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1996
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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE
''
68*
E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN
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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE
E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN
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INTHENETHERLANDS
19:47:48 PM
CONTENTS
OF VOLUME
XXXIV (1996)
Isabel Moreira:
Salt Lake City
, Utah
Reviews
1
rilegia
Klaus Jacobi, Christian Fromintellectusverus/falsusto thedictum propositions:The Semantics
Strub, Peter King:
ofPeter
Abelard
and
his
Circle
im
15
;
Freiburg Breisgau
Ohio
Hildesheim;
Columbus,
Fiona Robb:
TheFunction
in Scholastic
TheoofRepetition
41
Oxford
bgyof theTrinity
Paul J.J.M. Barker:
Deuxques, concepts
, quwot:
Syncatgormes
dansle ms.Paris,
tionsanonymes
, conserves
Nijmegen
lat.
lies
la smantique
de
BJV.,
16.401,
PierreAilly(c. 1350-1420)
76
Oleg V. Bychkov:
TheReflection
StoicIdeas
ofSomeTraditional
Toronto
in theThirteenth-Century
Scholastic
Theories
141
ofBeauty
s So-called
TractatusPrimus,with
L.M. de Rijk:
an
Burky'
Mheer
Editionof theAdditional
Quaestio"Utrum
contradictiosit maxima oppositio" .... 161
Elizabeth Karger:
MentalSentences
to Burleyand to
According
Paris
theEarlyOckham
192
DominikPerler:
ConThingsin theMind.Fourteenth-Century
"
trover
sies over"Intelligible
231
Oxford
Species
La rception
Francis Cheneval:
de la "Monarchie"
de Danteou
Les mtamorphoses
d'une uvrephiloFribourg
254
sophique
A Fragment
L.G. Kelly:
Michael
de
Summa
Marbasio,
of
de modissignificandi
Ottawa& Cambridge
268
(LaugeOlafNieben)
19:47:48 PM
131
IV
Books Received
CONTENTS
Thomas Aquinas, SelectedPhilosophical
and translated
, selected
by Timothy
Writings
135
McDermott
(E.P. Bos)
:
MatthiasKaufmann,Begriffe
, Stze,Dinge
bei Wilhelmvon
Referenzund Wahrheit
140
Ockham(Reinhard
Hlsen)
Aristoteles
Uebersetztund
, PeriHermencias.
erlutertvon Hermann Weidemann.
Werkein deutscher
Ueher
Aristoteles
Setzung,
von
Grumach
Ernst
, herausgegeben
begrndet
vonHellmutFlashar(L.M. de Ryk)
270
Follon
and
Actualit
J.
J. McEvoy (eds.),
de la pensemdivale
274
(E.J. Ashworth)
the
Will
in
Risto Saarinen, Weakness
of
MedievalThought
toBuridan
fromAugustine
275
(Kimberly
Georgedes)
TheCambridge
edited
to
,
CompanionAquinas
and Eleonore
Stump
byNormanKretzmann
278
(E.P. Bos)
: fromPerLeen Spruit,Speciesintelligibilis
to Knowledge
280
(Dominik
ception
Perler)
284
19:47:48 PM
ThreeVisionsand ThreeHeavens
Augustine's
in SomeEarlyMedievalFlorilegia
ISABELMOREIRA*
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:47:56 PM
ISABELMOREIRA
are not always obvious. Indeed caution is needed even if, or perhaps
especiallyif,an overtlyingenuousexplanationforcompositionis provided
:, and this is the case with the
by the author of the text. Many florilegio.
LXV whichwas quoted above, comDialogusquaestionum
pseudaugustinian
a
of
selection
which
relatedto circumstancesotherthan
readings
prised
LXV was supposthose indicatedby the work. The Dialogusquaestionum
a
between
Orosius
that
was intendedto
and
edly dialogue
Augustine
questionsraised in the writingsof the
provide clear answersto difficult
ancients.In fact,the work was fashionedfromexcerptsprimarilyfrom
Augustine'swork and the question and responseformof the text was
into a biblical commentary.The truepurposeof the
rapidlytransformed
work,however,was to contributescripturaland patristicauthorityto a
particularside of a late eighthcenturyChristologicaldispute.
This particularflorilegist
showed remarkableskillin fashioninga work
which operatedon a diversityof levels. His compositionis an important
indicatorthat the florilegist's
craft,which is oftendeemed to be an inferiorliteraryendeavour,is not the artistically
or intellectually
sterileprocess
of cut and paste thatit can oftenseem. Nor is the finishedproductnecessarilya misshapen monsterpieced togetherfrom borrowed literary
or even the not so skilled,
corpses. In the hands of a skilledflorilegist,
the excerptedtextscame to the attentionof new audienceswho read new
meaninginto them.
In orderto fullyappreciatethe contribution
thatthistypeof literature
made to the early medieval understandingof patristictexts,it is necessary to move beyond studieswhich focus on the "vertical"relationship
betweenthe pseudonymoustext and the originalsource text,and strive
towards a "horizontal" investigationacross a wide spectrumof early
medievalflorilegia.
That is to say, it would be usefulto be in a position
to trace how these textsrelated to one anotherto create a literaryculture of theirown. It is the kind of study,however,which is not easily
have not survived(althoughpseudonymous
accomplished.Many florilegia
attributionsto Church Fathers must have improvedsurvivalrate) and
to date withany accuracy.Anystudywhichattempts
theyare oftendifficult
the date
to surveythese littlestudied textsmust begin by investigating
and originof the work under review.Even then it may not be possible
to recreateaccuratelythe transmissionof ideas throughsurvivingtexts,
or be certainof the contextsin which theywere first(or secondly)discussed.Any discussionof the florilegist's
art mustbe framedby theseand
other
limitations.
there
are cases wheregroupsof such
Nevertheless,
many
textssurvivewhose relationshipto each otherare more securelyknown.
19:47:56 PM
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
THREEVISIONS
AUGUSTINE'S
19:47:56 PM
ISABELMOREIRA
19:47:56 PM
THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S
19:47:56 PM
ISABELMOREIRA
The commentatorargued that the textofJames 2.8 could be undervisiospirstood by referenceto the threetypesof vision;the visiocarnalis,
that
the
first
two
vision
He
italis(sic) et intellectualis. explained
types(like
the firstcategoriesof love) are subject to error,and both require [indigent)the intellectualvision.The threevisiontypeswere thuspresentedas
correspondingto threetypesof love, and were thereforemade relevant
to the passage on love.10This was followed,for good measure,by an
additional discussionof the four types of love, two visible (Love your
neighbour,and love your enemies) and two invisible(Love your God,
and love your soul- a veryNeoplatonicconcept).11Betweenthe two dethe firstcommentarycovered the standardexegeticalresponse
finitions,
to the questionof love in thisperiod,as a glance at otherminorexegetontheOld andNew Testament
ical works,includingPseudo-Isidore'sQuestions
show.12
The second commentary,
the Tractatus
Hilariiintroducedthethreevision
in
the
at
the
same
text,but thereis a significant
types exactly
juncture
difference.
Whereas the earliercommentaryallowed the threevisionsto
correspondto different
typesof love, thus commentingon James 2.8, in
the Tractatus
HilariiAugustine'sthreevisionsentirelylost any exegetical
in the Tractatus
relevance.The clumsyinclusionof thevisionaryformulation
Hilarii, now totallydigressionary,
is witnessto the mechanicalreproduction of information
so common in thisperiod.13
or a relatedtextfor
Bede, who as mentionedearlierused the Tractatus
10The late
authorof theQuestiones
(GCSL 108B),Turnhout
century
evangelii,
eighth
intelthem
tothedefinition
ofspiritual,
theseterms,
butassigned
1973,150-1usedexactly
lectualand rational:
exhibitio.
Intellectuality
, utsicdiligamus
, hospilalitatis
proximum
Spiritualits
absentem
sicut
etsecunda.
etpraesentem.
inprima
Rationabiliter,
11Commentarius
Turnhout
Hiberniae
Minores
I, (GCSL 108B),
, ed. R.E. McNally,
Scriptores
1973,12.
12Exegetical
toissues
andflorilegia
todefine
works
tended
lovebymeansofreference
classification
oflove,usedbybothcommentators
2.8.The four-fold
brought
up inJames
Theenorthetripartite
meansofdefinition.
tofollow
vision
standard
wasanother
theory,
ed.
Testamento
De vete
etnovo
lions,
Pseudo-Isidore,
quaes
mously
popular
mid-eighth
century
innuHiberniae
Minores
R.E. McNally,
1973,197-205,
I, (CGSL 108B),Turnhout
Smptores
merated
in chs.37-8thefourtypes
as loveforGod,loveforGodas weloveourselves,
AnoThecommentary
ofthe"Scottus
loveforourneighbours,
andloveforourenemies.
"Deum
inPseudo-Isidore
reveals:
demonstrates
itsparentage
as thispassage
nymus"
clearly
Et
utproximum.
sicutnos;inimicum
debemus:
ergoplusquamnosdiligere
proximum
nisiDeumprimum
menime
dilexerimus,
[c. 38] These
nosmetipsos
dilegere
potemus."
demultorium
See alsoPrebiarum
werethecommentator's
sentiments
, 24
exemplaribus
exactly.
on threetypes
oflove,andProsper
ofAquitaine,
Liber
sententiarum
, 367whichdrawson
Tract,
inev.Ioh.,75.5.
Augustine,
13In fact,a
in theTractatus
is to be found
passageon loveforGod andneighbours
Hilarii's
ofJames
1.4.
interpretation
19:47:56 PM
THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S
his Exposition
on theCatholic
, was familiarwithAugustine'sDe Genesi
Epistles
ad litteram
and chose to omit the threevisionspassage fromhis commenofJames 2.8 and love forGod
Thus by degreesthe interpretation
tary.14
and one's neighbourby means of Augustine'svisionarythemewas lost.
The appropriationof Augustine'svisionarytheoryby the Irish commentariesexamined above can tell us somethingof the way in which
informationwas preserved,made redundantand eventuallylost. The
authorof the firstIrish commentaryon the catholicepistleswas able to
withthe use of Augustine'svisiontreatiseto illustratethe pasexperiment
because the commentarywas indeed thefirstto be written
on
love
sage
on the catholicepisdes.Withoutexegeticalexamplesupon whichto draw,
the compilerwas not restrictedby conventionbut was ratheropen to
of the
whichmightcontributeto a betterunderstanding
any information
text.Once the tenuousconnectionbetweenAugustine'svision categories
and the biblical textwas broughtto the attentionof the learned Bede,
ratherthana rotecopier,the associationof the two textswas abandoned.
In thesethreeworks,then,we see how a particulartextcame to be associated with,or acted as a commentaryupon another,and likewisethe
processby which it disappeared.
LXV"
Visions
in theet
'Dialogusquaestionum
Augustine's
LXV we find
Dialogusquaestionum
Turningnow to the pseudaugustinian
the earliesttext to offera synthesisof Augustine'svision treatisein the
of
contextof the book of Genesis}0Of all the pseudaugustinian
florilegia
14BedeusedAugustine's
workon
adlitteram
forhisownexegetical
De Genesi
extensively
Turnhout
1967.Bede
Genesis
written
after
721:In Genesim
, ed.Gh.W.
Jones(CGSL118A),
in his
ofpassages
from
in hisselection
wasinfluenced
Augustine
byEugippius'
Excerpta
Bde
leVnrable
97 (1987),
ownflorilegium,
P.-I.Fransen,
, in:RevueBndictine,
D'Eugippius
TheLibraiy
Bede
M.L.W.Laistner,
187-94.On Bede'slibrary,
, in: A.H.
oftheVenerable
andWritings
HisLife
, Times,
, Oxford
1935,237-66.
Thompson
(ed.),Bede:
in Ireland
wasknown
at an early
De Genesi
adlitteram
Further
evidence
thatAugustine's
in an Irishepitome
ofthe
ofthework(inEugippius'
datecomesinthefragment
edition)
"DeGenesi
Anunedited
M. Gorman
late7thcentury,
ofanIrish
ofAugustine's
Epitome
fiagment
adlitteram,"
in:RevuedesEtudes
28 (1982),76-85.
Augustiniennes,
15Migne,
edition
ofthistext,andthisis
PL 40, 733-52.Thereis to dateno critical
A study
ofthework
LXVin itsentirety.
theDialogus
nottheplacetoexamine
quaestionum
himfordiscussing
underway.I wouldliketo thank
is nowcurrently
byM.M.Gorman
thisworkwithme.
abound.
withthevision
Latermedieval
works
theory
specifically
dealing
pseudaugustinian
is manivitae
which
A particularly
is supplied
decognitione
verae
fulsome
version
bytheLiber
ofAutun(12thcentury),
theworkofHonorius
ofthehighmiddle
festly
ages,probably
travers
sesapocryphes
mdivale
desaint
B. Blumenkranz,
La survie
,
, in:Augustinus
Augustin
Magister
19:47:56 PM
ISABELMOREIRA
19:47:56 PM
THREEVISIONS
ANDTHREEHEAVENS
AUGUSTINE'S
19:47:56 PM
10
ISABELMOREIRA
19:47:56 PM
AUGUSTINE'S
THREEVISIONSANDTHREEHEAVENS
11
19:47:56 PM
12
ISABELMOREIRA
we have it, withits prefaceand concludingquestions,is a Spanish composition.It was probablywrittenbetween775 and 793, and was used by
theSpanishanti-adoptionist
camp as a genuinepatristictexton thesubject.
now
to
the
LXV' use of AugustinevisionTurning
Dialogasquaestionum
In answer
ary categories,we findthe issue raised in questionsixty-three.
to the question,quotsuntgenera
visionm
the
reader
was
informed
of three
?,
first
that
there
were
three
vision
things:
types,corporeal,spiritual,and
intellectual.Secondly,theylearned that Augustinehad determinedthat
Paul's was the highestsort of vision,intellectualvision,as he was rapt
up to God in the thirdheaven. And thirdly,theyread that therewere
threeheavens correspondingto the threevisionsenumerated,a correlation whichwas the essence of Augustine'scosmographieapproach to the
vision theme. These were the primary,enduringfeaturesof later pseudonymousabridgementsof Augustine'svision theory.
For our purposes it is interesting
to note how sophisticatedthis synthesisis in comparisonto later medieval attempts.Sparse as the details
are in the Dialogusquaestionum
LXV, it preserveda featureof Augustine's
treatisewhich did not alwaysmake it into the later compilations,namely
theinterdependence
of thevisioncategories.Corporealvisioncannotoperate withoutspiritualvision,spiritualvision can existwithoutthe corporeal, and finallythe intellectualvision requiresneitherthe spiritualnor
the corporealvision.The significance
of thisinformation
is itspurelyphilThis
lifts
element
the
osophical importance.
summaryfroma floating
list to a genuine, if rudimentarysynthesisof Augustine'svision thesis.
Later pseudaugustiniantreatments
of the threevisionswere oftenweightier in termsof quantityof information,
but theytended to lose sightof
the thesis.26
Finally,the contextof the discussionof vision typesin the Dialogus
LXV immediatelyfollowingthe commentaryon Genesis
distinquaestionum
it
from
the
Irish
commentaries
which
guished
disregardedentirelythe
context
of
discussion.
The Dialogusquaesoriginal
Augustine'svisionary
tionum
LXV is unusual also when set beside otherearlymedievalGenesis
commentaries
whichborrowedmaterialfromAugustine'sDe Genesi
ad litteram
for
omitted
the
on
information
the
vision,
they
seeminglytangential
Claudius
of
Turin's
on Genesis
did not include
ary gradations.
Commentary
the visiontreatise,nor did the Genesis
Commentarycomposedby Wigbod
for Charlemagne.27Eleventh and twelfthcenturypseudonymoustexts
26See mynote15 above.
27Wigbod,
inGenesim
PL 93,233-430.
Quaestiones
(ps.-Bede),
19:47:56 PM
AUGUSTINE'S
THREEVISIONSANDTHREEHEAVENS
13
19:47:56 PM
14
ISABELMOREIRA
19:47:56 PM
/
" 1 Abelard
In his Commentary
on Aristotle's
"Perihermeneias,
distinguishes
fromwhat it says, that is, its content.
the formof an expression2{oratio)
This disThe contentof an expressionis its understanding{intellectus).
tinctionis surelythe mostwell-knownand centralidea in Abelard'scommentary.It provideshim with the opportunityto distinguishstatements
fromotherkindsof expressionswithoutimplyinga difference
{enuntiationes)
in theircontent,since the abilityof a statementto signifysomethingtrue
velfalsumfcannot be foundin its content.More precisely,
or false{verum
statementsboth fromcompleteexpressions{orationes
Abelarddistinguishes
are
not
statements
but ratherquestions,requests,commands,
that
perfectae)
etc.
yand fromincompleteexpressions,thatis, mere word strings{orationes
), such as homoalbus.These kinds of expressions,accordingto
imperfecta^
Abelard,do not differin the understanding
theypresentbut in the way
it.
theypresent
"Perhermeneias
" was
1 ThetextofAbelard's
from
the
onAristotle's
published
Commentary
someadditions
inGeyer[1927].Minio-Paluello
Milanmanuscript
[1958]125-8published
a
We arepreparing
to Geyer's
edition
basedon theBerlin
andcorrections
manuscript.
toappearshortly;
ofthefulltextfortheCorpus
chrislianorum
newandcomplete
edition
series,
ourown
ofGeyer[1927],butwesupply
wegivereferences
tothepageandlinenumber
Aristotle
insomecasesfrom
Citations
from
which
differs
version
ofAbelard's
text,
Geyer.
fortheGreektextandtheequivalent
number
aregivenbyBekker
pageandlinenumlatinus
Latintranslation
as givenin Aristoteles
berforBoethius's
(abbreviated
AL) in
Minio-Paluello
[1965].
2 We use"expression"
topickoutstrings
ofmorethanonewordwhicharein gram- in ourterminology,
notan
A single
buta dictio
matical
wordis notan oratio
agreement.
butmerely
a word.
expression
3 Thata statement
trueor falseis implied
is an expression
by
something
signifying
there
butonlythoseinwhich
whosaidthat"notevery
is a statement,
Aristotle,
expression
inBoethius,
De topicis
17a2-3),
andstated
istruth
orfalsity"
hermeneias
diffrentiis
(Peri
explicidy
1174B(oratio
verum
See also375.29-32.
falsumve).
significare
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,1
19:52:46 PM
16
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 17
1. The difference
betweennouns and verbs can only be discovered
what
is to be understood.In particular,
thedifference
by considering
the
cannotbe discoveredby considering signifiedthings,since the
same thingscan be signifiedby nouns and by verbs. Thus, the
noun "running"and the conjugatedverb "runs" signifythe same
thing."Running" and "runs," however,capture the same idea
in two different
ways which vary the understanding:Sed diversus
modusconcipiendi
variatintellectum,
cursusostenditur
,
quia hie in essentia
hie cumdiscretione
ibi
ibi in adiacentia,
sine
discretione
temporis,
temporis
(308.23-33).
2. To understanda statementmeans to understandthe parts of it
withone another.One canand to combinetheseunderstandings
and
connect
the signification
of things
not go further,
however,
each
of
the
statement
a
to
possessedby
part
single signification
of the thingpossessedby the statementas a whole, since thereis
no thingthat underliesthe statement:Res autempropositionis,
cum
remsubiectam,
ex rebusvocabulorum
nonconsistit
nullamhabeatpropositio
(308.34-40).
3. Thingssignifiedby wordslike "rose" or "lily"pass away. But one
can understandthesewordseven thoughtheremightbe no thing
signifiedby them.It is possible to make and to understandstatementsabout roses in theircomplete absence (e.g. in Winter).If
one is concernedwith statements,one should deal with what is
and not withthingswhichare onlytemporarily
constantly
signified
and
signified
transitory
(309.1-13).
The second argumentis especiallyopen to challenge.What lies behind
the crucial statementpropositio
nullamhabetremsubiectam
, which the argumentdependson? Abelard'ssecond and thirdargumentsimplya further
but also to
problem.One does not only want to understandstatements,
decide whethertheyare true or false. ThereforeAbelard must go further. It is not sufficient
to talk only about the signification
of underalso
He
must
create
the
to
standings.
somethinganalogous
capacity of
words to signifythingsthat applies to statements.
In his second excursus,while commentingon the firstchapterof the
Per hermeneias
, Abelard is concerned with this problem. Earlier, he inhis
terrupted expositionof Aristotle'stext to introducea firstexcursus
(312.33-318.35)in which he distinguishes
), imagination
perception(.sensus
and understanding(intellectus
(imaginatio'
), and explains theirrelationship.
Returningto his expositionof the text,he equates the "passions of the
19:52:46 PM
18
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONS 19
In any case, the distinctionbetween "true" and "false" is not applicable to simpleunderstandings.
However,as shownby the examplesgiven
are eithertrueor false.To which
so far,not all compositeunderstandings
false"
is
"true
or
applicable?One obvious sugunderstandings
composite
of
different
kinds
is
to
expressionsaccording to the
distinguish
gestion
that
to
theysignify, is, connectthe contentof the
specificunderstandings
expressionwithits form.
The strings
As mentionedabove, though,Abelardrejectsthissuggestion.
of words that have been consideredso far are semanticallywell-formed,
but theyare nevertheless
incompleteexpressions;sentencesalone are complete expressions.There is only one kind of sentenceto which "true or
The distinction
betweencomplete
false"is applicable,namelystatements.
and incompleteexpressions,accordingto the suggestionat hand, should
be a distinctionbetween differentformsof understandings.But this,
accordingto Abelard, is impossible,since the understandingof "a running man" is exactlythe same as the understandingof "A man runs."
are attachedto one another
In bothcases the same partialunderstandings
in the same way. Nor does it help to restrictour attentionto complete
expressions.Commands, wishes,questions,and statementsare different
formsof completeexpressions,and, accordingto Abelard,may have preciselythe same content:the command "Run!" (said to a man), the wish
"If only a man were running!,"the question "Is a man running?,"and
the statement"A man is running"involvethe same understandings.
But
commands,wishes,and questionsare neithertrue nor false. Yet if the
- which is
statement
necessarilyeither true or false cannot be distinbe they
guished with respect to understandingsfrom non-statements,
incompleteexpressionsor those completeexpressionsto which "true or
false"is not applicable,how then can it be singledout?
Abelardproposesa novel solution.He analysesthe statement"Socrates
sits"into an act of assertionpaired withan assertiblecontent,as though
it were "It is truethat Socrates sits." "That Socrates sits" and "Socrates
"That Socrates sits"
sits"are identicalwithrespectto the understanding.
- one
"I
"It
is
or
can be asserted
has
to
add
true"
assert"to it- but
just
it is not itselfa statement.A "that"-clauseis at best part of a statement.
Even commands,wishes,or questionsmightbe analyzed in such a way
that the ordered/desired/queried
contentis separated into a whetherclause or a that-clause.For example, the wish expressed by "If only
Socrateswere sitting!"can be stated as "I wish that Socrates were sitting!":a combinationof the desired content(that Socrates sits)with the
speaker'sstance ("I wish. . ."). What theseformsof completeexpressions
19:52:46 PM
20
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMINTELLECTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 2 1
his grammar,or his reaAbelars commentary,sometimessimplifying
or
of
Abelars
views,oftenaccomsoning, both; (d) independentreports
an
of
his
reasons
or
arguments.8
panied by
exposition
Yet GDS also includesmuch originalmaterial,both in its literalexegesisof Aristotleand in its digressions.Abelars commentaryis used exThere are discussionsof contemporary
tensivelybut not indiscriminately.
ideas and positionsintroducedby Dicuntquidam(experts,of course,to be
taken seriously).Sometimes in the text one can read Dicit magister
P.,
identifiable
as
Abelard.9
the
introduced
Likewise,
clearly
opinions
by quidam can oftenbe found in Abelars commentary,and frequentlythe
- thereis no alii autemdicunt
authorof GDS reportsonlyone position
folHe rarelyagrees with the reportedopinion. In
lowingthe quidamdicunt.
mostcases,he criticizesit,oftenusingseverewords:nullaratioest(181vb278). He opposes his own opinion to it: nos autemdimus(181vb32). The
authorof GDS is thoroughlyfamiliarwithAbelars work.At timeshe
adopts Abelars views. At other times he worksout his own position,
withAbelars theoriesand arguments.
almostalwaysdoingso by wrestling
In short,our authorhas an "Abelard-soaked"approach to philosophy.
of what mighthave
Here is an admittedlyspeculativereconstruction
been the case. We thinkthe authorof GDS studiedunderAbelard,from
whom he receivedthe most importantpart of his philosophicaltraining.
When he could no longer continue his studies with Abelard, he was
allowed to copy the manuscriptAbelard was using in his lectures.Now
he himselfgiveslectureson the Perihermeneias
, perhaps some years later.
He doesn't set great storein being thoughtof as a studentof Abelard.
Perhaps it wasn't safe to do so; Abelars notorietywas a two-edged
sword.10
But the authorof GDS does set greatstorein being thoughtof
8 Thefeatures
ofglosses
meminclined
(a)-(d)aretypical
byphilosophically
produced
bersofAbelars
circle.
theGfossae
secundum
uocales
as "Pll" in
See,forexample,
(listed
Marenbon
as "C8").
[1993])andtheGlossae
super
(listed
Categorias
9 Apart
from
Aristode
andBoethius,
theauthority
named
inGDS isAbelard,
mostoften
thanfourteen
as
no fewer
times(always
181vb18, 182va44,183rb03,
183va44,
189ral8,192val8,193ra02,195val9,196val3,
187ra22,
187ra51,
187va48,187vb43,
196va30.
alsoappearsin examples
at 187vb35
and 198va29-31.)
con(Abelard
Among
Albericof Parisis namedtwice(as "m.."),at 192va20and 195ra48
temporaries,
inan example
at 188va28-9),
andRobert
ofParisis namedonce(as"m.ro
.
(alsoappearing
writers
mentioned
at
other
names
that
193va38.
The
")
only
appearareclassical
parisiensem
Boethius
in hiscommentary.
by10
his
Theremaybe a bitter
himself
from
here:justas Abelard
hadto distance
irony
former
teacher
Roscelin
to avoidtheobloquy
thatfellon him,so tooperhaps
Abelars
- oratleastnotpublicly
- theteacher
hadtodisavow
students
avow
from
whomtheyhad
learned
so much.
19:52:46 PM
22
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONS 23
He arguesstronglyforhis own theoryas
the same understanding.
signify
an alternativeto Abelars view. On a closerlook, however,one realizes
thatthereis a falsequotationfromAbelard in an importantdetail. Our
author did not understandAbelard perfectly.This leads to a question.
Does he proposehis theoryonlysince he misrepresents
Abelard'sthought?
Or is his theoryan instructive
alternativeto Abelard worthconsidering
To do justice to the authorof GDS
independentof the misunderstanding?
let us firstdiscusshis theoryand afterwards
his disputewithAbelard.
The authorof GDS does not agree withAbelard'sidentifying
the "pasis talkingabout with"understandings"
sionsofthesoul" Aristotle
(319.11-4,
are passionsof the soul,
quoted on p. 17 above). Though understandings
not all passions of the soul are understandings,
and some passions that
are not understandings
have
a
semantic
role
to play. Not all meanmay
utterances
out
ingful
pick
(181vb6-8):
understandings
veronotasessecommodius
dicitquamsi diceret
"Passionum"
"intellectuum."
Non
enimomnes
vocessignificativae
intellectuum
suntnotae,sedquaedamintellectus,
ut
...
dictiones
et enuntiationes
Some vocessignificativae
ad placitum
signify
passionsof the soul but not understandings,namelycompleteexpressionssuch as questions,requests,commands,and the like, that aren't statements(181vb8-12):
animaepassiones,
utimperativa
. . . quaedam
veroaliasnotant
oratio
imperationem,
etcaetera
enimorationes,
huiusmodi
etsiperhuiusmodi;
deprecativa
deprecationem,
fectae
intellectus
sed
sint,nullostarnen
significant,
quia equeverosequefalsos,
illaequaetantum
et divisionis,
id estnegationis
et affirmationis
sunt;
compositionis
necintellectus
sineverovelfalso.
Moreover,the author of GDS clearlyrejectsthe idea that these expressions signify
when he con{intellectus
imperfetti)
incompleteunderstandings
tinues(18Ivb12-8):
sunta nominibus
velverbis
velimperfectis
orationibus
Qui autemimperfecti
significant^
. . . Cumigitur
orationes
intellectus
sint,nonpossunt
praedictae
perfectae
cumnihilimperfectum
eis significetur;
sed nec perfectos12
significare
imperfectos,
a solisenuntiationibus
intellectus
habent,
significare
significali
possunt,
quiahuiusmodi
convenit
verum
velfalsum
quibustantum
significare.
Thus expressionsthat aren't statementsdo not signifyunderstandings:
theysignifyneithercomplete understandings
(since "true or false" isn't
to
nor
(since onlyincomplete
incompleteunderstandings
applicable them)
expressionssignifyincompleteunderstandings).
12perfectos
V.
] veros
19:52:46 PM
24
STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
JACOBI,
The author of GDS thus draws the followingdistinction.A meaningor anotherkind of passion
fulutterancesignifieseitheran understanding
an incomof the soul. A singleword or an incompleteexpressionsignifies
plete understanding.Only a statementsignifiesa completeunderstanding. Now a statementis a completeexpression,but it isn't the onlykind.
Other kinds of complete expressionsare commands,requests,and the
like. They do not signifyan understandingbut rathersome otherpassion of the soul.
The crucialpoint to thisalternativesemantictheoryis its intentionto
unite the "true or false" criterionwith (complete)understandingsand
statements.Only those passions of the soul that mightbe true or false
sineverovelfalso 18Ivb11-2).These unare understandings
(cf.necintellectus
can
be
a solis
intellectus
derstandings only signifiedby statements(huiusmodi
conuenit
verum
vel
enuntiationibus
tantum
habent,
,
falsumsignificare
significan
quibus
kindsof passionsof
181vbl6-8). Other expressionssignifyeitherdifferent
the soul or incompleteunderstandings.
can also signify
Expressionsdesignatingan incompleteunderstanding
The
author
of
GDS
with
Abelard
that
agrees
completeexpresthings.
sions designatinga complete understandingdo not have an underlying
what happens to a thing
thing.However,it is possibleforthemto signify
is
not
that
or
is
eventus
and
(186ra16-20):
rerum)
(i
something
suntrerum
utimperfectae,
veronon,
Sedorationum
significativae,
quaedam
quaedam
utperfectae.
habent
dicitur
enim
Undeorationes
subicivelpraedicari:
imperfectae
estalbushomo"sicut"Socrates
esthomo."Perfectae
veroorationes
"Socrates
neque
habent
sedevensubicinequepraedicari
habent.
Nonenimaliquam
remsubiectam
tusrerum
<id est>aliquidessevelnonesse.
significant,
Thus the author of GDS holds the followingpair of theses:
are strictly
linkedwithexpressionsto which"true
(A) Understandings
or false" is applicable.
Abelard avoids the link proposed here in (A) since he wants to separate
the comprehensiblecontentfromthe varietyof formsof expressions.
are classifiedintocompleteand incompleteunder(B) Understandings
standings.
Abelard avoids this classification
since he wants to identifythe comprehensiblecontentof incompleteexpressionswith the contentof the correspondingcompleteexpressions.
But (A) is not formulatedexactlyif one takes (B) into account. The
since if underpoint made in (A) mustreferto completeunderstandings,
19:52:46 PM
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 25
standingscould only be foundin expressionsto which "true or false" is
applicable,thatis to say onlyin a subclassof completeexpressions,then
at all. The author
understandings
incompleteexpressionscould not signify
of GDS, however,insiststhat incompleteexpressionssignifyincomplete
To understand(A) correctlythereforepresupposesthe
understandings.
of
acceptance (B). We may thus replace (A) with the followingthesis:
are stricdylinkedwith expressionsto
(A*) Complete understandings
which "true or false" is applicable.
Perhaps the author of GDS was unaware of the logical dependence of
(A) on (B), since he discusses(A) beforehe discusses(B). We followhis
orderof presentationin our discussion.13
The author of GDS begins with (A)/(A*)- that is, with the elaboration of different
typesof completeexpressionsand theirrelationshipto
It is hardlysurprisingthat he triesto reservethe conunderstandings.
for statements.Though requestsand the like sigcept of understanding
He illusof
the
soul,
they do not signifyunderstandings.
nifypassions
In this case the will of the speaker{i.e.
tratesthiswith " Utinamlegerem!"
his passioanimi)is signified.An understanding,
however,to which "true
or false"is applicable is not signified.This is in contrastto "F0/0legere
,"
where an understandingis signified,a claim justifiedby referenceto
Priscian(181vb32-49):
veldeprecativas
et huiusmodi
nullatenus
Nosautemdicimus
orationes
imperativas
verum
velfalsum
sedtantum
non
constituere,
quasdamanimipassiones
significare,
nullum
velfalsum
intellectum
concedimus.
verum
Qui enimdicit"Utinam
legerem!"
inauditore
animivoluntatem
tarnen
verum
sedsolam14
animiintellectum
manifestat;
Undeista
illum
velielegere.
exverbis
enimeiusconcipit
auditor
intellectum;
generat
notaest,istavero"Volo
"Utinam
soliusvoluntatis
etnonintellectus
oratio
legerem!"
- eundemonstrat
etsignificai
enimproferentis
intellectus
notaest.Intellectus
legere"
in
Similiter
cum
demtamen
auditore
constituit.
intellectum
puerpetit
panem
utraque
sibidari,dicens
"Da mihipanem!,"
nonad intellectum
quemhabeatmanifestandum,
animaeaffectum
vocesedpotius
ad ilium15
cumnonintelligit
se hocvelie,taliutitur
in animoaudivoxillaverum
intellectum
indicandum.
Constituit
tamen
velfalsum
enimqui auditipsumimperare
toris.Intelligit
igitur
panemsibidari.Significant
UndedicitPriscianus
nonintellectus
sedquosdam
animiaffectus.
huiusmodi
orationes
<Institutiones
I 421.17>:
grammaticae
indicantes.
varioseiusaffectus
Modisuntinclinationes
animi,
13The author
to his
before
viewin 181vbl8-32
ofGDS expounds
Abelard's
turning
ofhisexposition
to IV.
owntheses.
We postpone
ourdiscussion
14solam
V.
] De Rijk[1966]47; illam
15illum'
alium
V = De Rijk[1966]48.
19:52:46 PM
26
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
Sicutenimdiversi16
suntanimiaffectus,
sicad illorum17
sunt
diversae
designationes
orationes:
ad optationem,
et sicde caeteris.
ad imperationem,
optativa
imperativa
186va53-186vb3).
In 182va42 the author of GDS begins to elaborate (B). Afterreporting Abelard'sview (182va44-182vb5),he says thatincompleteexpressions
don't signifyany trueor falseunderstanding
(182vb5-ll). He doesn'tsay
what theydo signify,
but, withrespectto Aristode'stext(16a9-ll = AL
an
5.11-4), he explicitlypointsout thatincompleteexpressionsdo signify
He
returns
to
the
of
and
(182vbl4-21).20
understanding
problem complete
incompleteexpressionsaftercommencinghis commentaryon chapter5
of the Peri hermeneias
,21which he begins with sed notandum
quod quidam
After
Abelard's
once
more
he
the
continues
(186va40).
citing
position
he
earlier
explanation began
(186va47-53):
16diversi
1 De Rijkfi966148; diversa
V.
17illorum
V = De Rijk[1966]48.
] aliorum
A crucial
feature
ofthistheory
is thewayit capitalizes
between
on thedifference
andlistener,
worked
outin 182ra6-20;
offalsestatements
andcortheproblem
speaker
rectunderstandings
in GDS, though
seemsto be original
(182vb23-33)
perhaps
inspired
In general,
theauthor
ofGDS hasa lively
senseofthecontext-dependence
byBoethius.
ofsemantics.
In 185vbl4-5
he arguesthattheunderstanding
constituted
bya wordis
takenexdemonstratio
nein thecircumstances
ofitsutterance;
in 186ra24-48
he argues
that
indexical
statements
suchas egolego
statements
suchas lego
, andhencenon-indexical
librum,
a context
fortheevaluation
oftheir
Sedillud
velillud
semantic
content:
verum
require
falsum
nonexsesedexproferentis
demonstration
significai
(186ra46-7).
altusV.
animalis]
20See also 183ra3-5
and 186rb29f.
2117a2= AL 8.8 (Enuntiativa
vero
nonomnis
. . .) It is another
markoftheclosesimilar-
19:52:46 PM
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 27
<scil.orationem>
etimperfectam
eundem
Nobisverononplacet
significare
perfectam
notaest"Socrates
Alterius
enimintellectus
intellectum.
legit"et "Socrates
legens."
constituvocamus
Omnesenimillasorationes
perfectum
quaein auditore
perfectas
Cumenimdico"Socrates
untintellectum.
perfectum
legit"in animoaudientium
nullum
cumautemdico"Socrates
intellectum;
legens,"
capitauditor
perfecgenero
tumintellectum,
quarenonestoratioperfecta.
The difference
among expressionsis reflectedin the differenceamong
understandings.
The semanticalimportof thisdiscussionin GDS is to isolate the distinctivecharacterof the statement.On the one hand, statementsare to
fromnon-declarativecompleteexpressionsthat are not
be distinguished
statements
(commands,wishes,and thelike) thisis thesubjectof (A)/(A*);
and passiones.
betweenintellectus
is explainedas a difference
the difference
currit
are
to
be
as
Homo
On the otherhand, statements
)
(such
distinguished
- thisis the
fromdeclarativeincompleteexpressions(such as homocurrens)
betweenintellecis explainedas a difference
subjectof (B); the difference
are
distinct
The
theses
and intellectus
tusperfecti
impeyfecti.
parts of a comaddresses.
well
as
his
former
student
as
one
that
Abelard
mon project,
But theydo not agree.
IV
The authorof GDS elaborates(A)/(A*) and (B) in directoppositionto
Abelard'sposition,which he is carefulto state beforeproposinghis own
theses.However,as mentionedon p. 22 above, thereis a mistakein his
descriptionof Abelars position.Whetherit is a mistakethatvitiateshis
account remainsto be seen.
Afteroutlininghis two theses(181vb6-18),and beforeconsidering(A),
the authorof GDS reportsAbelars statementthat the understandable
formsof expressionsmightbe the same. There is no
contentof different
doubt thatAbelard is his target:he prefaceshis remarkswith the words
P. Abelard is correctlyportrayedas having said that
dicittarnen
Magister
requests,commands,and statementsmighthave the same content,but
the authorof GDS is mistaken,however,in claimingthat Abelard said
velfalsum
that these different
formsof expressionsignifythe same verum
(181vbl8-23):22
"Perhermeneias"
thateachtakes
onAristotle's
GDS andAbelard's
Commentary
itybetween
Est
thanthemoretraditional
thistextto signalthestartofchapter
5, rather
beginning
autem
unaprima
oratio
enuntiativa
affirmatio
(17a8= AL 8.13).
22Despite
attheendinthewords
ofthepassage,
thereason
theanti-Abelardian
slant
given
Abelard
enuntiare
enim
is a verbatim
non
nisiaffirmando
velnegando
(327.21-2).
quotefrom
potest
19:52:46 PM
28
KLAUSJACOBI,
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
et eundem
Dicittarnen
P. idemverum
velfalsum
intellectum
a
Magister
significan
- utidem
etimperativis
orationibus
etconsimilibus,
etab enuntiationibus
deprecativis
intellectus
ab ista"Vololegere"et "Utinam
Alteram
tarnen
significatur
legerem."
etenuntiat,
"Vololegere,"
concedit
esse,scilicet
quiaverum
significai
propositionem
velfalsum
altera<m>non,scilicet
"Utinam
legerem!,"
quia licetverum
significet,
nontamenenuntiat,
enuntiare
enimnonpotest
nisiaffirmando
velnegando.
Abelard did not claim commands and the like to have a true or false
content.Yet the authorof GDS representshim as havingdone so. How
could such a carefulstudentof Abelardhave come to misrepresent
Abelard
so seriously?
His reasoningseems to be as follows.Abelard clearlysays that commands and other non-declarativecomplete expressionshave the same
understandingas statements.The author of GDS is of the opinion that
an integralpart of the understandingof statementsis that it presents
somethingas trueor false a versionof (A*). But if a command(say)has
the same understanding
and an integralpartof thatunderas a statement,
is
it
that
standing
presentssomethingas true or false,then it seems as
the
of the commandwillpresentsomethingas true
though
understanding
or false.This resultholds forall completeexpressions.Hence the author
of GDS puts the conclusionhe has drawn here into Abelard's mouth.
His doing so depends on takingAbelard to endorse his own thesis(A*),
and the possibility
of applying"true
connectingcompleteunderstandings
or false"; he couldn't imagineAbelard not acceptingthis connection.
Yet the author of GDS recognizesthat Abelard must, in line with
in
Aristotle,draw a distinctionbetween statementsand non-statements
termsof theirtruthand falsity.He findsin Abelard'stexta semanticdistinctionbetweensignifying
and stating{enuntiare),
and therefore
{significare)
ascribes to Abelard the view that in all kinds of expressionssomething
trueor falseis signified,
but only a statementdeclares or statesit. Small
wonder he wasn't satisfiedwith this idea! Afterall, how can an expression signifya truthor falsehood{verum
withoutstating
velfalsumsignificare)
it as well? The author of GDS is correctin having much troublewith
this distinction{nullaratioest)(181vb23-9).
Of course,Abelard never said that a command signifiesbut does not
statesomethingtrueor false.Despite thismisrepresentation,
however,the
author of GDS has grasped an importantpoint. Accordingto Abelard,
different
formsof expressionmay have identicalcontent(and indeed the
same understandings),
but what makes a formof an expressiona statement and hence susceptibleto "true or false"- is thatits contentis put
forwardwiththe modusenuntiandi.
But thenwhat makes a formof expression able to be assessed forits truthor falsityis not a matterof what is
19:52:46 PM
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMLNTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 29
said, or not merelya matterof what ia said, but also depends on how
it is said. The author of GDS sees no reason for this. Why should the
mode of presentationof some contentbe relevantto its truthor falsity?
thatit alone can presentits
about the modusenuntiandi
What is distinctive
contentin the true-or-falseway? The author of GDS is rightto be
In lightof such concerns,Abelard's positionbegins to look
dissatisfied.
suspiciouslyad hoc.
The situationis similarin the case of (B). Even thoughthereare two
passages where our author reportsAbelard correcdy(181vb29-32 and
186va40-7),in a thirdpassage, one where he explainshis own thesis,he
Abelard. He imputesto Abelard the view that
significandy
misrepresents
"whiteman" and "A man is white" signifythe same truthor falsehood
( 182va44-182vb4):23
orationes
ab enuntiationibus
intellectu
nondisP. imperfectas
Dicittamen
magister
intellectum
ab istaoratione
"homoalbus"significan
Asserit
eundem
namque
crepare.
velfalsum,
nectamenhanc"homo
qui ab ista"homoestalbus,"et idemverum
nullaenimimperfecta
albus"propositionem
concedit,
proponit;
quianihilenuntiando
nisiaffirmando
velnegat.Enuntiare
autemnonpotest
velnegando.
oratioaffirmai
Analogouslyto the preceding case, Abelard did not claim incomplete
expressionsto be true or false,althoughthe author of GDS represents
him as having done so. The reasoningis the same as before,namely
that truthand falsehoodare an integralpart of theirunderstanding.If
an incompleteand a completeexpressionsignifythe same truthor falsehood, why shouldn'tthe incompleteexpressionlikewisestate what the
completeexpressionstates?The authorof GDS once more sees no reason forit.
The same problemfoundin the presentationof (A) is behind the mistaken account of (B). But again the author of GDS has found a weaknessin Abelars position.It seemsclear thatAbelardowes us an account
of what he means by the modusenuntiandi
, and how importantsemantic
such as the difference
betweenexpressionsthat make statedistinctions,
mentsand thosethatfailto do so, can ride on it- to say nothingof how
theyare relevantto raisingthe questionof truthor falsehood.
The debate betweenAbelard and his formerstudentover thesesemanThere is justice on both sides. But
tical issues is complex and difficult.
an importantpiece of the puzzle is stillmissing.
23Againthereason
enuntiando
Abelard
at theend,nihil
. . . negando
, is a quotefrom
given
(327.21-3),
onlyslightly
rearranged.
19:52:46 PM
30
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
V
19:52:46 PM
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
FROMINTELLECTUS
PROPOSITIONS 3 1
The objectionraised here is of a piece with the problemsdiscussedin
IV above. It stems fromcombining(A*) with the claim that complete
and incompleteexpressionshave the same understanding.
Abelard replies
as follows(327.18-21):
velfalAd quodrespondemus
verum
"significare
quodin definitione
propositionis
dictapropositionum,
sum"nonsecundum
intellectum
est,sedsecundum
accipiendum
id quodestin revelnonestin re.
id estenuntiando
proponere
of somethingtrue or false from
Abelard here separatesthe signification
- thatis to
say, he rejects(A*) and forthe firsttime he
understandings
introducesthe dictum
, the missingpiece of thepuzzle. Complete
propositionis
of
truthand falsityare distinctivein virtue
that
are
expressions
capable
of the fact that theypropose what is or is not the case in a statementmakingway. We referthe questionof theirtruthor falsitynot to under. Abelard then takes up the veryprobstandingsat all but to theirdicta
lems that induce the author of GDS to work out his own theory,as
thoughdirectlyaddressingthe criticismsraised in IV, and resolvesthem
and the dicbetweenthe intellectus
propositionis
by mobilizingthe difference
tumpropositionis
.26
in the passage cited above,
Abelard'smentionof the dictum
propositionis
is
is
There
this
brief.
only
though, exceedingly
singleremark.He underscoresits importancebut does not explain the dictum
any further.Later,
while commentingon chapter4 of the Perihermenas
, Abelard adds an
at length(365.13-370.22). But therehe is
excursusdiscussingthe dictum
concernedwithquestionsabout its ontologicalstatus;its role as putative
statements;how it can be a vehicle for
subjector predicatein different
26Abelard
in 327.27-41:
writes
Sedneca ceteris
orationibus
diversa
estintellectu.
Cumenimaudio
enuntiatio
perfectis
ab ilio,"velcumdico
"O Petre!"
mevocari
ab ilio,sicut
sidicerem
"Egovocor
intelligo
inhancvil"Utinam
rexveniret!"
ac si dicerem
"Voloregem
venire
idemestintellectus
lm"etcumdicoimperando
veldeprecando
Petre!"
innuitur
vel
"Adesto
quodimpero
cumdici
turinterrogando
venit?"
ostendo
me
"Socrates
eumadesse.
Similiter
deprecor
eteundem
intellectum
tenet
"Socrates
siveintervenit,"
interrogare
quodvenit,
semper
inTopicis
Simdicatur
sivenon,sicut
ostendemus
[ed.Dal Prap. 225.4-227.10].
rogative
orationes.
Si enim
tantundem
plices
saepeostendunt
quantum
quoquedictiones
perfectae
dicam"Papae!"
vel"Heu!"ostendo
meadmiran
veldolere,
sicutsi dicerem
"Admiror"
vel"Doleo."Istetamen
estintellectus,
est,illecomposi
tus,quiest
quidictionis
simplex
velquaelibet
et cumorationes
interiectiones
dictiones
orationis,
<enuntient>,
simplices
nilproponunt.
Undeex modoproponendi
enuntiationes
sivepropositiones
enuntiando
maxime
dicuntur.
ofGDS inhisdiscussion
Thesearetheproblems
canvassed
of(A)and(B).
bytheauthor
19:52:46 PM
32
STRUB& PETERKING
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMINTELLECTUS
VERUS/FALSUS
TO THE DICTUM
PROPOSITIONIS 33
semanticrelationat work here is that of stating,which does not apply
at all but to a new and distinctitem,namelythe dicto understandings
tum.Abelard expands on this suggestionin replyingto two objections
(226.35-227.10):
Seddicitur
"enuntiare"
"verum
velfalaccipimus,
superfluit
quodsiper"significare"
sum"quodsupponitur;
estpropositio
quippeomnisoratioenuntiatiua
nonsolet
quod"significare"
pro"enuntiare"
Atquerespondemus
perse acceptum
velfalsum"
veltalealiquidquodsoliuspropositionis
"verum
accipi,nisisupponatur
Perihermeniarum
estsignificativa
sit,sicutilludin secundo
quod"affirmatio
aliquid
de aliquo,"id estenuntians
affirmando
aliquidde aliquo.
Si quisetiam
intellectuum30
nonaccipimus
"verum
vel
quaerat
quareindesignatione
falsum"
"enuntiare"
postquam31
subintelligimus
Profecto
omnino
intellectum
hunc,tarnen
significat
quiaipsum
quialicetpropositio
nondicit,
enuntiando
nonproponit.32
The "true or false" criterionis associated only with propositions,and,
Abelardasserts,is intimately
bound up withmakinga statement.
Although
a propositionsignifiesits understanding,
it does not presentit in a statement-makingway. Instead, doing so is entirelya matterof what the
propositionsays its dictum.
over true and false understandAbelars responseto the difficulties
ings sketchedin IV, then,has two elements.First,Abelard postulatesa
distinctfromthe semanticrelasemanticrelationof "stating"{enuntiare)
This allows him to maintain that statementsindeed
tion of signifying.
have the same signification
as othercompleteand incompleteexpressions
whileleavingroom forhis denial thatthe latterare therebypropositional
in character.Second, Abelard postulatesa special object forthissemantic relation,namelythe dictum
This allowshim to identify
what
propositionis.
is distinctive
about statementswithoutmakingunderstandings
somehow
to
truth
assessments
of
and
falsehood.
The
semantic
relations
susceptible
of stating/
differ
as
well
as
their
intrinsically
signifying
by
objects.
Abelard thus holds that expressionssignifytheirunderstandings,
and
that the same understandingcan be signifiedby an incompleteexpression, a non-declarativecompleteexpression,and a proposition.Propositions,in addition,saysomething.They proposewhat is or is not the case.
This is somethingpropositionsdo above and beyond what theyhave in
30intellectuum'
M = Dal Pra.
intellectum
31postquarr
Dal Pra(!).
priusquam
32proponit'
PonDal Pra.
19:52:46 PM
34
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMLNTFJF.CTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONS 35
true or false understandings,and conversely.34
Each makes the other
unnecessary.
Yet Abelardfreelytalksabout trueand falseunderstandings
afterintrois in 327.18-21 (cited on p. 31 above). Parts
proposition
ducingthe dictum
of his commentaryon Aristotle'sPeri hermeneias
can hardly be worked
formula
without
the
"intellectus
." For example,
using
verus/falsus
through
Abelard argues in 328.18-329.28 that understandingsshould be called
true or false not in line with the conceptionor dispositionof mental
animi.Here true and false underimages but accordingto the attentiones
in
a
the
theoretical
role
standingsplay
analysis Abelard's use of the
formulais neithercasual nor loose, but integralto the point under discussion.Furthermore,
passages like this one can easily be found in his
the
fact
that
the introduction
of the dictum
should
work,despite
propositionis
have made any mentionof true or false understandings
otiose.
Yet thisis only true of parts of his work. For, in the main, Abelard
not in the literalexegesisof
lays out his theoryof the dictum
propositionis
Aristode'stextbut in the independentexcurseshe adds to it. For examon Perihermeneias
4, Abelardargues
ple, in the excursusto his commentary
in favorof his theoryof the dictum.
and imaginatively
He knows
carefully
how unusual it must be for those who attend his lectures.He distinof understandings
and the signification
guishesbetweenthe signification
of what is said to be the case (<dictum
Most
the
propositionis). importantly,
formulaintellectus
doesn't appear even once. The same is true
verus/falsus
of his commentaryon Perihermeneias
5.35 By the same token,in speakwhile commentingon Aristode,he
ing of true and false understandings
often
of
the
dictum
The two accountscoexist
much
less
propositionis.
speaks
uneasilyin Abelard's writings,the formerat home in the commentary
and the latterin the excurses.When the two accounts appear together,
34This
hasescaped
hitherto
which
do nomorethanreport
point
existing
interpretations,
vet[1969]p. 373:
Abelard's
distinctions.
See forexample
Joli
Uneintellection
unevide,
oucompose.
Enrevanche
comme
seule
saine,
peuttresimple
uneintellection
telles
lesintellections
despropocompose
peuttreditevraieou fausse:
surla logique,
sitions.
Nousdbouchons
nonseulement
maisaussisurla question
alors,
dusensdespropositions,
traite
ailleurs.
See alsoJacobi[1981]p. 64-8,whichspeaksofwahre
in
und
Verstndnisse
, although
falsche
68-73he shows
thatthere
cannot
be anytrueor falseunderstandings.
p.35
In 373.4-5
ofunderstandings
withcomplete
Abelard
theidentity
associated
describes
andincomplete
as in 327.20;thissuggests
andnotbyverum/
faisum
expressions
byeundem
thathe is awareoftheimplications
ofhisshift
to thedictum
Gfr.374.25-6.
propositionis.
19:52:46 PM
36
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONIS 37
FROMINTFJJFCTUS
forexamacquaintedwithAbelars excursusin chapter4 on the dictum,
in
of
his
own
had
some
the
he
"layers"
manuscript
only
ple.)38Perhaps
not yet being
of Abelard,whereinwe findtrue or false understandings
"
." This text would raise all the
propositions
partlycorrectedby dictum
and
thatmotivatedAbelard to introducethe dictum
difficulties
propositions,
the author of GDS would be quite rightto highlightthem, thoughin
ignoranceof Abelard's later theoryhe solves the problemsin his own
individualway, as we have seen.
These generalconsiderationsreceiveparticularsupportin the case of
the passage where Abelard introducesthe dictum
(327.18-21).
propositionis
familiarwith thispassage. In the very
The authorof GDS is intimately
next sentenceAbelard writes(327.21-3):
nisiaffamando
velnegando,
nullaautem
Enuntiare
autemnonpossumus
imperfecta
velnegatatqueideonilenuntiando
oratioaffirmat
proponit.
The author of GDS refersnot once but twice to this remark,once at
181vb23(citedon p. 14 above) and once at 182vb04(citedon p. 15 above),
it being one of the few places Abelard tries to spell out what it is to
make a statement{enuntiare).
But the author of GDS makes no mention
If his
here or anywhereelse, for that matter.39
of the dictum
propositionis
at
its
about
the
dictum
included
a
remark
all,
importancewas
manuscript
not
detailed
discussionof
he
did
know
Abelard's
not highlighted.
Surely
in
4.
the dictum the excursusto chapter
This fact should give us pause. How could it happen that one of
Abelard'sclose followers,a memberof his philosophicalcircle,should be
so clearlyignorantof such an importantand distinctiveview of Abe. Rather,
lard's? It is not that he disagreeswith Abelard over the dictum
he is completelyunaware of the theory,thoughhe has a sharp awareness of the problemsthat would promptAbelard to develop it.
A natural suggestion,in keeping with the developmentalhypothesis
withAbelard at
sketchedabove, is thatthe authorof GDS was affiliated
a relativelyearly stage of Abelard's philosophicalthinking,and that he
38Theauthor
1 and
ofGDS directly
excurses
onPerihermeneias
citesAbelard's
Chapter
on Chapters
ofGDS
2-5.Theauthor
6; he seemsnotbe awareofanyexcurses
Chapter
7 andChapinAbelard's
excurses
onChapter
is alsofamiliar
withthedoctrine
expressed
ter9, butnotAbelard's
exactwording.
- interesting
39The author
aboutthestatus
ofGDS doesnothavethesamereticence
inthelight
anddictum
Tweedale
ofcontemporary
to linkstatus
(seeforexample
attempts
ofa soundunderstanding
as
Abelard's
characterization
[1976]).He citeswithapproval
one"inaccordwiththestatus
andeven
ofthething"
182va04,
(182rb34-6,
182va36-40),
enim
veritatem
etfalsitatem
e/ficiunt
(197rb08).
propositionum
goesso faras tosaystatus
19:52:46 PM
38
KLAUS
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
JACOBI,
19:52:46 PM
FROMINTELLECTUS
TO THE DICTUM
VERUS/FALSUS
PROPOSITIONIS 39
VII
An alternativehypothesisthat would account for (most of) the facts
extendsthe developmentalidea. It could be thatAbelard,havingdevised
the dictum
, came to repudiateit perhaps under the weightof
propositions
the philosophicaldifficulties
broughtin its train,e.g. questionsabout its
status.44
His
"mature
theory,"if indeed he came to a settled
ontological
That would explainwhyneitherthe
with
the
dictum.
view,mightdispense
authorof GDS nor Williamof Lucca mentionit. On thisscore,it is perto note that the lattertwo authorsshare a common
haps enlightening
and the eventus
each
propositionum,
terminology: speaksof documentum
perhaps
a clue to Abelars own view.45It may also be worthwhileto note that
- whether
in his Dialctica
withdifferent
Abelard experiments
terminology
this be an earliercomposition,a later one, or simultaneous where he
exsistentiae
rerum
ratherthan of dictapropositionum.
speaks of the essentiae/
This is but one hypothesisamong many.Anotheris thatAbelard came
to formulatehis theoryof the dictum
propositionis
very late in his career,
perhaps afterhe was no longer activelyteaching we see fragmented
in the writingsof
attemptsto grapplewithsomethinglike a dictum-Xhzory
the Montanists,perhaps evidence of Abelard's earliestattemptsto grapple withthe issue and that his last, incompletelyrevisedmanuscriptof
did not circulateafterAbelard's death (due to his
the Logicaingredientibus
infamousreputationat the hands of Bernard of Clairvaux?),thoughby
a quirkof fateit has come down to us. The authorof GDS and William,
would not have known of
and indeed all of Abelard's contemporaries,
to develop at the end of his life.
the theoryhe was struggling
It is too soon to tell which,if any, of these hypothesesis correct;not
enoughis knownabout Abelard'scircle.Now thatthe questionhas been
raised,we hope that furtherresearchwill help clarifythese matters.Yet
it in a preliminary
ofoneofthemanuscripts
oftheGlossae
examination
yetfound
super
Categorias
. though
thisis bvno meansconclusive.
44See Nuchelmans
of
[1973],Tweedale[1976],andde Libera[1981]fordiscussion
thephilosophical
ofthedictum
problems
posedbythetheory
propositionis.
45The author
in fourpassages:
at
ofGDS speaksofpropositions
related
to documenta
and 186va45/47
180va26
182vb09-11ifacere
documenturri)i
(addocumentum
{documentum
fieret),
In eachcasesuchpropositions
us with
adaliquod
documentum
faciendum/
faciendum).
acquaint
- theeventus
Whatan expression
thewaythings
rerum.
canturnoutin theworld
signifies
notbe described
in terms
is no resbutsomething
likea
likeres;whatan oratio
signifies
"to
a waytheworldis. Thejuridical
useofthephrase(meaning
fact,a stateofaffairs,
ofGDS is thinking
ofthestateof
thattheauthor
or "totestify")
giveevidence"
suggests
or a claimabouttheworldis
theworldas providing
thatan understanding
evidence
trueorfalse.In short,
at leastsomeoftheworkdonebythedictum
itseemstoperform
propositionis.
19:52:46 PM
40
KLAUSJACOBI,
CHRISTIAN
STRUB& PETERKING
one point seems clear already. Even if Abelard abandoned the dictum
the most radical possibilitymentionedhere there is no sign that he
returnedto true and false understandings
as a way of deedingwith the
underlyingphilosophicalissues. On the contrary,he and the author of
GDS have pursued opposite paths in theirattemptsto find a solution,
and in Abelard's case the path out of his circlehas led, at least initially,
fromintellectus
vems
/fabus to the dictum
propositionis.
Freiburgim Breisgau
Hildesheim
Ohio
Columbus,
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in ScholasticTheology
of theTrinity
of Repetition
FIONA ROBB
Leiden,1996
E.J.Brill,
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42
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
43
aumoyen
Medieval
de Rijk,Laphilosophie
, Leiden1981,tr.1985,82-6;B.B.Price,
Thought.
ge
AnIntroduction
, Oxford
1992,120-1.
8 Thisproject
Grabmann
in Die Geschichte
der
wasundertaken
mostnotably
byMartin
scholastischen
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1909-11.
, 2 vols.,Freiburg
9 H. Kantorowicz,
du
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, in:Revued'histoire
oftheGlossators
disputatae
Introduction
l'histoire
dela littrature
dela
16 (1939),1-67;A.M.Landgraf,
droit,
thologique
thatthequaestio
naissante
, Montral-Paris
1973,24,accepts
technique
developed
scolastique
inlawbefore
toanycausalinfluence.
Mostrecently,
butdoesnotcommit
himself
theology,
Lesquestions
danslesfacults
seeG. Fransen,
dedroit
, in:B.C. Baznetai (eds.),Les
disputes
etdemdecine.
danslesfacults
dethologie,
dedroit
etlesquestiones
questions
disputes
quodlibtiques
dumoyen
Turnhout
G. Makdisi,
dessources
44-45,
1985,225-77.
Typologie
geoccidental
: anInquiry
inLawandTheology
TheScholastic
inMedieval
Education
intoitsOrigins
Method
, in:
hislackofconofMakdisi's
49 (1974),640-61.Forcriticism
thesis,
especially
Speculum,
as both
Medieval
creteevidence
seePrice,
oftransmission,
, 137-8.Forthequaestio
Thought
in ancient
anda method
ofteaching
seeP. Hadot,La prhisa scholarly
exercise
Greece,
mdivaux
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dansles
toire
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Dfinition
thologiques
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as "la passion
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seeC. Viola,Manires
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l'hissonnelles
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Contribution
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(inItalian)
inQuestione.
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indiritto
e teologia
articles
is Verit
Il problema
nelXII secolo
, P. Feltrin
andM. Rossini
1992.
(eds.),Bergamo
19:52:52 PM
44
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
45
19:52:52 PM
46
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
47
19:52:52 PM
48
FIONAROBB
, Alan
extensively
by the anonymousauthorof the Glossaon the Sentences
of Lille, Peter of Poitersand Prepositinusof Cremona.21The use of specific types of argumentreceived an additional stimulusfromJames of
Venice's Latin translationc. 1125-50 of Aristotle's
De sophisticis
elenchis
, the
definitivework on the identification
and refutationof fallaciousargument.22At the same time,workson logic specifically
forpracticaluse by
The
debate
about
the
theologiansappeared.23
generationof the divine
essence was integratedinto thissystemof argument.The certainty,
as it
quicklybecame, that the essence did not beget could itselfbe used as a
controlforotherarguments.Its internallogic came to be so secure that
an argumentwas oftenvalid only if it was compatiblewith the essence
as non-begetting.
The main instanceof this centredon the questionof
the relationshipbetweenthe essence,the Personsand the personalpropertiesof begetting,
beingbegottenand proceeding.This was a much more
controversial
issue than thatof the generationof the essence,and
actively
explainswhy the lattercontinuedto be discussedthroughoutthe second
half of the twelfthcentury.On the one side were Gilbertof Poitiersand
his supporters,who seem to have argued that the personal properties
could not be predicatedeitherof the essence or of the Persons themselveson the groundsthat if theywere, the essence would beget; on the
other side stood Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiersand others,who had
to show that identifying
the Personswith theirpropertiesdid not entail
the generationof the essence. What seems to be a case of pointlessrepetitionof a question on which therewas an extremelystrongconsensus
21On Alanof Lille,see A. de Libera,
etthologie
dansla Summa"Quoniam
Logique
Homines"
d'AlamdeLille
andA. de Libera(eds.),Gilbert
etsescondePoitiers
, in:J.Jolivet
de la logique
d'histoire
etde la sman, Actesdu septime
temporains
symposium
europen
see L.M. de Rijk,Logica
tiquemdivales,
Naples1987,437-69;on Peterof Poitiers,
A Contribution
Modernorum.
totheHistory
Terminist
I 163, 2 vols.,Assen1962-7,
ofEarly
Logie
ofCremona,
seeG. Angelini,
L'ortodossia
e lagrammatica.
Analisi
distrut78;on Prepositinus
turae deduzione
storica
dellateologia
di Prepositino
trinitaria
, Analecta
183,Rome
Gregoriana
1972.
De sophisticis
elenchis
Latinus
VI 1-3,Bruxelles-Leiden
1975.
, ed. B.G. Dod,Aristoteles
See I. Rosier,
volution
desnotions
etunivocado
auXIIesicley
in:I. Rosier
'equivocado
(ed.),
tudes
Lille1988,103-66.
L'Ambigut.
historiques)
23See Cinq Peter
onwhich
De tropis
seeF. Giusberti,
Materials
especially theChanter's
loquendi,
ofLogic2,Naples1982,92-7;G.R.Evans,
Scholasticism
, History
fora Study
ofTwelfth
Century
A Work
"?Peter
theChanter's
De TropisLoquendi
andSome
in:
Fallacie,
ofttTerminist
Theology
20 (1982),40-58;eadem^
Peter
theChanter's
De troPonendo
Vivarium,
theologica
exempla:
in:History
ofUniversities,
dudiscours
2 (1982),1-14;L. Valente,
Arts
etsacra
pisloquendi,
dePierre
leChantre
, in:Histoire
paginadansleDe tropis
loquendi
Epistemologie
Language,
12/2(1990),69-102.See alsotheFallacie
Willelmi
Modernorum
, ed. de Rijk,Logica
,
maistri
II/2 683-702.
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
49
19:52:52 PM
50
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
51
19:52:52 PM
52
FIONAROBB
becomes one of the governingprinciplesof Abelars approach to all theAbelars theoryof verbal signification
ological problems.Furthermore,
and the actual things
betweenhow termssignify
allowshim to differentiate
which theysignify.He is able to do thisbecause he has liberatedhimself from the traditionalanalysis of universaisin termsof genera and
species in favourof a theoryof predicationbased on Aristode'sprinciple
that universaisare those thingswhich may be predicatedof many subword, can be pred, a significant
jects.39He is interestedin how a sermo
icated of many thingsratherthan in how it is that a universalinheres
in individuals.In thisway, he is able to avoid the problemswhich arise
when conventionally
nominalistor realistpositionsare takenwith reference to the Trinity,forneitherof these extremepositionscould accommodate the unity-trinity
balance.40
In answer to the firstpoint, that God begetsHimself,Abelard shows
that the same termscan be predicatedof one anotherboth absolutely
and relatively,
so that thereis identityof essence and distinction
of relationat the same time.41
Thus althoughthe Son is thatwhichis the Father
and is fromthe Father,he himselfis notthe Father;forjust as a bronze
statue is frombronze, but not thereforefromitself,so the Son is from
the Father, but not thereforefromhimself.42
Even though Father and
39De interpretatwne
Aristoteles
Latinus
II 1-2,Bruges-Paris
7, ed. L. Minio-Paluello,
1965,
9-10.J.F.Boler,
Abailard
andthe
Problem
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
, in:Journal
ofUniversais
1 (1963),37-51;
Arts
dulangage
etthologie
Ablard
chez
, Paris1969,21-2,85-104,
J.Jolivet,
andNon-Ralisme
etPlatonisme
Ablard.
Essaid'Interprtation,
in:Ablard
etsontemps
chez
, Actes
du ColloqueInternationale
l'occasion
du 9e centenaire
de la Naissance
de
organise
Pierre
14-19mai1979,Paris1981,75-95;M.M.Tweedale,
Abailard
onUniversais
Ablard,
,
Amsterdam
M. Tweedale
onAbailard.
Some
1976,93, on whichsee L.M. de Rijk,Martin
Criticisms
Venture
23 (1985),
, in:Vivarium,
81-97;L.M.de Rijk,TheSemantical
ofa Fascinating
s Solution
Abaelardus
, in:Thomas
, 139Impact
ofAbailard'
oftheProblem
ofUniversais
(ed.),Petrus
51; N. Kretzmann,
TheCulmination
inPeter
Abelard
andBenson
, in:Constable
oftheOldLogic
andRenewal
D.F. Blackwell,
Onto
Constructs.
TheEffects
Non, 488-511;
(eds.),Renaissance
bgical
andEthical
A Study
inMeaning
Theories:
andVerification
, Bern1988,34;
ofAbaelard's
Logical
D.E. Luscombe,
Peter
Abelard
Western
, in:Dronke
,
(ed.),A History
ofTwelfih-Century
Philosophy
works
ofuniversais,
seetheLogica
287-92.ForAbelars
andtheory
logical
"Ingredientibus"
andtheLogica
Petitioni
ed.B. Geyer,
Peter
Abelards.
"Nostrorum
Sociorum,"
,
Schriften,
Philosophische
Mnster
1919-33.
Constructs
Blackwell,
, 43-6.
Non-Ontological
41TSum
478-80.
IV.86-90,
III.54-61,180-3;TChr
306-9;TSchII.141-7,
42TChr
ex
"Eademitaqueratione
IV.90,p. 3081368*77:
qua nonlicetdiciquodmateria
se ipsasitmateriata,
velmateriatum
velconstituens
sitconstitutum
suiipsiussitmateria,
exsevelposterius
intalibus
sevelgenerans
materia
idemsitessentialiter
se,quamvis
quod
veluthocaesidemquodhaecstatua,
etidemconstituens,
etidempriusquod
materiatum,
- eadem,inquam,
et generans
ratione
et in diviposterius,
quodgeneratum,
proportionis
nispersonis
hocestDeusPatergenitus
a se ipso,nequeFiliusest
nequePaterestFilius,
hocestDeusFiliusgenitor
suiipsius
..."
Pater,
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
53
19:52:52 PM
54
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
55
This repetitionsignifies
trinitarian
much more than simplereittheology.55
it
occurs
the
Lombard
must
make sure thathe does not
because
eration;
fall into self-contradiction
unwittingly
by arguing,during the course of
anotherargument,in favourof a propositionwhich he has already rejected, namelythat the essence begets. The clearestapplicationof this
ariseswiththe questionof the typeof identitypertainingamong the Persons, the personal propertiesand the divine essence. This discussion
undoubtedlyrefersto the positionof Gilbertof Poitiers(d. 1154) and his
thattheremustbe some distinction
betweenthe Persons,their
supporters
and
In
the
Lombard
and many others
the
essence.
properties
general,
In particular,theologianssuch
rejectedthe need for such distinctions.56
as the Lombard and Robert of Melun attributedto Gilbertthe counterargumentthatif the personalpropertiesare, or are in, the essence,it follows thatthe essencebegets.Althoughthereis no evidencefromGilbert's
own writingsthathe put forwardthisparticularobjectionto an absolute
identityamong the Persons,theirpropertiesand the essence,contemporariesassumed that this must have been one of his reasons for denying
such identity.They proceed as thoughGilbertwas using this argument
as a deliberatetacticto forcehis opponentsinto self-contradiction.
Much
more likely,though,is thattheythemselveswere in the process of working out a formulawhich would hold togethera view of identityin God
withthe non-generation
of the essence. It would seem fromthis,therefore,thatthe questionof the generationof the essence had assumed such
centralimportancein discussionson the Trinitythat it was being used
as a means to screen and assess othertrinitarian
problems.
Several of Gilbert'steachingson the Trinityhad been partiallycondemned at the Council of Reims, held in 1148 beforethe composition
55For
in London,
theBreuiarium
sententiarum
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII, f. 129vb:
example,
hicsi paterdivinam
velessentia
velessentia
essentiam
filium
essentiam
"Queritur
genuit
velomnino
necgenuerit
necgenita
sit.Magnahecquestio
inter
et
doctores
contrarietatis
aufert
molestiam.
Nammagister
Petrus
asserit
vel
nullatenus
concedendum
repugnantie
velessentia
filium
velessentia
essentiam
On thisandother
quodpateressentiam
genuerit."
A.M.Landgraf,
Frhscholastische
derSentenzen
desLombarden
versions,
, in: Studia
Abkrzungen
InHonorem
Mediaevalia.
Martin
Introduction
,
, Bruges1948,171-99.
Raymundi
Josephi
Landgraf,
leavesthequestion
's authorship
ofSimonofTournai
114-15,
open.
56J. Schneider,
DieLehre
vom
Gott
inderSchule
Lombardus
desPetrus
, Mnchen
dreieinigen
1961,139-88.See alsotheanonymous
Summa,
London,
B.L.,Royal9 E XII, f. 150ra:
"Simbolum
essepersonas.
autemveritatis,
Ad corroborationem
fideiquodeclaratur
proprietates
subieimus
hicsimbolum
fidei
Gileberti
editum
est..."
errores
quodadversus
magisti
porete
In thesameMS is a seriesof theological
in whichthequestion
is similarly
questions
at f.236^: "Nonenimvidemus
addressed
sintin deoetnonsintdeus,
quodproprietates
cumdeussimplex
in
sit.Quamvis
sicutquidamasserunt
porretanus
magister
Gfilbertus],
docuerit
..."
contrarium,
quodtamennegavit
19:52:52 PM
56
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
57
19:52:52 PM
58
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
59
19:52:52 PM
60
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
61
19:52:52 PM
62
FIONAROBB
and "proceeding."87
backtrackson thisvery
However,Robertimmediately
a
on
based
not
dissimilarfromthe
authority
point, takingup position
Lombard's.88On balance, though,his positionwould seem to be thatit
is not necessaryto abandon directpredicationof the personalproperties
of the Persons or indirectpredicationof the personal propertiesof the
essence throughthe Persons,but that directpredicationof the personal
propertiesof the essence is dangerouslysuggestive.
A more consistentand ultimately
more effective
treatment
of the same
issue is given,again in the sectionon the generationof the divineessence,
, writtenin the
by the author of the Glossaon the Lombard's Sentences
1160s.89Supposing we were to allow the statement"the essence is the
Father," the followingwould apply: the term "pate has only one
thereforeit must retainthe same sense when statedof the
signification,
divineessenceas when statedof the Father;but the consequenceof predtherefore,
icating"pater"of the Fatheris thatthe Fatherbegets;similarly,
" is
the same should followwhen "pater
predicatedof the divineessence,
namely that the divine essence begets.90This argumentis repeated by
othertheologians.91
" is
The author of the Glossarespondswith the argumentthat "pater
statedrespective
, denotinga relation,only of the Father,not of the divine
essence.92In otherwords,the essenceis identicalwiththe one who begets
87ISentA.
"Namproprietates
suntipsepersone.
Ideosicutpersone
a divXXIII,14721"9:
inanonremoventur
itanecproprietates;
etsicutpersone
de ea enuntiantur,
ita
essentia,
etproprietates.
Sed nonquibuscumque
vocibus
de ipsispersonis
eisdem
enuntiantur,
possuntde divinaessentia
Hie enimvocibus;
enuntiari.
de
'generans,'
'genitus,'
'procedens,'
divinanequaquam
enuntiari
eo
dicuntur,
ipsispersonis
quibusde ipsaessentia
possunt,
"
hecvocescumhacvoce'divina
essentia'
ad aliamtransirent
quod
copulate
significationem
88ISentA.
150-1.
XXIV,
89Formerly
attributed
to PeterofPoitiers,
decritiques
seeA.M.Landgraf,
textuelles
Notes
surlesSentences
dePierre
Lombard
et mdivale,
ancienne
de Thologie
, in: Recherches
2 (1930),80-99at pp.80-2.FortheMSS,seeLandgraf,
Introduction
, 137-8.Theprologue
totheGlossa
dePierre
hasbeenpublished
littraire
leMangeur
surl'oeuvre
Notes
,
byR.M.Martin,
in: Recherches
de thologie
ancienne
et mdivale,
3 (1931),54-66at pp. 63-4,after
Leprologue
surlesSentences
attribues
desGloses
London,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII,andO. Lottin,
Pierre
dePoitierSy
in:Recherches
de Thologie
7 (1935),70-3,after
ancienne
etmdivale,
Paris,B.N.,lat.14423.
90London,
sic
essentia
etgeneretur,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII,f.7va:"Quodtamen
generet
videtur
isteterminus
convenit
posseprobari:
'pater'in nullasignificatione
patriin quantumnonconveniat
in quantum
habetsignificationem
divineessentie,
quiaunamtantum
illiustermini
de patresequitur,
Sed ad predicationem
personam
patrissignificat.
quod
huiusde divina
essentia
essenpatergeneret;
ergoad predicationem
sequitur,
quoddivina
tiagigneret."
91See Appendix
1.
Et estratio,
London,
B.L.,Royal7 F XIII, f. 7 : "Nonsequitur.
quialicetutro-
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
63
19:52:52 PM
64
FIONAROBB
98Sententiae
Petri
Pictaviensis
NotreDame,Indiana
1.27,ed. P.S.MooreandM. Dulong,
"Estenimaccidentalis
cumdicitur:
Divinaessentia
estPater,
1943,220145"9:
predicado
quia
idemestac sidicatur:
Divinaessentia
estgenerans
utpredicetur
deessenpersona,
persona
de persona."
tia,generans
Varsavienses
Trinitarian
etChristobgicae
in:Miscellanea
Giovanni
Quaestiones
, ed.F. Stegmller,
Mercati
et'Filius,'
, vol.2,Vatican1946,282-31at n. 21,p. 295:". . . haecnomina
'Pater,'
suntdeterminativa,
sanctus,'
'Spiritus
aliquando
personas
proprietatibus
aliquando
personas
tantum
nondistinguentes
notant
eas proprietates.
Si ergodicatur:
unapersona
estPater,
aliaFilius,
aliaSpiritus
hisnominibus
etpersonae
notantur
etproprietatibus
detersanctus,
aliagenita,
aliaprocessit.
Sedsidicatur:
divina
essentia
minants;
quiaaliapersona
genuit,
estPater,Filius,
histantum
seddivinaessentia
sanctus,
notantur,
Spiritus
personae
pronondeterminantur;
esttresillaepersonae,
sednecgenuit
prietatibus
quiadivinaessentia
necgenita
estnecprocessit."
100Ed. de Ryk,Logica
Modernorum
De Rijk{ibid.,
II/1,34-5)suggests
that
II/2,683-702.
William
deMontibus
deMontibus
William
(d. 1213)maybe theauthor.
(c.1140J.Goering,
andtheLiterature
Toronto1992,doesnotmention
the
Carey
1213).TheSchook
ofPastoral
tract
in hisdiscussion.
101
in argumentatione
Fallacie
Wllelmi
"Incidit
autemhecfallatia
, 69211*15:
magisti
quansubiecto
veleconverso;
documque
aliquidassignatur
quodnonpotest
assignari
predicato,
autquandosubiectum
alicuicuinonpotest
veleconverso;
assignatur
assignari
predicatum,
autquandoaliquidponitur
cumsubiecto
veleconquodnonpotest
ponicumpredicato,
verso."
See Aristotle,
De sophisticis
elenchis
, 166b29-166b37.
102
Fallacie
6939'11.
Willelmiy
magisti
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
65
19:52:52 PM
66
FIONAROBB
earndeterminant,
sicutvinum
estin dolioet in cellario,
doliumquidemhumectt,
sed
"Qui
noncellarium."
Cf.thegeneral
senseherewithPrepositinus
ofCremona,
Summa
pro"
ducit
ventos
ed. Angelini,
L'ortodossia
e la grammatica
10.6,partially
, 263-4who,likePeter,
cites
Defideorthodoxia
is thatalthough
theprop50.1,187.Hissolution
JohnofDamascus,
erties
arein theessence,
theproperties
oftheessence.
theyarenottherefore
1,0ISent.
"Etpropria
estinprimasubstantia
etsecunda
27,21632'3:
substantia,
qualitas
id estin significatis
et primam
nontarnen
sechorum;
determinat,
quidemsubstantiam
undam."
111De
Modernorum
II/1,496,525;J.Pinborg,
undSemantik
imMittelalter.
Rijk,Logica
Logik
Einberblick
ofJohnofSalisbury,
, Stuttgart
1972,59; andtheaccount
1.14,
Metalogicon
33. The notion
ofimpositio
seemsto be closely
related
to thatofthecausainventionis
of
thepartsofspeech.
See R.W.Hunt,Studies
onPriscian
intheEleventh
andTwelfth
Centuries,
/.Peter
HeliasandhisPredecessors
1 (1941-3),
andRenaissance
194, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Modernorum
II/1,110-1
Gram231,esp.pp.211-14;deRijk,Logica
1;K.M.Fredborg,
Speculative
mar
Western
, in:Dronke
, 177-95at pp. 181-2.
(ed.),A History
ofTwelfth-Century
Philosophy
112See,forexample
PeterofSpain'sdefinition
in theSummule
, ed. L.M. de
Logicales
estreipervocemsecuntermini,
Rijk,Assen1972,79: "Significado
prouthicsumitur,
dumplacitum
representado."
113
D.P. Henry,
TheEarly
in:Franciscan
23 (1963),205Studies,
History
ofSuppositio,
Modernorum
II/1, 16-18;
A. Maier,
dellaTarda
Scolastica
12;deRijk,Logica
,
Terminobgia
Logica
Rome1972,58; Pinborg,
undSemantik
OntheDoctrine
and
, 47-50;L. Nielson,
Logik
ofLogic
Porreta
andhisFollowers
du moyen
de l'Institut
, in: Cahiers
ofGilbert
Language
gegrecet
andSupponere
in12th-Century
Grammar
latin,17(1976),40-69;C.H. Kneepkens,
,
Suppositio
in:Jolivet
andde Libera(eds.),Gilbert
dePoitiers
1.
, 325-5
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
67
19:52:52 PM
68
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
69
to standingfor
Langton(d. 1228) statesthatthe word "God" is restricted
Personwhen it is joined to termscouplingor indicatingnotion,as in the
case of "God begets"or "God fromGod."122By the same token,Langton
explains,because "God" in thiscontextstandsforPerson,it does not folAnd similarly,"God
low from"God begets"that"the divinitybegets."123
God"
"essence
essence"
because
of the different
does
not
begot
imply
begot
of these two terms.124
significations
The chapteron univocationin the Summaof Stephen'scontemporary,
and
Master Hubertus,followschapterson suppositionand signification,
is dominatedby the problemof the generationof the essence. This section capturesthe extentof applicationof suppositiontheoryto theological problems.The fallacyof univocationoccurswheneverthe supposition
of a word is relaxed or restricted.The main example of this fallacyis
the argumentthat "God begot God" implies"essence begot essence."125
The problemarises in thiscase as a resultof confusionover the suppositionof "God." Hubertus' solutionto thisproblem resemblesthat proposed by Langton:
thesupposition
ofthename"God."
themselves
concerning
Manyopinions
present
seemsmoreuseful
and correct,
thatwithnotional
verbs
Butthissolution
namely
andinthatinstance
canmakea true
"God"is reduced
topersonal
only,
supposition
Thusthesenseis: GodbegotGod,that
forPerson
andnotforessence.
supposition
is,theFather
begottheSon.126
122
A Partial
Edition
s Summa
Summa
andL.B.Mortensen,
, ed.S. Ebbesen
ofStephen
Langton'
andQuaestiones
with
Parallels
Andrew
Sunesen's
in:Cahiers
de l'Institut
du
Hexameron,
from
49 (1985),25-224at p. 57: "Itemhaecdictio'deus'restringitur
moyen
gegrecet latin,
velperterminm
ad supponendum
notionem
notanpropersona
perterminm
copulantem
temnotionem.
Perterminm
utdeusgenerai;
notantem
utdeus
perterminm
copulantem
de deo."See alsotheanonymous
"Nota
summa,
London,
B.L.,Royal9 E XII, f.248va:
nichil
amitsedcumverbis
nocionalibus
quoddeusproprie
supponit
prodivinaessencia,
tensextenditur
ad personas.
Qualiasunt'generai,'
'gignitur,'
'procedit,'
'spiral,'
'spiratur.'"
123
cumutraque
Summa
istarum
dictionum
sitessentialis,
, p. 59: "Item,
'deus,''deitas,'
deitas
'deitas'
utsupponat
utsicdicatur
hocnomen
propersona,
quarenonpotest
restringi
utsubsicutdeusgenerat?
Haecestratio:hocnomen
'deitas'significai
essentiam
generat
essentiam
utinhaerentem."
hocnomen
'deus'significat
sistentem,
124Comm.
on restriction,
inSent.,
article
citedby
p. 7. Cf.withPetertheChanter's
Arts
dudiscours
etsacrapaginadansleDe tropis
Avranches,
Valente,
loquendi,
p. 97 from
MS 28,f. 110ra.
Bibliothque
Municipale,
1.y : Univocationem
cum
Ulm.z/yy,
umma)
Munich,
ayer.btaatsbibl.,
ntelligo
ex restrictione
vel relaxatione
vel estquandoquesignifications,
vocabuli,
suppositions
etipse
Et secundum
deusgenerat
incidere
fallatia
inargumentation.
hocsicnegotiamur:
Hic manifeste
namhoc
univocationis
fallatia,
est,ergodeusestet ipsegenerat.
apparet
trahitur
ad
nomen
ex adiunctione
huiusverbi'generat,'
sitessentiale,
'deus,'cumnatura
in conclusione
verorelaxatur
eiussuppositio,
et supponit
pro
personalem
significationem;
essentia."
126
Summa
Clm.28799,f.9 : ". . . plurales
occurrunt
, Munich,
Staatsbibl.,
Bayer.
opin-
19:52:52 PM
70
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
71
APPENDIX
1. "pater"in nullasignificatione
commit
nonditur
patri[. . .] de divinaessentia
convenit
virohuicet mulieri
[. . .] "habens
filium"in eademsignificatione
respective
huic
Glossa, London, B.L., Royal 7 F XIII:
convenitpatri in
[fol.7va]Iste terminus"pater" in nulla significatione
non
conveniat
divine
unam
tantum
habet
essende,
qua
quia
significationem,
in qua personampatrissignificai;sed ad predicationemillius terminide
patre sequitur,quod pater generet;ergo ad predicationemhuius de divina essentiasequitur,quod divina essentiagigneret.
Non sequitur[7vb]et est ratio:quod licetutrobiqueidem significet
hoc
dicaturde patre, de divina essentia
nomen "pater,"tarnencum respective
non diciturrespective.
Instantiatalis: iste terminus"habens filium"in eadem significatione
convenitviro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicationemde muliere
sequiturquod concepisset;ergo etc. Vel ita: esse eiusdem essentiecum
convenitfilioet filiationi.Sed ad predicapatre in eadem significatione
tionemilliusde filiosequitur,quod filiussit in patre.
Anonymous Summa, London, B.L., Royal 9 E XII:
convenitpatri iste terminus"pater"
[fol. 151va]In nulla significatione
in qua non conveniatdivineessentie,sed ad predicationemistiustermini
127
See my,A LateThirteenth-Centuiy
Attack
ontheFourth
Lateran
Council
theLibercontra
Lombardm
Debates
ontheTrinity
ancienne
andContemporary
de Thologie
, in:Recherches
etmdivale,
62 (1995),110-44.
19:52:52 PM
72
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
73
19:52:52 PM
74
FIONAROBB
19:52:52 PM
THE FUNCTION
OF REPETITION
75
19:52:52 PM
concepts,
Syncatgormes,
quivocit
dans le ms. Paris,B.N., lat. 16.401,
Deux questions
, conserves
anonymes
lies la smantique
de Pierred'Ailly(c. 1350-1420)
PAULJJ.M.BARKER
Introduction
Cet articlese veut une contribution l'historiographie
de la smanau
tardif
de
une
tude
deux
tique
Moyen Age
par
questionsanonymes,
conservesdans le manuscritParis, BibliothqueNationale, lat. 16.401.
Ces questionssont vraisemblablement
des produitsde la facultdes arts
de l'universitde Paris. Chacun des deux textesest li la smantique
parisiennede la seconde moiti du XIVe sicle, notamment celle de
Pierred'Ailly(c. 1350-1420).A notreconnaissance,le manuscritparisien
est la seule copie de ces deux questions.
La premirequestion, intituleUtrumsyncategoremati
in intellectu
correset
traite
le
actus
non
de
la
,
pondeat
conceptas
problme
correspondanceentre
le langage parl ou critet le langage mentalpour une catgorieprcise
de termes:les syncatgormes.1
La seconde question,intituleUtrum
aliquis
1 La notion
de syncatgorme
esthrite
d'unpassagedesInstitutiones
de
grammaticae
Priscien
et dsigne
latini
, vol.II, p. 545"7),
(d.M. Hertz,dans:H. Keil(d.),Grammatici
l'ensemble
c'est--dire
les expressions
d'expressions
"consignificatives"
(consignificantia),
qui
n'ontpas de signification
en elles-mmes,
maisseulement
en composition
avecd'autres
Cf. l'introduction
de N. Kretzmann,
expressions,
appelescatgormes.
Syncategoremata,
- A. Kenny- J. Pinborg
, sophismata
, dans:N. Kretzmann
exponibilia
(d.),TheCambridge
Medieval
Au XIIIesicle,
, Cambridge
1982,p. 211-245.
History
ofLater
Philosophy
l'analyse
dessyncatgormes
fitl'objetdestraits
De syncategorematibus
on tudiaun
, danslesquels
ensemble
relativement
stable
de termes
tantdupoint
devuedeleurs
significatives
proprits
ou rfrentielles
ou grammaticales.
que du pointde vuede leursproprits
syntactiques
Cestraits
examinrent
lesproprits
desdiffrents
enlesregroupant
plus
syncatgormes
ou moinssystmatiquement
en fonction
desphnomnes
tels
que cestermes
provoquent,
tantum
la ngation
l'exclusion
(omnis,
quela distribution
(non,
(solus,
), l'exception
totus),
nihil),
la modalit
{praeter,
nisi),la composition
), la conditionnalit
(est),
(necessario,
(jt,
contingenter
la conjonction
et la rduplicala comparaison
quiri),
(et),la disjonction
(vel,utrum),
(quam)
tion(inquantum,
secundum
cf.Kretzmann,
quod)',
pourcettesystmatique,
Syncategoremata,
de ces traits
De 13deeeuwse
traccf.H.A.G.Braakhuis,
p. 213,n. 10.Pouruneanalyse
taten
over
termen.
DeelI. Inleidende
Leiden1979(diss.),
studie,
syncategorematische
part.p. 105351.Au XIVesicle,
l'tudedessyncatgormes
se fitd'unemanire
dans
plusdisperse
lesSommes
de logique,
Il n'existe
notamment
dansle traitement
de certains
sophismes.
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,1
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
77
le problmede l'quivocitdans le
," affronte
conceptus
potestesseaequivocus
En
trait
aux
mental.
ayant
problmesrelatifsau langage mental,
langage
les deux questionss'inscriventdans un courant de la smantique,dont
l'initiateurprincipalest Guillaume d'Ockham (c. 1285-1347). Avant de
concentrernotreattentionsur nos deux questionsanonymes,il nous semble donc utile d'examiner brivementtrois lmentsde la conception
smantiqueockhamiste, savoir (i) la notion du langage mental,(*)la
questionde la correspondanceet (iii) le problmede l'quivocit.
(i) Bien qu'Ockham ne ftpas le premier concevoirl'ide d'un discours intrieur,sa conceptionde la pense comme un vritablelangage
mental constituenanmoinsl'un des lmentsnovateursde sa thorie
, Ockham introduitl'ide
smantique.2Ds le dbut de sa Summalogicae
de troisplans de langage, crit,vocal et conu, correspondant trois
typesde termes,crits,vocaux et conus. A l'oppos des termescritset
une langue particulire(lingua)et qui se mavocaux, qui appartiennent
en dehors de l'esprit,les termesconus sont des intentionsou
nifestent
des passionsde l'me, qui ne relventd'aucune langue et demeurentdans
l'esprit.Tout comme les termescritset vocaux, les termesconus sont
d'une propositionet s'organiseren un vriaptes treles constituants
table langage mental.Celui-ci se trouvede faon identiquechez tous les
humainset il est antrieur toutesles langues particulires.3
La prioritdu langage mentalpar rapportau langage crit et vocal
vientde la naturedes termesqui constituentces troisplans de langage.
Le concept,constituantdu langage mental,est un signe naturel d'une
chose, formdans l'espritde faon purementnaturellesuite la rencontrede l'espritet de la chose. Les termescritset vocaux, en revanche,
sont des signes conventionnels,
institusarbitrairement
pour signifierce
de manire naturelle.D existe donc un rapque les conceptssignifient
dessyncatgormes
au XIVesicle,
du dveloppement
de la thorie
pasd'aperu
gnral
maison peutconsulter
etthorie
dusigne
auXIV sicle
, Paris1989,passim
,
J. Biard,Logique
etA. Maier,Terminologia
dellatarda
scolastica
, Roma1972,passim.
logica
2 Pource qui suit,cf.Biard,Logique
La thorie
dela
Nominalisme.
, p. 52-73;C. Miction,
Ockham
onmend'Occam
, Paris1994,part.p. 143-72et 232-36;G.G.Normore,
signification
tallanguage,
science
dans:J.G.Smith(d.),Historical
1990,
, Dordrecht
foundations
ofcognitive
La philosophie
dulangage
deGuillaume
d'Occam
, dans:S. Ebbesen
p. 53-70et G. Panaccio,
Pourlesstades
inSptantike
undMittelalter
, Tbingen
1995,p. 184-206.
(d.),Sprachtheorien
dudveloppement
dela thorie
dulangage
dontnousfaisons
iciabstracockhamiste
mental,
d'Occam
Thories
delapense
etdesondiscours
chezGuillaume
,
, desesobjets
tion,cf.E. Karger,
dans:Dialogue33 (1994),p. 437-56et Ead., William
andAdam
Walter
Chatton
ofOckham,
Wodeham
ontheObjects
dans:Vivarium
andBelief
33.2(1995),p. 171-96.
ofKnowledge
3 Ockham,
- G. Gi - St.Brown,
St.Bonaventure,
Summa
I, 1,d. Ph.Boehner
logicae,
N.Y.,1974(Opera
I), p. 713"25.
philosophica,
19:53:43 PM
78
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
79
19:53:43 PM
80
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
titre
subordonn,
d'galit, plusieursconceptsdistincts,du faitqu'il
a reu plusieursimpositionsdistincteset non relies. En revanche,un
termeest quivoque a Consilio
lorsqu'il est subordonn un concept de
son
impositionprincipale,et un autre de par une impositionsepar
condaireque le termereoit cause d'une relationquelconque entreson
signifipremieret son signifisecondaire.10L'quivocit selon les deux
d'un terme
premiersmodes quivocations'attachedonc la signification
conventionnel.Elle se rsoutpar un recoursau langage mental.
(b) L'quivocit selon le troisimemode quivocation, en revanche,
ne s'attache pas la signification,
mais la suppositiond'un terme.11
, qui appartient un termeen lui-mmeindpenDistinguede la significatio
dammentde toutcontexted'usage, la notionde suppositio
dsignela fonctionrfrentielle
d'un termeau sein d'une proposition.Un termeest alors
quivoque selon le troisimemode quivocation lorsqu'il suppose de
diffrentes
maniresdans une proposition.Ainsi le termehomoest quidans
les propositionssuivanteshomoest animal
, homoest specieset
voque
homoestnomen
le
o
mme
terme
est pris respectivement
en supposition
,
personnelle,simple et matrielle,sans changer de signification
par une
nouvelle impositionquelconque. Or du faitqu'Ockham admet la triplicit de suppositionpersonnelle,simpleet matrielleautantdans le langage
mentalque dans le langage conventionnel,12
le problmede l'quivocit
10Summa
et III-4,3, p. 756M7.
, I, 13,ed.cit.,p. 4525*33,
III-4,2, p. 75348*57
logicae,
n Ibid.,III-4,
"Circatertium
modum
estprimoscien4, p. 7591-608:
aequivocationis
dumquodtuncesttertius
modusaequivocationis
quandoaliquadictiononaccipitur
pro
diversis
sedex hocsolumquodalicuicomparatur
ad
significatis,
quodnonpluspertinet
Etistemodus
exhocquodvox
nonaccidit
primarium
significatum
quamad secundarium.
in duobusprimis
sicutcontingit
sedex hocquodeadem
diversa,
modis,
potest
significare
voxpotest
diversis."
pro
supponere
12Ibid.,
"Sicutautemtalisdiversitas
terI, 64,p. 19756"9:
suppositionis
potest
competere
minovocaliet scripto,
ita etiampotest
termino
mentali,
quiaintentio
competere
potest
etprose ipsaetprovoceetproscripto."
Surce point,
supponere
proilioquodsignificai
Buridan
estendsaccord
avecOckham.
le seultypedesupposition
admis
D'aprsBuridan,
dansle langage
cf.JeanBuridan,
Summulae
mental
estla supposition
, VII,De
personnelle;
TheSummulae
VII, Defallaciis
, Tractalus
, d. S. Ebbesen,
, dans:J. Pinborg
fallais
(d.),The
Buridan
estergo,utmihi
, Copenhagen
1976,p. 139-60,
ofJohn
logic
part.156:"Sciendum
nonestnisiratione
materialis
vocissignificativae:
nullus
enimtervidetur,
quodsuppositio
minusin propositione
mentali
sed semper
materialiter,
supponit
personaliter,
quia non
utimur
enimeadem
terminis
mentalibus
ad placitum,
sicutvocibus
etscripturis,
numquam
oratio
mentalis
diversas
velacceptationes
habet."
Albert
deSaxe,enrevanche,
significationes
admet
deuxtypes
desupposition
etmatrielle;
danslelangage
mental,
supposition
personnelle
cf.Albert
Eine
de Saxe,Perutilis
derTermini.
II, 3, d. Chr.Kann,DieEigenschaften
logica,
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
81
Car contrairement
difficile.
aux deux
se pose ici de faonparticulirement
ne
se
ici par
rsoudre
modes
d'quivocation,l'quivocit peut
premiers
un recoursau langage mental,mais elle se trouvereportedans le langage mentallui-mme.13
A partirdes annes 1320, la smantique ockhamistea fait cole
notamment
Paris.14Elle a t assume, labore mais aussi transforme
Albert
de
Saxe
Buridan
(c. 1316-1390),Marsile
(c. 1295-1360),
par Jean
d'Inghen (c. 1340-1396),Pierre Ailly et bien d'autres,pour constituer
un courantde pense dsign par la suite comme nominalismeou via
moderna}0
C'est dans ce courantque se situentnos textesanonymes.
Dans la suite, nous concentreronsd'abord notre attention sur le
contenu,la compositionet la datationdu manuscritParis,B.N., lat. 16.401
qui a conservnos deux questions.Ensuite,nous donneronsune exposition du contenu des deux questions. Finalement,nous examineronsle
de Pierre d'Ailly.
rapportentreles deux questionset le trait Conceptas
Une ditiondes deux questionssera donne en appendice.
Paris, BJV.,lat. 16.401
/. Le manuscrit
Le manuscritParis, BibliothqueNationale,lat. 16.401 (anciennement
Sorbonne 989, 1708) est un manuscriten papier de 213 feuillets.Il se
compose de deux parties,dont la premirecompte 11 cahiers,mis en
dsordre,et la seconde 7 cahiers. Les dimensionsdu papier sont identiYork/Kln
Alberts
von
Sachsen
zurPerutilis
, Leiden/New
1994,p. 174,6-766.
Untersuchung
logica
Cf.infra
, p. 101,n. 68 et 69.
13Summa
"Etestnotandum
modus
, III-4,4, ed.cit.,p. 763113"7:
quodistetertius
logicae
duoprimi
modinon
inpropositione
purementali,
quamvis
aequivocationis
potest
reperiri
homo
habeant
ad placitum
institutis.
Undeistapropositio
mentalis
est
locumnisiin signis
velprose ipso."
eo quodsubiectum
potest
significative
supponere
species
distingui
potest,
mental
Pourle problme
de l'quivocit
dansle langage
chezOckham
cf.J. Trentman,
andequivocation
Ockham
onMental,
t dans:Mind79 (1970),p. 586-90;P.V. Spade,Synonymy
ofPhilosophy
18 (1980),p. 9-22
oftheHistory
inOckham's
mental
, dans:Journal
language
etMichon,
Nominalisme
, p. 222-36.
14Pourla diffusion
TheReception
Paris,
cf.W.J.Courtenay,
ockhamiste
dela smantique
et
at theUniversity
, dans:Z. Kaluza- P. Vignaux
(d.),Preuve
ofOckham's
ofParis
Thought
au XIVesicle
raisons
etthologie
l'universit
deParis.Logique
, ontologie
, Paris1984,p. 43-64,
part.44-7.
15
a tanalys
moderne
du terme
"nominalisme"
dansl'historiographie
par
L'emploi
Debate
TwoCenturies
In Search
, dans:R. Imbach
ofHistorical
W.J.Courtenay,
ofNominalism.
- A. Maier
a unbilancio
storiodifilosofia
e Novecento
: contributo
medievale
(d.),Glistudi
fraOtto
" and"via
"Viaantiqua
, cf.A.L.Gabriel,
, Rome1991,p. 233-51.Pourla viamoderna
grafico
intheFifteenth
totheGerman
Universities
andMasters
moderna"
andtheMigration
ofParisStudents
undFortschrittsundModerni.
, dans:A. Zimmermann
Traditionsbewutsein
Century
(d.),Antiqui
imspten
Mittelalter
, Berlin1974,p. 439-83.
bewutsein
19:53:43 PM
82
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
83
18Cf.Hohmann,
- P. Kibre,A Catalogue
, p. 412,n 139;L. Thorndike
of
Initienregister
Mediaeval
in
Latin
London
col.
978.
Ce textea tdit
19632,
Incipits
of
Scientific
Wrtings ,
Studien
desHernch
von
zudenastrologischen
, Leipzig1933,
parH. Pruckner,
Schuften
Langenstein
du trait
cf.Pruckner,
Pouruneexposition
ducontenu
ibid.,
p. 139-206.
p. 43-72.D'aprs
le trait
datede 1373.
Pruckner,
19Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, p. 421,n250;Thorndike
, col.1666;
Initienregister
N.H.Steneck,
andCreation
intheMiddle
Science
,
Ages.
ofLangenstein
(d.1397)onGenesis
Henry
NotreDame/London
, p. 86,n. 29.
1976,p. 195.Voirinfra
20Cf.Hohmann,
- Kibre,
A Catalogue
, p. 404,n 38; Thorndike
, col.309;
Initienregister
Science
andCreation
de ce trait
estdonneparC. Kren,
Steneck,
, p. 195.Une analyse
Homocentric
intheLatinWest:
TheDe reprobatane
eccentricorum
et epiclicorum
Astronomy
datede 1364;cettedatese
, dans:Isis59 (1968),p. 269-81.Le trait
ofHerny
ofHesse
trouve
dansle texte
mmedu trait,
f.62rde notre
"... ethocistotempore,
manuscrit:
scilicet
anno1364."
19:53:43 PM
84
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
85
19:53:43 PM
86
M. BARKER
PAULJ.J.
uideturquod non, quia tunclatitudocaliditatisforetinfinitaet per consequens caliditas in summo foretinfinita;consequens est falsum; igitur
etc. . . .- . . . potestincipereesse uerum.Et sic estfinisquestionisde intensione formarum."
11. Ff. 166v-8r:Anonyme,Quaestioutrum
in intellectu
corressyncategoremati
et
non
actus
est
hec:
utrum
in
conceptus.21
pondeat
"Questio
sincathegoremati
intellectucorrespondeatactus et non conceptus.Arguiturprimo quod
non . . .- . . . patet de primoconceptuipsiusintellectus,
scilicetde indiuiduo uago, qui est connotatiuus"(le textes'arrteau milieudes rponses
aux argumentsquodnon
; le copiste a laiss un blanc d'environ15 lignes
la
jusqu'
question suivante).
utrum
12. Ff. 168r-70v:
esseaequiAnonyme,Quaestio
aliquisconceptus
potest
vocus.26
"Questio est hec: utrumaliquis conceptuspotestesse equiuocus.
Et arguiturprimo quod sic. Nam aliquis conceptuspotestcapi . . .- . . .
ergo sequiturquod est in dictione.Et sic est finisistiusquestionisbone
et utilis,etc."
13. Ff. 170V-7V:
(attribue) Marsile d'Inghen, Quaestiode tactucorporumdurorum.29
"Questio michi multumdubia et non inmeritodubitanda
72 (ff.8Irala question
Utrum
etminus
auxff.
se trouve
112*,168ra-9va;
qualitas
suscipit
magis
Riardus
estprobablement
la mmeper89rb-101ra).
D'aprsSylla(ibid.,
p. 436),ce magister
sonneque Richard
En admettant
la conjecture
de Sylla,eten supposant
Kilvington.
que
aitrdig
soncommentaire
de la Physique
Oxford,
Kilvington
plusprcisment,
pendant
il s'ensuit
sa rgence
en philosophie,
dateprobablement
desannes1324-26;
que le texte
- B. Ensign
cf.N. Kretzmann
TheSophismata
Kretzmann,
ofRichard
Kilvington,
Cambridge
1990,p. xviii-xxviii,
part,xxv-xxvi.
Voirappendice
1.
28Voirappendice
II.
- Kibre,A Catalogue
Cf. rhorndike
uneseulecopiede
, col. 1202,qui connaissent
cettequestion,
savoirle ms.Oxford,
Bodleian
Canon.Misc.177,fols.62-(66),
Library,
Albertinus
de Placentia,
la suitede H.O. Coxe,Catalogus
mancodicum
qu'ilsattribuent
bibliothecae
codices
Graecos
etLatinos
canonicianos
Bodleianae,
, Oxford
usmptorum
parstertia
complectens
involumine,
contentorum
f. 213: "xj
1854,col.557,n 9. A sontour,Coxesuitla tabula
secundum
fo 75."
durorum
Albertinum
de placentia.
Questiode Contactu
corporum
- Kibre,A Catalogue
Thorndike
col. 1635,mentionnent
unequestion
intitule
Ensuite,
,
"utrum
se. . .," conserve
Biblioteca
durapossint
dansle ms.Cittdel Vaticano,
corpora
lat.4455(f.99va-102va),
estidentique
avecla ntre.
Enfin,
Apostolica,
laquelleen ralit
le ms.Bologna,
a conserv
unfragment
de la
Biblioteca
2567,ff.57ra-60vb,
Universitaria,
mmequestion,
savoirlespremiers
21 arguments
quodsic(ff.57ra-57vb);
aprsces 21
De tactu
durorum
le textequi suitestceluide la question
de Biaisede
arguments,
corporum
de Biaise
dansplusieurs
Parme,
qui a tconserve
copies.Pourlesmss.de la question
cf.G. Federici
diBiagio
Pelacani
da Parma
Vescovini
Vescovini,
, dans:G. Federici
Opere
nelTrecento
F. Barocelli
e astrologia
Pelacani
Parmense
, scienza
, Padova
(d.),Filosofia
Biagio
europeo.
1992,p. 181-216,
part.190.
Dansunesriede troisarticles,
De
nousesprons
diter
trois
prochainement
questions
Albertin
tactu
durorum
tantt
Marsile
tantt
, savoircelleattribue
corporum
d'Inghen
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
87
=
=
=
de Plaisance,
celled'Henri
de Langenstein
, p. 83,n 3), et cellede Biaisede
(voirsupra
Parme.
30Avecla question
De verificatione
is (14.2)cessophismes
constituent
unensemproposition
bledontl'dition
estannonce
parM. ZnonKaluza.
19:53:43 PM
88
PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
Cette reconstruction
montred'abord qu'il manque aujourd'huitroiscahiersde l'ensemble.En outre,elle soulignele caractrephilosophiquedu
recueil,puisqu'elle montrequ' l'originele seul textethologiquen'a pas
t plac au dbut,mais la finde l'ensemble.En effet, part ce dernier
trait,les ouvragesconcernenttous la philosophienaturelle,et une bonne
partied'entreeux vise des problmesastronomiques.Ils datentde la priode o Langensteinfutmatre la facultdes artsde l'universit
de Paris
La
lettre
sur
l'Immacule
a
t
(1364-1374).31
Conception
rdigelorsque
Langensteinfutmatre la facultde thologiede l'universitde Vienne
dans le dbatsurl'Immacule
( partirde 1384).D s'agitde son intervention
a
eu
lieu
de
l'universit
Paris
partirde l'anne 1387.32
Conceptionqui
L'ensemble d'ouvragesde Langensteindans notremanuscrita donc trs
probablementcirculdans le contextede l'universitde Paris. Il se peut
qu'un lve de Langensteinait laiss copier un certainnombre de ses
critsalors disponibles Paris.
Le contenu de la seconde partie du manuscrit(ff.120-213) est plus
vari que celui de la premire,et cause de la prsence de plusieurs
textesanonymesou d'attributiondouteuse,il est difficile
de saisirla raison pour laquelle ces diversouvragesont t rassembls.Toutefois,du
faitqu' partirdu traitde Jean de Hollande les textessont crits la
suite et d'une mme main, il s'ensuitque les ff. 128-213 ont t copis
comme un seul ensemble.Cet ensembleest prcd du traitde Burley
(ff. 120-127), qui a t rajout sans doute cause de la convergence
entreles sujetsde ce texteet de celui de Jean de Hollande. Bien que les
il est videntqu'ils
ouvragesdans cettepartieaient des originesdiverses,33
ont tous circulsdans un milieu universitaire,
probablementdans celui
de la facultdes arts de l'universitde Paris.
La provenanceparisiennede notremanuscrit,attestepar le contenu
des deux parties,se confirmepar le faitque les filigranes
identifis
figurent
31Pourla vieetlesuvres
- G. Kreuzer,
deLangenstein,
cf.Th.Hohmann
art.Heinrich
vonLangenstein
dans:
K.
Ruh
Die
deutsche
literatur
des
Mittelalters.
,
, Bd 3,
(d.),
Verfasserlexikon
Berlin/New
York1981,cols.763-73.
32Cf.M.H. Shank,"Unless
YouBelieve
, YouShallNotUnderstand":
, University
, and
Logic
inlateMedieval
Princeton
1988,p. 41-2.
Vienna,
Society
33Le Deprimo
etultimo
estunequestion
Toulouse
instanti
de Burley
(cf.Feltrin
dispute
- Parodi,
Il problema
deJeande Hollande
a probablement
tcrit
, p. 141),le trait
De intensione
, p. *13*),la question
Prague(cf.Bos,John
ofHolland
formarum
probablement
- Ensign
Oxford
The
Calculators
, p. 435-46etKretzmann
Kretzmann,
(cf.Sylla,TheOxford
les Sophismata
de
de Paris(renseignement
, p. xxv-xxvi);
Sophismata
proviennent
personnel
M. ZnonKaluza).
19:53:43 PM
CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT
89
19:53:43 PM
90
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
91
La thoriede la signification
que prsentel'anonyme est fondamentalementextensionnaliste.Ce n'est pas une nature commune ou une
essencequelconque,mais c'est la chose elle-mmequi est reprsenteet
du concept,en revanche,ne se
signifiepar le concept. La signification
limitepas aux objets rellementprsents,mais elle comprendl'ensemble
de choses qui correspondentau concept, que celles-cisoient prsentes,
Toutefois,un mode
possiblesou seulementimaginables.38
passes,futures,
ces choses s'ajoute au conceptde manide signifier
copulatifou disjonctif
re accidentelle,car il procde d'un acte distinctcorrespondant un synAinsi,par la propositionhomoestanimal
, l'intellectconoit
catgorme.39
non
mais
selon
un
mode copulatif
rellementl'ensemble des humains,
[ergoistehomoestanimalet illehomoestanimal)ou disjonctif{ergoistehomoest
ne modifie
animalvelillehomoestanimal
), du faitqu'aucun syncatgorme
la signification
En consquence,la supdu sujet de cette proposition.40
qui permetune descenteaux rfrents
positiondistributive,
par une propositioncopulative,ne convientpas un concept de par lui-mme,mais
lui advientde faon accidentellepar l'adjonctiond'un syncatgorme.41
Il en va de mme pour la suppositiondtermine,permettantune des38En reconnaissant
la significabilit
notre
esten accord
d'objets
imaginables,
anonyme
au sensstrict
le
avecMarsile
temporum
(le prsent,
d'Inghen
qui,outrelestroisdifferentiae
le possible
comme
etcinquime
admet
etl'imaginable
diffrence.
quatrime
passetlefutur)
"Tressuntdifferentie
sciliCf.Marsile
, d.Bos,p. 1021"8:
d'Inghen,
temporum,
Ampliationes
Et taiesetiamdicuntur
etfuturum.
utsolemus
dicerehoc
cetpresens,
preteritum
tempora,
addiduo,scilicet
estpresens
et imaginari
, hocestpreteritum
esse,
, etc.Et possunt
posse
tempus
inproposito
tamen
suntdifferentie
temdifferentie
temporum,
que,licetnonsintproprie
in propositionibus
namrespectu
eorumtermini
supponunt
prodiversis
tempoporum,
de Buridan
comme
ribus."
Surce point,
Marsile
s'carte
qui n'admet
que la possibilit
Cf.Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
diffrence
de temps.
ed.cit
., p. 34921*37.
quatrime
etBuridan
chezleslogiciens
ParexemCetcartentre
Marsile
estdevenue
clbre
tardifs.
etquartum
intitul
Commentum
emendatum
etcorrectum
inprimum
anonyme,
ple,le commentaire
Marsilii
deSuppositionibus,
Petri
Et super
tractatibus
tractatus
ampliationibus,
appellationibus
Hyspani
Marsile
inprimum
et
etconsequentiis
lui-mme
sousle titreCommentum
(attribu
d'Inghen
tractatum
Petri
a/Main1967),f.s8r,rap, Hagenau1495,repr.:Frankfurt
quartum
Hispani
iciles"duefamose
Biridani
etMarsilii."
Pourcesdeuxopinions
clbres,
porte
opiniones
sitsignificabile:
diInghen
e la chimera
cf.G. Roncaglia,
Utrum
Marsilio
Buridano,
, dans:
impossibile
e teologia
neltrecento.
Studi
inricordo
di Eugenio
L. Bianchi
Randi
, Louvain-la(d.),Filosofia
de la significabilit
dans
Neuve1994,p. 259-82.Pourle problme
non-existents
d'objets
engnral,
dans
etnon-existence
le cadrede la smantique
ockhamiste
cf.E. Karger,
Rfirence
- Z. Kaluza- A. de Libera,Lectionum
deGuillaume
la smantique
d'Ockham
, dans:J.Jolivet
Paris1991,p. 163-76et A.S. Me Grade,
varietates.
PaulVignaux
(1904-1987),
Hommage
45 (1985),
s Commitment
toRealPossibles
Studies
Ockham'
, dans:Franciscan
Plenty
ofNothing.
145-56.
pp.
39Cf.p. 11495-101.
40Cf.p. 114102-1
15116.
41Cf.p. 11490"3.
19:53:43 PM
92
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
93
(i) Comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, notrequestionconcernele problme gnralde la correspondanceentrele langage parl ou critet le
langage mental. Elle s'inscritainsi dans un courant de la smantique
Ockham
inspirpar Guillaumed'Ockham. Concernantles syncatgormes,
lui-mmeles admet simplementdans le langage mental,sans les analyser
en termesd'acte ou de concept.44
de conceptscorrespondant
Buridan,en revanche,parle explicitement
Il distingueentre,d'une part,des synmentalement
aux syncatgormes.
catgormesauxquels correspondun concept incomplexeou simple,et,
d'autrepart,des syncatgormes
ayantun conceptcomplexecomme corrlat mental. Rciproquement,il diffrencie
entre des catgormesqui
ont un conceptsimplecomme correspondantmental,et des catgormes
auxquels correspondun conceptcomplexe.45Toutefois,le vocabulairede
Buridans'cartede celui de notreanonymedans la mesureo Buridan
ne parle nullepart du correspondant
d'un syncatgorme
en termesd'une
alternativeentreacte ou concept.
C'est dans le traitde Pierred'AillyintitulConceptas,
rdigentre1368
et 1375,que se trouveune analyse,comparable celle de notreanonyme,
du corrlatmental d'une syncatgorme
vocal en termesde concept et
d'acte. En effet,ayant distinguentretroistypesde termesvocaux, des
et des termesmixtes,Pierre
purs catgormes,des purs syncatgormes
affirme
des
le
mental
termesmixtesest un cond'Ailly
que correspondant
d'un
acte
et d'un termemenceptcomplexe,compos
syncatgormatique
tal catgormatique.46
44Ockham,
Summa
"Adhucaliterdividitur
tam
I, 3, ed.cit.,p. 154"5:
terminus,
logicae,
vocalisquammentalis,
quidamsuntcategorematici,
quia terminorum
quidamsyncategorematici."
45Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
Gomme
dessyncat, ed.cit.,
p. 189155"73.
exemples
un concept
Buridan
donneet, itelet si ainsique la
gormes
auxquels
correspond
simple,
o elleestcopule(dansla mesure
o elleconnote
unecercopule(est)dansla mesure
tainetemporalit,
ellen'estpaspurement
Enrevanche,
comme
exemsyncatgormatique).
unconcept
Buridan
donnetantum
plesdessyncatgormes
auxquels
correspond
complexe,
etsolum
comme
et desinit.
Commeexem, ainsique les"syncatgormes
implicites"
incipit
Buridan
donne
mental,
plesdescatgormes
ayantun concept
simplecommecorrlat
homo
etle terme
abstrait
albedo
concret
album.
Commeexemples
descatgormes
, le terme
unconcept
Buridan
donnechimaera
et vacuum.
auxquels
correspond
complexe,
46Pierre
Modisignificandi
undihre
Destruktionen.
, d. L. Kaczmarek,
%w
d'Ailly,
Conceptus
Texte
im14.Jahrhundert
"Restt
unum
zurscholastischen
, Mnster
1980,p. 9617*34:
Sprachtheorie
scilicet
vocalium
estmere
dictum,
quodnonfuit
quodterminorum
quidam
cathegoreumaticus,
utisteterminus
homo
utisteterminus
omnis
; aliusestsincathegoreumaticus,
; aliusestterminus
vocalis
etpartim
etsicestmixtus,
partim
cathegoreumaticus
sincathegoreumaticus,
et esttalisqui scilicet
in duosterminos,
potestresolvi
quorumalterestpurecatheet alterestpuresincathegoreumaticus.
Cuiusmodi
estisteterminus
vocalis
goreumaticus,
19:53:43 PM
94
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
au secondpoint,
mne directement
(it)Le passage concerndu Conceptas
la tripledistinctionentrepurs syncatgormes,
purs catgormeset termes mixtes.A notre connaissance,cette tripledistinctionne se trouve
chez aucun auteur antrieur Ockham. En l'occurrence,c'est Ockham
lui-mmequi semble avoir introduitl'ide de termesmoyens,en observant que parmi les syncatgormes,qui se caractrisentpar l'absence
fixeet dtermine,certainsadverbesont un traitcomd'une signification
mun avec les catgormes, savoirjustementla signification
dtermine.
entre
Cependant,Ockham ne connatpas tellequelle la tripledistinction
et
termes
mixtes.47
en
Celle-ci, revanche,se
catgormes,syncatgormes
trouvechez au moins troisauteursaprs Ockham.
On la trouvechez Buridan dans le traitsur les suppositions.D'aprs
les termesqui ne signifient
auBuridan,s'appellentpurs syncatgormes
cune chose, outre les concepts qu'ils signifient
de faon immdiate.En
non seulerevanche,s'appellentpurs catgormesles termesqui signifient
mentles conceptsqu'ils signifient
de maniredirecte,mais aussi les choses
conues par ces concepts,et qui sont capables de fonctionnercomme
sujet ou prdicatd'une proposition.S'appellentmoyensou mixtessoitles
termesqui, outre le concept qu'ils signifient
de faon directe,signifient
comme
galementles chosesconues,sans pour autantpouvoirfonctionner
sujet ou prdicatd'une proposition,soit les termesqui comprennent la
foisun catgormeet un syncatgorme.48
nihil
velnilvelaliquid
vel generaliter
in neutro
omniasignauniversalia
velparticularia
ut omne,
substantiva,
, et sicde aliis.Et talestergenere,
quibusnonexprimuntur
aliquid
minidicuntur
mixti
etsincathegoreumatico.
ex cathegoreumatico
Et de facto
inmente
talibusterminis
ex actusincathegoreumatico
et termino
correspondet
conceptus
complexus
mentali
in quosmentaliter
utcumdicitur
resolvuntur;
cathegoreumatico,
aliquid,
<quod>
sicresolvitur
ens
, darumestquodin menteestcomplexio
terminorum,
aliquod
plurium
alterestpuresincathegoreumaticus
L'dition
etalterpurecathegoreumaticus."
de
quorum
Kaczmarek
a un caractre
nousavonschangquelquefois
la ponctuation.
provisoire;
de l'ouvrage
de Kaczmarek,
P.V. Spadea faitparatre
unetraduction
Indpendamment
cf.P.V.Spade,Peter
andInsolubles.
AnAnnotated
Translation
,
annote,
anglaise
ofAilly:
Concepts
n. 260).La datation
du trait
Dordrecht/Boston/London
1980,p. 16-34(100,n. 97-114,
- L. Kaczmarek
- O. Pluta,Diephilosophischen
estselonM. Chappuis
desPeter
von
Schriften
firPhilosophie
undChronologie
Zeitschrift
undTheologie
Authentizitt
, dans:Freiburger
Ailly.
cf.Biard,
33 (1986),p. 593-615,
du contenu
du trait,
part.p. 604-6.Pourdesaspects
dethorie
de
etreprsentation
chezPierre
Id.,Prsence
Logique,
p. 264-84,
d'Ailly.
Quelques
problmes
la connaissance
auXIVesicle
, dans:Dialogue31.3(1992),p. 459-74etL. Kaczmarek
(d.),
Destructions
modorum
simificandi,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia
1994,p. xv-xxxviii.
47Ockham,
Summa
, I, 4, ed.cit.,p. 1632"4.
logicae
48Buridan,
Tractatus
desuppositionibus,
dans
ed.cit.,
Ce passage
se comprend
p. 18789-8102.
la conception
de la smantique
exemcf.supra
buridanienne;
, p. 78,n. 4. Comme
gnrale
mixtes
le textedonne
ainsique la co, hodie,
nihil,
alicubi,
nemo,
secum,
plesdestermes
forte
o elleconnote
unetemporalit
pule(esi)dansla mesure
(cf.p. 207315-8320).
19:53:43 PM
CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT
95
19:53:43 PM
96
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
contento
subsubiecto,
nonestaliquaresque sitsubstantia
vel accidens,
sed beneest
modus
reietdispositio,
velpredicati;
etsicsincathegoremata
benesignificant
putasubiecti
nonsolumsignificai
existentiam
rei,sedetiammodum
rei,etc."
aliquidproutlyaliquid
Ce passagea tsignal
AnOutline
Medieval
from
parPh.Boehner,
Logic.
ofItsDevelopment
1250toc. 1400, Manchester
endtail
1966,p. 22-4et 119,n.27,etanalys
parBraakhuis,
De 13deeeuwse
trac
reidansle cadrede
de modus
taten,
p. 385-92.Pourle rlede la notion
la thorie
du mouvement,
cf.S. Caroti,
Oresme
onMotion
III,
(Questiones
superPhysicam,
31.1(1993),p. 8-36,part.34-6,etId.,La position
sur
deNicole
Oresme
2-7),dans:Vivarium
la nature
dumouvement
, p. 335-42.
51Pierre
"Undein predictis
, ed.dt., p. 8117"26:
d'Ailly,
Conceptus
descriptionibus
ponitur
li aliquid
etponitur
terminos
numeri
noncollectivos;
propter
cathegoreumaticos
singularis
numeri
collectivos
velpropter
terminos
noncolterminos
aliqua
singularis
propter
plurales
etponitur
terminos
radonesignificationis.
lectivos;
aliqualiter
propter
sincathegoreumaticos
utisteterminus
homo
utistetersecundi:
Exemplum
primi:
significai
aliquid.Exemplum
minus
hommes
in plurali
tercii:
ut
, velisteterminus
populus
significant
aliqua.Exemplum
isteterminus
omnis
cf.galement
8431-851
etp. 933M.
significai
aliqualiter";
p.
52Cf. 120ll4-121115.
p.
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
97
19:53:43 PM
98
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
et signification
concept "homme" lui-mmeen tant que reprsentation
des humainsrels. Deuximement,chaque conceptsignifiel'me en tant
de
du concept et la signification
que sa cause. Cette auto-signification
l'me en tant que cause, constituentce que le conceptsignifienaturellement au sens commun.57
D'aprs l'anonyme,chaque conceptest apte recevoirune imposition
soit la mme chose qu'il signifiedj
conventionnellement,
pour signifier
soit
d'autre.
chose
naturellement, quelque
Ainsi,le concept"homme,"qui
signifienaturellementau sens propre l'ensemble des humains, et qui
au sens communs'auto-signifie,
naturellement
peut treimpospour signifierconventionnellement
ce
soit.58
Cette
conventionquoi que
signification
nelle attacheau conceptne semblepas modifiersa signification
naturelle.
Avant d'aborderle problmede la possibilitd'un conceptquivoque,
examinonsquelles sont les dfinitions
d'univocitet d'quivocitmisesen
uvre par l'anonyme.Celles-ci s'apparententaux dfinitions
dont nous
avons parl dans notre introduction.L'on appelle ici univoque tout ce
qui signifieune ou plusieurschoses de par un seul concept(iunicoconcepto).
L'on appelle quivoque, en revanche,toutce qui signifieune pluralitde
choses (diurna),non pas de par un seul concept mais de par une pluralit de conceptsdiffrents
(<diuersis
conceptibus
).59
Les thsesde notre anonymese rsumentdans les deux propositions
suivantes.(i) A proprementparler,au niveau de sa signification
naturelle
au sens propre,chaque concept est univoque, car il signifiede par un
seul concept, savoir de par lui-mme,ce dont il est la ressemblance
naturelle.Or il n'est pas possiblequ'un seul conceptsoit la ressemblance
naturelleet propred'une pluralitde choses de par une pluralitde concar autrementle concept serait la fois un et multiple.
cepts diffrents,
Il s'ensuitque tout ce qui est signifipar un concept naturellement
au
sens propre constitueune unit selon l'espce.60
(i) Au sens plus large, un seul conceptpeut tre quivoque en signifiant une chose naturellementau sens propre,autre chose naturellement
au sens commun,et encore autre chose de faonconventionnelle.61
Ainsi,
le concept "homme" est quivoque en signifiantnaturellement
au sens
57Cf.p. 123198-124207,
et p. 127319"21.
p. 124211*2
30Cf.p. i24*ISMb
etp. 125** .
59Cf.p. 12086"90
et p. 126286"92.
ne faitpas la distinction
Notreanonyme,
cependant,
lestroismodesd'quivocation,
entre
dontnousavonsparlplushaut.Lesnotions
d'univocitetd'quivocit
sontutilises
icid'unemanire
assezgnrale.
bCf. l26*-'27'1*.
61Cf.p.
p. 127315*44.
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
99
19:53:43 PM
100
BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.
65Conceptus,
estsignum
ed.cit.,
"Terminus
p. 817'9:
quodeximpositione
quamactuhabet
velex natura
immutando
earnvitaliter
sua,potentie
aliquidvelaliquavelalicognitive
natum
estsignificare."
qualiter
66Conceptus
autem
eamvitaliter
immuestpotentie
, ed.cit.,
cognitive
p. 8114*6:
"Significare
tandoaliquidvelaliquavelaliqualiter
representare."
67Conceptus,
inproposito
noticia
immutatio
estactualis
ed.cit.,
"Undevitalis
p. 8127-233:
etinherens
vitaliter
sivecognitio
effective
causataa potentia
partialiter
cognitiva
perceptiva
Ex istadescriptione
vitaliter
sequitur
ipsipotentie
cognitive
perceptive.
quodad hocquod
sive
immutans
vitaliter
dicitur
noticia
potentiam
cognitivam
aliquaressivealiquaqualitas
Prima
illius
ad cognitivam
vitalis
immutatio
habitudo
qualitatis
potentiam.
requiritur
duplex
saltem
est
a potentia
estquodsiteffective
(. . .). Secundahabitudo
cognitiva,
partialiter
et insicutaccidens
inheret
suo subiecto
potentie
cognitive
quodtalisnoticiainhereat
de vitalis
immutatio
dansla
Pouruneanalyse
de la notion
formet
potentiam
cognitivam."
immutacf.L. Kaczmarek,
Vitalis
et dansla smantique
de Pierred'Ailly,
psychologie
derSptscholastik,
dans:A. Heinekamp
tio.Erkundungen
zurerkenntnispsychologischen
Terminology
Heinrich
Mnster
rationis.
W. Lenzen- M. Schneider
Mathesis
fiir
(d.),
Festschrifi
Schepers,
und
vonAilly,
Sent.
1, q. 3. Anmerkungen
beiPeter
zu Quellen
1990,p. 189-206;
Id., "Notitia"
im14.und15.Jahrhundert
dans:O. Pluta(d.),DiePhilosophie
1988,
, Amsterdam
Textgestalt,
de
la notion
a montr
d'Ailly
emprunte
que Pierre
part.p. 390.Kaczmarek
p. 385-420,
immutatio
deJeande Ripa.ChezJeande Ripa,la vitalis
vitalis
au commentaire
desSentences
aussibiende l'inhrence
immutatio
se situedansl'intellect
surunmodedistinct
quede l'inPierre
confirme
formation.
Dansle Conceptus
, en revanche,
d'Ailly
qu'ellese situedansla
dansla
Pourla notion
de vitalis
immutatio
facult
surle modede l'inhrence.
cognitive
dela vision
Leproblme
thorie
de connaissance
deJeande Ripa,cf.F. Ruello,
thologique
doctrinale
duXIV sicle,
d'histoire
l'universit
lemilieu
dans:Archives
deParisvers
batifique
du Moyenge55 (1980),p. 122-70.
etlittraire
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
101
19:53:43 PM
102
PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
103
19:53:43 PM
104
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
varis. Dans le manuscrit,il n'y a aucune indicationque nos deux questions constituentune unit quelconque, bien que le faitque la copie du
premier texte ne soit pas acheve laisse une incertitudesur ce point.
Ensuite, la seconde question donne un renvoi la "question prcdente," qui toutefoisne semble pas visernotrepremiertexte.Le renvoi
concernela dfinition
d'univocitcomme signification
d'une ou de plusieurs chosesde par un seul concept[unicoconceptu)P
Or, une telledfinition
ne se trouvenulle part dans la premirequestion.Finalement,le faitque
la notionla plus remarquablede la deuximequestion,celle de la Vitalis
immutatio
, soit entirementabsente dans le premiertexte,semble tre un
argumentpour dissocierles deux questions.
En somme, cause de leur positionisole dans le manuscrit,il est
pratiquementimpossibled'tabliravec certitudele rapportprcis entre
les deux questions.Cependant,deux conclusionssemblenttrepermises,
(z) Le renvoi une questionprcdentemontreque la deuximequestion
provientprobablementd'un ensemble consistantde plusieursquestions.
La convenanceentrenos deux textesanonymessur le plan doctrinalet
au niveau du vocabulairen'exclutpas la possibilitque la premirequestion proviennedu mme ensemble,(it) En revanche,en supposantque
les deux textesproviennentd'un mme ensemblede questions,il est pratiquementsr qu'ils ne s'y sont pas suivisdirectementdans l'ordre qui
est celui de notremanuscrit.
III. Les deuxquestions
et le Conceptus de PierreAilly
anonymes
Dans ce qui prcde,nous avons faitun rapprochement
entrenos ques. Il nous restemaintenant tablirplus prtionsanonymeset le Conceptus
cismentle rapportentreces troistextes.A cet effet,nous concentrons
d'abord notreattentionsur l'ouvrage de Pierred'Ailly.
Le Conceptus
est un traitsur le langage mental. Plus exactement,le
traitdveloppe une thorie des termesmentaux,vocaux et crits,en
examinantles deux derniersprincipalement
du ct de leur dpendance
l'gard du langage mental.L'auteur insistesur la subordinationdu langage crit et vocal au langage mental.76Quant sa forme,le Conceptus
A
et de distinctions.
se prsentecomme un compendiumde dfinitions
deux passages prs, o l'auteur critiquela thoriemodistedes partiesdu
75Cf. 126287*89.
p.
/bPierre
vocalis
d Amy,Conceptus
, ed.cit.,p. 99. Totaratioquarealiquisterminus
sivetermino
istamvelistamremestquia ad placitum
subordinatur
significet
conceptui
mentali
istamvelillamrem."
dicto,
proprie
qui naturaliter
proprie
significai
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
105
discourset de la construction,77
le traitn'a pas le caractred'un discoursargumentativ
mais d'une expositiond'une thoriesmantiquegnrale. Abstractionfaite de l'introductionterminologique,cette exposition
se divise en troistapes correspondantaux trois typesde termes,mais
du faitque les termescritset vocaux se subsumentsous le dnominateurde termesconventionnels,78
le traitconsisteen deux partiesprincil'une
sur
les
termes
mentaux
l'autresur les termesconventionnels.79
pales,
Ce qui nous intresseici, ce sont les distinctionset les dfinitions
donnes, ainsi que l'organisationdu trait.
Dans son introduction,
Pierred'Aillydfinitles notionsde terme,80
de
La
et
de
vitalis
immutatio.
vitalisimmutatio
est une connaissance
signifier,81
en acte (actualis
noticia
), cause en partiepar la facultcognitiveet en partie par la chose connue, et elle se trouvedans la facultcognitivesur le
mode d'inhrence,tout comme une formeaccidentelleinhre dans son
sujet.82Ensuite,l'auteur donne sa typologiegnrale du signe. Dans ce
est dfinicomme un signequi conduit(ducit)
cadre,le termeconventionnel
la connaissancede la chose signifie.Le termeconceptuel,en revanche,
est un signe qui est lui-mmeconnaissancede la chose signifie,dont il
est la similitudenaturelle.83
La premirepartieprincipaledu traitanalyseles termesconceptuels.
Ayant assimilles notionsde concept, de terme mental,d'acte d'intelliger et de connaissanceapprhensive,l'auteur examine (i) la connaissance apprhensivesimple et complexe, (ii) les termes mentaux catgormatiqueset syncatgormatiques,
(iii) les termesmentauxproprement
77Conceptus
et 9927-10017.
Pourla thorie
modiste
desparties
du dis, ed.rit.,
p. 8829-921
coursetde la cons
truc
La notion
departie
dudiscours
dansla grammaire
tio,cf.I. Rosier,
spculative
On
, dans:Histoire,
Epistmologie,
Langage3.1 (1981),p. 49-62,et G.H. Kneepkens,
mediaeval
tothe
with
notion
, dans:Histoire,
syntactic
special
reference
ofconstruction
thought
Epistmode la thorie
modiste
logie,Langage12.2(1990),p. 139-76,
part.p. 164-7.Unecritique
de la construction,
cellede Pierre
se trouve
danslesquestions
sur
d'Ailly,
comparable
la secondepartiedu Doctrinale
un certain
Marsile(d'Inghen?);
cf.C.H.
, attribues
: A Quaestiones-commentaiy
ontheSecond
PartofAlexander
de
Erfurt,
Q. 70A
Kneepkens,
Ampl.
Villa
Dei'sDoctrinale
AnExplorative
Noteona Specimen
byMarsilius
ofInghen?
ofConceptualist
Grammar
28.1(1990),p. 26-54.
, dans:Vivarium
78Conceptus
"De terminis
etmentalibus
dictis
, ed.cit.,
p. 10019"21:
scriptis
improprie
penitusuniformiter
dicendum
estsicutde vocalibus,
sicad placitum
quia
significant."
79Selonla pagination
de l'dition
de Kaczmarek,
le trait
se divisecomme
suit:introduction
et terminologique,
surlestermes
gnrale
p. 81'-8320;
premire
partieprincipale
seconde
surlestermes
mentaux,
conventionnels,
p. 832l-9236;
principale
partie
p. 931-10021.
, ed.at.,p. 81 , cf.supra,
100,n. 65.
Conceptus
p.
81
ed.cit.,p. 8114"6;
cf.supra,
Conceptus,
p. 100,n. 66.
ed.cit.,p. 81 -2 , cf.supra
, p. 100,n. 67.
Conceptus,
83Conceptus,
ed.cit.,p. 8235-320.
19:53:43 PM
106
PAULJ.J.M.
BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
107
deux
de
savoir
la
de faon ultime
()
degrs signification,
signification
et de faon non-ultime,(ii) les termes catgormatiques,syncatgormatiques et mixtes,(iii) les termesconventionnelsd'impositionou d'intentionpremireet d'impositionou d'intentionseconde et (iv)les termes
absolus et connotatifs.
conventionnels
88Conceptas
cf.supra
, ed.cit
., p. 8812"28;
, p. 102,n. 72.
89
ed.cit p. 8922-913.
Pourle rlede la notion
de suppositio
dansl'ouvrage
de
Conceptus,
Pierre
cf.Biard,
, p. 283-4.
d'Ailly,
Logique
90
, ed.cit.,p. 914'17.
91Conceptus
ed.cit.,
"Notandum
estquodconceptus
estactualis
noticia
alicuius
Conceptus,
p. 9118-236:
reicausata
inanima,
ab obiecto,
scilicet
a reconcepta
sivecognita,
etpartialiter
partialiter
etiama potentia
vitaliter
formaliter
immutans
intellectivam.
Et
ipsampotentiam
cognitiva
sicconceptus,
actualis
actusintelligendi,
vitalis
immutatio
noticia,
proeademresivequalitatesupponunt;
istitermini
tamen
illiusquali
tatis(. . .)."
cognotant
aliquashabitudines
92Conceptus
"Voxsignificativa
ad piaci
tumestqua apprehensa
ab
, ed.cit.,p. 936-418:
audituex impositione
eamvitaliter
immuquamactuhabet,nataestpotentie
cognitive
tandoinstrumentaliter
aliuda se etsibisimaliquidvelaliquavelaliqualiter
representare
ilia suoprolatore
vela suispartibus,
nisialiquidillorum
ex impositione.
(. . .)
significet
Notandum
estpromaiori
intellectu
ad placitum
nonestaliud
predictorum
quodsignificare
facta
etperplacitum
alicuius
totius
communitatis
velalicuius
quaminstitutio
pervoluntatem
habentis
etgerentis
velaliquavelaliqualiter
auctoritatem
vicem
totius
communitatis
aliquid
representare."
19:53:43 PM
108
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
d'un termeconventionnel
est
ultimatum)
(i) Le signifiultime(significatimi
ce que le termesignifiede faon propre et directe,c'est--direla chose
relle que le termesignifieen raison de son imposition.En revanche,le
nonultimatum)
d'un termeconventionnelest
signifinon-ultime(significatum
son signifi
le concept auquel il est subordonnafinde pouvoirsignifier
ultime.Le signifinon-ultimed'un termeconventionneln'est pas signifi
en raison de l'impositiondu terme.A proprementparler,un termeconventionnelne signifiepas le concept auquel il est subordonn,car il n'a
pas t impos pour signifierun concept. Il signifie,au contraire,une
chose rellepar l'intermdiaire
d'un concept.La signification
d'un terme
conventionnelprsupposela signification
naturelledu termemental.Du
ct de sa signification
non-ultime,certainsattribuentau termeconventionnelune "suppositionmentale" (suppositio
mentalis
), appele habituellement suppositionsimple,alors que du ct de sa signification
ultime,le
termevocale suppose personnellement.93
entrecatgormeset syncatgormes
(ii) La distinction
s'applique aussi
bien aux termesconventionnelsqu'aux termesmentaux.L'auteur introduit ici la tripledistinctionentrecatgormes,syncatgormes
et termes
mixtes.Les termesmixtes,en partie catgormeet en partie syncatgorme,sont analyss en termesde leur correspondantmental: celui-ci
est un conceptcompos d'un acte syncatgormatique
et d'un termemental catgormatique.94
(iii) Les termesvocaux d'impositionou d'intentionpremiresont des
termesqui signifient
une chose en tant que chose et non en tant que
sont
Ils
signe.
appels "d'impositionpremire" cause du faitqu'ils ne
prsupposent
pas l'impositiond'un autretermequelconque;ils sontappels
"d'intentionpremire"parce qu'ils sont subordonns un termemental
qui, lui, est d'intentionpremireproprementdit. En revanche,les termes
conventionnelsd'impositionou d'intentionseconde sont des termesqui
signifient
quelque chose en tant que signe d'autre chose. Ils sont appels
"d'impositionseconde" cause du fait que leur impositionprsuppose
l'impositiond'un autre terme;ils sont appels "d'intentionseconde" par
le faitqu'ils sont subordonns un concept d'intentionseconde.95
93Conceptas
Le vocabulaire
de Pierre
ultimatum
vs.
, ed.dt p. 9418-536.
d'Ailly
{significatum
nonultimatum)
immeceluide Buridan
ultimatum
vs.significatum
significatum
(significatum
rappelle
Cf.supra,
etPierre
du rapport
entre
Buridan
diatum).
d'Ailly,
p. 3, n. 4. Pouruneanalyse
cf.Biard,Losique
, p. 274-7.
94Conceptas
cf.supra
, ed.cit.,p. 9617-724;
, p. 93,n. 46.
^ Conceptus
, ed.at p. 97"-9.
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
109
tantenfinapplique
entretermesabsoluset connotatifs
(iv)La distinction
la deuximepartieprincipaledu traitse teraux termesconventionnels,
de la dpendance totale du langage vocal et crit
mine par l'affirmation
l'garddu langagemental,suivied'une critiquede la conceptionmodiste
de la smantique.96
Nous pouvonsmaintenantformulerquelques conclusionsconcernantle
rapportentrenos questionsanonymeset le Conceptus.
(i) Nos questionsne sont pas des extraitslittraux,ou des fragments
d'un extraitlittral,du textede Pierre d'Ailly.Cela est exclu aussi bien
en raison de la formedes troistextesqu'en raison de leur contenu.Du
soient
ct formel,il sembleexclu que nos textesscolaireset argumentatifs
comme l'est le Conceptus.
Du ct
des extraitsd'un recueilde dfinitions
du contenu,bien que le problme du correspondantmental d'un syncatgorme,affrontpar notre premire question, interviennedans le
, notre texte contientun certainnombre d'lmentsdoctrinaux
Conceptus
qui ne figurentpas dans le traitde Pierre d'Ailly.97En outre,le problme de l'quivocit des concepts, traitpar notre seconde question
,98
absent dans le Conceptus
anonyme,est entirement
de l'autre
d'une
et
Les
deux
(ii)
part le Conceptus
questionsanonymes
la
fondamen
courant
de
un
mme
smantique,inspir
appartiennent
talementpar Ockham et labor par Buridan,Albertde Saxe et Marsile
d'Inghen.Toutefois,l'appartenance un mme courantde la smantique
n'explique pas de manire suffisanteles rapports entre nos questions
part ce rapportgnral,
anonymeset le traitde Pierred'Ailly.En effet,
il existedes liens particuliersentreles troistextes.
"
D'abord, chacun des trois textesutilisel'expression aliqualitef'pour
Cette expressionest tydfinirla signification
propre du syncatgorme.
la
de
Pierre
et
nous
de
d'Ailly
ignoronsd'autresoccurrences
pense
pique
de cetteexpressionen un sens comparable.L'emploi de cettenotionconstitueun premierlien prcis entre nos deux questionsanonymeset le
Conceptus.
96Conceptus
, ed.t., p. 99M0021.
97Par
la
modifie
dontunsyncatgorme
lesquatrefaons
la distinction
entre
exemple,
l'ideselon
duconcept
, copulative
, copulatim)
, disiunctim
(cf.p. 11474*77),
(disiunctwe
signification
ou
l'ensemble
de chosesprsentes,
futures,
passes,
possibles
laquellele concept
signifie
de suppositio
disainsiquele vocabulaire
(cf.p. 11495"98),
imaginables,
quiluicorrespondent
et 115n7'132).
tributiva
etsuppositio
determinata
(cf.p. 11490"93
98Etant
la seulecopie
donnque le manuscrit
Paris,B.N.,lat.16.401,qui a conserv
a tcopientre1390et 1405(cf.supra
de nosquestions
connue
, p. 89),il est
anonymes,
n'a pastle modledu trait
de Pierre
vident
de nosquestions
d'Ailly.
que cette
copie
19:53:43 PM
110
M. BARKER
PAULJ.J.
99Conceptus,
ed.cit.,p. 842-5'et 96,7-724.
100Cf.
, p. 93,n. 46.
supra
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
111
=
=
=
=
=
=
AUCTORIS
INCERTI
utrum
in
intellectu
actuset nonconceptus
Quaestio
syncategoremati
correspondeat
Cod. Paris,Bibliothque
lat. 16.401,ff.166M68r
Nationale,
/f. 166v/Questio est hec: utrumsincathegoremati
in intellectucorrespondeatactus et non conceptus.
5
19:53:43 PM
112
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
45
113
19:53:43 PM
114
75
80
85
90
PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
Tercio notandumquod actus correspondentes
sincathegorematibus
non significantaliquam rem ad extra, sed precise dant modum
significandi
conceptibus,scilicetdisiunctiueuel copulatiue,disiunctim uel copulatim,secundumquod uaria sunt sincathegoremata.
Ex quo sequiturquod conceptusnon qualitercumquepotest,significai naturaliter.Patet, quia iste conceptushomo
omnes
, significans
hominesin intellectucopulatiue,non habet hoc naturaliter,
quia,
, certe ille non repredeposito actu correspondenteilli signo omnis
sentareiomnes hominescopulatiue.Et ergo est sibi accidentale.
Ex quo ulteriussequiturquod quilibetconceptusrepresentanssua
significatain intellectuequiualentercopulatiuehabet iliummodum
ex aliquo actu determinanteipsum intellectumd
ad sic
significandi
, quando significai
concipiendum.Patethoc, quia isteconceptushomo
in intellectuomnes homines copulatiue equiualenter,tunc oportet
quod intellectusdeterminetur
per aliquem actum correspondentem
istisignoomnis
, uel per consimilemactumhabentemuim distribuendi.
ultra
Sequitur
quod supposicio distributiuaconuenit intellectui
accidentaliter.Apparet, quia conuenit ex parte alicuius sincathegorematisdeterminantisintellectumad concipiendumsignificata
aliqualiterper conceptumcopulatiue.
95
, uel consimilem,
Quarto notandumquod per hunc conceptumhomo
intellectusconcipit omnes homines,et ille conceptushomorepresentai omnes homines presentes,pretritos,futuros,potentesesse
uel potentesymaginariesse. Sed modusrepresentandi
omneshomines,
scilicetcopulatiueuel copulatim,disiunctiueuel disiunctim,accidit
100 illi conceptuihomoex actu alicuius determinantis
intellectum
ad sic
concipiendum.
Ex quo sequiturquod in hac proposicionehomoestanimalintellectus per illum conceptumhomoconcipitomnes homines,et tarnen
nec copulatiuenec disiunctiueetc. Quod probatur:quia intellectus
105 non determinatur
ad <sic> concipiendumsignificatahuius termini
homoper aliquem actum; ergo intellectusnon concipithominescoillius
pulatiueuel disiunctiue,
significata
quia ille modus concipiendi6
terminihomoest accidentalisistiterminohomo.Et confirmatur:
quia
omniactu,conciperetsignificata
qua racioneintellectus,
circumscripto
110 huiusterminihomodisiunctiue,
eadem racionecopulatiue.Patet,quia
non est plus actus determinansunam partem quam aliam; igitur,
tuncomni actu, non essetracio quare plus conciperet
circumscripto
disiunctiuequam copulatiue.Et iterum,quia alias signumparticu-
19:53:43 PM
SYNGATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
115
19:53:43 PM
116
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
117
Tunc ad raciones.
Ad primam,quando arguebaturde dictioneadiectiua,diciturquod
Eciam diciturquod sibi non corresnon est purumsincathegorema.
ymo simplex,quia non rpugntintelpondetconceptuscompositus,
ut patetde primoconceptu
210 lectuihabere conceptumconnotatiuum,
scilicet
de
indiuiduo
uago, qui est connotatiuus.m
ipsiusintellectus,
a
b
c
d
e
f
8
h
1
j
k
1
m
primusarticulus]P
inclinatur]declinaturP
eafccathegorematiceP
cathegorematice]
intellectum]modum P
modusconcipiendi]conceptusconcipiendimodus concipiendiP
nisi] eque P
secundusarticulus]P"1
ita] ist ita P
actum] conceptumactum P
etc. P
etc.]
concipiendum]P"1
nullus]quilibetP nullusP"1
et sequitur
lacunaP
textus
connotatiuus]hicfinitur
19:53:43 PM
118
PAULJ.J.
M. BAKKER
APPENDICE II
AUCTORIS
INCERTI
utrum
Qustio
aliquisconceptus
potestesseaquivocus
Cod. Paris,Bibliothque
lat. 16.401,ff.168r-170v
Nationale,
/f.168r/Questioesthec: utrumaliquisconceptuspotestesse equiuocus.
19:53:43 PM
SYNGATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
119
conuenitcum asino, sequiturquod conceptus hominismagis con35 uenitcum asino /f. 168v/quam illa uox homoconuenitcum homine;
asinumquam <illa
ergo sequiturquod [illa uox] magis representabit
uox homo>hominem;ergo. Minor racionisnota de se.
Quarto sic: sicut se habet albedo ad conceptumeius proprium,ita
se habet caliditasad suum conceptumproprium,ergo per locum a
sicut se habet albedo ad caliditatem,sic
commutataproporcione:104
se habebit conceptusalbedinisad conceptumcaliditatis;sed sic est
quod albedo potest representarecaliditatem;ergo conceptusunius
potest representareconceptumalterius.Consequencia nota. Maior
45 apparet per locum a commutataproporcione.Et minor probatur:
quod quandocumqueuiderem
quia in mentemea possumconstituere
eciam
albedinem, quod
conciperemc caliditatem; et sic albedo
michi
caliditatem;et per consequens conceptusalbedinis
significarei
potestsignificare
conceptumcaliditatis.
50
Quinto sic: conceptushominispotestsignificarehominemet potest
illam uocem homo
; ergo sequiturquod ille conceptuspotest
significare
esse equiuocus. Consequencia tenet,quia illa res ad extraet illa uox
differunt
specifice.Et antecedensapparet de se. Et quod ille conillamuocem probatur:quia si aliquis
55 ceptushominispotestsignificare
habeat in mente sua conceptumhominis,tunc faciliterpotest duci
ad formandumillam uocem homo'ergo sequiturquod illam uocem
homopotestibi representare.
Consequencia tenet,quia nisi sic posset
non
uideretur
representare,
quomodo conceptusita faciliterpotest
60 duci ad formandumillam uocem. Et antecedens apparet, quia si
aliquis habeat conceptumhominis,ipse potestfaciliterconcipereet
formareuoces, que uoces huiusmodiconceptibussubordinantur.
40
Sexto sic: conceptussignificaialiud naturaliterproprieet aliud na70 turalitercommuniter;ergo conceptuspotestesse equiuocus. Consenon potesthabere
quencia tenet,quia huiusmodimodos significandi
Et
sine
antecedens
equiuocacione ipsius.
conceptus
probatur:quia
res ad extra;et ille
conceptushominisnaturaliter
proprierepresentat
idem conceptussignificaiseipsumnaturaliter
communiter;ergo idem
104
Cf.forte
Petrus
Tractatus
V, 34 (ed.De Rijk,7412'22):
("Summule
Logicales")
Hispanus,
sehabet
"Locusa proportione
esthabitudo
uniusproportionalium
ad reliquum.
Utsicut
rectornauis
ad navem,
sicsehabet
ad scolas;
sedinnaviregenda
estrector
non
rector
scolarum
eligendus
sorte
sedarte;
inscolis
estrector
nonsorte
sedarte
."
ergo
regendis
eligendus
19:53:43 PM
120
PAULJ.J.M.
BAKKER
75
80
85
90
95
100 Tercio: si conceptusposset esse equiuocus, sequereturquod fallacia equiuocacionis non esset fallacia in dictione.Consequens falsum. Probaturtamen consequencia: quia fallacieideo dicunturin
dictionequia <non> possuntfierisine signisad placituminstitutis;
modo, si equiuocacio fieretin mente,sequereturquod esset falla105 eia extra dictionem.
110
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
115
121
19:53:43 PM
122
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
naturaliter,aliud ad placitum. Patet diuisio in Summulis Petri
Hispani.109
naturaliterquoddam
140 Vlteriusest notandumquod significatiuorum
communiter.
proprie,aliud significainaturaliter
significainaturaliter
Vnde signum dicitursignificarenaturaliterproprie illud cuius est
propria similitudoet naturalisuerificacio;sicut conceptushominis
naturaliter
propriesignificaiomnes hominesad extra,quia ille con145 ceptusest naturalissimilitudoet propriaomni hominiad extra.Sed
naturaliter
communiter
illud cuius non est
signumdicitursignificare
similitudo
et
naturalis
uerificacio.
Isto
modo conceptus
propria
hominisdicitursignificare
et eciam
communiter,
seipsumnaturaliter
illa uox homodicitursignificareseipsam naturalitercommuniter.
150 Apparet,quia illa uox homonon est naturalissimilitudosui ipsius,
eo quod nichilest similitudosui ipsius.110
Istispremissisponunturalique conclusiones.
Prima conclusio8est: omnisconceptussignificat
remper ipsumconnaturaliter
Probatur
conclusio:
155 ceptam
proprie.
quia omnis conceptus est naturalissimilitudorei et propria per ipsum concepte;
naturaliter
ergo sequiturquod rem per ipsum conceptamsignificat
nota
ex
notabili
Et
antecedens
proprie.Consequencia
priusposito.
apparet ex dictis prius. Et apparet eciam, quia sicut ymago que
160 apparet in speculo est propria similitudoet naturalisrei uise, ita
conceptus hominis est naturalissimilitudoomnium hominumad
extra. Et ideo dicit Philosophusin secundo De anima quod lapis
109Petrus
Tractatus
"Vocum
("Summule
Hispanus,
") I, 3 (ed. De Rijk,23*8):
Logicales
aliasignificativa
ad placitum,
Voxsignificativa
alianaturaliter.
naturaliter
significativarum
estiliaque apudomnesidemrepresentat,
ut gemitus
latratus
canum.Vox
infirmorum,
ad placitum
estiliaquead voluntatem
uthomo."
instituentis
significativa
aliquid
representat,
110Cf.Petrus
de Alliaco,
"Notatamenquodsignificare
natu, ed.cit.,8812"28:
Conceptus
raliter
Unomodoproprie,
aliomodocommuniter.
naturaliter
capitur
dupliciter.
Significare
est[aliquid]
se ipsoet nonmediante
alioaliquidpotentie
eamvitaliter
proprie
cognitive
immutando
etsicdicimus
similitudo
alicuius
rei
representare,
quiestnaturalis
conceptum
Et siccapitur
in descriptionibus
naturaliter
Sed
proprie
representare.
significare
supradictis.
naturaliter
communiter
estnonse ipso,sedmediante
alioaliquidpotentie
significare
cognitive
eamvitaliter
immutando
ethocconvenit
cuilibet
enimres
rei;quelibet
representare,
ex natura
sua habetquodestnatacausaresuiconceptum
in potentia
et sic
intellectiva,
mediante
taliconceptu
estnatarepresentare
Ex quo sequitur
cognitive
potentie
seipsam.
ressignificat
velnataestsignificare
naturaliter
communiter.
quodomnis
seipsam
Significare
autemnaturaliter
solumconvenit
utsatispatetex dictis."
terminis
mentalibus,
proprie
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
123
19:53:43 PM
PAULJ.J.
M. BARKER
124
200
205
210
215
220
Secundus articulusp
Quantum ad secundumarticulum,in quo est uidendumde quesito
principali,sit prima supposicioqquod nullumens est similitudosui
225 ipsius.Probatursupposicio:quia similitudodicit rem ad extratanquam [per] terminmad quem aliquid refertur;
ergo sequiturquod
nichil dicitur esser similitudosui ipsius. Consequencia nota. Et
antecedenspatet, quia simileest in predicamentood aliquid
, et per
talem
habitudinem
eciam
consequens
importt.Quod
apparet ex
230 alio, quia, posito quod nichilessetin rerumnaturanisi solus Deus,
Deus non dicereturpropriealicui similisuel dissimilis.
Secunda supposicios,quod nulla uox uel scriptumsignificat
ad placitum <de sui natura>. Patet, quia multesunt uoces que possunt
ad placitum;igitursequiturconclusiouera. Conse235 non significare
quencia nota, quia illud quod alicui de sui natura1competit,non
potestsibi non inesse. Et antecedensapparet,quia de factomulte
sunt uoces que non significant,
ut bu baf etc. Confirmatursupposicio: quia ille uoces que significantad placitum,possunt non
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
125
250
255
260
265
ad
Tercia supposiciou,quod quodlibetens mundipotestsignificare
mundi
ens
ad
Patet,
placitum.
quia quodlibet
potestimponi
signiad
ficandum;ergo sequiturquod potest imponi ad significandum
ad
est
eo
placitum.Consequencia tenet, quod significare placitum
significaread uoluntatem siue ad placitum alicuius instituentis.
Antecedensapparet, quia quodlibet ens mundi ab aliquo potest
imponiad sic uel sic significandum.
Ex quo sequiturcorrelane quod circuluspendens ante tabernam
potest significaread placitum. Patet, quia potest imponi ad significandumunam proposicionemmentalem,que sit ista uinumuel
ceruisia
uenditur
in istadomo
, sicutde factotaliscirculustalemproposicionemmentalemsignificai.Vnde, aliquo uidentecirculumpendere
ante tabernam,concipitin mentesua: uinumuenditur
in illa domo.Ex
quo patet quod probabiliterpotestdici quod circuluspendens ante
tabernamsit proposicio uocalis. Patet, quia proposicionimentali
uere uel falsecorrespondedConsequencianota. Et antecedenspatet
ex dictis.
Secundo sequiturcorrelanequod ars memorienon est nisi quedam
institucioad placitum,uel fitper aliquam institucionemad placitum.Patet,quia si uolo recordarialicuiusproposicionis,ego pono
uel statuoquod angulustalisuel taliscolumpna representabit
michi
illam proposicionemin mente; et sic patet quod ars memoriefit
per imposicionem.
naturaliteret ad
270 Tercio sequiturquod possibileest idem significare
placitum.Patet,quia conceptushominissignificainaturaliteromnes
homines; et ille idem conceptus potest imponi ad significandum
hominesad placitum;ergo correlariumuerum.
Quarto sequiturquod possibileest idem significaread placitumet
275 naturaliter
respectueiusdem.Patet,quia conceptushominissignificai
112
Retranslatio
Roberti
B. Recensio
Ethica
Mcomachea
Grosseteste,
II, 1, 1103al9-20,
existencium
Latinus
enimnatura
XXVI,1-3,fase,iv,396):"Nullum
(Aristoteles
cognita
aliter
assuescit."
19:53:43 PM
126
BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.
19:53:43 PM
CONCEPTS,
SYNCATGORMES,
QUIVOCIT
127
305 diciturcommuniter,
quod in mente non est equiuocacio.
Tercia conclusionnulla que aliquo conceptunaturaliter
propriesignificantur,
possuntsignificaliequiuoce. Patet manifesteex conclusione precedente,quia si aliqua plura possuntsignificalinaturaliter
310 proprieper aliquem conceptum,illa plura erunt eiusdem speciei;
et per consequensoportebitquod ille conceptusilia omnia uniuoceb significarei,
quia quidquid est naturalissimilitudounius similium, est naturalissimilitudoalterius;ergo conclusio uera.
315 Quarta conclusionpossibileest aliquem conceptumesse equiuocum
significandoaliud naturaliterproprie et aliud naturalitercommuniter.Patet conclusio,quia conceptushominisnaturaliterproprie
omnes hominessignificat
ad extraet hoc conceptuqui est ipsemet,
secundumquod dictum est; et ille idem conceptussignificatalio
320 conceptu seipsum,scilicetqui est representatiuus
hominis,et hoc
naturaliteret communiter,quia nichil est naturalissimilitudosui
ipsius,ut dicebaturprius; ergo sequiturquod significataliud naturaliterproprieet aliud naturalitercommuniter.Consequencia nota.
Et antecedensapparet ex dictis.
325 Ex isto sequiturcorrelariequod possibile est eundem conceptum
esse equiuocum significandopure naturaliter.Patet, quia ille conhominesnaturaliter
uno conceptu;et significat
ceptushomosignificat
seipsum<naturaliter>alio conceptu; ergo sequiturquod significat
pure naturaliterequiuoce.
330 Secundo sequiturcorrelariequod, non obstantepredictaconclusinaturaliter
et ad placitumsine sui equiuoone, idempotestsignificare
cacione. Patet correlarium,quia clarum est quod aliquis conceptus
significatres ad extra naturaliter;et ille idem conceptus,eodem
<illas> res
conceptuquo significat,
potestimponiad significandum
335 ad extra; et sic patet quod significabit
naturaliteret ad placitum
sine equiuocacioned,quia unico eius conceptusignificabit
illa<s>.
Quinta conclusioeest quod possibile est aliquem conceptumesse
equiuocum significandonaturaliteret ad placitum. Probaturcon340 clusio: quia conceptushominisalio conceptu significatnaturaliter
res ad extra,et alio conceptu significat
seipsum;et sic ille conceptuspotestimponiad significandum
asinumuel bouem uno alio conceptu;ergo conclusiouera. Consequencia nota. Et antecedenseciam
clarum est ex terminis.
19:53:43 PM
128
BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.
345
Sexta conclusici:possibileest aliquem conceptumgesse equiuocum
communiter.
significando
precisenaturaliter
Apparetconclusio,quia
conceptushominisnaturalitercommuniterseipsumsignificai;et ille
naturaliter
communiter11
eius causam; ergo
idem conceptussignificat
350 conclusio uera. Consequencia nota est de se. Antecedensapparet,
primo,quod significatseipsumnaturalitercommuniterapparet de
se. Et quod significat
causam eius naturalitercommuniteralio coneffectusnaturaliterest representatiuus
omnis
ceptu apparet, quia
eius cause. Et quod hoc fitalio conceptuapparet,quia non potest
355 esse eadem similitudouel eadem racio qua significatilia diuersa
specificedistinctaetc.
et ultima:omnisconceptuspotestsignificare
Septimaconclusio1
pure
ad placitumequiuoce. Probaturconclusio:quia quilibetconceptus
360 potestimponiad significandum
plura equiuoce; ergo conclusiouera.
Et
nota.
antecedens
Consequencia
apparet,quia conceptushominis
ad
asinum,et tunc potestimponi ad
potestimponi
significandum
bouem alio conceptu,et sic de aliis multis.
significandum
365
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
129
Ad raciones.
Ad primam,quando dicitur"idem conceptuspotest teneridistributee, determinateetc.; ergo,"negaturconsequnciaet racio, quia
385 idem terminusuniuoce potestteneridistribuirne
et determinate.
Ad secundam diciturquod ipsa concludituerum. Sed ad formam
argumenti,
quando dicitur"conceptuspotestsupponereetc.,"negatur
consequncia.Et quando dicitur"ab inferioriad superis,"dicitur
390 quod, licet supponereest inferiusad significare,
tarnensupponere
ad placitumnon est inferiusad significare
ad placitum.Et sic conceditur"ab inferioriad superius,"extremisexistentibus
<sine addicione>; tamen,<existenti>buskextremis<cum addicione>, [et] sic
non ualet. Eciam diciturquod supponerecopulatiuenon est inferius
395 ad significare
copulatiue.
Ad tercium,quando dicitur"conceptushominispotest significare
asinum,"conceditur.Et diciturquod hoc non est racione similitudinis quam habet conceptushominiscum asino, sed hoc est quia
400 talis conceptuspotestimponi ad significandum
de nouo asinum.
405
410
equiuoce.
19:53:43 PM
BARKER
PAULJ.J.M.
130
425
430
435
p
q
discrete]distributiue
(?) P
lin.
P
non] sup.
P
conciperem]cor1"
oppositum]oppositumadd. P"1
primusarticulus]P"1
sicut] s. P
conclusio]prima conclusio add. P"1
conclusio] secunda conclusioadd. P"1
ex] est P
conclusio] tercia conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio] quarta conclusio add. P"1
representatiuus]
representansP
P
conce
effectus
effectus]
non est res] non est res non est res P
ad placitum]sub lin. P
secundusarticulus]P"1
supposicio]prima supposicioadd. P"1
19:53:43 PM
SYNCATGORMES,
CONCEPTS,
QUIVOCIT
r
s
1
u
v
w
x
y
z
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
1
j
k
esse] est P
supposicio]secunda supposicioadd. P"1
de sui natura] de natura P de sui natura P"1
supposicio]terciasupposicioadd. P"1
correspondei]sui correspondeiP
omne] omnis P
conclusio]prima conclusioadd. P"1
omnis]sic omnis P
conclusio]secunda conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio]terciaconclusioadd. P"1
uniuoce] equiuoce P
conclusio]quarta conclusio add. P"1
equiuocacione] imposicioneP
conclusio]quinta conclusioadd. P"1
conclusio]sexta conclusioadd. Pn
conceptum]terminmP
communiter]P"1
conclusio]septimaconclusioadd. P"1
predicatum]pccm seu pctm P
tamen existentibus]tnb9P
19:53:43 PM
131
Reviews
etla smantique
au XIIIesicle.
Librairie
comme
acte.Surla grammaire
La parole
IrneRosier,
Vrin,Paris1994(Sicet Non)370p.
Philosophique
"La parolecomme
acte"is an impresitmustbe saidthatIrneRosier's
Attheoutset
andtracea conbook.The objectoftheworkis toidentify
andinspiring
learned
sively
In orderto substantiate
herclaim
oflanguage
as actin thethirteenth
century.
ception
in thisperiodIrneRosierdoesnot
is indeeddiscernible
thatsucha viewoflanguage
andlogicbutalsotracesthisviewof
ofgrammar
limitherinvestigation
to thesciences
andmagic.
as diverse
as psychology,
inareasofknowledge
theology,
epistemology,
language
is verycomplex,
lucidmanner
Notsurprisingly,
theresulting
buttheauthor's
argument
in spiteofa highdegree
oftechnicaltokeepthereader
on track;
ofpresentation
serves
is never
inthesections
themainlineofargument
ongrammatical
analysis,
ity,particularly
allowed
to fadeintothebackground.
a rather
IrneRosierbasesherargument,
form
The authors
on whoseworks
loosely
Theircommon
denomandtheologians.
defined
ofmedieval
grammarians,
logicians,
group
in thetermiwhich
to thequestions
ofgrammatical
inator
is a shared
analysis
approach
Thismeansthat
as being"intentionalistic."
ofIrneRosiermaybe characterised
nology
a purely
intrinoflinguistic
theseauthors
transcend
in analysing
theconditions
meaning
the
to
the
sense
intended
sicviewoflanguage
andattach
by
speaker.
principal
importance
andRogerBacon.
in thisgroupareRobert
Of absolutely
Kilwardby
importance
pivotal
sevonefinds
andtheologians
In thecompany
ofthesetwowell-known
English
logicians
"Master
eralanonymous
authors,
John"holdsa prominent
amongwhomtheso-called
a figure
ofnolessstature
on Robert
hisliterary
Kilwardby
dependence
position.
Through
withthegroup.
theGreatis alsoshowntohavehadaffiliations
thanAlbert
takesup thefirst
Thebookcomprises
twoparts.
Theauthor's
partandconexposition
In thesecanda conclusion
followed
sistsofan introduction
(p. 11-245).
bysixchapters
ofexcerpts
from
translations
theauthor
French
ondpartofthebook(p. 247-342)
presents
in thebodyof
considered
ofthemedieval
thinkers
thegrammatical
andlogicalwritings
thework.Of theninetexts"Master
three,
John"andRogerBaconhaveeachsupplied
areeach
authors
theGreatandoneoftheanonymous
whereas
Robert
Albert
Kilwardby,
notes
areaccompanied
byexplanatory
represented
bya singletext.Allthetranslations
service
to thereader.
whichareofexcellent
in IrneRosier's
In spiteofitscomplexity
andwidereachthemainlineofargument
ofhowitis posthefundamental
outlines
bookis quiteclear.The first
question
chapter
in otherwaysfrom
or whichdeviate
sibleto understand
sentences
thatare incomplete
Medieval
andsemantics.
whatis strictly
grammarians
bytherulesofgrammar
required
twolevelsofcorrectbetween
thesolution
to thisproblem
found
bywayofa distinction
or surface
between
literal
ness.Thustheydistinguished
and,on thedeeper
completeness
orthenon-verthelinguistic
is basedon either
The latter
level,intellectual
completeness.
whatmaylie
tosupply
is uttered,
on thelistener's
inwhich
a sentence
balcontext
ability
In thisconofthespeaker.
inthesentence,
andlastbutnotleastontheintention
implicit
orintellection.
welltalkoftwodifferent
levelsofperfection
nection
onecouldequally
tomedieval
numerous
difficulties
A groupofexpressions
which
grammarians
presented
areinterjections,
andtheyaredealtwithin thesecondchapter.
theyarenot
Obviously,
andyet
withmeaning,
endowed
natural
or weeping.
Theyarewords
signslikemoaning
botha subject
whichrequire
to therulesofwell-ordered
speech,
theydo notconform
ofinterjecIn ordertoaccount
fortheability
verbfordeterminate
anda finite
meaning.
thenotion
"intentionalistic"
tionsto convey
themedieval
develop
meaning,
grammarians
which
is contraofa special
modeofsignifying
affectus"),
"bywayofaffect"
("permodum
"I hurt"
andthe
Thusthesentence
posedto ordinary
signification
"bywayofconcept."
Vivarium
34,1
O E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:53:48 PM
REVIEWS
133
inasmuch
as theinterjection
different
shows
"Ouch"convey
messages
slightly
interjection
ofpain,whereas
is almost
thisis presumed
thatthespeaker
overwhelmed
bythefeeling
hasthepresence
ofmindtoutter
a fully
formed
sentence.
nottobe thecaseifthespeaker
ofsignsforms
thecoreofthethird
A penetrating
ofRogerBacon'sdivision
analysis
doubtBacon'sdependence
In thefirst
beyond
chapter.
place,IrneRosierdemonstrates
tothearguonAugustine's
"De doctrine
Christiana."
andwhatismorepertinent
Secondly,
to Bacon'sconception
ofsigns,
itis
showsthat,according
mentofthebook,theauthor
butalsothatsomebody
be a signanda thing
notonlythatthere
signified
puts
required
else.In fact,in contradistincto somebody
thesignto usein communicating
something
and Bonaventure,
Fishacre
tionto contemporaries
suchas Richard
RogerBaconholds
ofthemessage
is ofgreater
ofthesignto therecipient
thattherelationship
importance
In itself
a signis a "dead"object;itstrue
thanthatofthesignto thething
signified.
forthis
nature
is realised
onlyin actualuse.Bacon'sviewis shownto be quiteunusual
inidentifying
currents
which
is successful
thedifferent
ofthought
andIrneRosier
period,
Bacon.
inspired
a first
usein daily
Therelationship
between
ofwordsandtheir
imposition
subsequent
As a matter
ofcourse,
thisrelaofdiscussion
in thefourth
lifeis at thecentre
chapter.
fortheevaluation
ofinstances
ofimproper
useof
is offundamental
importance
tionship
an exceptohaveadopted
suchas figurative
speech.
AgainRogerBaconisshown
language
is boundto stickto theestablished
useof
to himno speaker
tional
According
position.
freedom
ofspeech,
Baconrecognises
thatthe
In spiteofthisfundamental
words.
however,
outin greatdetail.
follows
setrules,
whichcanbe spelled
transference
ofwordsusually
theinterpretation
of
ofthebookthefourth
substantiates
In theoverall
chapter
argument
to linguistic
at thesametimeas it givesthe
Bacon's"intentionalistic"
analysis
approach
on and modify
thepreviously
of
author
an opportunity
to elaborate
presented
picture
Bacon'sdebttoAugustine.
which
theauthor
ontheconcept
of"actusexercitus"
In thebook'sfifth
focuses
chapter
"Actusexercitus"
to expressions
is contraposed
to "actussignificatus."
appliesvariously
to someextra-linguistic
as in thecase that
whichmakeor require
reference
situation,
a teacher's
ofa pupilwho
corporeal
punishment
somebody
says"welldone"inapplauding
ofthefunction
itgavea precise
sinned
therulesofgrammar.
description
Equally,
against
wasnegligible
whereas
whosesignificative
content
ofinvocations
suchas "Oh,Muriel!,"
wasapplicable
as well.Hereit
their
valuewashigh.In logictheconcept
performative
In Bacon'sadopandquantifiers
served
thewayinwhich
tocharacterise
negations
operate.
of"actusexercitus"
itis clearly
outthatit
tionandinterpretation
oftheconcept
spelled
ofthe"exercised
whois thesubject
act."On theotherhand,as Irne
is thespeaker
in thecontemporary
andordinary
theactwouldbe
Rosierlucidly
shows,
interpretation
A third
andhighly
instance
ofwords
totheterms
themselves.
beingput
assigned
peculiar
formulas.
Thusthewordsofthe
usetheauthor
locatesin thesacramental
to operative
in thesenseofordinary
forinstance,
arenotsignificative
Eucharist,
descriptive
language.
thepurpose
ofthesacrament.
inordertoeffect
something,
namely
Theyarepronounced
toconclude
thatthemedieval
worlddidrecognise
On thisbasistheauthor
feelsentitled
ofaffairs
about
where
todescribe
states
buttobring
instances
serves
notmerely
language
in theouterworld
andthusfunctions
as a meansofaction.
something
inthesixth
Thepower
ofwords
intheframework
ofattention
ofmagicis at thecentre
Atfirst
ofmagicin a bookofthisnature
theinclusion
mayappearrather
chapter.
sight,
whichturns
attuned
to thenewenvironment,
thereader
is quickly
However,
surprising.
Baconandhis
In thischapter
forIrneRosier's
outto be highly
argument.
significant
theauthor
work
isagainatthecentre
anddrawing
ontheArabic
ofthestage,
background
ofthespeaker's
intention
andthe
shows
howBacon'shighevaluation
veryconvincingly
of physical
linkedto his conception
activenatureof languageis intimately
reality.
which
are
is viewed
as beingbasedon effusions
theorderoftheuniverse
Fundamentally,
wordsfindtheirproper
fromobjects.
Amongtheseeffusions
continually
beingemitted
19:53:48 PM
134
REVIEWS
notsufficient
thattheybe spoken
aloud;
place.Forwordsto havepowerit is,however,
to BaconandhisArabicmentor,
be backedbya mental
on
effort
theymust,
according
thepartofthespeaker,
andin thisconnection
theintention
ofthespeaker
is shown
to
be ofparamount
importance.
The author
in theconclusion.
In
summarizes
theresults
ofherinvestigation
succinctly
thefirst
as itis presented
thatthefulllineofargument,
in thebook,
place,itis apparent
can be verified
ofRogerBacon,who,quitenaturally,
serves
as the
onlyin thethought
stablepointofreference
thebook.In thesecondplace,it is clearthatthe
throughout
"intentionalistic"
in otherauthors
is present
oftheperiod,
in Robert
approach
notably
andtheso-called
Master
Kilwardby,
pseudoRobert
Kilwardby,
John.Hereonedoesnot
findanyphysical
tobackthelinguistic
ForthisreasonIrneRosier
is
theory
conception.
careful
to stress
thatshedoesnotpretend
to haveidentified
a new"schoolofthought"
in grammar
andlogic.Instead,
oneshould
consider
theseauthors
tohaveshared
a commonperception,
should
be viewed
as acts,andthatthe
viz.,thatsomeusesoflanguage
ofthespeaker
intention
is ofsignificance
forreaching
oflinguisa proper
interpretation
ticutterances.
It is undeniably
difficult
todo full
ofIrneRosier's
A
justicetotherichness
argument.
shortrsum
cannotpossibly
all thefineandilluminating
whichthe
encompass
points
author
makesin thecourseofherexposition.
on thecentral
issueoflanguage
However,
as actor "performative"
a further
theargument
language
question
cropsup.In following
ofthebookthereader
hesitance
withregard
totheexpression
mayfeela slight
"language
as act."In fact,
as itis usedin thebookitdoesnotseemtobe an absolutely
unequivocal concept.
Fortheoverwhelming
oftheauthors
underinvestigation,
thepremajority
dominant
orcommon
useoflanguage
is bywayofconcept
or,in other
terms,
bymeans
ofordinary
Suchinstances
as interjections,
andinvosentences,
signification.
incomplete
cations
constitute
forthesethinkers,
arecovered
"lanwhich,
exceptions
bytheconcept
is bynature
hand,spoken
guageact."ForBacon,on theother
language
speechact,and
theintention
ofthespeaker
hasa verydefinite
roleto playin theprocess
ofcommunithisis so tosaybuiltintohisbasictheory
ofphysical
Thisbeingthecase,
cation;
reality.
Bacon'sadoption
ofthedistinction
thesignificative
between
andthe"performative"
uses
oflanguage
and "actusexercitus")
to be different
from
the
("actussignificatus"
appears
onefound
intheother
authors
included
inthegroup.
Onemight
askwhether
Baconever
considered
theconsistency
distinction
inherof,on theonehand,hisgrammatical/logical
itedfromRobertKilwardby
thephysical
takenoverfrom
and,on theother,
theory
Avicenna
andAl-Kindi.
On another
to feelsomewhat
leftin thelurch.
The factof
pointthereaderis likely
thematter
is thatIrneRosierdoesnotexplicitly
confront
theissueoftheconsistency
of
theso-called
"intentionalistic"
ofthispersuasion
Authors
witha douviewpoint.
operate
blecriterion
ofcorrectness.
Thusin several
ofthetexts
adduced
byIrneRosiergrammatical
correctness
andintentional
arecontraposed.
correctness
Intentional
correctness
is
saidtobe a characteristic
ofwhatever
themeaning
intended
bythespeaker,
fully
represents
whereas
is a property
correctness
ofsentences
thatconform
to therulesof
grammatical
andsemantics.
Therelationship
between
these
twocriteria
ofcorrectness
is,howgrammar
ofcorrect
coincide
is
ever,lessthanclear.Thatthetwocriteria
speechdo notalways
it is byno meansapparent
that
Nonetheless,
clearly
perceived
bythe"intentionalists."
theseauthors
havesucceeded
indealing
withcaseswhere
clash.
thetwocriteria
effectively
In thewords
ofRobert
andRogerBacon,whocopiedKilwardby's
Kilwardby
exposition,
a sentence
which
reflects
themindofthespeaker
should
be calleda "maximally
corfully
rect"sentence
eventhough
it might
notbe "absolutely
correct,"
i.e.,it maybe gramor semantically
deficient
from
ofSaxony
on
matically
Jordanus
(p. 42; cf.thequotation
thatis "maximally
correct"
ofbeing"absolutely
p. 47-8).Howsomething
mayfallshort
correct"
is byno meansevident,
andundoubtedly
thereader
a
wouldhaveappreciated
discussion
oftheconsistency
ofthisclaim.
19:53:48 PM
REVIEWS
135
a fewmistakes,
andIrneRosier's
tocontain
bookis
Evenverygoodbooksarelikely
sacraments
theauthor
claimsthat
no exception
to thisrule.DealingwiththeChristian
thoseoftheOld Convenant
thesacraments
aredistinguished
from
oftheNewConvenant
function
would,
however,
bytheir
(p. 200).Mostmedieval
theologians
disagree;
operative
itwasquiteevident
thata sacrament
suchas circumcitotheir
understanding,
according
It wasnota graceas fullas theonedonated
siondid,infact,
bring
gracetoitsrecipient.
wasno empty
circumcision
but,nonetheless,
signor a mereadumbrathrough
baptism
tionofwhatwastocome.
thatin translating
a textfrom
is thecircumstance
Lessworthy
ofmention
pseudo-KiltheLatinofthepublished
edition
IrneRosierhascorrected
a
bysubstituting
wardby
itis truethatinmedieval
for"consiliantur"
"conciliantur"
(p. 72).Ofcourse,
manuscripts
Thisis,however,
arelikely
nottanthesewords
tohavebeenconfused
orthographically.
between
"concilio"
and"consilior"
to saying
thatthedistinction
wasaltogether
tamount
tosuggest
obliterated
inthemiddle
venture
thata fitting
ages.Forthisreasononemight
instead
ofthe"concerter,"
French
translation
ofthisparticular
wordwouldbe "conseiller"
tobe lesssuited
which
forthecontext.
appears
Anobvious
inanother
translation
from
pseudo-Kilwardby;
slipofthepenis tobe found
in thelastlineofthetranslation
on p. 27 oneshould
read"finale"
instead
of"formelle."
should
serveonlyto setoffthevalueofa book
Suchinsignificant
blemishes,
however,
as erudite
andinspiring
as IrneRosier's.
itis a bookofgreatcourage.
In its
Moreover,
it attempts
to unify
choiceofsubject
as wellas manner
ofapproach
perceptions
gained
inwidely
In thisitprovides
a highly
laudable
service
different
tobreaking
down
disciplines.
thebarrieres
ofgrammar,
andtheology.
between
historians
logic,philosophy,
Copenhagen
LaugeOlaf Nielsen
andtranslated
McDermott.
Thomas
Selected
, selected
byTimothy
Aquinas,
Philosophical
Writings
York1993,xxxv+ 452p.
Press-The
World's
Oxford-New
Oxford
Classics,
University
ISBN0 19 2829467.
works
McThetranslation
ofselections
ofThomasAquinas's
byTimothy
philosophical
in philosophy,
andcomputer
is veryuseful
Dermott
science)
(formerly
professor
theology
andinteresting.
It provides
thereader
witha fluid
oftexts,
the
translation
notonlyfrom
Summa
a broadrangeof
butalsofrom
works.
Theselection
covers
manyother
Theologiae,
thatarepresented
Thetexts
as a whole,
andindividually,
areintrotopics,
systematically.
ducedbynotesthatareveryclearly
ordered:
eachtextis preceded
about
byinformation
dateofcomposition,
sources,
typeofpassageandhowtoreadit,andon thetranslation.
The titlepromises
thereadera selection
ofphilosophical
this
but,ofcourse,
writings,
doesnotexcludetextsthatin various
God- theGod of thephilosopher
waysdiscuss
discusses
section
structures
of thought,
i.e. thenatureand
Thomas,thatis. The first
ofNatural
andMetaphysics;
II is aboutstructures
difference
Mathematics
section
Science,
in general
III is aboutwhatis labelledthe
ofthings
form
matter,
etc.);section
(being,
"ladder
ofbeing,"
withelements
sections
IV,V andVI areabout
dealing
up tothemind;
aliaabouteternity
andtime,
aboutourwords
andconcepts
ofGod,
God,inHimself
(inter
aboutGod'sPower),
ofthings
aliaaboutcreation
andevil)andas
as thebeginning
(inter
theendofthings
aliaaboutmoralandtheological
McDermott
(inter
virtues)
respectively.
elucidates
hischoiceoftexts
on pp.xxi-xxiv.
indexofterms.
Thereis a useful
butadequate.
Theintroduction
tothegeneral
contents
ofThomas's
is short,
philosophy
withnumTheliterary
structure
ofthetexts
ofthequestio
) is wellpresented
(esp.theform
in a boldtypeface.
bersandtitles
To bemoreprecise,
McDermott
tobe absolutely
ontheonehand,thetranslation
wants,
faithful
toThomas's
turns
but,on theother,
prefers
contemporary
philosophical
meaning,
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Viuarium
34,1
19:53:48 PM
136
REVIEWS
to moretraditional
translations
translation
is someofphrase
(p. xvi).HereMcDermott's
from
Thomas's
ownwords.
times
at somedistance
I shallexamine
in moredetail.
sometranslations
- p. 51: "Being
idemsignifcat
truethenisjustthesameas existing"
verum
omnino
("ergo
thetruesignifies
translation
wouldbe e.g."therefore,
absolutely
quodens").A moreliteral
McDermott
haschosento render
thesameas being."
by"is,"and"esse"by
"signifcat"
thelevelofbeingis expressed
instead
ofthelevelof
"existence."
translation,
Bythefirst
notion
"esse"is a broader
thanwhatis conveyed
Further,
by"existence,"
signification.
which
wouldfavour
thetranslation
"being."
- p. 67:"Existing
thelatter
isa fixed
soI would
)" for"essesimpliciter";
(periodi
expression,
"to be without
Two linesbelow:"inbothsensesthings
can exist
prefer
qualification."
autemesseestaliquidin potentia").
is in
"Now,something
("ad utrumque
potentially"
in bothwaysofbeing"conveys
theontological
better.
potency
aspect
- p. 77:Twosentences
ofThomas's
texthavebeencontracted
toone:"Note,too. . . primary."
- p. 107:"exists"
should
be added.
(formaliter
est),an omission.
"Formally"
- p. 146:"(.. .) every
can be saidto undergo
theactualization
thatin fact
potentiality
it to fulfillment"
in actum,
dicipati,edam
("omnequodexitde potentia
brings
potest
cumperficitur").
thatgoesfrom
to act,can be said
Mysuggestion:
"everything
potency
to 'undergo,'
evenwhenit is madeperfect."
thisbrings
better
forward
thefact
Firstly,
thatThomasspeaksabouta thing
which
is perfected;
indicates
"etiam"
("even")
secondly
a climax.
- p. 209:"[1]"should
thefirst
be placedafter
sentence
"endless
Here
life").
(thatis after
theopponents'
start.
arguments
- p. 211,line2: "havea beginning":
"orend"isomitted.
Lne5: thereference
toAristotle's
is omitted.
Physics
- p. 215:"Aristotle
andthoughts
so clearly
sayswordsexpress
thoughts
things;
represent
wordsrefer
to things
We talkaboutthings
mediately
bywayofourmental
conceptions.
in thewaywe knowthem.(Respondeo
dicendum
voces
quod,secundum
Philosophum,
suntsignaintellectuum,
et intellectus
suntrerum
similitudines.
Et sicpatetquodvoces
referuntur
ad ressignificandas,
mediante
intellectus.
Secundum
conceptione
igitur
quod
I wouldprefer
the
sica nobispotest
aliquida nobisintellectu
nominali.)
cognosci
potest,
translation:
is that,according
wordsaresignsof
to thePhilosopher,
following
Myreply
and thoughts
are likenesses
of things
is herebrought
outmore
thoughts,
[therelation
"to represent"].
So clearly
to things
to be signified
wordsrefer
clearly
byMcDermott's
Thomasdoesnotspeakaboutthings
without
[omitted
by
byMcDermott;
qualification]
In thewaysomething
ofourintellect.
canbe knowbyuswithour
wayoftheconception
so itcanbe namedbyus [McDermott
doesnotrender
thetechnical
term"nointellect,
minare"].
The translation
is
McDermott's
bookis veryuseful,
foruniversity
courses.
especially
It is a little
however,
clear,whichmakesreading
free,
though
quiteeasyandattractive.
thegeneral
is no doubtpreserved.
ofThomas's
meaning
thought
E.P. Bos
Leiden
: Referenz
undWahrheit
vonOckham.
LeidenMatthias
beiWilhelm
, Stze,
Kaufmann,
Begriffe
Dinge
undTexte
NewYork-Kln:
(E.J.Brill)1994x + 255p. ISBN90 04 098895. (Studien
desMittelalters
zurGeistesgeschichte
, XL).
Ockhams
von1992zugrundeliegt,
konfrontiert
Das Buch,demeineHabilitationsschrift
mitAnstzen
in fnf
Semantik
undOntologie
gegenwrtiger
angelschsischer
Philosophie
"Zeichen
undDinge";"Wases gibtundwases nicht
gibt";"Suppositionslehre
Kapiteln:
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,1
19:54:09 PM
REVIEWS
137
"SatzundWahrheit,"
"Ockhams
derErkenntundmoderne
Logik,"
Entphysikalisierung
aberimmer
zentrale
Gedanken
werden
wieder
nistheorie."
so dasich
aufgegriffen,
Einige
nurunbedingt
einekapitelweise
Darstellung
empfiehlt.
ImKapitel
undDinge"untersucht
derAutor
Zeichenber"Zeichen
u.a.,ob Ockhams
Kritik
Referenztheorien
unterworfen
wre.Putnam
wentheorie
Putnams
an traditionellen
einemAusdruck
detsichgegendieAuffassung,
da die Referenz
undunabnotwendig
zwischen
Referenten
undZeichenbenutzers,
vonkausalen
Beziehungen
gleichsam
hngig
Ockham
Kaufmann
zukomme.
nun,da "esso aus<sehe>,alsvertrete
glaubt
"magisch"
derBezugnahme,
diePutnam
Theorien
dieAnsicht
angreift;
genaueineder"magischen"
Harmonie
zwischen
mentalen
unddenDingen
also,esgebeeineArtprstabilierte
Begriffen
einTerminus
aufOckhams
dictum
in irgendeiderWelt."(17)Er verweist
, "daniemals
fretwasanderes
nemSatz,. . . wennerbezeichnend
alsdas,
wird,
genommen
supponiert
wovonerwahrprdiziert
wird."(16)- DieseRegelerscheint
ihmwohldeshalb
anstig,
weilsieoffenlt,
unter
welchen
einAusdruck
dazukommt,
vonbestimmBedingungen
tenGegenstnden
wahrprdizierbar
zu sein.Es istabernicht
diesnicht
so,daOckham
erklrt.
Im Fallevon"mentalen
einermentalen
(alsoBestandteilen
Begriffen"
Sprache),
aufeinenkausalen
"... selbst
einenHinweis
zwischen
gibtOckham
Zusammenhang
sprachlichen
Zeichen
undihren
Ockham
betrachtet
nmlich
Referenten":
alsdurch
das
Begriffe
desBezeichneten
Bezeichnete
selbst
wobeidasModelldieWahrnehmung
ist.
verursacht,
istsicherlich
nicht
DieseTheorie
ohneProbleme
auchBegriffe
vonetwas
(kannmannicht
- z.B.denBegriff
wird
dasniemals
Schneehaben,
wahrgenommen
"nichtwahrgenommene
Kaufmann
da "Ockham
eineArt'Biologisierung'
bestimmter
Teileder
meint,
flocke?").
durch<fiihre>"
"unsere
in
(19,cf.157):Insofern
Sprache
neurophysiologische
Ausstattung
nicht
Ausma
wiewirdieWelterleben
darber
unddaherauchbebestimmt,
geringem
mten
unsere
mentalen
erheblich
"vondenErkenntnissen
derSinschreiben,"
Begriffe
beeinflut"
sein.Kaufmann
dieseFragezunchst
nenseele"
nicht
weiter.
Errichtet
verfolgt
z.B. nichtan Ockham
die Frage,wieunterdiesenUmstnden
eineuniverselle
mentale
sei(beiverschieden
mten
Sprache
mglich
ausgebildeten
Wahrnehmungsfhigkeiten
ja
unterschiedliche
oderunterschiedlich
vieleBegriffe
skizziert
er
Stattdessen
resultieren).
dieOckham
Attacken
wiediePutnams
diemodernen
Vertreter
Auswege,
gegenber
gegen
- umsofort
einermental
zu betonen,
da die "Termini
language
(insb.Fodor)blieben,
undStze<einermentalen
Entitten
sind,"undwirfursie
Sprache>etwasmysterise
Evidenz
besitzen"
er "Ockhams
derBegriffe
(20).Dannwiederfindet
"wenig
Deutung
nicht
Etwasspter
fahrt
ernochschrfere
Geschtze
Anvllig
abwegig."
gegenOckhams
"einer
nahme
vollausgebildeten,
nochdazulogisch
vollkommenen
auf:
mentalen
Sprache"
"NebendemFehlen
Evidenz
fureinesolcheSprachespricht
jeglicher
gegensie bereits
- etwabeider
derUmstand,
daOckhams
FormderLogifizierung
an elementaren
Stellen
- vonmodernen,
derPrdikation
anFregeanschlieenden
Anstzen
einerkanoniDeutung
schen
Notation
verschieden
ist."(40)DerAutor
sichoffenbar
orientiert
angngigen
Interpreabernicht,
daOckham
diementale
selbst
alslogisch
vollkommen
tationen,
Sprache
belegt
einstuft.
Mitdemzweiten
willerindizieren,
Punkt
daes mehralseineMglichkeit
gibt,
einelogisch
"vollkommene"
zu strukturieren.
Deisdrfte
Ockham
nicht
Sprache
ungelufig
- beiThomas,
erz.B.abweichende
derPrdikation
kannte
Modelle
sein,natrlich
gewesen
.
.
.
Burleigh
Seltsam
mutet
dieKorrektur
vonOckhams
Zeichen
an:"ImUnternatrlicher
Beispiel
zumRauch,
schied
dervomFeueraufsteigt,
sindSthnen
undLcheln
nurdannAusdruck
desSchmerzes
oderderFreude,
wennsienicht
bewut
unterdrckt
werden"
(18)In der
dasunterdrckt
nochAusdruck
sein?
vonirgendetwas
Tat,wiekannetwas,
wird,
IConnotative
undabsolute
Ausdrcke
Als"zentral"
furOckham
beschreibt
Kaufmann
dessen
vonkonSystem
Unterscheidung
notativen
Einabsoluter
Ausdrcken
Ausdrcken.
"bezeichnet"
nur
undabsoluten
Ausdruck
19:54:09 PM
138
REVIEWS
"Mensch"
dieeinzelnen
einkonnota"eine"Sache("Weie"
dieQualitten,
Menschen),
"Vater"nichtnurden
"wei"das weieDingunddie Qualitt,
tiver
mehrere:
dagegen
einweiteres
concretimi
Konnotativ
sindfr
, dasKind(aberkeineRelation)!
Mann,sondern
undQualitt"
dieTermini
alleranderen
alsSubstanz
Ockham,
(33).
"berhaupt
Kategorie
Theseistontologisch:
es sollauerSubstanzen
und
Das Motivfrdieseweitreichende
einerSachez.B. istnicht
individuellen
keine"Sachen"geben.Die Quantitt
Qualitten
SacheVerschiedenes.
Wasbezeichnet
alsoeinabstrakter
einesvonderquantifizierten
quanKonkreta!
DieswirdbeiKaufmann
titativer
Ausdruck?
trotz
indesnicht
guter
Darstellung
findet
sichdie Behauptung,
es gebedie "Referenten
sehrdeutlich.
Stattdessen
anderer
Termini
<als derabsoluten,
R.H.> . . . nurinanima,
zweiter
, siesindTermini
Intention,
Platzhalter
furkompliziertere
imErnst
entia
rationis."
Ausdrcke,
(107)Das kannderAutor
in "Sokrates
istzwei-Ellen-gro"
nicht
meinen!
Soll"zwei-Ellen-gro"
oderin "EinZweiluft"
entia
Einensrationis
rationis
bezeichnen?
kannnicht
Sokrates
nicht
laufen,
Ellen-groes
identisch
seinmitetwasinmeinem
Geiste.
WasOckham
sagt,istetwasvielHarmloseres,
- waskeinesfalls
sc.da Quantitten
etc.keineSachensind
daderkonkrete
ausschliet,
Ausdruck
zwei
Ellen
animam
extra
bezeichnet!
"zwei-Ellen-gro"
groen
Gegenstnde
Quantifikation
whrt
derStreit,
obdieSuppositionslehre
eineArtPrdikatenlogik
Jahrzehnte
(Ockhams)
- ergnzt
umAusflge
in
darstellt.
Nebeneinerausfhrlichen
derDiskussion
Darstellung
Kaufmann
im2. Kp.
Semantik
Welten
u. .- versucht
Freges
Kripkes
mglicher
Logik,
dieser
zu gewinnen,
zwischen
Ockhams
indem
erhnlichkeiten
FrageneueAspekte
geneHierfindet
derLeserwierellen
Ausdrcken
undQuinesgebundenen
Variablen
feststellt.
dereinengewissen
Zickzackkurs.
ZuerstwerdenVariablen
durchihregegenstndliche
"denkonnotativen
Termini
denn:"VxFxundExFx
Ockhams
hnlich,"
Interpretation
beziehen
sicheinmal
aufdieDingex unddannaufdieDinge,wovonFxwahrist."(105)
imTarskischen
Erstens
beziehen
sichgeschlossene
Stze(wie"ExFx")hchstens
Einspruch!
aufGegenstnde
SinnederErfllung
keinen.
Zweitens
dannaufalleoder
(resp.Reihen),
sindStzeoderSatzformen
nichtidentisch
mitin ihnenauftretenden
Variablen!
Drittens
laufen
frQuineVariablen
beralleGegenstnde,
somit
dieF
sicherlich
berdiejenigen,
sind(sofern
es solche
Es istirrefhrend
zu sagen:"dieDingex unddieDinge,wovon
gibt):
Fxwahrist,"wieesirrefuhrt
zu sagen:"dieelfSpieler
undderTorwart
desFuballteams."
"ExFx"istwahr,
wennmindestens
einGegenstand
WeltF ist.Etwasspter
dieser
behauptetKaufmann,
da "sichOckhams
in einerWeiseaufdieGegenstnde
absolute
Termini
derWeltbeziehen,
die derobjektuellen
derVariablen
nahekommt..."
(113)
Deutung
Diesmalistes geradedie Besonderheit
aufaille
nicht-konnotatiuer
Ausdrcke
sich"insofern
zu konnotativen
<zu beziehen>,
als im Unterschied
ObjekteeinerArtoderGattung
nichteinesmehrals das anderebezeichnet
<Ausdrcken>
diesiefrdieseRolle
wird,"
soll.Der Versuch
mutet
irrefhrend
undunntig
an. Selbstwennabsolute
empfehlen
Ausdrcke
undquantifizierbar
nichtkraft
einesdeskriptiven
Gehalts
sind,
bezeichneten,
werden
habensiedeshalb
nochlangenicht
alleBesonderheiten
vonVariablen.
Variablen
z. B. nicht
beiQuine(undFrege)
siesinddieSubjekte
vonPrdikaten,
Hilfsmittel,
prdiziert
aufzunehmen
Prdikationen
bzw.Referenzen
wieder
auszudrcken,
("wennx
komplexe
Vatervony ist,dannistx mnnlich,
undy istjngerals x").Ihrumgangssprachliches
siehtQuine(hnlich
wievorihmFrege)in bestimmten
Pronomina:
"wenn
Gegenstck
istjngeralsdieseundjener/jene
jemandderVatervonjemandist,dannistermnnlich,
raiEs istschwer
welcher
Artauchimmer,
ohne
zu erkennen,
wiegenerelle
Ausdrcke,
zu dieserLeistung
in derLagewren(unddann
denBeistand
Ausdrcke
pronominaler
derReferenz,
istes natrlich
zu sagen,dasPronomen
leistedieAufnahme
naheliegender
nicht
dergenerelle
Ausdruck).
Im Kapitelber"SatzundWahrheit"
eineninteressanten
berblick
gibtKaufmann
19:54:09 PM
REVIEWS
139
berhistorische
undmoderne
Wahrheitstheorien
undunternimmt
dasehrgeizige
Projekt,
mitgngigen
erOckhams
Ockhams
Ansatz
Theorien
zu vergleichen.
Ausfhrlich
wrdigt
dieWahrheit/
Falschheit
einesSatzesnicht
alseineEigenschaft
desSatzesanzuVersuch,
- oderwegen
- des mglichen
sondern
trotz
Schwankens
desWahrheitswertes
sie
sehen,
mitdemSatzselbst
zu identifizieren.
Zu Unrecht
kritisiert
erjedochFreddoso,
nichtzu
dafurOckham
"N istnicht
P" "stets
vonN impliziert."
dieExistenz
SeinVerweis
sehen,
daerselbst
undinfinite
Prdikaten
verwechII, cap.14)zeigt,
(Summa
Logicae
Negationen
selt(chimera
estnon-ens).
BuchII, cap. 3 htteihneinesanderen
belehrt: . . si talis
RH> sitnegativa
etpraedicatum
nonsup<indefinita,
, requiritur
propositio
quodsubiectum
immo
subiectum
velquod
ponant
proomnieodem,
requiritur
quod
pronullo
supponat,
supponat
pro
nonsupponit."
aliquoproquopraedicatum
(p. 255,13-16)
undUnbestimmtheit
Ontologie
Kaufmann
siehtOckhams
reduktionistische
alsVersuch
"... imBereich
des
Ontologie
ensreale
extra
animam
nurnochDingezu akzeptieren,
derenExistenz
sichim weitesten
- vonden
Sinnebehavioristisch
lt..." ( 47),"daes auerhalb
derSeele
berprfen
- geradephysikalische
himmlischen
Entitten
einmal
unddiejeniabgesehen
Gegenstnde
mitdenen
sieReizungen
unserer
genihrer
Qualitten
gibt,
(. . .) hervorKrperoberflchen"
rufen"
warnt
er:an denEigenschaften
vonSubstanzen
. . ., "zeigtsich,
(89).[Andererseits
daes nicht
ratsam
einfach
mitunseren
ist,Substanzen
gleichzusetzen
heutigen
physikalischen
auf
Gegenstnden"
(79)]DamitwreOckhams
Programm
gerademitHinblick
sehrinteressant.
Es bleibt
aberunklar,
woher
Kaufmann
Quines
skeptische
Bedeutungstheorie
die Gewiheit
da OckhamnurQualitten
die Reizungen
unserer
nimmt,
akzeptiert,
hervorrufen
knnen.
WelcheReizung
meiner
Oberflche
knnte
die
Krperoberflchen
caritas
meines
Nachbarn
verursachen?
Wiederum:
lassensichSubstanzen
wirklich
"behavioristisch
dasgerade
bestreiten
unddagegenhalten,
dadieselbe
Quinewrde
berprfen"?
Reizsituation
erscheint
vorunseren
verschieden
(einKaninchen
Augen)
ontologisch
ganz
- sozusagen
werden
kann
mitundohneSubstanz
vs.
interpretiert
("Da isteinKaninchen"
"Eshselt").
Das heitaberdoch:es gibtfrQuinegeradekeinen
behavioristischen
Test,
obeinePerson
mitunbekannter
dasVorliegen
einerSubstanz
imSinneOckhams
Sprache
konstatiert
odernicht.
Bemerkenswert
istschlielich,
daKaufmann
"imAnschlu
an das
beiOckham
Erkannte
dieInkohrenz
undberflssigkeit
desReizes(. . .) als universelle
. . . aufzeigen
Grundentitt
mchte"
(233).VielLrmumnichts?
Fazit
Kaufmann
versucht
zuzeigen,
daOckhams
auchflir
Philosophie
gegenwrtige
Philosophen
relevant
ist.Herausgekommen
isteinBuchbereinfaszinierendes
Thema,reichan guten
das zeigt,da Kaufmann
seineAutoren
aberseinZiel nicht
Darstellungen,
gutkennt,
immer
erreicht
undinderDurchfuhrung
nicht
zu berzeugen
es
Bisweilen
reitet
vermag.
einArgument
zu Tode,das denAufwand
kaumverdient,
dannwieder
ltes wichtige
Thesen
stellt
frhere
undThesen
inZweifel.
Auch
unbegrndet,
(scheinbar?)
Begrndungen
manche
sindnicht
So liestmanalsbersetzung
ein
Ockhams,
bersetzungen
zuverlssig.
Ausdruck
knne
nurineinfacher
. . . Supposition
"wenn
ermiteinem
extremum
auftreten,
wird
. . ." (133).Tatschlich
meint
Ockham
mit"comparare"
hiernicht
verglichen
Vergleichen,
sondern
dasVerbinden,
Zusammenstellen
imSatz).UnddiebersetAusdrcke
(zweier
derelictus
exaliquacausadeterminatae
. . rememorativum
ex
zungvon"effectus
, ducens
speciei,
ipsius
communi
inadhaesionem
alicui
enuntianti
essevelJuisse
velaliquid
talede
lege
propositioni
contingenti
illacausa
." (OT II 548)durch"eineWirkung,
dievoneinerderArtnach. . . bestimmten
Ursache
hinterlassen
andieseerinnert
. . . undnacheinem
Gesetz
zum
wurde,
allgemeinen
19:54:09 PM
140
REVIEWS
diesagt,da etwasmitdieserUrsache
Glaubenan einekontingente
fuhrt,
prAussage
sentistoderwaroderdergleichen"
nicht
denNagelaufdenKopf.Wirdhier
(p.12) trifft
nicht
vielmehr
vonjenerUrsache
selbst
dasieistoderwar(also:da es bergeglaubt,
gibtodergab)?
haupteineUrsache
Hamburg
Reinhard
Hlsen
19:54:09 PM
The Reflection
StoicIdeas in theThirteenth-Century
of Some Traditional
*
ScholasticTheoriesof Beauty
OLEG V. BYCHKOV
Vivarium
34,2
19:34:21 PM
142
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
19:34:21 PM
THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
143
19:34:21 PM
144
OLEGV. BYCHKOV
19:34:21 PM
THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
145
19:34:21 PM
146
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
19:34:21 PM
THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
147
ministrorum
, was
, based on Cicero's De officiis
Ambrose,whose De officiis
The
mentioned
ninthMiddle
the
known
already
Ages.
throughout
widely
centurycollectionof Cicero's excerptsmade by Hadoard containedcopiand the De naturadeorum.
One of the
ous quotationsfromthe De officiis
was
Moralium
the
of
Ciceronian
sources
excerpts
major twelfth-century
It
a
William
of
made
Conches.
to
ascribed
thorough
dogma
philosophorum
use of the De officiis
, addressingthe ques, as well as of the De inventione
tion of the subdivisionof virtues.12
It is also knownthattheseworksof Cicero werewidelyused by medieval
authorsin theiroriginaltreatises.Thus, in the ninthcenturyAlcuin used
as a source for his treatiseon rhetoric,and Cicero was
the De inventione
well known to such authorsas Rabanus Maurus and Eriugena. In the
John of Salisburymade an extensiveuse of Cicero's De
12th-century,
and
De
naturadeorum
, especiallyin his Policraticus.Cicero enjoyed
officiis
in
considerablepopularity the thirteenthcentury.Vincent of Beauvais
doctrinale.
Thomas Aquinas
used De off.1 in the widelyknown Speculum
also used the De officiis
, which
, but his favouriteworkwas the De inventione
he quoted abundantlyand even called a "littleGospel."13
could have been directlyavailable.
To put it briefly,the De inventione
could have been known directly,or throughthe Moralium
The De officiis
or some othercompiministrorum
, Ambrose'sDe officiis
dogma
philosophorum
were available eitherin some
lation. Extractsfromthe De naturadeorum
florilegiasimilarto the one of Hadoard, or throughthe works of the
"Chartrians."
twelfth-century
Now I willtreateach of the threemajor topicspertainingto the scholastic discussionof beauty separately,firsttracingback the corresponding
textualtraditionand thenoudiningthe underlyingStoic ideas.14The first
IX (1979),47-121et X
des textes,
antrieurs
au XIIIesicle
mdivaux
, in: Revued'histoire
(1980),116-64.
12Concerning
andDe
s De officiis
see:A.F. Goyle,Cicero3
Ambrose
andtheDe officiis
The
edition
15
224-56.
in:
Franciscan
ministrorum
St.
Ambrose
officiis
Studies,
,
(1955),
of
DesPresbyter
Hadoardus
is in:P. Schwenke,
collection
to whichI shallrefer
ofHadoard's
lateras Schwenke
to thisedition
CiceroExzerpte,
(Philologus,
Suppl.V) 1886;I willrefer
is in: Das Moralium
oftheMoralium
The edition
number.
witha reference
dogma
dogma
deConches
desGuillaume
, ed.J. Holmberg,
Uppsala1929,vol.I (laterreferred
Philosophorum
of thisworkin the
On thepopularity
withpageand linereference).
to as Holmberg
auXIIesicle:
leMoralium
duDe officiis
Uneadaptation
Middle
dogma
Agessee:Ph.Delhaye,
16
ancienne
et
de
in:
Recherches
mdivale,
(1949),227-58.
Thologie
Philosophorum,
13AbouttheuseofCicerobymedievali
Cicero
andHisInfluence
authors
see:J.C.Rolfe,
,
MilintheCourtroom
NewYork1928,p. 121-2andE.K. Rand,Cicero
ofSt.Thomas
Aquinas,
waukee1946.
14Theprinciples
tothe
I willquoteaccording
willbe as follows:
ofquoting
Augustine
inordertofacilitate
the
inthemajority
ofcasestheCCSL,witha linereference
editions,
19:34:21 PM
148
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
ofidentification
oftheexactpassages
scholastic
treatise.
process
quotedin eachparticular
Allreferences
andmostofthequotations
totheSummae
from
exacttexts
them
reproducing
willbe in thenotes.I willprovide
all necessary
textual
in
basedon thesetexts
analysis
1 willquoteCicero,apartfrom
thepaperitself.
thepassages
thatappearin theSummae
,
to theedition:
M. TulliiCiceronis
omnia
, Lipsiaein aedibus
according
scripta
quaemanserunt
B.G.Teubneri,
vol.1.2,1925(Deinventione);
Tusc.disp.);
1.4,1866(Definibus,
II.4, 1864(De
natura
deorum
intoconsideration
thecom, De legibus
, Tirnaeus).
); III.4,1864(Deqfjkiis
Taking
oftradition
andtheshortness
ofCiceronian
I willgiveallvariants,
plexity
passages,
together
withtheir
in thetextofthepaper.
analyses,
15CCSL XLVIII, 838,11.41-2.In theSumma
Halensis
I, inq.I, tr.III,qu.Ill, membr.
p.
estpartium
cumquadamsuaviI, cap.I, art.II, p. 162("omnis
pulchritudo
congruentia
tatecoloris")
and163("pulchritudo
estex congruentia
corporum
compositionis
partium").
In Albert,
S. Th.I, tr.6, qu. 26,cap.I, art.2.3,p. 178.52-3
estquae(".. . pulchritudo
damcongruentia
cumsuavitate
and94-5(". . . commensuratio
partium
coloris")
partium
cumsuavitate
I, p. 597
coloris");
quotedalsoin S. Th.II, tr.XI, qu. 62,membr.
briefly
consistt
in suavitate
in Ulrich,
(". . . pulchritudo
coloris");
p. 56.71-72
(". . . pulchritudo
estpartium
cumquadamsuavitate
Thomasmentions
consonantia
and
congruentia
coloris").
inS. Th., e.g.,I, 39,8 Resp.andII-II,145,I, Resp.,butthesetwoterms
claritas
aremost
borrowed
from
likely
directly
pseudo-Dionysius.
16H. Hagendahl,
andtheLatinClassics
with
1967(laterHagendahl
, Gteborg
Augustine
a reference
In tracing
theStoicsources,
I willalsousethefollowing
studies
refernumber).
form
anda reference
or pagenumber
ringto thembya short
only:Ioannesab Arnim
Stoicorum
veterum
vols.1-3,Lipsiae1921(laterSVF witha volume
(VonArnim),
fragmenta,
andreference
A.A.Long,D.N. Sedley,
TheHellenistic
, vols.1-2,Camnumber);
Philosophers
1987(later
LS witha reference
M. vanStraaten,
Panaetii
Rhodii
,
bridge
number);
Fragmenta
Leiden1962(laterPanaetius
witha reference
Posidonius.
I. TheFragments
, ed.
number);
L. Edelstein
andI.G. Kidd,Cambridge
witha reference
1972(laterPosidonius
number).
VonArnim's
stillextremely
valuable
is certainly
thecontent,
study,
although
regarding
outofdatein respect
to references
to works
andeditions.
whilekeeping
his
Therefore,
reference
I willprovide
inciting
morerecent
ifnecessary.
information
theworks
numbers,
19:34:21 PM
THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
149
cumea congruunt
saniinter
Sicutenimcorporis
se,e quibusconstamus,
temperado,
concordant
... [31]Et utcortas,sicanimidicitur,
quumeiusiudiciaopinionesque
cumcoloris
membrorum
quadamsuavitate
eaquediciaptafigura
porisestquaedam
. . . pulchritudo
sicin animoopinionum
turpulchritudo,
iudiciorumque
aequabilitas
...
vocatur
The resemblanceis, indeed, quite strikingand allows us to accept Tuse.
disp.4.13.30-1 as a directsource for both passages in Augustine.The
linked
of partsand colour" is a specificformulathatis tightly
"symmetry
the
to the Stoic parallelbetweenthe soul and the body which constitutes
core of Stoic materialismand appears in the contextof theirphysicsand
especiallymedical analogies in psychology(SVF 3.456-90 on the rcepi
etPiatonis
Thus Galen in De plantsHippocratis
5.2.158
7KX0COV
of Chrysippus).
that
the
Stoics
LS
Posidonius
asserts
65R,
3.471,
(and more
163)
(SVF
eivai
tcv
v
T
xiveo^Aovxai
xf''|/DX
preciselyChrysippus)vaXxyyav
koctc
He later explainsthat Chrysippuscompared the balanced
xacomia.
stateof the soul to the harmonyof bodilypowers,and the "diseases" of
of
the soul to bodilydisorders,just as beauty arises fromthe symmetry
in
distheir
and
from
(ibid.;Posidonius, fact,
asymmetry
parts,
ugliness
agrees withChrysippuson this,but not to the point of completelyabolishingthe parallel).In De placitis5.3.161 (SVF 3.472) Galen confirmsthat
the analogybetweenthe conditionsof the body and the soul stemsfrom
employingalmostthe same expressionas Cicero or Augustine:
Chrysippus,
v T
". . . tt|v(xvvyEiavtcvaioi^ecovv GD^M-expa
G^svo,to e kolAAo
. . ."17There is no doubt thatit is thiscontextthatis revoked
tcvlopoov
in the quoted passage fromTuse.disp.4 (Chapter 12 of book 4 startsby
mentioningthe Stoics). In fact, the bearing of 13.30-1 is the parallel
betweenthe body and the soul which is announced at the beginningof
13.30: Atque ut in malis attingitanimi naturamcorporissimilitudo,sic
in bonis. Anotherparallelof thiskind- betweenbodilybeautyand beautifulmoral conduct- that employsalmost the same formulais in De off.
1.28.98.18There is a generalagreementof scholarsconcerningthe Stoic
17Claudii
omnia
Gaietti
, ed.C.G. Khn,Lipsiae1823,t.V, p. 448,cf.p. 438.Cf.
Opera
xoociiax
xcov
xexKao
axiavmiexpa
alsoStobaeus,
11.110(SVF 3.278):aicep
xeKaircp
otxco
Kaixxfi
oxi
xXx)v,
K<x0eax(ox(ov
xMrjAxx
lieAxv
yuxi
mXo
Tipcx;
axcp
. . . (Ioannis
xoXyov
ml xcov
a')xo'jjipXov
xeaxo)Kaijcp
aXXr)*x
p.epv
crunnexpa
libriduo
Stobaei
etethicarum
, ed. A. Meineke,
Lipsiae1864,vol.II,
eclogarum
physicarum
32.25-9).
p. 18
ofdecorum
is theStoictheory
In fact,theprimary
concern
in De off.
1.93-101
(xo
andhonestum,
whicharethecategories
ofbroader
andnotthecriteria
rcpeTiov)
meaning,
a moredetailed
ofthispassage,
ofmaterial
ina strict
sense.I willprovide
analysis
beauty
in thesection
on honestum.
as wellas a fuller
quotation,
19:34:21 PM
150
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
19:34:21 PM
151
19:34:21 PM
152
OLEGV. BYCHKOV
19:34:21 PM
THEORIES
OF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
153
19:34:21 PM
154
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
19:34:21 PM
155
19:34:21 PM
156
OLEGV. BYCHKOV
sintmulta
honesta
uisibilia,
quamquam
pulchra
quaeminus
appellantur,
propne
ipsa
ex qua pulchra
tarnen
suntquaecumque
sunt,nullomodoest
pulchritudo,
pulchra
uisibilis.
ex qua nobisprosunt
sed ipsautilitas,
Item,multautiliauisibilia;
quaeuisibilis
nonest.27
dicimus,
quamdiuinam
cumqueprosunt,
prouidentiam
19:34:21 PM
THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
157
19:34:21 PM
158
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
19:34:21 PM
THEORIESOF BEAUTY
STOICIDEASIN THE SCHOLASTIC
159
dicitur:
huiusvisea est,utab honesto
nonqueatsepaGraeceenimrcpercov
potest;
rali. . . (Deoff.
1.27.93-4)
and materialbeauty,quite
The firstmotifis a parallel between decorum
decorum
is
as
naturalforthe Stoics:
inseparablefromvirtueas beauty is
fromhealth(also see above, especiallythe discussionof De off.1.28.98):
nonpotest
a valetudine,
etpulchritudo
secerni
sichoc,de quo
Utvenustas
corporis
totum
illudquidem
estcumvirtute
sedmente
etcogdecorum
confusum,
loquimur,
. . . (Deoff.
Schwenke
itatione
1.27.95,
478).
distinguitur
The passages fromAlbert'scommentarythatat least lead to thiscontext
are Simon 182.12-3and Simon 182.29-30. The second motifis the manifestcharacterof honestum
, its propertyto have a certainappearance and
"shine forth"just as materialbeautyin bodies:
velint
consentaneum
... utid decorum
esse,quoditanaturae
sit,utin eo moderatioet temperantia
cumspeciequadamliberali
(Ibid.,1.27.96,Schwenke
adpareat
from
areSimon185.75-7
Albert's
and
commentary
478).Thecorresponding
passages
Simon186.16-9.
in the Middle Ages sharesthe
and decorum
The Stoic theoryof honestum
same destinyas the Stoic view of beauty as "symmetryof parts." In
Stoicism,both motifsconvergein one aspect,thatis, the parallelbetween
the state of the soul and the body. Indeed, beauty is described,on the
and order,on the other,as somethingthatpleases
one hand, as symmetry
itself
and
shines
forth.
Both qualities,however,referto both bodies
by
(proportionof parts,shiningforthof materialform)and souls (arrangementof virtues,apparentnobilityof conduct).However, Augustineand
the latermedievalChristianauthorswho were temptedto use theseStoic
and obliteratethe parviewshad to fittheminto a Christianframework
allel betweenthe soul and the body. It was achieved by separatingthe
two partsof the statementswhich containedanalogies betweenthe body
and the soul: in the case of honestum
and decorum
, by using the passages
the
and honestum
on
the
one
about
virtue
hand,
passages
applied
separately;
exclusivelyto spiritualphenomena,and on the other,the passages about
materialbeauty.
I would like to conclude by emphasisingthe followingpoint. Without
any doubt, the roots of all three ancient theoriesof beauty (symmetry,
the beauty of the universe,and moral beauty or honestum
) that were in
the centreof my attentionhere are found already in Plato and some
otherschoolspre-datingStoicism.The importantpoint is, however,that
the Stoicsassembledall thesescatteredviewsand put themtogether,producingcoherenttheoriesthatwere essentialto theirteachingand affected
all aspectsof it. The remnantsof thesewidelydisseminatedtheorieswere
19:34:21 PM
160
OLEGV. BYGHKOV
used in the 13th centurywhere scholasticsoftendrew directlyon "professed"Stoic sourcesratherthan on otherschools- simplybecause whenever theylooked forstatementson beauty theyinevitablyfound,among
others,some Stoic ideas. I hope that this broad diachronicperspective
will provide a betterunderstandingof how the Middle Ages received
ancient theoriesand disputes,if only in a fragmented
way, and in particularof how Stoicismwas at times"present"to thisprocess.
Toronto
Centre
forMedievalStudies
of Toronto
University
19:34:21 PM
1. Introduction.
Natureand Date oftheWork
The extensivelist of worksby Walter Burley1containsa collectionof
some eagerlydisputedquestionsconcerningnaturalphilosophy,which in
most of the manuscriptcatalogues goes under the blank title Tractatus
In the colophons of the older manuscriptsthese questions are
primus.2
specified:
et de ydemptitate
et qualitate
de activitate
tractatus
sensibilium,
specifica
Explicit
forme
et
etde inductione
subita
animalis
etelementaris,
calonscelestis,
substantial,
de unitate
contrariorum.3
specifica
In theVatican manuscriptVat.lat.817, whichpresentsthe same colophon,
our treatiseis introducedas follows:"Tractatusde activitate,unitateet
augmentationeformarumactivarumhabentiumcontrariasuscipiencium
magis et minus." However, this title seems also to include the subject
De causa intrinseca
intensionis
et
matterof the subsequentTractatus
secundus,
current
in
which
its
title
the
of
acddentalium
remissionis
,
formarum
colophon
is mentioned:"Explicit. . . Burleusde intensioneet remissioneformarum."
AnnelieseMaier (who failedto see that the titlegivenby Vat.lat. 817
refersto the whole of the firstand second treatisesratherthan to just
the first)was fortunateenough to findBurley'sown referenceto the first
of our treatises.4In the shorterversion of his ExpositiosuperlibrumSex
1James
31 (1969),[174A. Weisheipl,
Mertonense
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
O.P.,Repertorium
Latin
Aristotle
Commentaries
24
See alsoCharles
, in:Traditio,
Lohr,Medieval
224],185-208.
(1968),171-87.
2 Weisheipl,
listofmanuscripts
somecorrections
nr.44, p. 204.Weisheipl's
requires
andadditions.
3 Bruges,
cod.501,f. 105r.See also Vat.lat.817,f. 223r;Paris,BN
Stadsbibliotheek,
oct.76,f. 106ra.
lat.6441,f.25vb;Erfurt,
Amplon.
4 See A. Maier,Ausgehendes
Mittelalter
nine,"HandI, Roma1964,[209-35],
chapter
schriftliches
zu Wilhelm
Ockham
undWalter
235,n. 57; thischapter
Burley,"
[209-35],
inArchivm
Franciscanum
ofherarticle
isa reissue
someadditions)
Historicum
(with
published
48 (1955),225-51.
Vivarium
34,2
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:34:29 PM
162
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
163
19:34:29 PM
164
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
165
"
contradicp. 3) the same hand continueswith a separate question Utrum
"
ho sit maximaoppositio(under the heading De contradictoriis
which
runs
),
fromfols 105r-111r and simplywinds up withthe closingformula"Hec
de questione sufficiant."It opens with the words "Adhuc circa genus
oppositionisresttinquirendum. . Next a nice copy is found (on fols
lllr-158v) of the second treatise(our CISM, but withoutany title).Its
incipitruns:
In hoctractatu
secundo
intendo
de causaintrinseca
perscrutali
susceptionis
magiset
minus.
Et hunctractatum
dividoin sexcapitula.
In primodeclaratur
quodforma
nonsuscipit
ad partem,
magiset minus
peradditionem
partis
utraque
permanente
[...]
The treatiseis given a titleafterits explicit:
Et ideononindigent
Et sicpatetquidvidetur
essedicendum
circa
agente
pronunc.
causamintensionis
et remissionis
formarum
Et hec
[formalium!
MS] accidentalium.
sufficiant
Et si aliquidinhoctractatu
dictum
fuerit
vel
contrarium,
ergoad presens.
- quodabsit!
- , illudrevoco
nonconsonum,
veritat
fidei
caholice
mecorsupponens
rectioni
sacrosancte.
Necrationem
communi
ecclesie
necauctoritatem
Aristotilis
vel
alterius
veram
romane
ecclesie
etvericuiuscumque
philosophi
reputo
quecontradicit
tatfideiChristiane.
tractatus
de causaextrnseca
intensionis
et remissionis
Explicit
formarum
accidentalium.
The theoryabout the intensionand remissionof accidental formsthat
Burleyexpoundsin thistreatise(a theorythat alreadyfeaturesin QCFA)
is knownto be directedagainstthe one defendedby his masterand tutor
Thomas de Wylton.20
2.2 Erfurt, Amplon.
oct.76
This manuscriptof 174 fols,whichis dated 1345 and opens withsome
authors,contains, after the heading
logical tractswrittenby different
BURLEY, our two treatises:QCFA on 84ra-106ra (followedby the tract
Utrumcontradicho
on fols 106rb-109rb)and CISM on 109va-127rb.The
versionof QCFAdoes not substantially
differ
fromthe one foundin Bruges,
but the CISM copy shows quite a lot of redactionaldifferences.
The latter ends withthe simpleformula"Et hoc sufficit
quoad presens."
Fols 127rb-133vbcontain a tractDe terminis
naturalibus.
Inc.: "De qualitateuniformisciendumest quod quedam est qualitas [. .
20TheshortQuestio
desusceptione
etminus
(Inc."Utrum
magis
qualitas
suscipiat
magiset
is found
in Oxford,
Bodleian
cod.Canon,
misc.
226,if.38-43,andin the
minus")
Library,
Vatican
cod.Vat.lat.2148,ff.71-5,immediately
a copyofBurley's
corLibrary,
following
CISM(ff.57r-70v).
tract,
responding
19:34:29 PM
L.M.DE RIJK
166
19:34:29 PM
PRIMUS
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
BURLEY'S
167
19:34:29 PM
168
L.M. DE RIJK
127vb-136ra:De syllogismis
136ra-139rb:De suppositionibus
139rb-149rb:De principiti
scientiarum
.28
3 . An Analysisof thefourquestions
discussed
in QCFA
After the introductorylines quoted above (our section 1), Burley
continues:29
conclusiones
dubiavelfalsa.Prima
'B 70r'Dixiquatuor
quevidebantur
quibusdam
invirtute
formam
substantialem
velinvirtute
quodqualitas
potest
propria
producere
esseprincipium
totaleproductivum
forme
substantial.
Verbigratia,
calor
propria
in virtute
etcalorqui estin semine
in
ignispotest
propria
producere
ignem,
potest
virtute
animam
sensitivm.
Secundaconclusio,
propria
producere
que etiamvidetur
inmateria
inductionis
subite
forme
substantial
nonrequidubia,fuit
quodininstanti
ritur
inducens
formam.
Tertiaconclusio
agensprotunc
quodistitrescaloresquos
in secundo
De generatione
animalium
calorcelestis,
ele, scilicet
Philosophus
distinguit
mentaris
etanimalis,
sunteiusdem
athome.
conspeciei
Quartaconclusio
quodforme
videlicet
caloret frigus,
albedoetnigredo,
sunteiusdem
trarie,
speciei
specialissime.
Thus the fourtheses objected to by Burley'sopponentsall concern the
natureand activityor operationof accidentalformsor qualities,namely
[1] that a qualitycan produce a substantialformby its own; [2] that at
the very momentin which a substantialformis induced in matterno
exterioragent is requiredto effectthis; [3] thatcelestial,elementary,
and
animal heat all belong to the same ultimatespecies,and [4] thatcontrary
forms,such as heat and cold, blacknessand whiteness,belongto the same
ultimatespecies.
Next the author goes on to discussthese questions.
28A critical
edition
ofthisLogica
withthreeannexaaddedlateron bythe
, together
hasbeenprepared
author.
See ournote15.
author,
bythepresent
Thequotations
areall after
theBruges
corrected
with
and,ifnecessary,
manuscript,
thehelpoftheotherMSS (including
somefifteenth
treacentury
copiesofthepresent
author
is abouttofinish
a critical
edition
ofDQCNandtheoriginal
vertise).Thepresent
sionofCISM.
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
3.1
169
Thefirstthesis
19:34:29 PM
L.M.DE RIJK
170
tuncestinactu,etnonrequirit
tuncsitinactu,sedsolumquodprequodgenerans
fuitusquead illudinstans.
Ad ultimum
dicoquodcalorignisetcaloranimalis
sunt
inprobatione
sicut
eiusdem
videbitur
tertie
conclusions
Necpropter
speciei,
principalis.
hoc oportet
in omnino
eundem
effectum
secundum
et hoc
quodpossint
speciem,
quianonsuntsubeodemgradu.
3.2
The secondthesis
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
171
omnino.
Etilleforme
Etillesuntforme
nonrequirunt
permanentes
quandosuntfacte,
nonplusproprimoinstanti
instanti
Et
efficiens,
quamproquocumque
posteriori.
suntforme
et etiammulte
huiusmodi
forme
accidentales.
substantiates,
3.3
The thirdthesis
Thefourth
thesis
19:34:29 PM
172
L.M.DE RIJK
because it is focussed
Burley'firstargumenttakenfromlogic is interesting,
on the notion of (greateror lesser)distancebetweenthe extremesof the
various kinds of opposition,which is preciselythe subject matterof the
insertedquestion Utrumcontradictio
handed down in our manuscriptsin
between QCFA and CISM:
distant
distantia
[B 81v
] Prmaratiotalisest.Quandocumque
aliquaduoequaliter
a perfectissimo
formali
in aliquaspecie:si unumistorum
duorum
sitin iliaspecie,
eritin iliaspecie;et similiter,
si illudquodestremotius
a perfectissimo
sit
reliquum
in eademspeciecumperfectissimo,
etilludquodestpropinquius
forpropinquitate
malieritin eademspeciecumilioperfectissimo.
Hoc apparet
ex determinatis
in
SexPrmpirumy
decausasusceptionis
etminus,
loyca.Dicitenimauctor
capitulo
magis
talequodmagisaccedit
ad summum
tale
tale,etilludestminus
quodilludestmagis
illudestalbiusquodestpropinquius
a summo
tali.Verbigratia,
quodmagisdistat
etilludestminus
albumquodmagisdistat
EtidemvultPhiab albissimo.
albissimo,
in Thopicis
etetiaminquarto
de priori;
etloquuntur
de
, capitulo
losophies
Metaphisice
distantia
etpropinquitate
formali.
etaliquam
Sed estdarealiquam
caliditatem
frigiditatem
distantia
formali
a summa
etetiamestdarealicaliditate;
que equedistant
summe
data.Ergocum
caliditati,
quamfrigiditatem
propinquiorem
aliquacaliditate
caliditas
datasitin eademspeciecumsumma
caliditate,
quecumque
sequitur
quod
summe
etetiamfrigiditas
caliditati,
frigiditas
queestequepropinqua
queestpropincaliditati
data,sintin eademspeciecumsumma
quiorsumme
quamuna caliditas
caliditate.
caliditas
et frigiditas
suntin eademspecie.Et volo
Et,perconsequens,
etdistantia
formarum
cumloquorde
formali
semper
loquide propinquitate
ipsarum
distantia
velpropinquitate
earum.
Next, in defendingthe major premissBurleytakeswhat in his view are
two basic presuppositions
("fundamenta")of AristoteliannaturalphilosoAristotle
not put them into words,he has to agree):
did
phy (although
in scientia
declarata
ab Aristotile
naturali.
[B 8Jv]Et supponoduo fundamenta
Primm
estquodreipermanentis
inesseperalterationem
de novoproducte
estdare
in quo habetesse.Et hecratioestplana(etsiAristotiles
instans
nondixisprimum
setearn),quiain ultimo
instanti
mensurantis
alterationem
habetterminus
temporis
alterationis
moveretur
ad formam
Secundum
esse,quiaaliter
primo
aliquid
quamhabet.
fundamentum
velcorrupte
non
estquodreipermanentis
producte
peralterationem
inquo [B 82r]habetesse.Ethancsentit
estdareultimum
instans
Aristotiles
etvera
Aristotiles
earnnonscripsisset.
esset,
quamvis
Startingfromthese two presuppositions
Burleydeveloped quite an intricate argument,which, as he reports,was objected to by an opponent
(referredto as "quidam reverendussocius") "in prima replicationesua"
(during the graduation ceremony,probably). Burley gives an account
and his own answers.
[B 82r-85v'of the opponent'scounter-arguments,
He reportsall these "replicationes"and "reprobationesreplicationis,"
but
insteadof answeringthem,Burleysetsout to put forwardeightnew theses
which he thinksare conclusiveenough againstthe opponent'sobjections:
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
173
sociuset magister,
credens
rationes
measessesophisti[B 85v]Quidamreverendus
ad rationes
ad quartam
conclusionem
adductas
modoinfrascripto.
cas,respondet
Contra
octoconclusiones
quascredoconcludere.
quemproboperordinem
AnnelieseMaier has rightlyobserved31that this masterhad opposed to
Burley'sviewsboth in unpublisheddiscourse,which had somehow come
to Burley'sattention,and in writtendocuments.The opponentmusthave
reacted to Burley'sreplies,for the latterreturnsto his eight additional
Meanwhilehe adds some otherargumentsin supthesesquite extensively.
port of his original"conclusioprincipalis"(numberfour,that is).
All thingsconsidered,the disputeover the fourthprincipalthesismust
have taken some time. Weisheipl righdyconcludes that we have to do
witha protractedpolemic32betweenBurleyand this Master.33
In some of the new argumentsadduced in supportof the fourththesis ("rationesnove ad principlemconclusionem"),the notionof distance
betweenoppositionalextremesis again preponderant.To Burley'smind,
one of the opponent's counter-arguments
ignores the basic difference
and contradiction:
betweencontrariety
dicoquodcontradictoria
nonsuntinspeciesolum
nisialterum
'B 104v]Adquartum
contradictoriorum
estinspecie.Modo,si iliaquemagisdistant
sintineademspecie,
et illaque minusdistant
eruntin eademspecie,et hoc si utraque
sintin specie.
Huiusmodi
autemnonsuntcontradictoria.
Quarerationonconcludit.
The treatiseQCFA winds up as follows:
dicoquodinter
individua
eiusdem
nonestessen[i?104v-105r
] Adseptimum
speciei
tialis
ordosecundum
nonagente;
tarnen
efficientiam,
quiaunum
potest
agere,
reliquo
31Op.rit.,
unomodoin dogmatibus
nonscriptis,
aliomodoin
p. 224."[. . .] respondet
In dogmatibus
nonscriptis,
secundum
dogmatibus
scriptis.
quodfuitmichireportatum,
dicit[. . .1."
32Weisheipl,
184.Forthatmatter,
Ockham
andSome
itsprotractedness
did
Mertonians,
notpleaseeverybody.
Thecopyist
ofVat.
lat.2148(written
about1400)quiteabruptly
surely
throws
hisjob up andwe arealsotold(f.54rb)why:"Adistamreplicationem
respondet
sociusquodnumquam
hecduoconcessit,
scilicet
in quo
dominus
quodestdareultimum
respermanens
habetesse,et quodestdareprimum
instans
in
corrupta
peralterationem
habetesse.Seddicitquoddixitetc.De ista
quorespermanens
producta
peralterationem
voluiscribere,
nichil
illeBurleus
facitusquead finem
bene
questione
quoniam
questionis
stationis
unumquaternum
de littera
totaliter
unde(= 'because')
nonponitnisisoluinutili,
tiones
etreplications
sibiinvicem
etsupponit
faciebant,
quasipseetquidamaliusdoctor
Burleus
multa
falsa.Ergoetc.
33Weisheipl,
Ockham
andSome
Mertonians
in identifying
thisobsti, 185-6couldbe right
nateopponent
as stillthesameone,Thomasde Wylton.
It should
be notedthat,
as early
as in QCFA
hisownviewsoftheintension
andremission
offorms
, Burley
expounds
along
linesas in CISM, which
is known
tobe directed
Thomasde Wylton's
similar
theagainst
offorms
in hisQuestio
and remission
desusceptione
et
(as setforth
magis
oryofintension
seealsoournote20 above).
minus
qualitatis;
19:34:29 PM
174
L.M. DE RIJK
ordosecundum
etemineninter
individua
eiusdem
estessentialis
speciei
perfectionem
de omnispeciesuscipiente
veladminus
inter
tiam.Ethocestverum
magisetminus,
eiusdem
estessentialis
ordo.Nec
[sunt
E' gradus
speciei
suscipientis
magiset minus
ordinem
3 Metaphisice
hunc[hocE] negatAristotiles,
secun, sedsolumessentialem
dumefficientiam.
Ad octavum
dicoquodin eademspecieestaliquidmagisactivum
et aliquidminus
activum.
Namcalorintensior
estmagisactivus
quamcalorremissuntin eademspecie.Ideoillarationonconcludit.
Ad ultimum
dico
sionet tarnen
intendit
minus
calidum
etremittit
ettarnen
sunt
calidum;
quodmagiscalidum
magis
eiusdem
Ideorationon'B 105r]concludit.
speciei.
Et in hiissitfinis
sermonis
nostri
de unitate
Et si in hiis
contrariorum.
specifica
sitVeritas,
utfingo,
omnem
hominem
venientem
Altissimo,
regratietur
qui"illumint
in huncmundum."
Si verononsitVeritas
in predictis,
forte
inveperea aliquando
Si autemaliquidbenedictum
nietur
Veritas.
de omissis
autemindulsit,acceptetur;
Nam"nonsolumhiisdiceregratiam
estquorum
iustum
geatur.
aliquisopinionibus
sed etiamhiisqui adhucsuperficialiter
hii
etenim
communicaverit,
enuntiaverunt;
conferunt
nostrum
sunt,"ut dicit34
Aristotiles,
aliquid;namhabitm
preexercitati
secundo
.
Metaphisice
4. Theposition
Utrum contradictio
of theinserted
question
It is commonlysaid35thatthe questionabout thenatureof contradictory
oppositionas opposed to contraryopposition,whichin all our manuscripts
is foundstraightafterQCFA and immediatelyprecedingCISM, has nothing in common with these two treatises.
In my view, thereare a numberof argumentsto counterthe assumption that Utrum
contradictio
is an isolatedquestion.For one thing,the fact
thatin our manuscripts,
thequestionis continually
Treatise I
putin between
II
and
Treatise
of
the
work
himself
refers
(our QCFA)
(our CISM)
Burley
to as De forrnis
accidentalibus
, can be taken as a hint that,when officially
the
two
the authorregardedit appropriateto add to
treatises,
publishing
not
the
but
insertedquestion Utrum
as well.
contradictio
QCFA
only CISM,
It shouldbe noticedin thisconnectionthatoriginallyCISM had no explicit
link with QCFA either.36
Again, as faras its contentsare concerned,the insertedquestionabout
the truenaturesof contradiction
and contrariety
has doctrinalconnections
withpart of the subject matterof QCFA, as has already been remarked
with respectto its most importantprincipalthesisIV (above, our section 3.4).
Moreover,we know of at least two copyistswho were inclinedto considertheinsertedquestionan integralpartof QCFA.About the fourteenth34Metaph.
II 1,993b11-15.
35E.g.Maier,op.cit.,220;Weisheipl,
Ockham
andSome
Mertonians
, 185,n. 7.
36See Maier, cit.,219.
op.
19:34:29 PM
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
175
19:34:29 PM
176
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
ill
In contrarium
arguitur
4 In contrariumarguitursic. Oppositio est quedam distantia,secundum
; ergo ilia que minusdistantminussunt
Philosophum,decimo48Metaphisice
opposita,et que minimedistantminimesunt opposita. Sed contradictoria minimedistant.Ergo contradictoriaminimesunt opposita.
5 Maior patet. Minor declaratursic. Illa minimedistantinterque non
est medium,et que sic se habent quod impossibileest aliquid recedere
ab uno quin statimsit sub reliquo; ut satis patet intelligenti.Sed inter
et quarto
contradictorianon est medium, ut patet49primo Posteriorum
nec
est
recedat
ab
uno
contradictorio;
Metaphisice
possibilequod aliquid
rum quin statimsit sub reliquo; aliteresset mediumintercontradictoria.
Ergo contradictoria[B 105v' minime distant.Et, per consequens, contradictionon est maxima oppositio,sed minima.
6 Item. Illa minus opponunturque minoremrepugnantiamincludunt.
Sed contradictoriaminoremrepugnantiamincluduntquam quecumque
alia opposita.Ego etc.Maior patetde se. Et probo minoremnam: Alia opincluditcontradictionem,
ut de se manifestum
est.
positioa contradictione
Et edam includitoppositionemaliam,scilicetoppositionempropriamquam
addit supra contradictionem.
minoremrepugnantiam
Ergo contradictoria
includuntquam quecumque alia opposita. Et, per consequens, contradictioest minoroppositio.
SOLVITUR
QUESTIO
7 Circa istam questionemsic procedam. Primo probabo quod contradictorianon sunt maxime opposita. Secundo probabo quod contradictoria sunt minime opposita, et quod contradictioest minima oppositio.
Tertio dicam que sunt conditionesoppositionisratione quarum attenditur oppositio.Et quarto solvam rationesin contrarium.
nonsuntmaxime
Quodcontradictoria
opposita
8 Primamconclusionemprobo per sex rationes.Primosic. Si contradictoriamaximeet primorepugnarent,
tuncquanto alicui magisinessetunum
tanto
contradictoriorum,
magis repugnaretalteri, quia quanto aliquid
magis participtnaturamunius oppositorumprimo et principalius,tanto
magis destruitreliquumet, per consequens,tanto magis opponituralteri.
48Metaph.
X 5, 1056a35-bl.
49Anal.Post.I 2, 72al2-13;Metaph.
IV 7, 101lb23-24.
19:34:29 PM
178
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
SO-GALLED
BURLEY'S
179
19:34:29 PM
180
L.M.DE RIJK
B1nullus
B
omnis]
55Cf.Anal.Pr.I 28,
43b40sqq.
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
181
19:34:29 PM
182
L.M. DE RIJK
ethicorum
B
topicorum]
Topica
Vili 2, 157b17-18.
58
IX 9, 105lai 5-16.
Metaph.
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
183
exrepugnantie
B e oppositio]
B fquo]quibusB
repugnant]
propositio
59Metaph.
IV 2, 1004a20-22.
19:34:29 PM
184
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
SO-GALLED
TRA
BURLEY'S
CTATUSPRIMUS
185
B
ipsam]contradictionem
61Metaph.
X 4, 1055b26-29.
62Metaph.
X 4, 1055a34-b8.
19:34:29 PM
186
L.M.DE RIJK
1
B kquacumque]
B Jcontrariorum]
contradictoria
contradictoriorum
contraria]
quamB
cumque
63Metaph.
X 4, 1055b26-29.
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
SO-CALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
187
51 Septimo
arguitursic. Ilia magis opponunturque opponunturper se et
formaliter
quam illa que opponunturper accidens et materialiter.Sed
contradictoriaopponunturper se et formaliter.Et contrarianon opponunturnisi per accidens et materialiter.
Ergo etc. Maior patet. Et probo
minoremnam: Contradictoriain eo quod talia opponunturet non ratione
aliquorumaliorumoppositorum.Nam non-albumin eo quod non-album
et per se opponituralbo, quia destruitillud idem1quod album
formaliter
sed
nigrumnon opponituralbo nisi quia nigrumincluditnonponit,
album. Et ita contrariumper accidens opponitur suo contrario,quia
rationealterius,et contradictorium
opponitursuo conper se et formaliter
tradictorio.
in fine:hec est
52 Confirmatur
per Philosophum,secundo64Peryarmenias
est
vel
"bonum
"album
est
falsa
accidens
malum,"
quia non
nigrum"
per
non
bonum."
est
infert
istam
"bonum
nisi
est falsa
Ergo non esse
quia
bonum magis opponiturbono quam esse malum sibi opponitur.
53 Octavoarguitursic. Ilia oppositioin virtutecuius quecumque opposita
opponuntur,est maxima oppositio,quia "Unumquodque propterquid
etc" Sed in virtutecontradictionis
quecumque oppositaopponuntur.Ergo
etc.Probatiominorisnam: Contrarianon opponunturnisi quia includunt
non enim album opponiturnigronisi quia "album" inclucontradictoria;
dit "non-nigrum."
54 Nonoarguitursic. Illa maxime opponunturque se totis et totaliter
opponuntur.Contradictoriasunt huiusmodi,et non contraria,nec relativa. Ergo etc.
55 Decimoarguitursic. Illa suntmaximeoppositasupra que fundaturprimm et verissimum
principium.Contradictoriasunthuiusmodi,ut patet65
Ergo etc.
[B 109v] ex quarto Metaphisice.
56 Undcimo
arguitursic. Illa que in nullo conveniuntsuntmagis opposita
quam illa que conveniuntin aliquo. Sed contradictoriain nullo conveniunt,et alia"1opposita, ut contrariaet relativa,conveniuntin aliquo.
Ergo etc.
m
alia]aliquaB
illud]id B
64De interpr.
14,23bl5-27.
65Metaph.
IV 7, 101Ib23-1012a29.
19:34:29 PM
188
L.M.DE RIJK
In opposition
arguitur
57 Ad primamistarumrationumdico quod primumad quod aliqua reducunturest duplex,scilicetvel primumvia compositions,vel primumvia
resolutionis.Illud quod est primumvia compositionis,est simpliciuset
minus tale, sed illud quod est primumvia resolutionis,est magis compositum,quia resolutioincipit a composito et terminaturad Simplicia,
compositiovero econverso incipita simplicibuset terminaturad compositum.Et ita via compositionis<est> a minoriet simplicioriad maius
et compositius,et via resolutionisest a maiori et compositioriad minus
et simplicius.
58 Dico igiturquod via compositionisoppositiocontradictoria
est prima,
sed via resolutionisest postrema,et ideo est minima. Cum ergo dicitur
quod ilia oppositioest maxima ad quam omnis alia oppositioreducitur,
< concedo quod oppositiocontradictoria
est maximain eo quod ad ipsam
omnis alia oppositioreducitur
via
>,
compositionistamquam ad ultimam,
ilia
includit
omnes
alias
quia
oppositiones,si aliqua talisoppositiosit. Sed
huiusmodinon est oppositiocontradictoria.
59 Et si dicaturquod ad istam oppositionemreducituromnis alia oppositio et <quod> oppositiocontradictoriaest prima, dico quod est prima
via compositionis.Sed ad id quod est primumvia compositionis,non
reducituromnis alia oppositiotamquam ad oppositionemmaximam,sed
tamquam ad oppositionemsimplicissimam.Et ideo non oportet quod
oppositiocontradictoriasit maxima.
60 Unde uno modo concedo maiorem,scilicetquod id ad quod omnis
alia oppositio reducitur,est maxima oppositio;verum est, si reducatur
tamquam ad primumvia resolutioniset ultimumvia compositionis.Et
cum diciturquod omnis oppositioreduciturad contradictionem,
verum
est tamquam ad primumvia compositioniset tamquam ad ultimumvia
resolutionis.Et ideo non sequiturconclusio.
61 Ad secundum
esse simulvera non
argumentumdico quod contradictoria
est maximuminconveniens,sed magis impossibileest contrariaesse simul
vera. Dico tarnenquod contradictoria
esse simulvera est evidentiusimpossibilequam contrariaesse simulvera. Et ideo dico quod cum aliquis concesseritcontradictoria
esse simulvera,non potestduci ad evidentiusimposnisi
forte
ad
sibile,
negationemeiusdem de se.
62 Et ad confirmationem,
cum diciturquod contradictoria
esse simulvera
est oppositumprimiprincipii,dico quod non quecumque contradictoria
esse simulvera est oppositumprimiprincipii,sed contradictoria
que fiunt
in terminis
communissimis
et notissimis
esse simul[5 110r' vera est oppositum primiprincipii.Et est maximumimpossibile.Sed hoc non est solum
19:34:29 PM
SO-GALLED
TRACTATUS
PRIMUS
BURLEY'S
189
0
sednonB
potest
posse]Bcom.B sednonpotest]
66Averroes,
InIV Arist.
Metaph.
19:34:29 PM
190
L.M.DE RIJK
19:34:29 PM
BURLEY'S
TRACTATUS
SO-GALLED
PRIMUS
191
dictoriorum
semperest ens et reliquumnon-ens,dico quod non est verum,
ut patet ex dictis.Quamvis enim <hec> duo, ens et non-ens,contradicant et ita se habent quod alterumest ens et alterumnon-ens,tarnen
se habent sic quod alterumest ens et alterum
non omnia contradictoria
non-ens.
74 Ad septimum
dico quod non sola contradictoriaopponunturper se et
sed etiam contraria.Et quando dicitur"nigrumnon opponiformaliter,
tur albo nisi quia includitnon-album,"dico quod hoc non est verum,
quia si nigrumnon opponereturalbo nisi rationenon-albiinclusi,sequeretur quod nigrumnon opponereturalbo nisi contradictorie,
quod falsum
nec essent
includit
est. Dico ergo quod omnis oppositio
contradictionem,
includerent;tamen non tota causa
aliqua opposita nisi contradictionem
in
oppositionis quibuscumqueoppositisest contradictioinclusa in eis.
75 Ad octavum
, cum diciturquod omnia oppositaopponunturvirtutecondico quod verum est, sed non precise,ut dictumest; ymo
tradictionis,
non oportetquod contradictoriamaxime opponantur.
dico quod contradictorianon se totisopponuntur,
76 [B lllr] Ad nonum
in
communicant
terminis,sicut contrarianec opponunturtotaliter,
quia
quia solumincluduntunumgenusoppositionis.Sed alia oppositaincludunt
et etiamoppodiversageneraoppositionis,
quia includuntcontradictionem
sitionempropriigeneris.Et ita non opponunturtotaliter,sed partialiter.
77 Ad decimum
, quando diciturquod ilia suntmaxime oppositasuper que
fundaturprimumet verissimumprincipium,dico quod non est verum,
ymo primumet verissimumprincipiumfundatursuper ilia interque non
estmediumper abnegationem.Et talia suntimmediataet,per consequens,
minimedistantia;et ita sunt minimeopposita,.Dico ergo quod ilia sunt
minimeopposita super que fundaturprimumet verissimumprincipium.
nichil est commune,
78 Ad ultimum
, quando diciturquod contradictoriis
scilicetpropoest
dico quod contradictoriis
commune,
complexis aliquid
p
Similiter
dico
et
huiusmodi.
esse
siti, oratio,
quod non habere
oppositum,
quia "ens" et "unum"
aliquid communenon arguitaliquam oppositionem,
nullumcommunehabent,et tamen non opponuntur.Unde habere commune <in quo conveniantet non habere commune> est omninoimpertinens ad oppositionem.Et ideo ista est falsa,scilicetquod ilia que in nullo
conveniunt,sunt magis opposita quam illa que in aliquo conveniunt.
Hec de questionesufficiant.
Papenweg 17
NL-6261 NE Mheer
p oratio]
omnino
B
19:34:29 PM
The intellectual
betweenWalterBurleyand WilliamOckham
relationship
was a remarkableone. Though Ockham relentlessly
criticizedthosewho,
such as Burley,admittedof commonnatures,he was nevertheless,
in matters of logic,2heavilyindebted to the same Burley,whose early works
years.Burley,on the otherhand,though
precededhis own by some fifteen
he, of course,regardedOckham's rejectionof commonnaturesas a major
mistake,neverthelessincorporatedin his later workssome of Ockham's
own views and analyses.3As a way of gaininga betterunderstanding
of
both authors,it may,then,prove usefulto comparetheirthinking,
at least
on some points of doctrine.I propose we do so on a subject to which
that of mentalsentences.4
both authorsmade an importantcontribution,
1 The
hasgrown
outofa paperreadata workshop
present
writing
organized
byCalvin
Normore
on thethought
ofWalter
heldat OhioStateUniversity
in May1995.
Burley,
I benefited
from
thecomments
oftheparticipants
andfrom
noteswithIvan
comparing
^Boh.I havea veryspecialdebttowards
of
version
RegaWoodwhohasreadan earlier
thispaperandgenerously
numerous
anddetailed
memake
provided
suggestions,
helping
thefinalversion
clearer
thanitotherwise
wouldhavebeen.I amalsograteful
to Claude
Panaccioforveryhelpful
comments.
2 Thanks
toS. Brown,
theeditor
ofBurley's
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
(seeBrown
1972)
andtotheauthors
oftheintroduction
toOckham's
Summa
(seeGi& Brown
logicae
1974),
weknow
thatOckham
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
thechapter
copiedfrom
practically
Burley's
in theSumma
ofrelative
andthathe
which,
, dealswiththesupposition
logicae
pronouns
washeavily
indebted
tohimforthechapters
withobligations
andwithinsolubles.
dealing
3 W. Courtenay,
in Courtenay
ofBurley's
Depuntate
artis
1987,seesinthestructure
logicaean influence
ofOckham's
Summa
. R. Wood,in Wood1984,haspointed
out
logicae
whenexpanding
thatBurley,
hispre-1316commentary
on Aristotle's
, whichhe
Physics
didafter
Ockham
hisowncommentary
ofthattextin 1324,often
hadwritten
relied
on
Ockham's
morethanon hisownearlier
one.On therelationship
between
commentary
andOckham,
on howtheysharedsomebasicviewsin spiteofobvious
Burley
disagreeL. Baudry
is stillwellworth
ments,
1934).
reading
(Baudry
4 When
I shallbe usingtheVenice1497edition
toworks
referring
byBurley,
(reprint
1967)ofhisSuper
artem
veterem
which
an Expositio
etAristotelis)
includes
byMinerva
Porphyri
tohereas his"lastcominlibrum
universalium
inlibrum
, an Expositio
(referred
praedicamentorum
on theCategories
inlibrum
sexprincipiorum
andan Expositio
inlibrum
mentary
"), an Expositio
theeditions
onthePerihermeneias
Perihermeneias;
byS. BrownofhisQuestions
(Brown
1974),
ofhisso-called
Middle
onthePerihermenias
de
(Brown
1973)andofhisTractatus
commentary
to works
I shallbe usingthe
(Brown1972).Whenreferring
suppositionibus
byOckham,
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
193
19:35:14 PM
194
ELIZABETH
KARGER
"
By "sentence,"as the medievaisoftendid when speakingof a propo
sitio" I shall mean categoricalsentences,sentenceswhich contain two
main termsunitedby a copula, one termbeing called "subject,"the other
"predicate."Both Burleyand Ockham admittedmental(categorical)sentences of varyingdegrees of complexity.The simplerones contain simple termsas subject and as predicate,whereas the more complex ones
contain at least one complex term.Ockham furtheradmittedtwo kinds
of mentalterms,some semantically
simple,called "absolute,"otherssemancalled
"connotative."
Let us agree to call "elementary
ticallycomplex,
mentalsentences,"the mentalsentenceswhich,on both theories,are composed of simple termsand those which,on Ockham's theory,are composed of semanticallysimpleterms.On both theories,elementarymental
sentencesin thissense are those which are attendedto first.9
And those
are the only ones I shall attendto here. Thus, when referring,
eitheron
Burley'sor on Ockham's theory,to "mentalsentences,"I shall mean the
elementaryones.
This paper fallsinto two parts. In the first,Burley'stheoryof mental
sentenceswill be reconstructed,
chieflyon the basis of textscontainedin
the threeworksalready mentioned.An account of Ockham's early theory of mentalsentenceswill thenbe presentedby comparingit withthat
of Burley.In so proceeding,my intentionis not to show that Ockham
was on some point of doctrineindebtedto Burley
thoughhe may well
have been , since I shall be reconstructing
Burley'sdoctrinepartlyon
the basis of a text writtenlate enough for its author to have possibly
drawn on Ockham. My purpose is ratherto bringto lightthe factthat,
in spite of some importantdifferences,
the theoriesof mental sentences
whichBurleyand the earlyOckham subscribedto have essentialfeatures
in common.
1. Mentalsentences
to Burley
according
The threeworksby BurleywhichI shall be mosdydrawingfromeach
on the
belong to a different
period of his career. The first,the Questions
Theseturnoutbeingentities
to truesentences,
as suchmind-independent,
corresponding
butwhich,
becausetheyhappentobe apprehended
aresaidtoexistobjecbythemind,
in it.Thesearetheentities
in thattext,
he calls"propositions
inre"(ed.cit.,
which,
tively
inConti1990
inBiard1989(p. 151-9),
andA. Conti,
1.24-1.27,
p. 60-2).Both
J.Biard,
" is notused
seemto havemissed
thefactthattheexpression
inre
(p. 125-36),
"propositio
in thatsensein theprooemium
the
itis usedto
ofhislastcommentary
on
where
Categories,
denote
whathe hadearlier
calleda "propositio
inmente."
9 In theOrdinatio
hisfirst
Ockham
, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh II, p. 271-89),
clearly
propounds
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
195
Perihermeneias
(hereafter"QPH"), belongs to his early career, the second,
on thePerihermeneias
the so-calledMiddlecommentary
(hereafter"MPH"), to
what mightbe called his middlecareer,and the third,his last Commentary
on theCategories
(hereafter"Cat"), to his later years.10
In all threeworks,Burleydistinguished
betweenseveral kindsof senThis means thatthereare
the
relation
of
ordered
tences,
signification.
by
othersentencesuntilsentencesare reached which
sentenceswhichsignify
sentences.The sentencesI am here
do not themselvessignify
any further
are
"ultimate"
the
"mental"
sentences,thosewhichcan be signified
calling
not
themselves
but
which
do
any. As alreadymentioned,
signify
by others,
ways: in QPH and in
Burleyhimselfreferredto them in two different
"
"
MPH, he called them "in mentewhereasin Cat, he called them in re."
Beforewe embarkon an attemptto reconstruct
Burley'stheoryof mental sentences,let us quicklyexamine this theoryof ordered sentences,
whichit presupposes.
1.1 Non-ultimate
and ultimate
sentences
The firstthingto note is that Burleydid not, in the threeworkswe
In the
are considering,admit the same number of kinds of sentences.11
firsttwo he admitted,besides the ultimatesentences,only two kinds of
sentences,namelythose in writingand those in speech.12In Cat, howadmitteda thirdsortof non-ultimate
sentence,namely
ever,he additionally
13
sentences"in concepto."
Accordingto the theorycontainedin Cat, a sentencein writingsignifies
a sentencein speech, a sentencein speech, a sentence"in conceptu
," and
a sentence"in conceptu
," an ultimatesentence.A sentencein writingis a
sentencethe termsof which are writtenwords, a sentencein speech is
" is one
one the termsof which are spokenwords,a sentence"in conceptu
the termsof which are concepts,identifiedwith mental qualities.14Now
a writtenterm signifiesa spoken one, a spoken one a concept, and a
withan
ofmental
a theory
ofconcepts,
sentences,
theory
byhisfirst
theory
presupposed
as in an afterthought.
on absolute
connotative
concepts
only,introducing
eye
concepts
10Theeditions
in footnote
4.
areindicated
usedforeachoftheseworks
" and
"
"enunciatio
11Burley
theexpressions
usesinterchangeably
,"
propositio
apparently
"
"
all theseterms
I am translating
sometimes
oratiotospeakofsentences.
by"sentence."
12See QPH,3.55,
248andMPH,1.02p. 45.
p.
13See Cat,prooemium
, sign.C3 vb-C4ra.
14In a treatise
of thearsvetus
as doesGat,to hislastcommentary
whichbelongs,
,
is conceived
withmental
actsbywhichsomething
identified
("possum
Burley
concepts
in
humanam
enimde homine
habereunumconceptum
naturam,"
Expositio
quo concipio
inthesametext,
withmental
librum
universalim,
, sign.A2 rb)andlater,
qualities
prooemium
19:35:14 PM
196
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
197
19:35:14 PM
198
ELIZABETH
KARGER
or ofgenera.
Butsomething
couldalsobe meant,
thoserelations
quitedifferent
namely
which
holdbetween
distinct
individuals
ofthesamespecies
orofthesamegenus
byvirtue
oftheir
or ofthesamegenus.Theserelations
arenotidentity
beingofthesamespecies
relations
at all.Thedifference
is onewhich
seemstobe driving
at inQPH,1.84,
Burley
Ockham
isperfectly
whoadmitted
andgeneric
aware,
(p. 214),andisoneofwhich
specific
in thelattersense,butnotin theformer
, d. 2, q. 6; OTh II,
identity
(see Ordinatio
and"generic"
taken
are,ofcourse,
p. 202,lin.18-p.203,lin.16).Here"specific"
identity
in theformer
sense.See thefollowing
footnote.
22Identity
as applicable
to all entities,
individuals
andcommon
is calledby
natures,
"numerical"
"inthecommon
or widesense."Identity
as applicable
Burley
identity
only
toindividuals
iscalled"numerical"
"inthestrict
sense."
as applicable
identity
Identity
only
tocommon
natures
onecalled"specific"
is oftwokinds,
theother
idenidentity,
"generic"
themanytexts
where
thisview,I quotefrom
theprooemium
tity.
Amongst
Burley
expresses
inlibrum
ofhisExpositio
universalim:
"idemnumero
sic dictum
E.K) est
(sc.communiter
ad idemnumero
stricte
et ad unumspecieet ad unumgenere
et est
superius
acceptum
commune
cuilibet
ente"(sign.A5 ra).Notethattheproperty
thata thing
hasofbeing
from
all others
self-identical
anddistinct
or all others
ofthesame
(all others
generally
is often
toas the"unity"
Forevery
referred
ofthething.
there
will,
typeofidentity,
type)
be a corresponding
inthetext
Thisexplains
then,
that,
typeof"unity."
Burley
justquoted,
ofthe"identity"
ofa thing
andofits"unity."
speaks
23".interchangeably
. . quodlibet
enimuniversale
velestaptum
natum
de pluripraedicatur,
praedicari
bus"(Expositio
inlibrum
universalium
of
, tr.2, c. 1,sign.B6 vb).Thoughtheseveral
things
whicha common
is predicable
nature
lessgeneral,
common
other,
natures,
mayinclude
include
in it.Notethat,
theindividuals
which
sincea predication
theyalways
participate
involves
theformation
ofa sentence,
thata common
nature
is predicable
theverynotion
ofeachoftheindividuals
canform
in itpresupposes
thattheintellect
which
participate
a sentence
withan individual
as itssubject
nature
anda common
as itspredicate.
24"... aliquoduniversale
habetessein animatantum
et aliquodhabetesseextraanimamet aliquoduniversale
habetessetamin animaquamextraanimam"
in
(Expositio
librum
universalium,
prooemium)
sign.A4 rb).
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
199
25"Secundo
et aliquasinestaliquaresuniversalis
notari
potest
quodextraanimam
notari
secundo
ex eodempotest
rerum;
quodenunciado
gularis;
patethocperdivisionem
inlibrum
etsingularia"
ex rebusextraanimam
(.Expositio
quaesuntuniversalia
componitur
, lib.I, tr.2, c. 2, sign.L5 rb).
perihermeneias
26See section
1.1above.
27"Circaenunciationem
ex rebusquasintelsciendum
in mente
quodistacomponitur
talis
asserat
vocesesseeasdem,
Si enimintellectus
lectusasserit
esseeademet diversa.
talisenunesseeasdem,
resextraanimam
Et si asserat
enunciatio
exvocibus.
componitur
ex rebusextraanimam"
ciadocomponitur
(QPH,3.553,p. 249).
19:35:14 PM
200
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
201
be called a "verbal copula" since it consistsin a verb. By contrast,mental sentences(in our sense),i.e. sentencesthe termsof which are things,
have no verbal copula. Their only copula is the veryact of composition
or divisionby which the sentenceis formed.
Since the only copula of a mentalsentence(in our sense) is the act of
compositionor of divisionby whichthe sentenceis formed,thisact must
be regardedas containedin the sentenceas one of its parts. Otherwise,
eisits coptherewould be no componentpart of the sentenceidentifiable
ula. It followsthat,whereaswritten,spokenand conceptualsentencesare
composed of homogeneousentities,mental sentences(in our sense) are
composedof heterogeneousones. For, by virtueof havinga verbal copula, writtenand spoken sentencesexistentirelyoutsidethe mind,33since
all theircomponentparts,subject,predicateand copula, are wordswhich
"have existenceoutsidethe mind."34Conceptualsentencesexist,of course,
"entirelywithinthe mind," since all theircomponentparts are mental
Mental sentences(in our sense) are, however,composed of entientities.35
ties of two kinds,since theycontain extra-mentalentities(at least most
of the time)as theirsubject and predicate,and a mentalentityas their
copula.36As Burleysays,such a sentenceis "partlyin the intellect,partly
outsidethe intellect."37
Revertingto our question: how can the mind forma sentencewith
ones, as its terms?The answerwhichBurley
things,possiblyextra-mental
thisby firstapprehendingtwo things
mind
achieves
would give is thatthe
and thenassertingthemto be the same or not to be the same. The ensuing sentencehas those thingsas its termsand that act of assertionas its
copula. Mental sentencescan then be characterizedas having thingsas
theirtermsand a mentalact as theircopula, an act consistingin assertof those things.
ing the identityor non-identity
A few consequencesfollowimmediately.From the fact that the copula of a mentalsentenceis alwaysan act of assertion,it followsthatevery
mentalsentencecarriesassertiveforce.From the fact that the assertion
or a negativecontent,it followsthat thereare
may have an affirmative
33". . . propositio
extraanimam"
inprolatione
esttotaliter
, sign.G4 rb).
(Gat,prooemium
34"... componitur
ibid.
esseextraanimam"
ex vocibus
quaehabent
35"... propositio
ibid.
in intellectu"
esttotaliter
ex conceptibus
verocomposita
36"Dicoergoquodnullapropositio
extraaniex rebus<est>totaliter
[est]composita
autem
materialia
estin mentevelin intellectu,
in talipropositione
mam,quiaformale
31.
theonequotedin footnote
follows
suntextraanimam"
ibid.Thistextimmediately
37"Compositio
etpartim
extraintellectum.
estin intellectu,
ex rebuspartim
composita
extra
esttotaliter
ad materialia
sedquantum
ad suumformale
estinintellectu,
Quantum
intellectum"
ibid.
19:35:14 PM
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ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
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203
19:35:14 PM
204
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
205
19:35:14 PM
206
KARGER
ELIZABETH
the
whereas the termsof writtenor spoken sentenceshave significates,
termsof mental sentencesare theirown significates.
Consequently,for
betweena term
termsof writtenor spokensentences,thereis a difference
thereis none for
suppositingforitselfand suppositingforits significate;
termsof mentalsentences.
We can now explicate more fullywhat Burley is saying,or rather
implying,in the textjust quoted. He is implyingthat some mentalsentences,the termsof which are things,assert,via theircopula, that their
termsare identical(ifthe copula is unnegated)or thattheyare not identical (ifthe copula is negated).This will be the case wheneverthe terms
suppositforthemselves,and thus eitherwhen the thingsare individuals,
since the termsthennecessarilysuppositforthemselves,
or when theyare
commonnaturestakenas suppositing
forthemselves.
But,he is also implythat
other
mental
sentences
via
their
assert,
ing
copula, that the things
forwhich theirtermssuppositare identical(if the copula is unnegated),
or that theyare not identical(ifthe copula is negated),where the things
suppositedfor are distinctfromthe termsthemselves.Now, thiswill be
the case only if at least one of the termsis a common nature,supposit"
ing for the individualswhich are its supposita
Where the firstalternativeapplies,i.e. wherethe termsare things,individualsor commonnatures,suppositingforthemselves,
the sentencemust
be a singularone. The sentencemust also be a singularone if its subject termis a thingtaken as suppositingforitself,howeverits predicate
termis taken.47But where the mentalsentencehas as its subjectterma
" it willbe a
commonnaturesuppositingforits "supposita
generalsentence.
1.4.2
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
207
termsof mentalsentences,postdatesby many years all of Ockham's relbe ruled out that Burleyborrowed
evant writings.It cannot, therefore,
the idea of thisextensionof suppositiontheoryfromOckham.
Some indicationcan, however,be foundin QPH that thiswas probably not the case and that Burleymay well have conceived of the idea
of extendingthe propertyof suppositionto termsof mental sentences
alreadywhen he was composingthis work,and, therefore,long before
Ockham had startedcomposingany of his own. The relevanttextis one
which explainshow a mental sentence- a sentencethe termsof which
- can be a universalsentence.In S. Brown's edition,the word
are things
"
" has been
mistakenlysubstituted(if not by the editor,by a
distinguitur
"
." Once corrected,the textcan be seen to suggest
copyist)for distribuitur
to be universal,it is requiredthat the thing
sentence
for
a
mental
that,
forms
its subject-termbe "distributed."This
which
common
nature)
(a
extendsto mentalsentencesa logicaldoctrineoriginallyapplied
suggestion
to spoken or writtensentences,according to which a necessary and
conditionfora sentenceto be universalis that its subject-term
sufficient
as can a spoken or
But can a real thingbe "distributed,"
be distributed.
to
writtenterm?It can, Burleybelieves. By definition, be distributedis
in such a
fora termof a sentenceto be "divided" into severalsupposita
- i.e. the truthof the sentence- is "saved" in each; now that
that
it
way
whichcommonnaturescan have, when used as terms,
is surelya property
no less than spoken or writtengeneralterms.49
This is a very remarkabletext, revealingthat, already in his early
career,Burleywas fullyprepared to extendthe propertyof distribution,
originallyassignedto termsof spoken or writtensentences,to the terms
of mental sentences.Distributionand suppositionare propertiesof the
same type,however,namelylogical propertieswhich termshave in sentences.It would be surprising,
then,if Burleyhad not been just as preextend
the
of
to
property suppositionto termsof mentalsentences.
pared
49Substituting
thetext
for"distingui,"
and "distribui"
for"distinguitur"
"distribuitur"
est
talisenunciado
si enunciado
sic habetessein mente,
"71/quaeres',
readsas follows:
distribuitur
enunciationis
itaquodaliquaestuniversalis;
alicuius
igitur
parsillius
quantitatis,
universalis
dicendum
est:concedo
etitaveraresextraanimam
distribuitur;
quodpropositio
... etconcedo
habetesseinmente
distribuitur,
quiadistribui
quodveraresextraanimam
in diversis
dividiita quodsalvetur
nonestaliudquamin supposita
(QPH,
suppositis"
thedefirecalls
hereina waywhich
defines
distribution
3.643,
p. 254).NotethatBurley
estuniusin
towhom:"distributio
hadgiven,
nition
which
Lambert
ofAuxerre
according
in Alessio1971,p. 229).
divisadivisio"
VIII, ed. F. Alessio
[Logica,
19:35:14 PM
208
1.4.3
ELIZABETH
KARGER
sentences
ofmental
Qualityand quantity
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
209
19:35:14 PM
2 10
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
211
55 and in a
in his Reportatio
on
redactionof his Ordinato,
Disputedquestion
the activityof the intellect,which are amongsthis very firstworks.In
when he deals
later works,as well as in later additionsto the Ordinatio,
withmentalsentences,he eitherpresentshis earlytheoryas one amongst
several equally probable ones, or he ignoresit entirelyand presentsa
theoryinstead. The theoryof mental sentenceswhich
whollydifferent
can be meaningfully
compared with that of Burley is his early theory,
however.It is, then,to that theorythat I now turn.
As Burleybeforehim, Ockham, too, consideredthereto be sentences
of variouskinds,thoughnever more than three,namelywritten,spoken
and mental.He also admitted,as Burleyhad, that these sentencesform
an ordering,thoughhe called the relationwherebytheyare ordered"subnot "signification."
Nevertheless,the resultingorderingis
ordination,"56
the same as it is accordingto Burley,since writtensentencesare subordinated to spoken ones and spoken ones to sentencesto which no furthersentencesare subordinated,which are then the "ultimate"sentences
of the ordering.As Burleysometimes,Ockham alwaysrefersto thoseultimate sentencesas to sentencesexisting"in the mind."57They, of course,
are the sentenceswe shall be calling"mentalsentences,"thoughOckham
"
mentales
himselfcalled them "propositions
only in later works.58
Ockham (the earlyOckham) has not provideda general characterization of mentalsentences.We must,then,extractone fromthe relevant
textsby lookingat what he has to say about mentalsentencesin different
to show that,accordplaces. What he does claim in severalplaces suffices
of
are
sentences
mental
to
some
him,
composed things,as they all
ing
are accordingto Burley.Indeed, the claim he makesin one place is strikinglysimilar,in its verywording,to those made by Burleyin the texts
quoted in section 1.3.
2.1
sentences
ofmental
Thingsas terms
19:35:14 PM
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ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
213
19:35:14 PM
214
ELIZABETH
KARGER
sentences
Thingsor fictaas terms
ofmental
19:35:14 PM
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215
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216
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
217
is not sufficiently
apprehensionof an existingindividual,thoughintuitive,
act
will
be
abstractive
one
then
clear,
immediatelycaused, having
only
the generalconcept of actual being as its object.76
"
"
Now, mostacts, especiallyif repeated,give rise to a habituswhichis
preservedin the agentand is latercapable of causinga similaract.77This
is true,in particular,of an abstractiveact, caused by an intuitivecognition,and havinga given concept as object. It will give rise,especiallyif
"
"
is
repeated,to a habituswhich is preservedin the intellect.This habitus
will
cause
are
conditions
if
the
of
present,
right
causing,and,
capable
anotherabstractiveact, havingas its object the same conceptas the original one. Moreover,this "second" abstractiveact will be caused without
the agentbeingtherebymade to thinkof any one of the individualthings
caused him to formhis "first"abstracofwhichhad originally
theintuition
tive act withthat concept as object.78Indeed, these things,he may well
have forgotten.
An abstractiveact having a concept as its object can then.be caused
eitherby an intuitiveact or by a habitus.It can be caused by a habitus
,
as
same
the
act
if
abstractive
some
however,only
concept object
having
has been caused in the past by an act of directcognitionof an individual (or of individuals).It followsthat no abstractiveacts havingconcepts
as theirobjects,and hence no general acts of thinkingwould ever have
been caused if the intellecthad never had any directcontactwith particulars.It furtherfollowsthat everyconcept ultimatelydepends for its
76"... nonessetinconveniens
instanti
causaretur
nisialiudobstaret
cogquodinprimo
communisnatura
Priustarnen
et speciei
nitioetcommunissimi
conceptus
specialissimae.
ad iliumconceptum
sufficiunt
speciei
specialissimus,
quamad conceptum
quiapauciora
etperconsequens
sinealioetnone converso,
causari
etitailleposset
priusnatura"
simae,
d. 3, q. 5; OTh II, p. 478,lin.1-7).
{Ord.
77"... omnishabitus
ex quibusgenead actusconsimiles
inclint
immediate
praecise
to
a habitus',
acts
all
acts
rise
Not
lin.
OTh
11-2.
rator"
VI,
403,
12;
give
III,
p.
Rep. q.
I canneverform
I mayhaveseena thing,
often
do not.However
ofintuitive
cognition
can
ofthething
which
wouldcausemetoseeitagain.Onlythepresence
an inclination
causemeto do so.
naturally
78Thussomeone
a concept
oflionforexama givenspecies-concept,
whohasgrasped
should
be assothatthatconcept
seenan individual
lion,andwhohaslearnt
ple,having
hasbeen
iftheright
habitus
can thenlater,
ciatedwitha givenword(theword"lion"),
onceagain,namely
theword,
byan actpartially
formed,
graspthatconcept
uponhearing
madeto recallanyindividual
He doesthiswithout
causedbythehabitus.
beingthereby
non
ethabitoconceptu
habericonceptus,
reintellecta
lions.". . . quiaquacumque
potest
habehabericognitio
etfaciliter
hocpotest
statim
rei,ideoprimoet communius
propter
ressingularis"
turconceptus,
(Ord.d. 22,q. 1; OTh IV,
voce,quamquaecumque
prolata
p. 51,lin.10-3).
19:35:14 PM
2 18
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
219
2.2.2 An extension
ofsupposition
theory
, Ockham admittedthat,if a mental sentence
Having introducedficta
as its
can be formedwithapprehendedindividuals,possiblyextra-mental,
as
its
and
formed
with
also
one
with
terms,85
terms,one can also be
ficta
as its terms.86
The subject and
an apprehendedindividualand a fictum
the predicateof a mental sentenceis then eitheran apprehendedindior a fictum.
vidual,possiblyextra-mental,
a
Ockham made further,
bold, move: he extendedsuppositiontheory,
originallyconceived to be applied to termsof writtenand spoken sentences,to termsof mentalsentences.He admittedthat,if the subjector
the predicateof a mentalsentenceis an apprehendedindividual,it supHe furtheradmittedthat,if it is a fictum
, it
positsnecessarilyforitself.87
supposits,by its verynature,for the individualsit is common to, those
He did not deny thata fictum
of whichit is a sortof blue-print.88
is, nevtaken
for
itself.
sometimes
as
ertheless,
suppositing
We have seen thatBurleymade the same bold move of extendingsuppositiontheoryto termsof mentalsentences,thoughwe could only conjecture that he probablydid so independentlyof Ockham. Whetherhe
did or not,the resultingtheoriesare clearlyanalogous. On both theories,
individualssuppositnecessarilyfor themselves,whereas entitiescommon
to individuals,thoughtheymay be taken as suppositingfor themselves,
ordinarilysuppositforthe individualstheyare common to.
andgeneral
mental
sentences
2.2.3 Singular
By extendingthe propertyof suppositionto termsof mentalsentences,
whethertheybe apprehendedindividualsorficta
, Ockham was in a positionto accountforgeneralmentalsentences,as well as forsingularones.
If the subject-term
of a mental sentenceis an apprehendedindividual,
seeGat,tr.2, c. 2, sign.E2 rb.On individual
butnotbyhim(onindividual
quantities,
relational
seeGat,tr.2, c. 3, sign.E6 vb).
entities,
85"... ex his(fictis)
forman
turpropositiones"
inLibrum
Perihermeneias
Aristotelu
,
(Expositio
OPh II, p. 360,lin.27-8).
Lib.I, prooemium
7;
86See footnote
83.
87Talking
ofthetruths
inwhich
"Godhimself
issubject"
Ockham
[Deusinsesubicitur],
"... in illis. . . Deussubratione
etprose ipsosupponet"
writes:
deitatis
... et supponet
Ord.Prol.,
q. 9; OTh I, p. 269,lin.29-p.270,lin.3. Thesamewouldholdofanyapprehended
orindeed
ofa mental
sentence:
theindividual
would
individual,
subject,
predicate,
andwouldsupposit
foritself.
supposit
88"... illudfictum
in esse
. . . quoniam
esttalein esseobiectivo
qualeestsingulare
estaliquo
ideoex natura
suapotest
subiectivo,
supponere
proipsissingularibus
quorum
modosimilitudo"
(Ord.d. 2, q. 8; OTh II, p. 274,lin.17-9).
19:35:14 PM
220
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
221
The mental
mental
syncategorematics
copulaand other
However that may be, the fact is that,on Ockham's early theory,a
mental sentenceis a sentenceeach term of which is eitheran appreWhat has not yetbeen explained,however,
hendedindividualor a fictum.
is how the intellectsucceeds in forminga sentencewith such entitiesas
its terms.
act?
2.3.1 Can themental
copulabe a mental
In the textfromthe Ordinatio
quoted earlier,of which Wodeham provided an improvedversion,Ockham seems to be claimingthat a mental
90See section
itis
2.2.1aboveandthetextquotedin footnote
where
78,inparticular
hocpotest
said:". . . habito
nonpropter
statim
et faciliter
habencognitio
rei."
conceptu
91It might
be objected
totheSumma
that,
fogicae
according
(parsI, c. 1; OPhI, p. 8-9,
lin.53-65),
where
twosenses
of"sign"
aredistinguished,
there
a senseinwhich
is,indeed,
an entity
is a signofa thing
forthatthing,
a condionlyifitis capableofsuppositing
tionwhich,
is deemed
it beingalsorequired
thattheentity
however,
insufficient,
"bring
thething
intocognition"
in cognitionem
It is in thissenseof"sign"thata
[facit
venire].
is a signofa thing,
ina sensewhich
stillincludes
thenotion
of"calling
tomind"
concept
is signified.
whatever
Ifthisis thedoctrine
in theSumma
contained
thatitmustbe
, itdoesnotfollow
iogicae
inearlier
alsotheonecontained
works.
Letusnotforget
intheSumma
Ockham
that,
bgicae,
hasabandoned
thetheory
towhich
areficta
andhasidentified
instead
according
concepts
withactsofcognition.
trueto sayofan actofcognition
that
Now,itis trivially
concepts
it "brings
a thing
intocognition"
sinceit is thecognition
ofthatthing(or
(orthings)
The samecannotbe saidofficta,
however.
It follows
thatthereis a difference
things).
between
thesensein whicha fictum
is a signandthatin whichan actofcognition
is a
a fictum
in thesensethatitis capableofsuppositis a signofa thing
sign:whereas
only
an actofcognition
is a signofa thing
both
in thatsenseandin the
ingforthatthing,
senseofmaking
theintellect
aware(perhaps
ofthething.
"psychological"
confusedly)
92It is important
torealizethatOckham
didnotintroduce
becausehe hadfound
ficta
thenotion
thata mental
sentence
is composed
ofreally
an "utterly
untenexisting
things
able"one,as C. Panaccio
wouldhaveus believe
thathe did(seePanaccio1992,p. 138).
On thecontrary,
he thenfound
thatnotion
an entirely
he introone.Rather,
acceptable
duced
because
hefound
thenotion
thatsomereally
arenon-individuals
ficta
existing
things
an untenable
forepistemologica!
andlogicalreasons,
nonone,butnevertheless,
regarded
19:35:14 PM
222
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
223
and affirmation
as mental
acts
Themental
negation
copulaas an inherence;
19:35:14 PM
224
ELIZABETH
KARGER
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
225
19:35:14 PM
ELIZABETH
KARGER
226
39
Themental
mental
as "instituted
copulaandother
concepts
syncategorematics
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
227
even the
is thatmentalsyncategorematics,
What Ockham is suggesting
and
with
semantic
which
have
been
invested
or
are
concepts ficta
copula,
As
he
himself
says,they
syntactic
propertiestheydo not naturallyhave108.
are conceptswhich have been "instituted."109
They can then be used in
accordance not with theirnature,in which case theywould be used to
suppositforthe thingstheyare common to, but withtheir"institution,"
in which case theyare used as syncategorematics.
withappropriatesemanIn principle,theintellectcould investanyfictum
could serve as a copula,
tic and syntacticproperties,and thus anyfictum
In practicehowever,
as a sign of negationor as a sign of quantification.
will
it has abstracted
a
which
Ockham surmises,the intellect choose fictum
froma word of some spoken (or written)language which already has
thoseproperties.110
This is not the place to investigatethis intriguingtheoryfurther.Let
us note onlythatit positsmentalsyncategorematics
correspondingto the
of spoken (or written)language. From this it
main syncategorematics
followsthat the qualityand quantityof mental sentencesare accounted
for in the same way as theyare in the case of spoken or writtensenin the
tences,namelyby the presenceof the relevantsyncategorematics
sentence,exercisingthe requiredeffecton the termsand on the sentence
as a whole.
On thistheory,different
thoughit be fromthe precedingone, the act
of forminga mentalsentenceis surelystillto be thoughtof as the simultaneousapprehensionof all the componentsof thesentence.The diffrence
is thatthesecomponentsmay now include a sign of negationas well as
signs of quantification.One may furtherassume that, by being apprehended togetherwiththe entitieswhich formthe termsof the sentence,
each of the syncategorematics
ipsofactoexercisesits appointedrle on the
termsand on the sentenceas a whole. These syncategorematics
can then
be regardedas the means by which the intellectforms,withgiven entiratherthan negative,
tiesas terms,a mentalsentencewhichis affirmative
or vice versa,as well as one whichis particularratherthan universal,or
vice versa.
108
Suchas theproperty
of"signifying
a property
whichsignsof
onlywithanother,"
tantum
cumalio](ibid.,
have[competit
. . . quodsignificet
p. 286,lin.1-4).
quantification
109 . . dicerent
nonsunt
et negativi
et connotativi
syncategorematici
quodconceptus
a rebusexsuanatura
abstracti
... etideodicerent
quod
conceptus
supponentes
prorebus
necconnotativus
nisitantum
ex
necnegativus,
nullus[est]conceptus
syncategorematicus
institutione"
285,lin.11-6).
(ibid.,
p.
1,0". . . potest
. . . hoc
abstractos
a rebusad significandum
instituere
ipsosconceptus
fitconvenientius
abstractos
tamen
a vocibus"
(ibid.,
perconceptus
p. 286,lin.11-4).
19:35:14 PM
228
2.4
ELIZABETH
KARGER
s earlytheoiy
sentences
of Ockham3
ofmental
Summary
Let us reviewwhat we know of Ockham's earlytheoryor mentalsentences.The main featureswe have noted are the following.
The mind can formsentencesthe subject and predicateof which is
.
eitheran apprehendedindividual,possiblyan extra-mental
one, or a fictum
If the subject or the predicate is an apprehendedindividual,it always
, thoughit can suppositforitself,it supsuppositsforitself;if it is a fictum
for
the
individualsit is common to. Subject
its
very nature,
posits,by
and predicateare, of course,linked to each otherby a copula, and the
copula is also an apprehendedentity.
As to the view which should preferablybe held regardingthe nature
of the mentalcopula, Ockham was apparentlyundecided.He considered
two alternativetheories.Accordingto one theory,the mental copula is
either an apprehended respectas
of inherenceor, more usually,a fictum
common to individualinherences.When exploringthis theory,Ockham
apparentlytoyedwiththe idea of makingthe qualityof a sentencedepend
on the way its termsand its copula are apprehended,by assumingthat
or negatively.He hardly
they can be apprehended either affirmatively
could have takenthatidea seriouslyhowever,since it would have entailed
a consequence at variance with his doctrineas a whole.
Anothertheory,which he seems to have favoredover the preceding
to the main syncateone, admitsmentalsyncategorematics
corresponding
written
or
of
Mental
gorematics
spoken language.
syncategorematics,
includingthe copula, are, withinthis alternativetheory,identifiedwith
, used not as signs of the individualsthey are common to, but in
ficta
accordance with the semantic and syntacticpropertieswith which the
investedthem.The qualityand the quantityof a
intellecthas arbitrarily
mental sentencewill then depend on the syncategorematics
it contains
just as those of a writtenor spoken sentencedo.
On both theoriesof the mental copula, a mentalsentenceis thought
of as formedwhen the intellectapprehendssuitableentitiesall together.
These must include three main entities,one of which will exercisethe
rle of linkingthe othertwo as a subjectto a predicate.On one theory
of the mentalcopula, thisrle is exercisedby virtueof the natureof the
entityto which the mental copula is identified;on the other,thisrle is
exercisedby virtueof the fact that the chosen entityhas been arbitrarily investedwith the requiredfunction.
It is time to draw conclusions.How do mental sentences,as conceived
by Burley, compare with mental sentencesas conceived by the early
19:35:14 PM
BURLEYANDOCKHAM
229
betweenthem.
Ockham?Assuredly,thereare some importantdifferences
mental
sentences
as
their
to
terms,entities
may contain,
According Burley,
of
as
real
commonto individuals,thought
things.Accordingto Ockham,
the entitiescommonto individuals,which mentalsentencesmay contain,
are allficta
, thoughtof as havingno real existencewhatsoever.Moreover,
the copula it is identified
by Burleywiththe veryact of formingthe sentence,whereasit is identifiedby Ockham with an entitywhich must be
apprehended,along withthe termsof the sentence,by the intellectforming the sentence.Finally,on what seems to be Ockham's preferredthedeterminingthe quality
ory,mentalsentencescontain syncategorematics
and quantityof the sentence,just as spoken and writtensentencesdo,
whereas, according to Burley,there are apparentlyno other syncategorematicsthan various copulas, the particularcopula determiningthe
qualityand the quantityof the sentence.
Mental sentenceson the theoryof Burleyand mentalsentenceson the
theoryof the early Ockham have, nevertheless,very basic featuresin
common. Firstly,on both theories,a mental sentencemay contain an
individualas one of its terms(or one as each of its terms),an individual
taken as suppositingfor itself.Secondly,thoughon Ockham's theory,a
mental sentencecontainsa Jictum
where the correspondingsentenceon
Burley'stheorywould containa common nature,both thejictumand the
commonnatureare normallytakenas suppositingforthe individualsthey
are common to.
The main featurewhichmentalsentenceson Burley'stheoryand mental sentenceson the theoryof the early Ockham have in common is,
however,the following:theirtermsare apprehendedentities.This holds
of all terms,whethertheyare individualsor generalentitiescommon to
individuals,and whetherthe latterare regardedas reallyexistent,as they
are by Burley,or as existingmerelyas objectsof thought,as theyare by
Ockham. In this respect,mental sentences as conceived by the early
Ockham, have more in common with mentalsentencesas conceived by
Burley than they do with mental sentencesas conceived by the later
Ockham, who identifiedthem and their componentsnot with apprehended entities,but withmentalacts.
19:35:14 PM
230
ELIZABETH
KARGER
REFERENCES
Auxerre:
Firenze
1971.
Lamberti
Alessio1971- Lamberto
), ed. F. Alessio,
Logica
(Summa
Lesrapports
deGuillaume
d'Occam
etdeWalter
1934- L. Baudry,
, in:Archives
Burleigh
Baudry
et littraire
du MoyenAge,9 (1934),155-73.
doctrinale
d'histoire
etThorie
auXIVe
dusigne
sicle
Biard1989- J. Biard,Logique
, Paris1989.
onWilliam
Walter
Treatise
DeSuppositionibus
anditsinfluence
Brown
1972- S. Brown,
Burleigh's
32 (1972),15-64.
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
ofOckham
s Middle
onAristotle
in:
s Perihermenias
Brown1973- S. Brown,Walter
nurley
commentary
33 (1973),42-134.
Franciscan
Studies,
inLibrum
Perihermeneias
Brown1974- S. Brown;Walter
, in:Franciscan
Quaestiones
Burley's
34 (1974),200-95.
Studies,
inWalter
lastcommentary
onthe
arsvetus
Conti1990- A. Conti,
, in:Franciscan
Burley's
Ontology
50 (1990),121-76.
Studies,
Thereception
s thought
inFourteenth-century
1987- W.J.Courtenay,
ofOckham'
Courtenay
Ockham
toWyclif
Oxford
in:A. Hudson& M. Wilks(eds.),From
1987,89England
107.
designificato
universalis
deHarclay:
Gi 1971- G. Gi,Henricus
, in:Franciscan
Quaestio
conceptas
31 (1971),178-234.
Studies,
: Summa
toGuillelmi
deOckham
eds.Ph.Boehner,
Gi& Brown
1974- Introduction
Logicaey
N.Y. 1974,7*-73*.
St.Bonaventure,
G. Gi,S. Brown,
inLibrum
Secunda
Primm
Sententiarum
deWodeham:
Lectura
Gi & Wood1990- , Adam
, eds.
St.Bonaventure,
G. Gi andR. Wood,3 volumes,
N.Y.,1990.
etdesondiscours
dela pensee
Theories
chezGuillaume
, desesobjets
Karger1994- E. Karger,
33 (1994),437-56.
d'Occam
, in:Dialogue,
andAdam
Wodeham
onthe
William
Chatton
, Walter
objects
ofOckham
Karger1995- E. Karger,
33 (1995),171-96.
andbelief
in:Vivarium,
ofknowledge
1973.
Nuchelmans
1973- G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
, Amsterdam-London,
oftheProposition
1991.
etleschoses
Lesmots,
lesconcepts
Panaccio1991- C. Panaccio,
, Montral-Paris
in:Philosophical
From
mental
word
tomental
Panaccio1992- C. Panaccio,
Topics,
language,
20 (1992),125-47.
44
Wood1984 R. Wood,Walter
commentaries
Studies,
, in: Franciscan
Burley's
Physics
(1984),275-303.
Paris
CNRS
19:35:14 PM
Thingsin theMind
33
over"Intelligible
Controversies
Fourteenth-Century
Species
DOMINIK PERLER
/
traditionsubscribedto the
All medievalphilosophersin the Aristotelian
thesisthat materialthingsare hylomorphiccompounds: they consistof
matterand form.On the basis of thismetaphysicalthesistheyalso subscribedto the epistemologicalthesisthat we are able to acquire a cognitionof materialthingsby receivingtheir"formwithoutthe matter."1
This second thesis,however,sparkedan intensedebate in the late thirteenthand the fourteenth
century.How is it possible for us to abstract
or "stripoff" the formfromthe matter?What psychologicalprocesses
are necessaryto do that?And what kindof cognitiondo we acquire when
we receivethe form?
authors
To answer these questions,a number of thirteenth-century
the
Thomas
Duns
them
Albert
Great,
Scotus)
(among
Aquinas, John
and psychologicaltheory:the species
developeda complexepistemological
theory.2
They claimed that the receivingof the formwithoutthe matter
consistsin the factthatthe soul receivesspecial entities,so-calledspecies
which are endowed with a representational
function.In accord{species),
ance withthe traditionaldistinctionbetweenthe sensitiveand the intellectivepart of the soul, the medievalAristotelians
between
distinguished
two typesof species.3
1 See De anima
II, 12 (424al7-21).
2 On theancient
rootsandmedieval
intelliseeL. Spruit,
ofthistheory,
Species
origins
From
toKnowledge
Roots
andMedieval
Discussions
, vol.1: Classical
, Leiden1994;
gibilis.
Perception
K.H. Tachau,Vision
andCertitude
inthe
andtheFoundations
, Epistemologa
AgeofOckham.
Optics
Semantics
1250-1345
, Leiden1988(especially
of3
partI).
themedievais
To explain
therelationship
between
theperceived
andtheperceiver,
thing
alsointroduced
a third
inmedio.
Thisentity
wassupthespecies
typeofspecies,
namely
thething's
form
a medium
posedtotransmit
through
(e.g.theair)to thesenseorgan(e.g.
theeye).SinceI willfocuson thepsychological
thatare
and epistemological
processes
I willnotdiscuss
which
forreceiving
theform,
thisthird
required
played
typeofspecies,
a crucial
roleinphysical
andoptical
Fora thorough
seeK.H. Tachau,
treatment,
theory.
Vision
intheAgeofOckham
der"species
in
andCertitude
, op.cit.,andA. Maier,Das Problem
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:35:21 PM
232
DOMINIK
PERLER
sensibilis
), which
(1) The sensitivepart receivesthe sensiblespecies[species
form
in
a
situation.
as
it
is
concrete
the
Thus,
perceived
represents thing's
the treeexactly
a personlookingat a treereceivessome entityrepresenting
in the way it is givenin thatsituation:as an object witha certaincolour,
a certainshape, etc.
part of the soul
(2) On the basis of the sensiblespecies,the intellective
which
abstractsthe intelligiblespecies [speciesintelligibilis
),
representsthe
pure formof the thing.Thus, afterreceivinga sensiblespecies of a concrete tree the agent intellectabstractsan intelligiblespecies which representsnothingbut the pure formof the tree: the formstrippedof all
individualqualitiesand all perceptualcircumstances.
As soon as someone is in possessionof an intelligiblespecies,he or
she has "assimilated"the thing or is "informed"by the thing,as the
medievaissaid- not because such a person has literallybecome like the
thing(someoneperceivinga treedoes not become like a tree),but because
of that
he or she has acquired a representation
(oftencalled a similitudo)
is
somehow
in the
a
the
means
of
such
representation thing
thing.4By
intellectand can be cognized even when it is not physicallypresentor
no longerexisting.
It is obvious thatsuch an explanationraises a host of questions.What
sensorycontact with the thingdo we need so that we will be able to
receivea species?What ontologicalstatusdoes a species have? And how
exactlyare the two types of species related to the materialthing?All
and
these questionswere subject to heated debate in the late thirteenth
critical
raised
the early fourteenth
Yet
some
authors
not
only
century.5
questionsconcerningdetailsof the species theory,but triedto refutethe
" und
Gesammelte
Mittelalter.
medio
dieneue
des14.Jahrhunderts
, ineadem,
Ausgehendes
Naturphilosophie
des14.Jahrhunderts
zurGeistesgeschichte
, Roma1967,419-51.
Aufstze
4 See forexample
De anima
Albertus
3,
VII/1,lib.3, tract.
, ed. Coloniensis
Magnus,
art.2. Note
Summa
ThomasAquinas,
85,
I,
1968,
223-4;
q.
theologiae
cap. 12,Mnster
" didnot
in the
mean"likeness"
or "similitude"
thatthetechnical
term"similitudo
simply
in receiving
a
theprocess
ofassimilation:
modern
sense.It wasrather
usedto designate
As faras I can see,
similitudo
theperceiver
himself
to theperceived
assimilates
,
thing.
"
" becamea technical
Le
See forinstance
term
century.
onlyin thefourteenth
repraesentatio
trait
del'medeJeanBuridan
, ed. byB. Patar,Louvain1991,liberIII,
[Deprima
lectura]
natuestquodspeciesintelligibilis
estquaedamqualitas
q. 10,457: ". . . imaginandum
dicitur
esseinspeculo,
recte
raliter
sicut
obiecti,
imago,
quaevulgariter
repraesentativa
ipsius
est
inproposito;
estrepraesentativa
reiobiectae
sedsicdirecte
intelligibilis
species
speculo;
intellectui."
reiquaeobicitur
imago
quaedam
repraesentativa
5 For an overview,
see L. Spruit,
., chs.III and IV, and
intelligibilis,
Species
op.cit
XIV
delsecolo
La nozione
ai maestri
F. Corvino,
di "specie
daDunsScoto
agostiniani
intelligibile"
e Ugolino
70(1978),149-78.
daRimini
daOrvieto
difilosofia
neo-scolastica,
(Gregorio
), in:Rivista
19:35:21 PM
233
19:35:21 PM
234
PERLER
DOMINIK
resentingentity.
In lightof thiscritique,thereseems to be a clash betweentwo explanaspecies theoryon the one hand, and
torymodels: the representational
Ockham's strictlycausal theoryon the other. Some commentatorssee
such a clash and understandOckham's rejectionof species above all as
a defenceof directrealism.9Sometimesthe species theoryis even seen
of the early modern "veil of perception"theas a medieval forerunner
a
that
i.e.
as
theory
ory,
posits entitieswhich preventthe intellectfrom
a
access
to
the extramentalworld. Thus, L. Spruitclaims
direct
having
in his recent,verycomprehensivestudyof the species theorythat Duns
Scotus, Ockham's favouritetarget,"seems to share the view that the
species is a veil betweenthe soul and the world."10
is hardly
In the following,I want to show that such an interpretation
adequate if one carefullyexaminesScotus's defenceof the speciestheory,
which was repeatedand elaboratedin detail by some of Ockham's concontroversies
What is at stake in the fourteenth-century
temporaries.11
over species (mostlyintelligiblespecies)is not so much a conflictbetween
as a clash betweentwo metaphysdirectrealismand representationalism
ical models a clash that had far-reaching
epistemologicalconsequences.
To show this,I will firstanalyseScotus's argumentsendorsingthe species
theory(sectionII). Then I will evaluate Ockham's critiqueof thesearguments and analyse his own explanationof the process of receivingthe
thing'sform(sectionIII). Finally,I will draw some conclusionsand try
between Scotus and Ockham
to uncover some of the basic differences
(sectionIV).
9 SeeP. Alfri,
C. Michon,
Nominalismi.
d'Ockham.
Lesingulier
Guillaume
, Paris1989,215-26;
Paris1994,43-9.
dela signification
La thorie
d'Occam,
10L. Spruit,
, op.cit.,266.
Species
intelligibilis
11Themostexplicit
seeCj.Lral,
wasJohnotReading;
defender
oftheScotist
doctnne
doctrinae
Scoti
deReading
denecessitate
Ioannis
, in:Franciscan
Quaestio
Defensio
specierum
intelligibilium.
werealsodefended
29 (1969),66-156.Theintelligible
Chatton;
Studies,
byWalter
species
di
andIntelligible
onSensible
seeK.H. Tachau& C. Luna,Walter
Chatton
, in:Rivista
Species
dellafilosofia,
40 (1985),711-48(especially
storia
742-7).
19:35:21 PM
235
II
and the Lectura
on theSentences
In his Commentary
(both in the Ordinatio
),
Duns Scotus presentsa long, elaborate defence of the species theory.12
This defenceis mainlya responseto Henry of Ghent who had launched
an attackagainstany theoryappealing to intelligiblespecies.13According
to Henry,all one can receive fromthe materialobjects are phantasms
( phantasmata
:), i.e. a kind of sensoryimages. It is not the additionalreceivor
abstractingof intelligiblespecies that makes the receptionof the
ing
thing'sformpossible,but the fact that the agent intellectacts upon the
fromthem that makes them reprephantasmsand abstractseverything
sentationsof particularobjects. In doing that,the agent intellectenables
thepossibleintellectto graspthe mere essenceof the objects.The process
of receivingthe formwithoutthe matteris thereforeto be understood
as a three-step
process.When someone looks at, say, a tree,(i) he or she
receivesan innerimage picturingthe treeas a particularobject withindividual qualities,(ii) his or her agent intellectthen "purges"thisimage of
all featuresthatmake it an image of thatparticulartree,and (iii) on the
basis of the universalimage the possible intellectapprehendsthe pure
essence of the tree.14
Henrydenies that,in additionto step (iii),the agent intellectneeds to
producea specialkindof entitycalled "intelligible
species."He also denies
thatthe possibleintellectneeds to receivesuch an entity.Not onlywould
since the phantasmitselfis capable of representing
that be superfluous,
an object and puttingthe possibleintellectin action. It would also have
absurdconsequences.For if the possibleintellectwere receivingan intelligiblespecies,it would take on some entity.But then it would undergo
12Sucha defence
can alsobe foundin theQuestions
on theDe anima.
Sincetheir
is disputed
Studien
Werk
DunsScotus
von
zumliterarischen
,
authenticity
(seeV. Richter,
Johannes
willbe basedon theOrdinatio
Mnchen
andpartly
alsoon the
1985,15-6),myanalysis
Lectura.
Allreferences
to Scotus's
workapplytotheVatican
Omnia
edition
,
(= Vat.),Opera
Civitas
Vaticana1950f.,
and to theWadding
omnia
edition
, Paris:Vivs
(= W), Opera
1891-5.
13SeeHenry
ofGhent,
summarized
Quodlibetum
V, q. 14,ed.Venice1613,f.262rb-va,
and in Led.I, d. 3, pars3,
byScotusin Ord.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1 (Vat.Ill, 201-06),
XVI,325-29).
q. 1
14(Vat.
ofdivine
alsohada theory
In addition
to thistheory
ofnatural
abstraction,
Henry
in
illumination
to explain
thistheory
thecognitive
Scotuspresents
andcriticizes
process.
iteven
Ord.I, d. 3,pars1,q. 4 (Vat.Ill, 126-48).
ButHenry
seemsto haveabandoned
it wasattacked
onthe
before
as S.P. Marrone,
andDunsScotus
byScotus,
ofGhent
Henry
63 (1988),22-57,convincingly
In anycase,divine
, in:Speculum,
ofBeing,
Knowledge
argues.
inHenry's
illumination
isnotmentioned
intheQuodlibetum
V, q. 14.On thedifferent
stages
intellectual
in theThought
see S.P. Marrone,
Truth
andScientific
of
development,
Knowledge
MA 1985.
, Cambridge,
Henry
ofGhent
19:35:21 PM
236
DOMINIK
PERLER
a real change in the way an object undergoesa real change when it takes
on an accident,say a colour. Henry categoricallyrejectssuch an idea:
when the possible intellectgrasps the essence of a thing,it merelyactivates its cognitivefaculty.This is possiblebecause the agentintellectprovides it with the "purged" phantasm.But such a cognitive
change should
not be mistakenfor a realchange. The transitionfroma purelypotential to an actual cognitivestate should not be viewed as if the possible
intellectwere literallytakingon some entity.15
If Duns Scotus wantsto refuteHenry'scriticism,
he has to tackletwo
he
has
to
make
clear
that
the
problems.First,
presence of a phantasm,
no matterhow much it is "purged" or manipulatedby the agent intellect, is not enough to bring about the receptionof the thing'sform.
Second, he has to explain what kind of change occurs in the intellectif
it is not simplya real change.
In his extensiveresponseto Henry, Scotus deals with both problems.
In the Ordination
he adduces fourmain arguments(in the earlierLectura
even six) in orderto show thatthe intelligible
speciesis necessaryin addition to the phantasm.I confinemyselfto presentingand discussingthe
firsttwo of them.
The firstargument,called "the argumentfromthe representing
phanThe phantasm that is received
tasm," can be summarizedas follows.16
froma singularobject always representsthis object under the aspect of
somethingsingular,no matterhow much it is manipulatedor transformed
function
by the agent intellect,because whateverhas a representational
an
a
under
and
certain
cannot
represents object
aspect
simultaneously
representit under anotheraspect. An object, however,can not only be
representedunder the aspect of somethingsingular,but also under the
one
aspect of somethinguniversal.To have a completerepresentation,
needs to representit under both aspects. Therefore,in addition to the
the thingunder the aspect of somethingsingular,
phantasmrepresenting
anotherrepresenting
entityis necessary.This furtherentityis the intelligible species.
This argumentis obviouslybased upon the thesisthata thinghas two
different
Scotus does not give a detailed explanationor
aspects (rationes).
of
this
thesis,but I thinkwe have to understandit in the
justification
15See Ord
. I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 336(Vat.Ill, 203),andLed.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,
n. 254(Vat.XVI,327).
16See Ord
. I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 352andn. 357(Vat.Ill, 211-12and215-16),
and
Led.I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1,n. 268(Vat.XVI,332).
19:35:21 PM
237
contextof his general metaphysicaltheoryabout the structureof material things.For Scotus, everyobject consistsof a common natureand a
difference"
thatmakesit somethingsingular.These
so-called"contracting
two aspectsare closelylinked;in extramental
reality,the firstneveroccurs
withoutthe second. But thisdoes not mean that the firstaspect is really
identicalwiththe second or thatit can be reducedto the second. Rather,
distinct:althoughexistingtogetherand formthe two aspectsare formally
ing togethera concreteobject, the two aspects can be conceived apart
fromeach other and are thereforedistinguishable.17
So, if we want to
of an object x, we need to distinguish
have an adequate representation
x
namely(1) representing
carefullybetweentwo typesof representation,
and (2) repdifference)
qua somethingsingular(in virtueof its contracting
resentingx qua somethinguniversal(in virtueof its common nature).18
two different
For thesetwotypesof representation,
devices
representational
are required:the phantasmfor (1) and the intelligiblespecies for (2).
The last claim, however,does not seem to be veryplausible at first
sight.Why shouldn'twe suppose that one and the same device can representan objectundermore than one aspect?We could say,forinstance,
that a pictureof a tree representsthis object under several aspects: qua
somethinggreen, qua somethingflowering,qua somethinginhabitedby
birds,etc. Why couldn't we say in a similarway that a phantasmrepresentsa materialobject under two aspects: qua somethingsingularand
qua somethinguniversal?
in Scotus'ssense,
This objectionoverlooksthe factthatan aspect {ratio),
is not simplya quality.Being green,flowering,
etc. are all visiblequalities,and for everytype of quality thereis a certaintype of phantasm.
The two aspects"universal"and "singular,"however,are not such qualities.They are ratherthe two most basic aspects which a thinghas in
the common nature and the
virtueof its two metaphysicalconstituents,
17On theformal
see Ord.I, dist.2, pars2, q. 1-4(Vat.II, 349-61)and
distinction,
Ord.II, dist.3,parsI, q. 6 (Vat.VII, 484).Fora concise
seeA.B.Wolter,
The
analysis,
Formal
Distinction
Adams(ed.),ThePhilosophical
DunsScotus
, in:M. McGord
,
ofJohn
Theology
Ithaca& London1990,27-41;M. McGord
intheEarly
Universais
Fourteenth
Adams,
,
Century
in:N. Kretzmann
etal. (eds.),TheCambridge
Medieval
, Cambridge
ofLater
History
Philosophy
1982,411-39(especially
414-5).
18Notethatthecommon
in itself
nature
is notsomething
itis indifferent
to
universal;
or singularity.
Butthepresence
ofthecommon
nature
in thething
enables
universality
to represent
thething
theintellect
undera universali
Thatis whyScotusstresses
aspect.
thepointthat,
theuniversal
is onlyinintellectu.
See Ord.I, dist.3,pars3,
strictly
speaking,
q. 1,n. 360(Vat.Ill, 218);Ord.II, dist.3, pars1, q. 1,n. 34 (Vat.VII, 404)andthe
etuniversaux
Relles
intentions:
nature
commune
selon
DunsScot
,
analysis
givenbyO. Boulnois,
in:Revuede Mtaphysique
etde Morale,
97 (1992),3-33(especially
26-30).
19:35:21 PM
238
DOMINIK
PERLER
19:35:21 PM
239
19:35:21 PM
240
PERLER
DOMINIK
19:35:21 PM
241
19:35:21 PM
242
PERLER
DOMINIK
hidden. The veil metaphor,oftenused to characterizethe modern theoryof ideas,26is inappropriatefora descriptionof Scotus'stheorybecause
the intelligiblespecies do not hide anything.On the contrary,theyare
the indispensablemeans the intellectneeds to have access to the thing's
universalaspect.Had the intellectonlythe phantasms,it would onlyhave
access to the actuallyexistingthing,presentqua somethingsingular.
A more appropriatemodernmetaphorforcharacterizing
Scotus's theory would be thatof the microscope.By lookingthroughthe microscope
one is able to see some microbiologicalaspects that are inaccessibleto
the unaided senses.Likewise,by usingthe intelligible
species the intellect
is able to grasp the thing'suniversalaspect that is inaccessibleto the
senses and to the unaided sensoryfaculty.The crucial point is that the
intelligiblespecies,like the microscope,is that bywhichsomethingis seen
under a certainaspect, not at all that which is seen.
One problem still remains.In my shortpresentationof Henry's critique I pointed out that the introductionof intelligiblespecies seems to
amount to the introduction
of a "real change" in the intellect.In receiva
the
intellect
to take on an accidentin the same way
seems
ing species,
that an object takes on an accident when it receivesa quality,say, a
colour. Thus, the intellectinvolvedin long cognitiveprocessesseems to
be continuallytakingon accidentsand thus to be in a continualprocess
of "real change." How can Scotus avoid this odd consequence?
To answer this question,we need to take into account that Scotus
between two kinds of change. He concedes that
carefullydistinguishes
thereis a "real change" in the intellectinsofaras the intellectperforms
a real operation.But thisdoes not mean thatthe intellecttakeson some
accidentin the way an object takes on a quality,say the colour brown.
For an object takingon the colour brown literallybecomes brown,but
the intellect"takingon" the intelligiblespecies representingsomething
brown does not become brown. The fact that the intellectundergoesa
"real change" simplymeans that the intellectproduces some device to
make the object present.But the device itselfis not brown,nor does it
make the intellectbrown.(When I look througha microscopeto see, say,
a virus,the microscopeitselfdoes not become infectedby the virus,nor
does it infectme. The microscopeis nothingbut a device I use to make
the virus cognitively
presentto me.) Scotus claims that it is the process
26It becamepopular
Hume:
Central
influential
workLocke,
J. Bennett's
through
Berkeley,
Themes
usedbyL. Spruit
, Oxford
1971,69,andwasrecently
(seeaboven. 10)to characterize
Scotus's
position.
19:35:21 PM
243
19:35:21 PM
244
DOMINIK
PERLER
19:35:21 PM
245
19:35:21 PM
246
PERLER
DOMINIK
is somethinguniversal
, somethingthat does not existby itselfbut that is
instantiatedin the concrete,enmatteredthing. Given this assumption,
they thoughtthat the intellectis able to receive the formwithoutthe
For Ockham,
matteronly by "strippingoff" all the individualfeatures.33
there
a
common
Nor
is
naturethat
no
universal
form.
there
is
however,
All
could be separated by the intellectfromthe contractingdifference.
with
individual
the
its
nature:
there is in realityis the individualthing
thing"as it is here and now." Therefore,receivingthe formwithoutthe
mattercannot be a process of "strippingoff"the universalformfromits
individualfeatures.It can only be a process based on a causal relation
between the thingand the intellect:wheneverthe thingacts upon the
the intellectperformsacts thatare
sensesand causes sensoryimpressions,
directedtowardsthis thing.Strictlyspeaking,nothingis receivedin the
intellect.The intellectmerelyreacts to the causal inputsstemmingfrom
the thing"as it is here and now."
Obviously,Ockham does not wish to explain the process of receiving
entitiessuch as
the formwithoutthe matterby appealingto representing
the intelligiblespecies. But the main reason for that is not that he tries
to avoid some kind of veil between the intellectand the extramental
world. His rejectionof representingentitiesis rathermotivatedby his
rejectionof the assumptionthatthereis a universalformto be received.
Now, one may object against this strategythat Ockham overlooks
an importantpoint in Scotus's argument.Even if thereis nothingbut a
causal relationbetweenthe individualthingand the intellect,one has to
explain how there can be such a relation,given that the thingmerely
bringsabout sensorystates by acting upon the senses. How can these
stateshave an impacton intellectualacts? How can therebe a transition
fromsomethingphysiologicalto somethingintellectual?One crucialtask
of the speciestheoryis to answerthisquestion.For the speciesare exactly
thoseentitiesthatmake such a transition
possible.They enable the intelin ordinem),
lect to make a transfer"fromone order to another"{deordine
as Scotus says.34
In his responseto this objection,Ockham grantsthat thereis a transitionto be explained.But he claims thatthe explanationthe speciesthe33See forinstance
Summa
ThomasAquinas,
I, q. 86,art.1. Thisis,ofcourse,
theobgiae
it as thecommon
buthe reports
notScotus's
, q. 9 (W XXV,
Quodl.
position.
position,
intellecesseperse objectum
reimaterialis
omnes,
385):". . . secundum
quidditas
potest
hocest,abstractio
a
in objectoimmaterialitas,
tusnostri,
sedtantummodo,
si requiritur
hocest,
sitimmaterialis
materia
etex hocsequitur
terminative,
individuali,
quodoperado
ad objectasingularia
materialia."
indifferens
34See above
n. 21.
19:35:21 PM
247
19:35:21 PM
248
DOMINIK
PERLER
19:35:21 PM
249
lacks such a judgement.39Abstractivecognitionis thereforenot a cognitionof a special aspect; it is merelya cognitionthat is neutralwith
regardto the existenceor non-existenceof the thing.This is the case
when I cognize a trianglein a case where no triangleis physicallypresent to me. I merelycognize a triangle(a singularthing,nota universal
essence)and I withholdmy assent to its existenceor non-existence.To
do that,I do not need any representing
entitythat makes the triangle
presentto my intellect.
However,such an answerdoes not seem to resolvethe problem.How
can I make the trianglepresentto my intellectif thereis no concretetriangle I can look at? Do I not need some proxyforthe lackingtriangle
an intelligible
species that makes the trianglepresent?Ockham categoridenies
the
need forsuch an additionalentity.All I need in such a
cally
case is a previousintuitivecognitionor a seriesof such cognitions.These
, i.e. a dispositionto performan
cognitionsbringabout a certainhabitus
act of a certaintype.40Thus, when I look at a concretetrianglemany
timesand when I therefore
have manyintuitivecognitionsof the triangle,
I acquire a dispositionto performa certaintypeof act. This disposition,
not an intelligible
species,enables me to have an abstractivecognitionof
a triangle.For it is this dispositionthat enables me to bringabout acts
thatare similarto the previousones so that I can make a trianglepresent to my intellecteven when no triangleis physicallypresent.
This explanation,linkedto a complex theoryof memory,engendered
a long controversy
among Ockham's contemporaries.
John of Reading,
a defenderof the Scotisttheory,pointed out that a simple habitusdoes
not sufficeto cause an abstractivecognitionwhen the object is no longer
present.For the habitusmust not only cause later acts of a certaintype,
it mustalso representthe non-presentobject in theselater acts. But how
can a mere dispositionrepresentan object?John thoughtthatit is never
able to assume this function.Only a species which is endowed with a
functioncan do that.41
representational
For the moment,I will not furtheranalyse this controversy
over the
functionof the habitus.*2
What I want to stressis the basic metaphysical
point in Ockham's argumentabout abstractivecognition.Since in his
39See InI Sent
., prol.,q. 1 (OTh I, 31).
40On thefunction
ofthehabitus
, see In II Sent.,
q. XII-XIII(OTh V, 262,264-65,
271-72).
41See G. Gi,"Quaestio
Ioannisde Reading
de necessitate
intelligibilium.
specierum
doctrinae
Defensio
Scoti,"op.cit.,(especially
149-51).
42Fora detailed
seeM. McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, NotreDame 1987,
analysis,
19:35:21 PM
250
DOMINIK
PERLER
we
opinion a thingdoes not have two formallydistinctaspects (rationes),
cannot distinguishtwo types of cognitionby attributingone aspect to
each. Abstractivecognitioncannot be about the universalaspect because
thereis no such aspect in the thingitself.Consequently,thereis no need
to make thisaspectpresentby means of an intelligible
species.If we want
to make a distinctionbetween two types of cognition,this distinction
in the object,but upon our way
should be based not upon a difference
of cognizingthisthing,namelywithor withouta judgementof existence.
IV
Let me now draw some conclusionsand pointout the basic differences
between Scotus and Ockham. I hope this will shed some lighton the
of the whole controversy
over intelligiblespecies.
underpinnings
betweenthe two authors
First,it has become clear thatthebasic conflict
is a metaphysicalone and not, or at least not primarily,an epistemologica! one. Since Scotus startsfromthe premises(i) that everyconcrete,
materialthinghas a universalaspect and (ii) that this aspect cannot be
identifiedwithor reduced to the singularaspect,he is compelledto take
these premisesinto account when he deals with the problem of representation:an adequate representation
of a thinghas to be a representation of bothaspects,and we need a representational
device for each of
them.Ockham, however,rejectsthe metaphysicaldistinction
betweentwo
aspects and consequentlyrejectsthe distinctionbetweendifferent
representationaldevices: given that there is nothingbut the singularthing,
there is no need for a special device to representthe alleged universal
aspect. His critiqueof the species theoryis mainlya consequence of his
doctrine.That is whyhis critiqueshould
rejectionof Scotus'smetaphysical
be evaluated in light of the metaphysicalconflict.Whetheror not his
rejectionof the intelligiblespecies is convincingdepends on an answer
to the questionwhetheror not his rejectionof a non-reduciblecommon
nature,responsibleforthe universalaspect of a thing,is convincing.Such
an evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper.43But I thinkthat it
should not be neglectedin furtherstudies.
Mental
inLater
Medieval
515-25.See alsoM. Tweedale,
in:J.-C.
Scholasticism,
Representations
Smith
Historical
Foundations
Science
, Dordrecht
1990,35-51(especially
(ed.),
of
Cognitive
42).
43Foran excellent
DoesScotus'
Doctrine
onUniversais
Make
seeM. Tweedale,
evaluation,
in: O. Pluta(ed.),DiePhilosophie
im14. und15.Jahrhundert
, Amsterdam
1988,
AnySense?,
103-18.
19:35:21 PM
251
19:35:21 PM
252
DOMINIK
PERLER
ab intellectu,
motum
ab intellects
utagat,quasiscilicet
sedquo intellecaliquidrecipiat
tusutitur
ad suamactionem."
added)
(emphasis
47I cannot
with
hisdiscussion
ofScotus's
doctrine
whoconcludes
agreewithL. Spruit
theremark
that"cognition
involves
someinference
from
intermediary
inevitably
reprewiththeworld."
sentations
orentities,
andlacksdefacto
contact
all (direct)
intelligi{Species
weakrepresentationalism,
thethesis
bilis,
(1) thatrepresentaop.cit.,266)GivenScotus's
tionsarerequired
forcognition,
thethesis
doesnotimply
lacksall
(2) thatthecognizer
direct
contact
withtheworld.
Scotuswouldstrongly
opposetheclaimthatweneedtogo
inferential
world.
stepsto havean accessto theextramental
through
19:35:21 PM
253
"objective"or "intentional"existence.48
Accordingto this theory,someone apprehendinga concrete thing,say Socrates, under the universal
, does not immediatelyapprehendSocrates or some aspect
aspect animal
of Socrates,but the universalconcept animalwhich is a distinctentity.
Only such a position,which is not Scotus's positionand which Ockham
himselfgave up in his later theory,49
is a strongrepresentationalist
theory
thatposits"thirdentities"as the immediateobjects of the intellect.
over intelligible
Fourth,the controversy
species makesit clear thatone
of the main differences
betweenScotus (as well as his fourteenth-century
defenders,
e.g.Johnof Reading)and Ockham lies in theirtheoryof abstractive cognition.Most researchin the last three decades has focusedon
theirtheoriesof intuitivecognition,because most scholarswere primarin the vexingproblemof how therecan be an intuitivecogilyinterested
nitionof non-existent
the intenseattentionpaid
things.50
Unfortunately,
to this problem (and the ensuingheated debate about medieval skepticism) has thrustthe topic of abstractivecognitioninto the background.
But in fourteenth-century
debates, abstractivecognitionwas at least as
as intuitivecognition.In some respects,it was even more
controversial
controversial.
For Scotus and Ockham fullyagreed thatthe singularthing
is the object of an intuitivecognition.Unlike some thirteenth-century
authors(e.g.Thomas Aquinas),theyneverdoubtedthatthe singularthing
can be the firstand immediateobject of a cognition.Their point of conwas ratherabstractivecognition.They stronglydisagreedon the
troversy
questionsof what the object of an abstractivecognitionis and of how
somethingcan become the object of such a cognition.This disagreement
revealsa greatdeal about the metaphysicalfoundationof epistemological
issuesin the later middle ages.
All Souls College
Oxford
University
19:35:21 PM
1. Umrephilosophique
comme
historique
phnomne
L'uvre philosophiquen'est jamais directementintellig,elle est un
phnomnehistoriquedont la comprhensionest soumise aux lois de la
Avec le tempsqui nous spare de l'auperceptionet de l'interprtation.
le
de
transformation
du contexteet du code d'interprtateur, processus
tion se poursuitde sorteque toutelecturede l'uvredoive d'abord,pour
du contexte
saisirl'intentionde l'auteur,consisteren une reconstruction
et des systmesde "dcodage." Pour atteindrecela, il faut connatreles
et son
partisansde l'uvre, ses adversaires,son contexteinstitutionnel
il
En
connatre
sa
Le
terme
son
faut
bref,
rception.
public,
langage.
rceptionimpliquele momentactifde l'impactdu textesur l'histoireainsi
que le momentpassif de sa possible mise en fonctioncontrel'intention
de l'auteur par une utilisationpartielle,ou encore les contorsionsque
de ceux de l'auteur.Dans
subitl'uvrepour servirdes objectifsdiffrents
soul'histoire,ces deux moments,thoriquementspars,se manifestent
vent dans une formeconcomitante.C'est--direque l'uvre exerce son
On pourraitappeler cela la diainfluenceen tantqu'oeuvrerinterprte.
de
la
lectique
rception.
de l'histoirede la rceptiondoit tredisL'entreprisede reconstruction
"
" telle
tinguede la Wirkungsgeschichte
qu'elle est conue par l'hermneuundMethode.
H.G.
son uvre Wahrheit
notamment
Gadamer
dans
tique,
par
Werket
En effetGadamer prsupposeune identification
entre
complte
L'histoirede la rceptionne peut tolrer
entreuvre et effet.1
Wirkung,
cetteprsupposition.Si l'acquisitiond'une ide approximativede ce que
1 "Indervermeintlichen
derVerinderwirdemMastab
Naivitt
unseres
Verstehens,
mehr
so sehrvomEigenen
stndlichkeit
her,daes garnicht
zeigtsichdasAndere
folgen,
undMethode
alsEigenes
Wahrheit
undAnderes
zurAussage
kommt."
, 4th
(H.-G.Gadamer,
istalsonureinPhasendeshistorischen
Horizontes
ed.,Tbingen
1975,284)."DerEntwurf
moment
im Vollzugdes Verstehens
undverfestigt
sichnichtzu derSelbstentfremdung
der
Verstehenshorizont
einesvergangenen
wirdvondemeigenen
sondern
Bewutseins,
Vivarium
34,2
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:35:27 PM
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION
255
de la rceptionimmdiate,nous n'arrivela
lumire
du
texte
analyse
de l'uvre mme.
d'une uvrediffrents
rionsjamais au constatdes effets
mais pas de " Wirkungsgeschichte
Nous serionsen prsencede " Wirkungen"
,"
de rceptionsmais non d'une histoirede la rception,et d'une prise de
des horizonsqui est prsupposepar Gadamer
consciencede la diffrence
"
Ce que l'entrepriseque je propose a en
avec son Horizontverschmelzung"
commun avec la thoriede la rceptionest le fait que notre connaissance de l'uvre se constitue traversune analyse de sa mdiationpar
les lecteurs,et par une analyse des conditionsdes destinatairesimmdiats du texte.2
Mon intentionici est de rappelertroistapes de l'histoirede la rception de la Monarchie
de Dante avant sa premiredition imprimeen
1559.3Je vais prsenterune histoirede cetterceptionpour une priode
dans l'hisassez large et m'arrter la questiondu rle de la Monarchie
toire de la philosophiepolitique. Les exemples choisis vont dmontrer
que le rle que joue une uvre philosophiquechange avec le contexte.
En tant qu'apparitionhistorique,l'uvre philosophiquesubit des mtamorphosesau coursde sa rception.Elle change dans ses formesen fonction des intrtsde ses lecteurset ses noncs changentde signification
avec une modificationdu contexte.
33de Dante
2. La rception
de la "Monarchie
chezJeanFalkenberg
M.W. Senko a le mrited'avoir dit les deux rdactionsdu De monarchia mundide Jean Falkenberg et d'avoir dmontr que la deuxime
Im Vollzugdes Verstehens
einewirkliche
HorizontverGegenwart
eingeholt.
geschieht
diemitdemEntwurf
deshistorischen
Horizontes
dessen
zugleich
schmelzung,
Aufhebung
(Ibidem,
290).
vollbringt."
2 Cf.H.-R.Jauss,
ab Provokation
derLiteraturwissenschaft,
Frankfurt
1970.
Literaturgeschichte
3 Pouruneinterprtation
de la Monarchie
etde la pensepolitique
de Dantecf.R. ImbeiDante,
Dimension
dermenschlichen
dans:O. Hffe(d.),Der
bach,Diepolitische
Vernunft
- einpolitisches
Mensch
Her.Essays
zurpolitischen
, Stuttgart
1992,26-42;V. Russo,
Anthropologie
didiritto
e stato
: studio
suMonarchia
edEpistole
diDante,
Impero
politiche
Naples1987;G. Vasoli,
e Impero
neltardo
delle
idee
Medioevo:
Dante
dans:L. Firpo(d.),Storia
, Marsilio
s Ockham,
Papato
e sociali
tra
e politica
inDante
, economiche
, II, Turin1983,543-84;G. Vasoli,Filosofia
politiche
e Monarchia,
Convivio
Classensi
etun
dans:Letture
, 9-10(1982),11-37.Pouruneintroduction
commentaire
au texte
cf.B. Nardidans:DanteAlighieri,
de la Monarchie
Minori,
II,
Opere
a curadi P.V. Mengaldo,
B. Nardietal., Milan/Naples,
1979,241-503.Voiraussi
21967,215-75;idem,Nelmondo
B. Nardi,
difilosofia
dantesca
diDante
, Rome
, Florence
Saggi
de la pensepolitique
de Danteestdonnegalement
1944,94-205.Uneinterprtation
Dante
de
etla philosophie,
Paris1953,ch.III. Il existe
unedition
parE. Gilson,
bilingue
19:35:27 PM
256
FRANCIS
CHENEVAL
etexemplar
milivitaenimipsius
ydeafuit
maxime
tantis
Ecclesie,
presertim
pastorm,
cuiusestpascereagnoset oves.
summi,
sueviterelinUndeipseinJohanne
formam
quens"Exemplum"
inquit"dedivobis,ut
ego fecivobis,ita et vos
quemadmodum
ad Petrum,
etspetialiter
faciatis";
postquam
utineodem
offitium
sibicommisit,
pastoris
me."Sed
habemus,
"Petre,"
inquit
"sequere
coramPilato
Cristus
huiusmodi
regimen
abnegavit:
"Regnum"
inquit"meumnon
estdehocmundo;
(. .)."(.MonIII,xiv,3-5,
d. P.G.Ricci,Milan1965).
On peut constaterque Falkenbergsuit le texte de Dante presque littralement,autrementdit, qu'il avait le textesous les yeux. Mais il ne
de Dante tait donc prsente
mentionnejamais son auteur.La Monarchie
Cracovie en 1406, probablementde faon anonyme.
Le deuxime texteva dans le mme sens. Falkenbergcite Dante littralementafin de le critiquerd'un point de vue hirocratique.
19:35:27 PM
LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
257
illudquo nonexistente
autnonvirtuante illud,
autquononvirtuquononexistente
habettotam
suamvirtutem
nonest ante,aliudhabettotam
suamvirtutem,
non
aliquid
causailliusvirtutis,
sedecclesianonexis- estcausailliusvirtutis;
sed,Ecclesianon
tenteautnonvirtuante
habuit existente
autnonvirtuante,
habuit
imprium
Imperium
totam
suamvirtutem,
nonest totam
suamvirtutem:
nonest
ergoecclesia
ergoEcclesia
causavirtutis
etperconsequens
nec causavirtutis
etperconsequens
nec
imperii
Imperii
cumidemsitvirtus
etauctoritas auctoritatis,
cumidemsitvirtus
etauctoriauctoritatis,
eius.Maior,inquiunt,
huiusdemonpatet,
quiaimpossi- taseius.(. .) Maiorpropositio
bileesteffectum
suamcausam strationis
declarata
estinterminis;
minorem
praecedere
de qua intenditur.Cristus
et Ecclesiaconfirmt.
Cristus
nasefficientem,
praesertim
etecclesia
Christus
confirm- cendoetmoriendo,
utsuperius
dictum
Minorem,
aiunt,
est;
ant.Christus,
Caesaris
inActibus
cumPaulus
quiaedictum
Augusti Ecclesia,
Apostolorum
suntquam dicatad Festum:
"Adtribunal
Cesaris
quaepersuadentiora
operibus,
sto,
decimo
Ethicorum
cumetiam
sermones,
, nascendo
iudicari";
per- ubimeoportet
angelus
suasa.Ecclesia,
Caesarem
quiaPaulus
appel- Dei Paulodixerit
parum
post:"Netimeas,
lavi^ad tribunal
"stoubi Paule,Cesarite oportet
etinfra
caesaris,
assistere";
inquit,
meoportet
Actuum
XXV.Angelus iterumPaulusad Iudaeosexistentes
in
iudicari,"
etiamPauloapparens
dixit:"ne timeas Ytalia:"Contradicentibus
autemIudeis,
caesari
teopportet
Actuum coactus
sumappellare
nonquasi
Paule,
assistere,"
Cesarem,
XXVII.Et iterum:
coactus
sumappellare gentem
meamhabens
sed
aliquidaccusare,
animam
meam
demorte."
caesarem,
inquitPaulusad Iudaeosexis- uteruerem
Quod
tentes
in Italia,Actuum
XXVIII.Quodsi siCesariamtunciudicandi
non
temporalia
caesariamtunciudicandi
non habuisset
auctoritatem
necCristus
hocpertemporalia
habuisset
nec Christus
hoc suasisset,
necangelus
iliaverbanuntiasset,
auctoritatem,
necangelus
istaverbanunti- necillequidicebat
etesse
persuasisset,
"Cupiodissolvi
necillequidicebat:
et cumCristo"
iudicem
asset,
cupiodissolvi
incompetentem
appelessecumChristo,
iudicem lasset.
incompetentem
(Mon.III, xii,3-6).
Demonarchia
mundi
,
appellasset.
(Falkenberg,
d.Senko1986,98f.).
Le faitque le dominicainJean Falkenbergjugeait la Monarchie
digned'une
critiquepolmiqueindique que le textede Dante circulaitdans le milieu
rformateur
de Cracovie. A la lumire de la critiquehirocratiquede
la
de Dante apparatcomme une uvre critiqueet
Falkenberg, Monarchie
rformatrice.
La critiquede Falkenbergs'inscritdans une longue tradition de critiquehirocratiquede la Monarchie.
D'une faon dialectique,
cette critiqueest la preuve d'une rceptionet d'une perceptionde la
Monarchie
comme uvre rformatrice,
comme uvre critique.
" comme
3. Antonio
Roselliet la "Monarchie
uvre
anticonciliariste
Si nous laissonspasser un peu de temps,prcisment
jusqu' l'an 1433
et si nous changeonsde lieu pour nous rendre Ble, nous dcouvrons
de celle
que la rceptionde la Monarchie
y est compltementdiffrente
de Falkenberg Cracovie en 1406. Le juriste et avocat de la curie
Romaine Antonio Roselli utilise, dans son uvre intitulela Monarde
chie,sans nommerses sources,de nombreuxpassages de la Monarchie
19:35:27 PM
258
FRANGIS
CHENEVAL
dantiaCatkolica
Dante.7L'uvre magistralede Roselli,critecontrela Concor
de Nicolas de Cues et contreles tendancesconciliaristesdu Concile de
Ble, rgle les relationsde pouvoir entrele Pape, le Concile et l'empereur.Il fauten souligner
deux aspects, mon avis,principaux.
Premirement,
Roselli entreprendune lgitimationdu pouvoirmonarchique,tantimprial que papal. Roselli est un dfenseuracharn du principemonarchique
dans l'Eglise ainsi que dans l'Empire.Pour ce faire,il transposedes figures
d'argumentations
ecclsiologiquesdans la thoriedu pouvoir imprialet
utilise des argumentsphilosophiques en faveur de la monarchiepour
lgitimerle pouvoirdu pape contrele Concile. Le deuximeaspectprinen faveurd'une spacipal de l'uvre de Roselli est son argumentation
rationdes pouvoirsentrepape et empereur.L'empereurest directement
institupar Dieu et indpendantdu pape en matiretemporelle.Cette
deuximepositionlabore par un curialistepeut nous surprendre,
mais
elle est comprhensibledans le contextehistorique.L'uvre de Roselli
faisaitpartie d'une initiativediplomatiquedu ct papal pour gagnerla
sympathiede l'empereuret des princestemporelscontrele Concile. Face
la menace conciliaristecontemporaineau Concile de Ble, le pape
Eugne IV aboli, de faon provisoire,la doctrinehirocratique.
Dans les deux aspectsprincipauxde son uvre et dans les arguments
qu'il y produit,Roselli dpend souventde faon littralede la Monarchie
de Dante. B. Nardi avait consacr un article l'utilisationde Dante par
de Roselli, dans
Roselli, mais il s'est limit au livre V de la Monarchie
la
le
en
faveur
de
des
lequel juristeargumente
sparation
pouvoirs.8Les
livres II et III dans lesquels Roselli utiliseles argumentsde Dante en
faveurde la monarchieuniversellepour dfendrela monarchiedu pape
7 PourRoselli,cf.F. Cheneval,
derMonarchia
Dantes
Die Rezeption
, op.cit.,287-327;
K. Eckermann,
desmonarchischen
Gedankens
im15.Jahrhundert
Studien
zurGeschichte
(Abhandlungen
zurmittleren
De ornata
mulieundneueren
Geschichte,
73),Berlin1933;H. Kantorowicz,
rum.
A consilium
anIntroduction
onFifteenth
deRosellis
with
,
Century
Legislation
ofAntonius
Sumptuary
Abhanddans:idem,
Rechtshistorische
RechtsundStaatswissenschaftliche
Schriften
(Freiburger
Antonio
Rosellis
Schlick
E. Meuthen,
Gutachten
1970,315-76;
30),Karlsruhe
fiirHeinrich
lungen,
undReich.
Studien
imFreisinger
Bistumsstreit
zu
(1444),dans:H. Mordeck
(d.),AusKirche
undRecht
imMittelalter
Friedrich
, Politik
1983,461, Festschrift
Theologie
Kempf,
Sigmaringen
LePapeetleConcile
vol.I, Paris1909,257ss;
72;N. Valois,
J.Thomson,
Papa(1418-1450),
37 (1975),
andConciliarism
inAntonio
Rosei's
Monarchia
lism
445-58;
, dans:Mediaeval
Studies,
P. Verrua,
Antonio
etpape
Roselli
e l'opera
suaMonorchia
sivetractatus
depotestate
, dans:
imperatoris
XV.
Giornale
a Padova
nelsecolo
29 (1926),313-32;A. Belloni,
Dantesco,
Professori
giuristi
e cattedre
The"Monarchia"
1986,143-9;
, Frankfurt
ofAntonio
Profili
J.H.Burns,
bio-bibliografi
Roselli
andcontroversy,
context
dans:S. Chodorow
Text,
(d.),Proceedings
ofthe
(1380-1466):
International
Medieval
Canon
Law, Vatican1991,321-51.
Eighth
Congress
of
8 B. Nardi,Fortuna
XIVe XV,dans:idem,Nelmondo
diDante
dellaMonarchia
neisecoli
,
Roma1944,191-205.
19:35:27 PM
DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
259
19:35:27 PM
FRANGIS
CHENEVAL
260
uniusvicivelcastri
veloppidiin iurisdictione
Primaigitur
et
communitas
spirituali
Et ideoin vicissiveparochiis
melius
sunt
perunumregitur.
spiritualiter
temporali
utin qualibet
curamanimarum
ecclesiasitunuspresbyter
habentes,
(. .),
prebyteri
castroestmagister.
autem,
(. .). In civitatibus
que suntsecundum
quia in quolibet
in spiritualibus
in singulis
misticum
civitatibus
suntepiscommunitas,
corpus
singuli
autemestunuscivitatis
autem
defensor
misti(. .). In tertio
copi(. .). In temporalibus
co corpore
sivecommunitates
Nam
(. .) suntin spiritualibus
provincie
archiepiscopl.
in unaquaque
unusestarchiepiscopus
velmetropolitanus
(. .). Et in temprovincia
unusprovincie
siveuni(. .). In quartoautemmistico
poralibus
preses
corpore
regni
versitate
suntspiritualiter
sivepluribus
primates,
qui singuli
presunt
singulis
regnis
hecomniatamin unoindi(. .) et temporaliter
provinciis
praesunt
reges.Si igitur
viduocorpore
humano
etinhiscommunitatibus
quaminmisticis
corporibus
propter
et bonum
unitatem
est
est,(. .), quantomagishocipsumconveniens
pacisstabilitas
in totoipsohumano
etorbeuniverso,
utmelius
genere
(. .),preregatur
perunum,
sertim
cumsecundum
in politicis
sententiam
traditum
sit,quodquotiens
philosophi
ad unumfinem,
necesse
estunumeorum
seuregere,
pluraaliquaordinantur
regulare
aliosveroregulari
etregiperunum.
Ethicergoinspiritualibus
estPonfex
Romanus
Christi
vicarius.
estCesarRomanorum
Rex,quiainRomana
(. .). Etintemporalibus
civitate
deusconstituit
ultimo
divinam
et humanam
monarchiam.
Mon.,II,
(Roselli,
c. 6: Goldast
avecP, fol.113r-v).
I, 312;compar
Pour confirmer
notrethsed'une adaptationde la Monarchie
de Dante au
besoin de l'anticonciliarismede Roselli, voici encore deux textes qui
dmontrentaussi des dpendanceslittralesentreDante et Roselli:
Etideoconcluditur
essedebere
necessarium
unumprincipem,
ad quemomnesaliiut
inferiores
Aliassequeordinentur.
principes
si
existentibus
retur,
quodpluribus
paribus
intereos litigium
nonessetinter
oriretur,
eosiudicem
dare,cumparin paremnon
habeat
(. .),quodessetabsurdum,
imprium
cumessetdareimperfectionem
sineproprioperficiente,10
quodestimpossibile,
quia
nondeficit.
deuset naturain necessariis
esseunum11
necesse
(. .). Estigitur
supremumiudicem.
Mon
.,II, c. 7: Gold(Roselli,
astI, 313;compar
avecP, fol.116v).
Etubicunque
ibidebet
esselitigium,
potest
esseiudicium;
aliter
essetinperfectum
sine
cum
perfectivo:
quodestinpossibile,
proprio
Deuset natura
nondeficiat.
in necessariis
Interomnesduosprincipes,
alter
quorum
alteri
minime
esselitisubiectus
est,potest
veletiamsubditogiumvelculpaipsorum
- quodde se patet
- : ergointer
rum
tales
Etcumalter
esseiudicium.
dealtero
oportet
nonpossitex quo alteralteri
cognoscere
- namparinparem
nonsubditur
nonhabet
essetertium
iurisdictioimprium
oportet
nisamplioris
suiiurisambobus
quiambitu
Mon.,I, x, 1-3).
(Dante,
principetur.
rerum
illud
Undeinfertur,
bonum, Propter
quodin omnigenere
quodidestsummum
estoptimum
unum,
unum,et id estin se
(. .)
quodestmaxime
quod estmaxime
incorrelationibus
suisex
unum.Et ideo qua rePictagoras
bonum,
quodestmaxime
in correlationibus
suisex parte parteboniponebatunum,ex partevero
Pitagoras
boniponebat
expartemaliponebat maliplurale(. .); quodquidemPsalmista
unum,
"A fructu
viniet
dicens:
docetdicens: videbat
frumenti,
plura.EthocetiamPsalmista
"A fructu
sunt."(Mon.I, xv,2-3).
frumenti
vinietoleimultiplicad olei multiplicad
sunt."
infertur,
(. .).Ex quibus
superiores
quodoptima Quod si omnesconsequentie
estad optime
inunitate
bonitatis
consistit.
necesse
(. .). Exquibus veresunt,
quodsunt,
10
G.
proficiente
11perficiente:
esseunuminu.G.
19:35:27 PM
LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
vivere
necessaconcluditur
ad benemundi
a
riamesseunicam
supremam
potestatem,
aliaederiventur.
A/on.,
(Roselli,
quaomnes
avecP,
II, c. 7: Goldast
I, 314;compar
fol.117v-119r).
261
se haberehumanum
genusessein mundo
etperconsequens
MonarchMonarcham,
iamad beneessemundi.
(Dante,Mon.,I,
XV,10).
19:35:27 PM
262
FRANGIS
CHENEVAL
19:35:27 PM
LA RCEPTION
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
263
Marsilius
et Petrarca,
sedGulielmus
Ockamquoque(isFranciscanus
modoDantes,
huneIoannem
Scotiimpugnator)
contra
sedacerrimus
fuit,
scripsit
Papam,Ludovici
inquode paupertate
Christi
etApostolorum
vehementem
hostem,
librum,
agit.Iam
Numsite re Christiani
iustus
tresdisputt.
Dantesartculos
orbis,ut unusexistt
Numofficium
et Monarchiae
etMonarcha.
de iure
atquehonorImperij
Imperator
a Papa
Romanm.
NumMonarchia
sitpenespopulum
pendeat
atqueImperium
Dfinit
exsacris
Ecclesia.
autem
literis
Philosophicis,
partim
partim
atqueexRomana
e reChristiani
iustum
offiorbisesse,unumexistere
Imperatorem,
Argumentis
petitis
immediate
Romanm
esse.Deniqueimprium
ciumMonarchie
penespopulum
a Papa,vela RomanaEcclesiapendere.
a Deo, nequaquam
Atquehocestquod
habet:Namimprium
a se pendere
etsibiomnino
subesse
affirmai,
Papampessime
nunccumFerdinando
Caesareiniustissime
utnondum
voluerit
etpropterea
litigai,
CumenimCarolus
eumproCaesareagnoscere:
Caesarinmanibus
Quintus
amplisautElectorum
aitPapadebuisse
simorum
virorum
eum
Imperium
resignarit,
septem
in suismanibus
a meacceptam
ferat
resignare,
quareaddii:AutFerdinanus
digninonenimrecuso
Hoc etiam
tatem,
dare,autnonsumiliumproCaesarehabiturus.
in libelloDantesaliquoties
Romanm
Pontificem
cumtotoipsiusgregeprodignitateaccipit.
AitenimeumessevereTheologiae
utdecretalista,
nonTheologus
rudem,
avaritiam
in illisrationis
dicendus
sit.Aitambitionem
extinxisse
utnihilsit
lumen,
Aitquodcumsintiniquitatis
et diabolifilij,
iactent
se Ecclesiae
ipsisimpudentius.
Dei filios,
libidofuggerit,
quiutcommodius
queantperficere,
quecunque
opprimunt
necprosint
iudicem
de illisverius
dici?
fratres,
matrem,
eijiciant
pati.Quidpotest
enimeamEcclesiam,
Dei ceu
oppresserunt
quidmagisapposite?
quamnobisfilius
matrem
exturbant
etprojiciunt
nonmodoin exilia,sedin ignesquoqueeos,
dedit,
restituam
volunt.
sublevatam,
qui verammatrem
atquein pristinam
dignitatem
omnem
Deniqueaiuntse velie,utsolissibiliceatomnesEcclesias,
religionem
pro
sualibidine
se autemminime
a quoppiam
mortalium.
iudicare,
posseiudicari
Quare
nonnulla
sanepraeclara
etiaminsunt,
Dantes,quanquamnonnulla
attigit
quibus
illum
satisfuisse
verafideetspiritu
inomnibus
nondum
Dei illustratum
artiapparet,
culiscognoscendis,
utinam
in nostra
doctrinae
lucem
tempora
atquein hancdivinae
incidisset
excellens
illudingenium.
Huiuslibelli
facit
mentionem
Bart,inL. Divi.par.
de requirendis
eumferedamnatum
fuisse
haereseos
reis,ubiinquit
praesides.ff.
post
autoris
mortem.
Huneante60 annosinItalicam
convertit
Marsilius
Ficinus,
linguam
habeo.Illudestcertum,
nunvir,cuisversione
magnaeruditione
atqueautoritate
excusum
et apudpaucissimos
quamfuisse
typis
reperiri,
ego nonsinedifficultate
Etnihilominus
sibiPapaeab istolibello,
potuiadipisci.
usqueadeometuunt
quinondumprodijt,
ut eumin quatuor
Satisde Dante,
condemnarint.
Catalogis
semper
nonerant
omnibus
obvia,utpauciintelligere
quaefortassis
potuissent,
quidcondemnaritPapa,cumilliusMonarchiam
condemnavit.
Postremus
(P.P.Vergerio,
Catabgus
haereticorum
Romae
1559, Pforzheim:
Corvinus
1560,18).
conflantus
D semble
et summus
Vergerio appelle Dante summus
philosophies
theologus.
connatrel'uvre italiennede Dante mais il ne nomme qu'une uvre,
la Monarchie.
Il en discutebrivementle contenuet situeson auteurdans
la mmelignede traditionque Marsilede Padoue et Guillaumed'Ockham
qui ont aussi lutt contrele pape, avant la Rforme.L'aspect le plus
intressantdu texte de Vergerio est, me semble-t-il,est l'vocation de
l'actualitpolitiquede la Monarchie.
De plus, il remarqueque c'est avec
les argumentsde Dante qu'on peut prouverque dans la lutte actuelle
entre le pape Paul IV et l'empereur Ferdinand Ier, c'est le pape qui
19:35:27 PM
CHENEVAL
FRANCIS
264
19:35:27 PM
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
DE DANTE
LA RCEPTION
265
nonsequitur,
utquodnisiexconsensu
autpoenanascinehocexpedire,
jusimperii
Romanus
quaeolimfuere
populiRomani,
Imperator
jus
quit.Ne inomniaquidem,
itabelloamissasunt;aliapactionibus,
enimutbellaquaesita
alia
nunchabet;multa
in aliarum
autregum
derelictione
gentium
jus transierunt.
Quaedametiamcivitates
ex partesubditae,
auttantum
foedeolimplanesubditae,
inequaliter
posteatantum
Namomneshi modiautammittendi,
autmutandi
rataeessecoeperunt.
juris,non
aliosvalent.
Dejure
RomaniImperii,
minus
adversus
quamadversus
(HugoGrotius,
tres
cumannotatis
acpadslibri
auctoris
belli
, Amsterdam
1702,588).
2. Nous avons ensuitepu constaterque la mme uvre philosophiquea
tant donnes les circonstanceset
de faon trsdiffrente
t interprte
conditionsde rceptiondiverses.Jean Falkenbergcritiquela Monarchie
de
comme une uvre qu'il range aux cts d'autres critsrformateurs
son temps,commeune uvrehtrodoxe.AntonioRoselli utiliseles argumentsde Dante en faveurde la monarchieuniversellepour prouverla
monarchiedu pape dans l'Eglise. Sous cette apparence,la Monarchie
devientune uvre anticonciliariste.
Ce qui, la lumirede la critiquede
devient
Falkenberg,pouvait apparatrecomme une uvre rformatrice
sous la plume de Roselli une uvre soit-disantractionnaire.A l'poque
de la Rforme,les protestantsdcouvrent,grce la critiqueorthodoxe
la Monarchie
et grce aux Index de livresinterdits,
comme uvre antipapiste et antiromaineet lui donnentune nouvelle actualitdans la lutte
de l'empereurFerdinandIer contrele Pape Paul IV. Chaque auteur a
suivila loi de l'hermneutiqueet a interprtl'uvre dans l'horizonde
son temps.Mais la mthode avec laquelle nous avons pu constaterce
processusest la mthodehistorique.Cela montrecommentl'hermneutique prsupposela mthode historiqueet comment sans objectivation
historiquenous resterionsau niveau des auteurs ici prsents,nous ne
ferionsque des adaptationsde textesdans notrehorizon,sans tre capable de nous en rendrecompte.
Au cours de sa rception,la Monarchie
de Dante a pris diversesapparencesen fonctiond'un contextechaque foisdiffrent.
L'uvre "en soi,"
Dante
une
avait
dans
son
est
chose, l'uvre que le
conue,
que
esprit,
Florentina confieaux alas de l'histoirepar sa publicationsous forme
de manuscriten est une autre.Face aux exemplesque je viensde prsenter et ceux qu'on aurait pu encore prsenter,je dois avouer qu'il me
de donnerune rponsesimple la questiondu rle de la
parat difficile
Monarchie
dans l'histoirede la philosophiepolitique. La Monarchie
a jou
plusieursrlesdans l'histoireen fonctiond'un contextechaque foisdiffrent. Le rle de la Monarchie
dans l'histoiren'existepas, l'uvre a eu un
et
une
19:35:27 PM
266
CHENEVAL
FRANGIS
19:35:27 PM
DE DANTE
DE LA "MONARCHIE"
LA RCEPTION
267
reconnatresa propre historicitou livrerde bons argumentsqui dmontrentpourquoi elle transcendel'histoireou pourquoi elle reprsente
sa fin.
On pourraitse demanderjusqu' quel point une gnralisationde la
thsedes mtamorphosesde l'oeuvredans le cours de sa rceptionvaut
pour toutesles uvresphilosophiques.Sur la base des matriauxprsentsici il estimpossiblede rpondre cettequestion.Mais je peux souligner
que je ne connais aucune uvre philosophiquequi n'ait subi des mtadans l'histoirede sa rception.Dans la prface
morphosesinterprtatives
derreinen
de la deuximeditionde sa Kritik
, ImmanuelKant s'est
Vernunft
son
constat
la
de
uvre
et
a
prononcsur rception
que le remaniement
de l'uvrephilosophiquedans le cours de sa rceptionest invitable:"An
einzelnenStellen lt sich jeder philosophischeVortragzwacken (denn
er kann nicht so gepanzert auftreten,als der mathematische)."21
Une
philosophie,ou toutephilosophie,qui n'a pas (encore)atteintle degr de
certitudede la mathmatique,est soumise la loi de la rception.22
L'histoirede la rceptionde la Monarchie
a suivicetteloi, que nous trouvons si bien formulechez Boce dans La Consolation
dephilosophie
,23dans
25et chez Thomas
le UrnedesCauses
chez
Dante
dans
le
Convivio
,24
d'Aquin:26
"Omnequodrecipitur
in aliquo,recipitur
in eo permodum
recipients
Fribourg(Suisse)
Universit
de Fribourg
21B, XLTV.
22"Jeder
einesandern
Denkerbaut,so zu sagen,aufdenTrmmern
philosophische
seineigenes
nieisteineszu Standegekommen,
dasinallenseinen
Teilenbestndig
Werk;
weilsie
wre.MankanndaherschonausdemGrunde
nicht
lernen,
gewesen
Philosophie
nochnicht
A 27).
ist."(I. Kant,Logik
, Einleitung,
gegeben
23V, 4, 25.
24Prop.10.
25III, vii,3.
26Summa
, I, 75,5c.
theologiae
19:35:27 PM
A Fragment
ofMichaelde Marbasio,Summade modissignificandi
L.G. KELLY
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:35:36 PM
DE MARBASIO,
OF MICHAEL
SUMMA
DE MODISSIGNIFICANDI
A FRAGMENT
269
fragmentsin the stemma. The only significantvariant is the name,
Eberhardus(149.22), which agrees with the Krakow manuscriptsagainst
I would guess
the others.None of the other variantsseem significant.
that the manuscriptof which these sheets were a part was copied at
KrakowbeforeBJ1953,i.e. before1450, ifonlybecause the volumefrom
which theywere taken must have been surplusto requirementsor too
dilapidatedto be useful.
MS BJ510belongedto Michael Falkenerde Wratislavia(fl. 1502-1531).
Aristotelis
and a copy of theMetaphysics
It containshis Introduo
in metaphysica
itselfwithhis own marginalcommentary
and interlinear
glossesbyJoannes
Sommerfeld
{fl. 1487-1502).Though theythemselvesdo not figureamong
the grammarmastersof the university,
theirassociatesincludedthe great
de
Joannes
Glogovia Maiori. Both Sommerfeld
speculativegrammarian,
and Falkenerhad distinguished
careers.In the Actarectoralia
of theJagiellonian UniversitySommerfeldappears as a Master in 1487 and was
in Collegiominori
by 1492. Three years later he was Dean of
Collegiatus
Arts and on the Rector's Council. He died in 1502. Falkenerwas one
of the executorsof Sommerfeld'swill. He appears in the Actarectoralia
in
in Collegio
maiori.
1502 as a Master in the Facultyof Arts and Collegiatus
By 1505 he was Dean of Arts.In 1517 he was a professorof theology
and had been appointed Canon and Procurator
of the Church of Saint
Florian.He took his Doctorate of Theology in 1523 and was appointed
Counsellorto the Rector. By 1531 he was administrator
of Saint Florian
and one of the seniorprofessorsof theJagiellonianUniversity.
, Ottawa
of Ottawa
University
& DarwinCollege
, Cambridge
19:35:36 PM
Reviews
PeriHermeneias.
underlutert
vonHermann
Weidemann.
Aristoteles
Uebersetzt
Aristoteles,
in deutscher
Werke
vonErnstGrumach,
von
, begrndet
Uebersetzung
herausgegeben
Hellmut
Flashar.BandI, Teil II. Akademie
VerlagGmbH,Berlin1994.ISBN
3-05-001919-0.
oftheimportant
oftheBerlin
The superior
Akademie
to present
a modproject
Verlag
ernGerman
ofAristotle's
translation
withcurrent
philosophical
writings
together
scholarly
a morecompetent
commentaries
couldnothavefound
author
thanProfessor
Weidemann
De interpretatione
forthetranslation
of,andcommentary
uponAristotle's
(henceforth
Int.).
W. hastaken
involved
insuchan enterprise.
In an
intoall aspects
greatpainstoinquire
Introduction
heexhaustively
dealswiththeproblems
extensive
thetitle,
authensurrounding
andcomposition
ofInt.,as wellas withtheAncient
on thiswork.
commentaries
ticity,
- fora non-native
The German
translation
is painfully
butnoteasyto read
precise,
ofa largenumber
ofadditions
in brackets,
at least , as a result
whichapparreader,
areintended
to ruleoutanymisunderstandings,
themalicious
ones.The
ently
including
is sometimes
to read,owingto theinsertion
textofthecommentary
rather
difficult
of
butalways
footnote-like
remarks
intothetext,
understandable.
ofInt.areveryhelpful,
The comments
given(p. 133-473)
uponthefourteen
chapters
ordoctrinal
arenever
orsuperficially
disandevenintricate
philological
problems
ignored
ofchapter
nineis exemplary.
Asevery
student
ofAristotle's
missed.
W.'streatment
logic
thischapter,
whichdiscusses
theproblems
whatlaterwerecalledthe
knows,
concerning
- hassparked,
"futura
to usethewords
whosepioneerofProfessor
Ackrill,
contingentia"
- a "vigorous
andEnglish
translation
ofInt.stillis mosthelpful
discussion
ever
ingstudy
sinceitwaswritten
andnotleastin thelastfewyears".
W. gives(p. 223-99)
a full-scale
ofthisdifficult,
orsuccinct
andsometimes
somewhat
obscure
text,
and,on
interpretation
andcritically
examines
accounts
that,
topofthat,reports
(p. 300-24)themanydifferent
from
Boethius
havebeengiven
ofthisintriguing
Asa whole,
W.'sinteronwards,
chapter.
whois interested
in the
is convincing,
andcertainly
foreverybody
indispensable
pretation
matter.
subject
thegeneral
an outstanding
ofInt
thatW. haspresented
account
., a
Despite
impression
fewremarks
canbe madeto challenge
I shallconfine
myself
partsofhisinterpretation.
oftheintroductory
to somebasicsubjects
ofInt.(chs.1-4).
chapters
thevery
remark
concerns
theproblem
oftime-connotation
from
(a) A first
featuring
ofInt.,in theopening
inwhich
Aristotle
thedistincclarifies
chapter
(16a3-9),
beginning
tionbetween
ontheonehand,andtheir
constituents,
ovofia
statement-making
expressions
The decisive
themis thatstatements
aresusandprivet
on theother.
difference
between
arenot.In ordertohavea truthoftruth-values,
whereas
ov^aiaandpr||iaxa
ceptible
of "is"or "is not",
anditslinguistic
theaddition
value,a thought,
expression,
require
are
whentaken
becausev^axaandpr^axabythemselves,
likethoughts
bythemselves,
A serious
suchan addineither
truenorfalse(16a9-15).
arisesat 16a18,where
difficulty
is qualified
tionof"is"or"isnot"(elvaiand|xf|eivai,respectively)
rinXax;
bythephrase
followed
orwithreference
totime").
f'Kataxpvov
Ackrill,
byW.,prefers
("either
simply
timeversus
ofthisphrasein terms
oftheopposition
thecommon
"present
explanation
or to theomnitemporal
times"
to taking
to alludeto thetimeless
tcAxo
pastandfuture
timeandpastand
he feelsthatthedistinction
between
tense,
present
although
present
orwith
wouldnotbe veryhappily
"either
future
times
bythedisjunction
simply
expressed
reference
totime."
Thesamephrase
is alsousedatAnal.Pr.I 15,34b7-8and,somewhat
III 10,433b5-10.
at Topica
I 5, 192a22-30,
as wellas atDe anima
To mymind,
modified,
ofthis
theseparallel
thatwe shouldtakethealternative
interpretation
passages
suggest
theonethattakes
mentioned
above(which
is rejected
viz
phrase
bybothW. andAckrill),
Vivarium
34,2
O E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:36:12 PM
REVIEWS
271
ittoconcern
theopposition
between
time-connotation
andtimelessness.
W.
(Incidentally,
butdoesnottakethispassageas a parallel).
Anal.Pr.I 15,34b7-8,
(157)onlyadduces
Thekeynotion
is herethatoflkXcc,.
Whoever
takesAristotle's
useofthistermelsewhereintoconsideration
and 141b24;De
, 115b29-35
(e.g.AnalPost.71b34-72a5;
Topica
317b5-7;De celo
failto seethatthegeneral
ideain all thesepasI, 9) cannot
generatone,
is usedto standforan entity
of
sagesis thatthephrase"[x] takencwtX"
irrespective
itsbeinginstantiated
in matter,
and thatitscounterparts,
viz."[x] mx^po,""[x]
in matter.
andso on,standfor[x] as instantiated
Nowall material
instanjiefiiyjivov,"
tiation
is temporally
conditioned.
thenotion
of
comescloseto
Therefore,
naturally
thatoftimelessness.
In pointoffact,
onesometimes
finds
ofkGx;
thenotions
and"universality,"
opposed
tothetemporality
ofparticular
instantiations.
thenature
oftheuniThus,whendiscussing
versal
toallB"),Aristode
Pr.I 15,34b7ff.)
syllogistic
premiss
(e.g."Abelongs
(Anal.
explains
thatwe should
thephrase"belonging
understand
to all ofa subject"
notwithreference
to anytime(jir|Kaxxpvov
butjcAxo,
i.e."timeless,"
forthatis thewayto
paavxa),
aremadeof.The author
insists
thatin such
getholdofthematerial
genuine
syllogisms
cases"universality
mustbe takensimply,"
notlimited,
thatis, in terms
oftime(ibid.,
34b17-8).Thephrase
at bl8) seemstoruleouttimeandtemporal
(ot>
iopovxa
xpvcp
and to implytimelessness,
instantiation
rather
thanmerely
indefiniteness
or
temporal
toPlato,ofcourse,
Aristotle's
notion
oftimelessness
innoway
Contrary
omnitemporality.
theexistence
ofa transcendent
domain
ofbeing.
In hisview,thisnotion
is merely
implies
instrumental
inourconceiving
thethings
oftheoutside
viz.ourtaking
world,
(e.g.whenframaboutthem)theirimmanent
natures
as abstracted
fromthese
ingapodeictic
syllogisms
natures'
inherence
in thesethings,
in orderto draw,andtojustify,
connon-contingent
clusions
aboutthem.
Aristotle's
at 16a18("either
orwithreference
totime")
should
be interremark,
simply
oftimelessness
vs.temporality.
Whathe means
preted
alongthesamelines,i.e.in terms
to sayis thatthe"being"
addedto verbalexpressions
or thoughts,
which
them
provides
witha truth-value,
either
refers
to thetimeless
to theconnotatum
of
beingthatbelongs
theterm
orto temporal
instantiations
andinstances.
involved,
in Aristotle's
finds
somesupport
discussion
ofp%a, which(in
(b) Thisinterpretation
3 ofhistreatise)
is saidto"additionally
time"(itsdefinition
chapter
signify
being[1] "that
<sc.pfijia>which
is significant
time,[2] nopartofwhich
additionally
signifies
separately,
and[3] which
is always
a signofthings
quabeingsaidofsomething
else").
Aristotle
whatis meant
time"byopposing
explains
(16b8-9)
by"toadditionally
signify
time'I meanthis:health
is a
yiaveito (thename)"byieia:
"By'additionally
signifying
a pf'|ia,becauseitadditionally
as obtaining
now
."
name,butis-healthy
signifies
something
he intends
to saythatas a namevyieiarefers
to theentity
butin
Apparently
"health,"
itup quaform
whereas
ei refers
to health
as a form
-uyuxv
bringing
only,
actually
inhering
in something
or actualised
itself
in tempoelse,thusas an enmattered
form,
manifesting
ralconditions.
toAristotle,
no form
exists
itis enmattered
unless
in something
According
elseas itssubject-substrate.
Thisdoesnotmean,however,
thatwecouldneverrefer
to a
form
as such,irrespective
ofitsbeingimmanent
ina substrate.
Forthatmatter,
Aristotle's
vividdiscussion
withPlatoabouthisMaster's
Transcendent
as wellas
Forms,
Separate,
hisownreflections
in hisMetaphysics
abouttruesubstance,
wouldhavebeenimpossible
without
as such"inan abstract
names
up "forms
bringing
way.Nowin suchdiscussions,
entities
oftheir
intemporal
immanent
substrates
designate
regardless
being
("without
time"),
whereas
thisontological
stateis focussed
on.
byusingprmaxa
Feature
a signofthings
[3] ("isalways
else")is closely
quabeingsaidofsomething
linked
Whereas
onupwith[1],andis ina wayitscounterpart.
[1] brings
up an entity's
stateas something
in a subject-substrate
andhencetemporally
tological
beingimmanent
to thematching
situation
determined,
[3] refers
that,in keeping
grammatico-semantical
withthisontological
is also brought
to thissubjectstate,theentity
up quaassigned
19:36:12 PM
272
REVIEWS
- opposing
- thatwhatis
ThusAristotle
hisbasicview
substrate.
Plato's
implicitly
presents
a
tothe
a
is
a
So
a
reference
non-subsistent
pfj^ia
pfjiia
always
implies
signified
entity.
by
whichthesignificate
it designates
inheres
in. Quitenaturally,
subsistent
substrate
then,
as beingclosely
thesetwofeatures
ofpfj^ia
areexplained
related.
byAristotle
W. is oftheopinion
Ackrill,
pfljiais in facta
(177)thattheindefinite
(c) Following
withthenegative
an ordinary
which
pn^iatogether
sentence-fragment,
particle,
containing
I wouldprefer
tomakethestatement
itis partofa negative
totake
serves
one.However,
On thisassumption,
itmustrefer
ovovia."
"piOTOV
p%a" ina similar
wayas "indefinite
thatequalsan ordinary
to an expression
saveforthelatter
definite
prilla,
wayofreferThe indefinite
involved.
thussignifies
somekindofbeingin
pf|p.a
ringto thesignificate
an indefinite
manner,
(16b11)or "beingnot-just"
e.g."beingnot-healthy"
(20a31).One
is no empty
should
be awarethat,
there
names,
designajustas in thecaseofindefinite
an onticvalue,despite
theminimal
tioninvolved,
butreally
information
givenaboutits
nature.
The"characteristic"
is so vaguethatitcaneven
pfjn.cc
bytheindefinite
designated
"be saidofthings
thatareandthings
thate.g.
thatarenot,indiscriminately,"
meaning
and"not-just"
thatlackshealth
as wellas
"not-healthy"
maystandforanyexistent
thing
forwhatdoesnotexistat all.
ofAristotle's
Ourinterpretation
indefinite
reflects
thedoublemeaning
of
prilla
precisely
In Physics
II 5, 196b23fF.
hisuseof"piatov."
forinstance,
whendiscussing
thedifferent
causemaybe indicated,
he distinguishes
the(determinate)
perse
waysin whicha thing's
ofindeterminate,
from
theplurality
incidental
E.g.thecauseof
designation
designations.
a house(architect)
orbyoneoftheman'sincias "housebuilder"
maybepersedesignated
dentalattributes
as "thepale entity"
or "themusical";
in thelatter
case thecauseis
V 1,
indefinite
b 28),notquacause,butin thewayitis referred
to.In Physics
(piaxov,
term
which
theauthor
usesbothsenses
oftheindefinite
225a20-5,
"not-being,"
maystand
ina certain
forunqualified
is not"),as wellas "what-is-not"
taken
sense,
("what
not-being
or "whatis not-good."
viz. "whatis not-white"
It is wrong,
I think,
inAckrill
andW. 177)thatthephrase"holding
to assume
(with
ofwhatis andwhatis not"refers
ornon-existence
ofthe
to theexistence
discriminately
in whichtheindefinite
ofthesentence
is actually
used.Rather,
pfj^ia
subject
onlythe
ofits
of theindefinite
itself
is concerned,
proa'ssignificate
applicability
irrespective
in a sentence.
Ofthissignificate
itis saidthatiteither
ordoes
actually
occurring
applies,
not.Therefore,
thereference
where
it is said
madebyW. (177)to Categ.
10,13b27-35,
is notsick"is true,
thatifSocrates
doesnotexist"Socrates
seemstobe besidethepoint.
In thisconnection
it shouldbe keptin mindthatin chapters
is dis2 and3, Aristotle
andpfj^ia
aspotential
ofa statement-making
andthus
ovovia
ingredients
cussing
expression
on thethings
he focusses
to deterto,eachin itsownspecific
theyrefer
way.Ofcourse,
minewhat,
inaccordance
withtheir
eachofthem
contributes
totheAyo,
nature,
specific
andthestatement-making
when"'is' or 'is not'is added"(16a17-8),remains
expression
theultimate
aimoftheobservations
madein thesechapters.
twolinesofthenextpassage(16b19-20),
which
dealswiththepfj^awhen
(d) Thefirst
assumed.
The
uttered
shouldgiveriseto lessdifficulty
thanis commonly
justbyitself,
is wrongly
taken(W.p. 178)to mean"whentaken
phrase"whenuttered
justbyitself"
ofthetwofeaoutofa certain
statemental
Rather
itis onlyabouttheabsence
context."
additures
thatmakeup thespecific
between
andpf'na,
difference
viz.thelatter's
ovovia
itsattributive
tionaltime-reference
anditsbeingsaidofsomething
use,as
else,including
a name,because,
man."On thisassumption,
thepfjjiais merely
justlikea
e.g.in "white
from
itsbeingimmanent
as an onticvalue,detached
name,itonlybrings
upitssignificate
in something
ofwhich
itis said.Thefact
elseandwithout
thesubject-substrate
implying
in thatposition
thatthe
thatthepfjioc
doessignify
doesnotyeteoipsoimply
something
involved
is,oris not,thecase.Thisis quiteinlinewithwhathasbeensaidearlier
entity
"when
further
(16a13-8)aboutv|iaxaandpr^iata,
(viz.'is'or'isnot')isadded."
nothing
- inwhich
his
sentences
ofthischapter
tries
tosupport
Aristotle
(e) Thefinal
(16bl9ff.)
19:36:12 PM
REVIEWS
273
claimaboutthepfj^xoc
whentaken
on itsown,byan "anticipative
refutation"1
concerning
theverb"tobe"- are extremely
difficult.
Noteventheverb"tobe" (or "notto be"),
which
on thefaceofitseemstoreally
a counter-example
affords
imply
"being-the-case,"
- notevenifyouuse,without
toinvalidate
Aristotle
addimyclaim,
anyfurther
argues,2
whichquasubstantiated
neuter
worddoesimply
theideaof
tion,thetermov ("be-ing"),
thesentence
"o' evxveitcr
should
yiXv"
actually
beingthere(where
something
be readinparenthesi,
to Aristotle
paceW., 186).Whynot?Because,
(16b23-5),
according
eventheverb"tobe,"(including
itsnominal
"isnothing"
notion,
participle)
(isan empty
- forthissenseofTipoacrrinaveiv
thatis),andmerely
cfr.10,20a13- a
helpsto signify
certain
be conceived
which
cannot
ofwithout
thethings
combined.
(rvGeoi,
abouttheputative
occurrence
ofwhatlateron
(f) I wouldliketomakea finalremark
wascalled"copula".
W. adheres
viewthat
(e.g.155;158;176;353ff.;
370)tothecommon
theAristotelian
knows
ofa "copula."
The Aristotelian
is
already
proposition
proposition
"S = P"
takento be an expression
withthe(modern)
to theeffect
structure,
commonly
likethecopulain "S = P," thefunctor
"is"("isnot")is heldto be dyadic,
andto
that,
actas thatwhich
combines
in Latin)thesubject-term
withthepredicate-term.
("copulat"
there
is an alternative
view(heldbyMathen,
to theeffect
that
However,
amongothers)
theverb"is"is a monadic
functor
whenaddedto an "assertible
orstatable
comwhich,
a stateofaffairs),
makesup a statement
plex"(i.e.a Xyo
expressing
bysolely
asserting
thatthisstateofaffairs
is really
thecase.Thus,anydyadic
function
is out
(as "copula")
ofthequestion,
sincetheoyo
isalready
a composite
ovovia
byitself
expression
combining
andpolice.
Muchevidence
in support
ofthisview.I shallconfine
maybe putforward
totwospecimens.
myself
Aristotle
never
of"is"as "copula,"
noris thisverbeverbrought
with,
[1] To begin
speaks
a special
name.Besides,
"is"and"isnot"arealways
saidtobeadded
toa comupunder
bination
ofan ovovia
formed
anda pfinxx,
whereas
there
is neveranysuggestion
already
thatAristotle
takesthemasperforming
thecombination
ofan vojiaanda pfj^ia
themselves
.3
it is relevant
to recognise
whatAristotle
meanswhenhe says(at 16b24)
[2] Secondly,
that"it(theverb'is/and'is not5as well(!);see 16b22)helpsto signify
someoveoi,
whichcannot
be thought
ofwithout
thethings
combined."
is
Now,thewordcmveoi
usedeither
to refer
toa compound
structure
ofphysical
or
basically
("composite")
things
tothemental
actofuniting
twoormoreconcepts.
Thislogico-grammatical
useis twofold:
either
to an (alleged)
or it asserts
thiscomposite
as obtaining.
cvvGeoi
refers
only
composite,
- which
Theterm
occurs
viz- intheopening
iapeai,
onlyonce,forthatmatter,
chapter
- , mustbe explained
as thedenialoftheovvGeoi
referred
tobytheassertible
(16a12-4)
rather
thanas a separation
ofitscomponents.
ofspeaking
Thus,theprocedure
complex,
andspeaking
is basically
a matter
ofasserting
ordenytruly
(ctX"n0reiv)
falsely
(yeSeoOai)
- orwrongly,
- an assertible
totheeffect
thattoassert
or
ingrightly
respectively
complex,
to denyamounts
to giving
one'sassentto,or dissent
from
oneandthesameassertible
A lotofcriticism
ofAristotle's
semantics
wouldturn
outtobe beside
complex,
respectively.
thepoint,
ifthealternative
werefollowed,
as I hopeto havemadeclear
interpretation
elsewhere.4
To taketheforegoing
remarks
as serious
reservations
onthepartofthereviewer
would
be toignore
W.'soutstanding
achievement.
Theonlyreally
is thatthis
disappointing
thing
richstudy
hastodo withsucha poorIndex("Sachregister").
Mheer
L.M. DERijk
1I refer
toAristotle's
habitofsupporting
a claimbyinvalidating
a seemingly
bythisterm
Ackrill
strong
(1963),114;123;W.,156;163;181.
counter-example.
Cp.
2 Weidemann's
hasmadeaninteresting
toemend
thelocus
16b21-3.
(180-5)
attempt
corruptus
19:36:12 PM
274
REVIEWS
3 Notice
17a12;
inasfaras "is"isconcerned,
Aristotle
uses(16a15;16a18;16b30;
that
always
thepassive
verb
19b38;
20a9;20al4;20a36;21a21;21b6;21b21;
19b25;19b30;
cp.21b27-30)
nevertheactiveverbovvxiGevai.
jcpooT0eo0ai,
4
W. vanderHorstandDavidRunia(eds.),Studies
Pieter
Polyhistor.
KeimpeA. Algra,
toJaapMansfeld
intheHistory
andHistoriography
on hissix, presented
ofAncient
Philosophy
tieth
Leiden1996,115-34.
Birthday,
delapense
ditions
Actualit
mdivale.
de l'Institut
(eds.),
J.FollonandJ.McEvoy
Suprieur
de Philosophie-ditions
Louvain-la-Neuve-Louvain-Paris
Peeters,
1994,viii+ 360p.
ISBN90 6831607 9 / 2 877231372 {Philosophas
Mdivaux,
, 31).
In 1992theInstitute
ofMedieval
Studies
at theUniversit
de Louvain
celeCatholique
brated
itstwenty-fifth
andtheCentre
De Wulf-Mansion
ofthesameuniveranniversary,
dela pense
contains
to marktheevent.
Actualit
mdivale
the
a colloquium
sityorganized
ofarticles
at thecolloquium
as wellas a selection
scholars
who
byyoung
presented
papers
isintended
doctorate
at theCentre
De Wulf-Mansion.
Thecollection
havecompleted
their
notonlyto reflect
therecent
stateofstudies
in medieval
at theUniversit
philosophy
thememory
ofFernand
butalsoto honour
Van Steenberghen,
de Louvain,
Catholique
whosedeathwassucha lossto medieval
philosophy.
ofthecollection
is reflected
initscontents.
Therearesixteen
Therather
mixedorigin
theeditors'
notincluding
introduction.
Threeofthepapers
authors,
papersbythirteen
referat theUniversit
de Louvain
focusdirectly
on medieval
studies
Catholique
(though
enceis alsomadeto theworkdoneat theDe Wulf-Mansion
Centrum
oftheKatholieke
in 1978).
theFrench-speaking
toLouvain-la-Neuve
Universiteit
before
Leuven
partmoved
a paper
de l'Institut
de Louvain-la-Neuve,"
d'tudes
mdivales
Theyare:"Auxorigines
delivered
VanSteenberghen
hisdeath;
Follonon "Les
before
shortly
byFernand
Jacques
tudesde philosophie
mdivale
au CentreDe Wulf-Mansion";
andJozefBramson
"L'Aristoteles
biland'unedition
internationale."
latinus:
theytellofan impressive
Together
record
ofachievement,
whether
ofindividual
scholars
suchasJacqueline
Hamesse
(notto
which
Van Steenberghen
or ofinstitutions
suchas theS.I.E.P.M.,
has
mention
himself),
oftheunfortunate
ofrecent
cuts
itshomeat Louvain-la-Neuve.
Mention
impact
budget
willstrike
a chordwithmanyreaders.
A secondgeneral
themeis thenature
ofmedieval
andhowit shouldbe
philosophy
de la pense
studied.
Heretherelevant
introduction,
papersare theeditors'
"Apologie
etla
"La philosophie
du moyen
mdivale
mdivale";
James
McEvoy,
ge,la civilisation
CarlosSteel,"La philosophie
comme
de son
culture
du mdiviste";
mdivale
expression
selon
et actualit
"Histoire
de la mthode
Rosemann,
scolastique
poque";and Philipp
studThe various
oflinking
medieval
M. Grabmann."
authors
pointouttheimportance
in relation
outthe
to theology.
ieswithphilosophy,
andofseeing
Theybring
philosophy
whether
itfocuses
onlogicandsemanofanyoverly-narrow
primarily
approach,
dangers
the
on heterodox
or evenon ThomasAquinas
views,
tics,on mystical
(though
theology,
Steel's
on
rather
a
neo-Thomist
tend
to
be
touched
of
lightly).
dangers
approach
possible
nottrytoreadmedieval
He argues
thatoneshould
philopaperis particularly
insightful.
ofits
in terms
ofa response
tosocio-economic
factors,
giventheimportance
solely
sophy
one mustnotsuppose
thatbecause
texts.Equally,
withauthoritative
however,
struggle
in terms
ofa search
wasconcerned
withtexts,
itcanbe readsolely
medieval
philosophy
absolute
As Steelpoints
toseeka textually-based
fortimeless
truth.
out,theveryattempt
framework.
institutional
wasconditioned
andbya particular
truth
bya particular
theology
The third
in medieval
McEvoy
philosophy.
groupofpaperstakesup particular
topics
de Naples,"
l'universit
hascontributed
Pierre
innaturalibus
"Matre
d'Irlande,
professeur
de Hivernia
andhiswritings.
a useful
ofknown
facts
aboutPetrus
Among
papers
survey
dans
orientales
etoccidentales
wefindLauraRizzerio,
"Lessources
scholars,
byyounger
Vivarium
34,2
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:36:12 PM
274
REVIEWS
3 Notice
17a12;
inasfaras "is"isconcerned,
Aristotle
uses(16a15;16a18;16b30;
that
always
thepassive
verb
19b38;
20a9;20al4;20a36;21a21;21b6;21b21;
19b25;19b30;
cp.21b27-30)
nevertheactiveverbovvxiGevai.
jcpooT0eo0ai,
4
W. vanderHorstandDavidRunia(eds.),Studies
Pieter
Polyhistor.
KeimpeA. Algra,
toJaapMansfeld
intheHistory
andHistoriography
on hissix, presented
ofAncient
Philosophy
tieth
Leiden1996,115-34.
Birthday,
delapense
ditions
Actualit
mdivale.
de l'Institut
(eds.),
J.FollonandJ.McEvoy
Suprieur
de Philosophie-ditions
Louvain-la-Neuve-Louvain-Paris
Peeters,
1994,viii+ 360p.
ISBN90 6831607 9 / 2 877231372 {Philosophas
Mdivaux,
, 31).
In 1992theInstitute
ofMedieval
Studies
at theUniversit
de Louvain
celeCatholique
brated
itstwenty-fifth
andtheCentre
De Wulf-Mansion
ofthesameuniveranniversary,
dela pense
contains
to marktheevent.
Actualit
mdivale
the
a colloquium
sityorganized
ofarticles
at thecolloquium
as wellas a selection
scholars
who
byyoung
presented
papers
isintended
doctorate
at theCentre
De Wulf-Mansion.
Thecollection
havecompleted
their
notonlyto reflect
therecent
stateofstudies
in medieval
at theUniversit
philosophy
thememory
ofFernand
butalsoto honour
Van Steenberghen,
de Louvain,
Catholique
whosedeathwassucha lossto medieval
philosophy.
ofthecollection
is reflected
initscontents.
Therearesixteen
Therather
mixedorigin
theeditors'
notincluding
introduction.
Threeofthepapers
authors,
papersbythirteen
referat theUniversit
de Louvain
focusdirectly
on medieval
studies
Catholique
(though
enceis alsomadeto theworkdoneat theDe Wulf-Mansion
Centrum
oftheKatholieke
in 1978).
theFrench-speaking
toLouvain-la-Neuve
Universiteit
before
Leuven
partmoved
a paper
de l'Institut
de Louvain-la-Neuve,"
d'tudes
mdivales
Theyare:"Auxorigines
delivered
VanSteenberghen
hisdeath;
Follonon "Les
before
shortly
byFernand
Jacques
tudesde philosophie
mdivale
au CentreDe Wulf-Mansion";
andJozefBramson
"L'Aristoteles
biland'unedition
internationale."
latinus:
theytellofan impressive
Together
record
ofachievement,
whether
ofindividual
scholars
suchasJacqueline
Hamesse
(notto
which
Van Steenberghen
or ofinstitutions
suchas theS.I.E.P.M.,
has
mention
himself),
oftheunfortunate
ofrecent
cuts
itshomeat Louvain-la-Neuve.
Mention
impact
budget
willstrike
a chordwithmanyreaders.
A secondgeneral
themeis thenature
ofmedieval
andhowit shouldbe
philosophy
de la pense
studied.
Heretherelevant
introduction,
papersare theeditors'
"Apologie
etla
"La philosophie
du moyen
mdivale
mdivale";
James
McEvoy,
ge,la civilisation
CarlosSteel,"La philosophie
comme
de son
culture
du mdiviste";
mdivale
expression
selon
et actualit
"Histoire
de la mthode
Rosemann,
scolastique
poque";and Philipp
studThe various
oflinking
medieval
M. Grabmann."
authors
pointouttheimportance
in relation
outthe
to theology.
ieswithphilosophy,
andofseeing
Theybring
philosophy
whether
itfocuses
onlogicandsemanofanyoverly-narrow
primarily
approach,
dangers
the
on heterodox
or evenon ThomasAquinas
views,
tics,on mystical
(though
theology,
Steel's
on
rather
a
neo-Thomist
tend
to
be
touched
of
lightly).
dangers
approach
possible
nottrytoreadmedieval
He argues
thatoneshould
philopaperis particularly
insightful.
ofits
in terms
ofa response
tosocio-economic
factors,
giventheimportance
solely
sophy
one mustnotsuppose
thatbecause
texts.Equally,
withauthoritative
however,
struggle
in terms
ofa search
wasconcerned
withtexts,
itcanbe readsolely
medieval
philosophy
absolute
As Steelpoints
toseeka textually-based
fortimeless
truth.
out,theveryattempt
framework.
institutional
wasconditioned
andbya particular
truth
bya particular
theology
The third
in medieval
McEvoy
philosophy.
groupofpaperstakesup particular
topics
de Naples,"
l'universit
hascontributed
Pierre
innaturalibus
"Matre
d'Irlande,
professeur
de Hivernia
andhiswritings.
a useful
ofknown
facts
aboutPetrus
Among
papers
survey
dans
orientales
etoccidentales
wefindLauraRizzerio,
"Lessources
scholars,
byyounger
Vivarium
34,2
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:36:41 PM
REVIEWS
275
"'Homohominem
caniscanem,
de Robert
et
Grosseteste";
Rosemann,
l'exgse
generat,
Procration
humaine
et filiation
trinitaire
DeusDeumnongenerat?'
chezS. Augustin";
"Lerledel'amiti
dansla recherche
dubonheur
chezS. Augustin";
EoinCassidy,
Miguel
"De la flicit
chezBoceet chezDante";JorgeMartnez
Lluch-Baixauli,
philosophique
"De l'ordre
chezsaintThomasd'Aquin,"
PascalDasseleer,
"Etreet
Barrera,
politique
beautselonsaintThomasd'Aquin"andJean-Michel
Counet,"Nicolasde Cuse la
un dpassement
de l'hylmorphisme."
du MoyenAgeetde la Renaissance:
charnire
I shallpick
andwell-researched,
all thepapersin thisgroupareworkmanlike
Though
forcomment.
Themost
is "L'univocit
outjusttwoofthelongest
ambitious
philosophically
et la problmatique
chezJeanDunsScot,"byJean-Michel
de l'tant
de l'infini
Counet.
a plausible
ofhowtheunivocal
ofensallows
Counet
account
a rational
foungives
concept
dationforourcognitions.
In explaining
how(according
to Scotus)we movefromthe
ofaccidents
toensandhencetosubstance,
he appealsto a
red,white)
(e.g.,
apprehension
dialectical
oflanguage
weproject
thestructure
ontoreality.
He does
procedure
whereby
notprovide
texts
from
Scotusto substantiate
hisaccount
at themostcrucial
but,
points,
to theeffect
thatspoken
orwritten
words
cannot
be anaearlyarguments
givenScotus's
thatconcepts
be analogical,
I assumethatCounetis takcannot
logicalon thegrounds
in rather
a widesense,to include
mental
andhenceconceptual
inglanguage
language
Evenifmuchinthepaperneedsmoreprecise
structures.
formulation
anddocumentation,
itis generally
stimulating.
ThepaperI found
mostvaluable
was"Lesgrandes
de l'infinit
tapesde la dcouverte
divine
au XIIIesicle."The author,
Antoine
andexplores
it
Ct,takesa single
theme,
withadmirable
Thenotion
andprecision.
ofGod'sinfinity
wasrelatively
clarity
neglected
in thetwelfth
butitbecameimportant
after
the1241condemnation
ofthethecentury,
sisthatneither
northeblessed
in heavenseeGodin hisessence.
The problem
is
angels
an obvious
one.IfGodis simple,
thenitseemsthathe mustbe seenas a whole,
ornot
at all;butifGodis infinite,
thenno finite
mindcangrasphimcompletely.
Ctshows
howa newdoctrinal
consensus
arosewhich
involved
boththecareful
clarification
ofthe
nature
ofGod'sinfinity,
andtheexploration
ofan epistemology
which
non-quantitative
wouldallowoneto saythata finite
mindcouldbe saturated
without
byGod'sinfinity
thatinfinity.
exhausting
WhileI amhappy
toadmit
thatI learned
a lotfrom
theindividual
andwhile
articles,
I am equallyhappyto celebrate
theimmense
contributions
madeby theUniversit
deLouvain
tothestudy
ofmedieval
I findthatthisbookis marred
Catholique
philosophy,
itsparts.The institutional
linkalonedoesnotprovide
between
a true
bythedisparity
oftheme,
anditwouldprobably
havebeenbetter
toseparate
thecolloquium
unity
papers
from
theexamples
ofnewscholarship.
Ontario
Waterloo,
E.J.Ashworth
RistoSaarinen,
Weakness
toBuridan.
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought
from
Augustine
E.J.Brill,
Leiden1994,v + 207p. ISBN 90 04 099948 [Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters
, XLIV).
therehasbeenextensive
discussion
ofakrasia
ofthewill,"in
, or "weakness
Although
bothancient
andmodern
there
no discussion
hasbeenalmost
in
oftheproblem
thought,
thecontext
ofmedieval
The reasonforthis,according
is that
to Saarinen,
philosophy.
havemaintained
scholars
theviewthatbecausetheJudeo-Christian
ofhuman
concept
nature
intheMiddle
dominated
ofakrasia
wastaken
forgranted.
Since
Ages,theexistence
thewillis heldto be ableto actagainst
therefore
"a concept
ofakrasia
holdsno
reason,
interest."
to thecontrary
maintains
wasindeeda very
thatthere
special
(p. 2) Saarinen
ofakrasia,
discussion
rendered
intoLatinas incontinentia,
from
sophisticated
philosophical
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:36:41 PM
REVIEWS
275
"'Homohominem
caniscanem,
de Robert
et
Grosseteste";
Rosemann,
l'exgse
generat,
Procration
humaine
et filiation
trinitaire
DeusDeumnongenerat?'
chezS. Augustin";
"Lerledel'amiti
dansla recherche
dubonheur
chezS. Augustin";
EoinCassidy,
Miguel
"De la flicit
chezBoceet chezDante";JorgeMartnez
Lluch-Baixauli,
philosophique
"De l'ordre
chezsaintThomasd'Aquin,"
PascalDasseleer,
"Etreet
Barrera,
politique
beautselonsaintThomasd'Aquin"andJean-Michel
Counet,"Nicolasde Cuse la
un dpassement
de l'hylmorphisme."
du MoyenAgeetde la Renaissance:
charnire
I shallpick
andwell-researched,
all thepapersin thisgroupareworkmanlike
Though
forcomment.
Themost
is "L'univocit
outjusttwoofthelongest
ambitious
philosophically
et la problmatique
chezJeanDunsScot,"byJean-Michel
de l'tant
de l'infini
Counet.
a plausible
ofhowtheunivocal
ofensallows
Counet
account
a rational
foungives
concept
dationforourcognitions.
In explaining
how(according
to Scotus)we movefromthe
ofaccidents
toensandhencetosubstance,
he appealsto a
red,white)
(e.g.,
apprehension
dialectical
oflanguage
weproject
thestructure
ontoreality.
He does
procedure
whereby
notprovide
texts
from
Scotusto substantiate
hisaccount
at themostcrucial
but,
points,
to theeffect
thatspoken
orwritten
words
cannot
be anaearlyarguments
givenScotus's
thatconcepts
be analogical,
I assumethatCounetis takcannot
logicalon thegrounds
in rather
a widesense,to include
mental
andhenceconceptual
inglanguage
language
Evenifmuchinthepaperneedsmoreprecise
structures.
formulation
anddocumentation,
itis generally
stimulating.
ThepaperI found
mostvaluable
was"Lesgrandes
de l'infinit
tapesde la dcouverte
divine
au XIIIesicle."The author,
Antoine
andexplores
it
Ct,takesa single
theme,
withadmirable
Thenotion
andprecision.
ofGod'sinfinity
wasrelatively
clarity
neglected
in thetwelfth
butitbecameimportant
after
the1241condemnation
ofthethecentury,
sisthatneither
northeblessed
in heavenseeGodin hisessence.
The problem
is
angels
an obvious
one.IfGodis simple,
thenitseemsthathe mustbe seenas a whole,
ornot
at all;butifGodis infinite,
thenno finite
mindcangrasphimcompletely.
Ctshows
howa newdoctrinal
consensus
arosewhich
involved
boththecareful
clarification
ofthe
nature
ofGod'sinfinity,
andtheexploration
ofan epistemology
which
non-quantitative
wouldallowoneto saythata finite
mindcouldbe saturated
without
byGod'sinfinity
thatinfinity.
exhausting
WhileI amhappy
toadmit
thatI learned
a lotfrom
theindividual
andwhile
articles,
I am equallyhappyto celebrate
theimmense
contributions
madeby theUniversit
deLouvain
tothestudy
ofmedieval
I findthatthisbookis marred
Catholique
philosophy,
itsparts.The institutional
linkalonedoesnotprovide
between
a true
bythedisparity
oftheme,
anditwouldprobably
havebeenbetter
toseparate
thecolloquium
unity
papers
from
theexamples
ofnewscholarship.
Ontario
Waterloo,
E.J.Ashworth
RistoSaarinen,
Weakness
toBuridan.
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought
from
Augustine
E.J.Brill,
Leiden1994,v + 207p. ISBN 90 04 099948 [Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters
, XLIV).
therehasbeenextensive
discussion
ofakrasia
ofthewill,"in
, or "weakness
Although
bothancient
andmodern
there
no discussion
hasbeenalmost
in
oftheproblem
thought,
thecontext
ofmedieval
The reasonforthis,according
is that
to Saarinen,
philosophy.
havemaintained
scholars
theviewthatbecausetheJudeo-Christian
ofhuman
concept
nature
intheMiddle
dominated
ofakrasia
wastaken
forgranted.
Since
Ages,theexistence
thewillis heldto be ableto actagainst
therefore
"a concept
ofakrasia
holdsno
reason,
interest."
to thecontrary
maintains
wasindeeda very
thatthere
special
(p. 2) Saarinen
ofakrasia,
discussion
rendered
intoLatinas incontinentia,
from
sophisticated
philosophical
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:35:18 PM
276
REVIEWS
thethirteenth
onwards.
His workis an outline
and analysis
of themedieval
century
discussion
from
to Buridan.
Hisstudy
is ambitious
andenlightening.
Augustine
ofthree
In thefirst
Thebookconsists
theauthor
histopic
introduces
chapters.
chapter,
andestablishes
theparameters
ofhisdiscussion.
He briefly
discusses
modern
historiogradiscussion
oftheissuestems
from
therediscovphyon theissue.He notesthatmodern
ofaction.The author
to outline
Aristotle's
of
eryofAristotle's
theory
proceeds
concept
in terms
abasia
discussed
ofthepractical
Saarinen
notesthat
, whichAristotle
syllogism.
ofthepractical
"Within
akrasia
cannot
theframework
be explained
as thewill's
syllogism
intentional
thebetter
ofthereason."
rebellion
against
judgment
(p. 11) Thus,"Because
theirbetter
incontinent
theremustbe something
peopleseemto act against
judgment,
in other
withthejudgement
within
thepractiwords,
itself;
wrong
something
goeswrong
inthesouloftheakratic
calinference
formed
various
person."
(p. 11)Thereare,however,
viewsas to exactly
whichpremise
is notcompletely
understood
bytheakratic
person.
to oneview,theincontinent
doesnotpossess
a complete
of
According
person
knowledge
thesituation
inquestion
because
inhibits
theakrats
from
theminor
passion
comprehending
or frommaking
theproper
connection
between
themajorand minor
clearly,
premise
maintains
thattheincontinent
reaches
the
premises
(p. 12-3).A secondposition
person
conclusion
butintentionally
ofthepractical
violates
itin acting
clearly,
syllogism
uponit
maintained
thatAristotle
neverfound
a satisfactory
(p. 13).In anycase,"itis generally
solution"
to theproblem
ofhowonecanactakratically
(p. 17).
One endswithSaarinen
three
heuristic
models
forunderstanding
Chapter
establishing
themedieval
is the"Socratic-Aristotelian"
thatsince
(p. 17-9).Thefirst
positions
position
mandoesnotactagainst
theakratic
thuslackscomplete
reason,
right
person
knowledge
ofthegoodconclusion
andaction,
ofwhich
is obscured
somepassion.
knowledge
through
The secondmodelis termed
the"Non-Socratic
Aristotelian"
in which
theperposition,
sonhascomplete
ofthegoodconclusion
andgoodchoice,
buttheyarenot
knowledge
realized
as theakratic
violates
theknowledge.
The third
the
model,
intentionally
person
"Non-Aristotelian"
is thatoftheJudeo-Christian
modelin whichthewillis conmodel,
sidered
orself-determining
in human
an autonomous
action.
Within
thesethree
principle
modelsSaarinen
makesfurther
and theywillformthebasison whichhe
distinctions,
thinkers.
judgesMedieval
in theAugustinin
In Chapter
"Reluctant
TwoSaarinen
discusses
Actions
Tradition."
In thischapter
atlength,
theauthor
discusses
theAugustinin
contribution
sinceAugustine
thebasisformuchofthephilosophical
andtheological
discussion
oftheMiddle
provided
ofAristotle
thatpriortotherediscovery
in theWest.Although
Ages,especially
Augustine
mademany
tothesediscussions,
notesespecially
toincontributions
Saarinen
withregard
continent
behavior
theconcepts
ofthewillandthatofinuitus
or "todo
offreedom
focare
orreluctantly.
Saarinen
moves
ontodiscuss
Anselm
ofCanterbury,
something
unwillingly"
whoconcentrates
inuitus
maintains
on theexpression
velie.
Saarinen
thatforAnselm,
no
one can willanything
invitus
whowills,willswillingly.
becauseeveryone
, or reluctantly,
His nextsubject,
PeterAbelardtakestheopposite
to
view,i.e.,thatone can consent
itwitus.
PeterofPoitiers
without
it,andthuscando something
actually
something
willing
theinevitable
maintains
thatone can willone thing
without
further,
necessarily
willing
ofa latent
alsodiscuss
theAugustinin
notion
PeterofPoitiers
andothers
consequences.
wish,theideathata manmayachievea statein whichhe doesgoodonlyreluctantly,
or in whichhe commits
a sinwhileknowing
andperhaps
evenlatently
better,
wishing
Aristotle's
akranottocommit
thisis a moralstateresembling
it.According
to Saarinen,
sia.On theotherhand,he notes,in opposition
to theAristotelian
idea ofakrasia
, the
insucha moralstatenevertheless
tradition
maintains
thatthoseexisting
perAugustinin
liberum
form
their
actions
outofchoice(consensio3
arbitrium).
"
in Scholasticism"
covers
theperiodfrom
Grosseteste
Three,Akrasia
(c. 1246)
Chapter
- theperiodofwhathe terms
In
"Aristotelian
toJohnBuridan
scholasticism."
(d. 1358)
19:35:18 PM
REVIEWS
277
theGreat,
ThomasAquinas,
he discusses
theviewsofAlbert
Walter
thischapter
Burley,
withbrief
on DunsScotusandWilliam
excurses
of
GeraldOdonisandJohnBuridan,
inmoredetail).
Albert's
hemight
havecovered
viewscorrespond
Ockham
(bothofwhom
tothefirst
heuristic
modeloutline
above.He doesaddsomething
to the
roughly
original
discussion
thatone'sjudgments
do notalways
absolute
and
possess
certainty,
byarguing
to uncertain
basedon cognition.
connected
thusakrasia
becomes
judgment
becausein hisCommentary
on theMchomachean
viewsaremoreproblematic
Aquinas'
intheSumma
whereas
hebasically
follows
Albert
andtheAristotelian
Ethics
view,
Theobgiae
viewofabasiaas a transitory
andtheDe Mab he adoptsa morenon-Aristotelian
vice,
which
andafter
theactionhe knows
andwillsthegood,buthastemmeansthatbefore
itandconsented
toevil.Walter
takesa non-Aristotelian
Burley
lapsedfrom
posiporarily
inhissolution
totheproblem
ofhowakratic
tionas well,butis moreoriginal
actions
are
He introduces
thatwilling
theantecedens
thedoctrine
doesnotnecessarily
possible.
imply
theconsequens.
Thusan akratic
canknowandwillthepremises
ofa pracwilling
person
in a complete,
ticalsyllogism
, i.e.,the
perfect
way,buthe neednotwilltheirconsequens
action
which
as theconclusion
ofthepractical
healsomainMoreover,
emerges
syllogism.
- a person
tainstheakratic
actions
resemble
themovement
ofparalyzed
limbs
maywill
to movethemto theleft,
buttheynevertheless
moveto theright.
So, a person
might
thegoodchoicebutbe prevented
fromexecuting
it. Odonistriesto createa
possess
medium
between
theAristotelian
andAugustinin
which
leadstoinconsistencies
in
views,
hisargument.
He doesmaintain
thattheakratic
a goodchoice,
buthe
person
possesses
alsowants
tomaintain
thata conscious
badconsent
akratic
actions.
precedes
Buridan's
viewsareinteresting
becausehe seemsto takebothan Aristotelian
and a
viewofthematter.
On theonehandhe maintains
thattherational
Scotistic-Augustinian
freewillneveractscontrary
to reasonexcept
The psychology
behind
through
ignorance.
ithowever
is Augustinin
inthatthewillis freeandself-determining,
notmerely
a rationaldesire,
anditconsents
to all actions
forwhichthe
byitsownfreeactofacceptance
is morally
Buridan
solvestheobvious
withregard
to akrasia
person
responsible.
problem
thatthewillsimply
whatis supposed
to be known
andthusa degree
bysaying
ignores
ofignorance
is presupposed
forbothhisAristotelian
and Scotistic-Augustinian
explanationsofakratic
behavior.
Buridan
alsoapplies
Albert's
ideaofuncertain
tohis
judgments
ownends i.e.insofar
as judgment
remains
uncertain
thewillretains
itsself-control
and
thepossibility
ofself-determination.
Thusit appearsthatAlbert
theGreatand WalterBurley
seemto adoptpositions
intheAristotelian
models
GeraldOdonisandJohn
expressed
(1-2),butThomasAquinas,
Buridan
tendtoward
theideaofa self-determining
freewillin theAugustinin
defending
andlaterScotistic
sense(model3a). As a result,
Saarinen
in
seesa tendency
correctly
medieval
toward
a non-Aristotelian
ofwill.Theauthor
closeshisstudy
thought
theory
by
- thatthetopicofakrasia
whathe setouttoprove
in the
wasindeeddiscussed
affirming
middle
wasquitesophisticated,
from
thethirteenth
Agesandthatthediscussion
especially
tofourteenth
centuries.
Saarinen
histaskadmirably
wellin so brief
a space.The third
accomplished
chapter,
wouldbe better
intotwosmaller
theperiod
divided
onecovering
from
however,
chapters,
therecovery
ofAristotle's
to theendofthethirteenth
Ethics
and
century
(forexample),
thentreatthefourteenth
writers
I regret
thathe didnotcoverScotus
century
together.
in moredetailin theirownright.
andOckham
Theirimportance
to fourteenth
century
cannot
be disputed.
thought
On a moremechanical
ifon first
citation
ofsources
note,it wouldbe helpful
(espea fullcitation
thansimply
lastnameandyear
weregiven(rather
cially
secondary
works)
ofpublication),
andon subsequent
a shortened
title.It can be rather
troublecitations,
someforthereader
if
tohavetopagebackandforth
from
thetextto thebibliography
in a particular
oneis interested
source.In connection
withthispoint,hiscitations
of
19:35:18 PM
278
REVIEWS
incerinthatherefers
conclusions
toOckham's
works
wererather
Ockham's
haphazard,
nordoeshe givetheLatin.In
theparticular
tain"quaestiones"
butcitesneither
question,
forthis(p. 164,n. 22)itwouldallowthereaderto better
judge
spiteofhisjustification
thevolume
oftheOpera
ifonehadmorethanthecitation
ofmerely
theauthor's
reading
Omnia
andthepagenumber
(e.g.,p. 165-6).
forthestudy
resource
itsfewshortcomings,
Saarinen's
workis a veryvaluable
Despite
in the
itto anyone
interested
ofethics
andI highly
recommend
in medieval
philosophy,
ofwillandactionin medieval
thought.
theory
Steubenville
Kimberly
Georgedes
andEleonore
toAquinas.
Kretzmann
TheCambridge
EditedbyNorman
Stump.
Companion
UP, Cambridge
1993,viii+ 302 p. ISBN 0 521 437695 (Cambridge
Cambridge
Companions).
In thefirst
tenstudies
Thisvolume
contains
onThomas
Aquinas's
thought.
("Aquinas's
in its
in itsHistorical
philosophy
Philosophy
Setting"),
JanA. Aertsen
placesThomas's
have
historical
Thomasas a theologian
He portrays
e.g.hiswritings
setting.
byprofession;
Thomashas
theform
oftraditional
etc.).As theofogian
(lectio,
university
quaestio
proceedings
inhistory.
isconsidered
tobeimporbecome
oneoftheoutstanding
philosophers
Language
in God'sword.The visionofGod
themedievais
invested
tant,becauseoftheinterest
is
thatrevelation
marks
thefulfilment
ofhuman
as Aertsen
says,andthisimplies
activity,
Theintellect
tosatisfy
desire
should
be guided
thehuman
toknow.
bythelight
necessary
and
faith
natural
is therefore
offaith
(a doubletruth
presupposes
knowledge
impossible);
nature.
graceperfects
isontherelation
between
andAquinas"),
Thesecond
Owens,
("Aristotle
byJoseph
study
ofphilosophy:
fortheChristian
determine
different
kinds
thetwothinkers.
Cultural
factors
ofbeingwasmostimportant,
towhatAristotle
Thomastheconcept
and,contrary
taught,
ofa thing
arenotgrasped
withthesameintellectual
act.
theessence
andtheexistence
thefirst
Aristode
as follows:
between
andThomascanbe characterized
So thedifference
is not
existents.
Thomas's
focuses
onsensible
natures
, andthesecondon sensible
philosophy
ofAristotle's,
Owensconcludes.
justan extrapolation
The third
is byDavidB. Burrell
andIslamicandJewish
Thinkers"),
study
- forthe
-("Aquinas
in whichhe pointsto Aquinas's
attention
unusual
amonghiscontemporaries
In Avicenna
a guidefordistinguishofMaimonides
andAvicenna.
Thomasfinds
writings
in developing
hisproject
andessence;
Maimonides
is hisinspiration
ingbetween
existing
than
Thomasseemsto be moreconsistent
on theinteraction
ofreasonand revelation.
of
Maimonides
andleavesmatters
thathaveto do withdivine
liberty
(e.g.theeternity
As he hasdonealsoelseto faith
theworld)
(thatis notjustan opinion
amongothers).
Maimonides's
viewthatterms
Burrell
howThomascriticizes
where,
appliedto
explains
Theauthor
notesthataccordGodarepurely
Thomastakesrefuge
inanalogy.
equivocal.
whereas
theterms),
assert
thatGodknows
manmaytruly
(asfaras heuses
ingtoThomas,
itis notnecessary
formanto knowthewayofsignification.
suchas being,
In "Metaphysics"
fundamental
discusses
4),JohnF. Wippel
topics
(chapter
andacciofbeing,participation,
substance
theanalogy
subsistence,
beingand essence,
in Thomas's
to difficulties
matter
andform.
He points
dents,
e.g.thetransition
thought,
an intrinsic
from
existence
to "esse"as expressing
"esse"as denoting
act,andproblems
the
toexplain
Thecomposition
ofessence
andbeingis required
concerning
participation.
In agreement
withothercontributors
limited
andparticipated
ofessein beings.
presence
and
is a closeconnection
between
tothevolume,
concludes
thatthere
philosophy
Wippel
in Thomas's
theology
metaphysics.
Vivarium
34,2
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:35:18 PM
REVIEWS
279
in "Philosophy
of
of thevolume,
Norman
discusses
One oftheeditors
Kretzmann,
ofthehuman
andthewillin all their
Mind"(chapter
soul,theintellect
5) thecharacter
Kretzmann
relations
notes).
bytenpagesofinformative
points
(thistextis accompanied
theintellect
never
as inan ivory
toAquinas
tower,
alia,thataccording
out,inter
operates
initsnatural
The
italways
thecorporeal
nature
initscognition
examines
because
setting.
it is orientated
the
withregard
to theintellect:
towards
willis freein different
respects
coercively.
goodandmovestheintellect
in "Theory
ofKnowledge"
realist
and
stresses
ScottMacDonald
6) thegeneral
(chapter
of
ofThomas's
andpointsto thenotion
ofknowledge,
orientation
theory
anti-sceptical
ofscientia.
as thefoundations
MacDonald
immediate
persenote")
("propositiones
propositions
Thomas's
underscores
optimism.
epistemological
discusses
thetheological
character
ofhuman
In chapter
7, "Ethics,"
RalphMclnery
withan analysis
ofnatural
law:thisis,heconcludes,
action.
He winds
uphiscontribution
andought
notdo,andthese
thatthere
arecertain
truths
aboutwhatweought
thetheory
known
truths
aredescribed
as principles
perse.
In "LawandPolitics"
andlegal
8) PaulE. Sigmund
(chapter
placesAquinas's
political
in itshistorical
and stresses
itsinnovative
character.
He compares
theory
background
inhowfarThomas
ofpolitical
withmodern
toillustrate
Thomas's
order
views,
conceptions
canbe calleda democrat.
Thomas's
viewon womenandslavesaresketched.
Thereis
law(a fundamental
forpoliticati
ofnatural
notion
also(cf.chapter
7) a discussion
theory),
In thefinal
is accepted
section
notes
and,e.g.onthejustwarwhich
byThomas.
Sigmund
ofThomas,
his
thatthemodern
reader
whilerejecting
manyaspects
(e.g.themonarchy,
ofslavery,
towards
theJewsetc.)couldfindrelevant
hisattitudes
qualified
acceptance
in thehumancapacity
in thestrucThomas's
"belief
to identify
goals,values,
purposes
tureandfunctioning
ofa human
person."
In theninth
MarkJ.Jordan
andPhilosophy"),
discusses
Thomas's
("Theology
chapter
hisphilosophy
on therelation
between
andtheology.
concludes
that
conception
Jordan
as a theologian
to Aquinas,
Thomasseeshimself
(cf.Aertsen);
primarily
according
andfaith
can do muchmorethanreason.Alltheefforts
of
theology
perfects
theology,
areinadequate,
notas
andcanonlybe defined
as a waytowards
happiness,
philosophers
viewon therelation
illustrates
Jordan
byan analyproviding
happiness.
Aquinas's
general
viz.thenature
ofvirtue
is onlyincomplete
lacksisoftwoproblems,
virtue,
(paganvirtue
withthetruth),
andthecausality
ofthesacraments
(Thomas's
analysis
ingacquaintance
thatofinstrumental
leadsustorethink
Aristotle's
ofcauses,
especially
conception
causality).
Thefinalcontribution
editor
oftheCompanion,
Eleonore
10)is bytheother
(chapter
"Biblical
andPhilosophy."
Theauthor
inthelight
discusses
ofrecent
Stump:
Commentary
thedateofcomposition
ontheScriptures.
research
ofThomas's
commentaries
Commenting
onWeisheipl's
thenature
ofAquinas's
andpoints
conclusions
sheanalyses
commentaries
in hisdistinction
tothefactthatThomas
wasinfluential
between
theliteral
andthespiritualsense.
Hiscommentary
onRomans
is especially
richinphilosophical
Stump
theology,
continues.
To indicate
howuseful
thesecommentaries
areforphilosophical
andtheologionJob,
cal problems,
theauthor
discusses
someproblems
from
Thomas's
commentary
is likely
to conclude.
andcontrasts
hisanalyses
withwhatthemodern
reader
The Cambridge
is a veryinteresting,
toAquinas
written
to
introduction
Companion
clearly
Thomas
foranybody
whowishes
toknowmorethane.g.histories
ofphilosophy
orphiloAllmainfields
ofThomas'thought
dictionaries
offer.
arecovered;
the
usually
sophical
do notdiscuss
ofresearch
on Thomas,
anddo notaimprincipally
at disauthors
details
In theirintroduction,
withotherscholars.
cussions
Kretzmann
and Stumpwrite"The
ofthemedievais
in general
works
wouldprobably
be moreaccessible
nowiftheir
philovaluehad beenrecognized
earlier
below,"Andunder(. . .)," and,somewhat
sophical
thecontribution
makesto modern
medieval
seeingthe
standing
philosophy
philosophy,
will
as wellas therifts
between
theMiddleAgesand theEnlightenment,
continuities
19:36:55 PM
280
REVIEWS
oftheworks
ofthemoderns."
Thesecontinuities
the
between
deepenourunderstanding
arenotemphasized
in allchapters:
MiddleAgesandlaterphilosophy
theycomeforward
in thosebyJordan
andStump.
especially
thevolume,
is beautifully
Useful
indexes
which
complete
published.
Leiden
E.P. Bos
: from
LeenSpruit,
toKnowledge
Roots
andMedieval
, vol.I: Classical
intelligibilis
Species
Perception
vol.II: Renaissance
Later
andtheElimination
Controversies,
Scholasticism,
Discussions',
ofthe
inModem
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1994and1995,
Species
Philosophy.
E.J.Brill,
Intelligible
Studies
452 p. and590 p. ISBN 90-04-0988-3-6/90-04-10396-1.
inIntellectual
(Brill's
, 48 and49).
History
All medieval
and earlymodern
whoagreedthatknowledge
starts
with
philosophers
senseperception
faceda fundamental
howis itpossible
thatwegainan intellecproblem:
ofmaterial
tualknowledge
on thebasisofpurely
information?
things
sensoiy
Philosophers
in theAristotelian
tradition
triedto answer
thisquestion
a sophisticated
bydeveloping
andpsychological
theso-called
that
epistemological
theory,
"species
Theyclaimed
theory."
we needspecialentities
thatmediate
between
andintellectual
Giventhe
sensory
reality.
classical
distinction
between
different
two
between
partsof thesoul,theydistinguished
ofsuchentities,
a thing,
thesensitive
types
(a) Whenweperceive
partofthesoulreceives
as itis giventousinthat
somesensory
the"phantasms,"
thatrepresent
thething
devices,
oftheintellectual
situation,
some
(b) The activefeature
partofthesoulthenproduces
otherdevices,
the"intelligible
thatrepresent
butthecognitive
content
species,"
nothing
or essence)
ofthething.
I first
a
receive
Thus,whenI lookat a horse,
(the"quiddity"
thatrepresents
thisparticular
horseas itis givento mewitha certain
phantasm
shape,
a certain
etc.On thebasisofthephantasm,
theagentintellect
thenabstracts
the
colour,
- thehorsestripped
thatrepresents
thepureessence
ofthehorse
ofall
intelligible
species
individual
and all perceptual
circumstances.
The intelligible
qualities
speciesis thatby
which
iscognized,
notthatwhich
iscognized.
adquem)
(themedium
quo)thehorse
(theterminus
It is obvious
thatsuchan explanation
raisesa hostofquestions.
Howcan an intellifrom
a phantasm?
In whatsensedoesan intelligible
giblespeciesbe abstracted
species
a thing?
Andwhatontological
status
doesit have?In hisrich,verycomprerepresent
hensive
He adduces
L. Spruit
discusses
all thesequestions.
an impressive
number
of
study
texts
in thehisto showthatthespecies
wasoneofthemostinfluential
theories
theory
- a theory
in the
thatwasdeveloped
in itsfull-fledged
form
toryofcognitive
psychology
inancient
latethirteenth
buthaditsorigin
andwasdiscussed
century
throughphilosophy
outthelatemedieval
perioduntiltheseventeenth
century.
volume
ofhisstudy
witha longchapter
ontheGreek
andArabic
Spruit
opensthefirst
in themiddle
He thenexamines
itsdevelopment
ofthespecies
theory.
background
ages,
toThomas
whoiscredited
with
"the'canonattention
particular
paying
presenting
Aquinas,
ofintelligible
ical'theory
theauthor
discusses
(I, 156).In thefollowing
species"
chapters
thenumerous
on thespeciestheory
andearlyfourattacks
launched
bylatethirteenth
teenth
He convincingly
authors.
showsthatthecontroversy
arosebecauseitwas
century
notclearwhatontological
status
andfunction
thespecies
have.Somecritics
(e.g.Henry
tookthem
tobe entities
whileothers
ofGhent)
thatareliterally
ontheintellect,
impressed
themas iconicrepresentations
thatprevent
theintellect
from
understood
(e.g.Ockham)
a direct
accessto thematerial
outthatOckham's
having
things.
Spruit
correctly
points
was basedon a misunderstanding
critique
(I, 295).WhenThomasAquinasand Duns
Scotusdefined
thespecies
as similitudines
ofextramental
theytookthemto be not
things,
innerpictures
butrepresentations
thathavea structural
withthethings.
similarity
Spruit
alsoexamines
thevarious
ofthespecies
witha
medieval
defences
andillustrates
theory
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:36:55 PM
REVIEWS
281
thatthecanonical
wastransformed
inmany
number
ofexamples
theory
ways.SomeinterofRimini)
understood
thespecies
as meremnemonic
others
devices,
preters
(e.g.Greory
themas mental
defined
ofFontaines)
acts,and stillothers
(e.g.Godfrey
(e.g.Jamesof
thatareactivated
whenthereis a certain
tookthemto be dispositions
Viterbo)
sensory
itclearthateventheAristotelians
makes
Thissurvey
to thethesis
that
input.
subscribing
incognitive
there
must
be a mediating
entity
processes
gavewidely
divergent
explanations
ofthenature
andfunction
ofthisentity.
tothedevelopments
In thesecond
turns
ofthecanonical
in the
volume,
Spruit
theory
thatthe"newPlatonics"
tried
tointegrate
thenotion
Renaissance.
He convincingly
argues
within
a Neoplatonic
ofintelligible
framework.
PicodellaMirandola
Thus,Giovanni
species
withan innerlightthatsomehow
identified
thespecies
illuminates
material
and
reality
makes
itaccessible
totheintellect
Ficinoassimilated
thespecies
toideas
(II, 31);Marsilius
orinnate
a discussion
"formulae"
ofsomeinfluential
ofthe
(II, 33).After
representatives
Second
theseventeenth-century
examines
debates.
He treats
theattacks
Scholasticism,
Spruit
onthespecies
thatwereinspired
bothbythenewmechanistic
andbythe
theory
physics
ofideas.Correcting
someolderinterpretations,
herightly
outthatDescartes'
theory
points
wasnotso muchdirected
sensible
against
critique
intelligible
speciesas against
species,
as "flying
described
little
polemically
(II, 363).
images"
In presenting
a vastnumber
thatspanovera periodofmorethantwothouoftexts
sandyears,
an impressive
historical
His detailed
references
to
Spruit
displays
knowledge.
a largenumber
ofprimary
area valuable
sources
on thissubstudies
guideforfurther
willmakesomediscoveries
inthedensely
There
ject.Evenspecialists
packedbibliography.
in theattempt
alsoa danger
to includeas manytextsas possible
in one
is,however,
often
onetexttothenextwithout
rushes
from
a detailed
interstudy.
single
Spruit
giving
ofMiddle
ThreepagesonRichard
twopagesonRogerMarston,
onepage
town,
pretation.
- thesheerquantity
on Vitaldu Four
oftexts
andauthors
makesa careful
philosophical
evaluation
Evencomplex
anddifficult
authors
suchas Dietrich
ofFreiberg
impossible.
(six
in a hasty
andcursory
pages)andDunsScotus(ninepages)aretreated
way.In reading
thesechapters,
I often
wished
thattheauthor
hadadopted
themethodological
principle
nonmulta
sedmultam:
a thorough
ofa restricted
discussion
number
oftheories
instead
ofa
listoftexts.
itis helpful
Ofcourse,
tobe given
someinformation
about
long,never-ending
latemedieval
andearlymodern
authors
whoareoften
in textbooks.
Butthis
neglected
information
is sometimes
so shaky
or condensed
thatit is hardly
to evaluate
its
possible
value.Forexample,
mentions
theesseobiectivum
theories
develSpruit
philosophical
briefly
ofAscoli,
andHervaeus
PeterAureol
Natalis
in theearlyfourteenth
cenopedbyJames
Whenintroducing
ofAscoli's
hestates:
"The
tury.
James
theory
(inonesingle
paragraph!)
'esseobiectivum'
hasdifferent
It applies
to external
as known
meanings.
cognitive
objects
ortoobjects
formal
thatareeither
bythemind,
(thatis,mind-independent)
lacking
being,
'fictitia'
theunicorn)
orelse'entiarationis'
(forexample,
(somesimple
intentions)."
(I, 279)
Thisstatement
is certainly
andprovides
an interesting
aboutthecomcorrect,
warning
oftheesseobiectivum
ButSpruit
doesnotspelloutthedifferent
plexity
theory.
meanings,
- external
andhe doesnotexplain
ofitems
whya perplexing
variety
cognitive
objects,
fictitious
areall saidto haveesseobiectivum.
intentions
One can scarcely
simple
objects,
makesenseofJames's
without
an explanation
anda philosophical
of
theory
interpretation
thedifferent
ofthetechnical
term"aseobiectivum
."
meanings
Letmenowturntosomedetails.
In hisdiscussion
ofHenry
ofGhent's
ofthe
critique
outthatHenry
understood
themediating
entities
species
theory,
Spruit
repeatedly
points
as species
thatexistin addition
to thephantasms
andaresomehow
, i.e.as entities
impressae
on theintellect.
to Spruit,
suchan understanding
distorts
theorigiimpressed
According
naltheory.
"Theidentification
witha dematerialized
oftheintelligible
of
species
'dummy'
sensible
conflicts
with
overbysensory
reality,
mechanically
impressed
capabilities,
Aquinas'
all psychology
ofcognition.
The latter
is basedupona synergy
ofsenseperception
and
intellectual
whichplayqualitatively
different
rolesin knowledge
formation."
capabilities,
19:37:01 PM
282
REVIEWS
inemphasizing
never
thatAquinas
is certainly
(I, 211)Spruit
right
spokeabouta mechanical"impression."
ButI think
thatAquinas's
is notas clearandstraightforward
as
theory
wants
ittobe. ForAquinas
areproduced
clearly
species
by
Spruit
says(i) thatintelligible
theagentintellect
ofabstraction
and(ii)thattheyexistin theintellect.
So
bya process
themostnatural
to askis:whatkindofexistence
do theyhavein theintellect?
question
answer
tothiscrucial
as Spruit
doesnotgivea detailed
conAquinas
ontological
question,
cedes(I, 173).He confines
himself
tosaying
thatthespecies
havethestatus
ofaccidents.
Butiftheyareaccidents,
oftheintellect,
andonemaynaturally
theymustbe accidents
in thewayanother
thattheyaresomehow
on theintellect
accident,
suggest
"impressed"
is "impressed"
intalking
ona subject.
On thisaccount,
aboutspecies
saya colour,
impressae
doesnotdistort
butmerely
outitsontological
Henry
theory
spells
Aquinas's
consequences.
One mayreply
tosucha favourable
ofHenry's
thatitdoesnot
position
interpretation
a crucial
whentheagentintellect
takeintoaccount
theory:
pointin Aquinas's
produces
theintelligible
actualizes
the"intelligible
ofmaterial
speciesit merely
potential"
things
fortheimpression
ofaccidents;
actualization
is an
(I, 168).Thisshouldnotbe mistaken
active
whereas
is a purely
Sucha reply
is certainly
corprocess
impression
passive
process.
- a tension
rect.ButI think
thatitpoints
outa tension
inAquinas's
thathadfartheory
On theonehand,Aquinas
describes
theproduction
ofintelligible
reaching
consequences.
as theproduction
ofentities
thathavetheontological
status
ofaccidents
andfuncspecies
tionas similitudines
ofmaterial
On theotherhand,he alsodescribes
thisproducthings.
tionas themereactualization
ofmaterial
i.e.as a process
oftheintelligible
potential
things,
thatdoesnotrequire
Itseems
tomethatthistension
twodifferent
between
anynewentity.
wasresponsible
inthethirteenth
forthecontroversies
andfourteenth
descriptions
century.
WhenHenry
ofGhent
thefirst
andneglected
, he emphasized
spokeaboutspecies
impressae
thesecond.
It is important
toseethateventhedefenders
ofthespecies
forexample
Duns
theory,
thinks
thattheseauthors
weresimply
misled
Scotus,
spokeaboutspecies
impressae.
Spruit
oftheiropponents
bytheterminology
(I, 256 and258).I wouldsaythatmorethana
ofterminology
is at stakehere.WhenDunsScotus
defends
theexistence
ofintelproblem
he pointsoutthattheyplayan important
rolein thecognitive
species,
ligible
process:
] i.e.
a transition
"from
inor
oneorderto theother"
theymakepossible
{deordine
dinem),
from
thesensory
to theintellectual.
The phantasms
cannotplaythisrolebecausethey
existinthephantasy
andbelong
to thesensory
nomatter
howmuchthey
order,
maybe
ortransformed.
So weneedsomedevices
thatareabstracted
from
thephanmanipulated
tasmsbutexistin theintellect,
thusmaking
thebridge
between
thetwoorders.
These
aretheintelligible
devices
Sincetheyaredistinct
from
thephantasms,
species.
theymust
be specialentities
on theintellect
in thewayaccidents
thatareimpressed
areimpressed
on a subject.2
Giventhislineofargument,
DunsScotus's
talkaboutspecies
is a
impressae
ofhisthesis
thatthere
is a gapbetween
twoorders.
logicalconsequence
Thereis another
In discussing
attention.
Ockham's
ofthe
pointthatdeserves
critique
theepistemological
Ockhamrejects
species,
intelligible
argument:
Spruitstresses
species
becausehe takesthemto be iconicrepresentations.
is another
Yet,there
argument,
only
covered
forOckham.
Thespecies
(I, 294),thatis ofcrucial
quickly
bySpruit
importance
thatevery
material
consists
ofindividual
features
anda univertheory
presupposes
thing
sal essence.
The intelligible
havethefunction
ofmaking
theuniversal
essence
(or
species
thespeciestheory
he attacks
to theintellect.
WhenOckhamrejects
"quiddity")
present
thismetaphysical
a univerHe deniesthata material
hastwoaspects,
assumption.
thing
sal andan individual
deniesthatwe needsomespecialcognione,andhe consequently
tivedevices
to maketheuniversal
to theintellect.3
Allthatcanbe made
aspectpresent
istheindividual
withitsindividual
Thiscritique
reveals
animporpresent
thing
properties.
tantpointwhich,
is notfurther
is a
thespeciestheory
analysed
bySpruit:
surprisingly,
thatrelies
theory
theory,
psychologico-epistemological
upona specific
metaphysical
namely
realism
aboutuniversais.
Assoonas onerejects
thismetaphysical
latemedieval
(many
theory
19:37:01 PM
REVIEWS
283
itwithcogent
thespecies
will
andearlymodem
arguments),
philosophers
rejected
theory
as well.
be rejected
overspeciesis a complex
I hopemyshort
remarks
makeclearthatthecontroversy
anddetailed
well
closeattention
interpretation.
Spruit's
topicthatdeserves
philosophical
is a goodstarting
studies.
documented
study
pointandan important
guideforall further
Oxford
Dominik
Perler
1 SeeJohn
Vaticana
DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
I, dist.3,pars3, q. 1, n. 359(editio
III, 217).
2 Ofcourse,
which
toa realchange
is morethansuchanimpression,
amounts
ofthe
there
anintentional
thattheintellect
alsoundergoes
intellect.
Scotus
stresses
thepoint
(orcognitive)
theimpressed
a cognitive
content.
See Ord.I, dist.3, pars3,
because
convey
change
species
III, 235).
q. 1,n. 386(ed.Vaticana
3 SeeWilliam
InII Sent.,
V, 303).
Ockham,
q. XII-XIII(Operatheologica
19:37:01 PM
BooksReceived
Medieval
andtheTranscendentais.
TheCaseofThomas
Brill,
JanA. Aertsen,
Philosophy
Aquinas.
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1996x & 468p. ISBN90 04 105859 (Studien
undTexte
zurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
52)
Albertus
undderAlbertismus.
Deutsche
Kultur
desMittelalters
, vonM
Magnus
philosophische
HoenenundA. de libera.Brill,
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1995391p. ISBN90 04
104399 (Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
:
des Mittelalters,
48)- Contents
A. de Libera,Introduction
vonStrassburg:
einenarrative
; W. Haug,DerTristan
Gottfrieds
derLiebe?;
C. Vasoli,Fonti
albertine
nelConvivio
diDante,
E. Wber,
Philosophie
Ngativit
etcausalit:
leur
articulation
dansl'apophatisme
del'cole
d'Albert
leGrand',
O. Pluta,
der
Albert
Grosse
und
Buridan
imFeuer.
Aristotelische
Seelenlehre
undaugu; K. Rasch,DieSeele
Johannes
beiAlbert
vonKln
vonAquino,
vonBrabant
, Thomas
stinisch-gregorianische
Eschatologie
Siger
undDietrich
vonFreiberg,
G. Steer,
Das Compendium
veritatis
desHugoRipelin
von
theologiae
seines
Verhltnisses
zurBestimmung
zuAlbertus
; R. Blumrich,
Strassburg.
Anregungen
Magnus
Diedeutschen
vonLindau.
Einfranziskanischer
zurTheologia
Predigten
Marquards
maBeitrag
R. vandenBrandt,
DieEckhart-Predigten
derSammlung
Paradisus
anime
stica;
intelligentis
nher
C. Asmuth,
Meister
Eckharts
Buchdergttlichen
Z. Kaluza,Les
betrachtet,
Trstung,
dbuts
deValbertisme
vande Velde
Hoenen,Heymeric
tardif
(ParisetCologne)',
M.J.F.M.
desAlbertismus:
nach
denQuellen
deralbertistischen
(+ 1460)unddieGeschichte
AufderSuche
Intellektlehre
desTractatus
H. Schppert,
Geiler
vonKaysersberg.
EinBeitrag
zur
problematicus;
derPredigt,
Alchimia
Lazar/^etzyier,
; M.R.Pagnoni-Sturlese,
Imagologie
Bibliopola
Argentinensis.
e lullismo
a Strasburgo
undOrtsverzeichnis
; Personenagliinizidell'etmoderna
Parlare
dellaTrinit.
Lettura
dellaTheologia
Scholarium
diAbelardo.
Editrice
SergoPaoloBonanni,
Pontifica
Universit
Roma1996390pp.ISBN88 76527052
Gregoriana,
StevenChase,Angelic
Wisdom.
TheCherubim
andtheGrace
inRichard
ofContemplation
of
St.Victor.
ofNotreDamePress,
NotreDame-London
1995xxvi& 271pp.
University
ISBN0 26800644X (Studies
in Spirituality
andTheology,
2)
M.G.Garand,
Guibert
deNogent
etsessecrtaires.
Turnhout
199587 pp.& planches
Brepols,
ISBN 2 503 504507(hardbound)/5(paper
back)/9(series)
(CorpusChristianorum.
mediiAevi,II)
Autographa
Status
ofNew
Audience.
StateUniversity
, Identity,
Author,
Jorge
J.E.Gracia,Texts:
Ontobgical
YorkPress,
N.Y. 1996215pp.ISBN0 791429024
Albany,
Guillaume
Somme
delogique.
Deuxime
Partie.
introduction
etnotes
d'Ockham,
Traduction,
deJolBiard.Editions
1996
T.E.R.,Mauvezin
Individuum
undIndividualitt
imMittelalter.
vonJ.A.Aertsen
undA. Speer.
Herausgegeben
Walter
de Gruyter,
Berlin-New
York1996xxiii& 878 p. ISBN 3 11 0148927
Mediaevalia,
(Miscellanea
24)
DunsScotus.
andEthics.
EditedbyL. Honnefelder,
R. Wood,M. Dreyer.
John
Metaphysics
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1996ix & 608p. ISBN90 04 103570 (Studien
und
Brill,
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desMittelalters,
53)
PiviHannele
Peter
Abelard
onImagery.
andPractice,
to
with
Jussila,
Theory
Reference
Special
hisHymns.
Suomalainen
Helsinki
1995x & 237 pp. ISBN 951 41
Tiedeakatemia,
0787X
Law.AnAnalytic
Oxford
1996xv
Reconstruction,
J. Lisska,
Antony
Theory
ofNatural
Aquinas's
& 320pp.ISBN0 19 8263597
Mediaevalia.
Textos
e Estudos,
7-8(1995):Qmdlibetaria.
Miscellanea
studiorum
inhonorem
Prof.
J.M.
Da CruzPontes
annoiubilationis
suaeconimbrigae
de
MCMXCV.
CuraMariiA. Santiago
iuvamen
603p.
Carvahlo,
J.F.Meirinhos
praestante
PiviMehtonen,
OldConcepts
andNewPoetics.
andFabula
intheTwelfihHistoria,
Argumentum,
andEarlyThirteenth-Century
LatinPoetics
Societas
Scientiarum
Fennica1996
ofFiction.
173p. ISBN951 653 284 5 (Commentationes
1081996)
Humanarum
Litterarum
E.J.Brill,
Leiden,1996
Vivarium
34,2
19:37:10 PM
BOOKSRECEIVED
285
Mittelalters.
Wissenschaftliche
deslateinischen
Bernhard
Pabst,Atomtheorien
Buchgesellschaft,
1994vin& 373p. ISBN3 534 120787
Darmstadt
Seoro
Contents:
etMediaevalia
Patristica
, XVI (1995)88 pp. ISSN 0235-2280.
J. Miethke,
y
enelTractatus
delsighXIV)A.D. Tursi,El antiimperialismo
enla teoria
libertad
politica
deParis;
M. de Asa,El comentario
dePedro
etpapalideJuanQuidort
de regiapotestate
sobre
delasQuaestiones
la controversia
entre
sobre
elDe animalibus.
Transcripcin
Hispano
a la antropologia
de Gregorio
deNyssa;
Fr.
En torno
M.M. Bergad,
medicos
y fibsofos;
etLalliana;
Cronica
Aristotelica
; Reseas
Bertelloni,
bibliogrficas
Parma
Edizioni
ZaradiMarchesi
diAbelardo.
La Grammatica
Roberto
Isabella,
Pinzani,
Logica
di Philo<:>logica,
1995xiii& 197pp.(Quaderni
1)
e sistematica.
nelXX secolo.
diAristotele
Roberto
Radice,La "Metafisica"
ragionata
Bibliografia
Milano1996735pp.ISBN88 34308468
Vitae Pensiero,
A Critical
Edition
andEnglish
Translation
inthe
Middle
andtheOrigins
Bacon
Ages.
ofPerspectiva
Roger
andNotes
Clarendon
with
Introduction
, byDavidIindberg.
Press,
ofBacon's
Perspectiva
Oxford
1996cxi& 411pp.ISBN0 19 8239920
"scosunatura
e modalit
nella
Palaestra
rationis.
Discussioni
dellacopula
GinoRoncaglia,
filosofia
Firenze1996295 pp. ISBN 88 222 44133
lastica"
tedesca
delXVIIsecolo.
Olschki,
di storia
dellascienza,
39)
(Biblioteca
einer
"scientia
naturalis"
Dieentdeckte
Andreas
Natur.
zuBegrndungsversuchen
Untersuchungen
Speer,
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1995vii& 365pp.ISBN90 04
im12.Jahrhundert.
EJ.Brill,
desMittelalters,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
103457 (Studien
45)
roots
andmedieval
distoknowledge
From
C.L. Spruit,
, 1. Classical
intelligibilis.
perception
Species
controversies.
Leiden
cussions.
Leiden1993ISBN90 04 098836; 2. Renaissance
Brill,
Brill,
in Intellectual
48 & 49)
Studies
1994ISBN90 04 103961 (Brill's
History,
von
Tal.2., neubearbeitete
DerStrieker
, DanielvondemBlhenden
Auflage,
herausgegeben
MaxNiemeyer
1995xxvi& 364pp.ISBN3 484
Michael
Resler.
Verlag,
Tbingen
X (Kart.)
21192X (Geb.)/20192
- Schnheit
von
Internationales
derSprachgestalt
beiHildegard
desGotteswissens
Bingen.
Tiefe
Sympovom9. bis
Rabanus
Maurus
Wiesbaden-Naurod
siuminderKatholischen
Akademie
vonM. Schmidt.
1994.Herausgegeben
12.September
Frommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart1995ix & 239pp.ISBN3 772817025
BadCannstatt
des
desSelbstverstndlichen
imDenken
"Per
senotum":
Dielogische
LucaF. Tuninetti,
Beschaffenheit
1996xii & 216 pp. ISBN 90 04
Thomas
vonAquin.
York-Kln
Brill,Leiden-New
desMittelalters,
103686 (Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
47)
d'une
La "disputatio"
la Facult
desartsdeParis(1200-1350
environ).
Esquisse
OlgaWeijers,
Artistarum.
Turnhout
1995175pp.ISBN2 503504604 (Subsidia
typologie.
Brepols,
Etudes
surla Facult
desartsdanslesUniversits
mdivales,
2)
19:37:10 PM
Corrections
in Vol.34,No. 1,May1996,contained
The article
byPaulJJ.M.Bakker,
published
ofmistakes
Theseerrors
weretheresult
andnotthefault
someerrors.
bythepublisher
on thequality
notbe construed
as reflecting
ofhisscholarship.
oftheauthor
andshould
p. 95,n. 50; ". . . Cf.Albert
Aristotel
deinterpretation
de Saxe,Quaestiones
inlibram
, ed.
nonsignificant
cit., 767,p. 500:'Tertiaconclusio:
syncathegoremata
aliquamremquae
sitsubstantia
velaccidens,
sedbenesignificant
modm
rei,quodab aliisvocatur
significabile
verifican
vel
Patethc,nampraedicatum
de quolibet
contento
subsubiecto,
complexe.
subsubiecto,
nonestaliquaresquaesitsubstantia
a quolibet
contento
velacciremoveri
velpraedicati;
et sicsyncathedens,sedbeneestmodusreiet dispositio,
putasubiecti
benesignificant
nonsolum
exsistentiam
rei,sed
lyaliquid
aliquid,
goremata
prout
significai
reietc.'..
etiammodum
p. 128,1.369,remove
n. "k"(predicatum
); n. "k"is placedon p. 129,1.393.
Vivarium
34,2
EJ. Brill,
Leiden,1996
19:37:16 PM