THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO TAXATION ON

CONSUMPTION:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Paper presented to the 11th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health

Corn van Walbeek1

Senior Researcher
Economics of Tobacco Control Project in South Africa (Phase II)
Applied Fiscal Research Centre
University of Cape Town
South Africa
E-mail address: cwalbeek@humanities.uct.ac.za

The author would like to thank Prof. Iraj Abedian, Nick Wilkins, Stanley du Plessis, Tania
Ajam, Conrad Barberton, Rowena Jacobs (nee Van der Merwe) and Dr. Yusuf Saloojee for
useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from Research for International Tobacco
Control (RITC), an international secretariat housed at the International Development Research
Centre, Ottawa, Canada as well as the World Bank. Their financial support is gratefully
acknowledged.

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO TAXATION ON CONSUMPTION:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

1.

INTRODUCTION

Tobacco control policies usually rest on a number of pillars. The most important of
these are:
(1) Increases in the real excise rate on tobacco;
(2) Advertising restrictions;
(3) Restrictions on smoking in public and/or work places; and
(4) Awareness and education campaigns about the negative effects of tobacco use.
As will be pointed out, numerous econometric studies have investigated the
relationship between tobacco consumption and its price and have consistently found a
statistically significant negative relationship. Large excise-induced increases in the
price of tobacco has reduced consumption significantly.
The impact of advertising restrictions, restrictions on smoking in public and/or work
places and awareness campaigns on tobacco demand are more difficult to measure.
The econometric results about their impact on tobacco consumption are also not as
consistent and conclusive as that of the relationship between tobacco consumption
and real prices. Furthermore, as pointed out by Bardsley and Olekalns, 1999: 235-236
and other sources (get them), the impact of non-price determinants on the demand for
tobacco is much smaller than that of the real price of tobacco.
The focus of this paper is on the role of excise taxes in reducing tobacco consumption.
While other tobacco control measures certainly are important and serve a useful
supporting role, excise increases have an immediate and potentially large impact on
consumption. Excise taxes are levied to serve at least three objectives: (1) deterrence,
(2) government revenue, and (3) to achieve greater economic efficiency.
In Section 2 each of these three objectives is briefly discussed. As will be pointed out,
objective (3) is notoriously difficult to measure, but objectives (1) and (2) can be
measured relatively easily. In Section 3 the impact of increasing excise taxes on
government revenue and tobacco consumption in South Africa is discussed.
South Africa is one of a relatively small number of developing countries that has
adopted a comprehensive tobacco control policy. South Africas experience with
tobacco excise taxes can serve as a valuable input to other developing countries
wanting to implement tobacco control policies.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

2.

OBJECTIVES OF EXCISE TAXES

2.1

Deterrence

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

While there is some debate about whether the tax is borne fully by consumers or
whether the individual firms bear a part of the tax, nobody disputes the fact that an
increase in excise tax raises the retail price of tobacco products (see Chaloupka, et al.,
2000)2.
Despite the fact that tobacco is addictive and would therefore be expected to have a
low price elasticity, empirical studies in both developed and developing countries
have consistently found a statistically significant negative relationship between the
tobacco consumption and its real price (quote sources). The estimated price elasticity
of demand for tobacco in developed countries lies in the relatively narrow range of
0.25 to 0.50 (Chaloupka et al., 2000). In developing countries tobacco consumption
is more responsive to price changes, as indicated by the fact that most estimates of the
price elasticity range from 0.50 to 1.00 (Chaloupka et al., 2000). Based on these
elasticity estimates, an excise-induced real price increase should reduce consumption
in both developed and developing countries, but that the impact is likely to be larger
in developing countries.
From a tobacco control perspective these empirical results should be very exciting for
developing countries. Given the relatively low levels of income in developing
countries, smokers in developing countries are more sensitive to changes in the price
of tobacco products than smokers in developed countries.
Studies performed in developed countries indicated that the youth and poorer people
are more sensitive to price changes than other population groups (Chaloupka and
Grossman, 1996: 15-17 and Townsend, 1996: 134). If the same principles hold true in
the developing countries, excise rate increases will serve, firstly, to reduce the take-up
of smoking amongst the youth and, secondly, to discourage smoking in those groups
(mainly the poor) that are not easily reached by alternative tobacco control measures,
such as education campaigns.
An important issue concerns the substitutability of tobacco products. If the
government increases the excise rate on cigarettes, but not on other tobacco products,
2

To what extent the excise tax is passed on to consumers depends on the industry structure.
Economic theory prescribes that, in a perfectly competitive market with constant long-run
costs of production, an increase in tobacco taxes would be fully passed on to consumers in the
form of an equivalent price increase. At the other extreme, economic theory stipulates that a
monopolist would share the burden of the tax increase with smokers. Depending on the
relative price elasticities of demand and supply the monopolist would do this by reducing the
producer price of the product.
However, in most countries the tobacco industry is neither perfectly competitive nor a
monopoly, but rather an oligopoly. In models of oligopoly, the extent of collusion between
firms largely determines whether the firms bear a part of the tobacco tax. In general, if there is
little collusion, a higher proportion of the tax will be borne by the tobacco firms. On the other
hand, if there is much collusion, it is possible that firms can use the excise increase to increase
their producer prices, thus raising retail prices by more than the increase in the excise rate.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

there will be an incentive for smokers to switch to the lower-priced alternatives. Thus,
if taxation is to be effective in reducing consumption, alternative tobacco products
have to be taxed equivalently (Townsend, 1996: 137).
2.2

Government revenue

Excise taxes, as a proportion of government has decreased in most countries during

the past decades, mainly because governments were able to generate more income
from other sources. However, because of its relative ease of collection, taxes on
tobacco products are an easy source of revenue, especially in developing countries.
The relative price inelasticity of tobacco demand ensures that an increase in the excise
rate will result in an increase in government revenue. Estimates by Townsend (1996:
138) indicate that for every one per cent increase in the excise tax, government
revenue in the UK is expected to increase by between 0.6 and 0.9 per cent.
In fact, the mathematical relationship between increases in the excise rate and
government revenue is simple to derive. If one assumes that the full burden of the tax
is passed onto consumers (i.e. the supply curve is perfectly elastic) the expected
change in government revenue from a change in the excise rate can be represented as
follows:

d (GR ) d (Tax )
Tax
=
,
1 + e p
GR
Tax
P
where

(1)

d (GR)
is the percentage change in government revenue,
GR
d (Tax)
is the percentage change in the (specific) tax rate,
Tax
ep is the price elasticity of demand,
Tax is the (specific) tax, and
P is the retail price3.
If one takes natural logarithms and differentiates the following expression with respect to time
GR = Q Tax ,
this yields
d (GR) d (Tax ) d (Q)
=
+
GR
Tax
Q
Furthermore, from
d (Q)
d ( P)
= ep
Q
P
and
d ( P ) d (Tax ) Tax ,
=

P
Tax
P
follows
d (GR ) d (Tax )
Tax .
=

1 + e p
GR
Tax
P

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

Thus, for a typical developing country with a price elasticity of 0.6 and taxes
comprising 40 per cent of retail price, a 10 per cent excise tax increase will result in a
7.6 per cent increase in government revenue and a 6 per cent decrease in
consumption.
Equation (1) has important implications. These are:
The increase in government revenue as a result of an increase in the tax rate is
inversely proportional to the absolute size of the price elasticity ep; a relatively
inelastic demand implies greater revenue potential and vice versa. Equation
(1) confirms the comments of Warner et al. (1995:381), namely that the health
and revenue benefits of taxation are inversely related: a very low price
elasticity would mean that cigarette taxation is an efficient revenue generator,
but because it would result in little change in smoking in response to increased
taxes, the health gain would be small. For relatively elastic demand, the
revenue effect of a given increase in the excise rate will be smaller, but the
reduction in consumption will be more pronounced.
The government can still increase its revenues by increasing the excise rate,
even if the price elasticity is greater than unity in absolute terms. This result
differs from that of a firm wanting to maximise revenues, where the point of
maximum revenue is at unit elasticity. This conclusion is important for highprice countries where the equilibrium point may be on the relatively elastic
portion of the demand curve. Unless the demand is extremely elastic (greater,
in absolute terms, than the inverse of the tax proportion Tax/P), an increase in
excise taxes will increase, rather than decrease, government revenues.
The smaller the initial tax percentage (tax expressed as a percentage of the
retail price), the greater the impact of a given tax increase on government
revenue.
A point that is often raised by the industry is that rapidly increasing excise taxes
increases cigarette smuggling. The industrys argument is that the increase in
smuggling will reduce government revenue. The only solution to the problem of
smuggling is to lower the tax rate, as Canada did in 1994 (Joossens, 1998: 133).
This argument assumes that the prevalence of smuggling increases as the excise level
increases. A study by the European Parliament (as quoted in Joossens, 1998: 137) on
cross-border smuggling in the European Union does not support this argument. In
fact, cigarette smuggling in the high-tax, high-price countries in Northern Europe is
limited, whereas it is relatively commonplace in the low-tax, low-price countries in
the Mediterranean region. Thus, based on the experience in the EU, prices and taxes
do not necessarily explain smuggling.
Smuggling seems to be correlated with the average level of corruption in a country
(The World Bank, 1999: 63). In countries where corruption exists, it corrodes the
governance institutions and provides a thriving environment for smuggling of, inter
alia, cigarettes. Thus, except possibly for countries where corruption is dire, it needs
much more than higher cigarette taxes and prices for smuggling to be so effective as
to undermine fiscal revenues from tobacco taxation.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

2.3

Economic efficiency and equity

2.3.1

Efficiency

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

The retail price of tobacco does not necessarily reflect its social cost. Tobacco related
costs, such as increased public healthcare expenditure, and costs associated with
environmental tobacco smoke, are not borne by the smoker, but by society. Costs
imposed on society for which the user does not pay, are called negative externalities.
Where there are negative externalities, an excise tax will increase economic
efficiency; an efficient outcome is achieved at that point where the excise-included
retail price equals the social cost of the product.
If economic efficiency is the criteria for taxation, the appropriate tax rate must be set
at a level to incorporate net social costs. While the principle is relatively
straightforward, the measurement of the social costs associated with tobacco
consumption is not. There are major philosophical, definitional and practical
controversies in measuring the social costs of smoking. Some of the major
controversies are discussed in Warner, et al., 1995, Chaloupka et al., 2000 and
Lightwood et al., 2000.
A small number of studies on the external costs of smoking have been performed in
South Africa. Based on direct health care costs and lost productivity due to premature
mortality and hospital admission, Yach, McIntyre and Saloojee (1992: 276) estimate
the economic impact of smoking-related diseases in South Africa at R1.4 billion in
1988 (about 0.7 per cent of GDP). In this study no distinction was made between
private and social costs. Studies by the South African Medical Research Council
(SAMRC, 1988 and 1992) come to similar conclusions.
2.3.2 Equity4
Taxes must be perceived as being fair or equitable. Equity can be evaluated according
to two principles: the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle.
Given that tobacco consumption results in social costs, the benefit principle implies
that a user fee must be levied on tobacco in proportion to the social costs incurred.
In particular, since smokers consume publicly funded health care resources, advocates
of a user fee approach to cigarette taxation argue that excise taxes should be imposed
to force smokers to pay their own way.
The ability to pay principle to taxation has two dimensions: the horizontal and the
vertical. According to the horizontal dimension, people in equal circumstances
(usually defined in terms of income) should be taxed equally. According to the
vertical dimension, affluent people should bear a proportionally greater share of the
tax burden than poor people.
It is often held that excise taxes on cigarettes are regressive and therefore not
vertically equitable. A regressive tax is one where the tax as a proportion of income is
larger for poor people than for more affluent people. Given that (1) the prevalence of
4

This Section draws heavily from Warner, et al., 1995.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

smoking is greater amongst poor people, and (2) poor people in general spend a larger
proportion of their income on tobacco products, an excise tax on tobacco is
regressive.
However, even though a given tobacco excise tax may be regressive, increases in the
excise tax may not be. The reason is that poor people are more sensitive to changes in
the price than rich people. An increase in the excise rate will result in a proportionally
smaller increase in the tax burden of poor people5 than of more affluent people (see
Chaloupka, 2000 for a numerical example).
Ideally one would want all individual taxes to satisfy the ability to pay principle. In
the case of tobacco, it seems that the excise tax at any given one time does not satisfy
the vertical dimension of this principle, while increases in the tax rate generally do.
However, one should not become too fixated with the equity, or otherwise, of one tax,
but should rather judge the fairness of a tax system whether the overall effect of all
taxes is progressive or regressive.

3.

SOUTH AFRICAS EXPERIENCE WITH TOBACCO EXCISE TAXES

3.1

Historical and statistical review

Excise duties on tobacco products are not new in South Africa; in fact, it has been a
source of government revenue since the formation of the Union in 1910. Tobacco
excise taxes as a percentage of total government revenue increased from about 2,4 per
cent in 1920 to more than 7 per cent during the 1950s (Van Walbeek, 1996: 22).
Subsequently this percentage dropped to less than 2 per cent during the 1980s.
Excise taxes on cigarettes are levied as a specific tax, expressed as an amount per 10
cigarettes. In times of rapid inflation the rate will have to be adjusted regularly to
prevent it from being eroded. During the low-inflation years before the early-1970s it
was unnecessary to adjust the excise rate on cigarettes regularly. However, during the
1970s and especially during the 1980s the government was extremely reluctant to
adjust the excise rate on cigarettes. Between 1970 and 1990 the nominal excise rate
increased at an average rate of only 5,6 per cent per annum while the average inflation
rate was 12,5 per cent. During this period the real excise rate fell by 72,4 per cent.
In the 1983 Budget Speech the Minister of Finance (Barend du Plessis) said: The
Tobacco Board has presented justified arguments for the maintenance of the status
quo regarding the excise taxes on tobacco and I do not intend to wake sleeping dogs
(Republic of South Africa, 1983). In the 1986 Budget Speech the Minister again did
not increase the excise rate on any excisable products on the grounds that any
increases in excise duties at present could be counter-productive, since it could in fact
on account of the potentially adverse effect on consumption lead to a reduction of

In extreme cases an increase in the excise rate can reduce (in absolute terms) the burden of the
tax. This will occur where the price elasticity of demand is greater than the inverse of the tax
proportion of the retail price (see Equation (1) in Section 2.2).

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

revenue from this source (Republic of South Africa, 1986, p.12)6. Similar lobbying
by the Tobacco Board and the tobacco products manufacturing industry may explain
why the government did not increase excise rates in line with the inflation rate over
the entire period.
However, following the election of 1994, the Government of National Unity placed
the public health consequences of smoking in the spotlight. In 1994 the Minister of
Finance (Derek Keys) announced that the government would increase the excise rate
on cigarettes to a level where 50 per cent of the retail price would consist of excise tax
(Republic of South Africa, 1994). This would be phased in over a number of years. In
subsequent Budget Speeches the target seems to have softened somewhat. The current
target is to have excise tax and VAT combined comprise 50 per cent of the retail
price.
Figure 1: Composition of the real price of cigarettes, South Africa, 1961-1999
600

Cents/pack (constant 1995 prices

500

400

300

200

100

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

1961

Year
Producer price

Excise tax

Sales tax (GST/VAT)

Source: Auditor-General, Budget Reviews, Tobacco Board, Statistics South Africa7.

In Figure 1 the composition of the real price of cigarettes (in constant 1995 prices) is
shown for the period 1961 to 1999. Due mainly to the fact that the real excise rate on
cigarettes decreased by 74 per cent between 1961 and 1991, the real retail price
decreased by 43 per cent over the same period. However, since 1994 and especially
since 1997 the real excise rate has increased very dramatically. In real terms the
excise rate increased by 160 per cent between 1993 and 1999.
An interesting feature of Figure 1 concerns trends in the producer price of tobacco.
The producer price is defined as the retail price net of VAT and excise taxes. Between
1961 and 1991 the real producer price decreased at an average annual rate of about 1
6

Given that combined excise and sales taxes comprised only 41 per cent of the retail price in
1985, this would imply a price elasticity of about 2.4. Even if one takes the economic woes
of that period into account, an elasticity of such magnitude seems highly improbably.
For a comprehensive discussion of the derivation of the data, see Van Walbeek (2000(a)).

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

per cent. However, since 1991, and especially since 1996, the industry increased the
producer price dramatically. In fact, the real producer price in 1999 was 91 per cent
higher than in 1991 and 58 per cent higher than in 1994. The rapidly increasing excise
rate and the even more rapidly increasing producer price, has resulted in a doubling of
the real retail price of cigarettes during the past decade.
Possible reasons for this incongruous behaviour of the cigarette manufacturing
industry are discussed in Chaloupka, et al. (2000), Van Walbeek (2000(b)) and Van
der Merwe (1998(b): 34-35). While such a strategy would be denigrated by smokers,
who may feel that the industry is taking advantage of their addiction, the strategy has
positive tobacco control consequences. Given the negative price/quantity relationship,
an increase in the price of cigarettes, irrespective of whether this is due to an increase
in excise tax or greater profits by cigarette manufacturers, will decrease cigarette
consumption. Furthermore, since the excise increases are well-publicised, cigarette
manufacturers are in the fortunate position that they can blame the government for the
increase in the price, even though they are equally guilty of increasing the retail
price.
3.2

Price and consumption trends

Studies performed on South African data estimate the long-run price elasticity
between 0.5 and 0.9 (Reekie, 1994, Van Walbeek, 1996 and Van der Merwe and
Annett, 1998). The negative relationship between the real price of cigarettes and
consumption is vividly displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Real retail price vs. consumption of cigarettes
2500

500

2000

400
1500
300
1000
200
500

100

0
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Consumption of cigarettes (millions of

packs)

Real retail price of cigarettes (cents/pack

of 20; constant 1995 prices)

600

Year
Real retail price of cigarettes (cents/pack of 20; constant 1995 prices)

Consumption of cigarettes (millions of packs)

Source: Auditor-General, Tobacco Board, Statistics South Africa.

Between 1961 and 1991 consumption of cigarettes grew from 571 million packs to
1927 million packs. This represents an annual growth rate of 4,1 per cent. During this

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

11th Conference on Tobacco OR Health

10

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

period annual per capita8 consumption increased from around 50 packs to more than
80 packs. This increase in consumption was associated with a 43 per cent decrease in
the real price of cigarettes.
1991 marks a turning point in both cigarette prices and consumption. Between 1991
and 1999 total cigarette consumption decreased by 27 per cent. The Department of
Finance expects the consumption of cigarettes to decrease by another 7,7 per cent
during 2000. In per capita terms the decrease in consumption is even more
pronounced. From its plateau of slightly more than 80 packs during the 1980s, per
capita consumption fell to 58 packs in 1997, 54 packs in 1998 and to 49 packs in
1999. The Department of Finance expects per capita cigarette consumption to fall to
44 packs in 2000 (Republic of South Africa, 1999).
The rapid decline in cigarette consumption during the 1990s is a tribute to the
governments tobacco control policies. The mainstay of the governments antitobacco policy was the increase in excise rates, but, as was pointed out in Section 3.1,
increases in the producer price played an as important role in increasing the real retail
price.
3.3

Excise revenues

Even though the primary aim of South Africas tobacco control policy is to reduce
tobacco consumption, the fiscal demands are such that the revenue aspects of such a
policy cannot be ignored. At present all excise taxes enter the general revenue fund;
there is no dedicated fund to counteract the detrimental public health impact of
smoking.

250

2500

200

2000

150

1500

100

1000

50

500

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

0
1961

Year
Real excise rate (cents/pack of 20; constant 1995 prices)

Real excise revenues (R millions, constant 1995 prices)

Unless otherwise stated, per capita figures are calculated assuming a population aged 15 and
older.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Real excise revenues (R millions; constant 1995 prices)

Real excise rate (cents/pack of 20; constant 1995 prices)

Figure 3: Real excise rate vs. real excise revenue from cigarettes

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

11

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Source: Auditor-General, Budget Reviews, Tobacco Board

In Figure 3 real excise revenue from cigarettes is shown against the real excise rate.
Real government revenue from excise taxes increased in line with the growth in
consumption during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Despite continued increases in
consumption during the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid decline in the real excise rate
resulted in a decline in excise revenue from nearly R2 billion in 1977 to just more
than R1 billion in 1990 (all figures in constant 1995 prices).
Between 1993 and 1999 real excise revenues increased by 103 per cent, while the
excise rate increased by 160 per cent. Thus, the elasticity of total revenue with respect
to tax rate (the percentage increase in total revenue as a result of a one per cent
increase in the excise rate) for this period was 0.64.
While the government needs to remain vigilant, the evidence does not indicate that
increased tobacco smuggling has impacted significantly on government revenue. In an
open letter to the Minister of Health in October 1996, the Rembrandt Group - by far
South Africas largest cigarette manufacturer and distributor - claim that substantial
increases in the excise duty will result in increased smuggling (Rembrandt Group,
1996). According to them smuggling was out of control. The group cited the example
of Canada where the government lost revenue when it increased the excise rate on
cigarettes because of increased smuggling.
The fact of the matter is that since 1996 real excise revenues increased by 59 per cent
in response to a 91 per cent increase in the real excise rate. This implies a total
revenue elasticity of 0.64 for this period, the same as the preceding three years. If
there had been a major increase in smuggling, the revenue elasticity would have been
considerably lower after 1996.
4.

CONCLUSION

Although other tobacco control mechanisms exist, increases in the excise rate are
particularly effective in reducing tobacco consumption. Given their greater sensitivity
to price changes, the impact of excise rate increases on consumption is greater in
developing vis--vis developed countries. Furthermore, excise rate increases does not
cost the government anything; in fact, it has the potential to greatly increase
government revenue. At present the tax proportion of the retail price of tobacco
products in developing countries is low. Experience from the developed world has
indicated that the government can greatly increase the excise rate without any fear of
losing excise revenue.
While most developed countries have adopted comprehensive tobacco control
policies, currently few developing countries have any controls in place. Large and
regular increases in the real tobacco excise rate will provide immediate and tangible
results.
South Africa is one of a limited number of developing countries that has implemented
a comprehensive tobacco control policy. The mainstay of this policy is an increasing
real excise rate. This has resulted in large increases in the real price of cigarettes,
significant reductions in tobacco consumption and a large increase in excise revenues

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

12

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by the government. In South Africa, the battle against tobacco is not yet won, but at
least the tide has turned.

Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

Impact of Tobacco Taxation on Consumption

5.

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Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town

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Corn van Walbeek

Applied Fiscal Research Centre, Cape Town