1872610

France, the United States, and the Munich Crisis
Author(s): John McVickar Haight, Jr.

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1960), pp. 340-358
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1872610 .
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FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

JOHN
M\CVICKAR HAIGHT,
JR.
IN the fall of 1938 Europe faced its most and Hull's warning. Having been the Frenclh
serious international crisis since the armistice of 1918. War once again threatened to
engulf the European nations as Adolf Hitler
demanded a slice of Czechoslovakian territory. American historians have tended to belittle the role the United States played in
that crisis.1 However, despite its neutrality
legislation and a widespread popular feeling
of isolationism, that nation did weigh in the
scales of European peace. The leaders and
the people of one country, France, were especially sensitive to the foreign policy of the
United States, and the course their nation
followed in this crisis stemmed in part from
their evaluation of American policy. This
conclusion rests in particular upon an analysis of the diplomatic activities of both the
French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, and
the American ambassador, William C. Bullitt.
It rests in general upon popular French reaction to American policy.
In mid-August many people in France
turned with unusual interest towards the
United States. At that time Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and his secretary of state, Cordell
Hull, spoke in rapid and dramatic succession
and warned that if war broke out the American nation might be involved. An appreciative audience in France quickly assumed that
these speeches foreshadowed American aid
for the European democracies. To understand why men like Bonnet and Bullitt, as
well as many Frenchmen, jumped to this
conclusion, a brief review of background
developments is necessary.
Bonnet had a sDecial interest in Roosevelt's
1 See for example such disparate analyses of
the American diplomatic record during the prewar years as: Charles A. Beard, American foreign
policy in the making 1932-1940 (New Haven,
1946), pp. 219-20; Charles C. Tansill, Back door
to war (Chicago, 1952), p. 427; James M. Burns,
Roosevelt: the lion and the fox (New York, 1950),
p. 385; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The challenge to isolation, 1937-1940 (New
York, 1952), p. 34; Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from
Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1950), p. 75.
ambassador in Washington during the first

half of 1937, he returned home with the conviction that despite American isolationism
Roosevelt "would do everything possible to
aid France."2 When in April 1938 Bonnet
was appointed to the foreign ministry bv
Premier Edouard Daladier, he was convinced
of the weakness of France.3 At his first opportunity he alerted the American ambassador
to the seriousness of France's predicament.
With stark frankness Bonnet stated that
"there were no more cards in France's hand."
As his nation was "honor bound" to fulfill
her defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia,
war could be avoided only if concessions were
made to the predominantly German population in the Sudetenland. If war did come,
France could expect only "defeat and dismemberment." Faced with Germany's vastly
superior air force, France needed outside assistance, but Britain's prime minister had refused to give an unconditional commitment,
and Russia, Poland and Rumania had been
extremely hesitant in recent talks in Geneva.4
Bonnet called directly upon the United
States for its assistance when tensions over
the Czech Sudetenland flared up during the
weekend of May 21-22.5 The foreign minister,
2 Georges Bonnet, Defense de la paix, de TWashlinzgton au Quai d'Orsay (Geneva, 1946), p. 24. See
also pp. 16, 205, 304. Maurice Baumont criticizes
these memoirs as "clever special pleading" and
condemns the author for talking beside the point
and carefully selecting his sources. However, the
available diplomatic documents during the Munich crisis generally support Bonnet's memory of
his relations with and attitude toward the United
States. See M. Baumont, "French critics and
apologists debate Munich," Foreign agairs, XXV
(1947), 685.
3 Bonnet, pp. 88-92.
4 The ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the
secretary of state, May 16, 1938, Foreign relations
of the United States, 1938 (Washington, 1955), I,
500-04. (Hereafter cited as FR. All dispatches
from the ambassador will be labeled Bullitt.)
5For a detailed accoint see C. L. Weinhero,
340

FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

as Bullitt reported, had spent that night of
crisis "in agony as he had feared that Hitler
would order immediate mobilization . . .,"
and still "acutely disturbed" during the next
afternoon, Bonnet "implored me to have our
Government do whatever it could to work
out a solution to the conflict."6 Later in his
report to the French cabinet Bonnet spoke
particularly of "the interest that the United
States shows in the problems of central Europe" and gave as evidence the three visits
Bullitt paid to the Quai d'Orsay during that
frantic weekend.7 Bonnet's report seemed
confirmed when the American secretary of
state on May 28 appealed to the nations of
the world to abide by the Kellogg-Briand
peace pact8 and then a few days later called
upon his fellow countrymen to collaborate in
the current search for world peace.9
Bonnet, however, was not one to wait patiently for the Americans to make up their
minds. Instead he took the highly unusual
step of speaking directly to the American
people. In a broadcast beamed across the Atlantic on July 4 he spoke of "our common
"The May crisis, 1938," Journal of modern history, XXIX (1957), 213-25.
6 Bullitt, May 22, FR, pp. 512-15. Bonnet's
expectations seemed to have been raised by a report that President Roosevelt had tried to reach
Premier Daladier by telephone during the evening of May 21 (ibid., p. 514).
7 Le Temps, May 25, p. 3, carried a report on
this cabinet meeting. (An evening paper, Le
Temps predated its issues and thus this edition
appeared during the late afternoon of May 24.)
Bonnet informed the Polish ambassador to France,
Jules Lukasiewicz, on May 26, that "France
would be supported not only by England but
also by the United States" (Georges Bonnet,
"Letter to the editor," London Times, Literar-y
supplement, Jan. 30, 1953, p. 80).
8 For text see FR, pp. 520-21. For comments
by the French press on Hull's statement, see
Bullitt, May 31, FR, p. 523, and German ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the
state secretary (Weizacker), May 31, 1938, Docitments on German foreign policy, 1918-1945, Ser.
D (Washington, 1949), II, 227. (Hereafter cited as
GD.)
9 Hull spoke at Nashville, Tennessee, June 3.
Bullitt reported that this speech was regarded
throughout Europe as a powerful factor for peace,
and that "Bonnet, Poncet [Andre Fransois-Poncet,
France's ambassador to Germany] and other
Frenchmen have spoken of it in highest terms of
praise" (June 8, FR, p. 525).
341
ideals" and urged that "our two democracies

must neglect nothing to make them triumph."
His speech revealed that he considered both
Roosevelt and Hull to be ahead of their public in understanding "the interdependence
of the nations of the world and the impossibility of remaining indifferent to what goes
on outside their borders."'10Ten days after
that radio address Bonnet went so far as to
specify a step the United States could take:
Roosevelt should offer his services as arbiter
of the German-Czech problem.
Though Bullitt poured cold water on this
suggestion,1" the foreign minister continued
to hope for American assistance. During the
first weeks in August as Hitler rushed his
western defenses toward completion and directed his colossal troop maneuvers, it became apparent that the Sudetenlanders would
intensify their demands against Czechoslovakia.12 Thus as the danger of war mounted
and Roosevelt and Hull issued their warnings, Bonnet was in a frame of mind which
easily assumed that the American leaders
were now ready to assist him in his search
for peace.
The American ambassador also had reasons for welcoming Hull's and Roosevelt's
words.13 Bullitt had not rebuffed Bonnet's
suggestion that Roosevelt arbitrate the Czechoslovakian dispute just because he opposed
any form of American intervention in Europe. Rather, he opposed it because he did
not think the time appropriate.
He made his views particularly clear in a
personal letter he forwarded to Roosevelt
just prior to the May crisis.14 Herein he emphasized that every effort should be made to
avoid the outbreak of a European war. He
For the text see Le Temps, July 6, p. 3.
IBullitt, July 15, FR, p. 531.
12 Bonnet viewed these German maneuvers with
"great anxiety" (Bullitt, Aug. 12, FR, p. 63).
13 Two brief studies deal directly with Bullitt's
diplomatic career in France. Both, as will be
seen, need some modification in their account of
the Munich crisis. (W. W. Kaufmann, "Twvo
American ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy," in
G. A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, 1953), pp. 677-81;
and Gordon Wright, "Ambassador Bullitt and
the fall of France," World politics, X (1957),
63-91.)
14 Bullitt sent this letter by diplomatic pouch,
May 20, but two days later sped a copy by cable
to the White House (FR, pp. 509-12).
10

349
TOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.
had not needed Bonnet's warnings of May 16

to be convinced that war would not only destroy France but all of Western civilization.
It was his profound belief at this time that
war could only end with the triumph of
Bolshevism. Thus he preferred to see peace
maintained even if that meant the transfer
of the Sudetenland to the Third Reich. Disillisioned with the Versailles Treaty, he saw
no reason to maintain its inviolability. However, as he advised the president in this letter, the United States should not take part in
a cturrent revision of its terms. Otherwise
France and Britain might conclude that
America was "tied up in European political
problems" and consequently might "relax
their efforts to reconcile the Czechs and Germans." Bullitt did add, and this is most significant, that if "a German march across the
border of Czechoslovakia seems imminent,"
then the United States must intervene in
order to prevent war and the resultant Bolshevik conquest of Europe. Roosevelt should
call an international conference15 to deal
with the specific problem of Czechoslovakia.
Only "England, France, Germany and Italy"
shouild be invited, but they should be joined
by a representative of the United States. They
would probably accept the transfer of the
Sudetenland, but this "sell out" would be
justified because it would prevent a general
European war.16
Throughout the Munich crisis Bullitt consistently supported the policy he outlined in
this letter. Appeaser though he was, he never
went so far as to favor peace at any price. Indeed in late September when he recognized
Hitler's intention to resort to force, Bullitt
15 Btillitt made direct reference here to the
conference plans Roosevelt considered during
1937 and the early winter of 1938. See Dorothy
Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's quarantine speech,"
Politic(al science quarterly, LXXII (Sept. 1957),
405-34, for an analysis of the origin of this conference idea.
16 This letter did not stem from the panic of
the moment. Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes, noted that in a conversation of June 1938
with Bullitt, the latter spoke of his fear of Europe's destrulction, of his recognition of German
preponderance in the air and of his hopes that
the United States could avoid entry into the war
so as "to assume the burden of rebuilding what
this war will have left of Western Civilization"
(The secret diary of Harold L. Ickes, II [New
York. 1954], pp. 409-10).
again called for the United States to join an

international conference which would both
maintain peace and restrain the Fiihrer.17
Bullitt did not call for American intervention during the May crisis for the danger
ended quickly. When the threat of mobilization had passed, he once again urged that
the conflict be settled by negotiation. Speaking on Memorial Day before a sea of white
crosses in an American military cemetery, he
stated with deep feeling, "The disputes of
this generation must be settled by reason and
understanding."'18 Then in July when he
turned down Bonnet's suggestion of arbitration by Roosevelt, he did so to keep France
from relaxing her efforts to find a rational
and peaceful settlement of the Czech dispute.
However, when the Germans concentrated
large numbers of troops during the first weeks
in August, the situation changed critically
and Bullitt became as impatient as Bonnet
for the United States to play its part in maintaining Europe's peace. Thus he too welcomed the warnings that Hull and Roosevelt
beamed across the Atlantic.
As for French public interest in the United
States, it stemmed primarily from a widespread belief that Hitler would never dare
march if he knew the United States was committed to oppose him. Few Frenchmen could
believe that the Americans would not awaken
in time to take their stand.19 For a day-by17 Wright states that "the months before Muniich constituted a period of frustrated soulsearching" for Bullitt. A careful analysis of the
ambassador's letter of May 20 to the president
refutes this charge (Wright, p. 69; Kaufmann,
p. 664).
13 Le Matin, May 30, p. 1. On May 24 Bonnet
had asked Bullitt to express in a public speech
"the hope of the United States that peace in Europe might be preserved, urging moderation on
all concerned" (Bullitt, May 24, FR, p. 519). At
the request of Hull, Bullitt postponed his statenent until after the secretary's release of May 28
(secretary of state to Bullitt, May 25, FR, p. 520).
19 One of France's ablest correspondents stationed in the United States, Raoul de Roussy de
Sales, remarked during the summer of 1938: "The
American in the center of Nebraska is much
more sensitive to what happens in Czechoslovakia or in Korea than is the Auvergnat to the
way the forty-eight states think and feel." ("The
Amierican dilemma," L'Europe nouvelle, Aug. 27,
pp. 927-29). Like their forebears of the eighteenth century, the French of the twentieth indtilged in dreams about the Americans. (Durand


day interpretation of American actions the
French depended upon their press, and during the spring and summer they had been
kept unusually well informed.20 The foreign
policy of the United States was discussed in
the press during its debate over French
policy toward Czechoslovakia. While appeasers cited American neutrality as one more
reason why France should do business with
the fascist dictators, exponents of resistance
claimed that a policy of strength would win
American support. These two groups kept
alive French interest in the foreign policy of
the United States. By mid-August most
Frenchmen, along with Bonnet and Bullitt,
were ready to give the broadest interpretation to American pronouncements.
Roosevelt and Hull planned their addresses
so as to "embroider on the eternal questionmark of American foreign policy." Hull made
a special effort to beam his remarks of August
16 across the Atlantic, and two days later the
president addressed an audience in Kingston,
Canada. Both focused attention on the
mounting dangers to peace. Both warned of
the possibility of American involvement in
any future war. Roosevelt said: "We in
America are no longer a far-away continent
to which the eddies of controversies beyond
the seas could bring no interest or no harm.
. . . no one can keep Americans
opinions
on
from having
anti-demiocratic brutality.'21
Echeverria, Miragfe in the West: a history of the

French image of American society to 1815 [Princeton, 1957], pp. vii-xvi.)
20 The French press of the late thirties forms a
unique basis for the study of attitudes and
opinions in France. See my article, "The Paris
press (1938): mirror of a French tragedy," Gazette
(Amsterdam, Holland), II (1956), 150-56. For this
article some thirty dailies and twenty-five weeklies
published in Paris have been reviewed. They
have been supplemented with selections from the
provincial press. Provincial dailies with circulations exceeding 200,000 were consulted as were
all the journals published in six "sample" towns:
Lille, Troyes, Moulin, Bordeaux, Montpellier and
Lyon. These dailies on the whole followed the
lead of the Paris press in reporting and interpreting the news about the foreign policy of the
United States.
21 For text of Hull's broadcast see department
of state, Press releases (Washington, 1938). p. 117.
The secretary's address was translated into several
languages and rebroadcast to Europe. For Roosevelt's address see Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.) The
343
"Germany and Company" were obviously in

the minds of the speakers, but as one of their
speech writers noted, they, like Bullitt, worried lest they lead "England and Company"
to "count on us for direct assistance no matter what transpired."22 However, the French
did count on such assistance. Bonnet immediately stated to Bullitt that
A factor of the greatest importancein Germany's
hesitation was the apprehension that the United
States might be drawn into war. The utterances
and private conversationsof the President and
Secretary of State . . . were of vital importance
at the present time.23

The very thing Bonnet had been hoping for
seemed to have come true. The United States
had come to France's aid by warning Germany against war.
The American speeches apparently awakened many Frenchmen to the seriousness of
the German military preparations. The impact of these warnings upon them was reflected in the unusual unanimity of editorial
opinion. As a whole the press agreed that the
United States "will be alongside Britain and
France when the great decision must be
made."24 The leading organ of the radical
socialists emphasized that "the coalition of
the democracies is only complete with America."25 If the neutrality legislation were not
pub)lic papers and addresses of FranzklinD. Roosevelt (New York, 1938), pp. 491-4.
22 Adolf A. Berle to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Aug.
15, Presidential secretary's file, Box 24, Hyde
Park Library. See also Nancy H. Hooker (ed.),
The Mloffat Papers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) p.
194; Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Newr
York, 1948) I, 586-88. Berle was then an assistatit
secretary of state and J. Pierrepont Moffat was
chief of the department's European division.
23 The ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the
secretary of state, Aug. 18, 1938, State Departmnent Archives, 760 F 62/583 Sec. 1. (Hereafter
cited as SD.)
24 Henri B6renger, Agence econoomique et fi
nanciere, Aug. 18, p. 1. Berenger was president of
the committee for foreign affairs of the French
senate. For the American embassy's reports on
French press reaction to the speeches see Bullitt,
SD, 711.00/1011, 1017, 1034, 1087.
25 Depeche de Toulouse, Georges Scella, "The
twvo coalitions," Aug. 23, p. 1. Quotations and
references have been selected for their special
relev%ancy.No attempt can be made here to provide a full coverage of the French press; only the
major trends are indicated.

344
JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.
yet "a dead duck," 26 at least it had been

seriously wounded. It seemed, as La Republique depicted in a front-page cartoon on
August 22, that Roosevelt at the call of a
winged peace had stepped forward to take
his stand beside Daladier and Chamberlain.
Though caution was advised about expecting American troops or obtaining a formal
alliance,27 much was made of the strength of
the American arsenal.28 Only the extreme
Right added a sour note. It wondered when
the United States would turn to acts instead
of words and added, "Remember Wilson!"29
But such scepticism was to be expected from
that fascist quarter. The majority of the
French believed that the chances of the
United States doing its part to keep Hitler
from turning to war had improved. After all,
as one commentator noted, France now had
as her foreign minister a man who knew the
United States well and had done much to
awaken Americans to the realization that
they could not escape the conflict.30
American statements quickly became absorbed into the editorial debate over French
foreign policy. The Communists saw the
United States as agreeing with Moscow's
policy.31 Others, who supported resistance
26 Paris Soir, Aug. 17. p. 3. Jacques Fransalles,
the pen name used by de Sales, employed this
picturesque slang in reporting from Washington.
Paris Soir on Aug. 20 carried the headline, "The
Atlantic is no more."
27Le
Temps, "Bulletin du Jour," "American
speeches," Aug. 20, p. 1.
28 Le Figaro, Lucien Romier, "A long war and
America," Aug. 22, p. 1; La Republique,
Elmile
Roche's series of five front-page editorials comparing the military resources of the democracies
and the dictators, Aug. 21-5; Liberte de SudOuest, Bordeaux, Albert Milhaud, Aug. 21, p. 1;
L'8clair de Montpellier, "La politique," "America in the service of peace," Aug. 20, p. 1.
29 L'Express de L'Aube, Moulin, Louis Gerold,
"American support?" Aug. 19, p. 1 made this
reference to Wilson. See also L'Action Franpaise,
Charles Maurras, "Two voices from America,"
Aug. 20, p. 1; Bertrand de Jouvenal in his editorial, "The same country produces the same
men," commented: "Roosevelt is an idealist as
were the Americans in 1918. Hitler is a military
hero just as William was in 1914," La Liberte
Aug. 20, p. 1.
30L'Homme Libre, Jean Thouvenin, "On
Hull's warning," Aug. 18, p. 1. This daily was
considered to be close to Bonnet.
31 L'Humanite, Magnien, "Union and firmness
because of France's traditional policy towards

Germany, believed French firmness would aid
Hull and Roosevelt "in leading America
towards intervention."32 The fascist groups,
on the other hand, went so far as to see "the
American manifestation of solidarity as clear
approval of a collaboration policy."33 Leon
Blum, the former Socialist premier of the
Popular Front, seemed to capture the more
prevalent mood when he wrote: "The United
States . . . stands for peace and reason."34
He expectantly looked forward to American
assistance in arriving at a peaceful but just
compromise of the Sudetenlander's claims.
The general optimism seemed justified when
the cables reported American press approval
of Roosevelt's Kingston speech.35
Hitler apparently paid no heed to the
American warnings. German troops continued
to maneuver ominously. Goring's Luftwaffe
put on such a demonstration that their visitor,
the chief of the French air force, returned
home convinced that "if war comes, French
planes will be annihilated in fifteen days."36
Then, in full view of the French at Strasburg,
Hitler and his top generals toured their fortifications on the east bank of the Rhine. The
democracies viewed with apprehension the annual Nazi rally scheduled to meet at Nuremberg in early September, and rumors gained
currency that Hitler would take some dramatic step to curry favor with his fanatical
cohorts. Despite repeated warnings, the Gerof the democracies," Aug. 20, p. 3.
32 Marianne, Jacques Kayser, "Bilan de semaine," Aug. 24. Kayser was a vice-president of
the Radical Socialist party and one of Premier
Daladier's close advisers.
33 La Liberte, Claude Jeantet, Aug. 20, p. 1.
34Le Populaire, Leon Blum, "The declaration
of Roosevelt," Aug. 20, p. 1. In private conversation with Bullitt, Blum "attributed Germany's
hesitation in large part to the recent addresses."
(Bullitt, Aug. 26, SD, 851.00/1876.)
35 Paris Soir, Jacques Fransales, "The meaning
and the significance of Roosevelt's speech," Aug.
20, p. 1, compared the warmth of the American
reception of this speech with the denunciations
which had greeted Roosevelt's suggestion of a
"quarantine" in October 1937. Fransales added,
"Today isolationism is so discredited that Hull
and Roosevelt can speak as though it does not
exist."
36 3onnet, pp. 224-25; Bullitt, Aug. 23, FR, pp.
70-1; Andre Fransois-Poncet, The fateful years
(New York. 1949), pp. 264-5.


man leader still seemed to doubt that France
and Britain would march in defense of
Czechoslovakia.37
Concerned by the increasing gravity of the
Czech crisis, Bonnet turned again to the
United States. Another American warning on
the eve of the Nuremberg rally "might," he
said, "have an immensely important effect
on the question of peace in Europe." Also
worried by the rumors that Hitler would
soon march, Bullitt admitted the need to repeat the mid-August warnings of the president and the secretary of state.38
A ready-made opportunity for a FrancoAmerican display of unity presented itself in
the unveiling of a huge monument at the
Pointe de Grave near Bordeaux. It had been
erected to commemorate two significant
events in the history of both nations: the
embarkation of Lafayette in 1777 for the rebellious colonies and the debarkation of the
first American troops in 1917. The unveiling
ceremonies were scheduled for the weekend
before the Nazi rally, and Bullitt welcomed
Bonnet's invitation to share the speakers'
platform.
Bonnet and Bullitt met for dinner on
Auguist 99 to plan their speeches. Bonnet
wanted no more American platitudes, but
rather a clear warning of possible intervention by the United States if aggression were
committed in Europe. Bullitt agreed to repeat a statement he had made on February
22, 1937:
We know also that if war should break out again
in Europe it would be impossible to say that we
would not be forced into that war as we were
forced into war in 1917.39
When Bullitt forwarded the draft of his

speech to Washington for approval, it met
with Hull's disapproval.40 Incensed, Bullitt
telephoned Hull. He preferred, he said, "a
diplomatic illness" to the elimination of his
1937 warning, for "it will look like we are
backing water." Hull replied that the president shared his opposition and that the two
of them had already gone further in their
37 Charge in Paris (E. C. Wilson) to secretary
of state, Aug. 27, SD, 760 F. 62/670.
38 Bullitt, Aug. 29, SD, 851.413/140 Sec. 1.
39 Bonnet, pp. 205-7; Bullitt, Aug. 29, SD,
851.413/140 Sec. 1.
40 Secretary of state to Bullitt, Aug. 30, SD,
851.413/140, Sec. 2.
345
utterances than the British. The latter "had

a press campaign on in London showing how
close-in we all were and undertaking to give
the impression that we would join them."
Hull then turned to one of his major concerns. He and the president "had gone about
as far as our people perhaps would well
understand." 41
On being informed of this opposition,
Bonnet insisted that a further effort should
be made to maintain the strength of the
speech.42 Bullitt called Hull again on September 2, but the secretary remained adamant.
However, at Bullitt's request he transferred
the call to the White House. When pressed,
the president reverted to his less narrow approach to foreign policy, and personally dictated a substitute which "met Bill Bullitt's
position at least two-thirds of the way:"
We hope and pray that we may remain at peace
with every nation in this world. But as I suggested on the twenty-secondof February,1937,if
war should break out again in Europe, no hu.
man being could undertake to prophesywhether
or not the United States would become involved
in such a war.43
Hull's complaint about the British campaign "showing how close-in we all were"
could easily have been extended to the
French. Their press at this time spoke optimistically of the "American awakening."
Vendredi, a weekly of the moderate Left and
a supporter of resistance, declared that Germany should be worried by the attitude of
the United States.44 Supporters of appeasement, fearing the French will to resist might
be strengthened by visions of American aid,
sneered at such conclusions: "Something
more than the homilies of Hull and Roosevelt are needed to get the United States to
march."45 Bonnet, however, went so far as
to inform the German ambassador that if the
41 Memo of telephone conversation, secretary
of state and Bullitt, Aug. 30, SD, 123 Bullitt,
William C./451.
42 Bonnet, p. 207.
43 Bullitt, Sept. 3, SD, 851.413/141. This dispatch also alludes to Bullitt's telephone conversation with Hull on Sept. 2. See Moffat Papers,
p. 197, for remark in quotes.
44 Vendredi, "A week of unrest," Sept. 2, p. 2.
See also La Lumiere, Brumbach, Sept. 2, p. 1.
45 Paris Centre, Moulin, Sept. 2, p. 1, carried
this comment by St. Brice, a regular editorial
writer for the rightist Le Journal.

346
Reich launched a war, "the United States

would not stand aside."46
Bonnet, however, soon began to have doubts
about American intervention. The French
press on September 3 continued to feature
news from the United States, reported the
formation of an Atlantic fleet and Roosevelt's decision to remain in Washington for
the weekend because of the European crisis;
at the same time, Bonnet learned that the
department of state had toned down Bullitt's
speech. Though rumors circulated the next
day that Roosevelt would be ready, if war
came, to recall congress in order to revise the
Neutrality Act, Bonnet rephrased his own
speech. He feared that "Bullitt's reserve
would sound more like a disavowal than a
confirmation of my own words."47
Despite all their efforts the speakers at the
Pointe de Grave failed to attract serious international attention. Bullitt did allude to
the past bonds between France and the
United States, but his warning was too veiled.
For his part Bonnet made a bid for American
help. However, he emphasized that France
desired help not in waging war but "in safeguarding and organizing the peace to make
the world better."48 He had not yet swung
48The German ambassadorin France (Welczeck) to the German foreign ministry, Sept. 2,
GD, No. 422, pp. 682-84. Bonnet's remarkstands
in direct contrast to a dispatch which the British
ambassadorto France,Sir Eric Phipps, sent home
on Sept. 2. Phipps reported Bullitt as saying that
despite anti-German feeling in America, the
United States would not participate in hostilities
at an early date nor revise its Neutrality Act
before congressmet in January,and that "he has
made this clear to the French governmentand is
certain that they have no illusions on this score."
Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939,
third ser., 1938, E. L. Woodward & R. Butler

(eds.) (London, 1949), II No. 750, pp. 218-19
(hereafter cited as BD). In these early days of
SeptemberPhipps was more of an appeaserthan
Bonnet and apparently read more into Bullitt's
comments than was there. Bonnet was in close
contact with Bullitt at this time, and in view of
the latter's warning at the Pointe de Grave on
Sept. 4 seems to have interpreted Bullitt's position more correctlythan Phipps. Kaufmann(Bullitt, p. 663) levels an unjust charge of inconsistency against Bullitt for speaking one way to
Phipps and another at the Ponte de Grave.
47 Bonnet, pp. 207-8.
48Le Temps, Sept. 5, on its last page carried
the full texts of the Pointe de Grave addresses.
to "peace at any price" but merely restated

France's determination to remain faithful to
her defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia.49
The Paris press reported this Franco-American show at length and the editors cited
Bullitt's words to justify their own policy.50
The moderates generally shared the view: "It
is a fact that moral and economic support
will come from America if there is a conflict.
But military support?" The extreme Right
as usual disparaged even moral aid and characterized Bullitt's words as "more wind.$1.
While the resisters viewed Bullitt as demanding democratic solidarity to call Hitler's
bluff,52 some editors thought he was urging
peace by conciliation.53 Once more an American representative had failed to speak in
definite terms, and so provided the French
press with another opportunity to develop its
own interpretations.54
The most serious consequence of the Pointe
de Grave celebrations was wholly unintentional. Bullitt spoke at a banquet given by
49 Despite the weak phraseology of this pledge
Bonnet had gained Daladier's approval for making it (Bonnet, p. 208). In private conversation
with Bullitt, Bonnet stated that France would
fight "if a foot of a German soldier should cross
the Czechoslovakian frontier" (Bullitt, Sept. 6,
SD, 760 F.62/668).
50 Bullitt sent back to Washington a selection
of thirty-one editorials. (SD, 123 Bullitt, William
C. /450.)
51Paris Midi made this summary of editorial
opinion in its daily review of the press, "Les
journaux," Sept. 5, p. 3. The rightist remark
came from Le Journal, Clement Vautel, Sept.
5, p. 1.
52 LHumanite,
Gabriel Peri, Sept. 5, p. 1;
Sept. 7, p. 1; Sept. 9, p. 1; L'Humanite, Maurice
Thorez, "To save the peace," Sept. 10, p. 1;
L'Ordre, Andr& Stibio, Sept. 5, p. 1; La Lumihre,
Albert Bayet, Sept. 9, p. 1.
53LLIntransigeant,
Gallus, "France and America," Sept. 5, p. 1; Le Figaro, Lucien Romier,
"What will America do?" Sept. 5, p. 1; Le Temps,
"Bulletin du Jour," "Franco-American friendship," Sept. 5, p. 1; La Rdpublique, Pierre
Dominique, "America and France oppose brutal
force," Sept. 5, p. 1; Progres d'Allier, Moulin,
reprinted Dominique's editorial, Sept. 6, p. 1;
Petit Troyen, Jacques le Desert, "Before the
Nuremberg conference," Sept. 5-6, p. 1.
54 For an analysis of the lineup of the Parisian
journals during September 1938, see Alexander
Werth, France and Munich: before andi after
surrender (New York, 1939), pp. 225-32.


Bordeaux's officialdom for the visiting dignitaries, and a French journalist serving as
correspondent for the Associated Press reported him as stating: "The United States
and France are indefectibly united in war
and peace." This report caused a sensation
in the United States where the isolationists
charged that the Roosevelt administration
was linked with Paris and London in opposition to Hitler.55 Furiously Bullitt accused the
Associated Press of falsification and issued an
official denial.56
Meanwhile, during the week of September
5-12, attention focused on the Nazi rally at
Nuremberg. As the world awaited Hitler's
final speech on September 12, most Frenchmen remained calm and determined.57 Signs
of weakness, however, appeared both in
France and Britain. Two dailies, La Republique and the London Times, both reportedly
close to their governments, suggested the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Even
Hitler had not yet pushed his demands that
far. To counter any false impressions, Daladier again told the German representative in
Paris that France would march if Czechoslovakia were attacked.58 Bonnet in turn appealed for Britain's help in maintaining the
peace.59
In his efforts to prevent Hitler from going
too far at Nuremberg, Bonnet turned to the
United States. He proposed that American
leaders restate in private conversations the
warnings Roosevelt, Hull and Bullitt had
55
New York Times, Sept. 4, p. 5, carried this
report and even captioned

it "Bullitt promises
unity with France." In France only France de
Bordeaux printed the A.P. dispatch.
56 If the report
had been correct, the press
would have blazoned it across France and Bonnet certainly
would
have made much of it.
Apparently, as Bullitt suggested, it resulted from
the correspondent's
misinterpretation.
(SD, 123
Bullitt, W. C./441, 443, 444s,2.) Confusion
also
arose in France over this incident, and Bonnet
was falsely blamed for making statements at the
Pointe de Grave which provoked the isolationist outburst in America. See Werth, p. 235 and
Andr, Simon, J'Accuse: the men who betrayed

France (New York, 1940), p. 254.
57
Bullitt, Sept. 8, FR, p. 583.
58 German
charge d'affaires in France to the

German foreign ministry, Sept. 7, GD, No. 439,
pp. 712-14. See also Bullitt, Sept. 8, FR, p. 581.
59 Halifax to Phipps, Sept. 7, BD, No. 798, pp.
262-64. See also Bonnet, p. 188.
347
issued in their recent speeches. He also returned to his idea of the past July and asked
anew if the president "in case of dire necessity" would be willing to act as arbiter.
Bonnet frankly admitted he would accept the
transfer of the Sudetenland to German sovereignty if that would avert war and if "the
honor and prestige of Great Britain and
France would remain relatively intact."
Bullitt did not pour cold water on Bonnet's
request this time. Instead, he answered Bonnet's request for arbitration "evasively," stating that the Germans would be unwilling to
accept Roosevelt's offer.60Bullitt's reply could
not destroy Bonnet's expectations of American assistance. It remained for President
Roosevelt to accomplish this.
On September 9 Roosevelt was interviewed
by the press. One of the correspondents referred to the European scene:
Mr. President, as a result of recent speeches by
Joe Kennedy and AmbassadorBullitt and also
yourself and SecretaryHull the impression, according to reports, is growing abroad that the
United States is allied morally with the democracies of Europe in a sort of "Stop Hitler" movement, not necessarilyin commitmentsfor war or
anything of that sort, but morally.61
The president in response first referred to
Bullitt's published denial of the dispatch
from Bordeaux, then angrily countered the
impression that a moral alliance existed, or
such interpretations "are about one hundred
percent wrong." Deeply involved in his attempt to purge conservatives from the Democratic party, Roosevelt felt especially annoyed
at the political use the isolationists were making of this misinterpretation of fact. He went
on to recall his Kingston speech and Hull's
comments in mid-August: "That is the policy.
And do not put words into people's mouths
that they have not said."62
By these comments Roosevelt intended to
quiet political opposition, not to change his
foreign policy. However, the French press
offered its own interpretations of this star60 Bullitt, Sept. 8, SD, 760 F. 62/702.
61 The questioner had grounds for raising this
issue. On the same day in Washington Secretary

Hull expressed in private his disturbance at the
rumors about "a London-Paris-Washington peace
axis" (Moffat Papers, p. 198).
62 President's Personal File, Press Conference,
Vol. 12, No. 484, Sept. 9, Hyde Park Library.

348
tling declaration.63 The few journals that already advocated all-out appeasement of Germany headlined Roosevelt's denial and one
added, "The celebrated bloc of the three
great democracies
. . . is the most frighten-
ing practical joke of the present time."64 Le

Temps fairly crowed: "for some time we have
warned our readers against too broad an
interpretation of the recent [American]
speeches." One of the most determined exponents of resistance, Ltpoque, made no
bones about the president's remarks being
"as harmful to the cause of peace as the London Times article."65 Jacques Fransales, reporting from the United States, sadly explained that Roosevelt was trying to quiet
the isolationist campaign, which had gained
momentum since the London Times had
called for appeasement.66 Since the majority
of the Parisian and provincial newspapers
had not yet fully accepted appeasement, they
buried this extremely unpleasant news on the
inside pages and tempered their dissappointment by emphasizing Hull's claim that American foreign policy had not changed.
Roosevelt's declaration shook Bonnet severely. His embassy's report from Washington
that the United States would continue the
policy it announced in August67 apparently
made little impression on him. The enthusiasm with which the German propagandists
seized upon the news from Hyde Park offset
any soft words from Washington. Bonnet's
whole campaign to win the diplomatic support of the United States seemed to have
foundered. He now concluded that France
could no longer count on American assistance.68 Always an appeaser, Bonnet nonetheless had believed that France should fight if
Germany resorted to force. But faced with
what he now estimated to be the threat of
immediate war and the certain defeat of
France, he lost his nerve and swung over to
"peace at any price."69 The United States
played a role in causing this metamorphosis.70
Additional factors were involved. Conferences with the Russian and the Rumanian
representatives to the League of Nations on
September 11 strengthened Bonnet's belief
that the Soviet Union and Rumania would
not join the democratic front to protect
Czechoslovakia from Hitler's encroachments.71 Then Bonnet turned to the British
and asked: If France marched, "will you
march with us?" The foreign office refused, as
it had during the May crisis, to give a definite
promise of military support.72 A third factor
influencing Bonnet was the condition of the
French air force. Its frightening weakness
had just been confirmed on September 9
when Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh arrived
in Paris immediately after his personal review of the German air force. In his valued
opinion even the combined British and
French air fleets could not prevent the Luftwaffe from bombing French and British cities
at
Charge in Paris (Wilson) to the secretary of
state, Sept. 9, SD, 711.00/1108.
64Le Matin, Le Journal, La R'publique gave
Roosevelt's comments prominent front page coverage, while La Liberte coupled its story with a
large photograph of the president. Their example was followed by such provincial papers as
L'iclaire de Montpellier and L'Express de
L'Aube, Troyes. The quotation is taken from
Le Bien Public, Dijon, Sept. 11, p. 1. Choc, Sept.
15, a rightist weekly, attacked those who claimed
that "if we fight for the independence of Czechoslovakia, the United States will be behind us."
65 Le Temps, "Bulletin du Jour," "The international tensions," Sept. 11, p. 1; L'ipoque,
James Dormadi&re, "The forces of peace regroup," Sept. 12, p. 6.
66 Paris Soir, Fransales, "Roosevelt defines attitude of the United States," Sept. 11, p. 5.
67 Memorandum of talk between Jacques Truelle, French charge, and Pierrepont Moffat, chief
of division of European affairs, Sept. 10, SD, 760
F. 62/764; Moffat Papers, pp. 199-200.
will.73
The military weakness of France
63
68 Bonnet (p. 211) makes much of Roosevelt's

statement.
69 The British ambassador reported, "Bonnet
was very upset and said peace must be preserved
at any price," and he expressed surprise at the
suddenness of Bonnet's "collapse" (Phipps to
Halifax, Sept. 13, BD, No. 855, pp. 310-11; see
also ibid., No. 852, p. 309).
70 The British delegation
to the League of
Nations reported to Halifax on Sept. 11 that
Bonnet believed "the extremely serious situation
had been aggravated by recent articles in The
Times. . . . He had been further depressed by
President Roosevelt's recent announcement"
(ibid., No. 835, pp. 293-94).
71 Bonnet, pp. 188, 196-203.
72 Bonnet, pp. 213-220. See also BD, Nos. 798,
pp. 262-4, 807, pp. 269-70, 814, pp. 275-77, 822,
pp. 282, 834, pp. 292-93, 842, pp. 301-2.

73 Bullitt, Sept. 12, SD, 760 F. 62/739. Bonnet's
analysis of the seriousness of France's position
was not published along with the other section


and her diplomatic isolation combined to
break Bonnet's spirit.
However, he made one last despairing effort to win American intervention before
Hitler could call from his podium at Nuremberg for military action against Czechoslovakia. Would the United States caution Germany to follow the path of negotiation rather
than force? For the third time Bullitt turned
aside a demand from the foreign minister.
This time he said he doubted whether there
would be time to reach "anyone of importance" before the Fiihrer's speech.74
Though Hitler's finale at Nuremberg did
not unleash the German legions, the Sudetenlanders openly revolted. An atmosphere of
panic and despair settled over France as war
appeared imminent. Swept along by the
nervousness of the Quai d'Orsay, Daladier
during the night of September 13 pleaded
directly with the British prime minister to
find some compromise. He asked if Britain
would attend a three-power conference with
Germany.75 Chamberlain, however, preferred
direct negotiation with Hitler and on the
evening of September 14 announced he would
meet with the German Fiihrer the next day
at Berchtesgaden.
of this dispatch (FR, p. 589). Lindbergh had reviewed the Soviet as well as the German air
forces before flying on to Paris. At the request
of Premier Daladier Bullitt arranged a private
meeting between the famous flyer and the French
minister for air, Guy La Chambre, on Sept. 9
(John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: prologue to
tragedy [New York, 1948], p. 99.) For the best
summary of Lindbergh's report in the archives
of the department of state see the ambassador in
Great Britain (Joseph E. Kennedy) to the secretary of state, Sept. 22, FR, pp. 72-73. Daladier
considered Lindbergh's analysis "unduly pessimistic" (Phipps to Halifax, BD, No. 857, pp. 31112).
74Bullitt, Sept. 12, FR, p. 589. A similar request by the French ambassador met a similar
rebuff in Washington (Moffat Papers, pp. 20102). See also Hull, p. 589. Bonnet's previous requests on July 14 and Sept. 8 had been for
American arbitration.
75Phipps to Halifax, Sept. 13, BD, No. 861,
pp. 313-14. Bullitt informed Washington about
this proposal and hinted that the three powers
might like other states to join them. As a result
Hull spent an "evening of croquet and anxious
thought." (Bullitt, Sept. 14, FR, pp. 594-96. See
also Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner. The
American white paper [New York, 19403 pp. 7-8.)
349
The news of Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden was greeted in France, as Bullitt

reported, with "a relief that approaches
gaiety." Few Frenchmen now were ready to
fight. Rather, they welcomed an opportunity
of settling the Sudeten dispute by negotiation. Even Daladier shared Bonnet's enthusiasm over Chamberlain's initiative.76
The prime minister's sudden return to
London from Berchtesgaden raised new
doubts and fears. Rumors spread that Hitler
had demanded self-determination for the
Sudetenlanders, even outright cession of these
territories to the Third Reich. The final word
came after Daladier and Bonnet traveled to
London on September 18. The British and
French proposed that Czechoslovakia cede to
Germany without a plebiscite the territories
with a predominantly German population.
Blum reflected the more general French opinion when he greeted the proposals with a
mixture of "cowardly shame and relief." He
admitted war had probably been averted, but
certainly a high price had been paid.77 The
Czechs, however, refused to cede this territory upon which their major defense line had
been constructed. The feeling of crisis returned but was eased when under British and
French pressure Czechoslovakia gave way.
Many Frenchmen were deeply disturbed by
their government's refusal to stand by their
Czech ally, but the majority deemed the price
valid as long as peace was maintained.
During these days of mounting tension
46Bullitt, Sept. 15, FR, pp. 600-2. Wright, pp.
69-70, refers to Bullitt's report on Sept. 8 that
the French were determined to face the worst,
and to his statement of Sept. 15 that few Frenchmen were ready to fight. Wright implies these
conflicting analyses reflected the ambassador's
"troubled uncertainties." Indeed they did not.
Rather, Bullitt accurately reported the French
mood. Moffat noted in his diary on Sept. 14 "a
change in French sentiments, a reluctance to
envisage war which was in dramatic contradistinction with their attitude to date" (Mofat
Papers, p. 202). See also Phipps to Halifax, Sept.
15, BD, No. 894, pp. 336-7. Bullitt's dispatch of
Sept. 15 provides more evidence of his consistency. It was in this dispatch that he reaffirmed
his antagonism to the Versailles Treaty which he
had stated in his letter of May 20 to the president. It was at this time that he characterized
it as "the stupidest document ever penned by the
hand of man."
77Le Poputaire, Leon Blum, Sept. 19, p. 1.

350
and critical negotiations, the European democracies gained no support from the United
States. In fact Chamberlain's appeasement
tactics increased the opposition of the American isolationists to intervention, and the
French foreign ministry quickly learned of
this "new flare-up."78 Other confidential information seemed to confirm that Roosevelt
wanted no part of a "Stop Hitler" bloc. The
American undersecretary of state, Sumner
Welles, on September 16 met with Daladier,
Bonnet and the vice-premier, Camille Chautemps, for dinner in the American embassy,
and as the French leaders waited impatiently
for news of Chamberlain's negotiations in
Berchtesgaclen, Welles apparently informed
them that eighty per cent of the Americans
opposed any intervention in Europe.79 At
about the same time the foreign ministry was
reminded that if France became a belligerent,
the Neutrality Act would bar the shipment
of any implements of war to her. Included
in this prohibition would be the two hundred planes which the French had ordered
in June as well as those for which the French
navy was presently negotiating.80 The interpretation that Roosevelt's administration
had returned to isolationism seemed fully
justified when Andre Siegfried, one of
France's most astute students of the American
scene, reported upon his return from the
United States:
It would be an illusion to think that if there is
no European conflict, the American government
would give military aid or even financial aid in
the form of direct loans.81
78 Memo of conversation between Moffat and
French Ambassador St. Quentin, Sept. 15, FR, p.
605; Moffat Papers, p. 204.
79 Bonnet, pp. 212, 341.
80 Bonnet (p. 212) states that such a warning
had been issued in mid-September. State department archives contain no record of this warning
but rather of one that was issued in May 1938.
Bonnet also speaks of a personal warning Roosevelt sent to the French minister for air, Guy La
Chambre (pp. 341-2). It seems likely that this
letter was also sent in May. See Foreign relations
of the United States, 1938 (Washington, 1955), II,
306-312.
81 Le Temps, Andre Siegfried, "American opinion on the European crisis," Sept. 23, p. 8. This
article was reprinted in its entirety by L'Homme
libre, Sept. 23, p. 1; L'Pre Nouvelle, Sept. 23, p.
1; and La Ddpeche de Toulouse, Sept. 25, p. 1.
These four dailies were close to Bonnet. For his
Bonnet became so completely disillusioned

that he now gave American inaction as an
excuse for France's appeasement policy.82
Not only was the foreign minister disturbed
by American isolation, but together with several of his fellow ministers he became incensed by the American attacks upon French
foreign policy. Since the famous articles of
La Republique and the London Times, the
American press increasingly criticized any
proposals of the appeasers to transfer the
Sudeten areas to Germany. When an "authorized spokesman for the state department" and a United States senator publicly
added their disapproval,83 the French leaders
protested. Bullitt reported the intense annoyance that Daladier, Bonnet and Chautemps felt. As a revisionist, Bullitt himself
was deeply annoyed and demanded that all
members of "our government" refrain from
making it appear "that we believe that
France should go to war in order to keep
3,200,000 Sudetens under the rule of 7,000,
000 Czechs." Bullitt went on angrily: "It is
entirely honorable to urge another nation to
go to war if one is prepared to go to war at
once on the side of that nation." He implied
b) this that it was obvious the United States
was in no such mood or state of readiness.84
own evaluation of Siegfried's remarks see Bonnet,
p. 213.
82 Pertinax in his lead editorial, "The great
weakness," L'Europe Nouvelle, Sept. 24, pp. 102325, stated "certain French officials" had excused
appeasement by saying "President Roosevelt has
done nothing to aid us. He has done nothing
which can make us . . . count on anything more
than economic aid allowed by the Neutrality Act:
Cash and Carry." For a similar but more direct
charge against Bonnet see Alexander Werth, Twilight in France, D. W. Brogan (ed.) (New York,
1942), p. 193 and Simone, p. 254. Werth and
Simone saw Bonnet as anti-American at the time
of the Pointe de Grave incident. Actually, his
metamorphosis took place after Roosevelt's denial
of Sept. 9.
83 Le Temps, Sept. 17, p. 3, and 19, p. 3, carried these statements. The senator was Key Pittman, chairman of the foreign relations committee. State department officials by Sept. 14 were
already using the term "sellout" to describe
Chamberlain's appeasement policy (Moffat Papers, p. 204).
84 Bullitt,
Sept. 19, FR, pp. 617-18. Bullitt's
readiness to accept a revision of the Versailles
Treaty was no "zigzag" as Wright (D. 70) claims.


Bullitt and the French leaders reacted even
more strenuously when Dorothy Thompson
accused France of cowardice for not standing
by Czechoslovakia, and the New York Post
called the Anglo-French proposals a "transcendental sell-out."85 Bonnet went so far as
to summon the American correspondents in
Paris to protest what he called the injustice
of these critics and he regretted that for the
present he could not defend himself by a full
presentation of the facts.86
While the French foreign ministry discounted American assistance, others refused
to believe that Roosevelt would not help
France in its desperate hour of need. The
non-communist Left even began to call upon
the American president to intervene. This
campaign had been led off on September 17
by an editorial in Le Peuple, the daily organ
of France's huge labor union, the C. G. T.
(Confededration Gene'rale du Travail): "It is
necessary for Roosevelt to speak. . . . Only
America can save Europe from suicide."87
The following day the powerful voice of
Blum joined the campaign:
Isn't it time PresidentRoosevelt spoke to Europe
with all the prestige of his person, with all the
authority of the state whose moral and material
support will finally decide against any general
war?88
The campaign was carried directly to the
White House on September 19 when Ldon
Jouhaux, the secretary general of the C.G.T.,
personally pleaded with Roosevelt to intervene in Europe.89 While Le Peuble contin-
ued to call almost daily for American action,90 Blum on September 24 rejoined the
campaign. With the European crisis becoming more acute the Socialist leader entreated
the president to call for a truce and offer
his scrvices as arbiter. The call should come
immediately, for "time passes, each hour
counts." 91
The leftist campaign to win American support had enough significance in Paris to
rouse a countercampaign. The extreme rightist journals, as determined exponents of appeasement, still feared that the Left's visions
of such support would strengthen France's
will to resist. Hence they scoffed at the
Left's efforts. One editor likened Roosevelt's
speeches to the "Missouri winds."92 Another
referred to the president's denial of September 9 and reminded the "great rabbi" Blum
that "unfortunately neither Roosevelt nor
his country wishes to get into war."93 As
one fascist weekly wrote, the United States
should "maintain its role as merchant instead
of coming to tilt with windmills in a quixotic
fashion."94
These "windmills" were no figments of a
labor meeting in Mexico and used the opportunity to stop in Washington and speak with the
president. See the memos of the conversations of
Moffat and the secretary of state with the French
ambassador, Sept. 20 & 23, FR, pp. 625-26, 63839. In New York City Jouhaux stated in a public address: "It is a naive idea to suppose the
United States could remain in isolation or neutral in a war situation" (New York Times, Sept.
,1,
Bullitt, Sept. 21, SD, 760 F. 62/956; and the

memo of the conversation between the secretary
of state and the French ambassador, Sept. 23, FR,
pp. 638-9.
86 New York Times, Sept. 22, p. 4. L'Action
Franraise, Sept. 20, p. 1, expressed the views of
those in France who were extreme appeasers
when it printed as a headline: "The Americans
are pushing France and Britain toward war as
hard as they can-but they do not want to be
mixed up in it themselves."
87 Le Peuple, Raymond Bouyer, "America must
stop the suicide of Europe," Sept. 17, p. 1.
88 Le Populaire, Sept. 18, p. 1. Blum referred
in this editorial to the allusion he had made on
September 16 "to an intervention more distant
but more powerful than that of Neville Chamberlain." "All the world," Blum commented on
Sept. 18, "knew that I meant President Roosevelt."
89Jouhaux
was returning to France from a
85
351
p. 2).
9OLe Peuple, Leon Bothereau, "Action by the

democracies can save the peace," Sept. 18, p. 1;
on Sept. 19 Le Peuple carried a heavily outlined
front-page box announcing "Roosevelt, the time
to speak has come"; Raymond Bouyer on Sept.
20 applauded Jouhaux's personal initiative; on
Sept. 21 Le Peuple carried another front-page
editorial by Raymond Bouyer, "And now?"
91 Le Populaire, Blum, "Roosevelt should
speak," Sept. 24, p. 1.
92Le Journal, Clement Vautel, Sept. 23, p. 1.
93 LAction Franraise carried on a running attack upon the Left's campaign by quoting from
Le Peuple and Le Populaire and then adding its
disparaging comments. The quotations here are
taken from its "revue de la presse," Sept. 25, p.
7. See also Sept. 19, p. 7; Sept. 21, p. 5; Sept. 22,
p. 7; Sept. 24, p. 5.
94Je Suis Partout, G. M. Tracy, "Franlce has
more to gain than lose from the silence of the
United States," Sept. 22.

352
TOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT. TR.
quixotic imagination but very real dangers

to European peace, and they mounted as
Chamberlain met a second time with the
Fiihrer. Chamberlain flew to Godesberg on
September 22 and brought with him virtual
acceptance of Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands. Hitler, however, insisted upon immediate military occupation of the Sudetenland. Though shocked by his threat of armed
might, Chamberlain remained at Godesberg
throughout September 23, hoping to win a
modification of the Fuihrer's ultimatum. His
efforts netted little, but at a second meeting
late that evening he did obtain a postponement of action until October 1.
However, on the evening of September 23
Czechoslovakia ordered full mobilization
and early the next morning the French called
up an additional 500,000 troops thus raising the total under arms to a million. For
the next five days Europe lived under the
darkest cloud since the armistice of 1918.
Bullitt played a key role in shaping American diplomacy during this interval. Having
small regard for the Treaty of Versailles, he
was willing to see the Sudetenland transferred to Germany, and to that extent he followed the appeasers. However, he fully realized the danger of trying to appease Hitler
when the latter was threatening Europe with
the use of his armed might. Bullitt recognized
that either war or capitulation to force
would be catastrophic for Europe, and he
still believed that if either appeared imminent then the United States should intervene
to preserve the peace. American intervention
should follow the course which he had described in his letter to Roosevelt just prior
to the May crisis: the president should call
an international conference. Like so many
Frenchmen of the Left, Bullitt was sure Hitler would never dare resort to force if faced
with the certainty of American intervention.
Rather, he would return to the council table
and peacefully negotiate his demands on
Czechoslovakia. Bullitt's view lay at the root
of the two messages which Roosevelt sent to
Europe during those last desperate days before the Munich conference.
On September 24, the day when Chamberlain left Godesberg and the chances for peace
seemed so bleak, Bullitt first appealed to
Roosevelt to call a conference. On the previous day he had alerted the president to the
imminence of war: "German troops would
probably cross the Czech frontier tonight."95

Though Hitler's army did not march, the
danger of military action remained. So on
September 24 Bullitt coupled his request for
a conference with a plea that the president
also issue a "strong warning against armies
crossing frontiers."96
The top staff of the department of state
gave a cool reception to Bullitt's suggestion
of a conference. "The time," they felt, "was
not yet ripe for any statement by the President." Even Sumner Welles, who had just
returned to Washington from his European
trip, could not persuade his colleagues of the
need for such a conference. They were too
overcome by the "host of practical difficulties" such a meeting would entail.97
During the following day, Sunday, September 25, Bullitt sent off a flood of cables
to keep WXTashington
informed of the developments in France. The terms of the Godesberg demands had become known in official
circles.98 Finding them "totally unacceptable," Bullitt was disgusted to report that
Bonnet still urged peace, and that the majority of the French press, as yet unaware of
Hitler's terms, continued to back the foreign
minister.99 Premier Daladier, however, remained firm, but even he, as Bullitt reported,
would have to modify his determination to
resist Hitler's latest demands if the British
refused to support France. The decision
rested with the British leaders with whom
Daladier and Bonnet were to meet that night
in London.100 Bullitt sought to strengthen
Daladier's hand by urging Roosevelt to intervene. During the evening of the 25th he
called the White House and again emphasized the gravity of the situation. Apparently
at the same time he suggested that if Roosevelt would not call an international conference then he should offer to arbitrate the
Czech controversy.101 It seemed obvious that
9 Bullitt, Sept. 23, SD, 760 F. 62/1043. See also
Ickes, II, 473.
96 Bullitt, Sept. 24, FR, pp. 641-2.
97Moffat Papers, p. 211.
9s Bullitt, Sept. 25, FR, p. 649.
99 Bullitt, Sept. 25, SD, 760 F. 62/1065. Wright
(p. 70) criticizes the ambassador for supporting
appeasement on Sept. 19 and then urging resistance on Sept. 25, but Hitler's Godesberg demands had intervened.
100 Bullitt, Sept. 25, FR, pp. 646-8, 656-7.
101 Hull, pp. 591-2; Moffat Papers, p. 212.

353
such a step would persuade Hitler to abandon his threats of military action.
This time Bullitt gained the support of the
president. Contrarv to what Bonnet and his
colleagues believed after the Hyde Park denial, Roosevelt had not lost interest in Europe's problems. Rather, throughout the
subsequent fortnight he had increasinglyc devoted attention to them.102 Disturbed by
what some in the department of state called
the "sellout" of Czechoslovakia, he apparently was impressed by the resistance with
which the democracies had met the Godesberg demands. On the evening of September 25 he decided to act in their behalf.103
The department of state at the president's
orders had spent that day preparing a statement that could be sent to Europe. Bullitt's
plan for an international conference had
ac,ain been considered and again ruled out.
His suggestion for arbitration was also considered, but that ivas replaced by a less precise term, "a tender of good offices." However, even this ran into opposition, for
Norman Davis, one of the state department's
advisers, "took violent exception to any hint
of treaty revision." In turn Hull feared "the
public would confuse good offices with mediation." Though the president favored one or
the other of Bullitt's proposals, Hull and
Davis had their way and his message was
reduced to a "mere exhortation."104
Roosevelt's message to Hitler, Benes, Daladier and Chamberlain was sent early in the
morning of September 26. Though it was
couched in general terms, the president did
speak out against the horrors of war. He
urged that "reason and the spirit of equity"
prevail so that "the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war."
He then added:
reception in France. Bullitt was so infuriated by the xagueness ot its terms that he
routed MIoffat out of bed with a telephone
call at 5:15 a.m. He insisted that at least
arbitration be offered "if we would save the
situation."106 The French leaders read the
message in the light of their own predilections. Bonnet, who had returned from London still "ardently for peace at any price," 107
considered Roosevelt's "moderate and conciliatory tone" a support for his own policy
of appeasement.108 Daladier took an entirely
different view, seeing the message as approval
both for his efforts "to serve to the last
the ideals of peace and justice" and for his
desire to reach an agreement "compatible
with the dignity and vital interests of the
nations involved."109
During the evening of September 26 after
his return from London, Daladier had a long
talk with the American ambassador. He now
seemed "sure of himself and strong." He had
been encouraged by what Bullitt called the
"magnificent spirit of the French." French
opinion, apprised of the extent of the Godesberg terms, had swung overnight to the support of Daladier's policy of resistance.110
Also, Daladier was heartened by the promise
Chamberlain had given of military assistance
if Germany marched against Czechoslovakia.
Daladier was, as he stated to Bullitt, determined that France would not permit "the
infliction of gross injustices on small countries because of the threat of war." In time
a new basis of peace might be found at an
international conference, though the call for
such a conference could only come from the
president of the United States. For the immediate present only a determined policy of
resistance could convince Hitler of the futilitv of war.111
On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the

United States of America and for the sake of
humanity everywhereI most earnestly appeal to
you not to break off negotiations looking to a
peaceful, fair, and constructivesettlement of the
questions at issue.105
Moffat Papers, pp. 212-13.

Bullitt, Sept. 26, FR, p. 667.
108 Bonnet, p. 275.
109 Daladier used these phrases in the cable
thanking Roosevelt for his appeal. For its text
see FR, p. 662.
110 Bullitt had sent a cable earlier that day
describing appreciatively the spirit of resistance
which had swept France: Sept. 26, SD, 760 F. 62/
1104. See also the report on French opinion by
Philips, the New York Times correspondent in
Paris (Sept. 26, p. 6).
1"1 Bullitt, Sept. 26, FR, pp. 667-9. Wright (p.
70) again used Bullitt's dispatches out of context
when he compared that of Sept. 25, reporting
The president's message gained a varied

102
103
7/ .
104
p. 9.
105
Ickes, II, 467-9, 472-4.

For a similar interpretation see Rauch, p.
Moffat Papers, pp. 211-12; Alsop & Kintner,
For text see FR, pp. 657-8.
106
107

354
However, French opinion began to weaken

shortly after Daladier and Bullitt talked. Hitler had been scheduled to speak before a
monster rally at the Berlin Sportspalast and
many feared that he would announce his
decision to march. Though he castigated
Benes brutally, he did not unleash his troops.
The majority of the press in Paris quickly
pointed out that the German leader had left
the door open to negotiation. At first slowly
but then with growing rapidity many of the
French lost their "magnificent spirit" and
swung from resistance to appeasement.1"2
It was while they were in this mood that
the majority of French newspaper editors
learned of Roosevelt's message to Europe's
four leaders. Extreme appeasers hailed it as
a "solemn appeal for peace""13 and emphasized that peace "can only be achieved
through conciliation."114 Most of the press
also gave prominence to Roosevelt's intervention and linked it with Hitler's apparent
willingness to negotiate.115 A few voices, howDaladier as wavering, with this one of Sept. 26
concerning the premier's firmness. Wright implies
these conflicting reports reveal Bullitt's "zigzags."
Rather, they were accurate analyses of Daladier's
position, for on Sept. 26 the latter was in a much
stronger position because of popular French support and a British promise of assistance.
112 For Bullitt's summary of the press reaction
to Hitler's speech of Sept. 27, see SD, 760 F. 62/
1165. See also New York Times, Philips, Sept. 27,
p. 14.
113 Le Journal used this phrase for a heavily
typed headline on Sept. 27.

114 La Republique, i-mile Roche, "To preserve
the peace," Sept. 27, p. 1, and La Liberte, Jacques
Doriot,
"President
Roosevelt
. . . appeals
for
conciliation," Sept. 27, p. 1. See also L'Intransigranat, Galluis, "Roosevelt appeals to Hitler and
Benes," Sept. 26, p. 1; La Rdpublique, "An appeal
by President Caillux," Sept. 27, p. 1.
115 See for example Le Petit Parisien, Sept. 27
with its headlines, "Roosevelt sends a very pressing appeal for a peaceful arrangement" and
Lucien Bourgues' editorial comments; Le Journal
des DTbats, Pierre Bernus., "A supreme appeal of
President Roosevelt," Sept. 27, p. 1; Le Jour-Echo
de Paris, Uon Bailby's column and the frontpage box, which labeled Roosevelt's message "An
initiative towards peace," Sept. 27, p. 1; L'Oeuvre
and the comments in its lead editorial signed OE,
Sept. 27, p. 1. Much of the provincial press followved their colleagues in Paris by carrying large
front-page pictures of Roosevelt and emphasizing
the text of his message with heavy type or black
ever, still urged resistance rather than capitulation and hailed the American president for
supporting a common front against fascist
aggression."16 Le Peuple excitedly announced
in a banner headline, "In the name of 130

million Americans President Roosevelt has
spoken.'117
Blum too was most grateful that
"Roosevelt had thrown into the scales the

most powerful temporal authority in the
world." Believing, however, that Hitler had
not listened, he called on Roosevelt to speak
again: "Noblesse oblige: he cannot renounce
the task he has undertaken. . . . Roosevelt
should offer mediation . . . he ought to do so
out of the greatness of his own soul."'18

The voices of appeasement not only spoke
with renewed vigor in the French press on
September 27, they also spoke out again
within the government. At an unusual morning meeting of Daladier's cabinet Bonnet
again emphasized his fear that France would
be defeated. Latej in the day he reported to
the American ambassador that together with
the British foreign office he was developing
a plan whereby Hitler would be given the
Sudetenland bv October 1. Bu]litt immediately cabled Washington that this "would
mean a complete about face in the position
Daladier and Chamberlain had taken," but
"my conviction
is that . . . Daladier
posi-
tively will not assent to any such propooutlines, but editorial comment was sparse. For
Bullitt's summary see SD, 760 F 62/1165.
1166L'Ordre, Georges Lechartier, "Toward the
close union of the guardians of the peace," Sept.
27, p. 1; L'Humanite's headlines on Roosevelt's
message repeated its current slogan, "The union
and firmness of the democracies can still halt
the aggressors and save the peace." Sept. 27, p. 1.
117 Le Peuple's editorial, "A great gesture," by
Georges Buisson expressed the paper's gratitude
that its appeals finally had been answered. Sept.
27, p. 1. L'Action FranCaise quoted Buisson in its
"revue de la presse" and commented "The dozen
readers of Le Peuple will believe that the United
States already is our ally." Sept. 28, p. 4.
118Le Populaire, L6on Blum, Sept. 27, p. 1.
L'Action FranCaise also referred to Blum: "More
illusions and lies in Le Populaire where the great
rabbi is almost moved to tears. . . . Roosevelt,
having said that he prefers peace to war, is
nevertheless enrolled in the anti-fascist war.
That's terribly weak logic." Sept. 28, p. 4. Bullitt
reported that Blum believed his appeal "expresses faithfully the thoughts of all the people
and all the workers of France." (Sept. 27, SD, 760
F 62/1154.)


sal."119 Bullitt gave the impression that if
the all-out appeasers were to be restrained,
the United States must act quickly.
By the time Bullitt's cable arrived in the
early afternoon of September 27, President
Roosevelt already had determined upon action. "Information of unquestioned authenticity" had come through that at 2:00 p.m.
on the next day, September 28, Hitler would
march his armies into Czechoslovakia unless
the Godesberg terms were met.120 To help
stave off this catastrophe, the top staff of the
department of state readily agreed to two
steps: an appeal to Mussolini, and a message
urging other nations throughout the world
to join with the United States in pleading
for the maintenance of peace. A third step,
Bullitt's conference plan, ran into the renewed opposition of Secretary Hu11.121 Sumner Welles, however, refused to let the issue
die. He took it directly to the White House
where Hull was overruled and Welles was
permitted to sound out Britain and France
as to the feasibility of a conference.
The series of trans-Atlantic telephone calls
and cables that preceded the release of Roosevelt's second message do much to reveal its
purpose and meaning. Welles finally informed Bullitt: the president was considering
"something along the general line you and I
believe in," and he wanted to know what
Daladier's personal reaction would be to a
direct plea to Hitler to attend a conference."122 This was just what Bullitt had
been waiting for. It tallied with everything
he had suggested. However, he could not
immediately obtain Daladier's reaction, for
asleep when I received my
the preinier "wsvas
instructions." In the meantime Welles called
Kennedy in London, and in relatively short
order he received Chamberlain's reply. The
prime minister gave only cautious approval
to Roosevelt's plan, for he believed the time
for adinonishments had passed and he feared
Hitler might be antagonized by a direct
Bullitt, Sept. 27, FR, pp. 680-1.
Welles referred to this threat in his speech
of October 6 reviewing American actions during
the Munich crisis. See department of state, Press
releases, 1938, p. 238.
121 Moffat Papers, pp. 215-6; Alsopp & Kintner,
p. 10.
conversation between
122 Memo of telephone
Bullitt and Welles, Sept. 27, FR, pp. 675-6.
119
120
355
appeal to him and to no one else.123 In contrast, the awakened Daladier expressed "the
greatest gratitude for the president's continued efforts to preserve the peace" and fully
approved both the direct appeal to Hitler
and the calling of a conference which could
"work out the transfer of Czech territory to
Germany in peace." Where Chamberlain
feared any step that might antagonize the
German Fuhrer, Daladier realistically believed "Hitler at the present time would accept nothing except the absolute humiliation
of every nation on earth." It was apparent
that Daladier stood ready to fight before he
would permit Hitler "to make his wish law in
Europe." Perhaps there was one chance in a
thousand for peace; if Hitler accepted an international conference, "the president would
have saved the peace of the world."'24
Roosevelt did not forward his appeal to
Hitler until he learned of Daladier's firmness. In this second message the president
again denounced force "as unnecessary as it
is unjustifiable." He added that current negotiations stood open, and "they can be continued if you give the word." He suggested
that "a conference of all the nations directly
interested," held immediately in some neutral European country, would provide the
opportunity for all pertinent questions to be
solved "in a spirit of justice" and "of fair
dealing. ..."125
What was Roosevelt's intention in sending out this message during the night of
September 27? The evidence at hand supports the thesis that by virtue of this act
he "was no isolationist in his public conduct
of policy any more than in his private
faith."126 It no longer can be maintained
that the message was "far removed from any
advocacy of collective security."127 Given the
background of the conference plan since Bul123 See memos of two telephone conversations
between Bullitt and Welles at 8:45 a.m. and 2:45
p.m., SD 760 F 62/1117A; FR, pp. 675-76.
124 Bullitt, Sept. 27, FR, pp. 686-9. As published this document is marked with a time of
arrival in Washington of 11:50 p.m. The original
copy SD, 760 F 62/1175 bears a time mark of
9:46 p.m. Thus it appears this cable was received
thirty-two minutes before the dispatch of Roosevelt's second message.
125 For text see FR, pp. 684-S.
126 Rauch, p. 79.
127 Beard, p. 220.

356
litt's suggestion of Mfay20, it is obvious that

collective action to maintain the peace
formed the basis for Roosevelt's call. Another charge, that of caution, has been
raised against Roosevelt's policy.128 True,
he couched his message in "minimum terms"
and announced that "the United States has
no political involvements in Europe." After
his experience with the quarantine speech
he did indeed worry about arousing the ire
of the isolationists.129 The cautious handling
of the conference proposal seems also to have
been aimed at quieting Secretary Hull and
some of his advisers.130 One additional comment must be made. It appears that Roosevelt stood behind the Daladier-Bullitt-Welles
plan to resist rather than capitulate before
the threat of force but to accept a peaceful
transfer of the predominantly German areas
from Czechoslovakia to the Third Reich.
There is no evidence that Roosevelt intended to support Bonnet and "peace at anv
price."
The cautious terms of the second message,
however, played directly into the hands of
Bonnet. He had been forewarned by Daladier of Roosevelt's "most sensational intervention" and was fully prepared to utilize
his call for a conference. Upon receiving
final word on the message during the early
hours of September 28, Bonnet immediately
wired his ambassador in London:
Within a very short time Bonnet revealed

the lengths to which he was ready to go at
that conference. In a wire sent to the French
embassy in Berlin he ordered FranSois-Poncet
to accept virtually all of Hitler's Godesberg
demands.
During those last desperate hours of September 28 before the 2:00 p.m. deadline, the
French ambassador was not the only one to
plead with Hitler. Chamberlain also stated
in a letter that "all your conditions have
been met." Then came Mussolini's direct
request for a four-power conference. At 4:00
p.m. that day Chamberlain told the house of
commons that Hitler had invited him to confer at Munich.132
France's relief that war had been avoided
was likened by Bullitt to the feeling that
swept Europe on November 11, 1918.133The
French press excitedly welcomed Hitler's call
for the Munich conference. Dailies from right
to left associated this dramatic development
with Roosevelt's second appeal.134 Even the
extreme rightists agreed that "Roosevelt's
call prepared the ground" but in typical fashion added "Mussolini was the determining
factor."135 A few voices called
attention
to
the fact that Hitler's conference would not

meet in a neutral country, nor would all
132 W\hen Roosevelt heard that

Chamberlain
had accepted Hitler's invitation to Munich, he
M. Roosevelt has just proposed the convening immediately sent off a cryptic "Good man" to
of a conferencewith a view to solving the Czech- the prime minister. (FR, p. 688.) Apparently, like
oslovak problem. France, as well as England, Bullitt, he assumed that Chamberlain still stood
supports this initiative. But it would be well if with Daladier as an opponent to capitulation.
Italv also supported the proposal. Please discuss (Bullitt, Sept. 27, FR, p. 881.) He expected Chamthe matter with Lord Halifax.131
berlain to negotiate at Munich on the basis of
-reason and equity."
133 Bullitt, Sept. 29, FR, p. 692.
134 The rightist Matin carried the
128 Langer anid Gleason, p. 34.
headlines
129 NVelles stated to the French ambassador in
'Responding to the new and moving appeal of
Washinaton that in his first messaae Roosevelt
President Roosevelt, Daladier, Chamberlain, Hitler and Mussolini will meet today in Munich,"
aime(I at briingino the weight of the United
Sept. 29, p. 1. The C.G.T.'s organ bore this
States to bear upoti the Eturopean crisis and at
banner headline: "In the name of the workers
the same titne souight to avoid stirring American
of France, thank you, Mr. President," and Rayisolationiist feclings. St. QOtentin to the French
mond Bouyer in his editorial, "War has reforeign minister, Sept. 27, 1938, puiblished in
Roosevelt's Weg in den Krieg, Geheimiie Dokui- treated," gave full credit to Roosevelt. Le Peuple,
mente zur Krieopolitik des Prilsidenten der FTe- Sept. 29, p. 1.
133 Le Jour-Echo, FranSois Petri, Sept.
Staaten (Berlin, 1943), pp. 49-50.
reiniggtcn
29, p. 1;
130 See Moffat Papers, pp. 211-6.
L'Action Frangaise, Sept. 29, p. 1. Moderate api3' Bonnet, p. 282, see also pp. 278, 281 & 329.
peasers like Le Petit Parisien (Sept. 29, p. 1) also
Pauli Lombard, Le chen iin de MuAnichl (Paris,
emphasized Mussolini's role, but resisters like
1938), pp. 224-5, gives an interestino, chronology
Genevieive Tabouis concentrated on the impact
of Roosevelt's appeal upon Hitler (L'Oeuvre,
of the night of Sept. 27 and Bonnet's use of
Roosevelt's second appeal.
Sept. 29, p. 1).

FRANCE, TIHE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

interested nations be invited,136 and one
warned that the Munich meeting might operate to the disadvantage of England and
France.'37 The vast majority of the press,
however, focused on the fact that negotiations had replaced a recourse to arms. Few
would disagree with the claim "Roosevelt is
the savior of the peace."'138
In their search for peace France and Britain capitulated to Hitler at the Munich conference. As the details of that meeting and
the final agreement did not directly affect
Franco-American relations there is no need
to review them in detail here. It need only
be repeated that Hitler achieved a virtually
complete victory and that Daladier's plans
for negotiations based on justice and equity
were blasted as Czechoslovakia was forced to
accept Hitler's terms.
The French premier returned to Paris in
a mood of deep despair, but to his surprise
his fellow Frenchmen greeted him as a hero
of the hour. All but a few wildly cheered
Daladier and the Munich agreement for,
as their headlines screamed, "PEACE IS
SAVXED."While the vast majority of the
French press enveloped themselves in this
illusion, only a handful of news commentators understood the extent of their nation's
defeat.139
Despite the excitement over the European

136 L'Humanitd used as a headline "Roosevelt
has proposed a conference in a neutral country
of all interested
parties
. . . now neither
Czecho-
slovakia nor the U.S.S.R. is invited." Blum voiced

a similar warning but favored cautious negotiations. Le Populaire, Sept. 29, p. 1. Reporting
directly from Washington, Jacques Fransales emphasized Roosevelt's opposition to capitulation.
Paris Soir, Sept. 29, p. 3.
13- L'Ordre, Emil Bure, Sept. 29, p. 1.
139 Leon Jouhaux used this phrase when he
was interviewed upon his return to France. La
LibertJ de Sud Ouest, Bordeaux, carried in large
of peace," Sept. 29, p.
type, "Roosevelt-apostle
1. Like other provincial dailies, it continued to
follow the Parisian press in reporting news about
American foreign policy.
139 Amongst the critics of Munich the following must be listed: Pertinax of L'Europe nouvelle, Henri de Kerillis of L'JApoque, Genevieve
Tabouis of L'Oeuvre, Burt of L'Ordre, Georges
Bidault of L'Aube. Jouhaux renounced his initial approval of Munich in an editorial for Le
Peuple, Oct. 3, p. 1. The Communists in L'HttmanitWwere perhaps the most extreme opponents
of the settlement.
357
developments the French press did not let

their readers forget the United States. As
usual American foreign policy was used in
the debate over French policy. The Munichois press, those who favored the settlement,
willingly perpetuated two myths. The first
was that Roosevelt was responsible for the
calling of the Munich conference. The other
was that the terms of the -settlement were
acceptable to Roosevelt and his administration.140 It was pleasant of course to enclose
the events of the last few days of September
in a warm mantle of universal approval.
Only those who had stood all along for resistance had courage enough to admit, "The
United States feels that Czechoslovakia has
been betrayed."141 The majority of the
French preferred to express "their deep admiration for and profound gratitude to the
president for preserving the peace of the
world."142
140 Jean Provoust, the owner of the huge Paris
Soir, wrote on Oct. 1, "Yes we are going to live.
But thanks to whom? Thanks to Neville Chamberlain. . . . Thanks to Roosevelt." Le Temps
Oct. 1, p. 1, carried an unsigned editorial which
stated: "One should be filled with joy at this
armistice without combat . . . at this peace, as
President Roosevelt desired, before war." See also
L'Oeuvre, Andre Pierre, "What does Europe owe
Roosevelt?" Oct. 1, p. 1; L'Tre nouvelle, unsigned
editorial, "Vive la Paix," Oct. 1, p. 1.
141 Henri de Kerillis, one of the chief editors
of L'Lpoque, made this statement during his
attack upon the Munich policy in the chamber
of deputies. He was the one non-Communist who
voted against the settlement. See Journal officiel
de la Republique Franraise, chambre des deputes, debats parlementaires, Oct. 4, 1938, p. 1537.
Jacques Fransales warned in Paris Midi, Oct. 1,
that "a fatal consequence will be to push America back into isolationism again." Kerillis quoted
him in his editorial for L'Lpoque, Oct. 2, p. 1.
Jouhaux, and the Communists pointed out that
the Munich settlement did not fulfill Roosevelt's
proposals. Fransales amplified his evaluation of
the impact of Munich upon the United States
in two long articles: L'Europe nouvelle: "President Roosevelt's appeal," Oct. 15, pp. 1115-6;
L'Europe nouvelle documentaire, an annex published bv L'Europe nouvelle, "The evolution of
America during the European crisis," Oct. 29,
-82.
142 Bullitt so described the gist of the "deluge
of letters, messages and telegrams from patriotic
organizations, municipalities, officials and persons
of all walks of life" which flooded the American
embassv. Many of these messages are preserved

JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, .R.
358
France's architect of all-out appeasement,

Bonnet, had his own reasons for believing
that once again President Roosevelt supporte(l him. Bonnet was much impressed by
FranSois-Poncet's report that Hitler's concern over Roosevelt's second message had
helped prepare the way for the Ilunich invitation.143 ,As to American approval of the
agreement, the foreign minister could not
forget the appearance of the American ambassador at his apartment early on the morning of September 30.144 Bullitt had been so
excited abouit the maintenance of peace that,
in a burst of emotional relief, he had rushed
to congratulate Bonnet with his arms full of
flowers before coolly analyzing the terms
forced upon Czechoslovakia. The foreign
minister, as could be expected, was "overjoyed at the result of the conference" but
what is more significant, he asked Bullitt to
extend his gratitude to "the president for the
great help you had given for the preservation
of the peace." 145 Bonnet maintained this
impression as late as November and in an
Armistice I)ay speech before the American
club in Paris he stated:
I will never forget the emotion of affection and
the expression of joy, when on the day of the
Munich Accord, I saw the countenance of your
ambassador, William Bullit .
. [that] Accord
conforms with the principles stated by Cordell

Hull . . . , a settlement
tion.
by way of negotia-
. . .146
Bonnet like many of the Munichois enjoyed

living in the realm of mirages.
T'he one leader in France who recognized
the true nature of Munich was Premier
Daladier. It was he who returned the flowercarrying Bullitt to a full sense of reality when
he spoke of the "immense diplomatic defeat
for France and England."'47 What Daladier
said in private he did not dare state in public. He too wrapped the Munich settlement
in a mantle of American approval. In his
speech before the chamber of deputies recallamong the Roosevelt papers at the Hyde Park
Library. See Bullitt, Oct. 1, SD, 760 F 62/1380.
143 Bullitt, Sept. 28, FR, pp. 691-2.
144 Bonnet, p. 294. Bonnet also speaks in his
memoirs of the American press being "quasiunanimous in exalting news of the Munich Conference" (p. 287).
145 Bullitt, Sept. 30, SD, 760 F 62/1341.
146 For the text see Le Temps, Nov. 11, p. 8.
147 Bullitt, Oct. 3, FR, pp. 711-2.
ing and justifying France's actions throughout the entire Czech crisis, he referred to
"the great, generous and reasonable voice of
President
Roosevelt
. . . who so generously
contributed towards making a peaceful solution possible."148 Apparently the premier

believed it best to go along with Bonnet
and his majority until France became strong
enough to resist any further expansion of
Hitler's Reich.
Once convinced of the enormity of the
Munich defeat, Bullitt threw all his energies
into an effort to redress the European balance. He fully recognized the futility of "reasonable" revision at an international conference, and realized that only force could halt
the German dictator. After Daladier had revealed to him on October 3 that the lack of
air power had been the tragic chink in
France's armor, Bullitt hurriedly took passage for the United States both to speed the
delivery of planes to the French air force and
to fight against American isolationism. Planes
could help France stem the tide of Hitler's
march to victory, but if the United States
could be persuaded to intervene directly in
Europe's troubles, the democracies, Bullitt
believed, need never bow again before Nazi
Germany.
In the estimation of Bonnet in particular
and his compatriots in general, the United
States did play a role throughout the Munich
crisis. There seems little doubt that the failure of Roosevelt's government to commit
itself contributed towards Bonnet's acceptance of peace at any price. It also helped
weaken the spirit of resistance in France.
Even when Roosevelt attempted to throw his
weight behind Daladier's resistance policy,
the president's messages were couched in
such cautious terms they were misread. The
impact of American foreign policy upon
France was therefore the opposite of what
the majority of Americans and their leaders
wished. Ironically the position of the United
States was seen by many Frenchmen as one
more justification for a peace that meant the
"sell-out" of Czechoslovakia.
LEHIGH
UNIVERSITY
148 Journal officiel, debats parliamnentaires, Oct.

4, p. 1528. Werth reported the ovation Roosevelt
received exceeded that accorded the premier's
reference to Chamberlain (France and AMunich,
p. 327).


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France, the United States, and the Munich Crisis

Author(s): John McVickar Haight, Jr.

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

ambassador in Washington during the first

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

ideals" and urged that "our two democracies

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TOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

had not needed Bonnet's warnings of May 16

again called for the United States to join an

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

Echeverria, Miragfe in the West: a history of the

"Germany and Company" were obviously in

at the present time.23

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

yet "a dead duck," 26 at least it had been

because of France's traditional policy towards

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FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

When Bullitt forwarded the draft of his

utterances than the British. The latter "had

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JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

Reich launched a war, "the United States

third ser., 1938, E. L. Woodward & R. Butler

to "peace at any price" but merely restated

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FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

New York Times, Sept. 4, p. 5, carried this

report and even captioned

Andr, Simon, J'Accuse: the men who betrayed

Bullitt, Sept. 8, FR, p. 583.

charge d'affaires in France to the

issue. On the same day in Washington Secretary

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JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

. . . is the most frighten-

ing practical joke of the present time."64 Le

The military weakness of France

68 Bonnet (p. 211) makes much of Roosevelt's

pp. 282, 834, pp. 292-93, 842, pp. 301-2.

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FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

The news of Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden was greeted in France, as Bullitt

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

Bonnet became so completely disillusioned

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

Bullitt, Sept. 21, SD, 760 F. 62/956; and the

9OLe Peuple, Leon Bothereau, "Action by the

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TOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT. TR.

quixotic imagination but very real dangers

probably cross the Czech frontier tonight."95

This content downloaded from 188.26.206.14 on Sat, 17 Jan 2015 07:56:09 AM

FRANCE, THE U. S., AND THE MUNICH CRISIS

On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the

Moffat Papers, pp. 212-13.

The president's message gained a varied