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Documente Cultură
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
PR was ordered to be investigated for alleged participation in failed
1989 December coup. The AFP Generals sent the letter-complaint. So
PI. Panel then found PC to hold PR for trial for rebellion with murder
and frustrated murder, so info. PR then filed damages, saying
deliberate and willful and malicious experimentation when fully aware
of non-existence of such crime, motion to dismiss saying no actionable
wrong, denied. Instead of filing answer to denial, went directly to CA,
dismissed saying TC should proceed with trial. SC dismissed saying
failure to pay docketing fees.
Issue:
Whether or not there should be trial.
Held:
R maintains that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for
damages based on tort by reason of petitioners various malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance in office, as well as for violation by the
petitioners of RA3019(3e), not a suit for malicious prosecution. No.
Perusal of the complaint reveals it is one for malicious prosecution
because of rebellion case. And nowhere in complaint did R alleged
action based on tort or on RA3019(3e). Malicious prosecution has
been defined as:
An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.
The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly,
for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169R, November 19, 1956).
Statutory basis for damages for this found in NCC Human Relations.
To constitute malicious mischief, must be proof that prosecution
prompted by sinister design to vex and humiliate, initiated deliberately
knowing charges false and groundless. Mere act of submitting case to
authorities for prosecution does not make liable, for must prove
3elements:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with
an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled
by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. All these
requisites must concur.
From Rs complaint, none of elements alleged, so no cause of action.
Also, panel resolution thorough, and that P despite knowing
jurisprudence, honestly thought Rs case differed. A doubtful or difficult
question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard,
the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith
and regularity in the performance of official duties. Any person who
seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or illmotive. Here, since P were of honest conviction that there was PC to
hold R, and since R himself did not allege in his complaint lack of PC,
P cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Presence of PC
signifies absence of malice.
4elements:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the
prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal
action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was
impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive.
Gravamen is not the filing of a complaint based on wrong provision of
law, but deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the
charges were false and groundless. On PC, SC has ruled that for
purposes of malicious prosecution, PC means such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
Anent question whether prosecutor acted without PC in bringing action,
there was PC. During PI, RM admitted participating in commission.
Even if RM said she was in duress then, does not detract from fact that
based on RMs admission, there was reason for R to believe suit was
not unfounded.
In an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it
must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice.
There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to
warrant the award of damages under NCC19 to 21, or that the suit was
grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover, it is a doctrine wellentrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate. For policemen, merely acting in duty.
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any
clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, not established here. And case here for MP, not
for maltreatment from officers.
[Elements]
Conrado Magbanua v. Pilar Junsay
G.R. No. 132659, February 12, 2007
Ponente: Justice Chico-Nazario
Facts:
P Rosemarie Magbanua worked as housemaid in complainants
residence, charged by R as co-accused for robbery, acquitted. Then
filed damages, together with co-P father against R employer, and R
members of Bacolod police. Complaint said because of crim case,
suffered shame, humiliation, etc. That CM lost job and entire family
suffered, that RM suffered physical pain and mental torture. R said
statute of limitations bars, 4years8mos lapsing. P said cause of action
not for damages, but for malicious prosecution, so not barred. RTC
said complaint not to vex RM, no legal malice, CA affirming.
Issue: sole issue of law posed for resolution is whether a complaint for
moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's
fees, arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an
employee, is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or
by the National Labor Relations Commission created by Presidential
Decree No. 21, promulgated on October 14, 1972
Held: Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute
"matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's
dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer
relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact
he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of
his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be
confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated
article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by
either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a
person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,
the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article
2219, no. 1.
Case remanded to CFI for further proceedings
Spouses Guanio vs Makati Shangrila Hotel
Facts:
Held:
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Held:
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We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorios complaint for
damages readily shows that she filed a civil suit against
Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not
exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of
the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded
checks as payment for the various appliances
purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her,
because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal
complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she
was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon
City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of
her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay.
Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26,9
[21] 2176,10[22] and 218011[23] of the Civil Code.
Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on
the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed
to them any bad faith in her complaint
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