/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:36:22 AM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
is devoted
inparticular
totheprofane
sideofmediaeval
philosophy
andtheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddle
AgesandRenaissance.
- H.A.G.Braakhuis,
- C.H. Kneepkens,
EDITORS
L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)
(Nijmegen)
- W.J.Courtenay,
- E.P. Bos,(Leiden)
- D. Perler,
(Groningen)
(Madison)
- M.G.M.vanderPoel,(Nijmegen).
(Basel)
oftheEditorial
Board:Prof.
C.H.Kneepkens.
Secretary
Allcommunications,
thoseofa business
should
be addressed
nature,
except
toC.H.Kneepkens,
Faculteit
derLetteren,
Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen,
Vakgroep
P.O.Box716,9700AS Groningen,
TheNetherlands.
Mediaevistiek,
- Albert
- J.E.Murdoch,
ADVISORY
TullioGregory,
Zimmermann,
(Rome)
(Cologne)
COMMITTEE (Cambridge,
MA).
PUBLISHERS Brill,
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PUBLISHED Twiceyearly.
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11:36:22 AM

Realismin theLaterMiddleAges:
an Introduction

ALESSANDROD. CONTI

Medieval realismand nominalismare the two major theoreticalalternativesconcerningthe realityof generalobjects(universais,accordingto the
medieval terminology):
realistsbelieved in the objectivityof real species
and commonnatures;nominalistsdid not. In theirturn,realistsdisagreed
over <1> the ontologicalstatusof such common natures,and <2> the
relationshipbetweenthemand the individualsin which theyare present.
In particular,accordingto the so-called"moderaterealist"view (endorsed
by authorssuch as Albertthe Great,Thomas Aquinas,John Duns Scotus,
and Walter Burleybefore 1324), universaisare not self-subsistent
things
(or entities),but existonlyin singularthings,as universaishave no being
outside the being of their particularinstantiations.What is more, the
as indibeing of universaiscoincideswiththe being of theirinstantiations
so
that
universais
can
be
said
to
be
because
of the
viduals,
everlasting
successionof theseindividuals,not because of a peculiarkind of esse.But
whereasin Albert'sand Aquinas's opinion universaisexistinpotentia
outside the mind,and in actuwithinthe mind,on Duns Scotus's and Burley's
account they exist in actuoutside the mind, since for Duns Scotus and
conditionfora universalto be in actu
Burleythe necessaryand sufficient
is the existenceof at least one individualinstantiating
it. On the other
to
all
these
universais
and
hand, according
thinkers,
individuals,if considered as properlyuniversaisand individuals,are different
fromeach
others,since no universalqua such is an individual,nor viceversa.
In the thirddecade of the fourteenth
century,in his commentarieson
the Categories
and the De interpretatione
and in the firstpart of his Summa
logicaeOckham argued that the common realistaccount of the relationwiththe standard
shipbetweenuniversaisand individualswas inconsistent
definition
of real identity:if universaisare somethingexistingin re,really
identicalwiththeirindividualsconsideredas instancesof a type(e.g., the
universalman qua man is identicalwith Socrates),but different
considered as properlyuniversaisand individuals(e.g., man qua universalis
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,1

11:36:29 AM

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

different
fromSocratesconsideredqua individual),thenwhateveris predicated of the individualsmust be predicatedof theiruniversalis
too, and
so a unique general object (say, the human nature)would possess convia the attributesof different
individuals.
traryattributessimultaneously
Later medieval realistswere persuaded that Ockham's criticismwas
sufficient
to showthatthe traditional
realistaccountof the relationbetween
universalisand particularswas unacceptable,but not that realism as a
whole was untenable.Thus, theytriedto removethe unclearand aporetic
points stressedby the Venerabilis
Inceptor
by two fundamentalstrategies:
<1> the real distinctionbetween universaisand individuals;<2> new
notions of identityand distinction.The firststrategyis that of Walter
Burley,who in his later years (after1324) many timesclaimed that universaisfullyexistoutsidethe mind and are reallydistinctfromthe individuals in which theyare presentand of which theyare predicated.The
second strategyis that most commonlydeveloped in the later Middle
collectssix artiAges all over the Europe. The presentissue of Vivarium
cles concerningthe latterformof later medievalrealismand some of its
main doctrinalsources.
Fabrizio Ameriniexaminesthe replyto Ockham's ontologicalprogram
that two Italian Dominican masters,Franciscusde Prato and Stephanus
de Reate, elaboratedfroma more traditional,
realistpointof view derived
fromHervaeus Natalis's works.In order to avoid that a universaland
any of its individualswere consideredto be the same thing,theyregarded
identityas an intersectionof classes of things,so that it was possible to
say thattwo thingswere reallyidenticalwithoutsayingthattheyalso are
the same thing.In this way theyalso allowed that two thingscould be
consideredas not reallyidenticalwithoutentailingthat they were also
reallynon-identicaland hence reallydifferent.
The otherarticlesdeal withthemostimportant
"school"oflatermedieval
the
so-called
"Oxford
Realists"(besides
realists,
inauguratedbyJohnWyclif,
the
Robert
William
Wyclifhimself,
Englishmen
Alyngton,
Milverley,
William Penbygull,Roger Whelpdale, and John Tarteys,as well as the
GermanJohannesSharpe,and the ItalianPaul of Venice),and the Scotistic
roots of their main logico-metaphisical
theories.Accordingto all these
authors<1> universaisand individualswere reallyidenticalbut formally
distinct,and <2> predicationwas a real relationbetweenthings.In particular,Wyclifrevised Duns Scotus's notion of formaldistinction,and
developed a formof intensionallogic where the main relationbetween
intendedas the measure
beings is exactlythat one of formaldistinction,

11:36:29 AM

REALISM
IN THE LATERMIDDLEAGES

of thecoincidenceof themetaphysical
componentsof two res.Consequently,
startingfromthe definitionof being as what can be signifiedby a complex expression,Wyclifbuilt up a metaphysicsof essences (culminating
in an ontologicaland epistemological
primacyof universaisover any other
kind of beings),by which the subsequent Oxford Realists were to be
inspired.ModifyingWyclif's doctrine,they <1> introduceda new type
of predication,based on a partialidentitybetweenthe entitiesforwhich
the subjectand predicatestood, called predicationby essence (praedicatio
secundum
essentiam
), and <2> redefinedthe traditionalpost-Aristotelian
of
essential
and accidentalpredicationin termsof thispartial
categories
identity.
Stephen Dumont investigatesDuns Scotus's notion of formaldistinction,the main tool that the Oxford Realistsutilisedin buildingup their
philosophicalsystem.Dumont's studyexaminesScotus'sParisiandefinition
of the forand showsthatthislaterformulation
of the formaldistinction,
as
mal distinctiondoes not absolutelyprohibitan assertionof formalities
even in the case of the divinePerson,
correlatesof the formaldistinction,
so long as their non-identityis properlyqualified- a result that goes
of both modernand medievalcomagainstthe traditionalinterpretation
mentatorsof Scotus's thought,who had seen Scotus's Parisian treatment
of the formaldistinctionas less realistthan the precedingones, in the
sense that it would deny any extra-mentally
separate formalities.
medieval debates on the
late
to
Pini
Scotus's
legacy
explores
Giorgio
ontologicalstatusof the categories.In his paper, Pini showshow Scotus's
thesisof a real distinctionof the ten Aristoteliancategories,and his way
of articulatingit into a comprehensivemetaphyisicaldoctrineare two
to the later medieval realist
innovativeand not secondarycontributions
ontology.
Paul Vincent Spade and Laurent Cesalli analyse Wyclif'smain metaphysicaltheories.Wyclifis one of the most importantand authoritative
of the new forms
thinkersof the late Middle Ages and the starting-point
of his
of realismat the end of the Middle Ages. The chiefcharacteristics
can be traced back,
own formof realism,to which all his contributions
are the trustin the scheme object-labelas thefundamentalinterpretative
towardshypostatikey of any semanticproblem,and a strongpropensity
<
>
rules
zation:Wyclif 1 methodically
replaceslogicaland epistemological
with ontological criteriaand references,<2> tries to find ontological
he introduces,and <3> develgroundsforany kind of logical distinction
as
a
sort
of
his
of
componentialanalysis,where things
system logic
ops

11:36:29 AM

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

substitutefor lexemes and ontologicalpropertiesfor semantic features.

Nevertheless,as Paul Vincent Spade shows in his article,he cannot be
in his theoryof universais.Spade distinguishes
describedas "ultrarealist"
two common medievalnotionsof a universal:the Aristotelian-Porphyrian
one in termsof predicationand the Boethianone in termsof being metaphysicallycommon to many. On neitherapproach does Wyclif'stheory
of universaispostulatenew and non-standardentitiesbesides those recognized by more usual versionsof realism,so thathis theoryof universais
is less extremethan Walter Burley's.
Laurent Cesalli goes into Wyclif'span-propositionalism
(i.e., the claim
that whateveris ya proposition)and theoryof propositionaltruthand
falsity.Wyclif'stheoryof propositionderivesfromGrosseteste'sdoctrine,
in the lightof his notionof being as significabile
thathe interprets
percomIn
a
is
a
well
formed
and
plexum. Wyclif'sview, proposition
complete
the trueor the false,and <2> can be perfectly
speech,which<1> signifies
understood.Like Grosseteste,he claims that every(linguistic)
proposition
has a twofoldsignification:
naturaland artificial.
In itsnaturalsignification
a propositionmeans nothingbut its own existence,and thereforeit is
a propositionsignifieswhat is or
always true; in its artificialsignification
what is not, and it may thereforebe true or false.Accordingto Wyclif,
thereare fivekindsof propositions:<1> mental,<2> spoken,<3> writest
ten; <4> real, and <5> the signifiedpropositions{et quintaproposicio
sic essesicutproposicio
real
). The
significai
propositionis nothingbut any
individualthingin the world,while the signifiedpropositionseems to be
any actual situationconnectedwithindividualthings.In the firstpart of
his paper, Cesalli, startingfromWyclif'sfivefoldpropositionaltypology,
kindsof real predication;<2> the disanalyses <1> the threedifferent
tinctionbetweenprimaryand secondarysignification
of a proposition(the
latterbeing an instantiation
of the former);<3> the statusof logical truth
as opposed-to,but depending-on,metaphysicaltruth;and <4> the relaas intermediatebetween
tionshipbetweenWyclif'snotion of ens logicm,
statementsand facts,and Burley'spropositio
in re. The second part of
Cesalli's studydeals with two semanticand metaphysicalimplicationsof
the pan-propositionalism:
<1> the extendednotion of being, and <2>
the relationbetweencontentsof the divinemind as "archi-truth-makers"
and eternalas well as contingenttruths.
Finally,in my articleI offeran overviewofJohannesSharpe's ontology, togetherwith an analysisof his theoryof meaning. Sharpe is the
mostimportantand originalauthoramong Wyclif'sfollowers:his seman-

11:36:29 AM

IN THE LATERMIDDLEAGES
REALISM

tic and metaphysicaltheories are the end product of the two, main
medieval philosophicaltraditions,realism and nominalism,for he contributedto the new formof realisminauguratedby Wyclif,but was recepsharesthe
In fact,Sharpe substantially
tiveto manynominalistcriticisms.
he relbut
Oxford
the
other
of
and
view
Realists,
principles
metaphysical
egates the common realistrequirementsfor the generality(or universalof termsto a minorpositionwithinhis semantics
ityin his terminology)
He < 1>
and substantially
accepts the innersense of nominalistcriticisms.
the
fundamental
as
scheme
interpretative
rejects <1.1> the object-label
as a philosophkey of any semanticproblemand <1.2> hypostatization
ical strategyaimed at methodicallyreplacinglogical and epistemologica!
and <2> admitsOckham's
ruleswithontologicalstandardsand references,
thissemantic
of concepts.Unfortunately,
explanationforthe universality
approach partiallyundermineshis defence of realism,since it deprives
Sharpe of any compellingsemanticand epistemologicalreasons to posit
in re.
universalia
I would like to take
As the guesteditorof the presentissue of Vivarium
to thankthe editorialboard of thejournal forthe invithis opportunity
tationto compile the volume. I hope thatthese studieswill contributeto
of a period,the laterMiddle Ages, too
the progressof our understanding
oftenneglectedby medieval scholarsand historiansof ideas.

11:36:29 AM

1
Duns Scotus'sParisianQuestionon theFormalDistinction
STEPHEN D. DUMONT

Abstract
to
The degreeof realismthatDuns Scotusunderstoodhis formaldistinction
have impliedis a matterof disputegoingback to the fourteenth
century.
alike have seen Scotus's later,
Both modernand medievalcommentators
Parisiantreamentof the formaldistinction
as less realistin the sensethatit
or realities.
This lessrealist
woulddenyanyextra-mentally
separateformalities
readingdependsin largepart on a questionknownto scholarsonlyin the
highlycorrupteditionof Luke Wadding,whereit is printedas the firstof
miscellaneae
deformalitatibus.
The presentstudy
theotherwise
spuriousQuaestiones
as the
examinesthis questionin detail. Cited by Scotus's contemporaries
heldby Scotus
, we establishthatit was a specialdisputation
Quaestio
logicaScoti
in God,
of his use of the formaldistinction
at Parisin responseto criticisms
and providean analysisbased upona corrected
itsknownmanuscripts,
identify
of theWaddingedition.Our
text,showingin particularthetotalunreliability
analysisshowsthatthe LogicaScotidoes not absolutelyprohibitan assertion
as correlates
oftheformaldistinction,
evenin thedivinePerson,
offormalities
is properlyqualified.That is, the positingof
so long as theirnon-identity
formalities
does not of itselfentailan unqualifiedor absolutedistinction.
There can be littlequestion that Duns Scotus's so-called formaldistinction was one of the most importantrealistpositionsof the later middle
ages. Medieval and modern commentatorsalike, however,have differed
over the degree of realism Scotus understoodhis formaldistinctionto
have implied.The disagreementcenterson the revisedand considerably
expanded treatmentof the formaldistinctionthat Scotus presentedat
1 We shalluse thefollowing
fortheeditions
ofScotus:Vivs= Joannis
abbrevations
XII tomos
contiordinis
minorum
omnia
DunsScoti
Doctoris
Subtilis,
juxtaeditionem
Waddingi,
opera
Franciscanis
deobsewantia
accurate
nentem
a patribus
, 26 vols.,Paris1891;Vat.= I. Duns
recognita
adfidem
codicum
edita
omnia
studia
etcuraCommissionis
Scotisticae
Scoti
, 13 vols.,Vatican
Opera
Led.= Lectura
to hisworks
as follows:
; Ord.= Ordinatio
; Rep.par.=
City1950.We refer
=
I
toGirard
Add.
Additiones
wish
to
magnae.
mygratitude
parisiensis;Magn.
express
Reportatio
ofWalter
edition
Etzkorn
forhisgenerous
to quotefromhisforthcoming
permission
Chatton's
Lectura.

Vivarium
43,1

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl

11:36:38 AM

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

Paris and, in particular,on whetherhe mitigatedthe realismof his earlier, Oxford account.2
In his Oxfordwritings,
Scotus typicallyassertsthatwithinone and the
same thing(res)thereare formallydistinctrealities(:realitates
), entities(entior
formalities
as
he
terms
them,correspondtates)
( formalitates
),
variously
ing to our discreteconcepts of it.3 Scotus calls this distinctionbetween
such entities'real' in the sense thatit does not arise solelyfromthe mind
but existsin the thing(exparterei) prior to the action of any intellect
whatever,human or divine. At the same time, he says that these formally distinctentitiesare reallyidentical,since they can never actually
exist apart but only as unitedwithinthe same individual.Scotus argues
thatgenera and theirdifferences,
species and theirindividualdifferences,
and certainkindsof relationsand theirfoundations,are in each case formally distinct.He even extendsthe formaldistinctionto God, holding
thatthe personalpropertiesof the Trinityare each formallydistinctfrom
2 Although
it is absolutely
certain
thatScotuslectured
on theSentences
at Parisafter
doneso at Oxford,
there
is disagreement
overthechronology
oftheresulting
lithaving
The problem
is thatScotushastwocommentaries
on theSentences
from
erary
products.
an earlier
Oxford:
Lectura
isjudgedtobe hisclassroom
anda later,
, which
lectures,
very
substantial
oftheLectura
calledtheOrdinatio.
It is agreedthattheLectura
expansion
precedesthesurviving
form
oftheParisian
Sentences
known
as theReportatio
Parisiensis
(cf.note
13 below),
at leastforthefirst
twobooks(cf.Praefatio
, in:Vat.,vol.20,xii.).In dispute
is therelation
oftheOrdinatio
A fundamental
to theParisian
thesis
ofthecritiReportatio.
caliedition
ofScotus's
hasbeenthattheOrdinatio
works
is laterbecauseitwasthought
to
haveincorportated
andReportatio
boththeLectura
as sources.
As thepublication
ofthe
modern
of theLectura
editions
and Ordinatio
scholars
however,
progressed,
increasingly
viewed
thischronology
as implausible,
instead
to theconclusion
thatScotusmust
coming
havebegunrevising
theLectura
intotheOrdinatio
in Parisin
hisstudies
priorto starting
theFallof 1302,probably
intothesecondbook.We takethelatter
view,as
progressing
hisMindontheWill?,
in:Miscellanea
Mediaevalia
28:After
arguedin DidDunsScotus
Change
theCondemnations
,
of1277- TheUniversity
ofParisintheLastQuarter
oftheThirteenth
Century
Berlin2000,719-94,especially
758-67.See alsoAllanB. Wolter,
about
Scotus's
Reflections
in:Ludger
Honnefelder
DunsScotus:
andEthics,
Leiden/New
Works,
Early
(ed.),
John
Metaphysics
York1996,37-57.
3 Forthevarious
terms
Scotususedto express
thedistinction,
see Marilyn
Adams,
Ockham
onIdentity
andDistinction,
in: Franciscan
Studies,
(1976),31-3and G. Menching,
amBeispiel
der
andG. G.
zu denscotistischen
, in:J. Hamesse
Bemerkungen
Neologismen
formalitas
Steel(eds),L'laboration
duvocabulaire
auMoyen
Turnhout
The
2000,357-68.
phihsophique
ge,
observation
ofAllanWolter,
reiterated
andrealibyPeterKing,thatforScotus
formalitas
tasareetymologically
diminuitive
andmean'little
form'
or 'little
is incorrect.
The
thing'
-tasending
in Latinis abstract,
notdiminuitive,
andsignifies
forScotusa modeofconCf.FelixAlluntis
andAllanWolter
DunsScotus.
GodandCreatures:
The
ception.
(trans),
John
onMetaphysics,
in:
Quodlibetal
Questions,
Princeton,
N.J.1975,506-7andPeterKing,Scotus
ThomasWilliams
toDunsScotus,
2003,23.
(ed.),TheCambridge
Companion
Cambridge

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

the divineessence and that the divine attributes(e.g., goodness,wisdom,

etc.) are formallydistinctfromeach other.In the case of God, both real
of the divine
identityand absolute simplicityare ensuredby the infinity
essence.4
Owing no doubt to the statusand weighttraditionallyaccorded his
Oxfordworks,moderncommentatorslong viewed the above as Scotus's
definitive
accountof the formaldistinction,
one thathe was not perceived
to have modifiedin any fundamentalway.5 This picturechanged dramaticallywith the pioneeringdissertationof Hester Gelber and subsequent studiesby MarilynAdams. They argued that Scotus revisedthe
formaldistinction
at Paris so as to mitigateits realismby no longerholdthat
it
entailed
formalities
or 'property-bearers'
discrete,extra-mental
ing
withinone and the same thing.Accordingto theirreconstruction,
Scotus
was so led to revisethe formaldistinctionat Paris by criticismhe met
there over its application to the Trinity,where it seemed to threaten
divine simplicity.6
Adams gives a concise descriptionof Scotus's shiftin
position.
4 Forrepresentative
Oxford
statements
oftheformal
see:Lect.1 d. 2 nn.
distinction,
Vat.vol.16,211-7;d. 3 nn.121-2,
Vat.vol.16,270-2;d.8 nn.102-3,
258-77,
118,172-6,
Vat.vol.17,34-5,41,62-3,68-9;Ord.1 d. 2 nn.388-410,
Vat.vol.2, 349-61;
189-91,
d. 8 nn.105-7,135,191-4,
Vat.vol.4, 200-2,220,260-2;dd.33-4nn.1-3,Vat.vol.6,
Vat.vol.7, 483-4.See
243-4;Ord.2 d. 1 nn.272-5,Vat.vol.7, 135-6;d. 3 nn.187-8,
alsoAdams1976(above,n. 3), 31-3.
5 Priorto theworkofGelberandAdamspresently
studies
didnotconmentioned,
on theformal
distinction:
Efrem
template
anymajorchangein Scotus's
Bettoni,
thinking
Venanni
di studi
scotisti
, Milano1943,47-48;Maurice
(1920-1940):
Saggio
bibliografico
J.
TheFormal
Distinction
D.C. 1944;R. G. Wengert,
Grajewski,
ofDunsScotus,
Washington,
TheDevelopment
Distinction
intheLectura
Prima
DunsScotus
oftheDoctrine
oftheFormal
,
ofJohn
in:TheMonist,
49 (1965),571-87;
AllanWolter,
TheFormal
Distinction
, in:J.K. Ryanand
B. M. Bonansea
DunsScotus
D. C. 1965,45-60;Mariano
, 1265-1965
, Washington,
(eds),
John
Ilfondamento
della
exnatura
reiinScoto
Ioannis
distinzione
Traino,
, in:De doctrina
metafisico
formale
DunsScoti
526 n. 27.
, 4 vols.,Rome1968,voi.2, 143-73;
Gelber,
6 Hester
andtheTrinity:
A Clash
inScholastic
Gelber,
,
Goodenough
Logic
ofValues
Thought
1300-1335
ofWisconsin,
Madison
Adams1976(above,
n.3),
, Diss.University
1974,71-102;
in herUniversais
in theEarlyFourteenth
K.
25-44,whichis reprised
, in: Norman
Century
Kretzmann
Medieval
, Cambridge
(ed.),Cambridge
1982,412-7and
ofLater
History
Philosophy
William
Ockham
thesis
is morecom, 2 vols.,NotreDame,IN 1989,vol.1,22-9.Gelber's
Scotus's
hisReportatio
here,pinpointing
plexthanpresented
changeas midway
through
1 d. 33. Also,Adams(26-27,note67) is skeptical
ofGelber's
claimthatthe
parisiensis
Ordinatio
account
showsinfluence
oftheParisian
in partbecauseof
discussion,
perhaps
aboutitschronology
differing
assumptions
(cf.note2 above).Whileit has beenvery
noteveryone
hasfollowed
theGelber-Adams
Forinstance,
account.
Michael
influential,
DunsScotus
ontheFormal
Distinction
NewBrunswick,
, Diss.Rutgers
J.Jordan,
University,
N. J. 1984andChristopher
: Peter
andtheScotistic
J. Martin,
Logic
forDistinctions
ofNavarre

11:36:38 AM

10

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT
Scotus's
works
at leasttwo,importantly
contain
different
accounts
ofthisalternative
sortofnon-identity
or distinction,
however.
to thefirst
andearlier
verAccording
often
whatis really
oneandthesamething
a plurality
of
sion,there
is,within
(res),
entities
or property-bearers
whosenon-identity
or distinction
in no waydependon
ordivine.
ofanyintellect,
created
. . . Perhaps
itwasbecauseofpressure
theactivity
from
suchadversaries
at ParisthatScotusadopted
a different
stance.
. . . [H]e conin reality
tinues
to insist
on therecognition
ofsomedistinction
rei
(exnatura
) and
actoftheintellect,
but. . . nowdeniesthatthisinvolves
priorto every
distinguishofentities
orproperty-bearers
within
whatis really
oneandthesame
inga plurality
(res).1
thing

But preciselythis same splitin the interpretation

of Scotus's formaldistinctionis already evidentin its earliestfourteenth-century
reception.At
issue is whetherScotus intendedthe formaldistinction
to positextra-mentally distinctentitiesor not. For instance,the Spanish Scotist Peter of
Navarre writesabout 1320 that while many imputeto Scotus the more
this is incorrect.
realistinterpretation,
Andifthatnon-identity
be calleda formal
thenI saythatthedivine
distinction,
intellect
is distinct
from
thedivine
essence
. . . becausebythisdistinction
I
formally
do notmeantopositseveral
formalities
or several
realmodes,
as someassert.
Nor
didScotuspositthis,in myjudgment,
thisto him.8
although
manywrongly
impute
As we shall see in detail, the same dispute is reportedin England by
WalterChatton,who is even moreexplicitand expansive.Chattonexplains
that in using termslikeformalitas
or entitas
Scotus was only followingcustomarylanguage of his day, which referredto the various divineperfecTreatment
Medieval
andRenaissance
in
, in:(ed.)IgnacioAngelelli,
ofImpossible
Hypotheses
Logue
withAdamsthatScotus's
Parisian
formu, Hildesheim
2000,449-50n. 23 disagree
Spain
a substantial
lationrepresents
ofdoctrine
butargueinstead
thatitis a clarification
change
ofit.Alternatively,
Richard
Crossargues
thatat ParisScotustookhisformal
distinction
intheTrinity
ina more
rather
thanlessrealist
direction
thatthedivine
essence
byholding
andpersonal
werethemselves
distinct
rather
thandistinct
formalities
properties
(res)
things
or entities
within
a thing.
See hisScotus's
onDivine
Parisian
, in: Olivier
Teaching
Simplicity
Boulnois
Actes
ducolloque
deParis
2002,
, 1302-2002.
, 2-4septembre
(ed.)DunsScot Paris
Turnhout
foundanyfourteenth-century
thinker
so
2004,519-62.I havenot,however,
Scotus's
formal
at leastas it appliedto God,although
it seems
distinction,
interpreting
similar
to Ockham's
ofit.Cf.Adams,
note164.
66-67,especially
application
7 Adams1976(above,n. 3),25-6,37.
8 PeterofNavarre,
1 d. 35 q. 1, in:Po SagsAzcona,ed. Petri
Sent.
deAtarrabia
sive
deNavarra
Inprmum
sententiarum
, 2 vols,Madrid1974,vol.2, 794-5:"Etsiillanonscriptum
identias
vocetur
distinetio
dicoquoddistinguitur
ab ipsaformaliter
. . . quiaper
formalis,
istamdistinetionem
nonintelligo
velpluresmodosreales,ut
ponerepluresformalitates
necposuit
iudicio
hocsibimulti
maleimponant.
..."
dicunt;
Scotus,
meo,quamvis
quidam
On PeterofNavarre's
oftheformad
see Martin
2000(above,
distinction,
interpretation
n.6).

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

11

tions as if theywere distinct.Scotus, however,as well as other theolodeniedany actual,extra-mental

within
giansof the time,explicitly
plurality
God whenevertheyexpresslydiscussedthe problem,so that theirintent
behind thislanguage was clear.
Fromthisitis clearthatSubtleDoctorreasonably
deniedtheinference,
'Thisis not
thatoutside
themind,therefore
thisis formally
distinct
from
thatoutside
formally
themind,'
because
. . . theconsequent
denotes
thatin thething
itself
there
is some
sortofplurality
becauseofa plurality
ofentities,
whichis nottrue.Ifyouobject,
"On thecontrary,
Scotusmorethanonceadmitted
several
in God,"I
formalities
believe
thatalthough
he spokeinthemanner
inhistime,
current
hedidnotintend
topositsucha plurality
in thedivine
... In thisway,whileScotusperhaps
person.
saidsomethings
thatsuggested
several
withothers
in theway
formalities,
agreeing
ofspeaking
in hisday,he nevertheless
current
deniedsuchplurality
whenhe discussedhisintention.9
This less realistreading of Scotus was prevalent,found in both his followersand critics.Thus, Williamof Alnwick,Scotus's secretaryand socius
at Paris,took his own, non-realistversionof the formaldistinction,
which
disallowedthat it could strictlybe called a distinction,to be in agreement with Scotus.10Peter Aureoli,who otherwiserejected Scotus's formal distinction,
neverthelessdevoted an articleto defendingit at length
the
against
charge that it entailed a multitudeof formalitiesin God.
to
According Aureoli, this was a misunderstanding
(falsa imaginatio
) of
Scotus's formaldistinction.
Theseobjections
Scotus's
is reasonable
if
[against
Scotus]notwithstanding,
position
Alltheseobjections
understood.
from
a falseconception,
sincethey
correcdy
proceed
thattheformal
distinction
refers
to modesor formalities
or aspects
added
* imagine
to thedivine
whichis in no wayto be understood
as thecase."
nature,
9 Chatton,
Led.1 d. 2 q. 3 nn.111-3,
in:Joseph
C. WeyandGirard
J. Etzkorn
(eds),
Lectura
Toronto
"Ex istisapparet
ratioSententias,
super
forthcoming:
quodDoctorSubtilis
nabiliter
hancconsequentiam
'hocnonestformaliter
illudexnatura
hoc
negavit
rei,igitur
formaliter
ab ilioex naturarei',quia. . . perconsequens
denotatur
distinguitur
quodin
entitatum
Si dicas:
ipsareessetquaedam
pluralitas
aliquapluralitate,
quodnonestverum.
immoaliquotiens
concedit
in Deo.- Credoquodlicetlocutus
fuerit
pluresformalitates
secundum
modum
nonintendebat
talem
suo,tamen
loquendi
quicurrebat
tempore
ponere
inpersona
divina.
. . . Istomodoforte
isteDoctor,
licetconcordando
cumaliis
pluralitatem
in modoloquendi
in tempore
suo,dixerit
qui currebat
aliquaverbaquaeinnuant
plures
tamen
cumdiscussit
ex intentione,
talempluralitatem.
. . ."
formalitates,
negavit
10William
ofAlnwick,
deesse
Quod.qq. 1-2,in: A. Ledoux(ed.),Quaestiones
disputatae
etdeQuolibet
formal
distinction
in
, Rome1937,179-249,
intelligibili
esp.192.On Alnwick's
thesetexts,
seeGelber1974(above,n. 6), 166-72.
11PeterAureoli,
Sent.
1 d. 8 sect.23 n. 118,in:Eligius
Buytaert
(ed.),Scriptum
super
primm
Sententiarum
N. Y. 1956,vol.2, 1004:"His tamennon
, 2 vols.,St. Bonaventure,
sibeneintelligatur,
rationabilis
est.Procedunt
enimomnes
istae
obstantibus,
quarta
positio,

11:36:38 AM

12

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

On the other side of the disputeis the AugustininGregoryof Rimini,

writingat Paris in the 1340s, who is equally explicitabout the twofold
of Scotus's formaldistinction,
interpretation
althoughhe thinksthat,contraryto Chatton and others,Scotus must be read in the more realist
way. Aftermeticulously
itemizingScotus'svariousexpressionsforthe formal distinction,
Rimini observedthat Scotus's followerstriedto deny in
the face of such evidence that he understoodit to entail distinctformalities or entitieswithinthe same thing.Rimini himselfresolvedto show
thatScotus'sown wordsand arguments
indicatedthecontrary.
He describes
the disputein language almost identicalto that of Gelber and Adams.
ButbecausethisDoctor[i.e.,Scotus]hasspoken
in various
waysaboutthisformad
distinction
in reality
havesaidthatitwasnot
(exnatura
rei). . . someofhisfollowers
thisDoctor'sintent
to positin God anymultiplicity
or plurality
offormalities
or
distinct
outside
themindbutonlyto denythatonewas
quiditative
aspects
really
oftheother
. . . andthatthosewhoargueagainst
himin this
formally
predicated
senseproceed
from
an ignorance
ofhisintent.
I willshowthathe himTherefore,
selfposited,
andhadtopositas a consequence
ofwhathe said,thatin Godthere
is a multitude
ofentities,
which
he usually
calledformalities
andquiditative
aspects,
andactually
from
distinct
eachotheroutside
themind.12
really
Both modernand medievalcommentators
have focusedon two textsfrom
Scotus's teachingat Paris to make the case forthe less realistreadingof
his formaldistinction.
The firstand more studiedis 1 d. 33 of his Parisian
on
the
Sentences
knownas the Reportaho
Parisiensis.13
Its most
commentary
instantiae
exfalsaimaginatione,
distinctionem
istam
formalem
attendi
quoniam
imaginantur
autformalittes
autradones
additas
nullomodointelligendum
deitati;
penesmodos
quod
est "
12Gregory
1 Sent.
ofRimini,
d. 8 q. 1,in:A. DamasusTrapp(ed.),Gregorii
Ariminensis
OESALectura
etsecundum
sententiarum
NewYork1978,voi.2,
, 6 vols.,Berlin;
super
primurn
29-30:"Verum,
locisistedoctor
varielocutus
estde istadistinctione
forquiain diversis
maliex naturarei. . . ex quo aliquisequaceseiusdixerunt
nonfuisse
intentionis
huius
doctoris
multitudinem
velpluralitatem
formalitatum
autradonm
ponere
aliquam
quidditativarum
extraanimam
ex natura
reidistinctarum
indeo,sedtantummodo
unam
negare
de aliapraedicari
formaliter
... etquodarguentes
contra
euminprimosensuprocedunt
- , ideoostendam
exignorantia
intentionis
dictiopinantis
etponere
habuit
quodipseposuit
ad dietasua quodin deo estquaedammultitudo
consequenter
entitatum,
quasvocabat
formalitates
et rationes
ex natura
reiactualiter
extraanimam
distinctarum,
quidditativas,
unanonestalia."
quarum
13Rep.par.1 d. 33 qq. 1-3;cf.Vivs,voi.22, 392-410,
two
esp.402-6.The initial
booksofScotus's
Parisian
Sentences
survive
intwoforms:
students'
calledtheReportatio
reports,
is an 'A' (longer)
anda 'B' (shorter)
anda posthumous
, ofwhichthere
parisiensis
version,
madebyhissecretary,
William
ofAlnwick,
calledtheAdditiones
compilation
magnae.
Wadding
thelatercompilation
as thefirst
bookofScotus's
Parisian
mistakenly
printed
byAlnwick
Sentences
theversion
hasdepended.
, whichis consequently
uponwhichmostscholarship

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

13

of the formaldistinctionas a
prominentfeatureis Scotus's classification
or
secundum
a
qualified
quidnon-identity,depictioncompletelyabsentfrom
of
his
Oxford
treatments.
Adams especiallysees Scotus as here deciany
sivelybreakingfromhis Oxford view, in which he held that the extramental correlates of the formal distinction
and
, realitates
;formalitates
entitateswere absolutely(simpliciter
and
not
secundum
distinct.14
)
merely
quid
commentators
also drewparticularattentionto Scotus's
Fourteenth-century
treatmentin the Reportatio
of the formaldistinctionas merelysecundum
quid. PeterAureolireliedprincipallyon thistextto rebutthe charge that
Scotus'sdistinction
introduceddistinct
intoGod.15PeterThomae
formalitates
a
dedicated
of
his
De
modisdistinctionum
to its
explicitly
separate question
and defense.16
interpretation
The less realistcase forScotus's formaldistinctiondoes not restsolely
on Reportatio
1 d. 33, but additionally,if not principally,on a
parisiensis
second textalso thoughtto belong to his period at Paris. This text,however,has a shadowyexistencein Scotus's corpus that one would look in
vain to confirmin any moderncensus of his writings.17
Even given that

Untilrecently,
scholars
havetakenthemostauthoritative
version
ofReportatio
1Ato be
contained
inVienna,
sterreichische
MS lat.1453basedon itsclaim
Nationalbibliothek,
ina colophon
tohavebeen'examined'
Thisclaimhascome
(examinata)
byScotushimself.
underincreasing
sinceKlausRdlershowed
themanuscript
to havebeenconsuspicion
taminated
Additiones.
See hisDerProlog
derReportata
Parisiensia
desJohannes
Duns
byAlnwick's
Scotus.
undkritische
Edition
ofInnsbruck
zurTextberlieferung
, Diss.University
Untersuchungen
andOlegBychkov
DunsScotus.
TheExamined
1991,13-25;cf.AllanWolter
(eds),
John
Report
Lecture
N. Y. 2004,xix-xxi.
Forconvenience,
we
I-A,St.Bonaventure,
oftheParis
Reportatio
shallheresimply
citereferences
to theVivstext.
14"Yet,he now[atParis]deniesthatthis[theformal
involves
distinction]
distinguishofentities
orproperty-bearers
within
whatis really
oneandthesamething.
inga plurality
Scotuselaborates
thisideabycontrasting
absolute
distinction
distinctio
withrel(
simplidter)
ativedistinction
secundum
. . . Scotus's
first
offormal
account
distinction
in
(distinctio
quid).
theLectura
thatthesamerelation
ofabsolute
is found
between
a
suggested
non-identity
- viz.,formalities.
third
sortofentities
In theabove-mentioned
oftheReportata
Parisiensia
parts
andtheLogica.
Scotusrejects
suchanalogies.
. . ." Adams1976(above,n. 3),37,39.
15PeterAureoli,
Sent.
1 d. 8 sect.23 nn.53-59,93-139,
in:Eligius
(ed.)1956
Buytaert
Aureoli's
account
ofScotus's
at n. 53 is a sum(above,n. 11),983-7,1000-9.
position
solution.
maryoftheReportatio
16Peter
De modis
distinctionum
distinctio
seundum
necThomae,
q. 4 "Utrum
quidarguat
essario
entitatem
secundum
velinaltero
in:Vienna,
sterextremorum,"
quidinutroque
reichische
MS lat. 1494,f. 55v-57r;
cf.Geoffrey
and
Nationalbibliothek,
Bridges,
Identity
Distinction
inPetrus
Thomae
N. Y. 1959,111.Peter's
4 is a ded, St.Bonaventure,
question
icatedresponse
toAureoli's
ultimate
ofScotus's
account
oftheformal
distinction
rejection
inRep.
a study
onthistextanditsrelation
toAureoli.
par.1 d. 33q. 2. Weplantopublish
17The workis notmentioned
in thecomprehensive
ofScotus's
in De
survey
writings

11:36:38 AM

14

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

to have origit is a workof Scotus,it has neverbeen shown definitively

inated fromParis. It is knownto modernscholarsonlyin Wadding's sevedition, which, examination will show, is dreadfully
enteenth-century
in thiswork Scotus seems to address expresslythe
because
corrupt.Yet,
it has been regardedas containinghis
realismof the formaldistinction,
view on the matter.This second workis the object of our study.
definitive
Logica Scoti
Quaestioquae dicitur
The work at issue existsin printedformas the firstof a seriesof seven
deformiscellaneae
questionsthatWadding misleadinglyentitledQuaestiones
a
These questionsneitherform treatisenor,
Tractatus
malitatibus.
imperfectus.
They are rathera hodgepodge
except for the first,concern formalities.
of disparateitemsthat Wadding transcribed,as he himselftellsus, from
two, unrelatedmanuscripts.18
Wadding took the last six questionsfrom
Citt del Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaVaticana, MS Vat. lat. 869, a
largelyFranciscanmiscellanycontaining,among otherworks,theDe primo
miscellaneae
and De animaof Scotus.19None of these six Quaestiones
principio
are genuineworksof Scotus. Questions3, 4, and 6 belong to the Quodlibet
of Nicolas of Lyre.20As I have shown elsewhere,questions5 and 7 are
by an early followerof Scotus who also lefta set of questionson the
and a commentaryon the De animain the same manutranscendentais
The
first
of thesequestions,on the otherhand, is a genuinework.
script.21
Cittdel Vaticano,Biblioteca
Waddingtookit fromthefamousmanuscript
a preciousfourteenth-cenMS
Vat.
lat.
876
Vaticana,
V),
(=
Apostolica
of
the
earliest
one
codex
survivingattemptsto produce
containing
tury
In thismanuscript,the
an editionof Scotus's Oxfordand Paris Sentences.22
more
Historico-critica
I. DunsScoti.
Ordinatione
, in:Vat.,vol.1, 141*-54*.
Similarly,
Disquisitio
Some
on
DunsScotus.
do notlistthework;cf.Charles
recent
Balie,John
Reflections
surveys
theOccasion
, Rome1966,29-44andThomasWilliams,
ofhisBirth
oftheSeventh
Centenary
DunstheScot
Introduction
: TheLifeandWorks
, in:Williams
(ed.)2003(above,n. 3),
ofJohn
1-14.
18LukeWadding,
Censura
, in:Vivs,vol.5, 338.
19August
latini
1-1134
vaticani
, 3 vols.,Vatican1931,vol.2, 242-54at
Pelzer,Codices
243-4item3, 246item8, and247item12.
20Ephrem
Franciscanum
Le Quolibet
deNicolas
deLyre
, O.F.M.
, in:Archivm
Longpr,
La littrature
23 (1930),42-56,butas corrected
Glorieux,
Historicum,
quodlibbyPalmon
II, Paris,1935,200-1.
tique
21TheScotist
81 (1988),263-7.
Franciscanum
Historicum,
ofVat.lat.869, in:Archivm
22In hisnotice,
theshelfmark
as 879.See
however,
unfortunately
Wadding
misprinted
(above,n. 18),ibid.
Wadding,

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

15

question is explicitlyattributedto Scotus by a formalincipit unfortunatelyomittedby Wadding in his edition that gives the titleaccording
to which the work circulatedin the fourteenthcentury,namely,as the
LogicaScotior Quaestiologicalis.23
eiusdem
Doctoris
Incipit
[sc.Scoti]de formalitatibus,
Logica
quaestio
quae dicitur
attributorum.
Utrum
omneintrinsecum
Deo sitomnino
idem
Scoti,de distinctione
essentiae
divinae
velarctetur
intellectus,
circumscripta
quacumque
operatione
quaestioad essentiam
etproprietates.
(V, f.292ra)
Even a cursorycomparisonof Wadding's editionof the LogicaScotiwith
its manuscriptsource revealsthat the printedversionis distressingly
corrupt. In numerousplaces, Wadding made indiscriminateand needless
Scotus'sintended
emendations,oftenaltering,ifnot completelydestroying,
In
other
misread
the
meaning.
places, Wadding simply
manuscript,only
then to emend it beyond recognition.To take a typicalexample,within
the space of two lines Wadding firstmisreadsequitur
as semper
and then
idemas commune.
Since these mistakesrenderedthe texthopelesslymeanwhole phrasesnot
ingless,Wadding thencompensatedby simplyinserting
in the manuscript.As it originallystands,however,V reads perfectly.
Vivs, vol. 5, 339b:
V, f. 292rb:
Confirmatur
ratione,quia ad istud Confirmatur ratione, quia non
Pater est sequitur
antecedens'non semper
'Paterest idem Patri,igitur
idem Patri', non videtur inferri, Pater et Pater sunt idem'
'.
'ergo pater et pater est commune
In anothercase, Wadding inexplicablychanged necto etc.therebyconvertingwhat Scotus said was notan objectioninto one that was. Again,
the effectwas to renderScotus's textunintelligible.
V, f. 292va:
Vivs, vol. 5, 341b:
. . . vel negatione importatiper ... vel negationemodi importati
hoc quod est,scilicetC, etc.Contra per hoc quod est, scilicetC. Nec
hoc instantiaesunt,quia. . . .
contrahoc instantiaesunt,quia . . .

23AdamWodeham
ofV in his
workbytheexacttitlein theincipit
citesScotus's
1 d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 (CittdelVaticano,
Ordinatio
Oxoniensis
Biblioteca
Vaticana,
Apostolica
suade hacmateMS Vat.lat.955,f. 173v):"Etistum
sensum
ponitScotusin quaestione
from
Gelber(above,n. 6),630
riaquaevocatur
ScotiWe takethistextandcitation
Logica
B usestheequivalent
which
n. 4. Asweshallseebelow,
titleQuaestio
logicalis,
manuscript
is howChatton
refers
to thework.

11:36:38 AM

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

16

As we shall see, Wadding's edition containssimilarlyegregiouscorruptions at criticaljunctures,so that the LogicaScotias it existsin printed
In additionto Wadding's intrusions,
formcannot be reliablyinterpreted.
there are, of course, the expected deficienciesnative to the manuscript
itself,such as omissions.Fortunately,Gelber's assertionthat the Logica
Scotiis knownto survivein only thissingle,Vatican manuscriptis incorof Scotus'squestionwould
rect,since otherwisean accuratereconstruction
While it seems to have generallyescaped the attention
be impossible.24
in scatof scholars,six manuscriptsof the LogicaScotihave been identified
To thesewe can add a seventhcopy in Troyes 994,
teredpublications.25
attributed
to Francis
and has been mistakenly
whereit occursanonymously
of Meyronnes.26
A
C
V
L

Assisi,Bibliotecacomunale,MS 172, ff. 120v-122v.27

Cambridge,Peterhouse,MS 241, ff.45r-51v.28
Citt del Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaVaticana, MS Vat. lat.
876, ff.292ra-293vb.29
London, The BritishLibrary,MS Add. 7969, ff.38ra-42vb.30

24Gelber1974( above,n. 6),60.

25Fortheidentification
Scoti
inmanuscripts
oftheLogica
G, L andM seeC. Balie,De
9 (1929),185DunsScoti
doctoris
subtilis
acmariani
Collationibus
Ioannis
Vestnik,
, in:Bogoslovni
desQuaestiones
libros
219 andF. Pelster,
zurberlieferung
super
Metaphysicorum
Handschriftliches
Parisienses
undOxonienses
. 2. DieCollationes
undderCollationes
desDunsScotus
, in:Philosophisches
Balieincorrectly
hisarticle
44 (1931),79-92.Note,however,
thatthroughout
Jahrbuch,
than7969.
refers
to theshelfmark
ofL as 2969rather
26Thedescriptions
attributtoidentify
theLogica
ofT citedbelowinnote33failed
Scoti,
in thismanuscript
as found
ofMeyronnes,
becausetheincipit
to Francis
ingit instead
f. 157ra:"Utrum
esse(proomne)intrinsecum
variants.
It readsas follows,
contains
several
consideratione
intellecDeo sitomnino
idemessentiae
divinae,
circumscripta
quacumque
etproprietates."
tus,velartequoad(proarctetur
ad) essentiam
quaestio
27Victorin
Francommunalis
in:Archivm
codicis
172bibliotecae
Assisiensis,
Doucet,
Descriptio
ciscanum
502-24at 504-5;CesareCenci,Bibliotheca
25 (1932),257-74,
Historicum,
378-89,
ad Sacrum
conventum
Assisiensem
, 2 vols.Assisi,
1981,vol.2, 578-80.
manuscripta
28M. R.James,
A Descriptive
inthe
, Cambridge
ofPeterhouse
Catalogue
ofthe
Manuscripts
Library
1899,292.
29Pelzer,
I. DunsScotiDisquisitio
historicoCodices
at 259;De Ordinatione
( n. 19),258-262
fora finalquescontains
works
ofScotusexcept
critica
, Vat.vol.1, 39*.Thismanuscript
to theCollationes
Parisimses
tion(ff.323ra-324va)
, whichPelzerandtheVatican
appended
failtoidentify:
inpraedestinato
sitaliquacausapraevisa
editors
"Utrum
quareistepraedeson predestinais HenryofHarclay's
tinatus
et illereprobatus."
This,however,
question
ofitsoccurrence
whowasnonetheless
unaware
tion.Ithasbeenedited
byMarkHenninger,
andPredestination
in thismanuscript.
onDivine
Prescience
See hisHeniy
,
Questions
ofHarclay's
in:Franciscan
40 (1980),167-243.
Studies,
30Index
intheBritish
, 10vols.,Cambridge
1984,vol.3, 396.
ofManuscripts
Library

11:36:38 AM

SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION
B
M
T
Vivs

17

Oxford,Balliol College, MS 208, ff.41va-42vb.31

Oxford,Magdalen College, MS 194, ff.78ra-80vb.32
Troyes,Bibliothquemunicipale,MS 994, ff. 157ra-161ra.33
Wadding editionin Vivs, vol. 5, 338a-53a.

While a completecollationand analysisof the manuscriptsgoes beyond

our limitedintentionto provide a correctedversionof crucial passages
of the LogicaScoti
, some preliminaryindicationsof theirrelativemeritis
in order.ManuscriptsB, M and V are all fourteenth-century
copies and
carrya good text.Of these,B appears to be the mostimportant.It forms,
like V, a fourteenth-century
editionof Scotus's Sentences
and containsthe
a
Scoti
as
work
and
rubricated
with
the
Logica
separate
equivalenttide of
.
B
More
bears
witness
an
to
earlierstage of
Quaestio
logicalis
significantly,
the transmission
of the LogicaScotithan any of the othersurvivingmanuscripts,for it alone carries a criticalsentencethat all othersomit by
homoioteleuton.
ManuscriptsC and L are fifteenth-century
copies suffering
fromabbreviation,whilemanuscriptA is abbreviatedand truncated,ending prior to the apparentsolutionof the question.For our presentpurposes, therefore,
passages of the LogicaScotiwill be based upon B and,
when necessary,readingssupplied accordingto V and M.
Ipse Parisiusordinavit
quasdamquaestiones
logicales
Scholarshave takenthe LogicaScotito have been disputedat Paris largely
I d. 33.34The
owing to its similarityin doctrineto Reportatio
parisiensis
Parisianprovenanceof this question,however,can be firmlyestablished
fromboth manuscriptsand explicittestimonyof the period.
First,all principal manuscriptsinclude the LogicaScotiwith Parisian
material.In both V and B, which, as mentioned,formfourteenth-cen, the LogicaScotiimmediatelysucceeds
tury'editions'of Scotus's Sentences
the versionof Scotus's Paris lecturescompiled by William of Alnwick,
31R. A. B. Mynors,
, Oxford1963,
Catalogue
oftheManuscripts
ofBalliolCollege,
Oxford
203-4;Prolegomena
, Vat.,vol.8, 10*-2*.
32Ephrem
LeMS. 194duMagdalen
Franciscanum
, in:Archivm
Longpr,
College
d'Oxford
Historicum
22 (1929)588.
33Jeanne
- Pierre
Francois
deMeyronnes
Paris1961,17Barbet,
Roger
(1320-1321),
disputatio
Lesmanuscrits
dela Bibliothque
deTroyes
20;Jacques
, Grottaferrata
GuyBougerol,
franciscains
Genest
andJean-Paul
La Bibliothque
Vernet,
(Roma)1982,105;Andr
Bouhot,
JeanFranois
del'abbaye
deClairvaux
duXIIeauXVIIPsicle
, 2 vols.Paris,1997,vol.2, 630.
34See especially
Gelber1974(above,n. 6),90.

11:36:38 AM

18

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

In C, L and M the LogicaScotiis appended to the

the Additones
magnae.35
end of Scotus's Collationes
Parisienses
.36
Walter
Second,
Chatton,writingin the 1320s, explicitlyassertsthat
Scotus disputeda special logical questionat Paris on the formaldistinction,which work can only be identifiedwith the LogicaScoti31Chatton's
remarksoccur in the contextof defendinga less realistinterpretation
of
it
Scotus's formaldistinctionas applied to the divine attributesand persons. Chatton's targetwas Ockham, who had in the case of the divine
35In V theLogica
Scoti
is inserted
in B
between
books1 and2 oftheAdditiones
magnae;
it follows
ofthesemanuscripts
citedabovein notes29 and
book2. See thedescriptions
31 respectively.
36Scotusdisputed
a seriesofCollationes
at bothOxford
andParis,butneither
manunorscholars
in thecaseofthe
scripts
wholly
agreeon theirexactordering,
particularly
do agree,
thatthere
arenineteen
Parisian
Oxford
set.Themanuscripts
Collationes.
however,
forms
thelastornineteenth
oftheParisian
Collationes
Theyalsoagreeon whichquestion
andwhichthefirst
oftheOxford
Collationes.
See Doucet,1932(above,n. 27),502-503.
in sequence
theParisandthentheOxford
Collationes.
G, L andM contain
Manuscripts
In thesethreemanuscripts,
theLogica
Scoti
occursas thetwentieth
after
question
directly
andimmediately
Oxford
thenineteenth
Parisian
before
thefirst
Collatio.
See Balie1929
M proves
1931(above,n. 25),84-87.Manuscript
that
(above,n. 25),196-97andPelster
theLogica
Scoti
hasbeenappended
to theendoftheParisian
thanto the
grouprather
of theOxford
therubric
Collationes
Oxonienses
set,becauseit inserts
Incipiunt
beginning
Scoti
Oxford
Collatio.
theLogica
butbefore
thefirst
ThattheLogica
Scoti
is
(f.80vb)after
nota Collatio
seemsindicated
from
ofthe
byitsexclusion
probably
remaining
manuscripts
fortheParisian
Collationes
Collationes
after
thenine, twoofwhichplaceformal
explicits
Merton
teenth
BalliolCollegeMS 209,f. 141vandOxford,
(Oxford,
CollegeMS 65,f.
11Or).On theotherhand,Pelster
the
to identify
(above,n. 25),85 n. 16 wasincorrect
Scoti
witha question
ofvaguely
similar
titlethatimmediately
follows
thesummary
Logica
in theTabula
ofWilliam
ofMissal(fl. 1400)contained
in
oftheParisian
Collationes
Scoti
MS Vat.lat.890,f.5rb:"Utrum
CittdelVaticano,
Biblioteca
omnes
Vaticana,
Apostolica
de Deo secundum
sinteaedemDeo omnibus
rationes
substantiam
modiset
quaedicuntur
ofWilliam's
interse."Ourexamination
ofthisquestion
showsthatit
ensuing
summary
Scoti
an exactsummary
oftheidentically
bearsno relation
to theLogica
, butis instead
editedbyLaugeO. Nielsen,
titled
fifth
ofThomasWylton's
, recently
Quodlibet
question
ontheFormal
B. NooneandCeciliaTrifogli,
Thomas
Distinction
as
Question
Timothy
Wylton's
14 (2003),
totheDivine,
in:Documenti
e studisullatradizione
filosofica
medievale,
Applied
in Vatican890is found
in Charles
ofWilliam's
327-88.A partial
summary
transcription
deJeanDunsScotsurlesquatre
livres
desSentences
Balie,Lescommentaires
, Louvain1927,195
n. 19),274-77.We hopetoreturn
n. 1. On themanuscript,
seealsoPelzer1931(above,
in a future
toWilliam's
Tabula
publication.
37ForChatton's
ofScotus's
formal
see Gelber1974(above,
distinction,
interpretation
1
n. 6), 185-205.
Gelberdoescite(86,531n. 59) Chatton's
statement
from
hisReportatio
a specialquestion
at Parison theford. 34 (seebelow,n. 44) thatScotushasdisputed
maldistinction,
butfailsto takethisas a reference
to hisLogica.
Gelberapparently
did
ofChatton's
notmaketheconnection
totheLogica
because
shewasunaware
related
remark
inReportatio
1 d. 25 (seebelow,
hespecifies
n. 43),where
thattheseParisian
were
disputes
Scotus's
Quaestiones
logicales.

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

19

personsadmittedas the more probable view what he took to be a correct understanding(secundum

bonumintellecturn)
of Scotus's formaldistinction. Accordingto Ockham, Scotus's view was that between the divine
essence and personal propertythereexisteda formaldistinction,
which,
althoughextra-mental(ex parterei),was nonethelessnot real.38Chatton
rejectedboth Ockham's positionand its alleged source in Scotus. In his
discussionof the divinepersonsin d. 2 of his Reportatio
, Chattonopposed
Ockham's view and pointedlydenied that Scotus admittedany extramentalnon-identity
to existin actual fact betweenthe essence and personal property,but only that such was not contradictory.
In assertinga
formalnon-identity
between the essence and personal property,Scotus
onlymeant,accordingto Chatton,thatthe formalnatureof the one was
not included in the other,so that the proposition'Deity is Paternity'is
not true in the firstmode of essentialpredication.39
In the parallel pasfrom
his
later
and
Lectura
, Chattonexplicidycites Scotus's
sage
expanded
Ordinatio
in supportof his reading.There, Chatton notes, Scotus denied
a formaldistinction
betweenthe essence and personalproperty,expressly
the
inference
fromformalnon-identity
to formaldistinction.40
prohibiting
38Ockham,
Ord.1 d. 2 q. 11,in:GedeonGi etal. (ed.)Opera
, 10vols.,St.
Theologica
N. Y. 1967-86,
voi.2, 363,364:"Tertiaopinioestquodessentia
et relatio
Bonaventure,
suntunares,nectarnen
sunteademomnibus
modis
exnatura
reihabent
rei,sedexnatura
modm
etistanon-identitas
sufficit
ad distinctionem
realem
inter
non-identitatis,
aliquem
divina.
. . . Ideo respondeo
cumistaopinione,
mihiprobabilior,
supposita
quae videtur
non-identitatis
inter
naturam
divinam
etsuppositum.
Etpotest
quodestaliquismodus
dici,
secundum
bonumintellecturn,
nonrealiter."
For
formaliter,
quoddistinguuntur
quamvis
an analysis
ofOckham's
ofScotus's
formad
distinction
inthiscaseoftheTrinity,
adoption
seeGelber1974(above,n. 6), 172-84andAdams1976(above,n. 3),59-74.
39Chatton,
Rep.1 d. 2 q. 5 n. 10,in:JosephC. Weyand Girard
J. Etzkorn
(eds),
Sententias
nec
, 2 vols.,Toronto
Reportatio
super
2002,vol. 1, 179:"Sed teneooppositum,
credoquodfuerit
mensDoctoris
Subtilis
de facto,
licet
quodin re sittalisnon-identitas
fuerit
ususmodoloquendi
estin parte.Est
suo,qui modoverius
qui currebat
tempore
menssua,nonquodilianon-identitas
sitde factoa partereivelin re extraaniigitur
esseextra
definitio
essenmam,sedpotius
animam,
quodnonrepugnaret
quantum
exigeret
tiaevelpersonae;
et tuncestsensus
nonestde se paternitas,
itaquod
iste,quodessentia
haecnonestperse primomodo'deitasestpaternitas'.
..."
40ThepassageofScotus's
Ordinatio
Chatton
hasin mindis: Ord.1 d. 2 n. 403-5,Vat.
vol.2, 356-57:"Vocoautemidentitatem
ubiilludquoddicitur
sicidem,incluformalem,
ditilludcui sic estidem,in ratione
sua formali
et perse primomodo.In
quiditativa
autemessentia
nonincludit
in ratione
suaformali
proposito
quiditativa
proprietatem
supnece converso.
Et ideopotest
concediquod. . . haecrealitas
formaliter
nonest
positi,
eademilli,sicutpriusexpositum
estquidest'formaliter'.
illa,vel,nonestformaliter
debetconcedi
Meliusestutiistanegativa
'hocnonest
Numquid
igitur
aliquadistinctio?
formaliter
Sed nonnesequitur,
a et b non
idem',quam,hocestsicet sic 'distinctum'.

11:36:38 AM

20

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

Nor is it any wonder,Chatton says, that Scotus blocked this inference,

since everyoneunderstandsthe proposition,'The essence and property
howeversmall
are formally
distinction,
distinct,'to positsome extra-mental
or qualified,which would consequentlyreduce theirreal identityin the
person and divine simplicity.41
In additionto citingScotus's Ordinatio
againstthe more realistreading
Chattonalso citesa special questionthathe says
of his formaldistinction,
Scotus disputedwhen the view was attributedto him thathe placed mulin God:
tiple formalities
ordinavit
de
. . . cumsibiimponebatur
formalitates,
plures
quaestionem
quodposuisset
. . ,42
declarando.
hoc,oppositum
In the above textfromhis Lectura
, Chattondoes not specifywhere Scotus
In
earlier
this
the
, however,Chatton had
Reportatio
question.
disputed
cited this question twice,once in d. 25 and again in d. 34, to buttress
his less realistreading of Scotus's formaldistinction.In both instances,
Chatton says that Scotus disputedthe questionat Paris.
in persona
eademtantum
est
Sed tenendum
estoppositum,
quod[n]ulladistinctio
eiusdem
rei.UndenecDoctorSollemnis
audebatibiponere
distinctio
conceptuum
nec <Doctor>Subtilis
distinctionem
formalem.
Cum
distinctionem
intentionalem,
ex verbis
eiusaliquibus
talemdistinctionem
formalem,
ipse
aliquienimconcepissent
in quibusdocuitoppositum,
sed tantum
Parisius
ordinavit
logicales
quasdam
quaestiones
posuitquodhocnonestperse illud.Et ideodicocumeo,quodsineomnipluralnece converso.43
itate,deitasnonestperse paternitas
Praemitto
ea quae priusdixiquandoincepiloquide istamateria,
quia Doctores
nonaudebant
utmihividetur,
concedere
distinctionem
scribentes,
hucusque
aliquam
distincta?
suntidemformaliter,
ergosuntformaliter
Respondeo
quodnonoportet
sequi,
in antecedente
et in consequente
affirmatur."
quiaformalitas
negatur,
41Chatton,
Lect.1 d. 2 q. 6 nn.60-63,in: Wey-Etzkorn
(above,n. 9):
forthcoming
in istadistinctione
esseopinioDoctoris
Subtilis
secundaprimilibri,
"Ideoalia videtur
etrelatio
nonsuntidemperseprimo
mododicendi
indivinis
ista,quodessentia
quaestione
sicutipse
formalem,
perse,etideononsuntidemformaliter,
intelligendo
peridentitatem
- Et
unumcaditindefinitione
alterius.
se,quodillasintidemformaliter,
quorum
explicat
si velisex istoarguere
ita
formaliter,
quoddistinguuntur
ipsenegatconsequentiam;quod
videtur
tenere
divinaesttalisresproqua,licethaecpropositio
sitvera
quodpersona
in quid;etsecundo
'deitasestpaternitas',
nontarnen
estpraedicatio
videtur
tenere
quod
nondebeatpropter
hocconcediquoddeitaset paternitas
formaliter.
Nec
distinguuntur
intellectum
hominum
mirum,
quiaperistampropositionem
apudcommunem
intelligitur
extraanimam
etperconquodsitaliquadistinctio
quantumcumque
parvaet deminuta,
realisidentitas
et simplicitas
deminueretur
sequens
peream."
42Chatton,
Lect.1 d. 2 q. 3 n. 112 in:Wey-Etzkorn
(above,n. 9).
forthcoming
43Chatton,
. 1 d. 25 q. un.n. 19,in:Wey-Etzkorn
n. 39),vol.2, 174.
2002(above,
Rep

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
ON THE FORMAL
PARISIAN
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

21

immonegavit
nonaudebat
ineadem<persona>.
. . . Doctor
realem
Solemnis,
ponere,
cumtamen,
secundum
in eadempersona,
intentionalem
distinctionem
eum,iliaest
dixitquodhoc nonestperse 'deitasest
minima
realis.DoctorSubtilis
distinctio
Et
et si inferas
formaliter',
consequentiam.
negavit
'ergodistinguuntur
paternitas',
dictis
ex aliquibus
tamen
eius,ideodehocspecialiter
oppositum
quiaaliquiconceperunt
a partereiponitibi.44
distinctionem
undenullam
Parisius;
quaestionem
fecit
There can be no doubt that in all threeof the above passages Chatton
is referring
to one and the same workof Scotus and that it is the Logica
cites the Quaestiones
Scoti.The firstpassage from the Reportatio
logicales,
workas it circulatedsepexact
title
of
the
which,as we have seen, is the
in
century:it was annotatedas Quaestiologicalis
aratelyin the fourteenth
refers
in
V.
That
Chatton
Scoti
B and, as indicated,entitledQuaestio
logica
is entirelyconsistent
to the existenceof several such quaestiones
logicales
Scotus
refersto results
where
with the opening lines of the Logicaitself,
assumedfroman immediatelyprecedingdiscussion,now presumablylost:
et nonmodisidentitatis
de diversis
expraecedentibus
quidsittenendum
Supposito
terminorum
indivinis,
etiamrationibus
velnegandis
concedendis
identitatis
suppositis
de propositiohievidendum
vel non-identitatem,
talemidentitatem
exprimentium
inter
illas.(B,f.41ra)
et de ordine
et negandis
nibusconcedendis
cites one of these questionsin
The second passage fromthe Reportatio
to the Logica
can
be
construed
which
onlyas referring
similarly
particular,
Paris
Scotus disat
that
Here
Chatton
Scotithat we now possess.
says
puted a special question on whetherfromthe denial of the proposition,
'Paternityis essentiallyDeity,' it followsthat they are formallydistinct.
remarkin the LogicaindiAs the continuationof the above introductory
examinationof the
is
a
dedicated
cates, its precise and announced topic
various entailmentsof the proposition'Deity is not formallyPaternity':
ratione
subpraecisissima
essentia
Et ad breviter
acceptasita; paterniloquendum,
essepropositio
ratione
etpraecisa
tassubpropria
primo
acceptasitb.Haecvidetur
b.' (B,f.4Ira)
in hacmateria:
'a nonestformaliter
concedenda
Chattonestablishesbeyond any questionthatScotus's Logicaderivesfrom
his teachingat Paris. What is more, Chatton's description,
judging from
similarfourteenth-century
usage, seems to indicatethat Scotus both disthe questionsat Paris, the latterterm
puted (Jacit)and edited (ordinavit)
In addition to establishingthat
master.45
of
a
revision
the
suggesting
44Chatton,
2002( above,n. 39),vol.2,
Rep.1 dd.33-4q. un.n. 16,in:Wey-Etzkorn
290.
45Such,at anyrate,seemstobe thesenseoftheseterms
ofPisa'sDe
in Bartholomew

11:36:38 AM

22

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

Scotus's Logicawas disputedat Paris, Chattonalso confirmsGelber's thesis that Scotus encounteredcriticismat Paris over his applicationof the
formaldistinctionto the Trinity.46
Chatton is absolutelyclear that the
of his
Logicawas occasioned by what Scotus saw as misinterpretations
that
it
entailed
the
divine
essence
and
position,namely,
personal propwhich would vitiate
ertywere formallydistinctand separate formalities,
divine simplicity.On the other hand, Chatton seems equally clear that
Scotus did not change his positionat Paris, as Gelber and Adams have
inferred,but only defendedit againstunwarrantedconsequences.
To summarize,the questionprintedby Wadding as the firstof seven
otherwiseinauthenticQuaestiones
miscellaneae
deformalitatibus
is a genuine
work of Scotus that circulatedin the fourteenth
centuryunder the tide
LogicaScotior Quaestiologicate.This work, as Walter Chatton explicitly
in the earlyfourteenth
testifies
century,is in realitythe survivingpart of
what were several questionsof a disputationundertakenand edited by
Scotus himselfat Paris to correctwhat he took to be misconceptions
about the applicationof the formaldistinctionto God, particularlythe
divinepersons.

written
between
when
toScotus's
ThereBartholomew
1385-1390,
conformitate,
referring
writings.
usesfacere
to quodlibeta
to refer
andquaestiones
andordinare
to refer
to
, whicharedisputed,
Sentences
andBiblical
which
arerevised,
"Frater
Ioannes
commentaries,
usually
bymasters:
inAnglia
subtilis
nominatur.
Hieprimo
OxoniaeSententias
deinde
Scotus,
quidoctor
legit,
instudio
ubidoctor
factus
estfamosissimus
etfuit.
Hicintheologia
lucuParisiensi,
scripsit
et praecipue
et Quodlibeta
etiamfecit;
lenter,
libros,
superquattuor
quosipseordinavit;
tractatus
libros
etsuper
sacram
edidit;
fecit,
plures
quaestiones
super
Metaphysicae
Scripturam
ordinavit."
De conformitate
vitae
beati
Francis
advitam
Domini
lesu1.8.2,in:Analecta
postillas
4 (1906),337.ThistextwascitedbyBalie1966(above,n. 17),34. I am
franciscana,
to William
forthepointthatordinare
canrefer
to therevisions
made
grateful
Courtenay
bya master.
46As Crosspoints
basedherreconstruction
on Bali's
out,Gelberin partmistakenly
thatGodfrey
ofFontaines
debated
Scotuson theformal
distinclongrefuted
speculation
tionat Paris,whichdisputation
Baliethought
in theNotabilia
was recorded
Cancellarii
to Scotus's
in Worcester,
Cathedral
appended
Reportatio
parisiensis
preserved
libraryMS
F.69.Bali'sfanciful
viewwasimmediately
andcompletely
demolished
who
byGlorieux,
showed
thattheNotabilia
recorded
a disputation
ofThomasWylton,
notScotus.
Despite
thismistake,
Gelber's
overall
ofScotus's
formad
dishowever,
pointaboutthereception
tinction
at Parisstillstands,
sinceitis alsobasedinparton thetestimony
ofChatton,
as
wenoted(cf.above,n. 37).On theNotabilia
seeBalie1927(above,
n. 36),161Cancellarti,
DunsScotetlesNotabilia
Cancellarii
Franciscanum
His98; Palmon
Glorieux,
, in:Archivm
24 (1931),3-14;Gelber1974(above,n. 6), 71-72;cf.Cross2005(above,n. 6),
toricum,
521,527-28.

11:36:38 AM

PARISIAN
DISTINCTION
SCOTUS'S
ON THE FORMAL
QUESTION

23

of theLogica Scoti
Analysis
Even if scholarswere not fullyaware of the precise historicaloriginsof
the LogicaScoti
, theyunderstoodcompletelyits importanceforany assessof the Logica
mentof Scotus's formaldistinction.
Accordingly,treatments
Scotiare not lacking.Both Gelber and Adams, for instance,give summariesof the logjjcaScotias part of theircase forthe less realistreading
MartinTweedale has providedthe mostdetailed
More recently,
of Scotus.47
and commentary.48
Nonetheless,
analysisof theworkin a partialtranslation
are hindered,if not misled,by the poor conditionof
all thesetreatments
Tweedale's
Wadding's printedtext upon which they rely. Furthermore,
well
short
of Scotus's
is
while
detailed, onlypartial,ending
commentary,
formalsolutionto the question,which,in the Wadding text,is seriously
flawed.Our presentpurpose,then,is to examine the main line of reasoningof the LogicaScotiusing a corrected,more reliabletext.
- Utrum
idem
Deo sitomnino
omneintrinsecum
The formaltitleof the Logica
intellectus
consideratione
essentiae
divinae
, velarctetur
quaescircumscripta
quacumque
- asks
of
4
f.
etproprietates
tio ad essenam
whether,
Ira)
independently
(B,
in
are
of
God
all
intrinsic
act
of
the
intellect,
everyrespect
properties
any
identical[omnino
idem)to the divine essence. That is, at issue is whether
any sort of extra-mentaldistinctioncan be admittedbetweenthe divine
essence and an intrinsicproperty.AlthoughScotus stipulatesin the second halfof the title,omittedby Wadding,that he is limitingthe present
discussionto the personalproperties,he poses the questionin a perfectly
:), so that his ensuinganalysiswould seem to
generalway [omneintrinsecum
as well. This is confirmedboth by the forthe
divine
attributes
to
apply
de attributis
mal incipitin V, which entitlesthe Logicathe Quaestio
, as well
shall
as
we
as by William Alnwickand Peter Aureoli who,
see, take its
resultsto be applicable to the attributes.Ockham, on the other hand,
restrictsthe application of the Logicasolely to the personal properties,
forcefully
denyingany formaldistinctionbetween the divine attributes
and essence.49
The Logicadoes not exhibitthe standardformatof the scholasticquestion in which thereare typicallyinitialobjections,a magisterialsolution,
47Gelber1974(above,n. 6),89-96;Adams1976(above,n. 3),40-2.
48MartinM. Tweedale,Scotus
overUniversais
A Medieval
vs.Ockham:
, 2 vols.,
Dispute
vol.2, 473-86(commentary).
N.Y. 1999,vol.1,43-58(translation);
Lewiston,
49On Ockham's
see Adams1989(above,n. 6), vol.2,
treatment
of theattributes,
934-52.

11:36:38 AM

24

D. DUMONT
STEPHEN

and repliesto the objections.Instead, Scotus proceeds directlyto determine whichpropositionsconcerningthe identityof the divineessenceand
personalpropertiesare to be conceded,whichdenied,and in what order.
(As already noted, Scotus assumes fromprior discussions,presumably
of the different
kindsof
formingpart of this disputation,the definitions
identityand theirapplicabilityto God.) In thisfirstsectionof the question, Scotus examines three pairs of propositions,each with a singular
and pluralform,thatrepresent
and implied
increasingdegreesof ambiguity
distinction.The main purpose is to determineif, or under what interpretations,the second and thirdpropositionsfollowfromthe grantingof
the first.Using Scotus's own numberingand variables- a standingfor
the divine essence Deitas
) and b for the personal propertyof paternity
- these three
{Paternitas)
pairs of propositionscan be schematizedas follows. (In the second pair Scotus temporarilydrops the variables;equivalent formsas given by Scotus are placed in parentheses).
PI
P3
P5

Singular
a non est formaliter
b.
P2
non
est
formaliter
idem
(a
b).
Deitas est formaliter
distincta
P4
a paternitate.
a habet distinctamformalitatem P6
a formalitateb.
(Formalitasa est distinctaa
formalitateb.)

Plural
a et b non sunt formaliter
eadem.
Deitas et paternitassunt
formaliter
distinctae.
a et b habent distinctas
formalitates
(Formalitasa et formalitas
b sunt duae, sive distinctae
formalitates.)

On the left side are the singularforms,which in turn deny a formad

idem
disidentity{nonestformaliter
), asserta formaddistinction(estformaliter
tinctum
:), and finallyassert distinctformalities{habetdistinctam
formalitatem
)
between the divine essence and personal property.The plural versions
on the rightare not assumed to be equivalentto theirsingularcounterparts,for theirgrammaticalnumberseems to implygreaterdistinction.
Whetherthe pluraltypefollowsfromthe singularmusttherefore
be investigated,althoughScotus onlyexplicitlyconsidersthe relationof PI to P2,
presumablyextendingthe reasoningto the othercases. The bulk of the
discussionconcernswhetherP3 followsfromPI and P5 fromP3.
Scotus assertsthat the firstpropositionconceded concerningany lack

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
SGOTUS'S
QUESTION

25

of identitybetweenthe divineesssenceand personalpropertyis 'Deity is

not formallyPaternity'(PI), or its equivalent,'Deity is not formallythe
The tacitresponseto the questionwould thusbe negsame as Paternity.5
in
since
ative,
concedingthatessence and personalpropertyare not idenidem
tical formally(nonformaliter
) it is denied that they are identicalin
idem).Scotus stipulatesthat in concedingthisproposieveryway {ormino
betweenthe essenceand propertyis not deniedabsolutely
tion,the identity
), just as 'An ethiopian is not a white human' does not deny
(<absolute
absolutelythat an ethiopianis human but does so only under the qualificationof beingwhite.So too, in concedingPI the identityof the essence
and personis notabsolutelydeniedbutonlyas qualifiedby 'formally'.
1 d.
Scotus's above analysisis entirelyconsistentwiththatin Reportatio
and
the
essence
between
formal
the
characterizes
33, which
non-identity
In the
quid) and not absolute (simpliciter).50
propertyas qualified{secundum
the
will
now
Scotus
however,
by analysingin
,
Reportatio
go beyond
Logica
detail what inferencesare permittedfromsuch a qualifiednon-identity.
istomodo
esseb. Et compositio
In the Wadding text,the phrase utformaliter
modo
, etcomposito
, whichobscuresScotus's
(11.8-9) is misreadas utformaliter
ratherthan
technicalpoint thatthe denial applies to the union [compositio)
the predicate.
Et ad breviterloquendum,essentiasub praecisissimaratione
accepta sit a; paternitassub propria et praecisa rationeaccepta
sit b. Haec videturesse propositioprimo concedenda in hac
materia:'a non est formaliter
b' vel ista, quae aequipolletei: 'a
idem b' quod videturformaliterremotiora
5 non est formaliter
multitudineet varietateintellectuumseu sensuumdiversitate.In
' non negaturabsolute a esse
ista quidem 'a non est formaliter
sed esse sic sive sub tali modo, ut formaliter
esse[t] b. Et comratione
eius
non
isto
modo
quod importtcomnegatur,
positio
non
est homo albus'.
sicut
ista
10 positio,sed rationemodi,
'Aethiops
'
Similiterhic, a non est idem formaliterb' negaturidentitas
non absolute,sed sub isto modo, et hoc rationenegationismodi.
(B, f. 4 Ira; cf. Vivs, 339a)

50Rep.par.1 d. 33 q. 2 nn.8-13,in:Vivs,voi.22,402-405;
cf.pp. 12-3above.

11:36:38 AM

26

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

Proceeding to the second proposition(P2), Scotus observes that while

many use it as nearlyequivalentto the first(PI), it is more ambiguous
than its singularcounterpart.Both the conjunctionof a with b by the
copula (a et b) as well as the plural number of the verb and predicate
) seem to implya distinctionand numericalpluralitybetween
{sunteadem
the essence and personalpropertythatthe firstpropositiondoes not. This
seems confirmedby usage concerningthe Trinity,whichwould deny the
consequence,'The Fatheris identicalto the Father,thereforethe Father
and the Father are identical'.The antecedentis true,forit is equivalent
statement'The Fatheris the Father'.The consequentseems
to the identity
false,however,sincethe grammatically
compositesubjectdenotesa numerical plurality.For this reason, Scotus says, it does not seem PI and P2
are convertibleor equivalent.
Despite these concerns,Scotus appears quite prepared to allow the
equivalence of PI and P2. Leaving aside such literal readings of the
vimin verbis
), the assertionin P2 that 'a and b are
proposition{nonfaciendo
not the same' can be well understoodto deny the identityof a and b in
the same sense thatit is denied in PI, just as in common usage 'Socrates
is similarto Plato' is taken to be equivalentto 'Socrates and Plato are
As for the argumentthat the conjunction'0 and ' impliesa
similar'.51
betweenthe property
numericalplurality,and hence greaternon-identity
and essence than PI, Scotus respondsthat the plural subject,verb and
than the purelygrammaticalplupredicaterequireno greaterdistinction
of reasonsuffices.
this
the
least distinction
For
terms.
of
rality synonymous
than PI. Scotus conP2 thereforeimplies no greaterreal non-identity
cludes that PI and P2 seem to have the same meaning,or at least can
be reasonablyconstruedas convertible.
As we have already noted, the Wadding text is defectivein this section, reducingto completenonsensethe argumentat lines 10-13 below.
In addition,Wadding has changed the manuscriptreadingfromOb hoc
to
to Objicieshie in line 14 and then supplied a correspondingRespondeo
51In general,
or literal
sermonis
is to givea strict
to interpret
bymeansofvisor virtus
For
modum
communem
toonebasedoncommon
as opposed
loquendi).
usage(seguendo
reading
seeWilliam
forfourteenth-century
andsignificance
ofthisconcept
themeaning
theology,
intheFourteenth
over
virtus
sermonis
: TheCrisis
andFigures
Force
ofSpeech,
ofWords
J.Courtenay,
over
TheCrisis
23 (1984),107-28;
Studies,
, in: Franciscan
J. M. M. H. Thijssen,
Century
TheMethodological
anditsSemantic
Ockhamist
Hermeneutk
of
oftheCensure
Significance
Background:
Texts
andLogic
inMedieval
Verba
: Semiotics
December
,
Theological
29,1340,in: Vestigia,
Imagines,
ed. C. Marmo,
Bologna1997,371-92.

11:36:38 AM

SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

27

in line 15. This makes the textread as if Scotus is proposing

Non tarnen
an objectionand then replyingto it.52In fact,Scotus is simplydrawing
the conclusionfromthe above argumentsand then notingthat thereis
a reasonablereadingof P2 as equivalentto PI. Finally,Waddingmisreads
convertibiles
in line 32 as connaturales
Scotus's main con, therebydestroying
clusion to this section.

10

15

20

25

Secunda, qua multi utunturquasi aequivalente cum prima,

videturesse ista 4a et b non sunt formalitereadem', et tarnen
non est ista praecise determinataad ilium unum sensum,sicut
prima. Nam aliquis volens altercali53diceretquod hie ponitur
pluralitas a et b non sunt eadem5,tum ex copulationeposita
intera et , quae non potestesse sine aliqua distinctione,
quia
non videturquod omnino idem possitsibi ipsi copulali; tum ex
pluralitateconsignificataex copula et praedicato, cum dicitur
'sunt eadem'. . . .
Confirmatur
ratione,quia non sequitur'Pater est idem Patri,
igiturPater et Pater sunt idem'. Nam antecedens est verum,
sicutistud'Pater est Pater'; consequensvideturfalsum,quia nott
pluralitatemin suppositoet apposito.
Ob hoc non videturquod ista convertantur
in negativis,'hoc
non est idem illi,igiturhoc et illud non sunteadem'. Non tamen
faciendovim in verbis,ibi54sanus intellectushaberi potest,ut
'
negeturidentitasa ad b cum dicitur a et b non sunt eadem',
sicut negaturin antecedente,sicut in communimodo loquendi
pro eodem habemus,'Socrates est similisPlatoni' et 'Socrates et
Plato sunt similes'.
Et cum arguiturde ista pluralitate,quae videturponi in consequenteproptercopulationemin subiectoet numerumconsignificatumin praedicato,potestdiciquod ad utrumquesufficit
distinctio
ad distinctanorationis,immo minima,ilia scilicetquae sufficit
mina, scilicetsynonyma.Haec enim non negaretur'gladius et
ensis sunt idem' vel 'Marcus et Tullius sunt idem'. . . .

52Thismistake
inWadding
aninvolved
discussion
inTweedale
1999(above,
precipitates
n. 48),475-6.
53B mistakenly
readsalteran
foraltercan.
54I haveemended
thetexttoreadibiagainst
allmanuscripts,
which
ubi.Something
carry
seemswrong
withthissentence
as itstands,
sinceM hastried
tocorrect
itandV hasleft
partofitblank.

11:36:38 AM

28

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT
inter
Ad radonem,possetdici quod aliqua distinctiorequiritur
autem
est
de
vel
nominis.
Ista
saltem
rationis
posita
copulata,
extremisa et b.
30
Unde videnturillae propositionesprimae et ita eumdemintellectumimportare,vel saltem sine improprietate
possunta sane
convertibles
quantum ad intellectum.
intelligentibus
accipi quasi
4
f.
cf.
Vivs, 339a-340a)
Ira;
(B,

Far more significant

than Scotus's above discussionof P2 is his ensuing
examinationof whetherP3 followsfromPI. This formsa centraland
extensivepart of the Logicaand is regardedin the fourteenth
centuryas
formal
distinction.
Advocates
of
to
the
realism
of
Scotus's
key assessing
adduce in evidenceScotus's apparentlyplain
the less realistinterpretation
entailsa formaldistinction.
As we have
denial that a formalnon-identity
seen, Chatton repeatedlystressedthispoint in supportof his less realist
succinctremarkin the Ordinato
:
reading,explicitly
citingScotus'sfollowing
Andforthisreason
itcanbe conceded
that. . . thisreality
is notthatrealformally
to ourpriorexplanation
of
identical
to thatreality,
ityoris notformally
according
be conceded?
whatformally
means.Musttherefore
somedistinction
It is better
to
in
usethenegative
'Thisis notformally
thesame'than'thisis distinct
proposition
'a andb arenotthesameformally,
therefore
someway'.Butdoesitnotfollow,
they
I reply
areformally
distinct'?
thatit doesnotnecessarily
because'formally'
follow,
in theconsequent.55
is deniedin theantecedent
andaffirmed
Alnwick,who, as indicated,takes a less realistview of Scotus in support
also quotes the above text
of his own versionof the formaldistinction,
as encapsulatingScotus's whole position:
Andthisis becausethemodeofa negation
doesnotfollow
from
thenegation
of
themodeofa sentence.
thisdoesnotfollow:
'a is notformally
b,thereAccordingly,
forea is distinct
from
' is formally
non-identib' nordoesitevenfollow
formally
cal to b' as hasbeenshownin various
ofthe
ways.Thisseemsto be theintent
SubtleDoctor,
4, ofbookoneof
JohnDuns,forin theseconddistinction,
question
hisOxford
Ordinatio,
heasks"Doesitnotfollow
'a andb arenotformally
thesame,
He responds
that"itdoesnotfollow
therefore
distinct?"'
because
theyareformally
themodeofformality
intheantecedent
butintheconsequent
is denied
is affirmed."
in brief,
Thisis hisresponse
whichI think
is trueon account
ofwhathasbeen
said.56
55FortheLatin,seen. 40 above.
56Alnwick,
Quod.
q. 1, in:ed. Ledoux1937(above,n. 10),192:"Ethocestquiaad
modicompositionis,
nonsequitur
modus
negationem
negationis,
propter
quodnonsequitur
la nonestformaliter
a distinguitur
formaliter
a b' necetiamsequitur
b,igitur
quod'a sit
formaliter
nonidemb' ut multipliciter
ostensum
est.Haec videtur
esseintentio
Subtilis

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
QUESTION

29

In this section of the LogicaScotus subjectsthe above inferenceto an

or Reportatio.
extensiveanalysisgoingwell beyondanythingin the Ordinatio
Its importanceto our concernis thereforeclear. Ironically,if thisis one
of the more importantsectionsof the Logica,it is also the most corrupt
part of Wadding's edition,whichis marredby two long omissionsat critical junctures.We reproduceboth Wadding and a correctedtext based
on B to indicatethe lacuna in the textand its impact on interpretation:
B, f. 41ra-b
Vivs, 341a-b
in
Iuxta
istas
duas in quibus negatur
istas
duas
Juxta
quibus
suntaliae duae affirsunt
convertibilitas,
negatur convertibilitas,
Iuxta primam,
aliae duae affirmativae
distinc- mativaedistinctionis.
tionisjuxta primam.sta,Deitas ista 'Deitas est formaliterdistincta
5 est formaliter
distinctaa pater- a Paternitate'vel econverso.Iuxta
nitte,et e converso.Juxta se- secundam,ista 'Deitas et Paternitas
distinctae'.
cundamista,Deitas etpaternitas sunt formaliter
distinctae.
sunt formaliter
Propositionumistarum utraque
Propositionumistarumuna
10 estminusdeterminata
est
minus determinata ad unum
unum
ad
intellectumquam illae negati- intellectumquam illae negativae.
vae. Nam ista, quae minus Nam ista,quae minusvideturposse
videturposse habere diversos habere diversos intellectus,scilicet
intellectus,scilicet Deitas est 'Deitas est formaliterdistincta a
15 formaliterdistinctaa patemi- Paternitate',videtur posse habere
tate, videtur posse habere duplicemintellectum.Unum, quod
per ly 'formaliter'
duplicem intellectum.Unum, modusimportatus
circa istuddeterminabile
quod modus importatusper ly affirmetur
sicutaffirmatur
affirmetur
circaistud quod est 'distinctum',
formaliter,
idem isti',
20 determinabile,quod est dis- in ista 'hoc est formaliter
in
circa
istud
determinabile
affirmatur
ista:
sicut
tinctum,
quod est
hoc est formaliteridem isti, 'idem'.
circa istuddeterminabilequod
est idem.

Ioannis
4,inOrdinatione
secunda,
libri,
Duns,distinctione
Doctoris,
quaestione
namque
primi
suntfora et b nonsuntformaliter
sic:'Nonnesequitur
Oxoniensi
idem,igitur
, quaerit
in antecedente
maliter
distincta'?
quiamodusformalitatis
Respondet
quod'nonsequitur,
veram
Haecestsuaresponsio
affirmatur.'
etin consequente
brevis,
quamreputo
negatur
propter
praedicta."

11:36:38 AM

30
25

30

35

40

45

50

55

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT
Aliusintellectus
Alius intellectusposset haberi,
possethaben,
in
inclusa
hoc
quod negatio
quod negatio inclusa in hoc quod
quod est distinctum, negat est 'distinctum5,
negetmodumimpormodum importatumper hoc, tatumper hoc quod est 'formaliter'.
quod est formaliter.Et si iste Et si isteintellectus
possethaberiex
intellectusposset haberi ex vi vi sermonis,satispossetconcediistas
duas converti'a non est idem forsermonis,<. . .>
tunenon sequitur:non estidem maliteripsi
et 'a est distinctum
est
distinctum
formaliter
ab
formaliter,
ergo
ipso b' Si autem tansed
est
fallacia
contum
formaliter;
primusintellectus
possithaberi,
sequentis,quia in antecedente tunenon sequitur'non est idem fornegaturpraedicatumcomposi- maliter, ergo est distinctumfortum ex determinabiliet deter- maliter',sed estfallaciaconsequentis,
<. . .>
minante,et verificatur
quia in antecedentenegaturpraediista affirmatiocirca determi- catumcompositumex determinabili
nabilenegatum.Sicutnec tenet et determinante,
et verificatur
ratione
ista consequential homo non negationisipsiusdeterminationis.
In
est necessario albus; ergo est consequente vero affirmaturista
necessarionon albus,et in mul- determinado57circa determinabile
tisaliis,ut homo non est essen- negatum.Sicut nec tenet ista contialiteret quidditative,vel per sequentia'homo non est necessario
se primo modo risibilis;ergo albus,ergoest necessarionon albus',
homo est essentialiter
vel quid- et in multisaliis, ut 'homo non est
ditativeper se primomodo non essentialiter
et quiditativeet per se
risibilis.In antecedentequidem primomodo risibilis,ergo est essennegaturrisibilissub isto modo, tialiteret quiditativeet per se primo
et hoc est, quia iste modus modo non risibilis'.In antecedente
negatur; in consequente vero quidem negatur risibile sub isto
modus affirmaturrespectu modo, et hoc quia iste modus
praedicatinegati.Et ideo con- negatur.In consequentevero modus
sequens est falsum,nam istud affirmatur
respectupraedicatinegati.
non
Et
ideo
praedicatum negatum
consequensest falsum,nam
essentialiter
vel
istud
primo
quiddipraedicatum negatum non
vel
se
vel quiditatative, per primo modo, praedicaturessentialiter
dicitur de subjecto; imo nec tive seu per se primo modo de

57We readdeterminatio
herewithA against
all othermanuscripts
whichhaveaffirmatio.
Thisseemsrequired
forScotus's
point.

11:36:38 AM

SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION
60

31

alia negatiopraedicaturper se
primomodo de aliquo positivo,
nec negatio alia ingreditur
essentialiterin essentiam ali-

subiecto; immo nec aliqua negatio

praedicaturper se primo modo de
aliquo positivo,nec negatio aliqua
essentialiter
essentiamaliingreditur

quam positivam.

quam positivam.

Scotus says that the next propositionsto be consideredare the correformsof PI and P2, in which distinction
is affirmed
spondingaffirmative
ratherthan identitydenied, so that Deity is said to be formallydistinct
fromPaternityratherthan denied to be formallythe same. Scotus says
thatboth of theseaffirmative
propositions(P3 and P4) are more ambiguous than theirnegativecorrelates,which is evidenteven fromthe singular form(P3), which is the less ambiguousof the two. As Scotus makes
as negclear, the greaterambiguityarisesfromthe construalof distinction
ativein meaningrelativeto itspositivecorrelativeidem.That is, in attemptin P3 would be taken
ing to make the inferencefromPI to P3, distinctum
as equivalentlysubstituting
fornonidemin PI. But then,Scotus says,the
affirmative
P3
will
have at leasttwo different
proposition
meaningsdependon
how
the
is construed
ing
negativeparticlenonincluded in distinctum
withthe adverbialmodifier
The firstand most obvious reading
formaliter.
would be to takeformaliter
as qualifyingthe whole of what is includedin
In thissense, the nonwould be taken as negatingidemand fordistinctum.
maliter
would modifynonidemas a single,negativepredicate.On thisfirst
reading,the phrase would mean 'formallynot the same5. In a second,
more literalreading(ex vi sermonis
), the nonwould be taken not with idem
but as negatingthe qualificationformaliter
, so the second sense of the
would
be
'not
the
same'.
expression
formally
It is at thisjuncture in the text,preciselywhen Scotus is about to
assess which of these two readingsof P3 would followfromPI, that a
large omissionoccurs in the Wadding edition,as indicatedin lines 3034 of the above quotation.In this instance,Wadding came by the mistake honestly,since these lines are missingfromall manuscriptsexcept
B owing to a scribalerror.(As noted,thiserrorindicatesthat B derived
from,or had access to, a witnessearlierin the traditionthan any other
survivingmanuscript.)In droppingthe above lines,Wadding's textcompletelyinvertsScotus's meaning by making the inferencefrom PI go
of P3 ratherthan, as Scotus actually
throughon thefirstinterpretation
the
second
This
has misledmoderncommentators,
mistake
says,
interpretation.

11:36:38 AM

32

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

who, whilemanagingto followScotus'sargument,nonethelesshad to read

againstthe textas it stood in order to do so.58
Turningto the passage as restored,Scotus says thatifthe second reading of P3 can be takenfromthe meaningof its terms,then P3 could be
conceded to followfromPI, so that 'a is not formallythe same as
would be equivalentto 'a is formallydistinctfromb.' If, however,only
the firstreadingof P3 were allowed,thenthe inferencecannotgo through
but would be a fallacyof the consequent.At thispoint (11.40-42 above),
the Wadding texthas a second omission,again owing to a scribalerror
in V, which rendersScotus's explanationof the fallacyincoherent.The
repairedpassage says thata fallacyoccursbecause in the antecedent(PI)
a qualifiedpredicateis denied with respectto that qualification(nonest
whilein the consequent(i.e., the firstreadingof P3) a negformaliter
idem),
ative predicateis affirmed
withrespectto that same qualification(estformaliter
nonidem).
Thus, one can no morego fromPI to thefirst
interpretation
of P3 than from'man is not necessarilywhite'to 'man is necessarilynotwhite'.
Modern commentatorstake Scotus to be here diagnosinga scope fallacy,59but his precise concern is that the consequentis false because a
negationcannot be essentiallyassertedof or includedin somethingpositive.Thus, takingformaliter
to be equivalentto essentiality
or per
, quiditatwe
seprimomodo
Scotus
that
'man
is
not
risible'is true,because
,
says
essentially
is a propertyof a human being,not part of its definition,
as the
risibility
qualifier'essentially'implies.But this does not entail 'man is essentially
not risible',whichis false,since nothingnegativeentersinto the definition
or is essentiallypredicated of what is positive. Consequently,the first
of P3 cannot followfromPI, since 'not the same' cannot
interpretation
be formallyor essentiallyassertedof a positivesubject.
Scotus seems unpersuadedby these latterobjectionsto the inference
of P3 from PI. Against them he countersthat idemand distinctum
are
opposed and divide all of being. That is, theyare joindy exhaustiveand
entailthe assermutuallyexclusive.The denial of the one shouldtherefore
tion of the other,and, by extension,the denial of a qualifiedidentity
58To makesenseofthepassage,
AdamsandTweedale
all takethephrase
Et
Gelber,
si isteintellectus
haben
to thefirst
ofP3,whiletheLatiniste
posset
(1.29) to refer
meaning
can onlyrefer
to thesecondmeaning.
See Gelber1974(above,n. 6), 92; Adams1976
(above,n. 3),41; Tweedale1999(above,n. 48),vol.1,47.
59Adams1976(above,n. 3),41; Tweedale1999
(above,n. 48),vol.2, 478.

11:36:38 AM

SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

33

should entail the assertionof a distinctionqualifiedin the same sense.

Scotus argues that this is in fact grantedfor all the standardways in
which identityand distinctionare qualified.Thus, if two thingsare not
the same, then it followsthat theyare reallydistinct.The
really(realiter)
same holds forthe different
kindsof identitylistedby Aristotle
generic,
specificand numerical.The inferenceeven holds in the Trinity,where,
ifanywhere,one mightexpectan exception.If it is denied thatthe Father
and Son are 'personally'(personaliter
) identical,then it followsthat they
are personally
distinct.
Scotus
concludes,theobjectionswould
Consequently,
seem only to apply arbitrarily
to the presentcase offormaliter
distinctum.m
As before,Scotus is reluctantto decide the issue on technicalinterpretationsof propositions,seeing such as a matterfor logicians rather
than theologians,and seems contentto let the inferencefromPI to P3
go throughbased on common usage. In any case, Scotus says, P3 can
be conceded on its second interpretation
given above, which is not very
far fromthe meaning of PI. In the below text,Wadding's edition has
iliumintellectum
secundum
intellectum
, qui (1. 8),
quemin place of istumsecundum
thusremovingScotus's explicitreferenceto the second meaningof P3 as
the one that he is conceding.
Non videturigiturinstantiacontra istam consequentiam,nisi
dicaturpraecise esse in proposito.
De significatione
istiuspropositionis'a est distinctum
formaliter
ab ipso b' et utrumdeterminateimporttprimmsensumprae5 dictum,vel aliunde61dicaturmultiplexad istosduos sensuset discussionem exquisitam,et alia multa huiusmodi quae relinquo
logicis,sequendo communemmodum loquendi, ista potestconcedi, saltem concedendo62istumsecundumintellectum,qui non
videturmultumdistareab intellectunegativaeprimo concessae.
10 (B, f. 41rb; cf. Vivs, 341a)
Scotusaccordinglydeniesthatthe alleged counterexamples
have any force
and admitsthatconsequentssuch as 'man is not risibleessentially'would
have to be conceded.But thenwhatof the objectionthatnegationscannot
60Vivs,340b-341a.
textherepresents
no problems.
Wadding's
61Themanuscripts
areevenly
aliunde
andalium
vel
, which
splitbetween
reading
paleoareeasilyconfused.
We havestayed
withB, whichhastheformer
andmore
graphically
difficult
reading.
62B mistakenly
readsextendendo.

11:36:38 AM

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

34

of something
or includedin the definition
be predicatedessentially
positive?
Scotus gives two answers.In the first,he says that if the negationin a
, or
negativepredicate,whetherexpressed(libera),such as in nonrisibile
, can be taken in the consequentto
:), such as in distinctum
implied(iinclusa
then he concedes the consequent
adverbial
the
essentialiter,
qualifier
deny
'man is essentiallynot risible'.But this is not to concede that 'not risible5 is essentiallypredicatedof the positivesubject 'man', because then
is affirmedin the consequentratherthan denied, as this soluessentialiter
tion holds. In otherwords,Scotus deftlyobservesthatthe objectionconcerningessentialpredicationof negationsdoes not arise on the second
reading of P3 type propositions.In the text below, Scotus is using the
variable c for 'not risible'or a similarnegativepredicate.

Et cum arguiturquod c non cadit in definitione

hominis,sicut
nec aliqua negatio in definitione
positivi:
Respondeo: si negatiolibera vel inclusain hoc quod est c possit negare modum additumsignificatum
per hoc quod est 'essentialiter',tunc concedo istam, 'homo est c essentialiter'.Sed non
conceditur63
quod c praedicaturessentialiterde homine,quia in
antecedente negatur modus ille 'essentialiter',in consequente
affirmatur.
(B, f. 41rb; cf. Vivs, 341b)

The second solutionavoids this more literalreadingin which the negationimpliedby the predicateis takenso as to denythe adverbialqualifiers
et
in the consequent(nonfaciendovimde affirmatione
essentialiter
or formaliter
it
construes
these
est
hoc
modi
qualifiers
per quod c). Rather,
negatione importati
in the same way as theyspecifya type
a typeof distinction
as specifying
of identity,so that 'a is formallyidenticalto V and 'a is formallydistinct
from' would be immediatelyopposed. Thus, just as it is denied in the
is formallyidenticalwith man, so it would be
antecedentthat risibility
admittedin the consequentthat it is formallydistinct.On this second
reading,the above objectionconcerningessentialpredicationof a negadoes not qualifythe whole
tion does not apply, because here essentialiter
as
if
to
of
homo
est
distinctum
,
signifythat 'man is distinctfrom
composite
would
so
that
'distinctfromrisibility'
an
is
essential
predication,
risibility'
the
essentialiter
of
man.
enterinto the definition
Rather,
qualifiesonly the
that risibilityis distinctfrom man
, signifying
predicate term distinctum
63We arereading
Sednonconceditur
withM, L andG, forwhichB hasRespondeo
quia.
mistook
theNonforEt ideo.
hasNonconceditur
V actually
, butWadding

11:36:38 AM

SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

35

accordingto its essence,that is, is a distinctessence fromthe essence of

man. In supportof thisanalysis,Scotus interestingly
invokesthe rules of
which
that
one
must
frompropoobligation,
stipulate
proceed differently
sitionsinvolvingnegationor distinction
if essentialiter
is takento determine
the union (compositio
) ratherthan, as ordinarilyassumed,the subject.
Scotus thenadds a veryimportantrestriction
to takingP3 in thisway,
the
in
standard
distinction
modifiers
a determinatio
between
dimideploying
nuemseu distrahens
and a determinatio
nondiminuens
sed specificans.
In the former case, the modifierweakens or negates the whole with which it is
taken,such as in 'dead man', while in the latterit does not, such as in
'curlyhair'. The logical relevanceof thisdistinctionis thatin the former
case it is fallacious to reason to an unqualifiedassertionof the term
modified,while in the latterit is not. Thus, if there is a dead man, it
does not followthereis a man, but if one has curlyhair, it followsone
has hair. The formermoves fallaciouslyfroma qualified(secundum
quid)
to an unqualified(simpliciter)
assertion.64
Scotus saysthatin the above soluis taken with distinctum
tion, whereformaliter
, it is to be construedas a
determinatio
diminuens
a distinctione
that
a
,
is, qualificationthat weakens or
attenuatesthe distinction,so that we cannot inferfromformaliter
distinctuman absolute or unqualifieddistinction.The reason forthisrestriction
is that in PI formaliter
is taken in this way, for a denial of formalidenis
not
taken
to
a denial of identityabsolutelybetweenthe divine
allow
tity
essence and person.Thus, ifformaliter
is not takenin the same sense with
distinctum
, then P3 will not followfromPI.
As indicated,Wadding makes a small but catastrophicerrorin this
section,readingNec in line 7 as etc.and puttingit at the end of line 6.
This transforms
what was Scotus's explanationand defenseof his position in 11.1-6 into an incoherentobjectionagainstit. Wadding addition'
in line 10 as haecessentianatur
aliter,thus
ally misread Et hic essentialiter"
Scotus's
in
whole
obliterating
point the paragraph,namely,how to construethe adverb essentialiter.
Confrontedwiththese corruptions,
Tweedale
was understandably
unable to make any sense of the passage.65
Aliteretiam posset dici, quod accipiendo ista adverbia 'essentialiter' et 'formaliter'et similia ut praecise dicunt modum
64Forinstance,
see PeterofSpain,in: L. M. de Rijk(ed.),Tractatus.
Called
afterwards
Summule
Assen1972,157.
logicales.
65Tweedale1999(above,n. 48),vol.2, 480: "A mystifying
section
forwhichI have
no sensible
interpretation."

11:36:38 AM

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

36

10

15

20

25

sicut modum identitatis,immediateopposita sunt

distinctonis,
ista: 'a est sic idem 6' et 'a est sic distinctuma b' non faciendo
vel negationemodi importatiper hoc quod
vim de affirmatione
estc.
Nec contrahoc suntinstantiae,quia sicutrisibilenon est idem
ita est distinctumab homine essentialiter,
homini essentialiter,
secundumessentiamrisibilis,quia essentiaest
hoc est,distinctum
distinctaab essentia.Et hic 'essentialiter'non est determinado
sed determinadoprae'homo est distinctum',
huiuscompositionis
dicat huius,scilicetquod est 'distinctum'.Obligatio autem procedit secundum quod negatio vel distinctionotatur66esse de
essentiasubiecti,et proceditde alio intellectuprout'essentialiter'
determinarecompositionem.
intelligitur
Isto modo intelligendohoc totum quod est 'formaliterdistinctum','formaliter'est determinadodiminuensa distinctione,
ita
diminuita non-identitate,
sicut et hoc 'non idem formaliter'
'sunt
non
eadem
non
formaliter
sicut
formaliter,
sequitur
quod
igitursunt non eadem', sed est fallacia secundumquid et simigitursuntdispliciter,ita non sequitur'suntdistinctaformaliter,
tincta',sed est consimilisdefectus.
Si quis protendendoper illam propositionem'a est distinctum
a ipso V velitalium intellectum
formaliter
conciperequam intellectum distinctonis
diminutae,patet quod ista non sequiturex
ex ipsa aliud ulteriusinferritamquam
nec
potest
praemissis,
f.
ex
datis.
(B, 41rb; cf. Vivs, 341b-342a)
sequens

To summarize,Scotus gives two readingsof P3 and seems prepared to

allow its inferencefromPI on eitherof them. On one reading,P3 can
in a more technical,strictsenseso thatthe negationimplicit
be interpreted
. Construedin this sense, P3 can
in distinctum
is taken to denyformaliter
followfromPI, since the two propositionshave the same meaning. A
the whole
as modifying
more naturalsense of P3 is to take theformaliter
modifies
idem.On
is
when
it
as
it
of what is included in distinctum
, just
thisreading,the inferencefromPI to P3 would seem fallaciousbecause
included
the consequentP3 would falselyasserta negationto be essentially
in somethingpositive. Scotus, however, resiststhis reasoning,arguing
instead that since identityand distinctionare immediatelyopposed, the
66B herereadsnegatur
havenotatur.
which
theother
manuscripts,
against

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

37

negation of the one should entail the assertion of the other, even if
qualified,as common usage permits.The alleged fallacyarisingfroma
false assertionin the consequentof a negationof a positivesubjectdoes
not occur as long as certainrestrictions
is taken to
apply. First,formaliter
ratherthan the compositionof the prediqualifythe predicatedistinctum
cate withthe subject,and secondlythe forceofformaliter
is to weaken or
diminishthe predicate.This latterrestriction
is doubly important,since
it blocks any furtherinferenceto an absolute distinctionbetween the
essence and personalproperty,which PI similarlyrulesout. Under these
conditions,the inferencefromPI to P3 can go through.While Scotus is
clear that on other construaisP3 mightnot followfromPI, he seems
generallyreceptiveto admittingthe move fromthe one to the other as
illicitmove to some absolute
long as it does not engenderany further,
distinctionin God.
Scotus's analysisof P3 in thissectiondoes not seem to supportunequiof Alnwickand Chatton,according
vocallythe less realistinterpretation
to which Scotus denied in the Logicathe inferenceto formaldistinction.
The reason forthisis that Alnwickand Chatton are clearlyreadingthe
Logicain termsof the followinglines of the Ordinatio,
which,as we have
seen, theyboth quote as definitiveof Scotus's position:
Sednonnesequitur,
'a etb nonsuntidemformaliter,
distincta'?
ergosuntformaliter
in antecedente
et in
Respondeo
quodnonoportet
sequi,quia 'formaliter'
negatur,
affirmatur.67
consequente
While in this Ordinatio
text Scotus does not stop to elaborate why the
denial offormaliter
in the antecedentand its affirmation
in the consequent
is problematic,in the Logea he spells this out completely,as we have
seen. The analysisin theLogea showsthanin the above textof theOrdinatio
Scotus sees the inferenceas constituting
a fallacyof the consequent,equivalent to reasoningfrom'man is not necessarilywhite' to 'man is necessarilynot white'. But, as we also have just seen, in the Logea Scotus
no longersaw this objectionas affecting
the move fromnon-identity
to
at
least
for
the
indicated.In other
distinction,
readingsand restrictions
words,the Lojcaseems more open to allowingthe inferenceto a formal
distinctionthan the parallel Ordinatio
text.One can conclude that debate
67Scotus,
Ord.1 d. 2 nn.404-5,in:Vat.,vol.2, 357.We havereadformaliter
in the
secondsentence
wheretheVaticantextreadsformalitas
instead.
Thisseemsrequired
for
thelogical
pointScotusis making.

11:36:38 AM

38

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

at Paris led Scotus to see that the inferenceneed not be blocked tout
court
indeed, it would be more consistentwith common usage to allow
it but, as long as precautionsare taken to preventany implicationof
an absolute
distinction
withinGod, it is permissible.Chattonand Alnwick,
therefore,
only achieve theirreadingof the Logicaby makingit conform
to the earlierand less nuanced Ordinatio
view.
It is withthe thirdpair of propositions,however,that the Logicamost
directlyaddressesthe issue of Scotus's realismin the formaldistinction.
Here the move is made fromconcedingin P3 and P4 that the divine
essence and personalpropertiesare formallydistinctto concedingin P5
and P6 that they are distinctformalities.
It is preciselythis latterconcession that the less realistreading does not want attributedto Scotus.
For instance,as we have seen, Chatton is absolutelyclear that Scotus
in God and equallyclear thatScotus denied
denied any actual formalities
such in his Logica.
Continuing,then,Scotus says thattwo further,
equivalentpropositions
are inferredfromP3 and P4. FollowingPI and P3 would be the singular propositionsa has a formality
distinctfromformality
' or 'formaland P4 the
a
is
V
and
distinct
from
P2
ity
formality (P5)
following
or 'formalcorrespondingplural formscand b have distinctformalities'
a
b
formalities'
The
and
are
distinct
(P6).
ity
formality
argumentthat
is an extensionof the priorreathesefollowfromP3 and P4 respectively
soningfromanalogyused to justifythe move fromPI to P3. If a is really
distinct(distinctum
fromA,then we concede that a and b are disrealiter)
ifa is conceptuallydistinct(distincta
tinctrealities(realitates).
ratione)
Similarly,
fromb, then we similarlyadmit a and b are distinctconcepts {rationes).
By a parityof reasoning,then,fromthe concessionin P3 that a is forfromb we should furtherconcede that
distinctum)
mallydistinct(formaliter
are
distinct
formalities
).
{formalittes
they
It is objected that the inferencecannot be allowed, because in P3,
is either
takenin the sense accordingto whichit followsfromPI formaliter
negated with respectto identityor, under the alternativereading,is a
does not
qualificationdiminishingdistinction.In P5, however,formaliter
thatwould diminishthe asserted
occur,nor is thereany added qualification
distinctionbetweenformalities.
Ex tertiaet quarta inferuntur
propositionesaliae et converiuxta
et
tertiam
ista quinta 'a habet distinctibiles,puta
primam
a formalitateb' vel Tormalitasa est distincta
tam formalitatem

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
SGOTUS'S
QUESTION

39

a formalitate
b' Et iuxtasecundamet quartamista 'a et b habent
vel 'formalitasa et
5 distinctasformalitates
sive duas formalittes'
formalitasb sunt duae sive distinctaeformalitates'.
Quod istae sequanturex praemissisprobaturex simili,quia
si a est distinctumrealitera b, ergo alia est realitas a et alia
realitas b, et similitera et b ergo habent duas distinctasreali10 tates.A similietiam si a et b suntdistinctaratione,ergo habent
radonemab ipso b.
distinctas
radones,siveergo a habetdistinctam
secunin
hoc
est
'formaliter'
antecedente
Contra,
negatur
quod
ex
ilium
secundum
dum
intellectum,
quem sequitur prima,quae
vera est, vel saltem hoc quod est 'formaliter'est determinado
15 diminuensrespectueius quod est distinctum.In alia autem nec
videturdiminui,
nec distinctio
'formaliter'
negaturnec affirmatur,
quia nulla sibi additur determinatiodiminuens.(B, f. 41rb-va;
cf. Vivs, 342a-b)
In response,Scotus says thatwhat is qualifiedso as to be diminishedin
the antecedentdoes not followas unqualifiedin the consequent,forthis
is to committhe fallacysecundum
quid.Since P3 was conceded only as it
a
it
asserted diminisheddistinction, cannotentaila consequentthatwould
The whole issue,
affirmany unqualifieddistinctionbetween formalities.
a estdistincta
a formalitate
b' and
then,is whetherP5 and P6 'formalitas
'a
et
b
sunt
distinctae
formalitatesposit forequivalentlyformalitas formalitas
If
malitiestogetherwith unqualifieddistinction. theydo, then theycannot followfromP3 and P4 in the sensesconceded. If, however,theycan
or to denya formalmode
be interpreted
to asserta diminisheddistinction
of identity,then theycan be conceded.
Posset dici quod ex antecedentediminutonon sequituridem
simpliciteracceptum. Cum ergo ista propositio'a est formaliter
distinctuma ' non est concessa, nisi prout negaturhoc quod
est 'formaliter'per negationeminclusam in hoc quod est 'dis5 tinctum',vel quia secundumaliam viam hoc quod est 'formaliter'
diminuithoc quod est 'distinctum',ideo nullo modo sequitur
formalitaset distinctiosimpliciter.
consequens,in quo affirmatur
Stat vis in hoc: si ista propositio'formalitasa est distinctaa formalitateb' vel alia aequivalens sibi, puta 'formalitasa et for10 malitasb suntduae vel distinctaeformalitates',
ponitformalitatem
et cum hac distinctionem
quia si sic, nulla istarum
simpliciter,

11:36:38 AM

40

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT
sequiturex propositionibus
prius datis,secundumintellectumin
datae
sunt.
Si
in aliqua istarum68distrahaturdisautem
quo
tinctiosive diminuatursicut in antecedente,vel negeturmodus
15 importatusper hoc quod est 'formaliter',
poteruntistae sequi ex
illis. (B, f. 4 Iva; cf. Vivs, 342b)

It is at this exact point that the Logucamost directlyconfrontsthe question that medieval and modern commentatorsalike have used to gauge
the degree of realismin Scotus's formaldistinction.Does the admission
of some limitedor qualifieddistinctionbetween the divine essence and
personal propertiesposit distinctformalitiesin God? As we have seen,
the crux of the less realistpositionis thatno such formalities
are implied.
Scotus's own answer here is more nuanced: no propositionthat posits
bothformalities
in God and an absolute distinctionbetweenthem can be
admitted.The issue, then,is whetherpropositionsof the formof P5 or
can be construedto assert also a
P6, which assert distinctformalities,
diminisheddistinctionin the sense previouslyconceded in propositions
PI and P3. If so, talk of distinctformalities
can go through.
Scotus accordinglyembarkson a detailed analysisof whethersuch an
can be recoveredfromP5, namely,formalitas
a estdistincta
interpretation
a formalitate
b'. The primafacie obstacle to this interpretation,
as pointed
out in the above objection,is thatthe qualifying
adverbformaliter
no longer
occurs in P5, so that,in the absence of any added modifier,it seems to
be assertingan unqualifieddistinction.Scotus says that there are two
approaches to this difficulty
(<duplexmodusdicendi
), one which attemptsto
extractthe required,dilutingqualification
fromthe termdistincta
, the other
fromthe remainingtermformalitas.69
Scotus devotesmost of his attention
to the firstapproach.
To follow Scotus's ensuing discussionit is helpfulto realize that he
has expressedit in the technicalterminology
used to analyze the fallacy
secundum
et
.
The
reason
for
this,obviously,is that Scotus is
quid simpliciter
to
determine
whether
P5
an
trying
implies absolute distinction(.simpliciter
)
or one that is qualified(secundum
quid).Aristotleis the ultimatesource of
68B herereadsinstantiarum.
69Tweedale
takesduplex
modus
dicendi
inlines1-2ofthepassage
below(= Vivs,
342b32to Scotus's
discussion
ofthetwowaysin which
dis33)as referring
immediately
ensuing
tinction
can be qualified,
or formally.
thiswholediscussion
Rather,
namely,
materially
constitutes
theunusmodus
dicendi.
Scotusdoesnotgivethealiusmodus
dicendi
untilthree
columns
laterat Vivs,344a12.Cf.Tweedale1999(above,n. 48),vol.2, 482.

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
ON THE FORMAL
PARISIAN
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

41

as what is assertedby itselfwithout

the terminology,
definingsimpliciter
dico
added
(simpliciter quodnulloadditodico).By contrast,someanything
quidwhen a qualificationis added to it (Mud
thingis assertedsecundum
That to which the
dicitursecundum
quid cui addituraliqua determinatio).
the determinable
called
is
is
added
accordingly
qualification(determinatio)
in
a
the
relation
these
terms
determinabile
conceptual order
),
indicating
(<
in
the real order.70
matter
and
form
to thatbetween
broadlycorresponding
The added qualification,as we have seen, can diminishits determinable
diminuens
), as seems requiredforthe inferenceof P5, or merely
(determinatio
Scotus
contrahens
it (determinatio
restrict
).71Utilizingthislogical terminology,
as a determinabile
to see whether
andformalitas
as a determinado
treatsdistinctum
the additionof the one to the otherin P5 can be construedas indicatquidratherthan simpliciter.
ing a distinctionsecundum
first
to
the
Turning
approach,Scotussays,in line withthe above vocabhas a materialand a formalelement.It
ulary,that the term distinctum
it modifiesas a kind of matter;in
of
that
which
the
entity
presupposes
as a kindof form.For an unqualifiedor absolute
itselfit positsnon-identity
and the nonthen,both the entityof the itemsdistinguished
distinction,
could
identitybetweenthemmustbe unqualified.Consequently,distinctum
in
from
the
two
either
distinction
a
ways:
quid)
imply qualified(secundum
side of matter,because the entityof what it modifiesis qualified,or from
Scotus's
the side of form,because it positsa qualifiedtypeof non-identity.
1 d. 33 q. 2, where
analysishere coincideswithhis solutionin Reportado
he stipulatesthatforan absolutedistinctionboth the realityof the terms
betweenthem mustbe unqualified.72
and the non-identity

De isto,scilicetquod poniturin antecedente,potestesse duplex

modus dicendi.Unus iste:hoc quod est 'distinctum'aliquid praeet aliquid ponitper se quasi
exigitquasi materiale,puta entitatem,
hoc
sitdistinctio
Ad
non-identitatem.
formale,
simpliciter,
quod
puta
Et per
non-identitas.
entitas
et
et
simpliciter
requiritur simpliciter
esse
distinctio
secundum
quid: vel ex
consequens duplex potest

70Cf.SimonofFaversham,
libro
elenchorum
, q. n. 42,in:StenEbbesen
Quaestiones
super
fit
et forma
libro
elenchorum
, Toronto1984,156:"Sicutex materia
(ed^Quaestiones
super
radonem."
fitunumsecundum
etdeterminabili
unumsecundum
rem,sicexdeterminatione
71On allofthisterminology,
n.70),157-8.
seeSimonofFaversham
1984,q. 22(above,
TheAristotle
is fromTop.2.11(115b29-30).
72Rep.par.1 d. 33 q. 2 n. 9-10,in:Vivs,vol.22,402b-403b.

11:36:38 AM

42

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT
parte materialis,quia est entitastantumsecundumquid, vel ex
est non-identitas
solum
parteformalis,
quia in identittesimpliciter
secundumquid. (B, f. 4 lva; cf. Vivs, 342b-343a)

As to qualificationfromthe materialside, Scotus says that it is debatcan be diminishedas a resultof being added to
able whetherdistinctum
whose own being is merelyqualifiedor secundum
a determinabile
quid, as
from
where
ratio
has
distinct
when we say, 'This is a concept (iratio
that',
)
only a diminishedbeing. Common usage nonethelessseems to indicate
that such a diminutionof distinctiondoes result.Thus, the proposition,
taken
'This concept[ratio)is distinctfromthatconcept',is not customarily
between
rationes
but
rather
there
is
a
real
distinction
to signifythat
,
only
a distinction
namely,
proportionalto the being of the termsdistinguished,
one of reason.
In the followingpassage, Wadding has misread cuius(1. 2) as nullum
,
which makes littlesense, and then inserteda paragraph break in midsentenceafterhie (1. 5), therebydisruptingScotus's argument.
Utrum autem hoc quod est 'distinctum'possit diminuiprimo
modo per hoc, quod additur tali determinabilicuius proprium
esse est esse secundumquid, puta cum dicitur'ista est ratio distinctaab illa radone', dubiumest.Videturenim quod sic ex com5 muni modo loquendi in quocumque, sicut et hic 'haec ratio est
distinctaab illa ratione', ubi non significatur
per communem
modum loquendi distinctiorealis, sed tantumin tali esse quale
esse competitextremis,quod est esse rationis.Hoc videturposse
confirmari,quia determinadohabet esse secundum esse deter10 minabilis,vel saltemnon verius.(B, f. 4 lva; cf. Vivs, 343a)
can be qualified
Even if,as Scotus seems preparedto grant,a distinction
this
of
its
from
the
diminished
terms,
strategywill ultientity
materially
in
P5
to
as
futile
getting
go through,since, Scotuswill.make
matelyprove
clear, thereis no diminishedentityin the divineperson.These lattertwo
can be conpropositionswould thus seem admissibleonly if distinctum
strued as diminishingthe formalelement of non-identity.
Considering,
can be qualified,Scotus says
then,thissecond way in whicha distinction
to a determinabledoes not seem to diminthat merelyadding distinctum
That is, takenby itself,the term
ish the formalelementof non-identity.
a
it
distinctum
asserts
non-identity; does not conveyany specification
simply
or qualificationas to the nature of that non-identity.
Indeed, this is the

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
SGOTUS'S
QUESTION

43

assertsnon-identity
whole problemwithadmittingP5: distinctum
,
simpliciter
i.e., with nothingadded. Therefore,any formalqualificationas to the
would have to be supplied by the detertype or degree of non-identity
to which distinctum
is added as a determinate.
minabile
But, as Scotus says,
thisdoes not seem to be the case. First,a determinabledoes not of itself
added to it, forthe
specifythe formor natureof the verydetermination
obvious reason that the role of the determinableas such is to be determined or qualifiedratherthan to determineor qualify.If a determinable
qualifies an added determination,it does so materially,not formally.
Secondly,any determinableseems open to being qualifiedby eitheran
absolute or diminisheddistinctionwithoutcontradiction.For example,
and thusabsolutelyas
two concepts(rationes)
could be distinctspecifically,
even thoughmateriallytheir
regardsthe formalelementof non-identity,
being is diminished.If, however,a determinablehad such a nature or
formas to diminisha determinationadded to it, then it could not be
understoodor posited as absolutelydistinctwithoutcontradiction.As
a estdistincta
a formalitate
b',
applied to the propositionat issue, formalitas
takenas a determinabile
cannotdiminish
Scotus'sanalysismeansthatformalitas
or qualifythe non-identity
signifiedby distincta
exceptperhaps materially.
De diminutionedistinctionis
secundo modo, videlicetquannon videturquod ista
tumad formalemrationemnon-identitatis,
additurtedivel tali deterpossithaberiper hoc, quod 'distinctum'
determinans
minabili,tum quia determinabilenon est formaliter
5 suam determinationem,
sed si contrahatipsam, hoc est tantum
materialiter;tum quia quodcumque determinabilepotest intelvel dimitali vel tali,puta simpliciter
ligi determinalidistinctione
ut puta quod duae
nuta, et hoc sine repugnantiaintellectuum,
rationesdistinguuntur
quantumest ex
specifice,et ita simpliciter
Si autemdeterminabile
diminueret
10 rationenon-identitatis.
quantum
ad formalemrationemsui vel suam, non possetintelligivel poni
circa illud distinctiosimplicitersive non diminuta,quin videretur repugnantiaintellectuum.(B, f. 4 Iva; cf. Vivs, 343a-b)
Scotus accordinglyconcludes that if one holds the above analysis,then
a estdistincta
a formalitate
the propositionP5, 'formalitas
b', would have to
withthisconbe declaredfalse.But Scotus immediatelyraisesa difficulty
clusion. The logical rules on qualificationstipulatethat a determination
and the determinablewhich it governsmust occur on the same side of

11:36:38 AM

44

D. DUMONT
STEPHEN

does not occur. Thus,

the proposition,otherwisethe intendedrestriction
'
forexample,if thisrule is not observed,then the propositionomnishomo
'
estalbus would be true,because then the subject homowould stand for
homoalbusand the propositionwould be equivalentto omnishomoalbusest
contrahens
albus.73If this rule holds in the case of a determinatio
, such as
albus, it would also seem to apply, indeed even more so, to the case of
diminuens
a determinatio
, which is type of qualificationat issue here. For
estensis absolutely
omne
instance,thisruleshowsthattheproposition
opinabile
diminuens
the
determinatio
because
, is on the same
,
false,
namely,opinabile
side of the propositionas omneand thus is taken with it. The proposiassertsthateverything
tion therefore
capable of being thought
incorrectly
exists;renderingit true would require movingthe qualificationopinabile
to the otherside of the propositionso as to be taken correctlywithens.
In P5 as formulatedabove, however,the determinable(formalitas
) is only
in
the
in the subject and the determination(distincta)
predicate.
only
as 'forP5
formulated
that
would
some
Scotus
say
says,
Consequently,
b' could be denied on the groundsthat
a formalitate
malitasa estdistincta
and would admit
restrictive
it violatesthe ruleforwell-formed,
statements,
a formalitate
a estdistincta
a properlyformedversion,formalitas
b',
formalitas
occur togetheron the same side of the
and formalitas
in which distincta
would properlybe construedas diminproposition.In thisway,formalitas
in
first
formulationof P5 it does not.
the
whereas
distincta
,
ishing
of formbetween
Scotusdismissesthisconcern,holdingthatthe difference
to make the second any more true
the two propositionsis not sufficient
than the first,because in neithercase, as the above analysisshows,can
but
as to the formalelementof non-identity,
diminishdistincta
formalitas
only materially,if at all.
fromthe Wadding text,
The entireprecedingdiscussionis irretrievable
73BoththeruleandScotus's
ed. de Rijk
occurin PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
example
a parte
aliadaturregulatalis:nichil
positum
1972,(above,n. 64),201:"De restrictione
a partesubiecti
communem
terminm
quoad
positum
restringere
potest
predicati
' in princi4albus
4homo
estalbus*
dicitur
, isteterminus
predicato
Quia cum
plemsignificationem.
4
ad albos.Quia si restringerein subiecto
hominem1
nonpotest
positum
restringere
positus
solumdisadveniat
universale
si signum
turad albos,ergo(perregulam
precedentem)
' tenetur
'ei,
' isteterminus
'omnis
homo
albus
homo
est
in
hac:
Et
sic
albis.
tribueret
ipsumpro
4omnis
due
Unde
iste
est
albus.
omnis
homo
albus
est
sensus:
et
sic
solum
equipollent:
proalbis;
'
estvera,etsi una
estalbus1
. Ergosi unaestvera,reliqua
homo
albus
homo
estalbuset'omnis
albus
estalbus1.
homo
estfalsa.Sedhecestvera:'omnis
estfalsa,reliqua
Ergoheceritvera:
''homo
estalbus1
homo
estalbus'Sedhocestfalsum.
'omnis
,
Ergocumdicitur
Ergoetprimm.
1non
'homo
ad albos.Et sicpatetistaregula."
isteterminus
restringitur

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
ON THE FORMAL
PARISIAN
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

45

a estdistincta
because V has dropped the clause immoet ista'formalitas
forb' (11.3-4, below) owing to homoioteleuton,so that
malitasa formalitate
propositionthatformsthe whole
Wadding omitsthe second,reformulated
object of Scotus's analysis.Thus, Scotus's referenceat the end of the passage to the firstand second propositionsat issue cannot be recovered.
falsa as simpliciter
Additionally,Wadding misreadwhat in V is simpliciter
an
is
Scotus
what
absolutelyfalseproposays
prima(1. 13, below),turning
Needless to say, the formal,logical
sitioninto one that is self-evident!
is
make
is
to
Scotus
completelylost in the Wadding text.74
trying
point

10

15

20

Hoc tenendoconsequenterdicendumesset quod ista est simpliciterfalsa, quod 'formalitasa est distinctaa formalitateb'
immo et ista 'formalitasa est distinctaformalitasa formalitate
b' quae videturforsanalicui magis probabilisquam prima,pro
quanto hic ponuntur'formalitas'et 'distincta'ex eadem parte
In primaautemnon, sed unum tantumin subiecto
compositionis.
in
et aliud praedicato.Sicut autem non contrahitur
aliquid prosecum ex eadem parte composiprie, nisi per determinationem
tionispositam,alias ista posset concedi 'omnis homo est albus',
ad standumpro homine
quia subiectumtantumcontraheretur
contrahitur
albo, ita etiam vel magis non
aliquid vel diminuitur
per illud quod non ponitursecum ex eadem parte compositiofalsa 'omne opinabile est' vel 'est
nis. Unde haec est simpliciter
interistas,'formalitasest distinctaa forens'. Sed ista differentia
non
malitate'et 'formalitasest distinctaformalitasa formalitate',
ad hoc quod secunda sit vera, sicut nec prima, scilicet
sufficit
est vera, quia in neutrapotesthoc quod est 'formalitas'distrahere sive diminuerehoc quod est 'distincta',et hoc quantumad
sive non-identitatis.
formalemrationemdistinctionis
(B, f. 4 Iva;
cf. Vivs, 343b)

Having set aside this last concern,Scotus finallyconcludes that both of

the above versionsof P5 signifyan unqualifieddistinctionof one formalityfromanother,and this because they assert that the non-identity
betweenthem is absolute. P5 is thus false,says Scotus, because what is
takenpreciselyas such,does not satisfythe requirements
distinctformally,
forabsolutedistinction.Even if somethingformallydistinctis completely
74Tweedale's
in this
led astray
andcommentary
translation
is,quiteunderstandably,
Cf.Tweedale1999(above,n. 48),vol.1,54-5;vol.2, 483-4.
passage.

11:36:38 AM

46

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

unqualifiedfromthe materialside of its entity,so that it has complete

actualityas opposed to a diminishedexistencein the mind,properactualityas opposed to a potentialor virtualexistencein matteror a cause,
and separate actualityas opposed to existingin a mixture,stillit does
not meet illrequirementsfor absolute distinction.It lacks the completThere is only absolutenoning, formalelementof absolutenon-identity.
if
a
b
of
and
their
actual
and
real
existence
identity
togetherin one and
the same beingwould be incompatiblewithits simplicity.
Such, of course,
is not the case withthe divineessence and personalproperty,and so P5
is false.
This passage of the Logicais nearlyidenticalto the corresponding
part
of the Reportatio
forabsolute
, whereScotus similarlylistsfourrequirements
distinction.Three concern the entityof the termsdistinguished,
which
are the same as those given below. The fourthand finalrequirementis
an unqualifiednon-identity.75
Note also thatScotus refersto theserequirementsas havingbeen alreadydiscussedinpraecedenti
articulo
(11.2-3, below),
which allusion is dropped in Wadding. This referenceis apparentlyto
the same prior discussionsmentionedat the beginningof the Logicabut
now presumablylost.76
Notatur igiturin utraque quod sit distinctiosimpliciterformalitatisa formalitate,
et hoc quantum ad non-identitatem
simpliciter.Hoc autem falsumest, sicut dictum est in praecedenti
etsi habeat actualiarticulo,quia distinctumpraecise formaliter,
5 tatem pienam contra diminutumesse, et actualitatempropriam
contrapotentialiter
et virtualiter
esse, et actualitatemmeram sive
puram contra confusumesse sive mixtumesse, et quantum est
ex istis conditionibushabeat77aliqua requisitaad distinctionem
simpliciter,tamen deficitultimumcomplementum,scilicetnon10 identitassimpliciter,quae numquam est a ad b, nisi reali sim75Gf.Rep.par.1 d. 33 q. 2 n. 9, in:Vivs,vol.22,402:"Adhocquodaliquasimconditiones.
Primaest,quodsitaliquorum
in
pliciter
distinguantur,
requiruntur
quattuor
inmateactu,etnoninpotentia
tantum,
ea,quaesuntinpotentia
quianondistinguuntur
riaet nonsimpliciter,
quianonsuntin actu.Secundaest,quodsiteorum,
quaehabent
esseformale,
nontantum
uteffectus
suntin causavirtualiter
et nonformaliter.
virtuale,
Tertiaest,quodsiteorum,
esseconfusum,
in medioetmisutextrema
quaenonhabent
cibiliain mixto,
sedeorumquae habentessedistinctum
actualitatibus.
propriis
Quarta,
distinctionis
estnon-identitas.
..."
quaesolaestcompletiva
perfectae,
76See textquotedon p. 21 above.
77B readshabeant.

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
SGOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
QUESTION

47

plicitatieiusdem entis repugneta et b vere realiteret actualiter

simul esse in ipso. Sic non est de essentia et proprietate.(B,
f. 4 lva; cf. Vivs, 343b-344a)
thusfailsin its attemptto finda conThis firstapproach or modusdicendi
structionof P5 on which the asserteddistinctionbetween formalitiesis
qualifiedratherthan absolute. It failsprincipallybecause the expression
would diminishthe
cannot be construedso thatformalitas
distincta
formalitas
The requisiteweakeningforceofformaliter
noted in distincta.
non-identity
in
in the antecendentP3 is accordinglylost in the transitiontoformalitas
the consequentP5, so that an illicitinferenceis made fromsecundum
quid
is
Put in the logical termsof Scotus's analysis,the difficulty
to simpliciter.
as its deterthat in P3 formaliter
functionsas a determinalo
and distinctum
becomes
but theseroles are then reversedin P5, whereformalitas
minabile^
the determinabile
and distincta
the determinatio.
No weakingqualificationcan
as a determinabile
cannot qualify,except
thusarise in P5, becauseformalitas
as a determination
does
, while functioning
perhaps materially,and distincta
in
P3.
not of itselfqualifynon-identity,
more
than
distinctum
does
any
Afterhis lengthyexaminationof the firstapproach,whichis ultimately
to deny P5, Scotus brieflysets out an alius modusdicendi
which,he says,
some mightfindpreferable.This second approach would be to concede
some formof P5, such as 'haecformalitas
distincta
est ab illa' apparently
to
have
a
effect
on
the
takingformalitas
weaking
type of non-identity
asserted.In line with the previousdiscussion,Scotus observesthat this
can diminishthe formal
approach would have to explain how formalitas
in P3. At the
in a way equivalent to formaliter
elementof non-identity
if
wanted
to
avoid ambiScotus
one
this
least,
allows,
following approach
a estformaliter
distincta
a formaguity,he could perhaps concede formalitas
ltateb', which expresslyassertsthat the two formalities
are distinctonly
a est
, but could not concede the versiondenied above, formalitas
formaliter
distincta
a b5, which containsno qualification.This importanttext shows
that,in the end, Scotus is not opposed to allowingthe essence and propas long as the formal
ertyin the divinepersonto be distinctas formalities
as absolute.
elementof non-identity
is properlyqualifiedand not construable
In otherwords, Scotus's concessionto this second approach shows that
talk of formalities
does not of itselfentail an absolute distinction.
Alius modus dicendiforteplacet quibusdam,scilicetquod concederetur'haec formalitasdistinctaest ab illa', vel salternquod

11:36:38 AM

48

D. DUMONT
STEPHEN
'est distinctaformalitasab illa'. Sed tunc oporteretillas exponere
diminuiquantumad radonemsuam
qualiterpossethaec distinctio
5 formalemper hoc quod est 'formalitas',quia in quocumque
antecedentepraeconcesso,vel distinctiodiminuiturvel negatur
modus importatusper hoc quod est 'formaliter'.
Saltem,qui vult
uti verbis minus dubiis,ista fortepotestconcedere 'formalitasa
distinctaa formalitateV sed nec ista 'formalitasa
est formaliter
10 est distinctaa b' (B, f. 41va-b; cf. Vivs, 344a)

In the final part of his analysis,Scotus replies to the initial argument

fromanalogyin supportof the inferenceof P5 fromP3. It had reasoned
realiter
followsfromdistinctum
realitates
thatjust as distinetae
, and distinctae
followfrom
should
distinctae
rattorte
fromdistinctum
rationes
, so too
formalittes
. In his response,Scotus maintainsthat the thirdinferdistinctum
formaliter
ence is disanalogousto the firsttwo.
Scotus concedes the inferencein the firstleg of the argument,fordiswithrespect
an absolutedistinction
in the antecedentsignifies
realiter
tincta
On the materialside,everyto both the materialand formalrequirements.
refersto an absoluteratherthana qualified
one agreesthatthe termrealiter
similarlyindicatesan absolutenon-idenentity;on the formalside, realiter
titysince it has no diminishingforce.Thus, the inferencefollows,forin
the antecedentnothingis takensecundum
quidwhich in the consequentis
.
assertedsimpliciter
Scotus also concedes the inferenceof the second leg, althoughin it
the relationof antecedentto consequentis the converseof that in the
first.In this antecedent,the distinctionis diminished,at least as regards
the entityof the items, as is anythingasserted to exist in the mind.
, at least in
Therefore,fromthis it followsthat there are distinctrationes
the intellect,since again no fallaciousmove is made froman qualified
distinctionin the antecedentto an unqualifiedone in the consequent.
The desired,thirdinference,however,is fatallydissimilarto the first
is
two. Whereas in the antecedentof the firstleg the asserteddistinction
is
it
second
the
of
in
antecedent
the
not diminishedin any respect,and
diminishedonly in entity,in the antecedentof the intended,thirdinfer.
ence it is diminishedwithrespectto non-identity
formaliter
by the qualifier
The thirdconsequence is thus fallacious,whereas the firsttwo are not,
in the consequentwhich occurs only
forit assertsa distinctionsimpliciter
secundum
quid in the antecedent.In sum, Scotus denies that a parityof
does not funcreasoningholds betweenthesethreecases becauseformaliter
or ratione.
tion logicallyin the same way as eitherrealiter

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
ON THE FORMAL
PARISIAN
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

49

The Wadding editionof the followingtextcontainsno fewerthan sixteen mistakesaffectingits sense in various ways. Most notably,V has
realitate
. . . similidistincta
omittedthe entirephrase distincta
(11.1-3),which
Wadding then triedto emend, with the resultthat the summaryof the
initialargumentno longercoincidedwith Scotus's responseto it.

10

15

20

25

30

Ad argumentumin oppositum,quod procedita simili,'distinctarealitate,ergo distinctaerealitates,et distinctaratione,ergo

distinctaerationes;ergo a simili,distinctaformaliter,
ergo distinctaeformalitates':
quia cum dicitur'distinctarealiter',poniNego consequentiam,
tur distinctiosimpliciter,et hoc quantum ad utramque conditionem, tam videlicetquantum ad entitatem,quae hie omnis
quam etiam quantum
per hoc quod dicitur'realiter5,
intelligitur
rationemnonnihil
ibi
diminuens
est
ad non-identitatem,
quia
Et
ideo
identitatissimpliciter.
sequitur consequens, quod sunt
distinctaerealitatessive res, quia non infertur
aliquid simpliciter
ex seipso secundumquid accepto.
ibi
Cum etiam dicitur'haec suntdistinctaratione',diminuitur
sicut
diminuitur
ad
saltemquantum esse,
quodcumque
distinctio,
aliud sic determinatum,
puta cum dicitur'in opinione' vel 'in
Non autemdiminuitur
intellectu'.
quantumad formalemrationem
ibi
non
distinctionis,
ponitur aliqua determinatiosic per se
quia
diminuens.Sequitur igiturconsequens quod sint rationes disens enimrationisnon habet
tinctae,saltemsecundumintellectum,
esse nisi diminutum,ita quod quodcumque determinansipsum
non habet esse nisi diminutum.Ideo in consequentesic intelliex seipso diminutovel secundum
simpliciter
gendo,nihilinfertur
quid accepto in antecedente.
distinctumab ipso b'
Alitervero est de ista 'a est formaliter
nam hoc determinans'formaliter'diminuii hoc determinabile
non primomodo, scilicetquantumad entiquod est 'distinctum',
tatem,sed secundo modo, scilicetquantum ad non-identitatem,
distinctumnon includitsimpliciterdissiquidem esse formaliter
in praecedentiarticulo.Quando
dictis
ex
sicut
apparet
tingui,
formalitera , ergo formalitasa
distinctum
ergo infertur'a est
est distinctaa formalitateb' est fallacia secundumquid et simpliciter,quia distinctio,quae poniturin antecedentesecundum
quid, in consequenteponitursimpliciter.(B, f. 4 Ivb; cf. Vivs,
344a-b)

11:36:38 AM

50

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

Scotus closes his discussionof these firstthree pairs of propositionsby

summarizingwhich have been conceded and under what senses. First,
PI is to be conceded. Second, P3 is to be conceded by understanding
it
in the two waysindicated,namely,eitherby takingformaliter
to be negated
or as diminishingthe distinction.Finally,P5 taken in a unqualifiedway
is to be denied, as explained in the firstof the above two approaches,
but is to be conceded if properlyqualified,as allowed in the second
approach. Scotus concludes that the essence and personal propertyin
God can be conceded to be formallybut not absolutelydistinct.All the
conceded senses preservethat proscription.
Recolligendo igitura principioistiusarticuliquae hucusque
consistuntin hoc quod est ponere vel distinctionemcum hoc
quod est Tormaliter'vel 'formalitas',
primo concedenda est ista,
scilicet non est formaliter
idem b'
5
Secundo, ista 'z est formaliterdistinctumab ipso b' intelligendo sane, scilicetnegando modum importatumper hoc quod
est 'formaliter',
vel intelligendodistinctionem
diminuiper istum
modum additum,sicut dictumest prius.
Tertia propositio,scilicetquod 'formalitasa est distinctaa for10 malitateb' simpliciter
est neganda, et praecise concedenda cum
ista determinatione'formalitasa est distinctaformalitera formalitteb'
Et ita quodcumque essentialeconcedendumest esse distinctum formaliter
a quolibet personali,non autem simpliciterdis15 tinctum.(B, f. 4 Ivb; cf. Vivs 344b-345b)
From this point forward,the structureof the Logicabecomes less well
defined,and, in certainplaces, the manuscriptsagree less on the text.At
the least,threeremainingpointsshouldbe considered:Scotus'sarguments
forand then objectionsto further
propositionsalleged to followfromP3;
the dispositionof some eighteenobjectionsto the formaldistinction;
finally,
what appears to be the solutionto the question.
To take the firstpoint, Scotus says that apart fromthe above three
more commonlyconceded propositions,doubt remainsabout many others involvingqualificationsrelatedto the termformaliter
. He considerstwo
cases: 'There is a formaldistinctionof a to ' (Ipsiusa ad b distinctio
foror accordingto formality
fromV (a
malit)and 'flis distinctby formality
estdistinctum
ab ipsob, sivesecundum
It is argued that
formalitate
formalitatem).
both followfromP3 because theyavoid the fallacyincurredby P5. The

11:36:38 AM

DISTINCTION
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

51

firstclearlyfollows,since it explicitlyqualifiesthe distinctionas formalis

,
no
fallacious
in
there
will
be
distinctum
P3.
as
Thus,
qualifies
just formaliter
in P3 as the antecedentto an absolute
froma qualifieddistinction
inference
distinctionin the presentpropositionas the consequent. Similarly,the
second should followfromP3, since an adverbial modifieris equivalent
to a correspondingprepositionalphrase. Thus, the qualifications
formaliin the second proposition
diminishdistinctum
tteand secundum
formalitatem
diminishesit in P3. Accordingly,
in exactlythe same way thatformaliter
no fallacywould occur here any more than there.78
To these two furtherinferencesfrom P3, Scotus lodges a series of
since theydeterminedAlnwick's
objections.They are of particularinterest,
of the formaldistinction.Their historicalsignificance,
own interpretation
however,is lost in the Wadding text. Our concern restswith the first
objection,which is the most importantand which Alnwickappropriates
verbatim.We compare thisobjectionas it occursin B to the printedverbetween
sion to show how Waddinghas distortedits meaning.Differences
the two are placed in italics.

Vivs, 346a:
non ditidenContra:'Formaliter'
tittm,sed
diminuii aliquid
ad comet
determinai
aliud, magis
rationem
et
pletam
propriam
ipsius; ergo nec determinanshoc
quod est distinctum, diminuet

B, f. 4 Ivb:
Contra: 'Formaliter'non diminuii
sed ponitperfectissimam
identitatem,
identitatem
, nec diminuii aliquid
aliud, sed magis determinai ad
completamet propriamrationem
ipsius. Ergo nec determinanshoc
quod est 'distinctum' diminuet

ipsum.

ipsum.

The Wadding text,to the extentthat it makes any sense at ill,not only
does not conveythe forceof the objectionbut contradictsit. The strategy
of the objection is not to deny the validityof the inferenceof the two
to deny
additionalpropositionsfromP3. It is rathermore fundamentally
is not a weakingbut
the truthof P3 itselfon the groundsthatformaliter
a strengthening
qualification,indicatingthat what it modifiesis to be
taken in the most proper and perfectsense. The argumentis that when
formaliter
signifiesthe most completeidentitypossible.
applied to identity,
must qualifyin this way when applied
of
By parity reasoning,formaliter
78See Vivs,345b-6a,
occur.
textual
difficulties
whereno serious

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52

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

so thatit will signifythe most complete

to the correlativetermdistinctum,
or utmostdistinction.As such, it does not diminishdistinctionor anythingelse to which it is applied.
This argumentis lost or even contradictedin the Wadding text,since
in line 1 above, which dictatesthe whole sense of the passage,
diminuii
has been misread as dicit.Wadding's misreadingconveysthe idea that
does not signify
identityratherthan the nearlyoppositepoint of
formaliter
the objection that it intensifiesidentity.Futhermore,in dropping the
explanatoryphrase in lines 2-3, which includesthe negativeconjunction
...
is diminishing
nec,Wadding'stextactuallysaysthatformaliter
Formaliter'
of
the
that
the
whole
diminuit
objection
point
), which contradicts
aliquid
. . . ecdiminuit
it does not diminishanything('Formaliter'
aliquid
). The larger
effectof thiscorruptedpassage in Wadding is to renderthe interpretation
of thiswhole sectionproblematic,since the ensuingobjections,whichsimand equivalentexpressionsare not diminishing
ilarlyargue thatformaliter
with this lead, governingobjection.
inconsistent
become
qualifications,
As indicated,this objectionbecame decisivein Alnwick'sown theory
a factundetectablein Wadding's mangledtext.
of the formaldistinction,
Alnwick,takingthe line of argumentin theseobjections,denies the interdimpretationof P3 givenabove by Scotus,accordingto whichformaliter
. According to Alnwick,
inishes the non-identityimplied by distinctum
propositionsabout God in the formof P3 mustbe denied because they
imply absolute, unqualifieddistinction.When it is objected, as Scotus
can be construed as a diminishing
responded above, that formaliter
Alnwick
replies by quoting verbatimthe above objection
qualification,
that it is rathera qualificationthat specifiesthe proper and complete
nature of what it modifies.It thereforedoes not diminish.
a V ponitur
absolute
distinctio
'a formaliter
Sedperistudconsequens
distinguitur
diminuens
necdistrahens.
...
nonestdeterminado
inter
a et b, quialy'formaliter'
'
distin. . . quodin ista a formaliter
Ad maiorem
huiusrationis
potest
responden
sedtantum
distinctio
secundum
a b' nonponitur
distinctio
quid,
simpliciter
guitur
diminuens
a distinctione,
'formaliter'
videtur
essedeterminado
quiahaecdeterminatio
a non-identitate.
...
'nonidemformaliter'
diminuit
sicutethaecadditio
ab aliquo,quaedeterminat
Sed contra:
iliadeterminatio
nondiminuit
ipsumad
additum
sedhocquoddico'formaliter'
suamcompletam
etpropriam
alicui,
rationem;
ad propriam
nondimiutidentitti
velalicuialteri,
determinat
rationem;
igitur
ipsum
nuitab ipso.79
79William
ofAlnwick,
Quod.
q. 1, in:Ledoux(ed.)1937(above,n. 10),187.Alnwick
makesthesamepointin q. 2, 230-31.

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DISTINCTION
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
SCOTUS'S
QUESTION

53

Since Scotus does not respondto the objections,as we shall see, he gives
mustbe construedas eitherdiminon whether
no determination
formaliter
his
discussionto thispoint certainly
although
ishingor non-diminishing,
allows for the former.He does concede at the very end of the Logica
,
is taken in the non-diminishing
sense, then,as
however,that ifformaliter
Alnwicknotes,it impliesan absolutedistinctionand the essence and perIt is temptingto
sonal propertycannot be said to be formallydistinct.80
speculatethat since Alnwicktakes these objectionsto be so determinative and repeats them so accuratelythat he actually supplied them at
Scotus's disputationof the Logica.
Scotus does not replyto thisseriesof objectionsagainst
Unfortunately,
the two, furtherinferencesfromP3, althoughit seems that he intended
to do so. This is obscured by Wadding, who has emended the text at
thejuncturewhere theseobjectionsend and a new set begin,in thiscase
pointin the Logica
Althoughthistransitional
againstthe formaldistinction.
thisis probablythe correct
is not entirelyclear, even in the manuscripts,
form:81
B, f. 42ra:
Vivs, 347a:
Alia adducunturargumentacon- Ad argumenta.
formalema
tra distinctionemformalema et Contra distinctionem
et b arguitursic:
, arguitursic:
to respondto the
In otherwords,Scotus leftthe indicationAd argumenta
clause introduces
The
Contra
did
so.
but
never
of
set
objections,
previous
a second set of new objectionsthatdo not direcdyconcernthe inferences
fromPI, but are more general argumentsagainstthe formaldistinction
and formalities.
Assessingtheirdispositionin the Logicais, for the question of its realism,obviouslyrelevant.Are these argumentsthat Scotus is
80(B,f.42va;cf.Vivs,351a):"Si autemper'distinctum
distincformaliter'
intelligat
et
determinet
non
licet
'formaliter'
hoc
additum
tionem
diminuit,
compleat
per
simpliciter,
formaliter'."
hoc'essedistinctum
81The textofV, which
contra
Adargumenta
hasbefore
him,readsas follows:
Wadding
an emendation
a etb arguitur
sic(f.293rb).
distinctionem
obviously
thought
Wadding
formalem
to whatthesentence
wasnecessary,
because,
appearsto say,theimmediately
contrary
ofit.He thussimply
notdefenses
theformal
areagainst
distinction,
ensuing
arguments
withno basisin anymanutoAliaadducuntur
Adargumenta
, a reading
argumenta
changed
Ad
after
a fullstopis indicated
to agreewiththisfact.In manuscript
B, however,
script,
thatthephrase
Thisindicates
A thephrase
is simply
andinmanuscript
dropped.
argumenta
consisofthecontra
is grammatically
clause,whichis theonlyconstruction
independent
tentwiththeensuing
objections.

11:36:38 AM

54

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

himselfendorsingagainst the formaldistinction,or are they challenges

cannot answerthis
to it thathe would reject?The Logicaitselfregrettably
question,because Scotus gives no repliesto them. Withoutan answer,
of the Logicawould remain open.
however,the overall interpretation
answered
fromotherhistoricalsources.
this
can
be
Fortunately, question
As already indicated,Peter Aureoli, while eventuallyrejectingScotus's
nonethelessdefendsit againstwhat he took to be the
formaldistinction,
of some that it posited attributesin God as separate
false interpretation
formalitiesor realitiesadded to the divine essence. Aureoli's defenseof
Scotus comprisestwo parts.82First,he lays out the argumentsthat draw
their sources as
such an implicationfromScotus's position,identifying
Gerard of Bologna, Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus.83He then systematicallyrespondsto each argumentin termsof the general featuresof
Scotus's positionhe had already detailed. Of relevanceto our immediate concern is that among the argumentsAureoli reportsas those of
Gerard, Hervaeus and Durandus are several given as objectionsin this
section of the Logica.The correspondenceamong the firstthree is verbatim and in order,as is evidentfromthispartial comparison:
Aureoli,Sent.1 d. 8:84
Si enim voluntaset deitas foraut formamaliterdistinguuntur,
litas voluntatis secundum quod
huiusmodidiffera realitate,aut
non differ.Si non differ,ergo
idem est differreformaliteret
eis est alirealiter;si vero differ,
quid commune.. . .

B, f. 42rb; cf. Vivs, 347a-b:

Formalitasa in quantumhuius
a formaliae
aut differ
, au non.
Si non,idem es differre
formalier
e realier; si sic, au formaliai
e rei, cui es idem realier non
formalier,es aliquid commune,
au non. . . .

82PeterAureoli,
1 d. 8 sect.23,nn.93-139,
n. 11),
Sent.
in:Buytaert
(ed.1954(above,
1000-9.
83Theseareidentified
inAureoli's
Cf.Aureoli,
1000:"Articulus
rubric
tothearticle.
ibid.,
In quo ostenditur
est,nonobstantibus
quomodoquartusmodusrationabilis
quartus.
Aureoli's
scilicet
Gerardi
etHervaei
etDurandi."
rationibus
Generally
speaking,
aliquorum,
Allthreeofthesethinkers,
whichAureoli
listsin chronological
attributions
areaccurate.
Parisian
whichextended
from
the
forsometimewithScotus's
career,
order,
overlapped
as lateas theFallof1307.Wehaveyettoidentify
theoriginal
Fallof1302until
perhaps
sourceofthesethree
arguments.
84Sect.23,n. 93-5,in:Buytaert
We follow
thecor(ed. 1954(above,n. 11),1000-1.
onlineat http://www.igl.ku.dk/
rected
textbyChristopher
SchabelandRussellFriedman
~russ/
auriol.html.

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SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION
secundum
Praeterea,formalitas
formalitas
et
ut
a
quod
quocumaut est aliqua res
que alio differt,
aut nulla res.. . .
huiusmodi
Praeterea,formalitas
nihil aliud est quam quiditas seu
conceptusquiditativus,secundum
sic ponentes.Sed quiditasest vera
res et vera substantia.. . .

55

Item secundo,formalitas
ut foraut
est
res
aut
malitas,
aliqua
non. . . .
Item tertio,formalitashuiusmodi non est aliud quam quiditas
vel quid rei extra animam, non
vel intentionissecundae.
figmenti
Formalitasergo est substantia.. . .

While it is an open question,and one deservingof proper investigation,

whetherAureoli'sdefenseof Scotus is a faithful
one, the above passages
establishthe historicalfactthat the some eighteenargumentsagainstthe
formaldistinctionin the Logicawere lodged against Scotus by his own
contemporariesat Paris. They cannot thereforeof themselvesbe taken
as Scotus's own repudiationof the formaldistinctionor formalities.
They
also furtherconfirmWalter Chatton's account that Scotus disputedthe
Logicain responseto criticismsat Paris.
As indicated,Scotus gives no responsesto this second seriesof objections,so thattheyare immediatelyfollowedby the abruptappearance of
what seems to be a solutionof the question.
De primo articulo:Deitas sub completaactualitateex natura
rei est. Paternitasin completa actualitateest ibi ex natura rei.
Haec est actualitasad se et communicabilis,et illa ad aliud et
et hoc totumex natura rei. Sic videlicetde
incommunicabilis,
5 entitatea et entitateb.
Ex hoc secundum, scilicet de identittevel non-identitate.
sed actualiter,non virUbicumque est aliquid non potentialiter
non confuse,non mixtimsed in proprio
tualitersed formaliter,
esse, ibi hoc quantum est ex parte actualitatisproprieformalis,
non tarnenhabetur
10 habeturilludquod sufficeret
ad distinctionem,85
nisi
habeatur
quod compleat, scilicetnoncomplete distinctio,
sicutloquimurde identitterei simplicis.
identitatemsimpliciter,
Complet incompossibilitasactualitatisad actualitatem,incomin
sed incompossibilitas
possibilitasnon sicut est contrariorum,
15 eodem indivisibili.(B, f. 42rb; cf. Vivs, 350a-b)
85In all manuscripts
here,thephrasein thislinereads
exceptV, whichwe follow
senseandappears
adnondistinctionem.
Thisseemstomakelittle
illud
nonsufficeret
habetur
quod

11:36:38 AM

56

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

The above passages are veryelliptical,and theirexact connectionto the

precedingdiscussionis not whollyclear. This has no doubt contributed
to Wadding makingno fewerthan a dozen emendationsor misreadings
in as many lines,with seven occurringin the firstfourlines alone. Two
of these are substantialand misleading.First,he changes the opening
to Dico primo.This obscures the fact that
phrase fromDe primoarticulo
Scotus is makinga general resolution,presumablypertainingto the initial discussionof propositionsP1-P6. (In generalWadding has suppressed
everyreferenceScotus makes in the Logicato articuli,
apparentlybecause
he could findno such announced division.)Second, and far more serious, Wadding has both misreadand thenemendedthe sentencePatemitas
in completa
actualitate
est ibi ex naturarei(1. 2), convertingit into Patemitas
sub incompleta
actualitate
estibi ex naturarei.Aside fromdestroying
the main
Scotus
wants
to
in
make
this
text
point
passage, Wadding's
places within
God somethingincompleteor imperfect,
namely,physicalchange,which
the scholasticsdefineaccording to Aristotleas an incompleteact {actus
because it involvespotentiality.86
As rendered by Wadding,
imperfectus)
the
above
text
that
the
Trinitarian
therefore,
says
personis a whole comprised of the divine essence as completeact and the personal property
as incompleteact, effectively
turningthe essence into a mobile subject
and the propertyinto physicalmovement.Scotus, of course, cannot be
sayingthis.As he makes clear in relatedpassages of his Parisian Quodlibet
,
which must be nearlycontemporaneouswith the Logica,both the divine
essence and Paternityare in completeactuality:
In Deo estessentia
subcompleta
actualitate
et hocmereex natura
rei.87
essentiae,
Patemitas
etiam
. . . manet
insuaactualitate
estincompleta
com, quaesemper
completa
municatione
naturae.
. . .88
Scotus's above solutionappears to be addressingthe two elementsof distinctionset out earlier:the materialaspect of the entityof the termsand
the formalaspect of their non-identity.
The firstparagraph treatsthe
togoagainst
thepointScotus
is trying
tomake,
thatthere
canbe alltherequirenamely,
ments
sufficient
fordistinction
as regards
actualitatis
is still
(exparte
actuality
), andyetthere
notcomplete
distinction
without
absolute
non-identity.
86Gf.Aquinas,
InPh.3 (201b30-31)
lect.3 n. 296:"Etquidem
verum
estquodmotus
estactus,sedestactusimperfectus,
medius
inter
et actum."
potentiam
87Scotus,
delDoctor
Sutil
Quod.
q. 1 n. 24,in:FelixAlluntis
(ed.),Obras
JuanDunsEscoto.
Cuestiones
cuodlibetales
, Madrid1968,18.
88Scotus,
Quod.
q. 4 n. 57,in Alluntis
(ed.)1968(above,n. 87),155.

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DISTINCTION
ON THE FORMAL
PARISIAN
SGOTUS'S
QUESTION

57

the second the requireentityof the divineessenceand personalproperty,

The firstparagraphpresupposesthe earlierstipmentsfor non-identity.
can be qualifiedfromthe side of entityif actuality
ulationthatdistinction
is diminished,potentialor confused.Scotus thushere explicitlystatesthat
the entityof neitherthe essence nor propertyis in any way so qualified,
so that the actualityof each is completeand extra-mental{ex naturarei).
They differin that the actualityof the essence is absolute and communicable and thatof the propertyis relativeand incommunicable,but not
as to the perfectionof that actuality.Read against the prior discussion,
betweenthe divineessence
thisparagraphis concludingthatthe distinction
and personalpropertycannot be qualifiedon the materialside of entity.
Any qualificationof theirdistinctionwill accordinglyhave to be on the
whichScotustakesup in the secondparagraph.
formalside of non-identity,
The somewhatroughlycomposed second paragraphre-assertsthe earlier point that even where entityis absolutelyunqualified,so that from
the point of view of actualityall requirementsare presentfordistinction,
withoutthe completingelementof absolute
thereis not absolutedistinction
within
the divine person all entityis comIn
other
words,
non-identity.
is
not completeand utterdistinction.
but
there
pletelyand utterlyactual,
the one actualitymust be incompatiblewith
For absolute non-identity,
the otherin the same, indivisiblething,althoughnot as contraries.Scotus
explainsthislast qualificationin responseto the questionof what makes
one actualityincompatiblewith another.
Et si quaeras: quare actualitas haec sit incompossibilissimplicitatiilli in quibusdam,et in quibusdam non?
Respondeo: extrema simpliciterSimpliciase totis sunt compossibilia,et se totisincompossibilia,si sint incompossibilia.Est
5 igiturPaternitascompossibilis
Deitati,quia Paternitasest Paternitas,
et Deitas est Deitas, sicutin aliis.Albedo et humanitassuntincompossibilia in eodem simplici,quia humanitasest humanitas,et
albedo est albedo. Non tarnensuntincompossibiliain aliquo uno
per accidens, sic tarnensunt incompossibiliaalbedo et nigredo.
10 Et rationesincompossibilitatis
sunt ipsae proet compossibilitatis
priae rationesextremorum.(B, f. 42rb; cf. Vivs, 351a-b)
Scotus says that the incompatibility
resultingin an absolute non-identity
cannot be explainedby anythingbeyond the naturesof the thingsthemis
selves.The degree of incompatibility
requiredforabsolutenon-identity
as in the
not as high as opposites,for all it must violate is simplicity,

11:36:38 AM

58

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

case of a substanceand a quality.Opposites,however,not only cannot

be togetherin a simplebeing,but cannot even be united accidentally.
If read in relationto the titleof the questionand its main results,the
ratherfragmentary
solutionabove says that the divine essence and personal propertyare not in everyway the same (orminoidem
) but are distinct under qualification.A distinctioncan be qualified either from a
diminishedentityof the termsor froma diminishedtype of non-identity.The formeris not possible in God, since both the divine essence
and personal propertiesare fullyand utterlyactual. The distinctionis
thus qualifiedbecause the non-identity
itselfis not absolute, that is, is
formal.
As
has
been
this
solution
noted,
merely
closelytracksthat of the
Reportatio
parisiensis.
The Realismof theLogica Scoti
In view of the above analysis,what conclusionscan be drawn about the
realismof the LogicaScoti
, a work explicitlycited by both medieval and
moderncommentators
in supportof a less realistreadingof Scotus's formal distinction?On the medieval side, fourteenth-century
commentators
saw the Logicaas prohibiting
fromnonany inferenceto formaldistinction
in
God
and
as
that
the
divine
attribessence,
identity
especially denying
utes and personellpropertiesare distinctformalitites.
On the modernside,
scholars see Scotus in the Logicaand the related Reportatio
as
parisiensis
denyingformalitiesby virtue of admittingonly qualified distinctionin
God. On this precise point, they furthersee Scotus as departingfrom
his prior Oxford works,in which he had allowed withinGod the existence of absolutelydistinctformalities.Does the Logica support these
conclusions?
To take the firstof the two medieval claims, it is abundantlyclear
fromhis detailedanalysisof whetherP3 followsfromPI thatScotus does
not unequivocallydeny in the Logicaan inferenceto formaldistinction
in
God. Scotus admits P3 on at least two interpretations
and in general
seems receptiveto allowingthe inferencebased on common usage and
in more literalconstructions
uninterested
of P3 thatwould blockitsacceptance. Scotus's overridingconcern is to preventany assertionor ready
entailmentof absolute distinctionin God. Since P3 preservesthat exclusion in eitherthe firstsense of denyingformalidentityor in the second
of assertingdiminisheddistinction,
Scotus concedes it on thosemeanings.
It could be counteredthat the firstsense of P3 is simplyidenticalin

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

59

meaningto PI, and so does not reallyassertdistinctionat all, and that

the second sense is false because formaliter
, as Alnwickargued, is not a
Scotus
seems to come close to conweakeningqualification.Although
the
first
that
the
first
sense of P3 did not seem
ceding
point, observing
in meaningfromthatof PI (nonvidetur
multum
distare
ab intelverydifferent
lect negativae
primoconcessae
), it is not at all clear that he grantsthe second. Certainly,there is no decisive evidence in the Logicathat Scotus
thinksformaliter
must be taken as non-diminishing,
as Alnwickdoes, and
indeed quite a lot of evidence in it that he does not thinkso. As such,
we conclude that in the LogicaScotus does not absolutelydeny formal
distinctionin God but only if it leads to absolute distinction,
which,on
certainconstruais,it need not. As we have argued,thisrepresents
a developmentover the parallel and oftenquoted textfromthe Ordinatio.
As to the second medievalclaim, that in the LogicaScotus denied formalitiesin God, a point on which Chatton was most explicit,a similar
judgment seems warranted.AlthoughScotus's extensiveanalysis of P5
ultimatelyconcluded that it assertedan absolute distinctionbetweenformalities,for it contained no qualificationof the non-identitysignified
betweenthem,it did not conclude that in and of themselvesformalities
implyan absolutedistinction.Indeed, thisis evidentfromthe veryargument that Scotus used to establishthat P5 signifiedan absolute distinction betweenformalities.
In his analysisof P5 Scotus construesformalitas
to functionlogicallyas a determinabile.
Scotus then argued that because
any determinableof itselfseemed open to being qualifiedby distinction
thatwas eitherabsolute or diminished(<quodcumque
determinabile
potestinteldeterminari
distinctione
tali
vel
tali
vel
diminuta
the
occur,
ligi
puta simpliciter
),
rence offormalitas
in P5 could not of itselfdeterminedistincta
in one or
the otherway. Consequently,the non-identity
in P5
signifiedby distincta
remained unqualified.Obviously,Scotus's reasoningabout P5 depends
on takingformalitas
as neutralwithrespectto eitherabsolute or qualified
distinction.This is confirmedby Scotus's concessionof P5, both in the
second approach and in his concludingsummary,as long as it included
the diminishingqualifierformaliter.
This would be impossibleifformalitas
of itselfentailed absolute non-identity.To put it equivalently,Scotus
expresslysaysthatP5 is to be denied takenwithoutqualification(simpliciter)
but is to be conceded if qualified(cumdeterminatone).
Of itself,accordingly,
in P5 mustbe open to being takenin eitherway. It seems clear
formalitas
thereforethat, as with the firstclaim, the Logica cannot be taken as
in God, but only,as Scotus makes explicit,
absolutelydenyingformalities

11:36:38 AM

60

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

if formalitiesare posited together

withabsolute distinctionbetween them.
Taken as it stands,P5 does not avoid thisprohibition,but it can when
can be admitted.
properlyqualified,and so in this sense formalities
If the precedinganalysisis correct,then the moderninterpretation
of
the Logicaand Reportatio
seems doubtful.It means that Scotus's
parisiensis
in God in thesetwo
admittedlyunequivocaldenial of absolutedistinction
textsdoes not entail an correspondingly
unequivocal denial of formalities. That is, Scotus's restrictionof distinctionin God to secundum
quid
does not of itselfmean thathe excludesformalities,
since thesemay themselvesbe so distinct.To the attendantmodernclaim thatat OxfordScotus
allowed for an absolute distinctionof formalities
withinGod, of course,
the Logicacannot speak. But if Scotus went fromadmittingabsolute distinctionin God at Oxford, which seems doubtful,to admittingonly
qualifieddistinctionin God at Paris, thiswould not in any case entail a
to denyingformalities.
correspondingmove fromadmittingformalities
The above analysisseems entirelyconsistentwiththe main solutionof
theLogica,which,as indicated,correspondsquite closelyto thatof Reportatio
1 d. 33. Accordingto this solution,distinctioncomprisesboth a material component,whichis the entityof the itemsinvolved,as well as a formal component,which is the non-identity
of those items.For distinction
to be absolute, both the material and formal components must be
unqualified.Thus, even if the entityof the termswere whollyundiminished, so as to be fullyactual and in no way potential,virtual,or conforabsolutedistinction,
sinceadditionally
fused,thiswould not be sufficient
the formalelementof non-identity
must be unqualified.This non-identityoccurs when such entitiesor actualitiesare so incompatiblethatthey
cannot co-existin a simple being. Scotus's solution thus detaches the
fromthatof entity,so that satisfying
the latrequirementof non-identity
terdoes not necessarily
the
former.
on
Scotus's
solution,
satisfy
Accordingly,
the positingof formalities
as actual entities,regardlessof how unqualified,
does not of itselfmean thattheyare absolutelydistinct,since thisfurther
which may or may
requiresthat they be incompatiblewith simplicity,
not be the case, dependingon theirnatures(rationes).
As Scotus is clear,
some actualitiesor formalitiesare incompatiblein this way, and hence
while othersare not: Sed undeestquodaliquaeactuabsolutelynon-identical,
alitatespropraeetformales
suntincompossibiles
hoc modo
, aliquaenon? (Vivs,
350b; B, f. 41rb). To admit formalitiesis thereforenot necessarilyto
admit absolutedistinction,
contraryto what what both the medievaland
modern versionsof the less realistreading of Scotus seem to hold. At

11:36:38 AM

SCOTUS'S
PARISIAN
ON THE FORMAL
DISTINCTION
QUESTION

61

root, this readingappears to resultfromassessingalone the materialor

entitativerequirementfor absolute distinction.
Conclusion
The formaldistinction
is one of Scotus'smostcharacteristic
and influential
doctrines.Dispute over its meaning,however,particularlyon the fundamentalissue of the degree of realismthat it implies,extendsback to the
fourteenth
both among medieval as
century.A prevalentinterpretation,
well as modern commentators,
was to view the formaldistinctionin a
less realistway, accordingto which Scotus would deny that it entailed
extra-mental
formalities
or even distinction,
at least in the case of God.
This less realistview was based principallyon Scotus's Parisiantreatment,
which differsmarkedlyfromthe earlier Oxford discussion.Among the
Parisianworkstaken to be most indicativeof thisless realistview was a
treatise,that,up untilnow, was not certainlyknownto be Parisian,not
foundin standardcataloguesof Scotus's corpus,and existedin a printed
formso corruptas to defyinterpretation.
The limitedaim of this study
has been to discoverthe historicaloriginsof this work, known to the
fourteenthcenturyas the LogicaScoti
, and then to provide a corrected
textand preliminary
of
its
central
analysis
passages. We have shownthat
a
citations
Walter
confrere
of Ockham, establishthat
Chatton,
explicit
by
the LogicaScotiwas a special disputationcarried out by Scotus at Paris
in responseto criticismsof his applicationof the formaldistinctionto
God. We have uncoveredsufficient
manuscriptevidence to reconstruct
an accurate and sensible text at places where the printededition has
none. As a result,in several criticalpassages we could restoreScotus's
originalmeaningor argumentwhere it had been lost or distortedin the
printedversion.
A prelimaryassessmentbased on a more accurate text shows that in
the Logica
, at least in the incompleteformthat we now possess, Scotus
does in factallow, undercertainrestrictions,
not onlyan inferenceto formal distinction,
but also to distinctformalities,
even in the case of the
divine person. The overridingconcern of Scotus in the Logicais not to
exclude formaldistinctionor distinctformalitiesas such fromGod but
to exclude absolute distinction.To the extentthat the formercan be
assertedin God withoutgivingriseto the latter,whichin the LogicaScotus
seems to thinkis possible, they are permissable.Accordingly,the two
principalfeaturesof the less realistreadingof Scotus's formaldistinction

11:36:38 AM

62

STEPHEN
D. DUMONT

cannot,as both medievaland moderncommentatorsalike claim, be discovered unequivocallyin the LogicaScoti.Of course, however,the question of the extent of realism in Scotus's formaldistinctioncannot be
decided on the basis of his Logicaalone. Indeed, it cannoteven be decided
forhis Paris teachingfromhis Logicaalone. But neithercan these questionsbe decided apart froman accurate understanding
of his Logica
. To
thislatterconcern,we hope to have contributed.
Notre Dame, Indiana
ofNotreDame
University

11:36:38 AM

Scotus'sRealistConception
:
of theCategories
His Legacyto Late MedievalDebates
GIORGIO PINI

Abstract
Scotusclaimsthatthe extramental
worldis dividedintoten distinct
kindsof
essences,no one of whichcan be reducedto anotherone. Althoughby the
end of the thirteenth
centurythisclaimwas not new, Scotus'sway of articdoctrineresultedintoa groundulatingit intoa comprehensive
metaphysical
to whatbecameknownas 'late medievalrealism'.This
breakingcontribution
paper showshow Scotus'sview of the categoriesas ten kindsof irreducible
essencesshouldbe seen as a development
and correction
of his predecessors'
(includingThomas Aquinas's and Henryof Ghent's)views.The main elementsof Scotus'sdoctrineare his applicationof the real distinction
to the
categories,his view of inherenceas a categorialitem separatedfromaccibetweenabsoluteand non-absolute
accidents.Finally,
dents,and hisdistinction
althoughScotus'sdoctrineof the univocityof being seems to pose a challenge to his claim thatcategoriesare irreducibleto each otherand do not
have anythingin common,thispaper showshow Scotus'sdoctrineof univocityand his realistconceptionof the categoriescan be reconciledas two
theoriesthatdescribethe worldfromdifferent
pointsof view.
Scotus's contributionto realismis twofold.Most famously,he is a realist concerninguniversais.Even thoughhe does not subscribeto the naive
view that universaisare thingsoutside the mind, he maintainsthat universal conceptsare groundedon real featuresof the extramentalworld.
For he holds that any extramentalthingthat can be known by way of
a universalconcept can be analyzed into two constituents,
a common
and a proper one. The common constituentaccounts for the fact that
somethingis the kind of thingthat it is and is representedby a universal concept,the proper constituentaccountsforits beingjust the particular thingthat it is. These two constituents
cannot existone withoutthe
other. Nevertheless,they are distinctfromeach other withinthe same
thingindependentlyof the mind's activity.

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2005
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl

Vivarium
43,1

11:36:44 AM

64

GIORGIOPINI

In addition,Scotus is a realistconcerningcategories.He holds thatthe

extramentalworldis dividedinto ten kindsor categories.No one of these
kinds can be reduced to anotherone. They are the fundamentalbricks
that constitutereality.
Accordingly,Scotus's metaphysicsis the resultof the combinationof
two formsof realism,one concerninguniversais,the other concerning
categories.Both aspects of Scotus's realism were attacked by William
Ockham.1 This possiblycontributedto some confusionbetween them,
even amongScotus'scontemporaries
and immediatesuccessors.But Scotus's
two formsof realism,althoughcombined to give rise to a comprehensive metaphysical
view,are logicallyindependentof each other.One might
maintainthat categoriesare reallydistinctkindsof thingswhile disallowing Scotus's realism concerninguniversais.Conversely,one mighthold
thatthingsin the extramentalworldare constituted
of two formallynonidenticalconstituents
while rejectingScotus's strongrealism concerning
categories.
Scotus's two formsof realism also exploit different
conceptual tools.
- which
His positionon the categories
actuallyamountsto a sortof anti- is centredon the real distinction
reductionism
among them. His position on universaisis centredon the notionof a formaldistinction
between
the two constituents
of one thing;one of these two constituents
(usually
labeled as 'realities'or Tormalities')is actual with respectto the other
one, whichis potential.No one of them,however,could even existwithout the otherone, since theyare not two different
things,but two constituentsof just one thing.2
Finally,Scotus's two formsof realismconsiderthe worldfromdifferent
perspectives.His doctrineof categoriesfocuseson its fundamentalstruc1 William
Ordinato
Ockham,
I, d. 2. q. 6, in: Opera
II, edd.S. Brown-G.
theologica
Gi,
St. Bonaventure,
NY 1970,161-95(on universls);
Summa
I, cc. 44-62,in: Opera
logicae
Gl-S.Brown,
St.Bonaventure,
I, edd.P. Boehner-G.
NY 1974,132-93(on
philosophka
andtheir
See M. McCordAdams,William
Ockham
categories
distinction).
, 2 vols.,Notre
Dame,IN 1987,I, 43-59,143-285.
2 See forexample
Ord.II, d. 3, p. 1,q. 5-6,n. 189,in:Opera
omnia
JohnDunsScotus,
Civitas
Vaticana1973,484-5:". . . dicoquodcompositio
VII, ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
- velminus
potest
intelligi
proprie,
proutestex re actualiet repotentiali,
proprie,
prout
estex realitate
et realitate
actualiet potentiali
in eademre.Primomodononestindividuum
naturae
realitatem
addit[...]. Secundo
compositum
respectu
specificae,
quianullam
modoestnecessario
a qua accipitur
differentia
compositum,
quia illarealitas
specifica,
estrespectu
illiusrealitatis
a qua accipitur
differentia
potentialis
sicutsi essent
individualis,
resetres;nonenimrealitas
ex se habetundeincludat
realitatem
specifica
peridentitatem
sedtantum
includit
istaamboperidentitatem".
individualem,
aliquodtertium

11:36:44 AM

REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S
OF THE CATEGORIES

65

ture,i.e. the ten kindsinto which the world is divided and the relationship among thesekinds.His doctrineof universaisand formaldistinction
concernsthe internalstructureof thingswithineach categoryand their
possibilityof being known by way of concepts hierarchicallyordered
accordingto varyingdegreesof universality.
Contrarilyto what may be
a
Scotus's
world
is
not
world
of
formalitiesbut a world of
supposed,
for
are
of
things, only things
capable
independentexistenceand consethe world. Formalitiesare only
quentlyare the basic bricksconstituting
in the world.
constituents
of
what
exist
non-independent
Scotus's positionon universaisand the formaldistinctionis one of the
most famousand difficult
topicsin his metaphysics.As such, it has been
the object of severalexcellentstudies.3In thispaper, I focuson Scotus's
anti-reductionist
doctrineof the categories.Soon destinedto become the
basis of what Ockham labels 'the positionof the moderns',4its novelty
can be fullyappreciatedif compared to his contemporaries'and predecessors'opinions.Accordingly,
I firstgive a briefpresentationof the standard account of categoriesin Scotus's times.Second, I considerScotus's
own doctrinein some detail. Third, I take into account an apparent
betweenScotus'spositionon the categoriesand his doctrine
inconsistency
of univocity.Fourthand finally,I summarizeScotus's positionand I try
to give a firstassessmentof its influenceon late medievalrealism.It will
emergethat Scotus's influenceon the debate on the categorieswas decisive but indirect.It was mainlythroughOckham's critiqueand through
Walter Burley'sreactionto Ockham's critiquethat Scotus's doctrineof
the categoriesbecame knownto late medievalrealists.As a consequence
of this process,much of Scotus's subtle and nuanced positionwas lost.
Nevertheless,it clearlyappears that it was Scotus who approached the
3 See M. McCordAdams,
Ockham
onIdentity
andDistinction
36
, in: Franciscan
Studies,
on
43-6;P. King,DunsScotus
(1976),25-43;McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 16-29,
theCommon
andIndividual
Nature
, in: Philosophical
Difference
Topics,20 (1992),51-76;Id.,
Scotus
onMetaphysics
toDunsScotus
, in:T. Williams
, Cambridge
(ed.),TheCambridge
Companion
andIndividuation
2003,22-5;T.B.Noone,Universais
, in:Williams
(ed.),TheCambridge
Companion
toDunsScotus
Thereis somedebateconcerning
whether
andtowhatextent
Scotus
, 100-28.
hismindconcerning
theexactnature
oftheformal
distinction:
see H. Gelber,
changed
A ClashofValues
andtheTrinity.
inScholastic
1300-1335
, Ph.D Dissertation,
Logic
Thought
ofWisconsin
Parisian
onDivine
1974,80-5;R. Cross,Scotus's
,
University
Teaching
Simplicity
in: O. Boulnois
etal. (eds),DunsScot Paris,1302-2002
, Turnhout
2004,519-62;S.D.
DunsScotus's
Parisian
onthe
Formal
anditsFourteenth-Century
Distinction
Dumont,
Question
Reception
in thissameissue.
4 See notably
Summa
Ockham,
I, cc. 42-62,in: Opera
I, 118-93.See
logicae
philosophica
McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 144-6.

11:36:44 AM

66

GIORGIOPINI

topic of the real statusof the categoriesin a radicallynew way and consequentlyput all the question on a new track. So, even though only
throughOckham and Burley,Scotus's indirectinfluenceon late medieval
realismcan stillbe clearlydetected.
1. RealistConceptions
Scotus
of theCategories
Before
Scotus is neitherthe only nor the firstone to maintainthat the categories are a classificationof things.In the thirteenth
century,that was
by far the majorityview. Scotus's originalityconsistsin his takingvery
seriouslythe traditionalclaim concerningthe real statusof the categories
and in givinga rigorousformulation
of the standardposition.As it hapthis
had
effects
on
the
standardpositionitself.
pens,
devastating
Even thoughit lies beyond the scope of this paper, the originof the
doctrineof the categoriesmustbe briefly
takenintoaccount.In the fourth
of
his
known
as
the
, Aristotlepresentsa list of
Categories
chapter
writing
ten items as the meaningsof simple expressions.Elsewhere,he gives a
shorterlistof eightitemsas the meaningsof 'beingperse' Aristotlehimselfnevercalls theseten or eightitems'categories'(i.e. predications),
even
he
sometimes
connects
these
items
to
the
of
though
'figures predications'.5
Quite early,however,interpreters
joined togetherthe list of the meanings of simple termsand the 'figuresof predications'or 'predications'.
Soon, commentatorsagreed about the officiallistof Aristotle'scategories
and about their basic nature. Substance, Quality, Quantity,Relation,
Action,Passion,When, Where, Positionand Habit were commonlyconsidered as Aristotle'scategories.Moreover, it was commonlyheld that
theywere a primaryclassification.Since then,this seems to have been
a characteristic
point of any theoryof categories:no matterwhat they
classify,categoriesare the most fundamentaland basic featuresto which
5 Cat.4, Ib25-2a4;
Met.V, 7, 1017a22-27.
SeeM. Frede,
Top.I, 9, 103b20-39;
Categories
inAristotle
inAristotle
D.C. 1982,1-24(repr.
, in:DJ. O'Meara(ed.),Studies
, Washington,
in:M. Frede,Essays
inAncient
of
account
, Oxford
1987,29-48).Fora different
Philosophy
therelationship
between
andpredication,
seeL.M.de Rijk,OnAncient
however,
categories
andMedieval
Semantics
III: TheCategories
as Classes
18 (1980),1-62;
, in:Vivarium,
ofNames
as a KeyNotion
inAncient
andMedieval
Semantics
26 (1988),
Id., {Categorization}
, in:Vivarium,
Semantics
andOntology,
2 vols,Brill,Leiden-Boston-Kln
1-18;Id.,Aristotle:
2002,vol.I,
On thehistory
358-73.
oftheconcept
ofcategory,
seeH.M.Baumgarten
etal.,Kategorie,
133-6,
in:J. RitteiHK..
Wrterbuch
derPhilosophie
, IV, Darmstadt
1976,
(eds),Historisches
Grnger
714-76.

11:36:44 AM

REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S
OF THE CATEGORIES

67

the entitiesclassifiedcan be reduced. Medieval thinkersexpressedthis

pointby callingthe categoriesthe 'supremegenera' of being {summa
genera).
But thisleftopen the questionconcerningthe natureof the categories.
Given thattheyare a primaryclassification,
the questionis: a classification
of what? Since Late Antiquity,therehad been threeclassic solutionsto
this question.Accordingto which solutionwas preferred,the categories
wereseen as a classification
ofwords,of conceptsor of things.Accordingly,
Aristotle'slistof ten itemswas seen as a classification
of linguisticterms,
of mentalconceptsor of extramentalthings.6
Thanks to Boethius'scommentaryon the Categories
, medieval thinkers
familiar
were
with the late ancient debates over the nature of the categories and the place to be assigned to Aristode'swork of that name.
Boethiusalso providedthe classic solutionto the questionconcerningthe
natureof the categories.His conciliatorysolution
directlyderivedfrom
- is that Aristotleconsidersthe
Porphyry
categoriesas words signifying
things.Thus, Boethius apparentlysupportsa nominalisticinterpretation
of the Categories
, accordingto whichthe categoriesare signsand not things.
Some elements,however,also suggesta realistinterpretation.
For the ten
genera of wordsknownas 'categories'do signifyten kindsof things.And
thereseem to be good reasons for consideringthese ten kindsof things
as categories,too.7 Thus, the way was open to considerAristotle'scategories as both a classificationof thingsand a classificationof the signs
those things.
signifying
The possibility
of interpreting
the categoriesas signsor as thingsnotorise
to
the
debates
between realistsand nominalistsin the
riouslygave
In
twelfth
the
thirteenth
thecentury.
century,a complexand conciliatory
ory was developed accordingto which the categoriescan be considered
6 On lateancient
ofthecategories,
debates
thenature
see P. Hoffinann,
concerning
etlangage
selon
La question
duskopos
dutrait
aristotlicien
desCatgories
,
Catgories
Simplicius.
in:I. Hadot(ed.),Simplicius.
Sa vie,sonoeuvre,
sa survie
: Actes
duColloque
international
deParis
1er
oct.1985),Berlin-New
York1987,61-90;C.C. Evangeliou,
Aristotle's
(28 sept.Categories
andPorphyry
, Leiden-New
York,1988.
7 Boethius,
In Cat.,PL 64, 161A, 162B.On therelationship
between
Boethius
and
3 commentaries
seeJ. Shiel,Boethius
onAristotle
and Renaissance
, in: Mediaeval
Porphyry,
4 (1958),217-44;S. Ebbesen,
Boethius
as anAristotelian
Commentator
Studies,
, in:J. Wiesner
Werk
undWirkung,
York1987,286-311.
Botharticles
2 vols.,Berlin-New
(ed.),Aristoteles:
are reprinted
in R. Sorabji(ed.),Aristotle
TheAncient
Commentators
andTheir
Transformed.
London1990,349-72and373-91.See alsoA.D. Conti,
commentatore
e interBoezio
Influence,
delle
diAristotele,
Arnaldi
in:A. Degrandi
etal. (eds.),Scritti
inonore
diGirolamo
prete
Categorie
dallaScuola
distudi
medioevali
Nazionale
, Roma2001,77-102.
offerti

11:36:44 AM

68

GIORGIOPINI

thecategoriesare consideredas a classification

in twoways.In metaphysics,
of extramentalthings.In logic,the categoriesare consideredas concepts,
i.e. insofaras they are objects of cognitionand constitutethe basis for
of the itemsexistingin the world.
the intellect'soperationof classification
In brief,the standardview was that the categoriesare the most fundamentalkindsof thingsthat constitutethe world and that theyalso work
as the foundationon which our conceptualapparatusis grounded.8
So, as far as the structureof the world is at issue,it was the common
opinion that Aristotle'scategoriesare a read classificationof things.All
the same, some categoriesdifferin some obvious ways fromthe other
not illof themseem to be independentthings.In this
ones. Specifically,
betweenSubstance,on the one hand,
respect,thereis a clear difference
and all the othercategories,on the otherhand. For a substanceis somethingthat exists by itself,the other categoriesare accidents that exist
meaningfor
by inheringin a substance.Thus, 'to exist' has a different
substancesand accidents.For a substance,'to exist' means 'to be somethingby itself';for accidents,it means 'to exist in' or 'to inhere in a
substance'.9
In order to account for the differencebetween Substance and acciresortedto a divisionthatAristotleintroducesslightly
dents,commentators
before listingthe ten categories.Accordingto this division,thingsare
sortedout into fourkindsby way of the two relationsof 'being said of'
and 'being in'. Some thingsare neithersaid of nor are in anything;some
thingsare not said of anythingbut are in something;some thingsare
said of somethingbut are not in anything;finally,some thingsare both
said of somethingand in something.10
Boethiusaptlylabeled the divisionof thingsinto fourkinds'the smalldivisioor enumeratio
est division'{parvissima
) whereas the divisioninto ten
11Both the small and
division'
is
'the
enumeratio).
(maxima
biggest
categories
of thingsin the world.
the big divisionwere consideredas classifications
in
their
generality.The small division
They only differfromeach other
sortsout all thingsinto two big kinds accordingto the relationshipof
'being in': substances(notin anything)and accidents(in something).Each
8 See G. Pini,Categories
AnInterpretation
inDunsScotus.
andLogic
Categories
ofAristotle's
intheLateThirteenth
2002,1-12,19-44.
, Leiden-Boston-Kln
Century
9 See MetVII, 1, 1028al3-b7.
10Cat.2, Ia20-b9.
11Boethius,
In Cat.,PL 64, 169C,180B.

11:36:44 AM

SGOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

69

of these two kindsis in turndivided into individualand universalitems

accordingto the relationof 'being said of': universalsubstancesare said
of individualsubstances,which are not said of anything;universalaccidentsare said of individualaccidents,which are not said of anythingbut
are in individualsubstances.The big divisioninto ten kindswas regarded
as a more finelygrained account of the small divisionof all beings into
substancesand accidents.Substanceswere seen as the kindof thingsthat
are perse, i.e. that do not inherein anything.As to thingsthat are in or
inherein substances,theywere recognizedas actuallybelongingto nine
distinctgenera,namelythe nine accidentalcategories.Even thougheach
one of the accidentalcategoriesis a kind of thingdifferent
fromthe others, theyare all characterizedby the same mode of being,namelyinhering in a substance.
In the thirteenth
century,Aristotle'ssmall and big divisionwere combined in an originalway to give rise to a comprehensivepictureof the
structureof the world. Each categorywas consideredto be composed of
two aspects.The descriptionof each aspect variesfromauthorto author.
Let us considerThomas Aquinas'saccount,whichwas extremely
influential
at the end of the thirteenth
century.
Basically,Aquinas reads the distinctionbetweenessence and existence
into the categories.He holds that each categoryis composed of ratio(i.e.
an essentialaccount) and esse(i.e. its mode of existing).A category'sratio
comprisesall the essentialfeaturesof the thingsbelongingto that category.A category'sesseis the mode in which thingsbelongingto a certain categorynormallyexist.Whereas no thingcan change its ratioand
remain the same thing,it is possible for a thingto exist in a different
mode, i.e. to lose its esseand acquire anotherone. Even thoughthis is
not what takes place in the normal course of events,losing the proper
mode of existenceand acquiringa new one impliesno contradiction.So,
the ratioof Substanceis that of thingsthat have the naturaltendencyto
existby themselvesas autonomousproperty-bearers;
its esseor mode of
being is 'existingby itself'.As foraccidents,each one has its properratio
,
but theyall have the same esse
in
i.e.
a
substance.12
,
inhering
12ThomasAquinas,
Summa
novemgenerum
I, q. 28, a. 2: "... in quolibet
theologiae
accidentis
estduoconsiderare.
unumestessequodcompetit
Quorum
unicuique
ipsorum
secundum
Ethoccommuniter
inomnibus
estinesse
subiecto:
accidentis
quodestaccidens.
enimesseestinesse.
Aliudquodpotest
considerali
in unoquoque,
estpropria
ratiouniusillorum
alsoapplies
thedistinction
between
essence
andexiscuiusque
generum".
Aquinas
tenceto substance:
seeSumma
III, q. 77,a. 1, ad 2: ". . . dicendum
theologiae
quod,cum

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

The view accordingto which each categoryis the resultof the combinationof two aspectshas severaladvantages.For one thing,it accounts
for the big divide between substanceand accidentswhile at the same
time saving the distinctionof realityinto ten kinds.Substance and accidents are characterizedby the opposite modes of being in itselfand in
somethingelse, but each accidenthas its own ratio.Second, thisview prothe list of the categoriesby derivingthe
vides the possibilityofjustifying
categoriesfromsome commonmodes of being. Notoriously,thisis somethingmissingin Aristotle,who just giveshis listof ten itemswithoutany
comment or justification.But if categoriesare analysed into two constituents(i.e. an essence and its way of being or existing),the ten fundamentadessencescan be reducedto two even morebasic modes of being,
being by itselfand being in somethingelse; being in somethingelse, commodes of being,
mon to all the accidents,is in turndividedinto different
In
this
each one proper to a singleaccidentalcategory.
way, it is possiof Aristotle'slistof ten catble to show the rationaleand appropriateness
that the
to
account
for
some difficulties
it
becomes
Third,
easy
egories.13
doctrineof the categoriesposes to a Christianthinker.Specifically,the
in the Eucharistrequiresthatthe accidents
doctrineof Transubstantiation
of the consecratedhost exist withoutinheringin their subject,i.e. the
and impassiblesubbread, which has been transmutedinto a different
If
accident
thereis a disof
Christ.
within
each
the
stance,namely
body
tinctionbetweena ratioand a mode of beingand ifinheringin a substance
is not part of the ratioof the accident,it is possibleto posit the existence
vel
esseessentia
velsubstantiae
hocipsumquodestesse,nonpotest
ensnonsitgenus,
necdefinitio
accisubstantiae
estensperse sinesubiecto,
accidentis.
Nonergodefinitio
seuessentiae
substantiae
habereessenon
dentis
ensin subiecto:
sedquidditati
competit
habereessein subiecto".
in subiecto;
accidentis
autemsiveessentiae
competit
quidditati
d. 12,q. 1,aa. 1,ad 2, ed. M.F.Moos,Paris1947,499.Elsewhere,
See alsoInIV Sent.,
ofeachaccidental
catebetween
thetwoconstituents
thedistinction
Aquinasintroduces
ofeachcataccidentis
andtheratio
between
thecommon
ratio
propria
goryas a distinction
Paris1929,224. See M.G.
d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ed. P. Mandonnet,
see In I Sent.,
egory:
Theories
Oxford
Relations.
Medieval
1989,13-7.
1250-1325,
Henninger,
13See ThomasAquinas,In Met.,V, lect.9, edd. M.-R. Cathala-R.M.Spiazzi,
Taurini-Romae
Taurini-Romae
1964,nn.890-2;InPhys.,
Ill, lect.V, ed.P.M.Maggiolo,
Thomas
derivation
ofthecategories,
seeJ.F.Wippel,
1965,n. 322.On Aquinas's
Aquinas's
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
in:Journal
Derivation
(Predicaments),
oftheAristotelian
Categories
Aristotle's
onDeducing
25 (1987),13-34.See also G. Pini,Scotus
, in:J. BiardCategories
Actes
duXIIIe
desCatgories
-XVesicles).
I. Rosier-Catach
mdivale
(XIIe
(eds),La tradition
delogique
etdesmantique
mdivales
, 6-10juin2000),Louvain-la(Avignon
Symposium
europen
Neuve2003,23-35,in part.24-8.

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SCOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

71

of non-inhering
accidentswithoutany contradiction,
forit is not contrafor
to
exist
to
a
mode
that
is not proper to
dictory something
according
in
albeit
circumstances.14
it,
veryspecial
Henry of Ghent's doctrineof the categoriesis a variant of Thomas
Aquinas's position.It accounts for anotherpeculiarityof the doctrineof
the categories.For thereis an obvious asymmetry
in the accidentalcatSome
of
them
can
be
at
least
conceived
of
egories.
(and, accordingto
the Eucharistiedoctrine,they can also exist) withoutinheringin their
for a quality
subjects;otherscannot. Specifically,it is not contradictory
and a quantityto be conceived withouttheirsubjects.But with regard
to the remainingsevencategories(Relation,Action,Passion,When,Where,
Position,Habit), it seems that no one of themcan be conceivedof without the two extremesthat theycorrelate.15
For example, it is not possible to conceive of paternitywithouta fatherand a son; similarly,it is
not possible to conceive of burningwithoutsomethingthat burns and
somethingelse that is burnt.Accordingly,the accidental categoriesare
dividedinto two kinds:the absolute ones such as Quality and Quantity,
and the non-absoluteones, namelyRelation and the remainingsix accidents(dealt within the so-calledLibersexprincipiorum).
How is it possible
to accountforthisdifference
among accidents?By developingtheviewthat
categoriesare composed of two aspects, Henry of Ghent proposes the
followingscheme. Each categoryis the resultof the combinationof a
The mode of substanceis 'being in itself'.
thing(res)and a mode (ratio).16
The common mode of accidentsis 'being in' or 'inheringin' something
14On transubstantiation
andinherence,
seeM. McCord
Aristotle
andthe
Sacrament
Adams,
A Crisis
inMedieval
Aristotelianism
Tweedale
and
oftheAltar:
, in:R. Bosley-M.
(eds),Aristotle
HisMedieval
R. Imbach,
Letrait
del'eucharistie
deThomas
, Calgary
1992,195-249;
Interpreters
etlesaverrostes
et thologiques,
77 (1993),
, in: RevuedesSciences
Aquin
philosophiques
La raison
etle miracle.
Lesdoctrines
175-94;P.J.J.M.
Bakker,
(c. 1250-c.1400).
eucharistiques
Contribution
l'tude
desrapports
entre
etthologie
Universiteit
, PhD.Diss.,Katholieke
philosophie
G. Pini,Substance,
Accident
Scotus
andtheParis
Debate
1999,293-429:
, andInherence.
Nijmegen
ontheMetaphysics
etal. 2004(above,n. 3),DunsScot Paris
, in: Boulnois
oftheEucharist
,
273-311.
15According
to thestandard
medieval
ofrelations,
a relation
conception
(forexample,
is an accident
in a subject
invirtue
ofa founsimilarity)
inhering
(forexample,
Socrates)
dation
thewhiteness
ofSocrates)
anddirected
towards
a term
(forexample,
(forexample,
thewhiteness
ofPlato).See Henninger
1989(above,n. 12),4-6.
16Someconfusion
canarisebecauseofThomasAquinas's
andHenryofGhent's
terEventhough
therearesomedifferences
between
theirdoctrines,
it shouldbe
minology.
notedthatwhatAquinascallsratio
res
whatAquinas
, whereas
playstheroleofHenry's
callsesseplaystheroleofHenry's
ratio.

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

else. This common mode is differentiated

into nine modes. Accordingly,
each accidental categoryhas its own way of inheringin a substance,
which makes that accidentdifferent
fromthe otheraccidentalcategories.
As to the things,thereis a distinctionbetweenthe firstthreecategories
(Substance,Qualityand Quantity)and the otherones. Substance,Quality
and Quantityhave each theirown res. So, substancesare thingsdifferent
fromqualitiesand quantities,as well as existingin a mode different
from
the mode in which the othercategoriesexist.The same holds for qualities and quantities.Mattersare different
for the remainingseven catehowever.
Even
each
one
of
them is composed of a thing
gories,
though
and a mode, the thingin question is not proper to them. So, Relation
has its own proper mode of being but no proper thing,since it is not a
fromone of the firstthreeabsolutecategories.Withregard
thingdifferent
to the last six relativecategories,each one of them existsaccordingto
its own propermode of being,but theyare not thingsdifferent
fromone
of the threeabsolutecategoriesconsideredin conjunctionwitha relation.
So, a relationis the combinationof a thingbelongingto Substance or
Quality or Quantity and a mode proper to the categoryof Relation.
Each one of the othernon-absolutecategoriesis a combinationof a thing
belongingto Substance, Quality or Quantity togetherwith a relation.
Thus, accordingto Henry,thereare onlythreekindsof things:substances,
qualitiesand quantities.But since each categoryis the resultof the combinationof a thingand a mode and since there are no fewerthan ten
modes, the categoriesare ten.17
betweenabsolute
Henry of Ghent'sschemeaccountsforthe difference
and non-absoluteaccidents.The formercan be conceived of and even
existwithouttheirsubjects,for theyare thingsdifferent
fromtheirsubThe
latter
cannot
exist
or
even
be
conceived
of
without
theirsubjects.
because
are
not
different
from
jects,
them; theyonly modify
they
things
theirsubjectsby the additionof a mode. This mode is a real feature,so
even non-absolutecategoriesmustbe regardedas mind-independent
constituentsof the world. But they should not be consideredas thingson
theirown. Accordingly,the world is constitutedby threekindsof things
17Henry
ofGhent,
Summa
ordinaria*
omnia
), a. 32,q. 5, in:Opera
(Quaesones
XXVII,ed.
R. Macken,
Leuven1991,79,84-107.See alsoQuodl.
de Gandavo,
V, q. 6, in:Henricus
Louvain1961),I, 161O; Quodl.
, 2 vols,Paris1518(repr.
Quodlibeta
XV,q. 5, in:Henricus
de Gandavo,
G-H.See Henninger
1989(above,n. 12),48-52;Pini
, II, 577r-v
Quodlibeta
2002(above,n. 8),146-7.

11:36:44 AM

REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES
SGOTUS'S

73

variouslycombinedwithten modes. Such a combinationgivesrise to the

ten categories.
So, accordingto Henryof Ghent'sview,categoriesare a real classification
of the extramentalworld but not necessarilydistinctthings.There are
onlythreekindsof things,i.e. substances,quantitiesand qualities.All the
fromthese threekindsof things.
othercategoriesare not thingsdifferent
is
not
a
distinct
fromitsfoundation.
a
relation
Nevertheless,
thing
Specifically,
each categoryis somethingreal, i.e. a mind-independentitem of the
world.
Simon of Faversham
In the Paris arts faculty,Scotus's contemporary,
that
is likelyto have
(ca. 1260-1306),defendeda doctrineof categories
been influenceby Henry of Ghent. Simon defineda categoryas a coordinationof predicatesorganisedin a line accordingto different
degrees
fromthe least to the most common. Each of these sets
of universality,
of predicatesis based eitheron a distinctkind of thingsor on a distinct
mode of being. Substantial,quantitativeand qualititativepredicatesare
takenfromdistinctextramentalthings.All the otherseven kindsof predicates are takenfromdistinctmodes of being (whereSimon's modusessendi
correspondsto Henry'sratio).Simon of Faversham,however,stressedthat
it is not necessaryfor somethingto be groundedon a distinctthingin
for that item to
order to be a distinctand real category;it is sufficient
be taken froma real mode of being. So, there are ten real categories
even thoughthereare only threekindsof things,because thereare ten
of the mind's thinkingof them.
real modes of being quite independently
Since each of these ten modes of being is closelyparallel to a mode of
predicating(i.e. the mode in which a substanceexistscorrespondsto the
mode in which a substantialpredicate is predicatedof its subject,and
similarlyforthe othernine categories),it followsthat thereare as many
kindsof predicatesas thereare modes of being. A categoryis precisely
the set of predicatesbased on these real modes.18
18Simon
Wiss.Allgemeinbibl.,
ofFaversham,
III,q. 10,ms.Erfurt,
Quaestiones
super
Physicam,
F. 348,f.2Iva:"Praedicamentum
autemnihilaliudestquamcoordinado
praediAmplon.
ab aliisrebusvel modum
remdistinctam
cabilium
secundum
subet suprahabentium
modus
Etideoillaquaesignificant
a quoaccipitur
diversus
essendi
distinctum,
praedicandi.
habent
modos
velhabent
modosessendi
distinctos
resdistinctas
quiinnulloalioconveniunt
of
SimonalsoadoptsHenry
distinctos
etconstituunt
diversa
praedicamenta".
praedicandi
toits
thatdoesnotaddanydistinct
Ghent's
viewofRelation
as a distinct
thing
category
Praedicamentorum
See SimonofFaversham,
libro
foundation.
, in Id., Opera
Quaestiones
super
Padova1957,q. 42, 134-5.
omnia
ed. P. Mazzarella,
, I, Opera
logica,

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

: PeterofJohnOlivi
2. A Critique
of Categories
of theRealistConception
Scotus agrees with most of his immediatepredecessorsand contempoof things,not of signsor of
rariesthat the categoriesare a classification
the ways in whichwe describethe world.Beforethe end of the century,
thisrealistcontentionhad been virtuallyunchallengedamong thirteenthcenturyphilosophersand theologians.By the end of the century,however,some doubtswere raised againstthe dominantview. Notably,Peter
ofJohn Olivi suggestedconsideringAristotle'scategoriesas a classification
rationes.
not of different
Apparently,Olivi held that
things,but of different
a ratiois a way of describingthe world to which there correspondsno
in theworlditself.Consequendy,
distinctessenceand no essentialdifference
Olivi maintainedthat Aristotle'sdoctrineshould not be interpretedas
positingten distinctkinds of thingsin the world. Since the same thing
can oftenbe describedin different
ways,severalcategoriescan be regarded
of
the
same
as different
thing.Thus, the same thingcan be
descriptions
describedas belongingto two different
categories,accordingto which of
its aspects is taken into account. This is true,forexample, of Substance
and Quantity:Olivi held that theyare not two distinctkinds of things,
but only two distinctways of describingthe same kind of things,i.e.
materialsubstances.Accordingto whichpropertiesare takenintoaccount,
materialsubstancescan be describedas substancesor as quantities.Such
an approach to categoriesstillattributessome validityto the Aristotelian
scheme,but only insofaras categoriesare consideredas a well-grounded
classification
of our waysof describingthe world.Insofaras the real structureof the worldis considered,thingsbelong to fewerkindsthan the ten
listedby Aristotle:
thatthosethings
are
from
ofthings,
totheextent
aretaken
someaspects
Categories
coordination
of
andsignified
undera distinct
naturally
capableofbeingunderstood
ifoneandthesameessence
hasinitself
several
andspecies.
Therefore,
aspects
genera
indifferent
thatarenaturally
bywayofdifferent
genera
capableofbeingunderstood
if<thisessence>
is in a certain
thenthere
is no inconvenience
category
categories,
to another
one.19
andin another
to oneofitsaspects
category
according
according
mine.)
(trans,
19PeterofJohnOlivi,Quodlibeta
Le
, Venetiis
1509,q. 3, f.20 (as quotedin E. Bettoni,
a
sumuntur
diPierdi Giovanni
Olivi
dottrine
, Milano1959,208-9):"Praedicamenta
fihsofiche
cooretsignificare
subdiversa
rerum
rationibus
secundum
quodsuntaptaenataeintelligi
<habet>in se plures
rationes
et specierum.
Et tunesi eademessentia
dinatione
generum
in diversis
existendiversorum
praedicamentis
aptasnatasintelligi
permodum
generum
in unopraedicamento
et
tuncnihilinconveniens
si secundum
unamsuirationem
tium,

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OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SGOTUS'S

75

At firstsight,Olivi's treatmentof categorieswas only a developmentof

what we have foundin Henry of Ghent and Simon of Faversham.But
such a developmenthad serious effectson the whole significanceof
Aristotle'sdoctrine.From the remarkthat categoriesare not always distinctthingsand essences,Olivi drew the conclusionthat there is never
an essentialdistinctionamong categories.Accordingly,the categoriesare
to be seen not as a classificationof the world into mind-independent
of our modes of describingthe world accordkindsbut as a classification
rationes
to
distinct
) of the extramentalthings.So, Olivi applied
aspects(
ing
to all categorieswhat Henry of Ghent and Simon of Faversham said
about the last seven non-absolutecategories.This is particularlyevident
in the case of Substance and Quantity,which Olivi consideredas just
one essence viewed under different
aspects even thoughttheywere usuas
distinct
essences.
two
Moreover,Olivi thoughtthat the
ally regarded
and
factthat categoriesare distinctfromone anotheras distinctrationes
is ultimately
not as distinctessencesimpliesthatthe categorialdistinction
dependenton the way in which our mind understandsthe world,since
a ratiois an aspect of an extramentalthingthatdoes not existas an independentitem beforeour mind abstractsit fromotheraspectswithinthe
same thing.Consequently,one and the same thingcan be classifiedinto
distinctcategoriesaccordingto which aspect is taken into account.
In brief,Olivi startedfromthe standardpositionthatnot all categories
are distinctessences and extended this considerationto all categories.
Since categoriesare not distinctessences or things(res),theycannot be
essentiallyor reallydistinctfromeach other,foronly essencesand things
can be essentiallyand reallydistinctfromeach other.So, fromthe denial
that categoriesare distinctessences,Olivi could inferthat categoriesare
not essentiallyor reallydistinct.But if two items are not essentiallyor
really distinctfromeach other, their distinctionis at best potentialin
realityand must be the resultof the mind's abstraction.So Olivi coni.e.
cluded that the distinctionamong the categoriesis mind-dependent,
due to whichaspect of realitythe mind considersin abstractionfromthe
otherones.

insecundum
librum
ofJohnOlivi,Quaestiones
aliaminalio".SeealsoPeter
secundum
Sententiarum,
ad ClarasAquas1922-1926,
3 vols.,ed. B.Jansen,
I, q. 24,264;I, q. 25,444;I, q. 28,
1959(above),
210-5;D. Burr,ThePersecution
483-91;II, 262-3;II, q. 58,446.See Bettoni
66.5(1976),55-61.
oftheAmerican
Olivi
, in:Transaction
Society,
Philosophical
ofPeter

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GIORGIOPINI

There were good reasons for resistingOlivi's position.Some kind of

real distinctionamong the categories seems to be required in order
to account for some of the basic beliefsof the Christianfaith.Notably,
the distinctionamong the Personsin the Trinityseems to require some
distinctionbetweenSubstance and Relation; Transubmind-independent
distinctionbetween
stantiationseems to require some mind-independent
Olivi's
that
is
not
it
Substance and Quantity.So,
positionwas
surprising
officiallycensured. True, the Trinityremains in itselfmysteriousand
is a miracle.All the same, the mysteryand the mirTransubstantiation
acle are stillto be accounted for in termsof what is possible,i.e. nonAccordingly,a philosophicallymeaningfulreading of the
contradictory.
seems to require that the correctinterTrinityand Transubstantiation
of the categoriesis that they are really
doctrine
Aristotle's
of
pretation
distinctamong themselves.In 1283, fourmastersand threebachelorsof
the Universityof Paris issued a letterconcerningseveral suspectedtheses held by Olivi. In directresponseto Olivi's doctrineof the categories,
theygave what should probablybe consideredas the firstself-conscious
of the categoriesin the thirteenth
statementof a realistinterpretation
century:
and
to thePhilosopher
is contrary
distinct
arenotreally
To saythatthecategories
Burr
and
cases
of
relation
in
the
modified,
(trans.
quantity.20
dangerous
especially
41,55.)
of
Such a self-consciousendorsementof a strongrealistinterpretation
Olivi's
attack
after
stated
Aristotle'scategorieswas symptomatically
only
of the categories.Because of Olivi's crito the traditionalinterpretation
tique, it was not any longer possible to assume the realityof the distinctionamong the categoriesas unproblematic.Such a real distinction
had to be defendedand argued for. Thus, for the firsttime afterthe
twelfthcentury,the realityof the categoriesbecame an issue of philosophical debate. In this sense, the condemnationof Olivi's positioncan
be consideredas a turningpoint in the historyof the realistinterpretation of the categories.Scotus's strongrealismmust be seen in this con-

20Littera
in:Archivm
Olivi
Petri
Ioannis
contra
doctrinam
, ed.G. Fussenegger,
septem
sigillorum
47 (1954),45-53,in part.52: "Itemdicerequodpredicamenta
franciscanum
historicum,
et quantitate
de relatione
et maxime
estcontra
nondistinguantur
realiter,
Philosophum
in Burr's
translawith"categories"
I havesubstituted
estpericul[os]um".
"predicaments"
tion.See Burr1976(above,n. 19),41,55.

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OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SGOTUS'S

77

text,as a reactionto Olivi's attacksand a philosophicallycomprehensive

defenseof the claim that categoriesare reallydistinct.
Againstthe critiqueof the realityof the distinctionamong the categories, Henry of Ghent's sophisticateddistinctionbetween thingsand
modes appeared as too weak a response.Saying thatthereare just three
kinds of thingsin the extramentalworld, even thoughthese thingsare
combinedwith ten modes, was already givingway to a formof reductionism.For what are these modes? Are they real or not? If they are
fromthings?Their ontologicalstatusis unclear
real,how are theydifferent
and suspect,especiallyforthosewho want to defenda realistview of the
categories.By contrast,if these modes are not real, thereare only three
kindsof extramentalbeings,Substance,Quality and Quantity.And this
Simon
is just a plain formof ontologicalreductionism.Symptomatically,
from
each
distinct
of Favershaminsiststhat the categoriesare essentially
otherbecause no single categoryis part of the essence of anotherone,
even thoughnot necessarilythereis a distinctkindof thingscorresponding
to each category.Whethercategoriesare based on distinctkindsof things
staor distinctmodes of being, Simon defendstheirmind-independent
tus.21Even Simon's position,however,could appear too weak a response
to Olivi's doctrineof the categories.AgainstOlivi's reductionist
view, it
was
the
it
distinct.
are
that
the
stated
mustbe
So,
very
really
categories
concept of real distinctionthat had to be reconsidered.
Behind Scotus's adoption of a strongformof realismconcerningcategoriesthereis also his distasteforthe confusionbetweenlogic and metawith. Scotus maintains
physicsthat he reproachedtraditionaltreatments
that the paradigmaticcase of such a confusionis the standarddoctrine
of the analogyof being.As I have mentioned,it was commonlyheld that
the accidentalcategoriesare dependenton and inherentin Substance.It
was thoughtthatthisdependenceis capturedby the way in whichbeing
is predicatedof the categories.For it was said that being is predicated
primarilyof Substance and secondarilyof accidents.Thus, it was comto different
monlyheld thatthe way a predicatesuch as beingis attributed
ten kinds
into
structured
is
the
world
mirrors
the
way
typesof subjects
of things.Accordingly,the categorieswere regarded as the modes in
which a predicatecan be attributedto a subjectin a propositionas well
as the ten kindsof thingsthe worldis dividedinto.It is on such a twofold
21See thepassages
quotedabove,n. 18.

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GIORGIOPINI

characterof the categoriesthatthe standarddoctrineof analogyis based.

Also, it is thanksto this double nature of the categoriesthat analogy
worksas both a logico-semanticand a metaphysicaldoctrine.Now, it is
preciselysuch a mixtureof logic and metaphysicsthat Scotus rejects.In
on the Categories
his commentary
, Scotus subscribesto the traditionalopinion thatthe categoriescan be consideredboth froma logical and a metaphysicalpoint of view.22This does not mean, however,that the notion
of categoryis at the same timeboth logical and metaphysical.When consideredin logic, categoriesare the subjectsof a special class of concepts,
the so-called second intentions.By themselves,however,the categories
of thingsand are accordinglystudiedin metaphysics.
are a classification
When consideredin metaphysics,categoriesare just kinds of extramental things.23
There is no room forsuch an ambiguousnotionas analogy,
which was thoughtto have at the same time both a logical and a metaphysicalnature. Scotus's suspicionfor any confusionbetween a logical
and a metaphysicalapproach to categoriesand being is probablydue to
his affiliationto the thirteenth-century
English traditionwith which he
must have become familiarduringhis studiesat Oxford.24
22JohnDunsScotus,Quaestiones
Aristotelis
Praedicamenta
, q. 2, n. 5, in: Opera
super
phibad quaestionem
etal.,St.Bonaventure
I, edd.R. Andrews
1999,258:"Dicitur
sophica
quod
unomodoin quantum
decern
considerali:
suntentia;
praedicamenta
dupliciter
possunt
a ratione,
sivein quantum
aliomodoinquantum
considerantur
causata
aliquaproprietas
ab intellectu
eisattribuitur".
See Pini2002(above,n. 8), 138-44.
23JohnDunsScotus,
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
, q. 11, n. 26,in:Opera
Quaestiones
super
philosuntdecern
disrerum,
I, 350-1:"Dicendum
sophica
quodtantum
generalissima
quorum
nonsumitur
sedpenesipsasessentias.
tinctio
tantum,
penesaliquidlogicm
Ipsa enim
numero
inistis.
intendo
esttantum
variata
Undequoadilludquoddifficultats
generalissimi
hicscitur
forte
est,magismetaphysica
quamlogica.Ideosufficienter
quiaitaest,quamvis
debeatvelpossit
scireproper
metaphysicus
quid".
24See S. Donati,La discussione
delconcetto
diente
nellatradizione
dicommento
sulVunit
della
des
"Fisica":
commenti
parigini
deglianni1270-1315ca., in: M. Pickav(ed.),Die Logik
York2003
Transzendentalen.
zum65. Geburtstag,
, Berlin-New
Festschrift
fiirJanA. Aertsen
analof'semantic'
Mediaevalia,
(Miscellanea
30),60-139,
esp.71-81.On Scotus's
rejection
in thecaseofbeing,
seeJohnDunsScotus,
Praedicamenta
Quaestiones
ogy,specifically
super
Aristotelis
, q. 4, nn.26-36,in: Opera
I, 280-4.On Scotus's
phibsophica
position
concerning
e semantica
neicommenti
see G. Pini,Scoto
e l}anabgia.
Pisa2002,
aristotelici,
Logica
analogy,
TheSolution
toa
in Scotus's
46-9,51-73;Id., Unwoty
Quaestiones
superMetaphysicam:
Riddle
On therelationship
30 (2005),forthcoming.
between
theories
ofcat, in:Medioevo,
andtheories
ofpredication,
onAssertion
andtheCopula
: A Comparison
seeG. Pini,Scotus
egories
with
Valente(eds),Medieval
Theories
onAssertive
andNon-Assertive
, in:A. Maier-L.
Aquinas
Actsofthe14thEuropean
onMedieval
andSemantics.
Rome
, June11Language.
Symposium
Logic
15,2002, Firenze
2004,307-31.

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SCOTUS'S

79

Realism
3. Scotus'sStrong
commitmentto the
Scotus agrees with the standard thirteenth-century
the categoriesare
that
takes
the
claim
he
of
the
categories.Only,
reality
a classificationof thingsmore seriouslyand rigorouslythan his predecessorshad done, possiblyas a resultof the attacksmade on realismand
because of his distasteforany confusionbetweenlogic and metaphysics.
There were two ways of resistingOlivi's attackto a realistconceptionof
the categories.First,it could be conceded that not all the categoriesare
from
distinctessencesbut all the same Olivi was notjustifiedin inferring
For it could
of the categoriesis mind-dependent.
thisthatthe classification
be contendedthat notjust thingsand essencescan be reallydistinct.So,
it is one thingto be an essence and a thing,anotherthingto be a really
distinctitemof the world:a real (i.e. mind-inde(i.e. mind-independently)
is
not
distinction
necessarilygrounded on a distinctionamong
pendent)
two modes in which one and the same
between
things.The distinction
to cause a distinctionbetweentwo categories.
thingcan existis sufficient
This is the positionthat we implicitlyfindin Henry of Ghent and that
was explicitlydefendedby Simon of Faversham.
it is possible to accept Olivi's point that,if
Second and alternatively,
distinctas two things,theyare not two mindtwo itemsare not essentially
in the world. For a real and essentialdisitems
distinct
independently
tinctionholds only among thingsand essences. So, in order to defend
the distinctionamong categoriesas real, it must be demonstratedthat
each singlecategoryis a distinctkind of thingand not simplythe mode
in which a thingis. Scotus adopted this radical line of defense.
Scotus never wrote a comprehensivetreatmentof his realistconception of the categories.Consequendy,his positionmust be reconstructed
fromscatteredevidence. Nevertheless,it emergesas a remarkablypowerfuland consistentview concerninghow the world is constitutedby ten
distinctkindsof things.He holds that adoptinga realiststance concerning the categoriesimplies two other claims, namely that the categories
from
are extramentalthingsand consequentlythey are really different
each otherand irreducibleto one another.Accordingly,Scotus's realism
concerningcategoriescan be seen as consistingof threeconnectedclaims:
of the world (standardrealistclaim),
(1) the categoriesare a classification
which impliesthat (2) the categoriesare extramentalthings(strongrealist claim), which implies that (3) the categoriesare really distinctfrom

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

each otherand irreducibleto one another(anti-reductionist

claim).25Since
the division into categoriesis commonlyassumed as primary(for by
definitiona categoryis a summum
genus),claim (3) also impliesthat there
is no real thingcommonto the categoriesand thataccordinglytheycannot be reduced to somethingmore universal.They are primarilydiverse.
Scotus assumes claim 1, i.e. the standardrealistclaim, on which most
of his contemporaries
would have agreed. Scotus's taskis to demonstrate
that thisfairlycommon assumptionimpliesclaims 2 and 3, i.e. that categoriesare thingsand thattheyare reallydistinctfromeach other.This
strictunderstandingof realism opposes him to Henry of Ghent, who
would have conceded claim 1 but neither2 nor 3. For Henry held that
modes of
categoriesare a classificationof thingsaccordingto different
but
that
there
are
three
kinds
of
i.e.
being,
only
things, Substance,Quality
and Quantity.Accordingly,
Henry claimed thatonlythesethreeabsolute
categoriesare reallydistinctfromeach other(i.e. distinctas thingsfrom
things),since theyare absolute things;the other non-absolutecategories
are not thingsdifferent
fromthe absolute categorieson which theyare
founded but their status as mind-independentcategoryis nevertheless
) added to the three basic kinds of
groundedon distinctaspects (;rationes
thingsexistingin the world.
Scotus arguesthata real stanceconcerningcategoriesimpliesthatthey
are thingsin the extramentalworld (i.e. that claim 1 impliesclaim 2) by
the different
distinguishing
meaningsof 'thing'(res)or 'being' (ens).Scotus's
is seminalforlate medievalrealism.As such, it musthold our
distinction
attention.
'Thing' and 'being' may mean (a) anythingthat is logicallypossible,
i.e. that does not include a contradiction;(b) anythingthat is not only
logicallybut also reallypossible,i.e. that has or can have extramental
existence;(c) anythingthat has not only extramentalbut also absolute
relaexistence,i.e. that existsas somethingand not as a determination
tive to somethingelse; (d) anythingthat has not only absolute but also
perse existence,i.e. that by its own natureexistsby itselfand on which
other thingsdepend. These four meanings(which actually Scotus considersas threemain meanings,forhe regardsthe firstand the second as

25JohnDunsScotus,
libros
Aristotelis
, V, qq. 5-6,in:Opera
Quaestiones
super
Metaphysicorum
etal., St.Bonaventure
III, edd.R. Andrews
1997,447-87.Fora general
philosophica
presentation
ofScotus's
doctrine
ofcategories,
seeKing2003(above,n. 3),28-38.

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OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S

81

two subdivisionsof just one meaning) are clearlyordered accordingto

fromthe most to the least common.26
degreesof descendinguniversality,
Scotus holds that the categoriesare thingsand beingsin sense (b), i.e.
as what can have or has extramentalexistence,no matterwhat is the
language in which we formulateour statementsabout the world:
we saya
member
In thesecondsenseofthisfirst
(b)],however,
[i.e.in meaning
seemsto havethissense
themind.Avicenna
outside
is whatcanhaveentity
'thing'
Andthis
to all genera.
and'being'arecommon
in mindwhenhe saysthat'thing'
lanforin every
to thewordsin onelanguage,
as referring
cannotbe understood
exists
that
to
that
one
unindifferentiated
is
there
everything
applies
concept
guage
arethesamein all.In every
toAristotle]
thesoul.Forconcepts
outside
[according
whether
on sucha common
is onenameimposed
there
concept,
generally
language
Alluntis
Wolteror univocity.27
be one ofanalogy
modified,
itscommonness
(trans.
62.)
26DunsScotus,
omnia
XXV,ed. L. Vivs,Paris1895
, q. 3, nn.2-3,in: Opera
Quodlibet
ex dictisauctorum,
autem
"Sicut
113-5:
colligitur
Westmead,
1969),
Farnborough
(repr.
et <3> strictissime.
<2> communiter
hoc nomen'res'potestsumi<1> communissime,
ad quodcumque
<1.1> Communissime,
quodnonestnihilquodincludit
proutse extendit
etinintelomneesseextraintellectum
etsolumillud,quiailludexcludit
contradictionem,
esseextraanimam,
sicutnonpotest
contradictionem
lectu.Quodenimestsicincludens
contraut aliquodensin anima,quia numquam
essealiquidintelligibile
itanonpotest
cumobiecto
obiectum
unum
constituit
cumcontradictorio
dictorium
equesicut
intelligibile,
nihilquodnecestnecessepotest
cumobiecto.
<1.2>Aliomododicitur
nequesicutmodus
comomnino
modoaccipitur
<1.1>Ensergovelresistoprimo
aliquodensextraanimam.
sit
ens
sive
non
includit
ad
se
et
extendit
contradictionem,
munissime,
quod
quodcumque
sivesitensrealehabens
habensessein intellectu
hocestpraecise
considerante,
rationis,
in isto
<1.2> Et secundo,
intellectus.
extraconsiderationem
accipitur
aliquamentitatem
non
entitatem
minus
communiter
membro
aliquam
potest
proentequodhabetvelhabere
rem
Boethius
modoaccipit
intellectus
ex consideratione
distinguendo
[...]. <2> Secundo
cirremcontra
De Trinitate
modum
contra
rei,sicutloquitur
[...]. Vultergodistinguere
- substantia,
et quantitas
et sic,secundum
eum,solatriagenera
qualitas
cumstantiam,
membro
Hoc ergonomen'res',in secundo
aliaveroreicircumstantias.
remmonstrant,
sivemodum,
circumstantiam
contra
distinctum
dicitaliquodensabsolutum,
qui
acceptum,
a Philosopho
modushabetur
<3> Tertius
uniusad alterum.
dicithabitudinem
[...]. Ens
- et hocsivesitanalogm
siveunivocum
dictum
sivepotissime
ergo,sivesimpliciter
sola.
substantia
est
convenit
se
et
cui
ente
ibi
esse,
quod
primo
per
Philosophus
pro
accipit
et ensquodcumque
ensrationis
continentur
communissime
Sic ergosubprimomembro
etperse
ensrealeetabsolutum
etsubtertio,
ensrealeetabsolutum;
reale;subsecundo,
hasbeen
ofthispassage
n. 12),90-1.Theinterpretation
1989(above,
ens".See Henninger
dela
Unegnalogie
treetreprsentation.
See O. Boulnois,
theobjectofsomecontroversy.
444-52.
Paris
-XIVe
sicle
Scot
Duns
de

moderne
1999,
),
(XIIIe
mtaphysique l'poque
27DunsScotus,Quodlibet
autem
omnia
XXV, 114:"In secundo
, q. 3, n. 2, in: Opera
Et
extraanimam.
entitatem
resquodhaberepotest
dicitur
istius
membro
primimembri
I Metaphysicae
turloquiAvicenna
istomodovide
, cap. 5, quodea quae suntcommunia
in unalingua,
de vocabulis
illudintelligi
suntreset ens.Necpotest
omnibus
generibus
suntextra
ilia
ad
omnia
indifferens
unus
est
in
quae
conceptus
lingua
quia unaquaque
inqualibet
I Penhermeneias
enimsuntiidemapudomnes,
animam:
, etcommuniter
conceptus

11:36:44 AM

82

GIORGIOPINI

Thus, what is merelypossibleis not includedin any category.Something,

in orderto be in a category,mustbe real in a strongsense,i.e. as somethingthat is or can be extramental.Being a thingin thissense amounts
to having an essence. Thus, Scotus, by distinguishing
categorialbeing
thatis or
fromwhat is logicallypossible,makes clear thatnot everything
can be conceived of (which for Scotus coincides with what is logically
possible) has an essence. Merely conceivable entitiesdo not have an
essence and are not includedin a category.In theologicalterms,Scotus
expressesthispoint by sayingthat thingsdo not have an essence by the
simplefactthat God thinksor can thinkof them:thisis a necessarybut
conditionto be real in the strongsense that categories
not a sufficient
are real. Only when somethingis the object of God's creativepower does
it acquire an essence and become real.28
In this sense of 'thing5and 'being', all the categoriesare thingsand
beings in the same sense, for theyare illextramental,accordingto the
standardrealistassumption.Substance,Quality,Quantity,but also Relation
and all the non-absolutecategoriesare extramentalthingsin the same
sense of 'thing':
a
"Is a relation
aboutthequestion
thereis no difficulty
As thisdistinction
shows,
sense[i.e.meaning
if'thing'
be takenin thesecondandthird
(c) and(d)],
thing?"
sensepresents
noran absolute.
a substance
is neither
fora relation
Onlythefirst
notas regards
(a)],forit is clear
being[i.e.meaning
conceptual
though
difficulty,
is
Herethenthequestion
contradiction.
ofwithout
canbe thought
thata relation
thesoul.
ofitsownoutside
a realentity
oris a thing
ithasexistence
whether
having
itis a thing
To thisI answer,
[. . .] Fromwhathasbeensaiditis clearwhatkind
or relabsolute
thenitis either
is. Forifitis a singular
thisrelation
ofthing
thing
doesthisdetermination
Neither
or "beingto another."
itis relative
ative.Formally
forinthis
of'thing'
thismeaning
militate
"toanother"
[i.e.as extramental],
against
ofa thing,
orcircumstance
witha modeorrelationship
isnotcontrasted
sense'thing'
Wolter-Alluntis
themall.29
butitcovers
modified,
63-64.)
(trans.
sitiliacomtaliconceptui
communi,
qualiscumque
linguaestunumnomenimpositum
is taken(withsome
translation
The English
siveunivocationis".
munitas
siveanalogiae
Translated
TheQuodlibetal
GodandCreatures.
from
Questions.
modifications)
JohnDunsScotus,
andA.B.Wolter,
andGlossary
withan Introduction,
Princeton,
N.J.
Notes,
byF. Alluntis
1975,62.
28On Scotus's
see DunsScotus,Ord.I, d. 36. q. unica,in:
ofpossibility,
conception
See S. Knuuttila,
Vaticana
Civitas
omnia
1963,271-97.
Scotistica,
VI, ed.Commissio
Opera
andthe
York1993,138-49;Id, DunsScotus
inMedieval
Modalities
, London-New
Philosophy
Duns
R. Wood,M. Dreyer
Modalities
Foundations
(eds),John
, in:L. Honnefelder,
ofLogical
andEthics
1993, 127-43;
, Leiden-NewYork-Kobenhavn-Kln
Scotus,
Metaphysics
mitAusblick
beiDunsScotus
DieIdeen
undPossibilien
Intellecta.
Creatura
T. Hoffmann,
auf
Pondus
undMastrius
2002.
vonMayronis,
Franz
, Mnster
29DunsScotusQuodlibet
omnia
XXV, 115:"Ex istadisnctione
, q. 3, n. 3, in: Opera

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OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S

83

This is the core of Scotus's realismconcerningcategories.Of course,by

thisclaim Scotus does not mean thatall the categoriesbelong to just one
kind of things.Quite the contrary,the categoriesare ten diversekinds
of extramentalitems.'Thing' and 'being5are transcendental
terms,which
as such do not referto a singlekind of essence. There is no super-categoryof extramentalbeing.What is one is the sense of 'thing'and 'being'
accordingto which categoriesare said to be thingsand beings,but the
kindsof extramentalthingsare ten and irreducibleto one another.Scotus
is acutelyaware of whathas been called the 'sense/kindconfusion'.Saying
fromsayingthat there is just
that 'thing' has one meaning is different
that
thereare ten kindsof things
one kind of things.Accordingly,
saying
is fullycompatiblewith sayingthat 'thing'has just one meaning.30
catSome of the different
ways in which thingsbelongingto different
which
refers
of
and
are
exist
(d) 'thing',
capturedby meanings(c)
egories
to absolutecategories(Substance,Quality and Quantity)and
respectively
to Substance alone. Sometimesby 'thing' we only mean absolute categories or even only substances.But there is still a meaning of 'thing'
accordingto which all the categoriesare thingsin the same sense, i.e.
as extramentalentities.According to this meaning 'being a thing' is
Scotus holds that
equated to 'being extramentaPor 'mind-independent'.
thisis the meaningto take into account when positingthe categoriesas
of things.
i.e. as a classification
a real classification,
What kind of thingsare categories?Are theyuniversalor particular?
Scotus maintainsthat,properlyspeaking,in the extramentalworld the
only independentitems are particularsfallinginto one of the ten categories.Each particularitem,however,is constitutedby two elements,a
thatactualisesthepotencommonessenceand a principleof individuation
tial characterof the essence and makes an individualout of it. Neither
modoaccihabetde re tertio
difficultatem
sitres,nullam
si relatio
patetquodquaestio
difficultas
Tantum
ad
se.
non
est
substantia
secundo
vel
ergo
modo,
eque
quia
piendo
estintelligibilis
Sed necde enterationis,
estde primomembro.
quiapatetquodrelatio
realem
si habeatessesivesitreshabensentitatem
Estergohicsermo
sinecontradictione.
Et de hocdicoquodestres[...]. Ex hocapparet
extraanimam.
quaeresipsa
propriam
estresad alterum.
velestad sevelad alterum.
Ipsaformaliter
sit,quiasisitressingularis,
modo
est
res
isto
ei
"ad alterum"
Nec istadeterminatio
quia
loquendo,
rpugnt quod
velcircumstantiam
modm
velhabitudinem
contra
istomodoresnondistinguitur
rei,sed
from
somemodifications)
is taken(with
translation
eam".TheEnglish
includit
JohnDuns
andWolter
Alluntis
GodandCreatures
, transi.
(above,n. 27),63-4.
Scotus,
30On thesense/kind
of
Senses
andKinds
seeG.B.Matthews,
confusion
, in:TheJournal
69 (1972),149-57.
Philosophy,

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

is capable of independentexistence;only the

of these two constituents
in
of the ten categoriesare. Since the analyone
items
falling
particular
sis of a particular into two constituentscan be repeated at different
at the specific
levelsof generality
(i.e. at the individuallevelforparticulars,
level forspecificessences,up to the mostgenerallevel forcategorialconcepts),each categorycan be seen as the ordered set of all the itemsof
a certain kind. i.e. the individualsand their constituentsincapable of
independentexistencebut neverthelessprovided of some kind of mindindependentunity:
to thathierarchy,
all thatpertain
arecontained
there
In every
hierarchy
categorial
to thathierelsethatis notsomething
essentially
belonging
everything
disregarding
and
are
hierarchies
two
such
because
is
diverse,
primarily
any
(This
proved
archy.
Butjustas
theother's
to theonedoesso through
so nothing
hierarchy.)
belonging
at boththetopandthebotas itis limited
insofar
to thathierarchy,
there
belongs
so toothere
elseis predicated,
ofwhich
tom[...], a first
belongs
nothing
predicate,
catinevery
elseis madesubject.
towhich
toita lowest
Therefore,
nothing
subject,
established
is
not
individual
or
the
belonganything
through
hierarchy singular
egorial
Spade,79-80.)
(trans.
ingto anyotherhierarchy.31
In
So, accidentsare not dependenton substancesfortheirindividuality.
each category,no matterwhat categoryit is, thereare individualitems,
such as individualquantities,qualitiesor relations,thatare individualjust
because theyare extramentalthingsin the world belongingto a certain
kind.
as ReallyDistinct
4. Categories
of the claim that catScotus makes clear that a rigorousunderstanding
of thingsimpliesthat 'thing'mustbe takenin
egoriesare a classification
the same sense for all the categories.Accordingly,adi the categoriesare
thingsin the same sense, i.e. as extramentalentities.Now, in order to
31DunsScotus,Ord.II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 89,in: Opera
omnia
VII, 433-434:". . . in
ad illamcoordinationem,
suntomniapertinentia
coordinatione
praedicamentali
qualibet
essentialiter
alioquodnonestaliquidilliuscoordinationis
(hoc
circumscripto
quocumque
etitanihiluniusesttalepercoorduaesuntprimo
diversae,
quiacoordinationes
probatur,
etin
finita
estetinsursum
illaminquantum
sedad coordinationem
dinationem
alterius);
- itapertinet
de quo nihilpraedicatur,
deorsum
praedicatum,
primum
[...], sicutpertinet
coorestinqualibet
velindividuum
cuinihilsubicitur;
infimum
subiectum,
singulare
igitur
from
is
taken
translation
The
coordinationis".
alterius
nihil
alicuius
dinatione
English
per
DunsScotus
Problem
Mediaeval
onthe
FiveTexts
, Ockham.
Abelard}
Boethius,
Porphyry,
ofUniversals.
andEditedbyP.V. Spade,Indianapolis
Translated
1994,79-80.See alsoLect.II, d. 3,
omnia
XVII,258.
p. 1,q. 4, n. 91,in: Opera

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SCOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

85

prove his strongrealism,Scotus mustdemonstratethatthisclaim implies

that the categoriesare reallydistinctfromeach other and that no one
can be reduced to any other.This is his anti-reductionist
thesis.
Scotus's demonstrationis based on his notion of real distinction.
Accordingto Scotus, x andjy are reallydistinctif and only if (a) both x
and y are extramentalthingsand (b) it is logicallypossible for at least
one of them to exist withoutthe other. Clause (b)- usually called the
'separabilitycriterion'forreallydistinctthings is worthnoticing.Scotus
holds that the separabilitycriterionis not necessarilya symmetrical
relaif x
tion, even thoughquite oftenit is. x and y may be reallydifferent
can existwithouty buty cannot existwithoutx. This will play an important role in Scotus's way of distinguishing
between absolute and nonabsolute categories.32
of the different
By his distinction
meaningsof 'thing',Scotus has established that clause (a) holds for the categories,namely that all the catethattheseparability
goriesare extramental
things.He muststilldemonstrate
criterionholds forthe categories,namelythat,forany two categories,at
least one of them can existwithoutthe other.This claim is particularly
controversialas far as Relation is concerned,for it does not seem that
Relation adds anythingreal to its foundationand that accordinglyit is
reallydistinctfromit. So, it is to Relation that Scotus devotes a very
articulatedtreatmentto show thatit is reallydistinctfromits foundation.
SpecificallyagainstHenryof Ghent,Scotus demonstrates
by severalargumentsthatit is not contradictory
forthe foundationof a relationto exist
withoutthe relationfoundedon it.33In addition,Scotus shows in some
32Scotusformulates
theseparability
criterion
forrealdistinction
in Ord.II, d. 1,q. 5,
nn.200-204,
in:Opera
omnia
Civitas
Vaticana1973,101-3,
VII, ed. Gommissio
Scotistica,
in part.nn.200-1,101-2:". . . nihilestidemrealiter
esserealiter
alicui,sinequo potest
. . . quiaquodidemenssitrealiter
et nonsitrealiter,
videtur
esse
absquecontradictione
exquoprincipio
videtur
statm
concludi
diversitas
entium;
oppositum
primi
principii,
primo
contradictoria
eo modoquo dicuntur
de eis,videntur
non
dicantur,
quiasi de aliquibus
esseet non-esse
dicantur
de eis,videntur
essenonidemin
idem,et itasi contradictoria
essevelin re,sivenonidemens".See alsoLed.II, d. 1,q. 5, nn.184-7in: Opera
omnia
Civitas
Vaticana1982,61-2;Ord.II, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2,
XVIII,ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
in: Opera
omnia
VII, nn. 92-3,196-8.See McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1), 16-9;
1989(above,n. 12),71-2;King2003(above,n. 3),21-2.
Henninger
33DunsScotus,
Ord.II, d. 1. q. 5, nn. 188-120,
in: Opera
omnia
in part,
VII, 94-120,
nn.200 and205,101-4:". . . nihilestidemrealiter
esserealiter
alicui,sinequo potest
sed multaesuntrelationes
sinequibusfundamenta
esse
absquecontradictione;
possunt
suntrelationes
idemcumfunabsquecontradictione;
ergomultae
quaenonsuntrealiter
damento.
inomnibus
relationibus
fundamenta
[. . .] Minoretiamapparet
quarum
possunt

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

detail that the othercategoriesare reallydistinctfromeach otherin his

on theMetaphysics.
In the latterwork,however,he does not use
Questions
the separability
he demonstrates
thatthingsbelongingto different
criterion;
categories are really distinctbecause they have primarycontradictory
properties.This, in Scotus's opinion,amountsto showingthat categories
are reallydistinctfromeach other,since the same thingcannot bear two
primarilycontradictory
properties.Specifically,Scotus demonstratesthat
Quantityand Quality are reallydistinctfromSubstance,thatRelation is
reallydistinctfromits foundation,that Action, Passion, When, Where,
Positionand Habit are reallydistinctfromRelation,thatWhere is really
distinctfrom place, that When is really distinctfrom time, and that
Positionis reallydistinctfromWhen.34
Scotus does not provide a general demonstrationthat the categories
are really distinctfromeach other. His defenseof anti-reductionism
is
piecemeal. It could not have been otherwise.As Scotus remarks,any
demonstrationthat the categoriesare not reducibleone to anotherand
thatconsequentlytheirnumberis sufficient
cannot be of a logical nature,
i.e. it mustbe based on the way thingsare in the extramentalworld,not
on the way we understandthe categories.35
But such a demonstration
is
impossiblefortwo reasons.First,ifit were possible,it would demonstrate
the oppositeof what it is supposed to demonstrate,namelythat the categoriesare the primarydistinctionof all real things.For such a demonstrationwould be based on generalfeaturessuch as 'being in itself'and
'being in somethingelse', which,in orderto act as middleterms,should
be common to more than one categoryinsofaras the categoriesare real
kindsof thingsin the world. Consequently,therewould be a divisionof
things accordingto the relationsof 'being in itself'and 'being in somethingelse' prior to the divisioninto categories.Thus, the divisioninto
essesineterminis,
sicut
estinomnibus
relationibus
suntsimile,
aequiparantiae
(sicut
aequale
ethuiusmodi):
si enimhocalbumsitet illudalbumnonsit,hocalbumestsinesimilituet
si
aliud
album
in hocalboestsimilitudo;
dine,
essesineistoetcum
fiat,
potest
igitur
isto.Similiter
estin multis
relationibus
si enimistesithomo,et talisut
disquiparantiae:
- et ipseetiam
nullusaliussubsit
essedomisuae,eritsinedominatione,
potestad
potest
sicutdicitBoethius;
etitaestde multis
nus,servorum
accessione,
aliis,de quibusomnibus
nonoportet
adducere".
See alsoLed.II, d. 1,q. 5, nn.164-221,
in:Opera
omnia
exempla
omnia
XVIII,53-75;Quodl.
See Henninger
, q. 3, nn.4-20,in: Opera
1989
XXV, 115ff.
(above,n. 12),71-8,87-97.
34DunsScotus,
inMetaph.
in: Opera
Quaest.
V, q. 5-6,nn.81-103,
III, 466phibsophica
71. See Pini2002(above,n. 24),144-68.
35See above,n. 23.

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SGOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

87

categorieswould not be primary,because the categorieswould not be

diverse thingsthat do not have anythingin common. Second, such a
demonstration
would not showwhatit is supposedto demonstrate,
namely
that being is divided into exactlyten kindsand that these kindsare the
most basic divisionof being. For such a demonstration
would show that
most
kinds
before
is
divided
into
two
or
three
descending
being
general
into the categories,not that being is divided into exactlyten categories:
all
ofthecategories,
which
Note:there
areseveral
thesufficiency
waysforshowing
becausetheyprovetheopposite,
thatthedivision
seemtosindoubly.
First,
namely,
intoa being
Forifpriorto it is thedivision
ofbeingin thesetenis notprimary.
in itself
and further,
thatone member
oftheseis suband a beingnotin itself,
term
eachdivision
willbe onlyofan equivocal
orthatbothare,theneither
divided,
becausenamesare appliedat will),or
intoitsequivocates
(which
provesnothing,
a morecommon
moreimmediate
tobeing,
thatsomeofthosetenfallunder
concept
that
divided
intoten.To givean example:
assume
andthusbeingis notimmediately
inthegenera
ofsubstance
one
ofsubstance
thecategory
manytimes
bysubdividing
comesto tenmostspecialspecies,
thesewouldnotdividesubstance
primarfinally
ofthecategories
sin>because
<thewaysforshowing
thesufficiency
ily.Secondly,
foronewould
all thesewaysofdividing
do notprove<whatshouldbe proved>;
in thisway,and
is thusdivided,
andprecisely
haveto provethatwhatis divided
constitute
thesemostgenerals
thatthedividends
thisto theissueat hand,namely
Wolter
Etzkornmodified,
I, 411-2.)
(trans.
<categories>.36
thatthe
Scotus does not provideany generaldemonstration
Accordingly,
categoriesare irreducibleone to another and that there are only and
, as it was called,
praedicamentorum
exacdyten kindsof things.The sujkientia
can be argued for only by way of particulararguments:Substance is
reallydistinctfromQuantityand Quality, and so on. Just because the
of the extramentalworldtheycancategoriesare the mostbasic structure
not be reduced to a more generalframework:
36DunsScotus,Quaest.
inMetaph.
III, 464:
V, q. 5-6,nn.73-75,in: Opera
philosophica
sufficientiam
ostendendi
"Nota:variaesuntviaedivisivae
quaevidenpraedicamentorum,
entis
scilicet
turdupliciter
Primo,
quoddivisio
oppositum
propositi,
peccare:
quiaostendunt
in haecdecern
nonsitprima.Si enimpriusfiatin ensperse et in ensnonperse,et
nominis
divisio
erittantum
velambo:autquaelibet
subdividatur
ultraunummembrum
- quianomina
autaliquo
suntad placitum;
inaequivocata,
estprobare
quodnihil
aequivoci
diviimmediatior
communior
decern
eritconceptus
istorum
enti,etitaensnonimmediate
ingenere
multas
subordinatas
indecern.
ditur
ponendo
quodperdivisiones
Exemplum
patet:
illaenonprimodividead decern
deveniretur
substantiae
tandem
speciesspecialissimas,
enim
nonprobant.
rentsubstantiam.
Secundo,
Oporteret
quiaomnesillaeviaedivisivae
scilicet
et
hoc
ad
et
divisum
sic
sic,
dividitur,
quod
propositum,
praecise
probare
quod
somemodifications)
translation
istaken
TheEnglish
dividenda
constituant
(with
generalissima".
Translated
DunsScotus.
from
ontheMetaphysics
byG.J.Etzkorn
Questions
ofAristotle
byJohn
andA.B.Wolter,
2 vols.,St.Bonaventure
1997-98,
I, 411-2.

11:36:44 AM

88

GIORGIOPINI
viz.the
itmustbe saidthatthis,
tobe sufficient,
ifwe holdthedivision
Therefore,
orthreetwomembered,
areother
Neither
is thefirst.
ofbeingintogenera
division
Foronecannot
membered
divisions
proveeither
priortoit;norcanthisbe proved.
under
whatis divided
arecontained
thatthedividends
(sincethere
maybe an immeas aretheir
arediverse
northatthey
diverse,
(because
theyareprimary
diacythere),
nor
that
these
alone
are under
one
of
the
which
others),
deny
negatives
primary
areproved
ofthedivisors
becauseall immediacy
whatis divided,
bycontradiction,
hereis inapwhichprocedure
ofwhichis "notto havean intermediary,"
thefirst
is intoten.37
division
sincethefirst
Etzkorn-Wolter,
I, 412-3.)
(trans.
plicable,

Scotus's statementthatit is impossibleto demonstratethat thereare ten

categoriesbecause it is impossibleto reduce them to some more basic
modes of being sounds radical and unprecedented.Scotus moves against
a long traditionof attemptsto justifyAristotle'slistof categoriesby reducing them to some basic modes of being or of predicating.Scotus's position,however,is simplythe consequence of his strongrealistconception
of categoriesas the primarythingsinto which the extramentalworld is
divided.From a metaphysicalpoint of view, thereis nothingmore basic
and fundamentalthan categories.Reality is not divided into being per
se and being in somethingelse; it is immediatelydividedinto ten distinct
kindsof things,which have absolutelynothingreal in common. This is
intothe categoriescannotbe demonstrated
the reasonwhythe distinction
but must be assumed as primary.All that Scotus can give is a demonstrationthat a single categoryis reallydistinctfromthe other ones, by
appealing to the separabilitycriterion.
on theMetaphysics
to
The strategythat Scotus adopts in the Questions
demonstratethatone categoryis reallydistinctfromanotherseems to be
that
objectionable,however.As we have seen, thereScotus demonstrates
a certaincategoryis distinctfromthe other ones not by an appeal to
the separabilitycriterion,but by showingthat each categoryhas some
propertiesthat the other ones do not have. But, accordingto Scotus's
propertiesis not
ontology,showingthat two entitiesbear contradictory
sufficient
to demonstratethat theyare different
things.For Scotus mainIt is part of Scotus's
tains that thingsare not the only property-bearers.
37DunsScotus,
inMetaph.
III, 465:"Ideo
V, q. 5-6,n. 76,in: Opera
Quaest.
philosophica
essetdicendum
divisionem
essesufficientem,
tenendo
quodipsaestprima.Nec aliqua
sub
bimembris
seu trimembris
Quia nec quoddividentia
potest.
priorea; necprobari
cumsitimmediatio
ibi.Necquodsintdiversa,
diviso
diversa,
contineantur,
quiasuntprimo
immeunumab alio.Necquodsolasintsubdiviso,
etnegativa
quiaomnis
negando
prima
cuiusestprimo'nonhaberemedium',
diatiodividentium
percontradictionem,
probatur
from
TheEnglish
translation
is taken
exquoprimo
estindecern".
quaeviahicnonvalet,
Etzkorn
andWolter
ontheMetaphysics
, transi.
Questions
(above,n. 36),I, 412-3.

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SCOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

89

doctrineof universaisand the formaldistinctionthat,withineach thing,

there are some property-bearers,
formallynon-identicalto each other.
Scotus
holds
that
the
same thing can have contradictory
Accordingly,
properties,as long as the bearers of these propertiesare two formally
non-identicalentities.For example,withinthe same individualthereare
two formallynon-identicalconstituents,
a common nature and an indiThese
two
entities
have
viduatingprinciple.
contradictory
properties,for
the natureis common to several individualsand the individuatingprinciple is proper to only one individual.Thus, the same individualseems
to have contradictory
properties,according to whetherit is considered
with regardto its natureor to its individuatingprinciple.Consequently,
Scotus cannot demonstratethat the categoriesare really distinctfrom
each otheronly by showingthat theyhave contradictory
properties.For
the categoriescould have contradictory
if
even
properties
theywere fornon-identical
entities
within
the
same
mally
thing.38
Scotus could answer that this objectionfailsto take into account the
distinction
betweenprimaryand non-primary
contradiction.For it seems
to be part of his notionof formaldistinction
thatthe propertiespossessed
by formallynon-identicalentitiesare not primarilycontradictory
properties.Because two formallynon-identicalentitiesconstitutethe same thing,
the propertiesthey have are contradictory
only in a qualifiedway, i.e.
not
for
So,
formally, primarily.39
example, one could contend that the
of
property being common and non-commonare not primarilycontradictoryand that accordinglythey can be possessed by the same thing,
providedthat that thingbe consideredfromdifferent
aspects.Something
is common insofaras it is consideredaccordingto its common nature,
even thoughthe same thingis not common when consideredaccording
to its individuating
features.By contrast,the contradictory
propertiesthat
are true of one categorybut not of anotherare primarilycontradictory:
theypertainto a categorywithoutany qualification,not because of one
of itsformally
non-identicalconstituents.
It is doubtful,however,thatsuch
an answerwould convinceanybody.For it seems to presupposewhat it
mustdemonstrate,
holdsbetweenthings
namelythatprimarycontradiction
38.A similar
in generell:
theformal
distinction
pointwas raisedby Ockhamagainst
iftheformal
to Ockham,
in ontology,
distinction
is admitted
thereis no way
according
to arguefortherealdistinction
between
couldbe merely
things.
Everyproperty-bearer
distinct.
See William
Ord.I, d. 2, q. 6, in: Opera
Ockham,
II, 174.See
formally
theologica
McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 49-52.
39See McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 49.

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

and not between formalities.Scotus's criterionto demonstratethat one

categoryis really distinctfromanother seems ultimatelyto require the
separabilitycriterion.
In any case, it is a factworthnoticingthat Scotus resortsto formally
non-identicalentitiesonly when he must account for the hierarchical
orderingof thingswithinthe same category.Because of his endorsement
of realism,he holds that the categoriesare things,and thispreventshim
fromusingthe formaldistinction
to account forcategorialdiversity,
since
by definitionthe formaldistinctionapplies to entitieswithinthe same
thing.
5. Categories
as SimpleEssences
So, Scotus's realismconcerningcategoriesis the straightforward
position
of ten and only ten kindsof thingsin the extramentalworld. Each one
of them is simple,because it is not composed of ratioand esseor of res
and ratioor an essence and a mode of being: a categoryis simplya res,
i.e. an essence of a certainkind. Admittedly,this essence can be ananon-identical
in orderto account
lyzedintodifferent
formally
constituents,
for the hierarchically
orderedconceptsthat can representit, fromindividuals to the most universalgenera. But these two formallynon-identical constituentsare inseparablefromeach other. The very fact that a
categoryis somehow composed of these non-identicalentitiesexcludes
any sort of real distinctionwithinthe categoryitself.
This was not an uncontroversial
position.As I have mentioned,before
Scotus it was commonlyheld that each categorywas constitutedby two
elementsinsofaras it was a category.Quite often,it was even assumed
thatsomething,in orderto be in a category,had to be composed of two
reallydistinctitems,i.e. matterand form.Of course,thisposed the problem of the categorial status of immaterialand simple beings, such as
angels and God.40Thanks to his radical realism,Scotus gets rid of this
problem.Each categoryis a simpleessence. For example,in the case of
Substance,no compositionis requiredin order to be classifiedas a substance. The only necessaryrequirementis to be a real, absolute and per
se thing.Scotus of course does not mean to say that no substancecan
be composed of two different
things,such as formand matter:this is
40See A. Tabarroni,
"Utrum
Deussitinpraedicamento":
andCategorial
Ontological
Simplicity
Inclusion
2003(above,n. 13),271-87.
, in:BiardandRosier-Catach

11:36:44 AM

OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S

91

actuallythe case of all material substances.Scotus is only saying that

being composed of two distinctthingsis not a necessaryrequirementfor
belongingto any category,not even to Substance. Substances may or
may not be composed of matterand form.What is essentialis that they
are thingsperse. Insofaras theyare substances,theyare simpleessences
and things.If they are also composed of matterand form,this is not
because theyare substancesbut because theyare material.41
Scotus holds the same positionabout accidents.Accidentsare not comthingssuch as matterand form.Of course,each acciposed of different
dent can be conceived of accordingto different
degrees of universality
the
is accountedforby
and thispossibility
presenceof formallynon-identical entitieswithinthe same thing.Insofaras theyare categories,accidents are simple essences. Remarkably,here Scotus straightforwardly
should be posited
appeals to the principleof parsimony.No multiplicity
when it is not necessary.Thus, if somethingcan be explained without
positinga real composition,no real compositionshould be posited:
from
arecompounded
accidents
itis saidtothequestion
things
Otherwise,
[whether
ittheappearwhenthrough
be assumed
mustalways
thatpaucity
diverse]
essentially
to
ofa plurality
theassumption
ancesaresaved[...]. Andtherefore,
oughtalways
nothbut
are
which
that
of
because
statesomemanifest
postulated;
many
necessity
onewouldhavetoassume
becauseofwhich
inaccidents
theyarecomingappears
is
such
of
two
essential
Therefore,
composition
[...].
speaking
generally
parts,
posed
denied.42
II, 349.)
Etzkorn-Wolter,
(trans.
generally
to findScotus openlyendorsingthe principleof parIt may be surprising
simony,usuallyassociatedwithnominalism,when presentinghis doctrine
of categories,which is one of the main tenetsof Scotus's realism.At a
closer look, however,this appeal to the principleof parsimonyis not so
For Scotus's realismconcerningthe categoriesconsistsin getsurprising.
in order to account for
ting rid of such semi-thingsas esseand rationes
Scotus positsno fewer
the distinctionamong the categories.Admittedly,
than ten kindsof things;but all thesekindsare thingsin the same sense
of the word 'thing'.There is no need foradditionaltypesof entitiessuch
as mods of existenceor the like. So, Scotus's doctrineof the categories
all the categoriesare
amounts to a dramaticontologicalsimplification:
41See DunsScotus,
inMetaph.,
IV, edd.
VII, q. 19,n. 73,in: Opera
philosophica
Quaest.
NY 1997,379.
etal.,St.Bonaventure,
R. Andrews
42DunsScotus,
. inMetaph
IV, 403-404.
., VIII, q. 1, n. 22,in: Opera
philosophica
Quaest
and Wolter
Etzkorn
ontheMetaphysics
see Questions
FortheEnglish
, transi.
translation,
(above,n. 36),II, 349.

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

thingsand are reallydistinctfromeach other because anythingthat is

extramentalis a thingand everythingthat is a thingis really distinct
fromotherthings.
Accidents
6. Inherence
andNon-Absolute
Since all the categoriesare thingsin the same sense of the term'thing5,
how can Scotus account forthe inherenceof accidentsin substancesand
betweenabsolute and non-absoluteaccidents?A supforthe asymmetry
porterof the standarddoctrineof the compositionof the categoriescan
easily explain both facts. The inherence of accidents in substance is
explained by appealing to the special nature of the mode of existence
accidents,i.e. being in or inheringin somethingelse. This
constituting
accounts for the accident's dependence on substance. The asymmetry
betweenabsolute accidentslike Quality and Quantityand the remaining
to the existenceof only
non-absoluteaccidentsis explainedby referring
three kinds of things,substances,qualities and quantities.Non-absolute
categoriesare composed of a thingof one of the firstthree categories
non-absolutecategoriesare not
and a mode properto them.Accordingly,
This
their
foundations.
from
distinct
explains why non-absolute
things
can
be conceivedof (and on
absolute
accidents
cannot
whereas
accidents
special occasions even exist)withouttheirsubjects.
Scotus's realistdoctrineof the categoriesis an all-encompassingview
dealt with. He needs
in which these two problemsare straightforwardly
his
of
to
to posit no exception
general theory categoriesin order to
account for them.
As to the firstquestion,Scotus quite simplymaintainsthat inherence
is not a componentof accidentalcategories;by contrast,it is a thingin
its own right,i.e. an accident belongingto a certain category.Scotus
holds that inherencebelongs to one of the last six non-absolutecategories,specificallyto eitheraction or passion.43Accordingly,the nature
43DunsScotus,
omnia
Ord.IV, d. 12.q. 1,n. 6, in:Opera
XVII,Paris1891,534-5:"Et
vel
hocquodestaccidens
illudquodperse significai
si quaerasad quodgenuspertinet
advenientis.
Patetenimquod
extrinsecus
ad genus
inhaerens?
aliquodrespectus
Respondeo,
ratioeiusad se. Non autemdicitrespectum
dicitrespectum,
quia nonpotestintelligi
intrisecus
extremorum,
advenientem,
quia
consequentem
positionem
quianonnecessario
Si quaeras,ad
manere
sineistorespectu.
eiuset terminus
[. . .] fundamentum
possunt
ut sicpassiodicatnontantum
ad genuspassionis,
Videsi forte
respectum
quodgenus?
ad genusactionis,
utsicactiodicatnontanvelsi forte
passiad agens,sedad formam;

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SCOTUS'S
REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

93

of inherencehas nothingmysterious
forScotus. Inherenceis not a mode
of being or a semi-thingconstituting
accidental categories.It is a nonabsolute accident by which accidentsare related to substances.Since it
is an accident,inherenceitselfinheresin its subject,which in turnis an
inheringaccident.
This view of inherenceprovidesa straightforward
solutionto the problem of the possibilitythat absoluteaccidentssuch as quantitiesand qualitiesexistwithoutinheringin theirsubjects(as in the case of the Eucharist).
Since inherenceis an item in an non-absolutecategory,it is reallydistinctfromQuality and Quantity.Therefore,thereis no contradiction
for
Quality and Quantityto exist withoutinheringin a substance.This is
only an instanceof the separationof two reallydistinctthings.44
Scotus'spositinginherenceas one accidentreallydistinctfromthe others is an innovativemove.45In this way, Scotus provides a new ontological analysis of entitiescomposed of a substance and an absolute
accident,such as the compoundentityconstituted
by Socratesand whiteSuch entitieswere usuallyconsideredas the result
ness,i.e. Socrates-white.
of the combinationof two entities,a substance(forexample, Socrates),
and a quality(forexample,whiteness).Because it was thoughtthatit was
in the nature of a quality to inhere in a substance,the standardconceptionwas that,as soon as a substanceacting as a subjectfor a qualityand that veryqualitywere posited in the world,the resultwould be
tumrespectum
ad patiens,
sedformae
informantis.
Sedutroque
modoeritrespecagentis
tasextrinsecus
adveniens".
Scotus
alsodistinguishes
between
actualandhabitual
(orpotenHereI onlyfocuson actualinherence.
Fora moreextended
tial)inherence.
presentation
ofScotus's
andevolution,
seePini2004(above,n. 14),287-310.
position
44DunsScotus,
Ord.IV, d. 12.q. 1,n. 9, in: Opera
omnia
XVII,545:"Tertiaconclusio [seil.,quodilludquoddenominatur
a perse significato
accidentis
et estquidabsolutumpotest
esseetnoninesse
subiecto
sednecessario
inest
actualiter,
aptitudinaliter]
probatur,
undeabsolutum,
nonrequirit
terminm
necterminos,
quiaaccidens
absolutum,
quiatunc
nonessetabsolutum.
Si igitur
aliamdepensubiectum,
requirit
oportet
quodsitpropter
dentiam
ad ipsumessentialem.
Sed nullaestdependentia
necessaria
alicuius
simpliciter
absolti
ad aliquidquodnonestde essentia
causaextrnseca,
nisiad
eius,sed tantum
causamextrinsecam
scilicet
ad Deum.Subiectum
autemnonestde
simpliciter
primam,
essentia
accidentis
accidentis
absolti
ad subiectum
nonestsim[. . .] ergodependentia
necessaria.
Vocosimpliciter
necessarium
cuiusoppositum
includit
pliciter
contradictionem".
On discussions
abouttheinherence
ofaccidents,
seeS. Donati,"Utrum
accidens
possit
existere
sinesubiecto
". Aristotelische
undchristliche
in einigen
Metaphysik
Theologie
ungedruckten
desausgehenden
13.Jahrhunderts
Physikkommentaren
, in:J.A.Aertsen-K.
Emery,
Jr.-A.Speer
von1277.Philosophie
undTheologu
anderUniversitt
vonParisimlet(eds),NachderVerurteilung
(ks13.Jahrhunderts.
Studien
zenViertel
undTexte
York2001(Miscellanea
Mediaevalia
, Berlin-New
28),577-617.

11:36:44 AM

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GIORGIOPINI

a compound entity.No additionalitemwas requiredto account forthat

combination.By contrast,Scotus maintainsthatjust positinga substance
and a qualityis not sufficient
to accountforthe compoundentitySocrateswhite. For it is logicallypossible that both Socrates and his whiteness
existand that theydo not constituteone entity.In the late 1290s, when
, Scotus clearlyformulatedthe problembut stilldid not
writinghis Lectura
want to statethatinherenceis a separateitem added to a substanceand
an accident.46Some years afterwards,in his Ordinatio,
he changed his
as
we
have
seen.
additional
is
mind,
Something
requiredto account for
the union betweena substanceand an accident.This additionalentityis
a different
categorialitem,i.e. inherence.Accordingly,Scotus holds that
in a compound entitysuch as Socrates-whitethere are actually three
things:Socrates,his whitenessand the inherenceby whichSocrates'whiteness inheresin Socrates.
This analysisis only apparentlymore complicatedthan the standard
one. It is true that Scotus positsan additionalthingin order to account
for compound entities.But he is able to explain why a substanceand a
quality constitutesa unitywithoutappealing to semi-things
constituting
the naturesof accidentssuch as modes of being or mysterious
entitiesof
that sort.All the basic constituents
of the world are extramentalthings.
So, in orderto unitetwo things,theremustbe a thirdthinglinkingthem.
No special explanationis required.
There seems to be a serious problem in Scotus's view, however. If
inherenceis itselfan accident,it inheresin a quality or a quantityby
way of a second inherence.In turn,thissecond inherenceis an accident;
consequendy,it inheresin the firstinherenceby way of a thirdinherence, and so on. The way seems to be open to an infiniteregress.
Scotus is fullyaware of thisproblem,whichHenryof Ghenthad developed into a critiqueof the real distinctionbetween a relationand its
foundation.Scotus'ssolutionis based on his treatment
of the second questionthatI have mentionedabove, namelythe asymmetry
betweenabsolute
and non-absoluteaccidents.For it is true that Scotus holds that all the
46SeeDunsScotus,
Lect.
omnia
XVII,ed.Commissio
I, d. 17,p. 2,q. 4,n. 239,in:Opera
Civitas
Vaticana1966,257-8:"Credoautemquodhocestunumverbum
de
Scotistica,
difficilioribus
scilicet
multae
enimsuntoccultae
unitates
'unitas';
rerum,
philosophiae,
quae
nobislatent.
Considerabam
multoties
homo-album
verius
faciunt
unum
aliquando
quomodo
albedinis
ad hominem,
nonestaliquamsi essent
separata:
quodenimfacitinhaerentia
- ettarnen
tuncesthomo-album
addita,
'unum',
qua realitas
quandoalbedoestinhomine,
et nonquandosuntseparata".

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REALISTCONCEPTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

95

categoriesare extramentalthingsin the same sense of 'thing5.He also

thinks,however,that the way in which each categoryis an extramental
fromthe way thatthe othercategoriesare. Specifically,
thingis different
he agrees with the standardview that there is an asymmetry
between
absoluteaccidentssuch as Qualityand Quantityand the remainingseven
accidents(i.e. Relationand the so-called'six principles').WhereasQuantity
and Qualitycan existwithoutinheringin theirsubjects,Relation and the
last six categoriescannot.If a relativeaccidentexists,necessarilyits terms
exist:therecan be no fatherhoodwithouta fatherand a son. Scotus does
not have to make any adjustmentto his realistdoctrineof the categories
in order to account forthis asymmetry.
As I have noted above, his formulationof the separabilitycriterioncharacterizingthe real distinction
does not require symmetry:
x and y are reallydistinctif both of them
are thingsand if at leastone of themcan exist withoutthe other. The
difference
betweenabsoluteand non-absolutecategoriesis capturedexactly
in the separabilitycriterion.If
by the presence or absence of symmetry
x and y are absolute categories,x can exist withouty and y can exist
withoutx. This holds for Substance,Quality and Quantity.By contrast,
if x is an absolutecategoryandjy is a relativecategory,x can existwithouty butjycannotexistwithoutx. This is not an exceptionto the requirements for being really distinct.It only expressesin a formalway that
some categoriesare absolute and othercategoriesare not.47
If we come back to the threatof an infiniteregressconcerninginherbetween absolute and
ence, we see that Scotus's way of distinguishing
non-absolutecategoriesblocks such a regress.For a qualityand a quantitycan exist withoutinheringin a substance.Consequently,inherence
is really distinctfrom both Quantity and Quality: it is an item in a
different
accidental category.But now, let us consider the relationship
betweeninherenceand, say, a quality.Since inherenceis an accidentit is argued- , it inheresin a qualityby a second inherence,call it inherfromthe firstinherence,call it inherence
ence2,reallydifferent
i. According
to Scotus,however,it is not the case thatthe inherence2is reallydifferent
from inherencei. For inherence belongs to a non-absolute category.
Consequently,by its verynature,it cannot existwithoutits foundation.
the foundationof inherence!is a quality.So, if inherence!
By hypothesis,
exists,the qualityin which it inheresnecessarilyexists.The foundation
47DunsScotus,Ord.II, d. 1, q. 5, nn.267-70,in:
omnia
VII, 133-4;Lect.II,
Opera
d. 1,q. 5, nn.252-3,in: Opera
omnia
XVIII,85-6.

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of inherence2is inherence
i. So, if inherence2exists,inherence
i necessaris
an
if
exists.
there
infinite
inherence
and
inheri
Now,
ily
regressonly
are
distinct
from
each
because
in
that
case
should
ence2
other,
really
only
inherence2inherein inherence!by a thirdinherencereallydistinctfrom
inherence^i.e. inherence3.By contrast,if inherencei and inherence2are
reallythe same, thereis no regressand we can conclude that inherence
inheresin an accidental categoryjust by itself,not by the addition of
anotherinherencereallydistinctfromit. Now, this is exactlythe case.
For we have seen thatinherence2
cannotexistwithoutinherence
b because
it is a non-absoluteaccident.So, inherence
and
are
i
inherence2 reallydistinctfromeach otheronlyifinherence!can existwithoutinherence^But
this is not the case. For, as we have seen, inherence!cannot existwithout its foundation.Since inherence!is an accident,this amountsto saying that inherence!cannot existwithoutinheringin its foundation.But
the inherenceby which inherence!inheresin its foundationis precisely
inherence^ So, inherence!cannot existwithoutinherence^ Thus, inherthereis no threat
ence! and inherence2are not reallydistinct.Accordingly,
of an infinitemultiplication
of inherences.48
At firstsight,Scotus's denial of an infiniteregressconcerninginherence may appear over-complicated.
As a matterof fact,his argumentis
remarkableforthe absence of any ad hocassumption.It is entirelybased
on his own formulationof the separabilitycriterionfor really distinct
between absolute and nonthingsand his own way of distinguishing
absolutecategoriesaccordingto whetherthe separabilitycriterionis symmetricalor not. Thus, Scotus's rejectionof an infiniteregressis entirely
based on the constituting
featuresof his own doctrineof the categories.
No special assumptionis required.
A finalclarification
is needed in order to give a completeaccount of
Scotus's doctrineof the categories.Until now, I have been talkingabout
the non-absolutecategories,i.e. Relation and the last six categories,as if
there were no importantdistinctionamong them. All of them cannot
48SeeDunsScotus,
Ord.
omnia
II, d. 1,q. 5,n. 239,in:Opera
VII, 119:"... deprocessu
in infinitum,
dicoquodnonsequitur,
se ipsarefertur
ad fundamentum;
non
quiarelatio
enimpotest
esseabsquefundamento,
velabsquese,sinecontradictione.
Ipsaenimexisiset fundamento
ambosuntextrema
illiusrelationis
tente,
simul,
quae esteiusad funda- sinecontradictione
- absquerelatione
nonpotest
esse
eiusad fundamentum,
mentum;
igitur
- et itaillarelatio
et itasinecontradictione
nonpotest
esseabsquesuofundamento
qua
refertur
ad fundamentum,
eriteademsibi[. . .]". See alsoibid.,nn.268-71,133-43.
See
1989(above,n. 12),89-91.
Henninger

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REALISTCONCEPTION
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SCOTUS'S

97

existwithouttheirfoundation,even thoughtheyare reallydistinctfrom

it because theirfoundationcan existwithoutthem.But Scotus thinksthat
there is some differencebetween Relation, on the one hand, and the
remainingsix non-absolutecategories,on the other hand. Scotus elaborates on the traditionaldoctrinepresentedin the Libersexprincipiorum,
,
a
that
are
"within
are
divided
into
those
which
accidents
to
according
substance" and those that are attributedto substance "from outside".
Since the accidentsattributedto substance"fromoutside"are the last six
classifiedas
categories,it followsthat Relation is (somehowsurprisingly)
Scotus
calls
Relation
an accidentthatis "withina substance".49
Accordingly,
a respectas
intrinsecus
adveniens
, i.e. a relationcomingfrominside. It is typical of Relation thatit necessarilyexistsas soon as its foundationand its
termare posited. So, the foundationand the term are jointlysufficient
for a relationto exist. For example, once a fatherand a son are both
posited,there necessarilyexiststhe relationof fatherhood.By contrast,
extrnsecus
adveScotus calls the remainingsix relativecategoriesrespectas
six
last
catIt
is
of
these
from
outside.
nientes
i.e.
relations
,
typical
coming
but
not
sufficient
and
terms
are
that
their
foundations
onlynecessary
egories
conditionsfortheirexistence.An externalcause is also necessaryin order
to bringthe extrinsicrelationinto existence.For example,let us take the
action of burning.For this action to exist,Scotus thinksthat it is not
to posit the existenceof its foundation,i.e. fire,and its term,
sufficient
i.e. the thingthat is burnt.In additionto the foundationand the term,
an externalcause must also be posited,such as somebodywho puts the
thingto be burntnear the fire.50Since Scotus holds that it is logically
possiblefora qualityto existwithoutinheringin a substanceeven when
that substanceexists,it is clear why he thinksthat inherenceis a res
pecadveniens.
Substance(i.e. the termof inherence)and accident
tusextrnsecus
conditionsfor inher(i.e. the foundationof inherence)are not sufficient
ence to exist.An externalcause that makes the accident actuallyinhere
in the substanceis also required.

49Liber
I6'7:Categoriarum
in:Aristoteles
Latinus
sexprincipiorum,
c. 1,nn.14-15,
,
supplemento,
ed. L. MinioPaluello,
1966,38.
Bruges-Paris
50DunsScotus,
Paris1894
omnia
Ord.III, d. 1,q. 1,n. 15,in:Opera
XIV,ed.L. Vivs,
omnia
XX,
Westmead,
1969),41; Led.Ill, d. 1. q. 1, n. 82,in Opera
Farnborough
(repr.
Civitas
Vaticana2003,32; Ord.4, d. 13,q. 1, n. 9, in: Opera
ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
omnia
Westmead,
XVII,ed.L. Vivs,Paris1894(repr.
1969),668.See King
Farnborough
2003(above,n. 3),33-4.

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7. Univocity
and theCategories
Scotus holds that his realistdoctrineof the categoriesis logicallyindependentof his mostfamousmetaphysicaldoctrine,the univocityof being.
Categoriesare extramentalthingsand reallydistinctno matterwhether
being is univocal or analogous. Each of the two doctrinesstandsor falls
This claim, however,is open to challenge.For it is
by its own merits.51
Scotus's
view that the categories,insofaras they are things
implied by
primarilyirreducibleto one another,are primarilydiverse,i.e. thatthere
is no thingcommonto them.52But thisseems to be in contradiction
with
Scotus's endorsementof univocity,accordingto which there is a common conceptof being univocallypredicatedof all the categories.If being
is univocallypredicatedof the categories,it seems to play the role of a
genus. Accordingly,the categoriesare species under a common genus.
But thisis contraryto Scotus's view of the categoriesas primarilydiverse
as well as to Aristotle'sclaim that being is not a genus.53
Scotus is aware of thischallenge.He presentsit as an objectionto the
view that being is univocal to the categories.In Scotus's terms,the doctrineof the univocityof being seems to implythatbeing is a genus common to the categoriesand thatthe categoriesare species under the same
genus.54Scotus countersthatbeing is not a genus because it is somehow
common to its own differentiae,
whereasno genus can be said of its own
differentiae.
it
seems
that
there
can be no generic nature of being
So,
common to all the categoriesand distinctfromthe differentiae
properto
each category.For being is common both to the categoriesand to its
own differentiae.
Consequently,it does not seem to be possible to disa
common
and a properelementwithineach category(i.e. being
tinguish
and its own differentiae).
This is the gist of Scotus's famousdoctrineof
the double primacyof being, by commonnessand by virtuality.55
51DunsScotus,
, q. 3, n. 2, 113.See above,n. 27.
Quodl.
52On thedefinition
ofdifference
anddiversity,
seeAristotle,
Met.X, 3, 1054b23-27.
53Aristotle
claimsthatbeingis nota genusin Met.Ill, 3, 998b22-27.
Scotusclaims
thatcategories
areprimarily
diverse
in Quaest.
inMet.V, q. 4-5,n. 76,in:Opera
philosophica
ofthechallange
thatScotus's
doctrine
ofunivocity
seems
III, 465.Fora clearformulation
toposeto hisownmetaphysics,
seeKing2003(above,n. 3),20-1.
54DunsScotus,Quaestiones
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
, q. 4, n. 18 in: Opera
super
philosophica
etal., St.Bonaventure,
NY 1999,277-8;Quaest.
inMetaph.
I, edd.R. Andrews
IV, q. 1,
n. 50 and54,in: Opera
IV, 308-9.
philosophica
55DunsScotus,
Ord.I, d. 3,p. 1,q. 3, nn.137,151in:Opera
omnia
III, ed.Gommissio
Civitas
Scotistica,
Vaticana,
1954,85-6,93-4;Lect.I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2,nn.97-104,in:
omnia
Civitas
Vaticana1960,261-4.On thedocXVI, ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
Opera

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REALISTCONCEPTION
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99

This answer, however,is not entirelysatisfactory.

For it is part of
Scotus's doctrineof the double primacyof being that being is not predicated of the categoriesand of its differentiae
in the same way. Being is
predicatedper se of the categoriesand of categorialitems,because it is
included in them per se. But it is only virtuallycommon to its own
because it is not includedin themperse: theyare differences
differentiae,
but
of being,
being is not predicatedof them per se and they are not
beingsperse. Accordingly,the challengeposed by univocityis stillthere.
Even thoughbeing is common to everything,
it is common to the cateand
own
in
to
its
differentiae
two
different
senses. Consequendy,
gories
there seems to be space for a real nature (call it 'beingness'),common
to all the categoriesand not to its own differentiae,
in virtueof which
all the categoriesare beings.As a matterof fact,Scotus's doctrineof the
double primacyof being is meant to answeran objectionconcerningthe
To that extent,Scotus's
relationshipbetween being and its differentiae.
solutionis successful.But the double primacyof being is of no avail when
the relationshipbetweenbeing and the categoriesis taken into account.
What is at odds withhis doctrineof the categoriesis thatbeing is thought
to be univocallypredicatedof all the categoriesand thatthisclaim seems
to requirethat therebe a naturecommon to all the categoriesin virtue
of whichbeingis predicatedof themaccordingto the same account.This
seems to be impliedby Scotus's doctrineof univocityno matterwhether
or not.56
being is predicatedof its own differentiae
Thus, Scotus seems to have no valid solutionforthe challengeposed
by his doctrineof univocityto his view of the categoriesas primarily
diverse.Since being is univocallycommon to all categories,each catea formaland a materialone.
gorycan be analyzed into two constituents,
trine
ofthedoubleprimacy
ofbeing,
seeA.B.Wolter,
TheTranscendentais
andTheir
Function
in theMetaphysics
DunsScotus,
St. Bonaventure
The
1946,77-99;S.D. Dumont,
ofJohn
intheFourteenth
DunsScotus
andWilliam
Alnwick
,
oftheConcept
Univocity
ofBeing
Century:
John
in:Mediaeval
49 (1987),1-75,esp.20-4.
Studies,
56Scotushimself
theproblem
therelationship
between
clearly
distinguishes
concerning
andtheproblem
therelationship
and
between
beinganditsdifferentiae
concerning
being
- towhich
thecategories.
Theformer
thedoctrine
ofthedoubleprimacy
ofbeing
problem
- is formulated
is intended
togivea solution
in Ord.I, d. 3, p. 1,q. 3, n. 157,in: Opera
omnia
Lect.
d.
omnia
inMetaph.
III, 95;
I, 3,p. 1,q. 1-2,n. 109,in:Opera
XVI,265;Quaest.
therelaIV, q. 1, n. 57, in: Opera
III, 310.The latter
philosophica
problem,
concerning
between
is formulated
in thepassages
tionship
beingandthecategories,
quotedabovein
note43. Kingseemstoconfuse
thetwoproblems.
hisanswer
to thechalConsequendy,
addresses
theformer
See King2003
lengeposedbythelatter
problem
actually
problem.
(above,n. 3),28.

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GIORGIOPINI

that makes each categorythe

The formalconstituentis the differentia
The
material
constituentis being, which is
that
it
is.
specificcategory
common to everycategory.Accordingly,categoriesare species sharinga
common genus,not primarilydiversehighestgenera.57
Scotus,however,does have an answerto thischallenge.In some addiLet
he devisesa brilliantsolution.58
on theMetaphysics
tionsto his Questions
us firstnotice that the challengeto Scotus's metaphysicscomes froma
the
of univocity.Accordingto thisunderstanding,
specificunderstanding
doctrineof univocityis takento implythatthereis a real featurein each
thingaccordingto which it is a being and a thing(i.e. an extramental
and real thingbelongingto one of the categories).So, there is a com- forwhichwhateveris in the world is real.
- call it realitas
mon element
of univocityseems to fitwith Scotus's opinion that
This interpretation
of the world.
and
specificconceptsare groundedon the structure
generic
If two thingsbelong to the same species,theremustbe somethingcommon in them,i.e. a common natureor essence,in additionto an individuatingprinciple.Similarly,it seems that,since being is univocal and
common to whateveris real, in whateveris real- no matterwhich categoryit belongs to theremustbe a common constituentand a proper
one. The common constituentis somethinglike "beingness",by which
is the difference
whateveris real is real. The properconstituent
by which
into
each
descends
singlecategory.
being
of univocity.
Scotusdoes not endorsesuch an understanding
Specifically,
he does not concede thatthe univocityof being impliesthatthereis just
one nature ("beingness")common to all the categories.The contradictionbetweenunivocityand the primarydiversity
among categoriesderives
of the doctrineof the univocityand the
froman incorrectinterpretation
does not take into account is
nature of being. What his interpretation
that being is a transcendentalconcept, not a generic one. As a tranDoes thismean that
scendentalconcept,being is common to everything.
in the thingsin the worldwe mustposit a corresponding
entityby which
57DunsScotus,
inMetaph.
III, 309:"Item,
IV, q. 1,n. 54,in: Opera
Quaest.
philosophica
Namomnequodhabetin suoperse intellectu
sic:generaprimasuntspecies.
arguitur
illos
definiri
etaliquidformale,
peraliquaduoexprimentia
potest
proprie
aliquidmateriale
endset
sedomneprimm
quia habetin se conceptus
genusesthuiusmodi,
conceptus;
ad hocgenus;ergoestdefinibile
illudcommune
determinans
percomaliquidformale
additum".
muneet illudformale
58On Scotus's
andtheir
onthe
tohisQuestions
additions
Metaphysics
possible
posteriority
on theSentences
versions
ofthecommentary
to thevarious
, seePini2005(above,24).

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REALISTCONCEPTION
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SGOTUS'S

101

contheyare all beings?No, preciselybecause being is a transcendental

is
no
essence
there
is
above
the
Because
single
categories,
being
cept.
correspondingto it in the real world. By contrast,thereare ten essences
diversefromone anotheras things.Still,grantedthatbeing is a concept
to which there correspondten kinds of being, Scotus's doctrineof the
real groundingof conceptsseems to requirethattherebe a common eleto the conceptof being,in virtueof whichwhatever
mentcorresponding
existsis a being,just as thereis a common elementin all human beings
(i.e. humanity)in virtueof which they are what they are. But, within
thereis no need for such an element.It would be
Scotus's metaphysics,
trivialto say thatall extramentalthingsare real because theyhave somethingin common.What theyhave in common is just that theyare real.
But no real propertycorrespondsto the concept of being or being real.
The only propertycommon to all thingsthat are real is the propertyof
belongingto a category,which, accordingto Scotus, is a second-intention property,which depends on how we know the world,not on how
the world is.59
betweena genusand being.Things
So, thereis an importantdifference
in combelongingto a genus have some real feature(i.e. a formality)
mon. Possessingsuch a real featureaccountsforboth theirbelongingto
fromthingsbelongingto another
the same genusand theirbeing different
with transcendentalconcepts,however.For
genus. Things are different
transcendental
Accordingly,thereis
conceptsare common to everything.
no need to posit a real elementin thingsin order to account for their
of them.The conceptof beingunderwhich
and predicability
commonality
a real propertythatdifferentiates
thingsare conceivedof does not represent
what is real fromwhat is not. For thingsthat are not real are not things
at all, accordingto the sense of 'thing'thatis relevanthere. Accordingly,
it does not make sense to differentiate
thingsthat are real fromthings
that are not real. Scotus expresses this point by saying that being is
different
fromgeneric concepts because, unlike generic concepts,being
describesthe whole of the thingsof which it is predicated.So, being is
not to be seen as a part of each category,common to themall. For each
category,and not only a part of it, is entirelya being. Accordingly,the
fact that being is common to all the categoriesdoes not preventthem
frombeing primarilydiverse. For the commonalityof being does not
59DunsScotus,Quaest.
Praed
I, 262.See Pini
., q. 2, n. 19,in: Opera
philosophica
super
2002(above,n. 8), 161-3.

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GIORGIOPINI

in the thingsof whichit is predimplythe existenceof a common realitas

icated. Each categoryis being by itselfand each categoryis primarily
diversefromthe other categoriesby itself.This is due to the transcendental (i.e. non-generic)natureof being.
Scotus describes the differencebetween the relationshipbetween a
genus and its species and the relationshipbetween being and the catebetweena conceptthatexpressesonlypart of the
goriesas the diffrence
thingsof which it is predicated (such as the genus with regard to its
species) and a concept that expressesthe whole of that of which it is
predicated(such as beingwithregardto the categories).A genusexpresses
only the materialpart of its species; by contrast,being capturesa category in all its aspects. Surprisingly,Scotus says that the relationship
between being and the categoriesis in this respectsimilarto the relationshipbetweena species and the individualsof which it is predicated:
both of them expressthe whole of the thingsof which theyare predicated. This last statementseems to be at odds with Scotus's doctrineof
individuation,accordingto which the species expressesonly the essence
fallsoutsidethe essence.
of an individualand theprincipleof individuation
But this difficulty
should not retainour attentionnow. What is important is that Scotus maintainsthat being, as a transcendentalconcept,
expressesthe whole of its genera, and in this respect the relationship
fromthe relationship
between
betweenbeingand the categoriesis different
a genus and its species:
in all thattheyareand
differ
itcanbe saidthatjustas twoindividuals
Otherwise,
the
is nothing
realin theotherindividual
(andthere
except
yetareonein species
thatfallunderbeing.Hence,one
ofthespecies),
so herein thecategories
nature
ofbeing]in the
arespecies
candenythefirst
[seil.,thatthecategories
proposition
thatexpresses
thewholeofwhatfallsunderit.It is
caseofevery
common
notion
ofcaseswherewhatis common
true,however,
expresses
onlya partofwhatFalls
theotherpart.
underit,forthenit maybe determined
bysomething
expressing
andthatis a man,
thatis a substance
thewholething
Being,however,
expresses
modeofperse<predicato thefirst
is there
is a beingaccording
becausewhatever
tion>.60
Etzkorn-Wolter,
I, 266.)
(trans.
60See DunsScotus,Quaest.
inMetaph.
IV, 309-10:
IV, q. 1, 56, in: Opera
philosophica
numero
se totis
differunt
etse totis
suntunum
"Aliter
diciquodsicutduoindividua
potest
sichicde generibus
subente.
nisinatura
in specie(necestaliquidrealeinaltero
speciei),
illudquod
Undeprimapropositio
de omniunocommuni
quoddicittotum
negari
potest
tuncenim
inferius.
Veraestautemtantum
de aliocommuni
inferioris;
quoddicitpartem
et
determinatur
quodsubstantia
peraliudquoddicitaliamparte.Ensautemdicittotum
estibi,estensperse primomodo".See alsoibid.nn.51-3,
quodhomo,quiaquidquid
washotly
debated
between
308-9.Thispassageandtheparallelism
beingandspecies
by

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REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S
OF THE CATEGORIES

103

By claimingthatbeing is a univocal concept to which therecorresponds

no commonnature,Scotus capturesthe importantpointthatbeing is not
a real propertyshared by all the thingsthat exist,by which theywould
fromthe thingsthat do not exist. Being, like all transcenbe different
that is real. Accordingly,it is
dental concepts,is common to everything
not a differentiating
concept,unlikegenera. So thereis no real property
of being and no formality
by which a real thingis a being in addition
to being a thingof a certain kind. 'To be a being' just means being
somethingof a certainkind,i.e. somethingbelongingto one of the catof beingmakesit constitutionally
different
egories.The absoluteuniversality
froma genericconcept.61
Thus, Scotus's doctrineof univocitydoes not pose any threatto his
doctrineof the categoriesas real thingsprimarilydiverse.Even though
Scotus's talk of differences
of being may induce one to thinkof being as
a genus descendinginto species by way of differentiae,
he neverpositsa
real featureby which thingsare real and beings. Saying that something
is a being does not implysinglingout a propertythat somethingshould
possess in order to be a being; it only means that such a thingis real,
i.e. that it belongs to one of the categories.
Such a conceptionof being and the categoriesis also behind Scotus's
apparendyperplexingattack on the derivationof the categories,i.e. to
the demonstrability
of the sufficiency
and immediacyof their division.
can
be
demonstrated
for
divisionswhose elementsshare
Sufficiency
only
a commonfeature.Now, thingspossess a common featurein a non-trivial way when this common featuredifferentiates
them fromthingsthat
do not possessit. But in the case of being,thereis no such commonfeature.Accordingly,
the divisioninto the categoriescannotbe demonstrated
a
derivation.
There is no real common elementfromwhich
by general
it is possible to derive the categories.What is common is only the way
in which we considerthings:we see that they all belong to a category
and accordinglywe formthe concept of a category.But thereis no real
featurecorrespondingto such a common element.

William
andPetrus
1987(above,
Scotus's
first
Alnwick
Thomae.See S. Dumont
followers,
II. TheDe ente
n. 55),13-7;Id.,TheUnivocity
intheFourteenth
ofBeing
oftheConcept
Century:
in part.193-202.
Thomae
50 (1988),186-256,
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
ofPeter
61The significance
ofScotus's
ofbeingas a univocal
transcendental
conconception
in S.D. Dumont,
in:J. Marenbon
andDunsScotus,
ofGhent
ceptis welldescribed
Henry
London1998,315-20.
(ed.),Medieval
Philosophy,

11:36:44 AM

104

GIORGIOPINI

So, Scotus's doctrineof being and the categoriesis groundedon his

distinctionbetween the conceptual and the real perspectives.This distinctionis part of an English thirteenth-century
approach to being and
the categorieswithwhich Scotus was well familiar.62
Soon, however,both
Scotus's followersand his opponentswould lose contactwith this tradition. Accordingly,the doctrineof univocitywould oftenbe taken as a
doctrinepositingthe possessionof a real featurecommon to whateveris
real, contrarilyto what Scotus actuallyheld.63
8. Conclusion
Scotus's realistdoctrineof categoriesis an originaland comprehensive
metaphysicalview of how the world is structured.In oppositionto the
realistviews of categoriescurrentat the end of the thirteenth
century,
Scotus proposed a radical reformulation
of the whole issue by equating
and 'beinga thing'.As a consequence,he main'beingmind-independent'
tained that each categoryis a distinctkind of thingin the world. His
view should be seen as the reformulation
of the standardposition on
more solid ground,in order to resistthe critiquethat Olivi had moved
againstthe common realistassumption.
Even thoughScotus neverwrotea systematic
treatiseon thisissue,his
position can be reconstructedfrom scatteredbut solid evidence taken
fromhis theologicaland philosophicalwritings.Scotus'sview,as analyzed
in thispaper, can be summarizedin the followingclaims:
(1) Substance,Quality,Quantity,Relation,Action,Passion,When,Where,
Position,and Habit are called 'the categories';
of the world;
(2) The categoriesare a classification
(3) The categoriesare extramentalthings,i.e. typesof mind-independent
essences;
The
(4)
categoriesare reallydistinctfromeach other,irreducibleto one
anotherand primarilydiverse(i.e. theydo not have anythingreal in
common);
62See Donati2003(above,n. 24),71-81:Pini2005(above,n. 24).
63See forexample
Robert
inA. Conti,
as presented
Robert
,
Alyngton's
position
Alyngton
in: E.N. Zalta(ed.),TheStanford
), URL =
ofPhilosophy
(Fall2001 Edition
Encyclopedia
<http:/
/plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001
/entries/alyngton/>.

11:36:44 AM

REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S
OF THE CATEGORIES

105

(5) Each categoryconsistsof particulars,which are in turn analyzable

into formalconstituents
incapable of independentexistence,according to which the particularsare sortedinto species and genera;
(6) Substance,Qualityand Quantityare absolutecategories.This means
that the separabilitycriterionapplies to them in a symmetric
way:
if both X and y are eithera substanceor a qualityor a quantity,it
is logicallypossible forx to existwithouty and forjyto existwithout x;
Relation
and the remainingsix categories are non-absolutecate(7)
This
means that the separabilitycriterionapplies to themin
gories.
an asymmetricway: if x is an absolute categoryand y is a nonabsolute accident,it is logicallypossibleforx to existwithouty but
it is not logicallypossible fory to existwithoutx;
(8) Substance is the subject of accidents;
(9) Inherenceis an item belongingto a non-absolutecategory;
(10) The inherenceby which an absoluteaccidentinheresin a substance
is reallydistinctfromthe absolute categoryitself;
The
inherenceby whichan itemx in a non-absolutecategoryinheres
(11)
in a substanceor in an absoluteaccidentis not reallydistinctfromx;
(12) The foundationand term of a relation are necessaryand jointly
sufficient
for the relationto exist;
(13) The foundationand term of an item of one of the last six nonabsolute categoriesare necessarybut not sufficient
forthat thingto
the
concourse
of
an
external
is
cause
also
exist;
required.
of Aristotle
Amongtheseclaims,the firstone is based on an interpretation
in
assumed
the
Middle
As
it
from
a contemcommonly
Ages.
happens,
porarypoint of view thisis the weakestpoint in Scotus's doctrineof categories.For it seems to be particularly
implausiblethatjust the ten items
listedby Aristotleare the real and ultimateconstituents
of the world.
Scotus's
doctrine
of
came
under
attack.
Soon,
categories
Notably,
William Ockham criticizesit in severalways. Symptomatically,
however,
it is not the claim that the categoriesare the ten listedby Aristotlethat
Ockham rejects.By contrast,he rejectsclaim 2,- i.e. that the categories
are a classification
of the world- and its consequences(claims 3 and 4).
Ockham holdsthatthe categoriesare a classification
of signs,not ofthings.
Our conceptsnaturallycome intoten kinds,but to thesekindsof concepts
there correspondonly two kinds of thingsin the world, i.e. individual

11:36:44 AM

106

GIORGIOPINI

substancesand theirparts and individuadqualities.Thus, Aristotle'slist

of signs.As
can be retained,but it mustbe consideredas a classification
far as read kinds of extramentalthingsare concerned,Ockham's ontoforhe maintainsthatit is poslogical programis a formof reductionism,
sible to demonstratethat there are only two kinds of things in the
extramentalworld.64
Ockham's critique,Scotus'sinfluenceon him is clearly
Notwithstanding
detectable.First,Ockham takesScotus's doctrineas the standardformof
realismwhich he must reject. As I have said, Scotus's realismis quite
innovativeif compared to his predecessors'theoriesof categories.The
to its successin
factthat Ockham takesit as his polemicaltargettestifies
giving a rigorousformulationof the standard realist assumptionconcerningcategories.Second, Ockham takes over fromScotus thatwhat is
at issue, froman ontologica!point of view, is to establishthe real distinctionof one categoryfromanother.This too is a point characteristic
of Scotus'sview,aboutwhichScotusinnovatesthestandardrealisttradition.
So, it is clear that Scotus's realismconcerningcategoriesmustbe distinguishedfromthe previousstandardrealistassumptioncurrentat the
end of the thirteenth
century.Both Scotus, on the one hand, and, say,
Simon
of Faversham,on the otherhand, maintain
Ghent
and
of
Henry
that categoriesare a classificationof the world. But only Scotus holds
that thisclaim impliesthe radical statementthat all categoriesare things
in the worldand that,insofaras theyare things,theyare all on an equal
footing.
What is
Was Scotus's realistconceptionof the categoriesinfluential?
other
realist
and
the relationshipbetweenScotus'sposition
views,notably
the one held by the so-calledlate medievalrealists(i.e. Robert Alyngton,
John Sharpe, William Milverley,William Pengygull,Roger Whelpdale,
and John Tarteys)?65

64See McCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 143-56;

Connotative
G. Panaccio,
Concepts
2003(above,
in Ockham's
andTheir
Nominalism
, in: Biardand Rosier-Catach
Definitions
ofthecategories
n. 13),141-55.Similarly,
conception
JohnBuridan
opposedtherealist
andthatin
ofsigns(i.e.words)
area classifications
thatthecategories
on thegrounds
and
thereare onlythreekindsofthings,
substances,
qualities
namely
particular
reality
Master
Arts
. Portrait
SeeJ.Zupko,
Buridan
Dame,
, Notre
ofa Fourteenth-Century
John
quantities.
IN 2003,54-58.
65On theseauthors,
Universalia
seeJohannes
, ed. A.D. Conti,
super
Sharpe,Quaestio
Firenze
1990,295-336.

11:36:44 AM

OF THE CATEGORIES
REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S

107

In this regard,it seems that Scotus's influencewas negligibleif comAfterOckham's attackon Scotus,Burley
pared to thatof WalterBurley.66
defendeda realistconceptionof the categoriesin his last commentaryon
the Categories
(dated at 1337).67There are some noteworthydifferences
betweenBurley'sand Scotus's doctrineof categories.Burleyagrees that
the categoriesmust be seen as a classificationof thingsin the world.
notion of real distinction.
Central to his project,however,is a different
Whereas for Scotus two items are reallydistinctif and only if at least
one of them can exist withoutthe other,it seems that for Burleytwo
items are reallydistinctif one is predicatedof somethingof which the
otherone is not predicatedor if somethingis predicatedof one of them
and not of the other.68Since Burleyadopts a predicationcriterionand
not a separabilitycriterionas the basis forhis realism,he maintainsthat
two categoriesare reallydistinctfromeach other even thoughit is logicallyimpossibleforthemto existseparately.This conceptionof the real
has an immediateand evidentconsequence. Burleymaintains
distinction
that accidentsare reallyseparate fromSubstance even thoughno accident can exist withouta substance.In brief,real distinctiondoes not
imply the possibilityof independentexistence.69So, another aspect of
Scotus's doctrineof categorieswas lost,i.e. his positingall categorieson
- which
an equal footingas extramentalthings:the primacyof susbtance
Scotus had considerablyweakened- was reintroducedand was to stayas
an essentialfeatureof realistdoctrinesof categoriesin the future.70
66On Walter
: HisLifeandWorks
Walter
seeR. Wood- J. Ottman,
, in:
ofBurley
Burley,
37 (1999),1-23.
Vivarium,
67SeeA.D.Conti,
in:Franciscan
ArsVetus,
onthe
LastCommentary
inWalter
Burley's
Ontology
50 (1990),121-76.
Studies,
68WalterBurley,
Artem
Veterem
Aristotelis
Praedicamenta
, in: Expositio
super
super
Expositio
bona
doctrina
Venetiis
etAristotelis,
1509,f.44rb:"Notaquodexistolocosumitur
Porphyrii
Et est:si unum
ad invicem.
vel diversitatem
identitatem
ad cognoscendum
aliquorum
illanonsunteadem,seddiversa;
de aliquode quo nonpraedicatur
reliquum,
praedicatur
illanonsuntidem.Et
de reliquo,
de unoquodnonpraedicatur
etsi aliquidpraedicatur
ilia sunt
de reliquo,
de unoverepraedicatur
si quicquidverepraedicatur
e contrario:
in general,
butitis clearthatwhat
anddiversity
herespeaksofidentity
eadem".Burley
See Conti1990(above,n. 67),131-3.
anddiversity.
he saysappliesto realidentity
69Burley,
Aristotelis
Praedicamenta
, f.24va.See Conti1990(above,n. 67),
super
Expositio
159-60.
70See forexample
in:
inJohn
e metafisica
A.D. Conti,
dell'essenza
intenzionale
Wyclif
Logica
99
Evo
e
Archivio
il
Medio
Storico
Italiano
dell'Istituto
Bullettino
Muratoriano,
(1993),
per
diRobert
alleCategorie
e realt
nelcommento
inpart.164-70;
,
Alyngton
Id.,Linguaggio
159-219,
inpart.1854 (1993),179-306,
filosofica
e studisullatradizione
in:Documenti
medievale,
93,inpart.186,n. 24.

11:36:44 AM

108

GIORGIOPINI

The basic disagreementbetween Burley and Scotus lies in Scotus's

sharp distinctionbetween the logical level of predicationand the real
level of existence:since categoriesare a classificationof the world and
are thingsin the world,the only criterionthat applies to them is a separabilitycriterionbased on the possibilityof independentexistence.No
criterionbased on predicationis applicable, if we do not want to confusethe way thingsare in the world and the way in whichwe know the
world and predicate our concepts of one another. By contrast,Burley
positsa close parallelismbetweenexistenceand predication.Notoriously,
he even maintainsthat thereare real predications,which constitutethe
basis forour operationof predicatingone conceptof another.71
As a consequence, he conflatesthe real and logical levels into one. A categoryis
a distinctcategorybecause it cannot be predicatedby itselfof another
one and because no othercategorycan be predicatedby itselfof it.
So, both Scotus and Burleyhold a formof categorialrealism,but their
In some respect,Burley'sview is much more
views are very different.
similarto thatof Henryof Ghentand Simon of Faversham,againstwhom
Scotus had proposed his own formof realism.Burleyreportsthe opinion of 'the old wise men' (i.e. Henry of Ghent),accordingto which each
categoryis constitutedby two elements,a thingand its mode of being.
Burley maintainsthat the mode of being is what is most importantto
constitutea distinctcategory,because in the very same categorythere
may be thingsessentiallydistinctfromeach other but characterizedby
the same mode of being:
oftheoldwisemen,twofeaitmustbe known
tothedoctrine
that,
First,
according
inorder
a categorial
a thing
tures
arenecessary
toobtain
anda mode
thing,
namely
in every
ofbeingaddedto thatthing.
Andthosetwofeatures
arefound
category.
Forthecategories
eachotherbywayofdistinct
aredistinct
from
modesofbeing,
in orderfortwothings
becausethemerediversity
ofthings
is notsufficient
to be
in distinct
Forin thesamecategory
there
areessentially
different
categories.
things;
butall thethings
to thesamecategory
havethesamegeneral
modeof
belonging
(Trans,mine.)
being.72
71Burley,
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
See Conti1990(above,
, ff.17vb-18va.
Expositio
super
n. 67),134-5.
72Burley,
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
estsciendum,
secundum
, f.22ra:"Primo
Expositio
super
doctrinam
duo,sciliantiquorum
sapientium,
quodad rempraedicamentalem
requiruntur
cetreset modusessendi
illirei.Et illaduoreperiuntur
in omnipraedicasuperadditus
mento.
Nampraedicamenta
ab invicem
modosessendi,
distinguuntur
perdiversos
quia
soladiversitas
rerum
nonsufficit
ad hocquodaliquasintindiversis
Nam
praedicamentis.
ineodempraedicamento
suntresessentialiter
sedomnes
reseiusdem
diffrentes;
praedicamenti
habent
eundem
modm
essendi".
See Conti1990(above,n. 67),150-1.
generlem

11:36:44 AM

REALISTCONCEPTION
SCOTUS'S
OF THE CATEGORIES

109

Scotus'srealism,as we have seen,was basicallya reactionto thisapproach

to categories.
Now, it seems that late medieval realistswere directlyinfluencedby
Burley.If we considerWyclifand his follower,Robert Alyngton(d. ca.
1398), we see that Scotus's view of the categoriesas real thingsto be
distinguishedfrom classes of concepts or sets of predicatesis virtually
absent.73Burleyis the main influence.Scotus is only indirectlypresent
throughOckham's confutationof his view. So, in a way, Scotus still
exertedan influenceon late medieval realism,because he was the first
to posit a self-conscious
realistview of the categoriesand as such he was
attackedby Ockham. But the detailsand radicalismof his solutionwere
abandoned by his successors.Robert Alyngtonis largelydependenton
Wyclifand Burley.When he looks forpredecessorsin his realistproject,
he mentionsAlbertthe Great,Giles of Rome, RobertGrosseteste,
Augustine
and Avicenna.74The name of Scotus is absent. This confirmsWilliam
in England
Courtenay'sremarkthatScotusseemsto have had no followers
untila verylate date, as faras his philosophicalteachingsare concerned.75
to findboth WalterBurleyand RobertAlyngton
So, it is not surprising
proposinga derivationof categoriessimilarto those currentin Scotus's
time.76
They do not seem to be aware of Scotus'scritiqueof such attempts
to reduce the categoriesto some more generadmodes of being. They
posit the verynotion of mode of being at the basis of theirdoctrinesof
the categories.
In conclusion,Scotus's radical and coherentview of the categoriesas
ten distinct
thingsor objectsin theworldseemsto have remainedan unicum
in the successivehistoryof realism.Late medievalrealistssuch as Robert
Alyngtonseem to have been influencedby WalterBurley,who was closer
to the realistsbeforeScotus than to Scotus himself.All the same, Scotus's
indirectinfluencewas fundamental,
because it was Scotus who posed the
questionof realismin an explicitand self-conscious
way. So, it was Scotus
who set the philosophicalagenda forlate medieval realism,even though
his particularsolutionto the questionof the categorieswas not adopted,
73See A.D. Conti1993(above,n. 70),185-93.
74Robert
Litteralis
sententia
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
, ed.A.D.ContiinConti
Alyngton,
super
1993(above,n. 70).268.205-6.
75W.J.Courtenay,
Schools
andScholars
inFourteenth-Century
, Princeton
1987,185England
90.
76Burley,
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
Litteralis
sententia
, f.21rb-va;
Expositio
super
Alyngton,
super
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
, 252-4.See Conti1993(above,n. 70),192-3.

11:36:44 AM

110

GIORGIOPINI

and possiblywas not even known in detail. So, it seems to be possible

and
to distinguishseveral formsof categorialrealism in the thirteenth
was
seen
as
the
stanrealism
Olivi's
centuries.Before
fourteenth
attacks,
dard philosophicalposition concerningcategories.Then, Scotus reformulated the whole issue and proposed his radical view of the categories
as ten distinctthings.Scotus's solutionwas attackedby Ockham. After
Ockham, Burley defendeda formof categorialrealism that resembled
more the one currentbefore Scotus than Scotus's own radical view.
Finally,late medieval realistsdeveloped theirown theoriesof the categoriesunder the directinfluenceof Burleyand Wyclif.Scotus's sophisticated doctrineseems to have had no directinfluence,even thoughhis
projectof givinga solid philosophicalbasis to the realistdoctrineof the
categorieswas stillindirecdyresonantforthe realistsof the late fourteenth
century.Undoubtedly,its radicalismstillholds a fascinationfor modern
interpreters.
Pisa
ScuolaNormaleSuperiore

11:36:44 AM

The Problemof Universais

and Wyclif'sAlleged"Ultrarealism"
PAUL VINCENT SPADE

Abstract
in his theoryof universais.
JohnWyclifhas been describedas "ultrarealist"
This paper attemptsa preliminary
assessmentof thatjudgmentand argues
that,pendingfurther
study,we have no reason to accept it. It is certainly
truethatWyclifis extremely
vocal and insistent
about his realism,but it is
not obviousthat the actual contentof his view is especiallyextreme.The
paper distinguishestwo common medieval notions of a universal,the
Aristotelian/
one in termsof predicationand theBoethianone in
Porphyrian
termsof beingmetaphysically
commonto many.On neitherapproachdoes
entitiesbesides
Wyclif'stheoryof universais
postulatenew and non-standard
thoserecognizedby more usual versionsof realism.Again pendingfurther
extremeor
study,neitherdo Wyclif'sviewsappear to assignphilosophically
novel rolesto the entitieshe does recognizeas universal.On the contrary,
by at leastone measure,his theoryof universaisis less extremethanWalter
Burley's,as Wyclifhimselfobserves.For Wyclif,the universalis numerically
identicalwithits singulars,
but numericalidentity
is governedby something
weakerthanthe Indiscernibility
of identicals.
1
John Wyclif(ca. 1330-84) is one of the major medieval figuresin the
historyof the problem of universais.Indeed, he has been called "the
of the new formsof realismat the end of the Middle Ages."2
starting-point

1 The bestbiographical
ofWyclif
is stillH.B. Workman,
A Study
study
JohnWyclif:
of
theEnglish
Medieval
Church.
2 vols.,Oxford1926,although
muchthereneedsto be corrected.
Briefer
accounts
in Alessandro
in: TheStanford
Conti,
maybe found
JohnWyclif,
2002Edition).
EdwardN. Zalta(ed.),Stanford
2002URL
Encycbpedia
ofPhilosophy
(Spring
= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2002/entries/wyclif/;
Oxford
Anthony
Kenny,
Wyclif,
1985(PastMasters),
andS. Harrison
in:B.A.Gerrish,
in
Thomson,
John
Wyclif,
Reformers
, Philadelphia
1967,chap.1, 12-39.
Profile
2 Conti2002(above,n. 1).Forsomeofthe
influenced
see
peoplestrongly
byWyclif,
Alessandro
2001Edition)
n. 1):http://plato.
Conti,
, in:Zalta,(Winter
Johannes
Sharpe
(above,
Conti,PaulofVenice
, in:Zalta(Fall2001
stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/sharpe/;
n. 1):http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/paul-venice/
Edition)
(above,
Conti,
Robert
in:Zalta(Fall2001Edition)
n. 1):http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
Alyngton,
(above,
1/entries/
fall200
in: Zalta(Fall2001Edition
; Conti,William
alyngton/
j, (above,
Penbygull,
n. 1):http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/penbygull/.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,1

11:36:54 AM

112

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

Yet it was only with the editionand simultaneousEnglishtranslationof

in 1985 thatWyclif'smetaphysical
viewsbegan
his Tractatus
de universalibus
As
as
the
mention
of his
studied
at
all.3
late
to be seriously
1982,
only
occurs in
ofLaterMedievalPhilosophy
History
metaphysicsin The Cambridge
on the question
a singlefootnoteand refersonly to his "indivisibilism"
of the structureof continua.4Earlier studies,althoughsometimesinformative, are generallynot helpfulfor understandingthe intricaciesof
Wyclif'smetaphysics.5
and theOxford
One partial exceptionis Robson.6 Althoughhis Wyclif
Schoolsis primarilyconcerned with Wyclif'smetaphysicaltheoriesonly
insofaras they affectedhis theology,and althoughof course the book
de universalibus
, neverthelessit
predated a reliable editionof the Tractatus
containsa fair amount of detail about Wyclif'sviews on universais,as
of annihilation.
well as on time,modality,and the impossibility
3JohnWyclif,
Oxford
deUniversalibus
Tractatus
, ed. IvanJ. Mueller,
1985;JohnWyclif,
Oxford
1985.Linenumtransi.
deUniversalibus),
OnUniversais
(Tractatus
Anthony
Kenny,
Tractatus
deUniversalibus
coordinated
withthosein Wyclif,
areclosely
bersin thisvolume
,
willtherefore
ed. Mueller,
so thatthesamenumbers
maybe usedforboth.References
followed
referin Wyclif,
transi.
be givenbypagenumber
bythecorresponding
Kenny,
Sincethen,
some
encetoWyclif,
ed.Mueller,
lines,andpagenumber.
including
chapter,
edessere
nelpensiero
della
literature
includes
Alessandro
ofthemajorsecondary
Essenza
Conti,
Rivista
di storiadellafilosofia
PaoloVeneto
tarda
scolastica
), in: Medioevo:
(Burle?,
Wyclif,
e metafisica
inJohnWyclif,
intensionale
15 (1989),235-67;id.,Logica
deWessenza
medievale,
e Archivo
99.1(1993),
Storico
Italiano
Bullettino
dell'Istituto
muratoriano,
peril Medioevo
BasisofWyclif's
andFormal
Distinction
: OntheLogical
, in:
id.,Analogy
159-219;
Metaphysics
6 (1997),133-65;Conti2002(Wyclif;
andTheology,
Medieval
above,n. 1);
Philosophy
oftheDe
Kenny,TheRealism
chaps.1-3;Anthony
Kenny1985(above,n. 1),especially
Norman
inHisTimes
in:A. Kenny
, Oxford
1986,chap.2, 17-29;
Universalibus,
(ed.),Wyclif
andChange
inWyclif's
, in:Kenny
Continua,
Indivisibles,
Kretzmann,
ofScripture
(ed.)1986,
Logic
andPolitics
intheThought
E. Lahey,Stephen
E., Philosophy
ofJohn
chap.3, 31-65;Stephen
vii-1.
in:Wyclif,
transi.
2003;PaulVincent
Kenny
Wyclif,
Cambridge
Spade,Introduction,
4JohnE. Murdoch,
etal.,TheCambridge
in:Norman
andContinuity,
Kretzmann,
Infinity
From
tothe
Medieval
the
ofAristotle
Disintegration
ofScholasticism
Rediscovery
ofLater
Philosophy:
History
on p. 576 n. 36.
1982,chap.28,564-91,
1100-1600,
Cambridge
5 See,e.g.,Gotthard
andHisEnglish
trans.
Peter
Victor
Precursors,
Lechler,
John
Wycliffe
Rev.ed.,London1884[originally
Lorimer,
1878];MichaelHenryDziewicki,
published
Miscellanea
in: H. Dziewicki
AnEssayon Wyclif's
(ed.),Johannis
Wyclif
Philosophical
System,
NewYorkandFrankfurt/Main
2 vols.,London1902-1905
1966],
philosophica.
[Reprinted
s Theology,
in:
ThePhilosophical
BasisofWyclif
vol.1 (1902),v-xxvii;
S. Harrison
Thomson,
needsto be saidthat
11 (1931),86-116.Nevertheless,
ithardly
TheJournal
ofReligion,
totheheroic
labors
all subsequent
owesan incalculable
debtparticularly
workon Wyclif
andThomson.
ofDziewicki
*
6J.A.Robson,Wyclif
deente'
toScholastic
andtheOxford
Schools:
TheRelation
oftheSumma
Debates
at Oxford
intheLater
Fourteenth
1961.
Century,
Cambridge

11:36:54 AM

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ALLEGED"ULTRAREALISM"

113

about
Chapter 6 of Robson's book describesWyclifas an "ultrarealist"
universais.Such labels are generallynot veryhelpfulin comingto a clear
of an author'sviews.But in thiscase the designation"ultraunderstanding
realist"servesat least to introduceone of the thingsI want to touch on
in thispaper: Where does Wycliffiton the spectrumof medieval theories about universais?Are his views as extremeas Robson's description
suggests?Despite the labors of many scholarsin recentyears,7it is still
too earlyto attempta definitive
answerto thatquestion;too manyaspects
of Wyclif
's doctrineare stillunclear. Nevertheless,it is not too early to
make some relevantobservations.
I
Whateverour final verdictabout the content
of Wyclif'stheoryof universais,whetherit is an "ultrarealism"or not, it is undeniablytrue that
he is at least "ultra-insistent"
about his realism;he stresseshis commitment to universalis
repeatedlyand in very strongterms.In his Tractatus
de universalibus
for
,
instance,Wyclifremarksthat "all envyor actual sin is
caused by the lack of an orderedlove of universais."8
Again, he says,thereare fourmain reasonswhycertainpeople do not
believe in universais.First,theirreason is clouded because theyare too
devoted to the senses. Second, they are confused by various lines of
sophistry.Third, theyare just arrogantand pompous. And fourth,they
are badly educated.9
7 See theliterature
citedin n. 3 above.
8 Wyclif,
transi.
n. 3),22 = Wyclif,
ed.Mueller
1985(above,
n.3),
Kenny1985(above,
3.144-46,
p. 77.
9 Wyclif,
transi.
n. 3),24-5= Wyclif,
ed.Mueller
1985(above,
n.3),
Kenny1985(above,
"There
four
82:
is so muchdisagreement
3.251-74,
are,then, reasons
p.
whythere
among
scholastics
aboutuniversais,
andwhythere
is so muchdifference
from
theancients.
"Thefirst
causeis thedarkening
ofthereason
instress
ofsensible
bythestrong
objects,
which
itfrom
to theuniversais
ofsensibles,
whichcomefirst
in theorder
prevent
rising
ofnature.
It is in thisstate,
forthemostpart,thatwefindthevulgar
andtheworldly.
"Thesecondcauseis thattheearsofthesophists
think
discord
theydetect
amongthe
conclusions
whichmustnecessarily
be admitted
as a consequence
ofpostulating
universais.Forsome,likesophists
wishnotonlytoknow,
buttobe seentoknow;
indeed,
they
wishto avoidnotonlywhatis really
absurd
butalsowhatseemsabsurd.
"Thethird
causeis thearrogance
ofmany
whowanttostandoutfrom
others,
people,
or bombastically
defend
whattheyhaveoncesaid,as iftheywereincapable
ofpassing
from
to knowledge.
...
ignorance
"Thefourth
causeisthelackofinstruction
andthefearofthepossible
counter
arguments."

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SPADE
PAULVINCENT

he goes on, realistphilosophyseems to be under a kind

Furthermore,
of special divineprotection!For, whilethe relationbetweenthe threepersons of the Trinityand the one divinenatureis not exactlythe same as
the relationbetweenindividualsand a universalnaturein which theyall
participate,stillthe similaritiesbetweenthe two cases are so instructive
thatWyclifsuspectsit is forthisreason- forthe lightthe theoryof uni- that God sees to it that realismin
versaissheds on the Trinity
philosophy is never allowed to die out completely.10
But much of thatmay be perhapsregardedas no more than bluster.11
It means thatWyclifinsistedon his realism,and insistedon it loudlyand
in strikinglanguage. But it does not necessarilymean his doctrineis in
itselfan especiallyextremeformof realism.
II
Several distinctnotionsof a universali
were in circulationthroughoutthe
7 17a38-bl(my
Middle Ages. One comes fromAristode'sDe interpetatione
translation):
whileothers
aresingular.
I mean
, someareuniversal
Among
things
By"universal"
ofmany,
thatwhichis aptto be predicated
thatwhichis not.For
by"singular"
manis a universal,
Calliasa singular.
example,
The end of the firstsentenceof the quotationis, to be sure,stricdyspeaking ambiguous.A "singular"(or "individual")is not"apt to be predicated
of many." But this could be eitherbecause it is apt to be predicatedof
onethingonly or because it is not the kind of thingthat can be "predicated" at all, eitherof one thingor of many.In favorof the latterreading,
we have Aristode,who says in Categories
2 lb3-7 (my translation):
10Wyclif,
ed. Mueller1985(above,
transi.
Kenny1985(above,n. 3), 74 = Wyclif,
n. 3),8.621-30,
between
therelation
between
p. 175:"Butthereis a greatdissimilarity
thecommon
divine
nature
anditspersons,
andtherelation
between
nature
and
specific
itspersons.
So theknowledge
ofuniversais
is theprincipal
stepon theladderofwisdom
towards
theexploration
ofhidden
Andthis,I believe,
is thereason
truths.
whyGodhas
In thehighest
notpermitted
thedoctrine
ofuniversais
to dieoutaltogether.
the
Trinity
Father
oressence
is everything
thattheSonis,becausehe is all thesubstance
which
the
Sonis. If so,whatwonder
is it ifmanis thatonething
thata donkey
is,namely
generalsubstance?"
11Perhaps
is
notthefirst
remark.
Kenny1986(above,n. 3), 29,comments,
"Wyclif
togo so faras tosaythatallactualsinis causedbythelackofan ordered
love
prepared
in preferring
ofuniversais:
becausesinconsists
lessergoodsto greater
goodandin generalthemoreuniversal
goodis thegreater
good."

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115

likethisor thatman
noraresaidofa subject,
areina subject
Somethings
neither
ina subject
orsaidofa subliketheseis either
andthisor thathorse.Fornothing
...
oneareabsolutely
notsaidofanysubject,
andnumerically
individuad
ject.Things
Porphyry,however,opts for the formerreading. In his Isagogehe states
that an individual is "said of" one thing only,12and many medieval
authorsfollowedhim. Thus universais,on this reading,are "predicated
of many,"whereasindividualsor singularsare predicatedof a singlething
only.
But what kind of relation is predication?Nowadays, it is generally
are taken to be what are
treatedas a matterof language. That is, terms
terms(forexample, the
other
Either
are
they
predicatedof
predicated.
term'man' is predicatedof the term'Socrates') or, in a looser sense,we
sometimessay termsare predicatedof things(forexample,the term'man'
is predicatedof the actual human being Socrates);but we do notgenerthingsare predicatedof otherthings,that the
ally say that non-linguistic
themselves
are predicates.
things
thereis a long and quite reputablephilosophicaltradition
Nevertheless,
that does say just this.Accordingto this tradition,predicationis in fact
a relationamong things,and predicationrelationsinvolvinglanprimarily
guage (or at least the trueones) are based on and derivedfromthismore
basic metaphysicalrelationof what mightbe called "real predication."
can be "predicatedof many,"
Everyonerecognizesthat certain terms
so thatof course thereare "universais"in thissense in language. But are
that are predicatedof many in the
therein additionnon-linguistic
things
An
answer
is
affirmative
described?
realism,a negativeone nominalism.13
way

12Porphyry,
Berlin1887,
commentarium
etInAristotelis
Busse,
, ed.dolfus
Isagoge
Categorias
onthe
Mediaeval
in:PaulVincent
See thetranslation
and7.16-19.
2.17-20,
Spade,FiveTexts
Ockham
Abelard
Problem
1994,2,
Boethius,
, DunsScotus,
, Indianapolis
ofUniversais:
Porphyry,
individuals
someare saidofone thing
only,forexample
(8): "Foramongpredicates,
suchas genera,
aresaidofseveral
like'Socrates',
and'he'and'this'.Others
species,
things,
to
thatareproper
notaccidents
andcommon
accidents,
differences,
although
properties,
genusis saidofall the
something."
Again,Spade1994,6, (35):"Forthemostgeneral
underit,whilethegenuspriorto themostspecific
generaandspeciesandindividuals
andwhatis onlya species
andofindividuals,
is saidofailthemostspecific
species
species
is saidofonlyoneoftheparticulars."
Buttheindividuad
is saidofall theindividuals.
13Sometimes
andnomirealism
between
positions
peoplewantto allowintermediary
less
as something
or "moderate
realism"
forinstance
nalism,
(conceived
"conceptualism"
between
I seelittle
tofindan intermediary
thanfull-blown
"yes"
realism).
pointin trying
onthistopicwillultimately
ofanytheory
orfailure
and"no,"andsincethesuccess
depend

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SPADE
PAULVINCENT

Wyclifwas certainlya realistin this "predicational"sense: "... it is a

common featureof all universais,as Porphyrysays, to be predicatedof
many things."14
Again, the predicationof one termof another:15
whothink
thatthere
... is thesensemuchtalked
aboutmymodern
is no
writers,
on readpredication,
thethird
other.
Butin factthiskindofpredication
is modeled
in common.
which
is beingshared
It
kindofpredication
byorsaidofmanythings
in nature.
is predicated
ofitsinferiors
is in thismanner
thatevery
actualuniversal
As AnthonyKenny has observed,forWyclif"the keyto the understanding
of universaisis a grasp of the natureof predication."16
Note that realismin this "predicational"sense neednot be subject to
oftenraisedagainstrealism.Everything
any of the metaphysicaldifficulties
will depend on the detailsof what this "real predication"is taken to be.
If, for instance,it is interpretedin such a way that Platonic Forms or
Divine Ideas are "predicated"of the thingsmodeled on them,then the
Forms or Ideas are indeed universaisin the predicationalsense. But,
unless a given theorymakes additional claims, such universaisare not
subject to the metaphysicalobjection that universaiswould have to be
"in manyplaces at once," or to the objectionthatuniversalis
would have
to be conjoined withcontrariesat the same time (forinstance,animality
is conjoined with rationalityand humanityin Socrates but with irrationalityand asininityin Brunellusthe ass), thus violatingthe Law of
Contraries.17
Wyclifdoes regardthe Divine Ideas as universais:"The firstand foremostkind [ofuniversal],"he says,"is the eternalinotionor exemplaridea
in God."18But thereis nothingespeciallyextremeor radical about positon thedetails,
noton thelabel,I prefer
to keeptheterminology
as simple
as possible.
Formoreon thispoint,
seeSpade1985(above,n. 3),xiii,n. 14.
14Wyclif,
transi.
n. 3),p. 1 = Wyclif,
ed.Mueller
1985(above,
n.3),
Kenny1985(above,
16.
1.25-26,
p.
is Wyclif,
n. 3),p. 1 = Wyclif,
ed.Mueller
1985(above,
n.3),
transi.
Kenny1985(above,
17.
1.31-37,
p.
16Kenny1986(above,
n. 3), 17.Conti2002(Wyclif;
s
above,n. 1), 2.1,notesWyclif
toward
thehypostatization
oflogicalandlinguistic
andindeed
relations,
generad
tendency
callsthis"themaincharacteristic
ofhisphilosophical
style."
17Abelard
William
raisesthelatter
ofChampeaux's
objection,
amongothers,
against
ofuniversais.
See Martin
M. Tweedale,
Abailard
onUniversais.
Amsterdam
original
theory
andtheProblem
PeterOverton
Abailard
1976,95-111,andespecially
,
ofUniversais
King,Peter
Princeton
2 vols.(Ph.D.dissertation,
University
1982),Chap.3 (137-73).
18Wyclif,
= Wyclif,
transi.
n. 3),13(myaddition)
ed.Mueller
1985
Kenny1985(above,
onthePosterior
citesGrosseteste's
(above,n. 3),2.167-68,
p. 59.Wyclif
Commentaiy
Analytics,
1.7(Robertus
InAristotelis
libros
Posteriorum
Grosseteste,
, Walter
Analyticorum
Burleigh,
Super

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UNIVERSALS
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117

ing Divine Ideas and recognizingthem as general exemplarycauses of

creatures;indeed,thatwas the normalview in the Middle Ages. Is it any
more extremeor radical to thinkof that exemplarycausalityas a kind
of "real predication"?
On the contrary,one mightverywell have a generoustheoryof real
kindsof entitiesturnout
predicationaccordingto which many different
to be "predicatedof many," and so are universaisin the predicational
sense. But such a theoryis not going to be "ultrarealist"in any sense
that makes it philosophicallyextremeunless those entitiesinclude additionalones not foundin otherrealisttheories,or unlesstheyare assigned
novel roles they do not play in other theories;as long as commonly
accepted entitiesplay theirusual philosophicalroles,it makes littlephilowhethersome of those roles are interpretedas relasophical difference
tionsof "real predication."Does Wyclif'stheorythenpostulatenew entities
or give them novel roles to play that we do not findin othermedieval
realisttheories?That remainsto be seen.
Ill
But there are other ways of defininga universaltoo, and accordingly
otherways of drawingthe distinctionbetween realismand nominalism.
One very influentialdefinitioncomes fromBoethius's SecondCommentary
on Porphyry's
, and may be called the "metaphysicaldefinition"of
Isagoge
a universal.Accordingto Boethius,19
if genera and species are going to
be "shared" or "common" in the relevantway, it mustbe:
not"partbypart"in thewaya loafofbread,forinstance,
canbe
(a) as a whole,
saidtobe common
toorshared
byallthosewhotakea slice.No,whenpeoplesay
thatallhuman
sharea common
human
meanthatI haveexactly
nature,
beings
they
whatyouhaveofhumanity,
notthatwe havedistinct
ofsome
piecesorfragments
whole.20
larger

libros
Posteriorum
Aristotelis.
Venice:Gregorius
de Gregoriis,
15July1514.PhotoAnalyticorum
Frankfurt/Main
Commentarius
inPosteriorum
1966,fol.8va; Robertus
Grosseteste,
reprint
libros
lines103-11).
, ed. Pietro
Rossi,Firenze1981,139-40,
Analyticorum
19Boethius,
InIsagogen
commenta
Vienna
, editio
secunda,
1.10,ed.Samuel
Brandt,
Porphyrii
in Spade1994(above,n. 11),22, (14)-(18).
See thetranslation
1906,162.15-163.3.
20Wedo ofcourse
sometimes
andmeansomething
likethe"whole
speakof"humanity"
humanrace,"thatis,thecollection
ofall humanbeingstakentogether.
Butwhilethere
weretheories
of"collective
realism"
intheMiddleAgesthatinterpreted
universais
as such
thisis notwhatwasgenerally
meantbya universal.
"Collective
realism"
is
collections,

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PAULVINCENT
SPADE
- thewhole
in thewayI might
notin succession
owna house
(b) at thesametime,
andnotjusta partofit- butthensellit to you,so thatafterwards
youownthe
wholehouseandnotjusta partofit.No,we don'thaveto taketurns
the
having
wholeofhumannature.
forinstance,
a stageplaycan
"external"
(c) inmorethanthemerely
wayinwhich,
be saidto be sharedas a whole
andat thesametime
byall thosein theaudience.21
enters
intoourverystructure;
itis intrinsic
to us,notextrinsic.
No,humannature
It is a metaphysical
ofus.
"ingredient"

Boethiusconcludes:
Forit [genus]
is supposed
to be common
in sucha waythatboththewholeofit
is in all itssingulars,
andat onetime,
andalsoitis abletoconstitute
andform
the
substance
ofwhatitis common
to.22
Note that on this "metaphysicaldefinition,"Platonic Forms or Divine
Ideas will not normallybe countedas universais,at least not withoutconsiderable additional claims made about them. For they fail Boethius's
requirement(c); while they certainlydo play a crucial exemplaryand
causal role in "constituting
and formingthe substance"of the thingsproduced in accordance withthem,theyare not in those thingsbut (in the
case of Plato's Forms)in a separatedrealm of pure Being as distinctfrom
the realm of Becoming,23
or (in the case of the Divine Ideas) in the eternal mind of God as distinctfromthe contingentworld of creatures.
Wyclifis a realistin this metaphysicalsense as well as in the predicational sense. Thus, at the verybeginningof the Tractatus
de universalibus
,

associated
withtheearly-twelfth
ofSoissons,
andwascriticized
Joscelin
century
figure
by
SeeAlfred
Abelard.
Abailard
onCollective
in:TheJournal
ofPhilosophy,
Realismy
J.Freddoso,
75 (1978),527-38;King1982(above,n. 17),Chap.8 andAppendix
I.d; andTweedale
1976(above,n. 16),113-5.King1982,187-8,arguesthatthetraditional
attribution
to
ofthetextDegeneribus
etspeciebus
a collective
realist
is basedon
Joscelin
containing
theory
an error.
21The stage-play
is Boethius's
ownexample.
See Boethius,
ed. sec.,ed. Brandt1906
n. 19),162.22,
andSpade1994(above,
n. 12),22, (17).Do notbe misled.
There
(above,
is a sensein whichthestage-play
takestimeandso cannot
be viewed
as a wholeatthe
same
time.
Butthepointis thatwe don'thaveto taketurns
it.
viewing
22Boethius,
ed. sec.,ed. Brandt1906(above,n. 19),162.24-163.3,
and Spade1994
n. 19),22, (18).Boethius
is mainly
aboutthecategory
ofsubstance,
and
(above,
thinking
hasbeentalking
aboutgenusandspecies,
which
areessential
the
ingredients.
Presumably
words
"constitute
andform
thesubstance"
willhavetobe adjusted
toaccomappropriately
modate
besides
substance
andpredicables
besides
categories
genusandspecies.
23I amofcoursethinking
ofthosepassages
in Platowhere
theForms
areregarded
as
Thereareother
Parmenides
131ab,where
theForms
do sound
"separated."
passages,
notably
muchmorelikeBoethian
universais.

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ANDWYCLIF'S
UNIVERSALS

119

he distinguishes
three kinds of universais.The second, he says "is universal by community,a thing,for instance,shared by many supposits,
such as human nature and othergeneral and specificnatures."24
Indeed, in another passage discussedin the recent literature,Wyclif
appeals to the authorityof Robert Grossetesteto distinguishno fewer
thanfivekindsof universais:25
orexemplar
ideainGod.Theseckindis theeternal
notion
Thefirst
andforemost
in thesuperior
liketheintelligences
notion
ondkindis thecommon
created
causes,
form
rooted
kindofuniversell
is thecommon
The third
andtheheavenly
spheres.
are.
is whatAristotle's
in itsindividuals.
This,saysGrosseteste,
generaandspecies
in itsaccidents,
form
whichis thecommon
thereis theuniversal
appreFourthly,
- signsand
Thereis a fifth
kindofuniversal
form
ofintellect.
hended
bythelowest
- whichGrosseteste
to hisconcerns.
setsasideas irrelevant
mental
acts
The firstkind are just the Divine Ideas, as discussedabove. The second
are the reflectionsof the Divine Ideas in the "intelligences,"the separated substancesthat are the moversof the celestialspheresin medieval
cosmology.These sound quaint and unnecessaryperhapsto modernears,
but theywere standardfeatureof much medievalthought.The thirdkind
of universal,which Wyclifidentifieswith Aristotle'sgenera and species,
seems to be universalin the "metaphysical"sense defined,as we have
seen, by Boethius.The fourthkind is not entirelyclear, but seems to be
the kindof universalthe human intellectabstractsfromits encounterwith
the sensibleaccidentsof the individualthing.The fifthkind are just universaisin the "predicational"sense describedabove.26
24Wyclif,
ed. Mueller1985(above,
transi.
Kenny1985(above,n. 3),p. 1 = Wyclif,
a single
cause
is universal
kindofuniversal
n. 3), 1.11-13,
by"causality,"
p. 15.Thefirst
or
a signthatrepresents
thethird
kindis universal
ofmanyeffects;
by"representation,"
at once.(Wyclif,
transi.
Kenny1985(above,n. 3),p. 1 = Wyclif,
manythings
signifies
ofcourse,
thethird
ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3), 1.6-16,
pp. 15-16.)Fornominalists,
in
division
drawsthesamethreefold
kindofuniversal
is theonlykindthereis. Wyclif
n. 21.
manyplaces.See Spade1985(above,n. 3),xviii,
25Wyclif,
ed. Mueller1985(above,
transi.
Kenny1985(above,n. 3),p. 13= Wyclif,
discussion
of thepassage,see Kenny1986(above,
n. 3), 2.167-77,
p. 59. Forrecent
ofthis
oftherelation
n. 3), 23-4,andLahey2003(above,n. 3), 72-4.Fora discussion
mentioned
classification
of universais
above,seeLahey2003,
passageto thethreefold
M. 1966(above,
n. 18),
seeGrosseteste,
ed.Venice1514/Frankfurt
72-4.ForGrosseteste,
in
lines103-57.Grosseteste
fol.8va;Grosseteste,
ed. Rossi1981(above,n. 17),139-42,
hesimkindofuniversal
exclude
thefifth
thispassage
doesnotexplicitly
mentions;
Wyclif
it.(Seealson. 18 above.)
plyfailsto mention
26Themention
a consequence
ofthe
kindis probably
of"mental
acts"underthefifth
bothas
universal
of Ockhamand manynominalists
factthatWilliam
concepts
regarded
in a kindofmental
actsandas terms
mental
language.

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SPADE

Althoughthe details are not entirelyclear, therecertainlyappears to

or novel entitieshere. On the contrary,everybe no appeal to surprising
in
mentioned
this
is
list,even the "notions"in the "intelligences,"
thing
familiarfrom other medieval realisttheoriesthat are not regarded as
especiallyextreme.There is nothing"ultrarealist"at least in this text.
IV
But if Wyclifdoes not postulatenew and unheard of entitiesin his realism, does he nevertheless
give them radicallynovel roles to play? Could
he stillbe regardedas philosophically
extremein thatrespect?It is surely
answerto that question,since so much
prematureto hazard a definitive
of Wyclif'sview is stillnot completelyunderstood.Nevertheless,thereis
at least one passage whereWyclifhimselfdescribeshis positionas a kind
de unwersalibus
of "middleof the road" theory.In Tractatus
, Chap. 4, Wyclif
his
views
and
Giles of Rome,
contrasts
view
with
the
of
Aquinas
explicitly
on the one hand, and Walter Burley'son the other:27
andis universal
substance
is particular
Thus,somesaythatevery
[singularis],
only
on thebasis
is calledhuman,
universally;
justas an artefact
bybeingapprehended
anda thing
orotherwise
described
ofa humanity
outside
itself,
seen,orunderstood,
is attributed
toStThomas,
outside
itself.
Andthisopinion
onthebasisofsomething
Gilesandmanyothers.
is notanyofitssingulars
sinceit is conThe secondwaysaysthattheuniversal
andisprior
because
itis common,
orshared,
orpredicable,
trasted
witha particular
in manyotherways. . .
by thesensesand different
bynatureand imperceptible
Andthisopinion
and many
seemsto havebeenheldbyMasterWalter
Burleigh
others
...
I agreewiththefirst
theextremes;
I, formypart,takea middle
way,reconciling
thetwoareformally
thatevery
universal
is particular,
andviceversa
though
opinion
distinct
from
eachother.
As Wycliftells it, then,some people held that everysubstanceis a singular and presumablyevery accident too, although Wyclifdoes not
in realityis singular.
explicitlyaddress that point. In short,everything
real
can
be
those
same
Nevertheless,
things
apprehendedby the
singular
same
mind in a universell
When
that
these
way.
happens,
singularthings
are said to be "universais."

27Wyclif,
= Wyclif,
n. 3),pp.27-28(myaddition)
ed.Mueller
transi.
Kenny1985(above,
1985(above,n. 3),4.40-59,
86-87.
pp.

11:36:54 AM

UNIVERSALS
ANDWYCLIF'SALLEGED"ULTRAREALISM"

121

This is not so odd as it perhapssounds.What it means is thatsingulars

and universaisare not two different
kindsof things.Wyclifexplainsthat,
on thisview, to call somethinga universalis to denominateit "extrinsically."28In the same way, he says,we mightsay thatsome artificial
object
is a "human" product,or that an object is a "seen" or an "understood"
object.In all thesecases, we are describingthe productor object in terms
of its relationto thingsextrinsicto it, eitherto the human produceror
to the eye or mind that sees or understandsthe thing.So too, this theory holds,withuniversais.To call somethinga universalis to describeit
in termsof its relationsto an intellectthat apprehendsit in a certain
and in a latervocabulary,the term
generalway. Or to put it differently,
'universal'denotes
a singularbut connotes
the general way that singularis
understoodby the mind.
Wyclifdoes not spell out thisview in any detail. In particular,he does
not tell us how the theoryaccountsfor the fact that the mind is able to
apprehend singularsin this general way at all. Neverthelessthis view,
whateverits details,is attributed,
he says,to Aquinas, to Giles of Rome,
and to "others."Amongthese"others,"I would suggestHenryof Harclay
as a verylikelycandidate,althoughit is hard to be sure on the basis of
the littleWycliftellsus.29
But the correctattributionof the theoryis not importanthere. The
main thingforour purposesis whyWyclifbothersto mentionthisview.
First of all, it ya metaphysicalrealism,althoughnot in the Boethian
sense. Universaisare read entitiesoutside the mind. They are not concepts,and theyare notjust fictionswe make up. They reallyexist.And
theyare numericallythe same thingsas the singulars.
On this theory,it is correctto say that the singularis the universal
and vice versa. And the kind of identityindicatedby the copula 'is' is
the strongestavailable; the singular and the universal are numerically
identical.They are so identicalthat thereis no metaphysicalbasis whatever in the object itselffor a distinctionbetweensingularand universal.

28Wyclif,
ed. Mueller
1985(above,n. 3),4.43,p. 86: "extrinsice
denominata."
29On Harclay's
ofuniversais,
see GideonGi,Henricus
deHarclay:
de
Quaestio
theory
universalis
31 (1971),178-234
andMarilyn
McCord
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
significato
conceptus
in theEarlyFourteenth
Universalis
in Kretzmann
1982(above,n. 4),
Adams,
Century,
mentions
Chap.20, 411-39,on 423-35.Wyclif
Aquinasand Gilesbriefly
againin the
Tractatus
deuniversalibus,
transi.
Wyclif,
Kenny1985(above,n. 3),p. 167;compare
Wyclif,
ed. Mueller
1985(above,n. 3), 15.36-38,
p. 354.

11:36:54 AM

122

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

To that extentat least, the object is metaphysically

a seamlesswhole. If
we draw a distinction
nevertheless
betweensingularsand universais,that
can only be by appealing to something"extrinsic,"to somethingcompletelyoutsidethe objectwe are talkingabout, to the way the mind apprehendsthe object.
Wyclifagrees with this theoryin part. The universalmustbe numerically identicalwiththe singularif it is going to be predicatedof the sinTo this extentthen Wyclifagrees with the
gular by real predication.30
he
attributes
to
theory
Aquinas and Giles of Rome.
But thereis an obviousproblem:the logical principleof the Indiscernibilityof Identicals.If A and B are trulyidentical,then we ought to be
able to say exactlythe same thingabout A as about B , since afterall
Yet it appears we cannotsay the same thingsabout
theyare thesamething.
universaisas we can say about singulars.The whole notionof a universal, forinstance,is thatit can be common to or sharedby or predicated
of many thingsat once. The whole notion of a singular,on the other
hand, is that it cannot. Hence, it would appear, it is logicallyimpossible
to identifyuniversaiswith singulars.
if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is identicalwith the
Furthermore,
universalman. But Plato is a man too, and so he too is identicalwith
that same universellman. Hence, in virtueof the symmetry
and transiof
it
would
seem
to
follow
that
Socrates
is
identical
with
tivity identity,
Plato, which is plainlyfalse!
describesanothertheoryof universalis,
WalterBurley's
Wycliftherefore
in
at
least
for
the
reasons
part
just given,thatalthough
theory.Burleyheld,
universaisare read,and althoughtheyare reallypresentin theirsingular
instances,neverthelessthey are in no wayidenticalwith those singulars.
Indeed, Burleyis famousfor having held that thereis a realdistinction
betweenindividualsand theirconstituent
universais;Socrates,forinstance,
is reallydistinctfromhis humanity.31
And forBurley,the (negative)cri-

30See Spade1985(above,n. 3),xx-xxxvi.

Thiswillbe trueat leastforuniversalis
of
thethird
kindin theabovelistoffive,theonesWyclif
identifies
withAristotle's
genera
andspecies.
31See Adams1982(above,n. 29),423.See alsoPaulVincent
on
Burley
Spade,Walter
the
Terms
, in:Topoi16.1(1997),7-13,on 10-1.Contihasshown
Simple
Supposition
ofSingular
thatthisthesis
is characteristic
later(postConti,
onlyofBurley's
1324)view(Alessandro
Walter
in: TheStanford,
Edward
N. Zalta,
Burley,
(Fall2004Edition).
Encyclopedia
ofPhilosophy
ed. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/burley/).

11:36:54 AM

UNIVERSALS
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ALLEGED"ULTRAREALISM"

123

tenon of real distinctionis preciselythe Indiscernibility

of Identicals;if
A
one can say different
B
about
and
then
are
,
things
they
reallydistinct.32
As Wyclifpresentsthem,then,thesetwo kindsof realismmake opposite
mistakes.The firsttheorypreservesthe identityof singularand universal
that is requiredfor Wyclif'saccount of predication.But it goes too far
in not providinganybasis in the object itselffor a distinctionbetween
singular and universal, and so runs afoul of the principle of the
of Identicals.Burley'stheory,on the other hand, avoids
Indiscernibility
theseproblemsby denyingany kindof identitybetweensingularand universal.But by so doing,he seems to leave the theoryof predicationwithout any metaphysicalbasis at all.
In thissituation,Wyclifdoes what any respectablescholasticwould do;
he draws a distinction:"I, for my part, take a middle way, reconciling
the extremes;I agree with the firstopinion that everyuniversalis particular,and viceversathough the two are formallydistinctfrom each
other."33
And of course it is by stipulatingsuch a distinction
betweensinand
universal
that
also
to
gular
Wyclifgrantssomething
Burley'stheory.
Wyclif'stheoryof identityand distinctionleads to many questionsI
do not intendto address here.34For the presentlet us just say that for
WyclififA and B are formallydistinctthen theyare numericallyidentical and yet notindiscernible.The Indiscernibility
of Identicals,then, is
notapplicable to all kindsof identity.Furthermore,
since numericalidenit is notboth symmetrical
tityis compatiblewith the formaldistinction,
and transitive.
In short,pendingall the details,it appears to be designed
to be exactlythe sort of thingneeded to solve the problemsjust raised.
In at least thispassage, therefore,
Wyclifhimselfthinksof his own theory of universaisas moderatingbetween two more extremeviews.35In
the end, we have not yet found any reason to thinkof Wyclif'stheory
of universaisas "ultrarealist"
or as particularly
extremein any way except
forthe urgentrhetoriche uses to insiston it.
Bloomington,Indiana
IndianaUniversity
32See Adams1982(above,n. 29),423.
33See n. 27 above.
34See theliterature
citedin n. 3 above,especially
Spade1985(above,n. 3),xx-xxxi.
35It is perhaps
ironic
in assessing
"ultrarealism"
tonotethatAdamsdescribes
Wyclif's
itself
as a "moderate
realism."
Burley's
theory
(Adams1982(above,n. 29),422.)Wyclif's
evenmoremoderate.
is,at leastin thispassage,
theory

11:36:54 AM

 de Jean Wyclif
Le pan-propositionnalisme
LAURENTCESALLI

Abstragt
This paper showshow Wyclifis able at thesame time(i) to claimthatwhatever is is a proposition("pan-propositionalism")
and (ii) to developa nontrivialtheoryof propositional
truthand falsity.
The studyhas two parts: 1)
StartingfromWyclif'sfivefold
propositional
typology includinga propositio
realis(real proposition)
and a sic essesicutpropositio
significai
(a fact) we will
kindsof real predication,(b) the distinction
analyse (a) the threedifferent
betweenprimaryand secondarysignification
of propositions
(thelatterbeing
an instantiation
of the former)and (c) the statusof logicaltruthas opposed
to (butdependingon) metaphysical
truth.Furthermore,
thenotionof enslogibetweenstatements
cm(as intermediate
and facts)willbe comparedto Walter
in re of whichit appears to be a close analogon.2) The
Burley'spropositio
second part deals with two semanticand metaphysicalimplicationsof
the "pan-propositionalism":
(a) the extendednotionof being (ampliatio
entis)
called upon to explainthe truthof so-callednon-standard
(e.g.
propositions
modal) and (b) therelationbetweencontentsof thedivinemind
past,future,
as "arch-truth-makers"
and eternalas well as contingent
truths.
Introduction
S'il est sans doute raisonnablede ne pas multiplierles nologismespraeternecessitatevi,
celui qui figuredans le titrede la prsentetude s'impose
au nom d'une autre variantede ce mme principede parcimonie:une
expressioncapable de vhiculer elle-seulel'ide centraled'une thorie
entrerdans la terminologiede l'historiende
complexepeut lgitimement
la philosophie.Tel est, me semble-t-il,
le cas de la notion de pan-proen
de
la
thorie
de la propositionde Wyclif.Les
positionnalisme regard
suivent
ont
pages qui
pour objectifd'expliquerpourquoi. Pour ce faire,
nous tcheronsde prciserla teneurainsi que les implicationssmantiques et mtaphysiquesde l'quation fondatricede la mtaphysiquedu
dicipropositio
*. Sous peine de tomber
thologienanglais:omnequodestpotest
1JeanWyclif,
delogica
Tractatus
Londres
1893-99[inclut
la
, c. 5, d. M.H. Dziewicki,
14.
Logicae
continuado],
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,1

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYCLIF
LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME

125

dans une trivialitparfaitementstrile,une telle mise en abme de la

notion de propositionne peut tre opre qu' l'intrieurd'une thorie
pourvue de distinctionsrendantcompte adquatementde la difference
entrele langage et ses objets,mais aussi et avant tout du fonctionnement
smantiquede ses propositions:poser que tout ens est une proposition
entreles propositions-mots
exige que soit clairementfaitela diffrence
et les propoentreles propositions-signes
et les propositions-choses,
comme vrifonctionnant
les
enfin,
entre,
propositions
sitions-signifis,
vrifacteurs
comme
et
celles
{truth-makers).
porteurs(truth-bearer) qui agissent
Dans un premiertemps,nous examineronsla notion de proposition
labore par Wyclifdans le chapitre5 de la Logica.Le Doctorevangeliem
savoir les pron'y dnombrepas moins de cinq typespropositionnels,
On
skut
realis
et
sic
esse
in
voce
mentalis
,
,
, scripta
significat.
propositio
positions
voit se dessinerici une articulationessentielleentrele logique et l'ontologique, articulationque nous tenteronsde suivreselon troisaxes principaux: celui de la thoriede la prdication,celui de la smantiquedes
propositionset celui de la thoriede la vrit.Nous nous intresserons
realiset Yenslogicm
en particulier la propositio
, les mettanten relation,
in re dveloppe par Gauthier
l'un et l'autre,avec la notion de propositio
Burley.Il rsulterade cette comparaisonque s'il existe,dans la philosoin re de Burley,il rside davanphie de Wyclif,un cho de la propositio
realis.
que dans la propositio
tage dans Yenslogicm
Dans un second temps,nous aborderons,d'une part,la questionde la
smantiquedes propositionsdites non-standard comme les propositions ngatives,les propositionsau pass, au futurou encore les propositionsexprimantune simple possibilit-, et, de l'autre, celle du statut
des propositionsncessairementvraies et de leur relationavec l'archipropositionqu'est Dieu lui-mme.On montreraainsi que l'ontologiede
articule pour disposer
Wyclifprsente une notion d'ens suffisamment
dans les cas non-standardet que, s'il
d'une smantiquepropositionnelle
dans un cadre prsupposantun Crateurcomme
s'inscritindubitablement
de Wycliffonctionnede
le
premierprincipe, pan-propositionnalisme
du cr.
manireautonome l'intrieur

11:37:02 AM

126

CESALLI
LAURENT

I. La thse
pan-propositionnaliste
1. Omnequodestpotestdicipropositio
L'expression'thoriede la proposition'a une porte maximale dans la
pense de Wyclif.Il n'existe ma connaissanceaucun autreauteurmdival - la notable exceptiond'Hugolin d'Orvieto,et ce, dans un unique
passage2 qui ait faitun usage aussi gnreuxde la notion de proposition. L'amplituderemarquablede ce concept traditionnellement
logique
est une phrasepourpour la presque totalitdes mdivaux,une propositio
vue d'une valeur de vrit tientau faitque Wycliflui donne une assise
mtaphysiqueet, du mme coup, une dimensionthologique:on ne fait
pas de la logique pour le plaisir ou la beaut du geste,ni mme pour
l'intrtintrinsqued'une telle discipline,mais pour (enfin)comprendre
correctement
l'Ecriture.Cette entrepriseest dirigecontreces insipides
mixturesde termesqu'affectionnent
les gentilssous la figuredesquels
et les infidles
. . .3 L'Ecriturecontient
semblentse confondreles nominalistes
Il
la logique. suffit
de l'en extraire.C'est en elle que se trouventles bons
principesdmonstratifs,
lesquels, une fois reconnus,n'auront plus pour
effetde dtournerles espritsde la vrit.Car Dieu lui-mmea pourvu
et continuede pourvoir la surviede la juste doctrineraliste!4
Selon Wyclif,Il existeun senslargeet un sens strictdu termepropositio
Au sens large une propositionest un enssignifiant
de manirecomplexe
Le
choix
du
terme
'ens'
ne
trahit
(enscomplexe
significare
).
pas un manque

2 Hugolin
Commentarius
inquattuor
libros
Sententiarum
d'Orvieto,
, prol.,
q.l, a.2,d.D. Perler,
dans:Satztheorien.
undWissenschaftstheorie
Texte
im14.Jahrhundert
zurSprachphilosophie
, Darmstadt
istisin summa
conclusionem:
enstaliter
1990,412:Ex omnibus
esse,
recollige
quodlibet
verum.
est,estcomplexe
qualiter
3JeanWyclif,
d.Dziewicki
n. 1),1:Motus
sumperquos, proemium,
Logica
(ci-dessus,
damlegisdeiamicos
certum
tractatum
ad declarandam
sacrescripture
logicam
compilare.
Namvidens
muitos
ad logicam
transeuntes,
quiperillamproposuerant
legemdeimelius
etpropter
inomniprobacione
terminorum
mixtionem
cognovisse,
insipidam
gentilium
provacuitatem
mentes
posicionum
propter
operisearndeserentes,
proponoad acuendum
fidelium
eliciex scripturis.
ponere
probaciones
proposicionum
que debent
4JeanWyclif,
De unvoersalibus
Oxford
, viii,d. I. Mueller,
1985,175,1.618-27:(.. .)
Nonenimestpossibile
in materia
formam
increata
deficere
sitperceptibilis
quindefectus
in vestigio
creaturae
necVeritas
a fideli
increata
creditur
creatarelucet
quinin materia
utsimilitudo
manduci,
vestigium
perquodad ipsamcredendum
possumus
quaedamest.
universalium
estgradus
scalaesapientiae
ad indagandum
veri(. . .) Ideo,notitia
praecipuus
tatesabsconditas.
Et haeccredoestratioquareDeusnonpermittit
scholam
de universalibusin totodeficere.

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYCLIF
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127

de prcision,au contraire,il indique d'emble que la notionde proposition au sens large dborde la sphrelinguistique:
estenscomplexe
et sic,quiaomnequodest
Proposicio
largeloquendo
significans;
se esse,omnequodestsatisbenepotest
diciproposicio5.
significai
complexe
Tout ce qui est signifiede manirecomplexe qu'il est,tout ce qui est est
donc une proposition.Cet argumentest le fondementdu pan-propositionnalismede Wyclif.La mineuredemande tre explique: en quel
sens faut-ilentendreque tout ce qui est signifie
son propre tre? Le fait
d'treimplique-t-il
ncessairement
une formede rflexivit?
La dfinition
la notionde signification,
que donneWyclifde Yenscomprendeffectivement
mais uniquementsous le rapportde la possibilit: omneens estprimarie
Or tre signifin'est pas quivalent signifier:
il
signabile
percomplexum6.
ne suit pas du faitque x est signifipar la propositionjfr,que x est galementune proposition.L'originedu caractrede signepropre toutens
est chercherdans une formede transcendantalit
universelle:il est
affirme
de
connatre
ens
ce
soit,sans prenimpossible,
Wyclif,
quelque
que
dre en mme temps connaissancedu fait que l'objet de notre connaissance estun tant. Connatre l'tant x quivaut toujours savoir que x
est, ce qui revient dire que toutacte cognitifa une dimension(au moins
Cela a pour consquence que tout ens
indirectement)
propositionnelle7.
5JeanWyclif,
n. 1),14.Voiraussiparexemple
cet
, 5, d. Dziewicki
Logica
(ci-dessus,
autretexte
onnepeutplusclairement
la porte
maximale
de la notion
de proexprimant
au senslarge,
continuado
dubitatur
, III.1, p. 20: Ethiccommuniter
Logicae
position
quam
et videtur
michiprobabile
longaoraciopossitesseproposicio;
quodestdaremaximum
tale:quod sic esseproponam.
Sicuttotusmundus
racionaliter
potestdiciproposicio,
sic quantumlibet
artificiale
secundum
formam
artisdispositivam
magnum
potestesse
proposicio.
6JeanWyclif,
Oxford
De ente
incommuni
deente,
(Summa
1.1),1.3,d. S.H. Thomson,
advertenti
enssignificabile
1930,36:Ex istispalamsequitur
quodomneensestprimarie
verum
etecontra,
etperconsequens
communius
d.]percomplexum
[signabile
quamest
ensnonestpossibile
esse.
quicquam
7JeanWyclif,
De ente
incommuni
1: Omnecogniti
vumcognoscit
, 1.3,d. Thomson,
taliter
ensessein communi
eo ipsoquodquicquam
taliter
est
(. . .). Inpossibile
cognoscit
taliter
velscire,quodidemest,nisisciatad minimum
cognitivum
quicquam
cognoscere
illudesse(. . .) seteo ipsoquodseitde aliquoipsum
transcendentis.
esse,habetnoticiam
VoiraussiLogicae
continuado
n. 1),6: (. . .) contingit
, III.1, d.Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
cognoscereeandem
utdeumesse,incomplexe
et noncomplexe
utdeuscognoscit
veritatem,
se,
etcontingit
eandem
veritatem
secundum
raciones
cognoscere
complexe,
[res,d.]
quotlibet
etmodossignificando
Nichiltarnen
nisiquodcomponit
vel
complexe
quicquam
cognoscit,
dividit.
distincte
sinediscursu,
etcomIdeo,quodnosnonsufficimus
quicquam
cognoscere
veldivisione,
PrimaVeritas
sinediscursu
velactudistincto
infinitum
posicione
cognoscit
Nostamennichil
nisiad minimum
novimus
illudesse.
perfectius.
cognoscimus

11:37:02 AM

128

LAURENT
CESALLI

est la fois signe (de lui-mme)et signifi(par lui-mme).Il existetou- i.e.

tefoisdes entiaartificiels
fabriquspar les humains tombant la
fois sous le concept large de propositionet sous une acception nettement plus strictede cette mme notion:
Sed multocontraccius
diffinitur
veldescribitur,
secundum
proposicio
quodestorarioartificialiter
sic:proposicio
estoracioindicativa,
verum
velfalinventa,
congrua,
sumsignificans,
et perfectum
intellectum
reddens.
Vel: proposicio
est <o>racio
sicutestvelnonest8.
indicativa,
congrua,
significans
complexe
Le critrequi fait d'une entitune propositionau sens strict,est son
caractreartificiel:seules certainesentitsfabriquesentrenten ligne
de compte. Parmi les artefactsnaissantde notre production,seules les
oraciones
et les raciones
sont des propositionsau sens strict,pour autant
le
qu'elles soient assertives(indicative
), bien formes(<congrue
) et signifient
' et '
vrai ou le faux (les expressions'verum
velfalsumsignificans
comsignificans
plexesicutestvelnonest sont synonymes).
2. Quintuplex
dicitur
o
propositi
L'ensembledes entia,
est coex, qu'il s'agissed'objetsnaturelsou artificiels,
tensif l'ensemblede ce qui est une propositionau sens large. Une classe
bien prcise d'objets artificiels,
savoir les phrases (crites,vocales ou
d'une
valeur
de vritconstituele sous-ensembleparmentales)pourvues
ticulierde ce qui est une propositionau sens strict.Dans le chapitre5
de la Logica
, Wyclifva distinguercinq cas de figurepossiblespour ce qui
est de la nature des objets tombantsous l'une ou l'autre des acceptions
du terme*propositi
o' Voici le texteen question:
estproposicio,
scilicet:
vocalis
etscripta
[a] Sednotandum
quodquintuplex
mentalis,
utquelibet
resmovens
ad componendum
verevelfalse;etquinta
realis,
proposicio;
estsicessesicutproposicio
mentalis
estinanima,
proposicio
significai,
[b]Proposicio
et ipsapotest
intelligi
quadrupliciter.
Aliquando
capitur
prointencionibus
adequate
etcomplete
inclinantibus
ad aliqualiter
veldividendum.
Secundo
modo
componendum
ex intencapitur
proacribus
aggregatis,
que suntcircaproposicionem
compositam
cionibus.
Terciomodocapitur
toriproposicioni.
proactucomplexo
correspondent!
Et quarto,
mentalis
in
accipitur
proposicio
proipsa[illad.]anima,[c] Proposicio
vocecomponitur
ex vocibus
successive
etc.Proposicio
in voceestquamdiu
prolatis
sicuttempus,
aliquaparseiusest,quia[non]estressuccessiva,
[d]Proposicio
scripta
estaggregatum
ex terminis
cumsignificatione
sua complexa.
Et quamvis
scriptis,
nonsignificai
continue
se ipsamDeo, et
proposicio
nobis,tarnen
scripta
significai
8JeanWyclif,
n. 1),14.
5, d. Dziewicki
Logica,
(ci-dessus,

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYCLIF
LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME

129

similiter
ad significandum
realis
est,utiste
qualiter
imponitur
[e]Proposicio
primarie,
estsubiectum
et predicatum
et
homo,istelapis,etc.quiasicutin aliaproposicione
estdareistam
[subiecta
copula,sicinistohomine
personam,
que estparssubiectiva
etestdaresimiliter
naturam
humahumane,
subiectum;
d.]speciei
queesttamquam
inestistihomini
et realiter
nam,que essencialiter
tamquam
predicatum,
predicatur
de istohomine.
Et estdareessenciam
istius
hominis,
que estrealiscopulacopulans
istum
hominem
cumsuanatura.
Et sicutin proposicione
artificiali
dicipredicatum
istehomoestessencialiter
et realiter
turde subiecto,
sicin istaproposicione
realis,
natura
humana.[/] Quintaproposicio
estVeritas
a parterei,sicutista
significata
Veritas:
hominem
esseestVeritas
ethecestcausa
complexe,
quiaverum
complexum;
ed.]debetdiciproposicio9.
quare[qualiter
[a] La csure place la suite de l'numrationdes propositionscrites,
vocales et mentalestmoigned'un changementde registreentreles trois
mentionnspar Wyclif.
premierset les deux dernierstypespropositionnels
Parmi ceux-ci, le premier(propositio
realis)est n'importequelle chose
dans
la
mesure
o
elle
constitue
une motivationsuffisante
(quelibet
res)
pour
soit
avec
(ou sans) vrit;le second
qu'une (autre)proposition
compose
n'est pas une chose, mais une situation(sic esse).Il est remarquableque
ces propositionsrelle et situationnellesont dcritesrelativement
d'autres types de propositions:ainsi, une propositionrelle est-elleen
quelque sortela cause de la formationd'une propositiond'un autre type,
car comporrne
verevelfalse n'est rien d'autre que formerune proposition;
elle est dterminepar la signification
quant la propositionsituationnelle,
d'une propositiond'un autre type. Prenons par exemple la proposition
mentale' Sorestalbus'.La propositionrellequi motivesa compositionest
la choseblanche
Socrate
, alors que la propositionsituationnellesignifiepar
'Sor estalbus' est le faitque Socrateestblanc.
[b] La propositionmentale donne lieu une quadruple subdivision.
mentalis
. . . ipsa.. . . capitur
. . .), il
Malgr l'usage du singulier(propositio
apparat que Wyclifdcritbien ici plusieursentits,ou plus exactement,
entrentdans la constitutionde la proposiquatre lmentsqui ensemble
tion mentale.Ces momentsont en communun nom (Wyclifappelle chacune de ces entitspropositio
mentalis
') et une localisation:toutes sont in
anima,(i) Une premire
propositionmentale (pm) est compose d'intentions (intentiones
) inclinantde manireadquate et complte composer
ou diviserde quelque manire.En clair,il s'agit d'un complexed'enti motiver adquatement (adequate)la
ts mentales suffisant(complete)
9JeanWyclif,
de
14-5(j'ai changici ou l la ponctuation
, 5, d. Dziewicki,
Logica
l'dition).

11:37:02 AM

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CESALLI
LAURENT

compositiond'une proposition.Il y a un paralllismefonctionnelvident

entrepm et la propositionrelle (pr)dcriteen [a]: prridoit en quelque
sortemotiveradquatementla compositiond'une autre proposition.Si
>' est, pour Wyclif,le concept de quell'on ajoute cela qu'une ' intentic
que chose10,prriapparat comme la prsence in mentede pr. (ii) Une
deuxime
propositionmentale (pm)est un agrgat d'actes portantsur
(circa)pm. Les actes dont il est questionici sont les lmentsformelsde
la propositionmentale rsultantde leur exercice sur la matirefournie
la
par pm. Ainsi pm serait-elleune propositionau sens de ce qui motive
ralise
ce
au
sens
de
et
une
tre
et
va
, pm2
qui
proposition
compos
composition
en question,
la composition
(iii) Aprs avoir mentionnles lmentsmatriels
{Pmi)? Puis les actes intervenantdans la compositionde la proposition
mentale(pm2),Wyclifintroduitune troisime
propositionmentale (pm3).
Il s'agit non plus des actes responsablesde la formationde la proposition mentale,mais d'un unique acte complexe (actuscomplexus)
correspondant la propositionmentaleconsidredans sa totalit(actuscorrespondem
Sur le plan fonctionnel,
totipropositioni).
pm3apparatdonc comme un acte
la
De
propositionmentale,Wyclifdit qu'elle
(io)
quatrime
rcapitulatif,
n'est autre que l'me elle-mme.Le logicienanglais semble donc admetest
mentalis
tre la vrit d'une propositiondroutantecomme 'propositio
sur
relle
la
de
la
thorie
dont
affirmation
essentielle,
anima'
prdication
permetpeu-trede donner une explication.
laquelle nous reviendrons11,
[c] La propositionvocale ne faitpas l'objet de dveloppementsparticuliers,mais une remarquefaitepar Wyclifsur sa dure de vie mrite
d'tre souligne:une propositionvocale, dit l'auteur de la Logica
, existe
aussi longtempsqu'existel'une de ses parties,parce qu'elle est une chose
successive(ressuccessiva
:), comme le temps12.
10Wyclif,
n. 6), p. 60: Ideoquando
De ente
incommuni
, 1.1,ed. Thomson
(ci-dessus,
velsubstanciam,
hocintelligitur
notantur
quoadquiditatem
speciei,
aliquaesseejusdem
de re setintencionem
nondicitintencionem
velsingulare
cumesseuniversale
primam
telle
de savoir
s'ilappartient
Socrate
sansmeproccuper
secundam.
Lorsque
j'intellige
et ne comporte
estdirect
actecognitif
ou telleespce- autrement
dit,lorsqu'un
pas de
- le concept
En
de Socrate.
rflexif
moment
prima
quej'ai de Socrateestuneintentio
une
d'uneespce,
en tantque membre
Socrate
revanche,
je produis
je considre
lorsque
l'intention
seconde
secunda
partir
de lui(parexemple,
intentio
'species').
11Cf.ci-dessous,
p. 136,n. 28.
12L'dition
. . .) - mise
unengation
de Dziewicki
(. . . quianonestressuccessiva
comporte
- qui, monsens,rendle texteinintelligible.
En effet
citation
dansnotre
entre
crochets
de
arslogicae
du De puntate
selontoutevraisemblance
de ressuccessiva
la notion
provient
lestermes
consacr
auxpropositions
Dansle chapitre
Gauthier
incipit
comprenant
Burley.

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYCLIF
LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME

131

[d] La propositioncriteest un agrgatcompos de termescritspossdant une signification

complexe qui lui est propre. Comme cela a t
le cas pour la propositionvocale, la notion de temps entreici en ligne
de compte.Alors que Wyclifpourraitmettreen videncele caractrede
respermanens
que possde la propositioncritepar opposition la propositionvocale - ce qu'il ne fait pas - il insistesur la continuitde la
de l'crit,comme s'il taitessentielqu'un signe complexene
signification
demeurejamais smantiquementinerte.Les milliersd'inscriptions
renfermesdans les livrescontinuent-elles
de signifierlorsque personne ne
les lit?Wyclifmet un soin particulier montrerqu'une propositioncrite
ne cesse jamais d'exercerune fonctionsmantique.Si aucun humain ne
des propositionscrites,Dieu assume le rle de
peroit la signification
dcodeur permanentgarantissantainsi l'critune formede continuit
smantique13.
realisest de loin le plus intressant.
Les exem[e] Le cas de la propositio
ples de propositionsrellesdonns par Wyclifsont troublants,mais parfaitementcohrentsavec sa dfinitionde la propositionau sens large. Si
tout ensest une proposition,alors tel homme ou telle pierre serontvidemmentdes propositions.Encore faut-ilcomprendrele sens d'une telle
affirmation
. . . C'est prcismentce que tente d'expliquerici Wyclifen
comparantla compositiond'une propositionau sens troit(une expression linguistiquecompose d'un sujet,d'un prdicatet d'une copule) avec
et desinit
les pierres)
aux choses
, le Doctor
planus
opposeles chosespermanentes
(comme
successives
le temps):
Respermanentes
suntquarumesseestsimulsecundum
(comme
omnesearumpartes,
ut lapis,lignum.
Res successivae
suntquarumessenonestsimul
secundum
omnesearumpartes,
sedesseearumconsistit
in successione
itaquod
partium,
eisrpugnt
habereomnespartes
earumsimul,
cuiusmodi
suntdies,annusetuniversalitertempus
etmotus
Depuntate
artis
tractatus
, p. 191).Selon
(Gauthier
Burley,
logicae,
longior
- et que ne pouvait
- il est
la description
Dziewicki
qu'endonneBurley
pas connatre
vocale
soit
une
res
ses
doivent
ncesimpossible
qu'uneproposition
permanens
puisque parties
sairement
exister
lesunesaprslesautres.
Surcesquestions,
voirle dbatentre
Ablard
etAlberic
de Parissurl'intellection
ou complexe
despropositions
ainsiqu' A. de
simple
Liberaet I. Rosier-Catach,
scotiste
delaformule
dela conscration
, dans:
L'analyse
eucharistique
C. Marmo
Verba.
Semiotics
andLogic
inMedieval
Texts
(d.),Vestigia,
Imagines,
(XHthTheological
XlVth
), Turnhout
1997,171-201.
Century
13A l'arrire-plan
de cesremarques
de Wyclif
se dessine
unethorie
de la signification
- signe
- soumise
troistermes
/rcepteur/
la condition
signifi
qu'unsignedoitexerceren continu
sa fonction
souspeinede perdre
sa capacit
Si celaestcorsmantique.
semble
alorsse trouver
dansunesituation
commesi sa capacit
rect,l'crit
paradoxale,
- i.e.le fait,
mmede fonctionner
commemmoire
externe
prcisment,
que la fonctionsmantique
desinscriptions
renfermes
dansleslivres
treoublie
puisse
puislibre- menaait
mentractive
sa propre
nature
de signe.

11:37:02 AM

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CESALLI
LAURENT

la compositionmtaphysiqued'une chose singulirecomme tel ou tel

homme. La propositionrelle qu'est l'homme Socrate, par exemple,se
compose de la personneSocrate (sujet),de la naturehumaine (prdicat)
et de l'essence singulirede Socrate (copule). L'individuSocrate,sujet de
la propositionrelle,est une partiede l'espce humaine (estparssubiectiva
humane
); la naturehumaine,prdicatde cetteproposition,est essenspeciei
l'essence
inestistihomini)H'
l'individuSocrate (essencialiter
dans
tiellement
singulirede Socrate,copule relle(copularealis)de cetteproposition,coucum
ple l'individuSocrate avec sa nature humaine (copulaiistumhominem
dbouche sur la notionde
sua natura).Une telle rpartitionfonctionnelle
relle,
, et de fait,Wycliftablitun parallle strictentreproposiprdication
la naturehumaine,en tantqu'elle
tionslinguistiqueet extra-linguistique:
en Socrate, en est prdique rellement(realiter
est essentiellement
prediAutrementdit, l'individuSocrate est une proposition
caturde istohomine).
relle en vertu non seulementde certainslmentsmtaphysiquesqui
entrentdans sa composition,mais aussi des relationsexistantentre ces
comme nous le verrons,est une prdicalments.Cette configuration,
tion relle essentielle.Exprime dans le langage, elle se traduitpar la
naturahumana'
et essencialiter
propositionsuivante:'Sor estrealiter
mise
en
des
La
par Wyclifs'achve
place
propositions
[f]
typologie
nous
avons
la
'situationnelle',
prsenteprappele
par propositionque
et
alablement(texte [a]) comme tant un 'sic esseskutpropositio
significai
donne maintenantune descriptionplus dtaille.
dont le Doctoreuangelicus
realis
Contrairementau typepropositionnelprcdent(i.e. la propositio
), le
aux
est
dfini
propositions
par rapport
cinquime type propositionnel
En effet,
la locutionsicessesicut
!,caractrisant
significai
propositio
linguistiques.
la propositionsituationnelledans le texte [a], montre clairementque
14L'unedesdifficults
consiste
Socrate
rellequ'estl'individu
posesparla proposition
mutuel
de tout
semblent
tredansunrapport
en celaque sestermes
sujetetprdicat
la nature
de l'autre,
de l'espce
estdittreunepartie
d'unepart,Socrate
humaine;
partie:
dansla disse trouve
La clde ce problme
en Socrate.
humaine
existeessentiellement
humaine
estuneparet subjectives:
entre
tinction
l'espceou nature
quiditatives
parties
estunepartie
humain
alorsque toutindividu
humain
de toutindividu
tiequiditative
Burley:
cettedistinction
de l'espcehumaine.
probablement
Wyclif
emprunte
subjective
hominibus
de omnibus
essencialiter
homopredicatur
qui nondifferunt
(.. .) hecspecies
estpars
sicspecies
et sicutgenusestparsquidditativa
sedsolumnumero;
speciei,
specie,
n. 1),
velsuppositi
individui
2, d.Dziewicki,
(ci-dessus,
Logica,
(. . .) (Wyclif,
quidditativa
texte
subiectiva
de
l'individu
comme
ci-dessus,
humaine,
[e];
pour
cf.
pars
l'espce
9); pour
Libros
relevants
chezBurley,
lestextes
7.77,d.
posteriorum,
Analyticorum
super
cf.Quaestiones
dans:
etparte
Toronto
M.-C.Sommers,
, d.F. ScottetH. Shapiro,
2000,ainsiqueDe toto
duMoyen
etLittraire
Doctrinale
Archives
d'Histoire
spc.302.
Age,33 (1966),299-303,

11:37:02 AM

LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME
DE JEANWYCLIF

133

celle-ci n'est autre que le signifid'une propositionau sens strict.Par

suite, les deux dernierstypes propositionnelsnumrs par Wyclifne
s'excluentpas l'un l'autre.Par exemple,le signifide la propositionorale,
' est une
criteou mentalep: cSoresthomo
propositiondu cinquimetype,
mais il est galement,considren lui-mmeet non pas en relationavec
realis.
p, une propositiondu quatrimetype ou proposito
3. Le logiqueet l'ontologique
Si toutce qui existeest de naturepropositionnelle,
une certainecommunaut de structureet de fonctiondoit se retrouver tous les niveaux du
rel, c'est--direaussi bien dans les expressionslinguistiques(intra-ou
extramentales)
que dans les choses sur lesquellesportentces expressions.
Trois signes particuliersconfrentensemble un objet quelconque sa
naturepropositionnelle
ou propositionnalit:
(i) une structurepredicative
(il n'y a propositionque s'il y a prdication),(ii) une dimensionsmantique (une propositionrenvoie quelque chose qu'elle dit ou signifie)
et (iii) une valeur de vrit(une propositionest par dfinitionune entit
Nous considreronsmaintenantbrivementce que dit Wyclif
althique)15.
de ces troislmentsconstitutifs
de la propositionnalit.
relles
et relationnelle
, essentielle
(i) Les prdications
formelle
Le Doctorevanglicus
donne l'expos le plus completde sa thoriede la prdicationdans le premierchapitredu De universalibus
16.La notion de prdicationest consubstantielle
celle d'universel:commune
estomniuniversali
depluribus
dit
praedicari Wyclif17.
Trois sens du terme'praedicart
sont distingus:le premierest non-philosophique puisqu'il s'agit du sens apostolique du termeselon lequel ce
qui est prdiqu est,par exemple,la Bonne Nouvelle aux infidles{Fides
Christi
ingentibus)'
la distinctionentreles deux autressens de
praedicatur

trace
la
de
praedicari
ligne partagede la communautphilosophiqueentre
15J'utilise
le terme
au sensde 'pourvu
d'unevaleurde vrit'
'althique'
(peuimporte
laquelle).
16Pouruneprsentation
de la triple
division
de la prdication
relle,
parallle
cf.Jean
errores
circa
c. 2, d. S.H. Thomson,
dans:id.,A LostChapter
universalia,
Wyclif,
Purgans
of
's Summa
deente
4 (1929),339-46.
, dans:Speculum,
Wyclif
17JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
n. 4), 16,1.25-6.
, 1,d. Mueller
(ci-dessus,
18JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
, 1, 17,1.29.

11:37:02 AM

134

LAURENT
CESALLI

promoteursdu nominalisme,d'une part, et, de l'autre, zlateurs du

ralisme19.On a ici l'un des axiomes du systmewycliffien,
savoir la
thse de l'isomorphismeentrelangage et ralit.La prdicationlinguis- chre aux modernes n'est en vrit
de termino
tique termini
que la
mentale
ou
crite
de
relations
existant
hors
de la
vocale,
reproduction
tre
dans
le
c'est
tre
rel,
, ou
sphre linguistique20.
prdiqu
particip
encore tre dit de manirecommunicative.Le vritablesens du verbe

selon Wyclif,est le suivant:'a est prdiqu de V ne veut pas

praedicari"
dire que le termea inhredans le terme6, mais bien que la formeuniversellerelle a existe dans un sujet rel , par exemple,l'tre-homme
dans un individude l'espce humaine:
Constat
resdicitse,sicomneinferius
namque
philosophis
quod,sicutquaelibet
praeidestsubiective
suumsuperius,
etperconsequens
nomen
dicit,
dicit,
prius
praecopulat
realesuisuperioris
sibitamquam
cumomneinferius
habetsuumsuperius
subiecto,
sibicopulatum
utformam.
Constat
noninhaeret
itaquequodterminus
praedicatus
termino
subiecto.
Sedforma
veldenominado
universalis
uthominem
esse,inestcuihumanae
Ethoc,secundum
subtiles
estpraecumque
supposito
speciei.
grammaticos,
dicari21.
Ce passage s'avre riche en associationsloquentes.Par exemple:praedi
= praecopulare
=
care= priusdicere
mais
aussi
et
surtout
inesse.
Cette
,
praedicari
dernirequivalencefournitla cl de la comprhensiondu sens en lequel
tel homme (;istehomo)ou telle pierre[istelapis)sont des propositionsrelles: si tredanssignifietreprdiqu
rellement
, alors tout universelest prdirellement
de
son
infrieur
comme
d'un sujet,et formede ce fait
qu
avec lui une propositionrelle22.
Toute prdicationlinguistiquea donc un fondementrel. Wyclifdistinguetroistypesde prdicationsrelles:la premireest formelle(a), la
19JeanWyclif,
De unwersalibus
ad praedicationem
termini
de
, 1, 17 1. 30-7:Secundo
termino.
Et istaestfamosa
nullam
aliamesse,licetsecundum
verimodernis,
quiputant
tatem
istaexemplata
sita praedicatione
et est
reali,quae esttertium
genuspraedicandi
veldicicommunicative
de multis.
Et iliomodoomneuniversale
in actupraeparticipai!
dicatur
de suisinferioribus
in natura.
20Pouruneanalyse
dela prdication
le niveau
ets'intdpassant
purement
linguistique
ressant
la structure
de la proposition
comme
attribution
profonde
(la prdication
appositive
d'unsujetet d'unprdicat),
plutt
que commemiseen relation
cf.L.M. de Rijk,
Aristotle.
Semantics
andOntology,
Leiden2002,vol.I, 75-80ainsique Id., Categorization
as a
inAncient
andMedieval
Semantics
26 (1988),1-18.
, dans:Vivarium
KeyNotion
21JeanWyclif,
De unwersalibus,
n. 4), 22,1. 102-12.
1,d. Mueller
(ci-dessus,
22Parexemple
ce passagede la Logicae
continuado
n. 1),
, II.l, d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
5: Etvocopredicabile
utpredicetur.
Necestficticia
quodhabetaptitudinem
quoduniversale
est[etd.]inesse.
predicatur,
quiavereet realiter
praedicari

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYGLIF
LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME

135

deuximeessentielle(b) et la troisimerelationnelle(c
)23. Suit une prcision capitale: du faitqu'il s'agit de typesde prdicationrelle,les philodans les prdications
sophesn'ontpas traitde la faussetque l'on rencontre
entresignes,ni des prdicationsngatives,ni des prdicationsportantsur
le futurou le pass24.
relle
a lieu quand est prdique une forme
(a) La prdication
formelle
existantdans un certainsujet: Est autempraedicatio
formalis
praedicatio
qua
inexistem
subiecto
25.
Ainsi
la
humaine
fornature
est-elle
praedicatur
formaliter
mellementprdique de Socrate parce qu'elle existe en tant que forme
en Socrate. Cela vaut aussi bien pour les formessubstantiellesqu'acci' sont des
dentelles:'homoestanimaVet 'Petrusestmusicus
exemplesde prdicationrelle formelle26.
relle
essentielle
saisir.Deux conditions
est plus difficile
(b) La prdication
doiventtre rempliespour que l'on ait affaire une telle prdication:
l'identitessentielleentresujet et prdicat,deuximement,
premirement,
la diffrence
formelleentre sujet et prdicat27.Ici, 'diffrence'veut dire
'absence de rapportd'inhrenceentresujet et prdicat'.Si la prdication
formelletait fonde sur la relationde tout partie existantpar exemla
ple entreune espce et un genre (le suprieurprdiqu de l'infrieur),
essentielle
au
contraire
sur
une
d'essence
communaut
prdication
repose
qui en est le principeunificateur.Sujet et prdicatsont deux formesde
mme niveau logique, ou, ce qui revientau mme pour Wyclif,ontologique (elles ne sont pas dans un rapportde suprieur infrieur);elles
23JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
n. 4),27,1. 157-60:
, 1,d.Mueller
(.. .) dili(ci-dessus,
estnotandum
de triplici
scilicet
de praedicatione
de
manerie,
formali,
genter
praedicandi
secundum
essentiam
etdepraedicatione
secundum
Pourdeux
habitudinem.
praedicatione
excellents
de la thorie
de la prdication
de Wyclif,
intensionale
cf.A. Conti,
Logica
exposs
inJohn
dans:Bullettino
dell'Istituto
Storico
Italiano
e metafisica
dell'essenza
Wyclif,
perilMedio
Evoe Archivio
99/1(1993),159-219,
Muratoriano,
,
spc.210-8;P.V. Spade,Introduction
dans:JeanWyclif,
OnUniversals
deUniversalibus
Oxford
)9transi.
(Tractatus
Anthony
Kenny,
1985,xxxi-xlv.
24JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
n. 4), 27-8,1. 160-9:Talis
, 1, d. Mueller
(ci-dessus,
de falsa
autem
estexparterei.Et hincphilosophi
nonloquuntur
praedicatio
principaliter
necde praedicatione
necde praedicatione
de praeterito
negativa,
praedicatione
signorm
velde futuro,
licetvereex
quia talisnonestex parterei,sed solumverapraedicatio,
velremovetur
a reliqua,
uthomoab asinoet sicde aliisveripartereiunaresnegatur
tatibus
nera
tivis.Solumautemilludquodestforma
realiter
de subiecto.
praedicatur
25JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
, 1,d. Mueller,
28,1. 171-2.
26Ibid.,loc.cit.
27JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
Praedicatio
verosecun, 1,d. Mueller,
30,1. 194-198:
in qua eademessentia
dumessentiam
estpraedicatio
estsubiectum
etpraedicatum,
licet
alia sitratiopraedicati
uthic:'Deusesthomo','Ignisestaqua',
quamsitratiosubiecti,
'Universale
estsingulare'.

11:37:02 AM

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LAURENT
CESALLI

seront donc mutuellementexclusives:c'est ce que Wyclifappelle une

contradicho
, soit une incompatibilitde formes.Ce qu'exprime
formalis
une telle prdicationessentielleest une certainecommunaut
d'origine
pardiffrentes:
c'est un mme
tage par deux entitsrsultantde spcifications
substratessentielqui, coupl la formede la dit donneraDieu, et coupl la formede l'humanit,donnera l'homme. Idem pour l'eau et le
feu, comme pour le singulieret l'universel28.
relationnelle
.
(c) Le troisimetype de prdicationrelle est la prdication
Comme le faitremarquerP.V. Spade dans son introduction
la traductiondu De universalibus
rellesrelationnelles
rendentcompte
, les propositions
de ce que Peter Geach a appel des Cambridge
j29.Une chose peut
change
en causer une autre, tre intellige,aime, localise dans l'espace et le
28JeanWyclif,
De universalibus
Inprimo
exem, 1,d.Mueller,
30-2,1. 199-217:
igitur
plotheologico
patetquodaliaestratiosubiecti,
qua Deusest,etaliaratiopraedicati,
qua
esthomo,cumprimaratiovelforma
sitdeitaset secunda
humanitas
et claudit
contradictionem
formalem
deitatem
essehumanitatem.
In secundo
naturali
exemplo
patetquod
clauditcontraditionem
formalem
esseaquaeitatem.
Ideo ignisnonestaqua
igneitatem
secundum
formam
velformaliter
secundum
ultimum
sedessentialiter
velmatesingulare,
nuncestaqua.Et quoadtertium
exemrialiter,
quiaeademessentia,
quaenuncestignis,
communicabilitatem
multis
plumlogicm
patetquodclauditcontradictionem
suppositis
esseincommunicabilitatem
multis
Ideointelligitur
insunt
suppositis.
quodeidemessentiae
istaerationes
velsubstantiales
uteidemessentiae
inetessehominem
etesse
dispositiones,
istum
hominem.
Et essehominem
estcommune
omnihomini
etsicuniversale
formaliter,
sed esseistumhominem
estindividualiter
istiessentiae.
Cettedernire
appropriatum
la raison
d'trede la proposition
relle'Sorestrealiter
etessenciaphrase
permet
d'expliquer
liter
natura
rencontre
ci-dessus
la proposition
humana'
000).
(p.
Quant
problmatique
'
mentalis
estanima',
rencontre
ci-dessus
proposito
galement
(p. 000),il pourrait
s'agird'un
cas de prdication
relleessentielle
dansla mesure
o uneproposition
mentale
n'estrien
d'autrequ'uneme (il s'agirait
ici de l'essence
commune)
spcifie
par unecertaine
forme
savoir,
telleou telleproposition
mentale.
Cetteexplication
n'esttouaccidentelle,
tefois
satisfaisante
mentale
advenant
pas entirement
puisqu'unemeetuneproposition
cettemesontdeuxentits
de niveaux
et ontologiques
distincts.
logiques
29Cf.P. Geach,GodandtheSoul
1969.Le pointde dpart
de Geachestla
, Londres
dfinition
duchangement
donne
danslesThePrindples
parB. Russell
ofMathematics
(442):
Changeis thedifference
inrespect
oftruth
orfalsehood,
a proposition
between
concerantthetimeT, anda proposition
thesameentity
andthetime
ningan entity
concerning
thatthese
differ
intheonewhere
T', provided
propositions
onlybythefactthatT occurs
T' occurs
in theother.
En d'autres
si 'Socrate
estassis t/estvraieet'Socrate
termes,
estassis estfausse,
alorsun changement
estintervenu
entret et t2.Un Cambridge
intervient
le changement
concerne
desrela, plusprcisment,
change
lorsque
uniquement
tionsentrecetobjetet d'autres
de sesproprits
ne
objetsalorsqu'aucune
intrinsques
Parexemple,
le prede Socrate
enfant
estplusgrandque Socrate
alors
enfant,
change.
du prede Socratede l'tatde
qu'ilestpluspetitque Socrateadulte.Le changement
celuide pluspetitque Socrate
estintervenu
sansque le
plusgrandque Socrate
autrede sesproprits
intrinsprede Socratene changede tailleou sansqu'aucune
tmodifies.
quesn'aient

11:37:02 AM

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DE JEANWYCLIF

137

Contrairementaux prditempssans subirde modificationintrinsque30.

cationsformelleet essentielle,la prdicationselon la relationn'implique
aucune formed'identitentresujet et prdicat:la prdicationrelle relationnelleexprimepar la propositionlinguistique'Marie est aime par
Pierre' n'est pas une seule chose, mais plusieurs,en l'occurrence:Marie,
Pierreet l'amour de Pierrepour Marie31.
La thoriede la prdicationrelle labore par Wyclifsemble donc
tre la hauteurdes ambitionspan-propositionnalistes
du matreanglais:
la prdicationformellerend compte de la constitution
mtaphysiquedes
entia(substrat/ forme),la prdicationessentielleexprimela drivation
mtaphysiquedes entia partird'une mme origine(essencecommune /
formesspcifiantesincompatiblesentreelles), la prdicationrelationnelle
dcritles relationsentreentiadpourvuesd'effetssur leur constitution
ou
leur drivationmtaphysiques(termeou objet d'une relation/ relation).
On peut avancer ici l'hypothseselon laquelle les deux premierstypesde
, alors
prdicationsprennenten comptedes relationsessentiellesentreentia
le
troisime
concerne
des
relations
accidentelles
existant
entre'
eux.
que
type
naturelle
et artificielle,
et seconde
des
(ii) Significations
significations
premire
propositions
Tout ens, selon Wyclif,signifiede lui-mmequ'il est, et peut de ce fait
tre qualifide proposition.Cela veut dire que tout ce qui est a valeur
de signe au moins rflexif:
ce que tout enssignifien'est toutefoispas sa
propre existence il y a des entiaqui n'appartiennentpas au domaine
de l'existant- mais bien son pesant d'tre, en anglais, son onticvalue.
Les propositionslinguistiquespossdentune dimensionsmantiquesupellessontnon seulementsignesd'elles-mmes,
commen'importe
plmentaire:
30JeanWyclif,
De unwersalibus
n. 4),34,1.235-41:Tertia
est
, 1,d.Mueller
(ci-dessus,
secundum
habitudinem
exqua secundum
subiecto
nonoporpraedicatio
genusadveniente
tetipsumut sic esseproprie
ut contingit
remintelligi,
mobile,
amari,variecausareet
sibiubicationem,
et quotlibet
relationes
sinehocquod
rationis,
acquirere
quandelitatem
velsitmobile.
ipsumutsicmoveatur
31Wyclif
commeDunsScot,qu'unerelation
estrellelorsque
sesdeuxextradmet,
mesle sontgalement,
ce quiesticile caspardfinition
relleneconcerne
(laprdication
du monde).
De ente
XIII logietQuaestiones
que destatsactuels
JeanWyclif,
praedicamentali
caeetphilosophicae
rela, c.7,d.R. Beer,Londres
1891,73:Proquodicitur
quodextrema
cionum
suntaggregata
ex
dictarum,
existencium,
proprie
perse in genere
peraccidens
substanciis
et fundamentis
ut quantitate,
velqualitate,
et.illaextrema
relacionum,
sunt,
relaciopropria.
Ubi autemdeficit
illiuscondicioquibuspositis
sequitur
aliquapartcula
relativa
secundum
dicivelrelativa
rationis
nis,vocantur
(. . .).

11:37:02 AM

138

LAURENT
CESALLI

quels autrestants,mais galementsignesde ce quoi renvoiel'ensemble des termesqui les constituent.

naturelleet artificielle,
ainsi
entresignifications
Wycliffaitla distinction
qu'entre significations
premireet seconde des propositions.Une propositionse signifienaturellement
, elle signifieen vertu
elle-mme;artificiellement
de l'impositiondes mots une vrittellequ'elle est, ou telle qu'elle n'est
d'une propositionest ce que donne
premire
pas32. La signification
connatrel'ensembledes signes qui la composent.Par exemple,la pro'
position omnishomoest signifiepremirementquod omnishomoest, en
seconde
. La signification
de cette
d'autres termes,elle signifieson dictum
ce
le
dictum.
Dans
notre
mme propositionest
cas, quodiste
qu'exprime
homovelistehomoest
etprincipaliter
Etvocoprimarium
appresignificatimi
signi
cuiuscumque,
quodprimo
'homo'primarie
et homihenditur
totosigno;utisteterminus
hominem,
significai
in communi,
necillum,
individuo
nemprimarie
sednecistum
quocunque
significai
sedspeciem
velnaturanti
intellectui
demonstrato,
humanam,
quamprincipaliter
reprNec ista'omnishomoes primarie
sentt.
significai
quodistehomoest,velquod
sedpriomneensest,racione
verbitranscendentis
quodestparsdietepropositions;
toto
mariesignificai
homoest,quodprimo
etprincipaliter
apprehenditur
quodomnis
signo33.
Deux prcisionsimportantesdoivent tre apportes ici. Premirement
, la
et
est
un
relationentre signifispropositionnels
second
premier
rapport
d'instanciationanalogue celui qui existe entre les signifispremieret
' ou '
'34: de mme que
second d'un nom commun comme 'homo
angelus
Pierre et Paul instancientl'universelhomme, de mme, le fait que

32JeanWyclif,
n. 1),14:(.. .) istaproposicio:
'homo
5, d.Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
Logica,
est'significat
sicutestetcomplexe;
etideoestvera;ethecproposicio,
'nemoest'
primarie
sicutnonest;etideoillaestfalsa.Sednotandum
significai
primarie
complexe
quodduplex
estprimaria
scilicet
naturalis
et artificialis.
Primaria
naturalis
significado
significaci:
proestillamediante
naturaliter
seipsam.
Primaria
significat
significacio
posicionis
quaproposicio
artificialis
estillamediante
ex imposicione
idiomatis
veritatem
qua proposicio
significat
sicutest,velsicutnonest;sedhecproposicio
'Deusest'primarie
ex imposicione
significat
Deumesse;etistaproposicio
'homoest'primarie
istamveritatem,
scilicet
ex imposicione
'nullus
hominem
Deusest'significat
ex imposiesse;et istapropositio
significat
primarie
cionesicutnonest,necpossibile
estesse.
33JeanWyclif,
continuado
n. 1),76-7.
, 1.1,d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
Logicae
34JeanWyclif,
n. 1),7: Etnotandum
, 1.1,d.Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
Logica
quodterminusdiquid
etaliquid
secundarie.
Terminus
illudquod
significat
significat
primarie
primarie
'homo'primarie
sicutisteterminus
velprincipaliter
principaliter
apprehenditur
perillum;
et secundarie
vel
scilicet
naturam
hominem,
humanam,
significat
Johannem
significat
Et isteterminus
naturm
etsecundarie
Robertm.
'angelus'
significat
primarie
angelicam,
Michaelem
et aliumangelum.
Gabrielem,

11:37:02 AM

LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME
DE JEANWYCLIF

139

Pierre existe et le fait que Paul existe instancientle dictum

quod omnis
homoest. On pourraitmme parler ici de descensus
propositionnel35.
Deuximement
diffrent
essen, les signifis
premieret second des propositions
tiellementde par leur nature.En effet,le premierest extra-catgoriel
(il
ne s'agit ni d'une substance,ni d'un accident),alors que le second tombe
sous l'une ou plusieursdes catgories.Wyclifappelle l'tre extra-catgo' ou 'ensrationis
riel du signifipropositionnelpremier'ens logicm
':
(. . .) istaestvera:'omnishomoest';quiaprimarie
significai
quodomnishomoest,
etitaestquodomnis
homoest.Isteedamsuntvere,'Cesarfuit5,
'egononsumasid.] huiusmodi;
estquod
nus','Antichristus
esse',etcetere[cetera
potest
quiaVeritas
Cesarfuit,
quodegononsumasinus,
esse,etc.EtillasveriquodAntichristus
potest
tatesdicteproposiciones
veritates
necsuntsubprimarie
significant
(...). Istetarnen
stancie
necaccidentia,
sedencialogicavelenciarationis.36
Ce que dit Wyclifdu signifipremierdes propositions,mais aussi l'analogie qui existeentreles propositionset les universauxsous le rapportdu
ddoublementde la signification
voquentdeux ensemblesthoriquesantrieursau 14e sicle. Le premierest constitupar les thoriesdu dictum
et
du statuslaborespar PierreAblard. Il existeen effetun lien frappant
entre les dictaet les status
: leurs dnominationsse ressemblent(le status
'
hominis
est dsignpar l'expression'hominem
esse1
esse' alors que hominem
'
le
dictum
de
la
dsigne
proposition homoes); ils partagentun statutde
non-choseet de cause: la cause de l'impositiond'un mme nom diverses choses pour le status
, celle (au moins partielle)de la vritou de la
37. Le second ensemble
faussetdes propositionspour le dictum
thorique
est expos par l'auteur anonymede YArs Buranalorsqu'il rapportel'opinion de son matrequant la questionde savoirce que sontles signifis
ou enuntiabilia
propositionnels
pour lesquelsil proposede crerune onzime
ad
hoc
en
vertu
de
leur natureextra-prdicamentale38.
catgorie
35Le descensus
descente
au singulier)
estun terme
li la
(littralement,
technique
thorie
de la quantification
dansle cadrede la logiqueterministe.
Parexemple,
on peut
'
descendre
de la proposition
universelle
omnis
homo
curri
la conjonction
de proposi'istehomo etillehomo
tionssingulires
suivante:
currit
. . Cf.P.V.Spade,TheLogic
currit,
of
theCategorical:
Medieval
andAscent
and
, dans:N.Kretzmann
ofDescent
Theory
(d.),Meaning
inMedieval
, Dordrecht
Inference
1988,187-224.
Philosophy
36JeanWyclif,
continuado
n. 1),76.
, 1.1,d. Dziewicki
Logicae
(ci-dessus,
37fSensdespropositions
etontologie
Ablard
etGrgoire
deRimini
chezPierre
J-Jolivet,
, dans:
P. Bttgen,
S. Diebler,
M. Rashed(ds),Thorie
dela phrase
etdela proposition.
De Platon

Averros
de savoir
si lesdicta
, Paris1999,307-21,
spc.316.Pource quiestde la question
sontdesvri-facteurs
selonAbland,
cf.I. Rosier-Catach,
Lesdiscussions
sur
propositionum
lesignifi
despropositions
etsescontemporains
chezAblard
, in:A. Maieret L. Valente(ds),
Medieval
Theories
onAssertive
andNon-Assertive
, Florence
2004,1-34,spc.32.
Language
38ArsBurana
A Contribution
Modemorum.
totheHistory
, d. L.M. de Rijk,dans:id.,Logica

11:37:02 AM

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LAURENT
CESALLI

despropositions
le triple
(iii) Ualthicit
linguistiques:
paradoxedu
pan-propositionnalisme
dbouche sur plusieurs
L'quation fondatricedu pan-propositionnalisme
d'introduirela notion de faussetdans un
paradoxes lis la difficult
systmeo toutensnon seulementest une proposition(du faitqu'il signifie
de manirecomplexequ'il est),mais est du mme coup et ncessairement
une propositionvraie.En effet,puisque tout ens signifiequ'il est, tout ens
se trouvetrepar l-mmeson proprevrifacteur:
omnesignificam
significat
etperconsequens
dit Wyclif39.
Considronsmaintenantle
entitatem,
veritatem,
cas de cet ensparticulierqu'est une propositionlinguistiquefausse,par
'
exemplep' homoestasinus' Mis part le faitd'tre un ens, p a la propritde signifier
quelque chose appelonscettechose Y. En tantqu'ens,
p est une propositionvraie (jb signifiede manire complexe que p est);
pour la mme raison, s est une propositionvraie. Deux paradoxes se
ici - le troisime,imbriqudans la solutiondu deuxime,appaprofilent
ratraplus bas: d'une part,une propositionfaussecommep est ncessairementune propositionvraie, de l'autre,une propositionfaussecomme
une vrit.D'o la questionsuivante:si tout ce
p signifiencessairement
qui est y comprisles propositionsfausseset leurs signifis est une
vrit,commentintroduirela faussetdans le systme?Bref,comment
fairela diffrence
entrele vrai et le faux,s'il n'y a que du vrai?
Le premierparadoxe est facilementdsamorc:c'est sur le plan ontologique que p est une propositionvraie et non pas sur le plan logicosmantique.Si p est qualifiede vraie, c'est uniquementen tant qu'ens
et abstractionfaitede sa naturede signe40.
Le second paradoxe est plus difficile
rsoudre.Sa solutionpasse par
Terminist
, vol.II, Parts1/2,Assen1967,Part2, 208,1. 16:Notaergo,sive
ofEarly
Logic
dicatur
'dictum
sive'significatimi
sive'enuntiabile',
idemest.
propositionis'
propositionis',
Illudenimestenuntiabile
Verbigratia:
'homoestanimad':
quodsignificato
propositione.
hecpropositio
estvera,ideoscilicet
illudverum
quiaverum
significat;
quodsicintelligis,
estenuntiabile,
illudsit.(. . .) Videriquidemnonpotest
necaudirinecsentiri,
quicquid
sedsolointellectu
Si querisde quo rerum
an
sit,an sitsubstantia
percipi
potest.
genere
dicendum
estde enuntiabili,
sicutde predicabili,
nec
accidens,
quodnecestsubstantia
accidens
necestde aliquopredicamentorum.
Suumhabetenimmodum
perse existendi.
Et dicitur
nonideoquodnonsitde aliquopredicamento,
sedideo
'extrapredicamentale',
Aristotiles.
Estergode
quodnonestde aliquodecern
predicamentorum
que distinguit
dici'predicamentum
enuntiabilium'.
quodampredicamento,
quodpotest
39JeanWyclif,
continuado
n. 1),4.
, III.19d. Dziewicki
Logicae
(ci-dessus,
40JeanWyclif,
III.1, d.Dziewicki,
4-5:Ethuiusmodi
Veritas
velfalcontinuacio)
Logicae
sitasestin signotantum,
cumsitformaliter
denominans
velfalsum.
Et
ipsumesseverum
omnistalisfalsitas
videtur
michiesseVeritas,
etpossesignificali.

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141

une double distinction:celle, expose plus haut41,entresignifispropositionnelspremieret second, et celle qui oppose le vrai ou le faux (verum
la vritou la fausset(Veritas
/ falsurr)
/ falsitas).Toute proposition
a deux signifis.La propositionvraie q: 'omnishomoest signifiepremirement son dictum
, savoir: quodomnishomoestet secondairementquodbte
homoest,velistehomoest.Wyclifappelle le signifipremierde q 'verum!
et
son signifisecond 'ventas
est
vraie
existe
'; q
parce qu'il
quelque chose
dans le monde extra-linguistique
qui correspond ce qu'exprimeson dictum.Examinons maintenantle fonctionnement
smantiquede la propositionfaussep' celle-ci signifiepremirementquodhomoestasinus.Wyclif
appelle ce signifipremier'fabwrest le dcritcomme un ensqui n'est
pas, un ensquodnonest nonc qui constituenotretroisimeparadoxe:
Sedistitermini
'falsum'
etVeritas'
intel'verum',
superaddunt
superensnominaliter
lectum
ut 'dicovelcredoveritatem'
dico'ens(quodestproposicio)
verbi,
temporis
verum
velfalsum'
hocestensquodestvelensquodnonest.Et tuncdixi
significai
verum
velveritatem,
etfalsum
tuncdixivelconcep,
quiatuncdixiensquodtuncfuit
Etita'verum'
etVeritas'
suntpassiones
ends,significando
quiaensquodtuncnonfuit.
ensquodvereest,fuit,
velpotest
esse.Sicautem
nonilleterminus
'falsitas'.
Unde
erit,
si credoveritatem,
credoensquodest;si credofalsum,
credoensquodnonest42.
Qu'est-ce qu'un ensquodnonest?Nous disposonsmaintenantdes distinctions suffisantes
pour dcrirecet objet droutantet, du mme coup, le
librerde sa charge paradoxale: le signifipremierde p est un ens logicmextra-catgoriel43
priv de toute instanciationdans le monde catgoriel - il n'y a aucune substancedote de la formede l'asinit:
Sic ergosignificare
falsum
estsignificare
ensquodnonest,utista'homoestasinus'
et illudnonest,et ideoestfalsum
et impossibile
significat
quodhomoestasinus,
esse44.
quianonpotest
En revanche,la propositionfaussep a bien un signifipremier- s - et
s est un ens. Par suite, s est une vrit;p signifiedonc (premirement)
une vrit.En somme,ce qui diffrencie
les propositionsvraies des propositionsfaussesn'est pas le faitde possder un signifipremier(p et q
en sont toutesdeux pourvues);l'asymtrierequise apparat au niveau des
seconds:q en possde un, raisonpour laquelle il s'agit d'une prosignifis
fausse:
positionvraie,alors que p n'en a pas, ce qui en faitune proposition
41Cf.ci-dessus,
p. 000.
42JeanWyclif,
continuado
n. 1),4.
, III.1, d. Dziewicki
Logicae
(ci-dessus,
43Cf.ci-dessus,
p. 000.
44JeanWyclif,
continuado
n. 1),5.
, III.1, d. Dziewicki
Logicae
(ci-dessus,

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142

LAURENT
CESALLI
enimomnisentitas
Veritas
sicutet omneensdicitur
et
dicitur,
Quandoque
verum;
isteterminus,
contradictorie
convertibiliter
cumiliotermino
'ali'falsitas',
significai
Ettalem
falsitatem
credononpossesignificali,
cumomnesignificans
quanonentitas'.
etperconsequens
Etsicisteterminus
veritatem.
'falsitas'
entitatem,
significat
significat
omnem
veritatem
negative45.

La faussetou falsitasest l'ensemblevide qui ouvre l'espace logique et

mtaphysiquencessaire la fausset;le faux ou falsumappartient une
rgionparticulirede Yens(1'enslogicm)
qui permetaux propositionsfausses d'exercer leur fonctionsmantique:elles signifient
premirementle
sans
autant
devoir
secondairement
. Parmi
faux,
pour
signifier
quelquechose
les membresdu quatuor Veritas,
verum
,falsum
,falsitas
, seul le derniertombe
hors du domaine de l'^w46.
3. Propositions
relles
et enslogicm:
Burkyet Wycltf
On le sait, GauthierBurleyest l'auteur d'une thoriede la proposition
relle (ou propositio
in re) qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre47.Le statut
fonctionnelde cette entitest assez bien dfini:c'est le signifipropositionnelultimeainsi que le vrifacteur
des propositions.Son statutontofait
de
discussions
dont
logique
l'objet
l'enjeu centralest de savoir s'il
fautdonnerune lectureinternaliste
in reseraitun objet imma(la propositio
ou
externaliste
d'un
comme un fait,
nent)
(il s'agirait
objet transcendant,
par exemple) de la thorie.J'ai dfenduailleursune lectureinternaliste
de cette thorie: mon sens, la propositio
in re est un objet intentionnel
45JeanWyclif,
continuado
4. On a icil'expression
d'uneide
, III.1, d.Dziewicki,
Logicae
celleque l'ontrouve
dansunarticle
condamn
de Nicolasd'Autrcourt,
analogue
(art.
4
la mmechose(Dieu),
exactement
35) selonlaquelleDeusestet 'Deusnonestsignifient
maissurdesmodesdiffrents.
, III (Deusnonessol.,d.T.K.
Cf.aussiBuridan,
Sophismata
Cannstatt
Scott,
Stuttgart-Bad
1977,32s.
46Nousavonslescorrespondances
=
dcroissant
d'entit:
ventas
suivantes,
parordre
= ensnon-praedkamentale
= ensnon-praedicamenenspraedicamentale
est
est
; verum
; falsum
quod
quod
= non-ens.
talequodnonest
; falsitas
47La thorie
de la proposition
de Burley
a faitl'objetde diffrentes
tudesdontles
sontJanPinborg,
Walter
ontheMeaning
principales
, dans:Classicaet
Burley
ofProposition
28 (1967),394-404;
etthorie
dusigne
au XIVesicle
Mediaevalia,
JolBiard,Logique
, Paris
desnoncs
danslescommentaires
duPerihermeneias
deGautier
1989,136-61;
id.,Lestatut
Burley,
dans:H.A.G.Braakhuis
etC.H. Kneepkens
Perhermeneias
inthe
Latin
Middle
(ds),Aristotle's
Elizabeth
Mental
Sentences
toBurley
, Groningen-Haren
2003,103-18.
Ages
Karger,
According
andtotheEarly
Ockham
34 (1996),193-230.
Alessandro
e
, dans:Vivarium,
Conti,Significato
verit
in Walter
e studisullatradizione
filosofica
XI
, dans:Documenti
Burley
medievale,
Leralisme
deWalter
d'Histoire
(2000),317-50.L. Cesalli,
, dans:Archives
propositionnel
Burley
Doctrinale
et Littraire
du MoyenAge,68 (2001),155-221.

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYCLIF
LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME

143

Si l'on
immanentobjectivementfond dans la ralit extramentale48.
in re est une entit
accepte cette lecture,il est manifesteque la propositio
realisde Wyclif laquelle, rappelons-le,est
de la propositio
bien diffrente
de
le quatrimetype propositionsdcritdans le chapitre5 de la Logica*9.
realisconcerne
in reetpropositio
La raisonprincipalepour distinguer
propositio
la nature de la copuledes propositionsen question. Burley,dans la derde sa thorie(1337), dit que la copule de touteproponire formulation
alors que Wyclif
ou in re) est in anima50,
in voce
sition(in scripto,
, in mente
realisqu'elle est l'essencerelled'une chose,
dit de la copule de la propositio
,
essence qui, pour un ralisteconvaincu comme l'est le Doctorevangelicus
la

Ce
mentale51.
entit
une
n'est certainement
proquoi correspond
pas
est le complexe rel entirementextra-mentalsur
positiorealiswyclifienne
de ce qui se
in rede Burley.A la diffrence
lequel est fondela propositio
passe chez Wyclif,un tel complexe,chez Burley,n'estpas une proposi une proposition52.
tion,mais est seulementdit correspondre
in reburleyiennen'a-t-elledont pas de correspondantdans
La propositio
le dispositif
propositionnellabor par Wyclif?C'est mon sens du ct
53
in re
de Yenslogicm
qu'il faut chercherun correspondant la propositio
48L. Cesalli,
etGauthier
DunsScot
selon
Lesignifi
, dans:Th.Kobusch
Burley
Jean
propositionnel
14.Jahrhundert
Parisimfiiihen
anderUniversitt
( paratre).
(d.),Diskussionen
49Cf.ci-dessus,
p. 14.
50Gauthier
etAristotelis
veterem
artem
,
Liber
Pophym
, dans:id.,Super
praedicamentorum
Burley,
etaliquodformale.
estaliquodmateriale
Venise1497,f. 16rb:(. . .) inomnipropositione
etillacopulaestin
cumsubiecto
estcopulacopulans
inpropositione
Formale
predicatum
sunt
veroin propositione
materialia
veldivisio
intellectu
intellectus;
quia estcompositio
ex rebustotaliestcomposita
Dico ergoquodnullapropositio
etpredicatum.
subiectum
Materialia
velinintellectu.
estinmente
intalipropositione
terextraanimam
quiaformale
sittriplex,
Undecumpropositio
quaeautemsuntextraanimam.
quaedaminprolatione,
dici
in conceptu
et quaedamsignificata
damin conceptu
que potest
perpropositionem
totaliest
in
scilicet
modo
in
prolatione,
dicta,
propositio
re,
primo
propositio propositio
esseextra
ex vocibus
totaliter
ettalispropositio
terextraanimam
quehabent
componitur
Et
in
intellectu.
totaliter
est
ex
vero
composianimam.
conceptibus
composita
Propositio
ad
extraintellectum.
et partim
estin intellectu
ex rebuspartim
Quantum
tiocomposita
extraintellectum.
esttotaliter
ad materialia
sedquantum
estin intellectu
suumformale
51Textecitci-dessus,
[e].
p. 129, la lettre
52Gauthier
etAnstotetis,
veterem
artem
Liber
Pophym
, dans:Id.,Super
praedicamentorum
Burley,
inintellectu
correspondeat
Venise1497,f. 16va:Seddubium
est,an ipsicopuleexistenti
extrema
inintellectu
inreautnon.Dicendum
procopulanti
quodcopuleexistenti
aliquid
vel
extremorum
scilicet
in
ad
vere
re,
idemptitas
invicem,
aliquid
correspondei
positionis
in
vel
vero
divisioni
extrema
eorum
copule
negationi
supponunt
proquibus
idemptitas
vel
extremorum
diversitas
veracorrespondei
aliquidin re,scilicet
negativa
propositione
illorum
supponunt.
proquibusextrema
53Nousavonsrencontr
extraau sensd entite
d enslogicm
plushaut(p. 139)la notion
nous
de
Les
textes
les
lieu
en
que
Wyclif
propositions.
par
signifie premier
catgorielle

11:37:02 AM

144

LAURENT
CESALLI

de Burley.L'argumentle plus fortpour cette identification

provientde
la typologiede la vritque proposeWyclifdans le chapitre5 du deuxime
livre du De ente.La vritse dit de quatre maniresdiffrentes:
premireelle est une relationou une formeen vertude laquelle un signe est
ment,
vrai ou faux, et cette relationou cette formeest l'adquation du signe
vrai la vritqu'il signifie(K7);deuximement
et en consquence,le signe
lui-mmeest quelque chose de vrai ou de faux (V2); troisimement
, toute
une
vrit
est un
entitextra-mentaleest une vrit (J^); quatrimement
,
constitu
d'une
vrit
extra-mentale
et
d'un
acte
mental
agrgat
(V4):
Namventas
autfalsitas
estverum
aliquando
accipitur
proforma
positiva
qua signum
velfalsum
ad veritatem
formaliter,
que estadequacio
signisignificantis
significatam;
etquandoque
vocatur
3 vocatur
ensextraanimam
veriipsum
signum;
quodcunque
ex veritate
realiet actuanime54.
tas;et 4 aggregatum
Le quatrimetypede vrit(V4)est particulirement
intressant
pour son
caractreapparemmenthybride,puisqu'il rsulted'une union agrgative
entrele mentalet l'extra-mental.
Wyclifs'explique ce sujet et prsente
la chose comme une doctrinecommune.Selon cettevulgatasentencia
doctorum
, il existe non seulementdes choses entirementextra-mentales
intra-mentales
(comme les pierres)et des choses entirement
(comme les
rves ou les actes mentaux),mais aussi des choses qui sont enpartiedans
etenpartiehorsde l'me.Par exemple:l'universel,le tempset d'autresagrgats produitspar une oprationde l'intellectportantsur des choses extramentales.C'est pourquoi,prciseWyclif,
les philosophesdisentque l'intellect
faitl'universalitdans les choses:
Undeproexplanacione
notanda
sentiencia
doctorum,
quartimembri,
vulgata
que
est:aliquodesttotaliter
extraanimam,
utlignum,
lapis,et cetera,
aliquodtotaliter
in anima,utsompnia
et actusanime;aliquodautem,
utdicunt,
in animaet
partim
extraanimam,
utuniversale,
etceteraaggregata
ex operacione
intelpartim
tempus
lectuset rebusextra.Undedicunt
facituniversalitatem
philosophi
quodintellectus
(unitatem
d.)in rebus55.
dont il prtendreprendrela doctrine
Wyclifne nomme pas les doctores
commune. Il est toutefoiscertain que Gauthier Burley est ici un bon
candidat56.En effet,V4 ressemblepar bien des aspects - et jusqu' la
considrerons
dansce quisuitproposent
de cettenotion
dans
pourainsidireuneanalyse
le cas d'uneproposition
vraie.
54JeanWyclif,
De ente
n. 1),105.
, Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
55JeanWyclif,
De ente
105.
, Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki,
56Wyclif
connat
eneffet
la thorie
de la propositio
inrede Burley
la mentionne
puisqu'il
dansle De universalibus
n. 4),21,1.85-92:
Adillud
, 1,d.Mueller
explicitement
(ci-dessus,

11:37:02 AM

LE PAN-PROPOSITIONNALISME
DE JEANWYCLIF

145

in re.
terminologieutilise par Wyclifdans ces lignes la propositio
Comme celle-cien effet,Yenslogicm
est dit trepartimin animaet partim
extraanimam01
.
Le Doctorevangelicus
entreprendensuite de distribuerces quatre types
de vrits(Vj_4)en fonctiondes trois sciences surs que sont la grammaire, la logique et la mtaphysique.C'est aussi l'occasion pour lui de
donnerune interprtation
de l'adage aristotlicien
tirde Mtaphysique
VT.4
(1027b25) selon lequel le vrai et le faux, contrairementau bien et au
mal, ne sontpas dans les choses,mais seulementdans la pense. La thse
d'Aristotevaut pour deux vrits:la vritqu'est la formeou la relation
d'adquation en vertude laquelle un signeest vrai (F,), et la vritqu'est
l'agrgatd'une vritontologiqueet d'un acte mental(V4). V et V4sont
les typesde vritsqui concernentle logicien.Le champ d'investigation
de celui-ciest prcismentdlimitpar le rayon d'action des actes mentaux de compositionet de division:ce qui n'est pas mentalementcompos ou divis n'intressepas le logicien58.Restentles vritsdu signe
lui-mme(V2)et la vritontologique(V3).La premirerevientau grammairienqui ne traiteque des signes,et la seconde au mtaphysicien.
Ce qui donne, au final,la rpartitionsuivante:
estverum
V/. forma
qua signum
(adequatio)
V2: ipsum
signum
ens
V3: quodcumque
ex
ventate
realietactuanime
V4: aggregatum

-
->
->
->

logicus
grammaticus
metaphysicus
logicus

J'ai parl de sciences surs propos de la grammaire,de la logique et de la mtaphysique.Cette parent ressortde ce tableau pour
autant que l'on prenne en considrationles relations
qui, de toute vivrits.En effet,V3est l'lmentextradence,existententreces diffrentes
mental de K; v4 est le fondementde V (l'adquation entre un signe
dicitur
estfalsum,
cum'propositio'
dicitur
quodassumptum
etymologice
quasi'proalio
oratiopositaproventate
utloquitur
Bthius.
Illeautem
positio',
utputa:
quamsignificai,
ex parterei,quamDeus componit
ex subiectoet
qui sciretfundare
quod Veritas
sitrealispropositio,
ut ponitMagister
Walterus
minorem
praedicato,
Burleigh,
negaret
argumenti.
57Cf.ci-dessus,
textecitdansla note50.
58JeanWyclif,
De ente
n. 1),108:Illud<sc. 'verum
, Il.i,c. 5, d.Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
et falsum
nonsuntin rebus,
sedin mente'>verum
estde veroet falsoprimoet quarto
mododictis,
consideracio
ad logicos,
citracomquorum
pertinet
que [qui]nonconsistunt
et divisionem
in anima.
posicionem

11:37:02 AM

146

LAURENT
CESALLI

conventionnelet une vrit signifieprsuppose qu'un acte mental ait

port sur cette vrit); V2 enfin,est l'expressionde V4. Cela fait de la
vritlogique un typede vritintermdiaire
relevant la fois,mais toudes vritsmtaphysiqueet grammaticale:
jours partiellement,
Et patetquodtotacontroversia
de veritate
statin apprehensionis
varialoquencium
cionesignorm,
utsi dico[sicdicto,d.]:'mundum
esseestverum',
grammaticus,
estvera.Logicus
qui solumsignaconsidrt,
intelligit
quodtalisoracioinfinitiva
autemconcipit
sic mixtim,
esse'estverumex parterei,ut mens
quod'mundum
considerans
deumessein fineveritatis,
cumsitcausa
autem,
cogitt.
Metaphisicus
infinitivam
nominaliter
intellectam
quarealiasuntvera,intelligit
peroracionem
quod
essencia
mundi
estverautprimacausavidet59.
Si nous rorganisonsle tableau rcapitulatif
propos ci-dessusen regroules
deux
la
versants
de
vrit
pant
logique, celle-ci apparat comme le
lieu la fois de contactet de passage entreles choses choses-signes(V2)
et choses-signifis
(V3):
V2:
Vf.
V4:
V3:

ipsum
signum
(chose-signe)
estverum
forma
qua signum
(adequatio)
ex
ventate
realietactuanime
aggregatum
ens(chose-signifi)
quodcumque

->
-
-
-

grammaticus
logicus
logicus
metaphysicus

Ces quatre vritsfontdonc rellementsystme,tout type suprieur

(dans le tableau ainsi rorganis)dpendantdu (ou des) type(s)de vrit
se trouvantau-dessousde lui. Autrementdit,le systmeen questionn'est
rien d'autre qu'une analyseen quatre niveauxde la vrifaction
des signes
conventionnelsque sont les propositionsau sens strict.Les relationsde
ont pour consdpendanceexistantentreniveauxsuprieurset infrieurs
d'introduire
dans
le
des
vrificateurs
directs
quence
dispositif
propositionnel
et indirects,mdiatset immdiats.
Les dispositifs
de Burleyet de Wyclifcomprennent
donc
propositionnels
chacun deux niveaux en-de des propositionslinguistiques,dont l'un
est entirement
extra-mental
(c'est,chez Burley,ce qui correspond une
vraie
dans
la
ralit
extra-mentale,
et, chez Wyclif,une proproposition
realis
ou
vrit
comme
et
posito
mtaphysique
V3) l'autre est intentionnel
etobjectivementfonddans la ralitextramentale(c'est la propositio
in re
de Burleyet Yenslogkum
vrai ou V4de Wyclif).

59JeanWyclif,
De ente
109.
, Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki,

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LE PAN-PROPOSmONNALISME
DE JEANWYGLIF

147

II. Quelquesimplications
et mtaphysiques
du pan-propositionnalisme
smantiques
1. Smantique
despropositions
non-standard:
entis
Vampliatio
Toute propositionlinguistiquevraie est dote de deux signifis:le premierappartient Yenslogicm,
le second
, c'est une entitextra-catgorielle;
est une entitcatgorielleet se trouve dans un rapportinstanciation
avec le signifipremier.Comment fonctionneune telle thorielorsque
les exemplesconsidrsne sont plus des propositionsvraies affirmatives
au prsentcomme omnis
homoest, mais des propositionsvraies ngatives
ou des propositionsvraies au pass, au futurou exprimantune simple
possibilit?La solutionde cettedifficult
classique passe, chez Wyclif,par
un largissement
maximal de la notion d'ens:
Tantaigitur
estcommunitas
intellectus
ferri
entis,
quodnullus
potest
supernonens.
Cumigitur
intellectus
sitcommunissima
virtus
possibilis,
sequitur
quodens,ejusobjectumprimm,
sitcommunissimum
esse60.
cognoscibile
potens
La notion de non-tantest videmmentproblmatique:si la premire
4
phrase du texteci-dessusdoit avoir un sens, c'est que les mots nonens'
renvoient quelque chose d'intelligibleet, par suite, quelque tant.La
thoriedu non-ens
comme privationapporteraune solution ce problme.
l'instant
la question de l'tendue du domaine de Yens
Reprenons pour
dans toutesa gnralit.Le thmeest rcurrent
dans l'uvrelogico-mtaphysiquede Wyclif,mais les textesles plus importantsse trouventsans
doute dans le De entepraedicamentali
dont les premireslignes annoncent
d'emble la couleur:
Resttvidere,
si omneenssitenspredicamentale.
Videturquodnonquia omne
enspredicamentale
estsubstancia
velaccidens;
nonomneensestsubstancia
velacciet pretericionibus,
dens,ergoetc.Minorpatetde negacionibus,
futuricionibus
et

60JeanWyclif,
De ente
incommuni
n. 6), 3, ainsique De
, 1.1,d. Thomson
(ci-dessus,
ente
n. 31),1: Supposito
ex superbis
declaratis
et
, c. 1,d. Beer(ci-dessus,
praedicamentali
in posterm,
dicendis
quodenscommunissimum
possibile
equumcumintelligibili
(. . .)
etDe ente
n. 1),98: Hicdicoquod,cumensin sua
, Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
maxima
communitate
sitobiectum
virtutis
etforma
cognitive
(. . .). Dansle De materia
, ce
mouvement
estappel justetitre
une'ampliatio'
de la notion
d'tre:Tercio
thorique
huiusverbi'esse'ad hectria,scilicet
esseintelligibile,
essepossibile,
supponitur
ampliacio
et essein actualiexsistere,
cumdicitur
extrasistere:
esseactale,
quoddictum
quodesse
habent
creature
extradeumet deusextraintellectum
creatum
etforma
, 8, d.
(Demateria
M.H. Dziewicki,
dans:id.,Miscellanea
Londres
1902,p. 235).
philosophical

11:37:02 AM

148

LAURENT
CESALLI
alicui
cumaliisveritatibus
que nonpossunt
appropriare
ypoteticarum,
potenciis
predicamento61.

La thse de Wyclifest claire: ce qui estn'est pas puis par les dix genaccires d'tre que sont les catgoriesde la substanceet des diffrents
dents.Cette extensionde la notiond'ensest dj signifiedans l'quation
ens= intelligibile
, dont le termede droiteexprimeune possibilit,alors que
celui de gauche renvoie une actualit.Comme le laissententendreles
l'extensionde Yensapporte
etituriciones,
pretericiones
catgoriesde negationes,
une rponse partielle la questionsouleve ci-dessus:le domaine extrades proposicatgorielde Yensconprend galementles signifispremiers
tons non-standards.
Non contentde rpondre de tellesexigenceslogiqueset smantiques,
Wyclifargumentegalementsur d'autres plans en faveurde l'largissementde Yensen montrantque certainescollectionsde substanceset d'acciC'est
dents ne tombentsous aucune des dix catgoriesaristotliciennes.
des
des
des
des
villes
et
le cas, par exemple,
tats,
royaumes,
villages,des
familleset des mnages et, pour tout dire, de la plupartde choses, que
celles-cisoient naturelles(on peut penser aux fortsou aux chanes de
(commeles livres,ou les habitsrapics).D'autres
montagnes)ou artificielles
exemplessont tirsde la vie religieuse:ainsi l'Eglise, les couventset les
ordresreligieuxsont-ilsgalementdes agrgatslentia catgorielssans tom saisir sont les
ber eux-mmessous l'une des catgories.Plus difficiles
de
statut
d'tats
(l'habit religieux),
exemples
physiologiques(la faim,la
comme fairevu
soif)ainsi que de contenusd'attitudespropositionnelles
de . . . (la pauvret,le silence,la chastetet l'obissance):
velregnum,
domm
velfamiliam,
civitatem,
vicum,
Quismoralis
negaret
patriam
cummaiorparstamartificialium
necsitsubstancia
necaccidens,
quamnaturalium
setunumex substanciis
utpatetde predictis,
de pannis,
etcetelibris,
aggregatum,
risinstrumentas,
et cumulis
nonapostatans
(. . .) Quis eciamreligiosus
corporum?
ordinem
velhabitm,
ecclesiam,
claustrum,
conventum,
fernem,
sitim,
negaret
pauin ingressu
cumcastitate,
obediencia
et ceteris
silencium,
pertatem,
que religiosi
ordinis
affirmaciones
(. . .) Etnonestdubium
profitentur?
quin,illispositis,
ponuntur
et negaciones
de possibili,
et futuro62.
preterito
61JeanWyclif,
De ente
n. 31),1.
1,d. Beer(ci-dessus,
praedicamentali,
62JeanWyclif,
De ente
n. 1),2. On peutajouter
ici
, Lui,c. 1,d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
ce passagedu De ente
n. 31),4, donnant
un aperu
, 1, d. Beer(ci-dessus,
praedicamentali
de l'tendue
du domaine
de Yens
: Istispositis,
ens
extracatgoriel
patetquodrestringendo
ad illud,quodperse estin aliquodecern
suntquotlipredicamentale
predicamentorum,
nullum
estformaliter
enspredicamentale,
betencia,quorum
utpatetde Deo,unitate
et
cumaliisprincipiis
extragenus.Secundopatetidemde quotlibet
puncto,
privacionibus

11:37:02 AM

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Le monde regorgeantd'entitsextra-catgorielles,
semble dire Wyclif,il
va de soi que les affirmations
et les ngationsportantsur le pass, le
futurou encore le possibleaurontleur place dans le systme.Notons que
Wyclifne parle pas ici des expressions
linguistiques
portantsur le pass, le
futurou le possible- il ne faitaucun doute que ces expressionstombent
sous l'tant catgorielen tant que substances,pour l'crit,et accidents,
pour le vocal et le mental mais bien de ce que de telles expressions
savoir des preteritiones,
et autrespotentie.
signifient,
juturitiones
L'admissionde tels tantsextra-catgoriels
est fondepar l'quivalence
entrel'tantet ce qui est signifiable
de manirecomplexe[ens= significabile
) et le constat empirique selon lequel il est manifesteque
per complexum
nous pouvons signifier
de manirecomplexe des choses qui ne sont
ni
des
substancesni des accidents.Il n'est pas ncesproprementparler
'
saire que Socrate soit une substancepour que la proposition'Soresthomo
signifiequelque chose. Une foisSocrate mort,ce dont parle cettepropositionn'est plus la substanceSocrate, mais Socrate dans la mesureo il
est intelligible,
c'est--direcomme contenucognitif.Le faitque nous puissions formerdes propositionssignificatives
propos de choses non-existantessuffit
faireentrerles signifis
de tellespropositions
dans la catgorie
de Yens.
Si une
des propositionsnon-standards?
Qu'en est-ildes signifisseconds
est
son
doit
se
trouver
proposition vraie,
signifipremierextra-catgoriel
instanciquelque part dans le monde catgoriel.Quelles sontles instanciationsdes praeteritiones
Il semble que Wyclif
et autrespotentie?
, fiituritiones
a prvu une solution ce problme particulier.Le modle conceptuel
retenuici celui de la smantiquepartielledes syncatgormes,
en d'autre
termes,le modle de la consignification:
Adprimum
dicitur
'hocincomplexum
substanciam,
quodnonsequitur
significai
quantitatem
autqualitatem
estaliquodillorum
etc.,ergosuumprimarium
significatum
Namrestringendo
ad cathegoremata,
cumsincathegoremata
generum'.
incomplexa
et nichil
consignificant
perse significant,
patetquodlicetincomplexa
significant
priet talia,que nonsuntaliquaistorum
vaciones,
multitudines,
aggregata
peraccidens,
nonsintaliqua10 generum
tarnen
omniasuntaccidencia
subformaliter,
que,quamvis
cuinataestforma
inessecuiusestprivado.
Terciopatetidemde aggregatis
stancie,
per
de multitudinibus
et multis
omnem
ut
accidens,
similibus,
que oportet
loquentem
ponere,
futupatettamde artificialibus
quamnaturalibus.
Quartopatetidemde pretericionibus,
etnegacionibus,
dicerentur
accidencia
velposteriora
ricionibus,
potenciis
que,quamvis
ipsis
subiectis
secundum
esseintelligibile,
tamennonpossunt
diciaccidere
alicuisubstancie
secundum
esseexsistere.
Et idempatetde aggretatis
ex veritatibus
cuiusypoteticarum,
modisuntveritates
disiunctionem
etc..
coniunctionum,

11:37:02 AM

150

CESALLI
LAURENT
secundarie
eo ipso
10generum
verumtamen
10generum,
significant
aliquodistorum
velfutuvelnegacio,
preterido
privacio
incomplexa,
quiaomnis
quodcathegoremata
Omnisergotermi10 generum.
<vel> passioestde aliquoistorum
ricio,potencia
remextraanimam
actuisimplici
nussubordinatus
significai
aliquid
apprehendendi
estcolorconcludendi
horum10.Sed nonexinde
quodomneenssitaliquodhorum
talisproposicionis,
ad veritatem
10.Nonenimsufficit
quodeademressignificaretur
omnem
sed<requiritur>
etpredicatum,
significare
proposicionem
proprie
persubiectum
actuentem63.
veritatem

sous le signifipremierd'une propositionvraie au pass

Un descensus
est effectivement
possible,mais il s'agit pour ainsi dire d'une instantiade quelque chose
est preterititi
de ce signifi.Si toutepreteritio
tion diffre
d'actuel un momentdonn (c'est--direde quelque chose tombantsous
l'une des dix catgories),alors une propositionvraie au pass est vraie
bien relle,maispasse.La mme chose vaut
en raisond'une instanciation
futur.Le signifisecond d'une proposivraies
au
les
propositions
pour
tion vraie au pass est donc un complexe catgorielpass, celui d'une
propositionvraie au futur,un complexecatgorielfutur.Leur signifipremier,comme d'ailleurscelui de toute
proposition,est une entitextra-catau
futursontavec leur signifisecond
et
au
Les
propositions pass
gorielle.
dans une relationanalogue celle dans laquelle se trouvece que signifie
avec le signifidu catgormeauquel il estjoint. Cette
un syncatgorme
de
Wyclifautorisepeut-tre parler, propos de la relation
remarque
entrepropositionsvraies au pass (ou au futur)et leurs signifisseconds,
d'une relationde consignification
propositionnelle.
64
archi-vrifacteur
divincomme
: Vintellect
ternelles
2. Les vrits
Les propositionsdotesd'un signifipremierinstanciou instanciablesont
vraies,celles dont le signifipremierne peut donner lieu aucun descensuspropositionnelsont fausses,ce qui semble rglerle cas des pordes
ou encore, en termeswyclifiens,
teurs de vrit ou vriporteurs,
fonccumulent
les
instanciations
ces
strict.
De
ce
au
sens
fait,
propositiones
des protionsde signifisecond etde cause de la vritou vrifacteurs
des
entits
vrifacteurs
sont
Les
passes
catgorielles
prsentes,
positions.
cas que nous avons examinsdans la
ou futures- ce sont les diffrents
sectionprcdentede cette tude.
63JeanWyclif,
De ente
1,d. Beer,5.
praedicamentali,
64J'emprunte
vide
dansLa rfirence
A. de Liberaqui l'a introduite
cetteexpression
,
p. 226et suivantes.

11:37:02 AM

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151

Il existe pourtantdes propositionsvraies qui semblentchapper au

dans la mesureo elles ne requirentl'existence
principede vrifaction65,
d'aucune chose pour tre vraies. Par exemple,la vritexprimepar la
'
potestscirese non
proposition'2 -I-3 = 5', ou encore celle-ci: nullacreatura
essecreaturam
'66. Ces vrits,appeles per se note' sont en quelque sorte
althiquementautonomes,puisque leur vritne requiertriend'autreque
sermonis.
Estla signification
de leurs termes:elles sont vraies de virtute
ce dire que rienne rend de tellespropositionsvraies?Avons-nousaffaire
autrementdit, des vriici une exceptionau principede vrifaction,
Il n'en est rien. Comme toutevrit,ces
ts dpourvuesde vrifacteurs?
mais ces derpropositionsremarquablesont leurs propres vrifacteurs,
niers ont ceci de particulierqu'ils chappent notre connaissance.En
effet,il n'est pas en notrepouvoir d'tablirde tellesvrits par exemple, par une dmonstration mais seulementde les apprhenderintelLa raison en est que la cause de leur vritrsidedans la
lectuellement.
ratioternelledes choses, ce qui peut se paraphraserpar 'la natureet
divine:
l'agencementdes choses', lesquellessont d'institution
sermoillissanctis
Ettamen
sitdarisciencia
quede virtute
inpossibile
proporcionata
'illaveriChristiana
UndeAugustinus,
nissuntveritates.
2oDe doctrina
32,sicscribit:
cumsitin rerum
ab hominibus,
noninstitta
tasconeccionum
est,setanimadversa
et divinitus
institta67.
racione
perpetua
Les vritsncessairesou ternellescomme les propositionsmathmatimais, contrairement
ques ou analytiquesont donc bien des vrifacteurs,
ces derniersn'appar ce qui se passe pour les propositionscontingentes,
tiennentpas au monde cr, ou du moins pas directement.En effet,les
choses constituant
le monde cr sonttellesqu'elles nous donnentun certain accs ces vritsternelles traversleur ratio
, c'est--dire tramais cet accs demeure imparfait:il n'existepas
vers leur intelligibilit,
de science proportionnede tellesvrits.
Arriv ce point,on peut se poser la questionsuivante:si les vrifacteurs des vritsternellessont en Dieu, cela ne doit-ilpas galement
des vritscontingentes
trele cas des vrifacteurs
puisque Dieu, en tant
65J'appelle
vraieest
le principe
selonlequeltouteproposition
de vrifaction'
'principe
d'elle-mme.
rendue
vraieparquelquechosede distinct
66JeanWyclif,
n. 1),105:Quodautemsit
De ente
, Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
velnon
ab anima,
dareveritatem
a partereiindependentem
patetex hocquod,destructa
duoettriaessequinquetnullascreaturas
deussciret
<propositione>,
positaquacunque
possescirese nonessecreaturam.
67JeanWyclif,
De entei
105-6.
Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki,

11:37:02 AM

152

LAURENT
CESALLI

que Crateurde tout ce qui constituele monde catgoriel,en est ncessairementla cause? La rponse cette question est positive,mais elle
doit tre soigneusementarticule.Toute vrit cre existe prioritairement dans l'intellectdivin avant d'existerdans le monde. A cela, Wyclif
, quand nous dcouvrons
ajoute deux prcisionsremarquables.Premirement
la strucune vrit- c'est--direquand nous saisissonsintellectuellement
a
Dieu
le
contenu
telle
t
institue
du
rel
tureintelligible
qu'elle
par
de notre acte cognitifest cette vritdans son tre objectif(esseobiectide ce qui, dans le monde extramenvum
): il s'agit de la prsencein mente
du rel rsulte
nous.
Deuximement
est
, l'intelligibilit
tal,
intelligiblepour
d'une illuminationdivine.Celle-ci est prsentecomme tant
directement
la fois fi) ce qui faitdu rel existantindpendammentde notreintellect un possible objet de notreconnaissance,et fi)notrefacultintellectuelle elle-mme:
Veritas
causata
estin intellectu
PatetquodomnisVeritas
divino,
ymmo
quecunque
et nedum
estin deoquamin suoesseexistere;
hoc,setquandocunque
principalius
esseobiectivum
alicaVeritas
invenitur
ab intellectu
creato,
ipsaestinipsosecundum
animo.Sicuteniminpossibile
d.]
[inpossibilem,
intelligibile
perdeum,qui illabitur
sinelumine
irraestterram
vel aliudopacumvideriab oculocorporali
corporeo
creaturam
intellectualem
secundum
eiusintellectum
sicinpossibile
diante,
possibile
lucisprime
videre
mentaliter
sineirradiacione
pure,quamquidamvocant
quicquam
omnem
hominem
venientem
intellectum
ad hocquodillumint
agentem,
quantum
in aspectu
in hunemundum
mentis
sue68.
quolibet
L'ensemble des pistes suivies par Wyclifdans son analyse de la vrit
aboutissentdonc Dieu: d'une part en effet,toute vritcre dpend,
en dernireanalyse,de l'intellectdivin et, de l'autre,notrefacultintelmme du rel sont reconductibles une
lectiveainsi que l'intelligibilit
illuminationde la crationpar son Crateur.Notons que cettevisiondes
68Ibid.,Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki,
108.Pourl'ideque lesvrits
ontologiques
peuvent
dansl'intellect,
Gauthier
treperues
intellectuellement
etexister
Burley,
objectivement
dans:Franciscan
33 (1973),
Commentarius
inlibrum
PerUiermeneias
Studies,
, d. S.F. Brown,
45-134,1.27:Undedicoquodressignificata
peristam'homoestanimal'nondependet
intellectus
consiab intellectu
necetiamVeritas
istius
rei;immoistaessetveraetsinullus
essetveraetsinumquam
derarei.
Et istasimiliter
'chimaera
estchimaera'
aliquisintellecinrecorrespondent
inintellectu
tusconsiderarei.
Ististarnen
sicsehabentibus
propositiones
ex hocquodpereipit
talesveritates
extra.UndedicoquodVeritas
efficit
quasintellectus
in intellectu
intellectus
ad proposinonestnisiquaedamadaequatio
quae estsubiective
inintellectu.
Undedicoquodomnes
tionem
veram
habetesseobiectivum
proquaesolum
in intellectu
nonesseet etiam
humano
essesubiectivum
possunt
positiones
quae habent
habensessesubnonesseverae.Undeista'homoestanimal'quaeestpropositio
possunt
in intelin intellectu
iective
nonesse,tamenistautsolumhabetesseobiectivum
potest
lectunonpotest
nonessenecnonessevera.

11:37:02 AM

 DE JEANWYGLIF
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153

choses n'impliquepas que Dieu lui-mmesoit l'objet de tout acte cognide

tif,pas plus que cela n'impliquequ'il soit lui-mmele seul vrifacteur
la
bien
de
dcoule
en
Ce
toute proposition.
revanche,
positionde
qui,
Wyclifest le caractredoublementincontournablede Dieu dans le dispositifpropositionnelque nous dcrivons:en tant que cause des vrits
ontologiquesfondantles vritslogiques,eten tantque conditionsinequa
du rel.
nonde l'intelligibilit
Cela dit, le caractre inaltrableet permanentdes vritsternelles
pose eo ipsola question de leur relationavec l'tre ternelet immuable
par excellence qu'est Dieu. Or puisqu'il est dangereux de poser qu'il
existedes vritsternellesdistinctesde Dieu69,il s'agit d'expliquercomsonten quelque manireDieu, sans pour
mentces vritsembarrassantes
et
autants'identifier
purement simplement lui. En effet,toutesces vrits ne sont pas identiques(ou quivalentes)et il ne saurait y avoir de
pluraliten Dieu:
vel
a parteante,dicitaliquamessenciam
siteterna
quamvis
(. . .) nullatalisVeritas,
non
nisisolumdeum.(. . .) Et tarnen,
sic eternam,
naturam
formaliter,
loquendo
Deydeis
et a deo,ut patetperAugustinum
ab invicem
dubium
quindistinguntur
4670.
questione
Comprendrele statutdes vritsternelleset leur relationavec Dieu supqui peuventexispose que l'on soit au clair sur le genre de distinctions
ter en Dieu sans menacer son unit. Les vritsternellesexistenten
Dieu sans pour autantdevoirtrerellementdistinctesde l'essencedivine.
Ce sont,dit Wyclif,des resrationis
, analogues aux relationsexistantentre
les troispersonnesdivines:
indeoetdivinam
remracionis
racionis
inter
modoestdistinccio
Secundo
essenciam;
deiad unumdistincvelrelacioeterna
interpersonas,
velsic,quodrelacioeterna
extradeum
autcontingens,
necessaria
velVeritas
tum,
quenonponitaliquidexistere
( O-71
des propositionscontingentes
Les causes de l'ensemble des vrifacteurs
Ce
sont les cratures(leschoses
divin72.
dans
l'intellect
existentelles-aussi
69Voirla Collectio
Collectio
la plusancienne
remaniant
de jugements
recueil
iudiciorum,
entre1277et 1279,qui rappelle
errorum
que l'vquede Paris
parun inconnu
compile
ab
veritates
multae
suivante:
en 1240l'hrsie
condamne
Guillaume
fiierunt
quod
d'Auvergne
iudiciorum
Collectio
Du Pleissis
Deus(Charles
sunt
, Paris1733,
aeterno,
d'Argentr,
ipse
quaenon
158,186-7).
70JeanWyclif,
n. 1),6.
De ente
, I.i,c. 3, d. Dziewicki
(ci-dessus,
71JeanWyclif,
112.
De ente,
Il.i,c. 5, d. Dziewicki,
72JeanWyclif,
inter
111: (.. .) <debemus>
De ente
distinguere
, Il.i,c. 5, d.Dziewicki,

11:37:02 AM

154

CESALLI
LAURENT

mais aussi les relations,les vnements,etc.) telsingulires,universelles,

en Dieu. Il ne s'agit pas proprementparles qu'elles sont intelligibles
les propositionscontingentes
ler de ce quesignifient
lorsquenous formons
4
une propositioncomme Sorsede
, nous ne parlons videmmentpas d'un
contenude l'espritdivin,mais seulementde la positionspatialed'un certain individu:le faitque Socrate est assis en tant que ce faitest intellic
, mais
gible en Dieu n'est pas le signifiultimede la propositionSorsede
ce sans quoiil n'existeraitrien pour rendrecette propositionvraie73.
Conclusion
Dans la mesure o, si l'on en croitWyclif,tout enspeut tre dit bon
la positionphilosophiquedfenduepar le logicienanglais
droitproposition
Ce qui faitde la
mriteamplementle nom de pan-propositionnalisme.
pense de Wyclifun ensemblethoriqueremarquabletiententreautres
cela qu'il ne se limitepas argumenterla thsefondatricedu systme
son niveau d'expressionle plus gnral- tout ensest propositionneldu
faitqu'il signifiede manirecomplexe qu'il est, cela tant d la comrflexivede la perceptionde tout ens: intelligerx
posante originairement
quivaut toujours saisirque x est -, mais en explorejusqu'aux derAinsitrouveniresconsquenceslogiques,smantiqueset mtaphysiques.
t-on dans les critsde Wyclifnon seulementune indispensablethorie
de la fausset- sans elle, un constantsoupon de tautologiepseraitsur
le systmewyclifien-, mais aussi une explicationsoigneusementarticule de la vrit des noncs problmatiquesque sont les propositions
au pass, au futur,les propositionsngativesou encore les propositions
modales.

velesseingenere
setsolum
existenciam
etenciaintelligibilia
enciaracionis
quenonhabent
inintellectu
cuiusmodi
suntquotlibet
futuriciones,
raciones,
divino,
pretericiones,
potencie,
habent
nontarnen
sunteterne,
t alieveritates
que,quamvis
significate
perypotheticas
esseintelligibile.
settantum
velesseextraintellectum,
existenciam
73A l'arrire-plan
de predeuxensembles
de ce dveloppement
se trouvent
conceptuels
de
ici.Le premier
estla Quaestio
mireimportance
que mentionner
que nousne ferons
desrationes
seminales
laisses
de la thorie
texte
Ideisd'Augustin,
parDieu
quiest l'origine
de la matire
dansla cration.
Le secondestla thorie
(ou materia
premire
wyclifienne
etsonvolution
dansla doctrine
dematire
rcemment
tudie
informis)
parZ. Kaluza{Lanotion
etSt.Simonetta
Beonio-Brocchieri
,
, dans:M.T.Fumagalli
(ds),
John
Logica
Wyclif.
wyclifienne
Milano12-13febbraio
AttidelConvegno
1999,Florence
Internazionale,
Politica,
Teologia.
2003,113-51).

11:37:02 AM

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155

Dans les pages qui prcdent,nous avons insistsur troiscomposantes essentiellesde l'dificelogico-mtaphysique
labor par Wyclif:(i) la
thoriede la prdicationrelle(formelle,
essentielleet relationnelle)
comme
fondementontologiquede la structureet de l'althicitdes vriporteurs.
(i) La distinctionentre une signification
premireet une signification
- la
secondedes propositionslinguistiques
seconde,lorsqu'elleexiste,tant
une instanciationde la premireet, du mme coup, le vrifacteurdes
maximalde la notionens(iii) L'largissement
propositions
linguistiques,
ce que nous avons appel Yampliatio
entis qui confinele domaine cat
un
goriel
espace dramatiquementrduit,plus prcismentau sousensemblede ce qui est intelligibleet effectivement
instanci.Le reste,
savoir les collectivitset les collections,les institutions,
mais aussi les
les
tats
et
et
les
peuples,
(politiques mentaux)
signifispremiersdes proentia
au
positions (ou
logicatici)
appartiennent domaine extra-catgoriel
de Yens.
Le lien troitexistantentre ontologieet logique - faisantlui-mme
cho la relationessentielleentrepense divineet cration- confreau
La logique, par
logicienune positionstratgiqueparmi les scientifiques.
opposition la grammaire,n'est pas un simple art du langage; au
contrairede la mtaphysique,elle ne consistepas non plus en le seul
examen de la naturedes choses et de leur drivation partird'une cause
premire.Mdiatriceentrela mtaphysiqueet la grammaire,la logique
est une discipline la foiscentraleet hybride.'Mixtirr
est l'adverbe que
choisitWyclifpour dcrirel'accs du logicien au type de vritsqui le
concernent.Saisies ou recomposespar l'esprit,exprimespar des mots
mais fondesailleurs,les vritslogiquesfontfigured'interfaces
entrele
mentalet l'extra-mental.
Voil qui justifiesans doute la place privilgie
dans le tissupropositionneluniversel.
qu'on leur accorde habituellement
Freiburgi.Br.
Universitt
Albert-Ludwigs-

11:37:02 AM

and Semantics:
JohannesSharpedOntology
RealismRevisited*
Oxford
ALESSANDROD. CONTI

Abstragt
and originad
The GermanJohannesSharpeis the mostimportant
authorof
theoriesarethe
theso called"OxfordRealists":hissemanticand metaphysical
realismand
end productof the two main medievalphilosophicaltraditions,
he
to
the
new
form
of
realism
for
contributed
nominalism,
inauguratedby
Wyclif,but was receptiveto manynominalistcriticisms.
Startingfromthe
main thesisof Wyclif'smetaphysics,
that the universaland individualare
OxfordRealistsintroduceda new type
distinct,
reallyidenticalbut formally
of predication,
based on a partialidentity
betweenthe entitiesforwhichthe
called
and
by essence,and thenredefined
predication
subject
predicatestood,
of
essential
and accidentalpredication
thetraditional
categories
post-Aristotelian
in termsof thispartialidentity.
sharesthe metaphysical
Sharpe substantially
viewand principles
oftheotherOxfordRealists,buthe elaboratesa completely
different
sincehe acceptsthenominalist
semantics,
principleof theautonomy
of thoughtin relationto the world,and Ockham'sexplanationforthe uniof concepts.Unfortunately,
thissemanticapproachpartiallyunderversality
mines his defenceof realism,since it deprivesSharpe of any compelling
semanticand epistemological
reasonsto posit universaliain re. Therefore,
main
theses
certainlyare sensibleand reasonable,but,
Sharpe's
ontological
within
his
philosophicalsystemtheycannot in any way be
paradoxically,
consideredas absolutelyconsistent.
The GermanJohannesSharpe1is the mostimportantand originalauthor
of the so called "Oxford Realists", a group of thinkersinfluencedby
Wyclif'slogic and ontology.These included,besides Sharpe himself,the

* I wishto expessmygratitude
whokindly
reviewed
to Stephen
theEnglish
Dumont,
ofthearticle,
itstexton manypoints.
clarifying
1Johannes
in Westphalia,
wherehe wasborn
SharpewasofthedioceseofMnster
around1360.He received
hisBachelor
ofArtsfrom
theUniversity
ofPrague
presumably
in 1379,buthe spentthegreatest
lifein Oxford,
where
hewasfelpartofhisacademic
lowat Queen'sCollegefrom1391to 1403,andwhere
he becamea Master
ofArtsand
a DoctorofTheology.
In 1415he waslector
in Lneburg
Ordinarius
Thedateof
(Saxony).
hisdeathis unknown.
He established
a reputation
as a philosopher
anda theologian.
The
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,1

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SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
ANDSEMANTICS
JOHANNES

157

RobertAlyngton
WilliamPenbygull
Englishmen
(1*1398),WilliamMilverley,
and
(f 1420), Roger Whelpdale (f 1423),
John Tarteys,as well as the
Italian Paul of Venice (1369-1429).2Sharpe's semanticand metaphysical
theoriesare the end productof the two,main medievalphilosophicaltraditions,realismand nominalism,for he contributedto the new formof
realisminauguratedby Wyclif,on the one hand, but was receptiveto
on the other.
many nominalistcriticisms,
OxfordRealistsfocussedin particularon two featuresof Wyclif'smetaidenticalbut
physics:thatthe universaland individualwere really{realiter)
distinct
and
the
of
as
formally{formaliter
)
analysis predication a real relation between things.ModifyingWyclif'sdoctrine,they <1> introduced
a new typeof predication,based on a partialidentitybetweenthe entities
number
oftheextant
ofhisworks
andtheir
distribution
attest
his
manuscripts
widespread
andnotoriety
the15thcentury.
The following
areattribimportance
throughout
writings
- hisonlyedited
utedtohim:a treatise
onuniversais
universalia
a com{Quaestio
super
work);
on
Aristotle's
De
anima
libros
De anima);
a commentary
mentary
byquestions
(Quaestio
super
on Aristotle's
libros
on theproperbyquestions
Physics
(Quaestio
super
Physicorum
); a treatise
tiesofbeing(Depassionibus
entis
on formalities
an abbreviation
); a treatise
(Deformalitatibus);
ofDunsScotus'Quodlibeta
on theological
On his
; a groupofsixshorttreatises
subjects.
lifeandworks
seeH.B.Workman,
A Study
Medieval
Church
John
Wyclif:
ofthe
, 2 vols.,
English
Oxford
A Biographical
to
1926,vol.2, 124-5;A.B.Emden,
Register
oftheUniversity
ofOxford
A.D.1500, 3 vols.,Oxford
vol.3, p. 1680;Gh.H.Lohr,Medieval
Latin
Aristotele
1957-59,
- Myngodus)
Commentaries:
deKanthi
in:Traditio,
27 (1971),
onhisthought
Johannes
pp.279-80;
seeL. Kennedy,
TheDe animaofJohn
29 (1969),249-70;
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Sharpe
A.D.Conti,
Studio
storico-critico
universalia
, in:Johannes
Quaestio
, ed.A.D.Conti,
Sharpe,
super
Florence
derealisme.
Surdeux
1990,211-38,and 323-36;A. de Libera,Questions
arguments
antiockhamistes
deJohn
et de morale,
97 (1992),83-110;
, in:Revuede mtaphysique
Sharpe
A. de Libera,
La querelle
desuniversaux.
De Platon
lafinduMoyen
, Paris1996,411-28;
Age
- R.L. Friedman
A.D. Conti,Second
Intentions
intheLateMiddle
, in:S. Ebbesen
Ages
(eds),
Medieval
inLanguage
andCognition
, Copenhagen
Analyses
1999,453-70.
2 On theirlivesandworks
see Emden1959(above,n. 1),subnominibus.
Allofthem
studied
andtaught
in Oxford:
at Queen'sCollege,
at Exeter
Alyngton
Penbygull
College,
at BalliolandQueen'sColleges,
at BalliolCollege;PaulofVeniceat
Whelpdale
Tarteys
theAugustinin
studium
inOxford
from
1390to 1393.Excerpta
from
mainwork,
Alyngton's
thelitteralis
sententia
Praedicamenta
Aristotelis
e realt
nelcom, in A.D. Conti,Linguaggio
super
mento
alleCategorie
diRobert
e studi
sullatradizione
filosofica
, in:Documenti
Alyngton
medievale,
4 (1993),179-306,
on 242-306;
thecritical
edition
ofPenbygull's
De universalibus
in A.D.
Teoria
universali
e teoria
della
neltrattato
De universalibus
diWilliam
Conti,
degli
predicazione
Penbygull
discussione
e difesa
dellaposizione
di Wyclif,
in: Medioevo,
8 (1982),137-203,
on 178-203;
fromMilverley's
dequinqu
universalibus
Problema
excerpta
, Tartey's
Compendium
correspondem
libello
andWhelpdale's
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
in Sharpe,
universalia
Porphyrie
Quaestio
,
super
ed.Conti1990(above,
n. 1),Appendices
and
II, III, andIV respectively,
159-64,
165-87,
foranalyses
oftheir
mainworks
anddoctrines
andinformation
onWyclif's
influence
189-97;
seeConti1982(above),137-66;Conti1990(above,n. 1),295-322;
Conti1993(above),
A.D. Conti,Esistenza
e verit:
Forme
e strutture
delreale
inPaoloVeneto
e nelpensiero
179-241;
deltardo
medioevo
, Roma1996.
filosofico

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D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO

forwhich the subject and predicatestood, called predicationby essence

essentiarri
), and then<2> redefinedthe traditional
post-Aristotelian
(.secundum
categoriesof essentialand accidentalpredicationin termsof thispartial
identity.As a result,the copula of propositionssuch as "Socrates is a
man", "man is animal", "Socrates is white",could not be extensionally
as it did not mean thata givenobject is a memberof a cerinterpreted,
tain set or that a given set is includedin another,but it always signified
degreesof identitybetweenthe two (compound)entitiesto whichthe subject and the predicateof a givenpropositionreferred.Only in virtueof
renouncingthe traditionalview of predicationwere theseOxfordfollowers
account of the relationship
of Wyclifable to give a logicallysatisfactory
between universaisand individuals,which had always been the most
issue for any formof medieval realism.
difficult
Sharpe's independenceof thoughtand open-mindednesstowardsthe
nominalisttraditiondistinguishhim fromthe other Oxford Realists. In
fact,he relegatesthe common realistrequirementsforthe generality(or
in his terminology)
of termsto a minor positionwithinhis
universality
and
semantics
substantiallyaccepts the inner sense of nominalistcriticisms, rejecting<1> the object-labelscheme as thefundamentalinterpretativekey of any semantic problem and <2> hypostatizationas a
philosophicalstrategyaimed at methodicallyreplacinglogical and episConsequently,
temologica!ruleswithontologica!standardsand references.
he not only advanced the new formof realismbegun by Wyclif,but he
also revisedit and constructeda sort of mixed system,where the main
principlesof realistontologywentalongsidethoseof nominalistsemantics.
In what followsI offeran overviewof Sharpe's system,togetherwith
an analysisof his theoryof meaning.This will enable us to appreciate
the noveltyand vigourof his thoughtand to gauge his importanceand
peculiaritywithinthe movementof the OxfordRealists.In the firstsection, I shall sketchWyclif'spositionon the problemsof universaisand
predicationand its developmentby some OxfordRealistsin orderto better understandthe sources and doctrinalbackgroundof Sharpe's own
theses.In the second section,I shall treatSharpe's ontologyand in the
thirdhis theoryof meaningof terms.In a finalsectionI shall draw some
of Sharpe's semantictheoryin
conclusionsabout the generalsignificance
the lightof its ontologicalcommitment.

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ANDSEMANTICS
ONTOLOGY
JOHANNES

159

Universais
and Predication
to Sharpe
fromWyclif
1. As indicated,the startingpoint of Sharpe's philosophicalspeculation
are the theorieson universaisand predicationworkedout by Wyclifhimself and some of his Oxford followersof the generationleading up to
Sharpe: Robert Alyngton,William Penbygull,and Roger Whelpdale.
betweenthose
Wyclifpresentshis opinionon universaisas intermediate
of St Thomas and Giles of Rome, on the one side, and Walter Burley,
on the other.3Like Giles, whom he quotes by name, Wyclifrecognizes
threemain kinds of universais:<1> anterem
, or ideal universais,which
are the ideas in God and archetypesof all that is; <2> in re, or formal
universais,which are the common naturesshared by individualthings;
and <3> postrem
, or intentionaluniversais,which are the mental signs
by which we referto the universaisin re.4 The ideas in God are the
causes of the formaluniversais,and the formaluniversaisare the causes
of the intentionaluniversais.5
On the otherhand, likeBurley,Wyclifholds
that formaluniversaisexist outside our minds in actuand not in potentia
,
as moderate Realists thought,even if, unlike Burley,he maintainsthat
they are reallyidenticalwith theirown individuals.6So Wyclifaccepts
the traditionalrealistaccount of the relationshipbetweenuniversaisand
but he translates
it intothe termsof his own system.According
individuals,
to him,universaisand individualsare reallythe same butformally
distinct,
since theyshare the same empiricalreality,which is that of individuals.
Considered,however,as universaisand individualsthey have opposite
constituentprinciples:the generalityor natural-tendency-to-be-common
for universais,and the thisnessor impossibility-of-being(communicabilitas)
common (incommunicabilitas
) forindividuals.7
3 Cf.Wyclif,
Oxford1985,86-7.On
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch.4,. ed. I.J.Mueller,
On Universais
ofuniversais
see P.V. Spade,Introduction
,
, inJohnWyclif,
Wyclif's
theory
A. Kenny,Wyclif,
Oxford
translated
intoEnglish
Oxford1985,xviii-xx;
byA. Kenny,
andFormal
Distinction:
onthe
BasisofWyclif's
,
1985,7-17;A.D.Conti,
Logical
Metaphysics
Analogy
in: Medieval
and Theology,
on 150-4;De Libera1996
6.2 (1997),133-65,
Philosophy
seeA.D. Conti,Ontology
in Walter
Last
(above,n. 1),407-11.On Burley's
Burley's
theory
on 136-45,
and
ontheArsVetus,in: Franciscan
50 (1990),121-76,
Studies,
Commentary
153-60.
4 Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch.2, ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3),69.
5 Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus,
ch.2, ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3),65.
6 Cf.Wyclif,
tracDe ente
incommuni
Summa
deente
, libri
, ch.5, in:Johanns
primi
Wyclif,
tatus
etsecundus
Oxford
, ed. S.H. Thomson,
1930,58.
primus
7 Cf.Wyclif,
De ente
, ch.5, appendix
, ed. R. Beer.,London1891,
praedicamentali
posterior
De ente
librorum
errores
circauniversalia
incommuni
46; Purgans
, ch. 4, in:Johannes
Wyclif,

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160

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

theirreal identity
On the logical side, thismeans thatnotwithstanding
can
be directly
not everything
predicatedof unipredicableof individuals
versaisand viceversa
, althoughan indirectpredicationis always possible.
Wyclif'sdescriptionof the logical relationshipbetween universaisand
individualsdemanded the introductionof a new kind of predicationto
cover the cases admittedby the theoryof indirectinherenceof an accidental formin a substantialuniversaland of one second intentionin
three main typesof real predianother.ThereforeWyclifdistinguished
errores
circauniversalia
in comcation.8In the second chapterof the Purgans
munitheyare thefollowing:
formalpredication
(praedicatio
formalis),
predication
es
and
causal
secundum
essence
(praedicasentiam),
(
praedicatio
predication
by
In
Tractatus
de
universalibus
causal
tiosecundum
the
causam).9
predicationhas
secundum
habitudinem
been replaced by habitudinalpredication(praedicatio
),
circauniversalia
which Wyclifhad already recognizedin the Purganserrores
in communi
, but whose positionwithinthe main divisionof the typesof
de universalibus
, formalpredipredicationwas not clear.10In the Tractatus
and
habitudinal
cation,predicationby essence,
predicationare described
as three non-mutuallyexclusiveways of predicating,each more general
than the preceding.11
There is causal predicationwhen the formdesigis not presentin the entitysignifiedby the
nated by the predicate-term
No
but the real subjectis somethingcaused by thatentity.12
subject-term,
Formal predinstancesof thiskind of predicationare given by Wyclif.13
and
habitudinal
essence,
ication,predicationby
predicationare defined
in
universalia
in
and in the Tractatus
the
errores
circa
communi
Purgans
similarly
London1909,37-8;and Tractatus
deuniversalibus
duorum
, ch.
, ed. M.H. Dziewicki,
excerpta
1985(above,n. 3),62-3;ch.4, 86-7;ch. 10,208-13.
2, ed. Mueller
8 Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch. 1, ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3), 35-6.On
ofpredication
seeSpade1985(above,n. 3),xxxi-xli;
Conti1997(above,
Wyclif's
theory
n. 3), 155-8.
3
9 Cf.Wyclif,
circa
A 'Lost
errores
universalia
incommuni
, ch.2, in:S.H. Thomson,
Purgans
4 (1929),339-346,
on 342.As a matter
Summade ente,in:Speculum,
ofWyclif's
Chapter
forhisedition
of
offactthems.Cambridge,
B.16.2,usedbyDziewicki
Trinity
College,
andthefirst
thework,
lacksthesecond
section
ofthethird
S.H.Thomson
chapter
chapter.
thetextonthebasisofthems.Wien,sterreichische
4307.
Nationalbibliothek,
integrated
10Cf.Wyclif,
errores
1909(above,n. 7),34.
Purgans
, ch.3, ed. Dziewicki
11Cf.Wvclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
1985(above,n. 3),35.
, ch. 1,ed. Mueller
12Cf.Wyclif,
errores
1929(above,n. 9), 343.
, ch.2, ed. Thomson
Purgans
13In theworks
oftwoofhisOxonian
wefindthisexample:
"Dies
followers,
however,
estlatiosolissuperterram",
andnothing
us from
itas appropriate
for
prevents
assuming
- seePenbygull,
as well
n. 2),188;Whelpdale,
De universalibus
, ed.Conti1982(above,
Wyclif
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
universalia
, in:Sharpe,
, Appendix
IV, ed. Conti1990
Quaestio
super
(above,n. 1),190.

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SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
ANDSEMANTICS
JOHANNES

161

de universalibus.
Formal predicationis that in which the formdesignated
is directlypresentin the entitysignifiedby the subby the predicate-term
This
ject-term.
happens wheneveran item in the categorialline is predicated of its inferioror an accident of its subjectof inherence.14
In both
and the predicate-term
referto the same reality
cases, the subject-term
in virtueof the formconnotedby the predicate-term
itself.It is sufficient
forpredicationby essence thatthe same empiricalrealityis both the real
subjectand predicate,even thoughthe formalprincipleconnotedby the
differsfromthat connoted by the subject-term.God is
predicate-term
man' and 'The universalis particular'are instancesof thiskind of predication.15In fact,the same empiricalreality(or essence) which is a universal is also an individual,but the formsconnoted by the subject and
predicatetermsdifferfromeach other.Finally,thereis habitudinalpredication when the formconnotedby the predicate-term
does not inhere,
or
in
the
essence
the
directly indirectly,
designatedby
subjectbut simply
impliesa relationto it, so that the same predicatemay be at different
timessaid trulyor falselyof its subject withoutany change in the subject itself.16
Accordingto Wyclif,we use such predicationmainlyto express
theologicaltruths,such as God is known and loved by many creatures
or bringsabout, as efficient,
exemplar,and finalcause manygood effects.
It is evidentthat habitudinalpredicationdoes not require any kind of
identitybetweenthe entitiessignifiedby the subjectand predicateterms,
but that formalpredicationand essentialpredicationdo. So the ontoof the mostgeneraltypeof predicationdiffercomlogicalpresuppositions
pletelyfromthose of the othertwo typesby which it is implied.
The finalresultof Wyclif'schoices is thereforean incompletelydeveloped systemof intensionallogic that he superimposeson the standard
extensionalsystem.Because the ontologicalbasis of the mostgeneraltype
of predication,thatis, habitudinalpredication,is completelydifferent
from
those of the other two typesof predicationthat implyit, Alyngtonand
other Oxford authors of the subsequent generation tried to improve
Wyclif'stheoryby excludinghabitudinalpredicationand redefiningthe
othertwo kindsin a slightlydifferent
way.
14Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch. 1,ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3),28-9.See
alsoPurgans
errores
, ch.2, ed. Thomson,
p. 342.
15Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch. 1, ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3), 30. See
alsoPurgans
errores
circa
universalia
incommuni
1929(above,n. 9),342-3.
, ch.2, in Thomson
16Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, ch. 1,ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3),34.

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162

D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO

who dependson Avicennaand Wyclif,the

2. Accordingto Alyngton,17
formaluniversaisare common naturesin virtueof which the individuals
that share them are exactlywhat theyare, just as humanityis the form
by which everyman formallyis a man. Unlike Wyclif,however,he does
not thinkthat universaisexistin actuin the externalworld.18As natures,
to any divisioninto universaisand indithey are prior and indifferent
is not a conor communicabilitas)
unwersalitas
viduals.Althoughuniversality
(
stitutivemark of the nature itself,it is its unique, inseparableproperty.
As a consequence,formaluniversaiscan be conceivedof in two different
ways: by themselves,as firstintentions,or in union with and fromthe
, and
point of view of theirinseparableproperty,i.e. the communicabilitas
a
cerof
natures
are
as second intentions.In the firstcase, they
therefore
tain kind and are identicalwiththeirown individuals.For example,man
is the same thingas Socrates.In the second case, theyare properlyuniversais(i.e. somethingthat can be presentin many thingsat once), and
distinctfromtheirown individuals,consideredqua individuals,because of
.19
and incommunicabilitas
the oppositeconstitutive
principles:communicabilitas
but
identical
are
universais
)
to,
formally{formaliter
Hence,
really(realiter)
distinctfrom,theirindividuals.In fact,universaisare formalcauses in
relationto theirown individuals,while individualsare materialcauses in
kindsof entitiescan be
Thus threedifferent
relationto theiruniversais.20
naturesinstantiatedby
<1>
common
the
universais:
as
formal
qualified
individuals,whichare thingsof firstintention;<2> the formitselfof universalitythat belongsto a certaincommon naturewhen seen in its relation to the individuals,which is a thingof second intention;<3> the
proper to the common nature, by which it is a possible
intelligibility

17Alyngton
He
after
ofthegeneration
authors
wasoneofthemostimportant
Wyclif.
metaand Wyclif's
was deeplyinfluenced
system
logico-ontological
byWalterBurley's
on Burley's
relies
on theCategories
a commentary
Hismajorextant
, heavily
work,
physics.
He wasnonetheless
De ente
andWyclif's
on theCategories
lastcommentary
praedkamentali
of
thegeneral
whilefollowing
theories
newlogicalandsemantic
ableto develop
strategy
and/ormental
to linguistical
references
andmethodically
Realists
theOxford
replacing
and
ofuniversais
On histheory
realities.
to external
withreferences
activities
objective
seeConti1993(above,n. 2), 193-208.
predication
18Cf.Alyngton,
s. Praedicamenta
sententia
Litteralis
, in:Conti1993(above,
, ch.desubstantia
n. 2),279.
19Cf.Alyngton,
s. Praedicamenta
sententia
Litteralis
, 268.
, ch.desubstantia
20Cf.Alyngton,
s. Praedicamenta
sententia
Litteralis
, 275-6.
, ch.desubstantia

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SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
ANDSEMANTICS
JOHANNES

163

object of our mind thatis, the real principlewhichconnectsformaluniversaiswith mental universais.21

Since Alyngtonaccepted the core of the traditional,realistaccount of
the relationship
between(formal)universaisand individuals,he, likeWyclif,
had to defineits logical structuremore accurately,in order to avoid the
inconsistenciesstressedby Ockham and his followers.22
Thus he states
that <1> a universalin the categoryof substancecan directlyreceive
onlythe predicationsof substantialformsmore commonthanit; and <2>
the accidentalformsinheringin individualsubstancescan be predicated
of the universalsubstantialformthat those individualsinstantiateonly
indirectly(essentiality
) throughand in virtueof the individualsthemselves
of that substantialform.23
For this reason, Alyngton'sdescriptionof the
logical structureof the relationshipbetween universaisand individuals
demanded a redefinition
of predication.Indeed, he was the firstone to
ameliorateWyclif'stheoryby dividingpredicationinto formalpredication(prcwdicatw
remota
formalis
) and remoteinherence(inhaerena
), or predication
secundum
Remote
inherence
is grounded
by essence (praedicatio
essentiam).
on a partial identitybetween subject and predicate,which share some,
but not all, metaphysicalconstituents,
and does not demand thatthe form
be directlypresentin the entitysignified
signifiedby the predicate-term
On the contrary,such a directpresenceis required
by the subject-term.
formal
by
predication.'Man is an animal' and 'Socrates is white' are
instancesof formalpredication;'(What is) singularis (what is) common'
estcommune
('singulare
') and 'Humanityis (something)running'('humanitas
estcurrent)
are instancesof remoteinherence,since,accordingto Alyngton,
the propertyof runningis imputableto the formof humanity,if at least
one man is running.He is careful,however,to use a substantival
adjective
21Cf.Alyngton,
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
of
, ch.desubstantia
, 277.Thispartition
theformal
universal
is verysimilar
to thatpropounded
in hisTractatus
deunibyWyclif
versalibus
, ch.2, ed. Mueller1985(above,n. 3),64.
22Bothin hiscommentary
on theCategories
(ch.desubstantia
) andin hisSumma
Logkae
thatmanyunacceptable
follow
from
(parsI, chs.14-15)Ockhamstressed
consequences
thetwofold
admission
thatuniversais
aresomething
inre
, andareconstitutive
existing
parts
oftheessence
ofindividuals.
Forexample:
<1> whatever
is predicated
ofindividuals
will
be predicated
oftheir
universais
a uniquecommon
nature
at thesame
too;andtherefore
timewouldgetcontrary
attributes
fromitsindividuals.
<2> God couldnotannihilate
Socrates
individual
without
at thesametimedestroying
thewhole
(oranyother
substance)
ofsubstance,
andtherefore
created
sinceevery
accident
on
category
every
being,
depends
substance
foritsexistence.
23Cf.Alyngton,
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
in:Conti1993
, ch.deregulis
praedicationis,
(above,n. 2),246-8;ch.desubstantia
, 288-9.

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ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

in its neuterformas a predicate-term,

because only in this way can it
is not directlyprethat
the
form
the
signifiedby
predicate-term
appear
to it throughitsindividuals:24
sentin the subject,but is indirecdyattributed
in communi.
Sed sciendum
estquodduplexsoletponipraedicatio
Aliquaenimest
etaliquaestpraedicatio
formalis.
Estautem
secundum
essentiam
praedipraedicatio
estres
catiosecundum
essentiam
significata
perpraedicatum
quandoeademessentia
a partereiestpraedicatum,
sedalivelquandosubiectum
significata
persubiectum,
etdenomiutsic,persubiectum
connotatur,
primo
qua ratioformalis
quaenoninest
nativepraedicato,
vel e converso.
Ut sic: 'naturahumanaesthomosingularis',
estcurrens',
'homosingularis
estspecies',
et itade aliis.Nontamenest
'humanitas
nonestpraedicatum,
istapraedicatio
concedenda
'homoestasinus',
quiasubiectum
ad illampraedicaanimalitas
sittamhomoquamasinus,
quia oporteret
quamvis
velhomovelasinus,
essetprimoformaliter
tionem
quodnonest
quodanimalitas
estcommune,
forverum.
Conceditur
tamenquodsingulare
quia aliquaessentia
nece contra,
communis
esthomosingularis.
Nontamenalbumestnigrum
maliter
albaestnigranece connecrationale
estirrationale,
formaliter
quianullaessentia
formaliter
ratonalis
estirrationale;
et itade aliis.Et iuxta
tra,necaliquaessentia
nonforestgenus
hocconceditur
specialissima
generalissimm,
quamvis
quodspecies
utquandoratioprima
uthuiusmaliter.
Sedalia,estpraedicatio
formalis,
praedicati,
ut'homoestanimal',
'Sortes
estalbus'.Etista
subiecto;
modi,inestformaliter
primo
velaccidentalis.
duplexest:substantialis
Formal predicationitselfis in turn divided into formalsubstantialand
demands
formalaccidentalpredication,sinceformalpredicationnecessarily
the directpresenceof a formin a substrate,and, accordingto Alyngton,
thiscan occur in two different
ways: eitheras one of the innerconstituor as one of its subsidiary
tive element of the substrate(substantially),
Formal accidental predicationis then further
properties(accidentally).25
:26
and secundum
habitudinem
divided into secundum
motum
in formalem
accidentium
Accidentalis
ultradividitur
praedicationem
quaeimplicant
et aliorum
accidentium
subiectum
suumesseperse mobile
quaenonsicimplicant,
- de quibusdictum
estprius.
secundum
habitudinem
quaevocatur
praedicatio
The basic idea of thislast divisionseem to be that modes of being and
naturesof the accidentalformsdeterminethe set of substanceswhichcan
betweenthoseacciplay the role of theirsubstrate.Alyngtondistinguishes
dental formsthat requirea substancecapable of undergoingchange (per
se mobile
) as theirown directsubstrateof inherence,and thoseones which
do not need a substratewith such a characteristic.
Forms like quantity,
whiteness,risibilitas
, alteration,diminutionand so on belong to the first
24Alyngton,
LitteraUs
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
289.
, ch.desubstantia,
25Cf.Alyngton,
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
, 263.
, ch.desubstantia
26Alyngton,
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
, ch.desubstantia
, 289.

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JOHANNES

165

group,while relationsof reason27and respectas

, like causation,difference,
dilectio
and so on, fallunder the second one. The formsof the firstgroup
motum
bringabout formalaccidentalpredicationsecundum
, and the forms
of the second group formalaccidental predicationsecundum
habitudinem.
The formernecessarilyentailsingularsubstancesas theirsubstrates,
since
alone
can
while
the
latter
can
singulars
undergo change,
only
directly
inherein universalinatures{possuntinessedenominative
universalibus
).28
3. Some years later,in theirtreatiseson universaisWilliam Penbygull29
and Roger Whelpdale,30who almostcertainlybelong to the same generation as Sharpe, divided predicationinto formal(praedicatio
formalis
), by
essence (.secundum
essentiam
:), and causal (.secundum
causam).Predicationby
essence shows a partial identitybetween subject and predicate,which
27According
to Alyngton,
whoseaccountpartially
differs
fromthoseof Burley
and
in theactofreferring
ofonesubstance
to another
fourdistinct
constitutive
eleWyclif,
ments
canbe individuated:
therelation
forinstance,
theform
ofpaternity;
thesubitself,
strate
oftherelation,
thatis,thesubstance
whichdenominatively
receives
thenameof
therelation,
forinstance,
thesubstance
which
is thefather;
theobjectoftherelation,
that
withwhichthesubstrate
oftherelation
is connected,
forinstance,
is,thesubstance
the
substance
whichis theson;andthefoundation
thatis,the
{Jundamentum
) oftherelation,
absolute
in virtue
ofwhichtherelation
in thesubstrate
inheres
andin theobject.
entity
Thefoundation
is themaincomponent,
sinceit < 1> joinstherelation
to theunderlying
<2> allowstherelation
tolinkthesubstrate
totheobject,
and<3> transmits
substances,
totherelation
someofitsproperties.
Unlike
andWyclif,
affirms
thatnot
Burley
Alyngton
andquantities,
butsubstances
alsocanbe thefoundation
ofa relation.
On
onlyqualities
thisbasis,he defines
relations
ofreason,
from
their
eliminating
description
anyreference
to ourmindandutilising
criteria
ofreality
itself.
objective
onlybasedon theframework
In facthe maintains
thatwhatcharacterizes
therelations
ofreasonis thefulfilment
ofat
leastoneoftheseconditions:
<1> thesubject
ofinherence
oftherelation,
or itsobject,
is nota substance;
<2> theobjectis notan actualentity;
<3> thefoundation
oftherela- i.e.a substance,
tionis notan absolute
or a quantity,
or a qualitycf.Alyngton,
being
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedkamenta
On
, ch.derelatiuis
, in:Conti1993(above,n. 2),291-306.
ofrelations
seeConti1993(above,n. 2), 222-9.
Alyngton's
theory
28Cf.Alyngton,
Litteralis
sententia
s. Praedicamenta
etpraedkato,
in:Conti1993
, ch.desubiecto
(above,n. 2),245;ch.desubstantia
, 274.
29Penbygull
wasfrom
Exeterdiocese;he studied
at Oxford,
wherehe wasfellow
of
theExeter
in 1406-07.
He probably
diedat Oxford
in 1420.
Collegein 1399,andrector
toEmden1959(above,n. 1),vol.3, 1455hewrote
thefollowing
treateses:
De
According
Divisio
entis
theOxford
Realists
universalibus,
, andSuper
Porphyrii
Isagogen.
Among
Penbygull
wasthemostfaithful
toWyclif,
sincehisextant
devoted
writings
appearto be essentially
to a defence
and/
or explanation
ofWvclif
's mainphilosophical
theses.
30We possess
someinformation
on thelifeandworks
ofRogerWhelpdale.
He was
bornat Greystoke.
He studied
at Oxford,
wherehe wasfellow
ofBalliolCollegein the
lastdecadeofthefourteenth
thenfellow
ofQueen'sCollegein 1401-02,
century;
provost
ofQueen'sCollegefrom1404to 1420,whenhe becamebishopofCarlisle.
He diedin
1423.According
to Emden1959(above,n. 1),vol.3, 2031he wrotea treatise
on unicommentaries
on Porphyry's
andAristode's
Posterior
versais,
Isagoge
, anda comAnalytics
oflogic(Summulae
pendium
logkales).

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ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

share some, but not all, metaphysicalcomponentparts, and does not

is direcdypresent
requirethat the formconnotedby the predicate-term
in the essence denoted by the subject-term.
Formal predication,on the
contrary,requiressuch a directpresence. If the formconnoted by the
is intrinsicto the nature of the subject,then there is a
predicate-term
case of formalessentialpredication,while if it is extrinsic,then thereis
a formalaccidentalpredication.'Man is an animal' is an instanceof formal essentialpredication;'Socratesis white'is an instanceof formalaccidentalpredication.Moreover,Penbygulland Whelpdale,as did Alyngton,
divideformalaccidentalpredicationintosecundum
motum
and secundum
habitudinem
, but unlikeWyclif,who applied predicationby essence to second
intentionsonly,theyclaim that it holds also when applied to firstintentions.Thus, like Alyngton,theymaintainthat,forinstance,it is possible
to predicateof the universal-man[homoin communi)
the propertyof being
white,if at least one of its individualsis white.In this case, it is necessaryto use a substantivaladjectivein its neuterformas a predicate-term,
because only in this way can it appear that the entityconnotedby the
is not a formdirectlypresentin the subject,but indirectly
predicate-term
attributedto it throughits individualsand in virtueof the partial identitywhich holds between the formof humanityand the singularmen
who instantiateit. Hence, they acknowledgethat the proposition'The
universal-manis (something)white' {'homoin communi
estalbum!)is true,if
at least one existingman is white:31
secundum
essentam
etaliquaestpraedicatio
formalis.
Praedicatio
Aliquaestpraedicatio
secundum
essentam
estquandoresprimarie
estresprimarie
significat
persubiectum
dumtarnen
nullaforma
inclusa
inpreaedicato,
utforma,
significata
perpraedicatum,
inessereisignificatae
utverificetur
datapropositio.
requiritur
primarie
persubiectum
Ut hic 'homocommunis
estalbum'et in consimilibus,
ubipraedicatum
exsistens
adiectivum
nonsubstantivatur
. . . Praedicatio
formalis
estduplex:
persubiectum
31Penbygull,
De universalibus
, ed. Conti1982(above,n. 2), 186-7.See alsoWhelpdale,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus,
in:Sharpe,Quaestio
universalia
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1),
super
190-2:"Praedicatio
secundum
essentam
estduplex:
de termino
et
aliquaenimesttermini
secundum
essentam
termini
de termino
estquandoresprialiquareide re.Praedicatio
mariesignificata
estresprimarie
etnullaforma
perpraedicatum
significata
persubiectum,
connotata
utsic,requiritur
inessereiprimarie
principaliter
perpraedicatum,
significatae
formaliter
etdenominative,
itaquodisteterminus,
utsic,dicat[ur]
rationem
persubiectum
subquapropositio
verificatur.
Praedicatio
secundum
essentam
reide reestquandosubiectuma partereiestpraedicatum,
licetdiversa
sitratiopraedicati
et subiecti,
utSingulare
estuniversale'
. . . Praedicatio
formalis
reide reestquandoratiopraedicati,
hocestforma
inclusa
inpraedicato
velexsistens
uthuiusmodi,
formaliter
inestsubiecto,
ut
praedicatum
'homoestanimal',
'Sortes
estalbus'.Etdividitur
talispraedicatio
inpraedicationem
essentialem
etaccidentalem".

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SHARPE'S
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167

et aliquaformalis
Praedicatio
formalis
essentialis
accidentalis.
aliquaestpraedicatio
inpraedicato,
inexformalis
estquandoforma
inclusa
utforma,
essentialis
requiritur
forreisignificatae
. . . Praedicatio
sistere
essentialiter
etdenominative
persubiectum.
accidentalis
malisaccidentalis
estquandoperpraedicatum
significatur
aliquaforma
reisignificatae
ad verificationem
inexsistere
persubiecquaerequiritur
propositionis
tum;ethocdenominative.
in communi
circauniversalia
, they
Finally,like Wyclifin the Purganserrores
affirmthat there is causal predicationwhen the entitysignifiedby the
is not presentin any way in the entitysignifiedby the
predicate-term
but
subject-term, the real subjecthas been caused by the real predicate.32
Accordingto Penbygulland Whelpdale, formalessentialand formal
accidentalpredicationwould correspondto Aristotle'sessentialand accidental predication.33
But, as a matterof fact,theyagree with Wyclifin
regardingpredicationby essenceas more generalthanformalpredication.
As a consequence,in theirtheoriesthe formalpredicationis a particular
typeof predicationby essence. This means that theyimplicidyrecognize
a singleontologicalpattern,foundedon a sortof partialidentity,as the
basis of everykind of standardphilosophicalstatement(subject,copula,
and formalaccidental
predicate).But in thisway,formalessentialpredication
predication are very differentfrom their Aristotelianmodels, as they
expressdegreesin identityas well as predicationby essence.
32Cf.Penbygull,
De universalibus
istas
, ed. Conti1982(above,n. 2), 188:"Sedpraeter
et nonquamcumque
estdarepraedicationem
secundum
causam;
causam,
praedicationes
Tractatus
'voxestartenuissimus
uthic'diesestlatisolissuper
terrain',
ictus'";
Whelpdale,
deuniversalibus
universalia
, in: Sharpe,Quaestio
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1), 190:
super
"Praedicatio
secundum
causamestduplex:
de termino
et aliquareide
aliquaesttermini
de termino
<est> quandoperpraedicatum
re. Praedicatio
secundum
causamtermini
causareisignificatae
uthaec'diesestlatiosolissuper
significatur
primarie
persubiectum,
a partereiest
terram'.
Praedicatio
secundum
causamreide re estquandopraedicatum
etefficientibus".
causasubiecti.
Et debetistaintelligi
de causismaterialibus
principaliter
33On Aristotle's
Aristotle
onPredication
ofpredication
see: D.W. Hamlyn,
, in:
theory
6 (1961),110-26;
G.E.L.Owen,Inherence
10(1965),
97-105;
, in:Phronesis,
Phronesis,
J.M.E.
Aristotle
onPredication
76 (1967),80-96;
Review,
Moravcsik,
, in:Philosophical
J.Duerlinger,
inAristotle's
in:Phronesis,
15 (1970),pp. 179-203;
Predication
andInherence
J.C.
Categories,
A NewLook
atNonEssential
Predication
intheCategories,
in:TheNewScholasticism,
Kunkei,
17 (1972),107inAristotle's
45 (1971),110-6;B.Jones,
Individuals
, in:Phronesis,
Categories
oftheHistory
inAristotle's
in:Journal
andOntology
23; Ch.I.Stough,
Language
Categories,
R.E.Allen,
Substance
andPredication
inAristotle's
ofPhilosophy,
10(1972),
261-272;
Categories,
- R.M.Rorty
in:E.N. Lee - A.P.D.Mourelatos
andArgument
, Assen1973,
(eds),Exegesis
18(1973),60-70;
S.M.Cohen,Predicable
ofinAristotle's
in:Phronesis,
362-73;
Categories,
totheFirst
in:Phronesis,
20 (1975),
Introduction
FiveChapters
B.Jones,
ofAristotle's
Categories,
as an assertorie
to which'is' functions
and,fora newinterpretation,
146-72;
according
Semantics
andOntology
rather
thanas a copula,L.M. de Rijk,Aristotle:
, vol. 1,
operator
Leiden2002.

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ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

This interpretative
scheme of the nature and kinds of predicationis
a notion of identitythat is necessarilydifferent
on
ultimatelygrounded
fromthe standardone. Accordingto the most common opinion,as it is
summed up by Burleyin his last commentaryon the Categories
(1337),
the logical criteriaforidentityand (read)distinctionare the following:34
ofa iffitis predwithb iffforallx,itis thecasethatx is predicated
a is identical
icatedofb;
of andb is not,
b iffthere
is at leastonez suchthata is predicated
a differs
from
ofa andnotof
is at leastonew suchthatw is predicated
or viceversa
, VEL there
bior viceversa.
From this one can easily conclude that universaisand individualscan
whichcanhave generality,
neverbe the same, at least because universalis
not be predicatedof individuals,and individualsthisness,which cannot
be predicatedof universais.So Penbygull35
put forwardnew criteriafor
betweenthe notion
he
First
of
and
distinction.
all,
distinguishes
identity
and denies that the
of
difference
and
that
of non-identity
(or distinction)
then he affirmsthat
notion of differenceimplies that of non-identity;36
and real identityare logicallycompatible;37
the two notionsof difference
- nonforthese threenotions
finallyhe suggeststhe followingdefinitions
or distinction,
and (absolute)identity:38
identity,difference
in the
F suchthatF is present
withb iffthereis notanyform
a is not-identical
samewayin a andb;
34Cf.W. Burley,
Fraedicamenta
Aristotelis
, cap.deoppositione
, inExpositio
super
Expositio
super
etAristotelis,
ed.Venetiis
Artem
Veterem
1509,fol.44r:"NotaquodexistolocosumiPorphyrii
ad invicem.
veldiversitatem
identitatem
turdoctrina
bonaad cognoscendum
aliquorum
illanonsunt
de aliquode quo nonpraedicatur
Et est:si unumpraedicatur
reliquum,
illa
de reliquo,
de unoquodnonpraedicatur
etsi aliquidpraedicatur
eadem,seddiversa;
de
verepraedicatur
de unoverepraedicatur
nonsuntidem.Et e contrario:
si quicquid
ed. H.-U.Whler,
deuniversalibus,
iliasunteadem".See alsohisTractatus
Leipzig
reliquo,
1999,22.
35Thereis nonewformulation
inWhelpdale's
anddistinction
ofidentity
ofthenotions
and distinction
see Conti1982
On Penbygull
ofidentity
treatise
on universais.
theory
(above,n. 2), 153-6.
36Cf.Penbygull,
De universalibus
, ed. Conti1982(above,n. 2), 190.
37Cf.Penbygull,
De universalibus
, 190.
38Cf.Penbygull,
De universalibus
, 184and 189-90:"Item,si aliquaduosint,et aliquid
iliadifferunt;
sedaliquidinestformaliter
inestuniquoda reliquoremovetur,
communi,
a singulari;
et suumsingulare
ergouniversale
quia communicabilitas,
quodremovetur
huiusverbi
utpatetperexponentem
etperconsequens
unumnonestreliquum,
differunt;
. . . Ad quintum,
cumarguitur
'si aliquaduosinetc.,dicitur
'differ.
quodmultipliciter
utDeusethomo.
Primo
modoaliquadifferunt
dicuntur
plusquamgenere,
aliquadifferre.
radonem
uthomoetquantitas.
Et aliquasecundum
Et aliquadifferunt
differunt,
genere,

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169

in a but
F suchthatF is directly
from
b iffthereis at leasta form
a differs
present
notin b;
in
withb iffforall forms
a is (absolutely)
identical
Fi itis thecasethatF is present
inthesame
a iffitis present
wayin b.
are strongerthan the common ones forreal
The criteriafornon-identity
two thingscan be qualifiedas non-identicalif and onlyifthey
distinction:
of difference
to
different
categories.On the otherside,the definition
belong
does not exclude the possibilitythat two thingsdifferfromeach other
items.Thus, thereare degreesin disbut share one or more constitutive
tinction,and what is more, the degree of distinctionbetweentwo things
can be read as the inversemeasureof theirpartialidentity.For instance,
if we compare the list of both substantialand accidentalitemsthat constituteSocrateswith those that make up the universal-man{homoin communi
), it is evidentthat Socrates and the universal-mandifferfromeach
other,since there are formsthat belong to Socrates but do not belong
to the universal-manand viceversa.It is also evident,however,that the
two listsare identicalfor a large section- that is, that Socrates and the
universal-man,consideredfromthe point of view of theirmetaphysical
composition,are partiallythe same.
Such is the historicalframeworkagainst which Sharpe develops his
own ontology.
Sharpens
Ontology
As is the case forthe otherOxfordRealists,the core of Sharpe's ontology
lies in his theoryof universais.Indeed, he is a medieval realist,since he
defendsthe extra-mentalexistenceof universais:39
in mente
et extramentem.
Undedicoquodestdareuniversalia
et
et sicuniversale
formales
suntdiversae;
tarnen
estalia,rationes
quandouna essentia
et unacumhocestidentisolumdifferunt,
Sed aliquaratione
differunt.
suumsingulare
ratioetvoluntas,
etsicdifferunt
tasinsingulari
memoria,
essentia;
quaesunthaecanima,
habitaconceditur
utplacetpluribus
quoduniversale
Qua distinctione
ponere.
probanter
cumarguitur
sic'ergounumnonestreliquum',
Et ulterius,
differunt.
et suumsingulare
sedhocverad unameiusexponentem;
ab exposito
necarguitur
negatur
consequentia,
differt
a
universale
utcommunicabilitate,
sic'aliquadifferentia,
debetresolvi
bum'differ
et
universali
inestformaliter
sic:communicabilitas
Et antecedens
suosingulari'.
probatur
Velsic,etbrevius:
differunt.
etsuumsingulare
nonsicinestsuosingulari,
ergouniversale
et
universali
ergouniversalie
quodnonsicinestdatosingulari,
aliquodensinestformaliter
differunt".
datumsingulare
39Sharpe,
universalia
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1),68.
Quaestio
super

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D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO

However,his approach to the whole mattercan be definedas "analytic",

since he seems to believe that <1> any ontologyhas to be constructed
in relationto the resolutionof semanticproblems,<2> any philosophical
explanationof realityhas to be preceeded by a semanticexplanationof
the functionof our language, and <3> that thereis not a close correof language and the elespondencebetweenthe elementsand structures
ments and structuresof the world. So Sharpe distinguishestwo main
kinds of universais:universalforms,like humanity,really presentin a
of things,and universalsigns,both mentaland extra-mental,
multiplicity
which we referto real universaisand/or signifysomething
means
of
by
in a universalmanner:40
velsunthabivelsignorm,
ethocrerum
velsuntintentionalia,
inmente
Universalia
vel
extramentem
Sed universalia
intellectiones.
sicutuniversales
tualiavelactualia,
universales
sunttermini
cuiusmodi
inmente,
illisuniversalibus
suntsignasubordinata
taliasigna,de quibusiamlocutum
contra
velsuntresdistinctae
velvocales,
scripti
est.Et de istisestquaestio
principalis.
of thisdivisionis an analyOn the otherhand, the theoreticalframework
sis of the various meaningsof the term'universal5.Accordingto Sharpe,
they are six, since we can count the followingentitiesuniversal:<1>
of effects;<2> the ideas in God;
those causes that have a multiplicity
both affirmative
<3> the universalquantifier;<4> universalpropositions,
and negative;<5> universalforms,or real universais;and <6> universal signs:41
invead praesens
multis
Estergonotandum
sufficit,
modis,
quantum
quoduniversale
incausando,
etsicdicimus
Unomodosumitur
nitur
aliquas
prouniversali
acceptum.
universale
modoaccipitur
. . . Secundo
etaliquasparticulares.
causasesseuniversales
univeridea.. . . Tertiomodoaccipitur
causaliuniversali,
quaevocatur
proratione
uninatofacerepropositionem
universaliter
saleprosyncategoremate
distributivo,
in propositione.
a partesubiecti
dumponitur
versalem
pro
Quartomodoaccipitur
in essendo,
. . . Quintomodocapitur
universali.
quodest
prouniversali
propositione
homines
inqua omnes
Et sichumanitas,
communicatum.
eisrealiter
ideminmultis,
dicitur
Sextomodoetultimo
in essendo.
universalie
dicitur
aliquodesse
conveniunt,
vel
Et istomodointentio
velsupponendo.
in praedicando,
universalie
significando
universalie.
dicitur
commune
signum
coincideswith the being of theirown indiThe being of real universalis
because of
viduals,so that real universaiscan be said to be everlasting,

40Sharpe,
universalia
, 68; seealso50.
Quaestio
super
41Sharpe,
universalia
, 49-50.
Quaestio
super

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SHARPE'S
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171

the continuoussuccessionof theirindividuals,and reallyidenticalwith

them.42
On the otherside,universaisand individualsare formally
different
formalprinciples,and
fromeach other,as theyhave distinctconstitutive
thereforedifferent
The most importantamong the universal
properties.43
are
mental
which
are both acts of intellection(intellec
universais,
signs
tiones
), throughwhich our mind grasp the natureof universalforms,and
), throughwhich it connectsgeneral names with the
concepts (;intentiones
Since theyare not univocallypredicatedof
thingsto which theyrefer.44
theirinferiors,
the transcendentais
(ens,aliquid resetc.) are not universais
in the strictsense of the term(proprie)
5 Universalformsare of fivedissunt
maneries
universalium
tinctkinds (quinqu
formarum
), dependingon the
different
ways in which theyare participatedby singularsubstances:genMental conceptsand lin, and accidents.46
era, species,differences,
propria
in
a
are
universais
derivative
guisticsigns
way, because of what they
There are not real universaiscorresponddirectlyor indirectlysignify.47
') or 'sweet' ('fete'):48
ing to common accidentaltermslike 'white' ('album
Tertiaetultima
conlusio
ad praesens
estista:nullasuntuniversalia
concretive
acciilliusconcludentalia
ex parterei,suissingularibus
communicabilia.
Undeintentio
concretis
sionis
estquodististerminis
scilicet
accidentalibus,
'album',
'dulce','risibile',
ex partereipraeter
formas
etc.,noncorrespondent
appropriate
aliquauniversalia
etc.
connotatas;
putaquodnonestdarea partereialbumin communi,
The existenceof such real universaiswould entail a twofoldabsurdity:
the possibilityof <1> a directinherenceof accidentalformsin universal substancesand <2> of a unifiedentitycompoundedof substanceand
accident,which would thereforebe neithersubstancenor accident.49
As a consequence,Sharpe's positionon the problemof universaiscan
be summed up as follows.<1> Universaisexist in a threefoldway, as
commonnaturesin re, as conceptsin our mind,and as spokenand written
42Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 97 and 105.
Quaestio
super
43Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 91-2.
Quaestio
super
44Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 68-9.
Quaestio
super
45Cf.Sharpe,
ex
universa
transcendens
lia,74: "Licetaliquodsitcommune
Quaestio
super
universale".
natura
tarnen
taleestproprie
rei,nullum
46Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 81-2.
Quaestio
super
47Cf.Sharpe,
correlane
universalia
, 82: "Ex illaconclusione
Quaestio
sequitur
quod
super
inestsignoratione
etsignasuntsecundarie
universalia.
Patet:namquodcumque
conceptus
illudsecundarie
sibiinest;
sedesseuniversale
inestsignoratione
significati;
ergo
significati,
etc.".
48Sharpe,
universalia
, 83.
Quaestio
super
49Cf.Sharpe,
83-4.See also67-8,72-3,and 140-1.
universalia,
Quaestio
super

11:37:09 AM

172

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

linguisticsigns. <2> Real universaisare naturallyapt to be presentin

many thingsas theirmain metaphysicalcomponents.<3> Real universais have no being outside the being of theirindividuals.<4> Mental
universaisare partiallycaused in our mind by the commonnaturesexisting outside.This theoryof universaisis obviouslymodelledon the canons
of moderateRealism,nevertheless
an importantdifference
markshis position offfromthe most common ones, as exemplifiedby Aquinas' doctrine.Whereas accordingto St Thomas universaisexistinpotentia
outside
the mind and in actuonly in the mind, accordingto Sharpe's account
theyexist in actuoutside the mind, since theirbeing is the same as the
being of individuals,which is actual. For Sharpe an universalis in actu
if and onlyif thereis at least an individualin whichit is present.Therefore,our mind does not give actualityto universaisbut a separatemode
of existence.
As we have already seen, the descriptionof the relationshipbetween
universaisand individualsin termsof real identityand formaldistinction,
entails <1> that not everything
predicatedof individualscan be directly
attributed
to
their
universais,nor viceversa
, but <2> thatevery{formaliter)
thingpredicatedof individualshas to be in some way or anotherattributed to universaisand viceversa.Therefore,a redefinition
of the standard
kindsofpredication
was required.Like Alyngton,
and Whelpdale,
Penbygull,
modifies
with
Sharpe
Wyclif'stheory.Agreeing
Alyngton,but differing
fromPenbygulland Whelpdale, he divides readpredication,which is a
real relationbetween two entitiesof the world,into formalpredication
and predicationby essence(praedicatio
essentialia
velsecun( praedicatio
formalis)
dumessentiam
habitudinal
and causal predicationsThese are
), removing
not homogeneouswith the firsttwo, since theydo not not require any
kindof identitybetweenthe entitiessignified
by the subjectand predicate
terms.Predicationby essence <1> shows a partial identitybetweenthe
and thepredicate-thing,
whichsharesome metaphysical
comsubject-thing
ponentparts,and <2.1> does not require(or even <2.2> excludes)that
the formconnotedby the predicate-term
is directlypresentin the essence
the
Formal
signified
by
subject-term.
predication,on the contrary,
requires
such a directpresence:50
Sed ad hocintelligendum
scirequomodo
formalis
et essentialis
oportet
praedicatio
Proquo sciendum
illasduaspraedicationes
distinguuntur.
quodaliquidistinguunt
50Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 89-90.
super

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SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
ANDSEMANTICS
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173

sicutinferius
et superius,
itavidelicet
formalis
sitessentialis
quodomnispraedicatio
sednonecontra.
Etaliquidistinguunt
illaspraedicationes
sicutduasspecies
disparatas
Seddeiliononestmagnacura.Loquendo
secundum
praedicationis.
modm,
primm
ex partereiestessentialis,
talipraedicatione
quaelibet
praedicatio
quiain qualibet
idemveleadementitas
velessentia
estsubiectum
et preadicatum,
sicutin qualibet
sibidebitesubordinata
idemveleademressignificatur
praedicatione
signorm
per
subiectum
etpraedicatum.
. . . Sedpraedicatio
formalis
estex partereiquandoultra
illamidentitatem
additur
velimportatum
in
formae
quodpraedicatum
permodum
insitsubiecto
formae
uthic'homo
praedicato
informantis,
permodum
quidditative
estanimai',vel concretive
ut hic 'homoestrisibilis,
rationalis
vel
denominantis,
albus',etc.
Unlike Alyngton,Penbygull,and Whelpdale, however,Sharpe does not
explicitlydivide formalpredicationinto formalessentialand formalaccidentalpredication;moreover,as is evidentfromhis formulations,
he offers
two different
readingsof the distinctionbetweenformalpredicationand
predicationby essence. Accordingto the common view, predicationby
essence is more general than formalpredication.As a consequence, in
the standardtheoryof the Oxford Realists formalpredicationis a subtypeof predicationby essence. Sharpe introducesanotherinterpretation,
according to which the two kinds of predicationat issue are complementaryand mutuallyexclusive.This happenswhenpredicationby essence
excludes
thatthe formconnotedby the predicate-term
is directly
presentin
the essence signifiedby the subject-term:51
Sed secundo
mododistinguendo
illaspraedicationes
dicendum
estquodpraedicatio
formalis
estutprius,
sedpraedicatio
secundum
essentiam
estquandononesttalis
habitudo
formalis
intersubiectum
et praedicatum,
et tamenpropter
realemidentitatem
inter
illaestibiverapraedicatio.
Although,accordingto thelatterreading,formalpredicationis nota kindof
predicationby essence,thisreadingnevertheless
impliesan interpretation
of the 'is' ofpredicationin termsof identity
a new definition
and, therefore,
of thepair of antonymousnotionsof identity
and difference
(or distinction).
and distinction
combinesthoseof Duns Scotus,52
Sharpe'stheoryof identity
51Sharpe,
universalia,
, 91.
Quaestio
super
52On Scotus'
formal
distinction
see:M.J.Grajewski,
TheFormal
Distinction
,
ofDunsScotus
D.C. 1944;R.G.Wengert,
TheDevelopment
Doctrine
Distinction
Washington
ofthe
oftheFormal
intheLectura
DunsScotus
49 (1965),571-87;A.B.Wolter,
, in:The Monist,
primaofJohn
TheFormal
Distinction
DunsScotus
1265-1965
, in:J.K.Ryan& B.M. Bonansea
,
(eds),John
D.C. 1965,45-60;M. McCordAdams,Ockham
onIdentity
andDistinction
, in:
Washington
Fransciscan
36 (1976),5-74,on 25-43;A.B.Wolter,
ThePhilosophical
Studies,
of
Theology
DunsScotus
,3ed. M. McCordAdams,Ithaca& London1990,27-48;A. Bck,The
John
Structure
Formal
Distinction
andP. Prez-Ilzarbe
and
, in:I. Angelelli
ofScotus
(eds),Medieval
Renaissance
inSpain
, Hildesheim
2000,411-38.
Logic

11:37:09 AM

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ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

Wyclif53and Penbygull.<1> Like Penbygull,he considersidentityand

as the two possibleinversemeasuresof the coindistinction
(or difference)
cidence of the metaphysicalcomponentsof two given entities:54
veldifferentia
habent
se quasiprivet diversitas,
convenientia
et distinctio
Identitas
in quibusquanteunumoppositorum
estmaiusvel intensius
tante
ativeopposita,
velremissius.
alterum
estminus
formaland read
<2> He speaks of formaland real (or essentiell)
identity,
and <2.1> statesthatformaliden(or difference),
(or essential)distinction
tityis strongerthan read (or essential)identity,since the formerentails
is strongerthan formal
the latter,while,on the contrary,real difference
the
former:55
since
the
latter
is
entailed
distinction,
by
unaidentitas
dici
Ad probationem
quoddupliciter
potest
possetdici,ad maiorem
Sedde intensiva
videtur
maioralia,scilicet
extensive
etintensive.
magisad proposiscilicet
tum.Ideoiuxtaillamdicitur
minorem,
consequenter
negando
quodidentitas
name contra
realisvelessentialis
estmaiorquamformalis;
est,eo quodformalis
sicutex opposito
differentia
actualiter
includit
identitatem
realemet none contra,
differentiam
veldistinctionem
sednone conessentialis
actualiter
includit
formalem,
'illasuntformaliter
verso.Undesicutsequitur
idem,ergorealiter
idem',sednone
'iliasuntrealiter
disitapermutatim
distincta,
converso,
sequitur
ergosuntformaliter
et none converso.
tincta',
<3> Finally,he admits degrees in formaddistinction,as he recognizes
two different
types,the firstof which comes veryclose to thatproposed
in
his Ordinationwhile the second is drawn fromWyclif's
Scotus
by
de universalibus
.57The firsttypeof formaldistinction
holds among
Tractatus
thingssuch as the intellectivefacultiesof the soul, whereas the second
holds between such thingsas the essence of the soul and its intellective
facultiesand a species and its individuals:58
ingradibus.
formalis
consistt
Namquaedam
ex hocdistinguuntur
forSeddistinctio
sedtarnen
illaconmaliter
eorum
estinrectode altero
quodneutrum
praedicabile,
velindistincto,
venantintertio
sedtarnen
eorum
formaliter
singulari
quodneutrum
voliestquid[am]subsistens.
Et istomodose habent
intellectiva
etpotentia
potentia
53On Wyclif's
formulation
ofthe"family"
notions
offormal
distinction
seeSpade1985
Conti1997(above,n. 3), 158-63.
(above,n. 3),xx-xxxi;
54Sharpe,
universalia
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1),92.
Quaestio
super
55Sharpe,
universalia
, 91-2.
Quaestio
super
56Cf.DunsScotus,
vol.II, 356-7;Ordinatio
Ordinato
I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4,ed.Vaticana,
vol.VII, 483-4.
II, d. 3, p. 1,q. 6, ed. Vaticana,
57Cf.Wyclif,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, eh.4, ed. Mueller
(above,n. 3),90-2.
58Sharpe,Quaestio
libros
De anima
intellectiva
, q. II: "utrum
super
potentia
distinguatur
ab essentia
NewCollege,
ms.238,fol.236r-v.
animae",
Oxford,

11:37:09 AM

SHARPE'S
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ANDSEMANTICS
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175

tivaad ipsamanimam
intellectivam.
Et consimiliter
habent
se,secundum
quosdam,
- quodest
unitas
etventas
scilicet
entisincommuni
bonitas,
transcendentis,
respectu
multum
Sedaliquaexhocdistinguuntur
formaliter
estprediprobabile.
quodaliquid
cabilede unoquodnonde altero,
licetunumde alteroin rectopraedicetur,
et sic
identificantur.
Et sicconcedatur
animaeet suapotentia
quodessentia
distinguuntur
sicutconceditur
in aliamateria
et suumindividuum
distinformaliter;
quodspecies
et a quibusdam
etpersona,
sicutet ipsa
formaliter;
guuntur
theologis
quodessentia
formaliter.
attributa,
distinguuntur
The two different
sets of conditionsforthe formaldistinctioncan be formalized as follows:
1. two entitiesx and y are formally
distinctiff<1> both of themare constitutive
elementsof the same reality,but <2> neitherof themcan exist
of the other.
by itself,nor <3> is part of the definitedescription
2. two entitiesx and y are formally
distinctiff<1> thereis at least one z
such that is predicatedof x and not ofj, or viceversa
, but <2> x and
y are reallyidentical,as one is directlypredicatedof the otherqua its
main intrinsic
metaphysical
component.
real identity,
whichis presupposedby the formaldistinction,
Accordingly,
has to be definedin these terms:59
a is reallyidentical
withb iffbothof themare constitutive
or mateelements,
rialparts,
ofthesamereality,
VEL oneofthemis direcdy
oftheother
predicated
in thecategorial
line(thatis, quaitsmainintrinsic
quaitssuperior
metaphysical
component).
As a result,Sharpe's world consistsof finitebeings (thatis, "things"like
men, horses,stonesetc.),reallyexistingoutsidethe mind,made up of an
individualsubstanceand a host of formalentities(common substantial
naturesand accidentalforms,both universaland singular)existingin it
and throughit, since none of theseformalentitiescan existby themselves.
They are real only in so far as theyconstituteindividualsubstancesor
are presentin individualsubstancesqua theirproperties.Specificsubstantial
59Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
n. 1),98: "ProquoscienQuaestio
, ed.Conti1990(above,
super
dumquoddupliciter
dicuntur
deductaoperatione
intellectus
concreati,
aliquarealiter,
venire.
Unomodoquiauniuntur
velidentificantur
in aliquoquodestcommune
utrique
et a quolibet
illorum
distinctum
formaliter
velsecundum
et istomodoomne
rationem;
homines
in speciehumana.
conveniunt
Aliomodoconveniunt
singulares
aliquarealiter,
velexnatura
velidentificantur
essenrei,quiasicuniuntur
quodunumestalterum
propter
tialem
habitudinem
inferioritatis
velsuperioritatis
uniusad alterum;
et hocmodohomo
communis
et homosingularis
conveniunt.
Et haecconvenientia
videtur
essemaiorquam
praecedens".

11:37:09 AM

176

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

natures(or essences) can be conceived fromtwo points of view: intenand extensionally{in concreto
sionally(in abstracto)
). Viewed intensionally,
specificsubstantialnaturesare nothingbut the set of essentialproperties
that individualsubstancesare to instantiate,but consideredwithoutany
referenceto such instantiations.
Viewed extensionally,
specificsubstantial
naturesare those same formsconceivedof as instantiatedby at least one
singularsubstance.For instance,human nature consideredintensionally
is humanity[humanit
the universal-man(homoin communi
as), extensionally
).
is
a
or
more
Humanity properly form,
accurately,the essentialprinciple
of a substantial
form,thatis, somethingexistentially
incompleteand depenis thissame formconsideredaccordingto its own
dent;the universal-man
mode of being, and thereforeas a sort of existentially
autonomousand
like
independententity.60
Consequently,
Wyclif,Sharpe holds that a formal universalactuallyexistsoutside the mind if at least one individuell
instantiatesit, so that withoutindividualscommon natures(or essences)
are not reallyuniversais.61
This means thatthe relationshipbetweencommon naturesand singularsis ultimatelybased on individuation,since no
actual universality
and no instantiation
is possiblewithoutindividuation.
On this subject Sharpe seems to accepts the essentialsof Aquinas' docthat< 1> the universal-man
is compoundedof both
trine,since he affirms
common matterand formand that <2> matteras affectedby dimensive
subquantityand other accidentalproperties(materia
quantaet accidentibus
strata)is the very principleof individuation,since it causes the passage
from the level of universaisto that of singulars.62
Thus, according to
individuation
means
how
a multiplicity
of
Sharpe, explaining
explaining
individualscan be obtainedfroma singlespecificnature,the problemat
issue being the dialecticaldevelopmentfromone to many and not the
passage fromabstractto concrete.
Sharpe's world countsmany typesof entities:universaland individual
substancesand accidents(likehomoin communi
and Socrates and the general formof whitenessand this particularformof whiteness),universal
abstractsubstantialessences(likehumanity),
universaland individualsubstantialforms(like the human soul in general and the soul of Socrates),
and the
general and individualdifferences
(like the universal-rationality
rationality
properto Socrates) each one characterizedby its own mode
60Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 102.
super
61Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 105-6.
super
62Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 137-9.
super

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ONTOLOGY
SHARPE'S
JOHANNES

177

of being. This world is certainlyvery complex, but its complexityis

exceeded by complexityin language. Sharpe denies that thereis a close
correspondencebetweenlanguage and the world,as he believesthat our
thoughtis caused by the world,and our language by our thought,and
the relationbetween causes and effectsis a relationof the one to the
many.
ofMeaning
Theory
Sharpens
The basic idea of the common,medieval realisttheoryof meaningwas
between
derive fromontologicaldifferences
that semanticclassifications
the signifiedobjects. So, accordingto this approach, the simple expressions of our language (i.e. names) are distinctfromthe complex expressions (i.e. sentences)by virtueof theirown significata
, that is, by virtueof
In fact, the objects
refer.
kinds of objects to which they
the different
signifiedby complex expressionsare compoundsof at least two of those
signifiedby simpleexpressionsand a relationof identity(or non-identity,
in the case of a true negativesentence).A simpleobject is an item in a
category,that is, eithera singularsubstance,a substantialform,or an
accidentalform.Furthermore,
everysimpleexpressionof our language is
like a label that names just oneobject in the world,but whereas proper
names and singularexpressionslabel individuals(that is, token-objects),
which are the
generadtermslabel common natures(thatis, type-objects),
of that set of individualswhich instantimain metaphysicalconstituents
ate them.For instance,the generadexpression'man' labels and can stand
foreach and everyman only because it primarilysignifiesthe universal
formof humanityqua presentin each and everyman as the main constitutive
principleof theiressence.
As we have already said, Sharpe rejectsthe common realistcriteria
forthe generalityof termsand accepts the core of nominalistcriticisms.
In his opinion,to correspondto a common naturereallyexistingin the
conditionforbeing a genworldis no longerthe necessaryand sufficient
eral term.He thinksthat not only those termswhich signifya common
nature existingoutside the intellecthave to be viewed as common,but
also those which signifyuniversally:63
a
vocalium
scilicet
extramentem
Dicoquodsicutcommunitas
etc.,oritur
signorm
rerum
a communitate
oritur
itacommunitas
communitate
conceptuum
conceptuum,
63Sharpe,
universalia
, 69.
Quaestio
super

11:37:09 AM

178

D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO
inposterioribus
maiorem
essemultiplicitatem
ad extra.Et ideosicutcontingit
quam
itanonoportet
ineffectibus
inprioribus,
sicutmaiorestmultiplicitas
quamincausis,
in communitate
rerum
ad extraquantaestin communiquodsittantamultiplicitas
Et ideomaleimaginantur
ad placitum
velsignorm
tateconceptuum
impositorum.
suipriomnem
communitatem
signiessea communitate
quodoportet
qui dicunt
mariisignificati.

What is more, accordingto him, signifying

universally(thatis, signifying
of thingsdisa unifiedconceptwhich,in its turn,refersto a multiplicity
is
most
of
the
a
similar
mode
at
least
importantcondibeing),
playing
tion for semanticuniversality:64
maxime
facitad cometcommuniter
illimitate
Undepatetquodmodussignificandi
munitatem
signorm.
Nevertheless,other principlesof Sharpe's semanticsare similar to the
most importantfeaturesof Burley'ssemantics.Thus, Sharpe maintains
a comthat <1> abstractterms,such as 'humanity'or 'whiteness',signify
mon form,which is part of the essentialnatureof many individuals,and
that <2> concreteacciwhich has the same kind of existenceas them,65
dental termsdo not signifysimple categorialitemsbut aggregatescomand
posed of an individualsubstanceand a singularaccidental form,66
a
truth
if
if
of
real
it
is
the
a
is
true
and
<3>
sentence
that
only
sign
thatis, describeshow thingsare in the world.67
complexe
significabile),
(iVeritas
In Sharpe's opinion,common naturesreallyexistingin the world are
causes <1> of our acts of intellection(;intellectiones
) by which we grasp
are the semanintentiones
which
them,and <2> of the mentalconcepts(;
)
tic contentssignifiedby spoken (and written)terms.In theirturn,intelare like causes in relationto spoken and written
lectiones
and intentiones
terms.Still,neitherare our acts of intellectionand mentalconceptsuniversalbecause of the common natures,nor are our spoken (and written)
In otherwords,there
and intentiones.
termsuniversalbecause of intellectiones
is not a close isomorphismbetweenthe world,our thought,and our language, but only a loose connection:68
64Sharpe,
universalia
, 71. See also 129-30.
Quaestio
super
65Cf.Sharpe,
71-2.
universalia,
Quaestio
super
66Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 83-4,and 140-1.
Quaestio
super
67Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 131-2.
Quaestio
super
68Sharpe,Quaestio
in
universalia
, 68-9.See alsop. 71: "Sed quoadresad extra,
super
communitas
estlongepaucior
etoriginaliter
communitas,
quamin
reperitur
quibusprimo
velsignis".
conceptibus

11:37:09 AM

SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
ANDSEMANTICS
JOHANNES

179

In notitiam
illorum
universalium
<i.e. universalium
extramentem>
ex
pervenimus
notitia
universalium
et e contra.
Et ratione
illiusprovenit
multis
signorm
deceptio,
nullum
terminm
essecommunem
nisisibicorrespondeat
quodcredunt
aliquidex
- quoddicopropter
sisitterminus
habens
actualia
tides
partereicommune,
supposita
terminos
etc.Et ratione
illiusponunt
extragenuset
'chymaera',
aliquacommunia
et illorum
in genere
aliquain genere;
aliquasuntessentialia,
quaesignificantur
per
terminos
abstractos
vel concretos
et aliquasuntaccidentalia,
substantiales,
quae
concretos
utalbumin communi
etc.Sedilla
accidentales,
significantur
perterminos
universalium
videtur
essetracta
a posteriori,
scilicet
a multitudine
multiplicitas
signormcommunium;
et ideononreputo
earnsatissecuram,
cumpriusnaturaliter
sit
inrebusquaminsignis,
universalitas
etetiamquiasignapossunt
essecommunia
aliis
modisquamab universalitate
significatorum.
kinds of general (or
Thus, accordingto Sharpe, there are six different
universal)expressions,both spoken and written,four kinds of common
mentalconcepts,and threeways in which an extra-mentalformcan be
commonin relationto its supposita
and subiecta.
Among the simpleexpressions,those are universalthat: <1> universallysignifya common nature
reallyexistingin the world (in re), like the term'humanity';<2> universally connote a common nature really existingin the world, without
it, like the term'white' ('album
directlysignifying
'), which refersto white
thingsand connotesthe formof whiteness;<3> do not referto anything
really existingin the world, but which are correlatedwith a universal
positiveconcept,like the terms'void' and 'chimaera'; <4> correspondto
no common naturereallyexistingin the worldbut simplyto a common,
of thingscan
trans-categorial
negativeconceptunderwhich a multiplicity
be collected,such as 'individual','singular',and 'person', to which corresponda conceptequivalentto the negationof the notionof being common; and thisin two veryimproperways (valdeimproprie
): <5> equivocal
termsas such, since they are connectedwith a multiplicity
of different
like
'this
notions,and <6> demonstrative
pronouns,
(one)' ('Aoc'),when
used to suppositfor a common nature,even thoughtheycan signifyin
a singularmanner (discreti)
only.69
As is evident,Sharpe's analysisof the typesof universality
forlinguistic termsis based on two distinctbut compatiblecriteria:<1> the existence of a common nature directlyor indirectlysignifiedby them,and
- the latter
<2> the universalmode of signifying
being more important
than the former.Thus, based on the satisfactionof these two criteria,

69Gf.Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 69-71.
super

11:37:09 AM

180

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

Sharpe himselfreducesthe precedingdivisionof the kindsof universality

to a threefoldpartition:<1> termsthat signifyin a universalmode a
common nature existingin re and thus are properlycommon, such as
'Aomo';<2> termsthat signifyin a universalmode but do not referto
any common nature in re and thus are common in a less proper way,
and persona!
such as 'chymaera
; finally,<3> termsthat do not signifyin
a universalmode and thus are common in an improperway whenever
' '
they referto a common nature existingin re, such as hoc and other
demonstrative
pronouns:70
Undeposset
subtrimembri
divisione
diciquodsignorm
communium
aliudestcommuneex partesignificati
et modisignificandi
simul,ut 'homo';aliudex modo
ut'chymaera'
vel'persona';
etaliudex partesignificati
tantum,
tantum,
significandi
utly'hoc',etc.Et primus
modusestproprius,
secundus
minus
et tertius
proprius,
maxime
improprius.
In turn,mental conceptsare common in fourways only,corresponding
to the firstfourwaysof universality
terms,
peculiarto spoken(and written)
since there are no universalconceptsthat correspondto demonstrative
pronounsor equivocal termsas such:71
in mente
Sed quoadconceptus
dicitur
in communiquodnontantemultiplicantur
reipureaequivocum
et communem,
sicutest
tate;namnonestdareconceptum
extra
mentem.
Similiter
etiam
estquodtalibus
demonsignum
probabile
pronominibus
rescommunes
strantibus
noncorrespondet
communis
aliusa conceptu
terconceptus
miniproprie
nisiconceptus
communis,
signi.
On the otherhand, a readform(or nature)is common <1> intrinsically
and quidditatively(;intrinsece
et quidditative
and qualita), <2> intrinsically
intrinsece
et
or
<3>
and
),
qualitative
extrinsically denominatively
tively(
(extrin
seceetdenominative).
Abstractsubstantialforms,like humanity,are common
in the firstway only, since they are real exclusivelyqua parts of the
essence of individuell
substances.Essentialdifferences,
like rationality,
are
common in the firstway when consideredin relationto theirsingulars,
like the rationality
of Socrates or thatof Plato, but in the second way in
relationto the individualsubstances,which are theirultimatesubstrates
of existence.Universalaccidentalforms,like whiteness,are common in
the firstway in relation to their own singulars,like the whitenessof

70Sharpe,
universalia
, 71.
Quaestio
super
71Sharpe,
universalia
, 71.
Quaestio
super

11:37:09 AM

ANDSEMANTICS
SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
JOHANNES

181

Socratesor Plato, and in the thirdway in relationto the individualsubstancesin which theirsingularsinhere.72
As a consequence,withinSharpe's semanticsystem,concreteaccidenare neithersimplenor
tal terms(like 'white' or 'father'),whose significata
items
nor truthssignifiable
neither
that
is,
categorial
compositeobjects,
a
in a complex way (i.e. by a sentence),are thirdkind of expression
betweenthose that are simple (nouns) and complex (sentences).In fact,
as we have already seen, Sharpe affirmsthat concreteaccidental terms
do not signifysimple objects,but aggregatescompounded of substance
and accidentalform.Such aggregateslack numericalunityand hence do
not fall into any of the ten categories,for theyare not properlybeings
(entia).For thisreason,concreteaccidentalterms,althoughsimpleexpressions froma merelygrammaticalpoint of view, are not names. The two
metaphysicalcomponentsof such aggregates(i.e., individual substance
and singularaccidentalform)are relatedto the concreteaccidentalterm
in the followingway: althoughthe concreteaccidentaltermconnotesthe
accidentalform,this latteris not its directsignification
, so that the concreteaccidentaltermcan suppositforthe substanceonly.In otherwords,
the concreteaccidentaltermslabel substancesby means of the accidental formsfromwhichtheydraw theirname, so thattheyname substances
of an extrinsicform.73
only qua bearers (subiecta)
betweengeneralnames of the catThis factaccountsforthe difference
substantial
concrete
of
substance
terms),like 'man', and con(or
egory
crete accidentalterms.The formthat general names of the categoryof
substanceprincipallysignifyis really identicalwith the substancesthat
theylabel. Hence, in this case, the name itselfof the formcan be used
in
as a name of the substance.This obviouslyimpliesa slightdifference
'humani
as
such
substantial
concrete
and
absctract
between
terms,
meaning
'. While 'humanity'is not the name of the formconsidered
tas' and 'homo
in its totality,but the name of the essentialprincipleof the formonly,
that is, of the intensionalcontentcarriedby the term 'man', this latter
elementof
term signifiesthe substantialformconsideredas constitutive
instantiate
that
substances
the reality(esse)of a certainset of individual
it. As a consequence,accordingto Sharpe, 'man is humanity'('homoest
humanitas
') is a well formedand true sentence,since both subject and
the same entity,but 'whiteis whiteness'('albumestalbedo')
predicatesignify
72Cf.Sharpe,
71-2.
universalia,
Quaestio
super
73Cf.Sharpe,
universalia
, 72.
Quaestio
super

11:37:09 AM

182

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

is not, since 'white'does not directlysignify

the accidentalform,but only
the substratein which it inheresas the bearer of that form.Therefore,
it cannot stand for such a formin any sentence.74
Thus, Sharpe refuses
to followthe common opinion about the possible kinds of supposition
proper to the concreteaccidental terms,accordingto which a concrete
accidentalterm,like 'album!can suppositfor < 1> the substrateof inherence of the accidentalformthat it connotes(suppositio
personalis
), or <2>
the accidental formitself,that is, the whiteness{suppositio
abstractiva
), or
<3> the aggregatecomposedof the individualsubstance,whichplays the
role of the substrateof the form,and the singularaccidentalformat issue
concretiva
{suppositio
:).75
By limitingthe kindsof suppositionproperto concreteaccidentalterms
to the personal suppositionalone, Sharpe goes againstthe developments
of semanticsin his time.The same independenceand originality
of thought
in
his
solutionto the problemof the semanticstatusof termsof
appears
- a
second intentionsuch as 'individual'or 'singular'
question that was
in
controversial
Oxford
at
the
end
of
the
fourteenth
and the beginvery
of
the
fifteenth
centuries.
ning
Accordingto the OxfordRealists,a common termis always matched
by a common natureexistingin re, by whichit can referto a multiplicity
of things.Therefore,since the term'individual'appears to be common,
as it can stand fora multiplicity
of individuadthings,it would signifyan
extra-mental
commonnaturepresentin them.As a result,we would have
to admit the existenceof an individualcommon nature,whichwould be
a paradoxical entitypresentin all the individualsqua cause and principle
of theirbeing individuals.
The mostcommonway of avoidingsuch a paradox was thatproposed
on the Categories
by Alyngtonin his commentary
, whichwas thenaccepted
and repeated by Penbygull76
and Whelpdale77in theirtreatiseson universais.Accordingto Alyngton,termslike 'individual'have to be consideredas singularexpressions;moreprecisely,theyare "range-narrowed"

74Gf.Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 72-3.
super
75Cf.forinstance
De unwersalibus
, ed. Conti1982(above,n. 2), 196-7;
Penbygull,
John
Problema
libello
in:Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
Tarteys,
correspondem
Porphyria
, ed. Conti
super
1990(above,n. 1),Appendix
see Conti1990(above,n. 1),
III, p. 175.On thissubject
328-30.
76Cf.Penbygull,
De unwersalibus
, ed. Conti1982(above,n. 2), 194-5.
77Cf.Whelpdale,
Tractatus
deunwersalibus
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1),194-5.

11:37:09 AM

SHARPE'S
ANDSEMANTICS
ONTOLOGY
JOHANNES

183

intellectus
), like 'this man', because theyidentifya
expressions(a limitatione
a
referent
as
member
of
a given set of individuals.In fact,like
singular
'
other
any
"range-narrowed"
expression,the term individuum?
presupposes
a generalconcept(the conceptof being),the range of whichis narrowed
by an act of our intellectto just a unique object among beings,or more
to one objectthatis not common.78
precisely,
Sharpe arguesthatAlyngton's
answer goes against linguisticusage {communis
modusloquendi
) as well as
If Alyngtonwere right,thenthe followestablishedfacts{ratioexperimentalis).
that
would
admit,would be formallyincorrect:
ing argument,
everyone
manruns(homo
curdi)
andnottheuniversal-man
communis)
(etnonhomo
an individual
manruns(ergo
homo
curt
therefore
),
singularis
just like this otherone:
manruns(homo
currit)
andnottheuniversal-man
(etnonhomo
communis)
therefore
Socrates
runs(ergo
Sortes
currit).
The reasonis thatthe syntagm'an individualman' {'homo
') would
singularis
be a singularterm standingpreciselyfor only one individual,just like
it is a fact that anyone can understand
'Socrates' ('Sortes
'). Furthermore,
this sentence'an individualman runs' {'homosingularis
currit)even without knowingwho the man who is runningis- which would be, on the
contrary,a necessaryrequisiteaccordingto Alyngton'stheory.Therefore,
Sharpe regardssecofndintentionsof thiskind as common:79
velconceptus
'individuuum'
Et ad confirmationem,
quodilleterminus
qua arguitur
veltermini
est
estcommunis;
sedomniscommunitas
sibicorrespondens
conceptus
Unomodo,secunsuisignificati;
dupliciter
responden.
respectu
ergoetc.,hicpotest
maior
variinpositione,
minorem.
Nammulto
dumsententiam
negando
priustactam
est
in communitate
sicutmaiormultiplicitas
tasrepertitur
signorm
quamrerum,
terminis
solus
Dicitur
effectuum
causarum.
ergoquodin quibusdam
quamsuarum
facere
utvidetur
essede ististerminis
modus
sufficit
communitatem,
'chysignificandi
ex hocquodrepraesentant
maera',
etc.,quinonsunttermini
aliquasspecies
specifici
cumaliis
modum
ex natura
similem
rei,sedquiahabent
significandi
quodammodo
dicitur
in re.Et similiter
naturae
terminis
specificae
quibuscorrespondent
specificis
scilicet
licetaliquomodo,suntcommunes,
'individuum',
'singulare',
quodistitermini,
modum
indeterminate
etc.,propter
repraesentandi
plura,licethocnonsit
'persona',
mediomodo.
necpureunivoce,
sedquodammodo
pureaequivoce
78Cf.Alyngton,
s. Praedicamenta,
ch.desubstantia
Litteralis
sententia
, in:Conti1993(above,
n. 2),270-1.
79Sharpe,
seealso132-3.
universalia
, ed. Conti1990(above,n. 1),129-30;
Quaestio
super

11:37:09 AM

184

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

In thisway,he restoresthe semanticrankthatintuitively

would be assigned
to the 'individual
'-liketerms
was
unable
to achieve.
somethingAlyngton
he
admits
that
the nominalistexplanationof the universalFurthermore,
thusimplicityof signsholds in the particularcase of second intentions,
itlyrejectingthe universalvalue of the philosophicalstrategydeveloped
by Wyclifand the other Oxford Realists of methodicallyreplacinglogical and epistemologicalrules with ontological criteriaand references.
Accordingto Sharpe's account,our language and thoughthave theirown
range and normspartiallyindependentof those of the externalreality,
so that he acknowledgesboth the realistand Ockhamistfoundationsof
universalconcepts:<1> in some cases we recognizethat two (or more)
thingsare essentiallyor accidentallysimilarbecause of a universalnature
common to them,in which theyare united;but <2> sometimeswe are
forcedto admit thattwo (or more) individualsare similarto one another
by themselves,that is, simplybecause the nature of the firstindividual
and that of the second individualat issue are alike:80
Proquo ulterius
sciendum
univoce
quodunitasintentionis,
qua pluraimmediate
causan.Unomodoexunitate
inquamulta
naturae
repraesentantur,
potest
dupliciter
essentialiter
velaccidentaliter
aliomodopotest
causari
talisunitas
conveniunt;
propter
similitudinem
velproportionalem
habitudinem
multorum
inter
se,licetillasimilitudo
nonsitin aliquouno.Et ideomagisproportionalis
velconsimilis
habitudo
posset
vocari.Et iliumsecundum
modum
solumacceptant
crecientes
universalia,
negantes
- quodtamennonestverum.
se peripsumsalvare
nturm
universalium
Et aliqui,
solum
Sedegocredo
modum
esse
universalia,
ponentes
acceptant
primm.
utrumque
acpiendum.Primoergomodoprincipaliter
et secundomodosecundarie
causatur
unitas
intentionis
etgeneralis.
Sed secundo
modospecialiter
causatur
uniproprie
specialis
tasquarumdam
intentonum
ingenere,
sedcircumeunt
multa
quaenonsuntproprie
Etistomodo,quiaomniasingularia
habent
similes
etproportionales
genera.
quosdam
modosexsistendi
unusut sicnonhabetattributionem
ad alterum,
quorum
utpote
talisestsimpliciter
unaetindivisa
istosmodos
quiaquaelibet
etc.,ideoeissecundum
similies
unusconceptus
communis
cuisubordinato
hocnomen
potest
correspondere
etsicde similibus.
Et talisnecestproprie
necproprie
'singulare',
univocus,
aequivoetpotest
vocariconceptus
illimitatus
velconceptus
cus,necproprie
analogus,
vagus,
utaliquiipsum
vocant.
Et istomodobenedico'commune'
vel'conceptum
vagum',
licetnonadmittam
sunt
singulare
vagum.Et ex iliopatetquomodotalestermini
communes
modum
propter
signifcandi
principaliter.

80Sharpe,
universalia
Quaestio
, 130-1.
super

11:37:09 AM

ANDSEMANTICS
SHARPE'S
ONTOLOGY
JOHANNES

185

Remarks
Concluding
In his works,Wyclifoftenexpressesthe deepesthostility
to the nominalist
approach to the question of the relationshipbetween our thought(and
language)and the world.As a matterof fact,medievalNominalistsdrew
a sharp distinctionbetween thingsas they exist and the ways in which
we thinkof and talk about them. While the world consistsonly of two
(or three)kindsof individuals,the conceptsby which we grasp and refer
to these individualsare both singularand universal,but other typesas
well. Nor do the relationsthroughwhich we connect our notionsin a
propositioncloselycorrespondto the real linkswhichjoin individualsin
a stateof affairs.In sum, our knowledgeand language do not identically
and mutualrelareproducethe elementsof realityin theirinnerstructure
On the contheir
connections.
but
concern
them
and
merely
tionships,
an
of signs,
that
was
ordered
collection
language
trary,Wyclifbelieved
elementsof reality,and thattrue
to one of the constitutive
each referring
were
like
picturesof their inner structuresand
(linguistic)propositions
mutual relationships.For this reason, he <1> conceived of universaisas
those real essencescommon to many individualsthat are necessaryconand <2> thoughtthat only by
ditionsforour language to be significant,
with
universal
realitiescould the fact be
nouns
such
associatinggeneral
accountedforthateach commontermcan standformanythingsat once
and can label all of themin the same way. His peculiar formof realism
and his philosophicalstrategyare the logical consequencesof this rejection of nomininalist
semantics.OxfordRealistsfollowedWyclifdown this
attemptedto remove the aporetic and unclear
path and, furthermore,
aspects of his metaphysics.Thus, they <1> accepted his philosophical
strategyand the main principlesof his semantics,and <2> tried to
and predication.
identity,distinction,
improvehis ontologyby redefining
As it is evidentfromthe foregoinganalyses,Sharpe is a patentexcepsharesthe metaphysicalview and principlesof
tion,since he substantially
semanthe otherOxfordRealists,but he elaboratesa completelydifferent
which
are
on
the
five
based
others,
tics,
opposed
following theses,among
to the basic semanticassumptionsof his fellowRealists: <1> the modus
whether
is the mostimportantcriterionforestablishing
communiter
significandi
a simpletermis common or not; <2> thereare not universalaggregates,
compoundedof universalsubstancesand universalaccidentalforms,signified
'
by the concreteaccidentalterms,like album <3> mentaluniversaisare
signs of both real universaisand individualthings;<4> there are two

11:37:09 AM

186

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

kinds of mental universais,intellections(intellectiones

), which are the acts
by means of which we understandthe nature of universalforms,and
intentions(intentiones
), whichare the conceptsthroughwhichboth general
and proper names of our language are relatedto the thingstheysignify;
<5> transcategorial
termsof second intention,like 'individuum
and cpersona are commonnounsand not singularexpressions.In thisway,Sharpe
triedto reconcilesome demandsof nominalistphilosophywiththe realist
tradition,takinginto account the actual uses of words and the manner
in whichthe termswere tied,by the rulesof the language,to each other
and to our conceptsand ideas. As we have seen, on some verycrucial
points,he clearlyrefersto empiricalfacts(theratioexperimentalis)
concerning
linguisticusage in order to confutesome thesesproper to realistsemantics. So, whereas the semanticsthat the otherOxfordRealistswished to
constructwas a sortof formallanguagewhose principles,rules,elements,
and structuresderivedfromontology,since theyconceived of semantics
as a 'translation'of realityinto naturallanguage, Sharpe ratherdirects
his efforts
towardsbuildingup a semanticsas a sort of empiricalanalysis of our language- a studyof essentiallythe same kind as that occurring in modern linguistics.For him, to understandan expressionis not
merelyto be aware of the entityconnectedwithit, but also to be aware
of its actual or potentialuse- an absolute noveltywithinthe medieval
realistsetting.
Unfortunately,
Sharpe's semantic approach partiallyundermineshis
< 1> of the nomdefenceof realism.His acceptance,althoughrestricted,
inalistprincipleof the autonomyof thoughtin relationto the world,and
<2> of Ockham's explanationfor the universality
of concepts,deprives
of
semantic
and
Sharpe
any compelling
epistemologicalreasons to posit
universalia
in re. Therefore,his main ontologicalthesescertainlyare sensible and reasonable,but,paradoxically,withinSharpe's philosophicalsystem theycannot in any way be consideredas absolutelyconsistent.
L'Aquila
University
ofL'Aquila

11:37:09 AM

Whatis Real. A Replyto Ockham3

s Onto
logicalProgram*
FABRIZIOAMERINI

Abstract
When Ockham'slogic arrivesin Italy,some Dominicanphilosophers
bring
into question Ockham's ontologicalreductionistprogram.Among them,
Franciscusde Pratoand Stephanusde Reate pay a greatattentionto refute
Ockham'sclaim thatno universalexistsin the extra-mental
world.In order
to rejectOckham'sprogram,theystartby reconsidering
the notionof 'real',
thentherangeofapplication
oftherationaland therealdistinction.
Generally,
theirstrategyconsistsin re-addressingagainst Ockham some arguments
extractedfromHervaeusNatalis'sworks.Franciscus'sand Stephanus'sbasic
idea is thatsomeuniversais
are not acts of cognition,
but extra-mental,
predicable things.Such thingsare not separablefromsingulars,
nonetheless
they
are notthesame as thosesingulars.
it is notnecessary
to allow,
Consequently,
as Ockham does, thatif two thingsare not reallyidentical,theyare really
different
and hencereallyseparable.Accordingto them,it is possibleto hold
that two thingsare not reallyidenticalwithoutholdingthat theyare also
and hence reallydifferent.
reallynon-identical
Basically,theirreplyrelieson
a different
notionof the relationof identity.
Identityis regardedas an intersectionof classesof things,so thatit is possibleto say thattwo thingsare
reallyidenticalwithoutsayingthattheyalso are the same thing.Franciscus
and Stephanus,however,do not seem to achievecompletely
theiraim.
Introduction
Accordingto the definitionwe can find in a common dictionary,the
word 'real' indicateswhateverhas an effectiveexistence.Unfortunately,
the dictionarydoes not give a clear idea of what the phrase 'effective
existence'actuallymeans. On the one hand, it tells us that Socrates is
readif Socrates actuallyexists,but it also tells us that an eclipse is real
if the eclipse actuallyoccurs. So not only things,but also eventscould
be said to be real. But again what is an eventis not clear. On the other

* I wouldliketo thank
William
Dubaforhaving
revised
myEnglish.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,1

11:37:20 AM

188

FABRIZIO
AMERESTI

hand, ifwe tryto understanda bit morewhat the adverb'actually'means

in thesedefinitions,
we findthatsomethingactuallyexistsifit really
exists.
Hence, at the end of our provisionallinguisticinquiry,we know that
somethingis real if it reallyexists.As is evident,however,thisis not preciselywhat we could call an illuminatingexplanationof what the term
'real' means. It is not clear what conditionssomethingmust satisfyin
order forit to existreallyor actually.
of 'real' at least
Nonetheless,we see that in our dictionary-definition
two different
ideas are involved.Firstof all, the term 'real' is employed
to denote a specifickindof object, namelythat having an effective
existence,whateverit is. In order to understandbetterthispoint,we could
existence'by saying,forinstance,that
tryto refinethe notionof 'effective
has
an
effective
existence
if it is possible to establisha procesomething
dure of such a sort as to be able to referto such a thingand hence to
identifyit. But in the case of events,it is not so easy to come by such
a procedure. For it is not easy to representan event as somethingto
which we could refer.Therefore,in the case of eventswe could then
seek fora procedurethat is able to explain them.Anyway,accordingto
this nominal consideration'real' is a word with a given extensionand
withinits extensionwe come across thingsor events(ifwe assume their
existence)we can referto or explain,since theyare somehowin the field
of our experience.
To put thingsanotherway, we could claim that somethingis real in
two ways. First,somethingis real if we can identifyand hence point to
it. From this perspective,somethingreal is somethinghaving a positively
certifiableexistenceoutsidethe mind. In a second sense howeversomethingcan be real if we can say that it is what it is before the mind
definesit. From such a perspective,not only individualthings,but also
universalthings,simple or complex events,state of affairs,facts,and a
lot of conceptual contentscould be said to be real. In this way, somea kindof being,i.e. havinga kind
thingreal is somethinghavingnegatively
of being that is mind-independent.
Accordingto the strictsense of 'real', only individualsubstancesseem
to be authenticallyreal, because in fact only a substancecan be properlyreferredto. More generally,only individualthingsare real. Events,
universalthingsand even (individualor universal)propertiesare not real.
To be sure,someone mightobject thata propertyas well can be referred
to; forinstance,when we talk of thiswhitewhile pointingto the white-

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189

ness of a wall. But if we analyse this fact we realise that we are pointing to a wall that is white ratherthan to the whitenessof a wall. Only
by an act of selectiveattentioncan we considerthe whitenessof the wall
In any case, it is absolutelytrue that
the object of our act of referring.
individualthingsare qualifiedthings,and it is not immediatelycertain
substancewiththatan individualthingcan be regardedas an underlying
out the bundle of its qualifyingproperties.Therefore,it is not clear that
we can grasp the substancewithoutgraspingits properties;therebywe
to a real substancewhen we refer
cannot be sure that we are referring
to a real thing.
Accordingto the broad sense of 'real', however,we can extend the
domain of what is real in an indefinite
way. We can grantreal existence
but not point to. So
to everythingor eventwe can conceptuallyidentify
we can concludeto the real beingof somethingfromsome purelysemantic
or epistemologicalconsiderations.From this perspective,in the extramentalworld we can find,besides individualthings,universalitemsthat
correspondto or, at least, ground universalconcepts we have of individual things.If the firstsense of 'real' sheds lightalmost exclusivelyon
the metaphysicalside of what we could call the Problemof Realism, the
insofar
second one insteadcombinesontologicaland logicalconsiderations
in
is
real.
as it marksout the borderlinesof what
Now, keeping mind
debate on
well-defined
let me apply it to a historically
such a distinction,
Italian
Dominican
and
some
Ockham
held
between
i.e.
that
realism,
thinkersin 1330s, when Ockham's logic arrivesin Italy.
Realism
1. Ockham's
We are accustomedto describingOckham's ontologicaltheoryas a reductionisttheory.In fact,Ockham's philosophyis characterisedby a constant
traditionaldoctrines.
ontologicaland epistemological
attemptat simplifying
Withregardto ontologyin particular,one of Ockham's main goals consists
in simplifying
the structureof the categorialtable as forits metaphysical
involvement.First of all, Ockham simplifieshorizontallythe list of the
Aristoteliancategories,reducingthem to two, i.e. substanceand quality.
of each categoryby excludtheverticalstructure
he simplifies
Accordingly,
universal
universal
the
from
species, and universal
genera,
ontology
ing
the
two
out
that
have
Scholars
strategies
simplifying
pointed
differentiae.
are not equivalentat all. For such strategiesuse verydifferent
arguments

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AMERINI

and have verydifferent

motivationsforredefining
the categorialtable. I
do not want to dwell on such featureof Ockham's thoughthere.1What
is importantto noticeforour argumentis thatOckham arrivesat defining
an ontologythat is exclusivelypopulated by individualthings,i.e. individual substancesplus individualpropertiesbelongingto the genusofqualof Scotus's
ity.He comes to thisresulttakingas a starting
pointa criticism
and
then
ontologicaltheory
reflecting
upon the logicalvalue of the relation
of identity,both in philosophicaland theologicalcontexts.A doctrinal
point Ockham never abandons in his career is that no universalexists
outside the mind.2But as it is known,throughouthis career Ockham
changes his views on what is real in the mind.3In orderto illustratethis
theproblemfromail Aristotelian
point,letme startbyconsidering
perspective.
At the end of Book VI of the Metaphysics
, Aristotlestatesthat being
can be dividedinto mentaland extra-mental
being.4The formerconcerns
truthand falsity,while the latterconcernsthe externalbeing, to which
Aristotleapplies the categorial scheme. Moreover, Aristotlestates that
some of categorialextra-mental
beings can existonly in virtueof an act
of separationor unificationachieved by the mind.5This passage of the
offersto a medievalAristotelian
a good opportunity
Metaphysics
interpreter
to expresshis own views on the nature and extensionof what is reed.
According to Ockham's firstontological doctrine (i.e. the so-called
we can read Aristotle's
textas follows.Being can be divided
Fictum-theory),
into intra-mental
and extra-mental
being or being of raison (ensrationis)
being or real being (ensreale).In turn,thislattercan be subdividedinto
mental and extra-mentalbeing. We may representOckam's intuitionin
the followingscheme:
1 Fora insightful
examination
ofthistwofold
seeM. McCordAdams,
William
strategy,
Ockham
P. V. Spade,Three
Versions
, 2 vols.,Indiana1987,vol.I, 143-313;
ofOckham's
Reductionist
56 (1998),
335-46.
SeealsoP. V. Spade,Ockham's
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Program
Nominalist
: Some
MainThemes
to
, in P. V. Spade(ed.),TheCambridge
Metaphysics
Companion
Ockham
and G. Klima,Ockham's
Semantics
andOntology
, Cambridge
1999,100-17,
ofthe
, in P. V. Spade(ed.),op.cit.,118-42.
Categories
2 See e.g.William
I Librum
Sententiarum.
d. 2, q. 7, ed.
Ockham,
Scriptum
super
Ordination
G. Gi.St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1967,OTh I, 225-66,
1. 1; Expositio
in
esp.248,1.22-249,
Librum
Perihermenias
Aristotelis
& S. Brown,
St.Bonaventure,
, prol., 8, ed. A. Gambatese
N.Y. 1978,OPh II, 362-3;Summa
G. Gi,S. Brown,
I, ch. 15,ed. Ph.Boehner,
Logkae,
St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1974,OPh I, 50-4.
3 Fora useful
ofthischange,
seeMcCordAdams1987(above,n. 1),I, 74,
summary
n. 10.
4 Cf.Aristotle,
, VI, 4, 1027b28-33.
Metaphysics
5 Cf.Aristotle,
, VI, 4, 1027b32-33.
Metaphysics

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191

1
Scheme
orfictum
reason- intra-mental
being)
(objective

<of

. mental
real

being)
categorialbeing(.subjective

X extra-mental
Accordingto this division,being of reason concernsnot only the being
of true and falsepropositions(as Aristotleseems to think),but the being
of simple conceptsas well. Such a being is not a categorialbeing, but
ratherexpressesa special kind of being. As is well known,Ockham calls
such a being 'objective'being,insofaras it is definedexclusivelywithreference to the mind that cognisesa thingas an object it grasps.Properly
speaking,such a kind of being is preciselythe being a thinghas when
it is cognisedby the mind. On the otherhand, categorialbeing captures
anythingthat has a real or 'subjective'being, with regard to both the
world.Whileobjectivebeingconcernsuniversais,
mindand theextra-mental
individuals.6As an immediateconsequence of
concerns
subjectivebeing
can
have
thisdivision,we
only two kindsof relationof identityand distinction,i.e. the real identityand distinctionand the identityand distinctionof reason, althoughthe distinctionof reason can be considered
in two ways.7For two thingscan be different
accordingto reason either
of
reason or if they are two
an
act
of
results
if they are two different
notionsthat are extractedfromone and the same thing.So we
different
can have eithera distinctionof reason derivedfromand groundedupon
a thingin the extra-mentalworld or a distinctionof reason completely
notionswith
caused by the mind. While the firstone concernsdifferent
6 Among
Ockham
whether
itis debated
beingalso
objective
however,
scholars,
grants
ofOckham's
discussion
here.Fora general
I cannot
dwellon thisproblem
toindividuals.
n. 1),I, 73-105;
seeMcCordAdams1987(above,
ofobjective
Ead.,Ockham's
being,
theory
F. E. Kelley,
86 (1977),144-76;
in:ThePhilosophical
Entities
andUnreal
Nominalism
Review,
,
"
toHervaeus
Natalis
andItsRelation
in Ockham
onthe"Fictum
SomeObservations
, in:
Theory
etdeson
Thorie
dela pense
38 (1978),260-82;E. Karger,
Franciscan
, desesobjets
Studies,
d'Occam
discours
Being
chezGuillaume
, in:Dialogue33 (1994),437-56;S. Read,TheObjective
27 (1997),14-31.
Ficta,in:Philosophical
Quarterly,
ofOckham's
7 Cf.e.g.William
Ordinato
, d. 2, q. 3, OTh I, 78-9,11.4 foil.;q. 8, OTh I,
Ockham,
271-81.

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FABRIZIO
AMERESTI

regardto the thingfromwhich theyare extracted,the second one concerns different

notionswith regardto each other.
Afterhavingabandoned the so-calledFictumtheory,Ockham simplifies
the above-mentionedscheme as follows:
Scheme
2
real mental= beingof reason
being<Q
^ real extra-mental

> categorial
being{subjective
being)8

In thiscase, speakingof being of reason amountsto speakingof real mental being,i.e. of acts of cognition.A being of reason is a real being that
reason takes in the place of another (mental or extra-mental)thingor
even to referto another (mental or extra-mental)thing.9In Ockham's
new theory,thereis no room fora different
kind of non-categorial(universal)being,like objectivebeing. As a resultof the new theorywe have
that speakingof distinctionof reason amountsto speakingof a distinction that holds betweentwo real individualthingsthat exist subjectively
in the mind. From a logical point of view, a distinctionof reason is
reduced to a semanticdifferenceconcerningthe way of signifying
two
different
mental
items
have.
subjectively
Ockham thinksthatthispictureis sufficient
to capturethe articulation
of an extra-mental
realitythatis exclusivelypopulated by individualsubjectiveitems.However,some scholarshave pointedout thatwhat Ockham
claims to do is not exactlywhat Ockham in factdoes. Indeed, sometimes
Ockham seems to be implicitlycommittedto the view that we can find
in the extra-mental
world somethingotherthan individualthings.If it is
true that,for Ockham, whatevercan modifythe truth-value
of a propositionis somehowreal, then not only individualthings,but also the spatial,temporalor causal orderingof things,forinstance,have to be granted
a real being.10To be sure, such orderingsare not things.Nonetheless,
they are real all the same, at least according to the negativesense of
8 Cf.e.g.William
inlibrum
Perihermmias
Ockham,
Aristotelis,
Expositio
prol., 9, 364-5,
11.27-51and368-9,11.135-58;
Summa
Logicae
, I, ch.40,OPh I, 113,11.60-86.
9 Cf.e.g.William
Summa
Losdcae
Ockham,
, I, ch.40, OPh I, 113,11.60-4.
10Cf.e.g.William
Summa
Forsuchan account,
Ockham,
, I, chs.59-60passim.
Logicae
seeSpade1999(above,
n. 1),106-10;
foran opposite
Semantics
and
view,seeC. Panaccio,
Mental
, in:Spade(ed.)1999(above,n. 1),53-75,esp.61-3.
Language

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193

'real' definedabove, since theydo not depend completelyon the mind

for theirbeing. Accordingto the distinctiondrawn at the beginningof
thispaper, indeed, Ockham seems to deny that there existpositivelyin
fromindividualthingsbut are still
the worldreal itemsthat are different
that there are ways of being or
to
concede
he
seems
However,
things.
even dispositionsof individualthingsthat are real, althoughtheyare not
things.
Scholarsdisagreeon whetherthisis Ockham's real doctrine.However,
when Ockham agrees with Scotus that two thingsof a same species are
no one thinks
more similarthan two thingsof different
species,eventhough
of theseco-specificthingsas similar,he is actuallycommittedto the view
the world is not
that our 'spontaneous'way of graspingand signifying
some
extentbrought
but
is
to
an
of
the
result
of
action
the
mind,
only
about by the world as well. So the role is sometimesundervaluedthat
Ockham assignsto the universaland modal factorsof theworldin explaining our intellectualcognition,and so is the role played by the world in
the natural 'semanticspontaneity'of the human mind.
stimulating
AreNotActsof Cognition
s FirstReply:SomeUniversals
de Prato'
2. Franciscus
Afterhavingreceivedthe criticismof Walter Chatton,Ockham modifies
his firstontologicaldoctrineand embraces the idea that the notionsof
thing(res)and real being (ensreali)are co-extensive.In so doing,he simidea about whatcountsas real. Italian
plyre-proposesa veryold-fashioned
like Franciscusde Prato and Stephanusde Reate,11
Dominican thinkers,
thinkthat in fact Ockham's move has already been criticisedby the
General Master of the Order, Hervaeus Natalis, in the contextof his
debate with Radulphus Brito,Henry of Ghent,John Duns Scotus, and
PeterAureolion the natureof intentions.So in orderto refuteOckham's
for them to repeat the argumentationdeveloped
doctrineit is sufficient
by Hervaeus.
As a matterof fact, Italian Dominicans are well aware of the way
Ockham modifiesthe doctrine throughouthis career, but they focus
11 On thelifeandworks
deReate,seeF. Amerini,
de PratoandStephanus
ofFranciscus
da Prato.
a Francesco
e la suaattribuzione
inlogica
sitensrationis"
"Utrum
subiectum
La quaestio
Francesco
daPrato
egliscritti
deldomenicano
sullavita
Note
Domenicane,
), in:Memorie
(XIVsecolo
della"Loyca"
critica
da Prato.
Conl'edizione
diFrancesco
n.s.30 (1999),147-217;
Id.,La logica
univocaFirenze
devoce
e del"Tractatus
2005,3-26.

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AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

on Ockham'slaterdoctrine.Furthermore,
exclusively
theyshowno difficulty
in singlingout the most importantphilosophicalpoints involvedin the
debate. In particular,Franciscusde Prato providesa faithfulreconstrucon BeingofReason
tion of Ockham's last theoryin his Treatise
, composed
12Let me considerin some detail
between
1341
and
1343.
presumably
Franciscus'sfirstresponse.
Ockham identifiesbeing of
Accordingto Franciscus'sreconstruction,
reason with a sub-sectionof real being, namelymental subjectivebeing
(see above, scheme 2). A being of reason is an act of cognition,which
is identicalwith a concept.13If someone objected that it is a contradiction to say that one and the same item is at the same time real and of
reason- so that if an act of cognitionis a real being, it is not a being
of reason- , Ockham could replythat an act of cognitioncan be consideredaccordingto different
respects,so no contradictionarises.In fact,
if it is consideredin itself,an act of cognitionis a real being,because it
is a perfectivequalityof the mind. But if it is consideredwithregardto
the thingsit refersto, it is a being of reason,insofaras, as we said, the
reason makes use of it to referto extra-mentalthings.14
But the opponentcould insistthatany act of cognitionis a real being,
because it is a singularand subjectiveitem,as Ockham also claims. But
12On thistreatise,
see Amerini
1999(above,n. 11),172,n. 59, and 185-6,n. 88;
Amerini
dePrato
2005(above,n. 11),22-4.See alsoC. Rode,Franciscus
2004.
, Stuttgart
I amworking
withChristian
Rodetoproduce
thecritical
ofthetreatise.
edition
together
I refer
Forquotations,
tothecritical
inparentextwehaveprovisionally
established,
giving
thesis
thereference
tothefolios
ofthebestmanuscript
(Rome,Biblioteca
Angelica
1053).
13Cf.Franciscus,
deente
Tractatus
a. 1: "opinio
fuitetest
rationis,
aliquorum
antiquorum
etaliquorum
Guillelmi
sitactusintelmodernorum,
Ockham,
praecipue
quodensrationis
ligenditamrectusquamreflexus"
(ms.Rome,Bibl.Angel.1053,fol.55r).See also
2005(above,n. 11),290-1,11.12-37.Fora
Franciscus,
, I, III, a. 1, ed. Amerini
Logica
moreextensive
onFranciscus's
seeF. Amerini,
La dottrina
dellasignificado
remarks,
inquiry
diFrancesco
daPrato
O.P.(XIVsecolo).
Unacritica
tomista
a Guglielmo
diOckham
, in:Documenti
e StudisullaTradizione
Filosofica
11 (2000),375-408;
Amerini
2005(above,
Medievale,
n. 11),58-103.
14Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deente
rationis
istamopinionem
, a. 1: "Contra
arguosic:nullumensrationis
estensreale;sedomnisactusintelligendi
estverum
ensreale;ergonullusactusintelligendi
estensrationis.
Guillelmus
Ockham
(. . .) Ad istaobiectarespondet
et quidamalii,dicentes
considerali:
unomodo,
quodactusintelligendi
potest
dupliciter
actusintelligendi
estin se quidamactuset quaedamforma
inquantum
perficiens
potentiamintellectivam.
Et istomodoactusintelligendi
estverum
ensreale.(. . .) Aliomodo
ut accipitur
loco et viceobiecti,
idestinquantum
suum
potestconsiderali
repraesentat
obiectum.
Et istomodoactusintelligendi
estensrationis
et ensdiminutum"
(ms.Rome,
Bibi.Angel.1053,fol.55v).See alsoLogica,
2005(above,n. 11),
I, IV, a. 1,ed.Amerini
307-8,H.26-40.

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195

some typicalpropertiesof a being of reason, like being abstractedfrom

individualsor being predicatedof many things,cannot be attributedto
a singularand subjectiveitem.For otherwisesuch an itemcould be really
abstractedfromthe thingsit refersto and then we would fall back into
a Platonicpositionon universais.Moreover,nothingsingularcan be predicated of many things.Therefore,if it is possible to say, as Ockham in
factdoes, thatone and the same thing(i.e. one and the same act of cognition)can be singularin its nature and universalin its function,for
instanceinsofaras it signifiesor representsseveralthings,it is absolutely
impossibleto say that a thingis singularin its being and universalin
For an act of cognitioncannot be predicatedof things,because
predication.
predicationmust concern homogeneous items. Predicatingreal mental
acts of real extra-mentalthingsamountsto confusingitems of ontologically different
types.Consequently,it is necessaryto posit an object that
is (i) different
fromthe act of cognition,(ii) universal,and (iii) predicable
In some cases, this object must be a real thing.
of many things.15
Franciscusconcludeshis discussionstatingthatbeing of reason cannot
be the act of cognitionnor the extra-mental
thing,but mustbe the thing
cognised qua cognised.16In order to preventsome standard objections
concerningthe fictive,metaphysically
superfluousand epistemologically
if
not
status
of
such beingsof reason,Franciscus
unnecessary,
dangerous,
endorsescompletelyHervaeus's explanation.Such a kind of being does
not have an absolutestatusbut rathera relationalone, and it is logically
posteriorto both the cognitionof the thingand the thingcogniseditself.
The objectivebeing of a thingcognisedis none otherthan the relation
the thingcognisedbears to the mind that actuallycognisesit.17To put
thingsanotherway, the objectivebeing of a thingis nothingbut its being

15Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deente
a. 1, ms.Rome,Bibl.Angel.1053,fol.56r.
rationis,
See alsoLoma,I, IV, a. 1,ed. Amerini
11.60-80.
2005(above,n. 11),309-10,
16Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deente
rationis
, a. 1: "Et ideoestalia opiniobeatiThomae
realiter
nonestaliquidexistens
subiective
etmaistri
Hervaei,
quaeponitquodensrationis
in intellectu
realisecundum
suumessereale,sedestquidammodus
necin aliquanatura
ab intellectu"
obiectum
intellectus
illudobiectum
estintellectum
inquantum
consequens
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, a. 1,
(ms.Rome,Bibl.Angel.1053,fol.56v).See alsoFranciscus,
diFrancesco
daPrato
e Stefano
daRieti
ed.F. Amerini,
in:Id.,I trattati
De universalibus
(Secolo
n. 11),294-6;
2005(above,
2003,59,11.5-10;Logica
, I, III, a. 2, ed.Amerini
XIV),Spoleto
andthetexts
1999(above,n. 11),200-8.
quotedin Amerini
17Fora general
ofobjective
ofHervaeus's
andFranciscus's
theories
being,
presentation
seeAmerini
2005(above,n. 11),94-9and 103-41.

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

cognised,which coincidespreciselywith the cognitionof the thingonce

cognitionis consideredfromthe side of the thingthatbecomes cognised.18
If we read carefullyFranciscus'sand Stephanus'stexts,we see thatthe
most of their argumentsare extractedfromHervaeus's works.Let me
onSecond
Intentions
give an example.When Hervaeusdiscussesin his Treatise
the questions'whetheran act of cognitionis a firstintention'(q. 1, a. 2)
and 'whethera second intentionis an act of cognition'(q. 2, a. 1), he
reportstwo opinions.Accordingto the firstopinion, a firstintentionis
exactlythe thingcognised,while a second intentionis the act of cognition. Hervaeus rejectsthis opinion because a thingcannot be an intenFor
tion in itself(per se), as Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli think.19
otherwisethe propertyof being an intentioncould be an essential,i.e.
So to be an intentionmeans something
definitional,
propertyof a thing.20
18Seee.g.Franciscus,
in:Bochumer
etsecunda
intentane
Tractatus
deprima
, ed.B. Mojsisch,
andLogica
undMittelalter,
5 (2000),154-64,
furAntike
, I, III,
Jahrbuch
Philosophisches
is endorsed
The sameposition
ed. Amerini
2005(above,n. 11),289-306.
byStephanus
in:Mediaevalia
Tractatus
desecundis
intentionibus
deReate.Seee.g.Stephanus,
, ed.I. Domanski,
realietratonis
deente
12 (1967),67-106;see also Tractatus
, ms.
Polonorum,
Philosophica
etquidensreale,
Bibi.Univ.,IV. Q. 4, foi.59r:"Utsciasquidsitensrationis
Wroclaw,
volenti
studere
necessaria
etquidsecunda,
intentio
etquidsitprima
loyquesuntmultum
cam(. . .) debesprimoscirequodensrealeestilludquodhabetesseperse in rerum
estillud
nonfacitilludesse.(. . .) Ensautemrationis
noster
itaquodintellectus
natura,
a. 1,ms.Rome,
Tractatus
deente
rationis
(. . .)". See alsoFranciscus,
quodfacitintellectus
Bibi.Angel.1053,fols.56v-57r.
19Cf.e.g.HenryofGhent,
ordinarium
Summa
, a. 53, q. 5, ed. Paris1520
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953);Quodlibet
St.Bonaventure,
V, q. 6, andXV,q. 5, ed. Paris1518(repr.
(repr.
I Librum
d. 23,ed. D. Perler,
in:
Louvain1961);PeterAureoli,
Sententiarum)
Scriptum
super
du MoyenAge,61 (1994),248-9,n. 23.
Doctrinale
et Littraires
Archives
d'Histoire
20Cf. Hervaeus,
intentionibus
Tractatus
desecundis
, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Parisiis1489;also
deprima
etsecunda
intentione
Tractatus
, a. 1,ed. Mojsisch
Franciscus,
(above,n. 18),154,11.
thattheproperty
ofbeingan intenlikeAureoli
forexample,
25-34.Ifsomeone,
objected
couldreply
thata
ofa thing
an essential
tionis nonetheless
, Hervaeus
cognised
property
becauseto be
arepartially
anda thing
thesameandpartially
different,
cognised
thing
itis accidental
to
feature
ofa thing.
is an accidental
Therefore,
if,fora thing,
cognised
and hencetheproperty
ofbeingan
ofbeingcognised
be cognised,
thentheproperty
ofa thing
norofa thing
even
neither
intention
cannotbe essential
cognised,
properties
oftheproperty
of
can be regarded
as an essential
property
though
beingan intention
Hervaeus's
debate
with
seeJ.Pinborg,
Formoredetails
Aureoli,
concerning
beingcognised.
Aureoli
inDiskussion
Hervaeus
undPetrus
derIntentio
Secunda:
Natalis
Brito,
,
ZumBegriff
Radulphus
49-59.SeealsoD. Perler,
in:Cahiers
de l'Institut
duMoyen
AgeGrecetLatin,13(1974),
Remarks
onIntentionality.
A TextEdition
With
Peter
Aureol
vs.Hervaeus
Natalis
, in:
Introductory
duMoyen
Archives
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
etLittraire
Id.,Theorien
Age,61 (1994),227-62;
derIntentionalitt
imMittelalter
amMain2002,258-317;
and,fora reconstruction
, Frankfurt
Hervaeus
from
F. Amerini,
Realism
andIntentionality:
different
Natalis
, Peter
Perler's,
slightly
Debates
attheUniversity
andWilliam
Ockham
inDiscussion
Auriol,
, in Philosophical
ofParisinthe

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PROGRAM

197

more than to be a thing,which is cognised. Accordingto the second

opinion,i.e. that of Radulphus Brito,21instead,an absolute act of cognitionis a firstintention,while a respectiveact of cognitionis a second
intention.But Hervaeus rejectsthis opinion as well, because it does not
correctlyexplain the order obtainingbetweena firstand a second intention.In fact,it is impossibleforan act of cognitionto be groundedupon
a previousact of cognition,since two acts of cognitioncannot be present simultaneously
in the mind.22However, what is importantto note
for our argumentis that while rejectingthis second opinion Hervaeus
discussesthe same twofoldunderstanding
of 'act of cognition'we findin
Ockham. Let me quote the textat length:
to them,
theactofcognition
canbe considered
in twoways.According
According
to thefirst
realact,so it cannot
be saidto be a secondintenway,it is a certain
tionor to havebeingofreasoninsofar
as it is distinguished
from
realbeing.But
to thesecondway,theactofcognition
takestheplaceofthething
according
coginthesamewayas thepicture
ofa manis saidtobe a man,notindeed
man
nised,
in absolute,
butthedepicted
manis saidto be a manin a qualified
way(secundum
thepicture
ofa manissaidtobea manina qualified
anddiminished
Therefore,
quid).
theactofcognising
a manora horseis saidtobe a manora horse
way.Likewise,
ina diminished
andqualified
a man,although
cognised
way.Sincetheactofcognising
itis absolutely
a certain
nonetheless
itis notabsolutely
a man,butonlyin a
thing,
diminished
andqualified
theactofcognition
insofar
as it takesthe
way,therefore
is said to be a thingcognised
in a qualified
placeof thethingcognised
way.
as suchitis saidto havebeingofreasondistinguished
from
realor
Consequently,
absolute
being.23

First
Fourteenth
oftheInternational
heldinBonn,
Quarter
ofthe
Century.
Proceedings
Congress
14.-17.
2005(forthcoming).
April2004,Louvain-Paris
21Cf.Radulphus
onSecond
Intentions
in: Vivarium,
13
Brito,Sophism
, ed.J. Pinborg,
see Pinborg
1974(above,n. 20);
(1975),119-52.Formoredetailson sucha criticism,
Amerini
2005(above,n. 11),103-41.
22On thisargument,
see F. Amerini,
Le statut
dela proposition
deNdllec
chezHerv
, in:
A. Maier-L.
Valente
Theories
onAssertive
andNon-Assertive
Actsof
(eds.),Medieval
Language.
the14thEuropean
on Medieval
15th,
Symposium
LogicandSemantic
(Rome,
June11th2004,333-54.
2002),Firenze
23Cf.Hervaeus,
Tractatus
desecundis
intentionibus
, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Parisiis
1489,fol.18a:
"Secundum
Uno modosecundum
ipsos'actusintelligendi'
potest
accipidupliciter.
quod
estquidamactusrealis,
et sicnondicitur
secunda
intentio
nechabereesserationis
tantumproutdistinguitur
contraessereale.Aliomodoaccipitur
actusintelligendi
vicerei
sicutpietura
hominis
dicitur
seddicitur
intellectae,
homo,nonquidemhomosimpliciter,
homosecundum
hominis
secundum
pictus
quid.Undedicitur
pietura
quidet diminutive
homo.Sic etiamactusintelligendi
hominem
velequumdicitur
diminutive
et secundum
velequus.Et quiaactusintelligendi
licetsitsimpliciter
res
hominis,
quidhomointellectus
nontarnen
estsimpliciter
sedsecundum
etideoactus
homo,
quaedam,
quidetdiminutive,
vicereiintellectae,
secundum
resintellecta;
etper
intelligendi,
prout
accipitur
quiddicitur

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

AlthoughHervaeus thinksthat such a positionis a subtleone, nevertheless he goes out his way to prove that it is not true. In his discussion,
we findthe same set of argumentsFranciscusinvokesagainst Ockham.
To be sure, the positiondiscussedby Hervaeus is not strictlythe same
as Ockham's, for the basic reason that Hervaeus's opponentsclaim that
the act of cognitionconsideredas a substitutionof the thingcognised
coincideswiththe thingcogniseditself,and the thingcognisedis in turn
identicalwith the extra-mentalthing,even thoughin a diminishedway.
So, accordingto Hervaeus's favouriteexample, the pictureof Hercules
is a real picturein itself,but it is also a representation
of a thing,namely
Hercules. Again, Hercules is a real thing,but it is also the thingrepresented in the picture,and this thing representedis identical with the
extra-mental
Hercules,even thoughin a diminishedway. Ockham clearly
to
this
versionof the logicalontolobjects
step.Accordingto his simplified
ogy, thereis no need to posit a thirdthingin betweenthe extra-mental
of it. As to our examthingrepresentedand the mental representation
there
is
no
need
to
a
Hercules
ple,
posit
depicted in between the real
Hercules and the pictureof Hercules.In any case, Hervaeus's criticism
i.e. thatthe act of cognitionhoweverit is consideredis alwaysreallyseparate fromthe thingsbelongingto the extensionof the thingcognised,
so thatthe act of cognitioncannotbe the subjectof the propertyof being
- does not seem to
abstractedand hence of being universal
completely
miss the targetin the case of Ockham.
As a matterof fact,the endorsementof a more ontologicallyloaded
formof realismis connectedwitha precisepredicativerequirement.The
discussionof the propertyof being abstracted,but, more importantly,
the
discussionof the propertyof being predicable,shows that for Hervaeus
the cognitivemachineryof the human mind needs to operate according
to a triadicprocess. If it is possible to re-interpret
semanticor cognitive
universalityin terms of a set of functionsperformedby a naturally
significantsign, existingsubjectivelyin the mind, it is not possible,by
contrast,to explain the absolute and passive propertiesof a thing,like
those of being abstractedand being predicated,in a merelyfunctional
fromthe act of
way. In this case, we need to look foran item different
cognitionthat has to be the subjectof such logicatiproperties.From this
perspective,the twofoldunderstandingOckham introducesin order to
utsicdicitur
habereesserationis
distinctum
contra
esserealesivecontra
consequens
esse
simpliciter".

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199

explain both the nature and the functionof an act of cognitionundervalues the objectifying
and unifying
power of the human mind. Formally
tends
towardsone and onlyone object.
speaking,any conceptintentionally
FollowingHervaeus, Franciscuslabels such an object as obiectum
formale.
Such an object is what correspondsto a universalconcept or an act of
cognition.To posit such an object which is universal,predicable,and
- is
extra-mentalthings
universallyrepresenting
necessaryto understand
correctlythe epistemologicalprocess in any respect.
3. Franciscus
de Prato'sSecondReply
: SomeUniversals
AreReal Things
The redefinition
of Ockham's last doctrinepasses througha reaffirmation
of what historically
representsa 'new' solutiongiven to the problem of
i.e.
that
of
cognition,
bringingin the notionof objectivebeing. Ockham's
do
not
in Ockham's last
opponents
perceive any possible inconsistency
doctrine,as P. V. Spade does. Quite the opposite,they elaborate their
own theoryin oppositionto that of Ockham by criticisinghis exaggerated simplification
of epistemology
and ontology.WhereasOckham reduces
all the extra-mentalrealityto individualthings,they tryto prove that
therealso existuniversalthings,even thoughsuch thingsdo not existin
the worldin separationfromindividualthings.Such universalthingsare
represented
by universalobjects,whichthemselvesare represented
by universal concepts.
Accordingto Hervaeus,the divisionof intentionsinto firstand second
intentionis drawn accordingto objects representedby conceptsand not
to conceptsrepresenting
are objectswhosedefinition
objects.Firstintentions
does not containa referenceto the mind. By contrast,second intentions
are objects whose definitioncontainsa referenceto the mind. Thus, if
man is a firstintention,species is a second intention.But accordingto
such a vocabulary,individualthingslike Socrates and universalthings
likeman are firstintentions,
so both thingshave a certaindegreeof thingness or reality(realitas
mind-inde), because both thingsare definitionally
To
be
some
first
intention
is
not
a
real
sure,
pendent.24
metaphysically
24See Hervaeus,
Tractatus
desecundis
intentionibus,
1489,fol.4a-b.
q. 1,a. 1,ed. Parisiis
See alsoFranciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),294-5,11.11-36.
, I, III, a. 2, ed.Amerini
Logica
OftenHervaeus
between
andthingness
or reality
distinguishes
thing
(res)
(realitas
). Strictly
substances
arethings.
andtheothercatespeaking,
onlyindividuad
Qualities,
quantities,
arethings
senseoftheterm.
Butsubstantial
universais
arenot
gories
onlyin a broader

11:37:20 AM

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

thing.Indeed, fictiveentities,like chimaeras,are firstintentionsas well.

For they are definitionally
However, they are metamind-independent.
unreal
physically
things.Nonetheless,among firstintentionswe can find
some metaphysically
real things,like Socrates and man. They constitute
the class of thingswhose existencein the actual world is logicallypossible, i.e. itemsthatcan somehowexistin the actuadworld,and hence can
be somehowreferredto by simpleor complex expressionsof the natural
language.
According to Hervaeus, Franciscus,and Stephanus, to preservethe
entireextensionof the categorialtable and to defendthe real foundation
of intra-categorial
notions are part of one and the same philosophical
strategy.Individualitemsand universalitemsconstitutethe extra-mental
world. In his Treatise
on Universais
, writtenbetween 1341 and 1343,25but
especiallyin his Logica,writtenin 1343-1344,26Franciscuspointsout that
the Problemof Realism involvestwo main questions:(A) the questionof
a universalitem's beingand (B) the question of its unity.Accordingto
Franciscus'sreconstruction,
we can have threemain answersto such questions.The firstresponseis that of Ockham. He answersnegativelyboth
world thereare not
(A) and (B). For he upholdsthatin the extra-mental
universalthingsand consequentlysuch universalthingscannot be unified
The second responseis that of John Duns Scotus and Walter
things.27
Burley.They answer positivelyboth (A) and (B). For they uphold that
we can somehow deduce the existenceof extra-mentaluniversaisand
hence to establishthat theyhave a real unity,even thoughtheirunityis
less than numericalunity,which is real unityin the strongestsense.28
Finally, the third response is that of Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus
Natalis. They answerpositively(A) but negatively(B). Accordingto them,
forinstance,the universalmanexistsin the world,but it existsas a unified
object only in the mind. In otherwords,in the extra-mentalworld we
have(andhenceare)a thingness
orreality
outside
themind.
For
Nonetheless,
things.
they
ofa reflexive
andcomparative
actofmind.See e.g.Hervaeus,
theyare nottheresult
I Librum
d. 2, q. 2, respondeo
Sententiarum,
Scriptum
super
, ed. Venetiis
1505,fols.1Ovallrb;
Quodlibet
III, q. 3, respondeo
, ed. Venetiis
1513,fols.71ra-73ra;
VII, q. 15,respondeo
, fol.
143va-b.
25On thetimeofcomposition,
seeAmerini
2003(above,n. 16),7-15.
26On thetimeofcomposition,
seeAmerini
2005(above,n. 11),50-5.
27See Franciscus,
2005(above,
n. 11),307-10;Tractatus
I, IV, a. 1,ed.Amerini
Logica,
deunwersalibus
2003(above,n. 16),61-75.
, a. 2, ed.Amerini
28See Franciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),310-4;Tractatus
, I, IV, a. 2, ed.Amerini
Logica
deunwersalibus
2003(above,n. 16),75-84.
, a. 3, ed. Amerini

11:37:20 AM

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201

can find thingsthat are men, but a man can exist as an object only
in the mind.29But what does entitleus to say that man exists outside
the mind?
In orderto answerthisquestion,Franciscusclaims thatit is necessary
to clarifythe relationthat holds betweenuniversaisand singulars,which
also is the main point stressedby Ockham. The problemwith such an
attempt,however,is to overcomeOcham's explicitdenial thatthereexists
distinctionholding between two really
some kind of mind-independent
identicalthings.Accordingto Ockham, indeed, if two thingsare really
- this is the case if a
or really non-identical
different
propertycan be
predicatedof one of thembut not of the other , thentheycan be really
separated. But if two thingscannot be really separated,then they are
reallyidentical,so that whateveris predicatedof one of them is predicated of the otheras well. Like Ockham, Franciscusrejectsany kind of
distinctionthat is midwaybetweena real distinctionand one of reason.
Hervaeus criticisedHenry of Ghent's notion of intentionaldistinction,
too.30Similarly,FranciscuscriticisesScotus'snotionof formaldistinction.31
in order
Franciscusseems to thinkthatto posit a thirdkindof distinction
to solve some philosophicalor theologicalproblemsamounts simplyto
we invokean intentionalor
lookingforan ad hocsolution.Furthermore,

29See Franciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),314-8;butalso
, I, IV, a. 3, ed. Amerini
Logica
Tractatus
deuniversalibus,
a. 4, ed. Amerini
2003(above,n. 16),85-100.
30Cf.e.g.Hervaeus,
Henricum
deGandavo
Tractatus
dequattuor
materiis
conta
, II, ms.Vatican,
intentionis
nichilest.(. . .)
"Differentia
Bibl.Apost.Vat.,vat.lat.859,fols.44va-46va:
- quoddam
differre
de Gandavo]
Tertiam
autemdistinctionem
quamponit[seil.Henricus
- reputo
differre
intentione
reetdifferre
scilicet
medium
<inter
differre>
frivolam,
rationis,
differentia
estsecundum
aliquodesse;setomneessevelestessereivelratioquiaomnis
esserationis;
setque
esserealevelsecundum
differentia
estvelsecundum
nis;ergoomnis
tanesserationis
secundum
secundum
essereale,differunt
differunt
re;queverodifferunt
doctrine
On HenryofGhent's
necestponeremedium".
ratione
tantum;
tum,differunt
andHenry
ofintentional
seeJ. F. Wippel,
distinction,
of
ofGhent's
Theory
ofFontaines
Godfiey
Between
Essence
andExistence
Intentional
Distinction
, in:T. W. Koehler
procerum
(ed.),Sapientiae
intentionnelle
dela distinction
Lesdiverses
amore
chezHenri
, Roma1974;R. Macken,
applications
York1981,
undErkenntnis
imMittelalter
deGand
, Berlin-New
, in:J.P. Beckmann
(ed.),Sprache
769-76.
31Cf.Franciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),312-3,11.50-81.
, I, IV, a. 2, ed.Amerini
Logica
The
seeA. B. Wolter,
distinction
andOckham's
On Scotus's
doctrine
offormal
criticism,
DunsScotus
M. Bonansea
Formal
Distinction
1265-1965,
, in:J.K. Ryan-B.
Washington
(eds),
John
Studies
Distinction
Ockham
andtheFormal
D.C. 1965,45-60;D. P. Henry,
, in: Franciscan
andDistinction
onIdentity
25 (1965),285-92;M. McCordAdams,Ockham
, in: Franciscan
Studies
36 (1976),25-43.

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AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

formal distinctionin order to explain how it is possible to predicate

real (i.e. numerical)propertiesof individualand universalthings,
different
which are in factidentical,under the assumptionthat the distinctionof
to do thejob. But if thisthe case, how could such
reason is not sufficient
if it too is less than real
an intentionalor formeddistinctionbe sufficient
as
Hervaeus
argued againstHenry of Ghent,so
(i.e. numerical)?Finally,
Scotus
that
the domain of being is basically
Franciscusargues against
are two pasbipartite.Hence, since being identicaland being different
sions (passiones)of being, it followsthat we can have two and only two
- if it is true that a
kinds of relationof distinctionand identity
passion
has not to exceed the subjectof which it is predicated.32
a 'realist'philosophermustrethink
Accordingto Franciscus,therefore,
in such a way to avoid Ockham's remarkswithof the rationaldistinction
out accepting,as Burleydoes, a strongreal distinctionbetweenindividuals and universais.Again, Franciscusfindsthe clue to the solutionin
Hervaeus's works.In particular,in his Quodlibet
I, q. 9, Hervaeus rejects
or
some traditionalways of explainingthe foundationof intra-categorial
essentialnotions.Hervaeus argues that we ought not to posit metaphysas Simon of Favershamand
icallystrangeentitieslike extrinsicapparently
RadulphusBritodo, forinstance,in orderto explainsuch notions.Talking
this course simplymeans to be confrontedwith the problemagain. For
as well.
the question of foundationoccurs in the case of such apparentia
Nor is it necessaryto invokedifferent
degreesof impressionthatone and
the same thingproducesin the mind,as Aureoli does. For otherwisewe
such impresshall no longerhave extra-mental
groundsfordistinguishing
sions and preventingthe correspondingnotionsfrombeing merelyarbitraryones. Nor, finally,ought we to follow Scotus in positinga real
32See above,n. 30; seealsoHervaeus,
deformis,
Bibi.
Tractatus
, ms.Vatican,
respondeo
ensrealeet
ratiotalisest:sicutinvenitur
Apost.Vat.,vat.lat.859,fol.103ra:"Secunda
Tractatus
de
differre
re et solaratione";
ensrationis,
ita oportet
ponerequodinveniatur
I Librum
n. 30),II, fol.40rb;Scriptum
contra
Henricum
deGandavo
materiis
, (above,
super
quattuor
Sententiarum
1505;Quodlibet
I, q. 2; III, qq. 1 and3,
, d. 2, q. 2; d. 19,q. 3, ed. Venetiis
1513.Furthermore,
derelationibus,
ed. Venetiis
1513;Tractatus
q. 1, aa. 1-2,ed. Venetiis
a. 3, ed.Mojsisch
n. 18),157-8,
deprima
etsecunda
seeFranciscus,
Tractatus
intentione,
(above,
in: Bochumer
n. 2; Tractatus
desextranscendentibus
, a. 1, ed. B. Mojsisch,
Philosophisches
n. 2; Stephanus,
Tractatus
deente
reali
firAntike
undMittelalter,
5 (2000),177-8,
Jahrbuch
as well.
n. 18).Thesameposition
is endorsed
etrationis
byDurandofSt.Pourain
(above,
I Librum
Sententiarum
See e.g.Scriptum
1571,fol.17ra;
, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, ed. Venetiis
super
d. 33,q. 1,a. 1,respondeo
fol.17va-b;
d. 8, q. 2, fols.35rb-36rb;
d. 2, q. 2, respondeo,
, fols.
d. 36,q. 3, a. 1, respondeo
91vb-92va;
, fol.98ra.

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ONTOLOGIGAL
A REPLYTO OCKHAM'S

203

withinthe thing.In sum,positingin the extra-mental

stratification
intrinsic
fromthe things
different
or extrinsically
worldentitiesthatare intrinsically
But on the
notions.33
to
not
themselvesdoes
help explain intra-categorial
conditionto generate
otherhand a thingon its own is not a sufficient
solve
this
How
to
notions.
puzzle?
intra-categorial
Hervaeustriesto solvethe puzzle givingnew lifeto the old Porretanean
notion of 'conformity'
). His answer is that in order to form
(<conformitas
to hold that a thingbears different
notionsit is sufficient
intra-categorial
to other things. The relation of conformityis
relations of conformitas
world. Differentkindsof conforabsolutelygroundedon the extra-mental
mitasare caused by one and the same substantialform,whichexistsinside
the thingitself.So Hervaeus invertsAureoli's typicalway of solvingthe
notionsformation.That one and the same
problem of intra-categorial
is
in
mind impressionsof different
the
to
is
able
intensity
produce
thing
find
we
can
different
to the
due to the factthatcorresponding
impression
which
kindsand degreesof the relationof conformitas
in the thingdifferent
the thingitselfbears to other things.The mind formsessentialnotions
and unifyingsuch kindsand degrees.With regardto natby identifying
can be describedin terms
ural physicalbodies, thisrelationof conformitas
of biologicalfunctionsperformedby a naturalphysicalbody.34
Several times Hervaeus defendsthe doctrineof the unityof substantial form,35
providinga merelyextensionalaccount of the relationship
to each otheramounts
of conformitas.
SayingthatA and B have a conformitas
and specifically
to saying that A and B share a numericallydifferent
whichare performed
similarset of biologicalfunctions,
by theirsubstantial
forms.For instance,Socratesand Plato share the same formalfunctioning
and material organisation,which are grounded upon two numerically
substantialformsand two numericallydifferent
different
corporealbodies,
different
a
have
Plato
and
In
Socrates
body,
numerically
respectively. fact,
it
in
because
similar
is
nonetheless
which
supportsa specifically
species,
set of biologicalfunctions.Likely,they
similar(and numericallydifferent)

33Cf.Hervaeus,
1513,fols.19rafoil.
I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis
Quodlibet
34OftenHervaeus
or 'operations
as 'abilities'
labelssuchfunctions
(opera
[habilitates)
Venetiis
ed.
d.
I
Sententiarum
Seee.g.Hervaeus,
,
, 2,q. 2,respondeo
superLibrum
Scriptum
tiones).
II Librum
Sententiarum
seePeterAureoli,
ofsuchnotions,
,
1505.Fora critique
super
Scriptum
d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, ed. Romae1605,fols.60 ff.
35Forinstance,
deformis
in hisTractatus
, fols.98rb-118ra,
esp.fols.102vbloll,(above,
n. 32).

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FABRIZIO
AMERESTI

substantialform,whichis nonethelesssimilar
have a numericallydifferent
in species,because first,it enables them to performcertainfunctionsin
the same way and second, it is supportedby a specificallysimilar(and
materiatistructure,i.e. the organic physicalbody.
numericallydifferent)
functions
the
different
Thus,
performedby one and the same substantial
of the relaformentitleus eitherto providean extensionalinterpretation
of such
or to distinguish
different
degrees-extensions
tionshipof conformitas
a relationship.
notions can be distinguishedfromeach
As a result,intra-categorial
to
the
mind.
other by reference
Indeed, the mind unifiesthe biological
functionsshared by a class of thingsin universalconcepts,to each of
which one singleformalobject corresponds.So the inter-actionbetween
the world and the mind comparingthingsis a necessaryconditionfor
having essentialpropertiesas unifiednotions,i.e. for havingthe notions
of essentialproperties.The mind can formintra-categorial
notions,but
the world is made in such a way as to enablethe mind to formintracategorialnotions.This means that essentialpropertiesare not caused
by the mind. Nor does the mind simplydiscoverthem in the
arbitrarily
world. For outside the mind there do not exist essentialproperties,but
thatthenthe mind
rathersubstantialformsperforming
biologicalfunctions
can describeas essentialpropertiesof a substantialsubject.For instance,
rational,animal, and man do not existas unifiedthingin the world,but
in the worldwe findsuch facultiesas rationality,
ensouledbeing,and livfrom
which
we
can
rational
being,
acquire the notionsof rational,
ing
and
Moreover,one and the same thingcananimal,
man, respectively.
notionsof rational,animal, and man, but
not give rise to the different
our mind can form such notions by comparing and grouping things
conformitates.
accordingto different
We are now in a positionto understandhow Franciscustriesto avoid
Ockham's response.Accordingto Franciscus,animal and man, Peterand
man, for instance,are reallyidentical,as Ockham claims,but theyare
convertibilit,
not entirely
(totaliter,
r) identical.In spite of Ockham's remarks,
it is not problematicto finda propertythat can be predicatedof Peter
and not of man, or vice versa. But findingsuch a propertydoes not
or reallynonamountto provingthatPeter and man are reallydifferent
identicalaccordingto a positiverespect,so that theycan be reallyseparate. Peter and man are reallyidenticalif they are compared to each
other,but theyare not entirelyidenticalif theyare comparedto another

11:37:20 AM

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205

singularman.36Franciscusis aware, however,thatsomeone could object.

Indeed, if two thingsare not entirelyidentical,theyare not identicalin
But Franciscusconteststhe
any respect;hence, theyare reallydifferent.37
'two
of
this
thingsare not identicalin any
strength
consequence. Saying
to formulating
an invalid
hence
are
different'
amounts
they
really
respect,
consequence,because no thingin the world is identicalwithitselfin any
fromitself.According
respect,but no thingin the worldis reallydifferent
.38Therefore,the
to Franciscus,here we have a case offallaciaconsequents
followingconsequencesare valid: 'if Peter and man are identicalin any
respect,theyare identical','if Peter and man are not identical,theyare
not identicalin any respect'.But the followingconsequencesare invalid:
'ifPeterand man are identical,theyare identicalin any respect','ifPeter
and man are not identicalin any respect,theyare not identical'.39
Again, thisis Hervaeus's doctrine.In severalworks,indeed, Hervaeus
definesreal identityin termsof referential
identityand entirelyreal idenin
of
is
defined
terms
of
the
Therefore,
principle co-predication.40
tity
36See e.g.Franciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),317,11.78I, IV, a. 3, ed. Amerini
Logica
11.516-29pasdeuniversalibus,
a. 4, ed.Amerini
2003(above,n. 16),99-100,
88; Tractatus
et
suntidemrealiter
et essentialiter
et singulare,
ad invicem
sim:"universale
comparata,
in comparatione
ad tertium,
idestin
et singulare,
differunt
solaratione
(. . .) universale
non
et singulare
realiter
ad aliquidsingulare,
(. . .) universale
distinguuntur
comparatione
et in plus
Cuiusratioestquiaex quo universale
suntidemconvertibiliter.
pluraincludit
a. 5, 113,11.457-9;
se habetquamsingulare,
sequitur
quodnonsuntidemconvertibiliter";
realiter
se
sicdiversimode
11.643-94passim:
"exhocautemquodhomoetPetrus
119-21,
sedsequitur
differrent
nonsequitur
habent
ad Martinm,
realiter,
quodhomoet Petrus
See also Stephanus,
sed nonconvertibiliter".
quodhomoet Petrussintidemrealiter,
Bibi.Uniw.,IV. Q. 4, fol.15va:"illa
, lec.V, q. 3, ms.Wroclaw,
Scriptum
super
Porphyrium
'hocesthoc'
de alio predicatione
dicente
unumpredicatur
suntidemrealiter
quorum
realiter
de
unumpredicatur
convertibiliter
quorum
( . . .), sedillanonsuntidemrealiter
etrationis
deente
reali
, fol.59r-v(above,n. 18).
aliud";Tractatus
quo nonpredicatur
37Cf.Franciscus,
deuniversalibus
Tractatus
2003(above,n. 16),119,
, a. 5, ed. Amerini
nonsunt
ad se <invicem>
11.667-9:"Sed forte
dicetur:
si homoet Petrus,
comparati,
sedquaenonsuntidem
idemconvertibiliter,
modis;
sequitur
quodnonsuntidemomnibus
omnibus
differunt
modis,
aliquomodorealiter".
38Cf.Franciscus,
deuniversalibus
Tractatus
2003(above,n. 16),119, a. 5, ed. Amerini
nonsuntidem[realiter]
homoetPetrus
"istaestmalaconsequentia
20,11.672-85
passim:
estfalomnibus
modis,
(. . .) Undein taliprocessu
ergodifferunt
aliquomodorealiter.
laciaconsequentis".
39Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
2003(above,n. 16),119, a. 5, ed. Amerini
20,11.685-94.
40See e.g.Hervaeus,
1513,fol.7rb-va;
I, q. 2, ad 7 andad 9, ed. Venetiis
Quodlibet
derelationibus,
II, q. 7, fol.47rb;Tractatus
q. 1, a. 1, ed.
q. 9, fol.20rb;butespecially
Venetiis
1513,fols.54vb-55ra.

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

sayingthat Peter and man are reallyidenticalamountssimplyto saying

that Peter is a man and Peter is all that a man is. By contrast,saying
thatPeterand man are not entirelyidenticalamountsto sayingthatman
is more extendedthan Peter,so thatit is not truein an unqualifiedway
that man is Peter and man is all that Peter is. For thereis at least one
propertythat can be predicatedof Peter and not of man or vice versa.
Hervaeus summariseshis doctrinein two principles:
(1) the fact that A and B are reallyidenticalin everyrespectentails
or really
the factthatA and B are reallyidentical,i.e. not reallydifferent

non-identical;
(2) but the factthat A and B are not reallyidenticalin everyrespect
does not entail the fact that A and B are not reallyidentical,i.e. really
or reallynon-identical,so that we can say that A is not really
different
fromB or reallynon-B.
B or that it is reallydifferent
Hervaeus's argumentseems to be solid. Nonetheless,we could draw
fromit a thirdconsequencethatcould soundproblematicto bothHervaeus
and Franciscus:
(3) if A and B are not reallyidenticalin everyrespect,A and B are
or reallynon-identicalin some respect,because we can
reallydifferent
finda propertyP such that we can say that A is reallyP and B is not
reallyP.
Hervaeus could accept it with some qualification,while Franciscus
explicitlyrejectsit. Indeed, Hervaeus's basic idea seems to be thatthings
can have different
degreesof real identity.When two thingshave a certain degree of real identitythere is not real distinctionwith respectto
such a degree. Nonetheless,we can say that two thingscould not be
reallyidenticalwithrespectto anotherdegree.All thissimplymeans that
real
real identitydoes not come in degrees,but extensionally
intensionally
in
extended
with
is
classes,
increasingly
things
grouping
identity compatible
which overlap and hence enable us to extractfromone and the same
which
notions.Each overlappingestablishesa real identity,
thingdifferent
to
describe
is nonethelessextensionallypartial. Thus, Hervaeus prefers
of classes ratherthan as an un-graduatedlogidentityas an intersection
ical relation.Therefore,such a purelyextensionalaccount of real idennotions,because
intra-categorial
tityenables the mind to formdifferent
with
one and the same thingis naturallyinclinedto connect differently
To be sure, only the
other things,by way of the relationof conformitas.
mindcan recogniseand hence conceptuallyunifysuch connections.Nonetheless,such connectionsare reallygroundedon co-specificthingsthatare

11:37:20 AM

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207

linkedwitheach otherindependently
of and previouslyto any act of the
mind.
As we said, Franciscusrejects(3). But his argumentis somehow disconcerting.Franciscusargues that fromthe fact that A and B are not
entirelyidenticalwith regard to R it does not followthat A and B are
somehow differentwith regard to R.41 In order to understand fully
Franciscus'sposition,we mustkeep in mind that forFranciscusit is not
possible to conclude fromthe proposition'A and B are not somehow
identical'theproposition'A and B are somehownon-identical'.
Therefore,
althoughit mightbe allowed thatman and Petersomehoware not really
identical,because they are not entirelyidentical,it cannot be allowed
thatman and Peter are somehowreallynon-identical.As a consequence,
it cannot be allowed that man and Peter are somehowreallydifferent.42
The argumentappears logicallyweak. But I shall returnon this argument in the conclusionsof the paper.
For the timebeing,let me sum up what we said untilnow. Distinction
and unityof reason are generatedfromthingsby way of an act of mind.
The relationof conformitas
is the remotefoundationof the conceptualunity
possessed by any kind of predicable,while the proximatefoundationis
providedby universalconceptsthatrepresentindeterminately
thingspossome
Here
is
one
of
the
most
crucial
texts
conformitas.
sessing
by Hervaeus
this
concerning
topic:
Distinction
of reasonderives
fromreality
as froma remote
albeitby
foundation,
- as wesaidinthequestion
- ; likewise,
meansofa concept
ofmind
onformalities
the
or theunity
ofreasonamongthings,
likethataccording
to
(convenientia)
agreement
whichindividuals
in genera,
andspecies
forinstance,
from
derives
agreein species
as from
a remote
albeitbymeansofan operation
oftheintellect.
foundation,
reality
wemust
knowapartandindependently
ofanyoperation
ofintellect,
there
Therefore,
41Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
2003(above,n. 16),121,
, a. 5, ed. Amerini
11.728-40passim
: "cumulterius
dicitur
si homo
etPetrus
nonsunt
idem
omnibus
modis
realiter
,
modo
realiter
Petrus
, dicoquodnonsequitur
ergo
differunt
aliquo
(. . .) sicutetiamnonsequitur
nonestomnishomo,ergoPetrus
estaliquidnon-homo,
velsicutnonsequitur
Petrus
nonestomnibus
modisidentitatis
et omnibus
modisunitatis
homo,ergoPetrus
aliquo
modoestnon-homo".
42Cf.Franciscus,
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
2003(above,n. 16),121,
, a. 5, ed. Amerini
11.741-57passim
: "Hie etiamnotaquodaliudestdicerequodaliquaduo aliquomodo
nonsuntidemet aliudestdicerequodaliquaduoaliquomodosuntnon-idem.
(. . .) Et
ideodatoquodpossit
concedi
<inter
se> aliquomodononsintidem
quodhomoetPetrus
tamen
nonpotest
concedi
realiter,
quianonsuntidemconvertibiliter,
quodhomoetPetrus
< reali
inter
se aliquomodosintnon-idem
nonpotest
concedi
ter>;etperconsequens
quod
inter
se aliquo<modo>differrent
realiter".

11:37:20 AM

208

FABRIZIO
AMERINI
is conformity
and thisconformity
is greater
or lesserwith
amongdifferent
things
todifferent
thisconformity
is nottheunity
ofreason
Moreover,
regard
things.
itself,
butitsremote
foundation
thisconformity,
which
isintheextra-mental
(. . .) andfrom
a remote
canbe derived
theunity
(exnatura
things
bynature
rei),as from
foundation,
tothereason,
which
is theunity
ofthegenusandofanyother
according
predicable.
invirtue
ofsucha conformity
twomenaredisposed
tomove[the
Indeed,
bynature
towards
oneconcept,
which
is really
oneandtowhich
as one
intellect]
corresponds,
maninan indeterminate
i.e.without
Socrates
andPlato.Andtheunity
state,
object,
ofthisobject,
whichbelongs
to itwhentheobjectexists
in thiswayobjectively
in
theintellect,
as a cognised
intheknower,
anditsseparation
from
are
thing
singulars
a unity
and a separation
to thereason(. . .). Andso thefirst
doubtis
according
i.e.howtheunity
ofanypredicable
whatsoever
is derived,
foritis derived
explained,
fromthatrealconformity
as from
a remote
sucha unity
is
foundation;
however,
derived
from
a concept
oftheintellect,
thething
immediately
representing
cognised
in an indeterminate
to thatoneconcept.43
way,in so faras itcorresponds

Hervaeus's statementenables us to redefineAureoli's doctrine.The poswithdifferent

sibilitya thinghas to exhibitmore or less conformitas
things
is the reason why one and the same thing,according to one and the
same form,is able to generatedifferent
concepts,which representin a
more or less confuseway that thing.And this is a primitiveand nonreducible fact concerningthe extra-mentalworld. At the same time,
Hervaeus's argumentsofferto his Italian pupils a possible way to reply
to Ockham's arguments.Indeed, it is possible to say that,if two things
are reallyidentical,then whateveris predicatedof one of them is predicated of the otheras well if and onlyif such thingsare entirelyidentical
if such thingsare identicaland in additiontheirnames
or, alternatively,
43Cf.Hervaeus,
"Sicutdistinctio
secunQuodlibet
I, q. 9, ed.Venetiis
1513,fol.19va-b:
dumrationem
habetortum
a re sicuta fundamento
mediante
tarnen
remoto,
conceptu
sicutdictum
estin questione
deformalitatbus
siveunitas
intellectus,
, itaedamconvenientia
secundum
sicutindividua
conveniunt
in specieetspecies
conveniunt
rationem,
aliquorum
ingenere,
habetortum
a resicuta fundamento
mediante
tarnen
intelremoto,
operatione
lectus.
Undesciendum
resex naturarei,circumscripta
omnioperaquodinterdiversas
tioneintellectus,
estconformitas
et istainvenitur
maioretminor
et
diversorum,
respectu
istaconformitas
nonestipsaunitas
sedestsuumfundamentum
remotum
rationis,
(. . .) et
ab istaconformitate,
unitas
secundum
rei,accipitur
quaeestinrebusex natura
rationem,
velcuiuscumque
alterius
sicuta fundamento
remoto.
que estunitasgeneris
predicabilis,
Namduo homines
ex taliconformitate
natisuntmovere
ad unumconceptum,
qui est
unius{fort
. prounus)secundum
homoindetermirem,cui ut unumobiectum
respondet
natesineSorteetPlatone.
Et unitas
istius
utsicestinintellectu
obiecti,
quesibiconvenit
obiective
sicutcognitum
incognoscente,
a singularibus
estunitas
etsepeiusque
separatio
aratiosecundum
rationem
scilicet
(. . .). Et sicpatetad primum
dubium,
quomodo
accipiturunitas
realiaccipitur
uta fundamento
cuiuscumque
predicabilis,
quiaab illaconformitate
seda conceptu
intellectus
indeterminate
remintellectam
remoto,
representante
accipitur
illaunitas
immediate
illiuniconceptui".
proutindeterminate
respondet

11:37:20 AM

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209

In otherwords,once the
for one and the same thing.44
stand (supponimi)
we
Ockham's
is
can
arguments.But
identity qualifiedreferentially,
accept
if we separate the relationof identityfroma given reference,and consider it as the resultof an intersectionof increasinglymore extended
classes of things,then it is absolutelypossible to claim that two things
are reallyidenticalbut different
accordingto the reason,given that they
are not entirely(really)identical,because it is possibleto finda property
that is predicatedof one of them but not of the other.
Franciscusendorses completelyHervaeus's position. In particular,in
and V (On Categories
his Logica,partI, treatisesIV (On Predicables)
), Franciscus
as
Ockham's
doctrine
Hervaeus's
doctrine
to
developedin
reject
employs
the SummaLogicae.The goal of Franciscus'sanalysisis to defenda real
distinctionamong the categoriesand a reedfoundationof essentialintracategorialnotions.Franciscusobservesthat the term 'thing' (res)can be
taken in two ways.45On the one hand, it means a real essence, and in
thissense only the firstthreecategoriesare 'things'.On the otherhand,
the term'thing'means a mode of being of a real essence,and thisis the
way the otherseven categoriesare 'things'.
The defenceof the entirecategorialtable engagesFranciscusin a long
discussion.If not details,at least the centralpoint of his strategyshould
be clear by now. Invokingagain Hervaeus's doctrine,he stressesthat a
categorycan be consideredin two ways,eitheras an intentionor as the
contentof an intention.While Ockham understandsthe categoriesin the
firstway, Franciscusopts forthe second one. Franciscusdefendsthe realityof each categoryin the same way as he defendedthe realityof universais. Let me cite a final example. Franciscusupholds that it is not
possibleto statethatsubstanceand quantityare reallyidentical.For otherwise substantialpropertieswould be quantitativeproperties,and vice
44Cf.Hervaeus,
1513,fol.20rb:"iliamaiorhabetveriI, q. 9, ed. Venetiis
Quodlibet
diciad istam
etconvertibilits
tatem
maiorem,
(. . .) Aliter
potest
quandosuntidemrealiter
estquando
et cetera,
dicendum
quodverum
quodquandoaliquaduosuntidemrealiter
homini
suntidemet supponunt
animali,
rpugnt
proeodem,undequicquidrpugnt
et supponit
proeo".
proutidemestcumhomine
45Cf.Franciscus,
2005(above,n. 11),381,11.104-18;
, I, V, a. 1, ed. Amerini
Logica
n.32),215,11.971-5.Franciscus
2000(above,
Tractatus
desextranscendentbus
, a. 6,ed.Mojsisch
as it
between
from
Thomasthedistinction
alsoinherits
[resinsofar
thing'
'metaphysical
as it comesfromreor,
and 'epistemological
comesfromratus,
-a, -urn)
thing'(resinsofar
andsecondgenus
between
first
distinction
connects
withHervaeus's
thathepartially
reris),
IV Libros
Sententiarum
Cf.ThomasAquinas,
ofknowable
, I, d. 25,
Scriptum
super
things.
q. 1,a. 4, respondeo.

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FABRIZIO
AMERESTI

versa. On the other hand, there are propertiesthat substancehas, but

not quantity.46
Therefore,we can conclude that substanceand quantity
are not reallyidentical;hence they are really different.
But if we look
more closelyat his argument,we see that,in the case of categories,idenIn fact,
titycannot play the same role it plays in the case of universalis.
the above-mentionedargumententitlesus to conclude thatsubstanceand
quantityare not entirely
reallyidentical,but not that substanceand quantityare not reallyidentical.Thus, ifwe examinethe argumentsFranciscus
invokesto reject Ockham's doctrine,we realise that most of them are
physicalor empiricalarguments,insisting,for instance,on the impossibilityof there being a movementtowardssubstance,on the contradicof dimensions,and so on, while some other
torynotion of simultaneity
are
authoritative
arguments
simply
arguments,drawing on Aristotle's
In
some
as well seems to have realisedthat
Franciscus
measure,
Physics.
it is not possible to use the same patternof arguments,based upon the
relationof identity,
in orderto distinguish
the categoriesfromeach other.
Conclusions
As the previousdiscussionhas shown,Franciscusde Prato's writingstesformsof ontoltifythat Hervaeus's realismis one of the most influential
in
in
the
half
first
of
XlVth
ogy present Italy
Century.Hervaeus's realism
is usuallycontrastedwiththe 'exaggerated'realismof Scotus and Burley,
on the one hand, and with the 'reduced' realism of Ockham, on the
otherhand.
and logical conThey testifyalso that Dominicans favour a negative
ceptionof what is real. In fact,accordingto such a conceptionwhatever
can be definedas mind-independent
countsas real. In a narrowersense,
real
is
whatever
can
instead,
provide the ground for a truthful
concept
or judgementabout the extra-mental
world. Therefore,thereis no perfectoverlappingof logical realismand metaphysicalrealism.
Basically,Hervaeus's and Franciscus'smetaphysicalontologyis made
up of threekindsof items:(i) things,which are subdividedinto absolute
non-inhering
things,i.e. substances,and absoluteinheringthings,i.e. qualitiesand quantities;(ii) externalmodes of being of things,i.e. non-absolute
inheringthings,namelythe last seven accidentalcategories;(iii) internal
46Cf.Logica,
2005(above,n. 11),415-24.
I, V, a. 7, ed.Amerini

11:37:20 AM

A REPLYTO OCKHAM'S
ONTOLOGICAL
PROGRAM

2 11

modes of being of things,i.e. intra-categorical

properties.These itemsare
what correspondsto universalconcepts and what universalobjects represent.Moreover,these itemscoincide with what is signifiedby a common termof the ordinarylanguage. For thatreason,in severaloccasions
Franciscustalksof predicationof things(knownand signified)and contrastssuch a predicationwithOckham's idea thatpropositionexclusively
concernslinguisticsigns.47
Nonetheless, one is left with the impression that Hervaeus's and
Franciscus'slogical devices concerningthe relationsof identityand distinctiondo not reallywork and that the only way to counterOckham's
remarksavailable to a realistis the one followedby Burley.Indeed, the
problemraised by Ockham concernspreciselythe identitybetweenuniversaisand individualswhen identityis referentially
qualified.But in this
case it seems difficult
to avoid the conclusionthat individualsand universaisare entirely
reallyidentical,if the principleof co-predicationin fact
holds. But grantingboth the principleof co-predicationand the real distinctionbetween individualsand universaisamounts to grantingall the
problematicconsequencesOckham draws,forinstancethe predicationof
incompatiblepropertiesof one and the same thing.To put thingsanother
way, grantingthatamountsto grantingthattwo thingsare entirelyreally
identicalaccording to one respectand are not entirelyreally identical
accordingto anotherrespect.But thisimpliesa contradiction.For to be
entirelyreally identical means preciselyto be really identical in every
respect.
Franciscus'sargumentagainst(3) seemsto implytwo logFurthermore,
ical mistakes.On the one hand, two thingsthat are not entirelyidentical can be at the same time really identical and not really identical,
withoutthis latterclaim entailingthat such thingsare somehow really
On the otherhand, it seems to be perfectlyrightto conclude
different.
that two thingsare really non-identicalif they are not reallyidentical,
unlessbeing non-identicalsimplymeans being entirelynon-identical(but
thisis not the case accordingto Franciscus'sargument).
47On sucha topic,seeF. Amerini,
de
deFranois
etlangage
mental.
Unecritique
Catgories
Actesdu
mdivale
desCatgories
d'Occam
Prato
Guillaume
, in La tradition
sicles),
(XIIe-XVe
6-10Juin
mdivales
XIIIeSymposium
de logiqueet de smantique
(Avignon,
europen
de
ditions
de l'Institut
Suprieur
2000),runis
parJolBiardet IrneRosier-Catach,
173-86;
2003,
Peeters,
(Ma)
Louvain-la-Neuve-Louvain-Paris-Dudley
Philosophie-ditions
Amerini
2005(above,n. 22).

11:37:20 AM

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AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

of reason appears unsatisFinally,the real account of the difference

to
Hervaeus
and
Franciscus,the mind plays a decifactory.According
sive role in identifyingand diversifying
intra-categoricalnotions, by
comparingthingswith each other.So we face an alternative.Eitherwe
are forthe existencein the worldof somethingreallydistinctthatdirects
our mind towardsintra-categorical
notions,but Franciscusseems to think
that thisis a too strongformof realism,or we confineourselvesto saying that the distinctionof reason has only a groundin the extra-mental
world, as Franciscusin fact says. But this does not seem to be realistic
enough,because it simplyestablishesa negativeconclusion,i.e. thatintracategoricalnotionsare not arbitrary.Therefore,if this is the case, it is
difficult
to avoid Aureoli's suggestionto the effectthat the mind simply
startsfromthe world, but then it autonomouslyformsintra-categorical
notionsaccordingto different
one and the same thingproduces
impressions
on it.
In any case, apart fromsome pointsof weakness,Franciscus'sreplyis
an importantpiece of evidenceforour understanding
of both timesand
modes of the diffusion
of Ockham's philosophyin Italy as well as forthe
of the attemptmade by Hervaeus's pupils at reformulatreconstruction
ing in a new (i.e. herveian)vocabularythe 'moderate' ontologicalrealism of Thomas Aquinas.
Parma
ofParma
University

11:37:20 AM

Contributions
induplicate
should
be submitted
andbe accompanied
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andthetextmust
Manuscripts
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andin goodliterary
The manuscripts
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