Update: Electronic Evidence for Criminal Cases (People v.

Enojas)
Posted on 14 September 2014 | Leave a comment
Ang vs. Court of Appeals, GR 182835, 20 April 2010; Second Division, Abad [J],
provided:
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture,
Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should
have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
[People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 180501, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 616, 625-626]
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings. [A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2] (Emphasis mine)
However, People v. Enojas, GR 204894, 10 March 2014, Third Division, Abad [J],
provided:
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with
the Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions. [A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002.] Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.
[Id., Rule 11, Section 2] Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of
those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them. (Emphasis
mine)
The latter case does not confront directly the obiter in Ang v. Court of Appeals, but the
recognition of the 2002 resolution expanding the coverage of the rules on electronic
evidence in People v. Enojas is clear.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence apply to criminal cases.

34.Duduaco v. Laquindanum, 466 SCRA 428 (2005) In Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 215

SCRA 808 (1992), the Court spoke of a hierarchy of evidentiary values and its
implications on due process. It held that if a tribunal required more than what is really the
quantum of proof appropriate for that proceeding, there would be a violation of due
process. It then proceeded to arrange the pecking order as: (a) proof beyond reasonable
doubt; (b) clear and convincing evidence; (c) preponderance of evidence; and, (d)
substantial evidence. In Duduaco, the Court ruled that administrative proceedings against
judges are by nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases the quantum of proof required to support the
administrative charge should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt citing as authority In Re Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horilleno,
43 Phil. 212 (1922), at 215. Lex Bar Review 2009 35.Arnado v. Suarin, 467 SCRA 402
(2005) (Cebu) Barely a week later, the Court applied the principle in Duduaco to a
sheriff. Administrative proceedings against judicial employees are by nature, highly
penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The
quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more
substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

3.Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470
(2007)
Confronted anew with the question as to whether a potential extraditee is entitled to bail,
the Court found occasion to revisit what it had earlier decreed in Purganan, supra. It noted
that the modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights, citing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Fundamental
among the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process. While the Court in Purganan
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan was
accordingly in order. Lex Bar Review 2009 (Cebu) The Court also reasoned out that if
bail can be granted in deportation cases, it saw no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. R B G While
extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails
a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed
to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law
obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks
of a criminal process . By any standard, detention for an extended period of more than
two (2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditees fundamental right to
liberty. While the Philippines extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. So what standards should govern
the grant of bail to potential extraditee? The applicable standard of due process should not
be the same as that in criminal proceedings in the latter, the standard of due process is
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former, the assumption
is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Thus, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required
in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The potential
extraditee must prove by clear and convincing proof that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all orders and processes of the extradition court.

PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC
officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found
to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against
Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a
'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed
the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket,
two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,
the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried
the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during
that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could
allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a
crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he
is acquitted of the crime as charged.

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of
whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant
was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was
among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that
he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him
at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113
sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense
that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by
Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad
daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

UMIL VS. RAMOS

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the
arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the
confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where
inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member
of the New Peoples Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal
since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or
in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an
information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions
but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than
members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as
possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of
information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay.
The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were
not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in
their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti -- Marti
and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying
with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages
simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to
allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the
box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and found
marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti
invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the
Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution