Comparative Political Studies-2010-Gumuscu-835-61 PDF

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Political Studies
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Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in

Turkey and Egypt
Sebnem Gumuscu
Comparative Political Studies 2010 43: 835 originally published online 26
February 2010
DOI: 10.1177/0010414010361341
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Class, Status, and

Party: The Changing
Face of Political Islam
in Turkey and Egypt
Comparative Political Studies

43(7) 835861
The Author(s) 2010
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sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010414010361341
http://cps.sagepub.com
Sebnem Gumuscu1
Abstract
This article argues that socioeconomic changes within Islamist constituencies
are critical parts of understanding of how moderate Islamists emerge and
succeed. The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have
generated different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these two
countries. Economic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal
role in transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of a
strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy.
With the growing support of this rising devout bourgeoisie, the moderate
Islamists managed to transform Islamism into a democratic conservative
party. In Egypt, in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reform
prevented the formation of as strong and independent a devout bourgeoisie
that could be assertive in political Islam. Instead, the lower-middle-class
professionals, losers of reform, populated the Islamist constituency and
entrenched Islamism in ideological positions rather than pragmatism. This
ultimately led to the marginalization of the moderates in Egypt.
Keywords
Islamist moderation, devout bourgeoisie, economic reform, Justice and
Development Party, Muslim Brotherhood
1
University of Virginia, Charlottesville,VA
Corresponding Author:
Sebnem Gumuscu, University of Virginia, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, P.O. Box
400787, Charlottesville,VA 22904-4787
Email:sg6d@virginia.edu
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Comparative Political Studies 43(7)
Can Islamic political parties undergo fundamental change? Under what

conditions do they go beyond strategic participation in legal politics and
internalize the principles of democracy? During the 1990s in Turkey and
Egypt, groups within political Islamic movements shifted to the center of
the political spectrum where they assumed a moderate role and adhered to
democratic principles.1 Although moderates within each movement became
increasingly visible in both countries, only in Turkey did they successfully
transform the Islamist party into a centrist conservative party, Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party). In Egypt moderates failed to transform the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the party they
established, Wasat (Center), became a marginalized actor of Islamic activism in Egypt.2
Why did the Turkish Islamists succeed in marginalizing radicals and
moderating political Islam whereas their Egyptian counterparts failed and
got marginalized? Existing explanations based on inclusion, political learning, and repression cannot sufficiently address the complexity of moderation.
I contend that the socioeconomic changes are important factors that facilitate
a better understanding of belated moderation in Turkey and partial moderation in Egypt. In that respect, the ways in which economic liberalization
affected the Islamist constituency in Turkey and Egypt complement the existing explanations of the evolution of Islamism in these countries.
This article first assesses the extant explanations of moderation in the literature. The following section introduces the main argument in comparative
perspective. In the third section, the article lays down the details of Turkish
economic liberalization, how it affects the political Islamic constituency, and
the consequences for Islamism. In the final section, the article analyzes the
partial economic liberalization in Egypt, its effects on business classes and
professionals, and the implications for political Islamic movements.
Alternative Explanations of Islamist Moderation

Some scholars contend that institutional change can bring about substantive
changes in Islamic parties (Robinson, 1997; Schwedler, 2006). Labeled as
the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this approach suggests that during
periods of political liberalization radical political parties face a trade-off
between radicalism and inclusion, which requires them to moderate if they
are to be included in the legal political system (Huntington, 1991). Accordingly, when Islamists face a similar trade-off, they decide to partake in legal
politics and accept the rules of democratic politics, which signifies a tactical
change. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis anticipates that after this initial
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tactical adjustment an eventual ideological change will occur. This expectation, however, is theoretically underspecified and empirically unfounded for
the causal links between inclusion and ideological moderation are unclear,
and empirical studies reveal that rarely does inclusion induce ideological
moderation (Schwedler, 2006).
Other scholars highlight the importance of political learning. The political learning thesis emphasizes that political experience at the individual
level changes perceptions of democracy in a way that makes democratic participation more attractive (Bermeo, 1992; Wickham, 2004). Because political
learning is confined to the individual level, the thesis is not well suited to
addressing how individual experiences diffuse and shape group decisions.
That is, it cannot explain how change at the individual level translates into
broader changes at the party level.
Neither the inclusion-moderation thesis nor the political learning thesis can
solve the puzzle that Turkey and Egypt pose. Turkish Islamic parties opted for
inclusion in the democratic politics in 1970, but they showed no sign of ideological moderation until late 1990s. Likewise, in Egypt the MB participated in
parliamentary elections and established electoral alliances with rivals, yet this
experience has not induced an overall moderation. Therefore, inclusion is not a
good predictor of the timing of ideological moderation, suggesting that there
might be other factors beside inclusion that induce moderation. The political
learning thesis, on the other hand, might be a compelling argument for moderation of some Muslim Brothers, but it cannot explain why they failed to appeal
to a greater audience within the ranks of the MB. Likewise, the political learning thesis cannot fully explicate the reasons why groups within Turkish political
Islam emerged with diverging levels of moderation despite the fact that they
had similar political experiences. Finally, even if it was political learning that
induced moderation in Turkey, the mechanisms of diffusion of such individualbased political experience are unclear.
Alternatively, one could consider the history of militant Islamism in Egypt
and lack thereof in Turkey as a factor explaining the diverging outcomes in
these two cases. Although militant Islamists performed violent acts in 1970s
and 1990s, the MB denounced violent means of achieving an Islamic state
and society as early as the late 1960s when Supreme Guide Hudaybi (1977)
penned Preachers, not Judges in response to Qutbian radicalism. That is,
the MB like the Turkish Islamist parties preferred nonviolent means and
working through the system to Islamize the society and the state. Moreover,
militant Islamism never appealed to as wide a following as the MB, which
remained the dominant actor in Egyptian political Islam. Finally, militant
Islamist groups were increasingly marginalized following the states heavy
838
crackdown in the mid-1990s, and recently some militant groups called for
revision of violent means employed in attaining political goals.
Despite the similarity in strategies, Turkish Islamist parties enjoyed legal
status, whereas the MB remained an illegal organization since 1950s. The
MBs illegality, however, did not prevent them from running in parliamentary elections in alliance with other parties in the 1980s or as independents
since the 1990s and overtaking the professional associations in the early
1990s when the state accommodated the brotherhood. Illegality, however,
has been a handicap for the MB whenever the state resorted to it as an excuse
for intermittent repression. Yet again, legal status of Turkish Islamist parties
has been no guarantee against the wrath of the secular state establishment.
This has been manifest in party closure or political bans on its leaders, particularly when Islamists make their goals of Islamization of state and society
more explicit.3 In other words, the relationship between Islamists and the
state in both Turkey and Egypt is one of antagonism, and the difference in
legal status does not generate as wide a gap to adequately explain the different developments in political Islam.
The common trend of state repression observed in both cases cannot sufficiently address the differing scales of moderation in these countries either.
If it was states repression that induced moderation in Turkey, why has it not
generated moderation in Egypt where Islamists suffered in greater scale and
frequency compared to their Turkish counterparts? Again, why did it take
four different parties in three decades, all closed down by the Constitutional
Court, for Turkish Islamists to realize that the state would not allow them to
pursue Islamism? Therefore, state repression is insufficient in explaining the
timing of moderation. Likewise, it fails to explain why groups within political Islam adopt differing levels of moderation. In the February 28th process,
the secular Turkish state establishment cracked down on Islamists who in
turn adopted differing degrees of moderation that culminated in two different
political parties, the AKP and Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party) emerging
out of the Milli Gorus (MG, National Outlook) movement. To put it differently, repression might induce strategic change and introduce schisms within
Islamist movements, but it is insufficient to explain how exactly strategic
change turns into ideological moderation.
A fuller explanation of moderation requires specification of conditions
under which moderates overcome the resistance of the hardliners and replace
the authoritarian perception of Islam with that of liberal understanding.
Building on Bayats (2007) contention that change occurs when liberal and
democratic understanding of Islam is voiced by a powerful group within the
broader Islamist coalition, this article argues that developments that distribute
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power among parts of the Islamist constituency are critical in detecting these
conditions. Economic liberalization has been one such development that has
not only distributed power among components of Islamist coalition but also
generated an elective affinity between the most powerful group and a liberal
perception of Islam through novel articulations of Islam and its relations with
economy, politics, and society.
Economic Liberalization and

Its Effects on Class, Status, and Party
Political Islam is a movement that binds individuals at very different levels
of the social strata in a cross-class alliance by bringing forth the Islamic identity and appealing to religious sentiments (Onis, 1997, p. 748). This does not
necessarily imply that class interests are absent in these alliances (Tugal,
2002). In fact, different social classes join together for different goals and
ideals under the umbrella of Islamist politics (Gulalp, 2001). Economic
liberalization had diverging economic and political consequences for the
constituencies of political Islam in Turkey and Egypt. Although economic
reforms reduced state employment, shrank budgets, and privatized social services to the detriment of the middle- and lower-class professionals and wage
labor in both countries, implementation of an export-oriented economic program in Turkey facilitated the emergence of a strong devout bourgeoisie.
Egypts liberalization, in contrast, was limited to the financial and commercial sectors, and its beneficiaries were a narrow range of carefully selected
clients who remained dependent on the state.
In Turkey, economic liberalization provided opportunities to provincial
entrepreneurs that were previously excluded from the benefits of the import
substitution regime. As this provincial bourgeoisie began to prosper, it became
a force for pragmatism. Although their power grew within the Islamist coalition with their increasing financial and organizational strength, the power of
the losers of economic reformthe professional and lower classesdeclined
(Tugal, 2002). State retreat from economic activities and social services in
favor of the private sector further contributed to the strength of the devout
bourgeoisie that heavily invested in education, health, and media where the
losers within the Islamist constituency turned for employment, social services, and schooling (Yavuz, 2003a).
As the provincial entrepreneurs enjoyed economic growth and new lifestyles, they fused their religious piety with capitalist activity to build a new
class identity around relations of production, consumption, and religious
devotion.4 The devout bourgeoisie came to embody a new Weberian status
840
group with a distinct lifestyle and monopolized practices (Gerth & Mills,
1946) manifested in new customs of veiling, fasting, and Islamic vacationing.
The changes in economic class and social status led to changes in political
preferences of the devout bourgeoisie, creating an elective affinity between
the new bourgeois class and pragmatic politics that moderates advocate, for
ideological politics of Islamism, which the provincial entrepreneurs supported
throughout the 1970s, became increasingly costly over 1990s when the devout
bourgeoisie started to make extensive long- and short-term investments.
The new devout bourgeoisie hence emerged as a natural ally for moderate
Islamists in creating a new political identity that fuses religiosity and rights, faith
and freedom, and marries Islam with democracy and modernity (Bayat, 2007,
p. 11). Defense of this new economic and political identity was possible through
pragmatism and moderation in political tone and consolidation of liberal economy and democracy, which would strengthen the devout bourgeoisie vis--vis
the agents of the secular state led by the military. Increasing predominance of the
new devout bourgeoisie within the Islamist constituency strengthened the moderate forces within Turkish Islamism at the expense of the hard-liners.5
In Egypt, on the other hand, economic liberalization favored financial and
commercial sectors over manufacturing. It benefited big businesses more
than small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and it did not promote the integration of Islamic business with markets. And the states continuing presence
in the economy contributed to the heavy dependence of big business, secular
and devout alike, on the state for the continuing flow of profits. This led to
a weak presence of the devout bourgeoisie in politics. Instead, new middle
classes formed the main pillar of Islamist constituency. Economic liberalization in Egypt curtailed the states social welfare role and privatized welfare
services. Private voluntary associations and charity organizations filled the gap
left by the retreat of the state. Established by and serving the new middle
classes, these organizations entrenched the middle classs commitment to political Islam, and they enhanced its power relative to other social groups. This
Islamic parallel sector has come to represent an alternative vision of an Islamic
state that offers an alternative to sacrifices of economic liberalization. Though
this ideological project was attractive to the new middle classes, it was devoid
of the pragmatism that was essential to the incorporation of bourgeoisie in
Turkeys more moderate political Islam.
Turkish Economic Liberalization

and Emergence of Devout Bourgeoisie
The Turkish government abandoned an import substitution industrialization
model and switched to economic liberalism in January 1980 as a response to
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the current account imbalance and debt crises, which emerged as a result of
internal inability to adjust to the oil shocks of the 1970s (Rodrik, 1999).
Turkish economic reform sought macroeconomic stabilization, outward orientation through export promotion, and trade liberalization. The government
deregulated key relative prices such as the real exchange rate, real wages, and
interest rates.
As part of a broader structural reform, the government aimed at expansion
of export-oriented private sector. To initiate an export drive, the government
substantially devalued Turkish lira by 100% between 1980 and 1988. Tax
rebates, credit subsidies, and duty-free imports for exportables production
accompanied devaluation of the currency (Celasun & Rodrik, 1989, p. 668).
Finally, the income policy reduced the labor cost for manufacturers by 1.6%
annually from 1980 to 1988 (Odekon, 1992, p. 159). These policies bore
fruit when the total value of exports reached $13 billion in 1990 from a mere
$2.3 billion in 1979.6 The share of the manufactured goods in total exports
reached 78% in 1991, whereas the exports market diversified as Turkish goods
penetrated the new markets in the Middle East (Saracoglu, 1994, p. 71).
As the Turkish economy underwent a significant transformation, SMEs
in Anatolia gradually integrated with international markets in the 1990s
through buyer-driven commodity chains that emerged in the production of
labor-intensive consumer goods such as garments, housewares, and furniture (Gereffi, 1995, p. 116). This global post-Fordist production system
benefited small-scale manufacturers because they had flexible and laborintensive production systems that could easily integrate with global chains of
production through subcontracting. Thus, the benefits of liberalization trickled down to the provinces of Anatolia in the 1990s.
The establishment of the Association of Independent Industrialists and
Businessmen (MUSIAD) in 1990 facilitated these developments. Unlike
Istanbul-based, secular TUSIAD, MUSIAD represented SMEs based in
Istanbul and Anatolian provinces and pronounced its attachment to religious
and traditional values (Bugra, 1998). MUSIAD served as a catalyzer for
international integration for provincial entrepreneurs by facilitating the discovery of benefits of trade in its trips to several countries in Europe, Central
Asia, East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, its international fairs
where MUSIAD members could establish new connections with actors in
the global market, and its booklets and journals on a wide range of issues
pertaining to macro- and microeconomic developments.7 Thus, MUSIAD
substantially reduced the cost of information for devout businesses and rendered their integration with the global market easier.
As MUSIAD contributed to the development of devout bourgeoisie in
Turkey, it experienced substantial growth in size and power. The association
842
was founded in 1990 with 12 members and opened offices in 28 cities and
registered over 2,000 members over the course of 10 years. MUSIADs fastest
growing branches were located in cities with improving records of exports in
the postliberalization period. The relation between liberalization and growth
of MUSIAD is revealed in the fact that 1,330 of 1,776 MUSIAD member
companies as of 1995 were established after 1980. Many of these companies
engage in foreign trade and manufacturing in traditional export sectors (Bugra,
1999). A closer look at one of the bastions of devout bourgeoisie provides
further detail regarding the dynamics of change in Anatolia.
Konya: An Emerging Bastion

of the Devout Bourgeoisie
Konya is a central Anatolian city, famous for its conservative and pious
inhabitants. It hosts the largest MUSIAD branch after Istanbul. Konya has
been a site of phenomenal economic growth in the aftermath of liberalization. GDP per capita in Konya has increased to $2,241 in 2000 from $1,300
in 1987 while the citys population has increased 25% in the same period.
The change in the membership of the Konya Chamber of Commerce tells
more about the flourishing economic activity in the city. There were
14,279 members in the chamber in 1994, 19,366 in 1999, and 20,734 in
2007 (Arabaci, 2007, p. 29). The number of stock companies and limited
liability partnerships increased considerably during this period, pointing at
the growing size and financial power of the firms. The number of stock corporations was 539 in 1988, 740 in 1994, and 1,505 in 1999. Limited liability
partnerships totaled 360 in 1988, 2,347 in 1994, and 7,603 in 1999 (Arabaci,
2007, p. 29). The volume of exported goods produced in Konya has also
substantially increased over the years. The number of exporting companies
has doubled since 2001, whereas the value of their total exports quadrupled.
According to a survey conducted by the Konya Chamber of Industry, 64% of
industrialists (including subcontractors) in Konya export their products. Of
all exports, 60% goes to European countries, whereas the remaining 40%
goes to North Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America.8
As Konyas economy grew, so did the power of Konya MUSIAD. Selcuk
Ozturk, the current chairman, estimates that members of MUSIADs branch
in Konya control 30% of Konyas economy.9 MUSIAD members dominate
the boards of Konyas chambers of commerce and industry, with nine board
members in the Chamber of Industry and five board members in the Chamber
of Commerce. When asked about the causes of their economic success, several Konya MUSIAD members highlight the critical role MUSIAD played in
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their integration with global markets, along with Ozals liberal economic
policies that changed their business prospects by showing new opportunities
in the domestic and international markets. However, the change that the
devout entrepreneurs experienced was not confined to the economic sphere
alone. These achievements triggered a significant transformation of lifestyles
and Islams role in everyday life.
Embourgeoisement of the Devout Bourgeoisie

New consumerism, which constituted an inalienable part of economic and cultural globalization, started to affect the emerging devout entrepreneurs in the
1990s through the inflow of imports, novel trade relations, and new private
media. Consumerism presented a grave challenge to devout Muslims for it
fundamentally opposed the Islamic principles of modesty and frugality. Nevertheless, Muslims experienced a change in their consumption patterns facilitated
by marketing and advertising in Islamic media, changes in spiritual and intellectual values, and reconfiguration of space and class (Robbins, 2005, p. 16).
Devout businessmen substantially increased their power in the media
through the Islamic television stations and newspapers they established over
the 1990s. These Islamic media channels constituted the primary means of
marketing and advertising new Islamic commodities and hence transforming
the buying habits of individuals by turning luxuries into necessities. Meanwhile, new apparel companies founded by devout businessmen to produce
Islamic attire for women, tesettur, capitalized on this opportunity and further
perpetuated the process. Tekbir Apparel, a MUSIAD member company, is
the first of such companies whose marketing strategies created a fashion for
tesettur particularly through fashion shows with celebrity models.10 This new
fashion for Islamic attire pressured people to buy not out of need [or for
religious concerns] but for stylefrom a desire to conform to what others
defined as fashionable (Robbins, 2005, p. 17).
Fashionization of the veil replaced concern for religious piety and observance with a concern for beauty and style. Women of devout bourgeois
background satisfied their need for new styles by shopping for Turkish and
foreign brand names such as Vakko, Beymen, Burberry, and Escada (Turk,
2003). In so doing they turned the brand of ones headscarf into a sign of
ones status (Yavuz, 2003b, p. 281). This association has been continuously
reproduced in commercials that are often shot in fancy malls and relate the
product to high-status lives.
In response to those who intensified their criticisms of devout bourgeois
consumerism,11 founding chairman of MUSIAD, Erol Yarar (n.d., p. 39), blamed
844
mystical frugality popular in Sufi Islam and its motto one mouthful food,
one short coat as the source of sluggishness and lack of motivation toward
the world and the main cause of the backwardness of the Muslim world.
Moreover, the devout bourgeoisie attempted to obscure the line of demarcation between needs and luxury that determines the limits of consumption in
Islam. MUSIAD fairs host stylish brands of Ottoman-style furniture and decoration, whereas realtors in these fairs sell luxurious residences overlooking
the Kaaba in Mecca. These businessmen prefer foreign designer brands for
their attire or accessories (Turk, 2003), whereas in Ramadans they eat their
iftar (after-sunset feast) in five-star hotels or fancy restaurants.12 They enjoy
summer vacations in five-star hotels on the coast of the Mediterranean, tailored to their Islamic sentiments.13
Devout bourgeoisie also make long-term investments in their childrens
education by enrolling them in private schools, often established by other
devout businessmen, that emphasize bilingual education in Turkish and
English with a focus on science (Yavuz, 2003b, p. 281). Similarly, the new
bourgeoisie pronounce their existence as a distinct status group by moving to
the suburbs of the cities (Yavuz, 2003b, pp. 278-282). In Istanbul, the devout
bourgeois families reside in up-scale suburban neighborhoods such as
Florya, Beykoz, or Camlica. Reconfiguration of space is strikingly visible in
a MUSIAD residential project in Konya that offers a secluded space for families of MUSIAD members. This well-protected gated complex is located in
hip Meram with spacious apartments and variety of facilities, tennis courts,
parking lots, and indoor fountains. Meanwhile, socialization of devout bourgeoisie increasingly takes place in shopping centers, the ultimate site of
consumerism. The largest shopping center in Konya is located in the tallest
building in the city, Kule-Site, which is built by a MUSIAD member, who
takes pride in this accomplishment.
Hence, a new class of devout bourgeoisie has taken shape with its substantial economic power, distinct tastes, consumer preferences, and transformed
religious practices that set them apart from both secular bourgeoisie and
devout lower classes (Yavuz, 2003a, pp. 97-100). Through these practices
devout Muslims fused Islam with capitalism, modernity, and individualism.
Prolongation and consolidation of this new lifestyle within the broader
society necessitated changes in political preferences now dominated by pragmatism. The new political calculus forced the devout bourgeoisie to be an
ardent supporter of economic liberalism as the primary mechanism of capital
accumulation and democracy that would ensure a greater role in the decisionmaking process without paying the costs of Islamism or abandoning their
Muslim identities in business networks or public life.
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Effects of the Emergence of the Devout

Bourgeoisie on Turkish Political Islam
Devout provincial entrepreneurs had formed the core of the Islamist constituency since the establishment of the first Islamist party in 1970 by the MG
movement.14 Throughout the 1970s, marginalized Anatolian business funneled their grievances about the close alliance of Istanbul-based secular big
bourgeoisie and the state through the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party; Gulalp, 2001; Onis, 1997). Islamism increased its popularity
from the early 1990s onward under the Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party),
which managed to build a cross-class coalition of winners and losers of economic reform. On one hand the RP reflected the growing aspirations of the
devout bourgeoisie to consolidate their positions in the society and to achieve
elite status (Onis, 1997, p. 760), and on the other it appealed to the losers of
liberalization by greater reliance on the logic of redistribution (Bellin, 2000)
and demanding social justice through what the RP called the Just Order
program, which was a state-centered Islamic project that would deliver a
larger state and extensive welfare programs (Yavuz, 2003b).
Success in the 1995 elections made the RP the senior partner in a coalition
government with the centerright True Path Party. The RP stayed in power
for a year and had to resign as a result of culminating pressures in the aftermath of the National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997.15 In
1998 the Constitutional Court (CC) closed down the RP. In response, the MG
established the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) but could not prevent the
growing schism between the moderates (yenilikciler) and the hardliners
(gelenekciler). The whole process strengthened the hand of the moderates,
who since the late 1980s insisted that the RP should leave its radicalism
based on the presentation of Islam as an ideology and embrace a centrist political vision that would allow the party to reach a wider populace (Cakir &
Calmuk, 2001, p. 56).
Rapprochement between the rising devout bourgeoisie and moderates
crystallized into a close alliance in the aftermath of the February 28 process.
Although hardliners insisted on ideological dogmatism and state interventionism, the moderates responded to the change that has been taking place
within Islamist constituency. In 1998, the leader of the moderates, Erdogan,
pointed to this change and claimed that the MG had increasingly distanced
itself from its constituency and failed to respond to their demands (Cakir &
Calmuk, 2001, p. 154). The devout bourgeoisie openly supported the moderates against the hardliners for they believed moderates political vision to be in
greater conformance with their interests, new class identity, and social status.
846
The hardliners statist, anti-Western, and confrontational discourse conflicted

with the interests of the rising devout bourgeoisie, who desired liberal markets, minimal state intervention, a pro-Western attitude, and relatively peaceful
relations with the secular state establishment.16 Erol Yarar, the founding
chairman of MUSIAD, stated that the members of MUSIAD were highly
skeptical of Erbakans Just Order Economic Program and they rather preferred a political cadre who could deliver a well-functioning free market
(personal communication, March 14, 2007). Seyit Mehmet Buga, a Konya
MUSIAD member, confirms that the main factor behind the separation within
MG was its insistence on states dominance in the economy. Buga argues that
the hard-liners in the RP could not realize that the age of etatism was long
gone (personal communication, September 6, 2007). In short, the devout
bourgeoisie longed for a leader like Ozal who could merge piety with free
markets and democracy.17
The tense relations between the party and the secular establishment during
the RPs incumbency further contributed to this alienation. The uneasy relations of the party with state institutions substantially increased the risks for the
devout entrepreneurs within the RP constituency who would naturally desire
to minimize political costs. Finally, the distance of the RP to the West and
particularly the EU turned into a major concern for the devout bourgeoisie,
which established close business relations with the EU countries following
economic liberalization and the Customs Union finalized in 1996.
In their growing confrontation with the hardliners, which climaxed in the
Fazilet Party congress in 2000, the devout bourgeoisie supplied the moderates
with financial and political resources. Albayrak Group, a MUSIAD member
company and the chief financer of the moderates (Cakir & Calmuk, 2001,
p. 151), heavily propagated the cause of the moderates through its daily
newspaper, Yeni Safak, before and after the FP Congress (Yeni Safak, May
and June 2000). In reaction to growing support of MUSIAD for moderates,
Erbakan requested the establishment of an alternative businessmen association, ASKON, which would not attract as much following as MUSIAD (Nazli
Ilicak, personal communication, February 16, 2007).
Defeated in the party congress with half of the votes, the moderates left
the MG movement soon after the CC closed down the FP. Devout bourgeois
support for the moderates continued; 28 out of 31 businessmen MPs within
the ranks of FP joined them rather than staying with the hardliners.18 When
moderates established their conservative-democratic party, the AKP, in 2001
several MUSIAD members joined them to found the partys local offices in
Anatolia. Numerous MUSIAD members ran on the AKP ticket in the 2002
elections, and 20 MUSIAD members were elected AKP MPs.
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Gumuscu
Unlike the MG parties of the past, the AKP clearly separated religion and
politics and claimed that religion provides meaning to believers lives and it
should not have any political role beyond that. The party also adhered to a liberal and pluralist understanding of political parties and human rights as opposed
to totalizing and monopolizing perception of politics and human rights of the
MG. Moreover, the AKP clearly supported Turkeys accession to the EU and
supported consolidation of democracy and liberal economy in the country.
The close affinity between the devout bourgeoisie and the AKP is manifest in the party platform. As Ali Bayramoglu, former chairman of MUSIAD
and a current AKP MP, states, the associations policy recommendations have
substantively inspired the party (Turk, 2004). Indeed, the AKP party program
significantly parallels MUSIADs economic and political demands. MUSIAD
report on Democratization and Constitutional Reform published in 2000
clearly inspires the AKP, which, like MUSIAD, demands a more civil and
democratic constitution, extension of human rights and freedoms, decentralization of administration, and greater compliance with the EU Copenhagen
Criteria. Likewise, the AKP defends liberal economy and a small state, while
it advocates SME-based, export-oriented economic growth.
In short, the rising devout bourgeoisie, aiming to protect its economic
power and consolidate its identity, which fuses Islam and capitalism, as distinct from secular bourgeoisie, could not afford costly Islamism or political
passivity. These devout businessmen thus emerged as an ally to the moderate Islamists, who increasingly challenged the hardliners in the aftermath of
the February 28 process. This alliance facilitated the emergence of a moderate, democratic, economically liberal, and socially conservative political
party from the ranks of the MG.
Egypts Limited Economic

Opening and Its Beneficiaries
The state in Egypt carried out economic liberalization in two stages in 1970s
and 1990s, and in both waves of reform the state managed to preserve its
dominant role in the economy. It could exert great degree of control over the
effects of liberalization as well as the new private economic actors. The outcome was the accruing of benefits to a concentrated group of big business
with close ties with the regime. Few benefits trickled down to SMEs, and the
middle classes were impoverished by the states retreat from social welfare
and employment provision.
Following two decades of Arab socialism, Sadat initiated a process of economic liberalization called Infitah (Open Door Economic Policy), which was
848
designed to give a greater role to the private actors in the economy. The main
goals of the Infitah at its inception in 1974 were to attract foreign capital and
foreign direct investment, to stimulate private sector, and to increase the efficiency of the public sector enterprises (Waterbury, 1985, p. 66).
The way the Egyptian government designed economic opening led to
major developments in financial and commercial sectors without generating
any significant change in the manufacturing sector and its export capacity.
Most of the foreign investment entered Egypt in the early years of the Infitah
was directed to construction, petroleum, and services sector, that is, tourism
and banking. None of these sectors provided Egypt with new sources of
employment or exportable surplus. Foreign investors were mostly interested
in establishing joint venture banks to extract foreign exchange remittances
from Egyptian depositors for profitable placements abroad than in investing
in Egyptian enterprise (Moore, 1986, p. 634). Even when these joint venture
banks invested in Egyptian undertakings, they preferred financing foreign
trade (Moore, 1986, p. 643) because the governments interest rate policy
had the effect of discouraging investment in tradable agriculture and industry
in favor of commercial transactions (Shafik, 1994, p. 17).
During the Infitah the state managed to retain its centrality in the economy
because of extensive rents collected in the 1970s and 1980s such as oil, remittances of migrant labor in the Gulf, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, international
aid from the West (Springborg, 1989, p. 154), and legal regulations. One such
regulation concerned joint ventures between public companies and private
investors. What seems, at first, to be back door privatization was in fact another
route for the government to extend its control over the emerging private
sector (Springborg, 1989, p. 151). That is why the public sector expanded
over 3.5% per annum between 1973 and 1982 (Shafik, 1994, p. 13).
Such a prominent role preserved by the state in a relatively liberal economy
led to the emergence of state bourgeoisie, composed of managers, technocrats, and high-level bureaucrats who are in close contact with foreign and
private capital (Waterbury, 1991). Along with state bourgeoisie Infitah has
also given birth to a new bourgeois class that has grown heavily dependent
on the state that reigned over the banking sector in joint ventures, determined
the interest and exchange rates, shaped the course of investment through various incentives, and handed down large-scale public projects to the new class
of oligopolists. It was mostly the public sector and big business in joint ventures that benefited from this policy. SMEs have been deprived access to the
same attractive rules offered to large firms (Hondoussa, cited in Springborg,
1989, p. 159).
Most of these decisions in favor of big business were extensions of close
and personal connections between the state and the Infitah bourgeoisie. For
849
Gumuscu
instance, big businesses hired former cabinet members with no prior experience in the private sector as board chairmen, general managers, or advisers
(Ibrahim, 1994, p. 21). Or these businessmen joined the ranks of the ruling
National Democratic Party and got elected to the Peoples Assembly. In 1987,
there were more than 80 members of the Infitah bourgeoisie in the Assembly,
compared to fewer than 20 in 1976. Prominent figures of the new bourgeoisie
also found the opportunity to sit in the cabinet as ministers. The percentage
of businessmen in cabinet appointments increased from 2.4 in 1970 to 14.7
in 1981 and to 20 in 1990 (Ibrahim, 1994).
The Infitah has provided devout businessmen with opportunities of expansion as well. In the 1980s the Islamic financial sector emerged and developed
as Islamic banks and Islamic investment companies handsomely benefited
from Infitah policies. The two major Islamic banks in Egypt, the Faisal Islamic
Bank and the International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development,
channeled most of their activity to either short-term trade financing, which
carries relatively little risk, or foreign currency and precious metals speculation (Ayubi, 1991, p. 185). Islamic investment companies also flourished in
the same period; their number reached 50 in 1980s, as they gained the lions
share of workers remittances (Moore, 1990, p. 249). They operated like venture capital firms, paying depositors on the basis of the profitability of their
portfolio rather than a fixed rate of interest. These funds were unregulated
and uninsured but were able to mobilize substantial savings with high rates
of return (Shafik, 1994, p. 18), which was possible because of substantial
profits they made in currency speculation, gold trade, real estate, and commerce (Moore, 1990, p. 250). Manufacturing was a marginal undertaking for
Islamic investment companies because of greater risks and lower returns
associated with this particular sector.
Expansion of devout bourgeoisie in the finance sector in the 1980s was
stalled when the government imposed reporting requirements and a regulatory structure on the Islamic funds in 1988 that in turn triggered numerous
bankruptcies (Moore, 1990). By the late 1980s, Islamic investment companies lost their power in the financial sector, whereas Islamic banks managed
to hold on to their activities albeit in a smaller scale as their clientelemigrant
workersshrank in the late 1980s as a result of the recession in the Gulf.
Although the state built strong and intimate ties with big business, SMEs
during Infitah did not receive any assistance from the state or the secular and
Islamic financial institutions. Because they were deprived of incentives and
access to cheap credit, they had to rely on their own resources for capital
accumulation. Moreover, because their business ventures have not rested on
strategic relationships with the bureaucracy or the political elite and because
there is no organized group that could defend their collective interests, they
850
have been vulnerable to arbitrary and frequently destructive interventions of

the bureaucracy (Springborg, 1989, pp. 78-80). Finally, the states reluctance to pursue an export-oriented growth strategy deprived the SMEs of the
opportunities in the international markets that their Turkish counterparts substantively enjoyed.
Economic Stabilization in the 1990s

In the 1980s, Egypt suffered economic crises that could not be solved by oil
and tourism rents. The gap between investment and savings grew exponentially as the state directed already scarce sources for investment to infrastructure
and neglected the manufacturing and agricultural sectors in favor of commercial and service sectors while simultaneous boosts in imports culminated
in an ever-growing deficit in the current account.19 The government financed
the gap by borrowing, making Egypt the most indebted country in the world
(Richards, 1991, p. 1723).
Mubarak signed a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary
Fund in the 1991 for economic stabilization and structural adjustment. Soon
the macroeconomic indicators improved.20 The state has taken steps to liberalize trade and finance, to deregulate prices, and to make Egyptian pound
convertible. However, the Mubarak regime was not as successful in enacting
structural reforms. The state maintained its predominant position in the economy. State-owned banks controlled 70% of all bank assets; privatization of
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remained dawdling (91 out of 314 SOEs
were privatized, only 9 had a change in management; Shafik, 1994, p. 18).
The state continued to support big business primarily through investments
in transportation and communications sectors and bids in airport and road
development projects on which big business could embark. Although big
business enjoyed the benefits, the business environment remained unfriendly
for the SMEs. A survey concludes that small firms suffer more than larger
firms do from institutional constraints such as tax administration, dispute
settlement, cost of access to finance, and unofficial payments made to state
agents (Fawzy, 1998). The reason is that the SMEs have limited access to
the state mechanism and limited or no personal connections to the state elite.
Therefore, they have no political assets to counterbalance the unlimited discretionary power of the tax collector or a way of avoiding unofficial payments
made to the bureaucracy (Fawzy, 1998).
In sum, the two-staged economic liberalization in Egypt generated a different outcome than the Turkish case. Economic policies in Egypt enabled
the state to construct a new winners circle mostly composed of big business
851
Gumuscu
and state bourgeoisie, pushing small and medium entrepreneurs and the
middle and lower classes to the sidelines. As a result, the devout bourgeoisie
emerged divided and ineffective. Small devout businessmen have never
found the opportunity to expand, given the unfavorable economic environment for small-scale manufacturers. Only big businesses owned by devout
families could grow in this economic environment and could do so heavily
dependent on the state. Despite its limits and ineffectiveness, a process of
embourgeoisement nevertheless took place among devout upper classes.
New Devout Bourgeois Culture in Egypt

Globalization combined with economic liberalization under the states control brought conspicuous consumption, shopping malls, gated communities,
and Western-style vacations to the lives of devout upper-class Egyptians
(Bayat, 2007, p. 165). As a new devout bourgeois class has taken shape
Islamist practices underwent a process of embourgeoisement that ultimately
divorced political and official Islamic content from these practices.
Veiling, a critical symbol of Islamist politics in the 1970s and 1980s, has
become increasingly an item of luxurious consumption in the bourgeois
culture of upper class Egyptian women. Hijab, which had been a sign of
equality and decency for the Islamist movements, now turned into a sign of
status and taste for bourgeois women, who shop in fancy boutiques in Egypt
and Europe (Haenni & Tammam, 2003). And as they do so they follow the
new trends and styles in magazines such as Hijab Fashion, for they desire
to conform to fashion and accentuate their individuality rather than their
Islamic modesty.
The uneasy combination of piety and privilege in new patterns of consumption and new forms of observing Islam has been justified by the new
preachers in Egypt. Amr Khaled, the most popular of them all, first appeared
in late 1990s in salon-style gatherings with his designer suits, Hugo Boss
shirts, and tie and clean-shaven face, and he looked more like a televangelist than the ulama of al-Azhar. Amr Khaled talks about attaining the values
of liberal modernity: ambition, success, hard work, and efficiency. For him,
Muslims should seek wealth through hard work and ambition, and they
should never be ashamed of their material possessions. He assures his nouveau riche audience that they could be pious while maintaining their power
and prestige (Bayat, 2007, p. 153):
I want to be rich so that people will look at me and say You see, rich
and religious, and they will love God through my wealth.... I want
852
to have money and the best clothes to make people love Gods religion.
(quoted in Haenni & Tammam, 2003)
As for political preferences, Egypts small devout bourgeoisie followed
a different path from their Turkish counterparts. The pervasive state role
in economy rendered the devout bourgeoisie dependent on the state for
preservation of affluence and economic power. Although this dependence
rendered Islamism increasingly risky, the new lifestyles with novel values of
consumerism decreased the affinity between the devout bourgeoisie and
mainstream Islamist ideology. Thus, they embraced passive piety rather
than Islamist political activism (Bayat, 2007, p. 7).
Political Connections of the Devout Bourgeoisie

Political Islam shows a greater diversity in Egypt than it does in Turkey.
Although militant Islamist groups made to the headlines often in the 1970s
and 1990s with assassinations and attacks on tourists and Copts, they remained
mostly insignificant and fragmented within broader Islamism (Bayat, 2007,
p. 40). Since 1928 the MB has determined the course of Islamism in Egypt
and has monopolized the terrain in recent years.
The primary goal of the brotherhood has been the establishment of an
Islamic society and state that fully conforms to Sharia (Mitchell, 1969). The
MB followed mostly a gradualist method of Islamizing the society primarily
through dawa (invitation to God) that would ultimately deliver the Islamic
state. In his first decade in power Mubarak accommodated the MB, without
bestowing legality to the organization, and allowed it to run in elections in
alliance with legal parties. From the early 1980s onward the MB added the
parliament and professional associations to its areas of activism. The middlegeneration Muslim Brothers capitalized well on the opportunities of
participation and achieved success at the polls and overwhelming victory in
the professional associations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
A wave of state repression in response to the increasing power of the
MB particularly in the professional associations exposed the internal strife
between the moderate and conservative Brothers. The moderates, who had
demanded that the MB pursue legality, greater cooperation with secular
opposition, and internal democracy within the organization, accused the conservative old guard of being autocratic, ideologically rigid, and obsessed
with internal unity and discipline (Wickham, 2002, p. 217). When the old
guard insisted on staying the course, a group of Muslim Brothers left the
movement to establish the Wasat Party in 1996. The Wasat distanced itself
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Gumuscu
from the MBs authoritarianism and scriptural dogmatism and sought to

build a new polity around a civilizational concept of Islam that was more
inclusive and pluralist than the MBs vision that treats Islam as religion and
state (din wa-dawla; Stacher, 2002; Wickham, 2004).
Those moderates who decided to stay in the MB continued their struggle
to reform the organization from within. Led by Essam al-Erian and Abu al-Futuh,
the moderates convinced the old guard that establishing a Muslim Brothers
party would serve the interests of the movement. However, significant divisions persist within the movement over issues pertaining to democracy,
citizenship, minority, and womens rights as well as the place of a prospective
Muslim Brothers party within the larger organization. The conservative old
guard believes that a formal political party would prolong the existence of the
MB given the existing institutional constraints, but they contend that a prospective Muslim Brothers party should be an organic extension of the society
of the Muslim Brothers. As such the party would be an arm of the MB active
in politics, whereas its other arms reach religion, business, education, and
charity. Moderate Muslim Brothers, however, ask for an independent Muslim
Brothers political party with no organic ties with the organization and separation of the MBs religious functions from its political activity.21 Such a
separation would secure the party from the authority of the old guard and
democratization of membership by removing the existing obstacles before
membership of women and non-Muslims.
Though moderates introduced concepts such as citizenship, democracy,
and pluralism to the discourse of the MB through testimonies released in
1990s and 2000s, contradictory remarks by different MB leaders regarding
democracy, the rights of the Coptic minority, and womens status illustrate
unresolved disputes and the lack of consensus among the brothers.22 Nor does
the moderates rhetoric of pluralism and popular eliminate references to the
supremacy of Sharia or idioms such as Islam is the solution or Islam is both
religion and state (Bayat, 2007, p. 186). Thus, the brotherhoods new discourse on democracy appears ambivalent as it signifies a set of procedures
that facilitate the implementation of Sharia rather than a system that expresses
the will of the populace to govern themselves (Bayat, 2007, p. 177).
An important factor that contributes to this ambivalent position toward
democracy is the distribution of power within the Islamist constituency. Ideological dogmatism prevails over pragmatism within the ranks of the MB. This
is partly because of the weakness of pragmatist elements, primarily the devout
bourgeoisie within the Islamist constituency. There are two primary reasons as
to why the devout bourgeoisie generally avoids connections with the brotherhood. First, for those who are sympathetic to the cause of the brotherhood, such
854
a connection carries considerable political and economic risks. Owner of the

Rayan Group, Ahmad Tawfik Abd al-Fatah, confirmed these risks: The business of working with money requires stability, not continuous change or
surprises, and certainly not getting into dangerous political games (Moore,
1990, p. 252). The fact that it is too costly to confront the state given the high
level of dependency of the bourgeoisie, secular and devout alike, forces them
to ally with elements in the state apparatus and the official press by employing
ex-ministers, governors, outspoken editors, and journalists (Ayubi, 1991, p.
193). These high costs attached to Islamism became once more apparent when
the state cracked down on the businessmen affiliated with the MB in early
2007. Khariat al-Shater, as a prominent leader of the brotherhood, paid for this
involvement in Islamism when he, along with other businessmen associated
with the MB, was tried before the military tribunal and sentenced to several
years in prison following the most recent cycle of state repression.
Second, the values of the new bourgeois lifestyle conflict with the Islamic
values internalized by the MB. The devout bourgeois concern for capitalist accumulation and consumption directly contradicts the MBs vision of Islam based on
humbleness and modesty. Muslim Brothers express their disdain of the new trend
propagated by Amr Khaled by calling it air-conditioned Islam. Because the
devout bourgeoisie and the Muslim Brothers represent different status groups
with different values and lifestyles, the followers of air-conditioned Islam either
remain apolitical or stay closer to the more democratic Wasat Party (Haenni &
Tammam, 2003). Five businessmen sitting on the board of the Wasat Party epitomize its appeal to the devout bourgeoisie. The WP leader al-Madi confirms this
connection between his party and the new trend and claims that his party represents the interests of the medium-size devout bourgeoisie and upper-middle-class
professionals (personal communication, July 11, 2007).
Ultimately, the MB remains predominantly an organization of the educated
lower-middle classes and professionals (Bayat, 2007; Clark, 2004; Wickham,
2002). The MBs exceptional success in the professional syndicates in the early
1990s and its comparative absence in business associations demonstrate the
predominance of the professional class among the ranks of the organization.
The greater strength of the lower-middle classes has crucial implications for
the MBs political vision. The middle and lower classes have been among the
losers of economic liberalization programs that led to the retreat of the state
from the welfare services, cancellation of the graduate program, slow but
ongoing privatization, and increasing impoverishment and unemployment.
This meant the annulment of the social contract concluded between Nasser and
the middle classes following the revolution. Economic reforms increasingly
led to economic, political, and social marginalization of the new middle classes,
855
Gumuscu
who aspired for upward mobilization but instead experienced decreasing

wages, inadequate housing, and unemployment (Clark, 1996, p. 39). The new
middle classes disappointment with the state fed into a growing adherence to
the ideal of an Islamic state that would deliver higher status, better lives and
prestige for professionals by justly acknowledging and rewarding merit (Wickham, 2002, p. 160). These professionals indeed started constructing this Islamic
polity as an alternative to the secular state through dawa, which served as an
ideological framework that mobilized them on the basis of interests and ideas
through mosques and private voluntary organizations, that is, clinics, schools,
hospitals, day care centers, and vocational training centers (Wickham, 2002,
pp. 161-162). These organizations represented ideology through action by
showing the shortcomings of the secular state following its retreat from social
services (Clark, 2004, p. 12). In short, Islam as din wa-dawla would deliver the
future that the new middle classes have dreamed of.
The way the Egyptian state pursued economic liberalization had significant implications for Islamic constituency and its political preferences. First,
the government implemented economic liberalization in such a way that the
benefits of liberalization accrued predominantly to the big business. SMEs,
unlike their Turkish counterparts, have not benefited from liberalization, thus
the expansion of devout bourgeoisie was curtailed. Second, continued state
dominance in the economy combined with ongoing confrontation with the
Islamists had significant consequences for the activity of devout bourgeoisie within political movements. Because of high costs associated with
political Islamic activity, many devout businessmen have remained apolitical, whereas some parts of devout bourgeoisie stayed closer to the moderate
and less confrontational line of the Wasat Party. This ultimately left the mainstream political Islam under the dominance of lower-middle classes whose
interests have been hurt by economic reforms and who demand an Islamic
state to replace the existing corrupt and exclusionary regime.
The current makeup of the Islamist constituency prolongs the hesitant
moderation within the MB where moderate voices remain weak vis--vis the
conservatives. This is why mainstream political Islamism cannot successfully internalize democratic principles. It is why the moderate WP remains
marginal and weak as opposed to the more prominent MB.
Conclusion
The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have generated
different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these two countries. Economic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal role in
856
transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of a

strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy
and increasing its power within the broader Islamist constituency. In Egypt,
in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reform prevented the
formation of a strong and independent devout bourgeoisie that could be
assertive in political Islam. It was primarily the losers from reform who populated the Islamist constituency and entrench Islamism in ideological
positions rather than pragmatism.
The socioeconomic developments within political Islamic constituencies
indeed fill in the gaps left by inclusion, political learning, and repression-based
explanations of political Islamic change in Turkey and Egypt. The emergence
of a strong and well-organized devout bourgeoisie in Turkey triggered a significant ideological change in the Turkish political Islamic tradition that
showed no signs of ideological change in three decades following its inclusion
in the democratic political system. Only after the constituency of the political
Islamic party experienced significant economic, social, and political changes
did Turkish political Islam embrace ideological moderation, while in Egypt
moderates within political Islamic movements failed to induce broader ideological change. The weak and divided nature of Egyptian devout bourgeoisie
is a reason as to why moderates both within and outside of the MB could not
defeat the conservatives and incur substantial moderation in Islamism.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this article was published in the Robert Schuman Centre Advanced
Studies Working Paper Series. I would like to thank John E. Echeverri-Gent, William B.
Quandt, Carol M. Mershon, Thomas W. Smith, Jeff Haynes, Guy Ben-Porat,
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Nora Fisher, and two anonymous referees for their comments
on the article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship
and/or publication of this article.
Financial Disclosure/Funding
The author received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this
article.
Notes
1. By democratic principles this article refers to liberal norms of democracy that
include civil, political, and social rights and pluralism.
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Gumuscu
2. This article adopts the distinction made between tactical (strategic) and ideological moderation in the literature. Tactical moderation refers to strategic adaptation
of Islamists to the institutional environment often observed as acceptance of the
rules of electoral competition without abandoning the overall goal of establishing
an Islamic state. Ideological moderation, on the other hand, refers to abandonment
or revision of Islamist goals. It entails a substantial commitment to democratic
principles such as political pluralism, peaceful alternation of power, and citizenship rights (Wickham, 2004, p. 206). The primary puzzle of this article is belated
ideological moderation in Turkey and marginal ideological moderation in Egypt.
3. The Islamic political parties were closed down in 1970, 1980, 1998, and 2000,
and the leader of Islamists, Erbakan, was banned from politics in 1980 and 1998.
4. The fact that the devout entrepreneurs attain greater wealth and new social status
does not lead to the disappearance of religion as a system of meaning in their
lives (Tugal, 2002). The concept of alternative modernity well captures this
synthesis of capitalism and Islam constructed by the devout bourgeoisie.
5. This alliance was possible because of the high degree of independence of the
devout bourgeoisie from the state for profit accumulation. Because profitability
is not subject to the discretionary support of the state through subsidized inputs,
protected markets, and cronyism (Bellin, 2000, p. 184), the new bourgeoisie
could enjoy political activism as a means of protecting their new status.
6. Turkish Statistical Institute, Foreign Trade Statistics (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/
VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4, retrieved January 4, 2008).
7. For information on the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD) activities, see www.musiad.org.tr.
8. See the Konya Chamber of Industry (www.kso.org.tr).
9. This and the following information was collected through a series of interviews
conducted with 15 MUSIAD members in Konya between September 2 and
November 12, 2007.
10. For a detailed study of tesettur companies, see Binark and Kilicbay (2000).
11. More radical and revolutionary groups and prominent intellectuals of Islamist
movement such as Mehmet Sevket Eygi and Ali Bulac heavily criticized emerging embourgeoisement and consumerism within devout upper classes. For a study
of these divisions, see Tugal (2002).
12. For changing practices in Ramadan, see Sandikci and Omeraki (2007).
13. A sector of Islamic vacationing provided by five-star hotels in compliance with
Islamic rules became increasingly popular in the 1990s. These hotels serve devout
bourgeois families with gender-segregated beaches, and they refuse to serve alcohol.
14. The Milli Gorus (MG) movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan has
implicitly envisioned an Islamic state, and it explicitly aimed for Islamization of
Turkish society. The movement established the National Order Party in 1970, the
858
National Salvation Party in 1971, the Welfare Party (RP) in 1983, and the Virtue
Party in 1998.
15. The military wing of the NSC demanded Prime Minister Erbakan during the
meeting on February 28 to take steps to eradicate Islamist reactionary activism in
Turkey and hence started a new period known as the February 28 process that entails
a major crackdown on Islamism by the secular establishment. In this process, the
Constitutional Court shut down the RP in 1998 and banned several politicians
including its leader Erbakan from politics, whereas succeeding coalition governments reinstated the headscarf ban in the universities and extended compulsory
education to 8 years to cut down on the demand for religious vocational schools.
16. One might ask why the devout bourgeoisie did not simply turn to the Center
Right parties but tried to transform Islamists. Indeed, the devout bourgeois was
longing for a party like Ozals Motherland (ANAP) with closer ties to pious
groups in society and clear preference for economic and political liberalization
and Europeanization. ANAP, however, after Ozals death in 1992, distanced itself
from conservatives and allied with liberalsecular upper classes. Clearly, they
would not cater to the devout identity of the rising bourgeoisie. Moreover, Center
Right parties were facing significant corruption charges that made them noncredible alternatives. Having no other place to turn, the devout bourgeoisie tilted the
balance of power within the MG movement via its financial and political support
in favor of moderates.
17. Not surprisingly, Erdogan insistently identified with Ozals policies and resorted
to his legacy after he and other moderates established the Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi in 2001 (Yavuz, 2003a, p. 258).
18. Based on the information provided by the Grand National Assembly (www
.tbmm.gov.tr).
19. Of the total investment, 45% was concentrated in infrastructure, and less than
20% of infrastructure-related investments were related to the manufacturing sector (Richards, 1991, p. 1722).
20. The public deficit to GDP ratio shrank to 3%; the inflation rate was cut back to 7%.
21. Essam al-Eryan clearly states this necessity in his article titled Towards the
Renaissance in Al-Ahram Weekly Online (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/
op71.htm).
22. Although moderates claim that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) stands for equal
rights for Copts and women, former supreme guide Mashur argued that the state
should impose jizya (poll tax) on the Copts. Likewise, former supreme guide
Omar al-Tilmissani stated,
I do not like to talk about women.... I want nothing to do with modern theories and the equality of men and women.... A woman who believes that she
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Gumuscu
is equal to a man is a woman who has lost her femininity, virtue, and dignity.
(El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 382)
MB contends that Copts and women cannot become president.
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Bio
Sebnem Gumuscu is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at University of
Virginia in Charlottesville, VA.

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