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Vivarium

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1996

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXXIV (1996)

''

68*

E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

19:47:48 PM

VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXXIV (1996)

E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

19:47:48 PM

VIVARIUM

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

AN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUALLIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
to theprofane
vivarium
sideof mediis devotedin particular
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(Nijmegen)
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(Madison).
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(Groningen)
Courtenay,
oftheEditorial
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19:47:48 PM

CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XXXIV (1996)

Isabel Moreira:
Salt Lake City
, Utah

Augustine'sThree Visions and Three


Heavens in Some Early Medieval Flo-

Reviews

Irne Rosier,La parolecomme


acte.Surla
XIIIe
et
la
au
sicle
grammaire smantique

1
rilegia
Klaus Jacobi, Christian Fromintellectusverus/falsusto thedictum propositions:The Semantics
Strub, Peter King:
ofPeter
Abelard
and
his
Circle
im
15
;
Freiburg Breisgau
Ohio
Hildesheim;
Columbus,
Fiona Robb:
TheFunction
in Scholastic
TheoofRepetition
41
Oxford
bgyof theTrinity
Paul J.J.M. Barker:
Deuxques, concepts
, quwot:
Syncatgormes
dansle ms.Paris,
tionsanonymes
, conserves
Nijmegen
lat.
lies

la smantique
de
BJV.,
16.401,
PierreAilly(c. 1350-1420)
76
Oleg V. Bychkov:
TheReflection
StoicIdeas
ofSomeTraditional
Toronto
in theThirteenth-Century
Scholastic
Theories
141
ofBeauty
s So-called
TractatusPrimus,with
L.M. de Rijk:
an
Burky'
Mheer
Editionof theAdditional
Quaestio"Utrum
contradictiosit maxima oppositio" .... 161
Elizabeth Karger:
MentalSentences
to Burleyand to
According
Paris
theEarlyOckham
192
DominikPerler:
ConThingsin theMind.Fourteenth-Century
"
trover
sies over"Intelligible
231
Oxford
Species
La rception
Francis Cheneval:
de la "Monarchie"
de Danteou
Les mtamorphoses
d'une uvrephiloFribourg
254
sophique
A Fragment
L.G. Kelly:
Michael
de
Summa
Marbasio,
of
de modissignificandi
Ottawa& Cambridge
268

(LaugeOlafNieben)

19:47:48 PM

131

IV

Books Received

CONTENTS
Thomas Aquinas, SelectedPhilosophical
and translated
, selected
by Timothy
Writings
135
McDermott
(E.P. Bos)
:
MatthiasKaufmann,Begriffe
, Stze,Dinge
bei Wilhelmvon
Referenzund Wahrheit
140
Ockham(Reinhard
Hlsen)
Aristoteles
Uebersetztund
, PeriHermencias.
erlutertvon Hermann Weidemann.
Werkein deutscher
Ueher
Aristoteles
Setzung,
von
Grumach
Ernst
, herausgegeben
begrndet
vonHellmutFlashar(L.M. de Ryk)
270
Follon
and
Actualit
J.
J. McEvoy (eds.),
de la pensemdivale
274
(E.J. Ashworth)
the
Will
in
Risto Saarinen, Weakness
of
MedievalThought
toBuridan
fromAugustine
275
(Kimberly
Georgedes)
TheCambridge
edited
to
,
CompanionAquinas
and Eleonore
Stump
byNormanKretzmann
278
(E.P. Bos)
: fromPerLeen Spruit,Speciesintelligibilis
to Knowledge
280
(Dominik
ception
Perler)
284

19:47:48 PM

ThreeVisionsand ThreeHeavens
Augustine's
in SomeEarlyMedievalFlorilegia
ISABELMOREIRA*

When, accordingto an eighthcenturypseudaugustiniantext,Orosius


wanted to persuade St. Augustineto elucidate some particularlyknotty
he explainedforhis masterand forhis readquestionson the scriptures,
to his society."It is the case
ers the veryessence of the value offlorilegia
in
not unlikein faith,have
unlike
but
that many verypious men,
style
to read them
publishedinnumerablelittleworks,such that it is difficult
all; and theywhichare read are littleunderstoodon accountof the beauty
intricaciesof the questions."1
of theireloquence and verydifficult
on the educationalexigencywhich
is
a
classic
statement
This, surely,
prompteda genre which flourishedso robustlyin the middle ages. Yet
workscan only
the underlying
motivationforthe productionof florilegial
of the difficult
be explainedpartlyin termsof providinga "clarification"
various
reasonswhich
for
the
were
of
ancients.
Florilegia
compiled
writings
* I would
adviceandcomments:
W.Courfortheir
thefollowing
scholars
liketothank
toJ. Divjak
I am alsograteful
P. Meyvaert
andC. McDannell.
M.M.Gorman,
tenay,
hisforthLXVfrom
oftheDialogus
forproviding
mewitha listofmanuscripts
quaestionum
derWerke
desHeiligen
volume
onFrance
forDiehandschriftliche
Augustinus.
berlieferung
coming
1 Dialogus
etAugustini
LXVOrosii
, Migne,PL 40,cols.
respondentis
quaestionum
percontantis
sednondiversa
"Licet
multi
etprobatissimi
viridiverso
733-52:
stifo,
opusfideinnumerabilia
quidem
venustatem
: ea tarnen
itautdifficile
siteorum
omnia
culaediderint,
eloquii
propter
legere
quaeleguntur,
In cataloging
allAugustinin
manminime
etdiffidllimas
intelliguntur."
quaestionum
perplexitates,
berinthemiddle
toAugustine
thoseattributed
ages,Diehandschriftliche
uscripts,
including
Akademie
derWissenschaften,
dersterreichischen
derWerke
desHeiligen
lieferung
[.Sitzungsberichte
Augustinus
ofthisimporadvances
ourknowledge
5 vols.(Vienna
1969-76),
Philosophisch-historisch
Klasse'
saint),
in:Dictionnaire
attribus
oftexts.
tantcorpus
Seealso,F. Cavallera,
(Aprocryphes
Augustin
deSpiritualit
, I, Paris1937cols.1130-5.
l'histoire
des
H.-M.Rochis,Contribution
Onflorilegia
andotherrelated
sourcetypes,
63 (1953),246-91especially
duhaut
, in:RevueBndictine,
asctiques
moyen
agelatin
florilges
desaint
La survie
mdivale
notesp. 246 n. 2, p. 248 n. 3. B. Blumenkranz,
bibliographie
travers
sesapocryphes
, in:Augustinus
), Paris1954,1003-18.
[tudes
Augustiniermes
Magister
Augustin
A study
culture
TheLove
Desire
andthe
, 3rded.,New
ofmonastic
J.Leclercq,
ofLearning
forGod.
imFrhmittelalter,
derlateinischen
inderGeschichte
York1982,182-4.
B. Bischoff
Exegese
Wendepunkte
et
des"Quaestiones
La littrature
in: SacrisErudiri,
G. Bardy,
6 (1954),189-279.
patristique
:
341-69.
N.
41
sur
l'criture
sainte
in:
Revue
,
Hathaway,
Compilatio
(1932),
responsiones"
Biblique,
toCompiling,
in:Viator,
From
20 (1989),19-44.
Plagiarism
Vivarium
34,1

EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:47:56 PM

ISABELMOREIRA

are not always obvious. Indeed caution is needed even if, or perhaps
especiallyif,an overtlyingenuousexplanationforcompositionis provided
:, and this is the case with the
by the author of the text. Many florilegio.
LXV whichwas quoted above, comDialogusquaestionum
pseudaugustinian
a
of
selection
which
relatedto circumstancesotherthan
readings
prised
LXV was supposthose indicatedby the work. The Dialogusquaestionum
a
between
Orosius
that
was intendedto
and
edly dialogue
Augustine
questionsraised in the writingsof the
provide clear answersto difficult
ancients.In fact,the work was fashionedfromexcerptsprimarilyfrom
Augustine'swork and the question and responseformof the text was
into a biblical commentary.The truepurposeof the
rapidlytransformed
work,however,was to contributescripturaland patristicauthorityto a
particularside of a late eighthcenturyChristologicaldispute.
This particularflorilegist
showed remarkableskillin fashioninga work
which operatedon a diversityof levels. His compositionis an important
indicatorthat the florilegist's
craft,which is oftendeemed to be an inferiorliteraryendeavour,is not the artistically
or intellectually
sterileprocess
of cut and paste thatit can oftenseem. Nor is the finishedproductnecessarilya misshapen monsterpieced togetherfrom borrowed literary
or even the not so skilled,
corpses. In the hands of a skilledflorilegist,
the excerptedtextscame to the attentionof new audienceswho read new
meaninginto them.
In orderto fullyappreciatethe contribution
thatthistypeof literature
made to the early medieval understandingof patristictexts,it is necessary to move beyond studieswhich focus on the "vertical"relationship
betweenthe pseudonymoustext and the originalsource text,and strive
towards a "horizontal" investigationacross a wide spectrumof early
medievalflorilegia.
That is to say, it would be usefulto be in a position
to trace how these textsrelated to one anotherto create a literaryculture of theirown. It is the kind of study,however,which is not easily
have not survived(althoughpseudonymous
accomplished.Many florilegia
attributionsto Church Fathers must have improvedsurvivalrate) and
to date withany accuracy.Anystudywhichattempts
theyare oftendifficult
the date
to surveythese littlestudied textsmust begin by investigating
and originof the work under review.Even then it may not be possible
to recreateaccuratelythe transmissionof ideas throughsurvivingtexts,
or be certainof the contextsin which theywere first(or secondly)discussed.Any discussionof the florilegist's
art mustbe framedby theseand
other
limitations.
there
are cases wheregroupsof such
Nevertheless,
many
textssurvivewhose relationshipto each otherare more securelyknown.

19:47:56 PM

ANDTHREEHEAVENS
THREEVISIONS
AUGUSTINE'S

It is then instructiveto consider how compilerstreatedtheirmaterial,


what decisionswere made concerningthe contextin which certaintypes
what materialwas
of information
were discussed,and just as importantly,
ultimately
dropped fromconsideration.This is best accomplishedby reference to concreteexamples; cases where we can followthe process of
whose historyis known.
text selectionand eliminationamong florilegio,
I
will
on
the
transmission
of one particular
focusattention
Consequently
themewhich appears in some early medievalflorilegio.:
Augustine'sthree
theme
of
As
we
shall
the
found new
vision.
see,
categories
Augustinin
for
as
it
was
thus
new
and
contexts,
excerptedinto
opportunity
meaning,
some earlymedievalflorilegio.
In book 12 of his De Genesiad litteram
Augustineexpoundedhis famous
which
defined
the gradationsof humanvision
tripartite
categorization
kind'svisionor knowledgeof God by means of the followingthreecategories.Corporealvisionis thatvisionwhichis seen by the body. Spiritual
or imaginativevisionis thatseen with the mind's eye, and finally,intellectual vision is that pinpoint of divine illuminationwhich is beyond
human intellection.2
Augustineconsidered these three categoriesto be
with the exceptionof the thirdcategory.Thus
mutuallyinterdependent
corporealvisionrequiresspiritualvisionto enable it to processand store
in the memory.Spiritualvision needs the intellectualcapacinformation
to
understand
and interpretthe vision,while being able to function
ity
withoutcorporealvision. Intellectualvision alone has no need of other
vision typessince that visionwas itselfpure knowledgeand understanding. To each of thesevisioncategoriesAugustineassigneda corresponding gradationof heaven.
AlthoughAugustine'sdiscussionof thisthemewas to have a long historyin the writingsof the high middle ages, it was relativelyneglected
in the firstfewcenturiesafterhis death. One possibleexplanationforthis
neglectlay in the arcane philosophicalnature of the visionarytheme
whichdid not have the doctrinal,scripturalor pedagogicalinterestwhich
.3
usuallydeterminedthe choice of textsgiven new exposure in florilegio
2 Augustine,
De Genesi
ad litteram
libri
XII,XII.6,ed. Zycha,(CSEL 28) Vienna1894,
3-435.
3 In ItalyandGaul,tworegions
withAugustine's
witha particularly
closeassociation
ofLucullainAugustine's
is categorical.
In Italy,
disinterest
vision
work,
theory
Eugippius
themostblatant
of
num'sExcerpta
exoperbus
S. Augustini
(early6thC) provides
example
thisdeficiency.
ofthemostimportant
teachcommission
wastomakea selection
Eugippius'
whosescopeandcomprehensiveThisinvolved
himina project
ingsofthesaintly
bishop.
nesswasnottobe equalled
forcenturies.
As M.M.Gorman
hasshown,
scripEugippius'
adlitteram.
withAugustine's
De Genesi
torium
hada particularly
intimate
connection
scholarly

19:47:56 PM

ISABELMOREIRA

What it didhave was a numericalformulation


(threetypesof vision)which
to
the
of
and which occasionally
it
compiler florilegio,
gave genuineappeal
overcamethe passage's potentialforcompleteobscurity.For the purpose
of thisstudyAugustine'streatmentof the threevisionshas the additional
whichis recognizablyAugustine'sown,
advantageof being a formulation
in
a
so
and
singlework,
expounded
ensuringthat the ultimatesource of
can be identifiedwith certainty.4
the information
In tracingthe fateof Augustine'svisionarytheoryas it is presentedin
we will uncover the momentof the florilegist's
early medievaliflorilegio,
choice. Augustine'stextwill emergeepitomized,transformed,
newlyinterto
fit
and
tailored
contexts
its
author.Firstto be
preted,
unimaginedby
examined is the tripartitevision theme in some early Irish works,and
LXV
secondlythe use of the vision categoriesin the Dialogusquaestionum
writtenon the European continent.
ThemeIn SomeIrishFlorilegio
Augustine's
Visionary
The earliestworks in which Augustine'stext on the three types of
vision was reproduced,were two commentarieson the catholic epistles
dated by R.E. McNally to the late seventhand early eighthcenturies.5
The workwasreadwithcareand Eugippius
included
fourteen
it in his
from
passages
bookofexcerpts.
noneoftheselected
weretaken
from
booktwelve
Significantly,
passages
anditsabsence,
whenweknowthecompiler
readtheentire
is
work,
(thevision
treatise)
a clearindication
thatthisparticular
idea was considered
On
Augustinin
marginal.
andhiscirclesee M.M. Gorman,
De Genesi
Eugippius
forSt.Augustine's
Chapter
headings
ad litteram,
in:Revuedestudes
andEugippius
andthe
26 (1980),99-104,
Augustiniennes,
Tradition
De Genesi
in:RevueBndictine,
ad litteram,
ofthe
Origins
ofSt.Augustine's
Manuscript
90 (1980),4-79.
treatise
is equally
vision
absent
from
ofLrins'
Vincent
Augustine's
Augustine-inspired
in theearlyfifth
PL Suppl.Ill 23-45.
, ed.Hamman,
florilegium
composed
century,
Excerpta
Theseexcerpts
areconfined
toAugustine's
workontheTrinity
andhisrefutation
ofArms
andNestorius.
useful
to a bishopconcerned
witheradicatTheyarethesortofwritings
SeeJ.T.Lienhard,
TheEarliest
8
, in:Augustinin
Studies,
ingheresy.
Florilegia
ofAugustine
which
withEugippius'
falls
into
isvery
work,
brief,
(1977),21-31.Vincent's
bycomparison
offlorilegium
a category
whichhas no aspiration
to broadrepresentation,
beingdirected
rather
to narrowly
defined
doctrinal
Likewise
Liber
senofAquitaine's
questions.
Prosper
tentiarum
fifth
whichsurveys
a widerspectrum
ofAugustine's
than
(early
century)
thought
doesVincent,
is verylimited
and although
doesmakea selection
nevertheless,
Prosper
from
booktwelve
oftheDe Genesi
ad litteram
in which
offers
(XII.7),a chapter
Augustine
an elaboration
on thedefinition
ofthethree
vision
eleomits
vision
theory
types,
Prosper
ments.
ofAquitaine,
Liber
sententiarum
, c. 295,ed.P. Callens
Prosper
(CGSL68A),Turnhout
1972,329.
4 The
inother
theme
is tobe found
works
butnotinthispretri-partite
byAugustine,
ciseformulation
withthethree
vision
to thethree
heavens.
types
corresponding
5 Commentarius
inepistolas
catholicas.
Scottus
Hiberniae
, ed. R.E. McNally,
anonymus
Scriptores
Minores
I, (CCSL 108B),Turnhout
1973,3-50.

19:47:56 PM

THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S

whichwere composed in the Irish traditionfall


These two commentaries
intothatcategoryof exegeticalcompositionwhich,in itswholesaleapprofroma florilegium.
priationof earliersources,is hardlyto be differentiated
of Reicheis probablytheworkof the scriptorium
The firstcommentary
The commentary
nau; an Irish compositionof the late seventhcentury.6
of this"Scottusanonymus,"or theworkfromwhichit derived,influenced
stronglya second, slighdylater commentaryon the catholic epistles,the
cannicas
Hilariiin septem
Tractatus
, which McNally also considered
epistolas
to be an Irishcomposition,datingprobablybetween690 and 708.7 The
Tractatus
Hilariiwas in turn almost certainlyBede's source for much of
his well-knownExpositio
catholicas
in epistolas
septem
composed c. 708-9, a
workwhichwould not reproduceAugustine'stext.8
The dependenceof the second Irishcommentaryon the firstcommentaryon James is easilydiscernedin passages whichintroduceAugustine's
visionarytheme.In both worksthe theme of threevisionswas
tripartite
tuumsicutteipsum.This
thetextofJames 2.8, Diligesproximum
used to clarify
biblical
which
in
oneof
the
fact,
was,
Augustinehad used to
passages
XII. 6 and 11.
illustratehis visionarycategoriesin his De Genesiad litteram
in
the
commentators
moulded
Lookingmore closelyat the way which
theirborrowedthemeto the scripturalcontext,we discoverthatthe selectionof Augustine'stextwhichin the firstIrishcommentaryoperatedwith
conneca readilyperceivedif clumsyrationale,failedto make sufficient
in
the
second.
tion withthe scripturalpassage
The anonymousauthorof the firstcommentaryfirstexplainedforhis
reader the meaning of James 2.8 concerninglove for one's neighbour
and then,in a substantiell
additionalsectionintroducedAugustine'sthree
typesof vision.9
6 On theIrish
inHiberno-Latin
Literature
seeJ.F.Kelly,
tradition
, in:
Augustine
exegetical
P. Grosjean,
irlandais
du VIIesicle,
8 (1977),139-49,
Studies,
Quelques
exgtes
Augustinin
:
ThePseudonymous
inHiberno-Latin
Tradition
in:SacrisErudiri,
7 (1955),
67-98andM. Herren,
400-900
andLetters
anIntroduction
, in: T.T.O'Mearaand B. Naumann
(eds.),LatinScript
,
Leiden1976,121-31.
Minores
Hiberniae
cannicas
Tractatus
Hilarii
in septem
, ed.R.E.McNally,
Scnptores
epistolas
author
ofthis
Turnhout
AsMcNally
out,thestated
1973,53-124.
I, (CGSL108B),
points
or
ofPoitiers
be a pseudonymous
attribution
toHilary
neednotnecessarily
work,
Hilary,
isreferred
Thework
havebeenthenameoftheauthor.
ofAries,
butmaygenuinely
Hilary
toas Pseudo-Hilary
nevertheless.
8 Bede,Expositio
catholicas
inepistolas
, (CGSL 121),Turnhout
1983,181-342.
septem
9 Commentarius
Hiberniae
Minores
I, (GGSL108B),Turnhout
, ed. R.E. McNally,
Scriptores
however
on a topicsuggested,
1973,12. Lengthy
obliquely,
bya particular
digressions
See
biblical
wastheaccepted
methodology
byearlymedieval
exegetes.
passage,
employed
inthe
3rded.,Oxford
TheStudy
Bible
Middle
1983,andJ.Leclercq,
Beryl
Ages,
Smalley,
ofthe
TheLoveofLearning
andtheDesire
, 3rded.,NewYork1982,71-88.
forGod

19:47:56 PM

ISABELMOREIRA

The commentatorargued that the textofJames 2.8 could be undervisiospirstood by referenceto the threetypesof vision;the visiocarnalis,
that
the
first
two
vision
He
italis(sic) et intellectualis. explained
types(like
the firstcategoriesof love) are subject to error,and both require [indigent)the intellectualvision.The threevisiontypeswere thuspresentedas
correspondingto threetypesof love, and were thereforemade relevant
to the passage on love.10This was followed,for good measure,by an
additional discussionof the four types of love, two visible (Love your
neighbour,and love your enemies) and two invisible(Love your God,
and love your soul- a veryNeoplatonicconcept).11Betweenthe two dethe firstcommentarycovered the standardexegeticalresponse
finitions,
to the questionof love in thisperiod,as a glance at otherminorexegetontheOld andNew Testament
ical works,includingPseudo-Isidore'sQuestions
show.12
The second commentary,
the Tractatus
Hilariiintroducedthethreevision
in
the
at
the
same
text,but thereis a significant
types exactly
juncture
difference.
Whereas the earliercommentaryallowed the threevisionsto
correspondto different
typesof love, thus commentingon James 2.8, in
the Tractatus
HilariiAugustine'sthreevisionsentirelylost any exegetical
in the Tractatus
relevance.The clumsyinclusionof thevisionaryformulation
Hilarii, now totallydigressionary,
is witnessto the mechanicalreproduction of information
so common in thisperiod.13
or a relatedtextfor
Bede, who as mentionedearlierused the Tractatus
10The late
authorof theQuestiones
(GCSL 108B),Turnhout
century
evangelii,
eighth
intelthem
tothedefinition
ofspiritual,
theseterms,
butassigned
1973,150-1usedexactly
lectualand rational:
exhibitio.
Intellectuality
, utsicdiligamus
, hospilalitatis
proximum
Spiritualits
absentem
sicut
etsecunda.
etpraesentem.
inprima
Rationabiliter,
11Commentarius
Turnhout
Hiberniae
Minores
I, (GCSL 108B),
, ed. R.E. McNally,
Scriptores
1973,12.
12Exegetical
toissues
andflorilegia
todefine
works
tended
lovebymeansofreference
classification
oflove,usedbybothcommentators
2.8.The four-fold
brought
up inJames
Theenorthetripartite
meansofdefinition.
tofollow
vision
standard
wasanother
theory,
ed.
Testamento
De vete
etnovo
lions,
Pseudo-Isidore,
quaes
mously
popular
mid-eighth
century
innuHiberniae
Minores
R.E. McNally,
1973,197-205,
I, (CGSL 108B),Turnhout
Smptores
merated
in chs.37-8thefourtypes
as loveforGod,loveforGodas weloveourselves,
AnoThecommentary
ofthe"Scottus
loveforourneighbours,
andloveforourenemies.
"Deum
inPseudo-Isidore
reveals:
demonstrates
itsparentage
as thispassage
nymus"
clearly
Et
utproximum.
sicutnos;inimicum
debemus:
ergoplusquamnosdiligere
proximum
nisiDeumprimum
menime
dilexerimus,
[c. 38] These
nosmetipsos
dilegere
potemus."
demultorium
See alsoPrebiarum
werethecommentator's
sentiments
, 24
exemplaribus
exactly.
on threetypes
oflove,andProsper
ofAquitaine,
Liber
sententiarum
, 367whichdrawson
Tract,
inev.Ioh.,75.5.
Augustine,
13In fact,a
in theTractatus
is to be found
passageon loveforGod andneighbours
Hilarii's
ofJames
1.4.
interpretation

19:47:56 PM

THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S

his Exposition
on theCatholic
, was familiarwithAugustine'sDe Genesi
Epistles
ad litteram
and chose to omit the threevisionspassage fromhis commenofJames 2.8 and love forGod
Thus by degreesthe interpretation
tary.14
and one's neighbourby means of Augustine'svisionarythemewas lost.
The appropriationof Augustine'svisionarytheoryby the Irish commentariesexamined above can tell us somethingof the way in which
informationwas preserved,made redundantand eventuallylost. The
authorof the firstIrish commentaryon the catholicepistleswas able to
withthe use of Augustine'svisiontreatiseto illustratethe pasexperiment
because the commentarywas indeed thefirstto be written
on
love
sage
on the catholicepisdes.Withoutexegeticalexamplesupon whichto draw,
the compilerwas not restrictedby conventionbut was ratheropen to
of the
whichmightcontributeto a betterunderstanding
any information
text.Once the tenuousconnectionbetweenAugustine'svision categories
and the biblical textwas broughtto the attentionof the learned Bede,
ratherthana rotecopier,the associationof the two textswas abandoned.
In thesethreeworks,then,we see how a particulartextcame to be associated with,or acted as a commentaryupon another,and likewisethe
processby which it disappeared.
LXV"
Visions
in theet
'Dialogusquaestionum
Augustine's
LXV we find
Dialogusquaestionum
Turningnow to the pseudaugustinian
the earliesttext to offera synthesisof Augustine'svision treatisein the
of
contextof the book of Genesis}0Of all the pseudaugustinian
florilegia
14BedeusedAugustine's
workon
adlitteram
forhisownexegetical
De Genesi
extensively
Turnhout
1967.Bede
Genesis
written
after
721:In Genesim
, ed.Gh.W.
Jones(CGSL118A),
in his
ofpassages
from
in hisselection
wasinfluenced
Augustine
byEugippius'
Excerpta
Bde
leVnrable
97 (1987),
ownflorilegium,
P.-I.Fransen,
, in:RevueBndictine,
D'Eugippius
TheLibraiy
Bede
M.L.W.Laistner,
187-94.On Bede'slibrary,
, in: A.H.
oftheVenerable
andWritings
HisLife
, Times,
, Oxford
1935,237-66.
Thompson
(ed.),Bede:
in Ireland
wasknown
at an early
De Genesi
adlitteram
Further
evidence
thatAugustine's
in an Irishepitome
ofthe
ofthework(inEugippius'
datecomesinthefragment
edition)
"DeGenesi
Anunedited
M. Gorman
late7thcentury,
ofanIrish
ofAugustine's
Epitome
fiagment
adlitteram,"
in:RevuedesEtudes
28 (1982),76-85.
Augustiniennes,
15Migne,
edition
ofthistext,andthisis
PL 40, 733-52.Thereis to dateno critical
A study
ofthework
LXVin itsentirety.
theDialogus
nottheplacetoexamine
quaestionum
himfordiscussing
underway.I wouldliketo thank
is nowcurrently
byM.M.Gorman
thisworkwithme.
abound.
withthevision
Latermedieval
works
theory
specifically
dealing
pseudaugustinian
is manivitae
which
A particularly
is supplied
decognitione
verae
fulsome
version
bytheLiber
ofAutun(12thcentury),
theworkofHonorius
ofthehighmiddle
festly
ages,probably
travers
sesapocryphes
mdivale
desaint
B. Blumenkranz,
La survie
,
, in:Augustinus
Augustin
Magister

19:47:56 PM

ISABELMOREIRA

the middle ages to preserveAugustine'svision classification,


thisis without a doubt the most interesting.
Its earlydate and fidelity
to the intention of Augustine'scommentarycontributesto makingit an important
recordof familiarity
withAugustine'swork,and his visionthemein particular.Unfortunately,
the text has been littlestudied,and its date and
are
still
to
origin
open
question.BeforeI considerAugustine'svisionary
in
a
theory the work, shortdigressionwill be necessaryin whichI make
my own suggestionsconcerningits date and origin.A descriptionof the
textand its main componentswill clarifysome of the issuessurrounding
its compositionand date.
In the firstsection of the work, Orosius launches immediatelyinto
twelvequestionsconcerningthe TrinitystartingwithGenesis1.1. The second section(questionstwelveto twenty)comprisesquestionson the Old
and New Testamentset out in no apparentorder.The thirdsection(questionstwenty-one
to sixty-two)
returnsto the beginningof Genesis
and follows the normal sequence of questionson the text.A significant
portion
of thissectionhas verbatimcorrespondences
withthe Commentary
on Genesis, a more substantialcommentaryon Genesis than the DialogusquaesLXV' erroneouslyattributedin the middle ages to Eucheriusof
tionum
Lyons (sixthcentury),but now consideredto be the workof Claudius of
Turin (ninthcentury).16
The final section is perhaps the most interesting
of all. It comprises
threequestions(sixty-three
to sixty-five).
is a syntheQuestion sixty-three
Paris1954,1003-18.
In thiswork,
thevisionmaterial
is fleshed
outbytheuseofpagan
oneiromantic
andphilosophic
The 11thcentury
De Tribus
habitaculis
written
terminology.
Patrick
ofDublin,
andattributed
toAugustine
is another
bybishop
amongothers,
exceptionalcase wheretheauthorship
waswellknown
in manymanuscripts,
butin others
itsAugustinin
dueto thevisioncontent
attribution
from
acquired
recognizably
deriving
hiswork.
Thepseudonymous
attribution
ofboththeseworks
is a clearindication
ofhow
anduniformly
wasidentified
with
inthemedieval
vision
routinely
Augustine
theory
period.
decognitione
verae
PL 40, 1028;De tribus
habitaculis
See,Liber
vitae,
, ed.A. Gwynn,
(Scriptores
LatiniHiberniae),
Dublin1955,21-8.Twoother
theLiber
despiritu
works,
pseudonymous
etanima
andtheLiber
animae
adDeum
didnotdrawon thetripartite
vision
catsoliloquiorum
as theothers
haddone,butdrewon book12 oftheDe Genesi
ad litteram
for
egorization
related
TheLiber
despiritu
adanima
drewverbatim
onAugustine's
1.24forexample,
aspects.
definition
ofecstasy
in theDe Genesi
ad litteram
XII.26.
On Claudius
ofTurin's
ofthepseudo-Eucherian
onGenesis
, see
authorship
Commentary
M.L.W.Laistner,
Some
medieval
ontheOldTestament
commentaries
, in:TheLnteUectucd
early
Heritage
Middle
Claudio
deTurny
autor
, Cornell1957,200-1whocitesDomBellet,
oftheEarly
Ages
deloscomentarios
"Ingenesim
etregam"
delPseudo
9 (Madrid
Bblicos,
, in: Estudios
Euqurio
noteM.M.Gorman's
correction
ofthemistaken
attribution
ofthe
1950),209-23;
although
MS Autun27 commentary
to Claudius,
TheEncyclopedic
onGenesis
Commentary
prepared
for
in:Recherches
17(1982),192footnote
79.See also
Charlemagne
byWigbod,
Augustiniennes,
TheEncyclopedic
Gorman,
, 192.
Commentary

19:47:56 PM

THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S

sis of Augustine'svision categoriesas expounded in book XII of his De


Genesi
ad litteram.
offersfourcategoriesof Apostle,and
Question sixty-four
how
we
are
asks
to know which prelatesare sent by
questionsixty-five
God. The last threequestions,then,returnto the concernswith which
the documentopened, namely the need to discerntrue teachingsfrom
false,and true teachersfromfalse.
The natureof the heresywhich the documentsoughtto address may
directus to its date and origin.The Dialogusquaestionum
LXV opens with
the errorsof the hereticalSabellians (who maintainthat God is one person ratherthan the orthodoxpositionwhich discernsthree:personas
disThis
not
in
non
deitatem
is
a
,
tinguimus
separamus).
veryhelpful securing date
since earlymedievalauthorswere wont to identifyin a new heresy,still
withouta name, its root in one of the older establishedheresies.Both
the fourthcenturyPriscillianists
and the eighthcenturyMigetianswere
orthodox
consideredby
churchmento sharetheirerrorwiththe Sabellians,
fortheydoubted in common that the second person of the Trinitywas
withthe Fatherfromthe beginning.17
The next doctrinalassertionis that the Son of God is God's son by
natureand not by adoption (igitur
FiliusDei naturaestFilius,nonadopone
),
forotherwisetherewould be two Sons. This doctrineof two Sons (Nestorianism)was espoused by Elipandus of Toledo and his followerswho,
in seekingto distancethemselvesfromthe Migetian error(which fused
the divineand human in Christ),made so starka distinction
betweenthe
Thestriking
between
Claudius'
andtheDialogus
commentary
correspondences
quaestionum
LXVshould
notovershadow
thetruedegree
ofassociation.
Byfarthegreater
partofthis
section
is notdrawn
from
theCommentary
onGenesis.
1 The Patripassians
andSabellians
believed
thatthesecondpersonoftheTrinity
is
ofnotbeingdistinguished
onewiththeFather
to theextent
from
him.The Father
was
incarnate
andsuffered
as Christ
in a distinct
thatChrist
did
existence,
temporal
meaning
notexistfrom
thebeginning.
wasaccused
ofteaching
thatthere
werethree
corMigetius
in theTrinity,
thesecondbeingChrist
bornoftheVirgin,
andthussharporealpersons
thebelief
andSabellians
oftheTrinity
thatthesecondperson
ingwiththePatripassians
didnotexistbefore
theincarnation.
at thecouncil
werecondemned
teachings
Migetius'
in 782andarespecifically
oftheDialogus
ofSeville
countered
bytheorthodox
compiler
LXV.By785,seeking
todistance
theMigetian
himself
from
error,
quaestionum
Bishop
ElipandusofToledoandhisfollowers
a distinction
between
Christ's
divine
andhuman
proposed
which
nature
thatitimplied
theexistence
oftwoSons,andthusthisposition,
wassoradical
andSabellians,
On thePatripassians
too,iscountered
bythecompiler.
J.F.Bethune-Baker,
Doctrine
AnIntroduction
totheEarly
, 9thed.,London1951,103-6.On
History
ofChristian
toMigetius,
beliefs
seeElipandus'
letter
eretico
directa
, ed.J.Gil,
Migetian
Epistula
<M>igetio
Muzarabicorum
vol.1)Madrid1973,68-78.SeealsoJ.Vives,Condlios
(Corpus
Scriptorum
e hispano-romanos
Barcelona-Madrid
andH. Leclercq,
Histoire
des
1963,C.J.Hefele
visigticos
Conles
TheLastChristology
III, 2, Paris1910,985-92andmostrecendy
J. Cavadini,
ofthe
West
1993.
, Philadelphia

19:47:56 PM

10

ISABELMOREIRA

The explicitrefutwo personsof Christthattheylikewisefellinto error.18


tationof this errorsuggeststhat the Dialogusquaestionum
LXV, or at least
tractof the late eighth
the opening section of it, is an anti-adoptionist
century.This would place the prefaceafter785, when the disputebegan
to surface.19
A terminus
antequern
can be also posited.Claudius of Turin's Commentary
on Genesis
which
has
the
LXV as one of its sources,is
,
Dialogusquaestionum
And Michael
securelydated to 81 1 (the date of the earliestmanuscript).20
Gorman has shownthatthe Dialogusquaestionum
LXV was used by Wigbod
for the Genesis commentarywhich he composed for the Emperor
Charlemagne,a work which he dates between 775 and 800.21Finally,
the vision sectionof the Dialogusquaestionum
LXV was reproducedverbatim in the Libri Caroliniwhose date is c. 793.22The Dialogusquaestionum
18Elipandus
ofToledoargued
thatChrist
inhisdivinity
wastheSonofGodbynature,
butin hishuman
manifestation
wasthesonofGodbyadoption.
Histeachings
werecondemned
ofNarbonne)
andbyPopeLeo III in 798
byPopeHadrianI in 788 (council
ofRome).The correspondence
is to be found
in the
(council
generated
bythisdispute
ed.J. Gil,citedabove,andin thePatrologia
Latina101.
Muzarabicorum
Corpus
Scriptorum
TheLastChris
See also,J. Cavadini,
19Theissueofdateis notmoretology. clarified
at thework's
substantially bylooking
dependentsources.
We know,
forexample,
thattheDialogus
LXVdrewon Eucherius
quaestionum
ofLyons'Instructiones
whichthussubstantially
antedates
the
, a workofthesixthcentury
LXV.G. Bardy,
La littrature
desquaestiones
et responsiones
Dialogus
quaestionum
patristique
surl'criture
41 (1932),537,cited,
sainte
M.M.Gorman,
Theencyclope, in:RevueBiblique,
diccommentary
thattheCarolingian
Liber
28.Thesuggestion
, 178footnote
pseudaugustinian
deTrinitate
etUnitale
D wasa sourcefortheDialogus
LXVwasrevised
bythe
quaestionum
monks
learned
Benedictine
oftheCongregation
ofSt. Mauer,forit is theLiber
which
on theDialogus
LXV.(Admonitio,
PL 40, 733,andPL 42, 1193).Most
depends
quaestionum
is thecloserelationship
between
theDialogus
LXVandClaudius
however,
telling,
quaestionum
ofTurin'sCommentarius
inGenesim
which
hasalready
above.Thetwotexts
beenmentioned
areclosenotonlyin content
butalsoin date,although
thanthebriefer
rather
Dialogus
LXVbeinga contraction
of Claudius'longer
the
work,as Mignebelieved,
quaestionum
LXVis oneofitssources.
Dialogus
quaestionum
20M.L.W.Laistner,
Some
Medieval
Commentaries
, 191,contra
Early
J. Madoz,Le Symbole
duXL*concile
deTolde,
Louvain1938,164-91
whobasedhislaterdating
on theerroneous
belief
thattheBenediction
contained
in theworkwasderived
Alcuin
from
ofthePatriarchs
whohadit from
thatit wasfrom
Bede.Laistner
Rufinus
(d. 410)andwas
recognized
usedbyIsidore
Claudius
wasconsecrated
to theSee ofTurinin 818,
(mid7thcentury).
sevenyearsafterhiscommentary
was written.
I refer
to himby his titleforeasier
identification.
21M.M.Gorman,
TheEncyclopedic
Commentary.
22Theodulf
is thelikely
oftheLibriCarolini
ofOrleans
author
, A. Freeman,
Theodulf
of
andtheLibriCarolini,
Orleans
in:Speculum,
TheauthorP. Meyvaert,
32 (1957),663-705,
Carolini
." Observations
in: RevueBndictine,
89
book,
shipofthe"Libri
prompted
bya recent
andthePsalm
citations
(1979),29-57,andA. Freeman,
Theodulf
ofOrleans
oftheLibriCaroBndictine
authorlini,in:Revue
, 47 (1987),195-224.
[L. Wallach
putsa caseforAlcuinian
inLatinandGreek
Studies
Documents
theCarolingian
, Ithaca-London
ship,Diplomatic
from
age

19:47:56 PM

AUGUSTINE'S
THREEVISIONSANDTHREEHEAVENS

11

cannot be later than 793, and is perhaps as earlyas 775.


LXV therefore,
Whereas it is impossibleto know whetherthe work was commissioned
by one of the disputants,it was clearlywrittenwithinthe contextof this
dispute.The dialogueforminvolvingAugustineand Orosius was intended
withthe anti-adoptionist
to associateAugustineintimately
position,which
was a preferredtacticby both sides of the dispute.
Turningnow to the work'splace of composition.The earliestmanuLXV is a fragment,Leyden,
scriptevidence for the Dialogusquaestionum
Bibliotheekder Rijksuniversiteit
B.P.L.3230, whichVirginiaBrown,Bernhard Bischoffand JamesJ. John have identifiedas eighthcentury,written in a French hand.23However, there are good reasons for thinking
LXV was writtennot by a Frankishscholar
that the Dialogusquaestionum
but by a Spanish exile workingat the Frankishcourt.
The firstindicationthatthe textstemsfroma milieufamiliarwiththe
Spanish Christiantraditionis its verbatimquotation frompart of the
Symbolof Toledo XI an unlikelychoice of textfora Frankishauthor.24
LXV
Secondly,as we have seen, the earliestuse of the Dialogusquaestionum
is seen in workswrittenby Spanish exiles workingat the Carolingian
on Genesis
and Theodulfof Orleans'
court:Claudius of Turin's Commentary
LibriCarolini.Finally,the choice of locutorsin the dialogue is also suggestiveof a Spanish milieu.The dialogue purportsto take place between
Augustineand his discipleOrosius, who lived in NorthAfricafrom414
onwards,but who was Spanish by birthand education. As G. Morin
noticed,pseudonymousattributionstend to follownationalistlines.25It
assertedthatthe Dialogusquaestionum
LXV in the form
may be confidendy
in
written
in stages,
wasprobably
written
theLibriCarolini
1977,62-3.]Although
largely
andthe
FateoftheLibriCarolini,
in:Viator,
16(1985),
793,A. Freeman,
Orthodoxy
Carolingian
65-108.
23Addenda
tothe
Codices
Latini
54 (1992),
286-307.
Studies,
Antiquiores
(II),in:Mediaeval
Theearliest
is Escorial
b.IV.17 which
B. Bischoff,
J.Divjak,
complete
manuscript
following
desaint
datestothesecond
halfoftheninth
enEspagne)
century,
Augustin
J.DivjakLaprsence
in: Coloqio
decodices
entre
enlossiglos
sobre
rculadon
VLLL-XLLL,
y la peninsula
y escritos
Europa
Universidad
delos
de Santiago
de Compostela
1988,31 footnote
83.;G. Anatoln,
Ctalogo
cdices
latinos
dela RealBibliotheca
delEscorial
theman, vol.1, Madrid1910,203-4described
is inCarolingian
andassigned
a 10thcentury
date.TheEscorial
uscript
manuscript
script
withVisigothic
Numerous
latermanuscripts
can be found
in otherEuropean
notations.
der
oftheworkis unknown.
collections.
See Diehandschriftliche
The redactor
berlieferung
desHeiligen
derWissenWerke
dersterreichischen
Akademie
, (Sitzungsberichte
Augustinus
I havebeenunableto
5 vols.,Vienna1969-76,
schaften,
Klasse),
Philosophisch-historisch
deS.Augustin
toJ.Divjak's
toQuodvultdeus,
Laprsence
discover
attribution
anysubstantiation
enEspagne
, 31.
24Symbol
ofToledoXI, PL 84,454.
25CitedbyB. Blumenkranz,
Lmsurvie
mdivale
, 1014.

19:47:56 PM

12

ISABELMOREIRA

we have it, withits prefaceand concludingquestions,is a Spanish composition.It was probablywrittenbetween775 and 793, and was used by
theSpanishanti-adoptionist
camp as a genuinepatristictexton thesubject.
now
to
the
LXV' use of AugustinevisionTurning
Dialogasquaestionum
In answer
ary categories,we findthe issue raised in questionsixty-three.
to the question,quotsuntgenera
visionm
the
reader
was
informed
of three
?,
first
that
there
were
three
vision
things:
types,corporeal,spiritual,and
intellectual.Secondly,theylearned that Augustinehad determinedthat
Paul's was the highestsort of vision,intellectualvision,as he was rapt
up to God in the thirdheaven. And thirdly,theyread that therewere
threeheavens correspondingto the threevisionsenumerated,a correlation whichwas the essence of Augustine'scosmographieapproach to the
vision theme. These were the primary,enduringfeaturesof later pseudonymousabridgementsof Augustine'svision theory.
For our purposes it is interesting
to note how sophisticatedthis synthesisis in comparisonto later medieval attempts.Sparse as the details
are in the Dialogusquaestionum
LXV, it preserveda featureof Augustine's
treatisewhich did not alwaysmake it into the later compilations,namely
theinterdependence
of thevisioncategories.Corporealvisioncannotoperate withoutspiritualvision,spiritualvision can existwithoutthe corporeal, and finallythe intellectualvision requiresneitherthe spiritualnor
the corporealvision.The significance
of thisinformation
is itspurelyphilThis
lifts
element
the
osophical importance.
summaryfroma floating
list to a genuine, if rudimentarysynthesisof Augustine'svision thesis.
Later pseudaugustiniantreatments
of the threevisionswere oftenweightier in termsof quantityof information,
but theytended to lose sightof
the thesis.26
Finally,the contextof the discussionof vision typesin the Dialogus
LXV immediatelyfollowingthe commentaryon Genesis
distinquaestionum
it
from
the
Irish
commentaries
which
guished
disregardedentirelythe
context
of
discussion.
The Dialogusquaesoriginal
Augustine'svisionary
tionum
LXV is unusual also when set beside otherearlymedievalGenesis
commentaries
whichborrowedmaterialfromAugustine'sDe Genesi
ad litteram
for
omitted
the
on
information
the
vision,
they
seeminglytangential
Claudius
of
Turin's
on Genesis
did not include
ary gradations.
Commentary
the visiontreatise,nor did the Genesis
Commentarycomposedby Wigbod
for Charlemagne.27Eleventh and twelfthcenturypseudonymoustexts
26See mynote15 above.
27Wigbod,
inGenesim
PL 93,233-430.
Quaestiones
(ps.-Bede),

19:47:56 PM

AUGUSTINE'S
THREEVISIONSANDTHREEHEAVENS

13

tendedto lead intothe discussionof visionsnot in connectionwithGenesis


,
but in the contextof discussionsof the soul. It is thisfidelity
to the strucwhich makes the
ture and meaning of Augustine'sDe Genesiad litteram
LXV such an importantdocument.
Dialogusquaestionum
To conclude: From such a remove it is oftendifficult
to identifythe
reasonsfor the florilegisschoice of textsin the early middle ages. We
cannot always be sure which textswere available to him and in what
formor conditiontheywere known. Speculation about the reasons for
the preferenceof one textover anotheris limitedby such considerations.
Yet by followingAugustine'stripartitevisionaryclassificationas it was
presentedin some early compilations,we have been able to document
some of the impulsesat work.
In the firstplace, certaintextshad a "sound bite" value in that they
were easily remembered.Medieval scholarshad a tremendouscapacity
for remembering
numberedcategoriessuch as the four typesof death,
or the seven types of prophecy.Augustine'sthree vision types fit this
mnemonicformto the extentthat,as we have seen, it could appear in
the unusualcontextof a commentaryon James2.8. Unusual, thatis, only
because thisparticularassociationof textsdid not survive.The use of the
visionarytheoryin the Irish commentariesillustratesthe imaginative
processat workat a particularmomentin time,a timewhen the exegetical responseto a biblical text had not yet gelled into an authoritative
code, firstpermitting
Augustine'stextto be used and then discarded.
Secondly,the use of Augustine'stripartite
visionarytheoryas it appears
in the pseudaugustinian
LXV
Dialogusquaestionum alertsus to motivations
in text selectionbeyond simple "clarification."The danger of doctrinal
errorsentauthorsscurrying
back to patristictextswhichtheytransformed
into usefuland easily digestibletextbooksor epitomesof the weightier
originals.In this case, the Christologicaldisputein progressdetermined
the choice of questionsand answersculled fromthe De Genesiad litteram
.
Unlikeothercommentarieson the book of Genesis in thisperiod,which
quite logicallydrew only on the Genesis portionof Augustine'sDe Genesi
ad litteram
LXV strove to introduceAugustine's
, the Dialogusquaestionum
in
commentary somethingapproachingepitomaiform.
as an importantand sometimescreFinally,the place of the florilegist
ative contributor
to the early medievalintellectualsphere should not be
overlooked.If we look beyond the apparentintellectualenervationwhich
such derivativeliterarymedia suggest,we findthattheseworkswere compiled with a measure of understandingfor the needs of theirintended
audience whichgave thema timelinessand relevancewhich the original

19:47:56 PM

14

ISABELMOREIRA

workshad sometimeslost. The florilegist's


responseto Augustine'swork
as it has been examinedhere constitutes
more than an after-image
of an
The
has
the
to
and
originalliterarycorpus.
ability promote
florilegist
popularizecertainideas withinhis culturewhichmightotherwisebe neglected.
The absence offlorilegio,
would be farmore indicativeof intellectualdecay
than theirpresence,forwhile essentiallyderivativein content,theysometimesdisplayedconsiderableingenuityin formand presentation.
As florlegia
become more widelystudied,one anticipatesgreat riches
for understandingthe literarycultureof the early middle ages. For it is
the ultimateironyof thisliteraturethat while the compiler'spurpose in
was oftencast as a process of simplification,
a procreatinga florilegium
cess by which the problem of obscuritywas resolved,in realitythe florilegistpresentsto the historianthe riches of obscurity,no more easily
penetratedthan the "beautifuleloquence" of the ancients.
Salt Lake City,Utah
The University
of Utah

19:47:56 PM

Fromintellectusverus/falsusto thedictum propositions:


The Semantics
of PeterAbelardand his Circle
KLAUSJACOBI
CHRISTIANSTRUB
PETER KING

/
" 1 Abelard
In his Commentary
on Aristotle's
"Perihermeneias,
distinguishes
fromwhat it says, that is, its content.
the formof an expression2{oratio)
This disThe contentof an expressionis its understanding{intellectus).
tinctionis surelythe mostwell-knownand centralidea in Abelard'scommentary.It provideshim with the opportunityto distinguishstatements
fromotherkindsof expressionswithoutimplyinga difference
{enuntiationes)
in theircontent,since the abilityof a statementto signifysomethingtrue
velfalsumfcannot be foundin its content.More precisely,
or false{verum
statementsboth fromcompleteexpressions{orationes
Abelarddistinguishes
are
not
statements
but ratherquestions,requests,commands,
that
perfectae)
etc.
yand fromincompleteexpressions,thatis, mere word strings{orationes
), such as homoalbus.These kinds of expressions,accordingto
imperfecta^
Abelard,do not differin the understanding
theypresentbut in the way
it.
theypresent
"Perhermeneias
" was
1 ThetextofAbelard's
from
the
onAristotle's
published
Commentary
someadditions
inGeyer[1927].Minio-Paluello
Milanmanuscript
[1958]125-8published
a
We arepreparing
to Geyer's
edition
basedon theBerlin
andcorrections
manuscript.
toappearshortly;
ofthefulltextfortheCorpus
chrislianorum
newandcomplete
edition
series,
ourown
ofGeyer[1927],butwesupply
wegivereferences
tothepageandlinenumber
Aristotle
insomecasesfrom
Citations
from
which
differs
version
ofAbelard's
text,
Geyer.
fortheGreektextandtheequivalent
number
aregivenbyBekker
pageandlinenumlatinus
Latintranslation
as givenin Aristoteles
berforBoethius's
(abbreviated
AL) in
Minio-Paluello
[1965].
2 We use"expression"
topickoutstrings
ofmorethanonewordwhicharein gram- in ourterminology,
notan
A single
buta dictio
matical
wordis notan oratio
agreement.
butmerely
a word.
expression
3 Thata statement
trueor falseis implied
is an expression
by
something
signifying
there
butonlythoseinwhich
whosaidthat"notevery
is a statement,
Aristotle,
expression
inBoethius,
De topicis
17a2-3),
andstated
istruth
orfalsity"
hermeneias
diffrentiis
(Peri
explicidy
1174B(oratio
verum
See also375.29-32.
falsumve).
significare
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,1

19:52:46 PM

16

CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
JACOBI,

The reasoningthat leads Abelard to this thesiscan be found in the


"Perihermeneias.
" Here AbelarddesonAristotle's
prologueof his Commentary
cribes the subject of the work he is going to commenton, namelyvoces
ad placitum
meaningful
perse (307.12-3). Those conventionally
significativae
utterancesare singlewords(<dictiones
), like nouns or verbs,and expressions
(<orationes
), thatis to say stringsof words that are not onlyjuxtaposed but
relatedto one another(307.9-10).
His main purpose in dealing with linguisticsigns is to examine the
It consistsminimally,according
simple (categorical)statement(enuntiatio).
to Aristotle,of a noun and a verb; one noun and one verb are sufficient
to compose one simple statement.Nouns and verbs are dealt with in
order to examine statements(307.17-23).
Now accordingto Abelard, nouns and verbs signifyin two different
ways (307.26-30):
unamquidemde rebus,
Nominaenimet verbaduplicem
habent,
significationem
intellectus
ad eas pertiRes enimsignificant
constituendo
alteram
de intellectibus.
attendentes.
hocestnaturam
nentes,
aliquamearumvelproprietatem
This distinctionand way in which the distinctparts are relatedto one
anotheris plausible.Abelard's use of it, however,is remarkable.He does
of each thingand the
not stressthe differencebetween the singularity
universalmeaning of words, but ratherputs the emphasis on another
whichis complementary
to the firstone. Words nevercapture
difference,
a thingas a whole in its complexity.Instead,theydraw attentionto some
propertyof the signifiedthing.
peculiarityor distinctive
of
Abelard links his semantical distinctionbetween the signification
of understandings
rerum/
intellectuurr)
(signicatio
thingsand the signification
to the followingthesis:since nouns and verbsare consideredin orderto
examinestatements,
because thelatterconsistsof them,onlythesignification
is relevant.The signification
of thingscan be neglected
of understandings
or is at best of secondaryinterest(308.19-22):
recte
sicutdiximus,
nomina
etverbatamresquamintellectus
Cumautem
significent,
ubi
videlicet
sed
nonsecundum
hicde eisagitur
intellectuum,
rerum,
significationem
de eisintenditur
constitutionem
propter
propositionis.
he offersthe folTo establishthisclaim, which is not at all self-evident,
lowingthreearguments:4
4 Abelard
is
forthisclaim.
alsohas reasons
ofsymmetry
Categories
Justas Aristotle's
to words
is devoted
to wordsinsofar
so hisPerihermeneias
devoted
as theysignify
things,
in their
cfr.111.8-11).
othercapacity,
(309.14-9;
namely
understandings
signifying

19:52:46 PM

TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 17
1. The difference
betweennouns and verbs can only be discovered
what
is to be understood.In particular,
thedifference
by considering
the
cannotbe discoveredby considering signifiedthings,since the
same thingscan be signifiedby nouns and by verbs. Thus, the
noun "running"and the conjugatedverb "runs" signifythe same
thing."Running" and "runs," however,capture the same idea
in two different
ways which vary the understanding:Sed diversus
modusconcipiendi
variatintellectum,
cursusostenditur
,
quia hie in essentia
hie cumdiscretione
ibi
ibi in adiacentia,
sine
discretione
temporis,
temporis
(308.23-33).
2. To understanda statementmeans to understandthe parts of it
withone another.One canand to combinetheseunderstandings
and
connect
the signification
of things
not go further,
however,
each
of
the
statement
a
to
possessedby
part
single signification
of the thingpossessedby the statementas a whole, since thereis
no thingthat underliesthe statement:Res autempropositionis,
cum
remsubiectam,
ex rebusvocabulorum
nonconsistit
nullamhabeatpropositio
(308.34-40).
3. Thingssignifiedby wordslike "rose" or "lily"pass away. But one
can understandthesewordseven thoughtheremightbe no thing
signifiedby them.It is possible to make and to understandstatementsabout roses in theircomplete absence (e.g. in Winter).If
one is concernedwith statements,one should deal with what is
and not withthingswhichare onlytemporarily
constantly
signified
and
signified
transitory
(309.1-13).
The second argumentis especiallyopen to challenge.What lies behind
the crucial statementpropositio
nullamhabetremsubiectam
, which the argumentdependson? Abelard'ssecond and thirdargumentsimplya further
but also to
problem.One does not only want to understandstatements,
decide whethertheyare true or false. ThereforeAbelard must go further. It is not sufficient
to talk only about the signification
of underalso
He
must
create
the
to
standings.
somethinganalogous
capacity of
words to signifythingsthat applies to statements.
In his second excursus,while commentingon the firstchapterof the
Per hermeneias
, Abelard is concerned with this problem. Earlier, he inhis
terrupted expositionof Aristotle'stext to introducea firstexcursus
(312.33-318.35)in which he distinguishes
), imagination
perception(.sensus
and understanding(intellectus
(imaginatio'
), and explains theirrelationship.
Returningto his expositionof the text,he equates the "passions of the

19:52:46 PM

18

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

It turnsout that all


soul" Aristotleis talkingabout with understandings.
utterancesin a language signifyunderstandings
(319.11-4):5
idestintellectuum.
EARUM
dicunPASSiONUM
quaesuntinanima,
Quaeideopassiones
turesse,quia dumaliquidintelligimus
animus
habet,dumse
quandam
passionem
ad remcoartai.
Abelard's interpretation
is plausible,but, as will be demonstratedlater,
there is some oppositionto it. Nevertheless,this firstexcursuslays the
groundworkforthe next.
Abelard interrupts
his expositionfor a second time when he is combetweenthoseunderstandings
whichare
mentingon Aristotle'sdistinction
neithertruenor falseand thosewhichmustbe eithertrueor false(16a911 = AL 5.11-4). His aim in this second excursus(325.12-331.11) is to
betweendifferent
kindsof understandings.6
clarifyformaldistinctions
All utterancesin a language signifyunderstandings.
When one understandsa singleword,forexample "man," one has a simple{simplex)
underan
When
one
one
understands
has
a
standing.
expression,
composite(compositum
understanding.The example Abelard uses is well-chosen:as an
example fora stringof wordsthatare connected,an expression,he takes
the definiensof "man": "rationalmortalanimal" {animalrationale
mortale).
In presentingthese exampleshe shows that a simpleunderstanding
does
not indicate the understandingof somethingsimple. Rather the act of
is designatedas either"simple"or "composite."In the case
understanding
of a simpleunderstanding,
such as the understanding
of "man," the content is grasped at once; in case of a compositeunderstanding,
such as
the understanding
of "rationalmortalanimal," severalwordsare grasped
and theseunderstandings
are attachedto one anotherto formone composite understanding.
betweensound (sanus)and empty{cassus)understandings,
Distinguishing
Abelardaskswhethera word or an expressionsignifies
not onlyan understandingbut also a thing.It mighthappen that even if each word in an
expressionsignifiesa thing,the expressionas a whole does not.
5 Abelard
thisway:animi
matters
idestintellectus
repeatedly
explains
(312.15-6);
passiones,
anima
sunt
e} id estintellectuum
(312.22);animi
passiones
(319.3-4);
paspassionum
quaeintellectus
idestintellectibus
This
siones
hocestintellectus
depassionibus
animae,
animae,
(320.40);
(322.30).
" willbe decisive
of"passio
whenAbelard
thatthe
shows
Andronicus
interpretation
against
Perihermeneias
See also319.16-21;
is an authentic
workofAristotle
321.21-2;
(323.4-16).
331.21-2.
325.10-1;
6 See Jacobi[1981]forfurther
information
aboutthesedistinctions
and forexact
references.

19:52:46 PM

FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONS 19
In any case, the distinctionbetween "true" and "false" is not applicable to simpleunderstandings.
However,as shownby the examplesgiven
are eithertrueor false.To which
so far,not all compositeunderstandings
false"
is
"true
or
applicable?One obvious sugunderstandings
composite
of
different
kinds
is
to
expressionsaccording to the
distinguish
gestion
that
to
theysignify, is, connectthe contentof the
specificunderstandings
expressionwithits form.
The strings
As mentionedabove, though,Abelardrejectsthissuggestion.
of words that have been consideredso far are semanticallywell-formed,
but theyare nevertheless
incompleteexpressions;sentencesalone are complete expressions.There is only one kind of sentenceto which "true or
The distinction
betweencomplete
false"is applicable,namelystatements.
and incompleteexpressions,accordingto the suggestionat hand, should
be a distinctionbetween differentformsof understandings.But this,
accordingto Abelard, is impossible,since the understandingof "a running man" is exactlythe same as the understandingof "A man runs."
are attachedto one another
In bothcases the same partialunderstandings
in the same way. Nor does it help to restrictour attentionto complete
expressions.Commands, wishes,questions,and statementsare different
formsof completeexpressions,and, accordingto Abelard,may have preciselythe same content:the command "Run!" (said to a man), the wish
"If only a man were running!,"the question "Is a man running?,"and
the statement"A man is running"involvethe same understandings.
But
commands,wishes,and questionsare neithertrue nor false. Yet if the
- which is
statement
necessarilyeither true or false cannot be distinbe they
guished with respect to understandingsfrom non-statements,
incompleteexpressionsor those completeexpressionsto which "true or
false"is not applicable,how then can it be singledout?
Abelardproposesa novel solution.He analysesthe statement"Socrates
sits"into an act of assertionpaired withan assertiblecontent,as though
it were "It is truethat Socrates sits." "That Socrates sits" and "Socrates
"That Socrates sits"
sits"are identicalwithrespectto the understanding.
- one
"I
"It
is
or
can be asserted
has
to
add
true"
assert"to it- but
just
it is not itselfa statement.A "that"-clauseis at best part of a statement.
Even commands,wishes,or questionsmightbe analyzed in such a way
that the ordered/desired/queried
contentis separated into a whetherclause or a that-clause.For example, the wish expressed by "If only
Socrateswere sitting!"can be stated as "I wish that Socrates were sitting!":a combinationof the desired content(that Socrates sits)with the
speaker'sstance ("I wish. . ."). What theseformsof completeexpressions

19:52:46 PM

20

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

make explicitis the act of the speakeror the thinkerwithrespectto their


content("that. .
The speaker declares himselfon the contentof the
In
a
statement
this act is an assertion(327.18-21):
expression.
Ad quodrespondemus
verum
velfalquodin definitione
propositionis
"significare
sum"[Boethius,
De diff.
intellectum
top.PL 64 1174C]nonsecundum
accipiendum
dictapropositionum,
id estenuntiando
id quodestin
est,sedsecundum
proponere
revelnonestin re.
What makes a completeexpressiona statementis that,in additionto its
content(presentedby "that"), it has the modusenuntiandi
(327.25-6) it
presentsa contentin a declarativeway, as opposed to, say, the modus
of contentacross
interrogandi
(cfr.327.27-35). This allows for uniformity
distinctmodes of presentationwhile maintainingthe uniquenessof statementsamong othertypesof completeexpressions.
II
Abelard'ssemanticideas were opposed even in his own circleand alternativetheorieswere proposed.An extraordinary
textbears witnessto this
alternative.We shall referto it by its incipitas the Ghssae "doctrinae
ser"
monm or GDS for short.7It is a completecommentaryon Aristotle's
Perihermeneias
it includesdetailedliteral
, and, like Abelard's commentary,
of
Aristotle's
text
as
well
as
exegesis
digressionsthat take up relevant
These
are
not
understood
to
be different
problems.
enterprises.Instead,
the carefulexplanationof Aristotleis part of the project of developing
philosophicallyadequate views in semantics.Questionsare raised,objections examined, argumentsproposed, alternativeinterpretationscanvassed- all in the course of explainingAristotle'smeaningand methods.
The two worksshare more than a commonstructureand design.One
is the parentof the other.GDS includes(a) literalquotationof Abelard's
sometimesextensive,but typicallywithoutacknowledgment;
commentary,
(b) judicious pastiche of Abelard's text,drawingmaterialfromdifferent
witha greateror lesserdegree of
passages,usuallyorganizeddifferently,
exactnessin the citations;(c) selectiveparaphrase,more or less close, of
7 The textofGDS is found
in V = MS Paris,Bibliothque
Nationale
cod.lat.15015
ff.l80ra01-199ra46.
Marenbon
see
[1993]listsGDS as "H15"in hisworking
catalogue;
theentry
thereforinformation
aboutthescholarly
literature.
We arepreparing
a comfortheCorpus
christianorum
series
toaccompany
ouredition
ofAbelard's
completeedition
Allreferences
hereareto themanuscript.
from
themanuscript
have
mentary.
Excerpts
beenpublished
in De Rijk[1962]113-6,613-5andin De Rijk[1966]47-8;thelatter
includes
several
thatwillalsobe discussed
here.
passages

19:52:46 PM

FROMINTELLECTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 2 1
his grammar,or his reaAbelars commentary,sometimessimplifying
or
of
Abelars
views,oftenaccomsoning, both; (d) independentreports
an
of
his
reasons
or
arguments.8
panied by
exposition
Yet GDS also includesmuch originalmaterial,both in its literalexegesisof Aristotleand in its digressions.Abelars commentaryis used exThere are discussionsof contemporary
tensivelybut not indiscriminately.
ideas and positionsintroducedby Dicuntquidam(experts,of course,to be
taken seriously).Sometimes in the text one can read Dicit magister
P.,
identifiable
as
Abelard.9
the
introduced
Likewise,
clearly
opinions
by quidam can oftenbe found in Abelars commentary,and frequentlythe
- thereis no alii autemdicunt
authorof GDS reportsonlyone position
folHe rarelyagrees with the reportedopinion. In
lowingthe quidamdicunt.
mostcases,he criticizesit,oftenusingseverewords:nullaratioest(181vb278). He opposes his own opinion to it: nos autemdimus(181vb32). The
authorof GDS is thoroughlyfamiliarwithAbelars work.At timeshe
adopts Abelars views. At other times he worksout his own position,
withAbelars theoriesand arguments.
almostalwaysdoingso by wrestling
In short,our authorhas an "Abelard-soaked"approach to philosophy.
of what mighthave
Here is an admittedlyspeculativereconstruction
been the case. We thinkthe authorof GDS studiedunderAbelard,from
whom he receivedthe most importantpart of his philosophicaltraining.
When he could no longer continue his studies with Abelard, he was
allowed to copy the manuscriptAbelard was using in his lectures.Now
he himselfgiveslectureson the Perihermeneias
, perhaps some years later.
He doesn't set great storein being thoughtof as a studentof Abelard.
Perhaps it wasn't safe to do so; Abelars notorietywas a two-edged
sword.10
But the authorof GDS does set greatstorein being thoughtof
8 Thefeatures
ofglosses
meminclined
(a)-(d)aretypical
byphilosophically
produced
bersofAbelars
circle.
theGfossae
secundum
uocales
as "Pll" in
See,forexample,
(listed
Marenbon
as "C8").
[1993])andtheGlossae
super
(listed
Categorias
9 Apart
from
Aristode
andBoethius,
theauthority
named
inGDS isAbelard,
mostoften
thanfourteen
as
no fewer
times(always
181vb18, 182va44,183rb03,
183va44,
189ral8,192val8,193ra02,195val9,196val3,
187ra22,
187ra51,
187va48,187vb43,
196va30.
alsoappearsin examples
at 187vb35
and 198va29-31.)
con(Abelard
Among
Albericof Parisis namedtwice(as "m.."),at 192va20and 195ra48
temporaries,
inan example
at 188va28-9),
andRobert
ofParisis namedonce(as"m.ro
.
(alsoappearing
writers
mentioned
at
other
names
that
193va38.
The
")
only
appearareclassical
parisiensem
Boethius
in hiscommentary.
by10
his
Theremaybe a bitter
himself
from
here:justas Abelard
hadto distance
irony
former
teacher
Roscelin
to avoidtheobloquy
thatfellon him,so tooperhaps
Abelars
- oratleastnotpublicly
- theteacher
hadtodisavow
students
avow
from
whomtheyhad
learned
so much.

19:52:46 PM

22

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

as an independentteacher in logic- independentespeciallyof Magister


Petrus!
Now the authorof GDS rarelymakesa show of his independenceover
mattersof literalexegesis.It is not as an expositorof Aristotlethat he
findsfaultwith Abelard. Instead, his disagreementsare systematicand
philosophicalin nature. For the most part this correspondsto the two
structuralaims of the commentariesmentionedabove, so thatwhen the
authorof GDS takesexcerptsfromAbelardwithoutindicatingit, he goes
back to Abelard's expositorypassages, but when he criticizesAbelars
ideas, he refersto the excurses.Not to all of them,of course; the author
of GDS is not interestedin all subjectsthat are discussedin the Perihermendasand in Abelard's commentary.For instance,he is not interested
at all in the discussionof the copula, a matterof deep concernforAbelard in his commentaryon chapter3 of the Perihermeneias.u
On the other
hand Abelars thesisoutlinedabove, where he separatesthe formand
the contentof an expression,is of great interestto him.
There can be no doubt that Abelard was a distinguishedteacherof
logic and a strikingphilosopher.The author of GDS was likewisean
It is
expert.His oppositionto Abelard is consistentand thoroughgoing.
instructive
to compare his ideas on the formand contentof an expression with those put forwardby Abelard. Which logical or semantictheories seemed to him unacceptable?Which theoriesdid he propose as
alternatives?
What are theirpresuppositions?
Ill
Abelard bases his theoryabout the distinctionbetweenthe formand
contentof an expressionon his theoryof understandings,
as developed
in the firstexcursuswhile commentingon the firstchapter of the Peri
hermeneias
(312.33-318.35). The author of GDS used materialfromthis
firstexcursusextensively(181ral-181va46). He also knowsAbelard'ssecond excursus,where Abelard develops his distinctionbetween different
kinds of understandings,
as noted. But he does not agree with Abelard
that incompleteexpressionsand different
kinds of completeexpressions
n However,
he stresses
Abelard's
idea of taking
thecopulaestas syncategorematic
Abelard's
owntenseeJacobi[1985]),transforming
360.02-22,
390.11-393.37;
(361.30-6,
tative
considerations
intoa doctrine;
seeforinstance
Forthemost
185vb40-7.
though,
part,
theauthor
ofGDS is notparticularly
roleofthecopinexploring
thesemantic
interested
ula (unlike
Abelard!).

19:52:46 PM

FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONS 23
He arguesstronglyforhis own theoryas
the same understanding.
signify
an alternativeto Abelars view. On a closerlook, however,one realizes
thatthereis a falsequotationfromAbelard in an importantdetail. Our
author did not understandAbelard perfectly.This leads to a question.
Does he proposehis theoryonlysince he misrepresents
Abelard'sthought?
Or is his theoryan instructive
alternativeto Abelard worthconsidering
To do justice to the authorof GDS
independentof the misunderstanding?
let us firstdiscusshis theoryand afterwards
his disputewithAbelard.
The authorof GDS does not agree withAbelard'sidentifying
the "pasis talkingabout with"understandings"
sionsofthesoul" Aristotle
(319.11-4,
are passionsof the soul,
quoted on p. 17 above). Though understandings
not all passions of the soul are understandings,
and some passions that
are not understandings
have
a
semantic
role
to play. Not all meanmay
utterances
out
ingful
pick
(181vb6-8):
understandings
veronotasessecommodius
dicitquamsi diceret
"Passionum"
"intellectuum."
Non
enimomnes
vocessignificativae
intellectuum
suntnotae,sedquaedamintellectus,
ut
...
dictiones
et enuntiationes
Some vocessignificativae
ad placitum
signify
passionsof the soul but not understandings,namelycompleteexpressionssuch as questions,requests,commands,and the like, that aren't statements(181vb8-12):
animaepassiones,
utimperativa
. . . quaedam
veroaliasnotant
oratio
imperationem,
etcaetera
enimorationes,
huiusmodi
etsiperhuiusmodi;
deprecativa
deprecationem,
fectae
intellectus
sed
sint,nullostarnen
significant,
quia equeverosequefalsos,
illaequaetantum
et divisionis,
id estnegationis
et affirmationis
sunt;
compositionis
necintellectus
sineverovelfalso.
Moreover,the author of GDS clearlyrejectsthe idea that these expressions signify
when he con{intellectus
imperfetti)
incompleteunderstandings
tinues(18Ivb12-8):
sunta nominibus
velverbis
velimperfectis
orationibus
Qui autemimperfecti
significant^
. . . Cumigitur
orationes
intellectus
sint,nonpossunt
praedictae
perfectae
cumnihilimperfectum
eis significetur;
sed nec perfectos12
significare
imperfectos,
a solisenuntiationibus
intellectus
habent,
significare
significali
possunt,
quiahuiusmodi
convenit
verum
velfalsum
quibustantum
significare.
Thus expressionsthat aren't statementsdo not signifyunderstandings:
theysignifyneithercomplete understandings
(since "true or false" isn't
to
nor
(since onlyincomplete
incompleteunderstandings
applicable them)
expressionssignifyincompleteunderstandings).
12perfectos
V.
] veros

19:52:46 PM

24

STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
JACOBI,

The author of GDS thus draws the followingdistinction.A meaningor anotherkind of passion
fulutterancesignifieseitheran understanding
an incomof the soul. A singleword or an incompleteexpressionsignifies
plete understanding.Only a statementsignifiesa completeunderstanding. Now a statementis a completeexpression,but it isn't the onlykind.
Other kinds of complete expressionsare commands,requests,and the
like. They do not signifyan understandingbut rathersome otherpassion of the soul.
The crucialpoint to thisalternativesemantictheoryis its intentionto
unite the "true or false" criterionwith (complete)understandingsand
statements.Only those passions of the soul that mightbe true or false
sineverovelfalso 18Ivb11-2).These unare understandings
(cf.necintellectus
can
be
a solis
intellectus
derstandings only signifiedby statements(huiusmodi
conuenit
verum
vel
enuntiationibus
tantum
habent,
,
falsumsignificare
significan
quibus
kindsof passionsof
181vbl6-8). Other expressionssignifyeitherdifferent
the soul or incompleteunderstandings.
can also signify
Expressionsdesignatingan incompleteunderstanding
The
author
of
GDS
with
Abelard
that
agrees
completeexpresthings.
sions designatinga complete understandingdo not have an underlying
what happens to a thing
thing.However,it is possibleforthemto signify
is
not
that
or
is
eventus
and
(186ra16-20):
rerum)
(i
something
suntrerum
utimperfectae,
veronon,
Sedorationum
significativae,
quaedam
quaedam
utperfectae.
habent
dicitur
enim
Undeorationes
subicivelpraedicari:
imperfectae
estalbushomo"sicut"Socrates
esthomo."Perfectae
veroorationes
"Socrates
neque
habent
sedevensubicinequepraedicari
habent.
Nonenimaliquam
remsubiectam
tusrerum
<id est>aliquidessevelnonesse.
significant,
Thus the author of GDS holds the followingpair of theses:
are strictly
linkedwithexpressionsto which"true
(A) Understandings
or false" is applicable.
Abelard avoids the link proposed here in (A) since he wants to separate
the comprehensiblecontentfromthe varietyof formsof expressions.
are classifiedintocompleteand incompleteunder(B) Understandings
standings.
Abelard avoids this classification
since he wants to identifythe comprehensiblecontentof incompleteexpressionswith the contentof the correspondingcompleteexpressions.
But (A) is not formulatedexactlyif one takes (B) into account. The
since if underpoint made in (A) mustreferto completeunderstandings,

19:52:46 PM

VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 25
standingscould only be foundin expressionsto which "true or false" is
applicable,thatis to say onlyin a subclassof completeexpressions,then
at all. The author
understandings
incompleteexpressionscould not signify
of GDS, however,insiststhat incompleteexpressionssignifyincomplete
To understand(A) correctlythereforepresupposesthe
understandings.
of
acceptance (B). We may thus replace (A) with the followingthesis:
are stricdylinkedwith expressionsto
(A*) Complete understandings
which "true or false" is applicable.
Perhaps the author of GDS was unaware of the logical dependence of
(A) on (B), since he discusses(A) beforehe discusses(B). We followhis
orderof presentationin our discussion.13
The author of GDS begins with (A)/(A*)- that is, with the elaboration of different
typesof completeexpressionsand theirrelationshipto
It is hardlysurprisingthat he triesto reservethe conunderstandings.
for statements.Though requestsand the like sigcept of understanding
He illusof
the
soul,
they do not signifyunderstandings.
nifypassions
In this case the will of the speaker{i.e.
tratesthiswith " Utinamlegerem!"
his passioanimi)is signified.An understanding,
however,to which "true
or false"is applicable is not signified.This is in contrastto "F0/0legere
,"
where an understandingis signified,a claim justifiedby referenceto
Priscian(181vb32-49):
veldeprecativas
et huiusmodi
nullatenus
Nosautemdicimus
orationes
imperativas
verum
velfalsum
sedtantum
non
constituere,
quasdamanimipassiones
significare,
nullum
velfalsum
intellectum
concedimus.
verum
Qui enimdicit"Utinam
legerem!"
inauditore
animivoluntatem
tarnen
verum
sedsolam14
animiintellectum
manifestat;
Undeista
illum
velielegere.
exverbis
enimeiusconcipit
auditor
intellectum;
generat
notaest,istavero"Volo
"Utinam
soliusvoluntatis
etnonintellectus
oratio
legerem!"
- eundemonstrat
etsignificai
enimproferentis
intellectus
notaest.Intellectus
legere"
in
Similiter
cum
demtamen
auditore
constituit.
intellectum
puerpetit
panem
utraque
sibidari,dicens
"Da mihipanem!,"
nonad intellectum
quemhabeatmanifestandum,
animaeaffectum
vocesedpotius
ad ilium15
cumnonintelligit
se hocvelie,taliutitur
in animoaudivoxillaverum
intellectum
indicandum.
Constituit
tamen
velfalsum
enimqui auditipsumimperare
toris.Intelligit
igitur
panemsibidari.Significant
UndedicitPriscianus
nonintellectus
sedquosdam
animiaffectus.
huiusmodi
orationes
<Institutiones
I 421.17>:
grammaticae
indicantes.
varioseiusaffectus
Modisuntinclinationes
animi,

13The author
to his
before
viewin 181vbl8-32
ofGDS expounds
Abelard's
turning
ofhisexposition
to IV.
owntheses.
We postpone
ourdiscussion
14solam
V.
] De Rijk[1966]47; illam
15illum'
alium
V = De Rijk[1966]48.

19:52:46 PM

26

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
Sicutenimdiversi16
suntanimiaffectus,
sicad illorum17
sunt
diversae
designationes
orationes:
ad optationem,
et sicde caeteris.
ad imperationem,
optativa
imperativa

Anotheraspect of the theorybecomes therebyclear. The theoryhas to


distinguishbetween the speaker and the listener,since even if one who
a passion of the soul and not an undermakes a request is signifying
have an understanding,
standing,the listenerwill nevertheless
namelyan
that
the
wants
as
faras the
noted.18
As
understanding
speaker
something,
is
that
aren't
statements
are on
speaker concerned,completeexpressions
a par with the cries of brute animals (182ral-6):
Ex latratu
enimcanisquiauditcanemiratum
eumintelligit,
nontarnen
voxillaanimalis19
intellectus
nomenest,cumanimalproferens
vocemnullum
habeatintellecdicimus
ab imperfectis
tum;similiter
quodnecverinecfalsiintellectus
significantur
orationibus.
Soliusenimaffirmationis
sunthuiusmodi
intellectus
estverum
quarum
velfalsum
significare.
A personissuesan orderif he wantssomeone to obey him,just as a dog
barksin case it is angry.On the otherhand the listenerhas a complete
understanding both of the commander'swill and of the dog's anger (cf.

186va53-186vb3).
In 182va42 the author of GDS begins to elaborate (B). Afterreporting Abelard'sview (182va44-182vb5),he says thatincompleteexpressions
don't signifyany trueor falseunderstanding
(182vb5-ll). He doesn'tsay
what theydo signify,
but, withrespectto Aristode'stext(16a9-ll = AL
an
5.11-4), he explicitlypointsout thatincompleteexpressionsdo signify
He
returns
to
the
of
and
(182vbl4-21).20
understanding
problem complete
incompleteexpressionsaftercommencinghis commentaryon chapter5
of the Peri hermeneias
,21which he begins with sed notandum
quod quidam
After
Abelard's
once
more
he
the
continues
(186va40).
citing
position
he
earlier
explanation began
(186va47-53):
16diversi
1 De Rijkfi966148; diversa
V.
17illorum
V = De Rijk[1966]48.
] aliorum
A crucial
feature
ofthistheory
is thewayit capitalizes
between
on thedifference
andlistener,
worked
outin 182ra6-20;
offalsestatements
andcortheproblem
speaker
rectunderstandings
in GDS, though
seemsto be original
(182vb23-33)
perhaps
inspired
In general,
theauthor
ofGDS hasa lively
senseofthecontext-dependence
byBoethius.
ofsemantics.
In 185vbl4-5
he arguesthattheunderstanding
constituted
bya wordis
takenexdemonstratio
nein thecircumstances
ofitsutterance;
in 186ra24-48
he argues
that
indexical
statements
suchas egolego
statements
suchas lego
, andhencenon-indexical
librum,
a context
fortheevaluation
oftheir
Sedillud
velillud
semantic
content:
verum
require
falsum
nonexsesedexproferentis
demonstration
significai
(186ra46-7).
altusV.
animalis]
20See also 183ra3-5
and 186rb29f.
2117a2= AL 8.8 (Enuntiativa
vero
nonomnis
. . .) It is another
markoftheclosesimilar-

19:52:46 PM

TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 27
<scil.orationem>
etimperfectam
eundem
Nobisverononplacet
significare
perfectam
notaest"Socrates
Alterius
enimintellectus
intellectum.
legit"et "Socrates
legens."
constituvocamus
Omnesenimillasorationes
perfectum
quaein auditore
perfectas
Cumenimdico"Socrates
untintellectum.
perfectum
legit"in animoaudientium
nullum
cumautemdico"Socrates
intellectum;
legens,"
capitauditor
perfecgenero
tumintellectum,
quarenonestoratioperfecta.
The difference
among expressionsis reflectedin the differenceamong
understandings.
The semanticalimportof thisdiscussionin GDS is to isolate the distinctivecharacterof the statement.On the one hand, statementsare to
fromnon-declarativecompleteexpressionsthat are not
be distinguished
statements
(commands,wishes,and thelike) thisis thesubjectof (A)/(A*);
and passiones.
betweenintellectus
is explainedas a difference
the difference
currit
are
to
be
as
Homo
On the otherhand, statements
)
(such
distinguished
- thisis the
fromdeclarativeincompleteexpressions(such as homocurrens)
betweenintellecis explainedas a difference
subjectof (B); the difference
are
distinct
The
theses
and intellectus
tusperfecti
impeyfecti.
parts of a comaddresses.
well
as
his
former
student
as
one
that
Abelard
mon project,
But theydo not agree.
IV
The authorof GDS elaborates(A)/(A*) and (B) in directoppositionto
Abelard'sposition,which he is carefulto state beforeproposinghis own
theses.However,as mentionedon p. 22 above, thereis a mistakein his
descriptionof Abelars position.Whetherit is a mistakethatvitiateshis
account remainsto be seen.
Afteroutlininghis two theses(181vb6-18),and beforeconsidering(A),
the authorof GDS reportsAbelars statementthat the understandable
formsof expressionsmightbe the same. There is no
contentof different
doubt thatAbelard is his target:he prefaceshis remarkswith the words
P. Abelard is correctlyportrayedas having said that
dicittarnen
Magister
requests,commands,and statementsmighthave the same content,but
the authorof GDS is mistaken,however,in claimingthat Abelard said
velfalsum
that these different
formsof expressionsignifythe same verum
(181vbl8-23):22
"Perhermeneias"
thateachtakes
onAristotle's
GDS andAbelard's
Commentary
itybetween
Est
thanthemoretraditional
thistextto signalthestartofchapter
5, rather
beginning
autem
unaprima
oratio
enuntiativa
affirmatio
(17a8= AL 8.13).
22Despite
attheendinthewords
ofthepassage,
thereason
theanti-Abelardian
slant
given
Abelard
enuntiare
enim
is a verbatim
non
nisiaffirmando
velnegando
(327.21-2).
quotefrom
potest

19:52:46 PM

28

KLAUSJACOBI,
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
et eundem
Dicittarnen
P. idemverum
velfalsum
intellectum
a
Magister
significan
- utidem
etimperativis
orationibus
etconsimilibus,
etab enuntiationibus
deprecativis
intellectus
ab ista"Vololegere"et "Utinam
Alteram
tarnen
significatur
legerem."
etenuntiat,
"Vololegere,"
concedit
esse,scilicet
quiaverum
significai
propositionem
velfalsum
altera<m>non,scilicet
"Utinam
legerem!,"
quia licetverum
significet,
nontamenenuntiat,
enuntiare
enimnonpotest
nisiaffirmando
velnegando.

Abelard did not claim commands and the like to have a true or false
content.Yet the authorof GDS representshim as havingdone so. How
could such a carefulstudentof Abelardhave come to misrepresent
Abelard
so seriously?
His reasoningseems to be as follows.Abelard clearlysays that commands and other non-declarativecomplete expressionshave the same
understandingas statements.The author of GDS is of the opinion that
an integralpart of the understandingof statementsis that it presents
somethingas trueor false a versionof (A*). But if a command(say)has
the same understanding
and an integralpartof thatunderas a statement,
is
it
that
standing
presentssomethingas true or false,then it seems as
the
of the commandwillpresentsomethingas true
though
understanding
or false.This resultholds forall completeexpressions.Hence the author
of GDS puts the conclusionhe has drawn here into Abelard's mouth.
His doing so depends on takingAbelard to endorse his own thesis(A*),
and the possibility
of applying"true
connectingcompleteunderstandings
or false"; he couldn't imagineAbelard not acceptingthis connection.
Yet the author of GDS recognizesthat Abelard must, in line with
in
Aristotle,draw a distinctionbetween statementsand non-statements
termsof theirtruthand falsity.He findsin Abelard'stexta semanticdistinctionbetweensignifying
and stating{enuntiare),
and therefore
{significare)
ascribes to Abelard the view that in all kinds of expressionssomething
trueor falseis signified,
but only a statementdeclares or statesit. Small
wonder he wasn't satisfiedwith this idea! Afterall, how can an expression signifya truthor falsehood{verum
withoutstating
velfalsumsignificare)
it as well? The author of GDS is correctin having much troublewith
this distinction{nullaratioest)(181vb23-9).
Of course,Abelard never said that a command signifiesbut does not
statesomethingtrueor false.Despite thismisrepresentation,
however,the
author of GDS has grasped an importantpoint. Accordingto Abelard,
different
formsof expressionmay have identicalcontent(and indeed the
same understandings),
but what makes a formof an expressiona statement and hence susceptibleto "true or false"- is thatits contentis put
forwardwiththe modusenuntiandi.
But thenwhat makes a formof expression able to be assessed forits truthor falsityis not a matterof what is

19:52:46 PM

VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMLNTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 29
said, or not merelya matterof what ia said, but also depends on how
it is said. The author of GDS sees no reason for this. Why should the
mode of presentationof some contentbe relevantto its truthor falsity?
thatit alone can presentits
about the modusenuntiandi
What is distinctive
contentin the true-or-falseway? The author of GDS is rightto be
In lightof such concerns,Abelard's positionbegins to look
dissatisfied.
suspiciouslyad hoc.
The situationis similarin the case of (B). Even thoughthereare two
passages where our author reportsAbelard correcdy(181vb29-32 and
186va40-7),in a thirdpassage, one where he explainshis own thesis,he
Abelard. He imputesto Abelard the view that
significandy
misrepresents
"whiteman" and "A man is white" signifythe same truthor falsehood
( 182va44-182vb4):23
orationes
ab enuntiationibus
intellectu
nondisP. imperfectas
Dicittamen
magister
intellectum
ab istaoratione
"homoalbus"significan
Asserit
eundem
namque
crepare.
velfalsum,
nectamenhanc"homo
qui ab ista"homoestalbus,"et idemverum
nullaenimimperfecta
albus"propositionem
concedit,
proponit;
quianihilenuntiando
nisiaffirmando
velnegat.Enuntiare
autemnonpotest
velnegando.
oratioaffirmai
Analogouslyto the preceding case, Abelard did not claim incomplete
expressionsto be true or false,althoughthe author of GDS represents
him as having done so. The reasoningis the same as before,namely
that truthand falsehoodare an integralpart of theirunderstanding.If
an incompleteand a completeexpressionsignifythe same truthor falsehood, why shouldn'tthe incompleteexpressionlikewisestate what the
completeexpressionstates?The authorof GDS once more sees no reason forit.
The same problemfoundin the presentationof (A) is behind the mistaken account of (B). But again the author of GDS has found a weaknessin Abelars position.It seemsclear thatAbelardowes us an account
of what he means by the modusenuntiandi
, and how importantsemantic
such as the difference
betweenexpressionsthat make statedistinctions,
mentsand thosethatfailto do so, can ride on it- to say nothingof how
theyare relevantto raisingthe questionof truthor falsehood.
The debate betweenAbelard and his formerstudentover thesesemanThere is justice on both sides. But
tical issues is complex and difficult.
an importantpiece of the puzzle is stillmissing.

23Againthereason
enuntiando
Abelard
at theend,nihil
. . . negando
, is a quotefrom
given
(327.21-3),
onlyslightly
rearranged.

19:52:46 PM

30

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
V

The author of GDS attributestheses to Abelard he never has held.


Yet Abelard does make free use of the terminology
behind the theses.
an
Abelard opens his excursuson understandings
enumeration
of forby
mal distinctionshe has to investigate.There we find the distinction
besidesintellectus
sanus/
,24intellectus
cassus,and othersthat
simplex/
compositus
need not be mentionedhere- betweenintellectus
verus/falsus
(325.15).
Now it is strikingthat all these distinctionsare discussed separately
When he comes to thisdistinction
Abelard
verus/falsus.
exceptforintellectus
merelysays (326.37-327.1):25
Namnecomnisintellectus
sanus"verus"
dicitur
necomniscassus"falsus."
proprie
Verusenimvelfalsus
essenonpotest
intellectus
nisisit.compositus,
utsuntproposivelfortasse
tionum
intellectus
aliarum
orationum
etiamimperfectarum.
quarundam
As faras the distinctions
betweenintellectus
sanus/
cassusand intellectus
verus/
falsusare concerned,it is obvious that the understanding
corresponding
to a single word, which mightbe sound or empty,cannot be true or
false. But who would maintainsuch a claim? The real problemof how
a distinctioncould be drawn betweenstatements("Socrates
curri
), other
curreret
complete expressions(" UtinamSocrates
/"), and incompleteexpressions ("Socrates
withrespectto theirspecificunderstandings
is not
currens")
solved.
to
in
Abelard
this
there
is
thereby
According
passage,
only one
to
a
true
false
or
requirement having
understanding,
namely that the
condition.
expressionbe composite.It is a necessarybut not a sufficient
More needs to be said to account for the difference.
In an objection given shordy after the explanationjust described,
Abelard attacksexactlythis difficulty
(327.14-7):
Sed opponitur
vel"homoalbus"intellectum
verum
velfalquod,si "homocurrens"
sumsignificant
sicutpropositio,
totaeisdefinitio
convenit,
propositions
quodsitscilicetoratioverum
vel falsum
undeeas oportet
essepropositiones,
cum
significans,
tamensintimperfectae
orationes.
24The author
ofGDS rejects
thisdistinction,
andin 183rb5-183va5
he givesreasons
- forinstance,
fortherejection
of composite
he pointsoutthatunderunderstandings
aretransitory
anddo notexistsimultaneously
toliterally
constitute
a composite
standings
wecouldthenhavetheseeming
ofa truecomposite
understandunderstanding;
paradox
ofGDS
andthelike.Instead,
theauthor
ingmadeupoffalseconstituent
understandings;
thatboththepartsof expressions
maintains
and expressions
themselves
signify
simple
understandings.
25Theauthor
ofGDS introduces
thedistinction
between
sanus/
andverus/falsus
in
cassus
182rb30-182va8
fromAbelard)
verbatim
and in 182va22-42
(almost
(largely
following
trueandfalseunderstandings
heinterprets
ina somewhat
different
fashAbelard),
though
ion(as willbe discussed
below).

19:52:46 PM

VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 3 1
The objectionraised here is of a piece with the problemsdiscussedin
IV above. It stems fromcombining(A*) with the claim that complete
and incompleteexpressionshave the same understanding.
Abelard replies
as follows(327.18-21):
velfalAd quodrespondemus
verum
"significare
quodin definitione
propositionis
dictapropositionum,
sum"nonsecundum
intellectum
est,sedsecundum
accipiendum
id quodestin revelnonestin re.
id estenuntiando
proponere
of somethingtrue or false from
Abelard here separatesthe signification
- thatis to
say, he rejects(A*) and forthe firsttime he
understandings
introducesthe dictum
, the missingpiece of thepuzzle. Complete
propositionis
of
truthand falsityare distinctivein virtue
that
are
expressions
capable
of the fact that theypropose what is or is not the case in a statementmakingway. We referthe questionof theirtruthor falsitynot to under. Abelard then takes up the veryprobstandingsat all but to theirdicta
lems that induce the author of GDS to work out his own theory,as
thoughdirectlyaddressingthe criticismsraised in IV, and resolvesthem
and the dicbetweenthe intellectus
propositionis
by mobilizingthe difference
tumpropositionis
.26
in the passage cited above,
Abelard'smentionof the dictum
propositionis
is
is
There
this
brief.
only
though, exceedingly
singleremark.He underscoresits importancebut does not explain the dictum
any further.Later,
while commentingon chapter4 of the Perihermenas
, Abelard adds an
at length(365.13-370.22). But therehe is
excursusdiscussingthe dictum
concernedwithquestionsabout its ontologicalstatus;its role as putative
statements;how it can be a vehicle for
subjector predicatein different
26Abelard
in 327.27-41:
writes
Sedneca ceteris
orationibus
diversa
estintellectu.
Cumenimaudio
enuntiatio
perfectis
ab ilio,"velcumdico
"O Petre!"
mevocari
ab ilio,sicut
sidicerem
"Egovocor
intelligo
inhancvil"Utinam
rexveniret!"
ac si dicerem
"Voloregem
venire
idemestintellectus
lm"etcumdicoimperando
veldeprecando
Petre!"
innuitur
vel
"Adesto
quodimpero
cumdici
turinterrogando
venit?"
ostendo
me
"Socrates
eumadesse.
Similiter
deprecor
eteundem
intellectum
tenet
"Socrates
siveintervenit,"
interrogare
quodvenit,
semper
inTopicis
Simdicatur
sivenon,sicut
ostendemus
[ed.Dal Prap. 225.4-227.10].
rogative
orationes.
Si enim
tantundem
plices
saepeostendunt
quantum
quoquedictiones
perfectae
dicam"Papae!"
vel"Heu!"ostendo
meadmiran
veldolere,
sicutsi dicerem
"Admiror"
vel"Doleo."Istetamen
estintellectus,
est,illecomposi
tus,quiest
quidictionis
simplex
velquaelibet
et cumorationes
interiectiones
dictiones
orationis,
<enuntient>,
simplices
nilproponunt.
Undeex modoproponendi
enuntiationes
sivepropositiones
enuntiando
maxime
dicuntur.
ofGDS inhisdiscussion
Thesearetheproblems
canvassed
of(A)and(B).
bytheauthor

19:52:46 PM

32

STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
JACOBI,

necessityand possibility;how it explains the kinds of oppositionfound


among propositions;and the like. There is no mentionof true or false
and no accountof how the dictum
overcomesthe difficulties
understandings
it was designedto address.
Abelardreturns
to thisissueelsewherein hisLogicaingredimbus,
specifically
in
he
to
the
cited
above
which
introduces
the dictum
referring
passage
In
his
on
Boethius's
"De
Abelard
Commentary
topicisdifferentiis
propositions.
an
takesup Boethius'sdefinitionof a propositionas
expressionsignifying
1174B: propositio
estoratioverum
differentiis
somethingtrueor false(De topicis
where
he
writes
and
(225.22-9
226.15-30):27
falsumve
significam
),
"Verum"
modoenimnomina
suntpropoquippeac "falsum"
tripliciter
accipiuntur:
secundum
veravelfalsa;modonomina
intellecsitionum,
quoddicitur
propositio
undeintellectuum
aliumverum
aliumfalsum;
modoetiamnomina
tuum,
dicimus,
eorum
a propositionibus,
iuxtaquoddicimus
hancpropositionem
dicere
quaedicuntur
- hocestproponere28
illamautemfalsum
verum,
talequid
quodinreestvelquodin
re nonest[. . .] De duabusautemposterioribus
vel"fal"verum"
significationibus
sum"quaeritur
tionisaccipiendae
sint.Sed si dicamus
quae in definitione
proposi
"verum"
verum
vel
vel"falsum"
nomina
esseintellectuum,
cumdicitur
"significans
- ac si dicatur
- profecto
falsum"
verivelfalsiintellectus"
totadefinido
"significativa
multis
vel
orationibus
veluti
ista:"homocurrens"
convenit,
propositionis29
imperfectis
dequo
"hominem
nonhabent
currere,"
quam"homocurrit,"
quaealiumintellectum
ubi etiamostendimus
"veram"
plenius
superPerihermenias
egimus,
propositionem
vel "falsam"
sensum
suumquamsecundum
magisdeberedicisecundum
conceptionem
velfalsum"
suiintellectus.
Similiter
hocloco"significare
verum
magisaccipi
dictum
convenit
secundum
ac si dicereintellectum,
propositionis
quamsecundum
mus"enuntians
talequid
quodin re estvelin re nonest,"namquodin re estvel
...
quodnonestpropositionibus
ponimus
Given that complete and incompleteexpressionshave the same understanding,Abelard asserts,and takingthe definitionof the propositionto
referto understandings,
therewould be no way to block the conclusion
that incompleteexpressionsare themselvespropositions;we must thereforetake the definitionas referring
to what propositionssay ratherthan
to theirunderstandings.
on the
The argumentis the same one put forwardin the commentary
Abelard's explicit
Perihermeneias
, couched in a more general framework.
. . .) is thereto
as
ostendimus
the
latter
further
confirmation
etiam
(ubi
appeal
fore disingenuous.Yet at the end of this passage he offersa clue: the
" has beeneditedin Dal Pra
27Abelard's
onBoethius's
"Detopicis
Commentary
differentiis
=
M
168rcod.lat.7493ff.
themanuscript MS Paris,Bibliothque
Nationale
[1969]from
our
to thepageandlinenumber
butwe supply
ofhisedition,
184r;we givereferences
ownversion
ofAbelard's
textdirectly
themanuscript
from
(allvariants
noted).
28proponere
M = Dal Pra.
] proposition
+
M (following
Dal rras excision).
propositions
J definitio

19:52:46 PM

FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONIS 33
semanticrelationat work here is that of stating,which does not apply
at all but to a new and distinctitem,namelythe dicto understandings
tum.Abelard expands on this suggestionin replyingto two objections
(226.35-227.10):
Seddicitur
"enuntiare"
"verum
velfalaccipimus,
superfluit
quodsiper"significare"
sum"quodsupponitur;
estpropositio
quippeomnisoratioenuntiatiua
nonsolet
quod"significare"
pro"enuntiare"
Atquerespondemus
perse acceptum
velfalsum"
veltalealiquidquodsoliuspropositionis
"verum
accipi,nisisupponatur
Perihermeniarum
estsignificativa
sit,sicutilludin secundo
quod"affirmatio
aliquid
de aliquo,"id estenuntians
affirmando
aliquidde aliquo.
Si quisetiam
intellectuum30
nonaccipimus
"verum
vel
quaerat
quareindesignatione
falsum"
"enuntiare"
postquam31
subintelligimus
Profecto
omnino
intellectum
hunc,tarnen
significat
quiaipsum
quialicetpropositio
nondicit,
enuntiando
nonproponit.32
The "true or false" criterionis associated only with propositions,and,
Abelardasserts,is intimately
bound up withmakinga statement.
Although
a propositionsignifiesits understanding,
it does not presentit in a statement-makingway. Instead, doing so is entirelya matterof what the
propositionsays its dictum.
over true and false understandAbelars responseto the difficulties
ings sketchedin IV, then,has two elements.First,Abelard postulatesa
distinctfromthe semanticrelasemanticrelationof "stating"{enuntiare)
This allows him to maintain that statementsindeed
tion of signifying.
have the same signification
as othercompleteand incompleteexpressions
whileleavingroom forhis denial thatthe latterare therebypropositional
in character.Second, Abelard postulatesa special object forthissemantic relation,namelythe dictum
This allowshim to identify
what
propositionis.
is distinctive
about statementswithoutmakingunderstandings
somehow
to
truth
assessments
of
and
falsehood.
The
semantic
relations
susceptible
of stating/
differ
as
well
as
their
intrinsically
signifying
by
objects.
Abelard thus holds that expressionssignifytheirunderstandings,
and
that the same understandingcan be signifiedby an incompleteexpression, a non-declarativecompleteexpression,and a proposition.Propositions,in addition,saysomething.They proposewhat is or is not the case.
This is somethingpropositionsdo above and beyond what theyhave in

30intellectuum'
M = Dal Pra.
intellectum
31postquarr
Dal Pra(!).
priusquam
32proponit'
PonDal Pra.

19:52:46 PM

34

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

common with otherexpressions.Hence it requiresa new semanticrelation. Furthermore,


propositionsstate how thingsare. And "how things
- is neitheritselfa
are" what it is that a propositionstates
thing(statan
is
not
nor
is
not
It is
ing
referring)
understanding
(stating
signifying).
ratherthe new object of the new semanticrelation,namelywhat is said
by the proposition,its dictum
propositions.
Much remainsto clarifyin thisaccount. Yet even so we can see how
the introductionof the dictum
is motivatedby the difficulties
propositionis
true
and
false
Abelars doctrineaddresses
surrounding
understandings.33
the points attacked by the author of GDS and provides a systematic
answerto a fundamentalproblemin semantics.Unfortunately,
all is not
as simple as it seems at first.
VI
Abelard clearlystatesin all of the passages we have been considering
that "true or false" is not to be used as a distinctionamong understandings.In the case of singlewords we speak of understandings
being
sound or emptyratherthan true or false.Talk of truthor falsityis out
of place in the case of incompleteexpressionsand non-declarativecomplete expressions,as Abelard repeatedlyemphasizes;if theywere susceptible to truthand falsitytheywould be propositions.Yet in the case of
is the vehicle of
complete declarativeexpressionsthe dictum
propositionis
truthand falsity,not the associated understanding,
and to speak of its
associated understandingas true or false would be a mistake,since the
selfsameunderstanding
can also be associatedwithnon-declarative
expressions. There is no philosophicalworkleftforthe notionof trueand false
to do.
understandings
after
Abelard introducedthe dictum
Therefore,
, all menpropositionis
tion of intellectus
and
indeed
could,
should,have been dropped.
verus/falsus
There is no need for a dictum
if one accepts the concept of
propositionis
33Wedo notmeanto
usesthedictum
inmany
other
roles
denythatAbelard
propositionis
inhissemantics,
oflogic,andmetaphysics.
Butthefactremains
thatheintrophilosophy
ducesit in thecontext
oftrueandfalseunderstandings,
his
and,whenhe summarizes
" he
inhisCommentary
doctrine
onBoethius's
onthese
"Detopicis
concentrates
entiis,
differ
aspects
we maythink
oftherelative
valueofthevarious
motivaagain.Whatever
philosophical
tionsthetheory
ofthedictum
propositionis
mayhavehad,from
identifying
logicalcontent
across
distinct
sentences
toproviding
a vehicle
formodaloperators,
Abelard
grammatically
himself
takesit in thefirst
to address
instance
thedifficulties
withtrueandfalseunderstandings.

19:52:46 PM

FROMLNTFJF.CTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 35
true or false understandings,and conversely.34
Each makes the other
unnecessary.
Yet Abelardfreelytalksabout trueand falseunderstandings
afterintrois in 327.18-21 (cited on p. 31 above). Parts
proposition
ducingthe dictum
of his commentaryon Aristotle'sPeri hermeneias
can hardly be worked
formula
without
the
"intellectus
." For example,
using
verus/falsus
through
Abelard argues in 328.18-329.28 that understandingsshould be called
true or false not in line with the conceptionor dispositionof mental
animi.Here true and false underimages but accordingto the attentiones
in
a
the
theoretical
role
standingsplay
analysis Abelard's use of the
formulais neithercasual nor loose, but integralto the point under discussion.Furthermore,
passages like this one can easily be found in his
the
fact
that
the introduction
of the dictum
should
work,despite
propositionis
have made any mentionof true or false understandings
otiose.
Yet thisis only true of parts of his work. For, in the main, Abelard
not in the literalexegesisof
lays out his theoryof the dictum
propositionis
Aristode'stextbut in the independentexcurseshe adds to it. For examon Perihermeneias
4, Abelardargues
ple, in the excursusto his commentary
in favorof his theoryof the dictum.
and imaginatively
He knows
carefully
how unusual it must be for those who attend his lectures.He distinof understandings
and the signification
guishesbetweenthe signification
of what is said to be the case (<dictum
Most
the
propositionis). importantly,
formulaintellectus
doesn't appear even once. The same is true
verus/falsus
of his commentaryon Perihermeneias
5.35 By the same token,in speakwhile commentingon Aristode,he
ing of true and false understandings
often
of
the
dictum
The two accountscoexist
much
less
propositionis.
speaks
uneasilyin Abelard's writings,the formerat home in the commentary
and the latterin the excurses.When the two accounts appear together,

34This
hasescaped
hitherto
which
do nomorethanreport
point
existing
interpretations,
vet[1969]p. 373:
Abelard's
distinctions.
See forexample
Joli
Uneintellection
unevide,
oucompose.
Enrevanche
comme
seule
saine,
peuttresimple
uneintellection
telles
lesintellections
despropocompose
peuttreditevraieou fausse:
surla logique,
sitions.
Nousdbouchons
nonseulement
maisaussisurla question
alors,
dusensdespropositions,
traite
ailleurs.
See alsoJacobi[1981]p. 64-8,whichspeaksofwahre
in
und
Verstndnisse
, although
falsche
68-73he shows
thatthere
cannot
be anytrueor falseunderstandings.
p.35
In 373.4-5
ofunderstandings
withcomplete
Abelard
theidentity
associated
describes
andincomplete
as in 327.20;thissuggests
andnotbyverum/
faisum
expressions
byeundem
thathe is awareoftheimplications
ofhisshift
to thedictum
Gfr.374.25-6.
propositionis.

19:52:46 PM

36

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

as theysometimesdo, theyare not well integrated.36


One hypothesisthatwould explainthe stateof Abelars textis a "layered" account of the compositionof his work,a view that is independAbelard developedhis theoryof the
entlyplausible.37On thishypothesis,
is
after
the
dictum
proposition
compositionof his basic commentary(the literal exegesisof Aristode),and perhaps even aftersome of the otherexcurseshad been composed and insertedinto the text.If so, thenAbelard
may well not have made all the correctionsneeded to bringthe restof
his textinto line with his new ideas, thoughhe did make some adjust"dictum
ments.The passage whereAbelardsubstitutes
for"true
propositionis"
or false understanding"(namely327.14-41) may be such a later adjustment.We can thenwriteoffthe persistenceof the formulaintellectus
verus/
a
relic
an
as
of
earlier
of
Abelard's
one
that
for
falsus
stage
thinking,
some unknownreason was never fullyrevisedout of the text.
This hypothesiscan also explain the "mistakes"made by the author
of GDS, canvassedin IV. While the authorof GDS seems to have been
familiarwithmostor all of Abelard'sliteralexegesisof Aristode,the same
cannot be said for Abelard's excurses. (He shows no signs of being
36Thereis oneremarkable
inwhich
Abelard
seemstocontradict
he
everything
passage
hassaidaboutthedictum
(375.33-5):
propositionis
Namquantum
ad intellectum
sivead dictum
etimperoratio
saepenondifferunt
perfecta
ut"Socratem
et"Socrates
ineo quodhaecenuntiat,
currere"
sedmagis
id
fecta,
currit,"
estaffirmat
velnegat,
ilianon.
in whichthetwo
at all!Otherpassages
Incomplete
expressions
oughtnothavea dictum
accounts
arejuxtaposed
are perhaps
in linewith
butable to be construed
misleading
inexplaining
Abelard's
Forexample,
views.
howa proposition
ismultiple,
Abelard
professed
writes
(381.23-5):
Pluresautem,
id estmultiplex,
estpropositio,
de uno,id estperunam
quaesimiliter
plurasignificat,
materiam
sivequantum
ad dictapropositionum
sive
enuntiationis,
ad intellectum.
quantum
Thechoicebetween
anddicta
onlymakes
understandings
posedat theendofthispassage
senseifwe takeAbelard
to be using"signify"
in a widesense,onethatincludes
"generas wellas "stating."
Abelard's
atingan understanding"
usageis
(signification
proper)
thelarger
looseand fluidthatthisis at leastplausible.
Thereis,ofcourse,
sufficiently
- see De Rijk
and dictaare connected
to one another
of howunderstandings
question
i19821,
oneofthefewarticles
to address
theissue.
37Abelard
inthisfashion;
histheological
works
itisnotunreasonable
tothink
composed
thathedidthesameforhislogical
forthis
works.
SeeJacobi/Strub
[1995],which
argues
claimin thespecific
caseofAbelard's
onAristotle's
"Per
hermeneias
Abelard's
Commentary
revito havebeenthesubject
ofconstant
text,then,is nota fixedobject;it is likely
sionandrewriting.
Thereareinteresting
fortheproject
Abelard's
ofdating
consequences
works.

19:52:46 PM

TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONIS 37
FROMINTFJJFCTUS
forexamacquaintedwithAbelars excursusin chapter4 on the dictum,
in
of
his
own
had
some
the
he
"layers"
manuscript
only
ple.)38Perhaps
not yet being
of Abelard,whereinwe findtrue or false understandings
"
." This text would raise all the
propositions
partlycorrectedby dictum
and
thatmotivatedAbelard to introducethe dictum
difficulties
propositions,
the author of GDS would be quite rightto highlightthem, thoughin
ignoranceof Abelard's later theoryhe solves the problemsin his own
individualway, as we have seen.
These generalconsiderationsreceiveparticularsupportin the case of
the passage where Abelard introducesthe dictum
(327.18-21).
propositionis
familiarwith thispassage. In the very
The authorof GDS is intimately
next sentenceAbelard writes(327.21-3):
nisiaffamando
velnegando,
nullaautem
Enuntiare
autemnonpossumus
imperfecta
velnegatatqueideonilenuntiando
oratioaffirmat
proponit.
The author of GDS refersnot once but twice to this remark,once at
181vb23(citedon p. 14 above) and once at 182vb04(citedon p. 15 above),
it being one of the few places Abelard tries to spell out what it is to
make a statement{enuntiare).
But the author of GDS makes no mention
If his
here or anywhereelse, for that matter.39
of the dictum
propositionis
at
its
about
the
dictum
included
a
remark
all,
importancewas
manuscript
not
detailed
discussionof
he
did
know
Abelard's
not highlighted.
Surely
in
4.
the dictum the excursusto chapter
This fact should give us pause. How could it happen that one of
Abelard'sclose followers,a memberof his philosophicalcircle,should be
so clearlyignorantof such an importantand distinctiveview of Abe. Rather,
lard's? It is not that he disagreeswith Abelard over the dictum
he is completelyunaware of the theory,thoughhe has a sharp awareness of the problemsthat would promptAbelard to develop it.
A natural suggestion,in keeping with the developmentalhypothesis
withAbelard at
sketchedabove, is thatthe authorof GDS was affiliated
a relativelyearly stage of Abelard's philosophicalthinking,and that he
38Theauthor
1 and
ofGDS directly
excurses
onPerihermeneias
citesAbelard's
Chapter
on Chapters
ofGDS
2-5.Theauthor
6; he seemsnotbe awareofanyexcurses
Chapter
7 andChapinAbelard's
excurses
onChapter
is alsofamiliar
withthedoctrine
expressed
ter9, butnotAbelard's
exactwording.
- interesting
39The author
aboutthestatus
ofGDS doesnothavethesamereticence
inthelight
anddictum
Tweedale
ofcontemporary
to linkstatus
(seeforexample
attempts
ofa soundunderstanding
as
Abelard's
characterization
[1976]).He citeswithapproval
one"inaccordwiththestatus
andeven
ofthething"
182va04,
(182rb34-6,
182va36-40),
enim
veritatem
etfalsitatem
e/ficiunt
(197rb08).
propositionum
goesso faras tosaystatus

19:52:46 PM

38

KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,

composed GDS beforeAbelard developed the theoryof the dictum


propositionis
at
rate
before
The
about
over
true
(or
it).
any
hearing
problems
and falseunderstandings
and explainingthe distinctive
characterof statementswould have been problemsdebated in Abelard's circle; the master and the studenteach came to resolve the problemsindependently,
and, as it turnedout, in diametrically
opposed ways.40
Anothermemberof Abelard's circle providessome negativeevidence
here: William of Lucca, whose Summadialecticae
artisdates fromthe latter part of the twelfthcentury,well afterAbelard's death.41William is
also a devoted followerof Abelard- so much so that he refersto him
a distinction
simplyas "the Philosopher"(Philosophus),
usuallyreservedfor
Aristotle.Yet like the author of GDS, Williamis completelyunaware of
the dictum
It is not so much as mentionedin the whole of the
propositionis.
Summadialecticae
artis.*2
when Williamturnsto the sensesof
Furthermore,
"true"and "false"in 5.22, he offersonlytwo alternatives:
theyare proper
names eitherof understandings
or of statesof affairs(euentus
),
propositionum
to propositionsin virtueof the
though sometimesthey are transferred
truthor falsityof theirassociated understandings.
But Williamis writing
at a late enoughdate to be fullyacquaintedwithAbelard'smaturetheory.
?43
Why is thereno mentionof the dictum
propositionis
40This
is stronger
thanit needsto be. The author
ofGDS wrote
in ignosuggestion
ranceofAbelard's
buttheconverse
neednothold.Consider
whatAbelard
views,
says
whenhe returns
to hisdistinction
between
and incomplete
and
complete
expressions
between
different
forms
ofcomplete
in a laterpassagein hiscommentary
on
expressions
Perihermeneias
5 (373.1-6):
Nosautem
orationis
noniuxtaperfectionem
perfectionem
significationis
pensamus,
quod
videlicet
huiusperfectum
Nam"Socratem
est,illiusimperfectum.
significativum
legere"
estidempenitus
et "Socrates
currens"
quaeimperfecta
significai
quod"Socrates
legit"
eundem
habetintellectum
currit"
et perse etiamdictaeandem
animi
quem"Socrates
facit
. . ."
currit
conceptionem
quam"Socrates
Thislookslikean objection
to theviewsheldbytheauthor
ofGDS!
41William
ofLucca'sSumma
dialecticae
artis
hasbeeneditedin Pozzi[1975];all referencesareto thisedition.
42The onlypossible
mention
ofdicta
in 8.29-33,
where
William
takesup the
occurs
ofwhatan argument
is. He considers
theproposals
thatarguments
areproposiquestion
thattheyaretheunderstandings
associated
withpropositions,
thattheyare(sometions,
andthattheyarehypotheticarum
dicta.
Butitis clear
themselves,"
how)"things
propositionum
from
he meansno morethanthepropositions
thatenter
intothe
8.31thatbythelatter
antecedent
andtheconsequent
oftheconsequence
an argument.
(Inanyevent
representing
William
all thesuggestions,
in 8.33thatarguments
consist
rejects
concluding
onlyin
Thereareno otherusesofthetermin hiswork.
words.)
43Whatofthetwoother
works
inAbelard's
circle(mentioned
inn.8
clearly
produced
The Glossae
secundum
vocales
hasno mention
ofthedictum
Norhavewe
above)?
propositionis.

19:52:46 PM

FROMINTELLECTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONIS 39
VII
An alternativehypothesisthat would account for (most of) the facts
extendsthe developmentalidea. It could be thatAbelard,havingdevised
the dictum
, came to repudiateit perhaps under the weightof
propositions
the philosophicaldifficulties
broughtin its train,e.g. questionsabout its
status.44
His
"mature
theory,"if indeed he came to a settled
ontological
That would explainwhyneitherthe
with
the
dictum.
view,mightdispense
authorof GDS nor Williamof Lucca mentionit. On thisscore,it is perto note that the lattertwo authorsshare a common
haps enlightening
and the eventus
each
propositionum,
terminology: speaksof documentum
perhaps
a clue to Abelars own view.45It may also be worthwhileto note that
- whether
in his Dialctica
withdifferent
Abelard experiments
terminology
this be an earliercomposition,a later one, or simultaneous where he
exsistentiae
rerum
ratherthan of dictapropositionum.
speaks of the essentiae/
This is but one hypothesisamong many.Anotheris thatAbelard came
to formulatehis theoryof the dictum
propositionis
very late in his career,
perhaps afterhe was no longer activelyteaching we see fragmented
in the writingsof
attemptsto grapplewithsomethinglike a dictum-Xhzory
the Montanists,perhaps evidence of Abelard's earliestattemptsto grapple withthe issue and that his last, incompletelyrevisedmanuscriptof
did not circulateafterAbelard's death (due to his
the Logicaingredientibus
infamousreputationat the hands of Bernard of Clairvaux?),thoughby
a quirkof fateit has come down to us. The authorof GDS and William,
would not have known of
and indeed all of Abelard's contemporaries,
to develop at the end of his life.
the theoryhe was struggling
It is too soon to tell which,if any, of these hypothesesis correct;not
enoughis knownabout Abelard'scircle.Now thatthe questionhas been
raised,we hope that furtherresearchwill help clarifythese matters.Yet
it in a preliminary
ofoneofthemanuscripts
oftheGlossae
examination
yetfound
super
Categorias
. though
thisis bvno meansconclusive.
44See Nuchelmans
of
[1973],Tweedale[1976],andde Libera[1981]fordiscussion
thephilosophical
ofthedictum
problems
posedbythetheory
propositionis.
45The author
in fourpassages:
at
ofGDS speaksofpropositions
related
to documenta
and 186va45/47
180va26
182vb09-11ifacere
documenturri)i
(addocumentum
{documentum
fieret),
In eachcasesuchpropositions
us with
adaliquod
documentum
faciendum/
faciendum).
acquaint
- theeventus
Whatan expression
thewaythings
rerum.
canturnoutin theworld
signifies
notbe described
in terms
is no resbutsomething
likea
likeres;whatan oratio
signifies
"to
a waytheworldis. Thejuridical
useofthephrase(meaning
fact,a stateofaffairs,
ofGDS is thinking
ofthestateof
thattheauthor
or "totestify")
giveevidence"
suggests
or a claimabouttheworldis
theworldas providing
thatan understanding
evidence
trueorfalse.In short,
at leastsomeoftheworkdonebythedictum
itseemstoperform
propositionis.

19:52:46 PM

40

KLAUSJACOBI,
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING

one point seems clear already. Even if Abelard abandoned the dictum
the most radical possibilitymentionedhere there is no sign that he
returnedto true and false understandings
as a way of deedingwith the
underlyingphilosophicalissues. On the contrary,he and the author of
GDS have pursued opposite paths in theirattemptsto find a solution,
and in Abelard's case the path out of his circlehas led, at least initially,
fromintellectus
vems
/fabus to the dictum
propositionis.
Freiburgim Breisgau
Hildesheim
Ohio
Columbus,

Bibliography
Dal Pra [1969]Pietro
Abelardo:
Scrtti
di logica
Hisedi, ed. MarioDal Pra,Firenze19692.
tionofAbelard's
onBoethius's
"Detopicis
is found
on p. 205.4Commentary
diffrentiis"
330.17
De Rijk[1962]L.M.De Rijk,Logica
: A Contribution
modernorum
tothe
Terminist
History
ofEarly
Vol.I: OntheTwelfth
Theories
Logic.
, Assen1962
Century
ofFallacy
De Rijk[1966]L.M. De Rijk,Some
NewEvidence
in: Vivarium
, IV
ofTwelfih-Century
Logic,
(1966),1-57
De Rijk[1982]L.M.De Rijk,La signification
delaproposition
chez
Ablard,
(dictum
propositionis)
in Pierre
Ablard-Pierre
levnrable
, Paris1982,547-55
III (Glosses
onthe"Deinter
edited
Geyer[1927]Abelard,
Logica
"ingredientibus"
pretatione"),
by
Bernhard
Mnster
1927
Geyer,
DieSemantik
undAussagen
in
Jacobi[1981]KlausJacobi,
Ausdrcke,
sprachlicher
Ausdrucksfolgen
Abaelards
Kommentar
in:Medioevo
zu Perihermeneias,
, VII (1981),41-89
Abelard
andFrege:
theSemantics
andPropositions
Jacobi[1983]KlausJacobi,
, in:Atti
ofWords
delConvegno
distoria
della
SanGimignano
4-8dicembre
intemazionale
1982,Bologna
logica,
1983
Diskussion
ber
inPeter
Abaelards
Kommentar
Jacobi[1985]KlausJacobi,
unpersnliche
Aussagen
Semantics
andMetaphysics
zuPerihermeneias
, in:E.P.Bos(ed.),Mediaeval
, Nijmegen
1985,
p. 1-63
Abaelard
als Kommentator
Jacobi/Strub
Strub,Peter
, in:
[1995]KlausJacobi& Christian
F. Dominguez,
R. Imbach,
Th.Pindl,
P. Walter
Aristotelica
etLulliana
(eds.),
(FSCharles
H. Lohr)1995,11-34
Arts
dulangage
ettheologu
Ablard
chez
Jolivet
[1969]JeanJolivet,
, Paris1969
de Libera[1981]Alainde Libera,
Ablard
etledictisme,
in:Ablard:
Le "Dialogue,"
Laphiloso, Genve-Lausanne-Neuchtel
1981,59-92
phiedela logique
Marenbon
LatinGlosses
andCommentaries
onAristotelian
Texts,
[1993]Medieval
Before
Logical
c. 1150A.D.in:Ch. Burnett
andCommentaries
onAristotelian
Texts:
(ed.),Glosses
Logical
TheSyriac,
Arabic
andMedieval
LatinTraditions.
London1993,77-127
Nuchelmans
Theories
Ancient
andMedieval
[1973]GabrielNuchelmans,
oftheProposition:
andFalsity
1973
, Amsterdam
Conceptions
oftheBearers
ofTruth
Pozzi[1975]Guglielmo,
vescovo
di Lucca.Summa
dialetice
artis.
A curae conintroduzione
di Lorenzo
Pozzi,Padova1975
Tweedale[1976]Martin
M. Tweedale,
Abailard
onUniversals
1976
, Amsterdam

19:52:46 PM

The Function
in ScholasticTheology
of theTrinity
of Repetition
FIONA ROBB

In 1817 Samuel Taylor Coleridgereceiveda letterfroman aggrieved


Unitarianin responseto thepoet's previousattackon the Unitarianfaith.1
The respondantcomplainedthat"A child,who is versedin his cathechism,
knowsas much respectingthe Trinityas the mostlaboriousdivine."2The
same mighthave been said of academic discussionson the Trinityin the
second halfof the twelfth
century,since theytoo seemed merelyto hover
verveso characteristic
of scholasroundthecentralissuewiththe rigoristic
these discussions,the
tic thought.In the eyes of many contemporaries,
firstlarge-scaleexperimentin sustainedscholastictheology,did nothing
to further
of the doctrinebeyondwhatwas alreadybelieved
understanding
Christians.
Thus Bishop Stephen of Tournai's (1192-1203)
ordinary
by
famousattackon the theologicalschools in Paris towardsthe end of the
centuryincludeda memorablegibe at debates on the Trinity.His accusationthatsuch infernalwranglingwas motivatedby raw ambitionrather
than genuineconcernforthe truthof the matterrepresentedthe view of
many concernedecclesiastics.3
Over the interveningcenturiesmuch energyhas been expended in
attackson and defencesof scholastictheology.AttacksfromHumanist
and Reformationscholarswere the firstsigns of crisisfromwithinacademic theology,but theirown approacheswere stilltoo heavilyindebted
to scholasticmethodsto constitutea real break.4The reallycrushingblow
1 Samuel
TheCollected
Works
, vol.6, Lay
Coleridge
ofSamuel
Taylor
TaylorColeridge,
as a theologian,
seeJ.Robert
On Coleridge
Sermons
London1972,249-54.
, ed.RJ.White,
Mass.1969,92-5;DanielW. Hardy,
ColeandChristian
Doctrine
Barth,
, Cambridge,
Coleridge
ontheTrinity
69 (1987),145-55.
Review,
, in:Anglican
Theological
ridge
2 Ibid.,251.
3 Chartularium
4 vols.,Paris1891-9,
I 47-8,tr.in
Parisiensis
Universitatis
, ed. H. Denifle,
Records
andUfeintheMiddle
L. Thorndike,
, NewYork1944,23. On critics
Ages
University
TheSchools
Critics
ingeneral,
seeS.C. Ferruolo,
TheOrigins
ofParisandtheir
oftheUniversity.
ofTournai.
1110-1215
, Stanford
1985,esp.269-77on Stephen
4 P.O.Knsteller,
mRenaissance
Renaissance
andScholasticism
inthe
Italian
Humanism
, in:Studies
of
therhetorical
andLetters,
Rome1956,553-83,
posture
esp.561-3,whostresses
Thought
andScholastics:
vis--vis
C.G.Nauert,
humanist
critics
scholasticism;
Jr.,TheClash
ofHumanists
4 (1973),1-18;
anApproach
toPre-Reformation
Controversies
, in: Sixteenth
Century
Journal,
Vivarium
34,1

Leiden,1996
E.J.Brill,

19:52:52 PM

42

FIONAROBB

was deliveredby Enlightenment


criticssuch as Denis Diderot (1713-84),
forwhomscholasticism
was littlemorethana sterileformofAristotelianism,
consistingof a fixedprogrammeof "one hundredpuerilequestions."5
Althoughscholasticismhas benefitedfromthe wholesale reassessment
of the Middle Ages undertakenthis century,some importantquestions
remain unanswered.Foremostamong these is the question of whether
therewas any intellectual
forthe repetitive
contentof so many
justification
scholasticwritings.This includes repetitionnot just of themesand general contentbut of specificquestionsand formsof argumentation.
Such
was
characteristic
of
scholastic
from
the
repetition
verybegintheology
ning,and was not merelythe outcome of the emergenceof a theological syllabusat the new schools and universities
along withthe inevitable
whichwentwithit. Repetitionwas alwayspart of scholasstandardisation
tic method.It will be my task here to investigatethe various causes of
such repetition,and to propose that,in some contextsat least,it formed
an integralpart of valid intellectualinquiry.6I shall be particularly
concerned with tracingthis repetitionthrougha numberof technicalarguments used in questionsratherthan focusingon pure repetitionin the
formof the citationof authorities.This approach is open to the charge
of artificiality
given that in practicequestionsand quotationswere often
inseparable,but I have triedto referto othersides of the problemwherever necessary.
In order to understandthe functionof repetitionwithinscholastic
we have firstto realise that scholasticmethodsand institutions
writings,
themselvesfosteredsuch practices.The questionof methodis absolutely
crucial here, since most scholars now consider that the only property
which diversescholasticthinkerscan be said to have shared was a common methodology.7
This view constitutesa rejectionof earlierattempts
S. Ozment,
TheAgeofReform
AnIntellectual
and
1250-1550.
andReligious
ofLateMedieval
History
Humanism
, NewHaven-London
1980,73-8,231-9,302-17;
Reformation
Europe
J.H.Overfield,
andScholasticism
inLateMedieval
ofthisambiva1984.A goodexample
, Princeton
Germany
lenceamongcritics,
bothbecauseitattacks
withitsmethods,
scholasticism
andis imbued
is Luther's
Contra
scholasticam
Werke
Berlin
, in:Luthers
, ed.E. Vogelsang,
Disputatio
theologiam
Works
1955,V 320-6,tr.in Luther's
1957,XXXI 9-16.
, ed. H.J.Grimm,
Philadelphia
5 Diderot,
Paris1976,IV 302.
, ed.J. Loughandj. Proust,
Encyclopdie
6 Becauseof
thecurrency
oftheconcept
ofrepetition,
critical
theoriterability,
among
itis appropriate
topointoutthatmypurpose
theis notto deconstruct
scholastic
orists,
It is onething
toinvestigate
theclaimthatiterability
is theverycondition
oflanology.
andquiteanother
to examine
guageandcommunication,
problems
whya setofspecific
shouldhaveassumed
a central
andrecurring
a givenintellectual
tradition.
status
within
Thisis notto denythepossibility
ofa deconstructive
ofscholasticism.
reading
See D. Knowles,
TheEvolution
, 2nded.,London1988,79-84;L.M.
ofMedieval
Thought

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

43

to imputeto the scholasticsa set of beliefsdistinctfromthose held by


Christiansin general.8And yet the fact that scholasticismas a method
has the potentialto extendwell beyond Christiandoctrinedoes not preclude it fromtendingto produce certainresultswhen applied to doctrine
form.In thissense, scholasticism
and fromtherefore
havinga distinctive
was a methodwithparticularimplicationswhen applied to the systemof
Christianbeliefs.
What was thismethod?More than anythingit was the practiceof asking questions,knownas the quaestiotechnique.The originsof the quaestioare subject to dispute,thoughthey are usuallylocated in the study
Rather than becomingemand practiceof law in the eleventhcentury.9
broiled in that debate, it mightbe more usefulsimplyto observe that
sometimein the eleventhcentury,theologians(among others)began to
apply criticalreadingtechniquesto theirsources,namely the Bible and
the Church Fathers.It was the beginningof source criticismas we now
is anotherreason whyit is so difficult
to idenpracticeit thisfamiliarity
what
about
There
is
no
is
scholastic
methods.
whollysatistify
unique
such
should
have
been
as
to
factoryexplanation
why
practices
developed
at thistime.One of thosemostfrequently
resortedto, the increasedavailabilityof Aristotle'slogical works,cannot be reconciledwiththe absence
of any dramaticincrease in copies of the staple Aristoteliantextsuntil

aumoyen
Medieval
de Rijk,Laphilosophie
, Leiden1981,tr.1985,82-6;B.B.Price,
Thought.
ge
AnIntroduction
, Oxford
1992,120-1.
8 Thisproject
Grabmann
in Die Geschichte
der
wasundertaken
mostnotably
byMartin
scholastischen
Methode
1909-11.
, 2 vols.,Freiburg
9 H. Kantorowicz,
du
TheQuaestiones
, in:Revued'histoire
oftheGlossators
disputatae
Introduction
l'histoire
dela littrature
dela
16 (1939),1-67;A.M.Landgraf,
droit,
thologique
thatthequaestio
naissante
, Montral-Paris
1973,24,accepts
technique
developed
scolastique
inlawbefore
toanycausalinfluence.
Mostrecently,
butdoesnotcommit
himself
theology,
Lesquestions
danslesfacults
seeG. Fransen,
dedroit
, in:B.C. Baznetai (eds.),Les
disputes
etdemdecine.
danslesfacults
dethologie,
dedroit
etlesquestiones
questions
disputes
quodlibtiques
dumoyen
Turnhout
G. Makdisi,
dessources
44-45,
1985,225-77.
Typologie
geoccidental
: anInquiry
inLawandTheology
TheScholastic
inMedieval
Education
intoitsOrigins
Method
, in:
hislackofconofMakdisi's
49 (1974),640-61.Forcriticism
thesis,
especially
Speculum,
as both
Medieval
creteevidence
seePrice,
oftransmission,
, 137-8.Forthequaestio
Thought
in ancient
anda method
ofteaching
seeP. Hadot,La prhisa scholarly
exercise
Greece,
mdivaux
littraires
dansles
toire
desgenres
littraires
dansl'Antiquit
, in: Lesgenres
philosophiques
etphilosophiques
etexploitation
sources
mdivales.
, critique
1982,
, Turnholt
Dfinition
thologiques
1-9.Forthequaestio
as "la passion
de l'homme
de toutsavoir,"
seeC. Viola,Manires
peretleXIIesicle.
l'hissonnelles
etimpersonnelles
d'aborder
unproblme:
Saint
Contribution
Augustin
ofsources
and
toire
dela Quaestio,
in:ibid.,
collection
11-30at p. 14.A useful
(inItalian)
inQuestione.
delmetodo
indiritto
e teologia
articles
is Verit
Il problema
nelXII secolo
, P. Feltrin
andM. Rossini
1992.
(eds.),Bergamo

19:52:52 PM

44

FIONAROBB

One of the more interesting


the early thirteenth
century.10
hypothesesof
recent years sees scholasticmethods and criticalreading techniquesas
some of the "implicationsof literacy,"and the necessaryresponseto the
of hereticalgroupswho used textualauthoritiesto challenge
proliferation
custom
and tradition.11
The fact that most explanationscannot
religious
such
reference
to the contextof renaissanceand revival
get beyond
general
in the twelfth
that
detailedcausal explanationswillalways
centurysuggests
elude us.
This criticalreading of sources gave rise to questioning:lectioled to
The quaestiowas the single most importantcause of repetition
quaestio.12
in theologicalargument,especiallywhen seen in conjunctionwiththe use
of quotations.Since most questionscould eventuallybe tracedback to a
workof theology,usuallyone held as authoritative
by the Church,it genfollowed
that
included
from
thatand otherworks;
erally
they
quotations
thus
as
a
discussionof those quotations,and even
developed
questions
10Thisapplies
notjusttonewly
translated
butalsotocopiesofAristotle's
works,
Categories
andDe interpretatione
andPorphyry's
untiltheearlythirteenth
wellafter
the
Isagoge
century,
establishment
ofa dialectical
method
ofquestioning.
SeeJ. Isaac,Le PeriHermeneias
en
Occident
deBoke SaintThomas
Isaac'sresearch
has
, Paris1953,36 fortheDe interpretatione.
beenexpanded
conclusions
fortheCategories
andtheIsagoge
uponwithsimilar
byO. Lewry,
Boethian
West
inthe
Medieval
HisLife
andInfluence
, in:M. Gibson
, Thought
,
Logic
(ed.),Boethius.
Oxford1981,90-134at pp. 103-4.On Aristotle's
, see W. andM. Kneale,The
Organon
Medieval
, Oxford
1962,23-112;J.Marenbon,
ofLogic
Development
Early
(480-1150).
Philosophy
AnIntroduction
ofthelogica
vetus
intheninth
, 2nded.,London1988,20-34.On availability
to eleventh
seeM. Haren,Medieval
TheWestern
Intellectual
Tradition
centuries,
Thought.
from
totheThirteenth
transla, 2nded.,London1992,88-9.On twelfth-century
Antiquity
Century
tionsofthelogica
nova
Latinus
etcd.(eds.),The
, seeB.D. Dod,Aristoteles
, in:N. Kretzmann
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,45-79;L. Minio-Paluello,
Cambridge
History
ofLater
Philosophy
TheLatin
Aristot
le,Amsterdam
1972,esp.205-15onJamesofVenice.On the
Opuscula.
translation
ofAristode
in thewider
context
ofthetwelfth-century
workoftranslation,
see
M.-T.d'Alverny,
Translations
andTranslators
and R.L. Benson(eds.),
, in: G. Constable
intheTwelfth
Renaissance
andRenewal
in
a passage
, Oxford
1982,421-62.Certainly,
Century
seemstosuggest
thatAristotle's
atleastwereanindisJohnofSalisbury's
Metabgicon
Topics
toolin effective
See Metabgicon
III.10,ed. C.I. Webb,Oxford
pensable
argumentation.
1929,154.
11B. Stock,The
Written
andModels
inthe
ofLiteracy.
Implications
ofInterpretation
Language
Eleventh
andTwelfth
Centuries
, Princeton
1983,esp.59-60.
12On lectio,
see O. Weijers,
au XIII sicle
desuniversits
, Roma1987,324-5.
Terminologie
On therelationship
between
lectio
and quaestio
collections
de
, see A.M.Landgraf,
Quelques
dela seconde
moiti
duXIIesicle.
de Thologie
anConclusions
, in:Recherches
Quaestiones
cienneetmdivale,
7 (1935),113-28.
See alsoLandgraf,
Introduction
, 48-9;G. Paretal.,
La renaissance
duXII sicle.
Lescoles
etl'enseignement
1933,124-5;B.C. Bazn,
, Paris-Ottawa
La quaestio
in:Lesgenres
littraires
, 31-49at pp. 32-3.B.C. Bazn,Lesquestions
disputata,
danslesfacults
dethologie,
disin:B.C.Baznetal. (eds.),Lesquestions
disputes3
principalement
- thetext,
fourelements
different
essential
to thequaestio
, 15-149at p. 29,identifies
putes
ofthetext,
thedialectical
method
andtheregular
ofthemaster.
interpretations
teaching

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

45

when the discussionmoved well beyond the cited texts,as it invariably


did, the citationsremainedan integralpart of the debate, therebyalways
thelinkwithauthority
and tradition.
Hence thecentralimpormaintaining
textsin the framingof questions.13
tance of authoritative
Such generoususe of quotationsthroughouta quaestio
might,however,
have only served to stifledebate and new avenues of inquiry.But the
textsas a potentiallyconstrainingfactorin the
citationof authoritative
of new argumentsshould not be exaggerated.As interpretive
formulation
became
more sophisticatedthroughthe use of literarydevices,
techniques
the possibilities
of what could be achievedworkingwithinthe parameters
imposedby textualauthoritiesexpanded. More importantthan the texts
themselveswas the master'sinterpretation
of them (ideterminatio
).14 Once
detachedfromits originalcontext,a passage fromAugustineor Jerome
assumed an independentstatusand was subject to the individualinter"the authoritative
pretationof thepresidingmaster.As de Rijk has written,
text,despiteits initialimportance,increasinglytook on th characterof
of an emergentprofession.
an instrument."15
It was the instrument
This structuralrepetitionalso has somethingto do with the use of
easily rememberedstock argumentsas a teachingdevice.16Adoption of
the activityof asking questionsas a common practice could only take
of studyitself.The emerplace in the contextof the institutionalisation
of
institutions
whose
sole
function
was
to pose and
systematically
gence
resolveproblemsof meaningand interpretation
was bound to affectboth
theseproblems.The practiceof the
writtenand oral ways of structuring
owed
as
much
to
,
therefore,
quaestio
teaching methods and classroom
discussionsas it did to problemsarisingfrompurelytextualstudy.Many
took the formof studentnotesof the master'sapproach to and
quaestiones
resolutionof a disputed question (reportationes
).17 More importandy,the
13Particularly
isA. Lang,Dietheologische
goodonthis,
esp.theroleofglosses,
Prinzipienlehre
dermittelalterlichen
Scholastik
1964,26-33.
, Freiburg
14M.-D.Chenu,
au douzime
La thologie
sicle
, 2nded.,Paris1966,358-60.Fora conofa determinatio,
seeMatthew
maiora
Paris,Chronica
, ed.H.R. Luard,
temporary
description
7 vols.,London1872-83,
II 476-7forhisaccount
ofoneofSimonofTournai's
eventful
lectures.
15La
, 102.
16A. philosophie
etal. (eds.),
Medieval
Literature
, in:Kretzmann
KennyandJ. Pinborg,
Philosophical
TheCambridge
Medieval
char, 11-42at p. 29. On themnemonic
ofLater
Philosophy
History
seeW.J.Ong,Orality
andLiteracy.
TheTechnologizing
acteristic
ofprimary
oralsocieties,
of
theWord,
London1982,33-6.
17Forthe
ofreportatio
desuniversits
, seeWeijers,
, 361-5;
J. Hamesse,
Terminobgie
practice
ettransmission
detextes
andPhilosophical
, in:M. Asztalos
Reportado
(ed.),TheEditing
ofTheological
Texts
Stockholm
1986,11-46.
omtheMiddle
Ages,

19:52:52 PM

46

FIONAROBB

itselfbecame an establishedmethod of teachingin


practice of repetitio
Paris and Oxford.18
All these featuresof scholasticmethod have been known to scholars
forsome time. Nor is thereanythingpeculiar to scholasticismabout the
which took place. Withoutundermining
the cengradual standardisation
tral importanceof these factors,I wish to suggestthat in some contexts
repetitionwas only apparent. Some problemscontinuedto be discussed
not onlybecause of the inertiaof the system,but also because theirrelevance to otherdebateswas so extensivethattheydisguisedthe real point
of contention.This practice was, not surprisingly,
fundamentalto apto
trinitarian
where
it
is
difficult
to draw clear
proaches
problems
already
distinctionsbetween different
topics. In what followsI shall argue that
repetitioncan only be fullyunderstoodin the contextof a networkof
interconnected
argumentsand thatonce thisis realisedit becomes apparent that repetitionsometimessignalleda new approach to a particular
of a well rehearsedset piece.
problemratherthan simple regurgitation
The examples I want to look at in this connectionforma sequence
of argumentsabout the Trinitydating fromthe 1120s. They converge
on the questionof whetheror not the divineessencebegetsor is begotten.
This questionin turn relatesto the issue of whetherthereare any distinctionswhatsoeverbetweenthe personalproperties(of begetting,being
begottenand proceeding),the threedivinePersonsand the divineessence.
The discussionabout the generationof the essence was at the heart
of twelfth-century
approachesto trinitarian
theologybecause it seemed to
providea means of holdingtogetherthe oftencompetingclaims of unity
of essence and trinityof Persons.The Father'sbegettingof the Son and
the processionof the Holy Spiritfromboth were the source of distinction in God, but such personal distinctions
had to be achieved without
any divisionor diminutionin the absoluteand simpleunityof the divine
essencecommonto all threePersons.The questionof whetherthe essence
itselfwas involvedin any of these generationalacts was, therefore,
an
importantone. Preciselybecause the question had a bearing upon a
sequence of interrelatedissues in particularthose of the uniquenessof
the essence and the propertieswhich account for the personal distinc- it offered
tions
a meansof resolvingtheproblemof identity
and difference
in God. For on the one hand, if essence begetsessence,we arriveat a
doctrineof God in which there is identitybut no difference,
in which
because thereis only one essence,somethingbegetsitself;and the same
18A. Maier,
inMedieval
, Leiden1994,122-5.
University
Training
Europe

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

47

thingalso begetsitselfeven ifwe suppose thatthe essencebegetsthe Son,


given that the Son is identicalwith the essence. On the other hand, if
we taketheview thatthe essencedoes not beget,we arriveat what seems
to be an equally unsustainableposition,in which an impermissibledistinctionseems to be introducedbetweentwo thingswhich are identical,
so thatthe Fatherwho is identicalwiththe divineessence begetsthe Son
who is identicalwiththe divineessence,and yet it does not followfrom
thisthat essence begetsessence.
This complex of issues is a good illustrationof the phenomenonof
repetitionto which I wish to draw attention.The relentlessand often
seeminglypointlessdiscussionof the same questionabout the generation
of the divine essence served several functions.It was withoutdoubt a
and fundamental
problemin trinitarian
theology.Howgenuinelydifficult
which
was
also
a
to
a
solution
it
ever,
(in termsof the
plausible
problem
intellectualsystem)had been foundrelativelyearlyin the twelfth
century
which
a
on the
Abelard
Peter
after
consensus
Peter
and
Lombard,
by
issue emergedalmostimmediately.The factof thisconsensusmakes the
on-goingdiscussionof the questionseem almostperverse.Why did theologianscontinueto discussan issue which had alreadybeen settledand
whichhad never even appeared controversialin the firstplace?
The answeris, of course,that the questiongave rise to furtherquestions,such as the questionof the relationbetweenthe Persons,theirpropertiesand the divine essence, fromwhich it could not be subsequently
disentangled.The propensityof medieval scholasticismto repeat questions and argumentsthus turnsout to be a case of the "hermeneutical
of the question,"the processby whicha seeminglyself-contained
priority
questionleads us onto entirelyunanticipatedvistasof inquirywhichthemselves,once opened up, change the meaningof the originalproblem.19
The firstintellectual
justificationforrepetitionconcernsthe scholastic
methodof argumentand counter-argument.
The art of discoveringvalid
argumentswas a growingconcernforscholarsin all fieldsin the twelfth
or counter-arguments
were becoming a standardfeacentury.Instantiae
ture in the studyof logic and, increasingly,
They were used
theology.20
19H.G. Gadamer,
Truth
andMethod
, 2nded.,London1988,362-79.
20Y. Iwakuma,
with
an
A Study
Instantiae.
ofTwelfthTechnique
ofArgumentation
Century
Edition
du moyen
de l'Institut
BNlat.6674f. 1-5, in:Cahiers
gegrecetlatin,
ofMs.Paris
44 (1983),61-80at pp.61-2.For
38 (1981),1-91atp. 2, andInstantiae
Revisited
, in:ibid.,
someuseful
on instantiae
comments
, in:
, see K. Jacobi,
Twelfth
Century
Logic(ii):TheLater
P. Dronke
Western
1988,227-51at
, Cambridge
(ed.),A History
ofTwelfth-Century
Philosophy
pp.242-5.

19:52:52 PM

48

FIONAROBB

, Alan
extensively
by the anonymousauthorof the Glossaon the Sentences
of Lille, Peter of Poitersand Prepositinusof Cremona.21The use of specific types of argumentreceived an additional stimulusfromJames of
Venice's Latin translationc. 1125-50 of Aristotle's
De sophisticis
elenchis
, the
definitivework on the identification
and refutationof fallaciousargument.22At the same time,workson logic specifically
forpracticaluse by
The
debate
about
the
theologiansappeared.23
generationof the divine
essence was integratedinto thissystemof argument.The certainty,
as it
quicklybecame, that the essence did not beget could itselfbe used as a
controlforotherarguments.Its internallogic came to be so secure that
an argumentwas oftenvalid only if it was compatiblewith the essence
as non-begetting.
The main instanceof this centredon the questionof
the relationshipbetweenthe essence,the Personsand the personalpropertiesof begetting,
beingbegottenand proceeding.This was a much more
controversial
issue than thatof the generationof the essence,and
actively
explainswhy the lattercontinuedto be discussedthroughoutthe second
half of the twelfthcentury.On the one side were Gilbertof Poitiersand
his supporters,who seem to have argued that the personal properties
could not be predicatedeitherof the essence or of the Persons themselveson the groundsthat if theywere, the essence would beget; on the
other side stood Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiersand others,who had
to show that identifying
the Personswith theirpropertiesdid not entail
the generationof the essence. What seems to be a case of pointlessrepetitionof a question on which therewas an extremelystrongconsensus
21On Alanof Lille,see A. de Libera,
etthologie
dansla Summa"Quoniam
Logique
Homines"
d'AlamdeLille
andA. de Libera(eds.),Gilbert
etsescondePoitiers
, in:J.Jolivet
de la logique
d'histoire
etde la sman, Actesdu septime
temporains
symposium
europen
see L.M. de Rijk,Logica
tiquemdivales,
Naples1987,437-69;on Peterof Poitiers,
A Contribution
Modernorum.
totheHistory
Terminist
I 163, 2 vols.,Assen1962-7,
ofEarly
Logie
ofCremona,
seeG. Angelini,
L'ortodossia
e lagrammatica.
Analisi
distrut78;on Prepositinus
turae deduzione
storica
dellateologia
di Prepositino
trinitaria
, Analecta
183,Rome
Gregoriana
1972.
De sophisticis
elenchis
Latinus
VI 1-3,Bruxelles-Leiden
1975.
, ed. B.G. Dod,Aristoteles
See I. Rosier,
volution
desnotions
etunivocado
auXIIesicley
in:I. Rosier
'equivocado
(ed.),
tudes
Lille1988,103-66.
L'Ambigut.
historiques)
23See Cinq Peter
onwhich
De tropis
seeF. Giusberti,
Materials
especially theChanter's
loquendi,
ofLogic2,Naples1982,92-7;G.R.Evans,
Scholasticism
, History
fora Study
ofTwelfth
Century
A Work
"?Peter
theChanter's
De TropisLoquendi
andSome
in:
Fallacie,
ofttTerminist
Theology
20 (1982),40-58;eadem^
Peter
theChanter's
De troPonendo
Vivarium,
theologica
exempla:
in:History
ofUniversities,
dudiscours
2 (1982),1-14;L. Valente,
Arts
etsacra
pisloquendi,
dePierre
leChantre
, in:Histoire
paginadansleDe tropis
loquendi
Epistemologie
Language,
12/2(1990),69-102.See alsotheFallacie
Willelmi
Modernorum
, ed. de Rijk,Logica
,
maistri
II/2 683-702.

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

49

turnsout to be a genuine attemptto settlea problem which stillperplexed and dividedtheologians.


The second aspect of the debate about the generationof the essence
which accountsforits relentlessdiscussion,especiallyinto the thirteenth
and fourteenth
centuries,was the way it came to be a testinggroundfor
an
of theologicallanguage.
out
internallycoherentclassification
working
This was one of the major achievementsof the academic theologyof the
second halfof the twelfthcentury.This systemof classification
consisted
of a set of guidingprinciplesand rules which allowed scholarsto use a
theoryof language to solve theologicalproblems.Trinitarianproblems
were in large part responsible for the development of this semantic
approach. The problemof the generationof the essence was of particular fascinationsince the conclusion which theologians came to adopt
seemed to involvea contradiction.For reasons which will be explained,
theologiansaccepted the statementthat "God begot God" but rejected
the statementthat "essence begot essence." This seemed an unsustainbetween "God" and "essence,"
able positionbecause by distinguishing
termsbothdenotingunityand oneness,theologiansthusseemed to ignore
the requirements
of divinesimplicity,
the idea that thereis absolutelyno
divisionor elementof compositionor change in God. The problem,then,
was to explainhow the statements"God begot God" and "essence begot
essence"onlyappeared to be sayingthe same thing.The proofthatthey
different
was based on distinguishing
between
were in factfundamentally
the different
propertiesof the words "God" and "essence."
These two dimensions,of argumentand signification,
to the frequency
with Whichthe question about the divine essence was discussed were
in arguthemselves
linked.One of the mosteffective
inextricably
strategies
ment was demonstrating
that an opposing view committedthe fallacies
of univocationand equivocation.Theologians knew that the same word
did not alwaysretaina singleunchangingmeaning,both because its first
and because the same
usages (;impositiones
) resultedin diversesignifications
word could have different
significations
accordingto its use in a particular context.24It is this innate link between fallacies and signification
which explainsthe close developmentbetweenthe theoryof supposition
and the use of fallacies.25
Whereverthe signification
or core meaningof
a wordwas variable,itssupposition(meaning-in-context)
would varyfrom
24Forthisdefinition
ofequivocation,
seeRosier,
Evolution
desnotions
132-3.
/'equivocatio,
Alsothedefinition
thesecondhalfofthetwelfth
oftheFallacie
from
century;
Pawipontane
seede Rijk,Logica
Modernorum
, II/1 494-7.
25Ibid.,
491.

19:52:52 PM

50

FIONAROBB

one sentence to another.Any failureto take account of this variation


riskedcommitting
the fallacyof equivocationby misconstruing
thatterm's
and
its
signification consequently supposition.
Beforegoing into detail eitherabout the use of argumentor the theit is necessaryto trace the historyof the discussion
ory of signification,
about the generationof the divineessence to its earlytwelfth-century
ori33
The
first
mention
of
the
issue
in
occurs
the
"Summi
Boni
gins.
TheokgLa
or De Trinitate
of PeterAbelard (d. 1142) writtenbetween 1118 and 1120
and condemnedat the Council of Soissonsin 1121.26It is also mentioned
in subsequentversionsof the Theobgiaand Abelars accountof the examination of his doctrineat Soissons in the HistoriaCalamitatum
.27In these
works,Abelard rejects the view that the statement"God begot God,"
authorisedby theNicene Creed,28necessarily
implies(1) God begotHimself;
substance
substance.29
(2)
begot
Abelard rejected both inferenceson the groundsof (1) Sabellianism
and (2) physicalimpossibility.
For iffromthe statement"God begotGod"
it followedthat God begot Himself,the resultwould be that a Person
begot himself;and this in turnmeans that the Father is the Son whom
he begot,which commitsthe errorof Sabellianismby denyingany real
distinction
betweenFatherand Son.30Further,iffromthe statement"God
God"
it followedthat substancebegot substance,the resultwould
begot
be that somethingbegot itselfgiven that there is only one divine substance.31This cannotbe accepted,saysAbelard citingAugustine,because
"
26Theobgia
Boni
ed.E.M.Buytaert
"Summi
andG.J.Mews,Turnholt
1987.On
[TSum],
thetitle
anddating,
seeE.M.Buytaert,
Abelars
Trinitarian
Doctrine
, in:E.M.Buytaert
(ed.),
Peter
Abelard.
, Louvain1974,127-52;
oftheInternational
Proceedings
Conference
G.J.Mews,The
in:R. Thomas(ed.),Petrus
Abaelardus
Abelard,
Development
oftheTheologia
ofPeter
(1079-1
142).
Person
undWirkung,
Trier1980,183-98.
, Werk
27Theologia
Christiana
Turnholt
"Scholarium"
1969;Theologia
'TChr',ed. E.M. Buytaert,
and C.J.Mews,Turnholt
Calamitatum
, ed.
1987;Historia
[TSch],ed. E.M. Buytaert
Paris1959.
J. Monfrin,
28Conciliorum
Oecumenicorum
Decreta
etal.,Bologna
Christum
, ed.J.Alberigo
1973,5: "Iesum
filium
de patre,
hocestde substantia
deumde deo,lumen
de lumine,
dei,natum
patris,
deumverum
de deovero,natum
nonfactum,
uniussubstantiae
cumpatre,
quodGraeci
dicunt
homousion
..."
29TSum
III.109-1
11.62,134;TChr
1,235-6;IV.78,301-2;TSch11.64,
440;Hist.Calam.,
84-5.See alsoSicetNon,ed.B.B.Boyer
andR. Mckeon,
1976-7,
Q. 15,
Chicago-London
"substantia
" and"essentia"
145-51.
there
is
Abelard
usestheterms
though
interchangeably
in:Pierre
a clearpreference
delexicographie
SeeJ.Jolivet,
fortheformer.
Notes
ablardienne,
Ablard.
Pierre
le Vnrable.
Lescourants
littraires
etartistiques
enoccident
au milieu
philosophiques,
duXIIesicle,
Paris1975,531-43at pp.542-3.
30Hist.Calam.,
III.110-11,
440.On Sabellius
andSabellianism,
85; TChr
235;TSch11.64,
seeJ. Pelikan,
TheEmergence
theCatholic
Tradition
1971,176-82.
(100-600),
of
Chicago
31TSum
III.109,235.
11.62,134;TChr

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

51

no thingexistswhich can beget or reproduceitself.32


AfterSoissons,Abelard associates these untenable opinions with one
of his principalaccusersand academic rivals,Albericof Reims (d. 1141).33
Abelard's rivalrywith Alberic went back to their studentdays under
Master Anselmof Laon (d. Ill 7).34Abelard attributesAlberic'soppositionto intellectual
jealousy ratherthanto genuinedoubtsabout his orthodoxy.35In a personal encounterwhich took place beforethe main session, AlbericconfrontedAbelard with his claim in the TSumthat even
though"God begot God" and God is unique, it did not followthat God
Abelardinsinuatesthatthiswas merelya desperateploy
begot Himself.36
to findsome valid basis forcondemninghis work.37SupposingAbelars
account to be reliable,this suggeststhat even Alberic,the only known
proponentof the view that God begets Himself,was motivatedmuch
more by personalthan theologicalconsiderations.38
The mistakewhich Abelard attributesto Alberic is failingto distinof different
words or the same words in
guishbetweenthe significations
different
contextson the falseassumptionthatto do so would undermine
and identityof
the identityof essencein God. But even divinesimplicity
to use termssuch as "God," "subessenceare not open-endedinvitations
stance" and "Person" indiscriminately.
Distinguishingbetween the general meaning of words and their meaning in particularcontextsthus
32TSum
De Trinitate
III.109,235; TSch11.64,
LI, ed.
440;Augustine,
11.62,134;TChr
PL 42,820:"Quiautemputant
eiusesse
2 vols.,Turnholt
1968,I 28s2"6,
W.J.Mountain,
eo pluserrant
deumutseipsum
quodnonsolumdeusitanonest
potentiae
ipsegenuerit,
Nullaenimomnino
neccorporalis
creatura.
resestquae se ipsumgigsednecspiritalis
natutsit."
33ForAlberic,
TheCathedral
School
intheTime
seeJ.R.Williams,
Alberic,
ofReims
ofMaster
1118-1136
20 (1964),93-114.
, in:Traditio,
34D.E. Luscombe,
intheEarly
Abelard.
TheInfluence
TheSchool
ofPeter
ofAbelard's
Thought
Scholastic
Period
, Cambridge
1969,179-81.
35Hist.Calam.,
83708"10:
accensi
contra
mecon"Undeemulimeivehementer
concilium
..."
maxime
duoilliantiqui
Albericus
scilicet
et Lotulfus
insidiatores,
gregaverunt,
36Hist.Calam.,
84-5.
37Hist.Calam.,
ad meanimointemptantis
cum
84751"2:
"Quadamautemdie,Albericus
suisaccedens
..."
quibusdam
discipulis
38
thequestion
ofexaggeration
about
or distortion,
therearealsodoubts
Apartfrom
in
oftheHistoria
Calamitatum.
SeeJ.F.Benton,
Fraud
andBorrowing
theauthenticity
, Fiction
in: Pierre
le Vnrable
theCorrespondence
andHeloise,
Ablard.
Pierre
, 471-506;A
ofAbelard
in: Thomas(ed.),
Reconsideration
andHeloise,
ofAbelard
oftheAuthenticity
oftheCorrespondence
andHeloise,
imMittelalter
Petrus
in:Flschungen
Abaelardus,
41-52;TheCorrespondence
,
ofAbelard
1988,95-120.Allreprinted
inMedieval
Hannover
inJ.F.Benton,
Power
andPersonality
Culture,
Fora recent
ed.T.N.Bisson,
London1991,417-53,
487-512respectively.
France,
475-86,
infavour
assessment
ofauthenticity,
seeG.N.L.Brooke,
TheMedieval
IdeaofMarriage,
Oxford
1989,94-102.

19:52:52 PM

52

FIONAROBB

becomes one of the governingprinciplesof Abelars approach to all theAbelars theoryof verbal signification
ological problems.Furthermore,
and the actual things
betweenhow termssignify
allowshim to differentiate
which theysignify.He is able to do thisbecause he has liberatedhimself from the traditionalanalysis of universaisin termsof genera and
species in favourof a theoryof predicationbased on Aristode'sprinciple
that universaisare those thingswhich may be predicatedof many subword, can be pred, a significant
jects.39He is interestedin how a sermo
icated of many thingsratherthan in how it is that a universalinheres
in individuals.In thisway, he is able to avoid the problemswhich arise
when conventionally
nominalistor realistpositionsare takenwith reference to the Trinity,forneitherof these extremepositionscould accommodate the unity-trinity
balance.40
In answer to the firstpoint, that God begetsHimself,Abelard shows
that the same termscan be predicatedof one anotherboth absolutely
and relatively,
so that thereis identityof essence and distinction
of relationat the same time.41
Thus althoughthe Son is thatwhichis the Father
and is fromthe Father,he himselfis notthe Father;forjust as a bronze
statue is frombronze, but not thereforefromitself,so the Son is from
the Father, but not thereforefromhimself.42
Even though Father and
39De interpretatwne
Aristoteles
Latinus
II 1-2,Bruges-Paris
7, ed. L. Minio-Paluello,
1965,
9-10.J.F.Boler,
Abailard
andthe
Problem
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
, in:Journal
ofUniversais
1 (1963),37-51;
Arts
dulangage
etthologie
Ablard
chez
, Paris1969,21-2,85-104,
J.Jolivet,
andNon-Ralisme
etPlatonisme
Ablard.
Essaid'Interprtation,
in:Ablard
etsontemps
chez
, Actes
du ColloqueInternationale
l'occasion
du 9e centenaire
de la Naissance
de
organise
Pierre
14-19mai1979,Paris1981,75-95;M.M.Tweedale,
Abailard
onUniversais
Ablard,
,
Amsterdam
M. Tweedale
onAbailard.
Some
1976,93, on whichsee L.M. de Rijk,Martin
Criticisms
Venture
23 (1985),
, in:Vivarium,
81-97;L.M.de Rijk,TheSemantical
ofa Fascinating
s Solution
Abaelardus
, in:Thomas
, 139Impact
ofAbailard'
oftheProblem
ofUniversais
(ed.),Petrus
51; N. Kretzmann,
TheCulmination
inPeter
Abelard
andBenson
, in:Constable
oftheOldLogic
andRenewal
D.F. Blackwell,
Onto
Constructs.
TheEffects
Non, 488-511;
(eds.),Renaissance
bgical
andEthical
A Study
inMeaning
Theories:
andVerification
, Bern1988,34;
ofAbaelard's
Logical
D.E. Luscombe,
Peter
Abelard
Western
, in:Dronke
,
(ed.),A History
ofTwelfih-Century
Philosophy
works
ofuniversais,
seetheLogica
287-92.ForAbelars
andtheory
logical
"Ingredientibus"
andtheLogica
Petitioni
ed.B. Geyer,
Peter
Abelards.
"Nostrorum
Sociorum,"
,
Schriften,
Philosophische
Mnster
1919-33.
Constructs
Blackwell,
, 43-6.
Non-Ontological
41TSum
478-80.
IV.86-90,
III.54-61,180-3;TChr
306-9;TSchII.141-7,
42TChr
ex
"Eademitaqueratione
IV.90,p. 3081368*77:
qua nonlicetdiciquodmateria
se ipsasitmateriata,
velmateriatum
velconstituens
sitconstitutum
suiipsiussitmateria,
exsevelposterius
intalibus
sevelgenerans
materia
idemsitessentialiter
se,quamvis
quod
veluthocaesidemquodhaecstatua,
etidemconstituens,
etidempriusquod
materiatum,
- eadem,inquam,
et generans
ratione
et in diviposterius,
quodgeneratum,
proportionis
nispersonis
hocestDeusPatergenitus
a se ipso,nequeFiliusest
nequePaterestFilius,
hocestDeusFiliusgenitor
suiipsius
..."
Pater,

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

53

Son are the same in essence,theyare distinctin termsof definitionand


property,which means it does not followfromthe fact that the Son is
begottenfromthe Father that somethingis begottenfromitself.43
Nor can the words of the Council of Nicea, "God fromGod" [Deus
de Deo) stand as an authorityforthe view eitherthat God begot Himself
or thatsubstancebegot substance.44
The propositionwithwhichAbelard
has to contendis that since the word "God" is a proper name {nomen
) indicatingone undividedand singularsubstanceratherthan a
proprium
class of substances,it mustbe conceded thatGod begot God impliesthat
Abelard respondsthat God is distinctfromGod
somethingbegot itself.45
or
by definition propertyaccording to the distinctionof Persons.46He
discusseshere veryexplicitlythe problemof the signification
of the word
"God" in a way whichhas a directbearingon subsequenttreatments
of
the same issue. In the expression"God fromGod," the word "God" has
different
meanings.Moreover,the placing of the preposition"de" which
- betweenthe firstand
indicatesa relationbetweenbegetterand begotten
second occurencesof the word "God" shows that the Persons rather
than the substanceare being indicated.47
This particularapplicationand
of
of the context,and because
"God"
is
because
understanding
possible
words are oftentransferred
fromtheirnormal signification
to another.48
It is not so amazing, then,that in the Creed a common name such as
"God" shouldtake on the propertiesof personalnames.49Abelars arguis that preciselythis transference
in the signification
of
ment,therefore,
theword"God" disqualifies
Himselfor substance
any talkof God begetting
substance.
begetting
By the 1150s, thereis littleindicationthat the issue was causing divi43TChr
IV.102,3161622"5:
. . cumPateretFiliusdiversi
ab invicem
sinttamdefinitione
licetsintidemessentialiter,
nonestnecesse
ut,cumFiliussitex Patre
quamproprietate,
velgeneretur
ex Patre,
idemsitex se velgeneretur
ex se. .
44TSum
IV.103,316.
111.62,
183;TChr
TChrIV.103,316162. "Sed dicismihiquia Deus de Deo est,cumFiliussitex
- undeetconfitemur
noscredere
inFilium
delumine,'
Patre,
Dei,'Deumde Deo,lumen
cumitaque,inquies,
Deussitde Deo, et 'Deus'hocnomen
sit
unius
et
indiproprium
viduaesingularis
necullomodoDeusa Deo sitdefinitione
sedpenisubstantiae,
diversus,
tusidem,oportet
concedi
idemesseex se ipso."
46TChr
IV.103,3161638"9.
47TSum
183.
111.62,
48TSum
184782"3:
a propria
evo111.62,
"Sepeautemvocesex adiunctis
significatione
cantur
ad aliam. . ."
49TSum
si in simbolo
fideicommune
nomen
trium
III.65,185824"6:
"Quidergomirum
in significationem
ex appositis
transeat
personarum,
quodest'deus'vel'lumen,'
personaliumnominum
..."

19:52:52 PM

54

FIONAROBB

sions in any conventionalsense: no authoractuallyputs forwardthe view


that the divineessence or substancebegets.This suggeststhatwe would
be wrongto associate specificindividualsor groupswiththe alleged disputants.But nor is thereany sign that the questionwas losingits fascination fortheologians.On the contrary,it becomes part of the standard
corpus of questionsaddressedin the second half of the twelfthcentury.
Much of this corpus was establishedas a direct resultof the Sentences
50
(1155-7) of Peter Lombard (d. 1160). The Lombard's work quickly
assumed the status of theological textbook at Paris, both because it
depended on the quaestiotechniqueand because it was the best attempt
at systematic
The geniusof the Lombard's
theologyhithertoundertaken.51
approach to the doctrineof generationlay preciselyin treatingthe propositionsof "God begot God" and "essence begot essence" as two successive quaestiones.
This juxtapositioncleverlyand succinctlyexposed the
contradiction
inherentin maintainingthat "God begot God"
apparent
whilstdenyingthat "essence begot essence." The firstquaestio
, having
establishedthat God does not beget Himself,concludesthat "God begot
God" is true.52This conclusionis the implicitpoint of departureforthe
second quaestio
, whichconsidersthe role of the divineessence in the generationalacts.53Althoughthe Lombard does not framethe question so
which emergesis the following:if it is true that
explicitly,the difficulty
God begot God, it should followon the groundsof identitythatessence
begot essence. The Lombard's solutionis overwhelmingly
metaphysical.
Developing Abelard's causal approach, the Lombard exposes the argument in favourof a begettingand a begottenessence as a contradiction
in terms.For it is inconceivablethat the divine essence, the verything
which confersdivinityon the Father,should be begottenby him. This
amountsto sayingthat the thingwhich makes the Father divineis also
begottenand thereforecaused by him.54
The problemof whetheror not the essence begetsis mentionedelsewhere in the Sentences
, and was clearlyan issue of some contentionin
50Forthe
seeI. Brady
inhisprolegomena
toMagisti
Petri
Lombardi
Parisiensis
,
dating,
Episcopi
inIV librisDistinctae
Sententiae
I, Grottaferrata
1971,82*-8*.
31M.L. Colish,
Lombard
Peter
, Leiden1994.
52ISent.
IV, 77-80.
53ISent.
V.l, 80-7.
54ISent.V.l.4, 8116"20:. . si Paterest
cumipsaessentia
divinaeessentiae,
genitor
divinaetsitetDeussit,eo ergoquodgnrt
etestetDeusest.Itaergononilludquod
esta PatreDeus,sedPatereo quodgenerai
etestetDeusest;etsi itaest,non
generatur
sedgignenti
causaestutetsitetDeussit..."
genito
gignens,
genitus

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

55

This repetitionsignifies
trinitarian
much more than simplereittheology.55
it
occurs
the
Lombard
must
make sure thathe does not
because
eration;
fall into self-contradiction
unwittingly
by arguing,during the course of
anotherargument,in favourof a propositionwhich he has already rejected, namelythat the essence begets. The clearestapplicationof this
ariseswiththe questionof the typeof identitypertainingamong the Persons, the personal propertiesand the divine essence. This discussion
undoubtedlyrefersto the positionof Gilbertof Poitiers(d. 1154) and his
thattheremustbe some distinction
betweenthe Persons,their
supporters
and
In
the
Lombard
and many others
the
essence.
properties
general,
In particular,theologianssuch
rejectedthe need for such distinctions.56
as the Lombard and Robert of Melun attributedto Gilbertthe counterargumentthatif the personalpropertiesare, or are in, the essence,it follows thatthe essencebegets.Althoughthereis no evidencefromGilbert's
own writingsthathe put forwardthisparticularobjectionto an absolute
identityamong the Persons,theirpropertiesand the essence,contemporariesassumed that this must have been one of his reasons for denying
such identity.They proceed as thoughGilbertwas using this argument
as a deliberatetacticto forcehis opponentsinto self-contradiction.
Much
more likely,though,is thattheythemselveswere in the process of working out a formulawhich would hold togethera view of identityin God
withthe non-generation
of the essence. It would seem fromthis,therefore,thatthe questionof the generationof the essence had assumed such
centralimportancein discussionson the Trinitythat it was being used
as a means to screen and assess othertrinitarian
problems.
Several of Gilbert'steachingson the Trinityhad been partiallycondemned at the Council of Reims, held in 1148 beforethe composition
55For
in London,
theBreuiarium
sententiarum
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII, f. 129vb:
example,
hicsi paterdivinam
velessentia
velessentia
essentiam
filium
essentiam
"Queritur
genuit
velomnino
necgenuerit
necgenita
sit.Magnahecquestio
inter
et
doctores
contrarietatis
aufert
molestiam.
Nammagister
Petrus
asserit
vel
nullatenus
concedendum
repugnantie
velessentia
filium
velessentia
essentiam
On thisandother
quodpateressentiam
genuerit."
A.M.Landgraf,
Frhscholastische
derSentenzen
desLombarden
versions,
, in: Studia
Abkrzungen
InHonorem
Mediaevalia.
Martin
Introduction
,
, Bruges1948,171-99.
Raymundi
Josephi
Landgraf,
leavesthequestion
's authorship
ofSimonofTournai
114-15,
open.
56J. Schneider,
DieLehre
vom
Gott
inderSchule
Lombardus
desPetrus
, Mnchen
dreieinigen
1961,139-88.See alsotheanonymous
Summa,
London,
B.L.,Royal9 E XII, f. 150ra:
"Simbolum
essepersonas.
autemveritatis,
Ad corroborationem
fideiquodeclaratur
proprietates
subieimus
hicsimbolum
fidei
Gileberti
editum
est..."
errores
quodadversus
magisti
porete
In thesameMS is a seriesof theological
in whichthequestion
is similarly
questions
at f.236^: "Nonenimvidemus
addressed
sintin deoetnonsintdeus,
quodproprietates
cumdeussimplex
in
sit.Quamvis
sicutquidamasserunt
porretanus
magister
Gfilbertus],
docuerit
..."
contrarium,
quodtamennegavit

19:52:52 PM

56

FIONAROBB

.57The Lombard attendedthe Council,participating


in the
of the Sentences
case againstGilbert.58
Several sectionsin the Sentences
build on the accuThe major issue of doctrinalcontentionbetween
sationsagainstGilbert.59
Peter and Gilbert the distinctions
betweenthe essence,the Personsand
- had been the
the personalproperties
subjectof considerableuncertainty
forsome timebeforethe Council, and had been leftundetermined
by a
The Lombard's view was that any such disnumber of theologians.60
tinctionswere inadmissableon the groundsof divine simplicity,
though
he was not always consistentin arguingthis.61Gilbert,conversely,maintained thatsuch distinctions
were indispensable.He argued thatthe personal propertieswere not the Personsthemselvesbut extrinsicto them.62
The same opinion can also be found in the earliestworksof Porretan
57On theCouncil,
seeA. Hayen,Le concile
deReims
etl'erreur
deGilbert
dela
thologique
Porre
d'histoire
doctrinale
et littraire
du moyen
, in:Archives
29-102;
ge,10 (1935-6),
N.M. Hring,
TheCaseofGilbert
dela Porre
ofPoitiers
(1142-1
154),in: Mediaeval
Bishop
13 (1951),1-40;N.M.Hring,
ontheCounl
andConsistory
Notes
Studies,
ofRheims
(1148),
in:Mediaeval
28 (1966),39-59;G.R.Evans,Godescalc
andtheTrialof
Studies,
ofSt.Martin
Gilbert
57 (1981),196-209.
, in:Analecta
Praemonstratensia,
ofPoitiers
58FortheLombard's
seeJohnofSalisbury,
Historia
attendance,
, ed. andtr.
Pontificalis
M. Chibnall,
London1956,16; Geoffrey
ofAuxerre,
n. 28, p. 35, ed. N.M.
Scriptum
TheWritings
Gilbert
in:Analecta
Cisterciensia,
Hring,
Against
ofPoitiers
byGeoffrey
ofAuxerre,
22 (1966),3-83.
59On theLombard's
Le mouvement
duXIIesicle,
J. de Ghellinck,
opposition,
thologique
2nded.,Bruxelles-Paris
Petrus
unddieSprachlogik
in
Lombardus
1948,263-7;N.M.Hring,
derTrinittslehre
derPorretanerschule,
in:Miscellanea
Lombardiana
, Turin1953,113-27;F. Pelster,
Petrus
Lombardus
unddieVerhandlungen
ber
dieStreitfrage
desGilbertus
Porreta
inParis(1147)und
Reims
65-73.On theother
alsoborrowed
from
Gilbert
hand,theLombard
(1148),in:ibid.,
forhisGlossa
Pauli.See Brady,
M.L. Colish,
Gilbert
, theEarly
., 76*-82*.
super
epstolas
proleg
Porretans
andPeter
Lombard.
Semantics
andTheology,
in:Jolivet
andde Libera(eds.),Gilbert
de
a reassessment
offers
ofPeterLombard's
butseems
to Gilbert
Poitiers,
229-50,
opposition
to exaggerate
theparallels
whichsheidentifies
between
theirrespective
on the
positions
Trinity.
60SeeJohnof
Hist.Pont.,
18-19forthecautious
recommended
Salisbury,
by
approach
Robert
de Bosco.Previously
and Gilbert
hadbeenkeen
theUniversal
UlgerofAngers
ofmaintaining
suchdistinctions;
seeAbelard,
TChrIII.167,257,IV.77,301;
proponents
H.C. Van Elswijk,
Gilbert
Porreta.
Sa vie
sapense
, sonuvre,
, Louvain1966,329-34.
hisadmission
beem particular
thatsomemental
distinction
between
nature/essence
I &h.XXXIV.
andPersonis unavoidable,
1.9, 25012"13:
intelli"... aliquaestin ratione
distinctio
cumdicitur
etcumdicitur
is theGreek
'essentia.'"
gentiae
'hypostasis'
Hypostasis
oftheLatinpersona.
equivalent
62TheCommentaries
onBoethius
Toronto1966,
, ed. N.M. Hring,
byGilbert
ofPoitiers
n. 43,p. 148.The author
ofa commentary
on theAthanasian
Creedattributes
thisand
similar
distinctions
to quidam.
A Commentary
See N.M.Hring,
onthePseudo-Athanasian
Creed
27 (1965),23-53at pp. 35-7n. 30-41.Butfor
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
byGilbert
ofPoitiers
thisvery
reason
Gilbert's
seems
andPhilosophy
seeL.O. Nielson,
doubtful;
authorship
Theology
intheTwelfth
A Study
inGilbert
Porreta'
s Thinking
andtheTheological
Century.
ofthe
Exposition
Doctrine
thePeriod
Leiden1982,44.
1130-1180,
oftheIncarnation
during

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

57

theology,writtenbefore 1148.63Gilberteven went so far as to deny that


the Personscould be predicatedof the essence on the groundsthat only
the abstractnature(paternitas
) and not the concreteform(pater)of a Person
was trulypredicable.64
Predicatingthe Personsof the essence would thus
be likesaying"one Personis threePersons"since the subject-term
"God"
or "essence" would have to stand for a distinctindividual,namely a
Person.65Gilbert's concern here is about the rectitudeof predicating
concreteindividualsof a universalform,somethingwhich Aristotelian
logic prohibited.66
In the Sentences
the Lombard refersto Gilbert'sview that the properto the Persons and the divine
ties are externally
affixa)
joined (extrinsecus
He further
essenceratherthan being in theminternally
alludes
(interius).61
to the argument,supposedlyharnassedin supportof this view, that if
63N.M.Hring,
Gisleberti
Pictavensis
in:
DieSententie
episcopi,
magisti
(longversion),
etlittraire
Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
dumoyen
ge,45 (1978),83-180atp. 112n. 10;
der
Gisleberti
Pictavensis
II: Die Version
N.M. Hring,
Die Sententie
episcopi,
magisti
seeM.L.
in:ibid.,
46 (1979),45-105.On theseworks,
Florentiner
, (short
version),
Handschrift
ancienne
55 (1988),
deThologie
etmdivale,
Porretan
, in:Recherches
Colish,
Early
Theology
58-79.
64Gilbert
See Hring,
The
Depraedicatione
trium
ofPoitiers,
, PL 64, 1301-1310.
personarum
unddieSprachlogik
Lombardus
CaseofGilbert
dela Porree
, 119-20;M.E. Williams,
, 10andPetrus
ontheTrinity
asfound
inhiscommentaries
onBoethius
Porreta
TheTeaching
, Analecta
ofGilbert
undTrinitt
nachdemKommentar
Gottheit
56,Rome1951,93-7;M.A.Schmidt,
Gregoriana
Gilbert
Porreta
desGilbert
Porreta
zu Boethius
,
, De Trinitate
, Basel1956,170-1;Van Elswijk,
ofAuxerre,
Libellus
and
ofGeoffrey
146-7.Thisis alsothereading
III.9,49,ed. Hring,
I Imperatoria,
OttoofFreising,
Friderici
Gesta
1912,1.52,75:"QuodtheoHannover-Leipzig
in nullapredicarentur
propositione."
logicae
personae
65See Lombard,
IV.1.2,79-80;theGlossa
on theSentences
ISent.
B.L.,Royal
, London,
trespersone
suntunusdeus
7 F XIII,f.7^: "Ponit
concedentium:
quorundam
opinionem
deusestpateretfilius
etspiritus
sanctus.
Videtur
sednone converso.
Nonenimconcedunt:
sitaccedere
ad haeresim
Sabelli[. . .] si dicatur
'deus
enimtalibus
quodhocconcedere
hoc esse
esttrespersone,'
ut 'deus'sitin suppositione
oportet
proaliquapersonarum,
velspiritus
sanctus
esttrespersone.'";
ofa short
verum
etita'velpatervelfilius
fragment
tarnen
Patr.48,f.73r:"Quidam
sententiam
, Bamberg,
porretani
[. . .]
glossontheSentences
Hic autemesterror
Sabellianorum
. . . ." See
ergoremdicisessetrespersonas.
aliquam
in:Archives
doctrihomines
d'histoire
alsoAlanofLille,Summa
68,ed.P. Glorieux,
Quoniam
Commentarius
naleetlittraire
dumoyen
atp. 218;Stephen
Langton,
ge,20(1953),113-364
insententias,
Mnster
DerSentenzenkommentar
dasKardinals
, ed.A.M.Landgraf,
Langton
Stephan
ed.J.Warichez,
Lesdisputations
LXXXIII.2-3,
1952,7. Cf.SimonofTournai,
Disputationes
insacram
n. 15,partially
deSimon
de Tournai
, Louvain1932,242 andInstitutions
paginam
4 (1932),59-72,
ancienne
et mdivale,
ed. M. Schmaus,
in: Recherches
de Thologie
vom
Gott
at pp. 71-2.See Schneider,
DieLehre
294-307
, 184-8forother
187-98,
dreieinigen
treatments.
66Categories
I 1-5,Bruges-Paris
Aristoteles
Latinus
1961,Ib6-lb8.
2, ed.L. Minio-Paluello,
67ISent.
to this
XXXIII.1.6,242.AlsoGeoffrey
ofAuxerre,
, p. 32.According
Scriptum
i.e. theyonly
areinferior
accidents,
(extrinsecus
affixa
), thepersonal
terminology
properties
affect
thestatus
andstatus,
seeL.M. de Rijk,
ofa substance,
notitsbeing.On accident

19:52:52 PM

58

FIONAROBB

these propertieswere in the divine essence, the consequence would be


that the same thingbegets and is begotten,which is nothingless than
Sabellianism.68
Gilberthimselfdoes not seem to put forwardthis obstacle to strictidentitybetweenthe properties,the Personsand the essence,
thoughit can be seen in some early Porretansentencecollections:one
author reportsthe view that everything
in God cannot be God accordto
substance
since
we
otherwise
would
end up concludingfromthe
ing
fact that the Father begot the Son that paternitybegot sonship;69the
author of the Sententiae
divinitatis
, on the otherhand, allows that the personal propertiesmay be in God as long as they are not in the divine
substancesince God begetsbut the divinesubstancedoes not.70In order
to show thatsuch inferencesare invalid,the Lombard has to explainhow
the propertiescan be in the essence withoutthe resultbeing that the
essencebegets.71
His solutionis to distinguish
the way in whichthe propertiesare in the essencefromthe way in whichtheyare in the Persons.72
For it does not followfromthe fact that the propertiesdeterminethe
Persons when they are in them, that they also determinethe essence
when theyare in it. And so paternityand sonshipare the essence without that meaningthat the essence begets or is begotten.73
The Lombard's treatmentof the issue of the relationof the essence
vis--visthe propertiesand the Personstakesa lot forgrantedand leaves
Semantics
andMetaphysics
A Chapter
in Gilbert
Platonism
/,in:
ofPoitiers.
ofTwelfth
Century
26 (1988),73-112at pp. 100-6.
Vivarium,
XXXIII.1.9,243 : "Sipaternitas
ISent.
etfiliatio
inDeo siveindivina
essentia
sunt,
eademigitur
ressibipaterestet filius.
Namin quo paternitas
est,Paterest:et in quo
Filiusest.Si igitur
unaeademque
reshabetin se paternitatem
etfiliationem,
filiatio,
ipsa
etgnrt
etgeneratur
..."
69Sententie GisUberti version),
n. 10,p. 112:". . . si paternitas
estdeuset
maistri
(long
filiado
estdeus,ergosipater
verum
filiationem."
est,etpaternitas
filium,
quod
genuit
genuit
70DieSententiae
Divinitatis.
EinSentenzenbuch
derGilbertschen
Schule
Mnster
, ed. B. Geyer,
nongignonsunt[proprietates],
1909,160*:"In divinasubstantia
quiadivinasubstantia
nitequegignitur,
sedin Deo esseconcedi
potest;
quiahocnomen'Deus'ad utrumque
se habetscilicet
et ad substantiam."
ad personam
71ISent.
XXXIII.1,240-3.See L. Ott,DieTrinittslehre
derSumma
sententiarum
alsQuelle
at pp. 177-8fortheLombard's
desPetrus
Lombardus
21 (1943),159-86
, in:DivusThomas,
on theSumma
, PL 176.58-9.
dependence
72See theanonymous
Clm.7622,f.46. "Magister
, Munich,
Staatsbibl.,
quaestio
Bayer.
Petrus
concedit
estdivinaessentia
et estin divinaessentia,
sed
quodgenerado
utrumque
nonconcedit,
scilicet
cumsolageneratione
dicatur
quodsequitur
quisgenerare,
ergodivina essentia
gnrt."
73I.Sent.
cum
XXXIII.1.10,24326"8:
". . . licetpaternitas
et filiatio
sintdivinaessentia,
earnnondterminent,
nonideopotestdiciquoddivinaessentia
et generet
et generetur. . citing
Defideorthodoxia
: Versions
andCerbanus
, ed.
JohnDamascene,
ofBurgundio
E.M.Buytaert,
Franciscan
Institute
TextSeries
Publications,
8,NewYork1955,50.1,187.

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

59

bemany questions unanswered.74His strictconceptual differentiation


to unity(essence)and thoseto trinity
tweenthosethingspertaining
(Persons)
is not extendedto take account of the relationbetween these elements
identity.Robert of Melun
except via the assertionof straightforward
in
Sentences
his
(1155/56-1163/64),on the other hand, is pre(d. 1167)
these
to
address
issues,even at the riskof alienatingthe readerby
pared
of the Lombard's work.75
the kind of clarityso characteristic
sacrificing
The first-draft
feel of Robert'sworkperhaps accountsforits lack of success as a textbook,though Robert's opinion still carried considerable
weightand was cited by other authors,most notablyJohn of Cornwall
in the contextof christologicaldebates,76and Master Hubertus in the
Like the Lombard, Robert is also
1190s for his views on the Trinity.77
a
number
of
questionsrelatingto the doctrineof divine
preoccupiedby
it
"whether is truethat God begot Himselfor another
generation,firstly,
God, since it is true that God begot God."78Robert brieflyrecapitulates
Abelard's originalargument,citingAugustine'sstatementthat no thing
Because the word "God" is a typeof commonname which
begetsitself.79
can indicateeitherPerson or essence,80its exact meaningin thisparticular case can onlybe determinedfromthe context,which here excludes
74The
ontheSentences
issuggested
ofhistreament
, London,
bytheBreviarium
inadequacy
sedeasdem
inpersonis
essedicunt,
"Aliiveroproprietates
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII,f. 134ra:
et forte
aliissententie
et hisargumentis
diffitantur,
esse,velessentiam
Magisti
personas
derSentenzen
desLombarden
Petri
SeeLandgraf,
Frhscholastisch
, 178-9.
Abkrzungen
opponunt."
75Sententie
deRobert
deMelun
Oeuvres
, vol.4, Louvain1952.Datedby
, ed.R.M.Martin,
desRobert
vonMelun
U. Horst,
undGotteslehre
Die Trinitts, Mainz1964,23. ForRobert's
ecclsideRobert
deMelun
L'uvre
seeR.M.Martin,
, in:Revued'histoire
thologique
biography,
teachForRobert's
15/1(1914),456-89andOeuvres
, vol.1,Louvain1932,vi-xii.
astique,
career
at Paris,seeJohnofSalisbury,
, 78-9.
Metalogicon
ing
76Eubgium
in:Mediaeval
13(1951),
ed.N.M.Hring,
Alexandrm
Studies,
tertium
Papam
LateTwelfth
inthe
atp. 268.AlsoR.W.Hunt,
253-300
, in:Transactions
Learning
Century
English
ofCriklade
oftheRoyalHistorical
19(1936),19-42atpp. 32-3,37-8forRobert
Society,
whocitesRobert's
teaching
approvingly.
"
77References
DieSumme
fragmenta
(9 intotal)areindicated
"Colligite
byR. Heinzmann,
inderScholastik
desMagister
Hubertus
zurtheologischen
,
(Clm28 799).EinBeitrag
Systembildung
undGotteslehre
Die Trinittsinfluence
in general,
Mnchen
Horst,
1974,14.On Robert's
des12.
beiPaulinenkommentaren
desRobert
vonMelun
, 318-27;A.M.Landgraf,
Familienbildung
Schule
vonMelun
undseine
2. Robert
, in:Biblica,13 (1932),169-93.
Jahrhunderts.
78ISentA.
eniman verum
sit,Deumse velaliumDeumgeneXXI, 1416"8:
"Queritur
thatRobert
should
elsewhere
Deum."It is notable
estDeumgenuisse
rasse:quiaverum
theFather's
oftheSonwithArianism.
errors
I, 3-5)identify
(lSent.3.
concerning
generation
79On Abelard's
Unplaidoyer
ProPetro
seeR.M.Martin,
in general,
influence
Abaelardo,
et thologiques,
deRobert
S. Bernard
deMelun
contre
, in:Revuedessciences
philosophiques
TheSchool
281-98.
12(1923),308-23;Luscombe,
Abelard
ofPeter
80ISent.Z.
XXXI,222-3.
XXIII,77; ISentA.

19:52:52 PM

60

FIONAROBB

as a commonnoun.81For thisreason,in the state"God" fromsignifying


Fatherand Son respecment"God begot God," the word "God" signifies
nature
shared
rather
than
the
common
by them.
tively,
Robert thus deals with the problem of the generationof the essence
relativelyeasily, adopting much the same positionas Abelard and the
Lombard. He continues,nevertheless,
to discussthe questionat some considerablelength,oftenexaminingthe same problemsseveral timesover.
This repetitionis pardy explainedby Robert'sown defectsas a thinker,82
but is also a prime example of the argumentthat the essence does not
beget being used as a control.Robert has set himselfthe unenviabletask
of (1) showingthatin realitythereis absoluteidentityamong the Persons,
the propertiesand the essence,and thisdoes not necessitatethe generation of the essence; (2) showinghow thissituationcan be truthfully
and
in
so
that
there
of
false
is
no
reasonablyexpressed language
danger any
conclusionsbeing drawn as a resultof carelessness.Unfortunately,
confusioncharacterisesthe discussionbecause Robert himselfchanges his
mind as he goes along.
with Robert as an author, to explain away
Despite these difficulties
this repetitionpurelywith referenceto his desire to displayhis skillsas
a logicianwould be to underestimate
as a theologian.Robert's
his sincerity
is
not
to
rerun
the
same
objective
aimlessly
argumentsbut to come to
termswiththe Porretanargumentsagainstabsoluteidentitybetweenthe
Persons,theirpropertiesand the divine essence,includingthe argument
thatif the personalpropertieswere predicatedeitherdirecdyor indirecdy
(throughthe Persons)of the divine essence,therewould be no avoiding
the conclusion that the divine essence is begetting,begottenand proceeding.83Nor is thisa case of crude partisanshipon Robert'spart. The
sheer scale of the problem of these relationsand the compellingnature
of the objection against identityassociated with the Porretaniwere the
81ISentA.
necaliumDeum,facileresisti
hoc
"Deusnecse genuit,
XXI, 14117'22:
potest
etnonessentiam.
'Deus'inpredicta
locutione
quiahocnomen
personas
cognito
distinguit
Undecumqueritur,
nomen
velalium,questioni
an Deusse ipsumgenuerit
locumtollit
commune
in
Trinitati
Namnonconvenienter
ad nomen
commune
personaliter
acceptum.
fieri
locoproprii
relatio
positum
potest."
82Colish,
Peter
76.
Lombardy
83ISentA.
essentiam
sinid est,divinam
catholica
XXII, 1446"13:
"QuodEcclesia
recipit,
et omnium
simul.Verumenimest:divina
gularum
personarum
suscipere
predicationem
essentia
Sanctus
est.Veraest
Paterest,divinaessentia
Filiusest,divinaessentia
Spiritus
etista:divina
diviessentia
estPateretFiliusetSpiritus
Sanctus.
Athicinferunt
quidam:
na ergoessentia
und
estet genitaatqueprocedens."
See Horst,Die Trinittsgenerans
Gotteslehre
desRobert
vonMelun
ISent.
IV.1.2,79-80.
, 140-4.Gf.Lombard,

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

61

and so it is not surprisingthat such


source of monumentaldifficulties,
should be reflectedin Robert's approach. In confronting
the
difficulties
than
Peter
Robert
also
more
Lombard
the
explains
clearly
logic
problem,
of the Porretanposition.Indeed, the problem takes a semanticrather
than ontologicalformunder the questionof whetheror not the personal
propertiescan be predicatedof the essence. The Porretanireject direct
predication(1) of the propertiesof the Personsand (2) of the Personsof
indirectpredicationof the properthe essence.The latteralso constitutes
ties of the essence followingthe Aristotelianprinciplethat the predicate
in (1) is the predicateof the predicatein (2) and thereforethe predicate
of the subject in (2).84In theirview, any such concessionwould entail
the followingsequence of predicativestatements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the Father is begetting


paterestgenerans/
estpater/the
essentia
essence is the Father
the essence is begetting
essentia
estgenerans/
the essence begets.
therefore,
ergoessentia
generai/

In otherwords,if the propertyof begettingis predicatedof the Father,


and the Person of the Father is predicatedof the essence, the rules of
be predicateddirectly
syllogistic
logic requirethatthepropertyof begetting
of the essence. The idea is that if the Father and the essence are identical,any propertydirectlyattributedto the Father mustalso be directly
attributedto the essence. And thus only if the essence is begettingcan
it be the subjectof the Father in a predicativestatement;but since the
it cannotbe the subjectof the Father.85
essenceis not begetting,
As Robert
in the
if
which
the
that
is
stated
of
the
Father
"For
reports
argument,
statement'the Fatheris begetting'is removedfromthe divineessence,it
will in all ways be true that the divine essence is not the Father."86
Robertof Melun's solutionto theproblemdependson language theory
and counter-arguments.
At firsthe takes up the rathercomplex position
thateven thoughthe propertiesare the Personsthemselves,theyare not
predicatedof the divine essence with the words "begetting,""begotten"
84Categories
3, Ibl0-lbl5.
85ISentA.
si generans
non
"Atqua ratione
Patris
XXII, 14419"27:
suscipit
predicationem
Paterest.Nam
est?Nonenimaliunde
estquodPaterPaterestet quoddivinaessentia
undealiunde
hocessepossitratione
nullaassignari
Si ergoPaterindePaterest,
potest.
essenecesse
non
essentiam
exeodemPatrem
estautPatrem
est,etdivinam
quiagenerans
Divinaergoessentia
essevidePateressepossit.
esse,cumnonsitundealiunde
generans
tur,autPaternonesse."
86ISentA.
"Sienimid a divina
essentia
removetur
XXII,1454"6:
quodhicde Patreenunnonesse."
Paterestgenerans,
verum
eritdivinam
essentiam
Patrem
modis
omnibus
tiatur,

19:52:52 PM

62

FIONAROBB

and "proceeding."87
backtrackson thisvery
However,Robertimmediately
a
on
based
not
dissimilarfromthe
authority
point, takingup position
Lombard's.88On balance, though,his positionwould seem to be thatit
is not necessaryto abandon directpredicationof the personalproperties
of the Persons or indirectpredicationof the personal propertiesof the
essence throughthe Persons,but that directpredicationof the personal
propertiesof the essence is dangerouslysuggestive.
A more consistentand ultimately
more effective
treatment
of the same
issue is given,again in the sectionon the generationof the divineessence,
, writtenin the
by the author of the Glossaon the Lombard's Sentences
1160s.89Supposing we were to allow the statement"the essence is the
Father," the followingwould apply: the term "pate has only one
thereforeit must retainthe same sense when statedof the
signification,
divineessenceas when statedof the Father;but the consequenceof predtherefore,
icating"pater"of the Fatheris thatthe Fatherbegets;similarly,
" is
the same should followwhen "pater
predicatedof the divineessence,
namely that the divine essence begets.90This argumentis repeated by
othertheologians.91
" is
The author of the Glossarespondswith the argumentthat "pater
statedrespective
, denotinga relation,only of the Father,not of the divine
essence.92In otherwords,the essenceis identicalwiththe one who begets
87ISentA.
"Namproprietates
suntipsepersone.
Ideosicutpersone
a divXXIII,14721"9:
inanonremoventur
itanecproprietates;
etsicutpersone
de ea enuntiantur,
ita
essentia,
etproprietates.
Sed nonquibuscumque
vocibus
de ipsispersonis
eisdem
enuntiantur,
possuntde divinaessentia
Hie enimvocibus;
enuntiari.
de
'generans,'
'genitus,'
'procedens,'
divinanequaquam
enuntiari
eo
dicuntur,
ipsispersonis
quibusde ipsaessentia
possunt,
"
hecvocescumhacvoce'divina
essentia'
ad aliamtransirent
quod
copulate
significationem
88ISentA.
150-1.
XXIV,
89Formerly
attributed
to PeterofPoitiers,
decritiques
seeA.M.Landgraf,
textuelles
Notes
surlesSentences
dePierre
Lombard
et mdivale,
ancienne
de Thologie
, in: Recherches
2 (1930),80-99at pp.80-2.FortheMSS,seeLandgraf,
Introduction
, 137-8.Theprologue
totheGlossa
dePierre
hasbeenpublished
littraire
leMangeur
surl'oeuvre
Notes
,
byR.M.Martin,
in: Recherches
de thologie
ancienne
et mdivale,
3 (1931),54-66at pp. 63-4,after
Leprologue
surlesSentences
attribues
desGloses
London,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII,andO. Lottin,
Pierre
dePoitierSy
in:Recherches
de Thologie
7 (1935),70-3,after
ancienne
etmdivale,
Paris,B.N.,lat.14423.
90London,
sic
essentia
etgeneretur,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII,f.7va:"Quodtamen
generet
videtur
isteterminus
convenit
posseprobari:
'pater'in nullasignificatione
patriin quantumnonconveniat
in quantum
habetsignificationem
divineessentie,
quiaunamtantum
illiustermini
de patresequitur,
Sed ad predicationem
personam
patrissignificat.
quod
huiusde divina
essentia
essenpatergeneret;
ergoad predicationem
sequitur,
quoddivina
tiagigneret."
91See Appendix
1.
Et estratio,
London,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII, f. 7 : "Nonsequitur.
quialicetutro-

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

63

(the Father)but it does not followfromthis that it has the propertyof


foundedon
begetting.To prove his point, the author gives an instantia
of the same property
the same falsepremise,namelythatthe attribution
to different
subjectsnecessarilyproducesthe same effects.Thus the term
"habens
"
to any given man or
filiurriapplies with the same signification
it
is
a
it
but
when
of
woman,
woman, followsthat she has
predicated
if
we
And so
were to followthroughthe same line of reasonconceived.93
ing whichwould have the essence beget as a resultof being the subject
of the Father,we would also have to conclude that the man "having a
or counter-arguments,
are an integral
son" has also conceived.Instantiate,
in
a
of arguments the Glossaand numberof them
part of the refutation
recurin subsequenttheologicalworks.94
A relatedpoint which strengthens
s positionis
considerablythe Glossa!
a distinction
betweenadjectivaland substantivalpredication.95
The stateestgenerans
is perfectly
valid so long as generans
is predicated
mentessentia
, that is, indirectlythroughthe Father, and not
substantiallyof essentia
adjectivally.Robert of Melun had treatedwords such as "begetting"as
purelyadjectival,whichis why he rejecteddirectpredicationof the pros use of the distinction
betweenadjecpertiesof the essence.96The Glossa'
tival and substantivalpredicationallows the authorpreciselythis luxury
of predicatingthe propertiesof the essence, and thus avoiding doubts
whilstupholdingthe view that the essence does
about divine simplicity,
is predicatedsubstantially,the only statenot beget. As long as generans
is paterestgenerans
ment which can be inferredfromessentia
estgenerans
,
to
Persons
conditions
of
the
not essentia
The
same
general
apply predication
of the essence,such as when we say essentia
estpater.As the Glossa
, Master
of
and
Peter
of
all
Cremona
Mrtius,Prepositnus
argue, when
Capua
of the essence the meaningis essentia
;
generans
pateris predicatedsubstantive
.97To thispredicationadiecbut adiecwe
, the meaningis essentia
generat
filium
hocnomen'pater,'
cumrespective
dicatur
de ptre,et de
tarnen
biqueidemsignificai
divina
essentia
nondicitur
respective."
93London,
in
Isteterminus
'habensfilium'
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII, f. 7. "Instantia.
eademsignificatione
convenit
virohuicet mulieri
de muliere
huic,sedad predicationem
sequitur
quodconcepisset.
Ergoetc."
94See Appendix
1.
95Forfourteenth-century
andTrinitarian
De modo
Theology.
usage,seeA. Maier,
Logic
ac sylogizandi,
andInference
inMedieval
in:N. Kretzmann
Philosophy.
(ed.),Meaning
predicanoli
Studies
inMemory
, Dordrecht
1988,247-95at pp.251-3.
of
Pinborg,
Jan
96ISentA.
ei dubium
essenonestimo
XXIII, 1489*11:
qui non
"Quodundecontingat,
vimdictionum
rarosinevi relationis
adiecti
varum,
ignort
que
ponuntur."
97See
Appendix.

19:52:52 PM

64

FIONAROBB

tivealso correspondsPeter of Poitiers'concept of accidentalpredication


estpateris equivalentto divinaessentia
wherebythe statementdivinaessentia
estgenerans
The
author
the
of
Varsavienses
makesa simQuaestiones
persona?*
ilar point. For since the Personsare sometimesused to denote the propertiesand sometimesare not, when they are predicatedof the divine
essencetheydenotethe Personsonlyand thusthepropertiesdo not determine the essence."
The kind of argumentabout the propertiesand the generationof the
essence rejectedby an increasingnumber of theologiansis listed as an
textexampleof the fallacyaccordingto accidentin a late twelfth-century
on
book
Wllelmi.100
The authorsays thisfalfallacies,the Fallaciemagisti
lacy occurs "wheneversomethingis assignedto the subjectwhichcannot
be assignedto the predicate,or vice versa; or when the subjectis assigned
to somethingto which the predicate cannot be assigned,or vice versa;
or when somethingis placed with the subject which cannot be placed
with the predicate,or vice versa."101
Hence the followingfallacy:
divinaessentia
estpersona
generans
divinaessentia
estpersona
102
estgenerans.
ergodivinaessentia

98Sententiae
Petri
Pictaviensis
NotreDame,Indiana
1.27,ed. P.S.MooreandM. Dulong,
"Estenimaccidentalis
cumdicitur:
Divinaessentia
estPater,
1943,220145"9:
predicado
quia
idemestac sidicatur:
Divinaessentia
estgenerans
utpredicetur
deessenpersona,
persona
de persona."
tia,generans
Varsavienses
Trinitarian
etChristobgicae
in:Miscellanea
Giovanni
Quaestiones
, ed.F. Stegmller,
Mercati
et'Filius,'
, vol.2,Vatican1946,282-31at n. 21,p. 295:". . . haecnomina
'Pater,'
suntdeterminativa,
sanctus,'
'Spiritus
aliquando
personas
proprietatibus
aliquando
personas
tantum
nondistinguentes
notant
eas proprietates.
Si ergodicatur:
unapersona
estPater,
aliaFilius,
aliaSpiritus
hisnominibus
etpersonae
notantur
etproprietatibus
detersanctus,
aliagenita,
aliaprocessit.
Sedsidicatur:
divina
essentia
minants;
quiaaliapersona
genuit,
estPater,Filius,
histantum
seddivinaessentia
sanctus,
notantur,
Spiritus
personae
pronondeterminantur;
esttresillaepersonae,
sednecgenuit
prietatibus
quiadivinaessentia
necgenita
estnecprocessit."
100Ed. de Ryk,Logica
Modernorum
De Rijk{ibid.,
II/1,34-5)suggests
that
II/2,683-702.
William
deMontibus
deMontibus
William
(d. 1213)maybe theauthor.
(c.1140J.Goering,
andtheLiterature
Toronto1992,doesnotmention
the
Carey
1213).TheSchook
ofPastoral
tract
in hisdiscussion.
101
in argumentatione
Fallacie
Wllelmi
"Incidit
autemhecfallatia
, 69211*15:
magisti
quansubiecto
veleconverso;
documque
aliquidassignatur
quodnonpotest
assignari
predicato,
autquandosubiectum
alicuicuinonpotest
veleconverso;
assignatur
assignari
predicatum,
autquandoaliquidponitur
cumsubiecto
veleconquodnonpotest
ponicumpredicato,
verso."
See Aristotle,
De sophisticis
elenchis
, 166b29-166b37.
102
Fallacie
6939'11.
Willelmiy
magisti

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

65

Master Hubertuswritingin the 1190s makes explicituse of the fallacy


accordingto accidentin preciselythe same context.The case arises during his considerationof the questionof whetherthe Personscan be predFor since it is proper to the Father to beget,if
icated of the essence.103
"Father" is predicatedof the essence and we say "the divine essence is
the Father,"it mustfollowthat the essence is also begetting.104
Further,
the Personsthemselvesmust be removedfromthe divine essence if its
is to be avoided since theyalso signifythe propertiesof
self-generation
But this argumentdisintebegetting,being begottenand proceeding.105
accident.
For
into
a
by the same reasoningit
grates
fallacyaccording
bronze
occurs
could be said thatsince
naturally,and a statueis bronze,
it followsthat a statueis natural,which is plainlynot true.106
This rejectionof the Porretanpositionbecomes commonplace.Peter
of Poitierscombines the Lombard's section on the propertiesand the
essence with his argumentsthat the essence does not beget.107Again,
Peter'sobjectiveis to argue that the propertiesare in the essence whilst
thatif thisis the case, the essence begets,
avoidingthe counter-argument
He reinforces
and since the essence does not beget,theyare not in it.108
the issue with
the Lombard's conclusions,and goes furtherin clarifying
an analogywhich showsjust how the propertiesmay be in the Persons
and in the essence in different
ways: a cellar contains a cask of wine,
and thus the wine is "in" both the cask and the cellar; yet the wine
In otherwords,the wine has a
moistensthe cask only,not the cellar.109
103Summa
Glm.28799,f.8*^.
, Munich,
Staatsbibl.,
Bayer.
104Summa
Clm.28799,f.8va:"Seddivina
essentia
estpater
Staatsbibl.,
, Munich,
Bayer.
et procedens,
et filius
et spiritus
sanctus,
ergononestpateret
ergoestgenerans,
genita
etspiritus
flius
sanctus."
105Summa
Glm.28799,f. 8va:"Itemratione
, Munich,
Bayer.Staatsbibl.,
propriorum
a divinaessentia,
sedistasuntvel
removentur
personarum:
gignere,
gigniet procedere
removetur
ab ea."
trium
ergopredicatio
personarum
personarum,
significant
propria
106Summa
Glm.28799,f.8: . . proprium
erisessenatuStaatsbibl.,
, Munich,
Bayer.
raleetsesecomitantur,
sedstatuaestes,ergoestnaturale."
quiasi estes estnaturale;
107ISent.
27,215-23.
108
cumsintindivinaessentia,
earn
ISent.
"Soletetiamquerian proprietates,
27,2151*8:
de illis
ethuiusmodi
utitanegatur
Divinaessentia
utitaveredicatur:
dterminent,
gignit,
et copulant.
soientformari
Circaid huiusmodi
vocabulis
que proprietates
significant
etsuntin essentia;
obiectiones:
etsuntin personis
ergoautnondeterminant
proprietates
aut gignidivinagignit
autdeterminant
essentiam;
quodsi est,ergoessentia
personas
n.
Varsavienses
Gott
tur.. . ." See Schneider,
DieLehre
vom
, 154-6.Cf. Quaestiones
dreieinigen
suntin personis,
24,298:"Proprietates
[. . .] ergosuntin divinaessentia;
ergoponuntur
in divinaessentia;
est,
Quod falsum
genitaestet processit.
genuit,
ergodivinaessentia
velprocessisse,
etsiprimum
ideodivinam
[proprietas]
genitam
quianonsequitur
genuisse,
de essentia."
praedicetur
109
cumsintin essentia,
non
ISent.
dicendum
27,21629"32:
quodproprietates,
"Propterea

19:52:52 PM

66

FIONAROBB

physicaleffecton only one of those thingsin whichit is said to be. The


analogy works on the basis of the Aristoteliandistinctionbetween first
and second substance.A distinguishing
qualityis in both the first(individual) and second (common)substance,in the sense of what is signified
by them, but it only determinesthe first,not the second substance.110
Thus the propertiesof individualsare different
fromthose of the common natureshared by them.
Anotherfeatureof trinitarian
theologyin the second halfof the twelfth
centurywhich explainsthe repetitionof the argumentabout the generation of the divineessence is the increasingimportance,both theoretically
and empirically,of the distinctionbetweensignification
and supposition.
This distinctionwas the most popular device for explainingapparent
in mainstreamtheology.The sigabsurdities,objectionsor contradictions
nificationof any word could ultimatelybe tracedback to its firstusage,
its primaimpositionConsequently,everyword possessed a core, general
meaningwhichwas prior to its meaningin any given context.This was
a fairlyvague concept.112
The conceptof supposition,on the otherhand,
the
means
fordetermining
a word's meaningas used
provided
necessary
in an actual sentence.113
As Sten Ebbesen has said, "No one could have

earndeterminant,
sicutvinum
estin dolioet in cellario,
doliumquidemhumectt,
sed
"Qui
noncellarium."
Cf.thegeneral
senseherewithPrepositinus
ofCremona,
Summa
pro"
ducit
ventos
ed. Angelini,
L'ortodossia
e la grammatica
10.6,partially
, 263-4who,likePeter,
cites
Defideorthodoxia
is thatalthough
theprop50.1,187.Hissolution
JohnofDamascus,
erties
arein theessence,
theproperties
oftheessence.
theyarenottherefore
1,0ISent.
"Etpropria
estinprimasubstantia
etsecunda
27,21632'3:
substantia,
qualitas
id estin significatis
et primam
nontarnen
sechorum;
determinat,
quidemsubstantiam
undam."
111De
Modernorum
II/1,496,525;J.Pinborg,
undSemantik
imMittelalter.
Rijk,Logica
Logik
Einberblick
ofJohnofSalisbury,
, Stuttgart
1972,59; andtheaccount
1.14,
Metalogicon
33. The notion
ofimpositio
seemsto be closely
related
to thatofthecausainventionis
of
thepartsofspeech.
See R.W.Hunt,Studies
onPriscian
intheEleventh
andTwelfth
Centuries,
/.Peter
HeliasandhisPredecessors
1 (1941-3),
andRenaissance
194, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Modernorum
II/1,110-1
Gram231,esp.pp.211-14;deRijk,Logica
1;K.M.Fredborg,
Speculative
mar
Western
, in:Dronke
, 177-95at pp. 181-2.
(ed.),A History
ofTwelfth-Century
Philosophy
112See,forexample
PeterofSpain'sdefinition
in theSummule
, ed. L.M. de
Logicales
estreipervocemsecuntermini,
Rijk,Assen1972,79: "Significado
prouthicsumitur,
dumplacitum
representado."
113
D.P. Henry,
TheEarly
in:Franciscan
23 (1963),205Studies,
History
ofSuppositio,
Modernorum
II/1, 16-18;
A. Maier,
dellaTarda
Scolastica
12;deRijk,Logica
,
Terminobgia
Logica
Rome1972,58; Pinborg,
undSemantik
OntheDoctrine
and
, 47-50;L. Nielson,
Logik
ofLogic
Porreta
andhisFollowers
du moyen
de l'Institut
, in: Cahiers
ofGilbert
Language
gegrecet
andSupponere
in12th-Century
Grammar
latin,17(1976),40-69;C.H. Kneepkens,
,
Suppositio
in:Jolivet
andde Libera(eds.),Gilbert
dePoitiers
1.
, 325-5

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
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67

a strongermotivationthan a teacherof theologyfor askingwhat terms


stand forin given contexts."114
of theterms"God" and "essence,"
Again,theproblemof thesignification
in relationto the problemof why "God begot God" but not
particularly
of thisapproachand assumed
"essencebegotessence,"was at the forefront
an almost emblematicstatus.115
It raised searchingquestionsabout lanwhichechoed a range of preoccupationscommon
guage and signification
not just to theologians,but to other scholarsas well. Discussion of the
questionof whetheressence begot essenceprovideda forumin which to
thrashout and refinesemanticconceptssuch as the distinctionbetween
and suppositionand their applicabilityto empiricalprobsignification
lems. The evidence that thiswas indeed the case is irrefutable;
in their
discussionof the signification
of particularwords theologiansrepeatedly
used the example of God begot God/essencebegot essence as a testcase
fortheirsemantictheories.
Alan of Lille may have been responsibleforthe widespreaduse by the
late twelfthcenturyof the signification-supposition
method of solving
he
have
the
seems
to
been
first
problems: certainly
theologianto use it
He
used
the
we
of
could
extensively.116
say "God begot
problem why
God" but not "essence begot essence" as the main illustrationof the
in signification
difference
betweenthe terms"God" and "essence." The
in
the
fact
that
both "God" and "essence" were classified
lay
difficulty
as essentialtermswith a univocal signification
and supposition,namely
the divine essence, and yet behaved differently
despite this. It was this
apparentcontradictionwhich had to be accounted for. Alan's solution
was to qualifythe definitionof "God" as an essentialnoun, by adding
thatalthoughits signification
was the divineessence,itsproper
supposition
was a Person,and only improperly
the divineessence.117
Only thiskind of
1,4S. Ebbesen,
TheSemantics
toStephen
andAndrew
Sunsesen
,
oftheTrinity
According
Langton
in:Jolivet
andde Libera(eds.),Gilbert
dePoitiers
, 401-35at p. 402.
115On thedebateanditsrelationship
tomedieval
inthethirteenth
semantics,
especially
andfourteenth
seeS.F.Brown,
Medieval
inItsTheological
Context
centuries,
,
Supposition
Theory
in:Medieval
andTheology,
3 (1993),121-57.
Philosophy
116
Alanhimself
seemsto havederived
thedistinction
fromGilbert
of Poitiers.
See
A. de Libera,
etthologie
dansla Summa"Quoniam
Homines"
d'Alain
deLille
, in:
Logique
andde Libera(eds.),Gilbert
dePoitiers
, 437-69.
Jolivet
Summa
homines
essentialia
Quoniam
56,p. 199:"Suntalianomina
que naturam
predicantetpersonam
dicitur
essentiale
ratione
uthocnomen
'Deus';ettalenomen
appellant,
etsignificationis.
Proqualitate
autemsignificat
vero
naturam,
predicationis
prosubstantia
autempropersona,
autemproessentia."
significat
personam;
supponit
inproprie
Aquinas'
viewcomesvery
closetothis.See HJ.M.Schoot,
: thePossibilities
andSupposition
and
Aquinas
Limitations
in divinis,
in:Vivarium,
at pp. 210-2,218-22.
31 (1993),193-225
ofLogic

19:52:52 PM

68

FIONAROBB

in the suppositionand signification


of "God" would explainits
flexibility
varied uses in different
far
and
propositions.By
away the most importantinstanceof thiswas the proposition"God begot God." For if "God"
stood only for the essence, we would not be able to say "God begot"
withoutconcluding that "essence begot."118On the other hand, even
though the proper suppositionof "God" was a Person, it had at least
such as "God is Trinity"
improperlyto standforthe essenceifstatements
were to be true,giventhatno one Personis the Trinity.119
Thus, according to Alan, "God" is properlyused as a personal,but improperlyas an
essentialnoun.120That is, it stands for Person directly,and for essence
It is as thoughin orderto reach the idea of the divineessence
indirectly.
fromthe word "God" we have to go throughone of the divinePersons.
Other authorsadopt a similarapproach to explainwhy "God," unlike
otheressentialterms,does not alwayssignify
the divineessence.The element of equivocation runs throughall explanations:"God," because it
was partlyessentialand partlypersonal,sometimesstood foressenceand
sometimesfor Person.121Again, the main proof that "God" does not
always stand forthe divine essence is the argumentthat,if it did, "God
begot God" would imply"essence begot essence." For example,Stephen
1,8Summa
homines
esttantum,
Quoniam
56,p. 200:"Necessentia
quianonessetverum
Deusgenuit
divinanongenuit
est."
necgenita
Deum,quiaessentia
Itemsi tantum
Deusest
Ibid.,iyy-^U:
personale
ponitur,
ergononveredicitur
ullapersona
estistavera."
trinitas,
quia
pro
120
estpersonale
sed
Ibid.,p. 200: "Adhocdicimus
quodhocnomen'Deus'proprie
essentialiter."
Alan'susageof"proper"
and"improper"
seemsto coninproprie
ponitur
tradict
Evans'judgement
thatAlandoesnotemploy
theseterms
as a measure
oftechnical exactitude.
See G.R. Evans,AlanofLille.TheFrontiers
intheLaterTwelfth
ofTheology
, Cambridge
1983,33-4.
Century
121
AlanofLille,Summa
homines
Quoniam
56,p. 200:"Undehocnomen
quandoque
poniturpersonaliter,
uthic:Deusgenuit
utibi:Deusesttrinitas.";
Simon
Deum,etessentialiter
ofTournai,
"Gumdicitur
Deusgignit,
Deusgignitur,
nomen
LXXIX,22924"6:
Disputationes
Dei personaliter
sumitur.
Sed cumdicitur
unussolusDeus est,nomenDei essentialiter
ISent.
PeterofPoitiers,
"nomen
'Deus'quandoque
dicitur.";
27, 217617:
persoaccipitur
ethocdinoscitur
ex adiuncto.
Namcumnomine
velverbosignificante
naliter,
notionem,
ad personam,
velprepositione,
refertur
utcumdicitur:
Deusgenuit
Deum,Deusde Deo
et huiusmodi,
Gumverodicitur
propersonis
intelligitur.
perse,ut:Deusest,ad essentiampertinet."
Peterof Gapua,Summa
Clm.14508,f. lvb:
, Munich,
Bayer.Staatsbibl.,
autemhocnomen'deus'essentiale
utdeus
sit,
"Quamvis
aliquando
ponitur
personaliter,
"
ofCremona,
Summa
ventos"
". . . dicent
deum.";
3.3,20925'6:
Quiproducit
genuit
Prepositinus
'deus'aliquando
Master
quodhocnomen
proessentia
aliquando
supponit.";
propersona
Summa
Clm.28799,f.6:"Dicimus
Hubertus,
, Munich,
Staatsbibl.,
Bayer.
quodnonsemsedaliquando
perhocnomen'deus'in subiecto
aliquampersonarum
dsignt;
supponit
Alexander
essentiam,
, ed. R.W.
aliquandopersonam.";
Nequam,Speculum
Speculationem
Oxford1988,Il.xvii,136:"Hocnomen'Deus'proprie
essentiale
Thomson,
est,
positum
sedex vi adiuncti
utin his,'Deusgenerat,'
'Deusgeneratur.'"
sepeponitur
personaliter,

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
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69

to standingfor
Langton(d. 1228) statesthatthe word "God" is restricted
Personwhen it is joined to termscouplingor indicatingnotion,as in the
case of "God begets"or "God fromGod."122By the same token,Langton
explains,because "God" in thiscontextstandsforPerson,it does not folAnd similarly,"God
low from"God begets"that"the divinitybegets."123
God"
"essence
essence"
because
of the different
does
not
begot
imply
begot
of these two terms.124
significations
The chapteron univocationin the Summaof Stephen'scontemporary,
and
Master Hubertus,followschapterson suppositionand signification,
is dominatedby the problemof the generationof the essence. This section capturesthe extentof applicationof suppositiontheoryto theological problems.The fallacyof univocationoccurswheneverthe supposition
of a word is relaxed or restricted.The main example of this fallacyis
the argumentthat "God begot God" implies"essence begot essence."125
The problemarises in thiscase as a resultof confusionover the suppositionof "God." Hubertus' solutionto thisproblem resemblesthat proposed by Langton:
thesupposition
ofthename"God."
themselves
concerning
Manyopinions
present
seemsmoreuseful
and correct,
thatwithnotional
verbs
Butthissolution
namely
andinthatinstance
canmakea true
"God"is reduced
topersonal
only,
supposition
Thusthesenseis: GodbegotGod,that
forPerson
andnotforessence.
supposition
is,theFather
begottheSon.126
122
A Partial
Edition
s Summa
Summa
andL.B.Mortensen,
, ed.S. Ebbesen
ofStephen
Langton'
andQuaestiones
with
Parallels
Andrew
Sunesen's
in:Cahiers
de l'Institut
du
Hexameron,
from
49 (1985),25-224at p. 57: "Itemhaecdictio'deus'restringitur
moyen
gegrecet latin,
velperterminm
ad supponendum
notionem
notanpropersona
perterminm
copulantem
temnotionem.
Perterminm
utdeusgenerai;
notantem
utdeus
perterminm
copulantem
de deo."See alsotheanonymous
"Nota
summa,
London,
B.L.,Royal9 E XII, f.248va:
nichil
amitsedcumverbis
nocionalibus
quoddeusproprie
supponit
prodivinaessencia,
tensextenditur
ad personas.
Qualiasunt'generai,'
'gignitur,'
'procedit,'
'spiral,'
'spiratur.'"
123
cumutraque
Summa
istarum
dictionum
sitessentialis,
, p. 59: "Item,
'deus,''deitas,'
deitas
'deitas'
utsupponat
utsicdicatur
hocnomen
propersona,
quarenonpotest
restringi
utsubsicutdeusgenerat?
Haecestratio:hocnomen
'deitas'significai
essentiam
generat
essentiam
utinhaerentem."
hocnomen
'deus'significat
sistentem,
124Comm.
on restriction,
inSent.,
article
citedby
p. 7. Cf.withPetertheChanter's
Arts
dudiscours
etsacrapaginadansleDe tropis
Avranches,
Valente,
loquendi,
p. 97 from
MS 28,f. 110ra.
Bibliothque
Municipale,
1.y : Univocationem
cum
Ulm.z/yy,
umma)
Munich,
ayer.btaatsbibl.,
ntelligo
ex restrictione
vel relaxatione
vel estquandoquesignifications,
vocabuli,
suppositions
etipse
Et secundum
deusgenerat
incidere
fallatia
inargumentation.
hocsicnegotiamur:
Hic manifeste
namhoc
univocationis
fallatia,
est,ergodeusestet ipsegenerat.
apparet
trahitur
ad
nomen
ex adiunctione
huiusverbi'generat,'
sitessentiale,
'deus,'cumnatura
in conclusione
verorelaxatur
eiussuppositio,
et supponit
pro
personalem
significationem;
essentia."
126
Summa
Clm.28799,f.9 : ". . . plurales
occurrunt
, Munich,
Staatsbibl.,
Bayer.
opin-

19:52:52 PM

70

FIONAROBB

These examplesfroma wide range of theologiansshow how progresstowards a satisfactory


clarification
of the different
of the words
significations
"God" and "essence" was ultimatelybound up with,perhaps even driven by, questions concerningthe doctrineof divine generation.Every
author who has somethingto say on the subject eitherraised the issue
of thesetermsin the contextof why"God begotGod,"
of the signification
but not "essence begot essence," or, conversely,employedthesepropositionsas the main instancesof why theirsignification
was problematicin
the firstplace.
From this considerationof a numberof interrelatedaspects of trinitarian theologyin the twelfthcentury,it can be seen that the repetition
of argumentsby scholastictheologianswas not alwaysor merelya working throughof a predeterminedacademic syllabus,but oftensignalled
the employmentof theologicalcertaintiesto assess issueswhichwere less
certainor where a consensuswas only beginningto emerge.Although
characteristic
of institutionalised
formsof study
repetitionis a side-effect
it
is
also
a
creative
of
throughouthistory,
part any pedagogical system.
Indeed, it would be hard to imagine any intellectualsystemwhich did
not containlarge chunksof repetitivematerial.Scholasticismhas seemed
conspicuousin this respectbecause of its heavy reliance on authorities
and its terse,highlyformalisedmethodsof argumentationand interpretation.It is possible,however,to see how the interconnectedness
of much
of Christiandoctrine,in this case the doctrineof the Trinity,was also
responsiblefor much of the reiterativenature of scholastic theology.
Certainly,as faras the problemsconsideredhere are concerned,it proved
impossibleto omit the debate about the generationof the divineessence
fromother discussions,on both doctrinaland methodologicalgrounds.
The issue was doctrinallyrelevantto othersbecause it encapsulatedthe
tensionbetween essentialidentityand personal distinctionwhich is the
it could not
very core of the trinitarianmystery.And methodologically
be easilydispensedwithbecause it was so amenable to the scholasticsystem of argumentand counter-argument
and to the semantictechniques
used in problemsolving.The trulyenduringqualityof the problemwas
and fourfurtherattestedto by its continueddiscussionin the thirteenth
teenthcenturies.Particularlyremarkablewas its emergenceas a hody
ionesde suppositione
huiusnominis
'deus.'Expedidor
tarnen
et verior
videtur
hec,scilicetquodex notonali
verbocontrahat
tantum
etquodmram
personalem
suppositionem,
ibi faciatsuppositionem
et nonproessentia.
Estergosensus:
deusgenuit
propersona
deum,id estpaterfilium."

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

71

contentiousissue (paradoxically,forthe firsttime)in the last quarterof


the thirteenth
centurywhen it became one of the centralpoints of dispute betweenthe Franciscan,Peter Olivi (d. 1298), and officialswithin
the order.127
It is in factimpossibleto understandthe accusationsagainst
Olivi withoutsome acquaintance with the twelfth-century
originsof the
such issues could be
issue about the divineessence. Although,therefore,
under discussionfor centurieswithoutseeming to advance any further
towardsa finalconclusion,theirmeaningwas alwayssusceptibleto change
as new questionsand assumptionstook shape.

APPENDIX
1. "pater"in nullasignificatione
commit
nonditur
patri[. . .] de divinaessentia
convenit
virohuicet mulieri
[. . .] "habens
filium"in eademsignificatione
respective
huic
Glossa, London, B.L., Royal 7 F XIII:
convenitpatri in
[fol.7va]Iste terminus"pater" in nulla significatione
non
conveniat
divine
unam
tantum
habet
essende,
qua
quia
significationem,
in qua personampatrissignificai;sed ad predicationemillius terminide
patre sequitur,quod pater generet;ergo ad predicationemhuius de divina essentiasequitur,quod divina essentiagigneret.
Non sequitur[7vb]et est ratio:quod licetutrobiqueidem significet
hoc
dicaturde patre, de divina essentia
nomen "pater,"tarnencum respective
non diciturrespective.
Instantiatalis: iste terminus"habens filium"in eadem significatione
convenitviro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicationemde muliere
sequiturquod concepisset;ergo etc. Vel ita: esse eiusdem essentiecum
convenitfilioet filiationi.Sed ad predicapatre in eadem significatione
tionemilliusde filiosequitur,quod filiussit in patre.
Anonymous Summa, London, B.L., Royal 9 E XII:
convenitpatri iste terminus"pater"
[fol. 151va]In nulla significatione
in qua non conveniatdivineessentie,sed ad predicationemistiustermini
127
See my,A LateThirteenth-Centuiy
Attack
ontheFourth
Lateran
Council
theLibercontra
Lombardm
Debates
ontheTrinity
ancienne
andContemporary
de Thologie
, in:Recherches
etmdivale,
62 (1995),110-44.

19:52:52 PM

72

FIONAROBB

de patre sequitur,quod pater generet;ergo ad predicationemeiusdemde


divinaessentiasequitur,quod divinaessentiageneret.Quare non provenit,
cum de patreet non de divinaessentiarespective
dicaturhoc nomen"pater."
Instantia:iste terminus"habens filium"in eadem significatione
convenitviro huic et mulierihuic, sed ad predicationemde muliere,sequitur
quod concepii,ergo etc. Vel ita: esse eiusdemessentiecum patrein eadem
convenitfilioet filiationi.
Sed ad predicationemilliusde filio
significatione
filius
in
sit
sequitur,quod
patre. Ergo etc.
Magister Mrtius, Quaestiones, Paris, B.N., lat. 14556:
[fol. 280ra] Iste terminus"pater" non convenitin alia significatione
patri in qua non conveniatdivine essentie,quia tantumunam significationemhabet. Significaienimpersonampatris.Sed ad predicationem
illius
de patre sequitur,quod pater gigneret,quia si aliquis est propriegenerat.
illiusde divinaessentiasequitur,quod ipsa generat.
Ergo ad predicationem
tamen
dicunt
Quidam
quod isti termini"persona,""pater" idem predicant de patre et de divina essentia,respective
tamen dicunturad patrem,
sed ad divinamessentiamnumquam dicunturrespective.Unde ab eis diciturilla predicado,scilicet"essentiadivinaest pater,"occidentalism
ista vero
est
scilicet
duo
coniunctim
"pater
pater" propria,quoniam
predicantur
ita quod non uterqueprediceturde subiectodivisim[. . .] Dicunt tamen
quidam hanc propositionem"divina essentiaest pater" duppliciterposse
, cum dicitur"divina
intelligi:si enim hoc nomen "pater" teneturadiective
essentiaest pater," falsumest, est enim sensus:"divina essentiaest geneverumest, ut sit sensus:"divina essenrans"; si vero substantive
teneretur,
tia est ille qui est pater."
[280rb]Instantiaargumenti:iste terminus"habens filium"in eadem
convenitistimulieriet istiviro. Sed ad predicationemistius
significatione
terminide mulieresequiturquod ipsa conceperitprolem. Ergo ad predicationemistiusterminide viro sequitur,quod ipse prolem conceperit.
Ne mirerissi huiusmodiinstantiisrepellamus.
Anonymous Quaestio, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm.
7622:
convenitpatriet divine
[fol.46rb]Iste terminusin eadem significatione
essentievel in diversa.Si concedaturin diversa,ergo in ea significatione
qua convenitpatri,removetura divina essentia;ergo divina essentianon
est pater; quod falsumest. Ergo in eadem significatione
convenitpatriet
divine essentie,sed ad predicationemillius terminide patre, cum dico:
"pater est pater," sequitur:"ergo generat."Ergo ad predicationemeius-

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

73

dem terminide divinaessenta,sequitur:"si divinaessentaest pater,ergo


generat."
conAd hoc dicimusquod isteterminus"pater"in eadem significatione
venitpatriet divineessentie,non tarnenomni eo modo "pater" de divietproprie
na essentiaquo de patre: de patre siquidem "pater" relative
, de
divina essentiaquasi accidentaliter.
a simpliconversa
2. Argumentum
Glossa, London, B.L., Royal 7 F XIII:
[fol.7vb]Item. Idem esse patremet generare,ergo cuicumque convenit hoc, et illud. Sed divineessentieconvenitesse patrem,ergo generare.
Non sequitur.Non enim ait Augustinus:"idem esse patremet generare,"
idem
sed: "idem estpatriesse patremet generare."Nec est intelligendum:
sed consecutionequia unum sequiturad aliud.
essentiavel significatione,
est uterqueterminus,scilicet
Vel, idem est etc.,idesteiusdemproprietatis
et
"pater" "generare."
a simpliconversa',
Item.Bonumestargumentum
paterfiliidei est deus, ergo
deus estpaterfiliidei; ergo quod predicaturin prima,subiciturin secunda,
ergo divinaessentiaest pater filiidei, ergo filiusdei est filiusdivineessentie, ergo divina essentiagenuitfilium.Ad quod dicimusquod licet argumentumbonum sit, non tarnenquod predicaturin prima, subiciturin
secunda. Instantia:creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Bonum est
argumentuma simpliciconversa; ergo quod subiciturin prima, predicaturin secunda,ergo idem est deum creatoremesse et deum esse; quod
falsumest.
Item. Iste terminus"pater filiidei" tantumhanc personam significat,
predicaturde divina essentiavel removetur
ergo in eadem significatione
de divina essentia.Si predicatur,ergo divina essentia est pater filii;si
removetur,ergo divina essentianon est illa persona. Instantia:hoc nomen "homo" significathanc speciem homo, ergo in illa significatione
predicaturde istishominibusvel removeturab Ulis. Si predicatur,ergo
istihominessunthomo; si removetur,ergo hec species homo non prediet adieccaturde eis. Nota quod iste terminus"pater" accipitursubstantive
Unde
non.
: substantiveacceptus diciturde divina essentia,adiective
tive
ista propositio"divina substantiaest pater" sic potest distingui:"divina
substantiaest pater,"idest ille qui habet filium;sic verumest. Sed habet
filium;sic non est. Et ut substantiveaccipiatur,concedi potest "divina
essentiaest pater filii,"adiectivenon.

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74

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Anonymous Summa, London, B.L., Royal 9 E XII:


[fol. 151va]Item. Proprietasque predicaturde ptrecum dicitur"pater
gnrt,"predicaturde essentia;ergo divina essentiagenerat.Instantia:
hoc nomine "homo," predicaturde pluribus;ergo
speciesque significatur
sunt
homo.
plura
Item. Idem est esse patrem et generare.
Respondemus;non habet auctoritatem"idem esse patremet generare,"
sed "idem est patri esse patremet generare,"idesteadem est patrisproprietaspaternitas[151vb]que generatio,et eiusdemproprietatissunt isti
termini"pater" et "generare."
Item. Divina essentiaest pater filiidei, ergo filiusdei est fliusdivine
essentie,divina igituressentiagenuitfilium.
Item. Deus est dominusdiaboli,ergo diabolusest servusdei. Vel divina
essentiaest spiratorspiritussancti,ergo spiritussanctusspiratura divina
essentia.Vel negeturprima. Que tarnenita probari videtur.Necessarum
estargumentum
a simpliconversa
: pater filiidei est deus, ergo deus est pater
filiidei; ergo quod predicaturin prima, subiciturin secunda. Instantia:
creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Conveniens est argumentuma
simpliciconversa;ergo quod subiciturin prima, predicaturin secunda.
Idem est ergo deum esse creatoremet esse deum. Quod non concedunt.
Item. Iste terminus"pater filiidei" tantumhanc personamsignificat,
ergo in eadem significatione
predicaturde divina essentiavel removetur
ab ea. Si predicatur,ergo divina essentiaest pater filiidei; si removetur,
ergo divina essentianon est illa persona. Instantia:hoc nomen "homo"
hanc speciemhomo, ergo in ista significatione
significat
predicaturde istis
vel removeturab istis. Si predicatur,ergo duo homines sunt homo; si
removetur,ergo hec species homo non predicaturde eis. Nota quod iste
terminus"pater"sive "paterfilii"substantive
accipitursecundumquod divina essentiaest pater sive pater filii,idest ille qui habet filium;et adiectwe
secundum quod non diciturhic terminusde divina essentia,designato
videlicetdivinamessentiamhabere filiumsive generare.
Anonymous quaestio, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm.
7622:
[fol.46] Instantia:hec species homo predicaturde istisduobus, ergo
isti duo sunt homo.
Item. Pater filiiest deus, ergo deus est pater filii.Bonumestargumentum
a simplici
conversa
, ergo quod predicaturin prima,subiciturin secunda, et
in
subicitur
quod
prima, predicaturin secunda; ergo divina essentiaest
pater filii.

19:52:52 PM

THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION

75

Item. Divina essentianon est pater filii;hie removeturiste terminus


"pater"; ergo ilia propositiofalsa est; ergo sua contradictoriaest vera,
scilicetessentiadivina est pater filii;ergo filiusest filiusdivine essentie.
eandemspeciem,
Non sequitur.Licetenim"homo" et "homines"significent
non tarnenremoveturilla species: "homo non est homines."Vel potest
esse falsumprimumargumentum:creatorest deus, ergo deus est creator.
Locus est a simpliciconversa.Ergo cum essentiadivina in prima subiciatur,in secunda predicatur.Non sequitur,quia idem iam esset deum
esse deum et esse creatorem.
Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek,
Clm. 14508:
[fol.2va]Item. "Persona est pater," "personagnrt."Iste due propositiones[2vb]suntequipollenteset subiectusterminuscommunisest utrique;
ergo et predicatasunt equipollentia.Isti ergo duo termini,"pater," "gnrt,"suntequipollentes;
ergo de quocumquepredicaturunus,et reliquus.
Sed iste terminus"pater" predicaturde divina essentia,ut "divina essentia est pater." Igituret iste terminus"generat"predicaturde eadem, ut
vere scilicetposset dici "divina essentiagenerat."
Responsio.Prima falsa est. Nam hoc nomen "pater" potesttenerisubstantive
, et secundumhoc non sunt propositionesequipollentes[...]
[2rb]Nos vero sicut in subiecto,ita et in predicatoconcedimus"divina essentiaest pater filii."Nec inde sequitur:"ergo habet filium."Nam
Unde
conceditursecundumquod hoc nomen "pater" ponitursubstantive.
esset concedendum:"ergo est persona que habet filium."Ipse vero concluditacsi tenereturadiective.
Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 4.5, p. 21811"15:
Plures negant hanc: "essentia est pater filii";dicunt enim quod cum
dico: "essentiaest pater,"hoc nomen "pater" ibi teneturquasi substantive
,
et tantumvalet quantum:"essentiaest persona generans."Sed cum dico:
adiective
"essentiaest paterfilii,"ibi hoc nomen "pater" intelligitur
, et tantum valet acsi dicerem:"essentiageneratfilium."

19:52:52 PM

concepts,
Syncatgormes,
quivocit
dans le ms. Paris,B.N., lat. 16.401,
Deux questions
, conserves
anonymes
lies la smantique
de Pierred'Ailly(c. 1350-1420)
PAULJJ.M.BARKER

Introduction
Cet articlese veut une contribution l'historiographie
de la smanau
tardif
de
une
tude
deux
tique
Moyen Age
par
questionsanonymes,
conservesdans le manuscritParis, BibliothqueNationale, lat. 16.401.
Ces questionssont vraisemblablement
des produitsde la facultdes arts
de l'universitde Paris. Chacun des deux textesest li la smantique
parisiennede la seconde moiti du XIVe sicle, notamment celle de
Pierred'Ailly(c. 1350-1420).A notreconnaissance,le manuscritparisien
est la seule copie de ces deux questions.
La premirequestion, intituleUtrumsyncategoremati
in intellectu
correset
traite
le
actus
non
de
la
,
pondeat
conceptas
problme
correspondanceentre
le langage parl ou critet le langage mentalpour une catgorieprcise
de termes:les syncatgormes.1
La seconde question,intituleUtrum
aliquis
1 La notion
de syncatgorme
esthrite
d'unpassagedesInstitutiones
de
grammaticae
Priscien
et dsigne
latini
, vol.II, p. 545"7),
(d.M. Hertz,dans:H. Keil(d.),Grammatici
l'ensemble
c'est--dire
les expressions
d'expressions
"consignificatives"
(consignificantia),
qui
n'ontpas de signification
en elles-mmes,
maisseulement
en composition
avecd'autres
Cf. l'introduction
de N. Kretzmann,
expressions,
appelescatgormes.
Syncategoremata,
- A. Kenny- J. Pinborg
, sophismata
, dans:N. Kretzmann
exponibilia
(d.),TheCambridge
Medieval
Au XIIIesicle,
, Cambridge
1982,p. 211-245.
History
ofLater
Philosophy
l'analyse
dessyncatgormes
fitl'objetdestraits
De syncategorematibus
on tudiaun
, danslesquels
ensemble
relativement
stable
de termes
tantdupoint
devuedeleurs
significatives
proprits
ou rfrentielles
ou grammaticales.
que du pointde vuede leursproprits
syntactiques
Cestraits
examinrent
lesproprits
desdiffrents
enlesregroupant
plus
syncatgormes
ou moinssystmatiquement
en fonction
desphnomnes
tels
que cestermes
provoquent,
tantum
la ngation
l'exclusion
(omnis,
quela distribution
(non,
(solus,
), l'exception
totus),
nihil),
la modalit
{praeter,
nisi),la composition
), la conditionnalit
(est),
(necessario,
(jt,
contingenter
la conjonction
et la rduplicala comparaison
quiri),
(et),la disjonction
(vel,utrum),
(quam)
tion(inquantum,
secundum
cf.Kretzmann,
quod)',
pourcettesystmatique,
Syncategoremata,
de ces traits
De 13deeeuwse
traccf.H.A.G.Braakhuis,
p. 213,n. 10.Pouruneanalyse
taten
over
termen.
DeelI. Inleidende
Leiden1979(diss.),
studie,
syncategorematische
part.p. 105351.Au XIVesicle,
l'tudedessyncatgormes
se fitd'unemanire
dans
plusdisperse
lesSommes
de logique,
Il n'existe
notamment
dansle traitement
de certains
sophismes.
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,1

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

77

le problmede l'quivocitdans le
," affronte
conceptus
potestesseaequivocus
En
trait
aux
mental.
ayant
problmesrelatifsau langage mental,
langage
les deux questionss'inscriventdans un courant de la smantique,dont
l'initiateurprincipalest Guillaume d'Ockham (c. 1285-1347). Avant de
concentrernotreattentionsur nos deux questionsanonymes,il nous semble donc utile d'examiner brivementtrois lmentsde la conception
smantiqueockhamiste, savoir (i) la notion du langage mental,(*)la
questionde la correspondanceet (iii) le problmede l'quivocit.
(i) Bien qu'Ockham ne ftpas le premier concevoirl'ide d'un discours intrieur,sa conceptionde la pense comme un vritablelangage
mental constituenanmoinsl'un des lmentsnovateursde sa thorie
, Ockham introduitl'ide
smantique.2Ds le dbut de sa Summalogicae
de troisplans de langage, crit,vocal et conu, correspondant trois
typesde termes,crits,vocaux et conus. A l'oppos des termescritset
une langue particulire(lingua)et qui se mavocaux, qui appartiennent
en dehors de l'esprit,les termesconus sont des intentionsou
nifestent
des passionsde l'me, qui ne relventd'aucune langue et demeurentdans
l'esprit.Tout comme les termescritset vocaux, les termesconus sont
d'une propositionet s'organiseren un vriaptes treles constituants
table langage mental.Celui-ci se trouvede faon identiquechez tous les
humainset il est antrieur toutesles langues particulires.3
La prioritdu langage mentalpar rapportau langage crit et vocal
vientde la naturedes termesqui constituentces troisplans de langage.
Le concept,constituantdu langage mental,est un signe naturel d'une
chose, formdans l'espritde faon purementnaturellesuite la rencontrede l'espritet de la chose. Les termescritset vocaux, en revanche,
sont des signes conventionnels,
institusarbitrairement
pour signifierce
de manire naturelle.D existe donc un rapque les conceptssignifient
dessyncatgormes
au XIVesicle,
du dveloppement
de la thorie
pasd'aperu
gnral
maison peutconsulter
etthorie
dusigne
auXIV sicle
, Paris1989,passim
,
J. Biard,Logique
etA. Maier,Terminologia
dellatarda
scolastica
, Roma1972,passim.
logica
2 Pource qui suit,cf.Biard,Logique
La thorie
dela
Nominalisme.
, p. 52-73;C. Miction,
Ockham
onmend'Occam
, Paris1994,part.p. 143-72et 232-36;G.G.Normore,
signification
tallanguage,
science
dans:J.G.Smith(d.),Historical
1990,
, Dordrecht
foundations
ofcognitive
La philosophie
dulangage
deGuillaume
d'Occam
, dans:S. Ebbesen
p. 53-70et G. Panaccio,
Pourlesstades
inSptantike
undMittelalter
, Tbingen
1995,p. 184-206.
(d.),Sprachtheorien
dudveloppement
dela thorie
dulangage
dontnousfaisons
iciabstracockhamiste
mental,
d'Occam
Thories
delapense
etdesondiscours
chezGuillaume
,
, desesobjets
tion,cf.E. Karger,
dans:Dialogue33 (1994),p. 437-56et Ead., William
andAdam
Walter
Chatton
ofOckham,
Wodeham
ontheObjects
dans:Vivarium
andBelief
33.2(1995),p. 171-96.
ofKnowledge
3 Ockham,
- G. Gi - St.Brown,
St.Bonaventure,
Summa
I, 1,d. Ph.Boehner
logicae,
N.Y.,1974(Opera
I), p. 713"25.
philosophica,

19:53:43 PM

78

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

port de subordinationentreces diffrents


typesde termes.Toutefois,ce
ne
des
de
subordination
concerne
pas l'objet de la signification
rapport
termes.En effet,Ockham renonce la conceptionaristotlico-bocienne,
selonlaquelle le motvocal signifie
le concept,tandisque le conceptconoit
les choses relles.4Pour lui, au contraire,chacun des troistypesde termes signifiedirectementet sans intermdiaire
les choses rellesde sorte
les
termes
et
sont
vocaux
tous titregalit des
crits,
conus
que
des
choses.
sont hirarchisesdu fait
Seulement
leurs
signes
significations
de faon premireet naturellece que les terque les conceptssignifient
mes critset vocaux signifient
de maniredriveet conventionnelle.5
Les
trois
de
()
plans
langage s'organisentselon une structuresemsans
blable,
que pour autant il existeentreeux un isomorphismeexact.
Partantde l'organisationgrammaticaledu langage parl, Ockham dtermine avec prcisionquelles catgoriesont un correspondantdans le langage mental. Le critremis en uvre pour tranchercette question est
celui de la pertinencesmantique.De faongnrale,n'ont de correspondant dans le langage mentalque les lmentsncessairespour dterminer
4 Cf.Boce,In librum
Aristotelis
Perihermeneias,
editio
, I, 1, d. C. Meiser,
prima
Leipzig
"Remconcipit
intellectum
verovocesdsignant,
1877,p. 3713"15:
intellectus,
ipsasvero
voceslitterae
editio
, I, 1, d. G. Meiser,
(cf.secunda
significant"
Leipzig1880,p. 2027*28).
Bocedonneunschma
selonlequelle motsignifie
Ailleurs,
quelquepeudiffrent,
prinle concept,
etsecondairement
la chose,cf.p. 4015'22:
"Voxenimetintellectum
cipalement
et ipsamrem.ut cumdicolapiset intellectum
reisignificai
id
lapidiset ipsumlapidem
estipsamsubstantiam
sedpriusintellectum,
secundum
verolocosignificai
rem.
dsignt,
animaesunt,
sedillasolaquaeprima;
ergononomniaquaevoxsignificai
prius
passiones
enimsignificai
secundo
verolocores."C'estBuridan
intellectus,
qui,dansle cadred'une
ockhamiste
de la smantique,
a remisen valeurle secondschmabocien.
conception
le motvocalsignifie
d'abordetde faondirecte
unconcept,
et,parl'inD'aprsBuridan,
il signifie
la choseelle-mme.
termdiaire
duconcept,
Le concept
constitue
doncle signifi
immdiat
du mot(significatum
immediaturri
ultime
), alorsque la choserelleen estle signifi
Cf.JeanBuridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
, d. M.E. Reina,dans:
ultimatum).
(significatimi
distoria
Rivista
critica
dellafilosofia
et323-52,
12(1957),
part.20259"65:
p. 175-208
"Propter
catealiasclausulas
rememorandum
estquodantedictum
videlicet
fuit,
quoddictiones
innatae
secundum
resaliquasmediantibus
significant
gorematicae
supponere
conceptibus,
velsimiles
suntad significandum;
sicergoillasresistisconcepquosconceptus
impositae
vocamus
in proposito,
illosautemconceptus
tibusconceptas
ultimata
vocamus
significata
." Pourun aperugnral
cf.Biard,
immediata
de la smantique
buridanienne,
significata
et ultimatum
a t
Le vocabulaire
immediatum
buridanien
de significatum
, p. 162-202.
Logique
entreautrespar Marsiled'Inghen,
d. E.P. Bos,Marsilius
ofInghen.
Suppositions,
repris
A FirstCritical
Edition
Treatises
ontheProperties
ofTerms.
Ampliationes,
oftheSuppositiones,
et
Restrictions
andAlienationes
, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster
1983,p. 5411'23,
Appellationes,
Pierre
cf.infira
, p. 108,n. 93.
d'Ailly,
5 Summa
inlibrum
Perihermeneias
et846"52.
Cf.galement
I, 1,ed.cit.,
logicae,
p. 726-834
Expositio
- St.Brown,
Aristotelis
St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1978(Opera
, Prooemium,
2, d Ph.Boehner
Philosophical
II), p. 3475'18.

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

79

et la valeurde vritd'une proposition.Tous les lments,


la signification
au contraire,qui ne tiennentqu' l'ornementationou la congruence
et la vrit,n'appartiennentqu'au
du discours,et non la signification
Il
langage vocal et crit.6 s'ensuitque le langage mentalobtientle statut
non perd'un langage idal, pur de tous les lmentssmantiquement
et
de
de
toute
toute
redondance.
notamment
tinents,
synonymie
(iii) Dans cette conceptionde la smantique,la question de l'quivocit se pose de deux faons diffrentes.7
(a) A proprementparler, les
notionsd'univocitet d'quivocitne s'appliquentpas aux concepts,mais
du faitque l'univocitou l'quivoseulementaux termesconventionnels,8
un ou plusieurs
citd'un termese dfinit
justementpar sa subordination
concepts:un termeest univoquelorsqu'ilestsubordonn un seul concept,
alors qu'il est quivoque dans le cas o il correspond une pluralitde
De cettedfinitiongnrale dcoulentles deux preconceptsdiffrents.9
6 La
conventionnel
etle langage
mende la correspondance
entre
le langage
question
deuxendroits:
Summa
et Quodlibeta
talesttraite
notamment
, I, 3,ed.cit.,
p. 11'-4104
logicae
13136.
N.Y. 1980(Opera
, V, 8, d.J.C.Wey,St.Bonaventure,
IX),p. 5081theobgica,
septem
La philosophie
dulangage
Cf.Biard,
, p. 187-8.
, p. 64-6et Panaccio,
Logique
7 Pourla notion
andAnalogy
inFourteenth
cf.E.J.Ashworth,
Equivocation
Century
d'quivocit
- O. Pluta(d.),Historia
medii
andBuridan
Ockham
, Burley
, dans:B. Mojsisch
Logic:
philosophiae
derPhilosophie
desMittelalters
aeui.Studien
zurGeschichte
, Amsterdam
1991,I,
/Philadelphia
la notion
deSaxe
estdistinguenda":
chezAlbert
,
/'equivocado
propositio
p. 23-43;Ead., "Nulla
d'Albert
deSaxe.Paris-Vienne
auXIVesicle
dans:J.Biard(d.),Itinraires
, Paris1991,p. 14918 (1977),
beEliminated?,
CanEquivocation
dans:StudiaMediewistyczne
60; S. Ebbesen,
etlestudes
runies
, Lille1988.
L'ambigut.
Cinqtudes
historiques
p. 8103-24,
parI. Rosier,
Summa
"Estautemprimo
sciendum
, I, 13,ed.t.,p. 441(M2:
quodsolavoxvel
logicae
et ideointendo
institutum
velunivocum,
anialiudsignum
ad placitum
estaequivocum
maevelconceptus
nonestaequivocus
necunivocus
proprie
loquendo."
9 Ibid.,
et464 . "Estautemvoxillaaequivoca
p. 4513"15
pluranonest
quaesignificans
sedestsignum
unum
seuintentiosubordinatum
uniconceptui,
pluribus
conceptibus
signum
nibusanimaesubordinatum.
autemdicitur
omneilludquodestsubordina(. . .) Univocum
nonestunivocum
tumuniconceptui,
sivesignificet
plurasivenon.Tamenproprie
loquendo
nisisignificet
velnatumsitsignificare
itatamenquodnonsignificet
pluraaequeprimo,
illapluranisiquiaunaintendo
animaesignificat
subordinatum
illa,itaquodsitsignum
insignificando
unisignonaturali,
seuconceptus
animae."
Cf.galement
quodestintendo
inlibrum
Aristotelis
N.Y. 1978(Opera
, d. G. Gi,St.Bonaventure,
Expositio
praedieamentorum
Des dfinitions
semblables
se trouvent
chezBuridan
etMarsile
, II),p. 143172"175.
philosophica
inpraedicamenta
Mnchen
Cf.JeanBuridan,
Quaestiones
, d.J. Schneider,
1983,
d'Inghen.
inpraedicamenta
et Marsile
, ms.Wien,NB,5467,f. 13ra:
Quaestiones
p. 445-553
d'Inghen,
termini
univoci
aut equivoci
"Tertioestnotandum
vocalesdicuntur
quodprincipaliter
velpluralitatem
unitatem
Unde,
conceptuum
quibustalestermini
correspondent.
propter
si
si conceptus
situnuscorrespondens
talitermino
dicitur
univocus,
prosuosignificato,
autem
talitermino
nonsitunussedplures
respectu
significatorum
conceptus
correspondens
Ethocestpropter
talistermini,
tunctalisterminus
dicitur
hoc,quodvocessunt
equivocus.
univocus
etideosiestunusconceptus,
terminus
dicitur
subordinate;
quasihabens
conceptibus
etequiunius
dicitur
; si autemhabetplures,
significationem
equivocus
conceptus
quasiindifferenter
valenter
suasignificata
."
significam
plurium
conceptuum

19:53:43 PM

80

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

miers modes quivocation qu'Ockham distngue la suite Aristote:


Un termeest quivoque a casulorsqu'ilest
l'quivocita casuet a Consilio.

titre
subordonn,
d'galit, plusieursconceptsdistincts,du faitqu'il
a reu plusieursimpositionsdistincteset non relies. En revanche,un
termeest quivoque a Consilio
lorsqu'il est subordonn un concept de
son
impositionprincipale,et un autre de par une impositionsepar
condaireque le termereoit cause d'une relationquelconque entreson
signifipremieret son signifisecondaire.10L'quivocit selon les deux
d'un terme
premiersmodes quivocations'attachedonc la signification
conventionnel.Elle se rsoutpar un recoursau langage mental.
(b) L'quivocit selon le troisimemode quivocation, en revanche,
ne s'attache pas la signification,
mais la suppositiond'un terme.11
, qui appartient un termeen lui-mmeindpenDistinguede la significatio
dammentde toutcontexted'usage, la notionde suppositio
dsignela fonctionrfrentielle
d'un termeau sein d'une proposition.Un termeest alors
quivoque selon le troisimemode quivocation lorsqu'il suppose de
diffrentes
maniresdans une proposition.Ainsi le termehomoest quidans
les propositionssuivanteshomoest animal
, homoest specieset
voque
homoestnomen
le
o
mme
terme
est pris respectivement
en supposition
,
personnelle,simple et matrielle,sans changer de signification
par une
nouvelle impositionquelconque. Or du faitqu'Ockham admet la triplicit de suppositionpersonnelle,simpleet matrielleautantdans le langage
mentalque dans le langage conventionnel,12
le problmede l'quivocit
10Summa
et III-4,3, p. 756M7.
, I, 13,ed.cit.,p. 4525*33,
III-4,2, p. 75348*57
logicae,
n Ibid.,III-4,
"Circatertium
modum
estprimoscien4, p. 7591-608:
aequivocationis
dumquodtuncesttertius
modusaequivocationis
quandoaliquadictiononaccipitur
pro
diversis
sedex hocsolumquodalicuicomparatur
ad
significatis,
quodnonpluspertinet
Etistemodus
exhocquodvox
nonaccidit
primarium
significatum
quamad secundarium.
in duobusprimis
sicutcontingit
sedex hocquodeadem
diversa,
modis,
potest
significare
voxpotest
diversis."
pro
supponere
12Ibid.,
"Sicutautemtalisdiversitas
terI, 64,p. 19756"9:
suppositionis
potest
competere
minovocaliet scripto,
ita etiampotest
termino
mentali,
quiaintentio
competere
potest
etprose ipsaetprovoceetproscripto."
Surce point,
supponere
proilioquodsignificai
Buridan
estendsaccord
avecOckham.
le seultypedesupposition
admis
D'aprsBuridan,
dansle langage
cf.JeanBuridan,
Summulae
mental
estla supposition
, VII,De
personnelle;
TheSummulae
VII, Defallaciis
, Tractalus
, d. S. Ebbesen,
, dans:J. Pinborg
fallais
(d.),The
Buridan
estergo,utmihi
, Copenhagen
1976,p. 139-60,
ofJohn
logic
part.156:"Sciendum
nonestnisiratione
materialis
vocissignificativae:
nullus
enimtervidetur,
quodsuppositio
minusin propositione
mentali
sed semper
materialiter,
supponit
personaliter,
quia non
utimur
enimeadem
terminis
mentalibus
ad placitum,
sicutvocibus
etscripturis,
numquam
oratio
mentalis
diversas
velacceptationes
habet."
Albert
deSaxe,enrevanche,
significationes
admet
deuxtypes
desupposition
etmatrielle;
danslelangage
mental,
supposition
personnelle
cf.Albert
Eine
de Saxe,Perutilis
derTermini.
II, 3, d. Chr.Kann,DieEigenschaften
logica,

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

81

Car contrairement
difficile.
aux deux
se pose ici de faonparticulirement
ne
se
ici par
rsoudre
modes
d'quivocation,l'quivocit peut
premiers
un recoursau langage mental,mais elle se trouvereportedans le langage mentallui-mme.13
A partirdes annes 1320, la smantique ockhamistea fait cole
notamment
Paris.14Elle a t assume, labore mais aussi transforme
Albert
de
Saxe
Buridan
(c. 1316-1390),Marsile
(c. 1295-1360),
par Jean
d'Inghen (c. 1340-1396),Pierre Ailly et bien d'autres,pour constituer
un courantde pense dsign par la suite comme nominalismeou via
moderna}0
C'est dans ce courantque se situentnos textesanonymes.
Dans la suite, nous concentreronsd'abord notre attention sur le
contenu,la compositionet la datationdu manuscritParis,B.N., lat. 16.401
qui a conservnos deux questions.Ensuite,nous donneronsune exposition du contenu des deux questions. Finalement,nous examineronsle
de Pierre d'Ailly.
rapportentreles deux questionset le trait Conceptas
Une ditiondes deux questionssera donne en appendice.
Paris, BJV.,lat. 16.401
/. Le manuscrit
Le manuscritParis, BibliothqueNationale,lat. 16.401 (anciennement
Sorbonne 989, 1708) est un manuscriten papier de 213 feuillets.Il se
compose de deux parties,dont la premirecompte 11 cahiers,mis en
dsordre,et la seconde 7 cahiers. Les dimensionsdu papier sont identiYork/Kln
Alberts
von
Sachsen
zurPerutilis
, Leiden/New
1994,p. 174,6-766.
Untersuchung
logica
Cf.infra
, p. 101,n. 68 et 69.
13Summa
"Etestnotandum
modus
, III-4,4, ed.cit.,p. 763113"7:
quodistetertius
logicae
duoprimi
modinon
inpropositione
purementali,
quamvis
aequivocationis
potest
reperiri
homo
habeant
ad placitum
institutis.
Undeistapropositio
mentalis
est
locumnisiin signis
velprose ipso."
eo quodsubiectum
potest
significative
supponere
species
distingui
potest,
mental
Pourle problme
de l'quivocit
dansle langage
chezOckham
cf.J. Trentman,
andequivocation
Ockham
onMental,
t dans:Mind79 (1970),p. 586-90;P.V. Spade,Synonymy
ofPhilosophy
18 (1980),p. 9-22
oftheHistory
inOckham's
mental
, dans:Journal
language
etMichon,
Nominalisme
, p. 222-36.
14Pourla diffusion
TheReception
Paris,
cf.W.J.Courtenay,
ockhamiste
dela smantique
et
at theUniversity
, dans:Z. Kaluza- P. Vignaux
(d.),Preuve
ofOckham's
ofParis
Thought
au XIVesicle
raisons
etthologie
l'universit
deParis.Logique
, ontologie
, Paris1984,p. 43-64,
part.44-7.
15
a tanalys
moderne
du terme
"nominalisme"
dansl'historiographie
par
L'emploi
Debate
TwoCenturies
In Search
, dans:R. Imbach
ofHistorical
W.J.Courtenay,
ofNominalism.
- A. Maier
a unbilancio
storiodifilosofia
e Novecento
: contributo
medievale
(d.),Glistudi
fraOtto
" and"via
"Viaantiqua
, cf.A.L.Gabriel,
, Rome1991,p. 233-51.Pourla viamoderna
grafico
intheFifteenth
totheGerman
Universities
andMasters
moderna"
andtheMigration
ofParisStudents
undFortschrittsundModerni.
, dans:A. Zimmermann
Traditionsbewutsein
Century
(d.),Antiqui
imspten
Mittelalter
, Berlin1974,p. 439-83.
bewutsein

19:53:43 PM

82

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

ques dans les deux parties, savoir 220 X 145 mm (justification:170 X


110 mm). L'critures'tend sur une colonne d'entre40 et 50 lignes.La
numrotation
des feuilletsest tardive;le premierfeuilletest numrot1-3;
les feuillets211 213 ne sont pas numrots.16
Voici le contenudu manuscrit:
1. Ff. l-3r-26v:Henri de Langenstein, Contradisceptationes
et contrarias
mendicantium
beatissimae
Mariae
et
praedicationes
fratrum
superconceptione
virginis
contra
maculam
saneioBernardo
mendaciter
de
maimpositam.11
"Incipitepistola
cula bernardicontra impugnacionemsanctorumdoctorumad clarificacionem uirginalisintegritatis
et puritatismatrisdomini uirginisgloriose.
Venerendisin Christo. . .- . . . et nos liberatisumus. Et sic finiturepis16La
matrielle
du manuscrit
estcomme
suit.
composition
Lescahiers
de la premire
partie:
I
signn,6 + 6 (ff.1-3-14);
II
signo,6 + 6 (ff.15-26);
III
sign/,5+ 5 (ff.27-36);
IV
signm,5 + 5 (ff.37-46);
V
signk,4 + 4 (ff.47-54);
VI
signb,5 + 5 + 3 (ff.55-67);
VII
sign
/ 6 + 6 (ff.68-78bis);
VIII signg, 7-1+ 7 (ff.79-91);
IX
signA,6 + 6 (ff.92-103);
X
sign,3 + 3 (ff.104-9);
XI
signa, 5 + 5 (ff.110-19).
Lesfiligranes
de la premire
sont:nos7511,
3361,6475et69 (?)du dictionnaire
partie
de G.M.Briquet,
Lesfiligranes
. Dictionnaire
desmarques
dupapier
dsleur
vers
historique
apparition
1282jusqu'en
1600, 1907(repr.
Amsterdam
1968),t. III.
Les cahiers
de la seconde
partie:
XII
signa, 4 + 4 (ff.120-7);
XIII sign,6 + 6 (ff.128-39);
XIV signc,8 + 8 (ff.140-55);
XV
signd,8 + 8 (ff.156-71);
XVI sign*,8 + 8 (ff.172-87);
XVII sign
l 8 + 8 (ff.188-203);
XVIII signg,6 + 6"1(ff.204,204bls,
205-10et 3 nonnumrots).
Lesfiligranes
de la seconde
sont:nos6475et6358du dictionnaire
de Briquet.
partie
17Cf.Th. Hohmann,
derWerke
Heinrichs
vonLangenstein
32
, dans:Traditio
Initienregister
, II.l, Stuttgart/Paris
(1976),
p. 399-426,
part.417,n203.L. Hain,Repertorium
Bibliographicum
1826(repr.:
Milan1948),n088403-8405
connat
Milan1480,
trois
ditions
de cetouvrage:
1500etBle 1500;Hohmann,
unequatrime:
ibid.,
Strasbourg
p. 417,n 203mentionne
1516(d.J.Wimpheling).
Kritische
Studien
der
zumSchrifttum
Strasbourg
D'aprsK.J.Heilig,
beiden
Heinriche
von
Hessen
ftir
christliche
Altertumskunde
und
, dans:Rmische
Quartalschrift
furKirchengeschichte
40 (1932),p. 105-76,
la lettre
a tcrite
Vienne
en
part.136-7,
1390.Cf.galement
A. Emmen,
vonLangenstein
Heinrich
unddieDiskussion
ber
dieEmpfngnis
- nderung
- Einfluss
Mariens.
Seine
Ansicht
sner
, dans:J. Auer- H. Volk(d.),
Stellungnahme
in Geschichte
undGegenwart
furMichaelSchmaus],
Mnchen
Theologie
1957,
[Festschrift
p. 625-50.

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

83

tola, Deo gracias. Explicit epistola magistihenrici de hassia in sacra


pagina doctoriseximii de macula beati bernardicontra impugnaciones
sanctorumdoctorumad clarificacionem
et puritatis
uirginalisintegritatis
matrisdominiglorioseetc."
.: "Sequitur tractatuscontra coniunctionistas
(F. 27r blanc; f. 27v inscr
lin.:
contra
[sup.
astrologos)de euentibusfuturorumeditus a uenerabili
magistro,magistrohenricode assia.")
contra
coniunc2. Ff. 28r-45v:Henri de Langenstein, Tractatus
astrologos
tionistas
deeuentibus
.l8
"Odit
obseruantes
uanitates
fiiturorum
superuacueideo
sic uiguituniuersitasparisiensissemperin iudicio et ueritate. . .- . . . que
exalantin aera. Et sic est finis,Deo laus. Explicittractandemputrefacte
tatuscontraconiunctionistas
de euentibusfuturorum
editus a uenerabili
henrico
de
hassia"
45v:
tabula
(f.
capitulorum).
magistro,magistro
(Ff. 46r"vblancs)
3. Ff. 47r-54v:Henri de Langenstein, Quaestiode tactucorporum
durorum
.19"Questio est ista: utrumquodlibetcorpus durum sit alteriinmediate quomodolibetnaturaliterapproximabile.Et arguiturquod non, sic:
quelibetduo corporadura . . . . . . dixi solum disputatiueet magisintencione dandi occasionem aliis ueritateminueniendi quam pertinaciter
alicui presumptuoseasserendi.Laus Deo finisest. Explicitquestio de corporibus duris determinataper reuerendumdoctorem sacre theologie,
uidelicetmagistrmhenricumde hassia, speculatoremsubtilemcui merces in celo sit copiosa. Amen, amen, amen, amen."
4. Ff. 55r-67v:Henri de Langenstein,De reprobatone
ecentricorum
et epiclorum.20
"Cum inferiorum
ad
celestium
conducit
cognicio
inquisicionem,
nam ea que ex his apud nos sunt,uelut experimentaliter
comprehendimus. . .- . . . sed sufficit
michipro nunc in generalimediumtetigisse.Et

18Cf.Hohmann,
- P. Kibre,A Catalogue
, p. 412,n 139;L. Thorndike
of
Initienregister
Mediaeval
in
Latin
London
col.
978.
Ce textea tdit
19632,
Incipits
of
Scientific
Wrtings ,
Studien
desHernch
von
zudenastrologischen
, Leipzig1933,
parH. Pruckner,
Schuften
Langenstein
du trait
cf.Pruckner,
Pouruneexposition
ducontenu
ibid.,
p. 139-206.
p. 43-72.D'aprs
le trait
datede 1373.
Pruckner,
19Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, p. 421,n250;Thorndike
, col.1666;
Initienregister
N.H.Steneck,
andCreation
intheMiddle
Science
,
Ages.
ofLangenstein
(d.1397)onGenesis
Henry
NotreDame/London
, p. 86,n. 29.
1976,p. 195.Voirinfra
20Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, p. 404,n 38; Thorndike
, col.309;
Initienregister
Science
andCreation
de ce trait
estdonneparC. Kren,
Steneck,
, p. 195.Une analyse
Homocentric
intheLatinWest:
TheDe reprobatane
eccentricorum
et epiclicorum
Astronomy
datede 1364;cettedatese
, dans:Isis59 (1968),p. 269-81.Le trait
ofHerny
ofHesse
trouve
dansle texte
mmedu trait,
f.62rde notre
"... ethocistotempore,
manuscrit:
scilicet
anno1364."

19:53:43 PM

84

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

sic huius ymaginacionisest finiscontra excntricoset epycyclos,a uenerabilimagistrohenricode hassia parisiusordinate."


5. Ff. 68r-91v:Henri de Langenstein, De habitudine
causarum
et influxu
21
naturae
communis."Quia scire uellem modum naturalisaministracionis
et
naturaliter
mundi
a
inferioris
celestium
subregiminis
agentem
superiori
celestiumquecausarum. . . . . . infraipsum trahatsursumquantum est
de se uideturpatere propositum.Et sic est finishuius tractatus.Explicit
tractatusde habitudinecausarum et influxunature communisrespectu
inferiorum,
quem edit magisterhenricusde hassia subtilisspeculator.Deo
Deo
gracias,
gracias."
6. Ff. 92r-106r:Henri de Langenstein,De reductione
effectuum
specialium
in virtutes
communes.22
(f. 92r inscr.:"Incipiuntcapitula et materiecapitulorum"). "Primmcapitulumest de modo inuencionisphilosophienaturalis.
Secundum de limitacione formarumsubstancialiumad distinctasdisposiciones complexionarias.(. . .) Propteradmirariinceperuntantiquitus
hominesphilosophari.Admirado siquidem. . .- . . . sanctisangelisinueniturforciusmalignisspiritibus.Deo gracias,amen. Explicitquidam tracin uirtutescommunesscriptusper etc."
tatus de reductioneeffectuum
(Ff. 106V-9V
blancs)
23 "Anno
7. Ff. 110r-19r:Henri de Langenstein, Quaestiode cometa
domini millesimocccmolxmooctauo a uigilia palmarum usque ad tres
septimanasparisius uisus fuitcometes temporecrepusculiuespertiniin
parte. . . . . . et superficialer absque pertinaciataliterfinire.Explicit
tractatusdisputacioniscum astrologissuper iudiciisapparicionumcometarumet est totumquestio una determinataa reuerendedistinctionis
uiro
in
henrico
de
in
doctore
sacra
ac
etc."
artibus
hacia,
magistro
pagina
8. Ff. 120r-25v:Gauthier Burley, De primoet ultimo
instanti2*
"Questio
de instantibusa Waltero Burlay. Utrum sit dare primum et ultimum
21Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, p. 415,n 176;Thorndike
, col.1223;
Initienregister
Science
and
Cration
194.
Pour
une
de
cf.P. Pirzio,
Le
Steneck,
, p.
analyse cetouvrage
" dans:
deltrattato
diEnrico
diLangenstein
"Dehabitudine
causarum
prospettive
filosofiche
(1325-1397)
Rivista
critica
di StoriadellaFilosofia
24 (1969),p. 363-73.D'aprsPirzio,
ibid.,
p. 363,
le trait
datede peuavant1372-3.
22Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, col.1143;
Initienregister,
p. 414,n 160;Thorndike
andCreation
Science
dateprobablement
d'avant1374,cf.Steneck,
Steneck,
, p. 195.Le trait
ibid.,
p. 16.
23Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, col. 103.
, p. 402,n 13;Thorndike
Initienregister
Cf.galement
Studien
du
Pruckner,
, p. 9-16(la listedesautres
mss.),
p. 23-43(uneanalyse
contenu
de l'ouvrage)
et 89-138(l'dition).
date
Studien
, p. 9, le trait
D'aprsPruckner,
de 1368-9.
24Cf.Thorndike
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
Lafilosofia
delsiglo
XIV.
, col. 1671;A. UaJurez,
Contexto
cultural
deWalter
de ce trait
se trouve
, Madrid1978,p. 77-8.Uneanalyse
Burley

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

85

instansin quo res permanenshabet esse. Et quia Philosophusdicitquod


est dare primumet non ultimum,ideo probaturprimoquod non est dare
primum,et secundo quod sit dare ultimum. . . . . . est dare ultimum.
Et sic patet quid sit dicendum de illa questione, que compilata est a
magistrowalteroburleyanglico sacre theologiedoctoreeximio,et sic est
finis."
(Ff. 126r-27vblancs)
instanti
,25
Anonyme(Jeande Hollande),De primoetultimo
9. Ff. 128r"49v:
in
et
8
de
instanti
"Philosophus
physicorumponit aliquas regulas primo
ultimo.Quas quidem intermiscuesuscipientesplerumque. . .- . . . quod
michi quod sintutilia etc. Et
sintsingulauera uel necessaria,sed sufficit
sic est finishuius tractatus,deo laus etc. Explicittractatusde instantibus
bonus et utilisetc."
10. Ff. 149v-66v:Anonyme(Richard Kilvington?),Quaestiode intensione
"Questio est ista: utrumqualitas suscipitmagis et minus. Et
formarum.26
- M. Parodi,
in Walter
Il problema
delprimo
e ultimo
istante
dans:MedansP. Feltrin
Burley,
- C. Shapiro,
Unedition
de ce texte
estfaite
dioevo9 (1983),
parH. Shapiro
p. 137-78.
furGeschichte
derPhilosophie
47
etultimo
desWalter
dans:Archiv
Deprimo
instanti
Burley,
Mertonense
Studies
, dans:Mediaeval
(1965),p. 157-73.
Repertorium
D'aprsJ.A.Weisheipl,
- Parodi,
1327;Feltrin
de Burley
estantrieur
31 (1969),
p. 174-224,
part.205,le trait
Il problema
1327.
, p. 141donnent
25D'aprsThorndike
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
et
Deprimo
, col. 1045,il s'agitde la question
deJeande Hollande,
cf.E.P.
Pourla vieetlesuvres
deJeande Hollande.
ultimo
instanti
onlogic
First
Four
tracts
Critical
Bos,John
insolubilia).
fallacie,
ofHolland.
(suppositiones,
obligationes,
andIndices
1985(Artistarium,
theManuscripts
with
anIntroduction
Edition
, Nijmegen
5),
from
andthe
William
Medieval
RiseofMathematical
Heytesbuiy.
Logic
D'aprsC. Wilson,
p. *13*-*33*.
datede 1369.
deJeande Hollande
, Madison1960,p. 33,la question
Physics
26Cettequestion
unesried'auteurs
savoir Roger
a tattribue
diffrents,
andTheologm
Natural
O.S.B.,
,
(cf.
Logician,
Philosopher,
J.A.Weisheipl,
Roger
Swyneshed,
Swyneshed
toDaniel
Callus
Studies
Presented
dans:Oxford
, Oxford
1964,p. 230-52,
part.241), Richard
Mertonense
Swineshead
, p. 221),ainsiqu' Thomasde Wylton
(cf.
Repertorium
(cf.Weisheipl,
- Kibre,A Catalogue
, col. 1665,qui connaisibid.,
Weisheipl,
p. 223).D'aprsThorndike
le ms.Oxford,
Can. Misc.226 (ff.
senttroiscopiesde cettequestion,
Bodleian
library,
Thomasde Anglia,
l'aurait
un certain
alorsque notremanuscrit
l'attribue
38ra-42ra)
A la suitedu catalogue
Marsile
de Thorndike
et Kibre,la question
attribue
d'Inghen.
Marsile
d'Autrcourt.
Amidela
estgnralement
attribue
Cf.Z. Kaluza,Nicolas
d'Inghen.
dela France
littraire
vrit
, Paris1995{Histoire
, t.XLII,fase.1),p. 197,n. 161.L'attribution
latins
de la Bibliothque
Marsile
se fonde
surl'inventaire
desmanuscrits
Nationale,
pubon
31 (1870),p. 187).Cependant,
de l'EcoledesChartes
liparL. Delisle(Bibliothque
dura
Marsile
Utrum
le voit,notre
ms.n'attribue
possunt
corpora
d'Inghen
que la question
L'attribution
seinvicem
etnonpasl'ensemble
destextes
desff.149v-77v.
(ff.170V-7V),
tangere
etminus
Richard
suitla conjecture
de la question
Utrum
qualitas
magis
Kilvington
suscipit
and
Calculators
andtheMathematics
1320-1350.
d'E.D. Sylla,TheOxford
ofMotion,
Physics
la question
de notre
Measurement
, NewYork/London
1991,p. 435-46.En effet,
byLatitudes
a reverendo
ms.estidentique
d'unesriede quatre"quaestiones
avecla deuxime
compilatas
" conserve
viro
Ricardo
dansle ms.Venezia,Bibi.Marc.,VI
libro
Physicorum
magistro
super

19:53:43 PM

86

M. BARKER
PAULJ.J.

uideturquod non, quia tunclatitudocaliditatisforetinfinitaet per consequens caliditas in summo foretinfinita;consequens est falsum; igitur
etc. . . .- . . . potestincipereesse uerum.Et sic estfinisquestionisde intensione formarum."
11. Ff. 166v-8r:Anonyme,Quaestioutrum
in intellectu
corressyncategoremati
et
non
actus
est
hec:
utrum
in
conceptus.21
pondeat
"Questio
sincathegoremati
intellectucorrespondeatactus et non conceptus.Arguiturprimo quod
non . . .- . . . patet de primoconceptuipsiusintellectus,
scilicetde indiuiduo uago, qui est connotatiuus"(le textes'arrteau milieudes rponses
aux argumentsquodnon
; le copiste a laiss un blanc d'environ15 lignes
la
jusqu'
question suivante).
utrum
12. Ff. 168r-70v:
esseaequiAnonyme,Quaestio
aliquisconceptus
potest
vocus.26
"Questio est hec: utrumaliquis conceptuspotestesse equiuocus.
Et arguiturprimo quod sic. Nam aliquis conceptuspotestcapi . . .- . . .
ergo sequiturquod est in dictione.Et sic est finisistiusquestionisbone
et utilis,etc."
13. Ff. 170V-7V:
(attribue) Marsile d'Inghen, Quaestiode tactucorporumdurorum.29
"Questio michi multumdubia et non inmeritodubitanda
72 (ff.8Irala question
Utrum
etminus
auxff.
se trouve
112*,168ra-9va;
qualitas
suscipit
magis
Riardus
estprobablement
la mmeper89rb-101ra).
D'aprsSylla(ibid.,
p. 436),ce magister
sonneque Richard
En admettant
la conjecture
de Sylla,eten supposant
Kilvington.
que
aitrdig
soncommentaire
de la Physique
Oxford,
Kilvington
plusprcisment,
pendant
il s'ensuit
sa rgence
en philosophie,
dateprobablement
desannes1324-26;
que le texte
- B. Ensign
cf.N. Kretzmann
TheSophismata
Kretzmann,
ofRichard
Kilvington,
Cambridge
1990,p. xviii-xxviii,
part,xxv-xxvi.
Voirappendice
1.
28Voirappendice
II.
- Kibre,A Catalogue
Cf. rhorndike
uneseulecopiede
, col. 1202,qui connaissent
cettequestion,
savoirle ms.Oxford,
Bodleian
Canon.Misc.177,fols.62-(66),
Library,
Albertinus
de Placentia,
la suitede H.O. Coxe,Catalogus
mancodicum
qu'ilsattribuent
bibliothecae
codices
Graecos
etLatinos
canonicianos
Bodleianae,
, Oxford
usmptorum
parstertia
complectens
involumine,
contentorum
f. 213: "xj
1854,col.557,n 9. A sontour,Coxesuitla tabula
secundum
fo 75."
durorum
Albertinum
de placentia.
Questiode Contactu
corporum
- Kibre,A Catalogue
Thorndike
col. 1635,mentionnent
unequestion
intitule
Ensuite,
,
"utrum
se. . .," conserve
Biblioteca
durapossint
dansle ms.Cittdel Vaticano,
corpora
lat.4455(f.99va-102va),
estidentique
avecla ntre.
Enfin,
Apostolica,
laquelleen ralit
le ms.Bologna,
a conserv
unfragment
de la
Biblioteca
2567,ff.57ra-60vb,
Universitaria,
mmequestion,
savoirlespremiers
21 arguments
quodsic(ff.57ra-57vb);
aprsces 21
De tactu
durorum
le textequi suitestceluide la question
de Biaisede
arguments,
corporum
de Biaise
dansplusieurs
Parme,
qui a tconserve
copies.Pourlesmss.de la question
cf.G. Federici
diBiagio
Pelacani
da Parma
Vescovini
Vescovini,
, dans:G. Federici
Opere
nelTrecento
F. Barocelli
e astrologia
Pelacani
Parmense
, scienza
, Padova
(d.),Filosofia
Biagio
europeo.
1992,p. 181-216,
part.190.
Dansunesriede troisarticles,
De
nousesprons
diter
trois
prochainement
questions
Albertin
tactu
durorum
tantt
Marsile
tantt
, savoircelleattribue
corporum
d'Inghen

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

87

est hec: utrumcorporadura possuntseinuicemtangere.Et arguiturprimo


quod sic . . . . . . et hec de questioneproutdei adiutoriosub correctione
meliusdicenciumsintbreuiterdicta et parcitemichiin quibus maie dixi,
Explicitquestiocomquia istamquestionemnunquamuidi determinatam.
de
a
mercilio
etc."
uenerabili
magistro
Inghen
pleta
14.1 Ff. 178r-98r:Anonyme,Sophismata
.30 "In hoc tractatuloaliqua
sophismatacommuniasophismataconscribam.Quorum primumsit hoc:
deus est; quod sine probacionealiqua ex fidenostrasuppono esse uerum.
Improbatursic . . . (f. 19lr) Sophismasecundumin ordineest hoc: homo
est asinus aliquibus racionibus,quibus probandum. Cuius impossibilitasine aliqua probacione suppono notam. . .- . . . haberi
tem et falsitatem
ex premissis.Et sic est finissophismatum,deo exinde
possentsufficienter
multimodasgraciarumreferoactiones"(le copistea laiss un blanc d'environ 10 lignes).
de verificatione
"Et illas
14.2 Ff. 198r-209v:
Anonyme,Quaestio
propositions.
iuxta mei ingeni[os]i paruitatem,quantum est de ui uocis redarguamet
opinionemmagisprobabilemeligam.Queriturigiturcirca presentemmateriamutrumad proposicionemesse ueram requirituret sufficit
ita esse
Et arguiturprimoquod sic . . . . . . et sic soluta
sicutper earnsignificatur.
est ilia racio et per consequens tota questio de uerificacioneproposicionis. Et sic est huius questionisfinis,deo gracias,amen, etc. etc."
La premirepartiedu manuscrit(ff.1-3-119)constitueun recueild'ouvragesd'Henri de Langenstein.Les cahiers de cettepartie ont t crits
par plusieursmains et rassemblspar leur premierpossesseurselon un
autre ordre que l'ordre alphabtique des signatures(critesd'une seule
main). Voici la suite originelledes cahiers:
a
b
c, /,e
f g
h, i
k
/,m
n, o

=
=
=

(XI) Quaestiode cometa'


ecentricorum
et epiciclorum
;
(VI) De reprobatione
manquent;
et influxu
causarum
naturae
communis
;
(VII-VIII) De habitudine
(IX-X) De reductione
effectuum]
durorum'
(V) Quaestiode tactucorporum
Tractatus
contra
coniunctionistas;
(III-IV)
astrologos
et contrarias
(I-II) Contradisceptationes
praedicationes'

de Plaisance,
celled'Henri
de Langenstein
, p. 83,n 3), et cellede Biaisede
(voirsupra
Parme.
30Avecla question
De verificatione
is (14.2)cessophismes
constituent
unensemproposition
bledontl'dition
estannonce
parM. ZnonKaluza.

19:53:43 PM

88

PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER

Cette reconstruction
montred'abord qu'il manque aujourd'huitroiscahiersde l'ensemble.En outre,elle soulignele caractrephilosophiquedu
recueil,puisqu'elle montrequ' l'originele seul textethologiquen'a pas
t plac au dbut,mais la finde l'ensemble.En effet, part ce dernier
trait,les ouvragesconcernenttous la philosophienaturelle,et une bonne
partied'entreeux vise des problmesastronomiques.Ils datentde la priode o Langensteinfutmatre la facultdes artsde l'universit
de Paris
La
lettre
sur
l'Immacule
a
t
(1364-1374).31
Conception
rdigelorsque
Langensteinfutmatre la facultde thologiede l'universitde Vienne
dans le dbatsurl'Immacule
( partirde 1384).D s'agitde son intervention
a
eu
lieu

de
l'universit
Paris
partirde l'anne 1387.32
Conceptionqui
L'ensemble d'ouvragesde Langensteindans notremanuscrita donc trs
probablementcirculdans le contextede l'universitde Paris. Il se peut
qu'un lve de Langensteinait laiss copier un certainnombre de ses
critsalors disponibles Paris.
Le contenu de la seconde partie du manuscrit(ff.120-213) est plus
vari que celui de la premire,et cause de la prsence de plusieurs
textesanonymesou d'attributiondouteuse,il est difficile
de saisirla raison pour laquelle ces diversouvragesont t rassembls.Toutefois,du
faitqu' partirdu traitde Jean de Hollande les textessont crits la
suite et d'une mme main, il s'ensuitque les ff. 128-213 ont t copis
comme un seul ensemble.Cet ensembleest prcd du traitde Burley
(ff. 120-127), qui a t rajout sans doute cause de la convergence
entreles sujetsde ce texteet de celui de Jean de Hollande. Bien que les
il est videntqu'ils
ouvragesdans cettepartieaient des originesdiverses,33
ont tous circulsdans un milieu universitaire,
probablementdans celui
de la facultdes arts de l'universitde Paris.
La provenanceparisiennede notremanuscrit,attestepar le contenu
des deux parties,se confirmepar le faitque les filigranes
identifis
figurent

31Pourla vieetlesuvres
- G. Kreuzer,
deLangenstein,
cf.Th.Hohmann
art.Heinrich
vonLangenstein
dans:
K.
Ruh
Die
deutsche
literatur
des
Mittelalters.
,
, Bd 3,
(d.),
Verfasserlexikon
Berlin/New
York1981,cols.763-73.
32Cf.M.H. Shank,"Unless
YouBelieve
, YouShallNotUnderstand":
, University
, and
Logic
inlateMedieval
Princeton
1988,p. 41-2.
Vienna,
Society
33Le Deprimo
etultimo
estunequestion
Toulouse
instanti
de Burley
(cf.Feltrin
dispute
- Parodi,
Il problema
deJeande Hollande
a probablement
tcrit
, p. 141),le trait

De intensione
, p. *13*),la question
Prague(cf.Bos,John
ofHolland
formarum
probablement
- Ensign
Oxford
The
Calculators
, p. 435-46etKretzmann
Kretzmann,
(cf.Sylla,TheOxford
les Sophismata
de
de Paris(renseignement
, p. xxv-xxvi);
Sophismata
proviennent
personnel
M. ZnonKaluza).

19:53:43 PM

CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT

89

dans des manuscritsparisiensd'entre 1387 et 1399, ce qui permetla


conclusionque l'ensembledu manuscrit t copi Paris entre 1390
et 1405.34Nous verronspar la suite que cette conclusions'accorde bien
ici.
avec la doctrinedes deux questionsqui nous intressent
et le contexte
doctrinal
des deuxquestions
II. Le contenu
II.l La premire
question
La questionUtrum
in intellectu
actusetnonconcepsincategoremati
correspondeat
tas se divise en deux articlesdont le premierapporte une srie de notabilia, et le second une srie de thses (<conclusiones
). La dernireest la
la question formuledans l'intiresponsalis)
rponse dfinitive(conclusio
et aux thsess'ajoutentquelquefoisdes corollaires.Par
tul.Aux notabilia
, les thses introduisentpeu d'lmentsnouveaux,
rapportaux notabilia
mais elles reformulent
de faon sommairece qui a t dj dit.35Telle
qu'elle se trouvedans notremanuscrit,la question n'est pas acheve; le
copistes'est arrtsoudainementdans les rponsesaux argumentsprincipaux en laissantun blanc d'environ 15 lignes.
Le premierarticledistingued'abord entre trois typesde termes:des
des purs catgormeset des termesmixtes,en parpurs syncatgormes,
Cette tripledistinctionne
tie catgormeset en partie syncatgormes.
concerne que les termesvocaux ou crits.En effet,l'on considre ici
commeun pur catgormetouttermeauquel correspondun concept,par
Un pur syncatgorme,
lequel l'intellectconoitune chose extra-mentale.
en revanche,est un termequi n'a comme corrlatmental qu'un acte.
De par cet acte, l'intellectmodifiesa conceptionde la chose, c'est--dire
il la conoit "d'une certainemanire" (aliqualiter).
Comme exemplesdes
34Nousrappelons
aux nos69, 3361,6358,
retrouvs
correspondent
que lesfiligranes
En rglegnrale,
on utilisait
le papierdans
de Briquet.
6475,et 7511du dictionnaire
4 5 ansaprsla fabrication;
mitHilfe
unepriode
cf.Th. Gerardy,
Datieren
d'environ
anderGesamtproduktion
vonWasserzeichen.
derSchaumburgischen
Papiermhle
Beispielhaft
dargestellt
von1604-1650
, Stuttgart
1968,p. 64-71.
Arensburg
35Cettestructure
de la seconde
estasseztypique
formelle
pource genrede questions
de logique(cf.par
moiti
du XIVesicle.On la trouve
nonseulement
dansles traits
de Marsile
lesQuaestiones
artem
veterem
exemple
super
(ms.Wien,NB,5467)),mais
d'Inghen
lesQuestiones
aussidansd'autres
textes
etthologiques.
Cf.parexemple
super
philosophiques
dumouLa position
deNicole
surla nature
de NicoleOresme
Oresme
Physicam
(d.S. Caroti,
etsmantiques
vement
III, 1-8):problmes
,
ontologiques
(Questiones
gnosologiques,
superPhysicam
le
du MoyenAge61 (1994),p. 303-85),
et littraire
dans:Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
Trait
dePierre
surla Consolation
deBoce(d.M. Chappuis,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia
d'Ailly
de Marsiled'Inghen
des Sentences
1505,repr.
1993)et le Commentaire
(d. Strasbourg
Frankfurt
a/Main1966).

19:53:43 PM

90

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

termesmixtes,l'anonymedonne une varitde termesdiffrents,


telsque
des adjectifscomparatifs(fortior
un pronom(aliudab), un adverbe
, doctior),
un verbe (differ),
ainsi qu'un substantif
(semper),
(nemo).Ces termesmixtes
ont un double correspondantmental: d'une part, dans la mesureo ils
sont des catgormes,un concept leur correspondpar lequel l'intellect
ils
conoit la chose intellige,d'autre part, en tant que syncatgormes
ont comme corrlatmentalun acte inclinantl'intellect modifiersa conception de la chose conue.36
Chez notre anonyme,les conceptssont des intermdiaires
entrel'intellect et la chose conue. En outre, ils ne sont pas les objets de la
des mots vocaux, mais ils signifient
eux-mmesles choses.
signification
Les actes, au contraire,ne signifient
aucune chose; leur seule fonction
consiste modifierla signification
des conceptsen leur confrantsoit un
mode de signifier
copulatifsoit un mode de signifier
disjonctif.37
36Cf. 11339*72
et 117196*7.
37Cf.p. 114 . Enp.
l'auteur
entre
modes
dontlesyncatgol'occurrence,
p.
distingue
quatre
rmemodifie
la signification
duconcept,
savoir:
disiunctive
etcopulatm.
, copulative
, disiunctim
Lesnotions
de disiunctive,
disiunctim
etcopulatim
interviennent
dansl'laboration
de
, copulative
la thorie
de la supposition,
dansle contexte
de la thorie
de la descente
plusprcisment,
auxrfrents
du terme.
estditstare
disiunctive
l'ensemble
unedescente
de ses
(i) Un terme
lorsqu'il
permet
rfrents
paruneproposition
disjonctive;
statdisiunctim
unedescente
dedisiuncto
(ii)unterme
permet
lorsqu'il
paruneproposition
extremo
la disjonctive
vel l'intrieur
d'unde sesextrmes;
, portant
staicopulative
la descente
auxrfrents
s'effectue
(iii)unterme
lorsque
parunepropositioncopulative;
un terme
estditstare
se raliseparune
(iv)finalement,
copulatim
lorsquela descente
decopulato
extremo
la conjonctive
et l'intrieur
d'unde sesextrmes.
, portant
proposition
Buridan
connat
le deuxime
dedisiuncto
et le troisime
(secundum
extremo)
propositionem
modede descente
la suppo(secundum
propositionem
copulativam
); il lesrelierespectivement
sition
confuse
tantum
distributive
(suppositio
confusa
) et la supposition
purement
(suppositio
Cf.Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
etp. 333790-4803.
Marsile
, ed.cit.,
distributv).
p. 324368"76
connat
le premier
de
disiunctivam
d'Inghen
(perpropositionem
), le deuxime
(perpropositionem
disiuncto
et le troisime
modede descente;
il lesrelie
extrem)
(perpropositionem
copulativam)
la supposition
dtermine
determinata
purerespectivement
), la supposition
(suppositio
et la supposition
mentconfuse
d. Bos,
distributive.
Cf.Marsile
Suppositiones1
d'Inghen,
Le quatrime
decopulato
modede descente
, perpropositionem
(descendere
p. 5616-826.
copulatim
a tintroduit
commeSortes
uneproposition
extremo)
parThomasMaulfelt
pouranalyser
la
ab omni
homine
Maulfelt
a unesupposition
confuse.
, o homine
differ
purement
critique
dfendue
entreautres
selonlaquelleun terme
position,
ayantunesupposiparOckham,
ne permet
dedisiuncto
extremo.
tionpurement
confuse
qu'unedescente
paruneproposition
un telterme
dedisiuncto
soitunedescente
D'aprsMaulfelt,
permet
paruneproposition
extremo
trelocalis
soitparuneproposition
decopulato
extremo.
doitprobablement
Maulfelt
Parisdanslesannes1330.Cf.S. Read,Descensus
vs.Thomas
Albert
ofSaxony
copulatim:
d'Albert
deSaxe
der
, dans:Biard(d.),Itinraires
, p. 71-85et Kann,DieEigenschaften
Maulfelt
Termini
, p. 87-105.

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

91

La thoriede la signification
que prsentel'anonyme est fondamentalementextensionnaliste.Ce n'est pas une nature commune ou une
essencequelconque,mais c'est la chose elle-mmequi est reprsenteet
du concept,en revanche,ne se
signifiepar le concept. La signification
limitepas aux objets rellementprsents,mais elle comprendl'ensemble
de choses qui correspondentau concept, que celles-cisoient prsentes,
Toutefois,un mode
possiblesou seulementimaginables.38
passes,futures,
ces choses s'ajoute au conceptde manide signifier
copulatifou disjonctif
re accidentelle,car il procde d'un acte distinctcorrespondant un synAinsi,par la propositionhomoestanimal
, l'intellectconoit
catgorme.39
non
mais
selon
un
mode copulatif
rellementl'ensemble des humains,
[ergoistehomoestanimalet illehomoestanimal)ou disjonctif{ergoistehomoest
ne modifie
animalvelillehomoestanimal
), du faitqu'aucun syncatgorme
la signification
En consquence,la supdu sujet de cette proposition.40
qui permetune descenteaux rfrents
positiondistributive,
par une propositioncopulative,ne convientpas un concept de par lui-mme,mais
lui advientde faon accidentellepar l'adjonctiond'un syncatgorme.41
Il en va de mme pour la suppositiondtermine,permettantune des38En reconnaissant
la significabilit
notre
esten accord
d'objets
imaginables,
anonyme
au sensstrict
le
avecMarsile
temporum
(le prsent,
d'Inghen
qui,outrelestroisdifferentiae
le possible
comme
etcinquime
admet
etl'imaginable
diffrence.
quatrime
passetlefutur)
"Tressuntdifferentie
sciliCf.Marsile
, d.Bos,p. 1021"8:
d'Inghen,
temporum,
Ampliationes
Et taiesetiamdicuntur
etfuturum.
utsolemus
dicerehoc
cetpresens,
preteritum
tempora,
addiduo,scilicet
estpresens
et imaginari
, hocestpreteritum
esse,
, etc.Et possunt
posse
tempus
inproposito
tamen
suntdifferentie
temdifferentie
temporum,
que,licetnonsintproprie
in propositionibus
namrespectu
eorumtermini
supponunt
prodiversis
tempoporum,
de Buridan
comme
ribus."
Surce point,
Marsile
s'carte
qui n'admet
que la possibilit
Cf.Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
diffrence
de temps.
ed.cit
., p. 34921*37.
quatrime
etBuridan
chezleslogiciens
ParexemCetcartentre
Marsile
estdevenue
clbre
tardifs.
etquartum
intitul
Commentum
emendatum
etcorrectum
inprimum
anonyme,
ple,le commentaire
Marsilii
deSuppositionibus,
Petri
Et super
tractatibus
tractatus
ampliationibus,
appellationibus
Hyspani
Marsile
inprimum
et
etconsequentiis
lui-mme
sousle titreCommentum
(attribu
d'Inghen
tractatum
Petri
a/Main1967),f.s8r,rap, Hagenau1495,repr.:Frankfurt
quartum
Hispani
iciles"duefamose
Biridani
etMarsilii."
Pourcesdeuxopinions
clbres,
porte
opiniones
sitsignificabile:
diInghen
e la chimera
cf.G. Roncaglia,
Utrum
Marsilio
Buridano,
, dans:
impossibile
e teologia
neltrecento.
Studi
inricordo
di Eugenio
L. Bianchi
Randi
, Louvain-la(d.),Filosofia
de la significabilit
dans
Neuve1994,p. 259-82.Pourle problme
non-existents
d'objets
engnral,
dans
etnon-existence
le cadrede la smantique
ockhamiste
cf.E. Karger,
Rfirence
- Z. Kaluza- A. de Libera,Lectionum
deGuillaume
la smantique
d'Ockham
, dans:J.Jolivet
Paris1991,p. 163-76et A.S. Me Grade,
varietates.
PaulVignaux
(1904-1987),
Hommage
45 (1985),
s Commitment
toRealPossibles
Studies
Ockham'
, dans:Franciscan
Plenty
ofNothing.
145-56.
pp.
39Cf.p. 11495-101.
40Cf.p. 114102-1
15116.
41Cf.p. 11490"3.

19:53:43 PM

92

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

cente aux rfrents


par une propositiondisjonctive.42
A la questionpose dans l'intitul,notreanonymerpondalors comme
n'a comme corrlatmentalqu'un simpleacte.
suit.Un pur syncatgorme
En effet,si le correspondantd'un syncatgorme
taitun concept,celuidu faitque le syncatgorme
ci auraitun statuttranscendantal,
exerce sa
valeur distributive
L'acte corresenversn'importequelle chose diffrente.
pondant au syncatgormene reprsentenulle chose extra-mentale.
Inversement,un tel acte ne procde pas non plus de ladite chose, mais
il est caus librementpar l'intellect.Tout acte mentalcorrespondantau
syncatgorme
s'applique un conceptquelconque,qui lui est donc ncessairementantrieur.Aux termesmixtes,en partie syncatgormes
et en
partie catgormes,correspond la fois un acte et un concept qui, lui,
est un conceptsimpleet non pas un conceptintrinsquement
compos.43
Afin de rapprochernotre anonyme de son contextedoctrinal,nous
sur troislments:(i) le problmedu correspondant
nous concentrerons
mental d'un syncatgorme,
(ii) la tripledistinctionentrepurs syncatet
gormes,purs catgormes termesmixtes,et (iii) la dfinitiondu syncatgorme.
42Cf.p. 115117-32.
En l'occurrence,
selonlaquellele sujet
l'anonyme
l'opinion
critique
d'uneproposition
indfinie
estanimal)
a unesupposition
dtermine
de parlui(ex.:homo
unedescente
une
mme,
permettant
paruneproposition
disjonctive.
D'aprsl'anonyme,
telleopinion
la proposition
indfinie
comme
d'uneproposition
interprte
quivalent
particulire
homo
estanimal
redondant.
), ce quirendle syncatgorme
simplement
aliquis
43Cf.(aliquis
17203.
iciuneopinion
assezrpandue,
selonlaquelle
L'anonyme
critique
p. 115,5,-1
le superlatif)
unengation.
l'adjectif
(ainsique parailleurs
comparatif
porteen lui-mme
Le fondement
de cetteopinion
consiste
en l'observation
d'uncomqu'unterme
prcd
a unesupposition
confuse
et distributive
dis(ou d'unsuperlatif)
paratif
confusa
(suppositio
Celle-ci
, quilibet,
tributiva).
peuttrecausenonseulement
parle signed'universalit
(omnis
totus
Cf. Ockham,
Summa
, I, 74, ed.cit.,
etc.)maisgalement
logicae
par la ngation.
et Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus,
ed.cit.,
L'ided'unengap. 23045"7
p. 329595-30654.
tioninhrente
auxcomparatifs
etsuperlatifs
se trouve
chezMarsile
parexemple
d'Inghen,
et compara"Nonaregulaest:nomina
rectaa superlativis
, d. Bos,p. 681"6:
Suppositions
tivisgradibus
confuse
SicuthicSortes
est
homine
stat
distributive.
, li homine
supponunt
fortior
confuse
distributive.
habentexponipernega(. . .) Et causaistiusestquia istanomina
"Decimaretionem."
Marsile
ditla mmechosepourdiffrt
et aliudab;cf.ibid.,
687"10:
aliudabfaciunt
terminm
stareconfuse
caret,
differ,
sequentem
gulaestquodtalestermini
li homine
utSortes
abhomine,
autSortes
estaliudabhomine,
confuse
distributive,
diffrt
supponit
o aprsla premire
occurrence
de aliudab,le ms.E! ajoute:"etconsimidistributive,"
in eis"(cf.Bos,p. 168et 201).Cf.galement
de
lespropter
inclusam
Albert
negationem
Saxe,Perutilis
II, 6, d. Kann,p. 206n-7l:"Decimaregula:Syncategoremata
logica,
per
secundum
sicutestistadictioquam
etcomparativus
excessum,
quaefitcomparatio
gradus
eametetiamsuperlativus,
se terminantes
eorum
includens
confundunt
terminos
sequentes
confuse
sicutdicendo
Sortes
est
homine.
distributive,
(. . .) Ratioregulae
fortior
dependentiam
includunt
cuiuslibet
aliorum
est,quiaistitermini
negationem
praedicati.
Exemplum
respectu
sicutdicendo
Sortes
homine
estfortis,
estfortior
enimsic:Sortes
comparativi
gradus
exponitur
ethomo
est
etnullus
homo
aliusa Sorte
esttam
Sortes
."
sicut
fortis,
fortis

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

93

(i) Comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, notrequestionconcernele problme gnralde la correspondanceentrele langage parl ou critet le
langage mental. Elle s'inscritainsi dans un courant de la smantique
Ockham
inspirpar Guillaumed'Ockham. Concernantles syncatgormes,
lui-mmeles admet simplementdans le langage mental,sans les analyser
en termesd'acte ou de concept.44
de conceptscorrespondant
Buridan,en revanche,parle explicitement
Il distingueentre,d'une part,des synmentalement
aux syncatgormes.
catgormesauxquels correspondun concept incomplexeou simple,et,
d'autrepart,des syncatgormes
ayantun conceptcomplexecomme corrlat mental. Rciproquement,il diffrencie
entre des catgormesqui
ont un conceptsimplecomme correspondantmental,et des catgormes
auxquels correspondun conceptcomplexe.45Toutefois,le vocabulairede
Buridans'cartede celui de notreanonymedans la mesureo Buridan
ne parle nullepart du correspondant
d'un syncatgorme
en termesd'une
alternativeentreacte ou concept.
C'est dans le traitde Pierred'AillyintitulConceptas,
rdigentre1368
et 1375,que se trouveune analyse,comparable celle de notreanonyme,
du corrlatmental d'une syncatgorme
vocal en termesde concept et
d'acte. En effet,ayant distinguentretroistypesde termesvocaux, des
et des termesmixtes,Pierre
purs catgormes,des purs syncatgormes
affirme
des
le
mental
termesmixtesest un cond'Ailly
que correspondant
d'un
acte
et d'un termemenceptcomplexe,compos
syncatgormatique
tal catgormatique.46
44Ockham,
Summa
"Adhucaliterdividitur
tam
I, 3, ed.cit.,p. 154"5:
terminus,
logicae,
vocalisquammentalis,
quidamsuntcategorematici,
quia terminorum
quidamsyncategorematici."
45Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
Gomme
dessyncat, ed.cit.,
p. 189155"73.
exemples
un concept
Buridan
donneet, itelet si ainsique la
gormes
auxquels
correspond
simple,
o elleestcopule(dansla mesure
o elleconnote
unecercopule(est)dansla mesure
tainetemporalit,
ellen'estpaspurement
Enrevanche,
comme
exemsyncatgormatique).
unconcept
Buridan
donnetantum
plesdessyncatgormes
auxquels
correspond
complexe,
etsolum
comme
et desinit.
Commeexem, ainsique les"syncatgormes
implicites"
incipit
Buridan
donne
mental,
plesdescatgormes
ayantun concept
simplecommecorrlat
homo
etle terme
abstrait
albedo
concret
album.
Commeexemples
descatgormes
, le terme
unconcept
Buridan
donnechimaera
et vacuum.
auxquels
correspond
complexe,
46Pierre
Modisignificandi
undihre
Destruktionen.
, d. L. Kaczmarek,
%w
d'Ailly,
Conceptus
Texte
im14.Jahrhundert
"Restt
unum
zurscholastischen
, Mnster
1980,p. 9617*34:
Sprachtheorie
scilicet
vocalium
estmere
dictum,
quodnonfuit
quodterminorum
quidam
cathegoreumaticus,
utisteterminus
homo
utisteterminus
omnis
; aliusestsincathegoreumaticus,
; aliusestterminus
vocalis
etpartim
etsicestmixtus,
partim
cathegoreumaticus
sincathegoreumaticus,
et esttalisqui scilicet
in duosterminos,
potestresolvi
quorumalterestpurecatheet alterestpuresincathegoreumaticus.
Cuiusmodi
estisteterminus
vocalis
goreumaticus,

19:53:43 PM

94

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

au secondpoint,
mne directement
(it)Le passage concerndu Conceptas
la tripledistinctionentrepurs syncatgormes,
purs catgormeset termes mixtes.A notre connaissance,cette tripledistinctionne se trouve
chez aucun auteur antrieur Ockham. En l'occurrence,c'est Ockham
lui-mmequi semble avoir introduitl'ide de termesmoyens,en observant que parmi les syncatgormes,qui se caractrisentpar l'absence
fixeet dtermine,certainsadverbesont un traitcomd'une signification
mun avec les catgormes, savoirjustementla signification
dtermine.
entre
Cependant,Ockham ne connatpas tellequelle la tripledistinction
et
termes
mixtes.47
en
Celle-ci, revanche,se
catgormes,syncatgormes
trouvechez au moins troisauteursaprs Ockham.
On la trouvechez Buridan dans le traitsur les suppositions.D'aprs
les termesqui ne signifient
auBuridan,s'appellentpurs syncatgormes
cune chose, outre les concepts qu'ils signifient
de faon immdiate.En
non seulerevanche,s'appellentpurs catgormesles termesqui signifient
mentles conceptsqu'ils signifient
de maniredirecte,mais aussi les choses
conues par ces concepts,et qui sont capables de fonctionnercomme
sujet ou prdicatd'une proposition.S'appellentmoyensou mixtessoitles
termesqui, outre le concept qu'ils signifient
de faon directe,signifient
comme
galementles chosesconues,sans pour autantpouvoirfonctionner
sujet ou prdicatd'une proposition,soit les termesqui comprennent la
foisun catgormeet un syncatgorme.48
nihil
velnilvelaliquid
vel generaliter
in neutro
omniasignauniversalia
velparticularia
ut omne,
substantiva,
, et sicde aliis.Et talestergenere,
quibusnonexprimuntur
aliquid
minidicuntur
mixti
etsincathegoreumatico.
ex cathegoreumatico
Et de facto
inmente
talibusterminis
ex actusincathegoreumatico
et termino
correspondet
conceptus
complexus
mentali
in quosmentaliter
utcumdicitur
resolvuntur;
cathegoreumatico,
aliquid,
<quod>
sicresolvitur
ens
, darumestquodin menteestcomplexio
terminorum,
aliquod
plurium
alterestpuresincathegoreumaticus
L'dition
etalterpurecathegoreumaticus."
de
quorum
Kaczmarek
a un caractre
nousavonschangquelquefois
la ponctuation.
provisoire;
de l'ouvrage
de Kaczmarek,
P.V. Spadea faitparatre
unetraduction
Indpendamment
cf.P.V.Spade,Peter
andInsolubles.
AnAnnotated
Translation
,
annote,
anglaise
ofAilly:
Concepts
n. 260).La datation
du trait
Dordrecht/Boston/London
1980,p. 16-34(100,n. 97-114,
- L. Kaczmarek
- O. Pluta,Diephilosophischen
estselonM. Chappuis
desPeter
von
Schriften
firPhilosophie
undChronologie
Zeitschrift
undTheologie
Authentizitt
, dans:Freiburger
Ailly.
cf.Biard,
33 (1986),p. 593-615,
du contenu
du trait,
part.p. 604-6.Pourdesaspects
dethorie
de
etreprsentation
chezPierre
Id.,Prsence
Logique,
p. 264-84,
d'Ailly.
Quelques
problmes
la connaissance
auXIVesicle
, dans:Dialogue31.3(1992),p. 459-74etL. Kaczmarek
(d.),
Destructions
modorum
simificandi,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia
1994,p. xv-xxxviii.
47Ockham,
Summa
, I, 4, ed.cit.,p. 1632"4.
logicae
48Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus,
dans
ed.cit.,
Ce passage
se comprend
p. 18789-8102.
la conception
de la smantique
exemcf.supra
buridanienne;
, p. 78,n. 4. Comme
gnrale
mixtes
le textedonne
ainsique la co, hodie,
nihil,
alicubi,
nemo,
secum,
plesdestermes
forte
o elleconnote
unetemporalit
pule(esi)dansla mesure
(cf.p. 207315-8320).

19:53:43 PM

CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT

95

On la trouve aussi chez Albert de Saxe, mais dans un vocabulaire


assez loignde celui de notreanonyme.Albertdistingueentreles cat(c'est--direen supposition
gormes(termesqui, pris en usage significatif
commesujetou prdicatd'une proponon-matrielle),
peuventfonctionner
ne
sition),les purs syncatgormes
(termesqui, pris en usage significatif,
ou
d'une
fonctionner
comme
sujet
proposition),et
peuventpas
prdicat
un
aliles syncatgormes
qui comprennent catgorme(syncathegoremata
et qui, cause du catgormecompris,sont
includentia)
qua cathegoremata
capable d'tre sujet ou prdicat.49
Le passagele plus prochedu vocabulairede notreanonymerestecepencit plus haut, du faitque seul Pierred'Aillytraite
dant celui du Conceptas
la tripledistinctionentrepurs catgormes,purs syncatgormes
et termes mixtesen utilisantle vocabulairede l'acte et du concept.
faitentrel'anonymeet le Conceptas
vaut gale(iii) Le rapprochement
mentpour la dfinition
du syncatgorme.
Bien que l'anonymene donne
il explique bien que
nullepart une dfinition
gnraledu syncatgorme,
la fonctionpropredu syncatgorme
consiste confreraux conceptsun
certainmode de signifier
(modus
), de sorteque l'intellectconoit
significandi
la chose signifiepar le concept "d'une certaine manire" (aliqualiter).
Concernantcette explication,on notera que l'anonymeutilisela notion
de mode de signifierdans un sens large et dcidmentnon technique,
et que son vocanotammentpar rapportaux traitsDe modissignificandi,
centresur la
bulaireest bien plus proche de la logique des terministes,
la
la
thoriede supposition,que de grammairespculativedes modistes.50
C'est par l'expression"aliqualiter
," employepour dsignerla signification
49Albert
de Saxe,Questiones
inartem
d. A. MuozGarca,Maracaibo1988,
veterem,
inlibrum
Aristotelis
deinterpretation,
despurssynQuaestiones
748,p. 492.Commeexemples
Albert
comme
dessyncathegoremata
donneomnis
etnullus;
exemples
aliquacathecatgormes,
includentia
etnihil
donnealiquid
comme
, Albert
goremata
aliquod
ens)
(quis'analyse
(quis'analyse
comme
nullum
le syncatgorme
se dfinit
du ctde sa
ens).ChezAlbert,
principalement
fonction
enrevanche,
la dfinition
dusyncatgorme
ChezOckham,
s'arpropositionnelle.
ticuleentirement
en termes
ChezBuridan,
on trouve
unedouble
de sa signification.
le syncatgorme
estcaractris
aussibiendu ctde sa signification
approche:
que du
ctde sa fonction
dansla proposition.
50Pourle vocabulaire
des modistae,
cf.I. Rosier,
La grammaire
des
spculative
technique
e linguaggio
nellaScolastica
: Parigi,
Lille1983et C. Marmo,
Semiotica
, Erfurt
Modistes,
Bologna
La semiotica
iciunpassage
clbre
d'Al1270-1330.
deiModisti
, Roma1994.Nousrappelons
en termes
bertde Saxe,qui parlegalement
dessyncatgormes
de modes,
nonpas de
modi
, maisde modirei.Il reliece "modede la chose"au complexe
significandi
significabile.Cf.Albert
de Saxe,Questiones
Aristotelis
deinterpretatione}
ed.cit., 767,p. 500:
inlibrum
"Tertia
remquesitsubstantia
velacciconclusio:
nonsignificant
aliquam
sincathegoremata
Patet
modum
dens,sedbenesignificant
rei,quodab aliisuocatur
significabile
complexe.
hoc:nampredicatum
a quolibet
subsubiecto
velremoveri
de quolibet
contento
verificali

19:53:43 PM

96

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

que l'anonymeest nouveau prochedu Conceppropredu syncatgorme,


tus. Dans cet ouvrage Pierre d'Ailly caractrise plusieursreprisesla
diffrence
entrela signification
du catgormeet celle du syncatgorme
"
," o aliquidexprimece qui
par l'expression aliquidvelaliqua velaliqualiter
est signifipar un catgormesingulier,aliqua ce qui est signifipar un
caractrisela significacatgormeplurielou collectif,alors que aliqualiter
tion propre du syncatgorme.51
En somme, sur le plan doctrinalet terminologique,notre premire
de Pierre
question anonyme s'apparente la smantique du Conceptus
d'Ailly.
IL2 La seconde
question
La question"utrum
esseequiuocus"
se compose galealiquisconceptus
potest
ment de deux articles,dont le premiertraitede faon gnralele mode
de signifier
propreaux conceptstandisque le second aborde le problme
de la possibilitde conceptsquivoques. La structure
formellede la question est comparable celle de la premire.
Le premierarticleprsented'abord quelques dfinitions.
Un concept
est dfinicomme la connaissance,prsentedans l'esprit,d'une chose.52
La dfinitionde la connaissanced'une chose, propose par l'anonyme,
est (i) une apprhensiond'une chose
comprenddeux lments:la cognicio
la
facult
et
cette
par
cognitive, (it) par
apprhension,la facultcognitivese trouve"modifievitalerient"
vitaliter
Le concept"homme"
(
immutatur).
est donc une apprhensiond'une chose qui modifievitalementl'intellect
de sorte qu'il connat actuellementdes humains rels. Ainsi, de par sa

contento
subsubiecto,
nonestaliquaresque sitsubstantia
vel accidens,
sed beneest
modus
reietdispositio,
velpredicati;
etsicsincathegoremata
benesignificant
putasubiecti
nonsolumsignificai
existentiam
rei,sedetiammodum
rei,etc."
aliquidproutlyaliquid
Ce passagea tsignal
AnOutline
Medieval
from
parPh.Boehner,
Logic.
ofItsDevelopment
1250toc. 1400, Manchester
endtail
1966,p. 22-4et 119,n.27,etanalys
parBraakhuis,
De 13deeeuwse
trac
reidansle cadrede
de modus
taten,
p. 385-92.Pourle rlede la notion
la thorie
du mouvement,
cf.S. Caroti,
Oresme
onMotion
III,
(Questiones
superPhysicam,
31.1(1993),p. 8-36,part.34-6,etId.,La position
sur
deNicole
Oresme
2-7),dans:Vivarium
la nature
dumouvement
, p. 335-42.
51Pierre
"Undein predictis
, ed.dt., p. 8117"26:
d'Ailly,
Conceptus
descriptionibus
ponitur
li aliquid
etponitur
terminos
numeri
noncollectivos;
propter
cathegoreumaticos
singularis
numeri
collectivos
velpropter
terminos
noncolterminos
aliqua
singularis
propter
plurales
etponitur
terminos
radonesignificationis.
lectivos;
aliqualiter
propter
sincathegoreumaticos
utisteterminus
homo
utistetersecundi:
Exemplum
primi:
significai
aliquid.Exemplum
minus
hommes
in plurali
tercii:
ut
, velisteterminus
populus
significant
aliqua.Exemplum
isteterminus
omnis
cf.galement
8431-851
etp. 933M.
significai
aliqualiter";
p.
52Cf. 120ll4-121115.
p.

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

97

connaissanceet son apprhension,la facultcognitivedevientelle-mme


La dfinition
de signifier
"des connaissances"(potentia
fitcogniriones).53
cognitiua
celle de la connaissance.Elle comprendles mmes
se reliedirectement
lments:signifier,
c'est (i) reprsenterquelque chose (<aliquid)ou d'une
certainemanire(<aliqualiter
) la facultcognitive,et (i) par cettereprsenla
facult
tation,
cognitiveest modifievitalement.54
avoir
conventionnelle
Aprs
voqu la distinctionentrela signification
et naturelle,l'anonymedivise la seconde catgorieen une signification
naturelleau sens commun.
naturelleau sens propre et une signification
aliterproprie)
ce dont
Un signe signifienaturellement
au sens propre (natur
il estla ressemblancenaturelleet propre.En revanche,il signifienaturellementau sens commun(naturaliter
ce dont il n'estpas la ressemcommuniter)
blance propre.Ainsi,le concept "homme" signifienaturellement
au sens
il
l'ensemble
des
humains
dont
est
la
ressemblance
En
naturelle.
propre
naturellement
au
sens
le
"homme"
se
revanche,
commun, concept
signifie
lui-mme,tout comme le mot vocal "homme" se signifielui-mmede
faon naturelleau sens commun. D'aprs l'anonyme, ces trois sortes
de signification,
naturelleau sens propre,naturelleau sens commun et
conviennentchacune au concept.55
conventionnelle,
Etant donn que le conceptest la ressemblancepropreet naturellede
la chose conue, il s'ensuitque le concept la signifienaturellementau
sens propre.D'aprs l'auteur,un concept n'est rien d'autre que la significationde la chose dont il est le concept,car le concept d'une chose est
et reprla connaissancede cettechose; or, connatregale reprsenter,
sentergedesignifier.
Plus exactement:chaque concept conoitet signifie
la chose conue de faon formelleet de par lui-mme(formaliter
seips),
du faitque la ressemblancepropre entrele concept et la chose se situe
au niveau de la forme.Le rapportentrele conceptet la chose tantformel et direct,il est impossiblequ'un concept soit actuellementprsent
dans l'espritsans signifier
ce qu'il signifienaturellement
au sens propre.
Le conceptsignifiedonc ncessairementce qu'il signifieainsi.56
Outre ce qu'il signifienaturellement
au sens propre,chaque concept
reprsenteet signifiedeux choses diffrentes.Premirement,chaque
conceptse reprsenteet se signifielui-mmeen tant que concept.Ainsi,
le concept "homme" reprsenteet signifie,outre les humains rels, le
53Cf.p. 121l17"22.
54Cf.p.
121124.
33Cf. 12r-122m
et I24y*.
p.
56Cf.p. 122,54-123196.

19:53:43 PM

98

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

et signification
concept "homme" lui-mmeen tant que reprsentation
des humainsrels. Deuximement,chaque conceptsignifiel'me en tant
de
du concept et la signification
que sa cause. Cette auto-signification
l'me en tant que cause, constituentce que le conceptsignifienaturellement au sens commun.57
D'aprs l'anonyme,chaque conceptest apte recevoirune imposition
soit la mme chose qu'il signifiedj
conventionnellement,
pour signifier
soit
d'autre.
chose
naturellement, quelque
Ainsi,le concept"homme,"qui
signifienaturellementau sens propre l'ensemble des humains, et qui
au sens communs'auto-signifie,
naturellement
peut treimpospour signifierconventionnellement
ce
soit.58
Cette
conventionquoi que
signification
nelle attacheau conceptne semblepas modifiersa signification
naturelle.
Avant d'aborderle problmede la possibilitd'un conceptquivoque,
examinonsquelles sont les dfinitions
d'univocitet d'quivocitmisesen
uvre par l'anonyme.Celles-ci s'apparententaux dfinitions
dont nous
avons parl dans notre introduction.L'on appelle ici univoque tout ce
qui signifieune ou plusieurschoses de par un seul concept(iunicoconcepto).
L'on appelle quivoque, en revanche,toutce qui signifieune pluralitde
choses (diurna),non pas de par un seul concept mais de par une pluralit de conceptsdiffrents
(<diuersis
conceptibus
).59
Les thsesde notre anonymese rsumentdans les deux propositions
suivantes.(i) A proprementparler,au niveau de sa signification
naturelle
au sens propre,chaque concept est univoque, car il signifiede par un
seul concept, savoir de par lui-mme,ce dont il est la ressemblance
naturelle.Or il n'est pas possiblequ'un seul conceptsoit la ressemblance
naturelleet propred'une pluralitde choses de par une pluralitde concar autrementle concept serait la fois un et multiple.
cepts diffrents,
Il s'ensuitque tout ce qui est signifipar un concept naturellement
au
sens propre constitueune unit selon l'espce.60
(i) Au sens plus large, un seul conceptpeut tre quivoque en signifiant une chose naturellementau sens propre,autre chose naturellement
au sens commun,et encore autre chose de faonconventionnelle.61
Ainsi,
le concept "homme" est quivoque en signifiantnaturellement
au sens
57Cf.p. 123198-124207,
et p. 127319"21.
p. 124211*2
30Cf.p. i24*ISMb
etp. 125** .
59Cf.p. 12086"90
et p. 126286"92.
ne faitpas la distinction
Notreanonyme,
cependant,
lestroismodesd'quivocation,
entre
dontnousavonsparlplushaut.Lesnotions
d'univocitetd'quivocit
sontutilises
icid'unemanire
assezgnrale.
bCf. l26*-'27'1*.
61Cf.p.
p. 127315*44.

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

99

propre l'ensemble des humains, en s'auto-signifiantnaturellementau


sens commun et en signifiantde faon conventionnellen'importequoi
d'autre. Un seul concept peut galement tre quivoque en signifiant
au sens commundeux choses diffrentes,
naturellement
c'est--direen se
lui-mme
en
et
l'me
en
tant
sa
cause.62
Finalement,
signifiant
signifiant
que
un concept peut tre quivoque en signifiantde faon purementconventionnelle,abstractionfaitede sa signification
naturelle,une diversit
de choses de par plusieursconceptsdiffrents.63
Tout comme la questionprcdente,la question Utrum
aliquisconceptas
essequiuocus
de Pierred'Ailly.Nous le monpotest
s'apparenteau Conceptas
treronspour troislments:(i) l'assimilationdes notionsde concept,de
et de signification;(ii) la dfinitionde
connaissance,de reprsentation
connaissanceet de signifier
comme une vitalisimmutatio
; (iii) l'laboration
de la distinction
entrela signification
naturelleau sens propreet au sens
commun.
(i) La conception
gnralede la smantiquemiseen uvrepar l'anonyme,
tourneautour d'une assimilationentrele domaine de la connaissanceet
celui de la signification.
Le concept est la fois assimil la connaisil
car
n'est
rien
d'autre
de la chose,et la signification,
sance,
que la cognicio
du faitqu'il est dfinicomme l'acte de signifierla chose conue. Cette
assimilations'exprime dans l'identificationdes notions de concept, de
connaissance,de reprsentation,
Or,
d'apprhensionet de signification.
cetteconceptiongnralede la smantiqueest voisinede celle du Conceptas. Comme l'anonyme,Pierred'Aillyrelie le concept tant la connaissance qu' la signification
de la chose, et il identifiede maniresemblable les notionsde concept,d'acte d'intelliger
et de connaissanceapprhensive
d'une chose, ainsi que les notionsde signifier
et de reprsenter.64
(ii) L'assimilation entre les domaines de la connaissance et de la
significationentrane un rapprochementdes dfinitionsdes deux domaines. Chez l'anonyme,la notion centrale dans les dfinitionsde la
connaissanceet de la signification
est: vitalisimmutatio.
Dans l'acte de connatre,la facultcognitiveengendreune apprhensiond'une chose par
c'est le terme
laquelle elle est modifievitalement.Dans l'acte de signifier,
62Cf.p. 128346"56.
63Cf. 128358*63.
p.
64Pierre
"Notandum
estulterius
men, ed.cit.,
d'Ailly,
Conceptas
p. 8321*2:
quodterminus
siveactusintelligendi
etnoticia
reiapprehensiva
idemsunt";
cf.galement
talis,
conceptus
Pourunaperu
de la smantique
de Pierre
notamment
p. 8114"6.
gnral
d'Ailly,
pourl'assimilation
desdomaines
de la connaissance
etde la signification,
cf.Biard,
, p. 264Logique
etreprsentation
84,etId.,Prsence
, p. 459-74,
part.461-2.

19:53:43 PM

100

BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.

qui modifievitalementla facultcognitiveen lui reprsentantquelque


chose (<aliquid)ou d'une certainemanire(<aliqualiter
). Chez l'anonyme,la
de
connaissanceet de
constituedonc le noyau des actes
vitalisimmutatio
Chez Pierre d'Ailly,la notion de vitalisimmutatio
occupe la
signification.
mme place centrale. Elle se trouve d'emble dans la dfinitiond'un
terme,comme ce qui est apte signifier
quelque chose (aliquidou aliqua)
ou d'une certainemanire(aliqualiter)
pour la facultcognitiveen la moElle se trouveensuitedans la dfinitionde signifier,
difiantvitalement.65
comme reprsenter
quelque chose ou d'une certainemanire la facult
en
la
modifiant
vitalement.66
Dans le Conceptus,
Pierre d'Ailly
cognitive
en termesde connaissance:elle est une concaractrisela vitalisimmutatio
naissanceactuelle,dontla cause efficiente
est en partiela facultcognitive
et en partie la chose connue, et elle se situe dans la facultcognitive.67
(iii) Notre anonyme distingueentre trois sortes de significationqui
conviennentau concept:naturelleau sens propre,naturelleau sens commun et conventionnelle.Le concept signifienaturellement
au sens proet
il
la
de
ce
lui-mme
dont
est
ressemblance
naturelle;
pre qu'il signifie par
naturellement
au sens commun,il se signifielui-mmemais non pas de

65Conceptus,
estsignum
ed.cit.,
"Terminus
p. 817'9:
quodeximpositione
quamactuhabet
velex natura
immutando
earnvitaliter
sua,potentie
aliquidvelaliquavelalicognitive
natum
estsignificare."
qualiter
66Conceptus
autem
eamvitaliter
immuestpotentie
, ed.cit.,
cognitive
p. 8114*6:
"Significare
tandoaliquidvelaliquavelaliqualiter
representare."
67Conceptus,
inproposito
noticia
immutatio
estactualis
ed.cit.,
"Undevitalis
p. 8127-233:
etinherens
vitaliter
sivecognitio
effective
causataa potentia
partialiter
cognitiva
perceptiva
Ex istadescriptione
vitaliter
sequitur
ipsipotentie
cognitive
perceptive.
quodad hocquod
sive
immutans
vitaliter
dicitur
noticia
potentiam
cognitivam
aliquaressivealiquaqualitas
Prima
illius
ad cognitivam
vitalis
immutatio
habitudo
qualitatis
potentiam.
requiritur
duplex
saltem
est
a potentia
estquodsiteffective
(. . .). Secundahabitudo
cognitiva,
partialiter
et insicutaccidens
inheret
suo subiecto
potentie
cognitive
quodtalisnoticiainhereat
de vitalis
immutatio
dansla
Pouruneanalyse
de la notion
formet
potentiam
cognitivam."
immutacf.L. Kaczmarek,
Vitalis
et dansla smantique
de Pierred'Ailly,
psychologie
derSptscholastik,
dans:A. Heinekamp
tio.Erkundungen
zurerkenntnispsychologischen
Terminology
Heinrich
Mnster
rationis.
W. Lenzen- M. Schneider
Mathesis
fiir
(d.),
Festschrifi
Schepers,
und
vonAilly,
Sent.
1, q. 3. Anmerkungen
beiPeter
zu Quellen
1990,p. 189-206;
Id., "Notitia"
im14.und15.Jahrhundert
dans:O. Pluta(d.),DiePhilosophie
1988,
, Amsterdam
Textgestalt,
de
la notion
a montr
d'Ailly
emprunte
que Pierre
part.p. 390.Kaczmarek
p. 385-420,
immutatio
deJeande Ripa.ChezJeande Ripa,la vitalis
vitalis
au commentaire
desSentences
aussibiende l'inhrence
immutatio
se situedansl'intellect
surunmodedistinct
quede l'inPierre
confirme
formation.
Dansle Conceptus
, en revanche,
d'Ailly
qu'ellese situedansla
dansla
Pourla notion
de vitalis
immutatio
facult
surle modede l'inhrence.
cognitive
dela vision
Leproblme
thorie
de connaissance
deJeande Ripa,cf.F. Ruello,
thologique
doctrinale
duXIV sicle,
d'histoire
l'universit
lemilieu
dans:Archives
deParisvers
batifique
du Moyenge55 (1980),p. 122-70.
etlittraire

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

101

il est capable de signifiern'importe


par lui-mme;conventionnellement,
de
autre
chose
concept.
quelle
par n'importequel
Des lmentsde cettethoriecurieusese trouventchez Albertde Saxe,
savoir dans le cadre de sa thoriede
mais dans un contextediffrent,
la suppositionmatrielle.Comme Ockham,mais contrairement
Buridan,
Albertadmet la suppositionmatriellenon seulementdans le langage
mais aussi dans le langage mental.Un termemental,tout
conventionnel,
en tantsigne naturel,peut avoir une suppositionmatrielleen plus de
C'est en traitantla suppositionmatrielle
sa suppositionpersonnelle.68
d'un termementalqu'Albertdistingueentre ce qu'un tel termesignifie
au senspropreet au sens commun.D'aprs Albert,le terme
naturellement
mentalsignifienaturellement
au sens proprece qu'il signifiepar le terme
conventionnelqui lui est subordonn,c'est--direles choses rellesdont
il est le signe naturel.Ainsi, le termemental suppose personnellement.
En revanche,ce que le termementalsignifie,mais non pas par le terme
conventionnel
qui lui est subordonn,constituece qu'il signifienaturellementau sens commun.De cettemanire,le termementalse signifieluiLe mme concept peut donc
mme. Il suppose alors matriellement.69
de
manire
choses
naturelle
deux
diffrentes
en fonctionde deux
signifier
68Albert
de Saxe,Perutilis
Albert
dfinit
la supposi, II, 3, d. Kann,p. 173'-66.
logica
tionmatrielle
comme
suit(p. 1733"6):
materialis
estacceptio
termini
"Suppositio
quiacciveldissimili
eodemmodovelalitersupponente
cui
pitur
prose velproaliquosibisimili
nonimponitur
ad significandum,
necilludproquosupponit
naturaliter
proprie
significai."
"Et dicebatur
Albert
naturaliter
ultimo:
Necillud
prcise
proquosupponit
(p. 17416"8):
proprie
mentales
eximpositione
sednaturaliter."
significai
quoadterminos
quinonsignificant
aliquid
Ockham
admetla triplicit
de supposition
et matrielle
dansle lanpersonnelle,
simple
au contraire,
Cf.supra
Buridan,
,
gagemental.
n'yadmetque la supposition
personnelle.
80,n. 12.
p. 69
Albert
de Saxe,Perutilis
, II, 3, d.Kann,p. 174-5 . "Etsignificant
logica
aliquanaturaliter
communiter.
Istudenimterminus
mentalis
diproprie,
aliquaautemnaturaliter
citur
naturaliter
ex impositione
voluntaria
significare
proprie
quodsignificai
perterminm
ad placitum
institutum
termino
et sic hicterminus
mentali,
qui subordinatur
praedicto
mentalis
homo
Sortem
et Platonem,
ethocnaturaliter
Et quandotermisignificai
proprie.
nusmentalis
materialiter
sed personaliter.
Istud
proaliquotali,nonsupponit
supponit
autemterminus
mentalis
naturaliter
dicitur
communiter
significare
quodab iliotermino
mentali
sednonperterminm
ad placitum
institutum
illitermino
mentali
subsignificatur,
ordinatum.
Ed sicterminus
mentalis
se naturaliter
communiter
et terminos
sibi
significat
similes.
Et quandoterminus
mentalis
sed
quodnonnaturaliter
proprie
protalisupponit
tuncsupponit
naturaliter
communiter
materialiter."
La source
d'Albert
significat,
peuttre
ThomasMaulfelt,
De suppositionibus
Wiss.Allgemeinbibliothek,
, ms.Erfurt,
Ampl.4 271,
f.41v:"Edamadditur
illapartcula
necipsum
naturaliter
proprie
significat,
quiaquidam
conceptusse ipsum
naturaliter
communiter
ueleciamsibisimile,
utilleconceptus
homo
significat
uel consimilis;
naturaliter
sicudisteconceptus
enset
quidamsignificat
qualitas)
proprie,
huiusmodi.
Et dicitur
se naturaliter
se ipsumnaturaliter
significare
proprie
quiainportat
etsuumsimile
in uoceuelin scripto
eundem
eciamconceptum
ex inpositione
uoluntaria

19:53:43 PM

102

PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER

Bien que l'ide qu'un conceptrenvoieaux


typesde suppositiondiffrents.
selon sa suppochoses selon sa suppositionpersonnelle,et s'auto-signifie
sitionmatrielle,soit comparable ce qu'exprimenotreanonyme,celuiles notions
ci s'carte du texted'Albertsur deux points. Premirement,
de suppositionpersonnelleet matriellen'interviennent
pas chez l'anonyme. Deuximement,l'ide qu'un concept en tant que concept puisse
avoir une signification
en plus de sa double signification
conventionnelle,
naturelle,ne se trouvenulle part dans le texted'Albert.
C'est nouveau dans le Conceptus
que se trouveune thoriesemblable
de
trois
sortes
voquant
significations
possiblesd'un concept,mais d'une
manireplus labore que chez l'anonyme.Elle s'articuledans le cadre
entredes termesmentauxproprementet improprement
d'une distinction
dits.70Les termesmentauxproprementdits sont des conceptsdes choses.
Ils n'ont qu'une signification
naturelle.71
Comme l'anonyme,Pierred'Ailly
un
ici
entre
sens
et
un
sens
communde cettesignification
distingue
propre
naturelle.Le conceptsignifienaturellement
au sens proprela chose qu'il
et
il
de
lui-mme
dont
est la similitudenaturelle.Il
signifie par
(seipso)
naturellement
au
sens
commun,non pas de par lui-mme
s'auto-signifie
mais par l'intermdiaire
de quelque chose d'autre.72En revanche,les termes mentaux improprementdits ne sont pas des concepts des choses,
mais des conceptsdes motsvocaux ou crits.Ils signifient
naturellement
au senspropreles motsvocaux ou critsdontils sontla similitude
naturelle.
Outre leur signification
naturelleau sens propre,ils sont aptes signifier
conventionnellement
tout ce qui peut tre dsignpar les mots dont ils
sont la ressemblancenaturelle.Chez Pierre d'Ailly c'est donc le terme
mentalimproprement
la foisde faon naturelleet
dit qui peut signifier
Omnisigitur
stansinpropositione
mentali
representans.
proisto
significai
conceptus
quod
3est
(homo
naturaliter
utin ilio/f.42r/exemplo
communiter,
materialiter,
concepsupponit
tusanime
mee
Sed conceptus
sicsupponens
, positoquodsicintelligam.
proeo quodnatuutin
raliter
nichilsignificat
dicitur
proprie
reprsentt
personaliter
supponere,
significai
a me"Le passagecitdu Perutilis
se trouve
logica
exemplo
'qualitas'
concipitur
quasi-littrachez
lement
d. Bos,p. 1226-323.
de Hollande,
Suppositions,
70PierreJean Conceptus
estter"Itemterminorum
mentalium
, ed.cit.,
d'Ailly,
quidam
p. 852'3:
minus
mentalis
aliusimproprie
dietus."
dietus,
proprie
71Conceptus
solumnatdietus
mentalis
estterminus
, ed.dt.,p. 88'1 . "Terminus
proprie
uraliter
Lestermes
ditssontsoitdesintentions
mentaux
premires,
signifieans."
proprement
soitdesintentions
cf.ibid
secondes;
., p. 8629-810.
72Conceptus
naturaliter
"Notatamen
, ed.dt.}p. 88l2"28:
dupliciter.
quodsignificare
capitur
est[aliquid]
se
Unomodoproprie,
aliomodocommuniter.
naturaliter
Significare
proprie
alioaliquidpotentie
earnvitaliter
immutando
representare
ipsoetnonmediante
cognitive
estnonse ipso,sed mediante
alio aliquid
naturaliter
communiter
(. . .). Sed significare
earnvitaliter
immutando
cognitive
(. .
potentie
representare

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

103

soit une pluralitde choses diffrentes


soit une mme
conventionnelle,
chose.73
En rsum,comme dans le cas du premiertexteet mme davantage,
la doctrinede la seconde question s'apparente celle du Conceptus.
La
ainsi
de
est
le
entre
savoir
nos
deux
textes
questions'impose
quel
rapport
anonymeset le traitde Pierred'Ailly.Avantde pouvoirrpondre cette
question,nous devons d'abord examinerle rapportdes deux questions
entreelles.
II.3 Le rapport
entre
les deuxquestions
Ayantvu que chacune de nos deux questionsanonymesa des traits
communsavec le Conceptus
, nous devons poser la question de savoir si
elles constituent
entreelles une quelconque unit,ou bien s'il s'agit simplementde deux questionsdisputesspares.
Certains lments semblent favoriserl'association des deux textes.
D'abord, les questionsconcernentchacune un problme relatifau langage mentalet, de faon gnrale,elles relventd'une mme conception
de la smantiqueselon laquelle un concept est un signe dsignantde
manireindterminel'ensemblede choses extra-mentales
qui lui corre"
spondant.Ensuite,l'emploi de l'expression aliqualite*
pour caractriser
la signification
propre d'un syncatgormeconstitueun trait commun
entreles deux questions.74
Finalement,la convenanceentreles deux questionsse confirmepar leur similitudeau niveau de la structureformelle.
Cependant,troislmentsdes deux questionsfavorisent
pluttleur dissociation.Nous rappelonsd'abord que la partiedu manuscrito se trouventnos textesanonymesconsisteen un ensembled'ouvragesdistinctset
73
"Terminus
mentalis
dietus
estconcep, ed.cit.,
Conceptus
p. 853'28:
[mentalis]
improprie
tusvocisvelscripture
sinonime
talivoci.Et dicitur
talisconceptus
terminus
mentalis
impronaturaliter
vocemvelscrip, quiaesttalisconceptus
priedietus
qui,licetsignificet
proprie
turam
cuiusestnaturalis
ad placitum
cumhoc significare
et
similitudo,
potesttarnen
subordinari
alteri
Verbigratia:
huius
conceptui
qui solumnaturaliter
significai.
conceptus
vocishomo
naturaliter
illamvocem
homo,
similitudo,
proprie
significai
quiaesteiusnaturalis
sedad placitum
omnes
insignificatane
homines
etutsicsubordinatur
significai
singulares,
illiconceptui
estrepresentativus
omnium
hominum.
(. . .) Clarum
qui naturaliter
proprie
estquodquispotest
in se formare
huiusvocisens.Quo facto,
illeconceptus
conceptum
illamvocemens
et idemconceptus
, cumsiteiusnaturalis
similitudo,
proprie
representat
ad placitum
omnesresmundi,
in significando
illiconceptui
significai
quiasubordinatur
communissimo
remmundi.
omnem
Et cumillavoxens
quinaturaliter
representat
proprie
situnaresconcepta
communissimo
omnium
entium,
conceptu
representativo
sequitur
quod
huiusvocisensad placitum
illamvocemensque etiamsignificai
natuconceptus
significai
raliter
proprie."
74Cf.
etp. 12112 .
p. 11359"72

19:53:43 PM

104

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

varis. Dans le manuscrit,il n'y a aucune indicationque nos deux questions constituentune unit quelconque, bien que le faitque la copie du
premier texte ne soit pas acheve laisse une incertitudesur ce point.
Ensuite, la seconde question donne un renvoi la "question prcdente," qui toutefoisne semble pas visernotrepremiertexte.Le renvoi
concernela dfinition
d'univocitcomme signification
d'une ou de plusieurs chosesde par un seul concept[unicoconceptu)P
Or, une telledfinition
ne se trouvenulle part dans la premirequestion.Finalement,le faitque
la notionla plus remarquablede la deuximequestion,celle de la Vitalis
immutatio
, soit entirementabsente dans le premiertexte,semble tre un
argumentpour dissocierles deux questions.
En somme, cause de leur positionisole dans le manuscrit,il est
pratiquementimpossibled'tabliravec certitudele rapportprcis entre
les deux questions.Cependant,deux conclusionssemblenttrepermises,
(z) Le renvoi une questionprcdentemontreque la deuximequestion
provientprobablementd'un ensemble consistantde plusieursquestions.
La convenanceentrenos deux textesanonymessur le plan doctrinalet
au niveau du vocabulairen'exclutpas la possibilitque la premirequestion proviennedu mme ensemble,(it) En revanche,en supposantque
les deux textesproviennentd'un mme ensemblede questions,il est pratiquementsr qu'ils ne s'y sont pas suivisdirectementdans l'ordre qui
est celui de notremanuscrit.
III. Les deuxquestions
et le Conceptus de PierreAilly
anonymes
Dans ce qui prcde,nous avons faitun rapprochement
entrenos ques. Il nous restemaintenant tablirplus prtionsanonymeset le Conceptus
cismentle rapportentreces troistextes.A cet effet,nous concentrons
d'abord notreattentionsur l'ouvrage de Pierred'Ailly.
Le Conceptus
est un traitsur le langage mental. Plus exactement,le
traitdveloppe une thorie des termesmentaux,vocaux et crits,en
examinantles deux derniersprincipalement
du ct de leur dpendance
l'gard du langage mental.L'auteur insistesur la subordinationdu langage crit et vocal au langage mental.76Quant sa forme,le Conceptus
A
et de distinctions.
se prsentecomme un compendiumde dfinitions
deux passages prs, o l'auteur critiquela thoriemodistedes partiesdu
75Cf. 126287*89.
p.
/bPierre
vocalis
d Amy,Conceptus
, ed.cit.,p. 99. Totaratioquarealiquisterminus
sivetermino
istamvelistamremestquia ad placitum
subordinatur
significet
conceptui
mentali
istamvelillamrem."
dicto,
proprie
qui naturaliter
proprie
significai

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

105

discourset de la construction,77
le traitn'a pas le caractred'un discoursargumentativ
mais d'une expositiond'une thoriesmantiquegnrale. Abstractionfaite de l'introductionterminologique,cette exposition
se divise en troistapes correspondantaux trois typesde termes,mais
du faitque les termescritset vocaux se subsumentsous le dnominateurde termesconventionnels,78
le traitconsisteen deux partiesprincil'une
sur
les
termes
mentaux
l'autresur les termesconventionnels.79
pales,
Ce qui nous intresseici, ce sont les distinctionset les dfinitions
donnes, ainsi que l'organisationdu trait.
Dans son introduction,
Pierred'Aillydfinitles notionsde terme,80
de
La
et
de
vitalis
immutatio.
vitalisimmutatio
est une connaissance
signifier,81
en acte (actualis
noticia
), cause en partiepar la facultcognitiveet en partie par la chose connue, et elle se trouvedans la facultcognitivesur le
mode d'inhrence,tout comme une formeaccidentelleinhre dans son
sujet.82Ensuite,l'auteur donne sa typologiegnrale du signe. Dans ce
est dfinicomme un signequi conduit(ducit)
cadre,le termeconventionnel
la connaissancede la chose signifie.Le termeconceptuel,en revanche,
est un signe qui est lui-mmeconnaissancede la chose signifie,dont il
est la similitudenaturelle.83
La premirepartieprincipaledu traitanalyseles termesconceptuels.
Ayant assimilles notionsde concept, de terme mental,d'acte d'intelliger et de connaissanceapprhensive,l'auteur examine (i) la connaissance apprhensivesimple et complexe, (ii) les termes mentaux catgormatiqueset syncatgormatiques,
(iii) les termesmentauxproprement
77Conceptus
et 9927-10017.
Pourla thorie
modiste
desparties
du dis, ed.rit.,
p. 8829-921
coursetde la cons
truc
La notion
departie
dudiscours
dansla grammaire
tio,cf.I. Rosier,
spculative
On
, dans:Histoire,
Epistmologie,
Langage3.1 (1981),p. 49-62,et G.H. Kneepkens,
mediaeval
tothe
with
notion
, dans:Histoire,
syntactic
special
reference
ofconstruction
thought
Epistmode la thorie
modiste
logie,Langage12.2(1990),p. 139-76,
part.p. 164-7.Unecritique
de la construction,
cellede Pierre
se trouve
danslesquestions
sur
d'Ailly,
comparable
la secondepartiedu Doctrinale
un certain
Marsile(d'Inghen?);
cf.C.H.
, attribues
: A Quaestiones-commentaiy
ontheSecond
PartofAlexander
de
Erfurt,
Q. 70A
Kneepkens,
Ampl.
Villa
Dei'sDoctrinale
AnExplorative
Noteona Specimen
byMarsilius
ofInghen?
ofConceptualist
Grammar
28.1(1990),p. 26-54.
, dans:Vivarium
78Conceptus
"De terminis
etmentalibus
dictis
, ed.cit.,
p. 10019"21:
scriptis
improprie
penitusuniformiter
dicendum
estsicutde vocalibus,
sicad placitum
quia
significant."
79Selonla pagination
de l'dition
de Kaczmarek,
le trait
se divisecomme
suit:introduction
et terminologique,
surlestermes
gnrale
p. 81'-8320;
premire
partieprincipale
seconde
surlestermes
mentaux,
conventionnels,
p. 832l-9236;
principale
partie
p. 931-10021.
, ed.at.,p. 81 , cf.supra,
100,n. 65.
Conceptus
p.
81
ed.cit.,p. 8114"6;
cf.supra,
Conceptus,
p. 100,n. 66.
ed.cit.,p. 81 -2 , cf.supra
, p. 100,n. 67.
Conceptus,
83Conceptus,
ed.cit.,p. 8235-320.

19:53:43 PM

106

PAULJ.J.M.
BARKER

naturelleau sens propre et au


et improprement
dits,(iv) la signification
sens commun et (v) les termesabsolus et connotatifs.
(i) La connaissanceapprhensived'une chose est de deux sortes:simple
et complexe. La connaissancesimple est la mme chose qu'un concept
simple (ex.: homo),tandis que la connaissancecomplexe est identique
un conceptcomplexe.Un conceptpeut trecomplexesoit selon un mode
indistant(ex.: homoalbus)soit selon un mode distant(ex.: homoestalbus).
Une propositionmentalepeut donc s'interprter
comme un seul concept
modum
distantis
.84
complexeper
sont
(i) Les termesmentauxcatgormatiqueset syncatgormatiques
aussi
bien
du
de
vue
de leur signification
analyss
point
que du point de
vue de leurfonction
L'auteuraboutit une quadruple
(officium).
grammaticale
distinction
entre(a) des termesmentauxcatgormatiques
de signification
et
b
de
des
termes
mentaux
syncatgormatiques fonction;(,)
catgormatiques
de fonctionet syncatgormatiques
de signification;
(c) des termesmentaux
la foiscatgormatiques
de signification
et de fonctionet (d) des termes
mentaux la foissyncatgormatiques
de signification
et de fonction.85
Un
terme
mental
dit
un
est
(iii)
proprement
concept d'une chose.Un
tel termesignifiede faon purementnaturelle.Un termementalimproprementdit, en revanche,est un concept d'un motvocal ou crit. Ces
conventionnelle
conceptsdes mots sont capables d'avoir une signification
en plus de leur signification
naturelle.86
Les termesmentauxproprement
dits sont soit des intentionspremires,s'ils signifient
leur signifien tant
que chose et non en tant que signe, soit des intentionssecondes, s'ils
leur signifien tant que signe d'autre chose.87
signifient
La
naturellese diviseen une signification
naturelleau
(iv)
signification
sens propre et au sens commun. On parle d'une signification
naturelle
84Conceptas
Cf.Biard,Logique
, ed.cit.,
, p. 278etSpade,Peter
ofAilly,
p. 101,
p. 8322-42.
n. 120.
85Conceptus
, ed.cit.,
, p. 268-9etSpade,Peter
Logique
ofAilly,
p. 102-4,
p. 84-5, cf.Biard,
n. 122-35.
Cette
dusyncatgorme
avoirtintroduite
double
semble
approche
parBuridan,
Tractatus
cf.supra,
desuppositionibus
etsupra,
, ed.cit
., p. 188106"14
p. 94.
86Conceptus
cf.supra
semble
, ed.dt.,p. 852-628;
, p. 102,n. 70 et p. 103,n. 73. Pierre
avoiremprunt
la distinction
entretermes
et improprement
dits
mentaux
proprement
de Rimini,
d'unepart,les noncs
mentales
entre,
Grgoire
qui distingue
qui sontdes
desmotsvocaux[voces)
et qui varient
en fonction
de la difference
imagesou similitudes
deslangues,
mentales
desmots
et,d'autre
part,lesnoncs
pasdessimilitudes
qui,n'tant
sontidentiques
cheztousleshumains
etquisignifient
naturellevocaux,
(eaedem
apudomnes)
afinde pouvoir
conventionnellement;lesmotsvocauxleurssontsubordonnes
signifier
mentunechoseextra-mentale.
etsecundum
Cf.Grgoire
de Rimini,
Lectura
super
primm
Sententiarum
111. Cf.Biard,Logique
, I, prol.,1, 3, d. A.D. Trapp- V. Marcolino,
,
p. 3025n. 136-49.
ofAilly,
p. 270-1et Spade,Peter
p. 104-5,
n. 150-68.
, ed.at., p. 86-8. Cf.Spade,Peter
, p. 105-7,
Conceptus
ofAilly

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

107

au sens propre,si le signe signifieune chose de par lui-mmeet non pas


de par quelque chose d'autre. En revanche,on parle d'une signification
naturelleau senscommun,si le signesignifiela chose signifie
par quelque
chose d'autre. Chaque chose relle peut avoir une signification
naturelle
au sens commun,du faitque chaque chose existenteest capable de produire un concept dans un intellectquelconque et de provoquer,par ce
d'elle-mmedans la facultcognitive.88
concept,une reprsentation
(v) La distinctionentretermesmentauxabsolus et connotatifsconclut
la premirepartieprincipaledu trait.Un termementalabsolu ne connote rien d'autre que ce pour quoi il "suppose naturellement"
(naturaliter
En
mental
connotatif
un
terme
connote
revanche,
)
supponit
quelque chose
A l'oppos du terme
d'autreque ce pour quoi il suppose naturellement.89
savoirun signifimatabsolu,le termeconnotatifa un double signifi,
riel (son rfrentau sens strict)et un signififormel(ce que le terme
connote).90La distinctionentre termesabsolus et connotatifss'applique
enfin la terminologie
mme du trait:les notionsde concept,de connaissance en acte (actualisnoticia
), d'acte d'intelligeret de vitalisimmutatio
supune
seule
et
mme
posentpour
qualit de la facultcognitive,mais selon
une pluralitde connotations.91
La seconde partie principaledu traitanalyse les termesconventionPierred'Aillyexamine
nels. Ayantdfinila signification
conventionelle,92

deux
de
savoir
la
de faon ultime
()
degrs signification,
signification
et de faon non-ultime,(ii) les termes catgormatiques,syncatgormatiques et mixtes,(iii) les termesconventionnelsd'impositionou d'intentionpremireet d'impositionou d'intentionseconde et (iv)les termes
absolus et connotatifs.
conventionnels
88Conceptas
cf.supra
, ed.cit
., p. 8812"28;
, p. 102,n. 72.
89
ed.cit p. 8922-913.
Pourle rlede la notion
de suppositio
dansl'ouvrage
de
Conceptus,
Pierre
cf.Biard,
, p. 283-4.
d'Ailly,
Logique
90
, ed.cit.,p. 914'17.
91Conceptus
ed.cit.,
"Notandum
estquodconceptus
estactualis
noticia
alicuius
Conceptus,
p. 9118-236:
reicausata
inanima,
ab obiecto,
scilicet
a reconcepta
sivecognita,
etpartialiter
partialiter
etiama potentia
vitaliter
formaliter
immutans
intellectivam.
Et
ipsampotentiam
cognitiva
sicconceptus,
actualis
actusintelligendi,
vitalis
immutatio
noticia,
proeademresivequalitatesupponunt;
istitermini
tamen
illiusquali
tatis(. . .)."
cognotant
aliquashabitudines
92Conceptus
"Voxsignificativa
ad piaci
tumestqua apprehensa
ab
, ed.cit.,p. 936-418:
audituex impositione
eamvitaliter
immuquamactuhabet,nataestpotentie
cognitive
tandoinstrumentaliter
aliuda se etsibisimaliquidvelaliquavelaliqualiter
representare
ilia suoprolatore
vela suispartibus,
nisialiquidillorum
ex impositione.
(. . .)
significet
Notandum
estpromaiori
intellectu
ad placitum
nonestaliud
predictorum
quodsignificare
facta
etperplacitum
alicuius
totius
communitatis
velalicuius
quaminstitutio
pervoluntatem
habentis
etgerentis
velaliquavelaliqualiter
auctoritatem
vicem
totius
communitatis
aliquid
representare."

19:53:43 PM

108

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

d'un termeconventionnel
est
ultimatum)
(i) Le signifiultime(significatimi
ce que le termesignifiede faon propre et directe,c'est--direla chose
relle que le termesignifieen raison de son imposition.En revanche,le
nonultimatum)
d'un termeconventionnelest
signifinon-ultime(significatum
son signifi
le concept auquel il est subordonnafinde pouvoirsignifier
ultime.Le signifinon-ultimed'un termeconventionneln'est pas signifi
en raison de l'impositiondu terme.A proprementparler,un termeconventionnelne signifiepas le concept auquel il est subordonn,car il n'a
pas t impos pour signifierun concept. Il signifie,au contraire,une
chose rellepar l'intermdiaire
d'un concept.La signification
d'un terme
conventionnelprsupposela signification
naturelledu termemental.Du
ct de sa signification
non-ultime,certainsattribuentau termeconventionnelune "suppositionmentale" (suppositio
mentalis
), appele habituellement suppositionsimple,alors que du ct de sa signification
ultime,le
termevocale suppose personnellement.93
entrecatgormeset syncatgormes
(ii) La distinction
s'applique aussi
bien aux termesconventionnelsqu'aux termesmentaux.L'auteur introduit ici la tripledistinctionentrecatgormes,syncatgormes
et termes
mixtes.Les termesmixtes,en partie catgormeet en partie syncatgorme,sont analyss en termesde leur correspondantmental: celui-ci
est un conceptcompos d'un acte syncatgormatique
et d'un termemental catgormatique.94
(iii) Les termesvocaux d'impositionou d'intentionpremiresont des
termesqui signifient
une chose en tant que chose et non en tant que
sont
Ils
signe.
appels "d'impositionpremire" cause du faitqu'ils ne
prsupposent
pas l'impositiond'un autretermequelconque;ils sontappels
"d'intentionpremire"parce qu'ils sont subordonns un termemental
qui, lui, est d'intentionpremireproprementdit. En revanche,les termes
conventionnelsd'impositionou d'intentionseconde sont des termesqui
signifient
quelque chose en tant que signe d'autre chose. Ils sont appels
"d'impositionseconde" cause du fait que leur impositionprsuppose
l'impositiond'un autre terme;ils sont appels "d'intentionseconde" par
le faitqu'ils sont subordonns un concept d'intentionseconde.95

93Conceptas
Le vocabulaire
de Pierre
ultimatum
vs.
, ed.dt p. 9418-536.
d'Ailly
{significatum
nonultimatum)
immeceluide Buridan
ultimatum
vs.significatum
significatum
(significatum
rappelle
Cf.supra,
etPierre
du rapport
entre
Buridan
diatum).
d'Ailly,
p. 3, n. 4. Pouruneanalyse
cf.Biard,Losique
, p. 274-7.
94Conceptas
cf.supra
, ed.cit.,p. 9617-724;
, p. 93,n. 46.
^ Conceptus
, ed.at p. 97"-9.

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SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

109

tantenfinapplique
entretermesabsoluset connotatifs
(iv)La distinction
la deuximepartieprincipaledu traitse teraux termesconventionnels,
de la dpendance totale du langage vocal et crit
mine par l'affirmation
l'garddu langagemental,suivied'une critiquede la conceptionmodiste
de la smantique.96
Nous pouvonsmaintenantformulerquelques conclusionsconcernantle
rapportentrenos questionsanonymeset le Conceptus.
(i) Nos questionsne sont pas des extraitslittraux,ou des fragments
d'un extraitlittral,du textede Pierre d'Ailly.Cela est exclu aussi bien
en raison de la formedes troistextesqu'en raison de leur contenu.Du
soient
ct formel,il sembleexclu que nos textesscolaireset argumentatifs
comme l'est le Conceptus.
Du ct
des extraitsd'un recueilde dfinitions
du contenu,bien que le problme du correspondantmental d'un syncatgorme,affrontpar notre premire question, interviennedans le
, notre texte contientun certainnombre d'lmentsdoctrinaux
Conceptus
qui ne figurentpas dans le traitde Pierre d'Ailly.97En outre,le problme de l'quivocit des concepts, traitpar notre seconde question
,98
absent dans le Conceptus
anonyme,est entirement
de l'autre
d'une
et
Les
deux
(ii)
part le Conceptus
questionsanonymes
la
fondamen
courant
de
un
mme
smantique,inspir
appartiennent
talementpar Ockham et labor par Buridan,Albertde Saxe et Marsile
d'Inghen.Toutefois,l'appartenance un mme courantde la smantique
n'explique pas de manire suffisanteles rapports entre nos questions
part ce rapportgnral,
anonymeset le traitde Pierred'Ailly.En effet,
il existedes liens particuliersentreles troistextes.
"
D'abord, chacun des trois textesutilisel'expression aliqualitef'pour
Cette expressionest tydfinirla signification
propre du syncatgorme.
la
de
Pierre
et
nous
de
d'Ailly
ignoronsd'autresoccurrences
pense
pique
de cetteexpressionen un sens comparable.L'emploi de cettenotionconstitueun premierlien prcis entre nos deux questionsanonymeset le
Conceptus.
96Conceptus
, ed.t., p. 99M0021.
97Par
la
modifie
dontunsyncatgorme
lesquatrefaons
la distinction
entre
exemple,
l'ideselon
duconcept
, copulative
, copulatim)
, disiunctim
(cf.p. 11474*77),
(disiunctwe
signification
ou
l'ensemble
de chosesprsentes,
futures,
passes,
possibles
laquellele concept
signifie
de suppositio
disainsiquele vocabulaire
(cf.p. 11495"98),
imaginables,
quiluicorrespondent
et 115n7'132).
tributiva
etsuppositio
determinata
(cf.p. 11490"93
98Etant
la seulecopie
donnque le manuscrit
Paris,B.N.,lat.16.401,qui a conserv
a tcopientre1390et 1405(cf.supra
de nosquestions
connue
, p. 89),il est
anonymes,
n'a pastle modledu trait
de Pierre
vident
de nosquestions
d'Ailly.
que cette
copie

19:53:43 PM

110

M. BARKER
PAULJ.J.

Ensuite,un second lien particulierexiste entre notre deuxime question et le Conceptas.


Chacun de ces deux textesutilisela notionde vitalis
dfinitions
de la connaissanceet de la signification.
au
des
centre
immutatio
Or, abstractionfaitede notrequestionanonyme,PierreAilly est le seul
auteur connu au XIVe sicle avoir employcettenotiondans le cadre
constituedonc un lien
de la smantique.La notion de vitalisimmutatio
notre
et
le
entre
deuxime
Conceptas.
question
particulier
Finalement,il existegalementun lien entrenotrepremirequestion
A deux endroitsdiffrents
de son trait,Pierre Ailly
et le Conceptas.
savoirdans
et
la
distinction
entre
analyse
catgormes syncatgormes,
la
la premirepartie sur les termesmentaux,et dans seconde partiesur
les termesconventionnels."Or le contenu de notre premirequestion
, bien qu'elle concorrespondnettementau second passage du Conceptas
tiennecertainslmentsdoctrinauxqui ne figurent
pas dans le traitde
Pierre d'Ailly.En effet,dans les deux textesl'on analyse le correspondant mentald'un syncatgorme
en termesd'acte et de concept,et chacun
des deux textesintroduitla tripledistinctionentrecatgormes,syncatgormeset termesmixtes.En outre,la convergenceentrenotrepremire
est accentue par le faitque la notion
question anonymeet le Conceptas
de vitalisimmatatio
soit prcismentabsenteaussi bien dans notrequestion
que dans le passage correspondantdu traitde Pierre d'Ailly.100
(iii) Nous avons vit soigneusementde poser la question de l'auteur
ou des auteursde nos questions.Il nous semble que notre matrielne
suffit
pas pour en dcider. En outre,la carte du paysage doctrinalde la
smantiqueparisiennede la seconde moiti du XIVe sicle est encore
concernant
trop peu dresse pour permettredes conclusionsdfinitives
des textesanonymescomme les ntres. Cependant, ayant vu les liens
entrenos textesanonymeset le traitde Pierred'Ailly,rien ne nous empche de tracerquelques lignes hypothtiquessur cette carte. En effet,
troissolutionsont une plausibilitsrieuse.D'abord, il se peut que nos
questionssoientdes produitsd'un matreinconnudont Pierred'Aillys'est
Ensuite, l'inverse semble galement
inspir en rdigeantson Conceptas.
c'est--dire
nos
questionssoientl'uvre d'un inconnusous
possible,
que
l'influencede l'enseignementde Pierred'Ailly.Finalement,il se peut que
nos questions soient des fragmentsd'un ouvrage inconnu et actuellement perdu de Pierre d'Ailly lui-mme.Quoi qu'il en soit, nos textes

99Conceptus,
ed.cit.,p. 842-5'et 96,7-724.
100Cf.
, p. 93,n. 46.
supra

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

111

contribuent une comprhensionplus englobante d'un courant de la


smantiquerelativement
peu connu.
dition
Principes
Nous avons reproduitle textede notre unique manuscrit.Dans l'apparat critique,nous avons indiqu les lecturesmodifies,les mots supprimsdans le manuscritainsi que les noticesqui se trouventen marge.
Dans les notes,nous avons identifiles rfrences
faitesexplicitement
par
l'auteur.Tous les passages paralllesdu Conceptus
ont t copis en entier.
L'orthographemdivale a t respecte.L'alternance entre "(sin)cathzgorema" et "(sin)cAategorema,"
que l'on trouvedans le manuscrit,a t
en lisant "(sin)cathegorema."La ponctuationainsi que la
homognifie
sont
capitalisation
adaptes l'usage moderne.
Nous avons utilis le sigle P pour le manuscritParis, Bibliothque
Nationale,lat. 16.401 ainsi que les signeset les abbreviationssuivants:
<. . .>
[. . .]
exemple
add.
P"1
sub lin.
sup.lin.

=
=
=
=
=
=

mot suppl par l'diteur


mot supprimpar l'diteur
mot supprimdans le manuscrit
addidit
P
in margine
sub linea
supralinem
APPENDICE I

AUCTORIS
INCERTI
utrum
in
intellectu
actuset nonconceptus
Quaestio
syncategoremati
correspondeat
Cod. Paris,Bibliothque
lat. 16.401,ff.166M68r
Nationale,
/f. 166v/Questio est hec: utrumsincathegoremati
in intellectucorrespondeatactus et non conceptus.
5

Arguiturprimo quod non: quia adiectiuumest sincathegorema;et


tamen in intellectunon solum correspondetactus, ymo eciam et
conceptus;ergo questio falsa. Consequencia nota. Et maior patet,
quia nullum adiectiuum est per se significatiuum;
ergo quodlibet

19:53:43 PM

112

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

adiectiuumest per se sincathegorema.Gonsequencia nota uirtute


10 illiusuocabuli sincathegorema]
diciturenim sincathegorema
quasi cumalio
uel
Sed
minor
adiectiuum
mensignificatiuumpredicatiuum.
patet, quia
tale significaires ad extra, ut albussignificairem substancialemet
albedinemsibi inherentem;et per consequenssibi non <solum> coralbedinis et eciam
respondetactus, ymo conceptus representatiuus
15 rei albe cui albedo inheret.
et tarnensibi in mente
Secundo: hoc uerbumestest sincathegorema;
non <solum> correspondetactus,ymo conceptus;ergo. Consequncia nota. Et maior patet per Philosophumin primo Peryarmeneias
Et
20 dicentem:"si estquidem purumdixeris,ipsumnichilsignificai."101
minorpatet per hanc proposicionemmentalemhomoestanimal,ly est
correspondetin mente conceptus temporis;ergo non solum actus.
Consequncia nota. Et antecedensapparet, quia ly estin proposicione dieta significaitempus,quia est sensus homoestanimaiin tem25 porepresenti
; et illud tempus non significato ex parte subiectiseu
eciam ex partepredicati,proutnotumest,quia subiectumet predicatumsuntnomina;que significant
sine tempore,testePhilosophoprimo
ex partecopule. Et per consequens
Peryarmeneias;102
ergo significatur
isti uerbo estnon correspondetsolum actus,ymo conceptus.
30
Tercio sic: istidictioniomnisin mentenon solum correspondetactus,
ymo conceptus;ergo. Consequencia nota. Et antecedensprobatur:
nam ista proposicio mentalisomnishomoest animaiin re extra non
solum significaihominemesse animai <sed omnem hominemesse
35 animal>; et hoc significatum
non /f. 167r/habet ex parte illiusterminihomo,
nec ex parte illiusterminianimai
, nec eciam ex parteillius
ex
illius
terminiomnis.Et per
[illius]
copule; ergo parte
significacionis
isti
non
dictioni
omnis
solum
consequens
correspondetactus, ymo
eciam et conceptus.
40
, doctior
, aliud, nonidemetc., que habent
Quarto: iste dictionesfortior
uim distribuendi,sunt signa sincathegorematica,quia alias non
haberentuim distribuendi,et tamen representantres ad extra, ut
101
De Interpretation
Latinus
3, 16b22-25
II, 1-2,7):"Nequeenimessesignum
(Aristoteles
nihilest,consignificat
estpurum
estreivelnonesse
necsihocipsum
dixeris:
quidem
ipsum
autemquandam
sinecompositis
nonestintellegere."
quam
compositionem
102
De Interpretation
Latinus
2, 16a19-20(Aristoteles
II, 1-2,6): "Nomenergoestvox
sinetempore,
secundum
cuiusnullaparsestsignificativa
separata."
significativa
placitum

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
45

113

notumest; modo, quilibetactus in anima representansrem ad extra


est conceptus;ergo etc.

In oppositumarguiturper communemfamam: communiterenim


non correspondeicondiciturquod dictionibussincathegorematicis
50 ceptus,sed purus actus.
In questione erunt duo articuli. In primo ponentur notabilia, in
secundo conclusiones.
55
Primusarticulusa
est intersinQuantum ad primmnotandumest quod diffrencia
60 cathegoremapurum et cathegorema purum, unde purum sincathegoremanon habet in mente nisi quemdam actum per quem
intellectus
inclinaturb
ad concipiendumaliqualiterper conceptus,sed
cathegoremahabet in intellectuconceptum per quem intellectus
concipitaliquam rem, ut substanciamuel accidens uel aliquod taie.
65
Secundo notandumquod alique dictionesdicunturpartimcathegoreut iste dictionessemper
maticecet partimsincathegorematice,
, fortior
,
doctior
, differt
, aliudab, etc. Et dicuntursincathegorematice
quia intelsicut per actus
lectus inclinaturper tales dictioneset determinatur
70 correspondentes
terminis.
Et
dicuntur
dictiones
sincathegorematicis
intellectus
cathegorematicequia
per conceptuscorrespondentestalibusdictionibusconcipitaliquam rem,ut substanciamuel accidens.103
]3f Petrus
de Alliaco,
"Restt
unumquodnonfuitdictum,
, ed.cit.,9617"34:
Conceptus
scilicet
vocalium
utisteterminus
quidamestmerecathegoreumaticus,
quodterminorum
homo
utisteterminus
aliusestterminus
vocalis
omnis;
; aliusestsincathegoreumaticus,
paret partim
et sicestmixtus,
et esttalisqui
timcathegoreumaticus
sincathegoreumaticus,
in duosterminos,
et alter
scilicet
resolvi
alterestpurecathegoreumaticus,
quorum
potest
Cuiusmodi
estisteterminus
vocalisnihil
velnilvelaliquid
estpuresincathegoreumaticus.
in neutrogenere,
vel generaliter
omniasignauniversalia
vel particularia
quibusnon
utomne
mixti
ex
dicuntur
, aliquid
, etsicde aliis.Et talestermini
substantiva,
exprimuntur
corresEt de factoin mentetalibus
terminis
et sincathegoreumatico.
cathegoreumatico
mentali
ex actusincathegoreumatico
et termino
pondeiconceptus
cathegocomplexus
in quosmentaliter
ut cumdicitur
reumatico,
resolvuntur;
aliquid,
<quod> sic resolvitur
clarum
estcomplexio
alterest
estquodinmente
ensy
terminorum,
aliquod
plurium
quorum
et alterpurecathegoreumaticus."
puresincathegoreumaticus

19:53:43 PM

114

75

80

85

90

PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
Tercio notandumquod actus correspondentes
sincathegorematibus
non significantaliquam rem ad extra, sed precise dant modum
significandi
conceptibus,scilicetdisiunctiueuel copulatiue,disiunctim uel copulatim,secundumquod uaria sunt sincathegoremata.
Ex quo sequiturquod conceptusnon qualitercumquepotest,significai naturaliter.Patet, quia iste conceptushomo
omnes
, significans
hominesin intellectucopulatiue,non habet hoc naturaliter,
quia,
, certe ille non repredeposito actu correspondenteilli signo omnis
sentareiomnes hominescopulatiue.Et ergo est sibi accidentale.
Ex quo ulteriussequiturquod quilibetconceptusrepresentanssua
significatain intellectuequiualentercopulatiuehabet iliummodum
ex aliquo actu determinanteipsum intellectumd
ad sic
significandi
, quando significai
concipiendum.Patethoc, quia isteconceptushomo
in intellectuomnes homines copulatiue equiualenter,tunc oportet
quod intellectusdeterminetur
per aliquem actum correspondentem
istisignoomnis
, uel per consimilemactumhabentemuim distribuendi.
ultra
Sequitur
quod supposicio distributiuaconuenit intellectui
accidentaliter.Apparet, quia conuenit ex parte alicuius sincathegorematisdeterminantisintellectumad concipiendumsignificata
aliqualiterper conceptumcopulatiue.

95

, uel consimilem,
Quarto notandumquod per hunc conceptumhomo
intellectusconcipit omnes homines,et ille conceptushomorepresentai omnes homines presentes,pretritos,futuros,potentesesse
uel potentesymaginariesse. Sed modusrepresentandi
omneshomines,
scilicetcopulatiueuel copulatim,disiunctiueuel disiunctim,accidit
100 illi conceptuihomoex actu alicuius determinantis
intellectum
ad sic
concipiendum.
Ex quo sequiturquod in hac proposicionehomoestanimalintellectus per illum conceptumhomoconcipitomnes homines,et tarnen
nec copulatiuenec disiunctiueetc. Quod probatur:quia intellectus
105 non determinatur
ad <sic> concipiendumsignificatahuius termini
homoper aliquem actum; ergo intellectusnon concipithominescoillius
pulatiueuel disiunctiue,
significata
quia ille modus concipiendi6
terminihomoest accidentalisistiterminohomo.Et confirmatur:
quia
omniactu,conciperetsignificata
qua racioneintellectus,
circumscripto
110 huiusterminihomodisiunctiue,
eadem racionecopulatiue.Patet,quia
non est plus actus determinansunam partem quam aliam; igitur,
tuncomni actu, non essetracio quare plus conciperet
circumscripto
disiunctiuequam copulatiue.Et iterum,quia alias signumparticu-

19:53:43 PM

SYNGATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

115

lare frustraadderetursubiectoproposicionis,quia adhuc nichilfacit


115 uel faceret,si ille conceptus<homo> in hac proposicionehomocurritsignificaisua significatadisiunctiue.
Ex quo sequiturquod non in qualibetproposicioneindefinita
subiectum /f. 167v/supponitdeterminateuel disiunctiue.Patet, quia in
proposicionementaliindefinitanon est aliquis actus determinans
120 intellectumad concipiendumsua predicatadisiunctiue.
Sed hic diceret aliquis quod in qualibet proposicione indefinita
subiectumsupponitdeterminateet disiunctiue.Respondetur quod
sic loquenteslargecapiuntproposicionem
indefinitam
proutequiualet
particulari.Vnde in nulla proposicione<indefinita>subiectumsup125 ponit disiunctiue. Et hoc patet, quia si in aliqua proposicione
indefinita
subiectumdeterminateet disiunctiue<supponeret>, sicut
in ista homoest animal
, tune sic: intellectusdeterminaturde se ad
per ly homodisiunctiueequiualenterabsque
concipiendumsignificata
aliquo actu; ergo actus particularescorrespondentessignis super130 fluerent.Patet, quia eque bene intellectusdeterminaretur[eque
bene] ad <sic> concipiendumper ly homo'sed consequensnon est
dicendum;ergo relinquiturdictumnon esse simpliciteruerum.
Sed tuncaliquisdiceret:ergoistamentalishomocurrit
non estproposicio, sed proposicioplures;patet,quia intellectusnon concipitsigni135 ficaia huius terminihomonec equiualentercopulatiue nec disiunctiue, sed inconiuncte,et per consequens est proposicio plures.
Respondeturquod non: quia nulla mentalisultimataest proposicio
plures; modo, illa homoestanimaiest mentalisultimata;igituretc.
Confirmatur:
quia illa mentalis<non> habet nisifunum subiectum,
unum
140
predicatumet unicam copulam. Eciam nec modus significandi in mente copulatiue uel disiunctiueest causa proposicionis
plures;sed oporteretquod uocalisproposiciouel scripta<esset una>,
et quod tali proposicioniuocali uel scriptecorresponderent
plures
proposicionesin mente.
145
Hec de primo articulo.
Secundus articulusg
150
Quantum ad secundum articulumsit hec prima conclusio: alicui
dictioniuocali [illi] in mente correspondetpurus actus nulliusad
extrarepresen
tatiuus.Patet,nam istidictioniuocali omnisin mente

19:53:43 PM

116

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

ad extra.Quod procorrespondeiunus actus nulliusrepresentatiuus


homines
155 batur:quia ille actus qui sibi correspondetnec representat
nec aliqua alia, quia qua racione representareihomines,eadem
racione representareteciam [nos uel] asinos, quia itah bene per
istumactum1isteconceptusasinuspotestdistribuiin mentesicutiste
, et sic esset transcendens,
conceptushomo
quod non est dicendum;
160 ymo essetita communequod non essetdare communiusseu communior dictio;ergo. Ex quo sequiturquod nullipuro sincathegoremati
in mente correspondetconceptus.Patet,quia isti sincathegoremati
omnisin mentenon correspondetaliquis conceptus,sed purusactus;
et non est maior racio de uno quam de alio; ergo.
165 Ex ista sequitur quod actus correspondentessincathegorematibus
non causantura rebus significatis
per terminosquibus adduntur.
Probatur:quia actus correspondentes
non sunt
sincathegorematibus
naturalessimilitudines
rerumad extra; ergo etcJ
Vlteriussequiturquod actus correspondentessincathegorematibus
170 causanturlibere ab intellectu.Patet,quia ex quo non causantura
rebusad extra,intellectus,
quando uult,potestformaretalemactum,
et dimitierequando uult.
Vlteriussequiturquod quemlibetactum sincathegorematicum
peceditaliquis conceptus.Patet,quia intellectus
non formatin se talem
nisi per ilium determinatse ad con175 actum sincathegorematicum
cipiendumsignificata
per conceptumcopulatiueuel disiunctiue;ergo
correlariumuerum.
Secunda conclusio:istisdictionibusdoctior
, et sic de aliis, in
, fortior
180 mentecorrespondetconceptus.Patet,quia per quamlibettalemdictionemmentalemintellectus
concipitremad extra;ergo.Consequencia
nota, quia omne teileuocaturconceptusin anima per quod intellectus concipitaliquid ad extra. Et antecedenspatet,quia conceptus,
cui correspondetlyfortior
, est conceptussubstancie,ut notumest.
185 Ex quo sequiturquod tales dictionesnon habent uim confundendi
racione alicuiusnegacionisincluse,quia eis in mentecorrespondent
conceptussimplices;ergo ibi non est aliqua negacio inclusa,quia
in conceptusimplicinichilincluditur,
quia alias essetconceptuscompositus,et non simplex.
190 Tercia conclusio,et est responsalis:cuilibetdictionipure sincathegorematicecorrespondetactus in mente et non conceptus.Patet,
quia istidictioniomnisin mentesolum /f. 168r/correspondetactus;

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

117

et non est maior rado de una quam de alia; ergo etc.


195 Ex quo sequiturcorrelanequod dictionibuspartimcathegorematiin mentecorrespondetconceptus.
cis et partimsincathegorematicis
, que est partim cathegorematicaet
Patet, quia huic dictioninemo
uel
partimsincathegorematica, sibi simili,correspondetconceptus;
et non est maior racio de una quam de alia; ergo. Consequencia
nota.Et antecedenspatet,quia sibicorrespondet
conceptusin mente,
200 per quem intellectusdeterminaturad concipiendumkaliqualiter
significataterminicui fit addicio. Vt in mente totushomotantum
ualet sicut guelibet
, similiterin mente nemotantumualet
parshominis
1 homo.
sicut nullus
205

Tunc ad raciones.
Ad primam,quando arguebaturde dictioneadiectiua,diciturquod
Eciam diciturquod sibi non corresnon est purumsincathegorema.
ymo simplex,quia non rpugntintelpondetconceptuscompositus,
ut patetde primoconceptu
210 lectuihabere conceptumconnotatiuum,
scilicet
de
indiuiduo
uago, qui est connotatiuus.m
ipsiusintellectus,
a
b
c
d
e
f
8
h
1
j
k
1
m

primusarticulus]P
inclinatur]declinaturP
eafccathegorematiceP
cathegorematice]
intellectum]modum P
modusconcipiendi]conceptusconcipiendimodus concipiendiP
nisi] eque P
secundusarticulus]P"1
ita] ist ita P
actum] conceptumactum P
etc. P
etc.]
concipiendum]P"1
nullus]quilibetP nullusP"1
et sequitur
lacunaP
textus
connotatiuus]hicfinitur

19:53:43 PM

118

PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
APPENDICE II
AUCTORIS
INCERTI
utrum
Qustio
aliquisconceptus
potestesseaquivocus
Cod. Paris,Bibliothque
lat. 16.401,ff.168r-170v
Nationale,
/f.168r/Questioesthec: utrumaliquisconceptuspotestesse equiuocus.

Et arguiturprimoquod sic. Nam aliquis conceptuspotestcapi distri5


butiue, determinate,discretea;ergo sequiturquod aliquis conceptus
potest esse equiuocus. Consequencia tenet,quia isti modi capiendi
non possuntstaresine equiuocacione.Et antecedensapparet,<quia>
in illa proposicioneomnishomocurtly homostat confuseet distributiue in conceptu,et in illa proposicionehomocurrit
ly homodetermi10 nate, et in ista istehomocurrit
homo
stat
ibi
discrete.
ly
Secundo sic: nam conceptuspotestsignificare
ad placitum;ergo conceptus potest esse equiuocus. Consequencia tenet,quia omne illud
quod potest significare<ad placitum>, de facto eciam illud est
15 equiuocum. Antecedensprobatur:quia conceptuspotest supponere
ad placitum;ergo potestsignificare
ad placitum.Consequencia tenet
ab inferioriad superius;et ergo qualitercumquealiquis conceptus
Et antecedensprobatur:quia potest
supponit,taliterpotestsignificare.
unde
ille terminushomosupponit,ut in
supponerequando uolumus,
et
20 illa proposicionehomoestanimai
, quando uolumuspotestnon supponere, ut hic Sor esthomohinnibilis.
Tercio sic: conceptus hominispotest significareasinum; ergo conceptus potest esse equiuocus. Consequencia tenet,quia conceptus
25 huius terminihomononbpotestsignificare
homineset asinos uniuoce
et unico conceptu; ergo. Et antecedens probatur: quia conceptus
hominismagis conuenitcum asino quam illa uox homocum homine;
sed sic est quod illa uox homopotest significarehominem;ergo et
conceptushominispotestrepresentareasinum. Tenet consequencia,
30 quia significaciofitracione similitudinis
et racione conueniencie.Et
antecedenspro prima parte probatur:quia conceptushominismagis
conuenit cum homine quam illa uox homoconuenitcum homine;
modo, cum homo magis conuenitcum asino quam illa uox homo

19:53:43 PM

SYNGATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

119

conuenitcum asino, sequiturquod conceptus hominismagis con35 uenitcum asino /f. 168v/quam illa uox homoconuenitcum homine;
asinumquam <illa
ergo sequiturquod [illa uox] magis representabit
uox homo>hominem;ergo. Minor racionisnota de se.
Quarto sic: sicut se habet albedo ad conceptumeius proprium,ita
se habet caliditasad suum conceptumproprium,ergo per locum a
sicut se habet albedo ad caliditatem,sic
commutataproporcione:104
se habebit conceptusalbedinisad conceptumcaliditatis;sed sic est
quod albedo potest representarecaliditatem;ergo conceptusunius
potest representareconceptumalterius.Consequencia nota. Maior
45 apparet per locum a commutataproporcione.Et minor probatur:
quod quandocumqueuiderem
quia in mentemea possumconstituere
eciam
albedinem, quod
conciperemc caliditatem; et sic albedo
michi
caliditatem;et per consequens conceptusalbedinis
significarei
potestsignificare
conceptumcaliditatis.
50
Quinto sic: conceptushominispotestsignificarehominemet potest
illam uocem homo
; ergo sequiturquod ille conceptuspotest
significare
esse equiuocus. Consequencia tenet,quia illa res ad extraet illa uox
differunt
specifice.Et antecedensapparet de se. Et quod ille conillamuocem probatur:quia si aliquis
55 ceptushominispotestsignificare
habeat in mente sua conceptumhominis,tunc faciliterpotest duci
ad formandumillam uocem homo'ergo sequiturquod illam uocem
homopotestibi representare.
Consequencia tenet,quia nisi sic posset
non
uideretur
representare,
quomodo conceptusita faciliterpotest
60 duci ad formandumillam uocem. Et antecedens apparet, quia si
aliquis habeat conceptumhominis,ipse potestfaciliterconcipereet
formareuoces, que uoces huiusmodiconceptibussubordinantur.
40

Sexto sic: conceptussignificaialiud naturaliterproprieet aliud na70 turalitercommuniter;ergo conceptuspotestesse equiuocus. Consenon potesthabere
quencia tenet,quia huiusmodimodos significandi
Et
sine
antecedens
equiuocacione ipsius.
conceptus
probatur:quia
res ad extra;et ille
conceptushominisnaturaliter
proprierepresentat
idem conceptussignificaiseipsumnaturaliter
communiter;ergo idem
104
Cf.forte
Petrus
Tractatus
V, 34 (ed.De Rijk,7412'22):
("Summule
Logicales")
Hispanus,
sehabet
"Locusa proportione
esthabitudo
uniusproportionalium
ad reliquum.
Utsicut
rectornauis
ad navem,
sicsehabet
ad scolas;
sedinnaviregenda
estrector
non
rector
scolarum
eligendus
sorte
sedarte;
inscolis
estrector
nonsorte
sedarte
."
ergo
regendis
eligendus

19:53:43 PM

120

PAULJ.J.M.
BAKKER

75

ter proprieet naturalitercommuniter.


conceptussignificainaturali

80

aliquid uel aliqua pure ad plaSeptimo,conceptuspotestsignificare


esse
citum;ergopotest
equiuocus.Consequenciatenet.Et antecedens
ad placitum
probatur:quia ille conceptushominispotestsignificare
et
asinum;
hominem;et potestsignificare
equum
ergo.Consequencia
nota. Et antecedensprobatur:quia sicutilla uox homopotestimponi
ad significandum
hominem,equum et asinum, ita conceptussibi
correspondempotestconciperetalia significata.

85

90

95

In oppositumdarguitur primo sic: quia nullus conceptus potest


diuersadiuersisconceptibus;ergo. Consequencia nota ex
significare
nominis
equiuoci. Antecedensprobatur:quia si conceptusposquid
diuersadiuersisconceptibus,tuncconceptusunus non
set significare
esset conceptusunus; consequensimplicai; ergo.
Secundo: si sic, sequereturquod alique proposicionesmentalesessent
distinguende.Consequens falsum,quia dicimus communiterquod
proposicionesmentalesnon sunt distinguende,sed solum uocales
uel scripte.Consequencia apparet,quia ubicumquereperiturmultiplicitas uel equiuocacio, ibidem reperiturdistinctio,et per consein mentereperitur
Sed per aduersarium
quens ille essentdistinguende.
eciam
distinctio.
et
multiplicitas;
ergo

100 Tercio: si conceptusposset esse equiuocus, sequereturquod fallacia equiuocacionis non esset fallacia in dictione.Consequens falsum. Probaturtamen consequencia: quia fallacieideo dicunturin
dictionequia <non> possuntfierisine signisad placituminstitutis;
modo, si equiuocacio fieretin mente,sequereturquod esset falla105 eia extra dictionem.

110

In questione erunt duo articuli. In primo uidebitur de modo


conceptuum,et in secundo uidebiturde quesito.
significandi
Piimus articulus6
Quantum ad primumarticulumest notandumquod conceptusnichil

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
115

121

aliud est quam cognicio rei existensin anima.

Pro quo secundo est notandumquod cognicio est apprehensiorei


secundumpotenciamcognitiuammediantequa ipsa potencia cognitiua uitaliterimmutatur.Verbi gracia, sicut conceptus hominis
120 diciturapprehensiorei mediantequa potencia cognitiuaimmutatur
ad cognoscendumhominem ad extra. Vnde potencia cognitiua,
mediantecognicioneet apprehensione,fitcogniciones.105
sic potestdescribi:significare
Tercio est notandumquod significare
125 est potencie cognitiuealiquid uel aliqualiterrepresentandoipsam
Et dicituribidem estpotencie
uitaliterimmutare.106
, et non
cognitiue
intellectiue
, quia animali bruto,quod non habet intellectiuam
potenEt disicutfapparet,ideo etc.107
ciam, uox aliqua dicitursignificare
licet
non
cituribi aliqualiter
significent
quia
proptersincathegoremata,
130 /f. 169r/ aliquid, tamen aliqualiter.Et capituribi aliquidtranscenDicitureciam
dente^ scilicetproutaliquid diciturunum uel plura.108
ad
immutando
notanteruitaliter
ipsam
designandumquod non omne
sed illud significatur
illud quod est in anima significatur,
quod uitaliterimmutaiipsam.
135
Quarto notandum est quod significatiuorum
quoddam significai
105
Cf.Petrus
"Notandum
estulterius
de Alliaco,
, ed.di.,8321*2:
quodterminus
Conceptus
reiapprehensiva
idemsunt."Cf.ibisiveactusintelligendi
et noticia
mentalis,
conceptus
inanima,
9118*25:
"Notandum
estquodconceptus
estactualis
noticia
alicuius
reicausata
dem,
et partialiter
ab obiecto,
a re concepta
sivecognita,
etiama potentia
scilicet
partialiter
intellectivam.
Et sic conceptus,
formaliter
vitaliter
immutans
cognitiva,
ipsampotentiam
actualis
actusintelligendi,
Vitalis
immutatio
noticia,
proeademresivequalitate
supponunt;
illiusqualitatis."
tamen
istitermini
cognotant
aliquashabitudines
106Gf.Petrus
14-6
autemestpotentie
de Alliaco,
, ed.cit.,81 : "Significare
cogniConceptus
tiveeamvitaliter
velaliquavelaliqualiter
immutando
representare."
aliquid
107
etnonintelCf.Petrus
"Etdicitur
de Alliaco,
, ed.cit
., 9318"21:
cognitive
Conceptus
potentie
sedetiambrutis
lective,
quianonsolumhominibus
aliquidsignificatur,
pervocesad piacituminstitutis
contingit."
aliquidsignificare
108Cf.Petrus
"Undein predictis
de Alliaco,Conceptus
, ed.cit.,8117'26:
descriptionibus
li aliquid
numeri
et
terminos
noncollectivos;
cathegoreumaticos
singularis
ponitur
propter
numeri
velpropter
terminos
terminos
collectivos
ponitur
aliqua
singularis
plurales
propter
noncollectivos;
terminos
ratione
etponitur
significationis.
aliqualiter
sincathegoreumaticos
propter
utisteterhomo
secundi:
utisteterminus
Exemplum
primi:
significai
aliquid.Exemplum
in plurali
minus
velisteterminus
homines
tercii:
ut
aliqua.Exemplum
significant
populus,
isteterminus
omnis
significai
aliqualiter."
Cf.ibidem
velaliqua
terminos
"Deindedicitur
, 9331*34:
(/)
aliquid
propter
cathegoreumatico
vocalessinterminos
ut Sortes
, homo
, populus
; et dicitur
significatone,
aliqualiter
propter
utomnis."
cathegoreumaticos
signification,

19:53:43 PM

122

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
naturaliter,aliud ad placitum. Patet diuisio in Summulis Petri
Hispani.109

naturaliterquoddam
140 Vlteriusest notandumquod significatiuorum
communiter.
proprie,aliud significainaturaliter
significainaturaliter
Vnde signum dicitursignificarenaturaliterproprie illud cuius est
propria similitudoet naturalisuerificacio;sicut conceptushominis
naturaliter
propriesignificaiomnes hominesad extra,quia ille con145 ceptusest naturalissimilitudoet propriaomni hominiad extra.Sed
naturaliter
communiter
illud cuius non est
signumdicitursignificare
similitudo
et
naturalis
uerificacio.
Isto
modo conceptus
propria
hominisdicitursignificare
et eciam
communiter,
seipsumnaturaliter
illa uox homodicitursignificareseipsam naturalitercommuniter.
150 Apparet,quia illa uox homonon est naturalissimilitudosui ipsius,
eo quod nichilest similitudosui ipsius.110
Istispremissisponunturalique conclusiones.
Prima conclusio8est: omnisconceptussignificat
remper ipsumconnaturaliter
Probatur
conclusio:
155 ceptam
proprie.
quia omnis conceptus est naturalissimilitudorei et propria per ipsum concepte;
naturaliter
ergo sequiturquod rem per ipsum conceptamsignificat
nota
ex
notabili
Et
antecedens
proprie.Consequencia
priusposito.
apparet ex dictis prius. Et apparet eciam, quia sicut ymago que
160 apparet in speculo est propria similitudoet naturalisrei uise, ita
conceptus hominis est naturalissimilitudoomnium hominumad
extra. Et ideo dicit Philosophusin secundo De anima quod lapis

109Petrus
Tractatus
"Vocum
("Summule
Hispanus,
") I, 3 (ed. De Rijk,23*8):
Logicales
aliasignificativa
ad placitum,
Voxsignificativa
alianaturaliter.
naturaliter
significativarum
estiliaque apudomnesidemrepresentat,
ut gemitus
latratus
canum.Vox
infirmorum,
ad placitum
estiliaquead voluntatem
uthomo."
instituentis
significativa
aliquid
representat,
110Cf.Petrus
de Alliaco,
"Notatamenquodsignificare
natu, ed.cit.,8812"28:
Conceptus
raliter
Unomodoproprie,
aliomodocommuniter.
naturaliter
capitur
dupliciter.
Significare
est[aliquid]
se ipsoet nonmediante
alioaliquidpotentie
eamvitaliter
proprie
cognitive
immutando
etsicdicimus
similitudo
alicuius
rei
representare,
quiestnaturalis
conceptum
Et siccapitur
in descriptionibus
naturaliter
Sed
proprie
representare.
significare
supradictis.
naturaliter
communiter
estnonse ipso,sedmediante
alioaliquidpotentie
significare
cognitive
eamvitaliter
immutando
ethocconvenit
cuilibet
enimres
rei;quelibet
representare,
ex natura
sua habetquodestnatacausaresuiconceptum
in potentia
et sic
intellectiva,
mediante
taliconceptu
estnatarepresentare
Ex quo sequitur
cognitive
potentie
seipsam.
ressignificat
velnataestsignificare
naturaliter
communiter.
quodomnis
seipsam
Significare
autemnaturaliter
solumconvenit
utsatispatetex dictis."
terminis
mentalibus,
proprie

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

123

idest naturalissimilitudosiue connon est in anima sed species,111


Et
uolensfaceredomum
dicitur
communiter
quod domificator
ceptus.
165 formatdomum in mente sua, ad cuius similitudinemipse facit
domum ad extra.
Secunda conclusiohquod omnis conceptusest significadorei per
ipsum concepte proprie et naturaliter.Probatur conclusio: quia
et significadonichil
nichilaliud est quam representare,
170 significare
aliud est quam representacio;modo, representacionichil aliud est
quam apprehensioseu cognicio;modo, omnis conceptusest cognicio, ut dicebatur;ergo sequiturquod omnisconceptusest significado
rei per ipsum concepte naturaliterproprie.Et antecedensapparet
conclusio:quia uel significadoest
175 satisex1priusdictis.Confirmatur
distinctaab ipso conceptu, uel non est distincta.Si secundum,
habeturpropositum.Si primm,fieretprocessusin infinitum.
Vnde
nichil
est
hominis
aliud
est
ymaginandum quod conceptus
quam
significadoilliusuocis homo'si igitursignificado,per aduersarium,
180 essetdistinctaa conceptu,tuncpetereturadhuc de illa, et sic fieret
processusin infinitum.
Tercia conclusionest hec, quod omnis conceptusformaliter
seipso
et propriesignificai
remin ipso conceptam.Patetconclusioex prece185 dentibus,quia omnis conceptus est formalitersimilitudorei per
ipsum concepteet per ipsum significate;
ergo. Consequencia nota.
Et antecedenspatet ex precedentibus.
non statconceptumesse in anima et non significare
Quarta conclusiok:
Probaturconclusio:
190 rem naturaliter
proprieper ipsum significatam.
ex
ille
formaliter
et
illam
rem significai,
quia
quo conceptus
seipso
in
ille
anima
<est>, quod
sequiturquod quandocumque
conceptus
illam rem. Consequencia nota. Et antecedensapparet
representabit
ex dictis.Sed uerum est quod ista conclusioest intelligendasecun195 dum potenciasnaturales,quia per potenciamDei bene stat quod
esset unus conceptusin anima qui nichilrepresentaret.
Quinta conclusio: omnis conceptus significatiuusest representatiuus1alteriusa re per ipsum proprieet naturaliterconcepta. Ista
111
De anima
Cf.Auctoritates
Aristotelis
III, 8, 431b29-432al.
, de AnimaIII, n 163(ed.
eius."
Hamesse,
188):"Lapisnonestin animasedspecies

19:53:43 PM

PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER

124
200

205

210

215

conclusio probatur: quia omnis effectus"1


est representatiuussue
sed
sic
est
huiusmodi
cause;
quod
conceptusest effectusquidam,
et causa eius non est res"per ipsumproprieet naturaliter
concepta;
ergo.Consequncianota. Et maiorsatisapparet.Et minordeclaratur:
quia ipsius conceptuscausa nichil aliud est quam ipsa anima que
concipit,et conceptusdicituresse effectus
ipsiusanime. Confirmatur
conclusio: quia omnis conceptus est representatiuus
sui ipsius, et
ipsemetest aliud a re per ipsum concepta; ergo conclusiouera.
Sexta conclusio:conceptuspotestsignificare
naturaliter
proprie,naturalitercommuniteret ad placitum.Probaturconclusio:quia conceptus hominis
significainaturaliterproprieomnes homines;et ille
idem conceptus <significat> seipsum naturalitercommuniter;et
ad placitum0patet,quia ille conceptuspotest
quod potestsignificare
/f.
169V
ad
asinumet equum, sicutilla uox
imponi
significandum
homo
ad placitum;ergo.Consequencia
, et sic ille conceptussignificabit
nota. Et antecedensprobaturper predicta.
Hec de primo.

220
Secundus articulusp
Quantum ad secundumarticulum,in quo est uidendumde quesito
principali,sit prima supposicioqquod nullumens est similitudosui
225 ipsius.Probatursupposicio:quia similitudodicit rem ad extratanquam [per] terminmad quem aliquid refertur;
ergo sequiturquod
nichil dicitur esser similitudosui ipsius. Consequencia nota. Et
antecedenspatet, quia simileest in predicamentood aliquid
, et per
talem
habitudinem
eciam
consequens
importt.Quod
apparet ex
230 alio, quia, posito quod nichilessetin rerumnaturanisi solus Deus,
Deus non dicereturpropriealicui similisuel dissimilis.
Secunda supposicios,quod nulla uox uel scriptumsignificat
ad placitum <de sui natura>. Patet, quia multesunt uoces que possunt
ad placitum;igitursequiturconclusiouera. Conse235 non significare
quencia nota, quia illud quod alicui de sui natura1competit,non
potestsibi non inesse. Et antecedensapparet,quia de factomulte
sunt uoces que non significant,
ut bu baf etc. Confirmatursupposicio: quia ille uoces que significantad placitum,possunt non

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

125

ad placitum;ergo sequiturquod tales uoces non signifi240 significare


cant ad placitumde sui natura.Tenet consequenciaper illud quod
dicitursecundo Ethicorum,scilicetquod natura existenciumnichil
aliud assuescit.112
Antecedenspatet,quia illa uox homo
, que significai omnes homines ad placitum,potest destrui et sic destituia
ammodo ad placitum.
245 significacene,ita quod non significet

250

255

260

265

ad
Tercia supposiciou,quod quodlibetens mundipotestsignificare
mundi
ens
ad
Patet,
placitum.
quia quodlibet
potestimponi
signiad
ficandum;ergo sequiturquod potest imponi ad significandum
ad
est
eo
placitum.Consequencia tenet, quod significare placitum
significaread uoluntatem siue ad placitum alicuius instituentis.
Antecedensapparet, quia quodlibet ens mundi ab aliquo potest
imponiad sic uel sic significandum.
Ex quo sequiturcorrelane quod circuluspendens ante tabernam
potest significaread placitum. Patet, quia potest imponi ad significandumunam proposicionemmentalem,que sit ista uinumuel
ceruisia
uenditur
in istadomo
, sicutde factotaliscirculustalemproposicionemmentalemsignificai.Vnde, aliquo uidentecirculumpendere
ante tabernam,concipitin mentesua: uinumuenditur
in illa domo.Ex
quo patet quod probabiliterpotestdici quod circuluspendens ante
tabernamsit proposicio uocalis. Patet, quia proposicionimentali
uere uel falsecorrespondedConsequencianota. Et antecedenspatet
ex dictis.
Secundo sequiturcorrelanequod ars memorienon est nisi quedam
institucioad placitum,uel fitper aliquam institucionemad placitum.Patet,quia si uolo recordarialicuiusproposicionis,ego pono
uel statuoquod angulustalisuel taliscolumpna representabit
michi
illam proposicionemin mente; et sic patet quod ars memoriefit

per imposicionem.
naturaliteret ad
270 Tercio sequiturquod possibileest idem significare
placitum.Patet,quia conceptushominissignificainaturaliteromnes
homines; et ille idem conceptus potest imponi ad significandum
hominesad placitum;ergo correlariumuerum.
Quarto sequiturquod possibileest idem significaread placitumet
275 naturaliter
respectueiusdem.Patet,quia conceptushominissignificai
112
Retranslatio
Roberti
B. Recensio
Ethica
Mcomachea
Grosseteste,
II, 1, 1103al9-20,
existencium
Latinus
enimnatura
XXVI,1-3,fase,iv,396):"Nullum
(Aristoteles
cognita
aliter
assuescit."

19:53:43 PM

126

BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.

naturaliterhomines seipso et formaliter,


ut dictum est in primo
ille
et
idem
articulo;
conceptuspotestimponi eodem conceptu ad
homines
ad placitum;et sic idem respectueiusdem
significandum
esset significatiuum
naturaliteret ad placitum;ergo. Consequencia
280 nota. Et antecedenssimiliter.113
Quinto sequiturquod quilibetconceptuspotestsignificaread placitum.Patet,quia omnewens potestsignificare
ad placitum;omnis
ad placonceptusest ens; ergo quilibetconceptuspotestsignificare
citum.Consequencia nota. Et antecedensest darum de se.
285
Istispremississit hec prima conclusio*:omnis conceptusest uniuocus. Probatur:quia omnis conceptus significaialiquid uel aliqua
unico conceptu;ergo omnis conceptusest uniuocus. Consequencia
nota ex questioneprecedente.Et antecedensprobatur:quia omnis
290 conceptusest naturalissimilitudoalicuiusad placitum;ergo sequitur
quod omnisyconceptusest uniuocus,quia significaialiquid uel aliqua et hoc eciam unico conceptu,scilicetseipso.
Secunda conclusio2:non est possibilealiquem conceptumsignificare
295 equiuoce naturaliterproprie. <Probatur:> quia non est possibile
quod aliquis conceptussignificaiplura naturaliterpropriediuersis
conceptibus;ergo conclusiouera. Consequencia nota, quia hoc est
aliquem conceptumplura naturaliter
significare
proprie.Antecedens
probatur:quia non est possibilequod aliquis conceptussit naturalis
300 similitudoet propriadiuersorumdiuersisconceptibus;ergo sequitur
quod non potest significarenaturaliterproprie illa plura diuersis
conceptibus.Consequencia nota. /f. 170V Antecedenspatet, quia
si sic, ille conceptusesset plures et non unus, quia esset naturalis
similitudoplurium;ergo. Et ista conclusio innuiturper hoc quod
1,3Gf.Petrus
de Alliaco,
"Ex quo sequitur
, ed.cit.,8514"31:
Conceptus
quodidemterminusmentalis
dietusestsignificativus
et ad placitum;
nechoc est
naturaliter
improprie
difficile
ad
id estcomparando
illumterminm
diversorum,
cognitu
[in]tamenrespectu
diversa
Sedquodhocsitverum
etiamrespectu
eiusdem,
significata.
patetsic:namdarum
in se formare
estquodquispotest
huiusvocisens.Quo facto,
illeconceptus
conceptum
illamvocemens
et idemconceptus
, cumsiteiusnaturalis
similitudo,
proprie
representat
ad placitum
omnesresmundi,
in significando
illiconceptui
significai
quia subordinatur
communissimo
remmundi.
omnem
Etcumillavoxens
quinaturaliter
proprie
representat
situnaresconcepta
communissimo
omnium
entium,
conceptu
representativo
sequitur
quod
huiusvocisensad placitum
illamvocemensque etiamsignificai
naconceptus
significai
turaliter
utdictum
est.Etpatetergoquodidemterminus
diementalis
proprie,
improprie
tuseandem
remsignificai
naturaliter
etad placitum
ultimate."
proprie

19:53:43 PM

CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT

127

305 diciturcommuniter,
quod in mente non est equiuocacio.
Tercia conclusionnulla que aliquo conceptunaturaliter
propriesignificantur,
possuntsignificaliequiuoce. Patet manifesteex conclusione precedente,quia si aliqua plura possuntsignificalinaturaliter
310 proprieper aliquem conceptum,illa plura erunt eiusdem speciei;
et per consequensoportebitquod ille conceptusilia omnia uniuoceb significarei,
quia quidquid est naturalissimilitudounius similium, est naturalissimilitudoalterius;ergo conclusio uera.
315 Quarta conclusionpossibileest aliquem conceptumesse equiuocum
significandoaliud naturaliterproprie et aliud naturalitercommuniter.Patet conclusio,quia conceptushominisnaturaliterproprie
omnes hominessignificat
ad extraet hoc conceptuqui est ipsemet,
secundumquod dictum est; et ille idem conceptussignificatalio
320 conceptu seipsum,scilicetqui est representatiuus
hominis,et hoc
naturaliteret communiter,quia nichil est naturalissimilitudosui
ipsius,ut dicebaturprius; ergo sequiturquod significataliud naturaliterproprieet aliud naturalitercommuniter.Consequencia nota.
Et antecedensapparet ex dictis.
325 Ex isto sequiturcorrelariequod possibile est eundem conceptum
esse equiuocum significandopure naturaliter.Patet, quia ille conhominesnaturaliter
uno conceptu;et significat
ceptushomosignificat
seipsum<naturaliter>alio conceptu; ergo sequiturquod significat
pure naturaliterequiuoce.
330 Secundo sequiturcorrelariequod, non obstantepredictaconclusinaturaliter
et ad placitumsine sui equiuoone, idempotestsignificare
cacione. Patet correlarium,quia clarum est quod aliquis conceptus
significatres ad extra naturaliter;et ille idem conceptus,eodem
<illas> res
conceptuquo significat,
potestimponiad significandum
335 ad extra; et sic patet quod significabit
naturaliteret ad placitum
sine equiuocacioned,quia unico eius conceptusignificabit
illa<s>.
Quinta conclusioeest quod possibile est aliquem conceptumesse
equiuocum significandonaturaliteret ad placitum. Probaturcon340 clusio: quia conceptushominisalio conceptu significatnaturaliter
res ad extra,et alio conceptu significat
seipsum;et sic ille conceptuspotestimponiad significandum
asinumuel bouem uno alio conceptu;ergo conclusiouera. Consequencia nota. Et antecedenseciam
clarum est ex terminis.

19:53:43 PM

128

BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.

345
Sexta conclusici:possibileest aliquem conceptumgesse equiuocum
communiter.
significando
precisenaturaliter
Apparetconclusio,quia
conceptushominisnaturalitercommuniterseipsumsignificai;et ille
naturaliter
communiter11
eius causam; ergo
idem conceptussignificat
350 conclusio uera. Consequencia nota est de se. Antecedensapparet,
primo,quod significatseipsumnaturalitercommuniterapparet de
se. Et quod significat
causam eius naturalitercommuniteralio coneffectusnaturaliterest representatiuus
omnis
ceptu apparet, quia
eius cause. Et quod hoc fitalio conceptuapparet,quia non potest
355 esse eadem similitudouel eadem racio qua significatilia diuersa
specificedistinctaetc.
et ultima:omnisconceptuspotestsignificare
Septimaconclusio1
pure
ad placitumequiuoce. Probaturconclusio:quia quilibetconceptus
360 potestimponiad significandum
plura equiuoce; ergo conclusiouera.
Et
nota.
antecedens
Consequencia
apparet,quia conceptushominis
ad
asinum,et tunc potestimponi ad
potestimponi
significandum
bouem alio conceptu,et sic de aliis multis.
significandum
365

Sequitur ex istisquod conceptuspotestesse equiuocus.

Sed pro solucioneargumentorum


factorumante oppositumest sciendum quod quodlibetpredicatamipotestsignificaresuum significatum. Patet,quia quodlibetpredicatumk
suum
potestrepresentare
370 significatum
esse
intellectui;ergo sequiturquod potest
signumsui
et intelsigni<ficati>.Consequencia tenet,quia idem est significare
lectuirepresentare
uocem. Quod apparet,nam sicutconceptushominis
significatSor, ita Sor potest representarehominem,quia quando
aliquis concipitSor, concipitconceptumhominisetc.
375 Ex quo sequiturquod possibileest aliquem conceptumsignificare
<aliquid> ad placitum et [aliquod] naturaliteruniuoce. Apparet
satis ex prius dictis,quia ex quo conceptusrepresentatSor seipso,
ille conceptuspotestimponi ad significandum
Sor; ergo.
Secundo sequitur quod quandocumque aliquid imponitur ad
ad placitumconceptum,et ille
380 significandum,
tunc ex ilio significat
ad
/f.
170V
uocem, et
potesteciam significare
conceptus placitum
sic de aliis.
Hec de secundo articulo.

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SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT

129

Ad raciones.
Ad primam,quando dicitur"idem conceptuspotest teneridistributee, determinateetc.; ergo,"negaturconsequnciaet racio, quia
385 idem terminusuniuoce potestteneridistribuirne
et determinate.
Ad secundam diciturquod ipsa concludituerum. Sed ad formam
argumenti,
quando dicitur"conceptuspotestsupponereetc.,"negatur
consequncia.Et quando dicitur"ab inferioriad superis,"dicitur
390 quod, licet supponereest inferiusad significare,
tarnensupponere
ad placitumnon est inferiusad significare
ad placitum.Et sic conceditur"ab inferioriad superius,"extremisexistentibus
<sine addicione>; tamen,<existenti>buskextremis<cum addicione>, [et] sic
non ualet. Eciam diciturquod supponerecopulatiuenon est inferius
395 ad significare
copulatiue.
Ad tercium,quando dicitur"conceptushominispotest significare
asinum,"conceditur.Et diciturquod hoc non est racione similitudinis quam habet conceptushominiscum asino, sed hoc est quia
400 talis conceptuspotestimponi ad significandum
de nouo asinum.

405

Ad quartum,quando dicitur"sicutse habet albedo ad album etc.,"


diciturquod illa racio bene probat pro quinta conclusione,scilicet
naturaliteret ad placitumequiuoce.
quod potestsignificare
Ad quintum,quando dicitur"conceptushominissignificat
homines
ad extra et illam uocem," diciturquod illa racio bene arguitpro
sexta conclusione,scilicetquod significatplura precise naturaliter

410

equiuoce.

Ad sextm,quando dicitur"idem conceptussignificatnaturaliter


etc.," diciturquod illa racio bene arguitpro quarta conclusione.
Ad septimum,quando diciturquod quilibetconceptuspotestsigni415 ficarepure equiuoce etc., diciturquod illa racio arguitpro septima
conclusione,uidelicetquod idem conceptuspotestimponi etc.
Ad racionespost oppositum.
Ad
420
primam("nullusconceptussignificat
plura diuersisconceptibus")
negaturantecedens.Et quando diciturquia "si sic, sequereturquod

19:53:43 PM

BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.

130

425

430

435

non esset unus conceptus,sed plures," negaturconsequencia. Et


diciturquod ilia racio bene probat quod nullus conceptuspotest
naturaliterproprie.Et hoc est uerum.
plura significare
Ad secundam,quando diciturquia "si sic, sequereturquod equiuocacio esset in mente," concediturconsequencia et consequens. Et
est in uoce, diciturquod
quando diciturquod solum multiplicitas
uerum est ut plurimum.
Ad terciam,quando dicitur"si sic, sequereturquod fallaciaequiuocacionisessetextradictionem,"negaturconsequenciaet consequens.
Et quando diciturquod fallacia ideo diciturextra dictionemquia
potestfierisine signisetc., diciturquod non, sed ideo quia potest
fierisine multiplicitate
signorm;modo, diciturquod fallaciaequiuocacionis non potestfierisine multiplicitate
signorm;ergo sequitur
est
in
dictione.
quod
Et sic est finisistiusquestionisbone et utilis,etc.
Nijmegen
Katholieke
Universitt
Faculteit
derWijsbegeerte
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
1
j
k
1
m
n

p
q

discrete]distributiue
(?) P
lin.
P
non] sup.
P
conciperem]cor1"
oppositum]oppositumadd. P"1
primusarticulus]P"1
sicut] s. P
conclusio]prima conclusio add. P"1
conclusio] secunda conclusioadd. P"1
ex] est P
conclusio] tercia conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio] quarta conclusio add. P"1
representatiuus]
representansP
P
conce
effectus
effectus]
non est res] non est res non est res P
ad placitum]sub lin. P
secundusarticulus]P"1
supposicio]prima supposicioadd. P"1

19:53:43 PM

SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
r
s
1
u
v
w
x
y
z
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
1
j
k

esse] est P
supposicio]secunda supposicioadd. P"1
de sui natura] de natura P de sui natura P"1
supposicio]terciasupposicioadd. P"1
correspondei]sui correspondeiP
omne] omnis P
conclusio]prima conclusioadd. P"1
omnis]sic omnis P
conclusio]secunda conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio]terciaconclusioadd. P"1
uniuoce] equiuoce P
conclusio]quarta conclusio add. P"1
equiuocacione] imposicioneP
conclusio]quinta conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio]sexta conclusioadd. Pn
conceptum]terminmP
communiter]P"1
conclusio]septimaconclusioadd. P"1
predicatum]pccm seu pctm P
tamen existentibus]tnb9P

19:53:43 PM

131

Reviews
etla smantique
au XIIIesicle.
Librairie
comme
acte.Surla grammaire
La parole
IrneRosier,
Vrin,Paris1994(Sicet Non)370p.
Philosophique
"La parolecomme
acte"is an impresitmustbe saidthatIrneRosier's
Attheoutset
andtracea conbook.The objectoftheworkis toidentify
andinspiring
learned
sively
In orderto substantiate
herclaim
oflanguage
as actin thethirteenth
century.
ception
in thisperiodIrneRosierdoesnot
is indeeddiscernible
thatsucha viewoflanguage
andlogicbutalsotracesthisviewof
ofgrammar
limitherinvestigation
to thesciences
andmagic.
as diverse
as psychology,
inareasofknowledge
theology,
epistemology,
language
is verycomplex,
lucidmanner
Notsurprisingly,
theresulting
buttheauthor's
argument
in spiteofa highdegree
oftechnicaltokeepthereader
on track;
ofpresentation
serves
is never
inthesections
themainlineofargument
ongrammatical
analysis,
ity,particularly
allowed
to fadeintothebackground.
a rather
IrneRosierbasesherargument,
form
The authors
on whoseworks
loosely
Theircommon
denomandtheologians.
defined
ofmedieval
grammarians,
logicians,
group
in thetermiwhich
to thequestions
ofgrammatical
inator
is a shared
analysis
approach
Thismeansthat
as being"intentionalistic."
ofIrneRosiermaybe characterised
nology
a purely
intrinoflinguistic
theseauthors
transcend
in analysing
theconditions
meaning
the
to
the
sense
intended
sicviewoflanguage
andattach
by
speaker.
principal
importance
andRogerBacon.
in thisgroupareRobert
Of absolutely
Kilwardby
importance
pivotal
sevonefinds
andtheologians
In thecompany
ofthesetwowell-known
English
logicians
"Master
eralanonymous
authors,
John"holdsa prominent
amongwhomtheso-called
a figure
ofnolessstature
on Robert
hisliterary
Kilwardby
dependence
position.
Through
withthegroup.
theGreatis alsoshowntohavehadaffiliations
thanAlbert
takesup thefirst
Thebookcomprises
twoparts.
Theauthor's
partandconexposition
In thesecanda conclusion
followed
sistsofan introduction
(p. 11-245).
bysixchapters
ofexcerpts
from
translations
theauthor
French
ondpartofthebook(p. 247-342)
presents
in thebodyof
considered
ofthemedieval
thinkers
thegrammatical
andlogicalwritings
thework.Of theninetexts"Master
three,
John"andRogerBaconhaveeachsupplied
areeach
authors
theGreatandoneoftheanonymous
whereas
Robert
Albert
Kilwardby,
notes
areaccompanied
byexplanatory
represented
bya singletext.Allthetranslations
service
to thereader.
whichareofexcellent
in IrneRosier's
In spiteofitscomplexity
andwidereachthemainlineofargument
ofhowitis posthefundamental
outlines
bookis quiteclear.The first
question
chapter
in otherwaysfrom
or whichdeviate
sibleto understand
sentences
thatare incomplete
Medieval
andsemantics.
whatis strictly
grammarians
bytherulesofgrammar
required
twolevelsofcorrectbetween
thesolution
to thisproblem
found
bywayofa distinction
or surface
between
literal
ness.Thustheydistinguished
and,on thedeeper
completeness
orthenon-verthelinguistic
is basedon either
The latter
level,intellectual
completeness.
whatmaylie
tosupply
is uttered,
on thelistener's
inwhich
a sentence
balcontext
ability
In thisconofthespeaker.
inthesentence,
andlastbutnotleastontheintention
implicit
orintellection.
welltalkoftwodifferent
levelsofperfection
nection
onecouldequally
tomedieval
numerous
difficulties
A groupofexpressions
which
grammarians
presented
areinterjections,
andtheyaredealtwithin thesecondchapter.
theyarenot
Obviously,
andyet
withmeaning,
endowed
natural
or weeping.
Theyarewords
signslikemoaning
botha subject
whichrequire
to therulesofwell-ordered
speech,
theydo notconform
ofinterjecIn ordertoaccount
fortheability
verbfordeterminate
anda finite
meaning.
thenotion
"intentionalistic"
tionsto convey
themedieval
develop
meaning,
grammarians
which
is contraofa special
modeofsignifying
affectus"),
"bywayofaffect"
("permodum
"I hurt"
andthe
Thusthesentence
posedto ordinary
signification
"bywayofconcept."
Vivarium
34,1

O E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:53:48 PM

REVIEWS

133

inasmuch
as theinterjection
different
shows
"Ouch"convey
messages
slightly
interjection
ofpain,whereas
is almost
thisis presumed
thatthespeaker
overwhelmed
bythefeeling
hasthepresence
ofmindtoutter
a fully
formed
sentence.
nottobe thecaseifthespeaker
ofsignsforms
thecoreofthethird
A penetrating
ofRogerBacon'sdivision
analysis
doubtBacon'sdependence
In thefirst
beyond
chapter.
place,IrneRosierdemonstrates
tothearguonAugustine's
"De doctrine
Christiana."
andwhatismorepertinent
Secondly,
to Bacon'sconception
ofsigns,
itis
showsthat,according
mentofthebook,theauthor
butalsothatsomebody
be a signanda thing
notonlythatthere
signified
puts
required
else.In fact,in contradistincto somebody
thesignto usein communicating
something
and Bonaventure,
Fishacre
tionto contemporaries
suchas Richard
RogerBaconholds
ofthemessage
is ofgreater
ofthesignto therecipient
thattherelationship
importance
In itself
a signis a "dead"object;itstrue
thanthatofthesignto thething
signified.
forthis
nature
is realised
onlyin actualuse.Bacon'sviewis shownto be quiteunusual
inidentifying
currents
which
is successful
thedifferent
ofthought
andIrneRosier
period,
Bacon.
inspired
a first
usein daily
Therelationship
between
ofwordsandtheir
imposition
subsequent
As a matter
ofcourse,
thisrelaofdiscussion
in thefourth
lifeis at thecentre
chapter.
fortheevaluation
ofinstances
ofimproper
useof
is offundamental
importance
tionship
an exceptohaveadopted
suchas figurative
speech.
AgainRogerBaconisshown
language
is boundto stickto theestablished
useof
to himno speaker
tional
According
position.
freedom
ofspeech,
Baconrecognises
thatthe
In spiteofthisfundamental
words.
however,
outin greatdetail.
follows
setrules,
whichcanbe spelled
transference
ofwordsusually
theinterpretation
of
ofthebookthefourth
substantiates
In theoverall
chapter
argument
to linguistic
at thesametimeas it givesthe
Bacon's"intentionalistic"
analysis
approach
on and modify
thepreviously
of
author
an opportunity
to elaborate
presented
picture
Bacon'sdebttoAugustine.
which
theauthor
ontheconcept
of"actusexercitus"
In thebook'sfifth
focuses
chapter
"Actusexercitus"
to expressions
is contraposed
to "actussignificatus."
appliesvariously
to someextra-linguistic
as in thecase that
whichmakeor require
reference
situation,
a teacher's
ofa pupilwho
corporeal
punishment
somebody
says"welldone"inapplauding
ofthefunction
itgavea precise
sinned
therulesofgrammar.
description
Equally,
against
wasnegligible
whereas
whosesignificative
content
ofinvocations
suchas "Oh,Muriel!,"
wasapplicable
as well.Hereit
their
valuewashigh.In logictheconcept
performative
In Bacon'sadopandquantifiers
served
thewayinwhich
tocharacterise
negations
operate.
of"actusexercitus"
itis clearly
outthatit
tionandinterpretation
oftheconcept
spelled
ofthe"exercised
whois thesubject
act."On theotherhand,as Irne
is thespeaker
in thecontemporary
andordinary
theactwouldbe
Rosierlucidly
shows,
interpretation
A third
andhighly
instance
ofwords
totheterms
themselves.
beingput
assigned
peculiar
formulas.
Thusthewordsofthe
usetheauthor
locatesin thesacramental
to operative
in thesenseofordinary
forinstance,
arenotsignificative
Eucharist,
descriptive
language.
thepurpose
ofthesacrament.
inordertoeffect
something,
namely
Theyarepronounced
toconclude
thatthemedieval
worlddidrecognise
On thisbasistheauthor
feelsentitled
ofaffairs
about
where
todescribe
states
buttobring
instances
serves
notmerely
language
in theouterworld
andthusfunctions
as a meansofaction.
something
inthesixth
Thepower
ofwords
intheframework
ofattention
ofmagicis at thecentre
Atfirst
ofmagicin a bookofthisnature
theinclusion
mayappearrather
chapter.
sight,
whichturns
attuned
to thenewenvironment,
thereader
is quickly
However,
surprising.
Baconandhis
In thischapter
forIrneRosier's
outto be highly
argument.
significant
theauthor
work
isagainatthecentre
anddrawing
ontheArabic
ofthestage,
background
ofthespeaker's
intention
andthe
shows
howBacon'shighevaluation
veryconvincingly
of physical
linkedto his conception
activenatureof languageis intimately
reality.
which
are
is viewed
as beingbasedon effusions
theorderoftheuniverse
Fundamentally,
wordsfindtheirproper
fromobjects.
Amongtheseeffusions
continually
beingemitted

19:53:48 PM

134

REVIEWS

notsufficient
thattheybe spoken
aloud;
place.Forwordsto havepowerit is,however,
to BaconandhisArabicmentor,
be backedbya mental
on
effort
theymust,
according
thepartofthespeaker,
andin thisconnection
theintention
ofthespeaker
is shown
to
be ofparamount
importance.
The author
in theconclusion.
In
summarizes
theresults
ofherinvestigation
succinctly
thefirst
as itis presented
thatthefulllineofargument,
in thebook,
place,itis apparent
can be verified
ofRogerBacon,who,quitenaturally,
serves
as the
onlyin thethought
stablepointofreference
thebook.In thesecondplace,it is clearthatthe
throughout
"intentionalistic"
in otherauthors
is present
oftheperiod,
in Robert
approach
notably
andtheso-called
Master
Kilwardby,
pseudoRobert
Kilwardby,
John.Hereonedoesnot
findanyphysical
tobackthelinguistic
ForthisreasonIrneRosier
is
theory
conception.
careful
to stress
thatshedoesnotpretend
to haveidentified
a new"schoolofthought"
in grammar
andlogic.Instead,
oneshould
consider
theseauthors
tohaveshared
a commonperception,
should
be viewed
as acts,andthatthe
viz.,thatsomeusesoflanguage
ofthespeaker
intention
is ofsignificance
forreaching
oflinguisa proper
interpretation
ticutterances.
It is undeniably
difficult
todo full
ofIrneRosier's
A
justicetotherichness
argument.
shortrsum
cannotpossibly
all thefineandilluminating
whichthe
encompass
points
author
makesin thecourseofherexposition.
on thecentral
issueoflanguage
However,
as actor "performative"
a further
theargument
language
question
cropsup.In following
ofthebookthereader
hesitance
withregard
totheexpression
mayfeela slight
"language
as act."In fact,
as itis usedin thebookitdoesnotseemtobe an absolutely
unequivocal concept.
Fortheoverwhelming
oftheauthors
underinvestigation,
thepremajority
dominant
orcommon
useoflanguage
is bywayofconcept
or,in other
terms,
bymeans
ofordinary
Suchinstances
as interjections,
andinvosentences,
signification.
incomplete
cations
constitute
forthesethinkers,
arecovered
"lanwhich,
exceptions
bytheconcept
is bynature
hand,spoken
guageact."ForBacon,on theother
language
speechact,and
theintention
ofthespeaker
hasa verydefinite
roleto playin theprocess
ofcommunithisis so tosaybuiltintohisbasictheory
ofphysical
Thisbeingthecase,
cation;
reality.
Bacon'sadoption
ofthedistinction
thesignificative
between
andthe"performative"
uses
oflanguage
and "actusexercitus")
to be different
from
the
("actussignificatus"
appears
onefound
intheother
authors
included
inthegroup.
Onemight
askwhether
Baconever
considered
theconsistency
distinction
inherof,on theonehand,hisgrammatical/logical
itedfromRobertKilwardby
thephysical
takenoverfrom
and,on theother,
theory
Avicenna
andAl-Kindi.
On another
to feelsomewhat
leftin thelurch.
The factof
pointthereaderis likely
thematter
is thatIrneRosierdoesnotexplicitly
confront
theissueoftheconsistency
of
theso-called
"intentionalistic"
ofthispersuasion
Authors
witha douviewpoint.
operate
blecriterion
ofcorrectness.
Thusin several
ofthetexts
adduced
byIrneRosiergrammatical
correctness
andintentional
arecontraposed.
correctness
Intentional
correctness
is
saidtobe a characteristic
ofwhatever
themeaning
intended
bythespeaker,
fully
represents
whereas
is a property
correctness
ofsentences
thatconform
to therulesof
grammatical
andsemantics.
Therelationship
between
these
twocriteria
ofcorrectness
is,howgrammar
ofcorrect
coincide
is
ever,lessthanclear.Thatthetwocriteria
speechdo notalways
it is byno meansapparent
that
Nonetheless,
clearly
perceived
bythe"intentionalists."
theseauthors
havesucceeded
indealing
withcaseswhere
clash.
thetwocriteria
effectively
In thewords
ofRobert
andRogerBacon,whocopiedKilwardby's
Kilwardby
exposition,
a sentence
which
reflects
themindofthespeaker
should
be calleda "maximally
corfully
rect"sentence
eventhough
it might
notbe "absolutely
correct,"
i.e.,it maybe gramor semantically
deficient
from
ofSaxony
on
matically
Jordanus
(p. 42; cf.thequotation
thatis "maximally
correct"
ofbeing"absolutely
p. 47-8).Howsomething
mayfallshort
correct"
is byno meansevident,
andundoubtedly
thereader
a
wouldhaveappreciated
discussion
oftheconsistency
ofthisclaim.

19:53:48 PM

REVIEWS

135

a fewmistakes,
andIrneRosier's
tocontain
bookis
Evenverygoodbooksarelikely
sacraments
theauthor
claimsthat
no exception
to thisrule.DealingwiththeChristian
thoseoftheOld Convenant
thesacraments
aredistinguished
from
oftheNewConvenant
function
would,
however,
bytheir
(p. 200).Mostmedieval
theologians
disagree;
operative
itwasquiteevident
thata sacrament
suchas circumcitotheir
understanding,
according
It wasnota graceas fullas theonedonated
siondid,infact,
bring
gracetoitsrecipient.
wasno empty
circumcision
but,nonetheless,
signor a mereadumbrathrough
baptism
tionofwhatwastocome.
thatin translating
a textfrom
is thecircumstance
Lessworthy
ofmention
pseudo-KiltheLatinofthepublished
edition
IrneRosierhascorrected
a
bysubstituting
wardby
itis truethatinmedieval
for"consiliantur"
"conciliantur"
(p. 72).Ofcourse,
manuscripts
Thisis,however,
arelikely
nottanthesewords
tohavebeenconfused
orthographically.
between
"concilio"
and"consilior"
to saying
thatthedistinction
wasaltogether
tamount
tosuggest
obliterated
inthemiddle
venture
thata fitting
ages.Forthisreasononemight
instead
ofthe"concerter,"
French
translation
ofthisparticular
wordwouldbe "conseiller"
tobe lesssuited
which
forthecontext.
appears
Anobvious
inanother
translation
from
pseudo-Kilwardby;
slipofthepenis tobe found
in thelastlineofthetranslation
on p. 27 oneshould
read"finale"
instead
of"formelle."
should
serveonlyto setoffthevalueofa book
Suchinsignificant
blemishes,
however,
as erudite
andinspiring
as IrneRosier's.
itis a bookofgreatcourage.
In its
Moreover,
it attempts
to unify
choiceofsubject
as wellas manner
ofapproach
perceptions
gained
inwidely
In thisitprovides
a highly
laudable
service
different
tobreaking
down
disciplines.
thebarrieres
ofgrammar,
andtheology.
between
historians
logic,philosophy,
Copenhagen

LaugeOlaf Nielsen

andtranslated
McDermott.
Thomas
Selected
, selected
byTimothy
Aquinas,
Philosophical
Writings
York1993,xxxv+ 452p.
Press-The
World's
Oxford-New
Oxford
Classics,
University
ISBN0 19 2829467.
works
McThetranslation
ofselections
ofThomasAquinas's
byTimothy
philosophical
in philosophy,
andcomputer
is veryuseful
Dermott
science)
(formerly
professor
theology
andinteresting.
It provides
thereader
witha fluid
oftexts,
the
translation
notonlyfrom
Summa
a broadrangeof
butalsofrom
works.
Theselection
covers
manyother
Theologiae,
thatarepresented
Thetexts
as a whole,
andindividually,
areintrotopics,
systematically.
ducedbynotesthatareveryclearly
ordered:
eachtextis preceded
about
byinformation
dateofcomposition,
sources,
typeofpassageandhowtoreadit,andon thetranslation.
The titlepromises
thereadera selection
ofphilosophical
this
but,ofcourse,
writings,
doesnotexcludetextsthatin various
God- theGod of thephilosopher
waysdiscuss
discusses
section
structures
of thought,
i.e. thenatureand
Thomas,thatis. The first
ofNatural
andMetaphysics;
II is aboutstructures
difference
Mathematics
section
Science,
in general
III is aboutwhatis labelledthe
ofthings
form
matter,
etc.);section
(being,
"ladder
ofbeing,"
withelements
sections
IV,V andVI areabout
dealing
up tothemind;
aliaabouteternity
andtime,
aboutourwords
andconcepts
ofGod,
God,inHimself
(inter
aboutGod'sPower),
ofthings
aliaaboutcreation
andevil)andas
as thebeginning
(inter
theendofthings
aliaaboutmoralandtheological
McDermott
(inter
virtues)
respectively.
elucidates
hischoiceoftexts
on pp.xxi-xxiv.
indexofterms.
Thereis a useful
butadequate.
Theintroduction
tothegeneral
contents
ofThomas's
is short,
philosophy
withnumTheliterary
structure
ofthetexts
ofthequestio
) is wellpresented
(esp.theform
in a boldtypeface.
bersandtitles
To bemoreprecise,
McDermott
tobe absolutely
ontheonehand,thetranslation
wants,
faithful
toThomas's
turns
but,on theother,
prefers
contemporary
philosophical
meaning,
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Viuarium
34,1

19:53:48 PM

136

REVIEWS

to moretraditional
translations
translation
is someofphrase
(p. xvi).HereMcDermott's
from
Thomas's
ownwords.
times
at somedistance
I shallexamine
in moredetail.
sometranslations
- p. 51: "Being
idemsignifcat
truethenisjustthesameas existing"
verum
omnino
("ergo
thetruesignifies
translation
wouldbe e.g."therefore,
absolutely
quodens").A moreliteral
McDermott
haschosento render
thesameas being."
by"is,"and"esse"by
"signifcat"
thelevelofbeingis expressed
instead
ofthelevelof
"existence."
translation,
Bythefirst
notion
"esse"is a broader
thanwhatis conveyed
Further,
by"existence,"
signification.
which
wouldfavour
thetranslation
"being."
- p. 67:"Existing
thelatter
isa fixed
soI would
)" for"essesimpliciter";
(periodi
expression,
"to be without
Two linesbelow:"inbothsensesthings
can exist
prefer
qualification."
autemesseestaliquidin potentia").
is in
"Now,something
("ad utrumque
potentially"
in bothwaysofbeing"conveys
theontological
better.
potency
aspect
- p. 77:Twosentences
ofThomas's
texthavebeencontracted
toone:"Note,too. . . primary."
- p. 107:"exists"
should
be added.
(formaliter
est),an omission.
"Formally"
- p. 146:"(.. .) every
can be saidto undergo
theactualization
thatin fact
potentiality
it to fulfillment"
in actum,
dicipati,edam
("omnequodexitde potentia
brings
potest
cumperficitur").
thatgoesfrom
to act,can be said
Mysuggestion:
"everything
potency
to 'undergo,'
evenwhenit is madeperfect."
thisbrings
better
forward
thefact
Firstly,
thatThomasspeaksabouta thing
which
is perfected;
indicates
"etiam"
("even")
secondly
a climax.
- p. 209:"[1]"should
thefirst
be placedafter
sentence
"endless
Here
life").
(thatis after
theopponents'
start.
arguments
- p. 211,line2: "havea beginning":
"orend"isomitted.
Lne5: thereference
toAristotle's
is omitted.
Physics
- p. 215:"Aristotle
andthoughts
so clearly
sayswordsexpress
thoughts
things;
represent
wordsrefer
to things
We talkaboutthings
mediately
bywayofourmental
conceptions.
in thewaywe knowthem.(Respondeo
dicendum
voces
quod,secundum
Philosophum,
suntsignaintellectuum,
et intellectus
suntrerum
similitudines.
Et sicpatetquodvoces
referuntur
ad ressignificandas,
mediante
intellectus.
Secundum
conceptione
igitur
quod
I wouldprefer
the
sica nobispotest
aliquida nobisintellectu
nominali.)
cognosci
potest,
translation:
is that,according
wordsaresignsof
to thePhilosopher,
following
Myreply
and thoughts
are likenesses
of things
is herebrought
outmore
thoughts,
[therelation
"to represent"].
So clearly
to things
to be signified
wordsrefer
clearly
byMcDermott's
Thomasdoesnotspeakaboutthings
without
[omitted
by
byMcDermott;
qualification]
In thewaysomething
ofourintellect.
canbe knowbyuswithour
wayoftheconception
so itcanbe namedbyus [McDermott
doesnotrender
thetechnical
term"nointellect,
minare"].
The translation
is
McDermott's
bookis veryuseful,
foruniversity
courses.
especially
It is a little
however,
clear,whichmakesreading
free,
though
quiteeasyandattractive.
thegeneral
is no doubtpreserved.
ofThomas's
meaning
thought
E.P. Bos

Leiden

: Referenz
undWahrheit
vonOckham.
LeidenMatthias
beiWilhelm
, Stze,
Kaufmann,
Begriffe
Dinge
undTexte
NewYork-Kln:
(E.J.Brill)1994x + 255p. ISBN90 04 098895. (Studien
desMittelalters
zurGeistesgeschichte
, XL).
Ockhams
von1992zugrundeliegt,
konfrontiert
Das Buch,demeineHabilitationsschrift
mitAnstzen
in fnf
Semantik
undOntologie
gegenwrtiger
angelschsischer
Philosophie
"Zeichen
undDinge";"Wases gibtundwases nicht
gibt";"Suppositionslehre
Kapiteln:
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,1

19:54:09 PM

REVIEWS

137

"SatzundWahrheit,"
"Ockhams
derErkenntundmoderne
Logik,"
Entphysikalisierung
aberimmer
zentrale
Gedanken
werden
wieder
nistheorie."
so dasich
aufgegriffen,
Einige
nurunbedingt
einekapitelweise
Darstellung
empfiehlt.
ImKapitel
undDinge"untersucht
derAutor
Zeichenber"Zeichen
u.a.,ob Ockhams
Kritik
Referenztheorien
unterworfen
wre.Putnam
wentheorie
Putnams
an traditionellen
einemAusdruck
detsichgegendieAuffassung,
da die Referenz
undunabnotwendig
zwischen
Referenten
undZeichenbenutzers,
vonkausalen
Beziehungen
gleichsam
hngig
Ockham
Kaufmann
zukomme.
nun,da "esso aus<sehe>,alsvertrete
glaubt
"magisch"
derBezugnahme,
diePutnam
Theorien
dieAnsicht
angreift;
genaueineder"magischen"
Harmonie
zwischen
mentalen
unddenDingen
also,esgebeeineArtprstabilierte
Begriffen
einTerminus
aufOckhams
dictum
in irgendeiderWelt."(17)Er verweist
, "daniemals
fretwasanderes
nemSatz,. . . wennerbezeichnend
alsdas,
wird,
genommen
supponiert
wovonerwahrprdiziert
wird."(16)- DieseRegelerscheint
ihmwohldeshalb
anstig,
weilsieoffenlt,
unter
welchen
einAusdruck
dazukommt,
vonbestimmBedingungen
tenGegenstnden
wahrprdizierbar
zu sein.Es istabernicht
diesnicht
so,daOckham
erklrt.
Im Fallevon"mentalen
einermentalen
(alsoBestandteilen
Begriffen"
Sprache),
aufeinenkausalen
"... selbst
einenHinweis
zwischen
gibtOckham
Zusammenhang
sprachlichen
Zeichen
undihren
Ockham
betrachtet
nmlich
Referenten":
alsdurch
das
Begriffe
desBezeichneten
Bezeichnete
selbst
wobeidasModelldieWahrnehmung
ist.
verursacht,
istsicherlich
nicht
DieseTheorie
ohneProbleme
auchBegriffe
vonetwas
(kannmannicht
- z.B.denBegriff
wird
dasniemals
Schneehaben,
wahrgenommen
"nichtwahrgenommene
Kaufmann
da "Ockham
eineArt'Biologisierung'
bestimmter
Teileder
meint,
flocke?").
durch<fiihre>"
"unsere
in
(19,cf.157):Insofern
Sprache
neurophysiologische
Ausstattung
nicht
Ausma
wiewirdieWelterleben
darber
unddaherauchbebestimmt,
geringem
mten
unsere
mentalen
erheblich
"vondenErkenntnissen
derSinschreiben,"
Begriffe
beeinflut"
sein.Kaufmann
dieseFragezunchst
nenseele"
nicht
weiter.
Errichtet
verfolgt
z.B. nichtan Ockham
die Frage,wieunterdiesenUmstnden
eineuniverselle
mentale
sei(beiverschieden
mten
Sprache
mglich
ausgebildeten
Wahrnehmungsfhigkeiten
ja
unterschiedliche
oderunterschiedlich
vieleBegriffe
skizziert
er
Stattdessen
resultieren).
dieOckham
Attacken
wiediePutnams
diemodernen
Vertreter
Auswege,
gegenber
gegen
- umsofort
einermental
zu betonen,
da die "Termini
language
(insb.Fodor)blieben,
undStze<einermentalen
Entitten
sind,"undwirfursie
Sprache>etwasmysterise
Evidenz
besitzen"
er "Ockhams
derBegriffe
(20).Dannwiederfindet
"wenig
Deutung
nicht
Etwasspter
fahrt
ernochschrfere
Geschtze
Anvllig
abwegig."
gegenOckhams
"einer
nahme
vollausgebildeten,
nochdazulogisch
vollkommenen
auf:
mentalen
Sprache"
"NebendemFehlen
Evidenz
fureinesolcheSprachespricht
jeglicher
gegensie bereits
- etwabeider
derUmstand,
daOckhams
FormderLogifizierung
an elementaren
Stellen
- vonmodernen,
derPrdikation
anFregeanschlieenden
Anstzen
einerkanoniDeutung
schen
Notation
verschieden
ist."(40)DerAutor
sichoffenbar
orientiert
angngigen
Interpreabernicht,
daOckham
diementale
selbst
alslogisch
vollkommen
tationen,
Sprache
belegt
einstuft.
Mitdemzweiten
willerindizieren,
Punkt
daes mehralseineMglichkeit
gibt,
einelogisch
"vollkommene"
zu strukturieren.
Deisdrfte
Ockham
nicht
Sprache
ungelufig
- beiThomas,
erz.B.abweichende
derPrdikation
kannte
Modelle
sein,natrlich
gewesen
.
.
.
Burleigh
Seltsam
mutet
dieKorrektur
vonOckhams
Zeichen
an:"ImUnternatrlicher
Beispiel
zumRauch,
schied
dervomFeueraufsteigt,
sindSthnen
undLcheln
nurdannAusdruck
desSchmerzes
oderderFreude,
wennsienicht
bewut
unterdrckt
werden"
(18)In der
dasunterdrckt
nochAusdruck
sein?
vonirgendetwas
Tat,wiekannetwas,
wird,
IConnotative
undabsolute
Ausdrcke
Als"zentral"
furOckham
beschreibt
Kaufmann
dessen
vonkonSystem
Unterscheidung
notativen
Einabsoluter
Ausdrcken
Ausdrcken.
"bezeichnet"
nur
undabsoluten
Ausdruck

19:54:09 PM

138

REVIEWS

"Mensch"
dieeinzelnen
einkonnota"eine"Sache("Weie"
dieQualitten,
Menschen),
"Vater"nichtnurden
"wei"das weieDingunddie Qualitt,
tiver
mehrere:
dagegen
einweiteres
concretimi
Konnotativ
sindfr
, dasKind(aberkeineRelation)!
Mann,sondern
undQualitt"
dieTermini
alleranderen
alsSubstanz
Ockham,
(33).
"berhaupt
Kategorie
Theseistontologisch:
es sollauerSubstanzen
und
Das Motivfrdieseweitreichende
einerSachez.B. istnicht
individuellen
keine"Sachen"geben.Die Quantitt
Qualitten
SacheVerschiedenes.
Wasbezeichnet
alsoeinabstrakter
einesvonderquantifizierten
quanKonkreta!
DieswirdbeiKaufmann
titativer
Ausdruck?
trotz
indesnicht
guter
Darstellung
findet
sichdie Behauptung,
es gebedie "Referenten
sehrdeutlich.
Stattdessen
anderer
Termini
<als derabsoluten,
R.H.> . . . nurinanima,
zweiter
, siesindTermini
Intention,
Platzhalter
furkompliziertere
imErnst
entia
rationis."
Ausdrcke,
(107)Das kannderAutor
in "Sokrates
istzwei-Ellen-gro"
nicht
meinen!
Soll"zwei-Ellen-gro"
oderin "EinZweiluft"
entia
Einensrationis
rationis
bezeichnen?
kannnicht
Sokrates
nicht
laufen,
Ellen-groes
identisch
seinmitetwasinmeinem
Geiste.
WasOckham
sagt,istetwasvielHarmloseres,
- waskeinesfalls
sc.da Quantitten
etc.keineSachensind
daderkonkrete
ausschliet,
Ausdruck
zwei
Ellen
animam
extra
bezeichnet!
"zwei-Ellen-gro"
groen
Gegenstnde
Quantifikation
whrt
derStreit,
obdieSuppositionslehre
eineArtPrdikatenlogik
Jahrzehnte
(Ockhams)
- ergnzt
umAusflge
in
darstellt.
Nebeneinerausfhrlichen
derDiskussion
Darstellung
Kaufmann
im2. Kp.
Semantik
Welten
u. .- versucht
Freges
Kripkes
mglicher
Logik,
dieser
zu gewinnen,
zwischen
Ockhams
indem
erhnlichkeiten
FrageneueAspekte
geneHierfindet
derLeserwierellen
Ausdrcken
undQuinesgebundenen
Variablen
feststellt.
dereinengewissen
Zickzackkurs.
ZuerstwerdenVariablen
durchihregegenstndliche
"denkonnotativen
Termini
denn:"VxFxundExFx
Ockhams
hnlich,"
Interpretation
beziehen
sicheinmal
aufdieDingex unddannaufdieDinge,wovonFxwahrist."(105)
imTarskischen
Erstens
beziehen
sichgeschlossene
Stze(wie"ExFx")hchstens
Einspruch!
aufGegenstnde
SinnederErfllung
keinen.
Zweitens
dannaufalleoder
(resp.Reihen),
sindStzeoderSatzformen
nichtidentisch
mitin ihnenauftretenden
Variablen!
Drittens
laufen
frQuineVariablen
beralleGegenstnde,
somit
dieF
sicherlich
berdiejenigen,
sind(sofern
es solche
Es istirrefhrend
zu sagen:"dieDingex unddieDinge,wovon
gibt):
Fxwahrist,"wieesirrefuhrt
zu sagen:"dieelfSpieler
undderTorwart
desFuballteams."
"ExFx"istwahr,
wennmindestens
einGegenstand
WeltF ist.Etwasspter
dieser
behauptetKaufmann,
da "sichOckhams
in einerWeiseaufdieGegenstnde
absolute
Termini
derWeltbeziehen,
die derobjektuellen
derVariablen
nahekommt..."
(113)
Deutung
Diesmalistes geradedie Besonderheit
aufaille
nicht-konnotatiuer
Ausdrcke
sich"insofern
zu konnotativen
<zu beziehen>,
als im Unterschied
ObjekteeinerArtoderGattung
nichteinesmehrals das anderebezeichnet
<Ausdrcken>
diesiefrdieseRolle
wird,"
soll.Der Versuch
mutet
irrefhrend
undunntig
an. Selbstwennabsolute
empfehlen
Ausdrcke
undquantifizierbar
nichtkraft
einesdeskriptiven
Gehalts
sind,
bezeichneten,
werden
habensiedeshalb
nochlangenicht
alleBesonderheiten
vonVariablen.
Variablen
z. B. nicht
beiQuine(undFrege)
siesinddieSubjekte
vonPrdikaten,
Hilfsmittel,
prdiziert
aufzunehmen
Prdikationen
bzw.Referenzen
wieder
auszudrcken,
("wennx
komplexe
Vatervony ist,dannistx mnnlich,
undy istjngerals x").Ihrumgangssprachliches
siehtQuine(hnlich
wievorihmFrege)in bestimmten
Pronomina:
"wenn
Gegenstck
istjngeralsdieseundjener/jene
jemandderVatervonjemandist,dannistermnnlich,
raiEs istschwer
welcher
Artauchimmer,
ohne
zu erkennen,
wiegenerelle
Ausdrcke,
zu dieserLeistung
in derLagewren(unddann
denBeistand
Ausdrcke
pronominaler
derReferenz,
istes natrlich
zu sagen,dasPronomen
leistedieAufnahme
naheliegender
nicht
dergenerelle
Ausdruck).
Im Kapitelber"SatzundWahrheit"
eineninteressanten
berblick
gibtKaufmann

19:54:09 PM

REVIEWS

139

berhistorische
undmoderne
Wahrheitstheorien
undunternimmt
dasehrgeizige
Projekt,
mitgngigen
erOckhams
Ockhams
Ansatz
Theorien
zu vergleichen.
Ausfhrlich
wrdigt
dieWahrheit/
Falschheit
einesSatzesnicht
alseineEigenschaft
desSatzesanzuVersuch,
- oderwegen
- des mglichen
sondern
trotz
Schwankens
desWahrheitswertes
sie
sehen,
mitdemSatzselbst
zu identifizieren.
Zu Unrecht
kritisiert
erjedochFreddoso,
nichtzu
dafurOckham
"N istnicht
P" "stets
vonN impliziert."
dieExistenz
SeinVerweis
sehen,
daerselbst
undinfinite
Prdikaten
verwechII, cap.14)zeigt,
(Summa
Logicae
Negationen
selt(chimera
estnon-ens).
BuchII, cap. 3 htteihneinesanderen
belehrt: . . si talis
RH> sitnegativa
etpraedicatum
nonsup<indefinita,
, requiritur
propositio
quodsubiectum
immo
subiectum
velquod
ponant
proomnieodem,
requiritur
quod
pronullo
supponat,
supponat
pro
nonsupponit."
aliquoproquopraedicatum
(p. 255,13-16)
undUnbestimmtheit
Ontologie
Kaufmann
siehtOckhams
reduktionistische
alsVersuch
"... imBereich
des
Ontologie
ensreale
extra
animam
nurnochDingezu akzeptieren,
derenExistenz
sichim weitesten
- vonden
Sinnebehavioristisch
lt..." ( 47),"daes auerhalb
derSeele
berprfen
- geradephysikalische
himmlischen
Entitten
einmal
unddiejeniabgesehen
Gegenstnde
mitdenen
sieReizungen
unserer
genihrer
Qualitten
gibt,
(. . .) hervorKrperoberflchen"
rufen"
warnt
er:an denEigenschaften
vonSubstanzen
. . ., "zeigtsich,
(89).[Andererseits
daes nicht
ratsam
einfach
mitunseren
ist,Substanzen
gleichzusetzen
heutigen
physikalischen
auf
Gegenstnden"
(79)]DamitwreOckhams
Programm
gerademitHinblick
sehrinteressant.
Es bleibt
aberunklar,
woher
Kaufmann
Quines
skeptische
Bedeutungstheorie
die Gewiheit
da OckhamnurQualitten
die Reizungen
unserer
nimmt,
akzeptiert,
hervorrufen
knnen.
WelcheReizung
meiner
Oberflche
knnte
die
Krperoberflchen
caritas
meines
Nachbarn
verursachen?
Wiederum:
lassensichSubstanzen
wirklich
"behavioristisch
dasgerade
bestreiten
unddagegenhalten,
dadieselbe
Quinewrde
berprfen"?
Reizsituation
erscheint
vorunseren
verschieden
(einKaninchen
Augen)
ontologisch
ganz
- sozusagen
werden
kann
mitundohneSubstanz
vs.
interpretiert
("Da isteinKaninchen"
"Eshselt").
Das heitaberdoch:es gibtfrQuinegeradekeinen
behavioristischen
Test,
obeinePerson
mitunbekannter
dasVorliegen
einerSubstanz
imSinneOckhams
Sprache
konstatiert
odernicht.
Bemerkenswert
istschlielich,
daKaufmann
"imAnschlu
an das
beiOckham
Erkannte
dieInkohrenz
undberflssigkeit
desReizes(. . .) als universelle
. . . aufzeigen
Grundentitt
mchte"
(233).VielLrmumnichts?
Fazit
Kaufmann
versucht
zuzeigen,
daOckhams
auchflir
Philosophie
gegenwrtige
Philosophen
relevant
ist.Herausgekommen
isteinBuchbereinfaszinierendes
Thema,reichan guten
das zeigt,da Kaufmann
seineAutoren
aberseinZiel nicht
Darstellungen,
gutkennt,
immer
erreicht
undinderDurchfuhrung
nicht
zu berzeugen
es
Bisweilen
reitet
vermag.
einArgument
zu Tode,das denAufwand
kaumverdient,
dannwieder
ltes wichtige
Thesen
stellt
frhere
undThesen
inZweifel.
Auch
unbegrndet,
(scheinbar?)
Begrndungen
manche
sindnicht
So liestmanalsbersetzung
ein
Ockhams,
bersetzungen
zuverlssig.
Ausdruck
knne
nurineinfacher
. . . Supposition
"wenn
ermiteinem
extremum
auftreten,
wird
. . ." (133).Tatschlich
meint
Ockham
mit"comparare"
hiernicht
verglichen
Vergleichen,
sondern
dasVerbinden,
Zusammenstellen
imSatz).UnddiebersetAusdrcke
(zweier
derelictus
exaliquacausadeterminatae
. . rememorativum
ex
zungvon"effectus
, ducens
speciei,
ipsius
communi
inadhaesionem
alicui
enuntianti
essevelJuisse
velaliquid
talede
lege
propositioni
contingenti
illacausa
." (OT II 548)durch"eineWirkung,
dievoneinerderArtnach. . . bestimmten
Ursache
hinterlassen
andieseerinnert
. . . undnacheinem
Gesetz
zum
wurde,
allgemeinen

19:54:09 PM

140

REVIEWS

diesagt,da etwasmitdieserUrsache
Glaubenan einekontingente
fuhrt,
prAussage
sentistoderwaroderdergleichen"
nicht
denNagelaufdenKopf.Wirdhier
(p.12) trifft
nicht
vielmehr
vonjenerUrsache
selbst
dasieistoderwar(also:da es bergeglaubt,
gibtodergab)?
haupteineUrsache
Hamburg

Reinhard
Hlsen

19:54:09 PM

The Reflection
StoicIdeas in theThirteenth-Century
of Some Traditional
*
ScholasticTheoriesof Beauty
OLEG V. BYCHKOV

The scope of the presentpaper is to followseveral traditionalStoic


ideas on theirway fromAntiquityto the high Middle Ages. A studyof
the manuscripttraditionof a particularwork of antiquity,or a studyof
the ancienttextualsources of a particularauthor usuallyneeds no justification.However, disseminationand availabilityof ancient textsis only
one aspectof theirlife.It is equallyinteresting
to considerhow theywere
read and incorporated.And for the Middle Ages such a task will often
involvea studyof the historyof ideas, ratherthan texts.Ideas had a life
and value of theirown and spread, sometimeswithoutconsiderableloss
of theirintegrity,
throughvarious sources and authors. It would seem
to groundthe studyof the hisideal, however,despiteobviousdifficulties,
of
a
of
tradition.
ideas
on
textual
thoroughstudy
tory
Medieval ideas of beauty in the 12th and 13th centuriesare usually
discussedagainst the backgroundof medieval versionsof Platonismor
Neoplatonismwhichoriginatedin the textsof pseudo-Dionysiusthe Areopagite,Augustineand some commentarieson Plato (e.g., Calcidius' commentaryon the Timaeus)and were supportedby the authorityof Biblical
parallels(e.g., the "cosmology"of Genesis).1The majorityof general accountsof 13th-century
philosophyare dedicatedfullyto the receptionof
Aristotle.2
scholasticdiscusHowever, duringmy studyof 13th-century
sionsof beautya slightly
different
pictureappeared. Apart froman abundance of referencesto typicallyPlatonicor Neoplatonictheories,I found
a large numberof ideas that are traditionally
attributedto the Stoics,
in
and earlymedieval
with
texts
that
are
the
ancient
contained
together
sourceswhich have a Stoic background.
* I wouldliketo thankProfessor
BradInwoodfortheir
JohnMageeand Professor
form.
The
adviceandcriticism
without
whichthispapercouldnotappearin itspresent
ofthispapermuchbenefited
from
PaulaLeverage.
style
by
suggestions
1 Cf.E. de Bruyne,
mdivale
Etudes
1946;U. Eco,Artand
, vols.1-3,Brugge
d'esthtique
intheMiddle
NewHaven-London
1986.
Apes,
Beauty
2 Cf.J. Marenbon,
London-New
Later
Medieval
York1991.
(1150-1350),
Philosophy
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:34:21 PM

142

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

Stoicismin the Middle Ages, in particularin the 12th century,has


been the object of littlestudy.3The general consensusseems to be, as
expressedby M. Lapidge, that . . to speak of Stoic influencein twelfthcenturythoughtis to misrepresentthe case" (the 13th centuryin this
respectdoes not seem to be an exception,accordingto the cited secondary literature).PraisingVerbeke for choosingthe term"presence"as he
speaks of Stoicismin the Middle Ages, Lapidge continuesthat he will
"attemptto indicatewhereand how this'presence'was felt,withoutimplying at any point thatit was a decisivepresence"(Lapidge, op. at., p. 84).
Given this opinion, as well as the scarcityof literatureon the subject,
the presentstudymightbecome a furthercontribution
to the questionof
the "presence"of Stoicismin the medievalperiod, and especiallyin the
13th century.
However, a scholar who attemptsto trace exclusivelyStoic ideas and
sourcesin the Middle Ages, especiallyregardingthe medievaltheoriesof
beauty,immediatelyfaces the problemof how to separate the Stoic theories fromthose of other schools, mainlyPlatonismand Neoplatonism.
Firstof all, the originsof some doctrinesof the ancientStoa were Platonic
(in the case of theoriesof beauty there are distinctparallels with the
HippiasMajor, Tmaeusand Symposion).
Secondly,a fewideas thatare reminiscentof Stoicismcome to the Middle Ages, sometimestransformed,
throughthe prism of Neoplatonism (in particularthat of the Church
Fathers)which makes it almost impossibleto trace their exact origins.
The only possible solution appears to be, first,to exclude all interest
in the influenceson the Stoics (as Plato) and draw a line carefully
between
the primary(e.g., Platonic) originsof ideas, on the one hand, and their
immediate(Stoic) sourceson the other.The second taskwill be to avoid
all ideas coming indirecdythroughthe contextof other schools (e.g.,
Neoplatonism).Thus an attribution
may onlybe made when a phraseor
an idea can be traced back directlyto a professedStoic, or comes from
a source traditionally
recognizedas Stoic withina reliableancienttradition (e.g., fromCicero's statementsetc.). Argumentsbased on the resemblance withtraditionalStoic "themes"may be used sparingly,and mosdy
to confirmalready establishedtextualdependence.
3 The bestknown
are:M. Lapidge,TheStoic
studies
Inheritance
, in:P. Dronke
(ed.),A
ThePresence
1988,81-113;G. Verbeke,
, Cambridge
History
ofTwelfthCentury
of
Philosophy
Stoicism
inMedieval
1983(Stoicism
in theMiddleAgesin general);
, Washington
Thought
L.D. Reynolds,
TheMedieval
Tradition
Letters
Studien
, Oxford
1965;K.D. Nothdurft,
ofSeneca's
Seneca's
undTheologie
deszwlften
zumEinfluss
aufdiePhilosophie
Jahrhunderts
Leiden-Cologne
1963(SenecaintheMiddleAges);forCicero's
intheMiddleAges,seebelow.
Stoicworks

19:34:21 PM

THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

143

In orderto deal witha coherenttextualand doctrinaltradition,I will


limitmyself,in the presentpaper, to a particulargroup of 13th-century
scholasticworks.These will be theologicaltreatises(.Summae
) produced
withinthe Dominican school by Albertthe Great and his two disciples
Ulrichof Strassburgand Thomas Aquinas,and also the FranciscanSumma
Halensisas an importantsource forthe above mentionedauthors.4
The discussionof beauty was suggestedby several Biblical passages,
confirmed,in theirturn,by Patristictextsand affectedthe three most
importantsectionsof the scholasticSummae.In the sectionon God, His
propertiesof beingthe themeis thebeauty
qualitiesand the transcendental
of God (mentionedin the Song of Songs, and very oftenin Augustine
and pseudo-Dionysius).Here the essence and the most general (ontological) propertiesof beauty are discussed,in order to understandhow it
can be attributedto God and how it differsfromgoodness. The beauty
of the universeor creation(describedin the Genesis,on numerousoccasions in Augustineand pseudo-Dionysius)is discussedin the sectionon
the createduniverseand its properties.A variationof the above theme
is an attemptto account for the existenceof ugliness(evil if taken in
oppositionto goodness)in the world.Finally,moral,or "spiritual"beauty
and oftenreferredto by Augustine
impliedin the Latin term honestum
and otherPatristicand earlymedievalauthorsappears in the sectionon
4 I amusing
oftheSummae
Summa
thefollowing
editions
(therelevant
indicated):
chapters
Halensis
: lib.I, inq.I, tract.
1924,
I, cap.I, art.II (Quaracchi,
III, quaest.III, membr.
lib.II parsI (I-II),inq.I, tract.
vol.1,p. 162-3);
II, quaest.Ill, cap. I-VI (Quaracchi,
Albertus
Summa
6, quaest.26,
, parsI, tract.
1928,vol.2, p. 99-108).
theologica
Magnus,
11,quaest.
parsII, tract.
Cologne1978,vol.34.1,p. 177-9);
cap.I, art.2.3(ed.D. Siedler,
UlrichofStrassburg,
De summo
bono
62 (ea. S.C.ABorgnet,
1895,vol.32,p. 596-604).
,
Medii
Aevi1.2,Hamburg
Teutonicorum
1987.Thomas
lib.2,tr.3,cap.4, Corpus
Philosophorum
sac.P. Caramello
cum
Summa
, I, 39,8; II-II,145,1-3,curaetstudio
Theologica
Aquinas,
Taurini-Romae
useAlbert's
textu
etrecensione
1948,vol.1-3.I willoccasionally
leonina,
on De Div.Nom.4 ofpseudo-Dionysius
(ed.P. Simon,Cologne1972,vol.
commentary
Theinfluence
oftheSumma
Halensis
where
Stoicsources
arequoted.
37.1,p. 180-6)
(which
of
tohavebeenwritten
Alexander
existed
believed
bytheFransican
by1250,wasearlier
on contemporary
is well
scholars
Halesandis known
alsoas theSumma
Alexandi)
fiatris
dertheologischen
Alberts
des
known
desVerhltnisses
Summe
umProblem
(e.g.,see:H. Neufeld,
Grossen
Summa
Alexanders
vonHaies
27 (1940),
zurtheologischen
Studien,
, in: Franziskanische
in their
onbeauty
andUlrich,
22-36,65-87).Albert
chapters
quotations
quoteorborrow
ona
ofUlrich
andThomasonAlbert
is thatofstudents
from
itdirectly.
Thedependence
Summa.
is in general
teacher.
Ulrich
usesthetextofAlbert's
Although
Aquinas
evidently
ofAlbert's
views
ofbeauty
there
is evidence
ofhisperfect
knowledge
quiteindependent,
heapparently
tooknotesfrom
onthe"DivineNames"("De pulchro
Albert's
commentary
et bono,"S. Thomae
omnia
ed. P. Mandonnet,
, vol.5 (opuscula
Aquinatis
spuria),
opuscula
which
withAlbert's
arealmost
identical
1927,417-43)
(cf.citededioriginal
commentary
tionbyP. Simon,
Cologne1972,vol.37.1,180-97).

19:34:21 PM

144

OLEGV. BYCHKOV

man and the main problemsof morality.5


In thiscase, the scholasticstry
the
for
of
to account
phenomenon "spiritual,"or moral, beauty and its
positionin respectto other typesof beauty and related categories(i.e.,
decorum
, aptum,conveniens
).6
pulchrum,
As it happens,all threemajor pointsin the 13th-century
scholasticdiscussion of beauty are illustratedby quotationsfromancient and early
medieval authors,many of which can be traced back directlyto some
prominentStoic theories.Bearingin mindthe goal of thepresentpaper
to uncover Stoic theoriesin the scholastictexts I have to justifymy
selectionof quotationsfromthe relevantchaptersof the Summaethat I
intendto analyze below. Althoughpseudo-Dionysiusaccountsforalmost
as much quoted materialas all other authoritiestaken together,I must
set him aside at the verybeginning.His sourceswillbe extremely
difficult,
if at all possible,to determineand, in any case, his textsare so infused
withNeoplatonismthatit will be hard to singleout any distinctively
Stoic
motif.Plato and Aristotlemustbe ruled out as earlysources,the latter's
textsbeing mostlyirrelevantto beauty as such, apart fromone quotation.There are severalquotationsfromIsidore thatare hardlyconcerned
with the questionof beauty directly;it would, perhaps,be quite hard to
of his Stoic sources,as well. QuotationsfromBoethius
speak definitively
5 See belowon "spiritual
orhonestam.
OutoftheGreekPatristic
tradition,
beauty"
very
fewfigures
werewellknown
to medieval
Western
scholars
apartfrom
pseudo-Dionysius,
therefore
remained
ofByzantine
ofbeauty.
theories
theymosdy
ignorant
6 Allthree
ofthisdiscussion
in theSumma
are contained
Haknsis
and
majorthemes
Albert's
Summa
Summa
doesnotdiscuss
theuniversal
Theologica.
Aquinas'
Theologica
beauty
andtheplaceofugliness
hiscommentary
on the"Divine
infact,
Ulrich,
(unlike
Names").
dedicates
a specialchapter
tothequestion
ofbeauty
intheSumma
deBono
where
hedeals
withallthree
at once.Theheadings
are:Summa
oftherelevant
(andmore)
points
chapters
lib.I, inq.I, tract.
divinae
naturae
Halensis,
III, quaest.III (Debonitate
I, cap.I,
), membr.
art.II (Anidem
sitbonum
etpukhrum);
lib.II parsI (I-II),inq.I, tract.
II, quaest.III (De
creatura
S. Th.parsI, tract.
secundum
seudepukkritudine
6, quaest.
Albert,
qualitatem
creati);
secundum
inten26 (Debono
bonum
etpukhrum
secundum
communem
se),cap. 1, art.2.3 (Utrum
tionem
sint
idem
11, quaest.62 (Depukkritudine
veldiverse
universi
i);parsII, tract.
quaeexornata
consisti
De summo
bono
S. Th.I, 39,8
); Ulrich,
, lib.2, tr.3, cap.4 (Depukh.ro);
Thomas,
convenienter
a sacris
doctoribus
sintessentialia
honII-II,145,1-3(Utrum
(Utrum
attributo);
personis
estam
sitidem
virtuti
honestum
decorum
honestam
abutili
etdekesitidem
; Utrum
; Utrum
quod
diffrt
One shouldnotforget
thatmostofthesethemes
werealsopresent
in the"Divine
tabilt).
Names"ofpseudo-Dionysius,
Ulrich's
which
wascommented
andThomas.
uponbyAlbert
Depukhro
is structured
totheorderinwhich
almost
themainquestions
chapter
according
raised
arepresented,
andsomepoints
ofthediscussion
areevensugbypseudo-Dionysius
forthe
cannot
be accepted
as a witness
bythelatter.
gested
Although
pseudo-Dionysius
Stoicsbecause
ofthecomplicity
ofhissources
ofconvergence
(seebelow),
yetthese
points
shouldnotprevent
onefrom
an estabto tracesimilar
viewsthatcomefrom
attempting
lishedStoictradition.

19:34:21 PM

THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

145

givenby Albertdo not point at any specificStoic doctrines,either.What


remainsis a wide range of passages fromAugustineand Cicero (at least
threeworksof the latterare quoted on numerousoccasions; some quotationsfromboth authorsare repeatedseveraltimesand theircontentis
carefullydiscussed)whichin lengthand abundance can competewithall
othersources,includingpseudo-Dionysius.7
The passages fromCicero and Augustinewhich were quoted by the
On the essence of beauty,Augustine,De
scholasticsare the following.8
civ.Dei XXII. 19 (in the SummaHalensis
, Albertand Ulrich).On the beauty
of the universe,Cicero, De nat.deor.2.34.87 (in Ulrich only) and (on the
same topic but includingalso the question of evil/ugliness)Augustine,
Enchiridion
10-11 (in the SummaHalensis
, Albertand Ulrich),De liberoarbitrioIII.9.24-27 and De civ.Dei XVI.8 (in the SummaHalensisand Albert),
Augustine,De civ.Dei XI.23 (in the SummaHalensisonly). On the theory
of honestam,
, Cicero, De ino. 2.52.157 (in Albert,Ulrich and Thomas), De
De off.1.5.14 and a passage
to 28.100 (in Albertimprecisely),
1.27.93
off.
similarto De off.3.3.11 (in Thomas) and Augustine,De diversis
quaestionibus
, Albert,Ulrich and Thomas).
83) 30 (in the SummaHalensis
(or Quaestiones
At thispoint,a fewgeneralremarksmustbe made concerningthe disseminationand availabilityof the cited worksof Cicero and Augustine
in the Middle Ages towardsthe 13thcentury.The sourcesof Augustinin
to trace preciselybecause most of the worksof
quotationsare difficult
thisauthorwere easilyaccessible(thelatter,in fact,underminesthe whole
projectof exact tracing).Althoughthe most readilyavailable workswere
"The Cityof God," "On The Trinity"and "Enarrations
only"Confessions,"
in Psalms," the great schoolmastersof Paris and other famous schools
presumablyhad access to manymore. However,accordingto the textual
evidence (see below), most of the quotationsfromAugustinethat were
7 Nevertheless,
I stillthink
itnecessary
togiveat leastan approximate
ideaofthefull
in therelevant
andtheSumma
Halensis
scholastics
rangeofauthorities
quotedbythethree
on beauty.
Foreachmedieval
I willgivethenumber
from
ofquotations
author,
chapters
forpseudo-Dionysius,
classical
andearlymedieval
theBibleandthequoauthors
(except
I
usedlaterin thispaper)wherethenameofthequotedsourceis clearly
stated.
tations
tobeauty
oranyStoicdocalsoindicate
from
thatarenotrelevant
quotations
Augustine
trines.
willnotbe given.
The Summa
Halensis:
The namesofquotedworks
(not
Augustine
- 9; Isidore- 2;
- 2; Aristode
- 4; Isidore
- 3. Albert:
(notrelevant)
relevant)
Augustine
- 4; other(Plato,Fulgentius,
Boethius
ofNyssa)- 8. Ulrich:
Ambrosius,
AugusGregory
- 1. Thomas:
- 3; Aristotle
- 1; other
- 5; Isidore
tine(notrelevant)
(Avicenna)
Augustine
- 8;
- 5 (anda fewmorescattered
references
Aristotle
to theDe Trinitate)'
(notrelevant)
- 1.
Isidore
8 Textsthemselves,
exactlinereferences
andtextual
willbe givenin thecoranalyses
ofparticular
sections
belowwiththediscussion
topics.
responding

19:34:21 PM

146

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

used by Albert or Ulrich in their chapters on beauty were borrowed


directlyfromthe SummaHalensis.9Given the factthat the SummaHalensis
was a collectivework carried out over a period of time,I may suggest
that the primaryextractionof excerptsdirectlyfrom the manuscripts
containingAugustine'sworkswas done by the compilersof the Summa
for otherscholars.
which later servedas a sort of florilegium
The case of Cicero's quotationsis more complex and challenging.I
in the threeworksof Cicero quoted by thescholasinterested
am primarily
and the De
tics that contain Stoic ideas: the De inventione
, the De officiis
the
Stoic
of
the
De inventreatise
naturadeorum.
(Since
early
background
tioneis not immediatelyclear, in the analysisbelow I will also use the De
finibusand the De legibuswhich both have a strikingresemblancewith
some of the quoted passages fromthe De inventione
). None of the above
of
the
worksis quoted in the corresponding
SummaHalensiswhich
chapters
as
therefore
served a sourceof Augustininquotations,
Albert,Ulrichand
Thomas must have had othersources forquotingCicero.
The analysis of medieval manuscripttraditionof Cicero's works in
Of the De inventione
, "there
questionprovidesthe followinginformation.10
from
the
tenth
are numerouscompletemanuscripts
centuryon . . ."
dating
(Texts,p. 99) and a well establishedtraditionby the 12th century.The
De naturadeorum
existedin at least threemanuscriptsalready in the 9th
in
century France, one of which served as a source to Hadoard's collection of Ciceronian excerptsat Corbie; a few manuscriptsare known
after 10-11th cenfromthe 12th and 13th centuries.Of the De officiis
..." and its "popularitywas
turies,"there remain a host of recentiores
markedby its being the firstclassical workto be printed"(Ibid.,
fittingly
p. 131).
The cited works of Cicero also circulatedin numerouscompilations
and florilegia.11
In fact,such compilationsstartedalready at the time of
9 Neither
in thechapusedbythescholastics
norCiceronian
quotations
Augustinin
one
wasotherwise
ofsentences
which
collection
tersonbeauty
appearinPeterLombard's
treatises.
scholastic
oftheprincipal
sources
ofall thirteenth-century
10I willrelyon thefollowing
: A Survey
Texts
andTransmission.
,
oftheLatinClassics
study:
De natura
L.D. Reynolds
' De inventione,
1983,latercitedas "Texts"
p. 98-100;
(ed.),Oxford
ofthedissemination
of
thebestaccount
deorum
, p. 124-8;De officiis,
p. 130-1.However,
300-1300
inChristian
theDe officiis
is contained
in:N.E.Nelson,
Cicero's
De officiis
,
ThoughtinEnglish
andComparative
Literature
in:Essays
andStudies
Pubi.,Language
, Un. ofMichigan
andLiterature,
10 (1933),59-160.
11On theflorilegia
authors
see:C.H. Haskins,
ofclassical
(andCiceroin particular)
The
TheRenaissance
Mass.1927,p. 113;E.M. Sanford,
, Cambridge,
oftheTwelfth-Century
ofthe
UseofClassical
Latin
In TheLibri
manuales
andProceedings
Authors
, in:Transactions
des
Amer.
Philol.
55 (1924),190-248;
B. MnkOlsen,Lesclassiques
latins
dans
Assoc.,
florilges

19:34:21 PM

THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

147

ministrorum
, was
, based on Cicero's De officiis
Ambrose,whose De officiis
The
mentioned
ninthMiddle
the
known
already
Ages.
throughout
widely
centurycollectionof Cicero's excerptsmade by Hadoard containedcopiand the De naturadeorum.
One of the
ous quotationsfromthe De officiis
was
Moralium
the
of
Ciceronian
sources
excerpts
major twelfth-century
It
a
William
of
made
Conches.
to
ascribed
thorough
dogma
philosophorum
use of the De officiis
, addressingthe ques, as well as of the De inventione
tion of the subdivisionof virtues.12
It is also knownthattheseworksof Cicero werewidelyused by medieval
authorsin theiroriginaltreatises.Thus, in the ninthcenturyAlcuin used
as a source for his treatiseon rhetoric,and Cicero was
the De inventione
well known to such authorsas Rabanus Maurus and Eriugena. In the
John of Salisburymade an extensiveuse of Cicero's De
12th-century,
and
De
naturadeorum
, especiallyin his Policraticus.Cicero enjoyed
officiis
in
considerablepopularity the thirteenthcentury.Vincent of Beauvais
doctrinale.
Thomas Aquinas
used De off.1 in the widelyknown Speculum
also used the De officiis
, which
, but his favouriteworkwas the De inventione
he quoted abundantlyand even called a "littleGospel."13
could have been directlyavailable.
To put it briefly,the De inventione
could have been known directly,or throughthe Moralium
The De officiis
or some othercompiministrorum
, Ambrose'sDe officiis
dogma
philosophorum
were available eitherin some
lation. Extractsfromthe De naturadeorum
florilegiasimilarto the one of Hadoard, or throughthe works of the
"Chartrians."
twelfth-century
Now I willtreateach of the threemajor topicspertainingto the scholastic discussionof beauty separately,firsttracingback the corresponding
textualtraditionand thenoudiningthe underlyingStoic ideas.14The first
IX (1979),47-121et X
des textes,
antrieurs
au XIIIesicle
mdivaux
, in: Revued'histoire
(1980),116-64.
12Concerning
andDe
s De officiis
see:A.F. Goyle,Cicero3
Ambrose
andtheDe officiis
The
edition
15
224-56.
in:
Franciscan
ministrorum
St.
Ambrose
officiis
Studies,
,
(1955),
of
DesPresbyter
Hadoardus
is in:P. Schwenke,
collection
to whichI shallrefer
ofHadoard's
lateras Schwenke
to thisedition
CiceroExzerpte,
(Philologus,
Suppl.V) 1886;I willrefer
is in: Das Moralium
oftheMoralium
The edition
number.
witha reference
dogma
dogma
deConches
desGuillaume
, ed.J. Holmberg,
Uppsala1929,vol.I (laterreferred
Philosophorum
of thisworkin the
On thepopularity
withpageand linereference).
to as Holmberg
auXIIesicle:
leMoralium
duDe officiis
Uneadaptation
Middle
dogma
Agessee:Ph.Delhaye,
16
ancienne
et
de
in:
Recherches
mdivale,
(1949),227-58.
Thologie
Philosophorum,
13AbouttheuseofCicerobymedievali
Cicero
andHisInfluence
authors
see:J.C.Rolfe,
,
MilintheCourtroom
NewYork1928,p. 121-2andE.K. Rand,Cicero
ofSt.Thomas
Aquinas,
waukee1946.
14Theprinciples
tothe
I willquoteaccording
willbe as follows:
ofquoting
Augustine
inordertofacilitate
the
inthemajority
ofcasestheCCSL,witha linereference
editions,

19:34:21 PM

148

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

topic concernsthe most generalpropertiesof beauty.The passage from


Augustine,De civ.Dei XXII. 19 used by the scholasticsto outline these
propertiesreads:
Omnisenimcorporis
estpartium
cumquadamcolonssuapulchritudo
congruentia
uitate.15
Albert,perhaps,quotes here fromthe SummaHalensis
, while Ulrich'sdeon
the
latter
is
and
evident.
Consonantia
commensuratio
as condipendence
tions of beauty are mentionedin Albert'scommentaryon the "Divine
Names" passim
, but thisis mostlikelythe influenceof the textof pseudoand claritas.
Dionysius,just like in the case of Thomas' consonantia
does
not
list
this
from
Hagendahl16
passage
Augustineas dependenton
classical
source.
he
an
identicalEp. 3.4 (Haalmost
However, quotes
any
gendahl 319) Quid est corporispulchritudo?Congruentiapartiumcum
quadam colorissuavitate as dependenton Cicero, Tusc.disp.4.13.30-1:

ofidentification
oftheexactpassages
scholastic
treatise.
process
quotedin eachparticular
Allreferences
andmostofthequotations
totheSummae
from
exacttexts
them
reproducing
willbe in thenotes.I willprovide
all necessary
textual
in
basedon thesetexts
analysis
1 willquoteCicero,apartfrom
thepaperitself.
thepassages
thatappearin theSummae
,
to theedition:
M. TulliiCiceronis
omnia
, Lipsiaein aedibus
according
scripta
quaemanserunt
B.G.Teubneri,
vol.1.2,1925(Deinventione);
Tusc.disp.);
1.4,1866(Definibus,
II.4, 1864(De
natura
deorum
intoconsideration
thecom, De legibus
, Tirnaeus).
); III.4,1864(Deqfjkiis
Taking
oftradition
andtheshortness
ofCiceronian
I willgiveallvariants,
plexity
passages,
together
withtheir
in thetextofthepaper.
analyses,
15CCSL XLVIII, 838,11.41-2.In theSumma
Halensis
I, inq.I, tr.III,qu.Ill, membr.
p.
estpartium
cumquadamsuaviI, cap.I, art.II, p. 162("omnis
pulchritudo
congruentia
tatecoloris")
and163("pulchritudo
estex congruentia
corporum
compositionis
partium").
In Albert,
S. Th.I, tr.6, qu. 26,cap.I, art.2.3,p. 178.52-3
estquae(".. . pulchritudo
damcongruentia
cumsuavitate
and94-5(". . . commensuratio
partium
coloris")
partium
cumsuavitate
I, p. 597
coloris");
quotedalsoin S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. 62,membr.
briefly
consistt
in suavitate
in Ulrich,
(". . . pulchritudo
coloris");
p. 56.71-72
(". . . pulchritudo
estpartium
cumquadamsuavitate
Thomasmentions
consonantia
and
congruentia
coloris").
inS. Th., e.g.,I, 39,8 Resp.andII-II,145,I, Resp.,butthesetwoterms
claritas
aremost
borrowed
from
likely
directly
pseudo-Dionysius.
16H. Hagendahl,
andtheLatinClassics
with
1967(laterHagendahl
, Gteborg
Augustine
a reference
In tracing
theStoicsources,
I willalsousethefollowing
studies
refernumber).
form
anda reference
or pagenumber
ringto thembya short
only:Ioannesab Arnim
Stoicorum
veterum
vols.1-3,Lipsiae1921(laterSVF witha volume
(VonArnim),
fragmenta,
andreference
A.A.Long,D.N. Sedley,
TheHellenistic
, vols.1-2,Camnumber);
Philosophers
1987(later
LS witha reference
M. vanStraaten,
Panaetii
Rhodii
,
bridge
number);
Fragmenta
Leiden1962(laterPanaetius
witha reference
Posidonius.
I. TheFragments
, ed.
number);
L. Edelstein
andI.G. Kidd,Cambridge
witha reference
1972(laterPosidonius
number).
VonArnim's
stillextremely
valuable
is certainly
thecontent,
study,
although
regarding
outofdatein respect
to references
to works
andeditions.
whilekeeping
his
Therefore,
reference
I willprovide
inciting
morerecent
ifnecessary.
information
theworks
numbers,

19:34:21 PM

THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

149

cumea congruunt
saniinter
Sicutenimcorporis
se,e quibusconstamus,
temperado,
concordant
... [31]Et utcortas,sicanimidicitur,
quumeiusiudiciaopinionesque
cumcoloris
membrorum
quadamsuavitate
eaquediciaptafigura
porisestquaedam
. . . pulchritudo
sicin animoopinionum
turpulchritudo,
iudiciorumque
aequabilitas
...
vocatur
The resemblanceis, indeed, quite strikingand allows us to accept Tuse.
disp.4.13.30-1 as a directsource for both passages in Augustine.The
linked
of partsand colour" is a specificformulathatis tightly
"symmetry
the
to the Stoic parallelbetweenthe soul and the body which constitutes
core of Stoic materialismand appears in the contextof theirphysicsand
especiallymedical analogies in psychology(SVF 3.456-90 on the rcepi
etPiatonis
Thus Galen in De plantsHippocratis
5.2.158
7KX0COV
of Chrysippus).
that
the
Stoics
LS
Posidonius
asserts
65R,
3.471,
(and more
163)
(SVF
eivai
tcv
v
T
xiveo^Aovxai
xf''|/DX
preciselyChrysippus)vaXxyyav
koctc
He later explainsthat Chrysippuscompared the balanced
xacomia.
stateof the soul to the harmonyof bodilypowers,and the "diseases" of
of
the soul to bodilydisorders,just as beauty arises fromthe symmetry
in
distheir
and
from
(ibid.;Posidonius, fact,
asymmetry
parts,
ugliness
agrees withChrysippuson this,but not to the point of completelyabolishingthe parallel).In De placitis5.3.161 (SVF 3.472) Galen confirmsthat
the analogybetweenthe conditionsof the body and the soul stemsfrom
employingalmostthe same expressionas Cicero or Augustine:
Chrysippus,
v T
". . . tt|v(xvvyEiavtcvaioi^ecovv GD^M-expa
G^svo,to e kolAAo
. . ."17There is no doubt thatit is thiscontextthatis revoked
tcvlopoov
in the quoted passage fromTuse.disp.4 (Chapter 12 of book 4 startsby
mentioningthe Stoics). In fact, the bearing of 13.30-1 is the parallel
betweenthe body and the soul which is announced at the beginningof
13.30: Atque ut in malis attingitanimi naturamcorporissimilitudo,sic
in bonis. Anotherparallelof thiskind- betweenbodilybeautyand beautifulmoral conduct- that employsalmost the same formulais in De off.
1.28.98.18There is a generalagreementof scholarsconcerningthe Stoic
17Claudii
omnia
Gaietti
, ed.C.G. Khn,Lipsiae1823,t.V, p. 448,cf.p. 438.Cf.
Opera
xoociiax
xcov
xexKao
axiavmiexpa
alsoStobaeus,
11.110(SVF 3.278):aicep
xeKaircp
otxco
Kaixxfi
oxi
xXx)v,
K<x0eax(ox(ov
xMrjAxx
lieAxv
yuxi
mXo
Tipcx;
axcp
. . . (Ioannis
xoXyov
ml xcov
a')xo'jjipXov
xeaxo)Kaijcp
aXXr)*x
p.epv
crunnexpa
libriduo
Stobaei
etethicarum
, ed. A. Meineke,
Lipsiae1864,vol.II,
eclogarum
physicarum
32.25-9).
p. 18
ofdecorum
is theStoictheory
In fact,theprimary
concern
in De off.
1.93-101
(xo
andhonestum,
whicharethecategories
ofbroader
andnotthecriteria
rcpeTiov)
meaning,
a moredetailed
ofthispassage,
ofmaterial
ina strict
sense.I willprovide
analysis
beauty
in thesection
on honestum.
as wellas a fuller
quotation,

19:34:21 PM

150

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

natureof thispassage (cf. Panaetius 107), and thereis littledoubt about


Augustine'sknowledgeof it:
... ut enimpulchritudo
membrorum
movetoculoset
corporis
aptacompositione
sic
delectat
hocipso,quodinterse omnespartes
cumquodamleporeconsentiunt,
hocdecorum,
viveorum,
quodelucetin vita,movet
adprobationem
quibuscumque
et constantia
et moderatione
dictorum
omnium
itur,ordine
atquefactorum.
It is most importantfor the currentdiscussionthat the different
verof
sions thisparticularStoic formulathatdescribesthe criterionof material beauty link togetherDe off.1.28.98, Tusc. disp. 4.13.30-1 (the key
membrorum
, compositio
phrasesfiguramembrorum
) and Augustine'stext(thekey
cum
coloris
suavitate
).19
phrase
The view that linksbeauty to symmetry
and order,in fact,pre-dates
19Thereis a well-known
Enn.1.6.1thatdescribes
beauty
bythe
passagein Plotinus,
sameformula:
xv
tccxtcov,
"Aeyexai
(lvrircap
jiEpcov
ecev,
ax;aupiiexpa
rcp
Kaircp
txett'et>xpoa
xAxdv
trcp
jioie. . ." (Plotini
ttjv
yivmo
,
rcpocTev
opera
t. 1,ed. P. HenryandH.-R.Schwyzer,
Paris-Bruxelles
latercitedas
1951,p. 105.20-3;
Graeser
andtheStoics:
A Preliminary
, Leiden1972,No. 71; later
(Plotinus
Schwyzer).
Study
Graeser
witha reference
evenlinks
thispassage
withDe off.
Plo1.27.93-28.101.
number)
tinusapparently
theformal
criterion
oftmXvoftheStoics,
arguesagainst
symmetry
orproportionality,
andclaims
thatitis,onthecontrary,
andone-ness.
However,
simplicity
nodirect
attribution
canbe madesincePlotinus
doesnotactually
mention
theStoics.
The
between
is alsoon thewholefarfrom
andPlotinus
relationship
Augustine
beingclear.(A
vastliterature
on thesubject
ed.JJ.O'Donnell,
Oxford
, Confessions,
exists,
e.g.,Augustine
LateLatin
Writers
andtheir
Greek
Sources
1992,vol.2 (Commentary),
,
p. 413-8;P.P.Courcelle,
Mass. 1969;P. Henry,
Plotin
etl'occident
cf.
, Louvain1934.In particular
Cambridge,
B. Switalski,
Plotinus
andtheEthics
witha
, NewYork1946(laterSwitalski
ofSt.Augustine
Evento touchupontheseproblems
pagenumber),
p. 20 aboutthepassagein question.)
wouldexcedethescopeofthispaper.
briefly
Arnim
a passage
from
alsolists
inGenesin
etsolutiones
Philo,Qmestiones
4.99,which
employs
thesameStoicformula
to describe
theessence
ofbody
ofmaterial
"... fairness
beauty:
inrespect
ofthatwhich
is calledbeauty
ofform,
which
ofthesymmetry
consists
ofparts
andbeauty
ofform
andAnswers
onGenesis
the
, tr.from
(sic)..." (Philo,
Suppl.1. Questions
ancient
Armenian
1953,p. 382-3;SVF 3.592usesAucher's
Philo,
byR. Marcus,
transi.).
wasso indebted
ofcourse,
to Platonism
thathisevidence
forStoicism
mustbe usedwith
caution.
thissourcemaybe ofsomeimportance
that
sincethereis evidence
However,
knewan ancient
Latinversion
comofthisworkofPhilo,
who,beinga Biblical
Augustine
in Augustine's
couldgivemoreweight,
to thispaganpointofview(See:
mentator,
mind,
L'ancienne
version
latine
desQuestions
surla Gense
in: Texte
dePhilon
d'Alexandrie
, ed. F. Petit,
undUntersuchungen
deraltchristlichen
Literatur
zurGeschichte
1973,p. 7).I sug, Bd. 113,Berlin,
in theArmenian
of
translation
ofform"
twiceinstead
gestthattheconfusion
("beauty
ofform
andagreable
wascausedbythesimilar
oftwoterms
"beauty
colour")
orthography
in theGreek:
theGreekfragments
forthe
from
ofthe"Questions"
e^iopcpia
(established
first
ande^xpou*
which
(kocA.reading)
appears
againinDe vitaMosis2.140:"toatDjiaxo
teKaieaapKaKeTai
... trrjiavoa
vp^iovt
o)va')^i(iTpt
fiepcov
expoa
KaipeTCv
dePhilon
..." (Lesuvres
d'Alexandrie
sousle patronoyh-ctcv
crumpcDva
publies
de LyonparR. Arnaldez
etJ. Pouilloux,
Paris1967,vol.22,p. 252-4;
agede l'universit
SVF 3.592usesMangey
edit.).

19:34:21 PM

STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC


THEORIESOF BEAUTY

151

Stoicism.It can be foundalreadyin Plato and the Pythagoreans.20


Howof
this
idea
us
to
attribute
the
final
allows
vera
ever, particularphrasing
to the Middle Ages, to the established
sion of it, which was transmitted
Stoic tradition.It is quite obvious thatChristianauthors,while usingthis
formula,triedto veil by all means the body/soulparallel thatwas unacand applied it, in its originalphrasing,exclusively
ceptableto Christianity
to materialbeauty.
I will introducethe next theme,the beautyand perfectionof the universe,by a quotationfromCicero, De nat.deor.2.34.87:
itaconstitutae
. . . omnesmundi
sunt,utequead usummeliores
potuerint
partes
essenequead speciem
pulchriores.
Ulrich(p. 62.237-8) quotes thispassage exactly.Although,as has been
was directlyavailable at his time,the
the De naturadeorum
demonstrated,
the same passource of this quotationis almost certainlya florilegium:
and
it was cited
in
Hadoard's
collection
is
contained
(Schwenke83)
sage
and
Thomas
of
York.21
Bacon
by Roger
Arnimdoes not list De nat. deor.2.34.87: indeed, this passage simply
could be inspiredby a typicallyGreek perceptionof the world in terms
of beauty.22However,the contextof De nat.deor.2, where the phenomenon of the beauty of the world is used for a particularpurpose- to
prove the existenceof Gods points at another distincttheoryof Stoic
in SVF 1.528-47 and 2.1009origin(cf.sectionsentitledDe naturadeorum
to
Cleanthes:
Thus,
1021).
according
inconversione
. . . quartam
esseeamquevelmaximam
motus
causam
aequabilitatem
omnium
distinctionem,
varietatem,
caeli,solis,lunaesiderumque
pulchritudinem,
nonesseea fortuita
rerum
ordinem,
(Denat.deor.
aspectus
ipsesatisindicaret
quarum
2.5.15;SVF 1.528,LS 54C,Schwenke
28).
20Platoin Symp.
of Eros.The
theomiexpo
ia andXPot
196Amentions
K.ta)
KaXKai
to Stobaeus,
thatf|lvxiKalauwicxpa
taught
Pythagoreans,
according
der
ti axaaKaicrunnexpa
a'>H<popa,
aiaxpteKaiaaupxpopa
(H. Diels,Die Fragmente
Vorsokratiker
, Berlin,
1951,vol.I, p. 469.36-7).
21Cf.RogerBacon,Quaest.
R. Baconi
Depantis
hactenus
inedita
Arist.
in: Opera
, ed.
supra
itaproductae
suntutnecad
resmundi
R. Steele,
fase.XI, Oxonii1932,p. 185("omnes
thisquotausumpotuerint
essemeliores
necad species
Pease,whonotices
pulchriores."
- M. TulliCiceronis
libri
secunDe natura
deorum
tionin a reference
on p. 763ofhisedition
- attributes
itto a wrong
workof
dusettertius
Mass.1958
, ed.byA.S.Pease,Cambridge,
La beaut
transcendan, proprit
, in:D.H. Pouillon,
Bacon),andThomasofYork,Sapientiale
duMoyen
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
tale.
lesscholasliques
Chez
(1220-1270
%in:Archives
(exactquotation).
ge,15(1946),326.34-6
22Forexample,
owntranslation:
"... quandoqui29A ff.(inCicero's
byPlato,7imams
. . .")- another
demnequemundo
pulchrius
nequeeiusaedificatore
praestantius
quicquam
that
the
Stoics
on
Plato.
drew
proof

19:34:21 PM

152

OLEGV. BYCHKOV

The same proofis carriedon into the Stoic traditionthatis ascribedby


Arnimto Chrysippusin SVF 2. Thus Cicero's characterBalbus,the advocate of Stoic ideas, exclaims:
tantam
varietatem
rerum
. . . tantum
caemundi,
ergoornatum
pulchritudinemque
immortalium
lestium
domicilium
... si tuumac nondeorum
ptes,nonneplane
videare?
2.6.17;SVF 2.1012)
{Denot.deor.
desipere
The beautyof the universe,accordingto the Stoics,was also the primary
source of our ideas about Gods (SVF 2.1009).23
It was mostimportantforthe Stoics,in orderto substantiatetheirethical doctrine,to affirmfirstof all the stabilityof the universalorderand
the presence of the Divine governancethat could serve as a solid proof
of the existenceof the universalLaw. To attain theirgoal, the Stoics
turnedto the mostattractivephenomenonin the world,beauty,thusaestheticizingtheir cosmological doctrinesand using worldlybeauty as a
proof of the existenceof the Divine Power. This is, perhaps, the only
Stoic theorythatwas transmitted
to the laterChristianauthorsintactand
.24
scholasticSummae
finallymade its way into the thirteenth-century
23Cicerorefers
tothebeauty
andperfection
in thecontext
oftheuniverse
ofitsdivine
on numerous
occasions
inDe nat.deor.
2.7.18(quoted
origin
byThomasofYork,op.cit.,
and327.11;Pouillon
failstoidentify
thesequotations);
326.15-6
2.13.37(cited
byThomas
ofYork,ibid.,
in 2.13.35,14.38,14.39,16.43,
327.13);2.22.58(SVF 1.172)andpassim
21.56,44.115.
24A slightly
thatoftheplaceofevil(physical
ormoral)
different
anduglidiscussion,
nessin theuniversal
a very
Summae
and
beauty
occupies
prominent
placein thescholastic
is illustrated
ofquotations
itsStoicbackfrom
bya largenumber
Augustine.
Although
cannot
be confirmed
itdefinitely
ground
byexactreferences,
goesbackto theStoictheI willappendthismaterial
oriesofevil,andtherefore
in a footnote
initsshortened
form.
The quotation
from
Enchiridion
10-11describes
theargument
mostconcisely:
Augustine,
"... simuluerouniversa
ualdebona,quia ex omnibus
consistt
uniuersitatis
admirabilis
In qua etiamilludquodmalum
beneordinatum
etlocosuopositum,
dicitur,
pulchritudo.
eminentius
commendai
et laudabiliora
sintdumcomparantur
bona,ut magisplaceant
malis"(GGSLXLVI,p. 53,11.24-9,in theSumma
Halensis
I-II /II parsI/,inq.I, tr.II,
S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. XLII,membr.
II, p. 599;
qu. Ill, cap.IV, art.1,p. 104;in Albert,
- -just
inUlrich,
a paraphrase).
Other
from
usedtodescribe
p. 58.114-5
Augustine
passages
thesameproblem
areas follows:
De civ.DeiXVI.8(CCSL XLVIII,p. 509,11.
Augustine,
Halensis
29-36andp. 510,11.71-5,intheSumma
II, parsI, inq.I, tr.II, qu. Ill, cap.3.3,
- quotation
S. Th.
order:
11.71-5,then29-36;in Albert,
p. 101-2
givenin thefollowing
- reversed
II. tr.XI, qu. LXn,membr.
orderis preserved);
De Ubero
arbitrio
2, p. 599-600
III.9.24-7(CCSL XXIX,p. 290-1,11.25-7,42-4,61-70,72-80,81-7,92-6,in theSumma
Halensis
I-II,inq.I, tr.II, qu. Ill, cap.I, art.II, p. 101/11.
92-6,repeats
p. 106/;cap.
81-7and72-6/;ibidem
IV. p. 102/11.
65-70/;cap.VI, art.I, p. 104/11.
, 11.59-60;ibidem
,
11.61-7;ibidem
25-7and
, p. 105/11.
77-80,repeats
, art.II, p. 105/11.
p. 106/;ibidem
S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. LXII, membr.
43-4/;in Albert,
92-6/;p. 602/11.
II, p. 599/11.
81-7and11.72-6/;p. 603/11.
De civ.DeiXI.23(CCSLXLVIII,p. 342,11.28-31,
65-70/);
intheSumma
Halensis
only:I-II,inq.I, tr.II, qu. Ill, cap.VI, art.I, p. 104).Thebearing

19:34:21 PM

THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

153

Moral beauty,or honestum


, however,interestedmedievalscholasticsthe
most and, althoughquotationson the topic are usuallyshort,the number of theiroccurrencesin textsis great,due to the lengthand detailed
I will tryto trace the Ciceronianquotations
characterof the discussion.25
first,quotingall passages in the text of the paper in order to deal with
a rathercomplextextualtradition(in fact,it would be impossibleto provide a singleuniformpassage forthis tradition).
There is no mentionof Cicero on this topic in the SummaHalensis
whichexcludesthe latteras a possiblesourceforthe others.Albertquotes
ofevil(including
moralevilor sins)in the
ofthequotedpassages
is thattheexistence
is fully
universe
justified
bythefactthatitmakesthegoodstandout.Theviewthatevil
intheuniversal
ordercanbe traced
backtotheStoicswitha great
is absolutely
necessary
sitProvidentia
in SVF 2.1168-86
Curmalasint,
cum
andLS
dealofcertainty
(cf.thesection
their
ideaoftheDivineLawagainst
their
65,vol.1,p. 386).The Stoicshadto defend
whopressed
themto explain
theAcademics)
whythisintelligent
(inparticular
opponents
as evil.Thisviewis represented,
Lawhadcreated
suchan irrational
e.g.,in Aulus
thing
MetesAtticae
, 7.1.2-3(SVF 2.1169,LS 54QJor 7.1.7(SVF 2.1170,LS 54QJ.
Gellius,
whomhe quotesinDe civ.
knewandusedGellius
thatAugustine
Thereis goodevidence
omitthequestion
of
ofStoicism
Deiandonthesubject
(cf.Hagendahl
397).I completely
ofevilwasonlynecessary
Stoicviewwasthattheexistence
theauthentic
whether
(Gellius)
St.rep.,
insomeway(Plutarch,
1044Dand1050C-D).
orthatitwasalsouseful
Augustine
tothatofPlotinus
is alsoverymuchsimilar
holdsthelatter
definitely
pointofviewwhich
t. 1, p. 275.6-7,
Graeser
t. 1, p. 308.1-5,
60; III.2.5,Schwyzer,
(Enn.III.3.7,Schwyzer
63 lists11.15-27,
cf.Switalski
7-9and15-6,p. 276.17-8,
21-2,Graeser
p. 102,note469;
TheProblem
see:B.A.G.Fuller,
oftheStoictheory
ofevilon Plotinus
on theinfluence
of
I omit
EvilinPlotinus
189T,192ff.,
1912,p. 157-63,
, Cambridge
207-9).Asearlier,
passim
andtheStoics(whom
he doesnotmenbetween
Plotinus
theproblem
oftherelationship
The lasttwoquotations
from
tionhereas well)andPlotinus
andAugustine.
Augustine
oftheuniverse
inrhetorical
orlinguistic
which
ofevilandthebeauty
address
theproblem
Stoictradition.
sincethegenterms
areimpossible
tolinkwithanyparticular
However,
tocitethem
totheStoicteaching
ofthediscussion
on evil,I decided
eraltenet
is similar
here.TheyareDe civ.DeiXI.18 (CCSL XLVIII, p. 337,11.1-8,18-24.In theSumma
Halensis
I-II,inq.I, tr.II, qu. Ill, cap.Ill, art.I, p. 100/II.18-21and 1-6/;in Albert,
ibidem
S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. LXII,membr.
II, p. 598-9/II.18-21/;
, p. 599 /II.1-6/;cites
- a paraphrase,
andDe natura
boni8 (GSELXXV,sect.
on p. 600;in Ulrich
p. 54.75-6)
In theSumma
Halensis
I-II,inq.I, tr.II, qu. III, cap.V, p. 103;
VI, pars2, p. 858.22-8.
inAlbert,
S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. LXII,membr.
I, p. 596).
25The factthathonestum
as a moralterm(cf.itstranslation
which
is usually
regarded
The
to as "beauty"
in thispaperneedsclarification.
in LS 60) is referred
as "rectitude"
wasusedto translate
theGreektermtokcxXov
reasonis thathonestum
mostobvious
(see
- thefactwhichGreek
as wellas moral,
below)whichdidhavetheaesthetic,
meaning
theLatinhonThe secondreasonis thatalthough
hadtotakeintoaccount.
philosophers
it in thelate
it gradually
estum
didnothaveanyaesthetic
meaning,
acquired
primarily
ofitsGreek
counhaditintheMiddleAges)duetotheinfluence
(anddefinitely
Antiquity
thencouldbe
and translators.
Honestum
commentators
and theworkofvarious
terpart
of1 Cor.12.24theterms
terms.
usedtotranslate
other
aesthetic
E.g.,intheLatinversion
ande')oxfl|iova
andnotmtax.Thomas
inhonesta
andhonesta
translate
axflM-Ova
("shapely"),
in S. Th.II-II, 145.11:
"vocatautemibiinhonesta
confirms
thechoiceofterms
Aquinas
membra
honesta
autemmembra
turpia,
pulchra."

19:34:21 PM

154

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

Cicero in his commentaryon De div. nom.4 on numerousoccasions.26


The firstpassage quoted as the De offiis
reads: [honestum]sua vi nos
trahitet sua dignitatenos allicit(Simon 181.78-182.1,Mand. 419). I will
presentthe followingquotationsin orderof theirappearance: Cicero (no
specifics),virtusautem est species honesti(Simon 182.12-3, Mand. 420);
Cicero (as mentioningin the De offiis
unius ad alterum[sc.
), differentia
honestiet pulchri](Simon 182.29-30,Mand. 420); Cicero (quoted as the
De officiis
), honestumdicitpulchrumsecundumnotitiamsui ab aliis (Simon
185.75-7, Mand. 425); Cicero (not specified),[virtus]. . . cum quadam
claritatein notitiamveniat, et propterhanc aptitudinemdixit Tullius,
quod diciturpulchrumhonestum,secundumquod respectualteriusclarescit (Simon 186.16-9, Mand. 426); (not specifiedeven as Cicero, but cf.
Simon 181.78-182.1) [honestum]sua vi et dignitatetrahitdesideriumad
se (Simon 186.51, Mand. 427).
Ulrich quotes Cicero as the De offiis
twice and cites ones (p. 56.50;
59. 135-cited;59.145-6): [honestum]sua vi nos trahitet sua dignitatenos
allicit.Thomas refersto Cicero on several occasions in the chapteron
in the "moral" part of his Summa
honestum
: Cicero (quoted as Rhetoric
),
Honestum esse quod propter se appetitur,and Cicero (quoted as II
Rhetoric),quiddam est quod sua vi nos allicit,et sua dignitatetrahit(S.T.
II-II, 145, art. I); Cicero (quoted as I De off),formamipsam, et tanquam
faciem honestivides: quae si oculis cerneretur,mirabilesamores ut ait
Plato excitaretsapientiae (S.T. II-II, 145, art. II, ad 1); (no author or
workmentioned,but cf. art. I), propterse appetitur(S.T. II-II, 145, art.
Ill); Cicero (quoted as II Rhet
.), est enim aliquid non proptersuam vim
et nturm,sed propterfructumet utilitatemappetendum,quod pecunia est {ibid)' Cicero (quoted as the De offiis
), quod nihilpotestesse utile
quod non sit honestum[ibid).
Firstof all, 1 will tryto determinethe source of the shortphrase sua
vi nostrahit
etsua dignitate
nosallicit.It appears in Albert,Ulrich(who probknownto Aquinas (cf.his notes
ably drew on Albert),and was definitely
in Mandonnet).The editorsusuallyidentify
it as De ino.2.52.157, but it
is referredto as the De offiis
and the exact wordingis foundin neither
of these works.One of the most common sourcesfor the De offiis
was
the Moralium
and it is therethatthisphraseis found:
DogmaPhilosophorum,
26Allrelevant
texts
areprinted
on p. 180-6byP. Simon(Cologne
thiswork
edition);
is almost
ofAlbert
as I havealready
withThomas'notesinP. Manidentical,
mentioned,
ofDepulchro
donnes
edition
I willprovide
etbono.
to theseeditions
page/linereferences
in brackets
SimonandMand.
usingabbreviations

19:34:21 PM

STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC


THEORIES
OF BEAUTY

155

Honestumest quod sua vi nos trahitet sua dignitatenos allicit(Holmberg,


7.10-11). This is more likelya rephrasingof Cicero, De ino. 2.52.157-8
(see below),but the workwas so well knownas a compilationfromthe
De officiis
that apparentlyno one went to any troubleto check.
However,mostof the quoted passages of Cicero can be traceddirecdy
to De ino.2.52.157T.(Albert,Simon 182.12-13; Simon 186.51; Thomas
S.T. II-II, 145, art. I, III - art. Ill includingan almost exact quotation estenim. . . pecuniaest),and De off.1.27.93-28.100 (and more exactly
1.27.94-6,Albert,Simon 182.29-30; 185.75-7 cf. cumspeciequadamliberali in De off.1.27.96 discussedbelow; Simon 186.16-9), 1.5.14 (Thomas,
S.T. II-II, 145, art. II, ad 1, exact quotation)and 3.3.11 (Thomas, S.T.
II-II, 145, art. III). It is noticeablethatThomas quotes much more pre. The resemblingpassages
Dogma
ciselyand does not relyon the Moralium
fromCicero (exceptforthe exact quotations)read as follows:
honestum
ad sese. . . tra) . . . Namestquiddam,
quodsuavi nosadliciat
(Concerning
- honestum
. . . quid. . . (concerning
themixedcategory
andutile)
henssuadignitate
nosinlectos
ducit
...
damex horum
iunctum
quodet sua vi et dignitate
partibus
sepetitur,
autaliquaexpartepropter
honand. . . quodauttotum
(Deino.2.52.157)
. . . illudenimhonestum,
estum
nominabimus
(Deinv.2.53.159);
quodsaepedicimus,
nosmovet
. . . omnis
viretiamsi in aliocernimus,
tamen
atqueilli. . . amicosfacit
. . . (Deoff.
. . . perse nobis
tusnosad se adlicit
1.17.55-56)
[honestum
decorumque]
etspeciesuacommovet
omnium
natura
. . . (Deoff.
2.9.32)Cui. . .
placetanimosque
honestum
nec
itasuntStoiciadsensi,
ut et,quidquid
esset,id utileessecenserent
utilequidquam
(Deoff.
3.3.11).
quodnonhonestum
The quoted passages fromthe De inventione
are not listedby Arnimas
Stoic, for the evidentreason that the sources of this early treatiseare
difficult
to trace. ThereforeI will have to rely on its almost verbatim
withDe fin.2.14.44-5 (the beginningof thispassage is in SVF
similarity
3.22), 3.6.21 (LS 59D), and 3.11.36 (SVF 3.41), and De leg.1.18.48 (SVF
3.43) which suggeststhatDe inv.2.52.157 belongs to the same tradition
(I will quote and discussin detail thesepassages below). Of the passages
fromthe De officiis,
only 3.3.11 is listed by SVF (1.558). However, the
Stoic backgroundof Book 1 is beyond doubt (see the discussionof this
book below). It is also of interestthat,withthe notionof honestum
, a new
idea of beautyis introduced,in additionto its orderlyand symmetrical
nature:its abilityto please by itselfand be soughtforits own sake.
The lastpassage thatpertainsto the discussionof honestum
is fromAugustine,De diversis
(or Quaestiones
83) 30:
quaestionibus
. . . honestum
se ipsumexpetendum
dicitur
est,utileautemquodad
quodpropter
uocointellegibilem
aliudaliquid
referendum
est. . . Honestatem
pulchritudinem,
quam
nosproprie
utilitatem
autemdiuinam
dicimus,
Quapropter
spiritalem
prouidentiam.

19:34:21 PM

156

OLEGV. BYCHKOV
sintmulta
honesta
uisibilia,
quamquam
pulchra
quaeminus
appellantur,
propne
ipsa
ex qua pulchra
tarnen
suntquaecumque
sunt,nullomodoest
pulchritudo,
pulchra
uisibilis.
ex qua nobisprosunt
sed ipsautilitas,
Item,multautiliauisibilia;
quaeuisibilis
nonest.27
dicimus,
quamdiuinam
cumqueprosunt,
prouidentiam

The SummaHalensisrendersthe passage ratheraccurately,withonly a


few changes. It is not possible to say where Albertis quotingfrom,but
Ulrich almost certainlyfrom the SummaHalensis
. Thomas withoutany
doubt quotes fromthe originaltext of Augustinesince his quotationis
the most precise. AlthoughHagendahl fails to notice this,it is possible
to establishthe directtextualdependence of this passage on Cicero (as
it happens,almostall resemblingpassages fromCicero are listedin SVF;
see the discussionbelow). Cicero's passages read as follows:
si honestum
visuapropEgoautemexistimo,
aliquidesseostendero,
quodsitipsum
tersequeexpetendum
. . . Honestum
id intelligimus,
igitur
quodtaleest,utdetracta
omniutilitate
sineullispraemiis
iurelaudari
perse ipsum
fructibusque
(Defin.
possit
SVF 3.22);. . . ipsumque
honestum.
. . solumvi sua et dignitate
2.14.44-5;
expetendum
est(Defin.3.6.21,LS 59D; cf.Moralium
omneautem,
Dogma).),
quodhonestumsit,id essepropter
se expetendum
... (Defin.3.11.36,SVF 3.41);.. . honesta
... et iuset omnehonestum
sua sponte
esse
expetenda
perse. . . (Defin.3.11.38);
SVF 3.43).
(Deleg.1.18.48,
expetendum
Since De ino. 2.52.157, which was used forthe concept of honestum
by
the scholastics,so closelyresemblesthe passages quoted above, it could
also be viewed as a potentialsource for Augustine'sQuaestiones
83, 30.
of
De
inv.
is
evident
from
fact
that
2.52.157
the
Augustine'sknowledge
he quotes De inv. 2.53.159-55.167 extensively
after
immediately
quaest.30,
in quaest.31.28
27GGSLXLTVA,
Halensis
I, inq.I, tr.Ill, qu.
p. 38-9,11.5-7,17-24.In theSumma
se expetendicitur
III, membr.
I, cap.1,art.2, resp.,
p. 162(". . . honestum
quodpropter
dumest,utileveroquodad aliudreferendum
est.Honestatem
autemvocointelligibilem
utilitatem
verodivinam
dicimus;
pulcritudinem,
quamnosspiritulem
proprie
providentiam.Quapropter,
multa
sintpulcra
honesta
visibilia,
quamquam
quaeminus
proprie
appelex qua pulchra
suntquaecumque
nullomodo
lantur,
ipsatamen
pulcritudo,
pulcrasunt,
estvisibilis.
suntutilia
exqua nobisprosunt,
Item,multa
visibilia;
utilitas,
ipsatamen
quam
divinam
visibilis
nonest");in Albert,
S. ThI, tr.6, qu. 26,c. I,
dicimus,
providentiam
art.2.3,p. 179.9-10
in
estintelligibilis);
([bonum
perse, id esthonestum]
pulchritudo
Ulrich,
p. 58.132("[honestas
est]intelligibilis
pulchritudo,
quamnosspiritulem
proprie
inThomas,
S. Th.II-II,145,art.II, Resp.("Honestum
vocointelligibilem
dicimus");
pulnosproprie
andart.III. ("honestum
dicitur
chritudinem,
quamspiritulem
dicimus")
quod
est,utileautemquodad aliquidaliudreferendum
propter
seipsum
appetendum
est").
28Theother
ideain theQuaestiones
83.30("ipsatamen
. . . nullo
prominent
pulchritudo
modoestvisibilis
. . .") is almost
Platonic.
One mayrecount
Plato'sviewthatto
certainly
mvis something
as opposedto itsconcrete
manifestations.
Gf.Ttmaeus,
transcendent,
etc.butmoreexacdy
476B:"Olpivnov. . . <piXr|Kooi
KaicpiXoOe^ove
x
Symposium
Resp.
TKaX(pcv
KalxpoKaiax^aia Kainviax ktcv
toiotcov
oTcovxai
Sitioup-

19:34:21 PM

THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

157

Both Ciceronianand Augustinintextsthatdeal withhonestum


point at
The large numberof occurrencesof the
the Stoic doctrineof to kocAxSv.
aesthetictermx mAv in Stoic textswe owe to the fact that, for the
was identicalwith the good, or the highestgoal.
Stoics, only to kocxSv
This idea servedto prove the main postulateof Stoic ethics:that only
"morallygood" is beneficialto man. There was apparentlyno difficulty
in understanding
whybeneficialactionswere good. However,whypurely
moralactionswhichinvolvedthe austereway of life,and sometimeseven
suicide (i.e., not beneficialin the common sense), should be "good" was
moral
not so obvious. For the lack of a special term for "disinterested
on
a
that
the
relied
common
described
Stoics
action"
linguisticusage
even purelymoral (but not beneficial)actionsas "beautiful"(i.e., in "disinterestedaesthetic"terms)and then triedto prove with syllogismsthat
to Kocv
is identicalwiththe good, or benefit(cf. the section"that only
to Kocv
is good" in SVF 3.29-37, where this teachingis attributedto
Chrysippus,and LS 60, especiallyvol. 1, p. 374-5). The Stoic syllogisms
. 1039C
Thus Plutarchin St. rep
have been preservedin several texts.29
relates:
(SVF 3.29)
xojivov
xKaxSv
evt5>Tiepi
KaAo)
Kai|iT]v
ya0velvat,xoioxoi
nprcofii^iv
x
Tya0v
xapeaxv
x6'apexv
mivexv
apexvpeaxvyoi
KxpT|Tai
kocXv
...
6'icaivexv
Cicero in De fin.3.8.27 retellsthe same syllogismin Latin (SVF 3.37, LS
60N; cf. the same argumentin almost the same terms in Tusc. disp.
5.15.45):
est:quodautemlaudabile
omnelaudabile
est,omneesthonesQuodestbonm,
est. . . Illudautem
bonum
esse
tum.Bonum
quodest,honestum
perabsurdum,
igitur
aut,si id,
sit,autexpetendum,
quodnonplacens,
aliquid,
quodnonexpetendum
id autemhonesnonetiamdiligendum:
itaetiamlaudabile:
ergoetiamprobandum:
tum.Itafitutquodbonum
sit.
sit,id etiamhonestum
in the Stoic teaching
However,it is the main propertyof to kocAov
to be soughtforits own sake thatis most importantforthe analysisof
textsand ideas in this paper. It is explained preciselyby the fact that
the Stoicspositedvirtue,or t kocvwhichwas identicalwithit, as happinessand the finalgoal, and not as a means of achievingsomethingelse
..
ieivxeKaio7coao0ai
axcov
axo
toxi
koXo
fiivoiaxf|v
(poiv
yoneva,
vaxo
thisview,butfor
couldhaveborrowed
I cannot
as yettellfrom
which
source
Augustine
thepresent
paperitis ofno consequence.
29Forthe
withthepassages
inthescholastic
Summae
similarities
textual
sakeofillustrating
theLatintradition.
from
I willquoteat length
thecorresponding
texts,
especially

19:34:21 PM

158

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

essein SVF 3.38-48 and


se ipsamexpetendam
(cf. the section Vvrtutem
propter
LS 61, especiallyvol. 1, p. 383; the phrasingof the followingpassages
of virtueand t kocv,
probablygoes back to the Aristoteliandefinitions
cf.Met. 1072a and Rhet.1366a). Thus SextusEmpiricusin M. 11.99 (np
yocGv
t|0iko'),SVF 3.38) assertsthat the Stoics jivovt kocv
5oti
Kal
toto
ori
arc
tcvycDv
eKVDaGai
aipexv
ovxe
vofiouaiv <paei
cpcov.
Diogenes Laertius (7.89, SVF 3.39, LS 6 IA) also agrees that the
. . . at>TTiv
Stoics consideredtt|vte apexr^v
Si'arnveivai aipexr|v. . . The
same opinion is preservedin the Latin traditionin severalpassages from
Cicero: De fin. 3.11.36 (see above; SVF 3.41), De leg. 1.18.48 (see above;
SVF 3.43), and De fin.5.7.20 (SVF 3.44, LS 64G). The last one reads as
follows:
Atverofacere
etiamsi
utadipiscamur,
naturam
ea non
omnia,
sunt,
quaesecundum
etsolum
id esseethonestum
etsolumbonum
Stoici
assequamur,
perse expetendum
dicunt.
The Stoic teachingthat honestum
must be sought for its own sake was
marked with such distinctphrasingthat it became widelydisseminated
throughvarioustextualtraditionsand became a prominentthemein the
13th-century
scholasticism.
I
to say a fewwords about the Stoic doctrineof decorum
have
Finally,
which is closelyrelatedto honestum
(to 7ip7iov)
(t rnv)and contributed
in aesthetictermsin the Middle
much to the interpretation
of honestum
Ages.30It is best preservedin Cicero's De off.1.27.93-28.101. The Stoic
nature of this doctrineis confirmedby Cicero's own statementat the
verybeginningof Book 1 (1.2.6), and Van Straaten(107) attributesthis
more preciselyto Panaetius.The importanceof the doctheoryof decorum
trineof decorum
is thatit accountsfortwo importantmotifspertainingto
honestum
that appear in the imprecisequotationsin Albert'scommentary
on De div.nom.4 but are absent fromthe discussionof honestum
proper
was almostidenticalwithhonpresentedabove. Since forCicero decorum
estum
the propertiesof the formercould easilybe attributedto the latter:
etquasi
utde unareliqua
dicendum
sit,inqua verecundia
partehonestatis
Sequitur
et modestia
sedatioperturbationum
vitae,temperantia
omnisque
quidamornatus
Hoc lococontinetur
animiet rerum
moduscernitur.
id,quoddiciLatinedecorum
30The rootsofthediscussion
ofthesetwoGreekterms
canbe seenin Plato,Hippias
itlater.In theGreektradition,
tJtpercov
theStoicspresumably
found
Major293Ewhere
hada destiny
forthereason
thatitalsohada "double"
similar
tothatofticaAxSv
meanIn thiscasetheambiandmoral"suitability"
or "fitness."
ing- bothaesthetic
(material)
inevenmore
intheLatinsincedecorum
waspreserved
was(unlike
honestum)
perceived
guity
terms
thantTiprcov.
aesthetic

19:34:21 PM

THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC

159

dicitur:
huiusvisea est,utab honesto
nonqueatsepaGraeceenimrcpercov
potest;
rali. . . (Deoff.
1.27.93-4)
and materialbeauty,quite
The firstmotifis a parallel between decorum
decorum
is
as
naturalforthe Stoics:
inseparablefromvirtueas beauty is
fromhealth(also see above, especiallythe discussionof De off.1.28.98):
nonpotest
a valetudine,
etpulchritudo
secerni
sichoc,de quo
Utvenustas
corporis
totum
illudquidem
estcumvirtute
sedmente
etcogdecorum
confusum,
loquimur,
. . . (Deoff.
Schwenke
itatione
1.27.95,
478).
distinguitur
The passages fromAlbert'scommentarythatat least lead to thiscontext
are Simon 182.12-3and Simon 182.29-30. The second motifis the manifestcharacterof honestum
, its propertyto have a certainappearance and
"shine forth"just as materialbeautyin bodies:
velint
consentaneum
... utid decorum
esse,quoditanaturae
sit,utin eo moderatioet temperantia
cumspeciequadamliberali
(Ibid.,1.27.96,Schwenke
adpareat
from
areSimon185.75-7
Albert's
and
commentary
478).Thecorresponding
passages
Simon186.16-9.
in the Middle Ages sharesthe
and decorum
The Stoic theoryof honestum
same destinyas the Stoic view of beauty as "symmetryof parts." In
Stoicism,both motifsconvergein one aspect,thatis, the parallelbetween
the state of the soul and the body. Indeed, beauty is described,on the
and order,on the other,as somethingthatpleases
one hand, as symmetry
itself
and
shines
forth.
Both qualities,however,referto both bodies
by
(proportionof parts,shiningforthof materialform)and souls (arrangementof virtues,apparentnobilityof conduct).However, Augustineand
the latermedievalChristianauthorswho were temptedto use theseStoic
and obliteratethe parviewshad to fittheminto a Christianframework
allel betweenthe soul and the body. It was achieved by separatingthe
two partsof the statementswhich containedanalogies betweenthe body
and the soul: in the case of honestum
and decorum
, by using the passages
the
and honestum
on
the
one
about
virtue
hand,
passages
applied
separately;
exclusivelyto spiritualphenomena,and on the other,the passages about
materialbeauty.
I would like to conclude by emphasisingthe followingpoint. Without
any doubt, the roots of all three ancient theoriesof beauty (symmetry,
the beauty of the universe,and moral beauty or honestum
) that were in
the centreof my attentionhere are found already in Plato and some
otherschoolspre-datingStoicism.The importantpoint is, however,that
the Stoicsassembledall thesescatteredviewsand put themtogether,producingcoherenttheoriesthatwere essentialto theirteachingand affected
all aspectsof it. The remnantsof thesewidelydisseminatedtheorieswere

19:34:21 PM

160

OLEGV. BYGHKOV

used in the 13th centurywhere scholasticsoftendrew directlyon "professed"Stoic sourcesratherthan on otherschools- simplybecause whenever theylooked forstatementson beauty theyinevitablyfound,among
others,some Stoic ideas. I hope that this broad diachronicperspective
will provide a betterunderstandingof how the Middle Ages received
ancient theoriesand disputes,if only in a fragmented
way, and in particularof how Stoicismwas at times"present"to thisprocess.
Toronto
Centre
forMedievalStudies
of Toronto
University

19:34:21 PM

's So-calledTractatus Primus, withan Editionof theAdditional


Burky
sit maximaoppositio"
Quaestio "Utrumcontradictio
L.M. DE RIJK

1. Introduction.
Natureand Date oftheWork
The extensivelist of worksby Walter Burley1containsa collectionof
some eagerlydisputedquestionsconcerningnaturalphilosophy,which in
most of the manuscriptcatalogues goes under the blank title Tractatus
In the colophons of the older manuscriptsthese questions are
primus.2
specified:
et de ydemptitate
et qualitate
de activitate
tractatus
sensibilium,
specifica
Explicit
forme
et
etde inductione
subita
animalis
etelementaris,
calonscelestis,
substantial,
de unitate
contrariorum.3
specifica
In theVatican manuscriptVat.lat.817, whichpresentsthe same colophon,
our treatiseis introducedas follows:"Tractatusde activitate,unitateet
augmentationeformarumactivarumhabentiumcontrariasuscipiencium
magis et minus." However, this title seems also to include the subject
De causa intrinseca
intensionis
et
matterof the subsequentTractatus
secundus,
current
in
which
its
title
the
of
acddentalium
remissionis
,
formarum
colophon
is mentioned:"Explicit. . . Burleusde intensioneet remissioneformarum."
AnnelieseMaier (who failedto see that the titlegivenby Vat.lat. 817
refersto the whole of the firstand second treatisesratherthan to just
the first)was fortunateenough to findBurley'sown referenceto the first
of our treatises.4In the shorterversion of his ExpositiosuperlibrumSex
1James
31 (1969),[174A. Weisheipl,
Mertonense
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
O.P.,Repertorium
Latin
Aristotle
Commentaries
24
See alsoCharles
, in:Traditio,
Lohr,Medieval
224],185-208.
(1968),171-87.
2 Weisheipl,
listofmanuscripts
somecorrections
nr.44, p. 204.Weisheipl's
requires
andadditions.
3 Bruges,
cod.501,f. 105r.See also Vat.lat.817,f. 223r;Paris,BN
Stadsbibliotheek,
oct.76,f. 106ra.
lat.6441,f.25vb;Erfurt,
Amplon.
4 See A. Maier,Ausgehendes
Mittelalter
nine,"HandI, Roma1964,[209-35],
chapter
schriftliches
zu Wilhelm
Ockham
undWalter
235,n. 57; thischapter
Burley,"
[209-35],
inArchivm
Franciscanum
ofherarticle
isa reissue
someadditions)
Historicum
(with
published
48 (1955),225-51.
Vivarium
34,2

EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:34:29 PM

162

L.M.DE RIJK

, writtenafterhe had leftParis in 1327, he deals withthe posiprinpiorum


tion concerningthe specificsamenessof whitenessand blacknesshe had
,5 and refersto his "primustractatusde
argued for in the fourthquaestio
formisaccidentalibus":
etnigredo
insummo
Etistapositio
videtur
sunteiusponere
quodalbedoinsummo
demspecieispecialissime;
et eodemmodode aliiscontrariis.
[. . .] Et istamopiin primo
nionem
tenuiParisius
et earndeclaravi
tractatu
de formis
accidentalibus.6
" covers
This referenceseems to implythatthe title"Deformis
accidentalibus
both the Tractatus
, which was afterprimusand the Tractatussecundus
wards called "De intensione
." I thinkit would be betet remissione
formarum
ter to call the firsttreatise"De formisaccidentalibus
, pars prima," withthe
"
subtide"De quattuor
conclusionibus
reaformasaccidentales
(henceforth
QCF).
The second treatise,then,whichcontainsa discussionof a closelyrelated
, pars
subject matter,should go under the title "De formisaccidentalibus
"
with
the
subtide
"De
causa
et
minus
intrinseca
secunda,"
susceptionis
magis
etremis(henceforth
CISM). Later on, its currenttitlebecame De intensione
sioneformarum.
The treatiseQCFA is among Burley'searlierworks.The authorintends
to defend four theses (which,in accordance with contemporaryusage,
were called "conclusiones")about the natureand activityof sensibleforms.
At the time of his defencein a sententialdisputationconcerningthe first
of Peter Lombard's Book IV, as well as afterwards,
distinctio
these theses
had raised some doubtswithcontemporary
some
of
whom even
scholars,
them
In
lines
his
as
the
of
treatise,
fiady rejected
sophistical.
opening
Burleyis most expliciton this score:
In prima
Sententiarum
dixiquedam
falsa,
dubia,
questione
quarti
quealiquibus
aliquibus
videbantur.
Ideoad requisitionem
sociorum
et causaexercitii,
quibusdam
sophistica
utVeritas
in medium
conclusiones
visasdubiasquasin predicta
deducatur,
planius
inscriptis
cumsuisrationibus
autimprobabiutprobabilitas
questione
posui,
redigam,
etdefectus.
litasillarum
conclusionum
dictarum
rationum
simul
evidentiaque
appareat
Michalskiis certainlyrightin assumingthat we have to do here witha
so-called "principium"on the fourthBook of Lombard's Sentenae
,7 i.e.
an inaugurallectureto be held by the sententialbachelor afterhe had
5 Forthisquaestio
3 (esp.3.4).
seebelow,oursection
6 QuotedafterVat.lat.cod.2147,f. 102r.
7 Constantin
au
courants
nouvelle
etlesdiffrents
Michalski,
C.M.,La physique
philosophiques
XIV sicle,
in Konstanty
La philosophie
Cracovie
au
1927,p. 8; anastatic
Michalski,
reprint
XIVsicle.
SixEtudes
in:KurtFlasch
zurPhilosophie
Philosopfnca.
(ed.),Opuscula
Abhandlungen
undihrer
Frankfurt
Geschichte,
1969,214.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

163

obtainedthe degreeof "magistertheologie."The authorsays thathe has


committedthislecturetogetherwith the discussionto writingat his fellow bachelors'request,obviouslybecause theycould not attendBurley's
performancesince theyhad theirown lecturesat the same time (hence
"socii concurrentes)."8
collative"whichusuallyaccomThe subjectmatterof the "disputationes
In
panied theselecturesmosdywent farbeyondthe textof the Sententiae.
point of fact,in the opening chapterof Book IV, Peter Lombard deals
withthe doctrineof the seven sacramentsand the sacramentalsigns.For
of the Sententiae
othercommentators
, problemsof naturalphilosophydid
notcome up fordiscussion.In Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent.dist. 1, qu. 1,
art. 1-5 forexample,quite understandably
nothingis foundon itemsfrom
naturalphilosophy.9
Ockham, on the otherhand,
Burley'scontemporary
does discusssome problemsof causalityinvolvedin the viewsof the sacraments'effectson the christian'ssoul, especiallyin his dubium
, but
quartum
in his answerto this dubium
, he only remarksthat a sensiblethingcan
have efficient
causalityon the soul merelythroughthe latter'scognitive
acts.10Burley'sproblemsclearlysurpassOckham's attention.
As will appear fromour analysisof the fourquestions(section3 of the
presentpaper),Burley'sprincipalopponentis his tutorand fellowMertonian, Thomas de Wylton.11Burley must have obtained the degree of
Master of Theologysomewherebetween 1314 (when Thomas de Wylton
and 1327, when Burley
became Parisian Master of Theology himself)12
was appointedenvoyof King Edward III to the Papal Court at Avignon.13
8 In theMendicant
SeeDeniflecoincidence
wasnotpermitted.
Orders
sucha temporal
II 2, Paris1896,p. 694,nota6. FortheinauParisiensis
Chartularium
Universitatis
Ghatelain,
see OlgaWeijers,
sententiarius"
tobe heldbythe"baccalarius
Terminologie
gurallectures
mentioned
there
desuniversits
auXIIIesicle
, Rome1987,413-9,andtheliterature
(p. 414,
AnIntroduction
toHisLifeandWritings,
Adam
Wodeham.
n. 152),andalsoW.Courtenay,
Leiden1978,175.
9 Scriptum
edidit
R.P.Maria
Sententiis
Petri
Lombardi
recognovit
atqueiterum
Magisti
super
Fabianus
Moos,O.P. TomusIV, Paris1947,p. 9-44.
10Quaestiones
ediderunt
inlibrum
Sententiarum
RegaWoodet Gedeon
quartum
(Reportado)
N.Y. 1984,p. 171718:
Romualdo
O.F.M.St.Bonaventure
Green,
Gi,O.F.M.,adlaborante
aninonpotest
nisimediante
"Adaliuddicoquodsensibile
aliquoipsius
agereinanimam
mae,putamediante
cognitione."
11See Maier,op.dt., 222-4,andWeisheipl,
andSome
Mertonians
Ockham
, in:Mediaeval
with
whosuccinctly
thevividandprotracted
30 (1968),163-213,
Studies,
polemic
analyses
in Vienna,
oftheDominikanerkonvent
on thebasisofcodex160/130
ThomasWylton,
Mertonense
lifeandworks
seeWeisheipl,
ff.83rb-89v.
ForWylton's
, 222-4.
Repertorium
12See Denifle-Chatelain,
op.cit.,II, 171.
13See A.B.Emden,
toA.D.1500, Oxford
A Biographical
oftheUniversity
ofOxford
Register
referred
to by
whois repeatedly
Thomasde Wylton,
1957-59,
I, 313.Forthatmatter,

19:34:29 PM

164

L.M.DE RIJK

As a matterof fact,Burley'stheologicalgraduationis commonlydated


1320-22.14This may be right,and would suggestthe early 1320s as a
on
probable date of QCFA. This much is certainthat,in his Commentaiy
theSentences
, which was writtennot later than the mid 1320s, Gerald
contradicho
Odonis mostextensively
,
quotes15fromthe insertedtractUtrum
is
unlike
what
is
rather
connected
with
which,
commonlyassumed,
closely
QCFA.16
2. TheManuscripts
In spite of the fact that Burley'sviews defendedin the two treatises
did not earn much applause, the tractshave been handed down in as
some of which containadaptationsof Burley's
many as ten manuscripts,
For the timebeing,I shall confinemyselfto fourfairlygood copies,
text.17
all datingfromthe fourteenth
century.
2.1 Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek
, cod. 501
The libraryof the city(Stadsbibliotheek)
of Bruges (Belgium)possesses
a nice copy of the two treatisesin codex 501.18This fourteenth-century
parchmentcodex of 158 fols,measuring194 x 135 mm. and partlywritten over two columns,containson fols 1-69 the longerversionof Burley's
De puniateartislogicae
.19The tract QCFA has been writtenby a different
hand, in one column,on fols 70r-105r.Afterthe explicit(quoted above,
in QCFAas "dominus
cancellarius
in 1327,
wasnolonger
chancellor
Londonensis,"
Burley
andpossibly
no longer
alive.
14Givenhisdateofbirth
mustbythenhavealready
beensome45
(1275/6),
Burley
For1275/6
is datedas lateas 1320/22.
yearsofage.I do notknowwhythegraduation
as Burley's
dateofbirth
seethecolophon
est
ofhisExpositio
artem
veterem:
super
"Completa
hecexpositio
annodomini
GCGtricsimo
milsimo
quintadie mensis
Augusti
septimo
et annoetatisexpositoris
A Caius
secundo."
Gonville
, cod.
(Ms Cambridge,
sexagsima
f. 13Ir; London,
Lambeth
Palace
139/79,
5, 1337,Burley
, cod.143,f. 185).So, onAugust
was61.
15See L.M. de Rijk,Geraldus
from
O.F.M.
Edition
the
Odonis
, LOGICA.FirstCritical
Extant
Introd
., sect.4.
(BrillLeidenforthcoming),
Manuscripts
16See below,
oursection
four.
17A rejection
ofBurley's
fourth
thesis
Chunradus
de Monte
principal
bya magister
vonMegenberg)
inVienna,
occurs
cod.160/130,
Dominikanerkonvent,
(Konrad
puellarum
ff.89v-91v,
theendofBurley's
onBurley's
after
treatise.
Foran anonymous
attack
straight
first
in Vat.lat.3066,ff.4v-7vseeMaier,op.cit.y
thesis
found
224-5.
18See A. de Poorter,
dela Bibliothque
dela Ville
deBruges
desmanuscrits
,
Catalogue
publique
Gembloux-Paris
1934.
19EditedbyPhilotheus
OleanSt.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1955.TheBruges
Boehner,
copy
is oneofthesixmanuscripts
usedbyBoehner.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

165

"
contradicp. 3) the same hand continueswith a separate question Utrum
"
ho sit maximaoppositio(under the heading De contradictoriis
which
runs
),
fromfols 105r-111r and simplywinds up withthe closingformula"Hec
de questione sufficiant."It opens with the words "Adhuc circa genus
oppositionisresttinquirendum. . Next a nice copy is found (on fols
lllr-158v) of the second treatise(our CISM, but withoutany title).Its
incipitruns:
In hoctractatu
secundo
intendo
de causaintrinseca
perscrutali
susceptionis
magiset
minus.
Et hunctractatum
dividoin sexcapitula.
In primodeclaratur
quodforma
nonsuscipit
ad partem,
magiset minus
peradditionem
partis
utraque
permanente
[...]
The treatiseis given a titleafterits explicit:
Et ideononindigent
Et sicpatetquidvidetur
essedicendum
circa
agente
pronunc.
causamintensionis
et remissionis
formarum
Et hec
[formalium!
MS] accidentalium.
sufficiant
Et si aliquidinhoctractatu
dictum
fuerit
vel
contrarium,
ergoad presens.
- quodabsit!
- , illudrevoco
nonconsonum,
veritat
fidei
caholice
mecorsupponens
rectioni
sacrosancte.
Necrationem
communi
ecclesie
necauctoritatem
Aristotilis
vel
alterius
veram
romane
ecclesie
etvericuiuscumque
philosophi
reputo
quecontradicit
tatfideiChristiane.
tractatus
de causaextrnseca
intensionis
et remissionis
Explicit
formarum
accidentalium.
The theoryabout the intensionand remissionof accidental formsthat
Burleyexpoundsin thistreatise(a theorythat alreadyfeaturesin QCFA)
is knownto be directedagainstthe one defendedby his masterand tutor
Thomas de Wylton.20
2.2 Erfurt, Amplon.
oct.76
This manuscriptof 174 fols,whichis dated 1345 and opens withsome
authors,contains, after the heading
logical tractswrittenby different
BURLEY, our two treatises:QCFA on 84ra-106ra (followedby the tract
Utrumcontradicho
on fols 106rb-109rb)and CISM on 109va-127rb.The
versionof QCFAdoes not substantially
differ
fromthe one foundin Bruges,
but the CISM copy shows quite a lot of redactionaldifferences.
The latter ends withthe simpleformula"Et hoc sufficit
quoad presens."
Fols 127rb-133vbcontain a tractDe terminis
naturalibus.
Inc.: "De qualitateuniformisciendumest quod quedam est qualitas [. .
20TheshortQuestio
desusceptione
etminus
(Inc."Utrum
magis
qualitas
suscipiat
magiset
is found
in Oxford,
Bodleian
cod.Canon,
misc.
226,if.38-43,andin the
minus")
Library,
Vatican
cod.Vat.lat.2148,ff.71-5,immediately
a copyofBurley's
corLibrary,
following
CISM(ff.57r-70v).
tract,
responding

19:34:29 PM

L.M.DE RIJK

166

On fols 134ra-157raa tracton logic is found,which beginswith the


words "Utrum ars logica doceat discernere...." In Schum's catalogue21
it is given the heading "De effectuartislogicae cum multisbonis sophismatibus."To my knowledge,thiswork is not extantanywhereelse.
Afterthe heading "alius tractatus"a copy is foundof Ockham,De rebus
successivis.
2.3 Vatican City, Vat.lat. 817
This parchmentcodex of 258 fols(measuring275 X 196 mm.)is extensivelydescribedby AugustPelzer in the officialcatalogue of the codices
Vat.lat. 679-1134.22Only fols 203r-257vare of interestto us now.
Fols 203r-223rpresenta text of QCFA which is practicallythe same
as that found in our Bruges manuscript,fols 70r-105r.A nice copy of
CISM occurs on fols 227r-257v,which correspondsto Bruges,fols lllr158v, and is followedby an Index on fol. 258r. Like in the Brugesand
Erfurtmanuscripts,the separate question "Utrum contradictio
. . has
been handed down (fols 223r-226v) in between QCFA and CISM, but
unlikethe one who wrotethe othercopies, the presentcopyist,although
still speakingoffourquestions,takes the insertedquestion as somehow
belongingto QCFA by adding (226v) the formula"Explicitprimustractatus" (referring
to our QCFA) after
the insertedquestion.It shouldbe noted,
however,that,all the same, the QCFA copy concludes(fol.223r) withthe
usual formula"Explicittractatusde activitatequalitatumsensibilium
..."
2.4

Paris, BN lat. 6441

This parchmentmanuscriptof 149 folsopens (folslra-22va)withsome


tractson logic, viz. Burley'sDe puntateartislogicaetactatuslongior
(folslra18vb), and the tractwhich begins with "Quia in sophismatibusprobandis et improbandis"(18vb-22va).This part of the manuscriptis followed
(fols22va-32va) by a copy of QCFA, whereas CISM runsfromfols34rb48va. Again, our separate question "Utrum contradictio"is found (fols
32va-34rb)in between QCFA and CISM, introducedby the same intro:
"Adhuc circa genus oppositorumresttinquirendumutrumcontradictio
sit maxima oppositio." It ends with the words "Hec de contradictoriis
sufficiant."
follows
Rightafterthe conclusionof CISM an indexquaestionum
21W. Schum,
Beschreibendes
derAmplonianischen
Verzeichnis
zu Erfurt
,
HandschriftenSammlung
Berlin1887.
22A. Pelzer,
Codices
Vaticani
Latini
, vol.II 1-2,Roma1931-33.

19:34:29 PM

PRIMUS
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
BURLEY'S

167

(fols48va-49ra),which,however,does not concernour tractsQCFA and


CISM. In point of fact,the firstitem (numbered23!) seems to referto
of QCFA, the second one to the subjectmatterof CISM,
the firstquaestio
:23
contradicho
and the thirdone to the separate tractin between,Utrum
[23] Utrumqualitasin virtutesua possitproducereformamsubstantialem.
Conclusio prima quod sic.
[33] Utrumcontradictiosit maxima oppositio.
[34] Utrumformeaccidentalessuscipiuntmagiset minus.Conclusioprima.
Other questionsare:
[48] Utrum actus voluntatisfiatsubito vel in tempore.Utrum voluntas
sit potentia nobiliorquam intellectus.
[91] Utrummotussit alia res a rebus permanentibus.
immoAnotherseries(fol.49ra) beginswith "Utrumin circumstantiis
of this series must
ralibusexcuseturpeccatum." The two finalquaestiones
: "Utrumpossitesse aliquod peccatum
de se trouver
ensemble
be bientonnes
and
"Utrum continuumcomponaturex
deus
non
possit punire,"
quod
punctis."
The remainderof fol.49ra as well as fols49v-50vare blank.Fols 51ra84va containvarioustheologicalquestions(not of Burley'shand): De revelatione futurorum
("Quero istam questionemutrumdeus
contingentium
de processuamoris;
rationali
futura
revelare
creature
contingentia");
possit
de beatitudine;de nobilitatevoluntatis,de cantate et de eius augmentaand many others.
tione,de fruitione,
Fols 85ra-89rbcontain Ockham, De quantitate
, withoutthe prologue,
and withthe explicit"Et ista de ista materiasufficiat(!)
quod [readquia]
alias disertetractabode ea."24A shorttractDe motu
, which in factis an
25
In III Phys.Arist
extractfromOckham's Expositio
., p. 42 1-30, is read on
fols 90rb-93ra.The same author's SummaLogicae
, partes II and III26 is
foundon fols 93ra-126rb.At the end the words "diligenterconsiderans
de quolibet an sit consequensvel repugnanspreconcessovel antecedens
prenegatout sic semperrespondeat"have been omittedby haplography,27
23I cannot
It should
be noticed
thatthe
thequaestiones.
thenumbers
explain
preceding
is notcontinuous.
numbering
24See theedition
N.Y. 1986,5-85.
theol.
X), St.Bonaventure,
byC.A.Grassi(Opera
25Ed. V. Richter
Phil.IV), St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1985.
andG. Leibold(Opera
26P. 241-849ed. Philotheus
Phil.I),
Brown{Opera
GedeonGi,Stephanus
Boehner,
St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1974.
27Thecopyist
seemsto havehadaccesstoveryreliable
involved,
copiesoftheworks
buthe usesthemwithunbelievable
negligence.

19:34:29 PM

168

L.M. DE RIJK

because of the foregoing"Et tunc primo respondeat."Next follows(fols


126rb-127vb)a ratherextensivetable of contents,which ends as follows:
"C. 23 [in fact= the finalchapter 18 of the edition]quomodo predicta
fallacia peccat contra naturam sillogismiet quomodo paralogismiqui
videntursillogismicompletiet non suntdeficiunta natura sillogismorum.
deo gratias."
Afterthreelines leftblank, three treatisesof the Logicaby Ockham's
fellowbrotherand later MinisterGeneral, Gerald Odonis are found:
-

127vb-136ra:De syllogismis
136ra-139rb:De suppositionibus
139rb-149rb:De principiti
scientiarum
.28

3 . An Analysisof thefourquestions
discussed
in QCFA
After the introductorylines quoted above (our section 1), Burley
continues:29
conclusiones
dubiavelfalsa.Prima
'B 70r'Dixiquatuor
quevidebantur
quibusdam
invirtute
formam
substantialem
velinvirtute
quodqualitas
potest
propria
producere
esseprincipium
totaleproductivum
forme
substantial.
Verbigratia,
calor
propria
in virtute
etcalorqui estin semine
in
ignispotest
propria
producere
ignem,
potest
virtute
animam
sensitivm.
Secundaconclusio,
propria
producere
que etiamvidetur
inmateria
inductionis
subite
forme
substantial
nonrequidubia,fuit
quodininstanti
ritur
inducens
formam.
Tertiaconclusio
agensprotunc
quodistitrescaloresquos
in secundo
De generatione
animalium
calorcelestis,
ele, scilicet
Philosophus
distinguit
mentaris
etanimalis,
sunteiusdem
athome.
conspeciei
Quartaconclusio
quodforme
videlicet
caloret frigus,
albedoetnigredo,
sunteiusdem
trarie,
speciei
specialissime.
Thus the fourtheses objected to by Burley'sopponentsall concern the
natureand activityor operationof accidentalformsor qualities,namely
[1] that a qualitycan produce a substantialformby its own; [2] that at
the very momentin which a substantialformis induced in matterno
exterioragent is requiredto effectthis; [3] thatcelestial,elementary,
and
animal heat all belong to the same ultimatespecies,and [4] thatcontrary
forms,such as heat and cold, blacknessand whiteness,belongto the same
ultimatespecies.
Next the author goes on to discussthese questions.
28A critical
edition
ofthisLogica
withthreeannexaaddedlateron bythe
, together
hasbeenprepared
author.
See ournote15.
author,
bythepresent
Thequotations
areall after
theBruges
corrected
with
and,ifnecessary,
manuscript,
thehelpoftheotherMSS (including
somefifteenth
treacentury
copiesofthepresent
author
is abouttofinish
a critical
edition
ofDQCNandtheoriginal
vertise).Thepresent
sionofCISM.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
3.1

169

Thefirstthesis

Burleybeginswithsketchingthe procedureof his argument:


invirtute
estquodqualitas
formam
subPrima
potest
producere
propria
ergoquestio
<sic proceditur>.
Primoprobaboearnper
Circaistamconclusionem
stantialem.
veltresradones,
difficile
triplex
rumpitur";
que sufficient,
quia "funiculus
quatuor
et tertio
movebo
dubiaet solvam
ea. Primaratioesttalis.
secundo
perauctoritates,
in aliquamformam
alioactivocircumscripto,
Illudquodperse,quocumque
potest
in eandem,
illudin virtute
in illam
etsineeo aliudagensnonpotest
potest
propria
in formam
alioactivocircumscripto,
subformam.
Calorperse,quocumque
potest
sinecaloreproducere
formam
substantial
stantialem
ignisetforma
ignisnonpotest
formam
substantialem
substantialem
propria
potest
igni.Ergocalorin virtute
ignis
in virtute
formam
Et,perconsequens,
propria
potest
producere
qualitas
producere.
Maiorhuiusrationis
estde se nota.Et minorem
ad
substantalem.
proboquantum
suipartem.
utramque
Afterhe has reported[.B 70r-v'his own expositionof the firstthesisto
his fellowbachelors,Burleygives an account of Master Thomas's oppositionduringthe performanceof the inaugurallecture:
dominus
Reverendus
noster
cancellarius
Lonmagister
'B 70v]Huicrationi
respondet
in aliquamdispositionem
donensis30
nonpotest
necesquodcalorin virtute
propria
sitantem
ad formam
substantialem
ignis,
precedens
dispositionem
quianulladispositio
ad formam
forme
ignis.Quod patetquia: Quecumque
ignisnecessitat
dispositio
inaliquoinstanti
inducitur
instans
inducitur
antedeductionem
forme
ignis,
precedenti
iliaduoinstantia
esttempus
in quo
in quoinducitur
forma
medium,
ignis.Et inter
subforma
mediononestmateria
ignis.Et ideonulladispositio
precedens
tempore
nonstatim
inducitur
forma
ad formam
necessitat
ymo
exquo,iliainducta,
ignis,
ignis,
Etsidicatur
medium
estmateria
forme
subprivatione
[. . .] responignis.
pertempus
Thomas
reverendus
detistedoctor
replies
bymaster
[follow
farther
].
[...]. Et si dicatur
Of course, Burleyis stillfar frombeing discouraged.He makes many
efforts
to invalidatehis opponent'sarguments:
Sedistanonsufficiunt,
utmichi
vide
tur.Benetarnen
verum
estetneces'B 70v-71r]
rationis
illudquoddicitmagister
meusquod[...]. Sed fundamentum
istius
sarium
in hocquodcalorin virtute
in totamaltera'i.e.Burley
's] consistit
potest
propria
doctionem
formam
substantialem
In hocenimconveniunt
omnes
precedentem
ignis.
tores
calefacere
edamsecundum
quodcalorin virtute
potest
[...]. Apparet
propria
fidem
enimestquodhostiaconsecrata,
si essetcalida,calecatholicam.
Manifestum
invirtute
etcertum
noncalefaceret
forme
substantialis.
estquodcalorhostie
faceret;
The discussionis vividlycontinuedand winds up not beforefol. 78v:
nonesttunc
] Dico quodsi per"generationem"
[B 78v
intelligatur
"aliquidfieri,"
inactu.Sedintelligendo
esse,"sicgeneratio
per"generationem"
"genitum
generatio
30Thomas
onNov.13,1316,
deWylton
ismentioned
as a CanonofSt.Paul'sLondon,
hasbecomevacantby 1327.
andas Chancellor
1320.The latter
position
byAugust

19:34:29 PM

L.M.DE RIJK

170

tuncestinactu,etnonrequirit
tuncsitinactu,sedsolumquodprequodgenerans
fuitusquead illudinstans.
Ad ultimum
dicoquodcalorignisetcaloranimalis
sunt
inprobatione
sicut
eiusdem
videbitur
tertie
conclusions
Necpropter
speciei,
principalis.
hoc oportet
in omnino
eundem
effectum
secundum
et hoc
quodpossint
speciem,
quianonsuntsubeodemgradu.
3.2

The secondthesis

ConcerningBurley'ssecond thesis,severalopponentshad raiseddoubts


about his view of the generationof a mixtumout of the elements.They
ask themselveswhat preciselycauses the inductionof the substantialform
of the mixtumin the finalmomentof the generation,in which the elements are involved in mutual transmutation.
The elementsthemselves
cannot be that cause, since, at that verymoment,theyno longerexist:
videndum
estde secunda.
[B 78v'Visode primaconclusione
principali,
Quidam
enimdoctores
faciunt
difficultatem
de generatione
mixti
ex elementis,
quidscilicet
inducat
formam
mixti
substantialem
in ultimo
instanti
totam
mensurantis
temporis
transmutationem
<elementorum>
ad invicem.
Nonenimpotestdiciquodin ilio
instanti
inquosubiecto
inducitur
forma
ab ipsiselementis,
mixti,
quodinducitur
quia
in ilioinstanti
dementa
etitain ilioinstanti
suntcorrupta,
nonsunt.Et quodnon
Ideocurrunt
ad celumtanquam
ad ultimum
dicentes
est,nichilinducit.
refugium,
ultimo
celuminducit
formam
mixti.
quodin ilioinstanti
Burleyhad replied,he reports,thattheyare mistakenabout whatis going
on au moment
, and are in factlookingfora superfluousagent:
supreme
et dixiquodin ilioinstanti
ultimo
mensu[B 78v
] Huicrationi
respondi
temporis
rantis
totam
transmutationem
elementorum
ad invicem
nonrequiritur
agensprotunc
inducens
estinducta.
Et ideoprotunc
forma
nonrequiritur
formam,
quiaprotunc
- inductum
- ,
inducens
enimnonoportet
sicutnonoportet
inducere,
agereactum
sedsufficit
fuit
inducens
in
tototempore
quod
precedenti.
Since thisis preciselythe claim thathad raised some new doubts,Burley
decided to adduce six new argumentsin supportof his second thesis:
ideoproboistam
conclusiodubium,
[B 78v-80r
] Et quiaistudvidebatur
quibusdam
nemsecundam
scilicet
forme
subinductionis
subite
persexrationes,
quodininstanti
in materia
stantialis
nonrequiritur
inducens
Primaratioest
formam.
agensprotunc
hec.Guinonrpugnt
sibipronulloinstanti
illud.
aliquidprounoinstanti,
rpugnt
a great
series
andrefiitations].
[Follows
ofarguments,
counter-arguments,
Burley's final answer again underlinesthe importance of considering
the process of the mutuallytransmutingelementsfrom the rightperspective:
etconservans
efficiens
[B 80r
sunt,
] Etdicoquodtalesforme
requirunt
quandofacte
in continuo
fieri.
Et ideodicitAugustinus
quiaconsistunt
quodlumennonestfactumin medio,
sedfitin medio.Aliesuntforme
suntfactein subiectis.
que proprie

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

171

omnino.
Etilleforme
Etillesuntforme
nonrequirunt
permanentes
quandosuntfacte,
nonplusproprimoinstanti
instanti
Et
efficiens,
quamproquocumque
posteriori.
suntforme
et etiammulte
huiusmodi
forme
accidentales.
substantiates,
3.3

The thirdthesis

The thirdthesisis supportedby fourarguments:


istaquodillitrescalores
dubia,fuit
[B80r
] Tertiaconclusio
principalis
quevidebatur
in secundo
De generatone
scilicet
calorcelestis,
animalium,
quosPhilosophus
distinguit
etanimalis,
sunteiusdem
athome.
Undeponoconclusionem
sub
elementaris,
speciei
hacforma
et animalis
sunteiusdem
athome
elementaris,
quodcalorcelestis,
speciei
seuspecialissime.
Hecconclusio
Primo
sic.Calorcelestis
aut
probatur
quadrupliciter.
hocdicitur
celestis
autquiaesta celoeffective.
propter
quiaestin celosubiective,
Nonprimomodo,quia calornonestsubiective
in celo,cumcelumnonreipiat
essecelestis
Sed
peregrinas
impressiones.
Ergocalordicitur
quiaesta celoeffective.
calorelementaris
esta celoeffective.
et calorelementaris
idem
Ergocalorcelestis
sunt.Et eademratione
caloranimalis
eritidemcumists.Et,perconsequens,
non
differunt
specie.
Aftera lengthyexchange of argumentsand counter-arguments,
Burley
raises a ratherintricatedoubt concerningthe supposed (and by Burley
himselfdefended)specificsamenessof celestialand animal heat, a doubt
he hardlycan take away except by appealing to probability:
Sedhicestunumdubium,
si idemcalorsecundum
esset
[B 81r-v'
quoniam
speciem
caloranimalis
et celestis,
tuncgenerata
a calorecelesti
perputrefactionem
possent
a caloreelementari,
itaquodsi in hyeme
essetcalorigneus
circacorpus,
generali
animatum
elementi
sicutperactionem
celi.
[. . .] itageneraretur
corpus
peractionem
Et hoc confirmatur,
materiam
et,perconsequens,
quia eodemmododisponeret
consimilem
formam
induceret.
concedendo
Dicendum,
conclusionem,
quodsi calor
sicregulari
et in graduconvenienti
salvalisicutcalorcelestis,
[B 81v'igneus
posset
animaisicutcalorcelestis.
Sed hecessetvaldedifficile,
et forte
quodsicgeneraret
impossibile.
3.4

Thefourth
thesis

No doubt, Burley'sfourththesisis the most peculiar one in that it


seems to ignorethe different
(specific)naturesof distinctcolours,such as
whiteand black,or of oppositequalities,such as hot and cold. Especially
the fourththesishas provokedan eager discussion,both duringand after
Burley' graduation.The author startsby reportinghis defence of the
thesisduringtheprindpiurrv.
viderede quartaconclusione
et de rationibus
suis.
'B 81v]Nuncrestt
principali
conclusio
eratquodforme
videlicet
caloretfrigus,
albedoetnigredo,
contrarie,
Quarta
sunteiusdem
Istamconclusionem
et aucspeciei
specialissime.
probavi
perrationes
toritates.
Perrationes,
tertio
moralem,
primoloyce,secundo
phisice,
perrationem
medicinalem.
quarto
perrationem

19:34:29 PM

172

L.M.DE RIJK

because it is focussed
Burley'firstargumenttakenfromlogic is interesting,
on the notion of (greateror lesser)distancebetweenthe extremesof the
various kinds of opposition,which is preciselythe subject matterof the
insertedquestion Utrumcontradictio
handed down in our manuscriptsin
between QCFA and CISM:
distant
distantia
[B 81v
] Prmaratiotalisest.Quandocumque
aliquaduoequaliter
a perfectissimo
formali
in aliquaspecie:si unumistorum
duorum
sitin iliaspecie,
eritin iliaspecie;et similiter,
si illudquodestremotius
a perfectissimo
sit
reliquum
in eademspeciecumperfectissimo,
etilludquodestpropinquius
forpropinquitate
malieritin eademspeciecumilioperfectissimo.
Hoc apparet
ex determinatis
in
SexPrmpirumy
decausasusceptionis
etminus,
loyca.Dicitenimauctor
capitulo
magis
talequodmagisaccedit
ad summum
tale
tale,etilludestminus
quodilludestmagis
illudestalbiusquodestpropinquius
a summo
tali.Verbigratia,
quodmagisdistat
etilludestminus
albumquodmagisdistat
EtidemvultPhiab albissimo.
albissimo,
in Thopicis
etetiaminquarto
de priori;
etloquuntur
de
, capitulo
losophies
Metaphisice
distantia
etpropinquitate
formali.
etaliquam
Sed estdarealiquam
caliditatem
frigiditatem
distantia
formali
a summa
etetiamestdarealicaliditate;
que equedistant
summe
data.Ergocum
caliditati,
quamfrigiditatem
propinquiorem
aliquacaliditate
caliditas
datasitin eademspeciecumsumma
caliditate,
quecumque
sequitur
quod
summe
etetiamfrigiditas
caliditati,
frigiditas
queestequepropinqua
queestpropincaliditati
data,sintin eademspeciecumsumma
quiorsumme
quamuna caliditas
caliditate.
caliditas
et frigiditas
suntin eademspecie.Et volo
Et,perconsequens,
etdistantia
formarum
cumloquorde
formali
semper
loquide propinquitate
ipsarum
distantia
velpropinquitate
earum.
Next, in defendingthe major premissBurleytakeswhat in his view are
two basic presuppositions
("fundamenta")of AristoteliannaturalphilosoAristotle
not put them into words,he has to agree):
did
phy (although
in scientia
declarata
ab Aristotile
naturali.
[B 8Jv]Et supponoduo fundamenta
Primm
estquodreipermanentis
inesseperalterationem
de novoproducte
estdare
in quo habetesse.Et hecratioestplana(etsiAristotiles
instans
nondixisprimum
setearn),quiain ultimo
instanti
mensurantis
alterationem
habetterminus
temporis
alterationis
moveretur
ad formam
Secundum
esse,quiaaliter
primo
aliquid
quamhabet.
fundamentum
velcorrupte
non
estquodreipermanentis
producte
peralterationem
inquo [B 82r]habetesse.Ethancsentit
estdareultimum
instans
Aristotiles
etvera
Aristotiles
earnnonscripsisset.
esset,
quamvis
Startingfromthese two presuppositions
Burleydeveloped quite an intricate argument,which, as he reports,was objected to by an opponent
(referredto as "quidam reverendussocius") "in prima replicationesua"
(during the graduation ceremony,probably). Burley gives an account
and his own answers.
[B 82r-85v'of the opponent'scounter-arguments,
He reportsall these "replicationes"and "reprobationesreplicationis,"
but
insteadof answeringthem,Burleysetsout to put forwardeightnew theses
which he thinksare conclusiveenough againstthe opponent'sobjections:

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

173

sociuset magister,
credens
rationes
measessesophisti[B 85v]Quidamreverendus
ad rationes
ad quartam
conclusionem
adductas
modoinfrascripto.
cas,respondet
Contra
octoconclusiones
quascredoconcludere.
quemproboperordinem
AnnelieseMaier has rightlyobserved31that this masterhad opposed to
Burley'sviewsboth in unpublisheddiscourse,which had somehow come
to Burley'sattention,and in writtendocuments.The opponentmusthave
reacted to Burley'sreplies,for the latterreturnsto his eight additional
Meanwhilehe adds some otherargumentsin supthesesquite extensively.
port of his original"conclusioprincipalis"(numberfour,that is).
All thingsconsidered,the disputeover the fourthprincipalthesismust
have taken some time. Weisheipl righdyconcludes that we have to do
witha protractedpolemic32betweenBurleyand this Master.33
In some of the new argumentsadduced in supportof the fourththesis ("rationesnove ad principlemconclusionem"),the notionof distance
betweenoppositionalextremesis again preponderant.To Burley'smind,
one of the opponent's counter-arguments
ignores the basic difference
and contradiction:
betweencontrariety
dicoquodcontradictoria
nonsuntinspeciesolum
nisialterum
'B 104v]Adquartum
contradictoriorum
estinspecie.Modo,si iliaquemagisdistant
sintineademspecie,
et illaque minusdistant
eruntin eademspecie,et hoc si utraque
sintin specie.
Huiusmodi
autemnonsuntcontradictoria.
Quarerationonconcludit.
The treatiseQCFA winds up as follows:
dicoquodinter
individua
eiusdem
nonestessen[i?104v-105r
] Adseptimum
speciei
tialis
ordosecundum
nonagente;
tarnen
efficientiam,
quiaunum
potest
agere,
reliquo
31Op.rit.,
unomodoin dogmatibus
nonscriptis,
aliomodoin
p. 224."[. . .] respondet
In dogmatibus
nonscriptis,
secundum
dogmatibus
scriptis.
quodfuitmichireportatum,
dicit[. . .1."
32Weisheipl,
184.Forthatmatter,
Ockham
andSome
itsprotractedness
did
Mertonians,
notpleaseeverybody.
Thecopyist
ofVat.
lat.2148(written
about1400)quiteabruptly
surely
throws
hisjob up andwe arealsotold(f.54rb)why:"Adistamreplicationem
respondet
sociusquodnumquam
hecduoconcessit,
scilicet
in quo
dominus
quodestdareultimum
respermanens
habetesse,et quodestdareprimum
instans
in
corrupta
peralterationem
habetesse.Seddicitquoddixitetc.De ista
quorespermanens
producta
peralterationem
voluiscribere,
nichil
illeBurleus
facitusquead finem
bene
questione
quoniam
questionis
stationis
unumquaternum
de littera
totaliter
unde(= 'because')
nonponitnisisoluinutili,
tiones
etreplications
sibiinvicem
etsupponit
faciebant,
quasipseetquidamaliusdoctor
Burleus
multa
falsa.Ergoetc.
33Weisheipl,
Ockham
andSome
Mertonians
in identifying
thisobsti, 185-6couldbe right
nateopponent
as stillthesameone,Thomasde Wylton.
It should
be notedthat,
as early
as in QCFA
hisownviewsoftheintension
andremission
offorms
, Burley
expounds
along
linesas in CISM, which
is known
tobe directed
Thomasde Wylton's
similar
theagainst
offorms
in hisQuestio
and remission
desusceptione
et
(as setforth
magis
oryofintension
seealsoournote20 above).
minus
qualitatis;

19:34:29 PM

174

L.M. DE RIJK
ordosecundum
etemineninter
individua
eiusdem
estessentialis
speciei
perfectionem
de omnispeciesuscipiente
veladminus
inter
tiam.Ethocestverum
magisetminus,
eiusdem
estessentialis
ordo.Nec
[sunt
E' gradus
speciei
suscipientis
magiset minus
ordinem
3 Metaphisice
hunc[hocE] negatAristotiles,
secun, sedsolumessentialem
dumefficientiam.
Ad octavum
dicoquodin eademspecieestaliquidmagisactivum
et aliquidminus
activum.
Namcalorintensior
estmagisactivus
quamcalorremissuntin eademspecie.Ideoillarationonconcludit.
Ad ultimum
dico
sionet tarnen
intendit
minus
calidum
etremittit
ettarnen
sunt
calidum;
quodmagiscalidum
magis
eiusdem
Ideorationon'B 105r]concludit.
speciei.
Et in hiissitfinis
sermonis
nostri
de unitate
Et si in hiis
contrariorum.
specifica
sitVeritas,
utfingo,
omnem
hominem
venientem
Altissimo,
regratietur
qui"illumint
in huncmundum."
Si verononsitVeritas
in predictis,
forte
inveperea aliquando
Si autemaliquidbenedictum
nietur
Veritas.
de omissis
autemindulsit,acceptetur;
Nam"nonsolumhiisdiceregratiam
estquorum
iustum
geatur.
aliquisopinionibus
sed etiamhiisqui adhucsuperficialiter
hii
etenim
communicaverit,
enuntiaverunt;
conferunt
nostrum
sunt,"ut dicit34
Aristotiles,
aliquid;namhabitm
preexercitati
secundo
.
Metaphisice

4. Theposition
Utrum contradictio
of theinserted
question
It is commonlysaid35thatthe questionabout thenatureof contradictory
oppositionas opposed to contraryopposition,whichin all our manuscripts
is foundstraightafterQCFA and immediatelyprecedingCISM, has nothing in common with these two treatises.
In my view, thereare a numberof argumentsto counterthe assumption that Utrum
contradictio
is an isolatedquestion.For one thing,the fact
thatin our manuscripts,
thequestionis continually
Treatise I
putin between
II
and
Treatise
of
the
work
himself
refers
(our QCFA)
(our CISM)
Burley
to as De forrnis
accidentalibus
, can be taken as a hint that,when officially
the
two
the authorregardedit appropriateto add to
treatises,
publishing
not
the
but
insertedquestion Utrum
as well.
contradictio
QCFA
only CISM,
It shouldbe noticedin thisconnectionthatoriginallyCISM had no explicit
link with QCFA either.36
Again, as faras its contentsare concerned,the insertedquestionabout
the truenaturesof contradiction
and contrariety
has doctrinalconnections
withpart of the subject matterof QCFA, as has already been remarked
with respectto its most importantprincipalthesisIV (above, our section 3.4).
Moreover,we know of at least two copyistswho were inclinedto considertheinsertedquestionan integralpartof QCFA.About the fourteenth34Metaph.
II 1,993b11-15.
35E.g.Maier,op.cit.,220;Weisheipl,
Ockham
andSome
Mertonians
, 185,n. 7.
36See Maier, cit.,219.
op.

19:34:29 PM

TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED

175

centurycopy Vat.lat. 817 we have already remarkedupon the copyist's


behaviour on that score.37AnotherVatican manuscript,Vat. ht. 2148
about 1400) is even more explicitin thisrespectand bluntlytakes
(written
forthat
the insertedquestionas the fifthone of QCFA' quite incorrectly,
who
all
for
a
scribe
not
that
and
matter,
easily takes
surprising
perhaps
the libertyof cancellingparts of his textat his own discretion:
Et estquintaquestio
sitmaxima
Contradictio
oppositio.
[.54rb
] QjjestioEst Utrum
Et arguo'itis ourscribe
whois
burleiin suoprimotractatu.
de numero
questionum
scilicet
nonsit
ad partem
] primo
quamcredoforeveram,
quodcontradictio
speaking
...
maxima
oppositio
Nontaliauxiliolyou may say, but one has to agree thatthe copyist'sview
is understandableto some extent.
of the inserted
one has to pay some attentionto the intro
Furthermore,
"Adhuccirca
in
as
is
found
our
older
it
genus oppomanuscripts:
question
utrumcontradictiosit maxima oppositio." This
sitions resttinquirendum
inquirylinksup well with the polemic discussionabout thesisIV.
Finally,it should be remarkedthat the insertedquestionis not a logical one, properlyspeaking.Primarilyit concernsthe oppositionof natural principlesinvolvedin generationand alteration,and runs along the
same lines as in Aristotle'sdiscussionin his Physics?*
All in all, it seems reasonable to take the insertedquestion as an
annexumto QCFA, added by Burleywhen he went on to officially
publish his earliertextsunder the all-coveringtitleDe formisaccidentalibiLs.
Utrum contradictiocriticised
5. The question
by GeraldOdonisO.F.M.
In an extensiveaddendum to his tractDe sillogismis
(whichis the first
in
of
the
definitive
version
of his Logica
, written the early 1330s),the
part
FranciscanGerald Odonis severelycriticisesBurley'stract"Utrum contradictiosit maxima oppositio." In the firstarticle39Gerald introduces
37See oursection
2.3.
38Compare
in Aristotle's
doctheroleofbothcontrary
andcontradictory
opposition
III 5, 205a6-7;
trineofgeneration,
and changein general;
see e.g.Physics
alteration,
V 1, 225a13 and2, 226b2-3.
It is alsosignificant
thatGeraldOdonisopposesBurley's
ofcontradictory
viewofthenature
intheinserted
as expounded
(from
question
opposition
in a tract
which
hetakesextensive
entitled
"Utrum
inter
forthatmatter)
prinquotations,
nature
sitmaxima
cipia
oppositio."
39Theadditional
hisCommentary
onthe
Quaestio
, whichhasbeentakenbyGeraldfrom
stillshowstheusualform
ofsentential
SentenceSy
Bytheway,sincethiscomquestions.
oftheOrder
election
as Minister
General
before
Gerald's
waswritten
mentary
certainly

19:34:29 PM

176

L.M.DE RIJK

Burley's view as "quedam falsa sententia"(cap. 5).40 He considershis


opponent'sviews on thismatterimportantenough to quote Burley'stext
41
extensively
(capp. 5-34), in orderto object to the erroneousopinionwith
utmostaccuracy(capp. 35-90). Burley'sname is nevermentioned,but his
authorshipalso appears fromsome later marginalglosses in the manuscript,in which the glossatorclearlytakes sides withBurleyand charges
Gerald of basic misunderstandings
concerningBurley'sview,42not unexpectedlyindeed.
6. The TextafierMs Bruges 50143
UTRUMCONTRADICHO
SIT MAXIMA
OPPOSITIO
Vdetur
quodsic
1 [B 105r] Adhuc circa genus oppositionisresttinquirendumutrumcontradictiosit maxima oppositio.Et videturquod sic quia: Illud quod est
principiumin aliquo genere,est maximetale, ut patet44per Philosophum,
secundo Metaphisice.
Sed contradictioest prima oppositioin genereoppositionis,ut patet45per Philosophum,decimo Metaphisice.
Igiturcontradictio est maxima oppositio.
2 Item. Philosophus,secundo Pery
armenias
, in fine,dicit46quod affirmatio
et negado suntmaximeoppositaet quod affirmatio
per se opponiturnegationiet quod affirmatio
non opponituraffirmationi
nisiper accidens.Cum
et negatiosintoppositacontradictorie,
ergo affirmatio
sequiturquod contradictoriasunt per se et maxime opposita. Et, per consequens,contradictio est maxima oppositio.
3 Item. Ilia oppositioest maxima oppositioad quam omnis alia oppositio habet reduci. Sed omnis alia oppositioa contradictionehabet reduci
ad contradictionem.
Ergo contradictioest < maxima> oppositio.Maior et
minorhuius rationispatent47ex decimo Metaphisice.
in 1329,Burley's
tract"Utrum
half
contradictio"
mustbe datednotlaterthanthefirst
ofthe1320s.
40See theedition
in note15 above.
announced
41
16-7aremissing
in Gerald's
Burley's
capp.
quotation.
42See e.g.Gerald's
Annexion
I, adcapp.57-8,ed. de Riik.
Logica,
43Ifnecessary,
corrected
withthehelpofthethree
other
2.1-2.4.
Mss;seeoursections
44Metaph.
II 1,993b23-26.
45Metaph.
X 4, 1055b
1-2.
46De interpr.
14,23a27-b27.
47Gf.
X 4, 1055a34-b8.
Metaph.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

ill

In contrarium
arguitur
4 In contrariumarguitursic. Oppositio est quedam distantia,secundum
; ergo ilia que minusdistantminussunt
Philosophum,decimo48Metaphisice
opposita,et que minimedistantminimesunt opposita. Sed contradictoria minimedistant.Ergo contradictoriaminimesunt opposita.
5 Maior patet. Minor declaratursic. Illa minimedistantinterque non
est medium,et que sic se habent quod impossibileest aliquid recedere
ab uno quin statimsit sub reliquo; ut satis patet intelligenti.Sed inter
et quarto
contradictorianon est medium, ut patet49primo Posteriorum
nec
est
recedat
ab
uno
contradictorio;
Metaphisice
possibilequod aliquid
rum quin statimsit sub reliquo; aliteresset mediumintercontradictoria.
Ergo contradictoria[B 105v' minime distant.Et, per consequens, contradictionon est maxima oppositio,sed minima.
6 Item. Illa minus opponunturque minoremrepugnantiamincludunt.
Sed contradictoriaminoremrepugnantiamincluduntquam quecumque
alia opposita.Ego etc.Maior patetde se. Et probo minoremnam: Alia opincluditcontradictionem,
ut de se manifestum
est.
positioa contradictione
Et edam includitoppositionemaliam,scilicetoppositionempropriamquam
addit supra contradictionem.
minoremrepugnantiam
Ergo contradictoria
includuntquam quecumque alia opposita. Et, per consequens, contradictioest minoroppositio.
SOLVITUR
QUESTIO
7 Circa istam questionemsic procedam. Primo probabo quod contradictorianon sunt maxime opposita. Secundo probabo quod contradictoria sunt minime opposita, et quod contradictioest minima oppositio.
Tertio dicam que sunt conditionesoppositionisratione quarum attenditur oppositio.Et quarto solvam rationesin contrarium.
nonsuntmaxime
Quodcontradictoria
opposita
8 Primamconclusionemprobo per sex rationes.Primosic. Si contradictoriamaximeet primorepugnarent,
tuncquanto alicui magisinessetunum
tanto
contradictoriorum,
magis repugnaretalteri, quia quanto aliquid
magis participtnaturamunius oppositorumprimo et principalius,tanto
magis destruitreliquumet, per consequens,tanto magis opponituralteri.
48Metaph.
X 5, 1056a35-bl.
49Anal.Post.I 2, 72al2-13;Metaph.
IV 7, 101lb23-24.

19:34:29 PM

178

L.M.DE RIJK

Si ergo album et non-album,que sunt contradictoria,essent maxime


opposita,tunc quanto aliquid esset magis album, tanto magis opponeretur non-albo. <Igitur magis album magis opponitur non-albo>. Sed
albissimumest maxime album. Ergo albissimummaxime opponeretur
non-albo. Sed albissimumnon opponiturnon-albo contradictorie.Ergo
non-albi.Et, per
aliquid magis opponiturnon-alboquam contradictorium
maxima
non
est
oppositio.
consequens,oppositiocontradictoria
: si simpliciterpredicali
9 Confirmaturhec ratio secundo50 Topicorum
subici,et magispredicali sequitur<ad> magis
sequitur<ad> simpliciter
subici. Et intelligiturhec propositioin predicanone essentiali.Si ergo
album essentialiteret primo opponatur non-albo, sequiturquod magis
album magis opponaturnon-albo. Et sic albissimummaxime opponitur
non-albo. Et tamen non opponiturei contradictorie.
Ergo etc.
10 Et si dicaturquod albissimumopponaturcontradictorie
non-albo,conde eodem. Sed albissimumet nontra: Contradictorianon falsificantur
album falsificantede eodem, quia si Sortes sit albus remisse,tunc hec
est falsa "Sortes est albissimus,"et hec similiter"Sortes est non-albus."
Item. Tantum unum contradicituni. Sed album contradicitnon-albo.
non-albo.Consequentiapatet,quia album
Ergo albissimumnon contradicit
et albissimumnon sunt omnino idem, quoniam si sic, omne album esset
albissimum;quod falsumest.
11 Confirmaturhec ratio sic. In omni genere oppositionisest sic quod
quanto unum oppositorumest magis intensumet sub perfectiori
gradu,
tantomagis opponiturreliquo. Huius ratio est quia quanto unum oppositorum [B 106r] est intensius,tanto magis potest destruerereliquum,et
quanto magis potestdestruere,tanto magis opponitur.Exemplumest de
albo et nigro,calido et frigido,nam quanto aliquid est intensius< album,
> calidum,tantomagis
tantomagisopponiturnigro,et quanto est intensius
Si
album
et
non-album
sunt
opponiturfrigido. ergo
oppositaprimo,tunc
Cum ergo
album
est
tanto
non-albo.
intensius,
quanto
magis opponitur
sit
albissimum
maxime
albissimum
album intensissime,sequitur quod
opponiturnon-albo.
12 Et quamvis fortedici poteritquod albissimumnon magis opponitur
non-albo quam album, tamen necesse est dicere quod albissimumtantum opponiturnon-albo quantum album non-albo opponitur,cum albissimum maxime includat naturam albi. Sed albissimumnon opponitur
non-albo contradictorie,
ut probatum est. Ergo aliquid aliud a contradictorionon-albi opponiturnon-albo tantumquantum album opponitur
50Topica
II 11,115b4-7.

19:34:29 PM

TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
SO-GALLED
BURLEY'S

179

non-albo.Ergo oppositiocontradictorianon est maxima oppositio.


13 Ad istamrationemdicuntaliqui fatuiquod album et non-albumnon
Et non habet
Contra: Album habet contradictorium.
suntcontradictoria.
aliud contradictorium
quam non-album.Quod autem album habeat contradictoriumpatet quia: Album habet contrarium.Et omnis oppositio
includitcontradictionem.
Ergo si album habet contrarium,sequiturquod
album habet contradictorium.
14 Item. Philosophus,quintoPhisicorum
, dicit51quod generatioest ex conut ab albo in non-album.Et quarto Metatradictorio
in contradictorium,
phisicedicit52Philosophusquod intercontradictorianon est medium,et
exemplificatde bono <et> non-bono,vero <et> non-vero.Ergo talia
incomplexacontradicunt.
alterumcon15 Item. Aristotilesvult quod de quolibet vere affirmatur
non
medium
contradictoria
est
et
inter
tradictoriorum, quod
per abneSed
illud
non
ut patet53quarto Metaphisice.
potest
gationemextremorum,
complexis,quia certumest quod intercontraintelligide contradictoriis
dictoriacomplexaest mediumper abnegationemutriusque,nam lapis est
mediumper abnegationeminteristas"omnishomo currit,""quidam homo
non currit,"quia neutra harum predicaturde lapide. Et sic intercontradictoriacomplexa est medium. Similiterneutrumcontradictoriorum
complexorumpredicaturde quolibet.Ergo relinquiturquod interincomplexa sit contradictio;aliternon possentverificaliea que dicunturcomscilicetquod intercontradictorianon est dare
muniterde contradictione,
medium,et quod de quolibet vere dicituralterumcontradictoriorum.
16 Sed54fortediceretaliquis quod illa ratio probat ' 106v] quod albissimum contradicitnon-albo, quia si album contradicitnon-albo, magis
album contradicitmagis non-albo et maxime album maxime contradicit
non-albo,et ita albissimumcontradicitnon-albo.
17 Et dicendumquod non oportetquod, si album contradicitnon-albo,
quod propterhoc magis album magis contradicitnon-albo, quia contradicerenon suscipitmagiset minus,nam omnia contradictoria
equaliter
contradicunt.Sed oppositiosuscipitmagis et minus; quedam enim sunt
magis opposita,quedam sunt minusopposita.Nona autem illa regula "si
a non]B modocett.
51Physica
V 1,225bl.
52Cf.Metaph.
IV 7, 1011023-35.
53Cf.Metaph.
IV 7, 101123-31.
54Capp.16-7desunt
Odonis.
a textu
citatoa Geraldo

19:34:29 PM

180

L.M.DE RIJK

et magis magis etc


." intelligitur
in illis in
simplicitersequitursimpliciter,
terminus
et
in
et
quibus uterque
suscipitmagis minus,
predicationeessentiali seu necessaria.Et sic non est in proposito.Ideo etc.
18 Secundoprobo primamconclusionem,scilicetquod contradictoria
non
suntmaximeopposita,et hoc sic. Ista consequentiaest bona "omnishomo
currit;ergo quidam homo currit."Sed impossibileest quod aliquid plus
repugnetconsequentiquam antecedenti.Sed ista "nullus homo currit"
contradicithuic "quidam homo currit."Ergo cum non plus repugnetconsequentiquam antecedenti,oportetquod tantaoppositionerepugnethuic
"omnis homo currit"quanta rpugnt<huic> "quidam homo currit."
Sed ista "nullushomo currit"rpugnthuic "quidam homo currit"contradictorieet huic "omnisbhomo currit"contrarie.Ergo oppositiocontradictorianon est maior quam oppositiocontraria.
19 Huic fortediceturquod ista "nullushomo currit"plus rpugnthuic
"quidam homo currit"quam huic "omnishomo currit";et diciturquod possibilevel necesseest aliquid plus repugnareconsequentiquam antecedenti.
Contra: Si aliquid plus rpugntconsequentiquam antecedenti,tuncconsequens plus rpugntalicui quam antecedens.Sed hoc est impossibile.
20 Probatioquia: Si consequens<plus repugnareiquam antecedens,tunc
consequensplus destrueret
quam antecedens.Hoc est impossibile.Probado
>
Si
quia:
consequens plus destruitquam antecedens,ergo consequens
destruitaliquid quod non destruitantecedens;sit ergo a illud quod consequens destruitet antecedensnon. Si ergo consequens destruita, tunc
consequensinfertoppositumipsiusa ; et sit illud b. Et antecedens,per te,
non destruita. Ergo antecedens non infertoppositum ipsius a . Ergo
antecedensnon infertb. Et consequensinfertb. Ergo, si consequensalicui
plus rpugntquam antecedens,sequereturquod aliquid sequereturad
consequens quod non ad antecedens.Sed hoc est impossibile,quia per
Priorm
, hec regulaest necessaria"quidquid sequitur
Philosophum,primo55
ad consequens,sequiturad antecedens."
21 Item. Si aliquid plus rpugntconsequentiquam antecedenti,tunc in
aliquo rpugntconsequentiin quo non rpugnt[B 107r' antecedenti.
In ilio ergo in quo rpugntconsequentiet non antecedenti,stat cum
antecedente.Sed quidquid stat cum antecedente,stat cum consequente.
Ergo in ilio in quo rpugntconsequenti,statcum consequente.Ergo per
b

B1nullus
B
omnis]

55Cf.Anal.Pr.I 28,
43b40sqq.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

181

idem <idem> eidem repugnaretet non repugnarei;quod est impossibile.


22 Hoc potestargui sub hac forma.Si aliquid plus rpugntconsequenti
quam antecedenti,tuncin aliquo rpugntconsequentiin quo non rpugnt antecedenti;sit illud a. Si tunc aliquid per a rpugntconsequentiet
non antecedenti,
tunca rpugntconsequentiet non rpugntantecedenti;
antecedente.
Sed quidquid stat cum antecedente,stat cum
stat
cum
ergo
consequente.Ergo a stat cum consequente et a rpugntconsequenti.
> et non repugnaretet staretcum
Ergo idem repugnaret< consequenti
est
impossibile.Ergo et illudex quo sequiturest imposconsequente,quod
scilicet
sibile,
quod aliquid plus repugnetconsequentiquam antecedenti.
23 Istis rationibus<positis>, fortedicetur quod aliquid plus rpugnt
consequentiquam antecedentiet, per consequens,plus rpugntalicui
quam antecedensrpugnteidem,tarnenconsequensnon rpugntalicui
cui non rpugntantecedens,eidem tarnenrpugnt consequens plus
quam antecedens; nec destruitconsequens aliquid quod non destruit
antecedens,tarnenconsequens destruitaliquid plus quam antecedens
destruitillud.
24 Contra: Si consequens plus rpugntalicui quam antecedens,ergo
magis impossibileest consequensesse verum cum ilio quam antecedens.
Sed ad antecedensesse verumcum aliquo sequiturconsequensesse verum
cum ilio. Ergo ex minusimpossibilisequereturmagis impossibile,et hoc
Sed hoc est impossibile,quia minusimpossibileresper se et formaliter.
pectu magis impossibilishabet rationempossibilis.Sed ex possibilinumet per se. <Ergo ex minusimpossibili
quam sequiturimpossibileformaliter
et per se>.
numquam sequiturmagis impossibileformaliter
25 Item. Si consequensmagisrpugntalicui quam antecedens,ergo conincluditrespectualicuiusquam antecedens.
sequensmaioremrepugnantiam
Ergo consequensaliquid includitquod non includitantecedens.Sed quidquid includitur,ponitur.Ergo consequens aliquid ponit quod non ponit
antecedens.Et sie aliquid sequereturad consequens quod non sequeretur ad antecedens.Sed hoc est impossibile.Ergo impossibileest quod
consequensplus repugnetalicui quam antecedens.
26 Tertioprobo conclusionemprimam sic. Ex minori oppositionenon
ex tertioTopkorum'
infertur
maior,quia minusnon includitmaius,ut patet56
et patet edam universaliteromnibus: minus calidum non includitcaliut
dum. Sed oppositiocontrariaincluditoppositionemcontradictoriam,
manifestepatet. Ergo oppositiocontrarianon est minorquam oppositio
56Cf.Topica
III 3, 118bl0-19.

19:34:29 PM

182

L.M. DE RIJK

contradictoria. Et, per consequens, oppositio contradictorianon est


maxima.
21 Quartoprobo idem sic. Illud quod est peius, magis opponiturbono, et
econverso:illudquod magisopponiturbono, est peius,ut patet57ex octavo
.c Et patet per rationemquoniam: Quod magis destruitbonum,
Topicorum
illud est peius, et econverso:illud quod est peius, magis destruitbonum.
Sed contrariumboni est peius quam contradictorium
boni. Ergo contrariumboni magis opponiturbono quam contradictorium
boni [B 107v]
sibi opponitur.Et, per consequens,oppositiocontradictoria
non est oppositio maxima.
28 Probado minorisnam: Inducendo in omnibusbonis, sempercontrarium boni <est peius quam contradictorium
boni, quia contrariumboni>
est actualitermalum et contradictorium
boni est indifferens
ad bonum et
ad malum. Ut patet inductive:Contrariumtemperantie,scilicetintemperantia,est actu malum, et contradictorium
temperantie,scilicetnonad bonum et malum, nam non-temperantia
temperantia,est indifferens
diciturde iustitiaet de iniustitia,de fortitudine
et de timiditate.
Et eodem
modo est in omnibus aliis, scilicetquod contrariumboni actu includit
boni non includitactu malitiamsed est
malitiam,sed contradictorium
indifferens
ad bonum et ad malum.
29 Et confirmatur
hec ratio nam: Per Philosophum,58
nono Metaphisice
:
in malis actus est peior quam potentia;in bonis econverso.Sed contrarium boni est actu malum, sed contradictorium
boni est potentiamalum,
ad bonum et ad malum,et id quod est indifferens
ad
quia est indifferens
in
est
ad
illa.
aliqua,
potentia
30 Quintoarguo ad eandem conclusionemsic. Necessariumet impossibile
plus repugnantquam possibileet impossibile.Et tamenpossibileet impossibile repugnantcontradictorie.Ergo contradictorianon maxime opponuntur.
31 Probatio antecedentis,scilicetquod necessariumet impossibileplus
repugnantquam possibileet impossibile,nam: Possibileest mediuminter
necessariumet impossibile,quia possibileest quod potestesse et non esse,
et possibileesse et non esse est mediuminternecessariumet impossibile,
quia in hoc quod potest esse convenitcum necessarioet in hoc quod
potest non esse convenitcum impossibili.Sed extremaplus repugnant
c

ethicorum
B
topicorum]

Topica
Vili 2, 157b17-18.
58
IX 9, 105lai 5-16.
Metaph.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

183

quam mediumet extremum.Ergo necessariumet impossibileplus repugnantd quam possibileet impossibile.


32 Et confirmatur
hec ratio sic. Si possibilemaxime repugnaretimpossibili,tunc illud quod est maxime possibile,maxime repugnaretimpossiest maximepossibile.Ergo < maxime>
bili. Sed contingensad utrumlibet
Sed
hoc
est
falsum,cum contingensad utrumlirepugnaretimpossibili.
bet sit mediuminternecessariumet impossibile.
33 Sextoprobatureadem conclusio sic. Illa que possunt esse simul in
eodem, minus opponunturquam illa que non possunt <esse> simul in
eodem. Sed contrariain summo numquam possuntsimulesse in eodem,
et contradictoria
possuntsimulesse in eodem. Ergo etc.Maior de se patet.
Et minoremprobo; una enim pars minorisest de se manifesta,scilicet
quod contrariain summo non possuntsimul esse in eodem.
34 Et probo aliam partemsic. In lacte simulsuntalbedo et non-albedoque sunt contradictoria , nam in lacte simulsunt albedo et dulcedo, et
dulcedo est non-albedo.Et confirmatur
quia: in quocumque est inferius,
in eodem est suum superius;sed dulcedo est inferiusad non-albedinem;
ergo cum in lacte simul sint albedo et dulcedo, sequiturquod in lacte
sunt simulalbedo et non-albedo.
35 Et si dicaturquod non-albedo non est [B 108r] per se superiusad
dulcedinem,contra: Aliquid est per se superius ad dulcedinem. Tunc
arguitursub hac forma:Aliquid est per se superiusad dulcedinem.Aut
ergo est albedo, aut non-albedo.Sed non est dicere quod sit albedo. Ergo
est non-albedo.
estminimaoppositio
Quodcontradicho
36 Secundam conclusionemprinciplemprobo quadrupliciter.Primosic.
Illa oppositioeest minimaque minimamdiversitatem
requirit.Sed huiusmodi est oppositio6contradictoria.Ergo etc.Maior patet, quia ubi est
minor diversitas,ibi est minor oppositio,eoquod oppositio est quedam
ut patet59ex quarto Metaphisice.
Et minorpatet, quia
species diversitatis,
sufficit
ad
nam
contradictionem,
quelibetdiversitas,quamcumque parva,
modicum
sit
includit
condiversum,
quodlibet diversum,quamcumque
tradictorium
illiusa quof est diversum.
d

exrepugnantie
B e oppositio]
B fquo]quibusB
repugnant]
propositio

59Metaph.
IV 2, 1004a20-22.

19:34:29 PM

184

L.M.DE RIJK

37 Secundoprobaturidem sic. Oppositio est quedam distantaformalis,ut


: "Ubicumque est minor
et decimo Metaphisice
patet60ex quarto Metaphisice
distantia,ibi et minor oppositio."Sed intercontradictoriaest minordistantia. Ergo et minoroppositio.
38 Probatiominoris.Ilia que suntimmediatasic quod nullumest medium
interea, nec per abnegationemnec secundumformam,sed sic se habent
quod non potestaliquid deserereunum nisi sit sub reliquo, illa minime
sunthuiusmodi,quia
distant,ymo omninonon distant.Sed contradictoria
suntimmediata,et non potestaliquid recedereab uno concontradictoria
nisi statmsit sub reliquo. <Nec est sic de aliis oppositradictoriorum
tis>, unde inter omnia <alia> opposita est aliquo modo medium,vel
secundumformamvel per abnegationemutriusqueextremi,sed intercontradictorianullo modo est medium.
39 Tertioprobatureadem conclusiosic. Quelibet oppositioalia ab oppositione contradictoriaincluditgoppositionem contradictoriam,et non
econverso.Ex hoc arguitursic. Illa magisopponunturque maioremoppositionemincludunt.Sed quelibet oppositioalia ab oppositionecontradictoria maioremoppositionemincluditquam oppositiocontradictoria.
Ergo
etc
. Maior patet de se. Minor patet quia: Quelibet alia oppositioab oppoEt preterhoc
sitionecontradictoria
includitoppositionemcontradictoriam.
includitoppositionempropriigeneris.Ergo etc.
40 Et si dicaturquod alie species oppositionisnon includuntformaliter
contra:Formaliter
sequitur"Sortesestalbus;
oppositionemcontradictoriam,
ergo Sortesnon est niger,"quia oppositumconsequentisformaliter
rpugnt antecedenti.Sed album et nigrumsunt contraria,et nigrumet nonnigrumsunt contradictoria.Ex contrarioergo nigri sequiturformaliter
contradictorium
nigri;et eodem modo est de aliis oppositis.
41 Quartoprobaturidem sic. Illa minimeopponunturque minimese interimuntet maxime interomnia opposita se compatiuntur.Sed contradictoria sunt huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior est de se manifesta.Et probo
minorem nam: Non-calidum in eo quod non-calidumminus interimit
vel quodcumque
calidumet magispermittit
secum calidumquam frigidum
aliud oppositumcalido permittatsecum calidum. Probo nam: Tepidum
minus ' 108v] interimitcalidum quam frigiduminterimitcalidum, et
calidum.
magis permittitsecum calidum quam frigidumsecum permittit
Et tepidumest non-calidum.Ergo etc.
g includit]
nondicitB
60Metaph.,
cf.X 5, 1056a35-b2.
ibid.;

19:34:29 PM

SO-GALLED
TRA
BURLEY'S
CTATUSPRIMUS

185

42 Dico igiturquod contradictioest minima oppositio,quia ad contradictionemsufficit


minor diversitas;et etiam quia quelibet alia oppositio
includitcontradictionem
et etiam oppositionemsuperadditam,
formaliter
et ideo quelibet alia oppositiose habet per appositionemrespectuconet aliam oppositionem,et hoc
tradictionis,
quia includitcontradictionem
actualiter.
Que suntconditiones
oppositionis
43 Circa tertiumprincipaledico quod opposita quedam sunt complexa,
quedam incomplexa,ut patetin contrariiset in contradictoriis.
Loquendo
de oppositis complexis,sic. Conditio oppositorumest non posse esse
<simul> vera, ymo si unum est verum,necessarioreliquumest falsum.
Unde ad scienduman aliqua complexa sintopposita,considerandumest
si illa complexa possintaliquando simul esse vera. Et si sic, non sunt
opposita; si <vero> non possunt < simul> esse vera ita quod eo ipso
quod <propositio> una est vera reliqua est falsa, tunc sunt opposita. Si
vero loquamurde oppositisincomplexis,sic eorum conditioest non posse
vere affirmari
simul de eodem numero.
sit maximaoppositio
Quodcontradictio
44 Circa quartum principalearguo contra istam opinionem. Et probo
sint maxime opposita et quod contradictiosit maxquod contradictoria
ima oppositio.Et hoc probo per undecim rationes.Primosic. Illa oppositioest maxima ad quam omnis alia oppositioreducitur.Sed omnis alia
oppositio reduciturad oppositionemcontradictoriam.Ergo etc. Maior
, nam in unoquoque genereillud est primum
patet61ex decimoMetaphisice
et magistale ad quod reducunturomnia alia. Et minorpatet,quia omnis
et> reduciturad ipsam,hut patet62
oppositio< includitcontradictionem
ex eodem decimo Metaphisice.
45 Item.Illa maximesuntoppositaque esse simulvera maximeest impossibile. Sed maxime impossibileest contradictoriaesse simul vera. Ergo
etc.Probatio minorisnam: Si aliquis concdt contradictoriaesse simul
vera, ipse ad maximumimpossibileductusest nec potestduci ad maius.
h

B
ipsam]contradictionem

61Metaph.
X 4, 1055b26-29.
62Metaph.
X 4, 1055a34-b8.

19:34:29 PM

186

L.M.DE RIJK

hec ratio.Maxime necessarioopponiturmaximumimposEt confirmatur


sibile.Sed primmprincipiumest maximenecessarium.Ergo suumoppositum est maximumimpossibile.Sed oppositumprimiprincipiiest contradictoriaesse simul vera. Ergo etc.
46 Tertioarguitursic. Illa que magis conveniunt,minusopponuntur.Sed
contrariamagisconveniuntquam contradictoria.
Ergo etc.Probatiominoris
nam: Contraria1possunt simul esse falsa. Sed contradictorianumquam
possuntsimul esse falsa nec simul vera. Ergo etc.
47 Quartosic. Ens et non-ens magis opponunturquam ens et ens. Sed
est ens et alterumnon-ens.Sed utrumsemperalterumcontradictoriorum*
est ens. Ergo contradictoriamagis opponunturquam
que contrariorumj
contraria.
48 Quintosic. In omni genere est dare unum primmad quod omnia
illiusgenerisreducuntur*
ut patet63ex decimo Metaphisice.
Ergo in genere
oppositionisest dare unum primm.Sed primaoppositioin genereoppositionisnon est oppositiocontraria,nec relativa,nec privativa,quia ad
nullam illarumreducunturomnes alie oppositiones,ut patet. Ergo prima
oppositiovel maxima 'B 109r] est oppositiocontradictoria.
49 Sextosic. Illa que maxime distantsunt maxime opposita. Sed contradictoriamaxime distant.Ergo etc.Maior patet,quia exquo oppositioest
distantia,sequiturquod ilia que maxime distant,maxime sunt opposita.
Et minorpatet, quia interens et non-ensest distantiainfinita.
50 Quod probaturdupliciter.Primo quia illa distantiaest infinitasupra
Sed supra distantiamque est inter
quam non potestnisi agens infinitum.
ens et non-ens,non potestnisi agens infinitum,
nam nullumagens creatum potest de omnino non-enteproducereens, quia hoc est creare, et
nullumagens creatumpotestcreare. Secundo probaturidem sic. Illa distantia est infinitaque est maior quacumquekdistantiafinita.Sed distantia que est interens et non-ens,est maior quacumque distantiafinita.
Probo. Quecumque distantiafinitadetur,ilia potestesse interentia; <non
enim est aliqua distantiafinitaquin tanta possitesse interentia>. Cum
ergo maior sit distantiainterens et non-ensquam interentia quecumque,
sequiturquod distantiainter ens et non-ensest maior quacumque distantiafinita.

1
B kquacumque]
B Jcontrariorum]
contradictoria
contradictoriorum
contraria]
quamB
cumque
63Metaph.
X 4, 1055b26-29.

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS

187

51 Septimo
arguitursic. Ilia magis opponunturque opponunturper se et
formaliter
quam illa que opponunturper accidens et materialiter.Sed
contradictoriaopponunturper se et formaliter.Et contrarianon opponunturnisi per accidens et materialiter.
Ergo etc. Maior patet. Et probo
minoremnam: Contradictoriain eo quod talia opponunturet non ratione
aliquorumaliorumoppositorum.Nam non-albumin eo quod non-album
et per se opponituralbo, quia destruitillud idem1quod album
formaliter
sed
nigrumnon opponituralbo nisi quia nigrumincluditnonponit,
album. Et ita contrariumper accidens opponitur suo contrario,quia
rationealterius,et contradictorium
opponitursuo conper se et formaliter
tradictorio.
in fine:hec est
52 Confirmatur
per Philosophum,secundo64Peryarmenias
est
vel
"bonum
"album
est
falsa
accidens
malum,"
quia non
nigrum"
per
non
bonum."
est
infert
istam
"bonum
nisi
est falsa
Ergo non esse
quia
bonum magis opponiturbono quam esse malum sibi opponitur.
53 Octavoarguitursic. Ilia oppositioin virtutecuius quecumque opposita
opponuntur,est maxima oppositio,quia "Unumquodque propterquid
etc" Sed in virtutecontradictionis
quecumque oppositaopponuntur.Ergo
etc.Probatiominorisnam: Contrarianon opponunturnisi quia includunt
non enim album opponiturnigronisi quia "album" inclucontradictoria;
dit "non-nigrum."
54 Nonoarguitursic. Illa maxime opponunturque se totis et totaliter
opponuntur.Contradictoriasunt huiusmodi,et non contraria,nec relativa. Ergo etc.
55 Decimoarguitursic. Illa suntmaximeoppositasupra que fundaturprimm et verissimum
principium.Contradictoriasunthuiusmodi,ut patet65
Ergo etc.
[B 109v] ex quarto Metaphisice.
56 Undcimo
arguitursic. Illa que in nullo conveniuntsuntmagis opposita
quam illa que conveniuntin aliquo. Sed contradictoriain nullo conveniunt,et alia"1opposita, ut contrariaet relativa,conveniuntin aliquo.
Ergo etc.

m
alia]aliquaB
illud]id B

64De interpr.
14,23bl5-27.
65Metaph.
IV 7, 101Ib23-1012a29.

19:34:29 PM

188

L.M.DE RIJK
In opposition
arguitur

57 Ad primamistarumrationumdico quod primumad quod aliqua reducunturest duplex,scilicetvel primumvia compositions,vel primumvia
resolutionis.Illud quod est primumvia compositionis,est simpliciuset
minus tale, sed illud quod est primumvia resolutionis,est magis compositum,quia resolutioincipit a composito et terminaturad Simplicia,
compositiovero econverso incipita simplicibuset terminaturad compositum.Et ita via compositionis<est> a minoriet simplicioriad maius
et compositius,et via resolutionisest a maiori et compositioriad minus
et simplicius.
58 Dico igiturquod via compositionisoppositiocontradictoria
est prima,
sed via resolutionisest postrema,et ideo est minima. Cum ergo dicitur
quod ilia oppositioest maxima ad quam omnis alia oppositioreducitur,
< concedo quod oppositiocontradictoria
est maximain eo quod ad ipsam
omnis alia oppositioreducitur
via
>,
compositionistamquam ad ultimam,
ilia
includit
omnes
alias
quia
oppositiones,si aliqua talisoppositiosit. Sed
huiusmodinon est oppositiocontradictoria.
59 Et si dicaturquod ad istam oppositionemreducituromnis alia oppositio et <quod> oppositiocontradictoriaest prima, dico quod est prima
via compositionis.Sed ad id quod est primumvia compositionis,non
reducituromnis alia oppositiotamquam ad oppositionemmaximam,sed
tamquam ad oppositionemsimplicissimam.Et ideo non oportet quod
oppositiocontradictoriasit maxima.
60 Unde uno modo concedo maiorem,scilicetquod id ad quod omnis
alia oppositio reducitur,est maxima oppositio;verum est, si reducatur
tamquam ad primumvia resolutioniset ultimumvia compositionis.Et
cum diciturquod omnis oppositioreduciturad contradictionem,
verum
est tamquam ad primumvia compositioniset tamquam ad ultimumvia
resolutionis.Et ideo non sequiturconclusio.
61 Ad secundum
esse simulvera non
argumentumdico quod contradictoria
est maximuminconveniens,sed magis impossibileest contrariaesse simul
vera. Dico tarnenquod contradictoria
esse simulvera est evidentiusimpossibilequam contrariaesse simulvera. Et ideo dico quod cum aliquis concesseritcontradictoria
esse simulvera,non potestduci ad evidentiusimposnisi
forte
ad
sibile,
negationemeiusdem de se.
62 Et ad confirmationem,
cum diciturquod contradictoria
esse simulvera
est oppositumprimiprincipii,dico quod non quecumque contradictoria
esse simulvera est oppositumprimiprincipii,sed contradictoria
que fiunt
in terminis
communissimis
et notissimis
esse simul[5 110r' vera est oppositum primiprincipii.Et est maximumimpossibile.Sed hoc non est solum

19:34:29 PM

SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
BURLEY'S

189

virtuteoppositioniscontradictorie,sed magis virtuteterminorumcomet notissimorum.


munissimorum
63 Vel possetdici ad formamargument!Cum diciturquod primumprincipiumest maximenecessarium,et suum oppositumest maximumimpossibile,potestdici quod primumprincipiumnon est maxime necessarium,
sed evidentissimum
necessarium,unde primumprincipiumcomplexum
maxime habet ista duo simul, scilicetevidentiamet necessitatem;non
tarnenhabet maxime ista duo divisim.
64 Vel possetdici quod primumprincipiumnon est magis istud- scilicet
non suntsimulvera- quam illud quod contrarianon
quod contradictoria
simul in eodem, quoniam utrumqueponit66Commentator
congregantur
.
esse primumprincipium,quarto Metaphisice
contraria
dico
non magisconveniuntcon65 Ad tertium
argumentum
quod
venientiaopposita oppositioniquam contradictoria.Et cum diciturquod
contrariapossuntsimul esse falsa, dico quod convenirein falsitatenon
rpugntoppositioni,nam non est de rationeoppositorumnon posse esse
simul falsa,sed de ratione oppositorumest non posse" esse simul vera.
Nam sicutcontrariain multisconveniuntin quibus non conveniuntcontradictoria,<ita contradictoriaconveniuntin multisin quibus non con>. Contradictoriaenim conveniuntin hoc quod utraque
veniuntcontraria
propositiopotestesse singularis,ut dicendo "Sortes currit""Sortes non
esse propositiosingularis.
currit."Sed non potestutrumquecontrariorum
Similiter
inquantumhuiusmodi,est extremum
utrumquecontradictoriorum,
sed non potest0utrumquecontrariorum,
contradictionis,
inquantumest
huiusmodi,<esse> extremumcontradictionis.
66 Ad formamergo argumentidico quod ilia que magisconveniuntconvenientiaopposita oppositioni,minus sunt opposita, sed contrarianon
sunthuiusmodi,quia ista convenientia,scilicetin falsitate,non opponitur
oppositioni,quia non est de rationeoppositorumquod non possuntesse
simulfalsa,sed solum quod non possuntsimul esse vera.
67 Ad quartum
, cum diciturquod ens et non-ensmagis opponunturquam
ens et ens, sed alterumcontradictoriorum
semperest ens et alterumnonens, dico maior huius rationisest falsa,et minor etiam. Fit enim maior
falsa, quoniam supponendo quod albedo et nigredo existantin rerum
natura,et quod nulluscolor mdiusexisttin rerumnatura,adhuc albedo
n

0
sednonB
potest
posse]Bcom.B sednonpotest]

66Averroes,
InIV Arist.
Metaph.

19:34:29 PM

190

L.M.DE RIJK

et nigredosunt magis opposita quam albedo et color medius,unde exisnichilfaciuntad oppositionem.


tentiavel non-existentia
68 Sed est etiam minorfalsa,quia utrumquecontradictoriorum
est ens,
scilicet"omnis homo currit,""quidam homo non curit,"quia utrumque
istorumest propositioet, per consequens,utrumqueistorumest ens. Idem
patet in incomplexis,nam album est ens et similiternon-albumest ens.
Quod patet, quia nigrumest ens, et nigrumet non-albumidem sunt.
Ergo etc.
69 Confirmatur,
quia: Superius est [B llOv] ens quandocumque aliquid
eo inferiusest ens. Sed aliquid inferiusad non-album est ens, scilicet
nigrumet fuscum.Ideo etc.
70 Et si dicaturquod nigrumnon est per se inferiusad non-album,contra: Per se superiusad nigrumest aliquid. Aut ergo est album, aut nonalbum. Sed non est dicere quod per se superiusad nigrumest album.
Ideo relinquiturquod per se superiusad nigrumest non-album.Et tunc
arguo ad hoc quod <si> superiussit ens per se, et inferiussit ens. Cum
ergo nigrumsitens, sequiturquod non-albumsitens. Ad illudigiturquod
communiterdiciturquod alterumcontradictoriorum
est ens et alterum
non-ens,dico quod per "ens" et "non-ens"debetintelligiidem affirmatum
et negatum. Unde alterumcontradictoriorum
est aliquid affirmatum
et
est
illud
idem
reliquum
negatum.
71 Ad quintum
argumentumdico quod in genere oppositionisest dare
unum primmvia compositionisad quod cetera omnia reducuntur.Et
illud est contradictio.Sed id quod est primumvia compositionis,
non est
maximum,sed minimum,ut dictum est superius.Et si querereturque
oppositioest maxima in genere oppositionis,credo quod oppositiocontraria,quia ilia includitoppositionemcontradictoriamet privativamet
aliquid superaddit.Ideo manifestumest quod oppositio contrariamaior
est quam oppositiocontradictoria.
72 Et est etiam maior quam oppositiorelativa,quia oppositiocontraria
est oppositioabsoluta,et oppositiorelativanon. Similiter:Opposita contrariedestruuntse, ita quod unum agit in reliquum,ipsum corrumpendo,
sed sic non est de oppositisrelative.Et cum diciturquod oppositiorelativa non reduciturad oppositionemcontrariam,dico quod oppositiorelativa reduciturad oppositionemcontrariamsicut species contentesub
eodem genere reducunturad primamspeciemgeneris.
73 Ad sextum
argumentumdico quod contradictorianon magis distant,
minime
distant.
Et cum diciturquod interens et non-ensest maxymo
ima distantia,dico quod non est verum; ymo duo entia possunt plus
distareet plus repugnarequam ens et non-ens,ut probatumest supra.
Similiterin alio deficitargumentum:quando diciturquod unum contra-

19:34:29 PM

BURLEY'S
TRACTATUS
SO-GALLED
PRIMUS

191

dictoriorum
semperest ens et reliquumnon-ens,dico quod non est verum,
ut patet ex dictis.Quamvis enim <hec> duo, ens et non-ens,contradicant et ita se habent quod alterumest ens et alterumnon-ens,tarnen
se habent sic quod alterumest ens et alterum
non omnia contradictoria
non-ens.
74 Ad septimum
dico quod non sola contradictoriaopponunturper se et
sed etiam contraria.Et quando dicitur"nigrumnon opponiformaliter,
tur albo nisi quia includitnon-album,"dico quod hoc non est verum,
quia si nigrumnon opponereturalbo nisi rationenon-albiinclusi,sequeretur quod nigrumnon opponereturalbo nisi contradictorie,
quod falsum
nec essent
includit
est. Dico ergo quod omnis oppositio
contradictionem,
includerent;tamen non tota causa
aliqua opposita nisi contradictionem
in
oppositionis quibuscumqueoppositisest contradictioinclusa in eis.
75 Ad octavum
, cum diciturquod omnia oppositaopponunturvirtutecondico quod verum est, sed non precise,ut dictumest; ymo
tradictionis,
non oportetquod contradictoriamaxime opponantur.
dico quod contradictorianon se totisopponuntur,
76 [B lllr] Ad nonum
in
communicant
terminis,sicut contrarianec opponunturtotaliter,
quia
quia solumincluduntunumgenusoppositionis.Sed alia oppositaincludunt
et etiamoppodiversageneraoppositionis,
quia includuntcontradictionem
sitionempropriigeneris.Et ita non opponunturtotaliter,sed partialiter.
77 Ad decimum
, quando diciturquod ilia suntmaxime oppositasuper que
fundaturprimumet verissimumprincipium,dico quod non est verum,
ymo primumet verissimumprincipiumfundatursuper ilia interque non
estmediumper abnegationem.Et talia suntimmediataet,per consequens,
minimedistantia;et ita sunt minimeopposita,.Dico ergo quod ilia sunt
minimeopposita super que fundaturprimumet verissimumprincipium.
nichil est commune,
78 Ad ultimum
, quando diciturquod contradictoriis
scilicetpropoest
dico quod contradictoriis
commune,
complexis aliquid
p
Similiter
dico
et
huiusmodi.
esse
siti, oratio,
quod non habere
oppositum,
quia "ens" et "unum"
aliquid communenon arguitaliquam oppositionem,
nullumcommunehabent,et tamen non opponuntur.Unde habere commune <in quo conveniantet non habere commune> est omninoimpertinens ad oppositionem.Et ideo ista est falsa,scilicetquod ilia que in nullo
conveniunt,sunt magis opposita quam illa que in aliquo conveniunt.
Hec de questionesufficiant.
Papenweg 17
NL-6261 NE Mheer
p oratio]
omnino
B

19:34:29 PM

to Burkyand to theEarly Ockham}


MentalSentences
According
ELIZABETHKARGER

The intellectual
betweenWalterBurleyand WilliamOckham
relationship
was a remarkableone. Though Ockham relentlessly
criticizedthosewho,
such as Burley,admittedof commonnatures,he was nevertheless,
in matters of logic,2heavilyindebted to the same Burley,whose early works
years.Burley,on the otherhand,though
precededhis own by some fifteen
he, of course,regardedOckham's rejectionof commonnaturesas a major
mistake,neverthelessincorporatedin his later workssome of Ockham's
own views and analyses.3As a way of gaininga betterunderstanding
of
both authors,it may,then,prove usefulto comparetheirthinking,
at least
on some points of doctrine.I propose we do so on a subject to which
that of mentalsentences.4
both authorsmade an importantcontribution,
1 The
hasgrown
outofa paperreadata workshop
present
writing
organized
byCalvin
Normore
on thethought
ofWalter
heldat OhioStateUniversity
in May1995.
Burley,
I benefited
from
thecomments
oftheparticipants
andfrom
noteswithIvan
comparing
^Boh.I havea veryspecialdebttowards
of
version
RegaWoodwhohasreadan earlier
thispaperandgenerously
numerous
anddetailed
memake
provided
suggestions,
helping
thefinalversion
clearer
thanitotherwise
wouldhavebeen.I amalsograteful
to Claude
Panaccioforveryhelpful
comments.
2 Thanks
toS. Brown,
theeditor
ofBurley's
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
(seeBrown
1972)
andtotheauthors
oftheintroduction
toOckham's
Summa
(seeGi& Brown
logicae
1974),
weknow
thatOckham
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
thechapter
copiedfrom
practically
Burley's
in theSumma
ofrelative
andthathe
which,
, dealswiththesupposition
logicae
pronouns
washeavily
indebted
tohimforthechapters
withobligations
andwithinsolubles.
dealing
3 W. Courtenay,
in Courtenay
ofBurley's
Depuntate
artis
1987,seesinthestructure
logicaean influence
ofOckham's
Summa
. R. Wood,in Wood1984,haspointed
out
logicae
whenexpanding
thatBurley,
hispre-1316commentary
on Aristotle's
, whichhe
Physics
didafter
Ockham
hisowncommentary
ofthattextin 1324,often
hadwritten
relied
on
Ockham's
morethanon hisownearlier
one.On therelationship
between
commentary
andOckham,
on howtheysharedsomebasicviewsin spiteofobvious
Burley
disagreeL. Baudry
is stillwellworth
ments,
1934).
reading
(Baudry
4 When
I shallbe usingtheVenice1497edition
toworks
referring
byBurley,
(reprint
1967)ofhisSuper
artem
veterem
which
an Expositio
etAristotelis)
includes
byMinerva
Porphyri
tohereas his"lastcominlibrum
universalium
inlibrum
, an Expositio
(referred
praedicamentorum
on theCategories
inlibrum
sexprincipiorum
andan Expositio
inlibrum
mentary
"), an Expositio
theeditions
onthePerihermeneias
Perihermeneias;
byS. BrownofhisQuestions
(Brown
1974),
ofhisso-called
Middle
onthePerihermenias
de
(Brown
1973)andofhisTractatus
commentary
to works
I shallbe usingthe
(Brown1972).Whenreferring
suppositionibus
byOckham,
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

193

The doctrinesI propose we compare need to be circumscribedmore


precisely,however.With respectto Ockham, the firstthingto note is
that he did not, throughouthis academic career, shortin durationas it
was, always subscribeto the same conceptionof mental sentences.The
5
one he firstsubscribedto is expounded in his Commentary
on theSentences
on the activityof the intellect,both probably
and in a Disputedquestion
writtenduringthe years 1317-1319,exceptingfromthe firstbook of his
on theSentences
the insertionsintroducedby the author in the
Commentary
course of later revisions.The other,which he favoreda fewyears later,
in his Quodlibets
and in his Questions
is set forthchieflyin his Summalogicae,
onAristotle's
.6 Now the doctrineof mentalsentenceswhichI intend
Physics
to compare withthat of Burleyis exclusivelythe one the early Ockham
subscribedto.
conBy contrastwithOckham, Burleyneverdid renouncehis originell
ceptionof mentalsentences,the one he was already defendingin 1301,
in his Questions
on thePerihermeneias
, and which he stillwas defendingsome
in
Middlecommentary
on thePerihermeneias.
his
so-called
twentyyears later,
he
in
the
mental
sentences
addition
to
However,
originallyrecognized,
he eventuallyadmittedthe existenceof mentalsentencesof anotherkind,7
on theCategories
and when he did so, as he did in his last Commentary
, dated
1337, insteadof speakingof two sortsof mental sentences,he referred
as being "in
to the sentenceshe had earliercalled "mental" ("in mente"),
re" When speakingof "mental sentences"according to Burley,I shall
mean exclusivelythose he firstreferredto as being "in mente"and later
as being "in re"%
whichcomdue to theFranciscan
critical
edition
ofhisnon-political
Institute,
writings
here"OTh")andan "OperaPhilosophica"
an "OperaTheologica"
series
(abbreviated
prises
inSt.Bonaventure,
waspublished
series
here"OPh").Theedition
N.Y.,over
(abbreviated
theyears1967-1988.
5 The first
hascomedownto us onlyin
ontheSentences
's Commentary
bookofOckham
The three
referred
to as Ockham's
Ordinatio.
theform
ofan or
andis,accordingly,
dinatio,
referred
to as
andare,accordingly,
ofa reportatio
booksexistonlyin theform
following
Ockham's
Reportatio.
6 Although
a different
sentences
eachpresuppose
these
twoconceptions
ofmental
theory
in Karger1994.
as shown
ofconcepts,
thisis nottheonlyfeature
bywhichtheydiffer,
7
1.1.
ofmental
See belowsection
mental
sentences
qualities.
composed
8 Namely
didnotconsistendy
usetheexpression
It should
be mentioned
thatBurley
"propositio
" todenote
He sometimes
useditto
called"inmente."
inre
thesentences
hehadoriginally
in theordinary
denote
entities
ofa wholly
different
sense,
sort,whicharenotsentences
He
butrather
actualstates
whichhappento be apprehended
ofaffairs
bytheintellect.
he
onthePerihermeneias
doesso in theMiddle
, wherehe opposesthesentences
commentary
ofwhichhe nowsaysthattheyexist"subto as being"inmente,"
hadoriginally
referred
inthemind.
inthemind,
as hesays,exist"onlyobjectively,"
withentities
which,
jectively"

19:35:14 PM

194

ELIZABETH
KARGER

"
By "sentence,"as the medievaisoftendid when speakingof a propo
sitio" I shall mean categoricalsentences,sentenceswhich contain two
main termsunitedby a copula, one termbeing called "subject,"the other
"predicate."Both Burleyand Ockham admittedmental(categorical)sentences of varyingdegrees of complexity.The simplerones contain simple termsas subject and as predicate,whereas the more complex ones
contain at least one complex term.Ockham furtheradmittedtwo kinds
of mentalterms,some semantically
simple,called "absolute,"otherssemancalled
"connotative."
Let us agree to call "elementary
ticallycomplex,
mentalsentences,"the mentalsentenceswhich,on both theories,are composed of simple termsand those which,on Ockham's theory,are composed of semanticallysimpleterms.On both theories,elementarymental
sentencesin thissense are those which are attendedto first.9
And those
are the only ones I shall attendto here. Thus, when referring,
eitheron
Burley'sor on Ockham's theory,to "mentalsentences,"I shall mean the
elementaryones.
This paper fallsinto two parts. In the first,Burley'stheoryof mental
sentenceswill be reconstructed,
chieflyon the basis of textscontainedin
the threeworksalready mentioned.An account of Ockham's early theory of mentalsentenceswill thenbe presentedby comparingit withthat
of Burley.In so proceeding,my intentionis not to show that Ockham
was on some point of doctrineindebtedto Burley
thoughhe may well
have been , since I shall be reconstructing
Burley'sdoctrinepartlyon
the basis of a text writtenlate enough for its author to have possibly
drawn on Ockham. My purpose is ratherto bringto lightthe factthat,
in spite of some importantdifferences,
the theoriesof mental sentences
whichBurleyand the earlyOckham subscribedto have essentialfeatures
in common.
1. Mentalsentences
to Burley
according
The threeworksby BurleywhichI shall be mosdydrawingfromeach
on the
belong to a different
period of his career. The first,the Questions
Theseturnoutbeingentities
to truesentences,
as suchmind-independent,
corresponding
butwhich,
becausetheyhappentobe apprehended
aresaidtoexistobjecbythemind,
in it.Thesearetheentities
in thattext,
he calls"propositions
inre"(ed.cit.,
which,
tively
inConti1990
inBiard1989(p. 151-9),
andA. Conti,
1.24-1.27,
p. 60-2).Both
J.Biard,
" is notused
seemto havemissed
thefactthattheexpression
inre
(p. 125-36),
"propositio
in thatsensein theprooemium
the
itis usedto
ofhislastcommentary
on
where
Categories,
denote
whathe hadearlier
calleda "propositio
inmente."
9 In theOrdinatio
hisfirst
Ockham
, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh II, p. 271-89),
clearly
propounds

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

195

Perihermeneias
(hereafter"QPH"), belongs to his early career, the second,
on thePerihermeneias
the so-calledMiddlecommentary
(hereafter"MPH"), to
what mightbe called his middlecareer,and the third,his last Commentary
on theCategories
(hereafter"Cat"), to his later years.10
In all threeworks,Burleydistinguished
betweenseveral kindsof senThis means thatthereare
the
relation
of
ordered
tences,
signification.
by
othersentencesuntilsentencesare reached which
sentenceswhichsignify
sentences.The sentencesI am here
do not themselvessignify
any further
are
"ultimate"
the
"mental"
sentences,thosewhichcan be signified
calling
not
themselves
but
which
do
any. As alreadymentioned,
signify
by others,
ways: in QPH and in
Burleyhimselfreferredto them in two different
"
"
MPH, he called them "in mentewhereasin Cat, he called them in re."
Beforewe embarkon an attemptto reconstruct
Burley'stheoryof mental sentences,let us quicklyexamine this theoryof ordered sentences,
whichit presupposes.
1.1 Non-ultimate
and ultimate
sentences
The firstthingto note is that Burleydid not, in the threeworkswe
In the
are considering,admit the same number of kinds of sentences.11
firsttwo he admitted,besides the ultimatesentences,only two kinds of
sentences,namelythose in writingand those in speech.12In Cat, howadmitteda thirdsortof non-ultimate
sentence,namely
ever,he additionally
13
sentences"in concepto."
Accordingto the theorycontainedin Cat, a sentencein writingsignifies
a sentencein speech, a sentencein speech, a sentence"in conceptu
," and
a sentence"in conceptu
," an ultimatesentence.A sentencein writingis a
sentencethe termsof which are writtenwords, a sentencein speech is
" is one
one the termsof which are spokenwords,a sentence"in conceptu
the termsof which are concepts,identifiedwith mental qualities.14Now
a writtenterm signifiesa spoken one, a spoken one a concept, and a
withan
ofmental
a theory
ofconcepts,
sentences,
theory
byhisfirst
theory
presupposed
as in an afterthought.
on absolute
connotative
concepts
only,introducing
eye
concepts
10Theeditions
in footnote
4.
areindicated
usedforeachoftheseworks
" and
"
"enunciatio
11Burley
theexpressions
usesinterchangeably
,"
propositio
apparently
"
"
all theseterms
I am translating
sometimes
oratiotospeakofsentences.
by"sentence."
12See QPH,3.55,
248andMPH,1.02p. 45.
p.
13See Cat,prooemium
, sign.C3 vb-C4ra.
14In a treatise
of thearsvetus
as doesGat,to hislastcommentary
whichbelongs,
,
is conceived
withmental
actsbywhichsomething
identified
("possum
Burley
concepts
in
humanam
enimde homine
habereunumconceptum
naturam,"
Expositio
quo concipio
inthesametext,
withmental
librum
universalim,
, sign.A2 rb)andlater,
qualities
prooemium

19:35:14 PM

196

ELIZABETH
KARGER

concepta thing.Consequentlyultimatesentencesare sentencescomposed


of things.They will accordinglybe called "in re"Xb
The theorycontainedin the two earliertextsis the same except that
" are
sentences"in concepta
lacking and that the ultimatesentences,conceived of, as before,as composed of things,are called "propositions
in
"ie It
mente
in
to
note
both
earlier
all
is, however,important
that,
texts,
sentences,even those "in writing"or "in speech," are, in a loose sense,
said to be "in mente"They are "in the mind" insofaras, accordingto a
view held by Burleyin all threeworks,all sentenceswithoutexception
are mind-madeentities,the mind being responsiblefor composingone
or negatively,forminga sentence of
entitywith another,affirmatively
which those entitiesare the subject and the predicate.17As the author
writesin MQH, "everypart of a sentencein writingor in speech is a
part of a sentencein the mind."18When he proposesto call ultimatesentences "propositions
in mente
," he is, then, takingthe phrase not in this
loose sense, in which it applies to all sentences,but in a strictsense.
Since the "ultimate"sentencesare those we are calling "mental sentences,"we can, then, say that, on Burley'sdoctrine,mental sentences
are composed,not of words,nor of concepts,but of "things."But what
are the entitieshe is calling "things,"opposingthem to words and concepts?To answerthis question,we need to make an excursusinto Burleian ontology.
1.2 An excursus
intoBuridanontology
It would be wrong to assume that,by excludingwords and concepts
frombeing "things,"Burleyis excludingthingsof certainkinds.The fact
in animaqui estverum
ensin animaquiaestqualitas
animae"
(". . . habent
conceptum
B1 rb).
ibid.,
sign.
15"... cum
sittriplex,
et
propositio
quaedamin prolatione,
quaedamin conceptu
inconceptu
dicipropositio
inre"(Cat,
quaedam
significata
perpropositionem
quaepotest
failstomention
thesentences
"inwriting,"
which
he
, sign.C4 rb).HereBurley
prooemium
mentioned
inscripto
in
had,however,
earlier,
saying:
"propositio
significat
propositionem
in vocesignificat
in conceptu"
(ibid..
voce,propositio
propositionem
sign.C3 vb).
16"Illud
sivesignificetur
mediate
sive
quodsignificetur
perpropositionem
prolatam
sittalequodnonsignificat
dummodo
immediate,
illud,vocopropoaliquidaliudulterius
sitionem
in mente"
(QPH,3.553,p. 250).
17"...
nonestaliudquamcompositio
ad invicem
propositio
aliquorum
perintellectum
utpropositio
affirmativa
autdivisio
ab invicem
utpropositio
aliquorum
(Cat,
negativa."
as faras I know,
doesnotdrawtheconsequence,
it
, C3 vb).Though,
prooemium
Burley
follows
thatthere
is no sentence
in a closedbook.
(propositio)
18". . .
in scripto
velinprolatione
in mente"
estparsorationis
quaelibet
parsorationis
(MPH,1.03,p. 45).

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

197

is thatneitherwordsnor conceptscan be definedas a particularkind of


thing,though they can be definedas particularkinds of things(vocal
mentalqualities)usedas signs(of otherthings).It folsounds,inscriptions,
lows that,by excludingwords and conceptsfrombeing "things,"Burley
is excludingmerelya certainuse of things,namelytheiruse as signs(of
otherthings).It furtherfollowsthat,when he claims that "things,"and
notwords or concepts,are the termsof mental sentences(in our sense),
he is not restricting
the scope of the word "thing"as far as the entities
denoted are concerned,and therefore,
appearances to the contrarynotin
its
he
is
the
word
widestpossible sense.
taking
withstanding,
But what are the entitieswhich,forBurley,count as "things,"in the
widestpossible sense of the word? Those entities,of course, which are
includedin his ontology.Now it is a well-knownfact of Burley'sontology that it includes not only individuals,but entitiescommon to indiwhichmay,accordingly,
be
viduals,in whichthe individualsparticipate,19
When Burleytalksof a "thing"in the widest
called "commonnatures."20
possible sense, he may, then,be talkingeitherof an individualor of a
common nature.
This means thatindividualsand
Common naturesare non-individuals.
commonnaturesdiffer
of them.Indiby the typeof identitycharacteristic
vidualsare characterizedby what may be called "numerical"identityand
by being "numerically"distinctfromone another.Common natures,by
contrast,are devoid of thattypeof identityand are characterizedinstead
by what might,withdue caution,be called "specific"or "generic"idenindividualsand common naturesare,
Nevertheless,
tityand distinctness.21
19Becauseindividuals
in a common
onecanconceive
ofcommon
nature,
participate
in itsrelation
as Burley
whenhe writes:
"connature
to thoseindividuals,
acknowledges
humanam
in ordine
ad iliaquaeparticipant
eandem
naturam"
in
cipionaturam
{Expositio
librum
universalium
, prooemium
, sign.A2 rb).
20Burley
doesnotadmit
orderuniversais
from
distinct
thefirst
order
higher
apparently
to thatof
ones.Hisposition
withrespect
to higher
orderuniversais
is apparently
similar
tofirst
ofHarclay
withrespect
orderones.Harclay's
viewwasthatfirst
orderuniHenry
in a certain
versais
areindividuals
conceived
deUniversali
, edited
way(seein hisQuaestio
uniseemstoidentify
secondorder
byG. GiinGi 1971,79,p. 216).Similarly,
Burley
withfirst
order
ina certain
toa text,
versais
onesconsidered
way.Forexample,
according
ofhisExpositio
inlibrum
human
footnote,
unwersaliumi
partially
quotedin thepreceeding
as thatin whichindividuals
suchas Socrates
is
nature
considered
andPlatoparticipate
thesamething
initself,
is a thing
as human
nature
considered
butwhereas
thelatter
"of
first
"ofsecondintention"
intention"
theformer
is a thing
andis as suchsignified
bya
He concludes,
"Ex hispatet
secondordertermsuchas "species"
or "universal."
saying:
et secundae
eandem
remesseprimae
intentionis
ibid.,
intentionis,"
sign.A2 va).
21When
of"specific"
ofa posor of"generic"
onemustbe careful
identity,
speaking
Whatismeant
couldbe thetypeofidentity
characteristic
ofspecies
siblemisunderstanding.

19:35:14 PM

198

ELIZABETH
KARGER

in some verygeneralsense of identityand distinctness,


each of themselfidenticaland distinctfromall others.22
Otherwise,theycould not all be
called "things."
From the logical point of view, common naturesare Porphyrianuniversalis,since theyare trulypredicableof many otherentities,being truly
predicableat least of each of the individualstheyare common to.23
An individualexistseitherin the mind or extra-mentally.
A common
nature exists eithermentally,or extra-mentally
or both, dependingon
whetherthe individualswhich participatein it all exist mentallyor all
existextra-mentally
or some mentally,some extra-mentally.24
Individuals
and common natureswe are most likelyto be interestedin and thus to
formsentenceswith are, however,those which existextra-mentally.
Revertingto Burley'sclaim that the termsof mentalsentences(in our
sense) are "things,"and not words nor concepts,we must,then,interpret him as sayingthat the termsof mentalsentencesare individualsor

or ofgenera.
Butsomething
couldalsobe meant,
thoserelations
quitedifferent
namely
which
holdbetween
distinct
individuals
ofthesamespecies
orofthesamegenus
byvirtue
oftheir
or ofthesamegenus.Theserelations
arenotidentity
beingofthesamespecies
relations
at all.Thedifference
is onewhich
seemstobe driving
at inQPH,1.84,
Burley
Ockham
isperfectly
whoadmitted
andgeneric
aware,
(p. 214),andisoneofwhich
specific
in thelattersense,butnotin theformer
, d. 2, q. 6; OTh II,
identity
(see Ordinatio
and"generic"
taken
are,ofcourse,
p. 202,lin.18-p.203,lin.16).Here"specific"
identity
in theformer
sense.See thefollowing
footnote.
22Identity
as applicable
to all entities,
individuals
andcommon
is calledby
natures,
"numerical"
"inthecommon
or widesense."Identity
as applicable
Burley
identity
only
toindividuals
iscalled"numerical"
"inthestrict
sense."
as applicable
identity
Identity
only
tocommon
natures
onecalled"specific"
is oftwokinds,
theother
idenidentity,
"generic"
themanytexts
where
thisview,I quotefrom
theprooemium
tity.
Amongst
Burley
expresses
inlibrum
ofhisExpositio
universalim:
"idemnumero
sic dictum
E.K) est
(sc.communiter
ad idemnumero
stricte
et ad unumspecieet ad unumgenere
et est
superius
acceptum
commune
cuilibet
ente"(sign.A5 ra).Notethattheproperty
thata thing
hasofbeing
from
all others
self-identical
anddistinct
or all others
ofthesame
(all others
generally
is often
toas the"unity"
Forevery
referred
ofthething.
there
will,
typeofidentity,
type)
be a corresponding
inthetext
Thisexplains
then,
that,
typeof"unity."
Burley
justquoted,
ofthe"identity"
ofa thing
andofits"unity."
speaks
23".interchangeably
. . quodlibet
enimuniversale
velestaptum
natum
de pluripraedicatur,
praedicari
bus"(Expositio
inlibrum
universalium
of
, tr.2, c. 1,sign.B6 vb).Thoughtheseveral
things
whicha common
is predicable
nature
lessgeneral,
common
other,
natures,
mayinclude
include
in it.Notethat,
theindividuals
which
sincea predication
theyalways
participate
involves
theformation
ofa sentence,
thata common
nature
is predicable
theverynotion
ofeachoftheindividuals
canform
in itpresupposes
thattheintellect
which
participate
a sentence
withan individual
as itssubject
nature
anda common
as itspredicate.
24"... aliquoduniversale
habetessein animatantum
et aliquodhabetesseextraanimamet aliquoduniversale
habetessetamin animaquamextraanimam"
in
(Expositio
librum
universalium,
prooemium)
sign.A4 rb).

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

199

common naturesand that theyare most likelyto exist extra-mentally.25


But how can the mind achieve the feat of forminga sentencewith
things,individualsor common natures,possibly extra-mentalones, as
terms?To thisquestion,Burleyhas, I believe,providedtwo answers.The
firstmay be regardedas belongingto a simplifieddoctrine,one which
holds only forparticularlysimple mentalsentences.The otherholds for
many more mentalsentences,perhaps forall those we have called "elewhat I shall call Burley's"simI will distinguish
mentary."Accordingly,
and
his
"amended theory."Consider
of
mental
sentences"
plifiedtheory
his simplified
first.
theory
sentences
1.3 Burley
3ssimplified
ofmental
theory
The questionis: how can the mind forma sentencewiththings,posones, as its terms?In the same way as it formsa sensiblyextra-mental
- as terms,
tencewithwords- or withconcepts
Burley'sanswerwould be,
remindingus thatall sentencesare formedby the mind.26If so, the mind
musthave a generalrecipe forforminga sentencewitheitherwords,or
concepts,or thingsas terms.What is this recipe? A very simple one,
Burleywould tell us, consistingin apprehendingtwo words,or two concepts,or two things,and assertingthem to be identical,in which case
in which case the senor to be non-identical,
the sentenceis affirmative,
tence is negative.
This is Burley'savowed doctrinein all three workswe are drawing
from.Thus in QPH, taking"sentencein the mind" in the loose sense in
which the phrase applies to all sentences,he writes:"a sentencein the
mind is composed of thingsthe intellectassertsto be the same or to be
different,"
things.27
addingthatthesethingscan be wordsor extra-mental
In MPH, taking"sentencein the mind" in the same sense,he writes:"a
sentencein the mind is composed of thingswhich the intellectcomposes
with each other or divides fromeach other,whetherthese thingsare

25"Secundo
et aliquasinestaliquaresuniversalis
notari
potest
quodextraanimam
notari
secundo
ex eodempotest
rerum;
quodenunciado
gularis;
patethocperdivisionem
inlibrum
etsingularia"
ex rebusextraanimam
(.Expositio
quaesuntuniversalia
componitur
, lib.I, tr.2, c. 2, sign.L5 rb).
perihermeneias
26See section
1.1above.
27"Circaenunciationem
ex rebusquasintelsciendum
in mente
quodistacomponitur
talis
asserat
vocesesseeasdem,
Si enimintellectus
lectusasserit
esseeademet diversa.
talisenunesseeasdem,
resextraanimam
Et si asserat
enunciatio
exvocibus.
componitur
ex rebusextraanimam"
ciadocomponitur
(QPH,3.553,p. 249).

19:35:14 PM

200

ELIZABETH
KARGER

words or thingssignifiedby words."28In Cat, he refersto QPH, writing


that: "I rememberhavingsaid and recordedin writingthat the intellect
can make a sentencefromany entitieswhatever,because the intellectcan
assertthemto be the same or different,"
again adding that theseentities
be
but
also
and
even
words,
may
things,
concepts.29He summarizeshis
"the
intellect
can
positionby saying:
compose any apprehendedsimple
entitieswitheach other,assertingthem to be the same or not to be the
same," where the apprehendedsimpleentitiescan be words,conceptsor
things.30
If sentencesare composed by the intellectin the same way, whether
theirtermsare words (spoken or written),concepts,or things,there is
neverthelessone importantdifferencebetween sentences composed of
thingsand sentencesof the otherthreekinds.The difference
pertainsto
the copula, the functionof which is to link the predicateto the subject.
All sentences,written,
spoken,conceptualand mental(in our sense),have
as a copula the very act of formingthe sentence,an act which is said
to be a "composition,"if the sentenceis affirmative,
and a "division,"if
it is negative.31
This act is an act of the intellectand, as we have just
seen, it is an act of assertion,wherebythe intellectassertsthe terms
(words,conceptsor things)to be identicalor to be non-identical.In written, spoken (and perhaps conceptual)sentences,however,this copula is
not a part of the sentenceitself.Writtenand spoken sentenceshave, of
course, a copula as a componentpart, but it is anothercopula, which
expressesthe first,since it expressesthe "composition"of the sentence32
(or its "division"if a sign of negationis added). This kind of copula may
28 . . oratioin mente
ex rebusquasintellectus
ad invicem
vel
componitur
componit
dividit
ab invicem,
siveillaeressintvoces,sivesintressignificatae
pervoces"(MPH,
1.02,p. 45).
29 . . recolomedixisse
et in scriptis
facere
reliquisse
quodintellectus
potest
propositionem
exquibuscumque
asserere
iliaesseeademveldiversa
. . . Sed
quiaintellectus
potest
intellectus
ad invicem
res. . . et vocesad invicem
et conceptus"
potest
componere
(Cat,
, sign.G3 vb).
prooemium
30". . . intellectus
ad invicem
omniaSimplicia
potest
componere
apprehensa
perintellectum
asserendo
illaesseeademvelnonesseeadem.Gumigitur
intellectus
potest
apprehendere
etres,sequitur
voces,conceptus
quodintellectus
potest
componere
propositionem
tamde rebusquamde vocibus
quamde conceptibus"
(Gat,prooemium
, sign.C4 rb).
31 . . inomni
estaliquodmateriale
etaliquodformale.
inpropoFormale
propositione
sitione
estcopulacopulans
cumsubjecto
et illacopulaestin intellectu
praedicatum
quia
estcompositio
veldivisio
intellectus.
Materialia
veroin propositione
suntsubjectum
et
, sign.G4 rb).
praedicatum,"
(Gat,prooemium
"... quandohocverbum
esesttertium
tuncestsyncategorema
etimporadjacens
ttsolamcompositionem"
(MPH,1.417,p. 75).

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

201

be called a "verbal copula" since it consistsin a verb. By contrast,mental sentences(in our sense),i.e. sentencesthe termsof which are things,
have no verbal copula. Their only copula is the veryact of composition
or divisionby which the sentenceis formed.
Since the only copula of a mentalsentence(in our sense) is the act of
compositionor of divisionby whichthe sentenceis formed,thisact must
be regardedas containedin the sentenceas one of its parts. Otherwise,
eisits coptherewould be no componentpart of the sentenceidentifiable
ula. It followsthat,whereaswritten,spokenand conceptualsentencesare
composed of homogeneousentities,mental sentences(in our sense) are
composedof heterogeneousones. For, by virtueof havinga verbal copula, writtenand spoken sentencesexistentirelyoutsidethe mind,33since
all theircomponentparts,subject,predicateand copula, are wordswhich
"have existenceoutsidethe mind."34Conceptualsentencesexist,of course,
"entirelywithinthe mind," since all theircomponentparts are mental
Mental sentences(in our sense) are, however,composed of entientities.35
ties of two kinds,since theycontain extra-mentalentities(at least most
of the time)as theirsubject and predicate,and a mentalentityas their
copula.36As Burleysays,such a sentenceis "partlyin the intellect,partly
outsidethe intellect."37
Revertingto our question: how can the mind forma sentencewith
ones, as its terms?The answerwhichBurley
things,possiblyextra-mental
thisby firstapprehendingtwo things
mind
achieves
would give is thatthe
and thenassertingthemto be the same or not to be the same. The ensuing sentencehas those thingsas its termsand that act of assertionas its
copula. Mental sentencescan then be characterizedas having thingsas
theirtermsand a mentalact as theircopula, an act consistingin assertof those things.
ing the identityor non-identity
A few consequencesfollowimmediately.From the fact that the copula of a mentalsentenceis alwaysan act of assertion,it followsthatevery
mentalsentencecarriesassertiveforce.From the fact that the assertion
or a negativecontent,it followsthat thereare
may have an affirmative
33". . . propositio
extraanimam"
inprolatione
esttotaliter
, sign.G4 rb).
(Gat,prooemium
34"... componitur
ibid.
esseextraanimam"
ex vocibus
quaehabent
35"... propositio
ibid.
in intellectu"
esttotaliter
ex conceptibus
verocomposita
36"Dicoergoquodnullapropositio
extraaniex rebus<est>totaliter
[est]composita
autem
materialia
estin mentevelin intellectu,
in talipropositione
mam,quiaformale
31.
theonequotedin footnote
follows
suntextraanimam"
ibid.Thistextimmediately
37"Compositio
etpartim
extraintellectum.
estin intellectu,
ex rebuspartim
composita
extra
esttotaliter
ad materialia
sedquantum
ad suumformale
estinintellectu,
Quantum
intellectum"
ibid.

19:35:14 PM

202

ELIZABETH
KARGER

and a negativeone. From the natureof the


two copulas, an affirmative
assertedcontent,it followsthat a mentalsentence,via its copula, asserts
of its terms,dependingon whether
eitherthe identityor the non-identity
or negative.
the copula is affirmative
Other consequences followif we take into account the fact that the
"things"which formthe termsof a mentalsentenceare eitherindividuals or common natures.Firsdy,only an apprehendedindividualand an
apprehendedcommonnaturecan be a termof a mentalsentenceso that,
in particular,the subject-termof a mental sentencewill be either an
apprehendedindividualor an apprehendedcommon nature.Secondly,if
the subject-term
is an apprehendedindividual,the sentencewill,of course,
be singular,whereasifit is an apprehendedcommonnature,it may,but,
as we shall see, need not,be general.38
When Ockham referred
to "some"
who "positthat,in additionto singularthings,thereare universalthings,
and that apprehendedsingularthingsare the subjectsin singularsentences,and that apprehendeduniversalthingsare the parts of universal
he musthave had Burleyin mind.
sentences,"39
To summarize:all threeof the worksby Burleywe are drawingfrom
seem to contain the followingdoctrine:mental sentences(in our sense),
and negative,can be formedby theintelsingularand general,affirmative
lect. All that is required is that the intellectassertof two thingsit has
apprehended,each of which is an individualor a common nature,that
they are identicalor that they are non-identical.That act of assertion
will formthe copula of the sentence,whereasthosethingswill be its subject and predicate. The sentence itselfwill thus assert,via its copula,
eitherthat its termsare identicalor that theyare non-identical.
howsuffices,
Burleywas surelya good theorist.A momentof reflection
ever, to reach the convictionthat, if so, though this can be a rough
approximationof his doctrine,it cannot be the whole of it. For, if it
were, it would be defectiveon two counts. In the firstplace, it would
not account for true affirmative
mental sentences,nor forfalse negative
ones. To be true,a sentenceassertingidentitycannot assertthe identity
of two thingsand, to be false,a sentenceassertingnon-identity
cannot
assertthe non-identity
of two things.In the second place, it would not
38Bya
I meana categorical
or
sentence
which
is either
universal
sentence,
"general"
particular.
39 . . ponunt
ressingulares
suntresuniversales,
etquodressingualiquiquodpraeter
laresconceptae
suntsubjecta
in propositionibus
et resuniversales
singularibus
conceptae
suntpartespropositionum
universalium"
inlibrum
Perihermeneias
Aristoteli
, lib.I,
(Expositio
OPh II, p. 362-3,lin.10-3).
prooemium,

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

203

account forgeneralmental sentences,for even if the "things"


effectively
assertedby a sentence to be identical (or non-identical)are common
natures,it will not followthat the sentenceis general.A sentenceasserting that one given common nature is identical (or non-identical)with
anotheris just as singularas a sentenceassertingof one given individual
thatit is identical(or non-identical)with another.
sentences
s amended
1.4 Burley'
theory
ofmental
We can say with confidencethat the doctrinewe have derivedfrom
the textsconsideredso faris but a roughapproximationof Burley'strue
doctrineif we findin other textsthe means to amend it. I have found
none where Burleycorrectsthe impressionthat a mental sentenceneed
be composedof two distinctthingsas its terms.We will see shortly,however, (in section 2.1), the required amendmentcoming froman unexpected quarter,namelyfromWilliam Ockham. The amendmentconsists
in allowinga mentalsentenceto be formedwith a given thingboth as
its subjectand as its predicate,the copula unitingthe thingto itself,as
it were. A sentenceso formedwill asserttrulyof thatthingthatit is selfidentical,or falselythat it is distinctfromitself.Though Burley apparentlyfailedto mentionit, this amendmentis obvious enough forhim to
have been confidentthe alert reader would introduceit himself.
andgenerality
1.4.1 Supposition
so far so that general
The task of amendingthe theoryreconstructed
mental sentencescan be adequately accounted for is not such an easy
we findin Burleythe means by which to do so. The
affair.Fortunately,
relevanttextis to be foundin Cat, where the author makes the following claim: "to the copula existingin the intellect,linkingto one another
the termsof a true(affirmative)
sentence,therecorrespondssomethingin
reality,namelyeithertheiridentityor the identityof the thingsthe terms
suppositfor; to the divisionor the negationof the copula in a negative
true sentencethere correspondssomethingin reality,namely the nonidentityof the termsor of the thingsthe termssuppositfor."40
Though thisclaim could hold of all sentencessince, as we have seen,
40"Dicendum
verae
extrema
inintellectu
propositions
copulanti
quodcopulaeexistenti
eorum
vel
identitas
extremorum
in
identitas
scilicet
ad invicem
re,
correspondet
aliquid
divisioni
verovelnegationi
negacopulaeinpropositione
supponunt;
proquibusextrema
velillorum
diversitas
extremorum
tivaveracorrespondet
proquibus
aliquidin re,scilicet
extrema
(Cat,prooemium,
sign.C4 va).
supponunt"

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204

ELIZABETH
KARGER

all sentences,even writtenand spoken ones, have a copula "existingin


the intellect,"whichis the veryact of formingthe sentence,it is intended
to hold more particularlyof mentalsentences(in our sense). For mental
of whichdepends
sentences(in our sense)are the sentencesthe truth-value
in
what
When
on
exists
reality.
Burleyspecifies,as he does here,
directly
what must "correspondin reality"to the copula of a sentencefor the
sentenceto be true,he is, therefore,
talkingprimarilyof mentalsentences.
Now, thatwhich "correspondsin reality"to the copula of a truesentence is that which the sentenceassertsvia its copula and which is realized given that the sentence is true. It followsthat, if we know what
correspondsin realityto the copula of a truesentence,we knowwhat is
asserted,via its copula, by any sentence,a true one, or a falseone. But
Burleyhas told us what correspondsto the copula of a truementalsentence. He has, then,also told us what is asserted,via its copula, by any
mental sentence.Specifically,we now know that any affirmative
mental
sentencesasserts,via its copula, one of two things:eitherthe identityof
its terms,or the identityof things"suppositedfor" by its terms;we also
know that any negativemental sentencesasserts,via its copula, one of
two things:either the non-identity
of its terms,or the non-identity
of
things"suppositedfor" by its terms.
We can, then, derive fromthis text an importantcorrectionof the
doctrinereconstructed
so far.We may now say that,accordingto Burley,
not all mental sentencesassert,via their copula, the identity(or nonRather some do
identity)of theirterms.That was an oversimplification.
assertthat,but othersassertthe identity(or non-identity)
of things"supfor"
their
terms.
posited
by
To appreciatethe implicationsof thiscorrecteddoctrine,in whichthe
key notionis clearlythat of "supposition,"let us recall the relevantfeaturesof Burleiansuppositiontheorywhich,as the authordevelopedit in
his logical treatises,applies to termsof spoken or writtensentences.
In his early Tractatus
de suppositionibus
, Burleyrefrains,perhaps wisely,
fromdefiningsupposition.He tellsus, however,that a termsuppositsfor
an entityin a sentenceonly if it formsthe subject or the predicateof
the sentence.41He then divides supposition.Suppositionis divided first
into "material"and "formal"supposition.42
A termsuppositsmateriallyif
41"... suppositio
estproprietas
extremorum
ordinatur
secundum
quodunumextremum
ad aliudin propositione"
desuppositionibus
in Brown1972,2.01,
, ed. S. Brown,
(Tractatus
p. 34).
42In fact,supposition
is first
divided
intoimproper
andproper
Forthe
supposition.
at hand,we may,however,
thatfirst
division
andidentify
purpose
disregard
supposition

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

205

it suppositsforitself,and hence for a writtenor spoken word.43It sup"


positsformallyif it suppositseitherfor its significateor for its supposi
"
tum"or supposita
," suppositing"simply"in the firstcase, "personally"in
the second.44Now, if the term is a simple singularterm,i.e. a proper
coincideswiththe indiname or a demonstrative
pronoun,its "suppositum"
so that,in this case, simple and personal supposition
vidual it signifies,
"
"
Where the termis a generalterm,however,its supposita
also coincide.45
of the term,since the termsignifies
are entitiesdistinctfromthe significate
the individualswhich partica commonnatureand has as its "supposita"
are
also
which
in
individuals
called, and even more properlyso,
ipate it,
of the common nature itself.In this case, "simple" and
the "supposita"
"personal"suppositionare distinct.
Returningto our text,what Burleyis doing there may appear quite
remarkable:he is assumingthatsuppositioncan be extendedfromterms
of spokenor writtensentencesto termsof mental sentences,and hence
to see how this should be done. In
to things.In fact,it is not difficult
the case wherethe termconsideredis an individual,thatindividualnecessarilysuppositsfor itself.In the case where the term consideredis a
commonnature,thatentitymay suppositin two ways,namelyeitherfor
"
."46 Not only is it
itself,or for the individualswhich are its supposita
termsof writfrom
of
the
to
extend
property supposition
unproblematic
ten or spoken sentencesto termsof mental sentences,the theoryone
obtainsis simplerthan the original.The reason whyit is simpleris clear:
and"formal"
into"material"
is divided
withproper
supProper
supposition
supposition.
et quaedamestmaterialis"
dividitur:
quaedamestformalis
"Suppositio
propria
position.
{ibid.,
2.2,p. 35).
43"Suppositio
estquandoterminus
materialis
2.2,p. 35).
provoce"(ibid.,
supponit
44"Suppositio
suovelprosupformalis
estquandoterminus
prosignificato
supponit
et quaedampersonalis"
formalis
quiaquaedamestsimplex
suppositio
posto,et dividitur
is simple
thatformal
textindicates
supposition
clearly
(ibid.,
2.3,p. 35).The subsequent
for
a "supit
when
it
and
for
what
whentheterm
supposits
signifies, "personal"
supposits
positum."
45"In termino
et suppositio
nondifferunt
discreto
persosuppositio
simplex
simplici
nalis"(ibid.,
37).
2.4,
p.
46Discussing
is truly
suchas beingcapableoflaughter,
thewayin whicha "passio,"
writes:
itis "proper"
ofthespecies
to,namely
Burley
"propria
beinga human,
predicable
heimmewhich
sedproindividuis,"
proipsaspecieprecise
passiononinestalicuispeciei
etinest
cuius
est
inest
reformulates
as:
passio
propria
specie
passioprimo
"propria
diately
in librum
universalium
ei primout supponit
, tract.2, c. 1, sign.
(Expositio
proindividuis"
forinstance)
nature
insomecases,a common
tosaying
Cl ra).Thisamounts
(a passio
that,
ofwhichit is a proper
nature
common
ofanother
can be truly
(thespecies
predicated
it is common
fortheindividuals
is takenas suppositing
ifthelatter
to,butnotif
passio)
foritself.
itis taken
as suppositing

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206

KARGER
ELIZABETH

the
whereas the termsof writtenor spoken sentenceshave significates,
termsof mental sentencesare theirown significates.
Consequently,for
betweena term
termsof writtenor spokensentences,thereis a difference
thereis none for
suppositingforitselfand suppositingforits significate;
termsof mentalsentences.
We can now explicate more fullywhat Burley is saying,or rather
implying,in the textjust quoted. He is implyingthat some mentalsentences,the termsof which are things,assert,via theircopula, that their
termsare identical(ifthe copula is unnegated)or thattheyare not identical (ifthe copula is negated).This will be the case wheneverthe terms
suppositforthemselves,and thus eitherwhen the thingsare individuals,
since the termsthennecessarilysuppositforthemselves,
or when theyare
commonnaturestakenas suppositing
forthemselves.
But,he is also implythat
other
mental
sentences
via
their
assert,
ing
copula, that the things
forwhich theirtermssuppositare identical(if the copula is unnegated),
or that theyare not identical(ifthe copula is negated),where the things
suppositedfor are distinctfromthe termsthemselves.Now, thiswill be
the case only if at least one of the termsis a common nature,supposit"
ing for the individualswhich are its supposita
Where the firstalternativeapplies,i.e. wherethe termsare things,individualsor commonnatures,suppositingforthemselves,
the sentencemust
be a singularone. The sentencemust also be a singularone if its subject termis a thingtaken as suppositingforitself,howeverits predicate
termis taken.47But where the mentalsentencehas as its subjectterma
" it willbe a
commonnaturesuppositingforits "supposita
generalsentence.
1.4.2

Withwhomdid theidea originate:


Ockham
orBurley?

The extensionof the propertyof supposition,a propertyoriginally


assignedto termsof spokenor writtensentences,to termsof mentalsentenceshas clearlybeen instrumental
in allowingforan adequate account
of generalmentalsentences.The idea of thus extendingsuppositiontheWe can see now that
oryis one withwhich Ockham has been credited.48
thisis a turnwhich Burley,too, had taken.It mustbe recognized,however, that the text of Cat, in which suppositionis expresslyassignedto
47In hisTractalus
desuppositionibus
where
ofa
thesubject-term
, Burley
that,
recognized
orwritten
is a general
term
sentence
foritself,
thesentence
is a singuspoken
suppositing
larone{ed.cit.,4.13,p. 57).Buta common
nature
usedas a term
in a mental
sentence
canonlybe regarded
as a general
term.
It follows
where
thesubject-term
ofa menthat,
talsentence
is a common
foritself,
nature
one.
thesentence
is a singular
suppositing
48In particular C. Panaccio.
See Panaccio1991andPanaccio1992,p. 137.
by

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

207

termsof mentalsentences,postdatesby many years all of Ockham's relbe ruled out that Burleyborrowed
evant writings.It cannot, therefore,
the idea of thisextensionof suppositiontheoryfromOckham.
Some indicationcan, however,be foundin QPH that thiswas probably not the case and that Burleymay well have conceived of the idea
of extendingthe propertyof suppositionto termsof mental sentences
alreadywhen he was composingthis work,and, therefore,long before
Ockham had startedcomposingany of his own. The relevanttextis one
which explainshow a mental sentence- a sentencethe termsof which
- can be a universalsentence.In S. Brown's edition,the word
are things
"
" has been
mistakenlysubstituted(if not by the editor,by a
distinguitur
"
." Once corrected,the textcan be seen to suggest
copyist)for distribuitur
to be universal,it is requiredthat the thing
sentence
for
a
mental
that,
forms
its subject-termbe "distributed."This
which
common
nature)
(a
extendsto mentalsentencesa logicaldoctrineoriginallyapplied
suggestion
to spoken or writtensentences,according to which a necessary and
conditionfora sentenceto be universalis that its subject-term
sufficient
as can a spoken or
But can a real thingbe "distributed,"
be distributed.
to
writtenterm?It can, Burleybelieves. By definition, be distributedis
in such a
fora termof a sentenceto be "divided" into severalsupposita
- i.e. the truthof the sentence- is "saved" in each; now that
that
it
way
whichcommonnaturescan have, when used as terms,
is surelya property
no less than spoken or writtengeneralterms.49
This is a very remarkabletext, revealingthat, already in his early
career,Burleywas fullyprepared to extendthe propertyof distribution,
originallyassignedto termsof spoken or writtensentences,to the terms
of mental sentences.Distributionand suppositionare propertiesof the
same type,however,namelylogical propertieswhich termshave in sentences.It would be surprising,
then,if Burleyhad not been just as preextend
the
of
to
property suppositionto termsof mentalsentences.
pared

49Substituting
thetext
for"distingui,"
and "distribui"
for"distinguitur"
"distribuitur"
est
talisenunciado
si enunciado
sic habetessein mente,
"71/quaeres',
readsas follows:
distribuitur
enunciationis
itaquodaliquaestuniversalis;
alicuius
igitur
parsillius
quantitatis,
universalis
dicendum
est:concedo
etitaveraresextraanimam
distribuitur;
quodpropositio
... etconcedo
habetesseinmente
distribuitur,
quiadistribui
quodveraresextraanimam
in diversis
dividiita quodsalvetur
nonestaliudquamin supposita
(QPH,
suppositis"
thedefirecalls
hereina waywhich
defines
distribution
3.643,
p. 254).NotethatBurley
estuniusin
towhom:"distributio
hadgiven,
nition
which
Lambert
ofAuxerre
according
in Alessio1971,p. 229).
divisadivisio"
VIII, ed. F. Alessio
[Logica,

19:35:14 PM

208
1.4.3

ELIZABETH
KARGER
sentences
ofmental
Qualityand quantity

However thatmay be, thereis anotherrespectin which the textfrom


Cat, quoted at the beginningof section 1.4.1, seems to contain a docfromthe one which we derivedfromthe texts
trinesomewhatdifferent
consideredearlier.This difference
pertainsto the way negationis to be
thoughtof in a mental sentence.The textsfirstexamined suggested,it
will be recalled, that there are two mental copulas, one by which an
mentalsentenceis formed,the otherby whicha negativeone
affirmative
is, both copulas being mental acts. In the presenttext,Burleyseems to
have anotherdoctrinein mind, for he now describesthe negativemental copula as "the negationof the copula." This suggeststhattheremight
be just one mentalcopula, alwaysan act by whicha prima
facieaffirmative
mental sentenceis formed,and that the sentenceis then made negative
by a furtheract of negating.
It is unlikelythatthisshould be Burley'sconsidereddoctrinehowever.
Throughouthis career,he regardedeveryact of forminga mentalsentence as being an act of assertion.Consequendy,no unassertedact of
forminga mental sentencecould be allowed for.Where the sentenceis
the contentassertedwhichis negative.Similarly,
negative,it is, therefore,
whereit is affirmative.
I conclude that,on thispoint,Burley'sconsidered
doctrinedoes not differfromthe one we firstreconstructed,
and thatit
admits of two mental copulas, one carryingan affirmative
content,the
other a negativeone, both acts by which a sentenceis formed,50
both
acts of assertion.
If thisreconstruction
of Burley'sdoctrineof mentalsentenceis correct,
thereis an importantdifference
betweenBurleianmental sentencesand
theirspoken or writtencounterparts.
Whereas affirmative
Burleianmental sentencesand theircontradictory
contain
different
negatives
copulas,
affirmative
spoken and writtensentencesand theircontradictory
negativescontain the same copula, but differin that the negativeones contain in additiona sign of negation.51
or negativeconstitutes
what is knownas the "quality"
Being affirmative
50Theactof
an affirmative
mental
calleda "composition,"
is prior,
sentence,
forming
to thatofforming
a negative
mental
". . . nunc
calleda "division."
however,
sentence,
estposterior
divisio
nisialiquorum
compositione,
quianonestdivisio
priuscompositorum"
inlibrum
lib.I, tr.2, c. 1,sign.L2 vb).I
Perihermeneias,
(MPH,1.62,p. 79 andExpositio
takeBurley
to be suggesting
thatan actof"division"
thenotion
ofa prioract
conveys
of"composition"
neednothaveeffectively
takenplace.
which,
however,
51"... a partevocis. . . affirmatio
estsimplicior
negatione,
quoniamnegatio
super
affirmationem
additparticulam
ibid.
negativam."

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

209

of a categoricalsentence,whetherit is a singularor a generellsentence.


As to the "quantity"of a general categoricalsentence,it consistsin its
beingparticularor universal.If the qualityof a Burleianmentalsentence
depends on its copula, what does its quantity,if it is a generalsentence,
depend on?
In order to answer this question,let us look again at the text from
In that
QPH whichcontainedan accountof universalmentalsentences.52
text,it will be recalled,Burleyrecognizesthat,fora mental sentenceto
as is the case fora spomustbe distributed,
be universal,its subject-term
ken or writtensentence.He does not, however,tell us what the feature
to be
of a universalmentalsentenceis which determinesits subject-term
I have foundno othertextwhere Burleyfillsthat gap in his
distributed.
account of universalmental sentences.If we want to do so, we must,
resortto conjecture.
therefore,
A plausibleconjectureis that the featureof a mental sentencewhich
of the sentenceto be distributedis the copdeterminesthe subject-term
ula. More precisely,given that the copula of a generadmentadsentence
is asserted
is the mental act by which an identity(or a non-identity)
it
seems
for
its
between individualssupposited
terms,
by
plausible to
assume the following:if each of the individualssuppositedfor by the
assertedby the
is involvedin the identity(or non-identity)
subject-term
otherwise.
it
not
distributed
and
is
is
that
term
distributed,
copula,
If thisconjectureis correct,we would have to recognizethatnot only
the quality,but also the quantityof mentalsentences,as conceivedof by
Burley,depends on the forceof the copula. We could, then,tentatively,
attributeto him the followingdoctrine.There existsan array of mental
some negative,each of them a mentadact by
copulas, some affirmative,
whicha sentenceis formed.Amongstthe affirmative
copulas (to consider
in
of one termwith
the
one
would
consist
identity
asserting
those),
only
theother(whetherthetermsare distinctthingsor one and thesame thing),
sentence.
and would resultin the formationof a singular affirmative
Anotherwould consistin assertingthe identityof an individualsuppositedforby one termwithan individualsuppositedforby the otherterm,
sentence.
and would resultin the formationof a universalaffirmative
If somethingof the sort is Burley's doctrine,not only would there
would be no mental counterpartto a spoken or writtensigns of negation, therewould be none to spoken or writtensigns of quantification.
There would be, instead, a varietyof mental copulas, each of them
52Quotedin footnote
49.

19:35:14 PM

2 10

ELIZABETH
KARGER

accountingfor both the quality and the quantityof the sentencesthey


serve to form.
Some of Burley'sexplicitteachingsmake it appear quite likelythatthis
was, indeed, his doctrine,not only of the quality,but also of the quantityof mental sentences.Burley regarded categoricalsentences,mental
ones in particular,as containingone "formal"component,namelytheir
The qualcopula, and two "material"components,namelytheirterms.53
ity and the quantityof a sentenceboth belong to the formof the sentence, however.It should followthat, on Burley'sview, two sentences
differby theirformif and only if they differby theircopula, and, in
particular,that,if theydifferby theirqualityor theirquantity,theydiffer
by theircopula. But, as a matterof fact,thisdoes not hold of spokenor
writtensentences.It should, then,hold of mental ones, as of sentences
true to form.54
To summarize:Burleyadmittedmental sentencesthe termsof which
are things,individualsor common natures,thingswhich,in most cases,
are extra-mental.
The copula of a Burleianmentalsentence,however,is
never an extra-mentalthing,but always a mental act, namelythe very
act of formingthe sentence,which is itselfan act of assertingan idenFurthermorea mentalsentenceis generalonly if
tity(or a non-identity).
its subject-term
is a common nature and the assertedidentity(or nonidentity)pertainsto the individuals"suppositedfor"by each of its terms.
Finally,it is probable that Burleyadmittedno mentalsyncategorematics
otherthan mentalcopulas.
2. Mentalsentences
to theearlyOckham
according
As indicated in the introductionto this paper, the theoryof mental sentencesthe early Ockham subscribedto is contained in the first
53See thetextquotedin footnote
31.
54Alsorelevant,
in thisconnection,
is Burley's
on whatmakesa sentence
teaching
modal.According
to him,a spoken
orwritten
sentence
is properly
modalonlyifitcontainsa modaladverb
which"determines
theverbbyreasonof(determining)
thecomposition"
verbum
inlibrum
ratione
Perihermeneias
, lib.II,
[determinant
(.Expositio
compositionis]
tr.2, c. 1, N5 va).Butifa spoken
ofa modal
or written
sentence
is modalbyvirtue
adverb
ifthe
thecomposition
theverb,modifies
itfollows
which,
that,
itself,
bymodifying
sentence
is mental,
itis byvirtue
thatitis
ofa specialactofcomposition
(orofdivision)
modal.If so,it further
thatthereare modalmental
to the
follows
copulasin addition
assertorie
onesandthata mental
is assertorie
sentence
or modaldepending
on itscopula.Butifthemodality
ofa mental
sentence
on itscopulaas doesitsquality,
depends
itsquantity
doesso too.
surely

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

211

55 and in a
in his Reportatio
on
redactionof his Ordinato,
Disputedquestion
the activityof the intellect,which are amongsthis very firstworks.In
when he deals
later works,as well as in later additionsto the Ordinatio,
withmentalsentences,he eitherpresentshis earlytheoryas one amongst
several equally probable ones, or he ignoresit entirelyand presentsa
theoryinstead. The theoryof mental sentenceswhich
whollydifferent
can be meaningfully
compared with that of Burley is his early theory,
however.It is, then,to that theorythat I now turn.
As Burleybeforehim, Ockham, too, consideredthereto be sentences
of variouskinds,thoughnever more than three,namelywritten,spoken
and mental.He also admitted,as Burleyhad, that these sentencesform
an ordering,thoughhe called the relationwherebytheyare ordered"subnot "signification."
Nevertheless,the resultingorderingis
ordination,"56
the same as it is accordingto Burley,since writtensentencesare subordinated to spoken ones and spoken ones to sentencesto which no furthersentencesare subordinated,which are then the "ultimate"sentences
of the ordering.As Burleysometimes,Ockham alwaysrefersto thoseultimate sentencesas to sentencesexisting"in the mind."57They, of course,
are the sentenceswe shall be calling"mentalsentences,"thoughOckham
"
mentales
himselfcalled them "propositions
only in later works.58
Ockham (the earlyOckham) has not provideda general characterization of mentalsentences.We must,then,extractone fromthe relevant
textsby lookingat what he has to say about mentalsentencesin different
to show that,accordplaces. What he does claim in severalplaces suffices
of
are
sentences
mental
to
some
him,
composed things,as they all
ing
are accordingto Burley.Indeed, the claim he makesin one place is strikinglysimilar,in its verywording,to those made by Burleyin the texts
quoted in section 1.3.
2.1

sentences
ofmental
Thingsas terms

, we read: "whateverthe intelThus, in the prologue of the Ordinatio


it can compose withanother
lect can apprehendby a simpleintellection,
55See footnote
5.
56Thisis notquiteaccurate
's view,subordination
is a relation
since,on Ockham
only
a correspondadmitted
He nevertheless
sentences.
between
notbetween
terms,
implicitly
no nameforit.
he provided
relation
between
sentences,
though
ing
57"Propositio
hocestdictu:
inmente,
invoceetinscripto,
. . . habettriplex
esse,scilicet
etaliquaestscripta"
etintellecta,
esttantum
aliquaestprolata,
concepta
aliquapropositio
as "Ord."],d. 2, q. 4; OTh II, p. 134,lin.10-3).
hereafter
(iOrdinatio
[abbreviated
58As in
hereafter
as "Quod."),Ill, q. 12 (OTh IX,
Quodlibeta
(abbreviated
Septem

19:35:14 PM

212

ELIZABETH
KARGER

thingor with itself,sayingthisis that.'"59In this text,the claim made


is applied to an intellectwhich,by divinefavor,is supposed to be apprehending God and the divine persons direcdy,and who would then be
capable of "composing,"as it were, God and the Son, sayingmentally
thatthe one is the other.However,the claim could be applied,of course,
to an intellectwhich is apprehendingthingsof a more mundane sort.
Just as Burley had done, Ockham is admittingthat the intellectcan
forma sentencewith apprehendedthings,possiblyextra-mental
ones, as
terms,and, moreover,that the intellectachievesthisby sayingone thing
to be the other.True, he does not, as Burleyhad done, mention,in this
text,the possibilitythat a negativementidsentencebe formed,but he
does so elsewhere.60
And, even in this text,he mightwell have written
himselfthe words by which Adam Wodeham paraphraseshim, so that
the textwould have read as follows:"whateverthe intellectcan apprehend by a simple intellection,the intellectcan compose or divide with
anotheror withitself,saying,'thisis that'or 'thisis not that.'"61Moreover,
whilepresentinga doctrinequite similarto thatof Burley,Ockham even
improvesin one respecton the latter,since he explicitlyallows for the
which,as we noted in section 1.4, Burleyhad omittedto menpossibility
tion,namelythat a mentalsentencebe sometimesformedby composing
"a thingwithitself."
One differencebetween this doctrineand the one Burley presents,
however,is that the act of "saying" one thingto be identicalor nonidenticalwith itselfor with another,the act by which the sentenceis
formed,was surelynot regardedby Ockham as carryingassertiveforce.
Ockham distinguishedbetween the act of formingor apprehendinga
thequestion
dealtwithis: "utrum
mentalis
exrebus
p. 246),where
propositio
componatur
velex conceptibus."
59"...
intellectus
noti
cumalio
quidquid
tia,potest
potest
intelligere
simplici
componere
velcumse ipso,dicendo
'hocesthoc'"(Ord.
prol.,
q. 1; OTh I, p. 49,lin.16-8).Compare
thiswithBurley's
textquotedin footnote
30: ". . . intellectus
ad invipotest
componere
cemomniaSimplicia
asserendo
illaesseeademvelnonesse
apprehensa
perintellectum
eadem."
60
hereafter
as "Rep."],q. 12-13
Namelyin bookII of theReportatio
[abbreviated
heclaims
thatsomeone
whodirectly
(OThV, p. 280,lin.21-p.281,lin.10),where
apprehendsa givenwhiteness
anda givenblackness
can form
a mental
sentence
withthose
as terms,
a sentence
thatthewhiteness
is nottheblackness.
See belowsecthings
saying
tion2.3.2,wherethedoctrine
in thistextis further
contained
examined.
61"quidquid
intellectus
notitia
intellectus
cumaliovel
potest
simplici
intelligere,
potest
cumse ipsocomponere
veldividere,
dicendo
'hocesthoc'vel'hocnonesthoc'"(Lectura
. . . prol.,q. 6, 5,eds.G. Gi andR. Wood,inGi& Wood1990,vol.1,p. 148,
secunda
Un.34-6).

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

213

menteilsentenceand that of assentingor of dissentingto it.62But that


could hardlyhave been made if the act of forminga sentence
distinction
carriedby itselfassertiveforce.
between two doctrines,howThis is but a relativelyminordifference
ever. The main fact is that both authors have claimed that a mental
sentencecan be formed,each termof which is a real thing,possiblyan
extra-mental
one, a sentencewhich expressesthe identityor non-identity
of a thingwithitselfor with another.
Some readersmay be taken aback by the notion that Ockham could
have admittedthe possibilityof mentalsentencesthe termsof which are
real things,includingextra-mentalones. Did not Ockham rejectsuch a
?63Indeed he did, aligninga batview as totallyabsurd in the Quodlibets
so conceived.64The correct
sentences
mental
of
tery objectionsagainst
of
from
the
to
be
conclusion
drawn,however,
presencein the Quodlibets
these objectionsto a doctrinehe himselfonce subscribedto, is that,by
the time he wrote this work, Ockham had changed his mind on the
nature of mental sentences.65Consequendy, though one of his targets
was quite probablyBurley,as bothJ. Wey
when he wrotethat Quodlibet
he must have had also another
and G. Nuchelmans have surmised,66
62"... actusiudicativus
actumapprehensivum
alicuius
complexi
praesupponit
respectu
ofthe
eiusdem"
[Ord.
respectu
prol.,q. 1; OTh I, p. 17,lin.15-7).On theequivalence
withthatofapprehending
a mental
sentence
actofforming
it,as admitted
byOckham
105.
seefootnote
in hisearlyepistemology,
63See Quod.Ill, q. 12 (OTh IX, p. 246-50).
64Manyoftheseobjections
Indeedsomeofthemore
withOckham.
didnotoriginate
inQPH.Thusin3.541
himself
werealready
"knock
down"
provided
byBurley
arguments
haecessetvera:
ex rebusextraanimam,
componeretur
(p. 247),we read:"sienunciado
istam
secundum
andin3.623(p. 252):"Sidicatur:
bibit
respon'subjectum
praedicatum'"
estanima'estquoddam
essethomo,quiahaecpropositio
sionem
'corpus
aliquapropositio
ex corpore
et animaet omnetaleesthomo."Theseobjections
correspond
compositum
in Quod.Ill, q. 12.
to thethird
andthesecondofthoselisted
byOckham
respectively
65Ockham's
ifit conwithin
onesingle
ofmindis sometimes
work,
apparent
change
of
Theprooemium
earlier
thantheother.
onepartofwhichwaswritten
tainstwoparts,
two
Aristotel
is a casein point.It comprises
Perihermeneias
inlibrurn
bookI ofhisExpositio
In thelatertext(OPh II,
laterthanthesecond(8-10).
thefirst
(4-7)written
parts,
andthat
realthings
canbe non-singular
denies
boththatthere
p. 361,lin.41-3),Ockham
in theearlier
whereas
one(OPhII, p. 363,
canbe partsofmental
realthings
sentences,
realthings.
canbe non-singular
he rejects
lin.14-9),
onlytheviewthatthere
66The texton whichOckham
is presumably
cannot,
Burley
against
basinghisattack
both
be theonetowhich
Cat,written
refer,
namely
however,
J.WeyandG. Nuchelmans
arenotevencalled"prosentences
thequestionable
after
many
Quod,andinwhich
years
ofOckham's
edition
ofthecritical
inmente"
, refers
Quodlibets
(Wey,theeditor
positiones
doesthe
1toq. 12ofQuod.Ill, p. 246ofOTh IX, andNuchelmans
toCatinfootnote
is rather
source
Ockham's
sameinNuchelmans
1973,p. 219-20).
QPH,written
probable
."
inmente
called
are
sentences
in
which
the
and
before
"propositions
questionable
Quod,
long

19:35:14 PM

214

ELIZABETH
KARGER

targetin mind, none other than his own formerself!67Moreover it is


clear that Ockham's formerselfwould not have been embarassedby the
, any more than Burleywould have
objectionsset forthin the Quodlibets
been; Burley had answered some of those very objectionslong before
they were made by Ockham.68Both would have regarded Ockham's
Quodlibets
argumentsas inferring
onlyapparendyparadoxicalconsequences
fromthe doctrineat hand. In particular,theywould have both accepted
the consequence that we may forma mentalsentencewith thingsexisting at a great distance fromeach other,as well as with thingsone of
which is actingphysicallyon the other.69
All thatis, afterall, requiredis
that we perceive,remember,or otherwiseapprehendthem.
2.2

sentences
Thingsor fictaas terms
ofmental

As is well known,Ockham did not, however,give the same extension


to the word "thing"as Burleyhad. On Ockham's doctrine,thereare no
thingsapart fromindividuals,which all have the same type of numerical identityand whichare all, in the same way,numericallydistinctfrom
one another.70It followsthat,on Ockham's view, any mental sentence,
each term of which is a thing,is necessarilya sentence each term of
which is an individual.It furtherfollowsthat all such mental sentences
will, of necessity,be singularsentenceson Ockham's doctrine.But, of
course, Ockham had no intentionof allowingonly for singularmental
sentences.How did he then conceive of the generalones?
The answer is that, instead of conceivingsuch sentencesas having
common naturesas terms,he conceived them as havingwhat he called
To understand
"ficta"as terms,entitieswhich he also called "concepts."71
67In thefootnote
to Quod.Ill, q. 12inwhich
toBurley
herefers
foot(seepreceding
and rightly
as to an authorhaving
so, to Ockhamhimself,
note),
J. Weyalso refers,
defended
theviewon mental
sentences
underattack.
ThetextbyOckham
to
Weyrefers
is thetextoftheOrdinatio
above.
quoted
68See QPH,3.623, 252,where
answers
thesecondoftheobjections
p.
Burley
quoted
in footnote
64.
69In Cat,Burley
all consequences
ofthatnature
,
cheerfully
accepts
(seeCat,prooemium
C4 va).
sign.
70". . . omnisres
estunaressecundum
numerum
quae nonestpluresresnecessario
et perconsequens
estressingularis"
inlibrum
inPraedicabilbus
, prooemium
(Expositio
Porphyri
"omnis
unitas
realisestunitas
nume2; OPh II, p. 12,lin.79-80).Or,moreconcisely:
ralis"{Ord.
d. 2, q. 4; OTh II, p. 202,lin.22-3).Recallthatthe"unity"
ofa thing
is its
ofbeingself-identical
anddistinct
from
all otherthings
so thatifthere
is only
property
onetypeofidentity,
there
is onlyonetypeof"unity"
andconversely
(seefootnote
22).
71"... idemestsubiectum
inpropositione
etparticulari,
universali
nontantum
inpropoin vocesed etiamin propositionibus
sitionibus
in mente,
sunt;et
quae nullius
linguae

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

215

what Ockhamistfictaare, we need to make an excursusinto Ockhamist


epistemology.
intoOckhamist
2.2.1 An excursus
epistemology
is the assumptionthat,
Characteristic
of Ockham's earlyepistemology,72
thatact
when the intellectproducesa simplebut generalact of thinking,
can
has one and only one object. Thus, the intellect
produce a general
of a rose, thoughnot of any particularrose, an act which
act of thinking
musthave an object,Ockham assumed.73Now thisobject can neitherbe
a particularrose, nor any otherindividual,nor, of course, the common
natureof being a rose, therebeing no such thing.What then can that
object be? It must,Ockham conjectured,be a pure object of thought,
or concept.74
and it is an entityof that sortwhich he calls a fictum
If generalacts of thinkinghaving as theirobject a concept do exist,
a "scientific"theoryof them,scientificin Aristotelianterms,of course,
requiresthat one should explain how they are produced. Accordingto
the causal theoryprovidedby Ockham, any such act, whichis called an
"abstractive"mentalact, has been caused in one of two ways.
Where the abstractiveact is a "primitive"one, an act having as its
object a given concept which has never been previouslygrasped by the
intellect,it must have been produced in the followingway. Its immediate cause was anotherintellective
act, normallyan intuitiveone, whereby
eitherone individualwas directlyapprehendedor, in some cases, several
individualswere. Consider the case where only one individualwas intuitively and clearly apprehended.In thatcase, the conceptwhich forms
inillisnonsubicitur
d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 276,
tantum
(Ord.
conceptus"
aliquares,igitur
lin.1-4).
72Karger1994contains,
in section1.1,an account
ofOckham's
earlyepistemology.
in support
ofmyunderstanding
ofOckham's
references
in thatarticle
Textual
provided
doctrine
arenotrepeated
here.
73
toAdamWodeham,
thisassumption
is mistaken,
yetitis a mostnatural
According
wethink
itis basedon experience.
Ashewrites: . . quandocomonetomake,
because
munis
intentio
itavidetur
nobisquodibiunum-quid
rosaeestinmente,
(Lectura
concipitur"
this
secunda.
vol.III, p. 19,lin.10-11).
PeterAuriol,
. . d. 8, q. 1,9,ed.rit.,
too,thought
fertur
wassomething
he experienced.
As he wrote:
"constat
superrosam
quodintellectus
in Ord.d. 27,q. 3;
etexperitur
illamsibiobiciobjective"
byOckham
simpliciter
(quoted
ofthinking
toillustrate
the
OTh IV,p. 235,lin.14-6).Theexample
ofa roseingeneral
of generalobjectsoriginates
of thinking
withPeterAuriol,as
purported
experience
outin correspondance.
Aurioldidnotaccount
forthispurported
R. Woodhaspointed
wasrejected
in thesomewayas Ockham
andhisaccount
did,however,
by
experience
Ockham
253,lin.7-p.254,lin.8).
{ibid.,
p.
74"... fictum
actumintelligendi
... estilludquodimmediate
termint
quandonullum
(Ord.d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 274,lin.13-6).
singulare
intelligitur"

19:35:14 PM

216

ELIZABETH
KARGER

the object of the subsequentabstractiveact is one which"represents"that


individualand it is, on that account,called a "similitude"of it. Though
the concept representsthat individual,it does so, however,only in that
which the individualessentiallyis. But whateveran individualessentially
is, an individual"of the same species" is too, accordingto the received
doctrine.It followsthat, if a concept representsan individualin that
which thatindividualessentiallyis, it also representsall otherindividuals
"of the same species." Such concepts can, accordingly,be regardedas
each of the feablue-printsor models of those individuals,representing
turesessentialto them,and onlythose,by havingthemselves
corresponding
features.Thus, forexample,a conceptrepresenting
individualswhichare
essentiallycomposite,such as human beings,who are essentiallycomposed of a soul (or of several)and a body, does so by being itselfcomposite. Such conceptsare species-concepts.75
Some primitiveabstractiveacts are, however,caused by the direct
and clear apprehensionnot of one, but of severalindividuals,individuals
whichare, in some respect,essentiallysimilarand, in some respect,essentiallydissimilar.The conceptwhich formsthe object of such an act representsthose individualsin that by which theyare essentiallysimilaror,
in otherwords,in that which each of them essentially,
thoughpartially,
is. Accordingly,
it can stillbe regardedas a similitudeor a blue-printof
those individuals,but a partial one, containing,as it were, blankswhich
could be filledin various alternativeways. Such conceptsare genus-concepts.Note thatno genus-conceptcould have been abstractedfromindividuals which bear no essentialsimilarity
whatsoeverto each other.
Ockham also admits of an abstractiveact, the object or which is the
general concept of actual being. Such an act is caused by the direct
apprehensionof any existingindividualwhatsoever,whetherthat apprehensionis a clear one or not. If the directapprehensionof an existing
individualis sufficiently
clear, then two abstractiveacts will be immeone
the
diatelycaused,
object of which is a species-concept,the other
the object of which is the general concept of actual being. If the direct
75In Ord.d. 8, 3 (OTh III, 214,lin.
that,
q.
p.
20-p.215,lin.10),Ockham
explains
whenever
a species-concept
is "immediately
abstracted
a thing"
naturaliter
from
[abstractus
a re]which
immediate
is "composite"
theconcept
is not"simple"
[composita],
[simplex],
as itwere,of"several
In
beingcomposed,
concepts"
partial
[plures
conceptus
partiales].
other
ifthething
is composite,
so is theconcept
it.Thereason
"abstracted"
from
words,
i.e.a fictum
suchas is,in subjec, "is,in objective
whythisis so is thata concept,
being,
tivebeing,
thething
first
nonsitnisitaleinesseobiecapprehended"
[. . . cumconceptus
tivoqualeestipsumapprehensum
in essesubiectivo].
primum

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

217

is not sufficiently
apprehensionof an existingindividual,thoughintuitive,
act
will
be
abstractive
one
then
clear,
immediatelycaused, having
only
the generalconcept of actual being as its object.76
"
"
Now, mostacts, especiallyif repeated,give rise to a habituswhichis
preservedin the agentand is latercapable of causinga similaract.77This
is true,in particular,of an abstractiveact, caused by an intuitivecognition,and havinga given concept as object. It will give rise,especiallyif
"
"
is
repeated,to a habituswhich is preservedin the intellect.This habitus
will
cause
are
conditions
if
the
of
present,
right
causing,and,
capable
anotherabstractiveact, havingas its object the same conceptas the original one. Moreover,this "second" abstractiveact will be caused without
the agentbeingtherebymade to thinkof any one of the individualthings
caused him to formhis "first"abstracofwhichhad originally
theintuition
tive act withthat concept as object.78Indeed, these things,he may well
have forgotten.
An abstractiveact having a concept as its object can then.be caused
eitherby an intuitiveact or by a habitus.It can be caused by a habitus
,
as
same
the
act
if
abstractive
some
however,only
concept object
having
has been caused in the past by an act of directcognitionof an individual (or of individuals).It followsthat no abstractiveacts havingconcepts
as theirobjects,and hence no general acts of thinkingwould ever have
been caused if the intellecthad never had any directcontactwith particulars.It furtherfollowsthat everyconcept ultimatelydepends for its

76"... nonessetinconveniens
instanti
causaretur
nisialiudobstaret
cogquodinprimo
communisnatura
Priustarnen
et speciei
nitioetcommunissimi
conceptus
specialissimae.
ad iliumconceptum
sufficiunt
speciei
specialissimus,
quamad conceptum
quiapauciora
etperconsequens
sinealioetnone converso,
causari
etitailleposset
priusnatura"
simae,
d. 3, q. 5; OTh II, p. 478,lin.1-7).
{Ord.
77"... omnishabitus
ex quibusgenead actusconsimiles
inclint
immediate
praecise
to
a habitus',
acts
all
acts
rise
Not
lin.
OTh
11-2.
rator"
VI,
403,
12;
give
III,
p.
Rep. q.
I canneverform
I mayhaveseena thing,
often
do not.However
ofintuitive
cognition
can
ofthething
which
wouldcausemetoseeitagain.Onlythepresence
an inclination
causemeto do so.
naturally
78Thussomeone
a concept
oflionforexama givenspecies-concept,
whohasgrasped
should
be assothatthatconcept
seenan individual
lion,andwhohaslearnt
ple,having
hasbeen
iftheright
habitus
can thenlater,
ciatedwitha givenword(theword"lion"),
onceagain,namely
theword,
byan actpartially
formed,
graspthatconcept
uponhearing
madeto recallanyindividual
He doesthiswithout
causedbythehabitus.
beingthereby
non
ethabitoconceptu
habericonceptus,
reintellecta
lions.". . . quiaquacumque
potest
habehabericognitio
etfaciliter
hocpotest
statim
rei,ideoprimoet communius
propter
ressingularis"
turconceptus,
(Ord.d. 22,q. 1; OTh IV,
voce,quamquaecumque
prolata
p. 51,lin.10-3).

19:35:14 PM

2 18

ELIZABETH
KARGER

on the apprehensionof particulars,79


fromwhichOckham someformation
timessays that it has been "abstracted."80
Except that theydo not belong to the world of real things,concepts,
as identifiedby Ockham withficta,
, are quite analogous to the common
natureswhichfeaturein Burley'sdoctrine.Indeed, theseentitiesare analogous in threeways. From an epistemologicalpoint of view, entitiesof
withwhat the intellectgraspsby a generalact
both sortsare identifiable
of thinking,
one wherebyit thinksof something,thoughnot of any individual thing.81
From an ontologicalpoint of view, both sortsof entities
are non-individuals,
both "commonto" individuals,thoughnot,of course,
in the same way, since a common natureis common to the individuals
which participatein it, whereas a fictumor concept is common to the
individualsof which,unrealthoughit be, it is a kindof blue-print.82
From
a logical point of view, both sortsof entitiesare Porphyrianuniversais,
since theyare trulypredicable of many otherentities,being trulypredicable at least of each of the individualstheyare common to.83It seems
thatOckham musthave introduced
forcommonnatures,
fictaas substitutes
in
his
the
mostimportantrlesperformedby comfictafulfilling,
opinion,
mon natures,withoutthe drawbackof an objectionableontology.84
79Thus,a
canbe apprehended
thecorspecies-concept
byan agentuponhishearing
word(seepreceding
haspreviously
beenappreresponding
footnote)
onlyifan individual
hended
andtheconcept
"abstracted"
eveniftheagentlaterforgets
therefrom,
originally
thatindividual.
"... a quocumque
ad prolationem
vocis,
apprehendente
conceptum
primo
antecognitionem
illiusconceptus"
d. 22;OTh IV,
aliquaressingularis
intelligebatur
(Ord.
p. 51,lin.14-6).
80"...
sicfictus
etabstractus
a rebussingularibus
. . ." (Ord.
d.2,
conceptus
praecognitis
75.
8; OTh II, p. 276,lin.6-7).See footnote
q. 81
". . . illudsingulare
sicfictum
. . . potest
vocariconceptus
mentis
et termint
actum
extraet tarnen
intelligendi
quandononintelligitur
aliquaressingularis
intelligitur
aliquid
commune
rebusextra"(Expositio
inlibrum
Perihermeneias
Aristotel
, lib.I, prooemium
7; OPh
II, p. 360,lin.14-25).
82By
to all theindividuals
ofwhichit is a blue-print,
a fictum
or
equallyrelating
is a universal.
". . . illudfictum
et
concept
potestvocariuniversale,
quia estexemplar
indifferenter
omniasingularia
extra"Ord.d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 272,lin.14-5).
respiciens
83". . . illudfictum
... estilludunumquodpraedicatur
de pluribus"
(ibid.,
p. 274,lin.
An Ockhamist
is predicable
ofmanyentities
which
less
13-21).
other,
fictum
mayinclude
include
itis a blue-print
theindividuals
of.Sincea predi, butwhich
ficta
general
always
cationinvolves
theformation
ofa sentence,
theverynotion
thata fictum
is predicable
of
eachoftheindividuals
ofwhichit is a blue-print
thattheintellect
already
presupposes
canform
a sentence
withan individual,
an extra-mental
and
one,as itssubject
possibly
a fictum
as itspredicate.
The analogy
withBurley's
doctrine
is striking
footnote
(see
23).
84It doesnotfollow
thattherewillbe an Ockhamist
to each
fictum
corresponding
Burleian
common
nature.
Therecan be nonecorresponding
to thosecommon
natures
admitted
as beingcommon
toindividuals
which
Ockham
didnotacknowledge,
byBurley
suchas individual
andtheindividual
relational
entities
admitted
quantities
byhissenior,

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

219

2.2.2 An extension
ofsupposition
theory
, Ockham admittedthat,if a mental sentence
Having introducedficta
as its
can be formedwithapprehendedindividuals,possiblyextra-mental,
as
its
and
formed
with
also
one
with
terms,85
terms,one can also be
ficta
as its terms.86
The subject and
an apprehendedindividualand a fictum
the predicateof a mental sentenceis then eitheran apprehendedindior a fictum.
vidual,possiblyextra-mental,
a
Ockham made further,
bold, move: he extendedsuppositiontheory,
originallyconceived to be applied to termsof writtenand spoken sentences,to termsof mentalsentences.He admittedthat,if the subjector
the predicateof a mentalsentenceis an apprehendedindividual,it supHe furtheradmittedthat,if it is a fictum
, it
positsnecessarilyforitself.87
supposits,by its verynature,for the individualsit is common to, those
He did not deny thata fictum
of whichit is a sortof blue-print.88
is, nevtaken
for
itself.
sometimes
as
ertheless,
suppositing
We have seen thatBurleymade the same bold move of extendingsuppositiontheoryto termsof mentalsentences,thoughwe could only conjecture that he probablydid so independentlyof Ockham. Whetherhe
did or not,the resultingtheoriesare clearlyanalogous. On both theories,
individualssuppositnecessarilyfor themselves,whereas entitiescommon
to individuals,thoughtheymay be taken as suppositingfor themselves,
ordinarilysuppositforthe individualstheyare common to.
andgeneral
mental
sentences
2.2.3 Singular
By extendingthe propertyof suppositionto termsof mentalsentences,
whethertheybe apprehendedindividualsorficta
, Ockham was in a positionto accountforgeneralmentalsentences,as well as forsingularones.
If the subject-term
of a mental sentenceis an apprehendedindividual,
seeGat,tr.2, c. 2, sign.E2 rb.On individual
butnotbyhim(onindividual
quantities,
relational
seeGat,tr.2, c. 3, sign.E6 vb).
entities,
85"... ex his(fictis)
forman
turpropositiones"
inLibrum
Perihermeneias
Aristotelu
,
(Expositio
OPh II, p. 360,lin.27-8).
Lib.I, prooemium
7;
86See footnote
83.
87Talking
ofthetruths
inwhich
"Godhimself
issubject"
Ockham
[Deusinsesubicitur],
"... in illis. . . Deussubratione
etprose ipsosupponet"
writes:
deitatis
... et supponet
Ord.Prol.,
q. 9; OTh I, p. 269,lin.29-p.270,lin.3. Thesamewouldholdofanyapprehended
orindeed
ofa mental
sentence:
theindividual
would
individual,
subject,
predicate,
andwouldsupposit
foritself.
supposit
88"... illudfictum
in esse
. . . quoniam
esttalein esseobiectivo
qualeestsingulare
estaliquo
ideoex natura
suapotest
subiectivo,
supponere
proipsissingularibus
quorum
modosimilitudo"
(Ord.d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 274,lin.17-9).

19:35:14 PM

220

ELIZABETH
KARGER

the sentencewill necessarilybe singular,as remarkedearlier.It is genEven so, it need


of the sentenceis a fictum.
eral only if the subject-term
if
is taken as supnot be a general sentence,however,since, thefictum
positingfor itself,it should be regarded as a singularsentence.It will
be a general sentenceif thefictum
suppositsfor the individuals
definitely
it is common to.
Here again, Ockham's theoryis clearlyanalogous to that of Burley.
On both theories,it is the extensionof suppositiontheoryto general
termsof mental sentences,identifiedwith common natureson Burley's
theory,withfictaon Ockham's, which has allowed general mental sentences to be adequatelyaccounted for.
2.2.4

and fictaas signs


Common
natures

The rles played byfictawithinOckham's doctrineare seen to closely


correspondto thoseplayed by common natureswithinBurley's.There is
which we have not yet acknowlhowever,or so it seems,one difference
these
entities
within
their
between
respectivetheories.Whereas
edged
common
insisted
that
natures,though they can be signifiedby
Burley
spoken or writtenterms,are not signs,Ockham regardedfictaas being
signs,89
namelysignsof the individualstheyare common to.
This difference
may be more apparentthan real, however,each author
sense. For Burley,an entityis a sign
the
term
using
"sign" in a different
only insofaras it calls to mind some otherentity.For Ockham, thereis
a sense of "sign" in which an entityis a sign if it is capable of suppositingin a sentenceforotherentities.But thisis a propertywhichficta
have, as we have seen. It is forthisreason,then,that Ockham regarded
fictaas being signs. Now, common natureshave that property,too, on
Burley's theory.It followsthat Burley could have regarded common
naturesas signsif only he had acknowledgedOckham's sense of "sign."
On the other hand, if Ockham had acknowledgedno other sense of
is nota
"sign" than Burley's,he would have had to admit that a fictum
is not a sign in Burley'ssense, at least not of the entities
sign. A fictum
or
it is common to, since, as we have seen, the apprehensionof a fictum
of
of
the
to
think
intellect
does
determine
the
not
any
things
concept
89In a textwhere,
with
hecallsconcepts,
identified
a quotefrom
Aristotle,
commenting
"
animaeet vocessuntquaedamsigna
animae
, passiones
," Ockhamwrites:
"passiones
ficta
sed
nonipsaspassiones
itaquodvocesinstituuntur
ad significandum,
animae,
ordinata,
suntsignaillarum
et aliquomodoillaepassiones
resillasquarumsuntillaepassiones
rerum"
[Ord.d. 22, q. 1; OTh IV, p. 50, lin.4-7).See also Ord.d. 2, q. 4; OTh II,
p. 140,lin.3 andq. 9, OTh II, p. 308,lin.24.

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

221

fromwhichit has been originallyabstractedand to whichit is common.90


A fictum
need not, then,"call to mind" any of the entitiesit is common
to, so thatit is not a "sign" of those entitiesin Burley'ssense.91
The analogy between common natures on Burley's theoryand ficta
on Ockham's is anythingbut superficial.Indeed, it runs so deep that,
as earliersuggested,we mightconjecturethat Ockham introducedficta
to serve the purpose of Burley'scommon natures,which he could not
countenance.92
2.3

The mental
mental
syncategorematics
copulaand other

However that may be, the fact is that,on Ockham's early theory,a
mental sentenceis a sentenceeach term of which is eitheran appreWhat has not yetbeen explained,however,
hendedindividualor a fictum.
is how the intellectsucceeds in forminga sentencewith such entitiesas
its terms.
act?
2.3.1 Can themental
copulabe a mental
In the textfromthe Ordinatio
quoted earlier,of which Wodeham provided an improvedversion,Ockham seems to be claimingthat a mental
90See section
itis
2.2.1aboveandthetextquotedin footnote
where
78,inparticular
hocpotest
said:". . . habito
nonpropter
statim
et faciliter
habencognitio
rei."
conceptu
91It might
be objected
totheSumma
that,
fogicae
according
(parsI, c. 1; OPhI, p. 8-9,
lin.53-65),
where
twosenses
of"sign"
aredistinguished,
there
a senseinwhich
is,indeed,
an entity
is a signofa thing
forthatthing,
a condionlyifitis capableofsuppositing
tionwhich,
is deemed
it beingalsorequired
thattheentity
however,
insufficient,
"bring
thething
intocognition"
in cognitionem
It is in thissenseof"sign"thata
[facit
venire].
is a signofa thing,
ina sensewhich
stillincludes
thenotion
of"calling
tomind"
concept
is signified.
whatever
Ifthisis thedoctrine
in theSumma
contained
thatitmustbe
, itdoesnotfollow
iogicae
inearlier
alsotheonecontained
works.
Letusnotforget
intheSumma
Ockham
that,
bgicae,
hasabandoned
thetheory
towhich
areficta
andhasidentified
instead
according
concepts
withactsofcognition.
trueto sayofan actofcognition
that
Now,itis trivially
concepts
it "brings
a thing
intocognition"
sinceit is thecognition
ofthatthing(or
(orthings)
The samecannotbe saidofficta,
however.
It follows
thatthereis a difference
things).
between
thesensein whicha fictum
is a signandthatin whichan actofcognition
is a
a fictum
in thesensethatitis capableofsuppositis a signofa thing
sign:whereas
only
an actofcognition
is a signofa thing
both
in thatsenseandin the
ingforthatthing,
senseofmaking
theintellect
aware(perhaps
ofthething.
"psychological"
confusedly)
92It is important
torealizethatOckham
didnotintroduce
becausehe hadfound
ficta
thenotion
thata mental
sentence
is composed
ofreally
an "utterly
untenexisting
things
able"one,as C. Panaccio
wouldhaveus believe
thathe did(seePanaccio1992,p. 138).
On thecontrary,
he thenfound
thatnotion
an entirely
he introone.Rather,
acceptable
duced
because
hefound
thenotion
thatsomereally
arenon-individuals
ficta
existing
things
an untenable
forepistemologica!
andlogicalreasons,
nonone,butnevertheless,
regarded

19:35:14 PM

222

ELIZABETH
KARGER

sentence,each termof whichis an apprehendedindividual,is formedby


the act of saying (non assertively)of one individualthat it is identical
(or non-identical)withitselfor withanotherindividual,the copula being
that very act, which naturallyhas the functionof linkingthe individual
to itselfor to anotheras a subject to a predicate.
If this is Ockham's doctrinefor mental sentencesthe termsof which
are individuals,thereis no apparentreasonwhyit shouldnot be extended
to mental sentencesone or both termsof which are ficta.The copula
would then,on Ockham's doctrineas on Burley's,coincidewiththe very
act of formingthe sentence,a mental act by which one term(fictum
or
is
with
another
(or withitself)as a subjectto a predicate.
individual) linked
There is a text by Adam Wodeham where the author,commenting
thatveryselectionfromthe Ordinatio
such a doctrineto Ockham.
, attributes
to
Ockham
had
identified
the mentalcopula with
According Wodeham,
whatWodeham calls a "comparativeconcept"or, as he also says,a "comparativeact." The comparativeacts in questionare acts of the intellect
and
consistingin "comparing"an entity"withitselfor with another,"93
it is by the means of such an act that,accordingto the doctrineattributed to Ockham, the intellectcomposes a sentencewith those entitiesas
In otherwords,Wodeham would have us believethat,accordits terms.94
in a mentalsentencethe termsof which are individual
to
Ockham,
ing
or
the
,
linkage of those entitieswith one anotheris brought
things ficta
about by a mentalact, which is itselfthe copula of the sentence.
A consequence of such a doctrine,however,as Wodeham pointsout,
is that everyact of assentingto (or dissentingfrom)a mental sentence
would be an act which,though"direct"withrespectto the termsof the
sentence,whichare not mentalacts, would be "reflexive"withrespectto
its copula, which is a mental act.95Every act of assent or dissentto a
mentalsentencewould, then,be partlyreflexive.
but
common
toindividuals,
as indispensable.
is a non-individual,
individuals,
Now,a fictum
it is a mereobjectof thought,
It is therefore
nota reallyexisting
thing.
ontologically
as
or so Ockhamthought
at thetime.Onlylaterdidhe cameto consider
acceptable,
helater
ofthings.
untenable
thenotion
thata mental
sentence
canbe composed
Though
howas well,hedidnotdo so becauseheconsidered
their
notion
untenable,
ficta
rejected
toassume
them.
because
he considered
thatitis a superfluous
ever,butrather
hypothesis
93". . . juxtadoctrinam
Ockham
. . . verbum
mentale
estquidamconcepquamscribit
...
secunda
tuscomparativus
eiusdem
ad se ipsumvel ad alterum
(Lectura
comparando"
6, 4,ed.cit
., vol.I, p. 147,lin.3-9.)
prol.,
q.
94"...
format
quandointellectus
componit
aliquidcumaliquo. . . medipropositionem,
antenotacompositionis"
147,lin.5-7).
(ibid.,
p.
95"... quicumque
et
... estrectus
actusassentiendi
veldissentiendi
respectu
praedicati
reflexus
subjecti,
(ibid.,
p. 150,lin.29-32).
respectu
compositionis"

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

223

Preciselybecause it would carry this consequence, it seems to me


doubtfulthat Ockham ever did hold that theoryof the mental copula.
For he certainlyhad reasonto avoid maintainingthatassentingto a menon its own acts.96
tal sentencenecessarilyinvolvesthe mind's reflecting
we findhim
matter
is
in
where
the
texts
discussed,
explicitly
Accordingly,
with
a
mental
the
mental
not
to
act, but with
copula
proposing identify
an apprehendedentity.It is farfromclear what thisapprehendedentity
is supposed to be, however.
2.3.2

and affirmation
as mental
acts
Themental
negation
copulaas an inherence;

of Ockham's early thought


which meets the interpreter
The difficulty
theoriesare suggestedin
regardingthe mental copula is that different
different
texts.Accordingto one theory,containedpartlyin question 1,
the mental
partlyin question 12-13 of the second book of the Reportatio,
copula could, in exceptionalcases, be identifiedwith an apprehended
individualand, in more ordinarycases, with a fictum.
The exceptionalcase is the one where the copula is an apprehended
individualof a veryspecial sort,the existenceof which Ockham admitted only in his early writings,namelya relationalentityof inherence.97
mentalsentence- a trueone- could
The suggestionis thatan affirmative
be formedwitha substanceas one of its termsand a qualityinherentin
it as the other,the "respectus"of inherenceitself,wherebythe quality
inheresin the substance,being the copula.98For such a sentenceto be
formed,a sentencewhich would correspondto "this qualityinheresin
this substance,"it would sufficethat the intellectapprehend the three
The "respectus"of inherence,whichlinksalready
entitiessimultaneously.
in it,
in realitythe qualityto the substance,makingit inhere effectively
would then,in addition,assume the rle of the copula, linkingthe two
96Ockham
Aslongas
admitted
thatevery
actofknowledge
is an actofassent.
always
orficta
as terms,
he furheregarded
mental
sentences
as having
individuals
apprehended
ther
actofassent
hasa mental
sentence
as itsobject(seeKarger1995,
admitted
thatevery
to a mental
werepartly
itwould,
on
section
actofassent
sentence
reflexive,
2). Ifevery
Butthisconthatevery
actofknowledge
is partly
reflexive.
these
havefollowed
principles,
in Quod.
Ockham
wouldhavefound
since,as he laterremarked
unacceptable
sequence,
of
Ill, q. 8; OTh IX, p. 233-4,lin.24-5),thereareunflective
peoplewhoareunaware
their
mental
actsandwhoarenonetheless
capableofknowledge.
97See Ord.d. 30,q. 4; OTh IV, p. 369,lin.21-p.370,lin.7.
98". . . in istapropositione
estdicerequodcopula
[vocali]'Sortiinestalbedo,'melius
comillaminhaerentiam
actualem
[licetnonsupponit
significai
proea]. Et tunctotum
habebit
esseextraanimam,
quiatamextrema
quamcopula"(Rep.II,
plexum
[mentale]
q. 1; OTh V, p. 22,Un.21-p.23,lin.2).

19:35:14 PM

224

ELIZABETH
KARGER

entitiesconceptuallyone with the otheras a subjectto a predicate." As


Ockham himselfpointsout, such a sentencewould be a remarkableone
indeed,since each of its components,includingeven its copula, would be
an extra-mentalthing.100
Even Burley never dreamt of a sentence so
"in
re"!
entirely
The more usual case is one where the copula is not a real thing,but
a fictum
. Though, of course, not an individualinherence,the required
would, nevertheless,Ockham surmises,be common to individual
fictum
inherences.101
Such a copula would allow the formationof many more
sentencesthan the precedingone does. In the firstplace it would allow
the formationnot only of true,but also of falseaffirmative
sentences,the
termsof which are apprehendedindividuals.But it would also allow the
formationof sentencesone termof whichat least is not an apprehended
. Thus a mentalsentencecorresponding
to "a whiteindividual,but a fictum
ness inheresin some man" could be formedwiththe conceptsof whiteness and of man as termsand that of inherenceas the copula.
Not all mental sentencescan be thoughtof as expressinginherence
however.Accordingly,
Ockham suggeststhatthe conceptcommonto individual inherencesmightformthe copula of a mentalsentence,the import
of which is not that of expressinginherence,but ratheridentity.102
A
mentalsentencecould thus be formedof which the concept of angel is
the subject,that of substancethe predicate,and that of inherencethe
copula. Such a sentencewould not say that an angel inheresin a subOckham does not
stance,but thatan angel is a substance.Unfortunately,
99"... si solumhabeam
tuncnon
extremorum,
conceptum
copulaeetnonconceptum
habeonecsubiectum
necpraedicatum.
Sed si habeamconceptum
copulaeet cumhoc
extremorum
. . . necessario
habeosubiectum
et praedicatum"
conceptum
(ibid.,
p. 19,
lin.1-8).Notethathere"conceptus"
is taken,
notas synonymous
with"fictum,"
butin
thesenseof"conceptio,"
an actofapprehension.
Ockham
is saying
forthe
that,
denoting
itsrleoflinking
the"extremes"
to oneanother
as subject
to predicopulato exercise
withtheextremes.
cate,ithasto be apprehended
simultaneously
100See thetext
in footnote
98.
101"Etsicdico quoted
'homini
inestalbedo,'
importatur
quodin iliapropositione
percopulam
in anima... et estcommunis
absolutus
esseobiective
conceptus
qui habettantum
per
inhaerentiae
actualis"
(ibid.,
praedicationem
respectibus
p. 20,lin.15-20).
102"Dicoquod
ad
inhaerentiam
[conceptus
copulae]nontantum
significai
praedicati
subiectum
realiter
a subiecto
et sibiinestrealiter,
sed
quandopraedicatum
distinguitur
estomnino
idemsubiecto
subsuovelquandoilludproquosupponit
quandopraedicatum
iectum
idemcumilioproquo supponit
estomnino
praedicatum.
Exemplum
primi[Sorti
inestalbedo]iampositum
'Deusestens.'
est.Exemplum
secundi:
estsubstantia,'
'angelus
In istisnullaestinhaerentia
a partereiinterpraedicatum
in
et subiectum,
sedtantum
Et hocnonestaliudnisiquodpercopulam
denotatur
conceptu.
quodilludproquosupestidemcumilioproquo supponit
(ibid.,
ponitsubiectum
praedicatum"
p. 20,lin.3-13).

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

225

explain how the concept of inherencecan, in some contexts,come to


expressidentity.
thatthisis so, and thatthe conceptabstracted
Let us admit,nevertheless,
fromindividualinherencesmay serve as a copula expressinginherence
or as a copula expressingidentity.In eithercase, in orderto forma sentence havingthatconceptas copula and apprehendedindividualsorficta
to apprehendthatconcepttogether
as terms,it is necessaryand sufficient
withthoseentities.The conceptservingas copula will thenipsofactoexercise the functionof linkingthe two otherentitiesone with the other,as
a subjectto a predicate.103
The act of apprehendingtwo entities,each of
themeitheran individualor a fictum
, togetherwiththe concept of inherence, is thenan act wherebya mentalsentenceis formedwiththoseentities as its termsand that concept as its copula.
We cannot but notice that,at best, only the formationof affirmative
mentalsentencesmay be accountedforin thisway,however.How should
the formationof negativeones be explained?Ockham's answeris apparendy the following:thereare two ways in which the intellectcan apprehend the entitiesin which the termsof the mentalsentenceconsistand
in whichits copula consists:it can do so affirmatively
thefictum
or negamentalsentenceis formed,in the
tively.In the firstcase, an affirmative
second a negativeone.104
Followingthis suggestion,we would have to say that a mental sentenceis renderedaffirmative
or negativenot by the presenceor absence
of some constituent,
namelya mental sign of negation,but by the way
its termsand its copula are apprehendedby the intellectwhen forming
the sentence.But, if that were the case, a mentalsentencewould never
consistjust of the termsand the copula which the intellectapprehends
when it formsthe sentence,since that entityis neitheraffirmative
nor
A
mental
sentence
would
have
to
with
be
the
identified,
rather,
negative.
of
that
and
of
act
the
which
the
sentence
aggregate
by
compositeentity
is formed,since it is this act which is properlyaffirmative
or negative.
And that aggregatecould itselfbe apprehendedonly by a furtheract.
Since the aggregateis the sentence,it followsthat the act by which the
103See thetextquotedin footnote
99.
104
a givenindividual
whiteness
anda given
Thustheintellect,
intuitively
apprehending
individual
canform
a negative
mental
sentence
actwhereby
both
blackness,
bya mental
that
individuals
are apprehended
withthecopula,on thecondition,
however,
together
be apprehended
these
entities
". . . hietantum
actum:
unum
habeoduplicem
"negatively."
intuitivum
terminatum
ad albedinem
et nigredinem
et aliumcomplexum
quo negatur
albedoa nigredine,
ad copulam
et extrema
negative"
{Rep.II, q. 12-3;
qui terminatur
OTh V, p. 281,lin.1-4).

19:35:14 PM

ELIZABETH
KARGER

226

sentenceis apprehendedwould have to be distinctfromthe act by which


it is formed.But this is whollyat variance with Ockham's early epistemology,according to which the act of forminga mental sentenceand
that of apprehendingit are one and the same act.105I conclude that
Ockham could not have includedthisaccount of how a mentalsentence
comes to be affirmative
or negativein his definitive
doctrine.
2.3.3

39
Themental
mental
as "instituted
copulaandother
concepts
syncategorematics

We should not be surprised,then,if we findOckham, in othertexts,


accountof the mentalcopula and of thatwhich
proposinga verydifferent
rendersa mental sentenceaffirmative
or negative.This account is contained withina more general theoryof both mental syncategorematics
and of mental connotativeterms.That theoryis alluded to in various
places of the Ordinationbut thereis just one textin whichit is described
in some detail.107
Though the theoryalso deals with mentalconnotative
terms,we need considerit here only insofaras it providesan account of
mentalsyncategorematics.
otherthan
Accordingto thistheory,thereare mentidsyncategorematics
the copula, amongstthem a mental sign of negationas well as signsof
and ofparticularity,
quantity,i.e.of universality
propositional
corresponding
to "every"and "some." Moreover,all mentalsyncategorematics,
includare
as
abstracted
the
to
be
identified
with
or
such
,
ing
copula,
concepts ficta
fromindividuals.It is not, however,by virtueof some propertyof the
individualsit is common to that a mentalsyncategorematic
exercisesits
characteristic
rle withina sentence.Rather it does so because the intellect has arbitrarily
investedit with the requiredsemanticand syntactic
properties.
105
The equivalence
between
a mental
sentence
and"apprehending"
(called
"forming"
"
a complexum
itispresupposed
") ispartandparcelofOckham's
early
epistemology,
though
rather
thanasserted
Thepresupposition
is apparent
inseveral
outright.
places.In Rep.Ill,
. . . praesupponit
"iudicare
q. 2 (OThVI, p. 85,lin.14-6),forexample:
apprehensionem
siveformationem
alsoin Quaestiones
, q. 3 (OTh VIII, p. 169,lin.
complexi";
disputable
and,a little
268-9):"... actumquo apprehenditur
compositio";
complexum,
qui dicitur
further
in thesametext(ibid.,
illud
velformandi
p. 170,lin.287-8):"actusapprehendi
complexum."
106
Theseplacesinclude:
Ord.d. 2, q. 9 (OThII, p. 299,lin.3-5);ibid.,
p. 308,lin.12;
Ord.d. 3, q. 2 (OTh II, p. 403,Un.4); Ord.d. 8, q. 2 (OTh III, p. 194,Un.8-9);Ord.
d. 8, q. 3 (OTh III, p. 215,Un.12-3,where,
on Une13,thetermcaUedfor,ifthetext
is tomakesense,
is theonediscarded
however,
carried,
bytheeditors,
byallmanuscripts
not"specificus")
and Ord.d. 35,q. 4 (OTh IV, p. 474,
two,namely
"institutus,"
except
Un.22-3).
107
in Ord.d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 285,Un.11-p.286,Un.22.
Namely

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

227

even the
is thatmentalsyncategorematics,
What Ockham is suggesting
and
with
semantic
which
have
been
invested
or
are
concepts ficta
copula,
As
he
himself
says,they
syntactic
propertiestheydo not naturallyhave108.
are conceptswhich have been "instituted."109
They can then be used in
accordance not with theirnature,in which case theywould be used to
suppositforthe thingstheyare common to, but withtheir"institution,"
in which case theyare used as syncategorematics.
withappropriatesemanIn principle,theintellectcould investanyfictum
could serve as a copula,
tic and syntacticproperties,and thus anyfictum
In practicehowever,
as a sign of negationor as a sign of quantification.
will
it has abstracted
a
which
Ockham surmises,the intellect choose fictum
froma word of some spoken (or written)language which already has
thoseproperties.110
This is not the place to investigatethis intriguingtheoryfurther.Let
us note onlythatit positsmentalsyncategorematics
correspondingto the
of spoken (or written)language. From this it
main syncategorematics
followsthat the qualityand quantityof mental sentencesare accounted
for in the same way as theyare in the case of spoken or writtensenin the
tences,namelyby the presenceof the relevantsyncategorematics
sentence,exercisingthe requiredeffecton the termsand on the sentence
as a whole.
On thistheory,different
thoughit be fromthe precedingone, the act
of forminga mentalsentenceis surelystillto be thoughtof as the simultaneousapprehensionof all the componentsof thesentence.The diffrence
is thatthesecomponentsmay now include a sign of negationas well as
signs of quantification.One may furtherassume that, by being apprehended togetherwiththe entitieswhich formthe termsof the sentence,
each of the syncategorematics
ipsofactoexercisesits appointedrle on the
termsand on the sentenceas a whole. These syncategorematics
can then
be regardedas the means by which the intellectforms,withgiven entiratherthan negative,
tiesas terms,a mentalsentencewhichis affirmative
or vice versa,as well as one whichis particularratherthan universal,or
vice versa.
108
Suchas theproperty
of"signifying
a property
whichsignsof
onlywithanother,"
tantum
cumalio](ibid.,
have[competit
. . . quodsignificet
p. 286,lin.1-4).
quantification
109 . . dicerent
nonsunt
et negativi
et connotativi
syncategorematici
quodconceptus
a rebusexsuanatura
abstracti
... etideodicerent
quod
conceptus
supponentes
prorebus
necconnotativus
nisitantum
ex
necnegativus,
nullus[est]conceptus
syncategorematicus
institutione"
285,lin.11-6).
(ibid.,
p.
1,0". . . potest
. . . hoc
abstractos
a rebusad significandum
instituere
ipsosconceptus
fitconvenientius
abstractos
tamen
a vocibus"
(ibid.,
perconceptus
p. 286,lin.11-4).

19:35:14 PM

228
2.4

ELIZABETH
KARGER
s earlytheoiy
sentences
of Ockham3
ofmental
Summary

Let us reviewwhat we know of Ockham's earlytheoryor mentalsentences.The main featureswe have noted are the following.
The mind can formsentencesthe subject and predicateof which is
.
eitheran apprehendedindividual,possiblyan extra-mental
one, or a fictum
If the subject or the predicate is an apprehendedindividual,it always
, thoughit can suppositforitself,it supsuppositsforitself;if it is a fictum
for
the
individualsit is common to. Subject
its
very nature,
posits,by
and predicateare, of course,linked to each otherby a copula, and the
copula is also an apprehendedentity.
As to the view which should preferablybe held regardingthe nature
of the mentalcopula, Ockham was apparentlyundecided.He considered
two alternativetheories.Accordingto one theory,the mental copula is
either an apprehended respectas
of inherenceor, more usually,a fictum
common to individualinherences.When exploringthis theory,Ockham
apparentlytoyedwiththe idea of makingthe qualityof a sentencedepend
on the way its termsand its copula are apprehended,by assumingthat
or negatively.He hardly
they can be apprehended either affirmatively
could have takenthatidea seriouslyhowever,since it would have entailed
a consequence at variance with his doctrineas a whole.
Anothertheory,which he seems to have favoredover the preceding
to the main syncateone, admitsmentalsyncategorematics
corresponding
written
or
of
Mental
gorematics
spoken language.
syncategorematics,
includingthe copula, are, withinthis alternativetheory,identifiedwith
, used not as signs of the individualsthey are common to, but in
ficta
accordance with the semantic and syntacticpropertieswith which the
investedthem.The qualityand the quantityof a
intellecthas arbitrarily
mental sentencewill then depend on the syncategorematics
it contains
just as those of a writtenor spoken sentencedo.
On both theoriesof the mental copula, a mentalsentenceis thought
of as formedwhen the intellectapprehendssuitableentitiesall together.
These must include three main entities,one of which will exercisethe
rle of linkingthe othertwo as a subjectto a predicate.On one theory
of the mentalcopula, thisrle is exercisedby virtueof the natureof the
entityto which the mental copula is identified;on the other,thisrle is
exercisedby virtueof the fact that the chosen entityhas been arbitrarily investedwith the requiredfunction.
It is time to draw conclusions.How do mental sentences,as conceived
by Burley, compare with mental sentencesas conceived by the early

19:35:14 PM

BURLEYANDOCKHAM

229

betweenthem.
Ockham?Assuredly,thereare some importantdifferences
mental
sentences
as
their
to
terms,entities
may contain,
According Burley,
of
as
real
commonto individuals,thought
things.Accordingto Ockham,
the entitiescommonto individuals,which mentalsentencesmay contain,
are allficta
, thoughtof as havingno real existencewhatsoever.Moreover,
the copula it is identified
by Burleywiththe veryact of formingthe sentence,whereasit is identifiedby Ockham with an entitywhich must be
apprehended,along withthe termsof the sentence,by the intellectforming the sentence.Finally,on what seems to be Ockham's preferredthedeterminingthe quality
ory,mentalsentencescontain syncategorematics
and quantityof the sentence,just as spoken and writtensentencesdo,
whereas, according to Burley,there are apparentlyno other syncategorematicsthan various copulas, the particularcopula determiningthe
qualityand the quantityof the sentence.
Mental sentenceson the theoryof Burleyand mentalsentenceson the
theoryof the early Ockham have, nevertheless,very basic featuresin
common. Firstly,on both theories,a mental sentencemay contain an
individualas one of its terms(or one as each of its terms),an individual
taken as suppositingfor itself.Secondly,thoughon Ockham's theory,a
mental sentencecontainsa Jictum
where the correspondingsentenceon
Burley'stheorywould containa common nature,both thejictumand the
commonnatureare normallytakenas suppositingforthe individualsthey
are common to.
The main featurewhichmentalsentenceson Burley'stheoryand mental sentenceson the theoryof the early Ockham have in common is,
however,the following:theirtermsare apprehendedentities.This holds
of all terms,whethertheyare individualsor generalentitiescommon to
individuals,and whetherthe latterare regardedas reallyexistent,as they
are by Burley,or as existingmerelyas objectsof thought,as theyare by
Ockham. In this respect,mental sentences as conceived by the early
Ockham, have more in common with mentalsentencesas conceived by
Burley than they do with mental sentencesas conceived by the later
Ockham, who identifiedthem and their componentsnot with apprehended entities,but withmentalacts.

19:35:14 PM

230

ELIZABETH
KARGER
REFERENCES

Auxerre:
Firenze
1971.
Lamberti
Alessio1971- Lamberto
), ed. F. Alessio,
Logica
(Summa
Lesrapports
deGuillaume
d'Occam
etdeWalter
1934- L. Baudry,
, in:Archives
Burleigh
Baudry
et littraire
du MoyenAge,9 (1934),155-73.
doctrinale
d'histoire
etThorie
auXIVe
dusigne
sicle
Biard1989- J. Biard,Logique
, Paris1989.
onWilliam
Walter
Treatise
DeSuppositionibus
anditsinfluence
Brown
1972- S. Brown,
Burleigh's
32 (1972),15-64.
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
ofOckham
s Middle
onAristotle
in:
s Perihermenias
Brown1973- S. Brown,Walter
nurley
commentary
33 (1973),42-134.
Franciscan
Studies,
inLibrum
Perihermeneias
Brown1974- S. Brown;Walter
, in:Franciscan
Quaestiones
Burley's
34 (1974),200-95.
Studies,
inWalter
lastcommentary
onthe
arsvetus
Conti1990- A. Conti,
, in:Franciscan
Burley's
Ontology
50 (1990),121-76.
Studies,
Thereception
s thought
inFourteenth-century
1987- W.J.Courtenay,
ofOckham'
Courtenay
Ockham
toWyclif
Oxford
in:A. Hudson& M. Wilks(eds.),From
1987,89England
107.
designificato
universalis
deHarclay:
Gi 1971- G. Gi,Henricus
, in:Franciscan
Quaestio
conceptas
31 (1971),178-234.
Studies,
: Summa
toGuillelmi
deOckham
eds.Ph.Boehner,
Gi& Brown
1974- Introduction
Logicaey
N.Y. 1974,7*-73*.
St.Bonaventure,
G. Gi,S. Brown,
inLibrum
Secunda
Primm
Sententiarum
deWodeham:
Lectura
Gi & Wood1990- , Adam
, eds.
St.Bonaventure,
G. Gi andR. Wood,3 volumes,
N.Y.,1990.
etdesondiscours
dela pensee
Theories
chezGuillaume
, desesobjets
Karger1994- E. Karger,
33 (1994),437-56.
d'Occam
, in:Dialogue,
andAdam
Wodeham
onthe
William
Chatton
, Walter
objects
ofOckham
Karger1995- E. Karger,
33 (1995),171-96.
andbelief
in:Vivarium,
ofknowledge
1973.
Nuchelmans
1973- G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
, Amsterdam-London,
oftheProposition
1991.
etleschoses
Lesmots,
lesconcepts
Panaccio1991- C. Panaccio,
, Montral-Paris
in:Philosophical
From
mental
word
tomental
Panaccio1992- C. Panaccio,
Topics,
language,
20 (1992),125-47.
44
Wood1984 R. Wood,Walter
commentaries
Studies,
, in: Franciscan
Burley's
Physics
(1984),275-303.
Paris
CNRS

19:35:14 PM

Thingsin theMind
33
over"Intelligible
Controversies
Fourteenth-Century
Species
DOMINIK PERLER

/
traditionsubscribedto the
All medievalphilosophersin the Aristotelian
thesisthat materialthingsare hylomorphiccompounds: they consistof
matterand form.On the basis of thismetaphysicalthesistheyalso subscribedto the epistemologicalthesisthat we are able to acquire a cognitionof materialthingsby receivingtheir"formwithoutthe matter."1
This second thesis,however,sparkedan intensedebate in the late thirteenthand the fourteenth
century.How is it possible for us to abstract
or "stripoff" the formfromthe matter?What psychologicalprocesses
are necessaryto do that?And what kindof cognitiondo we acquire when
we receivethe form?
authors
To answer these questions,a number of thirteenth-century
the
Thomas
Duns
them
Albert
Great,
Scotus)
(among
Aquinas, John
and psychologicaltheory:the species
developeda complexepistemological
theory.2
They claimed that the receivingof the formwithoutthe matter
consistsin the factthatthe soul receivesspecial entities,so-calledspecies
which are endowed with a representational
function.In accord{species),
ance withthe traditionaldistinctionbetweenthe sensitiveand the intellectivepart of the soul, the medievalAristotelians
between
distinguished
two typesof species.3
1 See De anima
II, 12 (424al7-21).
2 On theancient
rootsandmedieval
intelliseeL. Spruit,
ofthistheory,
Species
origins
From
toKnowledge
Roots
andMedieval
Discussions
, vol.1: Classical
, Leiden1994;
gibilis.
Perception
K.H. Tachau,Vision
andCertitude
inthe
andtheFoundations
, Epistemologa
AgeofOckham.
Optics
Semantics
1250-1345
, Leiden1988(especially
of3
partI).
themedievais
To explain
therelationship
between
theperceived
andtheperceiver,
thing
alsointroduced
a third
inmedio.
Thisentity
wassupthespecies
typeofspecies,
namely
thething's
form
a medium
posedtotransmit
through
(e.g.theair)to thesenseorgan(e.g.
theeye).SinceI willfocuson thepsychological
thatare
and epistemological
processes
I willnotdiscuss
which
forreceiving
theform,
thisthird
required
played
typeofspecies,
a crucial
roleinphysical
andoptical
Fora thorough
seeK.H. Tachau,
treatment,
theory.
Vision
intheAgeofOckham
der"species
in
andCertitude
, op.cit.,andA. Maier,Das Problem
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:35:21 PM

232

DOMINIK
PERLER

sensibilis
), which
(1) The sensitivepart receivesthe sensiblespecies[species
form
in
a
situation.
as
it
is
concrete
the
Thus,
perceived
represents thing's
the treeexactly
a personlookingat a treereceivessome entityrepresenting
in the way it is givenin thatsituation:as an object witha certaincolour,
a certainshape, etc.
part of the soul
(2) On the basis of the sensiblespecies,the intellective
which
abstractsthe intelligiblespecies [speciesintelligibilis
),
representsthe
pure formof the thing.Thus, afterreceivinga sensiblespecies of a concrete tree the agent intellectabstractsan intelligiblespecies which representsnothingbut the pure formof the tree: the formstrippedof all
individualqualitiesand all perceptualcircumstances.
As soon as someone is in possessionof an intelligiblespecies,he or
she has "assimilated"the thing or is "informed"by the thing,as the
medievaissaid- not because such a person has literallybecome like the
thing(someoneperceivinga treedoes not become like a tree),but because
of that
he or she has acquired a representation
(oftencalled a similitudo)
is
somehow
in the
a
the
means
of
such
representation thing
thing.4By
intellectand can be cognized even when it is not physicallypresentor
no longerexisting.
It is obvious thatsuch an explanationraises a host of questions.What
sensorycontact with the thingdo we need so that we will be able to
receivea species?What ontologicalstatusdoes a species have? And how
exactlyare the two types of species related to the materialthing?All
and
these questionswere subject to heated debate in the late thirteenth
critical
raised
the early fourteenth
Yet
some
authors
not
only
century.5
questionsconcerningdetailsof the species theory,but triedto refutethe
" und
Gesammelte
Mittelalter.
medio
dieneue
des14.Jahrhunderts
, ineadem,
Ausgehendes
Naturphilosophie
des14.Jahrhunderts
zurGeistesgeschichte
, Roma1967,419-51.
Aufstze
4 See forexample
De anima
Albertus
3,
VII/1,lib.3, tract.
, ed. Coloniensis
Magnus,
art.2. Note
Summa
ThomasAquinas,
85,
I,
1968,
223-4;
q.
theologiae
cap. 12,Mnster
" didnot
in the
mean"likeness"
or "similitude"
thatthetechnical
term"similitudo
simply
in receiving
a
theprocess
ofassimilation:
modern
sense.It wasrather
usedto designate
As faras I can see,
similitudo
theperceiver
himself
to theperceived
assimilates
,
thing.
"
" becamea technical
Le
See forinstance
term
century.
onlyin thefourteenth
repraesentatio
trait
del'medeJeanBuridan
, ed. byB. Patar,Louvain1991,liberIII,
[Deprima
lectura]
natuestquodspeciesintelligibilis
estquaedamqualitas
q. 10,457: ". . . imaginandum
dicitur
esseinspeculo,
recte
raliter
sicut
obiecti,
imago,
quaevulgariter
repraesentativa
ipsius
est
inproposito;
estrepraesentativa
reiobiectae
sedsicdirecte
intelligibilis
species
speculo;
intellectui."
reiquaeobicitur
imago
quaedam
repraesentativa
5 For an overview,
see L. Spruit,
., chs.III and IV, and
intelligibilis,
Species
op.cit
XIV
delsecolo
La nozione
ai maestri
F. Corvino,
di "specie
daDunsScoto
agostiniani
intelligibile"
e Ugolino
70(1978),149-78.
daRimini
daOrvieto
difilosofia
neo-scolastica,
(Gregorio
), in:Rivista

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

233

crittheoryas a whole. Ockham, one of the most ferventand influential


and
sensible
He
claimed:
both
ics, sweepinglyrejected
species.
intelligible
onedoesnotneedtopositanything
besides
In ordertohavean intuitive
cognition,
- no species
at all.The proofforthisis: what
andthecognized
theintellect
thing
ofentities
takesplaceby
can takeplacebymeansofa restricted
number
vainly
Butan intuitive
cantakeplacebymeansof(i)the
meansofmoreentities.
cognition
there
Therefore
etc.6
intellect
and(ii)thething
seen,without
beinganyspecies.
To refutethe existenceof species, Ockham obviouslyappeals to his
famousprincipleof parsimony.Since the assimilationof the thing'sform
only requires two entities,namely the material thing acting upon the
sensesand the intellectrespondingto thisaction,it is superfluousto posit
a thirdentitywhich is supposed somehow to mediate between the two.
Not only is the existenceof such a mediatingentitysuperfluous,but it
is even dangerous,because it threatenstheimmediaterelationship
between
the intellectand the extramentalthing.7If therewere a species in the
intellect(or anothertypeof species in the sensitivepart of the soul), the
intellectwould have an immediateaccess only to thisthirdentity,notto
the thingitself.Having such a restrictedaccess, the intellectwould be
like someone who is able to look only at a statue of Hercules, not at
Herculeshimself:the representation
of a thing,not the thingitself,would
be presentto the intellect.8
And if the intellecthad no directaccess to
with the thing.
the thingitself,it could not compare the representation
whether
or
not
the
it
could
not
is
Consequently,
judge
representation
correct.
Ockham's critiqueof the species theoryseems to be motivatedby a
If one
defenceof directrealismagainstany formof representationalism.
to
entities
to
the
of
the
form
representational
explain
appeals
reception
withoutthe matter,one givesup the fundamentalclaim thatthe intellect
6 In11Sent.,
intuitivam
habendam
non
q. XII-XIII(OThV, 268):". . . ad cognitionem
intellectum
et remcognitam,
et nullam
oportet
aliquidponerepraeter
speciem
penitus.
Hocprobatur,
fitperpluraquodpotest
fieri
Sedperintellectum
quiafrustra
perpauciora.
et remvisam,
fieri
sineomnispecie,
intuitiva,
potest
cognitio
ergoetc."In thispassage,
Ockham's
directed
theintelligible
Hisextensive
is mosdy
critique
species.
against
critique
ofthesensible
inInIII Sent
Allreferences
canbe found
., q. Ill (OThVI, 98-129).
species
to Ockham's
workapplyto thecritical
edition
established
Institute,
bytheFranciscan
S. Bonaventure,
OTh = Operatheologica.
OPh = Operaphilosophica,
N.Y.,1967F.;
7 Forthatreason,
Ockham
alsorejects
entities
with"inten(atleastin hislaterworks)
or"objective"
whicharesupposed
to mediate
between
theintellect
and
tional"
existence,
theextramental
See In I Sent.,
in
dist.27,q. 3 (OTh IV, 241),andan analysis
things.
D. Perler,
undreale
. Einesptmittelalterliche
Kontroverse
Intentionale
Existenz
, in:Philosophisches
102(1995),261-78.
Jahrbuch,
8 See InII Sent.
, q. XII-XIII(OTh V, 274).

19:35:21 PM

234

PERLER
DOMINIK

access to the materialthing.In Ockham'sview,the recephas an immediate


tion of the formconsistsin the mere fact that the perceiveris affected
by the materialthingand that such a sensorycontactcauses intellectual
acts- acts that are directedtowardsthe thingitselfand that have this
thingas theircontent.Such a causal relationdoes not requireany rep-

resentingentity.
In lightof thiscritique,thereseems to be a clash betweentwo explanaspecies theoryon the one hand, and
torymodels: the representational
Ockham's strictlycausal theoryon the other. Some commentatorssee
such a clash and understandOckham's rejectionof species above all as
a defenceof directrealism.9Sometimesthe species theoryis even seen
of the early modern "veil of perception"theas a medieval forerunner
a
that
i.e.
as
theory
ory,
posits entitieswhich preventthe intellectfrom
a
access
to
the extramentalworld. Thus, L. Spruitclaims
direct
having
in his recent,verycomprehensivestudyof the species theorythat Duns
Scotus, Ockham's favouritetarget,"seems to share the view that the
species is a veil betweenthe soul and the world."10
is hardly
In the following,I want to show that such an interpretation
adequate if one carefullyexaminesScotus's defenceof the speciestheory,
which was repeatedand elaboratedin detail by some of Ockham's concontroversies
What is at stake in the fourteenth-century
temporaries.11
over species (mostlyintelligiblespecies)is not so much a conflictbetween
as a clash betweentwo metaphysdirectrealismand representationalism
ical models a clash that had far-reaching
epistemologicalconsequences.
To show this,I will firstanalyseScotus's argumentsendorsingthe species
theory(sectionII). Then I will evaluate Ockham's critiqueof thesearguments and analyse his own explanationof the process of receivingthe
thing'sform(sectionIII). Finally,I will draw some conclusionsand try
between Scotus and Ockham
to uncover some of the basic differences
(sectionIV).

9 SeeP. Alfri,
C. Michon,
Nominalismi.
d'Ockham.
Lesingulier
Guillaume
, Paris1989,215-26;
Paris1994,43-9.
dela signification
La thorie
d'Occam,
10L. Spruit,
, op.cit.,266.
Species
intelligibilis
11Themostexplicit
seeCj.Lral,
wasJohnotReading;
defender
oftheScotist
doctnne
doctrinae
Scoti
deReading
denecessitate
Ioannis
, in:Franciscan
Quaestio
Defensio
specierum
intelligibilium.
werealsodefended
29 (1969),66-156.Theintelligible
Chatton;
Studies,
byWalter
species
di
andIntelligible
onSensible
seeK.H. Tachau& C. Luna,Walter
Chatton
, in:Rivista
Species
dellafilosofia,
40 (1985),711-48(especially
storia
742-7).

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

235

II
and the Lectura
on theSentences
In his Commentary
(both in the Ordinatio
),
Duns Scotus presentsa long, elaborate defence of the species theory.12
This defenceis mainlya responseto Henry of Ghent who had launched
an attackagainstany theoryappealing to intelligiblespecies.13According
to Henry,all one can receive fromthe materialobjects are phantasms
( phantasmata
:), i.e. a kind of sensoryimages. It is not the additionalreceivor
abstractingof intelligiblespecies that makes the receptionof the
ing
thing'sformpossible,but the fact that the agent intellectacts upon the
fromthem that makes them reprephantasmsand abstractseverything
sentationsof particularobjects. In doing that,the agent intellectenables
thepossibleintellectto graspthe mere essenceof the objects.The process
of receivingthe formwithoutthe matteris thereforeto be understood
as a three-step
process.When someone looks at, say, a tree,(i) he or she
receivesan innerimage picturingthe treeas a particularobject withindividual qualities,(ii) his or her agent intellectthen "purges"thisimage of
all featuresthatmake it an image of thatparticulartree,and (iii) on the
basis of the universalimage the possible intellectapprehendsthe pure
essence of the tree.14
Henrydenies that,in additionto step (iii),the agent intellectneeds to
producea specialkindof entitycalled "intelligible
species."He also denies
thatthe possibleintellectneeds to receivesuch an entity.Not onlywould
since the phantasmitselfis capable of representing
that be superfluous,
an object and puttingthe possibleintellectin action. It would also have
absurdconsequences.For if the possibleintellectwere receivingan intelligiblespecies,it would take on some entity.But then it would undergo
12Sucha defence
can alsobe foundin theQuestions
on theDe anima.
Sincetheir
is disputed
Studien
Werk
DunsScotus
von
zumliterarischen
,
authenticity
(seeV. Richter,
Johannes
willbe basedon theOrdinatio
Mnchen
andpartly
alsoon the
1985,15-6),myanalysis
Lectura.
Allreferences
to Scotus's
workapplytotheVatican
Omnia
edition
,
(= Vat.),Opera
Civitas
Vaticana1950f.,
and to theWadding
omnia
edition
, Paris:Vivs
(= W), Opera
1891-5.
13SeeHenry
ofGhent,
summarized
Quodlibetum
V, q. 14,ed.Venice1613,f.262rb-va,
and in Led.I, d. 3, pars3,
byScotusin Ord.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1 (Vat.Ill, 201-06),
XVI,325-29).
q. 1
14(Vat.
ofdivine
alsohada theory
In addition
to thistheory
ofnatural
abstraction,
Henry
in
illumination
to explain
thistheory
thecognitive
Scotuspresents
andcriticizes
process.
iteven
Ord.I, d. 3,pars1,q. 4 (Vat.Ill, 126-48).
ButHenry
seemsto haveabandoned
it wasattacked
onthe
before
as S.P. Marrone,
andDunsScotus
byScotus,
ofGhent
Henry
63 (1988),22-57,convincingly
In anycase,divine
, in:Speculum,
ofBeing,
Knowledge
argues.
inHenry's
illumination
isnotmentioned
intheQuodlibetum
V, q. 14.On thedifferent
stages
intellectual
in theThought
see S.P. Marrone,
Truth
andScientific
of
development,
Knowledge
MA 1985.
, Cambridge,
Henry
ofGhent

19:35:21 PM

236

DOMINIK
PERLER

a real change in the way an object undergoesa real change when it takes
on an accident,say a colour. Henry categoricallyrejectssuch an idea:
when the possible intellectgrasps the essence of a thing,it merelyactivates its cognitivefaculty.This is possiblebecause the agentintellectprovides it with the "purged" phantasm.But such a cognitive
change should
not be mistakenfor a realchange. The transitionfroma purelypotential to an actual cognitivestate should not be viewed as if the possible
intellectwere literallytakingon some entity.15
If Duns Scotus wantsto refuteHenry'scriticism,
he has to tackletwo
he
has
to
make
clear
that
the
problems.First,
presence of a phantasm,
no matterhow much it is "purged" or manipulatedby the agent intellect, is not enough to bring about the receptionof the thing'sform.
Second, he has to explain what kind of change occurs in the intellectif
it is not simplya real change.
In his extensiveresponseto Henry, Scotus deals with both problems.
In the Ordination
he adduces fourmain arguments(in the earlierLectura
even six) in orderto show thatthe intelligible
speciesis necessaryin addition to the phantasm.I confinemyselfto presentingand discussingthe
firsttwo of them.
The firstargument,called "the argumentfromthe representing
phanThe phantasm that is received
tasm," can be summarizedas follows.16
froma singularobject always representsthis object under the aspect of
somethingsingular,no matterhow much it is manipulatedor transformed
function
by the agent intellect,because whateverhas a representational
an
a
under
and
certain
cannot
represents object
aspect
simultaneously
representit under anotheraspect. An object, however,can not only be
representedunder the aspect of somethingsingular,but also under the
one
aspect of somethinguniversal.To have a completerepresentation,
needs to representit under both aspects. Therefore,in addition to the
the thingunder the aspect of somethingsingular,
phantasmrepresenting
anotherrepresenting
entityis necessary.This furtherentityis the intelligible species.
This argumentis obviouslybased upon the thesisthata thinghas two
different
Scotus does not give a detailed explanationor
aspects (rationes).
of
this
thesis,but I thinkwe have to understandit in the
justification
15See Ord
. I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 336(Vat.Ill, 203),andLed.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,
n. 254(Vat.XVI,327).
16See Ord
. I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 352andn. 357(Vat.Ill, 211-12and215-16),
and
Led.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 268(Vat.XVI,332).

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THINGSIN THE MIND

237

contextof his general metaphysicaltheoryabout the structureof material things.For Scotus, everyobject consistsof a common natureand a
difference"
thatmakesit somethingsingular.These
so-called"contracting
two aspectsare closelylinked;in extramental
reality,the firstneveroccurs
withoutthe second. But thisdoes not mean that the firstaspect is really
identicalwiththe second or thatit can be reducedto the second. Rather,
distinct:althoughexistingtogetherand formthe two aspectsare formally
ing togethera concreteobject, the two aspects can be conceived apart
fromeach other and are thereforedistinguishable.17
So, if we want to
of an object x, we need to distinguish
have an adequate representation
x
namely(1) representing
carefullybetweentwo typesof representation,
and (2) repdifference)
qua somethingsingular(in virtueof its contracting
resentingx qua somethinguniversal(in virtueof its common nature).18
two different
For thesetwotypesof representation,
devices
representational
are required:the phantasmfor (1) and the intelligiblespecies for (2).
The last claim, however,does not seem to be veryplausible at first
sight.Why shouldn'twe suppose that one and the same device can representan objectundermore than one aspect?We could say,forinstance,
that a pictureof a tree representsthis object under several aspects: qua
somethinggreen, qua somethingflowering,qua somethinginhabitedby
birds,etc. Why couldn't we say in a similarway that a phantasmrepresentsa materialobject under two aspects: qua somethingsingularand
qua somethinguniversal?
in Scotus'ssense,
This objectionoverlooksthe factthatan aspect {ratio),
is not simplya quality.Being green,flowering,
etc. are all visiblequalities,and for everytype of quality thereis a certaintype of phantasm.
The two aspects"universal"and "singular,"however,are not such qualities.They are ratherthe two most basic aspects which a thinghas in
the common nature and the
virtueof its two metaphysicalconstituents,
17On theformal
see Ord.I, dist.2, pars2, q. 1-4(Vat.II, 349-61)and
distinction,
Ord.II, dist.3,parsI, q. 6 (Vat.VII, 484).Fora concise
seeA.B.Wolter,
The
analysis,
Formal
Distinction
Adams(ed.),ThePhilosophical
DunsScotus
, in:M. McGord
,
ofJohn
Theology
Ithaca& London1990,27-41;M. McGord
intheEarly
Universais
Fourteenth
Adams,
,
Century
in:N. Kretzmann
etal. (eds.),TheCambridge
Medieval
, Cambridge
ofLater
History
Philosophy
1982,411-39(especially
414-5).
18Notethatthecommon
in itself
nature
is notsomething
itis indifferent
to
universal;
or singularity.
Butthepresence
ofthecommon
nature
in thething
enables
universality
to represent
thething
theintellect
undera universali
Thatis whyScotusstresses
aspect.
thepointthat,
theuniversal
is onlyinintellectu.
See Ord.I, dist.3,pars3,
strictly
speaking,
q. 1,n. 360(Vat.Ill, 218);Ord.II, dist.3, pars1, q. 1,n. 34 (Vat.VII, 404)andthe
etuniversaux
Relles
intentions:
nature
commune
selon
DunsScot
,
analysis
givenbyO. Boulnois,
in:Revuede Mtaphysique
etde Morale,
97 (1992),3-33(especially
26-30).

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PERLER

These aspectsare alwaysformally


distinct;in extracontractingdifference.
mental reality,one of them cannot existapart fromthe other.If someone thinksthat they are somehow similarto qualities,which are really
distinct(one qualitycan existapart fromanotherquality),he or she overlooks this metaphysicalfact.And if someone thinksthat the two aspects
ought to be representedby one and the same device, namelythe phantasm,he or she behaves like someone- to give a modernanalogy- who
triesto representthe perceptiblequalitiesof a treeand its chemicalstructure with one and the same device. As we need one device for representingthe tree qua somethinggreen (e.g.a drawing)and anotherdevice
for representing
it qua somethinghaving such and such a structure(e.g.
a chemicalformula),we also need two different
categoriesof devicesfor
a
tree
and
qua somethingsingular
qua somethinguniversal.
representing
The fact that we have to deal with two different
aspects is the main
reason why Scotus rejectsHenry'sidea thatthe phantasmitself,provided
it is "purged"of all particularfeaturesby the agent intellect,can put the
possible intellectin action and make it apprehend the thing'sessence.
This would be possibleonlyifthe phantasmsomehowassumedtwo representationalfunctions.In its basic formit would have to representthe
thingas somethingsingular,and in its "purged" formit would have to
representit as somethinguniversal.Such a double functionis impossithe thing
ble, accordingto Scotus,because thephantasmalwaysrepresents
as somethingsingular.No matterhow much it is manipulatedby the
function.(No matter
agent intellect,it never changes its representational
how much the drawingof a tree,representing
it as somethinggreen,is
manipulated,it will never representthe tree as somethinghaving such
and such a chemical structure.We would commita categorymistakeif
we were to appeal to a drawingto representthe chemicalstructure.)
That
is why Scotus stressesthe point that "the phantasmrepresentswith its
entirefunction(secundum
totam
the object as somethingsingularto
virtutem)
the imagination."19
Let me now turn to the second argument,the so-called "argument
The
fromthe agent intellect,"which may be summarizedas follows.20
19Ord.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1, n. 357 (Vat.II, 215):"... repraesentativum
secundum
nonpotest
totam
virtutem
simul
suamrepraesentans
repraesentare
aliquidsubunaratione,
virtutem
suam
idemvelaliudsubaliaratione
sedphantasma
. . . secundum
totam
obiecti;
utsingulare
virtuti
. . ." See alsoLed.I, d. 3, pars3,
obiectum
repraesentat
phantasticae
q. 1,n. 273 (Vat.XVI,334).
20See Ord.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 359(Vat.III, 216-17).
Thisargument
is alsomenin Led.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 275(Vat.XVI,335)butnotfully
tioned
out.
spelled

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

239

agent intellectis a facultythat is able to performsome real operation.


such an operation,it bringsabout somethingreal. What
When it performs
is broughtabout cannot simplybe a phantasmin the imagination;otherwise the agentintellectwould bringabout a sensorystatewhich does not
belongto the intellectualrealm.What is broughtabout by the agentintellect cannot simplybe an act either.For everyintellectualact needs to
have an object,and the proper object foran intellectualact is the thing
underits universalaspect. Therefore,what is broughtabout by the agent
intellectmustbe somethingin the intellectualrealm and somethingthat
providesthe properobject foran intellectualact. This entityis the intelligiblespecies: it makes the thingpresentunder its universalaspect.
This argumentis again based upon the metaphysicalthesisthata thing
does not onlyhave a singularaspect but,in virtueof its common nature,
also a universalaspect.The main taskof the intellectis to make thisuniversalaspect present.To do this,the intellectneeds to be providedwith
a representational
device which cannot simplybe located in a lower facsuch
as
the
ulty
imagination.Only that which is located in the intellect
can make the universalaspect presentto the intellectualacts.
Now one mightobject,fromHenry'spoint of view,thatthe last claim
is not plausibleat all. Why couldn'twe say that the agent intellectsimply acts upon the phantasmswhich are indeed located in the lower senthem,
soryfaculty?
Why shouldn'tthe agentintellectbe able to transform
thusendowingthemwiththe capabilityto make the universalaspect present to the intellect?It seems superfluousto assume thatsome additional
device is needed. One could imaginethatthe agentintelrepresentational
lect acts somehowlike the sun. In spring,when the sun illuminatesthe
plantshiddenunderthe earth,it endowsthemwiththe capabilityto grow
and to make certain aspects (e.g. theirtypicalshape or colour) visible.
Likewise,when the intellectacts upon or "illuminates"the phantasmsin
the sensoryfaculty,it endows themwiththe capacityto make the thing's
universalaspect somehowvisible.
Such an objectionoverlooksScotus's claim that the intellect'stask is
not simplyto act upon the phantasm,but to bringabout somethingthat
belongsto the intellectualrealm.In doing this,the intellectcauses a tranin ordinem),
as Scotus says.21
sition"fromone order to another"(de ordine
By the two ordershe understandsthe sensoryorder manifestin the sensoryfaculty(includingboth the externaland the internalsenses),and the
21See Ord.I, dist.3,
actioterminus
pars3, q. 1, n. 359(Vat.Ill, 217): . . primus
..
in actu,quia'transfert
de ordine
in ordinem
nisintellectus
estuniversale
agentis

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PERLER
DOMINIK

intellectualorder manifestin the intellect.Since the phantasmsalways


remain in the sensoryfaculty,no matterhow much they are "illuminated," theyalways belong to the sensoryorder.
The problemlurkingin the backgroundof this argumentis a fundamental one. How is it possible,Scotus asks, that on the basis of purely
acts? To put
statesan object can become presentto the intellectual
sensory
an
intellectualactivit crudely:how can materialstuffbe the basis for
Scotus says,
ity?No matterhow much we manipulatethe materialstuff,
into somethingintellectual,and it can never
it can never be transferred
by itselfbe the basis foran intellectualactivity.We need somethingthat
is relatedto the sensorystatesbut belongsto the intellectualorder.This
mediatingentityis the intelligiblespecies. It is produced when certain
sensorystatesoccur, but it is primarilyproduced by the intellect,not by
the sensorystates,and it is located in the intellect.In givingsuch an
answer,Scotus triesto finda middleway betweentwo extremepositions.
On the one hand, he avoids a materialistpositionby emphasizingthat
the sensorystatesalone are never capable of causing an intellectualact,
nor are theycapable of providingthe appropriateobject foran intellectual act. No matterhow much these states are manipulated,there is
always a gap between the sensoryand the intellectualrealm. On the
otherhand, Scotus eschewsan idealistpositionby pointingout that the
intellectcan never,by itself,performan act thatis directedtowardssome
materialobject. Such an act always requiresthe presenceof the object.
And the object can become presentonly if it acts upon the senses and
causes a phantasm,fromwhich the intellectthen abstractsan intelligible
; it
species. The intellectcannot create the presenceof the object ex nihilo
needs to have a sensorybasis.22
For Scotus, the comparisonwith the plants illuminatedby the sun
would be misleadingbecause the sun does not have the functionof transferringthe plantsfromone orderinto another.The plantsalwaysbelong
to the physicalorder, whetherthey are in a visible or in an invisible
state.And the aspectsthatbecome visible(shape, colour,etc.) in the illuminatedstateare alwaysperceptiblequalities.The intellect,on the other
hand, has preciselythe functionof transferring
somethingfromone order
to
intellectis not simplya
the
to another.And what becomes present
22Thismid-way
in Scotus's
ofthecausesofa cogis apparent
longdiscussion
position
to thesensesneedto co-operate
nition.
He claimsthatthesouland thething
present
alone
Neither
thesoulnorthething
etobiectum
concurrere
animam
praesens").
("oportet
iscapableofcausing
a cognition.
See Ord.
I, dist.3,pars3,q. 2,n.486-9(Vat.Ill,289-90).

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

241

perceptiblequalitybut an aspect the thinghas in virtueof its common


nature,one of its most basic constituents.
What is the thrustof the two argumentsI have presentedso far?Both
are obviouslybased upon a metaphysicalthesisand need to be evaluated
in lightof this thesis.For Scotus, everythinghas both a universaland
a singularaspect because it consistsof a common nature and a conIf we want to have a full cognitionof a thing,we
tractingdifference.
need to take into account bothaspects. The thing'suniversalaspect can
neitherbe eliminatednor reduced to its singularaspect. Likewise,the
the universalaspect can neicognitivedevicesnecessaryforrepresenting
ther be eliminatednor reduced to those necessaryfor representing
the
singularaspect. This is one of the main reasons why Scotus claims that
we need to distinguishbetween two typesof cognition.23
In an intuitive
a
we
under
its
a
as
cognition cognize thing
singularaspect:
thingthat is
and
to
actuallyexisting
present us. To gain such a cognition,we only
need to be in a sensorycontactwith the thing.In an abstractive
cognition,however,we cognize a thingunder its universalor essentialaspect
(sub ratione
quidditativa
): as somethingthat is not physicallypresentand
not
be
might
actuallyexistingbut that is presentin its pure essence.24
To gain thissecond kindof cognition,we need peculiarcognitivedevices,
the intelligible
species,which make the thingpresentto the intellect.
Scotus's
thesisthatwe need peculiarcognitivedevicesforthe secYet,
ond type of cognitiondoes not amount to the claim that these devices
preventthe intellectfromhavingan immediateaccess to the thing.The
intelligiblespecies are that by which a thingis cognized under its universalaspect,not at all thatwhichis immediatelycognized(exceptin the
case wheresomeone reflectsupon the way he or she cognizes the thing
under its universalaspect). That which is immediatelycognized is the
thushaving
thingitself the thinginsofaras it is the objectof the intellect,
an "objectiveexistence"(esseobiectivum
The
).25
intelligiblespecies do not
formany kind of veil behindwhich the extramentalthingsare somehow
23Thisis,ofcourse,
nottheonlyreason.
Therearealsotheological
reasons
forthis
as a Science
as S.D. Dumont,
andDunsScotus's
Distinction
between
Intuitive
distinction,
Theology
andAbstractive
64 (1989),579-99,
out.
, in:Speculum
Cognition
rightly
points
24See Quodl.
ofthispassage,
see
q. 13,n. 9 (W XXV,522).Foran extensive
analysis
L. Honnefelder,
Ensinquantum
ens.
DerBegriff
desSeienden
derMetaphysik
ab solchen
alsGegenstand
nach
derLehre
desJohannes
DunsScotus
, Mnster
1979,218-31.
25Notethatthething
with"objective
is nota kindofthird
existence"
butthe
entity
itself
insofar
as itis theobjectoftheintellect.
I discuss
Am
thispointin myWhat
thing
I Thinking
About?
DunsScotus
andPeter
onIntentional
Aureol
32 (1994),
, in:Vivarium,
Objects
72-89.

19:35:21 PM

242

PERLER
DOMINIK

hidden. The veil metaphor,oftenused to characterizethe modern theoryof ideas,26is inappropriatefora descriptionof Scotus'stheorybecause
the intelligiblespecies do not hide anything.On the contrary,theyare
the indispensablemeans the intellectneeds to have access to the thing's
universalaspect.Had the intellectonlythe phantasms,it would onlyhave
access to the actuallyexistingthing,presentqua somethingsingular.
A more appropriatemodernmetaphorforcharacterizing
Scotus's theory would be thatof the microscope.By lookingthroughthe microscope
one is able to see some microbiologicalaspects that are inaccessibleto
the unaided senses.Likewise,by usingthe intelligible
species the intellect
is able to grasp the thing'suniversalaspect that is inaccessibleto the
senses and to the unaided sensoryfaculty.The crucial point is that the
intelligiblespecies,like the microscope,is that bywhichsomethingis seen
under a certainaspect, not at all that which is seen.
One problem still remains.In my shortpresentationof Henry's critique I pointed out that the introductionof intelligiblespecies seems to
amount to the introduction
of a "real change" in the intellect.In receiva
the
intellect
to take on an accidentin the same way
seems
ing species,
that an object takes on an accident when it receivesa quality,say, a
colour. Thus, the intellectinvolvedin long cognitiveprocessesseems to
be continuallytakingon accidentsand thus to be in a continualprocess
of "real change." How can Scotus avoid this odd consequence?
To answer this question,we need to take into account that Scotus
between two kinds of change. He concedes that
carefullydistinguishes
thereis a "real change" in the intellectinsofaras the intellectperforms
a real operation.But thisdoes not mean thatthe intellecttakeson some
accidentin the way an object takes on a quality,say the colour brown.
For an object takingon the colour brown literallybecomes brown,but
the intellect"takingon" the intelligiblespecies representingsomething
brown does not become brown. The fact that the intellectundergoesa
"real change" simplymeans that the intellectproduces some device to
make the object present.But the device itselfis not brown,nor does it
make the intellectbrown.(When I look througha microscopeto see, say,
a virus,the microscopeitselfdoes not become infectedby the virus,nor
does it infectme. The microscopeis nothingbut a device I use to make
the virus cognitively
presentto me.) Scotus claims that it is the process
26It becamepopular
Hume:
Central
influential
workLocke,
J. Bennett's
through
Berkeley,
Themes
usedbyL. Spruit
, Oxford
1971,69,andwasrecently
(seeaboven. 10)to characterize
Scotus's
position.

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

243

of makinga thingpresentthatis relevanthere. Wheneversuch a process


occurs,the intellectundergoesan intentional
change which is to be disreal
tinguishedfromthe
change:
I saythattheintellect
is notonlyreally
affected
bytherealobjectwhenitimpresses
It is alsointentionally
sucha realspecies.
affected
as theobject
bythisobjectinsofar
Andthissecondaffection
shines
is the"receiving
of
(or:change)
up in thespecies.
an understanding."27
By makinga distinctionbetween two ways of being affectedor two
kindsof change,Scotus emphasizesthe factthatsomethingmore is occurring than the productionand the use of some device, which is indeed
somethingreal. What is occurringin additionis an intentionalor cognitivechange: the object becomes present(or "shines up") under its universal aspect. To use the modern microscopemetaphor,we may say:
what happenswhen we look at a thingthrougha microscopeis not only
something"real," namelyour use of a technicaldevice. What happens
in additionis a cognitivechange: the microbiologicalfeatureshitherto
invisibleto us become visible.And what undergoesthischange is not the
thingitself,forit always remainsthe same, whetheror not it is looked
at throughthe microscope.Instead,it is we who are changed in a certain way, because we gain an insightinto the thingwe did not have
- we are
before
to thething.Likewise,
changedin our cognitiverelationship
we are somehow changed when we "look at" a thingby means of an
intelligiblespecies because the thingbecomes present to us under an
aspect thathad hithertobeen inaccessible.
Ill
In his Commentary
on theSentences
, Ockham examinesScotus's defenceof
the speciestheorybut rejectsit aftera detaileddiscussion.He repeatedly
pointsout thatthe species are not requiredfora cognitiveprocess.Such
a process can be explained with referenceto two entitiesonly, namely
the materialthingactingupon the senses and the intellectrespondingto
this action.28Anyone who posits a species mediatingbetween the two
positsa superfluous
entityand therebyviolatesthe principleof parsimony.
27Ord.I, dist.3,
non
pars3, q. 1, n. 386 (Vat.Ill, 235):". . . dicoquodintellectus
tantum
ab obiecto
realiter
talemspeciem
sedetiamab
reali,imprimente
patitur
realem,
ilioobiectout relucet
in speciepatitur
intentionali:
et illa secundapassioest
passione
intellectionis
. . See alsoLed.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 298(Vat.XVI,345).
'receptio
28See InII Sent.
, q. XII-XIII(OThV, 268-76).

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DOMINIK
PERLER

One mightimmediatelyrespondto such a critiquethatthe speciesare


not superfluous.
Afterall, theyassumean important
as the analyfunction,
sis of Scotus's argumentshas shown.They make it possibleforan object
to become presentunderits universalaspect.This functionis not assumed
by any other entity.Anticipatinga possible objection,Scotus pointsout
thatany appeal to the principleof parsimonyoverlooksthisfunctionand
is thereforeillegitimate:
Ifyouareobjecting:
"oneshouldnotposita plurality
wherethereis no necessity;
thereis no necessity
thatthereis a necessity
when
here,therefore
etc.,"I answer
theperfection
ofnature
it.Foralthough
thissubject,
a humanbeing,
can
requires
havean objectpresent
<to him>in a phantasm
becausehe is a human
nevbeing,
ertheless
thehuman
intellectual
inasmuch
as itis intellectual,
doesnothave
nature,
ifithastheobjectonlyina presence
theobjectsufficiently
from
the
present
begged
phantasy.29
If therewere no intelligiblespecies, an object would be presentonly
insofaras it is presentin the phantasy;its presencewould be "begged"
fromthis lower faculty,as Scotus metaphorically
says. But in the phantasy,an object is presentonly underits singularaspect. To make it present under its universalaspect, a special device is required.
How can Ockham appeal to the principleof parsimonyin lightof this
response?How can he maintainhis claim thatthe speciesare superfluous
entitieswithoutneglectingthe functionScotus attributesto them?
Ockham chooses a radical strategy.He denies that the species have a
specificfunctionto assume by denyingthat an object has any universal
aspect that should be made presentto the intellect.Replyingto Scotus,
he claims:
I saythatthere
in a thing,
arenottworepresentable
oneofwhich
(rationes)
aspects
is represented
tothephantasy
totheintellect.
andtheother
Therearenottwosuch
ina thing,
thecontracted
nature
andthecontracting
because
aspects
namely
property,
is in a thing
whatever
is singular
. . .30

29Ord.I, dist.3, pars3, q. 1, n. 369 (Vat.Ill, 224):"Si obicias'pluralitas


nonest
- respondeo:
nisiubiestnecessitas,
hicnonestnecessitas,
necessitas
ponenda
ergoetc.,'
estquandoperfectio
naturae
hoc requirit.
Licetautemhocsuppositum
quodesthomo,
inphantasmate,
habereobiectum
natura
intellectupossit
quiahomoest,tamen
praesens
alishominis,
ut intellectualis
sufficienter
si nonhabet
est,nonhabetobiectum
praesens
nisiin praesentia
a virtute
tastica."
mendicata
ipsum
phan
30InII Sent.,
q. XII-XIII(OThV, 303):". . . dicoquodnonsuntduaerationes
repraein re quarum
sentabiles
unarepraesentatur
et alia intellectui.
phantasiae
Quia nonsunt
taliaduoin re,natura
scilicet
contracta
etproprietas
estin re
contrahens,
quiaquidquid
..
estsingulare

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

245

Ockham's critiqueis obviouslydirectedagainstthe metaphysicalbasis


of the species theory.Since an object has no universalaspect, there is
no need fora peculiardevice thatshould make thisaspect presentto the
intellect.In denyingthat an intelligiblespecies is requiredforthe cognitive process,Ockham does not so much oppose the thesisthat thereis
a thirdentitypreventingthe intellectfromhaving an immediateaccess
to the extramentalobject. He ratheropposes the thesis that the thing
itselfhas a universalaspect that should be made presentto the intellect.
That is, he opposes Scotus's metaphysical
thesis concerningthe internal
structure
of a thing.
Ockham opposes this thesisabove all because he takes it to be incoherent.He points out that a concrete thingis somethingsingular,as
everyoneincludingScotus grants,and therefore
something"determined,"
i.e.something
and differing
fromall otherthings.
havinga unique structure
But if such a thinghad a universalaspect in virtueof a common nature,
it would have to be something"indifferent"
as well, i.e. somethingthat
does not differfromall other things.For what is universalis precisely
somethingthat can be instantiatedin many things,and thus something
"indifferent"
to many things.Therefore,the claim that a singularthing
has a universali
aspect amountsto the claim thata singularthingis someand somethingindifferent.
determined
Such a claim is a blatant
thing
incoherencein Ockham's opinion.31
Given this incoherentmetaphysicalthesis,Ockham thinksthat the
whole epistemological
theoryfoundedupon thisthesisis incoherent.Since
a singularthingdoes not have a universalaspect,thereis no need fora
special device to representthisalleged aspect.All thatcan be represented
is the singularthingas it is given in a concreteperceptualsituation:
Therefore
I saythattheintellect
thesingular
knows
as it is here
intuitively
thing
andnow,according
to all theconditions
underwhich
thesenseknows
itas wellas
tomoreCother
conditions>.32
according
It becomes clear fromthis affirmation
that Ockham rejects a thesis
thatwas sharedby manymedievalAristotelians.
When theseauthorsdishow
cussed the questionof
the intellectcognizesa thingby receivingits
formwithoutthe matter,theyalways assumed that the formor essence
31SeeInII Sent., XII-XIII(OthV, 299)andmoreextensively
InI Sentdist.2, q. 4
q.
(OTh 108-22).
32InII Sentq. XII-XIII(OThV, 284):"Ideodicoquodintellectus
intuitive
cognoscit
uthicetnuncetsecundum
omnes
condiciones
secundum
sensus
singulare
quascognoscit
etetiamsecundum
plures."

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PERLER
DOMINIK

is somethinguniversal
, somethingthat does not existby itselfbut that is
instantiatedin the concrete,enmatteredthing. Given this assumption,
they thoughtthat the intellectis able to receive the formwithoutthe
For Ockham,
matteronly by "strippingoff" all the individualfeatures.33
there
a
common
Nor
is
naturethat
no
universal
form.
there
is
however,
All
could be separated by the intellectfromthe contractingdifference.
with
individual
the
its
nature:
there is in realityis the individualthing
thing"as it is here and now." Therefore,receivingthe formwithoutthe
mattercannot be a process of "strippingoff"the universalformfromits
individualfeatures.It can only be a process based on a causal relation
between the thingand the intellect:wheneverthe thingacts upon the
the intellectperformsacts thatare
sensesand causes sensoryimpressions,
directedtowardsthis thing.Strictlyspeaking,nothingis receivedin the
intellect.The intellectmerelyreacts to the causal inputsstemmingfrom
the thing"as it is here and now."
Obviously,Ockham does not wish to explain the process of receiving
entitiessuch as
the formwithoutthe matterby appealingto representing
the intelligiblespecies. But the main reason for that is not that he tries
to avoid some kind of veil between the intellectand the extramental
world. His rejectionof representingentitiesis rathermotivatedby his
rejectionof the assumptionthatthereis a universalformto be received.
Now, one may object against this strategythat Ockham overlooks
an importantpoint in Scotus's argument.Even if thereis nothingbut a
causal relationbetweenthe individualthingand the intellect,one has to
explain how there can be such a relation,given that the thingmerely
bringsabout sensorystates by acting upon the senses. How can these
stateshave an impacton intellectualacts? How can therebe a transition
fromsomethingphysiologicalto somethingintellectual?One crucialtask
of the speciestheoryis to answerthisquestion.For the speciesare exactly
thoseentitiesthatmake such a transition
possible.They enable the intelin ordinem),
lect to make a transfer"fromone order to another"{deordine
as Scotus says.34
In his responseto this objection,Ockham grantsthat thereis a transitionto be explained.But he claims thatthe explanationthe speciesthe33See forinstance
Summa
ThomasAquinas,
I, q. 86,art.1. Thisis,ofcourse,
theobgiae
it as thecommon
buthe reports
notScotus's
, q. 9 (W XXV,
Quodl.
position.
position,
intellecesseperse objectum
reimaterialis
omnes,
385):". . . secundum
quidditas
potest
hocest,abstractio
a
in objectoimmaterialitas,
tusnostri,
sedtantummodo,
si requiritur
hocest,
sitimmaterialis
materia
etex hocsequitur
terminative,
individuali,
quodoperado
ad objectasingularia
materialia."
indifferens
34See above
n. 21.

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

247

at all. For thistheorysimplypositsan entity


ory givesis not satisfactory
thatsomehowmediatesbetweenthe two orders.Both the thingbringing
about the sensorystatesand the intellectreactingto these statesare said
to be the "partialcauses" of the intelligiblespecies.35But how can there
be a material(or sensory)cause and an intellectualcause for a single
entity?And what statusdoes thisentityhave halfsensoryand halfintellectual? Ockham thinksthat the very same problem the species theory
startedwithshowsup again. If one simplyassumesthatthereis an entity
thatsomehowmakes the bridgebetweenthe sensoryand the intellectual
order,one stillneeds to explain how such a bridge can simultaneously
belong to two orders.In Ockham's view, such a mysterious
bridgeis no
help at all. Instead of positinga mediatingentityone may equally well
affirmthat the sensorystatesare the immediatecause of the intellectual
acts. He concludes:
Asyouclaimthatthecorporeal
canbe a partial
causeforthecausation
ofthespecies
in thespiritual
I claimthatthecorporeal
is a partial
causeforthecausation
realm,
ofan understanding
in thespiritual
realm.36
Let me illustratethis critiquewith an example. When someone looks
at a tree,he or she acquires some visual states.These states obviously
belongto the sensoryrealm. How can theycause an intellectualact that
is directedtowardsthe tree?The defendersof the species theorywould
answerthatthe sensorystatesas a partialcause, togetherwiththe intellect as the otherpartial cause, bringabout an intelligiblespecies representingthetree.This speciesmakesit possiblethattherebe an act directed
towardsthetreebecauseit makesthetreepresentto theintellect.
Ockham's
reactionto this explanationwould be as follows:why do you posit a
species with a hybridstatus partlycaused by the sensorystates,partly
by the intellect to make the treepresentto the intellect?You mightas
well say thatthe treemakesitselfpresentto the intellect,giventhereare
appropriatevisual states.And you don't resolvethe problemof the transitionfromthe sensoryto the intellectualrealm by positingthe species,
because you stillhave to explain how this entitycan be caused both by
somethingsensoryand by somethingintellectual.
Of course,such a replydoes not fullyexplain the problemof how the
treemakesitselfpresentto the intellectwhen thereare appropriatevisual
states.What kind of relationis therebetween the visual statesand the
35Scotusmakes
thisclaimin Ord.I, dist.3, pars3, q. 2, n. 486(Vat.Ill, 289).
36InII Sent
esse
., q. XII-XIH(OThV, 275):"Velsicuttuponisquodcorporale
potest
causapartialis
ad causandum
inspirituali,
itaegoponoquodcorporale
estcausa
speciem
ad causandum
in spirituali."
intellectionem
partialis

19:35:21 PM

248

DOMINIK
PERLER

intellectualacts? As far as I can see, Ockham does not give an explicit


answer to this question. He confineshimselfto saying that the visual
statesare a cause of the intellectualacts withoutspellingout the details
of this causal relation.But I thinkthat this relationand the so-called
transitionfromthe sensoryorder to the intellectualone are not a real
issue for him because he takes it for grantedthat all the parts of the
fromeach other,forma unity.37
soul, thoughdiffering
Therefore,there
is no gap betweenthe statesof one part and thoseof another.Both sensoryand intellectualstatesare occurringin one and the same soul. Unlike
Scotus, Ockham does not thinkthat the two kindsof statesare categorSo he does not have to deal with the problem of how
ically different.
therecan be a causal relationbetweentwo categoricallydifferent
states,
or of how therecan be a transitionfromone order to the other.Since
the sensitivesoul and the intellectivesoul are nothingbut two potencies
of one and the same substance,the sensoryand the intellectualstatesare
also statesof one and the same substance.
There is anotherobjectionone mightraise againstOckham's rejection
of the species. As has become clear in the last section,the species plays
a crucialrole in Scotus'sdistinction
betweenintuitiveand abstractivecognition.In the case of an abstractivecognition,when the cognized thing
is not existingor not physicallypresent,the intellectneeds some representingentityto make the thingpresent.In such a case, thethingbecomes
presentin its mere essence (sub ratione
quidditativa
:), regardlessof its existence. Thus, when thereis no concretetriangleI can look at, I need a
to make the triangle'sessencepresentin abstractionfrom
triangle-species
its existence.Were there no such species, I would not be able to performan act directedtowardsthe triangle.How can Ockham explainsuch
a case withoutappealing to an intelligiblespecies?
His answerto thisquestionis based upon a redefinition
of abstractive
Unlike
Scotus
who
claimed
that
intuitive
cognition.
cognitionis about the
singular,existingthingand abstractivecognitionabout the essence of the
thing,Ockham holds that both types of cognitionare about the very
same thingunder the same aspect (sub eademratione).38
They differinsofar as intuitivecognitionis always accompanied by a judgementabout
the existenceor non-existenceof the thing,whereasabstractivecognition
37See on theintellective
partIn II Sent.,
q. 20 (OThV, 435-43)andon thesensitive
In III Sent.
, q. 4 (OTh VI, 135-39).
part
38In I Sent.,
a parte
et subeademratione
prol.,q. 1 (OTh I, 36): . . idemtotaliter
obiecti
estobiectum
intuitivae
et abstractivae
<notitiae>."

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

249

lacks such a judgement.39Abstractivecognitionis thereforenot a cognitionof a special aspect; it is merelya cognitionthat is neutralwith
regardto the existenceor non-existenceof the thing.This is the case
when I cognize a trianglein a case where no triangleis physicallypresent to me. I merelycognize a triangle(a singularthing,nota universal
essence)and I withholdmy assent to its existenceor non-existence.To
do that,I do not need any representing
entitythat makes the triangle
presentto my intellect.
However,such an answerdoes not seem to resolvethe problem.How
can I make the trianglepresentto my intellectif thereis no concretetriangle I can look at? Do I not need some proxyforthe lackingtriangle
an intelligible
species that makes the trianglepresent?Ockham categoridenies
the
need forsuch an additionalentity.All I need in such a
cally
case is a previousintuitivecognitionor a seriesof such cognitions.These
, i.e. a dispositionto performan
cognitionsbringabout a certainhabitus
act of a certaintype.40Thus, when I look at a concretetrianglemany
timesand when I therefore
have manyintuitivecognitionsof the triangle,
I acquire a dispositionto performa certaintypeof act. This disposition,
not an intelligible
species,enables me to have an abstractivecognitionof
a triangle.For it is this dispositionthat enables me to bringabout acts
thatare similarto the previousones so that I can make a trianglepresent to my intellecteven when no triangleis physicallypresent.
This explanation,linkedto a complex theoryof memory,engendered
a long controversy
among Ockham's contemporaries.
John of Reading,
a defenderof the Scotisttheory,pointed out that a simple habitusdoes
not sufficeto cause an abstractivecognitionwhen the object is no longer
present.For the habitusmust not only cause later acts of a certaintype,
it mustalso representthe non-presentobject in theselater acts. But how
can a mere dispositionrepresentan object?John thoughtthatit is never
able to assume this function.Only a species which is endowed with a
functioncan do that.41
representational
For the moment,I will not furtheranalyse this controversy
over the
functionof the habitus.*2
What I want to stressis the basic metaphysical
point in Ockham's argumentabout abstractivecognition.Since in his
39See InI Sent
., prol.,q. 1 (OTh I, 31).
40On thefunction
ofthehabitus
, see In II Sent.,
q. XII-XIII(OTh V, 262,264-65,
271-72).
41See G. Gi,"Quaestio
Ioannisde Reading
de necessitate
intelligibilium.
specierum
doctrinae
Defensio
Scoti,"op.cit.,(especially
149-51).
42Fora detailed
seeM. McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, NotreDame 1987,
analysis,

19:35:21 PM

250

DOMINIK
PERLER

we
opinion a thingdoes not have two formallydistinctaspects (rationes),
cannot distinguishtwo types of cognitionby attributingone aspect to
each. Abstractivecognitioncannot be about the universalaspect because
thereis no such aspect in the thingitself.Consequently,thereis no need
to make thisaspectpresentby means of an intelligible
species.If we want
to make a distinctionbetween two types of cognition,this distinction
in the object,but upon our way
should be based not upon a difference
of cognizingthisthing,namelywithor withouta judgementof existence.
IV
Let me now draw some conclusionsand pointout the basic differences
between Scotus and Ockham. I hope this will shed some lighton the
of the whole controversy
over intelligiblespecies.
underpinnings
betweenthe two authors
First,it has become clear thatthebasic conflict
is a metaphysicalone and not, or at least not primarily,an epistemologica! one. Since Scotus startsfromthe premises(i) that everyconcrete,
materialthinghas a universalaspect and (ii) that this aspect cannot be
identifiedwithor reduced to the singularaspect,he is compelledto take
these premisesinto account when he deals with the problem of representation:an adequate representation
of a thinghas to be a representation of bothaspects,and we need a representational
device for each of
them.Ockham, however,rejectsthe metaphysicaldistinction
betweentwo
aspects and consequentlyrejectsthe distinctionbetweendifferent
representationaldevices: given that there is nothingbut the singularthing,
there is no need for a special device to representthe alleged universal
aspect. His critiqueof the species theoryis mainlya consequence of his
doctrine.That is whyhis critiqueshould
rejectionof Scotus'smetaphysical
be evaluated in light of the metaphysicalconflict.Whetheror not his
rejectionof the intelligiblespecies is convincingdepends on an answer
to the questionwhetheror not his rejectionof a non-reduciblecommon
nature,responsibleforthe universalaspect of a thing,is convincing.Such
an evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper.43But I thinkthat it
should not be neglectedin furtherstudies.

Mental
inLater
Medieval
515-25.See alsoM. Tweedale,
in:J.-C.
Scholasticism,
Representations
Smith
Historical
Foundations
Science
, Dordrecht
1990,35-51(especially
(ed.),
of
Cognitive
42).
43Foran excellent
DoesScotus'
Doctrine
onUniversais
Make
seeM. Tweedale,
evaluation,
in: O. Pluta(ed.),DiePhilosophie
im14. und15.Jahrhundert
, Amsterdam
1988,
AnySense?,
103-18.

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

251

Second, the metaphysicalconflictbetween the two authors is also


responsiblefortheirdisagreementin explaininghow the intellect"assimilates"itselfto the thingwhen it receivesits formwithoutthe matter.For
Scotus, the process of assimilatingis a process of making the thing
above ail its universalaspect presentto the intellect.For Ockham, such
a processcan be no more than a causal process,because thereis nothing but the singularthingthatcan be present,and such a thingbecomes
presentwheneverit acts upon the perceiver,so as to cause sensorystates
acts. Given thatthereis nothingbesidesthe singularthing,
and intellectual
it would be pointlessto posit a mediatingentity.Ockham claims thatwe
would run into an infiniteregressif we were to posit such an entity.For
when someonewere sayingthat a thingx becomes presentby means of
an entity, we could always ask how e becomes present.If the answer
were thate becomespresentby means of anotherentity,say e*, we could
again ask how e* becomes present.To explain the presence of a mediating entity,another mediatingentitywould always be required.44So,
instead of positingan infinitenumber of mediatingentities,we should
insteadaffirmfromthe beginningthat x becomes presentbyitself,
given
thatthereare appropriatesensorystates.
Third, despiteOckham's insistentclaim that we have to preservethe
immediaterelationshipbetween the thingand the intellect,his conflict
withScotus is not a conflictbetweendirectrealismand representationalism,as it may seem,but a conflictbetweentwo variantsof directrealism.
For both authorsagree that, given normal circumstances,the material
thingis the firstand immediateobject we cognize. Their disagreement
is about the questionof what the internalstructureof the materialthing
is and, consequently,how its formcan be received.Since Scotus thinks
thatthe materialobjecthas a universalaspect to whichwe have no access
by means of sensoryactivityalone, he claims that there needs to be a
special device thatmakes thisaspect present.This device, the intelligible
species,is that by which the thingbecomes presentunder its universal
The species has a
aspect,not thatwhichbecomes immediatelypresent.45
function.46
Of course, Scotus oftenspeaks about a
purelyinstrumental
44See In II Sent.,
q. XII-XIII(OThV, 273).
45Morethan
inhisScotus
:
madethispoint
andIntuition
thirty
years
ago,J.F.Boleralready
Some
Remarks
49 (1965),556-7:"One maynothavemuchtruck
with
, in: The Monist,
morestepsorentities
in theanalyandspecies,
butthere
couldbe a hundred
phantasms
sisanditwouldnotaffect
the'directness'
ofourknowledge
onewhit."
46Ord.
enimintelligibilium
a nobis
I, d. 3,pars3, q. 3, n. 562(Vat.Ill, 334):"Videtur
in intellectu
essequasiinstrumentum
non
naturaliter
intellectorum
ipsiusintellectus,
species

19:35:21 PM

252

DOMINIK
PERLER

function,and he explicitlycalls the species a "representrepresentational


That
is why his positioncan be characterizedas a repreing entity."
sentationalist
theoryin some sense. But one shouldbe carefulwhen using
the label "representationalist."
The strong
thesis
representationalist
Tl: Intelligible
entitieswhichalone are immespeciesare the representing
diatelypresentto the intellect,
which cannot be ascribedto Scotus,is to be distinguished
fromthe weak
thesis
representationalist
entitiesby which the mateT2: Intelligiblespecies are the representing
rial objects become fullypresentto the intellect,
which is Scotus's thesis and which does not contradictdirect realism.
Scotus even triesto defenddirectrealismand make it more plausibleby
pointingout thatthe materialthingwithall its aspects,includingthe universal one, can be the immediateobject of the intellectonly if thereis
an appropriatedevice for makingit present.In his opinion, the thesis
that the materialthingis the immediateobject is a philosophically
interif
an
account of how by what kind of
estingthesisonly we are given
- such a
devicesand psychologicalprocesses
thingcan become presentto
the intellect.47
in the strongsense only
Scotus's positionbecomes representationalist
if one abandons the thesisthat the materialthingitselfhas a common
nature,responsibleforthe thing'suniversalaspect.As soon as one claims
that such a universalaspect is a universalconceptwitha peculiar ontological status,one does indeed introducea "thirdentity"between the
materialthingand the cognizingintellect.For in that case, the material
object is no longer the immediateobject when somethingis cognized
under a universalaspect. Rather, a peculiar entitybecomes the immediate object. Such a positioncan be foundin Ockham's earlytheoryof
universaiswhere he claims that a universalconcept is an entitywith

ab intellectu,
motum
ab intellects
utagat,quasiscilicet
sedquo intellecaliquidrecipiat
tusutitur
ad suamactionem."
added)
(emphasis
47I cannot
with
hisdiscussion
ofScotus's
doctrine
whoconcludes
agreewithL. Spruit
theremark
that"cognition
involves
someinference
from
intermediary
inevitably
reprewiththeworld."
sentations
orentities,
andlacksdefacto
contact
all (direct)
intelligi{Species
weakrepresentationalism,
thethesis
bilis,
(1) thatrepresentaop.cit.,266)GivenScotus's
tionsarerequired
forcognition,
thethesis
doesnotimply
lacksall
(2) thatthecognizer
direct
contact
withtheworld.
Scotuswouldstrongly
opposetheclaimthatweneedtogo
inferential
world.
stepsto havean accessto theextramental
through

19:35:21 PM

THINGSIN THE MIND

253

"objective"or "intentional"existence.48
Accordingto this theory,someone apprehendinga concrete thing,say Socrates, under the universal
, does not immediatelyapprehendSocrates or some aspect
aspect animal
of Socrates,but the universalconcept animalwhich is a distinctentity.
Only such a position,which is not Scotus's positionand which Ockham
himselfgave up in his later theory,49
is a strongrepresentationalist
theory
thatposits"thirdentities"as the immediateobjects of the intellect.
over intelligible
Fourth,the controversy
species makesit clear thatone
of the main differences
betweenScotus (as well as his fourteenth-century
defenders,
e.g.Johnof Reading)and Ockham lies in theirtheoryof abstractive cognition.Most researchin the last three decades has focusedon
theirtheoriesof intuitivecognition,because most scholarswere primarin the vexingproblemof how therecan be an intuitivecogilyinterested
nitionof non-existent
the intenseattentionpaid
things.50
Unfortunately,
to this problem (and the ensuingheated debate about medieval skepticism) has thrustthe topic of abstractivecognitioninto the background.
But in fourteenth-century
debates, abstractivecognitionwas at least as
as intuitivecognition.In some respects,it was even more
controversial
controversial.
For Scotus and Ockham fullyagreed thatthe singularthing
is the object of an intuitivecognition.Unlike some thirteenth-century
authors(e.g.Thomas Aquinas),theyneverdoubtedthatthe singularthing
can be the firstand immediateobject of a cognition.Their point of conwas ratherabstractivecognition.They stronglydisagreedon the
troversy
questionsof what the object of an abstractivecognitionis and of how
somethingcan become the object of such a cognition.This disagreement
revealsa greatdeal about the metaphysicalfoundationof epistemological
issuesin the later middle ages.
All Souls College
Oxford
University

48See InI Sent.


, dist.2, q. 8 (OTh II, 271-81).
49On thewell-known
transition
from
theso-called
existence
to the
"objective
theory"
later"act-theory,"
seeM. McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, op.at.,71-107.
50A notable
is K.H. Tachau(Vision
andCertitude
inthe
, op.at.,
exception
AgeofOckham
whorightly
remarks
thattheproblem
ofintuitive
should
be seeninlight
75-81)
cognition
- a dichotomy
ofthedichotomy
"intuitive-abstractive"
thatpointsoutdifferent
waysof
a
and
not
as
a
aboutskepticism.
cognizingthing
problem

19:35:21 PM

" de Dante ou Les


de la "Monarchie
La rception
mtamorphoses
d'uneuvre
philosophique
FRANCISCHENEVAL

1. Umrephilosophique
comme
historique
phnomne
L'uvre philosophiquen'est jamais directementintellig,elle est un
phnomnehistoriquedont la comprhensionest soumise aux lois de la
Avec le tempsqui nous spare de l'auperceptionet de l'interprtation.
le
de
transformation
du contexteet du code d'interprtateur, processus
tion se poursuitde sorteque toutelecturede l'uvredoive d'abord,pour
du contexte
saisirl'intentionde l'auteur,consisteren une reconstruction
et des systmesde "dcodage." Pour atteindrecela, il faut connatreles
et son
partisansde l'uvre, ses adversaires,son contexteinstitutionnel
il
En
connatre
sa
Le
terme
son
faut
bref,
rception.
public,
langage.
rceptionimpliquele momentactifde l'impactdu textesur l'histoireainsi
que le momentpassif de sa possible mise en fonctioncontrel'intention
de l'auteur par une utilisationpartielle,ou encore les contorsionsque
de ceux de l'auteur.Dans
subitl'uvrepour servirdes objectifsdiffrents
soul'histoire,ces deux moments,thoriquementspars,se manifestent
vent dans une formeconcomitante.C'est--direque l'uvre exerce son
On pourraitappeler cela la diainfluenceen tantqu'oeuvrerinterprte.
de
la
lectique
rception.
de l'histoirede la rceptiondoit tredisL'entreprisede reconstruction
"
" telle
tinguede la Wirkungsgeschichte
qu'elle est conue par l'hermneuundMethode.
H.G.
son uvre Wahrheit
notamment
Gadamer
dans
tique,
par
Werket
En effetGadamer prsupposeune identification
entre
complte
L'histoirede la rceptionne peut tolrer
entreuvre et effet.1
Wirkung,
cetteprsupposition.Si l'acquisitiond'une ide approximativede ce que
1 "Indervermeintlichen
derVerinderwirdemMastab
Naivitt
unseres
Verstehens,
mehr
so sehrvomEigenen
stndlichkeit
her,daes garnicht
zeigtsichdasAndere
folgen,
undMethode
alsEigenes
Wahrheit
undAnderes
zurAussage
kommt."
, 4th
(H.-G.Gadamer,
istalsonureinPhasendeshistorischen
Horizontes
ed.,Tbingen
1975,284)."DerEntwurf
moment
im Vollzugdes Verstehens
undverfestigt
sichnichtzu derSelbstentfremdung
der
Verstehenshorizont
einesvergangenen
wirdvondemeigenen
sondern
Bewutseins,
Vivarium
34,2

E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:35:27 PM

DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION

255

dire son public tait impossiblepar une


l'auteurvoulait effectivement

de la rceptionimmdiate,nous n'arrivela
lumire
du
texte
analyse
de l'uvre mme.
d'une uvrediffrents
rionsjamais au constatdes effets
mais pas de " Wirkungsgeschichte
Nous serionsen prsencede " Wirkungen"
,"
de rceptionsmais non d'une histoirede la rception,et d'une prise de
des horizonsqui est prsupposepar Gadamer
consciencede la diffrence
"
Ce que l'entrepriseque je propose a en
avec son Horizontverschmelzung"
commun avec la thoriede la rceptionest le fait que notre connaissance de l'uvre se constitue traversune analyse de sa mdiationpar
les lecteurs,et par une analyse des conditionsdes destinatairesimmdiats du texte.2
Mon intentionici est de rappelertroistapes de l'histoirede la rception de la Monarchie
de Dante avant sa premiredition imprimeen
1559.3Je vais prsenterune histoirede cetterceptionpour une priode
dans l'hisassez large et m'arrter la questiondu rle de la Monarchie
toire de la philosophiepolitique. Les exemples choisis vont dmontrer
que le rle que joue une uvre philosophiquechange avec le contexte.
En tant qu'apparitionhistorique,l'uvre philosophiquesubit des mtamorphosesau coursde sa rception.Elle change dans ses formesen fonction des intrtsde ses lecteurset ses noncs changentde signification
avec une modificationdu contexte.
33de Dante
2. La rception
de la "Monarchie
chezJeanFalkenberg
M.W. Senko a le mrited'avoir dit les deux rdactionsdu De monarchia mundide Jean Falkenberg et d'avoir dmontr que la deuxime
Im Vollzugdes Verstehens
einewirkliche
HorizontverGegenwart
eingeholt.
geschieht
diemitdemEntwurf
deshistorischen
Horizontes
dessen
zugleich
schmelzung,
Aufhebung
(Ibidem,
290).
vollbringt."
2 Cf.H.-R.Jauss,
ab Provokation
derLiteraturwissenschaft,
Frankfurt
1970.
Literaturgeschichte
3 Pouruneinterprtation
de la Monarchie
etde la pensepolitique
de Dantecf.R. ImbeiDante,
Dimension
dermenschlichen
dans:O. Hffe(d.),Der
bach,Diepolitische
Vernunft
- einpolitisches
Mensch
Her.Essays
zurpolitischen
, Stuttgart
1992,26-42;V. Russo,
Anthropologie
didiritto
e stato
: studio
suMonarchia
edEpistole
diDante,
Impero
politiche
Naples1987;G. Vasoli,
e Impero
neltardo
delle
idee
Medioevo:
Dante
dans:L. Firpo(d.),Storia
, Marsilio
s Ockham,
Papato
e sociali
tra
e politica
inDante
, economiche
, II, Turin1983,543-84;G. Vasoli,Filosofia
politiche
e Monarchia,
Convivio
Classensi
etun
dans:Letture
, 9-10(1982),11-37.Pouruneintroduction
commentaire
au texte
cf.B. Nardidans:DanteAlighieri,
de la Monarchie
Minori,
II,
Opere
a curadi P.V. Mengaldo,
B. Nardietal., Milan/Naples,
1979,241-503.Voiraussi
21967,215-75;idem,Nelmondo
B. Nardi,
difilosofia
dantesca
diDante
, Rome
, Florence
Saggi
de la pensepolitique
de Danteestdonnegalement
1944,94-205.Uneinterprtation
Dante
de
etla philosophie,
Paris1953,ch.III. Il existe
unedition
parE. Gilson,
bilingue

19:35:27 PM

256

FRANCIS
CHENEVAL

rdactionde cetteuvre,rdige Rome avant 1407, contenaitquelques


de Dante Alighieri.4Dans une
passages polmiques contre la Monarchie
montr
que Falkenbergcritiquaitla Monarchie
publicationantrieure,j'ai
dj dans la deuximerdactioncrite Cracovie en 1406 et que la critique de Falkenbergne se limitaitpas aux passages indiquspar Senko.5
Pour notretche, il suffit
de rappeler, titred'exemple,qu'un dfenseur
de la monarchieuniversellepapale, tel que Falkenberg,critiquaitla Monarde l'poque.6 A
chiede Dante tout comme d'autresuvresrformatrices
ce propos,je prsentedeux passagesqui n'ontpas t indiquspar Senko.
de ceux qui
Les deux textesse situentdans le contextede la rfutation
le
la
thse
selon
le
est
monarque universel.
n'acceptentpas
laquelle pape
Sedcontra
hancconclusionem
quidamsic
ideafuitet exemplar
vitaChristi
arguunt:
militan
sumtisecclesiae,
pastoris
praesertim
vitaesuaeecclemi,quiainIoanneformam
siae relinquens
"exemplum,
inquit,dedi
vobisutquemadmodum
egofecivobisita
Et specialiter
ad Petrm
et vosfaciatis."
officium
sibicommisit
postquam
pastoris
me,"sedChristus
inquit:
"sequere
regnum
coramPilatoabnegavit:
temporale
"regmeum
nonestdehocmundo,"
num,
inquit,
etergopapanonhabetdominium
temporale.(Falkenberg,
De monarchia
mundi
, d.
Senko1986,151).

etexemplar
milivitaenimipsius
ydeafuit
maxime
tantis
Ecclesie,
presertim
pastorm,
cuiusestpascereagnoset oves.
summi,
sueviterelinUndeipseinJohanne
formam
quens"Exemplum"
inquit"dedivobis,ut
ego fecivobis,ita et vos
quemadmodum
ad Petrum,
etspetialiter
faciatis";
postquam
utineodem
offitium
sibicommisit,
pastoris
me."Sed
habemus,
"Petre,"
inquit
"sequere
coramPilato
Cristus
huiusmodi
regimen
abnegavit:
"Regnum"
inquit"meumnon
estdehocmundo;
(. .)."(.MonIII,xiv,3-5,
d. P.G.Ricci,Milan1965).

On peut constaterque Falkenbergsuit le texte de Dante presque littralement,autrementdit, qu'il avait le textesous les yeux. Mais il ne
de Dante tait donc prsente
mentionnejamais son auteur.La Monarchie
Cracovie en 1406, probablementde faon anonyme.
Le deuxime texteva dans le mme sens. Falkenbergcite Dante littralementafin de le critiquerd'un point de vue hirocratique.

trad,du latinparM. Gally,


du florentin:
l'uvre
Dante,La monarchie,
politique
principale
de La modernit
deDante
Paris1993.Cf.aussiJ.F.Took,Dante.
Lyric
parC. Lefort,
prcd
AnIntroduction
totheMinor
Works
PoetandPhilosopher.
1990,147-73.
, Oxford
4JeanFalkenberg,
Bratislava
DeMonarchia
Mundi
1975;Krakowska
, d.W.Senko,
Redakga
Warsovie
1986.
"DeMonarchia
Mundi"d. W. Senko,
J. 5Falkenberga
1559.
imJahre
Dantes
biszurEditio
derMonarchia
Cf.F. Cheneval,
DieRezeption
Princeps
eines
Mnchen
1995,258-84.
Werkes,
Metamorphosen
philosophischen
6 II s'agitde: Mattieu
W. Senko,
Depraxi
romanae
curiae
de Cracovie,
Mateusza
z
, edidit
aureum
Krakowa
"Depraxi
romanae
curiae
, edidit
>"Bratislava/Warsovie/Cracovie
1969;Speculum
Graz
M. Goldast,
in:Monarchia
Romani
1614,1527-1558.
, II, Hannover
(Nouv.impr.
Imperii
1995.
d. crit.parW. Senko,
Warzovie
1960).Nouvelle

19:35:27 PM

LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE

257

illudquo nonexistente
autnonvirtuante illud,
autquononvirtuquononexistente
habettotam
suamvirtutem
nonest ante,aliudhabettotam
suamvirtutem,
non
aliquid
causailliusvirtutis,
sedecclesianonexis- estcausailliusvirtutis;
sed,Ecclesianon
tenteautnonvirtuante
habuit existente
autnonvirtuante,
habuit
imprium
Imperium
totam
suamvirtutem,
nonest totam
suamvirtutem:
nonest
ergoecclesia
ergoEcclesia
causavirtutis
etperconsequens
nec causavirtutis
etperconsequens
nec
imperii
Imperii
cumidemsitvirtus
etauctoritas auctoritatis,
cumidemsitvirtus
etauctoriauctoritatis,
eius.Maior,inquiunt,
huiusdemonpatet,
quiaimpossi- taseius.(. .) Maiorpropositio
bileesteffectum
suamcausam strationis
declarata
estinterminis;
minorem
praecedere
de qua intenditur.Cristus
et Ecclesiaconfirmt.
Cristus
nasefficientem,
praesertim
etecclesia
Christus
confirm- cendoetmoriendo,
utsuperius
dictum
Minorem,
aiunt,
est;
ant.Christus,
Caesaris
inActibus
cumPaulus
quiaedictum
Augusti Ecclesia,
Apostolorum
suntquam dicatad Festum:
"Adtribunal
Cesaris
quaepersuadentiora
operibus,
sto,
decimo
Ethicorum
cumetiam
sermones,
, nascendo
iudicari";
per- ubimeoportet
angelus
suasa.Ecclesia,
Caesarem
quiaPaulus
appel- Dei Paulodixerit
parum
post:"Netimeas,
lavi^ad tribunal
"stoubi Paule,Cesarite oportet
etinfra
caesaris,
assistere";
inquit,
meoportet
Actuum
XXV.Angelus iterumPaulusad Iudaeosexistentes
in
iudicari,"
etiamPauloapparens
dixit:"ne timeas Ytalia:"Contradicentibus
autemIudeis,
caesari
teopportet
Actuum coactus
sumappellare
nonquasi
Paule,
assistere,"
Cesarem,
XXVII.Et iterum:
coactus
sumappellare gentem
meamhabens
sed
aliquidaccusare,
animam
meam
demorte."
caesarem,
inquitPaulusad Iudaeosexis- uteruerem
Quod
tentes
in Italia,Actuum
XXVIII.Quodsi siCesariamtunciudicandi
non
temporalia
caesariamtunciudicandi
non habuisset
auctoritatem
necCristus
hocpertemporalia
habuisset
nec Christus
hoc suasisset,
necangelus
iliaverbanuntiasset,
auctoritatem,
necangelus
istaverbanunti- necillequidicebat
etesse
persuasisset,
"Cupiodissolvi
necillequidicebat:
et cumCristo"
iudicem
asset,
cupiodissolvi
incompetentem
appelessecumChristo,
iudicem lasset.
incompetentem
(Mon.III, xii,3-6).
Demonarchia
mundi
,
appellasset.
(Falkenberg,
d.Senko1986,98f.).
Le faitque le dominicainJean Falkenbergjugeait la Monarchie
digned'une
critiquepolmiqueindique que le textede Dante circulaitdans le milieu
rformateur
de Cracovie. A la lumire de la critiquehirocratiquede
la
de Dante apparatcomme une uvre critiqueet
Falkenberg, Monarchie
rformatrice.
La critiquede Falkenbergs'inscritdans une longue tradition de critiquehirocratiquede la Monarchie.
D'une faon dialectique,
cette critiqueest la preuve d'une rceptionet d'une perceptionde la
Monarchie
comme uvre rformatrice,
comme uvre critique.
" comme
3. Antonio
Roselliet la "Monarchie
uvre
anticonciliariste
Si nous laissonspasser un peu de temps,prcisment
jusqu' l'an 1433
et si nous changeonsde lieu pour nous rendre Ble, nous dcouvrons
de celle
que la rceptionde la Monarchie
y est compltementdiffrente
de Falkenberg Cracovie en 1406. Le juriste et avocat de la curie
Romaine Antonio Roselli utilise, dans son uvre intitulela Monarde
chie,sans nommerses sources,de nombreuxpassages de la Monarchie

19:35:27 PM

258

FRANGIS
CHENEVAL

dantiaCatkolica
Dante.7L'uvre magistralede Roselli,critecontrela Concor
de Nicolas de Cues et contreles tendancesconciliaristesdu Concile de
Ble, rgle les relationsde pouvoir entrele Pape, le Concile et l'empereur.Il fauten souligner
deux aspects, mon avis,principaux.
Premirement,
Roselli entreprendune lgitimationdu pouvoirmonarchique,tantimprial que papal. Roselli est un dfenseuracharn du principemonarchique
dans l'Eglise ainsi que dans l'Empire.Pour ce faire,il transposedes figures
d'argumentations
ecclsiologiquesdans la thoriedu pouvoir imprialet
utilise des argumentsphilosophiques en faveur de la monarchiepour
lgitimerle pouvoirdu pape contrele Concile. Le deuximeaspectprinen faveurd'une spacipal de l'uvre de Roselli est son argumentation
rationdes pouvoirsentrepape et empereur.L'empereurest directement
institupar Dieu et indpendantdu pape en matiretemporelle.Cette
deuximepositionlabore par un curialistepeut nous surprendre,
mais
elle est comprhensibledans le contextehistorique.L'uvre de Roselli
faisaitpartie d'une initiativediplomatiquedu ct papal pour gagnerla
sympathiede l'empereuret des princestemporelscontrele Concile. Face
la menace conciliaristecontemporaineau Concile de Ble, le pape
Eugne IV aboli, de faon provisoire,la doctrinehirocratique.
Dans les deux aspectsprincipauxde son uvre et dans les arguments
qu'il y produit,Roselli dpend souventde faon littralede la Monarchie
de Dante. B. Nardi avait consacr un article l'utilisationde Dante par
de Roselli, dans
Roselli, mais il s'est limit au livre V de la Monarchie
la
le
en
faveur
de
des
lequel juristeargumente
sparation
pouvoirs.8Les
livres II et III dans lesquels Roselli utiliseles argumentsde Dante en
faveurde la monarchieuniversellepour dfendrela monarchiedu pape
7 PourRoselli,cf.F. Cheneval,
derMonarchia
Dantes
Die Rezeption
, op.cit.,287-327;
K. Eckermann,
desmonarchischen
Gedankens
im15.Jahrhundert
Studien
zurGeschichte
(Abhandlungen
zurmittleren
De ornata
mulieundneueren
Geschichte,
73),Berlin1933;H. Kantorowicz,
rum.
A consilium
anIntroduction
onFifteenth
deRosellis
with
,
Century
Legislation
ofAntonius
Sumptuary
Abhanddans:idem,
Rechtshistorische
RechtsundStaatswissenschaftliche
Schriften
(Freiburger
Antonio
Rosellis
Schlick
E. Meuthen,
Gutachten
1970,315-76;
30),Karlsruhe
fiirHeinrich
lungen,
undReich.
Studien
imFreisinger
Bistumsstreit
zu
(1444),dans:H. Mordeck
(d.),AusKirche
undRecht
imMittelalter
Friedrich
, Politik
1983,461, Festschrift
Theologie
Kempf,
Sigmaringen
LePapeetleConcile
vol.I, Paris1909,257ss;
72;N. Valois,
J.Thomson,
Papa(1418-1450),
37 (1975),
andConciliarism
inAntonio
Rosei's
Monarchia
lism
445-58;
, dans:Mediaeval
Studies,
P. Verrua,
Antonio
etpape
Roselli
e l'opera
suaMonorchia
sivetractatus
depotestate
, dans:
imperatoris
XV.
Giornale
a Padova
nelsecolo
29 (1926),313-32;A. Belloni,
Dantesco,
Professori
giuristi
e cattedre
The"Monarchia"
1986,143-9;
, Frankfurt
ofAntonio
Profili
J.H.Burns,
bio-bibliografi
Roselli
andcontroversy,
context
dans:S. Chodorow
Text,
(d.),Proceedings
ofthe
(1380-1466):
International
Medieval
Canon
Law, Vatican1991,321-51.
Eighth
Congress
of
8 B. Nardi,Fortuna
XIVe XV,dans:idem,Nelmondo
diDante
dellaMonarchia
neisecoli
,
Roma1944,191-205.

19:35:27 PM

DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"

259

dans l'Eglise contrele Concile me paraissenttre les plus importantset


les plus intressants.
Je me concentreraidonc sur le livreII o le primat
et dmocdu pape dans l'Egliseest discutcontredes thoriesconciliaristes
le
diffrend
Roselli
entrele
de
du
l'Eglise.
prend
ratiques gouvernement
un
fondamental
sur la
dbat
comme
occasion
et
le
Concile
pour
pape
structuredu pouvoir.Ainsi il commence avec la question: "An ad bene
esse mundiviverenecesse sit unicam esse principlempotestatem,a qua
cetere ut sequaces deriventur."(Roselli, Mon., II, c. 1: Goldast I, 301;
comparavec Paris,lat. 4237, fol. 90r). La mthodede Roselli implique
de Dante: "an
de la questionde la Monarchie
une lgantetransposition
au
ad bene esse mundinecessariasit" (Mon.,I, ii, 3)9 discourssur la structure du pouvoir l'intrieurde l'Eglise. Par la suite Roselli prouve la
ncessitde la monarchiedu pape dans l'Eglise avec les argumentsde
Dante. Le textesuivantle dmontreclairement:
unamdomum,
cuiusfinis
Namsi consideramus
domum
unam,ipsa Si consideremus
ad benevivere
melius
domus
preparare,
quidem
perunumseniorem estdomsticos
essequiregulet
etregat.
secundum
(. .).
(. .).Etidem unumoportet
regitur
philosophum.
vicumunum,cuiusfinis
universita- Si consideremus
estin aliismisticis
corporibus
tampersonarum
sehabent,
cumperunum estcommoda
tum,
quamrerum
quiamelius
unumoportet
essealiorum
Suntenimsecundum
reguphilosophumauxiliado,
reguntur.
cuius
ltorem.
communitates.
Estenimuna,que
(. .). Si verounamcivitatem,
quinqu
estbenesufficienterque
unum
finis
ex pluribus
domibus.
rsultat
vivere,
Alia,que
unum
esseregimen.
constituitur
expluribus
vicis.
Etitaestcom- oportet
(. .). Si denique
cuiusfinisestis qui
Philo- regnum
munitas
civitatis,
particulare,
que secundum
cummaiorifiducia
sue tranquilestbene civitatis
estperfecta,
quiasicivitas
sophum
esse
unum
inea debetinveniri
est
litatis,
ordinata,
regem
qui regat
oportet
quidquid
vita.Tertiaest atquegubernet.
necessarium
(. .). Si ergosic se habet
prohominis
inhiisetin singulis
ex
communitas
que ad unumaliquod
provincie,
que consurgit
verum
estquodassumitur
civitatibus.
supra;
pluribus
Quartaestcommuni- ordinantur,
humanum
tasregni,
expluribus
quodtotum
provinciis. nuncconstat
genus
quersultat
ad unum,ut iampreostensum
orbis
exomnibus ordinatur
esttotius
etconstat
Quinta
esseregulans
sive
mundi
H,c. 6: Goldast fuit:
Mon.,
(Roselli,
ergounumoportet
regnis.
ethoc"Monarcha"
sive"Imperator"
avecParis,BN,lat.4237, regens
I, 312;compar
dicidebet.Et sicpatetquodad beneesse
fol.112v-l
13r).
mundinecesseestMonarchiam
essesive
., I, v, 5-9).
(Dante,Mon
Imperium.
L'aspect dcisifde cette adaptationde l'argumentde Dante consisteen
son applicationau discoursde lgitimationdu pouvoir dans l'Eglise. La
rductiondu pouvoir chaque chelon au pouvoir d'un seul, rduction
opre par Dante, est applique par Roselli au pouvoir de l'Eglise
chaque chelon correspondant.Il construitainsi une structuremonarchique parallle dans l'Empire et dans l'Eglise:
9 Cf.Mon I, v, 2: "utrum
Monarchia
necessaria
sit."
ad beneessemundi
temporalis

19:35:27 PM

FRANGIS
CHENEVAL

260

uniusvicivelcastri
veloppidiin iurisdictione
Primaigitur
et
communitas
spirituali
Et ideoin vicissiveparochiis
melius
sunt
perunumregitur.
spiritualiter
temporali
utin qualibet
curamanimarum
ecclesiasitunuspresbyter
habentes,
(. .),
prebyteri
castroestmagister.
autem,
(. .). In civitatibus
que suntsecundum
quia in quolibet
in spiritualibus
in singulis
misticum
civitatibus
suntepiscommunitas,
corpus
singuli
autemestunuscivitatis
autem
defensor
misti(. .). In tertio
copi(. .). In temporalibus
co corpore
sivecommunitates
Nam
(. .) suntin spiritualibus
provincie
archiepiscopl.
in unaquaque
unusestarchiepiscopus
velmetropolitanus
(. .). Et in temprovincia
unusprovincie
siveuni(. .). In quartoautemmistico
poralibus
preses
corpore
regni
versitate
suntspiritualiter
sivepluribus
primates,
qui singuli
presunt
singulis
regnis
hecomniatamin unoindi(. .) et temporaliter
provinciis
praesunt
reges.Si igitur
viduocorpore
humano
etinhiscommunitatibus
quaminmisticis
corporibus
propter
et bonum
unitatem
est
est,(. .), quantomagishocipsumconveniens
pacisstabilitas
in totoipsohumano
etorbeuniverso,
utmelius
genere
(. .),preregatur
perunum,
sertim
cumsecundum
in politicis
sententiam
traditum
sit,quodquotiens
philosophi
ad unumfinem,
necesse
estunumeorum
seuregere,
pluraaliquaordinantur
regulare
aliosveroregulari
etregiperunum.
Ethicergoinspiritualibus
estPonfex
Romanus
Christi
vicarius.
estCesarRomanorum
Rex,quiainRomana
(. .). Etintemporalibus
civitate
deusconstituit
ultimo
divinam
et humanam
monarchiam.
Mon.,II,
(Roselli,
c. 6: Goldast
avecP, fol.113r-v).
I, 312;compar
Pour confirmer
notrethsed'une adaptationde la Monarchie
de Dante au
besoin de l'anticonciliarismede Roselli, voici encore deux textes qui
dmontrentaussi des dpendanceslittralesentreDante et Roselli:
Etideoconcluditur
essedebere
necessarium
unumprincipem,
ad quemomnesaliiut
inferiores
Aliassequeordinentur.
principes
si
existentibus
retur,
quodpluribus
paribus
intereos litigium
nonessetinter
oriretur,
eosiudicem
dare,cumparin paremnon
habeat
(. .),quodessetabsurdum,
imprium
cumessetdareimperfectionem
sineproprioperficiente,10
quodestimpossibile,
quia
nondeficit.
deuset naturain necessariis
esseunum11
necesse
(. .). Estigitur
supremumiudicem.
Mon
.,II, c. 7: Gold(Roselli,
astI, 313;compar
avecP, fol.116v).

Etubicunque
ibidebet
esselitigium,
potest
esseiudicium;
aliter
essetinperfectum
sine
cum
perfectivo:
quodestinpossibile,
proprio
Deuset natura
nondeficiat.
in necessariis
Interomnesduosprincipes,
alter
quorum
alteri
minime
esselitisubiectus
est,potest
veletiamsubditogiumvelculpaipsorum
- quodde se patet
- : ergointer
rum
tales
Etcumalter
esseiudicium.
dealtero
oportet
nonpossitex quo alteralteri
cognoscere
- namparinparem
nonsubditur
nonhabet
essetertium
iurisdictioimprium
oportet
nisamplioris
suiiurisambobus
quiambitu
Mon.,I, x, 1-3).
(Dante,
principetur.

rerum
illud
Undeinfertur,
bonum, Propter
quodin omnigenere
quodidestsummum
estoptimum
unum,
unum,et id estin se
(. .)
quodestmaxime
quod estmaxime
incorrelationibus
suisex
unum.Et ideo qua rePictagoras
bonum,
quodestmaxime
in correlationibus
suisex parte parteboniponebatunum,ex partevero
Pitagoras
boniponebat
expartemaliponebat maliplurale(. .); quodquidemPsalmista
unum,
"A fructu
viniet
dicens:
docetdicens: videbat
frumenti,
plura.EthocetiamPsalmista
"A fructu
sunt."(Mon.I, xv,2-3).
frumenti
vinietoleimultiplicad olei multiplicad
sunt."
infertur,
(. .).Ex quibus
superiores
quodoptima Quod si omnesconsequentie
estad optime
inunitate
bonitatis
consistit.
necesse
(. .). Exquibus veresunt,
quodsunt,
10
G.
proficiente
11perficiente:
esseunuminu.G.

19:35:27 PM

LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
vivere
necessaconcluditur
ad benemundi
a
riamesseunicam
supremam
potestatem,
aliaederiventur.
A/on.,
(Roselli,
quaomnes
avecP,
II, c. 7: Goldast
I, 314;compar
fol.117v-119r).

261

se haberehumanum
genusessein mundo
etperconsequens
MonarchMonarcham,
iamad beneessemundi.
(Dante,Mon.,I,
XV,10).

Des sept argumentsen faveurdu pouvoir monarchiquedu pape dans


Roselli en a repriscinq du premierlivre
l'Eglise contreles conciliaristes,
de la Monarchie
de Dante.12Roselli a reprisles argumentsmonarchiques
de Dante pour luttercontrele conciliarisme.Sous la plume de Roselli et
dans le contextede la lutteentrele pape et le Concile de Bie, la Monarchie
de Dante a t transforme
par une rceptionpartielleen une uvre
anticonciliariste
et antidmocratique.
" et le
4. La "Monarchie
protestantisme
On peut constaterqu' un nouveaupotentielde rceptionde la Monarchie
de Dante, du ct protestant,
se dveloppe durantle processusde rformation qui aboutira une sparation totale des deux dnominations
On peut bien saisirla rceptionde la Monarchie
catholiqueet protestante.13
et leur idalisationde Dante comme prdcesseurde
par les protestants
Luther,lorsque l'on prend en considrationles attaques constantesde
l'orthodoxiecontrela Monarchie
depuisles premiresheuresde sa publication.Les constantesaccusationsd'htrodoxie,lances contrela Monarchie
considrer
par les dfenseursde l'orthodoxie,ont amen les protestants
l'auteurde la Monarchie
comme un des leurs. En effet,ces attaques ont
commencavec Guy Vernani,dans les annes 30 du XIVe sicle et ont
culminavec la mise l'Index des livresinterditspar l'Eglise de Rome
en 1557. En 1539 par exemple,le juristede Lucques HenricusBuccellius
publie une uvre dans laquelle il dsigne comme hrtiquesluthriens
Dante et plusieursintellectuels
de la
qui ont ni la validitet l'historicit
donationde Constantin,commeNicolas de Cues, Huttenet Valla.14Dans
12Cf.F. Cheneval,
DieRezeption
derMonarchia
Dantes
, op.cit.,305ss.
13Cf.P. Chiminelli,
La fortuna
di Dantenellachristianit
> conspeciale
riformata
riferimento
Roma1921;F. Wagner,
Dante
inDeutschland.
Seinstaatlichkirchliches
Bildvon1417all'Italia,
1699
sulla
, dans:Deutsches
16,N.F.,7 (1934),1-86;C. Sebastio,
Dante-Jahrbuch,
Capitoli
Monarchia
diDante
nelprotestantesimo
diFacolt
dilettere
e filosofia,
(1550-1560
%dans:Annali
Bari15 (1972),339-84;
F. Cheneval,
DieRezeption
derMonarchia
Dantes
, op.cit.,371-81.
14"AdquamHaereticorum
modisresponde
tur."(H. Buccellius,
In
opinionem
pluribus
Constantini
IurisUtriusque
Praxis
Phaellus
Donationem,
, Lucca:IoannesBaptista
1539,IV, fol.
- "Erravit
insuaMonarchia,
erravit
inDialogosuo
292).
quippeDantespoetaFlorentinus
Piuspapa,inlibello
ad Basiiiense
concilium
De concordantia
catholica
erravit
quemscripsit

19:35:27 PM

262

FRANGIS
CHENEVAL

le contextedes luttesde la Rforme,la Monarchie


trouveune nouvelle
actualit.En 1554, soitavantla premireditionimprimede la Monarchie
,
celle-ci a t mise l'index des livresinterditspar l'Eglise de Venise.
Dans le cas de la Monarchie
, la condamnationa donc prcd la publication et fut mme dans un certain sens, la cause de son impression.
Dans une petite uvre,De idololawretano
, Pier Paolo Vergerio,un intellectuel protestantitalien qui savait utiliserles Index comme instrument
de propagande protestantecommentel'Index de Venise. Il ne manque
pas de remarquerque l'vque de Venise, en mettant l'index un livre
une intelligence
mdiocre,puisqu'il
qui n'estpas encoreimprim,manifeste
a
de
meilleure
qu'il n'y pas
propagande pour un livre inconnu que de
figurer l'Index:
Ac nonmodohocsensit,
etmultis
seddisertissime
alijsinlocistemirisice
exagitavit,
ab Ecclesia,
nonpendere
Imperium
quinomnibus
Ecclesijs
imperatorem
praeesse,
etiamRomanae:
in eo libro,cui
Patavinus
eodemtempore
quoddogmaMarsilius
titulus
defensor
obiter
asseverat,
pacis,diligentissime
equeid Dantesaffirmavit
paucisverbis,
sededitolibro,
cuititulum
cuiusmeminit
Bartholus
fecit,
MONARCHIA,
in L. Divi.par.praesides
ff.de require,
eum
reis,ubiadditDantem
ipsum
propter
librum
fuisse
condemnatum.
QuinetiamArchiepiscopus
postmortem
prohaeretico
libriin catalogo
Mediolanensis
Arcimboldus
eiusdemmet
haereticorum,
quemnuper
etprohibet
ne quiseumlegat,etsatisimprudenter,
adornavit,
meminit,
quumliber
sitimpressus,
etpaucissimi
sintqui illumhabeant.
tamen
ipsenondum
Imprimetur
ne dubita.
De idolo
lauretano
brevi,
, Tbingen
1554,53).
(PierPaoloVergerio,
Aprs le tmoignagede l'intellectuelprotestantMatthiasFlacius Illyricus
dans son catalogue
qui a faitfigurerDante comme auteurde la Monarchie
des prdcesseursde Luther (<catalogus
omnium
eorumqui anteD. Martinm
Lutherum
contra
piae memoriae
papameiusqueerrores
scripserunt)
publi a Bie en
1556, c'est nouveau un textede Vergerioqui nous prouve l'actualit
de la Monarchie
versle milieudu XVIe sicledans les luttesde la Rforme.
Dans son Postremus
catalogus
publi en 1560, nous trouvonsun long pasde Dante:
sage ddi la Monarchie
DantesAligeretiamFlorentinus
Io. Boccatij,
summus
patriaferecontemporaneus
vixlibelItalice
Latine
multa,
Philosophus,
summusque
Theologus,
paucissima
scripsit,
lumde Monarchia:
Gumenimin ea tempora
Bavarus
incidisset,
quibusLudovicus
Cesara nonnullis
annosdurissime
vexabatur,
Papisperplurimos
quodseetRomanm
illissubjicere
liberequidin eo sencalamo,
recusasset,
Imperium
aliquando
arrepto
tireitestatum
Patavinus
fecit
eodemtempore,
reliquit,
quodetiamMarsilius
scripto
cuidedittitulum:
Defensor
libro,
pacis,quinetPetrarcha
aliquidde eo,in quadam
ad Nicolaum
ac non
appellitavit,
Laurentij
Epistola,
qui se Tribunum
Augustum
Nicolaus
in praefatione
sua ad
de Cusa Cardinalis,
Ulrichus
Huttenus
seipsum
decepit
- "haec
LeonemX. Pont.Max."(In Constantini
Donationen
Martinus
, I, fol.252).
protulit
Lutherus
in quodamlibellosuo."(InConstantini
Donationem
, IV, fol.298).

19:35:27 PM

LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE

263

Marsilius
et Petrarca,
sedGulielmus
Ockamquoque(isFranciscanus
modoDantes,
huneIoannem
Scotiimpugnator)
contra
sedacerrimus
fuit,
scripsit
Papam,Ludovici
inquode paupertate
Christi
etApostolorum
vehementem
hostem,
librum,
agit.Iam
Numsite re Christiani
iustus
tresdisputt.
Dantesartculos
orbis,ut unusexistt
Numofficium
et Monarchiae
etMonarcha.
de iure
atquehonorImperij
Imperator
a Papa
Romanm.
NumMonarchia
sitpenespopulum
pendeat
atqueImperium
Dfinit
exsacris
Ecclesia.
autem
literis
Philosophicis,
partim
partim
atqueexRomana
e reChristiani
iustum
offiorbisesse,unumexistere
Imperatorem,
Argumentis
petitis
immediate
Romanm
esse.Deniqueimprium
ciumMonarchie
penespopulum
a Papa,vela RomanaEcclesiapendere.
a Deo, nequaquam
Atquehocestquod
habet:Namimprium
a se pendere
etsibiomnino
subesse
affirmai,
Papampessime
nunccumFerdinando
Caesareiniustissime
utnondum
voluerit
etpropterea
litigai,
CumenimCarolus
eumproCaesareagnoscere:
Caesarinmanibus
Quintus
amplisautElectorum
aitPapadebuisse
simorum
virorum
eum
Imperium
resignarit,
septem
in suismanibus
a meacceptam
ferat
resignare,
quareaddii:AutFerdinanus
digninonenimrecuso
Hoc etiam
tatem,
dare,autnonsumiliumproCaesarehabiturus.
in libelloDantesaliquoties
Romanm
Pontificem
cumtotoipsiusgregeprodignitateaccipit.
AitenimeumessevereTheologiae
utdecretalista,
nonTheologus
rudem,
avaritiam
in illisrationis
dicendus
sit.Aitambitionem
extinxisse
utnihilsit
lumen,
Aitquodcumsintiniquitatis
et diabolifilij,
iactent
se Ecclesiae
ipsisimpudentius.
Dei filios,
libidofuggerit,
quiutcommodius
queantperficere,
quecunque
opprimunt
necprosint
iudicem
de illisverius
dici?
fratres,
matrem,
eijiciant
pati.Quidpotest
enimeamEcclesiam,
Dei ceu
oppresserunt
quidmagisapposite?
quamnobisfilius
matrem
exturbant
etprojiciunt
nonmodoin exilia,sedin ignesquoqueeos,
dedit,
restituam
volunt.
sublevatam,
qui verammatrem
atquein pristinam
dignitatem
omnem
Deniqueaiuntse velie,utsolissibiliceatomnesEcclesias,
religionem
pro
sualibidine
se autemminime
a quoppiam
mortalium.
iudicare,
posseiudicari
Quare
nonnulla
sanepraeclara
etiaminsunt,
Dantes,quanquamnonnulla
attigit
quibus
illum
satisfuisse
verafideetspiritu
inomnibus
nondum
Dei illustratum
artiapparet,
culiscognoscendis,
utinam
in nostra
doctrinae
lucem
tempora
atquein hancdivinae
incidisset
excellens
illudingenium.
Huiuslibelli
facit
mentionem
Bart,inL. Divi.par.
de requirendis
eumferedamnatum
fuisse
haereseos
reis,ubiinquit
praesides.ff.
post
autoris
mortem.
Huneante60 annosinItalicam
convertit
Marsilius
Ficinus,
linguam
habeo.Illudestcertum,
nunvir,cuisversione
magnaeruditione
atqueautoritate
excusum
et apudpaucissimos
quamfuisse
typis
reperiri,
ego nonsinedifficultate
Etnihilominus
sibiPapaeab istolibello,
potuiadipisci.
usqueadeometuunt
quinondumprodijt,
ut eumin quatuor
Satisde Dante,
condemnarint.
Catalogis
semper
nonerant
omnibus
obvia,utpauciintelligere
quaefortassis
potuissent,
quidcondemnaritPapa,cumilliusMonarchiam
condemnavit.
Postremus
(P.P.Vergerio,
Catabgus
haereticorum
Romae
1559, Pforzheim:
Corvinus
1560,18).
conflantus
D semble
et summus
Vergerio appelle Dante summus
philosophies
theologus.
connatrel'uvre italiennede Dante mais il ne nomme qu'une uvre,
la Monarchie.
Il en discutebrivementle contenuet situeson auteurdans
la mmelignede traditionque Marsilede Padoue et Guillaumed'Ockham
qui ont aussi lutt contrele pape, avant la Rforme.L'aspect le plus
intressantdu texte de Vergerio est, me semble-t-il,est l'vocation de
l'actualitpolitiquede la Monarchie.
De plus, il remarqueque c'est avec
les argumentsde Dante qu'on peut prouverque dans la lutte actuelle
entre le pape Paul IV et l'empereur Ferdinand Ier, c'est le pape qui

19:35:27 PM

CHENEVAL
FRANCIS

264

commetune usurpationillgitimedu pouvoirimprial.On ne trouverait


pas de plus vrais argumentsque ceux de Dante contreles dcrtantes,
dit Vergerio(il se rfre Mon. III, iii, 6-10). Il est videntque Vergerio
tente de dmontrerune similitudeentrela situationhistoriquedans laet la situationactuelle; il essaye ainsi
quelle a t crite la Monarchie
la Monarchie
en fonctionde la lutte contreles revend'instrumentaliser
dicationsdu pouvoir temporelde Paul IV.
5. Conclusions
1. Nous avons toutd'abord brivementpris note de troismomentsde
la rceptionde la Monarchie
de Dante. Nous avons t les tmoinsdu fait
la
de
Dante
a
Monarchie
jou un rle Cracovie dans un des milieux
que
de rformeles plus importantsau dbut du XVe sicle. Elle a galement
laiss des traces dans une des uvrespolitiquesles plus importantesde
d'AntonioRoselli, et
l'poque du Concile de Ble, savoir la Monarchie
elle a t adopte par les protestantsdu XVIe sicle comme une uvre
qui avait une certaineactualitdans leurs luttescontrel'Eglise de Rome
et contreles nouvellesrevendicationsdu pouvoir temporelpar le pape
Paul IV. Ces exemplestmoignentde l'histoired'une rceptioncontinue
et trs mouvementeet ils rfutentles noncs de plusieurschercheurs
comme Kelsen,15Rausch,16Ullmann17et Skinner18
qui, sans avoir crit
la
une histoirede sa rception,jugeaientl'influencede Monarchie
de Dante
peu importanteou inexistante.Qui, face aux exemplesprsentsici, peut
encore tre surprispar le faitque Hugo Grotiusdans son uvre De jure
belliac pads juge ncessairede mentionnerla Monarchie
de Dante comme
uvre contrelaquelle la nouvelle conceptiondu droitinternationaldoit
tre dfendue?
1. Nequeestquodquemquam
Dantisargumenta,
nititur
moveant
quibusprobare
populos]
competere,
quiaid humano
generi
expeImperatori
jus taie[jusimperandi
Ut enimnavisaliqua
suiscompensantur
incommodis.
diat.Commoda
quae adfert,
numerus
sicethominum
ad earnmagnitudinem
potest,
quaereginequeat,
pervenire
etlocorum
tantaesse,utunumregimen
nonferat.
distantia
2. Deindeveroconcesso
15H. Kelsen,
DieStaatslehre
desDante
staatswissenschaftliche
Studien,
6),
(Wiener
Alighieri
Wien1905,147.
16H. Rausch,
vonPadua,DerVerteidiger
desFriedens
Nachwort
, AufGrund
, dans:Marsilius
vonH. Kusch,Stuttgart
vonW. Kunzmann
bearbeitet
derbersetzung
171,217.
17W. Ullmann,
IdeaofSovereignty
TheDevelopment
dans:The English
oftheMedieval
64 (1949),33.
Historical
Review,
18Q. Skinner,
TheFoundations
Political
1978,16-22.
, vol.I, Cambridge
ofModern
Thought

19:35:27 PM

DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION

265

nonsequitur,
utquodnisiexconsensu
autpoenanascinehocexpedire,
jusimperii
Romanus
quaeolimfuere
populiRomani,
Imperator
jus
quit.Ne inomniaquidem,
itabelloamissasunt;aliapactionibus,
enimutbellaquaesita
alia
nunchabet;multa
in aliarum
autregum
derelictione
gentium
jus transierunt.
Quaedametiamcivitates
ex partesubditae,
auttantum
foedeolimplanesubditae,
inequaliter
posteatantum
Namomneshi modiautammittendi,
autmutandi
rataeessecoeperunt.
juris,non
aliosvalent.
Dejure
RomaniImperii,
minus
adversus
quamadversus
(HugoGrotius,
tres
cumannotatis
acpadslibri
auctoris
belli
, Amsterdam
1702,588).
2. Nous avons ensuitepu constaterque la mme uvre philosophiquea
tant donnes les circonstanceset
de faon trsdiffrente
t interprte
conditionsde rceptiondiverses.Jean Falkenbergcritiquela Monarchie
de
comme une uvre qu'il range aux cts d'autres critsrformateurs
son temps,commeune uvrehtrodoxe.AntonioRoselli utiliseles argumentsde Dante en faveurde la monarchieuniversellepour prouverla
monarchiedu pape dans l'Eglise. Sous cette apparence,la Monarchie
devientune uvre anticonciliariste.
Ce qui, la lumirede la critiquede
devient
Falkenberg,pouvait apparatrecomme une uvre rformatrice
sous la plume de Roselli une uvre soit-disantractionnaire.A l'poque
de la Rforme,les protestantsdcouvrent,grce la critiqueorthodoxe
la Monarchie
et grce aux Index de livresinterdits,
comme uvre antipapiste et antiromaineet lui donnentune nouvelle actualitdans la lutte
de l'empereurFerdinandIer contrele Pape Paul IV. Chaque auteur a
suivila loi de l'hermneutiqueet a interprtl'uvre dans l'horizonde
son temps.Mais la mthode avec laquelle nous avons pu constaterce
processusest la mthodehistorique.Cela montrecommentl'hermneutique prsupposela mthode historiqueet comment sans objectivation
historiquenous resterionsau niveau des auteurs ici prsents,nous ne
ferionsque des adaptationsde textesdans notrehorizon,sans tre capable de nous en rendrecompte.
Au cours de sa rception,la Monarchie
de Dante a pris diversesapparencesen fonctiond'un contextechaque foisdiffrent.
L'uvre "en soi,"
Dante
une
avait
dans
son
est
chose, l'uvre que le
conue,
que
esprit,
Florentina confieaux alas de l'histoirepar sa publicationsous forme
de manuscriten est une autre.Face aux exemplesque je viensde prsenter et ceux qu'on aurait pu encore prsenter,je dois avouer qu'il me
de donnerune rponsesimple la questiondu rle de la
parat difficile
Monarchie
dans l'histoirede la philosophiepolitique. La Monarchie
a jou
plusieursrlesdans l'histoireen fonctiond'un contextechaque foisdiffrent. Le rle de la Monarchie
dans l'histoiren'existepas, l'uvre a eu un
et
une

selon les circonstances.


impact
importance chaque foisdiffrents
Les interprtes,
en exerantune rceptionpartielle,en isolantdes lments

19:35:27 PM

266

CHENEVAL
FRANGIS

dans un nouveau texte,ont


textuelsde la Monarchie
pour les rintgrer
de l'uvre. Le conet
l'intention
la
argumentative
chang signification
la
rdactionde l'uvre a demand une actude celui de
textediffrent
alisationde ses thses dans un nouvel horizon de comprhension.Trs
souventdans cette opration,les citationsde l'uvre ont t littrales,
de son utilisation,
mais tant donns le contexteet l'intrtdiffrents
de
Ainsise confirme
mme les citationslittralesont chang signification.
une opinioncentralede la thoriede la rception, savoir"dieMchtidentiti
derWiederholung
Abstand
,"19Cela ne comptedonc
des Wiederholten
imzeitlichen
mais
dans le cas de la Monarles
uvres
seulement
littraires,
pour
pas
a subi des
chiegalementpour une uvre philosophique.La Monarchie
, en tant qu'apparition historique,l'opus
mtamorphosespro captulectoris
de Dante, se prsente
l'uvre
arduumy
philosophiquequ'est la Monarchie
UmbertoEco qui,
ce
comme une "operaaperta
,"
qui peut-tresurprendrait
dans son ouvrage, a plutt parl des uvres d'art et non des uvres
philosophiques.20
La seule faon de rduirel'usage du textecontrel'intentionde l'auteur un minimumest la reconstruction
historiquede son milieu de
du texte la lumire de son contexte.La
rceptionet l'interprtation
mthode avec laquelle on se rend compte des contorsionssubies par
l'uvre et avec laquelle on indique les divergencesentre l'intentionde
l'auteuret celles qu'on lui prte est la mthodede l'histoirede la rception. C'est l'histoirequi vientau secoursdes philosophesabuss par une
lecture dcontextualisede leurs textes.Pour une philosophiesystmatique qui veut travailleravec des textesde l'histoirede la philosophiesans
de texte,le travaildoitd'abord
s'inscriredans la traditiondes falsificateurs
consisteren une reconstruction
historiquedes textes.Une philosophie
systmatique,
qui pense ne pas devoirse soumettre une reconstruction
des
textes,abouti la positionde l'hermneutiquede l'identihistorique
les textesdu pass
ficationde l'uvre et de sa rceptionet transforme
le
en prtextesd'une entreprisepropre.Pour "progrs"de la philosophie
il est peut-tresouhaitableque l'uvre philosophiquene restepas statique, immuablealors qu'elle doit tre adapte de nouvellesexigences.
Il est alors intressantde constaterqu'une philosophiesystmatiquequi
des textesdu pass reconnatimpliciteproposeune lecturenon-historique
ment l'historicitde la philosophie. Elle devraitpar consquent aussi
19Cf. H.-R.Jauss,Die Theorie
- Rckschau
derRezeption
,
Vorgeschichte
aufihreunerkannte
Konstanz
1987,31.
20U. Eco,Opera
, Milano1962.
aperta

19:35:27 PM

DE DANTE
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
LA RCEPTION

267

reconnatresa propre historicitou livrerde bons argumentsqui dmontrentpourquoi elle transcendel'histoireou pourquoi elle reprsente
sa fin.
On pourraitse demanderjusqu' quel point une gnralisationde la
thsedes mtamorphosesde l'oeuvredans le cours de sa rceptionvaut
pour toutesles uvresphilosophiques.Sur la base des matriauxprsentsici il estimpossiblede rpondre cettequestion.Mais je peux souligner
que je ne connais aucune uvre philosophiquequi n'ait subi des mtadans l'histoirede sa rception.Dans la prface
morphosesinterprtatives
derreinen
de la deuximeditionde sa Kritik
, ImmanuelKant s'est
Vernunft
son
constat
la
de
uvre
et
a
prononcsur rception
que le remaniement
de l'uvrephilosophiquedans le cours de sa rceptionest invitable:"An
einzelnenStellen lt sich jeder philosophischeVortragzwacken (denn
er kann nicht so gepanzert auftreten,als der mathematische)."21
Une
philosophie,ou toutephilosophie,qui n'a pas (encore)atteintle degr de
certitudede la mathmatique,est soumise la loi de la rception.22
L'histoirede la rceptionde la Monarchie
a suivicetteloi, que nous trouvons si bien formulechez Boce dans La Consolation
dephilosophie
,23dans
25et chez Thomas
le UrnedesCauses
chez
Dante
dans
le
Convivio
,24
d'Aquin:26
"Omnequodrecipitur
in aliquo,recipitur
in eo permodum
recipients
Fribourg(Suisse)
Universit
de Fribourg

21B, XLTV.
22"Jeder
einesandern
Denkerbaut,so zu sagen,aufdenTrmmern
philosophische
seineigenes
nieisteineszu Standegekommen,
dasinallenseinen
Teilenbestndig
Werk;
weilsie
wre.MankanndaherschonausdemGrunde
nicht
lernen,
gewesen
Philosophie
nochnicht
A 27).
ist."(I. Kant,Logik
, Einleitung,
gegeben
23V, 4, 25.
24Prop.10.
25III, vii,3.
26Summa
, I, 75,5c.
theologiae

19:35:27 PM

A Fragment
ofMichaelde Marbasio,Summade modissignificandi
L.G. KELLY

of Krakow have kindlysent


The Libraryof theJagiellonianUniversity
of two fragments
of Michel de Marbais's Summade modis
me reproductions
1
significandi
incorporatedinto the binding of MS BJ 510. The binding
dates fromabout 1500. The two sheetsin question,numbered"IIv" and
"IHr" in ink, are pasted in over the back end-papersof the manuscript,
it would seem,waste sheetssalvagedfroman older
whichare themselves,
manuscriptwrittenin a Gothic book-hand.The heads and foredgesof
are cut straightwhilethe tailsare tornveryuntidily
the Michel fragments
on
some
text
the sheets underneath.It would seem that our
revealing
were
part of a fullermanuscript,even a complete
fragmentsoriginally
one. Both fragments
begin and end in the middle of sentences,and it is
obvious thatboth sides of the sheetswere writtenon. Given thata fragment of the Doctrinale
is pasted over the frontend-papers,one wonders
if these fragments
were therefor reasons otherthan structural.
Page IIv is part of the chapteron the conjunction:
...
Incipit:ipsam coniunctionemformat(!) constituens
Explicit:. . . coniungitaliqua interse et disiungit(148.48-150.37 in my
edition)
IHr comes fromthe chapteron the interjection:
...
Incipit:cum quo huiusmodiinteriectioconstruitur
interiectioni
pro accidens. Unde ipse
Explicit: assignat significationem
in
the
edition)
(186.45-187.3
The fragments
are writtenin a bastardawhichbears a close resemblance
to the hands of BJ1944 and BJ1953. Each sheet has an illegiblecomment in a spideryhumanisthand writtenup the foredgemargin.The
patternof variantreadingsindicatesclose kinshipwith these two manuscripts,but thereis not enough evidence to even attemptto place these
1 Michaelis
demodis
Critical
Edition
withan introducde Marbasio
Summa
significandi.
- Bad Gonnstatt
1995(Grammatica
tionbyL.G. Kelly,Stuttgart
5).
Speculativa,
Vivarium
34,2

EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:35:36 PM

DE MARBASIO,
OF MICHAEL
SUMMA
DE MODISSIGNIFICANDI
A FRAGMENT
269
fragmentsin the stemma. The only significantvariant is the name,
Eberhardus(149.22), which agrees with the Krakow manuscriptsagainst
I would guess
the others.None of the other variantsseem significant.
that the manuscriptof which these sheets were a part was copied at
KrakowbeforeBJ1953,i.e. before1450, ifonlybecause the volumefrom
which theywere taken must have been surplusto requirementsor too
dilapidatedto be useful.
MS BJ510belongedto Michael Falkenerde Wratislavia(fl. 1502-1531).
Aristotelis
and a copy of theMetaphysics
It containshis Introduo
in metaphysica
itselfwithhis own marginalcommentary
and interlinear
glossesbyJoannes
Sommerfeld
{fl. 1487-1502).Though theythemselvesdo not figureamong
the grammarmastersof the university,
theirassociatesincludedthe great
de
Joannes
Glogovia Maiori. Both Sommerfeld
speculativegrammarian,
and Falkenerhad distinguished
careers.In the Actarectoralia
of theJagiellonian UniversitySommerfeldappears as a Master in 1487 and was
in Collegiominori
by 1492. Three years later he was Dean of
Collegiatus
Arts and on the Rector's Council. He died in 1502. Falkenerwas one
of the executorsof Sommerfeld'swill. He appears in the Actarectoralia
in
in Collegio
maiori.
1502 as a Master in the Facultyof Arts and Collegiatus
By 1505 he was Dean of Arts.In 1517 he was a professorof theology
and had been appointed Canon and Procurator
of the Church of Saint
Florian.He took his Doctorate of Theology in 1523 and was appointed
Counsellorto the Rector. By 1531 he was administrator
of Saint Florian
and one of the seniorprofessorsof theJagiellonianUniversity.
, Ottawa
of Ottawa
University
& DarwinCollege
, Cambridge

19:35:36 PM

Reviews
PeriHermeneias.
underlutert
vonHermann
Weidemann.
Aristoteles
Uebersetzt
Aristoteles,
in deutscher
Werke
vonErnstGrumach,
von
, begrndet
Uebersetzung
herausgegeben
Hellmut
Flashar.BandI, Teil II. Akademie
VerlagGmbH,Berlin1994.ISBN
3-05-001919-0.
oftheimportant
oftheBerlin
The superior
Akademie
to present
a modproject
Verlag
ernGerman
ofAristotle's
translation
withcurrent
philosophical
writings
together
scholarly
a morecompetent
commentaries
couldnothavefound
author
thanProfessor
Weidemann
De interpretatione
forthetranslation
of,andcommentary
uponAristotle's
(henceforth
Int.).
W. hastaken
involved
insuchan enterprise.
In an
intoall aspects
greatpainstoinquire
Introduction
heexhaustively
dealswiththeproblems
extensive
thetitle,
authensurrounding
andcomposition
ofInt.,as wellas withtheAncient
on thiswork.
commentaries
ticity,
- fora non-native
The German
translation
is painfully
butnoteasyto read
precise,
ofa largenumber
ofadditions
in brackets,
at least , as a result
whichapparreader,
areintended
to ruleoutanymisunderstandings,
themalicious
ones.The
ently
including
is sometimes
to read,owingto theinsertion
textofthecommentary
rather
difficult
of
butalways
footnote-like
remarks
intothetext,
understandable.
ofInt.areveryhelpful,
The comments
given(p. 133-473)
uponthefourteen
chapters
ordoctrinal
arenever
orsuperficially
disandevenintricate
philological
problems
ignored
ofchapter
nineis exemplary.
Asevery
student
ofAristotle's
missed.
W.'streatment
logic
thischapter,
whichdiscusses
theproblems
whatlaterwerecalledthe
knows,
concerning
- hassparked,
"futura
to usethewords
whosepioneerofProfessor
Ackrill,
contingentia"
- a "vigorous
andEnglish
translation
ofInt.stillis mosthelpful
discussion
ever
ingstudy
sinceitwaswritten
andnotleastin thelastfewyears".
W. gives(p. 223-99)
a full-scale
ofthisdifficult,
orsuccinct
andsometimes
somewhat
obscure
text,
and,on
interpretation
andcritically
examines
accounts
that,
topofthat,reports
(p. 300-24)themanydifferent
from
Boethius
havebeengiven
ofthisintriguing
Asa whole,
W.'sinteronwards,
chapter.
whois interested
in the
is convincing,
andcertainly
foreverybody
indispensable
pretation
matter.
subject
thegeneral
an outstanding
ofInt
thatW. haspresented
account
., a
Despite
impression
fewremarks
canbe madeto challenge
I shallconfine
myself
partsofhisinterpretation.
oftheintroductory
to somebasicsubjects
ofInt.(chs.1-4).
chapters
thevery
remark
concerns
theproblem
oftime-connotation
from
(a) A first
featuring
ofInt.,in theopening
inwhich
Aristotle
thedistincclarifies
chapter
(16a3-9),
beginning
tionbetween
ontheonehand,andtheir
constituents,
ovofia
statement-making
expressions
The decisive
themis thatstatements
aresusandprivet
on theother.
difference
between
arenot.In ordertohavea truthoftruth-values,
whereas
ov^aiaandpr||iaxa
ceptible
of "is"or "is not",
anditslinguistic
theaddition
value,a thought,
expression,
require
are
whentaken
becausev^axaandpr^axabythemselves,
likethoughts
bythemselves,
A serious
suchan addineither
truenorfalse(16a9-15).
arisesat 16a18,where
difficulty
is qualified
tionof"is"or"isnot"(elvaiand|xf|eivai,respectively)
rinXax;
bythephrase
followed
orwithreference
totime").
f'Kataxpvov
Ackrill,
byW.,prefers
("either
simply
timeversus
ofthisphrasein terms
oftheopposition
thecommon
"present
explanation
or to theomnitemporal
times"
to taking
to alludeto thetimeless
tcAxo
pastandfuture
timeandpastand
he feelsthatthedistinction
between
tense,
present
although
present
orwith
wouldnotbe veryhappily
"either
future
times
bythedisjunction
simply
expressed
reference
totime."
Thesamephrase
is alsousedatAnal.Pr.I 15,34b7-8and,somewhat
III 10,433b5-10.
at Topica
I 5, 192a22-30,
as wellas atDe anima
To mymind,
modified,
ofthis
theseparallel
thatwe shouldtakethealternative
interpretation
passages
suggest
theonethattakes
mentioned
above(which
is rejected
viz
phrase
bybothW. andAckrill),
Vivarium
34,2

O E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:36:12 PM

REVIEWS

271

ittoconcern
theopposition
between
time-connotation
andtimelessness.
W.
(Incidentally,
butdoesnottakethispassageas a parallel).
Anal.Pr.I 15,34b7-8,
(157)onlyadduces
Thekeynotion
is herethatoflkXcc,.
Whoever
takesAristotle's
useofthistermelsewhereintoconsideration
and 141b24;De
, 115b29-35
(e.g.AnalPost.71b34-72a5;
Topica
317b5-7;De celo
failto seethatthegeneral
ideain all thesepasI, 9) cannot
generatone,
is usedto standforan entity
of
sagesis thatthephrase"[x] takencwtX"
irrespective
itsbeinginstantiated
in matter,
and thatitscounterparts,
viz."[x] mx^po,""[x]
in matter.
andso on,standfor[x] as instantiated
Nowall material
instanjiefiiyjivov,"
tiation
is temporally
conditioned.
thenotion
of
comescloseto
Therefore,
naturally
thatoftimelessness.
In pointoffact,
onesometimes
finds
ofkGx;
thenotions
and"universality,"
opposed
tothetemporality
ofparticular
instantiations.
thenature
oftheuniThus,whendiscussing
versal
toallB"),Aristode
Pr.I 15,34b7ff.)
syllogistic
premiss
(e.g."Abelongs
(Anal.
explains
thatwe should
thephrase"belonging
understand
to all ofa subject"
notwithreference
to anytime(jir|Kaxxpvov
butjcAxo,
i.e."timeless,"
forthatis thewayto
paavxa),
aremadeof.The author
insists
thatin such
getholdofthematerial
genuine
syllogisms
cases"universality
mustbe takensimply,"
notlimited,
thatis, in terms
oftime(ibid.,
34b17-8).Thephrase
at bl8) seemstoruleouttimeandtemporal
(ot>
iopovxa
xpvcp
and to implytimelessness,
instantiation
rather
thanmerely
indefiniteness
or
temporal
toPlato,ofcourse,
Aristotle's
notion
oftimelessness
innoway
Contrary
omnitemporality.
theexistence
ofa transcendent
domain
ofbeing.
In hisview,thisnotion
is merely
implies
instrumental
inourconceiving
thethings
oftheoutside
viz.ourtaking
world,
(e.g.whenframaboutthem)theirimmanent
natures
as abstracted
fromthese
ingapodeictic
syllogisms
natures'
inherence
in thesethings,
in orderto draw,andtojustify,
connon-contingent
clusions
aboutthem.
Aristotle's
at 16a18("either
orwithreference
totime")
should
be interremark,
simply
oftimelessness
vs.temporality.
Whathe means
preted
alongthesamelines,i.e.in terms
to sayis thatthe"being"
addedto verbalexpressions
or thoughts,
which
them
provides
witha truth-value,
either
refers
to thetimeless
to theconnotatum
of
beingthatbelongs
theterm
orto temporal
instantiations
andinstances.
involved,
in Aristotle's
finds
somesupport
discussion
ofp%a, which(in
(b) Thisinterpretation
3 ofhistreatise)
is saidto"additionally
time"(itsdefinition
chapter
signify
being[1] "that
<sc.pfijia>which
is significant
time,[2] nopartofwhich
additionally
signifies
separately,
and[3] which
is always
a signofthings
quabeingsaidofsomething
else").
Aristotle
whatis meant
time"byopposing
explains
(16b8-9)
by"toadditionally
signify
time'I meanthis:health
is a
yiaveito (thename)"byieia:
"By'additionally
signifying
a pf'|ia,becauseitadditionally
as obtaining
now
."
name,butis-healthy
signifies
something
he intends
to saythatas a namevyieiarefers
to theentity
butin
Apparently
"health,"
itup quaform
whereas
ei refers
to health
as a form
-uyuxv
bringing
only,
actually
inhering
in something
or actualised
itself
in tempoelse,thusas an enmattered
form,
manifesting
ralconditions.
toAristotle,
no form
exists
itis enmattered
unless
in something
According
elseas itssubject-substrate.
Thisdoesnotmean,however,
thatwecouldneverrefer
to a
form
as such,irrespective
ofitsbeingimmanent
ina substrate.
Forthatmatter,
Aristotle's
vividdiscussion
withPlatoabouthisMaster's
Transcendent
as wellas
Forms,
Separate,
hisownreflections
in hisMetaphysics
abouttruesubstance,
wouldhavebeenimpossible
without
as such"inan abstract
names
up "forms
bringing
way.Nowin suchdiscussions,
entities
oftheir
intemporal
immanent
substrates
designate
regardless
being
("without
time"),
whereas
thisontological
stateis focussed
on.
byusingprmaxa
Feature
a signofthings
[3] ("isalways
else")is closely
quabeingsaidofsomething
linked
Whereas
onupwith[1],andis ina wayitscounterpart.
[1] brings
up an entity's
stateas something
in a subject-substrate
andhencetemporally
tological
beingimmanent
to thematching
situation
determined,
[3] refers
that,in keeping
grammatico-semantical
withthisontological
is also brought
to thissubjectstate,theentity
up quaassigned

19:36:12 PM

272

REVIEWS

- opposing
- thatwhatis
ThusAristotle
hisbasicview
substrate.
Plato's
implicitly
presents
a
tothe
a
is
a
So
a
reference
non-subsistent
pfj^ia
pfjiia
always
implies
signified
entity.
by
whichthesignificate
it designates
inheres
in. Quitenaturally,
subsistent
substrate
then,
as beingclosely
thesetwofeatures
ofpfj^ia
areexplained
related.
byAristotle
W. is oftheopinion
Ackrill,
pfljiais in facta
(177)thattheindefinite
(c) Following
withthenegative
an ordinary
which
pn^iatogether
sentence-fragment,
particle,
containing
I wouldprefer
tomakethestatement
itis partofa negative
totake
serves
one.However,
On thisassumption,
itmustrefer
ovovia."
"piOTOV
p%a" ina similar
wayas "indefinite
thatequalsan ordinary
to an expression
saveforthelatter
definite
prilla,
wayofreferThe indefinite
involved.
thussignifies
somekindofbeingin
pf|p.a
ringto thesignificate
an indefinite
manner,
(16b11)or "beingnot-just"
e.g."beingnot-healthy"
(20a31).One
is no empty
should
be awarethat,
there
names,
designajustas in thecaseofindefinite
an onticvalue,despite
theminimal
tioninvolved,
butreally
information
givenaboutits
nature.
The"characteristic"
is so vaguethatitcaneven
pfjn.cc
bytheindefinite
designated
"be saidofthings
thatareandthings
thate.g.
thatarenot,indiscriminately,"
meaning
and"not-just"
thatlackshealth
as wellas
"not-healthy"
maystandforanyexistent
thing
forwhatdoesnotexistat all.
ofAristotle's
Ourinterpretation
indefinite
reflects
thedoublemeaning
of
prilla
precisely
In Physics
II 5, 196b23fF.
hisuseof"piatov."
forinstance,
whendiscussing
thedifferent
causemaybe indicated,
he distinguishes
the(determinate)
perse
waysin whicha thing's
ofindeterminate,
from
theplurality
incidental
E.g.thecauseof
designation
designations.
a house(architect)
orbyoneoftheman'sincias "housebuilder"
maybepersedesignated
dentalattributes
as "thepale entity"
or "themusical";
in thelatter
case thecauseis
V 1,
indefinite
b 28),notquacause,butin thewayitis referred
to.In Physics
(piaxov,
term
which
theauthor
usesbothsenses
oftheindefinite
225a20-5,
"not-being,"
maystand
ina certain
forunqualified
is not"),as wellas "what-is-not"
taken
sense,
("what
not-being
or "whatis not-good."
viz. "whatis not-white"
It is wrong,
I think,
inAckrill
andW. 177)thatthephrase"holding
to assume
(with
ofwhatis andwhatis not"refers
ornon-existence
ofthe
to theexistence
discriminately
in whichtheindefinite
ofthesentence
is actually
used.Rather,
pfj^ia
subject
onlythe
ofits
of theindefinite
itself
is concerned,
proa'ssignificate
applicability
irrespective
in a sentence.
Ofthissignificate
itis saidthatiteither
ordoes
actually
occurring
applies,
not.Therefore,
thereference
where
it is said
madebyW. (177)to Categ.
10,13b27-35,
is notsick"is true,
thatifSocrates
doesnotexist"Socrates
seemstobe besidethepoint.
In thisconnection
it shouldbe keptin mindthatin chapters
is dis2 and3, Aristotle
andpfj^ia
aspotential
ofa statement-making
andthus
ovovia
ingredients
cussing
expression
on thethings
he focusses
to deterto,eachin itsownspecific
theyrefer
way.Ofcourse,
minewhat,
inaccordance
withtheir
eachofthem
contributes
totheAyo,
nature,
specific
andthestatement-making
when"'is' or 'is not'is added"(16a17-8),remains
expression
theultimate
aimoftheobservations
madein thesechapters.
twolinesofthenextpassage(16b19-20),
which
dealswiththepfj^awhen
(d) Thefirst
assumed.
The
uttered
shouldgiveriseto lessdifficulty
thanis commonly
justbyitself,
is wrongly
taken(W.p. 178)to mean"whentaken
phrase"whenuttered
justbyitself"
ofthetwofeaoutofa certain
statemental
Rather
itis onlyabouttheabsence
context."
additures
thatmakeup thespecific
between
andpf'na,
difference
viz.thelatter's
ovovia
itsattributive
tionaltime-reference
anditsbeingsaidofsomething
use,as
else,including
a name,because,
man."On thisassumption,
thepfjjiais merely
justlikea
e.g.in "white
from
itsbeingimmanent
as an onticvalue,detached
name,itonlybrings
upitssignificate
in something
ofwhich
itis said.Thefact
elseandwithout
thesubject-substrate
implying
in thatposition
thatthe
thatthepfjioc
doessignify
doesnotyeteoipsoimply
something
involved
is,oris not,thecase.Thisis quiteinlinewithwhathasbeensaidearlier
entity
"when
further
(16a13-8)aboutv|iaxaandpr^iata,
(viz.'is'or'isnot')isadded."
nothing
- inwhich
his
sentences
ofthischapter
tries
tosupport
Aristotle
(e) Thefinal
(16bl9ff.)

19:36:12 PM

REVIEWS

273

claimaboutthepfj^xoc
whentaken
on itsown,byan "anticipative
refutation"1
concerning
theverb"tobe"- are extremely
difficult.
Noteventheverb"tobe" (or "notto be"),
which
on thefaceofitseemstoreally
a counter-example
affords
imply
"being-the-case,"
- notevenifyouuse,without
toinvalidate
Aristotle
addimyclaim,
anyfurther
argues,2
whichquasubstantiated
neuter
worddoesimply
theideaof
tion,thetermov ("be-ing"),
thesentence
"o' evxveitcr
should
yiXv"
actually
beingthere(where
something
be readinparenthesi,
to Aristotle
paceW., 186).Whynot?Because,
(16b23-5),
according
eventheverb"tobe,"(including
itsnominal
"isnothing"
notion,
participle)
(isan empty
- forthissenseofTipoacrrinaveiv
thatis),andmerely
cfr.10,20a13- a
helpsto signify
certain
be conceived
which
cannot
ofwithout
thethings
combined.
(rvGeoi,
abouttheputative
occurrence
ofwhatlateron
(f) I wouldliketomakea finalremark
wascalled"copula".
W. adheres
viewthat
(e.g.155;158;176;353ff.;
370)tothecommon
theAristotelian
knows
ofa "copula."
The Aristotelian
is
already
proposition
proposition
"S = P"
takento be an expression
withthe(modern)
to theeffect
structure,
commonly
likethecopulain "S = P," thefunctor
"is"("isnot")is heldto be dyadic,
andto
that,
actas thatwhich
combines
in Latin)thesubject-term
withthepredicate-term.
("copulat"
there
is an alternative
view(heldbyMathen,
to theeffect
that
However,
amongothers)
theverb"is"is a monadic
functor
whenaddedto an "assertible
orstatable
comwhich,
a stateofaffairs),
makesup a statement
plex"(i.e.a Xyo
expressing
bysolely
asserting
thatthisstateofaffairs
is really
thecase.Thus,anydyadic
function
is out
(as "copula")
ofthequestion,
sincetheoyo
isalready
a composite
ovovia
byitself
expression
combining
andpolice.
Muchevidence
in support
ofthisview.I shallconfine
maybe putforward
totwospecimens.
myself
Aristotle
never
of"is"as "copula,"
noris thisverbeverbrought
with,
[1] To begin
speaks
a special
name.Besides,
"is"and"isnot"arealways
saidtobeadded
toa comupunder
bination
ofan ovovia
formed
anda pfinxx,
whereas
there
is neveranysuggestion
already
thatAristotle
takesthemasperforming
thecombination
ofan vojiaanda pfj^ia
themselves
.3
it is relevant
to recognise
whatAristotle
meanswhenhe says(at 16b24)
[2] Secondly,
that"it(theverb'is/and'is not5as well(!);see 16b22)helpsto signify
someoveoi,
whichcannot
be thought
ofwithout
thethings
combined."
is
Now,thewordcmveoi
usedeither
to refer
toa compound
structure
ofphysical
or
basically
("composite")
things
tothemental
actofuniting
twoormoreconcepts.
Thislogico-grammatical
useis twofold:
either
to an (alleged)
or it asserts
thiscomposite
as obtaining.
cvvGeoi
refers
only
composite,
- which
Theterm
occurs
viz- intheopening
iapeai,
onlyonce,forthatmatter,
chapter
- , mustbe explained
as thedenialoftheovvGeoi
referred
tobytheassertible
(16a12-4)
rather
thanas a separation
ofitscomponents.
ofspeaking
Thus,theprocedure
complex,
andspeaking
is basically
a matter
ofasserting
ordenytruly
(ctX"n0reiv)
falsely
(yeSeoOai)
- orwrongly,
- an assertible
totheeffect
thattoassert
or
ingrightly
respectively
complex,
to denyamounts
to giving
one'sassentto,or dissent
from
oneandthesameassertible
A lotofcriticism
ofAristotle's
semantics
wouldturn
outtobe beside
complex,
respectively.
thepoint,
ifthealternative
werefollowed,
as I hopeto havemadeclear
interpretation
elsewhere.4
To taketheforegoing
remarks
as serious
reservations
onthepartofthereviewer
would
be toignore
W.'soutstanding
achievement.
Theonlyreally
is thatthis
disappointing
thing
richstudy
hastodo withsucha poorIndex("Sachregister").
Mheer

L.M. DERijk

1I refer
toAristotle's
habitofsupporting
a claimbyinvalidating
a seemingly
bythisterm
Ackrill
strong
(1963),114;123;W.,156;163;181.
counter-example.
Cp.
2 Weidemann's
hasmadeaninteresting
toemend
thelocus
16b21-3.
(180-5)
attempt
corruptus

19:36:12 PM

274

REVIEWS

3 Notice
17a12;
inasfaras "is"isconcerned,
Aristotle
uses(16a15;16a18;16b30;
that
always
thepassive
verb
19b38;
20a9;20al4;20a36;21a21;21b6;21b21;
19b25;19b30;
cp.21b27-30)
nevertheactiveverbovvxiGevai.
jcpooT0eo0ai,
4
W. vanderHorstandDavidRunia(eds.),Studies
Pieter
Polyhistor.
KeimpeA. Algra,
toJaapMansfeld
intheHistory
andHistoriography
on hissix, presented
ofAncient
Philosophy
tieth
Leiden1996,115-34.
Birthday,
delapense
ditions
Actualit
mdivale.
de l'Institut
(eds.),
J.FollonandJ.McEvoy
Suprieur
de Philosophie-ditions
Louvain-la-Neuve-Louvain-Paris
Peeters,
1994,viii+ 360p.
ISBN90 6831607 9 / 2 877231372 {Philosophas
Mdivaux,
, 31).
In 1992theInstitute
ofMedieval
Studies
at theUniversit
de Louvain
celeCatholique
brated
itstwenty-fifth
andtheCentre
De Wulf-Mansion
ofthesameuniveranniversary,
dela pense
contains
to marktheevent.
Actualit
mdivale
the
a colloquium
sityorganized
ofarticles
at thecolloquium
as wellas a selection
scholars
who
byyoung
presented
papers
isintended
doctorate
at theCentre
De Wulf-Mansion.
Thecollection
havecompleted
their
notonlyto reflect
therecent
stateofstudies
in medieval
at theUniversit
philosophy
thememory
ofFernand
butalsoto honour
Van Steenberghen,
de Louvain,
Catholique
whosedeathwassucha lossto medieval
philosophy.
ofthecollection
is reflected
initscontents.
Therearesixteen
Therather
mixedorigin
theeditors'
notincluding
introduction.
Threeofthepapers
authors,
papersbythirteen
referat theUniversit
de Louvain
focusdirectly
on medieval
studies
Catholique
(though
enceis alsomadeto theworkdoneat theDe Wulf-Mansion
Centrum
oftheKatholieke
in 1978).
theFrench-speaking
toLouvain-la-Neuve
Universiteit
before
Leuven
partmoved
a paper
de l'Institut
de Louvain-la-Neuve,"
d'tudes
mdivales
Theyare:"Auxorigines
delivered
VanSteenberghen
hisdeath;
Follonon "Les
before
shortly
byFernand
Jacques
tudesde philosophie
mdivale
au CentreDe Wulf-Mansion";
andJozefBramson
"L'Aristoteles
biland'unedition
internationale."
latinus:
theytellofan impressive
Together
record
ofachievement,
whether
ofindividual
scholars
suchasJacqueline
Hamesse
(notto
which
Van Steenberghen
or ofinstitutions
suchas theS.I.E.P.M.,
has
mention
himself),
oftheunfortunate
ofrecent
cuts
itshomeat Louvain-la-Neuve.
Mention
impact
budget
willstrike
a chordwithmanyreaders.
A secondgeneral
themeis thenature
ofmedieval
andhowit shouldbe
philosophy
de la pense
studied.
Heretherelevant
introduction,
papersare theeditors'
"Apologie
etla
"La philosophie
du moyen
mdivale
mdivale";
James
McEvoy,
ge,la civilisation
CarlosSteel,"La philosophie
comme
de son
culture
du mdiviste";
mdivale
expression
selon
et actualit
"Histoire
de la mthode
Rosemann,
scolastique
poque";and Philipp
studThe various
oflinking
medieval
M. Grabmann."
authors
pointouttheimportance
in relation
outthe
to theology.
ieswithphilosophy,
andofseeing
Theybring
philosophy
whether
itfocuses
onlogicandsemanofanyoverly-narrow
primarily
approach,
dangers
the
on heterodox
or evenon ThomasAquinas
views,
tics,on mystical
(though
theology,
Steel's
on
rather
a
neo-Thomist
tend
to
be
touched
of
lightly).
dangers
approach
possible
nottrytoreadmedieval
He argues
thatoneshould
philopaperis particularly
insightful.
ofits
in terms
ofa response
tosocio-economic
factors,
giventheimportance
solely
sophy
one mustnotsuppose
thatbecause
texts.Equally,
withauthoritative
however,
struggle
in terms
ofa search
wasconcerned
withtexts,
itcanbe readsolely
medieval
philosophy
absolute
As Steelpoints
toseeka textually-based
fortimeless
truth.
out,theveryattempt
framework.
institutional
wasconditioned
andbya particular
truth
bya particular
theology
The third
in medieval
McEvoy
philosophy.
groupofpaperstakesup particular
topics
de Naples,"
l'universit
hascontributed
Pierre
innaturalibus
"Matre
d'Irlande,
professeur
de Hivernia
andhiswritings.
a useful
ofknown
facts
aboutPetrus
Among
papers
survey
dans
orientales
etoccidentales
wefindLauraRizzerio,
"Lessources
scholars,
byyounger
Vivarium
34,2

E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:36:12 PM

274

REVIEWS

3 Notice
17a12;
inasfaras "is"isconcerned,
Aristotle
uses(16a15;16a18;16b30;
that
always
thepassive
verb
19b38;
20a9;20al4;20a36;21a21;21b6;21b21;
19b25;19b30;
cp.21b27-30)
nevertheactiveverbovvxiGevai.
jcpooT0eo0ai,
4
W. vanderHorstandDavidRunia(eds.),Studies
Pieter
Polyhistor.
KeimpeA. Algra,
toJaapMansfeld
intheHistory
andHistoriography
on hissix, presented
ofAncient
Philosophy
tieth
Leiden1996,115-34.
Birthday,
delapense
ditions
Actualit
mdivale.
de l'Institut
(eds.),
J.FollonandJ.McEvoy
Suprieur
de Philosophie-ditions
Louvain-la-Neuve-Louvain-Paris
Peeters,
1994,viii+ 360p.
ISBN90 6831607 9 / 2 877231372 {Philosophas
Mdivaux,
, 31).
In 1992theInstitute
ofMedieval
Studies
at theUniversit
de Louvain
celeCatholique
brated
itstwenty-fifth
andtheCentre
De Wulf-Mansion
ofthesameuniveranniversary,
dela pense
contains
to marktheevent.
Actualit
mdivale
the
a colloquium
sityorganized
ofarticles
at thecolloquium
as wellas a selection
scholars
who
byyoung
presented
papers
isintended
doctorate
at theCentre
De Wulf-Mansion.
Thecollection
havecompleted
their
notonlyto reflect
therecent
stateofstudies
in medieval
at theUniversit
philosophy
thememory
ofFernand
butalsoto honour
Van Steenberghen,
de Louvain,
Catholique
whosedeathwassucha lossto medieval
philosophy.
ofthecollection
is reflected
initscontents.
Therearesixteen
Therather
mixedorigin
theeditors'
notincluding
introduction.
Threeofthepapers
authors,
papersbythirteen
referat theUniversit
de Louvain
focusdirectly
on medieval
studies
Catholique
(though
enceis alsomadeto theworkdoneat theDe Wulf-Mansion
Centrum
oftheKatholieke
in 1978).
theFrench-speaking
toLouvain-la-Neuve
Universiteit
before
Leuven
partmoved
a paper
de l'Institut
de Louvain-la-Neuve,"
d'tudes
mdivales
Theyare:"Auxorigines
delivered
VanSteenberghen
hisdeath;
Follonon "Les
before
shortly
byFernand
Jacques
tudesde philosophie
mdivale
au CentreDe Wulf-Mansion";
andJozefBramson
"L'Aristoteles
biland'unedition
internationale."
latinus:
theytellofan impressive
Together
record
ofachievement,
whether
ofindividual
scholars
suchasJacqueline
Hamesse
(notto
which
Van Steenberghen
or ofinstitutions
suchas theS.I.E.P.M.,
has
mention
himself),
oftheunfortunate
ofrecent
cuts
itshomeat Louvain-la-Neuve.
Mention
impact
budget
willstrike
a chordwithmanyreaders.
A secondgeneral
themeis thenature
ofmedieval
andhowit shouldbe
philosophy
de la pense
studied.
Heretherelevant
introduction,
papersare theeditors'
"Apologie
etla
"La philosophie
du moyen
mdivale
mdivale";
James
McEvoy,
ge,la civilisation
CarlosSteel,"La philosophie
comme
de son
culture
du mdiviste";
mdivale
expression
selon
et actualit
"Histoire
de la mthode
Rosemann,
scolastique
poque";and Philipp
studThe various
oflinking
medieval
M. Grabmann."
authors
pointouttheimportance
in relation
outthe
to theology.
ieswithphilosophy,
andofseeing
Theybring
philosophy
whether
itfocuses
onlogicandsemanofanyoverly-narrow
primarily
approach,
dangers
the
on heterodox
or evenon ThomasAquinas
views,
tics,on mystical
(though
theology,
Steel's
on
rather
a
neo-Thomist
tend
to
be
touched
of
lightly).
dangers
approach
possible
nottrytoreadmedieval
He argues
thatoneshould
philopaperis particularly
insightful.
ofits
in terms
ofa response
tosocio-economic
factors,
giventheimportance
solely
sophy
one mustnotsuppose
thatbecause
texts.Equally,
withauthoritative
however,
struggle
in terms
ofa search
wasconcerned
withtexts,
itcanbe readsolely
medieval
philosophy
absolute
As Steelpoints
toseeka textually-based
fortimeless
truth.
out,theveryattempt
framework.
institutional
wasconditioned
andbya particular
truth
bya particular
theology
The third
in medieval
McEvoy
philosophy.
groupofpaperstakesup particular
topics
de Naples,"
l'universit
hascontributed
Pierre
innaturalibus
"Matre
d'Irlande,
professeur
de Hivernia
andhiswritings.
a useful
ofknown
facts
aboutPetrus
Among
papers
survey
dans
orientales
etoccidentales
wefindLauraRizzerio,
"Lessources
scholars,
byyounger
Vivarium
34,2

E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:36:41 PM

REVIEWS

275

"'Homohominem
caniscanem,
de Robert
et
Grosseteste";
Rosemann,
l'exgse
generat,
Procration
humaine
et filiation
trinitaire
DeusDeumnongenerat?'
chezS. Augustin";
"Lerledel'amiti
dansla recherche
dubonheur
chezS. Augustin";
EoinCassidy,
Miguel
"De la flicit
chezBoceet chezDante";JorgeMartnez
Lluch-Baixauli,
philosophique
"De l'ordre
chezsaintThomasd'Aquin,"
PascalDasseleer,
"Etreet
Barrera,
politique
beautselonsaintThomasd'Aquin"andJean-Michel
Counet,"Nicolasde Cuse la
un dpassement
de l'hylmorphisme."
du MoyenAgeetde la Renaissance:
charnire
I shallpick
andwell-researched,
all thepapersin thisgroupareworkmanlike
Though
forcomment.
Themost
is "L'univocit
outjusttwoofthelongest
ambitious
philosophically
et la problmatique
chezJeanDunsScot,"byJean-Michel
de l'tant
de l'infini
Counet.
a plausible
ofhowtheunivocal
ofensallows
Counet
account
a rational
foungives
concept
dationforourcognitions.
In explaining
how(according
to Scotus)we movefromthe
ofaccidents
toensandhencetosubstance,
he appealsto a
red,white)
(e.g.,
apprehension
dialectical
oflanguage
weproject
thestructure
ontoreality.
He does
procedure
whereby
notprovide
texts
from
Scotusto substantiate
hisaccount
at themostcrucial
but,
points,
to theeffect
thatspoken
orwritten
words
cannot
be anaearlyarguments
givenScotus's
thatconcepts
be analogical,
I assumethatCounetis takcannot
logicalon thegrounds
in rather
a widesense,to include
mental
andhenceconceptual
inglanguage
language
Evenifmuchinthepaperneedsmoreprecise
structures.
formulation
anddocumentation,
itis generally
stimulating.
ThepaperI found
mostvaluable
was"Lesgrandes
de l'infinit
tapesde la dcouverte
divine
au XIIIesicle."The author,
Antoine
andexplores
it
Ct,takesa single
theme,
withadmirable
Thenotion
andprecision.
ofGod'sinfinity
wasrelatively
clarity
neglected
in thetwelfth
butitbecameimportant
after
the1241condemnation
ofthethecentury,
sisthatneither
northeblessed
in heavenseeGodin hisessence.
The problem
is
angels
an obvious
one.IfGodis simple,
thenitseemsthathe mustbe seenas a whole,
ornot
at all;butifGodis infinite,
thenno finite
mindcangrasphimcompletely.
Ctshows
howa newdoctrinal
consensus
arosewhich
involved
boththecareful
clarification
ofthe
nature
ofGod'sinfinity,
andtheexploration
ofan epistemology
which
non-quantitative
wouldallowoneto saythata finite
mindcouldbe saturated
without
byGod'sinfinity
thatinfinity.
exhausting
WhileI amhappy
toadmit
thatI learned
a lotfrom
theindividual
andwhile
articles,
I am equallyhappyto celebrate
theimmense
contributions
madeby theUniversit
deLouvain
tothestudy
ofmedieval
I findthatthisbookis marred
Catholique
philosophy,
itsparts.The institutional
linkalonedoesnotprovide
between
a true
bythedisparity
oftheme,
anditwouldprobably
havebeenbetter
toseparate
thecolloquium
unity
papers
from
theexamples
ofnewscholarship.
Ontario
Waterloo,

E.J.Ashworth

RistoSaarinen,
Weakness
toBuridan.
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought
from
Augustine
E.J.Brill,
Leiden1994,v + 207p. ISBN 90 04 099948 [Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters
, XLIV).
therehasbeenextensive
discussion
ofakrasia
ofthewill,"in
, or "weakness
Although
bothancient
andmodern
there
no discussion
hasbeenalmost
in
oftheproblem
thought,
thecontext
ofmedieval
The reasonforthis,according
is that
to Saarinen,
philosophy.
havemaintained
scholars
theviewthatbecausetheJudeo-Christian
ofhuman
concept
nature
intheMiddle
dominated
ofakrasia
wastaken
forgranted.
Since
Ages,theexistence
thewillis heldto be ableto actagainst
therefore
"a concept
ofakrasia
holdsno
reason,
interest."
to thecontrary
maintains
wasindeeda very
thatthere
special
(p. 2) Saarinen
ofakrasia,
discussion
rendered
intoLatinas incontinentia,
from
sophisticated
philosophical
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:36:41 PM

REVIEWS

275

"'Homohominem
caniscanem,
de Robert
et
Grosseteste";
Rosemann,
l'exgse
generat,
Procration
humaine
et filiation
trinitaire
DeusDeumnongenerat?'
chezS. Augustin";
"Lerledel'amiti
dansla recherche
dubonheur
chezS. Augustin";
EoinCassidy,
Miguel
"De la flicit
chezBoceet chezDante";JorgeMartnez
Lluch-Baixauli,
philosophique
"De l'ordre
chezsaintThomasd'Aquin,"
PascalDasseleer,
"Etreet
Barrera,
politique
beautselonsaintThomasd'Aquin"andJean-Michel
Counet,"Nicolasde Cuse la
un dpassement
de l'hylmorphisme."
du MoyenAgeetde la Renaissance:
charnire
I shallpick
andwell-researched,
all thepapersin thisgroupareworkmanlike
Though
forcomment.
Themost
is "L'univocit
outjusttwoofthelongest
ambitious
philosophically
et la problmatique
chezJeanDunsScot,"byJean-Michel
de l'tant
de l'infini
Counet.
a plausible
ofhowtheunivocal
ofensallows
Counet
account
a rational
foungives
concept
dationforourcognitions.
In explaining
how(according
to Scotus)we movefromthe
ofaccidents
toensandhencetosubstance,
he appealsto a
red,white)
(e.g.,
apprehension
dialectical
oflanguage
weproject
thestructure
ontoreality.
He does
procedure
whereby
notprovide
texts
from
Scotusto substantiate
hisaccount
at themostcrucial
but,
points,
to theeffect
thatspoken
orwritten
words
cannot
be anaearlyarguments
givenScotus's
thatconcepts
be analogical,
I assumethatCounetis takcannot
logicalon thegrounds
in rather
a widesense,to include
mental
andhenceconceptual
inglanguage
language
Evenifmuchinthepaperneedsmoreprecise
structures.
formulation
anddocumentation,
itis generally
stimulating.
ThepaperI found
mostvaluable
was"Lesgrandes
de l'infinit
tapesde la dcouverte
divine
au XIIIesicle."The author,
Antoine
andexplores
it
Ct,takesa single
theme,
withadmirable
Thenotion
andprecision.
ofGod'sinfinity
wasrelatively
clarity
neglected
in thetwelfth
butitbecameimportant
after
the1241condemnation
ofthethecentury,
sisthatneither
northeblessed
in heavenseeGodin hisessence.
The problem
is
angels
an obvious
one.IfGodis simple,
thenitseemsthathe mustbe seenas a whole,
ornot
at all;butifGodis infinite,
thenno finite
mindcangrasphimcompletely.
Ctshows
howa newdoctrinal
consensus
arosewhich
involved
boththecareful
clarification
ofthe
nature
ofGod'sinfinity,
andtheexploration
ofan epistemology
which
non-quantitative
wouldallowoneto saythata finite
mindcouldbe saturated
without
byGod'sinfinity
thatinfinity.
exhausting
WhileI amhappy
toadmit
thatI learned
a lotfrom
theindividual
andwhile
articles,
I am equallyhappyto celebrate
theimmense
contributions
madeby theUniversit
deLouvain
tothestudy
ofmedieval
I findthatthisbookis marred
Catholique
philosophy,
itsparts.The institutional
linkalonedoesnotprovide
between
a true
bythedisparity
oftheme,
anditwouldprobably
havebeenbetter
toseparate
thecolloquium
unity
papers
from
theexamples
ofnewscholarship.
Ontario
Waterloo,

E.J.Ashworth

RistoSaarinen,
Weakness
toBuridan.
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought
from
Augustine
E.J.Brill,
Leiden1994,v + 207p. ISBN 90 04 099948 [Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters
, XLIV).
therehasbeenextensive
discussion
ofakrasia
ofthewill,"in
, or "weakness
Although
bothancient
andmodern
there
no discussion
hasbeenalmost
in
oftheproblem
thought,
thecontext
ofmedieval
The reasonforthis,according
is that
to Saarinen,
philosophy.
havemaintained
scholars
theviewthatbecausetheJudeo-Christian
ofhuman
concept
nature
intheMiddle
dominated
ofakrasia
wastaken
forgranted.
Since
Ages,theexistence
thewillis heldto be ableto actagainst
therefore
"a concept
ofakrasia
holdsno
reason,
interest."
to thecontrary
maintains
wasindeeda very
thatthere
special
(p. 2) Saarinen
ofakrasia,
discussion
rendered
intoLatinas incontinentia,
from
sophisticated
philosophical
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:35:18 PM

276

REVIEWS

thethirteenth
onwards.
His workis an outline
and analysis
of themedieval
century
discussion
from
to Buridan.
Hisstudy
is ambitious
andenlightening.
Augustine
ofthree
In thefirst
Thebookconsists
theauthor
histopic
introduces
chapters.
chapter,
andestablishes
theparameters
ofhisdiscussion.
He briefly
discusses
modern
historiogradiscussion
oftheissuestems
from
therediscovphyon theissue.He notesthatmodern
ofaction.The author
to outline
Aristotle's
of
eryofAristotle's
theory
proceeds
concept
in terms
abasia
discussed
ofthepractical
Saarinen
notesthat
, whichAristotle
syllogism.
ofthepractical
"Within
akrasia
cannot
theframework
be explained
as thewill's
syllogism
intentional
thebetter
ofthereason."
rebellion
against
judgment
(p. 11) Thus,"Because
theirbetter
incontinent
theremustbe something
peopleseemto act against
judgment,
in other
withthejudgement
within
thepractiwords,
itself;
wrong
something
goeswrong
inthesouloftheakratic
calinference
formed
various
person."
(p. 11)Thereare,however,
viewsas to exactly
whichpremise
is notcompletely
understood
bytheakratic
person.
to oneview,theincontinent
doesnotpossess
a complete
of
According
person
knowledge
thesituation
inquestion
because
inhibits
theakrats
from
theminor
passion
comprehending
or frommaking
theproper
connection
between
themajorand minor
clearly,
premise
maintains
thattheincontinent
reaches
the
premises
(p. 12-3).A secondposition
person
conclusion
butintentionally
ofthepractical
violates
itin acting
clearly,
syllogism
uponit
maintained
thatAristotle
neverfound
a satisfactory
(p. 13).In anycase,"itis generally
solution"
to theproblem
ofhowonecanactakratically
(p. 17).
One endswithSaarinen
three
heuristic
models
forunderstanding
Chapter
establishing
themedieval
is the"Socratic-Aristotelian"
thatsince
(p. 17-9).Thefirst
positions
position
mandoesnotactagainst
theakratic
thuslackscomplete
reason,
right
person
knowledge
ofthegoodconclusion
andaction,
ofwhich
is obscured
somepassion.
knowledge
through
The secondmodelis termed
the"Non-Socratic
Aristotelian"
in which
theperposition,
sonhascomplete
ofthegoodconclusion
andgoodchoice,
buttheyarenot
knowledge
realized
as theakratic
violates
theknowledge.
The third
the
model,
intentionally
person
"Non-Aristotelian"
is thatoftheJudeo-Christian
modelin whichthewillis conmodel,
sidered
orself-determining
in human
an autonomous
action.
Within
thesethree
principle
modelsSaarinen
makesfurther
and theywillformthebasison whichhe
distinctions,
thinkers.
judgesMedieval
in theAugustinin
In Chapter
"Reluctant
TwoSaarinen
discusses
Actions
Tradition."
In thischapter
atlength,
theauthor
discusses
theAugustinin
contribution
sinceAugustine
thebasisformuchofthephilosophical
andtheological
discussion
oftheMiddle
provided
ofAristotle
thatpriortotherediscovery
in theWest.Although
Ages,especially
Augustine
mademany
tothesediscussions,
notesespecially
toincontributions
Saarinen
withregard
continent
behavior
theconcepts
ofthewillandthatofinuitus
or "todo
offreedom
focare
orreluctantly.
Saarinen
moves
ontodiscuss
Anselm
ofCanterbury,
something
unwillingly"
whoconcentrates
inuitus
maintains
on theexpression
velie.
Saarinen
thatforAnselm,
no
one can willanything
invitus
whowills,willswillingly.
becauseeveryone
, or reluctantly,
His nextsubject,
PeterAbelardtakestheopposite
to
view,i.e.,thatone can consent
itwitus.
PeterofPoitiers
without
it,andthuscando something
actually
something
willing
theinevitable
maintains
thatone can willone thing
without
further,
necessarily
willing
ofa latent
alsodiscuss
theAugustinin
notion
PeterofPoitiers
andothers
consequences.
wish,theideathata manmayachievea statein whichhe doesgoodonlyreluctantly,
or in whichhe commits
a sinwhileknowing
andperhaps
evenlatently
better,
wishing
Aristotle's
akranottocommit
thisis a moralstateresembling
it.According
to Saarinen,
sia.On theotherhand,he notes,in opposition
to theAristotelian
idea ofakrasia
, the
insucha moralstatenevertheless
tradition
maintains
thatthoseexisting
perAugustinin
liberum
form
their
actions
outofchoice(consensio3
arbitrium).
"
in Scholasticism"
covers
theperiodfrom
Grosseteste
Three,Akrasia
(c. 1246)
Chapter
- theperiodofwhathe terms
In
"Aristotelian
toJohnBuridan
scholasticism."
(d. 1358)

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277

theGreat,
ThomasAquinas,
he discusses
theviewsofAlbert
Walter
thischapter
Burley,
withbrief
on DunsScotusandWilliam
excurses
of
GeraldOdonisandJohnBuridan,
inmoredetail).
Albert's
hemight
havecovered
viewscorrespond
Ockham
(bothofwhom
tothefirst
heuristic
modeloutline
above.He doesaddsomething
to the
roughly
original
discussion
thatone'sjudgments
do notalways
absolute
and
possess
certainty,
byarguing
to uncertain
basedon cognition.
connected
thusakrasia
becomes
judgment
becausein hisCommentary
on theMchomachean
viewsaremoreproblematic
Aquinas'
intheSumma
whereas
hebasically
follows
Albert
andtheAristotelian
Ethics
view,
Theobgiae
viewofabasiaas a transitory
andtheDe Mab he adoptsa morenon-Aristotelian
vice,
which
andafter
theactionhe knows
andwillsthegood,buthastemmeansthatbefore
itandconsented
toevil.Walter
takesa non-Aristotelian
Burley
lapsedfrom
posiporarily
inhissolution
totheproblem
ofhowakratic
tionas well,butis moreoriginal
actions
are
He introduces
thatwilling
theantecedens
thedoctrine
doesnotnecessarily
possible.
imply
theconsequens.
Thusan akratic
canknowandwillthepremises
ofa pracwilling
person
in a complete,
ticalsyllogism
, i.e.,the
perfect
way,buthe neednotwilltheirconsequens
action
which
as theconclusion
ofthepractical
healsomainMoreover,
emerges
syllogism.
- a person
tainstheakratic
actions
resemble
themovement
ofparalyzed
limbs
maywill
to movethemto theleft,
buttheynevertheless
moveto theright.
So, a person
might
thegoodchoicebutbe prevented
fromexecuting
it. Odonistriesto createa
possess
medium
between
theAristotelian
andAugustinin
which
leadstoinconsistencies
in
views,
hisargument.
He doesmaintain
thattheakratic
a goodchoice,
buthe
person
possesses
alsowants
tomaintain
thata conscious
badconsent
akratic
actions.
precedes
Buridan's
viewsareinteresting
becausehe seemsto takebothan Aristotelian
and a
viewofthematter.
On theonehandhe maintains
thattherational
Scotistic-Augustinian
freewillneveractscontrary
to reasonexcept
The psychology
behind
through
ignorance.
ithowever
is Augustinin
inthatthewillis freeandself-determining,
notmerely
a rationaldesire,
anditconsents
to all actions
forwhichthe
byitsownfreeactofacceptance
is morally
Buridan
solvestheobvious
withregard
to akrasia
person
responsible.
problem
thatthewillsimply
whatis supposed
to be known
andthusa degree
bysaying
ignores
ofignorance
is presupposed
forbothhisAristotelian
and Scotistic-Augustinian
explanationsofakratic
behavior.
Buridan
alsoapplies
Albert's
ideaofuncertain
tohis
judgments
ownends i.e.insofar
as judgment
remains
uncertain
thewillretains
itsself-control
and
thepossibility
ofself-determination.
Thusit appearsthatAlbert
theGreatand WalterBurley
seemto adoptpositions
intheAristotelian
models
GeraldOdonisandJohn
expressed
(1-2),butThomasAquinas,
Buridan
tendtoward
theideaofa self-determining
freewillin theAugustinin
defending
andlaterScotistic
sense(model3a). As a result,
Saarinen
in
seesa tendency
correctly
medieval
toward
a non-Aristotelian
ofwill.Theauthor
closeshisstudy
thought
theory
by
- thatthetopicofakrasia
whathe setouttoprove
in the
wasindeeddiscussed
affirming
middle
wasquitesophisticated,
from
thethirteenth
Agesandthatthediscussion
especially
tofourteenth
centuries.
Saarinen
histaskadmirably
wellin so brief
a space.The third
accomplished
chapter,
wouldbe better
intotwosmaller
theperiod
divided
onecovering
from
however,
chapters,
therecovery
ofAristotle's
to theendofthethirteenth
Ethics
and
century
(forexample),
thentreatthefourteenth
writers
I regret
thathe didnotcoverScotus
century
together.
in moredetailin theirownright.
andOckham
Theirimportance
to fourteenth
century
cannot
be disputed.
thought
On a moremechanical
ifon first
citation
ofsources
note,it wouldbe helpful
(espea fullcitation
thansimply
lastnameandyear
weregiven(rather
cially
secondary
works)
ofpublication),
andon subsequent
a shortened
title.It can be rather
troublecitations,
someforthereader
if
tohavetopagebackandforth
from
thetextto thebibliography
in a particular
oneis interested
source.In connection
withthispoint,hiscitations
of

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incerinthatherefers
conclusions
toOckham's
works
wererather
Ockham's
haphazard,
nordoeshe givetheLatin.In
theparticular
tain"quaestiones"
butcitesneither
question,
forthis(p. 164,n. 22)itwouldallowthereaderto better
judge
spiteofhisjustification
thevolume
oftheOpera
ifonehadmorethanthecitation
ofmerely
theauthor's
reading
Omnia
andthepagenumber
(e.g.,p. 165-6).
forthestudy
resource
itsfewshortcomings,
Saarinen's
workis a veryvaluable
Despite
in the
itto anyone
interested
ofethics
andI highly
recommend
in medieval
philosophy,
ofwillandactionin medieval
thought.
theory
Steubenville

Kimberly
Georgedes

andEleonore
toAquinas.
Kretzmann
TheCambridge
EditedbyNorman
Stump.
Companion
UP, Cambridge
1993,viii+ 302 p. ISBN 0 521 437695 (Cambridge
Cambridge
Companions).
In thefirst
tenstudies
Thisvolume
contains
onThomas
Aquinas's
thought.
("Aquinas's
in its
in itsHistorical
philosophy
Philosophy
Setting"),
JanA. Aertsen
placesThomas's
have
historical
Thomasas a theologian
He portrays
e.g.hiswritings
setting.
byprofession;
Thomashas
theform
oftraditional
etc.).As theofogian
(lectio,
university
quaestio
proceedings
inhistory.
isconsidered
tobeimporbecome
oneoftheoutstanding
philosophers
Language
in God'sword.The visionofGod
themedievais
invested
tant,becauseoftheinterest
is
thatrevelation
marks
thefulfilment
ofhuman
as Aertsen
says,andthisimplies
activity,
Theintellect
tosatisfy
desire
should
be guided
thehuman
toknow.
bythelight
necessary
and
faith
natural
is therefore
offaith
(a doubletruth
presupposes
knowledge
impossible);
nature.
graceperfects
isontherelation
between
andAquinas"),
Thesecond
Owens,
("Aristotle
byJoseph
study
ofphilosophy:
fortheChristian
determine
different
kinds
thetwothinkers.
Cultural
factors
ofbeingwasmostimportant,
towhatAristotle
Thomastheconcept
and,contrary
taught,
ofa thing
arenotgrasped
withthesameintellectual
act.
theessence
andtheexistence
thefirst
Aristode
as follows:
between
andThomascanbe characterized
So thedifference
is not
existents.
Thomas's
focuses
onsensible
natures
, andthesecondon sensible
philosophy
ofAristotle's,
Owensconcludes.
justan extrapolation
The third
is byDavidB. Burrell
andIslamicandJewish
Thinkers"),
study
- forthe
-("Aquinas
in whichhe pointsto Aquinas's
attention
unusual
amonghiscontemporaries
In Avicenna
a guidefordistinguishofMaimonides
andAvicenna.
Thomasfinds
writings
in developing
hisproject
andessence;
Maimonides
is hisinspiration
ingbetween
existing
than
Thomasseemsto be moreconsistent
on theinteraction
ofreasonand revelation.
of
Maimonides
andleavesmatters
thathaveto do withdivine
liberty
(e.g.theeternity
As he hasdonealsoelseto faith
theworld)
(thatis notjustan opinion
amongothers).
Maimonides's
viewthatterms
Burrell
howThomascriticizes
where,
appliedto
explains
Theauthor
notesthataccordGodarepurely
Thomastakesrefuge
inanalogy.
equivocal.
whereas
theterms),
assert
thatGodknows
manmaytruly
(asfaras heuses
ingtoThomas,
itis notnecessary
formanto knowthewayofsignification.
suchas being,
In "Metaphysics"
fundamental
discusses
4),JohnF. Wippel
topics
(chapter
andacciofbeing,participation,
substance
theanalogy
subsistence,
beingand essence,
in Thomas's
to difficulties
matter
andform.
He points
dents,
e.g.thetransition
thought,
an intrinsic
from
existence
to "esse"as expressing
"esse"as denoting
act,andproblems
the
toexplain
Thecomposition
ofessence
andbeingis required
concerning
participation.
In agreement
withothercontributors
limited
andparticipated
ofessein beings.
presence
and
is a closeconnection
between
tothevolume,
concludes
thatthere
philosophy
Wippel
in Thomas's
theology
metaphysics.
Vivarium
34,2

E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:35:18 PM

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279

in "Philosophy
of
of thevolume,
Norman
discusses
One oftheeditors
Kretzmann,
ofthehuman
andthewillin all their
Mind"(chapter
soul,theintellect
5) thecharacter
Kretzmann
relations
notes).
bytenpagesofinformative
points
(thistextis accompanied
theintellect
never
as inan ivory
toAquinas
tower,
alia,thataccording
out,inter
operates
initsnatural
The
italways
thecorporeal
nature
initscognition
examines
because
setting.
it is orientated
the
withregard
to theintellect:
towards
willis freein different
respects
coercively.
goodandmovestheintellect
in "Theory
ofKnowledge"
realist
and
stresses
ScottMacDonald
6) thegeneral
(chapter
of
ofThomas's
andpointsto thenotion
ofknowledge,
orientation
theory
anti-sceptical
ofscientia.
as thefoundations
MacDonald
immediate
persenote")
("propositiones
propositions
Thomas's
underscores
optimism.
epistemological
discusses
thetheological
character
ofhuman
In chapter
7, "Ethics,"
RalphMclnery
withan analysis
ofnatural
law:thisis,heconcludes,
action.
He winds
uphiscontribution
andought
notdo,andthese
thatthere
arecertain
truths
aboutwhatweought
thetheory
known
truths
aredescribed
as principles
perse.
In "LawandPolitics"
andlegal
8) PaulE. Sigmund
(chapter
placesAquinas's
political
in itshistorical
and stresses
itsinnovative
character.
He compares
theory
background
inhowfarThomas
ofpolitical
withmodern
toillustrate
Thomas's
order
views,
conceptions
canbe calleda democrat.
Thomas's
viewon womenandslavesaresketched.
Thereis
law(a fundamental
forpoliticati
ofnatural
notion
also(cf.chapter
7) a discussion
theory),
In thefinal
is accepted
section
notes
and,e.g.onthejustwarwhich
byThomas.
Sigmund
ofThomas,
his
thatthemodern
reader
whilerejecting
manyaspects
(e.g.themonarchy,
ofslavery,
towards
theJewsetc.)couldfindrelevant
hisattitudes
qualified
acceptance
in thehumancapacity
in thestrucThomas's
"belief
to identify
goals,values,
purposes
tureandfunctioning
ofa human
person."
In theninth
MarkJ.Jordan
andPhilosophy"),
discusses
Thomas's
("Theology
chapter
hisphilosophy
on therelation
between
andtheology.
concludes
that
conception
Jordan
as a theologian
to Aquinas,
Thomasseeshimself
(cf.Aertsen);
primarily
according
andfaith
can do muchmorethanreason.Alltheefforts
of
theology
perfects
theology,
areinadequate,
notas
andcanonlybe defined
as a waytowards
happiness,
philosophers
viewon therelation
illustrates
Jordan
byan analyproviding
happiness.
Aquinas's
general
viz.thenature
ofvirtue
is onlyincomplete
lacksisoftwoproblems,
virtue,
(paganvirtue
withthetruth),
andthecausality
ofthesacraments
(Thomas's
analysis
ingacquaintance
thatofinstrumental
leadsustorethink
Aristotle's
ofcauses,
especially
conception
causality).
Thefinalcontribution
editor
oftheCompanion,
Eleonore
10)is bytheother
(chapter
"Biblical
andPhilosophy."
Theauthor
inthelight
discusses
ofrecent
Stump:
Commentary
thedateofcomposition
ontheScriptures.
research
ofThomas's
commentaries
Commenting
onWeisheipl's
thenature
ofAquinas's
andpoints
conclusions
sheanalyses
commentaries
in hisdistinction
tothefactthatThomas
wasinfluential
between
theliteral
andthespiritualsense.
Hiscommentary
onRomans
is especially
richinphilosophical
Stump
theology,
continues.
To indicate
howuseful
thesecommentaries
areforphilosophical
andtheologionJob,
cal problems,
theauthor
discusses
someproblems
from
Thomas's
commentary
is likely
to conclude.
andcontrasts
hisanalyses
withwhatthemodern
reader
The Cambridge
is a veryinteresting,
toAquinas
written
to
introduction
Companion
clearly
Thomas
foranybody
whowishes
toknowmorethane.g.histories
ofphilosophy
orphiloAllmainfields
ofThomas'thought
dictionaries
offer.
arecovered;
the
usually
sophical
do notdiscuss
ofresearch
on Thomas,
anddo notaimprincipally
at disauthors
details
In theirintroduction,
withotherscholars.
cussions
Kretzmann
and Stumpwrite"The
ofthemedievais
in general
works
wouldprobably
be moreaccessible
nowiftheir
philovaluehad beenrecognized
earlier
below,"Andunder(. . .)," and,somewhat
sophical
thecontribution
makesto modern
medieval
seeingthe
standing
philosophy
philosophy,
will
as wellas therifts
between
theMiddleAgesand theEnlightenment,
continuities

19:36:55 PM

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oftheworks
ofthemoderns."
Thesecontinuities
the
between
deepenourunderstanding
arenotemphasized
in allchapters:
MiddleAgesandlaterphilosophy
theycomeforward
in thosebyJordan
andStump.
especially
thevolume,
is beautifully
Useful
indexes
which
complete
published.
Leiden

E.P. Bos

: from
LeenSpruit,
toKnowledge
Roots
andMedieval
, vol.I: Classical
intelligibilis
Species
Perception
vol.II: Renaissance
Later
andtheElimination
Controversies,
Scholasticism,
Discussions',
ofthe
inModem
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1994and1995,
Species
Philosophy.
E.J.Brill,
Intelligible
Studies
452 p. and590 p. ISBN 90-04-0988-3-6/90-04-10396-1.
inIntellectual
(Brill's
, 48 and49).
History
All medieval
and earlymodern
whoagreedthatknowledge
starts
with
philosophers
senseperception
faceda fundamental
howis itpossible
thatwegainan intellecproblem:
ofmaterial
tualknowledge
on thebasisofpurely
information?
things
sensoiy
Philosophers
in theAristotelian
tradition
triedto answer
thisquestion
a sophisticated
bydeveloping
andpsychological
theso-called
that
epistemological
theory,
"species
Theyclaimed
theory."
we needspecialentities
thatmediate
between
andintellectual
Giventhe
sensory
reality.
classical
distinction
between
different
two
between
partsof thesoul,theydistinguished
ofsuchentities,
a thing,
thesensitive
types
(a) Whenweperceive
partofthesoulreceives
as itis giventousinthat
somesensory
the"phantasms,"
thatrepresent
thething
devices,
oftheintellectual
situation,
some
(b) The activefeature
partofthesoulthenproduces
otherdevices,
the"intelligible
thatrepresent
butthecognitive
content
species,"
nothing
or essence)
ofthething.
I first
a
receive
Thus,whenI lookat a horse,
(the"quiddity"
thatrepresents
thisparticular
horseas itis givento mewitha certain
phantasm
shape,
a certain
etc.On thebasisofthephantasm,
theagentintellect
thenabstracts
the
colour,
- thehorsestripped
thatrepresents
thepureessence
ofthehorse
ofall
intelligible
species
individual
and all perceptual
circumstances.
The intelligible
qualities
speciesis thatby
which
iscognized,
notthatwhich
iscognized.
adquem)
(themedium
quo)thehorse
(theterminus
It is obvious
thatsuchan explanation
raisesa hostofquestions.
Howcan an intellifrom
a phantasm?
In whatsensedoesan intelligible
giblespeciesbe abstracted
species
a thing?
Andwhatontological
status
doesit have?In hisrich,verycomprerepresent
hensive
He adduces
L. Spruit
discusses
all thesequestions.
an impressive
number
of
study
texts
in thehisto showthatthespecies
wasoneofthemostinfluential
theories
theory
- a theory
in the
thatwasdeveloped
in itsfull-fledged
form
toryofcognitive
psychology
inancient
latethirteenth
buthaditsorigin
andwasdiscussed
century
throughphilosophy
outthelatemedieval
perioduntiltheseventeenth
century.
volume
ofhisstudy
witha longchapter
ontheGreek
andArabic
Spruit
opensthefirst
in themiddle
He thenexamines
itsdevelopment
ofthespecies
theory.
background
ages,
toThomas
whoiscredited
with
"the'canonattention
particular
paying
presenting
Aquinas,
ofintelligible
ical'theory
theauthor
discusses
(I, 156).In thefollowing
species"
chapters
thenumerous
on thespeciestheory
andearlyfourattacks
launched
bylatethirteenth
teenth
He convincingly
authors.
showsthatthecontroversy
arosebecauseitwas
century
notclearwhatontological
status
andfunction
thespecies
have.Somecritics
(e.g.Henry
tookthem
tobe entities
whileothers
ofGhent)
thatareliterally
ontheintellect,
impressed
themas iconicrepresentations
thatprevent
theintellect
from
understood
(e.g.Ockham)
a direct
accessto thematerial
outthatOckham's
having
things.
Spruit
correctly
points
was basedon a misunderstanding
critique
(I, 295).WhenThomasAquinasand Duns
Scotusdefined
thespecies
as similitudines
ofextramental
theytookthemto be not
things,
innerpictures
butrepresentations
thathavea structural
withthethings.
similarity
Spruit
alsoexamines
thevarious
ofthespecies
witha
medieval
defences
andillustrates
theory
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:36:55 PM

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281

thatthecanonical
wastransformed
inmany
number
ofexamples
theory
ways.SomeinterofRimini)
understood
thespecies
as meremnemonic
others
devices,
preters
(e.g.Greory
themas mental
defined
ofFontaines)
acts,and stillothers
(e.g.Godfrey
(e.g.Jamesof
thatareactivated
whenthereis a certain
tookthemto be dispositions
Viterbo)
sensory
itclearthateventheAristotelians
makes
Thissurvey
to thethesis
that
input.
subscribing
incognitive
there
must
be a mediating
entity
processes
gavewidely
divergent
explanations
ofthenature
andfunction
ofthisentity.
tothedevelopments
In thesecond
turns
ofthecanonical
in the
volume,
Spruit
theory
thatthe"newPlatonics"
tried
tointegrate
thenotion
Renaissance.
He convincingly
argues
within
a Neoplatonic
ofintelligible
framework.
PicodellaMirandola
Thus,Giovanni
species
withan innerlightthatsomehow
identified
thespecies
illuminates
material
and
reality
makes
itaccessible
totheintellect
Ficinoassimilated
thespecies
toideas
(II, 31);Marsilius
orinnate
a discussion
"formulae"
ofsomeinfluential
ofthe
(II, 33).After
representatives
Second
theseventeenth-century
examines
debates.
He treats
theattacks
Scholasticism,
Spruit
onthespecies
thatwereinspired
bothbythenewmechanistic
andbythe
theory
physics
ofideas.Correcting
someolderinterpretations,
herightly
outthatDescartes'
theory
points
wasnotso muchdirected
sensible
against
critique
intelligible
speciesas against
species,
as "flying
described
little
polemically
(II, 363).
images"
In presenting
a vastnumber
thatspanovera periodofmorethantwothouoftexts
sandyears,
an impressive
historical
His detailed
references
to
Spruit
displays
knowledge.
a largenumber
ofprimary
area valuable
sources
on thissubstudies
guideforfurther
willmakesomediscoveries
inthedensely
There
ject.Evenspecialists
packedbibliography.
in theattempt
alsoa danger
to includeas manytextsas possible
in one
is,however,
often
onetexttothenextwithout
rushes
from
a detailed
interstudy.
single
Spruit
giving
ofMiddle
ThreepagesonRichard
twopagesonRogerMarston,
onepage
town,
pretation.
- thesheerquantity
on Vitaldu Four
oftexts
andauthors
makesa careful
philosophical
evaluation
Evencomplex
anddifficult
authors
suchas Dietrich
ofFreiberg
impossible.
(six
in a hasty
andcursory
pages)andDunsScotus(ninepages)aretreated
way.In reading
thesechapters,
I often
wished
thattheauthor
hadadopted
themethodological
principle
nonmulta
sedmultam:
a thorough
ofa restricted
discussion
number
oftheories
instead
ofa
listoftexts.
itis helpful
Ofcourse,
tobe given
someinformation
about
long,never-ending
latemedieval
andearlymodern
authors
whoareoften
in textbooks.
Butthis
neglected
information
is sometimes
so shaky
or condensed
thatit is hardly
to evaluate
its
possible
value.Forexample,
mentions
theesseobiectivum
theories
develSpruit
philosophical
briefly
ofAscoli,
andHervaeus
PeterAureol
Natalis
in theearlyfourteenth
cenopedbyJames
Whenintroducing
ofAscoli's
hestates:
"The
tury.
James
theory
(inonesingle
paragraph!)
'esseobiectivum'
hasdifferent
It applies
to external
as known
meanings.
cognitive
objects
ortoobjects
formal
thatareeither
bythemind,
(thatis,mind-independent)
lacking
being,
'fictitia'
theunicorn)
orelse'entiarationis'
(forexample,
(somesimple
intentions)."
(I, 279)
Thisstatement
is certainly
andprovides
an interesting
aboutthecomcorrect,
warning
oftheesseobiectivum
ButSpruit
doesnotspelloutthedifferent
plexity
theory.
meanings,
- external
andhe doesnotexplain
ofitems
whya perplexing
variety
cognitive
objects,
fictitious
areall saidto haveesseobiectivum.
intentions
One can scarcely
simple
objects,
makesenseofJames's
without
an explanation
anda philosophical
of
theory
interpretation
thedifferent
ofthetechnical
term"aseobiectivum
."
meanings
Letmenowturntosomedetails.
In hisdiscussion
ofHenry
ofGhent's
ofthe
critique
outthatHenry
understood
themediating
entities
species
theory,
Spruit
repeatedly
points
as species
thatexistin addition
to thephantasms
andaresomehow
, i.e.as entities
impressae
on theintellect.
to Spruit,
suchan understanding
distorts
theorigiimpressed
According
naltheory.
"Theidentification
witha dematerialized
oftheintelligible
of
species
'dummy'
sensible
conflicts
with
overbysensory
reality,
mechanically
impressed
capabilities,
Aquinas'
all psychology
ofcognition.
The latter
is basedupona synergy
ofsenseperception
and
intellectual
whichplayqualitatively
different
rolesin knowledge
formation."
capabilities,

19:37:01 PM

282

REVIEWS

inemphasizing
never
thatAquinas
is certainly
(I, 211)Spruit
right
spokeabouta mechanical"impression."
ButI think
thatAquinas's
is notas clearandstraightforward
as
theory
wants
ittobe. ForAquinas
areproduced
clearly
species
by
Spruit
says(i) thatintelligible
theagentintellect
ofabstraction
and(ii)thattheyexistin theintellect.
So
bya process
themostnatural
to askis:whatkindofexistence
do theyhavein theintellect?
question
answer
tothiscrucial
as Spruit
doesnotgivea detailed
conAquinas
ontological
question,
cedes(I, 173).He confines
himself
tosaying
thatthespecies
havethestatus
ofaccidents.
Butiftheyareaccidents,
oftheintellect,
andonemaynaturally
theymustbe accidents
in thewayanother
thattheyaresomehow
on theintellect
accident,
suggest
"impressed"
is "impressed"
intalking
ona subject.
On thisaccount,
aboutspecies
saya colour,
impressae
doesnotdistort
butmerely
outitsontological
Henry
theory
spells
Aquinas's
consequences.
One mayreply
tosucha favourable
ofHenry's
thatitdoesnot
position
interpretation
a crucial
whentheagentintellect
takeintoaccount
theory:
pointin Aquinas's
produces
theintelligible
actualizes
the"intelligible
ofmaterial
speciesit merely
potential"
things
fortheimpression
ofaccidents;
actualization
is an
(I, 168).Thisshouldnotbe mistaken
active
whereas
is a purely
Sucha reply
is certainly
corprocess
impression
passive
process.
- a tension
rect.ButI think
thatitpoints
outa tension
inAquinas's
thathadfartheory
On theonehand,Aquinas
describes
theproduction
ofintelligible
reaching
consequences.
as theproduction
ofentities
thathavetheontological
status
ofaccidents
andfuncspecies
tionas similitudines
ofmaterial
On theotherhand,he alsodescribes
thisproducthings.
tionas themereactualization
ofmaterial
i.e.as a process
oftheintelligible
potential
things,
thatdoesnotrequire
Itseems
tomethatthistension
twodifferent
between
anynewentity.
wasresponsible
inthethirteenth
forthecontroversies
andfourteenth
descriptions
century.
WhenHenry
ofGhent
thefirst
andneglected
, he emphasized
spokeaboutspecies
impressae
thesecond.
It is important
toseethateventhedefenders
ofthespecies
forexample
Duns
theory,
thinks
thattheseauthors
weresimply
misled
Scotus,
spokeaboutspecies
impressae.
Spruit
oftheiropponents
bytheterminology
(I, 256 and258).I wouldsaythatmorethana
ofterminology
is at stakehere.WhenDunsScotus
defends
theexistence
ofintelproblem
he pointsoutthattheyplayan important
rolein thecognitive
species,
ligible
process:
] i.e.
a transition
"from
inor
oneorderto theother"
theymakepossible
{deordine
dinem),
from
thesensory
to theintellectual.
The phantasms
cannotplaythisrolebecausethey
existinthephantasy
andbelong
to thesensory
nomatter
howmuchthey
order,
maybe
ortransformed.
So weneedsomedevices
thatareabstracted
from
thephanmanipulated
tasmsbutexistin theintellect,
thusmaking
thebridge
between
thetwoorders.
These
aretheintelligible
devices
Sincetheyaredistinct
from
thephantasms,
species.
theymust
be specialentities
on theintellect
in thewayaccidents
thatareimpressed
areimpressed
on a subject.2
Giventhislineofargument,
DunsScotus's
talkaboutspecies
is a
impressae
ofhisthesis
thatthere
is a gapbetween
twoorders.
logicalconsequence
Thereis another
In discussing
attention.
Ockham's
ofthe
pointthatdeserves
critique
theepistemological
Ockhamrejects
species,
intelligible
argument:
Spruitstresses
species
becausehe takesthemto be iconicrepresentations.
is another
Yet,there
argument,
only
covered
forOckham.
Thespecies
(I, 294),thatis ofcrucial
quickly
bySpruit
importance
thatevery
material
consists
ofindividual
features
anda univertheory
presupposes
thing
sal essence.
The intelligible
havethefunction
ofmaking
theuniversal
essence
(or
species
thespeciestheory
he attacks
to theintellect.
WhenOckhamrejects
"quiddity")
present
thismetaphysical
a univerHe deniesthata material
hastwoaspects,
assumption.
thing
sal andan individual
deniesthatwe needsomespecialcognione,andhe consequently
tivedevices
to maketheuniversal
to theintellect.3
Allthatcanbe made
aspectpresent
istheindividual
withitsindividual
Thiscritique
reveals
animporpresent
thing
properties.
tantpointwhich,
is notfurther
is a
thespeciestheory
analysed
bySpruit:
surprisingly,
thatrelies
theory
theory,
psychologico-epistemological
upona specific
metaphysical
namely
realism
aboutuniversais.
Assoonas onerejects
thismetaphysical
latemedieval
(many
theory

19:37:01 PM

REVIEWS

283

itwithcogent
thespecies
will
andearlymodem
arguments),
philosophers
rejected
theory
as well.
be rejected
overspeciesis a complex
I hopemyshort
remarks
makeclearthatthecontroversy
anddetailed
well
closeattention
interpretation.
Spruit's
topicthatdeserves
philosophical
is a goodstarting
studies.
documented
study
pointandan important
guideforall further
Oxford

Dominik
Perler

1 SeeJohn
Vaticana
DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
I, dist.3,pars3, q. 1, n. 359(editio
III, 217).
2 Ofcourse,
which
toa realchange
is morethansuchanimpression,
amounts
ofthe
there
anintentional
thattheintellect
alsoundergoes
intellect.
Scotus
stresses
thepoint
(orcognitive)
theimpressed
a cognitive
content.
See Ord.I, dist.3, pars3,
because
convey
change
species
III, 235).
q. 1,n. 386(ed.Vaticana
3 SeeWilliam
InII Sent.,
V, 303).
Ockham,
q. XII-XIII(Operatheologica

19:37:01 PM

BooksReceived
Medieval
andtheTranscendentais.
TheCaseofThomas
Brill,
JanA. Aertsen,
Philosophy
Aquinas.
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1996x & 468p. ISBN90 04 105859 (Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
52)
Albertus
undderAlbertismus.
Deutsche
Kultur
desMittelalters
, vonM
Magnus
philosophische
HoenenundA. de libera.Brill,
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1995391p. ISBN90 04
104399 (Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
:
des Mittelalters,
48)- Contents
A. de Libera,Introduction
vonStrassburg:
einenarrative
; W. Haug,DerTristan
Gottfrieds
derLiebe?;
C. Vasoli,Fonti
albertine
nelConvivio
diDante,
E. Wber,
Philosophie
Ngativit
etcausalit:
leur
articulation
dansl'apophatisme
del'cole
d'Albert
leGrand',
O. Pluta,
der
Albert
Grosse
und
Buridan
imFeuer.
Aristotelische
Seelenlehre
undaugu; K. Rasch,DieSeele
Johannes
beiAlbert
vonKln
vonAquino,
vonBrabant
, Thomas
stinisch-gregorianische
Eschatologie
Siger
undDietrich
vonFreiberg,
G. Steer,
Das Compendium
veritatis
desHugoRipelin
von
theologiae
seines
Verhltnisses
zurBestimmung
zuAlbertus
; R. Blumrich,
Strassburg.
Anregungen
Magnus
Diedeutschen
vonLindau.
Einfranziskanischer
zurTheologia
Predigten
Marquards
maBeitrag
R. vandenBrandt,
DieEckhart-Predigten
derSammlung
Paradisus
anime
stica;
intelligentis
nher
C. Asmuth,
Meister
Eckharts
Buchdergttlichen
Z. Kaluza,Les
betrachtet,
Trstung,
dbuts
deValbertisme
vande Velde
Hoenen,Heymeric
tardif
(ParisetCologne)',
M.J.F.M.
desAlbertismus:
nach
denQuellen
deralbertistischen
(+ 1460)unddieGeschichte
AufderSuche
Intellektlehre
desTractatus
H. Schppert,
Geiler
vonKaysersberg.
EinBeitrag
zur
problematicus;
derPredigt,
Alchimia
Lazar/^etzyier,
; M.R.Pagnoni-Sturlese,
Imagologie
Bibliopola
Argentinensis.
e lullismo
a Strasburgo
undOrtsverzeichnis
; Personenagliinizidell'etmoderna
Parlare
dellaTrinit.
Lettura
dellaTheologia
Scholarium
diAbelardo.
Editrice
SergoPaoloBonanni,
Pontifica
Universit
Roma1996390pp.ISBN88 76527052
Gregoriana,
StevenChase,Angelic
Wisdom.
TheCherubim
andtheGrace
inRichard
ofContemplation
of
St.Victor.
ofNotreDamePress,
NotreDame-London
1995xxvi& 271pp.
University
ISBN0 26800644X (Studies
in Spirituality
andTheology,
2)
M.G.Garand,
Guibert
deNogent
etsessecrtaires.
Turnhout
199587 pp.& planches
Brepols,
ISBN 2 503 504507(hardbound)/5(paper
back)/9(series)
(CorpusChristianorum.
mediiAevi,II)
Autographa
Status
ofNew
Audience.
StateUniversity
, Identity,
Author,
Jorge
J.E.Gracia,Texts:
Ontobgical
YorkPress,
N.Y. 1996215pp.ISBN0 791429024
Albany,
Guillaume
Somme
delogique.
Deuxime
Partie.
introduction
etnotes
d'Ockham,
Traduction,
deJolBiard.Editions
1996
T.E.R.,Mauvezin
Individuum
undIndividualitt
imMittelalter.
vonJ.A.Aertsen
undA. Speer.
Herausgegeben
Walter
de Gruyter,
Berlin-New
York1996xxiii& 878 p. ISBN 3 11 0148927
Mediaevalia,
(Miscellanea
24)
DunsScotus.
andEthics.
EditedbyL. Honnefelder,
R. Wood,M. Dreyer.
John
Metaphysics
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1996ix & 608p. ISBN90 04 103570 (Studien
und
Brill,
TextezurGeschichte
desMittelalters,
53)
PiviHannele
Peter
Abelard
onImagery.
andPractice,
to
with
Jussila,
Theory
Reference
Special
hisHymns.
Suomalainen
Helsinki
1995x & 237 pp. ISBN 951 41
Tiedeakatemia,
0787X
Law.AnAnalytic
Oxford
1996xv
Reconstruction,
J. Lisska,
Antony
Theory
ofNatural
Aquinas's
& 320pp.ISBN0 19 8263597
Mediaevalia.
Textos
e Estudos,
7-8(1995):Qmdlibetaria.
Miscellanea
studiorum
inhonorem
Prof.
J.M.
Da CruzPontes
annoiubilationis
suaeconimbrigae
de
MCMXCV.
CuraMariiA. Santiago
iuvamen
603p.
Carvahlo,
J.F.Meirinhos
praestante
PiviMehtonen,
OldConcepts
andNewPoetics.
andFabula
intheTwelfihHistoria,
Argumentum,
andEarlyThirteenth-Century
LatinPoetics
Societas
Scientiarum
Fennica1996
ofFiction.
173p. ISBN951 653 284 5 (Commentationes
1081996)
Humanarum
Litterarum
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996

Vivarium
34,2

19:37:10 PM

BOOKSRECEIVED

285

Mittelalters.
Wissenschaftliche
deslateinischen
Bernhard
Pabst,Atomtheorien
Buchgesellschaft,
1994vin& 373p. ISBN3 534 120787
Darmstadt
Seoro
Contents:
etMediaevalia
Patristica
, XVI (1995)88 pp. ISSN 0235-2280.
J. Miethke,
y
enelTractatus
delsighXIV)A.D. Tursi,El antiimperialismo
enla teoria
libertad
politica
deParis;
M. de Asa,El comentario
dePedro
etpapalideJuanQuidort
de regiapotestate
sobre
delasQuaestiones
la controversia
entre
sobre
elDe animalibus.
Transcripcin
Hispano
a la antropologia
de Gregorio
deNyssa;
Fr.
En torno
M.M. Bergad,
medicos
y fibsofos;
etLalliana;
Cronica
Aristotelica
; Reseas
Bertelloni,
bibliogrficas
Parma
Edizioni
ZaradiMarchesi
diAbelardo.
La Grammatica
Roberto
Isabella,
Pinzani,
Logica
di Philo<:>logica,
1995xiii& 197pp.(Quaderni
1)
e sistematica.
nelXX secolo.
diAristotele
Roberto
Radice,La "Metafisica"
ragionata
Bibliografia
Milano1996735pp.ISBN88 34308468
Vitae Pensiero,
A Critical
Edition
andEnglish
Translation
inthe
Middle
andtheOrigins
Bacon
Ages.
ofPerspectiva
Roger
andNotes
Clarendon
with
Introduction
, byDavidIindberg.
Press,
ofBacon's
Perspectiva
Oxford
1996cxi& 411pp.ISBN0 19 8239920
"scosunatura
e modalit
nella
Palaestra
rationis.
Discussioni
dellacopula
GinoRoncaglia,
filosofia
Firenze1996295 pp. ISBN 88 222 44133
lastica"
tedesca
delXVIIsecolo.
Olschki,
di storia
dellascienza,
39)
(Biblioteca
einer
"scientia
naturalis"
Dieentdeckte
Andreas
Natur.
zuBegrndungsversuchen
Untersuchungen
Speer,
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1995vii& 365pp.ISBN90 04
im12.Jahrhundert.
EJ.Brill,
desMittelalters,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
103457 (Studien
45)
roots
andmedieval
distoknowledge
From
C.L. Spruit,
, 1. Classical
intelligibilis.
perception
Species
controversies.
Leiden
cussions.
Leiden1993ISBN90 04 098836; 2. Renaissance
Brill,
Brill,
in Intellectual
48 & 49)
Studies
1994ISBN90 04 103961 (Brill's
History,
von
Tal.2., neubearbeitete
DerStrieker
, DanielvondemBlhenden
Auflage,
herausgegeben
MaxNiemeyer
1995xxvi& 364pp.ISBN3 484
Michael
Resler.
Verlag,
Tbingen
X (Kart.)
21192X (Geb.)/20192
- Schnheit
von
Internationales
derSprachgestalt
beiHildegard
desGotteswissens
Bingen.
Tiefe
Sympovom9. bis
Rabanus
Maurus
Wiesbaden-Naurod
siuminderKatholischen
Akademie
vonM. Schmidt.
1994.Herausgegeben
12.September
Frommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart1995ix & 239pp.ISBN3 772817025
BadCannstatt
des
desSelbstverstndlichen
imDenken
"Per
senotum":
Dielogische
LucaF. Tuninetti,
Beschaffenheit
1996xii & 216 pp. ISBN 90 04
Thomas
vonAquin.
York-Kln
Brill,Leiden-New
desMittelalters,
103686 (Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
47)
d'une
La "disputatio"
la Facult
desartsdeParis(1200-1350
environ).
Esquisse
OlgaWeijers,
Artistarum.
Turnhout
1995175pp.ISBN2 503504604 (Subsidia
typologie.
Brepols,
Etudes
surla Facult
desartsdanslesUniversits
mdivales,
2)

19:37:10 PM

Corrections
in Vol.34,No. 1,May1996,contained
The article
byPaulJJ.M.Bakker,
published
ofmistakes
Theseerrors
weretheresult
andnotthefault
someerrors.
bythepublisher
on thequality
notbe construed
as reflecting
ofhisscholarship.
oftheauthor
andshould
p. 95,n. 50; ". . . Cf.Albert
Aristotel
deinterpretation
de Saxe,Quaestiones
inlibram
, ed.
nonsignificant
cit., 767,p. 500:'Tertiaconclusio:
syncathegoremata
aliquamremquae
sitsubstantia
velaccidens,
sedbenesignificant
modm
rei,quodab aliisvocatur
significabile
verifican
vel
Patethc,nampraedicatum
de quolibet
contento
subsubiecto,
complexe.
subsubiecto,
nonestaliquaresquaesitsubstantia
a quolibet
contento
velacciremoveri
velpraedicati;
et sicsyncathedens,sedbeneestmodusreiet dispositio,
putasubiecti
benesignificant
nonsolum
exsistentiam
rei,sed
lyaliquid
aliquid,
goremata
prout
significai
reietc.'..
etiammodum
p. 128,1.369,remove
n. "k"(predicatum
); n. "k"is placedon p. 129,1.393.

Vivarium
34,2

EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996

19:37:16 PM

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