Critique of Martin Rhonheimers moral philosophy

Kritik an Martin Rhonheimers ethischer Theorie

compiled by Raphael E. Bexten Mayerling 2012
urn:nbn:de:0288-2012061209

To be sure, no moral theologian today would still derive moral normativity immediately from nature as such
(understood as the naturally given and presented). (Rhonheimer 2000, XVII.)
New Natural Law Theory:
Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and
evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians), are per se nota
(self-evident) and indemonstrable. They are not inferred from facts. (Finnis 1980, 33)
The dilemma is simply this: one must either produce the means by which to proceed from facts to norms, or
discontinue the attempt to espouse natural-law philosophy (Veatch 1980-1981, 253. [emphasis added = e.a.])
Knowledge of human nature is not the point of departure for ethics, and even less for the practical reason of each acting
subject: it is, rather, its result. We must already know the human good to interpret nature rightly and thereby reach the
concept of human nature, which is full of normative meaning. This human good we know, indeed, through the natural
law, which therefore must be understood as a cognitive principle as a form, that is to say, of moral knowledge:
(Rhonheimer 2003, 6.)
The norm that prohibits the killing of a human being appears, in this case [vital conflicts], to be simply pointless and
nonsensical. In fact, the meaning of the norm is that no unjust killing be committed. The only morally good thing that
can be done is to save the life of the mother. (Rhonheimer 2009, 123)1
Falls jedoch infolge von Nichtstun voraussichtlich beide [Mutter und Kind] sterben werden, die Mutter durch rtzliche
Intervention aber gerettet werden knnte, so besteht keine Konkurrenzsituation. Es gibt kein Entweder die Mutter oder
das Kind. Es existiert einzig und allein eine lebensbedrohliche Situation fr die Mutter. Fr das Kind kann ohnehin nichts
mehr getan werden, eine kurze Zeitspanne seines Weiterlebens scheint vernachlssigbar zu sein, zudem ist die Situation, in
der es sich befindet und die es verursacht, ganz besonders im Falle der Eileiterschwangerschaft, schwer pathologisch
(zumindest sind dies die Voraussetzungen, unter denen wir hier den Fall diskutieren). Wie gesagt ist genau deshalb eine
Gterabwgung auch gar nicht mglich. (Rhonheimer 2004, 151-152)
Problematisch ist natrlich der Zusatz von 1889 (et quamcumque chirurgicam operationem directe occisivam fetus)
durch welchen die Kraniotomie, so scheint es, flschlicherweise dem Genus des direkten Ttens zugeordnet wird, die ja
nun wirklich allen involvierten Autoren immer als unerlaubt galt, und die Entscheidung von 1895, die dies besttigt und
das Verdikt sogar auf den Fall der bloen Entfernung eines nichtlebensfhigen und in der Folge sterbenden Ftus aus dem
Mutterleib ausweitet.[i] [i] Das bedeutet, dass die Revision dieser Urteile keine Einschrnkung des Verbots der direkten
Ttung implizieren wrde, sondern nur die Zurcknahme der Behauptung, Kraniotomie (und analoge Verfahren) sei eine
Form dessen, was man in einem moralischen Sinne direktes Tten nennt. Allerdings ist die Formulierung directe
occisivam fetus wieder uerst problematisch: Bezieht sie sich auf die physische oder auf die intentionale Direktheit der
occisio? Ist mit occisio der Akt auf der Ebene des physischen Geschehens oder die intentionale menschliche
Handlung des Ttens gemeint? Je nach dem wird der Sinn des Dekretes dann natrlich ein anderer. Man darf wohl
behaupten, dass es bei die damaligen Diskussionslage schwierig gewesen wre, diese Differenzierungen angemessen
vorzunehmen. (Rhonheimer 2004, 185-186)

1 (May 2010, 349) Rhonheimer says that his book [(Rhonheimer 2009)] was drafted for the Roman Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith and completed and submitted to the congregation in 2000. After it was carefully studied in the Congregation and
by its then prefect, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the congregation in turn asked that it be published, so that the theses it contains could
be discussed by.

Table of Contents

Martin Rhonheimer .................................................................................................................... 2

Leo Elders s.v.d.: .......................................................................................................................... 3
Marie A. Anderson, Robert L. Fastiggi, David E. Hargroder, Rev. Joseph C. Howard Jr., and
C. Ward Kischer: .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Piotr Lichacz, O.P.: ...................................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 4
Shalina Stilley ............................................................................................................................... 7
Four Solutions to the IOP [Is-Ought problem] ....................................................................... 7
William E. May:............................................................................................................................ 8
Steven J. Jensen: ......................................................................................................................... 10
JANET E. SMITH: .................................................................................................................... 12
Final Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 13
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 14

William E. May:
Martin Rhonheimer2
is a priest in the Prelature of Opus Dei and a philosopher noted both for his interpretation of the natural law teaching of
St. Thomas Aquinas and for many other philosophical studies. He is also recognized for his arguments in defense of Pope
Paul VIs teaching on contraception in Humanae vitae. One of his most important and thought-provoking essays on this
subject, Contraception, Sexual Behavior, and Natural Law: Philosophical Foundation of the Norm of Humanae Vitae,
was published in this journal. He also has written articles in defense of Pope John Paul IIs Veritatis splendor. (May 2010,
330-331. [e.a.])
(Rhonheimer 2004, 138-140): Meine Position kann kurz in folgender Weise zusammengefasst werden: Wie jede
moralische Frage, kann auch die Frage des Ttens und der Abtreibung nur im Rahmen des dem Problem spezifisch
zugehrigen ethischen Kontextes angegangen werden. Ethische Kontexte definieren sich durch als Ziele von Tugenden
verstandene Prinzipien. Direktes Tten (eines Unschuldigen), ja berhaupt die Frage des Ttens eines Menschen, ist
eine Frage der Gerechtigkeit, beziehungsweise der Verletzung der Gerechtigkeit (und zwar auf der fundamentalsten Ebene
von Gerechtigkeit). Nur in diesem ethischen Kontext des Prinzips Gerechtigkeit und damit der Tugend der
2 (May 2010, 347.) Born in 1950, Rhonheimer studied philosophy, history, political science, and theology in Zurich, receiving his
doctorate in philosophy from the University of Zurich. He also studied in Rome. In 1974 he joined Opus Dei and in 1983 was
ordained to the priesthood. He is the author of more than twenty books, most originally written in German with many translated into
Italian, English, and other languages, and over two hundred major essays in anthologies and journals, including essays published in
some of the proceedings of the Pontifical Academy for Life. Major works translated into English include Natural Law and Practical
Reason: A Thomist View of Human Autonomy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); and The Perspective of the Acting
Person: Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).
Currently professor of ethics and political philosophy at the School of Philosophy of the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in
Rome, he is a member of the editorial boards of The American Journal of Jurisprudence
(Notre Dame Law School) and member of the scientific board of Acta Philosophica (Pontifical University of the Holy Cross). In 2002
he was appointed as a corresponding academician to the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Gerechtigkeit kann die Frage des Ttens als Frage der Moral berhaupt behandelt werden. Das heit, Tten kann als
moralisch schlechte Handlung berhaupt nur bewertet werden, insofern Tten mglicherweise eine Verletzung der
Gerechtigkeit ist. Oder nochmals anders gesagt: Tten ist, in sich betrachtet, sittlich schlecht immer nur insofern tten
ungerecht ist. Nur im ethischen Kontext Ge- [139] rechtigkeit hat es somit einen Sinn, in einem moralisch relevanten
Sinn von direktem Tten (als willentliche Entscheidung oder Wahl, einem Menschen das Leben zu nehmen) zu
sprechen. Tten als rein physisch betrachtete (gewaltsame) Verursachung des Todes eines Menschen ist, wie direkt
auch immer die Ttung sich vollzieht, moralisch nicht bewertbar, und der Ausdruck direkt htte auf dieser Ebene allein
betrachtet keinerlei moralisch relevante Bedeutung. [] Wenige Extremflle, wie sie der Frage der Kraniotomie aber auch
der Extrauteringraviditt zugrunde liegen, entziehen sich jedoch aus geriau angebbaren Grnden dem ethischen Kontext
Gerechtigkeit. Das Prinzip Gerechtigkeit ist der Situation nicht mehr adquat und damit ist auch die Ungerechtigkeit,
die dem Ttungsverbot zugrunde liegt, hier auch nicht mehr einsichtig (was sich gerade dann zeigt, wenn man hier im
Namen der Heiligkeit und Unantastbarkeit des menschlichen Lebens verlangt, die Mutter msse zusammen mit ihrem
bereits unrettbar verlorenen Kind sterben). Tten als moralisch verwerfliche Handlung, und das heit przise: als
Verletzung der Gerechtigkeit, steht in solchen Fllen gar nicht zur Diskussion. Hingegen erscheint in diesem extremen
Konfliktfall die Lebensrettung der Mutter als gebotene Pflicht der Gerechtigkeit (oder zumindest als der Gerechtigkeit
angemessene Handlung), so dass die Handlung (auch wenn sie eine physisch direkte Verursachung des Todes impliziert)
moralisch korrekt als Handlung der Leberisrettung und damit auf der Ebene ihres Objektes als gerechte Handlung beschrieben
und bewertet werden kann. Das heit: Die Ttung des Ungeborenen fllt hier (1) aus der Alternative gerecht/ungerecht
heraus und wird (2) dadurch auf der Ebene des Handlungsobjekts als der Gerechtigkeit zumindest angemessene
Lebensrettungshandlung beschreibbar. Deshalb ist die todesverursachende rztliche Intervention selbst [140] analog zu
einer nicht-intentionalen Nebenfolge, das heit analog zu einer nicht-absichtlichen Verursachung (praeter intentionem) der
Todesfolge zu beurteilen. Damit, so scheint mir, wird die einem gesunden rztlichen Ethos entsprechende moralische
Intuition gerechtfertigt, dass der Arzt in einem solchen Fall verpflichtet ist, wenigstens das Leben der Mutter zu retten und
ihn fr den Tod der Leibesfrucht keinerlei Verantwortung oder Schuld trifft. Nicht darum, eine Norm aufzustellen Im
Falle X ist es erlaubt, Y zu tun geht es, sondern darum festzustellen, dass hier den Arzt keine Verantwortung fr den Tod
des Kindes trifft. Es geht also letztlich nicht um eine normative Rechtfertigung (denn der Fall entzieht sich streng
genommen jeglicher Normierung), sondern um ein Entschuldigen des Handelnden in einer rational auswegslosen
Situation. (Rhonheimer 2004, 138-140)
Leo Elders s.v.d.:
M. Rhonheimer verwendet die Kategorie der Partizipation am ewigen Gesetz, um ein objektives Fundament fr
unsere sittlichen Verpflichtungen zu finden. Nach seiner Meinung kann der Verstand diese nicht aus natrlichen
Strukturen ableiten, und ist die Ethik von Anthropologie und Ontologie unabhngig. Der praktische Verstand
ergreift so die These - unmittelbar das in ihm liegende bonum rationis, und zwar durch Partizipation am ewigen
Gesetz.- Es ist zweifelsohne richtig, das Sittengesetz als eine Partizipation am ewigen Gesetz zu betrachten, aber
dennoch mssen wir unsere sittlichen Verpflichtungen rational begrnden und einsichtig machen. Hierfr gibt es
keinen anderen Weg als Thomas Lehre vom Naturrecht. In Rhonheimers Sicht bleibt das Fundament fr die
ersten Prinzipien absolut unklar. (Elders 2009, 242) Cf. also (Elders 1989, 2006; 2005; 2001).

Marie A. Anderson, Robert L. Fastiggi, David E. Hargroder, Rev. Joseph C. Howard Jr., and C. Ward Kischer:

Martin Rhonheimers Defense of Craniotomy, Salpingostomy, and the Use of Methotrexate

Rev. Martin Rhonheimers defense of the use of salpingostomy and methotrexate in resolving ectopic pregnancies is based
on his version of virtue ethics. His book Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies,
which appeared in English in 2009, is a detailed, subtle, and sophisticated study, but a number of Catholic ethicists have
described the central thesis as fatally flawed and lacking a certain moderate realism about killing and the way people
normally intend. For Rhonheimer, killing is wrong because it violates the virtue of justice. In certain extreme cases, such
as those that required a craniotomy prior to the development of cesarean section or, in the contemporary context, cases
of ectopic pregnancy, the unborn child or embryo has no chance of survival. Therefore, according to Rhonheimer, the
killing that occurs is only physically direct and immediate, but on the part of the agent there is no intentionality that violates

justice. As a result, the prohibition of intentional killing is not violated because, without a chance of survival, the unborn
child or embryo cannot claim, in justice, any immunity from killing. Moreover, the intention of the agent is not to kill the
unborn child but to save the life of the mother. Thus, in these extreme cases of vital conflict, the physical act of directly
bringing about the embryos death is not a violation of justice, and therefore it is not wrong. (Anderson et al. 2011, 676)
It should first be noted that Rhonheimers position stands in direct opposition to the decisions of the Holy Office of
1884 and 1889, both of which ruled that the moral legitimacy of craniotomy cannot be safely taught (tuto doceri non posse)
in Catholic schools.52 Rhonheimer sees the decisions of the Holy Office as problematic a cause for confusion. In
terms of Catholic ecclesiology, however, these rulings represent teachings of the ordinary magisterium. Unless such
decisions have been qualified by subsequent magisterial interventions (which has not been the case), they merit religious
assent on the part of the faithful. Rhonheimer also misrepresents what the Holy Office ruled in 1884 and 1889 concerning
craniotomy. It did not state that the morality of craniotomy could not be taught as certain, but that it cannot be safely
taught. One might be tempted to think this is merely an issue of the translation found in the English edition of
Rhonheimers book, but he himself states that a judgment of tuto doceri/tradi non posse means only that one cannot teach
something with certainty of conscience (because it is perhaps wrong). This, though, is not what such a ruling means.
There are many theological positions that are tolerated or permitted, but they have not been taught as certain by the
magisterium. Contrary to Rhonheimer, what the Holy Office taught in 1884 and 1889 was that Catholic professors could
not safely uphold the moral permissibility of craniotomy. In other words, the moral defense of craniotomy was judged to be
a dangerous and impermissible position to teach. In a similar way, the Holy Office ruled in 1944 that the position of
mitigated millenarianism (which teaches that, before the final resurrection, Christ will come to reign visibly over the
earth) cannot be safely taught (tuto doceri non posse). The Holy Office was not saying that mitigated millenarianism was
permitted as long as it was not taught as certain. Rather, it was saying that this position could not be safely taught. In
other words, it was a position that could not be publicly sustained and defended by Catholics. (Anderson et al. 2011, 677678)
Piotr Lichacz, O.P.:
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly known that the question: Is it possible to infer an ought from an is? which means: Is it
possible to make the transition from descriptive phrases to prescriptive ones or from fact to value? is nowhere to
be found in St. Thomass writings. Neither do we find the question: Is it possible to base ethics upon a non-value
science or upon some definition of goodness? It seems to some that Aquinas, as a pre-Enlightenment author, did
not see these philosophical traps, which were discovered more than five centuries after his death, and thus he
unwittingly committed a massive initial error which led to the elaboration of a complex, blundering moral theory.
For indeed, if we were simply to ask whether Aquinas inferred moral rules from factual statements or moved from
fact to value, many scholars would reply affirmatively, despite much recent interpretative acrobatics undertaken to
deny this. For a fair number of people this is unfortunately a sufficient reason to cast such an author aside in order
to prevent the loss of precious time in the study of theories which do not respect the basic rules of contemporary
philosophy and theology. For them, to acknowledge this movement from fact to value is like acknowledging a
pupils mistake. It completely disqualifies the author in question. He is banished from the contemporary world of
serious thinking because the thesis no ought from is is one of the dogmas of modern thinking and the
naturalistic fallacy remains a serious objection in the evaluations of meta-ethical theories.
This disqualification and banishment may, however, be precipitate. One can rightly ask, for example, what it
means for Aquinas to infer. In particular, one can askwhat the character of inference is on the logical level
and in what its relation or relations to things, signified by the words of descriptive and prescriptive phrases,
consists. What is it we describe with our words and phrases? What makes an inference illicit? Whence do we
obtain the principles that allow us to say that an inference is improper? Have we only one logic? What kind of
logic makes untenable any derivation of practical judgments from theoretical ones? More profoundly, is there
really an insurmountable chasm between fact and value, between is and ought, between factual and moral
statements? Is fact really value-free? What kind of description devoids facts from their value-content and
makes is a stranger to ought? These questions are asked because it is very probable that these modern
problems do not apply to Aquinass worldview at all.

The interpretative acrobatics mentioned above, which aim to deny that Aquinas infers ought from is, are the
work of certain Thomists who seem convinced that these problems are applicable to St. Thomass moral teaching
on both the philosophical and theological level.3 For example, the best known proponent of this interpretation of
Aquinas insists:
Aquinass repeated affirmation that practical reasons first principles are undeduced refutes the
common accusation or assumption that his ethics invalidly attempts to deduce or infer ought
from is, for his affirmation entails that the sources of all relevant oughts cannot be deduced from
any is. There remain, however, a number of contemporary Thomists who deny that such a
deduction or inference need be fallacious, and regard Aquinas as postulating some such deduction
or inference. (Finnis 2011)
A common feature of this type of interpretation is a quest for the experimental source of the moral ought
based on the argument that we need not learn metaphysics in order to know what we ought to do. As an almost
obvious conclusion we find that our ethical knowledge precedes our speculative knowledge of human nature,
ethical knowledge being distinguished from ethical reflection. (Rhonheimer 2003, 23.) The latter may take
advantage of speculative knowledge but not the former because this would destroy moral autonomy. Ethics or
moral theology reposes on the first principle of moral knowledge and is subsequently developed through moral
reflection. This is so because there can be no valid deduction of a normative conclusion without a normative
principle, and thus [the] first practical principles cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations.4
It is argued that Aquinas is in agreement with these claims: he escapes this logically illicit transition from is to
ought by an appeal to the principles of practical reason, which are autonomous regarding theoretical principles.
What is often brought forth is a concern to guarantee the practical character of ethics. Morality seen as a theory of
action in conformity with human nature would reduce ethics to a theoretical science. Ethics, in fact, is irreducibly
practical. Hence, the Aristotelian attempt (present in Aquinass writings) to identify a distinctive or peculiarly
human function is at least unnecessary for the whole of ethics.6 In the same vein, St. Thomass identification of
mans last end is said not to be foundational for his ethics, despite surface appearances. (Finnis 2011) It is
thus possible, for example, to make an elaborate sketch of Aquinass theory of natural law without needing to
advert to the question of Gods existence or nature or will. We are reminded as well by another author that the
time of naturalism (equated often with physicalism) in ethics or moral theology is over: To be sure, no moral

(Lichacz 2008, 2. [e.a.]) The expression some Thomists conceals especially such names as Germain Grisez, John Finnis,
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., who initiated the controversy around the New Natural Law Theory (the controversy began in 1965 with
Grisezs article The First Principle of Practical Reason:
A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2 Natural Law Forum 10 [1965]:
168-201, but an extensive discussion followed the publication of Finniss book Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980]). Later, the same or a slightly modified thesis was repeated in many publications by these authors and
other followers. From among those later defenders of this interpretation we can enumerate most notably Robert P. George and to
some extent also Martin Rhonheimer (although Rhonheimer is influenced by it, he does not adopt fully Grisez-Finnis-Boyles approach). Each of
these authors deserves a high esteem for his impressive work in the field of moral
philosophy and theology. Many other Thomist scholars nonetheless have been struck by the affinity of arguments advanced by
the proponents of the New Natural Law Theory with these of David Hume and G. E. Moore. This was one of the reasons
why this innovation in reading Aquinas was criticized. Among early critics of this approach were such authors as Henry B. Veatch
and Ralph McInerny. Later many others also objected against such interpretation, including Russel Hittinger, Lloyd Weinreb,
Janice L. Smith, Brian V. Johnstone, Benedict M. Ashley, Alasdair MacIntyre, Fulvio Di Blasi,
Anthony Lisska, Steven A. Long, John Rist, and Jean Porter. For a long list of publications on both sides of this controversy and
an interesting discussion of the issue, see e.g. Fulvio Di Blasi, God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas, transl.
by D. Thunder (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustines Press, 2006). For an earlier account see e.g. Janice L. Schultz, Is-Ought:
Prescribing and a Present Controversy, The Thomist 49 (1985): 1-23; and a continuation article: idem, Thomistic Metaethics
and a Present Controversy, The Thomist 52 (1988): 40-62; Russell Hittinger, A Critique of
the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). While I acknowledge that some
presentations of their interpretation might be oversimplified and not entirely just, I do not intend to present the whole
controversy once again.
4 (Lichacz 2008, 4.) Rhonheimer does not think function argument is an erratic boulder and criticizes Finnis on this point,
see cf. (Rhonheimer 2003, 24.)
3

theologian today would still derive moral normativity immediately from nature as such (understood as the
naturally given and presented). (Rhonheimer 2000, XVII.)
I will argue that Aquinas in a sense justified the transition from is to ought and I will attempt to
exhibit some reasons why his ethics and moral theology are and should be naturalistic. The meta-ethical
problems identified with David Hume and George Edward Moore, when compared with Aquinass
teaching, will appear only as the consequences of mistakes made (or arbitrary decisions taken) on a more
basic level, namely, the epistemological, semantic, and logical. These mistakes result as well in the
elimination of the philosophy of nature and in the debilitation of metaphysics. I will argue that St.
Thomass approach to human cognition, semantics and logic is to some degree immune to such
perturbations. Thus, a defense of his ethics or moral theology against the accusation that he invalidly
infers an ought from an is should not deny that he infers an ought from an is, but rather should
explain in what sense he validly infers an ought from an is. I will clearly distinguish in the Is/Ought
Thesis between the logical sub-thesis, the semantic sub-thesis, and the internalist assumption, which are
distinct layers of the question. It is probable that the Thomistic is/ought controversy consists precisely in
the blurring of these distinctions. A strong emphasis on the motivational character of moral discourse or
necessarily practical character of ethics seems to introduce the hegemony of the question: how is it that
we know we ought to do something? (a kind of phenomenology of action) over the question: why
ought we do something? (a causal explanation). I will however not verify this possibility here. In this
dissertation I intend only to show, distinguishing these three layers of the question, in what way Aquinas
justifies the transition from is to ought. (Lichacz 2008, 1-5.)
The aim of this dissertation was to show whether St. Thomas Aquinas justified the transition from is
to ought, that is, the transition from factual descriptions to moral claims. The need for such a study was
dictated by a controversy that originated with an interpretation of Aquinass writings that takes for
granted the negative answer, namely that generally there is no justification for such a transition and
Aquinas did not even try to justify it or to make it. For it is believed that to make such a transition is to
commit a basic logical fallacy: you simply cannot infer prescriptive conclusions from purely descriptive
premises. This claim is presented as an obvious philosophical principle. Some texts from the Summa
Theologiae are quoted as well in order to prove that practical principles are not deduced from theoretical
principles. This should confirm the opinion that St. Thomas was so a great thinker that already in the
thirteenth century in his ethical theory he avoided a common mistake which was named and stigmatized
only in the eighteenth century by David Hume. Moreover, since the first practical principles are not
deduced from metaphysics or natural science, it follows that Aquinass ethics is not and cannot be
naturalistic. By the same token St. Thomas avoided in his ethics the naturalistic fallacy identified by
George Edward Moore in the twentieth century.
But this interpretation of St. Thomas proved controversial for several Thomists and many critiques
appeared that show inconsistencies in this approach. This study, however, was not undertaken as another
polemic with those distinguished authors who advanced the aforementioned interpretation. It intended
only to present positively some aspects of Aquinass teaching that help to understand why it is possible to
say that he did justify the transition from is to ought. [] For our topic, it turned out to be crucial
because, although the problem of the possibility of inferring an ought from is belongs to ethics or its
foundations, the roots of the problem are not ethical and thus the problem seems to be insoluble within
ethics as a discipline. Hence, we concluded that in order to find an answer to the problem of this
dissertation we cannot read only the texts which we judge to belong to ethics or moral theology. Doing so
might easily lead us to interpret them anachronistically. (Lichacz 2008, 264-266.)
Trying to give a brief answer to the question whether St. Thomas Aquinas justified the transition from
is to ought, we should say: yes, he did. The logical sub-thesis of the Is/Ought Thesis in Aquinass
framework is simply wrong. It is true that not from every descriptive sentence or synthetic statement
which uses no term in its moral sense there follows a moral statement. Yet there are descriptive sentences

that point at the final cause of a human being and thus entail moral statements. And there are specific
rules in material logic discussed by St. Thomas that help to discern what conditions of descriptive
sentences should be fulfilled so as to justify such an inference. (Lichacz 2008, 274-275.) Cf. also (Stilley
2010).
Shalina Stilley
Four Solutions to the IOP [Is-Ought problem]
During the past half century philosophers have come up with numerous solutions to the IOP both as it relates to the
ethics in general and as it relates to natural law theory in particular. The first of these solutions attempts to show that
the problem is merely a pseudo-problem. Searle, for example, claims to have offered a counterexample to the IOP by
showing that an Ought can be derived from an Is. Moreover, his counterexample seems to be valid. Although he
admits that one counterexample cannot in itself refute a philosophical thesis, he argues that a counterexample in
addition to an explanation of how the counterexample works, can.Gewirth also attempts to offer a counterexample.
Even if these counterexamples are valid, however, several questions need to be asked. First, since neither Searle nor
Gewirth are natural law theorists, it needs to be asked whether their counterexamples are pertinent to natural law
theory. Even if we assume that Searle and Gewrith are successful in providing counterexamples, it could still be
argued that, unless they implement the claims of natural law theory, the IOP is still a problem for natural law theory.
Second, it needs to be asked whether the Ought derived in their counterexamples are moral, prescriptive, determinate,
categorical, and egalitarian. Only if both of these questions can be answered affirmatively can these counterexamples
be used by natural law theorists.
A second solution involves deriving an Ought from the desires of agents.5 By utilizing this method, it is possible to
derive a conclusion containing an Ought from statements concerning human nature as in the following argument: (1)
Doing X is contrary to human nature. (2) Because X damages or goes against human nature, it leads to bad consequences. Therefore, (3)
if agents desire to avoid these bad consequences, they ought to avoid doing X. Although, at this point, only a hypothetical Ought
has been derived, further statements can be added to derive a categorical one. These statements are: (4) All agents in
fact desire to avoid bad consequences and (5) Doing X always leads to bad consequences. With these additional statements, it is possible to
conclude (6) All agents always ought to avoid doing X.
The most obvious difficulty with this approach is that it would not seem to address all aspects of the IOP. Although
the Ought-conclusion is not formulated as a hypothetical statement per se, the argument as a whole seems to be
contingent on the desires of the agent and, hence, does not seem to be a viable solution. Otherwise stated, since a
categorical Ought cannot be based on contingent on variable or escapable features either of agents and since desires
are variable, escapable features any derivation based on desires would not seem to be properly categorized as
categorical. A related difficulty is that the Ought-conclusion would seem, at least at first blush, to lack determinacy
since different agents have different desires. Yet another difficulty is that it does not seem that the Ought derived is
necessarily moral. Thus, more work needs to be done if natural law theorists utilize this approach.
A third solution attempts to show that if we return to an Aristotelian, teleological, and functional understanding of
human nature, the problem disappears. The claim is that once we come to understand the function of the human
person, the Ought emerges. Analogously, if we grasp the notion of a watch as something which has the function of
keeping time accurately, we can conclude that a watch which does not keep time properly is a bad watch and one
which does is a good watch. In other words, once we grasp what the function of a watch is, it becomes clear that a
watch ought to keep time accurately. Likewise, if we grasp the notion of a farmer as someone who has the function of
producing crops, we can conclude that a farmer who does not produce crops is a bad farmer and one who does is a
good farmer. Once we grasp the function of a farmer, it becomes clear that a farmer ought to produce crops. It would
seem, then, that if we can acquire an understanding of the function of the human person, the Ought would at once
surface or to put it differently it would seem that since natural law theory incorporates a functional view of
human nature, the IOP may not apply to it.

(Stilley 2010, 27) Janet Smith is an example of a natural law theorist who utilizes this type of methodology
(although she does not specifically claim that it is a way of overcoming the IOP).
7

Although many natural law theorists have accepted this as a solution to the problem, it too leads to difficulties. One
of the main difficulties is that it is not clear that it is possible to come to know the function or essence of the human
person. Another difficulty is that, even if we assume that it is possible to know the function of a human being, it is
not clear that knowing that function would provide us with a moral Ought rather than merely an Ought of adequacy.
It is clear that, since the very function of a watch is to keep time accurately, a watch ought to keep time accurately. It
may also be clear, at least in some cases, that since the very function of a farmer is to produce crops, a farmer ought to
do so (provided that he is able to). What is not clear, however, is that this is a moral Ought rather than just an Ought
of adequacy. It would be absurd to argue that, since the function of a watch is to keep time, a watch has a moral
obligation to keep time. It would also be absurd to argue that just because the function of a farmer is to produce
crops, he has a moral obligation to do so. Why, then, must we accept that just because the human person has a
particular function, he has a moral obligation to act in accord with this function? Apparently, if this approach is to be
used, more work needs to be done here too.
A fourth solution, which has been put forth by Finnis, Grisez and others, has been to start with an underived, selfevident Ought. This approach involves arguing that some goods are self-evident and, hence, need not be derived
from statements about human nature at all. As Finnis puts it,
the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately
grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians, are per se nota (self-evident) and
indemonstrable. They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not
inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about the
function of a human being, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception
of nature. (Finnis 1980, 33-34)
Finnis also claims that specifically moral Ought statements must be derived from these self-evident first principles and,
hence, he fully admits that the moral Ought must be derived. Nevertheless, he maintains that the moral Ought is not
derived from Isstatements but, rather, directly from a pre-moral Ought-statement.
However, this solution too meets with difficulties. One such difficulty is that it is not clear that the Ought is related to
human nature and so it is not clear that this method is proper to natural law theory. (Cf. Veatch 1980-1981, 253) If
this approach is utilized by natural law theorists, they must establish that there is some link between the moral Ought
and human nature.
Another difficulty is that it would seem to leave us with an indeterminate Ought since there is much disagreement
about what the first principles and basic forms of good and evil are. Although all persons within a given culture might
be able to agree on some principles, it is not clear that all persons tout court are able to agree. What might be accepted
as a self-evident principle or Ought by some agents might differ from what is accepted as self-evident by other agents.
Each of these proposed solutions have pros and cons, that is, each of them offer a path to a solution to the IOP as it
pertains specifically to natural law theory while at the same time leaving some questions unanswered. (Stilley 2010,
26-31)
William E. May:
Masturbation
In an essay defending Veritatis splendor, in a section criticizing Richard A. McCormick, S.J.s proportionalistic
expansion of the moral object, Rhonheimer writes with regard to the relationship between the stimulating of a
mans genitals and the moral act of masturbation:
[S]timulation of the genital organs as such is not a kind of behavior that can be chosen or
willingly performed by a human person; a basic reason, intent, or purpose is needed. That is why
the Catechism of the Catholic Church very correctly writes in n. 2352: By masturbation is to be
understood the deliberate stimulation of the genital organs in order to derive sexual pleasure.
That seems very clear. If one chooses the same behavioral pattern (stimulating genital organs) in
order to get semen for fertility analysis, then one simply chooses an action that is different by its
object. (Rhonheimer 1995, 296.)

Rhonheimer thus held that stimulating a mans genital organs to get semen for fertility analysis was morally
permissible. Rhonheimer, in a cordial email to me, wrote that he did not say this but rather only that the chosen
act was different [from masturbation] in its object. I accept this as Rhonheimers position. But if the chosen act
is different in its object or different by its object (as the text cited reads), then the chosen act cannot be
masturbation insofar as Rhonheimers precise point is that while both have the same behavioral pattern, they
have different moral objects: one is masturbation, defined as choosing that pattern in order to derive sexual
pleasure, whereas the other is to choose that pattern to provide semen for fertility analysis. My criticism was
and still is that Rhonheimers position is not that of Pope Pius XII, who explicitly condemned as masturbation the
act of freely choosing to stimulate ones genitals to provide semen for fertility analysis. I accept Pius XIIs
position, not Rhonheimers. Moreover, it seems to me that I did not unreasonably infer that, for Rhonheimer,
such stimulation of the genital organs is morally permissible, for, in asserting that the actions moral object is
different, he in no way shows that the action whose specifying moral object is to provide semen for fertility
awareness is morally evil. (May 2010, 331.)
Rhonheimers Solution to the Vital Conflicts6
In the final section of his book, Rhonheimer applies his reasoning to four common procedures used to resolve ectopic
pregnancies. First is salpingectomy (the surgical excision of an entire fallopian tube containing an unborn child); second is
linear salpingo(s)tomy (slitting the tube where the baby is implanted and removing the unborn child and then sewing the
tube together so that a future conception can take place in it); third is the use of the drug methotrexate (which dissolves
the trophoblastic tissue attaching the unborn child to the tube and thus removes it from the tube); finally there is expectant
management (or waiting to see if the unborn child will pass through the tube and enter the mothers uterus). Rhonheimer
judges the first two treatments morally legitimate because patients considering them ordinarily have reached the stage of
vital conflict. He does not think that the third, use of methotrexate, is licit since the drug is administered when tubal
pregnancies are first discovered, and at that time there is reason to think that the embryo will not die; since this is not a
case of vital indication, he believes that the procedure becomes something approaching a direct attack on the embryo.
(Rhonheimer 2009, 116.) Finally, expectant management is justifiable if the progress of the tubal pregnancy has not yet
reached the point of vital conflict.
Rhonheimers Argument Summarized
I have already summarized the principal claim made by Rhonheimer that the proper way to resolve the vital conflicts
posed by craniotomy and ectopic pregnancies is to recognize that
the killing of any human being is a question of justice at its most fundamental level. Only within the ethical
context of justice does it make any sense to speak in a morally relevant way of a direct killing as a choice to
take a human life. It is only this reference to the virtue of justice that enables one to call an act of killing morally
evil. (Rhonheimer 2009, 11-12)
Viewed from the context provided by an ethics of justice as a virtue, Rhonheimer recapitulates his own argument justifying
craniotomy and use of any physical act removing and thus resulting in the death of an unborn child implanted ectopically
by saying:
The norm that prohibits the killing of a human being appears, in this case [vital conflicts], to be simply
pointless and nonsensical. In fact, the meaning of the norm is that no unjust killing be committed.
The only morally good thing that can be done is to save the life of the mother. (Rhonheimer 2009, 123)
The final pages of Rhonheimers book, titled Epilogue: Virtue Ethics, offer important insights into his
thought. (Rhonheimer 2009, 138-150)

6 Cf. also (Cavanaugh 2011; Guevin 2011; Flannery 2011) Kevin L. Flannery: Abstract: This article considers M. Therese
Lysaught's analysis of an apparent abortion that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona, in 2009. Since Lysaught invokes it, the article considers
Rev. Martin Rhonheimer's theory about the bearing of vital conflict situations on the object of the act performed. A vital conflict
situation is present when, for instance, the life of a mother might be spared if her fetus is aborted, otherwise she and the fetus will die.
The article argues that the use of such situations in this way by Lysaught and Rhonheimer (and possibly others) is incompatible with
Church teaching. The article concludes by suggesting that certain cases might be analyzed in such a way that the mother's life is saved
and the fetus dies but there is no direct abortion.

Rhonheimer also asserts:

Killing is evil, not because the good of life has been destroyed, but because, by the destruction of his life
his bodily and thus fully human existence in this world one has acted toward a concrete living human
person in a thoroughly unjust way it is not goods that are infringed upon but claims, rights of human
persons. (Rhonheimer 2009, 142.)
Here Rhonheimer seems to be criticizing those who say that it is always morally evil to choose to damage,
destroy, or impede a basic human good such as life in a concrete human person. This, in essence, is the position
taken by Grisez et al., who hold that a specific negative moral norm, an absolute with no exceptions, is not to
choose to destroy a basic human good such as life itself. Grisez et al., while recognizing the role that virtue has
to play in our moral life, do not propose a virtue-based ethics but rather one rooted in normative principles of
the natural law, which for them, as for Aquinas, is the work of intellect as practical, and consists of an ordered
set of true practical propositionsAquinas calls them universal propositions of practical reason ordered to
action beginning with the most common and universal and proceeding to more specific kinds of norms:
positive which are always binding but not for every instance (norms binding semper sed non pro semper)
and negative which are not only always binding but also binding at all times insofar as one can forbear doing
any evil whatsoever (semper et ad semper).
Concluding Evaluative Assessment of Rhonheimers Work in Medical Ethics
There is no doubt that Rhonheimers studies on issues in medical (or bioethical) issues are exceptionally thoughtprovoking. In my judgment his criticism of the proportionalist methodology involving the weighing of the
unweighable values of human lives and of the physicalism of the traditional Catholic understanding of the
object morally specifying human acts is helpful. But despite the helpfulness of some of Rhonheimers views on
disputed issues in medical ethics, his analyses can be seriously questioned and criticized. I will summarize my
major problems with his analyses by focusing on the following aspects of Rhonheimers moral thought:
1. His claim that the intentional killing of an innocent human being either as means or as end is, from the
perspective of justice, morally wrong because it violates the principle of equality. (Rhonheimer 2009, 40-42)
2. His claim that the norm that prohibits the [intentional] killing of a human being appears, in this case [vital
conflicts], to be simply pointless and nonsensical. In fact, the meaning of the norm is that no unjust killing be
committed. (Rhonheimer 2009, 123.)
3. His contention that killing is evil, not because the good of life has been destroyed, but because, by the
destruction of his life his bodily and thus fully human existence in this world one has acted toward a
concrete living human person in a thoroughly unjust way it is not goods that are infringed upon but
claims, rights of human persons. (Rhonheimer 2009, 142.)
4. His rejection of the principle of double effect. (May 2010, 340-341.)

Steven J. Jensen:
Martin Rhonheimers The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics offers
a bold summary of Thomistic virtue ethics, laid upon some not-so-Thomistic foundations, culminating in
questionable, perhaps even dangerous, conclusions concerning actions evil in themselves. (Jensen 2012, 135)
Since we are rational creatures, we realize the strivings in our actions not blindly or with instinct but through
reasoned deliberation (Rhonheimer 2011, 50-57). As such, human actions are always deliberate and intentional
actions. If a description of activity does not include intention, then it describes mere bodily movement and not
human action. An example to which Rhonheimer often returns is lying on your bed. Described just as such it
picks out a state of the body. Only when we add something like I am lying on my bed to get some rest are we

10

describing a human action (Rhonheimer 2011, 55). The descriptions I am resting or I am doing yoga
elliptically contain intentions that go along with the bodily state of lying on the bed, so that they also identify
human actions. Rhonheimer is here speaking of intentions within activities; he is not referring to further intentions
that go outside the human action now being performed (Rhonheimer 2011, 55;104-105). If someone steals in
order to commit adultery, then the intention to commit adultery is a remote intention going beyond the immediate
action of theft, but if someone lies on a bed in order to rest, the end of resting is part of the very activity now
being performed. Rhonheimer, then, is making two divides. First, he is distinguishing mere physical activity or
activity considered according to some natural speciesand human activity, which has an intention built into it.
Second, he is distinguishing the intention that enters into an activity and a further intention that goes beyond the
activity.These distinctions are reasonable enough, but Rhonheimer never clearly delineates the boundaries of each.
Disregarding this imprecision will come back to haunt the unwary reader. Consider the first distinction. Lying on
the bed is mere physical activity. Lying in order to rest is a human action; it is what Rhonheimer calls a basic
intentional action, that is, the minimal unit of the human action: natural activity with intention (Rhonheimer 2011,
55). But how much intention is needed for basic intentional action? Suppose somebody asks me what I am doing,
and I answer that I am moving my finger. Presumably, my response has provided mere bodily activity. Now I
add, I am moving my finger in order to pull the trigger. Is this intention of pulling the trigger enough to provide
a basic intentional action? Why, you might ask, am I pulling the trigger? In order to fire the gun. Is firing a gun,
then, a basic intentional action, or do I need to go further yet in my intentions? I am firing the gun in order to
make a noise. Is making a noise a basic intentional action? I am firing the gun in order to make a noise in order
to signal the start of the race. Do I now have a basic intentional action? Or, on the other hand, is making a noise a
basic intentional action, and signaling the start of the race is a further intention beyond the activity? Rhonheimer
does not provide the tools to answer these questions, questions which, at this point, might appear to be mere
quibbling over details, especially for an introductory book. The importance of these questions, however, will
appear later, when Rhonheimer discusses killing, lying, certain kinds of abortion, and other intrinsically evil
actions. His account of the morality of these actions will hang crucially upon these divisionsbetween physical
activity and basic intentional action and between human actions and further intentionsbut he will not explain
upon what basis he makes the divisions. From what he says, it seems that Rhonheimer thinks basic intentional
actions must include some sort of human good to their intention (Rhonheimer 2011, 106). Lying in bed is merely
a physical state, but resting is a human good. At any rate, Rhonheimer never clarifies the point. (Jensen 2012,
136-138)
A similar comment can be made concerning rights. In contrast to his usage of ethical context, Rhonheimer
does give a limited treatment concerning rights (2348). He says, however, that talk of natural rights must be
recast in terms of the doctrine of justice as a virtue (235). Rights then, are secondary, a derivative concept.
Surprisingly, then, when it comes to particular cases, rights begin doing much of the work of ethical justification.
We must return a deposited item only when the owner has a right to the return (348). Killing is an injustice
because the other person has a right to life equal to my own (355, 401). Capital punishment is objectively an action
of justice because it does not damage the right of another (357). Lying is wrong because the interlocutor has a
right to live in the social order and a right to the institutions proper to this, which presuppose truthfulness (364).
Stealing is the taking of something rightly possessed by another (371, 387). The act of taking something away from
someone else gets ist moral identity because it is directed against the right of the other person (386). Since rights
have not been clearly defined, one is left with the impression that moral actions are defined, circularly, by the
application of morally loadedconcepts, even as Proportionalists claim concerning moral absolutes, for
example,adultery is simply sexual relations outside of marriage that is wrong. At any rate, what becomes clear is
that the lack of content in practical reason, that is, a practical reason that simply defines the good itself and does
not depend upon nature, has left a vacuum that has been filled by undefined moral concepts such as rights and
ethical context. Since rights are easily created by whoever wishes to create them, such a practical reason is greatly
to be feared. Homo prudens is man set loose in the void of empty space. (Jensen 2012, 158-159)

11

JANET E. SMITH:
THE ARGUMENT THAT there are times when it is moral to use condoms to reduce the risk of transmitting
the HIV has recently resurfaced, this time from a surprising source: Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, a philosopher who is no
dissenter from Church teaching. In several recent publications he has attempted to determine the morality of the use of
condoms to reduce the risk of transmitting the HIV. The Church has no explicit teaching on this matter. Certainly, it
teaches that contraception is always wrong and Rhonheimer agrees with that teaching. He seeks to determine if use of
the condom by HIV-infected spouses is intrinsically evil.
Rhonheimer rightly observes that condoms themselves are not intrinsically evil--they are just things and they may
have moral as well as immoral uses. It is the use of devices and chemicals as contraceptives that makes them immoral
not their very existence nor every use. He argues that condoms can never morally be used for contraceptive purposes
but that there are other moral uses for condoms, even when they have a contraceptive effect. He supports the Church's
teaching that married couples may never use devices and chemicals as contraceptives. But he maintains that
promiscuous people, sexually active ho-mosexuals, and prostitutes, all of whom are at risk of spreading or contracting
the HIV, would be showing a "certain sense of responsibility" were they to use condoms. He does not say that it is
moral for them to use condoms, only that it may be less vicious for them to do so than not.
Most significant and controversial is his argument that an HIV-infected spouse could morally use a condom for
the purpose of reducing the risk of infection. He argues that such an act does not violate the condemna-tion of
contraception laid out in Humanae vitae. He argues that HIV-infected spouses would not be using a condom as a
contraceptive. Thus, they would not be using an evil means, that is, performing an evil act, to achieve a good end.
Rather, these spouses would be tolerating the contraceptive effect of the condom as a side effect. In this essay I will
explain my reasons for rejecting Rhonheimer's conclusion.
The differences between Rhonheimer and myself go beyond a difference on how to assess the morality of the use
of a condom by an HIV-infected spouse. Indeed, it derives not from a disagreement about the truth of the Church's
teaching on contraception, for there we agree, but on how one properly determines the good-ness or badness of a
moral action. Here is not the place to give a full response to Rhonheimer's method of moral analysis, but the attentive
reader will realize that we disagree on some of the fundamentals of moral analysis. Rhonheimer does not recommend
that HIV-infected spouses use condoms; he maintains that rarely would the risk of transmitting the HIV be
proportionate to the goods sought. He is simply saying that such use of a condom would not be a contraceptive act and
could be morally permissible if the goods sought were proportionate to the risk. This position does not make him a
proportionalist, of course; many moral actions require an analysis of the proportionality of goods. (Smith 2006, 27-29)
I believe my differences with Rhonheimer involve what constitutes the object of the moral act, what the "end" of the
act is, what practical reason is, and how "nature" impacts the evaluation of an action. My critique of the method of
moral analysis of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, William May, and Joseph Boyle (Appendix 4 in my Humanae Vitae: A
Generation Later [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991]: 340-70) may shed light on some
of the disagreements that I have with Rhonheimer. Rhonheimer has his own disagreements with Grisez's method but
shares to some significant extent its understanding of practical reason. (Smith 2006, footnote 4)
Strangely, Rhonheimer does not recommend that HIV-infected spouses confine their acts of conjugal intercourse to
the infertile periods, in which at least the contraceptive power of the condom would not be in play as a side-effect.
Moreover, Rhonheimer's reasoning would seem to permit some other acts generally considered by Catholics who are in
line with the magisterium to be against the moral principles of the Church. Would Rhonheimer think a male could use a
nonperforated condom to collect semen for fertility testing? Indeed, would masturbation to acquire semen for fertility
testing be moral? Could it be said that that the masturbator was not intending the solitary orgasm--that it is the side effect
of semen gathering?(39)
Indeed, it is odd that neither Rhonheimer nor others who argue for the morality of using the condom to reduce the risk
of transmitting the HIV address the question of the morality of using a condom to reduce the risk of transmitting other
sexually transmitted diseases. Clearly, the importance of not transmitting the HIV is heightened because the HIV causes
AIDS which is fatal; nonetheless, medications are increasing the lifespans of those who have the HIV. Although other
STDs are not lethal (though the connection of the HPV, the human papillomavirus, with cervical cancer may qualify it as a
life-threatening STD), they can cause lifetime infections and inconvenience. Isn't the intent not to transmit nonfatal STDs
similar to the intent not to transmit the HIV? (Smith 2006, 62)

12

The above is an examination of the question of the morality of the use of condoms to reduce the risk of the transmission
of the HIV. While I believe that those who think HIV-infected spouses may morally use a condom are wrong, I believe
this is a legitimate question raised by those who are faithful to the magisterium and that the discussions up to this point
have helped clarify not only this matter but some related extremely important issues as well (e.g., what kind of act is
necessary for consummation and what it means for an act to be unitive). This discussion is directed primarily at those
trained in the mode of analyzing the morality of actions developed in the Catholic tradition. It is doubtful that the analysis
will have much persuasive power for those unfamiliar with that tradition. It is highly probable that it will have nearly no
persuasive impact on most of those who are at risk of transmitting or contracting the HIV. Nonetheless, the complaint
that the Catholic Church is wrong to oppose the distribution of condoms to stop the spread of the HIV is a bit puzzling,
when probed. After all, the vast majority of those who have the HIV contracted it by having sexual intercourse outside of
marriage; many are homosexuals or men unfaithful to their wives or fornicators. Does anyone think that these men are not
using condoms because the Catholic Church says they should not? Are there any social-service organizations or
governments which do not distribute condoms because the Church disapproves of them?
Perhaps the charge is that Catholic hospitals, social-service organizations, and educational institutions should be
distributing condoms. But the Church thinks the real solution is chastity before marriage and fidelity within. It believes
that with God's grace we can control our sexual appetites. It seems unreasonable that a world that promotes dropping
condoms from the sky (many of them defective) and accepts the fornication and promiscuity that led to the problem of
the HIV and its ravages should expect the Church to join that disastrous program.
The Church remains firm in her conviction that human beings are fully capable of living in accord with the morality
demanded by the reality of human sexual intercourse. When they do not do so, the results are, as I said, disastrous. No
doubt Rhonheimer and I agree fully on this matter. (Smith 2006, 68-69) Cf. also (Long 2008; Napier 2011; Newton 2011;
Wong 2007; Bexten 2010)
Final Conclusion
William E. May:
In this concluding evaluation of Rhonheimers work on disputed issues in medical ethics I have given my reasons for
thinking that his virtue-based approach to solving those issues, in particular vital conflicts, is not adequate and is rather
rooted in a misreading of relevant magisterial documents. (May 2010, 347)
JANET E. SMITH:
I believe my differences with Rhonheimer involve what constitutes the object of the moral act, what the "end" of the act
is, what practical reason is, and how "nature" impacts the evaluation of an action. My critique of the method of moral
analysis of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, William May, and Joseph Boyle (Appendix 4 in my Humanae Vitae: A Generation
Later [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991]: 340-70) may shed light on some of the
disagreements that I have with Rhonheimer. Rhonheimer has his own disagreements with Grisez's method but shares to
some significant extent its understanding of practical reason. (Smith 2006, footnote 4) Cf. also (Rhonheimer 1994)

Leo Elders s.v.d.:

M. Rhonheimer verwendet die Kategorie der Partizipation am ewigen Gesetz, um ein objektives Fundament fr unsere
sittlichen Verpflichtungen zu finden. Nach seiner Meinung kann der Verstand diese nicht aus natrlichen Strukturen
ableiten, und ist die Ethik von Anthropologie und Ontologie unabhngig. Der praktische Verstand ergreift so die These
- unmittelbar das in ihm liegende bonum rationis, und zwar durch Partizipation am ewigen Gesetz.- Es ist zweifelsohne
richtig, das Sittengesetz als eine Partizipation am ewigen Gesetz zu betrachten, aber dennoch mssen wir unsere sittlichen
Verpflichtungen rational begrnden und einsichtig machen. Hierfr gibt es keinen anderen Weg als Thomas Lehre vom
Naturrecht. In Rhonheimers Sicht bleibt das Fundament fr die ersten Prinzipien absolut unklar. (Elders 2009, 242) Cf.
also (Elders 1989, 2006; 2005; 2001).

13

Steven J. Jensen:
Martin Rhonheimers The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics offers a bold
summary of Thomistic virtue ethics, laid upon some not-so-Thomistic foundations, culminating in questionable, perhaps
even dangerous, conclusions concerning actions evil in themselves. (Jensen 2012, 135)

Sic ergo patet falsam esse quorundam sententiam qui dicebant nihil interesse ad fidei veritatem quid de creaturis quisque
sentiret, dummodo circa Deum recte sentiatur [] nam error circa creaturas redundat in falsam de Deo sententiam, et
hominum mentes a Deo abducit, in quem fides dirigere nititur, dum ipsas quibusdam aliis causis supponit. 7 (Thomas
2009, ScG, lib. 2 cap. 3 n. 6.)
It is, therefore, evident that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it made no difference to the truth of the faith
what anyone holds about creatures, so long as one thinks rightly about God [] For error concerning creatures, by
subjecting them to causes other than God, spills over into false opinion about God, and takes mens minds away from
Him, to whom faith seeks to lead them. (Thomas 1975, ScG, lib. 2 cap. 3 n. 6.)
So ist also offenbar, da die Meinung bestimmter Leute falsch ist, die sagten, es komme fr die Wahrheit des Glaubens
nicht darauf an, was man ber die Geschpfe meine, wenn man nur in bezug auf Gott die richtige Meinung habe []
Denn der Irrtum ber die Geschpfe geht ber in eine falsche Meinung von Gott und fhrt den Geist der Menschen von
Gott weg zu dem sie der Glaube doch hinzulenken trachtet indem der Irrtum die Geschpfe anderen Ursachen
unterordnet. (Thomas 1975, ScG, lib. 2 cap. 3 n. 6.)

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ethisch legitim, wenn einer der beiden Ehepartner HIV positive infiziert ist? - Eine ethische Studie."
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Press, Oxford University Press.

7 So ist es offenbar, da die Meinung bestimmter Leute falsch ist, die sagen, es komme fr die Wahrheit des Glaubens nicht
darauf an, was man ber die Geschpfe meine, wenn man nur in Bezug auf Gott die richtige Meinung habe [] Denn der Irrtum ber
die Geschpfe geht ber in eine falsche Meinung von Gott und fhrt den Geist der Menschen von Gott weg zu dem sie der Glaube
doch hinzulenken trachtet , indem der Irrtum die Geschpfe anderen Ursachen unterordnet. (Thomas 2009, ScG, lib. 2 cap. 3 n. 6;
11).

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