STATE OF MISSOURI vs.

WILLIAM ARTHUR BALL

339 SW 2D 783
FACTS
On October 15, 1958, Krekeler Jewelry Store was robbed by
two men. They took watches and rings amounting to
$4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Subsequently,
Krekeler identified William Arthur Ball from pictures and
during the trial.
In his motion for new trial, Ball objected to the fact that a
police officer who arrested him was allowed to testify that
$258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from him. It
is said that the introduction of these exhibits were immaterial
and irrelevant neither tended to prove nor disprove any
issues involved in the case; that said money as seized at the
time of the arrest was neither identified by Krekeler or by any
other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from
the A.L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on Oct. 15; and
that said evidence was considered by the jury to the
prejudice of the appellant.

money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the

taker of money charged as taken, because in general all
money of the same denomination and material is alike, and
the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the
money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.
In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record
that the money in Balls possession at the time of his arrest
came from or had some connection with the robbery and in
the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness
before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence
was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was
obviously prejudicial for if it tend to prove the offense for
which the appellant was on trial, the jury may have inferred
that he was huilty of another robbery.

KAREN ROSE C, TAMAYO

ISSUE
WON the effects confiscated from Ball should be admissible
in evidence
RULING
No. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or
any of the items on Balls person as having come from the
jewelry store so that in fact they were no admissible in
evidence, the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice
took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from
the register. There was no proof as to the denomination of
the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140.
Here 19 days have elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had
suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all
these circumstances the mere possession of a quantity of

The RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa.

affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Gregorio Silot Jr vs. Estrella de la Rosa

GR No. 159240 / February 4, 2008

Such ruling was

ISSUE
WON the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner
Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondents evidence

FACTS
RULING
On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and
respondent Estrella de la Rosa entered into a contract for the
construction of a dormitory-apartment building on Lot 1-A-9D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed that
Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of
the total value of the materials purchased for the
project. Upon turnover in February 1997 of the completed
structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased
was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which isP826,474.98. Silot
required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00,
or P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through her sonin-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment
but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her
repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit
against Silot.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot,
dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for
de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingos proposed
testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during
the making of the additional works mentioned were already
accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were
performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total
sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is
onlyP826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount
of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment
of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any
demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an
alleged balance.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the

mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel. The
only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself
cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the
client is deprived of his day in court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find
any application in this case. As the records would plainly
show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the
appellate court observed, he could have introduced
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or
correct the admission made by his counsel.
More importantly, Silots counsel clearly made admissions of
the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose
presentation was dispensed with.
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not
require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of
a prior showing that the admissions had been made through
palpable mistake
Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed.

KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO

Petitioner averred that it had already paid Guillermo the

amount of P1,022,793.46 for his services and that there was
even an overpayment of P58,189.46. Petitioner further
claimed that Guillermo is liable for unpaid rentals amounting
to P66,000.00 as of June 1990 for his occupancy of one of the
houses in Virginia Valley Subdivision since 1985.
During the pre-trial of the case, the parties agreed to limit
the issues to whether petitioner had paid Guillermo in full in
accordance with their contract

TOWNE & CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GUILLERMO R. VOLUNTAD
G.R. No. 135043. July 14, 2004
FACTS
Guillermo Volunta and Towne & City Development
Corporation were both engaged in the construction business.
From 1984 to 1985, Guillermo and petitioner entered into a
contract for the (a) construction of several housing units
belonging to or reserved for different individuals; (b) repair of
several existing housing units belonging to different
individuals; and (c) repair of facilities, all located at the
Virginia Valley Subdivision, owned and developed by the
petitioner. The
total
contract
cost
amounted
to
P1,041,359.00.

Guillermo did not adduce evidence, whether testimonial or

documentary, as evidence-in-chief in view of the admissions
made by petitioner in its Answer with Counter-claims that
indeed it entered into a contract with him and that it was
obliged to pay him for his services. Petitioner, for its part,
presented as its sole witness Rhodora Aguila to prove that it
paid Guillermo for his services under the contract. She
testified that she personally handed or delivered the cash or
check payments to Guillermo, adding that Guillermo
acknowledged payments with his signatures on the vouchers.
The RTC ruled that petitioner pay the respondent and the
respondent vacate the house occupied by him and belonging
to the petitioner. Such ruling was affirmed by the CA; hence,
this petition.

The parties agreed that Guillermo should be paid in full by

petitioner the agreed contract cost upon completion of the
project. In 1985, pending completion of the project,
Guillermo was allowed by petitioner to occupy, free of
charge, one of its houses at the Virginia Valley Subdivision.

ISSUE

After completing the construction and repair works subject of

the contract, Guillermo demanded payment for his services.

RULING

When petitioner failed to satisfy his claim in full, Guillermo

filed on April 30, 1990 a Complaint for collection against
petitioner before the RTC-Manila and alleged that petitioner
paid him only the amount of P69,400.00, leaving a balance
of P971,959.00 under the terms of their contract.

whether a voucher suffices as evidence of payment and thus

should have been considered and admitted in evidence as
laid down in PNB v. Court of Appeals

The question of whether petitioners vouchers bearing

Guillermos signature constitute adequate proof of payment
of Guillermos claim requires an examination of the vouchers
and an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
petitioners issuance thereof.

The ruling in PNB v. Court of Appeals is that while a receipt of

payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment, it is,
however, not conclusive but merely presumptive; neither it is
exclusive evidence as the fact of payment may be
established also by parole evidence. Contrary to petitioners
stance, the appellate court did not disregard but instead took
into account the ruling in the cited case. This may easily be
confirmed by reviewing the factual predicates on which the
ruling was handed down.
In the case at bar, petitioner has relied on vouchers to prove
its defense of payment. However, as correctly pointed out by
the trial court which the appellate court upheld, vouchers
are not receipts.
A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that
money has been or goods have been delivered, while a
voucher is documentary record of a business transaction.
The references to alleged check payments in the vouchers
presented by the petitioner do not vest them with the
character of receipts. Under Article 1249 of the Civil
Code, payment of debts in money has to be made in legal
tender and the delivery of mercantile documents, including
checks, shall produce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor
they have been impaired.
From the text of the Civil Code provision, it is clear that there
are two exceptions to the rule that payment by check does
not extinguish the obligation. Neither exception is present in
this case. Concerning the first, petitioner failed to produce
the originals of the checks after their supposed encashment
and even the bank statements although the supposed
payments by check were effected only about 5 years before
the filing of the collection suit. Anent the second exception,
the doctrine is that it does not apply to instruments executed
by
the
debtor
himself
and
delivered
to
the
creditor. Indubitably, that is not the situation in this case.
Petition denied.

KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO

Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the

presence of the deceased and of each other as required by
law, hence allowed probate.
Hence, this appeal contending that the CA erred in holding
that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the
three instrumental witnesses were credible witness.

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES vs. HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and LUTGARDASANTIAGO
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
FACTS
Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition before the CFI of Rizal for
the probate of the will allegedly executed by Isabel Andres
Gabriel who died a widow and without an issue. Lutgarda
Santiago and Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales were nieces of the
deceased.
In her will, the deceased bequeathed some legacies to her
relatives but instituted Lutgarda, who was referred to by the
decedent as aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki,
inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" as
the universal heir and executor.
Rizalina opposed the probate.
The RTC disallowed the
probate of the will but the CA, on appeal ruled that the will in
question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and

She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code,
that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute
requirement which must be complied with before an alleged
last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that
to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record
that the witness has a good standing in his community, or
that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications
of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term
"credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness
may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil
Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of
the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as
used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and
well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the
latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code
provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of
witnesses.
ISSUE
WON the contention is tenable.
RULING
No. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of
a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth
the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These
Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the
age of eighteen years or more, and not blind,

deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may

be a witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821.
The following are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the
witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and
accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be
shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions
propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown
from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction
of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's
contention that it must first be established in the record the
good standing of the witness in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty
and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of
the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that
the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given
the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where
the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must
be supported by two character witnesses who must prove
their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and
uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization
are character witnesses in that being citizens of the
Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by

the Act and a person of good repute and morally

irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all
the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the
provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7,
Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a
will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said
execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings
laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the
three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this
Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover,
petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the
said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of
them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or
dumb, or cannot read or write.
Petition denied.

KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO

FACTS
Josieline Lara Chan filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that
a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the
Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit
of a hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note
that Johnny suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse.
on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was
there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to
be allowed to submit in evidence the records sought by
subpoena duces
tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records
were covered by physician-patient privilege.
The RTC sustained the opposition and denied the motion. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE

G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner, v. JOHNNY T.
CHAN, Respondent.

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court

correctly denied the issuance of a subpoenaduces
tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that
these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.
RULING

Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC.
24. Disqualification
by
reason
of
privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

San Miguel Corporation vs. Helen KAlalo

GR No. 185522 June 13, 2012

cralavvonlinelawlibrary

FACTS
x

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or

obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case
be examined without the patients consent as to any facts
which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give
him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate
cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the
future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired
between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam
up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
Petition denied.

KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO

Respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since

1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner
SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she
would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank
check and a check to be filled up with an amount
corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At
the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would
compute the actual amount due to the latter by deducting
the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases from
the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded
in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount
would be written on the blank check, and respondent would
fund her account accordingly.
In time, respondents business grew and the number of beer
products delivered to her by SMC increased from 200 to
4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of
deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep
track of the transactions. Thus, she requested regular
statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.
In 2000, SMCs agent required Kalalo to issue several
postdated checks to cope with the probable increase in
orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing
her of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with the
request; but after making several cash payments and
returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she
noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount.
She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed
statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to
protect her rights and to compel SMC to update her account,
she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven
checks she had issued to petitioner

On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of

respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC sent her a demand letter
for the value of the seven dishonored checks.
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats
made by the agents of SMC, respondents counsel wrote a
letter (the Offer of Compromise) wherein Kalalo
acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account
demanding the payment of the sum of 816,689.00 and
submitt[ed] a proposal by way of Compromise Agreement
to settle the said obligation.
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that
SMC update her account. During trial, and after the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied.
After tallying all cash payments and funded checks and
crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement
of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed
to petitioner was 71,009. Respondent thereafter recanted
her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the time she had
the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents
with imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she
actually owed petitioner.
The MeTC, RTC, and CA ruled in favor of Kalalo, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether
in her Offer of Compromise, respondent
unequivocally admitted her liability to private complainantappellant duly assisted by her counsel.

Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise

offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission
of liability.
Petitioner further argues that respondents Offer of
Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the
Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior
to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March
2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of
Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a
criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as
an implied admission of guilt.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her
receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted
the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that,
at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount
owed to petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she
was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from
petitioners agents. The trial courts and the CA gave weight
to her justification, and we find no cogent reason to disturb
their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of
Compromise may not be considered as evidence against
respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to
petitioner in the amount of 921,215.
Petition denied.

RULING
Contrary to petitioners contention, the letter does not
contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what
respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement
of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MICHAEL A. HIPONA

GR NO. 185709 FEBRUARY 18, 2010
FACTS
AAA was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her
house in Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City. She
was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which
eventually led to her death. Her furniture and belongings
were found strewn on the floor. AAAs necklace with two
heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were
likewise missing.
Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored
into the lawanit wall of the comfort room inside AAAs house,
big enough for a person of medium build to enter. The main
electrical switch behind a shower curtain located at the
back room was turned off, drawing the police to infer that
the perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAAs house.
SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a
meeting of AAAs relatives during which AAAs sister BBB,
who is appellants mother, declared that her son-appellant
had told her that Mama, Im sorry, I did it because I did not
have the money, and he was thus apologizing for AAAs
death. BBB executed an affidavit affirming appellants
confession.
On the basis of BBBs information, the police arrested
appellant on June 13, 2000 or the day after the commission
of the crime. He was at the time wearing AAAs missing
necklace. When on even date he was presented to the
media and his relatives, appellant apologized but qualified
his participation in the crime, claiming that he only acted as

a look-out, and attributed the crime to his co-accused

Romulo B. Seva, Jr. alias Gerpacs and a certain Reypacs.
A day after his arrest or on June 14, 2000, appellant in an
interview which was broadcasted, when asked by a radio
reporter Why did you do it to your aunt?, answered
Because of my friends and peers. When pressed if he was
intoxicated or was on drugs when he did it, appellant
answered that he did it because of his friends and of poverty.
Albeit appellants mother BBB refused to take the witness
stand, SPO1 Agbalog and Consuelo Maravilla, another
relative of appellant, testified on BBBs declaration given
during the meeting of relatives.
Appellant refused to present evidence on his behalf while
Seva presented evidence to controvert the evidence on his
alleged participation in the crime.
The RTC convicted Hipona but acquitted Seva. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

interview are deemed voluntary and are

admissible in evidence. (underscoring supplied)
Appellant argues, however, that the questions posed to
him by the radio broadcaster were vague for the latter did
not specify what crime was being referred to when he
questioned appellant. But, as the appellate court posited,
appellant should have qualified his answer during the
interview if indeed there was a need. Besides, he had the
opportunity to clarify his answer to the interview during the
trial. But, as stated earlier, he opted not to take the witness
stand.
The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for
the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant,
and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the occasion
thereof. Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the
Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance instead.
Conviction affirmed.

ISSUE
WON the interview which was broadcasted an implied
admission.
RULING
Yes.
Not only does appellants conviction rest on an
unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. It rests also on
his unbridled admission to the media.
People v. Andan instructs:
Appellants confessions
to
the
media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised

KAREN ROSE C. TAMAYO