April

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163656
MARINA B. SCHROEDER,
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTYS. MARIO A. SALDEVAR and

ERWIN C. MACALINO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007
x ------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated October 30, 2003 and the
Resolution[2] dated May 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63418,
entitled Attys. Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino v. Hon. Lydia QuerubinLayosa, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 217, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, The Ombudsman, The Department of Justice, National Bureau of
Investigation, and Marina B. Schroeder, that partly set aside the Order[3] dated
October 30, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-0-001090 [I.S. No. 98-394].
The pertinent facts are as follows.
Petitioner Marina B. Schroeder owns a liquor store in Robinsons

Galleria, Pasig City. Respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino are the
Legal Division Chief and Attorney II, respectively, of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Revenue District Office No. 7 in Quezon City.
Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation conducted upon
petitioners complaint.
After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, an information for direct bribery against
respondents. The case was remanded to the DOJ for preliminary investigation.
The DOJ issued a Resolution[4] finding probable cause to indict respondents

for direct bribery. Aggrieved, respondents filed in the DOJ a petition for review of
the said Resolution. The DOJ, however, endorsed the petition to the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a motion for

reconsideration of the aforesaid DOJ Resolution. It denied the petition for review
for lack of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding no merit to the petition for
review of public respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino, treated herein as
a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Department of Justice, Manila,
dated 07 June 1999, in I.S. No. 98-394 [Crim. Case No. Q-98-76453], finding probable
cause to continue with the prosecution in court of said respondents for Direct Bribery,
the same [Petition for Review a.k.a. Motion for Reconsideration] is hereby DENIED, with
finality.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and

mandamus. The appellate court found no probable cause against respondent
Saldevar, but upheld the finding of probable cause against respondent
Macalino. The dispositive portion of its assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED insofar as petitioner Mario A.
Saldevar is concerned. Accordingly, the order of the Ombudsman dated October 30,
2000 finding probable cause to prosecute said petitioner for direct bribery
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The subject order is AFFIRMED in all other aspects.
[6]
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,

but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS
NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENT SALDEVAR; and
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS
OWN FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE PROSECUTORIAL ARMS
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
[7]
Petitioner contends that the determination of probable cause is an

executive function lodged with the prosecutorial arm of the government, not with
the judiciary. Petitioner argues the evidence on record clearly establish probable
cause to indict Saldevar with Macalino. Petitioner stresses Saldevar need not
actually demand and receive the marked money in order for him to be indicted
for direct bribery. Petitioner adds that since respondents never ascribed any ill
motive to the NBI agents who conducted the entrapment operation, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties applies.
Respondents, however, insist that the DOJ erred in endorsing the petition
for review to the Ombudsman. They aver that the Ombudsman cannot deny the
petition for review filed in the DOJ. Respondents maintain that the Court of
Appeals can determine probable cause because the DOJ erred in not resolving the
petition for review. They also point out that the Ombudsman glossed over the
issue of illegal arrest. Respondents posit that the operation conducted by the NBI
was an instigation, not an entrapment.
We find the petition meritorious.

In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises wide latitude
of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in
court. Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information
filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. [8] As a rule, courts
cannot interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. In the determination of probable cause, the Ombudsmans
discretion prevails over judicial discretion.[9]
In this case, there being no clear showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against
Saldevar for direct bribery, the Court of Appeals erred in supplanting the
Ombudsmans discretion with its own.
Probable cause is simply the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite a belief that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
is probably guilty of the said crime.[10] In this case, sufficient evidence on record
clearly shows the existence of probable cause against Saldevar. Contrary to the
appellate courts theory, Saldevar need not actually demand and receive the bribe
money in order for him to be indicted for direct bribery. Mere belief, after
weighing the relevant facts and circumstances, that Saldevar probably committed
direct bribery suffices for the establishment of probable cause. Whether he is
indeed guilty of direct bribery is a different matter, which can properly be
determined at a full blown trial on the merits of the case.
Furthermore, note that the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in

nature. Hence, when respondents assailed the said findings before the Court of
Appeals on the contention that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion, respondents clearly raised questions of fact. Respondents arguments
zeroed in on the Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. It bears stress that a
petition for certiorari admits only of questions of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
should have, in the first place, dismissed respondents petition for certiorari on
the ground that it raised questions of fact.
Lastly, we are not prepared to indulge respondents insistence that the DOJ
cannot endorse to the Ombudsman the petition for review of the
abovementioned DOJ Resolution. The Ombudsmans power to investigate and to
prosecute is plenary and unqualified.[11] It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
or improper.[12] In this case, respondents are public officers charged with the
commission of a crime. The DOJ Resolution, subject of the petition for review,
found probable cause against respondents for the crime of direct bribery. The
Ombudsman thus acted within its authority in taking over the said petition for
review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated October 30, 2003 and Resolution dated May 6, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63418 are SET ASIDE. The October 30, 2000 Order[13] of
the Ombudsman in OMB-0-00-1090 [I.S. No. 98-394], finding no merit and
denying the petition for review of herein respondents and finding probable cause
to indict respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino for direct bribery,
is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
Rollo, pp. 38-50.

Id. at 52.
CA rollo, pp. 23-36.
Id. at 102-111.
Id. at 35.
Rollo, p. 50.
Id. at 353.
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 475, 493.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 466.
Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, G.R. Nos. 145957-68, January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 691, 694.
Id.
CA rollo, pp. 23-26.
SECOND DIVISION
JUAN DULALIA, JR.,

Complainant,
A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case

No. 04-1380]
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan
(respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules
1.01,[1] 6.02,[2] and 7.03[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as
follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building
permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the
requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same
to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J.
Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan,
reading as follows, quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F.
Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr.
and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the
building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his
family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of
the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention theunbearable
nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his
above referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their
properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would
only be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one but
an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory
foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds
residential house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential
house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property,
loss of life and for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they
are immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at
your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of
Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by
virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the
part of the owner of the Building under construction with
therequirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National
Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the
provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the
non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National
Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to
penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly
supplied)
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building

permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to
respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondents marriage with
Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.[5]
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint
Affidavit[6] he filed against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3 (e)[7] of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)[8] of Republic Act No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).[9]
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,[10] the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly
opposes the application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of
their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was
that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a
married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not authorized to
represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have
satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find
no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension
of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges
by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the
presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman
vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review[13] filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he

contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while
his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967,
is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for
building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal
Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,[14] respondent attached the July 29, 2005[15]Joint
Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing
complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a)
and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein
respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not
an opposition for the issuance of complainants building permit, but rather
to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements
for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building
Official after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of
the Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by herein
complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued.
Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been
committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed
out by respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building
Official and not of the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by
complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the private
practice of his law profession despite being employed in the government as
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into
consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be
justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant,
there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints against the
respondent.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the
charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as
Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against complainant
and his wife.
As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that
he opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired whether
complainants wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the
National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about the danger and
damages to their properties, health and safety occasioned by the construction of
the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on
September 28, 2004,[17] whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly
written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building
Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Order/Notice stating that [f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this
office to instate proper legal action against you.[18]
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005[19] from the Office of
the Municipal Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the
application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning
Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it
to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not prohibited. [20]
It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second
marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent
liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark

County, Nevada, USA,[21] when the Family Code of the Philippines had already
taken effect.[22] He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the
impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil
Code.[23] For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall
have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct,
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [24] Gross
immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[25]
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,[26] this Court
declared that the therein respondents act of contracting a second marriage while
the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he
was suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were
considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or
for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically
involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total
love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and
child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic)
with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted
ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[27]
In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given
the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the
applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985
when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted,
until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was
romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has
remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda
Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact elected him and
served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been
handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which
applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful
attitude of his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding,
respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second
marriage while the first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.[28]
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took
effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there
until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9,
1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:[29]
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of
law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule

1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
Annex E of the Complaint, rollo, p. 36.
Rollo, pp. 7-10.
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public official and employee
shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest
over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be
employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public
funds and revenues.
xxxx
(c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity
except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members
of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
In the Complaint Affidavit it was erroneously referred to as RA 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991).
Rollo, pp. 367- 374.
Id. at 373-374.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 419-433.
Id. at 456-490.
Annex 11, rollo, pp.608-610.
Rollo, pp. 609-610.
As shown by Annex A of the Complaint, rollo, p.12.
Rollo, p. 74.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 79. Attached as Annex 5 of respondents Answer is the Memorandum dated July 2, 1998 of
Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor Eduardo A. Alarilla, which states:
xxxx
In accordance with MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 of the Office of the
President, Malacaang, you are hereby given permission to engage in the private practice of your legal
profession provided that it shall not be in conflict with your powers, duties and responsibilities defined and
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
provided for by the Local Government Code of 1991, thus, always giving priority to the interest of the
municipality.
xxxx
Annex 10, rollo, p. 261.
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 6010,
August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624; Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 707 (2000); Narag v. Narag, 353
Phil. 643, 655 (1998).
St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, supra at 624; Ui v.
Bonifacio, supra.
Supra.
Id. at 625.
Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91.
Id. at 100-101.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 6691

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
- versus -
ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment [1] dated August
12, 2004 filed by Atty. George S. Briones charging Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez with
violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping and Rule 19.01 and
Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is the April 3, 2002 Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in SP Proc. No. 99-92870, entitled,
In the Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of Luz J. Henson, to
wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
1. Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba,
Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty.
George S. Briones of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which
shall be charged against the estate.
2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except
the payment of his commission which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the
estate.
3. Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs in
proportion to their shares. From the share of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall be
deducted the advances made to her.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Complainant Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz

J. Henson. Respondent Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the
late Luz J. Henson (Heirs).
On April 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from
the Order dated April 3, 2002, questioning the payment of commission to
Atty. Briones.[2]
On April 29, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
70349 assailing the Order dated March 12, 2002, appointing the firm of Alba,
Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J. Henson, as well
as the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it denied their motion for
recommendation.[3]
On July 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition for Mandamus,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 71844,[4] alleging that the respondent Judge therein
unlawfully refused to comply with his ministerial duty to approve their appeal
which was perfected on time.[5]
Atty. Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J.
Henson, represented by Atty. Jimenez, are guilty of forum shopping for which
reason, the petition should be dismissed. [6]
On February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping
issue, granted the petition and ordered the respondent Judge to give due course to
the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it
directed the payment of commission to Atty. Briones.[7]
Atty. Briones then filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 159130,
praying for the dismissal of the appeal from the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar
as it ordered the payment of commission to him, as the Special Administrator of
the estate of the deceased Luz J. Henson.[8]
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda.
Atty. Briones (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed his
Memorandum with Administrative Complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents,[9] for violation of Rule 19.01 and Rule
12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 28-91
on forum shopping.
Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as
respondent) and the Heirs engaged again in forum shopping when respondent, as
counsel for the Heirs, filed a criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against
complainant for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order dated April 3,
2002 which directed complainant to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in
proportion to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting
or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case of proceeding.
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument, and the like; or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the
ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of
the case to another counsel.
by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against him to obtain an improper

advantage in Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 before the RTC, Branch 46, and
coerce complainant to deliver to the Heirs the residue of the estate of the late Luz J.
Henson without any writ of execution or any pronouncement from the RTC as to
the finality of the Order dated April 3, 2002;[10] and in executing an affidavit in
support of the criminal complaint.
The Court in its Resolution dated January 24, 2005, in G.R. No. 159130,
resolved to docket the complaint against Atty. Jimenez as a regular administrative
complaint; referred said Complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC); and
required Atty. Jimenez to comment.[11]
Respondent filed his Comment on April 6, 2005. He contends that when he

assisted the Heirs in filing a criminal case against complainant, he was merely
fulfilling his legal duty to take the necessary steps to protect the interests of his
clients; that it cannot serve as basis for filing an administrative case against
him.[12] Respondent further citesSantiago v. Rafanan[13] where the Court absolved
the respondent lawyer from administrative liability in submitting an affidavit in a
preliminary investigation in defense of his clients.
On January 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation
recommending that the administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez be
dismissed for lack of merit.[14]
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum
shopping. Records show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J.
Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing
the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and
Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing
the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to
complainant. It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of
action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum
shopping.[15] The Court likewise finds no fault on the part of respondent in
executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint as held in
the Santiago case.
However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that
respondent violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Records reveal that before respondent assisted the Heirs in filing
the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the
latter to comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate
to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson. Considering that complainant did not reply
to the demand letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of
his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3,
2002 which directs complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to
their shares. As aptly pointed out by complainant, respondent should have first
filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of the third part of said Order
instead of immediately resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against him. A
mere perusal of the rest of the Order dated April 3, 2002 readily discloses that the
approval of the report of complainant as Special Administrator was suspended
prior to the audit of the administration of complainant. Consequently, the RTC
would still have to determine and define the residue referred to in the subject
Order. The filing of the criminal complaint was evidently premature.
Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate
Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against
herein complainant after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that
a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability. The Court
is not convinced. Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper
motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered
to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
As held in Suzuki v. Tiamson:[16]
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to
represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers
performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the
law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients
compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to
resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their
clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and
zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first
and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.[17]
Although respondent failed to live up to this expectation, there is no evidence that

he acted with malice or bad faith. Consequently, it is but fit to reprimand
respondent for his act of unfair dealing with complainant. It must be stressed that
disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of
the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment
less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end
desired.[18]
WHEREFORE, Atty.
Jacinto D. Jimenez
is
found GUILTY of and REPRIMANDED for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
Rollo, pp. 2-33.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Entitled, Lilia J. Henson-Cruz; Ruby J. Henson and Antonio J. Henson, petitioners, versus,
Hon. Artemio S. Tipon, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and George C. Briones, Respondents.
Rollo, p. 43.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 2 and 33. (G.R. No. 159130 is still pending with the Court).
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 184.
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91, 103-104.
Rollo, p. 212.
Argel v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 867, 876 (1999).
A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 129.
Id. at 139-140.
Id. at 140.
E N B A NC
SPOUSES RODOLFO and
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1735
SYLVIA CABICO,
Complainants,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
JUDGE EVELYN L. DIMACULANGAN- Promulgated:

QUERIJERO, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 26,
Respondent.
April 27, 2007
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by spouses Rodolfo and

Sylvia Cabico (complainants)
against
Judge
Evelyn
L. DimaculanganQuerijero (respondent
Judge),
Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch
26
(trial
court). Complainants charged respondent Judge with ignorance of the law, abuse
of authority, and conduct unbecoming a trial court judge.
The Facts
In their complaint[1] dated 16 October 2001, complainants stated that they

are the parents of AAA (victim), the 17-year old rape victim in Criminal Case No.
10383-AF then pending before respondent Judges sala. Complainants stated that
of
the
three
accused
in
the
criminal
case,
namely,
Edwin Azarcon y Macabante (Azarcon), Rayshawn delaRosa (Dela Rosa), and
Rodrigo Nadora, Jr. (Nadora), only Azarcon was detained as the other two were at
large.
Complainants asserted that at the hearing on 12 October 2001, their counsel

manifested in open court that no settlement of the case would be pursued as one
Atty. IldefonsoJ. Cruz informed him that the remaining amount for the settlement
of the case would not be given to complainants. Complainants asserted that it
was at this point that respondent Judge called Sylvia Cabico and uttered angrily
with a loud voice the following:
Mrs. Cabico, isauli mo ang lahat ng pera nila, ngayon din

di puwedeng hindi, ngayon din.[2]
at
Complainants alleged that the utterance caused Sylvia Cabico great

embarrassment. Complainants asserted that respondent Judges actuation
violated Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Moreover, complainants alleged that when they were about to return home
after the trial of the case was reset to 9 November 2001, someone called them
and ordered them to appear before Atty. Fraizerwin Viterbo (Atty. Viterbo), Clerk
of Court of the trial court.
Complainants alleged that at his office, Atty. Viterbo ordered them and the
victim to sign an Affidavit of Desistance. Complainants alleged that
Atty. Viterbo warned
them,
Hindi maaari na di kayo pumirma at magagalit ang judge sa inyo.
Complainants asserted that

affidavit, Atty. Viterbo uttered, thus:
when
they
refused
to
sign
the
Maaari naman kayong kumuha ng ibang abogado at maaari ninyong palitan ma

ski ilan. Ang totoo niyan ay ubra naming pawalan yan wala kayong magagawa.[3]
Complainants asserted that Atty. Viterbo then went inside the chambers and
informed respondent Judge about complainants refusal to sign the
affidavit. Complainants asserted that respondent Judge came out of her
chambers and in a loud and angry voice, uttered the following:
Misis, bakit ayaw mong pumirma. Sige, huwag mo ng asahan na masisingil mo

pa si Nadora. Didismisin ko ang lahat ang tatlo na iyan. Pumunta ka ng Batangas at
doon mo pabistahan si Nadora. Mas takot kayo sa abogado ninyo kaysa sa akin.[4]
Complainants asserted that, on that same day, 12 October 2001, despite the
absence of an affidavit of desistance, respondent Judge issued an order, thus:
There being a receipt today from the private complainant that she received the
balance of the full amount of P50,000.00 from accused Rayshawn dela Rosa
and P50,000.00 from accused Edwin Azarcon as payment for the civil liability and that
she is no longer interested in the criminal aspect, this case is as it is hereby DISMISSED
with prejudice against both accused.
District
Jail
Warden Rufino M.
Santiago,
Jr.
of
the
BJMP, Camp Tinio, Cabanatuan City or his authorized representative is directed to
release immediately Edwin Azarcon unless he is detained for other lawful cause or
causes.
Issue warrant of arrest against Rodrigo Nadora, Jr. alias Johny as he is still at
large.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Complainants stated that in view of that order, Azarcon was released from
detention.
Complainants also asserted that the issuance of the order shows respondent
Judges gross ignorance of the law as criminal actions cannot be compromised and
the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Dela Rosa. Complainants also claimed that respondent Judge violated Canon
2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for having shown partiality in favor of
the accused.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 10 December 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to file her comment on the
complaint.[6]
In her Comment dated 10 January 2002, respondent Judge offered the

following explanations:
1. This administrative complaint arose from the machination and prodding of

Atty. Carlito Inton on the spouses Rodolfo and Sylvia Cabico to get even with the
undersigned judge as he lost the Petition for Habeas Corpus of his client under SP. Proc.
No. 840-AF entitled Amelia J. Nazareno vs. Dominador G. Nazareno on August 24, 2001
which was tried in the sala of the undersigned. x x x
Atty. Inton is notorious as an ambulance chaser and a perennial loser in his political
aspirations in Nueva Ecija as he was continuously repudiated by the electorate. To prove
his notoriety, it is of common knowledge that a grenade was thrown at his house and
gasoline poured on said house to burn it;
2. Atty. Inton entered his appearance only on September 26, 2001 in Criminal Case No.
10384-AF entitled People vs. Rayshawn dela Rosa, Rodrigo Nadora, Jr. and
Edwin Azarcon, subject of this Complaint, on complaint of Maria Liza Cabico, a 17-year
old girl who was working as a Guest Relations Officer in a beerhouse
in Cabanatuan City. Before Atty. Inton's appearance, Mrs.Cabico and her daughter, the
private complainant, manifested in Court that accused Azarcon had already
paid P47,500.00 leaving a balance of P2,500.00; and dela Rosa paid P49,000.00 leaving a
balance of P1,000.00 and that private complainant was no longer interested in the penal
aspect of the case. The Court did not act on their manifestation as there were balances
from Azarconand dela Rosa. Thus, the issuance of the Orders of this Court dated August
3, and 10, 2001, which are attached hereto and marked as Annexes A and B;
3. In the hearing of September 26, 2001, Atty. Inton, the ambulance chaser, upon
learning thru court manifestation that private complainant had P96,500.00
from Azarcon and dela Rosa, voluntarily offered his services and entered his
appearance. He stealthily advised the private complainant and Mrs. Cabico not to obey
the Order of this Court to execute an affidavit of desistance in favor
of Azarcon and dela Rosa upon receipt of the balances. He assured them that they could
demand more money from the accused and still proceed with the trial on the merits. Of
course, Atty. Inton will be insured of continuous appearance fees. This information was
relayed to the undersigned by a member of her staff who was seated near Atty. Inton, the
private complainant and Mrs. Cabico. Thus, this Court issued the attached Order
of September 26, 2001 as the affidavit of desistance could not yet be executed because of
the unpaid balances fromAzarcon and dela Rosa and marked as Annex C;
4. In the October 12, 2001 hearing, the balance of P2,500.00 from Azarcon and P1,000.00
from dela Rosa were paid to private complainant. Following the legal advice of Atty. Inton,
private complainant refused to sign the Pag- uurong ng Habla, which is attached and marked as
Annex D. To administer justice to the poor accused who in good faith thought that
the
case could be settled amicably and so as not to be under the mercy of
Atty.
Inton and the private complainant for their selfish motives, this Court issued the
Order of October 12, 2001 with the receipt of the balances from Azarcon and dela Rosa, which
are attached and marked as Annexes E and
E-1. Edwin Azarcon, a detainee at the
BJMP, Camp Tinio, Cabanatuan
City was ordered released.
5. The undersigned did not act in an emotional manner in the hearing of October 12,
2001 when she advised Mrs. Cabico, who was adamant for the conduct of a trial on the
merits immediately, as dictated upon by Atty. Inton. What the undersigned stated was:
Mrs. Cabico,
kung
gusto ninyong matuloy ang bista ay isauli ninyo ang perang ibinigay n
g mga akusado at ngayon din
ay bibistahan ang kaso kung handa ang inyongtestigo
Utterances of this kind would not produce embarrassment. The undersigned was
just stating a fact in good faith. Even Assistant City Prosecutor Edward O. Joson did not
interpose an objection or comment to my said statement. Mrs. Cabico presumably was
embarrassed
because
she
could
no
longer
return
the P100,000.00
to Azarcon and dela Rosa as Mrs. Cabico herself confessed to a member of the staff that
Atty. Inton collected P43,000.00 out of said amount. The statements allegedly uttered by
the undersigned in the Complaint are mere concoctions of Atty.Inton to place the
undersigned in a bad light;
6. Due to the continuing heavy pressure of work, the undersigned had an oversight that
accused dela Rosa was already under the jurisdiction of this Court. To rectify
immediately, in the hearing of November 21, 2001, the undersigned motu propio ordered
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against said accused. The Order of November 21,
2001 is attached and marked as Annex F. Dela Rosa voluntarily submitted himself to the
Court and was arraigned on November 23, 2001. Likewise, accused Rodrigo Nadora, Jr.,
who was previously at large, voluntarily submitted to the Court and was arraigned
on November 21, 2001. Certificates of their Arraignment are hereto attached and
marked as Annexes G and G-1; Receipt of P50,000.00 from Rodrigo Nadora, Jr. as civil
liability for private complainant is not interested in penal and is marked as G-2;
7. On November 23, 2001, private complainant finally signed a Salaysay ng Paguurong ng Habla and placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. On the same date,
the attached Order of the Court was issued dismissing the case and marked as Annex H;
8. At no time has the undersigned acted in a harsh and oppressive manner. She knows
that a judge is under the sanction of law.
Moreover, has she been harsh and oppressive in her actuations in and out of
Court, the officials of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter could have supported Atty. Inton by
endorsing the filing of this administrative case as Atty. Inton tried to, but miserably
failed to do so.[7]
On 20
February
2002,
Atty. Carlito R. Inton (Atty. Inton),
complainants counsel, filed for the complainants a Reply to Respondents
Comment.[8] Atty. Inton alleged that he never prodded complainants to file the
present complaint. Atty. Inton asserted that he was not a notorious ambulance
chaser and that he even tried to persuade complainants not to pursue the case.
Atty. Inton also asserted that on 16 October 2001, complainants prepared

and
signed
a
complaint
which
included
Atty. Viterbo as
respondent. Atty. Inton asserted that he was able to persuade complainants not
to pursue the case against Atty. Viterbo.
Moreover, Atty. Inton denied respondent Judges allegation that the victim
was a Guest Relations Officer in a beerhouse in Cabanatuan City.
Atty. Inton stated that the victim never worked in any such establishment as she
and her family were members of Iglesia ni Cristo.
Atty. Inton asserted that the fact that respondent Judge dismissed the
criminal case when the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
accused and mentioned in her order payment of money as ground for the
dismissal of the case only shows her ignorance of the law. Atty. Inton denied the
other allegations of respondent Judge as mere assumptions and are but collateral
matters.
In her Supplemental Answer with Leave of Court[9] dated 21 March 2003,

respondent Judge asserted that in the disposition of the present case, she applied
Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which required courts to consider the
possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of
resolution.
Respondent Judge reiterated that the present administrative matter was
filed because Atty. Inton had an ax to grind against her. Respondent Judge
asserted that Atty. Intonwanted to get even with her because his appeal from
her 24 August 2001 decision in a habeas corpus case was dismissed.
On 10 April 2003, complainants filed a Reply to Supplemental Answer and

Affidavit.[10] Complainants asserted that respondent Judge acted with malice
because she issued her 12 October 2001 order even without the consent of both
the public prosecutor and the victim. Complainants also stated that perjured
witnesses executed the affidavits which respondent Judge submitted before the
Court.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
In its evaluation of the allegations of both complainants and respondent

Judge, the OCA stated:
After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned finds merit in
the charge.
The complaint presented the issues of manifest partiality of respondent Judge in

favor of the accused; discourtesy in insulting complainant in open court; and gross
ignorance of the law in dismissing the criminal complaint against one of the accused
despite the fact that being at large, the court has not obtained jurisdiction over his
person.
x x x *T+he mere filing of affidavit of desistance or Salaysay ng Paguurong ng Habla by the aggrieved party herself, does not ipso facto make the criminal
case dismissible. Article 266-C does not include desistance of the offended party as a
ground for extinction of criminal liability whether total or partial.
xxxx
Respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law when she issued the
order dated 12 October 2001, dismissing the criminal case with prejudice against both
accused after the latter had paid their individual civil liability. x x x
On the issue of respondents partiality towards the accused, the same was very
much apparent when respondent issued an order on 12 October 2001 dismissing the
complaint against all three accused, she stated therein that the civil liability has been
paid and that private complainant was no longer interested in the criminal aspect of the
case, despite of the fact that on the same date complainant and the victim refused to
sign the affidavit of desistance prepared for them. Due to respondents haste to dismiss
the criminal complaint, she even forgot the fact that the accused
therein Rayshawn dela Rosa has not yet been arraigned. It was only on 21 November
2001 that the two accused were arraigned.[11]
The OCA recommended that this case be re-docketed as a

regular administrative case and that respondent Judge be fined P5,000, with
warning that a commission of any of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
The Courts Ruling
The evaluation and the recommendations of the OCA are well-taken, except
for the penalty.
There is no question that on 12 October 2001, respondent Judge dismissed

with prejudice Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF and 10383-AF[12] against Dela Rosa
and Azarconafter they had paid their individual civil liability. This is in utter
disregard and in gross ignorance of the law, for payment of civil liability does not
extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article
344 of this
Code.
On the other hand, Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Partial extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
is
3. For good conduct allowances

serving his sentence.
which the
culprit may
earn while
he
The victims affidavit of desistance[13] could not have justified the dismissal
of the criminal cases. Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997,[14] has reclassified rape as a crime against persons. Hence, any
public prosecutor, even without the complaint of the victim or her parents, or
guardian, can prosecute the offender.[15]
Even if we consider the victims affidavit of desistance, still it would not

justify the dismissal. By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in
court.[16] Here, the victim made the so-called pardon of the accused after the
institution of the action.[17] Hence, the victim had already lost the right or
absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed because the
case had already reached and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial
court.[18]
When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the
law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.[19] As an advocate of justice and
a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and
be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. A judge should be acquainted with
legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. Having
accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent Judge owes the public and
the court she sits in proficiency in the law. Respondent Judge failed to live up to
these standards.[20]
Respondent Judge has also clearly violated Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which provides:
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent Judge showed partiality in favor of the accused when she issued
her 12 October 2001 order dismissing the subject criminal case. Respondent
Judge stated in her order that she dismissed the criminal case because Dela Rosa
and Azarcon had already paid their civil liability and private complainant was no
longer interested in the criminal aspect of the case.[21] However, the record
reveals that on the same day that the dismissal order was issued, complainant
Sylvia Cabico and the victim had also refused to sign the affidavit of desistance
that was prepared for them.[22]
Also, respondent Judge dismissed with prejudice the criminal case

against Dela Rosa even when he had not been arraigned. By her own admission,
respondent Judge made an oversight that accused Dela Rosa was already under
the jurisdiction of the court.[23] Thus, in her order of 21 November 2001,
respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Dela Rosa.[24]
Respondent Judges actuations in the premises only betray her gross

ignorance of procedural rules. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired by arrest.[25]
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Unfamiliarity
with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, such incompetence erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Basic rules of procedure must be at
the palm of a judges hands.
When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross

ignorance of the law. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, the
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds
or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[26]
We cannot countenance respondent Judges discourtesy in insulting

Sylvia Cabico during the hearing on 12 October 2001. Respondent Judges
statement
was
unbecoming
a
judge. Her
behavior
towards
Sylvia Cabico betrayed her impatience in the conduct of the hearing.
A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of a trial is a norm of

behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good
judge.[27] Respondent Judges actuations violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Rule 3.04. -- A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,

especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Clearly, respondent Judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the
litigants who appeared before her.
Respondent Judges reliance on Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of

Court[28] in disposing of the criminal case is misplaced.[29] While the effort of
respondent Judge to hasten the resolution of the cases before her is
commendable, that task, however, should not be done in utter disregard of the
rudiments of the law and procedure. The duty to dispose of the court business
promptly and to decide cases within the reglementary periods should be
consistent with a faithful compliance with the prescribed set of procedures. The
avowed purpose of acting on cases as early as possible does not justify even the
slightest abuse of judicial authority and discretion or excuse due observance of
the basic elements of the rule of law.[30]
A judge must render justice without resorting to uncalled for

shortcuts.[31] Respondent Judge failed to live up to the standards required of her
high position.
Under Rule 140, Section 8(9) of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge and penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from
above P20,000 to P40,000.[32]
Under the circumstances prevailing in the present case, we find that a fine
of P21,000 is in order.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero of

the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 liable for GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and FINE her P21,000. We STERNLY WARN her that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Rollo, pp. 1-8.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15-17.
[8]
Id. at 30-33.
[9]
Id. at 56-57.
[10]
Id. at 74-77.
[11]
Id. at 48-49.
[12]
Complaint mentions only Criminal Case No. 10383-AF.
[13]
Rollo, p. 29.
[14]
An Act Expanding the Definition of the Crime of Rape, Reclassifying the Same as a
Crime
Against Persons, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, as Amended, Otherwise Known as
The
Revised Penal Code, and For Other Purposes.
[15]
Section 2, Republic Act No. 8353.
[16]
People v. Ramirez, Jr., G.R. Nos. 150079-80, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 666; People v. Montes,
461
Phil. 563 (2003); People v. Trelles, 395 Phil. 38 (2000).
[17]
Rollo, p. 29.
[18]
People v. Ramirez, Jr., supra note 16.
[19]
Almonte v. Bien, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1532, 27 June 2005, 461 SCRA 218.
[20]
Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 20.
[21]
Rollo, p. 9.
[22]
Id. at 22.
[23]
Id. at 17.
[24]
Id. at 25.
[25]
Rule 113, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. I, 83 (2000).
[26]
Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, 22 December 2004, 447 SCRA 450; Almojuela,
Jr.
v. Ringor, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1521, 27 July 2004, 435 SCRA 261.
[27]
The Officers and Members of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan, 464 Phil.
900
(2004).
[28]
Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
[6]
[7]
Nature and purpose. -- x x x The court shall consider: (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of
a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution.
[29]
Rollo, p. 56.
[30]
Torres v. Villanueva, 387 Phil. 516 (2000).
[31]
Zuo v. Cabebe, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ, 26 November 2004, 444 SCRA 382.
[32]
Fortune Life Insurance, Co., Inc. v. Luczon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1901, 30 November
2006;
Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2002, 24 November 2006.
SECOND DIVISION
REMBERTO C. KARA-AN,
Complainant,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1674

[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1550-MTJ]
Present:
- versus QUISUMBING, J.,
JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 55, JUDGE EDISON
F. QUINTIN, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 56;
and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
MA. FE BRENDA J. TRAVINO,
Respondents.
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
April 19, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against respondents

Judge Fransciso S. Lindo (Judge Lindo), Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 55, Judge Edison F. Quintin (Judge Quintin), Presiding
Judge of MeTC, Branch 56, and Fe Brenda J. Travino (Ms. Travino), Branch Clerk
of Court of MeTC Branch 55, all ofMalabon City, for Dishonesty; Gross
Misconduct; Gross Ignorance of the Laws, Rules and Procedures; Violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
Violation of Articles 171, 172, 206 and 220 of the Revised Penal Code; and
Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code
of Professional Responsibility in relation to Civil Case No. JL00-128 (the Civil
Case) for damages entitled Remberto C. Kara-an v. Hector Villacorta, et al.
In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated 8 March 2004, complainant Remberto C.
Kara-an alleges that respondent Judge Lindo issued an Order[2] dated 6 March
2002voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the Civil Case. On even date, the
order of inhibition was transmitted to and was received by Branch 56, presided
over by respondent Judge Quintin who was then the Executive Judge
of Malabon MeTC.[3]
Complainant claims that although Judge Quintins office received a copy of
Judge Lindos order of inhibition on the same date, Judge Quintin did not take any
action thereon until 3 February 2004.[4] Complainant contends that
Judge Quintin violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case
within three (3) months from 6 March 2002, citing Section 16, Article III and
Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.[5]
Complainant moreover alleges that Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino violated
Articles 207 (malicious delay in the administration of justice) and 220 (illegal use
of public funds or property) of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that it took
Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino from 6 March 2002 to 28 January 2004 to transmit
the records of the case from Branch 55 to Branch 56 upon
Judge Lindos inhibition.[6]
Complainant also assails the Order dated 6 March 2002 issued by
Judge Lindo and the Order dated 3 February 2004 issued by Judge Quintin for
treating the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the Civil Case as a
pending incident even if said motion does not contain any notice of hearing and
is therefore a mere scrap of paper.[7]
Complainant alleges that when the respondent judges committed the illegal
acts, they took advantage of their positions and illegally used public funds and
properties which are intended only for lawful purposes.[8]
Complainant Kara-an thus charges the respondents with the following:
1. Violation of Article 171 (falsification by public officer, employee);

Article 172 (use of falsified document); Article 206 (knowingly rendering an
unjust interlocutory order or negligently rendering such interlocutory order);
Article 207 (malicious delay in the administration of justice); Article 220 (illegal
use of public funds or property), all penalized under the Revised Penal Code:
2. Dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A. No. 3019);
3. Willful violation and/or gross ignorance of the law, rules and procedure;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;
5. Untruthful statements in the narration of facts which violates the
lawyers oath;
6. Gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Lawyers Oath, Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, such as:
a. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01- A judge should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity and independence;
b. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.02- A judge should
administer justice impartially;
c. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.01- A judge should
at all times promote public confidence in the integrity and the impartiality
of the judiciary;
d. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.03- A judge should
not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment;
e. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.09- A judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all time the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity;
f. Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct;
g. Lawyers Oath;
h. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.01- A
lawyer should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct;
i. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 10.01- A

lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any, nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice;
j. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 10, Rule 10.03-A
lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice;
k. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162)
Canon 3- Avoidance of Impropriety;
l. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162) Canon
22 Infractions of Law;
m. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162)
Canon 30- Social Relations; and
n. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162)
Canon 31- Summary of Judicial Obligations.
7. Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) xxx causing undue injury to
any party (complainant), or giving any private party (the defendants in the Civil
Case) any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
respondents official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[9]
Complainant prays that judgment be rendered against respondents ordering

their disbarment and dismissal from public service.[10]
In his Comment[11] dated 12 April 2004, Judge Lindo avers that simultaneous
with the filing of the instant complaint, complainant filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Malabon a complaint alleging violation by the respondents of
Articles 171, 172, 206, 207 and 220 of the Revised Penal Code arising from
Judge Lindos disposition of the Civil Case.[12]
Judge Lindo next states that complainant had previously filed on 26
February 2002 an administrative complaint against Judge Lindo, Ms. Travino and
Deputy Sheriff Ruben C. Tan for their acts performed in connection with the Civil
Case. The case, docketed as A.M. OCA I.P.I.-02-5203-MTJ, was dismissed by the
Second Division of the Court on 8 September 2003.[13]
Judge Lindo avers that such acts amount to willful and deliberate forum
shopping which is a ground for the summary dismissal of the instant complaint
with prejudice. He also asserts that such acts constitute direct contempt and calls
for administrative sanction.[14] Judge Lindo contends that complainant is a losing
and disgruntled litigant, acting as counsel for himself, who filed the instant
unfounded and malicious case and the criminal cases before the prosecution office
to put him to shame, public ridicule or contempt.
With regard to the charge of making untruthful statements in violation of
Article 171 (falsification by public officer) of the Revised Penal Code,
Judge Lindo contends, in refutation, that he cannot find any order or orders issued
by him that violate said provision.[15]
Concerning the charge of violation of Article 172 (falsification by private
individual and use of falsified documents) of the RPC, Judge Lindo asserts that the
charge is not only preposterous but also without sense. Judge Lindo also denies
giving unwarranted benefits or causing injury to any person. He likewise claims
that the orders he issued in the Civil Case were in accord with law and
procedure.[16]
Further, Judge Lindo argues that he cannot be faulted for the delayed
transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. He points to the Courts Circular No.
10, dated 22 May 1987 which states that with respect to multiple sala courts, only
the order of inhibition shall be forwarded to the Executive Judge for appropriate
action. The records of the case shall be kept in the docket of the court concerned
while awaiting instruction and/or action of the Executive Judge thereon.[17]
Finally, Judge Lindo states that complainant should have resorted to judicial
review of the orders instead of filing the instant complaint which is not a substitute
for such review.[18]
By way of a 2nd Indorsement[19] dated 14 April 2004, Judge Quintin contends
that complainants charges stem from two (2) acts attributed to him, viz: (1) his
alleged failure, as Executive Judge of MeTC, to timely act on the order of
inhibition; and (2) his issuance of an Order dated 3 February 2004 setting the Civil
Case for further proceedings, as there was a pending motion to dismiss filed by
defendants which had not been acted upon by Judge Lindo.[20]
Judge Quintin states that although the order of inhibition had been received
by his office on 6 March 2002, the same did not reach his personal attention until
Judge Lindoasked him to duly act on it. Since the order could not be located,
Judge Quintin requested the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. Upon
receipt of the records on 28 January 2004, he issued the assailed Order dated 3
February 2004.[21]
Judge Quintin claims that he had no alternative but to set the Civil Case for
hearing to tackle the pending motion to dismiss. Judge Quintin maintains that even
if the notice in the motion is defective for failing to state the date of hearing, the
defect is cured by the courts cognizance thereof and by the fact that the adverse
party had been notified of the existence of the pleading.[22]
Lastly, Judge Quintin submits that there is no probable cause against him for
malicious delay in the administration of justice. For delay to be malicious, there
must be a deliberate intent to inflict damage on the complainant and there is none
shown in this case.[23] Judge Quintin thus prays that the instant complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit.
For her part, Ms. Travino categorically denies all the accusations against her.
She claims that the charges were intended to harass her as the first administrative
complaint had been dismissed by
the Court.[24] Ms. Travino also stresses that she is not guilty of delay in the
transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. She had merely relied on the Circular
which states that only the order of inhibition should be transmitted to the Executive
Judge.[25]
Thereafter, complainant filed his Reply and five (5) more supplemental
replies reiterating his previous submissions.
Records show that the case started when complainant, as attorney-in-fact
for Teofila Beduya Cinco, filed a claim for survivorship with the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO). Because of the alleged delay in the processing
of Cincos claim, complainant filed a case against Hector Villacorta, Ferdinand
Paler and John Does, with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6713. In August 2000, the
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
As a result, complainant filed the Civil Case against Villacorta and Paler of
the PVAO and Alan Caares, Rudiger Falcis II and Orlando Casimiro of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the military. The case was raffled to Branch 55 of
the MeTC of Malabon presided over by Judge Lindo. Summonses issued by said
court were served only on Caares, Falcis II and Casimiro. The other two
defendants connected with the PVAO could not be served. Then, Caares, Falcis II
and Casimiro filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. The motion was
set for hearing by Judge Lindo on 1 March 2002 but complainant filed an exparte motion for inhibition. Judge Lindo issued the assailed Order dated 6 March
2002 voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the Civil Case. The order of
inhibition was sent to and received by Branch 56 presided over by Judge Quintin.
However, it appears that Judge Quintin did not act on it until 3 February 2004,
when he issued the Order of even date noting the inhibition and setting the motion
to dismiss for hearing on 5 March 2004.[26]
In its Report[27] dated 30 June 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommended that the instant case be re-docketed as an administrative
matter and that Judge Quintin be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for his delayed
action on the order of inhibition. With respect to Judge Lindo, the OCA
recommended that he be reprimanded as his failure to devise an efficient recording
and filing system in his sala contributed to the undue delayed action on his
inhibition. The OCA likewise recommended that Ms.Travino be fined for her
failure to report the inactive status of the Civil Case to the presiding judge.
The matter was thereafter referred to Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., ViceExecutive Judge of the RTC of Malabon City for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Aquino, however, failed to terminate the case as
complainant moved for his inhibition. Upon receipt of the motion,
Judge Aquino voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the administrative case.
Thus, the Court referred the case to a consultant at the OCA for investigation,
report and recommendation. Justice Romulo S. Quimbo was designated as Hearing
Officer of the case.[28]
In his Report dated 2 March 2007, Justice Quimbo recommended that
Judge Quintin be held guilty of delay in the resolution of the inhibition of
Judge Lindo and that a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) be imposed on
him. Justice Quimbo further recommended that the case be dismissed against
Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino.[29]
Justice Quimbo held that Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino were not under any
obligation to follow up on the status of the order of inhibition after they have duly
transmitted the same to Judge Quintin.[30]
Notably, Justice Quimbo opined that respondents are charged with a litany
of imagined sins without evidence to support the same except the vivid
imagination of the complainant and his self-serving and dogmatic interpretation of

the law and rules.[31]
In the course of his investigation, Justice Quimbo suspected that the Civil
Case may not be the only case where complainant was appearing. A cursory look
at complainants stationery (envelop) would lead one to assume that he is
practicing law. Thus, Justice Quimbo recommended that the first level courts,
particularly in Metro Manila, be asked to report to the Court whether complainant
has any other appearances in their salas.[32]
After a careful study, the Court is of the opinion that Judge Quintin is guilty
of delay in resolving the order of inhibition.
Record reveals that Judge Lindos order of inhibition dated 6 March
2002 was received by Judge Quintins sala on the same day. Records also show
that no action had been taken on the order until 3 February 2004. It appears that the
order of inhibition was misplaced and could not be found as
Judge Quintin required the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case.
Nevertheless, Judge Quintin cannot escape liability simply because the order was
not brought to his personal attention.
If indeed the order got lost or misplaced, Judge Quintin should have
conducted an inquiry into the matter. While it may be true that the instant he
received the records of the Civil Case on 28 January 2004, he immediately issued
an order 3 February 2004, still his inaction on the order for almost two (2) years is
not excused.
Judge Quintin likewise cannot escape liability by ascribing blame to his
court employees in that the order was never brought to his attention. Judges are
ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts. They cannot be
allowed to use their staffs as shields to evade responsibility for mistakes and
mishaps in the course of the performance of judicial duties. The subordinates are
not the guardians of the judges responsibilities.[33]
It is the duty of judges to devise an efficient recording and filing system in

their courts to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy
and timely disposition.[34] In Ricolcol v. Camarista,[35] the Court aptly ruled:
A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or

resolution and is expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on
them promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their
speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her
responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her
official functions.[36]
The Court however increases the amount of the fine imposed to Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) pursuant to jurisprudence.[37]
With respect to Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino, the Court is also of the
opinion that after duly transmitting the order of inhibition to Branch 56, they were
under no obligation to inquire into its status. However, had both closely supervised
the preparation of the trial courts semestral docket reports, they would have
noticed the pending incident and would have promptly called the attention of
Judge Quintin on the matter. Thus, the Court reminds Judge Lindo and
Ms. Travino of their duty to closely supervise and monitor the semestral docket
inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held
in Gordon v. Lilagan:[38]
The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Although this responsibility primarily rests in the
presiding judge, it is shared with the court staff. This Court has consistently
required Judges for a continuous inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that a
trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the branch
clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to
keep the cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court
underscored the importance of this physical inventory stressing it is only by this
that the judge can keep himself abreast of the status of the pending cases and
informed that everything is in order in his court.[39]
Finally, the Court adopts Justice Quimbos recommendation to require the

first level courts, particularly in Metro Manila, to report whether complainant has
made any appearances therein.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edison F. Quintin of Metropolitan Trial
Court of Malabon, Branch 56, is hereby found guilty of GROSS INEFFICIENCY
and FINED in the amount of three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). He is further
ADMONISHED to be circumspect in the performance of his judicial functions. A
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The complaint against Judge Francisso S. Lindo Presiding Judge of
Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 55, and Fe Brenda J. Travino Branch
Clerk of Court ofMeTC of Malabon, Branch 55 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
However, they are REMINDED of their duty to diligently supervise the
preparation of their semestral docket inventories.
The First Level Courts of Metro Manila are hereby directed to report to the
Court whether complainant Remberto C. Kara-an has any other appearances in
their salas.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
O.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-12.
[2]
Id. at 16-18; Exhibit B.
[3]
Id. at 2-3.
[4]
Id. at 13; Exhibit A.
[5]
Id. at 3.
[6]
Id. at 2.
[7]
Id. at 3.
[8]
Id. at 4.
[9]
Id. at 5-6.
[10]
Id. at 7.
[11]
Id. at 26-31.
[12]
Id. at 26.
[13]
Id. at 26-27.
[14]
Id. at 27.
[15]
Id. at 28.
[16]
Id. at 28.
[17]
Id. at 29-30.
[18]
Id. at 31.
[19]
Id. at 22-25.
[20]
Id. at 22.
[21]
Id. at 22-23.
[22]
Id. at 23.
[23]
Id. at 24.
[24]
Id. at 50-53; In her Comment dated 12 April 2004.
[25]
Id. at 51-52.
[26]
Id. at 12-13; Report of the Hearing Officer Designate.
[27]
Id. at 186-195.
[28]
Id. at 9.
[29]
Id. at 16.
[30]
Id. at 15.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Id. at 16.
[33]
Atty. Hilario v. Judge Concepcion, 383 Phil. 843,853 (2000).
[34]
Gordon v. Lilagan, 414 Phil. 221, 231 (2001).
[35]
371 Phil. 399 (1999).
[36]
Id. at 406.
[37]
Atty. Hilario v. Judge Concepcion, supra note 33 at 853-854.
[38]
Gordon v. Lilagan, supra note 34.
[39]
Id. at 230-231.
FIRST DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR,
A.M. No. P-06-2103

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-7-430-RTC)
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus-
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. ROMULO V. PAREDES,

former Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, Branch 2,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 17, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case is a result of the audit conducted

by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the books of
account of Atty.Romulo V. Paredes, former clerk of court of the
Regional
Trial
compulsorily
Court, Bangued, Abra,
retired
on July
18,
Branch
2003. Because
2,
who
of
the
discrepancies discovered, a financial audit[1] was also made on

the books of account of Dennis S. Benedito and Samson T.
Sanchez, the former and incumbent officers-in-charge/clerks of
court, respectively, of the same court.[2]
The OCA, in its memorandum dated July 7, 2005, had the
following findings: (1) there was a shortage of P34,000 in the
fiduciary fund; (2) withdrawal slips bore only the signature of the
clerk of court (without the corresponding signature of the Executive
Judge Charito B.
Gonzales
or
Presiding
Judge
Corpus
B. Alzate)[3] and (3) University of the Philippines Law Center official

receipts were issued for the different funds instead of Supreme
Court receipts.
The OCA made the following recommendations:

A.
The FINANCIAL
DIRECTED to:
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE,
OCA
be
1. DEDUCT the amount of P34,000.00 from the retirement benefits

of Atty. ROMULO V. PAREDES to settle his accountability caused by
two (2) double withdrawals in [Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)]

Savings Account No. 1031-0015-32, Bangued, Abra Branch; and
2. TRANSFER/REMIT the restituted/deducted amount to RTCBangued, Abra under the aforementioned LBP Savings Account;
B.
This Report be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter

against Atty. ROMULO V. PAREDES and a fine of P5,000.00 be
imposed upon him for simple neglect of duty for failure to supervise and
manage the financial transactions in his Court;
C.
Mr. SAMSON T. SANCHEZ be DIRECTED to:
1. EXPLAIN why he is the lone signatory of Fiduciary Fund Savings

Account No. 1031-0015-32 with the LBP-Bangued, Abra Branch;
2. EXPLAIN why U.P. Law Center official receipts were utilized for the
[Judiciary Development Fund], Fiduciary Fund, General Fund, Sheriff
General Fund and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund;
3. ENSURE that the overage of P2,744.05 in the LBP Fidicuary Fund

Account is applied on the withdrawn tax of P7,713.76[4] (on interest
earned) before the net amount of P4,969.71 is deducted from future
interest income to replace the shortage in the Fiduciary Account
and SUBMIT a Report on the matter to the Fiscal Monitoring Division,
Court Management Office, OCA; and
4. RELIGIOUSLY COMPLY with the Circulars of the Court;
D.
Presiding Judge CORPUS B. ALZATE be DIRECTED to EXPLAIN why

he allowed Mr. Sanchez to be the lone signatory of Fiduciary Fund
Savings Account No. 1031-0015-32 with the LBP-Bangued, Abra Branch
when he was the Executive Judge; and
E.
Executive Judge CHARITO B. GONZALES be DIRECTED to:
1. CLOSELY MONITOR the financial transactions of the Court; and
2. STUDY and IMPLEMENT procedures that

internal control over financial transactions.[5]
shall
strengthen
the
The balance of P34,000 for the fiduciary fund was a result of

two instances of double withdrawals of cash bonds in two criminal
cases, to wit:
a.
Collection of P10,0000.00 on 12 January 1996 (per O.R. No. 8962146)

for Criminal Case No. 1689 [(People) vs. Oandasan] was deposited
on January 19, 1996. It was first withdrawn on 6 August 1997 and again
on 11 January 2002.
xxx
b.
xxx
xxx
Collection of P24,000.00 on 16 December 1998 (per O.R. No. 8051911)

for Criminal Case No. 274 [(People) vs. Carlito Purisima] was deposited
on the same day. It was withdrawn for the first time on 26 March
2001 and again on 20 December 2002.[6]
Regarding the amount of P10,000, Paredes explained that the

first withdrawal was made without a court order during the
incumbency of former clerk of court Manuel T. Belarmino (who
compulsorily retired on January 1, 2002) whom he replaced

on August 27, 1997. The second withdrawal, on the other hand,
was supported by a court order dated January 3, 2002 and
acknowledgement receipt dated January 11, 2002.
With respect to the amount of P24,000, Paredes stated that he

authorized the first withdrawal and it was valid. However, the
second
withdrawal was caused by his cash clerk at that
time, Edgardo Balido (who retired on August 31, 2003), whom he

entrusted with money collections, withdrawals and deposits.
The OCA found Paredes liable for simple neglect of duty. It

declared that Paredes could have easily discovered the erroneous
first withdrawal of P10,000 had he thoroughly checked the
supporting
documents
of
the
August
1997
fiduciary
fund
report which he signed. According to the OCA, Paredes could not

exculpate himself by pointing to his cash clerk and the trust and
confidence he reposed on the latter. As the accountable officer and
custodian of his courts funds, it was his duty to ensure the
legitimacy of every financial transaction within his responsibility.
Thus, the OCA recommended that a fine in the amount

of P5,000 be imposed on Paredes for simple neglect of duty and that
he be ordered to restitute the total amount of P34,000 to be

deducted from his retirement benefits.
We agree with the OCAs recommendations.
Public office is a public trust.[7] Those charged with the

dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the
lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.[8] Not only must their conduct at all times be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it
must be beyond suspicion.[9]
Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated
custodians of the court's funds, revenues, records, properties
and premises.[10] As such, they are generally regarded as
treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager
thereof.[11] Thus, they are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction
or impairment of such funds and property.[12]
Paredes was remiss in the performance of his duties as
clerk of court with regard to financial concerns. He should have
corrected
the
mistake
of
his
predecessor
but
he
did
not. Likewise, the trust he reposed on his subordinate was not a
valid defense. It was his duty to see to it that his subordinates

performed their functions properly. These incidents clearly
proved his neglect of duty.
His failure to properly supervise and manage the financial
transactions
in
his
court
constituted
simple
neglect
of
duty. Simple neglect of duty has been defined as the failure of an

employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies
a
disregard
of
duty
resulting
from
carelessness
or
indifference.[13] Under Rule IV, Section 52(B) of the Uniform Rules

on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, it is a less grave
offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day to six
months suspension for the first offense.[14]
Considering that Paredes compulsorily retired from the
service on July 18, 2003, his penalty shall be, in lieu of
suspension, a fine in the amount of P5,000.[15] Given that it was
his first offense and following the Court's ruling in In Re: Report
on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City,[16] we deem this amount
reasonable.
The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even

simple neglect of duty lessens the people's confidence in the
judiciary and ultimately in the administration of justice.[17]
The other recommendations of the OCA with respect to
acting clerk of court Sanchez, Presiding Judge Alzate and
Executive Judge Gonzales are also well-taken.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Romulo V. Paredes, former clerk of court

of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, is hereby
foundGUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is ordered to pay
a FINE of P5,000, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. The
amount of P34,000 shall also be deducted from his retirement
benefits and remitted to Land Bank of the Philippines savings
account
no.
1031-0015-32
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court, Bangued, Abra, Branch 2.
Samson T. Sanchez is DIRECTED to:

(1)
EXPLAIN why he is the lone signatory of fiduciary fund

savings account no. 1031-0015-32;
(2)
EXPLAIN why University of the Philippines Law Center

official
receipts
were
utilized
for
the
judiciary
development fund, fiduciary fund, general fund, sheriff
general fund and the special allowance for the judiciary

fund;
(3)
ENSURE that the overage of P2,744.05 in the Land Bank

of the Philippines fiduciary fund account is applied to the
withdrawn tax ofP7,713.76 on interest earned before the
net amount of P4,969.71 is deducted from future interest
income to replace the shortage in the fiduciary account
and SUBMIT a report on the matter to the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office, Office of
the Court Administrator and
(4)
RELIGIOUSLY COMPLY with the circulars of this Court.

Presiding
Judge
Corpus
B. Alzate is DIRECTED to EXPLAIN why he allowed Mr. Samson

T. Sanchez to be the lone signatory of fiduciary fund savings
account no. 1031-0015-32 when he was the Executive Judge.
Executive Judge Charito B. Gonzales is DIRECTED to:
(1)
CLOSELY MONITOR the financial transactions of her

court and
(2)
STUDY and IMPLEMENT procedures
that
shall
strengthen internal control over financial transactions.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Conducted on September 21 and 23, 2004.

Mr. Benedito was the Officer-in-Charge from September 1 to 30, 2004, in the absence of Mr. Sanchez
who took the bar examinations that year.
OCA Circular No. 50-95.
The amount of P7,713.76 which was the 20% tax on interest earned on deposits was erroneously
withdrawn from the fiduciary fund account and remitted to the judiciary development fund account. The
amount of P2,744.05 will be deducted from this amount.
Memorandum Re: Report on the Financial Audit conducted at the OCC, Regional Trial
Court, Bangued, Abra.
Id.
CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
Re: Final Report on the Financial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court
of Midsayap, North Cotabato, A.M. No. 05-8-233-MTC, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 12, 16.
Id.
In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Koronadal City, A.M. No. 02-9-233-MTCC, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 356, 374.
Id.
Id., citations omitted.
OCA v. Montalla, A.M. No. P-06-2269, 20 December 2006.
Rosales v. Buenaventura, A.M. No. 2004-15-SC, 16 November 2006.
Report on the Financial Audit on the Books of Accounts of Mr. Delfin T. Polido, A.M. No. P-06-2127, 17
February 2006.
Supra note 10.
Reyes v. Pablico, A.M. No. P-06-2109, 27 November 2006.
FIRST DIVISION
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
Complainants,
A.C. No. 6323

Present:

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
-versus-
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment and suspension[2] against

respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares
and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on
forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client,
Sarah
Divina
Morales
Al-Rasheed,
repeatedly sued
him
for
violations of the lease contract which they executed over a

commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Paraaque.[3]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.[4] The case was dismissed for

improper venue.[5]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for
breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274. [6] The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 990233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute.[7] Al-Rasheed, through
counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course
to her appeal.[8] The subsequent petition for review on certiorari
filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. [9]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274[10] where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.[11] It was dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata and prescription.[12]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only
performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute
the interests of his client.[13] He denied that he was forum shopping
as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping,[14] disclosed
the two previous cases involving the same cause of action which
had been filed and dismissed.[15] Respondent further claims he
could not refuse his clients request to file a new case because AlRasheed was the oppressed party in the transaction.[16]
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents

comment, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[17]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that
respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the
same cause of action and subject matter.[18] It opined that
respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for
lack of interest to prosecute.[19] Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits.[20] The CBD recommended the suspension of respondent
for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum
shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to
reprimand.[22]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as
to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither
mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as
lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They
accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [23] As the
first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, [a]
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote
respect
for
law
and
legal
processes.[24] Moreover,
according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should not

wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.[25]
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from
filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have
known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not
to know this elementary principle of procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed
the second complaint. Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the
Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate
of non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed
that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease
contract. As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty.
Villalon unapologetically reproduced his 1999[26] arguments and
assertions in the 2004[27]complaint. Respondent obviously knew the
law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that
respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides
that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the

expense of truth and justice.[28] Lawyers have the duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple
actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade
justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject
themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful
violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to
the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just
and consistent with truth and honor.[29]
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is
insufficient and rules instead that CBDs recommendation for a sixmonth
suspension
from
the
practice
of
law
to
be
more
commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of

respondents death on September 27, 2006,[30] the penalty can no
longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect,
rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Dated February 18, 2004.

Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 1-4.
Id., pp. 35-39.
Id. p. 41. Atty. Apolinario Torcuador filed the said action on behalf of Al-Rasheed.
Id., p. 73.
Id., pp. 1, 26.
Order dated July 10, 2000, id., p. 21.
Id., p. 2.
Id., See also Resolution dated March 28, 2001 denying petition for review on certiorari for failure of
petitioner [Al-Rasheed] to show a reversible error committed by the [Court of Appeals], p. 23 and
Resolution dated August 8, 2001 denying petitioners motion for lack of compelling reason nor substantial
arguments to merit reconsideration, p. 24.
Id., p. 1. The case was also a complaint for breach of contract with damages.
Id., p. 26.
Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 62-63.
Rollo (Vol. I), p. 43.
Id.
Id., pp. 43-44.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
Id., p. 46.
Resolution dated August 4, 2004, rollo (Vol. II), p. 1.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, dated October 4, 2005, penned
by Com. Salvador B. Hababag; rollo (Vol. IV), p. 6.
Id., p. 6.
Id., p. 7.
Id., p. 8.
Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, dated 26 May 2006, id., p. 2.
Radjaie v. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 15 (2000).
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1.
See Lawyers Oath.
Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 5-15.
Id., pp. 26-30.
People v. Almedras, G.R. No. 145915, 24 April 2003, 401 SCRA 555, 573.
Foronda v. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, 10 August 2004, 436 SCRA 9, 23.
Respondents widow, thru Atty. Alicia Vidal, IBP Governor for Greater Manila and Chair of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, informed the Court of respondents demise and furnished it a copy of
respondents death certificate.
THIRD DIVISION
LUISITO BALATBAT,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 1666

Present:
- versus -
ATTY. EDGARDO ARIAS Y

SANCHEZ,
Respondent.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
x------------------------------------ --------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant administrative complaint refers to the charges of malpractice
and gross negligence against Atty. Edgardo Arias y Sanchez of relative to Civil
Case No. 003066-CV for recovery of a sum of money.
In the Complaint[1] dated September 8, 1976, Luisito Balatbat alleged that

he engaged the services of respondent to undertake his defense in the said civil
case. According to complainant, he did not attend the scheduled hearings
because respondent told him that there was no need to be
present. But when he verified the status of the case from the then City Court
of Manila, he was surprised to learn that a Decision[2] dated June 21, 1976 had
already been rendered. Complainant alleged that the enforcement of the
decision caused him and his family untold miseries, embarrassment and public
ridicule.[3]
The evidence on record shows that the city court declared complainant in
default
for
failure
to
appear
during
the June
18,
1976 hearing. Plaintiff was, thereafter, allowed

to
present
evidence ex
parte. After three days, a judgment adverse to complainant was rendered,
prompting the plaintiff to move for execution ex-parte;[4] Two days thereafter,
aWrit of Execution[5] was issued.
In his Answer,[6] respondent claimed that the notice of the hearing of

the June 18, 1976 trial was made to appear as though signed by him.[7] He
insisted that it was not his signature. He, likewise, asserted that contrary to
complainants allegations, he always tried to take the complainant with him to the
city court for all the scheduled hearings; it was always the complainant who, for
one reason or another, could not go with him.[8]
Respondent further alleged that complainant had filed a Manifestation in

the City Court terminating his (respondents) legal services, and a new counsel for
complainant entered an appearance. Respondent claimed that he could not have
possibly opposed the Ex Parte Motion for Execution filed in the civil case since he
was not furnished a copy thereof.[9] Respondent prayed that complainant be
punished for contumacy for being motivated by ill will and malice in filing the
instant administrative complaint against him.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation.
Complainant testified that he had gone to the City Court to make a follow-up
on the status of the case since respondent had not been communicating nor
collecting fees from him for two months. He then discovered that a decision had
already been rendered.[10] He went to respondents office to inquire the status of
his case, and respondent told him that they were on the loss. He asked
respondent to show him the copy of the decision, and respondent replied that it
was already in default. Complainant then demanded that the records of the case
be shown to him but again, respondent refused.[11]
Respondent, for his part, claimed that it was complainant who notified him
of the adverse decision and promised that he would verify this with the city
court.[12] Respondent then requested the complainant to return the next day. He
insisted that unlike the notices of previous hearings in the case, he did not receive
any notice from the City Court of the supposed hearing that was reset on June 18,
1976;[13] that the signature appearing therein was not his; and that he did not
know who had affixed the same.[14] Thereafter, he informed the complainant that
he had already prepared a draft pleading; that he would file it to have the
decision set aside; and that it could easily be proven that the signature appearing
in the records was not his signature.[15]
The presentation of the parties respective evidence was terminated

on September 6, 1977. After they submitted their respective Memoranda, the
case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD). The parties were then required to furnish copies of the
documentary exhibits submitted in evidence.
Incidentally, it appears that a confusion as to the identity of respondent

arose when the IBP-CBD sent a Notice[16] dated January 15, 1992 setting the
hearing of the case onFebruary 28, 1992 to a certain Atty. Edgardo S. Arias at the
latters address in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. On the date set for hearing, the
said Edgardo S. Arias filed a Motion to Be Furnished Copy of Complaint and for
Re-Setting of Hearing, averring therein that he did not know the nature of the
charge against him because he had not been furnished a copy of the
complaint and other supporting documents. Accordingly, he requested that
complainant be ordered to furnish him a copy of the complaint and that he be
given at least fifteen days thereafter to file his answer or comment.[17] On May 5,
1992, he filed his comment. Emphasizing therein that his middle name was
SORCA, he lamented that the instant complaint must have referred to Atty.
Edgardo SANCHEZ Arias, a practicing lawyer in Manila, and not to himself for the
reason that he had beenpermanently residing and practicing his profession
in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan since 1971.[18]
In its Report dated October 20, 1995, the IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month, and warned
that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely. The IBP Board
of Governors then issued Resolution No. XII-96-45 dated January 27, 1996,
adopting the said Report and Recommendation.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
Based on respondents own admissions, he did not properly withdraw as

counsel for complainant. The settled rule is that the attorney-client relation
continues until the client gives a notice of discharge, or manifests to the court or
tribunal where the case is pending that counsel is being discharged, with a copy
served upon the adverse party.[19] Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is
to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court
relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138, Section
26[20] of the Rules of Court.
This rule is consistent with the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, and is not at
liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[21] The duty of a lawyer to
safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his effective
discharge from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of the
litigation.[22] The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name of the
new counsel is properly recorded and the records properly handed
over.[23] Verily, the abandonment of a client in violation of the attorneys contract
amounts to an ignorance of the most elementary principles of professional
ethics.[24]
As the Investigating Commissioner noted, it was respondents duty, upon
being apprised of the adverse decision, to exhaust all available remedies at the
time to prevent its attaining finality and, more importantly, to forestall the
inevitable execution that would follow considering that at that time, the winning
party had not yet filed the motion for execution.[25] Our pronouncement
in Santiago v. Fojas[26] is instructive on this point:
x x x Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with its correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession.
Respondents actuations belie his claim that he had not been remiss in his
duties to his client. The records show that on March 25, 1976, he received a
notice of hearing[27] for the setting of the case for trial on April 30, 1976. He went
to the City Court on the appointed day.[28] However, finding that plaintiff and
defendant (complainant herein) therein had not yet arrived, he requested the
clerk of court to cancel the hearing on the ground that he had two (2) criminal
cases pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branches 17 and 29 which
he had to attend to.[29] He then failed to verify the next hearing date with the
court. When asked why he failed to do so, respondent declared that it slipped
[his] mind and took the word of the Clerk of Court that notices [would] be sent to
both
parties.[30] As
it
turned
out, the said hearing was re-scheduled to June 18, 1976, the day plaintiff
presented his evidence ex parte. Forthwith, judgment was rendered based solely
thereon after which, execution ensued.[31] Respondent should have, at the very
least, moved to have the hearing postponed on the ground of conflict in his
scheduled hearings in other cases.
Indeed, the negligent failure of respondent to act accordingly under the

circumstances clearly negates not only his claim that he appeared in court
always mindful of his duties,[32] but also his vow to serve his client with
competence and diligence[33] and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him.[34] Respondents actuations likewise violate Rule 18.04, which mandates that
a lawyer keep the client informed of the status of the case and respond within a
reasonable time to a clients request for information. A client must never be left
in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in
the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.[35]
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney

exert his best efforts in the prosecution or defense of a clients cause. A lawyer
who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests
of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[36] Lawyers are
indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at
the legal profession, strict compliance with ones oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics is an imperative.[37]
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, for violation of the Code of

Professional
Responsibility,
respondent
Atty.
Edgardo
Arias y
Sanchez is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) month. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. He is likewiseDIRECTED to report the date of
his receipt of this Decision to enable the Court to determine when his suspension
shall have taken effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all the courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, p. 4.
Annex A, id. at 5.
[3]
Rollo, p. 4.
[4]
Annex B, id. at 6.
[5]
Annex C, id. at 7.
[6]
Rollo, p. 13-17.
[7]
Id. at 14.
[8]
TSN, August 2, 1977, p. 27.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 10-12.
[10]
TSN, February 4, 1977, pp. 10-11.
[11]
Id. at 40-42.
[12]
TSN, August 2, 1977, pp. 39-43.
[13]
Id. at 18-19.
[14]
Id. at 19.
[15]
Id. at 20.
[16]
Rollo, p. 2.
[17]
Id. at 4.
[18]
Id. at 8.
In his Comment, Edgardo Sorca Arias further argued that
a. The undersigned Atty. EDGARDO SORCA ARIAS has not met and, hence, does not know personally
the complainant LUISITO BALATBAT. It goes to reason that BALATBAT has never been his client.
b. Any EDGARDO SORCA ARIAS has never held office at Rm. 310, Goiti Building, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
from March 15, 1969 (the date he took his lawyers oath) up to the present. It may sound funny, facetious or
droll, but the truth is he does not know where Goiti Building exactly is, nor has he ever seen it!
c. On June 18, 1976, or prior thereto, undersigned Atty. EDGARDO SORCA ARIAS was employed as
Municipal Attorney of Roxas, Palawan and had been appearing in court in cases involving
the municipality of Roxas, Palawan.
[2]
A copy of one of his pleadings filed on May 11, 1976 with the then COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PALAWAN, Branch IV, in Civil Case No. 939, entitled BRUNO C. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, versus
MUNICIPALITY OF ROXAS, PALAWAN, et al., Defendants, is hereto attached as ANNEX 1
hereof. This pleading (ANNEX 1) readily shows that Atty. EDGARDO SORCA ARIAS was then
Municipal Attorney of Roxas, Palawan, and was in said province in May and June, 1976 practicing his
profession within the period of time mentioned in the complaint. How, then, could he have held office
at Goiti Building, Sta. Cruz, Manila, at that time? And how could he possibly have a client by the name of
LUISITO BALATBAT when he was in Palawan all the time serving as Municipal Attorney of
Roxas, Palawan?
d. As earlier adverted to, the undersigned Atty. EDGARDO SORCA ARIAS has been residing and practicing
the law profession in Puerto Princesa City since 1970 continuously up to the present. Attached hereto is a
copy of his pleadings filed in 1972 with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of the Province of Palawan in re:
Crim. Case No. 136 (Alonzo de Leon, et al.). This pleading readily shows that in 1972, undersigned attorney
was then residing at Milagrosa Village,Liberty, Puerto Princesa City. Said pleading is marked as ANNEX
2 thereof.
[19]
Canoy v. Ortiz, A.C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 410, 420.
[20]
Rule 138, Section 26 provides in part, An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire.
[21]
Santeco v. Avance, 463 Phil. 359, 369 (2003); Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 798 (1997).
[22]
Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Dioneda, 447 Phil. 408, 414 (2003).
[23]
Santeco v. Avance, supra, at 370.
[24]
In Re Yeager, 56 Phil. 691, 692 (1932).
[25]
Report, pp. 3-4.
[26]
A.C. No. 4103, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 68, 73-74.
[27]
Rollo, p. 19.
[28]
TSN, August 2, 1977, p. 30.
[29]
Rollo, p. 15.
[30]
TSN, August 2, 1977, p. 35.
[31]
Report, p. 3.
[32]
Rollo, p. 14.
[33]
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18.
[34]
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 18.03.
[35]
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 406, 411.
[36]
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 248.
[37]
Id. at 253.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
EDUARDO SAN MIGUEL,

Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749

[Formerly OCA IPI-01-1342-RTJ]
Present:
Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ

MACEDA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275,

Las Pias City,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 4, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is the Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated November 28, 2001 of Eduardo

M.
San
Miguel
(complainant)
charging
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (respondent), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 275, Las Pias City with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest
Partiality, Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Evident Bad Faith and
Gross Inexcusable Negligence, relative to Criminal Case No. 00-0736, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Eduardo M. San Miguel and Socorro B. Osorio, for
Violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.[2]
Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and
delivery of .50 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable
by prision correccional. He
jumped
bail. On May
10,
2001,
then
Judge Florentino Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond in
the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00.
Complainant was arrested on September 8, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the
state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground of
reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability that

accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution. The Motion was set for
hearing onSeptember 19, 2001. On September 17, 2001, complainant filed an
Opposition to the Motion. On the same day, or two (2) days before the scheduled
hearing, respondent issued an Order granting the Motion. During the hearing
of September 19, 2001, respondent opted to consider complainants Opposition as
a motion for reconsideration and merely ordered the prosecutor to file a reply
thereto. On November 21, 2001, respondent issued an Order clarifying his Order
of September 17, 2001.
Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due
process was gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001
Order without giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. The issuance
of the September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's gross ignorance of the law as
the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable
by reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a
constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, the
intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was to deny him of his constitutional
right to bail. The issuance of the November 21, 2001 Order that only the bail
recommended by the prosecutor was considered withdrawn did not relieve the
respondent of any liability.
In his Comment[3] dated March 8, 2002, respondent explained that the
motion to cancel the prosecutor's recommended bail in Crim. Case No. 00-0736
did not need any hearing because the court could act upon it without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party. When he canceled the bail, the cancellation referred
to the P60,000.00 and not theP120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres. The
September 17, 2001 Order canceling the bail does not speak of the cancellation of
the P120,000.00 bail and the same was reaffirmed in a subsequent Order
on November 21, 2001. The right of complainant to be heard in the motion to
withdraw bail was never violated nor his right to bail impaired. Complainant could
have posted the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres or could have
seasonably moved for the lifting of the warrant, but he did not. The Order of
cancellation is dated September 17, 2001 while the Information for murder was
filed against complainant on September 14, 2001 or three days earlier. Thus, the
cancellation was in due course because complainant was already detained for the
non-bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered.
In the Agenda Report[4] dated September 17, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION: The complaint is meritorious.
The
complainant
is
correct
in
saying
that
the
order
dated September 17, 2001 of respondent denied him his right to bail. This order
was issued upon motion of the prosecution which motion was quite explicit of
what was sought to be cancelled. The motion in part reads:
xxx
2. In the said warrant of arrest the Honorable Court

recommended bail in the amount of P120,000.00 to secure
the provisional release of the accused. Undersigned most
respectfully
moves
for
the
cancellation
of
this
recommended bail amount due to the actuations of both

accused towards the authority of this Honorable Court.
xxx
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed that the allowance for bail granted to the accused to secure
their provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest dated
May 10, 2001 be CANCELLED as there is reasonable ground to
believe and all indication, point to the probability, that both
accused are seriously considering flight from the prosecution of the
instant case. x x x
It is thus clear that what the prosecution prayed for was the cancellation of
the bail of P120,000.00 set by Judge Alumbres in his Warrant of Arrest
dated May 10, 2001. This necessarily meant that the prosecution wanted
complainant to remain in jail without bail. Hence, when respondent granted the
motion in his order dated September 17, 2001, he in effect denied complainant his
right to bail. It can not be denied that since complainant was charged with an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment and
since he has not yet been convicted, bail in his case is still a matter of
right. (Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court) This is true notwithstanding the fact
that he previously jumped bail. In such a case, respondent should have increased
the amount of bail or set certain conditions to ensure complainant's presence
during the trial, but he can not deny altogether complainant's right to bail.
xxx
In order to prove his point that he never intended to deny respondent his
right to bail, respondent used as example Socorro Osorio, the other co-accused,
who
was
able
to
gain
her
provisional
liberty by
posting
bail
of P120,000.00. This is untenable. Ms. Osorio was able to post bail only
on November 26, 2001 (Rollo, p. 5) or five (5) days after respondent issued
hisclarificatory order of November 21, 2001. It is important to recall that the first
order of respondent, that dated September 17, 2001, gave the clear impression that
bail has been cancelled and from that date up to the time he issued the order dated
November 21, 2001 clarifying his position, or a period of two (2) months,
complainant stayed in jail because he has lost his right to bail as a result of the
patently erroneous and illegal order of respondent Judge. Hence, respondent is
liable for gross ignorance of the law for having denied complainant's right to bail
in a case where bail was a matter of right. Besides, the prosecution's motion was
granted two (2) days before the scheduled date of hearing thereby depriving the
accused of his right to due process.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of

the Honorable Court our recommendations that the instant complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and respondent be FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of a similar offense in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.[5]
In the Resolution of November 27, 2002, the Court required the parties to
manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings. Difficulties were encountered in notifying the parties.
Finally, on September 18, 2006, respondent manifested his willingness to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
In its undated Letter-Reply,[6] the Postmaster of Las Pias informed the
Court that the letter addressed to complainant under Registry No. 59265 dated June
23, 2005 was returned unserved with the notation RTS-Deceased.
Thus, in the Resolution of January 29, 2007, the Court deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All
persons,
except
those
charged
with
offenses
punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,

be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

that before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, all persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right.
Records show that complainant was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article
III
of
R.A.
No.
6425
which
is
punishable
by prision correccional. Following the provisions of the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
Records show that the prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail
was very precise in its prayer, i.e., that the allowance for bail granted to the
accused to secure his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest
dated May 10, 2001 be canceled as there is reasonable ground to believe and all
indications point to the probability that accused is seriously considering flight from
the prosecution of the case.
Two days before the scheduled date of hearing of the prosecutors
Motion, respondent issued the Order dated September 17, 2001, to wit:
ORDER
Considering the allegations in the Motion to Cancel Recommended

Bail filed by the State Prosecutor that both accused are considering flight,
especially accused San Miguel who is facing a number of grave criminal charges,
and the probability of the accused jumping bail is very high to warrant the
cancellation of the recommended bail, and it appearing that the accused
x x x jumped bail on May 10, 2001, the x x x motion is GRANTED. The bail
recommended xxx is considered withdrawn.
SO ORDERED.[7]
However, respondent continued with the hearing on September 19, 2001. He

considered the Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Order granting the withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended
bail.[8] This may have rectified the mistake committed by respondent as the latter
took into consideration that the accused has a right to due process as much as the
State;[9] but then, no evidence was adduced to prove that complainant was seriously
considering flight from prosecution, which was very critical to the granting or
denial of the motion of the prosecution to cancel bail.
In his Order dated November 21, 2001, to wit:
ORDER
The
question
is
whether
or
not
the
increased
bail
of P120,000.00 fixed by x x x Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, in the Warrant of

Arrest he issued on May 10, 2001 x x x was also withdrawn by the Order
dated September 17, 2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its
recommended bail.
The answer is in the negative.
On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio xxx manifested that x x x the

bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by the withdrawal of the
prosecution's recommended bail. That is correct. Any of the accused, therefore,
could have applied for bail thereunder. They could have even moved for the
lifting of the warrant dated May 10. But, they did not.
It is clear from the [September] 17 Order that only the bail

recommended by the prosecutor was considered withdrawn. Such Order does
not speak of cancellation of theP120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding
Judge x x x.
SO ORDERED.[10]
respondent clarified that the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by the
withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail; only the bail recommended by
the prosecutor in the amount of P60,000.00 was considered withdrawn in the Order
of September 17, 2001. This belated order cannot exonerate respondent from
liability. The bail in the amount of P60,000.00 was already forfeited as a
consequence of complainant's jumping bail.[11] How then can respondent claim that
he merely canceled the recommended bail of P60,000.00 when the same had
already been forfeited? The only recommended bail that remains subject of the
Motion of the prosecutor is the increased bail in the amount of P120,000.00. Thus,
there remains no other conclusion except that respondent canceled the
recommended bail in the increased amount of P120,000.00. The Order
ofSeptember 17, 2001 effectively deprived complainant of his constitutional right
to bail when it was issued two days before the scheduled hearing on September 19,
2001.
The OCA was right in observing that it was a mere afterthought on the part
of respondent in issuing the clarificatory Order, for how can the latter cancel
the P60,000.00 bail when the same was already forfeited as a consequence of
complainant's jumping bail?
And even granting for the sake of argument that complainant was also
charged with the crime of murder on September 14, 2001, or three days before the
Order of cancellation was issued, respondent failed to consider that what was being
prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended bail for
violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the crime of murder.
Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due
hearing was justified considering that complainant was already detained for the
non-bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered, is
misplaced.
As we opined in Andres v. Beltran,[12] it is a misconception that when an
accused is charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or that
the crime of murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with
an offense that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x x x is
discretionary on the part of the trial court. In other words, accused is still entitled
to bail but no longer "as a matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary and calls for
a judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant
bail. The prosecution is accorded ample opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong.[13]
As we held in Sy Guan v. Amparo,[14] where bail is a matter of right and

prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be
allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater
discretion than to increase the bondto such an amount as would reasonably tend
to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be
subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be
required.[15]
Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing, we find that the
prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that there exists a high probability
of accused's jumping bail that would warrant the cancellation of the recommended
bail bond. Following then the above ratiocination, respondent's only recourse is to
fix a higher amount of bail and not cancel the P120,000.00 bail fixed by
Judge Alumbres.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a partys remedy, if prejudiced by the orders
of a judge given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing court, and not
with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.[16] As a matter of policy,
in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous.[17] A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment unless there is
proof that the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit an
injustice. Thus, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge
in the performance of his official duties makes him liabletherefor.[18] The Court
has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.[19]
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge
must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[20] Complainant, having failed to
present positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting the Motion without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
Anent the allegation that complainant was deprived of his right to due
process, we find the same meritorious.
Sec. 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Respondent's issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order two days prior to the
scheduled hearing without considering complainant's Opposition to the Motion,
effectively deprived the latter of his constitutional right to due process. As above
stated, during the September 19, 2001 hearing, respondent considered the
Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order,
albeit, the prosecutor was merely ordered to file its reply thereto without adducing
evidence to prove the high probability that complainant will jump bail.
Respondent's issuance of the assailed Order before the scheduled hearing is
premature and is tantamount to misconduct. Thus, we find respondent guilty of
simple misconduct. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of
a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause.[21] It generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. Respondent may not be held guilty of gross misconduct because the term
gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be
excused; flagrant; shameful.[22] In this case, complainant was not able to post bail
because there is no other way for a lay man to interpret the assailed Order except
that it effectively canceled the bail bond fixed by JudgeAlumbres, thereby
depriving him of his right to temporary liberty as a result of respondent's erroneous
Order.
WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Branch 275,
Las Pias City is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINED in the amount
of P5,000.00 with aWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
Rollo, pp. 2-5.

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Rollo, pp. 41-48.
Id. at 69-72.
Id. at 70-72.
Id. at 88.
Rollo, p. 13.
Id. at 31.
People v. Lacson, 459 Phil. 330, 346-347 (2003).
Rollo, p. 33.
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 114, Sec. 21.
415 Phil. 598 (2001).
Andres v. Beltran, supra note 12, at 603-604.
79 Phil. 670 (1947).
Id. at 671-672.
Dadula v.Ginete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1500, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 575, 587.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
Id. at 587.
Pantig v. Daing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1791, July 8, 2004, 434 SCRA 7, 16.
Dadula v. Ginete, supra note 16, at 587.
Zuo v. Cabebe, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 382, 391.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005,
468 SCRA 21, 35.
Id. at 35-36.
EN BANC
CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 5426

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO
GARCIA,
VELASCO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
- versus -
ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 3, 2007
x------------------------------------ --------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The
complaint
instant
administrative
filed
case
stemmed
from
the
by Chita Pantoja-Mumar charging
respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit,

falsification of document, breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It
appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute
Sale[1] for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property
in Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of the
spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure
a torrens title[2] over the property under their names.
In the verified Complaint[3] dated March 17, 2001, complainant alleged that
respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale
dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through,
and the deed was not notarized. She further narrated, thus:
8. [Respondent], knowing fully well that there actually was no transaction
between the Pantojas and the Perezes, notarized the same document apparently in
violation of his oath as a lawyer and a breach of his duty as a notary public. Worst
was the fact that [the] spouses Perez and the respondent had the
document thumbmarked by [a person other than] Maximina Pantoja as appearing
above in the same typewritten name. Attached is an enlarged Machine Copy
of Maximina Pantojas true and genuine thumbmark as Annex C while an
enlarged machine copy of thethumbmark appearing above her typewritten name
in the said document is attached as Annex D for comparison;
9. Moreover, the respondent x x x made it appear in the falsified/fabricated and
forged document that the same was acknowledged before him on December 29,
1987, when in truth and in fact, he and [the] spouses Perez prepared, falsified,
fabricated and forged the said document after June 13, 1988, when they were able
to fraudulently secure the first page thereof from Lucresia P. Awe, not to mention
the fact that neither of the parties to the said document appeared before him as
required under the notarial law. This is supported by the written declaration of
[the] spouses Perez dated June 25, 1988 that they bought the property on June 13,
1988 for P40,000.00, a photocopy of which is attached as Annex E hereof.
10. On the basis of such falsified, fabricated and forged document denominated as
Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, [the] spouses Perez with the help of
respondent attorney, were able to effect the issuance of a title over the abovedescribed property in their names to the damage and prejudice of complainant and
the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. Attached as Annex F is a
photocopy of the title;[4]
Respondent denies the charges against him. His version of what transpired
during the signing and notarization of the document is as follows:
9. x x x [D]uring the signing of the document at the ancestral home of
the Pantojas on
December
29,
1987,
by
surviving
spouse Celedonia Lumen Pantoja and all the children (except Mrs. Mumar), the
respondent called the attention of Mrs. Pantoja to the fact that Mrs. Mumar was
not a signatory to the document because she was absent. Mrs. Pantoja pleaded
with the respondent to proceed with the notarization of the document because she
badly needed the money. She promised to have the document signed by
Mrs. Mumar as soon as she would come toDanao City;
10. But Mrs. Pantoja did not make good her promise. So, on February 24,
1989, Edilberto Perez (vendee) sent a registered letter to Mrs. Chita P. Mumar at
her address at Talibon, Bohol, informing her of the sale of their 3.3526 hectare
property located in Pandan, Cambanay, Danao City, covered by Tax Dec. 0080895, a copy of the letter is hereto attached as Annex F. The letter was received
by her son Odelio Mumar on March 2, 1989, per postal registry return card hereto
attached as Annex G;
11. Obviously, as early as March 2, 1989, complainant Mumar already
knew of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale. Therefore, her right of
action, whether civil, criminal or administrative, is barred by prescription. She is
also guilty of laches in failing to assert her right for an unreasonable length of
time;
12. Lastly, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale was published in
the Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the cities and province
of Cebu in its issues of March 18, 23 and 31, 1989, as shown by an Affidavit of
Publication by its Editor-in-Chief Pacheco Seares, a copy of said affidavit is
hereto attached as Annex H.[5]
He alleged that no criminal charges for falsification were filed against him,
and it was only on January 11, 2000 that seven of the ten heirs of Jose Pantoja, Sr.
filed a civil case for Recovery of Ownership, Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale, Accounting and Damages.[6]
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on November
26,
2001.
The
case
was
assigned
to
Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa. A mandatory conference was held on October
15, 2003, where only the complainant appeared and manifested that she was
willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted. She
requested for additional time to file a verified position paper.
For his part, respondent filed a Manifestation that he received the notice of
mandatory conference, but requested to be excused therefrom. He stated that he
was also willing to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings.
In her Position Paper, complainant reiterated the allegations in her
complaint. She insisted that respondent forged her signature, which originally did
not appear on the first page of the document before it was borrowed. She added
that respondent had also falsified a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to make it
appear that one of her co-heirs had authorized another to sign the deed for her.
According to the complainant, respondent dated the questioned document
December 29, 1987, when in fact the first page containing all the signatures of
the heirs was borrowed only on June 13, 1988. Even the spouses Perez declared in
writing that they had bought the subject property on June 13, 1988. The
complainant stressed that the spouses Perez were able to secure a certificate of title
to the subject property because of the forged document.
In his Comment on the Position Paper, respondent alleged that the
allegations in the complaint are self-serving and not supported by evidence. To
prove his point, respondent enclosed the original duplicate of the SPA which was
notarized on November 4, 1987, and the transcript of stenographic notes in Civil
Case No. DNA-574, particularly the testimony of Clarita Manulat, who testified on
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the SPA and handcarried it
to Pasig on June 20, 1987.
Regarding Maximinas thumbmark, respondent recalled that on December
29, 1987, he, Clarita Manulat, and vendee Filomena Perez went to the residence
of CeledoniaPantoja as previously agreed upon. Only the complainant was not
present. After the other heirs finished signing the document, Mrs. Pantoja asked
permission from respondent if she could bring the document inside the bedroom
because she would be coaxing her daughter to affix her thumbmark.
Mrs. Pantoja told them that Maximina was reclusive and suffering from mental
imbalance.
According to respondent, the so-called thumbmark of Maximina which

appears on the cedula is the fake one. He surmised that this thumbmark was
probably affixed on thecedula by one of her sisters, since Maximina would not
come out of her room and had to be coaxed by her mother to affix
her thumbmark on the document. Respondent also enclosed a copy of the transcript
of his testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574.
In reply, complainant pointed out that respondent had admitted that he did
not see Maximina affix her thumbmark on the assailed Deed, yet he notarized it;
respondent had also admitted that he had committed a breach of his office as a
notary public on cross-examination in Civil Case No DNA-574. Respondents
belief that Maximina Pantoja was suffering from some mental ailment and yet still
notarized it only proves his misconduct.
In her Report dated January 16, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner found
that while the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be
resolved in the civil case, the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public
have been duly established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:
1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on
or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was
not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to
be December 29, 1987;
2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the
authority and/or in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;
3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix
her thumbmark to the document; and
4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did
not sign it.[7]
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions
were established through respondents own admission that he notarized the
document even ifMaximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence,
and that complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed. The Investigating
Commissioner also considered respondents testimony in Civil Case No. DNA574.[8] Citing Gonzales v. Ramos,[9] Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
the notarial commission of respondent be revoked; and that he be disqualified from

reappointment as notary public for a period of two years and suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated May 26, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline approved Resolution No. XVII-2006-281, worded
as follows:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent was remiss in his duties as notaries public, Atty. Januario C. Flores is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Respondents notarialcommission
is Revoked
and
Disqualified from
reappointment for two (2) years.
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty,

meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is
through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public
one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of
authenticity
and
due
execution.[10] Indeed,
a
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for
this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties.[11] Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.[12] A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a
document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and
ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.[13]
As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent admitted

he did not actually see one of the signatories to the subject deed sign, and that he
notarized the deed despite the absence of the complainants signature:
Q. In other words, you were not present when Maximina Pantoja affixed
her thumbmark on Exhibit 2?
A.
I was present, but I did not see Maximina Pantoja affixed (sic)
her thumbmark on Exhibit 2. I just presumed that it was
her thumbmark because I relied on the statement and representation of
Mrs. Celedonia Pantoja that
she
was
going
to
coax
her
daughter, Maximina Pantoja, to affix her thumbmark. Right after, when she
came out from her bedroom, the document had already
a thumbmark of Maximina Pantoja (TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No.
DNA-570, pp. 20-21).
xxxx
Q. Even without the signature of Chita Mumar [complainant], you notarized the
document?
A. There is nothing wrong. What would have been a gross mistake on my part if
somebody [else affixed] the signature of Chita Mumar when I notarized it.
Q. But you correctly notarized the document even without the signature
of Chita Mumar, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And do you think that is proper, legal and ethical on the part of the
Public?
Notary
A. No. (TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No. DNA-574, pp. 28-29).[14]
Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining

that all the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the public
on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01
thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great
caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where
any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would
accomplish the end desired.[15]Considering that this is the respondents first
administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBPs recommendation of a twoyear suspension from the practice of law to one year.[16]
The Court also finds it unnecessary to discuss the other matters raised by the
parties, since they involve the merits of Civil Case No. DNA-574, best left for the
trial court to decide.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores is GUILTY of
violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2)
years. He is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken
effect.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.

Id. at 8.
[3]
Id. at 1-3.
[4]
Id. at 2.
[5]
Id. at 17.
[6]
Id. at 30-36.
[7]
Report dated January 16, 2006, p. 11.
[8]
Id. at 11-12.
[9]
A.C. No. 6649, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 352, 359.
[10]
Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 329, 347.
[11]
Traya, Jr. v. Villamor, A.C. No. 4595, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 293, 296, citing Realino v. Villamor, 87
SCRA 318 (1978).
[12]
Serzo v. Flores, A.C. No. 6040, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 412, 416 citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403 SCRA 216,
220-221 (2003).
[13]
Social Security Commission v. Coral, A.C. No. 6249, October 14, 2004, 440 SCRA 291, 296.
[14]
Report dated January 16, 2006, p. 12.
[15]
Buado v. Layag, A.C. No. 5182, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 159, 166.
[16]
The IBPs Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions enumerates the following factors to be considered in
imposing sanctions after a finding of lawyer misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyers mental state;
(c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyers misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors (Rule 3.0).
According to Rule 9.32(a), the absence of a prior disciplinary record is a mitigating factor.
[2]
FIRST DIVISION
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE,

INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 149875

Present:

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
-
versus -
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. A. D. VALMONTE,
Respondent.
April 2, 2007
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing
the Decision[2] dated April 20, 2001 and Resolution[3] dated September 6, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54302, entitled AMA Computer College,
Inc., plaintiff-appellant, versus Atty. A.D. Valmonte, defendant-appellee.
On April 16, 1991, petitioner AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA), an

educational institution established and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City a complaint for
suspension as an attorney against Atty. A. D. Valmonte, respondent, under
Section 27[4] and Section 28,[5]Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1038.
The complaint alleges that sometime in 1983, petitioner AMA and Emilio V.
Tayao executed a contract of lease over the latters parcel of land
in Makati City. The parties agreed, among others, that the period of the lease
shall be for six (6) years; that the land will be used by petitioner as site for its
school; and that it has an option to purchase the property.
When petitioner was about to exercise its option to buy the land, Tayao
commenced a scheme to frustrate the formers plan by obtaining a loan from an
absent party the FELN International Corporation (FELN). To secure the loan, he
executed three (3) simulated promissory notes amounting to P4.5 million in favor
of FELN. The notes were without any consideration.
Allegedly, Tayao defaulted in the payment of the loan. So, on July 13, 1989,
FELN, through its alleged president Lai Chen Hsung, filed with the RTC, Branch
59, MakatiCity a fabricated complaint for collection of a sum of money against
Tayao, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-4567. FELNs counsel was respondent Atty.
A. D. Valmonte.
On July 24, 1989, Tayao and FELN executed a Compromise Agreement

whereby the former will pay the loan on or before July 31, 1989. This
Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court in its Compromise
Judgment dated August 8, 1989.
Subsequently, FELN filed with the trial court a motion for execution of its
Compromise Judgment alleging that Tayao failed to comply with his obligation on
time, specifically to pay his loan of P50 million. The motion was
granted. Eventually, the building occupied by petitioner was levied upon by the
sheriff.
Petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion to lift the order of levy
and execution but it was denied on the ground that the Compromise Judgment
has become final and executory. This prompted petitioner to file with the RTC,
Branch 59 a complaint for suspension as attorney against respondent. Petitioner
alleged therein that respondent committed fraudulent acts by filing a mock
action for sum of money against Tayao based on fictitious promissory notes.
Respondents purpose was to deprive petitioner of its option to buy the subject
property which, because of the levy on execution, disrupted the academic
operation of its school with 3,000 students.
In his answer (with counterclaim) to petitioners complaint, respondent

alleged that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Tayao. The
Compromise Judgment in Civil Case No. 89-4567 has long become final and
executory and bars petitioner from assailing the same.
On September 4, 1990, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the

complaint for non-suit and authorized respondent to adduce his evidence exparte. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was partly granted by
the trial court by allowing counsel to cross-examine respondent.
On May 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its Decision[6] in favor of
respondent, ordering petitioner to pay the latter P300,000.00 as moral damages
and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, holding that:
From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the defendant,

the Court is convinced that the filing of this case for the suspension of defendant from
the practice of law had unnecessarily and unjustly maligned his professional reputation,
competence and integrity. Being in the active practice of law for 40 years, 27 years of
which were spent in the law firm of William H. Quasha as senior partner, it is difficult to
believe that defendant would resort to fraud and deceit in the exercise of his profession.
xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision promulgated on April 20,

2001, affirmed the Decision of the trial court with modification in the sense that
the moral damages and attorneys fees were reduced to P100,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the

appellate court in its Resolution dated September 6, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

Decision of the trial court finding that its complaint against respondent was filed
in bad faith; and in awarding respondent moral damages and attorneys fees.
In his comment, respondent prays that the petition be dismissed on the

ground of res judicata.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,

provides:
Filing of petition with the Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by

certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, in a petition for review on certiorari, this Court is limited to

reviewing errors of law absent any showing that the findings of fact of the
appellate court are not supported by the records.[7]
Petitioner, in urging us to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and

thus suspend respondent from the practice of law, alleged in its petition that the
promissory notes executed by Tayao in favor of FELN have been simulated; that
FELN is a fictitious entity; that Civil Case No. 89-4567 is a mock suit; that the
Compromise Agreement is a sham; and that respondent fraudulently prevented
petitioner from exercising its right to purchase the property. In other words,
petitioner wants to relitigate the facts and issues already passed upon by the trial
court and sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner pleads that we substitute our own judgment to those

of the trial court and the appellate court by conducting our own evaluation of the
evidence. This contravenes Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules requiring the petition
to raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its
function
to
analyze
or
weigh
evidence
all
over
again, subject to certain exceptions,[8] none of which is present here.
Moreover, petitioner was declared non-suited by the trial court. The

allegations in its complaint, therefore, remain unsubstantiated.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54302 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
Filed under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Cancio
C. Garcia (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed), Rollo,
pp. 38-47.
Id., p. 49.
[4]
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willingly appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[5]
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. The Court
of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
[6]
[7]
[8]
Rollo, pp. 171-176.

Bernaldez v. Francia, G.R. No. 143929, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 488.
The exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of
the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts which, if properly taken into
account, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence upon which they are based; and (8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.
FIRST DIVISION
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR.,
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1932
for and in behalf of LUMOT
(formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1837-RTJ)
ANLAP JALANDONI,
Complainant,
Present:

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus-
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
JUDGE DEMOSTHENES L.
MAGALLANES and Clerk of Court
GIA INDEPENDENCIA L. ARINDAY,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Bacolod City,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 2, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint[1] against Judge

Demosthenes L. Magallanes, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 54, and Atty. Gia L. Arinday,
clerk of court of the said branch. The complaint, dated August 8,
2003, was filed by Humberto Lim, Jr., for and in behalf of Lumot
Anlap Jalandoni.
Complainant Jalandoni was one of the defendants in Civil

Case No. 97-9680[2] assigned to Branch 54 of RTC Bacolod City.
Despite a period of over five years from the time it was submitted
for decision, the case remained unresolved as of the filing of the
complaint[3].
In a letter dated July 7, 2003[4] addressed to respondent clerk

of court, defendants requested for copies of all court pleadings and
incidents on record pertaining to the civil case. Despite repeated
follow-up,[5] respondent clerk of court failed to act on the request.
On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 02-24328 & 0224329[6], and 02-24330 & 02-24331[7] (in which complainants
family corporation was a party) were also assigned to Branch 54 of
RTC Bacolod City. In one of the hearings, complainant noticed that
respondent judge seated himself with the counsels of the opposing
party and engaged them in conversation. When complainants
counsel arrived, respondent judge suddenly stood up and took the
bench.[8]
The
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
(OCA)
required
respondent judge and clerk of court to file their respective

comments.[9] Both failed to comply. On December 8, 2003,
tracers[10] were sent to them reiterating OCAs directive to file their
comments.
On January 6, 2004, respondent judge submitted his

comment[11] explaining that it was with deep regret that he was
unable to resolve and timely dispose of the case. He claimed he was
suffering from heart ailment and hyperacidity which made him
easily exhausted, causing the delay in resolving the cases pending
in his court. His decision-making was further hampered when his

stenographer suffered a stroke and became bedridden. He also
averred that he had explained his condition to the parties to the
case and the latter understood his predicament.
On the other hand, respondent clerk of court failed to submit

her comment in continued defiance of the OCAs directives.
The
OCA
found
the
respondent
judges
explanation
unmeritorious. While his condition was understandable, it was only

mitigating and could not exculpate him from liability. He should
have asked the Court for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. The OCA recommended a fine of P11,000 with a
stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt
with more severely.[12]
As to respondent clerk of court, the OCA recommended that

she
be
required
to
show
cause
why
she
should
not
be
administratively dealt with for her failure to submit her comment.
On March 18, 2005, however, complainant manifested her

lack of interest in pursuing the administrative case. After receiving
the decision on the civil case, she became convinced that
respondent judge was, after all, impartial. Moreover, respondent
judge inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases, disproving

any personal interest in the cases. She likewise conducted her own
investigation and was satisfied that respondent clerk of court had
no part in the refusal to furnish the requested documents since she
was not present when the requests were made. For these reasons,
she moved to withdraw the complaint.[13]
On June 29, 2005, this Court denied the motion to withdraw

the case and submitted the matter for resolution. As for respondent
clerk of court, she had been given two opportunities to comment on
the complaint. Her refusal was deemed a waiver of her right to do
so.
A motion to withdraw an administrative complaint against a

member of the judiciary cannot deprive this Court of its authority to
ascertain
the
culpability
of
respondent
and
impose
the
corresponding penalty.[14] This Court has a great interest in the

conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of the judiciary
in ensuring the prompt and efficient delivery of justice at all
times. Its efforts to comply with its constitutional mandate cannot
be frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties[15] because
the issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant
has a cause of action against the respondents but whether the
latter breached the norms and standards of the courts.[16]
Respondent judge admitted that he failed to resolve Civil Case

No. 97-9680 for more than five years. This was a violation of the
Constitution which mandates that lower courts must dispose of
their cases promptly and decide them within three months from the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself.[17] It was also a violation of
the Canon
of
Judicial
Ethics[18] and Code
of
Judicial
Conduct[19] which required judges to dispose of the courts business

promptly and decide cases within the required periods.[20]
A judge should be efficient in performing his judicial duties.

He should decide his cases within the prescribed period; failure to
do so constitutes gross inefficiency. The raison d etre of courts lies
not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do
so seasonably.[21]
Respondent judge could not use his health condition and the
absence of his stenographer to justify his failure to promptly resolve
the civil case. Moreover, the fact that the parties to the case
supposedly understood his condition did not excuse him from
complying with the period which he was mandated to observe in
deference to the Courts policy of speedy disposition of cases. At the
very least, he should have asked for an extension. While this Court
understands that judges cannot always abide by the prescribed
periods, it is not for us to take the initiative in offering an extension.
In numerous cases, we have allowed extensions but always upon

the proper application by the judge concerned and on meritorious
grounds. His failure to ask for an extension was therefore
inexcusable.
The eventual rendition of the decision notwithstanding,

respondent judge should nevertheless be penalized for having
incurred undue delay. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, this is
a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office
for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of more
than P10,000
but
not
exceeding P20,000.
Considering
the
unreasonable delay of more than five years, the maximum fine

of P20,000 should be imposed on him.
Regarding the charge of bias and partiality against respondent

judge, there was no evidence to support the allegation. The
standard
of
substantial
evidence
required
in
administrative
proceedings means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The records are
bereft of substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable for
this. At best, the allegations were mere presumptions which did not
meet the mandated standard. Respondent judge should not be held
responsible for allegations which were not proven.
The Court has never hesitated to discipline lower court judges

and court personnel found guilty of violations of the law or
the Canon of Judicial Ethics and Code of Judicial Conduct. But it
has likewise never wavered in exonerating them when the charges
are baseless. Let the guilty be severely brought to book but let
those who are innocent enjoy merited exoneration to which they are
entitled as a matter of justice.[22]
Lastly, respondent clerk of court was directed to comment on

the complaint twice. Her refusal to controvert the charges against
her was in effect an admission of the same. In any case, the
records are clear that complainant sent her two written requests for
the issuance of copies of the documents. Both demands were never
heeded. In an attempt, however, to exonerate respondent clerk of
court, complainant later manifested that after conducting a
personal investigation, she allegedly discovered that respondent
should not be made accountable since she was not present when
the requests were made.
We disagree. Respondent clerk of court was remiss in her

duties.
Section 5 (a) and (d) of RA 6713[23] reads:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of

their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests - All public officials and
employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof,
respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent
by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d) Act immediately on the publics personal transactions. - All public

officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail
himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act
promptly and expeditiously.
She violated the foregoing provisions. This constituted neglect

of duty which cannot be countenanced. She should be reminded of
her sacred duty as an officer of the court to attend to the publics
queries.[24] Her alleged absence when the requests were made
cannot exculpate her.
Under Section 52 (C) (13) and (15), Rule IV of the Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, respondent clerk
of courts infraction is classified as a light offense.
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.
C. The following are light offenses with corresponding penalties:
xxx
xxx
xxx
13. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen days from
receipt xxx
1st Offense Reprimand

2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense Dismissal
xxx
xxx
xxx
15. Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services
of the office, or act promptly and expeditiously on public transactions.
1st Offense Reprimand

2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense Dismissal
This being her first offense, respondent clerk of court is

subject to reprimand with a stern warning that the commission of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. She is also admonished to be more diligent in complying
with the orders of the OCA. Her defiance to lawful orders does not
speak well of a court employee and a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes is

hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision and
is FINEDTwenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000). Respondent clerk of
court Atty.
Gia
Independencia
hereby REPRIMANDED with
a STERN
Arinday
WARNING that
is
the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt

with more severely.
Let this order be entered in the records of Judge Magallanes

and Atty. Arinday.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
Rollo, pp. 1-7.

Leonardo Tayapad v. Totti Anlap, et al., id., pp. 9-11.
August 12, 2003.
Rollo, p. 32.
Written demands dated July 7, 2003 and July 17, 2003, id., pp. 32-33.
People of the Philippines v. Dennis Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin.
People of the Philippines v. Carmen Jalbuena y Jalandoni.
Rollo, pp. 5-6.
Id., pp. 35-36.
Id., pp. 73-74.
Id., pp. 75-76.
Id., pp. 80-84. The OCA noted that as of January 5, 2005, the decision on the civil case was already due for
release.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
Manifestation / Motion to Withdraw, rollo, pp. 85-88.

Castelo v. Florendo, A.M. No. P-96-1179, 10 October 2003, 413 SCRA 219.
Camsa v. Rendon, 448 Phil. 1 (2003).
Mamaclay v. Francisco, 447 Phil. 356 (2003).
Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary took effect on June 1, 2004. The act
complained of was committed in 1998. In any event, Sec. 6 of Canons of Judicial Ethics provided:
6. Promptness
[A judge] should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that
justice delayed is often justice denied.
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 provided:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1,
2004 superseded the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct to the extent that the
provisions or concepts therein are embodied in the New Code. provided, however, that in case of
deficiency or absence of specific provisions in the New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code
of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character.
Vicente Pichon v. Judge Lucilo Rallos, 444 Phil. 131 (2003).
Santos v. Lorenzo, 436 Phil. 209 (2002).
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Muyco v. Saratan, A.M. No. P-03-1761, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA 1.
THIRD DIVISION
CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO,
A.C. No. 6051
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 2, 2007
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified complaint[1] dated June 14, 2002, complainant Celia ArroyoPosidio prayed for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan on
account of deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in violation of the
lawyers oath.
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in Special

Proceeding No. C-525, entitled Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de Guzman
Arroyo,filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Complainant paid
respondent legal fees in the amount of P20,000.00. However, on June 6, 1990,
respondent withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said case, thus
complainant engaged the services of another lawyer.
Sometime in August 1996, respondent contacted complainant and showed

her documents consisting of tax declarations of properties purportedly forming
part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but were not included in the
Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525. He
convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged
undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After
several months, however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant
decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of
the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands.
Consequently, complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages

against
respondent
before
Branch
81,
Metropolitan
Trial
Court, Valenzuela City which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7130. On March 31,
1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREEFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to:
1.
To pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from September 7, 1996 until the same is fully paid and/or satisfied;
2.
To pay plaintiff the amount of P8,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
3.
To pay the cost of suit.[2]
Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed[3] the

Metropolitan Trial Court decision in toto. Thus, complainant filed a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted on March 19, 2001.[4]
To satisfy the judgment against him, respondent issued Prudential Bank

check number 0338742[5] dated May 31, 2001 in the amount of P120,000.00 in
favor of complainant. However, upon presentment for payment, the check was
dishonored for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of
dishonor and demand[6]dated September 3, 2001, respondent refused to honor
his obligation. Hence, this administrative complaint charging respondent with
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in violation of the lawyers
oath.
Respondent denied complainants allegations. He admitted having

received the amount of P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial
payment for his services in Special Proceeding Case No. C-525. Further, he
alleged that he had already paid complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as
evidenced by a Receipt & Quitclaim[7] dated August 10, 2000.
On March 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 15,
2006, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report[8] finding respondent
guilty of violating the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in
defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same. Thus
4.3
xxx
Noteworthy is the factual finding of the court that Complainant had already paid
respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for services he had rendered in Special
Proceeding case No. C-525. Thus, Respondents claim that the P100,000.00 given to him
by Complainant allegedly for payment of his legal services in the Special Proceeding is
not correct. The MTC decision likewise found that Respondent requested payment of
the P100,000.00 in consideration for his representing Complainant in the additional
claims to be filed against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. Respondent,
however, failed to file the claims. Hence, complainant demanded the return of
the P100,000.00. The MTC decision has already become final and executory as
evidenced by a copy of the Order of Writ of Execution issued by the Court.
4.4
xxx
4.5 As already pointed out, the RTC had rendered a decision affirming in toto
the decision of the MTC that the P100,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent is
not for the payment of his previous services rendered in the Special Proceeding case No.
C-525 but rather as payment for filing of an additional claim from the estate of the late
Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. It is clear that there is identity of parties in the civil case
for recovery of sum of money and damages and in the administrative case for
disbarment filed by herein Complainant. Thus, while the causes of action are different
in the two cases, there is conclusiveness on the factual circumstances surrounding
Complainants delivery of the P100,000.00 to Respondent. Respondent*s+ bare
assertion that his receipt of the P100,000.00 was for payment of legal services
previously rendered in the Special Proceeding case No. C-525 does not hold water and
cannot overturn the factual conclusions reached by the MTC in its decision.
4.6
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for deceit or misrepresentation
to the prejudice of or as a means to defraud his client. In the case of Munar v.
Flores, the Supreme Court suspended an attorney who deceitfully defrauded a client
of a sum of money allegedly representing cost of fees and other miscellaneous
expenses for a suit to be filed but which promised suit he never filed nor did he return
the amount despite demands. Failure on the part of the lawyer, upon demand, to
return to his client the funds or property held by him on the latters behalf gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
It is clear in this case that Complainant made demands for the return of
the P100,000.00, but the same remained unanswered by Respondent. This prompted
Complainant to file a civil case for collection of sum of money and damages. Worse,
after the decision was rendered in favor of Complainant, and a writ of execution issued,
Respondent issued a check purportedly to settle the case only to have the check bounce
for insufficiency of funds. The conversion of the clients property is a gross violation of
general morality as well as professional ethics, and deserves severe punishment. This
conversion of clients property is a ground for disciplinary action and presupposes
fraudulent intent on the part of the lawyer. In the case of Manalato v. Reyes, the
Supreme Court emphasized that fraudulent intent may be inferred from the lawyers
refusal to make restitution after demand. Such circumstance is present in this case.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, this Commissioner respectfully recommends that a

penalty ranging from suspension for a period of six (6) months to one (1) year at the
discretion of the Board be imposed with warning that repetition of similar conduct in
the future will warrant a more severe penalty.[9]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating

Commissioner but modified the penalty from suspension to reprimand[10] with
stern warning that a similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings of the IBP. However, we find that the penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by
respondent.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin every lawyer to act with the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his
practice of law.[11] Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct[12] and are mandated to serve their clients with
competence and diligence.[13] To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.[14]
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the

lawyer to account for all money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to
file an action, appeal an adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the
purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such
step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client.[15]
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as

legal fees for filing additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman
Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was imperative that he
immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand therefor. Having
received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was
unjustified in keeping complainants money. His obligation was to immediately
return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite complainants repeated
demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay any
man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.
A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.[16] A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith
on his part is exacted.[17] In Barnachea v. Quiocho,[18] the Court suspended a
lawyer from the practice of law for one year for his failure to return clients funds
which were given to him for the expenses for the transfer of title over real
property and in payment for his legal services. The Court held:
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may
come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the
funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a
deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over
real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately
to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return the money of his
client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said
money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer [of] funds
entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times,

comply with what the court lawfully requires.[20] It bears stressing that the
judgment against him in Civil Case No. 7130 has long become final and
executory. However, up to this date, he has failed to comply with the order to
pay complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as well as interest and attorneys
fees. His refusal to comply with the said order constitutes a willful disobedience
to the courts lawful orders.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court.[21] And while respondent issued a check in the
amount of P120,000.00 in favor of complainant, purportedly to satisfy the
judgment against him, the check was later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account. Respondent never denied the issuance of the check or
refuted complainants allegations regarding the same. Neither did he question
the veracity of complainants evidence which consisted of the check itself.
Needless to say, the act of issuing a bouncing check further compounded

respondents infractions. Time and again, we have held that the act of a lawyer in
issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes willful
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law
and lawyers.[22] Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action.[23]
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting
moral and ethical standards imposed on members of the legal profession.
Respondents refusal to return complainants money upon demand, his failure to
comply with the lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the issuance of a
bouncing check, reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal profession is a

privilege. Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the
duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.[24]
The Court believes that a penalty of suspension is called for under the
circumstances. In Espiritu v. Cabredo IV,[25] a lawyer was suspended for one year
for failure to account for and return the amount of P51,161.00 to his
client. In Reyes v. Maglaya,[26] a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to
return to his client the amount ofP1,500.00 despite numerous
demands. Likewise, in Castillo v. Taguines,[27] a lawyer was suspended for one
year for failure to return to his client the amount of P500.00 and for issuing a
bouncing check.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of the respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all the courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-4.

Id. at 5.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 9.
[5]
Id. at 8.
[6]
Id. at 10-11.
[7]
Id. at 33.
[8]
Id. at 70-82. Penned by Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
[9]
Id. at 76-81.
[10]
Id. at 69.
[11]
Ong v. Unto, 426 Phil. 531, 540 (2002).
[12]
Rule 1.01, Canon I, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[13]
Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[14]
Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon Jr., 392 Phil. 394, 402 (2000).
[2]
[15]
Schulz v. Flores, 462 Phil. 601, 612 (2003).

Villanueva v. Ishiwata, A.C. No. 5041, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 401, 405.
[17]
Navarro v. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520, 527 (1998).
[18]
447 Phil. 67 (2003).
[19]
Id. at 75.
[20]
Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 402.
[21]
Sibulo v. Ilagan, A.C. No. 4711, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 1, 7.
[22]
Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 335.
[23]
Cuizon v. Macalino, Adm. Case No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 484.
[24]
Malhabour v. Atty. Sarmiento, A.C. No. 5417, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 1, 9.
[25]
443 Phil. 24 (2003).
[26]
313 Phil. 1 (1995).
[27]
325 Phil. 1 (1996).
[16]

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163656

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

ATTYS. MARIO A. SALDEVAR and

April 27, 2007

The pertinent facts are as follows.

Petitioner Marina B. Schroeder owns a liquor store in Robinsons

Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the National

The DOJ issued a Resolution[4] finding probable cause to indict respondents

The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a motion for

Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,

Petitioner contends that the determination of probable cause is an

We find the petition meritorious.

Furthermore, note that the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Rollo, pp. 38-50.

JUAN DULALIA, JR.,

A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,

By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building

By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 6691

ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ,

Complainant Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz

by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against him to obtain an improper

Respondent filed his Comment on April 6, 2005. He contends that when he

Although respondent failed to live up to this expectation, there is no evidence that

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Rollo, pp. 2-33.

SPOUSES RODOLFO and

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1735

JUDGE EVELYN L. DIMACULANGAN- Promulgated:

April 27, 2007

This is an administrative complaint filed by spouses Rodolfo and

In their complaint[1] dated 16 October 2001, complainants stated that they

Complainants asserted that at the hearing on 12 October 2001, their counsel

Mrs. Cabico, isauli mo ang lahat ng pera nila, ngayon din

Complainants alleged that the utterance caused Sylvia Cabico great

Complainants asserted that

Maaari naman kayong kumuha ng ibang abogado at maaari ninyong palitan ma

Misis, bakit ayaw mong pumirma. Sige, huwag mo ng asahan na masisingil mo

In her Comment dated 10 January 2002, respondent Judge offered the

1. This administrative complaint arose from the machination and prodding of

Atty. Inton also asserted that on 16 October 2001, complainants prepared

In her Supplemental Answer with Leave of Court[9] dated 21 March 2003,

On 10 April 2003, complainants filed a Reply to Supplemental Answer and

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

In its evaluation of the allegations of both complainants and respondent

The complaint presented the issues of manifest partiality of respondent Judge in

The OCA recommended that this case be re-docketed as a

The Courts Ruling

There is no question that on 12 October 2001, respondent Judge dismissed