Stalin'sLetterstoMolotov19251936

Pagei

ANNALSOFCOMMUNISM
EachvolumeintheseriesAnnalsofCommunismpublishesselectedandpreviouslyinaccessibledocumentsfromformerSovietstateandpartyarchivesinthe
frameworkofanarrativetextthatfocusesonaparticulartopicinthehistoryofSovietandinternationalcommunism.SeparateEnglishandRussianeditionsare
prepared.RussianandAmericanscholarsselectandannotatethedocumentsforeachvolumetogethertheyexplaintheselectioncriteriaanddiscussthestateof
relevantresearchandscholarlyinterpretation.Documentsarechosennotfortheirsupportofanysingleinterpretationbutfortheirparticularhistoricalimportanceor
theirgeneralvalueindeepeningunderstandingandfacilitatingdiscussion.Thevolumesaredesignedtobeusefultostudents,scholars,andinterestedgeneralreaders.

Pageii

EXECUTIVEEDITOR,ANNALSOFCOMMUNISM
JonathanBrent,YaleUniversityPress
AMERICANEDITORIALADVISORYCOMMITTEE
IvoBanac,YaleUniversity
JeffreyBurds,UniversityofRochester
WilliamChase,UniversityofPittsburgh
VictorErlich,YaleUniversity
SheilaFitzpatrick,UniversityofChicago
GregoryFreeze,BrandeisUniversity
J.ArchGetty,UniversityofCaliforniaatRiverside
RobertL.Jackson,YaleUniversity
LeonLipson,YaleUniversity
CzeslawMilosz,UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley
NormanNaimark,StanfordUniversity
GeneralWilliamOdom,HudsonInstituteandYaleUniversity
DanielOrlovsky,SouthernMethodistUniversity
MarkSteinberg,YaleUniversity
MarkvonHagen,ColumbiaUniversity
PiotrWandycz,YaleUniversity
RUSSIANEDITORIALADVISORYCOMMITTEE
K.M.Anderson,RussianCenterforthePreservationandStudyofDocumentsofRecentHistory(RTsKhIDNI)
N.N.Bolkhovitinov,RussianAcademyofSciences
A.O.Chubarian,RussianAcademyofSciences
V.P.Danilov,RussianAcademyofSciences
F.I.Firsov,formerlyofMoscowStateUniversityandtheCominternArchiveintheRussianCenterforthePreservationandStudyofDocumentsofRecentHistory
(RTsKhIDNI)
V.P.Kozlov,StateArchivalServiceoftheRussianFederation
V.S.Lelchuk,RussianAcademyofSciences
S.V.Mironenko,StateArchiveoftheRussianFederation
O.V.Naumov,RussianCenterforthePreservationandStudyofDocumentsofRecentHistory(RTsKhIDNI)
R.G.Pikhoia,StateArchivalServiceoftheRussianFederation
A.N.Sakharov,RussianAcademyofSciences
T.T.Timofeev,RussianAcademyofSciences
Ye.A.Tiurina,RussianStateArchiveoftheEconomy(RGAE)
GeneralD.A.Volkogonov,advisortothepresidentoftheRussianFederation
SERIESCOORDINATOR,MOSCOW
N.P.Yakovlev

Pageiii

Stalin'sLetterstoMolotov19251936
Editedby
LarsT.Lih,OlegV.Naumov,andOlegV.Khlevniuk
RussianConsultingScholars
L.KoshelevaandL.Rogovaia
V.LelchukandV.Naumov
TranslatedfromtheRussianbyCatherineA.Fitzpatrick
ForewordbyRobertC.Tucker

Pageiv

PublishedwithassistancefromtheNationalEndowmentfortheHumanitiesandtheOpenSocietyFund.
Copyright1995byYaleUniversity.
Allrightsreserved.
Thisbookmaynotbereproduced,inwholeorinpart,includingillustrations,inanyform(beyondthatcopyingpermittedbySections107and108oftheU.S.
CopyrightLawandexceptbyreviewersforthepublicpress),withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublishers.
DesignedbyJamesJ.JohnsonandsetinSabonRomantypebyTheComposingRoomofMichigan,Inc.PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyVailBallou
Press,Binghamton,NewYork.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Stalin'sletterstoMolotov,19251936/editedbyLarsT.Lih,OlegV.Naumov,
andOlegV.KhlevniukRussianconsultingscholarsL.Kosheleva...[etal.]
translatedfromtheRussianbyCatherineA.Fitzpatrick,forewordbyRobertC.
Tucker.
p.cm.(Annalsofcommunism)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0300062117
1.Stalin,Joseph,18791953Correspondence.2.Molotov,Vyacheslav
Mikhaylovich,1890Correspondence.3.HeadsofstateSovietUnion
Correspondence.4.SovietUnionPoliticsandgovernment19171936.I.Lih,
LarsT.II.Naumov,OlegV.III.Khlevniuk,OlegV.IV.Kosheleva,L.
IV.Series.
DK268.S8A41995
947.084'2'092dc209444050
CIP
AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
ThepaperinthisbookmeetstheguidelinesforpermanenceanddurabilityoftheCommitteeonProductionGuidelinesforBookLongevityoftheCouncilonLibrary
Resources.
1098765432

Pagev

Contents
Foreword,
RobertC.Tucker

vii

Preface,
RussianEditorsandScholars

xiii

Acknowledgments

xv

NoteontheDocumentsandtheNarrative

xvii
1

ChapterOne
1925

67

ChapterTwo
1926

97

ChapterThree
1927

133

ChapterFour
1929

145

ChapterFive
1930

187

ChapterSix
19311936

224

Appendix:TheEastmanAffair

241

GlossaryofNames

251

Index

269

Introduction,
LarsT.Lih

Pagevii

Foreword
OnhisaccessiontopowerinMoscowin1985,MikhailGorbachevsetouttoreformthecrisisriddenSovietsystemandsponsoredopenness(glasnost')asameans
tothatend.EventsoftheSovietpast,andespeciallyofStalin'sautocraticrule,becamesubjectsofdiscussioninthepress,andresearchersbegantoreceiveaccessto
longclosedofficialarchivescontainingdocumentsbearingonthoseevents.AfterthecollapseoftheSovietstatein1991,accesstothearchivesfurtherimproved.
Oneofthesignificantconsequencesistheappearanceofthisvolume.ItcontainslettersandnoteswrittenbyStalintohistrustyfollowerViacheslavMolotovduringthe
yearsfrom1925to1936.In1969,theninretirementattheageofseventynine,MolotovturnedthesematerialsovertotheCentralPartyArchive.Now,atlonglast,
theyseethelightofpublication.
Thereaderofthisvolumehasbeenwellservedbyitseditors.OlegV.Naumov,assistantdirectoroftheRussianCenterforthePreservationandStudyofDocuments
ofRecentHistory,OlegV.Khlevniuk,andtheirassociateshaveprovidedageneralpreface,highlyinformativeintroductionstothelettersforeachyearorgroupof
yearscovered,notestothelettersthemselves,andaglossaryofnames.Theintroductionsinclude,insomeinstances,thetextsofotherformerlytopsecretlettersby
oneoranotherhighplacedpersoninStalin'sentourage.TheAmericaneditor,LarsT.Lih,aforemostWesternspecialistonthe1920sintheSovietUnion,has
contributedaninterpretivegeneralintroductionthatprovidesamplebackgroundinformationanddevelopstheviewthattheletterscastmuchlightonhowStalinwent
aboutrunningtheSovietstateduringthoseyears.Thattheycertainlydo.
ItwasStalin'scustomtospendlengthyperiodsfromthelatersummerinto

Pageviii

thefallathisvillaontheBlackSeacoast,wherehewoulddevotehimselftothinkingoutstateaffairswhileatrest.HecorrespondedwithMolotov(insomeinstances
lettersareaddressedtootherPolitburomembersaswell).Molotov,forhispart,kepthiminformedofdevelopmentsinMoscowandcarriedoutdirectionscontained
inStalin'sletters.NocopiesofMolotov'sletterstoStalininthecourseofthiscorrespondencehavecometolight.
ThequestionofselectivityonMolotov'spartarises.TheRussianeditorspointoutthatmostofthelettersarefrom1925,1926,1927,1929,and1930,andthatonlya
relativefewarefrom1931through1936(thereisonlyonefrom1936).Therearenolettersfor1928and1934,twokeyyearsinSoviethistoryandinStalin'srule.
Commentingonthesmallnumberoflettersfrom1931through1936,theRussianeditorsstatethattheselettersrepresentjustasmallportionofthecorrespondence
betweenStalinandMolotovduringthisperiodandadd:"Thecontentsoftheseletterssuggestthatonlythemost'harmless'documents,thosethatinnowaytouched
uponStalin'sandMolotov'sdarkestandmostcriminalactivities,wereselectedforthearchive."Thispointispresumablywelltaken.
Molotov'sownlifewasingravedangerfromStalinin1952andearly1953,whenthenowincreasinglycrazeddictatorwaspreparingtodoawaywithhimand
possiblyothermembersofhisentourageinanewbloodypurgethatonlyhissuddendeathfromastrokeforestalled.Speakingofthattimeinoneofhisconversations
withFeliksChuev,Molotovobserved:"Ithinkthatifhe[thatis,StalinR.T.]hadlivedanotheryearorso,Imightnothavesurvived,butinspiteofthat,Ihave
believedandbelievethathecarriedouttaskssocolossalanddifficultthatnooneofustheninthepartycouldhavefulfilledthem."1Naturally,sinceMolotovremained
truetoStalintotheveryendofhisownlife(hediedin1986attheageofninetysix),hewouldhardlyhaveturnedovertoposterityanylettersfromStalinthatwould
revealhimandbyimplicationMolotovhimselfashishenchmaninanevillight.
Evenafterallthisistakenintoaccount,wemustagreewiththeRussianandAmericaneditorsofthisvolumethatthelettersMolotovallowedtosurvivethrowvaluable
lightonvariouseventsofthoseyearsandhelpresolvesomemattersonwhichhistorianshavediffered.Take,forexample,thesubjectofStalinandforeignaffairs.He
wasnotonlyconcernedwitheconomicpolicyandtheinternalpowerstruggleinthe1920s(assomehavethought)butalsoengrossedinforeignaffairs.Thisweseein
lettersbearingonChinaandGreat
1.

F.Chuev,StosorokbesedsMolotovym:IzdnevnikaF.Chueva(Moscow,1991),279.

Pageix

Britain,whererevolutionarytendenciesseemedafootin19261927.Stalinwentbeyondbeinginterestedandtookituponhimselftobehisownforeigncommissar
actingthroughMolotov.Hewascritical,nottosaycontemptuous,ofhisofficialforeigncommissar,MaksimLitvinov,abasicallyWesternorientedoldBolshevikand
aJew,whomhewouldreplacewithMolotovin1939tosignalhisreadinesstodobusinesswithHitler.WesternleaderswhonegotiatedwithStalinduringWorldWar
IIwouldhavebeeninterestedinhiscommentinalettertoMolotov(9September1929),aproposnegotiationswiththeBritishgovernment:"Rememberweare
wagingastruggle(negotiationwithenemiesisalsostruggle),notwithEnglandalone,butwiththewholecapitalistworld."
Lihraisesthequestion:DidStalindismissworldrevolutioninfavorofbuildinguptheSovietstate(asTrotsky,forone,allegedatthetime),ordidheremaindedicated
toworldrevolution?Lih'sanswer,basedontheletters,isthatinStalin'smindtheSovietstateandinternationalrevolutioncoalesced,andthelettersprovidesupport
forthisview.Theylikewisebearouttheproposition,whichhasbeendevelopedinthescholarlyliterature,thatStalinwasaRussianimperialBolshevikforwhomthe
furtherprogressoftheinternationalCommunistrevolutionandtheterritorialexpansionofSovietRussiaarounditsperipherywereoneandthesameprocess.2Thus
Stalin'sletterof7October1929bruitstheideaoforganizing"anuprisingbyarevolutionarymovement"inadjacentManchuria.Armedintervention(withmainly
Chinesemannedbrigades)would"establisharevolutionarygovernment(massacrethelandowners,bringinthepeasants,createsovietsinthecitiesandtowns,and
soon)."HereisapreviewoftheeffortsthatStalinmadebeginningin1945toencourageseparatistmovementsinManchuriaandSinkiangprovincesinChina,and,
morebroadly,ofthesovietizationimposedafterWorldWarIIonSovietoccupiedneighboringcountriesintheprocessofimperialaggrandizementunderCommunist
banners.AlsorevelatoryofStalin'sRussianimperialbolshevismisapassageinspiredbyapublicspeechofMolotov'sinJanuary1933:"TodayIreadthesectionon
internationalaffairs.Itcameoutwell.Theconfident,contemptuoustonewithrespecttothe'great'powers,thebeliefinourownstrength,thedelicatebutplainspitting
inthepotoftheswaggering'greatpowers'verygood.Letthemeatit."
WhatcanStalin'sletterstoMolotovtellusabouthispersonality?Insofaras
2.

RobertC.Tucker,StalininPower:TheRevolutionfromAbove,19281941(NewYork,1990),4550.

Pagex

thelettersthatMolotovwaswillingtosharewithposteritycastlightonthematter,theytellus,firstofall,thatStalinwastotallyconsumedbypolitics.Thelengthy
sojournsinthesouthwerelessvacationsintheordinarysensethanopportunitiestoconcentratehisboundlessenergyonpolitics,toreadSovietnewspapersandother
officialdocuments,tothinkouthispoliticalpositionsonmenandevents,andtocommunicatehispoliticalwilltotheoligarchyviatheeverobedientMolotov.Although
hesometimesaddedregardstoMolotov'swifeattheendofaletter,onewouldnotknowfromthemthathetoohadawife(untillate1932,whenshecommitted
suicide)andchildrenofhisown.UnlikemostRussians,whohavetheireasygoinginterludes,thisGeorgianbornleaderwasathinking,reacting,plottingpolitician
duringeverywakinghour.AsLihputsit,hewasStalin''atwork."Indeed,untilthedayofhisfatalstroke,1March1953,atwhichtimehewasactivelyplottingand
preparinghisown"finalsolution"fortheJewsofSovietRussiaandtheeliminationof,amonghighlyplacedothers,Molotov(andhisJewishwife),Stalinremained
actively"atwork."
TheStalinoftheletters,asLihagainargues,wasanastuteandeffectiveleaderwhocametotheforeinthepostLeninBolshevikhierarchylargelybyvirtueofhis
uncommonleadershipcapability:hiscapacitytoassesspersonalitiesandsituationsandprescribemeasuresfordealingwiththemthatservedhisinterests.Hewas
neitherthemediocritythatanoldstereotypemadehimouttobe,norjustapoliticalbossandmachinepoliticianwhorosetosupremepowerbyexploitingtheauthority
tomakeappointmentsthathepossessedasthepartyCentralCommittee'sgeneralsecretary.Notthatplacementandreplacementofcadreswasamatterofsmall
concerntohim.Buthewasindefatigableinhisstrivingtofunctionasaleader.Whatthatmeanttohimisreflectedina1929letterinwhichhedismissedtheold
BolshevikYe.Yaroslavskiibecause"heisweakinthepoliticalleadershipdepartment(helovestoswimalong'withthetide'ofthesentimentofthe'masses')."
Stalin'sstrengthinthat"department"securedtheremovalofthreeopponentsfromthePolitburoin19291930:Bukharin,Rykov,andTomskii,whomhecalled
"rightists"(infacttheywereBolsheviksonthemoderateleft).ItlikewisepropelledhimtoofficialpublicrecognitionasLenin'ssuccessorastheSovietregime'snew
supremeleaderorvozhd',inotherwordsandtherebypavedthewayforhistransformationoftheregimeandsystemduringthe1930s.Inthisprocess,hemade
himselfintoanabsoluteautocratonthemodelofsixteenthcenturyIvantheTerrible,aheroinhiseyes.
ButinspeakingofStalinasahighlyeffectiveleader,aqualificationiscalled

Pagexi

for.HisformidableleadershipskillswereeffectiveinthequestforpersonalpowerandsubsequentlyfortheaggrandizementofthereconstitutedRussianempirethat
wastheUSSR.Buttheseveryskillsprovedabsolutelydisastrousforthecountryanditspeople,andfortherulingCommunistPartyitself:inthecourseofthe
terroristicmasscollectivizationofthepeasantryandtheGreatTerrorinthe1930s,inStalin'srelationswithHitlerin19391941,inhisdirectionoftheRedArmy
duringtheensuingSovietGermanwar,andintheColdWaragainsttheWestafterwards.HowandwhythiswassoisatopicbeyondthescopeofthisForeword,but
thefactmustbestated.Thefundamentalexplanation,Iwouldmaintain,isthatStalin'ssupremeaim,towhichhewaswillingtosacrificeeverythingotherthanpower,
wasglory.AndhisquestforgloryhadcatastrophicconsequencesforSovietRussiaandtheworld.
GiventhecensorshipthatMolotovmusthaveexercisedinselectingthelettersthatsurvived,wewouldnotexpectthemtorevealanotherkeyfacetofStalin's
personalitythequalitiesthatunderlayhismurderousrampageinthe1930sandbeyond,whosestilluncountedvictimsnumberinthetensofmillionsandstamphim
as,ifnotthegreatestsinglecriminalinworldhistory,then,alongwithHitler,oneofthetwogreatest.Andyet,thelettershavesomethingtosaytousevenonthis
score.
First,theyshowthathismindworkedconspiratoriallyandwasatitsmostcreative,sotospeak,insofunctioning.WeseetheStalinofthelettersdevising
conspiratorialexplanationsforthemanifoldshortagesandbreakdownscausedbyhismadcapindustrializationunderthefiveyearplan(19281932)explanations
thatfoundthecausationin"wrecking"activitiesbycovertenemies.Andweseehimdevisingscriptsforshowtrialsofthesealleged"wreckers"whowouldbeforced
undertorturetoconfesstoconspiringagainsttheSovietstate.Now,amindsostronglygiventothinkinginconspiratorialtermswasonethatwouldalsocarryona
conspiratorialwaragainstpoliticaladversariesorthoseconsideredtobesuch.Inthissense,thelettersoftheearly1930scastlightonStalin'sowngreatconspiracyof
themiddletolater1930sagainsttheregimeandtheCommunistPartyasthenconstituted.
Second,thelettersshowthatStalinwastotallydevoidofthemostelementaryhumanfeelingforthosewhofellvictimtooneoranotherofhispoliticaldesigns.Their
sufferinganddeaths,andthesufferingoftheirlovedones,weremattersofcompleteindifferencetothismanwhosofearedforhisownlife,wasinfactsuchacoward,
thatthesecurityarrangementsconcerninghisownpersonalsafetywereunprecedentedlyelaborate.Thus,writinginearlyAugust1930abouttheshortageofcoinsin
thefinancialsystem,Stalinfinds"wrecker

Pagexii

elementsfromtheGosbankbureaucracy"responsibleandprescribesapurgeoftheFinanceandGosbankapparatusthatwouldinvolve"definitelyshoot[ing]twoor
threedozenwreckersfromtheseapparaty,includingseveraldozencommoncashiers."Stillmoretothepoint,hewascompletelyindifferenttothemassivefamineand
starvationthatresultedfromhisrelentlesspressurereflectedintheletterstoexportverylargequantitiesofgraininordertobuyforeignmachineryandhelpwith
industrialization.
GivenStalin'sindifferencetothesufferinganddeathdirectlyresultingfromhispolicydecisionsandhishabituallycalmandcollectedmannerinpublicappearancesas
wellasinmeetingswithhighlevelforeignvisitors,heacquiredthereputationofbeinganunemotionalpersonwhowascoldbloodedlycalculatinginallhisstatecraft.
Hecouldbethatonoccasion.Butbehindthescenesandthelettersareveryrevealinginthisrespecthewasanextremelyemotionalman.Butthisemotionalitywas
onedimensional.Hisbasicemotionwasanger,vindictiveandvengefulanger.WhenSovietofficialsorothersactedinwaysthatcontravenedhisdictatesor,ingeneral,
displeasedhim,hewouldexplodeinrage.HisletterstoMolotovoccasionallyrevealtheseoutburstsofanger.When,forexample,shortagesappearedthatshowedhis
regimeinanegativelight,aninfuriatedStalinwouldinsistthatsupposedlyguiltyofficialsbeputtodeathas"wreckers"and"saboteurs."Theyhadtobetreatedas
conspiringclassenemies.AsLihobserves,"ThevividinvectiveofthelettersbeliestheimageofthecoldbloodedStalin."
Bythemid1930s,onceStalinheldabsolutepower,hisvindictiveangerinflictedsufferinganddeath,notonlyonindividualsandsmallgroups,butonentiresectionsof
thepopulation,includingaverylargeproportionoftherulingCommunistParty.Indeed,thisman'sangerbecamegenocidalinsweep.
Allthemorepressingforthehistorianbecomesthequestionofwhattypicallyarousedit.Thelettersthemselvescannotgiveustheanswertothisquestion.Asa
biographerofStalin,IwillconcludewiththepropositionthatwhatfrequentlyarousedStalin'sdeathdealingangerandvindictivenesswasspeechoractionthat,
directlyorindirectly,negatedhislifelongsearchforglory,thatcontradictedhisimageofhimselfastheleaderofgeniusthatheneededtobeandnotthecatastrophic
onethathewas.
ROBERTC.TUCKER

Pagexiii

Preface
InDecember1969attheageofseventynine,ViacheslavM.MolotovturnedovertotheCentralPartyArchiveattheInstituteofMarxismLeninismseventynine
originallettersandnoteshehadreceivedfromJosefVissarionovichStalin.FormanydecadesMolotovoccupiedtoppositionsintheSovietUnion'spartystate
hierarchyasaPolitburomember,chairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars,andministerofforeignaffairs.ThesonofabailifffromViatskprovince,Molotovbeganhis
dizzyingcareerbybecomingoneofStalin'smostloyalcomradesinarmsduringthe1920shedidnothesitatetosupportStalininthestruggleagainstallopposing
factions,andhewaspreparedtoobeyanyordertheleaderwouldgivehim.Inacertainsense,the1920sand1930scouldbeconsideredthesummitofMolotov's
politicalcareer.LikeothermembersofthePolitburo,MolotovplayedarelativelyindependentpoliticalroleuntilStalin'stotalrulewasfullyestablished.Molotov's
supportwasimportanttoStalin'sefforttoensureamajorityinthePolitburo.Forthisreason,Stalincorrespondedregularlywithhissupporters,guidingtheiractions,
carefullyfollowingtheirmoves,andgivingthemadviceanddirections.StalinwasaparticularlyactivecorrespondentwhenhewasvacationingoutsideMoscow.
DuringthemanyyearsthatSovietpoliticalhistoryhasbeenstudied,scholars(primarilyWestern)haveprovidedmanyinterestingassessmentsofthestrugglewithinthe
upperechelonsoftheKremlinleadershipofthenatureandmechanismsofpartystateruleinthe1920sand1930sandfinally,ofthepersonalityofStalinhimself.But
researchers'opportunitieswerelimited.Theirconclusionsweredrawnfromindirecttestimoniesandsecondhanddocuments.Thepublicationofprimarysourcesthus
acquiresparticularlygreatsignificance,especiallyletterswrittenbyaSovietleader.IntheselettersStalinreveals,inthe

Pagexiv

mostcandidanddirectway,thedevelopmentofthebasicideasthatwerelaterimplementedasofficialpolicy.Relativelyfewsuchprimarydocumentshavepreviously
beenavailable.AndthiscollectionoflettersfromStalintoMolotovisuniquelyvaluable.
Stalin'sletterstoMolotovfrom1925,1926,1927,1929,and1930andanumberofnotesthetwoleadersexchangedduringmeetingsofthePolitburoconstitutethe
mainbodyofthedocuments.Theselectionfortheyear1926alsoincludessixcodedtelegramsthatStalinandMolotovexchangedduringtheirdiscussionsof
internationalaffairsandonecodedtelegramfromTovstukhatoStalin.Theperiodfrom1931through1936isrepresentedbyonlyafewdocuments.Lettersfrom
otheryears(notably1928)aremissingaltogether.ItisnotknownwhetherMolotovturnedoverallthedocumentsinhispossessionoronlyaportionofthem.
Nevertheless,despitetheirfragmentarynature,theletterspreservedcontainunparalleledinformation,andtheyenableustosubstantiallybroadenandrefineour
understandingofthenatureandmechanismoftheSovietUnion'spartystateleadershipinthe1920sand1930s.Theyalsoofferaninvaluablesourceforstudying
Stalinasanindividual.
TheintroductorysectionsforeachyearandthenoteshelptoelucidatethemeaningofStalin'sletters.Wedonotclaimtoprovideanexhaustiveanalysisofthese
letters.Ourtaskismodest:toenableresearchersandinterestedreaderstofamiliarizethemselveswiththetexts,toprovideinsightintotheirmeaningandcontent,and
topresentthehistoricalbackgroundofthecorrespondence.
ManyofthepoliticaleventsaboutwhichStalinwroteareunfamiliartohistorians.Documentsconcerningtheactivitiesoftopgovernmentofficialshaveonlyrecently
becomeavailable.Theyhaveasyetbeenpoorlystudied,andforthemostparttheyhavenotbecomegenerallyfamiliartotheacademicaudience.Forthisreason,as
muchnewmaterialaspossibleispresentedintheintroductorysectionsandinthenotesthemajorityofthesenewdocumentsarepublishedinfull,notextracted.
Unfortunately,acertainnumberofimportantsourcesarestillinaccessible.Thefinaldecisionsonanumberofissuesmentionedintheletters,forexample,weremade
undertherubricofthe"SpecialFile,"thehighestformofsecrecyintheSovietUnion.Documentsgiventhisclassification,includingdocumentsthatconcernmanyof
theissuesrelatingtoforeignpolicythatarediscussedinthe1927letters,arestillintheRussianPresidentialArchiveandareinaccessibletoresearchers.Alldecisions
thatweresenttotheSpecialFileareflaggedinthenotes.
RUSSIANEDITORSANDSCHOLARS

Pagexv

Acknowledgments
Iwouldliketothankthefollowingpeople:JonathanBrent,forinvitingmetoparticipateintheAnnalsofCommunismseries,aprojectofthehighestscholarlyvalue
RobertC.Tucker,fortakingtimeawayfromhisbiographyofStalintowriteaforewordtothisvolumeJaneHedges,forherexpertassistanceandhighstandards.A
grantfromtheNationalCouncilofSovietandEastEuropeanAffairspartlysupportedtheresearchonwhichmyintroductionwasbasedthecouncil,however,isnot
responsibleforitscontentormyfindings.
LARST.LIH

Pagexvii

NoteontheDocumentsandtheNarrative
AllthelettersfromStalintoMolotovpresentedinthisvolumearelocatedintheRussianCenterforthePreservationandStudyofDocumentsofRecentHistory
(Rossiiskiitsentrkhraneniiaiizucheniiadokumentovnoveisheiistorii,hereafterRTsKhIDNI).Stalin'slettersarelocatedinfond558,opis1,delo5388.Thearchival
andreferencenumbersofotherdocumentsareprovided.
Stalin'sletterstoMolotovareallhandwritteninpenorpencil,exceptfornumber83,whichistyped.Notalltheletterscarryoriginaldates.WhenMolotovpresented
hiscollectiontothearchive,hepenciledanestimateddateoneachletter,butinanumberofcaseshewasmistaken.Stalinhimselfwrotetheyear1926onseveral
lettersdealingwitheventsthatdefinitelyoccurredin1927.Allcorrectionstothedatesarediscussedinthenotes.Thedateappearinginbracketsatthetopoftheletter
isthecorrecteddate.Thelettersarepresentedinchronologicalorderandarenumberedconsecutively.
Intheletters,wordsthatwereunderlinedonceappearhereinitalic,wordsthatwereunderlinedtwiceinbold.Itisnotpossibletoascertainwhethertheunderlining
wasdonebyStalin,byMolotov,orbyalaterreader,sincealloftheunderliningwasaddedbyhand.Allellipses(...)inthelettersareintheoriginals.(Whenthe
lettersarequotedelsewhereinthetext,underliningisnotalwaysretained,andellipsesusedelsewhereindicateomissionsmadebytheeditorsunlessotherwisenoted.)
SomeofthelettersincludecommentswrittenbyothermembersofthePolitburo:briefcommentsarepresentedinthenotes,longerremarksappearafterStalin'stext.
TheRussianeditorsandscholarswrotethetextthatintroducesthelettersfor

Pagexviii

eachyear.TheyalsopreparedthebiographicalmaterialintheGlossaryofNames(theinformationprovidedisgenerallyrestrictedtotheperiodcoveredbythe
letters).TheU.S.editionwasprepareddirectlyfromthetranscriptprovidedbytheRussianeditors,withoutreferencetotheoriginalletters.TheU.S.editoreditedthe
translation,wrotetheIntroduction,andaddedallmaterialinbrackets,unlessotherwisenoted.NotesbytheRussianeditorsappearwithoutattribution.Notesbythe
U.S.editorandthetranslatoraresolabeled.Anumberofnotesarerepeatedinfullsothateachlettercanbereadwithoutreferencetoearlierones.
SomeoftheselettershavealreadyappearedinRussianinSovietperiodicals.Thelettersfrom1925(letters1through10)canbefoundinIzvestiiaTsK,no.9(1990):
18492.Letters50,56,57,59,62,65,66,68,78,and79werepublishedinKommunist,no.11(1990):94106.

Pagexx

MolotovandStalin

Page1

Introduction
DoyoudreamaboutStalin?
Notoften,butsometimes.ThecircumstancesareveryunusualI'minsomesortofdestroyedcity,andIcan'tfindanywayout.AfterwardsImeetwithhim.Inaword,verystrange
dreams,veryconfused.
V.M.MOLOTOV

In1969,themanwhoselongassociationwithStalinresultedinsucheeriedreams,ViacheslavM.Molotov,turnedoverapacketofletterstopartyauthorities.Forthe
mostpart,StalinwrotetheseletterstoMolotovduringtheyears1925to1936whileawayfromMoscowonwhatappeartoberatherfrequentvacations.Although
generallyaddressedtoMolotov,theletterswereoftenintendedforStalin'salliesinthePolitburo.Inhismemoirs,Molotovdescribestheselettersasbothpersonaland
officialtheycontainmusingsonpoliticalevents,argumentsmeanttopersuadefellowPolitburomembers,andspecificinstructions.1Detailed,handwrittenletterswere
evidentlynecessarygiventhelackofareliabletelephonelinkbetweenMoscowandSochi(whereStalin'sBlackSearesortwaslocated).Wethereforehaveprimitive
communicationstechnologytothankforauniquesetofdocumentsthatthrowasearchinglightonhowStalinapproachedhisjobofrunningtheSovietstate.
Thelettersputusinthemiddleofmanycrucialepisodesduringadramaticperiodoftransformation.WeseeStalinfightingagainstpartyrivalslikeTrotskyand
Bukharin,tryingtomaneuverinthe
1.

F.Chuev,StosorokbesedsMolotovym:IzdnevnikaF.Chueva(Moscow,1991),277.Molotov'sconversationswithChuevareavailableinEnglish:MolotovRemembers:Inside
KremlinPolitics,ed.AlbertResis(Chicago,1993).AbiographicalsketchofMolotovcanbefoundinRoyMedvedev,AllStalin'sMen(NewYork,1985).

Page2

rapidsoftheChineserevolution,insistingonthecompletionofalloutcollectivization,andorderingtheexecutionofscapegoatsforeconomicfailures.Thevalueofthe
correspondenceisgreatlyenhancedbythecomprehensiveannotationprovidedbytheRussianside.Theyhaveelucidatedmuchthatwouldotherwisehaveremained
mysteriousandhavealsogivenussupplementaryarchivaldocumentsofthehighestinterest.
StalinatWork
In1925,whentheStalinMolotovcorrespondencebegins,StalinhadbeengeneralsecretaryoftheCommunistPartyforseveralyears.Theofficialdutiesofthe
Secretariatconcernedinternalpartymattersthatweresupposedtobebelowthelevelofhighpolicy,andthepostofgeneralsecretarywasnotyettheunchallenged
leadershippositionitlaterbecameasaresultofStalin'sascendancy.TheletterssometimesreflectanalmostconsciousapprenticeshiponStalin'spart:heextendshis
policymakingroleintoeconomicanddiplomaticaffairswithgreaterandgreaterassurance.
MolotovhadactuallyheldthepostofpartysecretarypriortoStalin.AdecadeyoungerthanStalin,Molotovwasrenownedforhisbureaucraticefficiency,buthedid
nothaveanyindependentpoliticalauthority.In1922thepartyleadersdecideditwouldbebettertohaveaseniorpartyfigureheaduptheSecretariat,andStalinwas
giventhejob.MolotovremainedintheSecretariatandsoonbecameafullmemberofthePolitburo.
Molotovalwaysseemedrathercoldandunemotional,occasionallyrevealingastreakofaggressivepedantrythatwasextremelyirritatingtootherpartyleaders.They
calledhimStoneBottom,anicknamethatwasdismissiveandyetrespectfulofhishugecapacityforwork.HisheroworshipofStalinseemsgenuineenough,andhis
roleasStalin'srighthandmanisevidentfromtheletters.Hewouldarguewithhisbossonoccasion,butalwaysinanefforttopointoutwhatwouldbeinStalin'sbest
interest.Molotovwaslaterrewardedforhisloyaltywithanumberofimportantposts,includingheadofthegovernmentandministerofforeignaffairs.
TowardtheendofStalin'slife,Molotovfellintodisfavor.HewasforcedtoparticipateinthePolitburomeetingthatapprovedthe

Page3

arrestofhiswife(Molotovabstained).Nevertheless,afterStalin'sdeath,MolotovremainedloyaltoStalin'smemory,andhisunreconstructedviewsledeventuallytoa
fallingoutwithNikitaKhrushchevandtohisexpulsionfromtheparty.Molotovdoggedlyappliedforreinstatementandwasrewardedwithapartycardshortlybefore
hisdeathin1986.
ThepresentcollectionoflettersbeginsatatimewhentheBolshevikpartywasapproachingaturningpoint.ThedecadefromthebeginningofWorldWarIto1925
wasaperiodofsocialandeconomicbreakdownandreconstitutionforRussia.Thelowpointoccurredinthewinterof19201921.Theeconomicupswingmade
possiblebytheendofhostilitiesassociatedwiththecivilwarwasfurtherstrengthenedbytheNewEconomicPolicy(NEP)thatwasintroducedinthespringof1921.
Theessenceofthenewpolicywasashorttermtolerationofprivatecapitalistsandmiddlemen,combinedwithalongertermacceptanceofaregulatedmarketasthe
keyeconomiclinkbetweensocializedindustryandpeasantfarms.TheBolsheviksassumedthat,atsomefuturedate,industrywouldbeadvancedenoughtoallow
Russianagriculturetobereorganizedintolargeproductiveunits.Inthemeantime,industrialgrowthhadtorelyonthesurplusproducedbysmallpeasantfarms.
By1925theeconomywasonthevergeofreachingprewarlevels.Thisrecoverywasshakyandinfirm,however,sincetheorgyofdestructionanddemoralizationthat
hadoccurredfrom1914to1921couldnotbemadeupinafewyears'time.Furthermore,therestoftheworldhadnotstoodstill.ThustheBolshevikswereleftinan
evenweakerinternationalpositionthanpreviousRussiangovernmentshadoccupied.Still,bylate1925theBolshevikswerepreparingtomakeanadvancebeyond
simplerecoveryundertheguidanceofageneralstrategythathadanumberofoptimisticassumptionsbuiltintoit:thesuperiorproductivityofnationalizedindustry,the
availabilityofmarketedsurplusesofagriculturalgoods,andarelativelybenigninternationalenvironment.
Perhapsbecauseofthisoptimism,Stalindevoteslittleattentiontoeconomicquestionsinthelettersfrom1925,1926,and1927.Hecommentsin1926:''Iamnot
alarmedbyeconomicmatters.Rykovwillbeabletotakecareofthem.Theoppositionwinsabsolutelyzeropointsoneconomicmatters"(letter20).AlthoughAleksei

Page4

Rykovwasofficialheadofthegovernmentinthemid1920s,hewasarelativelycolorlessfigurewhomhistorianshaveleftinthebackground.Stalin'sremarkhintsthat
hisrolemayhavebeengreaterthanwesuspected.
Inthelettersfromthemid1920sStalin'sprincipaleconomicconcernistoensurethatthePolitburomaintainscontrolovereconomicquestions,despitetheresistance
ofplanningspecialists,"monopolistic"statesyndicates,andlowerleveltradingcooperatives.OneitemofparticularinterestisStalin'sskepticalattitudein1925toward
theDneprostroiprojectaproposedhydroelectricstationthatlaterbecameasymbolofStalin'sindustrialachievements(letters2and3).WeknowthatStalinvoted
againsttheprojectinApril1926,buthereweseethathismisgivingsdatebacktoamuchearlierstage.Stalinfeltthatacommissionthathadbeenestablishedunder
Trotsky'sleadershipwouldbetoohastyinbeginningtheproject.(Heneednothaveworried,forinfactTrotskyusedhisinfluencetoslowitdown.)2Stalinlearned
abouttheDneprostroicommissionfromanewspaperarticle,andindeedthisseemstohavebeenhismainsourceofeconomicinformation,atleastwhilehewason
vacation.
Themid1920swereaturningpointforbolshevismpoliticallyaswellaseconomically.TheBolshevikshadalwaysfeltthatoneofthereasonstheywereabletosurvive
inanextremelyhostileworldwastheunityofwhattheycalledthetopleadershipnucleus.UnlikealmostallotherRussianparties,theBolshevikshadnotallowedthe
inevitabledissensionsandtheclashofambitionstodrivethepartyapartduringthecivilwarandthefirstyearsofNEP.Everyonerealizedthatthisremarkablepolitical
featstemmedfromLenin'suniquepositioninthepartyandthatthingswouldbeverydifferentafterhisdeath.SincenoonecouldduplicateLenin'sstatus,theremaining
leadershadtodevelopnewmethodsforensuringunity.Thisprocessisreflectedinthelettersfrom1925through1927,whicharestronglypreoccupiedwiththe
politicalbattlewithinthePolitburoagainstTrotskyandZinoviev.Stalin'sattitudestowardhisrivalsarereflectedinmanyotherlettersthroughoutthecollec
2.

AnneD.Rassweiler,TheGenerationofPower:TheHistoryofDneprostroi(Oxford,1988).

Page5

tion.Takentogether,theletterssuggesttheneedtoreconsiderthewaywelookattheleadershipstrugglesafterLenin'sdeath.
In1925,mostobserversfeltthatthecountrywasrunbyatriumvirateconsistingofZinoviev,Kamenev,andStalin,withTrotskyalreadyrelegatedtothesidelines.
TrotskyhadbeenopenlyatoddswithhisPolitburocolleaguesforseveralyearsbefore1925.Bytheendof1923,hehadmanagedtoenragetherestofhisPolitburo
colleaguessothoroughlythattheyformedashadowPolitburo:thesemerka(theseven),aninstitutionthatplaysalargeroleinStalin'slettersfromthemid1920s.The
seven'ssolepurposewastoconductPolitburobusinesswithoutTrotsky'sparticipation.TrotskydidnotevenknowthesevenexisteduntilZinovievtoldhimwhenthey
joinedforcesin1926.
Stalin'sletterstoMolotovgiveusacloseupviewofsomedramaticepisodesinthisbattleamongthetopleaders.In1925thePolitburotookStalin'ssuggestionand
compelledTrotskytoissueapublicrefutationofabookwrittenbyhisAmericanadmirerMaxEastman.The"Eastmanaffair"haspreviouslybeendescribedasa
cynicalcoverupinwhichthetriumvirateforcedTrotskytotellconsciouslies.Thelettersandotherdocumentsallowamuchdifferentinterpretation.
AnothersplitwithinthePolitburowasdramaticallyrevealedattheXIVPartyCongressinlate1925.Forreasonsofbothpolicyandambition,ZinovievandKamenev
rebelledandcalledforStalin'sremovalfromthepostofgeneralsecretary.Theireffortfailedutterlyduringthewinterof19251926Zinovievevenlostcontrolofhis
politicalbaseinLeningrad.EventhoughZinovievhadformerlybeenoneofthemostprominentTrotskybaitersintheleadership,henowfeltitexpedienttojoinforces
withhiserstwhilefoe.Thuswasformedtheunitedleftopposition,whichopenlychallengedthePolitburomajorityfromaleftiststandpointuntillate1927,whenits
leaderswerethrownoutoftheparty.TrotskyendedupinexileZinovievandKamenevrecantedandweresoonreinstated.
AlargenumberofStalin'slettersin1926and1927dealwithforeignpolicy,particularlywithrevolutionarystirringsinEnglandandChina.Stalin'sintenseinvolvement
beliestheimageofanisolationistleaderinterestedonlyin"socialisminonecountry."The

Page6

lettersshowusthatStalindidnotmakearigiddistinctionbetweentheinterestsofworldrevolutionandtheinterestsoftheSovietstate:bothconcernsarecontinually
presentinhisoutlook.
AlthoughtheBritishgovernmenthadrecognizedtheSovietUnionin1924,theConservativePartythatwasreturnedtopowerattheendoftheyearwas
uncomfortablewithanydealingswithbombthrowingBolsheviks.RelationswerefurtherstrainedbytheenthusiasmwithwhichtheBolsheviksgreetedthebriefgeneral
strikeof1926andthemoralandmaterialsupporttheygavetothestrikingminers.Backathome,theleftoppositionattackedthePolitburofornotbeingrevolutionary
enough.Theoptimismof1926didnotlastlong:workingclassmilitancyinEnglandpeteredoutandtheConservativegovernmentbrokeoffdiplomaticrelationsin
1927.WhenaLabourgovernmentwasformedin1929,itpromptlyextendedrecognitiontotheSovietUnionstill,revolutionaryfeelingamongtheBritishworking
classdidnotresurface.3
RelationswithChinawereevenmorecomplex,sinceChinawasexperiencingitsownrevolutionaryupheavalinthemid1920s.Themovementagainsttheimperialist
powerswasspearheadedbythegovernmentatCantoncontrolledbytheKuomintang,thenationalistpartyfoundedbySunYatsen.AlliedtotheKuomintangwasthe
newlyformedChineseCommunistParty.ThanksinlargeparttoRussianpoliticalandmilitaryadvisors,theKuomintangwaspreparedin1926toundertakethe
NorthernExpeditioninanefforttouniteacountryrenderedpowerlessbyinternaldivisions.TheNorthernExpeditionwasaphenomenalmilitarysuccess,butitquickly
ledtodivisionswithinthecampoftheChineserevolutionaries.Bythemiddleof1927,theChineseCommunistsfoundthemselvesisolatedanddrivenunderground,
firstbyChiangKaishekandthenbythesocalledleftKuomintanggovernmentlocatedinWuhan.
TheBolshevikleadersviewedeventsinChinawiththehopethatanationalistandantiimperialistgovernmentwouldunitethecountryandstrikeablowattheworld
powerofWesterncapitalism.Tothisend,theycounseledtheChineseCommunistPartytoworkascloselyaspossiblewiththeKuomintangandlaterwiththe
3.

DanielF.Calhoun,TheUnitedFront:TheTUCandtheRussians,19231928(Cambridge,1976).

Page7

Wuhangovernment.Theleftoppositionroundlycriticizedthis"rightist"policyofcooperationwiththebourgeoisiethatledeventuallytodisasterfortheChinese
Communists.4
PolicytowardbothChinaandGreatBritainwasthusamatterofintensedisputeamongtheBolshevikleaders.ThedramaticPolitburoshowdownwithZinovievin
June1926involvedpolicytowardtheBritishtradeunions.Inspiteofthispartisandimension,thelettersrevealStalin'sgenuineenthusiasmaboutrevolutionary
prospectsin1926aswellashisreactiontodefeatin1927.Particularlyrevealingarethelettersfrom1927writtenatthemomentwhenStalinhadtofaceuptotheruin
ofhisChinapolicy.
After1927theprospectofrevolutionelsewherediminished,andStalin'sforeignpolicyconcernswereconfinedtosuchissuesasdiplomaticrecognitionfromGreat
BritainandtheUnitedStates.HisinterestinChinanowfocusedontheChineseEasternRailway,whichranthroughManchuria.Thisrailroad,builtduringtsaristtimes,
wasofstrategicimportancetotheSovietgovernmentasthemostefficientroutetoVladivostok.ThedefactorulerofManchuria,awarlordnamedChangTsolin,
wantedcompletecontrolovertherailroad.Thedisputeovertherailroadculminatedinabriefarmedclashin1929betweentheSovietgovernmentandChang'sson
(ChangHsuehliang).5EventhoughthedisputeovertheChineseEasternRailwaywasentirelyamatterofstate,Stalinvieweditthroughtheprismofrevolutionary
interests.HeevenoutlinedascenarioforretainingcontrolovertherailroadbyinstigatinganinstantrevolutioninManchuria.
From1925to1927,StalinworkedcloselywithbothNikolaiBukharin,editorofPravda(thepartynewspaper)andprincipalpartytheorist,andAlekseiRykov,head
oftheSovietgovernmentandtopeconomicadministrator.TherearenoletterstoMolotovfrom1928,whichisapitybutwhichaddstothedramaticeffectwhenthe
curtainrisesin1929andwefindStalinandMolotovplottingagainsttheirerstwhileallies,BukharinandRykov.ThereasonfortheconflictwasStalin'sradical
"offensivealongthe
4.

C.MartinWilburandJulieLienyingHow,MissionariesofRevolution:SovietAdvisersandNationalistChina,19201927(Cambridge,Mass.,1989).

5.

ForbackgroundontheconflictovertheChineseEasternRailwayin1929,seeE.H.Carr,FoundationsofaPlannedEconomy,vol.3(NewYork,197678),895910.

Page8

wholefront,"whichattemptedtocombineafranticpaceofindustrializationwithalloutcollectivizationinagriculture.Stalin'sgeneraloffensivemeanttheendofNEP
anditsuseofthemarkettolinkthepeasantswithstateindustry.BukharinandRykov,whofoundthispolicyillconceivedanddangerous,werecondemnedasleaders
ofthe"rightdeviation."6
Thelettersfrom1929and1930touchonallaspectsofthisgreattransformation.Stalin'shighpressureindustrialpoliciesledtoanupheavalintheeconomythatleftthe
governmentstrugglingtomaintainasemblanceofcontrol.ThelettersshowStalin'sresponsetothisemergencyasheceaselesslyshufflespersonnelinordertoputthe
rightpersonintherightposition.AmoredestructiveresponsetotheunendingstreamoffoulupsandbreakdownswastoassignallblametoenemieswithintheSoviet
governmentitself.Anideologycenteredon"wrecking"findsexpressionintheletters.Formanyobservers,upwardmobilityviapromotionofftheshopfloor
(vydvizhenie)wasakeysourceofsupportfortheStalinistsystem.ItisthusironictofindStalininveighingagainstvydvizhenieasdisruptive(letter69).
OnlyscatteredpassagesinthelettersshowStalin'sattitudetowardgrainprocurementandcollectivization,buttakentogethertheyilluminatethemindsetthatgaverise
tothemomentousdecisioninlate1929tocombinealloutcollectivizationwithmassiverepressionofthekulaks(betteroffpeasants).ThelettersalsoshowStalin's
intenselypersonalangeragainsttheleadersoftherightdeviation.Moresurprisingly,wefindthesameanger,justifiedwiththesamerhetoric,directedagainstpeople
whoareusuallyregardedasfarremovedfromtherightdeviation:theformerTrotskyistGeorgiiPiatakovandtheloyalStalinistSergoOrdzhonikidze.Thelettersthus
forceustoreexaminethepoliticallogicbywhichStalindefinedhisenemieswithintheparty.
Thenatureofthecorrespondencechangesdrasticallyafter1930,andwehaveonlythirteenratherfragmentarylettersfromtheyears19311936.Thereasonsforthis
changeareunclear.Molotovre
6.

InvaluablebackgroundformanyoftheissuesdiscussedinStalin'sletterscanbefoundinR.W.Davies,TheSovietEconomyinTurmoil,19291930(Cambridge,Mass.,1989).

Page9

placedRykovasheadofthegovernmentinlate1930,anditcouldbethatothermeanswerefoundtotransmitStalin'sinstructions.ItisalsopossiblethatMolotov
founditexpedienttosuppressincriminatingmaterial.Nevertheless,thelettersfromthisperiodarenotwithoutinterest.InSeptember1935,forexample,Stalingivesa
provisionaloutlineofthenewConstitutionadoptedthefollowingyear,thusdocumentingastrongdirectiveroleearlyinthedraftingprocess(letter83).7Stalinwanted
theConstitutiontoreflectonly"whathasalreadybeenachieved"heandMolotovevidentlyhadsomewhatmacabretheoreticaldisputesoverexactlywhatstageof
socialismhadbeenreachedbythemid1930s.
Thelistoftopicscoveredinthelettersisalongandvariedone.Justasrevealingarethepatternsthatemergefromthecollectionasawhole,whichgiveusan
unparalleledlookatStalinasleader.AcompleteanalysisofStalin'sleadershipwouldcoveratleastthreedimensions.WeneedtoconsiderStalinasanofficialand
examinetheconstraintsfacedbyanybodyinthepositionoftopleaderinacountryundergoingrevolutionarytransformation.WeneedtolookatStalinasaBolshevik,
sincethebasicmentaltoolsStalinappliedtohisjobwerederivedfromtheBolshevikpoliticalcultureinwhichhehadspenthisadultlife.NorcanweneglectStalinas
anindividualwithhisownparticularpsychologicalmakeupandmentalhabits.
Stalin'slettersfillinthegapbetweenpublicspeechesaboutthegeneraldirectionofpolicy,ontheonehand,andspecificdecisionsaboutdaytodaymatters,onthe
othertheyaredocumentsofleadershipandpersuasionaimedspecificallyatthetopechelonsoftheBolshevikparty.Assuch,theythrowvaluableandmuchneeded
lightonallthreedimensionsofStalinasaleader.BecauseStalinisexplaininghisviewsonurgentpolicyquestions,weobservehimasanofficial,dealingwiththewhole
rangeofproblemsthatwouldconfrontanyrulerofRussia.BecauseheistryingtoobtainsupportinthePolitburo,wecanexaminetheargumentsthatStalinthought
wouldworkwithfellowBolsheviks.AlthoughwewillneverlearnwhatStalinsaidprivatelytohimself,thelettersprovideuswiththe
7.

J.ArchGetty,"StateandSocietyunderStalin:ConstitutionsandElectionsinthe1930s,"SlavicReview50(1991):1835.

Page10

nextbestresourceforlearningaboutStalinasanindividual:howStalindefinedtheworldinconfidentialcorrespondencewithhisclosestpoliticalfriend.
Alongwithmycommentaryonspecifictopics,IshalladvanceageneralinterpretationofStalinasaleaderthatisbasedonmyreadingoftheletters.Myargument,in
brief,isasfollows:StalinhadaconsciousandcoherentapproachtogoverningthatIshallcalltheantibureaucratscenario.Theconstructivesideofthisscenario
allowedStalintousehisundeniableleadershipskillstogetthingsdoneandtomaintainPolitburosupport.TheseskillsweretheoriginalbasisofStalin'spower.Onthe
otherhand,theantibureaucratscenarioalsodefinedgoverningasacontinualstrugglewithclassenemiesofvarioustypesandhues.Thescenariothusgaveexpression
totheangryandvindictivesidesofStalin'spersonality.
ThesuspiciousandpunitivefeaturesofStalin'sscenariowerealwayspresent,buttheybecamemorepronouncedin1929and1930whenthecountrywasplunged
intothewhirlwindofthegeneraloffensive.WeobserveStalin'sangeratthoseheperceivedasenemiesbecomeincreasinglyintense.Indeed,theringofenemiesseems
tocloseinonhim:firsttheinternational"capitalistencirclement,"thendomesticclassenemieslikethekulaks,nextthe"bourgeoisspecialists"workingfortheSoviet
governmentitself,andfinallysomeofhisclosestcomrades.Althoughthecorrespondencefadesoutintheearly1930s,wearewellonourwaytothemurderouspurge
campaignsof19371938.ThesameoutlookthatallowedStalintorunthegovernmentforsomanyyearsalsopushedhimclosetodestroyingit.
TheAntibureaucratScenario
TounderstandStalinatwork,weneedtounderstandhisviewsonrunningagovernment.Itisnotdifficulttodiscovertheseviews,forthiswasasubjectthatmattered
deeplytoStalinhegaveitconsiderablethoughtandsetforthhisconclusionsonanumberofoccasions.Hisownsummaryofhisviewsseemsnomorethanacouple
ofbanalplatitudes:theneedforproper"selectionofofficials"and"checkinguponfulfillment"ofpolicydirectives.Theseblandslo

Page11

gansonlyrevealtheirfullmeaning,however,whensetintothecontextofadramaticandpoliticizedscenarioofclassconflictandrevolutionarytransformation.The
detailsofthisscenariocanbefoundinStalin'spublishedspeechestheletterstoMolotovrevealhowthescenarioguidedhiminhisdaytodaywork.
Stalin'sscenariocanbesummarizedasfollows:ThereisnoobjectiveobstacletothesuccessfulconstructionofsocialisminRussia.Thesovietsystemofgovernment,
thestatecontrolofthecommandingheightsoftheeconomy,andthenaturalresourcesofRussiaitselfalloftheseprovidethepotentialforsuccessfullycompletingthe
revolution.Correctleadershipthusbecomesthecrucialfactor.Thefirsttaskofleadershipistodefinethecorrectline.Thecoreleadershipofthepartyits"leading
nucleus"mustaccuratelysizeupthesituationanddeducethenecessarytasksfacingthepartyatanyonetime.Themainthreattodefiningthecorrectlinecomesfrom
waveringonthepartofleaderswhointheirheartslackfaithintherevolution.
Definingthecorrectlineisonlythefirststep.Nextitmustbespelledoutsothatallotherpartymembersunderstandboththeoverallpictureandtheirownroleinit.
Thisrequiresclarityinpresentationandacarefulselectionofslogansanddirectives.Butitwouldbecriminallaxnesstobelievethatthepartylinewillbecarriedout
automatically.Properleadershiprequiresunremittingattentionto"selectionofofficials"and"checkinguponfulfillment."ThemainthreathereisRussia'slowlevelof
culture,whichforcestheworkerpeasantstatetorelyonmany"classalienelements"initsgovernmentbureaucracy.Asaresult,vigilanceisoneofthebasicdutiesof
eachpartymember.
ThesearethebarebonesofStalin'soutlook,statedinsomewhatdrypropositionalform.Inordertounderstandtheemotionalpowerofthisview,wehavetorecastit
intheformofthedramaticantibureaucratscenariothatportrayswellintentionedbutnaiveCommunistsdoingbattlewithsophisticatedbureaucratswhotrytofooland
corruptthem.Stalin'sattitudesemergeinvividlanguagetakenfromthreespeechesgivenatdifferentstagesofhiscareer.
In1920,StalinwasheadofWorkerPeasantInspection(Rabkrin).ThisagencywasthedescendentofthetsaristMinistryofStateControl,whichwasdevotedmainly
toauditingaccountsofother

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governmentagencies.LeninhadambitiousplansfortheWorkerPeasantInspectionandsawitasaninstrumentofmassparticipationingovernment.AlthoughStalin
wasnominallytheheadofWorkerPeasantInspection,hisotherdutiesduringthecivilwarpreventedhimfromgivingmuchofhistimetoit.StalinlefttheWorker
PeasantInspectionin1922whenhetookoverthepostofgeneralsecretary.
InOctober1920,StalinaddressedagroupofofficialsfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection.Hestressedthevitalimportanceofprogressingfromtheseizureof
politicalpowertothegenuinecontroloverthestateapparat:"Comrades,thepeoplewhoreallyrunthecountryarenotthosewhoelectdelegates,whetherto
parliamentinthebourgeoissystemortosovietcongressesundertheSovietsystem.No,thosewhofactuallyrunthecountryarethosewhoreallymastertheexecutive
apparaty[or,theapparatyoffulfillment],thosewholeadtheseapparaty."Thistaskwasdifficultbecausetheworkersandpeasantsdidnothaveanyprerevolutionary
experienceinadministration.Oneconsequenceofthissituationwasthat"althoughbureaucratismhasbeensmashed,thebureaucratshaveremained.Painting
themselvesassovietofficials,theyhaveenteredourstateapparaty.Heretheyusetheinsufficientexperienceofworkersandpeasantswhohavejustcomeintopower
theyspinouttheiroldmachinationsinordertoplunderstatepropertytheyintroducetheiroldbourgeoismorals."AsWorkerPeasantInspectionofficialstriedtodo
theirjob,theywouldundoubtedlyrunintooppositionfrom"overzealousbureaucrats,aswellassomeCommunistswhogiveintothevoicesofthesebureaucrats."
Whenencounteringthis,theirmottoshouldbe:"Don'tspareindividuals,nomatterwhatpositiontheyoccupyspareonlythecause,theinterestsofthecause."8
ForoursecondspeechweturntotheXIIPartyCongressin1923.ThiswasthelastpartycongressinLenin'slifetimehewasalreadyincapacitatedbystrokesand
didnotattend.Inhisspeech,StalindepictedhimselfasdevelopingLenin'soutlook.Inadditiontopoliticalconsiderations,Stalinfeltthattherewasa"moralaspect"to
Lenin'sdemandforanimprovedapparat:Lenin"wantedtogetto
8.

J.V.Stalin,Sochineniia,13vols.todate(Moscow,1946),4:36668.

Page13

thepointwherethecountrycontainednotasinglebigwig,nomatterhowhighlyplaced,aboutwhichthemaninthestreetcouldsay,'thatoneisabovecontrol.'''Years
later,inthemid1930s,amurderousversionofthispopulistrhetoricdominatedthemassmedia.
AnotherofLenin'ssloganswas"selectionofofficials."Stalinexplainedthissloganbyarguingthatitwasinsufficientmerelytogivedirectivesyouhadtofindofficials
whocouldunderstandthesedirectivesandregardthemastheirown.ForthisreasontheCentralCommitteeneededtoknoweachhighofficialthroughandthrough.9
OurfinalexamplecomesfromthespeechStalingaveatameetingoftheCentralCommitteeinJanuary1933.Stalinarguedthattheperiodofrevolutionary
transformationwasdrawingtoaclose:itwastimetomakethenewstructuresworkinaproductiveandefficientmanner.Themainobstaclewasstillthe"enemy
within"(toborrowaphrasefromJ.EdgarHoover),portrayedinvividandmelodramaticfashionascrushedandresentfulclassenemies:"Thrownoutoftheirgroove,
andscatteredoverthewholefaceoftheUSSR,these'formerpeople'[theelitedisinheritedbytherevolution]havewormedtheirwayintoourplantsandfactories,
intoourgovernmentofficesandtradingorganizations,intoourrailwayandwatertransportenterprises,and,principally,intoourcollectiveandstatefarms.Theyhave
creptintotheseplacesandtakencoverthere,donningthemaskof'workers'and'peasants,'andsomeofthemhaveevenmanagedtowormtheirwayintotheparty."
Whatdidtheseclassenemiescarrywiththemintotheseplaces?afeelingofhatredtowardSovietpower,afeelingofburningenmitytowardthenewformsof
economy,life,andculture.Inspiredbythishatred,thealienelementssetouttoorganizesabotagecertainprofessors,forexample,wentsofarastoinjectplagueand
anthraxgermsintocattle.Stalininsistedthat"thetaskistoejectthese'formerpeople'fromourownenterprisesandinstitutionsandrenderthempermanently
harmless."Unfortunatelysomepeoplewithinthepartythoughtthattheclassstrugglewasdyingdown,sincetheenemyclasseshadbeendefeatedinopenbattle.Such
peoplehaveeitherdegeneratedoraretwofacedtheymustbedrivenoutoftheparty
9.

Stalin,Sochineniia,5:197222.

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10

andtheirsmugphilistineattitudereplacedbyrevolutionaryvigilance.

ThesethreespeechesgiveanideaoftheemotionsStalininvestedintheantibureaucratscenario.Inspiteofanincreaseintheviolenceandobsessivenessofthe
rhetoric,thefundamentaloutlookremainsthesame:thesystemisbasicallygoodproblemsarisefromhostileindividualswithinthesystemandtheirabilitytofool
otherwisededicatedrevolutionariesonlyaunitedleadershipdevoidofwaveringcancombatthebureaucrats.
TurningnowtoStalin'scorrespondencewithMolotov,weobservethattheslogans"checkinguponfulfillment"and"selectionofofficials"areubiquitous.Some
exampleswillshowhowStalinappliedtheseinpractice.HiseffortstoimprovetheoilindustryintheUralsdemonstratehisattitudetowardselectingofficials(letters
42,44,46,57).Giventhedecisiontodevelopthisindustry,Stalin'scontributionwastogetacompetentpersonforthetoppartypostsomeonewhowasa
"Communist/oilman."Oncethispersonwasfound,hewastobegiventhe"combatassignment''todevelopoil,driveoutincompetent"wreckers,"andprotecttheUrals
fromhavingpersonnelbe"looted"byotherlocalitiesandinstitutions.
Theshortageof"bigpeople"energeticandtalentedadministratorsisaconstantcomplaint.Inletter60,StalinwantstohelptheCommissariatofTradebysending
overRozengoltsfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection,eventhoughherealizesthatSergoOrdzhonikidze,theheadofWorkerPeasantInspection,willbeupset.He
endswiththetypicalStalinsentiment:"DopeoplepityKhinchuk[atradeofficial]?Butthecauseshouldbepitiedevenmore.DotheynotwanttooffendSergo?But
whataboutthecausecansuchanimportantandseriousmatterbeoffended?"
Oncehavingselectedthemanforthejobandgivenhimvastpowers,Stalinhadtoworryaboutwhetherhewoulddowhathewassupposedtodo.Hencethe
importanceoftheslogan"checkinguponfulfillment."Hisobsessiveconcernisrevealedinanexhortationaboutgrainprocurementin1929(letter42):
10.

Stalin,Sochineniia,13:159233.AfullerstudyofStalin'stheoryofleadershipanditsrelationtobolshevismwillbepresentedinmy"WhatWasBolshevism:Narrativesof
Identityinthe1920s"(workinprogress).

Page15
ThePolitburohasadoptedmyproposalsconcerninggrainprocurement.Thisisgood,butinmyopinion,itisinadequate.NowtheproblemisfulfillingthePolitburo'sdecision.
Thereisnoneedtoinsistthatallprocurementorganizations(especiallyinUkraine)willevadethisdecision....Therefore,itisnecessarytodemandthefollowingfrom
procurementorganizations,theOGPU,theCollectiveFarmCenter,andsoforth:
a)copiesoftheirinstructionstosubordinateorgansconcerningthefulfillmentofthePolitburo'sdecisionb)regularreportseverytwoweeks(evenbetter,onceaweek)aboutthe
resultsofthefulfillmentofthedecisions.TheWorkerPeasantInspectionandtheCentralControlCommissionshouldbeinvolvedinthisaswell.Idon'tknowhowyouregardthis
matterandtheoutlookforgrainprocurement(Mikoianprobablythinksthatsincethedecisionhasbeenreached,henowhas130millionpoodsofanuntouchablereservesittingin
thegrainelevators)....Andgrainprocurementthisyearwillprovidethebasisforeverythingwe'redoingifwefouluphere,everythingwillbewipedout.Andthedangerofa
foulupwillgrowifwedon'tinsistthattheCentralCommittee'sdecisionbefulfilledwithunrelentingfirmnessandruthlessness.

In1930,StalindreamedofaFulfillmentCommissionthatwouldsolveallhisproblems:"Withoutsuchanauthoritativeandrapidlyactingcommission,wewillnotbe
abletobreakthroughthewallofbureaucratismand[improve]theslipshodperformanceinourbureaucracies.Withoutsuchreforms,thecenter'sdirectiveswillremain
completelyonpaper"(letter68).(Thiscommissionwasactuallysetupinlate1930,butnothingcameofit.)WhenStalinwantedtogiveMolotovapatontheback,it
isnowonderthathepaidhimtheultimatecomplimentandpraisedhis"Leninistcheckinguponfulfillment"(letter70).
Whensetintothecontextoftheantibureaucratscenario,thetwosloganshavebothaconstructiveandadestructiveside."Checkinguponfulfillment"isthetaskofany
responsibleadministratorwhowantstoensurethatcentralpoliciesareactuallycarriedout.AccordingtoStalin'santibureaucratscenario,however,classmotivated
hostilityisthemainreasonbureaucratsdonotfollowdirectives.Ifconsciousorunconscioussabotageistheproblem,repressionisboundtobeatleastpartofthe
solution."Selectionofofficials"did

Page16

notmeansimplychoosingandpromotingthemostcompetentpeople.Therewasamoraldimension:Officialsneededtobechosenwhowouldlookonpartydirectives
astheirownandwhowouldnotbeseducedby"bourgeoisspecialists."Butiftheselectedofficialsprovedlessreliablethananticipated,thismoraldimensioncould
easilygiverisetodisappointmentandvindictiveanger.
LetusnowconsiderhowtheantibureaucratscenariofitsintothethreedimensionsofStalinasleader.First,Stalinasanofficial:anypoliticiantryingtorunanunwieldy
bureaucracyislikelytodevelopsomesortofantibureaucratscenario.RichardNeustadt'sclassicPresidentialPowershowsthisprocessatworkinthecaseofthe
Americanpresidency.11InStalin'scase,wehavetoaddhispositionastopleaderinacountryundergoingastateguidedrevolutionarytransformation.Stalinhadto
runthecountrywiththehelpofofficialswhosetrustworthinesswasdubiousandwhosecompetencewasperhapsevenmoredubious.Hewasforcedtogrant
enormouspowertothesepeopleandtogivethemnexttoimpossibletasks.Obsessionwithshufflingpersonnelandintensesuspicionofappointeeswasbuiltintothe
situation,andtheantibureaucratscenarioreflectedthesestructuralrealities.
Stalindidnotcreatehisparticularversionoftheantibureaucratscenarioinavacuum,andsowehavetoconsiderStalinasaBolshevik.Hisscenariohadrootsinwhat
mightbecalledthepopularbolshevismthataroseduringthecivilwar.BothbeforeandaftertheOctoberrevolutionof1917,theBolsheviksblamedthebreakdownof
theeconomyonthesabotageofcapitalistsandbureaucratsandpresentedthemselvesastheonlyforcecapableofcrushingthissabotage.Whentheeconomic
breakdowncontinuedduringthecivilwar,thepopulationtransferredthisexplanationtotheBolshevikstateitself.Thepopulationinventedanewcategorythe"soviet
bourgeoisie"thatStalintookoverandusedforhisownpurposes.12
StalincouldplausiblyclaimLenin'sauthorityforhisscenario,sinceLeninalsoviewedpublicadministrationasadramaticstruggleagainstaclassenemy.WhenLenin
insistedontheslogans"checkinguponfulfillment"and"selectionofofficials"in1922,he
11.

RichardNeustadt,PresidentialPower:ThePoliticsofLeadership(NewYork,1960).

12.

MaryMcAuley,BreadandJustice(Oxford,1991),400.

Page17

emphasizedthattheywerepartof"thestrugglebetweentwoirreconcilablyhostileclasses[that]appearstobegoingoninallgovernmentoffices."Leninblamedhis
frustrationwithbureaucraticredtapeoncleversaboteurs:"Thevilebureaucraticbogdrawsusintothewritingofpapers,endlesstalkfestsaboutdecrees,thewriting
ofdecrees,andrealliveworkdrownsinthatseaofpaper.Cleversaboteursdeliberatelydrawusintothispaperswamp.Themajorityofpeople'scommissarsand
othergovernmentdignitariesunwittingly'walkintothetrap.'"13
TheantibureaucratscenariowasthusderivedfromexperiencesthatalltheBolshevikleadershadlivedthrough.SharedexperiencegaveStalin'sperceptionsabasic
legitimacywiththepartyelite:whathesaidmadesensetothem,evenwhentheydisagreedwithit.ThelettersshowtheusethatStalinmadeofthescenariowhen
exhortinghisPolitburocolleagues.
InspiteofitslinkswithBolshevikpoliticalculture,theantibureaucratscenariomustalsobeconsideredfromthepointofviewofStalinasanindividual.Stalinstoodout
amongBolshevikleadersintheattentionhedevotedtotheproblemsofcontrollingthestate.ThispointisusuallymadebyemphasizingthatStalinwaspreoccupied
withmachinepoliticsandwithmanipulatingthestateandpartyapart.Thisisonewayofputtingit,andnodoubtavalidone,butifwelimitourselvestothis
presentation,weriskunderestimatingStalininthesamewayhisopponentsdid.AnequallyvalidwayofputtingitisthatnootherBolshevikleadertooksoseriouslythe
basicproblemconfrontingtheBolsheviks:howtorunthecountry.Stalin'santibureaucratscenarioaroseoutofhisreflectionsonthatproblem.
Accordingtothescenario,goodgovernmentwasaneternalbattleinwhichnobleintentionswerecontinuallythwartedbytheillwillofsaboteurs.Withoutgoingdeeply
intopsychologicalspeculations,wemayconcludethatthisscenariowouldrecommenditselftoapersonpredisposedtoseetheworldinangry,punitiveterms.
Furthermore,asStalin'sgoalsbecamemoreambitiousandasthechaosofthegeneraloffensiveledtogreaterandgreaterfrustration,theintensityoftheemotionshe
investedinthescenariorosetoamurderouspitch.
13.

RobertC.Tucker,ed.,TheLeninAnthology(NewYork,1975),52628,717.

Page18

PoliticalOppositionduringNEP
Inthelettersfrom1925through1927StalinisstronglypreoccupiedwiththepoliticalbattlewithinthePolitburoagainstTrotskyandZinoviev.Theselettersamply
confirmsomewellknownimagesofStalin.OneisStalintheCraftyManeuverer.In1925StalinseizesonabookpublishedintheWestasanopportunitytofurther
discreditTrotsky,andin1926hedirectsaPolitburocampaigntoisolateZinovievandKamenev.AnotherfamiliarimageisStalintheCatechist:theStalinwholearned
inhisdaysattheTbilisiTheologicalSeminarytosumupanyquestionwithcutanddriedformulae.
YeteventhesefamiliarimagesrequiremodificationwhenweobservetheminthecontextofrelationswithinthePolitburo.ThePolitburomajority(whichincluded
ZinovievandKamenevin1925)reliedonStalinnotjusttodosecretarialchoresbuttoactasaleader:hisinfluencewithinthePolitburowasbasedonwhathis
colleaguesconsideredthecogencyofhisanalysisandthesoundnessofhisrecommendations.
TheEastmanAffair
TheEastmanaffairof1925providesanexcellentcasestudyofStalin'sleadershipwithinthePolitburo.Thisaffairhasusuallybeeninterpretedasabrazencoverupof
theexistenceofthedocumentknownasLenin'sTestament.Inlate1922,afewmonthsbeforehisfinalstroke,Lenindictatedashortdocumentthathetermeda"letter
tothe[party]congress."Init,hecharacterizedthetopleadersinapostscriptaddedafewdayslater,hesuggestedthatStalinberemovedfromthepostofgeneral
secretaryoftheparty.OnlyNadezhdaKrupskaia,Lenin'swife,knewthefullcontentsofthisdocumentuntilafterLenin'sdeathinearly1924,atwhichtimesheturned
itandrelateddocumentsovertotheCentralCommittee.ThepartyleadershipdecidednottoreadLenin'sletterintotheofficialrecordoftheupcomingXIIIParty
Congressbutrathertoreadittoeachdelegationofftherecord.Stalinofferedhisresignationasgeneralsecretary,butitwasnotaccepted.Theletteritselfwasnot
published.
Althoughthisletterbecamewidelyknownas"Lenin'sTestament,"itshouldbenotedthatLeninhimselfdidnotgiveitthis

Page19

labelitwasinfactoneofaseriesofdictationsonvariousmatters.By1925,Bukharinandothershadgiventhetitle"Lenin'sTestament"tothefivearticlesLenin
publishedinearly1923,onthegroundsthatthesefinalarticlesdiscussmattersofgrandpoliticalstrategy.Forconvenience,IwillrefertoLenin'sletterasthe
Testament,withtheprovisothattheappropriatenessofthislabelisamatterofdispute.
TheWesternscholarswhohavediscussedtheEastmanaffair(LeonardSchapiro,IsaacDeutscher,andBorisSouvarine,amongothers)alltellasimilarstory:after
Lenin'sdeath,hisTestamentwassuppressed.In1925MaxEastman,anAmericanjournalist,wroteSinceLeninDied,inwhichherevealedtheexistenceofthe
Testamentandgaveanaccuratedescriptionofitscontents.14TherulingtriumvirateStalin,Zinoviev,andKamenevwerehorrifiedatthewhistlebeingblownon
theircoverupandforcedbothTrotskyandKrupskaiatowritelettersdenyingtheexistenceoftheTestament.Thusconstrainedtodenywhatheandotherinformed
peopleknewtobetrue,Trotskyutterlydiscreditedhimself.15(Trotsky'sandKrupskaia'slettersareincludedintheappendix.)
ThisaccountneedstobereconsideredinthelightofStalin'sletterstoMolotovandtheotherremarkabledocumentspresentedbytheRussianside.16Chiefamongthe
newdocumentsisStalin'slongmemorandumdetailingthemisstatementsmadeinEastman'sbookanddemandingthatTrotskypubliclyrepudiatethesemisstatements.
Fromletter6itappearsthatStalinwantedtopublishhismemorandum.ThisfactinitselfforcesustoreopenthecaseandaskwhethertheEastmanaffairwasacynical
coveruporwhetherthe
14.

MaxEastman,SinceLeninDied(1925Westport,Conn.:Hyperion,1973).Forpagereferences,seetext.

15.

LeonardSchapiro,TheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,rev.ed.(NewYork,1971),300301IsaacDeutscher,TheProphetUnarmed:Trotsky,19211929(NewYork,1959),
2012BorisSouvarine,Stalin:ACriticalSurveyofBolshevism(NewYork,1939),414,348.
16.

ForfurtherbackgroundontherelationshipbetweenTrotskyandEastman,seeV.V.Shevstov,"LevTrotskiiiMaksIstmen[MaxEastman]:Istoriiaodnoipoliticheskoidruzhby,"
Novaiainoveishaiaistoriia,no.6(1990):14163.ManyimportantnewdocumentsthatshedlightontheEastmanaffaircanbefoundinYuriBuranov,Lenin'sWill:Falsifiedand
Forbidden(Amherst,Mass.,1994).Buranov'sbookisunfortunatelymarredbyseriousinaccuracies,manyofwhichareattributabletotheveryinadequateEnglishtranslation.

Page20

Politburowasmakingwhatitconsideredlegitimatedemands.OurgeneralpictureofPolitburopoliticsinthe1920swillbestronglyinfluencedbytheanswertothis
question.
PreviousWesterninterpretationshaveallacceptedthatEastman'sbook"correctlyreproducedlongextracts"oftheTestament.17OnreadingSinceLeninDied,Iwas
surprisedtofindthiswasfarfromtrue.NotonlydoesEastmangiveahighlydistortedrenditionoftheTestament,butthedistortionsallclearlyserveanexplicitpolitical
purpose,unambiguouslystatedinthefinalsentenceofthebook:revolutionariesinothercountriesoughttorememberthat"theydidnotpledgethemselvestoaccept,in
thenameof'Leninism,'theinternationalauthorityofagroupagainstwhomLenin'sdyingwordswereawarning,andwhohavepreservedthatauthoritybysuppressing
theessentialtextsofLenin"(130).
EastmaninterpretstheTestamentasa"directendorsementofTrotsky'sauthority"(31).Inordertoreachthisconclusion,hehadtoremovethecomplimentary
referencestootherleadersaswellastheuncomplimentaryreferencestoTrotsky.18TheblamefortheseerrorsshouldnotfallprimarilyonEastman,whoreliedon
"threeresponsibleCommunistsinRussia"whohadreadtheTestamentand"committeditsvitalphrasestomemory"(3031).Inmemoirspublishedin1964,Eastman
recalledthatduringtheXIIIPartyCongressin1924,Trotsky"toldme,drawingmeintoahiddencornerofthepalace,theprincipalphrasesofLenin's'testament.'''19
(InamemorandumtoStalinreproducedhere,TrotskyimpliesthathedidnotmeetwithEastmanduringthisperiod.)Beforepublication,Eastmanshowedhis
manuscripttoChristianRakovskii,oneofTrotsky'scomradeswhowasworkinginFranceatthetime,andRakovskiiapprovedpublication.Theresponsibilityforthe
distortionsthereforeseemstoliewiththeTrotskygroupitself.
Tounderstandthefollowingcourseofevents,then,wemuststartwiththerealizationthatSinceLeninDiedisaninaccurate,highly
17.

Schapiro,CommunistParty,300.AfullerstudyofLenin'sTestamentandtheissuesraisedinStalin'smemorandumontheEastmanbookwillbefoundinmy"RoadtoLenin's
Testament"(workinprogress).
18.

AdetaileddiscussionofEastman'serrorscanbefoundintheappendix.

19.

MaxEastman,LoveandRevolution:MyJourneythroughanEpoch(NewYork,1964),425.

Page21

politicizedaccountthatcontrastsTrotsky,withhis"saintly"devotiontotherevolution(13),toalltheotherleadersoftheparty,whoarenothingmorethan
unscrupuloususurpers.AfterStalinwasalertedtotheexistenceofSinceLeninDied,hemusthavebeenelated:allhehadtodowassendaroundatranslationof
Eastman'sbooktothePolitburo(andlatertolocalpartyofficials)andTrotskywouldbefurtherdiscredited.WhatmustTrotsky'scolleagueshavefelt,forexample,
whentheyreadapassagelikethefollowing:"IfyoudancedonthecorpseofVladimirIlich,youwouldinsulthisspiritlessthanbyclappingcensorshiponhisownlast
wordstohisPartyandjugglingunderthetable,withthecheapesttricksofthedemagogue,theconscientiousthoughtsofthatmanwhomhedesignatedasthebestof
you"(92).
Stalin'slengthymemorandumontheEastmanbookisagoodexampleofhiscatechisticstyle,withitsnumberedpointsanditsrepetitioususeofthephrase"Trotsky
mustbeaware."Onthewhole,though,itmusthavestruckhisPolitburocomradesasrathermoderateandrestrained.Hepassedoverallgenuinepoliticaldifferences
andstucktoissueswherehefelttherecouldbenoargumentaboutEastman'serrors.HedidnotaskTrotskytodenytheexistenceoftheTestamentortoaffirmany
particularinterpretationofit.StalindidnotaccuseTrotskyofbreakingdisciplineandrevealingpartysecretsrather,hechosetotakeatfacevalueTrotsky'sassertion
thathehadnothingtodowiththeTestament'stransmissiontoEastman.Stalin'smainpointwasthatbykeepingsilent,Trotskywasgivingdefactolegitimacyto
slanderousaccusations.
ThedemandthatTrotskydisavowthisopenattackontheRussianCommunistPartymusthaveseemedperfectlylegitimatetothePolitburo.Trotskycompliedwiththe
requestandwroteanopenletter.AcomparisonofTrotsky'sletterandStalin'smemorandumshowsthatTrotskystuckfairlyclosetothepointsStalinsuggested.
Trotskyalsoaddedsomerhetoricalflourishesthathavecausedconfusioneversince:
Inseveralplacesinhisbook,EastmansaysthattheCentralCommittee"hid"fromthepartyanumberofhighlyimportantdocumentsthatLeninwroteinthelastperiodofhislife
(lettersonthenationalquestion,thesocalledtestament,andsoforth)thiscannotbetermed

Page22
anythingotherthanaslanderoftheCentralCommitteeofourparty....VladimirIlichdidnotleaveany"testament"andthecharacterofhisrelationtotheparty,nottomention
thecharacterofthepartyitself,excludesthepossibilityofsucha"testament."Whentheemigr,foreignbourgeois,andmenshevistpressusesthetermtestament,itusuallyhas
inmindaletterinaformdistortedbeyondrecognitioninwhichVladimirIlichgaveadviceofaninternalpartycharacter.TheXIIICongressgavethisletter,likealltheothers,
itscloseattentionanddrewtheconclusionsappropriatetothecircumstancesofthemoment.Anytalkofahiddenorviolated''testament"isaspitefulinventionaimedagainstthe
realwillofVladimirIlichandtheinterestsofthepartyhecreated.20

ThisisthepassagethathasledscholarstoassertthatTrotskyconsciouslyliedabouttheexistenceoftheTestament.Itisclearfromthetextofhisletterandthe
accompanyingopenletterbyKrupskaiathatthiswasnothisintention.Trotsky'spointisthatitisinappropriatetocallLenin'slettera"testament,"inotherwords,a
literalstatementoflastwishesthatthepartywasbeholdentocarryout.ItisworthnotingthatalthoughTrotskystatesthatEastman'stextisdefective,heiscarefulnot
todenytheconclusionsthatEastmandrewfromtheTestament.Trotsky'ssilenceonthiscentralpointstandsoutclearlywhenhisletteriscontrastedwithKrupskaia's
letter,sinceKrupskaiadoesdealdirectlywiththisissue.
IfStalinwasengineeringacoverup,hewouldnothaveinsistedonpublishinghisownmemorandum,forhediscussestheTestament(underthatname)atlength.Ifwe
mayjudgefromhiscommentstoMolotov,Stalinevenfeltthatinsteadofdiscreditinghimself,TrotskywouldactuallygaininprestigebydenouncingEastman.Inorder
topreventthisoutcome,StalinarguesthathisownmemorandumshouldbepublishedtoshowthatTrotskyactedunderPolitburopressure(letter6).Later,Stalin
opinesthatTrotsky"savedhimself"byhiscompliance(letter9).
OnthisrevisedunderstandingoftheEastmanaffair,thePolitburodidnotaskTrotskytotellobviousuntruths,nordidhedoso.IfTrotskywasdiscredited,itwas
becauseheorhisfriendsallowedthepublicationofaninflammatorybroadside.
20.

Trotsky'sletter,Bolshevik,1925,no.16:6770.Thefulltextofthisletterappearsintheappendix.

Page23

EventhoughtheWesternscholarswhohavewrittenontheEastmanaffairdidnothaveaccesstoStalin'smemorandumandhiscorrespondencewithMolotov,itisstill
puzzlingwhytheychosetoendorsetheaccuracyofEastman'srenditionoftheTestament.OnereasonisthattheyweremisledbyTrotsky'srhetoricalflourishesinto
theerroneousassumptionthatthePolitburowantedhimtodenytheveryexistenceoftheTestament.IsuspectthatanotherreasonwastheirexclusivefocusonLenin's
suggestionthatStalinberemovedfromthepostofgeneralsecretary.ThisfocusledthemtooverlookthepoliticalaimsofEastman'sbookandthedistortionsEastman
unwittinglyperpetratedinordertoservethoseaims.ThesescholarswerealsocomfortablewiththelevelofcynicismtheyassignedtotheBolshevikleaders:according
totheiraccount,allthePolitburomembers,Trotskyincluded,wereconsciousliarsblandlybetrayingtheirdeadleaderanddenyingtheobvious.Painfulasitmaybeto
ourpreconceptions,itseemsthat,inthisinstanceatleast,thePolitburodidnot"laughatallhonestyasalimitedprejudice"(asBorisSouvarinewritesinhisaccountof
theaffair).21
ThenewlightthrownontheEastmanaffair,whencombinedwithevidenceinotherrecentlypublisheddocuments,makesitdifficulttoputPolitburopoliticsinthe
frameworkofaTrotskyStalinduelorevenaduelbetweenTrotskyandthetriumvirate(Stalin,Zinoviev,Kamenev).TrotskywasnotdefeatedbecauseofStalin's
growingpower.AstheRussianhistoriansValeriiNadtocheevandDmitriiVolkogonovhavepointedout,thereverseistrue:Stalingainedpowerbecausehewasable
toprovideleadershipinthePolitburo'sefforttoneutralizeTrotsky.22TheEastmanaffairshowshowthisworked.Stalintooktheinitiative,buthewasabletoconvince
hiscolleaguesprimarilybecausehehadagoodcase.TherestofthePolitburoagreedthatTrotskyshouldmakeapublicstatementdenouncingEastmanandused
Stalin'smemorandumasabasisfordraftingthestatement.Beyondthatpoint,thePolitburomajoritybrokeupamiddisputesonappropriatefurtheraction(with
ZinovievtakingaharderlineagainstTrotskythanStalindid).Inspiteofthesuccessofhismemorandum,Stalindoesnotyetseem
21.

Souvarine,Stalin,414.

22.

ValeriiNadtocheev,"'Triumvirat'ili'semerka'?"inTrudnyevoprosyistorii(Moscow,1991)DmitriiVolkogonov,TriumphandTragedy(London,1991).

Page24

thedominantfigure.Adifferentimpressionisgiveninthefollowingyear,afterZinovievandKamenevwentintoopposition.
TheCampaignagainstZinoviev
Byallaccounts,Zinovievwasnotaparticularlyattractivehumanbeing.Neitherinpowernorinoppositionwashisconductinspiring.UnlikeTrotskyandBukharin,
ZinovievhasneverbeencelebratedinamajorbiographyasasymbolofresistancetoStalin,andWesternpoliticalpartiesnevertransformedhimintoanicon.From
theevidenceoftheletters,however,theleadersofthepartymajoritytreatedhisoppositionwithgreaterseriousnessthantheydidtheattacksbyTrotsky,whowas
morerenownedbutalsomoremarginalized.
ZinovievandKamenevopenlychallengedStalinattheXIVPartyCongressafewmonthsaftertheEastmanaffairin1925.Stalin'sforcesmovedquicklytodismantle
Zinoviev'spoliticalbaseinLeningrad.InspiteofhisformerhostilitytoTrotsky,Zinovievnowfounditexpedienttojoinforceswithhim.Theiralliancewasformed
soonafterthedefeatofthegeneralstrikeinEngland,andsinceZinovievwasstillheadoftheComintern(theinternationalorganizationthatunitedtheCommunist
partiesoftheworld),itwasnaturalthatthePolitburoshowdowntooktheformofachallengetothepreviouspolicyofcooperatingwiththeBritishunions.
OneofthefirstjointactionsofthenewlyformedcoalitionwasastormyPolitburomeetinginearlyJune1926.Becauseofthepoliticaltensionthatsurroundedthis
meeting,therewasaflurryoflettersbetweentheabsentStalinandhispoliticalfriendsinMoscow,andwecanfollowtheeventindetail.InabiographyofTrotsky,
IsaacDeutscherpicturesTrotskyforcingahesitantandvacillatingZinovievtorejecttheunitedfrontpoliciesinEngland.Withhisusualflairforjournalisticdetail,
Deutschersetsthescene:"Thebattlewasjoined,partlyonStalin'sinitiative,inthefirstdaysofJune.ImmediatelyafterTrotsky'sreturn,StalinmethimatthePolitburo"
withanumberofaccusations.23
Thispictureisdifficulttosquarewiththetrainofeventsportrayedintheletters:Zinovievpreparesthethesescondemningthe
23.

Deutscher,ProphetUnarmed,269.

Page25

unitedfrontandleadsthefightatthePolitburosession.IfTrotskywastheleaderofthecoalitiononthisissue,thefactwaskeptcarefullyhiddenfromtherestofthe
Politburo.Stalinwasvacationingatthetime,soBukharinandMolotovprovidedtheleadershipoftheoffensiveagainstZinovievandTrotsky.
Thusthelettersforceustomakeaconsiderableadjustmentinourpictureoftheearlydaysoftheunitedopposition.ThepointisnotDeutscher'spardonableerror
aboutStalin'sphysicalwhereabouts,butratherthemisleadingimageoftheleadershipdisputeasessentiallyaduelbetweenTrotskyandStalin.Asthelettersshow,the
duelwasinfactbetweenZinovievandthePolitburomajority.
ThenextimportantclashbetweenthenewlyunitedoppositionandthePolitburomajorityoccurredatameetingofthefullCentralCommitteeinJuly.Inpreparationfor
thismeeting,Stalinpennedoneofthemoreremarkablelettersinthecollection(letter21).InitStalingiveshisreasonsforconsideringtheZinovievgroupastheleader
ofallschismatictendenciesintheparty.Henotesthatpreviousoppositiongroupshadstayedwithindefiniteboundsfurthermore,becauseZinovievoccupiedamuch
morecentralplaceinBolshevikaffairsthananypreviousoppositionleader,hewasbetteracquaintedwiththeleadership'swayofdoingthings.Anotherreasonfor
worrywasZinoviev'spotentialpowerbaseasCominternchief(StalindoesnotmentionLeningrad,whichhadbeeneffectivelytakenawayfromZinovievearlierinthe
year).
StalinrecommendsthatZinovievandTrotskybetreateddifferently,withthebruntoftheattackaimedatZinoviev.Thisrecommendationispartlyjustifiedbypurely
tacticalconsiderationsofdivideandconquer,althoughitispossiblethatStalinmeanswhathesays:Trotskyandhisfollowersshouldbegivenachancetoreturntothe
foldandworkasteammembers.Stalin'srecommendationwasfaithfullyfollowedbyhispoliticalfriends,asshownbyastatementRykovmadeaftertheJulyCentral
Committeemeeting,totheeffectthatTrotsky'sactionsdonotrequiredirectreprisalinthesamewaythatZinoviev'sdo,because"ComradeTrotskymadenosuch
attemptatasplit."24
Stalin'sleadershipamountedtomorethanthecontrolover
24.

RobertVincentDaniels,TheConscienceoftheRevolution:CommunistOppositioninSovietRussia(Cambridge,Mass.,1960),279.

Page26

appointmentsthatisusuallyconsideredthemainbasisforhispower.Inhismemoirs,MolotovrepeatedlystresseshisadmirationforStalin'sabilitytosizeupasituation
andextractdirectivesforaction.25Thetwoepisodesportrayedinthelettersthe1925Eastmanaffairandthe1926campaignagainstZinovievshowthatthe
Politburocameincreasinglytorelyontheseskills.
WhatweviewascraftymaneuveringmaynothaveappearedthatwaytoStalin'sPolitburocolleagues.Fromtheirpointofview,Stalin'sproposalaboutEastman's
bookwasnotaninvitationtoskullduggerybutalegitimatedemandthatTrotskydisassociatehimselffromascurrilousattackontheRussianCommunistParty.Stalin's
letteroutliningtheantiZinovievstrategyshowsthathewasnoamateuratpoliticalinfighting.ButStalinwasnotmakinganysecretofhistactics:theletterisaddressed
to"Molotov,Rykov,Bukharin,andotherfriends."Stalinwaseliminatingapoliticalrival,buthewasalsoworkingtowardagoaltowhichheandhisfellowBolsheviks
accordedhighlegitimacy:preservingaunitedleadershipteam.
Stalin'scatechisticstyleofexpositioninhispublicspeecheshasstruckmanyobserversasthemanifestationofadogmaticmind.Thelettersshowusthatheemployed
thesamedoggedapproachinhisprivatecorrespondence.Yethiscolleaguesmayhaveappreciatedhisconsciouscommitmenttoclarityinsettingouthisdefinitionof
thesituation.Inspiteof(orperhapsbecauseof)thenumberedparagraphsandthelitanystylerepetitions,someofthelettersarecompellingexpositionsof
complicatedarguments.IntheopeningparagraphofhisletteroutliningthecampaignagainstZinoviev(letter21),Stalinmentionsthathereflectedonthequestiona
gooddealbuthasnowworkeditalloutandthereuponfollowthefamiliarnumberedparagraphs.ItwouldseemthattheotherPolitburomembershadcometorely
onhisabilitytoanalyzeasituationanddeviseacourseofaction.
AccordingtoStalin'santibureaucratscenario,theunityofthetopleadershipregardingthecorrectlinewasanessentialpreconditionforthefightagainstthereal
enemies:thebureaucratsrunningthegovernment.Hethereforehadnocompunctionaboutquashing
25.

See,forexample,Molotov'sunfavorablecomparisonofSergeiKirovtoStalininChuev,Stosorokbesed,30713.

Page27

Politburocolleagueswhogotoutofline.Yetdespitethevigorofthepoliticalinfightingin1925and1926,anddespiteStalin'scontemptforhisrivals("Really,Grisha's
[Zinoviev's]brazennessknowsnobounds"[letter20]),itisevidentthathedidnotyetregardthemasenemiesofthepartyandtherevolution.Itwouldtakeseveral
yearsofconflictandfrustrationbeforeStalinarrivedattheleveloftitanicangerandrejectionwefindinthelettersfrom1929and1930.
TheOutsideWorld
BukharinopenedtheXVPartyConferencein1926withaspeechthatcontainedthesestirringwords:"Theinternationalrevolutionisnowonthemoveinthree
columns.ItismovingintheEastwiththemarchoftheChinesepeople,withitsmanyhundredsofmillions.ItismovinginthefarWestwiththemeasuredtreadofthe
BritishcoalminersitismovingintheSovietUnion,withourgrowingoffensiveagainstthecapitalistelementsofoureconomy.Thesethreeforceswillbecomemore
andmoredecisive,andtothemwillbegiventhefinalvictory."26
WhatwasStalin'sreactiontothisenthusiasticpictureofimminentworldrevolution?Didhethinkitwasmereverbiage,orwashegenuinelycaughtupinamomentof
enthusiasm?DidStalindismissworldrevolutioninfavorofbuildinguptheSovietstate,ordidheremainatheartaBolshevikdedicatedtooverthrowingcapitalist
societyeverywhere?
Observershavelongpuzzledoverthesequestions.OnepointofviewderivesfromTrotsky'scritiqueof"socialisminonecountry"asabetrayaloftherevolution.
Accordingtothisview,Stalindecidedearlyonthatthechancesofrevolutionelsewherewerenil.Byinclinationaswellasconviction,Stalinwasreadytoturnhisback
ontherestoftheworldanddevotehisenergiestobuildingupapowerfulSovietstate.Onlywhenpressedbythecritiquemadebytheunitedleftoppositiondidhefeel
itnecessarytomakeevenverbalobeisancetotheiconofBolshevikinternationalism.HehadonlycontemptfortheComintern,exceptperhapsasaminortoolof
Sovietforeignpolicy.Somescholarshaveevenspeculatedthathedidnot
26.

15KonferentsiiaVKP(b)(Moscow,1927),45.

Page28

wanttoseeasuccessfulrevolutionelsewhere:Whoneedspowerfulsocialistrivals?
Anotherviewisthatthequestionshouldnotbeputineitherorterms:eithertheinterestsofworldrevolutionortheinterestsoftheSovietstate.Weshouldratherseek
tounderstandhowthetwocoalescedinStalin'smind.StalinwasindeeddeeplycommittedtotheinterestsoftheSovietstate,butwestillneedtoexaminehowhe
understoodthoseinterests.Stalinwasnothypocriticalinhissupportforworldrevolution,sincefromhispointofviewnosacrificeofstateinterestswasinvolved.His
cautionaboutrevolutionaryprospectsinparticularcasesdidnotmeanhedismissedallrevolutionaryprospectsfortheforeseeablefuture.27
ThepublicationofStalin'sletterstoMolotovgivesusachancetomovetowardresolvingtheseissues,forseveralimportantepisodesofbothCominternpolicyand
Sovietdiplomacyaretreatedindetail.In1926and1927,StalinisconcernedwithwhatappeartoberevolutionarysituationsinEnglandandChina.After1927,asthe
revolutionarytideebbs,Stalin'sattentioninthelettersturnstowardproblemsarisingfromstatetostaterelations.SinceStalinwastalkinginprivatewithlikeminded
colleagues,therewaslittlepartisanpressuretosoundmorerevolutionarythanhefelt.Letusreviewthecluesprovidedbythelettersbeforeassessingthenew
evidence.WewillfirstexamineStalin'sfeelingsabouttheprospectsforrevolutionin1926and1927.
PolicytowardtheBritishtradeunionswasapriorityissuein1926.ThePolitburomajority'sofficiallinewasthatthesituationinEnglandwasmovinginthedirectionof
revolutionbutthatitwouldbeunwisetobreakwiththereformisttradeunionsintheostentatiousfashiondemandedbyZinovievandTrotsky.Theunitedleft
oppositioninterpretedthepolicyoftheunitedfrontasdefactocollaborationwiththereformistunionleaders,andthusabetrayalofLeninistprinciples.Theirparticular
targetwastheAngloRussianCommitteethathadbeenestablishedasalinkbetweentheSoviettradeunionsandtheGeneralCounciloftheBritishTradeUnions
Congress.Inresponse,
27.

FordifferentpointsofviewonStalin'sattitudetowardrevolutionoutsidetheUSSR,seeIsaacDeutscher,Stalin:APoliticalBiography(Oxford,1949),chap.10RobertC.
Tucker,StalininPower:TheRevolutionfromAbove,19281941(NewYork,1990).

Page29

thePolitburoinsistedthattheironlymotivewastounmaskthetradeunionleadersasthevacillatingreformiststhattheywere.Letters1319containStalin'sexposition
ofthemajoritypointofviewinpreparationforthePolitburoclashwithZinovievinJune.StalinemphasizeshiscompleteagreementwithBukharinandtheothersin
Moscow.Giventhehighlypartisancontext,however,itisdifficulttosaywhetherStalin'sprotestationsaresincere.
Muchmorerevealingarevariousremarksinletter23,writteninAugust1926.StalinfirstnotesthatadelegationfromtheBritishcoalminerswillsoonarrivethey
shouldbegivenanenthusiasticreception.MoreSovietmoneyneedstobecollectedforthestrikingminers."ThesituationinEnglandisserious,anditobligesusto
makeserious'sacrifices.'"TheAmericanshadpromisedtogivetheminersamilliondollars,anditwouldbeshamefuliftheSovietUniongaveanyless.(Stalinneednot
haveworried,sinceintheendtheAmericansgaveverylittle.)28Evensendingmoneyisaninsufficientgesture:StalinsuggestsfollowingthewishesoftheBritish
Communistsandimposinganembargooncoalimports.
StalinthenlatchesontowhatheconsidersamissedopportunityforunmaskingtheBritishlaborleadersascowards:Didn'ttheygoonvacationratherthanaccountfor
theiractions?HementionsthatheiskeepingupwiththeBritishCommunistnewspapers,soheknowstheyhavenot"trumpeted"thesefactsastheyshould.Stalin's
suggestiongotarestrainedresponsefromMikhailTomskii,theleaderoftheSoviettradeunions.TomskiihadvisitedEnglandandhadacquiredagreatersenseof
politicalrealityhedoubtedwhetherunmaskingthereformistleaders'vacationtripswouldproduceaseriouspoliticaleffect.
StalingoesontoaskhowtheCominternExecutiveCommitteeisreactingtonew,moreradicalslogansadvocatingnewelectionsinEngland.Thementionofthe
CominternremindshimofaprojecttopublishtheComintern'sjournalmorefrequently:Whyisn'tBukharinpushingthismattermoreenergetically?Aweeklyjournal
wouldgreatlyimprovetheworkoftheCominternanditsmemberparties.(OnStalin'sattitudetowardtheComintern,seealsoletter82,from1935.)
28.

CharlesLochMowat,BritainbetweentheWars,19181940(London,1955),chap.6.

Page30

Letusconsiderafewothercommentsfrom1926beforeassessingtheevidence.Inletter12,writtenbeforetheoutbreakofcontroversywithinthePolitburo,Stalin
insiststhatapamphletdocumentingSovietsupportforthestrikingcoalminersbetranslatedintoallthemajorWesternlanguages.Inletter26,welearnthatStalin
preferredtoloanratherthangivetheGeneralCouncilthemoneytheyrequested.Hismotivation:toshowEuropethattheSovietsweresoberpeoplewhoknewhow
tocountkopecks.Finally,inletter28StalinarguesagainstundulyirritatingtheBritishreformistsovertheirfailuretoprotesttheirgovernment'sinterventioninChina.
Takentogether,Stalin'sremarksindicatethathewasveryinvolvedintheBritishsituationandgenuinelyhopedforamoreradicaloutcome.Thelettersalsoseemto
acquithimofanyrealinterestincollaboratingwithreformists:unmaskingalwaysgetstoppriority.Onewouldnotdeducefromtheselettersthathewascontemptuous
oftheComintern.Ontheotherhand,heiscertainlynotaboveusingagestureofrevolutionarysolidarityasawayofburnishingtheSovietgovernment'sfinancial
reputation.Stalinsawnoanomalyinadvancingbothsetsofinterestssimultaneously.
Theotherburningissueofthemid1920swastheSovietandCominternroleintheChineserevolution.ThecourseofeventsinChinaisinconceivablewithoutthe
crucialinfluenceofRussianpoliticalandmilitaryadvisorslikeMikhailBorodinandVasiliiBliucher.Manybookshavebeendevotedtotherightsandwrongs,the
insightsandmistakes,ofCominternpolicyanditsdisastrousoutcomefortheChineseCommunistParty,yetthelettersshednewlightontheattitudesofbothStalin
andhisPolitburocolleagues.LetusrestrictourselvesheretopassagesthathelpusunderstandStalin'sgeneralattitudetowardrevolutionoutsidetheSovietUnion.
Atthebeginningof1926,StalinthoughttheKuomintanggovernmentinCantonwouldbebestadvisednottoattempttounifythecountrywithariskyenterpriselike
theNorthernExpedition.Inspiteofhiscautiononthemilitaryfront,hefelttheKuomintangwouldstrengthenitspoliticalbaseandachieveastrongerantiimperialist
thrustifitcarriedoutathoroughagrarianreform.29
29.

Stalin'sviewscanbefoundinhisadditiontoamemorandumwrittenbyTrotskythetextcanbefoundinKommunisticheskaiaoppozitsiiavSSSR,192327,4vols.(Benson,
Vt.:ChalidzePublications,1988),1:179.

Page31

WhenChiangKaishekwentaheadandlaunchedthehighlysuccessfulNorthernExpedition,Stalinwaselatedandassumedthatanewstageoftherevolutionhad
commenced.HeexplainshisfeelingstoMolotovwhencriticizingLevKarakhan,thetopSovietdiplomatinChinaatthetime:"Hehasoutlivedhisusefulness:hewas
andhasremainedtheambassadorofthefirststageoftheChineserevolutionandisentirelyuselessasaleaderinthecurrentnewsituation,boththeChineseandthe
internationalsituation....KarakhanwillneverunderstandthatHankowwillsoonbecometheChineseMoscow"(letter28).(Hankowwasoneofthecitiesinthe
WuhancomplexwheretheKuomintangsetupitscapitalduringtheNorthernExpedition.Hisremarkabouta"ChineseMoscow"reflectshisviewthatthewhole
countrywouldbeunitedunderoneantiimperialistgovernment,notthattherewouldbeasocialistrevolutioninChina.)
ThecruxofwhatStalincalledthenewstageoftherevolutionwastheopportunityforwidespreadagrarianreform.Stalinseemstohavebelievedthatgivingthe
peasantslandwouldstrengthentheKuomintangandthatanimplicitdealcouldthereforebestruckonthefollowingbasis:theKuomintangarmieswouldprovide
militarycover,andtheChineseCommunistPartywouldstirupthepeasantmasses.AletterwritteninJune1927showsthatStalinwaswillingtomakeconsiderable
sacrificestoobtainpoliticalspacefortheChineseCommunists.Bythistime,theMoscowleadershadbeguntorealizethatthe"leftKuomintang"governmentin
WuhanwasonthevergeofturningagainsttheCommunists.Stalinheregiveshisreasonsforstavingofftheevildaybymeansofdirectsubsidies(letter33):
LosingWuhanasaseparatecentermeanslosingatleastsomecenterfortherevolutionarymovement,losingthepossibilityoffreeassemblyandralliesfortheworkers,losingthe
possibilityoftheopenexistenceoftheCommunistParty,losingthepossibilityofanopenrevolutionarypressinaword,losingthepossibilityofopenlyorganizingthe
proletariatandtherevolution.Inordertoobtainallthis,Iassureyou,itisworthgivingWuhananextra35milliononlywithsomeassurancethatWuhanwillnotsurrenderto
thetendermerciesofNanking[headquartersoftherightKuomintang]withourmoneywastedfornothing.

Thebreakcameonlytwoweekslater,andStalinhadtofacetheruinofallhishopesforrevolutionarycollaborationwiththeKuo

Page32

mintang.AftertakingadaytoreadthroughallthedocumentssentdownfromMoscow,Stalinpennedletter36,alongseriesofglumreflectionsonthefutureofthe
ChineseCommunists.
Thelettercontainspoliticaladvicefortheimmediatefuture:theChineseCommunistsshouldleavethegovernmentbutnottheKuomintangitself.ThePolitburoquickly
adoptedthisadvice,andinstructionstothateffectweresentofftoChinaevenbeforeStalinreturnedfromvacation.30Stalininsistedthattheblameforthefailureof
CominternstrategylaywiththeleadersoftheChineseCommunistPartythistoobecameofficialpolicy.Stalin'schargeagainsttheChineseleaderswasthattheyfailed
totakeadvantageofthepoliticalspaceStalinthoughttheyhad:theydidnotmobilizethepeasantsorinfiltratethearmy.Hedismissedtheminthesamewayhe
dismissedKarakhan:theyhadbeenrecruitedinthefirstphaseoftherevolutionandwereunsuitableforitssecond,moreradicalphase.
Stalin'sletterisconsiderablymorepessimisticthanarehislaterpublicstatements.HedescribesinvividtermswhattheChineseCommunistPartywillhavetoundergo
asthetideofrevolutionebbsaway:''[going]underground,arrests,beatings,executions,betrayalsandprovocationsamongtheirownranks,etc."Stalin'sscenariofor
theChineseCommunistsisderivedfromBolshevikexperiencebetweentherevolutionof1905andtheoutbreakofrevolutionin1917Stalinthinksitlikelythatthe
ChineseCommunistswillhavetowaitasimilarlengthoftimebeforeanewrevolutionaryoutburstoccursinChina.
Inanarticlepublishedonlyafortnightlater,Stalinmentionsthepessimistic19051917scenarioaslesslikelythanthepossibilityofaswiftreturntothestormsof
revolution.Fromletter38itappearsthatStalin'schangeofheartwastheresultofobjectionsbyMolotovandperhapsBukharin.Themoreoptimisticreadingofthe
ChinesesituationledtoanumberofabortiverevoltsbyChineseCommuniststhatcompoundedthedamagedoneduringtheKuomintangalliance.Stalinnodoubt
reflectedthathisfirstinstinctshadbeencorrect.
AnotheraspectofStalin'sletternotreflectedinlaterpublicstate
30.

HelmutGruber,SovietRussiaMasterstheComintern:InternationalCommunismintheEraofStalin'sAscendancy(NewYork,1974),494500C.MartinWilbur,The
NationalistRevolutioninChina,19231928(Cambridge,1983),144.

Page33

mentsishisconceptionoffutureSovietaidtotheChineseCommunists.TheproposedaidseemstoconsistofbetterMarxistliteratureandbetteradvisors."We
shouldregularlysendtoChina,notpeoplewedon'tneed,butcompetentpeopleinstead."Thesepoliticaladvisorswillplaytheroleof"nannies"forthepresent
amorphousandweakCentralCommittee."Astherevolutionandthepartygrow,theneedforthese'nannies'willdisappear.''
Inthefollowingletter,Stalinnotessomemisgivingsonthepartofsomeofhispoliticalfriendsaboutpastpolicybutdefiantlyaffirms:"NeverhaveIbeensodeeplyand
firmlyconvincedofthecorrectnessofourpolicy,bothinChinaandregardingtheAngloRussianCommittee,asIamnow"(letter37).Ashedidthroughouthis
politicalcareer,StalinblamedanyunfortunateresultsonthefailureoflocalleaderstounderstandthePolitburo'scorrectpolicy.
Tosumup:StalinseesthesuccessoftheChineseCommunistPartyasamatterofbothstateandrevolutionaryinterest.Althoughbyinstinctheiscautiousabout
revolutionaryprospects,hecanalsobecarriedawaybyapparentsuccess.HeassumesthattheSovietmodelshouldguidetheChineseCommunists,buthealso
assumesthatSoviet"nannies"areonlyatemporarynecessity.
After1927theletterstouchmoreonstatediplomacythanonrevolutionarystrategy.ThisgivesustheopportunitytoobserveStalin'samalgamationofstateand
revolutionaryinterestsfromanotherangle:hisinsistenceonimposingrevolutionaryconsiderationsonnormaldiplomacy.Letter44(August1929)providesseveral
examples.ByactingtoughinstatenegotiationswithEnglandandChina,theSovietUnionisalsostrikingablowforrevolution:
Thepointisnotonlyornotevenmainlyhowtoresolvethisorthat"conflict."Thepointisreallytouseourtoughpositiontounmaskcompletelyandtounderminetheauthority
ofChiangKaishek'sgovernment,agovernmentoflackeysofimperialism,forattemptingtobecomethemodelof"nationalgovernments"forthecolonialanddependent
countries...[thus]mak[ing]iteasiertocarryouttherevolutionaryeducationoftheworkersincolonialcountries(andtheChineseworkersaboveall).

Conversely,revolutionarysuccessredoundstotheSovietstate:"This[unmasking]isaveryimportantandnecessaryrevolutionarytask,whichwill,atthesametime,
raisetheprestigeoftheSoviet

Page34

governmentintheeyesoftheworkersofallcountries(andaboveallintheeyesoftheworkingclassoftheUSSR)."
Aversionoftheantibureaucratscenarioisatplayhere.Backin1925,StalinhadwarnedthatcapitalistencirclementmightcorrupttheSovietforeignservice,leading
thepolicyspecialiststoforgetthecauseofworldrevolution.31ThisseemstobethethoughtbehindtherepeatedsneersdirectedatMaksimLitvinov,actingheadofthe
foreignservice."Litvinovdoesnotseeandisnotinterestedin[therevolutionaryaspectofpolicy].ButthePolitburo[apartyinstitution]shouldtakeallthisinto
account"(letter44).LitvinovisthereforeassociatedwithBukharinandRykov:"Thesepeopledon'tseethegrowthofthepowerandmightoftheUSSR,northose
changesininternationalrelationsthathaveoccurredrecently(andwillgoontakingplace)"(letter51seealsoletter45).Thiscorruptionbytheoutsideenvironmentis
atypicalsymptomoftherightdeviation(discussedinthesection''RightDeviation").
Themostdramaticdiplomaticeventof1929wasthearmedinterventionarisingoutoftheclashovertheChineseEasternRailway.Thiswasasurgicalmilitary
operationagainstweakresistancewithlittlefearofinterventionbyotherpowersinotherwords,somethingontheorderofPanamaorGrenada.Thewarwasnot
givenwidepublicityathomeoneAmericanjournalistcalledit"thewarnobodyknew."32Still,Stalinwaselatedbyitssuccess:"LetthemknowwhattheBolsheviks
arelike!IthinktheChineselandownerswon'tforgettheobjectlessontaughtthembytheFarEastArmy"(letter53).HealsoallowedthatLitvinov'sspeechonthe
subjectwasn'tsobadinthisspeechLitvinovmockedtheAmericansfortheirattemptatdiplomaticintervention.
Thestrangestamalgamationofstateandrevolutionaryinterestsoccursduringthepreparationforthisintervention(letter51).Atonepoint,Stalinwantedtoexpandthe
operationfromalimitedincursiontoamoregrandioserevolutionaryuprising.Hisprojectedscenariomakesitseemsosimple:OrganizeandequiptwoChinese
brigadesandgivethemthetaskoffomentingarebellionamongtheManchuriantroopsthenhavethemoccupyHarbinanddeclarearevolutionarystateauthority.
Afterthat,attractthepeasantsby
31.

Stalin,Sochineniia,7:16790.

32.

EugeneLyons,AssignmentinUtopia(NewYork,1937).

Page35

smashingthelandowners,organizesovietsintownandcountry,andgoonfromthere.ThisrevolutionarydaydreamseemsatypicalofthecautiousStalin,andthereis
noindicationanythingwasdonewithit.Butperhapswecanseeitasafirstsketchofwhathasbeencalled"revolutionfromabroad,"atermlaterappliedtothe
countriesontheUSSR'swesternborder.33
Asthegeneraloffensiveofthefiveyearplancameintofullswing,theimperativesofStalin'sdomesticrevolutionsometimesinterferedwithnormaldiplomaticrelations.
Severaloftheletterswrittenafter1929touchonthisproblem.Inletter72,forexample,Stalincommentsona1931speechbyMolotovdefendingtheSovietUnion
againstchargesofusingforcedlabor.StalinwantsMolotovtoarguethatdekulakizedpeasantsworkonlyonavoluntarybasiswiththesamerightsasfreelabor.In
letter65,ontheotherhand,Stalinhopedtousethedomesticcampaignagainst"wreckers"fordiplomaticpurposes:Sincethegovernmenthadconfessionsofsabotage
byBritishnationals,whynotpublishthempriortoupcomingtalkswiththeBritishgovernmentaboutdebtsandconcessions?ItisnotclearexactlywhatStalinhopedto
gainfromthismaneuveritisprobablyjustaswellthatsomeoneappearstohavetalkedhimoutofit.
OtherscatteredcommentssuggestStalin'sattitudetowardrelationswiththecapitalistworld:hethoughttheyweredangerous(becausethecapitalistsareenemiesill
disposedtowardtheSovietUnion),unpleasant(becausesomanybourgeoispoliticiansarejustpettycrooks),butnecessary.Americanreaderswillbeinterestedinhis
commentsin1932onpossiblediplomaticrecognitionbytheUnitedStates:"UnitedStatesthisisacomplicatedmatter.Insofarastheywanttouseflatterytodragus
intoawarwithJapan,wecantellthemtogotohell.InsofarastheoilindustrialistsoftheUnitedStateshaveagreedtogiveusaloanof100millionrubleswithout
requiringfromusanypoliticalcompensation,wewouldbefoolishnottotaketheirmoney"(letter74).
Stalin'schipontheshoulderdefensivenessisreadilyapparentinacommentonyetanotherMolotovspeech:"Viacheslav!TodayIreadthesectiononinternational
affairs.Itcameoutwell.Theconfi
33.

JanT.Gross,RevolutionfromAbroad:TheSovietConquestofPoland'sWesternUkraineandWesternBelorussia(Princeton,1988).

Page36

dent,contemptuoustonewithrespecttothe'great'powers,thebeliefinourownstrength,thedelicatebutplainspittinginthepotoftheswaggering'greatpowers'
verygood.Letthemeatit"(letter76).
Havingreviewedtheevidencesuppliedbytheletters,wecanreturntothedisputeoverStalin'sattitudetowardtheoutsideworld.ThelettersrefutetheTrotsky
derivedinterpretationof"socialisminonecountry"asanisolationistrejectionofrevolutionelsewhere.Tobesure,StalinneverignoredtheinterestsoftheSovietstate
andhewasoftencautioustothepointofpessimismabouttheprospectsforimmediaterevolution.Butthelettersshowthathewasalsocapableofhopeand
enthusiasmwhenrevolutionseemedtobeonthemoveandreadytoputhismoneywherehismouthwas.Thelettersalsodocumenthisunremittinghostilitytowardand
suspicionofthecapitalistworldevenwhenhewasforcedtodealwithit.Hewasvigilantlesttheforeignpolicyprofessionalssuccumbtothediseaseofrightist
degenerationandlosetheabilitytoseetherevolutionaryaspectofdiplomacy.Allinall,Stalincomesoutoftheletterswithhisrevolutionarycredentialsingoodorder.
ThusStalindidnotseestateinterestsandrevolutionaryinterestsin"eitheror"terms.Butthisleavesopenthequestionofexactlyhowheamalgamatedthetwoinhis
mind.OnekeyfactorwastheprestigeoftheSovietstateathomeandabroad.ThecapitalistworldwouldneveraccordevenbasiclegitimacytotheSovietUnion,
muchlessacceptitasanequaloradmireit.TheSovietUnioncouldappealonlytothedisinheritedonlyasanembodimentoftherevolutionaryideacouldtheSoviet
Unionacquirealeadershiproleworthyofagreatpower.YetIdonotmeantosuggestthatStalinwasinterestedinworldrevolutiononlyasapropagandatoolforthe
Russianempire.BecauseheidentifiedhimselfwiththeprestigeoftheSovietstate,healsoidentifiedhimselfwithitsleadingidea.Asfirstservantofthestate,hewas
alsofirstservantofworldrevolution.
GrainTributeandCollectivization
Startingin1929,StalinledtheBolshevikpartyandtheSovietstateinawaragainstthepeasantryor,asStalin'sloyalistswouldsay,againstthebetteroffpeasants
(kulaks)whosabotagednecessary

Page37

policies.Thecampaignhadtwotheatersofconflict.Onewasastruggleovergrain:Stalininsistedthatthepeasantshadtopaywhatheopenlycalledatributeinorder
tohelpfinanceindustrialization.Theotherareaofconflictwasastruggleoverhowthepeasantsrantheirfarms:Stalinwantedtotransformthebasicproductionunitsof
thecountrysidefromsmallindividualfarmstolargescalecollectiveones(kolkhozy).
Theamountofmaterialinthelettersthatbearsontheseeventsisnotlarge,butwhatexistsishighlysuggestiveandilluminateskeyaspectsofthethoughtprocessesthat
gaverisetosomeofthemostimportantdecisionsinSoviethistory.WhatconnectiondidStalinseebetweencollectingthetributeandtransformingpeasantproduction
relations?Whatlaybehindthefatefuldecisioninlate1929tounleashalloutcollectivizationcoupledwithdekulakization?InwhatwaysdidStalinprodstateandparty
toembarkonthiscampaign?
Obtainingthegraintributeandimposingcollectivizedproductionareseparategoals.Itisquitepossibletopursueeachofthemindependentlyinfact,theymighteven
beseenascontradictory.Duringthecivilwar,theBolsheviksfeltcompelledtoexactaheavytaxfromthepeasantry,andforjustthisreasontheyfounditexpedientto
moveslowlyinattemptingtotransformproductionrelations.
Inthelate1920sandearly1930s,incontrast,thetwogoalswerepursuedintandem.Theusualinterpretationisthatmasscollectivizationwasadoptedinorderto
obtainthetribute,ontheassumptionthatitiseasiertoapplystatecoerciontolargescalecollectivefarmsthantoscatteredindividualfarms.YetasStephanMerlhas
cogentlyargued,thisassumptionisbynomeansselfevident.34Thecollectivizationdrivegreatlydisruptedproductionandalienatedthepeasantry,thusmakingiteven
moredifficulttocollectthetribute.By1934Stalinhadtakensomuchgrainfromthepeasantsthatheinflictedmassstarvation(letters74and77givesomeindication
ofthepressurethePolitburowasputtingonthecountryinordertoextractgrain).Yetwhatwasdecisivewasnottheexistenceofcollectivefarmsbutthemassive
investmentinrepressiveresourcesStalinmadeintheearly1930sinordertomakethesystemworkatall.
34.

StephanMerl,DieAnfngederKollektivierunginderSowjetunion(Wiesbaden,1985).

Page38

Giventhatthestatepreparedtostopatnothing,thesameamountofgraincouldhavebeenextractedfromindividualfarms,perhapsevenwithlesscoercion.
ItthusremainsanopenquestionexactlywhyStalinlinkedthetwogoals.Ifweturntohisspeechesof1928,whenhewasseekingtorallythepartyleadershipbehind
hisstrategy,wefindthefollowingargument:Thisyearwehavehadtoapplycoercive"emergencymeasures"togetthegrainweneedtokeepindustrializationontrack.
Weareallagreedthatusingsuchmethodsiscostlyandunsatisfactoryinthelongrun.Wecannotliveforeverwiththiscontinualwarwiththepeasants,withno
reserves,andwithhungerthreateningthecityandthetowns.(Stalin'sobsessionwithareservefundcanbeobservedinmanyofhis1929letters,particularlyletters44
and53.)Collectivefarmsaretheonlyrouteofescapefromthischroniccrisis.Sincethecollectivefarmswillbesupportedbystateeconomicassistance,thestatewill
haveagreateropportunitytoensuredeliveriesbyeconomicmeans.Anexpandingcollectivefarmmovementwillalsoundercuttheauthorityofthekulaks,whose
sabotageisaprincipalreasonforthedifficultieswehaveencounteredingraincollection.
ThusStalindidnotpubliclyadvocatecollectivizationasanecessarytoolforcoercingthepeasants.Ironically,giventhewaythingsturnedout,Stalinoriginallydefended
collectivizationasawayofmakingupforthepoliticalandeconomicdamagecausedbycollectionofthetributeandofavoidingthepermanentconfrontationwiththe
peasantsimpliedbyrepeateduseofemergencymeasures.
ThequestioniswhetherthispublicadvocacyaccuratelyreflectsStalin'sprivatethinking.Thecluesprovidedbythelettersareatleastconsistentwiththethesisthat
Stalindidnotseecollectivizationasamethodforcollectingthetribute.Stalin'ssinglemindedinsistenceongettinggraintoexportcomesthroughloudandclear.Grain
procurementsarethekeytoeverythingwithoutexportstherewillbenonewfactories.Theneedissourgentthatitisimpossibleeventowaitforbettergrainprices
(letter60).Yetinletter41fromAugust1929,collectivefarmsthemselvesshowupasoneofthemainbarrierstosuccessfulprocurement.Laterintheyearhe
pronounceshimselfreasonablysatisfiedwiththeprocurementcampaign(letters51and53),buthissatisfactiondidnotstophim

Page39

fromgivingthegreenlighttothealloutcollectivizationcampaign.Hisattitudein1930issimilar:hisangeratimpedimentstothecollectivizationdriveinletters61and
63isseparatefromhisexhortationsforbetterprocurementinletters57,59,60(seealso67).
Turningnowtothecollectivizationdriveitself,wecanaskwhetherthelettersprovideanycluetothedecisioninlate1929toproceedwithalloutcollectivization,
coupledwith"liquidationofthekulaksasaclass."Thebasicargumentinfavorofcollectivefarmshadalwaysbeentheirabilitytomakeefficientuseofuptodate
equipment.Itwasclearthatindustrywasinnopositiontoprovidethisequipment,andpriortoDecember1929Stalinhadneverarguedthatcollectivefarmscould
increaseproductionwithoutnewequipment.
Allduring1929,regionalofficialstriedtoattractcentralattentionandresourcesbyacceleratingtherateofcollectivizationintheirareas.Themostextremecasewas
KhopercountyinthelowerVolgaregion:localpartyofficialsannouncedinlateAugustthattheywouldcompletealloutcollectivizationbytheendofthefiveyear
plan.Aphenomenalrateofcollectivizationthenfollowed.InJune,only2.2percentofKhoperfarmshadbeencollectivizedbyOctober,thetotalhadreachedatleast
30percentforthewholecounty,withmuchhigherpercentagesreachedinsomeareas.35
Itisuncleartowhatextentlocalofficialsactedontheirowninitiative,butthereisnodoubtthatcentralpartyofficialsgavemuchattentionandencouragementtothe
franticpaceofcollectivizationinKhoper.Lesssanguinewerestateofficialsresponsibleforadministeringthecollectivefarmmovementtheylookedintothesituation
andsentbackcriticalreportstoMoscow.Asaresult,acommissionunderT.R.RyskulovwassentouttoKhoperinlateOctober.BytheendofNovember,this
commissionreportedbacktoMoscowanddismissedtheskepticswhoarguedthatadministrativepressurewasbehindtherushtoformcollectivefarmsinKhoper.
Ryskulovretortedthattheseskepticswerecompletelyconfused:therateofcollectivizationshouldbeaccelerated,notreduced.
ThegoingsoninKhoperformthebackgroundforanexcitedpassagefromStalin'sletterdated5December1929(letter53):
35.

ForbackgroundonKhoper,seeR.W.Davies,TheSocialistOffensive:TheCollectivisationofSovietAgriculture,19291930(Cambridge,Mass.,1980).

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Thecollectivefarmmovementisgrowingbyleapsandbounds.Ofcoursetherearenotenoughmachinesandtractorshowcoulditbeotherwise?butsimplypoolingthe
peasanttoolsresultsinacolossalincreaseinsownacreage(insomeregionsbyasmuchas50percent!).InthelowerVolga[whereKhoperwaslocated],60percentofpeasant
farmshavebeentransferred(alreadytransferred!)tocollectivefarms.Theeyesofourrightistsarepoppingoutoftheirheadsinamazement....[ellipsisinoriginal]

InanimportantspeechattheendofDecember,StalinagainusedKhopertoshowwhycollectivefarmsbroughttremendousadvantagesevenwithoutexpensivenew
equipment.Bysimplybandingtogether,thepeasantswereinapositiontoplowundervirginandabandonedlandonascalethatlaybeyondthepowersofindividual
peasantfarmers.Inthissamespeech,Stalinannouncedthenewslogan"liquidationofthekulaksasaclass."Hearguedthatitwouldhavebeenirresponsibleto
liquidatethekulaksanysoonerbecausetheycouldnothavebeenreplaced.
Withtheclueprovidedbytheletterof5December,wecansurmisethefollowing:StalinregardedKhoperasatestinggroundforalloutcollectivization.InNovember
1929,highofficialswerestillarguingabouttheresultsofthisexperiment,soStalinwaitedforthereportoftheRyskulovcommission.Thenewshereceivedexcited
himbecauseitgavehimthegreenlight,notonlyforalloutcollectivization,butalsofordekulakization.Evenwithouttractors,itwaspossibleforcollectivefarmsto
replacethekulakfarmswithoutdamagingagriculturaloutput.
ThedecisionmadeinlateDecemberandinearlyJanuary1930ledtoawaveofforcedcollectivizationandotherexcessesthatthreatenedtodestroythecountry,so
theleadershipwasforcedtocallatemporaryhaltinMarch1930,whenStalinpublishedhisarticle"DizzinessfromSuccess."Amassexodusofpeasantsfromexisting
collectivefarmsfollowedimmediately.Stalin'sdeterminationtopressonwithcollectivizationisrevealedina1930letterwrittenattheendofthesummer(letter61).
Theimmediateoccasionforhisoutburstwasacampaigninfavorofsettlementassociations,anewformofruralorganization:
Youseemveryunconcernedaboutthestatuteforsettlementassociationsandtheaccompanyingagitationinthepress.Keepinmindthatthisillomenedstatutewasofferedtous
asthenewword,whichclaims

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tobesettingitselfupagainstthe"old"word,i.e.,thestatutefortheagriculturalartel[basicformofacollectivefarm].Andthewholepointofthesettlement(new)statuteisthe
desiretogivetheindividualthepossibilityof"improvinghis(individual)farm."Whatkindofnonsenseisthis?Herewehavethecollectivefarmmovementadvancingina
growingwave,andthenthecleveronesfromtheCommissariatofAgricultureandfromtheagriculturalcooperativesocietieswanttoevadethequestionofcollectivefarmsand
busythemselveswith"improving"theindividualpeasantfarm!Itseemstomethattherightistshaveachievedsomesortofrevengehere,sneakinginthisstatuteonsettlement
associations,becausepeopleintheCentralCommittee,sincethey'reoverburdenedwithwork,haven'tnoticedthelittletrick.

Stalin'spracticalconclusionsshowtheemphasisheputondevisingcorrectslogansandconductingeducationalpropagandainthepress(letter63):
Anillusionhasarisenofaretreatfromtheslogan"Forthecollectivefarms!"totheslogan"Forthesettlementassociations!"Itdoesn'tmatterwhattheywantinMoscowin
practicethere'sbeenaswitchfromthevitalandtriumphantslogan"Fororagainstthecollectivefarms"tothemongrel,artificialslogan"Fororagainstthesettlement
associations."Andallofthisatatimewhenwehaveagrowingsurgeofpeasantsintothecollectivefarms!...
Inmyopinion,weshould,first,giveaninternaldirectivetolocalpartycommitteesnottogetcarriedawaywithsettlementassociations....Inthesecondplace,itwouldbewellto
overhaulPravdaandallofourpressinthespiritoftheslogan,"Intothecollectivefarms."...Inaword,[weshould]launchasystematicandpersistentcampaigninthepressfor
thecollectivefarmmovementasthemajoranddecisivefactorinourcurrentagriculturalpolicy.

Theseremarkssuggestthatcollectivizationwouldneverhavebeencompletedwithoutunremittingpressurefromtheverytop.Thestatebureaucracywasnota
machinebentonachievingasingleaimbutacomplexorganismreflectingvariouscurrentsandpressures.Inthiscase,specialistsintheCommissariatofAgriculture
weretryingtodotheirjobimproveagriculturalproductivitybygivingsupporttoindividualfarmers.Stalinrealizedthatthisprovidedanalternativetothecollective
farms,andhemovedtocutofftherouteofescape.

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By19291930,Stalinhadimmensepower.Itisstriking,forexample,howquicklypresscampaignsfolloweduponpronouncementsintheseletters.InAugust1929
hecomplainsaboutthelackofcooperationingrainprocurementshownbycollectivefarmsapresscampaignfollowsinSeptember.Immediatelyafterhisletterof5
DecemberonthebreakthroughinKhoper,thepressannouncesthattractorsarenotaninevitableprerequisiteofcollectivization.Finally,historianshaveobserveda
shifttowardaharderlineoncollectivizationinSeptember1930thatis,immediatelyaftertheletterjustcitedonthedangerofaslowdown.36
YetStalin'spowertogethiswayonspecificissuesdidnotguaranteethesuccessofhisleadershipincarryingoutarevolutionarypolicylikecollectivization.Guidedby
hisantibureaucratscenario,Stalinrealizedthathehadtostrugglecontinuallyagainstthebureaucracyanditstendencytofollowthepathofleastresistance.This
requiredenergeticcheckinguponfulfillment:toppartyleadersshouldnotallowincorrectpoliciestoslippastthembecauseofinattention.Theantibureaucratscenario
alsohelpedStalininterpretthesourceofthisbureaucraticresistance.Inthecaseofthestatuteonsettlement,itwasadefactoalliancebetweenthespecialistsworking
intheCommissariatofAgricultureandtherightistswithintheparty.Inthenexttwosections,weshalllookmorecloselyatStalin'sdealingswiththesetwosetsof
enemieswithinthestateapparatandtheparty.
WreckerismRampant
Thegeneraloffensiveof19291930wasaccompaniedbysteadilymountingrepressionagainstanyexpertorbureaucratwhoseemedtoquestionthepracticalityof
theindustrializationandcollectivizationcampaigns.Startinginlate1929,theWorkerPeasantInspection,theagencythatbothLeninandStalinhadseenasaweapon
againstbureaucratism,conductedawiderangingpurgeofeconomicbureaucracies.Inthisperiod,itstaskwastofindanyunusedproductionreservesandtoremove
thebureaucratswhoallegedlyhidthem.Moreandmoreengineersandotherspecialistswerearrestedforcounterrevolutionaryactivity.Asthesuperhumanpressure
on
36.

Forbackground,seeDavies,SocialistOffensive,37281.

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thecountrycreatedmorefrequentfoulupsandbreakdowns,morescapegoatswereaccusedofwreckerism.AparticularlygrislyexecutioncameinSeptember1930:
fortyeightspecialistsinthemeatindustrywereexecutedafterasecrettrialinwhichtheywerefoundguiltyof"sabotagingthemeatsupply."Apublictrialofengineers
accusedofforminganindustrialpartydevotedtowreckerismbeganinNovemberthiswasfollowedinthespringof1931byanothertrialdevotedtoamythical
"UnionBureau"ofMensheviks.
Thesehystericalbutdeadlyaccusationsofimprobableconspiracieshaveoftenbeencalledawitchhunt.Onechallengeforobserversinsuchcasesistoprobethe
mixtureofbeliefandcynicismthatmotivatedthewitchhunters.Stalin'slettersfrom1930providerichmaterialonthisscore.Hiscynicismisprominentlyondisplay.A
strikinginstanceistheexecutionofthefortyeight"saboteurs"inthemeatindustry.Journalisticaccountsfromtheperiodallstresshowmuchthisparticularactof
barbarityshockedSovietsocietyevenamidthegrowingrepression.37Itappearsfromletter65thatthedecisiontomurdertheseunfortunatespecialistsresultedfroma
burstofvindictiveangerbyStalin,impatientwithPolitburofootdragging:"Wemustimmediatelypublishallthetestimoniesofallthewreckersofthesuppliesofmeat,
fish,tinnedgoods,andvegetables.Forwhatpurposearewepreservingthem,whythe'secrets'?Weshouldpublishthemalongwithanannouncementthatthe
CentralExecutiveCommitteeortheCouncilofCommissarshasturnedoverthemattertotheOGPU...andafteraweekhavetheOGPUannouncethatallthese
scoundrelswillbeexecutedbyfiringsquad.Theyshouldallbeshot"(letter65seealsoletter57).Lessthantwoweekslatertheexecutionswerecarriedout.
ForStalin,judicialformshadmeaningonlyasagitationaltheater.Inletter63,hemuseswhetherornotitwouldbeexpedienttobringKondratievandhis"co
conspirators"totrial:"Bytheway,howaboutMessrs.Defendantsadmittingtheirmistakesanddisgracingthemselvespolitically,whilesimultaneouslyacknowledging
thestrengthoftheSovietgovernmentandthecorrectnessofthemethod
37.

WilliamHenryChamberlin,Russia'sIronAge(Boston,1935),154EugeneLyons,AssignmentinUtopia(NewYork,1937),34961H.R.Knickerbocker,TheRedTradeMenace:
ProgressoftheSovietFiveYearPlan(NewYork,1931),268WilliamReswick,IDreamtRevolution(Chicago,1952),29498.

Page44

ofcollectivization?Itwouldn'tbeabadthingiftheydid.''Inletter65,heinsiststhataccusatorydocumentsbepublishedwithanappropriate"interpretation"fromthe
pressunderscoringthepoliticalmoraltobedrawn.
Stalinwasthuscoldbloodedlysetonmaximizingthepoliticalexploitationofhisvictims.Butanotherquestionisstillunanswered:WasStalinconsciouslyframing
innocentvictims,ordidhereallybelieveintheguiltoftheaccused?Judgingfromtheevidenceoftheletters,itwouldappearthathewasabeliever.Giventhe
farfetchednatureoftheallegedcrimes,thisconclusionisveryhardtocredityetjustforthatreason,weshouldmakethestrongestpossiblehypotheticalcaseinits
favorbeforedismissingit.EvenifwedecidethatStalinmusthavebeenawareofwhathewasdoing,itisstillstrikingthathefeltcompelledtoplaytheroleofa
believerinconfidentialcorrespondencewithhisclosestpoliticalfriends.
Thebasicmodeofproofusedbythesecretpolicewastheforcedconfession.Stalinexpressednodoubtsaboutthereliabilityofthismethodonthecontrary,he
seemstohavethoughtthatprisonertestimonieswere"indisputabledocuments"(letter65)thatwouldconvinceanyonewhoreadthem.Hecontinuallyurgesthat
relevanttestimoniesbepresentedtoeliteandmassaudiences(seeletters56,57,59,and65).Theintroductorysectionfortheyear1930containsStalin'sremarkable
letterabouttheforcedtestimoniestotheheadofthesecretpolice,V.R.Menzhinskii,inwhichStalinhopesthatevenWesternworkerswillbeimpressedbythe
confessions.
ThereareotherindicationsthatStalintookthesetestimoniesquiteseriously.Ifwecompareletter62withthelettertoMenzhinskiijustmentioned,itappearsthatStalin
wasgenuinelyconcernedaboutthethreatofinterventionallegedlydiscoveredbythesecretpolice.AlthoughStalingavestronghintstothepolice,heevidentlydidnot
simplydictateadesiredscenario,andthetestimoniesdidnotshoweverythinghewantedthemtoshow.Eventhoughheisconvincedthatthereisa"directline"
betweenthearrested"saboteurs"andBukharin,heisforcedtoadmitthatthepolicehavenotyetfoundanyindicationofit(letters57,67).
WhattheletterstellusaboutthesocalledSyrtsovLominadzeaffairisalsorevealing.S.I.SyrtsovwasafastrisingpartyofficialwhohadstronglysupportedStalin's
lineeversincetheextraordin

Page45

arymeasureswereintroducedin1928.In1930hewasheadofgovernmentfortheRussianrepublic,andmanyobserversfelthewasbeinggroomedtoreplace
RykovasheadofgovernmentfortheSovietUnionasawhole.Yetinthefallof1930,Syrtsov(alongwithV.V.Lominadze,apartyofficialfromtheNorthCaucasus)
wasexpelledfromtheCentralCommitteeandaccusedofformingan"undergroundfactionalcenter."MostanalystsassumethatthetroublestemmedfromSyrtsov's
publiclystatedviews,particularlyaspeechhegaveinAugustinwhichheobliquelycriticizedtheferociouspaceofthegeneraloffensive.TheSyrtsovLominadzeaffair
roundedofftherepressionsof1930withevidenceofasplitwithintheStalinistleadershipgroupitself.
Thelettersraisethepossibilitythattheaffairwastriggeredbyaninformer'sreportthatStalinreceivedinlateOctober.Intheweekspriortothisreport,Syrtsovis
mentionedacoupleoftimes,notwithgreatapprovalbutnotassomeonewhowasabouttoberemoved(letters64,69).Inletter64Syrtsovisassociatedwiththe
rightdeviationistRykov,butonlyinthecontextofabureaucraticdisputeovertheuseofforcedlabor.Stalinexplodesinangeronlyinletter71,whichwaswrittenafter
hereceivedtheinformer'sdenunciation.ThusitseemsthatStalindidnotfirstchooseSyrtsovasavictimandtrumpupacaseagainsthim,butratherthatSyrtsov's
viewsweredeclaredbeyondthepaleafterStalinbecameconvincedofhisguilt.
Manyobservers,bothatthetimeandlater,havepointedoutthenumerousabsurditiesandselfcontradictionsinthechargesmadeinthenewspapersandatthecircus
likeshowtrials.Isitpossiblethatanyonewithminimumintelligencecouldhavebeentakeninbythisnonsenseforhalfaminute?Butperhapsthisisnottheright
questiontoask.Givenasecurecognitiveframework,allsortsofanomaliescanbeignoredorexplainedaway.Inoursociety,weareawarethatourcourtsystem
producesmanyabsurditiesandmiscarriagesofjustice,yetbecausewebelieveinitsbasicprinciples,wedonotlosefaithinthesystemasawhole.
SoitwaswithStalinandhisfriends.Theycouldexplainawayanyanomaliesintheirsystemasaproductofthesamebureaucratismandwreckerisminthesecret
policethatexistedinallotherstateagencies.Theyconsidereditprudenttoinstituteproceduralsafeguardsinthemoreimportantcases.Prominentamongtheseisthe

Page46

confrontation(ochnaiastavka),inwhichtheaccusedmethisaccuserfacetofaceinfrontofinterestedofficials.Thecompleteinadequacyofthissafeguardmaybe
apparenttous,butthatdoesnotmeanitwasapparenttotheleadersoftheBolshevikparty.(ThishypotheticaldescriptionoftheStalinistmentalityisvividlyillustrated
byMolotov'smemoirs.)
Weshouldnotbetoohastyindismissingthesystemofforcedconfessionsasobviouslyunacceptabletoanyintelligentperson.Theuseoftorturehasalongand
distinguishedhistoryinWesternjurisprudence.Historianshaveshownthattorturewasinstitutedforcasesinwhichevidencewasinherentlyhardtocomeby:
witchcraft,forexample,oradultery.Itreplacedtrialbyordealwhenrationalistcriticismunderminedthelegitimacyoftheearliermethodofpronouncingjudgmentin
otherwiseundecidablecases.38ThishistorygivesusaclueaboutthecompellingpowerthatthemethodofforcedconfessionshadovertheStalinistleadership.The
alternativetobelievinginforcedconfessionswassimplynotknowingandthiswasintolerableinanatmospherepermeatedbyinsecurityandstruggle.
Adisputeoverforeignpolicyin1929illustratesStalin'sreactiontocognitiveinsecurity.WhentheLabourPartytookovertheBritishgovernmentafteranelectionin
spring1929,theSovietgovernmentexpectedaquickresumptionofthediplomaticrelationsbrokenoffbytheConservativesin1927.TheBolshevikswere
determinednottomakerecognitionconditionalontheresolutionofsuchhighlycontentiousissuesastsaristdebtsorCominternpropaganda.Priortorecognition,
therefore,theywoulddiscussonlytheprocedureforresolvingthecontroversialissues,nottheirsubstance.Thisrathersubtledistinctionledtomisunderstandingsata
meetinginJulybetweenBritishForeignSecretaryArthurHendersonandtheSovietambassadortoFrance,V.S.Dovgalevskiiaccordingtoasourcecloseto
Litvinov,theproblemwasalsoattributableto"lackofacommonlanguagewellunderstoodbyboth."39TheRussiansreceivedtheimpressionthatHendersonhad
insistedonsubstantivetalksHendersonlaterdeniedthathehaddoneso.
38.

RobertBartlett,TrialbyFireandWater:TheMedievalJudicialOrdeal(Oxford,1988).

39.

LouisFischer,TheSovietsinWorldAffairs(1930reprintNewYork,1960),604.

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ThedisputewithintheSovietgovernmentinvolvedthebestwaytodealwiththeuncertaintysurroundingHenderson'srealintentions.Litvinovseemstohaveargued
thatitwasamisunderstandingandthatanymoveontheBritishsidetoclearitupshouldbemetbyaforthrightSovietresponse.Stalinwasconvinceditwasatrap
evenafterHendersonmadeconciliatorystatementsinSeptember,Stalinarguedforasuspicious,goslowattitude(letters40,42,44,47,51).
Thisbackgroundmakesletter47arevealinginstanceofhowStalindealtwithinherentuncertainty.StalinwasconvincedthatLitvinov'sinformantswereunreliablethe
onlywaytoarriveatacorrectinterpretationwasthroughthe"logicofthings."StalinarrivedathisowninsightintoHenderson'sintentionsbyviewingthesituationinthe
lightofgeneralconsiderations:theBolsheviksweredealingwithenemies,diplomaticpolitenesswasonlya"masked"attempttotakeadvantageoftheSoviets,left
wingbourgeoisgovernmentsoftentriedtogainlegitimacybyactingtoughwiththeSoviets.Inthewelterofambiguoussignals,Stalinusedmaximslikethesetogivehim
theconfidencetodismissLitvinov'sviewsinanaggressivefashion.Yetitseemsclearthatthisaggressivenessarosefromanunderlyingcognitiveinsecurity.Asthetop
leaderinrevolutionarytimes,Stalinhadnoaccesstounbiasedinformationandwascondemnedtopermanentradicaluncertainty.Hehadtofallbackonhisownsense
ofthe"logicofthings."Ifforcedconfessionsseemedtoconfirmhislogic,theyundoubtedlyacquiredacompellingpowerinhismind.
AnothercircumstancethatprotectedStalin'sbeliefintheguiltofhisvictimswasthevaguenessofthecategoriesusedtodefineit:"sabotage,""wrecking,""faction,"
"center,"andahostofothers.''Center,"forexample,couldrefertoanythingfromashadowgovernmenttoacasualgettogetherofmalcontents.Stalin'shabitof
runningtogethernames("Inaddition,thedisciplesofBogolepovGromanSokolnikovKondratievshouldbeturnedout"[letter67])ismorethanarhetoricaldevice:it
manifestsanoutlookthatseizesonalmostanycontactbetweenindividualsasatokenofapurposefulorganization.BecauseMikhailKalininspoketosomeofthe
arrested"scoundrels,"heisonhiswaytojoiningacounterrevolutionaryorganization:theCentralCommitteeshouldbenotified(letters59and63).Thereasoning
recallsStalin'searlierinterestin

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discoveringthatYevgeniiPreobrazhenskiihadvisitedTrotskyinBerlin(letter11from1926).
ThepeopleoftheSovietUnionwouldprobablyhavebeenbetteroffifStalinhadbeenmorecynicalthanhewas.RobertTuckerhaspointedouthowmuchpainand
sufferingwentintothemassproductionofconfessionsduring1937.40Theseconfessionsservednoearthlypurposetheywerepromptlyfiledawayandforgotten.
TuckerspeculatesthatStalininsistedontheseconfessionsasprooftoposteritythathisvisionofaworldfilledwithenemieswasbasicallycorrect.Itwasarepetition
onagrandiosescaleofhisinsistencein1930thatpeoplereadandheedthetestimoniesofarrestedwreckers.
Inthissectionwehaveseentheantibureaucratscenarioturnmurderous.Bureaucratsarenolongermerelyafocusforexasperationtheyarecastasevilwreckers.
Thisoutlookwasnotinconsistentwiththecynicalscapegoatingthataccompaniedtheantiwreckercampaignthroughoutthe1930s.TheRussianhistorianO.V.
Khlevniukhasdescribedthesituationin1937:
Iffoodwasdeliveredinirregularfashion,thiswasbecauseofenemieswhohadinfiltratedthecollectivefarms,andappropriatetrialswerealreadybeingorganized.Iftheaccident
rateatworkwashigh,asimpleexplanationwasalreadyathandintheformofexposedwreckers.Thehousingproblemwasnotsolvedforyears,andevenfinishedhousescould
notbelivedinbecauseofincompleteandunsoundworkwreckerismagain.Wreckerswereactiveintrade,whichworkedincrediblybadly.Wreckersintransportthat'sthe
reasontrainsjumpedtherails.Ingeneral,theStalinistleadershipusedameansofmanipulatingpublicopinionthatwassimplebuteffectiveenoughunderthecircumstances:
everythinggoodcamefromtheparty,fromSovietpower,andfromtheleadereverythingbadcamefromenemiesandwreckers.41

ThisexcellentdescriptionfallsshortofacompleteexplanationbecauseitmakesStalinandhisfriendstoocynicalandknowing.Thelettersindicatethat,atleastin
1930,Stalingenuinelybelievedthatthewreckerswereguiltyascharged.Notonlydidhebelieve,buthethoughtthatothersbelieved.Hiscapacityforrationalma
40.

Tucker,StalininPower.

41.

O.V.Khlevniuk,1937:Stalin,NKVDisovetskoeobshchestvo(Moscow,1992),8182.

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nipulationmusthavebeenseverelylimitedbyhisownangrycredulity.
RightDeviation
UptonowwehaveseenStalinlashingoutatvariousgroupsdefinedasenemies:capitalistgovernments,kulaks,and"classalienelements"employedbytheSoviet
state.Inallthesecases,Stalin'sanger,howeverirrational,wasdirectedagainstpeopletowardwhomBolshevikshadlongbeenhostile.Inthissectionweshallexamine
aphenomenonthatismuchhardertounderstand:Stalin'slashingoutatfellowBolsheviks,notjustavowedrivalsfortheleadershiplikeTrotskyorZinoviev,butparty
comradeswhoprotestedtheirloyaltytoStalin'sgeneralline.WasthisanaberrationexplainableonlyintermsofStalin'sindividualpsychology?Orwasitbasedona
politicallogicthatStalinsharedwithhisvictims?
Toanswerthesequestionswemustexaminethephenomenonoftherightdeviation.42Thereisanairofparadoxabouttherightdeviation.Ontheonehand,itwasan
ephemeralpoliticalopposition,quicklycalledintobeingbyStalin'schangeofcoursein1928andasquicklydefeated.Ontheotherhand,itseemedtotheStalinist
leadershiptobeapermanentenemythatcouldneverbeentirelyrootedout,onethatthreatenedtoundoallofStalin'sworkevenafterhisdeath.Inhismemoirs,
Molotovmaintainsthattherightdeviationwasapermanenttemptationthatwasmuchmoredangerousthantheleftopposition.43
ClearlytheStalinistleadershiphadanexpandeddefinitionoftherightdeviationthatencompassedmorethantheoppositiontotheextraordinarymeasuresof1928and
thebreakneckindustrializationofthefirstfiveyearplan.Therightdeviationinthisexpandedsensewasnotjustarightwingcounterparttotheleftopposition.Theleft
oppositioncanbedefinedbyspecificbeliefsorpolicycommitmentsthesamecannotbesaidoftherightdeviation,sinceitwasdefinedlessbyanyspecificsetof
beliefsthanbythelogicofStalin'sattitude.Tounderstandthislogic,wemustreturntothe
42.

ThestandardstudyoftherightdeviationinthestrictsenseisStephenF.Cohen,BukharinandtheBolshevikRevolution(NewYork,1971).

43.

Foranexample,seeChuev,Stosorokbesed,171.

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antibureaucratscenarioandlookmorecloselyattherelationshipbetweenthewilyspecialistandthenaiveCommunist.
Inexpoundingthisfeatureoftheantibureaucratscenario,Stalinoftenusedtheimageryofinfection.Avividexampleofthisimagerycanbefoundinletter66,when
StalincallsM.N.Riutina"counterrevolutionaryscum[nechist']"whoshouldbesentfarawayfromMoscow.NechistisatermtakenfromRussianfolkbeliefit
meansliterally"theuncleanone"andreferstothedevilorindeedtoanyonewithwhomoneshouldnotsharethesamefoodanddrink.Stalin'scombinationofforeign
Marxistjargonandearthypeasantabuseiseloquentnotonlystylisticallybutalsopolitically,revealingaconceptofpollutionthatcouldonlyberemovedbya
''cleansing"(chistka,usuallytranslatedas"purge").
Stalin'spoliticalepidemiologytracedtheinfectionoftherightdeviationthroughthefollowingchain:surroundingclasses,lowerlevelbureaucrats,bourgeoisspecialists,
Communistadministrators,partyleaders.Oncethepartyleaderswereinfected,theywereamenacetothecauseandcouldnotbetolerated.
Iftheideaofinfectionistakenseriously,itpresentstwoproblems:howtodealwiththelowerlevelbureaucratswhoarethesourceoftheinfection,andhowtodeal
withtheinfectedleaders.ThelettersshowStalinactingtoresolvebothproblemsbeforeandaftertheofficialdiscoveryoftherightdeviationin1928.Theyrevealthat
thelogicthatdefinedtherightdeviationwasalreadyinevidenceduringNEP,althoughtherewasanincreaseinemotionalintensityafter1928.
Ifspecialistsandotherlowerlevelbureaucratsareseenaswreckers,theresponseisstraightforward:roundthemupandwringconfessionsoutofthem.Iftheyare
seenasasourceofinfection,theproblemismoreinsidious:Howcananyoneworkwiththemwithoutlosingone'sBolshevikimmunity?Inthelongrun,thebourgeois
specialistswouldbereplacedby"ourpeople."ThelettersshowStalin'sresponsestothisdilemmaintheshortrun:pressure,reliableCommunistadministrators,anda
unitedleadershipfront.
TheneedtoexertpressureonstateeconomicorganswaspartofofficialNEPdoctrine.Bukharinarguedthatwithoutthespurofcompetition,stateindustrywas
threatenedbymonopolisticdegradation.Thesolutiontothisproblemwasnottoreintroducecompe

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titionwithinstateindustrybutrathertoexertfirmpoliticalleadership.Stalinagreedinletter4(28July1925),hewrites:"Thesyndicate'sinertiaisunderstandable:it
doesn'tfeellikeexpandingproductionsinceexpansionmeansmoreheadacheswhybringonunnecessaryheadachesifthesyndicateisdoingfinewithoutthem?This
ruinousinertiathatarisesfromitsmonopolypositionhastobeovercomenomatterwhat."
Thus,nothingspecialisoccurringwhenStalininformsMolotovin1926that"wearedraftingimmediateandconcretemeasurestoreduceretailprices(wewillput
brutalpressureonthetradeandcooperativenetwork)"(letter30).MoreuniquelycharacteristicofStalinishisangryoutburstin1926againstlowerlevelcooperative
andstateprocurementagentswho"violated"policydirectivesbyofferingpriceshigherthanofficiallypermitted(letter27):
Anextremelybadimpressionisproducedbytheconstantcommuniqusinthepress(especiallyintheeconomicpress)aboutthecompleteviolationofdirectivesfromthe
CommissariatofTradeandthepartybythecooperativesandbythelocalandcentralprocurementagencies.Thevirtualimpunityoftheseobviouscriminalsisgristforthemillof
theNepmen[privatemiddlemen]andotherenemiesoftheworkingclassitdemoralizestheentireeconomicandsovietapparat,itturnsourdirectivesandourpartyintoa
meaninglesstoy.Thiscan'tbetoleratedanyfurtherifwedon'twanttobecapturedbythesebastardswhoclaimto"accept"ourdirectivesbutinrealitymockus.

Stalininsiststhattheseviolatorsmustbearrestedandacircularsentouttolocalpartycommittees:"Theseviolatorsareenemiesoftheworkingclassand...the
strugglewiththemshouldbemerciless"(letter27).(StalinwasstillfumingabouttheseviolatorsinanimpromptuspeechgivenseveralmonthslaterinJanuary1927.)44
IfthissortofpressurewasconsideredappropriateevenduringNEP,itislesssurprisingthatduringthefiveyearplanStalinwouldrelymoreandmoreonthesecurity
police(OGPU)tocarryouteconomictasks.Anillustrativeexamplefrom1929isletter41onimprovinggrainprocurements.Thesourcesofdifficultiesincludepetty
speculators,"Nepmanelements"inthecooperativeandstateeconomicorgans,anduncooperativecollectivefarms.Theanswer
44.

Stalin,Sochineniia,9:15859.

Page52

ineachcaseistosendintheOGPUotherwisethegovernmentislimitingitselftomerepropaganda.Inthenextletter,Stalinisstillworried,eventhoughthePolitburo
hasadoptedhissuggestion:itisunlikelythateithertheprocurementagencyorthesecuritypolicewillcarryoutthedirectiveswithoutvigorouscheckingupon
fulfillmentbythetopleadership.
In1930the"OGPUization"ofeconomicadministrationseemstotakeastepforwardwhenStalinfeelsthatbankpolicywouldbemuchimprovedifthehierarchy
werecleansedofunreliableCommunistsandreplacedwithpeoplefromtheOGPUandtheWorkerPeasantInspection(letter63).Stalinusestheexpressiveand
untranslatablephraseproverochnomordoboinaiarabota.TheclosestAmericanidiomIcanthinkofis"kickbutt"thegeneralideais"checkingupbypunching
peopleintheface."
AnalternativetocrudepressureofthissortistosendinreliableCommunistswhowillkeeptabsontoplevelspecialists.Unfortunately,Stalin'sfearthatthespecialists
wouldsubverttheparty'scontrolmadetherelationshipbetweenspecialistsandCommunistsinherentlyunstableinhiseyes.Hisattitudecanbedocumentedbyhis
referencestooneofthemostimportant"nonpartyspecialists,"VladimirGroman,aformerMenshevikwhosecontributionduringthe1920stothemethodologyof
planningwassogreatthatheprobablydeservesthetitle"fatherofSovietplanning."InJuly1925,StalincomplainsthatthePolitburoislosingcontrolofimportant
economicdecisionstoGosplan(thestateplanningagency)infact,noteventoGosplanbuttomiddlelevelexperts.TherealleadershipofGosplancomesfrom
"SmilgaandStrumilin...plusGroman"(letter5).Aspartymembers,SmilgaandStrumilinweresupposedtokeepaneyeonthings,butweretheyreallyreliable?In
letter10,StalincallsSmilaxa"fake''economicleader.
In1929,whilethegeneraloffensiveisinfullswing,Stalindemandsreliabilityofamoreviolentandradicalsort.HewantsMarianto"smashthenestofGromans,
Vinogradskiis,andothersuchbourgeoispoliticiansensconcedinGosplan,theCentralStatisticalAdministration,andsoon.HoundthemoutofMoscowandputin
theirplaceyoungfellows,ourpeople,Communists"(letter44).
By1930Gromanisawreckerwhoshouldbeshot.Butapartfromhisoutandoutwrecking,Gromanisasourceofinfection.

Page53

Hisexampleinspiredthesmallerfry,thecashiers,andvariousotherspecialists(whoshouldalsobeshot).Nodoubtifallwereknown,a"directlink"(thatis,achainof
acquaintances)couldbefoundbetweenGromanandtheleadersoftherightdeviation.GromanalsoseemedtoinfectanyCommunistadministratorwhosupervised
him.In1925,Piatakovwaspreferabletothe"sham"Smilga,butnowhetooisa"dubiousCommunist"wholets"financialwreckers"getawaywithmurder(letter57).
Astheseremarksshow,Stalinfeltthatlowerlevelelementswereencouragedbyinfectedleadersatthetopandthereforenowaveringordissensionamongthetop
leadershipcouldbetolerated.Aunitedfrontisneededinbotheconomicandpoliticalspheres.Ifprocurementagenciescompeteamongthemselves,grainholderswill
seetheirchanceandholdoutforabetterprice(letter41).Inthesameway,ifthepartyleadershipisopenlydivided,thebureaucratswillrejoice.AsStalinwarns
MolotovinSeptember1929,eventheappearanceofreconsideringtheselfcriticismcampaignwilldiscouragethebestelementsofthepartyandgladdentheheartsof
bureaucratseverywhere(letter49).
Bythesemeanspressure,reliablewatchdogs,unitedleadershipfrontStalinsoughttoquarantinethesourceofinfection,butwithonlypartialsuccess.Whatifa
seniorBolshevikaPolitburomemberbecameinfected?Bywhatsymptomswouldyourecognizethedisease?Whatpoliticalconsequencesarisefromthepresence
oftheinfectedleader?AnswerstothesequestionscanbefoundinaspeechMolotovgaveatthePartyConferencein1926.Welearnfromletter29thatMolotov
askedStalintolookoverthisspeechbeforeitwasprinted.WemaythusinferthatMolotovregardedthespeechasanexpressionoftheirjointoutlook.
Molotov'sspeechisapoliticalsermononthenecessityoffaith."Faithinvictory,assuranceaboutone'sownforces,agenuineconvictionaboutthecorrectnessof
one'slineandtheunwaveringdecisivenessinstrugglethatflowsfromitthisiswhatwilldecidetheoutcome[ofourstruggle]."Iffaithcanmovemountains,lackof
faithisdeadly.Lackoffaithisnotanunimportantmatter,notjustapsychologicalquirkno,itstemsfromawhole"ideologyofunbelief."Thosepartymemberswho
lackfaith"willwaver,willwobble,willgetconfused,willnothavealine,andwillconfuseeverybody

Page54

theycan.Thisisthelogicofthings."Itisabsolutelyintolerabletopermitwavererstoremainintheleadership:"Inthisperiodofundoubtedlytenseandlongdrawnout
struggleforvictory,itisnecessarythatourhandsnotshake,thatourwillnotwaver,thatourthinkingnotbeparalyzed."45
Inotherwords,thesymptomofthediseaseislackoffaith,andiftopleadersareinfected,theresultwillbewidespreadwaveringandconfusion.In1926thisanalysis
wasdirectedagainsttheleftopposition,withthesupportofBukharinandRykov.In1929,duringthefuryofthegeneraloffensive,itwasturnedagainsttheright
deviation.Intheirnotesfor1929,theRussianeditorshavegivenusaPolitburostatementfromAugustofthatyearcondemningBukharinitisinstructivetocompare
thistexttoMolotov'searlierattackontheleft.Bukharinismaking"maskedattacks"againsttheparty.Acaseinpoint:inarecentspeechhecitedMarx'sdictum
"Doubteverything."Doesn'tthisshowthat"Com.Bukharinisengagedinspreadingunbelief[nedoverie]inthegenerallineoftheparty"?Hisstrugglewiththe
leadershiparisesoutoftheinevitablewaveringofthepetitbourgeoisstratumduringatimeofintenseclassstruggle.AndsinceBukharin'ssalliesagainsttheCentral
Committeedestroytheappearanceofaunitedleadershipfront,they"nourishtheillusions"ofcapitalistelementswhohopethatresistancemightpayoff.Inother
words,Bukharinhasbeeninfectedbypetitbourgeoiswavering,andtheresultinglackoffaithdemoralizesthepartyandencouragestheclassenemy.
TheletterssupplementthispoliticalanalysisbyrevealingStalin'sintenselypersonalangerwithBukharin.Whendescribinghisfeelings,Stalinresortstoarevealing
socialimagerythatassociatesBukharinwiththemilieuofthespecialists.Inoneofhisoutburstsofhardtotranslateinvective,Stalincastshimintheroleofa
prerevolutionaryintelligent:heisa"typicalrepresentativeofthespineless,effeteintelligentinpolitics,leaninginthedirectionofaKadetlawyer"(letter42).(The
Kadets,orConstitutionalDemocrats,weremembersoftheleadingliberalpartyinthedecadebeforetherevolution.)Stalin'sconflationofBukharinwiththeeducated
specialisthelpsexplainwhyhewassosurethatBukharinwassomehowinspiringthebureaucratstofrustratetheparty'saims:hewouldfeelmoreathomeintheleft
wingofa
45.

15Konferentsiia,65475.

Page55

partyofpetitbourgeoissocialiststhanintheCommunistParty,whereheisadecrepit,rottendefeatist(letter67).
WethenobservethestrangedebatebetweenBukharinandStalinin1929,inwhichBukharinproteststhathehasnodifferenceswiththegenerallineandStalininsists
thathedoes.InaprivateconversationthatsomeonereportedtoStalin,BukharinevidentlyclaimedthathisdifficultieswiththeCentralCommitteestemmedfromhis
personaldifficultieswithStalin.Stalinwouldhavenoneofit:"IfhisdisagreementswiththepresentCentralCommitteeareexplainablebyStalin's'personality,'thenhow
doesoneexplainhisdisagreementswiththeCentralCommitteewhenLeninlived?Lenin's'personality'?ButwhydoeshepraiseLeninsomuchnow,afterhisdeath?
Isn'titforthesamereasonthatallrenegadeslikeTrotskypraiseLenin(afterhisdeath!)?Ourlawyerhascompletelytiedhimselfinknots"(letter43).
ThusStalinclaimedthatBukharin'sdislikeofhimarosefromprofoundpoliticalcausesandBukharinclaimedthatitdidnot.ItisironicthatBukharin'spresentday
reputationrestsontheassumptionthatBukharinwaswrongandStalinwasright.
Bukharinistheparadigmaticrightdeviationist.ButaccordingtoStalin'sversionoftheantibureaucratscenario,anypartyleaderwhoworkedcloselywithspecialists
riskedinfection.Accordingtotheusualcategoriesofpartyhistory,GeorgiiPiatakov,AlekseiRykov,andSergoOrdzhonikidzebelongincompletelydifferentslots:
Rykovwasarightdeviationist,PiatakovaTrotskyist,andOrdzhonikidzealoyalStalinist.YetthelettersrevealhowStalinlashedoutateachoftheminstrikingly
similarterms.
AslongtimeheadoftheSovietgovernmentandtopeconomicadministrator,Rykovwasthecoleaderoftherightdeviatioinstgroup.Inhismemoirs,Molotovdwells
onthedisgraceofbeingcalledaRykovitebyStalinaslateas1950.46Likealmostanyoneinhisposition,Rykovwantedtohaveefficient,businesslikerelationswith
thespecialistsworkingunderhimandwasirritatedbythesystematicdistrustthatinterferedwithproductivework.AtthesamePartyConferencein1926where
Molotovdeliveredhissermononfaith,Rykovreadaloudalongletterfromaspecialistofhisacquaintancewhowasonthevergeofquitting.Thespecialistgavea
46.

Chuev,Stosorokbesed,469.

Page56

longlistofallthereportshehadtomaketoinquisitivegovernmentagenciesandendedwithadescriptionofsomepettyharassmentbythelocalOGPUofficer.Rykov
furiouslyscoldedthesecuritypoliceforthrowingitsweightaroundjusttoshowwhowasboss.Hethendrewthemoral:"Ofcourse,togetherwithgoodspecialists,
therearealsobadones.Buttheworkingclassshouldbeabletoseparateoutthegoodfromthebad,andtohelpthegoodineverywaywhilepunishingthebad."47
ThisoutburstbyRykovshowsthatStalin'sversionoftheantibureaucratscenariowasnottheonlyonecompatiblewithBolshevikpoliticalculture.ButRykov's
defenseofspecialistsmadehimaprimetargetforStalin'ssuspicion.SometimesStalinsoundedasifRykov'sbodyhadbeensnatchedandhewasnolongera
Bolshevikbutaspecialist.InSeptember1929,StalinwashighlyirritatedbyarecentspeechinwhichRykovevidentlyfailedtodenouncetherightdeviation."Inmy
opinion,it'sthespeechofanonpartysovietbureaucratpretendingtotakethetoneofa'loyal'person'sympathizing'withthesoviets"(letter50).
AftermentallyexpellingRykovfromthepartyinthisway,Stalininsistedonremovinghimfromkeygovernmentalpostsinthenameofensuringeffectiveparty
leadershipofthegovernment.Hereasonedthatonlyinthiswaycouldtherotinthetopgovernmentagenciesbeeffectivelyeliminated.Rykovandhisinfected
associatescouldnolongerbetolerated."IfRykovandCo.trytosticktheirnosesinagain,beatthemoverthehead.Wehavesparedthemenough.Itwouldbea
crimetosparethemnow"(letter67).
ButifRykovandcompanywereremoved,whowouldtaketheirplacewhileremainingimmunefrominfection?AplausiblecandidatewasPiatakov,whohadalways
beenknownasavigorous,perhapstoovigorous,partyadministrator.In1925,Stalinpreferredhimoverthe"sham"Smilga.Piatakovhadjoinedtheleftopposition
becauseofhisdesireformoreenergeticindustrialization,buthewasoneofthefirsttorecantandreenlistwhenStalinstartedhisindustrialpushinthelate1920s.In
1930,PiatakovwasheadoftheGosbank.
47.

15Konferentsiia,11820.

Page57

ItisnotquiteclearfromthelettersexactlywhyStalinwasangryatPiatakovin1930.ManyobserversatthetimefeltthatPiatakovwasresistingtheinflationary
policiesdemandedbythepartyleadership.AccordingtoR.W.Davies,thisisanunlikelyexplanation.Piatakovhadrecentlypresidedoveracomplicatedcredit
reformdesignedtoensurebettercentralplanningofcredit.Owingtohasteandlackofpreparation,thereformsledtosevere,unplannedinflationasaresult,aharsh
deflationarypolicywasinstitutedsoonafterPiatakov'sdismissalintheautumnof1930.48AnotherpossibleexplanationforStalin'sdiscontentissuggestedby
Piatakov'smemorandumreproducedintheintroductorysectionfortheyear1930:someofhisrecommendationsamountedtoadefactocriticismoftheoverallthrust
ofeconomicpolicy.
Inflationarypressureswereaninevitableresultofmassiveindustrializationthesmallchangecrisisdiscussedintheletterswasapassingepisodeconfinedtothe
summerof1930.Stalin'sangeratthe"wreckers"involvedisamplydocumentedhere,andvisitingjournalistswerestruckbytheferocityofthecampaignagainst
"hoarders."49StalinmayhaveheldPiatakovresponsibleforthisminicrisis.Mostlikely,Stalinwasnotfororagainstinflation,fororagainstthecreditreforms,but
simplyirritatedatPiatakovwhenthingswentwrong.
MoreimportantforourpurposesisStalin'sinterpretationofPiatakov'ssins:Piatakovisa"genuinerightistTrotskyist"(letter65seealsoletter66).Iftheright
deviationwasasetofpolicypositionsliketheleftopposition,thisdescriptionwouldbemerelynonsensical.ButholdingTrotskyistopinionsonindustrialtempois
perfectlycompatiblewithbeingalinkinthechainofinfection.Piatakovisunderthethumbofhisspecialistsheis"apoorcommissaralongsidespecialists"(letter60).
(TheallusionistothepracticeduringthecivilwarofattachingBolshevikcommissarstothearmyinordertokeepaneyeonformertsaristofficers.)Piatakovbecomes
"themostharmfulelementintheRykovPiatakovblocplustheKondratievdefeatistsentimentsofthebureaucratsfromthesovietapparat"(letter65).Theknotted
proseoftheRussianoriginalconveysanevenstrongerimpressionofanunbreakableconglomerate.
48.

Davies,SovietEconomyinTurmoil,431.

49.

Knickerbocker,TheRedTradeMenace,25657.

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BothRykovandPiatakovhadblotsontheirescutcheons:theirparticipationatonetimeoranotherinoppositionalcurrentswithintheparty.Perhapssomeonewhohad
neverwaveredinsupportingStalinwouldbetterwithstandinfection.In1930,whenplottingtoremoveRykovfromhisgovernmentalposts,Stalinfeltitwasessential
togetsomeonelikeSergoOrdzhonikidzetodothejob.Alas!in1933,theconflictaroseagain,andthistimewithOrdzhonikidzehimself(letters78and79).
Ordzhonikidze(knowntoeverybodysimplyasSergo)wasafellowGeorgianwhohadbeenaStalinloyalistfromtheverybeginningandyethadmanagedtoretainhis
independenceinawaythatpeoplelikeMolotovhadfailedtodo.ThelettersshowStalin'sgreatrelianceonSergoaswellashisoccasionalimpatiencewithhisfiery
temperament(seeletters25,27,31).TheclashwithOrdzhonikidzein1933isallthemorerevealing.Bynow,thescenarioisfamiliar.Aneconomicdifficultyexists
(thistimeitinvolvesmissingparts).Itscauseisviolationofpartydecisionsbyimpudentenemiesoftheparty.Apunitivecampaignagainstthemisannounced.Anyone
whoraisesawarninghandaboutthiscampaignnomatterwhoisactinginan"antiparty"manner.Theevilmotivesofthelowerlevelviolatorsareclearenough,
butStalinisalsoaggrievedbyOrdzhonikidze:"Forwhatreason[ishedoingthis]?Ofcourse,notinordertoreininthereactionaryviolatorsofpartydecisionsrather
tosupportthemmorally,tojustifythemintheeyesofpartyopinion,and,inthisway,todiscredittheparty'sunfoldingcampaignwhichinpracticemeanstodiscredit
thepolicyoftheCentralCommittee"(letter79).
Inearly1937OrdzhonikidzecommittedsuicideundercircumstancesthatpointtoagrowingconflictwithStalinoverexactlythissortofissue.Ordzhonikidze'sdeath
removedoneofthefewremainingbarrierstothepurgecampaignof1937thatdecimatedtheSovietelite.
Webeganthissectionbynotingtheparadoxicalqualityoftherightdeviation:elusiveyetfearsome.Theimageryofinfectionhelpsaccountforitsinsidiouspowerinthe
eyesofStalinandMolotov.Oneisalmosttemptedtodefinetherightdeviation(intheexpandedsenseunderconsiderationhere)astheattempttobeaselfrespecting
Stalinistmoreexactly,theattempttocombineloyalty

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withselfrespect.Apartyleaderassignedadifficultjobwouldtrytodoitinthemostprofessionalwayhecould,andthismeantestablishingaworkingrelationship
withspecialistsandsometimessuggestingalocalrevisionofthegeneralline.ButassoonasanythingwentwrongorotherwiseirritatedStalin,theantibureaucrat
scenariowouldcomeintoplayandStalinwouldseehisformercomradeasinfectedbytheclassenemy,asasourceofrot,andasanuncleanspiritthathadtobe
exorcised.
Allthreedimensionsofleadershipareneededtoexplainthisresult.Asanofficial,Stalinwasplacedinarelationshipthatwasboundtoproducetension:thetopparty
leaderwasexertingpressureontheeconomicbureaucracy.One'sfeelingsaboutthespecialistsdependedtoalargeextentonwhereonestoodinthisrelationship.
Ordzhonikidzechangedhisownattitudetowardspecialistsin1930whenhemovedfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection(usedinthisperiodasapartytoolfor
proddingthespecialists)overtothetoppostinthegovernmenteconomicbureaucracy.50
Butanexplanationbasedsolelyonthedynamicsofbureaucraticpoliticsisinsufficient.LeonidBrezhnevconfrontedthesamestructuraltensionsStalinfacedbut
reactedquitedifferently.InpartthiswasbecausetheSovietUnionwasnolongerundergoingrevolutionarytransformationinBrezhnev'stime.Brezhnevalsohadthe
advantageofmanylongyearsofexperiencewithasystemthatwasnewanddangerouslyunpredictableintheearly1930s.Forthesereasons,Stalin'slevelof
frustrationandsuspicionwasboundtobemuchhigher.
Themainreason,however,thatdifferentpeoplereactdifferentlytothesamestructuralrealitiesisthattheyinterpretthemdifferentlyintheirownminds.Forthesource
ofStalin'sinterpretation,wemustturntotheothertwodimensionsofleadership:politicalcultureandindividualpsychology.Stalindefinedtheproblemshefacedwith
theaidoftheantibureaucratscenario.Hedidnotmakeupthisscenarioallbyhimself:someversionofthescenario,andevenmuchoftheimageryofinfection,was
canonicalwithinBolshevikpoliticalculture.EvenwhenRykovwasdefendingspecialists,hehadtoadmitthattherewerebadonesrequiringpoliceattention.The
lettersshowthattheessentiallogicthatdefinedthe
50.

SheilaFitzpatrick,"Ordzhonikidze'sTakeoverofVesenkha:ACaseStudyinSovietBureaucraticPolitics,"SovietStudies37(1985):15372.

Page60

rightdeviationwaspresentandactivealreadyinthemid1920sbeforeStalin'sradicalchangeofcourse.Itwascommonpartyproperty,andwhenStalininvokedit
hecouldexpecthiswordstoresonateevenwithhisvictims.
Still,noteveryBolshevikwouldinvestthescenariowiththesameemotionalintensity,andsowemustlookatStalin'sownpsychologicalmakeup.Thevividinvective
ofthelettersbeliestheimageofthecoldbloodedStalin.TheantibureaucratscenarioinitselfdoesnotaccountforStalin'scertaintyaboutBukharin'sguiltorhisability
tosuspectclosefriendslikeOrdzhonikidzeofdeliberatelyencouragingpolicyviolation.Thepersonwhowrotetheseletterswasageneralsecretary,aBolshevik,and
anexceptionalindividual.
Conclusion
WhenalargenewbodyofmaterialsuchasStalin'sletterstoMolotovbecomesavailable,itisalwaysdifficulttoassessitssignificance.Thisisdoublydifficultatthe
presenttime,becauseoftheongoingarchivalrevolutioninSoviethistory.Myownconclusionsareofferedhereashypothesesintendedtopromotediscussion.
TheselettersshowStalinatworktheyrevealhowhesawhisjobandhowheapproachedtheproblemsonhisdeskeachmorning.Ihavearguedthatthe
antibureaucratscenarioprovidesanessentialkeytounderstandingStalin'soutlook.Thisscenarioservedasabridgebetweenhisdaytodaywork(decidingonpolicy
andgettingitimplemented)andhisdescentintocriminality(campaignsagainstwreckersandrightdeviationists).Themundaneslogans"checkinguponfulfillment"and
"selectionofofficials"wereembeddedinapoliticizeddramaofclassconflictthatpittedtherevolutionarypartyagainstthespecialistsandbureaucrats.The
bureaucracyrepresentedthepetitebourgeoisieand,assuch,providedasourceofinfectionforpartyofficials.Stalininterpretedthefrustrationsofhisjobastheresult
ofsabotage,andhethereforelashedoutwithmurderousanger.
TheantibureaucratscenarioalsoformedabridgebetweentheStalinofNEPandtheStalinofthegeneraloffensive.Asearlyas1925and1926,Stalinwasangryat
"violators"ofpolicydirectivesandworriedaboutlossofPolitburocontrol.Theintolerabilityofanywaveringwithinthepartyleadershipwasalreadyexplicitdoc

Page61

trine.ButStalin'sapplicationoftheantibureaucratscenariobecamesteadilymoreviolentduringthegeneraloffensivewhensocietythreatenedtospinoutofcontrol.
Thecognitiveframeworkstayedprettymuchthesametheemotionalintensitybecamemuchfiercer.
Finally,theantibureaucratscenariounitesthethreedimensionsofStalin'sleadership.ThisscenariorepresentstheresourcesofBolshevikpoliticalcultureappliedtoa
particularjobbyaparticularindividual.Mosttopexecutiveswillcomeupwithsomeformoftheantibureaucratscenario,butStalin'sversionarosefromthe
revolutionaryexperiencesoftheBolshevikpartyanditscollectivereflectiononthem.AlthoughStalin'sscenariothusmadesensetohiscolleagues,italsoacquireda
characteristicallyangryandvindictivetonewhenheappliedit.Thelettersrevealthisvividlybecausetheywerewrittenasimmediatereactionstovariousproblems
confrontingStalin.
ThepictureofStalinthatemergesfromtheletterswillhaveaprofoundeffectonanumberofscholarlydebates.51Therehavebeentwogeneralapproachesto
decipheringtheenigmaofStalineachhasbeengivenclassicexpressionbysomeonewhoworkedwithhimandpresumablyknewhimwell.In1928,afterBukharin
brokewithStalin,hesummeduphisnewviewofStalintoKamenev:"Stalinisanunprincipledintriguer,whosubordinateseverythingtothepreservationofhisown
power."52BukharinwentontocomplainthatStalinchangedhisviewslikeaweathercockwheneveritsuitedhisinterests.
ThisdescriptionhasremainedthebasisofonepopularinterpretationofStalin.Itisnotwithoutfoundation,forthereisnodoubtthatStalinwasanadeptintriguerthe
Molotovlettersprovidesomeexcellentexamples.Thequestionremains:WasStalinanunprincipledoraprincipledintriguer?IncontrasttoBukharin'sviewin1928is
acommentNikitaKhrushchevmadeduringthe"secretspeech"of1956inwhichheexposedmanyofthecrimesofthedeadtyrant:"Wecannotsaythatthesewere
thedeedsofagiddy
51.

ForthreerecentbooklengthstudiesofthevariousdebatesconcerningStalinandStalinism,seeGiuseppaBoffa,TheStalinPhenomenon(Ithaca,1992)ChrisWard,Stalin's
Russia(London,1993)GraemeGill,TheOriginsoftheStalinistPoliticalSystem(Cambridge,1990).
52.

RobertV.Daniels,ed.,ADocumentaryHistoryofCommunism,2vols.(NewYork,1960),1:308.

Page62

despot.Heconsideredthatthisshouldbedoneintheinterestoftheparty,oftheworkingmasses,inthenameofthedefenseoftherevolution'sgains.Inthisliesthe
wholetragedy!''53
Inspiteofitsairofparadox,Khrushchev'sportraitofasincereStalinhasalwayshadadherents.Inmyview,thelettersweighinheavilyonKhrushchev'ssideofthe
debate:Stalinwasabeliever.
ThisconclusionbearsonanotherdebateoverStalin:Howmuchcontroldidhehaveoverevents?Toputthedebateinoversimplifiedterms:WasStalinpowerfuland
committedenoughtoachievewhathewanted,sothatwecandeducehisintentionsfromtheresults?Orwashethecreatureofprocessesbeyondhisken,avoiding
decisionsuntilhishandwasforced?Theletterssuggesttheneedtoposethequestioninotherterms.TheyrevealaverypowerfulStalinwhowasaggressively
confidentabouthisownopinions.Whenhewascommittedtoapolicy,heselectedofficialsandcheckeduponfulfillmentuntilthatpolicywascarriedout.His
insistenceonthecollectivizationdriveisthemosteloquentexampleintheletters.
Ontheotherhand,controlovereventsimpliescognitivecontrol.ToassumethatwecandeduceStalin'sintentionsfromtheactualresultsistoassumethatheknew
whathewasdoinginotherwords,thathehadinsightintotheworkingsofstateandsocietyandthatheunderstoodtheeffectsofhisactions.Fewreadersofthe
letterswillwanttodefendthesestatements.IhavearguedthatmuchofStalin'sopinionatedintolerancearosefromcognitiveinsecurityastopleaderinrevolutionary
times,hehadnoaccesstounbiasedinformationandwascondemnedtopermanentradicaluncertainty.Theoverridingmoodofthelettersisnottheconfidenceof
powerbuttheangeroffrustration.
AnotherlongstandingdebateoverStalinconcernshiscommitmenttoworldrevolutionandthemeaningof"socialisminonecountry."ThelettersshowthatStalindid
notseerevolutionaryinterestsandstateinterestsineitherorterms:hisgenuineinvolvementintherevolutionaryupswinginEnglandandChinadidnotcontradicthis
fundamentalloyaltytothepowerandprestigeoftheSovietstate.Finally,thelettersshowthatbythemid1920sStalin'sascendancywithinthePolitburorestedtoa
largeextentonhis
53.

KhrushchevRemembers,trans.StrobeTalbott(Boston,1970),616.

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leadershipskillsandhisabilitytomakeagoodcaseforhisrecommendations.
EachreaderoftheStalinletterswillcomeawaywithaconceptionofthepersonwhowrotethem.HereIoffermyownimpressions.Muchofthecorrespondenceis
devotedtotheroughandtumbleofpoliticalinfighting.AssumingthatthiswasaninevitablepartoftheKremlinenvironment,IfindthatStalin'simageofhimselfasa
devoted,conscientiousleaderisnotentirelywithoutfoundation.Heplainlyworkedveryhardtryingtoresolvegenuinelyintractableproblems.Hisleadershipskillsare
impressive.Althoughitisusualtoscornhiscatechisticstyleandnumberedparagraphs,IhaveafeelingthatifIwereonacommitteewithStalinandthoseprodigious
memoscamemyway,Iwouldfindthemdifficulttoignore.
Ontheotherhand,theemotionalrangefoundinthelettersisfrighteninglynarrowitalmostseemsconfinedtoanger,irritation,andvindictiveness.Praise,generosity,
enthusiasm,humorthese,whilenotentirelyabsent,areinshortsupply.RobertDaniels'scharacterizationbasedonStalin'spublicwritingisamplyconfirmedbythe
letters:"ananxious,rigid,compulsive,combativemind."54Stalinwascaughtupineventsbeyondhiscomprehension(wearestillstrugglingtounderstandthemtoday),
andhisconceptualequipmentwasplainlyinadequateforgraspingtherealcausesofhisproblemsortheeffectsofhisactions.Hisignoranceandanger,amplifiedbyhis
sincerityandhisleadershipskills,ledtocrimesofhorrifyingdimensions.ItwouldtakethepowersofaDostoyevskytofullydescribethecombinationofcynicismand
belief,ofmanipulationandsincerity,thatresultedinthetragedyofStalinandhistimes.
54.

RobertV.Daniels,TheNatureofCommunism(NewYork,1962),115.

Page65

InstitutionalBackgroundtotheLetters
TheSovietpoliticalsystemwasdividedintopartyandstateinstitutions.ThisdivisionwasmoremeaningfulinStalin'stimethanitbecamelater,because,intheearly
yearsoftheSovietUnion,thepartyfeltthatstateinstitutionswerefilledwith"classalienelements"whoseloyaltywasdubious.InStalin'sletters,"soviet"oftenmeans
''stateinstitutionsasopposedtoparty."Ironically,thisusagemeantthatthetermsovietacquiredpejorativeovertoneswhenusedbypartymembers.
Thesovietsthemselveswereelectivecouncils.ThesecouncilsformedapyramidalsystemtoppedbytheCentralExecutiveCommittee,whichwasthereforethe
supremeauthorityinconstitutionalterms.AbodywithmorerealpowerwastheCouncilofPeople'sCommissars,whosemembersincludedtheheadsofthepowerful
ministries.(Henceforth,People'swillnotbeincludedinthenameofthiscouncilandofothercommissariats.)
TheSovietgovernmentalsomanagedindustrydirectly,andimportantstateinstitutionsdevelopedeconomicpolicy.Thetopdecisionmakingbodyfortheeconomyas
awholewastheLaborDefenseCouncil.TheresponsibilityforthedaytodaycoordinationofindustrialadministrationwasgiventotheSupremeEconomicCouncil,
whileGosplan(StatePlanningAgency)developedplanningtechniquesandpreparedlongtermeconomicstrategy.
Letusturnnowtotheparty.Itstopleadershipbodiesweresetupalongthelinesofaparliamentarysystem.TheCentralCommitteewastheparliamentthat
theoreticallyhadsovereignauthoritybetweenelections(theelectorateconsistedoflargepartycongressesheldeveryotheryearorsoduringthe1920s).ThePolitburo
wastheequivalentofacabinet,andthegeneralsecretarytooktheroleofprimeminister.TheSecretariatthusbecametheparty'scivilservice.AlthoughStalinas
generalsecretarywasclearlyfirstamongcolleagueswhowerelessandlesshisequal,hecouldnottakePolitburosupportcompletelyforgranted.
Oneortwoinstitutionsstraddledthealwaysfluidborderbetweenstateandparty.OnewastheSovietsecuritypolice,called,amongalongseriesofnames,the
OGPUortheGPU.Although

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theoreticallyastatebody,itwasevenmorethoroughlypoliticizedthanmost.AnothercrossoverinstitutionwastheWorkerPeasantInspection(Rabkrin).Following
somesuggestionsinLenin'slastarticles,thisstateinspectionagencywasamalgamatedwiththeCentralControlCommission,apartybodythatoccupiedasomewhat
similarpositionwithintheparty.Thejobofalltheseinstitutionssecuritypolice,WorkerPeasantInspection,andCentralControlCommissionwastohelpthe
partyleadership"checkuponfulfillment."
In1925fullmembersofthePolitburowereJosephStalin,LevKamenev,LevTrotsky,GrigoriiZinoviev,AlekseiRykov,MikhailTomskii,andNikolaiBukharinin
January1926ViacheslavMolotovwaspromotedtofullmemberandKamenevdemotedtocandidatemember(KlimVoroshilovalsobecameamemberatthistime).
In1930thePolitburoconsistedofStalin,Voroshilov,LazarKaganovich,MikhailKalinin,SergeiKirov,StanislavKosior,ValerianKuibyshev,Molotov,Jan
Rudzutak,andRykov.Rykovwasremovedattheendof1930.
TheCommunistInternational(Comintern)wasanorganizationunitingtheworld'scommunistpartiesofficiallyspeaking,theCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionwas
justone"section"likealltherest.Inpractice,however,sincetheSovietpartywastheonlyoneinpower,iteasilydominatedtheinstitution.TheCominternwasalso
headedbyaCentralExecutiveCommittee.
Intheyearsbeforetherevolution,theBolshevikswerethebeneficiariesofLenin'sinexhaustiblesupplyoftermsofpolemicalabuse.Thesetermsretainedtheir
importanceinCominternaffairsparticularlybecausetheyoftenarosefromtheproblemsofpreparingfortherevolution.Opportunismwasthemostinclusiveterm,
embracingallthewaysinwhichapartycouldevadethedemandsoftherevolutionandsettleformerereform.Oneroadtoopportunismwas"boycottism"or
"recallism"(otzovizm),alabelgiventoaBolshevikfactionthatrefusedtoworkwithinbourgeoisinstitutionslikeaparliamentorthetradeunions.Averydifferentroad
tothesamedestinationwas"liquidationism":thedesiretoliquidatethepartyundergroundandtobecontentwithlegalinstitutionsonly.Afinalfailingwas
''tailism"(khvostizm),whichmeantfollowingbehindthemassesandtheirmomentarymoodsratherthanprovidingfirmleadership.

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ChapterOne
1925
TheletterspreservedfromthecorrespondencebetweenStalinandMolotovbeginin1925,acrucialturningpointintheSovietgovernment'spoliticalprogram.This
yearisgenerallyviewedasthepeakofLenin'sNewEconomicPolicy(NEP).Inthespringof1925,acomprehensiveprogramofeconomicliberalizationforthe
countrysidewaspassed.Agriculturaltaxesandthecostofmachineryweresubstantiallyreduced,loanswereexpanded,landrentalrightsandtherighttousehired
laborwereexpanded,andcontroloversmallscalepeasanttradewasloosened.Inindustry,craftsmenweregivensignificantlatitude,andthepressureonprivate
tradersthe"Nepmen"waslessened.
Theeconomicreformswerereinforcedbyashiftinpoliticalstrategytowardweakeningclasscontradictionsandtheclassstruggleandtowardovercomingcapitalist
elementsinanevolutionarymanner.Therenewaloftheactivityofthesovietsallowedelectionstobeheldthatwerefreerthanthoseinthepast.Thecentral
governmenttriedtocurbharassmentoftheprosperouspeasantsandthe"bourgeoisspecialists."
Alloftheseeventsarefairlywellknownandhavebeenrepeatedlyandcarefullystudiedbyscholars.InStalin'sletters,however,theseproblems,socentraltothelife
ofthenationatthattime,arevirtuallyunmentioned.Stalinwasentirelyconsumedbythepoliticalstrugglewithintheupperechelonsofpower.Indeed,thisisa
characteristicfeatureofalltheletterspublishedhere.Stalinwasinterestedindecisionsonforeignordomesticpoliciesprimarilyastheyrelatedtohisstrugglefor
power.Thisisrevealedwithparticu

Page68

larcandorinthesecondhalfofthe1920s,duringthewarwiththepartyopposition.
TheclashbetweenthesocalledtroikaStalin,Kamenev,andZinovievontheonehandandTrotskyontheotherhandbeganduringLenin'sillnessandgrew
particularlyaggravatedafterhisdeath.InAugust1924,alargegroupofCentralCommitteemembersopposedtoTrotskyconvenedaconferencewherethey
declaredthemselvesthecollectiveleadersandelectedanexecutiveorgan,the"seven,"consistingofallthemembersofthePolitburoexceptforTrotsky(Bukharin,
Zinoviev,Kamenev,Rykov,Stalin,Tomskii)plusKuibyshev,thechairmanoftheCentralControlCommission(CCC)oftheAllUnionCommunistParty
(Bolshevik).1ThesevenregularlymetontheeveofPolitburosessionsanddecidedallthefundamentalissues.AtthePolitburomeetingitself,withTrotskypresent,
resolutionsthathadalreadybeenagreedonwereformallyapproved.Stalin'sletterstoMolotovfrom1925provideauniquesourceforstudyingtheactivitiesofthe
sevenandtherolethatStalinplayedinthis"undergroundPolitburo."
Asthelettersreveal,twoissueswerethefocusofStalin'sattention:approvalofaprogramfortheconstructionoftheDneprHydroelectricPowerStation
(Dneprostroi)andtheEastmanaffair.EachoftheseissuesfiguredprominentlyinthecampaignagainstTrotsky.
TrotskynotonlyheadedthecommissionfortheconstructionoftheDneprStationbutwasaferventadvocateandpromoteroftheproject.Stalinwasagainstthe
planfromallindications,primarilybecauseTrotskywasinvolved.Stalinwasunabletoobtainsupportforhispositionamongtheseven.InApril1926ataCentral
Committeeplenum,heonceagainaccusedTrotskyoftryingtoupsetthebalancebetweenthegovernment'sfinancialcapabilitiesandthepaceofindustrial
development."How,forexample,canthefactbeexplained,"Stalinasked,"thatCom.2Trotsky,whohasforcedtheissueoftheDneprconstruction,isforgetting
abouttheresourcesrequiredforthisenormousundertaking?...Howwillwekeepfromfallingintothepredicamentofthatpeasantfellowwho,whenhehadsaved
upanextrakopeck,insteadofrepairinghisplowand
1.

Hereafterreferredtoas"theparty"Trans.

2.

TheRussianabbreviationfortovarishch'(comrade)ist.ortov.andhasbeenrendered"Com."throughoutthebookTrans.

Page69

fixinguphisfarm,boughtagramophoneand...wentbankrupt.Canwereallynotreckonwiththisdanger?Canwereallynotreckonwiththedecisionofthe[XIV
Party]Congressrequiringourindustrialplanstoconformtoourresources?Meanwhile,Com.TrotskyisobviouslynotreckoningwiththisdecisionoftheCongress."3
Soon,however,virtuallyconfirmingthepoliticalmotivationbehindhisprotests,Stalinchangedhismind.ByOctober1926attheXVPartyConference,the
constructionoftheDneprStationwaspresentedasaprioritytask,withanemphasisonitsprofitandimportanceforthecountry'seconomy.Forexample,V.Ya.
Chubar,chairmanoftheUkrainianSovietofCommissars,statedthat"topostponetheseworkswouldmeantoartificiallyslowthepaceoftheindustrializationofan
importantpartoftheUnion."4Allfearsoffinancialhardshipwereforgotten.On25November1926,thePolitburodecidedthatbothDneprostroiandthe
SemerechenskRailroadweretoppriorityprojectsofallunionimportance.5On31January1927,thePolitburodecided"toorganizetheconstructionofDneprostroi
withourownresources"onlyif"themostcompetentforeignexpertisecouldbeinvolved.''6Bythattime,Trotskyhadbeenvirtuallyremovedfromhisjob,andhis
namewasinnowayassociatedwithDneprostroi.
ThebattleovertheconstructionoftheDneprStationplayedafarlessimportantroleinTrotsky'spoliticaldestiny,however,thandidtheEastmanaffair.TheEastman
affairgrewoutofabookpublishedintheWestbyMaxEastman,anAmericanCommunistandjournalist.EastmanhadtraveledtoRussianumeroustimes,knew
Russian,wasmarriedtoaRussianwoman(Ye.V.Krylenko,thesisterofN.V.Krylenko,RSFSR7commissarofjustice),andwasthusabletogatheragreatdealof
materialaboutthestrugglewithintheSovietpoliticalleadershipduringthelastmonthsofLenin'slifeandfol
3.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.220,l.110.[ArchivalreferencesuseRussiandesignationsasfollows:"f."forfond(fund)"op."foropis'(register)"d."fordelo(file)"l."forlist
(page)Trans.]
4.

XVAllUnionPartyConference.Transcript(MoscowandLeningrad,1927),150.

5.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.604,l.3.

6.

Ibid.,d.615,ll.12.

7.

RFSFRistheRussianacronymfortheRussianSovietFederalSocialistRepublic,onerepublicoftheUSSRTrans.

Page70

lowinghisdeath.EastmanmetseveraltimeswithTrotskyandwashisardentsupporter.InEastman'sportrayal,TrotskywasoneofthefewtrueleadersoftheRussian
revolution,who,afteritsculmination,fellvictimtotheschemingofunprincipledKremlinintriguers.ThebookrevealsmanyKremlinsecrets,includingthecircumstances
ofthepublicationofLenin'slastarticles,his"testament,"andsoon.
AftertheappearanceofEastman'sbook,Trotskyfoundhimselfinadifficultsituation.AlmostimmediatelytheheadsofseveralWesternCommunistpartiesaddressed
inquiriestohim,askingwhetherthefactsreportedbyEastmanaboutTrotsky'spersecutioncorrespondedwithreality.Submittingtopartydiscipline(becausethefacts
citedbyEastmanwereconsideredsecret),TrotskywasforcedtoanswerthatEastmanwaslying.ButthismeantthatTrotskyhimselfwasnowlying,becausemuchof
whatEastmanwrotewasthetruth.Initially,wishingtoextracthimselffromanunpleasantsituationwiththeleastdamage,Trotskytriedtosimplyofferseveralgeneral
rebuttals.Stalin,whohadavestedinterestinthisincident,however,decidedtopublicizeitaswidelyaspossibleandtoexploititvigorouslytodiscreditTrotsky.On
17June1925,Stalinsentthefollowinglengthymemorandum:
TOALLMEMBERSANDCANDIDATESOFTHEPOLITBUROANDPRESIDIUMOFTHECENTRALCONTROLCOMMISSION

On8Mayofthisyear,thePolitburoreceivedastatementfromCom.Trotskyaddressedto"Com.EricVerney"attheperiodicalSundayWorkerinreplytoEricVerney'sinquiry
aboutabookbyEastman,SinceLeninDied.Publishedandwidelyquotedinthebourgeoispress,SinceLeninDieddepictsCom.Trotskyasa"victimofintrigue,"andthereaders
ofthebookaregiventounderstandthatTrotskyregards[bourgeois]democracyandfreetradeinafavorablelight.Inviewofthispresentation,EricVerneyaskedCom.Trotskyto
provideanexplanationthatwouldbepublishedintheSundayWorker.
Com.Trotsky'sstatement,asisknown,wasprintedinPravda,no.104(9May1925).
IpersonallypaidnoattentiontoCom.Trotsky'sstatementatthetimebecauseIhadnonotionofthenatureofEastman'sbook.
On9May1925,Com.TrotskyreceivedaninquiryfromtheCentralCommitteeoftheBritishCommunistPartysignedbyCom.InkpininconnectionwithEastman'sbook.Com.
InkpinasksCom.Trotskyto

Page71
makeastatementconcerningEastman'sbook,because"theenemiesoftheCommunistInternationalinourcountryexploityourpositioninrelationtotheRussianCommunist
Party."
HereisthefulltextoftheletterfromInkpin:
9May1925.ToCom.L.Trotsky.DearCom.Trotsky!TheCentralCommitteeoftheBritishpartyhasassignedmetosendyoutheattachedcopyofthebookbyMaxEastman,
SinceLeninDied,andtheissuesoftheNewLeader,Lansbury'sWeekly,andLabourMagazinecontainingreviewsofthebook.Thesereviewswillshowyouhowenemiesofthe
CommunistInternationalinourcountryexploityourpositioninrelationtotheRussianCommunistParty.
OurCentralCommitteeconsidersthatitwouldbeveryusefulifyouwouldwriteandsendananswertothesereviewers.Suchanarticlewouldbeofgoodservicetothe
Communistmovementinourcountry,andweforourpartwoulddoeverythingpossibletogiveitthewidestpublicity.WithCommunistgreetings,GeneralSecretaryInkpin.
Com.TrotskywrotethefollowingletterinreplytoInkpin'sletter:
DearCom.Inkpin:Yourletterof9MaywasevidentlywrittenbeforemyanswertotheinquiryfromtheSundayWorkerwasreceivedinLondon.
Mybrochure"WhereIsEnglandHeaded?"willbe,Ihope,asufficientreplytoalltheattemptsoftheFabianpacifists,theparliamentarycareerists,thePhilistines,andthe
MacDonaldstousevariouseventsinourpartyasproofoftheadvantageofreformismovercommunismandofdemocracyoverthedictatorshipoftheproletariat.
AssoonasmybrochureisreviewedbytheCentralCommitteeofourparty,Iwillnotdelayinsendingyouthemanuscript.
WithCommunistgreetings,L.Trotsky
21May1925.
Atthesametime,Com.TrotskysenttothePolitburoincareofCom.Stalinaletterdated19May1925,whereinCom.Trotsky,withoutprovidingadirectreplytothequestions
raisedbyCom.Inkpin,attemptstogetbywithareferencetohisbrochure"WhereIsEnglandHeaded?"whichhasnorelationshiptoCom.Inkpin'sinquiry.
HereisthetextofCom.Trotsky'sletter:
ToComradeStalin.DearComrade!Inordertoavoidanymisunderstandingswhatsoever,Iconsideritnecessarytoprovideyouwiththefollowinginformationregardingthe
EnglishbookbyMaxEastman,

Page72
SinceLeninDied(Ihavejustreceivedthisbookandhavemanagedtoleafthroughitquickly).
IbecameacquaintedwithM.EastmanasanAmericanCommunistatoneofthefirstinternationalcongressesoftheComintern.
Threeorfouryearsago,Eastmanaskedformyassistanceinwritingmybiography.Irefused,suggestingthathedosomeotherworkofmoregeneralinterest.Eastmanrepliedina
letterinwhichhearguedthattheAmericanworkerwouldbecomeinterestedincommunismnotinresponsetotheexpoundingoftheoryorhistorybutinresponsetoa
biographicalstoryheandotherAmericanwriterswantedtofashionaweaponofCommunistpropagandaoutofthebiographiesofseveralRussianrevolutionaries.Eastman
askedmetogivehimthenecessaryfactsandsubsequentlytoreviewthemanuscript.IrepliedthatinviewofhisexplanationIdidnotfeelIcouldrefusetotellhimthenecessary
facts,butIdefinitelyrefusedtoreadthemanuscriptandthusacceptdirectorindirectresponsibilityforthebiography.
SubsequentlyIgaveEastmaninformationrelatingtothefirsttwentytwoyearsofmylife,beforeIarrivedinLondonin1902.Iknowthathevisitedmyrelativesandschoolmates
andcollectedinformationaboutthatsameera.Thesematerialsarewhatgavehim,apparently,theopportunitytowritethebookLevTrotsky:PortraitofaYouth,the
announcementofwhichisprintedonthecoverofthebookSinceLeninDied.
ThelasttimeIsawEastmanmusthavebeenmorethanayearandahalfagoIlosttrackofhimaltogetherafterthat.Ihadnonotionofhisintentiontowriteabookdevotedto
thediscussioninourparty.Andevenhe,ofcourse,didnothavethisintentionduringthatperiodwhenhemetwithmetocollectfactsaboutmyyouth.
Itgoeswithoutsayingthathecouldnothavereceivedanypartydocumentsfrommeorthroughme.Eastman,however,didspeakandwriteRussianwell,hadmanyfriendsinour
party,wasmarriedtoaRussianCommunist,asIwasrecentlytold,andconsequentlyhadfreeaccesstoallourpartyliterature,including,evidently,thosedocumentsthatwere
senttolocalorganizations,distributedtomembersoftheXIIIPartyCongress,etc.Ihavenotverifiedwhetherhehascitedthesedocumentsaccuratelyorfromrumor.
ThepressoftheBritishmensheviksistryingtouseEastman'sbookagainstcommunism(thesecretaryoftheBritishCommunistPartysentme,alongwithEastman'sbook,three
issuesofmensheviktypepublicationsthatincludedarticlesaboutthatbook).Meanwhile,mytelegramwassupposedtoappearintheSundayWorker(thereismention

Page73
ofthisintheDailyHerald).Ithinkthatmypamphlet"WhereIsEnglandHeaded?"willbequitetimelyunderthesecircumstancesandwilldispelmanyillusionsandmuchgossip
spreadbythemenshevikandbourgeoispress.IintendtodoanappropriatesupplementfortheEnglishedition.
Inaprivateconversation,ItoldyouthatforhalfayearIhavenotreceivedanyCominterndocuments.Inparticular,Ihavenoideawhatsoeverwhatthe"inquiry"Treintraised
aboutmeinvolves.TothisdayIdonotknowwhyRosmerandMonattewereexpelledfromtheparty,Idonotknowwhattheirdisagreementsarewiththeparty,andIdonotknow
whattheyarepublishingorevenwhethertheyarepublishinganythingatall.8
WithCommunistgreetings,L.Trotsky
Moscow,19May1925.
OnlyafterthisletterfromCom.TrotskyandonlybecauseCom.TrotskystubbornlyrefusedtoreplydirectlytoCom.Inkpin'squestionsabouttheEastmanbookdiditbecome
cleartomethatIhadtofamiliarizemyselfimmediatelywiththecontentsofthatbook.
AcquaintancewithEastman'sbookconvincedmethatthisbookwasnotwrittennaively,thatitspurposeistodiscreditthegovernmentoftheUSSRandtheCentralCommitteeof
theRussianCommunistParty,andthatforthesepurposesEastmanindulgesinawholerangeofslandersanddistortions,referringtoTrotsky'sauthorityandtohis"friendship"
withTrotskyandtosomesecretdocumentsthathavenotyetbeenpublished.IwasparticularlysurprisedbyEastman'sstatementsconcerninghis"chats"withCom.Trotsky
aboutLenin'ssocalledtestamentandaboutthe''mainfiguresintheCentralCommittee,"andalsobyhisstatementthattheauthenticityof[histextof]Lenin'ssocalledtestament
wasconfirmedby"threeresponsibleCommunistsinRussia,"whom"I(thatis,Eastman)interviewedseparatelyandwhohadallrecentlyreadtheletterandcommitteditsmost
vitalphrasestomemory."
Formeitbecameclearthat,giveneverythingIhavejustrelated,itwouldbenotonlyintolerablebutoutrightcriminaltohushupthequestionofCom.Trotsky'srelationshipwith
EastmanandhisbookSinceLeninDied.
8.

AlfredRosmerandPierreMonattewereexpelledfromtheFrenchCommunistPartyinDecember1924becauseoftheirsupportforTrotsky.AlbertTreintwasoneofthetop
leadersoftheFrenchCommunistParty,andhesupportedtheantiTrotskymajorityintheSovietPolitburo.Fordetails,seeHelmutGruber,SovietRussiaMasterstheComintern:
InternationalCommunismintheEraofStalin'sAscendancy(NewYork,1974)U.S.Ed.

Page74
Inviewofthat,afterdiscussingthematterwiththesecretariesoftheCentralCommittee,IorderedEastman'sbooktranslatedintoRussianandsentthetranslationtoPolitburo
membersandcandidatesfortheirreview.
Iwasalsomovedtoactbecause,meanwhile,allandsundrybourgeoisandsocialdemocraticpartieshavealreadybeguntousetheEastmanbookintheforeignpressagainstthe
RussianCommunistPartyandSovietrule:theytakeadvantageofthefactthatintheircampaignagainsttheleadersoftheSovietgovernmenttheycannowrelyonthe
"testimonies"ofthe"Communist"Eastman,a"friend''ofCom.Trotskywhohas"chats"withhim,totheeffectthatRussiaisruledbyanirresponsiblebunchofusurpersand
deceivers.
IhavenodoubtwhatsoeverthatEastman'sbookislibelous,thatitwillproveenormouslyprofitabletotheworldcounterrevolution(andhasalreadydoneso!),andthatitwill
causeseriousdamagetotheentireworldrevolutionarymovement.
ThatiswhyIthinkthatCom.Trotsky,onwhomEastmanoccasionallyclaimstorelyinhisbookwhenspeakingagainsttheleadersoftheRussianCommunistPartyandtheSoviet
revolutionaryauthority,cannotpassoverEastman'sbookinsilence.
IamnotthinkingatpresentofproposingtoCom.TrotskythathesubstantivelyrespondinthepresstothefundamentalissuescoveredinEastman'sbook,whicharethe
fundamentalquestionsofourdisputesaswell.LetthepartyandtheInternationaljudgewhoisrightandwhosepoliticalpositioniscorrect,thepositionoftheCentralCommittee
orthepositionofCom.Trotsky.
ButcertainminimumobligationsrestonpartymembersamemberoftheCentralCommitteeandPolitburo,suchasCom.Trotskyisatthismoment,hasacertainminimummoral
dutythatCom.Trotskycannotandshouldnotrefuse.ThisminimumrequiresthatCom.Trotskyspeakoutinthepressunequivocallyagainstthecrudedistortionsoffactsthatare
knowntoeveryone,distortionspermittedinEastman'sbookforthepurposeofdiscreditingtheRussianCommunistParty.ObviouslythesilenceofCom.Trotskyinthiscasemay
beconstruedonlyasaconfirmationoranexcuseforthesedistortions.
IthinkthatCom.Trotskyshouldrebutatleastthefollowingdistortions:
1)Inthesection,"AttackingtheOldGuard,"Eastman'slittlebooksaysthat"Trotsky'sletter[thereferenceistoanappealtothelocalcommitteesin1923inconnectionwiththe
Politburo'sresolutiononinternalpartydemocracyJ.Stalin]andsomesupplementaryarticles

Page75
9

inpamphletformwerepracticallysuppressedbythePolitburo"[53].

Further,inchapter9ofEastman'sbook,itsaysthat"Trotsky'sbook[thereferenceistovolume3ofTrotsky'sworksandLessonsofOctoberJ.Stalin]waspracticallysuppressed
bythePolitburountilthey[thatis,theCentralCommitteeoftheRussianCommunistPartyJ.Stalin]weresureofthesuccessoftheirmanoeuvre"[8081].
Finally,chapter14ofEastman'sbooksaysthat"Trotsky'struetextsdonotappearinpublictorefutetheir[thatis,theCentralCommittee'sJ.Stalin]statements.Thesetextsare
readprivately,conscientiously,bythosemindswhohavethecourageandpenetrationtoresisttheuniversalofficialhysteriastimulatedandsupportedbytheState"[125].Ithink
thatCom.TrotskyshouldrefutethesestatementsbyEastmanasmaliciousslanderagainstthepartyandtheSovietgovernment.Com.Trotskycannothelpbutknowthatneither
duringthepartydiscussionsof1923or1924,noratanytimewhatsoever,didtheCentralCommitteeobstructtheprintingofCom.Trotsky'sarticlesandbooksinanyway.
Inparticular,Com.Trotskymustrecallthatduringthe1923discussionhehimselfrefusedinhiswellknownstatementinthepresstoreplytotheargumentsofrepresentativesof
thepartymajority.Hemustalsorememberthefollowingstatement"FromtheEditors"ofPravda,thecentralpartyorgan:
"FromtheEditors.InreplytothequestionposedbyanumberofcomradesconcerningwhyCom.TrotskyisnotrespondingtothecriticismofTrotskyism,theeditorsofPravda
reportthatsofarneitherCom.TrotskynorhisclosesupportershavesubmittedanyarticlesinresponsetothecriticismofTrotskyism"(seePravda,no.284[13December1924]).
2)ThesecondchapterofEastman'sbookspeaksoftheRussianCommunistPartyleadersas"suppressingthewritingsofLeninhimself,"[20]andinchapter9itsaysthatthey,
thatis,thepartyleaders,"clap[ped]thecensorshiponhis[thatis,Lenin'sJ.Stalin]ownlastwordstohisParty"[92].
IthinkthatCom.TrotskyshouldalsorefutethesestatementsbyEastmanasalieandaslibelagainsttheleadersoftheparty,theCentralCommittee,anditsPolitburo.Trotsky
knowsquiteaswellasdoallothermembersoftheCentralCommitteethatEastman'sreportsdonotcorrespondwithrealitytotheslightestdegree.
3)Inthesecondchapterofhisbook,Eastmanstatesthat"allthose
9.

ThetextofthepassagesfromMaxEastman'sbook(SinceLeninDied[1925])aretakenfromtheEnglishoriginal.

Page76
presentatthemeeting,includingthesecretaries,werenotonlyagainstthepoliciesproposedbyLenin,buttheywereagainstthepublicationofthearticle"[25][thereferenceisto
Lenin'sarticle"HowWeShouldReorganizeRabkrin"J.Stalin].10
IthinkthatCom.TrotskyshouldalsorefutethisstatementbyEastmanasanobviousslander.Hecannothelpbutrecall,first,thatLenin'splanassetforthinhisarticlewasnot
discussedsubstantivelyatthistimesecond,thatthePolitburowasconvenedinconnectionwiththestatementsinLenin'sarticleaboutthepossibleschismintheCentral
Committeestatementsthatcouldhaveprovokedmisunderstandinginthepartyorganizations.Com.TrotskycouldnothelpbutknowthatthePolitburothendecidedtosendto
partyorganizations,inadditiontoLenin'sprintedarticle,aspecialletterfromtheOrgburoandthePolitburooftheCentralCommitteestatingthatthearticleshouldnotprovide
groundsforanyperceptionofaschismintheCentralCommittee.Com.TrotskymustknowthatthedecisiontopublishLenin'sarticleimmediately,andtosendaletterfromthe
membersoftheOrgburoandPolitburoabouttheabsenceofaschismwithintheCentralCommittee,waspassedunanimouslyanynotionthatthePolitburo'sdecisiononthe
publicationofLenin'sarticlewaspassedunderpressurefromCom.Trotskyisaridiculousabsurdity.
Hereisthetextoftheletter:
LettertotheProvincialandRegionalCommittees.DearComrades,Pravdano.16of25JanuarycarriesLenin'sarticle"HowWeShouldReorganizeRabkrin."Onepartofthisarticle
speaksabouttheroleoftheCentralCommitteeofourpartyandtheneedtotakeorganizationalmeasuresthatwilleliminatetheprospectof,ormakeasdifficultaspossible,a
schismintheCentralCommitteeifmutualrelationsbetweentheproletariatandthepeasantrybecomecomplicatedinconnectionwiththechangesensuingfromNEP.Some
comradeshavedirectedthePolitburo'sattentiontothefactthatthecomradesintheprovincesmayviewthisarticlebyCom.Leninasanindicationofarecentinternalschism
withintheCentralCommitteethathaspromptedCom.Lenintoadvancetheorganizationalproposalsoutlinedinhisarticle.Inordertoeliminatethepossibilityofsuch
conclusionswhichdonotatallcorrespondtotherealstateofaffairsthePolitburoandtheOrgburoconsideritnecessarytonotifytheprovincialcommitteesofthe
circumstancessurroundingthewritingofCom.Lenin'sarticle.
ThereturnofCom.Lenintohighlypressuredworkafterhisillness
10.

Actually,EastmanincorrectlythoughtthedisputewasoveranotherarticlebyLenin,"BetterFewerbutBetter"U.S.Ed.

Page77
ledtoexhaustion.ThedoctorspronounceditnecessarytoprescribeforCom.Leninacertainperiodofabsoluterestwithoutevenreadingnewspapers(sinceforCom.Lenin
readingnewspapersis,ofcourse,notentertainmentorameansofrelaxationbutanoccasionforintensecontemplationofallthecurrentpoliticalissues).Itgoeswithoutsaying
thatCom.LenindoesnottakepartinthePolitburosessions,andheisnotevensentagain,instrictaccordancewithhisdoctors'advicethetranscriptsofthesessionsofthe
PolitburoandtheOrgburo.Thedoctorsbelieve,however,thatbecausecompletementalinactivityisintolerableforhim,Com.Leninshouldbeallowedtokeepsomethinglikea
journal,inwhichhenoteshisthoughtsonvariousissueswhenauthorizedbyCom.Leninhimself,moreover,aportionofthisjournalmayappearinthepress.Theseexternal
conditionsunderlyingthewritingof"HowWeShouldReorganizeRabkrin"demonstratethattheproposalscontainedinthisarticlearesuggestednotbyanycomplicationsinside
theCentralCommitteebutbyCom.Lenin'sgeneralviewsonthedifficultiesthatwillfacethepartyinthecominghistoricalepoch.
InthisstrictlyinformationalletterwewillnotconsiderthepossiblelongrangedangersthatComradeLeninappropriatelyraisedinhisarticle.ThemembersofthePolitburoand
Orgburo,however,wishtostatewithcompleteunanimity,inordertoavoidanypossiblemisunderstandings,thatintheworkoftheCentralCommitteethereareabsolutelyno
circumstancesthatwouldprovideanybasiswhatsoeverforfearsofa"schism."
Thisexplanationisprovidedintheformofastrictlysecretletter,ratherthanbeingpublishedinthepress,toavoidgivingenemiestheopportunitytocauseconfusionand
agitationthroughfalsereportsaboutthestateofCom.Lenin'shealth.TheCentralCommitteehasnodoubtthatifanyoneintheprovinceshasdrawnthealarmingconclusions
notedinthebeginningofthisletterfromthearticlebyCom.Lenin,theprovincialcommitteeswillnotdelayincorrectlyorientingthepartyorganizations.
AvailableMembersofthePolitburoandOrgburooftheCentralCommitteeoftheRussianCommunistParty:

Andreev

Molotov

Bukharin

Rykov

Dzerzhinsky

Stalin

Kalinin

Tomskii

Kamenev

Trotsky

Kuibyshev

Moscow,27January1923

Page78
4)Chapter3ofEastman'sbooktalksaboutLenin's"testament."
"OneofthemostsolemnandcarefullyweighedutterancesthatevercamefromLenin'spenwassuppressedintheinterestsof'Leninism'bythattriumvirateof'oldBolsheviks,'
Stalin,ZinovievandKamenev....Theydecidedthatitmightbereadandexplainedprivatelytothedelegateskeptwithinthebureaucracy,thatistosay,butnotputbeforethe
partyfordiscussion,asLenindirected"[2829].11
IthinkthatCom.TrotskyshouldalsorefutethisstatementbyEastmanasamaliciousslander.Firstofall,hecannothelpbutknowthatLenin's"testament"wassenttotheCentral
CommitteefortheexclusiveuseofthePartyCongresssecond,thatneitherLeninnorCom.Krupskaia"demanded"orinanywayproposedtomakethe''testament"asubjectof
"discussionbeforetheentireParty"third,thatthe"testament"wasreadtoallthedelegationstotheCongresswithoutexception,thatis,toallthemembersoftheCongress
withoutexceptionfourth,thatwhentheCongresspresidiumaskedtheCongressasawholewhetherthe"testament"wasknowntoallthemembersoftheCongressandwhether
anydiscussionofitwasrequired,thepresidiumreceivedthereplythatthe"testament"wasknowntoallandthattherewasnoneedtodiscussitfifth,thatneitherTrotskynor
anyothermemberoftheCongressmadeanyprotestaboutpossibleirregularitiesattheCongresssixth,thatbyvirtueofthis,tospeakofsuppressingthe"testament"meansto
slandermaliciouslytheCentralCommitteeandtheXIIIPartyCongress.
5)ThesecondchapterofEastman'sbooksaysthatthe"article[thereferenceistoLenin'sarticleonthenationalitiesquestionJ.Stalin]whichLeninconsideredof'leading
importance,'andwhichhedesignedtohavereadatapartyconvention,butwhichconstitutedadirectattackupontheauthorityofStalin,andacorrespondingendorsementofthe
authorityofTrotsky,wasnotreadatthepartyconvention,thetriumviratedecidingthatitwasforthewelfareofthepartytosuppressit"[23].
IthinkthatCom.TrotskyshouldalsorefutethisstatementbyEastmanasclearlylibelous.Hemustknow,first,thatLenin'sarticlewasreadbyallmembersoftheCongress
withoutexception,asstatedatafullmeetingoftheCongresssecond,thatnoneotherthanCom.StalinhimselfproposedthepublicationofLenin'sarticle,havingstatedon16
April1923,inadocumentknowntoallmembersoftheCentralCommittee,that"Com.Lenin'sarticleoughttobepublishedinthepress"third,thatLenin'sarticleonthe
nationalitiesissuewasnot
11.

Inthisinstance,Stalin'sRussianversionrearrangestheorderofthepassagesaspresentedbyEastmaninaddition,Eastman'swordprivatelyisrenderedasvsekretom
poriadke,thatis"secret"U.S.Ed.

Page79
publishedinthepressonlybecausetheCentralCommitteecouldnotfailtotakeintoconsiderationthatLenin'ssister,MariiaIlinichna,whohadLenin'sarticleinherpossession,
didnotconsideritpossibletopublishitinthepress.Com.Fotieva,Lenin'spersonalsecretary,statesthisinaspecialdocumentdated19April1923,inreplytoStalin'sproposalto
printthearticle:"MariiaIlinichna[Lenin'ssisterJ.Stalin]hasmadeastatement,"writesCom.Fotieva,"totheeffectthatsincetherewasnodirectorderfromLenintopublishthis
article,itcannotbeprinted,andsheconsidersitpossibleonlytohavethemembersoftheCongressfamiliarizethemselveswithit..."and,infact,Com.Fotievaaddsthat
"VladimirIlichdidnotconsiderthisarticletobefinishedandpreparedforthepress"fourth,thatEastman'sstatementthattheCongresswasnotinformedofLenin'sarticle
thereforeslanderstheparty.
6)Inthesecondchapterofhisbook,Eastman,amongotherthings,writesthefollowingaboutLenin's"testament":"Thereisnomysteryaboutmypossessionofthisandthe
foregoinginformationitisallcontainedinofficialdocumentsstolenbythecounterrevolutionistsandpublishedinRussian,atBerlin,intheSotzialisticheskyViestnik[Socialist
herald]"[26].
HereEastmanonceagaindistortsthetruth.NotLenin's"testament"butamaliciousdistortionofitwaspublishedinSotsialisticheskiyvestnik.
IthinkthatCom.Trotskyshouldmakeadeclarationaboutthisdistortion.
7)InthesecondchapterofEastman'sbook,Com.KuibyshevisincorrectlyportrayedasanopponentofLenin'splansetoutinthearticleabouttheWorkerPeasantInspection:
"ThedegreetowhichthepoliciesoutlinedbyLeninhavebeenfollowedmaybeinferredfromthefactthatKuibishev...isnowthePeople'sCommissionerofWorkers'and
Peasants'Inspection,andtheheadoftheCentralControlCommitteeoftheparty"[25].
Inotherwords,itseemsthatwhentheCentralCommitteeandthePartyCongressappointedKuibyshevcommissarofWorkerPeasantInspectionandchairmanoftheCentral
ControlCommission,theyintendednottoimplementLenin'splanbuttosabotageitandcauseittofail.
IthinkthatCom.Trotskyshouldalsomakeadeclarationagainstthislibelousstatementabouttheparty,forhemustknowthat,first,Lenin'splan,developedinthearticleabout
theWorkerPeasantInspection,waspassedbytheXIIPartyCongresssecond,Com.Kuibyshevwasandremainsasupporterandpromoterofthisplanthird,Com.Kuibyshev
waselectedchairmanoftheCentralControlCom

Page80
missionattheXIICongress(reelectedattheXIIICongress)inthepresenceofCom.TrotskyandwithoutanyobjectionsonthepartofCom.Trotskyorothermembersofthe
Congressfourth,Com.KuibyshevwasappointedheadofWorkerPeasantInspectionattheCentralCommitteeplenumof26April1923inthepresenceofCom.Trotskyand
withoutanyobjectionsonhispart.
8)Eastmanstatesinthefirstchapterofhisbook:"WhenLeninfellsickandwascompelledtowithdrawfromtheGovernment,heturnedagaintoTrotskyandaskedhimtotakehis
placeasPresidentoftheSovietofPeople'sCommissarsandoftheCouncilofLabourandDefence"[16].
Eastmanrepeatsthesamethinginthesecondchapterofhisbook:"He[thatis,Com.TrotskyJ.Stalin]declinedLenin'sproposalthatheshouldbecometheheadoftheSoviet
Government,andthusoftherevolutionarymovementoftheworld"[18].
IdonotthinkthatthisstatementbyEastman,which,bytheway,doesnotcorrespondatalltoreality,couldharmtheSovietgovernmentinanyway.Nevertheless,becauseof
Eastman'scrudedistortionofthefactsonamatterconcerningCom.Trotsky,Com.Trotskyoughttospeakoutagainstthisundeniabledistortionaswell.Com.Trotskymustknow
thatLeninproposedtohim,notthepostofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsandtheLaborDefenseCouncil,butthepostofoneofthefourdeputiesofthechairmanofthe
CouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil,havinginmindalreadytwodeputiesofhisownwhohadbeenpreviouslyappointed,ComradesRykovandTsiurupa,and
intendingtonominateathirddeputyofhisown,Com.Kamenev.HereisthecorrespondingdocumentsignedbyLenin:
TotheSecretaryoftheCentralCommittee,Com.Stalin.SinceCom.RykovwasgivenavacationbeforethereturnofTsiurupa(heisexpectedtoarriveon20September),andthe
doctorsarepromisingme(ofcourse,onlyintheeventthatnothingbadhappens)areturntowork(atfirstverylimited)by1October,IthinkthatitisimpossibletoburdenCom.
Tsiurupawithalltheongoingwork,andIproposeappointingtwomoredeputies(deputytothechairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsanddeputytothechairmanoftheLabor
DefenseCouncil),thatis,ComradesTrotskyandKamenev.Distributetheworkbetweenthemwithmyclearanceand,ofcourse,withthePolitburoasthehighestauthority.11
September1922.V.Ulianov(Lenin).
Com.TrotskymustbeawarethattherewerenootheroffersthenornowfromCom.Leninregardinghisappointmenttotheleadershipof

Page81
theCouncilofCommissarsortheLaborDefenseCouncil.Com.Trotskythusturneddown,notthepostofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsortheLaborDefenseCouncil,
butthepostofoneofthefourdeputiesofthechairman.Com.TrotskymustbeawarethatthePolitburovotedonLenin'sproposalasfollows:thoseinfavorofLenin'sproposal
wereStalin,Rykov,KalininthosewhoabstainedwereTomskii,KamenevandCom.Trotsky"categoricallyrefused"(Zinovievwasabsent).Com.Trotskymustbeawarethatthe
Politburopassedthefollowingresolutiononthismatter:"TheCentralCommitteePolitburowithregretnotesthecategoricalrefusalofCom.TrotskyandproposestoCom.
KamenevthatheassumethefulfillmentofthedutiesofdeputyuntilthereturnofCom.Tsiurupa."
ThedistortionscondonedbyEastman,asyoucansee,areglaring.
Theseare,inmyopinion,theeightindisputablepoints,Eastman'scrudestdistortions,thatCom.Trotskyisobligedtorefuteifhedoesnotwishtojustifythroughhissilence
Eastman'sslanderousandobjectivelycounterrevolutionaryattacksagainstthepartyandtheSovietgovernment.
Inconnectionwiththis,IsubmitthefollowingproposaltothePolitburo:
PROPOSETOCOM.TROTSKYTHATHEDISASSOCIATEHIMSELFDECISIVELYFROMEASTMANANDMAKEASTATEMENTFORTHEPRESSWITHACATEGORICALREBUTTALOFATLEASTTHOSE
DISTORTIONSTHATWEREOUTLINEDINTHEABOVEMENTIONEDEIGHTPOINTS.

AsforthegeneralpoliticalprofileofMr.Eastman,whostillcallshimselfaCommunist,ithardlydiffersinanywayfromtheprofileofotherenemiesoftheRCP[RussianCommunist
Party]andtheSovietgovernment.InhisbookhecharacterizestheRCPCongressasnothingbuta"ruthless"and"callousbureaucracy,"theCentralCommitteeofthepartyasa
"bandofdeceivers"and''usurpers,"theLeninlevy(inwhich200,000proletariansjoinedtheparty)asabureaucraticmaneuverbytheCentralCommitteeagainsttheopposition,
andtheRedArmyasaconglomerate"brokenintoseparatepieces"and"lackingdefensecapability,"andthesefactsclearlytellusthatinhisattacksagainsttheRussian
proletariatanditsgovernment,againstthepartyofthisproletariatanditsCentralCommittee,Eastmanhasoutdonerunofthemillcounterrevolutionariesandthewellknown
charlatansofWhiteGuardism.Noone,exceptthecharlatansofthecounterrevolution,haseverspokenoftheRCPandtheSovietgovernmentinsuchlanguageasthe"friend"of
Com.Trotsky,the"Communist"Eastman,permitshimself.ThereisnoquestionthattheAmericanCommunist

Page82
PartyandtheThirdInternationalwillproperlyevaluatetheseoutstandingexploitsofMr.Eastman.
17June1925
J.Stalin.12

Thefollowingday,18June,thePolitburoaffirmedStalin'sproposalaboutTrotsky'sstatementofrebuttalinthepress.Trotskyhimselfpromisedthatwithinthreedays
hewouldsubmitthetextofhisstatement.13On22June,TrotskyinfactsentStalinmaterialentitled"OnEastman'sBookSinceLeninDied."Withoutcitingany
accusations,Stalinrepliedwithabriefnote:
Ifyouareinterestedinmyopinion,Ipersonallyconsiderthedraftcompletelyunsatisfactory.Idonotunderstandhowyoucouldsubmitsuchadraftregardingthe
counterrevolutionarybookbyEastman,filledwithliesandslanderagainsttheparty,afteryouacceptedamoralobligationatthePolitburosessionof18Junetodisassociate
yourselfresolutelyfromEastmanandtorebutcategoricallythefactualdistortions.

InanappealtothePolitburo,Trotskytriedtodefendhimself,attemptingtoprovethatStalin'saccusationswerenonsense.Aftermeetingtheusualrebuff,however,he
begantorevisethetextofhisstatementforthepress.OversightofhisrevisionwasassumedbyBukharin,Zinoviev,Rykov,andStalin.TheydemandedfromTrotsky
harsheraccusationsagainstEastmanandacategoricaldenialofthefactscitedinEastman'sbook.Trotskyconcededtoalldemands.Thefinaltextofhisstatement,
whichhadsatisfiedthecensorsfromthe"seven,"wasreadyby1July1925.
NowStalinandhissupportersdecidedtotaketheaffairoutsidetheframeworkofthePolitburobyfirstbriefingabroadcircleofpartyfunctionariesaboutitandthen
publicizingitgenerally.InearlyJuly,CentralCommitteemembersL.M.Kaganovich,V.Ya.Chubar,andG.I.Petrovskiisubmittedastatementthatcontaineda
requestthat"allthemembersoftheCentralCommitteebesentallmaterialsonthepublicationofEastman'sbook"andthatmembersoftheCentralCommitteeofthe
UkrainianCommunistPartybebriefed.On7July1925,afterapollofPolitburomembers,thisrequestwasfulfilled.14ThematerialsontheEastmanaffairwere
12.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.507,ll.823.

13.

Ibid.,ll.1,2.

14.

Ibid.,d.510,l.7.

Page83

typeset,publishedintheformofasmallbook(containingStalin'sletter,thePolitburo'sresolutions,Trotsky'scorrespondencewithStalinandwithothermembersof
thePolitburo,anddraftsofTrotsky'sstatement),andsenttoCentralCommitteemembers.ButStalinhadfurtherplanstopublish,bothintheWestandlaterinthe
USSR,thefollowingdocuments:Trotsky'sstatement,aletterspeciallypreparedbyN.K.Krupskaia,inwhichshe,asLenin'swidow,refutesEastman,andtheletter
fromStalinhimselfthatdemonstrateshisroleinthestruggleforpartyinterests.Buttheseplans,towhichStalinrepeatedlyreferredinhisletterstoMolotov,werenever
fullyrealized.
SoonafterthematerialsontheaffairweresenttoCentralCommitteemembers,Trotskyhadoccasiontotaketheoffensive.On16July1925,theFrenchCommunist
newspaper,L'Humanit,publishedtheoriginalversionofTrotsky'sstatement.On27July,TrotskyaddressedalettertoBukharin,whoatthattimewasactingas
chairmanoftheComintern'sExecutiveCommittee.TrotskyexpressedhispuzzlementandprotestovertheFrenchpublicationanddemandedthatthecircumstancesof
theleakbeinvestigated,hintingthatpublicationhaddeliberatelybeenarrangedevenafterhe,Trotsky,hadmadeallthenecessaryconcessionsandhaddemonstrated
hisreadinesstocooperatewiththePolitburomajorityindefendingtheparty'sinterests.15Thatday,afterapollofPolitburomembers,thefollowingresolutionwas
passed:
a)TorequestL'Humanittopublish[anotice]thatthetextofCom.Trotsky'sletterregardingEastman'sbookthatappearedinL'Humanitisincompleteanddistorted.
b)TorequestL'Humanittopublishthefull(final)textofCom.Trotsky'sletteraboutEastman'sbook.16

Bukharin,inturn,orderedaninvestigationintothecircumstancesoftheincidentandinformedTrotskyofthisdecision.17
SoonitbecameclearthattheoriginalversionofTrotsky'sarticlehadbeengiventoL'HumanitbyD.Z.Manuilskii,amemberoftheComintern'sExecutive
Committeepresidium,duringhistriptoFrance.ThedocumentsthatremaindonotenableustodeterminetherealcircumstancesbehindManuilskii'sinitiative.
Nevertheless,
15.

Ibid.,f.325,op.1,d.418,ll.4344.

16.

Ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.513,l.6.

17.

Ibid.,f.325,op.1,d.418,l.45.

Page84

ascanbeseenfromthepublishedletters,Stalinwasinvolvedinthisconflict,andhewasevenforcedtodenycategoricallythatManuilskiihadactedinconcertwith
him.
Astheletterstestify,Stalinwasalsounabletogetthe"seven"toagreetopublishhisownletter.Theaffairendedinacompromise.OnlyTrotsky'sandKrupskaia's
statementswerepublished,firstabroad,thenintheUSSR(inthejournalBolshevik,1925,no.16).AsforthedocumentsontheEastmanaffair,itwasdecidedthat
onlyarelativelysmallgroupofpartyofficialsshouldseethem.Afterobtainingtheapprovalofthe"seven,"on27August1925,thePolitburodecidedtoturnoverall
materialsontheEastmanbooktotheComintern'sExecutiveCommitteesoitcould''briefthecentralcommitteesofthemostimportantCommunistparties."The
Politburoalsosentthedocuments,alongwithEastman'sbookitself,toalltheparty'sprovincialcommitteesandtomembersandcandidatemembersoftheCentral
CommitteeandtheCentralControlCommissiontheseitemsweregiventhestatusofarestricteddistributionletter.AtTrotsky'sinsistence,thecorrespondence
concerningtheL'HumanitincidentwasincludedinthepackageofdocumentssenttotheComintern'sExecutiveCommittee.
ThepublicationanddisseminationofdocumentsontheEastmanaffairhadhighlyunfortunateconsequencesforTrotsky.Onceagain,tothemassofpartybureaucrats
atvariouslevels,heappearedhumbledanddefeated,hanginghisheadbeforeStalin.Therankandfilepartymembers,especiallyhissupporters,wereshockedat
Trotsky'srecantationinBolshevik.BydeclaringEastmanaslanderer,Trotskyseemedtobewithdrawingfromfurtherstruggle,disavowinghisformeraccusations
againstthepartyleadership.Furthermore,bydenyingmanywellknownfacts,Trotskylookedlikealiar."It'sterrible,simplyterrible!It'sincomprehensiblewhyLev
Davidovich[Trotsky]woulddothat.Surelyhehasputhisheadontheblockwithsuchaletter.Hehasmadehimselfdespicable..."18Trotskyhimselfwasloathto
recallthisepisodeofhispoliticalbiography.
18.

N.Valentinov,NovaiaekonomicheskaiapolitikaikrizispartiiposlesmertiLenina(TheNewEconomicPolicyandthepartycrisisafterLenin'sdeath)(Moscow,1991),295.N.
Valentinov'srealnamewasN.V.Volskii(18791964).AftertheOctoberrevolution,hewasdeputyeditorofTorgovoPromyshlennaiagazeta(Commercialandindustrial
newspaper).Later,heworkedfortheUSSRtradedelegation.Heemigratedin1930.

StalinandMolotov

FirstpageofletterfromStalintoMolotov,12July1925(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.
5388,l.1).

Page85

Letter1
[12July1925]
Rostov7/12
Com.Molotov,1
Iwouldlikeyoutoshowthislettertothesevenafteryouhavereadit.
1)ThefellowsfromRostovwereheretoseeme.Itturnsoutthatthegrossyieldoftheharvestthisyearisapproximately500millionpoods2 [1.8tons],thatis,close
totherecordnumberin1914(I'mspeakingaboutYugovost).Thereisasurplusofabout270300millionpoods.IntheviewofourRostovfriends,ourexportoffices
(inYugovost)couldraise150170millionpoods.Thus150170millionpoodscouldbeshippedabroadfromtheYugovostregion.Notbad.Weshouldtakethis
factintoaccount.
2)ItisapparentfromthenewspapersthattheUSSReconomicagencieshavealreadydesignatedaprogramtoconstructnewfactories.I'mafraidthatthey'llstart
buildingintheborderregionswithouttakingintoaccountanumberofunfavorablefactorsinvolved,andthenifwemissthemoment,itwillbeimpossibletocorrect
mistakes.Forexample,theywanttobuildnewfactoriesinPeter3 andRostovthisisnotexpedient.Indesigningtheconstructionprogram,Ithinkthattwo
considerationsshouldbetakenintoaccountinadditiontotheprincipleofthefactories'proximitytorawmaterialsandfuel:thelinkwiththecountrysideandthe
geographicstrategicpositionofthenewfactories'location.Ourbasicinterioris:theUrals,theVolgaregion,theBlackEarthsouth(Tambov,Voronezh,Kursk,Orel,
etc.).Theseareexactlytheareas(ifyoudon'tcounttheUrals)thataresufferingfromalackofindustry.Meanwhile,thesearetheareasthatrepresentthemost
convenientrearguardforusintheeventofmilitarycomplications.Therefore,thesearepreciselytheareaswhereindustrialconstructionshouldbedeveloped.Inthat
respect,Peteriscompletelyunsuitable.Therewillbepressurefromthelocals,ofcourse,butthathastobeovercome.Thisissueissoimportantforusthatitoughtto
beplacedontheagendaoftheCentralCommitteeplenum,ifthatiswhatisrequiredtoovercomelocalpressure.Itwouldbegoodtoknowtheopinionoftheseven
onthis.
Regards,4
J.Stalin
P.S.I'mleavingforSochitoday.
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerthereisanotationbyMolotov:"1925=?"IntheupperlefthandcornerthereisacommentbyBukharin,"Iagreeabsolutelywith
everything.N.B.,"underwhicharethesignedinitials"J.R.''[Ya.E.Rudzutak]and"Yaros"[Ye.M.Yaroslavskii].
2.Apoodis36poundsavoirdupoisTrans.
3.Leningrad,nowknownasSt.PetersburgTrans.

Page86

4.Atthecloseofnearlyeveryletter,StalinwroteZhmurukuorKrepkozhmuruku(Ishakeyourhand,orIshakeyourhandfirmly).Thesewordshavebeen
renderedas"Regards"and"Warmregards"throughoutthetextTrans.
Letter2
[20July1925]
7/20/25
Com.Molotov,
Inissueno.159(15July)ofEkonomicheskaiazhizn'[Economiclife],Ireadanotice,"ExaminationoftheDneprConstructionProject"[Dneprostroi],1 from
whichitisevidentthattheparty(andtheSupremeEconomicCouncil)maybedraggedbitbybitintotheDneprostroimatter,requiringupto200millionrubles,ifwe
donottakepreventivemeasuresintime.Com.Dzerzhinskyhaspublished,itturnsout,an"order"accordingtowhichCom.Trotskyhasbeenrequestedtosubmita
technicalandfinancialplanfortheconstruction"bymidOctober,"sothat"thenecessaryloansforthepreparatoryoperationscanstillbeincludedinthebudget
for192526.''Theamountof30,000rubleshasbeenreleasedtoCom.Trotskyforthepreparationoftheplan.Thenoticecontainsafewsmallreservationsonthe
needforcautionandsoon.Butsince30,000rubleshavealreadybeenreleasedandadeadlineforsubmissionoftheplanhasbeenset,theprojectisbeginningtotake
onapracticalandthereforeseriousnature.
IdonotthinkthatwecanaffordtotakeonDneprostroieitherthisyearornextyeargivenourfinancialsituation.Onlytheotherdaywerejectedtheplanforthe
petroleumfactoryintheTranscaucasus,2 althoughitismorerealisticatpresentandafourthofthecost.OnwhatgroundsmustweaccepttheDneprostroiplan,which
islessrealisticforthepresentandfourtimesasexpensive?Dowereallyhavesomuchmoney?IstheDonbass(theregionwhereDneprostroiistobelocated)really
sufferingsuchafuelshortageorisnottheoppositethecase?WhyistheresuchhastewithDneprostroi?
Weneed,inthefirstplace,newequipmentforourwornoutfactoriesandplants.Hasthatneedreallybeensatisfied?
Weneed,furthermore,toexpandouragriculturalmachineryfactories,becausewearestillforcedtopurchaseabroadthemostelementaryagriculturaltoolsfortensof
millionsofrubles.
Weneed,then,tobuildatleastonetractormanufacturingplant,anewandlargefactory,becausewithoutoneormoresuchfactories,wecannotdevelopfurther.
Weneed,finally,toorganizecopperfoundries,todevelopleadproduction,toimproveourmilitaryindustry,becausewithoutthattheywillbeatuswiththeirbare
hands.

Page87

Arethoseneedsreallyallsatisfiedyet?
Howcanwe,whosufferfromashortageofcapital,forgetallthat?
Ithinkthatasidefromallsortsofotherdangers,wefaceanotherseriousdangerthedangerofsquanderingsomeofthekopeckswehavemanagedtoaccumulate,of
spendingthemfornothing,thoughtlessly,andthusofmakingourconstructionworkmoredifficult.AmonthagoCom.Dzerzhinskyunderstoodallthis.Andnow
apparentlyhe'sgottencarriedaway...
Iverymuchurgeyou,Com.Molotov,toreadthislettertoCom.Dzerzhinsky.Inviewoftheimportanceofthematter,readittothesevenanddropmeanoteto
informmeoftheiropinion.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.ThereferenceistothefollowingshortarticlefromEkonomicheskaiazhizn'(Economiclife),no.159(15July1925):
ThechairmanoftheUSSRSupremeEconomicCouncil,Com.F.Ye.Dzerzhinsky,hasissuedaspecialdecreeinconnectionwiththecompletionoftheblueprintforthe
constructionofahydroelectricpowerstationontheDneprRiver(Dneprostroi)andtheneedforatechnicalandeconomicappraisaloftheprojectandfortheresolution
ofthebasicissuesinvolvingitsimplementation.
ThedecreeindicatesthatowingtotheverycloseconnectionbetweentheproposedhydroelectricconstructionprojectontheDneprandtheproposalsforrestructuring
thewholeeconomyofthesouthernregion,itisnecessarytohaveanoverallplanfortechnicalandeconomicmeasuresinthisregionandafinancialplanfortheir
implementationbothduringconstructionandafterthestationisopenedforuse.
ThedraftingoftheseplansisassignedtoCom.L.D.Trotsky,memberoftheSupremeEconomicCouncilpresidium.
Com.TrotskyisassignedtoorganizeanappropriateinterdepartmentalconferencetoallowtheplantobecoordinatedwiththerequestsandneedsoftheCommissariatof
Transport,theCommissariatofAgricultureandotheroffices,andtodraftthisoveralleconomic,technical,andfinancialplan.
Areportwithapreliminaryoverallappraisaloftheprojectandanexhaustiveeconomic,technical,andfinancialplanistobepresentedtothepresidiumoftheSupreme
EconomicCouncilinmidOctoberthenecessaryloansforthepreparatoryoperationscanstillbeincludedinthebudgetfor19251926.
Acreditof30,000rublesisallocatedfortheprojectconferences.Inaddition,inlightoftheparticularimportanceoftheDneprStationforourentireeconomy,Com.
DzerzhinskyconsidersitnecessarytoincludeprominentspecialistsfromNorthAmericaintheappraisaloftheproject.
TheSupremeEconomicCouncilconsidersthatitcanaskthegovernmentfortheexceptionallylargesumsrequiredfortheDneprconstructionprojectonlyifthemistakes
ofpastconstructionprojectsaretakenintoaccountandonlyif,afteracomprehensivereviewofworldexperience,itcanbeguaranteedthattheproposedgiganticworks
willbeexpedient,timely,andeconomical.

2.TheFinanceCommissariat'sprotestagainsttheCouncilofCommissars'resolutiononthepetroleumpipelineswasreviewedatthePolitburosessionof8July1925.
ItwasdecidedtosuspendtheconstructionoftheBakuBatumgaspipelineandtoreviewthematteronceagainthefollowingyear(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.510,
l.5).

Page88

Letter3
[27July1925]
Com.Molotov,1
AweekagoIsenttoyoualetterprotestingagainsttheplanfortheimmediatelaunchingofelectrificationattheDneprrapids.Istilldon'thaveananswer.Didmyletter
getlostenroute,ordidyoureceiveit?Dropmealineaboutwhathappenedtotheletterifyoudon'tmind.
Bestregards,
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"July1925"
Letter4
[28July1925]
Sochi7/28/25
Com.Molotov,
Wehavetothinkabout[whowillrun]theparty'sOrganizationalandAssignmentDepartment.1 ItseemsGeiisn'trightforthejob.He'syoung,littleknown,without
muchofarecord,andhewon'tbeauthoritative.Askanyonethey'lltellyou.Krinitskiiisn'trighteitheroractuallyheisevenlessappropriatethanGei(forthesame
reasons).Isitperhapstimetotakeon[S.V.]KosiorandsendGeitoSiberia?PerhapswecouldtakeonShvernikorYanson?Justbyhimself,Baumanwouldn'tbe
bigenough,wouldhe?Ithinkhewon'tbeadequate.Really,appointingsomeoneforthisdepartmentisanutwe'vegottocrackbeforetheCongress.
The2 otherdayIreadinthenewspapersthatthetextilesyndicateevidentlydecidednottoexpandproductionverymuchinthecomingyearbecauseoftheshortageof
rawmaterials,mainlycottonfromTurkestan.Ifthatistrueandifthereasonreallyhastodowiththerawmaterials,thenthesyndicate'sdecision,inmyview,is
profoundlymistaken.ItwouldbemuchmoreprofitableforustopurchasemorerawmaterialsinAmerica(bytheway,Americancottonischeaprightnow)and
processithereinourcountrythantopurchasetextilesfromabroad.Itismoreprofitableinallrespects.Thisisaseriousmatter,worthyofattention.Thesyndicate's
inertiaisunderstandable:itdoesn'tfeellikeexpandingproductionsinceexpansionmeansmoreheadacheswhybringonunnecessaryheadachesifthesyndicateis
doingfinewithoutthem?Thisruinousinertiathatarisesfromitsmonopolypositionhastobeovercomenomatterwhat.SpeaktoDzerzhinskyaboutitshowhimmy
letter3 andaskhimtoputpressureonthesyndicate.Irepeat,thisisa

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seriousquestionthatmeritsattention.Eitherweresolveitproperlyintheinterestsofthestate,theworkers,andtheunemployed,whocouldbeplacedinjobsif
manufacturingwereexpanded,or,ifwedon'tresolveitcorrectly,asidefromeverythingelse,wewilllosetensofmillionsonthistoforeigntextilemillowners.
Warmregards,
J.Stalin
1.TheOrganizationalandAssignmentDepartmentoftheCentralCommittee(Orgraspred)wasformedin1924.ItwasacomponentoftheCentralCommittee
Secretariatwiththefollowingtasks:establishingandstrengtheningtieswithlocalpartybodiesinstructing,registering,selecting,andassigningpartycadres[trained
staff]bothtocentralaswellastolocalbodiesmobilizing,transferring,andnominatingpartyofficialsandperformingspecificassignmentsfromtheparty'sOrgburo
andCentralCommitteeSecretariat.
2.Thetextfromheretotheendismarkedinredpencil.
3.MolotovsentthefollowinglettertoDzerzhinskyon7August1925(RTsKhIDNIf.82,op.1,d.141):
Com.Dzerzhinsky,I'msendingyoutwolettersfromCom.Stalin(inthesecondonefrom28July,Iaskyoutonotethepartmarkedinredpencil).SinceIhavelearnedthat
youarestillrunningtheaffairsoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil,evenfromyoursickbed(ofcoursethisisnotgood,andinthenearfutureIwillhaveaserious
conversationwithyouaboutavacation),IaskyoutoconductaninquiryregardingStalin'squestions.Imyselfamcompletelyinagreementwithhim.Idonotdoubtthat
youarealso.IwillexpectfromyoureportsonbothDneprostroiandtheTextileSyndicate.Stalinhaspepperedmewithquestionsaboutthestatusofthesematters.Iwish
youagenuinerecoveryandavacationsoon!Regards!V.Molotov.
August7.P.S.IaskyoutoreturntheattachedlettersfromCom.Stalin.V.M.

Letter5
[July1925]
Com.Molotov,1
TheLaborDefenseCouncilmatter,ofcourse,isnotgoingwell.Dzerzhinskyisupset,2 he'sovertired,butthere'snosmokewithoutfire,ofcourse.InfactthePolitburo
itselfisinanawkwardpositionbecauseithasbeentornawayfromeconomicaffairs.TakealookatEkonomicheskaiazhizn'[Economiclife]andyou'llseethatour
fundsarebeingallocatedbySmilgaandbyStrumilinplusGroman,whilethePolitburo...thePolitburoischangingfromadirectingbodyintoacourtofappeals,into
somethinglikea"councilofelders."It'ssometimesevenworsethanthat:notGosplanbutGosplan"sections"andtheirspecialistsareincharge.It'sclearwhy
Dzerzhinskyisunhappy.Andworkcannothelpbutsufferfromthat.Idon'tseeanyotheralternativebuttorestructuretheLaborDefenseCouncil'smembershipand
bringinPolitburomembers.3
Greetings,
Yours,Stalin

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1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1926=?"InfacttheletterwaswritteninJuly1925.
2.On25July1925,StalinsentDzerzhinskythefollowingletter(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5272):
Sochi.25July.DearFeliks,IlearnedaboutyourletterofresignationfromMolotov.Iurgeyounottodothis.Thereisnobasisforit:1)theworkisgoingwell2)thereis
supportwithintheCentralCommittee3)we'llreorganizetheLaborDefenseCouncilsothatindividualcommissarscannotformblocstothedetrimentofstateinterests4)
we'llputGosplananditssectionsintheirplace.Hangonforamonthortwomore,andwe'llfixthingsupright.Bestregards,Yours,Stalin.
P.S.Howisyourhealth?

3.On15October1925,ataPolitburosession,Stalinraisedtheissue"OntheworkofthePolitburoandmutualrelationsamongthecentralinstitutions."Itwas
decidedthatinordertoimprovetheworkofthecentralinstitutionsoftheUSSR(CouncilofCommissars,LaborDefenseCouncil,CentralExecutiveCommittee
presidium,Gosplan,etc.)andtoestablishcompletecoordinationamongthem,aswellastoensurethePolitburo'sleadershipoftheirwork,twodaysamonthwould
besetasideforspecialsessionsofthePolitburoonissuesofstateand,particularly,ofeconomicorganization.APolitburocommissionforimprovingandcoordinating
theworkofthecentralinstitutionsoftheUnionwasestablishedatthemeeting(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.523,l.4).
Letter6
[1August1925]
Sochi8/1/25
Com.Molotov,
1)IwastoldthatManuilskiisentL'HumanitthefirstdraftofTrotsky'sarticleforpublication,notaccidently,butonpurpose.Ifthat'strue,it'sanoutrage.Ifit'strue,
thenwearedealing,notwitha"mistake,"asyouwroteme,butwiththepolicyofafewpeoplewhoforsomereasonarenotinterestedinpublishingTrotsky'sarticle
initsfinaleditedversion.Thisisunquestionablythecase.Thismattercannotbeleftasitis.Iproposeraisingtheissuewiththesevenandcondemning
Manuilskii'sintolerableaction,sincehehasplacedtheRussianCommunistPartyandL'Humanitinaridiculouspositionindoingso,wemustdefinitely
findoutwhoitwasthatinstigatedManuilskiitotakethismaliciousstep.Asbackground,letmetellyouseveralnecessaryfacts:a)thedocumentsweregivento
ManuilskiiatManuilskii'swrittenrequest(itshouldbeintheCentralCommittee'sfiles)andwiththeknowledgeoftheseven(Zinovievraisedtheissueofgiving
Manuilskiithedocumentsat[ameetingof]theseven)b)thedocumentsweregivenbeforethefinalversionofTrotsky'sarticlewasavailablec)theywerehanded
overtobriefthetoppeopleoftheCominternandwerenotforpublication(see,bytheway,Manuilskii'srequest)d)thequestionofpublishingthedocuments,
specifically,ofpublishingmymemoonEastman'sbook,wasdiscussedbytheseven,andinfactweallhadinmindpublishingmymemoafterthefinalversionof
Trotsky'sarticle

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waspublishedManuilskiiknewthise)beforeManuilskii'sdeparturetoGermany(inearlyJulyorlateJune)IaskedManuilskiitoreturntotheSecretariatofthe
CentralCommitteealldocuments.Heagreed,butyethedidnotreturnthedocumentsandtookthemwithhim.Thosearethefacts.Iurgentlyaskthesevento
followuponthismatterandthusputanendtosuchdirtytricksinourparty.
2)IdonotagreewiththesevenregardingthepublicationofonlyTrotsky'sarticleinitsfinalversion.First,Krupskaia'sarticle1 mustbepublishedaswell.Second,it
isquitepossibletopublishsomedocuments(includingmymemoonEastman'sbook)afterTrotsky'sarticleispublished,inordertoprovethatTrotskywrotethe
articleonlyunderpressurefromtheRussianCommunistParty(otherwiseTrotskymightappearasthesavioroftheparty'sprestige).
3)ReporttomeonthefateofTrotsky'sandKrupskaia'sarticlesonEastman:WeretheypublishedinEnglandornot?Ihaveaskedforthisthreetimesandstilldo
nothaveananswer.
4)Istilldon'thaveananswerfromyoutomyletteraboutDneprostroi.GiveyouranswerverballytoTovstukhahe'llwriteme.
5)Idon'tbelievethatTrotsky"didn'tread"Eastman'sarticlethatyousentouttoPolitburomembers.Trotskyisputtingyouon.
6)IreadTrotsky's"answers"totheGermandelegation.2 Idonotagreewitheverythinginthem.DoesPravdaagreewiththem?ThisisaplatformforTrotsky's
group.
7)Iamgettingbetter.TheMatsestinskiiwaters(nearSochi)aregoodforcuringsclerosis,revivingthenerves,dilatingtheheart,andcuringsciatica,gout,and
rheumatism.Ishouldsendmywifehere.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.Krupskaia'sarticle,"Pis'movredaktsiiuSundayWorker"(LettertotheeditoroftheSundayWorker)waspublishedinthejournalBolshevik,1925,no.16:71
73.[Foranexcerpt,seetheappendix.]
2.InJulyandAugust1925aGermanworkers'delegationvisitedtheUSSR.On25July,theymetwithTrotsky.Trotsky'sanswerstothedelegationwerepublishedin
Pravdaon29July1925.
Letter7
[Laterthan1August1925]
TotheSeven:1
Atonetime,thesevendecidedtopublishTrotsky'sarticleandKrupskaia'sletteraboutEastmanintheRussianpressaftertheywereprintedintheforeignpress.They
shouldhavealreadyappearedabroadbynow,butforsomereasontheyhavenotbeenprintedinourcountry,soIdonotconsideritsuperfluoustoremindyouofthis.
Theirpublicationwouldbeofgreatsignificanceespe

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ciallynowwhenManuilskiihascontrivedtoshufflethedeckandthushasunwittinglyraisedthequestionoftheauthenticityofTrotsky'sarticle.Ifit[Trotsky'sarticle]
weretobeprintedhere,thequestionofitsauthenticitywouldberemovedbyitself.Andthatwouldbeaplusfortheparty,andnotonlyourparty,buttheforeign
Communistparties,especiallytheCommunistpartiesofEnglandandAmerica.
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1925=?"
Letter8
[9August1925]
Sochi8/9/25
Com.Molotov,
ReadthislettertoBukharin.
Ireceivedyourletterof5August.
1)Apparently,theappointmentofGei1 occurredbeforeyoureceivedmyletterabouttheappointmentofShvernikorsomeoneelseasheadoftheOrganizationaland
AssignmentDepartment.WereallydidhaveanagreementaboutGei,butlaterIchangedmyopinion,aboutwhichIinformedyou,but,unfortunately,toolate.Well,
let'sseehowGeiwillbehave.Adecisionthathasbeenmadetwiceisnolongerworthchanging.
2)RegardingDneprostroi.Iamalittleworriedbecausetheprojectsoundslikehundredsofmillionsandpeoplewanttodecideitatfulltilt.Preventivemeasuresshould
betakenbeforeitistoolatemoreover,youshouldtrytopreventtheinterestsofthecausefromsufferingand[youshould]nothesitateevenifDzerzhinskyand
Trotskywillbesomewhatoffended.Thematterhastobedecidedbytheseven.
3)AsforManuilskii,thereissomekindofmisunderstandinghere,ifnotblackmail.OnceagainIstatethat1)IgavethedocumentstoManuilskii,withtheknowledge
oftheseven,toenablehimtobriefthetopofficialsoftheComintern,andnotforpublication2)ItoldManuilskiiaboutthepublicationabroad,alongwiththe
publicationofthefinaltextofTrotsky'sarticle,ofseveralotherdocumentsexactlywhichdocumentswouldbe(andcouldonlybe)decidedbytheseven3)Idid
notgiveandcouldnothavegivenanydirectivestoManuilskiionthepublicationofTrotsky'sunfinisheddraftarticle,sinceIstoodforandcontinuetostand
forthepublicationofTrotsky'sarticleinitsbestandnotitsworstform4)IcouldnothavegivensuchadirectivetoManuilskiiatall,sinceIdemandedfromhim
beforehisdepartureabroadthereturntotheCentralCommitteeofalldocuments(heagreedto

Page93

this,but,forsomereason,hedidnotdothis).AskManuilskiiwhyhedidn'treturnthedocumentsbeforehisdeparture.2
4)TheprintingofKrupskaia'sletterwasdecidedbytheseventhereviewwasassignedtome,Bukharin,Rykov,andZinoviev.Bukharin,Rykov,andIreviewedit
andapprovedit.Zinovievwasabsent.Peoplehaveasurprisinglyshortmemory,especiallyBukharin.
5)ThesevendecidedtopublishTrotsky'sarticleandKrupskaia'sletterintheRussianpressaftertheirpublicationabroad,withoutopening,however,inanywaya
[public]discussiononthisissue.It'spossiblethatthisdecisionhasnowbeenabrogatedbytheseven.That,ofcourse,istheiraffair.Butifithasn'tbeenabrogated,
theyshouldbepublishedinourpress.Canyoureportanythingtomeinthisregard?
6)AsforthepublicationofmymemoonEastman,wecantalkaboutthatwhenIgetbackfromvacation.There'snohurry.
7)TellBukharinthatPravdamustcommentonTrotsky'srepliesifitdoesn'tagreewiththem.
8)How'sFrunze'shealth?3
9)Kotovskiiwaskilledunderwhatcircumstances!It'sapity,hewasanoutstandingperson.4
Regards,
J.Stalin
Don'tberatemeforsuchalongletter.
1.ThePolitburoconsideredthedecisiontoappointGeiasheadoftheOrganizationalandAssignmentDepartmentoftheCentralCommitteeofthepartyon27July
and3August1925(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.513,l.6,andd.514,l.2).
2.AdraftofZinoviev'slettertoManuilskiidated12August1925hasbeenpreserved(ibid.,f.324,op.1,d.551,ll.13133):
Com.Manuilskii.BecausethemistakewiththeprintinginL'HumanitofthefirstdraftofTrotsky'sstatementintheformofafinaldraftisobviouslybecomingsignificant,
Iurgeyoutorecollectinmoredetail:
1)Didn'tItellyouthatyouhadtostartwiththepublicationofStalin'sletter(thefirst)andthenprovideexcerptswithcommentariesforalltherestaftersometime?
HowdoyouexplainthatStalin'sletterdidnotappearinL'Humanitandthatthefirstdraftwascalledfinal?
2)Didn'tItellyouthattherewasnofinaldraftofTrotsky'sstatementyet,sincetalksandcorrespondencewithhimwerestillcontinuing?
3)Didn'tIsendyoutotheSecretariatoftheCentralCommitteetoobtainallthedocuments?
4)Didn'tItellyouthatthedecisionofthecomradesworkingonthematterwastorevealhowTrotskyhadarrivedatthefinaldraft,thatis,thathewasforcedtorenounce
Eastman?
Didn'tItellyoutoprintthedraftitself(thefinalone)ofTrotsky'sstatementwithcommentariesfromL'Humanitandothersonlyafterthefinaldraftappearedinthe
Britishpress?
Didn'tItellyouatthesametimeofthedecisiontopublishapamphletopposingEastmaninEnglishbytheBritishCommunistsGallacherandPollitt?

3.Frunzediedontheoperatingtableon27October1925somepeopleatthetimeblamedStalinforhisdeath(cf.RoyMedvedev,LetHistoryJudge[NewYork,
1971],48)U.S.Ed.
4.AdraftofashortarticlebyStalindedicatedtothememoryofKotovskiihasbeenpreserved(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.2809):

Page94
IknewCom.Kotovskiiasanexemplarypartycomrade,anexperiencedmilitaryorganizer,andaseasonedcommander.IespeciallyrememberhimatthePolishfrontin1920,
whenCom.BudennybrokethroughtoZhitomirattherearofthePolisharmy,whileKotovskiiledhiscavalrybrigadeindesperatelyheroicraidsonthePoles'Kievarmy.
HewasathreattothePoles,becauseheknewhowto"pulverize"themlikenobodyelsecould,astheRedArmysoldiersusedtosaybackthen.Thebravestamongour
mostmodestcommandersandthemostmodestamongthebravethusIrememberCom.Kotovskii.Longlivehismemoryandglory.J.Stalin.

Letter9
[18August1925]
8/18
Com.Molotov,1
TheletterfromManuilskiiiscowardlyandconniving.
Istandentirelybymydeclarationontheswindlinganddirtytricks,despitethedissatisfactionofsomecomrades.
Kamenev'sdeclarationthatStalin'smainaiminthisaffairwastogethisownmemoaboutEastmanpublishedthisIconsiderdishonest.Heismeasuringothers
usinghisownyardstick...
YouandBukharindidthewrongthingbyvotingagainsttheproposalonthedocumentsconcerningEastman.2 YoushouldnotbebarringtheCentralCommitteesof
theforeignpartiesfromreceivingthedocumentsaboutEastman.KamenevandZinovievwanttoestablishthepreconditionsformakingTrotsky'sremovalfromthe
CentralCommitteenecessary,buttheywillnotsucceedinthisbecausetheydon'thavesupportingfacts.InhisanswertoEastman'sbook,Trotskydeterminedhisfate,
thatis,hesavedhimself.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1925=?"
2.On11August1925,MolotovsentStalinacodedtelegram(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.1,d.5389,l.11):
Byapolloftheabsentmembersoftheseven,avotewastakenonthefollowingproposalpassedbytheavailablemembers,withBukharinandMolotovvotingagainstit:
"InreplytotheComintern'srequest,theBolshevikdelegationispermittedtotransmit,asconfidentialmaterial,materialfromthePolitburoonthequestionofEastman's
booktothemembersofthecentralcommitteesofforeignCommunistparties."

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Letter10
[August1925]
Com.Molotov,1
Ireceivedyourletterof20August.IspokewithBukharintoday.
1)Youareproposinganagendaoffivequestionsfortheplenum:2 1)ForeignTrade,2)thetradeunions3)theComintern4)wages5)landreforminCentralAsia.I
donotobjecttosuchanagenda.Itisimportanttopreparethequestionofwages(theplannedincreaseofwagesandsoon).Thisitemwasraisedbytheseven,and
ShmidtwasassignedtoprepareitapartfromthePolitburo.Putpressureonhim.Whiletheissueisbeingprepared,itshouldberunpastthePolitburoaheadoftime.It
wouldbegoodtoaddtheissueofindustrialconstruction,withareportbyFeliks[Dzerzhinsky]orPiatakov.(Smilgashouldnotstickhisnoseinthishe'safakeasan
economicleader,andbesides,thisisnotaquestionoftheeconomyasawhole,butofindustry.)IfFelikscannotgiveareportnow,itcanbetableduntilthenext
plenum,butwiththeprovisothatafirmguaranteemustbegiventhatnotonefactoryofnationalsignificancewillbebuiltforthisperiodwithoutthePolitburo's
sanction.
2)NothingshouldbeformalizedontheissueoftheUkrainianPoorPeasants'Committees.ThedecisionoftheUkrainianCentralCommitteeonthisissuecoincides
entirelywiththedecisionsoftheXIVPartyConference.ItwouldbebettertoplaceareportoftheruralconferenceontheagendaoftheCentralCommitteeplenum
intheformofaseparateissueandtodescribeinthisreportthePoorPeasants'Committees,otherpeasantcommittees,andsoon.Infact,thiswillconfirmthedecision
oftheUkrainianCentralCommittee.Youshoulddothereport.Withoutfail.3
3)Theeconomicplancanbeplacedontheagendaofthenextplenum,ifitturnsouttobenecessary,givingthereportnottoGosplanbuttoRykov(Councilof
Commissars)orKamenev(LaborDefenseCouncil)withtheinvolvementoftheCentralControlCommission.
4)We'llspeaklaterabouttheagendafortheCongress.
5)Ifyouhavetime,writemoreIwillanswerindetail(Ihavelotsoftime).
6)Bukharinsaysthatyouarenowheavilyoverworked.IwilltrytobeinMoscowonthe10th,orevenearlier,inordertotakeoffsomeoftheload.
I'mhealthy.I'vemadeafairlygoodrecovery.
Regards,
Yours,J.Stalin
P.S.Thethesesonthetradeunionsareingeneralacceptable,buttheindividualformulationsneedreworkingbecausetheyareweakandtheindividualformulations
areinsufficientlyprecise.TheydefinitelyhavetoberevisedinthespiritofAndreev'swellknownspeech.
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"8/1925=?"

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2.Thefollowingquestionswerereviewedatthepartyplenumof310October1925:1)OnForeignTrade(KuibyshevandKrasinreporting).2)Ontheworkofthe
tradeunions(Tomskiireporting).3)Onwages(Shmidtreporting).4)OntheCentralCommittee'smeetingontheworkinthecountryside(Molotovreporting).5)On
thecurrentissuesinagriculturalpolicy(Kamenevreporting).6)OnthesituationintheforeignCommunistparties(Zinovievreporting).7)Ontheagenda,venue,and
deadlineforconveningtheXIVPartyCongress(Molotovreporting).8)OnthedissolutionofthewagescommissionoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControl
Commission.
3.TheConferenceontheWorkintheCountryside,atwhichMolotovspoke,approvedthedecisionoftheUkrainianCentralCommitteetoreorganizethecommittees
ofpoorvillagers[komnezamy]intovoluntaryorganizationstohelpimprovethefarmsofthepoorpeasantsandmiddlepeasants.Thetaskof''unifyingthepeasantryto
promotemutualaidandaidtothoseinneed"wasgiventothe"peasantcommittees"[krestkomy](RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.197,l.57).

Page97

ChapterTwo
1926
ThelettersshowthatStalinwaschieflyoccupiedwiththestruggleagainsthispoliticalopponentsin1926,justashehadbeenin1925.Afterthefinalbreakwith
ZinovievandKamenevattheXIVPartyCongressinlate1925,StalinandhissupportersweresoonfacedwithaunitedoppositionheadedbyTrotsky,Zinoviev,and
Kamenevthatcoalescedbythemiddleof1926.Inlate1925andearly1926,relativecalmcouldbeobservedinthehighechelonsofpower.Thetwosideswere
waitingeachotherout,watchingoneanother,analyzingthenewsituation,and,foratime,avoidingopenpolemics.AreflectionofthissituationwastheAugust
GuralskiandVojskovVujovichaffair.V.V.KuibyshevspokeaboutitinsomedetailattheJulyplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommission:
IbelievethatImustreadaloudtheappropriatedocuments...sothatalltheplenummemberscanseehowattemptstofactionalizeweremadesoonafterthePartyCongress,...
they...finallyculminatedinarealfactionalfight.Inlightofrecentevents,thisGuralskiandVujovichaffairisofparticularinterest.
ThePolitburohasinitspossessionaletter...fromGertrudGessler,memberoftheCommunistPartyofFrance:
Moscow.
10/1/1926
On3JanuaryComradeGuralskiapproachedmeandaskedmetocometohisroomtodiscussacertainmatter.
ComradeVujovichwasalsothere.IwasofferedatriptocarryoutthefollowingassignmentfortheoppositionoftheRussian[Com

Page98
munist]Party.IwastotraveltoBerlin,Paris,andperhapsRometomeetwithcertainleadingpartycomradesinordertopersuadethemnottotakeadefinitepositionwithregardto
thepartydiscussioninRussia.IwastoreporttothemthatthesituationinRussiawasnotatallclear,thatwithinashorttimethemoodinthepartywouldchangecompletelyand
turntotheleft,andthat,fortwomonthsatleast,thelargeforeignpartiesshouldnottakeastandinfavoroftheCentralCommitteeoftheRussianParty...Iwassupposedto
informeveryonethattheoppositionwasheldhostageinRussiaandwasdeniedtheopportunitytocommunicatewiththoseabroad.
Fromthefirstmomentitwasclearthatthiswasaquestionofadangerousfactionalfightonaninternationalscale,andIagreedtoaccepttheassignmentforthetimebeinginorder
tofollowdevelopments.
...SeveraltimesIspecificallyaskedwhoIwassupposedtorepresentwhenIarrivedinEurope,andIalwaysreceivedthesameanswer,thatIwastravelingonbehalfofthe
oppositionoftheRussianCommunistPartyandthatthreepeoplehaddirectresponsibility:Guralski,Vujovich,andZinoviev.OnFridaythe8th,IsawGuralskiandwasalone
withhimagainandheinformedmethatthewholeaffairwasoff,sinceatrucehadbeendeclaredthepreviouseveningbetweenbothfactionsofthepartyontheComintern
questionforaperiodofsixmonths.GuralskiinformedmethatthePolitburohadmadesubstantialconcessionstohisgrouponthepreviouseveningandthatithadbeendecided
thattheCominternworkshouldbeallowedtoproceedcalmlywithoutmajorchanges.HehimselfhadspentalmosttheentireeveningwithZinovievandPiatnitskiiinorderto
discussvariouslinesofwork,and,onthisbasis,itwasdecidedwithintheoppositionatCom.Kamenev'ssuggestionthattheentireplanformytripwastoremainineffectforthe
present.Guralskihimselfsupposedthatthiswholecompromisewouldfallapartwithintwomonthsand[suggestedthat]IshouldbepreparedtoarrangethingssothatIcould
leaveafterward.Ofcourse,hesaid,Piatnitskiiwasn'ttherewhenthiswasdecidedonlyGuralski,Zinoviev,andKamenevwerepresent.GertrudGessler,memberoftheCommunist
PartyofFrance.
ThisstatementfromCom.GesslerwasdiscussedinaspecialcommissionmadeupofComs.Piatnitskii,Lozovskii,andManuilskii.Thiscommissionreceivedtheassignmentfrom
theRussiandelegation,interrogatedGuralski,Vujovich,Roy,andGessler,andestablishedthat
1)Com.Guralski,togetherwithCom.Vujovich,attemptedinearlyJanuaryofthisyeartosendaspecialagenttomaketheroundsofthe

Page99
mostimportantCominternsections(France,Germany,andItaly)forthepurposeofconductingfactionalwork2)whilesharingtheviewsoftheLeningradopposition,theyacted
ontheirownpersonalbehalfandusedthenameofCom.Zinovievforfactionalaims...5)whenconfrontedwithCom.Gessler'sletter,Guralskitriedtodisparagethetestimonies
ofcomradeswhohadfulfilledtheirpartyduty,claimingthatpeoplehadbeensenttohimtoprovokehimintoafactionalact.[Thecommissionconcluded:]
...Onthebasisofthisinformation,thecommissionresolvestolimititselftoastrictreprimandofComs.GuralskiandVujovichand,inlightofGuralski'sparticularlyactiverolein
thisattempttocreateafaction,toremovehimfromworkintheCominternandtoreassignhimatthediscretionoftheCentralCommittee.
ThelaxityofthisresolutionincomparisontothedeedcommittedbyGuralskiandVujovich,inadditiontothemitigatingcircumstancescited,ismotivatedbythenecessityto
avoidcomplicationsintheworkoftheCominternandtoquicklyeliminatebyinternalpartymeanstheaftermathofthedisputesattheXIVPartyCongress.
19January1926.Signed:Piatnitskii.D.Manuilskii.A.Lozovskii.
ThisresolutionwaslaterconfirmedbythePolitburoon11February.ThusboththecommissionandthePolitburosawthisattemptbyVujovichandGuralski(Guralskiisamember
oftheRussian[Communist]Party)tocreatefactionsintheforeignCommunistpartiesasasequeltothedisputesattheXIVPartyCongress....Despitethefactthatthe
Politburo'swork[hadbeenhamperedby]manyindicationsoffactionalintoleranceandfrequentcontinuationofformermistakes,boththeCentralControlCommissionandthe
Politburoconsidereditpossibletobelievethattheoppositionwouldworkinharmonywiththeparty'sdecisions.1

Theperiodofrelativecalmintheinternalpartystruggledidnotlastlong.OnecauseofrenewedclashesbetweentheunitedoppositionandtheStalinistmajoritywas
eventsinGreatBritain.On1May1926,aminers'strikebegan.On4May,theGeneralCounciloftheBritishTradesUnionCongressdeclaredageneralstrikein
supportoftheminers.Buton12May,byarulingofthesameGeneralCouncil,thegeneralstrikewashalted.Atthesametime,theGeneralCouncilrefusedtoaccept
moneyfromtheSoviettradeunionssenttoaidthestrikingBritishworkers.Theunitedopposi
1.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.246,vyp.4,ll.15.

Page100

tionclaimedthattheeventsinGreatBritainprovedthatStalinandBukharinhadbeenmistakenintheirpolicyontheinternationaltradeunionmovement.Zinoviev,then
chairmanoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee,preparedthesesonthelessonsoftheBritishstrike.ThemajorityofthePolitburorejectedthem,andBukharin
preparedcounterthesesthatdefendedcooperationwiththesocialdemocratictradeunions.Bukharin'stheseswereacceptedbythePolitburo.
HavingprevailedontheissueoftheBritishstrike,thePolitburomajorityadoptedanactiveoffensiveagainsttheopposition.Stalinformulatedtheprogramand
conceptionofthisoveralloffensivefranklyinhislettertoMolotovof15June1926(letter20).Thechiefpretextforthenewattackagainsttheoppositionwastheso
calledLashevichaffair.
OnSunday,6June1926,aboutseventyCommunistsfromtheKrasnopresnenskiiDistrictinMoscowgatheredatadachaalongtheSavelovskaiarailline.The
meetinghadbeeninitiatedbyagroupofformerdistrictcommitteepartyworkerswhohadjoinedtheopposition.TheyinvitedM.M.LashevichanoldBolshevik,
thenfirstdeputyoftheUSSRRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,andasupporterofZinovievtospeakatthemeeting.AparticipantatthegatheringtheninformedM.
N.Riutin,secretaryoftheKrasnopresnenskiiDistrictPartyCommittee,aboutthemeeting.Riutin,inturn,sentadossiertotheCentralCommittee.On8or9June,a
speciallycreatedinvestigativebodyoftheCentralControlCommissioninterrogatedtheknownparticipantsatthemeeting.2Onthebasisofthesematerials,the
meetingwascharacterizedasundergroundandfactional.On12June,basedonthereportoftheinvestigativecommission,theCentralControlCommissionissued
penaltiesagainstsevenoftheparticipants.Lashevichwasgivenastrictreprimandwithawarning.TheCentralControlCommissionalsodecidedtoproposethatthe
nextplenumoftheCentralCommitteeexpelLashevichfromtheCentralCommittee,removehimimmediatelyfromhispositionattheRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,
anddenyhimtherighttooccupyanyresponsiblepostsforaperiodoftwoyears.3
2.

Ibid.,d.695,ll.1035.

3.

Ibid.,f.613,op.1,d.46,ll.2122.

Page101

Theinitialinspectionbytheinvestigativecommissiondidnotestablishthatanyotherpeoplehadbeeninvolvedinthecaseexceptthosewhohadactuallyattendedthe
meeting.ButStalinwasstilldissatisfied.AscanbeseenfromhislettertoMolotovof25June(letter21),StalindecidedtolinkthecaseofLashevichwithZinovievand
therebystrikeablowagainsttheopposition.HewasabletorealizehisplanattheJuly1926plenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommission.Just
asStalinhadsuggested,theLashevichaffairvirtuallybecametheZinovievaffairattheplenum.Furthermore,theevidenceconcerningdissentandfactionalactivities
gatheredbytheCentralControlCommissionandOGPU(forexample,the"affairs"ofMedvedev,Guralski,andVujovich)werepresentedattheplenum,onceagain
incompleteaccordwithStalin'sproposals,aslinksofasinglechainandamanifestationofthevigorousactivityofapowerful,conspiratorialoppositionalorganization.
Theplenumthusassertedthat"theoppositionhasdecidedtocrosstheboundarybetweenlegitimatelypromotingitsviewsandcreatinganillegalallunionorganization,
opposingitselftothepartyandthuspavingthewayforasplitintheparty'sranks."4TheplenumlaidthepoliticalresponsibilityatZinoviev'sdoorandexpelledhim
fromthePolitburo.
AftertheJulyplenum,theremovalofoppositionmembersfromtherulingpartyandstatebodieswasaccelerated.InOctober1926,ajointCentralCommitteeand
CentralControlCommissionplenumresolvedtoremoveZinovievfromthepostofchairmanoftheComintern,todismissTrotskyfromthePolitburo,andtodismiss
KamenevasacandidatememberofthePolitburo.
Oneofthelastepisodesinthetrouncingoftheoppositionin1926wastheconflictwithKamenevdescribedbyStalininaletterdated23December(letter30).Ina
speechatasessionoftheVIIexpandedplenumoftheCominternon15December1926,StalinnotedthatinMarch1917,Kamenevhadsentatelegramofgreetings
fromhisAchinskexiletotheProvisionalGovernmentandtoGreatPrinceMikhailRomanov(whowasbrieflytsarafterNicholasabdicated).Stalinalsoclaimedthatin
April1917attheVIIConfer
4.

KPSSvrezoliutsiiakh(ResolutionsoftheCPSU),vol.4(Moscow,1984),4950.

Page102

enceoftheBolshevikpartythisfactalmostcostKamenevhismembershipintheCentralCommitteeonlyLenin'sinterventionsavedhimfromlosingtheelection.
Kamenev,supportedbyZinovievandTrotsky,madeaspeechofrebuttal.Accordingtohisstatement,theSiberiannewspaperYeniseiskiikray[Yeniseyregion]of8
March1917,hadbeenthefirsttoprintthefalseinformationaboutthetelegramofgreetings.Severalweekslater,thisarticlehadbeenreprintedinPetrogradby
opponentsoftheBolsheviks.On8April1917,Pravdacarriedarebuttal.Theincidentwasclosedandthequestionofthegreetingwasneverraisedagain,evenatthe
VIIPartyConference.Kamenev'sversionwasconfirmedbynumeroustestimoniessubmittedbytheoppositiontotheCentralCommitteefromeyewitnesseswhohad
beenpoliticalexilesinAchinskin1917anddelegatesattheVIIPartyConference.On16December1926,Zinoviev,Smilga,andG.F.Fedorov,membersofthe
CentralCommitteeelectedin1917totheVIIPartyConferenceandsupportersofKamenev,madeanofficialstatementtothePolitburoaboutthetelegram.Theyalso
affirmedthattheKamenevtelegramhadneverexistedandthattheissuehadnevercomeupduringtheelectionsatthePartyConference.Theoppositiondemanded
thattheirstatementbepublishedinPravda.
On18December1926,thePolitburomajorityapprovedtheofficialtextofareplytothestatementfromZinoviev,Smilga,andFedorov,whichstatedinpart:
ThePolitburoconsiderstheincidentattheVIIexpandedplenumoftheCominternExecutiveCommitteeanincidentthatdoesnothaveanydirectrelationshiptofundamental
disagreements.Forthisreason,thePolitburo,notwishingtoovershadowfundamentalissueswiththeissueofoneofCom.Kamenev'smistakes(althoughasevereone),doesnot
consideritexpedienttopublishthestatementmadebyCom.Zinovievandtheothercomradesinthedailynewspapers.5

Asaresult,theoppositionmembers'statementwasplacedinBolshevik(1926,nos.2324),alongwithdocumentsthatrefutedtheversionofthestorygivenby
Kamenevandhissupporters.Theselectionofdocumentsincludedanofficialstatement,"Fromthe
5.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.607,1.7.

Stalin

LetterfromStalintoMolotov,[24May1926](RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5388,l.18).

Page103

CentralCommitteeoftheAllUnionCommunistParty(Bolshevik),"whichoutlinedthepositionofthePolitburomajority,andareprintofthearticlefromthe
newspaperYeniseiskiikrayof8March1917,withoutanycommentaryormentionthatthisarticlehadbeenrefutedbyPravdainApril1917.Thepublished
documentsincludedseveralselectedstatementsfromwitnessesamongtheexileswhoconfirmedthefactsoutlinedinYeniseiskiikrayandfromseveraldelegatesto
theAprilPartyConferencewhosupportedStalin'sversionoftheevents.
ThustheselectionofmaterialsplacedinBolshevikwasopenlytendentious.Notasingleoneofthenumerousdocumentscollectedbytheoppositionmembersto
counterthechargeswasevenmentionedallofthemhaveremainedinthearchivestothisday.Meanwhile,StalingleefullytoldMolotovofthelatestvictoryoverthe
opposition,gloatingoveritsweaknessandpowerlessness.
Letter11
[24May1926]
Hello,1
IgothereSundayevening.Theweatherwaslousy.TheharvestoutlookintheNorthCaucasusisgood.That'sgood.
Belenkiitoldmethat1)TrotskywasbackinMoscowasearlyasWednesdaymorning2)PreobrazhenskiiwenttovisithiminBerlin(forarendevous?).2 Interesting.
Well,allthebest,
J.Stalin
Monday.Sochi.
1.Molotov'snotationintheupperrighthandcorner:"1926=?"
2.Inthespringof1926,TrotskyandhiswifewereinBerlinformedicaltreatment(seeL.Trotsky,Moiazhizn'[Mylife][Moscow,1991],496).
Letter12
[26May1926]
Helloagain,1
Sinceyouareallbusywithlargematters,sometrivialmattersmayslipbyyou.Ithinkitwon'tbeoutofordertoremindyouofseveralnecessarydetails:

Page104

1)YoumustremindBukharinofthearticleagainstthe''workers'opposition."Itshouldn'tbeputoffanylonger.Itmustbewrittenimmediately.It'smoreadvantageous
forusifBukharinwritesit,andnotGrisha[Zinoviev],whohascriminallymissedalldeadlines.2 ItwouldbestrategicallyadvantageousifBukharinwouldwriteit.
Bukharinisfullywithinhisrightstodoso,sinceGrishahassabotagedtheassignmentfromthePolitburo.3
2)Wemustpublishthecompletetextoftheresolutionofourworkers(fromallregions)insupportoftheBritishstrikersingeneralandthecoalminersinparticularin
allthemostimportantlanguagesoftheWestasquicklyaspossible.IthinkitshouldbepublishedintheformofabrochurewithaforewordbyBukharinorTomskii.
NeitherGrishanorLozovskiiareneededhere.TheprefaceshouldbewrittenbyeitherBukharinorTomskii.Thisisafightingmatterandshouldnotbeallowedtofall
bythewayside.ItcanbepublishedbytheTradeUnionCouncilortheStatePublishingHouse.Itshouldn'tbepublishedbyCominternitselfthiscandoharm.
Betterhaveitcomefromthetradeunions.4
3)TellmesomethingaboutthatalarmingmatterthatUglanovandYagodareportedtous.5 Ifeverything'sallright,telegraphthemessage"Feelingfine"ifthingsare
bad,telegraphincodethemessage"Feelingsick."
That'sitfornow.Theweatherhasgottenbetter.
26/5/26
J.Stalin
1.Molotov'snotationonthisletteris:"5/26/1926."
2.In1924,S.P.Medvedev,aleaderoftheformer"workers'opposition,"draftedalettercriticizingtheparty'spolicy(publishedinKommunisticheskaiaoppozitsiia
vSSSR,192327[CommunistoppositionintheUSSR,192327],4vols.[Benson,Vt.:ChalidzePublications,1988],1:90101).Theletterwasdistributedamong
somemembersoftheBakuPartyOrganization.Atthattime,severalCommunistsexpelledfromtheCommunistPartyinBakuwerechargedwithattemptingtocreate
an"undergroundoppositiongroup,"whoseideologicalmentorwasMedvedevandanotherleaderoftheformer"workers'opposition,"A.G.Shliapnikov.Zinoviev
wasassignedtowriteanarticlecriticizingMedvedev's"platform."Hedidnotcarryoutthisassignment,however.On10July1926,Pravdacarriedaneditorial,
"RightistDangerinOurParty,"withadetailedanalysisandseverecriticismofMedvedev'sletter.FromallindicationsthiseditorialwaswrittenbyBukharin.
3.FromStalin'sspeechon15July1926,atthepartyplenum(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.246,vyp.1,ll.75,76):
Com.ZinovievagreedtowriteanarticlecriticizingMedvedev.Whydidn'thewriteit?WhyhashedraggedthisoutayearandnotspokenagainstMedvedev?...Why
hasCom.Zinovievsabotagedthedecisionforawholeyear,althoughhehimselfagreedtocriticizeMedvedev'sMenshevistletter?Why?Yesterdayhetriedtoexplain
thisasfollows:sincetherewasamarkedtendencytotherightintheparty,I,Zinoviev,decidedtospareMedvedev[asarepresentativeoftheleftU.S.Ed.]....
Com.TrotskyfeignssurprisethatweareraisingtheissueoftheMedvedevletterpreciselynow,whenitwaswrittenayearago.Andinfactwhywastheresuchadelay?
BecausewewaitedayearforCom.Zinoviev,whosabotagedthePolitburo'sdecision.BecauseaboutthreemonthsagotheCentralCommitteereceivedastatementfrom
ComradesShliapnikovandMedvedevinwhichnotonlydotheyfailtorenouncetheletterfromCom.Medvedev,but,onthecontrary,theydemandthatitbeprintedin
Pravda.BecausebackinAprilofthisyear,afterreceivingthestatementfromComradesShliapnikovandMedvedev,IsentthemembersoftheCentral

Page105
CommitteealetterwithmysignatureinwhichIonceagainremindedCom.ZinovievofhisdutytocriticizetheMedvedevletter.Ireceivednoreplytothisletter
whatsoever....
Allowmetoreadsomeextractsfrommyletter:"Sometimeagothesocalledworkers'oppositionprovidedaplatformofitsviewsintheformofthewellknownletterby
Com.Medvedevtomembersofthe'workers'opposition'inBaku.Thisplatformofthe'workers'opposition'statesthatthepolicyoftheCominternisleading'tothe
disorganizationoftheworkers'movementinthatcountry[thereferenceistoNorwayJ.Stalin]andtotheestablishmentof"Communist"partieswithfewmaterial
resources.TheyaremaintainedattheexpenseoftheRussianworkers,usingresourcesthatcostthembloodandsacrificesbutwhichtheythemselvescannotenjoy
undercurrentconditions,'that'inrealityhordesofpetitbourgeoistimeserversarecreatedmaintainedonRussiangold,theydepictthemselvesastheproletariatand
representthemselvesintheCominternasthemostrevolutionaryworkers.'Theplatformgoesontosaythat'our[thatis,the"workers'opposition"J.Stalin]evaluation
oftheWesternEuropeansocialdemocraticpartiesdiffersprofoundlyfromthoseevaluationsthataregivenbyourleaders[thatis,theCentralCommitteeJ.Stalin].'
Finallytheplatformstatesthat'we[thatis,the"workers'opposition"J.Stalin]considerthatassociationslikethe"TradeUnionInternational"[Profintern]arein
practice,deliberatelyornot,aninstrumentforcreatingagulfbetween,ontheonehand,theworkermassesofRussiaandtheCommunistmassesofWesternEuropeand,
ontheotherhand,thedecisivemassoftheentireproletariat.Itisadirecthindrance,unjustifiedbytherealsituation,toanauthenticunitedfrontoftheworkingclass
withineachcountryandattheinternationallevel.'...
TheCentralCommitteeassignedCom.Zinovievtopublishastatementinthepressagainsttheletter...,butCom.Zinovievformorethanayearnowhasnotseenfitto
fulfillthisassignment....IsitnotclearthatCom.Zinovievneedstoremainsilentaboutthe'workers'opposition'inordertosecurehimselftheblocheisestablishingwith
thatvery'workers'opposition'?AreCom.ZinovievandCom.MedvedevinagreementthattheCommunistpartiesintheWestarenotauthenticworkers'partiesbut
'hordesofpetitbourgeoistimeservers'?Yesorno?AreCom.ZinovievandCom.MedvedevinagreementthatAmsterdamismorevaluablethantheProfintern,thatthe
Profinternshouldbeliquidated?Yesorno?IfCom.Zinovievisnotinagreementwiththesefundamentalpointsofthe'workers'opposition,'then[why]isheforminga
blocwithitatthepresentmoment,andwhyishenotfulfillingtheCentralCommittee'sdecisionaboutpublishingastatementagainsttheplatformofthe'workers'
opposition'?Whatdoesallthistellus?ThatCom.TrotskyandCom.Zinovievhaveformedablocwiththe'workers'opposition.'

InhisstatementtotheCentralCommitteeon18July1926,Zinovievwrote(ibid.,d.696,ll.46,47):
Morethanayearago,with...theseven,thequestionwasraisedwhetherornottomakeastatementinthepressagainstMedvedev'sletter.Iheldtheopinionthatwe
shouldhaveanarticleinBolshevikandpublishCom.Medvedev'sletteritselfinfull.Ihavenotchangedmyopinion.EvennowIconsiderthatitwouldbecorrectto
publishtheletteritselfintheparty'stheoreticalorganandtoprovideaseriousandsharpanalysisofit.Amongtheseven,ComradeStalinatfirstconsideredthatthis
wasn'tnecessary,andthenwasinclinedtosaythatperhapsweshouldtrytowritesuchanarticle.ThefactionalsevenexpressedtheopinionthatIshouldwritethis
article.[AfterZinovievjoinedwithTrotsky,hecondemnedthesevenasafactionalorganizationU.S.Ed.]IdidnotwriteitpartlybecauseIwasoverloadedwithother
workbutpartlybecausethemoodinthesevenwashesitant:therewasn'tafirmdecisiontodefinitelypublishanarticle.Overthecourseofthenextyearandlater,noone
fromtheseveneverremindedmeevenoncethatthisarticlehadtobewritten....TheclaimthattheCentralCommitteeofourpartygavemeanassignmenttopublishan
articleagainstCom.Medvedevisalie.Itneverhappened.

NoPolitburodecisiontoassignZinovievthetaskofwritingthisarticlehasbeenfound.
4.In1926,theTradeUnionCouncilpublishedacollectioninRussian,AngliiskaiastachkairabochieSSSR(TheBritishstrikeandSovietworkers),simultaneously
issuingitinGermaninMoscowandBerlin.
5.Theeditorswereunabletodeterminethereferencehere.

Page106

Letter13
[1June1926]
1
On28May,MolotovsentyouadetailedletteraboutZinoviev'sthesesonthelessonsoftheBritishstrikes.Webelievethatitisextremelyimportantforyoutostudy
thesethesesimmediatelyandsendusyouropinion.ZinovievisreevaluatingouranalysisofcapitaliststabilizationandthetacticsoftheComintern,slingingmudatthe
Comintern'sexistingpolicy,andmakingreferencestothepartyandtoindividualCentralCommitteemembersashedidearlierin"PhilosophyoftheEra,"2 andheis
readytotakeuponhimselftheinitiativeofbreakingimmediatelywiththeGeneralCouncil.TrotskyalsoadvocatesademonstrativebreakwiththeGeneralCouncil.I
believethisisconsummatestupidityofthe"recallist"3 varietyandtheCentralCommitteeshouldruthlesslyopposeit.Opportunismdisguisedby"leftist"phrasesshould
beexposed.Zinoviev'sthesesmustberefutedandopposedwithpoliticallyprecisethesesfromtheCentralCommittee,includingourrightanddutytocriticize
ruthlesslyandexposetherightistsandalltheleftistsoftheGeneralCouncil,butwithoutinitiatingabreakwiththeGeneralCouncil.Amongusthereisfullunanimityon
thebasicpoint.BukharinprefersnottopresentourowncounterthesesbuttomakeinsteadappropriatecorrectionstoZinoviev'stheses.Wearepostponinga
discussionoftheBritishlessonsforfivedayswhilewethinkoverourtheses.We'reexpectingyourimmediatereply.ZinovievmadeaspeechatSverdlovUniversity4
inthespiritofhistheses.Trotskyechoedhim.Bukharinspokeoutagainstthemwithoutnamingnames.
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMMOLOTOVANDBUKHARINTOSTALIN

Molotov.Bukharin.
1.Thetelegramisprintedonaformfromtheparty'sTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee.Intheupperpartoftheformiswritten:"Tiflis.TranscaucasianRegional
Committee.DecipherinthepresenceofCom.Ordzhonikidze.HanddelivertoCom.Stalin"(RTsKhIDNIf.82,op.1,d.144,l.1).
2.AnarticlebyG.Ye.Zinoviev(frequentlyreprinted,forexample,G.Ye.Zinoviev,"Filosofiiaepokhi,"Leningrad,Priboy,1925Moscow,Moskovskiyrabochiy,
1925,etc.).
3."Recallist"isalabelgiventoaBolshevikfactionthatrefusedtoworkwithinabourgeoisinstitutionlikeaparliamentoratradeunionU.S.Ed.
4.TheSverdlovCommunistUniversity,apartyrunacademyfortrainingpartyandSovietpersonnel.
Letter14
[1June1926]
1
BukhariniswritingcounterthesestoZinoviev's.ZinovievandTrotskyarecausingustobeinaterriblerush.Inmyview,ourthesesmustprovideadeterminedattack
againstZinovievandTrotsky'sattemptstoconducta
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMMOLOTOVTOSTALIN

Page107

radicalalthoughcowardlyreviewofthepolicyoftheComintern,theparty,andtheTradeUnionCouncilourthesesshouldexposenotonlyultraleftismbutthatwhich
screensit,thatis,leftismintheComintern,asLenintaught.Theopportunistic"recallism"onthematterofthebreakwiththeGeneralCouncilmustbeexposed.
Simultaneouslywemust:1)emphasizetheconditionalnatureofthestabilizationandthegrowthofcomplicationsthatmayleadtorevolutioninthecapitalistcountries,
althoughtheoutcomemaygoeitherway2)[emphasize]thebetrayaloftherightistsandthecapitulationoftheleftistsintheGeneralCouncilinfacttheleftistsbearthe
mainobjectiveresponsibilityforthis,becausetheyhaveamajorityintheGeneralCouncil3)demonstratethatwehavejoinedandcanremainintheAngloSoviet
[sic]Committee,2 forthesakeofcontactwiththemassesofBritishworkers,withoutrestrictinginanywayourrighttocriticizeanyactionbytheGeneralCouncilor
oursupportoftherevolutionaryelementsoftheBritishworkers'movement.TheCommunistPartyofEnglandshouldbedecisivelydefendedagainstTrotsky'scharge
inPravdaof26Maythatitisanelementof"unrevolutionaryinhibition."Youropinionisneededimmediately.ItwouldbebetterifyoucameinpersontoMoscow
then(we)wouldpostponethedecisionontheBritishissueuntil7June.Awaitingyourreply.
Molotov
1.Intheupperpartofthetelegramiswritten:"DecipherinthepresenceofCom.Ordzhonikidze.HanddelivertoCom.Stalin"(RTsKhIDNIf.82,op.1,d.144,l.
2).
2.TheAngloRussianCommittee,ajointcommitteeofthetradeunionsofGreatBritainandtheUSSR,wascreatedinLondonon68April1925ataconferenceof
representativesoftheSovietTradeUnionCouncilandtheGeneralCounciloftheBritishTradesUnionCongress(TUC).ItwasdissolvedinSeptember1927after
diplomaticrelationsbetweenGreatBritainandtheUSSRwerebrokenoff.
Letter15
[2June1926]
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMSTALINTOMOLOTOV

2June1926
Moscow
CentralCommittee
ToMolotov:
Ireceivedthecodedtelegramtoday.Ihaven'treceivedMolotov'sletteryet.Iwillreadthethesesimmediatelyandreportbacktoyou.Idon'tunderstandhowthey
canrushyouwhenyouhavethemajority.Postponethematterforanotherweekandtellthemtogotohell.Thematterofthethesesisanimportantone,andwehave
tothinkitthroughwithouthaste.Apparentlytheywant

Page108

totakeadvantageoftheBritishissueinordertogetbackeverythingtheyhadlostbefore.Theymustbeputintheirplace.
Stalin
1.RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.3263,l.1.
Letter16
[3June1926]
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMSTALINTOMOLOTOV

CentralCommittee
AllUnionCommunistParty
Com.Molotov,
DecipherImmediately
BasicallyGrisha's[Zinoviev's]thesesproceedfromthepremisethat1)stabilizationisendingorhasalreadyended2)weareenteringintoorhavealreadyenteredinto
aphaseofrevolutionaryexplosions3)thetacticofgatheringforcesandworkinginthereactionarytradeunionsislosingitsviabilityandisrecedingintothe
background4)thetacticofaunitedfronthasoutliveditself5)wemustbuildourowntradeunionsbyrelyingonthe"minorities"movement.HenceGrisha'sproposal
totakeuponhimselftheinitiativeforanoutrightbreakwiththeGeneralCouncil.
Inthegivenhistoricalcircumstances,thisentirepremise,inmyview,isfundamentallyincorrectbecauseitplaysintothehandsofAmsterdam2 andtheSecond
International3 anddoomsourCommunistpartiestosectarianism.
Ithinkthat:
1)Stabilizationhasnotended,althoughit[circumstances]hasbeenandcontinuestobeshaky
2)Theprovocationofthe[general]strikebytheBritishConservativeswascapital'sattempttosolidifystabilizationthatis,inthiscase,capital,nottherevolution,
wasontheattack.
3)Thisattemptdidnotleadtoastrengtheningofstabilization,norcouldit.Butitalsodidnotleadtoatriumphantdevelopmentoftheworkers'revolutionarystruggle
ortothedestructionofstabilizationmoreover,asaresultofthestrike,somecategoriesofworkerswerenotabletopreserveeventheirformerconditionsofwork
andstruggle.
4)Asaresult,wedonothaveanewphaseofstormyonslaughtbytherevolutionbutacontinuingstabilization,temporary,notenduring,butstabilizationnonetheless,
fraughtwithnewattemptsbycapitaltomakenewattacksontheworkers,whocontinuetobeforcedtodefendthemselves.
5)Ourtaskistocontinuetogatherforcesand[form]arealunitedfronttopreparetheworkingclasstoresistnewattacksbycapitaltoturnthisdefense

Page109

intoabroadbasedrevolutionaryattackbytheproletariatagainstcapital,intoatransitiontoastruggleforpower.
6)HencetheneedformoreintenseworkbytheCommunistsinthereactionarytradeunionsforthepurposeofinternallytransformingthemandoftakingcontrolof
them.
7)HencetheneedforadeterminedstruggleagainstZinovievandTrotsky,whohavebeenadvocatingsplittingthetradeunionmovementandhaveopposedaunited
front,totheadvantageofOudegeestandSassenbach.
8)HenceadeterminedstruggleagainstZinovievandTrotsky,whoarepushingtheBritishtradeunionmovementintothearmsofAmsterdamandtheAmerican
FederationofLabor(AFL).
9)HenceadecisiverebuttalofZinovievandTrotsky'sline,whichleadstotheCommunistparties'isolationfromthemassesandtotheabandonmentofthemassesto
amonopolyofleadershipbyreformers.
10)Henceadecisiverebuttalofanyattempttotakeuponourselvestheinitiativeofsplittingthe[Soviet]TradeUnionCouncilfromtheBritishtradeunionmovement,
sinceabreakwiththeGeneralCouncilundertheseconditionsmustleadtoabreakwiththetradeunionsofEnglandinfavorofAmsterdam.
11)ThebreakwiththeGeneralCouncilwillsurelyleadtoadisruptioninthepolicyofaunifiedtradeunionmovementinFranceandGermanyaswell,sincethe
reformersinFranceandGermanyarenobetterthantheBritishreformers.
12)WorkwiththeProfintern4 andthe"minorities"mustbesteppedupandtheirauthorityincreased.
13)TheBritishCommunistPartymustbeunconditionallydefendedagainstZinovievandTrotsky'seffortstodiscreditit.
14)AnumberofthepracticalproposalsmadebyCom.Lozovskiishouldbeapproved,andcompleteagreementshouldbeestablishedbetweenTomskiiand
Lozovskii.
15)RuthlesscriticismofcentristsandleftistsintheGeneralCouncilisabsolutelynecessary.
16)Thiscriticismdoesnotandcannotexcludethepossibility[and]thenecessityofpreservingtheAngloSoviet[sic]Committee.5
17)SeparatelyfromtheCominterntheses,weshouldmakeadecisiontohavetheTradeUnionCouncilpassaresolution(afterhearingareportby[its]presidium
concerningtheresultsoftheMaystrike)criticizingthetreacheryoftherightistsandthelackofcharacteroftheleftists.Theresolutionshouldbebroadcastoverthe
radioandalsosenttotheBritishCommunistPartyandthe[tradeunion]minorityaswellastotheGeneralCouncilfortheirinformation.
18)ThetradeunionminorityandtheBritishCommunistPartyshouldlaunchavigorouscampaignfornewelectionstotheexecutivecommitteesoftheunionsandthe
GeneralCouncilaimingattheexpulsionoftheThomastraitors6 andtheirhangersonamongtheleftiststheBritishpartyshouldsupporttheirreplacementwithnew
revolutionaryleaders.
19)Bukharin'sthesesshouldtakeaccountofthedecisionsofthePolitburo

Page110

anditsBritishCommission7 abouttheBritishstrike,keepinginmindthatZinovievhasbrokenwiththesedecisionsinhistheses.
20)Zinoviev'sthesesmustbecompletelyrefutedasliquidationist8 andreplacedbyourtheses.
21)TherejectionofGrisha'sthesescouldleadtothreatsofresignationwhichshouldnotfrightenyouinanyway.
22)Idon'tthinkmytripisnecessary.
23)Iftalksarestillneededonadirectline,thensendanoteoverthewireandIwillanswer.
SentJune3
J.Stalin
1.RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.3266,ll.1,2.
2.TheAmsterdamInternationalofTradeUnionswasaninternationalassociationoftradeunionsformedinJuly1919atacongressinAmsterdam.Soviettradeunions
didnotjoin.TheAmsterdamInternationalofTradeUnionswascondemnedasreformistintheUSSR.
3.TheInternationalAssociationofSocialistParties,foundedinParisin1889.TheBolshevikscountereditwiththeIIICommunistInternational,foundedinMoscow
in1919.TheIIInternationalwascondemnedintheUSSRasopportunistandsocialreformist.
4.TheProfintern(RedInternationalofTradeUnions)wasaninternationalorganizationofleftisttradeunionsthatexistedfrom1921to1931undertheinfluenceofthe
USSR.
5.TheAngloRussianCommittee,ajointcommitteeofthetradeunionsofGreatBritainandtheUSSR,wascreatedinLondonon68April1925ataconferenceof
representativesoftheSovietTradeUnionCouncilandtheGeneralCounciloftheBritishTradesUnionCongress(TUC).ItwasdissolvedinSeptember1927after
diplomaticrelationsbetweenGreatBritainandtheUSSRwerebrokenoff.
6.JamesHenryThomasisusedhereasasymbolofthemoderatetradeunionleadersthatCommunistsfelthadbetrayedtheworkingclassbycallingoffthegeneral
strikeU.S.Ed.
7.NoinformationwasfoundinPolitburominutesconcerningthecreationandactivityoftheBritishCommissionofthePolitburo.
8.TheLiquidatorswereamovementwithinRussianMarxismthatallegedlyfavoredliquidatingtheundergroundpartyandpreservingonlythelegalinstitutionsU.S.
Ed.
Letter17
[3June1926]
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMSTALINTOMOLOTOV

Moscow
CentralCommittee
AllUnionCommunistParty
Com.Molotov,
DecipherImmediately
EndingofCodedTelegramNo.2
InBukharin'stheses,youmustdefinitelynoteZinoviev'sveryimportantmistakesonthematteroftheBritishstrike,onPilsudski,3 andontheChineserevolution4 and
criticizethemthoroughlyinwhateverwayyouchoose,

Page111

becausethesemistakesareintheairandfindsupportamongthoseintheCominternwithrightisttendencies.
1)AttheveryfirstsessionofthePolitburoduringthestartoftheBritishstrike,ZinovievcamewithadraftofdirectivesfortheBritishCommuniststhathehad
developedwiththehelpofcertainCominternmemberswhoareamongthosesympathizingwiththeopposition.Inthedraft,asPolitburomemberswellknow,there
turnedoutnottobeasinglewordontheneedtoshiftthegeneralstriketowardgreaterpoliticalstrugglenorwasthereanyhintoftheslogan"Downwiththe
Conservativegovernment,longlivetheworkers'government."ThemajorityofthePolitburointroducedthisnewdirectiveandnewsloganintoZinoviev'sdraftas
amendmentsthatZinovievwasobligedtoaccept.ThisomissionofthemostimportantsloganaboutthestrikemovementinEnglandisnottrivialitplaysintoThomas's
hands.5 ThereisnoguaranteethatsuchmistakeswillnotberepeatedintheworkofZinovievandhissupporters.Inordertoprotectthepartyfromsuchblatant
mistakes,Zinoviev'smistakesmustbediscussedinourtheses.
2)AtthenotoriousPolitburosessionaboutamonthago,ZinovievcamewithapurelyliquidationistproposalaboutthedesirabilityoftheCommunistPartyquittingthe
Kuomintang,6 thus[leavingit]inthehandsofitsrightwing.WhenthePolitburomajorityremarkedthatZinoviev'sproposalwouldleadtotheliquidationofthe
revolutionarymovementinChina,ZinovievandRadek,afterunsuccessfulattemptstodefendtheirproposal,wereforcedtowithdrawitandacceptthePolitburo's
proposaltointensifytheworkoftheCommunistPartywithintheKuomintangandtoconcentrateoureffortsagainsttherightwingwithintheKuomintang.Sincethere
isnoguaranteethatZinovievwon'tmakesuchamistakeagain,it'sessentialtodiscussthisinourtheses.
3)AtameetingofthePolitburo'sPolishCommission,7 onthedaythefirstreportswerereceivedaboutPilsudski'stakingWarsaw,Zinovievpresented,inthepresence
ofUnshlikht,Dzerzhinsky,Domski,Wenecki,andmanyothers,adraftofdirectivestothePolishCommunists,sayingthattheCommunists'neutralityinPilsudski's
strugglewiththefascistswasimpermissible.ThusaccordingtoZinoviev'stheses,PilsudskiisviewedasanantifascistandthePilsudskimovementisviewedasa
revolutionarymovement,butthereisnotasinglewordaboutthefactthatCommunistsupportofPilsudskiisevenmoreimpermissible.
ThemajorityofthecommissionintroducedabasicamendmentontheimpermissibilityofsupportingPilsudski,andZinovievwasobligedtoacceptthisamendment,
revisingtheentiredraftofthedirective.IamcertainthatthemistakesofthePolishCommunistsaboutwhichZinovievsogleefullywritesnowareentirelyareflectionof
Zinoviev'sdeeplyopportunisticviewoftheallegedrevolutionarynatureofthePilsudskiadventure.Becausethereisnoguaranteethatthesemistakeswillnotbe
repeated,itisessentialtotakeaccountoftheminBukharin'stheses.Ininformingyouaboutallthis,Iaskyoutocirculatethisdocumentamongourclosestfriends.
3June,9:00P.M.
Stalin

Page112

1.RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5297.
2.Notelegramnumberwasprovidedintheoriginal.
3.InMay1926,asaresultofPilsudski'smilitarycoup,thesocalledSanatsregimewasestablishedinPoland.
4.OnthedebatesbetweenthePolitburomajorityandtheoppositionconcerningtheissueoftheChineserevolutionandthepolicyregardingtheKuomintang,seethe
lettersfor1927.
5.JamesHenryThomasisusedhereasasymbolofthemoderatetradeunionleadersthatCommunistsfelthadbetrayedtheworkingclassbycallingoffthegeneral
strikeU.S.Ed.
6.TheKuomintang(NationalPeople'sParty)wasfoundedin1912andwastherulingpartyinChinafromthemid1920sthroughthe1940s.
7.NoinformationaboutthecreationoractivityofthePolitburo'sPolishCommissionhasbeendiscoveredinthePolitburominutes.
Letter18
[3June1926]
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMTOVSTUKHATOSTALIN

SentfromMoscow,3June1926
ReceivedanddecipheredJune3
Tiflis,TranscaucasianRegionalCommittee
To:Ordzhonikidze
DecipherimmediatelyforCom.Stalin
YesterdaycounterthesesaboutEngland,signedbyBukharin,Tomskii,andMolotov,weresentouttoallthemembersofthePolitburo.Theremainderhavegiventheir
consentinfull.TodaytheBritishissueswerediscussedatthePolitburo,withatranscriptmadeatZinoviev'sinsistence.Wereceivedyourtelegramduringthemeeting.
Westateourabsoluteagreementwithyou,includingthedetails.ThebattleatthePolitburowastremendoussixhours.TrotskyvotedinfavorofZinoviev.Zinoviev's
theseswererejected.Thethesesofthethreewereacceptedinprincipleandsenttothecommission.Zinovievdemandedthathebeallowedtodefendhispointof
viewintheComintern.ThePolitburodeclinedhisrequest.Trotskyalsovotedagainstthis.Detailstofollowinaletter.We'resendingthethesesofthethreetodayto
Sergo[Ordzhonikidze].WearealsosendingthemtoSochi.
Tovstukha
1.RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.3266,l.3.

Page113

Letter19
[4June1926]
CODEDTELEGRAMFROMSTALINTOMOLOTOV

Moscow
CentralCommittee
AllUnionCommunistParty
DecipherImmediately
Thecodedtelegramwasreceived.Iknewthattherewouldbecompleteagreement.Continueoninthesamespirit.Greetings.
Stalin
Decipheredandsenton4June,11:00A.M.
1.RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.3340.
Letter20
[15June1926]
6/16/26
Greetings,Molotov,
Greetings,Bukharin,
IreturnedtoSochitoday,15June.InTiflisIcamedownwithastomachache(Igotfoodpoisoningfromsomefish)andamnowhavingahardtimerecovering.Today
Ireadyourletters(undated)andBukharin'sletter(alsoundated).Myopinion:
1)Yourthesesturnedoutnicely.Grisha[Zinoviev]shouldbeexposedonthePolishissueaswell,sincehehimselfdraggedWarskiintoitandnowtriestofoisthimon
you.Really,Grisha'sbrazennessknowsnobounds.
2)TherewasnoneedtotelltheCominternthatthethesespassedunanimously.Theunanimitywasformal,butinrealitytherewasnounanimitywhatsoever.To
coverupthedisagreementwithGrishanowwouldmeantoabethiminhisantipartyworkandputourselvesinastupidposition.
3)IfLashevichisorganizingillegalmeetings,ifGrishaZinovievisorganizingR.Fischer'sflighttoGermany,1 andifSokolnikovisbeingsenttoFrancetothe
Congress2 itmeansthattheyhavedecided,alongwithTrotsky,tobreakupthepartythroughtheComintern.Idon'treallybelievethat'spossible,butalotofconflict
isquitepossible.Fromthisitfollowsthatwearecomingwemustcome,ifwewanttoprotectthepartyfromanysurprisestotheneedforanewregroupingof
peoplefromtheopposition.AstothemeasuresagainstLashevich,youarecorrect.ItwouldalsobegoodtopreparetheissueregardingZinovievonewayorthe
other.Thebestway,Ithink,wouldbetogivethe

Page114

plenumthePolitburo'sreportontheSpecialFile3 issuesand,whendiscussingitintheplenum,mentionallthesquabblesinthePolitburo,sothattheplenumcanhave
itssay.4
4)IfTrotskytellsBukharinthathesoonhopestohaveamajorityintheparty,thatmeanshehopestointimidateandblackmailBukharin.Howlittleheknowsandhow
muchheunderestimatesBukharin!ButIthinkprettysoonthepartywillpunchthemugsofTrotskyandGrishaalongwithKamenevandturnthemintoisolated
splitters,likeShliapnikov.
5)SokolnikovshouldberecalledfromFranceimmediately,andtheFrenchCentralCommitteeshouldbetoldthatSokolnikovhasnoassignmentsonFrenchmatters
fromeithertheparty'sCentralCommitteeorfromtheComintern.
6)Iamnotalarmedbyeconomicmatters.Rykovwillbeabletotakecareofthem.Theoppositionwinsabsolutelyzeropointsoneconomicmatters.
7)It'sverygoodthatBukharinhasmadeuphismindtoreportinMoscowandPeter[Petrograd].5
Well,goodbyefornow.
Bestregards,
J.Stalin
15June1926
P.S.RudzutaktogetherwithMikoianproposespostponingtheplenumto20July.6 Ihavenoobjections.J.Stalin
1.ThereferenceistoRuthFischer'stravelfromMoscowtoGermanyformedicaltreatmentwithoutthesanctionoftheComintern'sExecutiveCommittee.
2.ThereferenceistotheVCongressoftheFrenchCommunistParty,whichtookplaceinLilleon2126June1926.
3.TheSpecialFilecontainedthefinaldecisionsonanumberofissuesthatweretreatedwiththehighestdegreeofsecrecyintheSovietUnion.Documentsgiventhis
classificationarestillintheRussianPresidentialArchiveandareinaccessibletoresearchers.
4.On17June1926,ataPolitburomeeting,theagendafortheCentralCommitteeplenumfor10July1926wasapproved:1)newelectionsforthesoviets2)the
housingissue3)grainprocurement4)aresolutionoftheCentralControlCommissionpresidiumonLashevich,Belenkiietal.(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.568,l.3).
On8July1926,thePolitburodecidedtoaddanadditionalitem,theBritishminers'strikes,totheagenda(ibid.,d.573,l.2).
5.BukharingaveareporttoMoscowpartyactivistson8June1926,andtoLeningradpartyactivistson11June1926.
6.AjointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandtheCentralControlCommissionofthepartyopenedon14July1926.

Page115

Letter21
[25June1926]
Sochi,6/25/26
ToMolotov,Rykov,Bukharin,andotherfriends,
IhavelongponderedthematteroftheLashevichaffair,goingbackandforth,linkingitwiththequestionoftheoppositiongroupsingeneralseveraltimesIcameto
variousopinionsandhavefinallysettledonthefollowing:
1)BeforetheappearanceoftheZinovievgroup,thosewithoppositionaltendencies(Trotsky,theworkers'opposition,andothers)behavedmoreorlessloyallyand
weremoreorlesstolerable
2)WiththeappearanceoftheZinovievgroup,thosewithoppositionaltendenciesbegantogrowarrogantandbreaktheboundsofloyalty
3)TheZinovievgroupbecamethementorofeveryoneintheoppositionwhowasforsplittingthepartyineffectithasbecometheleaderofthesplittingtendenciesin
theparty
4)ThisrolefelltoZinoviev'sgroupbecausea)itisbetteracquaintedwithourmethodsthananyothergroup,b)itisstrongeringeneralthantheothergroupsandhas
controloftheCominternExecutiveCommittee([Zinovievis]chairmanoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee),whichrepresentsaseriousforcec)becauseofthisit
behavesmorearrogantlythananyothergroup,providingexamplesof''boldness"and"determination"tothosewithothertendencies
5)ThereforetheZinovievgroupisnowthemostharmful,andtheblowmustbestruckpreciselyagainstthisgroupattheplenum1
6)NotonlyshouldLashevichberemovedfromtheCentralCommittee,ZinovievshouldberemovedfromthePolitburo2 withawarningthathewillberemoved
fromtheCentralCommitteeifhedoesnotceasehisworkinpreparingaschism
7)EitherwestrikethisblownowwiththecalculationthatTrotskyandtheotherswillonceagainbecomeloyal,orweriskturningtheCentralCommitteeandits
bodiesintononviableinstitutionsincapableofwork,andwewillverysoonhavetodealwithatremendousfussinthepartythatwillharmthecauseandourunity
8)It'spossiblethatafterthis,ZinovievwillsubmithisresignationfromtheComintern.Weshouldacceptit.Atanyrate,afterbeingremovedfromthePolitburo,
Zinovievcannolongerbechairmanallthememberpartieswillunderstandthatandwilldrawthenecessaryconclusionthemselves.IntheComintern,wewillthen
shiftfromasystemwithachairmantoasystemwithasecretariat.3 ThiswilldisarmtheZinovievgroupandliquidateZinoviev'sarroganceinpreparingtheschism
(rememberwhatwassaidaboutStockholmattheCongress!)4
9)Iassureyouthatinthepartyandthecountrythisaffairwillgetbywithout

Page116

theslightestcomplicationsnoonewillfeelsorryforZinoviev,becausetheyknowhimwell
10)PreviouslyIhadthoughtthatabroadresolutiononunitywasneededattheplenum.NowIthinkthatitwouldbebettertoleavesucharesolutionforthe[XV]
Conference([wherewecouldprovide]atheoreticalfoundationandsoon)orfortheCongress.Attheplenum,wecanandshouldlimitourselvestoabriefresolution
onunityinthenarrowsenseofthewordinconnectionwiththeLashevichaffair,citingLenin'sresolutiononunityattheTenthCongress.5 Thisresolutionshould
saythatZinovievisbeingremovedfromthePolitburonotbecauseofdifferencesofopinionwiththeCentralCommitteetherearenolessprofounddisagreements
withTrotsky,afterall,althoughtheissueofremovingTrotskyfromthePolitburoisnotontheagendabutbecauseofhis(Zinoviev's)policyofschism.Ithinkthis
willbebetter:theworkerswillunderstandit,sincetheyvaluepartyunity,andthiswillbeaseriouswarningfortheotheroppositiongroups.Dzerzhinskycanbe
broughtintothePolitburotoreplaceZinoviev.Thepartywilltakethiswell.OrthenumberofPolitburomemberscanberaisedtotenbybringinginbothDzerzhinsky
andRudzutak.Obviously,withabroadplenumresolution(thepreviousplan),wewouldbeforcedtouniteZinovievandTrotskyofficiallyinonecamp,whichis
perhapsprematureandstrategicallyirrationalnow.Bettertobreakthemindividually.LetTrotskyandPiatakovdefendZinoviev,andwewilllisten.Atanyratethat
willbebetteratthisstage.Thenwe'llsee.
We'llspeakinmoredetailwhenIcometoMoscow.IthinkI'llbeinMoscowthreeorfourdaysbeforetheplenum.Whatdoyousaytothat?
P.S.Idon'tknowaboutyou,butIthinkthatwiththeLashevichaffair,theZinovieviteshavecuttheirownthroats,especiallyifthisaffairislinkedwiththeGuralski
affair.Andindeeditmustbelinked.
Bestregards,
J.Stalin.
1.Astatementfromthirteenmembersoftheplenum(I.Avdeev,I.Bakaev,L.Kamenev,N.Krupskaia,M.Lashevich,G.Lizdin,N.Muralov,A.Peterson,G.
Piatakov,K.Solovev,L.Trotsky,G.Yevdokimov,G.Zinoviev)wasaddressedtotheplenumbutnotincorporatedintotherecord(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.
696,l.68):
Thequestionofthe"affair"ofCom.Lashevich,placedonthe24JuneagendaofthisplenumbydecisionofthePolitburo,wasturnedintothe"affair"ofCom.Zinovievat
theverylastmomentbya20JulyresolutionoftheCentralControlCommission.WeconsideritnecessarytostatethatinthedraftresolutionoftheCentralControl
Commissionthereisnotasinglefact,notasinglereport,notasinglesuspicionthatwasnotknownsixweeksagowhentheCentralControlCommissionpasseda
resolutiononthe"affair"ofCom.Lashevichandothers.ThenameofCom.Zinovievdoesnotappearinthatresolution.Yet,inthefinaldraftoftheresolutionitisstated
completelycategoricallythat"allthreads"leadtoCom.Zinoviev,aschairmanoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee.Thismatter,asisabundantlycleartoeveryone,was
decidednotbytheCentralControlCommissionbutbyagroupwhoseleaderisCom.Stalin.Wearedealingherewithanewstageintheimplementationofaplanthatwas
conceivedlongagoandisbeingsystematicallycarriedout....

2.ByadecisionoftheJuly1926jointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommission,ZinovievwasremovedfromthePolitburo,andLashevich
wasexpelledascandidate

Page117

memberoftheCentralCommittee(KPSSvrezoliutsiiakh[ResolutionsoftheCPSU],vol.4[Moscow,1984],36).
3.TheVIIexpandedplenumoftheComintern'sExecutiveCommitteeof22November1926votedto"relieveCom.Zinovievofhisdeputiesaschairmanofthe
Comintern'sExecutiveCommitteeandofhisworkintheComintern."TheplenumeliminatedthepositionofchairmanoftheComintern'sExecutiveCommittee.Anew
executivebodyoftheCominternwasformed:thePoliticalSecretariat.
4.ThereferenceistoKrupskaia'sspeechattheXIVPartyCongresson20December1925.Atthattime,indefenseofZinoviev,shesaid(XIVCongressofthe
RussianCommunistParty[Bolshevik],Transcript[Moscow,1926],165,166):
OurCongressmustbeconcernedtosearchandfindthecorrectline.Thatisitstask.Wecannotreassureourselveswiththeideathatthemajorityisalwaysright.The
historyofourpartyincludescongresseswhenthemajoritywaswrong.Letusrecall,forexample,theStockholmCongress[IVJointCongressoftheRussianSocial
DemocraticWorkers'Partyin1906,atwhichtheBolshevikshadfewerrepresentativesthantheMensheviks].Themajorityshouldnotbecontentwithbeingthemajority
butshoulddispassionatelysearchforthecorrectdecision.

5.In1921,theXPartyCongresspassedaresolutionbanningfactionswithinthepartyU.S.Ed.
Letter22
[3August1926]
8/3(Tuesday)
Molotov,1
1)KamenevhasturnedinhisresignationbeforethereviewinthePolitburoofthequestionoftheexportimportplan,andheproposesthatMikoianreplacehim.2
2)ThePolitburohasreviewedthequestionoftheexportimportplanandpronouncedit"unfavorable,"havingcreatedtheRudzutakcommissiontoimprovemattersin
theCommissariatofTrade.3
3)WewillacceptKamenev'sresignationonThursday(5August)andappointMikoian,afterpollingtheCentralCommitteemembersonthismatter.4
4)We'rethinkingofsendingKamenevtoJapanandAralovtoChina(theChinesegovernmentdemandsKarakhan'sremoval,andwe'llhavetodoit)Koppcould
perhapsgotoItaly,byrecallingKerzhentsevtoMoscow,sincehehasn'tworkedoutinItaly.5
5)Thingsaregenerallynotgoingsobadly.AllthebigWesternpartieshavecomeoutinsupportofourCentralCommittee(includingbothFranceand
Czechoslovakia)againsttheopposition.
6)Bukharinhasstillnotreturned.6 TherearesixpeoplenowinthePolitburo:Rykov,Rudzutak,Kalinin,Stalin,Trotsky,andKamenev(Kamenevvotessincethere
arenoothercandidatesinMoscow).
7)YoualreadyknowaboutKuibyshev'sappointmenttotheSupremeEconomicCouncil.7 TheoppositioniskeepingalowprofileinthePolitburo.
GreetingstoallfriendsinSochi.
Bestregards,
Stalin

Page118

Sendmeatranscriptofyourspeechesassoonaspossible.WedecidedtopublishtheLashevichaffairinthenextissue,thatis,thedebatesonthisaffair.8
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"FromMoscow(?).1926=?"
2.KamenevnotesinhislettertotheCentralCommitteeof25July1926(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.579,ll.13,14):
TheworkoftheCommissariatofTradeinvolvesalargeamountofeconomicmaneuveringandrequires100percentsupportandcompletetrustonthepartofthe
PolitburoandLaborDefenseCouncil....ThissupportandtrustinmyworkattheCommissariatofTradewasmissingfromthePolitburoandLaborDefenseCouncilfrom
theverybeginning....ItisentirelyclearthataslongasIamattheheadofit,theCommissariatofTradecannotcountonanytrustoranyrealsupport....Thereexists
anintentiontousetheentirelyunavoidablemistakesoftheCommissariatofTrade,notforhelpfulcriticism,butforpoliticalpurposes.Suchanimportantgovernment
bodycannotworkinsuchanatmosphere,andIcannottakeresponsibilityforfulfillingitsresponsibilities....IassumethatCom.Mikoian,whohasrepeatedlybeen
namedinrecentdaysinthecapacityof[headof]theCommissariatofTrade,willbeabletocopewiththistask.

3.Theagendaitem"Onprogressinthefulfillmentoftheforeigncurrencyplanof19251926(intradeandnontradeareas)"wasreviewedatthePolitburoon29July
1926(ibid.,d.577,ll.4,5).
4.On5August1926,thePolitburodismissedKamenevfromhisworkattheCommissariatofTradeandappointedMikoiancommissarfordomesticandforeign
trade(ibid.,d.579,l.3).
5.InBukharin'sspeechtotheJulyplenumoftheCentralCommitteeonthePolitburo'sdecisionsregardingtheBritishminers'strikesandtheeventsinPolandand
China,hestates(ibid.,op.2,d.246,vyp.1,l.15):
WehadtheissueoftheChineseEasternRailway,themainstrategicartery,whichisourrevolutionaryforefingerpointedintoChina.Thecomradesintheoppositionhave
proposedthatwegetridoftheChineseEasternRailwayasquicklyaspossible,togiveitup,sinceitisa"blister"onourfoot....Butwhenhaveweeverturneddown
revolutionaryopportunitiesmerelybecausetheywerefraughtwithdifficulties?Suchsuggestionsweremade,buttheywererejected.Afterwehadsufferedanumberof
defeatsinChina,acertaindiplomaticreshufflingwasproposed:tosendKopptoChinaandKarakhantoJapan.Thepointwasthatafuriouscampaignwasbeingwaged
againstKarakhan,whoembodiedoursupportofthenationalrevolutionarymovement,whereasCom.Koppwasknownforhisskepticalattitudetothewholenational
revolutionarymovement.

On12August1926,thePolitburodecidedtoappointKoppSovietrepresentativeinItaly,freeinghimfromhisresponsibilitiesinJapan,andtoappoint[L.B.]
KamenevrepresentativetoJapan(ibid.,op.3,d.580,l.5).On30December1926,AralovwasappointedSovietrepresentativetothenationalgovernmentin
China.
6.BukharinwasinLeningradatthetime.On28July1926,hegaveaspeechtotheLeningradPartyOrganization'sactivists.
7.On29July1926,thePolitburoappointedKuibyshevchairmanoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil(ibid.,op.3,d.577,l.4).
8.AtranscriptofthediscussionoftheLashevichaffairattheJuly1926plenumoftheCentralCommitteewasincludedinthefourthissueofthetranscriptoftheJuly
plenumoftheCentralCommitteefor1926(ibid.,op.2,d.246,vyp.4).

Page119

Letter23
[27August1926]
ToMolotov(forourfriends),1
1)ThedelegationofBritishcoalminersshouldbearrivinganyday,ifithasnotalreadyarrived.Theyshouldbemet"byalltherulesofthegame"andasmuchmoney
aspossibleshouldbecollectedforthem.I'veheardthattheAmericanshavepromised1milliondollars.Wehavetocollectandsendpossibly1millionor2million
rubles(lessthantheAmericansisimpossible)orperhapsawhole3million.ThesituationinEnglandisserious,anditobligesustomakeserious"sacrifices."2
2)IthinkwemusttellAndreevthatheshouldinsistonanembargo.3 Theembargoisnowthemosturgentissue.TheBritishCommunistsarewaginganintensified
campaignfortheembargo.TheGeneralCouncilshouldnotbeallowedtogetawaywithmerecallstocollectmoney.Thatisnotenoughnow.Now[we]shouldpush
theembargoashardaspossible.Bytheway,howisAndreev'sworkcomingalong?4
3)IthinkthatneitherourownpressnortheBritishCommunistpresshasexploitedThomas'sandHenderson'sfleeingfromanaccountingofthecongressesofthe
"LabourParty"andthe"GeneralCouncil'stradeunions"(they"wentonvacation,"onetoCanadaandtheothertoAustralia).5 Weshouldtrumpetinbothourown
andtheBritishpressthatthesetraitorsfledfromresponsibility,sothatwhenthestrikewasdiscussed,theirabsencewouldkeepthemfrombeinginsulted.Weshould
broadcastthefactthattheGeneralCouncilandtheExecutiveCommitteeoftheLabourPartyhelpedthemfleefromanaccounting,andthustookuponthemselvesthe
responsibilityfortheirbetrayalsandsoon.It'sstrangethattheBritish(andour)pressissilentaboutit(IreadtheBritishCommunistnewspapers,andIknowthat
thesefactsarenotexposedthere.)
4)HowdidtheCominternreacttoyourletteraboutthecampaigntodissolveParliamentandhavenewelections?WhatdotheBritishCommuniststhinkaboutit?
5)YoushouldnotindefinitelypostponethematterofpublishingtheComintern'sKommunisticheskiyinternatsional[CommunistInternational]asaweekly.Youand
Bukharinshouldgetthatgoing.6 ItwillbeenormouslyimportantforimprovingandreorganizingalltheworkoftheCominternanditsmemberparties.Whatdoes
Bukharinthinkofthis?
6)Howistheeconomicsituationdoing?Howarethingswith[agricultural]procurements?Howaboutexports?Givemeabriefreportifthereistime.
Well,allthebest,
J.Stalin
27August1926
Re:Stalin'sletter(of27August)7
OnPoint1,a)Tomskiihaspromisedtoorganizetodayanappealfromthe

Page120

CentralCommitteeofMinerstotheBritishcoalminersregardingthefourmonthstrike.Theappealshouldsaythatoursupportwillcontinueandwillbethesameas
before.Itwillsaydirectlythat[our]CentralCommitteeofMinersiscertainthatthewishoftheTradeUnionCouncilfor1percent[contribution]willbepassed.This
isimportantfortodaybecauseon2Septembertherewillbeaconferenceofstrikingcoalminers.8
b)Weshouldmakeadecisiontosendthe2millionrublesataceremonialmeetingbetweenthetradeunionsandadelegationofminersrightbeforetheTradesUnion
Congress(before6September).We'lldiscussthislastitemb)atthePolitburo.
Iamentirelyforpoints2and3.Plus,acampaignshouldbelaunched,especiallyandaboveallinEngland,withpoliticalslogans(dissolutionoftheParliament,"Down
withtheConservativegovernment,foragenuineworkers'government").
Molotov
1September
1.ShvartscheckedwithmetodayaboutsendingthegreetingsandshouldclearitwithMolotovattwoo'clock,1September.
2.I'mforaid,asMolotovandIagreed.
3.Idon'tobjecttoexposingThomasandHenderson,butIdon'tthinkitwillproduceaseriouspoliticaleffectforus.
Tomskii
1September
1.Intheupperlefthandcorneristhenote:"Wehavereadthis.Agreed.Bukharin,J.Rudzutak,V.Kuibyshev,N.Yanson,Yem.Yaroslavskii."
2.Asasignofsolidaritywiththestrikingminers,theTradeUnionCouncildecidedtoallocateaportionofoneday'spaytothestrikers.TheBritishGeneralCouncil
wassent2.25millionrubles,whichitrefusedtoaccept.Subsequently,attherequestoftheMiners'FederationofGreatBritain,theTradeUnionCouncilsentthese
fundsdirectlytothefederation.
3.ThereferenceistoanembargooncoalshipmentstoGreatBritain.
4.A.AndreevtookpartintheworkoftheAngloRussianCommittee(seenote2inletter26).
5.JamesHenryThomasisusedhereasasymbolofthemoderatetradeunionleadersthatCommunistsfelthadbetrayedtheworkingclassbycallingoffthegeneral
strikeU.S.Ed.ArthurHendersonwassecretaryoftheBritishLabourPartyfrom1911until1934.
6.ThejournalKommunisticheskiyinternatsional,theorganoftheComintern'sExecutiveCommittee,waspublishedfrom1919to1943.Bydecisionofthe
Cominternpresidiumon15September1926,thejournalbecameaweekly.
7.ThefollowingnotesfromMolotovandTomskiiareappendedtoStalin'sletter.
8.On4September1926,thePolitburoacceptedbyvoicevoteTomskii'sdraftofthestatementfromtheTradeUnionCounciltotheBritishFederationofMiners
(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.585,l.3).

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Letter24
[30August1926]
Hello,Molotov,
1)MattersarecomingtoaheadandwecannotavoidraisingtheissueofremovingGrigorii[Zinoviev]fromtheComintern.Thisisindicatedbytheresolutionofa
numberoftheWesternparties(England,Germany)onhisremoval.Thefirstagendaitem("internationalquestions")forour(forthcoming)conferencealsospeaksto
this.Itwouldbeincomprehensibleandunnaturalifwe(theRussianCommunists)wereto"squirmoutof"thequestionofremovinghimatthesametimeas
circumstancesmakethequestionunavoidableandtwoWesternpartieshavedefinitivelyproposedremovinghim.Therefore,wecanandmustmakeadecisionabout
theexpediencyofremovinghim.1
2)TheformalhandlingofthemattershouldbedoneatanexpandedplenumoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee.Ifallpartiesoragreatmajorityofthemspeakin
favorofremovingGrigorii,suchanexpressionofwillcanbesafelyconsideredtheauthenticwillofalltheparties,thatis,oftheentireCongress.Afinaldecisioncanbe
madebythe[next]Congress.
2)2 Weshouldalreadybethinkingabouttheoutlineorthefirst(rough!)draftofthethesesonthetradeunionsandtheeconomicsituation.Arethereanysuchrough
draftsintheSecretariat,thatis,didtheSecretariatreceivethese"drafts"?Ifnot,wehavetohurry.3
3)Don'tyouthinkitwouldbeexpedienttointroducetothetradeunionsa"system"oran"institution"ofactivistsbyunions,orperhapsbyvariousbranchesofthe
manufacturingtradeunions?Ifthis"system"hasnotyetbeenintroduced,itoughttobe,becauseitwouldbothpromotenewpeopleandbringthetradeunionscloser
toproductionand,ingeneral,wouldinvigoratethetradeunions.Itisonlynecessarytoensurethattheactivistgroup(intextiles,petroleum,coal,andsoon)is
broad,thatitconsistnotonlyoftradeunionofficials,notonlyofCommunists,butofnonpartyworkersaswell(sayfiftyfifty),andsoon.Whatdoyouthinkabout
this?
4)Don'tyouthinkthatthematterofKamenevmustberaisedattheCentralCommitteeplenum?IstheCommissariatofForeignAffairsworkingtogetKamenevset
upinJapan?
Well,allthebest,
J.Stalin
30August1926
P.S.IreadStetskii'sarticleonthenewopposition.4 Thearticleisgood,butthereareafewindividualapplesinitthatspoilthewholebarrel.Accordingto
Stetskii,itseemsthatwearenotsupposedtostrivetoachieve"completepredominanceoftheproletariansandthesemiproletariansinthesoviets."That'snot
correct.Thedifferencewiththeoppositionisnotinthat,but,first,inthattheproletariatcannotphysicallypredominateinthosedistrictswhere

Page122

thereareveryfewproletarianssecond,inthatthepredominationmustbeunderstoodaspoliticalandnotjuststatisticalandthird,inthatweradicallydisagreewith
themethodsofachievingthepredominancethattheoppositionhasrecommendedtous.It'sverybadthatnoonehelpedStetskiicorrectsuchblunders.
1.TheOctoberjointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissionpassedthefollowingresolution(KPSSvrezoliutsiiakh[Resolutionsofthe
CPSU],vol.4[Moscow,1984],67,68):
ByvirtueofthefactthatCom.ZinovievdoesnotexpressthelineoftheAllUnionCommunistParty(Bolshevik)intheCommunistInternationaland,becauseofhis
factionalactivity,haslostthetrustofanumberofCommunistparties(German,British,French,American,etc.),whohaveannouncedthisintheirresolutions,theCentral
CommitteeandCentralControlCommissiondonotfinditpossibleforCom.ZinovievtocontinueworkingintheCommunistInternational.

2.Stalin'srepeatof"2"ispresentintheoriginal.
3.Stalin'sletterwaswrittenontheeveoftheXVPartyConference,whichtookplacefrom26Octoberto3November1926.Areportwasheardattheconference
ontheworkandfuturetasksofthetradeunions.Attheendof1926,theVIICongressofTradeUnionswasconvened,apparentlyinresponsetoStalin'swishto
makethetradeunionsmoreactive.
4.Stetskii'sarticle,"Kaknovaiaoppozitsiiaprishlaktrotskizmu"(HowthenewoppositioncametoTrotskyism),waspublishedinPravdaon26August1926.
Letter25
[4September1926]
9/4
Molotovich,1 ,2
Sergowasheretoseemetheotherday.HeisfuriouswiththeCentralCommittee'sstatementconcerninghisrecall.3 Heviewstheformulationoftherecallas
punishment,asaninsultgivenbytheCentralCommitteeforsomeunknownreason.HefeelsthatthephraseaboutSergobeingtransferredtoRostov"inMikoian's
place"isahintthatMikoianishigherthanSergo,thatSergoisonlygoodenoughtobeMikoian'sdeputy,andsoon.HeunderstandsthattheCentralCommittee
neverhadandnevercouldhaveadesiretooffendhim,toinsulthim,toplacehimunderneathMikoian,andsoon,buthebelievesthatthosewhoreceiveacopyofthe
CentralCommittee'sresolutioncouldunderstanditasinfactanattackonSergo,anditshouldbeformulatedbetterandmoreprecisely.Ithinkthatwemustsatisfy
him,sinceheisobjectivelyputinthepositionofanoffendedpersonbecauseofanaccidentalmistakeintheformulation.Theformulationcouldbecorrected
approximatelyasfollows:4
1)TocomplywithCom.Ordzhonikidze'srequesttorelievehimofhisdutiesasfirstsecretaryoftheTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteeandrejectthedemand
oftheTranscaucasianorganizations(thenationalcentralcommit

Page123

teesandtheTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee)tokeepCom.Ordzhonikidzeinhisoldpost.5
2)Topostponeforseveralmonths,inviewofCom.Ordzhonikidze'sdefiniterefusaltotransferimmediatelytoMoscow,6 thequestionofappointingCom.
OrdzhonikidzecommissarofWorkerPeasantInspectionanddeputychairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars.7
3)ToaccepttheproposaloftheNorthCaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteetoconfirmCom.OrdzhonikidzeasfirstsecretaryoftheNorthCaucasianCommittee(if
Com.Ordzhonikidzeconsents).
Thesooneryoutakecareofthislittlething,thebetter,andthenanewcopyoftheCentralCommittee'sresolutionwillhavetobesenttoeveryonewhoreceivedthe
oldcopy.
Youmightsaythatthisisallnonsense.Perhaps.ButImusttellyouthatthisnonsensemayseriouslyharmthecause,ifwedon'tcorrectit.
Nazaretianisplayingaveryunsavoryroleinthisaffair,whichonlywoundsSergo'sprideandeggshimonIdon'tknowwhathisspecificpurposeis.
Well,allthebest,
J.Stalin
1.ByturningMolotov'slastnameintoapatronymic,StalinisdemonstratinginformalityandfriendshipTrans.
2.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1926?"
3.On30August1926,thePolitburoapprovedbyvoicevotetheproposaloftheNorthCaucasianRegionalPartyOrganizationtorecallOrdzhonikidzefromthe
TranscaucasusandtoconfirmhimasfirstsecretaryoftheNorthCaucasianRegionalCommitteeinplaceofMikoian(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.584,l.5).
4.Stalincrossedoutthenextphrase:"Theapprovedproposalisadopted."
5.On1September1926,thefollowingletterwassenttoStalin(RTsKhIDNIf.85,op.26,d.5):
TOTHEGENERALSECRETARYOFTHECENTRALCOMMITTEEOFTHEPARTYCOMRADESTALIN.DEARKOBA:

InconnectionwiththeproposedtransferofSergofromtheTranscaucasus,we,agroupofhiscomradeswhohaveworkedwithhimforalongtimeintheTranscaucasus,
consideritourpartydutytowarnandcautionyou,astheleaderofourentirepartyandcountry,ofthedifficultiesthatcouldariseinourworkandalsotoprovidean
evaluationofthesituationthatmayemergeintheTranscaucasusandtheindividualTranscaucasianrepublicswithoutSergo,aswellas[raise]thequestionofhis
significantroleinourverycomplicatedsituation.
Firstofall,twocaveats:
1)Inordernottobeaccusedofdefendingnarrowlocalinterests,westatethatweunderstandperfectlywellandareawareoftheurgentneedtostrengthentheleadership
fromtheranksofthosewhohavespentmanyyearsasourmostprominentcomrades.Butwecannotforaminuteforgetthatinthetranquilandpeacefulconstructionof
socialisminourUnionasawhole,tranquilityintheTranscaucasusandthepeacefulcoexistenceofitspeoplesplayaverygreatrole.
ItseemsunnecessarytomentiontheenormoussignificanceoftheTranscaucasusinthelifeoftheUniontoonewhohastaughtustocarryoutacautious,flexiblepolicy,
imbuedwithaninternationalistspirit.
2)WealsodonotwanttobeaccusedofintimidationwiththegoalofkeepingSergointheTranscaucasus.Wedonotthinkthatyoususpectedusofbeingledinthis
matterbyafeelingofpersonalattachmenttoSergoratherthananawarenessofpoliticalnecessityandexpediency.
Thealarmthatnaturallyarisesineachofusandineachrankandfilememberofthepartyhasaveryseriousfoundation.Everyonerecallshowtheongoingworkofthe
Transcaucasian

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partybodiesandtheSoviet,tradeunion,andorganizationalbodieswassetup,whatdifficultieswereovercomeinthepast,withwhateffortsthepeacefulcoexistenceof
thepeoplesoftheCaucasuswasestablished,andwhatroleCom.Sergoplayedinthatwork.Justasclearlyweseeallthedifficulties[thatwillarise]infutureworkwithout
apersonwhoisabletounitearoundhimselfallthepeoplemostactiveanddecentinourrepublicandintheentireTranscaucasuswithoutregardtonationality.
ThefirstimportantdifficultythatwillariseafterthedepartureofCom.SergofromtheCaucasusisthestrengtheningofelementssowingmistrustandethnicenmity
amongthenationalitiesoftheTranscaucasus.ThemutualtrustofpeoplesintheCaucasusfoundarealbulwarknotonlyinthepoliticallineofthehighestpartybodies
butalsointhepersonofCom.Sergohimselfwithhisdeparture,thistrustcouldbeshaken.Sergowasable,withunshakablefirmness,confidentlyandwithoutfearsand
glancesoverhisshoulder,toimplementthislinewithoutleaningtowardthenationalistextortionsofthe"Hurrah"patriotsintherepublicsnortowardtheultra
internationalistphrasemongersaboutwhichbothIlich[Lenin]andyouinparticularwarned.
Theseconddifficulty,nolessimportant,isthestrengtheninginsidethepartyofelementsthatweresuppresseduntilnowbytheauthorityofCom.Sergoandwhowill,
withhisdeparture,undoubtedlyopenfuriousfireonthemajorityofthepartyanditsleadingbodies,makinguseoftheplatformofthe"newopposition"andhiding
behindthenamesofitsleaders.Therearealreadyobvioussignsofthis.Sergo'sdeparturewillunleashtheseelementsaswell.
Thethirddifficultyarisesfromthecomplicatedrelationsamongthethreerepublics.Com.Sergo'sauthorityinallthreerepublicsisextremelyhigh.Thereisn'tacornerof
theserepublicswhereSergo'snameisn'tknown.Sergo'snameislinkednotonlywithliberationfromthelandownersandthenobilityandwithnationalculturalliberation
fromthechauvinistpolicyoftsarismbutalsowiththepoliticalstabilityoftherepublicsandthefederationandtoanevengreaterextentwiththestablepeacebetween
theTranscaucasiannationalities.
ThefourthdifficultyarisesfromtheimpossibilityofreplacingCom.Sergowithsomeoneofequalauthorityorsomeonecapableofresolvingthecomplexissuesofour
dailylifeandofouroverallpolicywiththesameenergy,discernment,andobjectivity.Althoughthenationalitiesproblemhasbeenresolvedinprinciple,acorrect,
practicalimplementationinreallifeisstillrequiredtheslightestdeviationorviolationofthispolicywillcausethenationalityissuetospringupagaininfullbloom.The
distributionamongtherepublicsofanymaterialwealth,funds,andsoonwillprovokethenationalitiesissue.Allissuesherearecomplicatedbytheethnicaspect(land,
pastures,waterrights,etc.).Undertheseconditions,Com.Sergo'sexclusiveauthorityinallthreerepublicshasbeenofcrucialsignificanceinresolvingtheseissues,and
underhisleadership,theyhavebeensettledsmoothly,easily,andwithoutoffendinganyone.Sergo'sobjectivityisaboveanysuspicion,startingwithKhuloand
LanchkhutaandendingwithZangezurandShemakha....
Thislistofdifficultiesishardlycomplete.Insum,allsortsofdifficultiescouldcreateaverydangeroussituationintheTranscaucasus....
WeopenlystatethatwecannotcopewiththeworkthatCom.Sergowasableto.Allofourfearsforceustoaskyoutonotetheseconcernswhenyoumakethefinal
decisioninthematterofSergoincalculatingthepoliticalinterestsofboththeUnionasawholeandtheparticularinterestsoftheTranscaucasusanditsrepublics,we
askyoutorefrainfromtheproposedtransferofCom.SergotoMoscow.
ThisletterwasalreadywrittenwhenwereceivedCom.Molotov'stelegraminformingtheTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteeofCom.Sergo'sappointmentas
secretaryoftheNorthCaucasianRegionalCommittee(inplaceofCom.Mikoian)....
WithallthesincerityandcandorcharacteristicofBolsheviks,wemustinformyouthatweconsiderthisdecisionamistake....
Proceedingfromalloftheseconcerns,theTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee,onbehalfofallthepartyorganizationsoftheTranscaucasus,urgentlyrequeststhe
CentralCommitteetoreviewitsdecisionof8/30/26.
1.Makharadze2.Lukashin.3.Nazaretian.4.Eliava.5.Kartvelishvili.6.Karaev.7.Guseinov.8.Kasimov.9.R.Akhundov.10.Mravian.11.V.Sturua.12.Asribekov.13.P.
Ivanov14.A.Gegechkori.15.D.Bagirov.16.Mirzoian.17.K.Rumiantsev.18.M.Orakhelashvili.
9/1/26.

On9September1926,thePolitburorejectedtherequestfromtheTranscaucasianRegionalCommitteetoreviewOrdzhonikidze'sappointmentasfirstsecretary
oftheNorthCaucasianRegionalCommittee(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.586,ll.4,5).

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6.Theoriginaltextofthesecondpointwasasfollows:''TheappointmentofCom.OrdzhonikidzeascommissarofWorkerPeasantInspectionanddeputychairman
oftheCouncilofCommissarsshouldbepostponedforseveralmonthsinviewofCom.Ordzhonikidze'srefusalofimmediate"andsoon.
ThistextwascrossedoutbyStalinhimself.
7.ThequestionofOrdzhonikidze'sappointmentascommissarofWorkerPeasantInspectionwasdecidedinJuly1926,asshownbyacodedtelegramfromStalinto
Ordzhonikidzeof27July1926(ibid.,f.558,op.1,d.3259):
ForSergo.InviewofKuibyshev'spromotiontotheSupremeEconomicCouncil,wewillraisetheissueofyourappointmentascommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection
anddeputytoRykov.ForformalreasonsthematterofanewchairmanfortheCentralControlCommissionwillremainopenuntilthePartyConference,although
KuibyshevwillleavethechairmanshipatthenextCentralControlCommissionplenum.Inreportingthistoyou,weaskyounottokickupafussnothingwillcomeofit
anyway.Stalin.

Andon29July1926(ibid.,d.3341):
Thesuggestionwasnotmine,butallourfriends',includingRykovalongwithMolotov.Thequestionhasbeenputoffforseveralweeks.

Letter26
[8September1926]
9/8
Ireceivedyourletter.1
1)OurdelegationinBerlinhandleditselfratherwell.2 ThereportoftheTradeUnionCouncilisgenerallyallright.TheappealfromtheTradeUnionCouncilisgood.
Tomskii'sinterviewisgood.Idonotinsistonaloan[asopposedtoanoutrightgrant]totheGeneralCouncilortheFederationofCoalMiners.Ithinkthatthe
questionoftheloancanbepostponedforthetimebeing.Iraisedtheissueoftheloaninordertoshow"Europe"thatwearenotarepublic"madeoutofmoney,"but
peoplewithcalculation,abletosaveakopeck,thatwegiveloansinordertoberepaid,andsoforth.Butthismattercanbepostponedorperhapsdropped
altogether.
2)IalreadysentacodedtelegramaboutChina.IamcertainthatKoppandSerebriakovwillnotcarryoutourpolicytheywillonlygiveChang[Tsolin]the
opportunitytoexploitourminordifferencesandruinourcause.SendingKoppbacktoJapanwillmeanvirtuallynegatingthePolitburo'sdecisiononKoppand
Kamenev.ItwillnotlookgoodifdecisionsmadebythePolitburowithonesetofmembersarenullifiedbythesamePolitburowithanothersetofmemberswithout
sufficientgrounds.3 Ofcourse,atpresentyoucanseethingsbetter[inMoscow],butwestilloughtnotrunfromoneextremetoanotherbecauseChang,encouraged
byKopp,hastakenitintohisheadtoblackmailus.
Well,allthebest.
Regards,
J.Stalin

Page126

1.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1926=?"
2.InAugust1926atameetingoftheAngloRussianCommitteeinBerlin,theSoviettradeuniondelegationproposedlaunchingabroadcampaignofsupportforthe
Britishminers'strugglethatincludeddeclaringanembargoontheshippingofcoaltoGreatBritain.AdelegationoftheBritishGeneralCouncilrejectedthese
proposals.
3.On12August1926,whenthedecisionwasmadetoappointKoppSovietambassadortoItalyandKamenevSovietambassadortoJapan,Politburomembers
Bukharin,Rudzutak,Rykov,Stalin,Trotsky,andcandidatePolitburomembersAndreev,Kaganovich,andKamenevwerepresentatthePolitburosession
(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.580,l.1).On2September1926,thefollowingPolitburomemberswereinthesession:Bukharin,Kalinin,Molotov,Rudzutak,Tomskii
andcandidatemembersAndreev,Mikoian,andPetrovskii.
Letter27
[16September1926]
Hello,Molotov,1
Ireceivedyourletterof12September.
1)It'sgoodthatthemisunderstandingswithSerebriakovandKopphavefinallybeeneliminated.2 Otherwisewewouldhavedemolishedourownpolicy,thosepeople
wouldhavebeenhostagetoChangandtheJapanese,andweinturnwouldhavefoundourselveshostagetothosepeople.Chang'sstrengthderives,incidentally,from
thefactthathenowknows(KoppandSerebriakovhavelethimknowit)thatwewillnotembarkonmilitaryintervention,thatevenbackthen,halfayearago,we
werenotthinkingofadvancingonHarbin,thathethushasnothingtofearandcanallowhimselftobebrazen,selling"suchandsuch"totheJapaneseor(especially)
theBritishinordertogetsomesortofhelp.That'sthewholepoint.KoppandSerebriakovtoldChang(becauseoftheirindiscretion)asecretofourdiplomacy,the
secretthatweareonlyscaringChang,butwewillnotgotowarovertheChineseEasternRailway.TheygottheideatheycouldbuyoffChangandtheJapanesewith
softnessandgabbiness!Obviouslytheyalsohadafactionalpurposehere,carriedoutaccordingtothelineoftheCommissariatofForeignAffairswiththehelpof
Litvinov.
2)NowIcansaywithcompleteconfidencethatChangwillrestricthimselftomakingjabsandthatitwillnotcometoseizingtheChineseEasternRailwayatthis
stage.Chang,andJapan(andEngland)throughhim,areprobing,testingthestrengthofourresistance.ThatispreciselywhyKarakhanshouldnothavebeenrecalled
now.3 Butonlyforthatreason.BecauseitseemstomethatKarakhan,whohasgottenhimselfutterlyentangledintheunderhandedschemesoftheFengites4 and
otherChinese"generals,"nowconstitutesanegativefactorfromtheperspectiveofthesubstanceofourpolicyinChina.Wewillhavetoconsidertheissueofthe
ChineseEasternRailwayandChanginthenearfuture.

Page127

3)IdidnotwritetoyoulasttimeaboutSergoindetail.ButnowImustinformyouthatbothSergoandespeciallyNazaretianleftmewithanunpleasantimpression
inconnectionwiththeincidentinvolvinghis"recall"fromtheTranscaucasus.IhaditoutwithSergo,calledhimpetty,andstoppedseeinghim(heisnowinNewMt.
Athos).ThematterofthecompositionofthesecretariatoftheTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteemustnowbediscussedseparately.Nazaretianwillnotdoas
areplacementforSergointhesecretariat(hedoesnothavethestaturehe'snotseriousandnotalwaystruthful).
4)Asfarasthetargetfiguresgo,Ithinkthatwehavetoputonthepressurenowanddefinitelyreducethestaffsofthecommissariatsandselffinancingbodiesfrom
above.5 Otherwisetalkabouteconomicausteritywillremainempty.Industry'ssharemustdefinitelybeincreased.
5)NegotiationswithKrupskaiaarenotonlyilltimednow,theyarepoliticallyharmful.Krupskaiaisasplitter(seeherspeechabout"Stockholm"attheXIV
Congress).6 Shehastobebeaten,asasplitter,ifwewanttopreservetheunityoftheparty.Wecannothavetwocontradictorylines,fightingsplittersandmaking
peacewiththem.That'snotdialectics,that'snonsenseandhelplessness.It'spossiblethattomorrowZinovievwillcomeoutwithastatementonMolotov'sand
Bukharin's"lackofprinciple,"[saying]thatMolotovandBukharin''offered"Zinoviev(throughKrupskaia)a"bloc"andthathe,Zinoviev,"rejectedthisintolerable
flirtationwithdisdain,"andsoforthandsoon.
6)Youareabsolutelyrightaboutthe"Augustbloc."NotjustonebutseveralofIlich's[Lenin's]articlesshouldbepublished,andalongwiththem,weshouldtellthe
storyofhowthisblocemerged.WemustdefinitelyunleashSorinonthismatter.AspeechbyyouandBukharinisabsolutelynecessary.Itisaseriousmatter.7
7)It'sgoodtohearthattradeandwagesaregoingfairlywell.8
8)ItwouldnotbeabadideatodestroytheNechaevfledglings.9
9)Demian's[Bednyi's]poemwon'tdo.It'sprettydryandlifeless.Iwrotehimaboutit.
10)Iamgettingalittlebetter,butmyarmstillhurts.
11)Bukharinisaswineandperhapsworsethanaswine10becauseheconsidersitbeneathhisdignitytowriteeventwolinesabouthisimpressionsofGermany.I'll
getmyrevengeforthat.
Well,that'sitfornow.
Bestregards,
J.Stalin
16September1926
Additiontotheletter
Anextremelybadimpressionisproducedbytheconstantcommuniqusinthepress(especiallyintheeconomicpress)aboutthecompleteviolationofdirectivesfrom
theCommissariatofTradeandthepartybythecooperatives

Page128

andbythelocalandcentralprocurementagencies.ThevirtualimpunityoftheseobviouscriminalsisgristforthemilloftheNepmen[privatemiddlemen]andother
enemiesoftheworkingclassitdemoralizestheentireeconomicandsovietapparat,itturnsourdirectivesandourpartyintomeaninglesstoys.Thiscan'tbe
toleratedanyfurtherifwedon'twanttobecapturedbythesebastardswhoclaimto"accept"ourdirectivesbutinrealitymockus.Iproposerequiringthe
CommissariatofTrade(andtheWorkerPeasantInspection[todothefollowing]:
1)Theviolatorsofthepricingpolicyonstateprocurementsmustberemovedandturnedovertothecourts,andthenamesofthecriminalspublished.
2)Immediatelyremoveandturnovertothecourtstheviolatorsofthepricingpolicyconcerningsalesofindustrialgoodstothepublic(thereductionofretailprices),
publish[theirfullnames]andsoon.
3)Putoutapartycircularabouthowtheseviolatorsareenemiesoftheworkingclassandhowthestrugglewiththemshouldbemerciless.
Iadamantlyinsistonmyproposalandaskallofyoutoacceptit.UnderstandthatwithoutsuchmeasureswewilllosethecampaigninfavorofNepmanelementswho
aresittinginourstateprocurementandcooperativebodies.Withoutthesemeasures,itwillbeadisaster.
Awaitingyourreply,
J.Stalin
16September1926
1.Intheupperlefthandcorneroftheletterthereisanotation:"Wehavereadit:Molotov,Bukharin,Uglanov,J.Rudzutak."
2.On7September1926,thePolitburomadethefollowingdecisionregardingChina(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.585,l.3):"InlightoftheinformationfromCom.
Kopponhisneedforcontinuingtreatment,theresolutionofthePolitburofrom2Septemberofthisyearshouldberescinded."
3.On27August1926,atChicherin'ssuggestion,KarakhanwasrecalledtoMoscowtoreport(ibid.,d.584,l.5).On21SeptemberKarakhanwasrequestedto
speeduphistriptoMoscowbynotstoppingineitherCantonorJapan(ibid.,d.589,l.3).
4.FengiteswerefollowersofGen.FengYhsiang.In1925SovietrepresentativesestablishedcontactswithFeng,whoseunitsatthattimecontrolledanumberof
districtsinnorthernChinaand,bytheendof1925,occupiedTientsin.MilitaryadvisorsandmaterialsweresentunderthecommandofGen.Feng,whohaddeclared
himselfanadvocateofnationalrevolution.In1926,FengmaneuveredbackandforthbetweenvariousforcesinsideandoutsideChina.
5.On20September1926,thePolitburomadethefollowingdecision(ibid.,d.588,l.3):"Continueworktoreduceexpendituresontheadministrativeandeconomic
apparaty...byaminimumof15percent."
6.ForKrupskaia'sspeechattheXIVCongress,seeletter21,note4.
7.InViennainAugust1912,aconferenceofrepresentativesofanumberofRussiansocialdemocraticgroupsandtendenciestookplace.Inthecourseofthe
meetings,ablocemergedthatunitedthesupportersofTrotsky,anumberofrepresentativesoftheLatvianRegionalSocialDemocraticParty,theBund,the
TranscaucasianRegionalCommittee,andotherorganizations.ItopposedthedecisionsoftheRussianSocialDemocraticWorkers'PartyVIConference.
On5October1926,PravdapublishedMolotov'sspeechattheopeningofthecoursesforlocal

Page129

partyworkers.Inthisspeech,Molotovnotedthatanoppositionalblochadformedinthepartyuniting"tendencies[alltheway]fromthoseofMedvedevand
ShliapnikovtothoseofTrotskyandZinoviev"hecomparedthisbloctothe"Augustbloc"of19121914.Molotovdevotedanentiresectionofhisspeechtothe
storyoftheAugustblocheendedwiththestatementthattheAugustblochadsharedthefateoftheMenshevikpartyandthatthestrugglewiththeAugustbloc
hadallowedtheBolshevikparty''togrowintothepowerfulleaderoftheproletarianrevolution."ThejournalBolshevik(1925,no.16)reprintedLenin'sarticles
abouttheAugustblocandpublishedSorin'sarticle"TheAugustBloc."
8.On8September1926,theCentralControlCommissionreviewedtheCommissariatofTrade'sviolationofaPolitburo'sdirectiveabouttheacquisitionofforeign
stocks.Measuresweretakentopreventsuchviolationsinthefuture(ibid.,f.613,op.1,d.47,l.14).
9.ProbablyareferencetothecaseofN.V.Nechaev.On21September1926,theKurskProvinceControlCommissionexpelledNechaevforconducting
"oppositionalundergroundwork"anddistributingoppositionmaterials.Atthesametime,someofNechaev'scoworkerswhoknewabouthisviewsreceivedstrict
reprimands.Inlate1926andearly1927,theNechaevmatterwasreviewedbytheSecretariatoftheCentralControlCommissionandtheOrgburo.Thedecisionto
expelNechaevfromthepartyremainedineffect(ibid.,d.48,l.120b,andd.63,l.25).
10.Theauthor'sintenthereappearstobejocularTrans.
Letter28
[23September1926]
ComradeMolotov,
Ireceivedyourletterof20September.
1)Regardingwages,Ithinkyouhavegotitfairlywell.1 It'simportantthatthelowerstratareceivesomethingtangible.Itwouldalsobegoodtogivesomethingtothe
oilworkerswhodonotgetverymuchonthewhole,butifthereisn'tanopportunityatthismomenttheywillhavetobeturneddown,despitethecomplaintsofthe
Bakupeople.2
2)IfTrotsky"isinarage"andthinksof"openlygoingforbroke,"that'salltheworseforhim.It'squitepossiblethathe'llbebouncedoutofthePolitburonowthat
dependsonhisbehavior.3 Theissueisasfollows:eithertheymustsubmittotheparty,orthepartymustsubmittothem.It'sclearthatthepartywillceasetoexistas
apartyifitallowsthelatter(second)possibility.
3)AsforSmirnov,afterthewarningthathehasalreadyhad,onlyonethingremainsexpelhim,atleasttemporarily.4
4)Ithinkthattheplenumcannot"glossover"thequestionofMedvedev.5 Perhapsyouhaveameansof"glossingover"ifso,tellmewhatitis.
5)Perhapsyouarerightthatthequestionabouttheoppositionblocmustberaisedattheconference.6 Still,weshouldn'tgetaheadofourselvesbettertoobserve
howthatblocwillbehavenow.
6)YouandBukharinmusthurryupwithyourspeechonthequestionoftheAugustblocthere'snoreasontowaitnow,Ithink.
7)IwroteDemian[Bednyi]thathistaleis"dryandlifeless"and"won'tdo"(orsomethingtothateffect)andthat"itshouldnotbeprinted."Idon'thaveacopyorI
wouldsendittoyouimmediately.Asforthistalebeingabad

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"symptom"inthesenseofDemian'spositionworseningIdoubtit.We'lltalkmorewhenIcome.
8)Don'tgiveKarakhanhiswayonChinahe'llruinthewholething,that'sforsure.Hehasoutlivedhisusefulness:hewasandhasremainedtheambassadorofthe
firststageoftheChineserevolutionandisentirelyuselessasaleaderinthecurrentnewsituation,boththeChineseandtheinternationalsituation,giventhenew
eventswhichhedoesn'tunderstandandcan'tunderstandonhisown,forheisapersonwhoisterriblyfrivolousandlimited(inthesenseofrevolutionaryoutlook).
Butasforaudacityandimpudence,arroganceandconceithe'sgotplentyofthose.That'swhatisespeciallydangerous.Karakhanwillneverunderstandthat
HankowwillsoonbecometheChineseMoscow...
Well,bestregards,
J.Stalin
23September1926
Sochi.Iamgettingbetter,moreorless.
P.S.IamnotcertainthatanopenappealtotheGeneralCouncilfromtheTradeUnionCouncilregardingajointprotestagainstthebombingofWanhsieniscorrect.7
ItwilllookasifwearetauntingboththeGeneralCouncilandtheConservativesneedlessly.Isthisnecessary?Itwouldbebettertotakeother,moreeffectiveroutes.
1.On20September1926,thePolitburoapprovedtheproposalofitscommitteeonwages.Thecommitteeproposedraisingthewagesonlyofworkersemployedin
production.Alistofbranchesofindustrywherewagesweretoberaisedwasalsoapproved(coal,ore,metal,etc.)(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.588,ll.1,2).
2.On30September1926,thePolitburorecognizedtheneedtoraisethewagesofindividualgroupsofworkersinthepetroleumindustry(ibid.,d.590,l.2).
3.InOctober1926,ajointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissiondecidedtorelieveTrotskyofhisdutiesasamemberofthePolitburo
becauseofhisfactionalactivity.
4.On8September1926,V.M.Smirnovwasexpelledfromthepartyforfactionalactivity.On26November1926,afteracknowledginghismistakes,hewas
reinstated.
5.AtajointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissioninOctober1926,ShliapnikovandMedvedev,theformerleadersofthe"workers'
opposition,"werecondemnedforantipartyactivity.
6.TheCentralCommitteeplenumofOctober1926addedanitemconcerningtheoppositionandtheinternalpartysituationtotheagendaoftheXVParty
Conference,whichhadalreadybeenpublishedinthepress.
7.TheBritishnavy'sbombingoftheChinesecityofWanhsientookplaceon5September1926.

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Letter29
[7November1926]
Com.Molotov,1
Idon'tseeanyreasonwhythespeechinitscurrentformshouldn'tbeprintedwithoutanycorrectionsfromme,ifweall(includingmyself)giveourspeechestobe
printedwithoutanypreliminarychecking.Ihaveonlynowrealizedthewholeawkwardnessofnothavingshownanyonemyspeech.Isyourpersistenceregardingthe
correctionssayinginfactthatIwasmistakeninnotsendingaroundmyownspeechtofriends?Ialreadyfeelawkwardafterthedisputesofacoupleofdaysago.And
nowyouwanttokillmewithyourmodesty,onceagaininsistingonareviewofthespeech.No,Ihadbetterrefrain.Betterprintitintheformthatyouconsider
necessary.
J.Stalin
7November
1.ThetextiswrittenontheCentralCommittee'sstationery.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMolotov'shandwrittenremark:"Re:myspeechattheXVParty
Conference.V.M."StalinandMolotovwereinMoscowatthetime.TheXVPartyConferencetookplacefrom26Octoberto3November1926.Stalingavea
speechontheoppositionandtheinternalpartysituation.
Letter30
[23December1926]
Hello,Viacheslav,1
Youdon'thavetohurrybackyoucouldeasilyremainanotherweek(orevenmore)pastthedeadline.
Thingsaregoingprettywellhereforus.
1)stateprocurementsandexportsaregoingallright
2)revenuestothestatebudgetarenotcominginverywell
3)theChervonetsisdoingfine2
4)industryiscreepingaheadalittlebit
5)wedecidedtolowerthewholesalepriceonanumberofconsumergoods3
6)wearedraftingimmediateandconcretemeasurestoreduceretailprices(wewillputbrutalpressureonthetradeandcooperativenetwork).4
TheCongressofTradeUnionspassed"normally"asTomskiiwouldsaythatis,wepreservedeverythingwehadbutaddednothingnewtoourarsenal.5
TheexpandedplenumoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee6 wentallright.TheresolutionoftheXVConferencewaspassedunanimously(oneBordigasupporter
fromItalyabstained).Ouroppositionistsarereallyfools.WhythehelltheyjumpedintothefrayIdon'tknow,buttheygotwellandtrulywhipped.WhenKamenev
madeanirresponsiblyharmfulspeech,Ihadto

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remindhimintheclosingremarksofthetelegramtoM.Romanov.Kamenevcameoutwitha"rebuttal,"saying,"It'salie."7 Zinoviev,Kamenev,Smilga,andFedorov
broughta"statement"of"rebuttal"tothePolitburo,demandingthatitbepublished.WepublishedthestatementinBolshevikwiththeCentralCommittee'sanswerand
withdocumentsthatslaughteredKamenevpolitically.WeconsiderthatKamenevisknockedoutofcommissionandwon'tbeintheCentralCommitteeanylonger.
Well,that'sitfornow.Morelaterinperson.
Regards,
Koba
23December1926
1.TheletterwassentfromMoscow.
2.Tenrublebanknoteincirculation19221947Trans.
3.ThePolitburoconsideredreducingthewholesalepricesofconsumergoodson23December1926(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.607,ll.4,5.).
4.InFebruary1927,theCentralCommitteeplenumapprovedtheresolution"Onthereductionofretailandwholesaleprices"(KPSSvrezoliutsiiakh[Resolutionsof
theCPSU],vol.4[Moscow,1984],13748).
5.TheVIICongressofUSSRTradeUnionstookplaceon618December1926.
6.TheVIIexpandedplenumoftheCominternExecutiveCommitteetookplaceinMoscowfrom22Novemberthrough16December1926,with191
representativesfromtheCommunistpartiesofvariouscountriesinattendance.Theplenumdiscussedthefollowingissues:theinternationalsituationandthetasksof
theCominternthedisputesinsidetheSovietpartylessonsoftheBritishstriketheChinesequestiontheworkoftheCommunistsinthetradeunionmovement
questionsofindividualparties.
7.On15December1926,KamenevstatedthatthisreferencetoatelegramtoM.Romanovwasarepetitionofthegossipthatchauvinistsocialistshadspreadagainst
theBolsheviks.AttheeveningsessionoftheCominternplenum,hemadethefollowingstatement(RTsKhIDNIf.85,op.1c,d.173,ll.3,4):
YesterdayCom.StalinreportedfromtheCominternpodiumthatIhadsupposedlysentatelegramtoMikhailRomanovduringthefirstdaysoftheFebruaryrevolution....
TheeditorialboardofPravda,ofwhichIwasamemberatthattime,alongwithComradesLeninandZinoviev,learnedofthisslanderfromthenewspaperYedinstvo
[Unity],whichwasunderthedirectionofawellknownrenegadeandscoundrelandlatermonarchist,Aleksinskii,whointhosedayswagedafuriouscampaignagainst
theBolsheviksingeneralandagainsteachoneofusinparticular....Thisprovincialliepersonallydirectedagainstmewasjudgedbyallofustobepettyand
insignificantgossip,andwelimitedourselvestoseverallinesofrebuttal,statingthatthetelegramwassentonbehalfofarallyinaprovincialtowninSiberia,where,asan
exile,Ihadalsospokenitwassentagainstmywishes....
ItgoeswithoutsayingthatnooneincludingStalineventhoughtofascribinganysignificancewhatsoevertothisgossipwhen,twoweeksaftertheappearanceof
thislieattheApril(1917)conference,IasLeninhadproposedwaselectedalongwithhim,Zinoviev,andStalintothefirstlegalCentralCommitteeofourparty.Since
then,fortenyears,noonehasdaredtoreturntothisslander.
Aftertenyearsofcollaboration,torepeatsuchachargeasameansofstruggleistocondemnoneselfinthemostbrutalfashion.

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ChapterThree
1927
Historianshavefrequentlyregarded1927asayearofcrisisformoderatepoliciesandastheprologuetoStalin's"greatbreakthrough"oftheearly1930s.Therewere
manysignsofthegovernment'sdeparturefromNEP.Economicpolicywasbecominglessreasonedandbalanced.Attackson"bourgeoiselements"wereincreasing.
Thepoliticalregimegrewharsher.Thestrugglewiththeoppositioninthepartywaswagedwithincreasingstrength,chieflywiththehelpoftheOGPU.
ParticularlyinfluentialinSovietsocietyatthetimewasintensifiedpropagandaaboutadrasticdeteriorationoftheinternationalsituationandtheproximityofanewwar.
Thefactsbehindthishighpoweredcampaignincludethe23February1927notefromAustinChamberlain,Britishforeignminister,accusingtheUSSRofconducting
"antiBritishpropaganda"theattackontheSovietembassyinPekingon6April1927,instigatedbytheChinesegovernmentthesearchbytheBritishpoliceon12
May1927oftheofficesofArcos,anAngloSovietjointstockcompanyGreatBritain'sseveringofdiplomaticrelationswiththeUSSRattheendofMayandthe
murderofP.L.Voikov,SovietambassadortoPoland,on7June1927.
OfficialSovietpropagandaascribedgreatsignificancetoeachoftheseincidents.Thegovernmentusedinternationalproblemsasanexcusetocrackdowninternally.
NewspapersreportedtheOGPU'sdiscoveryofnew,hostileplots.InmidMayagroupofformernoblemenwhoworkedinvariousSovietgovernmentofficeswere
detainedashostages.OnthedayfollowingthemurderofVoikov,

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byorderoftheOGPUcollegium,thetwentyhostageswereexecutedwithouttrial.Thatsummerandfall,variousmilitarizedactivities,forexample,a"defenseweek"
andmobilizationdrills,wereorganized.
Stalin'sletterstoMolotovpreservedfrom1927arealmostentirelydevotedtoforeignpolicyissues.Hewasgreatlyconcernedwiththestateoftheinternational
Communistmovement.Inthatregard,1927wasayearofcrisis.TheunitedfrontpolicysufferedanumberoffailuresinGreatBritainandcontinualconflictundermined
theviabilityoftheAngloRussianCommittee,thesymboloftheunitedfrontpolicyofcooperationbetweentheCommunistsandthesocialdemocrats.InSeptember
1927,theBritishtradeunionsfinallywithdrewfromtheAngloRussianCommittee.
Tragic,bloodyeventstookplaceinChinathatsameyear.Forseveralyears,MoscowhadencouragedtheChineseCommuniststocooperatewiththeKuomintang,
restrainingthemfromanyindependentactionsforthesakeofpreservingandstrengtheningthe"revolutionarydemocraticbloc"withtheChinesebourgeoisie.Even
afterChiangKaishekmassacredtheCommunistsinShanghaiin1927,theSovietPolitburomajoritycontinuedtohewtoaversionofthispolicy.Theregimeofthe
"leftKuomintang"inWuhanpreservedforatimeitsalliancewiththeSovietgovernment,whichendeavoredtouseWuhanasaweaponagainstChiangKaishek.As
canbeseenfromtheletters,Wuhanwasgivennosmallamountofaid,andStalininsistedonincreasingit.
Thereweremanysigns,however,thattheWuhanregimewouldnotorientitselftowardMoscoworcooperateforlongwiththeCommunists.Nevertheless,Stalin
continuedtoinsistonthecorrectnessofthechosencourse.ThuswhenfreshdisasterbrokeoutinWuhan,theSovietgovernmentwaslargelycaughtbysurprise.In
midJuly1927,theChineseCommunistPartywasbannedandmanyCommunistswerepersecuted.
WhenherealizedthescopeofthedisasterinChina,Stalinimmediatelylaidthegroundworkforanorganizedretreat:inhislettershepersuadedhisgloomyalliesonthe
PolitburothattheirChinapolicyhadbeencorrectandthatthecrackdownagainsttheCommunistPartywasprovokedbyobjectivecircumstancesandwasmainlythe
faultoftheChineseCommuniststhemselves.TheStalin

StalinandthePolitburo:A.A.Andreev,K.Ye.Voroshilov,A.A.Zhdanov,L.M.Kaganovich,M.I.Kalinin,
A.I.Mikoian,V.M.Molotov,N.S.Khrushchev,L.P.Beriia,N.M.Shvernik

LetterfromStalintoMolotov,23July1927(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5388,l.48).

Page135

Bukharinleadershiprequiredalloftheseargumentstorepeltheopposition'sattack.
TheeventsinGreatBritainand,especially,Chinaprovidedthemembersoftheoppositionwithpowerfulargumentsagainsttheparty'sleadership.Thiswasthe
opposition'slastchance,anditmadetheutmostuseofit.Theinternalpartyconfrontationreacheditsapexinthefallof1927.Bytheendoftheyear,supportersof
TrotskyandZinoviev,liketheleadersoftheoppositionthemselves,wereexpelledfromtheparty,andmanywerepersecuted.
Letter31
[23June1927]
DearViacheslav,1
1)Ihadalook(veryquickly)atthe"transcriptoftheCentralControlCommissionsession"ontheZinovievandTrotskyaffair.Theimpressiongivenisoneofutter
confusiononthepartoftheCentralControlCommission.ZinovievandTrotsky,nottheCommissionmembers,didtheinterrogatingandtheaccusing.It'soddthat
someoftheCommissionmembersdidn'tshow.Where'sSergo?Wherehashegoneandwhyishehiding?Shameonhim!Iresolutelyprotestagainstthefactthatthe
commissiontochargeTrotskyandZinovievhasturnedintoaforumforchargesagainsttheCentralCommitteeandtheComintern,withanemphasisonthe"case"
againstStalin,whoisnotinMoscowandonwhomthereforeanyaccusationcanbepinned.WillTrotskyandZinovievreallybehandedthis"transcript"todistribute!
That'sallweneed.
2)NotethedocumentsonTrud[Labor].ApurgeshouldbeconductedinTrud.2
23June1926
1.Stalinhasplacedthedate23June1926underthetextoftheletter,althoughtheeventsaboutwhichStalinwaswritingtookplacein1927.ZinovievandTrotsky's
defensewasheardbytheCentralControlCommission,whosememberswereYanson,Shkiriatov,andIlin,on13and14June1927(RTsKhIDNIf.613,op.1,d.
48,l.57).
On24June1927,theCentralControlCommissionreviewedthequestion"OntheviolationofpartydisciplinebyComradesZinovievandTrotsky."TheCentral
ControlCommissionrecommendedthatthejointplenumconsiderremovingZinovievandTrotskyfromtheCentralCommittee.Thisdecisionwaspublishedin
Pravdaon26June1927.TrotskyprotestedtotheCentralControlCommissionabouttheomissionsanddistortionsinthepublishedtranscriptofhisspeechesat
theCentralControlCommission.
2.Noevidenceofsuchapurgehasbeendiscovered.

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Letter32
[24June1927]
6/24/26
DearViacheslav,1
Ijustreceivedyourlastletterbycourier.RegardingChina,Ithinkthat3or4millioncannowbesentoutofthe10million,andthequestionofthe15millionshouldbe
postponed.Another15millionisbeingaskedofus,apparentlyinordertoavoidanimmediateattackagainstChiangKaishekifwedon'tgivethose15million.2
Asfortheholytrinity(R.+Or.+V.),3 Iamremainingsilentaboutthemforthetimebeingsincetherewillstillbeplentyofopportunitiestodiscussthemlater.Or.isa
"goodfellow,"butaphonypolitician.Hewasalwaysa"simpleminded"politician.V.isprobablyjust"notthetype."AsforR.,heis"scheming,"supposingthatthisis
what''realpolitics"isallabout.
Greetings,
J.Stalin
1.TheupperlefthandcornerofthelettercontainsadateinsertedbyStalin:"24June1926."Theeventsdiscussedinthelettertookplacein1927.
2.ThereferenceistosubsidiesgiventheWuhangovernmentfororganizinganexpeditionagainstChiangKaishek'sgroup.
3.WecanonlyguesswhoStalinisreferringtohere.Judgingfromthenextletter,"R.,Or.,andV."wereinsomewayconnectedwithMikoian,whowascommissarof
tradeatthistimeU.S.Ed.
Letter33
[27June1927]
DearViacheslavandNikolai,1
1.Ireceivedyourlastletters(24June)andthePolitburoresolutionabouttheAngloRussianCommittee.2 Hack"them"topiecesprettywell(ImeantheGeneral
Council),notbymakingalotofnoise,butthoroughly.Theymaybreakoff[withus]inorderto"demonstrate"their"independence"fromMoscowandearn
Chamberlain'spraise.Buttheywilllosemoreinbreakingoffnowthan[iftheyhadbrokenoff]duringthecoalstrikeperiod,sincetherealthreatofwaraffectsall
workers,andveryprofoundly.Theywilltrytomakemuchoftheexecutions,butthatwon'tworkforverylong,especiallyifyoutrytoprovidesomewellargued
declarationonthatscore.Youshouldthrowitrightbackin"their"facesthattheyarehelpingtheirmasterslaunchandwageawar.
2.IalreadywroteaboutFeng[Yhsiang]inthecodedtelegram.ApparentlythereportaboutFengcorrespondstoreality.3 I'mafraidthatWuhan4 will

Page137

loseitsnerveandcomeunderNanking.5 It'snotwortharguingwithWuhanoverBorodin(ifWuhanwantstoremovehim).ButwemustinsistadamantlyonWuhan
notsubmittingtoNankingwhilethereisstillanopportunitytoinsist.LosingWuhanasaseparatecentermeanslosingatleastsomecenterfortherevolutionary
movement,losingthepossibilityoffreeassemblyandralliesfortheworkers,losingthepossibilityoftheopenexistenceoftheCommunistParty,losingthepossibility
ofanopenrevolutionarypressinaword,losingthepossibilityofopenlyorganizingtheproletariatandtherevolution.Inordertoobtainallthis,Iassureyou,itis
worthgivingWuhananextra35millionbutonlywithsomeassurancethatWuhanwillnotsurrendertothetendermerciesofNanking,withourmoneywastedfor
nothing.
3.IreceivedatelegramtheotherdayfromWangChingweiandgavehimafairlylengthyreplyofmyown.Readitandtellmeyouropinioninbrief.
4.IhavenoobjectionsregardingLozovskii.
5.RegardingtheexpediencyofmakingourrelationswithChiang"official,"Ihavemydoubts.TheanalogywithChangTsolindoesn'tholdup.WerecognizedChang
threeyearsago.Ifthematterweretocomeuptoday,wewouldnotofficiallyrecognizehim.TorecognizeChiangnow(thisminute)wouldmeanstrikingablow
againstWuhan(Wuhanstillexists)andthrowingdownthegauntlettoChangTsolin(remembertheChineseEasternRailway).ItwouldbebettertowaitonChiang
andkeepthestatusquo.
6.It'snotsurprisingthatR.hasgoneintoleftisminabigway.Thatmeansthathehaslostforaminutetheopportunityto"scheme,""maneuver,"andsoon.But
Mikoianisagreenhorninpolitics,atalentedgreenhorn,butagreenhornallthesame.Whenhegrowsup,he'llimprove.
Well,regards,
J.Stalin
27June1926
1.Stalindatestheletter27June1926.Infacttheeventsdiscussedinthelettertookplacein1927.Onthebackoftheletter,inBukharin'shand,is:"I'vereadit
through,Bukh."
2.On24June1927,thePolitburoapprovedtheideaofatradeuniondeclarationcriticizingtheBritishGeneralCouncil'spositionbecauseitspositionhadledtoa
breakwiththeAngloRussianCommitteeandtosupportfortheConservativegovernment.ThedeclarationincludedaresponsetotheGeneralCouncil'scriticismof
theexecutionoftwentyWhiteGuardsintheUSSRon9June1927(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.641,l.3).
3.On10June1927,atasecretmeetingwiththeWuhanleaders,FengYhsiang,thecommanderinchiefofthenationalgovernment'sforces,madehisalliancewith
Wuhanconditionaluponthelatter'sbreakwiththeCommunists.On21June,afterameetingbetweenFengYhsiangandChiangKaishek,theirintentiontoactin
unisonwasannounced.InatelegramtotheWuhangovernment,FengdemandedsubmissiontoNankingandthedismissalofBorodin,politicaladvisortothe
KuomintangCentralCommitteesentfromMoscowin1923.ForinformationonFengYhsiang,seenote4toletter27.
4.WuhaniswherethenationalgovernmentheadedbyWangChingweiwaslocated.Themajorityofthetoppostsinthisgovernmentwereheldbyrepresentativesof
theleftwingoftheKuomintang,andtwoministries(laborandagriculture)wereheadedbyCommunists.

Page138

5.ThereferenceistoChiangKaishek'sgroup,whosecenterwaslocatedinNankingafterthecoupof12April1927.
Letter34
[EarlyJuly1927]
DearViacheslav,1
I'msickandlyinginbedsoI'llbebrief.
1.TheTradeUnionCouncil'sdeclarationisgood,2 Rykov'sanswerisbad.3
2.Tomskii'sreportisweak.4
3.IwouldbeforgivingIshchenkoandValentinovawarning.5
4.TrotskyshouldgotoJapan.
5.Icouldcomefortheplenumifit'snecessaryandifyoupostponeit.6
6.Bukharin'sarticleaboutChinaturnedoutwell.7
Greetings,
J.Stalin
1.TheupperrighthandcorneroftheletterhasanotationfromMolotov:"1926=?"InfacttheletterwaswrittenbyStalininearlyJuly1927.Theupperlefthand
cornerhasanotationfromBukharin:"I'vereadit.Bukh."
2.ThereferenceistotheTradeUnionCouncil'sresolutionconcerningtheresultsofTomskii'snegotiationswithBritishrepresentativesregardingtheAngloRussian
Committee,whichwasapprovedbythePolitburoon28June1927(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.642,l.5).ThisresolutioncriticizedtheGeneralCouncil,becauseits
policywasleadingtothecollapseoftheAngloRussianCommitteeandtosupportoftheConservativegovernment.
3.ThereferenceistoRykov'sreplytothetelegramfrom[George]Lansburyand[James]Maxton,activistsoftheBritishworkers'movement,whohadprotestedthe
executionoftwentypeoplebyorderofthesecretpolice.Rykovclaimedthatthecampaignagainstthedeathpenaltywasdeliberatelylaunchedbythebourgeoisieto
coveruptheorganizationofanantiSovietimperialistblocandtoprepareforinterventionintheUSSR.
4.ThereferenceistoTomskii'sreportattheTradeUnionCouncilplenumon28June1927.
5.Ishchenko'sandValentinov'sfactionalactivitieswereontheagendaofseveralCentralControlCommissionmeetingsinthefallof1927.
Ishchenkowasaccusedofviolatingpartydiscipline"bydistributingwithoutconsentofpartybodies...amongnonpartypeoplehisappealtotheCongressof
WaterTransportWorkers,whichcontainedslanderousattacksagainstthelineoftheCentralCommittee."Itwasdeterminedthat"hisspeechattheTradeUnion
Councilplenumwasslanderagainsttheparty."
ValentinovwasaccusedofmakinganantipartyspeechattheTradeUnionCouncilplenum"defendingproposalsfromtheTrotskyistopposition."TheCentral
ControlCommissionresolutionstatedthathisspeechwas"anattempttodiscreditbeforenonpartymemberstheparty'sleadershipofthetradeunionmovement
throughjugglinganddistortionofthefacts."
BydecisionoftheCentralControlCommission,bothmenwereexpelledfromtheparty(RTsKhIDNIf.613,op.1,d.49,ll.124,127ob.,137,137ob.).
6.ThejointplenumoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissionopenedon29July1927.
7.ThereferenceistoBukharin'sarticle"Tekushchiimomentkitaiskoirevoliusii"(ThecurrentmomentintheChineserevolution),publishedinPravda,30June1927.

Page139

Letter35
[8July1927]
DearViacheslav,1
1.WhenIsentmybigcodedtelegramaboutChina,Ididn'tknowaboutT'angShenchih'smachinationsoraboutthebehavioroftheWuhangovernmentin
connectionwiththis.(Ialsodidn'thavethematerialsconcerningthedisarmingoftheworkers'guardinWuhan.)2 Obviously,withallthesenewmaterialsyouwere
justifiedinapprovingnewdirectives.WeusedtheWuhanleadershipasmuchaspossible.Nowit'stimetodiscardthem.Anattemptshouldbemadetotakeoverthe
peripheryoftheKuomintangandhelpitopposeitscurrentbosses.ThefactthattheperipheryoftheKuomintangisbeingpersecutedbymilitaryupstartstellsyouthat
thistaskmaybesuccessful.3 Therefore,ifthereisachance,weoughtnottolinkwithdrawalfromthenationalgovernment(whichisnecessarynow)withwithdrawal
fromtheKuomintang(whichmaybecomenecessaryinthenearfuture).
2.Iamnotafraidofthesituationinthegroup.WhyI'llexplainwhenIcome.
3.WhenshouldIcomeexactly?
Greetings,
J.Stalin
8July1926
1.Stalindatedtheletter8July1926,althoughtheeventsmentionedintheletteroccurredin1927.
2.Thereferenceistothedisarmingofworkers'detachmentsinWuhan,whichtookplaceinJune1927byorderofWangChingwei,headofthenationalgovernment
inWuhan.
3.Bythewordperiphery,StalinseemstomeanlocalorganizationsoftheKuomintangU.S.Ed.
Letter36
[9July1927]
7/9/26
ToMolotovandBukharin,1
Damnthebothofyou:youmisledmealittlebitbyaskingmyopiniononthenewdirectives(aboutChina)andnotprovidingmewithconcretefreshmaterial.Thedraft
ofthenewdirectivestalksaboutbothT'angShenchihanddisarmingtheworkers(the"virtualdisarming,"T'angShenchih"virtuallybecamethetoolofthe
counterrevolutionaries,"andsoon).Butfirst,noconcretefactsareprovidedthere,andsecond,neitherthepressnorthecodedtelegrams(whichIhadatthetime)
saidanythingabouttheexistenceofsuch

Page140

facts.Andnotonlydidyoumisleadmealittlebit,butIalsomisledyou,perhaps,withmylongandquiteangryreplybycodedtelegram.
AfterIreceivedthedraftofyournewdirectives,Idecided:so,theoppositionhasfinallywornBukharinandMolotovdownwithafloodofnew"theses,"andthey
havesuccumbed,finally,toblackmailso,Klim[Voroshilov]willbegladnowthatheisfreedfromthepaymentstoWuhan,whichiswhyhewasonlytoohappyto
voteforthenewdirectives.Andsoforthandsooninthesamespirit.NowIseethatwasallwrong.YesterdayIspentthewholedayreadingthenewmaterials
broughtbythecourier.NowIamnotworriedthatnewdirectiveshavebeensentbutratherthattheyhavebeensenttoolate.Idon'tthinkthatleavingthenational
governmentandtheKuomintangcaneasetheplightoftheCommunistPartyand"putitonitsfeet."Onthecontrary,leavingwillonlymakeiteasiertobeatupthe
Communists,createnewdiscord,andperhapsevenpreparesomethinglikeasplit.Butthereisnootherway,and,inanyevent,intheendwehadtocometothis.This
periodhastobegottenthrough,absolutely.
Butthatisnotthemainthingnow.ThemainthingiswhetherornotthecurrentChineseCommunistPartycanmanagetoemergewithhonorfromthisnewperiod
(theunderground,arrests,beatings,executions,betrayalsandprovocationsamongtheirownranks,etc.),tocomeouthardened,tempered,withoutsplittingup,
breakingintopieces,disintegrating,anddegeneratingintoasectoranumberofsects.Wecannotexcludethisdangeratall,norcanweexcludethepossibilityofan
intervalbetweenthisbourgeoisrevolutionandafuturebourgeoisrevolutionanalogoustotheintervalthatwehadbetween1905and1917(February).Moreover,I
believethatsuchadangerismorereal(ImeanthedangerofthedisintegrationoftheChineseCommunistParty)thansomeoftheseemingrealitiessoabundantin
China.Why?Becauseunfortunately,wedon'thavearealor,ifyoulike,actualCommunistPartyinChina.IfyoutakeawaythemiddlerankingCommunistswho
makegoodfightingmaterialbutwhoarecompletelyinexperiencedinpolitics,thenwhatisthecurrentCentralCommitteeoftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP)?
Nothingbutan"amalgamation"ofgeneralphrasesgatheredhereandthere,notlinkedtooneanotherwithanylineorguidingidea.Idon'twanttobeverydemanding
towardtheCentralCommitteeoftheCCP.Iknowthatonecan'tbetoodemandingtowardit.Buthereisasimpledemand:fulfillthedirectivesoftheComintern.Has
itfulfilledthesedirectives?No.No,becauseitdidnotunderstandthem,becauseitdidnotwanttofulfillthemandhashoodwinkedtheComintern,orbecauseit
wasn'tabletofulfillthem.Thatisafact.RoyblamesBorodin.That'sstupid.Itcan'tbethatBorodinhasmoreweightwiththeCCPoritsCentralCommitteethanthe
Cominterndoes.RoyhimselfwrotethatBorodindidnotattendtheCCPCongresssincehewasforcedtogointohiding....Some(some!)explainthisbythefact
thattheblocwiththeKuomintangistoblame,whichtiestheCCPdownanddoesnotallowittobeindependent.2 Thatisalsonottrue,foralthoughanyblocties
downthe

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membersofthebloconewayoranother,thatdoesn'tmeanthatweshouldbeagainstblocsingeneral.TakeChiang'sfivecoastalprovincesfromCantontoShanghai,
wherethereisnoblocwiththeKuomintang.HowcanyouexplainthatChiang'sagentsaremoresuccessfulatdisintegratingthe"army"oftheCommunists,thanthe
CommunistsareatdisintegratingChiang'srearguard?IsitnotafactthatawholenumberoftradeunionsarebreakingofffromtheCCP,andChiangcontinuestohold
strong?WhatsortofCCP"independence"isthat?...Ithinkthereasonisnotinthesefactors,althoughtheyhavetheirsignificance,butinthefactthatthecurrent
CentralCommittee(itsleadership)wasforgedintheperiodofthenationwiderevolutionandreceiveditsbaptismbyfireduringthisperiodanditturnedouttobe
completelyunadaptabletothenew,agrarianphaseoftherevolution.TheCCPCentralCommitteedoesnotunderstandthepointofthenewphaseofthe
revolution.ThereisnotasingleMarxistmindintheCentralCommitteecapableofunderstandingtheunderpinning(thesocialunderpinning)oftheeventsnow
occurring.TheCCPCentralCommitteewasunabletousetherichperiodoftheblocwithKuomintanginordertoconductenergeticworkinopenlyorganizingthe
revolution,theproletariat,thepeasantry,therevolutionarymilitaryunits,therevolutionizingofthearmy,theworkofsettingthesoldiersagainstthegenerals.The
CCPCentralCommitteehaslivedofftheKuomintangforawholeyearandhashadtheopportunityoffreelyworkingandorganizing,yetitdidnothingtoturnthe
conglomerateofelements(true,quitemilitant),incorrectlycalledaparty,intoarealparty....Ofcoursetherewasworkatthegrassroots.Weareindebtedtothe
middlerankingCommunistsforthat.Butcharacteristically,itwasnottheCentralCommitteethatwenttotheworkersandpeasantsbuttheworkersandpeasantswho
wenttotheCentralCommittee,andtheclosertheworkersandpeasantsapproachedtheCentralCommittee,thefartherawayfromthemwentthesocalledCentral
Committee,preferringtokilltimeinbehindthescenestalkswiththeleadersandgeneralsfromtheKuomintang.TheCCPsometimesbabblesaboutthehegemonyof
theproletariat.ButthemostintolerablethingaboutthisbabblingisthattheCCPdoesnothaveaclue(literally,notaclue)abouthegemonyitkillstheinitiativeof
theworkingmasses,underminesthe"unauthorized"actionsofthepeasantmasses,andreducesclasswarfareinChinatoalotofbigtalkaboutthe"feudal
bourgeoisie''(nowithasfinallybeendeterminedthat,asitturnsout,theauthorofthistermisRoy).
That'sthereasonwhytheComintern'sdirectivesarenotfulfilled.
ThatiswhyI'mafraidoflettingsuchapartyfloatfreelyonthe"wideopensea"beforeithasto(itwillcrashbeforeithasmanagedtohardenitself...).
ThatiswhyInowbelievethequestionofthepartyisthemainquestionoftheChineserevolution.
HowcanwefixtheconglomeratethatweincorrectlycalltheChineseCommunistParty?TherecallofCh'enTuhsiuorT'anPingshanwillnothelphere,ofcourse,
althoughIdon'tobjecttorecallingthemandteachingthema

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thingortwo.Othermeasuresareneeded.AgoodMarxistLeninistliteraturemustbecreatedintheChineselanguagefundamental,notmadeupof"littleleaflets"
andthenecessaryfundsmustnowbeallocatedforthis,withoutdelay(youcansaytoKlimthatthiswillcostmuchlessthanmaintainingonehundredofhis
hemorrhoidalbureaucrat/counterrevolutionariesforhalfayear).Furthermore,wehaveexpendedtoomucheffortonorganizingasystemofadvisorsforthearmiesin
China(moreover,theseadvisorsturnedoutnottobeontheballpoliticallythatis,theywereneverabletowarnusintimeofthedefectionoftheirown"chiefs").It's
timetoreallybusyourselveswiththeorganizationofasystemofpartyadvisorsattachedtotheCCPCentralCommittee,theCentralCommitteedepartments,
regionalorganizationsineachprovince,thedepartmentsoftheseregionalorganizations,thepartyyouthorganization,thepeasantdepartmentoftheCentral
Committee,themilitarydepartmentoftheCentralCommittee,thecentralorgan[partynewspaper],thefederationoftradeunionsofChina.BothBorodinandRoy
mustbepurgedfromChina,alongwithallthoseoppositionmembersthathindertheworkthere.WeshouldregularlysendtoChina,notpeoplewedon'tneed,but
competentpeopleinstead.Thestructurehastobesetupsothatallthesepartyadvisorsworktogetherasawhole,directedbythechiefadvisortotheCentral
Committee(theCominternrepresentative).These"nannies''arenecessaryatthisstagebecauseoftheweakness,shapelessnessandpoliticalamorphousness,andlack
ofqualificationofthecurrentCentralCommittee.TheCentralCommitteewilllearnfromthefromthepartyadvisors.Thepartyadvisorswillcompensateforthe
enormousshortcomingsoftheCCPCentralCommitteeanditstopregionalofficials.Theywillserve(forthetimebeing)asthenailsholdingtheexistingconglomerate
togetherasaparty.
Andsooninthesamespirit.
Astherevolutionandthepartygrow,theneedforthese"nannies"willdisappear.
Well,thatwilldo.
Regardstoyou,
J.Stalin
P.S.Reportbackonreceivingthisletter.Reportyouropinionaswell.Ifyoufinditnecessary,youcangiveittotheotherPolitburomemberstoread.
J.Stalin
1.Intheupperrighthandcorner,thedatewrittenbyStalinis9July1926,althoughtheeventsmentionedintheletteroccurredin1927.Atthetopoftheletterthere
arethefollowingnotations:"I'vereadit.Bukharin.Readit.A.I.Rykov,A.Andreev,M.Tomskii,Voroshilov,A.Mikoian."
2.StalinisreferringtotheviewsoftheunitedoppositionheadedbyZinovievandTrotskyU.S.Ed.

Page143

Letter37
[11July1927]
DearViacheslav,
1)IreceivedZinoviev'sarticle"TheContoursoftheComingWar."1 Areyoureallygoingtopublishthisignorantpieceoftrash?Iamdecidedlyagainstpublication.
2)IreadthePolitburodirectivesonthewithdrawalfromthenationalgovernmentinChina.IthinkthatsoontheissueofwithdrawingfromtheKuomintangwillhaveto
beraised.2 I'llexplainwhywhenIcome.IhavebeentoldthatsomepeopleareinarepentantmoodregardingourpolicyinChina.Ifthatistrue,it'stoobad.WhenI
come,Iwilltrytoprovethatourpolicywasandremainstheonlycorrectpolicy.NeverhaveIbeensodeeplyandfirmlyconvincedofthecorrectnessofourpolicy,
bothinChinaandregardingtheAngloRussianCommittee,asIamnow.
3)WhenshouldIbeinMoscow?
J.Stalin
11July1927
1.Zinoviev'sarticle"Konturygriaduschcheivoinyinashizadachi"(Contoursofthecomingwarandourtasks)outlinedtheviewsoftheunitedoppositiononboth
foreignpolicyanddomesticissues.ThearticlewassharplycriticizedatajointmeetingoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissioninAugust1927.
2.TheexpulsionoftheCommunistsfromtheKuomintangoccurredattheinitiativeoftheKuomintang'sCentralExecutiveCommitteeon26July1927.TheChinese
CommunistPartywasbanned,andmanyCommunistsandtheirsupporterswerepersecuted.
Letter38
[16July1927]
7/16/26
ToMolotov:1
1)We'lltalkaboutChinawhenIcome.Youdidn'tunderstandmyletter.Thelettersaysthatwecan'truleoutaninterval[betweenrevolutions],butthatdoesn'tmean
thatanewupsurgeinthenextperiodisruledout.Inshort,let'stalkwhenIgetthere.Youhaveapparentlydecidedtodistributethedocumentsoftheoppositionto
themembersandcandidatesoftheCentralCommitteeandtheCentralControlCommission.2 Butwhatdoyouhavetocounterthesedocumentswith?Surelynot
justBukharin'slastarticle?3 Butreally,it'sjustnotgoodenough!Todistributedocumentsinthatwaydoesn'thelpus.
2)YourhastinessinsettingupofficialdiplomaticrelationswithChiang

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[Kaishek]makesabadimpression.WhatisthisabowtoChamberlainorsomethingelseofthekind?What'sthebighurry?
3)I'llbeinMoscowonSaturdaymorningthe23rd.Iwantedtoputitoffanothertwodays,buttheweatherhereisstartingtoturnbad.
Greetings,
Stalin
1.Stalindatestheletter16July1926.Infact,theeventsmentionedintheletteroccurredin1927.
2.ThereferenceistostatementsfromtheoppositionontheChinesequestion.
3.Bukharin'sarticle"Nakrutomperevalekitaiskoirevoliutsii"(OnthesteeppassoftheChineserevolution)waspublishedinPravdaon10July1927.

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ChapterFour
1929
Intheletterswrittenin1929,asinthosewritteninpreviousyears,Stalinadvocatedanextremelyharshresponsetoallissuesthatfellunderthepurviewofthe
country'stopleadership.Onceagain,heproposedresolvingthegrowingproblemofgrainprocurementthroughcoerciveemergencymethods.Fromtheletterof10
August(letter41),itisapparentthatStalinisresponsibleforinsistingongrainprocurementevenifitrequiredcrudeforce.
NolessvigilantlydidStalincutoffattemptstovoiceeventheslightestdissentonthe"ideologicalfront."Asthelettersillustrate(letters39,42,43,44),acampaignwas
organizedonStalin'sorderstoexposethewellknownpartypropagandistsYa.StenandL.Shatskin.IntheirarticlespublishedinKomsomolskaiapravda,Stenand
Shatskincriticized"conformismintheparty"andsomemembers'lackofprincipletheycalledonmemberstothinkaboutthepartylineinanindependent,criticalway,
usingtheirownexperience.OnStalin'sinstructions,theseplatitudeswerecharacterizedasattemptstounderminepartydiscipline,andStenandShatskinwere
describedas"slippingintothepoliticalandorganizationalpositionsofTrotskyismonindividualissues."
Stalin'sforeignpolicypositionswerenolessharsh.In1929,theSovietleadership'sattentionwaschieflyfocusedonestablishingdiplomaticrelationswithGreatBritain
andovercomingtheconflictwithChinaregardingtheChineseEasternRailway(CER).AsignificantportionoftheletterstoMolotovin1929aredevotedtothese
mattersinparticular.
TheConservativegovernmentofGreatBritainsuspendeddiplo

Page146

maticrelationswiththeSovietUnioninJune1927.Overtime,largerandlargercirclesoftheBritishpublicfavoredrestoringrelations.Thus,whentheLabour
governmentwontheelectioninthespringof1929,itbeganalmostimmediatelytopreparefornegotiationswiththeUSSR.Britishleaderstriedtocombinethe
restorationofdiplomaticrelationswithasettlementofsomeoutstandingdisputesbetweentheUSSRandGreatBritainprimarilythedebtsofthetsaristgovernment,
Britishcitizens'claimsonpropertynationalizedintheSovietUnion,andthebanondistributing"Communistpropaganda"inGreatBritain,whichBritainviewedas
interferenceinitsinternalaffairs.
On17July1929,theLabourgovernmentnotifiedtheSovietgovernmentofitsreadinesstoresumerelationsandrequestedthataSovietrepresentativebesentto
workoutaprocedurefordiscussingthedisputedmatters.InlateJuly,V.S.DovgalevskiiwassenttoGreatBritainastheauthorizedrepresentativeofthegovernment
oftheUSSR.Hehadstrictinstructionstonegotiateonlyontheprocedureforresolvingthedisputedmatters,notontheirsubstance.TheKremlindemandedthat
diplomaticrelationsberestoredbeforeanymutualclaimscouldbesettled.
AttheveryfirstmeetinginLondon,BritishForeignMinisterArthurHendersoninformedDovgalevskiithattheBritishgovernmentcouldestablishdiplomaticrelations
onlythroughParliament,whosenextsessionstartedon29October.Inordernottolosetheinterveningthreemonths,heproposedthatnegotiationsonthedisputed
mattersshouldcommenceimmediately.Moscowrejectedtheoffer,andDovgalevskiileftGreatBritainrightaway.
On4September1929,HendersonreiteratedtheBritishgovernment'sreadinesstoconductnegotiationsontheprocedureforrenewingdiplomaticrelations.On6
SeptemberMaksimLitvinov,Sovietcommissarofforeignaffairs,announcedthattheUSSRhadagreedtotalksbetweenHendersonandDovgalevskiitobeginon24
SeptemberinLondon.On5October1929,theHouseofCommonsapprovedtherestorationofdiplomaticrelationswiththeUSSR.
ThelettersshowthatStalinwasdirectingthenegotiationswithGreatBritain.Theyalsorevealthathisinsistenceonaharsh,uncompromisingpositionledhiminto
conflictwithLitvinov,althoughtheprecisenatureoftheconflictremainsunclear.

Page147

ThediplomaticinterplaywithGreatBritaincoincidedwiththesharpconflictovertheCER,therailroadunderthejointadministrationoftheUSSRandChina.The
chairmanoftheboardoftheCER(thetaipanoftherailway)wasappointedbytheChinese,andtheadministratoroftherailroadwasaSovietcitizen.Otherpositions
wereheldbybothSovietandChinesecitizens.
On10July1929,theChinesepoliceoccupiedtheCERcentraltelegraphstationandarrestedanumberofSovietofficials.ThetaipandemandedthattheSoviet
administrator,A.I.Yemshanov,turnovertheadministrationoftherailroadtoChineseappointees.WhenYemshanovrefused,hisaide,Eismont,andotherofficials
wereexpelledfromChina.Thenewdirector,hisassistant,andotherofficialswereappointedbythetaipan.ManySovietcitizenswerearrested.Anarmedconflict
brokeoutontheSovietChineseborder.
On16August1929,theUSSRbrokeoffdiplomaticrelationswithChina.Thatsamemonth,byorderoftheRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,theSpecialFarEast
Armywasformed.MilitaryunitsweredeployedalongtheSovietChineseborder.Togetherwiththisdisplayofforce,therewereattemptstosettletheconflict
peacefully.WiththeintercessionoftheGermanambassadortoMoscow(GermanyundertooktodefendChineseinterestsintheUSSRandSovietinterestsinChina),
theSovietandChinesegovernmentstriedtocomeupwithadeclarationresolvingtheconflictinlateAugust.TheattemptfailedthestumblingblockwastheSoviet
government'srefusaltoappointanewCERadministratorandassistant.MoscowagreedtoreconsiderthematterofreplacingYemshanovandEismontonlyifthe
Chinesegovernmentwouldappointa"newchairmanoftheboard[taipan]toreplacethecurrentone,whoisdirectlyresponsibleforviolatingtheagreementandfor
aggressiveactionsontheCER."1TheChinesegovernmentrejectedthisstipulation.
Bothsideshadreasontobeuncompromisingandtodragoutthetalks.FromStalin'sletters,itbecomesevidentthathewascountingonprovokinganuprisingin
Manchuriabydispatchingspecialmilitarydetachmentstotheregion.InearlyOctober,Soviettroops
1.

DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR(DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy),vol.12(Moscow,1967),489.

Page148

commencedactivemilitaryoperations.InNovember,theChinesesufferedadefeatinManchuria.
On19November1929,A.Simanovskii,aSovietofficialinKhabarovsk,receivedfromaChineseofficialinHarbin,Ts'aiYunshan,astatementthathewasauthorized
toopentalksimmediatelytosettletheSovietChineseconflict.On22November,SimanovskiireportedtoTs'aithattheSovietgovernmentadvocatedapeaceful
settlementoftheconflictbutthattheChinesegovernmenthadtofulfillsomepreliminaryconditions:toofficiallyconsenttorestoringthestatusoftheCERthathad
existedpriortotheconflict,torestoretherightsofYemshanovandEismont,andtoimmediatelyreleaseallarrestedSovietcitizens.
TheChineseacceptedalltheSovietdemands.Asaresultofthenegotiations,apreliminaryprotocolendingtheSovietChineseconflictwassignedinNikolsk
Ussuriyskon3December1929.2On22December,theKhabarovskprotocolontherestorationoftheCER'spriorstatuswassigned.
AmongStalin'sconcernsin1929,thestrugglewiththeBukharingroupfiguredprominently.Inspiteofthepoliticaldefeatofthe"rightists"inApril1929atboththe
plenumoftheCentralCommitteeandtheXVIPartyConference,Bukharin,Rykov,andTomskiipreservedsomeauthorityinthepartystateapparat.Allofthem
remainedmembersofthePolitburo.Inaddition,RykovoccupiedthehighgovernmentpostsofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsandchairmanoftheLabor
DefenseCouncil.The"rightists"remainedongoodpersonaltermswithmanymembersofthePolitburo.ThisstateofaffairsinthePolitburoandthepositionofthe
BukharingroupprovidethebackgroundforunderstandingVoroshilov'slettertoOrdzhonikidzeof8June1929.
Moscow,8June1929
DearFriend,
Iamextremelygladtohearaboutyourgeneralconditionandthatyourwoundishealingwell.Everythingisgoingwellandthesunwillmakeupforwhatthe"oldbod"finds
difficulttohandle.Iknowthatyou'remadatmeforbeingsilent.Pleasenote,however,mygreatfriend,thatneitherUnshlikhtnor[S.S.]Kamenev(mydeputies)arehere,andIam
takingtherapallalone.Ofcoursethiscircumstanceisnojustification,
2.

Ibid.,59496,6012.

Page149
butstillyoumustbemoreindulgentwithme.What'sgoingonwithouraffairs?Ithinkyouknoweverythingthat'sinterestingandimportantfromKoba[Stalin],andtherestis
beingreportedfairlyaccuratelybythenewspapers.ItwillhardlybenewstoyouthatBugarin3hasbeenappointedtotheScientificTechnicalAdministrationoftheSupreme
EconomicCouncil.Theinformationwaspublishedinthenewspapers.Thenewspapersjustdon'tknowthedetailsthataccompaniedthis"act."Thecorrespondentsofthe
bourgeoisEuropeannewspapersexplainBukharin'sappointmentashisremovalfrompolitics,ashisdismissalfromtheleadership.Therearequiteafewpeopleinourcountrywho
thinkthesamething.ButinrealityBukharinbeggedeveryonenottoappointhimtotheCommissariatofEducationandproposedandtheninsistedonthejobasadministratorof
scienceandtechnology.Isupportedhiminthat,asdidseveralotherpeople,andbecausewewereaunitedmajoritywepusheditthrough(againstKoba).NowIsomewhatregret
myvote.Ithink(Ifear)thatBukharinwilldirectlyorindirectlysupporttheideathatthiswasaremovalfrompower.Mikhail[Tomskii]isstillatlooseends.Forthetimebeing,he
hasbeennominatedtotheCentralUnionofConsumerOrganizations,butneitherTomskiinorLiubimovisespeciallysympathetictothatidea.Thereisnowtalkofnominating
Liubimovcommissaroffinance,andifthatgoesthrough,thenitisquitelikelythatTomskiiwillhavetogototheCentralUnionofConsumerOrganizations.
AtthelastPolitburomeeting,arathernastyaffairbrokeoutbetweenBukharinandme.TheChineseaffairwasbeingdiscussed.Somefavoredademonstrationofmilitaryforceon
theManchurianborder.Bukharinspokeoutsharplyagainstthis.InmyspeechImentionedthatatonetimeBukharinhadidentifiedtheChineserevolutionwithourstosuchan
extentthattheruinoftheChineserevolutionwasequivalenttoourruin.Bugarinsaidinreplythatwehaveallsaiddifferentthingsatdifferenttimes,butonlyyou,Voroshilov
alone,hadadvocatedsupportforFengandChiangKaishek,whoarepresentlyslaughteringworkers.ThisunpardonablenonsensesoinfuriatedmethatIlostmyselfcontroland
blurtedoutinNikolashka's[Bukharin's]face,"Youliar,bastard,I'llpunchyouintheface,"andothersuchnonsenseandallinfrontofalargenumberofpeople.Bukharinistrash
andiscapableoftellingthemostvilefabricationsstraighttoyourface,puttinganespeciallyinnocentanddisgustinglyholyexpressiononhisever
3.

LiterallyBukhashka,aplayonBukharin'snamewiththeRussianwordbukashka,orinsectTrans.

Page150
lastinglyJesuiticalcountenancethisisnowcleartome,but,still,Ididnotbehaveproperly.
Butthetroubleismynerves.Thedamnedthingsgetmeintotrouble.Afterthisscene,BukharinleftthePolitburomeetinganddidnotreturn.Tomskiididnotreactatall.Rudzutak,
whowaschairman,shouldhavecalledmetoorder,Ithink,butgotbywithjustmumblingsomething.4

ItishardtosaytowhatextentStalinfearedthathistoovigorousandharshattacksonthe"rightists"wouldprovokeacounterattackinthePolitburoandpushhis
waveringsupporterstowardBukharin.Asusual,Stalinspentalongtimepreparing,stepbystep,forthefinalblowagainsttheBukharingroup.Bukharinwasremoved
fromthePolitburoinNovember1929Tomskii,inJuly1930andRykov,inDecember1930.Ineachcase,theirremovalwasprecededbyacampaignofharassment
andprovocation.Bukharinwasthemaintargetoftheseattacksin1929.
TheexcuseforthelatestattacksagainstBukharinwashisspeechattheAllUnionCongressofAtheists(Pravda,12June1929)andthepublicationofalongarticle,
"TheTheoryof'OrganizedMismanagement'"([Teoriia"organizovannoybezkhoziaistvennosti"],Pravda,30June1919).
On8July1929,thePolitburopassedthefollowingresolution:
a)ToconsiderthatCom.Bukharin'sspeechattheantireligiousCongressandhisarticle"OrganizedMismanagement"isacontinuationinmaskedformofthestruggleagainstthe
partyanditsCentralCommittee.
b)ToproposetotheeditorsofPravdaandotherorgansofthepartypressthattheresolutionoftherecentCentralCommitteeplenumbefollowedandthatsucharticlesand
speechesnotbepublishedinthefuture.5

Bukharintriedtoresist.On22July1929,hesentthefollowinglettertoallthePolitburomembersandcandidatemembersandalsotoYe.M.Yaroslavskii.
DearComrades,
IreceivedanexcerptfromthePolitburo'sdecisionsof8July1929thatpartlydealswiththeagendaitem"Onthearticleandspeechof
4.

RTsKhIDNIf.85,op.1/s.d.110,ll.120b.

5.

Ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.748,l.5.

Page151
Com.Bukharin."Accordingtothisdecision,thepublishingof"sucharticlesandspeeches"isprohibitedbyvirtueof"theresolutionoftherecentCentralCommitteeplenum"
becausethespeechattheantireligiouscongressandthearticleabout[Hermann]Bente'sbooksupposedlyrepresent"inmaskedform''a"struggleagainstthepartyanditsCentral
Committee."
Thisextraordinarydecision,whichiswithoutprecedentinthehistoryoftheparty,appearstometobeprofoundlyunjustforreasonsofbothsubstanceandform.
IgavethespeechattheCongressofAtheists,inaccordancewiththePolitburo'sresolution,onbehalfoftheCentralCommitteeoftheparty.Inordertoavoidtheslightest
misunderstanding,IaskedCom.Yaroslavskii,whowas,asisknown,aspeakerontheinternalpartyquestionattheCentralCommitteeplenumandthereforeafairlycompetent
personregardingthedecisionsoftheplenumonthismatter,togivehispreliminaryconsenttoanoutlineofthisspeechafterIgavethespeech,thecounciloftheatheist
congress,whosechairmanistheverysameCom.Yaroslavskii,decreedbyspecialdecisionthatthespeechshouldbeprintedasapamphlettheeditorsofPravda,headedby
Com.Krumin,alsofoundnothinginthespeechthatwouldcontradictthepartylinefinally,afterall,IpersonallyparticipatedinoneofseveralsessionsofthePolitburoafterthe
speechwaspublished,andnooneexpressedanynegativereactiontowardit.Unfortunately,thePolitburodoesnotindicatehowthespeechdepartsfromthepartyline,a
departurethatwasnotnotedbyanyoneforapproximatelysixweeks.
Thearticle"TheTheoryof'OrganizedMismanagement'"didnotdealatallwithissuesthatwereasubjectofdisputeattheplenum,andIcannotunderstandwhatcouldbethe
disagreementwiththepartyline.ThisarticlewasprintedafterthesecondreforminPravda'seditorialstaff,thatis,afterthecreationofaninternalcollegiumofCom.Yaroslavskii,
Krumin,andPopov.Theyapparentlyfoundnothinginthearticlethatwouldcontradictthepartylineandthedecisionsofthelastplenum,which,ofcourse,werealsosupported
byCom.Yaroslavskii,amemberoftheinternalcollegium.
Fromallofthisitfollowsthatwithoutanypreciseindicationofwhatmakesmyspeechandarticleincorrect,theeditorialstaff,whichhadnotnotedtheseinaccuracies,hasbeen
told,ineffect,nottoplaceasingleotherarticleundermybyline.Ifthisiswhatisintended,thenIwouldaskthePolitburotopassadirectandpreciseresolutiononthissubject,
which,ofcourse,willbeacceptedbymeformyinformationandguidance.
Withcomradelygreetings,
N.Bukharin6
6.

Ibid.,d.753,l.12.

Page152

ThatsamedayBukharinsenttothemembersofthePolitburoandtheCentralControlCommissionpresidiumacommunicationregardingsomelettersfromthe
KomsomolmemberG.Platonov(aclearprovocationorganizedagainstBukharin).
DearComrades,
InconnectionwiththelettersfromtheKomsomolmemberG.PlatonovthathavebeendistributedbyCom.Stalin,7ImustexpressmyprofoundregretthattheCentralCommittee
Secretariatdidnotfirstaskmeaboutthiscase.Platonov'slettersrepresenttheproductofthefantasyofamentallyillpersonhisaccountofaconversationwithmeisextremely
dissimilartotheactualconversationIwouldexpressitfarmoresharplyifitwerenotaquestionofamentallyillperson....
G.PlatonovtwicetriedtomeetwithmeinTeberda,andtwiceIrefusedbecausehemadeanentirelystrangeimpression.Thethirdtimeheapproachedmeandstatedcategorically
thatImustspeaktohimnomatterwhat,thathewasseverelyill,thathesufferedfromseverenervousattacks,thathehadjustsufferedsuchanattackbeforecomingtoseeme,
thathehadescapedfromtheobservationofadoctor,andsoon.Aftersuchanintroduction,Icouldnotsendhimhome,becausehehadtocalmdown.Foranhourandahalfhe
pouredouttomethedetailsofhisfamilylife(hisfatherwasamissionary,hiswifeisofbourgeoisbackground,hissurroundingsarebourgeois),theconstantconflicts,his
(Platonov's)"fanaticism"(andimmediatelythelackofdeterminationtobreakwithhisbourgeoissurroundings,andsoforth,andsoon).Ingreatagitationhethentoldmeabout
theBakuaffair(aboutwhichIdidnothavetheslightestnotion),abouttheexecutionofworkersbytheheadsoftheGPU,abouttheforgeryofdocumentsbytheGPU,aboutthe
judicialprotectionofCommunistsguiltyofrapingsomeschoolgirl,abouttheconcealingofalltheseaffairsfromthemasses,aboutthecoverupoftheexecutionofthe
conspiratorsnextfollowedstoriesabouttheuprisinginGandzhe,therebellionintheKononovosettlement,wheretroopssupposedlyrefusedtoact,andsoon.Itoldhimthat
theseaffairswerenotknowntomeatall.ThenPlatonovbegantogetoutragedatthe"uglymethodsofstruggle"againstmepersonally,begantotellmefactsaboutthisarea,
statingthathedidnotagreewiththem,thathecouldnotunderstandit,andsoon.Displayingcom
7.

Thelettersweresentouton19JulyfortheinformationofthemembersandcandidatemembersoftheCentralCommittee,themembersoftheKomsomolCentralCommittee
Bureau,andthemembersofthepresidiumoftheCentralControlCommission(annotationtothedocument).

Page153
pletefamiliaritywiththe"rednotebooks"(thetranscriptofthejointmeetingsofthePolitburoandtheCentralControlCommissionpresidiumandtheplenums)and,inparticular,
withmyspeeches,PlatonovaskedmeifIhadmadevariousproposals(aboutindividualtaxation,grainimports,regionalprices,andsoon).Inreplyingaffirmativelytothese
questions,Iliterallytoldhimthefollowing:ThedecisionsofthepartyanditsCentralCommitteearebindingforeveryone.Therecanbenoquestionoffactionalstruggle.Iam
obligedtodefendthepartydecisionsandwillalwaysdoso,notbecauseIvalue"ranksandorders"andnotbecauseI"recant''butbecausethatisthebasisofpartylife,
especiallyatsuchadifficultmomentasforthemethodsofstruggleagainstme,politicsisahardthing,youhavetoreconcileyourselftothat.He,Platonov,shouldcalmdown
andnottalkaboutany"uglymethods"andshouldnotspeakoutabouthis"doubts"butshouldgettreatmentheshouldbreakofffromhisbourgeoissurroundings.
Thatwastherealcontentofthe"chat."Theentirepointoftheconversationfrommysidewastocalmthesickfellowdown,toremindhimconstantlyofhis"fanaticism,"to
emphasizethatheshouldsay[tohisbourgeoissurroundings]"thehellwithyou,"andsoon.VirtuallythenextdayPlatonovsuddenlydisappeared.
Ithinkthepictureiscompletelyclear.Thebourgeoisfamily,the"religiousbackground,"andsoonpreventPlatonovfrom"advancing."Withthemaniacalzealofa"fanatic,"he
decidedtolookgoodduringthepurgeandcoverupany"religiousbackground,"sincerelybelieving,inallprobability,thatthiswouldbedonethrougha"sensationalexpos."It
iseasytoseethat[inhisletters]allofhisaccountistakenfromthe"rednotebooks"[andnotfromourconversation]andthatdespiteacertainabilitytorecreateargumentsfrom
thenewspapers,thereareobvioussignsofillnessevenintheletters(thementionoffanaticism,thedemandthatCom.Stalinreply,thedesireaftertheletter!tocorrespond
withme,therepeatedreferencestoreligiousbackground,andsoon).Ithinkthathislettershouldmostlikelybesenttohispersonalphysician.Iwriteallthisonthepremisethat
Platonovwasnotfeigningattacksandsoon.Ifthatisnotthecase,thenthepictureisdifferentbutnolessclear.Icannothelpbutnotethattheletterofasickpersondirected
againstamemberofthePolitburowassentouttomanyaddresseeswithoutthatPolitburomembereverbeingasked.
Withcomradelygreetings,
22July1929
N.Bukharin

Page154
8

P.S.IaskyoutodistributethisreporttothesameaddresseestowhichthelettersfromPlatonovweresent.

AfterStalin'slettertoMolotovof9August(letter40),inwhichBukharin'slettersweredescribedas"underhanded,"thePolitburo,on13August1929,passedthe
followingresolutionbyvoicevote,"OntheLettersofCom.Bukharinof22July1929."
Toapprovethefollowingresolution:
ThetworecentlettersfromCom.Bukharinof22July1929,addressedtotheCentralCommittee,testifythatCom.Bukharincontinuestousethemethodofstrugglewiththeparty
anditsCentralCommitteechosenbyhimoflate,makingindirectsortiesagainstdecisionsoftheCentralCommittee(in"private"conversations:the"chat"withCom.Kamenevand
nowthe''chats"withtheKomsomolmemberCom.Platonovandothers)andpermittinghimselffurthermaskedattacksonthepartylineinspeechesandarticles("Notesofan
Economist,"thenthespeech"ThePoliticalTestamentofLenin,"andrecentlythespeechattheAllUnionCongressofAtheistsandthearticle"TheTheoryof'Organized
Mismanagement'").Furthermore,eachtimethepartycatchesCom.Bukharinatthis,hesquirmsoutofadirectanswerandanadmissionofhismistakesandinrealitycoversthem
up.RegardingthetworecentlettersfromCom.Bukharin,thePolitburomuststatethefollowing:
a)InvaindoesCom.BukharinpretendnottounderstandthedecisionsofthePolitburocondemninghisarticle"TheTheoryof'OrganizedMismanagement.'"First,inthisarticle,
Com.BukharinmakesthesamemistakeinevaluatingthedevelopmentofcapitalismthatwaspointedoutatthelastplenumoftheComintern:"Thereconcilers'notionaboutthe
waningofinternalcontradictionswithincapitalistcountriesandthepossibilityoforganizingthedomesticmarketwhilepreservinganarchyonlyintheworldmarketisrefutedby
theentiredevelopmentofcapitalismduringthepastyearsandinrealitymeansacapitulationtoreformistideology."
Second,undercoverofthe"analogy"betweentheproletariandictatorship'smethodofeconomicmanagementandthemethodsusedbycontemporarycapitalistmonopolies,Com.
BukharinessentiallycontinueshisdefenseofviewscondemnedattheAprilplenumoftheCentralCommittee,thuscontinuinghisbattleagainsttheparty'spolicyofanintensified
offensiveagainstthecapitalistelementsandtheir
8.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.753,ll.1314.

Page155
removal.Hisactionscanonlynourishtheillusionsofcapitalistelementsaboutaretreatfromtheproletariat'ssocialistoffensive.
b)Com.BukharinalsopretendsthathisspeechattheCongressofAtheistsdoesnotcontradictthelineofthepartyanditsCentralCommittee.Meanwhile,inreality,undercover
oftheslogan"Doubteverything,"deployedbyMarxtodestroycapitalismandoverthrowthebourgeoisgovernment,Com.Bukharinisengagedinspreadingunbelief[nedoverie]
inthegenerallineoftheparty,whichpromotesthetriumphantconstructionofsocialism.Thus,insteadofhelpingtomobilizethebroadmassesofworkersundertheCommunist
banneroftheworkingclass,inthisspeech,Com.BukharincompletelyviolatestheMarxistmethodofdialecticsfurthermore,hecontinueshisstruggleagainsttheparty
leadership.Hisviewsreflectthevacillationsofpetitbourgeoissegments[ofthepopulation].Thesevacillationsareinevitablewhenclasswarfareisaggravatedduringthe
offensiveagainstcapitalistelements.
c)AlthoughnotbelievingitnecessarytodwellonBukharin's"justifications"regardinghis"chat"withKomsomolmemberG.Platonov,theCentralCommitteecannotoverlookthe
factthatevenCom.Bukharin'sletterwithoutdwellinghereontheunworthyattacksontheCentralCommitteeconfirmsthatheisusinganyexcusetocontinuethebattle
againsttheparty'spolicy.9

YetanotherconflictbetweentherightoppositionandStalinbrokeoutoverthereorganizationofPravda'seditorialstaff.InJune1929,thePolitburodisbandedthe
positionofmanagingeditor(otvetstvennyiredaktor)ofPravda(BukharinhadheldthepostuntilApril1929)andcreatedaseparateeditorialcollegiumtodirectthe
ongoingworkatthenewspaper.ThecollegiumconsistedofKrumin,Popov,andYaroslavskii.Severaldayslater,Rykov,Bukharin,Uglanov,Krupskaia,andothers
submittedastatementprotestingthedecisiontotheCentralCommittee.
TothesecretaryoftheCentralCommitteeoftheparty:
OntheissueoftheorganizationandcompositionoftheeditorialstaffofPravda:Ivotedagainstitforthefollowingreasons.
1.Thepresenteditorialstaff(Coms.Yaroslavskii,Krumin,Popov)includesnotasinglememberoftheCentralCommittee.Fortheentirehistoryofourparty(exceptforthetime
whentheeditorialstaffofthecentralorgan[partynewspaper]waschosenbyacongressalongwith
9.

Ibid.,ll.7,8.

Page156
theCentralCommittee),highlyauthoritativemembersoftheCentralCommitteehaveheadedthecentralorgan.ThisisallthemorenecessaryandpossiblenowbecausetheCentral
Committeehasmanymoremembersthaneverbefore.
2.Com.Yaroslavskiiisthemostpopularfigureamongthethree.ManyinthepartywillplacethemajorresponsibilityforrunningPravdaonhim.Buthe(Com.Yaroslavskii)isalso
oneofthetopofficialsoftheCentralControlCommissionandisamemberofitspresidium.
InhisworkatPravdaaschiefmemberoftheinnercoreoftheeditorialstaff,heiscompletelysubordinatetotheCentralCommitteeandisresponsibletoitforthecentralorgan.As
amemberoftheCentralControlCommissionpresidium,herepresentsanorganelectedbytheCongress,responsible[directly]totheCongress,andpossessingoversight
functions[andthusindependentoftheCentralCommittee].IthinkthatsuchapositiondoesnotcorrespondtothespiritofthepartyrulesandtotheLeninistprinciplesof
organizationoftheCentralControlCommission.
3.ThePolitburoresolutiondoesnotcontainanydirectivesaboutdividingfunctionsbetweenafulleditorialstaffandaninnercirclewithinit,justastherearenodirectivesto
dividethedutiesamongthethreemembersofthisinnereditorialcollegium.Suchasituationcouldcauseuncertaintyabouttheworkandresponsibilityofeachmemberofboththe
fulleditorialcollegiumandtheinnercircle.
4.Theonememberofthethree(theactualeditorialstaff)whocandevoteallhistimetotheeverydaydirectionofthecentralorganis,atthePolitburo'ssuggestion,arecent
Menshevik,Com.Popov.IdonotobjecttogivingformerMensheviksagreatdealofwork,butIcategoricallyopposegrantingthemthepoliticalroleassociatedwithguidingthe
workofthecentralorgan.ThisfactorisparticularlyimportantnowthatsucholdpartymembersandcentralorganworkersasMariiaIlinichnaUlianovahavebeenremovedfrom
theleadershipofthenewspaper.
5.ThelastCentralCommitteeplenumdecidedtodismissCom.Bukharinfromtheeditorshipofthecentralorgan,butbeforeIleftMoscow,neithertheplenumnorthePolitburohad
discussedthequestionofchangingtheactualorganizationofthecentralorgan'seditorialstaffandofeliminatingtheinstitutionofthemanagingeditor.
Ithinktheoldsystemwasmoresuitable:amanagingeditorchosenbytheCentralCommitteeplenumandacollegiumunderhim(orevenbetter,twoassistantsunderhim).
Becauseoftheexceptionalsignifi

Page157
canceofthecentralorganintheleadershipofthepartyandthecountry,themanagingeditormustbeoneofthemembersorcandidatemembersofthePolitburo.
22June1919
WithCommunistgreetings,
A.I.Rykov
Ivoteagainstthisproposal.
Reasons:
1)Thereisnojustificationforeliminatingthepositionofmanagingeditor.
2)ThereisnotasinglememberoftheCentralCommitteeontheeditorialstaff,whichmeansadrasticnarrowingoftheroleofthecentralorganandiswithoutprecedent.
3)ThereisalsonoCentralCommitteememberintheinternal"working"collegium,whereasCom.YaroslavskiiisamemberoftheCentralControlCommission,anorganthatis
supposedtomaintainoversight.
4)M.I.Ulianovahasbeenvirtuallyremovedfromthejob,althoughsheisalongtimeemployeeofPravdaandinitiatedtheworkers'correspondents'movement.10Nopreliminary
discussionwasheldwithher.
5)Com.Maretskiihasbeendismissed.
6)N.N.Popovhasbeenbroughtin,whowasaMenshevikduringthecivilwar.
N.Bukharin
Idonotobjecttotheeditorialcollegium,but,insteadofCom.Popov,IvoteforCom.M.I.Ulianovaasamemberoftheeditorialcollegium.
6/12
Kotov
IvotefortheinstitutionofamanagingeditorandagainstdismantlingthispositionIabstainregardingtheproposedstaffoftheeditorialcollegiumofPravda.
Kulikov
10.

Theworkers'correspondents(Rabkor)werefactoryworkerswhoprovidednewspaperswithstoriesofachievementsandabusesintheirfactories.Themovementbeganin
1923U.S.Ed.

Page158
1)Ivoteagainsteliminatingthepositionofmanagingeditorandcreatinganeditorialcollegium.
2)Iabstainregardingthecompositionoftheeditorialstaff.
6/12/29
N.Uglanov
1)Inthepast,therewereeditorialstaffswithoutmanagingeditors,butIhesitatetojudgewhetheritispossibletogetbywithoutamanagingeditornow.Moreover,evenwhenno
onewascalledthemanagingeditor,suchapersonalwaysexistedinpractice.2)Theeditorialstaff(expanded)consistsofmanyverybusyofficialswhocannotreallyserveas
morethanconsultants,andevensotheyarenottheonlyconsultants,ofcourse.Pravdarequiresaverythoroughcoverageofallissueseveryoneexpectsnolessfromit.3)I
abstainregardingthequestionofasmallereditorialstaff.
6/12/29
N.Krupskaia11

On6September1929,thePolitburopassedaresolutionbyvoicevote,"OnPravda'seditorialstaff":
TothemembersandcandidatemembersoftheCentralCommitteeoftheparty.
CopytothepresidiumoftheCentralControlCommissionoftheparty.
InconnectionwiththedistributionofastatementsubmittedtotheCentralCommitteebyComs.Rykov,Bukharin,andotherscontainingreasonsfortheirvotesonthequestionof
Pravda'seditorialstaff,thePolitburoconsidersitnecessarytoaddressinparticularthereasoningofCom.Rykov,whorepeatsinmoredetailedformthereasoningofCom.
Bukharinonthisquestion.
1.ThePolitburostatesthatCom.Rykov'sprotestagainstreplacingoftheindividualeditorofPravdawithaneditorialcollegiumisthoroughlymisleading.Com.Rykovstatesthat
previouslythecentralorganwasheadedbyauthoritativeCentralCommitteemembersthiscannotinanywayconcealtherealityofthecompletelyintolerableestrangementof
PravdafromtheCentralCommitteesincelastyear,eventhoughitwasformallyheadedbyaPolitburomember,Com.Bukharin.Infact,Com.Rykov'sreferenceto"authoritative"
CentralCommitteemembersisonlyarottenattempttoconcealthefactthat
11.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.756,ll.18,19.

Page159
beginninginthesummerof1928,agroupofyoungcomradeswhowerecompletelyuntestedinthepartyandhardlyauthoritativebegantorunPravda:Slepkov,Maretskii,andYe.
Tseitlin(Com.Bukharin'spersonalsecretary).CentralCommitteemembersknowverywellthatintheperiod19281929,Pravda'sLeninistpartylinewasupheld,notbecauseof
Com.Bukharin'spresenceasmanagingeditor,butratherbecauseofthechangeinPravda'seditorialcollegiumlastAugust,withtheappointmentofComs.KruminandSavelev,
andalsobecauseofthedirect,dailyguidancefromtheCentralCommittee.
2.ThePolitburostatesthatCom.Rykov'sstatement(aswellasthatofCom.Bukharin)concerningthe"removal"ofCom.M.I.Ulianovafromthedirectionofthenewspaperis
false.Com.Ulianovaisstillamemberoftheeditorialcollegiumjustasbefore,sheisthesecretaryoftheeditorialstaff.Itshouldbeaddedthatpriorto1928,Com.Ulianovawas
notamemberofPravda'seditorialcollegium.
3.ThePolitburonotesCom.Rykov'sunworthyattack(andalsothatofCom.Bukharin)onCom.N.N.Popov.Inaddition,thePolitburonotesthat(inAugust1928)Com.Popov
wasunanimouslyconfirmedasamemberoftheeditorialstaffofanotherleadingorganoftheparty,Bolshevikin1924,atthesuggestionofComs.BukharinandSkvortsov
Stepanov,hewasbroughtontothePravda'seditorialstaff.
4.ThePolitburoiscompelledtomakespecialmentionofCom.Rykov'sstatementthattheconfirmationoftheCentralControlCommissionpresidiummemberCom.Yaroslavskiiasa
memberofPravda'seditorialcollegiumsupposedly"didnotcorrespondtothespiritofthepartyrulesandtotheLeninistprinciplesoforganizationoftheCentralControl
Commission."Itiseasytoseethatinanattempttofindatleastsomesortofprincipledreasonforhiserroneousposition,Com.Rykovhas,intheend,losthiswaycompletely.
ThisisapparentevenfromCom.Rykov'sprotestagainst,ontheonehand,introducingintotheeditorialstaffonememberoftheCentralControlCommission(Com.Yaroslavskii)
and,ontheotherhand,notbringingintothisstaffanothermemberoftheCentralControlCommission(Com.Ulianova).Com.RykovnowobjectstoCom.Yaroslavskiibecausehe
isamemberoftheCentralControlCommissionpresidium,althoughpreviouslyhe[Rykov]himselfrepeatedlyvotedtotransferCom.YaroslavskiitoPravda'seditorialstaff.
Turningtoquestionsofprinciple,[weseethat]notonlydoCom.Rykov'sclaimshavenothingincommonwithbolshevism,buttheyarecompletelyidenticaltotheprevious
attemptsbytheTrotskyiststosee

Page160
theCentralControlCommissionandtheCentralCommitteeasinopposition.ThusitisapparentthatinthiscaseCom.Rykov'sreferencestothepartyrulesandthe"Leninist
principlesoforganizationoftheCentralControlCommission"onlyprovehisownlackofpoliticalprinciples.
SincethePolitburowasoccupiedwithanumberofcomplicatedandurgentmatters(theeconomy,theCER,BritishRussianrelations,etc.),itdidnothavetheopportunitytoreact
immediatelytothedocumentsofComs.Rykov,Bukharin,etal.
ThePolitburocannowstatethatthecorrectnessoftheCentralCommittee'sdecisionaboutthecompositionofPravda'seditorialstaffhasbeencompletelyand,infact,obviously
confirmedoverthepastmonths,duringwhichtimePravda'snecessarylinktotheCentralCommitteeanditscorrectpoliticallinehavebeenfullyensured.Asaresult,the
popularityofthecentralorganinthepartyandamongthebroadworkingmasseshasundeniablyincreased.
9/6/1929
PolitburooftheCentral
CommitteeoftheAllUnion
CommunistParty(Bolshevik)12

Stalin'snextmovewasalsoaimedatRykovandBukharin.ThepretextwasRykov'sspeechattheMoscowregionCongressofSoviets(Pravda,28September
1929).Intoneandcontentitwasthespeech,notofadisgracedoppositionfigure,butofaconfidentchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars.Theaudiencegreetedit,
accordingtoPravda,with"stormy,prolongedapplause."Stalin'sreactionfollowedimmediately.On30September,hewrotetoMolotov,Voroshilov,and
Ordzhonikidze(letter50)andproposedcondemningRykovandstrippinghimoftherighttochairPolitburomeetings.
SimultaneouslychargeswerereadiedagainstBukharininconnectionwiththesocalledVorobievaffair.On19September1929,atthepartycellattheIndustrial
AcademyoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil,areportfromcellmemberVorobievwasheard.In19281929,VorobievwasclosetothegroupofCommunistswho
supportedBukharin.ThisgroupmetattheapartmentofUglanov,asupporterofBukharinandthesecretaryoftheMoscowCityPartyCommittee,andincluded
Bukharin'spupils,Maretskii,Astrov,Zaitsev,Slepkov,andothers.Inthesecondhalfof1929,Vorobiev
12.

Ibid.,ll.8,1617.

Page161

wentovertoStalin'ssideandbegantotestifyaboutthe"factionalactivity"ofthe"rightists"intheMoscowPartyCommittee,reportingonthemoodsandcommentsof
thosearoundBukharinduringtheperiodofhisclashwithStalin.Vorobiev'sdetailedtestimonywasrecordedinthetranscriptofthecellmeetingattheIndustrial
AcademyandthensenttotheCentralCommittee.
On5October1929,thePolitburoreviewedtheVorobievaffairandRykov'sspeechandpassedageneralresolution.
a)TosendtotheCentralControlCommissionforreviewthematerialreceivedfromthebureauoftheIndustrialAcademycellandtheresolutionoftheMoscowCommittee.
(Approvedunanimously.)
b)TostatethatinCom.Rykov'sspeechattheMoscowregionCongressofSoviets,heoverlookedthecentralquestionoftheparty'spolicy.Com.Rykovdidnotemphasizethe
decisiveroleofthepartyinguaranteeingdespitetherightistsandtheappeasersoftherightdeviationandasaresultofthesystematicstrugglewiththemtheenormous
successesinfulfillingthefiveyeareconomicplan.Com.Rykovalsocompletelyoverlookedthequestionofthestrugglewiththerightdeviationanddidnotdisassociatehimself
fromtherightistsdespitethewellknownresolutionsofthepartyandtheComintern.Com.Rykovalsocompletelyoverlookedtheveryimportantquestionoftheparty'spolicy
concerninggrainprocurements,aboutwhichthepartyhadandcontinuestohaveradicaldisagreementswiththerightdeviationists.
AllofthisillustratesthatCom.RykovviolatedthedecisionoftheAprilplenumoftheCentralCommittee,whichemphasizedthattherightdeviationisthemaindangerintheparty
andobligedeachpartymember,especiallyCentralCommitteemembers,towageadeterminedstruggleagainsttherightdeviationandagainstanyappeasementofit.(Approved
byallexceptone,Com.Rykov.Com.Bukharinwasabsent.)13

Astheletterof7October1929(letter51)reveals,StalindecidedtouseVorobiev'stestimonyattheCentralCommitteeplenum.Vorobiev'scharges,amongother
materials,figuredinthereviewoftheBukharinquestionthattookplaceattheCentralCommitteeplenuminNovember1929.AsStalinhadintended,Bukharinwas
removedfromthePolitburo.
13.

Ibid.,d.761,l.6.

Page162

Letter39
[29July1929]
Com.Molotov,
ForMonday'sPolitburomeeting
IstronglyprotestpublishingSten'sarticleinKomsomolskaiapravda(seeKomsomolskaiapravda,no.169),whichissimilartoShatskin'sarticle,severaldays
afterthePolitburo'scondemnationofShatskin'sarticle.1 ,2 ThisiseitherstupidityonthepartoftheeditorsofKomsomolskaiapravda3 oradirectchallengetothe
CentralCommitteeoftheparty.TocallthesubordinationofKomsomols(andthatmeanspartymembersaswell)tothegeneralpartyline"careerism,"asStendoes,
meanstocallforareviewofthegeneralpartyline,fortheunderminingoftheirondisciplineoftheparty,fortheturningofthepartyintoadiscussionclub.Thatis
preciselyhowanyoppositiongrouphasbegunitsantipartywork.Trotskybeganhis"work"withthis.Zinovievgothisstartthatway.Bukharinhaschosenthissame
pathforhimself.TheShatskinAverbakhStenLominadzegroupisembarkingonthispath,demanding(essentially)thefreedomtoreviewthegeneralpartyline,the
freedomtoweakenpartydiscipline,thefreedomtoturnthepartyintoadiscussionclub.ForthistheShatskinStengroupistryingtoturnKomsomolskaiapravda
(ifithasnotalreadyturnedit)intoitsownbattleorgan.ForthisitistryingtoturnMolodaiagvardiia[Youngguard]intoitsowntheoreticaljournal.Forthis
KomsomolskaiapravdaiscounterposedtoPravda,andMolodaiagvardiia[is]counterposedtoBolshevik.Itistimetocallfororderanddisbandthisgroup,
whichisstraying,orhasalreadystrayed,fromthepathofLeninismtothepathofpetitbourgeois(Trotskyist)radicalism.Itistime,becauseonlyinthiswaycan
theseyoungcomradesbecorrectedandretainedfortheparty.
Itisnecessaryto:
1)ImmediatelytakeacloselookatthecompositionofthestaffsofKomsomolskaiapravdaandMolodaiagvardiiaandputattheirheadcomradeswhoare
experiencedintheparty4
2)CriticizetheideologicalvacillationsoftheShatskinStenAverbakhLominadzegroup5
3)ShowthattheSlepkovites6 andtheShatskinitesareassimilarastwopeasinapod.
Ithinkthatthesoonerwefinishwiththisaffair,thebetter.Todelaywouldmeanhurtingthecauseandperhapslosinganumberofyoungcomradeswhocouldbe
valuablepartyworkersinthefuture.Todelaywouldmeanallowingagroupthathasstrayedfromthepathtocorruptyoungcomradesandtogooncorruptingour
gloriousrevolutionaryyouthinthefuture.Thatwouldbecompletelyintolerable.
J.Stalin
29July1929

Page163

1.Ya.Sten,"VyshekommunisticheskoeznamiaMarksizmaLeninizma"(RaisehighthebannerofMarxismLeninism)L.Shatskin,"Doloipartiinuiu
obyvatel'shchinu"(Downwithpartyphilistinism),Komsomolskaiapravda(18June1929).Shatskin'sarticlewascondemnedinaresolutionofthePolitburoon22
July1929,andShatskinhimselfwasrelievedofhisdutiesasamemberoftheeditorialcollegiumofPravda(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.750,l.5).ThePolitburo
onceagainreturnedtothismatteron25July1929andproposedthattheeditorsofKomsomolskaiapravdaprovideanarticleclarifyingShatskin'serrorandthatthe
KomsomolBureaudiscussmeasurestostrengthenthenewspaper'seditorialstaff(ibid.,l.2).
2.AccordingtoStephenCohen,Sten,Shatskin,andLominadzewerethebestknownmembersof"agroupofradicalantiBukharinistssometimescalledthe'Young
StalinistLeft'[whohadbeen]protgsofStalinsincetheearlytwenties"(StephenF.Cohen,BukharinandtheBolshevikRevolution[NewYork,1971],45960).
ThisletterthusshowsStalin'simpatiencewithsignsofindependenceonthepartofhisownsupportersU.S.Ed.
3.KomsomolskaiapravdawastheofficialnewspaperoftheKomsomol,theparty'syouthorganizationU.S.Ed.
4.On15August1929,thePolitburoapprovedtheneweditorialcollegiumofKomsomolskaiapravdaproposedbytheKomsomolBureau.Thepositionof
managingeditorofthenewspaperwaseliminated.Thosedutieswerehandedtoacollegiumofthreewithintheeditorialstaff(ibid.,d.753,l.4).
5.On8August1929,thePolitburoapprovedaresolutionfromtheKomsomolonKomsomolskaiapravda.TheeditorsofPravdaandBolshevikwereaskedto
discussthemistakesinthearticlesbyStenandShatskin(ibid.,d.752,l.3).
6.StalinisreferringtoagroupofyoungtheoreticiansandjournalistswhosharedBukharin'sideologicalandtheoreticalviews.A.N.Slepkovwasoneofthebetter
knownrepresentativesofthisgroup.[Stalinisthereforeequating"left"and"right"deviationfromhis''generalline"U.S.Ed.]
Letter40
[9August1929]
Hello,Com.Molotov,1
VoroshilovandIhavediscussedyourletter(SergohaslongsinceleftforNalchik)andhavecometothefollowingconclusions.
OnEngland.IfHendersondoesnotprovideanewreason,intermsofaconcession(whichisratherunlikely),itwouldbebettertowaitonthequestionofEngland
untiladecisiveincreaseinthegrainprocurements[hasbeenattained],thatis,untilthemiddleorendofOctober.InmiddleorlateOctoberitwillbepossibleto
convenearegularsessionoftheCentralExecutiveCommittee,hearthereportfromtheCommissariatofForeignAffairs,andpasssomethinglikethefollowing
resolution:
"1)[TheCentralExecutiveCommittee]approvesthecourseofactionadoptedbytheCommissariatofForeignAffairs
2)Considersthattherearenogroundsforviolatingtheuniversalprincipleofpreliminaryestablishmentofnormaldiplomaticrelationsasthenecessarylegalbasisfor
theensuingsettlementofalldisputes,claims,andcounterclaims
3)AssignstheCouncilofCommissarsthetaskoforganizingadelegationtotheAngloSovietconference,assoonasambassadorsareexchanged."

Page164

Ithinkthisistheonlydecisionwecanmake.ToacceptHenderson'ssuggestionwouldmeanentanglingourselvesandpushingourselvesintoatrap.Toaccept
Henderson'ssuggestionwouldmean:
a)discouragingItaly,Germany,France,andtheotherswhorecognizeduswithoutpreliminaryconditionsandpushingthemtowardabreakwithus
b)strengtheningthoseelementsinAmericathatdonotwanttorecognizeus
c)justifyingthewaytheConservativesbrokewithus
d)helpingalltheDeterdingsandChamberlainstomovethefocusofattentionfromnormaleconomicrelationstothequestionofdebts,claimsofprivatepersons,and
propaganda
e)tacitlyagreeingtopaydebts,notonlytoEngland,buttoGermany,France,andsoonbecauseconsentingtoHenderson'sproposalwouldcreateaprecedentthat
everyonewoulddefinitelylatchonto
f)facilitatingthecreationofaunitedantiSovietfront.
Worsethanallthis,evenifweweretoagreetoHenderson'sproposal,wewouldnotachievetherestorationofrelationsbecausewewouldstillnotcometoan
agreementonthedisputedmatters,since[PrimeMinister]MacDonaldapparentlywantstodivergedramaticallyfromtheagreementof19242 andimpose
completelyunacceptabletermsonus.
NowHendersonandMacDonaldareexactlywherewewantthembecausewecanaccusethemofbeingmorebourgeoisthanthefascistsinItaly,thanthe
capitalistsinFranceandGermanywhorecognizeduswithoutanypreliminaryconditions.But(ifweacceptHenderson'sproposal)wewillbeexactlywherethey
wantus,becausetheywillaccuseusofnotvaluingthecauseofpeaceandthusnotmakingconcessionsonthedisputedmatters,andthentheywillsaythattheydon't
believeitispossibletorecognizetheUSSR.
ToacceptHenderson'sconditionsmeanstogetintoatrapourenemieshavesetforus.
TheproposeddraftresolutionoftheCentralExecutiveCommitteeisinmyviewtheonlyacceptableanswertothefraudofthebourgeoisieanditslackeysfromthe
"Labourgovernment."
RegardingBukharin(publicationoftheCominternresolutions,etc.),weareinfullagreementwithyou.3
Rakovskiishouldbesenttoanevenmoreremoteplacesothathecan'tlieanymoreabouttheBolsheviksinthepress.4
IconsiderbothofBukharin'sletterstobeunderhanded.ThisKadet5 professorapparentlydoesn'tunderstandthatyoucan'tfoolBolshevikswithsuchfraudulent
letters.HeisatypicalKadetlawyer.
ThebusinessofKomsomolskaiapravdacameoutquitewell.
That'sitfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
9August1929

Kalinin,Stalin,andVoroshilov

FirstpageofletterfromStalintoMolotov,10August1929(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.
5388,l.72).

Page165

1.Abovethetextoftheletterisanotation:"Readit.A.Mikoian,J.Rudzutak,Yaroslavskii,Kaganovich."
2.AgeneralagreementbetweentheUSSRandGreatBritainon8August1924(DokumentyuneshneipolitikiSSSR[DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy],vol.7
[Moscow,1963],60924).
3.Inaresolutionentitled"OnCom.Bukharin,"theXplenumoftheCominternExecutiveCommittee(319July1929)approvedtheCentralCommittee'sApril
decisiontoremoveBukharinfromtheworkoftheCommunistInternational.
4.Rakovskiiwasexpelledfromthepartyin1927.Whileinexile,hewroteanumberofarticlesforBiulleten'oppozitsii(Bulletinoftheopposition),whichwas
publishedabroadbyTrotsky.AfterStalin'sletter,RakovskiiwastransferredfromthelowerVolgaregiontoBarnaul[BarnaulisinwesternSiberia,southof
NovosibirskU.S.Ed.].
5.TheKadets,orConstitutionalDemocrats,weretheleadingliberalpartyinthedecadebeforetherevolutionU.S.Ed.
Letter41
[10August1929]
Hello,Com.Molotov,
IreadtheCentralCommittee'sdecreeongrainprocurements.1 Despiteallitsmerits,Ithinkitiscompletelyinadequate.Themainproblemwithgrainprocurements
atpresentis1)thepresenceofalargenumberofurbanspeculatorsatornearthegrainmarketwhotakethepeasants'grainawayfromthegovernmentandthe
mainthingcreateawaitandseeattitudeamongthegrainholders2)competitionbetweenprocurementorganizations,whichcreatestheopportunityforgrain
holderstobeobstinateandnotgiveupthegrain(whilewaitingforhigherprices),tohidethegrain,totaketheirtimeturningoverthegrain3)thedesireofawhole
numberofcollectivefarmstohidegrainsurplusesandsellgrainontheside.Thepresenceofthesefactorswhichwillgrowworseifwedon'ttakeemergency
measuresnowpreventsourprocurementsfromincreasing(andwillcontinuetodothis).Measuresoughttobetakennowagainstthisevilifwereallyarethinkingof
finishinguptheprocurementsinJanuaryorFebruaryandcomingoutofthecampaignasvictors.TheCentralCommitteedecreeshouldhavesaidthisfirstofall.But
thedecreeskirtsthisissueor,ifitdoesaddressit,mentionsitinpassing,andwhatissaidinthisregardislostintheendlessnumberofother(secondary)points,
liberallysprinkledthroughthewholesixfootlongdecree.I'mafraidthat,becauseofthewaythisisbeinghandled,wewillnotcollectenoughgrain.
Myadvice:
1)giveadirectiveimmediatelytothe[local]GPUstoimmediatelystartpunitivemeasuresregardingurban(andurbanrelated)speculatorsingrainproducts(thatis,
arrestthemanddeportthemfromgrainregions)inordertomakethegrainholdersfeelrightnow(atthebeginningofthegrainprocure

Page166

mentcampaign)thatlittlecanbegainedfromspeculation,thatthegraincanbegivenwithouttrouble(andwithoutloss)onlytostateandcooperativeorganizations
2)giveadirectiveimmediatelytothedirectorsofthecooperatives,Soiuzkhleb[stategrainpurchasingagency],OGPU,andthejudicialagenciestoexposeand
immediatelyhandovertothecourts(withimmediatedismissalfromtheirposts)allthoseprocurementofficialscaught[tryingtoobtaingrainbycompetingwithother
stateagencies],asindisputablyalienandNepmanelements(Idon'texclude"Communists")whohaveburrowedintoourorganizationslikethievesandhavemaliciously
helpedtowreckthecauseoftheworkers'state
3)establishsurveillanceofcollectivefarms(throughtheCollectiveFarmCenter,thepartyorganizations,theOGPU)sothatthosedirectorsofcollectivefarmscaught
holdingbackgrainsurplusesorsellingthemonthesidewillbeimmediatelydismissedfromtheirpostsandtriedfordefraudingthestateandforwrecking.
Ithinkthatwithouttheseandsimilarmeasures,wewillfailinourjob.
Otherwisewewillgetonlyspeechesandnoconcretemeasurestohelpgrainprocurement.
PleaseshowthislettertoMikoian.
Ihopetherewon'tbeanydisagreementsamongusonthis.
Iforgottoreplyinthefirstlettertothequestionofthe"uninterruptedweek."Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthisideashouldbepromoted,brushingasidetheobjectionsof
Uglanovandotherwhiners.2 Thiswillbeoneofthegreatestachievementsofourproductionpolicyandpractice.
That'sitfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
10August1929
Iagreewholly.
Voroshilov
1.Stalinwasreferringtothedraftofthedecree"Ongrainprocurement,"whichwasapprovedinfinalformbythePolitburoon15August1929andwhich
incorporatedallofStalin'scomments.Thedecreeranasfollows(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.753,l.3):
InordertofulfillcompletelytheannualplanofgrainprocurementsforJanuaryFebruaryandtomaintainafirmpricepolicy,thePolitburodecrees:
a)TodirecttheOGPUtoimplementdecisivepunitivemeasuresregardingurbanandurbanrelatedprofiteersofgrainproducts.
b)ToobligeTsentrosoiuz,Khlebotsentr,andSoiuzkhleb[stategrainpurchasingagencies]toresolutelydirectalltheirofficestoimmediatelyremoveallpurchasing
officialscaughtengaginginpricecompetition,notexceptingCommunists,formaliciouslyharmingthecauseoftheworkers'state.ToinstructtheOGPUandjudicial
bodiestoissuethroughtheirchannelsadirectiveoncombatingcompetitionofthiskind.
ToproposethattheCommissariatofTransportandtheleadershipoftheunionsofrailandwatertransportworkers,alongwiththeCommissariatofTrade,takeadditional
measurestocurbgrainprofiteering.

Page167
c)ToproposethattheCollectiveFarmCentermaintainsurveillanceovercollectivefarms:thosedirectorswhohavebeencaughtholdingbacksurplusgrainorsellingit
onthesideshouldbeimmediatelyremovedfromofficeandtriedfordefraudingthegovernmentandforsabotage.HavetheCommissariatofTrade,theOGPU,andparty
organizationsensuretheimplementationofthisdecree.
d)Tosendthisdecreetoallpartyorganizationsintheregionswithgrainsurpluses.

2.Theuninterruptedworkweek(withasystemofrevolvingdaysoff)wasintendedtoincreasetheuseofequipment.Butthenepreryvka[theidiomaticnounformed
fromtheadjectivenepreryvnaia,"uninterrupted"]hadmanynegativeaspectsthatwerediscussedinaspeechmadeon22July1929atameetingoftheCommissariat
ofLaborchairedbyCommissarN.A.Uglanov.Onthefollowingday,UglanovsentareporttotheCouncilofCommissarsstatingthat"topassaresolutionatthe
presenttimeconcerninganoverallorevenpartialtransitiontotheuninterruptedweekwouldbeimpossible."On22August1929,thePolitburoapprovedthedraftof
aCouncilofCommissarsresolutiononthetransitiontotheuninterruptedworkweek(ibid.,d.754,l.2).
Letter42
[21August1929]
Hello,Com.Molotov,1
1)OnEngland.Litvinoviswrong.Litvinovdoesn'twanttounderstandthatHendersonhasreplacedthequestionofprocedurewiththequestionofasettlement
(andnotsimplynegotiations)ofdisputed(all!)questions.Toacceptthiswouldmeanlosingourdiplomaticgains,armingourenemies,anddrivingourselvesintoa
deadend.WhateverconversationsDovgalevskiimighthaveafterHenderson'sdeclarationandthereplyfromForeignAffairs,2 they(theconversations)wouldbe
portrayedasnegotiationsonthesubstanceofthematter,andwewouldendupinthemostridiculousposition.Ithinkthatthetransferoftheissuefromthepresidium
tothefullCentralExecutiveCommitteeisnotnecessary,becauseifHendersonbacksawayfromhisposition,theissuecanbecoveredinthepresidium,andifhe
doesn't,wecanresolvetheissueintheCentralExecutiveCommitteesessionitself(bypassingthepresidium),tacitlyproceedingfromthepremisethat"plenumofthe
presidium"meansaCentralExecutiveCommitteesession.Itwouldseemthenthatyourquestionabout"emphasizingthetransferoftheissuefromthepresidiumtothe
CentralExecutiveCommittee"nolongerarises.
2)OnAzerbaidzhan.3 Gikalomustbesupportedineverything,becauseheisrightfundamentally(hehasretainedanyonemoreorlesscapableofworkfromamong
theoldcadreofthelocalofficials).ArtakandShatunovskaiaviewMirzoian'sremovalbytheCentralCommitteeasavictoryforthem,justasShatskinviewsthe
party'svictoryovertherightistsashispersonalvictoryovertheSlepkovites.Thisisallnonsenseandstupidity.BothShatunovskaiaandArtakshouldbesentbackto
MoscowtotheCommunistAcademy4 (towhichtheyhadpreviouslybeenassignedandfromwhichtheyhavenowreturnedtoBaku"bydecisionoftheBakuparty
activists").NothinggoodcanbeexpectedfromtheminBaku.Whatcanbeexpectedfromthemisobvious

Page168

fromKrasnyi'sstupidarticleinKomsomolskaiapravdaaboutBaku5 (onceagainKomsomolskaiapravdaisstickingitsnoseinotherpeople'sbusiness!).Both
BuniatzadeandthechairmanoftheAzerbaidzhanCouncilofCommissarsmustbekept.6 (Asofficials,alltheShatunovskiisandArtaksputtogetheraren'tworthone
Buniatzade.)7 Bagirov(despitehispastsins)8 willhavetobeconfirmedaschairmanoftheChekainAzerbaidzhan:heisnowtheonlypersonwhocancopewiththe
Musavatists9 andIttikhadists10whohaverearedtheirheadsintheAzerbaidzhancountryside.Thisisseriousbusinessandthereshouldbenofoolingaround.Itistoo
bad(reallytoobad)aboutKasumov.Hewasoneofthebestofficials,capableofbecomingamajorofficialinthefuture.Pleasedonotsettlethematterofsendinghim
somewherewithoutmyinvolvement.11
3)OntheTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee.TheTranscaucasianCommitteeisnotprovidingleadershiptothenationalcentralcommittees[oftheindividual
republics].Itisincapableofleadingthem.Itmustbefundamentallypurgedandrenewed.Thisisacomplexmatter.Itwillhavetobepostponeduntilthefall.12
4)I.N.Smirnov's"statement"istrash.Thesegentlemenshouldn'tbegivenanyconcessionsalltheywanttodoistoescapefromArt.5813andthenbasethemselves
inMoscowfortheirwreckerist"work."14
5)You'rerightwhenyousaythatBukharinisgoingdownhill.It'ssad,butafact.Whatcanyousay?itmustbe"fate."It'sstrange,though,thathehopestotrickthe
partywithpettyunderhanded"maneuvers."Heisatypicalrepresentativeofthespineless,effeteintelligentinpolitics,leaninginthedirectionofaKadetlawyer.15The
hellwithhim...
6)ThePolitburohasadoptedmyproposalsconcerninggrainprocurement.Thisisgood,butinmyopinion,itisinadequate.Nowtheproblemisfulfillingthe
Politburo'sdecision.Thereisnoneedtoinsistthatallprocurementorganizations(especiallyinUkraine)willevadethisdecision.Furthermore,I'mafraidthatthelocal
GPUwillnotlearnaboutthePolitburo'sdecision,andit(thedecision)willgetboggeddowninthe"bowels"oftheOGPU.Therefore,itisnecessarytodemandthe
followingfromprocurementorganizations,theOGPU,theCollectiveFarmCenter,andsoforth:
a)copiesoftheirinstructionstosubordinateorgansconcerningthefulfillmentofthePolitburo'sdecisionb)regularreportseverytwoweeks(evenbetter,oncea
week)abouttheresultsofthefulfillmentofthedecisions.TheWorkerPeasantInspectionandtheCentralControlCommissionshouldbeinvolvedinthisaswell.I
don'tknowhowyouregardthismatterandtheoutlookforgrainprocurement(Mikoianprobablythinksthatsincethedecisionhasbeenreached,henowhas130
millionpoodsofanuntouchablereservesittinginthegrainelevators).ButIthinkthatourgrainprocurementsarestillpoor.Judgeforyourself:Forthefirsttendaysof
Augustwefulfilledonly15percentoftheplan.Letussaythatfortheremainingtwotendayperiodswewillfulfillnot15percentbut20percentoftheplanthisisstill
not

Page169

whatweneednow.I'mafraidthatthispoorpacewillbecomethestandardforfutureprocurements.Andgrainprocurementthisyearwillprovidethebasisfor
everythingwe'redoingifwefouluphere,everythingwillbewipedout.Andthedangerofafoulupwillgrowifwedon'tinsistthattheCentralCommittee'sdecision
befulfilledwithunrelentingfirmnessandruthlessness.16
7)PayseriousattentiontotheoilbusinessintheUrals.Itturnsouttheydecidedtoplaceonlytenderricksperyear.Thederrickequipmentislargelypercussive
ratherthanrotary,sothedrillingwillbemurderouslyslow.ThatmeansthattheSupremeEconomicCouncilandthe"chiefs"ofoilextractionagencies(Uralneft,Azneft
andGrozneft)aretreatingtheextractionofoilintheUralsapproximatelyasNobeltreatedUkhta.17Thisisamonstrosityandacrime.Ithinkwemusta)organize
nowaspecialtrust,"Uralneft,"freeingtheUralsfromits"chiefs''whoarepreparedtodelaytheextractionofoilthereb)putattheheadofUralneftanexperienced
Communist/oilman,afterkickingoutthewreckerDobrynskiifromtheUrals(IthinkhisnameisDobrynskii),whoisthecurrent"chief"ofGrozneft("what'sgodfor
youisnogoodforus")c)obligetheSupremeEconomicCounciltoerectbetweenfortyandeightyrotaryderricksthisveryyear.Withouttheseandsimilarmeasures,
thebusinesswillrunintoobstacles(orevenperish),andwewon'thaveanyrealnewprospectingintheUrals.18
Well,that'sitfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.OntheCottonCommittee.IhavereceivedinformationthatmembersoftheCottonCommitteeaswellasGosplanworkers(especiallytheCottonCommittee)
don'tbelieveinthecorrectnessofthePolitburodecisionsregardingtheincreaseinthecottonproductionfiveyearplan19andwanttodefeatitinpracticeinorderto
showtheyareright.Ifthat'strue(Ithinkthere'sagoodlikelihoodthatitis),itmustbeacknowledgedthatsuchan"idea"fromtheCottonCommitteemembersisthe
mostvileformofwreckinganddeservestheharshestpunishment.Ingeneral,Idon'tthinkthatMamaevhaslongtoliveasheadoftheCottonCommittee.20It's
possiblethathewillbeabletofreehimselffromtheoldtraditionalroutinesoftheCottonCommittee,butIthinkit'sunlikely.Thereforeitisentirelycorrectthatthe
CentralCommitteehasbeguntothinknowaboutprovidingtheMainCottonCommitteewithnew,outstandingworkers.IsupposeFushmanwillbegoodforthis.
Kharitonovwouldperhapsdo,ifheiscapableofhonestwork.Shaduntswouldbeverygood,butSergoadamantlyobjects.Thereforeitwouldbebettertogive
ReingoldtotheCottonCommitteeinsteadofShadunts.InplaceofFushmanandKharitonov,otherofficialsofequalvalueshouldbegiventotheWorkerPeasant
Inspection.21
J.Stalin
21August1929

Page170

1.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMikoian'snotation:"I'vereadit.A.M."
2.TheCommissariatofForeignAffairs'statementonthecourseofthenegotiationstorestorediplomaticrelationsbetweentheUSSRandGreatBritainwaspublished
intheSovietpresson2August1929(DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR[DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy],vol.12[Moscow,1967],42930).
3.ThereferenceistothestrugglewithintheleadershipoftheAzerbaidzhanCommunistParty.On1July1929,theissue"OntheBakuAffair"wasreviewedatthe
Politburoandthefollowingwasdecided(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.747,l.4):
b)RelieveCom.MirzoianfromhisdutiesassecretaryoftheAzerbaidzhanparty,recallhimimmediatelytotheCentralCommittee.Acknowledgethenecessityofreplacing
thetopofficialsoftheGPUandCentralControlCommissionofAzerbaidzhan,afterproposingthattheCentralCommitteeandtheCentralControlCommissionof
AzerbaidzhannominatenewcandidatesforthepostsofchairmenoftheCentralControlCommissionandtheGPUofAzerbaidzhanandsubmitthemforconfirmationto
theAllUnionCentralCommittee.RecommendCom.GikaloforthepostoffirstsecretaryoftheAzerbaidzhanparty.

On14August1929,GikalosentatelegramtotheCentralCommitteethatwasdiscussedatthePolitburoonthefollowingday.Theresolutionacknowledged"that
Com.Gikalo'sline,especiallywithregardtokeepingthebestTurkiccadres,iscorrect"(ibid.,l.4).
On26September1929,thePolitburoapprovedthedraftofdirectivestoimplementtheCentralCommittee'sdecreeregardingtheAzerbaidzhanCentral
Committeereport.ThedirectiveswerebasedonStalin'sinstructionsaspresentedinthecurrentletter(ibid.,d.759,l.9):
Atthesametimethatnewcadresarebeingpromoted,itisnecessarytopreserveineverywaypossibletheoldcadreswhohavepassedthroughtheBolshevistschool
theTurkicofficials,amongothers....SpecialattentionmustbepaidtosteppingupthestrugglewiththecounterrevolutionarypartiesofMusavatistsandIttikhadists
whoarerevivingtheiractivities.

4.BeginninginOctober1929,ArtakattendedgovernmentcoursesonMarxismLeninismandShatunovskaiawasastudentinsimilarcoursesrunbytheparty.
5.B.Krasnyi'sarticle"Partiinye'vospitateli'bakinskogokomsomola"(Theparty"educators"oftheBakuKomsomol)waspublishedinKomsomolskaiapravdaon
21August1929.HediscussedtheparticipationoftheAzerbaidzhanKomsomolleadershipintheconflictswiththeTranscaucasianPartyOrganization.
6.On16September1929,thePolitburoresolved:"NottocarryoutthechangesintheAzerbaidzhanCouncilofCommissars(chairman,Com.Musabekovdeputy
chairman,Com.Buniatzade)"(ibid.,d.758,l.6).
7.On30January1930,thePolitburoapprovedtheTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee'smotiontonominateBuniatzadetothepostofchairmanofthe
AzerbaidzhanCouncilofCommissarsandMusabekovtothepostofchairmanoftheAzerbaidzhanCentralExecutiveCommittee(ibid.,d.775,l.11).
8.On24September1929,atameetingoftheCentralControlCommission,thequestionoftheleadersoftheAzerbaidzhanPartyOrganizationwasconsidered.The
resolutiononBagirovranasfollows:"InformCom.Bagirovthatin1924,aschairmanoftheGPU,hedidnottakemeasuresagainsttheintolerablemethodsofthe
GPU,andwarnhimthataschairmanoftheAzerbaidzhanGPUhewillbearfullresponsibilityifsuchincidentsreoccurintheGPUapparat"(ibid.,f.613,op.1,d.90,
l.47).
9.Musavat[Equality],abourgeoisnationalpartyinAzerbaidzhanfrom1911to1920.WiththesupportofTurkeyandlaterofGreatBritain,thispartyremainedin
powerinAzerbaidzhanfromSeptember1918untilApril1920.AfterSovietrulewasestablished,itceasedtoexist.
10.Ittikhadists,membersoftheTurkishnationalistpartyIttikhadveterakki[Unificationandprogress]thatwasfoundedin1899andoperateduntil1926.
11.On4July1929,theCentralControlCommission'scommitteeonthepurgingandcheckingoftheAgdamCityDistrictofKarabakhRegionremovedKasumov
MirBashirfromexecutivework

Page171

fortwoyearsandreprimandedhimforcommitting"anumberofcrudepoliticalmistakes."TheCentralControlCommissionamendedthetextofthiscommittee's
decisionon18JulyanddecreedthatKasumovshouldbe"reprimandedforcommittinganumberofmistakesthatledtothedistortionoftheclasslineatthelower
rungsofthesovietapparat"(ibid.,f.124,op.1,d.839,l.38).
12.On30October1929,thePolitburoconfirmedtheCentralCommittee'sdirectiveonthefutureworkoftheTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee,which
emphasizedtheneedtoimprovetheleadershipexercisedoverthecentralcommitteesoftherepublicanCommunistparties(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.765,ll.6,16,17).
Personneltransferswerealsomade.On5January1930,thePolitburoconfirmedthenewcompositionofthepresidiumandsecretariatoftheTranscaucasianRegional
Committee(ibid.,d.771,l.11).
13.Article58wastheallpurposesectionofthecriminalcodeunderwhichpoliticalarrestsweremade.SeeAleksandrI.Solzhenitsyn,TheGulagArchipelago,3
vols.(NewYork,197378),1:6067U.S.Ed.
14.In1929,afterTrotskywasexiledabroadandStalinistpolicymovedclearlytotheleft,manysupportersofTrotskyinexilerecantedandaskedtobereinstated
intotheparty.AmongthemwereI.N.SmirnovandV.A.TerVaganian.FromJulytotheendofOctober1929,theSmirnovgrouppreparedseveralversionsofits
statement.Inthefirstversion,whilerecognizingtheirmistakes,theyalsocriticizedStalin'spolicyanddemandedthatTrotskybereturnedtothecountry.Gradually,
theybackeddownandwroteastatementacceptabletoStalin.On30October1929,thePolitburoruled:"ConsiderthestatementofI.N.Smirnov
acceptable"(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.765,l.5).
ThestatementwaspublishedinPravdaon3November1929.Previously,on25October,thePolitburohadpassedthefollowingresolution(ibid.,d.764,l.6):
RegardingthoseformerTrotskyistsagainstwhomadministrativemeasuresweretaken:theOGPUmustterminatetheadministrativemeasuresagainstthosewhoopenly
declaretheirbreakwiththeoppositionand[theirdesirefor]thecessationoffactionalfightingandwhoacknowledgethegenerallineofthepartyandthedecisionsofthe
partyascorrect(althoughtheirstatementsarenotsufficientforacceptanceintotheparty)asfortheformerTrotskyists,whoremainactive,theGPUmustamelioratethe
administrativemeasuresappliedtothem,restrictingthemtosemiexileanddesignatingplaceswhereresidenceisprohibitedthem.

15.TheKadets,orConstitutionalDemocrats,weretheleadingliberalpartyinthedecadebeforetherevolutionU.S.Ed.
16.AllofStalin'sdirectiveswereincorporatedinthePolitburo'sdecree"OnthecourseofgrainprocurementsandimplementationofPolitburodirectives,"29August
1929.Theresolutionranasfollows(ibid.,d.755,ll.34):
a)ThePolitburonotestheslownessoffulfillment,andinsomecasesthevirtualnonfulfillment,ofCentralCommitteedirectivesontheneedtoincreasegrain
procurementsandcombatgrainprofiteering,toincreasecompetitionamonggrainpurchasers,andtocombatcasesofstatefarmsandcollectivefarmswithholdingtheir
grainandsellingitontheside.b)ThePolitburonotestheweakcourseofprocurementthroughoutthemiddleandlowerVolga,throughouttheNorthCaucasus,andalso
throughoutSiberiaandKazakhstan.c)Coms.MolotovandMikoianareassignedtodraftPolitburodirectivestolocalpartyorganizationsonimplementingCentral
Committeedirectives,onsystematicallycheckinguponfulfillment,andoninformingtheCentralCommitteeconcerningthemeasurestaken.Thedraftdirectivesshouldbe
puttoavoicevoteandsentoutinthenameofthePolitburo.d)Inthenearfuture,informationfromtheCommissariatofTradeonthecourseofthegrainprocurements
andtheimplementationoftheCentralCommittee'sdirectivesshouldbeontheagendaofeachPolitburomeeting,withasummoningofleadersofthemainprocurement
organizationsandtheOGPU.e)InordertocheckuponthefulfillmentoftheCentralCommittee'sdirectivesandtohelplocalorganizationsimprovegrainprocurement,
sendCom.MikoiantotheVolgaandNorthCaucasusforaperiodoftwoweeksandsendCom.EismonttoKazakhstan.Forthesamepurpose,mobilizeComs.Badaev,
Kiselev,Antselovich,andLeonov....f)ProposethatOGPUguaranteetheimplementationofthePolitburo'sdirectivesconcerningresolutepunitivemeasuresagainst
urbanandurbanrelatedgrainspeculatorsandreporttothePolitburoonthemeasurestakenwithinaweek.

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17.Uralneft,Azneft,andGrozneftwereagenciesinchargeofoilextractionintheUrals,Azerbaidzhan,andGroznyi(atownintheNorthCaucasus),respectively.
UkhtaisatowninnorthernRussiaU.S.Ed.
18.On5September1929,thePolitburopassedaresolution"OnUralneft"(ibid.,d.756,l.5):
a)toassigntheLaborDefenseCouncilandGosplan:1)toensurethatthetargetfiguresfor19291930guaranteeapaceofdevelopmentforUralneftthatwillprovidean
opportunitytoerectfiftyderricks,aswellastoestablishthemostmodernmethodsofoilextractionsuitableforthesoil,andtoincreasethesizeofconstructionprojects
correspondinglyapproximately15millionrubles2)toguaranteethenecessaryimportsforUralneftintheimportplanfor192919303)toincorporateinthetarget
figuresoftheCommissariatofTransportallmeasuresnecessarytoincreaseUralneft'sshipmentsbythemainraillinesandtobuildundergroundpipelinesintheareaof
theoilwellsb)toappointCom.K.RumiantsevchairmanoftheUralnefttrust.

19.TheCentralCommittee'sdecreeof18July1929,"OntheWorkofChiefAdministrationoftheCottonIndustry,"stipulatedasharpincreaseintherecently
approvedfiveyearplantodevelopcottonproduction.Theoriginalfiveyearplancalledforayieldof590,400tonsofcottonby1932,butthenewCentral
Committeedecreedemandedanincreasedyieldof787,200tons(Spravochnikpartiinogorabotnika[Partyworkerreferencemanual],issue7,chap.11[Moscow,
1930],22632).
20.MamaevwasdismissedfromhispositionattheChiefAdministrationoftheCottonIndustryon30November1929andwasappointeddeputydirectorofthe
boardofAmtorg(AmericanTradingCorporation)(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.767,l.8).
21.On23August1929,theCentralCommitteeSecretariatreviewedtherequestoftheCentralAsianpartybureauandtheMainCottonCommitteeforthe
assignmentofcertainofficials,includingKharitonov,Shadunts,andReingold,toworkinthecottonproducingregions.TheSecretariatapprovedonlyReingoldand
releasedhimfromhisdutiesatGosplan(ibid.,op.113,d.768,l.18).
Letter43
[23August1929]
23August1929
Hello,Com.Molotov,
1)Payparticularattentiontotheconstructionofnewironandsteelworks.ImeanTelbes,Magnitogorsk,andsoon.Accordingtothefigures,thesituationispoorin
thisarea.Lokatskov(Ithinkthat'shisname)istheheadofMainFerrousMetals.HisexperienceisintheUralMountainsarea,thatis,withtheoldroutines,because
themethodsofironandsteelproductionintheUrals(ferrousmetals,blastfurnaces,etc.)arereallyancient.AmericanandGermanspecialistsareeitherabsentor
broughtinmerelyforshowinthesmallestnumberspossible.Meanwhile,thereisnogreaterneedforforeigntechnicalassistancethaninthiscomplexbusiness.You
shouldshakeupKuibyshevandLokatskovanddemandfromthem(atthebeginning,andthenwe'llsee)writtenreportsonthestatusofthisarea,thetypeand
amountoftechnicalassistance,1 andsoon.Why,forexample,couldn'twebringinAustinandCo.orsomeotherfirmonacontractbasistobuildthenewplans?
Etc.,etc.

Page173

2)IreadtheComintern'sresolutiononBukharin.Itdidn'tturnouttoobadly.Ithinkthepublicationwasalittlelate.
3)IjustreadBystrianskii'sreportonhistalkwithBukharin.2 JustasIthought,Bukharinhasslidintotheswampofopportunismandmustnowresorttogossip,
forgery,andblackmail:hedoesn'thaveanyotherargumentsleft.Talkof"documents"and"landnationalization"etc.isthefraudofapettylawyerwhohasgone
bankruptinhis''practice."IfhisdisagreementswiththepresentCentralCommitteeareexplainableintermsofStalin's"personality,"thenhowdoesoneexplainhis
disagreementswiththeCentralCommitteewhenLeninlived?Lenin's"personality"?ButwhydoeshepraiseLeninsomuchnow,afterhisdeath?Isn'titforthesame
reasonthatallrenegadeslikeTrotskypraiseLenin(afterhisdeath!)?Ourlawyerhascompletelytiedhimselfinknots.
4)IreadShatskin'sletter.It'sacowardlyanddishonestletter.Shatskinwillcontinuehis"business."3
5)WhatifKrinitskiiweretobemadesecondsecretaryoftheTranscaucasianRegionalCommittee(afterfirstpurgingtheTranscaucasianCommitteeofitsoldballast),
whileleavingOrakhelashviliasfirstsecretary(Krinitskiiwillfinditdifficultwithouthimbecausehedoesn'tknowasinglelocallanguage)?Thenwe'llsee.4
Well,byefornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.WhendoesRykovarrive?5
1.ThequestionofconsultingforeignexpertsonironproductionwasreviewedmorethanonceatthePolitburoafterStalin'sletter.On10January1930,thePolitburo
approvedadecreedraftedbyRykov,"Ontheuseofforeigntechnicalassistanceinironandsteelworks"(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.772,ll.11,1517).
2.ThereferenceisprobablytoaroutinedenunciationofBukharin.Nodocumentsrelatedtothismatterhavebeendiscovered.
3.ThereferenceistoL.Shatskin'slettertotheCentralCommitteedated17August1929,whereheprotestedchargesmadeagainsthiminaKomsomoldecreeand
aPravdaeditorialregardinghisarticle"DownwithPartyPhilistinism"(ibid.,d.754,ll.1014).On22August1929,thePolitburoapprovedtheKomsomol's
resolutioncondemningShatskin's"opportunistic"views(ibid.,ll.3,15).
4.On30October1929,thePolitburofulfilledOrakhelashvili'srequesttorelievehimofhisdutiesassecretaryoftheTranscaucasianRegionalCommitteeandcreated
afivepersonsecretariatthatincludedA.I.Krinitskii(ibid.,d.765,l.17).On5January1930,thePolitburoconfirmedKrinitskiiassecretaryoftheTranscaucasian
RegionalCommittee(ibid.,d.771,l.11).
5.ByaPolitburoresolutionof16May1929,Rykovwasgrantedathreemonthleave(ibid.,d.740,l.9).

Page174

Letter44
[29August1929]
Hello,Com.Molotov,
Receivedyourletterof27August.
1)RegardingEngland.Ourpositionisentirelycorrect.ThePolitburo'sdecisiononLitvinov'sproposalwascorrect.1 Thepointisnotonlytoachieverecognition
withoutgettinglostalongtheway.Thepointisthatourposition,basedontheexposureofthe"Labourgovernment,"isanappealtothebestelementsoftheworking
classofthewholeworldourpositionunleashestheproletariat'srevolutionarycriticismofthe"Labourgovernment"andhelpsthecauseoftherevolutionary
educationofworkersofallnations(Englandaboveall).IthelpstheCommunistsoftheworldeducatetheworkersinthespiritofantireformism.It'sacrimenotto
usea"Godgiven"occasionforthispurposeLitvinovdoesnotseeandisnotinterestedin[therevolutionaryaspectofpolicy].ButthePolitburoshouldtakeallthis
intoaccount.
2)OnChina.ThesamehastobesaidaboutChina.Thepointisnotonlyornotevenmainlyhowtoresolvethisorthat"conflict."Thepointisreallytouseourtough
positiontounmaskcompletelyandtounderminetheauthorityofChiangKaishek'sgovernment,agovernmentoflackeysofimperialism,forattemptingtobecome
themodelof"nationalgovernment"forthecolonialanddependentcountries.TherecanbenodoubtthateachclashbetweenChiangKaishek'sgovernmentandthe
Sovietgovernment,justaseachconcessionChiangKaishekmakestous(andheisalreadystartingtomakeconcessions),isablowagainstChiangKaishekand
exposesChiangKaishek'sgovernmentasagovernmentoflackeysofimperialismandmakesiteasiertocarryouttherevolutionaryeducationoftheworkersin
colonialcountries(andtheChineseworkersaboveall).LitvinovandKarakhan(andtheyarenottheonlyones)don'tseethat.Somuchtheworseforthem.
3)GenerallyIwouldhavetosaythatintakingatoughpositionwithregardtothe"Labourgovernment"andChiangKaishek'sgovernment,weareexposing(and
havealreadyexposed)anumberofextremelyinterestingbehindthescenesconnectionsthatmakeobvious(eventotheblind)thedirectdependenceofthese
supposedly"popular"governmentsonthemostreactionaryforcesof"theirown"("national'')andinternationalimperialism.Thisisaveryimportantandnecessary
revolutionarytask,whichwill,atthesametime,raisetheprestigeoftheSovietgovernmentintheeyesoftheworkersofallcountries(andaboveallinthe
eyesoftheworkingclassoftheUSSR).ItisacrimeagainsttheUSSRnottotakethisfactorintoaccount.
4)Thecampaignagainstpetitbourgeoisradicalism(ShatskinandCo.)wentwell.
5)AlsothecampaignwentwellagainstBukharin,astheideologueoftherightists,etc.ThearticleinPravdaaboutBukharinissuperior.2
6)RegardingMirzoian,Iagreewithyou.3

Page175

7)ItwouldbegoodtoappointRumiantsevfromBakutoheadUralneft[oilextractionagencyintheUrals].Heknowsthebusinesswellandwouldpushthings
forward.4
8)Ialreadysent[via]Mikoian(inreplytohisletter)alettercongratulatingthePolitburoonitssuccessinsmashingthenestofGromans,Vinogradskiis,andother
suchbourgeoispoliticiansensconcedinGosplan,theCentralStatisticalAdministration,andsoon.HoundthemoutofMoscowandputintheirplaceyoungfellows,
ourpeople.Communists.5
9)Thegrainprocurementshavegonewell.SticktoafirmpolicyregardingSiberia,Kazakhstan,Bashkiria.NoconcessionstoEikheandothercomradeswishingto
shirkdifficultresponsibilities.Wemustandcanaccumulate100millionpoodsofemergencyreserves,ifwearereallyBolsheviksandnotjustfullofhotair.If
absolutelynecessary,wecouldknockoff57million,butnomore,andonlyundertheconditionthatitbemadeupinotherregions.Ifwecanbeatthisgrainthing,
thenwe'llprevailineverything,bothindomesticandforeignpolicies.
10)IambeginningtorecuperateinSochiaftermyillnessinNalchik.
Well,that'sitfornow.Regards.
J.Stalin
8/29/1929
P.S.Justreceivedthetextofthereply(ours)totheChinesenote.6 ObviouslyyouhavelostyournervesomewhatandlettheChineseputoneoveronyou.Andthisis
atatimewhenvictorywasassured.WhattheChinesewant,thatis,theremovalofYemshanovandEismont,endedupinthedeclaration,implyingthatweandnot
theChinesearetoblame.Andwhatwewant,thatis,theremovaloftheTAIPANanindicationthatwe(andnottheChinese)arerightdidnotgetintothe
declaration(yourestrictedyourselfonlytoan"oralreport"ofthistoDirkesen)!Thuswearesupposedtosignapaper(adeclaration)sayingwe'rewrongandthe
Chinesearerightinspiteoftheobviousfactsofthecase!Thatmeansgivingthedefeatedenemythefruitsofourvictory.Iseeherethe"wisdom"ofLitvinovand
Bukharin.AndwhatiftheChinesedon'tagreetoremovingthetaipanaftersuchadeclaration(signedbyus)?Afterall,theyhavetherightnottoagreetoit,sinceinthe
declarationwesignedthereisnothingsaidaboutappointinganewtaipan.Whatdoyouintendtodothen?Onlyonethingtodo:swallowthebitterpill.It'stoobad,
reallytoobad.
J.Stalin
1.On22and26August1929,Litvinov'sproposalconcerningEnglandwasdiscussedatthePolitburoandthedecisionwassenttotheSpecialFile.
2.Inthearticle,"ObobshibkakhiukloneT.Bukharina"(OnthemistakesanddeviationofCom.BukharinPravda,24August1929),Bukharinwasaccusedof
beingthe"chiefleaderandinspirerofthedeviationists."
3.On30September1929,thePolitburodecidedtoassignMirzoiantopartyworkintheUrals(ibid.,d.761,l.51).
4.ThePolitburoacceptedStalin'sproposalon5September1929:RumiantsevwasappointedchairmanoftheUralnefttrust(ibid.,d.756,l.5).

Page176

5.AtaPolitburosessionon22August1929,thequestionoftheCentralStatisticalAdministrationanditsAdvisoryCouncilwasreviewed.Thepersonnelofthe
AdvisoryCouncilhadtobechangedradicallyandthetoppositionsoftheCentralStatisticalAdministrationhadtobereinforcedwithpartymembers(ibid.,d.754,l.
3).InDecember1929,theCentralStatisticalAdministrationwastransferredtoGosplan(ibid.,d.769,l.2).ThenewpersonneloftheGosplanpresidiumandits
statisticalsectorwereconfirmedataPolitburosessionon25December1929(ibid.,d.770,l.4).
6.ThereportoftheCommissariatofForeignAffairsconcerningthedraftSovietChinesedeclarationaboutsettlingtheChineseEasternRailwayconflictwaspublished
intheSovietpresson31August1929(DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR[DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy],vol.12[Moscow,1967],48183).On6January
1930,thePolitburoreappointedYemshanovvicechairmanoftheboardoftheChineseEasternRailway(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.771,l.8).
Letter45
[1September1929]
9/1/1929
Hello,Com.Molotov,
1)FromNKIDreportspublishedinthepress,1 it'sobviousthatmyreproachontheChinesequestion(seemypreviousletterthepostscript)wasunfair.Itturns
outIdidn'treadthefineprintinthecodedreport.Well,whatofit,IamgladIwasmistakenandreadytoapologizefortheundeservedreproach.That,ofcourse,
doesn'tmeanthatLitvinov,Bukharin,andKarakhanhaveceasedtobeopportunists.Notawhit!
2)Readthedecisiononcontracting.2 ,3 It'sagoodthing.ButIthinkit'satransitionalthing.Ithinkwe'llsoonhavetogofurtherandtransferallthegrainprocurements
inthecountrysidetoagriculturalcooperatives(Khlebotsentr[sic]andothers),takingconsumercooperativesandKhlebotsentroutofthisbusinessandturning
Khlebotsentrintoacollectionagencyforprocuredgrain.Thisisparticularlynecessaryafterthesuccessesattainedwithcontracting.Withoutsuchareform,
competition[amongourselves]anditsconsequencesareinevitable.We'lltalkinmoredetailwhenIgettoMoscow.
3)Theprocurementsarenowgoingwell.That'sverygood.Ifwelinkthistothefactthatwehavealreadymanagedtotakeinmorethan400millionrublesonthethird
industrializationloan,wecansaywithcertaintythatthingsaregoingfairlywellforthetimebeing.Themainthingnowisnottorestonourlaurelsandtomovethings
forward.
4)What'sgoingonintheMoscow[party]organizationwhyisBaumanthrashingPolonskiisomercilesslywhatisthisuglypersonalsquabbleallabout?
Well,byefornow.Regards,
J.Stalin
1.ForthereportoftheCommissariatofForeignAffairs(NKID),seenote6toletter44.
2.Contracting(kontraktatsiia)wasamethodbrieflyusedingrainprocurement.Underthismethodthepeasantsagreed,beforetheharvest,todeliverasetamountto
thegovernmentinreturnforgovernmentpromisestoprovideindustrialgoods.U.S.Ed.

Page177

3.ThePolitburodecree"Ontheresultsandcurrenttasksintheareaofcontractinggrainsowing"waspassedon26August1929(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.755,ll.
2123).
Letter46
[6September1929]
Hello,Com.Molotov,
1)I'msendingyoualetterIjustgotfromMirzoian.YouknowthatI'mnotasupporterofthepolicyof"tolerance"regardingcomradeswhohavecommittedgrievous
errorsfromtheperspectiveoftheparty'sinterests.Imustsay,however,thatitisnotintheparty'sintereststofinishoffMirzoianhowever,Ithinkyouyourselfwrote
tometheotherdayaboutMirzoianinjustthissamevein.Hislettershouldbenotedandhisrequestfulfilled.
Ithinkitwouldn'tbeabadthingtoappointMirzoiansecretarytothePerm(Ural)RegionalCommitteeandgivehimanurgentcombatassignment:tomovetheoil
businessforwardintheUrals.1 Heknowstheoilbusinesswell,andtogetherwithRumiantsev(I'mproposingtoappointRumiantsevheadofUralneft[Uralsoil
extractionagency]),hecouldreallydeveloptheUraloilfields.AndoilintheUralsisthemostimportantmatternow,whichourSupremeEconomicCouncilers2
don'twanttounderstand.
2)IsupportedKabakovandOshvintsevontheZubarevmatter3 fortworeasons:a)despiteitsincreasinglyenormousimportancefortheUSSR,executivesare
terriblyscarceintheUrals,anditcan'tbe"plunderedendlessly"b)Zubarevisaspecialistinagriculture,andinArkhangelsk,strictlyspeaking,thereisn'tany
agriculture.
Well,solongfornow.
J.Stalin
9/6/1929
1.On30September1929,thePolitburodecidedtoassignMirzoiantopartyworkintheUrals(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.761,l.51).
2.Thatis,thestaffoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil.
3.On12.September1929,atMolotov'ssuggestion,thePolitburoleftZubarevintheUralsinsteadofreassigninghimtopartyworkinthenorth(ibid.,d.753,l.9,
andd.757,l.6).
Letter47
[9September1929]
Com.Molotov,
Receivedyourletterof9/6.
1)NohasteshouldbedisplayedontheBritishquestion.NowHendersonneedsarestorationofrelationsmorethanwedo.It'snotHendersonwhoisdangerous,
sincewehavepushedhimtothewall,butLitvinov,whobelieves

Page178

Wiseandotherbastardsmorethanthelogicofthings.Especiallydangerousare"our"Paris"advisors,"whorecommendedthatwesendHendersona"sympathetic"
answer.ThesepeopleareHenderson'sagents,whoinformtheBritishgovernmentanddisinformus.Inshort:nobackingdownfromourposition.Rememberweare
wagingastruggle(negotiationwithenemiesisalsostruggle),notwithEnglandalone,butwiththewholecapitalistworld,sincetheMacDonaldgovernmentisthe
vanguardofthecapitalistgovernmentsintheworkof"humiliating"and"bridling''theSovietgovernmentwith"new,"more"diplomatic,"moredisguised,andthus
more"effective"methods.TheMacDonaldgovernmentwantstoshowthewholecapitalistworldthatitcantakemorefromus(withthehelpof"gentle"methods)
thanMussolini,Poincar,andBaldwin,thatitcanbeagreaterShylockthanthecapitalistShylockhimself.Anditwantsthisbecauseonlyinthiswaycanitwinthe
trustofitsownbourgeoisie(andnotonlyitsbourgeoisie).Wereallywouldbeworthlessifwecouldn'tmanagetoreplytothesearrogantbastardsbrieflyandtothe
point:"Youwon'tgetafriggin'thingfromus."
2)Baumanmustbedisciplinedsternlyfortryingtodragtheorganizationintoastruggle,notoverpoliticalviews,but"overindividuals."ThatispreciselywhyPolonskii
shouldnotbebudged(forthetimebeingatleast).RegardingZhdanov,PostyshevandRumiantsev,itwouldbebettertowaituntilfall.
3)It'snotgoodifYaroslavskiibeginstotakeover(apparentlyhe'salreadybegun)as,ineffect,theeditorinchiefofPravda.Thatisdangerousandharmfultothe
cause,becausedespiteallhisotheroutstandingqualities,heisweakinthepoliticalleadershipdepartment(helovestoswimalong"withthetide"ofthesentimentof
the"masses").Nomatterhowitlooks,inreality,PravdaisnotdirectedbyYaroslavskiibutbysomeoneelse,someonelikeZinovievoroneofZinoviev'spupilswho
knowshowtoflatterYaroslavskiicleverlyandwhohasitinfortheLeningradorganization.Keepinmindthatsuchadangerisquitereal.Atanyrate,theshrill
uproarabouttheLeningradorganizationissuspicious.1
4)ThedecisiononRykoviscorrect.
Regards,
J.Stalin
9/9/1929
P.S.Ialmostforgot.Thenew(new!)statementfromSmirnov,Vaganian,Mrachkovskii,andothersmustberejectednotonlyasunacceptable(andhow!)butasa
documentfromimpudentcounterrevolutionarieswhoareexploitingYaroslavskii'seasygoingnatureandthetrusthehasshownthem.Yaroslavskiimustbeforbiddento
haveanythingtodowiththoseupstartswhohaveexploitedhiseasygoingnaturetoorganizetheircounterrevolutionaryfactionon"new,""withintheregulations"
principles.Wedon'tneedthemintheparty.Howcanyounotgraspthissimplething?2
Besides,Iresolutelyprotestagainstthefactthat,despitethePolitburoreso

Page179

lution,3 Zinovievhasbecomeoneofthepermanentstaffmembers(anddirectors?)ofPravda.Can'tanendbeputtothisoutrage?Who'stoblameforthis?Isit
Yaroslavskii?Whyareyoutoleratingthispoliticaldepravity?
J.Stalin
1.On1September1929,Pravdacarriedalargeselectionofmaterialsonthe"suppressionofselfcriticism"andthe"corruption"intheLeningradPartyOrganization.
Acampaignto"unleashselfcriticism"wasthenlaunchedinLeningradandcoveredindetailinPravda.
2.ForinformationonSmirnovandothers,seenote14forletter42.
3.On9May1929,thePolitburotookupthequestionof"thearticlebyCom.ZinovievinPravdaandKomsomolskaiapravdaof8Mayofthisyear"anddecided
"toreprimandtheeditorialstaffofPravdaandKomsomolskaiapravdaforprintingCom.Zinoviev'sarticleontheBerlineventsandtoremindthemthatarticlesby
Coms.ZinovievandKamenevcannotbeprintedwithoutpermissionfromtheCentralCommitteeSecretariat."[Inotherwords,Stalin'sdescriptionofZinovievasa
memberofPravda'seditorialstaffwashighlyexaggeratedU.S.Ed.]
Letter48
[9September1929]
9/9
Viacheslav,1
1)PoliudovabsolutelymustberemovedfromtheCommissariatofTransport.ThisisthesamenutcasethatkeptconfusingtheCentralCommitteeandTransportwith
newrailroadconstructionsandhasnothingCommunistabouthim(nothingleft).Nowhe'ssittingatTransportasheadof(new)construction.Comeon,whatkindof
builderishe?He'sthereasonconstructionofthenewtracksbetweenSiberiaandEuropeanRussiahaven'tmovedaninchforward.Getthatantipartymanoutof
Transport.He'sbeensystematicallyviolatingtheCentralCommittee'sresolutionsandalsosystematicallymockingthePolitburo.2
2)Next,whatisChernyidoingattheTransportcollegium?Whyhasn'thebeentransferredtoanotherjob?3
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1929=?"
2.On30December1929,theOrgburorelievedPoliudovofhisworkintheCommissariatofTransportandconfirmedhimasamemberoftheSoviettradedelegation
inBerlin(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.113,d.809,l.5).On5January1930,thePolitburoreversedthisdecisionandkeptPoliudovatTransport.On5March1930,he
wasgiveneditorialworkinconnectionwiththetrainingofexecutives(ibid.,op.3,d.778,l.8),andinSeptember,hewasappointeddirectoroftheBelorussianBaltic
Railway(ibid.,op.114,d.190,l.1).
3.On18September1929,theCentralCommitteeSecretariatconfirmedChernyiasdeputychairmanoftransportinchargeoftrainingspecialists.

Page180

Letter49
[13September1929]
Coms.MolotovandOrdzhonikidze,
Receivedyourcodedtelegramaboutselfcriticism.1 YourproposalisincorrectsinceaspecialdecreefromtheCentralCommitteeplusaspeechbyMolotovmaybe
understood(willbeunderstood!)bythepartyorganizationsasanewcoursebackward,asanappeal:"Reininselfcriticism,"whichisofcoursenotdesirableand
whichwillundoubtedlyunderminetheauthorityoftheCentralCommittee(andMolotov)intheeyesofthebestelementsofthepartyinfavorofallandsundry
bureaucrats.
ThearticleinPravdaattackingtheLeningradleadership(whichmeansKirovKomarov)wasagraveerror(especiallythewayitwasdone).2 Someone(thatis,an
enemyoftheparty)wantedtoportraythetopofficialsinLeningradasopposingthecorrectionoftheshortcomings(that'snottrue!)ButthosebunglersfromPravda
swallowedthebait,andnow"everything'sinacommotion"tothedelightoftheparty'senemies.TheyforgotthattheLeningradorganizationisn'tjustyourSochior
AstrakhanorBakuorganization.TheyforgotthatablowtothechiefsoftheLeningradorganization,whichrepresentsthemostreliablebulwarkoftheCentral
Committee,isablowtotheveryheartoftheCentralCommittee....TheCentralCommittee'sfaultconsistsofrelinquishingtherudderforamomentto
Pravda'seditorialcollegium,havingforgottenthatsomeonewhohasturnedselfcriticismintoasportCom.Yaroslavskiiisamemberofthecollegiumandthathe
possessesthehappyabilityofnotseeinganythingfurtherthanhisownnose.
ThesamemustbesaidaboutKomsomolskaiapravdaandlocalpressorgans.
LettheCentralCommitteeSecretariattaketherudderinhandagain,letitestablishmonitoringoverPravdaandKomsomolskaiapravda,letitchangethetone
andspiritofselfcriticisminthesenewspapersandtheneverythingwillbeallright.
Well,allthebest.
Regardstoyouboth,
J.Stalin
9/13/29
1.Thecodedtelegramwasnotfound.
2.ForPravda'sattackontheLeningradleadership,seenote1toletter47.

Page181

Letter50
[30September1929]
ToMolotov,Voroshilov,Ordzhonikidze:1
1)DidyoureadRykov'sspeech?Inmyopinion,it'sthespeechofanonpartysovietbureaucratpretendingtotakethetoneofa"loyal"person,"sympathizing"with
thesoviets.Butnotasinglewordabouttheparty!Notasinglewordabouttherightdeviation!Notasinglewordtosaythattheparty'sachievements,whichRykov
underhandedlyascribesnowtohimself,wereattainedinstrugglewiththerightists,includingRykovhimself!Allourofficialswhogivespeechesusuallyconsiderittheir
dutytospeakabouttherightistsandtocallforstruggleagainsttherightists.ButRykov,itseems,isfreefromsuchanobligation!Why?Imightaskonwhatbasis?
Howcanyoutolerate(meaningcoveringupaswell)thispoliticalhypocrisy?Don'tyouunderstandthatintoleratingsuchhypocrisy,youcreatetheillusionthat
Rykovhasseparatedfromtherightistsandyouthusmisleadtheparty,becauseeveryonecanseethatRykovhasneverhadathoughtofleavingtherightists?
Shouldn'tyougiveRykovanalternative:eitherdisassociateopenlyandhonestlyfromtherightistsandconciliators,orlosetherighttospeakinthenameoftheCentral
CommitteeandCouncilofCommissars.Ithinkthisshouldbedonebecauseit'stheleasttheCentralCommitteecandemandlessthanthatandtheCentral
Committeeceasestobeitself.
2)IlearnedthatRykovisstillchairingyourmeetingsonMondaysandThursdays.2 Isthattrue?Ifit'strue,whyareyouallowingthiscomedytogoon?Whoisitfor
andforwhatreason?Can'tyouputanendtothiscomedy?Isn'tittime?
3)IthinkI'llstayinSochianotherweek.What'syouropinion?Ifyousayso,Icanreturnimmediately.
Greetings,
Stalin
9/30/29
1.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMolotov'snote:
Totallyagreewitheverythingsaid.Didn'treadRykov'sspeech,butonlyskimmedtheheadings.Willread.
Idoseenow,however,thatStalinisright.Justdon'tagreethatwe're"covering"forRykov.WehavetofixthingsinthewayStalinproposes,however.V.
Molotov.10/3.
2.ThereferenceistoRykov'schairingofPolitburosessions.

Page182

Letter51
[7October1929]
Greetings,Molotov,
Receivedyourletterof10/4.
1)Thingsreallydidn'tturnoutsobadlywithEngland.Hendersonwasshownup.Rykov,alongwithBukharinandLitvinov,wasalsoshownup.Thesepeopledon't
seethegrowthofthepowerandmightoftheUSSR,northosechangesininternationalrelationsthathaveoccurredrecently(andwillgoontakingplace).
2)TherewillbealotoftroublewithChina.Bytheway,Ithinkthatit'stimetothinkaboutorganizinganuprisingbyarevolutionarymovementinManchuria.The
isolateddetachmentsbeingsenttoManchuriatoperformisolatedtasksofanepisodicnatureareagoodthing,ofcourse,buttheyarenotenough.Wehavetogofor
biggerthingsnow.Weneedtoorganizetwodoubleregimentbrigades,chieflymadeupofChinese,outfitthemwitheverythingnecessary(artillery,machineguns,and
soon),putChineseattheheadofthebrigade,andsendthemintoManchuriawiththefollowingassignment:tostiruparebellionamongtheManchuriantroops,to
havereliablesoldiersfromtheseforcesjointhem(theothersshouldbesenthomeafterremovingtheofficercorps),toformintoadivision,tooccupyHarbin,and,
aftergatheringforce,todeclareChangHsuehliangoverthrown,establisharevolutionarygovernment(massacrethelandowners,bringinthepeasants,createsoviets
inthecitiesandtowns,andsoon).Thisisnecessary.Thiswecanand,Ithink,shoulddo.No"internationallaw"contradictsthistask.Itwillbecleartoeveryonethat
weareagainstwarwithChina,thatourRedArmysoldiersareonlydefendingourbordersandhavenointentionofcrossingintoChineseterritory,andifthereisa
rebellioninsideManchuria,that'ssomethingquiteunderstandable,giventheatmosphereoftheregimeimposedbyChangHsuehliang.Thinkaboutit.It'simportant.
3)IreadthetranscriptoftheIndustrialAcademy'spartycell.ThematterwillhavetobeputontheagendaoftheCentralCommitteeplenum.Ishouldthinkthat
BukharinisgoingtobekickedoutofthePolitburo.
4)IreadthePolitburoresolutionaboutRykov.Acorrectresolution!Thisresolutionisbindingonus,ofcourse.Butwe'lltalkaboutthatwhenIcome.
5)Thingsaregoingwellwiththeprocurements.Butyoucan'trestyetyouhavetokeepupthepressure.Otherwisepeoplewillfallasleep.
6)Generally,I'dhavetoadmitthatthingsaregoingprettywellforyou[inMoscow](thatis,forus),atleastforthetimebeing.That'sgood.
I'llbeinMoscowinafewdays.
Regards,
J.Stalin
10/7/29

Page183

Letter52
[earlierthan17November1929]
Molotov,1
Thebasicresolution(aboutthetargetfigures)willbepublished,andwehavetoincludeathesisconcerningtheincompatibilityofpartymembershipwiththe
propagandizingordefenseofrightdeviationistviews.2
1.IntheupperlefthandcornerofthenoteisMolotov'snotation:"1930?"
2.AttheCentralCommitteeplenumof17November1929,Rudzutakproposedaddingtotheresolutiononeconomictargetfiguresfor19291930thephrase"to
recognizethatdefendingtheviewsofrightistopportunistsorappeasementwiththemisincompatiblewithmembershipintheparty."Theproposalwaspassedbythe
plenum(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.441,vyp.2,1.144).
Letter53
[5December1929]
HelloMolotshtein,1 ,2
Whythedevilhaveyouburrowedintoyourlair,likeabear,andwhyareyounottalking?Howarethingsthere,goodorbad?Writesomething.
Thingsarenotbadherefornow.
1)Thegrainprocurementsareprogressing.Todaywedecidedtoexpandtheemergencystocksoffoodto120millionpoods.Weareraisingthesupplyquotafor
industrialcitieslikeIvanovoVoznesensk,Kharkov,andsoon.
2)Thecollectivefarmmovementisgrowingbyleapsandbounds.Ofcoursetherearenotenoughmachinesandtractorshowcoulditbeotherwise?butsimply
poolingthepeasanttoolsresultsinacolossalincreaseinsownacreage(insomeregionsbyasmuchas50percent!).InthelowerVolga,60percentofpeasantfarms
havebeentransferred(alreadytransferred!)tocollectivefarms.Theeyesofourrightistsarepoppingoutoftheirheadsinamazement....3
3)Younodoubtalreadyknowaboutourforeignaffairs.ThingswithChinashouldpickup.ObviouslyourfellowsfromtheFarEastArmygavethemagoodscare.I
justreceivedfromChangHsuehliangatelegramconfirminghis"completeagreementwiththeresultsofthemeeting"betweenTs'ai[Yunshan]andSimanovskii.4 We
rebuffedAmericaandEnglandandFranceratherharshlyfortheirattempttointervene.5 Wecouldn'thavedoneotherwise.LetthemknowwhattheBolsheviksare
like!IthinktheChineselandownerswon'tforgettheobjectlessontaughtthembytheFarEastArmy.WedecidednottowithdrawourtroopsfromChinauntilour
conditionsareguaranteed.YoushouldreadLitvinov'sspeechattheCentralExecutiveCommitteesessionit'sprettygood.6
4)Youprobablyalreadyknowaboutthenewappointmentsfromthenewspapers.What'snewabouttheseappointmentsisa)Tomskii'sappointmentas

Page184

deputytoKuibyshev(Kuibyshevthinksperhapsnotwithoutreasonthattherewillbesomeadvantageinthis)b)theappointmentofShvartsaschairmanofthe
coal"association"(wedon'thaveabettercandidate).7
5)Therightists(thethree)areworkingaway,butsofartheyhaven'tmadeamove.RykovtookitintohisheadtobringYakovlevashisassistantadministrator(a"tea
drinkerssociety"!),butwenippedthisinthebud.8
Well,that'sitfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
12/5/29
1.AjocularversionofMolotov'snamethatgivesitaJewishflavorTrans.
2.TheletterwaswritteninMoscowandsenttoMolotovwhilehewasonvacation.
3.Formoreinformationonthecollectivizationdecision,seetheGrainTributeandCollectivizationsectionintheIntroductionU.S.Ed.
4.ChangHsuehliang'stelegramindicatingagreementwiththeNikolskUssuriyskprotocolonrestoringthestatusquoontheChineseEasternRailwaywasreceived
on5December1929(DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR[DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy],vol.12[Moscow,1967],639,601,602).
5.On3December1929,theSovietUnionwashandedanotefromthegovernmentsoftheUnitedStates,France,andEngland,whichstatedinpart(Dokumenty
vneshneipolitikiSSSR,605):
[Thereis]serioushopethatChinaandRussiawillrefrainfromorrenounceanyhostilemeasuresandwillfinditpossibletocometoapeacefulsettlementinthenear
futureofallissuesthatarethesubjectofconflictbetweenthematthepresenttime.

AreplypublishedintheSovietpresson4December1929noted(DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR,605):
TheSovietgovernmentcannothelpbutexpressitssurprisethatthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,whichbyitsownwishdoesnothaveanyofficial
relationswiththegovernmentoftheSovietUnion,findsitpossibletogiveitadviceandinstructions.

ThetextofthereplywasfirstreviewedataPolitburosessionon3December1929(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.767,11.12,26,27).
6.Litvinov'sreportwasheardatthesecondsessionoftheVConventionoftheCentralExecutiveCommitteeon4December1929(Dokumentyvneshneipolitiki
SSSR,60634).
7.On30November1929,thePolitburoappointedTomskiideputychairmanoftheSupremeEconomicCouncilandShvartschairmanofthecoalindustry
(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.767,l.12).
8.On20December1929,thePolitburoconfirmedYakovlevasRSFSRcommissaroffinance(ibid.,d.769,l.4).
Letter54
[25December1929]
Hello,Viacheslav,
OfcourseIgotyourfirstletter.Iknowyouarecursingmeinyourheartformysilence.Ican'tdenythatyouarefullywithinyourrightstodothat.Buttry

Page185

toseethingsmyway:I'mterriblyoverloadedandthere'snotimetosleep(literally!).SoonIwillwriteaproperletter.
1)Thingsaren'tgoodwithPravda'seditorialstaff.KovalevandNaumov(bothformerTrotskyists)areapparentlybossingeveryonearoundthere,includingseveral
otherpartyofficials.KovalevhasalreadytakenPopovinhand.Krumincontinuesto"float."Perhapsthiscouldbetoleratedforacertaintime,buttheproblemisthat
Kovalevisa"shadowyfigure"and"incomprehensible"andapparentlynotcompletelyoneofus(I'mtoldhehassympathyfortheZinovievites).TheyletShliapnikov
throughevenearliertheyslippeduponFrumkinandnowthere'sNaumov'sarticle.1 TheywantedtoletPiatakov'srecentarticlethrough,butKaganovichandI
caughtontoitintimeandmanagedtocorrect(lateatnight)some"unclear""passages''inPiatakov'sarticle.WewillstraightenouttheShliapnikovaffairtoday.As
forFrumkin,thisisanoldstoryandIthinkperhapsitcouldwaituntilamoreopportunemoment.I'mafraidKovalevandhisgroupwillhavetobedismissed....
2)Oneofthesedays,thePolitburoshoulddecideonmilitaryaffairs(there'sareportfromtheWorkerPeasantInspectionontheartilleryadministration)inconnection
withmeasuresalreadypassedbytheCommissariatforWarthataredesignedtoeliminatedisruptions.Weconsideritinexpedienttomakeanynoiseaboutthis.The
resolutionshouldgointotheSpecialFile.
3)KaganovichhaspromisedtomovethingsforwardonaschoolforpeoplelikeMikhailov(theLeningrader).
4)Thenastybusiness(DesovKomarov)againstKirov2 helpedtoacceleratethepurgeofbureaucratizedelementsfromtheLeningradorganization.There'snocloud
withoutasilverlining!TheLeningradProvincialPartyCommitteepassedtheCentralCommitteeresolutionand,accordingtowitnesses,notwithoutacertain
enthusiasm.It'safact!Komarov'sbureaucratismplayedarolehere,andtheCentralCommittee'sauthority,andthefactthatKirovhasapparentlyearnedthegreat
respectoftheLeningradorganizationinrecenttimes.Kodatskii,Alekseev,Lobov,Serganin(notasdeterminedlyastheothers)disassociatedthemselvesinstantly
fromDesovKomarov.TheLeningradersarethinkingofnominatingKodatskiiforthepostofchairman.ThisCentralCommitteeresolutionshouldalsogointothe
SpecialFile.
5)YoushouldalreadyknowabouttheChinesematter.Americahasdisgraceditselfsomewhatwithitsinterference.
6)Inafewdayswe'llmakethedecisiononthepaceofthecollectivefarmmovement.Yakovlev'scommissionhassubmittedadraft.Inmyopinion,itisn'tsuitable.
You'veprobablyalreadygotit.Letmeknowyouropinionviatelegraph.3
Onceagain:Ipromisetowriteaproperletter.
Warmregards,
J.Stalin
12/25/29

Page186

1.Shliapnikov'sarticle"Zaindustrializatsiiuzasotsializm"(Forindustrialismandforsocialism)waspublishedinPravdaon16December1929.Noarticlewith
Naumov'sbylinewaspublishedinPravdainDecember1929.EitherStalinwasreferringtoanunsignedpiece,oranarticlesubmittedbyNaumovwasnotpublished
inthenewspaper.
2.AfterhearingthereportbyDesov,amemberoftheLeningradControlCommission,regardingpresscoverageoftheabnormalphenomenaintheLeningradParty
Organization,theCentralControlCommissionsetupacommitteetoverifyhisinformation(RTsKhIDNIf.613,op.1,d.81,l.20).
3.Formoreonthecollectivizationdecision,seetheGrainTributeandCollectivizationsectionintheIntroductionU.S.Ed.

Page187

ChapterFive
1930
In1930,TheSovietUnionwasapproachingastateofcivilwar.InJanuaryandFebruarythegovernmentunleashedamassive,violentcollectivizationcampaign.By
10March,58percentofallpeasanthouseholdshadbeenforcedintothecollectivefarms,andmanypeasantshadbeenarrestedandexiled.Thecountryside
respondedwithmassiveunrest,thetruedimensionsofwhicharestillnotknown.Asaresultoftheforcedcollectivizationanddekulakizationofhundredsofthousands
ofpeasants,agriculturalproductiondeclined.Thecountrysurvivedonsemistarvationrationsthatwereconstantlybeingreduced.
Fromtheoutset,thepolicyofforcedindustrializationwasdestructiveandineffective.Asaresultofthisillconceivedpolicy,manyhundredsofmillionsofrubleswere
investedinunfinishedconstruction.Factoriesproducingconsumergoodsoftenhadtoreducetheiroutputbecauseofshortagesofequipmentandrawmaterials.The
costofindustrialproductionescalated,andtheoutputofdefectiveproductsincreaseddramatically.
Allofthiswasdisastrousforthestatebudget.Thehugedeficitwaspatchedupbyraisingprices,introducingobligatorypromissorynotesforloans,and,most
important,printingmoney.Intwentyonemonths,fromtheendof1928toJuly1930,1,556millionrubleswereputintocirculation,althoughthefiveyearplanhad
calledforthecreationofonly1,250millionrubles.1Themassiveinflationledtoinventoriesbecomingexhausted,andbartering
1.

RTsKhIDNIf.85,op.27,d.397,l.20b.

Page188

becamethenorm.Atfarmers'markets,peasantswouldsellagriculturalproductstourbandwellers,notformoney,butforsoap,thread,sugar,textiles,footwear,and
soon.
Oneofthemostgraphicdisplaysofthecompletecollapseofthebudgetwasthesocalledsmallchangecrisis.Sincepapermoneykeptdepreciating,peoplehoarded
coinscontainingatinyamountofsilver.Themonetarysystemsplitintotwo,withpricesdependentonwhetherpaymentwasincoinsorpaperbanknotes.Inanumber
ofplaces,sellersrefusedtoacceptpapermoney.Largeamountsofsilveraccumulatedinpeople'shomes.Althoughnewcoinswereminted,thescarcityofimported
silvermeantthatnotenoughwasproducedtocovertheshortage.
On19July1930,G.L.Piatakov,chairmanofGosbank(thestatebank),sentStalinamemoonthestatusofthecoinsupplyandthecountry'sfinances.Hecandidly
describedthefiscalcrisisandthecoinshortagetheexcessiveprintingofmoney,theriseinprices,thesmallchangecrisis,andsoonandproposedthefollowing
remedies:
Toestablishaclearanddefinitepartypositionregardingmoneyatthisnewstageofeconomicdevelopment....Torootouttheapatheticandtailist2attitudesomeeconomic
managershavetothequestionofmoneycirculation....AdirectivemustbegiventoGosplantoensurethatindustriesproducingmassconsumergoods...begivenfargreater
scopethanwasoriginallyintended.Inparticular,GroupBindustry[lightindustry]mustatallcostsattainagrowthrate,notof32percent(aswasoriginallyprojectedbyGosplan),
butofatleast35percentor36percent...
Importsmustbemademoreefficientineverywaypossible,discardingfromimport[orders]everythingthatisnotabsolutelynecessary...andmaximizingtheimportofraw
materialsforconsumerindustries:anattemptshouldbemadetoimportnotjustthreebutfourmillionpoodsofcotton,andtoincreasesomewhattheimportofwool,rubber,boot
leather,industrialfats...
Exportsshouldbereviewedandmademoreefficient.Theexportofanimalproductsintendedforhumanconsumption(butter,eggs,meat,andsoon)shouldbereducedor
eliminated.Exportsshouldalsobe
2.

Fromkhvostizm,"tailism,"anexpressioncondemningfollowingthecrowdorthemomentarymassmoodinsteadofprovidingleadershipU.S.Ed.

Page189
thoroughlyanalyzed,itembyitem,toeliminateanyitemsexportedatanexcessiveoroutrageousloss...
Theentirefiscalplanforthecomingyearmustbeimplementedwithoutcreatingadeficit,andthecreditplanforGosbankshouldbeimplementedwithoutprintingmoney.The
budgetshouldcontainanunexpendedreserveof2or2.5percent(thatis,about300400millionrubles).

Inaddition,Piatakovproposedraisingpricesonanumberofluxuryitemsandexpandingthesystemofloansfromconsumerstoberepaidbythefutureproductionof
consumergoodssewingmachines,pocketwatches,carriages,bicycles,sugar,andsoon.Heproposedtighteningcontroloverconstructionprojectstocombat
wasteinthisareaincreasingthenumberofloansregulatingpricesstrictlywithoutallowingprocurementcoststoriseandchangingthesystemthatallowedany
divergencefromthebudgettobecoveredbyprintingmoneyorbypermittingsomepaymentstobepostponed,andsoon.3
Inregardtothecoinshortage,GosbankdirectorssupportedtherepeatedsuggestionsofN.P.Briukhanov,commissaroffinance,thatsilvermoneybereplacedwith
nickelcoins.4Untilthiscouldbedone,BriukhanovandPiatakovadvocatedcontinuedsilverimportssothatmorecoinscouldbeminted.
InspiteofPiatakov'sattempttoshowfullsupportforthe"generalline"andhisrejectionof"anyopportunisticconclusionsaimedatexploitingthetemporarydisorderin
coincirculationinordertodiscreditoureconomicpolicyandaccuseusofoverlyambitiousandimpossibletempos,"StalinmusthaverealizedthatPiatakovwasin
effectadvocatingarealshiftincourse.Tocallforafundamentalchangeinattitudethatwouldmaketheuseofmoneyacceptable,foranincreaseintheproductionof
consumergoods,forthetransferofgoodsearmarkedforexporttothedomesticmarket,andforstricterfinancingoflargescaleconstructionprojectsallthese
largelycoincidedwiththe"rightist,opportunist''sentimentsfromwhichPiatakovwassoeagertodisassociatehimself.
Ascanbeseenfromtheletters,Stalinsharplycondemnedtheseproposalsandadvocatedhisownsolutionstotheproblem:"Defi
3.

RTsKhIDNIf.85,op.27,d.397,ll.5,6.

4.

GARFf.5446,op.6,d.656,ll.13.

Page190

nitelyshoottwoorthreedozenwreckers"fromtheFinanceCommissariatandGosbankandconductmorevigorousOGPUoperationsagainstblackmarketcoin
dealers(letter57).Stalinsupervisedtheseoperationspersonally.On2August1930,twoweeksafterreceivingareportfromPiatakov,StalinsentOGPUChairman
V.R.Menzhinskiithefollowinginquiry:
Canyousendamemoontheresultsofthestruggle(throughGPUchannels)againstthesmallchangespeculators(howmuchsilverwasconfiscatedandforwhichperiodwhat
institutionsaremostinvolvedinthistheroleofforeigncountriesandtheiragentshowmanypeoplehavebeenarrested,whatsortofpeople,andsoon).Reportalsoonyour
thoughtsaboutwhatmeasurestotakeforfurtherstruggle.5

ThereportrequestedwasonStalin'sdeskwithinafewdays.Afterstudyingit,StalindeliveredareprimandinwritingtoMenzhinskiion9August:
Ireceivedyourmemo.Yourpointofviewiscorrect.Thereisnodoubtofthat.Buttheproblemisthattheresultsoftheoperationtoconfiscatesmallsilverchangearealmost
pathetic.Itwasn'tevenworthwritingareportabout280,000rublesthat'saninsignificantsum.Apparentlyyoutookabiteoutofthecashiersandletitgoatthat,asoften
happensinourcountry.That'snotgoodenough.6

AlthoughthePolitburohadalreadypassedaresolutionaboutmintingnickelcoins,itisclearfromtheletterstoMolotovthatStalinrejectedthisidea,anditwas
immediatelywithdrawn.7
AftertheseinstructionsfromStalin,authoritiessteppedupthepersecutionofpeoplewhopurchasedcoins.PiatakovandBriukhanovweresoonremovedfromtheir
posts.JustasStalinhadsuggested(letter63),theworkof"inspectingandcheckingupbypunchingpeopleintheface"8wasconductedintheirministries.
Theaxefellmostheavilyontheoldspecialists.Stalin'slettersreflectacleardesiretodeflecttheresponsibilityfornumerousproblemsandfailuresonto"wreckers"
and"classenemies."Inthe1920s,numerousengineers,experts,andscientistsfromthepre
5.

Kommunist,no.11(1990):96(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5275,l.1).

6.

Kommunist,no.11(1990):9697(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5274,l.1).

7.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.793,l.12.

8.

AmoreapttranslationofproverochnomordoboinaiarabotaintoAmericanEnglishwouldbe"totakenamesandkickass"Trans.

Page191

revolutionaryeraworkedinplants,factories,commissariats,andotherinstitutions.Manyofthemhadbeenmembersofvariousparties,rangingfromMensheviksto
Kadets.9Theyhadagreatwealthofpracticalexperienceandexcellenteducations.InspiteoftheirfundamentalpoliticaldisagreementswiththeBolsheviks,these
peoplehadoptimisticallyembracedNEP.Theyhaddoneagreatdealfortheeconomicrenewalofthecountry,andtheirpoliticalsympathieswerewiththemoderate
wingofthepartyleadershipwhoadvocatedprudenceandcautioninbothpoliticalandeconomicspheres.ItcanevenbesaidthatNEP'ssuccesseslargelydepended
onthecooperationbetweentheexperiencedspecialistsfromtheoldintelligentsiaandthemoderategroupofBolshevikleaders.
Thepersecutionofthe"rightists"putanendtotheoldspecialists'hopesforanevolutionaryimprovementoftheSovietgovernment.Moreover,thespetsy(asthey
werecalledatthetime)weresomeofthefirstvictimsoftheleftistturninthe"generalline"inthelate1920s.ThefamousShakhtytrialinearly1928unleasheda
powerful''antispets"campaigninthecountry.10Manyrepresentativesoftheoldintelligentsiafellvictimtodismissals,arrests,andexecutionsduringthisperiod.The
Stalingovernmentnotonlyfoistedalltheblameonthe"bourgeoisspecialists"forthegrowingdifficultiesbroughtaboutbyitsradicalpoliciesbutriditselfofconfirmed
supportersofNEPanddestroyedtheintellectualalliesoftherightistswhowereaccusedoffraternizingwithandprovidingpatronageto"wreckers."Thiswasprecisely
theblueprintforthewidescalecampaignconductedin1930,whoseinstigator,asthelettersindicate,wasStalinhimself.
Inordertosubstantiatetheclaimthatawidespreadnetworkofcounterrevolutionarywreckers'organizationsexisted,theOGPUbegantoarrestmajorspecialistsfrom
thecentraleconomicministriesinthesummerof1930.TheseweregenerallywellknownscientistsandexpertswhohadplayedaprominentroleduringtheNEP
years.Forexample,N.D.Kondratiev,aformerSocialistRevolutionaryandassistantministeroffoodsupplyintheProvisional
9.

TheKadets,orConstitutionalDemocrats,weretheleadingliberalpartyinthedecadebeforetherevolutionU.S.Ed.

10.

In1928,morethanfiftyengineersweretriedforsabotageattheShakhtymines.ItwasoneofthefirstshowtrialsofwreckersU.S.Ed.

Page192

Government,hadworkedinSovietagriculturalagenciesandheadedtheMarketInstituteoftheCommissariatofFinanceN.P.MakarovandA.V.Chaianovheld
postsintheRSFSRCommissariatofAgricultureL.N.YurovskiiwasamemberofthecollegiumoftheFinanceCommissariatandP.A.Sadyrin,anagronomistof
peasantbackgroundwhowaselectedtotheCentralCommitteeoftheKadetpartyin1917,wasamemberofGosbank.TheexperiencedstatisticianV.G.Groman
remainedaMenshevikuntil1921,thenworkedatGosplanandtheCentralStatisticalAdministration.AnotherprominentMenshevik,V.A.Bazarov,hadhadasimilar
careerandhadworkedasaGosbankofficialsince1921.N.N.SukhanovwasajournalistwhohaddebatedLeninheworkedingovernmenteconomicagenciesand
intheSoviettradedelegationsinBerlinandParisduringthe1920s.In1930,StalindemandedthatSukhanov'swifebeinterrogatedunderthepretextthat"outrages
[were]goingonattheirhouse."(Ironically,Sukhanov'swifehadallowedherapartmenttobeusedwithoutherhusband'sknowledgeinOctober1917,priortothe
Bolshevikrevolution,foracrucialsecretmeetingoftheparty'sCentralCommittee.)
Soon,throughtheeffortsoftheOGPUandunderStalin'scarefulsupervision,materialswereprepareddescribingtheexistenceofapowerfulnetworkofinterrelated
antiSovietorganizationsinmanygovernmentoffices.Stalin'slettersprovideevidenceofhowthetestimonyofthearrestedwasused.UponStalin'sorder,testimonies
werecollectedandpublishedintheformofaprintedbrochure,Materialypodelukontrrevoliutsionnoy'Trudovoykrestianskoypartii'igruppirovkiSukhanova
Gromana(IzmaterialovsledstvennogoproizvodstvaOGPU)(MaterialsonthecaseoftheCounterrevolutionary"ToilingPeasants'Party"andtheSukhanovGroman
group[fromOGPUinvestigationfiles]).ThebrochurecontainedthetranscriptsoftheinterrogationsofKondratiev,Yurovskii,Makarov,Chaianov,Sadyrin,Groman,
andotherarrestedpersonsmadefrom27Julyto2September1930.Thepublicationwaswidelydistributedamongpartyandstatedirectors.
AscanbeseenfromMaterialy,the"testimonies"of"wreckers"followedacertainscript:theOGPUsupposedlydiscoveredthatacounterrevolutionaryToiling
Peasants'Party(TPP),withKondratievasitschairman,hadanorganizationinMoscowand''strongrepre

Page193

sentationintheprovinces."AccordingtotheOGPU'sallegations,theCentralCommitteeofthispartymetregularlyandhadevendrawnupalistofofficialsforafuture
governmentunderKondratiev.Itwassupposedtocometopowerthrougharmedinsurrection.TheTPPCentralCommitteehadclosecontacts(orsothepublished
"testimonies"claimed)withtheWhiteemigrRepublicanDemocraticAssociation,towhichsuchfamousemigrsasP.Miliukov,S.Maslov,A.Kerensky,B.
Brutskus,S.Prokopovich,andYe.Kuskovabelonged.OGPUinvestigatorslinkedtheTPPCentralCommitteewiththe"counterrevolutionaryorganizationof
SukhanovGromanBazarov"(soontobedubbedthe"UnionBureauofMensheviks").TheTPPallegedlydiscussedthecompositionofthefuturegovernmentwiththis
fellow''counterrevolutionaryorganization,"aswellasitsparticipationintheorganizationofpeasantuprisingsandsoon.
Infabricatingthecase,theOGPUalsoclaimedthattheTPPwasin"informationalcontact"witha"center"madeupofindustrialengineerslikeL.K.Ramzin,director
oftheInstituteofThermalTechnologyV.A.Larichev,memberoftheGosplanpresidiumA.A.Fedotov,chairmanofthecollegiumoftheTextileResearchInstitute
andS.V.Kupriianov,technicaldirectoroftheSupremeEconomicCouncil'stextiledivision.This"center"waslatercalledtheIndustrialParty(Promparty).Chaianov
wasslatedtobetheTPPrepresentativetothis"center."SupposedlyhehadregularlyinformedtheTPPaboutmeasurestodisrupttheentireeconomiclifeofthe
countryintheeventofforeignintervention.
Meanwhile,acasewasbeingpreparedconcerningacounterrevolutionaryorganizationof"wreckersinworkers'foodsupply."Thearrestsweremadeinthechief
governmentofficesinchargeofsupplyingfoodtothepopulace.TheOGPUplacedRiazantsevandYe.S.Karatyginattheheadofthis"organizationofwreckers."
KaratyginhadbeenatopofficialintheMinistryofFinanceandtheformereditorinchiefofTorgovopromyshlennaiagazeta(Tradeandindustrynewspaper).The
RiazantsevKaratygingroupwasdeclaredabranchofthe"wreckers'organization"runbyKondratievGroman.Aswelearnfromtheletters,Stalinmadethedecision
toexecutethosewhowerearrested.Athisorder,areportfromtheOGPUwasprintedon22September1930,concerningthediscoveryofa"wreckers'andspies'
organizationinvolvedinthesupplyof

Page194

themostbasicfoodproducts"theaimofthisorganizationwasto"causehungerinthecountryandprovokeunrestamongthebroadmassesofworkersandthus
facilitatetheoverthrowofthedictatorshipoftheproletariat."Severaldayslater,on25September,thenewspapersreportedtheexecutionoffortyeight"supply
wreckers.''Aloudpropagandacampaignwasorganizedaroundthisevent.Thepublic,wornoutbythefoodcrisis,wastoldthattherealpeopletoblameforthe
conditionsofpovertyhadbeenexposedandwouldnowbepunished.
AsimilarcampaignwaslaunchedinDecember1930duringthetrialoftheengineerswhohadsupposedlyformedthePromparty.Thecourt'sstatementinthe
PrompartyaffairassertedthatthisorganizationwastiedtothesocalledTorgprom[TradeandIndustry],aforeigncounterrevolutionarygroupcomposedofformer
ownersofRussianfactoriesheadedbyDenisov,Nobel,andMontashev.Thecourtclaimedthatthe"Prompartywaschieflycountingonamilitaryinterventionagainst
theUSSRand,inordertoprepareforthis,hadenteredintoorganizationalcontactwithinterventionistorganizationsbothintheUSSR(theSocialistRevolutionary,
Kadet,andkulakgroupofKondratievandChaianov,andtheMenshevikgroupofSukhanovandGroman)aswellasabroad(Torgprom,Miliukov'sgroup,and
Parisianinterventionistcircles)."11
Evidencewasgiventoshowthataforeignexpeditionarycorps,combinedwithremnantsofWrangel'sarmyandKrasnovCossackunits,waspreparingformilitary
interventionin1930.12TheseformationswereallegedlysupposedtostrikeacombinedblowagainstMoscowandLeningrad.Accordingtothecourt'sfinalstatement,
"Theplancontainedthenotionofusingsomeborderincidentasanexcuseforaninterventionists'attackagainsttheUSSR,sothatastheconflictprogressed,the
armedforcesofthecountriesalliedwithFrancePolandandRomaniacouldbeusedaswellasthearmiesoftheborderstates(thatis,thegroupofstatesonthe
peripheryoftheformerRussianempireLatvia,Lithuania,Estonia,andFinland)."Thecourtfurtherclaimedthat
11.

Protsess"prompartii"(25Noiabr7Dekabria1930g.)(Prompartytrial,25November7December1930)(Moscow,1931).

12.

WrangelandKrasnovweretsaristgeneralswhofoughtagainsttheBolsheviksduringthecivilwarU.S.Ed.

Page195

thetimeperiodfortheinterventionhadbeenmovedforwardlargelybecauseoftheabsence"insidetheUSSRofconditionsfavorabletocarryingoutanintervention."
AletterfromStalintoMenzhinskii,headofthesecretpolice,illustrateshowallofthesenotionsand"plans"cameabout,whotheirrealinstigatorwas,whoinreality
draftedthescriptforthetrialsof"spiesandwreckers,"andwhothoughtupthe"testimonies"thathadtobeobtainedfromthepersonsarrested:13
Com.Menzhinskii,
Receivedyourletterof10/2andthematerials.Ramzin'stestimoniesareveryinteresting.Ithinkthemostinterestingthinginhistestimoniesisthequestionofinterventionin
generalandthequestionaboutthetimingoftheinterventioninparticular.Itseemstheywereplottinganinterventionin1930butpostponedituntil1931oreven1932.Thisis
quitelikelyandimportant.It'sallthemoreimportantbecauseitcomesfromaprimarysource,thatis,fromthegroupofRiabushinskii,Gukasov,Denisov,andNobel,whorepresent
thestrongestsocioeconomicgroupofallthoseexistingintheUSSRandamongtheemigrs,thestrongestbothinfinancialbackingaswellasintieswiththeFrenchandBritish
governments.Itmightseemasifthe"TPP"orthe"Promparty"orMiliukov's"party"representsthemainforce.Butthat'snottrue.ThemainforceistheRiabushinskiiDenisov
Nobelgroupandthelikethatis,Torgprom.TheTPP,thePromparty,andMiliukov's"party''areerrandboysforTorgprom.Allthemoreinterestingistheinformationaboutthe
timingoftheinterventionthathascomefromTorgprom.Thequestionofinterventioningeneralandthetimingoftheinterventioninparticularisobviouslyofprimaryinterestfor
us.
Hencemyproposals:
a)Inanynew(future)testimoniesfromthechiefsofTPP,Promparty,andRamzin,payparticularattentiontothequestionofinterventionanditstiming:1)Whywasthe
interventionin1930postponed?2)WasitbecausePolandwasstillnotready?3)PerhapsbecauseRomaniawasnotready?4)Perhapsbecausetheborderstateshadstillnot
joinedwithPoland?5)Whydidtheypostponetheinterventionuntil1931?6)Whywerethey"ableto"postponeituntil1932?7)andsoforthandsoon
13.

Theinscriptionontheenvelopereads:"TotheOGPU,Com.Menzhinskii.Inpersononly.FromStalin."

Page196
b)BringchargesagainstLarichevandothermembersofthe"PrompartyCentralCommittee"andinterrogatethemasstrictlyaspossibleaboutthesamething,aftergivingthem
Ramzin'stestimonytoread
c)InterrogateGromanasstrictlyaspossibleaccordingtoRamzin'stestimony,heoncestatedinthe"UnitedCenter"that"theinterventionispostponeduntil1932"
d)RunMessrs.Kondratiev,Yurovskii,Chaianovetc.throughthemilltheyhavecleverlytriedtoevade[thechargeofhavinga]"tendencytowardintervention"butare
(indisputably!)interventionistinterrogatethemasstrictlyaspossibleonthetiming(Kondratiev,Yurovskii,andChaianovshouldalsoknowaboutthataswell,justasMiliukov,
whomtheyvisitedfora"chat,"knowsaboutit).
IfRamzin'stestimoniesareconfirmedandcorroboratedinthedepositionsofotherpersonsaccused(Groman,Larichev,Kondratievandcompany,etc.)thatwillbeaserious
victoryfortheOGPU,sincewe'llmakethematerialavailableinsomeformtotheCominternsectionsandtheworkersoftheworld,andwe'lllaunchthebroadestcampaignpossible
againsttheinterventionistsandwillsucceedinparalyzingthemandinheadingoffinterventionistattemptsforthenextoneortwoyears,whichisofgreatsignificanceforus.
Everythingunderstood?
Greetings,
J.Stalin14

Thispoliticalpersecutionwasaccompaniedbyafurthertighteningofthedomesticregimeandacrackdownondissentintheranksoftherulingparty.Inspiteofthe
harassmentof"rightdeviationists,"Stalin'spolicyprovokeddissatisfactioneven,insomecases,amongthepartyfigureswhohaduntilrecentlysupportedStalininhis
strugglewithBukharin.Themostsignificantactionagainsttheapostateswithintheparty'sranksin1930wasthecaseofthe"leftistrightwingbloc"ofSyrtsov
Lominadze.SyrtsovwasoriginallyStalin'sprotg.Foratime,heworkedattheCentralCommittee,andhebecameprominentin1928asanactivepromoterofthe
policyofforciblegrainprocurementinSiberia.SubsequentlyStalinbroughtSyrtsovtoMoscowandsethimupasthechairmanoftheRSFSRCouncilofCommissars
andacandidatememberofthePolitburo,clearlyopposingtheyoung,energeticSyrtsovtoRykov.
14.

Kommunist,no.11(1990):99100(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5276).

Page197

Syrtsovdidnotliveuptotheleader'shopes,however.ConfrontedwiththefruitsofStalin'sextremistpolicy,hebegantocriticizeitandproposeremediesthatwere
increasinglyreminiscentofthepointsmadebytheBukharingroup.Dissatisfactionwiththe"generalline"unitedSyrtsovandanotheryoungprotg,V.V.Lominadze,
whohadbeenappointedtotheexecutivepositionoffirstsecretaryoftheTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee.AgroupofsupportersgatheredaroundSyrtsov
andLominadzeseveralmeetingstookplacewithfrankconversationsaboutandsharpcriticismofStalin.
Tothisdayitisnotknownwhatpracticalactionsthisgrouphadinmind.Buton21and22October1930,Reznikov,oneofthemembersofthegroup,addressed
twodenunciationstoStalinattheCentralCommitteemeeting.Heinformedthegovernmentindetailaboutthegroup'smeetingsandtheissuesdiscussedthere.Onthe
basisofReznikov'sstatements,SyrtsovandLominadzeweregrilledatthepresidiumoftheCentralControlCommission.Anumberofthegroup'smemberswere
arrestedbytheOGPU.ThroughthejointeffortsoftheCentralControlCommissionandtheOGPU,thenecessarytestimonieswereextracted.On2December1930,
aCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissionresolutionwaspublished:"OnthefactionalworkofSyrtsov,Lominadze,andothers."ItstatedthatSyrtsovand
Lominadzehadorganizeda"leftistrightwingbloc"onthebasisofageneralpoliticalplatformthatcoincidedonallthebasicpointswiththeplatformofthe"right
opportunists."SyrtsovandLominadzewereexpelledfromthepartyandremovedfromtheirposts.OtherCommunistssuspectedofdisloyaltyalsofellvictimto
persecution.
OneofStalin'schiefconcernsin1930wastheremovalofRykovfromthepostofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars.Throughout19291930,astheletters
illustrate,Stalinpreparedvariouspretextsforattackinghim.FromStalin'sletters,itappearsthatonepurposebehindthefabricationofthecasesofthe
"counterrevolutionaryparties"wastodiscreditRykov(andalsoKalinin,whohadvacillatedandnotbeensufficiently"staunch").Themajorityofspecialistsarrestedby
OGPUworkedinthegovernmentapparatandwereinclosecontactwithRykovandKalininthroughtheirjobs.Interrogatorsmadeaspecialpointoftakingtestimony
from

Page198

thearrested"wreckers"aboutthesecontacts.Politicalresponsibilityforthe"activization"ofthe"counterrevolution"wasconstantlylaidatthedoorofthe"rightists,"
includingRykov.
StalinfirstconfidentiallyinformedMolotovofhisintentiontoremoveRykovinSeptember1930,apparentlyhavingdecidedthattheconditionswereripeforit.Trueto
hismethods,Stalinconceivedofanentireprogramtoreorganizegovernmentbodies,inthecontextofwhichRykov'sremovalwassupposedtolooklikeameredetail.
AttheDecemberCentralCommitteeplenum,Rykovandthe"rightists"asawholewereonceagainaccusedofideologicallyabettinghostileforces.AsKuibyshevsaid
inhisspeech,"ThewreckersfromthePromparty,theChaianovKondratievwing,andtheGromanwingareallhopingforthevictoryoftherightopportunists."15A
decisionwasmadeattheplenumtoremoveRykovandappointMolotovtothepostofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars.
Asthenewchairman,MolotovinformedtheplenumofthedecisiontoreformthemaingovernmentbodiesandoutlinedinfullStalin'snotionsasconveyedtohiminthe
letterof22September(letter68).TheplenumapprovedtheproposaltobringStalinintotheLaborDefenseCouncilandturntheLaborDefenseCouncilintoa
"militantandviableeconomicmanagementbody."Theplenumalsodecidedtocreatea"CommissiononFulfillment"undertheCouncilofCommissars,tobe
composedofthechairmanoftheCouncilofCommissars,theheadofWorkerPeasantInspection,thesecretaryoftheTradeUnionCouncil,andoneofthe
secretariesoftheCentralCommittee.Thecommissionwaschargedwithverifyingthefulfillmentoftheparty'sdirectivesandtheCouncilofCommissars'decisions.
Virtuallytheentirereorganizationwasstillborn.Thenewbodiesturnedouttobeapowerlessappendagetothetraditionalmechanismofpower.Asbefore,all
fundamentalquestionsandtheoversightofpolicyimplementationwereunderthecontrolofpartybodies.Nevertheless,Rykovwasremoved,yetanotherpurgehad
beenconductedinthestateeconomicapparat,andStalin'srealgoalshadbeenachieved.
15.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.2,d.460,l.83.

Page199

Letter55
[Earlierthan20April1930]1
WemustreckonwithCom.Bauman'scategoricalstatementthatheisnotanadvocateforanyspeciallineinourparty,althoughheistheonewhotolerated
appeasementofthe"leftist"deviationists.
IsthatpassagefrommyconcludingspeechsuitablefortheMoscowPartyCommittee?
PerhapsitshouldbesaidmoreforcefullythatBaumandoesn'thaveaspecialline?
[V.Molotov]
Ofcourse,ithastobesaidmorebluntlythathedoesn'thaveanyspecialline,thathehimselfisnota"leftist"deviationist,butthereare(orhavebeen)onlysome
examplesofappeasementof"leftist"deviationists.2
[J.Stalin]
1.AnotefromMolotov(mostlikelywrittenatoneofthePolitburomeetings)andStalin'sreplyonthebackofthenote.
2.On18April1930,thePolitburopolleditsmembersregardingthestatementbytheMoscowRegionalPartyCommitteesecretary,K.Bauman,inwhichhe
admittedthemistakesmadebytheMoscowCommitteeduringcollectivizationandaskedtoberelievedfromthepostofsecretaryoftheMoscowCommittee.The
PolitburonotedthatBaumanhad"inpracticedisplayedappeasementtoward'leftist'deviationists"andresolved(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.783,ll.12,13):
1)TosatisfytherequestofCom.BaumanregardinghisreleasefromthedutiesofsecretaryoftheMoscowRegionalorganization.2)TotransferCom.Baumantoworkat
theCentralCommitteeinthecapacityofasecretary.3)TorecommendthatCom.KaganovichtakethepostoffirstsecretaryoftheMoscowRegionalorganizationwhile
maintaininghispositionasCentralCommitteesecretary.

On20April1930,thePolitburoassignedMolotovtoreporttotheplenumoftheMoscowandMoscowRegionalpartycommitteesonthisresolution(ibid.,l.14).
On22April1930,thejointplenumoftheMoscowandMoscowRegionalpartycommittees"satisfied[Bauman's]request."
Letter56
[2August1930]
8/2
Viacheslav,
YouhaveprobablyalreadyreceivedthenewtestimoniesofGroman,Kondratiev,andMakarov.Yagodabroughtthemtoshowme.Ithinkthatallthesetestimonies
plusGroman'sfirsttestimonyshouldbesenttoallmembersoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissionandalsothemostactive

Page200

ofoureconomicmanagers.1 Thesearedocumentsofprimaryimportance.
Regards,
Stalin
1.On10August1930,thePolitburoresolvedtodistributethetestimoniesofthepersonsarrestedintheToilingPeasants'Partycasetomembersandcandidate
membersoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommissionandtohighleveleconomicmanagers(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.792,l.11).
Letter57
[Noearlierthan6August1930]
Viacheslav,1
Receivedyourletterof8/6.
1)I'magainsttransferringMirzoiantotheProfintern[TradeUnionInternational]becauseIhavealwaysbeenagainstandwillcontinuetobeagainstlootingprovinces,
especiallyaprovinceliketheUrals,whichisgrowingbyleapsandboundsandisinneedofofficials.2
2)Theresultsofthebattleagainstthecoinshortagearealmostnonexistent.280,000rublesisnonsense.Theyprobablyclampeddownonafewcashiersandletitgo
atthat.Butit'snotonlyaquestionofcashiers.It'saquestionofPiatakov,Briukhanov,andtheirentourage.BothPiatakovandBriukhanovwereforimportingsilver.
BothPiatakovandBriukhanovpreachedtheneedtoimportsilverandpushedaresolutiontothateffectthroughtheconferenceofthedeputies(ortheLaborDefense
Council)aresolutionwerejectedatMonday'smeeting,afterbrandingthem"blindfollowers"[khvostiki]ofthefinancialwreckers.Nowit'sobviouseventothe
blindthatYurovskiidirectedFinance'smeasures(andnotBriukhanov)andthatwreckerelementsfromtheGosbankbureaucracy(andnotPiatakov)directedthe
Gosbank"policy,"asinspiredbythe"government"ofKondratievGroman.Itisthusimportanttoa)fundamentallypurgetheFinanceandGosbankbureaucracy,
despitethewailsofdubiousCommunistslikeBriukhanovPiatakovb)definitelyshoottwoorthreedozenwreckersfromtheseapparaty,includingseveraldozen
commoncashiersc)continueOGPUoperationsthroughouttheUSSRthatareaimedatseizingsmallchange(silver).
3)IthinkthattheinvestigationintotheKondratievGromanSadyrinaffairmustbecontinuedverythoroughlyandwithouthaste.Thisisaveryimportantmatter.All
documentsconcerningthiscaseshouldbesenttomembersoftheCentralCommitteeandtheCentralControlCommission.Idon'tdoubtthatadirectconnectionwill
bediscovered(throughSokolnikovandTeodorovich)betweenthesegentlemenandtherightists(Bukharin,Rykov,Tomskii).Kondratiev,Groman,andafewother
scoundrelsmustdefinitelybeshot.
4)Awholegroupofwreckersinthemeatindustrymustdefinitelybeshotandtheirnamespublishedinthepress.

Page201

5)Isittruethatyouhavedecidedtoissuenickelcoinsrightnow?Ifthat'strue,it'samistake.Youshouldwaitwiththat.3
6)IsittruethatweimportedshoesfromEngland(forseveralmillionrubles)?Ifthat'strue,it'samistake.
7)It'sgoodthattheUnitedStateshaspermittedtheimportationofourtimber.4 Ourpatienceborefruit.WaitonBogdanovforthetimebeing.5
8)ThetreatywithItaly6 isaplus.Germanywillfollowsuit.Bytheway,howarethingswiththeGermancredits?7
9)Forcetheexportofgraintothemaximum.Ifwecanexportgrain,thecreditswillcome.
10)PayattentiontotheStalingradandLeningradtractorfactories.Thingsarebadthere.8
Well,regards,
Stalin
1.Intheupperlefthandcorner,Molotovhasnoted:"1930=?"
2.On21August1930,thePolitburoconfirmedMirzoianasthirdsecretaryoftheUralRegionalCommittee(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.793,l.17).
3.On20August1930,thePolitburorejectedtheproposalfromthePolitburocommissionheadedbyRudzutakonmintingnickelcoins(ibid.,l.12).
4.In1930,theUnitedStatesimposedbarriersagainstSovietexportsofmatches,timber,anthracite,manganeseore,andasbestos.On25July1930,theU.S.
DepartmentofCommercedeclaredanembargoontheimportoftimberfromtheUSSR.On28July,twoshipscarryingtimberfromtheUSSRwererefused
permissiontounload.FollowingprotestsfromtheSovietgovernmentandfromanumberofAmericancompanies,theDepartmentofCommercewithdrewthe
embargo.ButSovietgoodscontinuedtobeboycottedintheUnitedStatesandothercountries.Thereasonsfortheembargoesandboycottswereallegationsthatthe
Sovietsemployedslavelabor(inlaborcampsforthetimberandminingindustries)anddumpedtheseproductsontheworldmarketatbelowcost.
5.P.A.BogdanovwasdirectorofAmtorg(AmericanTradingCorporation)from1930to1934.On30July1930,thePolitburoreviewedBogdanov'sstatements.
ThedecisionwassenttotheSpecialFile(ibid.,d.791,l.10).On20August1930,thePolitburopassedaresolution,"OnAmtorg,"notingthattheWorkerPeasant
InspectionhaddiscoveredsubstantialoverpaymentsforoilandotherproductsfromAmerica,andprescribedmeasuresfor"eliminatingtheshortcomings
indicated"(ibid.,d.793,ll.11,32,33).
6.TheagreementbetweenthegovernmentsoftheUSSRandItalyonthediscountpurchaseofItalianproductsona"mostfavored"basiswassignedon2August
1930(DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR[DocumentsofUSSRforeignpolicy],vol.13[Moscow,1967],43941).
7.TalksonGermany'sgrantingofcreditstotheUSSRculminatedinthesigning,on14April1931,ofanagreementbetweentheSupremeEconomicCounciland
GermanindustrialrepresentativesthatgrantedtheSovietUnionsubstantialcreditsforthepurposeofmakinglargepurchasesfromGermany(Dokumentyvneshnei
politikiSSSR,vol.14[Moscow,1968],24648).
8.On25August1930,thePolitburodiscussedthequestionoftractormanufactureattheStalingradandPutilovfactories.Theresolutionemphasizedtheneedtofulfill
the19301931manufacturinggoalssetforthefactories.AcommissionthatincludedRykov,Kuibyshev,Osinskii,andotherswasformedtodiscussthepractical
measuresneededtofulfillthisresolution(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.793,l.3).

Page202

Letter58
[13August1930]
Viacheslav,
1)Doesn'titseemmorethanoddtoyouthattheSiberianskeptmumanddidn'tdemandEikhe'sremovalwhentheSiberianRegionalCommitteeembracedboth
halvesofSiberia,butnowthatSiberiahasbeendividedintotwosectionsandtheSiberianCommittee'ssphereofactivityhasbeenhalved(thatis,theSiberian
Committee'sjobhasbeenmadeeasier),1 Eikhesuddenlyturnsouttobe"unabletocope"withhisassignments?Ihavenodoubtthatthisisacrudelymasked
attempttodeceivetheCentralCommitteeandcreate"theirown"artellikeregionalcommitteebasedonmutualprotection.Iadviseyoutokickoutalltheintriguers
and,aboveall,Klimenko(theUkrainian"methods"ofplotting!),alongwithalltheBazovskiis,Liaksutkins,Kuznetsovs,andsoonandputfulltrustinEikhe,inorder
toteachthoseintriguersneveragaintoslanderhonestofficialsanddeceivetheCentralCommittee.2
2)TheCentralCommittee'sresolutiononAzerbaidzhanshouldbepublishedinfull(inPravda).ThosecleveronesfromtheCaucasussotwistedthingsintheirown
resolution(ithasalreadybeenpublished)thatGikalocomesoutlookinglikethemainculprit(sincehe'sattheheadofthelistofthoserecalled),andthe[real]main
culprits(Amasetal.)comeoutlookinglikesecondaryculprits,practicallydisciplesofGikalo.Inordertosmashthiscleverness(thisswindle),theCentralCommittee
resolutionmustbepublished.3
3)ThePolitburodidabsolutelytherightthinginseparatingMaykopfromGroznyi.4
That'sallfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.I'mgettingbetterbitbybit.
8/13/30
1.InJuly1930,changesweremadeintheadministrativeandterritorialpartitioningofSiberia.TheEasternSiberianRegionwasseparatedfromtheSiberianandFar
Easternregions.
2.InlateJuly1930,Kuznetsov,Bazovskii,Yeger,Klimenko,membersoftheWesternSiberianRegionalPartyCommitteeLiaksutkin,chairmanoftheRegional
ControlCommissionandotherssentStalinalettercriticizingtheworkofEikhe,firstsecretaryoftheSiberianRegionalCommittee,andcallingforhisimmediate
replacement(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.793,ll.2123).On19August1930,thisstatementwasdiscussedatthePolitburo.For"unprincipledcliquishnessand
unpartylikebehavior"Klimenko,Kuznetsov,Bazovskii,andYegerwerereprimandedanddismissedfromoffice(ibid.,l.7).
3.TheinternalpartysituationinAzerbaidzhanwasreviewedatPolitburosessionson20Julyand3August1930.Thedecreepassedstatedinpart(ibid.,d.790,l.8,
andd.791,ll.23,24):
Gossip,unprincipledcliquishness,intrigue,andcounterintriguehavespreadamongthechiefpartyactivists,demoralizingtherankandfileoftheorganizationand
disruptingthepositiveworkofthepartySovietandeconomiccooperativebodies....AlthoughCom.Gikalo

Page203
launchedalargeandenergeticcampaigntocorrect...thoseshortcomings,hewasnotabletosufficientlyrallythebasicmassofthepartyactivistsforfurthersuccessful
developmentoftheworkoftheAzerbaidzhanCommunistParty(largelybecausehewaspreventedfromdoingsobytheabovementionedcliques).

Gikalo,Bagirov,Amas,andotherswererecalledfromworkinAzerbaidzhan.
4.On10August1930,thePolitburoreceivedareportonthefireinMaykop.Theresolutionpassednotedthatinviewoftheabsenceofelementaryvigilanceinthe
matterofprotectingindustriesinMaykopitwasnecessaryto"punishtheguiltymostseverely."SinceinthePolitburo'sview,Grozneftdidnotdevotesufficient
attentiontoMaykop'sindustries,theywereremovedandgroupedinanindependentorganization(ibid.,d.792,l.7[GrozneftistheRussianacronymforthestate
organizationthatrantheGroznyioilindustry.GroznyiisthecapitalofwhatisnowtheChechniaRepublicoftheRussianFederation,formerlytheChechenIngushetian
AutonomousRepublicoftheRSFSRTrans.]).On10September1930,thePolitburoacceptedproposalsfromtheWorkerPeasantInspectionandtheCentral
ControlCommissiontoinstitutelegalandpartyproceedingsagainstGrozneftmanagerGanshinandotherofficials(ibid.,d.796,ll.10,38,39).
Letter59
[Noearlierthan23August1930]
Viacheslav,1
Thetotalfortenmonthsisonly26percentgrowthinstateindustry(insteadof32percent).Thisisaworrisometotal.Youspeakofthecounterplanforindustryand
financeandtheCentralCommitteemanifesto.2 Ithinkweshouldbepreparedtodoanythingtogetthat3032percentgrowth.I'mafraidit'slatetobespeakingabout
thisnownomajorchangescanbeintroducedbeforeOctober(theendoftheyear)inanyevent.Butperhapswecouldtry?Let'sgiveitashotwereallyoughtto
try.
2)Wehaveoneandahalfmonthslefttoexportgrain:startinginlateOctober(perhapsevenearlier),Americangrainwillcomeontothemarketinmassivequantities,
andwewon'tbeabletowithstandthat.Ifwedon'texport130150millionpoodsofgraininthesesixweeks,ourhardcurrencysituationcouldbecomereally
desperate.Onceagain:Wemustforcethroughgrainexportswithallourmight.
3)Sukhanov,Bazarov,andRamzinmustdefinitelybearrested.Sukhanov'swifeshouldbeprobed(she'saCommunist!):shecouldn'thelpbutknowaboutthe
outragesgoingonattheirhouse.Alltestimonieswithoutexception(boththebasicandthesupplementary)mustbedistributedtoCentralCommitteemembers.3 There
canbenodoubtthatKalininhassinned.EverythingreportedaboutKalinininthetestimoniesistheabsolutetruth.TheCentralCommitteemustdefinitelybeinformed
aboutthisinordertoteachKalininnevertogetmixedupwithsuchrascalsagain.4
4)ReceivedOsinskii'sletterabouttheAutomobileandAutomotiveScientificResearchInstitute.Osinskii'swrong.Istandbymyopinion.Klim[Voroshilov]willtell
youaboutmyreasons.JustlikeOsinskii'simpudence.5

Page204

5)AmsendingaclippingontheMariupolIronandSteelFactory.6 Thisisthefourthofthoseprovocateurs'escapadesatthatdamnedMetallurgicalInstitute.Can't
theguiltypartiesbepunishedasanobjectlesson?
(It'sPravda,23August1930)
Well,that'sallfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"8/1930."
2.Thepassingofthecounterplanwasorganizedinthefallof1930.TheCentralCommittee'sappeal"OntheThirdYearoftheFiveYearPlan"waspublishedon3
September1930.Thisappealcalledforusing"storm"methodsinanefforttocompletethelargelyunfulfilledplan.
3.On6September1930,theCentralCommitteepassedaresolutiontodistributetheadditionaltestimoniesofKondratiev,Groman,Sukhanov,andothers
(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.795,l.6).Seealsotheearlierdecisiontodistributetestimoniesmentionedinnote1toletter56.
4.Whileunderarrest,KondratievtestifiedthatKalininwasoneofhissourcesofinformationaboutthepoliticalsituationandinternalpartyaffairs.
5.ThedisputebetweenOsinskii,SupremeEconomicCouncildeputychairman,ontheonehand,andStalinandVoroshilov,ontheotherhand,aroseinconnection
withthetransferoftheaviationindustryfromtheSupremeEconomicCounciltotheCommissariatofWar.On20August1930thePolitburochargedKuibyshev,
chairmanoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil,with"ensuringthattheAutomobileandAutomotiveInstitutefullysatisfiestheneedsofthemilitaryregardingthe
manufactureofairplanemotors"(ibid.,d.793,l.8.)
6.On23August1930,PravdacarriedabriefnoticethattheboardoftheStateInstitutefortheDesignofMetallurgicalFactorieshadreviewedaproposalforanew
factoryinMariupol.ItwastobethelargestmetallurgicalfactoryintheUSSRandwasexpectedtoproduce816,000tonsofironand1,100,000tonsofsteel.
Letter60
[24August1930]
8/24/30
Viacheslav,
1)It'sverygoodthatyouhavetakenGosbankandits"director"1 underspecialsupervision.Thisveryimportantmattershouldhavebeentakencareoflongago.
KaktynandKarklinhaveapparentlynotbroughtanythingnewtoGosbank.AsforPiatakov,allindicationsarethathehasremainedthesameasalways,thatis,a
poorcommissaralongsideaspecialist(orspecialists)whoarenobetter.Heisahostagetohisbureaucracy.Youreallygettoknowpeopleinpractice,indailywork,
in"trivial"matters.Andhere,inthepracticalmattersoffinancial(andcredit!)management,Piatakovhasshownhistruecolorsasapoorcommissaralongsidepoor
specialists.AndIhavetotellyouthatthistypeofCommunisteconomicmanageristhemostharmfulforusatthistime.

Page205

Conclusion:hemustberemoved.Someoneelse(fromtheWorkerPeasantInspectionorOGPU)mustbeputinhisplace.We'lltalkaboutitinOctober.2
2)Mikoianreportsthatgrainprocurementsaregrowing,andeachdayweareshipping1to1.5millionpoodsofgrain.Ithinkthat'snotenough.Thequotafordaily
shipments(now)shouldberaisedto34millionpoodsataminimum.Otherwiseweriskbeingleftwithoutournewironandsteelandmachinebuildingfactories
(Avtozavod,Cheliabzavod,etc.).Somecleverpeoplewillcomealongandproposeholdingoffontheshipmentsuntilthepriceofgrainontheworldmarketrises''to
itsceiling."TherearequiteafewofthesecleverpeopleinTrade.Theyoughttobehorsewhipped,becausethey'redraggingusintoatrap.Inordertoholdoff,we
musthavehardcurrencyreserves.Butwedon'thavethem.Inordertoholdoff,wewouldhavetohaveasecurepositionontheinternationalgrainexchange.Andwe
haven'thadanypositionatallforalongtimetherewe'llonlyobtainitnowifwecanexploitconditionsthathavearisenatthepresentmomentandareparticularly
favorabletous.
Inshort,wemustpushgrainexportsfuriously.
3)MikoianrequeststhatRiabovolbeappointedheadofNeftexport[CentralOilExportAgency].3 Lomovwon'tlethimbecausehe'salreadyappointedRiabovol
headoftheproductiondepartmentoftheoilsyndicate.IthinkthatinthiscaseLomovismoreconcernedaboutensuringhisownconvenienceinsidethesyndicate(the
oilassociation)thanaboutpushingexports.ItwouldbebettertoputRiabovolinchargeoftheOilExportAgency.TheOilExportAgencyissick,ithastobecured
thecurrentdirectorsoftheOilExportAgencyhavefailed.4
4)WeshouldreplaceTumanov,whohascompletelyrottedaway.DoestheCentralCommitteereallyhopetoreformhiminaFrenchsetting?5
5)HowarethingswiththeChinese?
6)Howis"LenaGoldfields"?6
I'malittleundertheweather(strepthroat!),butit'llpasssoon.
Regards,
Stalin
Oh,Ialmostforgot.Wekeepforgettingaboutacertain"trivialmatter,"thatis,thatTradeisnowoneofthemostimportantcommissariats(andoneofthemost
complicated,ifnotthemostcomplicatedofall).Andwhatdowefind?Attheheadofthiscommissariatisapersonwhoisnotcopingwithajobthat,ingeneral,is
difficult,ifnotimpossible,foronepersontohandle.EitherwemustremoveMikoian,whichshouldn'tbeassumed,orweshouldprophimupwithoutstandingdeputies
which,Ithink,won'tmeetwithanyobjection.Thatwouldallseemtobecorrect.Theonlyquestionis:Whydon'tweimmediatelygofromwordtodeed?Why?What
arewewaitingfor?Whyshouldn'twegiveRozengoltstoMikoian(whereelsearewegoingtogetoutstandingpeopleifnotfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection?)
insteadofKhinchuk,who

Page206

hasbeenanutterfailureatrunningforeigntrade?WhatmoreevidenceisneededofKhinchuk'sfailure?DopeoplepityKhinchuk?Butthecauseshouldbepitiedeven
more.DotheynotwanttooffendSergo?Butwhataboutthecausecansuchanimportantandseriousmatterbeoffended?
Ipropose(formally):
1)toappointCom.Rozengoltsdeputyoftrade(forforeigntrade)andtoreleasehimfromhispositionattheWorkerPeasantInspection.
2)torelieveKhinchukfromhispositionasdeputyoftradeandappointhimeitherasUkhanov'sassistantfortheMoscowSovietoraschairmanofGrainExport.
IfSergoyells,givehimKlimenkofromSiberiainexchange.RozengoltsshouldbetransferredtoTradenomatterwhat.Tradehastobecured.Itwouldbeacrimeto
waitanylonger.7
J.Stalin
1.Atthe16August1930sessionoftheCouncilofCommissars,adecreewaspassedonreportsfromtheWorkerPeasantInspectionandGosbankonthecredit
reform.On30August1930,thePolitburoapprovedthisdecreeandnotedthatGosbank'simplementationofthecreditreformhadbeenunsatisfactory(RTsKhIDNI
f.17,op.3,d.794,l.5).
2.OnthereorganizationofGosbank,seenote2fordocument63.
3.Soiuzneftexport,theRussianacronymforAllUnionAssociationfortheExportofOilandOilProducts,alsocalledExportneftbyStalinTrans.
4.On18January1931,theOrgburoappointedRiabovoldeputychairmanoftheboardofSoiuzneft.On20January1931,thePolitburoreviewedtheissueofthe
managementofoilexportandresolved"toremovetheexportofoilfromthejurisdictionofSoiuzneftandtotransferoilexportstothejurisdictionoftheCommissariat
ofForeignTrade"(ibid.,d.811,l.8).On25January1931,Riabovolwasappointeddirectorofoilexport(ibid.,l.3).
5.On25November1930,thePolitburodiscussedTumanov'srequesttoberelievedofhisdutiesasSoviettraderepresentativeinFrance.Tumanovwasremoved
fromthispositionbutremainedatthedisposaloftheCommissariatofForeignTrade(ibid.,d.805,l.3).
6.LenaGoldfieldswasaBritishstockcompanythatsignedaconcessionagreementin1925withtheSovietgovernmenttomineandrefinegold,copper,iron,and
mixedmetalsinanumberofregionsinSiberia,theUrals,andtheAltaiMountains.Inearly1930,LenaGoldfieldsfiledasuitagainsttheSovietgovernmentin
arbitrationcourt.Afternegotiationstosettletheaccounts,anagreementwassignedin1934resolvingmutualclaims.TheLenaGoldfieldsmatterwasdecidedbya
pollingofPolitburomemberson6September1930.TheresolutionwassenttotheSpecialFile(ibid.,d.795,l.6).
7.On10September1930,Rozengoltswasappointeddeputycommissaroftrade.Inthesameresolution,KhinchukwasmadechairmanofExportkhlebwhile
retaininghispostatTrade(ibid.,d.796,l.9).On15September1930,however,thePolitburochangeditsmindandappointedKhinchukambassadortoBerlin(ibid.,
l.4).On15November1930,thePolitburodiscussedthereorganizationoftheCommissariatofTrade.Itwasdividedintotwoindependentcommissariats:
CommissariatofProvisionmentandCommissariatofForeignTrade.RozengoltswasappointedcommissarofforeigntradeandMikoianwasappointedcommissarof
provisionment(ibid.,d.804,l.6).

Page207

Letter61
[LateAugustEarlySeptember1930]
Viacheslav,1
Receivedyourlatestletter.
1)IamcompletelyinfavorofmovingupthecollectiveagreementsfromJanuarytoOctober.Thereshouldbenodelay!Andforthiswecertainlydon'tneeda
CentralCommitteeplenum.2
2)I'magainstmovingtheCentralCommitteeplenumtoearlyOctober.InordertomovetheplenumtoearlyOctober,weshouldhavethetargetfiguresready(nolater
than)midSeptember.Obviouslythetargetfigureswon'tbereadyintime.Inaddition,theplenumanditsnewdecreesaren'tthepointwe'vemadeahellishnumber
ofdecreesalready.Thenew"appeals"and"proclamations"areevenlessthepoint:eachissueofPravdaisan"appeal"or"proclamation.''What'simportantnowisto
haveathoroughandcontinuousmonitoring,checkinguponfulfillment.Untilcheckinguponfulfillmentisinorder,oureconomicandtradeunionbodies,and
consequentlythefulfillmentofplans,willbeunsatisfactory.IthinkthemostthatcanbedoneintermsofacceleratingtheplenumistomoveittolateOctober,andonly
ifgovernmentagencieswillhavethetargetfiguresfullyinhandinearlyOctober.
3)Youseemveryunconcernedaboutthestatuteforsettlementassociationsandtheaccompanyingagitationinthepress.3 Keepinmindthatthisillomenedstatutewas
offeredtousasthenewword,whichclaimstobesettingitselfupagainstthe"old"word,i.e.,thestatutefortheagriculturalartel[basicformofacollectivefarm].
Andthewholepointofthesettlement(new)statuteisthedesiretogivetheindividualthepossibilityof"improvinghis(individual)farm."Whatkindofnonsenseis
this?Herewehavethecollectivefarmmovementadvancinginagrowingwave,andthenthecleveronesfromtheCommissariatofAgricultureandfromthe
agriculturalcooperativesocietieswanttoevadethequestionofcollectivefarmsandbusythemselveswith"improving"theindividualpeasantfarm!Itseemstomethat
therightistshaveachievedsomesortofrevengehere,sneakinginthisstatuteonsettlementassociations,becausepeopleintheCentralCommittee,sincethey're
overburdenedwithwork,haven'tnoticedthelittletrick.
4)Regardingtheplenum'sagenda,Ialreadystatedmyopinionbycodedtelegram.IthinkitcouldbebeneficialonlyiftheCentralCommitteeplenumsweretomove
awayfromgeneraldecreesongeneralissuesandhearreportsrealreportsfromtheeconomiccommissariatsthataredoingbadly.Atpresent,provisionsfor
workersareoneofthemosturgentquestions.Consequently,theplenumcannotdisregardthisquestion.Theconsumercooperativesmustbeturnedupsidedownand
bureaucratismshakenoutofthem.Themeatsupplymustbecheckedandtherelevanteconomicorganizationsmustbeimproved.Hencemyagendaproposal.4

Page208

5)ItisbesttoappointKhinchuktoBerlin.HeisaneconomicadministratorandwillbemoresuitedtherethanSurits,whoisn'twellversedineconomicproblems.
Turkeyisanimportantareaforus.Theylikehimthereverymuch.Ithinkitwouldbeamistaketoremovehimfromthatposition.PeoplefromGrainExportwillbe
found(Fridrikhson,Zalmanov,currentdeputiesatGrainExport).5 Khlebexportwilldoallrightifonlythereisgrain.
6)Ipropose[M.M.]KaganovichfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection6 asthecandidateforheadofcivilaviation.
7)WhataboutRozengolts'sappointment?
That'sitfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.Iamgettingbackonmyfeetbitbybit.
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"9/1930=?"
2.On10September1930,thePolitburodecreedthatthenewcollectiveagreementstotakeeffecton1Octobershouldbecloselycoordinatedwiththefulfillmentof
economicplans(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.796,l.9).
3.Theregulationsonthesettlementassociationswerepublishedinthepresson30August1930.
4.FourissueswereplacedontheCentralCommitteeplenumfor1721December1930:thenationaleconomicplanfor1931thesummaryreportofthe
CommissariatofProvisionment,alongwithareportfromtheWorkerPeasantInspectiononmeatandvegetablesuppliesthesummaryreportfromtheCentralUnion
ofConsumerOrganizationsontheworkoftheconsumers'cooperativeassociations,accompaniedbyasupplementaryreportbytheWorkerPeasantInspectionand
newelectionstothesoviets.
5.TheappointmentofSuritsasambassadortoGermanywasconfirmedon10September1930(ibid.,l.9).Onthisappointmentcontroversy,seealsonote7toletter
60.
6.On15October1930,A.Z.GoltsmanwasconfirmedbythePolitburoasheadoftheCivilAviationAssociation(ibid.,d.800,l.7).
Letter62
[1September1930]
9/1/30
Viacheslav,
Payattention(forthetimebeing)totwothings:
1)ThePolesarecertaintobeputtingtogether(iftheyhavenotalreadydoneso)ablocofBalticstates(Estonia,Latvia,Finland)inanticipationofawaragainstthe
USSR.Ithinktheywon'tgotowarwiththeUSSRuntiltheyhavecreatedthisbloc.Thismeansthattheywillgotowarassoonastheyhavesecuredthebloc
(they'llfindanexcuse).TorepulseboththePolishRomaniansandtheBaltsweshouldpreparetodeploy(intheeventofwar)nofewerthan150to160infantry
divisions,thatis,(atleast)40to50divisions

Page209

morethanareprovidedforunderourcurrentguidelines.Thismeansthatwe'llhavetobringourcurrentarmyreservesupfrom640,000to700,000men.Without
this"reform,"itwon'tbepossibletoguaranteethedefenseofLeningradandrightbankUkraine1 (intheeventofaPolishBalticbloc).Inmyopinion,thisisbeyond
doubt.Andconversely,bythis"reform"wewouldensurethevictoriousdefenseoftheUSSR.Butthis"reform''willrequireconsiderableamountsoffunds(agreat
quantityofammunition,agreatdealofhardware,andasurplusofofficers,additionalexpendituresonuniformsandrations).Wherecanwefindthemoney?Ithink
vodkaproductionshouldbeexpanded(totheextentpossible).Weneedtogetridofafalsesenseofshameanddirectlyandopenlypromotethegreatestexpansion
ofvodkaproductionpossibleforthesakeofarealandseriousdefenseofourcountry.Consequently,thismatterhastobetakenintoaccountimmediately.The
relevantrawmaterialforvodkaproductionshouldbeformallyincludedinthenationalbudgetfor19301931.Keepinmindthataseriousupgradeofcivilaviationwill
alsorequirealotofmoney,andforthatpurposewe'llhavetoresortagaintovodka.2
2)Wehaveatremendousneedforroadbuildingmachingery,equipmentforbreadfactories,andlaundries.Themanufactureofthesemachinesisasimpleand
quitemanageablejobforourplants.Nooneevergivesitseriousattention(thinkingit"trivial"),andthereforeweareforcedtospendhardcurrency.Ukhanovtakes
thismatterseriously,buttheSupremeEconomicCouncilgiveshimnoopportunitytodoanythingit'slikeadoginthemanger,notdoinganythingitselfbutnotletting
othersdoanythingeither.Wemustputanendtothismuddle.WemustaddressthisissueattheCentralCommitteeandmakeitincumbentuponUkhanov(Moscow
Soviet)tobecomeinvolvedimmediatelyinthemanufactureofequipmentforlargescalemechanizedbakeriesandlaundries(androadbuildingmachinesaswell).
Somefinancialbackingwillhavetobeprovided.Butwemustmakeupourmindstodoitifwewanttogetthismattermoving.3
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.IjustreceivedtheCentralCommittee's"Appeal"concerningtheindustrialfinancialplanandtheCentralCommittee's"decree"onthepracticalmeansof
implementingthe"Appeal."ItturnedoutbetterthanIwouldhaveexpected.Verygood.4
J.Stalin
1."RightbankUkraine"referstothatpartofUkrainethatlieswestoftheDneprRiverU.S.Ed.
2.On2July1930,theCommissariatofFinanceproposedapriceincreaseforvodka.ThePolitburorejectedit(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.788,l.5).On15
September1930,thePolitburoreviewedthematterofincreasingvodkaproduction.ThedecisionwassenttotheSpecialFile(ibid.,d.796,l.7).
3.On25September1930,theCentralCommitteeestablishedacommitteeconsistingof

Page210

Kuibyshev,Ukhanov,andotherstoaddressalloftheseissues(ibid.,d.798,l.5).Stalin'sproposalsweretakenintoconsiderationinthePolitburoresolution"On
theconstructionofroadmachinery"of15October1930(ibid.,d.800,ll.3,2022).
4.OntheCentralCommittee'sappeal,seenote2toletter59.
Letter63
[2September1930]
9/2/1930
Viacheslav,
1)IagreetoTomskii's"resignation":heisdoingnothingforusinthechemicalindustry.1
2)AnexplanationofKondratiev's"case"inthepresswouldbeappropriateonlyintheeventthatweintendtoputthis"case"ontrial.Arewereadyforthis?Dowe
consideritnecessarytotakethis"case''totrial?Perhapsitwillbedifficulttodispensewithatrial.
Bytheway,howaboutMessrs.Defendantsadmittingtheirmistakesanddisgracingthemselvespolitically,whilesimultaneouslyacknowledgingthestrengthofthe
Sovietgovernmentandthecorrectnessofthemethodofcollectivization?Itwouldn'tbeabadthingiftheydid.
3)RegardingtheprosecutionofCommunistswhorenderedassistancetotheGromansandKondratievs,Iagree,butwhatistobedonewithRykov(who
unquestionablyhelpedthem)andKalinin(whoevidentlyhasbeenimplicatedinthis"affair"bythescoundrelTeodorovich)?Weneedtothinkaboutthis.
4)Itisverygoodthatyouhavefinallytakeninhandthe"loosecannons"fromGosbankandFinance(whichisrottentothecore).WhatareKarklin,Kaktyn,and
othersdoinginGosbank?DotheyreallyechoPiatakov'severyword?Inmyopinion,theleadershipofGosbankandFinancehastobereplacedwithpeoplefromthe
OGPUandtheWorkerPeasantInspectiononcetheselatterbodieshaveconductedsomeinspectingandcheckingupbypunchingpeopleintheface.2
5)Idon'tthinkit'scorrecttotriumphantlypublishthenewcharterofthesettlementassociationsandadvertiseitinthepress.3 Therewillbeanimpressionthatthe
slogan"Everyoneintothesettlementassociations!"runscountertotheslogan"Everyoneintothecollectivefarms!"Anillusionhasarisenofaretreatfromtheslogan
"Forthecollectivefarms!"totheslogan"Forthesettlementassociations"!Itdoesn'tmatterwhattheywantinMoscowinpracticethere'sbeenaswitchfromthe
vitalandtriumphantslogan"Fororagainstthecollectivefarms"tothemongrel,artificialslogan"Fororagainstthesettlementassociations."Andallofthisatatime
whenwehaveagrowingsurgeofpeasantsintothecollectivefarms!Ithinkthisattempttomakeus

Page211

retreatfromacollectivefarmmovementthatisincreasinglyontherisewillconfusepeopleandwillweakentheinfluxintothecollectivefarms.Ialreadysentyoua
telegramonthis.MaybeIshouldn'thavesentit,butpleasedonotberatemeforthis:itseemedtomethattheearlierIinformedyouaboutmyopinionthebetter.
Idon'tknowwhetheryouagreewithme,butifyoudo,wecanimmediatelystartputtingthebrakesonthisentire"settlement"ballyhoo.Inmyopinion,weshould,
first,giveaninternaldirectivetolocalpartycommitteesnottogetcarriedawaywithsettlementassociationsandnottosubstitutetheslogan"Intothesettlement
associations"fortheslogan"Intothecollectivefarms"andtofocusalltheirattentiononorganizingthemovementintothecollectivefarms.4 Inthesecondplace,it
wouldbewelltooverhaulPravdaandallofourpressinthespiritoftheslogan"Intothecollectivefarms"andtoobligethemtosystematicallydevoteatleastone
pageeverydaytofactsaboutthesurgeintothecollectivefarms,factsaboutadvantagesofcollectivefarmsoverindividualpeasantfarms.Indoingso,thesefacts,
reports,letters,andthelikeshouldnotbeprintedinsmallprintsomewhereinthebackpagesbutshouldhaveprominentcoverage.Inaword,[weshould]launch
asystematicandpersistentcampaigninthepressforthecollectivefarmmovement,whichisthemajoranddecisivefactorinourcurrentagriculturalpolicy.
Well,that'sallfornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.In1929,TomskiiwasappointedchairmanoftheAllUnionChemicalIndustryAssociation.On6September1930,thePolitburofulfilledTomskii'srequestto
relievehimofthispostbecauseofillness(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.795,l.5).On25September,Goltsmanwasappointedchairmanofthechemicalindustry(ibid.,
d.798,l.3).On15October1930,thispostwasgiventoPiatakov(ibid.,d.800,l.7).
2.On26September1930,theOrgburoreviewedtheissueof"theradicalimprovementofGosbankpersonnelinthecenterandprovinces"andnotedthat"some
improvementintheworkoftheGosbankstaffwasachievedbythoroughlypurgingitspersonnelaswellasbyroutinelyeliminatingthoseelementsselectedovera
periodofyearsbytheformerrightopportunistadministrationofGosbank."TheOrgburo'sdecreestipulatedfurthershufflingofpersonnelatGosbank.On15
October1930,byorderoftheCentralCommittee,PiatakovwasrelievedofhispositionasheadofGosbankandBriukhanovwasrelievedofhisdutiesatFinance.
KalmanovichwasappointedchairmanofGosbank,andGrinkowasappointedcommissaroffinance(ibid.,ll.7,8).
3.Theregulationsonthesettlementassociationswerepublishedinthepresson30August1930.
4.On24September1930,thePolitburoapprovedaletteroncollectivizationdraftedbytheCentralCommitteeandaddressedtoallregionalandprovincial
committees.Anexcerptfollows(KPSSvrezoliutsiiakh[ResolutionsoftheCPSU],vol.5[Moscow,1984],215):
TheCentralCommitteewarnsagainstanerroneoustendencyobservableinsomeorganizations,namely,tosubstituteagriculturalcooperativeassociationsforartels.
Whilerestoringtheagriculturalcooperativeassociationsinareaswithaweakcollectivefarmmovement,wemustfirmlyandpersistentlyorganizeagriculturalartelsasthe
basicformofthecollectivefarmmovementatthisstage.

Page212

Letter64
[7September1930]
9/7/30
Viacheslav,
Therearetwoissues:
1)I'mtoldthatRykovandKviringwanttosquelchthematterofthenortherncanal,contrarytothePolitburo'sdecisions.Theyshouldbetakendownapegandgiven
aslaponthewrists.Yes,thefinancialplanhastobecutasmuchaspossible,butit'sstillacrimetosquelchthismatter.1
2)I'mtoldtheywanttotakecriminals(withsentencesofmorethanthreeyears)awayfromOGPUandgivethemtothe[republican]NKVDs.Thisisanintrigue
orchestratedbyTolmachev,whoisrottenthroughandthrough.Syrtsov,towhomRykovhasbeenplayingup,alsohasahandinit.IthinkthePolitburo'sdecisions
shouldbeimplementedandtheNKVDsshouldbecloseddown.2
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.On5May1930,thePolitburoapprovedtheideaofconstructingtheentireBalticWhiteSeaCanal.Theresolutionranasfollows(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.
784,l.2):
Calculationsfortheconstructionplanforthesouthernsectionofthecanalshouldbebasedonthefollowingrequirements:
1)Constructionworkonthiscanalsection(fromLeningradtoLakeOnega)shouldstartatthebeginningofthenexteconomicyearandbecompletedwithintwoyears2)
thecanalshouldbedugtoadepththatwillallowthepassageofshipsdrawing18feet.
Thetotalcostofallconstructionworkonthesoutherncanalsectionshouldnotexceed60millionrubles.
TheCommissariatofTransportwiththeparticipationofthearmedforcesandtheOGPUshouldbechargedwithconductingageologicalsurveyforthediggingofthe
northerncanalsection(fromLakeOnegatotheWhiteSea).

Thepossibilityofusingprisonersinthisworkwasusedindeterminingthecostoftheconstructionworkonthenorthernsectionofthecanal.
AnoteofStalin'shasbeenpreserved,mostlikelywrittenduringthisPolitburomeeting(ibid.,f.558,op.1,d.5388,l.150):
Ithinkthatit'spossibletobuildittoOnega.Asforthenorthernsectionofthecanal,weshouldlimitourselvestosurveyingfornowIhaveinmindrelyingmainlyon
GPU[i.e.,prisonersTrans.].Atthesametime,wemustassignsomeonetocalculateyetagaintheexpensesinbuildingthisfirstsection.20millionplus70million.Too
much.

OnthebackofthenoteisMolotov'sreply:
Ihavemydoubtsabouttheexpediencyofbuildingthecanal.Ireadyournote.Theeconomicsideisnotthoughtthrough(it'snotclear).Shouldn'tthisprojectbethought
throughfirst?
Molotov

On5October1930,thePolitburotoldtheOGPUthatitshouldbeguidedbythedecisionof5May1930,andthequestionofappropriationsfortheBalticWhite
SeaCanalshouldbeputoffuntilconsiderationofthetargetfiguresfor1931wascompleted(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.799,l.5).

MolotovandStalin

LetterfromStalintoMolotov,7September1930(RTsKhIDNIf.558,op.1,d.5388,l.149).

Page213

2.On27June1929,thePolitburoapprovedthedecree"Ontheuseofthelaborofcriminalprisoners."Itstipulatedthatpersonssentencedtoimprisonmentforaterm
ofthreeormoreyearsshouldbetransferredtoprisoncampsrunbytheOGPU.Tohandletheseprisoners,theexistingconcentrationcampsweretobeexpanded
andnewonesweretobeestablished(aroundUkhta[atowninnorthernRussia]andinotherremoteregions)"forthepurposeofcolonizingtheseregionsandtapping
theirnaturalresourcesthroughtheexploitationofprisonermanpower."Personssentencedtotermsofimprisonmentofonetothreeyearswouldremaininthecustody
oftheNKVDoftheSovietrepublicsandwouldbeusedbythemforagriculturalandindustrialwork(ibid.,d.746,ll.2,11).
TheseNKVDs,however,resistedthetransferoftheprisonerswithtermslongerthanthreeyears,attemptingtousethemfortheirowneconomicprojects.Earlyin
August1930,Shirvindt,deputychairmanofinternalaffairsoftheRussianrepublic,sentamemotothegovernmentaskingforreconsiderationofthedecisionto
transferprisonerstoOGPUcamps.ThisrequestwassupportedbySyrtsov,chairmanoftheRSFSRCouncilofCommissars.On31August1930,thefollowing
decisionwasmadebytheConferenceofDeputieschairedbyRykov:"Personssentencedtoimprisonmentforatermofmorethanthreeyearsshallremainunder
thejurisdictionof[thepoliceoftherepublics]iftheycanbeusedforworkincoloniesandfactories"(GARFf.5446,op.6,d.725,ll.13,13).
AfterreceivingStalin'sletter,on5October1930thePolitburochangeditsmindanddecidedtogobacktolettingOGPUusetheseprisoners(RTsKhIDNIf.17,
op.3,d.799,l.5).
Letter65
[13September1930]
Viacheslav,1
1)Wemustimmediatelypublishallthetestimoniesofallthewreckersofthesuppliesofmeat,fish,tinnedgoods,andvegetables.Forwhatpurposearewe
preservingthem,whythe"secrets"?WeshouldpublishthemalongwithanannouncementthattheCentralExecutiveCommitteeortheCouncilofCommissarshas
turnedoverthemattertotheOGPUcollegium(it'sakindofjudicialbodyinoursystem)andafteraweekhavetheOGPUannouncethatallthesescoundrelswillbe
executedbyfiringsquad.Theyshouldallbeshot.2
2)Itwouldalsobegoodtopublishthetestimoniesofthe"IntelligenceService"agentsNeander,Gordon,Bondarenko,Akkerman,Bobrovshchikov,andothers
aboutthesubversiveactivityoftheVickersemployees,whohavebombed,setfireto,anddamagedourfactoriesandbuildings(Jackson,Lomans,Leap,and
others).3 Whyisthisrichmaterialbeingkeptsecret?NowthatnegotiationswiththeBritishondebtsandconcessionsarebeingopened,itwouldbemost
advantageousforustopublishAkkerman'sandothers'testimonies,preciselyastestimony(asindisputabledocuments).Thesedocumentscouldbepublished(after
carefulpreparation)fivedaysafterthepublicationofthetestimoniesofthewreckersinmeat,fish,etc.Forthetimebeing,itisbesttoconcentrateontheirpublication
andnotmentionanythingaboutthetrialandexecution.
3)Itisquiteclearthatboththefirstandthesecondgroupoftestimoniesshouldnotbepublished"justlikethat"butshouldbeaccompaniedbyan

Page214

introductionfromtheOGPU(orfromJustice)andwithaspecificinterpretationbyourpress.(Theleitmotifofthisinterpretationshouldbe:wehaverevealed
everything,weknoweverythingabouttheintriguesofthebourgeoisieanditsrobberarsonistsandwreckers,andweplantorakethemoverthecoals.)Early
testimoniesgivenbyPokrovskii,Strizhov,andothersmaybeaddedtoAkkerman'sandotherpeople'stestimoniesabouttheAngloscoundrelsfromtheIntelligence
Service.
4)IalreadysentyouacodedtelegramaboutRiutin.4
5)OurtopSoviethierarchy(LaborDefenseCouncil,CouncilofCommissars,ConferenceofDeputies)suffersfromafataldisease.TheLaborDefenseCouncilhas
beentransformedfromanactive,businesslikebodyintoanidleparliament.TheCouncilofCommissarsisparalyzedbyRykov'sinsipidandbasicallyantiparty
speeches.TheConferenceofDeputies,whichwaspreviouslytheheadquartersofRykovSokolnikovSheinman,hasnowtendedtobecometheheadquartersof
RykovPiatakovKviringorBogolepov(Idon'tseeabigdifferencebetweenthelasttwo)andisnowopposingitselftotheCentralCommittee.Clearlythiscan'tgo
on.Radicalmeasuresareneeded.AstowhatkindI'lltellyouwhenIgettoMoscow.Forthepresent,Piatakovshouldbewatchedclosely.Heisagenuinerightist
Trotskyist(anotherSokolnikov),andhenowrepresentsthemostharmfulelementintheRykovPiatakovblocplustheKondratievdefeatistsentimentsofthe
bureaucratsfromthesovietapparat.ItwouldbegoodtoaccelerateSergo'sandMikoian'sreturnfromvacationtogetherwithRudzutakandKuibyshev(andalso
Voroshilov),theywillbeabletoisolateRykovandPiatakovintheLaborDefenseCouncilandtheConferenceofDeputies.
6)Iamnowcompletelyrecovered.
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"9/13/30"
2.On20September1930,thePolitburopassedtheresolution"Onwreckersinmeatetal."(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.798,l.12):
a)Publishimmediatelythetestimoniesofthewreckersconcernedwiththesabotageofmeat,fish,cannedfood,andvegetables.
AccompanythismaterialwithabriefintroductionfromtheOGPUindicatingthatthecasehasbeensubmittedbytheCentralExecutiveCommitteeandCouncilof
CommissarstotheOGPUforreview.
b)Publisharticlesclarifyingtheimplicationsofthiscase,demonstratingthattheworkofthiscounterrevolutionarygangistotallyunmaskedandthatallmeasureshave
beentakentoundothedamageofwrecking.Setasideapageandahalfforthismaterialinthemajornewspaperson22September1930.
c)ChargeacommissionstaffedbyComs.Menzhinskii,Yaroslavskii,Rykov,andPostyshevtoreviewthematerialandintroductorytextfromtheOGPUpriorto
publication.

Thetestimoniesofmembersofthesocalledorganizationofwreckersofworkers'foodsupplywerepublishedinnewspaperson22September1930,withan
introductorystatementthatthe"CentralExecutiveCommitteeandtheCouncilofCommissarssubmittedthiscaseforreviewbytheOGPUcollegium,"asStalin
hadproposed.

Page215

On25September,newspaperscarriedanoticethattheOGPUcollegiumhadsentencedfortyeight"wreckersofworkers'supply"tobeshotandthatthe
sentencehadbeenexecuted.
3.Materialonthisissuehasnotbeenfound.
4.Stalin'scodedtelegramwasnotfound.On23September1930,Riutin'sfilewasreviewedbytheCentralExecutiveCommittee(ibid.,f.613,op.1,d.142,l.90).
RiutinwascondemnedforsharplycriticizingStalin.A.S.Nemov'sstatementtotheCentralCommitteeformedthebasisfortheaccusationagainstRiutin.TheCentral
ControlCommissionruledtoexpelRiutinfromtheparty.On5October1930,thePolitburopassedasimilarresolution(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.799,l.7).Shortly
thereafter,Riutinwasarrestedfor"counterrevolutionaryagitationandpropaganda."
Letter66
[13September1930]
Viacheslav,
Thisisinadditiontomyotherlettertoday.
1)WithregardtoRiutin,itseemstomethatit'simpossibletolimitourselvestoexpellinghimfromtheparty.Whensometimehaspassedafterhisexpulsion,hewill
havetobeexiledsomewhereasfaraspossiblefromMoscow.Thiscounterrevolutionaryscum[nechist']shouldbecompletelydisarmed.
2)ItalkedtoGanshin.IthinkthattheoilissueiscertaintoberaisedinthePolitburoinSeptemberintermsofanincreaseinthenumberofrefineriesforgasoline
production.Withoutthis,we'llgetintobigtrouble.IfwewaituntilOctober,itwillbetoolate.1
3)ForGod'ssake,stopthepress'ssquawkingabout"breakdownsrightandleft,""endlessfailures,""disruptions,"andothersuchnonsense.ThishystericalTrotskyist
rightdeviationisttoneisnotjustifiedbythefactsandisunbecomingtoBolsheviks.Ekonomicheskaiazhizn'[Economiclife],Pravda,Zaindustrializatsiiu[For
industrialization],and,toacertainextent,Izvestiiaareallbeingparticularlyshrill.Theyscreechaboutthe"falling"in[production]ratesorthemigrationofworkers
buttheydon'texplainwhat'sbehindit.Indeed,wheredidthis''sudden"flowofworkerstothecountrysidecomefrom,this"disastrous"turnover?Whatcanaccount
forit?Perhapsapoorfoodsupply?Butwerepeoplesuppliedanybetterlastyearcomparedtothisyear?Whywasn'tsuchaturnover,suchaflight,observedlast
year?Isn'titclearthattheworkerswenttothecountrysidefortheharvest?Theywanttoensurethatthecollectivefarmswon'tshortthemwhentheydistributethe
harvesttheywanttoworkforafewmonthsinthecollectivefarminfullviewofeveryoneandthusguaranteetheirrighttoafullcollectivefarmshare.Whydon'tthe
newspaperswriteaboutthat,insteadofjustsqueakinginpanic?Bytheway,theCentralCommittee's"Appeal"leftoutthispoint.
Well,byefornow.
J.Stalin
9/13/30

Page216

1.TheSupremeEconomicCouncil'sproposalsondevelopingoilrefineriesintheUSSRweresubmittedtothePolitburoon25September1930(RTsKhIDNIf.17,
op.3,d.798,l.16).ThePolitburoapprovedmostoftheseproposalsatits5October1930session(ibid.,d.799,ll.2,3).
Letter67
[Nolaterthan15September1930]
Viacheslav,1
Justreceivedyourletter.
1)ItisverygoodthatthePolitburohasopenedfireonRykovandCo.AlthoughBukharin,soitseems,isinvisibleinthismatter,heisundoubtedlythekeyinstigator
andrabblerouseragainsttheparty.ItisquiteclearthathewouldfeelbetterinaSukhanovKondratievparty,wherehe(Bukharin)wouldbeonthe"extremeleft,"
thanintheCommunistParty,wherehecanonlybearottendefeatistandapatheticopportunist.Bogolepovshouldbedrivenrightout,ofcourse.2 Butthematter
can'tstopthere.Inaddition,thedisciplesofBogolepovGromanSokolnikovKondratievshouldbeturnedout.ThismeansthatRykovandhislotmustgoaswell.
Thisisnowinevitable.Itisimpossibletogoontoleratingthisrottennessingovernmenteconomicmanagement.Butforthetimebeing,thisisjustbetweenyou
andme.
2)TheCentralCommittee'sdirectivesonprocurementsareverygood.Procurementwilltakeoff.3
3)IthinkAmosov'sreplacementbySemenovwouldfixthings.4
4)Yououghttoholdoffonyourvacation.Withoutyouthere(atthePolitburo),itwillbeverydifficult.IwillbeinMoscowinmidOctober.Ifyoucannotpostpone
yourvacationuntilthen,waitatleastuntilSergocomesback.5 Otherwise,theremaybeapredicament.
5)HowisVoroshilov?Didhegetbackalready?Sayhellotohim.
Regards,
J.Stalin
P.S.IfRykovandCo.trytosticktheirnosesinagain,beatthemoverthehead.Wehavesparedthemenough.Itwouldbeacrimetosparethemnow.
P.P.S.IproposethatwedistributethestatementbyKuznetsov(fromGosplan)tomembersoftheCentralCommitteeandCentralControlCommission.6
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1930=?"
2.On30November1930,thePolitburopassedGosplan'sproposal"OnProf.M.I.Bogolepov'sdismissalfromhispostintheGosplanpresidium"(RTsKhIDNIf.
17,op.3,d.806,l.13).
3.Thegrainprocurementdirectiveswereapprovedon15September1930bythePolitburo,whichnotedthatthe1930harvestexceededthoseofpastyearsandthat
themarketpotentialofthegraincropshadincreasedconsiderably.TheCentralCommitteeresolvedtoincreaseprocurementby117millionpoodsbyincreasingthe
annualgrainprocurementplanofrepublics,regions,andprovinces(ibid.,d.796,ll.5,2227).

Page217

4.On16August1930,theOrgburoreviewedthepreparationofthetransportationsystemforfallandwinterfreight.Theresolutionurgedallparty,tradeunion,and
economictransportationorganizationstonotethehighlyunsatisfactoryimplementationoftheCentralCommittee's8Maydecisiononthisissue.Molotovdemanded
thatallexecutivesonleaveberecalled.On17August,PostyshevsentanexpresstelegramtoAmosovurginghimtoreturnimmediately(ibid.,op.114,d.181,ll.1,2,
38,58,59).On10September1930,thePolitburoreviewedreportsonthefallwinterdeliveriesandrailroadaccidents.Becauseofpoorperformancein
transportation,thetradeunionsinparticularwerecriticized(ibid.,op.3,d.796,ll.8,3037).PerhapsthiswasthereasonthatStalinwroteaboutreplacingAmosov,
thechairmanoftheCentralCommitteeoftheRailWorkers'Union.
5.ByadecisionofthePolitburoon11October1930,Molotovwasgrantedaleave.Originallyscheduledtobeginon15September,itwaspostponeduntil16
October1930(ibid.,d.791,l.16,andd.800,l.14).On20July1930,Ordzhonikidzewasgivenatwomonthleavetobegin21July,andVoroshilovwasgranted
leavefrom1Augustto15September1930(ibid.,d.790,l.14).
6.Thestatementwasnotfound.Subsequently,on5December1930,indecidingtheissueofthedeputychairmanofGosplan,thePolitburodecreed:"Torelieve
Com.KuznetsovofhisdutiesasdeputychairmanofUSSRGosplan,inviewofhistransfertootherwork.ThedecisionshouldbemadeofficialafterCom.Kuznetsov
isappointedtotheboardoftheChineseEasternRailway"(ibid.,d.806,l.15).
Letter68
[22September1930]
22September1930
Viacheslav,
1)Itseemstomethattheissueofthetopgovernmenthierarchyshouldbefinallyresolvedbythefall.Thiswillalsoprovidethesolutiontothematterofleadershipin
general,becausethepartyandsovietauthoritiesarecloselyinterwovenandinseparablefromeachother.Myopiniononthatscoreisasfollows:
a)RykovandShmidtneedtoberelievedoftheirposts,andalltheirbureaucraticadvisoryandsecretarialstaffshouldbesentpacking.
b)You'llhavetotakeoverRykov'splaceaschairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil.Thisisnecessary.Otherwise,therewillbeasplit
betweenthesovietandthepartyleadership.Withsuchasetup,we'llhavecompleteunitybetweensovietandpartyleaders,andthiswillunquestionablydoubleour
strength.
c)TheLaborDefenseCouncilshouldbeconvertedfromabodyofchatterersintoamilitantandviableeconomicmanagementbody,andthenumberofLabor
DefenseCouncilmembersshouldbereducedtoabouttenoreleven(achairman,twodeputies,thechairmanofGosplan,theCommissariatsofFinanceandLabor,
theSupremeEconomicCouncil,theCommissariatsofTransport,War,Trade,andAgriculture).
d)UndertheCouncilofCommissars,astandingcommission("CommissiononFulfillment")shouldbeestablishedforthesolepurposeofsystematically

Page218

checkinguponthefulfillmentofthecenter'sdecisions.Itshouldhavetherighttocallbothpartymembersaswellasnonpartypeopletoanswer,rapidlyand
directly,forbureaucratism,nonfulfillment,mismanagement,orevasionofthecenter'sresolutions,andsoon.Thiscommissionshouldhavetherighttomakedirectuse
oftheservicesoftheWorkerPeasantInspection(inthefirstplace)andtheGPU,Procuracy,andpress.Withoutsuchanauthoritativeandrapidlyactingcommission,
wewillnotbeabletobreakthroughthewallofbureaucratismand[improve]theslipshodperformanceinourbureaucracies.Withoutsuchreforms,thecenter's
directiveswillremaincompletelyonpaper.Sergooughttobeputattheheadofthecommission(asthedeputychairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsandthehead
ofWorkerPeasantInspection).
ThustheCouncilofCommissarswillhavethreeimportantcommissions:Gosplan,LaborDefenseCouncil,andtheCommissiononFulfillment.
e)TheexistingConferenceofDeputiesshouldbedismantled,andthechairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsshouldbeallowedtoconsultwithhisdeputies(bringing
invariousofficials)athisowndiscretion.
Allofthisisjustbetweenyouandmeforthetimebeing.We'llspeakinmoredetailinthefall.Meanwhile,consultwithourclosestfriendsandreportonany
objections.
2)ThingsaregoingbadlyintheUrals.Millionsofpoundsoforearelyinginthepits,butthere'snothingtohaultheoreoutwith.Thewholeproblemisthatthereisn't
anytrackthatcanbeusedtorunspurlinesandbranchlinesthroughfactories.Whycouldn'twesuspendnewrailconstructionforayear,somewhereinUkraine
orelsewhereandtakeabout200300verstsoftrackandgiveitimmediatelytotheUrals?Ithinkwecoulddothis.ThatwouldsavetheUralironworksfrom
dependency(acurseddependency!)onhorses,oats,andotheridiocy.Canyoupushthis?
Whyisn'tKosiorgoingtoSverdlovsk?1
3)Rozengoltswasheretoseeme.HeaskedmetohelphimtransfertotheSupremeEconomicCouncil(insteadofTrade).IansweredthatIwouldfightforhimto
stayatTrade.ThenheaskedmetohelphimtotakethreeorfourofficialsalongwithhimfromtheWorkerPeasantInspection(Sudin,Belenkiianengineer,
Izrailovich,andanotherpersonwhosenameIcan'trecall).IpromisedmysupportandsaidthatI'dtellyouaboutit.2
4)HoldoffonthequestionofturningovertheKondratievaffairtothecourts.Thismatterisnotcompletelywithoutrisk.Waituntilthefalltoresolvethisissue.We'll
decidethisquestiontogetherinmidOctober.TherearecertainreasonsIhavefornotturningitover.Well,solong.
Bestregards,
Stalin
1.On25July1930,thePolitburoconfirmedI.V.KosioraschairmanofEasternSteelinSverdlovsk(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.790,l.4).On20December1930,
thePolitburoreverseditsdecisionandleftKosiorinhispositionasassistantchairmanoftheSupremeEconomicCouncil(ibid.,d.808,l.13).

Page219

2.On28November1930,thePolitburoconfirmedthemembershipofthecollegiumoftheCommissariatofTradeSudinwasincluded(ibid.,f.17,op.3,d.806,l.
6).
Letter69
[28September1930]
Viacheslav,
1)Haveyoureceivedmyletterof9/22?IsentitthroughYagoda.InitIwrote,amongotherthings,aboutthecreationofa"CommissiononFulfillment."Ithinkthatif
Sergoforsomereasonrefusesthepostofchairmanofthiscommission,youwouldhavetoassumethepostandSergocouldthenbeyourassistantforcheckingupon
fulfillment.Iconsidersuchacommissiontobeabsolutelyessentialasameansofinvigoratingourapparatandourstruggleagainstthebureaucratismthatisconsuming
us.
2)However,[creating]the"CommissiononFulfillment"addressesjustonesideofthematter,turningitsedgeagainstthebureaucratismofourapparat.Butinorderto
getourconstructionofsocialismfullyontrack,wemustincorporateyetanotheraspectofthematter.Imeanthe"turnover"atenterprises,"transients,"labor
discipline,theshrinkingcadreofpermanentemployees,socialistcompetition,andshockwork,organizingsuppliesforworkers.Asthesituationnowstands,someof
theworkerslaborhonestlyinaccordancewithsocialistcompetitionothers(themajority)areirresponsibleandtransient,yetthelatterareaswellprovisionedasthe
first(ifnotbetter),enjoythesameprivilegesofvacations,sanatoria,insurance,etc.,asthefirst.Isthisnotanoutrage?Thiscanundermineanyrealfoundationfor
socialistcompetitionandshockwork!Inadditiontothisoutrage,weareessentiallytearingawayfromproduction("upwardmobility"!)alltheworkerswhoshow
someinitiativeandhandingthemovertosomeofficeorotherwheretheydieofboredominunfamiliarsurroundings,decimatinginthiswaythebasiccoreofworkers
involvedinproduction.Thatis,onceagainweareunderminingthefoundationsofsocialistcompetitionandweakeningitsarmy.
Toacceptthissortofthingistogoagainsttheinterestsoftheconstructionofsocialism.
Whatshouldwedo?
Weneedto:
a)Reservesuppliesforworkersinthebasicanddecisivedistricts(thespeciallist)and,accordingly,reorganizethecooperativeandtradeorganizationsinthese
districts(and,ifneedbe,breakthemupandestablishnewones)inordertosupplyworkersrapidlyandfullykeepingthesedistrictsunderspecialobservationby
membersoftheCentralCommittee(speciallist).
b)Separateouttheshockworkersateachenterpriseandsupplythemfullyandinfirstorder[ofpriority]withfoodandclothingaswellashousingfully
guaranteethemallrightsofinsurance.

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c)Dividethenonshockworkersintotwocategories,thosewhohaveworkedataspecificenterpriseforatleastayearandthosewhohaveworkedforlessthana
year,inordertosupplytheformerwithgoodsandhousinginsecondorder[ofpriority]butinfullmeasureandthelatterinthirdorder[ofpriority]andinreduced
amounts.Regardinginsuranceforsickness,etc.,tellthemapproximatelythefollowing:Ifyouhaveworkedatanenterpriseforlessthanayear,youarepleasedto"be
atransient,"sopleasedonotexpectfullwagesintheeventofillness,but,let'ssay,twothirds,andthosewhohaveworkedatleastayear,letthemreceivefullwages.
Andsoon.1
d)Prohibitthepromotion[vydvizhenie]ofworkersfromtheshopfloortoanyandallbureaucracies,andencouragetheirpromotiononlywithinproduction(or
perhapswithinthetradeunions).Letworkersfromtheshopfloor(whoknowtheirtrade)bepromotedtoassistantcraftsmen,craftsmen,shopstewards,andsoon.
Thisisthekindofpromotionweneednowlikeairandwater.Withoutit,wewillsquanderourentirebasiccoreofindustrialworkersandhandoverourfactoriesto
parasiticalspongers.2
e)BreakwithTomskii'spetitbourgeoistraditionsregardingabsenteeismandlabordisciplineeliminateeverysingle"legal"loopholeforabsentees(puttingthemina
privilegedpositionrelativetohonestandhardworkingworkers)andmakeextensiveuseofworkers'courtsandexpulsionfromtradeunionsforabsenteeism.
f)BreakwithTomskii'spetitbourgeoistraditionsregardingtheunemployed,byorganizingafunctioningregisterofgenuinelyunemployedpeopleandsystematically
purgingthelistsofpeopleunemployedforspeciousreasonsorelementsunquestionablynotunemployed.Establisharegimewhereanunemployedpersonwhohas
alreadytwicerefusedoffersofworkwillautomaticallybedeniedtherighttoreceiveunemploymentcompensation.3
g)Andsoforthandsoon.
Idonotdoubtthattheseandsimilarmeasureswillfindgreatsupportamongtheworkers.
Thisis,ofcourse,aseriousandcomplicatedmatter.Weshouldthinkaboutitfromallangles.Whetherornotthesemeasurescanbeappliedimmediatelyinall
branchesofindustryisalsodisputable.Still,thisentirematterisextremelynecessaryandunavoidable.
Thinkthismatterover(andalsothequestionofthe"CommissiononFulfillment")inasmallcircleofourclosestfriendsandafterwardinformmeoftheiropinion.
Keepinmind,however,thatSyrtsov'scommissiononworkers'provisionmentwillnotbeabletoprovideanyhelpalongtheselines.Anewcommissionisneeded,
createdondifferentprinciples.Icouldbeonsuchacommissionifnecessary.4
Regards,
J.Stalin
9/28/30

Page221

P.S.JustreceivedyourletterfromtheDonbass.ItlookslikeShvartswasn'tsuitableforsuchabigjob.5
1.Adecree,"Onprovisionsforworkers,"thatincorporatedStalin'sbasicproposalswasapprovedbythePolitburoon15December1930(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.
3,d.807,l.5).
2.On25March1931,theCouncilofCommissarsandtheCentralCommitteepassedtheresolution"Onthefullterminationofthemobilizationofworkersfromthe
shopfloorforongoingcampaignsbylocalparty,soviet,andotherorganizations"(Spravochinkpartiynogorabotnika[Partyworkerreferencemanual],8thed.
[Moscow,1934],38586).
3.On20October1930,theCentralCommitteepassedthedecree"Onmeasuresforplannedprovisionofmanpowerandforthestruggleagainstworker
turnover"(ibid.,op.3,d.801,l.9).ThedecreenotedinparticularthattheCommissariatofLabor"exhibitedaclearlybureaucraticattitudetowardeconomicissues
andinsteadofefficientlyorganizing,assigning,andusingtherequisitemanpowerorcombatingtransientsormalingerers,itpaidtensofmillionsofrublesinstipendsto
hundredsofthousandsof'unemployed.'"Thedecreestipulatedthat"intheeventthatregisteredpersonsrefuseavailablework,theyshouldbeimmediatelyremoved
fromthelistsoflaboragencies...desertersandtransientsshouldbedeniedtherighttobesenttoworkatindustrialplantsforasixmonthperiod"(Spravochnik
partiinogorabotnika,39698).
4.On6September1930,theissueofsupplyingmeattoMoscowwasdiscussedataPolitburomeeting.Itwasdecidedtoexaminehowgoodsinshortsupplywere
distributedandtoinstituteunconditionalpunitivemeasuresagainst"counterrevolutionaryandspeculatorelements"whodisorganizedtheworkofthesupplyapparat.
AcommissionmadeupofSyrtsov(chairman),Postyshev,Shvernik,Yanson,Khlopliankin,Eismont,andotherswasassignedtodraftmeasuresforimproving
methodsforworkers'provisionment(eliminatingqueues,monitoringworkersinthecooperativesystem,andsoforth).Thecommissionwastoldtoreportonthe
resultsofitsworktwiceamonth(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.795,l.5).
On15October1930,thePolitburo'scommissiononworkers'provisionwasjoinedbyStalinandL.Kaganovich(ibid.,d.800,l.3).
5.On25July1930,ShvartswasconfirmedaschairmanoftheboardofSoiuzugol[Unioncoal]forthesouth(ibid.,d.790,l.4).Thestatusofthecoalindustrywas
oftendiscussedbythePolitburoduringAugustandSeptember.On19August1930,thePolitburopassedthedecree"OntheDonbasscoalindustry":"Thecoal
miningsituationandthefulfillmentofbasicproductiongoalsintheDonbassismostominousandrequiresthepassingofanumberofimmediate,urgent
measures"(ibid.,d.793,ll.8,2729).
InSeptember1930,theCentralCommitteereceivedinformationaboutaspeechShvartsmadeatameetingofRutchenkovkaworkersandspecialistson20
September,thePolitburodecreed:"Toconsiderthenatureofthisspeech...unacceptable...foraCommunisteconomicmanager"(ibid.,d.798,ll.2,3).On5
October1930,thePolitburorelievedShvartsfromhisdutiesaschairmanoftheboardofSoiuzugol(ibid.,d.799,l.6).
Letter70
[10October1930]
Viacheslav,
Receivedyourletterof10/6.
1)YourworkontheDonbassturnedoutwell.1 You'veachievedasampleofLeninistcheckinguponfulfillment.Ifitisrequired,letmecongratulateyouonyour
success.

Page222

2)Theproposaltoreinforcetheplanningagenciesisgood.I'msendingitbackwithafewofmycorrections.Theonlythingneededisto"outfit"theplanningagencies
withstudents,notwholesale,orindiscriminately,butthroughacomprehensiveindividualscreeningandwithoutspeedingeverythingup,as[theydo]inthemovies.2
3)I'msendingyouGanshin'sletterwithsomeothermaterials.Ifit'struethatthePolitburoisbringinglegalchargesagainsthim,thenIthinkGanshinwillhavetobe
removedfromexecutivework,andwewilllosehimforatime.Can'tthePolitburodecisionbemitigatedandthephrase"broughtuponlegalcharges"beremoved
fromhisrecord?I'mpersonallyforthat.ItwouldbemuchbettertoremoveLomovfromtheoilagency(hedoesn'tknowtheoilbusinessandneverwill)andput
Ganshininhisplace.3 Thatwouldbemuchbetter.We'lltalkaboutthisinmoredetailwhenIgettoMoscow.
Well,byefornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
Sergo,4
I'msendingyouKoba'sletterfromyesterday.We'llputGanshinonthePolitburoagendafor10/15andsoftenthepreviousdecision.
ReturnKoba'sletterandthe"draft"withhiscorrections.
Molotov
10/11
1.InSeptember1930,MolotovtookatriptotheDonbass.On25September1930,thePolitburodiscussedMolotov'stelegramfromtheDonbass(RTsKhIDNIf.
17,op.3,d.798,ll.3,19):
GiventhesignificantincreasesinthecoalminingeffortsinceOctober,especiallyconsideringtheneedtocompensateforthisyear'sshortfall,andgiventhecertain
possibilityofsignificantlyincreasingthemechanicalextractionofcoal,thematterofmechanizingtheDonbasshasbecomeanextremelyurgenttask....Itisnecessary
fortheeconomic,party,andtradeunionorganizationstofocusimmediatelyonmechanizingtheDonbass....InfulfillingtheOctober,quarterly,andannualindustrial
plansfortheDonbass,wemustbroadenthestruggleforanew,mechanized,andgenuinelysocialistDonbass....Intheevent[myproposal]isapproved,wewillmove
directlytoworkingoutaseriesofpracticalmeasuresforeconomic,party,andtradeunionagencies,sincetheworkofallDonbassorganizationswillhavetobe
restructured.

Molotov'sproposalwasapprovedbythePolitburo.
2.On15October1930,thePolitburopassedtheresolution"Ontheimprovementofstateplanning"(ibid.,d.800,l.15):
a)ImmediatelystrengthenthequalifiedpartyandnonpartystaffofGosplanandoftheplanningagenciesofthecommissariatsSupremeEconomicCouncil,Transport,
Agriculture,Tradeandcooperativeorganizations,etc.,bytransferringasignificantgroupofseniorstudentsfromtheeconomicfacultiesforthiswork(offeringthe
studentsassignedtothecommissariatstheadditionalopportunityofcontinuingtheirtheoreticalworkintherelevantinstitutionsofhighereducation).
b)EstablishaplanningacademyinMoscow.Alongwiththepermanentcadreofstudentsqualifiedpartymemberswhoareeconomicmanagerscomradesworkingin
theeconomiccommissariatsshouldalsotakeanumberofbasiccourses(accounting,improvementofproductionmethods,economicgeography,thetheoryofplanning,
thefiveyearplananditsfulfillment).

Page223

3.ForanearlierdecisionaboutGanshin,seenote4forletter58.On15October1930thePolitburoretracteditsdecisionof10September1930toturnGanshin
overtothecourtsanddecidedtolimithispunishmenttoapartyreprimand(ibid.,d.800,l.7).On15November1930,GanshinwasappointedchairmanofSoiuzneft
(ibid.,d.804,l.8).
4.Molotov'snotetoOrdzhonikidzewasattachedtoStalin'sletter.
Letter71
[23October1930]
10/23
Viacheslav,
1)I'msendingyoutworeportsfromReznikovonSyrtsov'sandLominadze'santiparty(essentiallyrightdeviationist)factionalgroup.It'sunimaginablevileness.
EverythinggoestoshowthatReznikov'sreportscorrespondwithreality.TheyplayedatstagingacouptheyplayedatbeingthePolitburoandwenttothelowest
depths.
2)AsfortheTchevskiiaffair,1 heturnsouttobe100percentclean.That'sverygood.
3)Thingsaregoingmoreorlessallrightforus.LezhavaandKviringwereremoved(fromAgriculture).Wewillformalizeitoneofthesedays.2 ,3
Howarethingsgoingforyou?
Regards,
Stalin
1.Thefactsremainunclear.ThereferenceisprobablytoTukhachevskii.
2.On20October1930,thePolitburopassedaresolutionrecallingKviringandrelievingLezhavafromhisdutiesasdeputychairmanoftheRSFSRCouncilof
Commissars(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.801,l.11).Soonafterward,LezhavawasappointedchairmanofUnionFisheriesandgivenahighpositioninthe
CommissariatofTrade.On30June1931,KviringwasconfirmedaschairmanoftheCreditGuaranteeBankinBerlin(ibid.,op.114,d.243,l.226).
3.Er.KviringshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeEmmanuilKviringwhoexcitedStalin'sangerinearlierletters.Er.KviringwasaminorofficialwhoStalinmayhave
mentionedonlybecausehehadworkedasMolotov'sassistantinthemid1920sU.S.Ed.

Page224

ChapterSix
19311936
TheFewLettersfromtheyears19311936thatMolotovhandedovertotheCentralPartyArchiveareonlyafragmentofthecorrespondenceforthisperiod.The
contentsoftheseletterssuggestthatonlythemost"harmless"documents,thosethatinnowaytoucheduponStalin'sandMolotov'sdarkestandmostcriminal
activities,wereselectedforthearchive.SurelyifwesupposethatStalinwasashonestwithhisclosestcomradeinarmsinthe1930sashehadbeeninthepreceding
period(andwehavenoreasontodoubtthis),Molotovwouldhavehadagreatdealtoconcealfromfuturegenerations.
Thefirsthalfofthe1930sisoneofthemosttragicperiodsinSoviethistory.Stalin'spoliciesplungedthecountryintoastateofvirtualcivilwar,creatingmillionsof
victims.Massarrests,executionsbyfiringsquad,anddeportationsattendedthecampaignofforcedcollectivization.Hundredsofthousandsofpeasantfamilieswere
subjectedtothesocalledspecialresettlements,transportedtoremotedistrictsofthecountry,andoftenlefttostarve.Thosewhosurvivedwereconfinedinspecial
settlementsunderthecustodyoftheOGPU,andtheirlaborwasexploitedforthemostdifficultjobsinthetimber,construction,andminingindustries.
Therigorsofforcedindustrializationfellnotonlyonthepeasantslifebecameprogressivelydifficultfortheurbanpopulationaswell.Intheindustrialcenters,itwas
commonforworkerstobehousedinbarracksorearthenbunkers,toreceivescantyfoodrations,andtoengageinbackbreakinglaborformanyhoursoftheday.
Theracetowardcollectivizationandindustrializationfinallycul

Page225

minatedinseverecrisis.Intheyearsfrom1931to1933,thecountrywasgrippedbyaharshfaminethatclaimedthelivesofseveralmillionpeople.Inspiteofhuge
investments,industrialproductiongrewonlyslightly.Withsuchanextremedeclineinlivingstandards,socialtensionsgrewmoreacute.Inthecountryside,people
voicedtheirapprehensions,silentlyengagedinsabotage,orfrequentlyfledfromthecollectivefarmsaltogether.Inthecities,therewereopendemonstrationsagainst
thegovernment.TheauthoritieswereconstantlyconfrontedbyantiSovietsentiments,evenwithinthelargestandthereforemostprivilegedindustrialenterprises.
CriticismofStalinhimselfwasinfactquitecommon.Withintheparty,theopinionwaswidespreadthathewasincapableofleadingthecountryoutofthecrisisor
placatingthepeasantryandthat,forthesereasons,hehadtogo.
Stalinhimselfandhisimmediatecirclethoughtotherwise,however.Rallyingalltheirresources,theyproceededtopacifysocietybyforce.Asusualwhenconfronted
withacrisis,Stalinadvancedthetheoryoftheintensificationoftheclassstruggle.AttheJanuary1933CentralCommitteeplenum,hedeclaredthatthedifficultiesthat
hademergedduringindustrializationwerethefaultofenemyopposition.Andsotheflowofmassarrests,executions,anddeportationsreachedevengreater
proportions.Thetallymadeatthetimeranintomanyhundredsofthousands.AsN.V.Krylenko,Russiancommissarofjustice,reportedtoStalinandMolotov,
738,000peopleweresentencedinthefirsthalfof1933alone,and687,000inthesecondhalf.1Yettheseextraordinaryfiguresdidnotincludethemanycategoriesof
peoplepersecutedinotherways:thosedeportedwhenaninternalpassportsystemwasimposedonurbanresidentsthosepurgedas''transientelements"fromthe
famineregionsandsoon.Themassarrestsledtooverflowingprisonandjailcells:byMay1933,atleast800,000hadbeendetained.On8May1933,Stalinand
Molotovwereobligedtoauthorizespecialinstructionsonreducingthejailpopulationto400,000andprohibitingfurtherunsanctioneddeportationsandarrests.2
Beginninginlate1932,thecrackdownonsocietyatlargewas
1.

RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.120,d.171,l.50.

2.

Ibid.,op.3,d.922,ll.58,58ob.

Page226

paralleledbyapurgewithinthepartyitselfthatcontinuedinvariousformsforseveralyears.ManyCommunistswereexpelledfromthepartyandthenarrested.A
seriesofdramaticeventscreatedtherationaleforpersecuting"heretical"partymembers.Alargegroupofpartyactivists,includingformeroppositionleadersKamenev
andZinoviev,werefacedwithcriminalchargesinconnectionwiththesocalledUnionofMarxistLeninists.TheintellectualdrivingforcebehindthisunionwasM.N.
Riutin,whoinmid1932hadwrittentwoantiStalinistdocuments,"StalinandtheCrisisofProletarianDictatorship"andtheopenletter"ToAllMembersoftheParty.''
Riutinwasarrestedandspentseveralyearsinprisonbeforehisexecutionbyfiringsquadin1937.3
Inlate1932andearly1933,thirtyeightpeoplewerearrestedontrumpedupchargesofbelongingtothesocalledAntiPartyCounterrevolutionaryGroupthat
consistedofSlepkovandothermembersoftherightdeviation("theBukharinschool").Thegroupincludedprominentscholars,students,andthosewhosidedwith
BukharinduringtheperiodofhisstrugglewithStalin,aswellasN.A.Uglanov,oneoftheleadingactivistsoftherightdeviation,whohadheldthepostofMoscow
PartyCommitteesecretaryuntil1929.AttheJanuary1933CentralCommitteeplenum,thesocalledantipartyfactionofEismont,Tolmachev,andSmirnovwas
ruthlesslycondemned.InformersrevealedthattheselongtimepartymemberswerehavingconversationsthatwerecriticalofStalin'spolicies,andthisinformationwas
thenusedasevidenceofan"undergroundoppositionfaction."Inconnectionwiththiscase,newchargeswerebroughtagainstTomskiiandRykov.Thesedramatic
eventsinMoscowsentsmallershockwavesthroughoutthecountry.ProvincialGPUofficerswhoreceivedtherelevantdecreesonthesecasesconcoctedtheirown
local"counterrevolutionarygroups."
TheassassinationofSergeiKirovinDecember1934sparkedanewroundofStalin'srepressions.Tothisday,historianscannotagreeonthistragicincident.Unclear
andmysteriouscircumstancespointtothepossibilitythatStalinmayhavehadahandinKirov'smurder.Regrettably,Stalin'slettersfortheyear1934aremissing
entirelyfromtheselectionthatMolotovdeliveredtothearchive.
3.

Riutin'slongdenunciationofStalinhasonlyrecentlybeenpublishedinIzvestiiaTsK,nos.812(1990)U.S.Ed.

Page227

Theyears1935and1936weremarkedbysteadilyincreasingpreparationsforthemasspersecutionthatwouldcometobeknownas"theYear1937,"
"Yezhovschina,"4and"theGreatTerror."OnecampaignfollowedanotherthereviewandreissuanceofpartycardstheStakhanovite''shockworkers'"movement,
forexampleaccompaniedbyarrests,expulsionsfromtheparty,andterminationsofemployment.Inthesummerof1936,theMoscowshowtrialsopenedagainst
theformeropposition.KamenevandZinovievwereputontrial,andBukharin,Rykov,Tomskii,andPiatakovwerecriticizedalongwithmanyotherleadersfromthe
Leninera.Localcampaignstodiscover"enemies"weresetinmotion.
ThesecampaignsofpersecutionledtostrifeamongthechiefgovernmentleadersandprefiguredtheconflictbetweenStalinandOrdzhonikidzethatculminatedin
Ordzhonikidze'sdeath.Bytheendof1936,arumorwascirculatingthateventhetrustedMolotovhadfallenintoStalin'sdisfavor.Tothisday,almostnothingis
knownaboutthepoliticalhistoryofthisperiod,andtheletterspublishedhereareofverylittlehelpinthisrespect.
AllthisdoesnotmeanthatStalin'sletterstoMolotovfortheyears19311936areofnointerest.Althoughtheydonotrevealsensationalincidentsorhitherto
unknownsecretsoftheSovietpast,theyneverthelesscontainimportantinformationaboutthedaytodayactivitiesoftopgovernmentofficials.Stalin'sthoughtsonthe
economictargetfiguresfortheyear1936illustratehowveryimportanteconomicdecisionsweremade(letters80,81).TheletteronthenewConstitutionprovides
ampleevidenceofStalin'sroleinitsdrafting(letter83).
Ofparticularnotearethelettersfromthefallof1933(letters78,79),whichcontainStalin'sreactiontotheconflictbetweenOrdzhonikidzeandA.Ya.Vyshinskii,
Sovietdeputyprocurator,whoenjoyedStalin'sfullsupport.AfterOrdzhonikidzeinsistedthatthePolitburoconsiderthequestion,othertoppartyleadersenteredthe
fray.ThisepisodeoffersarareopportunitytoassessthesituationwithinStalin'sPolitburoafterthedestructionoftheopposition,particularlyStalin'srelationshipwith
hisclosestcomradesintheearly1930s,beforetheonsetoftheGreatPurge.
4.

AfterNikolaiYezhov,Stalin'ssecretpolicechieffrom1936to1938Trans.

Page228

Letter72
[beforeMarch1931]
Molotov,
Ireadonlythepartabout"dumping"and"forced"labor.1 Thesectionon"dumping"isgood.Thesectionon''forced"laborisincompleteandunsatisfactory.Seethe
commentsandcorrectionsinthetext.
J.Stalin
P.S.Regardingthekulaks'labor,sincetheyarenotconvicts,eithertheyshouldnotbementionedatall,orweshouldexplaininaspecialsectionandwiththorough
documentationthattheonlyoneswhoworkamongthedeportedkulaksarethosewhowanttoworkand[thattheydoso]withalltherightsofvoluntarylabor.
1.ThereferenceistoMolotov'sspeechattheVICongressofSoviets(Pravda,11March1931).
Letter73
[24September1931]
Hello,Viacheslav,
Ireceivedtheletter.
Youarerightthatinlightofthenewcircumstances(thefinancialcrisisinEngland,etc.)wewillhavetoreduceourimports.1 Iamcertainwewillnotbeabletogetby
withoutareductionintheimportquotasapprovedatthebeginningoftheyear.Theconditionsatthestartoftheyearwereonething,butnowtheyhavechanged
(worsened).Weabsolutelymusttakethisintoconsideration.
RegardingthestorestheSupremeEconomicCouncilwantstoestablish,youareright,ofcourse.2
Regards,
J.Stalin
9/24/31
1.ThequestionofimportswasoftentakenupbythePolitburoinSeptemberandOctober1931.On29October1931,theresolution"Ontheexportimportand
currencyexchangeplanforthefourthquarteroftheyear1931"wasadopted.TheresolutionwassenttotheSpecialFile(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.857,l.5).
2.ThequestionofstoreswasconsideredbytheCouncilofCommissarsandtheLaborDefenseCouncilinSeptemberandOctober1931attheinitiativeofthe
SupremeEconomicCouncil,whichrequestedpermissiontoopenseventysevenstorestoserveworkersatthelargestenterprisesexclusively.Atthesuggestionofthe
SupremeEconomicCouncil,theplantdirectorsweregrantedtherighttoestablishregulationsfordistributinggoods.ByJanuary1932,eightythreestoresattachedto
specificfactorieshadbeenopened,sellinggoodsinshortsupplysolelytoemployeesfromthosefactories(GARFf.5446,op.13,d.1058,ll.6,29).

Voroshilov,Khrushchev,andStalin

TheCongressofVictors1934.Backrow:Finukludze,Voroshilov,Kaganovich,Kuibyshev.Frontrow:Ordzhonikidze,Stalin,
Molotov,Kirov.

Page229

Letter74
[19June1932]
Hello,Viacheslav,
Ireceivedyourletterdated13June.
1)UnitedStatesthisisacomplicatedmatter.InsofarastheywanttouseflatterytodragusintoawarwithJapan,wecantellthemtogotohell.Insofarastheoil
industrialistsoftheUnitedStateshaveagreedtogiveusaloanof100millionrubleswithoutrequiringfromusanypoliticalcompensation,wewouldbefoolishnotto
taketheirmoney.WemustreininRozengoltsandcorrecttheerrorintheagreementwiththeoilindustrialists!1 Weneedthehardcurrency!
2)TheproposalfromNankingaboutanonaggressionpactisutterchicanery.Really,theNankinggovernmentconsistsentirelyofpettycrooks.Thisdoesnotmean,
ofcourse,thatweshouldnotdealwiththesecrooksorwiththeirproposalforanonaggressionpact,butitcertainpaystokeepinmindthattheyarepettycrooks.2
3)RegardingtheUkrainians(Chubarandothers),IalreadywroteKaganovichandyoumustalreadyknowmyopinion.3 TherestisamatterforthePolitburo.
4)YouandKaganovichshouldbynowhavereceivedmyletteraboutthemeetingofthecouncilofsecretariesandchairmenofregionalcommitteesontheorganization
ofgrainprocurements.Ithinkthatweoughttohurryaheadwiththisimportantmatter,sowe'llbeabletopreventtherecurrenceoftheUkrainianmistakesinthearea
ofgrainprocurement.Thisisamostimportantmatter.4
5)Tebandaevasksthatwegivehimseveralmillionrubles(45millionrubles)fortheconstructionofanearthendamontheManichRiver(eastoftheDon).5 Thisis
astraightforwardmatterandisapparentlynecessary.
Byefornow.
Regards,
J.Stalin
6/19/32
1.Thefactsremainunclear.
2.AfterJapaneseforcesinvadednortheasternChinainSeptember1931,theproponentsofnormalizationofSinoSovietrelationswithintheChiangKaishek
governmentgrewmorepowerful.On6June1932,theKuomintangcentralpolicycouncilpassedaresolutiononsecretnegotiationswiththeUSSR,thecontentsof
whichwereleakedtothepress.On26June1932,theChineserepresentativeattheGenevadisarmamentconventiondeliveredalettertotheSovietcommissarfor
foreignaffairsproposingtheconsiderationofanonaggressionpactbetweentheUSSRandChina.On6July,Litvinovproposedbeginningnegotiationsona
nonaggressionpactandonestablishingdiplomaticrelations.InDecember1932,diplomaticrelationsbetweentheUSSRandChinawereestablished,butthetwo
countriesfailedtoagreeonanonaggressionpact.

Page230

3.Forcedcollectivizationresultedinwidespreadfamine.On17June1932,theUkrainianPolitburosentKaganovichandMolotovthefollowingtelegram:
OntheinstructionsofourCentralCommittee,ChubarhasinitiatedarequesttograntfoodassistancetoUkrainefordistrictsexperiencingastateofemergency.We
urgentlyrequestadditionalmeansforprocessingsugarbeetsandalsosupplementalaid:inadditiontothe220,000,another600,000poundsofbread.

InStalin'sview,UkrainiancropfailureswerecausedbyenemyresistanceandbythepoorleadershipofUkrainianofficials.On21June1932,theCentral
Committeesentatelegram,signedbyStalinandMolotov,totheUkrainianCentralCommitteeandCouncilofCommissars,proposingtoensurethecollectionof
grain"atallcosts."Thetelegramstated:
Nomannerofdeviationregardingeitheramountsordeadlinessetforgraindeliveriescanbepermittedfromtheplanestablishedforyourregionforcollectinggrain
fromcollectiveandprivatefarmsorfordeliveringgraintostatefarms.

On23June1932,inresponsetoS.V.Kosior'stelegramrequestingaid,thePolitburopassedthefollowingresolution:"Torestrictourselvestothedecisions
alreadyadoptedbytheCentralCommitteeandnottoapprovetheshipmentofadditioalgrainintoUkraine."(AllquotationsarefromThe19321933Ukrainian
FamineintheEyesofHistoriansandintheLanguageofDocuments[inUkrainianKiev,1990],183,186,187,190).
4.On21June1932,thePolitburoresolvedtocallameetingon28June1932ofthesecretariesandchairmenoftheexecutivecommitteesofUkraine,North
Caucasus,CentralBlackSearegion,thelowerandmiddleVolga,etc.ontheproblemsoforganizinggrainreservesandoffulfillingtheestablishedplanforgrain
reserves(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.889,l.16).On28June,thePolitburodecidednottopresentageneralreporttotheconferencebuttoauthorizeMolotovto
deliverakeynoteaddressontheproblemsandtoemphasizethatStalin'sproposalshadbeenapprovedbythePolitburoandmustformthebasisforanydecisions
regardinggrainprocurement(ibid.,d.890,l.8).[Forthe"Ukranianmistakes,"seenote3U.S.Ed.]
5.On10July1932,thePolitburoconfirmedthedecisionoftheCouncilofCommissarstorelease4millionrublesfromitsreservefundtoenabletheNorthCaucasus
RegionalExecutiveCommitteetoconstructadamontheManich(ibid.,d.891,l.13).[NoinformationisavailableconcerningTebandaevU.S.Ed.]
Letter75
[1932,beforeJune1932]
Hello,Viacheslav,1
1)Receivedtheletteronrevolutionarylegality.Itcameoutwell.Seemyminorcorrectionstothetext.IthinkthattheCentralCommitteedirective,namely,thefirst
twopointsincludingseveralcorrections,oughttobepublicized,butthethirdpointofthedirectiveshouldhaveonlyrestricteddistribution.2
2)DidyoureceivemytelegramaboutLancasterwiththeproposalofthenewterms(100milliondollars,10years,3percentinterest,1520percentofordersfrom
100milliondollars)?It'sadvantageoustous.ItisalsobeneficialtoLancaster,sincethetotalofhisclaimsisthusraisedto60millionrubles(40millionrublesunderthe
originalterms),andthetotalordersto40millionrubles(7millionrublesundertheoriginalterms).

Page231

3)Whatisthesituationregardingtheconferenceofsecretariesandprocurements?3
Regards,
P.S.ThenumberofPolitburoinquirieshasnoeffectonmyhealth.YoucansendasmanyinquiriesasyoulikeI'llbehappytoanswerthem.
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1928=?"Infacttheletterwaswritteninspring1932.
2.Thegovernmentdecree"Onrevolutionarylegality"wasapprovedbythePolitburoon25June1932.ThePolitburosentthefollowingdirectivetoallthelocalparty
organizations(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.890,l.11):
TheCentralCommitteewishestobringtotheattentionofallpartyorganizationsthedecreepublishedon27JunebytheCentralExecutiveCommitteeandtheCouncilof
Commissarsonthemeasurestobeundertakentoenforcerevolutionarylegalityandtorequireallpartyorganizationstoenactthemoststringentmeasures.
Emphasizingthespecialrolethatthecourtandtheprocuratormustplayinthematterofenforcingrevolutionarylegality,theCentralCommitteeproposesthatallparty
organizations:
1.Providethecommitteeallmannerofaidandsupportinthematterofenforcingrevolutionarylegality.
2.ImplementthoroughlythepartydecreesonthestrictresponsibilityofCommunistsforthemostminorinfringementsofthelaw....
Categoricallyforbidtheinvolvementofpartyorganizationsinspecificseparatejudicialmatters,aswellastheremovalortransferofanycourtemployeesinconnection
withtheiractivities,withouttheconsentandapprovaloftheseniorparty,judicial,andprocuratorialbodies.

Thegovernmentdecreewaspublishedon27June1932inPravda.
TheCentralExecutiveCommitteeandtheCouncilofCommissarsproposethatthegovernmentsofSovietandautonomousrepublics,procuratorialbodies,andthe
regionalexecutivecommittees:
1.Investigateanyallegationsaboutviolationsofrevolutionarylegalitybyofficialsandguaranteethespeediestconsiderationofthesemattersimposepunishment,upto
andincludingarrest,onofficialsresponsiblefortheseoffensesandonthoseguiltyofabureaucraticattitudetowardworkers'allegations....
3.Eliminatethepracticeofimposingburdensome[grain]obligations,dekulakization,etc.,inviolationofthelawsoftheSovietgovernmentinregardtoindividual
collectivefarmsaswellasfarmsofmiddlepeasants,whileimplementingthoroughlytheobligationsandmeasuresestablishedbySovietlawforkulakelements.
4.Requirethecourtsandprocuratorstoprosecuteofficialsinallinstancesinvolvingtheviolationoftoilers'rights,especiallyinthecasesofunlawfularrest,searches,
confiscation,orexpropriationofproperty,andimposestrictpunishmentonthosefoundguilty.
5.TheCentralExecutiveCommitteeandtheCouncilofCommissarsoftheUSSRwishtobringtotheattentionofalllocalorgansofSovietpowerandallprocurators'
officesthatstrictcompliancewithrevolutionarylegalityregardingcollectivefarmsandthemassesofcollectivefarmworkersisespeciallyimportantgiventhatthe
majorityofpeasantlaborersareconcentratedoncollectivefarms.
6.Intheinterestoffurtherenforcingrevolutionaryjusticeandofimprovingandraisingthestatusofthejudicialprocuratorialbodies,itiscategoricallyforbiddento
removeortransferpeople'sjudgesotherthanbythedecreeofregionalexecutivecommitteesortoremoveandtransferdistrictprocuratorsotherthanbythedecisionof
theregionalprocuratororthesupremeprocuratorialbodiesoftheprocuracyorCommissariatofJustice.

3.Onthesecretariesandgrainprocurement,seenote4toletter74.

Page232

Letter76
[January1933]
Viacheslav!1
TodayIreadthesectiononinternationalaffairs.2 Itcameoutwell.Theconfident,contemptuoustonewithrespecttothe"great"powers,thebeliefinourownstrength,
thedelicatebutplainspittinginthepotoftheswaggering"greatpowers"verygood.Letthemeatit.
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1/1933."Inthelowerrighthandcornerisanothernotationbyhim:"January1933."
2.ThereferenceistoMolotov'sspeechon23January1933totheCentralExecutiveCommittee(Pravda,24January1933).
Letter77
[before23April1933]
Viacheslav,1
IthinkweshouldsatisfySholokhov's2 requestinfull,thatis,grantanadditional80,000poodstoVeshenskresidentsand40,000poodstoVerkhnedonsk
residents.Thismatterhasapparentlyreceivedwidepublicattention,andafteralltheshamefulbehaviorthathasbeentolerated,wecanonlygainpolitically.Theextra
40,00050,000meanslittletous,butitisdecisiverightnowforthepopulationofthesetwodistricts.
Andso,let'svoteonthisimmediately(tellChernov).
Besidesthis,wemustsendsomeoneanyonethere(perhapsCom.Shkiriatov)toclearupthematterandcallonOvchinnikovandalltheotherswhocreatedthis
messtoaccountforthemselves.Wecandothistomorrow.3
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1929=?"InfactthisletterwaswritteninApril1933.
2.On20April1933,M.A.SholokhovwrotetoStalinabouttheforcibleexpropriationofcattlefromthepeasants.On23April1933,withStalinandMolotov
present,thePolitburoreviewedthesituationintheVeshenskDistrict.ShkiriatovwasassignedtotraveltotheVeshenskDistricttoconductaninquiryintothecauses
oftheintolerableviolationsduringgrainprocurementcommittedbylocalofficialsandbyrepresentativesofregionalagencies.
3.On4July1933,thePolitburoheardShkiriatov'sreportontheviolationsintheVeshenskDistrictinconnectionwithgrainprocurement.Amongthosequestioned
wereZimin,thesecondsecretaryoftheAzovBlackSeaRegionalCommitteeOvchinnikov,representativeofthecommitteeintheVeshenskDistrictaseriesof
workersintheVeshenskDistrictandSholokhov,asawitness.ThePolitburonoted(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.926,ll.5,6):
TheRegionalCommitteeischieflyresponsibleforsuchviolationsasthemassevictionofcollectivefarmworkersfromtheirhomesandforbiddingothercollectivefarm
workers

Page233
fromofferingtemporarysheltertothoseevicted.[Thecommittee]didnottaketimelymeasurestorectifytheseviolationsorevenissuewarningsregardingthem.
TheCentralCommitteeconsidersthattheentirelycorrectandabsolutelynecessarypolicyofapplyingpressuretothecollectivefarmworkerswhosabotagedthegrain
productioneffortwasdistortedandcompromisedintheVeshenskDistrictbecausethecommitteedidnotexerciseeffectiveoversight.

ThePolitburocriticizedthecommitteeforinadequatelyoverseeingtheactivitiesoftheirrepresentativesandagents.ZiminandOvchinnikovwereremovedfrom
theirposts.TheleadersoftheVeshenskdistrictweregivenstrictwarningsandreprimands.
Letter78
[1September1933]
ToComradeMolotov,1
1)Tobehonest,neitherI(norVoroshilov)likethefactthatyouareleavingforvacationforsixweeksinsteadoftwoweeksaswasagreeduponwhenwemadethe
vacationschedule.IfIhadknownbeforehandthatyouwishedtoleaveforsixweeks,Iwouldhaveproposedadifferentvacationschedule.Whydidyouchangethe
scheduleIdon'tunderstandit.AreyourunningawayfromSergo?Isitsohardtounderstandthatyousimplycan'tleavethePolitburoandCouncilofCommissarsto
Kuibyshev(hemaystartdrinking)ortoKaganovichforlong?True,Idid[originally]agree(inatelegram)totheextendedleave,butyouwillunderstandthatIcannot
actotherwise[now].
2)IconsiderSergo'sactionswithrespecttoVyshinskiithebehaviorofahooligan.Howcanyoulethimhavehisway?Byhisactofprotest,Sergoclearlywishedto
disruptthecampaignoftheCouncilofCommissarsandCentralCommitteetoprovideproperequipment.2 What'sthematter?DidKaganovichpullafastone?Soit
seems.Andhe'snottheonlyone.
J.Stalin
9/1
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"9/31=?"Inreality,theletterdatesfrom1933.
2.On1620August1933,thechiefjudicialcollegiumoftheUSSRSupremeCourtheardthecaseagainstofficialsresponsiblefortheproductionofagricultural
machinerytheywereaccusedofdeliveringcombineswithoutthefullcomplementofparts.Atthehearingson22August,thestateprosecutoranddeputySoviet
procurator,Vyshinskii,deliveredaspeechexcerptedasfollows(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.929,l.21):
ThisallowsustoasksomequestionsabouttheworkofSovieteconomicorganizationsingeneral.Wehavenoreasontopaintalltheeconomicorganizationscompletely
black,butwemust,regardlessoftheinstitutionorthepersonwhoheadsit,exposethegenuinely"black"marksthatindicatetheimmensefailureoftheworkmethodsof
someofthemostimportantgovernmentinstitutions.ImeantheCommissariatofAgricultureinthefirstplaceasrepresentedbyitsagriculturalsupplyagency,...Imean
theCommissariatofHeavyIndustryasrepresentedbyitsagriculturalmachineryassociation.

Vyshinskii'sstatementoutragedOrdzhonikidzeandYakovlev,whoweretheheadsofHeavyIndustryandAgriculture,respectively.InStalin'sabsence,they
managedtopersuadethePolitburo

Page234

toissuearesolutioncriticizingVyshinskiiforhisallegations:"TopointouttoCom.Vyshinskiithatheshouldnothaveformulatedhisviewsinaway...thatallows
incorrectaccusationstobemadeagainstHeavyIndustryandAgriculture."
On1September1933,thePolitburorevokedthisdecision(ibid.,d.930,l.13).
Letter79
[12September1933]
Hello,Viacheslav,
1)Iagreethatweshouldnotbudgetmorethan21billionrublesforcapitalinvestmentsfor1934andthatthegrowthinmanufacturingshouldnotbemorethat15
percent.Thiswillbeforthebest.1
2)Ialsoagreethatweshouldsetthegrossyieldforthe1932[sic]grainharvestat698millioncentners.2 Noless.
3)ThebehaviorofSergo(andYakovlev)intheaffairconcerning"productionwithfullequipment"canonlybecharacterizedas"antiparty,"sincetheirobjectiveisto
defendreactionarypartyelements[whoareacting]againsttheCentralCommittee.3 Infact,thewholecountryiscryingoutagainstthelackoffullequipment.The
partybeganacampaignonthissubjectinthepresswithclearlypublicizedpunitivemeasures.Thesentencingofenemiesofthepartythatis,ofallthosewho
maliciouslyinfringeonthedecisionsofthepartyandthegovernmenthasalreadybeendeclared,andSergo(withYakovlev),whobearstheresponsibilityforthese
violations,isattemptingtoattacktheprocuracyinsteadofconfessinghissins!Forwhatreason[ishedoingthis]?Ofcourse,notinordertoreininthereactionary
violatorsofpartydecisions4 rathertosupportthemmorally,tojustifythemintheeyesofpartyopinion,and,inthisway,todiscredittheparty'sunfolding
campaignwhichinpracticemeanstodiscreditthepolicyoftheCentralCommittee.
IwroteKaganovichtoexpressmysurprisethatheturnedouttobeinthecampofthereactionaryelementsintheparty.
4)Iamalittleuncomfortablewithbeingthereasonforyourearlyreturnfromyourvacation.Butthisawkwardnessaside,it'sobviousthatitwouldberashtoleavethe
center'sworktoKaganovichalone(Kuibyshevmaystartdrinking)foranylengthoftime,becauseKaganovichmustdividehistimebetweenhiscentralandlocal
responsibilities.IwillbeinMoscowinonemonth,andyouwillbeabletogoonvacationthen.
5)IhaveresolutelydecidedthatitwouldbeuselessforyoutotraveltoTurkey.5 LetVoroshilovandLitvinovgo.
Regards,
J.Stalin
9/12/33
1.ThereferencesaretothetargetfiguresfortheSovieteconomyin1934.
2.Onecentnerequals100kilogramsTrans.

Page235

3.Concerningthecontroversyoverkomplektnost(providingequipmentwithafullcomplementofparts),seenote2toletter78.
4.By"reactionaryviolatorsofpartydecisions"StalinmeansbureaucratswithintheSovietgovernmentandparty.Formoreabouttheseviolators,seethe
IntroductionU.S.Ed.
5.InMay1932,IsmetPasha,chairmanoftheCouncilofMinistersoftheTurkishRepublic,andTenfikRushtubeibi,ministerofforeignaffairs,visitedtheSoviet
Union.
On20September1933,thePolitburoapprovedareciprocalvisittoTurkey(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.931,l.17).AttheendofOctober1933,aSoviet
governmentdelegationheadedbyVoroshilovdepartedforAnkaratotakepartincelebrationsontheoccasionofthetenthanniversaryoftheTurkishRepublic.
Letter80
[21July1935]
Hello,Viacheslav,
Todaywediscussedthetargetfiguresfor1936.1 Basedonafigureof19billionforconstructionprojects,Mezhlauk[headofGosplan]proposedthisdistribution
amongtheministries:HeavyIndustrywouldreceive6billionTransport3billionplusAgriculture,LightIndustry,FoodIndustry,Timberreducednumbers.Health,
Education,MunicipalServices,LocalIndustry,andsoonalsoreducednumbers.Evenallowingforthemosteconomicalapproach,itdoesn'tworkout,especiallyif
weconsiderthatDefensemustbefullyprovidedforunderanycircumstances.Iproposedafigureof22billionrubles.Withthisnumber,HeavyIndustrywouldreceive
6billion500700million(alongwith8billionplusintheyear'35)Transportanadditional400500millionLightIndustry200millionFoodIndustry400500
millionEducation,HealthCarearound300millionAgriculture,StateFarms,LocalIndustry,MunicipalServices,Communications,etc.allthatremains.Heavy
Industry(theywanttoget9billion)andTransport(theywanttoget41/2billion).FoodIndustries,andalltheothersarehowling.
MezhlaukandChubarweretoldtomakeadistribution(roughly)basedonatotalof22billion.Weshallsee.
Somethingscan'tbecut.Defenserepairofroadsandmovingstock,pluspaymentsfornewtrainsandsteamenginesforTransporttheconstructionofschoolsfor
Educationreequipping(technical)forLightIndustrypaperandcellulosefactoriesforTimbersomeessentialindustries(coal,oil,blastfurnaces,rollingmills,
viscousmaterials,electricplants,chemicals)forHeavyIndustry.Thiscomplicatesthings.We'llsee.
How'slife?Areyougettinganyrest?
Myhealthisgoodmyfriendsarewellalso.
RegardstoCom.Zhemchuzhina.
J.Stalin
21July1935

Page236

P.S.Thefinalresolutiononthetargetfigures,liketheconversionofprices,wasputoffuntilthefall.2
1.Thereferenceistoameetingontargetproductionfiguresfor1936thattookplaceon26July1935[sic].Thegovernmentandpartydirectiveestablishingtarget
figureswasconfirmedbythePolitburoon28July1935(RTsKhIDNIf.17,op.3,d.969,ll.3138).
2.Thisprobablyreferstosubstantialchangesinfactorywholesalepricesthatoccurredin1936toeliminatetheneedforhugesubsidies.Forpricemovementsduring
thisperiod,seeAlecNove,AnEconomicHistoryoftheU.S.S.R.,1sted.(Harmondsworth,Eng.,1969),24651U.S.Ed.
Letter81
[Laterthan28July1935]
Hello,Viacheslav,1
1)Ireceivedyourletter.Weareconsideringorganizingmilitaryschoolsfortheartillery,aviation,andnavy.
2)Iamsendingthedirectiveonthetargetfiguresfor1936totheCouncilofCommissarsandCentralCommittee.2 Asyoucansee,thetotalamountbudgetedfor
constructionhasbeensetat27billionrubles,withfinancingat25billionrubles.Ifthecostofthoseconstructionprojectsisreducedby8percentandthisisan
obligatorydirectivetheamountbudgetedforconstructionwillbereducedto27billion,withagovernmentsubsidyof25billionrubles.Thiswillcreateamaterial
interestinreducingthecostofconstructionprojects.
Twentytwobillionwasinsufficientand,asisevident,wouldneverhavebeenenough.Theincreaseforschoolconstruction(up760million),forLightIndustry,
Timber,FoodIndustry,LocalIndustry(up900plusmillionrublesinall),forDefense(up1.1billion),forHealthCare,MoscowCanalconstruction,andotheritems
(morethan400millionrubles)determinedthenatureandsizeofthetargetfiguresfor1936.
Idonotregretthis,sinceeverythingthatincreasestheproductionofproductsformassconsumptionmustbestrengthenedeachyear.Otherwisethereisnopossibility
ofmovingahead.
Well,greetings,
GreetingstoCom.Zhemchuzhina
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperlefthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:''1935=?"
2.Onthemeetingontargetfiguresfor1936,seenote1toletter80.

Page237

Letter82
[5August1935]
5August1935
Hello,Viacheslav,
Ireceivedyourletter.Withrespecttothecompleteabolitionofrationbooksforfoodandconsumergoodsthisyear,ofcourseyou'reright.Wemustseethismatterto
itsconclusion.1
TheCominternCongresswasn'tsobad.2 ItwillbeevenmoreinterestingafterthereportsfromDimitrovandErcoli[P.Togliatti].Thedelegatesmadeagood
impression.Thedraftresolutionscameoutprettywell.IthinknowisthetimetocreatewithintheCominterntheofficeoffirstsecretary[gensek].IimagineDimitrov
couldbeappointedfirstsecretary.Piatnitskii,Manuilskii,andothers(fromamongtheforeigners)canbeputinassecretariesintheSecretariatoftheComintern
ExecutiveCommittee.
Iamindeedalittletired.IhadtospentalotoftimewiththeCominternmembers,withthe1936targetfigures,withallsortsofongoingquestionsinevitablyyouget
tired.Butit'snotadisastertirednesspassesquickly,withaday'srest,orevenafewhours'.
Greetings,
J.Stalin
1.Therationingsystemformeatandfishproducts,sugar,oils,andpotatoeswasabolishedon1October1935,andformanufacturedgoodson1January1936.
2.TheXIICongressoftheCominterntookplaceinMoscowfrom25Julyto20August,with513delegatesrepresentingsixtyfiveCommunistpartiesandanumber
ofinternationalorganizationsthathadjoinedtheComintern.TheCongressdiscussedthefollowingissues:Cominternactivities(W.Pieckreporting),theworkofthe
InternationalControlCommission(Z.Angaretisreporting),thefascistoffensiveandtheComintern'stasksinfightingfortheunityoftheworkingclassagainstfascism
andwar(G.Dimitrovreporting),imperialistpreparationforwarandthetasksoftheComintern(M.Ercoli[Togliatti]reporting),resultsoftheconstructionofsocialism
intheUSSR(D.Manuilskiireporting),electionstothehighestbodiesoftheComintern.
TheCongresselectedrulingbodiesfortheComintern:theExecutiveCommitteeoftheComintern,whichwascomposedoffortysixmembersandthirtythree
candidatemembers,andtheInternationalControlCommission,whichconsistedoftwentypeople.ThefollowingwerefullmembersoftheCominternSecretariat:
G.Dimitrov(generalsecretary),P.Togliatti,D.Manuilskii,W.Pieck,O.Kuusinen,A.Marty,K.GottwaldcandidatemembersoftheSecretariatwereM.
Moskvin(Trilisser),F.Florin,VanMin.

Page238

Letter83
[September1935]
Hello,Viacheslav,1
RegardingtheConstitution,Ithinkthatundernocircumstancesshoulditbeconfusedwiththepartyprogram.Itmustcontain[only]whathasalreadybeenachieved.
Theprogram,however,mustcontainwhatwearestillstrivingfor.
Ihavethefollowingpreliminaryplan.TheConstitutionmustconsistof(approximately)sevensections:1)Socialsystem(thesoviets,socialistproperty,socialist
agriculture,etc.)2)Governmentsystem(unionandautonomousrepublics,theunionoftheserepublics,equalityofnations,races,etc.)3)Supremegovernment
bodies(theCentralExecutiveCommitteeorthebodythatreplacesitthetwochambersandtheirpowersthepresidiumanditspowers,theCouncilofCommissars,
etc.)4)Administrativebodies(commissariats,etc.)5)Judicialbodies6)Rightsandresponsibilitiesofcitizens(civilliberties,freedomofunionsand
associations,thechurch,etc.)7)Electoralsystem.
IntheConstitution,theprinciplesshouldnotbeseparatedfromtheotherarticlesbutmustinsteadbeincorporatedasthefirstarticlesoftheConstitution.
Inmyopinion,apreambleisnotneeded.
Ithinkweneedtoholdareferendum.
Asfarasgrainpurchasesareconcerned,theplanwillhavetobesomewhatcurtailed.Everyoneiscomplainingthattheplanistoobig.IftheallotmentforUkraineisto
becutby10millionpoods,fortheNorthCaucasus[by]7millionpoods,fortheAzovBlackSearegionby5or6millionpoods,andiftheplansfortheother
regionsaretobecutbyanother2530[millionpoods],thenwecouldstillhaveaplanfor250240millionpoods.
Regards,
Yours,JStalin
9/26/35
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"2/1936."
Letter84
[February1936]
Reviewed.Notbad.Seecommentsinthetext.
J.Stalin1 ,2
2/1936

Page239

1.ThisletterisStalin'snotationonthefollowingnotefromMolotov:
ToComradeStalin
SendingyoutextofmyreportontheSovietConstitution.
Waitingforyourcommentsduringthedayon2/6.
Molotov

2.WhenMolotovsentacopyofhisreportontheConstitutiontoStalinforhisapprovalinFebruary1936,heevidentlyattachedStalin'sletterfromtheprevious
September(letter83).StalinwrotethesamemarginalnoteonbothhisownletterandMolotov'scoverletterU.S.Ed.
LetterswithUndeterminedDates
Letter85
Viacheslav!1
IamsendingyouZinoviev'slettertoSergo.2 Readitandweep.Itturnsoutthatallthese"notes"(fromKamenevandthenfromZinoviev)cameaboutnotsothat
copiescouldbesenttoTrotsky(towhom,evenafterthe"break,"our"Leninists"founditnecessarytogiveanaccount),butratherbecauseKamenevandZinoviev
havethehabitoftalkingamongthemselvesviaspecial"notes."AndthesegeniuseswanttheCentralCommitteetotrustthem''inadvance"!
Regards,
J.Stalin
1.IntheupperrighthandcornerisMolotov'snotation:"1926=?"
2.Zinoviev'slettertoOrdzhonikidzehasnotbeenfound.
Letter86
Hi,Molotov,
Thewatersherearetrulyremarkable.Terrific.I'lltellyouindetailwhenwemeet.
IwillbeinSochi(mostlikely!)by1September,ifnotearlier.
GreetingsfromNadia[N.S.Allilueva,Stalin'swife]toZhemchuzhina.
J.Stalin.

Page241

Appendix
TheEastmanAffair
ExcerptfromLenin'sTestament
(translatedbytheU.S.editorfromPolnoesobraniesochinenii,5thed.,34446)
24December1922.Ihaveinmindstabilityasaguaranteeagainstaschismintheimmediatefuture,andIintendtodealherewithafewideasconcerningpurely
personalqualities.
IthinkthatfromthisstandpointtheprimefactorsinthequestionofstabilityaresuchmembersoftheCentralCommitteeasStalinandTrotsky.Ithinktherelationship
betweenthemconstitutesthegreaterpartofthedangerofaschism,whichcouldbeavoided,andthispurpose,inmyopinion,wouldbeserved,amongotherthings,
byincreasingthenumberofCentralCommitteemembersto50or100.
ComradeStalin,havingbecomegeneralsecretary,hasboundlesspowerconcentratedinhishands,andIamnotsurewhetherhewillalwaysbecapableofusingthat
powerwithsufficientcaution.ComradeTrotsky,ontheotherhand,ashisstruggleagainsttheCentralCommitteeonthequestionoftheCommissariatforTransport
hasalreadyproved,isdistinguishednotonlybyoutstandingability.HeispersonallyperhapsthemostcapablemaninthepresentCentralCommittee,buthehas
displayedexcessiveselfassuranceandshownexcessivepreoccupationwiththepurelyadministrativesideofthework.
ThesetwoqualitiesofthetwooutstandingleadersofthepresentCentralCommitteecaninadvertentlyleadtoaschism,andifourpartydoesnottakestepstoavert
this,theschismmaycomeunexpectedly.
Ishallnotgiveanyfurtherappraisalsofthepersonalqualitiesofother

Page242

membersoftheCentralCommitteeIshalljustrecallthattheOctoberepisodewithZinovievandKamenevwas,ofcourse,noaccident,butneithercantheblamefor
itbelaiduponthempersonally,anymorethanunbolshevismcanuponTrotsky.
SpeakingoftheyoungCentralCommitteemembers,IwishtosayafewwordsaboutBukharinandPiatakov.Theyare,inmyopinion,themostoutstandingfigures
(amongtheyoungestones),andthefollowingmustbeborneinmindaboutthem:Bukharinisnotonlythemostvaluableandimportanttheoristofthepartyheisalso
rightlyconsideredthefavoriteofthewholeparty,buthistheoreticalviewscanbeclassifiedasfullyMarxistonlywithgreatreserve,forthereissomethingscholastic
abouthim(hehasnevermadeastudyofdialectics,and,Ithink,neverfullyunderstoodit).
25December1922.AsforPiatakov,heisunquestionablyamanofoutstandingwillandoutstandingability,butheshowstoomuchzealforadministrationandthe
administrativesideoftheworktoberelieduponinaseriouspoliticalmatter.
Bothoftheseremarks,ofcourse,aremadeonlyforthepresent,ontheassumptionthatboththeseoutstandinganddevotedpartyworkerswillfailtofindanoccasion
toenhancetheirknowledgeandamendtheironesidedeness.
4January1923.Stalinistoocrude,andthisdefect,althoughquitetolerableinourownmidstandindealingswithusCommunists,becomesintolerableinageneral
secretary.ThatiswhyIsuggestthatthecomradesthinkaboutawayofremovingStalinfromthatpostandappointinganothermaninhissteadwhoinallother
respectsdiffersfromComradeStalininhavingonlyoneadvantage,namely,thatofbeingmoretolerant,moreloyal,morepolite,andmoreconsideratetothe
comrades,lesscapricious,etc.Thiscircumstancemayappeartobeaninsignificanttrifle.ButIthinkthatfromthestandpointofsafeguardsagainstasplitandfromthe
standpointofwhatIwroteaboveabouttherelationshipbetweenStalinandTrotsky,itisnotatrifle,oritisatriflethatcanassumedecisivesignificance.
InaccuraciesinEastman'sAccountofLenin'sTestament
(preparedbytheU.S.editor)
1.AccordingtoEastman'saccountinSinceLeninDied,LeninreservesthewordoutstandingforTrotskyalone,thusshowingthatLeninthoughtTrotsky

Page243

was"theablestandthegreatest."Inactuality,LenincallsTrotskyandStalin"thetwooutstandingleaders"oftheCentralCommitteehealsodescribesBukharinand
Piatakovasoutstandingfiguresamongtheyoungergeneration.
2.EastmanquotesLeninasdescribingTrotskyasa"devotedrevolutionist."NosuchwordsappearinLenin'sTestament.
3.IntheTestament,LeninalsomentionsTrotsky's"struggleagainsttheCentralCommittee"atthetimeofthetradeuniondisputein1920ablackmarkonTrotsky's
recordintheeyesofmostpartymembers.Eastmandoesnotmentionthisremark.
4.InEastman'sversion,Leninisindulgent,notonlyofTrotsky,butofhisfollowers,forhe"didnotqualifyhispraiseofPitiakov[sic]whohasstoodwithTrotsky
throughoutthiscrisis"(30).Inreality,LeninstatesthatPiatakovbecametooabsorbedintheadministrativesideofthingsandwasthereforeunreliableinpolitical
matters.EastmanseemsunawarethatLeninalsoportraysTrotskyastooabsorbedintheadministrativesideofthings.
5.AccordingtoEastman,LeninusestheemotivetermapostasyinhisdiscussionofZinoviev'sandKamenev'sactionsin1917.Leninactuallyrestrictshimselftothe
euphemisticphrase"Octoberepisode."Moreimportant,EastmanfailstomentionthatLeninputthis"Octoberepisode"onaparwithTrotsky's"unbolshevism."
6.EastmancitesLenin'sremarkthatBukharindidnotfullyunderstandthedialecticandimpliesthatLeninthoughtBukharinwasworthlessasatheoretician.Inreality,
LenincallsBukharin"themostvaluableandimportanttheoristoftheparty."
7.AccordingtoEastman,LeninattacksStalinas"toobrutal."Thisisatendentioustranslationofgrubyi,whichisusuallyrenderedas"crude."
BothStalinandTrotskyalludedtotheEastmanaffairinlateryears.In1927,attheheightofthestrugglewiththeleftopposition,Stalinprovidedalengthyrefutationof
thechargethatLenin'sTestamenthadbeensuppressed.Inthecourseofhisremarks,hementionsTrotsky'sletterof1925andasksineffect:"Trotskytoldthetruthin
1925whydoeshedenyitnow?"
Trotskyseemstohavecommentedonthisaffaironlyonce:inaletterhewrotein1928withtheintentionofrehabilitatingEastman'spersonalreputation.There,he
doesnotcommentonanyofthesubstantiveissuesinvolved,nordoeshesuggestthathispublicstatementof1925containsanythinguntrue.Trotskydoesnoteven
retracthiscriticismofEastman'sactioninpublishingSinceLeninDied.AllTrotskysaysinthisletteristhat,ifthePolitburohadnotpressuredhim,hewouldnothave
publiclycriticizedEastmanonthisissue.

Page244

Trotsky'sLetter
(translatedbytheU.S.editorfromBolshevik,1925,no.16:6770)
IlearnedofthepublicationofEastman'sbookSinceLeninDiedfromaquerytelegraphedtomebyComradeJackson,editoroftheLondonSundayWorker,soon
aftermyreturnfromSukhumitoMoscow.ThisbookwasbeingusedbythebourgeoispresstoattackourpartyandSovietpower.Althoughmy[telegraphed]answer
toComradeJacksonwaspublishedinduecourseinthepress,Iconsideritusefultoreproducetheopeningsectionhere:"IknownothingoftheEastmanbookyou
askedmeabout.Thebourgeoispapersthathavecitedthebookhavenotreachedme.ItgoeswithoutsayingthatIrejectaprioriandcategoricallyanycomments
directedagainsttheRussianCommunistParty."Intherestofthetelegram,Ichallengedabsurdinsinuationsaboutmyallegedturntowardbourgeoisdemocracyand
freetrade.
IlaterreceivedacopyofEastman'sSinceLeninDiedfromthesecretaryoftheBritishCommunistParty,ComradeInkpin,withalettersimilartoComradeJackson's
telegram.Ididnotintendtoread,muchlesstoreact,toEastman'sbook,becauseIfeltthatmytelegramtoComradeJacksonwhichbythattimehadbeen
publishedintheBritishandforeignpressingeneralwassufficient.Aftermyclosestpartycomradesbecamefamiliarwiththebook,however,theyexpressedtheir
opinionthat,inviewofthebook'sreferencestoconversationswithme,mysilencemightprovideindirectsupporttoabookdirectedinitsentiretyagainstourparty.
Thispromptedmetotakethebookmoreseriouslyand,firstofall,toreaditmoreattentively.Basinghimselfoncertainepisodesofourpartylifefromthediscussion
onthemethodsofpartydemocracyandstateregulationoftheeconomyEastmanproceedstoconclusionsthatarecompletelyandutterlydirectedagainstourparty
andcapable,iftakenonfaith,ofdiscreditingthepartyandSovietpower.
Letusdwellfirstofallonathemethatnotonlyhashistoricalsignificancebutisstillaveryurgentoneatpresent:theRedArmy.Eastmanimpliesthatthechangein
individualleadershiphasledtoadisintegrationofthearmyandtoitslossoffightingcapacityandsoon.WhereEastmangothisridiculousinformationiscompletely
unknown,butitsabsurditystrikesoneimmediately.Wecertainlydon'tadvisetheimperialistgovernmentstobuildtheircalculationsonEastman'sdiscoveries.Bythe
way,EastmanseemsnottorealizethathisdescriptionoftheRedArmyalsonourishesthecompletelyrottenmensheviklegendaboutBonapartism,praetorianism,and
soon,foritisclearthatanarmy

Page245

capableof"fallingtopieces"becauseofachangeinindividualleadershipwouldnotbeaCommunistoraproletarianarmy,butratheraBonapartistandpraetorian
one.
Theauthorcitesinthecourseofhisbookalargenumberofdocumentsandbringsinmanyepisodes,oftenfromsecond,third,andfourthhandaccounts.Clearly
erroneousandfalseassertionscanbefoundinthisbookinnosmallnumber.Wewilldiscussonlythemostimportant.
Inseveralplacesinhisbook,EastmansaysthattheCentralCommittee"hid"fromthepartyanumberofhighlyimportantdocumentsthatLeninwroteinthelastperiod
ofhislife(lettersonthenationalquestion,thesocalledtestament,andsoforth)thiscannotbetermedanythingotherthanaslanderoftheCentralCommitteeofour
party.Theselettersgiveadviceonmattersofinternalpartyorganization,yetfromEastman'swords,theconclusioncouldbedrawnthatVladimirIlich[Lenin]meant
themtobeprinted.Infact,thisiscompletelyuntrue.Aftertheonsetofhisillness,VladimirIlichturnedmorethanoncetotheleadinginstitutionsofthepartyaswellas
tothePartyCongresswithproposals,letters,andsoon.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatalltheselettersandproposalscametotheattentionoftheaddresseesandtothe
knowledgeofthedelegatesoftheXIIIPartyCongressthese[letters],ofcourse,alwayshadtheirdueinfluenceonpartydecisions.Iftheywerenotpublished,thatis
becausetheirauthordidnotintendforthemtobepublished.VladimirIlichdidnotleaveany"testament,"andthecharacterofhisrelationtotheparty,nottomention
thecharacterofthepartyitself,excludesthepossibilityofsucha"testament."Whentheemigr,foreignbourgeois,andmenshevistpressusesthetermtestament,it
usuallyhasinmindaletterinaformdistortedbeyondrecognitioninwhichVladimirIlichgaveadviceofaninternalpartycharacter.TheXIIICongressgavethis
letter,likealltheothers,itscloseattentionanddrewtheconclusionsappropriatetothecircumstancesofthemoment.Anytalkofahiddenorviolated"testament''isa
spitefulinventionaimedagainsttherealwillofVladimirIlichandtheinterestsofthepartyhecreated.
JustasfalseisEastman'sassertionthattheCentralCommitteewantedtokeepunderwraps(thatis,notpublish)Lenin'sarticleabouttheWorkerPeasantInspection.
ThedisputeintheCentralCommitteeaboutthisarticle(ifdisputeistheproperword)involvedaquestionofsecondaryimportance,namely,whetherthepublicationof
Lenin'sarticleshouldbeaccompaniedbyanannouncementfromtheCentralCommitteetotheeffectthattherewasnodangerofaschism.Thisquestionwassettled
unanimouslyinthesamesession,andaletterwaswrittenbythemembersofthePolitburoandOrgburowho

Page246

werepresent.Thisletterwassenttopartyorganizationsandcontainedthefollowing:
"InthisstrictlyinformationalletterwewillnotconsiderthepossiblelongrangedangersthatComradeLeninappropriatelyraisedinhisarticle.Themembersofthe
PolitburoandOrgburo,however,wishtostatewithcompleteunanimity,inordertoavoidanypossiblemisunderstandings,thatintheworkoftheCentralCommittee
thereareabsolutelynocircumstancesthatwouldprovideanybasiswhatsoeverforfearsofa'schism.'"Notonlydoesthisdocumenthavemysignature,along
withthoseoftenorsoothers,butImyselfdraftedthetext(27January1923).
SinceComradeKuibyshevalsosignedthisletterwhichexpressestheCentralCommittee'sunanimousopinionofLenin'sproposalabouttheWorkerPeasant
InspectionanotherofEastman'sfalseassertionsisalsorefuted:theallegationthatComradeKuibyshevwasappointedtoheadtheWorkerPeasantInspectionasan
"opponent"ofLenin'sorganizationalplan.
Eastman'sassertionsthattheCentralCommitteeconfiscatedorinsomewayheldupmypamphletsin1923or1924oratanyothertimearefalseandbasedon
fantasticalrumors.
AlsocompletelyincorrectisEastman'sassertionthatLeninofferedmethepostofchairmanoftheCouncilofCommissarsoroftheLaborDefenseCouncil.Ilearnof
thisforthefirsttimefromEastman'spamphlet.
Nodoubtamoreattentivereadingofthebookwoulduncoveranumberofotherinaccuraciesanderrors,butthereishardlyanyneedtodothis.UsingEastman's
informationandcitinghisconclusions,thebourgeoisandespeciallythemenshevikpresshavetriedineverywaytoemphasizehis"closeness"tomeastheauthorofmy
biographyandhis"friendship"withme,clearlytryingbythisindirectmeanstogivehisconclusionsaweighttheydonotandcouldnothaveontheirown.Itis
thereforenecessarytodwellonthismatter.PerhapsthebestwayofshowingtherealnatureofmyrelationshipwithEastmanistoquoteabusinessletterIwrote
beforetherewasanytalkofhisbookSinceLeninDied.
DuringmystayinSukhumi,IreceivedfromapartycomradewhoisinvolvedinpublishingmyworksinMoscowamanuscriptbyEastmanentitledLevTrotsky:
PortraitofaYouth.Frommyassociate'saccompanyingletter,IlearnedthattheauthorhadsubmittedthismanuscripttotheStatePublishingHousesotheycould
considerpublishingaRussianeditionandthatitssentimentaltoneproducedastrangeand,forus,unaccustomedimpression.Irepliedtothisletteron3April1925:
"EvenbeforebecomingacquaintedwithEastman'smanuscript,Iamin

Page247

completeagreementwithyouthatitwouldbeabsolutelyinappropriatetopublishit.Thankyouforsendingthemanuscript,butIhavenostomachforreadingit.Iam
quitewillingtobelievethatitisunappetizing,especiallytoourRussianCommunisttaste.Eastmanwasveryinsistentintryingtoconvincemethatitwasverydifficultfor
Americanstointerestthemselvesincommunism,butthattheycouldbeinterestedinCommunists.Hisargumentwasnotentirelyunconvincing.Thatiswhatmoved
metogivehimhelp,althoughofaverylimitedkind:itslimitsareindicatedinmylettertohim.(On22May1923,IrespondedtoEastman'srepeatedrequestsforhelp
withthefollowingwords:'Iamwillingtohelpbyprovidingyouwithaccurateinformation,butIcannotagreetoreadyourmanuscript.Thatwouldmakeme
responsible,notonlyforitsfacts,butalsoforitspersonalevaluationsandjudgments.Itshouldbeevidenthowimpossiblethatwouldbe.Iamwillingtotakesome
limitedresponsibilityforthefactualstatementsImadetoyouatyourrequest.Foreverythingelse,theresponsibilitymustbeyoursalone.'Themanuscriptdoesnotgo
furtherthan1902.)Ididn'tknowthatheintendedtopublishthebookinRussiaotherwiseIwouldprobablyhavealreadyadvisedtheStatePublishingHousenotto
publishit.InnowayamIabletointerferewithEastman'spublicationofhisbookabroad.Heisa'free'writerwholivedinRussia,wherehecollectedmaterial,and
nowlivesinFranceorAmerica.Askhimnottopublishthebookasapersonalfavor?Iamnotcloseenoughtohimtomakethatrequest.Andingeneralitwould
hardlybeappropriate."
Thetopichere,Irepeat,isacompletelyinnocentbookaboutmyyouth(upto1902),butthetoneofmyletterleavesnoroomfordoubtthatmyrelationshipto
EastmandiffersinnowayfrommyrelationshiptoverymanyCommunistsor"sympatheticforeigners"whoturntomeforhelpintryingtolearnabouttheOctober
revolution,ourparty,andtheSovietstatecertainlynocloser.
Withvulgarselfassurance,Eastmanwaxesironicaboutmy"quixotic"attitudetomyclosestcomradesontheCentralCommittee,sinceaccordingtohimIreferredto
theminfriendlyfashion[even]duringthe"fiercediscussion."Eastman,evidently,feelscalledupontocorrectmy"mistake"andgivesadescriptionoftheleadersofour
partythatisimpossibletodescribeasanythingotherthanslander.
WesawearlierhowrottenisthefoundationonwhichEastmanhasconstructedhisedifice.Withascandalousdisregardforfactsandforproportion,heusesindividual
aspectsoftheintrapartydiscussioninordertoblackenourparty'snameanddestroyconfidenceinit.Itseemstome,however,thatanyreally

Page248

seriousandthoughtfulreaderdoesnotevenneedtoverifyEastman'scitationsandhis"documents"something,inanyevent,thatnoteveryonecando.Itissufficient
toaskoneselfthissimplequestion:ifthemaliciousevaluationoftheleadersofourpartygivenbyEastmanistrueeveninpart,thenhowcouldsuchapartyhavegone
throughlongyearsofundergroundstruggle,carriedoutagreatrevolution,ledmassesmanymillionsstrong,andaidedintheformationofrevolutionarypartiesinother
countries?NotonehonorableworkerwillbelievethepicturegivenbyEastman.Itcontainsitsowninternalcontradiction.ItmakesnodifferencewhatEastman's
ownintentionsare.Hisbookcanbeofserviceonlytothemostmaliciousenemiesofcommunismandtherevolution,anditistherefore,objectivelyspeaking,atoolof
counterrevolution.
ExcerptfromKrupskaia'sLetter
(translatedbytheU.S.editorfromBolshevik,1925,no.16:7173)
1July1925
ComradeTrotskynowknowsexactlyhowLeninfeltabouthimattheirmeetingin1902(fromthelettertoPlekhanovpublishedinthethirdLeninskiisbornik)and
alsohowLeninfeltabouthimattheendofhislife,becauseofLenin'sletterstothePartyCongress.Mr.Eastmanwritesallsortsofunbelievablenonsenseaboutthese
letters(callingthema"testament").Mr.Eastmanhasnounderstandingofthespiritofourparty.ForMr.EastmanaPartyCongressisacongressofpartybureaucrats.
ForusBolsheviks,theCongressisthehighestpartybody,whereeachmemberofthepartyissupposedtospeakwithcompletesincerity,withoutfearorfavor.Thisis
howLeninviewedaPartyCongress.Forhim,itsdecisionshadexceptionalsignificance:hewasalwaysagitatedbeforeaPartyCongressandalwayspreparedforit
withgreatcare.HisCongressspeecheswerealwaysparticularlydistinguishedbycarefulthoughtandweightinessofcontent.
Lenin'slettersonintrapartyrelations(the"testament")werealsowrittenforaPartyCongress.Heknewthatthepartywouldunderstandthemotivesthatdictatedthis
letter.Suchalettercouldonlybeaddressedtopeoplewhowouldundoubtedlyputtheinterestsofthecausefirst.Thelettercontained,amongotherthings,personal
descriptionsofthehighestpartycomrades.Thereisnolackoffaith[nedoverie]expressedintheletterstowardthesecomrades,withwhomV.I.workedformany
years.Onthecontrary,thereismuchthatisflatteringEastmanforgetstomentionthis.Thelettershadtheaimofhelpingtheothercomradesgetwork

Page249

movingintheproperdirection,and,forthatreason,theymentionnotonlyvirtuesbutalsodefects(includingTrotsky's),sinceitisnecessarytotakeintoaccountthese
defectswhenorganizingtheworkofthepartycollectiveinthebestpossibleway.
AsLeninwished,allmembersoftheCongressfamiliarizedthemselveswiththeletters.Itisincorrecttocallthema"testament,"sinceLenin'sTestamentinthereal
senseofthewordisincomparablywider:itconsistsofV.I.'slastarticlesanddiscussesthebasicquestionsofpartyandSovietwork.Thesearethearticles"On
Cooperation,""OnRabkrin,""PagefromaDiary''(oneducation),and"OurRevolution."TakentogetherwithwhatLeninsaidpreviously,thesearticleswillilluminate
thepathwemusttakeforalongtimetocome.Theyhaveallbeenpublished.ButMr.Eastmanisnotinterestedinthem.
TheenemiesoftheRussianCommunistPartyaretryingtousethe"testament"inordertodiscreditthepresentleadersofthepartyandtodiscreditthepartyitself.Mr.
Eastmanisenergeticallyworkingtoachievethesamepurpose:heslanderstheCentralCommitteebyshoutingthatthe"testament"hasbeensuppressed.Inthiswayhe
triestoinflameanunhealthycuriosity,thusdistortingtherealmeaningoftheletter.

Page251

GlossaryofNames
Thetermrepressed,whichappearsrepeatedlyinthisglossary,indicatesthatthepersonconcernedwasexpelledfromtheCommunistParty,arrested,andthen
probablyeitherwasexecutedordiedinthecamps.Whenonlyasingledateisprovided,itindicatesthatthepositionwasassumedatthattime.
A
Akhundov,RukhullaAliogly(18971938)Partymemberfrom1919.SecretaryofAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee,1924.Azerbaidzhancommissarofpublic
education.MemberofUSSRCentralExecutiveCommittee,192227.Repressed.
Alekseev,P.A.(18931939)Partymemberfrom1914.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,1927.CentralCommitteemember,1930.ChairmanofLeningrad
RegionalTradeUnionCouncil.
Aleksinskii,G.A.(18791967)ActivistinRussianSocialDemocraticmovement.SidedwithBolsheviks,1905.MemberofsecondDuma."Recallist,"1908.
Menshevik,1917.Emigr,1918.
Allilueva,NataliiaS.(19011932)Partymemberfrom1918.WifeofJosephStalin.AttendedMoscowIndustrialAcademy,192932.
Amas(realname:Amirbekov),A.S.(19041937?)Partymemberfrom1917.SecretaryofAbkhazianRegionalPartyCommittee,February1928toMay
1929.ChairmanofBatumiPartyPurgeCommission,JunetoSeptember1929.HeadoforganizationdepartmentofAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee,October1929
toJuly1930.DeputyheadoforganizationdepartmentofMoscowPartyCommittee.Repressed.
Amosov,A.M.(18961937)Partymemberfrom1914.ChairmanofCentralCommitteeofRailWorkers'Unionfrom1929.CentralCommitteecandidate
member,193034.ChiefofNorthernRailwayfrom1933.
Andreev,A.A.(18951971)Partymemberfrom1914.CentralCommitteesecretary,192425.ChairmanofCentralCommitteeofRailWorkers'Union,1922
27.SecretaryofNorthCaucasianRegionalCommittee,192730.

Page252

Antselovich,N.M.(18881952)Partymemberfrom1905.ChairmanofCentralCommitteeofAgricultureandForestryWorkers'Union,192330.Memberof
TradeUnionCentralCouncilpresidium.
Aralov,S.I.(18801969)Partymemberfrom1918.AmbassadortoLithuania,Turkey,Latvia,192125.MemberofcollegiumofUSSRCommissariatof
ForeignAffairs.AppointedSovietambassadortoChina'snationalgovernmenton30December1926.
Artak(Astamboltsian),A.A.(1895?)Partymemberfrom1916.SecretaryofBailovBibiEybatDistrictCommitteeofAzerbaidzhanCommunistParty,1926
29.StudentincoursesonMarxismLeninismundertheauspicesofUSSRCentralCommitteefromOctober1929.
Asribekov,Ye.M.(1898?)Partymemberfrom1917.SecretaryofTiflisCommitteeofGeorgianCommunistParty,1925.
Astrov,V.N.(1898?)Partymemberfrom1917.
Avdeev,I.A.(18771937?)Partymemberfrom1901.ChairmanofStalingradProvincialEconomicCouncil,1927.CentralCommitteecandidatemember.
Averbakh,L.L.(19031939)Partymemberfrom1919.EditorofNaliteraturnompostu(Onliteraryguard)andVestnikinostrannoiliteratury(Foreign
literaturereview),1929.Repressed.
B
Badaev,A.Ye.(18831951)Partymemberfrom1904.ChairmanofConsumers'Union(Leningrad),192129.ChairmanofCentralUnionofConsumers'
Organizations(Moscow),193033.
Bagirov,MirJafarAbbasovich(18961956)Partymemberfrom1917.ChairmanofAzerbaidzhanCheka(securitypolice)chairmanofAzerbaidzhanGPU
(securitypolice),commissarofinternalaffairsanddeputychairmanofAzerbaidzhanCouncilofCommissars,192127.ChairmanofAzerbaidzhanGPU(Baku),
192930.StudentincoursesonMarxismLeninismatUSSRCentralCommittee,193032.ExecutiveinstructorsentoutbytheCentralCommittee,1932.Chairman
ofAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee,193233.FirstsecretaryofAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee,1933.Sentencedtodeathandexecutedbyfiringsquad,1956.
Bakaev,I.P.(18971936)Partymemberfrom1906.ChairmanofLeningradProvincialControlCommission,1925.MemberofCentralControlCommission,
192527.AtXVPartyCongress,expelledfrompartyforjoiningTrotskyistoppositiongroup.Repressed.
Baldwin,Stanley(18671947)Britishstatesman,Conservativeprimeminister,192329.
Bauman,K.Ya.(18921937)Partymemberfrom1907.Politburocandidatemember,192930.SecondandthenfirstsecretaryofMoscowPartyCommittee,
192830.CentralCommitteesecretary,April1929toFebruary1934.Repressed.
Bazarov,V.(realname:V.A.Rudnev)(18741939)Philosopherandeconomist.Involvedinrevolutionarymovement,1896.AfterFebruaryrevolution,
coeditorofnewspaperNovaiazhizn'(Newlife).WorkedforUSSRGosplan,1921.
Bazovskii,N.A.(18951938?)Partymemberfrom1919.DeputychairmanofSiberianRegionalExecutiveCommittee,1929.MemberofSiberianRegional
PartyCommittee,1930.Repressed.

Page253

Bednyi,Demian(realname:Ye.A.Pridvorov)(18831945)Writer.Partymemberfrom1912.
Belenkii,A.Ya.(18831941)Partymemberfrom1902.OfficialofAllRussianCheka(securitypolice)andUSSROGPU(securitypolice)ofCouncilof
Commissars.ChiefofLenin'sbodyguard,191924.
Belenkii,Z.M.(1888?)Partymemberfrom1905.ChairmanofNorthCaucasianRegionalTradeUnionCouncil,1925.MemberofcollegiumofWorker
PeasantInspection,192831.DeputycommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection,193134.
Bogdanov,P.A.(18821939)Partymemberfrom1905.ChairmanofRSFSREconomicCouncil,192125.ChairmanofNorthCaucasianRegionalExecutive
Committee,1926.HeadofAmericanTradingCorporation,193034.Repressed.
Bogolepov,M.I.(18791945)Economist,correspondingmemberofUSSRAcademyofSciences.HeadofbudgetandfinancedepartmentofGosplan,1930.
Bordiga,Amadeo(18891970)ActivistofItalianworkingclassmovement.CofounderandearlyleaderofItalianCommunistParty,1921.Heldleftistviews
opposedItalianCommunistPartyleaders,1926.Expelledfrompartyforfactionalactivity.
Borodin,M.M.(18841951)Partymemberfrom1903.CominternrepresentativeinChina,192327politicaladvisortoKuomintangleadership,192327.
Briukhanov,N.P.(18781942)Partymemberfrom1902commissaroffinance,192630.Repressed.
Brutskus,B.D.(18781938)Economistandagronomist.Authorofanumberofworksonagricultureandeconomics.ExpelledfromRussia,1922.
Budenny,S.M.(18831973)Partymemberfrom1919.InspectorofRedArmyCavalry,192437.
Bukharin,N.I.(18881938)Partymemberfrom1906.Politburomember,192429.Repressed.
Buniatzade,D.Kh.(18881938)Partymemberfrom1908.DeputychairmanofAzerbaidzhanCouncilofCommissars,1908.Chairman,30January1930.
Bystrianskii,V.A.(18861940)Partymemberfrom1907.Historian,journalist.WorkedforIzvestiiaVTsIK(AllUnionCentralExecutiveCommitteenews)
andPetrogradskaiapravda(Petrogradtruth),1917.LectureratCommunistUniversity(Leningrad),1922.
C
Chaianov,A.V.(18881937)Agrarianeconomist.DirectorofResearchInstituteofAgriculturalEconomicsandPolitics,1930.Repressed.
Chamberlain,Austin(18631937)Britishpolitician.Foreignsecretary,192429.
ChangHsuehliang.(1901?)ChangTsolin'sson,commanderofNortheasternArmy.DefactorulerofManchuria.
Ch'enTuhsiu(18721942)GeneralsecretaryofChineseCommunistParty,192127.
Chernov,M.A.(18911938)Menshevik,190918.SocialDemocratInternationalist,191820.Partymemberfrom1920.Ukrainiancommissarofdomestic
trade,192528.ChairmanofCommitteeonProcurementofAgriculturalProductsand

Page254

memberofUSSRCommissariatofTrade,1930.USSRcommissarofagriculture,193437.Repressed.
Chernyi,V.N.(1891?)Partymemberfrom1918.HeadofResearchAdministration,March1929.HeadofUnitedAdministrationofRiverTransportfrom
January1930.
ChiangKaishek(18871975)HeadofKuomintangregimefrom1927.
Chicherin,G.V.(18721936)Partymemberfrom1905.Commissarofforeignaffairs,191830.
Chubar,V.Ya.(18911939)Partymemberfrom1907.CentralCommitteemember,1921.ChairmanofUkrainianCouncilofCommissars,192334.Repressed.
D
Desov,G.A.(1884?)Partymemberfrom1902.ChairmanofLeningradProvincialControlCommission,192629.DirectorofGeltsPrecisionMachineBuilding
Works,October1930.
Deterding,SirHenriHeadofRoyalDutchShell,aBritishDutchoiltrust.
Dimitrov,Georgi(18821949)ActivistinBulgarianandinternationallabormovement.SecretarygeneralofCominternExecutiveCommittee,1935.
Domski,G.G.(18831937)MemberofPolishSocialDemocraticParty,1904.MemberofeditorialboardofSvit(World,PolishnewspaperinMoscow).
MemberofCentralCommitteeofPolishCommunistParty,March1926.
Dovgalevskii,V.S.(18851934)Partymemberfrom1908.SovietambassadortoFrance,192834.
Dzerzhinsky,F.Ye.(18771926)Partymemberfrom1895.CentralCommitteemember.HeadofCheka(securitypolice)fromlate1917headofOGPU
(securitypolice),192226.AlsochairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncil,1924.
E
Eastman,Max.(18831969)Americanjournalistandwriter.
Eikhe,R.I.(18901940)Partymemberfrom1905.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,192530.ChairmanofSiberianRegionalExecutiveCommittee,
192529.FirstsecretaryofSiberianandWestSiberianRegionalPartyCommittees.
Eismont,N.B.(18911935)Partymemberfrom1917.CommissaroftradeofRSFSRanddeputycommissarofforeignanddomestictradeofUSSR,1926.
Arrested,1933.Released,1935.Killedinacaraccident.(ThisisnottheEismontwhowasanemployeeoftheChineseEasternRailway.)
Eliava,Sh.Z.(18881937)Partymemberfrom1904.ChairmanofGeorgianCouncilofCommissars,1923.ChairmanofTranscaucasianCouncilofCommissars,
1927.Repressed.
F
Fedorov,G.F.(18911936)Partymemberfrom1907.Afterthecivilwar,involvedinmajortradeunion,party,andSovietwork.AttheXVPartyCongress,
expelledfrompartyformembershipinTrotskyistoppositiongroup,1927.RestoredtopartybydecisionofCentralControlCommission,1928.Workedin
metallurgicalindustry.Expelledagain,1934.
FengYhsiang(18821948)Chinesegeneral,memberoftheKuomintang.
Fischer,Ruth(18951961)HeadedaleftistgroupoftheGermanCommunistPartyinthe1920s.MemberofCentralCommitteeofGermanCommunistParty,
192326.CandidatememberofCominternExecutiveCommittee,1924.RemovedfromofficialpositionsinCominternbyExecutiveCommitteeofficialatproposalof
Sovietparty

Page255

(approvedbyPolitburo,19June1926).ExpelledfromGermanpartybydecisionofCentralCommitteeofGermanCommunistParty,19August1926.
Fotieva,L.A.(18811975)Partymemberfrom1904.SecretaryofLaborDefenseCouncil,191830.V.I.Lenin'ssecretary,191824.
Fridrikhson,L.Kh.(18891937?)Partymemberfrom1908.HeadofStateGrainTrade,1926.Appointedchairmanoftheboardofthejointstockcompany
GrainExport,21August1930.Repressed.
Frumkin,M.I.(18781938)Partymemberfrom1898.DeputycommissaroffinanceofUSSR,1929.Repressed.
Frunze,M.V.(18851925)Partymemberfrom1904.CentralCommitteemember,1921.Politburocandidatemember,1924.ArmyCommanderofUkraineand
Crimea,192024.DeputychairmanofRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncilanddeputycommissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairs,1924.AlsoRedArmychiefofstaff.
ChairmanofRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,commissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairs,January1925.
Fushman,A.M.(18891936)Partymemberfrom1921.Chairmanoftextileimportagency.
G
Gallacher,William(18811965)ActivistinBritishandinternationallabormovement.MemberofBritishCommunistParty,1921.
Ganshin,S.M.(18951937)Partymemberfrom1914.HeadofGroznyioilindustry,192830.DeputychairmanofSovietoilindustry,1931.Repressed.
Gegechkori,A.A.(18871928)Partymemberfrom1908.DeputychairmanofGeorgianCouncilofCommissars,1922.Simultaneouslycommissarofinternal
affairs,commissarofagriculture.
Gei,K.V.(18961939)Partymemberfrom1916.SecretaryofPermDistrictPartyCommittee,1924.Headoforganizationanddistributiondepartmentof
CentralCommittee,CentralCommitteecandidatemember,192526.ConfirmedassecretaryofUralRegionalCommitteebyPolitburo,28August1926.
Gikalo,N.F.(18971938)Partymemberfrom1917.SecretaryofNorthCaucasianRegionalCommitteefrom1925.FirstsecretaryofUzbekistanCentral
CommitteeandAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee.Repressed.
Goltsman,A.Z.(18941933)Partymemberfrom1917.HighofficialatSupremeEconomicCouncil,CentralControlCommission,maindirectorateofairforce
from1922.
Grinko,G.F.(18901938)Partymemberfrom1919.DeputychairmanofGosplanfrom1926.Deputycommissarofagriculture,1929.Commissaroffinance,
193037.MemberofCentralExecutiveCommittee.Repressed.
GrishaSeeZinoviev,G.Ye.
Groman,V.G.(18741932?)Economist,statistician.AfterOctoberrevolution,memberofGosplanandofCentralStatisticalAdministrationpresidium,consulting
editoratAllUnionAssociationofSugarIndustry.
Guralski,A.(realname:A.Ya.Kheifets)(18901960)Partymemberfrom1918.CominternrepresentativeinFrancein1924.

Page256

Guseinov,MirzaDavudBagirogly(18941938)Partymemberfrom1918.AzerbaidzhanandTranscaucasiancommissaroffinancedeputychairmanof
TranscaucasianCouncilofCommissars,1920.
H
Henderson,Arthur(18631935)LeadingfigureinBritishLabourParty,191134BritishForeignSecretary,1929.
I
Ilin,N.I.(1884?)Partymemberfrom1910.MemberofpresidiumofcombinedCentralControlCommissionandWorkerPeasantInspection,192334.
Inkpin,Albert(18841944)SecretarygeneralofBritishCommunistParty.
Ishchenko,A.G.(18951937)PartymemberfromApril1917.ChairmanofWaterTransportWorkers'UnionCentralCommitteememberofcollegiumof
CommissariatofTransportmemberofcommitteeforconstructionofVolgaDonraillink,1927.Repressed.
Ivanov,P.DeputyheadofmainboardofFuelIndustry.
Izrailovich,A.I.(18831937?)Partymemberfrom1918.ManagerofminingandfuelgroupatWorkerPeasantInspection,1929.Deputychiefofmain
directorateofCoalIndustrymemberofcollegiumofCommissariatofHeavyIndustry,1933.Repressed.
K
Kabakov,I.D.(18911937)Partymemberfrom1914.FirstsecretaryofUralRegionalPartyCommittee,1929.CentralCommitteemember.Repressed.
Kaganovich,L.M.(18931991)Partymemberfrom1911.CentralCommitteesecretary,192425and192839.GeneralsecretaryofUkrainianCentral
Committee,192528.FirstsecretaryofMoscowPartyCommittee,193035.SimultaneouslyfirstsecretaryofMoscowCityPartyCommittee,193134.Central
Committeedepartmenthead,1933.
Kaganovich,M.M.(18881941)Partymemberfrom1905.MemberofWorkerPeasantInspectioncollegium,192830.PresidiummemberofSupreme
EconomicCouncil,departmentheadanddeputychairmanofMachineBuildingIndustryAdministrationofSupremeEconomicCouncil,193031.Headofmain
directorateofMachineBuildingIndustry,193132.Deputycommissarofheavyindustry,1933.HeadoftechnologyandproductiondepartmentofCommissariatof
HeavyIndustry,193334.HeadofmaindirectorateofAircraftIndustryofCommissariatofHeavyIndustry,193536.Committedsuicide.
Kaktyn,A.M.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1916.DeputybusinessmanagerofCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil,192629.Highofficial
atGosbank,1930.MemberofWorkerPeasantInspectioncollegium,193134.
Kalinin,M.I.(18751946)Partymemberfrom1898.CentralCommitteemember,1919.Politburomember,1926.ChairmanofCentralExecutiveCommittee,
1922.
Kalmanovich,M.I.(18881937)Partymemberfrom1917.Deputycommissarofagriculture,1929.MemberofCentralControlCommission.Repressed.
Kamenev,L.B.(18831936)Partymemberfrom1901.DeputychairmanofCouncilofCommissarschairmanofLaborDefenseCouncil,1922.Commissarof
domesticandforeigntrade,JanuarytoAugust1926.SovietambassadortoItalychairmanofTechnicalandScientificAdministrationofSupremeEconomicCouncil
andofMainConcessionCommittee,1926.Repressed.

Page257

Kamenev,S.S.(18811936)Militarycommander.Partymemberfrom1930.Deputycommissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairsanddeputychairmanof
RevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,192734.
Karaev,A.G.(18961938)Partymemberfrom1917.MemberofTranscaucasianRegionalCommitteeofWorkerPeasantInspection.
Karakhan,L.M.(18891937)Partymemberfrom1917.SovietambassadortoChina,192326.Deputycommissarofforeignaffairs,1927.Repressed.
Karklin,R.Ya.(1894?)Partymemberfrom1914.HeadofindustrialdepartmentofGosbank,193032.
Kartvelishvili,L.I.(realname:Lavrentiev)(18901938)Partymemberfrom1910.GeorgianCentralCommitteesecretaryandTranscaucasianRegional
CommitteesecretarychairmanofGeorgianCouncilofCommissars,1923.
KasumovMirBashirFattakhogly(18761949)Partymemberfrom1910.DeputychairmanofAzerbaidzhanCentralExecutiveCommitteememberof
TranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,192125.MemberofBakuRevolutionaryCommittee,April1929.ChairmanofKarabakhDistrictExecutiveCommittee
ofAzerbaidzhan,September1929.
Kerensky,A.F.(18811970)Politician,lawyer.Ministerofjusticeministerofmilitaryandnavalaffairsprimeministerandsupremecommanderinchiefin
ProvisionalGovernment,1917.
Kerzhentsev,P.M.(18811940)Partymemberfrom1904.SovietambassadortoItaly,192526.
Khinchuk,L.M.(18681944)Partymemberfrom1920.Deputycommissaroftrade,1927.AmbassadortoGermany,193034.Repressed.
Kirov,S.M.(18861934)Partymemberfrom1904.CentralCommitteemember,1923.Politburomember,1930.FirstsecretaryofLeningradProvincial
(Regional)PartyCommittee.Assassinated.
Kiselev,A.S.(18791937)Partymemberfrom1898.ChairmanofSmallCouncilofCommissars,192123.MemberofCentralControlCommissionpresidium,
192325.SecretaryofAllRussianCentralExecutiveCommittee,1924.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,192534.
KlimSeeVoroshilov,K.Ye.
Klimenko,I.Ye.(1891?)Partymemberfrom1912.Appointeddeputycommissarofagriculture,1927.Chairmanofmaindirectorateoftractorcenterchairman
ofUSSRAgriculturalCooperationanddeputycommissarofagriculture,1929.ChairmanofSiberianRegionalExecutiveCommittee,CentralCommitteecandidate
member,1930.
KobaNicknameforStalin.
Kodatskii,I.F.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1914.DeputychairmanandchairmanofLeningradRegionalEconomicCouncil,192829.CentralCommittee
candidatemember,1925.Repressed.
Komarov,N.P.(realname:F.Ye.Sobinov)(18861937)Partymemberfrom1909.ChairmanofLeningradSovietExecutiveCommittee,192629.Worked
forSupreme

Page258

EconomicCouncil,193031.RSFSRcommissarofmunicipalservices,1931.CentralCommitteemember.Repressed.
Kondratiev,N.D.(18921938)Economist.DirectorofMarketInstituteofCommissariatofFinance.Arrestedandsentencedinconnectionwithcaseofsocalled
ToilingPeasantsParty,1930.In1987,this"case"wasacknowledgedtohavebeenfalsified,andtheaccusedwerefullyexonerated.
Kopp,V.L.(18801930)Partymemberfrom1917.MemberofcollegiumofCommissariatofForeignAffairs,192325.SovietambassadortoJapan,April
1925.SovietambassadortoSweden,192730.
Kosior,I.V.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1908.DeputychairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncildeputycommissarofheavyindustry,1927.Representative
ofCouncilofCommissarsinFarEasternRegion,1933.
Kosior,S.V.(18891939)Partymemberfrom1907.SecretaryofSiberianBureauofRussianCommunistParty,1922.CentralCommitteesecretary,1926.
Secretarygeneral(firstsecretary)ofUkrainianCentralCommittee,192838.Repressed.
Kotov,V.A.(18951937)Partymemberfrom1915.MoscowPartyCommitteesecretary,192528.MemberofcollegiumofRSFSRCommissariatofLabor,
1929.Repressed.
Kotovskii,G.I.(18811925)Partymemberfrom1920.Civilwarhero.
KovalevHeadofPravdaPartyDepartment.MemberofPravda'seditorialboardfrom10June1929.ElectedpartycellsecretaryofPravda.
Krasin,L.B.(18701926)Partymemberfrom1890.Commissarofforeigntrade,192023,192526.
Krinitskii,A.I.(18941937)Partymemberfrom1915.Secretary,firstsecretaryofBelorussianCentralCommittee,1924.CentralCommitteedepartmenthead,
192729.SecretaryofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,192930.DeputycommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection,1930.Repressed.
Krumin,G.I.(realname:Kruminsh)(18941943)Partymemberfrom1909.EditorofnewspaperEkonomicheskaiazhizn'(Economiclife),191928.
EditorialstaffmemberofPravda,1928.EditorofIzvestiiaVTsIKiTsIKsovetov(NewsofAllUnionCentralExecutiveCommitteeandCentralExecutive
CommitteeofSoviets),1930.
Krupskaia,N.K.(18691939)Partymemberfrom1898.WifeofLenin.ElectedmemberofCentralControlCommissionatXIIIandXIVPartyCongressesand
memberofCentralCommitteeatXVthroughXVIIPartyCongresses.HeadofMainPoliticalEducationCommitteeofCommissariatofPublicEducation,1920.
DeputyRSFSRcommissarofpubliceducation,1929.
Krylenko,N.V.(18851938)Partymemberfrom1904.ChairmanofSupremeTribunalRSFSRchiefpublicprocurator,1918.RSFSRcommissarofjustice,
1931.Repressed.
Kuibyshev,V.V.(18881935)Partymemberfrom1904.CentralCommitteemember,1922.Politburomember,1927.ChairmanoftheCentralControl
CommissioncommissarofWorkerPeasantInspectiondeputychairmanofCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil,JanuarytoNovember1926.
ChairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncil,192630.DeputychairmanandchairmanofGosplandeputychairmanofCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefense
Council,193034.

Page259

Kulikov,Ye.F.(18911937?)Partymemberfrom1910.Repressed.
Kuskova,Ye.D.(18691958)Journalistadvocateof"economism"attheturnofthecentury.InvolvedinfoundationandworkofCommitteeforFamineRelief.
ExpelledfromUSSRin1922.
Kuznetsov,S.M.(1891?)CollegiummemberofCommissariatofFinance,192329.DeputychairmanofGosplan,192931.Approvedasvicechairmanofthe
boardofChineseEasternRailway,10April1931.
Kviring,Er.I.(1892?)Partymemberfrom1912.AssistanttoCentralCommitteesecretaryMolotov,192628.MemberofcollegiumofCommissariatof
Agriculture,192829.ChairmanofAgriculturalCooperationCouncil,192930.RSFSRdeputycommissarofagriculture,early1930toSeptember1930.
Kviring,Ye.I.(18881937)Partymemberfrom1912.CentralCommitteemember,192324.DeputychairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncil,1927.Deputy
chairmanofGosplan,1927.Deputycommissaroftransport,1931.DeputychairmanofGoodsCommitteeofLaborDefenseCouncil,193234.Repressed.
L
Larichev,V.AMemberofGosplanpresidium,192930.
Lashevich,M.M.(18841928)Partymemberfrom1901.DeputycommissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairsanddeputychairmanoftheRevolutionaryMilitary
Council,1925.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,192526.
Leonov,F.G.(1892?)Partymemberfrom1893.CentralCommitteemember.
Lezhava,A.M.(18701937)Partymemberfrom1904.DeputychairmanofRSFSRCouncilofCommissarsandchairmanofRSFSRGosplan,192430.
Repressed.
Liaksutkin,F.F.(1896?)Partymemberfrom1913.ChairmanofSiberianRegionalControlCommission,192930.Headofcomplaintsofficeandleaderof
procurementgroupforWorkerPeasantInspection,193133.
Litvinov,M.M.(18761951)Partymemberfrom1898.DeputycommissarofforeignaffairsofUSSR,1921.CommissarofforeignaffairsofUSSR,193039.
Liubimov,I.Ye.(18821937)Partymemberfrom1902.Boardmemberofcentralcooperativeagency,192630.
Lizdin,G.Ya.(1864?)Partymemberfrom1892.MemberoffactorytradeunioncommitteeofBalticFactorymemberofCentralControlCommission,1925.
Lobov,S.S.(18881937)Partymemberfrom1913.CentralCommitteemember,192437.ChairmanofRSFSRCouncilofCommissars,192630.Deputy
commissarofprovisionment,1930.Commissaroftimberindustry,193236.Repressed.
Lokatskov,F.I.(18811937)Partymemberfrom1904.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,192730.
Lominadze,V.V.(18971935)Partymemberfrom1917.PresidiummemberofCominternExecutiveCommittee,192529.SecretaryofExecutiveCommittee
ofYouthCommunistInternational,192526.SecretaryofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,193031.Committedsuicide.
Lomov,G.I.(realname:Oppokov)(18881938)Partymemberfrom1903.MemberofpresidiumofSupremeEconomicCouncil,1929.Repressed.
Lozovskii,A.(realname:S.A.Dridzo)(18781952)Partymemberfrom1901.GeneralsecretaryofProfintern(RedInternationalofTradeUnions).
Repressed.

Page260

Lukashin(realname:Srapionian),S.LFirstsecretaryofCentralCommitteeofArmenianCommunistParty,1921.ElectedtoTranscaucasianRegionalParty
Committee,1922.MemberofCentralExecutiveCommitteeofUSSR.
M
MacDonald,JamesRamsey(18661937)CofounderandleaderofBritishLabourParty.Primeminister,1924and192931.
Makarov,N.P.(18871980)Agrarianeconomist.ProfessoratTimiriazevAcademyofAgricultureandVoronezhInstituteofAgriculturepresidiummemberof
LandPlanningCommissionofRSFSRCommissariatofAgriculture.
Makharadze,F.I.(18681941)Partymemberfrom1903.ChairmanofCentralExecutiveCommitteeofGeorgianSSRfrom1922chairmanofGeorgian
CouncilofCommissarschairmanofCentralExecutiveCommitteeofTranscaucasianSovietFederativeSocialistRepublic.
Mamaev,A.S.(18921938?)Partymemberfrom1917.Chairmanofmainadministrationofthecottonindustry,192429.DeputychairmanofAmericanTrading
Corporation,January1930.
Manuilskii,D.Z.(18831959)Partymemberfrom1903.CentralCommitteemember,1923.PresidiummemberofCominternExecutiveCommittee,1924.
SecretaryofCominternExecutiveCommittee,192843.
Maretskii,D.P.(19011938)Partymemberfrom1891.Until1925,contributedtoPravda.AcademicsecretaryofplanningcommissionandheadofEconomic
CabinetofUSSRAcademyofSciences,Leningrad,192932.
MariiaIlinichnaSeeUlianova,M.I.
Maslov,S.L.(18731938)RightSocialistRevolutionary.MinisterofagricultureinProvisionalGovernment.Subsequentlyworkedforeconomicorganizationsand
scientificinstitutions.
Medvedev,S.P.(18851937)Partymemberfrom1900.TradeunionworkinCentralCommitteeofMetalworkers'Union,1920.Subsequentlyworkedfor
CommissariatofLabor.ChairmanofSyndicateofNonferrousMetallurgicalEnterprises,192829.
Menzhinskii,V.R.(18741934)Partymemberfrom1902.ChairmanofOGPU(securitypolice),1926.CentralCommitteememberfrom1927.
Mezhlauk,V.I.(18931938)Partymemberfrom1917.FirstdeputychairmanofGosplan,1931.ChairmanofGosplan,193437DeputychairmanofCouncil
ofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil.Repressed.
Mikoian,A.I.(18951978)JoinedBolshevikparty,1915.SecretaryofNorthCaucasianRegionalCommitteeofAllUnionCommunistParty(Bolshevik),1924
26.CommissarofforeignanddomestictradeofUSSR,August1926.Commissaroffoodprovisionment,1930.Commissaroffoodindustry,193438.
Miliukov,P.N.(18591943)Politician,historian,andjournalist.
Mirzoian,L.N.(18971939)Partymemberfrom1917.SecretaryofCentralCommitteeofAzerbaidzhanCommunistParty,192529.CentralCommittee
candidatemember,1927.Repressed.
Monatte,Pierre(18811960)Frenchtradeunionfigureandjournalist.EditorialstaffmemberofpublicationofFrenchCommunistParty,192124.Published
TrotskyistorganLaRvolutionproltarienne,1925.

Page261

Mrachkovskii,S.V.(18881936)Partymemberfrom1905.Commanderinchiefof,first,Uraland,then,WestSiberianMilitaryDistrict,192025.Chairmanof
boardofStateCommitteeofTextileMachinery,1927.Expelledfrompartyforfactionalactivity,September1927.Restoredandappointedconstructionchiefof
BaikalAmurMainRailwayLine,1928.Repressed.
Mravian,A.A.(18861929)Partymemberfrom1905.DeputychairmanofCouncilofCommissarsandcommissarofpubliceducationofArmenianSSR,1923.
MemberofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,1924.
Muralov,N.I.(18771937)Partymemberfrom1903.RectorofTimiriazevAcademyofAgriculturememberofRSFSRGosplanpresidium,1925.Memberof
theCentralControlCommission.Repressed.
Musabekov,G.M.(18881938)Partymemberfrom1918.ChairmanofCouncilofCommissars,1922.ChairmanofCentralExecutiveCommitteeof
AzerbaidzhanSSR,1929.Repressed.
Mussolini,Benito(18831945)FascistleaderofItaly,192243.
N
Nazaretian,A.M.(18891937)Partymemberfrom1905.SecretaryofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteechairmanofCentralControlCommissionand
ofWorkerPeasantInspectionofTranscaucasianSovietFederativeSocialistRepublic,1924.
Nechaev,N.V.(1887?)Partymemberfrom1915.InstructorworkingforKurskProvincialPartyCommittee,1925.Headoforganizationdepartmentandthen
secretaryofBelgorodPartyCommittee,1926.
NikolaiSeeBukharin,N.I.
Nobel,Emmanuel(18591932)HeadedenterprisesofNobelfamilyinRussiapriorto1917.
O
Orakhelashvili,M.D.(18811937)Partymemberfrom1903.SecretaryofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteeofAllUnionCommunistParty
(Bolshevik)chairmanofCouncilofCommissarsofTranscaucasianSovietFederativeSocialistRepublic,1926.CentralCommitteemember,192634.Repressed.
Ordzhonikidze,G.K.(Partypseudonym:Sergo)(18861937)Partymemberfrom1903.FirstsecretaryoftheTranscaucasianandNorthCaucasianRegional
PartyCommittees,192226.ChairmanofCentralControlCommissionandcommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection,192630.DeputychairmanofCouncilof
CommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil.ChairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncil,1930.Commissarofheavyindustry,1932.Committedsuicide.
Oshvintsev,M.K.(1889?)Partymemberfrom1917.ChairmanofUralRegionalExecutiveCommitteeCentralCommitteecandidatemember,1930.
Osinskii(realname:Obolenskii),V.V.(18871938)Partymemberfrom1907.DeputychairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncilCentralCommitteecandidate
member,1930.Repressed.
Oudegeest,JanSocialDemocrat,leaderofDutchRailWorkers'andTramWorkers'Unioninthe1920s.
Ovchinnikov,G.F.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1918.SecretaryofPartyCommitteeofRostovAgriculturalMachineBuildingPlant,193233.First
secretaryofRostovCityCommitteeofAllUnionCommunistParty,1933.ChiefofNorthCaucasianRegionalCommunicationBoard,November1933.Repressed.

Page262

P
Peterson,A.A.(1895?)Partymemberfrom1917.InvestigatorforCentralControlCommission.
Petrovskii,G.I.(18781958)Partymemberfrom1897.ChairmanofAllUkrainianCentralExecutiveCommitteeandofCentralExecutiveCommitteeof
UkrainianSSR,191938.AlsocochairmanofUSSRCentralExecutiveCommittee,1922.
Piatakov,G.L.(18901937)Partymemberfrom1910.DeputychairmanofSupremeEconomicCouncil,1923.TraderepresentativetoFrance,1928.Chairman
ofboardofGosbank,1929.Deputycommissarofheavyindustry,July1931.CentralCommitteemember,192336.HeadofGosbank,192930.Repressed.
Piatnitskii,I.A.(18821938)Partymemberfrom1898.SecretaryofCominternExecutiveCommittee,1923.CentralCommitteemember,192737.Repressed.
Pilsudski,Jozef(18671935)Marshal,activistintherightwingofthePolishSocialistParty.Polishprimeminister,192628,1930.
Poincar,Raymond(18601934)Frenchpresident,192629.
Poliudov,Ye.V.(1887?)Partymemberfrom1907.CollegiummemberofCommissariatofTransport,1929.
Pollitt,Harry(18901960)ActivistofBritishandinternationallabormovement,cofounderandmemberofBritishCommunistParty,192443.Memberof
CominternExecutiveCommittee,192443.
Polonskii,B.I.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1912.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,1927.SecretaryofMoscowPartyCommittee,1928.First
secretaryofCentralCommitteeofAzerbaidzhanCommunistPartysecretaryofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,1930.Repressed.
Popov,N.N.(1890/911938)Partymemberfrom1919.(MemberofRussianSocialDemocraticWorkers'Party,1906.)EditorialstaffmemberofPravda,
1920.SecretaryofCentralCommitteeofUkrainianCommunistParty,193337.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,1930.Repressed.
Postyshev,P.P.(18871939)Partymemberfrom1904.SecretaryofCentralCommitteeofUkrainianCommunistParty(Bolshevik),1926.CentralCommittee
member,1927.Repressed.
Preobrazhenskii,Ye.A.(18861937)Partymemberfrom1903.Statesman,economistmemberofCommissariatofFinanceandmemberofCommunist
Academypresidiumpriorto1927.Repressed.
Prokopovich,S.N.(18711955)Journalist,economist.MemberofCommitteeforFamineRelief.Deported,1922.
R
Radek,K.B.(18851939)MemberofRussianSocialDemocraticWorkers'Partyfrom1903.MemberofPolishSocialDemocraticParty,1902.Memberof
SocialDemocraticPartyofPolandandLithuania,1904.ActivefigureinleftwingofGermanSocialDemocraticmovement,1908.MemberofCentralCommitteeof
RussianCommunistParty(Bolshevik),191924.AtXVCongressofCommunistParty(1927),expelledasactivememberofTrotskyistoppositiongroupreinstated
in1929.Repressed.
Rakovskii,Ch.G.(18731941)Partymemberfrom1917.SovietambassadortoGreatBritain,192325ambassadortoFrance,October1925.Expelledfrom
CommunistParty,1927reinstated,1935.Repressed.

Page263

Ramzin,L.K.(18871948)Thermalengineer.DirectorofAllUnionInstituteofThermalEngineering,1930.
Reingold,I.I.(18871936)Partymemberfrom1917.WorkedforGosplan,1929.Appointedchairmanofmainadministrationofcottonindustry,30November
1929.WorkedasdeputycommissarofagriculturepriortoDecember1934.Repressed.
Reznikov,B.G.(1898?)Partymemberfrom1917.SecretaryofpartycellatdepartmentofliteratureofInstituteofRedProfessors.InOctober1930,wrote
twodenunciationstoCentralCommitteeconcerningSyrtsov'sfactionalactivity.
Riabovol,K.S.(18941937?)Partymemberfrom1919.Workedasahighofficialintheoilindustryfrom1927.ChairmanofCentralOilExportAgency,1931
33.
Riabushinskii,P.P.(18711924)IndustrialistandpoliticalactivistemigratedafterOctoberrevolution.
Riutin,M.N.(18901937)Partymemberfrom1914.SecretaryofKrasnopresnenskiiDistrictPartyCommittee,Moscow,192528.CentralCommittee
commissioneroncollectivization,1929.AppointedchairmanofPhotographyandCinematographyIndustryAdministrationandpresidiummemberofSupreme
EconomicCouncil,March1930.Repressed.
Romanov,M.A.(18781918)Grandduke,brotheroflastRussianemperor,NicholasII.
Roy,ManabendraNat(18921948)ActivistinIndiannationalliberationmovement.Workedin1920sforComintern.CominternrepresentativeinChina,1927.
ExpelledfromComintern,1929.
Rozengolts,A.P.(18891938)Partymemberfrom1905.DeputycommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection,1928.Deputycommissarandsubsequently
commissarofforeignanddomestictrade,1930.MemberofCentralControlCommission.Repressed.
Rudzutak,JanE.(18871938)Partymemberfrom1905.CentralCommitteemember,192037.Politburomember,192632.CentralCommitteecandidate
member,192326.Commissaroftransport,192430.DeputychairmanofCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil,192637.AlsochairmanofCentral
ControlCommissionandWorkerPeasantInspection,193134.Repressed.
Rumiantsev,K.A.(18911932)Partymemberfrom1916.Inthe1920s,deputychairmanofAzerbaidzhanoiltrust,memberofTranscaucasianRegional
Committee,memberofAzerbaidzhanCentralCommittee.From1925candidatememberofCommunistParty.
Rykov,A.I.(18811938)Partymemberfrom1898.CentralCommitteemember,192034.Politburomember,192230.ChairmanofCouncilofCommissars,
192430.AlsochairmanofLaborDefenseCouncil,192630.Commissarofcommunications,193136.Repressed.
S
Sadyrin,P.A.(1877?)BoardmemberofGosbank,1930.
Sassenbach,ILeaderofGermanSaddlers'Union.ActivistinInternationalSecretariatofTradeUnionsin1920s.
Savelev,M.A.(18841939)Partymemberfrom1903.DirectorofV.I.LeninInstitute,192830.ByPolitburoresolution,madeeditorialstaffmemberof
Pravda,30July1928.

Page264

Serebriakov,L.P.(18881937)Partymemberfrom1905.Deputycommissaroftransport,192224.Subsequentlyperformedeconomicworkwithin
commissariat.Memberofcollegium,1929.HeadofmaindirectorateofPavedRoadsofCommissariatofInternalAffairs,1931.Repressed.
SergoSeeOrdzhonikidze,G.K.
Shadunts,S.K.(18981937?)Partymemberfrom1917.WorkerPeasantInspectionstaffmember.
Shatskin,L.A.(19021937)Partymemberfrom1917.MemberofCentralControlCommissionofAllUnionCommunistParty(Bolshevik),192730.
Shatunovskaia,O.G.(19011990)Partymemberfrom1916.HeadofadepartmentofBailovBibiEibatDistrictPartyCommittee,192729.Studentincourses
onMarxismLeninismundertheauspicesofUSSRCentralCommittee,October1929.
Sheinman,A.L.(1886?)Partymemberfrom1903.Deputycommissaroffinance,192629.
Shkiriatov,M.F.(18831954)Partymemberfrom1906.MemberofCentralControlCommission,192234.MemberofcollegiumofCommissariatofWorker
PeasantInspection,1927.
Shliapnikov,A.G.(18851937)Partymemberfrom1901.LeaderofWorkers'Oppositiongroup,192022.Chairmanofboardofjointstockcompany
Metallimport,1926.
Shmidt,V.V.(18861938)Partymemberfrom1905.CentralCommitteemember,192530.RSFSRandUSSRcommissaroflabor,191828.Deputy
chairmanofCouncilofCommissarsandLaborDefenseCouncil,192830.Deputycommissarofagriculture,1930.ChiefarbitratorofCouncilofCommissars,1931.
Repressed.
Sholokhov,M.A.(19051984)Writer,publicfigure.AcademicianatUSSRAcademyofSciences.WonNobelPrizeforLiteraturein1965.
Shvarts,I.I.(18791951)Partymemberfrom1899.Boardmember(southernarea)ofAllUnionAssociationofCoalIndustry,1930.
Shvernik,N.M.(18881970)Partymemberfrom1905.CentralCommitteemember,1925.MemberofCentralControlCommissionpresidiumandWorker
PeasantInspection,1924.SecretaryofLeningradProvincialPartyCommitteeandNorthwesternBureauofCentralCommittee,192526.
Simanovskii,A.A.(1874?)Partymemberfrom1917.OfficialofCommissariatofForeignAffairs,192630.
SkvortsovStepanov,I.I.(18701928)Partymemberfrom1896.EditorofIzvestiia,deputyeditorofPravdaeditorofLeningradskaiapravda,1925.
CentralCommitteemember,1925.
Slepkov,A.N.(18991937)Partymemberfrom1919.ContributedtoPravda,Bolshevik,192428.Alsoexecutiveinstructorandheadofagitationand
propagandadepartmentofCominternExecutiveCommittee.BureaumemberandheadofagitationandpropagandadepartmentofMidVolgaRegionalParty
Committee,192832.
Smilga,I.T.(18921938)Partymemberfrom1907.DeputychairmanofGosplan,

Page265

autumn1923.MemberofLaborDefenseCouncil,192426.CentralCommitteemember,192527.Repressed.
Smirnov,I.N.(18811936)Partymemberfrom1899.Commissarofpostalandtelegraphservice,192327.AtXVPartyCongress(1927)expelledforfactional
activity.Repressed.
Smirnov,V.M.(18871937)Partymemberfrom1907.MemberofGosplanpresidium.Repressed.
Sokolnikov,G.Ya.(18881939)Partymemberfrom1905.CentralCommitteemember,192230.RSFSRcommissaroffinance,192226.USSRcommissar
offinance,July1923.DeputychairmanofGosplan,1926.Headofoilsyndicate,1928.SovietambassadortoGreatBritain,192932.Repressed.
Sorin,V.G.(18931944)Partymemberfrom1917.MemberofMoscowPartyCommitteememberofbureauofMoscowPartyCommittee,192025.Worked
atV.I.LeninInstitute,1924.
Sten,Ya.Ye.(18991937)Partymemberfrom1914.DeputydirectorofInstituteofMarxandEngels,192830.ProfessoratInstituteofRedProfessorsandstaff
memberatUSSRAcademyofSciences,1932.
Stetskii,A.I.(18961938)Partymemberfrom1915.MemberofNorthwesternbureauofCentralCommitteeanddepartmentheadofLeningradProvincialParty
Committee,192629.HeadofdepartmentsofCentralCommittee,193038.EditorinchiefofBolshevik,1934.
Strumilin,S.G.(18771974)Partymemberfrom1923.WellknownSovieteconomistandstatistician.WorkedforRSFSRandUSSRGosplan,192137.
Sturua,I.F.(18701931)Partymemberfrom1896.MemberofTranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee.
Sudin,S.KPartymemberfrom1918.Workedinfieldoftransportation,192027.MemberofCentralControlCommission,1928.
Sukhanov,N.N.(18821940)Economist,journalist.MemberofLandPlanningCommissionpresidiumofCommissariatofAgriculturememberofcouncilofFirst
LaborArmy,1920memberofUSSRtradedelegationstoBerlinandParisfullmemberofInstituteofForeignTradeMonopoly.Repressed.
Sukhanova,G.K.(18881958)Partymemberfrom1905.WifeofN.N.Sukhanov.
Surits,Ya.Z.(18821952)Partymemberfrom1903.SovietambassadortoTurkey,1930.
Sverdlov,Ya.M.(18851919)Partymemberfrom1901.ChairmanofRussianCentralExecutiveCommitteeofRSFSR.
Syrtsov,S.I.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1913.CentralCommitteemember,192730.Politburocandidatemember,192930.SecretaryofSiberian
RegionalPartyCommittee,1926.ChairmanofRSFSRCouncilofCommissars(headofgovernment),192930.Subsequentlyperformedeconomicwork.
T
T'anPingshan(18861956)MemberofCentralCommitteeandPolitburoofChineseCommunistParty,192627.MinisterofagricultureinWuhangovernment
ofKuomintang.

Page266

T'angShenchih(18891970)ChinesemilitaryleadermemberofWuhangovernmentchairmanofHunanProvince.
Teodorovich,I.A.(18751940)Partymemberfrom1895.GeneralsecretaryofPeasants'International,192830.Repressed.
TerVaganian,V.A.(18931936)Partymemberfrom1912.AttheXVPartyCongress(1927),expelledfor''aggressiveTrotskyistactivity."Expelledinitiallyto
BiiskandthentoKazan,January1928.Repressed.
Thomas,JamesHenry(18841949)GeneralsecretaryofBritishNationalUnionofRailWorkers.
Togliatti(pseudonym:Ercoli),Palmiro(18931964)GeneralsecretaryofItalianCommunistParty,1926.MemberofCominternExecutiveCommittee
Secretariat,1935.
Tolmachev,V.N.(18861937)Partymemberfrom1904.RSFSRcommissarofinternalaffairs.
Tomskii,M.P.(18801936)Partymemberfrom1904.CentralCommitteemember,191934.Politburomember,192230.ChairmanofTradeUnionCouncil,
192229.Headofassociationofstatepublishinghouses,193236.Committedsuicide.
Tovstukha,I.P.(18891935)Partymemberfrom1913.CentralCommitteestaffmember,192124.AssistantdirectorofV.I.LeninInstitute,192426.
Trotsky,L.D.(18791940)Participatedinrevolutionarymovementfrom1897.Partymemberfrom1917.PolitburomemberofCentralCommittee,191926.
CommissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairsandchairmanofRevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,191925.PresidiummemberofSupremeEconomicCouncilchairmanof
MainConcessionCommittee,1925.
Tsiurupa,A.D.(18701928)Fromthebeginningof1918,commissaroffoodsupply.Fromtheendof1921,assistantchairmanofCouncilofCommissarsand
LaborDefenseCouncil.HeadofWorkerPeasantInspection,1922.HeadofGosplan,1923.Commissaroftrade,1925.CentralCommitteememberfrom1923.
Tukhachevskii,M.N.(18931937)Partymemberfrom1918.MarshalofSovietUnion.ChiefofstaffoftheWorkers'andPeasants'RedArmy,192528.
Repressed.
Tumanov,N.G.(18871936)Partymemberfrom1917.SoviettraderepresentativeinFrance,1930.
U
Uglanov,N.A.(18861937)Partymemberfrom1907.CentralCommitteemember,192330.Candidatememberofpolitburo,192629.CentralCommittee
secretary,192429.Simultaneously,firstsecretaryofMoscowRegionalPartyCommitteeandMoscowCityPartyCommittee,192428.Commissaroflabor,1930.
Repressed.
Ukhanov,K.V.(18911937)Partymemberfrom1907.CentralCommitteemember,192337.ChairmanofMoscowSoviet,May1926toMarch1927.
ChairmanofMoscowRegionExecutiveCommittee,1929.Deputycommissarofprovisionment,February1932.Repressed.
Ulianova,M.I.(18781937)Partymemberfrom1898.EditorialstaffmemberandexecutivesecretaryofPravda,191729.SubsequentlymemberofCentral
ControlCommission.
Unshlikht,I.S.(18791938)Partymemberfrom1900.DeputychairmanofRevolu

Page267

tionaryMilitaryCouncilanddeputycommissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairs,192530.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,1925.Repressed.
V
VaganianSeeTerVaganian,V.A.
Valentinov,G.B.(1896?)Partymemberfrom1915.DeputyeditorofTrud(Labor),192429.Repressed.
Voikov,P.L.(18881927)Partymemberfrom1917.SovietambassadortoPoland,1924.Assassinated.
Voroshilov,K.Ye.(18811969)Partymemberfrom1903.MemberofCentralCommittee,192161.Commissarofmilitaryandnavalaffairschairmanof
RevolutionaryMilitaryCouncil,192534.
Vujovich,VujoDmitrievich(18971936)MemberofSerbianSocialDemocraticParty,1912.Partymemberfrom1918.MemberofCominternExecutive
Committee.
Vyshinskii,A.Ya.(18831954)Partymemberfrom1920.Menshevikfrom1903.RSFSRprocuratoranddeputycommissarofjusticefrom1931Sovietdeputy
procurator,1933.
W
WangChingwei(18831944)AleaderoftheKuomintang.ChairmanofNationalGovernmentofChineseRepublicinCanton,192526.Electedchairmanof
KuomintangCentralExecutiveCommittee,January1926.ChairmanofCentralMilitaryCouncil,JanuarytoApril1926.ChairmanofNationalGovernmentinWuhan,
ApriltoSeptember1927.
Warski,A.(realname:A.Warszawski)(18681937)ParticipatedinPolishCommunistmovement.CofounderandleaderofSocialDemocraticPartyof
KingdomofPolandandLithuaniaandofPolishCommunistParty.MemberofPolishCentralCommittee,191929.MemberofPolishPolitburo,192329.Forcedto
emigratetoUSSR,wherehetookupresearchwork,1929.
Wise,EdwardFrank(18851933)Britishpoliticalfigure.EconomicadvisoronforeigntradeatLondonbranchofcentralcooperativeagencyofUSSR.Took
partininformaltalksonresumingBritishSovietdiplomaticrelations.
Y
Yagoda,G.G.(18911938)Partymemberfrom1907.DeputychairmanofOGPU(securitypolice),1924.
Yakovlev,Ya.A.(18961938)Partymemberfrom1913.Commissarofagriculture,192934.CentralCommitteemember,1930.Repressed.
Yakovleva,V.N.(18841941)Partymemberfrom1904.RSFSRcommissaroffinance,192937.Repressed.
Yanson,N.M.(18821938)Partymemberfrom1905.DeputycommissarofWorkerPeasantInspection,1925.
Yaroslavskii,Ye.M.(18781943)Partymemberfrom1898.MemberofCentralControlCommission,192334.SecretaryofpartycollegiumofCentral
ControlCommissionandmemberofcollegiumofWorkerPeasantInspection,1923.
Yeger,V.Yu.(1895?)Partymemberfrom1917.HeadoforganizationandinstructiondepartmentofNovosibirskRegionalPartyCommittee,1930.
Yemshanov,A.I.(18911937?)Partymemberfrom1917.ChiefofChineseEasternRailway,1926toJune1931.HeadofGosplan'srailwaytransport
department,1931.Repressed.

Page268

Yevdokimov,G.Ye.(18841936)Partymemberfrom1903.CentralCommitteesecretarymemberofCentralCommitteeOrgburo,192527.Repressed.
Yurovskii,L.N.(1884?)ChiefofCurrencyAdministrationofCommissariatofFinanceofUSSRmemberofcollegiumofCommissariatofFinanceofUSSR,
1929.
Z
Zaitsev,A.D.(18991937?)Partymemberfrom1919.Repressed.
Zalmanov,M.M.(1879?)Partymemberfrom1919.
Zhdanov,A.A.(18961948)Partymemberfrom1915.FirstsecretaryofNizhegorodProvincialPartyCommittee,1924.CentralCommitteecandidatemember,
1925.
Zhemchuzhina,P.S.(18971970)Partymemberfrom1918.WifeofV.M.Molotov.
Zinoviev,G.Ye.(18831936)Partymemberfrom1901.CentralCommitteememberPolitburomember,192126.ChairmanofCominternExecutive
Committee,191926.Repressed.
Zubarev,P.T.(18861938)Partymemberfrom1904.DeputychairmanofSverdlovskRegionalPartyExecutiveCommittee,192328.Secondsecretaryof
SverdlovskRegionalPartyCommittee,192931.Repressed.

Page269

Index
A
Absenteeism,220
Advisers,toChineseCommunistParty,142
Agrarianreform,inChina,31
Agriculture,85,233n2,234,235.SeealsoCollectivization
Alekseev,P.A.,185
Allilueva,N.S.,239
AmericanFederationofLabor(AFL),109
AmericanTradingCorporation(Amtorg),172n20,201n5
Amosov,A.M.,216,217n4
AmsterdamInternationalofTradeUnions,108,109,110n2
Amtorg.SeeAmericanTradingCorporation
Andreev,A.A.,95
AngloRussianCommittee,28,107,109,110n5,134,136,138n2,143
AntiPartyCounterrevolutionaryGroup,226
AntiSovietorganizations,ingovernmentoffices,19293
Antispetscampaign,19096
Aralov,S.I.,117,118n5
Army.SeeRedArmy
Artak,A.A.,167,170n4
Astrov,V.N.,160
Augustbloc(191214),127,128n7,129
AustinandCo.,172
AutomobileandAutomotiveInstitute,203,204n6
Averbakh,L.L.,162
Aviationindustry,204n6
AzerbaidzhanCommunistParty,170n3,202
Azerbaidzhan,104nn2,3,16768
B
Bagirov,MirJafarAbbasovich,168,170n8
Baku,Azerbaijan,104nn2,3,129,16768
BalticWhiteSeaCanal,212n1
Bauman,K.Ya.,88,176,178,199
Bazarov,V.A.,192,203
Bazovskii,N.A.,202
Bednyi,Demian,127,12930
Belenkii,Z.M.,103,218
Bliucher,Vasilii,30
Bogdanov,P.A.,201
Bogolepov,M.I.,216
Bolshevik:
Kamenev'stelegramtoGreatPrinceMikhailRomanovand,1023
Krupskaia'sletteronEastmanaffair,22,83,91,93,24849
Trotsky'sletteronEastmanaffair,2122,84,24448
Borodin,M.M.,30,137n3,140,142
Boycottism,66
Breadfactories,209
Brezhnev,Leonid,59
Britain.SeeGreatBritain
BritishCommunistParty,7071,107,109
Briukhanov,N.P.,189,190,200,211n2
Brutskus,B.D.,193
Budget,targetfiguresfor,234,23536,237
Bukharin,N.I.,78,34,114,127,138,

Page270

(continued)
Bukharin,N.I.
168,173
AllUnionCongressofAtheists,speechat,15051,155
AntiPartyCounterrevolutionaryGroupand,226
leftistrightwingblocand,216
Leninon,242,243
letterstoCentralCommittee(13August1929),15455,164
miners'strikeinGreatBritainand,100,106,11214
petitbourgeoisattitudeof,5455
Platonov'sletters,communicationon,15254,155
Politburo,membershipin,66,182
asrightdeviationist,5455,174,216
onStalin,61
SupremeEconomicCouncil,appointmentto,149
"Theoryof'OrganizedMismanagement,'"15051,15455
Vorobievaffairand,16061
Voroshilovand,14950
onworldrevolution,27
Bukharingroup,14850,15561,184,227
Buniatzade,D.Kh.,168,170n7
Buranov,Yuri,19n16
Bystrianskii,V.A.,173
C
Capitalistworld,relationswith,3536
CentralCommittee,65
Eastmanaffairand,94n2,24546
grainprocurement,decreeon,16567,16869,171n6,175
July1926plenumof,101
October1925plenumof,9596
October1926plenumof,101
OrganizationalandAssignmentDepartmentof,8889,92
schismin,7577
semerkaand,68
CentralControlCommission,66,101,135,168
CentralExecutiveCommittee,65
CentralStatisticalAdministration,175,176n5
Chaianov,A.V.,192,193,196
Chamberlain,Austin,133,136
ChangHsuehliang,7,182,183
ChangTsolin,7,125,126,137
Checkinguponfulfillment,1415,1617,42,52,171,190,207,210,21819,221
Ch'enTuhsiu,141
Chernyi,V.N.,179
ChiangKaishek,6,31,33,136,137,144,149,174,229
China:
agrarianreformin,31
nonaggressionpactwith,229
NorthernExpedition,6,31
Wuhangovernment,31,136,139,140.SeealsoKuomintangManchuria
ChineseCommunistParty,67,3133,111,13435,14042
ChineseEasternRailway,7,118n5,126,217n6
armedinterventionover,3435,14748,175,176n6,184n4
Chineserevolution,3033,110,112n4,130,138,143
Chistka,50
Chubar,V.Ya.,69,229,230n3,235
Classenemies,1314
Classstruggle,1314,225
Cleansing,50
Coalindustry,221n5
CoalshipmentstoGreatBritain,embargoon,119,120n3,125,126n2
Cognitiveinsecurity,inStalin,4647,62
Cohen,Stephen,163n2
Coinshortage.SeeSmallchangecrisis
Collectivefarms,166.SeealsoSettlementassociations
Collectivization,8,3642,183,187,22425
Comintern,20,27,29,115,121,140,237.SeealsoGuralskiandVujovichaffair
CommissariatofAgriculture,233n2
CommissariatofFinance,210,211n2
CommissariatofHeavyIndustry,233n2
CommissariatofTrade,117,118n2,12728,2056
CommissariatofTransport,179
CommissionforFulfillment,15,198,21718,219
CommunistInternational.SeeComintern
ConferenceofDeputies,214,218
Confession,forced,44,4647
Confrontation(ochnaiastavka),46
Constitutionof1936,9,238
Consumercooperatives,207
Contracting,ingrainprocurement,176
CottonCommittee,169
CottonIndustry,ChiefAdministrationof,169,172n19
CouncilofPeople'sCommissars,65,214
D
Daniels,RobertV.,63
Davies,R.W.,57
Deathpenalty,138n3
Defenseindustry,235,236
Desov,G.A.,185
Deutscher,Isaac,19,2425
Dimitrov,Georgi,237
DiplomaticrecognitionofUSSRbyUnitedStates,35
Dneprostroiproject,4,6869,8688,91,92
Donbass,221
Dovgalevskii,V.S.,46,146
Dzerzhinskii,F.Ye.:
industrialconstruction,rolein,95
LaborDefenseCouncil,rolein,89,90n2
Politburo,membershipin,

Page271

116
SupremeEconomicCouncil,rolein,88,89n3
E
Eastman,Max,5,19,20,6970
Eastmanaffair,5,1824,6984,9094
Bolshevik,Trotsky'sletterin,2122,84,24448
CentralCommitteeand,94n2
Inkpin'sletter,Trotsky'sreplyto,71
Krupskaiaand,18,19,22,78,83,91,93,24849
L'Humanit,Trotsky'sstatementin,83,90
Stalin'smemorandum,21,22,7082
Trotsky'slettertoStalin,7173
Zinoviev'slettertoManuilskii,93n2
Economy,34
Education,235
Eikhe,R.I.,175,202
Eismont,N.B.,147,148,175,221n4,226
Ekonomicheskaiazhizn',86,89,215
EmbargooncoalshipmentstoGreatBritain,119,120n3,125,126n2
Emotionalrange,ofStalin'sletters,63
Engineers,trialof.SeeIndustrialParty(Promparty)
England.SeeGreatBritain
Estonia,194,2089
ExecutionofWhiteGuards(9June1927),136,137n2,138n3
F
Factionalism:
GuralskiandVujovichaffair,9799
Kamenev,conflictwith,1013
Lashevichaffair,100101
Fedorov,G.F.,102
Fedotov,A.A.,193
FengYhsiang,126,128n4,136,137n3
Finance,Commissariatof,210,211n2
Finland,194,2089
Fischer,Ruth,113,114n1
Florin,F.,237n2
Foodindustry,235,236
Foodstamps,237
Foodsupplyservices,wreckersin,19394
Forcedconfession,44,4647
Forcedlabor,35,212n1,213n2,228
Foreignexpeditionarycorps,19496
Foreignpolicy,56
Foreigntechnicalassistance,172,173n1
Fotieva,L.A.,79
FrenchCommunistParty,73n8,113,114
Fridrikhson,L.Kh.,208
Frumkin,M.I.,185
Frunze,M.V.,93
FulfillmentCommission.SeeCommissionforFulfillment
Fushman,A.M.,169
G
Ganshin,S.M.,203n4,215,222,223n3
Gei,K.V.,88,92,93n1
Germancredits,201
Gessler,Gertrud,9798
Gikalo,N.F.,167,170n3,202
Gipromez,204
Goltsman,A.Z.,211n1
Gosbank,18890,200,204,210
Gosplan,52,65,89,175,23536
Gottwald,K.,237n2
Government:
antiSovietorganizationsin,19293
selectionofofficials,Stalin'sviewson,13,14
Stalin'sviewson,1011
GPU.SeeSecuritypolice
Grainexports,201,203,205
Grainharvest,85,234
Grainprocurement,1415,3639,182,183,216n3,229,238
CentralCommittee'sdecreeon,16567,16869,171n6,175
contractingand,176
quotasfordailyshipments,205
securitypolice,roleof,5152
violationsinconnectionwith,23233
GreatBritain,56,7,24
coalshipments,embargoon,119,120n3,125,126n3
importsfrom,201
miners'strikein,99100,104,10614,118n5,11920
restorationofdiplomaticrelationswith,4647,14546,16364,167,174,17778,182
tradeunionsin,2830.SeealsoAngloRussianCommitteeBritishCommunistParty
Greatpowers,232
GreatTerror,227
Grinko,G.F.,211n2
Groman,V.G.,5253,89,192,196,199,200
Grozneft,203n4
Groznyi,172n17,202,203n4
Guralski,A.,9799
GuralskiandVujovichaffair,9799,101,116
H
Hankow,China,31,130
Harbin,China,182,
Harvest.SeeGrainharvest
Healthcare,235,236
Healthinsurance,220
Heavyindustry,235
Commissariatof,233n2
Henderson,Arthur,4647,119,120n5,146,16364,167,17778,182
"HowWeShouldReorganizeRabkrin"(Lenin),7577,24546
Hydroelectricalpowerstations.SeeDneprostroiproject

Page272

I
Imports,201,228
Industrialconstruction,95
Industrialization,85,187,22425.SeealsoWreckerism
IndustrialParty(Promparty),193,19496,198
Infection,imageryof,50
Inflation,57
Inkpin,Albert,7071,73,244
Institutionalbackground,toStalin'sletters,6566
InternationalAssociationofSocialistParties,108,110n3
Internationalism.SeeCominternWorldrevolution
Ironandsteelworks,172
Ishchenko,A.G.,138
Italy,treatywith,201
Ittihadveterakkiparty(Turkey),168,170n10
Izrailovich,A.I.,218
Izvestiia,215
J
Jailpopulation,225
Japan,118n5,121,125,126
K
Kaganovich,L.M.,185,208,229,230n3,233
MoscowRegionalPartyCommittee,secretaryof,199
Politburo,membershipin,66,221n4,234
Kaktyn,A.M.,204,210
Kalinin,M.I.,47,197,203,204n4
leftistrightwingblocand,210
Politburo,membershipin,66
Kalmanovich,M.I.,211n2
Kamenev,L.B.:
inCommissariatofTrade,117,118nn2,4
Eastmanaffairand,94
Japan,ambassadorto,121,126n3
Leninon,243
telegramofgreetingstoGreatPrinceMikhailRomanov,1013,13132
trialof,227
UnionofMarxistLeninistsand,226.SeealsoGuralskiandVujovichaffair
Karakhan,L.M.,31,117,118n5,126,130,174,176
Karatygin,Ye.S.,193
Karklin,R.Ya.,204,210
KasumovMirBashirFattakhogly,168,170n11
Kerenskii,A.F.,193
Kerzhentsev,P.M.,117
Kharitonov,M.M.,169,172n21
Khinchuk,L.M.,206,208
Khlebexport,208
Khlevniuk,O.V.,48
Khlopliankin,I.I.,221n3
Khopercounty,collectivizationin,3940
Khrushchev,Nikita,6162
Kirov,S.M.,66,180,185,226
Klim.SeeVoroshilov,K.Ye.
Klimenko,I.Ye.,202,206
Koba.SeeStalin,Josef
Kodatskii,I.F.,185
Kolkhozy.SeeCollectivization
Komarov,N.P.,180,185
Kommunisticheskiyinternatsional,119,120n6
Komsomolskaiapravda,162,164,168,170n5,179n3,180
Kondratiev,N.D.,19193,196,199,200,204n4,210,218
Kopp,B.L.,117,118n5,125,126,128n2
Kosior,I.V.,218
Kosior,S.V.,66,88,230n3
Kotov,V.A.,157
Kotovskii,G.I.,93
Krasnyi,B.,168,170n5
Krinitskii,A.I.,88,173
Krumin,G.I.,151,155,159
Krupskaia,N.K.:
Eastmanaffairand,18,19,22,78,84,91,93,24849
Pravda,onreorganizationof,155,158
Zinoviev,defenseof,117n4
Krylenko,N.V.,69,225
Krylenko,Ye.V.,69
Kuibyshev,V.V.:
drinkingproblemof,233,234
onGuralskiandVujovichaffair,9799
inLaborDefenseCouncil,214
Politburo,membershipin,66
onPromparty,198
SupremeEconomicCouncil,appointmentto,117,118n7,172,184,204n6
WorkerPeasantInspection,rolein,7980,246
Kulaks,liquidationof,40
Kulikov,Ye.F.,157
Kuomintang,67,3031,111,134,137,139,14041,143,229n2
Kupriianov,S.V.,193
Kuskova,Ye.D.,193
Kuusinen,O.,237n2
Kuznetsov,S.M.,202,216,217n6
Kviring,Emmanuil,212
Kviring,Ye.I.,223
L
LaborDefenseCouncil,65,89,90n2,198,214,217
Labordiscipline,220
Larichev,V.A.,193,196
Lashevich,M.M.,100101,113,115,116,118
Latvia,194,2089

Page273

Laundries,209
LeadershipstrugglewithinPolitburo,45
LeadershiptheoryofStalin:
checkinguponfulfillment,1415
government,viewson,1011
selectionofofficials,13,14
stateapparat,1213
Leftistrightwingbloc,19697,199
Leftopposition,rightdeviationand,49
Legality,revolutionary,230,231n2
LenaGoldfields,205,206n6
Lenin,Vladimir:
onBukharin,242,243
onKamenev,243
onnationalitiesquestion,7879
onPiatakov,242,243
onselectionofofficials,1617
onStalin,241,24243
onstateapparat,1213
testamentof,73,7778,79,24143,245,24849
onTrotsky,241,24243
WorkerPeasantInspection(Rabkrin),viewson,12,7577,24546
onZinoviev,243
Leningrad,24,25
Leningradpartyorganization,178,179n1,180,185
LevTrotsky:
PortraitofaYouth(Eastman),24648
L'Humanit,83,90
Liaksutkin,F.F.,202
Lightindustry,235,236
Liquidationism,66
Liquidationofkulaks,40
Lithuania,194
Litvinov,M.M.,34,126,146,174,175,175n1,17778,183,234
Liubimov,I.Ye.,149
Lobov,S.S.,185
Lokatskov,F.I.,172
Lominadze,V.V.,45,162,196,197,223
Lomov,G.I.,205,222
Lozovskii,A.,109
M
MacDonald,JamesRamsey,164,178
Maikop,202,203n4
Makarov,N.P.,192,199
Mamaev,A.S.,169,172n20
Manchuria,7,14748,182
Manichriverdam,229,230n5
Manuilskii,D.Z.,8384,9091,9293,94,237
Maretskii,D.P.,157,159,160
MariupolIronandSteelFactory,204
Marty,A.,237n2
Maslov,S.L.,193
Meatindustry,wreckersin,43,200,21314
Medvedev,S.P.,104nn2,3,130n5
Menzhinskii,V.R.,44,190,19596,214n2
Merl,Stephan,37
Mezhlauk,V.I.,235
Mikoian,A.I.,117,118nn2,4,122,168,2056,214
MilitaryinterventionagainstSovietUnion,19496,2089
Militaryschools,236
Miliukov,P.N.,193,196
Miners'strike,inGreatBritain,99100,104,10614,11214,118n5,11920
Mirzoian,L.N.,167,174,177,200
Molodaiagvardiia,162
Molotov,V.M.,23,5354,66,198
Monatte,Pierre,73
MoscowRegionalPartyCommittee,199n2
Moskvin,M.,237n2
Mrachkovskii,S.V.,178
Musabekov,G.M.,170n3
Musavatparty(Azerbaidzhan),168,170n9
N
Nadtocheev,Valerii,23
Nankinggovernment.SeeChiangKaishek
Nationalitiesquestion,7879
Nazaretian,A.M.,127
Nechaev,N.V.,127,129n9
Nemov,A.S.,215n4
NEP.SeeNewEconomicPolicy(NEP)
Neustadt,Richard,16
NewEconomicPolicy(NEP),3,5051,67,191
Nickelcoins,mintingof,201
Nobel,Emmanuel,169,194
NonaggressionpactwithChina,229
NorthernExpedition(Kuomintang),6,31
O
Ochnaiastavka.SeeConfrontation
OGPU.SeeSecuritypolice
Oilextractionagencies,169,172n18,222
Oilindustry,14,215
Opportunism,66
Orakhelashvili,M.D.,173
Ordzhonikidze,Sergo,8,55,58,135,169,206,214,216,218,227
CommissionforFulfillment,chairmanof,219,234
TranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommitteeand,12225,127
Voroshilov'sletterto,14850
WorkerPeasantInspection,headof,14,59,123,125n7
OrganizationandAssignmentDepartmentofCentralCommittee(Orgraspred),8889,92
Osinskii,V.V.,203
Ovchinnikov,G.F.,232n3
P
Partyunity,45
Petrograd.SeeLeningrad

Page274

Piatakov,G.L.,8,53,55,5658,185,214,227
AllUnionChemicalIndustryAssociation,chairmanof,211nn1,2
Gosbank,chairmanof,18890,200,2045,210
Leninon,242,243
Zinovievand,116
Piatnitskii,I.A.,237
Pieck,Wilhelm,237n2
Pilsudski,Jozef,110,111,112n3
Platonov,G.,15254,155
Poland,194,195,2089
PolishCommunistParty,111
Politburo,65,89
leadershipstrugglewithin,45
membersof,66
semerka,5
shadowPolitburo,5
Poliudov,Ye.V.,179
Polonskii,B.I.,176,178
Popov,N.N.,151,155,159,185
Postyshev,P.P.,178,214n2,217n4,221n4
Pravda,15560,17879,179n3,180,185,207,211,215
Preliminarycheckingofspeeches,131
Preobrazhenskii,Ye.A.,48,103
Prisonpopulation,225.SeealsoForcedlabor
Profintern.SeeTradeUnionInternational(Profintern)
Prokopovich,S.N.,193
Promotionofftheshopfloor.SeeUpwardmobility
Promparty.SeeIndustrialParty(Promparty)
Purge.SeeCleansing
R
Rabkrin.SeeWorkerPeasantInspection(Rabkrin)
Rakovskii,Kh.G.,20,164,165n4
Ramzin,L.K.,193,196,203
Rationbooks,237
Recallism,66,1067
RedArmy,81,24445
Reingold,I.I.,169,172n21
RepublicanDemocraticAssociation,193
Revolutionaryinterests,stateinterestsand,3335,36
Revolutionarylegality,230,231n2
Reznikov,B.,197,223
Riabovol,K.S.,205,206n4
RiazantsevKaratygingroup,193
Rightdeviation,4960,19697
Riutin,M.N.,50,214,215,215n4,226
Roadbuildingmachinery,209
Romania,194,195,2089
Romanov,GreatPrinceMikhail,1013,13132
Rosmer,Alfred,73
RoyManabendraNat,140,141,142
Rozengolts,A.P.,206,208,218,229
Rudzutak,Ya.E.,66,117,150,183n2,214
Rumiantsev,I.P.,172n18,175,177,178
Rykov,A.I.,34,78,34,58,114,178,182,217,227
AntiPartyCounterrevolutionaryGroupand,226
BalticWhiteSeaCanaland,212
inCouncilofCommissars,19798,214
executionofWhiteGuardsand,138
leftistrightwingblocand,210
Politburo,membershipin,66,181
Pravda,onreorganizationof,15557,15860
onprisoners'jurisdiction,213n2
specialists,defenseof,5556,59
speechatMoscowregionCongressofSoviets,160,161
onTrotsky,25.SeealsoBukharingroup
Ryskulov,T.R.,3940
S
Sabotage,1617,43
Sadyrin,P.A.,200
Savelev,M.A.,159
Scapegoating,48
Schapiro,Leonard,19
Schism,inCentralCommittee,7577
Schoolconstruction,236
Securitypolice,44,45,5152,56,6566,200,212,213n2.SeealsoAntispetscampaign
Selectionofofficials,13,14,1617
Selfcriticism,180
SemerechenskRailroad,69
Semerka,5,68,85,87,9093,95,105n3
Serebriakov,L.P.,125,126
Serganin,M.M.,185
Settlementassociations,4041,207,21011
ShadowPolitburo,5,68
Shadunts,S.K.,169,172n21
Shatskin,L.A.,145,162,167,173,174
Shatunovskaia,O.G.,167,170n4
Sheinman,A.L.,214
Shirvindt,Ye.G.,213n2
Shkiriatov,M.F.,232n3
Shliapnikov,A.G.,104nn2,3,114,130n5,185,186n1
Shmidt,V.V.,217
Shockwork,219,227
Sholokhov,M.A.,23233
Shvarts,I.I.,221
Shvernik,N.M.,88,92,221n4
Simanovskii,A.,148,183
SinceLeninDied(Eastman).SeeEastmanaffair
Slavelabor.SeeForcedlabor
Slepkov,A.N.,159,160,162,163n6,167,226

Page275

Smallchangecrisis,18788,189,200,201
Smilga,I.T.,52,89,95,102
Smirnov,I.N.,168,171n14,178,226
Smirnov,V.M.,129,130n4
Socialistcompetition,219
Soiuzneftexport,205
Sokolnikov,G.Ya.,113,114,200,214
Souvarin,Boris,19,23
Soviets,65
SovietUnion,diplomaticrecognitionofbyUnitedStates,35
Specialists:
antispetscampaign,19096
Rykov'sdefenseof,5556,59
Stalin,Josef:
asaBolshevik,1617
Bukharinon,61
cognitiveinsecurityin,4647,62
emotionalrangefoundinlettersof,63
asanindividual,17
Khrushchevon,6162
leadershiptheoryof,1017
asanofficial,16
onpreliminarycheckingofspeeches,131
onZinoviev,27.SeealsoLeadershiptheoryofStalin
Stateapparat,1213
Stateinterests,andrevolutionaryinterests,3335,36
Steelworks,172
Sten,I.Ye.,145,162
Stetskii,A.I.,12122
St.Petersburg.SeeLeningrad
Strumilin,S.G.,52,89
Sudin,S.K.,218
Sukhanov,N.N.,192,203
SundayWorker,70
SunYatsen,6
SupremeEconomicCouncil,65,89n3,209,228
Surits,Ya.Z.,208
Syndicates,intextileindustry,8889
Syrtsov,S.I.,4445,19697,212,213n2,220,221n4,223
SyrtsovLominadzeaffair,4445,19697
T
Tailism,66
T'angShenchih,139
T'anPingshan,141
Teodorovich,I.A.,200,210
TerVaganian,V.A.,171n14,178
TestamentofLenin,73,7778,79,24143,245,24849
Textileindustry,8889
"Theoryof'OrganizedMismanagement'"(Bukharin),15051,15455
Thomas,JamesHenry,109,110n6,111,119,120n5
Timber,235,236
Timberexport,201
Togliatti,Palmiro,237
ToilingPeasants'Party(TPP),19293,195,199200
Tolmachev,V.N.,212,226
Tomskii,M.P.,29,109,138,149,227
AllUnionChemicalIndustryAssociation,chairmanof,210,211n1
AntiPartyCounterrevolutionaryGroupand,226
miners'strikeinGreatBritainand,11214,119,120n8
petitbourgeoisattitudeof,220
Politburo,membershipin,66
SupremeEconomicCouncil,appointmentto,18384.SeealsoBukharingroup
Torgprom,194,195
Torture,useof,48
Tovstukha,I.P.,91,112
Trade,Commissariatof,117,118n2,12728,2056
TradeUnionInternational(Profintern),104n3,109,110n4,200
Tradeunions:
AmsterdamInternationalofTradeUnions,108,109,110n2
AngloRussianCommittee,28
inGreatBritain,2830
TranscaucasianRegionalPartyCommittee,12224,127,168
Transport,217n4,235
Commissariatof,179
Trotsky,L.D.:
CentralCommittee,removalfrom,135
Leninon,241,24243
Politburo,membershipin,66,101,129,130n3
Rykovon,25
semerkaand,68
workers'oppositiongroupand,104n3
worldrevolution,viewson,27
Zinovievand,2425.SeealsoDneprostroiprojectEastmanaffairLevTrotsky:PortraitofaYouth(Eastman)
Trud,135
Ts'aiYunshan,148,183
Tseitlin,Ye.,159
Tucker,Robert,48
Tumanov,N.G.,205,206n5
Turkey,208,234,235n5
U
Uglanov,N.A.,155,158,160,166,167n2,226
Ukhanov,K.V.,209
Ukhta,169,213n2
Ukraine,faminein,230n3
UkranianCentralCommittee,95,96n3,229,230n3
UkranianPoorPeasants'Committees,95,96n3
Ulianov,Vladimir.SeeLenin,Vladimir

Page276

Ulianova,M.I.,79,156,157,159
Unemployment,220
Uninterruptedworkweek,166,167n2
UnionBureauofMensheviks,193
UnionofMarxistLeninists,226
UnitedStates,229
AmericanFederationofLabor(AFL),109
diplomaticrecognitionofUSSRby,35
importoftimberfromSovietUnion,201
Upwardmobility,8,219,220
UralMountains:
extractionofoilin,169,172n18,175,177
ironandsteelworksin,172,218
Uralneft,175
V
Vacationschedules,233
Valentinov,G.B.,138
VanMin,237n2
Verney,Eric,70
Vodkaproduction,209
Voikov,P.L.,133
Volkogonov,Dmitrii,23
Vorobievaffair,16061
Voroshilov,K.Ye.,66,140,142,14850,203,214,216,234
Vujovich,V.D.,9799
Vydvizhenie.SeeUpwardmobility
Vyshinskii,A.Ya.,227,233
W
Wages,129,130nn1,2
WangChingwei,137n4,139n2
Wanhsien,China,130
Warski,A.,113
WhiteGuards'execution(9June1927),136,137n2,138n3
WhiteSea.SeeBalticWhiteSeaCanal
WorkerPeasantInspection(Rabkrin),1112,42,66
grainprocurementand,168
Kuibyshev'srolein,7980
Ordzhonikidze'srolein,123,125n7.Seealso''HowWeShouldReorganizeRabkrin"(Lenin)
Workers'oppositiongroup,104nn2,3,129,130n5
Workerturnover,221n3
Worldrevolution,2736
Wreckerism,4249,19394,200
Wuhangovernment,China,31,136,137,139,140
Y
Yagoda,G.G.,199,219
Yakovlev,Ya.A.,185,234
Yanson,N.M.,88,221n4
Yaroslavskii,Ye.M.,151,155,159,17879,180,214n2
Yeger,V.Yu.,202n2
Yemshanov,A.Ye.,147,148,175
Yeniseiskiikray,103
Yezhovschina,227
Yurovskii,L.N.,192,196,200
Z
Zaindustrializatsiiu,215
Zaitsev,A.D.,160
Zalmanov,M.M.,208
Zhdanov,A.A.,178
Zhemchuzhina,P.S.,235,236,239
Zinoviev,G.Ye.:
campainagainst,2427,11315,135,143,227,239
onChineseCommunistParty,111
Comintern,removalfrom,101,121,122n1
Eastmanaffairand,93n2,94
Leninon,243
miners'strikeinGreatBritainand,100,10614
PolishCommunists,directivesto,111,113
Politburo,membershipin,66,116n2
Pravda,asdirectorof,179
Trotskyand,2425
UnionofMarxistLeninistsand,226
workers'oppositiongroupand,104n3.SeealsoGuralskiandVujovichaffair
Zubarev,P.T.,177