Autonomy and Peace Review: Emerging Key Issues On The Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law

Autonomy & Peace Review
A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

ISSN 2243-8165-14-12
Emerging Key Issues

on the Proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law
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Iss
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Established in 2001, the Institute

for Autonomy and Governance, Inc.
seeks to provide research, training
and technical assistance to promote
meaningful autonomy and governance
in the southern Philippines.
The publication of this review is
made possible through the grant of the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. KAS is in
5th floor, Cambridge Center Building,
108 Tordesillas Corner Gallardo Street,
Salcedo Village, Makati City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, telephone 8943737.
Opinions expressed in the articles
are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the
Editorial Board. Cover photo courtesy
of OPAPP.
Autonomy
and
Peace Review
Institute for Autonomy and Governance

konrad adenauer-stiftung
Contents
9
Editorial
15
25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop

Series
First published on iag.org.ph on Oct. 22, 2014
51
Q&A with Congressman Rufus Rodriguez on

the Emerging Key Issues on the BBL
81
Bangsamoro Basic Law: Step Forward

Longer Road to Peace
Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
137
From Presidential Government

Parliamentary Government
Jose Pepe Abueva
149
A Comparison: What RA 9054
on a
to
BBL
regional-
and the
say about local governance and
LGU relations
First published on iag.org.ph on Sept. 30, 2014
187
The Pains of the Comprehensive Agreement

on the Bangsamoro
Zainal Dimaukom Kulidtod, PhD
277
Proposed BBL Provisions Relevant

Indigenous Peoples
291
The Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)
415
Full Inclusion of
the Bangsamoro
the
to the
Indigenous Peoples
in
Editorial Board
Atty. Benedicto R. Bacani
Editor-in-Chief
Benedikt Seemann
Country Representative
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Prof. Rommel Banlaoi
Executive Director
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence
and Terrorism Research
Prof. Sheila Algabre
Vice President for Mission and Identity
Notre Dame University
Amina Rasul
Convenor
Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy
Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., OMI
Senior Policy Adviser
Ramie Toledo
Communications Specialist
Omar Vicente D. Tadeja
Layout Artist
Editorial
Editorial
his issue of the Autonomy and Peace Review

is published when the Philippine House of
Representatives and the Senate are conducting
broad consultations and deliberations on the Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL) proposed by the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) and certified to Congress by the
Office of the President. The proposed BBL is the legal
instrument that provides the structures and processes
for implementing the Comprehensive Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (CAB) between the Government of
the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF). When ratified in the plebiscite, the BBL
will be the mini-constitution of the new Bangsamoro
political entity that will replace the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The approval by
Congress of the proposed BBL is one of the critical stages
in the Mindanao peace process as it holds promise that
genuine and meaningful Moro self-determination may
finally be achieved through the establishment of the new
Bangsamoro political entity. As well, the approval of
the proposed BBL will trigger the decommissioning of a
substantial number of MILF troops in accordance with
the terms of the FAB.

But the journey for the proposed BBL from its
approval in Congress to its ratification by the constituents
of the CAB-identified Bangsamoro core territories is not
without challenges. Congress with its plenary legislative

powers can introduce changes in the proposed BBL
for any reason including constitutional, administrative
and political grounds. While the executive branch of
the GPH and the MILF accept the plenary powers of
Congress and defers to its wisdom, they hope and
appeal that the House and the Senate recognize the
context of the long and exhaustive negotiations on the
proposed BBL, and pass unchanged if, not all, at the
very least its substantive and major provisions. Some
constitutionalists have weighed in the debates and
raised concerns that some provisions may be resting on
shaky constitutional grounds. Constitutional challenges
can hobble the implementation of the agreed roadmap.
Since the submission of the proposed BBL to Congress,
IAG has been contributing to the in-depth discussions
on the issues close to the hearts and minds of the
constituents. We have also launched a BBL watch to
monitor the hearings and deliberations in Congress.
We are convinced that providing the public the range
of views and opinions will in the end help in building
consensus and support to the agreed roadmap. Peoples
issues, whether out of fear and uncertainty, lack of
information or from legal and constitutional ground
must be articulated and adequately addressed.

This issue of the APR focuses on these emerging
issues.

We are publishing the key issues from IAGs fivepart BBL talkshop series from September to October
2014 and our Q&A with Congressman Rufus Rodriguez,
chairman of the ad hoc committee on the BBL in the
House of Representatives.

Judge Soliman Santos Jrs piece on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law: A Step Forward on a Longer
Road to Peace views the BBL through a contextual lens,
which he says is a decidedly strategic, larger, and longer
view of the BBL than just its substantive content. In this
way, the BBL is regarded as a step forward on a longer
road to peace.

Political scientist Jose Pepe Abuevas From
Presidential Government to Parliamentary Government
explores the shortcomings of our presidential form
of government and argues that we should amend our
Constitution to adopt a parliamentary form. This affirms
the ministerial form of the envisioned Bangsamoro
government.

We are also publishing A Comparison: What
RA 9054 and the BBL say about local governance and
regional-LGU relations by the Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) Undersecretary

Jose Lorena. This article lays down the provisions of the
existing RA 9054 vis-a-vis the BBL to see if indeed local
government units will potentially be better off under the
Bangsamoro.

Zainal D. Kulidtod, PhD examines the substantive
and procedural shortcomings of the CAB in his paper
The Pains of the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro. He argues that unless the grievance of
the most militant Moro is addressed, real and everlasting
peace in Mindanao will remain an elusive dream.

Finally, we are publishing the position paper of
indigenous peoples on the BBL and the full text of the
BBL for reference.

We hope that this issue of the APR can
significantly contribute in shaping a BBL that is inclusive
and acceptable to the majority of the constituents.
Atty. Benedicto R. Bacani

Executive Director
25 Takeaways from the IAG

BBL Talkshop Series
25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series
15

he proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

promises change. But is it a good one? IAGs fivepart talkshop series on the BBL in September to
October attempted to put a face to the new autonomous
political entity envisioned in the BBL. Here are our key
takeaways.

1. Crafting the BBL entailed finding the right
balance between the Constitution and the consistency
of the basic law to the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).

The CAB is the compilation of all agreements
between the Philippine government (GPH) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), most important of
which are the 10 decision points on principles the parties
reached in April 2012 and the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro and its four annexes presented and
signed in a ceremony in Malacaang in October 2012.
President Benigno Aquino issued an executive order
two months later creating the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) whose task is to translate the CAB
a political document into a legal tender, which is now
the BBL. From the BTC, the draft law was transmitted to
the Office of the President. There, the draft law was put
under further scrutiny to ensure that it does not violate
the Constitution.
16 Autonomy and Peace Review

Because the BBL will be passed through Congress,
we have to see that it complies with the Constitution. On
the part of the MILF, we were made to understand that
the government will not sign a document that is contrary
to the Constitution, MILF peace panel member Prof.
Abhoud Lingga said at the talkshop.

This is the farthest point the 17-year history of the
GPH-MILF peace table aimed at ending the insurgency
in the South has reached.

2. A prominent feature of the BBL, the provision
on asymmetric relationship between the Central
Government and the Bangsamoro Government often
attracts scrutiny for its novelty and constitutionality.

Our talkshop panel in the first series said
this relationship is defined well in the BBL and it is
constitutional.

According to Al Amin Julkipli, legal counsel with
the GPH peace panel, asymmetry is an acknowledgement
that the relationship between the Bangsamoro
Government and the Central Government is based on
the identity of the Bangsamoro and its requirements for
self-governance. That is why were setting up power
relations and wealth-sharing along those lines.

When you adopt that asymmetry you recognize
that there are people who are different from the majority.
17
[Hence you] look for political and socio-economic

arrangement that will suit them, Lingga said.

Julkipli believes that this arrangement will give
the Bangsamoro identity elbow room to flourish. It
also makes the Bangsamoro region distinct from other
regions and other local governments. This means that
it is higher than the local government units (LGUs) but
lower than the national government.

Edmund Tayao, University of Santo Tomas (UST)
political science professor and political analyst, said
that asymmetrical relationship is an option available to
democratic states like the Philippines to hold together a
multi-cultural society. This intent to recognize the distinct
identity of a particular people was acknowledged by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution when they included the
provision on autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras whose respective populations
share common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures.

For Julkipli, the fact that the provisions on
autonomous region (Article X) in the Constitution are
separate reflects the intent of its framers to really draw
the line in some ways between the LGUs and autonomous
regions.

Julkipli is confident that the character and spirit
of asymmetry and the intent to set up this kind of
relationship are reflected in the Constitution even if the

word per se is not found.

3. One application of asymmetry is the
parliamentary and ministerial form of government of
the Bangsamoro. And this is within the boundaries of
the Constitution, our talkshop panel assured.

The BBL says: The Bangsamoro Government
shall be parliamentary. Its political system is democratic,
allowing its people to freely participate in the political
processes within its territory. (Art. IV Sec. 2)

Moreover: The Bangsamoro Government shall
adopt an electoral system suitable to a ministerial form of
government, which shall allow democratic participation,
encourage formation of genuinely principled political
parties, and ensure accountability. (Art. IV Sec. 3)

Prof. Tayao lauded the decision to adopt a
parliamentary system for the Bangsamoro, saying that
the nation now has the opportunity to look at different
political systems.

There are two features that stand out, Prof.
Tayao said: the collegial nature of the Parliament and
the broader representation in government of different
groups and sectors.
19

In a parliamentary system, all ministers, including
the Prime Minister, talk as equals. This is a sharp contrast
to the cabinet setup under the presidential system
wherein the secretaries are expected to toe the line of
the President who appointed them. Ministers, unlike
cabinet secretaries, will get their mandate not from the
Prime Minister, but from the people who elected them.

Prof. Lingga added also that compared to the
presidential system, the parliamentary system is more
efficient and closer to Muslim practices and traditions
such as the sultanates.

Meanwhile, the provisions on the composition,
classification and allocation of seats, and election for
reserved seats for non-Moro indigenous peoples (Art.
VII, Sections 4, 5, and 6) would seem to ensure that the
Parliament will be inclusive.

The BBL classifies and allocates seats in the
Bangsamoro Parliament as district seats (40%) to be
elected from single member parliamentary districts,
party representatives (50%) who win seats through a
system of proportional representation, and reserved
seats or sectoral representatives (10%) to include nonMoro indigenous communities, settler communities,
and women.

Prof. Tayaos reading of this seat allocation is
the Bangsamoro Parliament will adopt a mixed system
such as the one practiced in Germany. He added that
political parties, unlike in the traditional elections, will
be strengthened under this system.

The BBL also states than a free and open
regional party system shall be allowed to evolve and
that only regional political parties duly accredited by
the Bangsamoro Electoral Office may participate in the
parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro.

Political parties will organize according to
their ideology, principles, and platforms. Political
parties in the Bangsamoro will be different from the
national that are political parties only in name, run by
particular individuals or a single individual, in fact. In
the Bangsamoro, when they campaign, they campaign
to get support for the party, not a particular person,
Prof. Tayao explained. This means that a strong political
party will have the power because it is organized, and
the members are the ones to determine who from among
them will represent the party in the Parliament.

Randolph Parcasio, ARMM expert and
consultant, said he likes the idea of having political party
representatives who will bring to the regional assembly
policies and programs representing the ideology of their
respective parties.
21

Deploring the prevailing multi-party system
[where] you can float like a butterfly and select whatever
party is convenient for you, the Bangsamoro electoral
system being proposed in the BBL is a welcome change,
he added.

`Another primary consideration why the
Bangsamoro will adopt a parliamentary system is the
multi-layered accountability and the efficiency this
system of government will afford the new autonomous
political entity, Julkipli told the audience at the talkshop.
This can provide opportunities for the Bangsamoro to
have a good structure and effective governance, he said.

4. There are no provisions in the BBL the
Bangsamoro could use later as a basis to secede or
declare independence.

In other words, the BBL is not a formula for
dismembering the Philippine Republic.

On the provision on self-governance (Art. IV, Sec.
1), the BBL only means self-determination. The provision
does not talk about any political action but of the exercise
to pursue economic, social, and cultural development,
Lingga clarified.
5. Vote of no confidence under the

parliamentary system is another welcome feature of
the BBL.

Under the parliamentary system, the Prime
Minister or Chief Minister is equal to the rest of the
members of the Parliament. He can be replaced even
before the general elections via a no confidence vote of
two-thirds of all members of the Parliament. In such case,
the Wali or the titular head will dissolve the Parliament
and call for a new parliamentary election on a date not
later than 120 days from the date of dissolution.

The BBL in Article VII Section 34 adds that, In
case of dissolution, the incumbent Chief Minister and
the Cabinet shall continue to conduct the affairs of
the Bangsamoro Government until a new Parliament
is convened and a Chief Minister is elected and has
qualified.

For Prof. Tayao, the confidence vote is actual
exercise of accountability a practical and political
solution to a political and legal problem. The presidential
system also has legal processes of accountability, but in
such cases, the executive department is held off like what
happened during the impeachment of US President Bill
Clinton. In the parliamentary system, the process [to
exact accountability] does not drag on and continuity of
government is not affected.
23
6. The role of Wali explained.

Wali is an Arabic term that means guardian, Prof.
Lingga said.

The BBL says that the Wali will be the titular
head of the Bangsamoro and as such, will take on only
ceremonial functions.

These ceremonial functions would include
signing of new appointment and administering oath of
office to the new Chief Minister, Prof. Lingga explained.

Upon advice of the Chief Minister, the Wali is
also the one in charge to dissolve the Parliament and
call for a new parliamentary election. The Wali cannot
countermand the Chief Minister.

7. A parliamentary system can be practiced in
the Bangsamoro region even while the national system
is unitary.

According to Julkipli, the provision on
autonomous region does not prescribe a specific form of
government, only that it should be democratic meaning
there are elective executive and legislative branches or
offices.

These are satisfied under the parliamentary
system of the Bangsamoro, in as much as the same are
being satisfied under the presidential system. This will
be the basis that Congress has the power to design a

form of government for the Bangsamoro that is different
from the national format, he added.

8. The BBL provides the Bangsamoro
Government competence and authority over LGUs.

This concept is not entirely new, Parcasio said.
He noted that under the ARMM the same have also
been devolved to the regional government. In his
view, 90 percent of the powers being proposed for the
Bangsamoro are already exercised under the ARMM.

For the Bangsamoro, regional-LGU relations will
be defined further in the Bangsamoro local government
code. This will be one of the priorities of the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority (BTA) once it takes over from the
ARMM.

The BBL says that local administration, municipal
corporations and other local authorities including the
creation of LGUs will fall under the exclusive powers of
the Bangsamoro Government.

The caveat is, under the Bangsamoro, privileges
already enjoyed by the LGUs will not be diminished.
The Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of prospective
constituent units will not be affected because this is
already guaranteed by the Constitution.
25

One of the policy gaps in the ARMM that Parcasio
hopes could be addressed in the Bangsamoro is the
lack of clarity on regulatory powers of the autonomous
region when it comes to the utilization of IRA. The proof
is the absence of Bureau of Local Government Finance
(BLGF) in the ARMM. The rest of the regions have BLGF
in their respective administrative jurisdictions.

Had the BLGF been devolved to the ARMM, the
regional government could have exercised some sort
of regulatory measure or power over LGUs in terms of
IRA utilization, Parcasio said. He also noted that based
on his initial reading of the BBL, there seems to be
provisions on regulatory authority by the Bangsamoro
Government over LGUs on such funds.

9. The Bangsamoro is inclusive.

Saying that the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) will
establish an inclusive new political entity and not an
Islamic state where non-Muslims will be discriminated,
the lone migrant settler representative in the Bangsamoro
Transition Commission (BTC) the body that drafted
the BBL called for support to the proposed basic law
now in Congress.

BTC Commissioner Peter Eisma urged skeptics
to open [their] hearts and minds during the second
talkshop.

We are advocating for peace. This is the time for
us to participate, Eisma said, adding that he himself
used to be an oppositionist but that he made a
paradigm shift because there is no other way except to
move forward.

The panel at the second talkshop also allayed fears
that only a few sectors will benefit from the establishment
of the Bangsamoro.

Citing provisions in the BBL on the allocation and
classification of the seats in the Parliament under the
proposed new political entity, Eisma asserted that the
Bangsamoro is a government for all and there is no
prohibition that if you are not Bangsamoro you cannot
run for office.

This government is not exclusive for Muslims
or the MILF Even a non-Muslim can put up a party
list because fifty percent of the seats will be allocated for
party list. Even in the districts, a Christian can run and
forty percent of the seats in the Parliament are for district
representatives, Eisma said.

The BBL proposes that 40 percent of the Members
of the Parliament will be district representation, 50
percent party representatives, and 10 percent reserved
seats.
27

Fr. Eliseo Mercado, senior policy adviser at IAG,
said that the Bangsamoro identity contained in the BBL
has no attached entitlement, hence, non-discriminatory.
The basis of the identity is historical to recognize the
struggle of the Bangsamoro. There is no special treatment
if you are a Bangsamoro, Fr. Mercado said.

Its up to you whether you want to ascribe or
not. If there will be no self-ascription by non-Muslims,
thats fine. But that does not mean that you are not part
of this government or you are not part of this territory,
Eisma clarified.

Fr. Mercado also noted how the BBL progressed
significantly. The inclusion in the preamble of the
Bangsamoro as well as other inhabitants of the
Bangsamoro shows attempts to be inclusive, he said.

10. The Bangsamoro will be a big improvement
from the current ARMM in terms of fiscal autonomy.

Former ARMM Executive Director Diamadel
Dumagay noted that the BBL provides for a stronger
fiscal autonomy in the Bangsamoro than what is currently
enjoyed by the ARMM. Dumagay cited provisions that
provide significant and additional sources of funds
for the Bangsamoro. The most noteworthy of which is
the annual block grant that will be programmed and
allocated by the Bangsamoro Parliament instead of
Congress.

The ARMM was also granted fiscal autonomy
under Republic Act 9054 but there is no provision on
block grant.

Fiscal autonomy means that the ARMM as a
government institution can administer and allocate
funds on its own, but RA 9054 is very limited in terms
of fiscal autonomy. The budget of the ARMM is part of
the national government. There is a sort of a block grant
in the form of lump sum appropriation but this only
averages 650 million annually. Its too small, Dumagay
said.

The BBL says that the amount of the annual block
grant of the Bangsamoro will not be less than the last
annual budget of the ARMM. For 2015, the ARMM
budget is P25 billion.

The annual national budget for 2015 is P 2.6
trillion.

11. Political autonomy and fiscal autonomy go
hand-in-hand.

More powers and duties will be devolved to the
Bangsamoro, and without fiscal autonomy and funds to
support these new powers and functions, it would be
meaningless, Eisma said.
29

Eisma added that the rationale behind fiscal
autonomy is to attain economic self-sufficiency and
allow the Bangsamoro to come up with its own budget,
development plan and schedule of expenditures.

Under the BBL, the Bangsamoro is given power
to enact its own appropriations law in order that it can
initiate programs and policies that will be responsive to
the needs of its people.

12. The BBL is more specific about natural
resources.

While the existing law (RA 9054) classifies
minerals as strategic and non-strategic, the BBL provides
for non-metallic minerals, metallic minerals, and fossil
fuels and uranium. For non-metallic minerals that
include sand, gravel, and quarry resources, 100 percent
of the revenues will go the Bangsamoro and its LGUs.
For metallic minerals, 75 percent shall be retained for the
Bangsamoro and its LGUs. For strategic resources that
include fossil fuels and uranium, the sharing is 50-50
between the Bangsamoro Government and the Central
Government.

The Bangsamoro can now rationalize the use
of its own resources as it charts its socio-economic
development.

The coverage of the Bangsamoro territory is very
rich in resources. Given these authorities, there is a big
chance for the Bangsamoro to catch up with the rest of
the country in terms of development, Dumagay added.
On the sharing of revenues between the Bangsamoro
Government and its constituent LGUs, the BBL does not
include specific details. This decision will be in the hands
of the Bangsamoro Parliament, according to Eisma. But
the BBL makes it clear that existing rights and privileges
of LGUs will not be diminished.

These rights and privileges of the LGUs are
more likely going to be enhanced under the Bangsamoro
because of additional revenues coming in, Eisma added.
13. The BBL should be able to implement measures to
uplift living conditions of the poor. Agriculture should
be the priority.

Former ARMM Social Fund Project Manager
Nasser Sinarimbo said 63 percent of the Bangsamoro
people belong to the sector of agriculture and majority
of the poor are in this sector.

The transition authority should be able to
implement programs on social services that directly and
immediately address needs of the poor communities,
particularly farmers and fisher folks, to also manage
their expectations.
31

There will be a one year transition period from
the ARMM to the regular Bangsamoro Government in
2016 during which the Bangsamoro Transition Authority
(BTA) will serve as the interim governing body.

Sinarimbo told the audience at the second
talkshop that the Bangsamoro Development Plan for the
transition period until 2016 is now being formulated.
The development plan will be based on sustainable
human development framework and the Bangsamoro
core value system with lens on peacebuilding. Its
primary components are social services, economy,
politics, security, environment, natural resources with
crosscutting themes on women and children, indigenous
peoples, and vulnerable groups.

According to Sinarimbo, this plan will most likely
be adopted by the BTA and make it its roadmap during
the transition period.

14. The BBL has enough safeguards to ensure that
funds address real needs of Bangsamoro communities
and funds are spent judiciously.

Foremost of which is the Bangsamoro Parliament
whose representatives will come from the different
districts and sectors of the Bangsamoro.

Our second panel believes that the Parliament
setup will ensure real representation of the will of
the people in policy- and decision-making in terms of

budgeting and development planning.

That power will reside in the Cabinet and not in
a single individual will also boost check and balance as
anti-corruption measure.

15. With improved fiscal arrangement between
the national government and the Bangsamoro
government, the Bangsamoro is poised to achieve
inclusive growth. But first, it needs competent officials
and empowered people to do the job.

Fr. Mercado echoed the analysis that growth in
the Philippines is not inclusive because it is made by a
mere 0.2 percent of the population.

There is the natural tendency to be attracted to
big corporations but the Bangsamoro should primarily
set its sights on economic policies that support small
and medium enterprises (SMEs), access to credit, and
mainstreaming of informal economy. This way, it can
make growth equally distributed, he said.

The provisions on sustainable development
framework and sustainable development board will
greatly help in this aspect.

For Haron Meling, head executive assistant to the
BTC Chairman, inclusive growth also entails political
33
empowerment. The Bangsamoro electoral system

that puts a premium to peoples representation and
participation in the Parliament is aligned with the goal
of economic empowerment, he said.

The Bangsamoro will also have to address critical
infrastructure to attract investments that will help create
jobs and spur economic growth.

Meanwhile, Dumagay emphasized on having
competent and service-oriented people in government
to deliver sustainable and inclusive development.

16. The Bangsamoro justice system intends to
give the people in the Bangsamoro wider access to
justice through modalities that best suit them.

These modalities include the Shariah for the
Muslims, customary rights and traditions of the
indigenous peoples, local courts, and alternative dispute
resolution systems.

The BBL guarantees that the justice system of the
Bangsamoro will not operate to the prejudice of nonMuslims and non-indigenous peoples.

The panel discussing justice, security and policing
provisions of the BBL during the third talkshop believes
that the Shariah and the tribal courts can be a parallel
system to the regular courts.

There should be no apprehension among
Christians that they, too, will be subject to Shariah. The
panel emphasized the caveat that the Shariah will cover
only Muslims.

17. Even so, the Shariah has to be evolved
through the acceptance of Muslims themselves.

Shariah as a source of law in terms of the
devolution of justice system to the Bangsamoro will have
to evolve.

It is not just the production of laws, but what are
feasible to be implemented in a particular jurisdiction,
Atty. Ishak Mastura said.

Mastura noted that there is no country governed
by constitutional law where the criminal system under
Shariah is fully implemented. There is no such thing
even in Malaysia and Indonesia, he said.

It is not possible as of yet. Even if there might be
a possibility in the future, it has to follow the trends in
other jurisdictions.

Mastura also likened the adoption of Shariah to
the practice of international law.

It goes through the local jurisdictions and
enhances or changes the legal frameworks or the rights
35
of individuals because now you are referring to another

source of laws, he explained.

18. Shariah as currently practiced in the ARMM
will be expanded under the Bangsamoro to include
commercial and criminal laws.

The BBL states that The Bangsamoro Parliament
shall enact laws pertaining to persons and family
relations, and other civil law matters, commercial law,
criminal law, including the definition of crimes and
prescription of penalties thereof. These laws on Shariah
shall only be applicable to Muslims. Criminal laws
enacted by the Bangsamoro Parliament shall be effective
within the territory of the Bangsamoro and shall be in
accordance with the universally accepted principles and
standards of human rights.

Presidential Decree No. 1083 or the existing Code
of Muslim Personal Laws covers only personal and
family relations. The intent of the BBL is to expand this
coverage to include commercial and criminal laws. What
is not clear at this point is whether the Shariah law that
the Bangsamoro Parliament will pass will repeal entirely
PD 1083 or only supplement it.

Mastura believes however that PD 1083 cannot
be repealed easily because this is a national law and
Muslims are not only in the Bangsamoro.

We will still need to have divorce, officiating of
marriage, registration of birth, resolution of succession
wherever Muslims are, and in law you carry your status
wherever you go so if you only have a law on personal
status that is only applicable In the Bangsamoro, it
would be very hard in terms of implementation because
you will have now two conflicting laws. In the case of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, [my opinion is] it would
encompass not only the Bangsamoro but the whole
Philippines, Mastura said.

19. There is no room for cruel and harsh
punishment in the Shariah system under the
Bangsamoro.

The BBL provision on Shariah comes with the
caveat in accordance with the universally accepted
principles and standards of human rights. The
Constitution also prohibits cruel and harsh punishment.
These are the guarantees that the Bangsamoro Shariah
will not impose such punishments. But the ultimate
guarantee is our culture and way of life, Mastura said.
There are principles in Sharia that are immutable like
the Koran and Sunnah in terms of source of law, but
the acceptance of society of the governing paradigm
and its laws, theres a wide universe for that. While its
inspirational for us to have those ideals and the ultimate
aspiration is to eventually implement the whole of what
is Sharia, the acceptance and the readiness of society is
something that will have to evolve, because society is
37
dynamic. Otherwise it becomes an extremist ideology,

Mastura explained.

20. The Bangsamoro Parliament will legislate
traditional justice system of indigenous peoples in the
Bangsamoro to give it the force of law.

Our panel during the third talkshop clarified
however that this legislation only goes as far as recognizing
the justice system of the IPs and standardizing it to avoid
different applications.

This is not imposition but recognition of traditional
justice mechanisms already codified and practiced by
the indigenous communities.
The Bangsamoro, in fact, will elevate IPs through
parity of esteem, [to accord them] the same status as the
Bangsamoro, Mastura said.

21. The Bangsamoro Police will still be part of
the Philippine National Police.

The Bangsamoro police shall be responsible to the
national government, Bangsamoro government, and the
communities it serves. It will be governed by a police law
that shall be passed by the Bangsamoro Parliament. The
Bangsamoro Police Board will supervise it through the
powers delegated by the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).

This is practically like the provision in RA 9054
that says the Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM)
will have the powers of the NAPOLCOM. But this was
never implemented, Mastura added.

In terms of operational control, the linkage
between the Chief Minister and the Bangsamoro Police
will be more organic, Mastura said.

The BBL states that the Bangsamoro Chief Minister
will exercise operational control and supervision and
disciplinary powers over the Bangsamoro Police.

While public order and safety within the
Bangsamoro will be the primary responsibility of the
Bangsamoro Government, the Central Government
retains defense and security as a reserved power.

22. There is no mention of IPRA (Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act) in the BBL but many of the formers
provisions including the four bundles of indigenous
peoples rights are in the basic law.

These four bundles of rights include the right to
native title, indigenous customs and traditions, justice
systems and indigenous political structures, the right
to an equitable share in revenues from the utilization of
resources in their ancestral lands, the right to free and
prior informed consent, right to political participation in
the Bangsamoro Government including reserved seats for
39
the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro Parliament,

the right to basic services and the right to freedom of
choice as their identity. This and the other provisions on
indigenous peoples will ensure that cultural integrity of
non-Islamized indigenous groups in the Bangsamoro is
preserved and protected, BTC Commissioners Froilyn
Mendoza and Melanio Ulama said.

For Mendoza, the BBLs enumeration of IP
rights does not only mean freedom of choice but an
acknowledgement of the distinct identity of the Teduray,
Lambangian, Dulangan Manobo, Blaan and Higaonon.
Unclear distinction between Moro and non-Moro
indigenous peoples also means unclear definition of
rights thus hampering the customs, traditions, and way
of life of non-Islamized IP groups, Mendoza said.

The BBL also recognizes traditional or tribal
justice system and provides for the creation of a tribal
university system within the Bangsamoro to address
the educational needs of the indigenous peoples in
the Bangsamoro. In addition, non-Moro indigenous
peoples will be provided two reserved seats in the
Bangsamoro Parliament to ensure their representation
and participation in the affairs of the Bangsamoro
Government.

23. A plebiscite will determine the core territory
of the Bangsamoro.

The draft BBL states that the core territory of the
Bangsamoro will include the present geographical area
of the ARMM, 6 municipalities in Lanao del Norte, and
39 barangays in North Cotabato. These municipalities
and barangays in Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato,
respectively, voted for inclusion in the ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite but were not included because the
determination of majority of votes then was at the
provincial and city level.

The BBL also includes Isabela City in Basilan and
Cotabato City, the de facto seat of the ARMM regional
government, in the plebiscite for the Bangsamoro. These
cities did not vote for inclusion in the ARMM during the
2001 plebiscite.

BTC legal counsel Lanang Ali, Jr. said during
the fifth talkshop that the determination of votes in
the plebiscite for the Bangsamoro will depend on the
enumeration of geographic areas in the BBL.

This means that for the current ARMM, votes
will be determined at the provincial/city level. For other
proposed geographic areas votes will be counted at the
municipal/barangay level. This is what sets apart the
Bangsamoro plebiscite from the ARMM plebiscite.
41

The BBL also says that other contiguous areas
where there is resolution of the LGU or a petition of at
least 10 percent of the registered voters asking for their
inclusion at least two months prior to the conduct of the
plebiscite may opt for inclusion in the Bangsamoro.

The challenge now for the government and MILF
peace panels is how to build a constituency for the
Bangsamoro to ensure that provinces that are part of
the ARMM will still vote for the Bangsamoro, ARMM
Executive Secretary Laisa Alamia said.

It is important that the people understand the
Bangsamoro and buy into it, she added.

Alamia opined that there will be enough budget
for the Bangsamoro even if new LGUs will choose to be
part of the new political entity.

Of the P25 billion ARMM budget for 2015, 60
percent will be allocated as capital outlay to fund
projects on the ground. This fund which will be turned
over to theBTA, the budget of the BTA itself, and the
block grant starting in 2016 will ensure that social
services, socio-economic and infrastructure projects will
be implemented down to the barangay level.

Citing past Supreme Court decision on
autonomous regions, Atty. Benedicto Bacani said there
should be at least two provinces voting for inclusion
for the Bangsamoro to be a legitimate autonomous

region. Those that voted no will return to their original
administrative regions.

On what will happen to barangays opting to join
the Bangsamoro, Ali brought up two possibilities: either
they will be reconstituted as one municipality especially
in the case of barangays contiguous to each other or
reconstituted to the Bangsamoro municipality nearest to
them.

Ali told the audience at the fifth talkshop that
North Cotabato First District Rep. Jesus Sacdalan has
filed a bill in Congress to create municipalities out of
these 39 barangays for the purpose of the Bangsamoro.
The Bangsamoro Parliament may also enact laws for the
reconstitution of these barangays into a new municipality
or to the Bangsamoro municipality nearest to them.
These barangays will undergo a transition period to
make sure that governance and social services will not
be disrupted.

This power does not extend however to the
creation of congressional districts. In such case the
Bangsamoro Government shall coordinate with the
Central Government through the Philippine Congress
Bangsamoro Parliament Forum.
43

24. The constitutional basis for the creation of
the Bangsamoro is different from its expansion later.

For the creation of the Bangsamoro, Ali pointed
to Article 10, Section 18, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution
that says:

The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.

This explains why only the barangays and not
their mother municipalities (in the case of barangays in
North Cotabato) and only the municipalities and not the
whole province (in the case of municipalities in Lanao
del Norte) will be asked in the plebiscite to determine
the territory of the Bangsamoro.

For expansion, after the Bangsamoro core
territory has been constituted already, the basis will now
be Article 10, Section 10 of the Constitution:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus if a barangay wishes to be part of the
Bangsamoro, the plebiscite will include the whole mother
municipality as the political unit directly affected, Ali
explained.

25. What exactly will happen to employees
of the ARMM is not yet clear without the transition
plan, but the BBL provides for gradual phasing out of
ARMM offices and necessary funds for the benefits
and entitlements of affected employees.

This is a one of the most recurring concerns in the
talkshop series.

The BBL states that upon ratification of the BBL,
the ARMM, including its offices and agencies, is deemed
abolished and the transition or interim period begins.
The BTA is the interim body that will govern the
Bangsamoro until the election of regular officials of the
new autonomous political entity in 2016.

On whether there will be massive abolition of
offices that will in turn make thousands of ARMM
employees jobless, Alamia said: There are no specifics
in the BBL as to what exactly will happen. That is why
we need the blueprint [for transition] as early as now to
address fear and apprehension of the people.
45

She noted that these employees will also vote in
the plebiscite.

We support the BBL but we cannot discount the
fact that the 35,000 ARMM employees are worried about
their future, she added.

Alamia, however, believes that the abolition of
ARMM agencies and employment on a massive scale
will not be practical even when the BTA is already
constituted because the interim governing body has yet
to enact many regional codes including the Bangsamoro
Civil Service Code.

Unless and until there is a transition plan
that would be implemented and the legal basis for
the transition plan would have been enacted by the
BTA, ARMM agencies will continue to carry out their
functions.

The BBL, in Article XVI, Section 9, says that the
BTA will schedule the gradual phasing out of offices of
the ARMM and, in consideration of public interest and
the delivery of services, officials holding appointive
positions will continue to perform their functions in
accordance with the schedule.

The BBL adds that funds for the benefits and
entitlements of affected ARMM employees shall be
provided.

In the end, Alamia urged ARMM employees and
their associations to submit to Congress recommendations
on how to phase transition from ARMM to Bangsamoro.
Notes on the talkshop series:

The BBL talkshop series was presented by IAG in
partnership with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Notre Dame
University (NDU), and Notre Dame Broadcasting Corp. (NDBC).
All five talkshops were held at the Tanghalang Michael Clark of
Notre Dame University in Cotabato City and were aired live over
NDBC stations DXMS and DXND. The first panel on Sept. 18
composed of GPH panel legal counsel Al Amin Julkipli, MILF
panel member Prof. Abhoud Lingga, ARMM consultant Randolph
Parcasio, and independent political analyst Prof. Edmund Tayao
discussed provisions of the BBL pertaining to political autonomy
and Bangsamoro Government. IAG Executive Director Atty.
Benedicto Bacani served as the host. IAG Senior Policy Adviser
Fr. Eliseo Mercado, OMI hosted the second talkshop on the wealthsharing, economy, and fiscal autonomy provisions in the BBL on
Oct. 1. The panelists were BTC Commissioner Peter Eisma, former
ARMM Executive Director Diamadel Dumagay, former ARMM
Social Fund Project Manager Engr. Nasser Sinarimbo, and Head
Executive Assistant of BTC Chairman Haron Meling. Atty. Bacani
returned as host of the third talkshop on Oct. 3, fielding questions
on justice, policing and security to panelists Atty. Sha Elijah
Dumama-Alba, legal consultant with the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) and Atty. Ishak Mastura, chair of the Regional
Board of Investments (RBOI) of the ARMM. NDBC radio anchor
and journalist Caloy Bautista hosted the fourth talkshop on Oct. 14
47
to discuss BBL provisions on basic rights and IP matters with the

experts panel composed of BTC Commissioners Froilyn Mendoza and
Melanio Ulama, Regional Human Rights Commissioner Alikhan
Abuat, and Al Qalam Executive Director Musolini Lidasan. The
fifth and last talkshop in the series hosted by Atty. Bacani on Oct. 16
was devoted to transition and plebiscite provisions of the BBL. The
panelists were ARMM Executive Secretary Laisa Alamia and BTC
legal counsel Lanang Ali, Jr.
Q&A with
Congressman Rufus Rodriguez
on the
Emerging Key Issues on the

Q&A with Congressman Rufus Rodriguez on the

Emerging Key Issues on the Bangsamoro Basic Law
Q&A with Congressman Rufus Rodriguez

Emerging Key Issues on the BBL
51
on the
ep. Rufus Rodriguez, chairman of the ad hoc

committee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)
in the House of Representatives, sat down with
IAG Executive Director Benedicto Bacani to discuss
what he thinks are the emerging issues on the BBL.
Rep. Rodriguez also answered burning questions raised
by the attendees during IAGs town hall meeting on
October 23.

Atty. Benedicto Bacani: Congressman Rodriguez,
so far, what is your general assessment of the ongoing
hearings and proceedings on the BBL?

Rep. Rufus Rodriguez: I was appointed and
elected by the plenary session of Congress to head the
ad hoc committee on the BBL. We have 75 members
and eight vice chairmen. There are 68 congressmen
from Mindanao, 59 from district representation, and
nine party-list who are really based and who come from
Mindanao. Sixty-eight is the Mindanao block.

House Bill 4994 is the BBL in the House of
Representatives. We have already conducted, as of this
afternoon, eight hearings. We have five hearings already
in the Batasang Pambansa. We already heard from the
finance sector the DOF, customs, BIR, from trade DTI,
and agrarian reform, and agriculture departments. We

have heard the security and police sector PNP, armed
forces, NSC.

After hearing these departments in the five
hearings, we have come to the first cluster of provincial
sorties. Our provincial sorties will not only be in the core
region that is mentioned in the BBL. We are going to all
the six regions in the country, especially in their capitals,
including therefore where Christians are the majority.

That is why after we come to Upi in Maguindanao,
Cotabato City, tomorrow, were going to three
simultaneous areas. From here were going to General
Santos City, but Ill drop off in Tacurong City in Sultan
Kudarat where Ill chair a public hearing. Vice chairman
Oaminal [Rep. Henry Oaminal, 2nd District, Misamis
Occidental] will take care of Koronadal. Vice Chair Pedro
Acharon will handle General Santos City.

The second cluster will be in the second week of
November. Were going to Tawi-tawi and Zamboanga
City and then the cluster of Basilan, and Sulu. Were
going to Marawi. Were going to Tubod because of the
six municipalities of Lanao del Norte included in the
proposed core territory. We will go to Iligan, Cagayan
de Oro, North Cotabato, particularly Midsayap and
Kabacan, then Davao City and Butuan City.

53

Massive consultations will be held. We have listed
16 areas in Mindanao, three in Visayas (Cebu, Iloilo,
Tacloban) and four regions in Luzon, including Regions
1, 2 and Bicol.

Why is it that the House of Representatives would
want to go all over the Philippines?

The reason for that is that the BBL affects
positively not only the core areas of the Bangsamoro, not
only the adjacent areas that will receive the benefits of
development when you have peace in the Bangsamoro
meaning Cotabato City (that is not yet a member but
if it becomes a member so much the better because it
is situated in the core territory of Maguindanao and
also Iligan and Cagayan de Oro because when there is
development in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur,
the effects will surely come to the centers of the regions
because they are the ones ready to receive additional
investments, influx of people, and expenses that will be
done by income generated in the Bangsamoro. The same
is true for General Santos and Davao City.

The general effect of this is if we have peace in
Mindanao, there is a large amount of development in
the entire country because when there is a conflict in
Mindanao, the TV stations will not only say Mindanao,
they say Philippines. We are all affected if something
happens here in Mindanao. But if Mindanao is peaceful,

we give the entire country that image of peace and there
will be development all over.

Thats what were doing now and intends to do in
the coming months to have the BBL passed.

Bacani: The ad hoc committee will come up with
a committee report. After that, what is the next step?

Rodriguez: It will be like this: By December
16, the last day of session for the year, before we take
the Christmas break, we intend to have finished the
38 hearings: 16 hearings in the Batasang Pambansa to
hear national officials, 16 hearings in different areas in
Mindanao, three hearings in Visayas, and four hearings
in Manila.

We will be through with the 38 hearings by
December 16. When we resume on January 20 [2015], we
are going to have an executive meeting of the members
of the ad hoc committee. We are now going to go section
by section from the first section to the last to see what
are the comments of the people on each section. There
will be a matrix that will put side by side with each
section the different comments of the different resource
persons from all over the country. Of course were going
to summarize. Well put together positions, opposition
against or suggestions different from the present section.
And then we are going to decide by section what will be

55
the form of each section. That would take a week and

after that we are going to have a voting in the committee
for the draft of the BBL as committee version. Now when
there is approval of that in a weeks time, were going
to give two weeks for plenary debates. That will be the
last week of January and first week of February. After
two weeks of plenary debates, we hope that we will be
ready in the second week of February to send the second
and third reading approval of the bill to the Senate. After
second and third reading, the bill will be sent to the
Senate already.

Hopefully the senators would have already
finished their consultations and will have already their
version. I think there will be some conflicting provisions
because they also have their own minds. There will be
a bicameral committee. We are projecting by end of
February that there will already be a BBL approved by
both Houses. By first week of March the President is
very supportive of this there will be immediate signing
of what the bicameral committee had approved. Well
have the plebiscite sometime in May.

After the plebiscite, after it is ratified by the
majority of votes cast in each province and cities and
the 39 barangays concerned, we are going to have
the appointment of the President of the BTA. That
is sometime in June or July, so they have at least one
year to be able to implement what is mandated of them
including the administrative code, local government

code and all the rest that they will pass in the interim.

Bacani: Lets look at the key issues, the issues that
are emerging there.

Rodriguez: Actually in the political side of
the issue the form of government, there is not much
opposition to that. I was expecting that would be one
because there is seemingly a conflict between the unitary
system of government, a centralized system and the
ministerial form of government. We have presidential
and unitary, but in the proposed bill its more of a
federal, a parliamentary. But theres not much that came
out against that.

But what we have is more on territory, on what
is contiguous. Some congressmen are apprehensive that
10 percent of their barangays in their area adjacent to
Bangsamoro territory maybe included in the plebiscite.
Aside from that, there are those in Zamboanga and
Palawan, which are very far, not contiguous by land,
theyre also saying that they might be included in that.
These are the issues now because it affects about eight
congressmen. These eight congressmen are in the
territories of Zamboanga and Palawan. Palawan is
mentioned in the historical [context] but they have never
been included in the territory. Then we have Iligan City
with six barangays adjacent. We have Sultan Kudarat

57
with some also adjacent and North Cotabato and Lanao

del Norte. That is one question.

The next is Bangsamoro waters. Why is it that
the Bangsamoro waters is 22.224 kilometers while the
fisheries code for the province is only 15 kilometers.
There are also those asking especially from Dipolog and
Pagadian where the industry of sardines are, why is it
that there is preferential rights for the Bangsamoro in
the zones of joint cooperation that is beyond the sea in
between the islands from Zamboanga to Basilan, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi. The Sulu Sea is what we call the zones of
joint cooperation. Why is there a Bangsamoro preference
in the rights to fish in that area?

For the IPs, they are asking about the IPRA. Why
the IPRA is not mentioned. The answer is all the rest of
IPRA is included in the Bangsamoro, plus, plus, plus.
There will be an office for IPs. The sharing is not only
one percent. If you notice in IPRA law only percent will
go to the IPs. Under the BBL, its equitable share. That
means higher than one percent because it says equitable.
That will be the Bangsamoro Parliament that will decide.
There are also issues about the distribution of powers,
but since I am a federalist, as CDP that believes in
federalism and parliamentary form of government, I
am in favor of delineating what is reserved power, what
is concurrent power, and what is exclusive power. The
reserved powers of the state are listed, about ten of
them. The concurrent powers, what both of them can

do, and then the exclusive powers are also listed. These
are the marks of federalism because there is delineation
of political powers through the central and the regional
autonomy.

The other one is the vested rights. What about the
lands secured already by the Christian settlers will they
be taken back? No. Because under the BBL, vested rights
are protected. But there is grievance machinery where
there will be reconciliation and transitional justice to
make sure that the legitimate grievance of Bangsamoro
people who were dispossessed, if the grievance is indeed
legitimate, will be recognized and there will be reparation
given to those unjustly dispossessed.

But as a whole, as we have heard from the
departments in Manila, IPs in Upi, the big majority is in
favor of the BBL.

Bacani: But the question really is operationalization.

Rodriguez: That is why we have to be vigilant once
this law is passed. We want the Bangsamoro Government
and the Parliament to succeed because the entire country
is watching us. How about the Bangsa Bicol, the Bangsa
Ilokano? How about us in Region 10, Cebu? These are
all who would want the rule of subsidiarity, the rule of
autonomy, in fact, the rule of federalism. That is why this

59
is a model for that because this law has clearly a federal

and parliamentary model.

Bacani: How about constitutionality?

Rodriguez: On constitutionality, [as mentioned
earlier] the issues are on the Central Government [that
is unitary and yet the Bangsamoro is] parliamentary,
preferential rights of the Bangsamoro in the zones of
cooperation.

Lets not make so much really on constitutionality,
because precisely the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) and the Office of the President are
making sure that there should be no unconstitutional
provisions because if there is, anybody can go to court.
Look at the MOA-AD. It was declared unconstitutional,
first, because there was lack of consultation in violation
of the executive order. Nobody really knew about MOAAD. Next, it was declared unconstitutional because
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity was created by the
agreement. No agreement can create an entity, only the
Congress.

Everything now is in the hands of Congress to
make this entity, the Bangsamoro. Everything now is in
the House and now we are going [around] in the biggest
and pervasive consultations that I can remember in my
seven years in Congress.

This is the bill that will have this kind of
widespread and inclusive consultation.

Bacani: Definitely, Congress will not just
rubberstamp this, there will be changes. How do we
strike the balance because the BBL in theory is supposed
to be faithful to the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB)?

Rodriguez: There will be consultations. We are
sensitive to the fact that this is give-and-take between
the government and the MILF. Before we will be able to
finalize our version of the bill, we will have consultations
with both the government panel and the MILF panel so
that the amendments we will propose will be acceptable.
But ultimately, whether accepted or not by these two
sectors, what we will leave is the constitutional and the
unconstitutional will be foregone. If we are sure that
it is unconstitutional, that it cannot fall in the liberal
interpretation, we are not going to put it there because it
will embarrass us. The Supreme Court will also declare
it unconstitutional.

Atty. Bacani opens the floor for questions from the
audience.

Former ARMM Executive Director Diamadel
Dumagay: Presently, in the ARMM, there are national
agencies that are within the ARMM structure, but they are
not devolved to the ARMM. Under the law, the ARMM

61
will be deemed abolished. What would happen to these

regional agencies operating within the jurisdiction of the
ARMM vis--vis the new Bangsamoro?

Rodriguez: There will be abolition of the ARMM
and the Bangsamoro will be installed. The different line
agencies which have regional offices if they are not part
of the ten powers that will be retained by the Central
Government, then it will be the Bangsamoro that will
handle them. And so the Bangsamoro will start to either
reappoint those already there in the agencies present in
the ARMM and they will now become employees of the
Bangsamoro.

Dumagay: This is about the block grant in the BBL.
It says that after four years from the operationalization
of the Bangsamoro, the following will be deducted from
the taxes:

Revenues from the additional taxes beyond those
already devolved to the ARMM collected 3 years before; and
Share of the Bangsamoro in the government income derived
from the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources, as provided in Section 32 (Art. 12), collected 3 years
before.

I think four years is too early to deduct from the
block grant income from the natural resources. Can
Congress extend the number of years?

Rodriguez: Thats a very good point. If we want
the Bangsamoro to have fiscal autonomy, why wont we
extend the time of deduction. Well take note of that,
have that discussed.

Mayor Abdullah Campong, South Upi: As
leader of IPs in South Upi, we are appealing to include
in the BBL, Upi, South Upi, and Datu Blah Sinsuat as
one district representing IPs, for the reason that in the
proposed parliamentary districts, the IPs are seemingly
at a disadvantage. If one of us runs, we are at odds
because we will not get votes from majority of the other
municipalities in our district. The IPs are not only present
in South Upi. They are also in Datu Odin Sinsuat, Talayan,
Datu Hoffer, Ampatuan, Shariff Aguak, and Datu Saudi
Ampatuan. Other than the two seats reserved for IPs,
we want one more seat for a representative from an IP
district. The three municipalities can make arrangement
so that whoever gets elected as representative in the
Bangsamoro Parliament will represent not only the
IPs, but the Christian settlers and the Moros present in
the area as well or an arrangement to divide the terms:
one term for the IPs, one term for Moros, one term for
Christian settlers.

Rodriguez: We are going to seriously look into
the proposal that North Upi, South Upi and Datu Blah
Sinsuat will be one district so that not only will you have
two reserved seats for the IPs in accordance of the BBL,

63
but there will an elected IP representative and this will

be materialized through a particular district.

Of the 60 Parliament seats, district representation
is allotted 40 percent meaning 24 seats, 50 percent will be
for party-list, and ten percent reserved seats that means
six seats.

I have already talked to members [of the
committee]. That was also brought out yesterday a
resolution so that three towns may become a district so
that you will have IP representation from the district
through election.

Fr. Ben Torreto: I am a priest from the Cotabato
Diocese. I have lived in Mindanao for quite some time
now. I believe that this law has benefits. My apprehension
is on the implementation because there have been
problems when it comes to the implementation of the
law. I believe that peace would always mean equality,
integrity of people, rights, and justice. I want to stress
that the meaning of peace that is integral, justice for all,
should be ensured in the law to avoid for instance, in
the hiring for jobs, discrimination. Biases and prejudices
arise because of the history of Mindanao but the peace
that we aspire should always connote justice, equality
and justice for everyone.

I would also want further clarification on Article
V, Section 4, Item j, which says that the Bangsamoro
Government as part of its exclusive powers will supervise

and regulate private schools in the Bangsamoro,
allowing for the participation of three representatives
of private schools in the deliberations of the appropriate
Bangsamoro Governments ministry or office dealing
with private schools.
Rodriguez: For a Bangsamoro to have a strong
autonomous area, politically and fiscally, is precisely to
devolve the regulation of education to the Bangsamoro
Government. Under that section, it is very clear that
the supervision and regulation of private schools
Notre Dame University for example will be under
the Bangsamoro Government through the Ministry
of Education that they are going to create. Another
important thing is there will be three representatives of
the private school system for example in the province of
Maguindanao that in the formulation of the regulations
for the private schools, it will take into account the points
of view of the representatives of private schools. So there
is that particular requirement that these three will be
embedded in the Ministry of Education. We cannot get
away really when we say that there is devolution, that
there is the rule of subsidiarity, and yet why is it that it
will be CHED in Manila that is going to regulate Notre
Dame in Cotabato City (granting that Cotabato City will
be part of the Bangsamoro) and not the Bangsamoro
regional government.

65

In the case of public schools, it is also clear that
public schools state colleges and universities will
remain to be governed by their charter. It is not true that
they will be governed by the Bangsamoro Government.

The chairman of the appropriate committee on
education in the Bangsamoro Parliament will sit as
chair or co-chair of that. But then academic freedom
will continue in both the public and private education
system.

Bacani: What about the system of education of
the Bangsamoro vis--vis the national education system
because there are also apprehensions on this?

Rodriguez: The State will always prescribe the
minimum that will be required of a graduate even from
those here in the Bangsamoro. However the provision in
the BBL on the madaris system says that the Bangsamoro
can also establish colleges on madaris and they will have
examination for the madaris teachers. They, probably
right now, will be integrating the madaris in the regular
[curriculum]. The DepEd will now try to have the
madaris education in elementary and high school in the
Bangsamoro area, but only for public schools.

Mario Catubay, IPDEV: This is still on education,
particularly on tribal system for IPs. This is not found in
IPRA. It will be good if IPRA will be embedded plus this
tribal university system. For almost two decades now,
IPRA has never been implemented. We hope that this

provision will be implemented.

Rodriguez: In fact there is a mandate for the
Bangsamoro Parliament to be able to enact a law that
will establish a tribal university system. What we
envision in the tribal university system is that with the
normal Western kind of education, the education for the
preservation of IP culture, traditions and practices will
be integrated. We would want that implemented by the
Bangsamoro Parliament.

John Unson, staff writer with the Philippine
Star: I am covering the most hostile areas in Mindanao.
As I go around, I would hear so many questions from
people whether RA 9054 will be repealed just like that,
because the people I talked to, their understanding is that
Republic Acts, this kind of laws, can only be improved
but you cannot absolutely delete them just like that.

Another thing is which would come first: the
deactivation of the ARMM and the creation of the
Bangsamoro, or the creation of the Bangsamoro and then
the deactivation of the ARMM? The people fear that they
have nothing to return to when ARMM is abolished or if
the creation of the Bangsamoro will not fare favorably in
the plebiscite.

On decommissioning and disarmament: It should
not be only the MILF that should be decommissioned

67
and disarmed. Mind you, 90 percent of the firearms of

rebels are their personal firearms and over the years
feudal culture has developed. Love of guns is so strong.
People like the datus have to show protection for their
people. They collect guns not to fight the government but
as a status symbol, protection from adversaries because
we have poor justice system in this part of the country.
People resort to rido. LGU officials also have guns that
need to be decommissioned.

Rodriguez: Three points: First, RA 9054 is a mere
law, it may be called organic law but there is only one
higher and fundamental law of our country and that is
the Constitution. Everything can be amended, revised or
repealed. That is why now with the BBL, it is repeal. In
fact RA 9054 repealed RA 6734. That has already been
done before.

Congress has the powers to repeal any kind of
law. Therefore Congress can repeal RA 9054, and that is
precisely the title of the BBL: establishing the Bangsamoro
and repealing RA 9054.

Congress can amend, revise, and can also repeal
a law because we want to substitute the ARMM with
the Bangsamoro that will have more political and fiscal
autonomy. You can see the big difference from RA 9054.
In terms of power-sharing, there is a clear delineation in
the BBL on what the Central Government will retain, the
concurrent powers and exclusive powers. Theres also

the provision on block grant. You will no longer go to
Congress to get your budget. You are going to have your
income and special development fund. RA 9054 does not
have that.

On the second issue, when the BBL is approved
in the plebiscite, thats only the time we abolish the
ARMM, and the Bangsamoro will come in. There is no
hiatus. There is a cutoff point, which is when the law is
ratified. The Bangsamoro will start, so does the fading
away of the ARMM.

When the law is approved, I dont expect massive
[abolition]. There has to be a transition. For instance, in
education, the teachers will continue. You cannot remove
them out and reappoint 20 thousand plus of them. These
are the things that can be put in the transition [plan] that
they will continue until the Bangsamoro is able to screen
new employees and so on.

The third point, on guns: normalization pertains
to the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). This is
strictly the army of the MILF. These are those that will be
listed by the MILF, who are the members and there will
be inventory of guns and members of the BIAF. We are
not saying surrender or even turnover but putting these
resources into non-use. Therefore you will continue to
have your guns and if they are registered, thats it But
one thing with the normalization is this: what if the list

69
of the BIAF and the guns will not be put into non-use by
not giving it to the authority which is headed by Norway,
with Brunei and Turkey [International Decommissioning
Body]? Then these become illegal firearms if they are not
registered with the Bangsamoro Police. Therefore either
you are able to register them in the Bangsamoro Police
or include them in the BIAF listing. Anything in between
will be illegal position of firearms.

On guns of LGUs, it will depend on the rules of
the Bangsamoro on how these firearms can be registered.

The Bangsamoro Parliament can have that law.

Rahib Payapat, Bangsamoro Business Club: On
LGUs within the prospective territory of the Bangsamoro,
we know that under the ARMM, the regional government
has no power to control and supervise them in terms of
the utilization of IRA. Will the future Bangsamoro have
these powers?

Rodriguez: The IRA of local governments will
remain untouched. It will not be given to the Bangsamoro.
LGUs will continue to receive their IRA even after the
BBL. The BBL will get 75 percent of internal revenue
collected in the territory not including the 40 percent of
the LGUs but only the 60 percent.

Will the Chief Minister be able to control how the
local governments spend their IRA?

No, he cannot because it is already recognized
that the LGUs will continue. There is also local autonomy
to them. The Chief Minister will only have general
supervision over them.
Bacani: But will there be additional resources for
the LGUs under the Bangsamoro?

Rodriguez: Yes. For example, in terms of the
natural resources found in the Bangsamoro, according
to the BBL, there will be equitable distribution, equitable
sharing of the benefits from the utilization of natural
resources of all LGUs concerned. The LGUs will be
able to share in accordance with what the Bangsamoro
Parliament will do [pass]. After all, the areas of LGUs are
represented in the Parliament.

Rahib Payapat: What makes the Bangsamoro
different from the current setup?

Rodriguez: We have more political autonomy,
more powers as enumerated in concurrent powers
for both the Bangsamoro Government and Central
Government. The Bangsamoro will have exclusive
powers. Practically everything except for foreign affairs,
monetary currency, intellectual property, and national
defense are in the Bangsamoro. A lot of these political
powers are not found in RA 9054. On fiscal autonomy,
you will have your own sources of revenue, block grant,
special development fund, taxes that you are going to

71
collect donors tax, estate tax, documentary stamp tax,

capital gains tax.

Bacani: How do we ensure that this can really be
implemented? Are you thinking of a mechanism in the
law, an oversight maybe?
Rodriguez: It is the law so it will have to be
implemented. Congress always has the right of oversight.
That is a given power of Congress. Because it makes laws
it also makes oversight so that the laws are faithfully
implemented. There will be a special committee on the
oversight of the implementation of the BBL. We are
making sure that this will not suffer the same fate as RA
9054.
Councilor
Benny
Ambalgan,
Paglat,
Maguindanao: This question is from the people of
Paglat, Maguindanao. We know that Mindanao and
the ARMM have many groups and sectors such as the
MNLF factions, the MILF, the religious, the datus and the
sultanates and lumads. These groups also have influence
and power. How do we cater to these groups to ensure
that they do not cause disturbance [create opposition to]
in the forthcoming Bangsamoro Basic Law.
Rodriguez: The BBL is the product of peace talks
between the government and the MILF. But it does
not mean that, we, in Congress, will not want to hear
these groups. That is why, as far as I am concerned, I

have always advocated inclusivity in the consultation
by asking the MNLF to join to hear their side. What is
important is the initiative for the MNLF and MILF to be
able to talk together and come up with their consensus
points. That will be stronger in terms of being able to
ask what should be included in the BBL. We want you
in the Bangsamoro to unite. We are going to hear you.
Ultimately, all of you, all the groups should be able to
come together.

As for the sultanates, the Council of Elders in
the BBL does not mention the sultanates in the different
territories. I think there should be recognition of the
sultanates because they, by history and genealogy,
can trace membership. There is ascendancy of sultans
over their clans. That is one of the possible changes
in the Council of Elders that we will institutionalize.
The sultanates of Maguindanao for instance will have
to group themselves together, choose from among
themselves who will sit in the Council of Elders. The
same is true for the sultanates in Lanao del Sur.

Datu Pagayao, Bangsamoro Business Council:
I want to be clarified about the Bangsamoro Police
that will be part of the PNP. How is this so because the
Bangsamoro will have its own government? Most of
those in the BIAF did not go to school. According to the
BBL, the qualifications of the Bangsamoro Police will be

73
the same as the police force all over the Philippines. Will
the BIAF be integrated in the Bangsamoro Police?

Rodriguez: The hiring of policemen in the
Bangsamoro will have to follow NAPOLCOMs
requirements for hiring of policemen. The salary will
likewise come from the national government, not from
the Bangsamoro Government.

The Chief Minister will have operational control
over the Bangsamoro Police, but it will be under the PNP
in terms of benefits, disciplining, and qualifications.

Pagayao: What if in the plebiscite, some
municipalities in Maguindanao opt out? How can the
province become part of the Bangsamoro core territory?

Rodriguez: The majority of the votes cast in the
province vote will be the basis.
Bacani: For cities, majority of votes cast in the city will
be the basis.

[Except in the municipalities in Lanao del Norte,
and 39 barangays in North Cotabato where the majority of
votes will be decided in the municipal and barangay level,
respectively Ed.]

Bacani: Another concern is how to govern these
municipalities and barangays.

Rodriguez: The law is silent whether they will
become part of Maguindanao. They can be a municipality.
Ultimately, they are adjacent to Maguindanao. But there
should be a specific legislation on that.

Pete Marquez, Metro Cotabato Chamber of
Commerce: Will the NEDA have influence on the
Bangsamoro?

Rodriguez: There will be an economic
development office for the Bangsamoro. In fact in the
NEDA national board, the Chief Minister is a member.
Marquez: We hope that will be implemented because
such representation by the ARMM is weak.

Another concern: Will the BIAF be integrated in
the armed forces?

Rodriguez: The BIAF will in fact be
decommissioned; their firearms will be put to non-use by
giving them to the International Decommissioning Body.
The BIAF will not automatically become members of the
armed forces. There is no discrimination in the quota for
the armed forces especially when there may be a creation
of the Bangsamoro command of the armed forces which
will be under the hierarchy and chain of command of
the armed forces. Anybody can apply, members of BIAF
can apply, so can Christians and lumads. They have to
follow the same requirements.

75

Akas Parending: In relation to territory, after
the plebiscite there will be a declared territory for the
Bangsamoro. Can Congress create its own political map
so in the future it will not create confusion to those
territories, barangays and municipalities that are part of
the Bangsamoro?

Rodriguez: The Bangsamoro area [after the
plebiscite] will now be the Bangsamoro area and we
cannot change that anymore unless 10 percent in some
future time of the inhabitants in certain areas would want
to join the Bangsamoro. What we can do in Congress
are legislative districts. [For instance] we can add in
Maguindanao additional district. That is the power
of Congress to have legislative districts in the House
of Representatives not in the Bangsamoro. It is now
appended in the law the Parliament districts but we are
open to North Upi, South Upi, and Datu Blah Sinsuat to
be also considered as district to have one representative.
We have here the appendix to the BBL composing the
districts.

Bacani notes that four municipalities are not included
in the appendix.

Vice Mayor Rasul Ebus, Datu Piang: What does
the BBL say about political dynasty? I do not see any
provisions on this in the BBL.

Rodriguez: If we put it there, the BBL might not
get approved. We are very clannish the Bangsamoro
and the IPs. Thats the culture we have. Our Constitution
has anti-dynasty provisions but whats happening?
Maybe the BTC thought that it is prudent not to put it
there because the BBL might not get approved anywhere
in the Bangsamoro.

Councilor Sammy Ibrahim, Datu Piang: Is it
possible to include in the BBL a mechanism or institution
that will focus only on ensuring check and balance? This
is a very hot issue since RA 6734 to RA 9054. Can we do
this in the BBL?

Rodriguez: The check and balance actually
is between the Bangsamoro Parliament and the
Bangsamoro Government. When they are merged, when
the Chief Minister comes from and sits in the Bangsamoro
Parliament, the members are still a check to the Chief
Minister. In fact the Chief Minister may lose by a vote of
no confidence. That can be sent to the Wali and [in such
case] the Wali will dissolve the Parliament. We cannot
have another entity for check and balance.

The other check of course is the Commission on
Audit (COA). While we have an audit body in the BBL, it
is still subject to the power and authority of the national
Commission on Audit that is the check and balance on
fiscal matters.

77

Badran Noor (CCSPC Alumni): On the plebiscite
that will be conducted possibly next year, is there a
mandate on the deleted, removed or transferred names
of registered voters with the Comelec? We have such
experience in the previous elections. Can Congress do
something to prevent such instances?

Rodriguez: We have to be vigilant against it, for
instance, to bring to the attention of the COMELEC if you
are removed or unlawfully transferred. You start with
the provincial COMELEC director, then the regional
director or the national en banc. That is a COMELEC
matter. It has the exclusive power on who can vote, who
can register and who should not be transferred.

Councilor Bruce Matabalao, Cotabato City:
Might there be a possibility of the BTAs term being
extended because based on the draft BBL, it is very clear
that the BTA will exercise the regular powers of the
regular Bangsamoro Government but it seems that its
term would be very limited?

What if somebody goes to the Supreme Court and
question the constitutionality of the BBL?

Rodriguez: Our bill is very clear that there
will elections of the Bangsamoro regular government
on the first Monday of May 2016. In other words, the
BTA will have a short term of about less than a year.
Probably we can extend that. We will consider that in
Congress because if the BTA will have a very short term,

it cannot lay the foundation for the regular Bangsamoro
Government to perform.

On the second question, it is very possible that
there will be always those who will feel that a particular
provision violates the Constitution. That is why our
main task in Congress is to make sure that there will be
no basis for anyone to go to Supreme Court. As far as our
minds and conscience will allow us, the one we will pass
will be in consonance with the Constitution.

We cannot be likened to the MOA-AD. The
problem in the MOA-AD was there was a violation of
executive order creating the panels because they should
had have consultations. Secondly, the BJE was not
created by Congress but by an executive agreement.

That is different now, because it will be Congress
that will create the Bangsamoro.

Rep. Rufus Rodriguez is also the president of the
Centrist Democratic Party of the Philippines (CDP). Learn
more about the party at http://cdp.com.ph.

Emerging Key Issues on the Proposed BBL: A Town
Hall Meeting with Cong. Rufus Rodriguez was presented by
the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG), Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), and Centrist Democracy Political
Institute (CDPI).
Bangsamoro Basic Law:

A Step Forward on a Longer
Road to Peace
Bangsamoro Basic Law: Step Forward on a Longer Road to Peace
81
Bangsamoro Basic Law: A Step Forward on a Longer

Road to Peace
Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Naga City, 25 October 2014
aving followed as closely as possible, even

from a distance, the Mindanao peace process
for more than 20 years since 1993, mainly as
a civil society peace advocate and occasionally as a
peace researcher and consultant, one can perhaps be
forgiven for giving occasional unsolicited analysis and
advice. There are certain conjunctures in that process
that particularly call for this. For me, the achievement
of an agreed version between the Government of the
Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law
(BBL) and its submission to Congress as House Bill
(HB) No. 4994 and Senate Bill (SB) No. 2408 is one such
conjuncture. The trajectory of this must ideally be not
only understood but also influenced for the better of the
whole process. It is better to say ones piece now seeking
to make a modest contribution to that end, rather than
later when it no longer matters because it has been
overtaken by events. But of course, one can only offer
ones thoughts in good faith and according to ones best
lights; their use or otherwise is mainly up to the direct
and key actors in the peace process.
Its Complicated But It Will Pass

How are we to view the BBL or more precisely
the proposed BBL now before Congress? Its complicated,
but this refers not only to its substantive content. It is
made more complicated by what is not in its text or
substantive content but also by its context and its place
or role in the overall Mindanao peace process (and its
various peace agreements) and in the solution of the
Bangsamoro problem. Ultimately, the latter has to be the
standard or lens for viewing the BBL. This is a decidedly
strategic, larger and longer view of the BBL than just its
substantive content. In this way one might see the BBL
as a step forward on a longer road to peace. And this
should help guide the current conjuncture which is in
the arena of Congressional deliberations.

Note that there is in fact no BBL yet, it still has to
be passed by Congress and then ratified by a plebiscite
among the residents in its proposed core territory. In
the nature of Congressional legislative processes, the
proposed BBL cannot be expected to be passed as is by
Congress, there will be amendments to it. The question
is whether the passed BBL would be faithful to the intent,
spirit and key substance of the proposed BBL. There is also
the possibility and even likelihood of constitutionality
suit challenges in the Supreme Court (SC) against the
proposed or passed BBL, if not also against its antecedent
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(CAB). The outcome of such constitutionality litigation
83
will necessarily bear on the BBL as in either upholding

it or striking it down, either partially or entirely.

For purposes of this paper, I will assume that the
proposed BBL will be passed by Congress more or less
faithful to its intent, spirit and key substance, and there
is political basis for this estimate. I will no longer hazard
here an estimate on any final adjudication by the SC of
the constitutionality issues. Your opinion is as good as
mine on this (and some legal luminaries have already
started to weigh in on this), but even Congress knows
that the final arbiter of constitutionality is the SC in a
proper suit or suits brought to it for that purpose.

For many, including in Congress, the key criterion
for passing the proposed BBL is constitutionality. In
fact, this was also the key criterion of the Office of the
President (OP) in reviewing the proposed BBL as drafted
by the Bangsamoro Transitory Commission (BTC). The
ensuing further negotiations on this (more precisely,
negotiations of interpretation and implementation of the
FAB and its Annexes) between the GPH and the MILF,
culminating all the way up to their respective principals
President Benigno S. Aquino III and Chairman Al-Haj
Murad Ebrahim, eventually resulted in the agreed
version of the proposed BBL submitted to Congress as
HB 4994 and SB 2408.

And so, on that basis, it may be said that as far as
the GPH, or more precisely the Executive Department of
the Philippine government, and the MILF are concerned,
there is a consensus that the agreed version of the

proposed BBL is faithful both to the Constitution (or
more precisely its flexibilities) and to the FAB and
its Annexes, the respective key parameters or terms of
reference of the two peace negotiating parties and now
peace partners. And so, I will no longer deal with these
two lenses for viewing and evaluating the proposed
BBL. I will look at it further below through some other
lens or term of reference which is whether it serves the
underlying goal of the Mindanao peace process to solve
the Bangsamoro problem.

The MILF has taken a leap of faith of sorts in
trusting not only President Aquino early on but also now
the collective wisdom of the members of Congress.
The sense of Congress appears to be that expressed
by Senate President Franklin Drilon who has said the
first important issue to be tackled is ensuring that
the proposed BBL would not require an amendment
to the Constitution, It should be consistent with the
Constitution, just like any law that we will pass. He said
in particular that Congress needed to ensure that the law
will stand scrutiny if questioned in the SC, It is therefore
incumbent upon us to make sure that the efforts exerted
by both panels will not be put in vain, by ensuring that
the Bangsamoro law falls within the four corners of the
Constitution Thus, also the prior thorough due
diligence legal review by the OP of the BTC-drafted
proposed BBL. Having resulted in the agreed version
of the proposed BBL with the imprimatur of no less than
President Aquino who himself directly endorsed it to the
85
leaders of Congress as no less than his major legacy of

legislation, HB 4994 and SB 2408 can be expected to be
carried by the ruling majority of his Liberal Party (LP).

If ever, the said bills would be subject only to
refinements and improvements, especially in defense
or enhancement of the administrations position that
the proposed BBL is constitutional, including making
whatever necessary or desirable bill amendments for this
purpose (on the premise ideally of MILF concurrence
therewith). If there is any provision that appears to
require a constitutional amendment, the scenario would
appear to be to remove or change it and defer to a later
time whatever might require a constitutional amendment
(again on the same ideal premise). In fact, the second
mandated task of the BTC is, whenever necessary, to
recommend proposed constitutional amendments but
the process and time frame for this is not indicated
in the outlined GPH-MILF peace road map till the
establishment of the Bangsamoro Government by mid2016, the scheduled end of term of President Aquino.

Given President Aquinos avowed historical
legacy stake in the GPH-MILF peace process, Bayan
Muna party-list representatives have said that while the
Congressional deliberations on the proposed BBL are
expected to be lengthy and contentious due to the scope
of the bill, the Congressional voting numbers which the
President can muster would still carry the day for the
passage of the BBL. This is what we referred to earlier as
the political basis for our estimate that it will be passed
by Congress more or less faithful to its intent, spirit and

key substance, or at least to an extent acceptable enough
to the MILF under a pragmatic doctrine of realpolitik.
Leaps of Faith, Tempering of Hopes

To be clear, this is not to say that Congress is a
rubber stamp. The fact that the MILF itself refers to its
collective wisdom may indicate that there would be, as
there should be, genuine deliberations hearing all sides
of the issues. If at all, this should also be an opportunity
for public discussion and education not only on the BBL
but also on the Bangsamoro problem and the Mindanao
peace process. We mentioned earlier about the MILFs
leap of faith in trusting that the merits of its cause will
survive Philippine constitutional processes, even if
without expressly submitting itself to this. Maybe that
leap of faith should count for something or should be
reciprocated by leaps of faith from the other side.

One cannot apply that same political basis
pertaining to Congress in order to estimate the likely
outcome of BBL constitutionality litigation in the SC.
But given the due diligence exercised by the Executive
Department and to be exercised by the Legislative
Department in ensuring that the Bangsamoro law falls
within the four corners of the Constitution, it can be
fairly estimated that the BBL would on the whole be
found and be upheld by the Judicial Department to be
constitutional, with at most only a few provisions, if
ever, found to be unconstitutional and separable from
87
the constitutional whole unlike the case of the aborted

2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD), which was declared unconstitutional as a
whole.

It must be a bit frustrating though for the MILF
that, after successfully negotiating with the GPH peace
panel resulting in the FAB and then the CAB, it would
appear to still have to further negotiate with the OP,
then Congress and then maybe the SC as regards the
interpretation and implementation of the FAB and its
Annexes in the form of the BBL. Welcome to the Philippine
presidential system of separation of powers, and checks
and balances. This might have something to do with the
MILFs decided preference for the parliamentary form
for the Bangsamoro Government.

To be sure, so much effort, resources and even
lives have gone into the GPH-MILF peace process
since it officially started in January 1997. After a long
and winding road to peace spanning so far more than
17 years (with the MILF, but 39 years for the Moro
National Liberation Front counting from the first Jeddah
peace talks in January 1975), the agreed version of the
proposed BBL -- now HB 4994 and SB 2408 -- represents
the most developed level so far of a joint Filipino-Moro
consensus measure to solve the Bangsamoro problem.
More so, if and when, it gets passed into a law that is
acceptable to the MILF.

The aborted 2008 MOA-AD may have provided
for a higher level of Bangsamoro self-determination (an
associative relationship) but this was a merely initialed
not signed agreement and it never got to the stage of
implementing legislation. As for Republic Act (RA)
No. 9054, the second Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), though it
purported to implement the 1996 Final Peace Agreement
(FPA) with the MNLF, it did not, up to this day, have the
latters concurrence or acceptance as the implementing
legislation. Precisely, the FAB learned that lesson of
history when it stipulated that This Agreement shall not
be implemented unilaterally. It is the said ARMM that
is sought to be replaced by a better Bangsamoro entity
to be established by the BBL upon its ratification by the
electorate in the proposed core territory which expands
on that of the ARMM.

There is a valid and understandable sense that,
having come this far with the proposed BBL, it is the best
or at least most feasible legislative measure moving
forward, while under the remainder of the Aquino
administration till mid-2016, to address the Bangsamoro
problem and secure peace in Muslim Mindanao.
Actually, that view I credit to a Mindanaoan peace
advocate friend Atty. Benedicto R. Bacani, who was in
the panel of independent lawyers that ably assisted the
proposed BBL negotiations, and who told me that the
proposed provisions in the BBL are the best moving
forward. That may indeed be so, and for this reason
the proposed BBL deserves the support, or better still
89
critical support, of all peace-loving Filipinos, not to

mention Moros.

Interior Secretary Mar Roxas has said that the
proposed BBL is the last chance that could bring
about lasting peace in Mindanao. Just for historical
perspective lest we forget, the same was said about the
1996 FPA with the MNLF. It is important to be aware
of past lessons, including those about premature
exultation and the revolution of rising expectations.
But just also for political perspective, it was Roxas and
Drilon who were on record, in the mass media as well
as in the SC, as the strongest oppositors to the 2008
MOA-AD -- when they were in the opposition to the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
What a difference a presidential administration makes
in the Philippines! Which actually also raises question
about the future of the Bangsamoro Government under
whatever next administration.

Indeed, what a difference a presidential
administration makes, or more precisely its popularity.
The 2008 MOA-AD under auspices of the unpopular
President Arroyo was not even a signed agreement but
it was already subjected to constitutionality litigation
in the SC and which eventually struck it down as
unconstitutional, while the FAB, then its Annexes and
finally the CAB under the auspices of the popular
President Aquino were all fully signed and sealed
agreements but until now no constitutionality suits have
been filed against them, notwithstanding continuing
commentaries of unconstitutionality by various legal

luminaries, including most prominently Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago and the Philippine Constitution
Association (Philconsa). Whatever constitutionality
issues against the FAB-CAB appear to have already been
overtaken by the proposed BBL now before Congress.
Of course, normally constitutionality litigation would be
considered premature in the case of mere bills which are
not yet laws (yet it was not considered premature for an
unsigned agreement like the 2008 MOA-AD!).

But of course one cannot deny those, especially
the Moros, who place their hopes for a finally just and
lasting peace in the FAB-CAB and the proposed BBL. One
senior Moro, lawyer Makabangkit B. Lanto, expressed
it well in response to critics of the peace pact: Many
Moros like myself will accept any piece of paper, short
of compromising our honor and dignity, that will keep
the ember of hope for peace burning in our hearts and
heal the wounds inflicted by the injustice of the past.
While a young blood Moro like Maleiha Shahara
D. Alim says it just as eloquently: Our ancestors
envisioned this moment. Our warriors fought for it.
Our people clamored and struggled for what is rightly
ours. And now it is within our grasp, to hold and uplift:
the promised land of the Bangsamoro. And as MILF
peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal told the House ad hoc
committee on the proposed BBL: The Bangsamoro is
the sum of our hopes and dreams. It may mean nothing
to you. But it is the whole world to us.
91

MILF Chairman Murad, in his remarks on the
signing of the CAB on 27 March 2014 at Malacanang Palace,
described it as the crowning glory of our struggle and
as the most fitting solution to the undying aspiration
of the Bangsamoro. A recent (16-22 September 2014)
editorial of Luwaran, official website of the MILF Central
Committee, titled BBL Menu for Unity and Solidarity,
has however shed some particularly interesting, if not
instructive and tempering, light on these high hopes, at
the time of Congressional deliberations on the proposed
BBL:
In the BBL, it addresses the issues of identity,
territory of the Bangsamoro, ancestral domain,
natural resources, sharing of powers and wealth,
administration of justice (Shariah Law, local
courts, and indigenous justice system of the
indigenous peoples), human rights issues, etc.
What more a Moro can ask for?
Of course, solving the Bangsamoro Question or
Problem will not be fully addressed by the BBL
alone even if it is passed by Congress. The basis
of the BBL is only the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (FAB), its four Annexes and
the Addendum on the Bangsamoro Waters,
thereby leaving other parts of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) not yet
addressed or unimplemented.
This will be done through the other mandate of the

Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) which
is to make proposals to amend the Constitution

The last two quoted paragraphs raise particularly
important angles that may have escaped the previous
attention of most. To recapitulate and/or restate these
angles coming from the MILF:
1. The Bangsamoro problem will not be fully
addressed by the proposed BBL alone even if
passed as is by Congress.
2. The proposed BBL is based only on the FAB, its
four Annexes and the Addendum on Bangsamoro
Waters, and not also on the other component
agreements of the CAB.
3. The other parts of the CAB (i.e. those not
covered by the BBL) are to be addressed or
implemented by constitutional amendments to be
proposed by the BTC.

These angles, which are clearly propositions of the
MILF (it remains to be seen whether these are concurred
in or shared by the GPH), might be said to jibe with our
view that the BBL is or should be seen as a step forward
in what is entailed to be a longer road to peace, beyond
2016. These MILF angles should give us some pause
to ponder on their implications and also to get a better
sense of where we really are at in the larger picture.
93
Solving the Bangsamoro Problem

If the MILF itself, which had first posed in
January 1997 the single peace talking point To solve
the Bangsamoro problem, says that solving the
Bangsamoro Question or Problem will not be fully
addressed by the BBL alone even if it is passed by
Congress, then who are we to say otherwise? After all,
it is their, not the GPHs, perception of the Bangsamoro
problem that is crucial for its solution. It is important
to go back to how the MILF elaborated on this problem,
through its Technical Committees Sub-Committee on
Agenda Setting, in February 1997:

This problem involves a wide variety of social,
cultural, economic and political issues and concerns that
include, but not limited to, the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Ancestral domain
Displaced and landless Bangsamoro
Destruction of properties and war victims
Human rights issues
Social and cultural discrimination
Corruption of the mind and the moral fiber
Economic inequities and widespread poverty
Exploitation of natural resources
Agrarian reform
The above issues and concerns are what we perceive

to be the Bangsamoro problem. Finding a political and
lasting solution to this problem will form part of the
agenda in the forthcoming formal talks between the GRP

and the MILF panels, with the end in view of establishing
a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable
to the Bangsamoro people. (underscorings supplied)

At one level, one can compare the aboveenumerated non-exclusive nine-point substantive agenda
starting with ancestral domain, on one hand, with the
substantive content of the FAB-CAB and BBL, on the
other. Most of the said nine-point substantive agenda
appear to be covered by the latter. However, if we take
the very important and contentious first item ancestral
domain, its substantive content has not been spelled out
in the FAB-CAB and BBL. In the BBL, it is merely listed
in the FAB, its Annex on Power-Sharing and the BBL
as ancestral domain and natural resources under the
Exclusive Powers of the Bangsamoro Government.
The exploitation of natural resources is spelled out
substantially in the FAB, its Annex on Wealth-Sharing,
its Addendum on Bangsamoro Waters and the BBL,
but not so when it comes to ancestral domain. It was
spelled out in the aborted 2008 MOA-AD but this is
not considered among the non-derogable prior peace
agreements (not being a signed agreement) nor a
component of the CAB.

One component of the CAB, the Declaration of
Continuity for Peace Negotiation dated 3 June 2010,
however, speaks of reframing the consensus points on
Ancestral Domain. An earlier Joint Statement dated
29 July 2009 included an Acknowledgment of MOA-
95
AD as an unsigned and yet initialed document, and

commitment by both sides to reframe the consensus
points with the end in view of moving towards the
comprehensive compact to bring about a negotiated
political settlement. Have the consensus points on
Ancestral Domain been reframed in the FAB, its Annexes
and the BBL? Can the listing of ancestral domain under
the Exclusive Powers of the Bangsamoro Government
be considered as that reframing? The interpretation of
ancestral domain, as well as the constitutionality of
Exclusive Powers for the Bangsamoro Government,
would appear to be still contentious issues, particularly
in the Congressional deliberations on the BBL, if not also
in any relevant constitutionality suit litigation.

On another level, one can look at the bottomline of the above-quoted elaboration of the Bangsamoro
problem: with the end in view of establishing a system
of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the
Bangsamoro people. Would the BBL establish this?
Speaking of acceptable, the FAB sets the tone at the
outset by stating that The Parties agree that the status
quo is unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro shall
be established to replace the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM referred to
here as the unacceptable status quo is subsequently
made clear to be the existing ARMM which is deemed
abolished (and RA 9054 creating it is deemed repealed)
upon the ratification of the BBL in a plebiscite. The
proposed BBL, in its very title, indicates the abolition of
the ARMM and the repeal of the first and second Organic
Acts for the ARMM, RA 9065 and RA 6734. But in the

body of the proposed BBL, it is only the Abolition of the
ARMM that is expressly or specifically provided, not
the repeal of RA 9054 and RA 6734 (itself not repealed
but amended by RA 9054). Of course, the intent as well
as the effect of the ratification of the BBL is to repeal RA
9054, if only as an inconsistent law even as the proposed
BBL itself actually adopts, by specific reference, certain
provisions of RA 9054.

The rationale for the abolition of the existing
ARMM is that it was famously pronounced by President
Aquino himself to be a failed experiment. The MILF
has of course long considered it as a non-solution to
the Bangsamoro problem, particularly as a political
entity for Bangsamoro self-governance. But as Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. writes: An important point to
remember is that the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) is governed by two organic acts:
the 1987 Constitution and the Organic Act for Muslim
Mindanao. The BBL as an organic act to govern the new
autonomous political entity called Bangsamoro would
replace only the latter (RA 9054) but not the former
(the Constitution). In other words, the constitutional
underpinning of the unacceptable status quo which is
the ARMM would still be there, even as its legislative
underpinning would be repealed and replaced by the
BBL.

In fine, the new Bangsamoro entity under the
BBL would still be considered an autonomous region
97
under the Constitution.

The level of Bangsamoro
self-determination would still be one of autonomy,
particularly of autonomous regions under the
Constitutions Article X, Sections 15-21. It would not be
the level of Bangsamoro self-determination conceived
as an associative relationship under the aborted 2008
MOA-AD, nor that conceived as a sub-state under the
MILFs 2010 and 2011 Draft Comprehensive Compact
on Interim Governance. In fact, in the MNLF Leaders
Meeting statement dated 11 June 2014, particularly on the
CAB, They welcome the MILF acceptance of autonomy
as a solution to the Bangsamoro problem. This, after the
MILFs long-time aversion to autonomy as a political
solution. But the new Bangsamoro entity under the BBL
is indeed what might be called enhanced autonomy
within the flexibilities of the Constitutions Art. X, Sec.
15-21. If anything, this shows the MILFs track record of
and continued willingness to compromise, to scale down
its demands, which at a previous historical point was for
no less than independence. Perhaps a question here is
whether the compromise or scaling down is tactical or
strategic.

The implications of the new Bangsamoro entity
under the BBL being still an autonomous region under
the Constitution should not be lost to the MILF and other
Moros for whom the Bangsamoro is the sum of our
hopes and dreams is the whole world to us. There
should be no illusions or unduly great expectations
about this promised land of the Bangsamoro in terms
of of their legitimate aspiration for self-governance.
The Philippine jurisprudence on autonomous regions,

particularly in Kida vs. Senate, 659 SCRA 270 (2011), and
which will bear on the new Bangsamoro entity even
under the BBL, is that:
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X
should likewise serve as a standard that Congress
must observe in dealing with legislation touching
on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The
terms of these sections leave no doubt on what
the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule
or self-government, in particular, the power to
legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under
these provisions are the permeating principles of
national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic In other words, the Constitution and
the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio [an empire
within an empire] in the relationship between
the national and regional governments.

Furthermore, the Kida Decision also pronounced
that From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms
of local governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections
15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. the ARMM is a local government
unit just like provinces, cities, municipalities, and
99
barangays This actually may clash in a sense with

the provision in the proposed BBL which speaks of
the Bangsamoro as distinct from other regions and
other governments in the context of providing for
the Asymmetric Relationship between the Central
Government and the Bangsamoro Government.

The existing constitutional framework that
would bear on autonomous regions is more precisely
indicated in the Kida Decision to be the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence which
is not limited to the jurisprudence on autonomous
regions and on local governments, but includes the
whole caboodle of constitutional jurisprudence. One
such jurisprudence on local governments is Basco vs.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), which referred to a
unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution. Being subject to this
existing constitutional framework, which includes being
expressly subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the new Bangsamoro entity under
the BBL will provide at most only a quantitative but
not a qualitative liberation from the overarching
highly-centralized unitary system of government of
the Philippines.

Is the constitutionally entrenched unitary system
of the Central Government not the bigger unacceptable
status quo that, for the longest time, has been the main
fetter to the legitimate wishes of the Bangsamoro people
to govern themselves? Would a new Bangsamoro entity
under the national sovereignty of the unitary Republic of

the Philippines be able to establish a system of life and
governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro
people? Would it thereby solve the Bangsamoro
problem? The MILF, through its afore-quoted Luwaran
editorial, has already answered this last question by
saying that it will not be fully addressed.

And so if, as the MILF says, the Bangsamoro
problem will not be fully addressed by the BBL, then
what else has to be done to solve it? The other important
angles of the MILF in that afore-quoted Luwaran
editorial may provide some answers or steps. Take
the second important angle which is that the proposed
BBL is based only on the FAB, its four Annexes and the
Addendum on Bangsamoro Waters, and not also on the
other component agreements of the CAB. Why this is
so is not clear, but the inclusion or incorporation of six
specific prior peace agreements into the CAB came only
towards the end of its negotiations in March 2014, after
there were already the FAB and all its Annexes. When
the Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities
(ATAM) was signed in February 2013, when there was
still no CAB, the ATAM provided that the BTC shall
draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law, using as bases the FAB
and its annexes. This was the guidance followed by the
BTC in drafting the proposed BBL, even though the rest
of the finalized and signed CAB was already there as a
possible reference.
101
CAB is Not Just FAB Plus its Annexes

The earlier notion that the CAB would be merely
the consolidation or putting together of the FAB and its
Annexes, as indicated in the FAQ primer about the FAB
by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP), turned out to be mistaken. As finalized,
the 87-page CAB consisted of twelve appended specific
peace agreements, namely the FAB, its four Annexes
and one Addendum (sub-totaling six peace agreements)
AND the following six specific prior peace agreements:
1. Agreement for the General Cessation
of Hostilities dated 18 July 1997 [Ramos
administration]
2. General Framework of Agreement of Intent
dated 27 August 1998 [Estrada administration]
3. Agreement on the General Framework for
the Resumption of Peace Talks dated 24 March
2001 [Arroyo administration]
4. Tripoli Agreement on Peace dated 22 June
2001 [Arroyo administration]
5. Declaration of Continuity for Peace
Negotiation dated 3 June 2010 [Arroyo
administration]
6. Decision Points on Principles as of April 2012
dated 24 April 2004 [Aquino administration]
In
addition,
the
CAB
provides
that
Supplementary to the CAB are the various agreements,
guidelines, terms of reference, and joint statements duly
signed and acknowledged by the Parties in the course

of the negotiations between the two parties beginning
in 1997. Yes, also this whole caboodle. This may be
attributed or credited to the MILFs long-time consistent
insistence that The parties commit to honor, respect
and implement all past agreements, as well as its
incremental (or cumulative) strategy for the peace
negotiations.

Again, going back to the afore-quoted Luwaran
editorial, it says that The basis of the BBL is only the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), its
four Annexes and the Addendum on the Bangsamoro
Waters, thereby leaving other parts of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) not yet addressed
or unimplemented. But right before this it says Of
course, solving the Bangsamoro Question or Problem
will not be fully addressed by the BBL alone even if it is
passed by Congress. The implication is that addressing
or implementing the other parts of the CAB will make
full or complete the solution of the Bangsamoro problem.
And then the editorial ends with This will be done
through the other mandate of the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) which is to make proposals to amend
the Constitution To be clear, it is saying two things
about addressing or implementing the other parts
of the CAB: (1) that this will make full or complete
the solution of the Bangsamoro problem; and (2) that
this will be done through or will entail no less than
constitutional amendments.
103

This is, to say the least, a major, major
proposition made by the MILF through its Luwaran
editorial. Without prejudice to further teasing this out
or even deconstructing it, the immediate implication it
brings is that the BBL should not be the end of it in terms
of legislative measures, which also include proposals
for constitutional amendments, to fully address the
Bangsamoro problem. Corollary to this and towards
the latter end, the establishment of the new Bangsamoro
entity under the BBL should likewise not be the end of it.
What should follow next after the BBL is not clear. What
is only clear is that the BTC has a secondary mandate
to work on or recommend proposals for constitutional
amendments. But the dealing with such proposals,
which normally would require Congressional action, is
not indicated in the announced GPH-MILF peace road
map till mid-2016. While the MILF has an eye towards
necessary constitutional amendments, and it was at
their instance that the BTC has that secondary mandate,
the GPH under President Aquino has never shown
keenness for such constitutional amendments based on
its position of negotiating only within the flexibilities of
the Constitution. As far as the Aquino administration
is concerned, it is effectively leaving this matter of
whatever necessary constitutional amendments to the
next administration to deal with.

But as far as the MILF is concerned, constitutional
amendments are eventually necessary, whether these
be for accommodating or entrenching political
arrangements of self-governance. The exact mutually
agreed formulation of the BTCs secondary task in the

FAB and its ATAM is To work on proposals to amend the
Philippine Constitution for the purpose of accommodating
and entrenching in the Constitution the agreement(s) of
the Parties whenever necessary without derogating from
any prior
peace agreements. The corresponding
formulation in the Presidents implementing Executive
Order (EO) No. 120 constituting the BTC is more general:
Whenever necessary, to recommend to Congress or the
people proposed amendments to the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Speaking of prior peace agreements, one might
divide into two clusters the list of 12 peace agreements
that constitute the integral parts of the CAB: (1) the
first five listed peace agreements from 1997 to 2010
before the Aquino administration; and (2) the last seven
peace agreements, especially the FAB and its Annexes,
from 2012 to 2014 under the Aquino administration. How
does this relate now to the MILFs Luwaran editorial
statement that the other parts of the CAB (i.e. those not
covered by the BBL which is based only on the FAB and
its Annexes) are to be addressed or implemented by
constitutional amendments to be proposed by the BTC?
The big difference between the two clusters of the CAB is
not only with the presidential administrations involved
but also with MILF acquiescence, as it were, to the
flexibilities of the Philippine constitution. This is rather
clear when it comes to the FAB and the BBL, starting with
former GPH peace panel chair Marvic M.V.F. Leonens
assurances regarding such flexibilities. The said MILF
105
acquiescence was definitely not there during the time of

the first cluster. In other words, for those earlier peace
agreements from 1997 to 2010, as far as the MILF was
concerned, there was no limiting parameter of working
within the existing constitutional framework thus,
some of these earlier agreements or some provisions
therein could be out of the (constitutional) box.

It will be recalled that the aborted 2008 MOAAD emerged during that time as an attempt to flesh out
the Ancestral Domain Aspect indicated by the 2001
Tripoli Agreement on Peace, then considered the mother
framework agreement with its three aspects of Security,
Rehabilitation and Ancestral Domain, and with the latter
as a prelude to the political solution of the Bangsamoro
problem. The MOA-AD stated that any provisions
requiring amendments to the existing legal order
shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework This stipulation, which was
understood to refer to amendments or changes to no less
than the existing constitutional order and framework,
was particularly struck down by the SC in its Decision
in Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic
of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),
568 SCRA 402 (2008), as a usurpation of the constituent
powers of Congress, a Constitutional Convention and
the people in the constitutional amendment process.

The said Province of North Cotabato Decision also
found that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution Not only its specific provisions

but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
[Government of the Republic of Philippines] and the BJE
[Bangsamoro Juridical Entity], are unconstitutional, for
the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
But a close reading of this Decision will show that it
does not preclude constitutional amendments, including
for an associative relationship and for independence
(giving up a portion of national territory), as long as the
constitutional processes are followed which include
adequate public information and consultation, as well as
the non-guaranteeing of constitutional amendments and
the non-usurpation of constituent powers. In fact, this
Decision made this pronouncement:
If the President is to be expected to find means
for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve
lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be
given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes
to the Constitution for their implementation.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable, but
she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures
for constitutional amendment and revision.
107

The Decision also noted the observation of
Professor Christine Bell in her law journal article on the
nature and legal status of peace agreements that the
typical way that peace agreements establish and confirm
mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization
is by linking them to new constitutional structures
addressing governance, elections, and legal and human
rights institutions. The Separate Opinion of Justice
Minita Chico-Nazario states the point even better than
the majority Decision:
It must be noted that the Constitution has been
in force for three decades now, yet, peace in
Mindanao still remained to be elusive under its
present terms. There is the possibility that the
solution to the peace problem in the Southern
Philippines lies beyond the present Constitution.
Exploring this possibility and considering the
necessary amendment of the Constitution are not
per se unconstitutional

And so, it should not be any wonder that also
during the time of the pre-Aquino first cluster of peace
agreements that constitute the integral parts of the
CAB, the MILF submitted its 2010 and 2011 Drafts for
a Comprehensive Compact on Interim Governance that
included an Annexure Draft Amendatory Clauses/
Article to the Constitution that would allow for a
Bangsamoro sub-state in asymmetrical relationship
with the Philippine state. At that point, the MILF was
clearly calling for a constitutional amendment. But
now, with the proposed BBL, it is clear, as we said,

that the MILF has acquiesced to the GPH position for
a basic law or organic act within the flexibilities of the
Constitution. This obviously involved a judgment call
on the part of the MILF that this is what is politically
feasible under the Aquino administration and that it is
better to have this BBL now as a building block rather
than have nothing to show or the unacceptable status
quo of the failed experiment ARMM. At the same
time, this converged with President Aquinos avowed
historical legacy stake in the GPH-MILF peace process.

Still, post-agreed version of the proposed BBL,
the MILF through is Luwaran editorial is now saying that
addressing or implementing the other parts of the CAB
will make full or complete the solution of the Bangsamoro
problem which will not be fully addressed by the BBL
which is based only on the FAB and its Annexes, and that
this addressing or implementing of the other parts of the
CAB will be done through constitutional amendments.
As for which are those other parts of the CAB being
referred to, it is not yet clear. Among the obvious relevant
questions to ask, either for clarity or for acting on, are the
following:

1. Why is the Bangsamoro problem not fully
solved by the BBL? (which question we also addressed
in the discussion above)

2. What are the key parts of the CAB not yet
addressed or fully addressed by the BBL?
109

3. Why was the BBL based only on the FAB and
its Annexes and not also on the rest of the CAB when in
fact this was already available at the start of the drafting
of the BBL?

4. Do all of the other parts of the CAB which
are not yet addressed or implemented by the BBL need
constitutional amendments (con-am) for that purpose?
Which key parts of the CAB need con-am? Which key
parts do not need con-am but only legislation?

5. For those key parts of the CAB that need
only legislation, why were these not addressed in the
proposed BBL? Whatever the reason, can these not be
now addressed in the finalization of the BBL?

To be sure, the solution of the Bangsamoro
problem does not lie solely in constitutional
amendments and legislation. For example, as we know,
the FABs Annex on Normalization, which includes
Decommissioning of the MILF forces and weapons and
a Socio-Economic Development Program, for the most
part, except for Policing, does not need legislation in
order to be implemented by executive and other action.
Another friend, long-time Mindanao historian, peace
advocate and former GRP peace negotiator Prof. Rudy
B. Rodil cautions that constitutional change is only one
solution and we must not forget finding the emotional
flavor for community harmony. His wisdom on this is
well-taken.

If the Bangsamoro problem is seen as a problem
of relationships, there are two key dimensions to this.
One dimension is the structural or vertical relationship
between the Philippine state and the Bangsamoro people,
and this is a mainly a matter of constitutional association
(at present, it is through an autonomous region). The other
dimension is the socio-cultural-emotional or horizontal
relationship between or among peoples, like particularly
the tri-peoples of Mindanao. We are just dealing here
in this article mainly with the former dimension without
forgetting the latter dimension, which we shall also
touch on because they are inter-related. But it is still
the constitutional-structural dimension that is decisive
for the core issue of self-determination.

The constitutional unitary system of government
of the Philippines is the major problem for Bangsamoro
self-determination. In this sense, or stated otherwise, the
Philippine Constitution is a major part of the Bangsamoro
problem. Another MILF Luwaran editorial, of July 8-15,
2014 and titled The Moro Question is Political, put it
this way: While we respect the Philippine Constitution,
but it is too shallow and limited to fully address this
[Bangsamoro] problem. This is the reason why up to
now the MILF is firm on its conviction that the current
Constitution would require an amendment to finally put
to rest the conflict in Mindanao. The Constitution is
part of the problem but it can also be part of the solution
through a correct constitutional amendment.
111

But also, as things stand, including for the MILF,
the menu of the day is the BBL, not constitutional
amendment. This could be, as it should be, the menu for
tomorrow. How and when it will get there is not yet clear.
What is only clear is the secondary mandated task of the
BTC to work on proposals for necessary constitutional
amendments AND the likelihood that the time for such
amendments will not be during the remaining term of
President Aquino till mid-2016. It may take much longer
because one effect, even if unintended, of the BBL is to
postpone constitutional amendments. The general or
prevailing thinking would be to give the BBL and the new
Bangsamoro entity a reasonable time or period of testing
before resorting to constitutional amendments. RA
6734, the first Organic Act of the ARMM, had a lifetime
from 1989 to 2001 or about 12 years, while RA 9054, the
second Organic Act of the ARMM, would have a lifetime
from 2001 to (expected) 2015 or about 14 years a total of
about 26 years or one generation for the unacceptable
status quo and failed experiment which is the existing
ARMM. Will it take another generation for necessary
constitutional amendments to come to life and finally
put to rest the conflict in Mindanao? This is why we
speak of a longer road to peace.

Does this mean more peace negotiations? Maybe,
maybe not. There is an understandable aversion by
many to seemingly interminable or never-ending peace
negotiations of a protracted peace process. At the same
time, it has also been noted that peace agreements
cannot be expected to anticipate everything and that the
changing times, situation and issues would often call

for new negotiations. Just witness the Mindanao peace
process since it started with the MNLF in 1975. There
are negotiations and there are negotiations. The 2012
FAB itself provides that The Negotiating Panel of both
Parties shall continue the negotiations until all issues are
resolved and all agreements are implemented. So, there
may be negotiations to resolve still unresolved issues and
negotiations on implementation. The GPH-MILF process
of agreeing on the version of the proposed BBL might be
characterized as negotiations on the implementation of
the CAB or, more precisely as the MILF would say, on
the implementation of the FAB and its Annexes.

It will be noted, however, that for what has been
referred to by the MILF as the crucial engagements
on August 10, 13-15, 25, 26, and September 4 [2014]
during the meeting between President Aquino and
Chairman Murad in the Palace, the negotiations were
no longer actively conducted by the two peace panels
but instead by selected high-level officials of both sides.
The MILF points to the nuances, contexts, and issues
settled or agreed by the parties especially during the
crucial engagements as particularly important for what
is in effect the statutory construction (i.e. the correct
interpretation or understanding) of the proposed BBL.
Possible Contours of a Longer Road to Peace

The short GPH-MILF road map to peace till 2016
envisions a very short transition process highlighted
113
by a transition mechanism in the form of an appointed

MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)
that is estimated to serve as the interim Bangsamoro
Government for likely only one year until the duly
elected regular Bangsamoro Government takes office.
By any standard, this is an extremely short transition
period that many, notably veteran Mindanao journalist
Patricio P. Diaz, have already noted would not serve the
standard purposes of transition like institution-, capacityand unity-building. It will be recalled that the MILF
originally sought as long as a six-year Interim Period in
its 2010/2011 Draft Comprehensive Compact, precisely
on the ground that sufficient lead time is necessary to
adequately prepare the ground for self-government.
And this preparation to govern should include adequate
testing and tempering against the corrupting influence
and arrogance of power.

There are thus suggestions of extending the
transition period of the BTA say to the next scheduled
synchronized elections in 2019. But there may be
an alternative way of looking and going about the
transition.
If the election of the first Bangsamoro
Government (BG) would not be postponed to give more
time for the transition to ripen under the BTA, then one
alternative may be to treat the period/s of the first BG or
the first two BGs (together presumably from 2016 to 2022)
as still part of the transition. Before the end of this longer
transition period, it can be expected that the time would
also already be more opportune for charter change to
accommodate out of the box arrangements to complete
the solution to the Bangsamoro problem, including

enabling a new political entity with a qualitatively higher
and better degree of self-determination for the Bangsamoro
people. This would entail readiness of the sovereign
Filipino people to change the Constitution in any way
it wants for the sake of peace.

On this particular strategic or long-term
process outlook, another friend, young FilipinoGerman political scientist and mediator Ariel Macaspac
Hernandez (formerly Penetrante), writes in his wellresearched and analytically insightful new Springer VS
book Nation-building and Identity Conflicts: Facilitating the
Mediation Process in Southern Philippines:
The Philippine public must realize the constitution
constantly needs reforms. These reforms do not
always mean a threat to the state. The constitution
cannot codify everything at one time and should
therefore be dynamic. The constitution is not
written to satisfy a single moment, but needs to
remain relevant in perpetuity. The constitution
is the aggregate of the experiences of the state. It
should be possible for the constitution to evolve to
accommodate claims of minority groups. While
it is understandable that the Philippine public
resists any measures to change the constitution,
because of the Marcos experience, this conviction
is not sustainable. The constitution must maintain
flexibility, while enforcing rules. The public
must understand any resolution of the conflict in
115
the Southern Philippines needs revisions of the

constitution. The Filipinos must learn to trust
again in the political processes of the country. Not
all proposed measures to change the constitution
are moved by the intention to install another
military regime in the country. Nevertheless, this
anxiety of the Philippine public of any change
must be addressed well. This anxiety is indeed
well grounded and is therefore legitimate. Hence,
the peace process in the Southern Philippines
must be complemented by a rejuvenation of the
political culture in the country.

When the time for that idea comes, ideally it
should be the Bangsamoro people themselves who
should draft the necessary constitutional amendments
to complete the solution to the Bangsamoro problem,
of course still subject to the constitutional process of
ratification by the Filipino people. A more inclusive
and representative multi-stakeholder body than the
MILF-tilted BTC will be needed to work on proposals
for such constitutional amendments. As it is, the BTC
shall cease to exist upon the enactment of the BBL.
Just as it will take time for the idea of constitutional
amendments to ripen, so too will it take time to bring
together a more inclusive and representative multistakeholder Bangsamoro constitutional convention.
And if co-related with peace negotiations, a recent
Conciliation Resources publication Accord policy brief
on Legitimacy and peace processes has noted the case
of the Darfurians (in Western Sudan) who rejected the
idea of conventional bilateral negotiations between the

Khartuom government and rebels as irrelevant to the
fragmented nature of the conflict. Instead, they suggested
a negotiating roundtable at which all stakeholders,
armed and unarmed, represented themselves.

In the case of the Bangsamoro, at least there
is already, for one, the proposal of Muslim Filipino
intellectual and legal luminary Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, Ph.D.
for a Bangsa Moro Constitutional Convention which
Congress shall convoke wherein all the Moro sectors 1.
Revolutionary, 2. Political, 3. Traditional, 4. Professional,
5. Educational, 6. Women, 7. Labor/Industrial, 8. Youth,
9. Agricultural, 10. Economic/Business, 11. Indigenous
Non-Muslim/Non-Christian Tribes, and 12. Religious
which has two sub-sectors, (a). Muslim Moros and
(b). Christian Moros shall be guaranteed appointed
representatives and together with freely elected
delegates duly constitute the congregation to draft a
new constitution/fundamental law/organic act/basic
law for the Bangsa Moro regional entity. Better though if
such a convention focuses first on a primary agenda of
drafting the necessary constitutional amendments that
would accommodate and enable that entity as desired to
reflect in this fundamental law the historicity, identity,
aspirations, sentiments, hopes and dreams of the Bangsa
Moro, before working on a new or amended BBL
guided by those constitutional amendments.

Former Law Dean Merlin M. Magallona has
noted regarding the FAB-based BBL that Congress
117
would measure its validity against the Constitution

as it stands unamended. In the first place, unless the
Basic Law would not depart from the Constitution,
the necessary constitutional changes must be in place
first before the Basic Law could come to Congress for
enactment. (underscoring supplied) This is actually
the ideal process if we seek out of the box solutions
to the Bangsamoro problem. This is the only way that a
BBL could rise to a level beyond that of the status quo of
the existing constitutional framework.

It must be pointed out that while the passage of
the BBL might have the unintended effect of postponing
necessary constitutional changes, some observers
have noted that the proposed BBL has already had
the unintended consequence of waking up the
federalist movement which is mainly being generated
from Mindanao. Long-time friend and organizational
colleague, GPH chief peace negotiator Prof. Miriam
Coronel Ferrer says that the new Bangsamoro entity
being created through the BBL is showing the way for
future charter change that would unloosen the strictures
of a unitary state. A shift to a federal state would indeed
necessitate charter change. Ironically, this particular
political-constitutional reform might even overtake the
necessary constitutional amendments to complete the
political solution of the Bangsamoro problem. But it has
to be asked, why is it that proposed federalism does not
raise questions of unconstitutionality in the way that a
proposed semi-federal Bangsamoro entity does? Part
of the answer must have to do with the long-standing

anti-Muslim bias among the Filipino Christian majority.

But of course the Bangsamoro problem is not
only a constitutional problem of Bangsamoro selfdetermination; an increasingly major aspect of it is
the political problem of Bangsamoro unity. I never tire
quoting this from a fraternity brother friend , sociology
professor and newspaper columnist Randolf S. David:
It is difficult to imagine an experiment in Islamic selfdetermination succeeding against a background of Moro
disunity. While such disunity may have been instigated
by Manilas imperial governments in the past, no amount
of constitutional accommodation by the center can solve
this now for Muslim Mindanao. Self-determination
requires that the Bangsamoro people imagine themselves
as one nation.

This requirement has become more urgent as
demonstrated by the Sabah and Zamboanga standoffs of
2013 (which represent the peace disgruntlement of the
Sulu sultanate remnants and the MNLF Misuari group)
and by the eruption of fighting with the MILF breakaway
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) right after
the signing of the last FAB Annexes in January 2014
(reminiscent of the MILFs own Five-Day War shortly
after the signing of the GRP-MNLF Jeddah Accord
in January 1986 as concerned U.S.-based Filipina
academic Michelle A. Roque incisively commented, the
MILF was once in the shoes of the BIFF).
119

Bostonian friend Steven Rood, who is The
Asia Foundation (TAF) representative first in the
International Contact Group (ICG) and then in the
Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) of the GPH-MILF
peace processes, considers the Zamboanga Tragedy
as a pivot point for the Mindanao peace process.
Firstly, it aggravated the long-standing anti-Muslim
bias among the Filipino Christian majority which has
adverse bearing on public opinion about concessions
to the minority Bangsamoro people arising from the
peace process. Secondly, it highlighted the Bangsamoro
disunity problem, exemplified by the MNLF and the
MILF, about the peace process, with long-time MNLF
Chairman Prof. Nurullaji P. Misuari as the most vocal
oppositor to the new deal with the MILF. One might
say, this is a different kind of Moro-Moro, an intraMoro dynamic where Moros are sometimes their own
worst enemies. All is not quiet on the Western front of
Muslim Mindanao.

The MILF Luwaran editorial which we have
extensively discussed has tauted the BBL as a Menu
for Unity and Solidarity. It would seem, however,
that this is addressed more to Filipino-Bangsamoro
unity rather than intra-Bangsamoro unity. Says the
editorial: the BBL is a menu for unity and solidarity
of the entire Philippine state We firmly believe the
BBL is an antidote to secession; and moreover, it gives
more legitimacy to the Philippine state. In allaying
fears about the proposed new Bangsamoro entity,
MILF chief negotiator Iqbal told a House committee

hearing, Instead of dismemberment of the Republic, the
Bangsamoro will further unite our peoples. There shall
be no state within a state. The Philippines shall remain
sovereign. But as far as the Bangsamoro revolutionary
(liberation fronts) sector is concerned, exemplified by the
MNLF and BIFF, the BBL might be in danger of being a
document of perpetual division, to use an expression
from the much more problematic peace process on the
Communist front.

The MNLF Leaders Meeting statement dated 11
June 2014 referred to the Jeddah Formula that appears
to be the latest mutation of the MNLF and its position.
There now appears another unified leadership under
Chairman Misuari. The agenda position is that the BBL
or a new autonomy law include all the provisions of the
1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 FPA (the Jakarta
Agreement) in tandem with all the provisions of the
CAB (even as the MILF itself, as we pointed out, views
the BBL as based, by stipulation, only on the FAB and
its Annexes). At any rate, they express openness to
pursue collaborative efforts to build on commonalities.
The difference or problem is in the MNLFs view that
the CAB is inferior to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and
1996 FPA: that the former is only a partial fulfillment of
the requirements of the latter, and that the former has
provisions inconsistent with the latter.

This MNLF agenda position is supported by or
in tandem with the latest Resolution No. 2/41-MM
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On Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines by

the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its
41st Session of its Conference of Foreign Ministers held
in Jeddah on 18-19 June 2014. It sees the CAB as a
major first step toward the implementation of previous
agreements [referring to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
and the 1996 FPA] as they are binding international
commitments AND they continue to formulate the
basis of any settlement of the conflict. It calls upon
the OIC Secretary-General to find common grounds
and narrow the gap between the MNLF and the MILF
leaderships and their respective positions through
coordination in the framework of the Bangsamoro
Coordination Forum (BCF) established between the two
fronts at the Islamic Conference in Dushanbe. Well, its
been four years since the 2010 Dushanbe Conference,
and the GPH-MNLF-OIC Tripartite Implementation
Review has since been overtaken by the GPH-MILF
peace negotiations resulting in the FAB, its Annexes, the
CAB and the proposed BBL.

The FAB Annex on Power Sharing actually
contains towards its end this provision, including an
additional task for the BTC:
As part of the Philippine Government
commitment in other peace agreements involving
the Bangsamoro, the Bangsamoro Basic Law
may adopt specific powers contained in these
agreements and in the ARMM Organic Law, as
amended.
The Bangsamoro Transition Commission shall

undertake an inventory of the powers and
consider the proposed recommendations from the
review process of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement
between the Government and the Moro National
Liberation Front for possible incorporation into
the Bangsamoro Basic Law. It shall also take into
account the proposed amendments of the ARMM
Regional Legislative Assembly to R.A. No. 9054.

And so, the BBL should also be scrutinized on this
basis. The GPH-MNLF-OIC Tripartite Implementation
Review had actually come up with 42 common proposed
amendments to RA 9054. But three remaining contentions
issues have bogged down this process. These issues are
indicated by the above-cited MNLF statement to be: a)
definition/sharing of revenues of strategic materials;
b) transitory mechanism-provisional government/
plebiscite; and c) territory.

The issue of strategic materials is well covered
by the provisions on Wealth Sharing in the FAB Annex
on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing and in the
proposed BBL. In fact, the provisions on Wealth Sharing
and Power Sharing for the Bangsamoro people in the
FAB and its Annexes make for a better deal for them than
did/does the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 FPA
as well as RA 9054. The former also addresses, much
better than the latter does, the concern of Normalization,
including Decommissioning a.k.a. disarmament and
123
demobilization. The MNLF and for that matter the OIC

should be honest, humble and statesman-like enough
to acknowledge and concede this. They should not
begrudge a better deal for the Bangsamoro people even
if this deal just further enhances the existing level of
Muslim autonomy under the status quo of the existing
constitutional framework. As we said, it is still a step
forward even if it makes the road to peace longer.

But if there is that mindset problem on the part of
the MNLF, it must also be asked why, despite the better
deal which the MILF has achieved, it has seemingly not
been able to convince and get the best possible support
for it from its fraternal Moro liberation front? Not to
mention really broad-based multi-stakeholder Moro
support for it, especially in the Sulu Archipelago. This
would appear to do with the question of the necessary
level of Moro leadership and statesmanship that inspires
trust, confidence and allegiance of the Bangsamoro
people. The next issue may be relevant to this.

The issue of transitory mechanism-provisional
government is actually addressed in the FAB, its
ATAM and the proposed BBL, with the BTA as the
interim Bangsamoro government (in effect, a provisional
government). But its being pre-ordained to be MILFled as the main mechanism for the MILFs leadership
in the Bangsamoro during the transition process
naturally or understandably leads to perceptions of MILF
domination or even exclusivity, as tended to be shown
in the BTC. And this clashes with Chairman Misuaris
overblown sense of his pre-eminent leadership over

the Bangsamoro struggle and the MNLFs international
status as the sole and legitimate representative of the
Muslims in the Southern Philippines as continues to
be recognized by the OIC. The MNLF and the OIC, if
not Misuari himself, should wake up to the historical
and political reality that the MNLF, particularly under
Misuaris paramount leadership, has been eclipsed by
the truly collective leadership of the MILF. But this in
turn demands a certain level of statesmanship on the
part of the MILF. Its sometimes knee-jerk and easy
labelling of critical voices as peace spoilers shows some
insecurity or intolerance towards dissenting opinions.
Such negative tendencies are precisely among what has
to be checked and corrected while still early, like during
a viable transition.

The bottom-line for the MNLF, as exemplified by
Misuari, appears to be getting some share of the power
in the transitory mechanism-provisional government.
There may still be a way of working this out through
a unity government type of formula that has been
employed in many other country conflicts. In this
regard, the MILF can be magnanimous in the same way
that the MNLF had previously accommodated MILF
representatives as part of the MNLF delegations with
observer status to several OIC annual Conferences/
Councils of Foreign Ministers.

It is the issue of plebiscite linked to territory
that may prove unresolvable, not so much between the
125
MNLF and the MILF as between the MNLF and the

GPH. The purported superiority of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement and the 1996 FPA stands on the flimsy ground
of the area of the autonomous region stipulated 14
provinces and 9 cities compared to the FABs core
area of 5 provinces, 3 cities, 6 separate municipalities
and 39 separate barangays. But the 14 provinces and 9
cities is a Misuari pipe-dream because most of these are
already Christian majority areas and these have voted
consistently against inclusion in a Muslim autonomous
region in two plebiscites already, in 1989 and 2001. The
FAB is more realistic in aspiring for the inclusion of
only Muslim majority areas in the vicinity of, but not
yet under, the existing ARMM. The undue focus by
the MNLF and the OIC in expanding the territory of a
Muslim autonomous region even to provinces and cities,
where by all counts the Christian majority there would
not accept it, is not only unrealistic for expansion but
also is potentially trouble-stoking which may instead
defeat the purpose of expansion.

As Steve Rood commented, While from Misuaris
point of view this [another plebiscite throughout the
entire territorial coverage of the original 1976 Tripoli
Agreement] is a reasonable demand, since the previous
plebiscites had gone ahead over the objections of the
MNLF, such a move would cause unrest in widespread
areas of Mindanao such as Zamboanga City, raising the
simple question: What part of no in two plebiscites is
not understood? As it is, there are even oppositors to
a plebiscite for the BBL say in the six separate Muslim-
majority Lanao del Norte municipalities which voted

Yes in the 2001 plebiscite because the province already
voted No. The above-quoted OIC Resolution also refers
to the BBL as governing the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region but As for the greater area outside this enclave,
the Tripoli Agreement still applies. Again, please wake
up!
Bangsamoro Unity Process

The still potentially helpful role of the OIC may no
longer be so much in shaping the agenda of the Mindanao
peace process, as the parties themselves have done so
and can still do this well enough, but rather in honestly
brokering MNLF-MILF unity in the peace process. It is
ironic but it is the reality that it has to take an external
entity to mediate between the MNLF and the MILF. But
it appears that it is only the OIC that has the clout as well
as the respect of both Moro liberation fronts for this, as
shown by the OIC-initiated BCF. Be that as it may, the
two Moro liberation fronts should be able to dialogue
and negotiate even just between themselves, without
an OIC mediator. There is also the just as important
domestic intra-Moro effort of Bangsamoro civil society
to work for MNLF-MILF unity. After all, if the Moros
should be able to govern themselves, then they should
be able to unite themselves.

It has become increasingly clear that Bangsamoro
unity, with MILF-MNLF unity as the litmus test, should
127
already be treated as a goal itself of the peace process

and no less than part of solving the Bangsamoro
problem. The better deal gains for the Bangsamoro
people in the GPH-MILF peace process could come to
naught if the MNLF problem (to put it bluntly) is not
solved. Better to address this problem now early in the
transition rather than as a bigger problem later down the
road. This urgent task of Bangsamoro unity should
have its own road map which of course should interlink
with the peace road map, and thus contribute thereto.
Even road maps can be works in progress. If there
are to be institutions and mechanisms of Bangsamoro
self-governance, there too should be institutions and
mechanisms of Bangsamoro unity.

To start with or more precisely start anew with,
there can be more inclusiveness in the Congressional
deliberations on the proposed BBL, to also make up
for the lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the
drafting of that proposed BBL, whether in the drafting
first by the BTC or in the subsequent re-drafting by the
homestretch meetings between the GPH-OP and the
MILF-BTC resulting in an agreed version. It is notable
that in these now very public deliberations, Cagayan de
Oro City Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez, who chairs the House
ad hoc committee on the proposed BBL, has sought to
invite Misuari as well as known BIFF leader Ameril
Umbra Kato to present their views, notwithstanding
standing warrants of arrest against them for their forces
military attacks against the government. The two Moro
rebel group leaders are said to have rejected such an

invitation, and have thus excluded themselves from this
process. Even so, their agenda, like that of the MNLF
discussed above, is of fairly public articulation, if not
documentation, and should be factored in for what it
may be worth for informed Congressional deliberations.

There are those who say that it is better to just
forget Misuari and his MNLF as well as Kato and the
BIFF, and move ahead towards the BBL and its new
Bangsamoro entity. After all, if this entity succeeds in
good self-governance, then those forces will eventually
come into the fold. But that does not always follow.
The quality of governance of autonomy, peace and
development -- will be strained by lack of cooperation
and support, and worse by continuing armed hostilities.
Commonalities in agenda and a better peace deal will not
be enough. Better fraternal organization relations and a
sense of stakeholdership and ownership will be needed.
The MILFs Iqbal has said that whats important is, at
the end of the day, well be able to handle all those issues
and move forward until we settle them. This will be
a test of Bangsamoro leadership and statesmanship on
the part of the MILF. It will have to find a way to reach
out to and constructively engage Misuari/his MILF and
Kato/the BIFF.

Misuari has himself only last August 2014
renewed, for the nth time, his call for independence.
Because he has cried wolf on this so many times, one
129
wonders whether this is for his usual saber-rattling

posturing or for real. More believable as for real, even
though with a much smaller military force, is the beef
(pun intended) of the BIFF not only for independence
but also for an Islamic state. Even if it is as small as
a barangay, as long as it is following the Islamic law,
said its spokesperson Abu Misry Mama, The Philippine
Constitution will never accommodate the Islamic law.
As for his views on the peace deal of the MILF, which
the BIFF had split from, there was a newspaper report
that Misry said the MILF made compromises to clinch a
deal, but the BIFF doubted that the agreement would get
congressional approval without further compromises.

It seems ironic that the above-discussed MILF
Luwaran editorial, as already quoted, states We firmly
believe the BBL is an antidote to secession, given that
the MILF has been the long-time standard-bearer of Moro
secession. But even as the MILF has to allay Filipino
fears about the proposed new Bangsamoro entity, it is
also accountable to its Bangsamoro constituency for
upholding their aspirations, just as it is accountable to
itself for being true to itself. There will be those from its
own rank and file, like the BIFF once was, who will ask
about, if not ask for, fidelity to the justness of the original
position like Islamic and Liberation in the very
name of the MILF (note how the BIFF has retained these
as Islamic and Freedom). There will be some internal
reckoning with the guidelines of the MILF founding
Chairman and ideologue Salamat Hashim such as the
ultimate aim of our Jihad is to make supreme the word of

Allah and There is no way to solve the [Bangsamoro]
problem except through independence independence
is the only viable solution but armed struggle should be
the last recourse. On the other hand, the BIFF would
fight for independence through armed struggle.

If one would study history (so as not to be
condemned to repeat its mistakes), a legitimate case
for Bangsamoro independence can be made. There is
of course a difference between independence through
armed struggle and independence through non-armed
struggle. In Philippine history, the former was achieved
from Spain, while the latter was achieved from the
United States. What will it be for Bangsamoro history?
The jury is still out on this, as it were. But the current
standard bearer of the Bangsamoro cause, the MILF,
has clearly opted, at this juncture of history, for a nonindependence solution through peace negotiations that
envision subsequent parliamentary struggle. Whatever
the ultimate aim is, even for an independent Islamic
state, indeed it may be said as a most level-headed
MILF leader has said Would it be politically taboo if
you aspire for anything through democratic means?
One can hardly argue with peaceful, civilized, and
democratic means of solving conflict or achieving
political objectives.

It will likely take some more years (decades?) for
the Filipino body politic to develop the political culture
and maturity to be able to peacefully and civilly allow
131
the Bangsamoro people to undertake the kind of credible

democratic exercise like the recent Scotland and Quebec
referendums for independence. Incidentally, the No
votes won, but only closely, in both those referendums.
But of course it could be different the next time around
because of an already substantial bloc of support for
independence in both cases. What is particularly
notable, and perhaps more important for such exercises,
was the mature respect shown by the Yes losers for
the peoples will. Perhaps the Bangsamoros envisioned
experience in a chosen parliamentary or ministerial
form of government based on genuine political parties
will contribute good examples and lessons for the
rejuvenation of Philippine political culture.

In this time of the current global hot topic of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which
the Abu Sayyaf Group and the BIFF have pledged
allegiance to but which the MILF has offered to join the
fight against there is all the more understandable fear
about the Islamic agenda, even in the peace process. As
early as the afore-mentioned FAQ Primer on the FAB by
the OPAPP among the Q&As is this:
Q: Is the Bangsamoro an Islamic state?
A: No. The Bangsamoro Government will be a
secular government where basic rights of all will
be protected. (underscorings supplied)

The answer seems to imply that the basic
rights of all will not be protected in a non-secular
government, thus perhaps unduly stoking fears about

an Islamic government. What now about the solution
of the Bangsamoro problem with the end in view of
establishing a system of life and governance suitable and
acceptable to the Bangsamoro people?

It is already of public knowledge that integral
not only to that system or way of life but also to the
very identity (if not also unity) of the Bangsamoro is
their religious belief of Islam. Part of this belief is that
religion is not separate but rather integral to every
aspect of life: prayer, fasting, politics, law, and society.
So why impose on them a secular political unit hewing
to the constitutional principle of inviolable separation of
Church and state? Is there or is there no constitutional
space for an Islamic, or more precisely a Moro Islamic,
way of life and governance? Unless this legitimate
Islamic aspiration is addressed or at least recognized,
there will likely emerge new Bangsamoro Islamic rebel
groups in the future. But of course we should also respect
and not be holier than what is truly acceptable to the
Bangsamoro people.
Final Note

I have probably said more than enough (or to
some, more than I should say) in terms of unsolicited
analysis and advice. I will leave it at that for now, for
what it may be of help to the Mindanao peace process.
Its current juncture of a short road map to peace till 2016
133
is already playing itself out. The end of that short road in

2016 will of course be another important juncture. When
that point comes, but even where we are now with an
agreed version of the proposed BBL just starting to be
deliberated in Congress, I believe it would help to have
a more strategic direction for the longer road ahead to
peace or to the full solution of the Bangsamoro problem.
This problem is so intractable that it may still be around
for another generation. I hope this piece can help set
that direction and generate more strategic thinking and
of course action on what is to be done. In the end, we
all hope for a better judgment of history and of future
generations. -- #
-----------------------SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. A.B. History cum laude (UP),
LL.B. (UNC), LL.M. (Melb); Member, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Camarines Sur Chapter. He has been
a long-time Bicolano human rights and IHL lawyer;
legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate,
researcher and writer esp. for and on the Mindanao peace
process, with several books on this, inc. The Moro Islamic
Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao
Peace Process (UP Press, 2001; with 2nd printing, 2009),
where he has long made the first full argument for
charter change for that peace process. He is presently
Presiding Judge of the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Nabua-Bato, and Acting Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balatan, both in
Camarines Sur.
From Presidential Government to

a
Parliamentary Government
From Presidential Government to a Parliamentary Government
137
From Presidential Government to a Parliamentary

Government
By Jose Pepe Abueva
Jose V. Abueva is Professor Emeritus of Political Science &

Public Administration at the University of the Philippines,
President of Kalayaan College in Quezon City and Director of
its Institute of Federal Parliamentary Democracy. Comments
are welcome at pepevabueva@gmail.com. This article first
appeared in The Bohol Chronicle on Aug. 17, 2014.
uddenly President Aquino III says he wants a

second term. But all along he has been against
amending our 1987 Constitutionalso called
the Cory Constitution of 1987. Apparently he realizes
how extremely difficult it is to govern our Presidential
Government that allows the President to govern for only
six years without any reelection. And to be subject to
the countervailing power of the Supreme Court that has
judged the PDAP and the DAP to be unconstitutional.
When in fact the President and the legislators have
enjoyed these discretionary practices so much in
governing our country. And many legislators have
enriched themselves by their misuse of their pork barrel,
thus the Supreme Courts judgment. And the needed
prosecution of legislators and many others for their
corruption.

But what is really wrong with our Presidential
Government and why should we amend our Constitution
to change it to a Parliamentary Government?

Separation of the executive power of the President
and the legislative power of Congress (the Senate and
the House of Representatives) causes intense rivalry
and competition for power and advantage among them.
Especially because, like the President, the 24 senators
are elected nationwide. Constant conflict and gridlock
among the President and the House and the Senate, and
congressional investigations into the workings of the
Executive Department delay and obstruct legislation,
administration, and reforms.

Because of the power of the media and cinema,
candidates for President and the Senate are increasingly
being selected mainly for their personal popularity or
win-ability and wealth, rather than political leadership.
The President has a fixed term of six years and may be
removed from office only by impeachment which is very
contentious and divisive, and nearly impossible to carry
out.

Our Presidential Government is unstable because
of people power and military intervention in politics
as shown in the failed impeachment of an incumbent
President: Joseph Estrada in 2001. During her term
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo suffered from several
threats of removal by people power and some military
139
leaders. President Corazon C. Aquino contended with

nine coup attempts.

Our Presidential Government is also unstable
because the President may want to extend his one term
of six years by seeking to amend the Constitution.
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972 that
enabled him to rule for 20 years (13 years plus beyond
his two four-year terms).

Rising cost of elections, especially national
elections of the President and senators, corrupt the
system. With the high stakes involved in politics and
widespread poverty, vote-buying is rampant, and
cheating is common. Various areas are prone to violence
related to elections.

Because our political parties are organizations of
politicians, undemocratic, unstable, and not programoriented, our leaders and political parties cannot be held
responsible and accountable to the people. With power
diffused and the leadership fragmented it is difficult to
know who is responsible and accountable for the success
or failure of governance.

So what Parliamentary Government is proposed?
By definition Parliament is vested with both legislative
and executive powers. And a unicameral Parliament
is recommended. Our Senate should therefore be
abolished.

In a Parliamentary Government, also known
as Party Government, most Members of Parliament
(MPs) are elected as registered members of their
respective political parties. They shall be committed
by law and practice to their partys ideals and program
of government. Voters shall vote for an individual
candidate for MP in their parliamentary district and also
for the political party those candidates represent. Some
seats in Parliament are reserved for the various political
parties in proportion to their share of the total votes cast
these parties bet in the parliamentary election

Checks and balance within the Parliament is
exercised in the relations between the majority party
and the opposition parties; and in the regular question
hour when the Government responds to the questions
and challenges of the opposition MPs. Interacting
with the Government and Parliament are other centers
of countervailing powers: business, interest groups,
the media, civil society organizations, as well as multinational and foreign interests.

Parliament shall have as many members as may
be provided by law. To begin with, Parliament shall
have as many elected members as the present district
representatives of the House of Representatives.

Other than the MPs who are elected in the
parliamentary districts, Parliament shall also have
MPs chosen by the political parties on the basis of
141
Proportional Representation (PR), or according to

their respective share of the total votes cast nationwide
in the parliamentary election. For this purpose 30
percent of the total seats in Parliament shall be reserved
for the political parties on the basis of PR. In our Global
Filipino Nation, Filipino citizens overseas shall be
entitled to representation in Parliament.

Members of Parliament shall be elected, or
chosen by the political parties, for a term of five years,
with no term limits. Candidates for MP must have a
college degree as proposed in our regional consultations
on Charter change in 2005.

The Prime Minister shall exercise the executive
power as the Head of Government. He is elected by
a majority of all the MPs. He is normally the leader
of the majority party in Parliament. As the Head of
the Government, the Prime Minister is assisted by his
Cabinet of Ministers, at least three-fourths of whom
shall be elected MPs.

From among its MPs, the Parliament elects the
President who is the Head of State. Upon election the
President shall cease to be an MP and a member of any
political party. He has a term of five years.

What are the expected advantages of the proposed
Parliamentary Government over our old and present
Presidential Government?

Exercising both legislative power and executive
power, the Parliament will ensure the coordinated,
efficient and effective exercise of both powersthe
making of laws and policies and their enforcement and
implementation. Especially because of the unicameral
Parliament proposed.

The Prime Minister and the Government (the
Cabinet of Ministers of the governing party headed by
the Prime Minister) assume collective responsibility
and accountability to Parliament and to the people
for governance. The people will know the political
party and leaders to reward for good governance and
administration, or to punish for failure and corruption,
unlike in our Presidential Government and our
fragmented and unaccountable political party system.
Parliamentary government is more likely to ensure
the election of the Head of Governmentthe Prime
Ministerfor his leadership and experience in the
political party and in the public service, as known to the
party members and the people.

It will help prevent the election of the Head of
Government, as in our Presidential Government, on the
basis largely of personal popularity, wealth, or winability, not on proven competence and experience as a
political and party leader.

It will be easier to change the Head of Government
and the ruling party whenever it becomes necessary,
143
by a vote of no confidence in Parliament. No need for

impeachment, people power revolts, and military
intervention that cause political instability, disrupt the
economy, discourage foreign investors, and hurt the
people, especially the poor.

Unlike in our Presidential Government where the
President is both Head of Government and Head of State,
the function of Head of State is assigned to a ceremonial
President elected by Parliament. This will reduce the
burdens on the Prime Minister who can concentrate
on governance. At the same time the President, who
symbolizes the peoples sovereignty and national unity,
can be a rallying point as a leader who is above partisan
politics.

Parliamentary Government and electoral
reform will empower the people to choose not only the
candidates for Parliament but also the political party
they want to govern the country and the regional and
local governments and to hold accountable for their
success or failure in governance.

In the long term this will develop political parties
that are democratic, disciplined, united, and effective
in making and carrying out a program of government
that can secure popular support. It will also develop
a two-party system, especially if the State provides a
campaign subsidy to the two leading political parties
and penalizes MPs who are disloyal to their political

party in Parliament.

The fragmented party-list system shall be
abolished. By consolidating the political parties. The
two major parties will compete for a majority of the seats
in Parliament that will entitle one of them to form the
Government.

The people will elect the members of Parliament
among candidates in the parliamentary districts. And
indirectly the people will also choose additional MPs
by Proportional Representation of the rival political
parties in the parliamentary election. It will therefore be
easier and faster and less costly to administer elections
and proclaim the winning candidates. Representation
of overseas Filipino citizens qualified to vote will also
enhance democracy in our Global Filipino nation.

It will also reduce the high cost of electing the Head
of Government in a national election by choosing the
leader of the majority party (or coalition) in Parliament
as Prime Minister.

The selection of additional members of Parliament
through Proportional Representation of the political
parties will enable the leading political party to select
competent leaders (among professionals, business
leaders, scholars) to serve in Parliament and the Cabinet.
145
These are leaders who are usually not willing to run for
public office.

Parliamentary government can lead to more
continuity in policy and administration if the Government
formed by the majority party or coalition governs well
and the people are satisfied. Unlike in our Presidential
Government where the incumbent President governs
for a maximum of six years and cannot seek reelection.
because the people will learn to reward or punish the
ruling party for its success or failure in governance.
The people will know that the ruling party, not just
individual leaders, is responsible and accountable for
the Governments performance.

As shown above, the shift to a Parliamentary
Government will also result in major reforms in the
electoral system and the political party system.

Functioning and effective democracy. In sum,
Parliamentary Government, along with the devolution
of powers, authority and resources to regional and local
governments as the Bangsamoro is designed to be
will help us achieve good governance: ang mabuti at
mabisang pamamalakad ng ating gobyerno at bayan.

Parliamentary Government, along with regional
and local autonomy in transition to a Federal Republic,
will enable us, Filipinos, to respond more efficiently
and effectively to our problems, meet our challenges,
achieve our goals as a nation, and compete in the global

economy. It will progressively empower us as a nation
to achieve the peace, prosperity, justice and security we
all want for ourselves and our children.

By removing the constitutional restrictions on
foreign investments and participation in the economy
and leaving it to Parliament to lay down policies,
the Government will be better able to attract those
investments. With more capital and funds we will create
more jobs, raise incomes, provide better education,
health, welfare, and security to our people. We can build
and maintain more schools, hospitals, waterworks,
roads, bridges, seaports and airports. We can employ
more of our professionals and skilled workers at home
instead of losing them to work overseas.

We shall be building a nation worthy of our heroes,
a country fit for our childrenof which all Filipinos can
be proud.
A Comparison: What RA 9054

and the
BBL say about local
governance and regional-LGU

relations
A Comparison: What RA 9054 and the BBL say about local governance
149
and regional-LGU relations
A Comparison: What RA 9054 and the BBL say about

local governance and regional-LGU relations
First published on iag.org.ph on Sept. 30, 2014
epublic Act (RA) 9054 is the Organic Act for

the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).

The proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL),
if approved by Congress, will supersede RA 9054 and
pave the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro, the
new political entity that will replace the ARMM.

This study was presented by Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
Undersecretary Jose Lorena at the forum on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law in Makati City on Sept. 24, 2014.
The forum is part of the IAG project with UNICEF
aimed at raising awareness of political institutions on
the protection of childrens rights and improving the
policymaking environment in the proposed Bangsamoro
areas.
On power and functions

RA 9054
ARTICLE IV
POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT
Section 1. Powers and
Functions.
BBL
ARTICLE VI
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
Section 7. Bangsamoro
Government and Its
Constituent Local
Section 1. Powers and
Government Units.
Functions.
The provinces, cities,
municipalities, barangays,
The Regional Government and geographic areas
may enact its own
within its territory shall
be the constituent units
regional administrative
code and regional
of the Bangsamoro. The
local government
authority to regulate on
code consistent with
its own responsibility
the Constitution. The
the affairs of the local
powers and functions
government units is
already vested upon
guaranteed within the
and the shares of
limit of this Basic Law.
the national taxes
The privileges already
provided by Republic
enjoyed by the local
Act No. 7160, the Local
government units under
Government Code
existing laws shall not
of 1991, to provinces,
be diminished unless
cities, municipalities,
otherwise altered,
and barangay in the
modified or reformed
autonomous region shall for good governance in
not be reduced.
accordance with a law
to be enacted by the
Bangsamoro Parliament.
151
ARTICLE III
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES
Section 3. Devolution of
Powers. - The regional
government shall adopt a
policy on local autonomy
whereby regional powers
shall be devolved to
local government units
particularly in areas of
education, health, human
resource, science and
technology and people
empowerment. Until a
law implementing this
provision is enacted by
the Regional Assembly,
Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government
Code of 1991, shall
continue to apply to all
the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and
barangay within the
autonomous region.
Section 6. Devolution
and Subsidiarity. The
Central Government
and the Bangsamoro
Government accept the
concept of devolution
as inspired by the
principles of subsidiarity.
Decisions are to be
made at the appropriate
level to ensure public
accountability and
transparency, and in
consideration of good
governance and the
general welfare.
The Regional Assembly

may not pass any law to
diminish, lessen, or reduce
the powers, functions,
and shares in the internal
revenue taxes of the said
as provided by Republic
Government Code of 1991.
OPAPPs Jose Lorena: The issue being raised by the
Local Government Units: Will the BBL diminish the
powers of the LGUs?

Like the RA 9054, the BBL guarantees the local
government units that there will be no diminutions on
the powers and functions as well as the privileges that
are extended to them by existing laws such as RA 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9054 though prohibits the Regional Assembly
to pass any law to diminish, lessen, or reduce the powers,
functions, and shares in the internal revenue taxes of the
said local government units as provided by RA 7160, while
the BBL provides for exception whereby the Bangsamoro
Government deem it necessary to modify the powers and
functions of LGUs through an enacted local government
code by the Bangsamoro Parliament, for the purpose of
establishing and reinforcing good governance reforms.
If issues on this arise, the Intergovernmental Relations
Mechanism shall be utilized.
153

The principle on devolution of powers from the
central government to the local government units is
present in RA 9054 and BBL, with an additional concept
subsidiarity introduced in the latter which means
decisions are to be made at the appropriate level.
On
creation, division, merging, abolition of local
governments and plebiscite
RA 9054
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
BBL
ARTICLE V
POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT
Section 19. Creation,

Division or Abolition
of Provinces, Cities,
Municipalities or
Barangay. - The Regional
Assembly may create,
divide, merge, abolish,
or substantially alter
boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities, or
barangay in accordance
with the criteria laid
down by Republic Act
No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of
1991, subject to the
approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
Section 3. Exclusive
Powers
57. Local administration,
municipal corporations
and other local authorities
including the creation of
local governments. The
Bangsamoro Government
shall manage and build
its own bureaucracy
and administrative
organization, in
accordance with the
ministerial form of
government;

may prescribe standards
lower than those
mandated by Republic
Government Code of
1991, in the creation,
division, merger,
abolition, or alteration
of the boundaries
of provinces, cities,
municipalities, or
barangay. Provinces,
cities, municipalities,
or barangay created,
divided, merged, or
whose boundaries are
altered without observing
the standards prescribed
by Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government
Code of 1991, shall not be
entitled to any share of
the taxes that are allotted
to the local government
units under the provisions
of the Code.
The financial
requirements of the
provinces, cities,
municipalities, or
barangay so created,
divided, or merged
The Bangsamoro
Parliament may create,
divide, merge, abolish
or substantially alter
boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities or
barangays in accordance
with a law enacted by the
Bangsamoro Parliament,
and subject to the
approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political
Subject to the criteria
provided in said
law, the Bangsamoro
Parliament may likewise
create appropriate local
government units in
the areas inhabited
predominantly by
indigenous peoples;
However, when such acts
require the creation of a
congressional district, the
shall cooperate and
coordinate with Central
Government through the
Philippine Congress
Bangsamoro Parliament
155
shall be provided by the

Regional Assembly out of
the general funds of the
Regional Government.
Forum to prioritize
the deliberations on
the creation of the
congressional district;
The holding of a plebiscite

to determine the will of the
majority of the voters of the
areas affected by the creation,
division, merger, or whose
boundaries are being altered
as required by Republic
Government Code of 1991,
shall, however, be observed.
may also change the
names of local government
units, public places and
institutions, and declare
regional holidays.
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS
Section 13. Plebiscite
and Effectivity of this
Organic Act. This Organic
Act shall take effect when
approved by a majority of
the votes cast in the four
(4) provinces constituting
the present Autonomous
Article XV
PLEBISCITE
Section 1. Establishment
of the Bangsamoro.
The establishment of
the Bangsamoro and
the determination of the
Bangsamoro territory
shall take effect upon
ratification of this Basic
Law by majority of the
Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao
pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6734, the Organic
Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim
Mindanao.
votes cast in the following

provinces, cities, and
geographical areas in a
plebiscite conducted for
the purpose:
a. The present
geographical area of the
Autonomous Region
A separate plebiscite shall in Muslim Mindanao
be held simultaneously
(ARMM);
with the plebiscite
mentioned in the
b. The Municipalities of
preceding paragraph in
Baloi, Munai, Nunungan,
the Provinces of Basilan,
Pantar, Tagoloan and
Cotabato, Davao del
Tangkal in the province of
Sur, Lanao del Norte,
Lanao del Norte;
Palawan, Sarangani,
South Cotabato, Sultan
c. The following thirty
Kudarat, Zamboanga del nine (39) Barangays
Norte, Zamboanga del
in the Municipalities
Sur and the newly created of Kabacan, Carmen,
Province of Zamboanga
Aleosan, Pigkawayan,
Sibugay, and the cities
Pikit, and Midsayap
of Cotabato, Dapitan,
in North Cotabato that
Dipolog, General Santos, voted for inclusion in the
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, ARMM during the 2001
Puerto Princesa,
plebiscite under Republic
Zamboanga, Digos,
Act No. 9054:
Koronadal, Tacurong, and
Kidapawan to determine i. Dunguan, Lower
by majority vote cast in
Mingading, and Tapodoc
every province and city
in the municipality of
whether or not the
Aleosan;
157
voters approve the

inclusion of their
respective provinces
or cities in the
autonomous region.
Only provinces and
cities voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall
be included in the
Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
ii. Manarapan and

Nasapian in the
municipality of Carmen;
iii. Nanga-an, Simbuhay
and Sanggadong in the
municipality of Kabacan;
iv. Damatulan,
Kadigasan, Kadingilan,
Kapinpilan, Kudarangan,
Central Labas,
If the majority of the votes Malingao, Mudseng,
cast in the said plebiscite Nabalawag, Olandang,
Sambulawan, and Tugal
in the four (4) provinces
favor the amendments
Midsayap;
to Republic Act 6734,
the amendments will be
v. Lower Baguer,
deemed ratified.
Balacayon, Buricain,
DatuBinasing, Kadingilan,
Matilac, Patot, and
Lower Pangangkalan
Pigkawayan;
vi. Bagoinged, Balatican,
S. Balong, S. Balongis,
Batulawan, Buliok,
Gokoton, Kabasalan,
Lagunde, Macabial,
Macasendeng, in
the municipality of
Pigkawayan;
d. The Cities of Cotabato

and Isabela; and
e. Those qualified for
inclusion in the plebiscite,
by way of resolution or
petition.
Section 2. Territorial
Jurisdiction. The
plebiscite for purposes of
determining the actual
territorial jurisdiction
of the Bangsamoro shall
be conducted, as far as
practicable, within one
hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity
of this Basic Law.
For this purpose,
the COMELEC shall
undertake the necessary
steps to enable the
holding of the plebiscite
within the said period.
Section 3. Results of
the Plebiscite. a. For
the present geographic
area of the ARMM: if the
majority of the registered
voters
159
in each province and

city vote in favor of the
(BBL), the respective
provinces and cities
shall be included in the
Bangsamoro.
b. For the municipalities
of Baloi, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagaloan and Tangkal
in the Province of
Lanao del Norte: If the
majority of the registered
voters in each of these
municipalities vote in
favor of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL), the
respective municipalities
Bangsamoro.
c. For other barangays
in the municipalities
of Kabacan, Carmen,
Aleosan, Pigcawayan,
Pikit, and Midsayap that
voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite: If the majority
of the registered voters in
each of these barangays
vote in favor of the

(BBL), the respective
barangays shall
be included in the
Bangsamoro.
d. For the cities of
Cotabato and Isabela:
If the majority of the
registered voters in each
of these cities vote in
favor of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL), the
respective cities shall
be included in the
Bangsamoro.
e. For all other contiguous
areas where there is a
resolution of the local
government unit or a
petition of at least ten
percent (10%) of the
registered voters in the
geographic area asking
for their inclusion at least
two months prior to the
conduct of the ratification
of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law BBL. If the majority
of the registered voters
in each of these local
government units vote in
favor of
161
the Bangsamoro Basic

Law BBL, the respective
Bangsamoro.
Section 4. Plebiscite for
Joining the Bangsamoro.
Any local government
unit or geographic area
outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the
Bangsamoro, but which
are contiguous to any of
the component units of
the Bangsamoro, upon a
verified petition for the
conduct of a plebiscite
of at least ten percent
10% of the registered
voters, submitted to the
Bangsamoro Electoral
Office.
Provided that, the
inclusion of said local
government unit or
geographic area in the
Bangsamoro shall be
effective when approved
by a majority of the
registered voters within
that local government
unit in the plebiscite

called for the purpose.
Provided further that the
schedule of the plebiscite
shall be determined by
the COMELEC through
the Bangsamoro Electoral
Office.
Lorena: The BBL states that the Bangsamoro
Parliament shall enact its own Local Government Code
which will provide the basis of the creation, merging,
abolishing and altering the boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangay to be undertaken by
the Bangsamoro Parliament.

In RA 9054, the Regional Assembly shall carry out
the same task in accordance with the criteria prescribed
by Republic Act No. 7160, to wit:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
TITLE ONE. - THE BARANGAY
CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND CREATION OF THE
BARANGAY

SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A barangay
maybe created out of a contiguous territory which has a
population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office except in
cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and
other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly
urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified
population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants:
163
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the

population of the original barangay or barangays to less
than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the
indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be
created in such communities by an Act of Congress,
notwithstanding the above requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare
a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial
jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the
sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned for appropriate action. In the case of
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and
other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by
the sangguniang bayan concerned.
TITLE TWO. - THE MUNICIPALITY
MUNICIPALITY

SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality
may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two
million five hundred thousand pesos (P=2,500,000.00)

for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the
1991 constant prices; a population of at least twentyfive thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at
least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof
shall not reduce the land area, population or income of
the original municipality or municipalities at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
municipality shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the municipality proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund of the municipality
concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.
TITLE THREE. - THE CITY
CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND CREATION OF THE CITY

SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
165
and if it has either of the following requisites:

i. a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
ii. a population of not less than one hundred
fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.

income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
TITLE FOUR. - THE PROVINCE
PROVINCE

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A province
may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P=20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:

i. a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
ii. a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.

income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Plebiscite for the creation, merging, division
and abolition of local governments:

In RA 9054, the holding of a plebiscite to determine
the will of the majority of the voters of the areas affected
by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries
are being altered as required by Republic Act No. 7160,
shall be observed.
167

In the same way, BBL requires for the approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political

However, there are issues being raised:

(1) What will happen to the six (6)
municipalities of Lanao Del Norte and 39
barangays in six (6) municipalities of North
Cotabato that are part of the core territory
subject to a plebiscite for voting for inclusion
to the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite for
RA 9054, if they voted again for inclusion,
this time, to the Bangsamoro? To which
provinces will they be attached?
(2) If these geographic areas are to undergo
plebiscite, then their mother provinces
must also undergo plebiscite as they are
directly and politically affected and there
are repercussions to the provinces that will
be brought about by this exercise.
(3) CHAPTER 2. - GENERAL POWERS AND
ATTRIBUTES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS of the 1991 Local Government Code
outlines the general rules for creation,
conversion, division, merger and abolition of
local government (please see below) and also
earlier mentioned are the requisites in creating
municipalities, cities and province.
CHAPTER 2. - GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES

OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general
rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another level shall be
based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based
on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services
and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. - It shall be determined
as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous,
unless it comprises two or more islands
or is separated by a local government
unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities
to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators
shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office
(NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau
(LMB) of the Department of Environment
169
and Natural Resources (DENR).

SEC. 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger
of existing local government units shall comply with
the same requirements herein prescribed for their
creation: Provided, however, That such division shall
not reduce the income, population, or land area of the
local government unit or units concerned to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code:
Provided, further, That the income classification of the
original local government unit or units shall not fall
below its current income classification prior to such
division. The income classification of local government
units shall be updated within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their
financial position resulting from the increased revenues
as provided herein.

SEC. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. - A local
government unit may be abolished when its income,
population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced
to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its
creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the
national agencies mentioned in Section 17 hereof to
Congress or to the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be.

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government
unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or
barangay with which the local government unit sought
to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.

SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect

unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity
of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said
law or ordinance fixes another date.

Question: How do you now reconcile the criteria
in creating, dividing, merging and abolishing local
governments prescribed by the 1991 Local Government
Code which is a National Law, with the provisions
on the joining of the components or core territories (6
municipalities in Lanao del Norte and the 39 barangays
in 6 municipalities in North Cotabato) that will vote for
inclusion and other contiguous areas that will petition
for inclusion in the Bangsamoro as stipulated in the BBL
which happens to be another national law?

The BBL, unfortunately, does not address
these issues. Given the complexities of the said issues,
the Congress is tasked to decide on the fate of these
geographic areas should they cast an affirmative vote for
their inclusion in the Bangsamoro.
171
On
intergovernmental relations mechanism and local
governments
RA 9054
ARTICLE V
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
BBL
ARTICLE VI
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
Section 1. General
Supervision of the
President over the
Regional Governor.
Consistent with the
Constitution and basic
policy on local autonomy,
the President of the
Republic shall exercise
general supervision over
the Regional Governor
to ensure that his or her
acts are within the scope
of his or her powers and
functions.
Section 3.
General Supervision.
Consistent with the
principle of autonomy
and the asymmetric
relation of the Central
Government and the
Bangsamoro Government,
the President shall
exercise general
supervision over the
to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
The power of supervision

of the President over the
provincial governors and
the mayors of the highly
urbanized cities shall be
exercised through the
Regional Governor; over
the mayors of the
Section 5. Council
of Leaders. The
Bangsamoro Council
of Leaders shall consist
of the Chief Minister,
provincial governors,
mayors of chartered cities,
and representatives from
the non-Moro indigenous
component cities and

municipalities, through
the provincial governor,
and the punong barangay,
through the city or
municipal mayor.
Section 6. Executive
Council; Deputy Regional
Governors. -The Regional
Governor shall appoint
three (3) deputies
each representing the
Christians, indigenous
cultural communities,
and the Muslims in the
region. The Regional
Governor, the Regional
Vice Governor, and
the three (3) deputies
shall comprise the
executive council of the
autonomous government.
The executive council
communities, women,
settler communities,
and other sectors. The
Bangsamoro Council of
Leaders shall be chaired
by the Chief Minister.
The Council shall advise
the Chief Minister on
matters of governance
in the Bangsamoro. The
representation of the
non-Moro indigenous
communities shall
be pursuant to their
customary laws and
indigenous processes.
173
shall advise the Regional

Governor on matters
of governance of the
autonomous region. The
three deputies shall be
ex officio members of
the regional cabinet with
or without portfolio.
The Regional Governor
may assign powers and
functions to the executive
council to promote the
general welfare of the
people of the autonomous
region subject to the laws
enacted by the Regional
Assembly.
Unless sooner removed
by the Regional Governor,
the term of office of
a deputy Regional
Governor shall be coterminus with the term
of office of the Regional
Governor who appointed
him or her.
Lorena: The mechanism for discussion on the
matters of governance in the autonomous region as
provided for in RA 9054 is named the Executive Council
which is comprised of the Regional Governor, three (3)
appointed deputies representing Christians, indigenous
cultural communities and Muslims in the region along
with Regional Vice Governor.

The BBL, on the other hand, provides for a more
inclusive and representative mechanism that includes
provincial governors, mayors of chartered cities,
and representatives from the non-Moro indigenous
communities, women, settler communities, and other
sectors who truly know the state of governance in their
areas. The mechanism named Council of Leaders is
chaired by the Chief Minister the head of the Bangsamoro
Government. It also underscores the recognition of the
representation of non-Moro indigenous communities
based on their customary laws and indigenous processes.
On local government share on natural resources
RA 9054
ARTICLE XII
ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
Section 5. Use,
Development of Mines,
Minerals, and Other
Natural Resources;
Revenue Sharing;
Exceptions.
(b) Sharing Between
Central Government or
National Government
and Regional
Government
BBL
Article XII
FISCAL AUTONOMY
Sharing in the
Exploration,
Development and
Utilization of Natural
Resources
Section 32. Sharing
in Exploration,
Development and
Utilization of Natural
Resource. Central
Government income from
taxes derived from
175
in Strategic Minerals
Revenues, Taxes, or Fees.
Fifty percent (50%) of
the revenues, taxes, or
fees derived from the use
and development of the
strategic minerals shall
accrue and be remitted to
the Regional Government
within thirty (30) days
from the end of every
quarter of every year. The
other fifty percent (50%)
shall accrue to the central
government or national
government.
(c) Sharing Between
Regional Government
and Local Government
Units in Strategic
Minerals Revenues,
Taxes, or Fees. The
share of the Regional
Government mentioned
above is hereby
apportioned as follows:
thirty percent (30%) to the
Regional Government;
twenty percent (20%) to
all the provinces; fifteen
percent (15%) to all the
cities; twenty percent
(20%) to all the
the exploration,
development and
utilization of all natural
resources within the
Bangsamoro shall be
allocated as follows:
a. For non-metallic
minerals (sand, gravel,
and quarry resources),
such revenues shall
pertain fully to the
Bangsamoro and its local
government units;
b. For metallic minerals,
seventy-five percent
(75%) shall pertain to the
Bangsamoro;
c. For fossil fuels
(petroleum, natural gas,
and coal and uranium),
the same shall be shared
equally between the
Central and Bangsamoro
Governments.
Such sharing scheme
shall be applicable to the
natural resources found
in the landmass that
comprise the Bangsamoro
territory as well as the
municipalities; and
fifteen percent (15%)
to all the barangays. If
there are no cities in the
autonomous region as of
the date the sharing above
mentioned is done, the
share of the cities shall be
divided equally by all the
provinces, municipalities,
and barangay in the
autonomous region
waters that are within the

territorial jurisdiction of
the Bangsamoro.
Section 33. Share of
the Constituent Local
Government Units. The
share of the Bangsamoro
Government in the
revenues referred to
in the immediately
preceding section
shall include those for
its constituent local
government units. The
shall enact a law detailing
the shares of such local
government units.
Lorena:

I. Sharing scheme on strategic minerals as a
natural resource between Central Government and
Regional/Bangsamoro Government:

RA 9054 (Section 5 (a) defined strategic minerals
by enumeration, uranium, petroleum and other fossil
fuels, mineral oils, all sources of energy as well as
natural reserves and aquatic parks, forest and watershed
reservations):

Central Government: 50%
177
Regional Government: 50%
BBL (classified natural resources into Nonmetallic and metallic minerals as well as fossil fuels):

(a) Non-metallic minerals:
(b) Metallic minerals:
Bangsamoro Government: 100%

(c) Fossil fuels:


II. Sharing scheme on strategic minerals as
a natural resource among local government units and
the Regional/Bangsamoro Government:

RA 9054:

Regional Government: 30%

Provinces: 20%
Cities: 15%
Municipalities: 20%
Barangays: 15%

BBL does not provide for this sharing scheme,
rather it mandates the Bangsamoro Parliament to
enact a law detailing the sharing scheme among
the Bangsamoro Government, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays of Bangsamoro on these
natural resources.

Although the BBL classified natural resource
into three (3) kinds, the sharing scheme on fossil fuels
which is called strategic minerals in RA 9054, remains
the same with both Central Government and Regional/
Bangsamoro Government receiving equal share. With
regard to metallic and non-metallic minerals, clearly the
Bangsamoro Government receives bigger shares than
the Central Government.
On local government share on internal revenue tax
RA 9054
ARTICLE IX
FISCAL AUTONOMY
BBL
ARTICLE XII
FISCAL AUTONOMY
Section 9. Sharing of
Internal Revenue, Natural
Resources Taxes, Fees and
Charges. - The collections
of a province or city from
national internal revenue
taxes, fees and charges,
and taxes imposed on
natural resources, shall be
distributed as follows:
Sources of Revenue
Section 10. Share in
Taxes of the Central
Government. Central
Government taxes, fees,
and charges collected in
the Bangsamoro, other
than tariff and customs
179
(a)Thirty-five percent
(35%) to the province or
city;
(b)Thirty-five percent
(35%) to the regional
government; and
duties, shall be shared as

follows:
a.Twenty-five percent
(25%) to the Central
Government; and
b.Seventy-five percent
(c)Thirty percent (30%) to (75%) to the Bangsamoro,
the central government or including the shares of
national government.
the localgovernment
units.
The share of the province
shall be apportioned as
The aforementioned
follows: forty-five percent twenty-five percent (25%)
(45%) to the province,
share of the Central
thirty-five percent (35%)
Government shall,for
to the municipality and
a period of ten (10)
twenty percent (20%) to
years, be retained by the
the barangay.
Bangsamoro Government.
The periodfor retention
The share of the city shall maybe extended upon
be distributed as follows: mutual agreement of
fifty percent (50%) to
the Central Government
the city and fifty percent
andthe Bangsamoro
(50%) to the barangay
Government.
concerned.
The province or
city concerned shall
Government Units
automatically retain its
in Taxes within the
share and remit the shares Bangsamoro. The
of the Regional
Government and the

central government or
national government
to their respective
treasurers who shall, after
deducting the share of the
Regional Government as
mentioned in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this Section,
remit the balance to the
national government
within the first five (5)
days of every month after
the collections were made.
The remittance of the
shares of the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and
barangay in the internal
revenue taxes, fees, and
charges and the taxes,
fees, and charges on the
use, development, and
operation of natural
autonomous region shall
be governed by law
enacted by the Regional
Assembly.
The remittances of the
share of the central
government or national

the shares ofconstituent
in the 75% share of the
inthe taxes, fees and
charges collected in their
jurisdiction by the Central
Government inthe
Bangsamoro.
Taxes and Revenue Code.
The Bangsamoro Parliament
shallenact a Bangsamoro
Tax Code, which shall cover
the taxing powers of the
BangsamoroGovernment.
Section 14. Fees and
Charges. The Bangsamoro
shall exercise the power
to levy fees and charges
pursuant to the powers
and functions that it shall
exercise in accordance with
this Basic Law, including
the powers already granted
under Republic Act No.
6734, RA 9054 and other
executive issuances, and
memoranda of agreement.
181
government of the
internal revenue taxes,
fees, and charges and
on the taxes, fees, and
charges on the use,
development, and
operation of the natural
autonomous region
shall be governed by the
rules and regulations
promulgated by the
Department of Finance of
the central government or
national government.
Officials who fail to
remit the shares of the
central government or
national government, the
Regional Government
and the local government
units concerned in the
taxes, fees, and charges
mentioned above may be
suspended or removed
from office by order of the
Secretary of Finance in
cases involving the share
of the central government
or national government or
by the Regional Governor
in cases involving the
ARTICLE XII
FISCAL AUTONOMY
Sources of Revenue
Section 10. Share in
Taxes of the Central
Government. Central
Government taxes, fees,
and charges collected in
the Bangsamoro, other
than tariff and customs
duties, shall be shared as
follows:
a. Twenty-five percent
(25%) to the Central
Government; and
b. Seventy-five percent
(75%) to the Bangsamoro,
including the shares of
the local government
units.
The aforementioned
twenty-five percent (25%)
share of the Central
Government shall, for
a period of ten (10)
years, be retained by the
share of the Regional

Government and by the
proper local government
executive in cases
involving the share of
local government.
The period for retention

maybe extended upon
mutual agreement of
the Central Government
and the Bangsamoro
Government.
Government Units
in Taxes within the
Bangsamoro. The
the shares of constituent
in the 75% share of the
in the taxes, fees and
charges collected in their
jurisdiction by the Central
Government in the
Bangsamoro.
Taxes and Revenue
Code. The Bangsamoro
Parliament shall enact a
Bangsamoro Tax Code,
which shall cover the
taxing powers of the
183
Section 14. Fees

and Charges. The
Bangsamoro shall exercise
the power to levy fees
and charges pursuant to
the powers and functions
that it shall exercise in
accordance with this
Basic Law, including the
powers already granted
under Republic Act.
No.6734, RA 9054 and
other executive issuances,
and memoranda of
agreement.
Lorena: The BBL decreased the share of the Central
Government on the taxes collected in the Bangsamoro
to 25%, from previous 30% share as provided for in RA
9054.

Therefore, there is an additional 5% internal
revenue tax to be distributed among Bangsamoro
Government and local government units, making it
75% from previously 70% share.

In RA 9054, the share of the regional government
amounts to 35% and province or city receives an equal
share of 35% which the province apportions into the
following:

Province: 45%
Municipality: 35%
Barangay: 20%

The 35% share of the city shall be divided as
follows:

City: 50%

Barangay: 50%

The BBL, however, did not specify the allocations
among the Local Government Units in taxes within the
Bangsamoro. It mandates the Bangsamoro Parliament
to enact a Bangsamoro Tax Code which will provide
details on the sharing scheme among constituent
LGUs as well as the taxing powers of the Bangsamoro
Government.

Aside from the powers already granted by
previous organic acts, the Bangsamoro Government is
given greater fiscal power with these provisions of the
BBL.
The Pains of the Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro
The Pains of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
187
The Pains of the Comprehensive Agreement on

the Bangsamoro
By Zainal Dimaukom Kulidtod, PhD1
Caveat
oltaire once said, I may not agree with what

you say, but I will defend to death your right
to say it. This hallmark foundation of the
freedom of expression is what I expect the readers to
bear in mind when reading this manuscript. Since this
writing tackles the different factors that could possibly
explain the foreseen failure of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), it contains a lot of
thought-provoking issues and probably even offensive
propositions. In this paper, I intentionally adopted the
rigid Islamic perspective in organizing my thoughts,
not because I want to follow the track of extremism, but
to analyze the present peace engagement between the
Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the most objective
way possible using the Islamists perspective since they
are the most radical members of the Bangsamoro society.

I expect varied reactions to my presentation. Some
may find both positive as well as negative points in this
work. But those who could not or would refuse to see
the truth and wisdom of this writing may find only the
negative aspects. Expectedly, they might even consider
me as a peace-spoiler, if not an outright enemy of the

peace process.

Nevertheless, let it be known that with all sincerity
and honesty in my heart, it is never my intention to
hurt anyone or any group. My sole aim is to present
the perspective of the most radical segment of the Moro
separatist fighters for our reconsideration and evaluation
so that real peace may finally reign in this troubled land.
It is my conviction that unless the grievance of the most
militant Moro is addressed, real and everlasting peace
in Mindanao will remain an elusive dream. It should be
remembered that this band of freedom fighters has the
strongest capability, the burning determination and the
iron will to sow disturbances in our midst in the name of
long-aspired justice and freedom.

Moreover, knowing and understanding the real
causes and genuine motives of this conflict would bring
us closer to our quest for justice for the thousands of
lost lives from both sides, and ultimately for the direct
victims of this war. Then, we can say we are already one
step closer to its ultimate resolution.

Looking at the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro and its Annexes, one
will notice that it contains both substantive as well as
procedural shortcomings. Presented hereunder are some
of the more serious ones. The first seven are considered
as substantive while the rest are procedural.
189
Substantial Limitations

[1] The Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro recognizes the spirit and embodies
some principles of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The foremost evidence of this is the provision of the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)2
in Paragraph 7 of the section on Transition and
Implementation that The Bangsamoro Basic Law
submitted by the Transition Commission shall be
certified as an urgent bill3 by the President. Clearly,
this provision of the Agreement is a constitutional
framework emphasizing a constitutional process
that all statutory laws emanate from the Philippine
Congress whose passage may be expedited when the
President certifies the urgency of the bill. This, indeed,
championed the legal sovereignty of the Congress
of the Philippines being the ultimate repository of
the state legislative power. Consequently, the above
provision affirms the spirit of the Philippine Constitution
being embodied in the Framework Agreement.

Therefore, since the Comprehensive Agreement
recognizes the fundamental law, it may be safely
concluded that the MILF finally conceded to the
granting of only an autonomous government, being
the only possible highest degree of self-determination
that can be validly established under the existing
Constitution.4 It is worth remembering that any form
of local governmental set-up different and higher in
degree of autonomy than the present ARMM would

require a change of the Constitution.5 And because the
Framework Agreement does not require the change in
the fundamental law, it follows that only an autonomous
region/government (like the ARMM) is affirmed
as the constitutionally-prescribed form or degree of
internal self-determination for the Bangsamoro people.
Consequently, the only way for it to go higher in degree of
self-determination is through a constitutional change.6
In short, it may be safely deduced that because the
questioned peace formula does not require amendment
to the Constitution, we can hardly expect any form of
government substantially higher in degree of autonomy
than the ARMM set-up.

Time and again, peace advocates have been
consistent in their proposition that the present setup of autonomy prevailing in Mindanao is never the
solution to the Moro problem. In fact, no less than
President Benigno S. Aquino III 7 categorically said that
the ARMM is a failed experiment. Otherwise, if this
ARMM is the ultimate solution, it could have put a rest
to the worsening peace and order situation in Mindanao
which started in August 1989 and continues for more
than 25 years (as of press time).

It is a fatal mistake to believe that there could
be another form of autonomy higher than the so-called
Expanded-ARMM which could possibly and validly be
established under the existing 1987 constitution. This
191
frame of mind is a sheer ignorance of the Philippine

constitutional law as well as the Philippine jurisprudence.

Putting the blame on the Philippine legal system
as the ultimate obstacle to our public quest for lasting
peace in Mindanao, one writer opined: The Philippine
legal systems seem to be unfriendly to a Peace Agreement
like the FPA. Many of the agreements provisions strike
discordant chords with the body of Philippine jurisprudence
and the Constitution itself, which is adverse to separatist
tendencies. 8

Since the present ARMM set-up, which is the
highest degree of self-rule that could be legally granted
to the Moros, is an autonomy formula established under
the present constitution but never solved the Mindanao
crisis, the envisioned Bangsamoro Government to be
organized in 2016 may also likely fail as it is to be created
also under the same constitution.

[2] Contrary to the claim of some sectors of our
society that the Bangsamoro Government prescribed
in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(CAB) is a variant of sub-state, which is a real form
of political autonomy, the fact remains that this
political arrangement also envisions a version of just
an administrative autonomy experimented by previous
Philippine Administrations.


In clarifying the difference between an
administrative
autonomy
(decentralization
of
administration) and a political autonomy (decentralization
of power), the Supreme Court pronounced in the
landmark case of Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391,
February 28, 1989; 170 SCRA 786, the following:
Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in
the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social
progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law.
He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power
in favor of local government units declared to
193
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous

government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to selfimmolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency. [Italics
supplied]

In short, political autonomy happens when
the people are given the right to freely determine their
political status, and to freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development without any imposition,
dictation or intervention from outside forces. Along this
line, one could infer that all forms of autonomy given
to the Moro (from the Marcos Regional Autonomous
Governments [RAGs], to Corys Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao [ARMM], to Arroyos Expanded
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [E-ARMM]
and finally to Aquino IIIs Bangsamoro) are just
shades of administrative decentralization pursuant
to decentralization principles embodied in the
Constitution as well as in the existing laws governing
local governments. In all these variants of autonomy,
the Bangsamoro people have never been given the
freedom to chart their political destiny. This is done by
the Philippine Congress, being the legal sovereign in the
country. 9

In other words, the system of life for the Muslims
in Mindanao is prescribed not by the Bangsamoro
themselves but by someone else. Can the Christianmajority Philippine Congress 10 prescribe what system
of life is best suited for the Muslims? Plain reason
dictates that it cannot. In the same manner, the Moro
cannot prescribe what system of life is appropriate for
the Christians.

Following this logic, observers of the Mindanao
conflict commonly share the view that all variants
of autonomy offered by the Philippine government
aimed at resolving the conflict finally ended as failed
experiments because they were all authored by people
foreign to the Moros. Obviously, since these lawmakers do not know the peculiarities and intricacies
of the Moros system of life, they prescribed the wrong
solutions.

Because the ARMM is just a version of an
administrative autonomy, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court, in Kida vs. Senate, 11 considered it as
a local government unit justifying that autonomous
regions fall under Article X of the Constitution which is
entitled Local Government. Consequently, the fate of
this local autonomy 12 in the country, where the ARMM
belongs, was clarified by the same Court in the most
celebrated case of Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988,
July 19, 2000, where the highest court lauded:
195
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy,

the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress. [Italics supplied]

[3] The New Political Entity to be organized by
2016 shall have no control over the LGUs in its territorial
jurisdiction since their IRAs shall automatically be given
to them without passing through the future Bangsamoro
Government.

The Philippine Constitution provides that Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.13 This non-self-executing provision
is given life by the Local Government Code of 1991 in
further stating that The share of each local government
unit shall be released, without need of any further action,
directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay

treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within
(5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the national government for whatever purpose. 14

Due to the statutory injunction for the National
Government to automatically and regularly release
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of any Local
Government Unit (LGU), either within or outside the
proposed Bangsamoro Political Entity, these LGUs shall
still be fiscally dependent on Manila. In short, LGUs
in the future Bangsamoro Government shall only be
administratively under the Regional Government but
they shall still be politically and fiscally dependent on
the Central Government. Thus, these LGUs shall be
accountable and, therefore, loyal not to the Bangsamoro
Government but to the National Government.

In the Pimentel case, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines laid down the following legal doctrines
relative to the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs regarding
their shares in the national internal revenue taxes. With
only three Justices dissenting in an en banc decision, the
Court nullified Administrative Order No. 372 decreed by
former President Ramos, entitled Adoption of Economy
Measures in Government for FY 1998, which ordained
in its Section 4 thereof that: Pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
197
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to

local government units shall be withheld. Says the
Court:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by no
less than the Constitution. The Local Government
Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose. [italics supplied]

The above pronouncement of the Court is now a
legal principle mandating that even the Chief Executive of
the Philippines cannot hold back or make any deduction
in the IRAs of the LGUs irrespective of his intention and
purpose.

This judicial ruling also holds true even if the
one making any lien or holdback in the IRA is the
Philippine Congress as settled in the Alternative Center for
Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. (ACORD),
et.al. vs. Ronaldo Zamora, et.al., G.R. No. 144256, June
8, 2005. In that case, the national legislature enacted the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000
which provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10
Billion) appropriated for UNPROGRAMMED FUND,
shall be released only when the original revenue targets
submitted by the President to Congress can be realized

based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by
certain committees enumerated by this law.

In invalidating such act of Congress, the highest
court amplifies:
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the
duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the
legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. To hold that the
executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it
has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute - a proposition
which is patently absurd. [Italics supplied]

In conclusion, for as long as the 1987 Philippine
Constitution remains un-amended, both the President
as well as Congress cannot impose any lien, holdback
or encumbrance of whatever kind to the IRAs of the
LGUs which would prevent them from their automatic
release, much more for rechanneling the release of these
revenue allotments to other entity, such as to the future

Since the LGUs in the future Bangsamoro
Government shall remain politically and fiscally under
the Central Government, can the New Political Entity
199
to be established in 2016 control and institute effective

reforms in these government units?

[4] On several occasions, the Peace Panel of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have made several
appeals to their counterparts in the government side not
to offer them the same propositions already enjoyed
by the present ARMM. Apparently, the MILF want
to be given a substantially higher degree of self-rule,
politically and fiscally, than that granted to the MNLFinspired ARMM.

However, a cursory reading of the CAB suggests
that the MILF has only minor achievements as compared
to the MNLF. The most notable ones are the following.

(4.I) The shifting from a presidential-like ARMM
to a parliamentary-like Bangsamoro Government. 15 To
some peace observers, this is the essence of asymmetry
contemplated by the MILF in the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (FAB) as stipulated in Section I,
Paragraph 2 of said Agreement which mandated that the
government of the Bangsamoro shall have a ministerial
form. As can be recalled, both peace panels conceded
that the status quo 16 is unacceptable, hence, the proposal
for the parliamentary system.

Some of the manifestations of the claim that
ARMM exhibited a presidential form are as follows:
First, the law creating it stipulates that the legislative
power of the autonomous government shall be vested in

the Regional Assembly whose members are elected by
popular vote.17 And second, its executive power shall
be vested in a Regional Governor who shall be elected
by the qualified voters of the autonomous region. Since
he is the chief executive of the Region, the Regional
Governor appoints all the members of the cabinet. 18

Accordingly, the above provisions indicate that
the law-making body of the autonomous region is
distinctly separate from its law-implementing body both
in terms of their memberships and functions. Moreover,
as opposed to a parliamentary system whose head
of government is voted indirectly by the electorates,
the chief executive of the ARMM is directly elected by
popular votes. Hence, it exhibits a presidential system.

On the other hand, the Annex on Power
Sharing19 indicated the following salient features of the
proposed Bangsamoro Government which exemplify a
parliamentary system.

It shall have a ministerial form of government
that is democratically constituted and representative of
the people in the region, and reflective of the diversity
of the Bangsamoro. The central seat of governmental
power is the Bangsamoro Assembly whose members are
to be chosen through democratic means. Being vested
with power to legislate,20 this Assembly will select from
among themselves a primus inter pares (literally means
201
first among equals), known as Chief Minister, who

will appoint his cabinet members, known as Ministers,
majority of whom shall also come from the members of
said Assembly.

Composed of the Chief Minister, the Deputy
Minister and other ministers, the Cabinet performs the
executive functions of government. By a vote of at least
two-thirds (2/3) of its members, it may be dissolved
by the Assembly through a vote of no-confidence
proceeding. Furthermore, serving as the advisory body
to the Assembly is a separate Council of Leaders to be
composed of LGU chief executives of provinces and
chartered cities and such other representatives coming
from non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler
communities and other sectors.

With the proposal to replace the ARMM by a
parliamentary-like Bangsamoro, will all the present
problems of the former be addressed by the latter?
Could the so-called Moro problem, being articulated
at present by the Islamic elements of the Bangsamoro
society, be effectively solved by a ministerial system of
government? Is the conflict in Mindanao a question of
what government type is given to the Moro, or is it a
question of how much do they control their system of
life?

(4.II) If we compare the Wealth Sharing Annex
of the MILFs CAB and the present law governing the
ARMM,21 there are two most striking areas worth

mentioning. First is the internal revenue taxes collected
in the region. Article I (Taxation), Section A (Taking
Powers), Paragraph 4, Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
the Wealth Sharing Annex proffers that: Central
Government taxes, fees and charges collected in the
Bangsamoro . . . shall be shared as follows: (a) Twenty
five (25%) percent to the Central Government, and (b)
Seventy (75%) percent to the Bangsamoro . . . On the
other hand, Article IX, Section 9 of RA 9054 provides that
seventy (70%) percent of The collections of a province
or city from national internal revenue taxes, fees and
charges, and taxes imposed on natural resources shall
be given to the regional government including the local
government units therein, while the remaining thirty
(30%) percent goes to the national government. In other
words, the share of the proposed Bangsamoro Government
from incomes collected in its territory is increased to only
five (5%) percent as compared to the share of the present
ARMM from taxes collected in the region. Second is the
sharing arrangement on matters of potential sources of
energy in the region. The Annex on Wealth Sharing in
Paragraph 3, Section VII (Natural Resources) thereof
states that: With respect to fossil fuels (petroleum, natural
gas, and coal) and uranium, the same shall be shared equally
between the Central and Bangsamoro governments . . .
This means that the sharing of income derived from
exploration, development and utilization of all natural
203
resources within the Bangsamoro between the Central

and Bangsamoro governments is in fifty-fifty (50:50) ratio.

On the other hand, Paragraph (b), Section 5, Article
XII (Economy and Patrimony) of RA 9054 also recognized
and mandated that: Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues,
taxes, or fees derived from the use and development of the
strategic minerals 22 shall accrue and be remitted to the Regional
Government . . . The other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the
central government or national government. This entails
that on matters of regional economy and patrimony, there
is no difference between the present ARMM law and the
newly-signed Wealth Sharing agreement.

Based on these facts, radical sectors of the
Bangsamoro society posit the conclusion that the MILF
have not achieved anything on matters of control of the
regions strategic minerals as compared to the present
ARMM set-up.

(4.III) Under the CAB, the term Bangsamoro is
given three meanings: (1) as a form of political entity, (2)
as a national identity, and (3) as a territory.

The first is found in Paragraph 1 of Section
I which provides that The Bangsamoro is the new
autonomous political entity (NPE)23 which shall be
established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). It will exhibit a ministerial

form and Cabinet system of government which
must reflect the Bangsamoro system of life and meet
internationally-accepted standards of governance. It
must have an electoral system suitable to a ministerial
form of government which shall allow democratic
participation, ensure accountability of public officers
primary to their constituents and encourage formation
of genuinely principled political parties.

The second meaning of the abovementioned
term is stated in Paragraph 5 of the same Section which
discloses that the Bangsamoro refers to those who at
the time of conquest and colonization were considered
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the
Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands including
Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed or
of full blood Their spouses shall also carry the same
identity. Obviously, this definition extends the meaning
of Bangsamoro as a national identity beyond residency.

Under R.A 6734, Bangsa Moro people are
citizens of the Philippines residing in the Autonomous
Region who are also considered as indigenous cultural
community on account of their descent from the
populations that inhabited the country or a distinct
geographical area at the time of conquest or colonization
and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some
or all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political
institutions. On the other hand, the new ARMM law
205
(R.A 9054) defines Bangsa Moro people as those citizens

of the Philippines residing in the Autonomous Region
belonging to the indigenous cultural community who
are believers in Islam and who have retained some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
institutions. Essentially, while the former law clarified
the term Banga Moro/Bangsamoro using a cultural
perspective, the latter statute defines it in religious
viewpoint. Does it make any sense? One thing is certain
that in both definitions the term Bangsa Moro is only
confined to ones residency as qualified by the phrase
residing in the Autonomous Region.

The final meaning is stipulated in Sections 1 and
3, Article V of the FAB enumerating the core territory24
to constitute the Bangsamoro. As agreed upon by the
Panels and subject to the results of a plebiscite, the New
Political Entity shall consist of the following:25

First is the present geographical area of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
This covers the five (5) provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and the
cities of Marawi and Lamitan. It is interesting to note
that the cities of Cotabato in Maguindanao and Isabela
of Basilan do not form part of the ARMM, although
they are located right in the very heart of the Muslim
Autonomy.

Second are those local government units adjacent
to the ARMM that voted for inclusion in ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite, like the municipalities of Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan, and Tangkal in
the Province of Lanao del Norte and some barangays
in the municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan,
Pigkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap. 26

Some legal luminaries in the country have
reservations on the validity of this political consensus
arguing that in the 2001 plebiscite, the residents of these
37 barangays in North Cotabato were asked whether
they were or were not interested to be included in
the territory of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), and not to the territory of the future
Bangsamoro Government. In other words, considering
that the ARMM and the Bangsamoro Government are
two different and distinct political entities, is it legally
permissible to say that the peoples initial preference
to be included in the former is the same preference
to be included in the latter? This invites a doctrinal
pronouncement by the Supreme Court. However, this
doubt could be clarified in the result of the plebiscite for
the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. After all,
the Constitution affirms that sovereignty resides in the
people.

The third core area is the cities of Cotabato in
the Maguindanao Province and Isabela in the Basilan
Province. Between these two cities, it is the case of
207
Cotabato City which is more intriguing. It should be

recalled that since the first establishment of the ARMM
in 1989 under the old law (R.A 6734), this City has been
the seat of the Regional Government, although it is not
a part of its territory. Thus, a government employee
in Cotabato City was quoted saying: Actually, a single
step immediately outside the Main Gate of the ORG (Office
of the Regional Governor) Compound is already outside the
ARMM. How is this awkward situation legally permissible?
Can one LGU in the Philippines legally hold its office in
another LGU?27

The fourth category includes those other
contiguous areas28 where at least 10% of the qualified
voters pass a resolution or a petition in their LGU asking
for their inclusion, at least two months prior to the
conduct of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law
and the process.

The phrase other contiguous areas includes
those communities of Muslims contiguous to, but
outside, the first three categories of the core territory
previously mentioned. As intended by the Parties, these
areas shall also be subjected to a plebiscite where at
least 10% of the qualified voters therein would indicate
their initial preference to be covered by the Bangsamoro
Government through their LGU resolution or a petition.
Such intention for inclusion must be filed at least two
months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the
law abolishing the ARMM.

But why is it that only at least 10 percent is
required, why not at least a majority? It requires a long
stretch of imagination to believe that in the intention
for inclusion (say) only 10 percent of the residents
consented, but two months thereafter and during the
formal ratification majority of them agree. This statistical
improvement from 10 percent approval to a majority
(say, 50 percent plus 1) approval is highly improbable,
if not impossible, considering the very short period
of two months which is to be used both for providing
basic services in these communities and thereafter
campaigning for their acceptability of the new law.

The fifth and final category of the Bangsamoro
territory is those areas which are contiguous and outside
the core territory where there are substantial populations
of the Bangsamoro that would opt anytime to be part of
the territory upon petition of at least ten percent (10%)
of the residents and approved by a majority of qualified
voters in a plebiscite. 29

This last category refers to those Muslim
communities contiguous to, but outside, the first four
categories of the core territory that may opt anytime
to be part of the territory of the Bangsamoro. In other
words, as compared to the fourth category, the filing
of their intention for inclusion shall be done after the
popular ratification of the new law. However, for them
to be validly under the Bangsamoro, the final approval
209
of the majority of the qualified voters therein is also

required.

Why does the FAB contemplate expanding the
Bangsamoro territory after its first plebiscite? This is
mandated in Article VI, Section 4 that protects the rights
of the Bangsamoro people residing outside the territory
of the Bangsamoro and undertakes programs for the
rehabilitation and development of their communities.
It further states that The Bangsamoro Government may
provide assistance to their communities to enhance their
economic, social and cultural development. Thus, it is
believed that once their communities are rehabilitated
and developed by the new government they would
eventually opt to join. On the contrary, should the
new political entity fail to meet their expectations,
these communities may refuse to be a part of this new
autonomous government.

Among the three interpretations of the term
Bangsamoro, what can be considered as a new
achievement in the FAB, as compared to the GRP-MNLF
Final Agreement, is the recognition of the Bangsamoro
as a national identity. According to MILF sympathizers,
this is what makes the new Agreement one step ahead
of the old one. However, it must be emphasized that
said recognition is just a national identity liberation, not
the liberation of the Bangsamoro homeland from the
bondage of tyranny, oppression and injustice.

(4.IV) Even before the signing of the Framework
Agreement on the Bangsamoro in October 2012,
there were already several foreign development
agencies actively involved in the peace process in
Mindanao. Among the most visible ones were the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), The Asia
Foundation (TAF), and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). Their involvement
was formalized and expanded in pursuance to the third
identified mandate of the International Monitoring
Team (IMT) to implement socio-economic assistance in
the conflict-affected communities. 30

However, after the signing of the FAB, a great
number of development agencies joined such as: the
World Bank, International Organization for Migration
(IOM), United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), United Nations World Food Programme
(UNWFP), United Nations Children Education Fund
(UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), Asian Development
Bank (ADB), and the Australian Agency for International
Development, among others. Moreover, experts on
peace building are telling us that still other foreign
development partners are ready and very eager to
extend their assistance once the Bangsmoro Government
is in place. As one peace builder noted, Within the first
three years of the regional government, many donors are
expected to offer their contribution for the success of the
Bangsamoro experiment.
211

This expected influx of development agencies
shall always carry with them their corresponding
flooding of funds which may be interpreted by some as
bribe to the rebels in the guise of development. This
impending sponsoring of massive development efforts
in the Moro communities is based on the mistaken
belief that this war in Mindanao is a rebellion motivated
dominantly by poverty and social injustice. Perhaps,
this is true in the early days of the Moro struggle under
the banner of the MNLF 30 as its Manifesto lauded:
We, the five million oppressed Bangsamoro people,wishing
to free ourselves from the terror, oppression and tyranny of
Filipino colonialism which has caused us untold sufferings
and miseries by criminality usurping our land, . . . and
murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and old folks in a
genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude . . . With such
declaration, the common direction of all peace efforts
in Mindanao is veering towards massive development
initiatives. Thus, the creation of the Zone of Peace and
Development, the Southern Philippine Council for
Peace and Development, and the Southern Philippine
Development Authority.

However, if we review the evolution of the Moro
cause, we would realize that it is getting deeper and
more radical. A good case in point is the pronouncement
made by the founding MILF Chairman, Salamat Hashim,
when he confided, The ultimate objective of a Muslim
community or Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah
by (1) The establishment of a true Muslim community;
(2) The establishment of a genuine Islamic system of

government; and, (3) The application of a real Islamic
way of life in all aspects of our life.32 Obviously, the
same ideological line is followed by the Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Having been inspired
by Salamats teachings, this Islamist Moro group
preferred to be under a government run like hell by the
Bangsamoro, as long as the Shariah law is observed to
the fullest extent possible, rather than a government run
like heaven by non-Moro whose laws promote all forms
of immoralities and injustices.

Therefore, this may take to mean that even if
all the Moro shall become millionaires overnight, this
conflict shall not necessarily end. As noted earlier, the
ultimate aim of every Mujahid33 is to make supreme
the words of Allah. And contrary to the poisonous
propaganda of the West, this long-aspired system of life
by the Moro will not result to fundamentalism as it is
already practiced in such liberal Muslim countries as
Indonesia (Banda Aceh), Malaysia, and Turkey.

(4.V) Another notable achievement of the MILF
in the CAB is the direct channeling of the development
programs of the government in the Moro areas (i.e.,
the Sajahatra Programs) to the MILF. Predictably, this
avoids the phenomenon of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC),
as a strategy of central governments to defeat liberation
movements, by winning the hearts of their civilian
supporters while fighting the rebels. In highlighting
213
the strategy of the LIC program, one author made this

pronouncement:
Instead of using economic aid as leverage
for substantial reforms, LIC advocates increased
use of humanitarian assistance . . . as a way to
soften, not solve socioeconomic problems. Also
humanitarian assistance is being used for military
support and as part of psychological operations . .
. The goal is to erode or eliminate base of popular
support 34

As correctly observed by one rebel leader,
the relationship between the rebels and their masssupporters is analogous to that of a fish and its water
habitat. If you remove the fish from the water it will
eventually die. Applying this to a conflict setting, if
one party wins the sympathy of the support base by
providing them economic benefits, they will be isolated
and eventually, neutralized.

Avoiding this political trick, the GPH, as a sign of
sincerity, has directly given these government programs
intended for rehabilitation of the war-torn areas to the
MILF.

(4.VI) From the MNLF point of view, their peace
agreements 35 with the GRP did not succeed because they
were all implemented unilaterally by the government.
Their participation in the peace process was only up to
the signing of the agreements. After which, the GPH

took over the implementation of the entire agreement.

Take the case of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. In
following its Third stipulation, Paragraph 16, 36 President
Marcos unilaterally implemented the said peace deal.

On March 25, 1977, he issued Proclamation No.
1628 declaring autonomy in Southern Philippines. It was
followed by the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 20
which provided for the organization of the Sangguniang
Pampook (Regional Assembly) in Regions IX (Central
Mindanao) and XII (Western Mindanao).37 After the
election of the representatives to the two Sangguiang
Pampook was held on May 7, 1979, the President
issued Presidential Decree No. 1618 implementing the
organization of the Sangguniang Pampook and the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook (Regional Executive
Council) in the said two Regions.

The same process happened during the
administration of President Corazon Aquino. Immediately
after her short meeting with Misuari on September 5,
1986 in Jolo, Sulu, she facilitated the realization of the
Muslim Autonomy by constitutionalizing the autonomy
formula.38 Subsequently, following the Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution, 39 President Aquino appointed all
the members of the Regional Consultative Commission
(RCC) that drafted the bill which finally metamorphosed
into Republic Act No. 6734. The appointed commissioners
215
were representatives of multi-sectoral bodies, not

necessarily MNLF members or sympathizers.

Even when the 1996 Peace Agreement was
implemented by incorporating its provisions in the
Expanded-ARMM Law, there was still no involvement
of the MNLF. They were not even required to submit
their proposal on how to accommodate the provisions of
said agreement to the proposed bill. As a result, both the
formulation and implementation of this law were solely
done by the Philippine Congress.

In other words, all necessary steps, legal or
otherwise, were done unilaterally by the GPH. For these
reasons, till now, the MNLF have never recognized their
participation in the implementation of either of the two
major agreements which they have signed with the
Philippine government.

Thus, to avoid this same pitfall, the FAB proffers
that This Agreement shall not be implemented
unilaterally. Apparently, this provision signals
the bilateral participation of both parties in its
implementation.

(4.VII) As an off-shoot of this on-going peace
settlement, the MILF shall be given the chance to
hold political power. Also, its high ranking members
are expected to occupy key positions in the National
Government. More properly termed as a pacification
campaign, this approach is known to some as the policy

of accommodation, if not attraction. However, it is feared
that if there are no adequate safeguarding measures
instituted, the MILF may just fall into the same pitfalls of
the MNLF.

As a sign of their gradual integration into the
government body politic, some of the top MNLF leaders,
supporters or their relatives were either appointed or
elected to government posts. Among the elected ones
were MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari (former ARMM
Governor), MNLF Foreign Affairs Officer Parouk
Hussin (former ARMM Governor), MNLF Commander
Abdulgani Salapuddin (former Deputy Speaker for
Mindanao, Philippine Congress), MNLF Council of 15
Secretary-General Muslimin Sema (former Mayor of
Cotabato City), MNLF Council of 15 Interim Chairman
Hatimil Hassan (former Assemblyman, ARMM Regional
Assembly), MNLF Commander Alhabsi Hassan (former
Assemblyman, ARMM Regional Assembly), MNLF
Commander Omar Solitario Ali (former Mayor of
Marawi City), MNLF Field Commander Cassan Capal
Kumander Posao (former Mayor of Saguiaran), and
MNLF Field Commander Datu Ben Mokalid (former
Mayor of Datu Piang), to name only a few.

These appointed MNLF members or supporters
included Yusop Jikiri (SPDA Chair), Bainon Karon
(SPDA board member), Alvarez Isnaji (DOST-ARMM
Secretary), Duma Sani (DILG-ARMM Secretary),
217
Abraham Iribani (DILG Undersecretary), Bai Sandra

Sema (DECS Undersecretary), among others. Today,
some of the MNLF members returned to civilian life,
while others simply followed the path of banditry. There
were also those who became the poorest of the poor.

Commenting on the final fate of the 1996 Final
Peace Agreement, Salah Jubair elucidates that instead of
giving genuine self-rule or autonomy to the Bangsamoro
people, as a distinct historical, religious, cultural group,
the FPA integrated the MNLF, including its leaders and
combatants, into the government body politic . . .40

More telling on the plight of the MNLF in this
pacification campaign was the findings of the IAG in its
January-March 2009 publication illuminating:
During the Marcos regime, government
jobs were offered to MNLF commanders in
exchange for allegiance to government. Such
vestiges of parceling government positions for
pacification of Moro leaders live on today.
Instead of facilitating Moro representation in
national affairs, government jobs have become
instruments for co-opting Moro leaders.
By being governor of the ARMM, Misuari
presided over an institution that his revolutionary
group rejected many times over. More
significantly, he was perceived to have allowed
himself to be co-opted at a time when he was

expected to provide the visionary leadership
for the Bangsamoro. The regular mentoring
provided by high government officials to Misuari
at the beginning of his term as ARMM governor
evoked the pathetic image of a revolutionary
eaten up by the system he wanted to change.41

Would the MILF not suffer the same blunder as
that of the MNLF?

(4.VIII) Aspiring to free the Bangsamoro people
from the human rights abuses and sufferings committed
and perpetrated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), the FAB mandated that In a phased and
gradual manner, all law enforcement functions shall be
transferred from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
the police force of the Bangsamoro.42 Pursuant to this
objective, The government shall redeploy AFP units
and troops from or within the Bangsamoro, consistent
with a normal and peaceful life . . . The AFP shall only
retain installations necessary for national defense and
security.43 Obviously, this is the government response
to the consensus that the MILF shall decommission
its forces and put their weapons beyond use. Under
this decommissioning component of the peace deal,
those MILF fighters who can qualify as members of the
Regional Police Force of the Bangsamoro may have the
opportunity to work in the government and shall become
the security forces of their homeland. In the course of
219
time, it is finally envisioned that all law enforcement

activities and programs related to the maintenance of
peace and order in the region shall be solely delegated
to this police force.

Provisions of the Agreement implicitly state
that the MILF could establish a special regional police
force which would take charge of all law enforcement
activities in the region, except those relating to national
security and external defense. To perform this mandate,
it is necessary that such police force must be separate
and distinct from the regular members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); otherwise, it cannot perform its
especially delegated law enforcement function. Could
this be possible?

Anent thereto, Section 6, Article XVI of the
Constitution enjoins that The State shall establish and
maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled
by a national police commission.44 Since the FAB embodies
the spirit of the Constitution, this above-quoted provision
shall always prevail over any of the expressed or implied
stipulations of the Parties. Thus, following the imports
of said provision, the Philippine Constitution recognizes
no other unit of the PNP doing law enforcement
activities in the land except the nationally-constituted
police unit administered and controlled by the Central
Government. Consequently, an establishment of any
special police force, with different uniform, insignias,
badges, or coat of arms from the regular PNP personnel,

shall definitely be an affront to the fundamental law and,
therefore, illegal.

This stand of the MILF in establishing a special
regional force for the Bangsamoro is not a new
development in the Mindanao peace process. As a matter
of fact, the MNLF have always insisted on its inclusion in
many instances. First was in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
which stipulated that Special Regional Security Forces
are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy for the
Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship
between these forces and the Central security forces
shall be fixed later.45 In clarifying the functions of these
forces, the 1977 MNLF Draft Demand posited that:
A Regional Security Force shall be set up and
maintained within the Autonomous Bangsamoro
Islamic Region for the following purposes: 1. To
Maintain law and order within the Region; 2. To
protect the lives and properties and honor of the
nationals of the Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic
Government; 3. To perform such other functions
as the Majlis As-Shura may, by law, provide.46

The final attempt of the MNLF in this aspiration
was embodied in the 1996 FPA which provides: . . . there
shall be created or constituted a PNP Regional Command
for the new Autonomous Region, which shall be the
Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) as referred to in
221
Paragraph 8, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement. With

this stipulation of the FPA, the proposed separate and
distinct character 47 of the SRSF from the regular police
personnel of the country, being contemplated in the
Tripoli Agreement as well as in the MNLF Draft Demand,
had already gotten blurred. Thus, to erase further any
cloud of separateness or distinctiveness from the regular
PNP, the Agreement in question already allowed the
SRSF to be composed of the existing PNP units in
the area of autonomy, the MNLF elements and other
residents of the area who may later on be recruited into
the force. This political fine-tuning effort was intended
to be consistent with the constitutional provision that
there shall be one police force in the country which is
national in scope and civilian in character.

Putting the blame on the government side for the
failure of this integration formula, the MNLF explained,
the GRP did not organize the MNLF integrees into
separate units under the command of a Deputy
Commander. Furthermore, they claimed that the GRP
deploys the MNLF integrees in combat duties to fight
their Muslim brothers from the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF).

In reference to the GPH-MILF CAB, both parties
have to meet immediately to thresh out problems and
arrive at a common interpretation of all its provisions
to avoid future conflicting interpretations. Take a closer
scrutiny of that part of the Agreement which says The
government shall redeploy AFP units and . . . shall only

retain installations necessary for national defense and
security. Parenthetically, in the minds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, all military units, troops,
installations, establishments and camps in the country
are intended and necessary for national security. In short,
the term redeploy is emasculated by its qualifying
phrase necessary for defense and national security.

Furthermore, another very alarming issue of
decommissioning is raised by a radical Moro professional
who preferred anonymity. In comparing the MILF CAB
to the MNLF FPA, he pointed out that What is even more
shocking provision of the CAB is the obligation on the part of
the MILF to decommission its forces by putting their weapons
beyond use regardless of whether they will join the proposed
regional police force or not. On this note, the FPA was far
better than the CAB. As can be recalled, the former agreement
obliged only those MNLF combatants who intended to join in
the AFP to surrender their firearms, while those who joined
the PNP were exempted from this requirement. In the case of
the CAB, all MILF forces are mandated to disarm themselves
whether they will join the regional police force or return to a
civilian life. Did the MILF achieve more in the CAB than
what the MNLF achieved in the FPA?

In conclusion, this envisioned integration of the
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) to become
regular members of the PNP is still considered by some
as a pain of the CAB. Have they sacrificed for more than
223
four decades only to become policemen? If this were so,

to my mind, they could have spent the good forty years
or so of their struggle in known universities where they
could have become generals by now!

Perhaps the MILF leadership and the Bangsamoro
people could learn a rewarding lesson from the experience
of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia relative
to the decommissioning of their forces. In highlighting
the points of growing dissatisfaction among the
Acehnese in the course of the implementation of their
peace agreement, one author says: 48
. . . there were voices of dissent in regards to
the compensation as the combatants are claiming
that the amount is not enough, while noncombatants are asking why they are left out in
the compensation process as they too have been
victims of the conflict . . .
There have been claims that the compensation
given was not what was originally promised . .
. there have also been rumors of dissatisfaction
among the GAM rank and file with the way
the GAM leadership is benefitting . . . many of
them have now become rich overnight by being
contractors, government officials . . . and other
types of employment, while the majority of the
rank and file continues to live in poverty and
hardship.

If the above-cited development in the Banda Aceh
would happen in the implementation of the recentlysigned CAB, it would confirm the prediction that this
peace agreement will solve only the problem of the postSalamat MILF leadership, but not the problem of the
Bangsamoro people.

[5] Since the signing of the FAB in October 2012,
the GPH-MILF peace panels have already conducted
countless peace advocacies or consultations in different
parts of Mindanao. But some participants are wondering
why they can hardly ask diagnostic questions pointing
to sensitive issues on the CAB (which may be the reasons
for its failure) because they were automatically branded
as peace spoilers or, worse, BIFF sympathizers. Are the
GPH-MILF peace panels espousing a dictated peace?
Why is it that only questions supportive of the peace
process are well entertained during those consultations?

In order to know the possible implications of this
policy of the peace panels in our quest for sustainable
peace in southern Philippines, we have to understand
what dictated peace is all about.

Using the manner of its attainment as the criterion,
peace can be classified as either negotiated or dictated.
The former is believed to last long since the interests of
both parties are addressed, while the latter is temporary
as the interest of only one party is served.
225

There are two ways of committing this dictated
peace. First is when one party in a negotiation imposes
its will, interests or condition to the other party. This is
sometimes known as horizontal-dictation because the
parties involved are presumed to be in equal footing.
And, second is when the negotiators are imposing to
their supporters/followers the will of the other party
in exchange for any political consensus which may or
may not redound to the benefit of the stakeholders. This
manner of imposition is labelled by peace experts as
vertical-dictation since the flow of decision or control is
from the top to the bottom.

Commenting on the final destiny of this
phenomenon of a dictated peace, a writer in the IAG
made the following pronouncement:
. . . peacebuilding is not about the imposition
of solutions . . . Community harmony and
peace can be achieved if people are allowed to
participate in activities that redound to their
welfare. Enduring or sustainable peace can be
achieved when people . . . can share their views
before any decision is made.49

[6] Under the CAB, funds from the National
Government shall come to the Bangsamoro in five forms,
viz:

(a) The 75% share of the Bangsamoro in the national
taxes, fees and charges levied within the Region (Article I,
Section A, Paragraph 4, Annex on Revenue Generation
and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro);
(b) Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) of the
Local Government Units within the Region (Section 286,
Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as The Local Government Code of
1991);

(c) The Block Grant (Article V, Paragraph A,
Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);

(d) The Special Development Funds (Article V,
Paragraph B, Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth
Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);
and,
(e) Funds for the socio-economic components of
the normalization (Item G, Paragraphs 1-6, Annex
on Normalization Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro).

This enumeration is not exclusive as the CAB also
contemplates to attract multi-donor country support,
assistance and pledges to the normalization process.
As mentioned earlier on, many are anticipating that
227
Within the first three years of the regional government,

it is expected that many donors will be on parade
wanting to contribute to the success of the Bangsamoro
experiment.

Those who are closely monitoring this recentlysigned Agreement have noted that among these five
identified funds from the National Government, what
appears to be new are the last three as the first two are
already enjoyed by the ARMM.

The Bangsamoro block grant (BBG) is an amount
that Central Government will provide annually for
the operation of the Bangsamoro Government. This
fiscal management system is aimed to free the future
Bangsamoro Government from the difficulties of the
usual annual budgetary process in which the budget
allocations for the Region is negotiated with the Congress.
Hence, the ARMM never enjoyed fiscal autonomy since
both the approval as well as the amount of its budgetary
appropriation are under the dictate and mercy of the
Congress. Such difficulty is even aggravated by the
national governments policy of prescribing ceiling
amount for the Regions fiscal allotment.

On the other hand, under this block grant system,
the Bangsamoro shall be automatically provided
with block subsidies to be allotted to it yearly without
undergoing the difficult process of budget hearing
before the Committee on Appropriations in the Lower
House. As mandated by the agreement, its total amount

shall not be less than the last budget received by the
ARMM immediately before the establishment of the
Bangsamoro.

With this new fiscal arrangement between the
New Political Entity and the Central Government, many
are made to believe that this block grant is a unique
achievement of the MILF. However, if we try to scan the
provisions of the 1996 FPA one would realize that it also
provided almost the same stipulation when it proffers
in its Paragraph 44 that:50 The Regional Autonomous
Government in the area of autonomy shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy in budgeting its own revenue resources and block
subsidies granted to it by the National Government . . .51

Moreover, another analogous stipulations
found in the MILF-CAB and the MNLF-FPA relate to
development funds. The former provides: The Central
Government shall also provide for a Special Development
Funds to the Bangsamoro for rehabilitation and development .
. . while the latter stipulated: The National Government
shall appropriate for the area of autonomy a sufficient amount
. . . for infrastructure projects which shall be based on a
development plan duly approved by the Regional Autonomous
Government . . . 52

Funds for the normalization process are
mandated by the provision of the Agreement which
obliged both Parties to intensify development efforts
229
for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of

the Bangsamoro, and institute programs to address the
needs of BIAF members and that of their communities.
For this purpose, negotiators of both Parties envisioned to
establish a Trust Fund to ensure the efficient, transparent
and accountable release of the funds to be provided by
multi-donor country support, assistance and pledges.

Given this wide range of fiscal provisions of the
CAB, peace building experts are predicting that if there
are no rigid mechanisms for transparency, accountability
and monitoring of public spending, excessive funding
of the future Bangsamoro Government may result
to rampant graft and corruption among new public
servants (and their families) who are fresh from their
difficult life in the forest. This common anticipation has
been based on post-conflict peace building experiences
in other countries.

[7] As already mentioned , there has been a
developing perception that the CAB will solve only
the problem of the post-Salamat MILF leadership, but
not the problem of the Bangsamoro people, especially
those sectors of the Bangsamoro society aiming for
a real Islamic system of life aspired by the late MILF
founder.53 For them, this peace formula cannot solve the
Islamic elements of the Bangsamoro struggle because only
the basic dimensions of it are intended to be addressed
by the said Agreement, such as its economic, social
and historical components. Since the CAB recognizes
the Bangsamoro as a national identity, the perceived

victory of the MILF in the Agreement is considered
by some as just a national identity liberation (at most) but
never a political liberation. Regrettably, this is against
(or even an insult to) the name of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front, as conceived by the late Sheik Salamat
Hashim (Allaho Yarhamu). As can be recalled, the MILF
broke away from its mother organization as an off-shoot
of the secular ideological line followed by the MNLF.
Thus, this Islamic Front was aimed at Islamic Liberation
being the essential requisite of establishing a genuine
Islamic government proposed by its late founder.

However, after the death of Sheik Salamat Hashim
in 2003, some of the MILFs former members have
been accusing its new leadership of leaning towards
the secular path.54 Some of their justifications are the
following:

First, in their negotiation with the government,
the MILF Peace Panel does not have any ulama member
while the GPH Panel has one (i.e., Dr. Hamid Barra).
With this arrangement, we cannot expect the MILF
negotiators to be properly guided by Islamic principles
of diplomacy since all of them have limited background
in Islam. What is even worse is they can be easily
manipulated by their counterparts in the government
who are more equipped with secular knowledge.
231

Second, among the four justifications of the MILF
in negotiating with the Philippine government, there was
no mention of any Islamic concern. Although, the MILF
is an Islamic front but the foundation of its negotiation is
very much secular.

Third, it is personally witnessed by some observers
of the MILF-Central Committee that decision-making in
the group is dominated by non-ulamas. Those members
who are learned in Islam cannot (or refused to) have
meaningful participation even in highly critical issues
as their opinions are suppressed by the secular-minded
members. This emerging development in the present
MILF leadership seems an affront to the Islamic social
contract developed by Caliph Abubakar As-Siddique
when, upon his formal enthronement as the khaleefah
(literally means successor) of Prophet Mohammad
(s.a.w.) to lead the Muslim Ummah, he mentioned before
the Muslim crowd the following: I have been chosen to
govern you, though I am not the best among you. Help me
if am right; correct me if I am wrong. The weak among you
will be strong until I have attained for him his due, and the
strong among you will be weak until I have made him give
what he owes. Obey me as long as I obey ALLAH (s.w.t.) and
his Prophet (s.a.w.); if I do not obey them, you owe me no
obedience.56 This pronouncement of Caliph Abubakar
became the foundation of the universally-accepted
principle of Islamic governance practiced in the Muslim
world Wa Amruhum Shra Baynahum (Consultative
Mandate). Moreover, the afore cited passages lay down
the duty of individual Muslims to their rulers, that is, to

object those decisions done contrary to Islamic teachings
and manners. Allegedly, however, this duty is no longer
faithfully observed in the Central Committee of the MILF
after Salamats demise. One interview said that if the
ones making decisions in the group are those more senior
or lawyer members, whether or not they have enough
knowledge on Islam, their views are usually controlling
and conclusive even without further consultation from
the ulamas.

`Is this alleged practice in the MILF-CC also
present in the MILF Peace Panel?

It must be recalled that during the leadership of
Sheik Salamat Hashim in the MILF, this revolutionary
organization have been faithfully adopting the Islamic
principle of consultative decision-making. In fact, in his
little book, the late founder had vividly prescribed the
general guidelines used by the MILF in formulating its
decisions and policies, viz:
One of the hallmarks of the MILF is its
policy of CONSULTATIVE and COLLECTIVE
Leadership. Essentially, this policy means that
no major decisions could be formulated and
implemented without first resorting to Shra
(consultations) in general meetings attended by
Central Committee members in the Homeland
and representatives from different regions. 57
233

For many sympathizers of the MILF, this longcherished policy of the Front has been relaxed in many
instances since the loss of its founder. In particular,
among the Sangir 58 Bangsamoro, they have the
emerging perception that the current MILF Leadership
serves only the interests of the major Moro tribes, like
the Maguindanaon, the Iranun and the Meranaw. For
example, during the signing of CAB on March 27, 2014,
when one of the Sangir Bangsamoro Mujahideen, who
was fatally wounded during the All-Out-War Policy
of President Estrada in 2000, was asked on his reaction,
he flippantly replied:Ang pakiramdam namin ngayon
ay parang hindi na kami importante sa Jihad natin, lalo na
ang katulad namin na walang pinag-aralan. Hindi kasi kami
nakapag-aral dahil sa Jihad natin. Masakit talaga sa amin
na mga Sangir na kahit isa ay wala man lang pinasama ng
MILF sa Manila. Anu pa kaya kapag mag-gubirno na sila.
[We feel that we are no longer important in our struggle,
especially those uneducated Moro like us. We failed
to study because of our Jihad. It is painful to us Sangir
Bangsamoro that no one of us was invited to join the
MILF delegation in Manila. What more if they are the
ones running the government.] 59

Seemingly, the MILF Peace Panel members, in
particular, are perceived by some peace advocates in
Mindanao as having adopted a centralist-democracy
policy. It has been generally observed that all critical
commentators to the present peace process are
collectively labelled as peace spoilers regardless of
their honest intentions or the merit of their contentions.

This observation became more apparent in August 2013
when a group of Bangsamoro youth drafted their press
release containing their strongly felt frustrations on the
recently-signed Annex on Wealth Sharing. Motivated by
their honest intention to remind the MILF Peace Panel on
the sensitivity of their peace journey with the Philippine
government, the press release made a bold declaration
which reads in part: 60
The future leaders of the Bangsamoro people
would like to make it known to the Peace Panels
of both the Government of the Philippines (GPH)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
that we are closely monitoring the on-going
peace negotiation between you. We know that
whatever peace agreement you may have agreed
will certainly shape our future in Mindanao.
For the MILF, we want to remind you again
to please solve the Bangsamoro problem in such a
manner that it would benefit the past, present and
future generations of the Bangsamoro people. How
we wish that the present MILF leadership after
Chairman Salamat Hashim would not be like that
of the MNLF which served only the interests of
its present-day members. Being motivated by
personal interests, the MNLF was demobilized
and lost its credibility even among the poorest
sectors of the Bangsamoro society because each
235
of its members saved only his own worldly and

material benefits by either joining the AFP/PNP
or becoming local politicians, without solving the
Bangsamoro problem. Out of frustration, others
simply turned into a civilian life and became the
poorest of the poor.
If the MILF is really committed to represent the
common interests of the oppressed Bangsamoro
people, it is even needless to remind you not to
repeat the same mistakes done by the MNLF in its
two (2) peace agreements with the Government
(i.e., 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Final
Peace Agreement).
Furthermore, may we remind you again
of our cries during the Second Bangsamoro
Consultative Assembly of June 1-3, 2001, where
we delegates were calling that the only just,
meaningful, and permanent solution to the
Mindanao problem is the complete independence
of the Bangsamoro people and the territories
they now actually occupy? And, if you can still
remember, the delegates even warned you in that
assembly:
That in view of the forthcoming peace
negotiations between the MILF and GRP, we are
giving our full support and mandate to the MILF
to represent us in said negotiations provided,
however, that the MILF does not deviate from our

demand for complete independence and accept
a compromise formula short of this aforesaid
demand. Should the MILF choose to deviate, these
supports or mandates are automatically rescinded and
withdrawn. [Italics supplied]
We are hereby expressing our overwhelming
frustration to the recently-signed Annex on
Wealth Sharing, because we have noticed that the
MILF Peace Panel violated its pronouncements
not to accept any agreement with the GPH having
the same tenor with that of the present ARMM
Law . . .
. . . on matters of regional economy and
patrimony, there is no difference between the
present ARMM law and the newly-signed Wealth
Sharing agreement. Or, to be brutally frank, the
MILF has not achieved anything on matters of
control of the regions strategic/metallic minerals
as compared to the present ARMM set-up . . .

However, instead of entertaining the merit of the
above call, the official website of the MILFs Committee
on Information (www.luwaran.com) stated in part in its
August 8, 2013 Editorial, entitled The ideal is only in
the mind, the following: 61
237
There is always no perfect agreement in

negotiation. If one tries to find fault, say the annex
on wealth-sharing, he or she can always see one
or two . . .
The idealists, mainly coming from the
inexperienced, always look for the perfect thing
but they wouldnt find any, because it does not
exist . . .
It is very easy to criticize, because it is only
the tongue that waggles. The critics assume this
role . . .
Often those who did not taste being bitten
by mosquitoes for years or even decades or have
almost starved to death for days, or have suffered
or involved in bloody battles are the bitterest of
critics of those who have dedicated their whole
life in the struggle.
Sometimes, those who are receiving regular
salaries from government are among those
harsh critics . . . Experience tells us that those
self-anointed leaders of the MNLF in the 70s,
usually the lovers of limelight, pretenders, and
the credit-seekers, were the first to abandon the
struggle. Some of them are in government now . .
. criticism hurled outside of what Islam allows is
tantamount to assuming the task of the enemy or

at least that of a spoiler.

A close scrutiny of this reaction shows that the
MILF Peace Panel is no longer open for any criticism
or suggestion, no matter how constructive it may be.
Whatever is its idea, correct or wrong, is controlling and
final. Again, isnt the MILF Panel espousing a dictated
peace for the Bangsamoro?

This perceived close door policy was confirmed
further during the BDP community visioning conducted
in different parts of Mindanao last February 2014.62 In
those occasions, I have consistently emphasized to the
participants that the safest stance to be taken by the Moro
people in view of these sprouting hopes from all corners
of the Mindanao society relative to the ongoing peace
process is, while expecting some good things from this peace
negotiation, we too must be ready and prepared for the worst.
However, immediately, a week after the conclusion of
said community activities, the official website of the
MILFs Committee on Information released its Editorial
on March 8, 2014, with the title Spoilers in the guise of
helpers, emphasizing the following:

All sorts of people from genuine friends of the
peace process to outright spoilers are what peace builders
have to grapple with as they struggle to conclude the
negotiations.
239
Sometimes spoilers are dressed in sheepskin

and pretend to be allies only to expose their real
color later after they have already sown virus in
the peace efforts. Even the best of allies can also
create problem in how they frame their ideas,
especially if they insist on them.
More seriously, there are those who pretend
to help but their real agenda is how to promote
their rigid ideological line that tend to create
trouble rather than harmony . . .

This pronouncement from the MILFs Committee
on Information confirmed the observation that opinions
critical to the MILF position in the peace process are
bound to be suppressed. What shall be the effect of this
suppressive character of the negotiators to the peace
process?

Along this line, it is important to mention the
most leading case of West Virginia Board of Education
vs. Bernadette, where the United States Supreme Court
castigated this suppressive tendency of those in authority.
In this case, the said tribunal passionately stated:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiments
in support of some end thought essential to their
time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. . . As governmental
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be . . .

Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon
find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of
the graveyard.63 [Italics supplied]

Procedural Limitations

[8] Expert peace builders proffer their comment
that the Mindanao-wide consultation process done by
the Peace Panel is against the procedure recognized
by medical practice, which is diagnose first before
prescribe. As observed, the two Panels are doing the
massive consultations with the people in the proposed
Bangsamoro Government only after they already have
an agreement. So, how could they accommodate the
suggestions of the people during these consultations if
the limitations and restrictions were already fixed in the
Agreement itself?64 Hence, critics of the peace agreement
are accusing that this consultation is just an education
drive, not a consultation in the real sense of the word.

This perceived lack of proper consultation in the
on-going Mindanao peace process is especially felt in the
choice of the word Bangsamoro. As observed, people
of Mindanao do not exactly know who can rightfully
claim this national identity. Even the Bangsamoro
themselves are confused of this term. Of course, the
general understanding among the Muslims is this term
refers only to them, and not to the Lumads nor to the
241
migrants. However, the GPH-MILF Peace Agreement

included the Lumads in the term Bangsamoro when
their peace pact mentioned both Islamized and nonIslamized Bangsamoro.

In particular, among the Meranaw, many are
afraid that with the adoption of such term Bangsamoro,
Muslims in Mindanao might not be supported anymore
by their brothers-in-faith abroad since the Moro are
now becoming nationalistic, which practice is strongly
discouraged by Islam.

Furthermore, among the Lumads, they are not
comfortable to be called Bangsamoro because they are
afraid that their ancestral domain will be taken by the
Muslims. In addition, they claimed that even before
their brother Moro became Muslims they were all
originally Lumads. This growing opposition among the
indigenous people in Mindanao on the present peace
process is reinforced further by the programs of some
Christian missionaries to empower them, per se. On this
note, a prominent Moro scholar has this to say:65
. . . some Bangsamoro intellectuals have
perceived a serious security threat to the future
Bangsamoro Government being perpetrated by
some conservative and dogmatic Christians
politicians, churchmen and grassroots activists
whose interest is to sow confusions and
misunderstandings in the Moro communities.
As early as now, even before the operation of

the Bangsamoro Government, this group of
Christians has been designing various strategies
to materialize their poisonous plans. Their
strategies concentrate in three entry points: (1)
persistently creating an impression that there can
be no real peace in Mindanao unless the GRPMNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 is fully
respected and incorporated into the GPH-MILF
CAB; (2) persistently encouraging the revival
of the sultanate/royalty claims of the Moro
royal families; and, (3) persistently initiating,
propagating, inciting and even sponsoring the
urge of the Indigenous Peoples (IPs) to have a
BangsaMamalu autonomy within the Bangsamoro
Government. This third one is the most serious
of the three since our brother IPs are very much
vulnerable for this divide-and-rule tactics of the
migrants . . .
While in plain view, they want to empower
the Lumads, but in substance and essence they
are (will be) using the IPs to create troubles within
the future Bangsamoro Government. Obviously,
these settlers are interpreting and re-interpreting the
aspiration of the IPs for self-governance to mean a
fully self-governing territory within the core areas of
the new political setup. The written pronouncement
of the Mindanao Peoples Peace Summit last
December 2013 is an outward testimony for this
243
sinister design. In highlighting their conceived

marginalization of the IPs in the GPH-MILF
Peace talks, the staff writer in that Summit says:
In the wake of these high profile negotiations between
the peace panels, a segment of the population in
Mindanao has remained in the margins and still is.
The Indigenous Peoples of Mindanao or the Lumads
have remained in the side lines.He further stated:They
(the Lumads) posed that as distinct people, with their
own set of belief and justice system, they are entitled
to self-governance within the future Bangsamoro
Government.
More telling is the alarming declaration of
the MPPM (Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement)
saying: A Mindanao-wide IP assembly declared that
they dont want to be part of the proposed Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity and that there was no consultation on
making their territories part of the proposed BJE . . .
Despite the consistent demand of the IP, the current
FAB came up with a definition of the Bangsamoro
which includes the Indigenous Peoples. The question
of recognition of their territory remained silent in the
provisions of the FAB. [Italics supplied]

[9] Due to the lack of proper and meaningful
consultation among the Bangsamoro stakeholders, the
likelihood of the future Bangsamoro territory to be smaller
than the present ARMM is not a remote possibility. So,
after the plebiscite, what will happen if the core territory

will be smaller than the present ARMM?

A 20-year old Maguindanaon student of MSU
Marawi Campus, who refused to be named, made the
following reactions when he was asked on the state of the
BTC consultation in Buluan, Maguindanao: Actually,
only the political leaders are very much active of these
consultations. Local people, especially those who came from the
remote places do not have any say during these consultations.
This is because they are afraid that what they say is useless,
or they do not know what really is thisministerial form of
government. In the last consultation here in Buluan, I tried
myself to express my views but I was not properly entertained
because they accused me of having a radical mind.

This trend in the peace process of engaging only with
the politicians is very much dangerous because these traditional
political leaders are the very potential political opponents of
the MILF come 2016. Expectedly, they will exert all means to
grab political power from the MILF.

In like manner, this observation was also felt in the
Lanao provinces. During the GPH-MILF Peace Panels
public consultation in Marawi City last March 11, 2014
participants were wondering why only local politicians
and some Meranaw MNLF Top 90 cadres were properly
consulted and entertained. There were not even enough
microphones to be used by the thousand participants
who came with their queries. Furthermore, majority of
245
the participants were students from different elementary

and secondary schools in Marawi City. However, more
important sectors of the society, like the business, church
and media were not properly represented. Not even the
officials, faculty and students of the Mindanao State
University - Main Campus, which is the only suprapremier University in the Bangsamoro core territory,
were invited to attend. 66

[10] Another procedural lapse of the CAB is the
duration of the Transition Authority. In this respect,
a question is propounded: Can the MILF-led BTA
deliver the Bangsamoro expectations within the short
transitional period of 1 year or even less?

It is very disturbing to note that only 1 year
duration is given as a transition period for the MILF
Tansitory Authority to solve the various sufferings of
the Bangsamoros which have evolved for decades, even for
centuries. We know that the success of the MILF in the 2016
political exercise depends on the political miracles it can
introduce to the Moro communities during the intelligentlycrafted short transitional period. Can the MILF remedy all
these problems in such a short time? Is the real intention
to show the MILF in good light? Or is it another ploy
to demean the MILF to the Moro population it seeks
to represent so that it cannot gain support when that
most awaited time in 2016 comes? Is it offered by the
Philippine government to the MILF so that it will become
another failed experiment?

Worth noting is the joint pronouncement of the
Office of the President and the Philippine Senate that
the deadline set for the final promulgation of the Basic
Law, which is to metamorphose into a Republic Act
to be processed by the Philippine Congress, shall be
on December 31, 2014. Thereafter, there shall follow a
special registration which may last to at least a week or
two to give an ample time for the Moro voters, many
of whom reside in the far-flung areas without sufficient
means of transportation, to register. About three to
four months after that general registration, there shall
be a region-wide campaign of the MILF and the GPH
Peace Panels to ensure the wide acceptance of the Basic
Law. Therefore, by the time that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in April or May of 2015, only 1 year (or even
less) is left for the Bangsamoro Transition Authority to
govern the new political entity.

It must be recalled that the Bangsamoro Basic
Law was submitted by the BTC last April 22, 2014 to
the Office of the President. However, as of press time
it was not yet forwarded to Congress as it is still being
subjected to the rigid scrutiny of the Malacaang Legal
Team for possible constitutional infirmities. Just last
week of June 2014, there has been a rumor that the GPH
legal team totally revised the BTC-draft of the BBL so
that it could pass any constitutional test. To save the
peace process from impending impasse, the principals
of both Peace Panels met in Hiroshima, Japan last June
247
24, 2014 to discuss this hurdle. Is the act of President

Aquino III in ordering the revision of the BTC draft of
the BBL in accordance with the signed agreements? Be
it noted that if the version of the BBL is dominantly out
of the constitutional parameters, we cannot expect the
President, or any Philippine President for that matter,
to submit it to Congress as a certified bill as it can be a
ground for his impeachment. 67

[11] With the overwhelming declaration of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court last November
19, 2013, political analysts have anticipated the lessening
of President Aquino IIIs influence in the Philippine
Congress. Thus, a question is raised: How could the
President ensure the full cooperation of the Congress in
the enactment of a Republic Act, which is the statutory
version of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) since his
influence on the lawmakers seems to have weakened
after the removal of the PDAF?

Popularly known as pork barrel, the PDAF is
the budgetary allocation given to the members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. It is a public
spending which is intended to benefit constituents of
a politician in return for their political support, either in
the form of campaign contributions or votes. 68

Beginning 2006, the amount was P70 Million
for each of the Congressmen and P200 Million for
each of the Senators. This fund allocation was stopped

during the Marcos Regime but was revived during the
Administration of President Corazon Aquino. Since
then the pork barrel is given different names, such as
Countryside Development Fund (CDF), Congressional
Initiative Fund (CIF) and Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). As practiced in some countries,
pork barrel also assumed different appellations, such as
election sweetener in United Kingdom, culvert politics
in Finland, election gifts in Germany, and electoral
alms in Romania. 69

Since the granting of the pork barrel largely
depends on the programs of any administration, by all
indications, it is a form of political favors granted to
the legislators in order to gain their political support.
Predictably, with the removal of the PDAF, it would
be difficult for President Aquino III to gain the full
cooperation of the Congress in the passage of a Republic
Act that would faithfully incorporate the provisions of
the BTC-draft Basic Law. And, once the law-makers will
not fully cooperate with the administration, it would be
disastrous to the peace process as they might re-write the
BTC version of the BBL which act may not be a welcome
development to the MILF Peace Panel.

Corollary to the nature of the PDAF is the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the
President which is considered by some as his pork
barrel. Specifically, it is a stimulus package under
249
the Aquino administration designed to fast-track

public spending and push economic growth. This
covers high-impact budgetary programs and projects
which will be augmented out of the savings generated
during the year and additional revenue sources. The
DAP was approved by the President on October 12,
2011, upon the recommendation of the Development
Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and the
Cabinet Clusters.70 Few months after the decision of
the supreme court in the PDAF was reached, last July 1,
2014, the DAP was also stricken out by the same Court
for being an affront to the mandate of the Constitution.

In invoking Section 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, the
following are the specific items declared as repugnant to
the supreme law, viz: a) the withdrawal of un-obligated
funds and their declaration as savings, b) the funding
of projects, activities and programs not covered by the
General Appropriations Act, and c) the cross-border
transfer of savings by the executive branch. 71

This latest development in the Executive
Department rendered even more difficult the fiscal
delinquency of the President to provide the sufficient
funds necessary for the favorable and immediate
legislation of the draft Basic Law in question.

[12] Although the CAB is believed (as it is intended)
to be the final embodiment of all the agreements of the
Parties, the subsequent engagements of both Panels

confirm the suspicion by some that it is not yet a terminal
agreement as many of its parts are still subject to further
negotiations.

As can be recalled, the FAB postulated in its
Section VII, Paragraph 7 that The draft Bangsamoro
Basic Law submitted by the Transition Commission
shall be certified as an urgent bill by the President. This
means that once the BTC-draft BBL, being based on the
CAB, is submitted to the Office of the President what
remains to be done by the President is only his ministerial
act of certifying the same to the Congress as an urgent
bill. The Agreement did not contemplate to allow the
Chief Executive to exercise his discretionary powers to
review, revise or set-aside the BTC version in order to
make it conform to the provisions of the supreme law as
this duty is supposed to be left to the sole discretion of
the Congress. Hence, after its submission to Malacaang
last April 22, 2014, the MILF Central Committee was
expecting President Aquino III to immediately certify
said proposed measure to the Congress and adopting in
toto the BTC draft.

However, being mindful of his sworn duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution of the Philippines,
after his receipt of the draft Basic Law, President Aquino
III immediately formed the Malacaang Legal Team,
instead of immediately forwarding it to the Congress, to
study the same for any constitutional infirmity. Based on
251
the Teams review for sixty-one (61) days, its members

had decided to totally revise it because majority of its
provisions are found repugnant to the supreme law.
But to save the strained relations between the Two
Peace Panels from further deterioration, GPH Peace
Panel Chair, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer mentioned in one
of her interviews the following diplomatic reaction
- That certain provisions in the draft measure may
be unconstitutional and that is why members of the
government and MILF peace panels are trying to fix these
loopholes. As a result of this act of fixing loopholes72
the draft measure was overhauled. Said revision was so
serious that only about 27 percent of the BTC version was
left. This means the other 73 percent were all insertions
or alterations from the Malacaan-created Legal Team.73

What is more alarming is the latest pronouncement
of the GPH Peace Panel Chair when she claimed that
their involvement in the peace process is only up to the
signing of the CAB last March 27, 2014. After that, the
BTC had the sole authority to draft the BBL, although the
Government Peace Panel could still lend assistance when
the need arises.74 Understandably, this new direction of
the government negotiators are clear violation of their
obligation under the Framework Agreement. They must
not forget that they made a commitment in Section VII,
Paragraph 12 of the FAB saying, An Exit Document
officially terminating the peace negotiation may be
crafted and signed by both Parties if and only when all
agreements have been fully implemented. Apparently,
this provision of the truce contemplated the continuous

functions of both Peace Panels until all the agreements
are fully implemented. Ergo, if they are really committed
to the attainment of a just and lasting peace in the South,
the members of the Government Peace Team must not
evade their responsibility under all the Agreements.

Last June 24, 2014 President Aquino III, together
with the members of the GPH Peace Panel and other
personnel from the Office of the Presidential Assistant on
the Peace Process (OPAPP), went to Japan to present to
the MILF Peace Panel the Malacaan-revised version of
the BBL in the presence of the MILF Chair Al-Haj Murad
Ebrahim. But since the government has overhauled the
BTC draft, the two Peace Panels cannot immediately
agree on a joint version. Instead, they met in Kuala
Lumpur last July 7-11, 2014 to settle the controversy with
the participation of the Malaysian Facilitator. However,
the disagreement was not finally settled. Hence, the BTC
Commissioners were scheduled to go to Manila last July
17-20 to have a finishing touch in order to finally arrive
at an agreed version of the proposed legislation. After
which, the final decision on this emerging diplomatic
conundrum should be settled, with the participation
again of the Malaysian facilitator, by the respective
principals of the two Panels, who were scheduled to
meet in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia last July 26, 2014.
Predictably, any positive development in that meeting
should have been incorporated in the incoming State of
the Nation Address (SONA) of President Aquino III set
253
on July 28, 2014. Although said meeting is scheduled

two days before the Presidential speech in the opening
of the Congress regular session, till now, we have yet
to see a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) that
should have been sent to congress for deliberation on
its opening session on July 28 at the Batasang Pambansa.
Furthermore, no meeting happened between President
Aquino III and Chairman Al-Haj Murad as this proposal
would have corrupted the peace process since this
violates the protocols on peace negotiations.

Evidently, this diplomatic strategy of President
Aquino III in dealing with the MILF through its
Chairman, instead of dealing with its duly constituted
Peace Panel, is analogous to the practice of employers
during collective bargaining with their employees
known as Boulwarism, which is completely outlawed
in our jurisdiction. Construed by foreign courts as a
bad-faith practice, this approach presupposes that the
company dealt with the union through the employees
rather than with the employees through the union.75 In
effect, the employees union is rendered ineffective or
useless.

Should such proposal of Malacaan have been
granted by the MILF Central Committee, its Peace Panel
shall be rendered nugatory which tendency may possibly
result to the moral corruption of its high ranking officers
and the eventual paralysis of the Front as a revolutionary
organization.

In expressing their developing frustration to the
recent development in the on-going peace process, the
MILF stated in a public affairs radio program of the
DXMY Radio Station in Cotabato City last July 28, 2014
at 6:30am that Wala kaming inaasahan sa SONA ni Pnoy
ngayon, at hindi kami masaya sapagkat hindi pinaniwalaan
ng Malacaan ang Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro. [We do not expect anything from PNoys
SONA today, and we are not happy because Malacaan
does not abide with the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro.]76 In response to this threatening
remarks from the MILF echelon, the Office of the
President made a public pronouncement last July 31, 2014
before the Malacaan Press Corps that President Aquino
III would certainly certify the Bangsamoro Basic Law to
the Congress as an urgent legislative measure. However,
this writer humbly believes that this pronouncement of
Malacaan is misleading the public because the proper
issue now is not whether or not PNoy will certify the
BBL to the Congress since that is already settled in the
FAB that he must do that. The contending issue is what
version of the BBL will be certified by the President the BTC
draft, the Malacaan draft or the joint/agreed draft?

In the light of this political impasse, the MILF
Peace Panel registered the Fronts official position which
they presented during their special meeting in Kuala
Lumpur before the Malaysian Facilitator last July 7-11,
2014, to wit: 1.All those issues that are settled in the FAB
255
and its Annexes will not be subject for renegotiation;77

and 2. Settled language in the FAB and its Annexes will
not be subject for renegotiation. Moreover, in order
to put a final closure to any attempt on the part of the
Philippine Government to renegotiate the CAB, the MILF
Peace Panel called their subsequent engagement with
the GPH as only a discussion instead of negotiation,
although experts on peace negotiation are viewing these
subsequent special meetings or discussions between
the Peace Panels as extensions of their negotiation and,
therefore, still a part of it. Thus, as long as the Exit
Document78 is not yet jointly signed by the Peace
Panels, this on-going negotiation, renegotiation, special
meetings, or discussions will continue over and over
again.
Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the CAB exhibits both procedural
and substantive limitations which may possibly cause
its failure to establish the MILF vision to end tyranny,
restore dignity and secure a bright and prosperous
future for all in the Bangsamoro Homeland. With
these identified varying loopholes of the concluded
Agreement, the Bangsamoro from different walks of life
have varied views on the real fate of this peace journey.

From the most conservative point of view among
Moro Mujahideen, the signed Comprehensive Agreement
between the Government and the MILF is a gracious act
from the Highest Heaven for two reasons. First, it will

serve as a filtering device among the Bangsamoro to
realize who are faithful in fighting for the genuine cause
of the Muslim south and who are hypocrites.79 For those
who follow the path pursued by Sheik Salamat Hashim,80
they are convinced that the CAB is never a solution to
the Moro Question for reasons already enumerated in
the previous pages. In fact, they viewed it as a design
to address only the grievance of those secular-minded
Moros who pretend to be the real representatives of the
oppressed Bangsamoro people. On the other hand, those
who view the Mindanao conflict as a revolution (not a
Jihad Fii Sabiilillah), this recently-concluded Agreement is
the most fitting solution to the decades security crisis in
the South, even though the same does not categorically
recognize any Quranic injunction to be compulsorily
practiced by every Muslim. For them, any objective that
is more ambitious than the present Agreement is a utopia
which does not exist except only in the mind. Moreover,
those who do not support the CAB are outrightly and
collectively categorized by these self-anointed peace
builders as peace spoilers irrespective of the merit of
their supposition. Worst, those critics of the CAB are
accused of sowing a fitna (confusion or misconception)
to the Moro people.

Secondly, since the Bangsamoro Government
to be established under the CAB shall be based on
the provisions of the Constitution relative to regional
autonomy, this peace paradigm shall prove the long-held
257
public perception that the constitutionally-prescribed

autonomy formula in this country will never solve the
Bangsamoro quest for self-rule.

More importantly, other Moro groups are
associating their perceived uncertainty of the CAB to the
post-President Aquino IIIs scenario.81 As experienced,
any peace initiative in Mindanao sustains itself only
during the reign in power of whoever is the sponsoring
President. For example, the Final Peace Agreement
(FPA) between the GRP the MNLF was only temporarily
successful during the administration of President Ramos.
After making the high ranking MNLF officers (like Nur
Misuari and Parouk Husin) as Regional Governors,
the Muslim autonomy was already transferred to the
hands of the local feudal-war lords who exploited and
corrupted the ARMM in the pursuit of their political and
economic aggrandizement.

With respect to the CAB, after PNoys exit
from power by 2016, how could the Parties ensure the
sustainability of peace dividends this Agreement may
foster? Would the next Philippine President to be elected
in 2016 be supportive of the Bangsamoro Government,
what if he would come from the opposition party? Would
the original vision of the Bangsamoro Government be
preserved once it is placed in the hands of the tribal
feudal lords whose personal interests always dictate and
dominate the common interest of the toiling and suffering
Moro masses? Is it not wiser to consider the view that
we can think and even expect for the best in the present peace
process, but we must also be ready and prepared for the worst?
What if we only expected for the best and did not prepare
for the worst, and the Bangsamoro Government became
another failed experiment? These are the never-ending
doubts haunting the minds of genuine peace advocates
but which the spiritual-materialist Moros consistently
refuse to entertain.

Right now, the Bangsamoro Basic Law is
undergoing a process of legal decomposition as the
variances between the BTC and the OPAPP versions
are like the distance between the heavens and the earth
due to constitutional issues. In this regard, what are the
appropriate and civilized courses of action left to the
MILF to undertake? Obviously, there are two peaceful
alternatives which can be employed by the said Moro
Front to vindicate itself from the developing diplomatic
gaps it is experiencing - domestic and international measures.

In the local level, the MILF, through the BTC, can
work on proposals to amend the Philippine Constitution
for the purpose of accommodating and entrenching
in the constitution the agreements of the Parties . . .
without derogating from any prior agreements. Since
this course of action requires the surgical amendment
to the supreme law, it also presupposes the uniform
vision, cooperation and commitment, not only of the
MILF and the Philippine Government but also of the
sovereign Filipino people. But given these tremendous
259
governance issues (PDAF, DAP, etc.) currently faced by

the Aquino III Administration, could it possibly get the
needed public support from the Filipino voters during a
plebiscite to be called for the purpose? Does it still have
enough time to amend the Constitution?

Additionally, the MILF can also engage the full
support of the Mindanao civil societies to exert both
political and moral pressures to the government to be
consistent with its promises and commitments to the
MILF.

In the international level, on the other hand, the
MILF can appeal to world opinion. Through the sponsorship
of the member-countries of the International Contact
Group and the International Monitoring Team, with the
Government of Malaysia, having been the facilitator to
the peace talks, playing the lead role, the international
community could persuade the Philippine Government
to hold on to its obligations and commitment to the
Moro Front under the CAB; otherwise, the Philippines
may have a negative image in the eyes of the peoples of
the world. If this happens, the economic as well as the
political conditions of the Philippines shall be adversely
affected as many countries might exert diplomatic
pressures to the Philippine government to faithfully
comply with the Agreement in question.

It must be recalled that in the international milieu,
there are some forms of economic and political diplomatic
measures used by foreign governments in persuading
a certain government to comply with its international

obligations.82 The following are some of the most
recognized ones, to wit: boycotting of commercial
products and human resources, suspension of commercial
intercourse, currency restriction, imposition of higher
tariffs, denial of loans and aids as well as withdrawal
of privileges, stoppage of travel to the subject state,
adverse propaganda, and denunciation of treaties. The
most extreme form of diplomatic pressure method is the
severance of diplomatic and consular relations.
REFERENCES
Books/Journals

ASIAWEEK Magazine, March 31, 2000.

Askandar, Kamarulzaman. The Struggle for
Self-Determination in Aceh, AUTONOMY AND
PEACE REVIEW: International Experiences of Selfdetermination. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy
and Governance, April-June 2007.

AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: The 1996
Final Peace Agreement Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National
Liberation Front: An In-depth Analysis, Highlights of
the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and Conflicting Claims
of Interpretation. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy
and Governance, January-March, 2009.
261

Azucena, Cesario A. Jr. Everyones LABOR
CODE. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2006.

Barry, Tom. Low Intensity Conflict: The New
Battlefield in Central America. The Resources Center,
Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986.

Hashim,
Salamat.
THE
BANGSAMORO
MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities:
Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985.

Jubair, Salah.THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE:
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Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007.

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Legal Notes on the
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Documents

Annex on Normalization, signed on 25 January
2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Annex on Power Sharing, signed on 8 December
2013, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth
Sharing, signed on 13 July 2013, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT
ON
THE
BANGSAMORO, signed on October 15, 2012, Malacaan
Palace, Manila, Philippines.

PRESS RELEASE FROM THE BANGSAMORO
YOUTH OF THE MOROLAND, Released on July 31,
2013, Bangsamoro Homeland, Mindanao.

Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring
Team (IMT), signed by the GRP-MILF Peace Panels on
27 August 2007 at Cyberjaya, Malaysia.

THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE
BANGSAMORO, signed on March 27, 2014, Malacaan
Palace, Manila, Philippines.

The Final Agreement on the Implementation of
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation
of the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial
Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference, signed on September
2, 1996, Malacaan Palace, Manila, Philippines.

The MNLF Draft Demand, submitted by Nur
Misuari to Undersecretary Barbero in February 1977,
263
Tripoli, Libya.

Tripoli Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed on December
23, 1976, Tripoli, Libya.

Unpublished Concept Paper for the Creation of
MILF-Special Agency for Indigenous Peoples Affairs,
February 2014, Bangsamoro Homeland, Mindanao.
Laws Cited

Batas Pambansa Blg. 20, or otherwise known
as An Act Providing for the Organization of the
Sangguniang Pampookin Each of Regions Nine and
Twelve, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. Enacted on March 23, 1979.

Presidential Decree Number 1618, Implementing
the Organization of the Sangguniang Pampook and the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap Ng Pook in Region IX and
Region XII and for Other Purposes. Issued on July 25,
1979.

Presidential Decree Number 1628, Declaring
Autonomy in Southern Philippines and for Other
Purposes. Issued on March 25, 1977.

Republic Act Number 6734, or otherwise known
as An Act Providing for an Act for the Autonomous
Region in Mindanao. Enacted on August 1, 1989.

as An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of
1991. Enacted on October 10, 1991.

as An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,
Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, As Amended. Promulgated on
March 31, 2001.

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. Ratified on February 2, 1987.
Cases Cited

Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms
and Development, Inc. (ACORD), et.al. vs. Ronaldo
Zamora, et.al., G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005.

Kida vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18,
2011.

Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February
28, 1989; 170 SCRA 786.

Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19,
2000.
265

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

West Virginia Board of Education vs. Bernadette,
219 U.S. 624.
On-Line Sources

http://um-bs.com/2011/02/06/what-doesislam-say-about-leadership/. Accessed on August 8,
2014.

http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/
welcome/item/1110-impasse-on-diluted-basic-lawmay-ignite-war-political-analyst-says. Accessed on July
29, 2014.

editorial/item/1100-milf-position-on-bbl%E2%80%99sdelay Accessed on July 29, 2014.

http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/.
Accessed on June 27, 2014.

http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen16th.
asp. Accessed on June 27, 2014.

editorial/item/489-the-ideal-is-only-in-the-mind.
Accessed on July 25, 2014.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel.
Accessed on July 16, 2014.

http://philippinesgoforgold.blogspot.
com/2013/10/what-is-dap-disbursement-acceleration.
html. Accessed on July 16, 2014.

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/90256/
supreme-court-votes-unanimously-dapunconstitutional. Accessed on July 11, 2014.
End Notes
Dr. Zainal D. Kulidtod, a native of Datu Piang, Maguindanao,
is the former Assistant Dean of the College of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Mindanao State University, Main Campus at Marawi
City. He holds the following degrees: AB Political Science (CUM
LAUDE), Master in Public Administration, Doctor of Philippine
Studies and Bachelor of Laws, all taken in the same university.
2
Signed on October 15, 2012, this is a roadmap agreement whose
details are provided in the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB).
3
In the landmark case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the
Supreme Court clarified the two objectives of the Presidents
certification, viz: The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. [G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630].
4
Section 15, Article X, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
5
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Legal Notes on the Right of SelfDetermination and on Secession: The Real and Realistic
Score, REFERENDUM ON POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE
BANGSAMORO: Study Papers on the Legal and Historical Basis.
Cotabato City: Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement, 2010, p. 39.
6
Ibid.
7
He is popularly known among Filipinos as PNoy (President
1
267
Noynoy).
8
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: The 1996 Final Peace
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front: An In-depth
Analysis, Highlights of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and
Conflicting Claims of Interpretation. Cotabato City: Institute of
Autonomy and Governance, January-March, 2009, p. 12.
9
In the R.A. 9054, its preamble provides: The people of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao . . . do ordain and
promulgate this Organic Act through the Congress of the
Philippines. [underline supplied]
10
As of the Sixteenth Congress, the total membership of the Philippine
National Legislature is 314, consisting of 290 Representatives and 24
Senators. Of this number, only 9 or 2.87% are Muslims, all belong to
the Lower House. [http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/] and
[http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen16th.asp], both accessed
on 6/27/2014.
11
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
12
Since the proposed Bangsamoro Government is also categorized
as a version of local autonomy prescribed by the Congress, it is also
bound by this ruling of the Court.
13
Section 6, Article X, Philippine Constitution.
14
Section 286, Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No.
7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government of 1991.
15
Presidential government is one wherein the state makes the
executive constitutionally independent of the legislature as regards
his tenure and, to a large extent, as regards his policies and acts,
and furnishes him with sufficient powers to prevent the legislature
from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the constitution as
the executives independence and prerogatives. This suggests that
presidential government possesses three basic characteristics: (1)
there is a separation of powers between the legislative, executive
and judicial departments, (2) the chief executive (i.e., President)
is directly chosen by the people and not by the legislature, and
(3) heads of executive agencies and administrative departments
are normally members of the presidents party. The first feature
suggests three attributes, such as: (a) each department is equal to
the other, (b) everyone must coordinate with the activities of the
other, and (c) each is independent within its own sphere.

By comparison, parliamentary system (sometimes known as Cabinet
government) is one in which the state confers upon the legislature
the power to terminate the term of office of the real executive.
Under this system, the Cabinet or ministry is immediately and
legally responsible to the legislature and politically responsible to
the electorate, while the titular, nominal, ceremonial or symbolic
executive chief of state (monarch or president) occupies the
position of irresponsibility. Among the most outstanding features
of parliamentary system are: (1) there is a union or fusion between
the legislative and executive departments, (2) the chief executive
is the Prime Minister who selects the ministers of government to
constitute the Cabinet, (3) the Prime Minister is not only head of
government but also the leader of his party and, consequently, the
leader of the parliamentary majority, (4) the citizens do not vote for
the chief executive but vote only for the legislative representatives,
and (5) the cabinet system separates the ceremonial executive from
the real working executive.
16
This concept was once a source of misunderstanding between the
GPH and MILF Peace Panels. On one hand, in using this term status
quo, the MILF was obviously referring to the system of the National
Government in the Philippines which has been prejudicial to the
Bangsamoros quest for self-rule. Therefore, it needs to be changed
to accommodate the sentiments of the Moro. On the other hand,
the Central Government was consistently interpreting this term
to mean the present ARMM. Thus, instead of changing the whole
Philippine governmental structure, what needs to be changed is
only its subpart, the ARMM.
17
See Sections 1 and 2, Article VI, R.A. No. 9054.
18
See Sections 1 and 2, Article VII, R.A. No. 9054.
19
Signed on 8 December 2013, it is the 3rd Annex of the Framework
Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
20
Implied from Item 9, Part Two of the Annex on Power Sharing, p.
4.
21
Republic Act No. 9054, or otherwise known as An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, As Amended. Promulgated on March 31, 2001.
22
Paragraph (a) of same Section defined the term strategic minerals
269
to include uranium, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oils,

all sources of potential energy.
23
The FAB envisions The government of the Bangsamoro shall
have a ministerial form with an electoral system suitable to a
ministerial form of government. And, The relationship between
the Central Government with the Bangsamoro Government shall be
asymmetric.
24
Following the provision of Article V, Section 2 of the FAB,
these areas are not be automatically form part of the Bangsamoro
Government. Instead, they are still to be subjected to a plebiscite in
pursuance to the mandate of the Constitution that The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.. [See Article X, Section 18]
25
Article V, Sections 1 and 3, Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (FAB).
26
Based on the 2001 Plebiscite Results from the COMELEC
(Commission on Elections), the number of barangays in each of
these 6 Municipalities in North Cotabato is distributed as follows:
Aleosan has 3 out of its 19 barangays; Carmen, 2 out of 28; Kabacan,
3 out of 24; Midsayap, 12 out of 57; Pigkawayan, 6 out of 40; and,
Pikit has 11 out of its 40 barangays.In short, the barangays in
question are 37 all in all.
27
In the case of Kida vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011,
the Supreme Court considered the ARMM as a local government
unit because autonomous regions fall under Article X of the
Constitution which is entitled Local Government.
28
Relate this to Article I, Section 2, Paragraph (b), GRP-MNLF Final
Peace Agreement which says: . . . clusters of contiguous Muslimdominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged
and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of
the new Autonomous Region.
29
Paragraph 3, Article V, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
30
See the Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team
(IMT) signed by the GRP-MILF Peace Panels on 27 August 2007 at
Cyberjaya, Malaysia.
31
Notwithstanding its Manifesto, the MNLF Draft Demand

submitted by Nur Misuari to Undersecretary Barbero in February
1977, Tripoli, Libya sought to establish an Autonomous Bangsamoro
Islamic Government (ABIG). [Italics in the text quoted supplied]
32
Salamat Hashim.THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives
and Responsibilities: Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985,
p.8.
33
Interpreted by some as Islamic freedom fighters, this term Mujahid
(singular for Mujahideen) differs from the word rebel. While a rebel
aims for social justice and human dignity, a Mujahid ultimately aims
for the establishment of an Islamic system of life. Applying this to
the ongoing GPH-MILF Peace Process, all those rebel-inclined MILF
elements shall interpret the CAB as the endpoint of their struggle,
while those Mujahid-inclined ones shall continue it until such time
that Islam finally reigns in the Bangsamoro Homeland.
34
Tom Barry. Low Intensity Conflict: The New Battlefield in Central
America. The Resources Center, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986, pp.10-12.
35
There are two major peace agreements signed by the Government
and the MNLF: the Tripoli Agreement (signed on December 23,
1976) and the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (signed on
September 2, 1996).
36
The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary
constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire
Agreement.
37
It may be noticed that, although the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
contemplated only one autonomous region but, Marcos finally
implemented two autonomous regions (i.e., Regions IV and XII) for
reasons only known to him.
38
See Article X, Section 15, 1987 Constitution.
39
The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies . . .
40
Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRPMILF Peace Process. Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies,
2007, p. 13.
41
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW:, 2097, Supra, pp. 96-97.
42
Article VIII, Section 6, FAB.
43
Paragraphs 1 and 2, Section D, Annex on Normalization.

44
271
[italics supplied]
Paragraph 8, Article III, Tripoli Agreement.
46
Article 21, MNLF Draft Demand, Supra.
47
In explaining the proper interpretation of the MNLF on the nature
of the SRSF, the Institute of Autonomy and Governance (IAG), after
series of their FGDs, disclosed the MNLF understands the SRSF
as distinct from a regular PNP regional command, since it brings
together PNP and MNLF members into a single security unit.
[AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, Supra.,p.38.]
48
Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Struggle for Self-Determination
in Aceh, AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: International
Experiences of Self-determination. Cotabato City: Institute of
Autonomy and Governance, April-June 2007, pp. 55-56.
49
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, 2009, Supra., pp. 55 and 58.
50
The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976
Tripoii Agreement Betweenthe Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference
Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference, signed on September 2, 1996.
51
[italics and bold face supplied]
52
[italics supplied]
53
In his book, the founding Chairman mentioned the following: The
ultimate objective of a Muslim community or Ummah is to make
supreme the Word of Allah . . . The meaning of making supreme the
Word of Allah is capsulized in the following: 1. The establishment
of a true Muslim community; 2. The establishment of a genuine
Islamic system of government; and, 3. The application of a real
Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life. [Salamat Hashim, THE
BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities.
Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985, pp. 8-9.]
54
This is based on the interviews conducted by the author with a
BIFF high ranking officer sometimes in February of 2014. According
to the interviewee, these are some of their grounds in breaking
away from the MILF.
55
The four justifications are enumerated in the book of Salah Jubair
(pseudonym of Mohagher Iqbal), The Long Road to Peace: Inside the
GRP-MILF Peace Process.Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro
Studies, 2007, pp. 13-14.
45

56
http://um-bs.com/2011/02/06/what-does-islam-say-aboutleadership/. Accessed on August 8, 2014. [underscoring and italics

in the quoted text supplied]
57
Salamat Hashim, Supra, p. 57.
58
The term Sangil, coined by misinformed history writers and
professors, to refer to those Islamized natives in the Sarangani and
the Balut Islands, is inaccurate. In the same manner that the Islamized
natives of the Maguindanao and the Cotabato provinces must be
correctly referred to as Maguindanaon, NOT Maguindanao.
59
The respondent, who requested not to be named, is one of the
members of the MILF-National Guard who were the close-in
bodyguards of Chairman Salamat Hashim.
60
Entitled PRESS RELEASE FROM THE BANGSAMORO YOUTH
OF THE MOROLAND, it was released on July 31, 2013, Bangsamoro
Homeland.
61
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/489-theideal-is-only-in-the-mind.Accessed on July 25, 2014.
62
This author had attended almost all of the community visioning
organized by the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) in
crafting the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP).
63
West Virginia Board of Education vs. Bernadette, 219 U.S. 624.
64
In emphasizing the controlling effect of the signed agreements
relative to the so-called public consultations conducted by the
BTC, the Editorial of the official website of the MILFs Committee
on Information mentioned last 8, 2014 that: The BTC welcomes
all ideas especially those relevant and useful ones, but with the
full understanding that only those that are within the purview of
the above-stated documents will find space in the BBL . . . [italics
supplied]
65
Unpublished concept paper for the creation of MILF-Special
Agency for Indigenous Peoples Affairs, Bangsamoro Homeland,
Mindanao, February 2014.
66
Based on the narration of an Executive Director of an NGO based
in Marawi City, who preferred anonymity.
67
Under Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
273
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All

other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. [italics supplied]
68
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel. Accessed on July 16,
2014.
69
Ibid.
70
http://philippinesgoforgold.blogspot.com/2013/10/what-isdap-disbursement-acceleration.html. Accessed on July 16, 2014.
71
http://www.interaksyon.com/article/90256/supreme-courtvotes-unanimously-dap-unconstitutional. Accessed on July 11,
2014.
72
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/welcome/item/1110impasse-on-diluted-basic-law-may-ignite-war-political-analystsays.Accessed on July 29, 2014.
73
Based on the interview conducted by this author to one of the
BTC Commissioners last July 13, 2014, Marawi City.
74
Based on the narration of a senior officer of an NGO based in
Cotabato City who attended the Mindanao Peacewavers Meeting
in Matina, Davao City last August 1-2, 2014 participated by the two
Peace Panels. The MILF side was represented by Mohagher Iqbal
(MILF Peace Panel Chair), Abdulla Camlian and Melanio Ulama;
while the Governments representatives were Miriam CoronelFerrer (GPH Peace Panel Chair) and Benedicto Bacani.
75
Cesario A. Azucena, Jr. Everyones LABOR CODE. Quezon City:
Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2006, p. 267.
76
Live radio interview with the MILF First Vice Chairman, Gazhali
Jaafar.
77
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/1100milf-position-on-bbl%E2%80%99s-delay Accessed on July 29, 2014.
78
Section VII, Paragraph 12 of the FAB says: An Exit Document
officially terminating the peace negotiation may be crafted and
signed by both Parties if and only when all agreements have been
fully implemented.
79
This was based on an interview conducted by this writer,
sometimes in July 2014, to a 46-year old MILF cadre in Basilan.
80
The following are some of the teachings of the late MILF founding
chairman, Sheik Salamat Hashim, viz:
(a) The ultimate objective of a Muslim community or Ummah is

to make supreme the Word of Allah by (1) The establishment of
a true Muslim community; (2) The establishment of a genuine
Islamic system of government; and, (3) The application of a real
Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life. [Salamat Hashim. THE
BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities:
Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985, p.8.];
(b) . . . our demand is independence. It means having a separate
territory, a separate government, and a separate armed forces . . .
[Interview by the ASIAWEEK Magazine, March 31, 2000];
(c) Do not be subjected by the Philippine Constitution, and do not
drop independence [Based on the narration of a faculty of MSU
Marawi City who once served as a member of the MILF Peace Panel,
this was the general guidelines sent by Chairman Salamat to the
MILF Peace Panel during the June 2001 GHP-MILF Peacetalks in
Tripoli, Libya.]; and
(d) It is a generational obligation of every Bangsamoro to teach,
educate and enlighten his children, relatives or friends on the
historical injustices and sufferings committed by the Filipino
colonizers and the Philippine government against the Bangsamoro
people, so that if we cannot achieve independence during our time,
at least we will be assured that our struggle shall be continued
by our succeeding generations. [This was his constant advice to
the Bangsamoro youth visiting him at Camp Abubakar-Siddique.
Matanog, Maguindanao. This writer had the privilege to attend
some of his lectures about the Mindanao problem.]
81
This is based on the assumption that PNoy could fully serve his
six-year term in office which is to end on June 30, 2016. It must
be noted that after the Supreme Court declaration of the DAP as
unconstitutional, PNoy has been experiencing all forms of political
demolition threatening his political survival. In fact, aside from the
widespread rumor on the destabilization plan, there are already
3 impeachment complaints filed against him before the House
of Representatives. Given this scenario, can he still give ample
time, efforts and resources for the realization of the Bangsamoro
Government?
82
This author respectfully submits that the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro is an international legal document.
Proposed BBL
Provisions Relevant to the
Indigenous Peoples
277
Proposed BBL Provisions Relevant to the Indigenous Peoples
Proposed BBL Provisions

Indigenous Peoples
Relevant
to
the
Preamble
e, the Bangsamoro people and other inhabitants

of the Bangsamoro

In consonance with the Constitution and the
universally accepted principles of human rights, liberty,
justice, democracy, and the norms and standards
of international law, reflective of our system of life
prescribed by our faith, and in harmony with our
customary laws, cultures and traditions.
Art. II Bangsamoro Identity

Sec. 1. Bangsamoro People - Those who at the
time of conquest and colonization were considered
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the
Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands including
Palawan, and their descendants, whether of mixed or
of full blood, shall have the right to identify themselves
as Bangsamoro by ascription or self-ascription. Spouses
and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro.

Sec. 2. Freedom of Choice. The freedom of
choice of other indigenous peoples shall be respected.

Art. IV General Principles and Policies

Sec. 5. Promotion of Unity. The Bangsamoro
Government shall promote unity, peace, justice, and
goodwill among all peoples, as well as encourage a just
and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Sec. 7. Social Justice.- The Bangsamoro shall
establish a government that ensures that every citizen
in the Bangsamoro is provided the basic necessities
and equal opportunities in life. Social Justice shall be
promoted in all phases of development and facets of life
within the Bangsamoro.

Sec. 8. International Treaties and Agreements.
The Bangsamoro Government shall respect and adhere
to all international treaties and agreements binding upon
the Central Government.
Art. V. Powers of Government
Sec. 2. Concurrent powers
xxx

5. Human rights and humanitarian protection
and promotion. The Bangsamoro Government
may organize its own bodies for human rights and
humanitarian protection and promotion that will work
cooperatively with relevant national institutions.

279
Sec 3. Exclusive Powers

xxx
29. Ancestral domain and natural resources;

30. Protection of the rights of the indigenous
people in the Bangsamoro in accordance with the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
and taking into account in addition to economic and
geographical criteria, their individual and communal
property rights, cultural integrity, customary beliefs,
historical and community traditions. The Bangsamoro
Parliament shall create an appropriate office or ministry
for the Indigenous Peoples, which shall be part of the
Bangsamoro Cabinet to develop and implement the
Bangsamoro programs for the indigenous people in
accordance with a law passed by the Parliament.
57. Local administration, municipal corporations
and other local authorities including the creation of local
governments. xxx

The Bangsamoro Parliament may create, divide,
merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays in
accordance with a law enacted by the Bangsamoro
Parliament, and subject to the approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. Subject to the criteria provided in
said law, the Bangsamoro Parliament may likewise
create appropriate local government units in the areas
inhabited predominantly by indigenous peoples.

Sec. 4. Other Exclusive Powers. The following
powers and competencies previously granted to the
ARMM under R.A. no 6734, as amended by R.A. no. 9054,
are hereby transferred to the Bangsamoro Government
as part of its exclusive powers:
xxx

d. To recognize constructive or traditional
possession of lands and resources by indigenous
cultural communities subject to judicial affirmation, the
petition for which shall be instituted within a period
of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Basic Law.
The procedure for judicial affirmation of imperfect titles
under existing laws shall, as far as practicable, apply to
the judicial affirmation of titles to ancestral lands.
Art. VI Intergovernmental Relations

Sec. 5. Council of Leaders. The Bangsamoro
Council of Leaders shall consist of the Chief Minister,
provincial governors, mayors of chartered cities,
and representatives from the non-Moro indigenous
communities, women, settler communities, and other
sectors. The Bangsamoro Council of Leaders shall
be chaired by the Chief Minister. The Council shall
advise the Chief Minister on matters of governance in
the Bangsamoro. The representation of the non-Moro
indigenous communities shall be pursuant to their
customary laws and indigenous processes.
281
Art. VII Bangsamoro Government

Sec. 5. Classification and Allocation of Seats
xxx
(3) Reserved Seats; Sectoral Representatives
Sectoral Representatives, constituting ten percent (10%)
of the Members of Parliament, including two (2) reserved
seats each for non-Moro indigenous communities and
settler communities.

Sec. 6. Election for Reserved Seats for Non-Moro
Indigenous Peoples. Notwithstanding the immediately
preceding sections, reserved seats for the non-Moro
indigenous peoples, such as, Teduray, Lambangian,
Dulangan Manono, Blaan and Higaonon, shall be
pursuant to their customary laws and indigenous
processes based on the following:

a. Primacy of customary laws and practices;

b. Primacy of consensus building;
c. Acceptability of the community;
d. Inclusivity and full participation;
e. Representation of the collective interests and
aspirations of non-Moro indigenous peopls;
f. Sustainability and strengthening of Indigenous
Political Structures
g.Track record and capability; and
h. Gender equity
Art. IX Basic Rights

Sec. 1. Basic rights in the Bangsamoro. In addition to
the basic rights already enjoyed by the citizens residing
in the Bangsamoro, the Bangsamoro Government shall
guarantee the following enforceable rights:
xxx
b. Right to freedom and expression of religion
and beliefs.

i.Right to equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in social and economic activity and the
public service, regardless of class, creed, disability,
gender and ethnicity.

k. Right to freedom from religious, ethnic and
sectarian harassment.

Sec. 2. Human rights. All laws and policies,
including customary laws shall conform to international
human rights and humanitarian standards. The rights
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) and other international
human rights instruments shall be guaranteed by the
Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government.

Sec. 3. Vested Property Rights Vested property
rights shall be recognized and respected.
283

Sec. 5. Indigenous Peoples Rights. - The
Bangsamoro Government recognizes the rights of the
indigenous peoples, and shall adopt measures for the
promotion and protection of their rights, the right to
their native titles and/or fusaka inged, indigenous
customs and traditions, justice systems and indigenous
political structures, right to an equitable share in
revenues from utilization of resources in their ancestral
lands, right to free, prior and informed consent, right to
political participation in the Bangsamoro Government
including reserved seats for the indigenous peoples in
the Bangsamoro parliament, the right to basic services
and the right to freedom of choice as to their identity.

Sec. 6. Customary Rights and Traditions The
customs, beliefs and traditions of the people in the
Bangsamoro are hereby recognized, protected and
guaranteed.

The Bangsamoro Parliament shall adopt measures
to ensure mutual respect and protection of the distinct
beliefs, customs and traditions of the Bangsamoro people
and other inhabitants in the Bangsamoro.

No person in the Bangsamoro shall be subjected to
any form of discrimination on account of creed, religion,
ethnic origin, parentage or sex.
Art. X Bangsamoro Justice System

Sec. 1. Justice System in the Bangsamoro.- the
justice system in the Bangsamoro shall consist of Shariah
Law which shall have supremacy and application over
Muslims only; the traditional or tribal justice system,
for the indigenous people in the Bangsamoro; the local
courts and alternative dispute resolution systems.

Nothing herein shall be construed to operate
to the prejudice of non-Muslims and non-indigenous
peoples.
Traditional/Tribal Justice Systems

Sec. 23/ Traditional/Tribal Justice Systems. The
Bangsamoro Parliament shall enact laws to promote and
support the traditional/tribal justice system that are
appropriate for the indigenous people, as defined by
them. The traditional justice systems are the mechanisms
to determine, settle and decide controversies and enforce
decisions involving disputes between members of the
indigenous people concerned in accordance with the
tribal codes of these communities.

Sec. 24. Office for Traditional/Tribal Justice
System.- There is hereby created an Office for Tribal
Justice System responsible in overseeing the study,
preservation and development of the tribal justice system
285
within the Bangsamoro. The powers and functions of the

Office shall be defined by the Bangsamoro Parliament.

The Office shall ensure the full participation of
indigenous peoples in the formulation, implementation
and evaluation of policies related to the strengthening of
tribal justice system; ensuring further that such systems
maintain their indigenous character in accordance with
the respective practices of each tribe.
Art. XI Public Order and Safety

Sec. 18. Indigenous Structure.- The Bangsamoro
Government shall recognize indigenous structures
or systems which promote peace, and law and order.
The Bangsamoro Parliament shall provide institutional
support to these structures and systems to enhance
peace and security in the Bangsamoro.
Art. XII Fiscal Autonomy

Sec. 34. Share of Indigenous Communities.Indigenous peoples shall have an equitable share
from the revenues generated from the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources that
are found within the territories covered by a native title
in their favor. The share shall be provided for in a law to
be passed by the Bangsamoro Parliament.

The Bangsamoro Parliament shall enact a law that
shall provide in detail said sharing system, including the
percentage of the shares of the indigenous peoples and
communities and the mechanisms therefor.
Art. XII Economy and Patrimony

Sec. 12. Rights of Indigenous Peoples Over
Natural Resources.- The Bangsamoro Parliament shall
enact a law recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples
in the Bangsamoro in relation to natural resources within
the territories covered by a native title, including their
share in revenues, as provided in this Basic Law, and
preferential rights in the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources within their areas.

The right of indigenous peoples to free and prior
informed consent in relation to development initiatives
shall be respected.

Sec. 15. Regulation of Small-Scale Mining.- Smallscale mining shall be regulated by the Bangsamoro
government to the end that the ecological balance, safety
and health, and the interests of the affected communities,
the miners, the indigenous peoples, and the local
government units of the place where such operations are
conducted are duly protected and safeguarded.
287
Sec. 19. xxx

The Central and Bangsamoro Governments shall
work together to regulate the waters that comprise the
Zones of Join Cooperation in the Sulu Sea and the Moro
Gulf. Policeis shall be jointly drawn up for the following
purposes:

xxx
a. Protection of the traditional fishing grounds;

d. Ensuring the exercise of the preferential rights
of the Bangsamoro people, other indigenous peoples in
the adjoining provinces, and the resident fishers in the
Bangsamoro, aquamarine, and other living resources
in the Zones of Joint Cooperation. The Joint Body shall
promulgate rules and regulations as to the exercise of
these preferential rights xxx
Art. XV Plebiscite

Sec. 9. Information Campaigns.- The Commission
on Elections shall supervise the conduct of information
campaigns on the plebiscite, including sectoral
campaigns for indigenous communities, women, youth,
religious, professionals and public and private sector
employees, in every municipality, city, and province
where the plebiscite is held.
Art. XVI Bangsamoro Transition Authority

Sec. 2.
xxx

The BTA shall be composed of fifty (50) members,
all of whom shall appointed by the President; Provided
that, non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler
communities and other sectors shall have representatives
in the BTA. Nominations may be submitted to the office
of the President for this purpose.
Sec. 7. Interim Cabinet. The Interim Cabinet shall be
composed of ten (10) primary offices with sub-offices for
matters covered and priority ministries:
xxx
f. Indigenous Peoples Affairs.
The Proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)
291
Republic)of)the)Philippines)
1"
2"
CONGRESS(OF(THE(PHILIPPINES(
4"
6"
___________________)Regular)Session)
3"
Metro)Manila)
5"
1"
!
7" )
8" )
9" Begun)and)held)in)Metro)Manila,)on)________________________)
10" )
11" )
12"
13"
14"
15"
16"
17"
18"
19"
REPUBLIC(ACT(NO.(_______(
AN(ACT(PROVIDING(FOR(THE(BASIC(LAW(FOR(THE(BANGSAMORO(AND(ABOLISHING(
THE(AUTONOMOUS(REGION(IN(MUSLIM(MINDANAO,(REPEALING(FOR(THE(PURPOSE(
REPUBLIC( ACT( NO.( 9054,( ENTITLED( AN( ACT( TO( STRENGTHEN( AND( EXPAND( THE(
ORGANIC( ACT( FOR( THE( AUTONOMOUS( REGION( IN( MUSLIM( MINDANAO,( AND(
REPUBLIC(ACT(NO.(6734,(ENTITLED(AN(ACT(PROVIDING(FOR(AN(ORGANIC(ACT(FOR(
THE(AUTONOMOUS(REGION(IN(MUSLIM(MINDANAO,(AND(FOR(OTHER(PURPOSES(
)
20" )
21" Be) it) enacted) by) the) Senate) and) the) House) of) Representatives) of) the) Philippines) in)
22" Congress)assembled:)
23" )
24"
25"
1"
PREAMBLE)
2"
!
2" )
3" )
4" We,)the)Bangsamoro)people)and)other)inhabitants)of)the)Bangsamoro,)imploring)the)aid)
5" of)the)Almighty,)aspiring)to)establish)an)enduring)peace)on)the)basis)of)justice)in)our)
6" communities) and) a) justly) balanced) society,) and) asserting) our) right) to) conserve) and)
7" develop)our)patrimony;)
8" ))
9" In)consonance)with)the)Constitution)and)the)universally)accepted)principles)of)human)
10" rights,) liberty,) justice,) democracy,) and) the) norms) and) standards) of) international) law,)
11" reflective) of) our) system) of) life) prescribed) by) our) faith,) and) in) harmony) with) our)
12" customary)laws,)cultures)and)traditions;)
13" ))
14" Affirming)the)distinct)historical)identity)and)birthright)of)the)Bangsamoro)people)to)their)
15" ancestral)homeland)and)their)right)to)selfFdetermination))beginning)with)the)struggle)
16" for)freedom)of)their)forefathers)in)generations)past)and)extending)to)the)present))to)
17" chart)their)political)future)through)a)democratic)process)that)will)secure)their)identity)
18" and) posterity,) and) allow) for) genuine) and) meaningful) selfFgovernance) as) stipulated)
19" under)the)Comprehensive)Agreement)on)the)Bangsamoro)(CAB);)
20" ))
21" With)the)blessings)of)the)Almighty,)do)hereby)ordain)and)promulgate)this)Bangsamoro)
22" Basic)Law,)through)the)Congress)of)the)Republic)of)the)Philippines,)as)the)basic)law)of)
23" the)Bangsamoro)that)establishes)the)asymmetrical)political)relationship)with)the)Central)
24" Government)founded)on)the)principles)of)subsidiarity)and)parity)of)esteem.)
25" )
26"
1"
2"
Article(I(
293
3"
!
NAME(AND(PURPOSE(
3" )
4" Section(1.(Short(Title.)This)law)shall)be)known)and)cited)as)the)Bangsamoro)Basic)
5" Law.)
6" )
7" Section(2.(Name.((The)name)of)the)political)entity)under)this)Basic)Law)shall)be)the)
8" Bangsamoro.)
9" )
10" Section( 3.( Purpose.) ) The) purpose) of) this) Basic) Law) is) to) establish) a) political) entity,)
11" provide) for) its) basic) structure) of) government) in) recognition) of) the) justness) and)
12" legitimacy)of)the)cause)of)the)Bangsamoro)people)and)their)aspiration)to)chart)their)
13" political)future)through)a)democratic)process)that)will)secure)their)identity)and)posterity)
14" and)allow)for)meaningful)selfFgovernance.)
15"
1"
2"
Article(II(
4"
!
BANGSAMORO(IDENTITY)
3" )
4" Section(1.(Bangsamoro(People.((Those)who)at)the)time)of)conquest)and)colonization)
5" were)considered)natives)or)original)inhabitants)of)Mindanao)and)the)Sulu)archipelago)
6" and)its)adjacent)islands)including)Palawan,)and)their)descendants,)whether)of)mixed)or)
7" of)full)blood,)shall)have)the)right)to)identify)themselves)as)Bangsamoro)by)ascription)or)
8" selfFascription.)Spouses)and)their)descendants)are)classified)as)Bangsamoro.)
9" )
10" Section( 2.( Freedom( of( Choice.( ( The) freedom) of) choice) of) other) indigenous) peoples)
11" shall)be)respected.)))
12" )
13" Section(3.(Bangsamoro(Symbol.((The)Bangsamoro)Parliament)shall)adopt)the)official)
14" flag,)emblem)and)anthem)of)the)Bangsamoro.)
15"
295
Article(III(
1"
2"
5"
!
TERRITORY)
3"
5"
maritime,)terrestrial,)fluvial)and)alluvial)domains,)and)the)aerial)domain)above)it.) The)
7"
9"
4"
Section( 1.( Definition( of( Territory) F) Territory) refers) to) the) land) mass) as) well) as) the)
6"
Bangsamoro)territory)shall)remain)a)part)of)the)Philippines.))
8"
Section(2.(Core(Territory))The)core)territory)of)the)Bangsamoro)shall)be)composed)of:)
10"
a. the)present)geographical)area)of)the)Autonomous)Region)in)Muslim)Mindanao;)
12"
b. the)Municipalities)of)Baloi,)Munai,)Nunungan,)Pantar,)Tagoloan)and)Tangkal)in)the)
14"
Kabacan,) Carmen,) Aleosan,) Pigkawayan,) Pikit) and) Midsayap) that) voted) for)
11"
province) of) Lanao) del) Norte) and) all) other) barangays) in) the) Municipalities) of)
13"
15"
inclusion)in)the)ARMM)during)the)2001)plebiscite;)
16"
18"
17"
c. the)cities)of)Cotabato)and)Isabela;)and)
19"
d. all)other)contiguous)areas)where)there)is)resolution)of)the)local)government)unit)
21"
asking) for) their) inclusion) at) least) two) months) prior) to) the) conduct) of) the)
or) a) petition) of) at) least) ten) percent) (10%)) of) the) registered) voters) ) in) the) area)
20"
ratification) of) the) Bangsamoro) Basic) Law) and) the) process) of) delimitation) of) the)
22"
23"
Bangsamoro.)
)
24"
In) order) to) ensure) the) widest) acceptability) of) the) Bangsamoro) Basic) Law) in) the) core)
26"
Bangsamoro)within)the)areas)for)their)adoption.)
25"
27"
28"
areas) aboveFmentioned,) a) popular) ratification) shall) be) conducted) among) all) the)
6"
!
1"
Section(3.(Contiguous(Territory()The)areas)which)are)contiguous)and)outside)the)core)
3"
percent)(10%))of)the)registered)voters)and)approved)by)a)majority)of)qualified)votes)cast)
5"
7"
streams) within) the) Bangsamoro) territory) shall) be) part) of) the) Bangsamoro.) The)
9"
Bangsamoro)Government.)
2"
territory) may) opt) at) anytime) to) be) part) of) the) territory) upon) petition) of) at) least) ten)
4"
in)a)plebiscite.)
6"
Section(4.(Inland(Waters.()All)inland)waters,)such)as)lakes,)rivers,)river)systems,)and)
8"
preservation) and) management) thereof) shall) be) under) the) jurisdiction) of) the)
10"
12"
kilometers)(12)nautical)miles))from)the)lowFwater)mark)of)the)coasts)that)are)part)of)the)
14"
of)the)Bangsamoro)political)entity.)
16"
Where) a) constituent) local) government) unit) of) the) Bangsamoro) and) an) adjoining) local)
18"
kilometers) of) waters) or) less) between) them,) a) line) equally) distant) from) the) opposite)
20"
of)the)adjoining)local)government)unit.)
22"
Should)they)be)so)situated)that)there)is)more)than)thirty)(30))kilometers)but)less)than)
24"
kilometers)municipal)waters)of)the)adjoining)local)government)unit)to)demarcate)it)from)
26"
28"
Bangsamoro)Government)shall)discuss)the)enhancement)of)the)area)of)the)Bangsamoro)
11"
Section( 5.( Bangsamoro( Waters) ) The) Bangsamoro) waters) shall) extend) up) to) 22.224)
13"
Bangsamoro)territory.)The)Bangsamoro)Waters)shall)be)part)of)the)territorial)jurisdiction)
15"
17"
government) unit) are) so) situated) on) the) opposite) shores) such) that) there) is) thirty) (30))
19"
shores)shall)be)drawn)to)demarcate)the)Bangsamoro)Waters)and)the)municipal)waters)
21"
23"
37.224)kilometers)of)waters)between)them,)a)line)shall)be)drawn)at)the)edge)of)the)15)
25"
the)Bangsamoro)Waters.)
27"
Ten) years) after) the) passage) of) this) Basic) Law,) the) Central) Government) and) the)
29"
Waters)through)the)necessary)processes)and)modalities.)
297
7"
!
1" Section( 6.( Constituent( Units.( ( The) provinces,) cities,) municipalities,) barangays) and)
2" geographical)areas)within)its)territory)shall)be)the)constituent)units)of)the)Bangsamoro.)
3" )
4" Section( 7.( Collective( Democratic( Rights( of( the( Bangsamoro( People.) F) The) collective)
5" rights)of)the)constituents)of)the)Bangsamoro)shall)be)recognized.)
6" )
7"
1"
)
Article(IV(
2"
3"
8"
!
GENERAL(PRINCIPLES(AND(POLICIES(
4"
6"
determination,) the) Bangsamoro) is) free) to) pursue) its) economic,) social) and) cultural)
8"
5"
Section( 1.( Self[Governance.( ( In) the) exercise) of) its) right) to) selfFgovernance) and) selfF
7"
development.)
9"
Section( 2.( Democratic( Political( System.) The) Bangsamoro) Government) shall) be)
10"
parliamentary.)Its)political)system)is)democratic,)allowing)its)people)to)freely)participate)
12"
14"
system) suitable) to) a) ministerial) form) of) government,) which) shall) allow) democratic)
16"
accountability.)
18"
Section(4.(Civilian(Government.(Governance)in)the)Bangsamoro)is)the)responsibility)of)
20"
military.)))
22"
Section( 5.( Promotion( of( Unity.) The) Bangsamoro) Government) shall) promote) unity,)
11"
in)the)political)processes)within)its)territory.)
13"
Section( 3.( Electoral( System.) F) The) Bangsamoro) Government) shall) adopt) an) electoral)
15"
participation,)encourage)formation)of)genuinely)principled)political)parties,)and)ensure)
17"
19"
the)dulyFelected)civilian)government.)Civilian)authority)is,)at)all)times,)supreme)over)the)
21"
23"
peace,)justice,)and)goodwill)among)all)peoples,)as)well)as)encourage)a)just)and)peaceful)
25"
27"
instrument)of)national)policy,)adopts)the)generally)accepted)principles)of)international)
29"
freedom,)cooperation,)and)amity)with)all)nations.)
24"
settlement)of)disputes.)
26"
The) Bangsamoro) abides) by) the) principle) that) the) country) renounces) war) as) an)
28"
law)as)part)of)the)law)of)the)land)and)adheres)to)the)policy)of)peace,)equality,)justice,)
1" (
299
9"
!
2" Section( 6.( Promotion( of( Right.) F) The) Bangsamoro) shall) adhere) to) the) principle) of)
3" enjoining)what)is)right)and)forbidding)what)is)wrong.)
4" )
5" Section(7.(Social(Justice.)F)The)Bangsamoro)shall)establish)a)government)that)ensures)
6" that) every) citizen) in) the) Bangsamoro) is) provided) the) basic) necessities) and) equal)
7" opportunities)in)life.)Social)Justice)shall)be)promoted)in)all)phases)of)development)and)
8" facets)of)life)within)the)Bangsamoro.)
9" )
10" Section(8.((International(Treaties(and(Agreements.)F)The)Bangsamoro)Government)shall)
11" respect) and) adhere) to) all) international) treaties) and) agreements) binding) upon) the)
12" Central)Government.)
13" )
14"
Article(V(
1"
2"
10"
!
POWERS(OF(GOVERNMENT(
3"
5"
jurisdiction) are) retained) by) the) Central) Government.) ) The) Central) Government) shall)
7"
4"
Section(1.(Reserved(Powers.((Reserved)powers)are)matters)over)which)authority)and)
6"
exercise)the)following)reserved)powers:)
8"
1. Defense)and)external)security;)
)
9"
10"
2. Foreign)policy;)
12"
3. Coinage)and)monetary)policy;)
13"
14"
4. Postal)service;)
15"
16"
5. Citizenship)and)naturalization;)
18"
6. Immigration;)
20"
7. Customs)and)tariff)as)qualified)by)Section)2(10),)Article)V)of)this)Basic)Law;)
22"
8. Common) market) and) global) trade,) provided) that) the) power) to) enter) into)
24"
to)the)Bangsamoro)Government)as)provided)in)Article)XII,)Section)25)of)this)Basic)
11"
17"
19"
21"
economic)agreements)given)to)the)ARMM)under)R.A.)9054)is)hereby)transferred)
23"
Law;)and)
25"
26"
27"
28"
9. Intellectual)property)rights.)
(
1"
301
11"
!
Section(2.(Concurrent(Powers.( [()Concurrent)powers)shall)refer)to)the)powers)shared)
2"
between) the) Central) Government) and) the) Bangsamoro) Government) within) the)
4"
6"
within)the)Bangsamoro)on)the)following)matters:)
3"
Bangsamoro,)as)provided)in)this)Basic)Law.))
5"
The)Central)Government)and)the)Bangsamoro)Government)shall)exercise)shared)powers)
7"
)
1. Social)security)and)pensions.))The)Bangsamoro)Government)may)organize)its)own)
8"
social) security) and) pension) systems) alongside) the) existing) Central) Government)
9"
10"
11"
social)security)and)pension)systems.))
)
The) Bangsamoro) Government) and) the) Central) Government) through) the)
12"
intergovernmental) relations) mechanism,) and) other) consultative) processes) shall,)
13"
14"
among)others,)ensure)that)the)investment)of)the)contributions)from)the)members)
16"
15"
responsive)to)their)cultural)and)religious)sensitivities.)
17"
from)the)Bangsamoro)in)the)Central)Government)social)security)and)pensions)is)
)
The)future)relationship)of)the)Central)Government)system)with)the)Bangsamoro)
18"
Government) system) with) respect) to) new) government) employees) and) other)
19"
qualified)individuals)in)the)Bangsamoro)shall)be)further)provided)for)in)law)duly)
20"
21"
22"
enacted)for)the)purpose.)
)
2. Quarantine.) ) There) is) hereby) created) an) office) for) quarantine) services) in) the)
23"
Bangsamoro.)It)shall)cooperate)and)coordinate)with)its)counterpart)offices)in)the)
24"
25"
26"
Central)Government.)
)
27"
3. Land) Registration.) ) The) Bangsamoro) Government,) in) accordance) with) the) land)
29"
in)the)Bangsamoro)territory)through)an)office)it)shall)create)for)this)purpose.)The)
28"
registration)system)of)the)Central)Government,)shall)administer)land)registration)
303
305
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375
377
379
381
383
385
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389
391
393
395
397
399
401
403
405
407
409
411
Full Inclusion of the

Indigenous People s in
theBangsamoro
Full-Inclusion-of-the-Indigenous-People-s-in-the-Bangsamoro
415
417
419
421
About the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

The Institute for Autonomy and Governance
(IAG) is an independent and non- partisan think tank
founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making autonomy
an effective vehicle for peace and development in the
southern Philippines.

IAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving
concept that encompasses any political structure
that is less than an independent state. It provides the
countrys minority Muslim and Indigenous Peoples
platforms to evolve self governance structures
whether federal, autonomous or associative.

IAG continues to conduct research, fora,
roundtable discussions, and conferences on the
issues of autonomy, good governance and political
settlements between the GPH and the Rebel Fronts
(MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papers and
journals on political, economic, and security issues that
define the much needed measures to be undertaken
for meaningful self-governance in the region.

IAG also provides support to the ARMM
Executive and the Iranon Development Council
(Buldon, Barira, Matanog, Parang and Datu Blah
Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building with focus
on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.

IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung in the Philippines.

IAG is located at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, Philippines, Telefax (64)552-2071.
Email: info@iag.org.ph and Website: www.iag.org.ph
Institute for Autonomy & Governance

Shaping public policy for peace and good governance
in the Southern Philippines
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Autonomy and Peace Review: Emerging Key Issues On The Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law

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Autonomy & Peace Review

A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

Emerging Key Issues

Established in 2001, the Institute

Institute for Autonomy and Governance

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop

Q&A with Congressman Rufus Rodriguez on

Bangsamoro Basic Law: Step Forward

From Presidential Government

A Comparison: What RA 9054

say about local governance and

The Pains of the Comprehensive Agreement

Proposed BBL Provisions Relevant

The Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

his issue of the Autonomy and Peace Review

without challenges. Congress with its plenary legislative

Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) Undersecretary

Atty. Benedicto R. Bacani

25 Takeaways from the IAG

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

he proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

16 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

[Hence you] look for political and socio-economic

18 Autonomy and Peace Review

relationship are reflected in the Constitution even if the

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

20 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

22 Autonomy and Peace Review

5. Vote of no confidence under the

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

6. The role of Wali explained.

24 Autonomy and Peace Review

be the basis that Congress has the power to design a

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

9. The Bangsamoro is inclusive.

26 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

28 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

30 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

32 Autonomy and Peace Review

the people in policy- and decision-making in terms of

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

empowerment. The Bangsamoro electoral system

34 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

of individuals because now you are referring to another

36 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

dynamic. Otherwise it becomes an extremist ideology,

38 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro Parliament,

40 Autonomy and Peace Review

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

42 Autonomy and Peace Review

for the Bangsamoro to be a legitimate autonomous

25 Takeaways from the IAG BBL Talkshop Series

44 Autonomy and Peace Review