FILOMENA R.

Respondent.

BENEDICTO,

Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIO

VILLAFLORES,

Facts
In 1980, Maria Villaflores (Maria) sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her nephew, respondent
Antonio Villaflores (Antonio). Antonio then took possession of the portion sold to him
and constructed a house thereon. Twelve (12) years later, or on August 15, 1992,
Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the
entire Lot 2-A. However, Antonio did not register the sale or pay the real property
taxes for the subject land.
On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena, evidenced by a
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the sale on September 6, 1994.
Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land.
In September 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation
of Notice of Adverse Claim against Antonio.
S h e a l l e g e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s a l e , s h e w a s n o t aware that Antonio had
any claim or interest over thesubject property.
Antonio assured her that there was no impediment to her acquisition of the land, and
promised to vacate the property five (5) years after the sale. In August1999,
Antonio requested an extension of one (1) year, and offered to pay a monthly
rental which she g r a n t e d . H o w e v e r , i n 2 0 0 0 , A n t o n i o r e f u s e d t o vacate
the property and, instead, claimed absolute ownership of Lot 2-A.
Antonio asserted absolute ownership over Lot 2- A . H e a l l e g e d t h a t h e
p u r c h a s e d t h e s u b j e c t property. He averred that Filomena was aware of the
s a l e ; h e n c e , t h e s u b s e q u e n t s a l e i n f a v o r of Filomena
was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated.
RTC r e n d e r e d a d e c i s i o n s u s t a i n i n g Fi l o m e n a s ownership. According to
the RTC, Filomena was the one who registered the sale in good faith; as such, s h e
h a s b e t t e r r i g h t t h a n A n t o n i o . I t re j e c t e d Antonios allegation
o f b a d f a i t h o n t h e p a r t o f F i l o m e n a b e c a u s e n o s u ffi c i e n t
e v i d e n c e w a s adduced to prove it. It declared Antonio a builder in good faith.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and remanded t h e c a s e t o t h e RTC f o r
f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s t o determine the respective rights of the parties under
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Issue
Whether Antonio is a possessor in good faith.
Ruling
The Court sustained the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith.

Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell
the land to the possessor in good faith. Anent to this, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full
reimbursement is made. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to
administer justice between the parties involved. Guided by this precept, it is
therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the
basis of reimbursement.
However, in spite of its finding of good faith on the part of Antonio by the RTC it did
not order the reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses he incurred.
Hence, the CA correctly ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings.

Heirs of Marcelino Cabal vs. Sps. Lorenzo Cabal and Rosita Cabal
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land
situated. Sometime in 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his wife and his children. It
appears that sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son,
Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of the lot. Since then, Marcelino resided
thereon. Later, Marcelinos son also built his house on the disputed property.
In 1964, Marcelos heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the lot. In the
interim, based on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was revealed that Marcelino
and his son occupied and built their houses on an area located on the southernmost
portion of another lot and not the adjacent lot designated to him. The spouses
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents) confronted Marcelino on this matter which
resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of
reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did
not materialize.
Hence, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages
against Marcelino. They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad
faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled in his
name. Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action against him
because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents
knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set
in.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the lot where Marcelino built his house was co-owned by
Marcelos children
2) Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith
HELD:
1) NO. It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in
1949 with the consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the

disputed lot since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his
father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or share in
the co-ownership was already particularly designated or physically segregated.
Thus, even before the lot was subdivided, Marcelino already occupied the disputed
portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot. Elementary
is the rule that there is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely
determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portion is
still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does make said portion less
determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.
Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion
since 1949, with the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would
have been just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not
one adjacent to it.
2) Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was
informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property. Marcelinos
possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the lot covered
by his title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his
father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware
that he intruded on respondents property when he continued to occupy and
possess the disputed lot after partition was effected.

BERNARDO v BATACLAN
FACTS:
Plaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from Pastor Samonte thru a
contract of sale. Thereafter, Bernardo instituted a case against said vendor to
secure possession of the land. Bernardo was able to obtain a favorable decision
from the court.
The plaintiff found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, in the said premises. It appears that
he has been authorized by former o w n e r s , a s f a r b a c k a s 1 9 2 2 , t o c l e a r
t h e l a n d a n d m a k e improvements thereon.
Thus, plaintiff instituted a case against Bataclan in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite. In this case, plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to be
a possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work
done and improvements made.
Both parties appealed the decision.
The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing the defendant to recover
compensation amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could
require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 down to P200
per hectare.

Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when the decision became final to exercise his
option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him.
On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire "to require the
defendant to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price
of P18,000 for the whole tract of land."
The defendant indicated that he was unable to pay the landand, on January 24, 1934,
an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant
the sum of P2,212.
Subsequently, on April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without
objection on the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at
public auction. The land was sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro for P8,000.
ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COURT
MANDATED COMPENSATION ARISING FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO
HELD:
NO.
Basing on Art 448 of the NCC, where the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith,
a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. The
law provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder
or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. In this case, the plaintiff, as
owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements to pay for the
land. The defendant avers that He is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of
P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him.
Defendant further claims that he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions
of article 453 of the Civil Code. While the said argument is legally tenable, the same
must perforce be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost his right of retention as
he failed to pay for the land. The law, as we have already said, requires no more than
that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of t h e
i m p r o v e m e n t s o r r e q u i r i n g t h e l a t t e r t o p a y f o r t h e land.
Republic v. CA (132 SCRA 514)
Facts:
Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-89709 situated
at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots
adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453

sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.) On 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.
Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the
application for registration.
On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. On 7 March 1975,
Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On 26 June 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on
the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds
covered by TCT 89709.
On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 August 1982,
the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower
cost; without costs. Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
CA.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision
appealed from, and ordered the private respondents to move back the dikes of their
fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to
which it belongs.
No accretion to speak of as the transfer of dikes is man-made and artificial; Article
457 NCC There is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred
their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan Rivers, and thus, if there is
any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. Article 457 of
the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."
Accretion requisites: Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before
an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They
are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through
the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Alluvion as exclusive work of nature indispensable. The requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no
evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers;
but there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made
and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it.
Reason in giving riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a
river. The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or
alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are
exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters
and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice
the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City
of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). In the present case, the riparian owner does not acquire the
additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to
bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards
the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect
their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.
Adjudication of land in question as private property is null and void. The conclusion
that can be made from said alleged accretion being declared for taxation purposes
only in 1972 is that areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after
the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan
river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. Thus, the lower
court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are
therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1
and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open
to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in
question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and
void.