Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services
on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing
agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification
Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the
implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such
shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate
with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology
and in computer application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the
National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive
tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the
PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective
budgets of the concerned agencies.

Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the
President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and
the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged
with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A.
THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A
LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B.
THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL
VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

B.
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C.
THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE
SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D.

A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No.
308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His
action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19,
1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the
National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives
from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules
to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is
not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental
right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the
exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative

power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed
by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The executive power is
vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole
and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of
the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace
and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative
policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative
structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book
II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV
on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book
VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general
administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the
effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states
that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a
subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no
duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that
without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however,
bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations
is not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to
the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy
which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give
them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy.
Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx

xxx

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The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed
"a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider
implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important
as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
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Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17.

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical
analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide

precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint,
retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality
and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal
identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual
holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique
pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49
and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be
scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology
employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique
print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically
analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric
achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a
unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the
individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts.
Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses
various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available
to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data
is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give
the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic
personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from
constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information
gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and
for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no
controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about
our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard
of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and
transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is
capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied
purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date
is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with
other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right
to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not
be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that
endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as
customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.

69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The
measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also
on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum
standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement
the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes
and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No.
591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.
73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however,
apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other
government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is
another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate
population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to
privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not
infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order.
Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and
it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose,
but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a
fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter
scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent
authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the
rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the
names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York
State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated
in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and
addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The
plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of
their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed,
it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a
grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was
a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed
commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained
numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the
gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above,
A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use of computers
to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to
achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information system in different
countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster
delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help
good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make
key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83
introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his
personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected to
the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy.
The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent

unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this
Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes
from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the
well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable
record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BAN
G.R. No. 174340

October 17, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner,
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE
SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE SERGEANTAT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 174318

October 17, 2006

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and CAMILO L. SABIO, Chairman, NARCISO S. NARIO, RICARDO M.
ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER and NICASIO A. CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL and JULIO JALANDONI, PCGG nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his capacity as member of both
said Committees, MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, THE SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 174177

October 17, 2006

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS, PHILIP G. BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO, ROBERTO
L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA ALOBBA, and JOHNNY TAN, petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS and PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, its MEMBERS and CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE
SENATOR RICHARD GORDON and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, its Members and Chairman, the HONORABLE SENATOR
JOKER P. ARROYO, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 1,1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task
of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.2 Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or

produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance."
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.3
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the Senate's power to conduct
legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),4
"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as
compared to the previous year's mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC
funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report
given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately
released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no
payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from
any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage any remaining value of the government's equity position in these
corporations from any abuses of power done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective
board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of
Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.5
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of
the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting
was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.6
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.7 At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,8 approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring
Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public
hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar
subpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J.
Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao,
Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.9
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his earlier position,
invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the
position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice10 to Chairman Sabio
requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice was issued "under the same
authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter11 dated September 4, 2006 to Senator Gordon
reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede,
Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they
submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation,12 which partly reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by
legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the
State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter.
E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the provision in controversy. Until
then, it stands to be respected as part of the legal system in this jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88,

October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to 'protect and enforce it without
fear or favor,' 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in
the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court
(Pending cases include: a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC,
Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No.
04-1049) for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of the
PCGG's functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts
will be unduly impeded by a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before the Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable Supreme Court held:
"[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
xxxxxx
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to attend the Senate inquiry to testify and
produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the
Committee on Public Services issued an Order13 directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President
Villar and the majority of the Committees' members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82
EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation,
Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against
Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San
Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and
Arroyo, and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede,
Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG's nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in
aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged: first, respondent Senate
Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455; second, the same inquiry is not in accordance
with the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual petitioners
are void for having been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455
constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already
acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political
questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent
Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to
privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable
controversies.
During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime, per agreement of the parties, petitioner
Chairman Sabio was allowed to go home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpus has become moot. The parties also agreed that the
service of the arrest warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees are
suspended during the pendency of the instant cases.14
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the
1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to
appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. With the resolution of this issue, all the other issues raised by the parties
have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees
the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that warrants a
declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is
imperative.
The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v.
Daugherty,15 cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.16 In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the
power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar17 explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies composing the legislature to do, in
their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them to legislate.It is well-established principle of this parliamentary
law, that either house may institute any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its
members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it
should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily
implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and
intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees,
preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well
established as it is in England, and the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to
punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it
may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is "an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:
Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it."
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in
Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.18 Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12.
What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.19
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is
significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.20
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard
to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough
to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b)
exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution
is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties
pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of
the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of
duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.24
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG
members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Pea,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis
of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section
4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in
the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most
serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of
the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
xxxxxx
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify
before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan26 reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the
filing of the present petitions.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the people's access to information:

Article II, Section 28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as
well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people
are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of
their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information
really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government.28 The
cases of Taada v. Tuvera29 and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission30 have recognized a citizen's interest and personality to enforce
a public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other data in aid of its
power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to
be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods
or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.32 As shown in
the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1
(principle of public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,33 the Court considered repealed Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local
governments, upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the
Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v.
Office of the Executive Secretary,34 the Court declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled "Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to
Undertake Philippine Halal Certification," void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v.
Romulo,35 the Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for
violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres,36 the Court likewise declared unconstitutional
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System," for being violative of
the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is "the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution."37 Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to declare
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this Court rule that Section
4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will answer the questions of the Senators, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, will you answer the
questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would
definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.

With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded from testifying before
respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his argument that the said provision exempts him and his corespondent Commissioners from testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him and his
Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate" was approved by Senate
President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of
the respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any
of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on
the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of Congress but also of "any of its
committees." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means
that the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
Committees.38
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability
and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,39 the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power was likened to
that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision are not very clearly stated, we take them to
be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of Congress to punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that
exercised by courts of justice, and that it being the well established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is held under the
order of a court of general jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court will discharge the prisoner or make further
inquiry into the cause of his commitment. That this is the general ruleas regards the relation of one court to another must be
conceded.
In McGrain,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held: "Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed." The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,41 sustained the Congress' power of contempt on the basis of this observation.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,42 the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon reason and policy and that
the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority
and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body
must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with
the affronts committed against its authority or dignity.43
In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,44 the Court characterized contempt power
as a matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with
the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power
of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers, this Court
holds that the respondent Senate Committees' inquiry does not violate their right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the
Constitution on government action." As held in Barenblatt v. United States,45 "the Congress, in common with all the other branches of
the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more
particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights."
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.46 Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from
our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"47 but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."48
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It
highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself
shall be disclosed."49 Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of
communication and correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.50 Applying this

determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455,
particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of
their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have
no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest.
Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,51
the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,52 employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of
the individual's right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration.53
In Valmonte v. Belmonte,54 the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to
privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting
the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy.
There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res.
No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance
the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."55 That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for
denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be
presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide
them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is asked.
His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall determine whether the right
has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall resume its investigation and the question or questions
previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the
Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to
carry out a legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will
be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for
intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the
Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel
Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with
the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings
relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and
174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative
to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti
and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors
and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, ChicoNazario, Tinga, Garcia, and Velasco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila
EN BANC
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN.
NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named
MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN
and VINCENT CALLAGAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191805
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT.
COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,
- versus -

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 193160
Promulgated:
November 15, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No.
191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).[1] Both Petitions assail the 12
April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt.
Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their
official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this
decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation
reports and provost marshal reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 made by the 5th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.
The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction or operation of the
military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents
having any reference to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of petitioners rights to life, liberty
and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from
suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioners prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.
Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa
Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus A. Verzosa, Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.)
Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and
Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events
relevant to the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa,
P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
Antecedent Facts
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members
targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[2]
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by
Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several
men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of
them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.[3]
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching him. The
car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive,

the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then
entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the
word Bravo written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army.[4]
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his membership in the NPA.
Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up. After the
interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.[5]
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him board a
vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to
being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was
detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing
that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.[6]
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission. While
passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier
pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers beat him and
tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical
interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he
failed to answer.[7]
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their way to an
NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member who
had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the
soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a
military truck and drove to Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag
Matutina, who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as sir.[8]
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that Rodriguez
had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the NPA
camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis,
Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis
around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.[9]
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA camp. He
was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival therein,
they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly
punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to
over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they
ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more.[10]
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an
encounter in Cumao, and
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he
received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely
coerced.[11]
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men appearing therein.
When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down the
name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it appear that
he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was
signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating,
but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.[12]
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the mountains, where he
saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.[13]
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped, the
soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military
camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile
Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.[14] When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and
contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramils
medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.[15]
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while he was
eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told him
that he would finally see his mother.
[16]
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a
surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to
report anything to the media.[17]
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a pair of
jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to
the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.[18]
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men. His mother,
Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to
the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the men accompanying them
were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and
one of the CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.[19]
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly prevent the
NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military
assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from
facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they
reached home.[20]
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office, where
Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return
home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they had
already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed
that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them.[21]
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in Isabela,
Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate
number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called
Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his
family then left and resumed their journey back home.[22]
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers went
inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would

serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguezs efforts to
confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes later.[23]
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on Torture and
Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.[24]
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that several
suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.[25]
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties
dated 2 December 2009.[26] The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog,
George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a.
The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguezs right to life, liberty
and security.
b.
The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family and his
witnesses.
c.
Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry Division, Maguing,
Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d.
Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, including
operation reports and
provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.
e.
Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of respondents, to be
expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.[27]
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had
been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.[28] We likewise
ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the
petition on or before 4 January 2010.[29] Finally, we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and
decide on the case within 10 days after its submission for decision.[30]
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits and other pieces of
evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.[31]
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return of the Writ,
which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.[32] In their Return, respondents therein alleged that
Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as Ka
Pepito by former rebels.[33] According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan Valley.[34] Wanting
to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in exchange for his protection.
[35]
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agents
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.[36] Since then, he acted as a
double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.[37] However, he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to
suspect him of being an infiltrator.[38] Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham
abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent.[39] Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition
was conducted.[40]
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January 2010,[41] alleging
that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing
their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their
assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies
to determine his location.[42] Cruz was able to speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.
[43] This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.[44]
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade
Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as
evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latters Contract as Agent.[45] The CHR officers
observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers.[46] In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had
been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was
released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein
CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. [47]
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at ease with his
military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.[48] Neither was there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took
pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilmas consent.[49]
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers and to have the
case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.[50]
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.[51] Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents
therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.[52] Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration,
Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of
errors:
a.

The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.

b.
The Court of Appeals erred in saying: (H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the effect of
enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioners right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner
is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner.
c.
[53]

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility.

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a.
The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she
may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
b.
Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to
establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and
security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or

to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under
the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.[54]
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
[55] They alleged that Rodriguez
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that
petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right
to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their corresponding interim
reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[56]
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and Resolution, the
following issues must be resolved:
I.
Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data
have already been issued in his favor.
II.
Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity
from suit.
III.
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
IV.
Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents in G.R. No.
191805.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of
the peoples rights to life, liberty and security.[57] The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[58] The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,[59]
and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.[60]
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner.[61] It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[62] Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.[64]
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.[65] As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy especially the right to
informational privacy[66] the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal,
civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court
may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or
information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.[67]

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be underscored
that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of
the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person
or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner
or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court,
justice or judge.
(a)
Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or
judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and
manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The
order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(b)
Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case
the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(c)
Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to
the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez[68] that [t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case
is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue
a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is
subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data
proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:[69]
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary
goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.[70]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision[71] found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 with the exception
of Calog, Palacpac or Harry to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security committed by
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. [72] The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with
respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she
should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor.
In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer
stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[73] we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for
acts committed during the latters tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject [Estradas] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by
the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The
plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet
can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him, viz:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the
President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it
affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case
moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation
from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US
President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to
obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in
Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted coconspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject
to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to
judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting
privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in

confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal
justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from
civil damages covers only official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the
case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.[74] (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,[75] we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the presidents incumbency:
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely
recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the
origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's
rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President,
albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the
reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office.
He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the
President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the
very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members
not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure,
considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the
President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez:
On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.[76] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command
responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,[77] command responsibility pertains to the responsibility
of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.[78] Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.[79] In the United States, for example,
command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Torture Victim Protection Act.[80] This development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows
that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that
command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in
Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance
with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the
author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.[81] (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in

amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this
regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not
abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v.
Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary signification as a
guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. It further stated that protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the doctrine of command
responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the
government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these
organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of
seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The
short title of the law is the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity. Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for
the crimes covered. Such limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statutes purpose and not intended to rule
out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers from the coverage of
reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the
present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly wants to make the Writ
of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is
a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable
under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencias hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with
implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[82] (Emphasis supplied.)
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,[83] likewise penned by Justice CarpioMorales, wherein this Court ruled:
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability. The
Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to instances of
determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the
author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability
which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility
may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a.
Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be
resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a.
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate;
b.
the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c.
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.[84]
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,[85] necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. [86]
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge,
i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence.[87] In the Philippines, a more
liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment
of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in all
Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement
Agencies (E.O. 226).[88] Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been

committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.[89] Knowledge of the commission
of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government officials area of
jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.[90]
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.[91]
b.
Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the Melo Commission and the Alston Report,
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of
enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.[92] Without even attaching, or at the very least,
quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the
Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.[93] Aside
from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for
his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to
life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Courts ruling in Razon,[94] to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if
it satisfies this basic minimum test.[95] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by
substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence adduced by
Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his
right to life, liberty and security.
a.
The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents for the
violation of or threat to Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found
sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted
Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Rodriguezs Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific
ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected
membership in the NPA.[96] His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col.
Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and torture,[97] and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR
representatives who appeared during his release.[98]
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguezs abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,[99] wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victims capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the physical
maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. According to
the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,[100] she examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile
Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived at the following findings:
FACE
-

10cm healed scar face right side

2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
both leg arm
hip area/lumbar area[101]

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of which confirmed
that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued a Medical Report dated 23
September 2009,[102] explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his detention by the military, to wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and ill-treatment done to
him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he
sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the conditions
related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found on his left ear is a result of an unknown object
placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming
punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result
of the psychological trauma he encountered during his detention.
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and ill-treatment done to
him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with
the alleged date of infliction (sic).[103] (Emphasis supplied.)

In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that the injuries
suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he could not have sustained
them from merely falling, thus making respondents claim highly implausible.
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of Rodriguez in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their argument that he was neither abducted
nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all times
congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary human experience.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have unhesitatingly assured his
family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the
military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009[104] Wilma executed, she made the following
averments:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha syang pagod at malaki ang
kanyang ipinayat.
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;
xxx

xxx

xxx

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel
para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
xxx

xxx

xxx

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na
kay Noriel; xxx[105]
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December 2009:[106]
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga
mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang masigla at masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako.
27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw
ma-train sya.
28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx[107]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory, contention of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member of the
CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-agent for the military. The
lower court ruled in this manner:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that
petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary
citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state that petitioner
agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information
regarding the movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the
mountains or the wilderness he dreads to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.[108] (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez,
respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers right to security when they made a visual
recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers one of whom was respondent Matutina in the house of petitioner on September 18,
2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung on the wall of the house, as
well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not
merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill
fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free
from the watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video
camera. The Court cannot and will not condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioners right to security
guaranteed by the fundamental law.[109] (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses presented by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial evidence to
show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of
evidence to show the CHR officers responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards
their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human
rights and investigate violations thereof,[110] should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and
address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in
facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
b.
The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguezs rights to life,
liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be
caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.[111] Moreover, in the context of amparo

proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance.[112] Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.[113]
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[114] that the right to security of a person
includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ
of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for
the truth by the government.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not only as prohibiting the State
from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The
ECHR interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the
leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state
authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts
proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of
national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation of
Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official
investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirezs
account of the events into consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military.
The ruling of the appellate court must be emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for while they were
charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and
one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the
Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st
Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military.
No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioners version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding
the alleged abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known
as the PNP Law, specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to investigate and prevent crimes, effect
the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to
order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioners abduction and
disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against
him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively investigate the
violations of petitioners right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army.[116] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right to security, for
which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability on the part of
respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when
the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred
to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient
allegations were maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that respondents Gen.
Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were
responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction,
detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation
as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result,
there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of
enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R.
No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings,
Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the
violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability
or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R.
No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino,
and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate
action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been

incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to
this Court the results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this Decision and in
the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the
foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for [ones] personality as a unique individual
whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11,
2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5
for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources,
Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair
shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building,
which is adjacent to petitioners property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure
to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up
and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they
order their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are
mere stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction is granted. Upon the
filing and approval of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction issue
against the [respondents] Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the
revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of [petitioners] lot and to transfer and
operate it elsewhere at the back where [petitioners] property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the
left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23
Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction in
consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27
The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building,
they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The
assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
I.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED 18
OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY
INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED
PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION
AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE
COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are
the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents installation of a
stationary camera directly facing petitioners property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same property
constitutes a violation of petitioners right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from
prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of anothers residence, petitioners opine
that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners property is
used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the
same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real
owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property
involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video
surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building. 42
Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
sensibilities.45 It is the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.46 Simply put, the right to privacy is the right to be let
alone.47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the
State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except in case of overriding social
need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards, can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded therefrom
and only certain individuals are allowed
to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
includes any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.49
The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence, however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers residence. This does not mean, however, that only the
residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also similar acts. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the
public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers
residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
The reasonable expectation of privacy
test is used to determine whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v.
Torres,52 we enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable. Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation of
privacy.53 Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent
of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy
of anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200
or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by [respondents] of
a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the

adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents] property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners].
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera
was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the
factory of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises,
then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. [Respondents] camera cannot be made to extend the view
to [petitioners] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over the objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners]
as property owners. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or
covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance
of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part
of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by
the court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not
entitled to an injunctive writ.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the
defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have
installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered
owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which
could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the
Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe
that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned
corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court
to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap
inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And
when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is
that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a
shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and
February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.