REGINO vs.

Pangasinan College of Science and

Technology
Upon enrolment, students and their school
enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students
agree to abide by the standards of academic
performance and codes of conduct, issued
usually in the form of manuals that are
distributed to the enrollees at the start of the
school term. Further, the school informs them
of the itemized fees they are expected to
pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the
enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the
contract. It cannot require fees other than
those it specified upon enrolment.

The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45,[1] seeking to nullify the July 12,
2002[2] and the November 22, 2002[3] Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U7541. The decretal portion of the first assailed
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the instant
motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action.[4]
The second challenged Order denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a
first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,
Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. During the
second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go
to the construction of the schools tennis and

volleyball courts. Each student was required to

pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each.
The project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets
with additional points in their test scores; those
who refused to pay were denied the
opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her
religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the
tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in
logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit
out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day,
Baladad, after announcing to the entire class
that she was not permitting petitioner and
another student to take their statistics
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets,
allegedly ejected them from the classroom.
Petitioners pleas ostensibly went unheeded by
Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly
defended their positions as compliance with
PCSTs policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a
pauper litigant, a Complaint[5] for damages
against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her
Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal
damages;P500,000 as moral damages; at
least P1,000,000
as
exemplary
damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the
costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss[6] on the ground of
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the
question raised involved the determination of
the wisdom of an administrative policy of the
PCST; hence, the case should have been
initiated before the proper administrative body,
the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondents Motion,
petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies was unnecessary,
because her action was not administrative in
nature, but one purely for damages arising from
respondents breach of the laws on human

relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the

courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In granting respondents Motion to
Dismiss, the trial court noted that the instant
controversy involved a higher institution of
learning, two of its faculty members and one of
its students. It added that Section 54 of the
Education Act of 1982 vested in the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and
regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled
that the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction
over the controversy.[7]
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order
dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of
action without, however, explaining this
ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present
Petition on pure questions of law.[8]

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of
the human relation provisions of the Civil Code,
filed by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior
declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action
exclusively for damages in regular courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based
upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on
human relations filed by a student against the
school.[9]

All of the foregoing point to one issue -whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable. The
Court, however, sees a second issue which,
though not expressly raised by petitioner, was
impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the
Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to
Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the RTC. According to them, the
determination of the controversy hinge on the
validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs
academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should
have been lodged in the CHED, the
administrative body tasked under Republic Act
No. 7722 to implement the state policy to
protect, foster and promote the right of all
citizens to affordable quality education at all
levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure
that education is accessible to all.[10]
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds
no relevance to the present case since she is
praying for damages, a remedy beyond the
domain of the CHED and well within the
jurisdiction of the courts.[11]
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v.
CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate on
the rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative
remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the
available administrative
remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper

authorities have been given the

appropriate opportunity to act
and correct their alleged errors,
if any, committed in the
administrative forum. x x x.[13]
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of
the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding
it to allow her to take her final examinations;
she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of
would not adequately redress her grievances;
under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents acts could no longer be undone or
rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative
body to act upon the matter complained
of.[14] Administrative agencies are not courts;
they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
are
they
deemed
judicial
tribunals.[15] Specifically, the CHED does not
have the power to award damages.[16] Hence,
petitioner could not have commenced her case
before the Commission.

valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in

the complaint.[20]
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause
of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
alleged facts. In their Motion to Dismiss,
respondents did not dispute any of petitioners
allegations, and they admitted that x x x the
crux of plaintiffs cause of action is the
determination of whether or not the
assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or
oppressive.[21] They thereby premised their
prayer for dismissal on the Complaints alleged
failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a
reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following
factual allegations:
10.

In the second week of

February 2002, defendant
Rachelle A. Gamurot, in
connivance with PCST,
forced plaintiff and her
classmates to buy or take
two tickets each, x x x;

11.

Plaintiff and many of her

classmates objected to the
forced distribution and
selling of tickets to them
but the said defendant
warned them that if they
refused [to] take or pay
the price of the two tickets
they would not be allowed
at all to take the final
examinations;

12.

As if to add insult to injury,

defendant Rachelle A.
Gamurot bribed students
with additional fifty points
or so in their test score in
her subject just to unjustly
influence and compel them
into taking the tickets;

13.

Despite the students

refusal, they were forced
to take the tickets because
[of] defendant Rachelle A.
Gamurots coercion and
act of intimidation, but still
many of them including
the plaintiff did not attend

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of

exceptions, one of which arises when the issue
is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of
the trial court.[17] Petitioners action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and
the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function
that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.[18]

Second Issue:
Cause of Action

Sufficient Causes of Action Stated

in the Allegations in the Complaint
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently
allege a cause of action; failure to do so
warrants its dismissal.[19] A complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged
to be true, the court should be able to render a

the dance party imposed

upon them by defendants
PCST and Rachelle A.
Gamurot;
14.

15.

16.

17.

Plaintiff was not able to pay

the price of her own two
tickets because aside form
the fact that she could not
afford to pay them it is also
against
her
religious
practice as a member of a
certain
religious
congregation
to
be
attending dance parties
and celebrations;
On March 14, 2002, before
defendant Rachelle A.
Gamurot gave her class its
final examination in the
subject Logic she warned
that students who had not
paid the tickets would not
be allowed to participate
in the examination, for
which
threat
and
intimidation
many
students were eventually
forced to make payments:
Because plaintiff could not
afford to pay, defendant
Rachelle
A.
Gamurot
inhumanly made plaintiff
sit out the class but the
defendant did not allow
her to take her final
examination in Logic;
On March 15, 2002 just
before the giving of the
final examination in the
subject
Statistics,
defendant Elissa Baladad,
in
connivance
with
defendants Rachelle A.
Gamurot
and
PCST,
announced
in
the
classroom that she was not
allowing
plaintiff
and
another student to take
the examination for their
failure and refusal to pay
the price of the tickets,

and
thenceforth
she
ejected plaintiff and the
other student from the
classroom;
18.

Plaintiff pleaded for a

chance to take the
examination
but
all
defendants could say was
that the prohibition to give
the examinations to nonpaying students was an
administrative decision;

19.

Plaintiff has already paid

her tuition fees and other
obligations in the school;

20.

That the above-cited

incident was not a first
since PCST also did another
forced distribution of
tickets to its students in
the first semester of school
year 2001-2002; x x x [22]

The foregoing allegations show two causes

of action; first, breach of contract; and second,
liability for tort.

Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
In Alcuaz
v.
PSBA,[23] the
Court
characterized the relationship between the
school and the student as a contract, in which
a student, once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester.[24] Two
years later, in Non v. Dames II,[25] the Court
modified the termination of contract theory
in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual
relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration,
but for the entire period the latter are
expected to complete it.[26] Except for the
variance in the period during which the
contractual relationship is considered to subsist,
both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in
characterizing the school-student relationship
as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also
reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences

appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of

such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations. The school undertakes to
provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of
the school and to observe its rules and
regulations.[27]
The terms of the school-student contract
are defined at the moment of its inception -upon enrolment of the student. Standards of
academic performance and the code of
behavior and discipline are usually set forth in
manuals distributed to new students at the
start of every school year. Further, schools
inform prospective enrollees the amount of
fees and the terms of payment.
In practice, students are normally required
to make a down payment upon enrollment,
with the balance to be paid before every
preliminary, midterm and final examination.
Their failure to pay their financial obligation is
regarded as a valid ground for the school to
deny them the opportunity to take these
examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely
ensure compliance with financial obligations; it
also underlines the importance of major
examinations. Failure to take a major
examination is usually fatal to the students
promotion to the next grade or to graduation.
Examination results form a significant basis for
their final grades. These tests are usually a
primary and an indispensable requisite to their
elevation to the next educational level and,
ultimately, to their completion of a course.
Education is not a measurable commodity.
It is not possible to determine who is better
educated than another. Nevertheless, a
students grades are an accepted approximation
of what would otherwise be an intangible
product of countless hours of study. The
importance of grades cannot be discounted in a
setting where education is generally the gate
pass to employment opportunities and better
life; such grades are often the means by which a
prospective employer measures whether a job
applicant has acquired the necessary tools or
skills for a particular profession or trade.

Thus, students expect that upon their

payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set
academic standards, completion of academic
requirements and observance of school rules
and regulations, the school would reward them
by recognizing their completion of the course
enrolled in.
The obligation on the part of the school
has been established in Magtibay v.
Garcia,[28] Licup
v.
University
of
San
Carlos[29] and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Garcia,[30] in which the Court held that, barring
any violation of the rules on the part of the
students, an institution of higher learning has
a contractual obligation to afford its students
a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund
its facilities and to meet astronomical operating
costs; this is a reality in running it. Crystal v.
Cebu International School[31] upheld the
imposition by respondent school of a land
purchase deposit in the amount of P50,000 per
student to be used for the purchase of a piece
of land and for the construction of new
buildings and other facilities x x x which the
school would transfer [to] and occupy after the
expiration of its lease contract over its present
site.
The amount was refundable after the
student graduated or left the school. After
noting that the imposition of the fee was made
only after prior consultation and approval by
the parents of the students, the Court held that
the school committed no actionable wrong in
refusing to admit the children of the petitioners
therein for their failure to pay the land
purchase deposit and the 2.5 percent monthly
surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the
assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in
the middle of the semester. It exacted the
dance party fee as a condition for the students
taking the final examinations, and ultimately for
its recognition of their ability to finish a course.
The fee, however, was not part of the schoolstudent contract entered into at the start of the
school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

Such contract is by no means an ordinary

one. In Non, we stressed that the schoolstudent contract is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by
the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers
over all educational institutions.[32] Sections 5
(1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution provide:
The State shall
protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and
shall take appropriate steps to
make such declaration
accessible to all.
Every student has a
right to select a profession or
course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic
requirements.
The same state policy resonates in Section
9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the
Education Act of 1982:
Section 9. Rights of
Students in School. In
addition to other rights, and
subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and
regulations, students and
pupils in all schools shall enjoy
the following rights:
xxx
x
(2) The right to
freely choose their
field of study subject
to existing curricula
and to continue their
course therein up to
graduation, except in
cases of academic
deficiency, or
violation of
disciplinary
regulations.

xx
xxx

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged
that private respondents inhumanly punish
students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
religious practice or lowly station in life, which
inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of
guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;[33] as a result
of such punishment, she was allegedly unable
to finish any of her subjects for the second
semester of that school year and had to lag
behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme
humiliation, mental agony and demoralization
of unimaginable proportions in violation of
Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These
provisions of the law state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy
of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling
with
or
disturbing the private
life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause
another to be alienated
from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating
another on account of
his beliefs, lowly station
in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other
personal condition.

Generally, liability for tort arises only

between parties not otherwise bound by a
contract. An academic institution, however,
may be held liable for tort even if it has an
existing contract with its students, since the act
that violated the contract may also be a tort.
We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which we
quote:
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 *of the
Civil Code] shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations,
arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a
tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France v.
Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for
his unwarranted expulsion from a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner airline.
It is noted, however, that the Court
referred to the petitioner-airlines
liability as one arising from tort, not one
arising form a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist
even if there is a contract, for the act
that breaks the contract may be also a
tort. x x x This view was not all that
revolutionary, for even as early as 1918,
this Court was already of a similar mind.
In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil.
780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated
thus: x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break
the contract under such conditions
that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is
the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21 x x
x.[35]
Academic Freedom

In their Memorandum, respondents harp

on their right to academic freedom. We are
not impressed.
According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses
the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4)
who may be admitted to study.[36] In Garcia v.
the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology,[37] the Court upheld the
respondent therein when it denied a female
students admission to theological studies in a
seminary for prospective priests. The Court
defined the freedom of an academic institution
thus: to decide for itself aims and objectives
and how best to attain them x x x free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly
when overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.[38]
In Tangonan v. Pao,[39] the Court upheld,
in the name of academic freedom, the right of
the school to refuse readmission of a nursing
student who had been enrolled on probation,
and who had failed her nursing subjects. These
instances notwithstanding, the Court has
emphasized that once a school has, in the name
of academic freedom, set its standards, these
should be meticulously observed and should
not be used to discriminate against certain
students.[40] After accepting them upon
enrollment, the school cannot renege on its
contractual obligation on grounds other than
those made known to, and accepted by,
students at the start of the school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint
alleges sufficient causes of action against
respondents, and that it should not have been
summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the
Court is not holding respondents liable for the
acts complained of. That will have to be ruled
upon in due course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED.
The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the
Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U7541. No costs.

SPOUSES GUANIO vs. Makati Shangrila-Hotel

Resort Inc.

For their wedding reception on July 28,

2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna
Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the
Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La
Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an
initial food tasting. Petitioners claim that they
requested the hotel to prepare for seven
persons the two of them, their respective
parents, and the wedding coordinator. At the
scheduled food tasting, however, respondent
prepared for only six.
Petitioners initially chose a set menu
which included black cod, king prawns and
angel hair pasta with wild mushroom sauce for
the main course which cost P1,000.00 per
person. They were, however, given an option in
which salmon, instead of king prawns, would be
in the menu at P950.00 per person. They in fact
partook of the salmon.
Three days before the event, a final food
tasting took place. Petitioners aver that the
salmon served was half the size of what they
were served during the initial food tasting; and
when queried about it, the hotel quoted a much
higher price (P1,200.00) for the size that was
initially served to them. The parties eventually
agreed on a final price P1,150 per person.
A day before the event or on July 27,
2001, the parties finalized and forged their
contract.[1]
Petitioners claim that during the
reception,
respondents
representatives,
Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales
Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite
their assurance that they would; their guests
complained of the delay in the service of the
dinner; certain items listed in the published
menu were unavailable; the hotels waiters
were rude and unapologetic when confronted
about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise
that there would be no charge for the extension
of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they
were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the
three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00
A.M. the next day.

Petitioners further claim that they brought

wine and liquor in accordance with their open
bar arrangement, but these were not served to
the guests who were forced to pay for their
drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to
the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.
(respondent) and received an apologetic reply
from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive
Assistant Manager in charge of Food and
Beverage. They
nevertheless
filed
a
complaint for breach of contract and
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofMakati City.
In its Answer, respondent claimed that
petitioners requested a combination of king
prawns and salmon, hence, the price was
increased to P1,200.00 per person, but
discounted at P1,150.00; that contrary to
petitioners claim, Marquez and Alvarez were
present during the event, albeit they were not
permanently stationed thereat as there were
three other hotel functions; that while there
was a delay in the service of the meals, the
same was occasioned by the sudden increase of
guests to 470 from the guaranteed expected
minimum number of guests of 350 to a
maximum of 380, as stated in the Banquet
Event Order (BEO);[2] and that Isaac Albacea,
Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed the
delay in the service of the meals to petitioner
Luigis father, Gil Guanio.
Respecting the belated service of meals to
some guests, respondent attributed it to the
insistence of petitioners wedding coordinator
that certain guests be served first.
On Svenssons letter, respondent, denying
it as an admission of liability, claimed that it was
meant to maintain goodwill to its customers.
By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch
148 of the Makati RTC rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering
the defendants to pay the plaintiff the
following:

1)

The amount of P350,000.00 by way of

actual damages;
2) The amount of P250,000.00 for and as
moral damages;
3) The amount of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
4) The amount of P100,000.00 for and as
attorneys fees.

courts decision, it holding that the proximate

cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected
increase in their guests:
x x x Hence, the alleged damage or
injury brought about by the confusion,
inconvenience and disarray during the
wedding reception may not be
attributed to
defendant-appellant
Shangri-la.

With costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

In finding for petitioners, the trial court

relied heavily on the letter of Svensson which is
partly quoted below:
Upon receiving your comments on our
service rendered during your reception
here with us, we are in fact, very
distressed. Right from minor issues
pappadums served in the soup instead
of the creutons, lack of valet parkers,
hard rolls being too hard till a major
one slow service, rude and arrogant
waiters, we have disappointed you in all
means.
Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do
that
the services
you
received
were unacceptable and definitely not
up to our standards. We understand
that it is our job to provide excellent
service and in this instance,we have
fallen short of your expectations. We
ask you please to accept our profound
apologies for causing such discomfort
and
annoyance. [4] (underscoring
supplied)

The trial court observed that from the

tenor of the letter . . . the defendant[-herein
respondent] admits that the services the
plaintiff[-herein petitioners] received were
unacceptable and definitely not up to their
standards.[5]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of July 27, 2009,[6] reversed the trial

We find that the said proximate

cause, which is entirely attributable to
plaintiffs-appellants, set the chain of
events which resulted in the alleged
inconveniences, to the plaintiffsappellants. Given the circumstances
that obtained, only the Sps. Guanio may
bear whatever consequential damages
that they may have allegedly
suffered.[7] (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration
having been denied by Resolution of November
18, 2009, the present petition for review was
filed.
The Court finds that since petitioners
complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of
proximate cause finds no application to it:
The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delicts,
not
in
actions
involving breach of contract. x x x The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability
to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such
a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function
of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.[8] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
What applies in the present case is
Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in
the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud,

negligence or delay, and those

who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.

RCPI v. Verchez, et al. [9] enlightens:

In culpa contractual x x x the
mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force
of contracts, will not permit a party to
be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the
tenor thereof. A breach upon the
contract confers upon the injured party
a valid cause for recovering that which
may have been lost or suffered. The
remedy serves to preserve the interests
of the promissee that may include
his expectation interest,which is his
interest in having the benefit of his
bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed, or
his reliance interest, which is his
interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract
not been made; or his restitution
interest, which is his interest in having
restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party. Indeed,
agreements can accomplish little, either
for their makers or for society, unless
they are made the basis for action. The
effect of every infraction is to create a
new duty, that is, to make
RECOMPENSE to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to
observe
his
contractual
obligation unless
he
can
show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of
his exercise of due diligence x x x or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to
excuse him from his ensuing liability.

(emphasis and underscoring in the

original; capitalization supplied)

The pertinent provisions of the Banquet

and Meeting Services Contract between the
parties read:
4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed
in accordance with the prescribed rate
for the minimum guaranteed number of
persons contracted for, regardless of
under attendance or non-appearance of
the expected number of guests, except
where the ENGAGER cancels the
Function in accordance with its Letter of
Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should
the attendance exceed the minimum
guaranteed attendance, the ENGAGER
shall also be billed at the actual rate per
cover in excess of the minimum
guaranteed attendance.
xxxx
4.5. The ENGAGER must inform
the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours
before the scheduled date and time of
the Function of any change in the
minimum guaranteed covers. In the
absence of such notice, paragraph 4.3
shall apply in the event of under
attendance. In
case
the
actual number of attendees exceed
the minimum guaranteed number by
ten percent (10%), the HOTEL
shall not in any way be held liable for
any damage or inconvenience which
may be caused thereby. The ENGAGER
shall also undertake to advise the
guests of the situation and take
positive steps to remedy the
same.[10] (emphasis,
italics
and
underscoring supplied)

Breach of contract is defined as the

failure without legal reason to comply with the
terms of a contract. It is also defined as the
[f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any
promise which forms the whole or part of the
contract.[11]

Q
The appellate court, and even the trial
court, observed that petitioners were remiss in
their obligation to inform respondent of the
change in the expected number of guests. The
observation is reflected in the records of the
case. Petitioners failure to discharge such
obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted
paragraph 4.5 of the parties contract provide,
respondent from liability for any damage or
inconvenience occasioned thereby.
As for petitioners claim that
respondent departed from its verbal agreement
with petitioners, the same fails, given that the
written contract which the parties entered into
the day before the event, being the law
between them.
Respecting the letter of Svensson on
which the trial court heavily relied as admission
of respondents liability but which the appellate
court brushed aside, the Court finds the
appellate courts stance in order. It is not
uncommon in the hotel industry to receive
comments, criticisms or feedback on the service
it delivers. It is also customary for hotel
management to try to smooth ruffled feathers
to preserve goodwill among its clientele.

You mentioned that the letter indicates an

acknowledgement of the concern and that
there was-the first letter there was an
acknowledgment of the concern and an
apology, not necessarily indicating that such or
admitting fault?
A

Yes.

Is this the letter that you are referring

to?
If I may, Your Honor, that was the letter
dated August 4, 2001, previously
marked as plaintiffs exhibits, Your
Honor. What is the procedure of the
hotel with respect to customer
concern?

Upon receipt of the concern from the

guest or client, we acknowledge receipt
of such concern, and as part of
procedure
in
service
industry
particularly Makati Shangri-la we
apologize for whatever inconvenience
but at the same time saying, that of
course, we would go through certain
investigation and get back to them for
the feedback with whatever concern
they may have.

Your Honor, I just like at this point mark

the exhibits, Your Honor, the letter
dated August 4, 2001 identified by the
witness, Your Honor, to be marked as
Exhibit 14 and the signature of Mr.
Krister Svensson be marked as Exhibit
14-A.[13]

Kalalo v. Luz holds:[12]

Statements which are
not estoppels nor judicial
admissions have no quality of
conclusiveness,
and
an
opponent whose admissions
have been offered against him
may offer any evidence which
serves as an explanation for his
former assertion of what he
now denies as a fact.

Respondents Catering Director,

Bea Marquez, explained the hotels
procedure on receiving and processing
complaints, viz:
ATTY. CALMA:

xxxx
Q

In your opinion, you just mentioned that

there is a procedure that the hotel
follows with respect to the complaint,
in your opinion was this procedure
followed in this particular concern?

Yes, maam.

What makes you say that this procedure

was followed?

As I mentioned earlier, we proved that

we did acknowledge the concern of the
client in this case and we did emphatize
from the client and apologized, and at
the same time got back to them in
whatever investigation we have.

You said that you apologized, what did

you apologize for?

Well, first of all it is a standard that we

apologize, right? Being in the service
industry, it is a practice that we
apologize
if
there
is
any
inconvenience, so the purpose for
apologizing is mainly to show empathy
and to ensure the client that we are
hearing them out and that we will do a
better investigation and it is not in any
way that we are admitting any
fault.[14] (underscoring supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanation

of the hotels Banquet Director overcomes any
presumption of admission of breach which
Svenssons letter might have conveyed.
The
exculpatory
clause
notwithstanding, the Court notes that
respondent could have managed the situation
better, it being held in high esteem in the hotel
and service industry. Given respondents vast
experience, it is safe to presume that this is not
its first encounter with booked events
exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not
audacious to expect that certain measures have
been placed in case this predicament crops up.
That regardless of these measures, respondent
still received complaints as in the present case,
does not amuse.
Respondent admitted that three hotel
functions coincided with petitioners reception.
To the Court, the delay in service might have
been avoided or minimized if respondent
exercised prescience in scheduling events. No
less than quality service should be delivered
especially in events which possibility of
repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not
expected to get married twice in their lifetimes.
In the present petition, under
considerations of equity, the Court deems it just
to award the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
nominal damages to petitioners, for the
discomfiture that they were subjected to during
to the event.[15] The Court recognizes that every
person is entitled to respect of his dignity,
personality,
privacy
and
peace
of

mind.[16] Respondents lack of prudence is an

affront to this right.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals
Decision
dated
July
27,
2009
is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in light
of the foregoing discussion, ORDERED to pay
the amount of P50,000.00 to petitioners by way
of nominal damages.
PADILLA vs. CA
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for
bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, appellant was charged
with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms punishable by reclusion
temporalmaximum to reclusion
perpetua. 1 Pending trial, appellant was released
on bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted as
charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of
17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He
appealed to public respondent Court of
Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming
his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his
bailbond and ordered his arrest for
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now
before us by way of a petition for review
on certiorari with an application for bail praying,
among others, to be allowed to post bail for his
temporary liberty. In his subsequent
pleading, 1 appellant moved for the separate
resolution of his bail application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant
is entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. 2 On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by
death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion. 3 Similarly,
if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of

discretion, except when any of the enumerated

circumstances 4 under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
But when the accused is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable byreclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of
guilt strong, bail shall be denied, 5 as it is neither
a matter of right nor of discretion. If the
evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a
matter of
right. 6
In People v. Nitcha 7, the Court, reiterating
established jurisprudence, there said:
. . . if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable byreclusion perpetua is convicted by
the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part
of the court. In such a situation, the court would
not have only determined that the evidence of
guilt is strong which would have been
sufficient to deny bail even before conviction
it would have likewise ruled that the accused's
guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Construing Section
3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en
banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People
v. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of
right even if he appeals the case to this Court
since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong. 8
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime
punishable byreclusion perpetua. Applying the
aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled
to bail as his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to
appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for
his bail application for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not evidence is strong
is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial
before the lower court and the appeal before

respondent court are more than sufficient in

accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is
designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,
moreover, is clear.
Thus:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition,
applies in this case. The circular unequivocably
provides that when an accused is charged with
a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled
and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's
application must, perforce, fail as he is no
longer entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to
accommodate his request for an X-ray and
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's
Hospital as follow-up examinations for his 1994
slipped-disc operation. It has been said that
while justice is the first virtue of the court, yet
admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence,
petitioner's request for the badly needed X-ray
and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid
Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as
certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves
attention. We recall that way back in 1946, we
allowed in Dela Rama v. People's Court, 9 a
precedent on which appellant now anchors his
application, a prisoner to be released on bail
when his continued detention would be
injurious to his health. This trend, however, has
changed with the development of times.
Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela
Rama's factual milieu. While appellant now

shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be

indifferent to his medical needs. And by
granting appellant's request, the Court is merely
performing its supervisory powers over
detainees to safeguard, among others, their
proper accommodation and health pursuant to
Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's
bailbond by public respondent court is
AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is
DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's request for
an X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke's
Hospital is GRANTED which should be
conducted at the first opportune time to be
arranged by the Director of the New Bilibid
Prison with the responsible officers of the
hospital, provided that appellant shall be at all
times subject to the security conditions
imposed by the prison's director. The
responsibility for the enforcement of the
subject request, as well as the security of the
appellant, devolves upon the Director of the
New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of the
medical examinations, appellant shall be
recommitted to prison without delay. As much
as possible, any unnecessary publicity should be
avoided.

PNCC vs. CA

FACTS: On 18 November 1985, private

respondents and petitioner entered into a
contract of lease of a parcel of land owned by
the former. The terms and conditions of said
contract of lease are as follows: a) the lease
shall be for a period of five (5) years which
begins upon the issuance of permit by the
Ministry of Human Settlement and renewable
at the option of the lessee under the terms and
conditions, b) the monthly rent is P20, 000.00
which shall be increased yearly by 5% based on
the monthly rate, c) the rent shall be paid yearly
in advance, and d) the property shall be used as
premises of a rock crushing plan.
On January 7, 1986, petitioner obtained permit
from the Ministry which was to be valid for two
(2) years unless revoked by the Ministry. Later,

respondent requested the payment of the first

annual rental. But petitioner alleged that the
payment of rental should commence on the
date of the issuance of the industrial clearance
not on the date of signing of the contract. It
then expressed its intention to terminate the
contract and decided to cancel the project due
to financial and technical difficulties. However,
petitioner refused to accede to respondents
request and reiterated their demand for the
payment of the first annual rental. But the
petitioner argued that it was only obligated to
pay P20, 000.00 as rental for one month
prompting private respondent to file an action
against the petitioner for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Pasig. The trial
court rendered decision in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner then appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals but the later affirmed the decision of
the trial court and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can avail of
the benefit of Article 1267 of the New Civil
Code.
RULING: NO. The petitioner cannot take refuge
of the said article. Article 1267 of the New Civil
Code provides that when the service has
become so difficult as to manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may
also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.
This article, which enunciates the doctrine of
unforeseen events, is not, however an absolute
application of the principle of rebus sic
stantibus, which would endanger the security of
contractual relations. The parties to the
contract must be presumed to have assumed
the risks of unfavorable developments. It is
therefore only in absolutely exceptional
chances of circumstances that equity demands
assistance for the debtor. The principle of rebus
sic stantibus neither fits in with the facts of the
case. Under this theory, the parties stipulate in
the light of certain prevailing conditions, and
once these conditions cease to exist, the
contract also ceases to exist.
In this case, petitioner averred that three (3)
abrupt change in the political climate of the
country after the EDSA Revolution and its poor
financial condition rendered the performance of

the lease contract impractical and inimical to

the corporate survival of the petitioner.
However, as held in Central Bank v. CA, mere
pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does
not discharge a contractual obligation, nor does
it constitute a defense of an action for specific
performance.
NPC vs. Heirs of Noble Casiano

FACTS
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension
electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts
traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon.
Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducing
their distance from the ground to only about 810 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who
were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As
early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon
made verbal and written requests for NPC to
institute safety measures to protect trail users
from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr.
Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the
Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional
poles, and they identified a possible rerouting
scheme to improve the distance from its
deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a
pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket
miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They
cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one pole
horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble
carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead
as they passed through the trail underneath the
NPC high-tension lines on their way to their
work place. As Noble was going uphill and
turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo
pole that he was carrying touched one of the
dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated
that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a
second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the
ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him,
but Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the
municipal health officer determined the cause
of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to
ventricular
fibulation,
secondary
to
electrocution. There was a small burned area in
the middle right finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site
confirmed that portions of the wires above the
trail hung very low. They noted that people

usually used the trail and had to pass directly

underneath the wires, and that the trail was the
only viable way since the other side was a
precipice. They did not see any danger warning
signs installed. After the GM of NPC was
informed of the incident, NPC repaired the
dangling lines and put up warning signs around
the area.
Nobles parents filed a claim for damages
against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in
maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that
signs were installed but they were stolen by
children, and that excavations were made to
increase the clearance from the ground but
some poles sank due to pocket mining in the
area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of
death could not have been electrocution since
Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC
argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it
was due to his own negligence.
RTC decided in favor of Nobles parents. RTC
observed that NPC witnesses were biased
because all but one were employees of NPC,
and they were not actually present at the time
of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since
the company has not acted upon the requests
and demands made by the community leaders
since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification
award of moral damages was reduced from
100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees was
disallowed since the reason for the award was
not expressly stated in the decision.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON there was contributory negligence on the
part of Noble. NO; hence, NPC is not entitled to
a mitigation of its liability.

RATIO
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence
when the partys act showed lack of ordinary
care and foresight that such act could cause

him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or

omission amounting to want of ordinary
care on
the
part
of
the
person
injured which, concurring with the defendants
negligence, is the proximate causeof the injury.
The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who
is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability will
be mitigated in consideration of the injured
partys contributory negligence.

Precedents + [non-]application to the case at

hand
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold
a person as having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs on an impending danger to
health and body. In this case, there were no
warning signs, and the trail was regularly used
by people since it was the only viable way from
Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be
faulted for simply doing what was ordinary
routine to other workers in the area.
NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket
mining, which is prohibited by DENR in the
area. In Aonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the
violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold
that the violation was the proximate cause of
the injury, unless the very injury that happened
was precisely what was intended to be
prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket
miners were unlicensed was not a justification
for NPC to leave their transmission lines
dangling.

Damages awarded
Nobles unearned income of 720k [loss of
earning capacity formula: Net Earning
Capacity = 2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x
(gross annual income reasonable and
necessary living expenses)]
Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is
gross negligence]
Moral damages of 50k

ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CA

Sought to be reversed in this petition is the

Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals'
First Division, setting aside the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte,
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
hereby set aside and another rendered
in its stead whereby defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs
actual damages of P30,229.45;
compensatory damages of P50,000.00;
exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the
costs of suit in both instances. (p. 27
Rollo)
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence
whereby both patties strive for the recognition
of their respective versions of the scenario from
which the disputed claims originate. The
respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized
the evidence of the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it
appears that in the evening of June 28
until the early morning of June 29, 1967
a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
consequent flooding in its wake.
Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June
29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated
and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede the deceased Isabel
Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen,
ventured out of the house of her son-inlaw, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded
northward towards the direction of the
Five Sisters Emporium, of which she
was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that
might have been damaged. Wading in
waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong,
a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery,
also owned by the deceased, and by
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at
the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned
by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked
side by side at a distance of between 5
and 6 meters behind the deceased,

Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay"

and quickly sank into the water. The
two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them from doing so because
on the spot where the deceased sank
they saw an electric wire dangling from
a post and moving in snake-like fashion
in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the
house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried
to go to the deceased, but at four
meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek
help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ
Cinema building which was four or five
blocks away.

INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on

Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he
turned right at the intersection of
Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric
wire about 30 meters long strung across
the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the
water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972)
Finding the Office of the INELCO still
closed, and seeing no lineman therein,
he returned to the NPC Compound.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by

Ernesto that his mother-in law had
been electrocuted, he acted
immediately. With his wife Jane,
together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros,
Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag
to request the police to ask the people
of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO to cut off the
electric current. Then the party waded
to the house on Guerrero Street. The
floodwater was receding and the lights
inside the house were out indicating
that the electric current had been cut
off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his
boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered
about two meters from an electric post.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out

of the compound again on another
inspection trip. Having learned of the
death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by
the house of the deceased at the corner
of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets
to which the body had been taken.
Using the resuscitator which was a
standard equipment in his jeep and
employing the skill he acquired from an
in service training on resuscitation, he
tried to revive the deceased. His efforts
proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting
in. On the left palm of the deceased,
Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound.
Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he
met two linemen on the way. He told
them about the grounded lines of the
INELCO In the afternoon of the same
day, he went on a third inspection trip
preparatory to the restoration of
power. The dangling wire he saw on
Guerrero early in the morning of June
29, 1967 was no longer there.

In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on

that fateful date, June 29, 1967,
Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric
Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in
their electric meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and
6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC
Compound on an inspection. On the
way, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground.
Since he could not see any INELCO
lineman, he decided to go to the

Many people came to the house at the

corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar
after learning that the deceased had
been electrocuted. Among the
sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro,
Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat,
Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the
relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro
examined the body at about 8:00 A.M.
on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish
or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which
indicated death by electrocution. On
the left palm, the doctor found an
"electrically charged wound" (Exh. C-1:
p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first
degree burn. About the base of the

thumb on the left hand was a burned

wound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.)
The certificate of death prepared by Dr.
Castro stated the cause of' death as
,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh.
I; p. 103, Ibid.).
In defense and exculpation, defendant
presented the testimonies of its officers
and employees, namely, Conrado Asis,
electric engineer; Loreto Abijero,
collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,
lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, presidentmanager of INELCO Through the
testimonies of these witnesses,
defendant sought to prove that on and
even before June 29, 1967 the electric
service system of the INELCO in the
whole franchise area, including Area
No. 9 which covered the residence of
Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero
Street, did not suffer from any defect
that might constitute a hazard to life
and property. The service lines, devices
and other INELCO equipment in Area
No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to
the date in question. As a public service
operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public,
defendant had installed safety devices
to prevent and avoid injuries to persons
and damage to property in case of
natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others. Defendant
had 12 linesmen charged with the duty
of making a round-the-clock check-up
of the areas respectively assigned to
them.
Defendant asserts that although a
strong typhoon struck the province of
Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting
to streets of Laoag City under water,
only a few known places in Laoag were
reported to have suffered damaged
electric lines, namely, at the southern
approach of the Marcos Bridge which
was washed away and where the
INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the
eastern part near the residence of the
late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the
far north near the defendant's power
plant at the corner of Segundo and

Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far

northwest side, near the premises of
the Ilocos Norte National High School.
Fabico Abijero, testified that in the early
morning before 6 o'clock on June 29,
1967 he passed by the intersection of
Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch off
the street lights in Area No. 9. He did
not see any cut or broken wires in or
near the vicinity. What he saw were
many people fishing out the body of
Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio
Briones was presented by the defense
to show that the deceased could not
have died of electrocution Substantially,
the testimony of the doctor is as
follows: Without an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not
even a medicolegal expert, can
speculate as to the real cause of death.
Cyanosis could not have been found in
the body of the deceased three hours
after her death, because cyanosis which
means lack of oxygen circulating in the
blood and rendering the color of the
skin purplish, appears only in a live
person. The presence of the elongated
burn in the left palm of the deceased
(Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to
establish her death by electrocution;
since burns caused by electricity are
more or less round in shape and with
points of entry and exit. Had the
deceased held the lethal wire for a long
time, the laceration in her palm would
have been bigger and the injury more
massive. (CA Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)
An action for damages in the aggregate amount
of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24,
1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p.
55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a
special defense, that the deceased could have
died simply either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable
only to herself and not to petitioner. In this
regard, it was pointed out that the deceased,
without petitioner's knowledge, caused the
installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting
a wire from the main house to the iron gate and

fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter

with electric current whenever the switch is on.
Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to
said burglar deterrent must have been left on,
hence, causing the deceased's electrocution
when she tried to open her gate that early
morning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, the
CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint but awarded to the
latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney's
fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA
which issued the controverted decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns
the following errors committed by the
respondent CA:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion
and error in considering the purely
hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto
de la Cruz as part of theres gestae.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion
and error in holding that the strong
typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag
City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967
and the flood and deluge it brought in
its wake were not fortuitous events and
did not exonerate petitioner-company
from liability for the death of Isabel Lao
Juan.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion and erred
in not applying the legal principle of
"assumption of risk" in the present case
to bar private respondents from
collecting damages from petitioner
company.
4. That the respondent Court of Appeals
gravely erred and abused its discretion
in completely reversing the findings of
fact of the trial court.
5. The findings of fact of the respondent
Court of Appeals are reversible under
the recognized exceptions.

6. The trial court did not err in awarding

moral damages and attorney's fees to
defendant corporation, now petitioner
company.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner
company may be held liable from the
death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, the
damages granted by respondent Court
of Appeals are improper and
exhorbitant. (Petitioners Memorandum,
p. 133, Rollo)
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1)
whether or not the deceased died of
electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner
may be held liable for the deceased's death;
and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's
substitution of the trial court's factual findings
for its own was proper.
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that
the same be resolved in the affirmative. By a
preponderance of evidence, private
respondents were able to show that the
deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion
which can be primarily derived from the
photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C1", "C-2") on the left palm of the former. Such
wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the
deceased had clutched a live wire of the
petitioner. This was corroborated by the
testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually
examined the body of the deceased a few hours
after the death and described the said burnt
wounds as a "first degree burn" (p. 144, TSN,
December 11, 1972) and that they were
"electrically charged" (p. 102, TSN, November
28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo
Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the
deceased screamed "Ay" and sank into the
water, they tried to render some help but were
overcome with fear by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from an electric post, moving in
the water in a snake-like fashion (supra). The
foregoing therefore justifies the respondent CA
in concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds
as described by the witnesses who saw them
can lead to no other conclusion than that they
were "burns," and there was nothing else in the
street where the victim was wading thru which
could cause a burn except the dangling live wire

of defendant company" (CA Decision, p. 22,

Rollo).
But in order to escape liability, petitioner
ventures into the theory that the deceased was
electrocuted, if such was really the case when
she tried to open her steel gate, which was
electrically charged by an electric wire she
herself caused to install to serve as a burglar
deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to
said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere
speculation, not backed up with evidence. As
required by the Rules, "each party must prove
his own affirmative allegations." (Rule 131, Sec.
1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted that
"during the trial, this theory was abandoned" by
the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo).
Furthermore the CA properly applied the
principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller,
and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl, were with
the deceased during that fateful
morning of June 29, 1967. This Court
has not been offered any sufficient
reason to discredit the testimonies of
these two young ladies. They were one
in the affirmation that the deceased,
while wading in the waist-deep flood on
Guerrero Street five or six meters ahead
of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. When they
approached the deceased to help, they
were stopped by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto
dela Cruz also tried to approach the
deceased, but he turned back shouting
that the water was grounded. These
bits of evidence carry much weight. For
the subject of the testimonies was a
startling occurrence, and the
declarations may be considered part of
the res gestae. (CA Decision, p. 21,
Rollo)
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence,
the following requisites must be present: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) that the statements
were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; (3) that the statements

made must concern the occurrence in question

and its immediately attending circumstances
(People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs.
Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any
abuse of discretion on the CA' part in view of
the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at
bar.
The statements made relative to the startling
occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely
as an exception to the hearsay rule on the
grounds of trustworthiness and necessity.
"Trustworthiness" because the statements are
made instinctively (Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala.
182), and "necessity" because such natural and
spontaneous utterances are more convincing
than the testimony of the same person on the
stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore,
the fact that the declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz,
was not presented to testify does not make the
testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida
Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part
of the res gestae. Similarly, We considered part
of the res gestae a conversation between two
accused immediately after commission of the
crime as overheard by a prosecution witness
(People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues
(vide petitioner's Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo),
Ernesto de la Cruz was not an actual witness to
the instant when the deceased sank into the
waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of
help of Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo
with the knowledge of, and immediately after,
the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling
event had not yet ceased when Ernesto de la
Cruz entered the scene considering that the
victim remained submerged. Under such a
circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of
mind characterized by nervous excitement had
been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's being as
anybody under the same contingency could
have experienced. As such, We cannot honestly
exclude his shouts that the water was grounded
from the res gestae just because he did not
actually see the sinking of the deceased nor
hear her scream "Ay."
Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a
mere opinion of Ernesto de la Cruz. While We
concede to the submission that the statement
must be one of facts rather than opinion, We

cannot agree to the proposition that the one

made by him was a mere opinion. On the
contrary, his shout was a translation of an
actuality as perceived by him through his sense
of touch.
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of
Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed
by the private respondents, thus, is presumed
to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e),
Rule 131. For the application of said Rule as
against a party to a case, it is necessary that the
evidence alleged to be suppressed is available
only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18
May 1955, 97 Phil. 953). The presumption does
not operate if the evidence in question is
equally available to both parties (StaplesHowe
Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil.
421). It is clear from the records that petitioner
could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the
witness stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo
Estavillo's suggestion to petitioner's counsel
when she testified on cross examination:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far
did he reach from the gate of the
house?
A. Well, you can ask that matter from
him sir because he is here. (TSN, p. 30,
26 Sept. 1972)
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the
opportunity to verify the declarations of
Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse to
private respondent, would have helped its case.
However, due to reasons known only to
petitioner, the opportunity was not taken.
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the
scales in the private respondents' favor. The
respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the
argument that petitioner be exonerated from
liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous
events. While it is true that typhoons and floods
are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's
death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place.
We subscribe to the conclusions of the
respondent CA when it found:

On the issue whether or not the

defendant incurred liability for the
electrocution and consequent death of
the late Isabel Lao Juan, defendant
called to the witness-stand its electrical
engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to
show exercise of extraordinary
diligence and to negate the charge of
negligence. The witnesses testified in a
general way about their duties and the
measures which
defendant usually adopts to prevent
hazards to life and limb. From these
testimonies, the lower court found
"that the electric lines and other
equipment of defendant corporation
were properly maintained by a welltrained team of lineman, technicians
and engineers working around the clock
to insure that these equipments were in
excellent condition at all times." (P. 40,
Record on Appeal) The finding of the
lower court, however, was based on
what the defendant's employees were
supposed to do, not on what they
actually did or failed to do on the
date in question, and not on the
occasion of
theemergency situation brought about
by the typhoon.
The lower court made a mistake in
assuming that defendant's employees
worked around the clock during the
occurrence of the typhoon on the night
of June 28 and until the early morning
of June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of
the National Power Corporation
affirmed that when he first set out on
an inspection trip between 6:00 and
6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw
grounded and disconnected electric
lines of the defendant but he saw
no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office
at the Life theatre on Rizal Street
was still closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24,
1972) Even the witnesses of defendant
contradict the finding of the lower
court. Conrado Asis, defendant's
electrical engineer, testified that he
conducted a general inspection of the
franchise area of the INELCO only
on June 30, 1967, the day following the

typhoon. The reason he gave for the

delay was that all their vehicles were
submerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973)
According to Asis, he arrived at his
office at 8:00 A.M. onJune 30 and after
briefing his men on what to do they
started out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two
days after the typhoon, the INELCO
people heard "rumors that someone
was electrocuted" so he sent one of his
men to the place but his man reported
back that there was no damaged wire.
(p. 385, Id.) Loreto Abijero, chief
lineman of defendant, corroborated
Engr. Juan. He testified that at about
8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr. Juan
came to the INELCO plant and asked the
INELCO people to inspect their lines. He
went with Engr. Juan and their
inspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28,
1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of
defendant, testified that at about 6:00
on June 29, 1967 the typhoon ceased.
At that time, he was at the main
building of the Divine Word College of
Laoag where he had taken his family for
refuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid.)
In times of calamities such as the one
which occurred in Laoag City on the
night of June 28 until the early hours of
June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence
requires a supplier of electricity to be
inconstant vigil to prevent or avoid any
probable incident that might imperil life
or limb. The evidence does not show
that defendant did that. On the
contrary, evidence discloses that there
were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area, nor even manning its
office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case,
petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public"...
considering that electricity is an agency, subtle
and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with
or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a
right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55

Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having

been shown, it may not now absolve itself from
liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act
of God combines or concurs with the negligence
of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria"
relied upon by petitioner finds no application in
the case at bar. It is imperative to note the
surrounding circumstances which impelled the
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by
Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept.
1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept.
1972), the deceased, accompanied by the
former two, were on their way to the latter's
grocery store "to see to it that the goods were
not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the
risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has
been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by
the consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or
when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts."
Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167).
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood,
was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore,
the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to petitioner's consent as
she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not
be barred from recovering damages as a result
of the death caused by petitioner's negligence
(ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused
its discretion in completely reversing the trial
court's findings of fact, pointing to the
testimonies of three of its employees its
electrical engineer, collector-inspector,
lineman, and president-manager to the effect

that it had exercised the degree of diligence

required of it in keeping its electric lines free
from defects that may imperil life and limb.
Likewise, the said employees of petitioner
categorically disowned the fatal wires as they
appear in two photographs taken on the
afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"),
suggesting that said wires were just hooked to
the electric post (petitioner's Memorandum, p.
170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held,
"(t)he finding of the lower court ... was based
on what the defendant's employees were
supposed to do, not on what they actually did
or failed to do on the date in question, and not
on the occasion of the emergency
situation brought about by the typhoon" (CA
Decision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found by the CA,
which We have already reiterated above,
petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like
manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the
several wires cannot stand the logical
conclusion reached by the CA when it held that
"(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the
witnesses who saw them can lead to no other
conclusion than that they were 'burns', and
there was nothing else in the street where the
victim was wading thru which could cause a
burn except the dangling live wire of defendant
company" (supra).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate
the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to
discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on
Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that
when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National
Power Corporation set out in the early morning
of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw
grounded and disconnected lines hanging from
posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO
lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO
office (vide, CA Decision, supra). The foregoing
shows that petitioner's duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence under the circumstance
was not observed, confirming the negligence of
petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
. . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag
were already alerted about the impending
typhoon, through radio announcements. Even
the fire department of the city announced the
coming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN,
March 13, 1975) At the INELCO irregularities in
the flow of electric current were noted because

"amperes of the switch volts were moving". And

yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to
wait for Engr. Juan to request that defendant's
switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked
why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he
"was not the machine tender of the electric
plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467468, Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross
inefficiency! (CA Decision, p. 26, Rollo)
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not
abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court's
findings but tediously considered the factual
circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to
review questions of fact raised from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, formerly
the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the
respondent CA awarded the following in private
respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual
damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death
and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000
in compensatory damages, computed in
accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey
Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of
P15,000 as average annual income of the
deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages;
P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except
for the award of P12,000 as compensation for
the victim's death, We affirm the respondent
CA's award for damages and attorney's fees.
Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs.
Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147
SCRA 381), We increase the said award of
P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total
actual damages to P48,229.45.
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's
fees awarded by the lower court was properly
made by the respondent CA, the charge of
malice and bad faith on the part of respondents
in instituting his case being a mere product of
wishful thinking and speculation. Award of
damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted
where the action was filed in good faith; there
should be no penalty on the right to litigate
(Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results
from a person's exercising his legal rights, it
is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA,
59 SCRA 110).

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the

respondent, except for the slight modification
that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Sanitary Steam Laundry Inc. vs. CA
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes
Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry
and a Cimarron which caused the death of three
persons and the injuries of several others. The accident
took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on
August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the
Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The
Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioners driver
to be responsible for the vehicular accident and
accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents
for P472,262.30 in damages and attorneys fees. Its
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. It
is here for a review of the appellate courts decision.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly
employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a
company project at Lian, Batangas. The other
passengers were family members and friends whom
they invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit
to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beach
until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back to
Manila.
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by
Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of
PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It
appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling
along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back
to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by
petitioners panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM,
which was traveling in the opposite direction. The
panel truck was on its way to petitioners plant in
Dasmarias, Cavite after delivering some linen to the
Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez,
claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly
stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid
hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the
opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with
the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez,
and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and
Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other
passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to
various hospitals.

On December 4, 1980, private respondents filed

this civil case for damages before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against petitioner.
On November 23, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, to which the case was transferred following the
reorganization of the judiciary, rendered judgment for
private respondents. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
It is for the reasons stated above that the court is
persuaded to award the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as proved in the trial as follows:
Actual or compensatory expenses:
a. Charito Estolano

P35,813.87 (Exh. J)

b. Nicanor Bernabe III

20,024.94

& Josefina C. Bernabe

c. Julieta, Ailyn &

45,830.45 (Exh. QQ)

Josefina Enriquez
and Josefina Valeiro
d. Leonor Macaspac

2,740.00

e. Victor Rey Ignacio

14,820.64 (Exh. EEE)

f. Rene Tablante

10,032.40 (Exh. QQQ)

g. Nenita Salonoy, widow;

20,000.00

and Manilyn, children

Moral damages should also be awarded as follows:
For the injuries sustained by:
a. Charito Estolano

P10,000.00 (Exh. F)

b. Julieta P. Enriquez

15,000.00 (Exh. MM)

c. Ailyn C. Enriquez

8,000.00 (Exh. NN)

d. Josefina R. Enriquez
e. Josefina P. Valerio

10,000.00 (Exh. OO)

2,000.00 (Exh. PP)

f. Nenita Salonoy

20,000.00 (Exh. DD)

g. Nicanor Bernabe III

8,000.00 (Exh. Q)

h. Josephine Bernabe

2,000.00 (Exh. R)

i. John Joseph Bernabe

10,000.00

j. Manilyn G. Salonoy

10,000.00 (Exh. EE)

k. Jack Salonoy

10,000.00 (Exh. JJ)

l. Leonor C. Macaspac

2,000.00 (Exh. AAA)

m. Victor Ignacio

8,000.00 (Exh. DDD)

n. Rene Tablanta

8,000.00 (Exh. FFF)

and finally the heirs of Jason Bernabe should be

awarded the sum of P50,000.00 for the latters
death. The heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be given
the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages and
unearned income.
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered in favor
of plaintiffs ordering defendant to pay the amounts
aforecited and to pay the further sum of P50,000.00 for
attorneys fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to which
the decision of the trial court was appealed, affirmed
the decision on January 26, 1995. Hence, this appeal.
First. Petitioner contends that the driver of the
Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and,
therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not totally
extinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron
was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations at
the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art.
2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be
negligent.
According to petitioner, the negligence consisted
of the following:
1. The Cimarron was overloaded because
there were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when
the passenger capacity of the vehicle was only 17.
2. The front seat of the Cimarron was
occupied by four adults, including the driver.

3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on

(its right headlight) as its left headlight was not
functioning.
Petitioner cites Art. III, 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
provides that No person operating any vehicle shall
allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
vehicle than its registered carry capacity and Art. IV,
3(e) which states that Every motor vehicle of more
than one meter of projected width, while in use on any
public highway shall bear two headlights... which not
later than one-half hour after sunset and until at least
one-half hour before sunrise and whenever weather
conditions so require, shall both be lighted.
Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck
encroached on a portion of the lane of the Cimarron
does not show that its driver was negligent. Petitioner
cites the case of Bayasen v. Court of Appeals,[1] which
allegedly held that the sudden swerving of a vehicle
caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not
negligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even if
petitioners swerving to the lane of respondents were
considered proof of negligence, this fact would not
negate the presumption of negligence on the part of
the other driver arising from his violations of traffic
rules and regulations.
Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling in Mckee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[2] in which a driver who
invaded the opposite lane and caused a collision
between his car and a truck coming from the opposite
lane, was exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear
chance, which states that a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in that case
should be applied to the present case. According to
petitioner, although the driver of the panel truck was
initially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had the
last opportunity to avoid the accident. However,
because of his negligence (i.e., the aforementioned
violations of traffic rules and regulations such as the use
of only one headlight at night and the overcrowding at
the front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to avoid a
collision with the panel truck.
We find the foregoing contention to be without
merit.
First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged
negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the
collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has

the burden of showing a causal connection between the

injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause
of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.[3] Petitioner says that driving an overloaded
vehicle with only one functioning headlight during
nighttime
certainly
increases
the
risk
of
accident,[4] that because the Cimarron had only one
headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the
fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded
decreased
*its+
maneuverability.[5] However, mere allegations such as
these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.

The panel truck drivers testimony is consistent

with the testimonies of private respondents that the
panel truck went out of control and simply smashed
into the Cimarron in which they were riding. Thus,
Nicanor Bernabe III testified:[7]

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case,

there was no way either driver could have avoided the
collision. The panel truck driver testified:[6]

A: Based on information I received, the light came

from the headlights of a certain panel owned by
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc.

Q. You stated you were following a jeepney along

the highway in Imus, Cavite, what happened
afterwards, if any?
A. The passenger jeepney I was following made a
sudden stop so I stepped on the brakes.
Q. Upon stepping on your brakes, what happened
if any?
A. The Mercedes Benz (panel) suddenly swerved to
the left, sir.

Q: And did you see how the accident happened?

A: I just saw a glare of light. That is all and then the
impact.
Q: Where did you see that glare of light?
A: Coming in front ahead of us.
Q: When you say ahead of you, was it . . . ?
A: Towards us.
....
Q: And from what did those glare of light come
from?

....
Q: You said that the lights were going towards
you. Now, at what pace did these lights come
toward you?
A: Fast pace.
Charito Estolano, another passenger who was
seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified that
they just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them. She
said:[8]

Q. How big was the swerving to the left?

A. The distance which my vehicle swerved beyond

the middle line or center line to the left was
about this distance, sir (witness demonstrating
by using both hands the distance).

Now, you said earlier that you were involved in

an accident. What was that accident?

An approaching vehicle hit us.

Now, why do you know that there was the

approaching vehicle?

There was a light which glared us and I knew

that it came from a vehicle. We were blinded.

Where was this vehicle headed for?

Headed for Cavite.

Coming from?

Coming from Manila, I think.

So that, actually, in relation to your vehicle, it

was coming from the opposite direction?

ATTY. ALILING:
Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot, Your Honor.
ATTY. GONZALES:
A little more, 1 1/2 feet.
ATTY. ALILING:
1 1/4 feet.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet.

Yes, sir.

Now, you said that the light headed towards

your vehicle. On which side of the highway was
your Tamaraw vehicle travelling at that time?

We were on the right lane.

Did you actually see this light from the vehicle

coming from the opposite direction heading
towards your vehicle?

Yes, sir.

And what happened after that?

After that, there was an impact.

All right. Will you tell the Court which bumped

which?

We were bumped by the vehicle which was

coming from the opposite direction.

The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of

the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped
the Cimarron. Hence, even if both headlights of the
Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped just
the same because the driver of the panel truck could
not stop despite the fact that he applied the
brakes. Petitioners contention that because of
decreased visibility, caused by the fact that the
Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its driver
failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in
fact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only
one headlight on. The police investigator did not state
in his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had
only one headlight on.
Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioners
contention that because of overcrowding in the front
seat of the Cimarron there was decreased
maneuverability which prevented the Cimarron driver
from avoiding the panel truck. There is absolutely no
basis for this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies
of the passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito
Estolano, who was seated in front, which suggest that
the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the
vehicle. To the contrary, from the testimony of some of
the witnesses,[9] it appears that the driver of the
Cimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of the
emergency created by the speeding panel truck coming
from the opposite direction he was not able to fully
move his Cimarron away from the path of the oncoming
vehicle. We are convinced that no maneuvering
which the Cimarron driver could have done would have
avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the

suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in

the front seat was immaterial.
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of petitioners
driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of
petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean
not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle
at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the
passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
Petitioners driver claimed that the distance
between the panel truck and the passenger jeepney in
front was about 12 meters.[10] If this was so, he would
have had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a
stop. It is very probable that the driver did not really
apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid
marks) but that finding the jeepney in front of him to be
in close proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it by
swerving his vehicle to the left. In the process,
however, he invaded a portion of the opposite lane and
consequently hit the Cimarron. Indeed, the panel truck
driver testified that his vehicle was running at the speed
of 60 miles per hour.[11] He tried to correct himself when
asked by petitioners counsel whether the panel truck
speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying
that the speedometer measured kilometers and not
miles, but on cross examination his testimony got
muddled.[12]
Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60
miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per
hour) or 60 kilometers per hour, the fact remains that
the panel truck was overspeeding because the
maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses on open
country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour.[13]
The case of Bayasen, which petitioner invokes,
cannot apply to this case. There was no swerving of the
vehicle in that case but skidding, and it was caused
by the fact that the road was wet and slippery. In this
case, the road was dry and safe. There was no reason
for the vehicle to swerve because of road
condition. The only explanation for this occurrence was
human error.
Petitioners reliance on the McKee case is also
misplaced. In that case, the driver of the vehicle at
fault, a truck, had an opportunity to avoid the collision
but he ignored the signals from the other vehicle, a car,
to slow down and allow it to safely pass the bridge. In
this case, there was no such opportunity given the
Cimarron on the night of the mishap. Everything
happened so quickly that before the passengers of the

Cimarron knew it, the vehicle had been bumped by the

truck.
Second. On its liability as employer of the
negligent driver, petitioner contends that the nonsubmission of the NBI clearance and police clearance of
its driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. It argues that there is
no law requiring employees to submit NBI and police
clearance prior to their employment. Hence,
petitioners failure to require submission of these
documents does not mean that it did not exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. On the other hand, it asserts that its
employment of Herman Hernandez as a driver means
that he had passed the screening tests of the company,
including submission of the aforementioned
documents. Petitioner maintains that the presumption
is that the said driver submitted NBI and police
clearance.
Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of
Appeals position that it failed to exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees by not
requiring its prospective employees to undergo
psychological and physical tests before employment has
no basis in law because there is no law requiring such
tests prior to hiring employees.
The petitioners contention has no merit. The
Court of Appeals did not say that petitioners failure to
submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof
that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection of its employees. What the Court of Appeals
said was that petitioners policy of requiring prospective
employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to
have at least two (2) years experience as driver prior to
employment was not enough to prove the exercise of
due diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed
to prove by its failure to present the drivers NBI and
police records during the trial.
With respect to the requirement of passing
psychological and physical tests prior to his
employment, although no law requires it, such
circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of
the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said:[14]
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and
emotional, were conducted on their would-be
employees. No on-the-job training and seminars
reminding employees, especially drivers, of road
courtesies and road rules and regulations were
done. There were no instructions given to defendants

drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor

what to do after an emergency occurs. There was even
failure on the part of defendant to present its
concerned employees 204 file. All these could only
mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the
diligence required of it of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses.[15] Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert
extra care in the selection and supervision of their
employees. They must go beyond the minimum
requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista,
the office manager of petitioner in its Dasmarias plant,
said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job
applicants to submit clearances from the police and the
NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver
they are required to have at least two (2) years driving
experience and to be holders of a professional drivers
license for at least two years. But the supposed
company policies on employment were not in
writing. Nor did Bautista show in what manner he
supervised the drivers to ensure that they drove their
vehicles in a safe way.
Third. With respect to the question of damages,
we find no reversible error committed in the award of
actual damages to private respondents. To justify an
award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.[16] Here, the actual damages claimed by private
respondents were duly supported by receipts and
appear to have been really incurred.
As to the moral damages awarded, we find them to
be reasonable and necessary in view of the
circumstances of this case. Moral damages are
awarded to allow the victims to obtain means,
diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral
suffering they had undergone due to the defendants
culpable action.[17] In this case, private respondents
doubtless suffered some ordeal because some of them
lost their loved ones, while others lost their
future. Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the Civil
Code, they suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award of
moral damages in their favor is thus justified.
The award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jason
Bernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordance
with law.[18] However, the award of P100,000 to the
heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decision
of the trial court as moral damages and unearned

income cannot be upheld. The heirs were already

included
among
those
awarded
moral
damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be
paid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother
Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. The
amount of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily
for loss of earning capacity but even then the amount
must be modified. In accordance with our cases[19] on
this question, the formula for determining the life
expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by
applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the
age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age
at the time of his death, as stated in his death
certificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or
up to 68 years old.
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the
time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more
than P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so
that
his
annual
gross
earnings
was
about P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50% should
be deducted as reasonable and necessary living
expenses because it seems his wife occasionally finds
work and thus helps in the household expenses.
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity
was P124,300.00 computed as follows:[20]
net earning
life
capacity (x) = expectancy x [Gross annual
income less
reasonable & necessary living
expenses]
x

[2 (80-46)]
3
=

22.6

P124,300.00

[P11,000 - P5,500]

5,500

In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should

be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
Finally, the award of attorneys fees should be
disallowed as the trial court did not give
any justification for granting it in its decision. It is now
settled that awards of attorneys fees must be based on
findings of fact and law, stated in the decision of the
trial court.[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED in the sense that the award of P100,000.00
denominated for moral damages and unearned
income is deleted, and in lieu thereof the amount

ofP124,300.00 for loss of earning capacity and the

further amount of P50,000.00 for death indemnity are
awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy and the
award of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees is
disallowed. In all other respects the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED.
TISON AND JABON vs. SPOUSES POMASIN
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a
jitney,[1] figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12
August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the
jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the
tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was
traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.[2]
The opposing parties gave two different
versions of the incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father,
was on board the jitney and seated on the passengers
side. He testified that while the jitney was passing
through a curve going downward, he saw a tractortrailer coming from the opposite direction and
encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by
the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing
death and injuries to its passengers.[3]
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while
he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on
the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the
road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner
and heading towards the direction of the truck. To
avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractortrailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks
of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left
fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few
meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise
damaged.[4]
Multiple death and injuries to those in the
jitney resulted.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay
Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea
Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and
Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His other
daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter
Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the
hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another
granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce,
Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista,

Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries.[5] On

the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the
tractor-trailer were injured.[6]
Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck,
extended financial assistance to respondents by giving
them P1,000.00 each immediately after the accident
and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of
Gregorios daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an
Affidavit of Desistance.
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence,
imprudence
and
carelessness
of
petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification
for the heirs of those who perished in the accident
at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00 for hospitalization,
medical and burial expenses; P350,000.00 for
continuous hospitalization and medical expenses of
Spouses
Pomasin;P1,000,000.00
as
moral
damages; P250,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; P30,000.00 for loss of income of
Cynthia; P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P1,000.00
per court appearance; P50,000.00 for litigation
expenses; and cost of suit.[7]
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it
was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the
accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was
authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an
amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of
Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners
complained that respondents filed the instant
complaint to harass them and profit from the
recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed for
damages.

plaintiffs have authorized Cynthia Pomasin to settle the

case amicably for P200,000.00; and that the proximate
cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or
negligence of defendants driver/employee but from
plaintiffs driver.[9]
The trial court considered the testimony of
Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and
reliable than that of Gregorios, a mere passenger,
whose observation and attention to the road is not as
focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded
that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the
tractor-trailer. The trial court likewise upheld the
Affidavit of Desistance as having been executed with
the tacit consent of respondents.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon
caused the vehicular collision. In support of such
finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Gregorios testimony that Jabon was driving the tractortrailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of
the jitney. Based on the gravity of the impact and the
damage caused to the jitney resulting in the death of
some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that
Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court noted
that the restriction in Jabons drivers license was
violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he
was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was
likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove
due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as
driver of the truck. Finally, the appellate court
disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by
Cynthia because the latter had no written power of
attorney from respondents and that she was so
confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that
she did not read its content.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint in view of the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by Cynthia. The motion was
denied for lack of merit.[8]
On 7 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing
the complaint for damages, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendants and against plaintiffs hereby
DISMISSING the instant complaint considering that

states:
WHEREFORE,
the
present
appeal is granted, and the trial courts
Decision dated February 7, 2003 is set
aside. Defendants-appellees
are
ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants or
their heirs the following:

a)
Actual
damages
of P136,000.00 as above computed, to

be offset with the P200,000.00 received

by plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin;

court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of

the case and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts
set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but
are contradicted by the evidence on record.[13]

b) Civil indemnity of P50,000.00

for the death of each victim, to be
offset with the balance of P64,000.00
from the aforementioned P200,000.00
of civil indemnity received by plaintiffappellant Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, the
net amount is computed at P37,200.00
each, as follows:
Narcisa
Pomasin

P37,200.00
Laarni

Pomasin

P37,200.00
Andrea

Pagunsan

The exceptions to the rule underscore the

substance and weight of the findings of the trial
court. They render inconclusive contrary findings by the
appellate court. The reason is now a fundamental
principle:

P.
P37,200.00

Dionisio
Perol

P37,200.00
Annie

Pagunsan

Jane
P37,200.00

P.

c)
Moral
damages
of P50,000.00 to each of the victims;
and
d) Attorneys fees of 10% of the total award.[10]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution[11] dated 19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact
and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by
the trial court: Who is the negligent party or the party
at fault?
[12]

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. And

the rule, and the exceptions, is that factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but may
be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of
Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate

[A]ppellate courts do not disturb the

findings of the trial courts with regard
to the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses. The reason for this is that
trial courts have the unique
opportunity to observe the witneses
first hand and note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial
courts findings of facts and conclusions are not
supported by the evidence on record, or when certain
facts of substance and value, likely to change the
outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial
court, or when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[14]
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more
pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which,
according to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff.[15] These requisites must be proved by a
preponderance
of
evidence.[16] The
claimants,

respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish

their claim or cause of action by preponderance of
evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it.[17]
The trial court found that the jitney driver was
negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than
the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court
that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the
vehicular collision.
One reason why the trial court found credible
the version of Jabon was because his concentration as
driver is more focused than that of a mere
passenger. The trial court expounded, thus:
In the appreciation of the
testimony of eye-witnesses, one
overriding consideration is their
opportunity for observation in getting
to know or actually seeing or observing
the matter they testify to. This most
particularly holds true in vehicular
collision or accident cases which
oftentimes happen merely momentarily
or in the split of a second. In the case
of a running or travelling vehicle,
especially in highway travel which
doubtless involves faster speed than in
ordinary
roads, the driver is
concentrated
on
his
driving
continuously from moment to moment
even in long trips. While in the case of
a mere passenger, he does not have to
direct his attention to the safe conduct
of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he
may converse with other passengers
and pay no attention to the driving or
safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as
he may even doze off to sleep if he
wants to, rendering his opportunity for
observation on the precise cause of the
accident or collision or immediately
preceding thereto not as much as that
of the driver whose attention is
continuously focused on his driving. So
that as between the respective versions
of the plaintiffs thru their passenger
and that of the defendants thru their
driver as to the cause or antecedent
causes that led to the vehicular collision
in this case, the version of the driver of

defendant should ordinarily be more

reliable than the version of a mere
passenger of Plaintiffs vehicle, simply
because the attention of the passenger
is not as much concentrated on the
driving as that of the driver,
consequently
the
capacity
for
observation of the latter of the latter on
the matter testified to which is the
precise point of inquiry --- the
proximate cause of the accident --- is
more reasonably reliable. Moreover,
the passengers vision is not as good as
that of the driver from the vantage
point of the drivers seat especially in
nighttime, thus rendering a passengers
opportunity for observation on the
antecedent causes of the collision lesser
than that of the driver. This being so,
this Court is more inclined to believe
the story of defendants driver Claudio
Jabon that the jitney driven by Laarni
Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the
curved road causing it to run thereafter
in a zigzag manner and in the process
the two vehicles approaching each
other from opposite directions at
highway speed came in contact with
each other, the zigzagging jeep hitting
the left fender of the truck all the way
to the fuel tank, the violent impact
resulting in the lighter vehicle, the
jitney, being thrown away due to the
disparate size of the truck.[18]
The appellate court labelled the trial courts
rationalization as a sweeping conjecture[19] and
countered that Gregorio was actually occupying the
front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view of
the incident despite the fact that he was not driving.
While it is logical that a drivers attention to the
road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger,
it should also be considered that the logic will hold only
if the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a
general rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow that
between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a
passenger, the former is more credible. The factual
setting of the event testified on must certainly be
considered.
The trial court did just that in the instant
case. Contrary to the observation of the Court of

Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and a

passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of analysis
of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabons alleged
vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial
court also took into consideration Gregorios admission
that prior to the accident, the jitney was running on the
curving and downward portion of the highway. The
appellate court, however, took into account the other
and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their
jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to
reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very
fast and encroaching the jitneys lane.
We perused the transcript of stenographic
notes and found that the truck was actually ascending
the highway when it collided with the descending
jitney.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Could you please tell the Court

what was your speed at the
time when you saw that
jeepney with top[-]load running
on a zigzag manner?

A:

I was running 35 to 40 kilometers

per
hour
because
I
was ascending plain. (Emphasis
supplied).[20]

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed

that he was ascending, viz:

During the direct examination, Jabon narrated

that the tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35
to 40 kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the
opposite lane running in a zigzag manner, thus:

Q:

Could you please describe the

condition in the area at the
time of the incident, was it dark
or day time?

A:

It was still bright.

COURT: But it was not approaching

sunset?
Q:
Now, when you passed by the
municipality of Polangui, Albay at about
5:00 of August 12, 1994, could you tell
the Court if there was any untoward
incident that happened?
A:

There was sir.

Q:

Could you please tell the Court?

A:

While on my way to Liboro

coming from Sorsogon, I met on
my way a vehicle going on a
zigzag direction and it even fell
on the shoulder and proceeded
going on its way on a zigzag
direction.

Q:
Could you describe to the Court
what was the kind of vehicle you saw
running in zigzag direction?
A:
A Toyota-jitney loaded
passengers with top-load.

with

Q:
You said that the top[-]load of
the jeep is loaded?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Was there any rain at that time?

A:

None sir.

Q:

So the road was dry?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:
You said you were ascending
towards the direction of Liboro,
Camarines Sur, is that correct at the
time the incident happened?
A:

Yes sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied).

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his

direct examination described the road condition where
the collision took place as curving and downward,
thus:
Q:
Could you please describe the
place where the incident happened in
so far as the road condition is
concerned?

A:
The road was curving and
downward.
Q:
And the road was of course clear
from traffic, is that correct?
A:

Yes sir.

Q:
And practically, your jitney was
the only car running at that time?
A:
supplied)

Yes

Going downward, the jitney had the tendency

to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can
result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains
why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the
tractor-trailer.

sir.[22] (Emphasis

Significantly, this is a confirmation of the

testimony of Jabon.
However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around
and stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw
the tractor-trailer running down very fact and
encroaching on their lane, to wit:
Q:

downward.[25] It is this conclusion, prodded by the

inconsistency of Gregorios testimony, that gives
credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the
herein respondents jitney, loaded with passengers
with top-load was running in a zigzag manner.[26]

Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the

trailer truck that collided with your
owner jeepney that you were riding
testified in open Court on July 24, 1997
which I quote, while on my way to
Liboro coming to Sorsogon I met a
vehicle going on a zig-zag direction and
it even fell on the shoulder and
proceeded going on its way on zig-zag
direction, what can you say about this
statement of this witness?

A:
We were no[t] zigzagging but because we
were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we
saw the on-coming vehicle going down very fast and
encroaching on our lane so our driver swerved our
vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the oncoming vehicle.[23] (Emphasis supplied).
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the
road condition was straightforward and consistent. The
recollection of Gregorio veered from curving and
downward to uphill.[24] On this point, Jabon and his
testimony is more credible.
The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road
shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial courts
conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill
which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of
Gregorio that the road was curving and

There was no showing that the tractor-trailer

was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence
that
the
tractor-trailer
was
in
fact
ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the
tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of
a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a
zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In
hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have
swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging
before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents,
though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in
this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and
space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer
uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming
downhill.
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter,
Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time
of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the
truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers
license, i.e.,restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact,
Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to
reinstate his articulated license containing restriction
code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractortrailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that
Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of
the collision.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of
traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,
the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time
of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic
regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[27] we held that a causal connection
must exist between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven

that the violation of the traffic regulation was the

proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially
contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.[28] Likewise controlling is our ruling
in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals[29] where we reiterated
that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation
of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing
liability
for
damages. In
said
case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt
to establish a causal connection between the safety
violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the
accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
presumption that these violations in themselves
sufficiently established negligence appreciable against
the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and
the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclists
own liability.[30] We took the occasion to state that.
The rule on negligence per se must admit
qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging
liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from
the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not
be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact
there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law,
while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid
rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation
for the harm suffered by those whose interests have
been invaded owing to the conduct of other.[31]
In the instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer drivers
restrictions on his license to the vehicular
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently
explain that the Land Transportation Office merely
erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.
Petitioners presented the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by Cynthia to exonerate them from
any liability. An affidavit of desistance is usually
frowned upon by courts. Little or no persuasive value is
often attached to a desistance.[32] The subject affidavit
does not deserve a second look more so that it appears

that Cynthia was not armed with a special power of

attorney to enter into a settlement with petitioners. At
any rate, it is an exercise of futility to delve into the
effects of the affidavit of desistance executed by one of
the respondents since it has already been established
that petitioners are not negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 943418 lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 74, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RAMOS vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner
can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount
of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a vehicular
collision.
The facts, as found by the
appellate court, are as follows:
On or about 10:40 oclock in the
morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan
(Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda (Street),
Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place
between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate
Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L.
Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
(Aquilino), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x
x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo (Rodel), with Plate Number LSR
917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela
Maliwat (Estela) sustained injuries. She was
immediately rushed to the hospital for
treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver,
Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car
at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour
along Rajah Matanda Street and has just
crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue
when (Ramos) Ford Espedition violently
rammed against the cars right rear door and
fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan
turned 180 degrees towards the direction
where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable

cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford

Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property. In the meantime,
petitioner
demanded from
respondent
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela
in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The
demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L.
Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based
on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and
subsequently raffled to Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos)
denied liability for damages insisting that it was
the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys)
driver, which was the proximate cause of the
accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan
car
crossed Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers
placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection.
(Ramos) further claimed that he
was not in the vehicle when the mishap
occurred. He asserted that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision
of his driver, Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the
parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated
1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) from
liability, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant case
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Counterclaims of the defendant are
likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
The aforesaid judgment did not
sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he
(sic) appealed the same before the RTC
of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215,
which rendered the assailed Decision
dated 5 September 2006, affirming the
MeTCs Decision. (C.O.L. Realtys)
Motion for Reconsideration met the

same fate as it was denied by the RTC in

its Order dated 5 June 2007.
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in
crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah
Matanda
Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated
November 30, 2004, such act is specifically
prohibited. Thus:
This is to certify that as per records found and
available in this office the crossing of vehicles
at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to
Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon Cityhas (sic) not
allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view
of the ongoing road construction at the
area.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along the
intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda
Street in order to prevent motorists from
crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino
crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of
the barricade which were broken, thus violating the
MMDA rule.[3]
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted
that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle was
moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the
subject of an ongoing construction (the Katipunan
Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed
into the rear door and fender of the passengers side of
Aquilinos car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree
turn.[4] It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of
contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition
at high speed along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision,[5] the dispositive portion
of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated 5 September 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent Lambert Ramos is held
solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to
pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation
the amount of P51,994.80 as actual
damages. Petitioner C.O.L. Realty
Corporations claim for exemplary

damages, attorneys fees and cost of

suit are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which
raises the following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME IS
INSUFFICIENT.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
There is no doubt in the appellate courts mind
that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition
against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street was theproximate cause of the accident.
Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to
the instant petition, it even conceded that petitioner
was guilty of mere contributory negligence.[6]
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
The Certification dated
30
November 2004 of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realtys)
barefaced assertion that its driver,
Aquilino, was not to be blamed for the
accident
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that as per
records found and available in this
office the crossing of vehicles
at Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah
Matanda
Street to
Blue
Ridge
Subdivision, Quezon Cityhas (sic) not
allowed since January 2004 up to the
present in view of the ongoing road
construction at the area.
This certification is issued upon
request of the interested parties for
whatever legal purpose it may serve.
(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that
there were barricades along the
intersection
of Katipunan

Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street. The

barricades were placed thereon to
caution drivers not to pass through the
intersecting roads. This prohibition
stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty)
claimed, the barriers were broken at
that point creating a small gap through
which any vehicle could pass. What is
clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly
ignored these barricades and drove
through it. Without doubt, his
negligence is established by the fact
that he violated a traffic regulation. This
finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil
Code
Unless there is proof
to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
Accordingly, there ought to be
no question on (C.O.L. Realtys)
negligence which resulted in the
vehicular mishap.[7]

However, it also declared Ramos liable

vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in
driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy
intersection. On this score, the appellate court made
the following pronouncement:
As a professional driver, Rodel
should have known that driving his
vehicle at a high speed in a major
thoroughfare which was then subject of
an on-going construction was a perilous
act. He had no regard to (sic) the safety
of other vehicles on the road. Because
of the impact of the collision,
(Aquilinos) sedan made a 180-degree
turn as (Ramos) Ford Expedition
careened and smashed into its rear
door and fender. We cannot exculpate
Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the
contributory negligence of Rodel, this

created a presumption of negligence on

the part of his employer, (Ramos). For
the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the
presumption by presenting adequate
and convincing proof that in the
selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care
and diligence of a good father of a
family. Employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence,
that they complied with everything that
was incumbent on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to
escape vicarious liability by averring
that Rodel was highly recommended
when he applied for the position of
family driver by the Social Service
Committee of his parish. A certain
Ramon Gomez, a member of the
churchs livelihood program, testified
that a background investigation would
have to be made before an applicant is
recommended to the parishioners for
employment. (Ramos) supposedly
tested Rodels driving skills before
accepting him for the job. Rodel has
been his driver since 2001, and except
for the mishap in 2004, he has not been
involved in any road accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos) evidence
which consisted mainly of testimonial
evidence remained unsubstantiated
and are thus, barren of significant
weight. There is nothing on the records
which would support (Ramos) bare
allegation
of
Rodels
10-year
unblemished driving record. He failed to
present convincing proof that he went
to the extent of verifying Rodels
qualifications, safety record, and driving
history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother
to refute (C.O.L. Realtys) stance that his
driver was texting with his cellphone
while running at a high speed and that
the latter did not slow down albeit he
knew that Katipunan Avenue was then
undergoing repairs and that the road

was barricaded with barriers. The

presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence in the selection of driver
remains unrebutted. As the employer of
Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for the
quasi-delict committed by the former.
Certainly, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service
records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must
formulate
standard
operating
procedures,
monitor
their
implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. These,
(Ramos) failed to do.[8]
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since
Aquilinos willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then
respondent alone should suffer the consequences of
the accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:
20.
It becomes apparent
therefore that the only time a plaintiff,
the respondent herein, can recover
damages is if its negligence was only
contributory, and such contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident. It has been clearly
established in this case, however, that
respondents negligence was not
merely contributory, but the sole
proximate cause of the accident.
xxxx
22.
As culled from the foregoing,
respondent was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. Respondents
vehicle should not have been in that
position since crossing the said
intersection was prohibited. Were it
not for the obvious negligence of
respondents driver in crossing the
intersection that was prohibited, the
accident would not have happened.
The crossing of respondents vehicle in
a
prohibited
intersection
unquestionably produced the injury,
and without which the accident would

not have occurred. On the other hand,

petitioners driver had the right to be
where he was at the time of the
mishap. As correctly concluded by the
RTC, the petitioners driver could not
be expected to slacken his speed while
travelling along said intersection since
nobody, in his right mind, would do
the same. Assuming, however, that
petitioners driver was indeed guilty of
any contributory negligence, such was
not the proximate cause of the
accident considering that again, if
respondents driver did not cross the
prohibited intersection, no accident
would have happened. No imputation
of any lack of care on Ilustrisimos
could thus be concluded. It is obvious
then that petitioners driver was not
guilty of any negligence that would
make petitioner vicariously liable for
damages.
23.
As the sole proximate cause of the
accident was respondents own driver, respondent
cannot claim damages from petitioner.[9]
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment
merely reiterated the appellate courts findings and
pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of
mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his
vicarious liability as Rodels employer under Article
2184 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article
2179. When
the
plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendants lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a

third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superiors action against the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is
made.[10]
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the
instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence
because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the
proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any
recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from
the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.[11]
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition
against
crossing Katipunan
Avenue from
Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA
prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where
the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since
such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the
busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction
of
the
Katipunan-Boni
Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs
own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the

issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event
that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it
will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory
negligence in this case would benefit only the
petitioner; it could not eliminate respondents liability
for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result
of the accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13,
2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006 dismissing for lack
of merit respondents complaint for damages is
hereby REINSTATED.
ACHEVARA vs. RAMOS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the
Decision dated April 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, and its Resolution dated October
23, 2006, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, dated February 14, 2000,
holding petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for
damages incurred due to a vehicular accident, which
resulted in the death of Arnulfo Ramos.
The facts are as follows:
On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and her
two minor children, namely, John Arnel Ramos and
Khristine Camille Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur
a Complaint2for damages under Article 21763 of the Civil
Code against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo
Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo
Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two
children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April
22, 1995 at the national highway
along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia
Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger
jeep with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved in the
vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as
the husband of the operator and as the administrator of

the conjugal partnership properties of the Spouses

Achevara.
In their Complaint,4 respondents alleged that in the
morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a
passenger jeep heading north on the national highway
in BarangayTablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless,
careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a
motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on
the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle
driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by
Arnulfo Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding
prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that
Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as
driver of the passenger jeep. Respondents sought to
recover actual damages for medical expenses in the
sum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in the sum
of P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary
damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
In their Answer,5 petitioners denied respondents'
allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle
and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They
alleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was
driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an
owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading
north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on
the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez
drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the
road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep
continued to move toward the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and
negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well
knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had
no cause of action against petitioners.
During trial on the merits, respondents presented three
witnesses: Alfredo Gamera, Dr. Emilio Joven and Elvira
Ramos.
Alfredo Gamera testified that at about 10:00 a.m. of
April 22, 1995, he and his wife were seated at the
waiting shed along the national highway in Tablac,
Candon, Ilocos Sur, waiting for a ride to the town proper
of Candon. He saw a motorcycle, driven by Police
Officer 3 (PO3) Baltazar de Peralta, coming from the
interior part of Tablac and proceeding south toward the
town proper. He also saw a southbound passenger jeep,
driven by Benigno Valdez, that wanted to overtake the
motorcycle of PO3 De Peralta. As it tried to overtake the

motorcycle, the passenger jeep encroached on the lane

of the northbound owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo
Ramos, which resulted in the collision. Gamera stated
that the point of impact was on the lane of the vehicle
of Arnulfo Ramos. Thereafter, the passenger jeep
screeched to a halt at the fence of the Funtanilla family.
The owner-type jeep was destroyed and the windshield
was broken.6
Gamera testified that he was about 100 meters from
the place where the vehicular accident occurred. The
speed of the passenger jeep was about 70 kilometers
per hour, while that of the owner-type jeep was about
30 kilometers per hour.7

Petitioners presented six witnesses, namely, PO3

Baltazar de Peralta, Special Police Officer 2 (SPO2)
Marvin Valdez, Herminigildo Pagaduan, Benigno Valdez,
Emilia Achevara and Alfredo Achevara.
PO3 Baltazar de Peralta stated that he was assigned to
Santiago, Ilocos Sur. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m.
of April 22, 1995, he was on board his motorcycle at the
waiting shed erected on the eastern side of the national
highway in Tablac, Ilocos Sur. He was about to go
southward, but waited a while to let a southbound
passenger jeep pass by. Then he followed behind the
passenger jeep.

On cross-examination, it was found that Gamera went

to the Police Station in Candon, Ilocos Sur to execute his
sworn statement only on May 30, 1992, one month
after the incident and after respondent Elvira Ramos
talked to him. Moreover, at the preliminary
investigation, Gamera did not mention in his sworn
statement that his wife was present during the incident,
which fact was admitted by respondent's counsel.
Further, at that time, Gamera was working as
a jueteng collector at the same joint where the
deceased Arnulfo Ramos was also employed, and he
had known Ramos for five years.8

When the passenger jeep was about 75 meters away

from him on the western lane of the national highway,
PO3 De Peralta spotted an owner-type jeep coming
from the south on the eastern lane of the road. He
observed that the owner-type jeep was running in a
zigzag manner as it went over the many holes on the
road. It did not slacken speed, causing the jeep's front
wheels to wiggle, before it bumped the passenger jeep
coming from the north. The collision occurred on the
lane of the passenger jeep, about two feet away from
the center line of the road, causing the owner-type jeep
to turn around and return to its former position, with its
right wheel removed; while the passenger jeep veered
to the right lane.14

Dr. Emilio Joven, a surgeon of the Lorma Medical

Center, San Fernando, La Union, testified that Arnulfo
Ramos was admitted at the Lorma Hospital at about
12:50 p.m. on April 22, 1995. The latter sustained
external injuries, mostly on the left side of the body,
which could have been caused by a vehicular accident.
The CT scan result of Arnulfo Ramos showed blood clots
inside the brain, scattered small hemorrhagic
contusions, and swelling and blood clots on the base of
the brain, which internal injuries caused his death.9 The
immediate cause of death was "acute cranio-cerebral
injury."10

After the collision, PO3 De Peralta assisted the ownertype jeep's driver, who fell to the ground, and helped
load him into a tricycle that would take him to the
hospital. Then he went to the driver of the passenger
jeep and asked him what happened. The driver
remarked, "Even if you do not like to meet an accident,
if that is what happened, you cannot do anything."
Thereafter, PO3 De Peralta proceeded on his way
southward. He reported the incident at the Police
Station of Candon, Ilocos Sur.15

Respondent Elvira Ramos testified on the damages she

incurred due to the vehicular accident, which resulted
in the death of her husband. She spent P33,513.00 for
hospitalization and P30,000.00 for the funeral. She
prayed for the award of lost earnings, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees
and other costs of litigation.11
She also testified that the owner-type jeep was
registered in the name of Matilde Tacad12 of Sto.
Domingo, Ilocos Sur.13 rbl rl l lbrr

PO3 De Peralta testified that the accident happened on

a straight part of the highway, but there were many
holes on the eastern lane. He stated that nothing
impeded his view of the incident.16
PO3 De Peralta also testified that he had known
respondents' witness, Alfredo Gamera, who was
his barangay mate for 20 years. He declared that he
never saw Gamera at the waiting shed or at the scene
of the incident on the morning of April 22, 1995.17

Investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez of the Candon Police

Station testified that at about 11:00 a.m. of April 22,
1995, he received a report of the vehicular accident that
occurred at the national highway in Tablac, Candon,
Ilocos Sur, which was three kilometers from the police
station. He proceeded to the site with some
companions. He saw a passenger jeep positioned
diagonally on the western shoulder of the road facing
southwest, while an owner-type jeep was on the right
lane. The driver of the owner-type jeep was seriously
injured and was brought to the hospital.18

Crescencia Achevara, on the national highway in Tablac,

Candon, Ilocos Sur heading south, while the owner-type
jeep of Arnulfo Ramos was heading north. Valdez stated
that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast
in a zigzag manner, when its right front wheel got
detached and the owner-type jeep bumped the left side
of his passenger jeep. Valdez swerved the passenger
jeep to the western edge of the road to avoid a
collision, but to no avail, as it bumped a post. He passed
out. When he regained consciousness, he saw the driver
of the owner-type jeep being rescued.23

SPO2 Valdez testified that the owner-type jeep's right

tire was detached, and its left front portion was
damaged, while the passenger jeep's left tire was
detached, and its left side portion was damaged.19

Valdez surrendered himself to the Police Station in

Candon, Ilocos Sur. He informed the police that his
vehicle was bumped by the owner-type jeep driven by
Arnulfo Ramos, and he showed his driver's license to
the police.24

Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that at 7:00 a.m. of

April 22, 1995, he was at the house of Barangay Captain
Victorino Gacusan of San Antonio, Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Gacusan was then the overall monitor of
the jueteng joint operation in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Pagaduan and Gacusan had earlier agreed to attend the
wake of an army captain at Tamorong, Candon, Ilocos
Sur that morning. While Pagaduan was waiting
for Barangay Captain Gacusan, the latter made a phone
call requesting for a vehicle to take them to Tamorong.
Not long after, a yellow owner-type jeep arrived, which
was driven by Arnulfo Ramos, an employee of
the jueteng joint. All of them rode the jeep with Plate
No. ACG 713. Barangay Captain Gacusan was on the
driver's seat, Pagaduan sat beside Gacusan, while
Arnulfo Ramos and the others sat on the rear seat.20
Pagaduan further testified that the group headed west
to Tamorong via Darapidap. When they reached a
bridge, Barangay Captain Gacusan tried to increase the
speed of the jeep, but it suddenly wiggled. Gacusan
stopped the jeep, and they all alighted from it. Gacusan
told Arnulfo Ramos to have the mechanical defect
repaired at the auto shop. Hence, they did not proceed
to Tamorong, but returned to the house of Gacusan by
tricycle. The next day, he heard from Gacusan that the
jeep they had used in their aborted trip to Tamorong
met an accident.21
On cross-examination, Pagaduan testified that it was
defense counsel Atty. Tudayan who requested him to
testify, because Atty. Tudayan had heard him discuss
the incident with some jueteng employees.22
Petitioner Benigno Valdez testified that on April 22,
1995, he was driving the passenger jeep of his aunt,

Valdez branded as false the testimony of respondents'

witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the former tried to
overtake the motorcycle of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and
encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep driven
by Arnulfo Ramos. Valdez testified that before the
vehicular accident, he saw a policeman following him,
but there was a tricycle between them. He denied that
he was driving fast and stated that his speed at that
time registered only 20 on the speedometer.25
Petitioner Alfredo Achevara testified that Crescencia
Achevara was his wife, while Benigno Valdez was the
nephew of his wife. He and his wife owned the
passenger jeep with Plate No. DKK-995 that was
involved in the vehicular accident. Valdez had been the
driver of the vehicle since 1992, although he drove it
only during daytime.26
Alfredo Achevara declared that before they employed
Benigno Valdez to drive the passenger jeep, the former
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting, training and supervising the latter.27 They
required Valdez to show them his professional driver's
license, and investigated his personal background and
training/experience as a driver. For his apprenticeship,
they required him to drive from Metro Manila to
Tagaytay City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day.
Achevara stated that he knew Benigno Valdez since
1988. As their driver since 1992, Valdez never
committed any traffic violation. On April 22, 1995, he
handed the key of the jeep to Valdez at about 7:30 a.m.
at their barangay in Padaoil, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur to
fetch the sound system in Santiago, Ilocos Sur for their

fiesta. He told Valdez to avoid an accident, bring his

license and avoid being hot-tempered.28
On February 14, 2000, the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,
Branch 22, rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 1431-N
in favor of respondents.
The trial court found that the testimony of respondents'
witness, Alfredo Gamera, was controverted by the
testimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the finding of
police investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez. Gamera
testified that the vehicular accident occurred because
the passenger jeep tried to overtake the motorcycle
driven by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on
the lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo
Ramos. Gamera's testimony was, however, refuted by
PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the
passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he
was the one following behind the passenger jeep.
Hence, the trial court concluded that the passenger jeep
did not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep on
the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the
motorcycle.

take this reasonable precaution, the omission and/or

breach of this duty on his part was the constitutive legal
cause of the mishap.30
The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clear
chance, as applied to this case, implied a contributory
negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who
knew of the mechanical defect of his vehicle.
Further, the trial court held that the evidence of the
Spouses Achevara failed to show that they exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of
Benigno Valdez as driver of their passenger jeep.31
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, the latter to
account for and to pay jointly and solidarily to the
plaintiffs, because of the contributory negligence on the
part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, the reduced amount
itemized as follows to wit:

Moreover, Gamera testified that the collision occurred

on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of the
wheels of the owner-type jeep was detached, so that it
stayed immobile at the place of collision, about two
meters east from the center line of the national
highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who
investigated the incident, found both vehicles on the
western lane of the national highway. Thus, the trial
court stated that it was undeniable that the collision
took place on the western lane of the national highway,
which was the passenger jeep's lane.

1) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - part of the total

receipted expenses at the hospitals;

The trial court held that, as contended by respondents,

the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable to this
case. It cited Picart v. Smith,29 which applied the said
doctrine, thus, where both parties are guilty of
negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that
of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

5) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - for attorney's

fees, and

The trial court held that the driver of the passenger

jeep, Benigno Valdez, having seen the risk exhibited by
the wiggling of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep,
causing it to run in a zigzag manner, should have parked
his vehicle on the right shoulder of the road so that the
mishap could have been prevented. Since he ignored to

2) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) - for funeral

expenses;
3) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) - for moral
damages;
4) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) - for exemplary
damages;

6) Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) - for actual and

other costs of litigation.32
The Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez appealed the
trial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated April 25, 2009, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed February 14, 2000 Decision
of the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, in Civil

Case No. 1431-N, is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION,that in addition to other awards made
by the trial court, defendants-appellants are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffsappellees the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Arnulfo Ramos and the moral damages and
attorney's fees awarded by the trial court are hereby
REDUCEDto P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively,
while the awards made by the trial court for exemplary
damages and "for actual and other costs of litigation"
are hereby DELETED.33
The motion for reconsideration of the Spouses
Achevara and Benigno Valdez was denied for lack of
merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution34 dated
October 23, 2006.
Hence, the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez filed
this petition.
The main issue is whether or not petitioners are liable
to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the
vehicular accident.
Petitioners contend that the doctrine of last clear
chance is not applicable to this case, because the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the late Arnulfo Ramos in knowingly driving the
defective owner-type jeep. When the front wheel of the
owner-type jeep was removed, the said jeep suddenly
encroached on the western lane and bumped the left
side of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez.
Considering that the interval between the time the
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to
the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, Valdez
no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Pantranco North Express Inc. v. Besa35 held that the
doctrine of last clear chance "can never apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered."
Petitioners assert that Arnulfo Ramos' negligence in
driving the owner-type jeep despite knowledge of its
mechanical defect, and his failure to have it repaired
first before driving, to prevent damage to life and
property did not only constitute contributory
negligence. Ramos' negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident, which resulted in his
untimely demise. Benigno Valdez should not be made to
suffer the unlawful and negligent acts of Ramos. Since
forseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence,

Valdez could not have foreseen that an accident might

happen due to the mechanical defect in the vehicle of
Ramos. It was Ramos alone who fully knew and could
foresee that an accident was likely to occur if he drove
his defective jeep, which indeed happened. Hence, the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident was the
negligence of Ramos in driving a mechanically defective
vehicle.
In short, petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos' own
negligence in knowingly driving a mechanically
defective vehicle was the immediate and proximate
cause of his death, and that the doctrine of last clear
chance does not apply to this case.
Petitioners' arguments are meritorious.
The Court notes that respondents' version of the
vehicular accident was rebutted by petitioners. The
testimony of respondents' witness, Alfredo Gamera,
that the vehicular accident occurred because the
passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez tried to
overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 Baltazar de
Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type
jeep, which resulted in the collision, was refuted by PO3
Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the passenger
jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the
one following behind the passenger jeep. Hence, the
trial court correctly concluded that the passenger jeep
did not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep on
the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the
motorcycle.
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on
the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels
was detached and stayed immobile at the place of
collision, about two meters east the center line of the
national highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who
investigated the incident, found both vehicles on the
western lane of the national highway. The owner-type
jeep was diagonally positioned on the right, western
lane; while the passenger jeep was on the western
shoulder of the road, diagonally facing southwest. The
trial court, therefore, correctly held that it was
undeniable that the collision took place on the western
lane of the national highway or the lane of the
passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the
owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
It must be pointed out that Herminigildo Pagaduan
testified that in the early morning of April 22, 1995, he
and Barangay Captain Gacusan, along with Arnulfo

Ramos, aborted their trip to Tamorong, Candon, Ilocos

Sur, using the same owner-type jeep because it was
wiggling. Ramos was advised to have the mechanical
defect repaired. Yet, later in the morning, Ramos was
driving the owner-type jeep on the national highway in
Candon. Benigno Valdez testified that the owner-type
jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner
when its right front wheel got detached, and the ownertype jeep suddenly bumped the passenger jeep he was
driving, hitting the left side of the passenger jeep
opposite his seat. Although Valdez swerved the
passenger jeep to the western edge of the road, it was
still hit by the owner-type jeep.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To
be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to
act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but
definite class of risks.36
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and
running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the
opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made
aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type
jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the
road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right
shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep
pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision
occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that
Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by
neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable
and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances and which proximately caused injury to
another.
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos
guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a
defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent
man would know that he would be putting himself and
other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk
for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the
circumstances, a prudent man would have had the
owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using
it until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grossly
negligent in continuing to drive on the highway the
mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on
the opposite lane and bumped the passenger jeep
driven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the
absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless
disregard of the safety of persons or property.37 It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences

without exerting any effort to avoid

them.38 rbl rl l lbrr
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno
Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued
to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite
knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did
not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road
upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos perhaps
because it still kept to its lane and Valdez did not know
the extent of its mechanical defect. However, when the
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the
passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and
steered the passenger jeep toward the western
shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this
point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost
control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had
the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving
the passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the
road.rbl rl l lbrr
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, but the defendant who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so
is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff.39 However, the doctrine does not apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.40
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this
case, because even if it can be said that it was Benigno
Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap
when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western
lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of
petitioners stated that when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno
Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western
shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the ownertype jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to the
western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger
jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that
considering that the time the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact
was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the records
are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance
between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must

have been near enough, because the passenger jeep

driven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision.
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply
to this case.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.41
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez
failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent
the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of
Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of
Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, dated
April 25, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 23,
2006, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

they observe all the diligence of a good father to

prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence
in supervising the activities of their son. It was only at
the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly
discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and
that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing
from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly
negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to
said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
living in their company.

VALENZUELA vs. CA
These two petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an
action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the
early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the
trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of
Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasidelict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident.

LIBI vs. IAC

G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992
FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both
minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a
result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's
parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for
vicarious liability.
RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
cause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180
of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising
from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The
parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary
and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that

Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At

around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at
Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the
direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she
noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at
a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home
in that cars condition, she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1 feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of
her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her
fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the

defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the

ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car.
Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her
thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the
rest of the body. She was brought to
the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was
found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to
distal thigh (above knee). She was confined in the
hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted
with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial
leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car
insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in
the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related
expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including
loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He
was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering
that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road
was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was
driving along the inner portion of the right lane of
Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue,
when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A.
Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright
lights. Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to
the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see
because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking
lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly
lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear
portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it was then
at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the
right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer).
He confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness that
after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to
the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that
plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a
licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared
the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the
three cars involved in the accident, testified that the
plaintiffs car was near the sidewalk; this witness did
not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiffs car
were on, and did not notice if there was an early
warning device; there was a street light at the corner of
Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It

was not mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen (p. 16,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified
that after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the
trunk compartment, defendants car came approaching
very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was
zigzagging. The rear left side of plaintiffs car was
bumped by the front right portion of defendants car; as
a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to the right
and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of defendants car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that
defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
smell it very well (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs
submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of
gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held
Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It
ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the
following amounts:
1.
P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2.
The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on
June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized
profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment; and
(c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in
plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the
date of this decision;
3.

P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;

4.

P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,

5.

P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and

6.

Costs.

As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants

filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for
Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C.
No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that
the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of

glass/debris from the parties cars, appeared to be at

the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial
court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an
appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals
found that there was ample basis from the evidence of
record for the trial courts finding that the plaintiffs car
was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk
when it was bumped by defendants car.[1] Dismissing
the defendants argument that the plaintiffs car was
improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the
respondent court noted that evidence which was
supposed to prove that the car was at or near center of
the right lane was never presented during the trial of
the case.[2] The respondent court furthermore observed
that:
Defendant Lis testimony that he was driving at a safe
speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness
Rodriguez who stated that he was outside his
beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake
Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his
attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to
the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the
trunk compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li
approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the
scene; defendants car was zigzagging, although there
were no holes and hazards on the street, and bumped
the leg of the plaintiff who was thrown against the
windshield of defendants car, causing its destruction.
He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled
out from under defendants car and was able to say
hurting words to Richard Li because he noticed that
the latter was under the influence of liquor, because he
could smell it very well (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17,
1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta.
Mesa in the 1970s, but did not know either plaintiff or
defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant
Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved
the Lis employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and
reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.
Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for
the same, in addition to costs, attorneys fees and the
other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,
dismissed the defendants counterclaims.[3]

Consequently, both parties assail the respondent

courts decision by filing two separate petitions before
this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that
he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuelas own negligence. Alternatively, he argues
that in the event that this Court finds him negligent,
such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent courts
decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial,
Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by
Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the
actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions
are hereby consolidated. It is plainly evident that the
petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no
substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts
to have this Court review are factual findings of the trial
court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding
Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi
Lancer provided by his company in the early morning
hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general
rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally
disturb such factual findings unless the findings of fact
of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
based on a misapprehension of facts.[5]
In the first place, Valenzuelas version of the
incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested
witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an
establishment located just across the scene of the
accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car
being driven at a very fast speed, racing towards the
general direction of Araneta Avenue.[6] Rodriguez
further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the
scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit
Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the
defendants Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendants car.
Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the
street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of
liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order
to survey the incident.[7] Equally important, Rodriguez
declared that he observed Valenzuelas car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk,[8] contrary to Lis
allegation that Valenzuelas car was close to the center
of the right lane. We agree that as between Lis self-

serving asseverations and the observations of a

witness who did not even know the accident victim
personally and who immediately gave a statement of
the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator
immediately after the incident, the latters testimony
deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own
examination of the transcript, We are not prepared to
set aside the trial courts reliance on the testimony of
Rodriguez negating defendants assertion that he was
driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a
motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily
impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and
no attempt was made to question his competence or
the accuracy of his statement that defendant was
driving very fast. This was the same statement he
gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told
to a newspaper report (Exh. P). We see no compelling
basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez testimony are
not borne out by an examination of the testimony.
Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident was
across the street where his beerhouse is located about
ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991).
He did not state that the accident transpired
immediately in front of his establishment. The
ownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is not
material; the business is registered in the name of his
mother, but he explained that he owns the
establishment (p. 5, tsn., June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his
side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident
transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the
testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a streetlight at
the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman
Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez
testified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain
and the rain has stopped and he was outside his
establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp.
64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was consistent with
plaintiffs testimony that it was no longer raining when
she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April 29, 1991).
It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the
way in an attempt to explain why he was travelling at
only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to the
testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived
at the scene only in response to a telephone call after
the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28,

1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in

Rodriguezs testimony that would impair the essential
integrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We
are compelled to affirm the trial courts acceptance of
the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness
Rodriguez we note that Lis testimony was peppered
with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude
that his version of the accident was merely adroitly
crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving,
which would exculpate him from any and all liability in
the incident. Against Valenzuelas corroborated claims,
his allegations were neither backed up by other
witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at
a speed of 55 kph. when out of nowhere he saw a dark
maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the)
plaintiffs car. He alleged that upon seeing this sudden
apparition he put on his brakes to no avail as the road
was slippery.[9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give
credence to Lis disingenuous and patently self-serving
asseverations. The average motorist alert to road
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to
a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light
rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare
like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to
react to the changing conditions of the road if he were
alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions.
Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological fight or flight[10] mechanisms are at
work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by
drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.[11] Lis
failure to react in a manner which would have avoided
the accident could therefore have been only due to
either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving
at a very fast speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol.[12] Either
factor working independently would have diminished
his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuelas
car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted
(quoted with approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the
San Juan Police immediately after the incident, he said
that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he
saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which
was plaintiffs car, indicating, again, thereby that,

indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his

surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he
was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a
still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at the
right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency
lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the
plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge of
her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan
Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs
car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet
and slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to
his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it
otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his
car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff,
notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery.
Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as he
claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then,
inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have
avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during
his testimony, which is contrary to what he told the
police immediately after the accident and is, therefore,
more believable, that he did not actually step on his
brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right when he
saw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the
opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have
bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly
parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not
even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in
order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car,
considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue
separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and
there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was
running at the right lane going towards Manila and the
on-coming car was also on its right lane going to
Cubao.[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was
negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi
Lancer, the next question for us to determine is
whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car
alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points
out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of

the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own
protection. [14] Based on the foregoing definition, the
standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li,
Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own
protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to
recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of
humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted
by
unusual
and
oftentimes
threatening
conditions.[15] Under the emergency rule adopted by
this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals,[16] an individual
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the
victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wrong
lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into
the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[18] that the driver therein, Jose Koh,
adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting the children. Using the
emergency rule the court concluded that Koh, in spite
of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the
collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not
guilty of negligence.[19]
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in
which reflective thought, or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases
is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by
the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a
rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely

find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her

not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because
the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking
zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a
threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the
instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion
of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that
she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other
motorists in danger, she did what was best under the
situation. As narrated by respondent court:
She stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.[20] In
fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the
investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that
Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the
sidewalk.[21] The sketch which he prepared after the
incident showed Valenzuelas car partly straddling the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from
motorists passing the right lane ofAurora Boulevard.
This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of
witness Rodriguez.[22]
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her
car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. Negligence, as it is commonly understood is
conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to
others.[23] It is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.[24] We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
Company,[25] that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence
adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li
was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It
bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at
about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled
into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is

ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he

was under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly
lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
automobile must be prepared for the sudden
appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway,
and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who
sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate
its sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act
properly when they appear may be found to amount to
negligence. [26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the
situation confronting him on the night of the accident
was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying
liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the
respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis
testimony, that the visit was in connection with official
matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes
required him to perform work outside the office as he
has to visit buyers and company clients, but he
admitted that on the night of the accident he came
from BF Homes Paraaque he did not have business
from the company (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The
use ofthe company car was partly required by the
nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for nonofficial business is a benefit, apparently referring to
the fringe benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the
negligence of his employees in the discharge of their
respective duties, the basis of which liability is
not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater
familias, which theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18).
Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee
was in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or
duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194
SCRA 341). In defining an employers liability for the
acts done within the scope of the employees assigned
tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes any
act done by an employee, in furtherance of the

interests of the employer or for the account of the

employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance of any act
indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the
trial courts finding that since defendant Li was
authorized by the company to use the company car
either officially or socially or even bring it home, he
can be considered as using the company car in the
service of his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was not among his
functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official
purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of
the perks attached to his position. But to impose
liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that
the damage was caused by their employees in the
service of the employer or on the occasion of their
functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at
the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of the companys business or its interests,
or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary
liability against defendant Alexander Commercial
Corporation must therefore fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the
relationship in question is not based on the principle
of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable
for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer,
for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our
agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article
2180 of the Civil Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Lis
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and
solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident
of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals[29] upon which respondent court has placed
undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and
its teachers supervision of students during an
extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the
provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218
of the Family Code which generally encompasses all

authorized school activities, whether inside or outside

school premises.
Second, the employers primary liability under the
concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in
relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual
or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a
showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that
the employer exercised the required amount of care in
selecting its employees, half of the employers burden is
overcome.
The
question
of
diligent supervision, however,
depends
on
the
circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latters
assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employees private
activities or during the performance of tasks either
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employees tasks. The case at bench presents a
situation of a different character, involving a practice
utilized by large companies with either their employees
of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide
certain classes of their employees with courtesy
vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned
and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
various plans through which employees eventually
acquire their vehicles after a given period of service, or
after paying a token amount. Many companies provide
liberal car plans to enable their managerial or other
employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the
cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise
be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually
owns and maintains the car up to the point of turnover
of ownership to the employee; in the second example,
the car is really owned and maintained by the employee
himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility when an
accident involving a company-issued car occurs during
private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance,
which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous
tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to
turning over the car (subject of company maintenance)

to their representatives. In other words, like a good

father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle
only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom
the car has been given full use of the said company car
for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car
to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like
every good father, satisfied that its employee will use
the privilege reasonably and responsively.

Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the

road on the night of the accident because he was
coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously selfserving. Assuming he really came from his officemates
place, the same could give rise to speculation that he
and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and
other work related strategies.

In the ordinary course of business, not all company

employees are given the privilege of using a companyissued car. For large companies other than those cited
in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege
serves important business purposes either related to
the image of success an entity intends to present to its
clients and to the public in general, or for practical and
utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other
employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients
conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car
serves both purposes. Since important business
transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all
sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the
provision for the unlimited use of a company car
thereforeprincipally serves the business and goodwill of
a company and only incidentally the private purposes of
the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial
employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing
for a company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the companys image, a company
owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able
to use the company issue capably and responsibly.

In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not

demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.[31] Not having been able
to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should
be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle ofbonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the
former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.

In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of

Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the
trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep
normal office hours as he was required quite often to
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective
buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients.[30] These meetings, clearly, were not strictly
confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his
company with its clients, meetings with clients were
both social as well as work-related functions. The
service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latters goodwill before its clientele. It
also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by
providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount

of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as
to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral
damages, while the said damages are not intended to
enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the
award should nonetheless be commensurate to the
suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the
opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an
amount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court
of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of
the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of
the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower
extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.
Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of
the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even
with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology.
Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was
paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo
adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic
replacements and months of physical and occupational
rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the
prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and readjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb

effected by the biological changes of middle-age,

menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches
menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be
adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting
from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed
in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other
words, the damage done to her would not only be
permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the
years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has
been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the
surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it
would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of
psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with
the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human
body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of
functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury,
mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to
this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion that the
amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury . physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as
a result of Lis grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision
of the court of Appeals is modified with the effect of
REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
CAEDO vs. Yu Khe That
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff
Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were
injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from
the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952),
contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders
a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael
Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of
P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for
moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary

damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,

with costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants against the
plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for lack
of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to
include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the
plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the
accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the case to us in view of the total amount of
the plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution:
(1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it
was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer,
defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On
the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo
negligent; and on the second, held his employer
solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of
March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos
Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial
was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in
Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in
the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel,
taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack
Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were
traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the
condition of the road and the absence of traffic the
Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the
Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56
kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable
from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the
same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse
by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on the right side and held at the other end by
Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the
rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters
away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each
side, and they should have given him sufficient warning
to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did
not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,

the carretela should anyway have been visible to him

from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in
the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own
lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind
the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left
in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's
left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the
car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo
had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his
speed, judged the distances in relation to
the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would
wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a
gamble beat the Mercury to the point where it would
be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between
them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way,
and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since
the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or
25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too
late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw
the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so
he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of
the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was
insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught
the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose.
Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried
to avoid the collision at the last moment by going
farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The
photographs taken at the scene show that the right
wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly
traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he
must be held liable for the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe
Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the
driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner
is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at

least twice within the next preceding two

months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor
was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the
first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in
Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where
this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is
present, unless the negligent acts of the driver
are continued for such a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by
the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them
and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The
owner of an automobile who permits his
chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example,
at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes
himself responsible, both criminally and civilly,
for the results produced by the acts of the
chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner
of the automobile, although present therein at
the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.
The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time
that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his
driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is
not respondent superior but rather the relationship
of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that

Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since
1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo
Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten
years. During that time he had no record of violation of
traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having
employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and
devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no
reason for the car owner to be in any special state of
alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience
of his driver. He became aware of the presence of
thecarretela when his car was only twelve meters
behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the
wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision
to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact
that another car was approaching from the opposite
direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The
thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other
man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that
due diligence required by law to prevent the
misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their
own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained or
endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules
of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by
the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car
owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part,
say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly
equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a

certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules
before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger
may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to
another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by
car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real
need of drivers' services, would be effectively
proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai,
solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next
question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court
as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral
damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo
2. Juana S. Caedo
3. Ephraim Caedo
4. Eileen Caedo
5. Rose Elaine Caedo
6. Merilyn Caedo
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the
Court should have granted them also actual or
compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the
injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand
maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages
are excessive and should be reduced. We find no
justification for either side. The amount of actual
damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason
of their injuries, other than expenses for medical
treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual
damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and
suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and
constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not
actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil
Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp,
frontal left; abrasions, chest wall,
anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to
5th inclusive. Third rib has a double
fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma;
Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower
lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to
probable basal fracture, skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of
nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep,
frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior,
left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal
phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III
and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal;
(3) left supraorbital
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base,
5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle
finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3)
shin, lower 1/3.
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and
lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)
nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third,
anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower

1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin,
lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See
Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent
of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral
damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified
in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe
Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs
against the latter.
VITARICH CORPORATION vs. LOCSIN
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the November
26, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de
Oro (CA-CDO), in CA G.R. CV
No.73726,2 whichreversed the August 9, 2001 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos
City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 6287, in favor of petitioner
Vitarich Corporation (Vitarich).
THE FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and
catering services business named Glamours Chicken
House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City.
Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had
been her supplier of poultry meat.3 In 1995, however,
her account was transferred to the newly opened
Vitarich branch in General Santos City.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losins orders
of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly
amounted to P921,083.10. During this said period,
Losins poultry meat needs for her business were
serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan
Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of
Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of
said corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during the
same period that her account started to experience
problems because of the fact that Directo delivered
stocks to her even without prior booking which is the
customary process of doing business with her.4

On August 24, 1996, Directos services were terminated

by Vitarich without Losins knowledge. He left without
turning over some supporting invoices covering the
orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand,
resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30,
1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they did not also
turn over pertinent invoices covering Losins account.5
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to
Losin covering her alleged unpaid account amounting
toP921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked
her records and discovered that she had an
overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00.
She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed
the latter that checks were issued and the same were
collected by Directo.6
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks
amounting to P288,463.30 which were dishonored
either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(DAIF) or Stop Payment.7
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of
Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before
the RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision8 in
favor of Vitarich, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff
the following:
1. P297,462.50 representing the three checks
which had been stopped payment with interest
at 12% per annum from the date of this
Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
2. P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales
(Exhibits L and M) with interest at 12% from
date of this Decision until the whole amount is
fully paid;
3. P20,000.00 in concept of attorneys fees; and
4. The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa and
Arnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaint
against Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby
ordered archived until he could be served with
summons.

SO ORDERED.9
Not satisfied with the RTC decision, Losin appealed to
the CA presenting the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE OVERPAYMENT MADE BY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO VITARICH
CORPORATION;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) CHECKS WITH
STOP PAYMENT ORDERS AND WITHOUT ANY
ANTECEDENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES FOR
THE TWO (2) CHECKS, NAMELY: RCBC CHECK
NO. CX 046324 AND RCBC CHECK NO. CX
046327 ; AND
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
VITARICH CORPORATION NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION OF ITS EMPLOYEES AND NEITHER
FINDING THE CORPORATION LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE.10
On November 26, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
decision in favor of Losin. Pertinently, the said decision
reads:
It is axiomatic that we should not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in a
better position to determine questions involving
credibility having heard the witnesses and having
observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial unless there is showing that the findings
of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion. This is such an instance.
By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. Thus, the elements of
agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties
to establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;

(iii) the agent acts as a representative and not for

himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.
The Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:
"Art. 1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds
himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter."
As far as Losin is concerned, Directo was a duly
authorized agent of Vitarich Corporation. As such, it fell
upon Directo to place her orders of dressed chicken and
other related products to their General Santos City
branch. All such orders were taken from the Vitarich
bodega by Directo as testified by Alona Calinawan, then
bookkeeper of Vitarich from March 1995 to September
1998, who was responsible for all the customers
accounts, receivables and withdrawals of dressed
chicken from their bodega.
A perusal of the records would show that Vitarich
included in their list of collectibles from Losin several
amounts that were not supported by their Charge Sales
Invoices such
as P44,987.70, P3,300.00; P28,855.40; P98,166.20;
P73,806.00; and P93,888.80 and which form part of
their total claim of P912,083.10. Furthermore, Vitarich
also submitted Charge Sales Invoices showing the
amount of P70,000.00, P41,792.40, P104,137.40
and P158,522.80 as part of their exhibits but which
amounts are not included in its summary statement of
collectibles against Losin.
It is noted that the dressed chicken and other related
products as manifested by the Charge Sales Invoices,
were taken out of the bodega and received by Directo,
who is now at large. There was no evidence presented
by Vitarich to prove that aforesaid stocks were
delivered to Losin. Contrary to what Vitarich claimed
that Directo resigned on August 24, 1996, exhibit X
shows that he was terminated. The fact can not be put
aside that Directo was the salesman and authorized
collector and by law, the agent of Vitarich. Criminal acts
committed by Directo by his non-remittance of the
proceeds of the checks given by Losin, is his separate
accountability with Vitarich and should not be imputed
to their client, Losin. In fact, defendant Directo
absconded when plaintiff-appellee started to question
his collectibles. The totality of Directos acts clearly
indicated a deliberate attempt to escape liability.

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the
purpose of contracting with specified persons, its
revocationshall not prejudice the latter if they were
not given notice thereof."
"Art. 1922. If the agent had general powers, revocation
of the agency does not prejudice third persons who
acted in good faith and without knowledge of the
revocation. Notice of the revocation in a newspaper of
general circulation is a sufficient warning to third
persons." (Emphasis Ours)
The reason for the law is obvious. Since the third
persons have been made to believe by the principal that
the agent is authorized to deal with them, they have the
right to presume that the representation continues to
exist in the absence of notification by the principal.
Nowhere in the records can it be found that Losin was
notified of the fact that Directo was no longer
representing the interest of Vitarich and that the latter
has terminated Directos services. There is also an
absence of any proof to show that Directos termination
has been published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
It is well settled that a question of fact is to be
determined by the evidence offered to support the
particular contention. In defendant-appellants
Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich, prepared
and signed by Losins bookkeeper, Imelda S. Cinco, all
the checks enumerated therein coincides with the bank
statements submitted by RCBC, thus corroborating
Losins claim that she has paid Vitarich. Vitarichs
contention that defendant Baybay tried very hard to
hide his accountabilities to the plaintiff x x x but failed
to explain why the account remained unpaid, confirms
its belief that their own agents as such, are accountable
for transactions made with third persons. "As a Sales
Supervisor, he is principally liable for the behavior of his
subordinates (Directo & Rosa) and for the enforcement
of company rules" which may have gone beyond their
authority to do such acts.
Anent the third assigned error that the lower court
erred in not finding Vitarich negligent in the selection of
its employees thereby making the former liable for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, We find
the same to be without basis as said article explicitly
holds that:

"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is

demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by

their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

x x x."

Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, that vicarious

liability attaches only to an employer when the tortuous
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course
of, his employment. The question to ask should be
whether at the time of the damage or injury, the
employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
employer or, independently, in that of his own? Vitarich
incurred no liability when Directos conduct, act or
omission went beyond the range of his employment.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how
determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies,
the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number."
"Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of
the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We reviewed the factual and legal issues of this case in

light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of
proof in civil cases, as explained by the Supreme Court
in Jison v. Court of Appeals:
"xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in
a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However,
in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes
out aprima facie case in his favour, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be
returned in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept
of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that
which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth."
Hence, Vitarich who has the burden of proof must
produce such quantum of evidence, with the former
having to rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the defendant-appellant Losins.
In this light, we have meticulously perused the records
of this case and [found] that the court a quo had erred
in appreciating the evidence presented.
In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that
a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must
establish his cause of action by a preponderance of
evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in
equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the
preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the
burden of proof fails and the petition/complaint must
thus be denied. We find that plaintiff-appellee Vitarich
failed to prove that the goods were ever delivered and
received by Losin, said charge sales invoices being
undated and unsigned by Losin being the consignee of
the goods.
On the other hand, Losin could not also prove that she
has overpaid Vitarich. Hence, her contention that she
has overpaid Vitarich and her prayer for refund of the
alleged overpaid amount, must necessarily fail.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the appealed judgment is

hereby SET ASIDE andVACATED. No pronouncement as

to cost.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition for review alleging that--AS THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS SQUARELY CONTRADICTS THAT OF THE TRIAL
COURT, PETITIONER HUMBLY REQUESTS THE SUPREME
COURT TO INQUIRE INTO THE ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS MADE BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS.12
As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court covers questions of law only.
Questions of fact are not reviewable and passed upon
by this Court in its exercise of judicial review. The
distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact has been well defined. A question of law exists
when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is
on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the
other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.13
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, namely: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.14
The aforementioned exceptions, particularly the
seventh exception, finds relevance in the case at bench
since the findings of the CA are clearly in conflict with
that of the trial court. For this reason, the Court is
constrained to reevaluate the evidence adduced by
both parties to resolve the issues which boil down to
whether or not Losin is liable to Vitarich and, if so, to
what extent.

The Court resolves the issues partly in favor of Vitarich.

Initially, Vitarich claims a total of P921,083.10 from
respondent Losin, Directo, Rosa and Baybay (defendants
in Civil Case No. 6287 for Sum of Money). According to
Vitarich, "[t]he successive and sudden resignations of
defendants Directo, Baybay and Rosa and the sudden
change of mind of defendant Losin after previously
acknowledging her accounts are part of an elaborate
and sinister scheme of defendants, acting singly or
collectively, in conspiracy or not, in defrauding plaintiff
corporation xxx."15
The RTC ruled in favor of Vitarich, ordering Losin to pay
the following: (1) P297,462.50 representing the three
(3) checks, the payment for which was stopped, with
corresponding interest at 12% per annum from the date
of the RTC decision until fully paid; (2) P101,450.20 for
the unpaid sales also with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of the RTC decision until fully
paid; (3) P20,000.00 for attorneys fees; and (4) cost of
suit.16 It appears that Vitarich did not challenge this part
of the RTC decision anymore.17
After Losin obtained a favorable RTC decision, Vitarich
now seeks relief from this Court through this petition
for review.
After an assessment of the evidentiary records, the
Court opines and so holds that the CA erred in reversing
the RTC decision. Losin is clearly liable to Vitarich.
Records bear out that Losin transacted with Vitarichs
representative Directo.18 Vitarich presented several
charge sales invoices19 and statement of account20 to
support Losins accountability for the products
delivered to her. A total of P921,083.10 was initially
charged to her. Losin, on the other hand, presented a
copy of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich
through its agent Directo,21 and a Statement of
Payments Made to Vitarich22 to support her allegation
of payment.
It is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin failed to
make a proper recording and documentation of their
transactions making it difficult to reconcile the evidence
presented by the parties to establish their respective
claims.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC,23 the Court
ruled that the burden rests on the debtor to prove

payment, rather than on the creditor to prove nonpayment. The debtor has the burden of showing with
legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged
by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court24 provides that the
burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth
of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount of evidence required by law. In this case,
however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she
alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin
failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court
is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single
official receipt to prove payment.25 This is contrary to
the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written
and signed acknowledgment that money and goods
have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of
payment although not exclusive.26 All she presented
were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to
Vitarich through its agent Directo,27 a Statement of
Payments Made to Vitarich,28 and apparently copies of
the pertinent history of her checking account with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these
may only serve as documentary records of her business
dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments
made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or
bills of exchange or other mercantile documents
shallproduce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed, or when through the fault of the
creditor they have been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was
neither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin were
actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot
consider that payment, much less overpayment, made
by Losin.
Now, the Court ascertains the extent of Losins liability.
A perusal of the records shows that Vitarich included in
its list of collectibles,29 several amounts that were not
properly supported by Charge Sales Invoice, to
wit, (1)P44,987.70; (2) P3,300.00; (3) P28,855.40; (4) P9
8,166.20; (5) P73,806.00; and (6) P93,888.80.30 It bears
noting that the Charge Sales Invoices presented for the

amounts listed as collectibles were undated and

unsigned by Losin, the supposed consignee of the goods
(except Exh. L). Of the six amounts, the Court
particularly considered the P93,888.80 as it was the
amount of one of the checks issued by Losin. Indeed,
the Court cannot disregard the fact that Losin issued a
corresponding check for the following amounts:
(1) P93,888.96 (dated August 27,
1996);31 (2) P50,265.00 (dated August 30, 1996);32 and
(3) P144,309.50 (dated August 31, 1996).33 The Court
believes that Losin would not have issued those checks
had she not received the goods so delivered to her. The
first two (2) checks were apparently received by the
Vitarich but were not encashed because of Losins
instruction to RCBC. Thus, Losin is liable to Vitarich but
not for the total amount of the three (3) mentioned
checks but only for the amount of P93,888.96
and P50,265.00 corresponding to the first two (2)
checks. Losin cannot be held liable for the amount of
the third check P144,309.50 because Vitarich did
not claim for this amount. The amount ofP144,309.50
for some reason, was not among those listed in the list
of collectibles of Vitarich.341avvphi1
Aside from the earlier mentioned liabilitiesthe Court
also holds Losin liable for the amount of P78,281.00
which was also among those listed as collectible by
Vitarich. Although the Charge Sales Invoice35 bearing
this amount was undated, it nevertheless, appears that
the goods corresponding to this amount were actually
received by Losins mother. This was even testified to by
Rosa36 and confirmed by Losin herself.37 With the
exception of the amounts corresponding to the two (2)
checks discussed above and the amount of P18,281.00
as appearing in Exh. L, the other amounts appearing on
the rest of the Charge Sales Invoice and on the
Statement of Account presented by Vitarich cannot be
charged on Losin for failure of Vitarich to prove that
these amounts are chargeable to her. Vitarich even
failed to prove that the rest of the goods as appearing
on the other Charge Sales Invoices were actually
delivered and received by her or her representative
since these Charge Sales Invoices were undated and
unsigned. Thus, Losin is liable to pay Vitarich the
amounts of P93,888.96, P50,265.00 andP78,281.00 or a
total of P222,434.96 only.
Inasmuch as the case at bar involves an obligation not
arising from a loan or forbearance of money, but
consists in the payment of a sum of money, the legal
rate of interest is 6% per annum of the amount
demanded.38 Interest shall continue to run from
February 12, 1997, the date when Vitarich demanded

payment of the sum amounting toP921,083.10 from

Losin (and not from the time of the filing of the
Complaint) until finality of the Decision (not until fully
paid). The rate of interest shall increase to 12% per
annum only from such finality until its satisfaction, the
interim period being deemed to be equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.391avvphi1

(3) Cost of suit.

The complaint against Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay is
dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo is
ordered archived until he could be served with
summons.
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation vs. De Los Santos

Regarding the grant of attorneys fees, the Court agrees

with the RTC that said award is justified. Losin refused
to pay Vitarich despite the latters repeated demands. It
was left with no recourse but to litigate and protect its
interest. We, however, opt to reduce the same
to P10,000.00 from P20,000.00.
The claims against Rosa and Baybay who allegedly did
not fully account for their sales transactions have not
been substantially proven by evidence. In fact, it
appears that Rosa and Baybay resigned. Resignation
would not have been possible unless accountabilities
with Vitarich had been settled first. It was only the
services of Directo that was apparently terminated by
Vitarich.40 Summons, however, was not served on him,
so he could not be made to account for the shortages of
collection.
WHEREFORE, the November 26, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
August 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 23, is REINSTATED subject
toMODIFICATIONS. Thus, the dispositive portion should
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
Chona Losin to pay Vitarich Corporation the following:
(1) P222,434.96 representing the two checks,
with Check Nos. CX 046324 dated August 27,
1996 and CX 046325 dated August 30, 1996
which had been stopped payment and the
amount as appearing in Charge Sales Invoice
marked as Exhibit L subject to an interest rate
of 6% per annum from February 12, 1997, the
date when Vitarich demanded payment of the
sum amounting to P921,083.10 from Losin until
finality of the Decision. The rate of interest shall
increase to 12% per annum only from such
finality until its satisfaction, the interim period
being deemed to be equivalent to a
forbearance of credit;
(2) P10,000.00 representing attorneys fees; and

FACTS:
On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los
Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos
was fetched by Wilfredos brother Armando, husband
of respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, from Rizal
Theater to after Teresas theater performance.
Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a
company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members
of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the
Galant Sigma.
Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan
Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the
shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo
S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner Filipinas
Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12
meters from the point of impact, across the White
Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp
Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flames
and burned to death beyond recognition all four
occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple homicide was
brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of
Mejia (shuttle driver). A consolidated civil case was filed
by the families of the deceased against Mejia. The RTC
ruled in favor of herein respondents. After the denial of
the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this petition stating that the respondent court
erred in finding Mejia negligent, such not being
supported by evidence on record.
ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent
HELD:
Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los
Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without
exercising the necessary care which could have
prevented the accident from happening. According to
petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the
victims should also be considered as negligence on the
part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating,

if not absolving petitioners liability. However, the said

argument deserves scant consideration.
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed
beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically
Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the
New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the
present case, Mejias violation of the traffic rules does
not erase the presumption that he was the one
negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from
statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is
nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and
drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with
all the conditions encountered which will enable him to
keep the vehicle under control and, whenever
necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid
injury to others using the highway.
A closer study of the Police Accident Report,
Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident
would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was
traveling at such a reckless speed that it collided with
the car bearing the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 15, 2001, is hereby AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that the moral damages be reduced
to P50,000.00.