Simmel's Philosophy of History and Its Relation to Phenomenology: Introduction

Author(s): Gary Backhaus

Source: Human Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2003), pp. 203-208
Published by: Springer
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k.J Human Studies 26: 203-208, 2003.

203
? 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
f

Simmel's Philosophy of History

Introduction
Phenomenology:

and Its Relation

to

GARY BACKHAUS
Department

of Philosophy

and Religious

Studies,

Morgan

State

Baltimore,

University,

MD

21251, USA

set of three papers presents

Simmel's
of history
philosophy

This

an inaugural study of the relationship of

Georg
to phenomenology.
These studies function as

in the sense that they lack corrobo

yet trailblazing
explorations
an established
to motivate
fur?
body of research. They are meant
ther historical
research concerning,
and creative use of, Simmel's
philosophy
a phenomenological
of history towards the goal of developing
to
approach

provisional,
ration with

is to demonstrate
that this subject
history. One task of this brief introduction
matter
as transcending
should be viewed
the narrow interests of a circum?
scribed group of Simmelian
stud?
specialists. This new direction in Simmelian
as potentially
ies should be recognized
in
effecting
important consequences
the fields of both the human sciences and philosophy.
Any historical
period of theoretical
thought needs to be a living history,
so
that
it
and continually
unfolds
continually
engaged
dynamically
through
the historical relation (and history only
Otherwise,
perspectival modifications.
exists as a relation) becomes
reified: we forget that it is a human achievement
as positivistic
and allow it to be packaged
neces?
facticities
("no assembly
as
a
rather
than
as
a
lived relation. Just
is fundamental
sary"),
inauthenticity
characteristic

of Dasein,
the reification
of history is also a fundamental mo?
of
historical
the historicality
Once
of the lifeworld
is
dality
inauthenticity.
as
the
of
can
the
be
objectivated
history,
hypostatization
temporal process
renewed
and continued
reflection. Another
fundamental
accepted without
which
follows
from
its
aspect of history is anachronistic
thinking,
present-at
hand objectivation.
Anachronistic
back into its
thinking reads an outcome
For example, we think of Husserl
as the father of the phenomen?
genesis.
and from our temporally
situated reflective
glance may
the
back into the horizons of his
present meaning-context
unthinkingly
place
milieu. This anachronistic
train?
thinking is quite common without disciplined
in
historical
but only a lived-historical
reflection can
ing
thinking and method,
counter this tendency of the natural attitude to de-historicize
the genesis of
ological

movement

its outcomes.
This
history

set of papers
of theoretical

reopens

to historical

thought

that exhibited

reflection
great

a fertile moment

intellectual

in the

transformation.

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204

GARY BACKHAUS

to the waning of neo-Kantianism

Through relating ourselves to itwe bear witness
movement.
and to the genesis of the phenomenological
It is a "contemporary
a
that
bears
historical
for those within
we,"
witness,
succeeding
generation
did not say to themselves:
the historical milieu
"We are bearing historical
. . ."
to the waning
of neo-Kantianism
They could not, unless
they
of
them.
We successors
also bear
fantasized what their successors might
say
to the arisings and developments
of the human and social
historical witness

witness

sciences

times. By raising the ques?

in light of its possible
relation to phe?
our three studies regenerate
the lived-dynamics
of historical
for perspectival
The pos?
and open the potential
transformation.
during Simmers
of history
philosophy

that occurred

tion of Simmel's
nomenology,

intellectual

perspective
sible consequence

concern a specific sub-text

will not merely
to set inmotion
reverberations
but rather there is the potential
historical
consequences
engenders
period in question, which
Studies

concerning
non-existent.

the relation
Even

on Simmel's

affinity
the ontology of the lifeworld,
One reason
in materializing.

work

of Simmel's

are

to phenomenology

the studies

including
of this set there simply exist scanty
Some thinkers (Levine, 1997; Psathas,

virtually
the authors
mented

for our living

to it.

relation

relation.

in this history,
the
throughout

already accomplished
serious research exploring

to phenomenology's
so we must ask why

by
this

1973; Wolff,
1991) have com?
studies of essences
and of
such studies have been

slow

is read primarily by theoretical

in
social theory, but
trained
the
who
have
been
history of German
sociologists
is that
not in phenomenology.
reified historical
The resulting
perspective
some recent histori?
thinker. However,
is an original, but neo-Kantian
Simmel
cal reflections
1997) have linked Simmel with the postmodern
(e.g., Jaworski,
- a stat?
has
Simmel
proven to be an enigmatic,
ambiguous
figure
perspective.
is that Simmel

him. Not only was he marginalized

that probably would have pleased
has been
recognized,
generally
although
during his lifetime, his influence,
woven
the
which
is
into
social
science
tradition,
something
inconspicuously
ure

New
into
intellectual
flamboyance.
insights
quite ironic given his notable,
a
are welcome,
of his work. If
for they engender
Simmel
living-exploration
a
can
as
a
to
ori?
be
linked
thinker
Simmel's
phenomenological
development
a
new
a
effects
transfor?
whole
which
within
works
his
entation,
appear
light,
in our living history. Non-phenomenological
may then be
sociologists
for only then can they under?
of phenomenology,
drawn into an exploration
thesis.
remark on the Simmel-phenomenology
stand and critically

mation

converse

is also true: phenomenologists

in Simmel will
the phenomenological
potential
The

who

have

to recognize
him as amem?

failed

gain by viewing

studies. It is
applied/practitioner
accomplished
ironic that the philosopher whose battlecry was "back to the things themselves"
gave us no applied studies to speak of, unless one counts the things that were

ber of the fold who

on Husserl's

desk or things

valuable

that he saw outside

his window,

which

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served

as

introduction:

philosophy

simmel's

of history

205

ex?
his rare examples. Husserl was far too busy with general methodological
es?
the
of
the
levels
Simmel
and
plication
highest
investigation.
investigates
of the doorknob
sential principles of the forms of sociation, writes descriptions
and the picture frame, provides a plethora of eidetic variations of the phenom?
enon of conflict, and among many
approach to the science of history

a phenomenological
things develops
in his last years. Our re-reading of Simmel
of phenomenology
of how
opens up a new assessment
other

from the standpoint

can be further developed,
his orientation
torical science.
These

studies also link the genesis

we open up the historical

fades and we recognize

context,
essential

James, and Stumpf (Backhaus,

ideas in which many
thinkers

1992). We

by influencing
the elements of phenomenology
transformational
to transcend

matricies?

area of his?

in the subject

to its horizons. When

of phenomenology
"the father of phenomenology"
appelation
aspects of Husserl's
thought in Brentano,
see the intricate web

participated.
and being influenced

milieu
ble

especially

Did

not others

of intellectual

benefit

from

the

by those around them? Were not

in the intellectual horizon as suggesting possi?
Wasn't
it possible
for other thinkers to be?
in a way

neo-Kantianism

that would
be congenial
with
or
to
bear
resemblance
be
called
phenomenology
enough
quasi
Is it possible that certain historical conditions put Husserl's
phenomenological?
in the forefront while other thinkers, if provided with other
phenomenology

gin
Husserl's

a transformational
have developed
matrix of paradigmatic
to
the
historical
milieu
without
its
consequences?
By returning
assuming
we
can
known outcome,
that historical
actualities did
regenerate possibilities
not realize. Once we contextualize
see how certain facets
Husserl, we might
conditions,

might

of thoughtwithin his historical milieu might exhibit phenomenological strains

as such. This

us to consider various
com?
and interpret other thinkers as developing
directions,
phenomenological
out
formulations
of
neo-Kantianism.
the
rela?
parative
leading
By exploring
own
tion of Simmel's
the
to
of
science
of
his
philosophy
history
philosophy
a relational horizon
of life (Lebensanschauung),
is formed with Heidegger's

without

then having

been

labeled

allows

existential

and hermeneutic
treatment of
phenomenology
ontology. Simmel's
as Heidegger's
that we hypostatize
the latter's
ontology
(although
ideas were shared elements
that were flourishing
in an intellectual-historical
the relationship
between
context) offers fresh insights, especially
concerning

elements

ontic and ontological

investigations.
reached what Heidegger
has shown

In his philosophy
of life, Simmel finally
to be the first task: the explication
of the
of the being for whom historical
a
science is pos?

and temporality
sibility. In this sense, then, Simmel's
lated once again after his philosophy

historicity

live to reformulate
tions. We

his historical

ontic

task would

have

to be reformu?

of life. Unfortunately,
Simmel did not
science on the basis of his ontological
reflec?
con?
Simmel's
contribution
in its historical

hope that re-witnessing

text enriches phenomenology
itself by opening

its outer horizon

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to reflection.

206

GARY BACKHAUS

area
the specific
theoretical
aspect of this set of papers concerns
our
the philosophy
of history. We hope that
studies stimulate sys?
addressed,
tematic comparative
research of various philosophies
of history by compar?
Another

ing Simmel's work with that of others who also sought to establish the scientific
our research promotes
limits for the field of historical
research. Moreover,
the
of Simmel's
work for continued
theoretical
of
phen?
viability
development
to history. If Simmel's
omenological
approaches
of history can be shown to be phenomenologically
this area can serve to promote further theoretical

to the philosophy
then his work in
oriented,
and applied study as well as
approach

to train the phenomenologically

oriented historian.
the fundamental
Some general points concerning

nature

of phenomen?
and a few remarks concerning

in light of Husserl's
orientation
goals
ological
this introduction.
the sense of each of our three papers complete
that various strata of Simmel's
These studies are based on the recognition
from a consciously
oriented neo-Kantianism,
developed
gradually
this
and finally to exhibit?
various
revisions
that
weakened
affiliation,
through
a
more
Too
much
basis.
hair-splitting would be involved
ing
phenomenological
thought

to decide whether

later work

should be labeled quasi-phenomenol

a propaedeutic
or properly
for phenomenology,
first point is that the early major phenomenologists
fundamental
material a priori
insight that non-constructive

Simmel's

ogy, proto-phenomenology,
The
phenomenological.

agree with Husserl's

can be uncovered
knowledge
example,

as the field of phenomenological

inquiry. For

states:

Heidegger

the a priori
construction.
But to disclose
is not to make an ''a-prioristic
Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the mean?
he has also given us the nec?
ing of any genuine philosophical
empiricism;
essary tools. 'A-priorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy which
about it. (1962, p. 490)
understands
itself. There is nothing constructivist
that essentially
It is this specific character of non-constructivity
separates the
sense of phenomenology
Husserl's methodo?
from neo-Kantian
perspectives.
strategies
evidence

logical
ological
in mind.

for and theoretical

become

more

constraint

understandable

in apprehending
phenomen?
this single point
by keeping

not because
he did not recognize
its
clung to his Cartesianism,
se?
evidence
but because
and inherent problems,
phenomenological
was his goal at all costs. Recent
constructivism
against neo-Kantian

Husserl
limits
cured

evidence

shows

in the very early

had already begun

standpoint of Cartesianism

with

that Heidegger

was

that Husserl

replace the egological

horizon
the worldly

twenties

to

to see

intersubjectivity,
as co-constituting
and to
along with intersubjectivity,
as a concrete deepening
the abstrac?
beyond
ground genetic phenomenology
tive nature of static phenomenology
(Welton, 2000). Husserl already had begun
phenomenological

investigations

to take up and develop

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introduction:
in his own way.

simmel's

But he was

corrupt phenomenological
to have papers
It is not incompatible
to both Husserlian
and Heideggerian
of Husserl's

to avoid

concerned
evidence

philosophy

of history

207

constructivisms

that would

in those non-egological
investigations.
in this set that exhibit Simmel's
relation

phenomenology.
corpus, we believe

In light of a broader
that Husserl would not

to a phenomenological
present in the things

because he
viewpoint
themselves
prior to any
was
It
this honest
part.

entire

understanding
have been opposed
to Simmel's
starting points for study, but that he was at?
a
to
to
find
way
tempting
ground such starting points.
rigorously
Simmel's
intellectual
allows him to leap straightaway
into
flamboyance
areas in which Husserl was too cautious
to venture. We claim that Simmel's
development
pushes
began to recognize

him closer
structures

construction

cognitive

on the theoretical

that led Simmel

apprehension
don much of it. He

tomodify

observer's

his neo-Kantianism

does this by starting from a standpoint

the empirical
in the socio-historical
subject embedded
to
which
allows
him
advance
without
world,
phenomenology
of
its
scope.
figuring
from

and then to aban?

of "immersion";
intersubjective
a conscious
pre?

In his philosophical
Simmel strives to ground a fundamental
anthropology
a priori basis for human feelings, images, and narratives. He
rejects both strictly
and
accounts
in
favor of piecemeal
empirical approaches
sheerly speculative
advancements

into a wide

attitudes, and world

variety of human activities,
views. His panoramic
of
human
studies
range through the descrip?
compilation
tive study of adventure
to the nature of the bridge, through ancient ruins to
modern
of money
to the need for tact.
coquetry, and through the development
His work,

in contrast

ogy through discovery;

a highly self-reflective

to Husserl's,

arrives at the parameters

of phenomenol?
that is, by concrete applications,
rather than through
stance of the principles
of phenomenology
prior to its

practice.
For Simmel,

the legitimacy
of history as a science appeared to be
showing
Human
life
unfolds
in its history; thus without history
strategy.
the
other
which
deal with contents of an histori?
sciences,
having legitimacy,
cal nature, are inherently problematic
sciences. History had to be wrested from
as well as mere storytelling.
Its interpretative meth?
metaphysical
speculation
an important

as an epistemologically
to be justified
sound component
of
otherwise
course
the
would be caught in the
science,
legitimizing
errors of realism. And
finally, history had to contain a logical or existential
such that it could be wrested
from historicism.
The philosophy
of
component
course
that
followed
this
for
the
of historical
history
grounding
legitimacy
odologies
historical

science

had

would

at least show

itself to be not incompatible

with phenomenol?
ogy.
The first of the papers that follows, by Gary Backhaus
and Richard Owsley,
a
discussion
of
four
constitutive
of Simmel's
presents
components
philoso?
ofthat philosophy
of history with
phy of history and shows the compatibility

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208

GARY BACKHAUS

could be made with Droysen, Dilthey, Humboldt,

in its claim, but if
1994). Such a task is modest
one were to carry this out systematically,
certain thinkers, such as Rickert, put
of history quite incompatible
with phenomenology.
forth a philosophy
The

phenomenology.
Comparisons
and others (Mueller-Vollmer,

and epistemological
paper discusses methodological
a philosophy
thinkers who expounded
from many
affinities.
Simmel's
phenomenological

that are absent

affinities
of history,

and exhibits

takes up the problem of evidence

and in?
paper, by Backhaus,
on
texts with Simmel's
1918 essay
the philosophy
of his?
terlaces Husserlian
to
Simmel
the
intuitive
is
show
that
tory. My goal
recognizes
apprehension
The

second

of cognitive
of history. I propose

of evidence,
for a science

instead

in a way that is coherent

ered the epistemological
field of phenomenology.

constructions
that Simmel

with Husserl's
breakthrough

as the basis
of the observer,
historical
intuition
explicates

is consid?
intuition, which
categorial
that opens up the material apriori
the

of life and
The third paper, by John Jalbert, addresses Simmel's
philosophy
to ontological
Simmel
shares Heidegger's
issues in which
thus is oriented
concerns. He assesses Simmel's
struggles to account for the relation between
as the uninterrupted
flow of life and the
of human existence
the historicity
as
In other words,
the
reflection.
historical
of
the
of
product
history
problem
on
ontic.
and
the
the
between
the
relation
here
is
focus
ontological

References
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Backhaus,
ological
Heidegger,
York:

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Critique
M.
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and

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(Ed.)

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The Hermeneutic
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G.

Georg

Ph.D.

(1997).

Reclaiming

Psathas,

and the Phenomen?

and Merleau-Ponty
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The Foundations

(1992).

(1973).

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