GR No.

137873 April 20, 2001

Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos
widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice
of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they
may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any
defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only
under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In
the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants
are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of
Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than
that of which she already had.

Persons and Family Relation

29
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS
D.M.
CONSUNJI,
INC.
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MARIA
J.
JUEGOG.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juegos widow then filed a petition for damages in the
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that
Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the
ruling inPacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover
from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
actionssimultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego.On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
TrialCourt.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although shehas
already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund.

The respondents case is an exceptionbecause private respondent was not aware of petitioners
negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights
as well. The decision of the court is affirmed
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA
14628 September 30, 1960

vs.

THE

HON.

COURT

OF APPEALS

ET

AL.G.R. No. L-

Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher inthe
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years youngerthan
she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made nopromise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insuranceunderwriter in
the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since oneevening in 1953,
when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin onboard M/V
"Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledadadvised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,subsequently,
or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,Soledad Cagigas
filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damagesfor alleged
breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness tosupport
the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion,said court
ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 amonth,
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. The judgment of the RTC is
hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as thenatural daughter of defendant, and
confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay tothe said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth dayof every month sentencing defendant
to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundredpesos (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)as moral damages; and the
further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees forplaintiff, with costs against
defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmedthis decision, except as to
the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which wereincreased to P5,614.25
and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise tomarry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioneris not
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger thanthe
complainant

who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a formerhigh school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be

when she became intimate withpetitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages
BUYCO vs PNB
GR No. 14406, June 30, 1961
Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover
the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956.
Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the
authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16,
1956 as RA 1576.
Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay
Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New
Civil Code).
This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any
provision regarding its retroactivity.
Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was
made.
Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 (Quico's version)
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of
1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the
president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were
all
pursuant
to
a
certain
provision
in
republic
act
2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners
together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this
court
asking
for
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
against
the
respondents.
Issue:
WON

RA

2207

was

impliedly

repealed

by

RA

3452?

Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when
there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have
to turn to RA 2207. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not
ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial
conflict
must
be
found
in
existing
and
prior
Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws.
Here
there
is
no
such
inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby
dissolved. Cost against petitioners.
Facts:
On Dec 26, 1964 respondent Feliciano wrote to the President of the Philippines urging immediate
importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice. On Dec 27, 1964 The President submitted the said letter
to his cabinet for consideration, and the cabinet approved the needed importation Dec 28, 1964.
The President designated respondent Feliciano through the Rice and Corn Administration to
undertake the importation, and thus respondent Feliciano announced an invitation to bid setting
the bidding at Feb 1, 1965.
Petitioner Iloilo Palay and Corn Association filed an instant petition before the Supreme Court
considering that said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibit the government from
importing rice, seeking to restrain respondents from conducting said bid.
Petitioners prayed for issuance of preliminary injunction which the Court granted.
Respondents answered that they anchor on the validity of the importation on RA 2207, which they
believe still stands.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not the importation in question is illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452, section
10 which provide that importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties.
2. whether or not RA 2207 has already been repealed by 3452
RULING:

The petition is dismissed

1. The abovemention importation is legal, because RA 2207 is still in effect. Section 2 of said Act
provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local rice supply of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, the President may authorize such importation.
2. Contention that RA 2207 has already been repealed by RA 3452 is untenable. The clause of RA
3452 repealing all laws inconsistent to RA 3452 does not apply to RA 2207 due to the clause's
nature.
Said clause of RA 3452 is not an express repealing clause, because it fails to identify or designate
Act or Acts that it intends to repeal.
The two laws refer to different methods applicable ro different circumstances. RA 3452 only
authorizes importation during normal times, while RA 2207 is to be in effect in times of national
emergency.
Lidasan v. Comelec G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Facts:
A statute, RA 4790, took effect on June 18, 1966. The republic act was entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". RA 4790 creates a new municipality of
Dianaton within Lanao del Sur with the seat found in Togaig, a barrio within the municipality of
Buldon in Cotabato and additionally it annexes several barrios of two municipalities(namely that of
Parang and Buldon) in Cotabato, which is also outside of Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident
and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition
and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional as its Title is misleading and invoked the provision of the
Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators
and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Issue:
Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sur" satisfies the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify
the
public
and
others
concerned
of
its
substance.
Decision:
No. RA 4790 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" is misleading since this not only creates a municipality (namely, Dianaton) within Lanao del
Sur but also annexes several barrios of the two municipalities of Cotabato, that of Parang and
Buldon. Thus, RA 4790 is deemed unconstitutional.
FACTS: Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled
An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed.
Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton,
Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor
of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration
in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult toperceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato
voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators

Facts:

Teoxon filed a claim for disability pension for having been permanently incapacitated from
work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month
contrary to the terms of the basic law (which says that he should receive a higher amount).

Teoxon filed his suit for mandamus against members of the board of administrators, his
claim was for a higher pension and payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney s
fees.

The court dismissed the petition stating that the Board is authorized to promulgate
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law.

The court also said that Teoxon s disability is not complete and therefore he cannot be
entitled to complete disability allowance.

Teoxon appealed the lower court s decision, arguing that his right as conferred by law takes
precedence to what the administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable.
Issue: whether or not there has been a failure to apply the doctrine that when there is a
repugnancy between the statute and the rules issued in pursuance of it, the statute prevails
Held: Yes there has been a failure to apply the doctrine that when there is a repugnancy between
the statue and the rules issued in pursuance of it, the statute prevails. The decision of the lower
court was reversed, petition for mandamus was granted.
The Veteran s Bill of Rights states that the persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof
who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained in
line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month for each of his unmarried
minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension
from other government funds, and shall receive in addition the necessary hospitalization and
medical care.
The court said that the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions.
The statue requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Therefore the members of the board of administrators should adhere to the veteran s bill of rights
and grant him the right amount of pension.
Article 22; its application.
In Republic, et al. v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007 the SC had the occasion to
once again say that Article 22, NCC was formulated as basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human
conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. (Advance Foundation Construction
Systems Corp. v. New World Properties and Ventures, Inc., G.R. Nos. 143154 & 143177, June 21,
2006, 491 SCRA 557, 578; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 312, 317
(1995)). The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. (Palma Development Corp. v.
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur, 459 Phil. 1042, 1050 (2003); Republic v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480). Since respondent had rendered
services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be
compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such
unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.

LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446
April 24, 1985
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official
gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which
are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was
a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise
provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issues:
(1)
(2)

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette

Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full

Held:
(1)
The court held that all statue including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2)
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the laws.

D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 137873
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos
widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Held:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only
under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws.
The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

2 SCRA 205
May 30, 1961
Facts:
Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned
to him at the end of every semester. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made
to sign a contract covenant and agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another
school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees
awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to finish his last term in law

school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued unless he pays the
amount of the tuition fees that were returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under
protest.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby
the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the
equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid or not.
Held:
The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void.
Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in
Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme
designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent
with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student,
waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of
his scholarship grants, is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be
entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon
at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs,
and dismissing defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
176 SCRA 778
August 25, 1989
Facts:
10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and
other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the
Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told
Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take
a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police
investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators
and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed
with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias,
but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973,
effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent,
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told
Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he
landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as
well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by
petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious

and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, Administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs

ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant
50 Phil. 867
November 01, 1927
Facts:
Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the deceased
Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and the testatrix wished that the
distribution of his properties and everything in connection with it be in accordance with the
Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were
the following: (1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition, (4) the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business, and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this
cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen
who have resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippines.
Held:
Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo,
where it was provided, nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. However,
the oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws.
Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testatrix was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents
174 SCRA 653
June 30, 1989
Facts:

This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI.
Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7
September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manilawhere their only
child Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986, Division 20

of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage.
27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983. Several motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:
(1)
Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the
petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former husband.
(2)
Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery
against the petitioner.
Held:
(1)
The petitioners family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound to
Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However, Philippine laws recognize decrees validly
and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse who
obtained a divorce decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to the
Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law.
(2)
As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the action for adultery under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO
ORDERED.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003
Facts:

Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private

respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the
marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and
Alexandria Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was
denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again
denied by the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners
motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues
regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce
from a foreign country.
Held:
Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign
country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children.
In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare
that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra
Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation
of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family
Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government.
Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution
of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 1996,
in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia.
March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to Samson
in November 1997.
In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989,
making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by
Philippine Laws.
2.
Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian
decree of divorce.
3.
Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced
marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad.
Held:
1.
No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
2.
No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed
the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official act of an
Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation solely of the divorce
decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient.
3.
Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by the
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we
REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage
on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY
BISAYA, respondent
G.R. No. 154259
February 28, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the
Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for
damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as
exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on
October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former managers
birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party, when he
was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati
policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner
he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the
celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart
denied Amay Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners
liable for damages caused to plaintiff.
Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his
confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each
other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave
the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request
that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply
left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the
petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its
Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), respondent
G.R. No. 142943
April 3, 2002
Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by petitioners regarding the February 1, 2000 Decision
and the April 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals where the decision of the trial court is set
aside, the complaint against MERALCO is dismissed, and plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but
unregistered electrical consumption.
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing, plaintiffs-appellees in this case, are the owners
of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City which they bought from
Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. On March 3, 1995, around 9am, defendant-appellants inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlina were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all
single phase meters at the house owned by the spouses. The inspectors performed their standard
operating procedure by first asking permission from the secretary of the couple before they proceed
to the inspection of the house. Later, the inspectors found out that there were few illegal markings
on the meter which made defendant-appellant temporarily disconnect electrical services that will
only be restored unless the couple will pay P178, 875 representing the differential bill. However, at

around 2pm, the electric service was reconnected as instructed by defendant-appellants officer.
Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the defendant-appellants inspectors in immediately
disconnecting the electrical service of MERALCO constituted a violation of rights of the plaintiffsappellees, making the respondent liable to pay damages to petitioner.
Held:
Yes. Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners electrical
supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Public
utilities have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the
consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is
considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is
MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,
322.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as
exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee

5 SCRA 200
May 30, 1962
Facts:
This is an appeal brought before the Court of Appeals upon the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants, who are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita,
based on their claim that defendant Alfonsoa married man who works as an agent of the La Perla
Cigar and Cigarette Factory, staying in Gasan, Marinduque, an adopted son of a Chinese named Pe
Beco who is a collateral relative of Lolitas fatherdeliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas
affection, causing moral damages to plaintiff.
Because of the frequency of his visits to Lolitas family who has allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs both in Gasan, and
Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from
the parental home on April 14, 1957.
Issue:

Whether or not defendant caused moral damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he
pursued his love affair with Lolita.
Held:
Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita
to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolitas family contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses
of litigations. Costs against appellee.
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendantsappellees
15 SCRA 179
November 29, 1965
Facts:

Out of their love affair, Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married on 24
February 1948 before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. Their marriage was duly registered in
the local civil registrar. Later in their marriage, Vicentas parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao,
found out of their secret marriage; however, she continued living with her parents than eloping with
her husband. Pastor went to Manila, leaving his wife in Cebu. Vicenta later went to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. On 24
June 1950, she applied for a passport where it is indicated the she is single. After approval of the
application, she left for the United States and there, on August 1950, filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character; marriage was
decreed divorced as final and absolute in Nevada on October 1950. She then sought papal
dispensation for her marriage to Tenchavez. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship in 1958. Herein petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta Escao and her parents, whom he alleged to have influenced her from living with him.
Issue:
Whether or not parents-defendants shall pay petitioner for damages.
Held:
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted
independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her
decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of
affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit
may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the
proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL,
respondents
133 SCRA 179
November 14, 1984
Facts:

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the December
15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issue of the Sunday Times where St. Louis Realty Corporation
misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy.
Trial court through Judge Leuterio awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as
moral damages and P2,000 as attorneys fees. Had it not been a late action for publication of
rectification and apologywhich only took place 15 April 1969 issue of Manila Times Doctor
Aramil could have not suffered mental anguish and his income would have not been reduced by
about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Appellate Court when it
affirmed the trial courts decision. Furthermore, the corporation contends that the decision is
contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this
Court and still continues to argue that the case is not covered by article 26.
Issue:
Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by
Article 26 of the new Civil Code.
Held:
Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Through that
negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it
from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA;
PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents
160 SCRA 441
April 15, 1988
Facts:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by
petitioner when the Court denied his motion for reconsideration due to lack of merit.
Private respondent Paz Abayan filed an information for bigamy against petitioner
Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for
declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his
answer petitioner claimed that his second marriage was void because it was solemnized without a
valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to
obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue:

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First
Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question.
Held:
The respondent judge answered in the negative. The Court sustained him.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of
the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan
who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato failed to prove that his consent to the second marriage
has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON,
respondents
139 SCRA 139
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they
established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed
against petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties and that
respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the

case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community
property as of June 11, 1982.
Issues:
a.
Whether or not their divorce in Nevada, USA in 1982 is recognized in the Philippines.
b.
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets
Held:
The policy against absolute divorce covers only Philippine nationals.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines
provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce the parties obtained from the
Nevada Court released both parties from marital ties, thus, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

DOROTHY B. TERRE vs ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

211 SCRA 6
July 3, 1992
Facts:
Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Jordan Terre, who is a
member of the Philippine Bar, with the knowledge of her marriage still courted her and have
convinced her to marry him since her prior marriage is void ab initio.
Later, respondent disappeared, and abandoned Dorothy and their first-born Jason. Complainant
found out that Atty. Terre married one named Helina Malicdem. Upon knowing of this, she filed an
administrative case to disbar respondent. Jordan claimed that his marriage to complainant, which
he believed in good faith, was null and void from the beginning; thus, does not need a judicial
declaration of nullity. He also denied that Jason was his son to Dorothy.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed in order to contract a second
marriage.
Held:
YES. A judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential, for
through it, a person can be determined as to be legally free to contract a second marriage.
However, in this case, the marriage between Dorothy and Atty. Jordan is deemed to be void since
the complainant's first marriage has not obtained a judicial declaration nullifying it. The respondent
was not charged of bigamy, but was proved to be guilty of gross immoral conduct, a factor that
affected his moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this Resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the
land. SO ORDERED.

CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, vs HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents
G.R. No. 70890
September 18, 1992
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses, and Wendell Libi, son of
petitioners, were sweethearts for more than two years before their death. Julie broke up with
Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character. Wendell kept on pestering
Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused him to threaten her. 14
January 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound of the same firearm.
Private respondents claimed that it was Wendell who deliberately caused their daughter's death,

and his, respectively. Spouses Libi contended that a third party, probably a person related to
Wendell's work as a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent, must have caused his death
and Julie's. Gotiong spouses filed a civil case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising
from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence, and denied defendants' counterclaim for lack
of sufficient merit. On appeal to respondent court, the lower court's decision was set aside.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of respondent court
promulgated on 2 January 1985 sentencing defendants-spouses Libi to pay to plaintiff P30,000.00
for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance
with established decisional laws; and
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Held:

The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority
or control, and who lives in their company. It is also proven that defendants-appellees utterly failed
to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias in preventing their minor son from committing
this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi
for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was
missing from safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
BELLIS vs. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

Facts:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the
ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN

G.R. No. L-27860

March 29, 1974

Facts:

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the
Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary
provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws
of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the
Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her
death (and not said law at any other time).
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14628
September 30, 1960
Facts:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,
Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon
her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente
lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to
the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred
pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's
fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793

February 13, 2009

Facts:

In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court Rowena
after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their
families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to
Rowenas plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the
traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily
sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After Edward proceeded to his
parents home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit
suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years old and
she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncles place but he Edward was being treated like a
prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle
and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edwards persistence that they live together,
she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report stating that
it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial
on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological incapacity of Edward
(dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the
Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed
and set aside the Trial Courts decision on the ground that the clinical psychologist did not examine
the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given
the petitioners totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edwards dependent personality
disorder and Rowenas narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial
Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses deportment. With Edwards affliction of dependent
personality disorder, he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends
to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals
and clear direction in life.Rowenas affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda
and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was
with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at
large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not
be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared.
Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should
he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for
the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on
the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two
children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would
from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk and
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she
refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was
forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented
Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutors manifestation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed trials court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that
the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was
likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial courts decision
was prematurely rendered.

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
to his death. Jose Juegos widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court
against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed of
the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against
the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Regional
Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she
has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondents case is an exception
because private respondent was not aware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well. The decision of the court is affirmed.