DEFENSES

SUMMARY
1. Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause of injury
2. Comparative v Contributory Negligence (Article 2179)
3. Assumption of Risk (Article 1174)
4. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
5. Prescription (Article 1146)
6. Force Majeur / Fortuitous Event (Article 1174)
7. Diligence (Article 2180, last paragraph)
8. Mistake & Waiver
9. Emergency or sudden peril doctrine
1. Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause of injury (3 cases)
to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

1. PLDT v CA [G.R. No. 57079. September 29, 1989.] PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
FACTS:
An action for damages was instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses
against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July
30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
Defenses (PLDT):
1. injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held
responsible
2. if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole
and the conduit system
Defenses (Barte):
1. it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its
contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both
ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. Trial Court: defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban
2. CA: reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban
spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether PLDT is liable
RULING:
No.
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND. Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left
that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot
be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained
abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause
of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. 30 The perils
of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
DAMAGES; A PARTY CANNOT CHARGE ANOTHER FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE. It is basic that
private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause
thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence
he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences
of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative
thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence

for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must
fail.
2. KIM V PHIL AERIAL TAXI [G.R. No. 39309. November 24, 1933.] TEH LE KIM, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI
CO., INC., defendant-appellee. Marcelo Nubla, G. E. Campbell and W. A. Caldwell, for appellant. L. D. Lockwood, for appellee.
FACTS:
On the morning of September 4, 1931, the plaintiff herein bought, in Manila, a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of the
defendant company's hydroplanes starting from Madrigal Field in Pasay. Inasmuch as the engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he
was to make the flight, was not working satisfactorily, the said plaintiff had to wait for some time. While the engine was being tested, the
plaintiff saw how it was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it ran away from it each time in order not to
be caught by the said propeller. Before the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it was decided
to have the plaintiff make the flight therein. The plaintiff and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the plane, entering
the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in their seats to which they were strapped. Later, they were shown how the straps
could be tightened or loosened in case of accident and were instructed further not to touch anything in the plane. After an uneventful
flight, the plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait, in front of Iloilo and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom,
when the plane stopped. The pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, permitting the engine, however, to continue to function until all the
gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and carburetor. This operation was necessary in accordance with the established practice of
aviation in order to avoid danger of fire which would exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline, and to prevent the
sudden cooling of the engine which might cause serious damage, especially to the valves.
When the pilot observed that of a banca was approaching rapidly on the right hand side of the plane, he arose signalled and shouted to
the boatman to keep his banca at a distance from the plane, inasmuch as there were waves and quite a strong current, and he feared
that the banca, which had a high prow, might collide with the plane and damage either the wing or the pontoon thereof. While he was
doing this, he heard the propeller strike something. He immediately turned off the switch and, looking on the other side, he saw Bohn
picking up the plaintiff out of the water.
What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the pilot was signalling to the banca, the plaintiff
unfastened the straps around him and, not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the
ladder to the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he
threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had to be amputated.
The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the propeller stops, then turn the plane around by
hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof towards the beach, and then take the passengers to shore in a banca. The pilot in charge
of the plane has had fourteen years experience, having first learned to fly during the World War. He is duly licensed by the Department
of Commerce of the United States and by the Department of Commerce and Communications of the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry the plaintiff-appellant Teh Le Kim safe and
sound to his destination.
RULING:
Yes. Hence, it is not liable. By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane,
is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought to know furthermore
that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore.
NEGLIGENCE; DAMAGES; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. It is not difficult to understand from the circumstances of the instant
case that the plaintiff-appellant, a passenger of a hydroplane belonging to the defendant company, acted with reckless negligence in
approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That the plaintiffappellant's negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident is so clear that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to
support the conclusion that the injury to his arm and the subsequent amputation thereof, were entirely and exclusively due to his own
imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant company or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer
the consequences of his act.
3. AMERICAN EXPRESS V CORDERO [G.R. No. 138550. October 14, 2005.] AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
petitioner, vs. NOEL CORDERO, defendant.
FACTS:
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in- law, went on a three-day
holiday trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock, the group went to the Watson's Chemist
Shop located at 277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his
American Express extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the
American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and
informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent's American Express card in half with a pair of
scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front of his family
and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express
charge card.
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioner's Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior Authorizer
Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same
number as respondent's card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in
Manila and not in Hong Kong, placed his card in the "Inspect Airwarn Support System." This is the system utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards.
When the Watson's sales clerk called up petitioner's Hong Kong Office, its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to
verify the latter's identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the "Inspect Airwarn Support System." However, respondent
refused. Consequently, petitioner's representative was unable to establish the identity of the cardholder. 5 This led to the confiscation of
respondent's card.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages against petitioner.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: liable for damages.
(2) Court of Appeals: affirming the trial court's Decision with modification in the sense that the amounts of damages awarded were
reduced.
ISSUE:
Whether AMEX is liable
RULING:
No.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner's representative, enabling the latter to
determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to
petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondent's humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner's representative.
It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner's representative
and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and
that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

2. COMPARATIVE V CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant's lack of care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

Under said doctrine, the negligence of both the plaintiff and of the defendant are compared for
the purpose of reaching an equitable apportionment of their respective liabilities for the damage caused and suffered by the plaintiff.

not a defense but an apportionment of liability - meaning it is a process

4. UMALI v BACANI [G.R. No. L-40570. January 30, 1976.] TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan, which started from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio
road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
"On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Ili who was passing by saw the broken
electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Cipriano Baldomero,
a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but
the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
"Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of
Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the
broken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by the lineman of the electric plant.
DEFENSE:
The proximate cause of the boy's death by electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event
the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his
employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing
him to leave his house during that time.

ISSUE: Whether the electric

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI Pangasinan - ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff company is liable
RULING: YES
series of negligence on the part of the defendant's employee resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution, to wit: the defendant
did not cut down the banana plants which are taller than the electric posts to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line; that
after the storm they did not cut off the flow of electricity from the lines pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut; and
lastly, in not taking precautions to prevent anybody from approaching the live wires.
NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE IS PRESUMED TO BE THE NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYER. The negligence of the employee is
presumed to be negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employee.
The liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is
to prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but
also in adequately supervising them over their work.
series of negligence on the part of defendant's employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution:
1. there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and
which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary
foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line
2. even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could
have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.
3. employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live
cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire
Contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on
the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place (cut wire was very near the house where victim was living) where the fatal fallen
wire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but We cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to
life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which
could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it.
In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence of the
good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over
their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from
its finding.
5. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. v IAC [G.R. No. 65295. March 10, 1987.] PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails- and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from

his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel
(2) IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages
Defenses: if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident
and the injuries he sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether Phoenix is liable

YES

RULING:
Private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the
preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had
gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have
been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not
see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon
which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant
is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the courts.
A man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. 20% of the damages awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily
liable therefor to the former.
6. PCIB v CA [G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001.] PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK
OF ASIA AND AMERICA), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A., respondents.
FACTS:
Ford Philippines drew and issued Citibank Check. No. SN 04867 on October 19, 1977, Citibank Check No. SN 10597 on July 19, 1978
and Citibank Check No. SN-16508 on April 20, 1979, all in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for payment of its
percentage taxes. The checks were crossed and deposited with the IBAA, now PCIB, BIR's authorized collecting bank. The first check
was cleared containing an indorsement that "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." The same, however, was
replaced with two (2) IBAA's managers' checks based on a call and letter request made by Godofredo Rivera, Ford's General Ledger
Accountant, on an alleged error in the computation of the tax due without IBAA verifying the authority of Rivera. These manager's
checks were later deposited in another bank and misappropriated by the syndicate. The last two checks were cleared by the Citibank
but failed to discover that the clearing stamps do not bear any initials. The proceeds of the checks were also illegally diverted or
switched by officers of PCIB members of the syndicate, who eventually encashed them. Ford, which was compelled to pay anew the
percentage taxes, sued in two actions for collection against the two banks on January 20, 1983, barely six years from the date the first
check was returned to the drawer. The direct perpetrators of the crime are now fugitives from justice.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
st
1 case:
(1) Trial Court: Citibank and IBAA were jointly and severally liable for the checks
(2) CA: only IBAA (PCIB) solely liable for the amount of the first check
nd

2 case:
(1) Trial Court: absolved PCIB from liability and held that only the Citibank is liable for the checks issued by Ford
(2) Court of Appeals: held both banks liable for negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the erroneous
encashment of the checks.
ISSUE:
Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks
intended as payment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Or has Ford's cause of action already prescribed?

RULING:
A. Citibank Check No. SN-04867
FORD
Ford, is guilty of the "imputed contributory negligence" that would defeat its claim for reimbursement, bearing in mind that its
employees, Godofredo Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of the syndicate.
although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the
proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as
the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
IBAA/PCIB
As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive instructions only from its principal BIR and not from any
other person especially so when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very imprudent on the part of the defendant IBAA to just
rely on the alleged telephone call of one (Godofredo Rivera and in his signature to the authenticity of such signature considering that
the plaintiff is not a client of the defendant IBAA."
Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a check payable to the collecting bank in behalf of the designated
payee may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly authorized by the payor. Otherwise stated, the diversion can be justified
only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that the drawer has clothed his agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds of
such check.
The crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account
of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account only.
Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the
clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".
PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.
Citibank
None
B. Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508
PCIBank
Section 5 31 of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides that any theft affecting items in transit for clearing, shall be for
the account of sending bank, which in this case is PCIBank.
Citibank
negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its payment of Ford's checks were made in due course and
legally in order. In its defense, Citibank claims the genuineness and due execution of said checks, considering that Citibank (1) has no
knowledge of any infirmity in the issuance of the checks in question (2) coupled by the fact that said checks were sufficiently funded
and (3) the endorsement of the Payee or lack thereof was guaranteed by PCIBank (formerly IBAA), thus, it has the obligation to honor
and pay the same.
As the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to
the latter. It failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its
designated payee.
Invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations
and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN
10597 and 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in
favor of the CIR. Time and again, we have stressed that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and
confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not
the highest, degree of diligence. A bank's liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary, wherein the defense of exercise of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no moment. Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos.
By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far
greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
The relationship between a holder of a commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is that of a principal and an
agent and the diversion of the amount of the check is justified only by proof of authority from the drawer; that in crossed checks, the
collecting bank is bound to scrutinize the check and know its depositors before clearing indorsement; that as a general rule, banks are
liable for wrongful or tortuous acts of its agents within the scope and in the course of their employment; that failure of the drawee bank
to seasonably discover irregularity in the checks constitutes negligence and renders the bank liable for loss of proceeds of the checks;
that an action upon a check prescribes in ten (10) years; and that the contributory negligence of the drawer shall reduce the damages
he may recover against the collecting bank.
Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is
negligent or wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or
wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable. The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person
and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury of which complaint is made.
Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer- payor's confidential employee or agent, who by
virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not entitle the
bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise
applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them in their possession.
As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents
within the course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within
the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of
which malice is an essential element. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by
the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will it be permitted to

shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is
liable for the fraudulent acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of his employment or
authority. And if an officer or employee of a bank, in his official capacity, receives money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged
with his bank for collection, the bank is liable for his misappropriation of such sum.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF SHALL REDUCE DAMAGES HE MAY RECOVER. Finally, we also find that Ford
is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its passbook, statements of
account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in
the exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve
percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may
recover.
7. ESTACION v BERNARDO [G.R. No. 144723. February 27, 2006.] LARRY ESTACION, petitioner, vs. NOE BERNARDO, thru and his
guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, respondents.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he
boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by
respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo), and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose,
an old woman wanted to ride, so respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, respondent Noe hung or stood on
the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and 14,
the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo
truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera
where respondent Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera
crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center
where his lower left leg was amputated.
respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint 3 for damages arising
from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano.
Defenses:
reckless imprudence of respondent driver Quinquillera and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the
proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification for whatever damages they would be sentenced to pay
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily
(2) CA: affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
ISSUE:
Whether the owner of the cargo truck is liable
RULING:
Yes. Both the cargo truck and jeepney are liable to Bernardo subject

to mitigation due to contributory negligence of Bernardo

Since the Fiera driver was negligent, there arises a presumption that respondent Bandoquillo, as owner of the Fiera, is negligent in the
selection and supervision of her employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and his driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence
of Quinquillera is sufficient basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated vis-- vis their degree of negligence consistent with
Article 2179 10 of the Civil Code
"unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation"; that since the Fiera driver was negligent, there arises a presumption that respondent
Bandoquillo, as owner of the Fiera, is negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and
his driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera is sufficient basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated
vis-- vis their degree of negligence consistent with Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Respondent Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such
act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. 24 Respondent Noe's act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
Respondent Quinquillera's act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position
creates undue risk of harm to respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand
In the present case, taking into account the contributing negligence of respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by distributing the damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; DRIVING THE CARGO TRUCK AT A FAST SPEED COUPLED WITH FAULTY BRAKES IS THE
NEGLIGENT ACT OF THE DRIVER. The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on the sketch report,
there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during the incident which, as testified to by the police investigator Rubia,
meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. Although
petitioner contends that there are other factors to explain why only one skid mark was found at the place of the incident, such as the
angle and edges of the road as well as the balance of the weight of the cargo laden in the truck, he failed to show that indeed those
factors were present to prove his defense. Such claim cannot be given credence considering that investigator Rubia testified that the
body of the truck was very much on the road, i.e., not over the shoulder of the road, and the road was straight. Indeed, it is the
negligent act of petitioner's driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of
respondent Noe's injury.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; PASSENGER'S ACT OF STANDING ON THE REAR CARRIER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
EXPOSING HIMSELF TO BODILY INJURY. However, we agree with petitioner that respondent Noe's act of standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when
they failed to consider that respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of

the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection. It has been established by the testimony of respondent Noe that he was with four or five other persons
standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. Respondent Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the
Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that
"to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. Respondent Noe's act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely
dangerous to his life and limb.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Contributory negligence has been defined as the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body

8. RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in
the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the
track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In
two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that
not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking
by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary
that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the
employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

9. [OLD CASE] TAYLOR v MANILA ELECTRIC G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA
ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla
del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit
was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they
had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.

After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on
stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.
After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents.
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to
care for his wounds.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up
work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained
employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
Defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered
no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant company is liable
RULING:
No, the company is not liable.
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found,
or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without
the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on
its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the
average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference
that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control.
plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition
of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or
less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and

their consequences; he was sui juris (legally competent; capacity to manage ones own affairs) in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have
avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act.
Counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based there the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and
disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision
wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus:
(1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2)
that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to
the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps
have been taken to interfere with such practice;
(4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a
license to enter upon another's premises.
Principle of proportional damages is not applicable. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

4. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the
determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is
chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.
10. PBCOM V CA [G.R. No. 97626. March 14, 1997.] PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL, et al., petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO LIPANA, its President & General Manager,
respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and
General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the
Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current
account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas,
allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7, with the Pasig Branch of PBC
in connection with its business of selling appliances.
From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling
P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned
out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 5301734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner
bank had, however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances.
Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust
and confidence on petitioner bank.
Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a
duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was
written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank.
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded,
it filed a collection suit before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: found petitioner bank negligent.
(2) Appellate court: affirmed the foregoing decision.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC petitioner bank's
negligence or that of private respondent's?
RULING:
The banks negligence is the proximate cause.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and
signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self- imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or
duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of
responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the account
holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should
have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip
was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too
shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up
the blank space later on. A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation and would have
insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by
the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss
suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not
have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of
care.
The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may
be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit: ". . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded."
In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of
the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private
respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively
by the petitioners.

CIVIL LAW; ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT. There are three elements of a quasi-delict:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
NEGLIGENCE; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
11. LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON [G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005.] NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband,
GLENROY ALOYSIUS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and
SERGIO LABANG, respondents.
FACTS:
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the
backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona's Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards
Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner
Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident
resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner
Nelen Lambert.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but reduced petitioner's liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray
(2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether Lambert is liable for damages
RULING:
Yes.
It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed
to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. He did not employ the necessary precaution to see to it that the
road was clear.
CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; PROXIMATE CAUSE; DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by
Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured
Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of
Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not
have happened.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; A PLAINTIFF WHO IS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN INJURY SHOULD NOT BE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN FULL BUT MUST BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT
BAR. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only
for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on
the circumstances of each case. . . .
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap:
(1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed;
(2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney;
(3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and
(4) was not wearing a protective helmet.
These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result.
The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant
to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage
shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
12. [ALSO # 7] ESTACION v BERNARDO [G.R. No. 144723. February 27, 2006.] LARRY ESTACION, petitioner, vs. NOE
BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA,
respondents.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he
boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by
respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo), and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose,
an old woman wanted to ride, so respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, respondent Noe hung or stood on
the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and 14,
the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo
truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera
where respondent Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera
crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center
where his lower left leg was amputated.
respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint 3 for damages arising
from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano.
Defenses:

reckless imprudence of respondent driver Quinquillera and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the
proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification for whatever damages they would be sentenced to pay
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily
(2) CA: affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
ISSUE:
Whether the owner of the cargo truck is liable
RULING:
Yes.
Since the Fiera driver was negligent, there arises a presumption that respondent Bandoquillo, as owner of the Fiera, is negligent in the
selection and supervision of her employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and his driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence
of Quinquillera is sufficient basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated vis-- vis their degree of negligence consistent with
Article 2179 10 of the Civil Code
"unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation"; that since the Fiera driver was negligent, there arises a presumption that respondent
Bandoquillo, as owner of the Fiera, is negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and
his driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera is sufficient basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated
vis-- vis their degree of negligence consistent with Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Respondent Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such
act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. 24 Respondent Noe's act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
Respondent Quinquillera's act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position
creates undue risk of harm to respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand
In the present case, taking into account the contributing negligence of respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by distributing the damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; DRIVING THE CARGO TRUCK AT A FAST SPEED COUPLED WITH FAULTY BRAKES IS THE
NEGLIGENT ACT OF THE DRIVER. The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on the sketch report,
there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during the incident which, as testified to by the police investigator Rubia,
meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. Although
petitioner contends that there are other factors to explain why only one skid mark was found at the place of the incident, such as the
angle and edges of the road as well as the balance of the weight of the cargo laden in the truck, he failed to show that indeed those
factors were present to prove his defense. Such claim cannot be given credence considering that investigator Rubia testified that the
body of the truck was very much on the road, i.e., not over the shoulder of the road, and the road was straight. Indeed, it is the
negligent act of petitioner's driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of
respondent Noe's injury.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; PASSENGER'S ACT OF STANDING ON THE REAR CARRIER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
EXPOSING HIMSELF TO BODILY INJURY. However, we agree with petitioner that respondent Noe's act of standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when
they failed to consider that respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection. It has been established by the testimony of respondent Noe that he was with four or five other persons
standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. Respondent Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the
Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that
"to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. Respondent Noe's act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely
dangerous to his life and limb.
13. PNR v BRUNTY [G.R. No. 169891. November 2, 2006.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs. ETHEL BRUNTY and
JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January
1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes
Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR
Train No. T- 71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila 4 as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m.,
January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada,
Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were
about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other
passengers suffered serious physical injuries. 5 A certain James Harrow 6 brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor's
Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was
brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctor's Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center
for further treatment. 7
On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter 8 to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages,
as a result of her daughter's death. When PNR did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint 9 for damages against the
PNR before the RTC of Manila.
Allegations:
1. direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac.

2. there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or
switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight
3. failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of
the train
Defenses:
1. right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing.
2. there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing.
3. the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita's negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by
the guard
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC: directed PNR to pay
2. CA: affirmed RTC with modification as to amount of damages
ISSUE:
Is PNR liable?
RULING:

Yes

the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety
standards in transportatio
An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the
following:
(1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars;
(2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and
(3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it
would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the
Moncada side of the road since one's view would be blocked by a cockpit arena
To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not
simply a condition for its occurrence.
The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; one's view
was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was then
driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not
negate petitioner's liability. The record is bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and
Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation
of liability, does not apply.

3. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
14. AFIALDA v HISOLE [G.R. No. L-2075. November 29, 1949.] MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and
FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants- appellees.
FACTS:
The now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation;
that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that
the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for
support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: article 2183
"The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape
from him or stray away.
"This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it."
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Lower Court: owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker
of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code.

ISSUE:
whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker.

RULING:
No.
Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.
For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious
reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from
causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such.
Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences.
15. TRANSPORTO v MIJARES
TOPIC: DANGEROUS CONDITIONS
A person who, knowing that he is exposed to a dangerous condition, voluntarily assumes the risk of such dangerous condition may not
recover from the defendant who maintained such dangerous conditions.
TRANSPORTO v MIJARES
Petitioner seeks to recover damages due to injuries sustained by him when he took the bet of defendant and lit the firecracker while
holding it tightly with his hand.
Petitioner cannot recover. He was already told by his officemates that the firecracker was real, and would explode, yet he was acting
stupid and all-knowing, saying that if it was held tightly, it wouldnt explode. He was the only cause for his own injury.
16. [G.R. No. 53401. November 6, 1989.] THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA
JUAN, respondents.
FACTS:
in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the
typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen,
ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards
the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that
might have been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five
Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned
by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the
deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so
because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the
water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but
at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from
Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane,
together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant
Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The
floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes
instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National
Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he
could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao
Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken.
In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on
Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June
24, 1968.
Defenses:
(1) electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life
and property.
(2) service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question.
(3) installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others.
(4) 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them.
(5) deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to
petitioner.
(6) deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to
the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI Ilocos Norte: defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs
ISSUE:
Whether INELCO is liable
RULING:
PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE. The respondent CA acted correctly in
disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public". . . considering
that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a
right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY THE CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS.
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case
at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the
subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their
way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known
danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C.
Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown
and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with
an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be
without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not
be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley
on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early
morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not
see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.
17. CO v CA [G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993.] ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage
operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983, in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984.
It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." LLjur

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify
the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Defense on appeal:
at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v.
People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
(2) CA: affirmed his conviction.
(3) SC: dismissed his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether conviction was proper
RULING:
No.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle
of prospectivity, and its clear implications as hereinabove set out and discussed, negativing criminal liability.

first enunciated in picart v smith (common law doctrine)

From american jurisprudence
only applies when both parties are negligent
4. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
(to compare negligence)
18. PICART V SMITH G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendantappellee.
FACTS:
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
The automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI La Union absolved the defendant from liability.
ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a
civil obligation to repair the damage done
RULING:
Yes, he is liable.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or,
seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on
the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
19. (OLD CASE) ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (1958)
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT,
defendant-appellee.
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people
are invited and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. The main pool it between two small pools
of oval shape known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the
water at different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is
entrusted to a recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had
taken the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his
brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said
natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the
requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador
Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter
when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel
Abao and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abao was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon,
and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty
bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abao was going around the pools to observe the bathers in compliance with the instructions
of his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody
was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abao of the same happening and Abao
immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
The death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
ISSUE: whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to
entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
RULING:
NO. Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into
the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.

there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or
prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility.
appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold
it liable for his death.
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion
in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Aba__o responded to
the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee
had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
20. (ALSO #1) PLDT v CA [G.R. No. 57079. September 29, 1989.] PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
FACTS:
An action for damages was instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses
against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July
30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
Defenses (PLDT):
1. injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held
responsible
2. if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole
and the conduit system
Defenses (Barte):
1. it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its
contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both
ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. Trial Court: defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban
2. CA: reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban
spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether PLDT is liable
RULING:
No.
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND. Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left
that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot
be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained
abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause
of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. 30 The perils
of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
DAMAGES; A PARTY CANNOT CHARGE ANOTHER FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE. It is basic that
private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause
thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence
he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences
of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative
thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence
for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must
fail.

21. RAYNERA V HICETA [G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999.] EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and
REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on his way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents,
Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which was involved in the said accident.
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the
southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right.
There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6 rushed him to the Paraaque
Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on
arrival.
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the
deceased demanded from respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident.
The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners, hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages
against respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the damages caused by the negligent operation
of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail the lights.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that respondents' negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of the victim's death. The trial court also applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility
of respondents by 20%.
(2) Court of Appeals: held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death, and
consequently, absolved respondents from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the truck is responsible for the accident
RULING:
No.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed,
approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling
posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents
installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; THE DRIVERS OF THE VEHICLES "WHO BUMP THE REAR OF ANOTHER VEHICLE" ARE
PRESUMED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, UNLESS CONTRADICTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. It has
been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the
situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid
the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim
himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the
accident.
He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
22. (ALSO #5) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. v IAC [G.R. No. 65295. March 10, 1987.] PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and
ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails- and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel
(2) IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages
Defenses: if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident
and the injuries he sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether Phoenix is liable
RULING:

Private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the
preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had
gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have
been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not
see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon
which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant
is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the courts.
A man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. 20% of the damages awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily
liable therefor to the former.

5. PRESCRIPTION (ARTICLE 1146)

Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1)
year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
23. KRAMER v CA [G.R. No. 83524. October 13, 1989.] ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARTA KRAMER, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer,
was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a
collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans- Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine
Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the
employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board
served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the
second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. 1
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional
Trial Court in Pasay City. 9 years
Defense:
(1) the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He
maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted
beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
Allegation:
(1) maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the
members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the
Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical
aspects attendant to such collision
(2) CA: granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The cause of action of
private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because
that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is
presently sought.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is
barred by the statute of limitations
RULING:
Yes.
QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE
OF ACTION. In Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there
exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when
the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff,
which is the time when the cause of action arises.
TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS. Under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2)
trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD COUNTED FROM DAY OF
COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. In this action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the
fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case.
Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year
prescriptive period.

24. SANTOS v PIZARDO [G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005.] SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA
BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE
B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.
FACTS:
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a twomonth old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van's passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q.
Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, 6 years
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial
court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners' cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the
cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to
be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
(2) CA: dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal
ISSUE:
Has the action prescribed?
RULING:
No. 10 years
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners' claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does
not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the
choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under
the Civil Code.
WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION EX DELICTO WILL OPERATE AS A BAR TO AN ACTION TO ENFORCE INDEPENDENT CIVIL
LIABILITY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex
quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation,
i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar
to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. The case of
Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. . . . We held that the dismissal of the action based on
culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party
being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this light, the trial court should
not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners' allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime. This does not offend the
policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale
action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also
consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
25. DE GUZMAN v TOYOTA [G.R. No. 141480. November 29, 2006.] CARLOS B. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA CUBAO,
INC., respondent.
FACTS:
On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996
model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in
36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998 (approximately 20 days after),
petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during
a heavy rain. Last 18 October 1998, after only 12,000 kilometers of use, the vehicle's engine cracked. Although it was previously driven
through a heavy rain, it didn't pass through flooded streets high enough to stop sturdy and resistant vehicles. Besides, vehicles of this
class are advertised as being capable of being driven on flooded areas or rugged terrain.Petitioner asserted that respondent should
replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was
not covered by a warranty.
On April 20, 1999 (19 months from delivery), petitioner filed a complaint for damages.
Defense:
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as
the case was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint. The Court agrees with the plaintiff's counsel that the subject pickup is a consumer product because it is used for personal, family or agricultural purposes, contrary to defendant counsel's claim that it is
not because it is a non-consumable item.
Since no warranty card or agreement was attached to the complaint, the contract of sale of the subject pick-up carried an implied
warranty that it was free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer. The
prescriptive period thereof is six (6) months under the Civil Code (Art. 1571).

ISSUE:
Whether the action has prescribed
RULING:
Yes.
Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an
action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the
allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden
defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to
hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case,
petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. 7 Since petitioner filed the complaint on
April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his
cause of action had become time-barred.

consumer act

Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the
prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed.

FORCE MAJEUR/FORTUITOUS EVENT (ARTICLE 1174)

1 unforeseen or if foreseen, cannot be avoided

2 no concurrent negligence of party

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
26. GOTESCO v CHATTO [G.R. No. 87584. June 16, 1992.] GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E.
CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the
movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but
even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the
theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt,
plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked to the nearby FEU
Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and
plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA
in July 1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for
about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ordered the defendant, herein petitioner, to pay the plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto

issue: whether gotesco is liable

YES

RULING:
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because
its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the
theater's ceiling. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, he is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It
does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. (TSN, June 14, 1985, p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong
about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to
introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have
collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason
why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination. Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is
the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was no shown that
any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects
could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as
disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers
to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That
the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of
occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering
that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not
discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: "Where a patron of a theater or
other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care
had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That
presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of
it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
27. SERVANDO v PHIL STEAM [G.R. Nos. L-36481-2. October 23, 1982.] AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffsappellees, vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded their respective cargoes on board appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to
Negros Occidental. Upon arrival of the vessel at the place of destination, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order,
into the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. After appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of apportion of her cargoes, the warehouse
was rated by fire of unknown origin, destroying the rest of the two appellees' cargoes. Appellees filed their claims from appellant for the
recovery of the value of the goods destroyed by fire.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ruled in favor of appellees and ordered payment of their claims, stating that since the burning of the warehouse occurred
before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable?
RULING:
Yes.

No

Appellant, as obligor, is exempt from liability for non- performance because the burning of the warehouse containing appellees' goods,
which is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, is a fortuitous event or force majeure which could not have been foreseen by

appellant.
Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. (See Art. 1174 of the New Civil Code.)
The Partidas(Law II, Title 33, Partida 7), the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as "an event that takes
place by accident and could not been have foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence
of robbers."
In the dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the Encyclopedia Juridicada Espaola says: "In a legal sense and consequently, also in
relation to contracts, caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) the cause of the unforseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to creditor."
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that
appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, out had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact,
pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending
withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and
was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever
over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio, 43 Phil. 511, where this Court held the
defendant liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline
and petroleum products. But unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that the cause of the fire that broke
out in the Custom's warehouse was in any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. Under the
circumstances, the appellant is plainly not responsible.
28. YOBIDO v CA [G.R. No. 113003. October 17, 1997.] ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.
FACTS:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur,
a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus suddenly
exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy and
physical injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was filed
by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City.
Defenses:
Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that 1. the 42-seater bus was not full as there were
only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat;
2. the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road.
3. the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the
incident.
DECISION:
(1) Trial Court: dismissing the action for lack of merit
(2) Court of Appeals: rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court
RULING:
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations must be
independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. As Article 1174 provides, no
person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen was inevitable. In other
words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
There is no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are exempted from
liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability
for damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject to modification that petitioners shall additionally pay herein,
respondents P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that
the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle.
Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it
could not explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.
It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous condition of the
road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should
have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the
vehicle's parts. As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the
strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations
toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the
failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers."

It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour
only within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so
fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the
presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law.

7. DILIGENCE (ARTICLE 2180, LAST PARAGRAPH)

diligence applies to defendant

himself and one who is
responsible for him

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through
a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

diligence is the control and supervision of employees

20. (OLD CASE) ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (1958)
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT,
defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited
and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. The main pool it between two small pools of oval
shape known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the water at
different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted
to a recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the
life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his
brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said
natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the
requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador
Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter
when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel
Abao and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abao was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon,
and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty
bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abao was going around the pools to observe the bathers in compliance with the instructions
of his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody
was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abao of the same happening and Abao
immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
The death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
ISSUE: whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to
entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
RULING:
NO. Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into
the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.
there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or
prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility.
appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold
it liable for his death.
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion
in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Aba__o responded to
the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee
had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
30. DULAY v CA [G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995.] MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her, own behalf and in behalf of the minor children
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security
Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed.
does not state facts necessary to
ISSUE:
Whether Superguard is liable

constitute quasi-delict

RULING:
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits.
The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting
was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and
whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can
present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far
better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground
that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that: ". . . Article 2176,
where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held: "Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.

31. GO v IAC [G.R. No. 68138. May 13, 1991.] AGUSTIN Y. GO and THE CONSOLIDATED BAND AND TRUST CORPORATION
(Solidbank), petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FLOVERTO JAZMIN, respondents.
FACTS:
Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and retired employee of the United States Federal Government. He had been a visitor in the
Philippines since 1972 residing at 34 Maravilla Street, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. As a pensionado of the U.S. government, he received
annuity checks in the amounts of $67.00 for disability and $620.00 for retirement through the Mangatarem post office. He used to
encash the checks at the Prudential Bank branch at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
Meanwhile, on April 22, 1975, Agustin Go, in his capacity as branch manager of the then Solidbank (which later became the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation) in Baguio City, allowed a person named "Floverto Jazmin" to open Savings Account No. BG
5206 by depositing two (2) U.S. treasury checks Nos. 5-449-076 and 5-448-890 in the respective amounts of $1810.00 and $913.40
The depositor's signature specimens were also taken.
Thereafter, the deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank for clearance. Inasmuch as Solidbank did not receive any word from the
drawee bank, after three (3) weeks, it allowed the depositor to withdraw the amount indicated in the checks.
On June 29, 1976 or more than a year later, the two dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that the amounts were
altered. 3 Consequently, Go reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in Baguio City. Eventually, the investigators found that
the person named "Floverto Jazmin" who made the deposit and withdrawal with Solidbank was an impostor.
On September 24, 1976, Jazmin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II at Lingayen a complaint against
Agustin Y. Go and the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P90,000 plus
attorney's fees of P5,000.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Lower court: found that Go was negligent in failing to exercise "more care, caution and vigilance" in accepting the checks for deposit
and encashment.
(2) Court of Appeals: failure to notice the substantial difference in the identity of the depositor and the payee in the check, concluded
that Go's negligence in the performance of his duties was "the proximate cause why appellant bank was swindled" and that denouncing
the crime to the constabulary authorities "merely aggravated the situation.
ISSUE:
Whether Go is liable
RULING:
Yes.
The facts of this case reveal that damages in the form of mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation were suffered by private
respondent only after the filing of the petitioners' complaint with the Philippine Constabulary. It was only then that he had to bear the
inconvenience of travelling to Benguet and Lingayen for the investigations as it was only then that he was subjected to embarrassment
for being a suspect in the unauthorized alteration of the treasury checks. Hence, it is understandable why petitioners appear to have
overlooked the facts antecedent to the filing of the complaint to the constabulary authorities and to have put undue emphasis on the
appellate court's statement that "denouncing a crime is not negligence." Although this Court has consistently held that there should be
no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper police authorities, is not
a ground for moral damages, we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is entitled to an award of
damages.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant. As Go's negligence was the root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment, Go is liable to
private respondents for damages.
Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable" with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, "(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks."
Pursuant to this provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view
of its own failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

8. MISTAKE & WAIVER

32. GATCHALIAN v DELIM [G.R. No. 56487. October 21, 1991.] REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini-bus at a
point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter,
the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several
passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union,
for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and
forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral
surface, leg, left. 1
On 14 July 1973, while injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later
paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in
going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit
petitioner Gatchalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral
damages.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any
right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
(2) Court of Appeals: reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by
denying petitioner's claim for damages:
ISSUE:
Is the waiver valid?
RULING:
No.
Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days,
when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she
experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without
bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she
actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.
CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; WAIVER OF RIGHT; RULE FOR ITS VALIDITY. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST NOT BE CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, PUBLIC POLICY AND GOOD CUSTOMS. Because what is involved
here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid
and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
33. THEIS v CA [G.R. No. 126013. February 12, 1997.] SPOUSES HEINZRICH THEIS AND BETTY THEIS, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ELEUTERIO GUERRERO, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XVIII,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGAYTAY CITY, CALSONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. 15515 (parcel no. 1 in the location map), 15516 (parcel no. 2) and 15684 (parcel no. 3), with the area of 1,000
square meters, 226 square meters and 1,000 square meters, respectively.
On October 26, 1987, unaware of the mistake by which private respondent appeared to be the owner of parcel no. 4 as indicated in the
erroneous survey, and based on the erroneous information given by the surveyor that parcel no. 4 is covered by TCT No. 15516 and
15684, private respondent, through its authorized representative, one Atty. Tarcisio S. Calilung, sold said parcel no. 4 to petitioners. All
three parcels of land are situated along Ligaya Drive, Barangay Francisco, Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no. 3, which is the lot
covered by TCT No. 15684 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no. 4.
Upon execution of the Deed of Sale, private respondent delivered TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684 to petitioners who, on October 28, 1987,
immediately registered the same with the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City. Thus, TCT Nos. 17041 and 17042 in the names of the
petitioners were issued.
In the early part of 1990, petitioners returned to the Philippines. When they went to Tagaytay to look over the vacant lots and to plan the
construction of their house thereon, they discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots
actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3 covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684. respectively. Parcel no. 3, however, could not
have been sold to the petitioners by the private respondents as a two-storey house, the construction cost of which far exceeded the
price paid by the petitioners, had already been built thereon even prior to the execution of the contract between the disputing parties.
Petitioners insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, which is the idle lot adjacent to parcel no. 3, and persisted in claiming that it was
parcel no. 4 that private respondent sold to them. However, private respondent could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did
not own parcel no. 4 in the first place.

The mistake in the identity of the lots is traceable to the erroneous survey conducted in 1985.
To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 covered by TCT Nos. 15515 and 15516, respectively, as these
two were precisely the two vacant lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction with
petitioners. Petitioners adamantly rejected the good faith offer. They refused to yield to reason and insisted on taking parcel no. 3,
covered by TCT No. 155864 and upon which a two-storey house stands, in addition to parcel no. 2, covered by TCT No. 15516, on the
ground that these TCTs have already been cancelled and new ones issued in their name. Private respondent was then compelled to file
an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof 1 in the Regional Trial Court.
DECISIONS OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of private respondent.
(2) Court of Appeals: affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale is voidable
RULING:
Yes
Private respondent committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, it is quite
impossible for private respondent to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good faith of the private respondent is
evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse
them with twice the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no other choice but to file an
action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake. Art. 1331 of the New Civil Code provides for the situations
whereby mistake may invalidate consent. The concept of error in this article must include both ignorance, which is the absence of
knowledge with respect to a thing and mistake properly speaking, which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the
existence of some circumstance, fact, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct
knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed by the private respondent in selling parcel no. 4 to the petitioners falls within the
second type. Verily, such mistake invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper. The petitioners cannot
be justified in their insistence that parcel no. 3, upon which private respondent constructed a two-storey house, be given to them in lieu
of parcel no. 4. The cost of construction for the said house far exceeds the amount paid by the petitioners to the private respondent.
Moreover, parcel no. 4, the lot mistakenly sold, was a vacant lot. Thus, to allow the petitioners to take parcel no. 3 would be to
countenance unjust enrichment. Considering that petitioners intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the
offer of the private respondent to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a
house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable.
34. YHT REALTY CORPORATION v CA [G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005.] YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ
and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to
the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in distributing
the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where
Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the
keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's booking at the Tropicana where he started staying during
his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987. 3
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his
practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the
procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of
two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel.
When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then would
assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box with the two keys. 4
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in
two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in another envelope; two (2) other envelopes
containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box. 5
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box with his key and with the
key of the management and took therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope containing
Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit cards. 6 McLoughlin left the other items in the box as
he did not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the
envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Three Thousand US
Dollars (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein. After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for
Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of
Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit
box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit
box with the key assigned to him. 11 McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she
had stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. 12 Lopez
also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.
Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory note reads as follows:
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency on or
before May 5, 1988.
However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking
For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box," 15 specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit: To release and hold free and blameless
TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any
cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any other person should the key be lost
Thus, he filed a complaint for damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan

(defendants) for the loss of McLoughlin's money which was discovered on 16 April 1988.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: ordered defendants to plaintiffs.
(2) CA: affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the amount of damages awarded
ISSUE:
whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written
waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids
such waivers

NO, it cannot evade liability

RULING:
Yes. in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand
in the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was
always with him most of the time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the
management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of
any showing that he made the management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety deposit
box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in the instant
case is the very safety of McLoughlin's deposit.
In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the
opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided.
SPECIAL CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICTS; EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for
damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found
negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the
negligence of such employer. Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of
Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and
YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.
Art. 2003 of the Civil Code provides: The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is
not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the
former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil
Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the
common carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does
not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in
prepared forms imposed by hotel-keepers on guests for their signature.