UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ROOSEVELT HOLIDAY, §
Plaintiff §
§
-V- §
§
THE CITY OF DALLAS, THE DALLAS §
POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOM LEPPERT, as §
the administrative head of the City of Dallas, § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-08CV2110-d
DAVID KUNKLE, individually and as the §
administrative head of the Dallas Police §
Department, WILLIAM PEPSIS, JR., §
DEBORAH D. MELANCON, RON §
WALDROP, JESSE REYES, MICHAEL §
EPPLE, and RICHARD DODGE, §
Defendants §

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE

TO THE HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE:

NOW COMES Plaintiff, Roosevelt Holiday, and files this, his Plaintiff’s Original

Petition and Request for Disclosure. The position of crime scene detective is an elite position

within the Dallas Police Department that has historically been reserved for White employees.

When Holiday was selected as a crime scene detective, White employees formed their own

internal “selection committee” to determine credentials for crime scene detectives. William

“Bill” Pepsis and Deborah D. “D. D.” Melancon, segregated minority crime scene detectives by

instituting a tier system among crime scene detectives; assigning Holiday and the other minority

detectives to the lowest tier. Pepsis also instituted subjective proficiency testing which would be

administered by crime scene detectives of the higher tiers to those of the lower tiers. When

Holiday was given a failing score on his Mock Crime Scene Proficiency Evaluation, he was

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assigned a desk job. When Holiday complained to the EEOC of race discrimination, the

Department refused to allow Holiday his grievance hearing rights. Holiday was then reassigned

to patrol. Following a thorough investigation, the EEOC sustained Holiday’s complaint of race

discrimination and issued a “cause finding” against the Dallas Police Department. On October

16, 2008, the Texas Workforce Commission issued a Notice of Right to File a Civil Action.

I.
PARTIES

2. Plaintiff, Roosevelt Holiday is an individual who resides in Cedar Hill, Texas.

3. The City of Dallas is a municipality located entirely within the State of Texas.

The City of Dallas may be served by serving its Mayor, Tom Leppert, with service of process at

1500 Marilla St., Dallas, TX 75201.

4. The Dallas Police Department is a law enforcement agency located entirely within

the State of Texas. The Dallas Police Department may be served by serving its Chief, David

Kunkle, with service of process at 1400 S. Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

5. Tom Leppert, sued in his official capacity as the administrative head of the City

of Dallas, may be served with service of process at 1500 Marilla St., Dallas, TX 75201.

6. David Kunkle, sued individually and in his official capacity as the administrative

head of the City of Dallas, may be served with service of process at 1400 S. Lamar, Dallas, TX

75215.

7. William Pepsis, Jr., an individual, may be served at his place of business, 1400 S.

Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

8. Deborah D. Melancon, an individual, may be served at her place of business,

1400 S. Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

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 9. Ron Waldrop, an individual, may be served at her place of business, 1400 S.

Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

10. Jesse Reyes, an individual, may be served at her place of business, 1400 S.

Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

11. Michael Epple, an individual, may be served at her place of business, 1400 S.

Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

12. Richard Dodge, an individual, may be served at her place of business, 1400 S.

Lamar, Dallas, TX 75215.

II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. Jurisdiction is proper because Defendants are citizens of the state of Texas, are

wholly contained governmental units within Texas, and/or have minimum contacts with Texas

and an assertion of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.

14. Venue is appropriate because the acts giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Dallas

County, Texas.

III.
FACTS

15. Plaintiff is Black/African-American.

16. Plaintiff has been employed by the Dallas Police Department since February,

1985.

17. In May, 2002, a position became available for a detective in the crime scene unit.

Plaintiff was selected by Deputy Chief Zachary Belton (Black) for this position.

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 18. The position of crime scene detective is an elite and prestigious position within the

Dallas Police Department.

19. At the time of Plaintiff’s selection there were approximately 15 crime scene

detectives, only one of whom was Black. The rest were White.

20. The crime scene unit training officer, Senior Corporal William “Bill” Pepsis, Jr.

(White), became disgruntled that Plaintiff was selected for this position.

21. Pepsis invited several crime scene unit detectives to a secret meeting. On

information and belief, these individuals included Michael Epple (White), Richard Dodge

(White), Dennis Williams (White), James “J.R.” Smith (White), and Shari Degan (White).

22. Pepsis informed these detectives that he wanted to establish a selection committee

to decide who would be able to be a part of the crime scene unit. Pepsis stated that by doing the

credentials as requirements for positions in the crime scene unit that “we” would be able to “get

rid of” Ernell Smith (Black) and myself.

23. Smith and Williams informed Pepsis that they did not want to be part of this

committee. Pepsis then presented his idea to Lt. David Davis (White). Davis denied Pepsis’

request to form a special selection committee.

24. A unit change of command took place around early 2005. Lt. Debra Knapp

(White) and Captain D. D. Melancon (White) were placed in charge of the crime scene unit.

Pepsis, Melancon, Epple, and Dodge decided to institute proficiency training for crime scene

detectives.

25. Pepsis and Melancon also created a tier system to classify detectives by level.

These levels were identified as Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3. Level 1 was identified as the

lowest and Level 3 was identified as the highest. Pepsis also designated certain individuals as

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being on “probationary” status. Pepsis placed himself, Epple, Smith, and Dodge at Level 3. No

non-White detectives were classified as Level 3. Plaintiff was designated as Level 1, non-

probationary. Raymond Bennett (Black) and Michael Gonzalez (Hispanic) were also classified

as Level 1, non-probationary.

26. The first testing dealt with latent fingerprints. Melancon specifically wrote in a

memo dated April 12, 2005, “Sworn personnel will be given one (1) opportunity to successfully

complete the latent print proficiency evaluation. Personnel who fail to successfully complete the

evaluation will be prohibited from conducting latent print comparisons and will be transferred

from the Section as soon as a suitable replacement can be found.” (Emphasis added.)

27. Pepsis failed the latent fingerprint test given to him by Detective Patrick

Genovese (White). Pepsis did not take any further tests after this initial exam. Furthermore,

Krieter (White), Richards (White), and Mitchell (White) also failed the latent fingerprint test.

Despite Melancon’s memo, none of these individuals were removed from the crime scene unit.

28. Historically, instead of testing detectives, the department had ensured detectives’

qualifications through continuous training and education. In 2005, Plaintiff attended the

Ridgeology School and was certified on August 26, 2005.

29. On July 22, 2005, Chief of Police David Kunkle (White) issued a memorandum

regarding proficiency testing. The memo stated, “While the department maintains the right and

responsibility to address performance issues, quarterly proficiency testing is not a tool to force

reassignments or otherwise remove employees from the unit.”

30. In 2006, Detective Pepsis created a Mock Crime Scene Proficiency Evaluation Test

that was administered only to minorities: Bennett, Gonzalez, and Plaintiff. Correct responses to

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the mock crime scene are subjective; they are a matter of opinion. The test was administered

May 3, 2006 by Dodge. Dodge told Plaintiff that he failed the test.

31. Plaintiff’s understanding is that he was to be retested in sixty days.

Approximately 118 days later, on September 26, 2006, Plaintiff was retested by Epple. Epple

told Plaintiff that he failed the test.

32. The test results are contrary to Plaintiff’s actual work performance, where he

continued to investigate serious felonies, including murders. In fact, Plaintiff was assigned to

investigate police involved shootings, a matter that is traditionally reserved to the best detectives

because of the liability issues involved.

33. On October 18, 2006, Plaintiff received a performance report and was ranked that

he met objectives/standards.

34. On February 6, 2007, Plaintiff was informed by Melacon that he was prohibited

from responding to crime scene calls and/or processing crime scenes. Plaintiff was instructed to

remain in the office and perform administrative duties as assigned by supervisory personnel.

35. Because of being assigned to a desk job, Plaintiff lost significant overtime pay

that he had received as a detective.

36. On February 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed an internal grievance alleging discrimination

and retaliation.

37. On February 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC

and the TWC-CRD. Plaintiff alleged that he was being discriminated against because of his

race.

38. On March 12, 2007, Plaintiff met with Melancon. Kate Zimmer (White) also

attended as a witness and took notes. Melancon offered to throw out Plaintiff’s September test

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and reinstate him as an active detective if he dropped my grievance. Plaintiff refused to

withdraw the grievance.

39. On March 13, 2007, Plaintiff was ordered to attend the Ridgeology School once

again. None of the three White workers who failed the latent fingerprint test were ordered to

attend the Ridgeology School.

40. On March 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a second Charge of Discrimination alleging

that he was being discriminated against because of my race as well as being unlawfully retaliated

against.

41. On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff was informed that he would be denied his grievance

hearing rights because he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On information and

belief, Ron Waldrop implemented the denial of Plaintiff’s grievance rights. Furthermore,

Plaintiff was informed that the Grievance Review Committee would not render a decision

because he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Revoking grievance rights would

dissuade a reasonable employee from filing with the EEOC.

42. In July, 2007, after Detective Marshall McLemore (White) failed the proficiency

test for fingerprint evaluation and comparison, Deputy Chief Jesse Reyes (Hispanic) suspended

the quarterly proficiency testing for all other detectives in the crime scene unit. On September

11, 2007, Plaintiff was informed by Verona Hayes (Black) that Pepsis stated to her that the

department had stopped giving proficiency tests on Reyes’ orders.

43. On August 22, 2007, Knapp informed Plaintiff that he must score a 90 on the

comprehensive crime scene qualifying test to remain in the crime scene response section.

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 44. On September 12, 2007, Plaintiff was again administered the Mock Crime Scene

Proficiency Evaluation Test by Epple. On September 27, 2007, Plaintiff was informed that he

had not passed the test.

45. On October 2, 2007, Plaintiff was informed by Knapp that Plaintiff would be

reassigned back to patrol.

46. On October 16, 2007, Plaintiff received a performance report and was ranked that

he met objectives/standards.

47. On October 29, 2007, Plaintiff met with Reyes and Knapp who informed Plaintiff

again that he was being reassigned back to patrol.

48. In November, 2007, Plaintiff was assigned back to patrol. This represented a

significant loss of prestige, less desirable job duties, and less overtime pay than he had as a

detective.

49. On November 13, 2007, the Department determined that it was inappropriate for

officers of equal rank to be testing each other or to perform evaluations. Pepsis, Dodge, and

Epple have the same rank as Plaintiff did and yet they gave tests and made recommendations as

to who should be transferred from the unit.

50. On June 19, 2008, the EEOC issued its determination. The EEOC sustained

Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination and found cause to believe that race discrimination and

retaliation had occurred.

51. On July 11, 2008, Reyes implemented a number of changes to the Field Training

and Evaluation Program. Reyes abolished Pepsis’ tier system with different levels for detectives.

52. On October 16, 2008, the Texas Workforce Commission issued a Notice of Right

to File a Civil Action giving Plaintiff the right to file the instant case.

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 53. All conditions precedent to the bringing of this suit have been satisfied or

fulfilled.

V.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RACE DISCRIMINATION
TEXAS LABOR CODE CHAPTER 21
AGAINST THE CITY OF DALLAS, THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND
TOM LEPPERT AND DAVID KUNKLE IN THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES

54. Plaintiff is an employee under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21.

55. Defendants are employers under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21. Leppert and

Kunkle are sued with regard to this cause of action for purposes of injunctive relief only.

56. Defendants demoted Plaintiff and denied Plaintiff compensation in violation of

Texas Labor Code 21.051 because of Plaintiff’s race.

57. Defendants disciplined Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to retake training classes in

violation of Texas Labor Code 21.051 because of Plaintiff’s race.

58. Defendants classified, segregated, and limited Plaintiff into a racially

discriminatory tier system in a manner that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of any

employment opportunity or adversely affect in any other manner the status of an employee.

59. Defendants harassed Plaintiff in a manner that affected the terms and conditions

of his employment because of Plaintiff’s race.

60. Defendants aided and abetted race discrimination against Plaintiff.

61. Because of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered damages within the

jurisdictional limits of this Court.

IV.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RETALIATION DISCRIMINATION
TEXAS LABOR CODE CHAPTER 21
AGAINST THE CITY OF DALLAS, THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND
TOM LEPPERT AND DAVID KUNKLE IN THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE - Page 9

 62. Plaintiff is an employee under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21.

63. Defendants are employers under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21. Leppert and

Kunkle are sued with regard to this cause of action for purposes of injunctive relief only.

64. Plaintiff opposed a discriminatory practice, made and filed a grievance of

discrimination with the Dallas Police Department, filed a complaint of discrimination with the

EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission – Civil Rights Division, and participated in the

EEOC and State investigations of his complaint.

65. Defendants demoted Plaintiff and denied Plaintiff compensation in violation of

Texas Labor Code 21.051 because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and took protected

activity by filing a discrimination complaint.

66. Defendants disciplined Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to retake training classes in

violation of Texas Labor Code 21.051 because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and

took protected activity by filing a discrimination complaint.

67. Defendants harassed Plaintiff in a manner that affected the terms and conditions

of his employment because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and took protected activity

by filing a discrimination complaint.

68. Because of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered damages within the

jurisdictional limits of this Court.

V.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RACE DISCRIMINATION
42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq.
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

69. Defendants acted adversely against Plaintiff.

70. Plaintiff’s race was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decisions.

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 71. Defendants demoted Plaintiff and denied Plaintiff compensation in violation of

Section 1981 because of Plaintiff’s race.

72. Defendants disciplined Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to retake training classes in

violation of Section 1981 because of Plaintiff’s race.

73. Defendants classified, segregated, and limited Plaintiff into a racially

discriminatory tier system in a manner that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of any

employment opportunity or adversely affect in any other manner the status of an employee.

74. Defendants harassed Plaintiff in a manner that affected the terms and conditions

of his employment because of Plaintiff’s race.

75. Defendants aided and abetted race discrimination against Plaintiff.

76. Because of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered damages within the

jurisdictional limits of this Court.

VI.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RETALIATION
42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq.
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

77. Plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Section 1981, specifically by opposing

race discrimination.

78. Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse action at the time, or after, the protected

conduct took place.

79. There was a causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the

adverse action against him.

80. Defendants demoted Plaintiff and denied Plaintiff compensation in violation of

Section 1981 because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and took protected activity by

filing a discrimination complaint.

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 81. Defendants disciplined Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to retake training classes in

violation of Section 1981 because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and took protected

activity by filing a discrimination complaint.

82. Defendants harassed Plaintiff in a manner that affected the terms and conditions

of his employment because Plaintiff opposed unlawful discrimination and took protected activity

by filing a discrimination complaint.

83. Because of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff suffered damages within the

jurisdictional limits of this Court.

VII.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RACE DISCRIMINATION
42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq.
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

84. The actions of Defendants were under color of the Authority of the State of

Texas. State or local officials act “under color” of the authority of the State when they act within

the limits of their lawful authority. An official acts "under color" of the state authority if he

abuses or misuses a power that he possesses only because he is an official.

85. The Plaintiff’s right to employment free from race discrimination is

Constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.

86. That Plaintiff held employment and was Black was a substantial or motivating

factor in the Defendants’ actions against Plaintiff.

87. The Defendants’ acts were the proximate or legal cause of the Plaintiff’s

damages.

88. Regarding the individually sued Defendants, they had a legal duty to act to

prevent the misdeeds and their failure to act amounted to gross negligence or deliberate

indifference of Plaintiff's rights.

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 VIII.
CAUSE OF ACTION: RETALIATION
42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq.

89. The actions of Defendants were under color of the Authority of the State of

Texas. State or local officials act “under color” of the authority of the State when they act within

the limits of their lawful authority. An official acts "under color" of the state authority if he

abuses or misuses a power that he possesses only because he is an official.

90. The Plaintiff’s made a complaint regarding a violation of Section 1983.

91. That Plaintiff opposed race discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor

in the Defendants’ actions against Plaintiff.

92. The Defendants’ acts were the proximate or legal cause of the Plaintiff’s

damages.

93. Regarding the individually sued Defendants, they had a legal duty to act to

prevent the misdeeds and their failure to act amounted to gross negligence or deliberate

indifference of Plaintiff's rights.

IX.
CAUSE OF ACTION: CONSPIRACY
42 U.S.C. § 1985, et seq.
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

94. Defendants conspired together to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights and his

employment.

95. The conspiracy consisted of two or more persons.

96. The conspiracy was motivated by racial animus.

97. Because of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff suffered damages within the

jurisdictional limits of this Court.

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 X.
DAMAGES

98. Plaintiff seeks his economic damages in the form of lost wages and benefits. This

includes both front and back pay.

99. Plaintiff seeks his damages for lost economic opportunity, including damages to

his career and lost earning potential.

100. Plaintiff seeks compensation for damages to his reputation.

101. Plaintiff seeks compensation for compensatory damages, including damages

related to harassment, mental anguish, and emotional pain.

102. Plaintiff seeks attorney fees, costs, and interest.

103. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including purging his employment file of

discipline and criticism. Plaintiff seeks the injunctive relief of reinstatement. Plaintiff seeks the

injunctive relief of promotion to restore him not only to where he was, but where he would be

today, absent discrimination. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monitoring to prevent future

segregation, discrimination, and harassment on the basis of race in the Dallas Police Department;

as well as monitoring and reporting by this Court, by a special master or other appointee of the

Court, or by such other person or entity as would ensure justice.

104. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

XI.
REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE

105. Plaintiff requests that Defendants disclose the information and/or materials in

Rule 194.2 within fifty days of service of this request.

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 XII.
JURY DEMAND

106. Plaintiff exercises his right to trial by jury and tenders the appropriate fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff respectfully prays that citation be issued

and that upon a trial on the merits that judgment shall be had against Defendants of the type and

amount stated herein, and for such other and further relief to which Plaintiff maybe justly

entitled.

Respectfully submitted,
ROB WILEY, P.C.

__________________________________
By: /s/ Robert J. Wiley
Robert J. Wiley
Texas Bar No. 24013750
Board Certified in Labor and Employment Law
Texas Board of Legal Specialization
Lindsey A. Watson
Texas Bar No. 24067930
ROB WILEY, P.C.
1825 Market Center Blvd., Suite 385
Dallas, Texas 75207
Telephone: (214) 528-6500
Facsimile: (214) 528-6511
rwiley@robwiley.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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