parties is an essential element for the existence of the contract because it is an indispensable
condition for the existence of consent.[18] There is no effective consent in law without the
capacity to give such consent. In other words, legal consent presupposes capacity.[19] Thus, there
is said to be no consent, and consequently, no contract when the agreement is entered into by one
in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor[20] unless he has by law a
right to represent the latter.[21] It has also been held that if the vendor is not the owner of the
property at the time of the sale, the sale is null and void,[22] because a person can sell only what
he owns or is authorized to sell.[23] One exception is when a contract entered into in behalf of
another who has not authorized it, subsequently confirmed or ratified the same in which case, the
transaction becomes valid and binding against him and he is estopped to question its legality.[24]
The trial court held that the oral contract of sale was valid and enforceable stating that while
it is true that at the time of the sale, Renato Gabriel was not the owner and that it was Daluyong

Gabriel who was the registered owner of the subject property, Daluyong Gabriel knew about the
transaction and tacitly authorized his son Renato Gabriel (whom he earlier designated as
administrator of his 5,010 square meter registered property) to enter into it. The receipt by
Renato Gabriel of the P90,000.00 paid by petitioner spouses as purchase price of subject portion
of land[25] and also of the amount of P14,400.00 paid by petitioners as advance rental fee for the
lease of one hundred seventy six (176) square meters thereof, in accordance with the then still
existing Contract of Lease (Exh. 10) entered into by Renato Gabriel as Lessor and Lydia delos
Reyes as lessee on September 26 1985 which was to expire only on June 15, 1991 was also
known not only to Daluyong Gabriel but also to his late wife Fe Salazar Gabriel and his two
other children, Maria Luisa Gabriel Esteban and Maria Rita Gabriel Bartolome. And even
assuming that Daluyong Gabriel did not expressly authorize Renato Gabriel to enter into such
contract of sale with petitioners in 1988, he (Daluyong Gabriel) confirmed/ratified the same by
his contemporaneous conduct and actuations shown during his lifetime. More importantly, the
trial court noted that Daluyong never presented Renato during the entire proceedings, despite
evidence[26] which tends to show that Renato Gabriel was not missing nor were his whereabouts
unknown as Daluyong wanted to impress the trial court, but had all the while been staying at the
Daluyong Gabriel residence at 185 I. Lopez St., Mandaluyong City but was deliberately
prevented (by Daluyong) from testifying or shedding light on the transactions involved in the
two cases then at bar. Hence, the decision of the trial court ordered Daluyong Gabriel, Renato
Gabriel, Maria Luisa G. Esteban and Maria Rita G. Bartolome to execute a Deed of Conveyance
and other necessary documents in favor of petitioners covering subject area of 300 square meters
to be taken from the 5,010 square meters covered by TCT No. T-17932 under the name of
Daluyong Gabriel which portion is actually occupied by petitioners Delos Reyes couple.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that the contract of sale cannot be upheld,
mainly because Renato Gabriel, as vendor, did not have the legal capacity to enter and to give
consent to the agreement, he, being neither the authorized agent (of Daluyong Gabriel) nor the
owner of the property subject of the sale. It was pointed out that three theories were advanced by
appellees to prove that the transaction they had with Renato concerning the sale of the portion in
question was regular, valid and enforceable. First theory is that Renato acted as the duly
authorized representative or agent of Daluyong. Second, that the portion in dispute was already
given to Renato as his share, hence, he validly sold the same to appellees. And third, that the
portion being litigated was part of Renatos inheritance from the estate of her deceased mother
which he validly disposed of to appellees. These reasons, according to the appellate court,
cannot go together, or even complement each other, to establish the regularity, validity or
enforceability of the sale made by Renato. It could not be possible for Renato to have acted in
three different capacities - as agent, owner, and heir - when he dealt with appellees, as the legal
consequences for each situation would be different. Thus, it was incumbent upon appellees to
explain what actually convinced them to buy the land from Renato, and because they failed to do
so, no proper basis can be found to uphold the alleged sale made by Renato as it cannot be
determined with certainty in what capacity Renato acted. And even assuming that he (Renato)
already succeeded to whatever hereditary right or participation he may have over the estate of his
father, he is still considered a co-owner with his two sisters of the subject property and that prior
to its partition, Renato cannot validly sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the
property owned in common. Besides, the entire lot covered by TCT No. T-17932 was
subsequently donated by Daluyong Gabriel to his daughter Marie Rita G. Bartolome on October
1, 1990 and is now covered by TCT No. T-68674 in her name.[27] Hence, the appellate courts

decision ordered appellees (petitioners) spouses Claudio and Lydia delos Reyes to immediately
vacate the 300 square meter portion of that land covered by TCT No. T-17932 which they are
occupying and to turn-over possession thereof to the appellants, private respondents herein.
As a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court.[28] When such findings of fact are the same and confirmatory of those of the trial court,
they are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal,[29] In such cases, the authority
of the Supreme Court is confined to correcting errors of law, if any, that might have been
committed below.[30] In the instant case, it is noted that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are not at variance in their factual findings that sometime in 1988, an oral contract of sale was
entered into by Renato Gabriel, (as vendor) with petitioners De los Reyes couple (as vendees)
involving a 300 square meter portion of a 5,010 square meter parcel of land located in Barrio
Magugpo, Tagum, Davao del Norte owned and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-17932 in the name of Daluyong Gabriel, father of Renato. Thus, this Court is tasked to review
and determine whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law[31] in its
legal conclusion that at the time the parties entered into said oral agreement of sale, Renato
Gabriel as the purported vendor, did not have the legal capacity to enter and/or to give consent to
the sale.
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Renato Gabriel was neither the
owner of the subject property nor a duly designated agent of the registered owner (Daluyong
Gabriel) authorized to sell subject property in his behalf, and there was also no sufficient
evidence adduced to show that Daluyong Gabriel subsequently ratified Renatos act. In this
connection it must be pointed out that pursuant to Article 1874 of the Civil Code, when the sale
of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing; otherwise the sale shall be void. In other words, for want of capacity (to give consent)
on the part of Renato Gabriel, the oral contract of sale lacks one of the essential requisites for its
validity prescribed under Article 1318, supra and is therefore null and void ab initio.
Petitioners contention that although at the time of the alleged sale, Renato Gabriel was not
yet the owner of the subject portion of land, after the death of Daluyong Gabriel, he (Renato)
became the owner and acquired title thereto by way of hereditary succession which title passed
by operation of law to petitioners pursuant to Article 1434 of the Civil Code[32] is not
tenable. Records show that on October 1, 1990 Daluyong Gabriel donated the entire lot covered
by TCT No. T-17932 to his daughter Maria Rita G. Bartolome and the property is now covered
by TCT No. T-68674 in her name. This means that when Daluyong Gabriel died on September
14, 1995, he was no longer the owner of the subject property. Accordingly, Renato Gabriel never
acquired ownership or title over any portion of said property as one of the heirs of Daluyong
Gabriel.
However, respondent Court of Appeals failed to consider the undisputed fact pointed out by
the trial court that petitioners had already performed their obligation under subject oral contract
of sale, i.e. completing their payment of P90,000.00 representing the purchase price of the 300
square meter portion of land. As was held in Nool vs. Court of Appeals[33] if a void contract
has been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in order. The relationship between
parties in any contract even if subsequently voided must always be characterized and punctuated
by good faith and fair dealing.[34] Hence, for the sake of justice and equity, and in consonance
with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense,[35] private respondent Renato

Gabriel, should be ordered to refund to petitioners the amount of P90,000.00 which they have
paid to and receipt of which was duly acknowledged by him. It is the policy of the Court to
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation especially where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it and where the ends of justice would not likely be subserved by the
remand thereof, to the lower Court. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even those not raised on appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just disposition of the case.[36]
However, petitioners claim for the refund to them of P1,000,000.00 representing the alleged
value and cost of the two-storey commercial building they constructed on subject portion of land
cannot be favorably considered as no sufficient evidence was adduced to prove and establish the
same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 36955 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it declared the oral contract of sale entered into by
Renato Gabriel of portion of the 5,010 square meter parcel of land registered in the name of
Daluyong Gabriel in favor of petitioners, null and void. Renato Gabriel is hereby ordered to
refund to petitioners the amount of P90,000.00 which was given in payment for subject land. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Postigo vs. Borjal
1. WILLS; INTERPRETATION OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS. It is a rule uniformly laid down by the
courts that the will of the testator is the primary and principal law governing wills and testamentary
dispositions of property, and when the provisions are clearly and positively stated, questions arising in the
courts in connection with the execution of and compliance therewith shall be adjusted in harmony with the
plain and literal meaning of the language of the testator, except where it clearly appears that his intention
was other than that actually expressed. (Art. 675, Civil Code.)
2. ID.; DUTY OF EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY. One of the duties of
the executor is to administer all such property as may come into his possession, according to the will of the
testator, and such property shall be distributed in accordance with the will after the hereditary debts and the
expenses incurred in the administration of the property have been paid.
3. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF CREDITS DOES NOT AFFECT EXPRESSED WILL OF TESTATOR. The extinction of
the obligations against an estate can not produce a modification of the will, nor cause the testamentary
provisions to be interpreted to mean other than what is stated in the will.
4. ID.; WIDOWS USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS. The validity and efficiency of the usufruct bequeathed to a
widow, who is at the same time executrix of the testator, is not incompatible with the provisions of section
695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because, apart from the obligation imposed by the testator upon his wife
in the matter of the payment of his debts, with which obligation she was unable to comply inasmuch as no
creditor presented himself, there still exists the order or request that she should retain the property
bequeathed in her possession for four years, and there is no valid reason why the will of the testator should
not be complied with.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On the 2d of September, 1903, Enrique Borjal executed his will and testament, of which the following
extract is pertinent to this issue:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"I hereby declare that I have been married to Doa Ambrosia Postigo for nearly twenty-five years, and that
we have had no issue during our marriage. I also declare that all our property, with the exception of two
parcels of land in the sitio of Caraycayon Gignaroy was acquired during marriage. The first of these parcels
is bounded on the north by the great River Baraton (here follows the description); the second, or that of
Gignaroy, is bounded on the north (description follows). All of said property shall be administered by my
wife for the space of four years in order to satisfy all of our debts, particularly that due to Don Domingo
Monasterio. At the expiration of the four years my wife shall transfer the parcels in Gignaroy which extend
from the great River Barayon down to the Arroyo de Gignaroy (description follows) to my sisters Dolores
Borjal."
cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

On the 26th of November, 1904, the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines appointed commissioners
to appraise the property of the deceased. They submitted to the court their report on the 30th of October,
1905, stating that they took the oath of office before the justice of the peace of Tigaon and immediately
proceeded to assess the property presented by the administratrix of the estate. At the same time they
published notices summoning all creditors who had claims against the said property and fixed the 15th and
30th day of each month for the hearing of claims. The first hearing by the commissioners took place on the
30th of December, 1904; successive ones were held on the 15th and 30th of each month from January to
October, 1905, but no claims whatever were presented by the creditors of the said estate of the late Enrique
Borjal.
The court below, on the 9th of July, 1906, thereupon approved the partition of the hereditary property made
by said commissioners in all of its parts, and ordered that the latter place Dolores Borjal in possession of
that portion of the inheritance corresponding to her without the necessity of waiting for the four years
stipulated in the will. To this end the court ordered that a formal deed of transfer be made out and
forwarded to the court in order that it might be included in the proceedings; that a certified copy of the deed
of transfer be also sent to the registrar of property in compliance with law; that the fees of the
commissioners appointed by the court be charged in equal parts to both inheritances, and that the bond
given by the executrix be canceled.
From said decision the latter appealed, and after giving bond for P500 he appeal was admitted and
forwarded to this court.
All debts that might be outstanding against the estate of the late Enrique Borjal having been held to be
barred by reason of their not being presented for collection within the period fixed for the purpose by the
duly appointed commissioners, the question at issue and presented to this court is whether the clause which
provided for the retention by the widow of the property which the deceased willed to his sister, Dolores
Borjal, may be considered as set aside, and the usufruct of the said property bequeathed to his widow,
Ambrosia Postigo, for the period of four years from the death of the testator for the purposes of meeting the
debts of the estate, particularly that owing to Domingo Monasterio, should be considered as having
terminated.
A rule that is uniformly laid down by the courts is, that the will of the testator is the primary and principal
law governing wills and testaments, and when the testamentary provisions are clearly and positively stated,
questions arising in the courts in connection with the execution of and compliance therewith shall be
adjusted in harmony with the plain and literal meaning of the language of the testator, except where it
clearly appears that his intention was other than that actually expressed. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of May 24, 1882; October 13, 1896; October 8, 1902.)
The above legal doctrine already constitutes a uniform settled rule and is in accord with the conclusive
provision of article 675 of the Civil Code which reads:
jgc:cha nrob les.com .ph

"Every testamentary provision shall be understood in the literal meaning of its words, unless it clearly
appears that the will of the testator was different. In case of doubt, that which appears most in accordance
with the intention of the testator, according to the tenor of the same will, shall be observed."
cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

Section 640 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, among other things, that after payment of the debts
and of the expenses of administration, the property of the testator shall be disposed of according to his will;

and section 643 of said code when enumerating the duties of an executor states that one of them is to
administer all property coming into his possession according to the will of the testator.
The testator bequeathed to his widow the usufruct of two parcels of land for the period of four years, in
order that she might meet the debts of her husband. Consequently, the circumstance that outstanding debts
of the said estate were declared to be barred, owing to the failure of the various creditors and especially of
the one named in the will, to appear within the time specified by the commissioners, is no valid reason for
shortening the period fixed in the will within which the usufruct should accrue to the widow and executrix.
The barring of the debts of the estate can not effect a modification of the will, nor cause the testamentary
provision of the testator to be interpreted as meaning anything but that stated in his will.
Clearly and precisely the testator provided as his last will that his said wife should administer the said
parcels of land for four years, in order that she might pay his debts. The fact that no creditor ever appeared
to collect them is no reason why the widow and executrix should be deprived of the usufruct of said
properties before the lapse of the said four years. Such deprivation would be in violation of the special law
that governs the matter, that is, the will of the testator, by which his property must be administered,
according to the legal provisions and settled rules hereinbefore cited.
The validity and efficiency of the usufruct bequeathed to the widow and executrix of the testator is not
incompatible with the provisions of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because apart from the
obligation imposed by the testator upon his wife in the matte of the payment of his debts, which obligation
she was unable to fulfill inasmuch as no creditor presented himself, there exists the order or request that
she should retain the said lands in her possession for four years, and there is no valid reason why the will of
the testator should not be complied with and the land be delivered to Dolores Borjal at the expiration of said
four years.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed,
and that it be held, as we do hereby hold, that Ambrosia Postigo is entitled to possession and to administer
for the period of four years, from the death of the testator, the two parcels of land and that Dolores Borjal
can not take possession thereof until after the lease of the said term. No special ruling is made as to the
costs in either instance.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
WILLARD, J., concurring:

chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

I concur in the result on the ground that this case falls within the provisions of article 797 of the Civil Code,
and of the decisions entered in the matters of Chiong Joc-Soy v. Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), and Fuestes v.
Canon (6 Phil. Rep., 117).

Vda. De Villanueva v. Juico

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

4 SCRA 550
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina of all his real and personal properties
giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widows
death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7
pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of
Dona Faustina.
HELD:
The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife
Doa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if
she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the
deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon
her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are
not included in her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the
intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to
Doa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership
should belong to Doa Fausta without mentioning any condition.
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which
he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en
prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .

OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su
uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a
ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted
a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the
probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership
and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said
project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh.
"C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la
clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled
in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the
widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the
widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of
his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is
evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the
full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
1wph1.t

SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words
"uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words,
which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following:
.
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo
voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha
menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no

ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had
been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting
and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ.,
concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.
Rodriguez v. CA
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL TO ATTACK CORPORATION
COLLATERALLY. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few
exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral
attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither
a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally
or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including
the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.
2. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPALITY IN QUESTION IS NOT A DE FACTO CORPORATION. In the cases where a de
facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid
law giving corporate validity to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan
was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto
corporation, as, independently of Section 68 of the Administrative Code, there is no other valid statute to
give color of authority to its creation.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NULLITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER CREATING MUNICIPALITY UPON ACTS THEREOF
BEFORE DECLARATION OF NULLITY. Executive Order 386 creating the municipality in question is a nullity
pursuant to the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. The executive
order therefore "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of
Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive Order
386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." There is then no basis for the respondents
apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of
unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

A will is the testator speaking after death. 1 The law listens and yields obedience, unless in the preparation
thereof or in the disposition made therein there is a failure to follow a legal norm. In the present suit, there
was none as to the formalities required, the will in question having been probated on September 23, 1960.
As to its intrinsic validity, there apparently was none either as shown by the project of partition having been
approved by the lower court, again, without opposition.
As more specifically set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals of January 18, 1967, the
reconsideration of which after about a year, to be more precise, on January 8, 1968, led to this petition
for certiorari: "It appears from the record that Doa Margarita Rodriguez died in the City of Manila on July
19, 1960, leaving a last will and testament under date of September 30, 1951 and that said last will and
testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila under
date of September 23, 1960, without the appellants opposition in Special Proceeding No. 3845, hence the
extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in question. On August 27, 1962, the executor of the last
will and testament of the late Doa Margarita Rodriguez presented a project of partition and the same was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without the opposition of the appellants. Hence, the
intrinsic validity of the will could never be again questioned and raised as issue in the trusteeship
proceedings No. 51872 of the same court." 2
One would expect, therefore, that the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals would write finis to this
litigation. Unfortunately, it was not so. It ought not to have been the case, for, as admitted, the deceased,
to quote from the language of the January 18, 1967 decision of the Court of Appeals, "at the time of her
death left no compulsory heirs or forced heirs and, consequently, [was] free to dispose of her properties
even to strangers at will as provided in her will." 3 It was likewise noted therein that the testatrix created a
trust which was objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first cousins of the deceased. Such
an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were
the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower court was appealed by respondent to the Court of
Appeals, which, in the original decision of January 18, 1967, affirmed the action taken by the Court of First
Instance.
A motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution of January 8, 1968, which
set aside its previous decision of January 18, 1967 and modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the
validity of the provision of clause 10 of the will creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause
reads thus:" [Clausula Decima O Pang Sampu]. Ipinaguutos ko na ang mga pag-aaring nasasabi sa
Clausulang ito ay pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang ipagbubukas ng Fideicomiso sa
Juzgado pagkatapos na maayos ang naiwanan kong pag-aari. Ang pangangasiwaang pag-aari ay ang mga
sumusunod: . . . Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang generator at
automobile) hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard,
Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng panibago at
alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon." 4
In the resolution setting aside the original decision of January 18, 1967, the Court of Appeals held that the
above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a clear violation of Article 867
and Article 870 of the Civil Code. It was further stated in the aforesaid resolution that the Court of Appeals
did arrive "at the considered view that the trust in question is a nullity for being in violation of the
aforestated rules (against perpetuities and the limitation regarding the inalienability of the hereditary
estate)." 5 There being then no institution of heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court
of Appeals held that "there should be intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative of
the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law on intestacy. The case should,
therefore, be remanded to the lower court." 6 Hence this petition for certiorari to review the aforesaid
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The validity of the above clause was not passed upon in the decision of January 18, 1967 of the Court of
Appeals; rather, it was assumed. The view that then prevailed was that the approval of the project of
partition sufficed to dispose of that question. The challenged resolution of January 8, 1968 betrayed a
change of heart of the Court of Appeals. It explained why: "The contention of [petitioner] that there had
already been a project partition approved by the lower court [which] operates as a waiver on the part of the
[respondents] to raise the issue of the invalidity of the questioned provision of the will which We have

sustained in our decision, seems to be not well taken. We have discovered from the records that the
properties involved in this case have not been disposed of as yet and are still within the reach of the probate
court. The necessary procedure, therefore, in accordance with the law as delineated in the above discussion,
should be observed. The order of the lower court granting the petition for the formation of the trust in
question should be annulled as being in violation of the rules against perpetuities and the limitation on the
prohibition for the alienation of the property left by the deceased." 7
We will not deviate from the approach thus taken by the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution of
January 8, 1968, but We differ in our conclusion. We find the clause, at least insofar as the first twenty-year
period is concerned, in accordance with the Civil Code provision. 8 Accordingly, we find for petitioners and
reverse the Court of Appeals.
The validity of the clause in question if interpreted to conform to the controlling legal norm prescribed by the
Civil Code cannot be assailed. If the January 18, 1967 decision of the Court of Appeals were to be modified,
it is only in the above sense. The reconsideration, as was done in the challenged resolution, which would
have the effect of partial intestacy, was uncalled for.
It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make clear her purpose not to
mortgage or to sell forevermore (kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some
justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny force and effect to such a wish
considering that "a perpetual prohibition to alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. 9 The more controlling
provision, however, as already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are
void."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is declared void is the
testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a provision
does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. Time and time again, We have said,
and We now repeat, that when a legal provision is clear and to the point, there is no room for interpretation.
It must be applied according to its literal terms. 10
Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as unequivocal, still the same conclusion
emerges. There is no room for intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged resolution of January 8,
1968 were not set aside. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect. This is
so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the
language of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case
of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred." 11 Nor is this all.
A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for observance. Thus: "The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." 12 The net result would be to reaffirm the conclusion reached that the challenged resolution of
January 8, 1968 is objectionable, in view of its lack of fidelity to the controlling legal norms.
In no other way can there be deference paid to what the testator had in mind. This Court so emphatically
expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years ago. Thus: "Respect for the will of a testator as
expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law
prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and provisions therein
written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real purpose. The will of
the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among
the parties in interest. Such is the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of Spain, constantly
maintained in a great number of decisions, among which are those of March 24, 1863, April 28, 1882, and
December 16, 1903." 13
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail that We could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. Thus:
"Where the testators intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but is
obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention,
and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict wording
and read a word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such
purpose may would or change the language of the will, such as restricting its application or supplying
omitted words or phrases." 14

A more recent reiteration of such an attitude is found in an opinion by former Chief Justice Paras. Thus: "As
a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapaa in leaving her properties to
the person named in the will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the
trial court itself found the will to have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our duty to give
expression to her will." 15
What further fortifies the view taken by Us is the admitted fact, as was expressed in the January 18, 1967
decision of the Court of Appeals that at the time of her death the deceased "left no compulsory heirs or
forced heirs and, consequently, free to dispose of her properties even to strangers . . . as provided in her
will." 16 That is what she did and petitioners have no valid cause for complaint, at least not one cognizable
in a court of justice.
As we had occasion to state: "Though it might appear right that Amando Clemente should receive something
from the estate because he, together with Ariston Bustamante, has been raised by the testatrix, and both
are her relatives, nevertheless it would be venturesome for us to advance our own idea of a just distribution
of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the later
will. As she had no forcible heirs, she was absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she chose,
subject of course to the payment of her debts. It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the
interpretation of a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a
deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the deceased
as manifested in the will. Once that intention has been determined through a careful reading of the will or
wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to
inquire into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest. It might be said that it is hard to understand
how, in a temporary anger at Amando Clemente, the testatrix would entirely cut him off from the
inheritance. We should not, however, sit in judgment upon her motives and sentiments, first because, as
already stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired,
and secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward processes of her conscience.
She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty." 17
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in question. It had
no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would
transpire thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell.
At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause
of action to a party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 8, 1968 of the Court of Appeals is set aside, thus leaving in full force
and effect its decision of January 18, 1967, which affirmed the lower court order of May 11, 1964. With
costs against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Capistrano, J., did not take part.