The Call for Intelligibility in Postmodern Educational Research

Author(s): Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre

Source: Educational Researcher, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Jun. - Jul., 2000), pp. 25-28
Published by: American Educational Research Association
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The

Call

in
Postmodern
Intelligibility

for

Educational Research
ELIZABETHADAMS ST.PIERRE
n his paper,'"Deciphering
Postmodern Educational Research," Mark
Constas (1998) notes that "the field of
educational inquiry finds itself in a
state of transition caused by the increased activity and debates related to
postmodernism" (p. 36). He explains,
however, that he has been unable
to find a "clear description" (p. 36) of
postmodern educational research and
has thereforedeveloped his own model
thatassimilates this "intractable"(p. 37)
and "idiosyncratic" (p. 38) phenomenon within a grid of eight typologies of
educational research, including narrative, neo-Marxist inquiry, and critical ethnography. Constas uses three
dimensions of educational inquirymethodological,political,and representational-to structure his grid, choosing to omit four other dimensions he
also identifies-ontological, epistemological, analytical, and practical. (I will
illustrate that the omission of the epistemological is particularly significant.)
Postmodern educational research is
cell #7 in this grid, described as "politmethodologically idioically decentering,
syncratic, and representationally unbounded"(p. 40).
The goal of Constas's (1998) project
is to "isolate the elusive nature of postmodernism" (p. 36);to get at its "essential qualities"(p. 40); "to identify unifying elements" (p. 36); to bring "some
clarity" (p. 38) to it; and, as a result, to
move "toward a metanarrativeof postmodern research"(p. 39). Frustratedby
the ill-defined nature of postmodernism, he asks that those who "rejectoutright the very attempt to define postmodernism in a simplified scheme"
organize their responses into an "intelligible set of assertions that encourages
constructive dialogue about the nature
of postmodern educational inquiry"
(p. 41).
Constas's request is not as simple as
it seems. As Foucault (1971/1972) explains in his archaeological analysis,

statements that are clear and coherent

within one discursive formation may
not be intelligible within another. It is
not uncommon in our scholarly work
to come up against what Britzman
(1995)calls the "limits of intelligibility"
(p. 155), the boundary "where thought
stops what it cannotbear to know, what
it must shut out to think as it does"
(p. 156). To move beyond the grids in
which we think, "we must make the intelligible appear against a backdrop of
emptiness and deny its necessity. We
must think that what exists is far from
filling all possible spaces" (Foucault,
1981/1997, pp. 39-40).
With this in mind, a question that
might be more interesting than "What
is postmodern educational research?"
is "How does one become available to
intelligibility?" That is, how does one
learn to hear and "understand"a statement made within a different structure
of intelligibility?At the least, this question shifts prevailing attitudes by assuming that the burden of intelligibility lies as much with the reader as with
the writer,a position contraryto that of
those who chide postmodernism for
"deliberate obfuscation over clarification" (Constas, 1998, p. 38). For some
reason, these readers expect postmodernism to be readily accessible and
coherent within a structure it works
against. When it isn't, those who employ its critiques are often accused not
only of being deliberately obfuscatory
but also irrationaland even nihilistic.
I can perhaps illustrate how intelligibility works by focusing on how postmodern critiquesshift the meaning and
significance of the concept relativism.I
have selected this example, not in response to Constas, since he does not
discuss it, but because postmodern
work is often accused of being relativistic (and evil) since it does not advocate a universal, independent standard of truth. In fact, relativism is only
an issue for those who believe there is a
JUNE-JULY2000

foundation, a "structureagainst which

other positions can be 'objectively'
judged" (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 185).
In effect, this position implies that there
is "no alternative between objectivism
and relativism" (Mouffe, 1988, p. 37).
Postmodernists dispute the assumptions that produce the objectivism/
relativism binary since they think of
truth2 as multiple, historical, contextual, contingent, political, and bound
up in power relations. Refusing the binary does not lead to the abandonment
of truth, however, as Foucault (1884/
1988) emphasizes when he says, "I believe too much in truth not to suppose
that thereare differenttruthsand different ways of speaking the truth"(p. 51).
Further, postmodernism does not
imply that one does not discriminate
among multiple truths, that "anything
goes." As Mouffe (1988) explains, "affirming that one cannot provide an ultimate rational foundation for any given
system of values does not imply that
one considers all views to be equal"
(p. 37). If there is no absolute truth to
which every instance can be compared
for its truth-value, if truth is instead
multiple and contextual, then the call
for ethical practice shifts from grand,
sweeping statements about truth and
justice to engagements with specific,
complex problemsthat do not have generalizablesolutions. This differentstate
of affairsis not irresponsible,irrational,
or nihilistic. Nor are its manifestations
"idiosyncratic" (Constas, 1998, p. 38),
except to those for whom this differently rational approach to relativism
is unintelligible. (As with truth, postmodern critiques argue for multiple
and historically specific forms of reason. See, for example, Michael Peters's
1999 work.)
The point is that I could argue that
Constas's work is incoherent, irrational, and idiosyncratic since it is not
intelligible within postmodernism. But
that is not my intention. Rather,I hope

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I have explained how a concept such as

relativism is interpreted in one way
within a particular set of conditions
and entirely reworked in another.
More importantly, I hope I have
made a case for the significance of
Constas's omission from his typology
of the epistemological and ontological
dimensions of educational inquiry, for
how one thinks about concepts such as
relativity, truth, reason, reality, knowledge, language, power, freedom, the
subject, and so forth-epistemological
and ontological concepts-shapes
those very conditions. For instance,
Constas's typology would be impossible had he considered postmodern
critiques of epistemology that are suspicious of the "desire to produce exhaustive taxonomies" (Spivak, 1988,
p. 212) in an attempt to order and contain knowledge. The "postmoderncondition" (Lyotard,1979/1984) is characterized by the crisis of epistemology, a
"crisis in legitimation, specifically of
knowledge, in which an attitude of
suspicion or lack of belief with regardto
'the master narratives'prevails. That is,
our assumptions about what constitutes
everyday knowledge as well as academic knowledge, indeed the very possibility of knowing, have been placed
deeply into question" (Martusewicz,
1992,pp. 131-132).
But, as Lather (1996) explains, in educational research"methodology often
diverts attention from more fundamental issues of epistemology" (p. 2), and it
seems that that is what has happened
in this case, for Constas (1998) states
that his discussion "is more concerned
with educational inquiry than it is with
the original literature from which the
rhetoric(italics added) of postmodern
educational research has received its
impetus" (p. 39). There are two problems with this standpoint. The first is
the implication that educators who say
they do postmodern educational research rely on "rhetoric" and avoid
studying postmodernism's critiques of
modernism's epistemology and ontology. This is a very serious charge, and
Constas does not cite the work to
which he refers.The second problem is,
as Lather explained above, assuming
that it is acceptable for educational researchers to use, discuss, and critique
methodology without having studied
the philosophy that produces it. Do educational researchers have some special exemption from scholarship that
demands more than a superficial read-

ing and casual appropriationof philosophy's concepts? What does it mean

to critique philosophy without studying philosophy? Postmodern analyses3
have been available-and elaborated
in the detail Constas and others desire-for decades. Postmodern educators (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather,
1991; Peters, 1996; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1997; Scheurich, 1997; St.Pierre&
Pillow, 2000;Stronach& MacLure,1997;
Usher & Edwards,1994)have explained
their work for years. Thus, I do not believe that those who have only cursorily examined postmodernism should
accuse those who havestudied the "original literature" of being unclear, incoherent, and unintelligible.
That said, I find that I am of two
minds about Constas's work. On the
one hand, I believe it is impossible to
fulfill his desire to "define postmodernism [or poststructuralism4]in a simplified scheme" (Constas, 1998, p. 41)
since postmodernism doesnot and cannot provide essentializing answers to
questions about its meaning. On the
other hand, I recognize the concern
of those who wish to understand what
is involved in what Constas (1998)
perceives to be the "increased activity
and debates related to postmodernism" (p. 36).
I address this concern hesitantly
since, with Lacan(cited in Ulmer, 1985),
I believe we should "avoid understanding too quickly" (p. 196). More importantly, I am reminded of Foucault's
(1983) rather ironic, given that he is
generally considered to be a postmodern philosopher/historian, question to
his interviewer, Gerard Raulet, "What
are we calling postmodernity? I'm not
up to date" (p. 202). Foucault continues, "Ido not understand what kind of
problem is common to the people we
call post-modern or post-structuralist"
(p. 203). Judith Butler (1992), whose
work is often labeled "postmodern"or
"poststructural,"agrees with Foucault,
"I don't know what postmodernism
is" (p. 17). Schrift (1995) explains that
"poststructuralismis not a monolithic
theory with a rigid and uniform set of
shared assumptions or axioms. It is instead a loose association of thinkers
who draw from several shared sources
[including] Nietzsche" (p. 6). Butler
(1992) elaborates as follows:
A numberof positionsareascribedto
postmodernism,as if it were the kind
of thing that could be the bearerof a
set of positions:discourseis all there
26

is, as if discoursewere some kind of

monisticstuffout of which all things
are composed;the subjectis dead, I
can neversay 'I'again;thereis no reality, only representations.These
characterizationsare variously imputed to postmodernism or poststructuralism,which are conflated
with each other and sometimes
conflated with deconstruction,and
sometimes understood as an indiscriminateassemblageof Frenchfeminism,deconstruction,Lacanianpsychoanalysis, Foucauldian analysis,
Rorty'sconversationalism,and culturalstudies.(p. 4)
The debate about the meaning of postmodernism is obviously confusing and
unsettling.
Twenty years ago, Lyotard (1979/
1984), defined postmodernism simply
as "incredulitytowardmetanarratives"5
(p. xxiv), and, with their disparate and
contradictoryprojects,postmodern critiques resist producing alternative or
successor regimes with accompanying
metanarratives. This is not to say that
certain themes are not evident in postmodern work. Jane Flax (1990), for example, lists some Enlightenment beliefs that "postmodern philosophers
seek to throw into radical doubt": that
"language is in some sense transparent"; that there is "a stable, coherent
self"; that "reason and its 'science'philosophy--can provide an objective,
reliable, and universal foundation of
knowledge";that "knowledge acquired
from the right use of reason will be
'true"'; that "by grounding claims to
authority in reason, the conflicts between truth, knowledge, and power
can be overcome"; and that "freedom
consists of obedience to laws that conform to the necessary results of the
right use of reason" (pp. 41-42).
The danger in such a list is that it is
tempting to gather the very different,
and contradictory, theories that have
emerged in critiquing these beliefs into
a metanarrative of postmodernism.
Butler (1992) asks key questions here:
Do all these theorieshave the same
structure(a comfortingnotion to the
critic who would dispense with
them all at once)?Is the effortto colonize and domesticatethese theories
underthe sign of the same,to group
them syntheticallyand masterfully
under a single rubric,a simple refusal to grantthe specificityof these
positions,an excuse not to read;and
not to read closely?(p. 5)
So how does one approachwhat Rajchman (1987) calls this "motley and elas-

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tic range of things"-a name given to

"conflictingsocial theories and philosophies" (p. 49)-and an inadequate label
for fluid and multiple dislocations and
alliances. I suggest that there is no easy
entree, no good place to begin, and
that, as Deleuze and Guattari (1980/
1987) explain, one can only ever be "in
the middle" (p. 25) of this gathering of
critique. From my own experience,
Butler's close reading involves following a "rhizomatic"(Deleuze & Guattari,
1980/1987, p. 3) citational trail from
one text to another, from one thinker to
another, from one researcher to another, as one immerses oneself in the
discourse and practices of postmodernism. Lather (1996) describes this
work as "rigorous confusion"(p. 15)
that "stutters" (Deleuze, 1993/1994,
p. 23), proceeds in fits and starts, and
makes no claims of mastery.
But I think becoming available to intelligibility involves more than close,
responsible reading. I believe it also involves the willingness to persistently
critique "what one cannot not want"
(Spivak, 1993, p. 46)-whether that is
Enlightenment humanism or postmodernism-what
Nietzsche (cited in
calls
that "philosophy
Spivak, 1974)
in which we feel freest; i.e., in which
our most powerful drive feels free to
function" (p. xxvii). Butler (1994/1995)
explains,
Forthe questionof whetheror not a
position is right, coherent,or interestingis, in this case,less informative
thanwhy it is we cometo occupyand
defend the territorythatwe do, what
it promisesus, fromwhat it promises
to protectus" (pp. 127-128).
Brian Fay (1987) says this is "not a
question of learning the theory so much
as it is learning to conceive of oneself in
termsof the theory" (p. 114).
I suggest this ethical approach holds
for whatever kind of educational research we undertake, using whatever
epistemologies we become attached
to-positivism, postmodernism, liberal
humanism, queer theories, race-based
theories, postcolonial theories, feminist
theories, criticaltheories, and so forth-each of which is an idiosyncratic, noninnocent way of knowing. I believe our
responsibility as researchers is to read
widely and deeply in the "original literature" in order to open up the protective structures we create that limit
intelligibility. As different questions
about educational research emerge,

perhaps our desires will shift from an

insistence on the "meaning" of concepts like postmodernism to, as Linda
Alcoff (1991)suggests, an investigation
of where our research goes and what it
does there. This kind of inquiry,then, is
always already political, ethical, and
material since it does not stray far from
the lived experiences of those influenced by educational research. To this
end, I believe that our responsibility is
to keep educational research in play,
increasingly unintelligible to itself, in
order to produce different knowledge
and produce knowledge differently as
we work for social justice in the human
sciences.

Notes
Elizabeth Adams St.Pierre is an assistant
professor at the University of Georgia, Language Education, 125 Aderhold Hall, Athens,
GA 30602.
1 Constas incorrectly cites my work in his
paper. My work troubling existing definitions
of the category of qualitative inquiry we call
data appears in an article titled "Methodology
in the Fold and the Irruption of Transgressive
Data" (1997a) published in the International
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education.
Constas incorrectly cites another article in a
different issue of the same journal, "Nomadic
Inquiry in the Smooth Spaces of the Field: A
Preface" (1997b), in which I trouble the category, thefield.
2 Foucault (1971/1972) explains that truth
cannot be absolute since it is not "outside
power." He says that
Eachsocietyhas its regime of truth,its 'general
politics' of truth;that is, the types of discourse
which it acceptsand makesfunctionas true;the
mechanismsand instanceswhich enableone to
distinguishtrueand falsestatements,the means
by which eachis sanctioned;the techniquesand
proceduresaccordedvalue in the acquisitionof
truth;the status of those who are chargedwith
sayingwhat countsas true.(p. 131)
3 Gayatri Spivak (1993) lists some of the deconstructive methods that have been theorized since the end of World War II as follows:
"archaeology, genealogy, power/knowledge
reading, schizo-analysis, rhizo-analysis, nonsubjective psychoanalysis, affirmative deconstruction, paralogic legitimation" (p. 274).
41 have elected to use the term postmodernism throughout this essay since it is the
term Constas uses. However, I use poststructuralism to describe my own work. The terms
poststructuralismand postmodernismare sometimes used interchangeably; however, there
are acknowledged differences in their meaning. Lather differentiates these two terms as
follows: postmodernism "raises issues of
chronology, economics (e.g., post-Fordism)
and aesthetics" (1993, p. 688) whereas poststructuralism describes the "working out of
academic theory within the culture of postmodernism" (1994, p. 113). Postmodernism is
an American term that refers to "the new stage
of multinational, multiconglomerate consumer
JUNE-JULY 2000

capitalism, and to all the technologies it has

spawned" (Kaplan, 1988, p. 4), as well as to the
avant garde in the arts, "the erosion of the
older distinction between high culture and
so-called mass or popular culture" (Jameson,
1988, p. 14). Jameson (1984) sees postmodernism as a "cultural dominant" (p. 56) that
began to emerge after World War II with late
consumer capitalism. The term postmodernism
first appeared in architecture, indicating a different way of organizing space and, by extension, a different relationship between space
and time. Poststructuralism is a French term
that represents the European avant garde in
critical theory, and is primarily a discourse
about modernity (Huyssen, 1990). It includes a
critique of structural linguistics, and is deconstructive in that it seeks "to distance us from
and make us skeptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the self, and language that are often taken for granted within
and serve as legitimation for contemporary
Western culture" (Flax, 1990, p. 41). During
the 1960s the political struggles of those marginalized by dominant discourses emerged
within and were produced by critical theories
of language, knowledge, and the subject as
humanism experienced a "legitimation crisis" (Habermas, 1975). Hutcheon (1993) points
out that "There is a long history of many such
skeptical sieges to positivism and humanism,
and today's footsoldiers of theory-Foucault,
Derrida, Habermas, Rorty, Baudrillard-follow in the footsteps of Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Marx and Freud, to name but a few, in their
challenges to the empiricist, rationalist, humanist assumptions of our cultural systems,
including those of science" (p. 247). See also
Michael Peters's (1999) essay that discusses
the distinctions between these two terms.
I In The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on
Knowledge,Lyotard (1979/1984) critiques what
he variously calls master narratives, metanarratives, grand narratives, metadiscourse,
or grand recits.He is suspicious of "any science
that legitimates itself with reference to a
metadiscourse [that makes] an explicit appeal
to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics
of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth" (p. xxiii). His
"incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv)
is directed, in particular, toward two master
legitimizing narratives, the liberation of humanity and the unity of knowledge.

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Ulmer, G. L. (1985). Applied grammatology:

Post(e)-Pedagogy
from Jacques Derrida to

JosephBeuys. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins

University Press.
Usher, R., & Edwards, R. (1994). Postmodernism
and education.London: Routledge.

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posals must be receivedby August1, 2000.

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