Clean Agent System Design

Eric Forssell and Scott Hill

Hughes Associates, Inc.
(410) 737-8677
www.haifire.com
NFPA World Fire Safety Congress & Expo
May 14, 2001

Objective

Discuss specific issues affecting clean agent

system design and system reliability
-

Extinguishing Concentrations
Safety/Design Factors
Concentration/Exposure Limits
Design Software
Thermal Decomposition
Agent Retention
Enclosure Pressure and Venting

What are clean agents?

Definition: No residue or collateral damage

resulting from discharge of agent.
Historically: Carbon dioxide and Halon 1301 were
the agents of choice. Ban on production of Halon
1301 due to contribution to stratospheric ozone
depletion.
Current agents include a variety of halocarbon and
inert gases

Applications

High system cost justified by high value of

protected space or protected equipment being
mission/process critical
Typical applications: Telecommunications
Equipment, Computer/Electronics Equipment,
Control Rooms, Process Critical Equipment,
Shipboard and Off-shore Machinery Rooms

How do clean agents work?

Increasing the heat capacity of the fire

environment, resulting in increased amounts of
energy required to raise the temperature of the
incoming air to the flame temperature.
Displacing oxygen, resulting in reduced heat
production.
Undergoing endothermic (energy absorbing)
decomposition reactions in the presence of the
flame.

Setting the Design

Concentration

Establish the extinguishing concentration

- By test: Agent and fuel specific

Use appropriate safety factor

Include any design factors
DC = (EC * SF) + DF

Extinguishing
Concentration

NFPA 2001, 2000 Edition:

- Class A

UL 2127 and UL 2166

Wood crib in 100 m3 enclosure
Plastic fuel array in 100 m3 enclosure

- Class B
Cup burner
Confirmed for a few fuels in larger scale tests (UL
and IMO)

Class A Tests

UL 2127 and UL 2166

- 3 types of polymeric materials (PMMA, PP,
and ABS)
- Difficult plastics to extinguish
- 4 sheet array
- Heptane or hot surface ignition

UL Class A Test
Arrangement
203mm x 406mm x 9.53mm
(8" x 16" xa")
Plastic Sheet

254mm (10")

254mm (10")

Aluminum
Angle Frame
3.2mm (1/8") Allthread Rod
Fuel Support

533mm (21")

Ignitor Pan

Load
Cell

12mm
(")

951mm
(37.5")
76mm
(3")
127mm
(5")

Drip Tray
Load Cell
12mm (")

Cinder
Block

305mm (12")

851 mm (33.5")

32mm
(1")

Channel Iron Frame

Covered With Steel
Sheet on Top and Two Sides
305mm (12")

381mm (15")

Polycarbonate
Baffles

89mm
(3.5")

610 mm (24")

Cup Burner Apparatus

85 2 mm

Chimney

535 25 mm

235 mm

Diffuser

Fuel Inlet

Air/Agent Inlet

Extinguishing Concentration
Differences for Heptane
Agent

ISO Values

Other ISO Burner

Difference

Values

(%)

IG-01 (Ar)

37.5

40.8

8.8

IG-1 (N2)

33.6

30.2

11.3

IG-541

33.8

31.9, 30.6

10.4

IG-55

32.3

FC-3110

5.9

5.3

11.3

HFC-23

12

12.3

2.5

HFC-227ea

6.6

6.6

Effect of Radiative
Feedback
.

q rad

TF (Bulk)
1
.

q rad

TF > TF
2
1

TF (Bulk)
2

Extinguishing
Concentration Summary

Extinguishing concentration determined by test

- Variability in testing

Radiative feedback may affect extinguishing

concentration
- Long preburn times
- Metal surfaces

Designer must determine how hazard relates to the

method for determining the extinguishing
concentration

Safety Factors

NFPA 2001, 2000 Edition

-

30% Class B, Manually activated

20% Class A
10% Inerting
Design Factors

ISO 14520, First Edition (August 2000):

-

30% Class A and B

10% Inerting

Safety Factors

Design deficiencies
Installation deficiencies
Uncertainty in extinguishing concentration
Special conditions

Design Factors

Additional quantity of agent

Intent is to increase system reliability
Account for specific condition
-

Number of tees
Enclosure pressure
Unclosable openings
Enclosure and fuel geometry
Obstructions

Prediction Accuracy

Halocarbons (UL 2166)

- Mass 10% with
standard deviation less
than 5
- Discharge time 1
second
- Nozzle pressure 10%

Inert Gases (UL 2127)

- Volume of agent 10%
with standard deviation
less than 5
- Discharge time 10
seconds
- Nozzle pressure 10%

Tee Design Factor

For systems protecting multiple hazards

For each hazard
- Start at point where pipe system enters the
hazard and count the number of tees in the flow
path back to the agent supply
- also include any tee in the hazard that supplies
agent to another hazard
- do not include manifold tees

Tee Design Factor (cont.)

Use the hazard with the highest tee count

Not necessary if system passes a discharge
test

Probability Distribution for

Agent Mass for 2 to 20 Tees
22
Experiment St andard Deviation =

0.0304

20
18

Relative Probability

16

2 Tees

14

4 Tees

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.60

20 Tees
0.65

0.70

0.75

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

1.05

1.10

Normalized Mass

1.15

1.20

1.25

1.30

1.35

1.40

1.45

16

Calculated Agent Quantity

Probability Distribution:
A System with 8 Tees (Std. Dev. = 0.0608)

14

Relative Probability

12
10
8

With

Without

Additional Agent

Additional Agent
99%

2
0
0.70

1%
0.75

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

1.05

1.10

1.15

1.20

1.25

Measured Agent Quantity (normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

1.30

Design Factor for Tees

DESIGN FACTOR

HALOCARBON

INERT GAS DESIGN

TEE COUNT

DESIGN FACTOR

FACTOR

0-4

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.04

0.00

0.05

0.01

10

0.06

0.01

11

0.07

0.02

12

0.07

0.02

13

0.08

0.03

Example
Hazard 1
Tee count of 8 tees
for Hazard 2 4%
additional agent
required

Hazard 2

Hazard 1
Alternate layout to
reduce tee count to 4
tees no additional
agent required.

Hazard 2

Enclosure Pressure Design

Factor

Agent quantity must be adjusted if ambient

enclosure pressure varies by more than 11
percent from standard sea level pressures
Pressure may be affected by factors other
than elevation
- Hyperbaric chambers, mines, facilities where
ventilation fans are used to create artificially
higher or lower pressures

Additional Design Factors

Unclosable openings
- Compensate by adding agent and extending discharge
time

Enclosure and fuel geometry

- Unusual geometries are typically addressed through
nozzle placement and additional agent
- Full-scale machinery space tests showed that for a large
enclosure with a complex obstructed geometry, agent
concentrations varied 20% in the enclosure

Additional Design Factors

Obstructions
- Obstructions such as ducts, cables, light
fixtures, etc. can block or impede agent
discharge which can affect mixing
- Address with nozzle placement and/or
additional agent

Concentration/Exposure
Limits

All efforts are made to avoid any

unnecessary exposure
- Time delays allow for egress from area
- Warning signals inside and outside of enclosure
indicate system activation

Concentration/Exposure
Limits

For halocarbons, maximum safe exposure

limit determined by cardiac sensitization
- Determined by testing with dogs stressed with
adrenaline
- NOAEL - No Observable Adverse Effect Level
- LOAEL - Lowest Observable Adverse Effect Level
- PBPK - Physiologically-Based Pharmacokinetic, model
used to account for rate of uptake of agent into the
blood stream

Concentration/Exposure
Limits

For inert gases, maximum safe exposure

limit determined by oxygen displacement
- Oxygen concentration of 12% by volume approximates
NOAEL type significance
- Oxygen concentration of 10% by volume approximates
LOAEL type significance
- The PBPK model does not apply to inert gases

Maximum Concentrations

Normally occupied enclosures

- Halocarbon agents
Up to NOAEL
Up to LOAEL with means to limit exposure to time
limits from PBPK model

- Inert gases
Up to 43% (12% oxygen) with means to limit
exposure to 5 minutes

Maximum Concentrations

Normally unoccupied enclosures

- Halocarbon agents
Up to 24% (16% oxygen) with means to limit
exposure to time limits from PBPK model

- Inert gases
Up to 52% (10% oxygen) with means to limit
exposure to 3 minutes
Up to 62% (8% oxygen) with means to limit
exposure to 30 seconds

What is the Purpose of Flow

Calculation Software?

Predict system discharge performance for design

purposes
- Discharge time, nozzle pressure, nozzle agent quantity
- Generally, systems are not discharge tested

Insure system meets criteria

- NFPA 2001, Listing or approval
- AHJ, OEM

Software is a tool

Sample System

Protection from Misuse

Initial listing/approval and follow-up service

Acceptable hardware built in
Error and Warning messages
Trained and competent user
Review of the design
- AHJ/Insurance
- Owner

Additional Features

Export pipe layout to Cad packages

Ability to lock diameter for individual pipe
segments
- Particularly helpful with retrofits

Design specific help

Verification of Flow
Calculation Method

Series of discharge tests conducted to verify

predictions
Tests also establish other system limits
-

minimum and maximum orifice area ratios

tee types, orientations, and split ratios
maximum arrival time imbalance
maximum runout time imbalance
maximum pipe volume to agent liquid/cylinder volume
ratio (percent in pipe)

Pre-Witness Tests

3 and 4 nozzle tests

Each test with multiple limits included
All limits hit at least once
Submittal package put together
-

software output
as-built drawings
experimental data

All tests must pass criteria

Witness Tests

UL/FM present
2 of the pre-witness tests chosen
- Re-run the tests, results must be acceptable

At least three new blind tests are run

-

The limits for a test are chosen

The test is laid out on the computer
The system is constructed and the test run
All tests must pass criteria

Limits for a Witness Test

Minimum fill density

Maximum discharge time
Maximum run out time imbalance
Minimum pipe flowrate
Minimum nozzle area ratio
50:50 bull tee
85:15 side tee

Post-Extinguishment
Enclosure Environment

Thermal Decomposition Products

- For Halocarbon Agents, Halon 1301, FM-200,
FE-25, and FE-13, production of HF is the
primary concern.
- For Inert Gas Agents, IG-100, IG-01, IG-55,
IG-541 and CO2, there are no thermal
decomposition products formed.

Post-Extinguishment
Enclosure Environment
- Resulting TDP concentration is dependent
upon:

Fire Size to Enclosure Volume Ratio.

Discharge Time.
Safety Factor (Utilizing higher than minimum
concentration can reduce amount formed).

HF Concentration (ppm)

E.W.Forssell, et al, An Evaluation of the International Maritime Organizations Gaseous Agent Test Protocol,
Fire Technology, 2001

12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

10

12

14

16

18

Fire Size to Room Volume Ratio (kW/m 3)

Agent
Halon 1301
NAF-SIII
CEA-410
CEA-308
FM-200
FE-13

NASA
(1.2 m 3) (28 m 3)

IMO Protocol (500 m 3)

(5%)
(12 %) NAFGT
(12 %) Ansul
(7%)
(9%)
(8.5%)
(8.6%) M/S-F
(8.6%) K-F
(8.6%) Chemetron

USCG (526 m 3)

(5%)

(3.7%)
(13.2%)
(6.2%)
(7.2%)
(7.9%)

(6.2%)

(6.0%)

(7.9%)

(7.0%)

(14.4%)

(14.4%)

(16%)

Approximate HF Production Correlation

NRC (121 m 3)

(5%)
(12%)
(7.6%)

(8.8%)

Post-Extinguishment
Enclosure Environment
- Primarily hazard is to personnel as equipment is
generally more tolerant than humans to exposures
- Dangerous Toxic Loading, DTLHuman, representing
the threshold for life threatening exposures estimated
by Meldrum as 12,000 ppm-minutes or an exposure to
1200 ppm HF for 10 minutes.
Meldrum, M., Toxicology of Substances in Relation to Major
Hazards: Hydrogen Fluoride, Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) Information Centre, Sheffield S37HQ, England, 1993.

- Early detection and fast suppression key to limiting

effects.

H a z a r d a s s e s s m e n t o f H F c o n c e n t r a t io n s
d u r in g G L C C E D P t e s t in g
5000
M a g T a p e (c )
M a g T a p e (o )
P a p e r(T L )
P a p e r(B L )
C ir c u it B o a r d
W ir e /n - H e p t a n e
L C 50

G u in e a P ig

4000

Average HF Concentration (ppm)

E s tim a te d L C 5 0 , M a m m a l

3000

Rat

R at
R at

2000

M onkey

R at

1000
E s t im a t e d D T L , H u m a n
M ouse

0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

E x p o s u r e T im e ( m in )
[H u g h e s A s s o c ia te s , In c . , " H a z a r d A s s e s s m e n t o f T h e r m a l D e c o m p o s it io n P r o d u c t s o f F M - 2 0 0 T M
in E le c tr o n ic s a n d D a ta P r o c e s s in g F a c ilit ie s " , H u g h e s A s s o c ia te s , I n c ., 1 9 9 5 ]

Agent Retention

Allows for time to deal with persistent

ignition sources and for hot surfaces to cool
down. Particularly important when
automatic shutdown is not part of activation
sequence.
Common cause of discharge test failures.
No hard answer for how long is enough
(case by case).

Agent Retention
The time, T, for the interface to descend to any
level, H, in the enclosure, is:

T=2Aencl[(K3Hencl)0.5-(K3H)0.5]/K3FACDALeak
where
K3=2g(pmix-pair)/[pmix+pair(FA/(1.0-FA))]

Agent Retention

Agent retention or holding time usually

based upon final interface height equal to
highest (lowest for nitrogen) combustible
material in enclosure.

Agent Retention Time in 10x10x10 ft Enclosure

with FA=0.5, Highest Combustible at 7.5 ft or
Lowest Combustible at 2.5 ft for Nitrogen
20

5% Halon 1301
8.7% FM-200
16.8% FE-13
11.7% FE-25
40.3% Inergen (IG-541)
54.6% Argon (IG-01)
45.5% Argonite (IG-55)
36.4% CO2

Agent Retention Time (minutes)

18
16
14

40.3% Nitrogen (IG-100)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

2
Leakage Area (ft )

1.50

1.75

2.00

Agent Retention Time in 10x10x10 ft Enclosure

with FA=0.5, Highest Combustible at 7.5 ft
20
5% Halon 1301
8.7% FM-200
16.8% FE-13
11.7% FE-25
40.3% Inergen (IG-541)
54.6% Argon (IG-01)
45.5% Argonite (IG-55)
36.4% CO2

18

Agent Retention Time (minutes)

16
14

40.3% Nitrogen (IG-100)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

2
Leakage Area (ft )

0.4

0.5

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

The experienced enclosure pressure

depends upon the following factors:
-

Total leakage area.

Design concentration.
Rate of agent addition (discharge time).

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

For agents stored as a liquid, Halon 1301,

FM-200, FE-25, and FE-13, the enclosure
undergoes two pressure pulses.
- The first pulse is negative and is due to the
quick reduction in enclosure temperature
caused by the vaporization of the agent in the
enclosure.
- The second pulse is positive, caused by the
volume of the added agent.

Enclosure Pressures
TM
2
2
3
3
8% FM-200 Discharge with 226 cm (35 in ) Leak in 85 m (3000 FT ) Enclosure
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
-100
-150
-200
-250
-300
-350

Cylinder
Actuation

Nozzle
Liquid
Run-Out

Total
Discharge

1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
-1.25
-1.50

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Time (sec)
[Great Lakes Chemical Corporation, 1997]

Pressure (iwc)

Pressure (Pa)

2.00

Leakage Area per Enclosure Volum e (in 2 /ft3 )

0.008

0.009

0.010

0.011

0.012

0.013

0.014

0.015

Enclosure Pressure (Pa)

600

2.5

500

2.0

400

1.5

300

1.0

200

0.5

100

7% Gypsum
8% Gypsum
9% Gypsum

7% Cinder Block
8% Cinder Block
9% Cinder Block

0.0

-100

-0.5

-200

-1.0

-300
-400

-1.5

-500

-2.0

-600

-2.5

-700

-3.0
1.9

2.0

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9
2

3.0

3.1

3.2

Leakage Area per Enclosure Volum e (cm /m )

Enclosure Pressures During FM -200

TM

Testing

[M. Robin, "Investigation of the Pressure Dynam ics of FM-200 System Discharges",
Presented at 1997 Halon Options Technical W orking Conference, Albuquerque, NM, May 1997]

3.3

Enclosure Pressure (iwc)

3.0

700

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

For agents stored as a compressed vapor,

IG-01, IG-100, IG-55, IG-541, the
enclosure undergoes a single pressure pulse.
- Maximum enclosure pressure corresponding to
the maximum rate of agent addition.
- Easier to predict as the significance of the heat
transfer from the compartment boundaries is
reduced.

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

With detailed flow predictions and

enclosure details, the experienced enclosure
pressure can be predicted with an
appropriate equation of state.

System Pressures
2200
2000

Exp-Manifold
Exp-Nozzle
Pred-Cylinder
Pred-Node1
Pred-Manifold
Pred-Nozzle

1800

Pressure (psig)

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0

20

40

60

80
Time (sec)

100

120

140

160

Enclosure Pressure
2.0
1.8
Measured
Predicted

Enclosure Pressure (iwc)

1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0

10

20

30
Time (sec)

40

50

60

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

Without detailed flow predictions, the

enclosure pressure can be found from an
orifice equation and an assumption
regarding the peak agent flow rate.
DPencl=[Qagent,max/(CdALeak(2g/pmixg)0.5)]2

Enclosure Pressure and

Venting

Enclosure Strength
- Varies with type of construction, but is less
than you might think. 2 iwc (500 Pa) is a
conservative value.
- Venting is required if developed pressure is
greater than what can be tolerated.

Summary

Extinguishing concentrations are determined by

test and are agent and fuel specific. Need to
understand how protected hazard relates to test
fuels.
2000 edition of NFPA 2001 includes an increased
safety factor (30%) for Class B and manually
activated systems.
ISO 14520 requires a 30% safety factor for Class
A and B hazards.

Summary

For some systems/applications the minimum

safety factor may not be appropriate. The
designer must understand and account for the
issues that affect system reliability.
NFPA 2001 allows halocarbon concentrations
above the NOAEL if means are provided to limit
the exposure time to those determined using the
PBPK model.
Software that has been thoroughly tested and
validated is essential.

Summary

Early detection and fast suppression are the key to

limiting production of thermal decomposition
products.
Agent retention time is dependent on agent
concentration, total leakage area, and leak
distribution.
There is no hard answer for how long the retention
time needs to be.

Summary

Developed enclosure pressures depend on the

agent, design concentration, leakage area, and
discharge time.
Venting is required if the developed pressure
exceeds the enclosure strength.