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1998

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXXVI (1998)

>68^

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NEW YORK

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXXVI (1998)

'1 ^ ^
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VIVARIUM

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

AN INTERNATIONAL
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CONTENTS
Rega Wood,
John Boler,
C.G. Normore,
Sukjae Lee,
JeffreyHause,
C.P. Ragland,
Allan Bck,
Mark Reuter,
Julie A. Allen,
H.A.G. Braakhuis,
Christoph Fleler,
Reviews

OF VOLUME

XXXVI (1998)

IntroThe Will. Problemsand Possibilities.

1
duction
Will as Power: Some Remarks on Its
5
ExplanatoryFunction
and
and
Anselm
Choosing:
Picking
Ockham on Choice
23
Scotus on the Will: The Rational Power
and the Dual Affections
40
Voluntarinessand Causality:Some ProblemsforAquinas' Theoryof Responsibility 55
Scotus on the Decalogue: What Sort of
Voluntarism
67
Scotus on the Consistencyof the Incarnation and the Trinity
83
Language, Lies and Human Action in
William of Ockham's Treatment of Insolubles
108
: A
On the Dating of Abailard's Dialogus
135
Reply to Mews
in
Thirteenth
Century
Obligations Early
Paris:The Obligationes
of Nicholasof Paris(?) 152
BuridansKommentarezur Nikomachischen
Ethik: Drei unechte Literalkommentare 234
Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A.
MacDonald (eds.), Centres of Learning.
Learning and Location in Pre-Modern
Europe and the Near East (.E.I. Saak) .... 250
George Molland, Mathematics and the
Medieval Ancestryof Physics(E.D. Sylld) 251
James McEnvoy (ed.), Robert Grosseteste:
New Perspectiveson his Thoughts and
256
Scholarship(L. Nauta)
Michael de Marbasio, Summa de modis
259
(I. RosierCatacH)
significandi
L.M. de Rijk, Nicholas of Autrecourt,
His CorrespondencewithMaster Giles &
Bernardof Arezzo (M. Kaufmann
264
)

18:50:25 PM

iv
Reviews (cont)

CONTENTS
Alessandro D. Conti, Esistenza e verit.
Formee strutture
del realein Paolo Veneto
del tardomedioevo
e nel pensierofilosofico

266
(D. Perler)
Andreas Speer (ed.), Die BibliothecaAmploniana:Ihre Bedeutungim Spannungsfeld
von Aristotelismus,
Nominalismusund Humanismus(L.G. Kelly
270
)
Books Received

273

18:50:25 PM

The Will: Problems

and Possibilities
Introduction

REGA WOOD

"The Will: Problemsand Possibilities:A Medieval Perspective"was the

titleof the Yale Universitycolloquiumat which this collectionof essays
originated.John Boler gave the keynoteaddress. Since Boler has just
of Washington,participantswere excitedand
retiredfromthe University
bit
note
thathe was just beginninga new research
a
to
perhaps
surprised
project.
Boler focused not on interpretative
questionsin Augustine,Thomas
and Scotus,but on the broaderphilosophicalquestion:What do we mean
when we explain human action by postulatingthe human will? Boler
began by remindingus thatSt. Augustineuses the term"will"in a variety
as a subtleobserverof human conduct
of ways- perhapsmoreimportandy
ratherthan as an abstractpsychologist
postulatingfacultiesin the soul.
Boler did not reject facultytalk, however.Instead he sought to exsorts of descriptionsused
plain its utilityand distinguishthe different
by medievaiswhen postulatingthe human will as the source of human
he contrastedthe views of Thomas Aquinas and
autonomy specifically,
Duns
Scotus.
John
The presentcollectionof essaysbegins with a revisedversionof Boler's
colloquiumpresentation.Though revisedfor this collectionit is stillan
early statementof the philosophical possibilitieshe sees in medieval
accounts.
Calvin Normore'spaper is about medievaldeparturesfromthe Aristotelianmodel of voluntaryaction in the worksof Anselm and William of
Ockham. Normore sees Anselm's chief departurefromAristotlein the
claim thatthe affection
forjustice is essentialto liberty;freechoice is the
to
for
its own sake. Anselmspeaks advisedlyof "keepability keepjustice
thathavingdepartedfromjustice,we cannot
since
he
holds
ing" justice,
model,
by ourselvesreattainit. Despite his departuresfromtheAristotelian
however,NormorearguesthatAnselmretainssome of its key features
namely,threeclaims:
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:50:32 PM

REGAWOOD
1. Everything
whichchanges
is changed
byanother
is in respect
to meansnotends
2. Deliberation
is sought
undertheaspectofgoodness.
3. Everything
sought

By contrastto Anselm,William of Ockham makes the will an entirely

active,in no respecta passive,faculty;its objects are not true causes of
its acts, but only occasions forits exercise.We deliberateabout ends as
well as means, and we are freeto choose wickednessas such. Ends are
not givenforfreecreatures.NormoresuggeststhatforOckham the contingencyof naturalteleologyis the price that must be paid forpositing
creaturelyfreechoice.
Sukjae Lee's paper begins by statinghis agreementwithJohn Boler,
Scotus' emphasis on the will is motivatedby his rejection of strictly
eudaimonisticethics.But Boler suggeststhat for Scotus, as for Ockham,
freedomrequiresthe abilityto pursue or not to pursue our affectionfor
justice. By contrast,Lee argues that for Scotus, libertyjust is following
the affectionforjustice; we can be freewithoutbeing capable of departing fromthe affectionforjustice.
Hause's paper is concerned
Looking carefullyat St. Thomas, Jeffrey
not withthe will and freelychosen acts, but withthe unintended.He is
concernedwith a specificproblem in Aquinas' theoryof responsibility:
under what circumstancesare we responsibleforacts of omision?When
can we be said to have voluntarilyembraced consequenceswe did not
intend.What account can we provide of the negligenceof drunkards?
Hause pointsto Thomas' claim that negligenceoccurs when we do not
do what we can and should do. He suggeststhat Thomas relies on
naturallaw theoryto establishwhat it is we should do when we can.
ScottRagland's paper seeksto explainthe natureofJohnDuns Scotus'
voluntarism.His paper addressesthe question:In what sense did Scotus
believe the prohibitionof theftwas contingenton divinecommand?How
His
could Scotus be both a naturallaw theoristand a moral voluntarist?
paper presumesa claim made earlierby Boler: that for Scotus the will
and intellectare notjust different
of the same agent,but facdescriptions
ultiescapable of different
acts. In the courseof his paper, Ragland rejects
Thomas Williams' recentinterpretation
of Scotus' voluntarism.
Attendedby A. Stephen McGrade, Bonnie Kent, Marilyn McCord
Adams, and R. James Long, as well as the authorswhose workappears
here, the colloquiumled to livelydiscussion.Taking offfromthe works
of Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus,Jim Long and I, for example,
spoke about the beginningof the FranciscanversusDominican disagree- whetherit comes fromwill or intelment about the natureof freedom

18:50:32 PM

INTRODUCTION

and
lect. By publishingthisgroup of papers on the will,on voluntarism,
on the nature of voluntaryaction, we hope to open and continuethe
discussionin the wider scholarlyworld- at least that part of it which
findsthat medievalphilosophyrepayscarefulstudy.
New Haven
Tale University
The Will: Problemsand Possibilities
Rega Wood,
John Boler,
Calvin G. Normore,
Sukjae Lee,

Introduction
andAbbreviations
Willas Power:SomeRemarks
onItsExplanatory
Function
and
and
Anselm
Ockham
on
Choice
Picking Choosing:
Scotus on theWill: The RationalPowerand theDual

Hause,
Jeffrey

Affections
Voluntariness
and Causality:
SomeProblems
forAquinas'

C.P. Ragland,

ofResponsibility
Theory
Scotuson theDecalogue:WhatSortof Voluntarism?

18:50:32 PM

REGAWOOD

In the papers collectedhere, the followingabbreviationsare employed:

ST
ThomasAquinas,
Summa
Aquinas,
theologiae
BFS
Biblioteca
Scholastica
Franciscana
MediiAevi,Quaracchi1903-1968,
1975Grottaferrata
OThI
de Ockham,
in lib.I Sententiarum
: Ordinatio,
Guillelmus
ed.
Ockham,
Scriptum
NY 1967
G. Gi andS. Brown,
St.Bonaventure,
OThVII Guillelmus
de Ockham,
inIV Sententiarum
Ockham,
Quaestiones
, ed. R. Wood
andG. Gi,St.Bonaventure,
NY 1984
OThVIII Guillelmus
de Ockham,
variae
et al.,St.
Ockham,
Quaestiones
, ed. G. Etzkorn
NY 1984
Bonaventure,
OThIX Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Ockham,
Quodlibeta
, ed.J.Wey,St.Bonaventure,
Septem
NY 1980
PhB
LesPhilosophes
: Texteset tudes,
Louvain1901-1941
Belges
InMetaph. IoannesDunsScotus,Quaestiones
subtilissimae
lib.Metaph.
Arist
Scotus,
.,
super
OperaOmniaVII, Paris1893
Sent.
Ioannes
inlib.Sent.
DunsScotus,
Scotus,
//-/F,
Quaestiones
OperaOmniaXIXXI,Paris1893-1894
Wolter
AllanB. Wolter,
DunsScotus
ontheWillandMorality
, Washington,
D.C. 1986
Usedtosupplement
toScotus'
references
citedbypagenumworks,
- e.g.Scotus,
berwhereappropriate
Sent
., Ill d. 36 n. 12,XV,630;
397.
Wolter,

18:50:32 PM

Will as Power:SomeRemarkson Its Explanatory

Function
JOHN BOLER

/
Hilary Putnam once said, concerningthe mind-bodyproblem,that the
issue cannot be whetherthereare minds,forwe know that people keep
thingsin mind,change theirminds and so on. The only relevantissue,
he claimed,is what sort of thingthe mind is.1 One mightbe tempted
to propose somethingsimilarabout will: afterall, where there's a will
there'sa way- and presumablya will. But the common sense charm
about Putnam's remarkcomes fromits (no doubt intendedbut no less
and the devil,of course,is in the details.In
deceptive)disingenuousness;
the case of will, the details involve,among other things,its checkered
contextsin which appeal has been made
historyand the many different
to will.
A casual glance at the historyof westernthoughtmightsuggestthat
once the will was discovered,or in a more sophisticatedform,once the
conceptof will was invented,2sometimein the later part of the Ancient
period, our understandingof it was graduallyrefineduntil the idea of
what we know as the will today evolved.3But even leaving aside the
problematicstatusof "what we know as the will today," the idea of a
of one thing,or developmentof a singleconprogressiveunderstanding
selectiveand/or idealized pictureof the historyof
cept,is a misleadingly
1 Thiswasin a talkPutnam
ever
gavesomeyearsago.I do notknowiftheremark
in hispublished
work.
appeared
2 Theearlyhistory
inAlbrecht
ofwillis discussed
Dihle,TheTheory
ofWillinClassical
theWill:From
Aristotle
toAugustine
, Berkeley
1982,andC.H. Kahn,Discovering
, in:
Antiquity
Studies
inLater
Greek
,
J.M.DillonandA.A.Long(eds.),TheQuestion
ofEclecticism:
Philosophy
oftheconcept
1988.Ian Hacking's
ofchildabuse
Berkeley
paperson thedevelopment
lessons
thatmight
be appliedto research
on thehistory
ofwill:TheSociology
provide
of
about
Child
Abuse
andMolding
Abuse
, in:Nous,22 (1988),53-63;TheMaking
,
Knowledge
ofChild
in:Critical
17 (1991),253-88.
Inquiry,
3
to "the"willarenotconstant
thehistory
ofphilosophy
andare
Appeals
throughout
rather
One shouldnotbe misled
ofdiscusactually
infrequent
today.
bytheprominence
sionsoffreewill,
where
thewillis present
rather
as thecatin "catapult."
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:50:40 PM

JOHNBOLER

will. In his book, The Will in Western

,4 Vernon Bourke claims to
Thought
accounts of will, some of which can be found
findseven or so different
in a singleauthor.A few mightbe construedas workingvariationson a
centraltheme,but many of them look more like a change of subject.It
in
is an illusion,I think,if the medievalperiod seems markedlydifferent
this respect.
Bourke'sbook has never receivedthe attentionits topic deserves.The
attemptto condense and order such a large amount of materialin so
shorta space was bound to have its limitations;and that,no doubt,has
I do not intend
deterredothersfromtryingto improveon Bourke'seffort.
to rush in to fillthat gap, even on, the relativelymore limitedtopic of
will in the Middle Ages.5But I do want to followout a general theme
I thinkis Bourke's major contribution:namely,that a great varietyof
philosophicalissues has been developed under the general heading of
"will." My specificefforthere is to focus on the structureof putative
explanationsof human action in which there is an appeal to will as a
thatI thinkare
power. What I have to offerare simplythreedistinctions
relevantto understanding
how appeals to willcan functionin thatbroader
context.The distinctionsthemselves,moreover,will not help to classify
or categorizedifferent
theoriesof will in the Middle Ages; but I hope
that, along with a few historicalasides, they may helpfullycomplicate
futurediscussionsof those theoriesby introducingpossibilitiesforfurther
exploration.
In what follows,then,in Section Two, I draw on Charles Peirce for
a distinctionbetween two senses of 'power,' which in Section Three I
apply to will: i.e., as a phenomenonand as a faculty.Section Four discusses two familiar,thoughI thinkimportantly
different,
appeals to will:
will as the source of wantsand as the source of autonomy.In both these
sections,I make referenceto Augustine,with an emphasison his termineglected
nology,in orderto focuson whatI thinkhave been the relatively
membersof the two pairs (viz., will as phenomenonand will as source
of
or reconstruction
of wants). This is not meant as an interpretation
conceived.
But
of
more
the
will,
Augustine
theory
narrowly
Augustine's
is writingbeforethe developmentand dominanceof the scheme of fac4 Vernon
TheWillin Western
, NewYork1964.
Thought
J. Bourke,
5 Ofcourse,
theobeendoneon individual
workhasalready
a greatdealofvaluable
thetimemaystillnot
riesofwill.But,as withworkon medieval
generally,
philosophy
be ripeforsummary
accounts.
As theotherpapersin thisvolume
show,thereis much
newworkbeingdone.

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

ulties(and theirinteraction)which is coin of the realm in later scholasticism.The freshnessof his approach to the broad topic of will can be
an asset ratherthan the liabilityit mightseem to be if viewed as an
unfinishedor incompleteeffortto develop the sort of theoriesthat are
familiarin Thirteenthand FourteenthCenturyaccounts.
In SectionFive, I turnto theselaterscholasticdiscussions.Here I propose a contrastbetween,on the one hand, directappeals fromhuman
action to powers and, on the other, analyses where human action is
treatedas a functionon the action of powersor facultiesas, so to speak,
deeper lyingentities.I tryto bringout the importanceof the distinction
by analyzinga special problemthat arisesin the account of the interaction of intellectand will, makinguse of some textsin Thomas Aquinas.
Here, and in some notesearlier,I offera briefcomparisonwiththe treatment of will in Duns Scotus. Again, the point is not to provide prooftexts that would justifya new interpretationof the theories of these
but ratherto explore(in an introductory
philosophers,
way) a philosophical
that
I
think
has
not
received
due
attention.
problematic
II
Will is one of many thingsabout ourselvesthat we come to indirectly
and not as a matterof directobservation.It is a relativelyrecentsophisticationto questionwhetherwe are aware of (or only inferthe existence
of) wantsand beliefsin our own case; but thereis nothingextraordinary
in the recognitionthat we postulatebeliefsand wants in explainingthe
actionsof others.As for thewill,we know it, or of it, by a furtherprojection as somethingthat supportsor explainsthe generalabilityto have
wantsand/or to act in a certainway. We are, in short,in the realm of
powers.6And the firstdistinctionI want to draw, is based on remarks
made by Charles Peirce in his efforts
to rescuethe notionof power from
the abuse it sufferedat the hands of modernthinkers.
Peirce takes up the topic in the face of Moliere's infamoussatire of
medical"explanation"in Le MaladeImaginaire.1
In Moliere'stext,the medical examinersask theirquestionin the followingway: Why does opium
6 When'occult'
meant
'occult
wasa pleonasm.
simply
unobserved,
powers'
7 "Domandatur
causam
etrationem
facit
A quoirespondeo;
dormire.
quareopium
quia
estin eo virtus
Le malade
. Third
dormitiva,
cujusestnaturasensusassoupire."
imaginaire
Interlude.
Peircequotesthisat 5.534(seefollowing
ofPeirce's
note).See mydiscussion
useofthisexample
in Charles
ParceandScholastic
Realism
, Seattle1963,88-92.

18:50:40 PM

JOHNBOLER

put people to sleep (i.e., what explanationdo you give for that fact)?
Here, the hapless medical student'sreply,that opium has a "dormitive
virtue,"is about as good an example of a non-explanationas one might
hope to find.Afterall, if you already know that opium puts people to
sleep, it is hardlyinformativemuch less explanatory to be told that
opium is able to put people to sleep. That is to say, to propose that
opium has such a power providesno new information
beyond the fact
that opium does what we already know it does; and this is worse than
uselessjust because of the pretenseof explanationby appeal to a purported cause.
Even when the case is set out in this way, however,Peirce defends
the student as having performedan "hypostaticabstraction,"i.e., an
abstractionthat introducesa new entity.8But the contributionof this
process, the role of the new thing,lies not in supplyinga cause that
would explain the initial fact but in allowingus to move on to make
new (perhaps "higherorder") associationsand connections:say, between
the soporificpower of opium and that of other soporifics,or between
soporificsand otherphenomena. So long as one does not confusehypostaticabstractionwith a straightforward
appeal to a cause, then,it can
a
in
the
useful
role
broader explanationor understandplay
(ifindirect)
ing of things.In fact,thisis a commonand familiarprocedure:e.g., when
a correlationis made between crime and poverty,smokingand cancer,
good studyhabits and success at college, etc. Of course, even with its
fancytitleof "hypostaticabstraction,"the resultingdormitivevirtuerepresentsonly a verytenuous sort of "power."
But Peirce has9 a different
account of the appeal to dormitivevirtue
that involvesa more straightforward
idea of power. Here it is helpfulto
the
for
dormitive
which
the
virtueis the supposedanswer:
adjust
question
not "Why does opium put people to sleep?" but "Why is it thatpeople
go to sleep aftertakingopium?" It is the latterquestionthatI thinkprovides the context for understandingPeirce's defense of the student's
8 See G. Hartshorne,
P. Weiss& A. Burks
Sanders
ofCharles
(eds.),TheCollected
Papers
Peirce
Mass.1931-58,
8 vols.I citeitusingthestandard
, Cambridge,
e.g.,"1.26"
practice:
refers
toparagraph
see 1.549(& note)
26 ofVolumeOne.In thepresent
instance,
then,
and4.235.Peirceoncecallsthis"subjectal
an abstraction
abstraction"
(4.332),meaning
a newthing
in contrast
in whichone
or subject,
to "prescissive
abstraction"
presenting
character
ofa thing
is considered
inseparation
from
theothers
(e.g.,2.364,1.549).Peirce
abstraction
saysthathypostatic
onlyan ensrationis
(4.463,5.449)butthatis not
produces
inPeirceas thephrase
see 1.26,5.312,
leadonetoexpect:
as ontologically
harmless
might
8.144-48,
8.153,andBoler,op.cit.(n. 7),84-5.
9 Or so itseemsto me.The twoforms
aremyresponsibility.
ofthequestion

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

answeras somethingthat at least gets on the board as an explanation.

First,theclaimthatopium has a powerof puttingpeople to sleep identifies
what Peirce calls a "would be," and thatgoes beyond the observedfacts
in any actual case or set of cases where someone has taken opium and
then gone to sleep.10Secondly,the studenthas offeredthe hypothesis(if
we can so dignifyit) that it is somethingabout opium that accountsfor
the observedcorrelationbetweentakingopium and going to sleep.11In
thiscontext,the studenthas made whatPeircecalls an abductiveinference.
- and Peirce allows that it carries
It may seem trivial
"vaguenessto an
extreme"12but withinthe logic of abduction,the postulationof a power
is an inferenceand representsa step beyond the initialfact that people
usuallydo go to sleep aftertakingopium.13It suggests,forexample,that
one shouldlook more closelyat the makeup of opium to understandthe
phenomenaratherthan,to use Peirce's favoriteexample, seekinga possible connectionwithsneezingby the Dowager Empress of China.14
Ill
The appeal to powers may always seem to have an aura of triviality
about it, but it is importantto see, as in Peirce's expositionof the dormitivevirtuecase, how it can carry substantiveclaims if one is clear
in structureof abductiveinferenceto powers from
about the difference
that of an appeal to "power" as an hypostaticabstraction.In the contextof "will," then,I describethis as a distinctionbetween (appeals to)
and will-as-phenomenon.15
The formeris familiarenough,
will-as-faculty
but I thinkits prominencetends to overshadowthe latter.I shall tryto
shiftthe balance with some selectivereferencesto Augustinewho was
writingbeforethe idea of will as a facultyhad become fullydeveloped
and dominant.
Consider firstan example of the confusionof the two appeals. The
phenomenonof a "dividedwill" is an importantelementin Augustine's
10See 4.172,5.436,5.528;andBoler,op.cit.(n. 7),99ff.
11Thiscouldnotbe saidofthefirst
inwhich
formulation
itis presupposed
thatopium
is thecauseofpeople's
to sleep.
going
124.234.
136.409.See thefurther
in Boler,op.cit.(n. 7),85-8,92-3.
references
14E.g.,at 5.8 and5.172.
15I usetheword'faculty'
to indicate
thisspecialappealto powers.
One shouldnot
confuse
witha muchlatermovement
in psychology
themedieval
account
called"faculty
psychology."

18:50:40 PM

10

JOHNBOLER

moral psychology,which allows him to develop interesting

relationships
But it would be a howler
withinthe descriptionof human experience.16
worthyof Moliere's medical studentto appeal to a dividedwillas a cause
of our having conflicting
basic wants. If we alreadyknow that we have
wants,it is worsethan no explanationat all to adopt a scheme
conflicting
of moral mechanicsin which some "power" (called the "dividedwill") is
supposed to produce the conflict.Having a divided will just is having
wants.By emphasizingthatphenomenon,Augustineis able to
conflicting
open up possible associationswith other featuresof our moral psychology. To suppose he is proposingthe dividedwill as a causeof the conflict
itself,however,would not only saddle him with a fallacybut lose the
forceof what he is up to in this case.17For what talk of a dividedwill
has to offeris not an insightinto the "mechanics"of our volitionsbut a
fullersense of the complexityof our "wantings"in the contextof our
moral life.
As it happens, I thinkAugustine'smajor contributionin this whole
area derivesfromhis talentfor psychologicaldescriptionratherthan a
taste for psychologicalmechanics. But the emphasis I have placed on
in Augustineis not meant to exclude the possibility
will-as-phenomenon
of his havingas well an account of, or the beginningsof an account of,
the will-as-faculty.18
It is just that readinghim throughthe lens of later
16Theclassic
locusis Confessions
thetranslation
ofFrank
, BkVIII. (I follow
Sheed,The
, NewYork1943,andcitetheLatinfrom
Confessions
ofSt.Augustine
James
J. O'Donnell,
, Confessions
, Oxford1992,Volume1.) See especially
VIII, x, tr.Sheed,173-4:
Augustine
It wasI. I didnotwholly
to do itandI whowasunwilling.
will.
"[I]t wasI whowilled
I wasnotwholly
I strove
andwasdistracted
Therefore
withmyself
unwilling.
bymyself";
ed.O'Donnell,
98:"[E]goeramquivolebam,
egoquinolebam:
egoeram.Necplenevolea meipso."Cf.John
Ideomecum
contendebam
et dissipabar
bam,necplenenolebam.
1994,184:"Augustine's
M. Rist,
is. . .
Ancient
, Cambridge
Augustine:
Thought
Baptised
position
thatall ofus areacratic
we haveovercome
a
all thetime,andthatwhilewe maythink
To this,
moralweakness,
thatitwillreturn.
there
is always
therealpossibility
particular
ofthemorally
we shouldadd thathisidentification
ofthemainfeature
however,
good
actas loving
rather
thanas somesortofknowing
moreconvincing."
makes
suchan analysis
17One should
willin a
an appealto a divided
or perverted
avoidtreating
certainly
thepossibility
theproblem
of"repairing"
waythatmight
suggest
alongthelinesofadjustin one'slawnmower.
similar
couldbe saidofanynotion
of
ingthecarburetor
Something
thattreated
it as somesortofmental
anditis partly
forthatreason
muscle;
will-power
thatI havenottakenitup as a kindofpower.
that
argument
Kennyhasan interesting
is no "WQ"forwillas an analogue
there
tointellect:
forIQ withrespect
A.J.P.
Kenny,
Freedom
andPower
Will,
, Oxford
1975,3-4.
18To picka fairly
develobvious
BooksXI-XIVshows
text,TheCity
ofGodi
Augustine
ofthewillfromexperiences
as senseexperience
andlove.
as disparate
opinga notion
At
in Confessions
ofwillappears
, Bk.VIII, a faculty
onlyindirectly.
Interestingly
enough,
ofhismindas what"commands
themindtowill,[andthough]
VIII,ix,Augustine
speaks

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

11

psychologicaltheoriesmay distractus fromwhat he can accomplishwith

of moral and psychologicalphenomenaand their
his subtledifferentiation
interconnections.
For example,Augustineclearlyplays a centralrole in the intriguing
(and I thinkstillunresolved)questionof the appearance and influenceof
In the background,of course,is
the notionof will in Westernthought.19
the classic storyof the strugglebetween Reason and Desire.20Rather
a new player into the contest(under
than see Augustineas interjecting
the guise of a facultyof will),it seems to me more promisingto take his
in descriptivepsychology.Where Reason
as a sophistication
contribution
had been viewed as in (perhaps heroic) combat with Desire, Augustine,
by fixingon the phenomena of wants and wanting,is able to relocate
an importantpart of the conflictwithinthe domain of Reason itself.21
It
in
an
advance
our
of
moral
is
that
represents
psychology
understanding
independentof any theoryabout how the phenomena are realized in
termsof powersor faculties.
For my current,limitedproject,it is (happily)not necessaryto review
all of Augustine'sdirectand indirectreferencesto will. Since my concern is onlyto call attentionto the notionof will as phenomenon,it will
be enough to suggestsome of the ways the termvoluntas
itselfpoints to
a broaderconceptthan in its referenceto a faculty.Because of its deriva5 is oftento be transtion fromivelle>
whichis used verybroadly,voluntas
lated simplyas wishor want.22And outsideof philosophicalcontexts,that
themindis itself,
it doesnotdo it"(Sheed,172);"imperat
utvelitanimus,
animus
nec
alterestnecfacittarnen"
(O'Donnell,
98).He goeson to saythatthemindcommands
inasmuch
as itwills;
andthisisa "will[that]
commands
itself
tobewill":"voluntas
imperat
- an oddphrase,
ut sitvoluntas"
witha claimevenlesslikely
to
ultimately
concluding
refer
to a faculty:
"Thusthere
aretwowillsin us,becauseneither
ofthemis entire:
and
whatis lacking
totheoneis present
totheother"
(Sheed,173):"etideosuntduaevolununaearumtotanonestethocadestalteri
tates,
quia
quoddeestalteri"
(O'Donnell,
98).
19See note2 above,andRist,op.cit.(n. 16),186-8.
20HowReasonandDesire
intointellect
andwillis story
of
undergo
metamorphosis
someinterest.
In itsclassical
Reasonis ableto "dukeit out"withDesire;butat
form,
somepointit is relegated
to thesidelines
and can only"observe"
thegoings
on.John
ofintellect
ofthe"spectator
seeJohnRatner(ed.),
is relevant:
Dewey's
theory"
critique
ThePhilosophy
ofintellect
, NewYork1928,163-7,
ofJohn
Dewey
esp.,166.The restriction
inthiswaymaybe themostimportant
factor
behind
the"emergence"
ofa notion
ofwill.
21In hislectures
ofethics,
onthehistory
which
havecirculated
insamizdat
form,
John
Rawlsclaims
thatKantabandoned
an earlier
inwhich
account
ofthemoralstruggle
will
couldwinorlosethebatdewith
inclinations
fora moresophisticated
account
(andrealistic)
where
thesignificant
moralstruggle
wasinternal
tothewill.I amsuggesting
thatonecan
seeAugustine's
contribution
to theclassical
account
similar
lines.
along
22See Confessions
as myelders]
, I, viii,tr.Sheed,11: "I begantouse[thesamesounds

18:50:40 PM

12

JOHNBOLER

is probablythe primarysense of the term.What I want to call attention

to, however,is the usage where 'the will(s)'is the appropriatetranslation
but the referenceis not to a faculty.
A simpleexample of this,I thinkricheriflooser,conceptcan be found
in Augustine'stalk of a "good will" {bonavoluntas).23
For a good will is
in
one does not lose
is
lost
and
of
course
that
serious
sin;24
something
the facultyof will in sinning.More to the point,thereare complications
in describingthe facultyof will as itselfgood or bad. A good facultyof
will is one that operates effectively,
that is, one that can make choices
and adhere to a goal; but that capacityis evidentequally in a will that
sins.25What Augustineis talkingabout is a personwhose "set of wants"
is orientedto the propergoal.26It is the sortof value-ladenconceptthat
is typicalof Augustine;and one should not be in a hurryto tryto cash
it in fora neutralfacultyplus a moraljudgment.27
The importanceof "want," or the contentof wants,among the senses
' at least in the
of 4voluntas
earlyMiddle Ages is not unique to Augustine.
in eissignis
to express
ed. O'Donnell,
8: "measque
edomito
mywishes":
jam voluntates
is
oreperhaecenuntiabam."
obvious
thatthereference
The pluralis a fairly
indication
notto thefaculty
ofwill.See theendof Confessions
, VIII, ix (quotedin 15.1,above,
n. 18),wherethetwowillsarethelikely
sourceofAnselm's
below.But
usagediscussed
' in theNewTestament
hastodo with
itis alsorelevant
herethatcvoluntas
almost
always
be done."
content:
or "Notmywillbutthine
e.g.,"I cometodo thewilloftheFather,"
23Thisis a prominent
butan accessible
textis TheCity
themein Augustine,
,
ofGod
witha goodwill;cf.MarcusDods(trans.),
he saystheangelswerecreated
XII, 9 where
vol.XLVIII,
Series
TheCity
Latina,
, NewYork1950,389(cf.Corpus
Christianorum,
ofGod
363-4).
24Ibid.
25Augustine
without
thehelpofgrace,is "unableto want"
doesthink
thata sinner,
ofwilloperates
is thatthefaculty
(seeRist,op.rit.(n. 16),152).Mypointhere,however,
in thesamewayin opting
forgoodor ill.Thisis likethepointKennymakesabouta
seenote17,above.
"volition
quotient":
26I takethephrase
tobring
from
hasdonemorethananyone
JohnRistwhoI think
of
ofAugustine's
ofwill:"The'natural5
account
outtheimportance
meaning
non-faculty
witha man'ssetof
. . . highlights
ofmoralcharacter
theword'voluntas'
theconnection
Fiveofthiswork("Will,
loveandright
wants"
action"),
[op.cit.(n. 16),187).In Chapter
Ristseemstometoprovide
a veryhelpful
andsoundcontext
forunderstanding
Augustine
on will.
' shouldbe readthesame
27Augustine's
rareuseofthephrase'voluntas
libera
way.It
sin.
a willthatis liberated
from
doesnotmean(whatwewouldcall)freewillbutrather
'liberum
to
arbitriurr
as he normally
See TheCity
does,
uses,
ofGod,XXII,'30,wherehe
' fortheliberated
will(Dods(tr.),
refer
tofreewill,andthenvoluntas
libera
866):"Andin
ineach,
andindivisible
thatcity,
there
shallbe [a] freewill,onein all thecitizens,
then,
"Eritergo
all ill. . .": (Corpus
from
Christ.
delivered
Lat.,vol.XLVIII,864,lines69ff.):
insingulis
voluntas
ab omnimalo
etinseparabilis
illiusciuitates
etunain omnibus
libera,
liberatur."
andseeibid.,
lines63ff.:
liberata";
gratia
"largiore

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

13

Two examplesmay serveto make the point.28In his Scitoteipsum

, Abelard
seeksto identify
the locus of immoralaction or sin; and he settleson the
inner action of consent
somethingwe would (correctly)describeas an
act of the will.29In an example he gives to justifyhis claim, however,
Abelard explicitlysays there is nothingwrong with the agent's voluntas
which prettyclearlyrefershere to an agent's general "want" or plan.
The passage is worthquoting at length:
Butperhaps
youwillsaythatthewillto do a bad deedis alsosinandmakesus
before
God,evenas thewilltodo a gooddeedmakesusjust,so thatjustas
guilty
ina badwillandnotonlyinnotbeing
ina goodwill,so sinconsists
virtue
consists
butalso,andlikevirtue,
in being.Forjustas wepleaseGodbywilling
todo what
himbywilling
webelieve
topleasehim,so we displease
to do whatwebelieve
to
himor holdhimin contempt.
himandwe seemto offend
ButI saythat
displease
ifweconsider
thismorecarefully,
ourconclusion
should
be very
from
different
what
itseems.Forsincewe sometimes
sinwithout
anybad willandsincethatbadwill
whenrestrained
butnotextinguished
a prizeforthosewhoresist
it and
procures
fora struggle
anda crown
itought
themateriell
ofglory,
nottobe calledsin
brings
so muchas a weakness
is nownecessary.
which
Forthere
is an innocent
manwhose
himthatwitha nakedswordhe chases
cruellordis so burning
withrageagainst
himforhislife.Forlongthatmanfleesandas faras he can he avoidshisown
intheendandunwillingly
heis forced
tokillhimlesthebe killed
murder;
byhim.
Tell me,whoever
youare,whatbad willhe had in doingthis.If he wantedto
to savehisownlife.Butsurely
thiswasnota bad will?
escapedeath,he wanted
I think,
Yousay:notthis,
butthewillhehadtokillthelordwhowaschasing
him.
I reply:
thatis wellandcleverly
saidifyoucanshowa willinwhatyouclaim.But
as hasalready
beensaid,hedidthisunwillingly
andundercompulsion;
as faras he
couldhedeferred
tolife;hewasalsoawarethatbythiskilling
he wouldput
injury
hisownlifein danger.
So howdidhe do willingly
whathe committed
withdanger
tohisownlifeas well?. . . [A]ndyetalthough
hewasconstrained
byfearofdeath,
hediddo wrong
inconsenting
toan unjust
which
heshould
haveundergone
killing
rather
thaninflicted.30

' in
28A
oftheuseof'voluntas
contexts
study
thourough
philosophical
obviously
requires
an examination
ofauthors
before
him(e.g.,Boethius).
Augustine
(e.g.,Cicero)andafter
as I havesaid,is onlyto callattention
toa non-faculty
useofthetermand
Mypurpose,
nottopursue
herea fullaccount
ofit.
29In reconstructing
an earlier
ofwill,wehavetobe careful
about
philosopher's
theory
whatusewearemaking
ofourown(orat leasta later)concept.
op.cit.(n. 2),
Hacking,
- andcaution
- in applying
discusses
thepropriety
needed
a concept
wehaveavailable
to
thebehavior
ofpeoplewholackedthatconcept.
30Abelard,
teipsum
D.E. Luscombe,
Scito
in:id.,Peter
Abelard3
s Ethics
, ed.& transi.
, Oxford
areonfacing
1979,6-9(theLatinandEnglish
pages):"Sedfortassis
inquies,
quiaetuoluntasmaliopenspeccatum
sicutuoluntas
boni
est,quae nosapudDeumreosconstituit,
utquemadmodum
inbonauoluntate,
uirtus
itapeccatum
inmalauolunfacit,
opensiustos
tateconsistt,
necin nonessetantum,
uerum
etiamin essesicutet illa.Quemadmodum
enimuolendo
facere
itauolendo
facere
quodDeo credimus
piacereipsiplacemus,
quod

18:50:40 PM

14

JOHNBOLER

at least,providesan even more interesting

case;
Anselm,terminologically
forhe triesto sortout his different
uses of the word 'voluntasIn De casu
diaboli
, Anselmidentifiestwo basic wants in rationalcreatures,which he
In De concordia
calls "voluntatis"31
, he returnsto that idea, calling these
'
of will.32But he explainstherethat'voluntas
basic inclinationsor affectiones
can be used to referto any of threethings:(a) forthe power of the soul
of this
that is the instrumentof willing,(b) for the inclination[affectio)
it
not
bother
So
does
and
for
the
use
of
this
instrument.33
instrument, (c)
'
5
him to continue using voluntasat times substantiallybut not for the
and to say: "A man's merit,whethergood or
faculty(or instrumentum),
from
these
two
inclinationswhich I am callingwills."34
derives
evil,
These briefreferencesto Abelard and Anselm are intendedonly to
' that I thinkis characteristic
call attentionto the broad use of 4voluntas
of writers(at least) in the earlyMiddle Ages. NothingI have said about
- is
them- or about Augustine,forthat matter
supposed to be definitive
uidemur.
siuecontempnere
et ipsumoffendere
Deo credimus
displicere
ipsidisplicemus,
estquamuideaSed dicoquiasi diligentius
de hocsentiendum
adtendamus,
longealiter
et cumipsamala
tur.Cumenimnonnunquam
absqueomnimalauoluntate,
peccemus
etmateriam
nonextincta,
resistentibus
uoluntas
refrenata,
pugnaeetglopalmam
pariat,
riaecoronanti
nontamipsapeccatum
confrt,
quaedamiamnecessaria
quaminfirmitas
in quemcrudelis
dominus
suusperfurorem
dicidebet.Ecce enimaliquisestinnocens
ensead interimendum
adeocommotus
est,uteumeuaginato
quemillediu
persequatur,
tandem
etnolens
occidit
coactus
suioccisionem
etquantumcunque
deuitans,
fugiens
potest
in
habuerit
eumneoccidatur
ab eo. Dicitomihiquicumque
es,quammalamuoluntatem
Sed
uitamconseruare.
uolebatpropriam
hoc facto.Volenssiquidem
mortem
effugere
de
sedillaquamhabuerit
haecarbitror,
malaerat?Non,inquies,
haecuoluntas
numquid
dominipersequentis.
Beneet argutedicis,si uoluntatem
occisione
possis
Respondeo,
in eo quodasseris.
est,nolenset coactushocfecit,
Sed,iamut dictum
quod
assignare
uitaesibiperiincolomen
sciens
uitam
distulit,
quoqueexhacinterfectione
potuit
quantum
culumimminere.
fecit,
quodcumipsoetiamuitaesuae
Quomodoergoilluduoluntarie
timore
coactus
commisit?
... [E]t tamendeliquit
mortis,
consentiendo,
quamuis
periculo
interfectioni
iniustae
quaminferre
oportuit."
quameumpotiusferre
31Thesearethewill-for-happiness
beatitudini*
commoai
or voluntas
) andthewill{voluntas
is developed
in chapters
The scheme
12 to 14 ofThe Fallof
for-justice
(voluntas
justitiae).
Anselm
andHerbert
Richardson
theDevil;cf.Jasper
, vol.II,
ofCanterbury
(transi.),
Hopkins
Omnia
Cantuariensis
Toronto1976,150-8.FortheLatin,see S. Anselmi
,
Opera
Archiepiscopi
ed. F.S. Schmitt,
1946,251-9.
Edinburgh
32De concordia
ofwill,
onthefaculty
withhisemphasis
that,
, III, 11.It^is notsurprising
D. 26.TheLatinandEnglish
' cf.Ordinatio
DunsScotus
should
, III, suppl.
affectiones'
prefer
ontheWillandMorality
DunsScotus
1986,178-9.
, Washington
appearin AllanB. Wolter,
33Anselm.,
dicividetur
vol.II, 278):"Voluntas
De concordia
utique
aequi(Operaomnia,
aliudusus
aliudaffectio
Aliudesteniminstrumentum
vocetripliciter.
instrumenti,
volendi,
eiusdem
instrumenti."
34Hopkins
and Richardson
(op.at. n. 31),218;(Operaomnia,vol.I, 284): Ex his
sive
omnemeritum
descendit
voluntates
duabus
hominis,
dicimus,
affectionibus,
quasetiam
bonm
sivemalum."

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

15

in the reconstruction
of what we would describeas theirtheoriesof will.
I
in all threecases that the reconstruction
it
think
As happens,
of their
theoriesis a verycomplex affairand not "just a matterof words." Still,
a concernfor usage can help to remove the veils that later psychological theoriestend to impose between the text of a Medieval writerand
of it.
our interpretation
'
,' reflects
Perhaps the tendencyto ignore the broader uses of voluntas
a concern that,withoutthe mooringsof a facultytheoryof will, such
uses representonly the reificationof incidentalphenomena which cannot be centralto the deeper analysisof psychologicaland moral explanation.Peirce'sreplyto the charge of a dormitive-virtue
fallacyseems to
me a step towardsprovidingsuitablespace forboth sortsof analysis.
IV
The second distinctionI findhelpfulin the analysisof talk of will cuts
across that of phenomenonand faculty,but it is more directlyrelevant
where appeals to will are part of a causal analysis.In that context,the
forinvokinga powerturnson the identification
of some "gap"
justification
in the observableevidence.It is a familiarmove in ordinarypractice,for
example,when we appeal to an agent's beliefsand wants to explain to
someone who questionswhy the agent did this ratherthan that.35But
withinthisbroad area, thereis an importantdifference
about the character of the gap or explanation.36
In one kind of case, the agent's action
will be explainedby the contentof the agent's want: e.g., "She leftthe
room because she wanted some freshair." In other cases, the appeal is
to the special way the agent acted, where ". . . because she just wanted
to" indicatesher actingfreely.I shall referto these as an appeal to the
will as source of wants and will as the source of autonomy.
The two sorts of appeal are familiarenough in themselves,even if
to the will.It is will as source
nowadaystheyare not usuallyboth referred
of autonomythatis primaryin freewilldiscussions,whilethe talkof beliefcum-desirein currentphilosophical psychologyhas to do with (what
I am calling)will as source of wants.37Both of these activitiescan be
35See
in TheMind-Body
Fodor'saccount
Problem
,
op.cit.(n. 17),129;andJerry
Kenny,
in:Scientific
A strict
"eliminativest"
ofcourse,
American,
244,Jan1981,116-20.
account,
woulddismiss
thefamiliar
as mere"folk
process
psychology."
36Cf.Kenny,
notagreewithmyformulation
ofthe
op.cit.(n. 17),128ff.
Kenny
might
distinction.
37Faculties
arenotpopular
Fodor's
likeothers
thatallude
account,
nowadays
generally.

18:50:40 PM

16

JOHNBOLER

attributedto one facultyof will,but only if one recognizeshow different

roles in
theyare. In the one case, wantsand beliefsplay complementary
the explanationof human behavior,operatingin theirown ways but, so
to speak, on the same level. But as the source of autonomy,the faculty
of will takes on a unique significancebeyond what can be exhibitedas
a functionon simplyhavingwants.38
Here again, I find somethinglike these two different
roles for will
'voluntas
' is the
reflectedin Augustine'sterminology.
where
Roughlyput,
dominantterm,the emphasis is on the contentof wanting,or as Rist
puts it, on the set of wants that characterizesa person at a certaintime.
When Augustineis concerned about the autonomyof human agents,
'
.'39
however,the emphasisshiftsto arbitrium
One may be led to underestimate
the role of arbitrium
because of standard translationswhere liberumarbitrium
voluntatis
is construed as "free
choice of (i.e., on the part of the facultyof) will."40The root meaning
"
of arbitrium
":
,' however,is not "choice" but what lies behind our arbiter
i.e., someone who makes a determination.
Augustine'suse of the geni' seems to me to indicate not the
tive of 'voluntas
power responsiblefor
that act but ratherwhat the determination
is about: a determination
of

to belief-cum-desire,
doesnotmention
it.On theotherhand,theemphasis
in freewill
discussions
isonwillas thesource
ofautonomy.
Frankfurt's
Freedom
article,
Harry
important
WeCare
About
, in hisTheImportance
, Cambridge
ofthewillandtheconcept
ofa person
ofWhat
theideaoflevelsofwill.Frankfurt
doessaysomethings
about
1988,11-25,introduces
thecharacter
ofa person
in terms
ofhishigher
andlowerlevelwants,
buttheprimary
is on personhood
in thecontrol
realized
ofone'swants.
emphasis
38Thedistinction
somewhat
intheway
someapparent
differences
might
helptoreduce
andScotustalkaboutthewill.A characteristic
ofwillinAquinas
account
Aquinas
begins
withthewillas intellectual
andso withthecontent
account
ofwants;
appetite
Kenny's
oftherelation
ofintellect
andwillin wanting
is in keeping
withthat:Aquinas
onMind,
NewYork1993,59,andseeKenny1975(op.cit.n. 16),49. Butwhentheissueis autontheideaofthewill'sself-movement;
thedevelopment
is described
omy,Aquinas
develops
in Grace
andFreedom
onwill
, NewYork1971,95-6.Scotus's
byBernard
thought
Lonergan
seemstodevelop
theother
is ontheautonomy
ofthewill(see
way:theoriginal
emphasis
sections
twoandthree
ofWolter's
while
thecontribution
oftheintellect
selections),
appears
later.Foran account
ofthelatter
seeWolter,
o.cit.(n.32),44-5.
development,
'
39NotethatAquinas
uses liberum
in thebroadsenseofautonomy,
arbitrium?
describing
ofourbeingmaster
itin terms
ofourownactions":
Liberum
arbitrium
ST,I-II,Prologue.
in choice(electio):
is realized
cf.Kenny1993(op.cit.n. 38),75.
ibid.;
40See theoften
usedtextofAugustine,
OnFreeChoice
1964.
, Indianapolis
oftheWill
Rist(op.cit.(n. 16),xv)nicely
finesses
theproblem
thetideofthedialogue
bytranslating
De libero
of
arbitrio
as "On HumanResponsibility."
Theissue,ofcourse,
is notonesimply
words
ortranslations.
AndinDe libero
arbitrio
isindeed
about(oraround)
, Augustine
talking
a faculty
ofwill.

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

17

what one wants. 4Liberum

,' then, indicates the manner of the determination:i.e., afterthe fashionof a freeperson and not a slave.41
In any event,it seems clear enough that the bulk of the work done
on Augustineon will has focusedon issues of autonomy,notablyfreedom of the will.That emphasisis hardlysurprising,
giventhe importance
of such topics as freewill and grace, or human responsibility
generally.
Moreover,our own philosophicalorientationis not withoutits effect.It
is onlyrelatively
recently,forexample,thatstudentsof philosophicalpsythe complementary
roles of beliefsand wants (or
have
stressed
chology
in
that
human
action
the interestin virtuetheor
"desires") explaining
ories of moralityhave emphasizedthe importanceof "thick"moral concepts in human practice.
It is worthrepeating,though,that my point in introducingthese first
of Augustine
has not been to proposea new interpretation
twodistinctions
from
underthe shadow
or otherMedieval authors,but ratherto bringout
of our preoccupationwith autonomy and the facultyof will, the less
workedon but I thinkequally fruitful
topics of the phenomenonof will
and the contentof wants.The thirddistinctionI want to discussis of a
different
order. It is generatedby a problem in the more sophisticated
appeals to powersor faculties;but it is not somethingto which medieval
writerscall explicitattention.
V
I want to propose,then,is relevantprimarilyto the
The finaldistinction
workof the laterscholastics.Augustine,I have suggested,can be seen as
of psychologicaland moral phenomenapriadvancingour understanding
of his descriptions.When we move on
marilythroughthe sophistication
to writersof the later Middle Ages, however,we finddeveloped theories
explicitlyinvolvingthe facultiesof intellectand will and their interaction.42And here the impressionis not so much of greatersensitivity
to
it. In any event,
the phenomenabut of an effortsomehow to get behind
41Theissueofhuman
at stakeinAugustine's
useofliberum
arbitrium
is clearly
autonomy
relevant
tothefreewill
ofhis
Butoneshould
be readyforsomespecialfeatures
problem.
towant"(Rist,
account:
forexample,
the"incapacity
op.cit.(n. 17),152)andtheideathat
theunredeemed
willcanchoosebutalways
evil(187).Thesearefeatures
ofwhat
chooses
calls"slavery
to sin."
Augustine
42See note15,above,on 'faculty.'
I alludeto in whatfollows
The complexities
may
be duelesstothelogicofpowers
andmoretothespecific
casesofintellect
and
generally
willas powers.

18:50:40 PM

18

JOHNBOLER

it is the idea of "gettingbehind" that I want to pursue. The context,of

course,is explanationin philosophicalpsychology.
The distinctionI have in mind contrastsa directappeal fromkind of
action to kind of power (or faculty)with an analysisof, so to speak, a
macroscopicaction as a functionon the actionsof deeper-lying
powers.
levels of analysis,in which the actionsof the whole
The use of different
are explainedin termsof the actionsof its parts,is familiarto us nowadays, both in physicsand psychology.So thereis a riskof anachronism
in applyingit to medieval authors;but it is an hypothesisthat I think
may help us both to understandsome of theirown disputesand to apprein modernthought.
ciate theirtransformation
By the time of the Thirteenthand FourteenthCenturies,writerswere
much more self-consciousabout the implicationsof appeals to powers
and/orfaculties.43
They made use of and added to a complex(Aristotelian)
schema foridentifying
powers that involves,in part,what we mightcall
"higherlevel" powers. The substantialformof a thingcan be seen as
itselfa dispositionof certainpowers,e.g., the power of motion,of growth
and so on. In the case of the human soul, its verycomplex powers of
intellectand will can in turnbe treatedas dispositionsof more specific
powers (e.g., the innate capacity for language, and the acquired ability
to speak English) which more directlyunderlie concrete actions. The
schema was neithermechanisticnor reductionist.
That is to say, thereis
no ghostly{geistliches)
mechanicsforpowers,as if theymightbe whirring
and clickingalong like the wheels and leversin a clock or Seventeenth
Centuryautomaton.For powers are not littlethingsat all; but of course
this raises questionsabout how theycan be causes of action- or more
generallyput, how theyfigureas explanatoryfactors.44
43Asa result,
theoretical
contheir
talkofpowers
comesladenwithbroader
respective
whatmaybe simply
different
intuitions
aboutmorality
cerns.
(seemyTranscending
Beyond
67
the
DunsScotus
ontheTwoAffections
Natural:
, in:Catholic
Quarterly,
ofWill
Philosophical
ofself-motion
andoftheroleoffinal
causesaffects
their
(1993),109-26),
analyses
differing
ofself-motion
is clearly
thewayeachtalksaboutwill.The relevance
ofScotus's
analysis
movetur
abaliomovetur,"
setoutinRoyR. Effler,
DunsScotus
andthe
"omne
John
principle
quod
oflatemedieval
on finality
is yettobe done.
St.Bonaventure
theories
1962.Anaccount
44One maywelldisagree
withFodor'sfunctionalism
as a theory
ofmental
phenomein
an interesting
aboutexplanation
non{loc.dt.(n. 35), 118ff.),
butit suggests
question
at a levelthatis independterms
ofpowers:
thatis,might
theappealtopowers
operate
in thecausalmakeup
entofhowtheprocesses
in terms
ofpowers
is "realized"
analyzed
in a
To follow
to askwhether,
ofthings?
hiscomputer
117):itis interesting
image(ibid.,
in wordelement
thewillfunctions
likethe"open/close"
as something
theory,
particular
onthecomputer.
button
software
orwhether
itmakes
itmorelikethe"on/off"
processing

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

19

The scholasticstypicallyinsistit is the substancethat is the primary

agent actingthroughits powers. For example,one sees by means of the
power or facultyof sight;it is not thatseeingis attributedto me because
that facultysees.45In the same way, it is not the intellector will properlyspeaking,that does such and such but the person that acts through
them.46
And so long as one goes fromactionsof an agent directlyto the
corresponding
power and even on to higherlevel powers it is plausible to ascribethe same action to the power and to the agent exercising
the power. In this contextthen,when an author says that the intellect
thinksand that the will tends to a certainend, it seems we are to treat
thisas anotherway of sayingthat the human agent can thinkin virtue
of the intellectand can have certain"tendings"in virtueof the will.
The structureof explanationvia powers becomes more complicated,
however,when one treatsan action of the whole as resultingfromthe
cooperationof more than one power. The relevantcase for my present
purposes is the cooperation of intellectand will in the productionof
human action. On the principlethat the action of a power or part is to
be attributed
to the agent (as performing
the action throughthatpower),
will
action
of
intellect
or
can
be
construed
as an action of the human
any
agent exercisingthat power. When my stomach digestsmy lunch, it is
proper to say that I am digestingmy lunch. Of course, my digesting
somethingis not a fullyhuman act but what Aquinas calls an "act of
man."47On the otherhand, thinkingand willingseem on the face of it
to be human acts; and that createsproblemsfortheirinteraction.
In the FirstPart of the Second Part of the SummaTheologiae
, Aquinas
discussesthe complementary
roles of intellectand will in the psychological and moral structureof human action.48There Aquinas assignsinter
45ST,I, q. 75,a. 2, ad 2: "Theactivities
ofpartsareattributed
tothewholethrough
theparts.Forwe speakofa manseeingwithhiseyeor feeling
withhishand,butnot
inthesamesenseas whenwespeakofsomething
ofitsheat;forstrictly
byreason
heating
heatin no senseheats.It canbe said,therefore,
thatthesoulunderstands
speaking
just
as theeyesees;butit is muchbetter
to saythatthemanunderstands
withhissoul."
"Undeetoperationes
attribuuntur
totiperpartes.
Dicimus
enimquodhomovidet
partium
etpalpatpermanum
aliterquamcalidum
calefacit
peroculum
percalorem,
quiacalor
nullomodocalefacit
Potest
diciquodanimaintelligit
sicutocuproprie
loquendo.
igitur
lusvidet,
sedmagis
dicitur
Thetextandtransproprie
quodhomointelligat
peranimam."
lationarefrom
Summa
NewYork1970,vol.11.
Theolosxae,
46Kenny
toAquinas's
claims
thatitis thesoulthatactsinthinking
rather
than
objects
theperson:
1993(op.cit.n. 38),134-6andch. 12,passim.
Kenny
47ST,I II, q. 1,a. 1.
48ST,I-II, 8-17.See
I oftheMcGraw-Hill
edition
fora schematic
sumqq.
Appendix
mary
(op.cit.(n.45),vol.17,211).

18:50:40 PM

20

JOHNBOLER

alia intending,choice and consentto the will and ordering(to an end),

The way he describesthese
decision and deliberationto the intellect.49
actionssuggeststhattheyare instancesof what you or I would be doing
ifwe deliberatedabout, decided on or chose something.But fullyhuman
actions must involve both intellectand will.50Were that sort of action
of
proper to the facultiesthemselves,it would seem to make homunculi
them:where the intellect(of itself)would have wantsand/or the will (of
itself)have beliefs.51
The most plausible resolutionof the problemwith thisspecifictext,I
think,is to read Aquinas as identifying
stages in an idealized case of a
human coming to a certaindecision and acting upon it. Deciding and
consenting,then,in thiscontext,would be attributedto intellectand will
in the somewhatlooser sense of fullyhuman acts whose dominantor
But whileit may servea descripdefiningaspectis cognitiveor conative.52
tivepurposeto divideup human action,assigningsome actions(primarily)
to will and others to intellect,it leaves us withouta basic account of
human acts as the productof acts of intellectand will.
If the interactionof intellectand will is to give us an explanation
of
human action,what is needed to avoid a regressis somethingotherthan
a directappeal froma kind of action to a power.53The fullyhuman (or
macroscopic)actionsattributedto human agentshave to be exhibitedas
a functionon more specializedor fine-grained
actions now to be attrib49Ibid.
, qq. 13-15.
50It is becauseofthisthatKennyaccusesAquinasofa mistake
here:Kenny1975
(op.cit.n. 17),25.
51Theissuemaywellbe morecomplicated
tends
thanthat.
Aristotle)
Aquinas
(following
andrational
notto drawa sharpdistinction
between
intellect
appetite"
(appe"appetitive
titivus
etappetitus
intellectus
ST,I-II,q. 13,a. 1. Butthisis notduetohistreatintellectivus):
ofthedisanalogy
between
thetwo
andwillas co-equals.
account
Kenny's
ingintellect
seemsto meto capture
Kenny1975(op.cit.n. 17),3-4;seealsohis
Aquinas's
position:
theoperation
ofthe
which
makes
ofcommand
as an operation
on a "phrastic,"
treatment
and86f.
willdependent
in a specialwayon an intellectual
content:
39f.,74ff.,
52One could,I suppose,
terms:
andthelikeas equivocal
take'decision,'
'deliberation'
andwillin theirinteraction
in one use,properly
ofintellect
to thefaculties
applicable
humanactionwhichtheirinteraction
and,in theother,
properly
appliedto thefully
to allowa
as an interpretation
ofAquinas
Butit seemsmoreplausible
simply
explains.
or
in whichanyfully
humanactionattributed
to theintellect
somewhat
looserreading
willis an actwhosedominant
or conative.
ordefining
aspectis cognitive
53Iftheactions
tointellect
andwillarehuman
attributed
acts,thenonefacesa regress
- as
andwill.Iftheyarenot
in explaining
themas constituted
actsofintellect
byfurther
- thenitbecomes
clearthat
acts
I think
ofhuman
mustbe thecaseforthebasicanalysis
inferareanddo cannot
be a simple
whatthosepowers
theprocedure
fordetermining
is a
from
encefrom
kindofactiontopower(sincetheonlykindofactionwe canstart
human
fully
action).

18:50:40 PM

WILLAS POWER

21

uted properlyto intellectand will. In that sort of analysis,intellectand

entities:i.e., where the intellect's
will would be treatedas "deeper-lying"
doing/ and thewill'sdoing Wjust is the persondoingAlpha and where
W and / are not the sort of actions that would be attributableto the
human agent as fullyhuman actions.That is not a move that Aquinas
explicitlyrecognizes,but it seems to have precedentin his writings.
Aquinas's accountof the workof the agentintellectseems to me a case
in point. To put a verycomplex analysisin verysimple terms,Aquinas
holdsthatthe agentintellectworkswiththe phantasm(as an instrument),
producingan intelligiblespecies in the possibleintellectwhich,once put
in act, producesthe word (verbum
).54All of that,I would say,just is the
human personcomingto understandsomething(in the formof a definition or proposition).And in that context,I think,the specialized action
of the agentintellect(e.g., its producingan intelligiblespeciesin the possible intellect)should be taken as proper to it and not somethingwe
would normallydescribethe human person as doing- in contrast,say,
or calculatingor solvinga puzzle.
to remembering
This two-levelsanalysisappears in Aquinas's account of the interacthe
tionof intellectand will when he speaks of the intellect's"specifying"
will or the will's (efficiendy)
causing the intellectto act;55forthese seem
to be actionsproperto those faculties,which then figurein the account
fromthe assigning
of fullyhuman actions.And that,I think,is different
of fullyhuman actions,like consenting,deliberatingand the like,now to
intellectand now to will as theirdominantfeature.
Anyoneappealingto the cooperativeaction of powers needs the more
complexsortof analysisI have been describing.But the case is interestI think,withDuns Scotus, thoughI have time here only
inglydifferent,
to gestureat it. The emphasishe puts on the will is well enough known
His insistencethatthe inteleven ifthe particularsare stillcontroversial.56
lect is strictlya naturalpower57and that the will is the only "rational
power"58give the impressionat least that he attributesa greaterindependenceof operationto thosefacultiesthanAquinas does.59At the same
54E.g.,in ST,I, q. 79,a. 3, andq. 86,passim.
55Ibid.,
I-II,q. 9, a. 1.
56A majormotive
ontheWilland
inAllanWolter's
thevaluable
DunsScotus
producing
wasto trytosettherecord
3ff.
Introduction,
Morality
straight:
57Quaestiones
inMetaphysicam
154-5.
, IX, q. 15:in Wolter,
58Wolter,
144-73.
59Kenny's
suitScotus's
treatment
ofthewill(seenote42, above)wouldnot,I think,
It maybe thatScotusrecognizes
a sharper
"factandvalue."
distinction
between
theory.

18:50:40 PM

22

JOHNBOLER

time, Scotus does not seem to be treatingthem exactlyas deeper lying

entities.The intellect'snaturaloperation,like the stomach's,can be primarilyattributedto the agent who thinksand digests.And the will as
the source of autonomy,which is Scotus's primaryemphasis, would
seem to have a unique if not altogetherindependentaction. Of course,
Scotus is no more likelythan Aquinas to treatthe will as a homunculus.
The action of will is the action of the person. Perhaps for Scotus, it is
not that the will is made a littleperson, but ratherthat the person is
"identified"withthe will- or to put the point less dramatically,
that the
is
realized
will.
actions
under
the
control
of
the
person only
through
I have throughoutbarely touched on issues that are highlyinterpretive and controversial.
For my presentpurpose,however,I am willingto
risk the distractionthat mightcause in order to point to some of the
complexitiesinvolvedin applyingthe distinctionbetween a "direct"or
simple appeal froma kind of action to a power, on the one hand, and,
on the other,an analysis of the fullyhuman action as a functionon
actionsproperto the facultiesof intellectand will. This distinction
brings
out more clearlya theme that runs throughthe othertwo as well. For
a descriptionof human action from
one can readilyenough reconstitute
the formaltalk of the action and even the interactions
of powers.But it
is a very much more difficult
the
to
establish
causal analysis
challenge
that is supposed to underlieit.
Seattle,Washington
University
of Washington

18:50:40 PM

1
Anselmand Ockhamon Choice
Pickingand Choosing:
C.G. NORMORE

Most recentworkon freedomand choice has operatedwithinwhat can

be broadlyconceivedof as an Aristotelianmodel. In thismodel deliberation is about means, not about ends, and motivesare all commensurable. Rational deliberationis thus a matterof maximizing(or satisfying)
motive satisfactionin the light of the agent's beliefs. Given the same
beliefsand the same motivesany two completelyrationalagents would
make thesame choices.Wherebeliefsand motivesare the same,difference
of choice reflectseitherirrationality
akrasia.
or, more mysteriously,
That Aristotleheld even the few views this briefsketchattributesis
controversial.
Because it mattersfor the contrastsI wish to draw, I will
take a momentto tryto make the sketchseem plausiblyAristotelian.
There is no word in AristotelianGreek which can uncontroversially
be
translatedby the modernEnglish'will.' Indeed AlbrechtDihle is moved
to writemore generallythat "[t]he Greeks had no word of this kind in
theirlanguage to denote will or intentionas such. . . . During the period
in meaning,
when the two verbs boulomai
and (e)thelo
were stilldifferent
the firstsignifiedprimarilythe planning and reflecting
which precedes
action. The second only meant 'to be disposed,' 'to be prepared.'"2
Aristotleis primarilyconcernedwiththe voluntarywhich seems to be
what has its originin the agent himselfwhen he knows the particulars
in which the action is.3 Aristotleunderstands'voluntary'broadly. He
allows thatchildrenand animalscan act voluntarily,4
that actionscaused
by emotionor appetiteare voluntary,thatactionsdone under duressare
and that actionswhich are not regrettedare voluntary.6
voluntary,5
What distinguishes
full human action is not that it is voluntarybut
1 I am grateful
to RegaWoodand C. ScottRaglandforhelpful
comments
on this
paper.
2 Albrecht
Dihle,TheTheory
, Berkeley
1982,20.
ofWillinClassical
Antiquity
3 Aristotle,
Ethica
Berlin1831.
Mcomachea,
3.1,1110a15,ed. Bekker,
* Anstot.,
Eth.Mc.,3.2,111lb7-10.
JAnstot.,
hAh.
Jyic.f
3.1,lllUalU.
6 Anstot.,
Eth.Mc., 3.1,1110bl9.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:50:49 PM

24

G.G.NORMORE

that it involvesdeliberation(boulesis
) which is what Dihle glossesas "the
and
which
reflection
precedesaction." For Aristotledeliberation
planning
startsfromthe layingdown of a singleend.7I suspectthatAristotlethinks
that thereis in fact a singletreelikestructurein which all of an agent's
deliberativeactivitycan be located, but that is not crucial at thispoint.
It is enough if any singledeliberationhas thisstructure.The end of the
deliberationis givenforthe deliberationand is not itselfin any way determined by it.8Deliberationis always with respectto means forattaining
a given end. The given end of the deliberationis perceivedas good by
the agent.
Now Aristotleand the traditionwhichfollowshim maintainthateverythingwhich is changed is changed by another.Nothingis preciselythe
cause of its own change. Prohairesis
(the outcome of a process of rational
a
in
is caused by someis
the
deliberation)
change
agent. So prohairesis
is
caused
his
tradition
that
it
and
Aristotle
by a combinasuggest
thing.
The
tion of a desiderativestate and a beliefstate.
combinationproduces
what Brad Inwood has called an "activateddesire,"which issues immediatelyin action if nothinginterferes.9
Aristotlehimselfgives few examples of thisprocess.Here is one from
De motuanimalium
chapterseven: "One thinksthat
[1] everyman ought to walk, and
[2] that one is a man oneself,
one walks."10
[3] straightaway
The conclusionis the immediateperformanceof the action. Here the
firstpremissexpressesdesire;the second,belief;and the conclusionseems,
at least,to be the action of walkingitself.Of course,none of thisneed be
verbal or explicit.
The process of deliberationwhich Aristotleoutlineshere is a causal
process. If we abstractfora momentfromwhetherwe are dealingwith
finalor efficient
causes,we can say thattheaction(thewalkingin Aristotle's
is
the
effectof the pre-existing
desiderativestate and the preexample)
we will
existingknowledge.Given those,in the absence of interference,
a
on
Since
the
state
desiderative
perception
expresses
simplyget walking.
the part of the agent about what is good, it would seem that action is
7 Aristot.,
Eth.Nic.,3.3,1112bl6.
8 Aristot.,
Eth.Nic.,3.3,112b11-12.
9 BradInwood,
Oxford
Ethics
andhuman
action
inearly
Stoicism,
1985,10-1.
De motu
Aristot.,
an.,7, 70la 10-13.

18:50:49 PM

ANSELM
ANDOCKHAM
ON CHOICE

25

simplythe causal resultof the good and the agent'sbeliefsabout how to

obtain it.
- the
It is here, of course, that the Socratic problem of akrasiaenters
problem which seems to structuremuch of Aristotle'saccount of proIf the end of deliberationis given and if the beliefsabout how
hairesis.
to obtain it are given,how can it happen that an agent sometimesacts
forthe worse?
This problemhas been centralto the entireAristoteliantradition.It
remainsso todayin the workof modernphilosopherslike Davidson and
Kenny. I do not want to trace out thisdialectichere. What is crucialfor
mypurposesis thatthe model of actioninvolvedis one in whicha process
of deliberationleads to a conclusionwhich eitheris the action or leads
to the action withoutany additional step that we mightplausiblycall
choosing.Since thisprocessof deliberationjust is an assessmentof what
is eithera good means (one view) or the best means (another)to accomplisha givenend, the agentwill failto bringabout thatend onlyif either
it is mistakenabout the efficacyof the means, or somethinginterferes
withthe processof deliberation,or somethingpreventsthe conclusionof
the deliberationissuingin action. Passion has been the traditionalcase
of such a something.But again this eitheris powerfulenough to interfereor it is not. There is no furtheract of choosingwhich determines
whetherit will or will not succeed in interfering.
It followsfromthispicture,as I have outlinedit, that it is not crucial
to human choice (prohairesis)
that the agent be confrontedwith several
means to an end. The processof deliberationmay normallyinvolveseveral means, but it could proceed even if therewere just one. In particular, thereis nothingin the virtuousagent'sconductwhich requiresthat
a viciousact be in any way a live optionforher or him. Indeed Aristotle
seems to thinkthatthe trulyvirtuousagentwill seldom if ever even consider a vicious alternative.
One further
consequenceof the model is thatif we findagentswhose
knowledgeis great enough and whose deliberativepowers are strong
enough,we will findagentswhich will naturallyact for the best. Thus
it is thatwithinthe late Greek philosophicaltradition,God acts for the
best not by choice but simplyin virtueof the divine nature.
The Aristotelianmodel and its descendantsare deservedlypopular
matter,and the model offers
among philosophers.Choice is a mysterious
considerableexplanatorypower. Yet the model does not capture conunreflective
commonsense.One powerfulintuitionabout choice
temporary
is thatfreechoice requiresthe abilityto choose otherwise.I say "choose

18:50:49 PM

26

G.G.NORMORE

otherwise,"not "act otherwise,"because there are, famously,cases in

which we would intuitively
say that an agent acts freelyeven in circumstancesin which doing otherwisewould be impossible.Some argue that
thisapplies to choice as well,but thatis certainlymore problematic,and
I will simplyassume here that the case has not been made.
The ability to choose otherwisefitsuneasily withinan Aristotelian
If a rationalagentwitha givenset of beliefsmaximizesmotive
framework.
thenforthatagentto act otherwisewould seem to be forher
satisfaction,
akrasia
to be irrational.Thus it is that withinthe Aristotelianframework
and a good deal of ingenuthreatensto collapse into mere irrationality,
ityis requiredto explain how an agent can be akraticand stillrational
enough to be held to be freeand so responsibleforher actions.
The Aristotelianmodel was not as dominantduringthe Middle Ages
as it is today.Althoughthe Aristotelian
model had itschampions,Thomas
for
the
center
of
Aquinas
example,
gravityin medieval thinkingabout
the will lay elsewhere.I want here to sketchtwo medievalapproachesto
choice which differgreatlyfromeach other,but are unitedin rejecting
model. Reflectionon themwill,I hope,
keyassumptionsof the Aristotelian
both teach us somethingabout choice and teach us somethingabout the
evolutionof medieval thinkingabout choice.
The Aristotelian
model as I have outlinedit is characterizedby a number of key claims. Among these are:
A. Everything
which changes is changed by another.
B. Deliberationis alwayswithrespectto means ratherthanwithrespect
to ends.
C. Everything
soughtis soughtunder the aspect of (thatis, because it
is perceivedto be) good.
The alternativetraditionsto which I now turnproceed, I think,from
a ratherdifferent
picturethan thatof choice as rationaldeliberation.On
the Aristotelianmodel, we performgood acts- that is, acts which bring
about the (perceived)good, exacdy when the process of deliberationis
not impeded. But on the alternativemodels, to which I wish to direct
attentionhere,we findwithinourselvesdistinctand in some sense incommensurablesourcesof motivationwhichcan (or at least can be perceived
directions.Whetherwe do good or evil in this
to) lead us in different
contextdepends on which source of motivationwe follow.Here it is not
the case that one source of motivationis seen as an impedimentto the
other- both are in some sense positive,and neitheris "really"the agent.
The agent chooses which to follow.

18:50:49 PM

ANDOCKHAM
ON CHOICE
ANSELM

27

Althoughit is unusual in some otherrespects,we can finda particularlyclear example of this centraltheme in the second traditionin the
work of Anselm of Canterbury.In his treatiseDe casu diaboli
, chapters
12-14,Anselmpresentsa thoughtexperiment.He begins:
nature
is calledgood,we commonly
asidethefactthatevery
speakoftwo
Leaving
evilis
whoseopposing
evils.One goodis calledjustice,
goodsandoftwoopposing
The other
(commodum)
goodis whatitseemsto mewe cancalladvantage
injustice.
to theevilofdisadvantage
which
is opposed
) . . ,n
(;incommodum
Anselmthen claims that no one can be happy who does not will (i)ult)
her own advantage and that no one ought to be happy who does not
will (ivult
) justice. He assumes the existenceof a being so constructed
and argues
"... that at firstGod gives her only the will-for-happiness"
thatin that case she "does not yet will anythingotherthan happiness."
Anselmcontinuesby arguingthat in such a case "it is obvious that she
is not at all able by herselfnot to will the onlythingthatshe has received
to will" and furtherthat "she wills to be happy in proportionas she
understandsthat therecan be a higherdegree."12He concludes that if
such a being thoughtshe would be happierby being like God (whichis
what Satan is said to have wanted),thenshe would of necessityseek that.
Anselmthen imaginesa being constructedonly with a will forjustice
and argues that in that case the being could only will just thingsand
furtherthat this agent "would not therebybe just, since it would have
receivedthiscapabilityin such a way that it would not have been able
to will otherwise."13
He then concludes:
becauseshewillshappiness
Thensinceshecannot
be calledjustor unjust
merely
... itis necorbecause
shewillswhatis fitting
(forshewouldwilltheseofnecessity)
forGodto makebothwillsso agreein herthatshewillsto be happyand
essary
wills
justly.14

11S. Anselmi,
De casudiaboli
1984,255:
, 12,OperaomniaI, ed. F. Schmitt,
Stuttgart
bonadicitur,
duo bonaet duo hiscontraria
"Excepto
namquehocquodomnisnatura
iniusticuicontrarium
estmalum
malausudicuntur.
Unumbonum
estquoddicitur
iustitia,
ethuicmalum
tia.Alterum
estquodmihividetur
bonum
opponipossedicicommodum,
. . ."
turincommodum.
12Anselm,
Vol.I, 256-7.
De casudiab
., 13,ed. Schmitt,
13Anselm,
Vol.I, 258:"Sicutenimibinonessetvoluntas
De casudiab.,
14,ed.Schmitt,
convenientia
itahicsiveliet
hocnonposset
iniusta
siveliet
nonvelie:
inconvenientia,
quoniam
utnonpossetaliter
velie."
sichocaccepisset
nonidcirco
essetiustavoluntas,
quoniam
14Anselm,
Vol.I, 258:"Quoniam
De casudiab.,14,ed. Schmitt,
ergonecsolummodo
sicvelit,
cumex necessitate
volendo
volendo
necsolummodo
beatitudinem,
quodconvenit
voluntatem
deusutramque
iustus
veliniustus
. . . necesse
estutsicfaciat
potest
appellali
in ilioconvenire,
utetbeatusessevelitetiustevelit."

18:50:49 PM

28

G.G.NORMORE

On Anselm'saccount,Satan (or anyone else) sins when,in a situationin

which it seems to the agent that what would increase happinessis not
identicalwithwhat is just, that agent followsthe will forhappinessand
does not followthe will forjustice.
The key elementof Anselm's account to which I wish to directyour
attentionis his claim thatan agent choosesby followingone will (voluntas)
ratherthan anotherand the associatedclaim thatfreechoice requires(at
least)two wills,since a one-willedagentwould act from(natural)necessity.
But the two-willsdoctrineseems to suggestan analogous philosophical
problem.When an agentacts accordingto one will ratherthanthe other,
whydoes it so act? If it is fora reason,thenthe agentseemsjust as determined as before.If it is forno reason at all, thenthe choice seems notso
much freeas arbitrary.
There is an interestingproblem here about the relationbetween a
choice and the reasons for it, but the two-willstheoristhas at least an
of each of the two willsas just like
immediatereply.Thinkof the structure
the structureof an agent on the Aristotelian
picture.Notice,forexample
thatthe will-to-happiness
ultiseems to be verymuch like the Aristotelian
mate motivatingdesireforhappiness.Now in the case of the Aristotelian
thatthe agentpursues
agent,we do not findit arbitraryor unintelligible
its happinessand so acts as it does. If the two-willedagent does exacdy
the same thingand for exactlythe same reasons,how can we find it
more arbitraryor less intelligible?If Anselm should ask Satan why he
acted as he did, Anselm would expect the reply"Because I thoughtit
would make me happy." Thus the Anselmian agent does not engage
in unmotivatedaction. But if Anselm asks Satan why he followedthe
Anselmshould expectthe
ratherthan the will-to-justice,
will-to-happiness
same reply.All that can be added in the second case is that Satan so
acts, because the will is the will. Thus thereis a questionforwhich the
Anselmianagent has littlereply
namely,why pursue happinessrather
thanjustice- but since pursuinghappinessin thiscontextjust is the same
act as pursuinghappinessratherthan justice, thereis no act forwhich
the Anselmianagent has no explanation.
I should add hastilythat I have spokenas thoughthe two wills(voluntatesseu qffectiones)
but thisis not so,
are, forAnselm,similarlystructured,
and that it is not so raises some trickyissues of Anselm interpretation.
Anselm claims:
. . . thereareusually
evils.One good
saidto be twogoodsandtwocorresponding
is thatwhich
is calledjustice,
is itscorresponding
andinjustice
evil;theother
good
evilis disadvananditscorresponding
is thatwhich
itseemscouldbe calledbenefit,

18:50:49 PM

ANSELM
ANDOCKHAM
ON CHOICE

29

willsjustice,
andnoteveryone
fleesinjustice;
butevery
rational
tage.Noteveryone
as wellas every
nature
whichcan sense,wantsto havewhatis bnficit
nature,
andwants
toavoidwhatis disadvantageous.
Forno onewants
anyparticular
thing
he thinks
unless
it willbe beneficial
to himin onewayor another.
in
Therefore,
thisway,everyone
wantswhatis goodforhimanddoesnotwantwhatis harmful
to him.So no onecanbe happywhodoesn't
wanthappiness;
andno onecanbe
whathe doesnotwantorbynothaving
whathe doeswant."15
happy
byhaving
Thus thereis a clear asymmetry
betweenthe two wills (voluntates
), as we
can see fromthe dialogue at the beginningof De casudiabolichapter 15:
T: "Do youthink
thatwhatever,
whenaddedtothewill,tempers
it,so thatitwants
no morethanis proper
andadvantageous,
is something?"
S: "Noonewithanysensewillthink
itis nothing."
T: "I believe
awarethatthisis nothing
otherthanjustice."
youaresufficiently
S: "Itcouldn't
be anything
else."16
Thus the agentwho willsjustice does not will againsthis own happiness,
but tempershis desireforhappiness.He wantsthe blessednessappropriate
to him.
Anselmdefinesjustice as "rectitudo
voluntatis
se servata"11
and he
propter
definesfreechoice as the "abilityto keep justice forits own sake."18He
explainshis use of the word 'keep' thus:
Nowas regards
theword'kept,'someone
willperhaps
ofwill
say:ifuprightness
is to be calledjusticeonlywhenit is kept,thentheoriginal
ofwillis
uprightness
notjustice
andwedon'treceive
whenwereceive
thisuprightness,
butwemake
justice
thisuprightness
become
it.Forwemustreceive
andhaveuprightbykeeping
justice
15Anselm,
De casudiab.,12,ed. Schmitt,
Vol.I, 255:". . . duobonaet duohiscontraria
malausudicuntur.
Unumbonum
estquoddicitur
cuicontrarium
estmalum
iustitia,
iniustitia.
Alterum
bonumestquodmihiuidetur
et huicmalum
possedicicommodum,
incommodum.
Sed iustitiam
opponitur
quidemnonomnesuolunt,
nequeomnesfugiunt
iniustitiam.
Commodum
uerononsolumomnisrationalis
naturasedetiamomnequod
sentire
Namnullusuultnisiquodaliquomodosibi
uult,et uitatincommodum.
potest
Hocigitur
modoomnes
benesibiesseuolunt,
etmalesibiessenolunt.
putatcommodum.
De hacbeatitudine
nuncdico,quianullus
essebeatus
Nulpotest
quinonuultbeatitudinem.
lusnamque
beatus
esseauthabendo
potest
quodnonuult,autnonhabendo
quoduult.
The translation
is a slightly
modified
version
ofthetranslation
in Anselm,
published
Freed
andH. Richardson,
NewYork1967,172.
Truth,
, andEvil
, tr.J. Hopkins
16Anselm,
De casudiab.,15,ed. Schmitt,
Vol.I, 259:
MAGISTER.Anputasaliquidessequodadditum
eidemuoluntati
illam,ne
temperat
et expedit?
plusuelitquamuelleoportet
DISCIPULUS.Nullus
nihilhocesseputabit.
intelligens
MAGISTER.Hoc credosatisanimaduertis
nonaliudessequamiustitiam.
DISCIPULUS.Nihilaliudcogitan
potest.
Forthetranslation,
cf.J. Hopkins
andH. Richardson
(op.cit.n. 15),176.
17Anselm,
De veritate.
Vol.I, 194.
12,ed. Schmitt,
18Anselm,
De liberiate
arbitrii
Vol.I, 212.
, 3, ed. Schmitt,

18:50:49 PM

30

G.G.NORMORE
andhaveitfor
nessofwillbefore
we cankeepit.So we don'treceive
uprightness
wehavereceived
timebecausewekeepit,butwebegintokeepitbecause
thefirst
haveit.
it andalready
we can reply
thatat oneandthesametime,
we receive
Butto theseobjections
bothtowillandto have.Forweonlyhaveitbywilling
it,andbythe
uprightness
itwe haveit.Moreover,
veryactofwilling
justas we bothhaveit andwillit at
thesametime,so we bothwillit andkeepit at thesametime;forjustas we do
is no timewhenwearewilling
it
notkeepuprightness
it,so there
bywilling
except
we keepit,andas long
thatwe arenotkeeping
it.As longas wewilluprightness
itandhaving
itoccurat thesame
sincewilling
as wekeepitwewillit.Therefore,
thenour
it andkeeping
it do notoccurat different
times,
time,andsincewilling
Andjustas wehave
itandourkeeping
occurat thesametime.
itnecessarily
having
itas longas we keepit,so we keepit as longas wehaveit.19

Thus to be just is to will to be just forits own sake and that is simply
to keep justice for its own sake. When an Anselmianagent desertsjustice, it cannot get it back unaided forsince it has ceased to wantjustice
forits own sake, if it came to wantjustice at all, that could only be for
- but then it would not want
the sake of its happiness
justice forits own
sake and so would not be just. Once lost, both justice and the will for
justice thoughnot the abilityto keep justice forits own sake mustbe
restoredfromoutside.
Anselmianagentsare motivatedagents.I argued above thatthe Anselmian agenthas reasonsforwhateveris chosen;had the otheroptionbeen
chosen therewould have been different
reasonsin play. There is someon
the
Anselmian
unusual
left
account,but it does not
thing
unexplained
seem to be an action.It seems to be somethingmore likean actionunder
one description.
Anselm'stwo-willsdoctrinewas takenup and discussedby a long line
of theoristsin the Middle Ages, especiallyin the Franciscan tradition,
and once Aristotle'sworkwithits clear statementof the competingmodel
was available- and especiallyonce it was championedby Aquinas and his
- two-willstheoristswere
followers
compelledto workout in some detail
an account of how the intellectworked,how it was relatedto choice and
what the causal structureof choice mightbe.
19Anselm,
forte
De ver
Vol.I, 195:"Quodautem'semata'dicitur,
., 12,ed. Schmitt,
nonmox
nonnisicumseruatur
dicendaestiustitia:
dicetaliquis:Si rectitudo
uoluntatis
cumillamaccipimus
sed nosseruando
ut habetur
estiustitia,
nec accipimus
iustitiam
Non
ethabemus
facimus
earnesseiustitiam.
Nampriusillamaccipimus
quamseruemus.
sedideo
illamprimitus
habemus
enimideoillamaccipimus
necidcirco
quia seruamus;
Sed ad haecnosrespondere
illamseruare
et habemus.
posquia accepimus
incipimus
nisiuolendo;
Nonenimillamhabemus
illametuelleethabere.
sumus,
quiasimul
accipimus
etuolumus,
simul
illamhabemus
etsi earnuolumus,
Sicutautem
hocipsoillamhabemus.
itaillamsimuluolumus
et seruamus."
Forthetranslation,
cf.J. Hopkins
andH. Richardson
{op.cit.n. 15),114-5.

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31

Anselm's model of choice differsfromAristotle'sin one key respect.

Whereas the Aristotelianagent is naturallydirectedtowarda singleend,
happiness,the Anselmianagenthas an innatedirectionto two ends,hapactions. Thus
piness and justice, which may appear to dictate different
in a givenchoice problemthe Anselmianagent may have to act on one
ultimateend ratherthan on another.It is thisfeatureof his model which
Anselmis convincedsaves freechoice. But if we except this (admittedly
Anselm and the Aristotelianare not so very far
difference,
significant)
of
an agent is moved to choice by ends already
For
both
them,
apart.
of
ends mustbe givenfromwithout.Indeed
and
for
both
them
so
given
an Anselmianagent could be modelled as a pair of Aristotelianagents,
one motivatedsolelyby the desire for happiness and the other by the
desireforhappinesstemperedby the love of (or attractionto)justice.Any
givenchoice the Anselmianagent makes will proceedjust as one of the
forAnselm
pair of Aristotelianagentswould proceed. What is different
is thatwhich of the pair makes a given choice is undetermined.
The passivityof the will and the treatmentof it as a natural agent
whichinevitablyseeks an end given fromwithoutwere featuresof both
the Aristotelianand the Anselmian models which later writersfound
problematic.A more radical traditioncharacterizedby a denial of the
Aristotelian
thesesoudined earlierarose. This traditioncomes to hold that
A. The will is a self-mover.
B. There is deliberationwith respectto ends as well as means.
C. The will has no necessaryorientationtowardsthe good.
The fullhistoryof these claims has stillto be workedout. I will confine
in
hereto discussinghow theyare handledby one of the keyfigures
myself
- William Ockham.
the later development
The shapingof Ockham's account begins it seems,withthe late thirteenthcenturyFranciscantheologian,PeterJohn Olivi. As Bonnie Kent
has argued, Bonaventureand his immediatedisciples,though certainly
betweenintelof the relationship
unwillingto acceptAquinas' formulation
lect and will, nonethelesshesitatedto break with the Aristotelianidea
thatthe will was to some extenta passive power and that it was moved
by the intellect.Olivi has no such hesitation.He writes:
andSaracens
Therefore
Catholics
from
certain
thefirst
aboutwhich
differ
thing
pagans
orthe
thatfreeactsaretotally
is,namely,
produced
bythewill,orthatfreechoice,
willinso faras itis free,
an active
Thisshould
be mainis totally
necessarily
power.
tained
For... it
bothaccording
totheCatholic
faith
toright
reason.
andaccording
is necessary
ofa first
mover
so that
thatfreechoiceshould
havethecharacter
(ratio)
andactive
itis ableto pushandpullbackandmovebothitself
andother
powers

18:50:49 PM

32

G.G.NORMORE
is pushing
to it- anddo thisnotonlywhennothing
it toward
the
virtues
subject
inthecontrary
Hence
butalsowhenthere
is something
direction.
inclining
contrary,
otherwise
thevirtuous
theinclination
ofitshabits;
itis ableto actagainst
[person]
tovice. . . Therefore
theveryessence
of
wouldnotbe abletofallawayfrom
virtue
andright
reason
eviwhich
withbothfaith
ourliberty
wemustpositin accordance
is totally
active.20
thatthewill,insofar
as itis free,
dently
proclaims

ProfessorKent has emphasizedthat Olivi's rejectionof the view thatthe

will is moved by another is part of an overall rejectionof Aristotelian
psychology.Olivi explicitlyappeals to Augustine.FollowingAugustine,he
denies that any spiritcan be affectedby any material object, and he
claims that our knowledgeof materialthingscomes fromGod's movement (illumination)of our intellect.By rejectingthe doctrineof abstraction, he rejects the view that the exercise of a power must be either
or formallycaused by its object. Thus, Olivi is in a positionto
efficiently
rejectnot only the view that the intellectmoves the will to act, but also
the view that the object of desireso moves it. He argues thatthe object
of volitionis not in any way an efficient
cause of thevolition.Nonetheless,
as Kent has stressed,Olivi does not deny the object of volitionany role
- whichhe
in the volition;it remainsas what Olivi calls a causaterminativa
locates in the genus of finalcause. Thus on Olivi's picture,the will is a
totallyactive power that moves toward some object as a terminating
moved towardthatobject by anythingoutcause, but it is not efficiendy
in the strongAnselmiansense,but one
side itself.It is thus a self-mover
dependenton an end givenfromoutsideforthe object towardswhichit
will move.
As Peter King points out, Duns Scotus seems to have been the first
moved is moved by
thinkerto insistthat the principlethat everything
another had to be restrictednot just to corporeal substancesbut even
20Petrus
BFS5,Quaracchi
InII Lib.Sent.,
Iohannis
Olivi,Quaestiones
q. 58,ed.B.Jansen,
disin quo catholici
a quibusdam
1924,II, 410-1:"Primum
igitur
paganiset Saracenis
arbia volntate
seuquodliberum
sinttotaliter
actusliberi
sentiunt,
quodscilicet
producti
tenendum
sittotaliter
estnecessario
inquantum
trium
velvoluntas,
estlibera,
activa,
potentia
rectam.
fidem
catholicam
rationem
tamsecundum
quamsecundum
habeat
arbitrium
Sicutenimex praecedenti
necesse
estquodliberum
quaestione
patet,
activassibi
et virtutes
rationem
et talisquodpossitse et aliaspotentias
primimotoris
estimpellens
etretrahere,
subiectas
etmovere
ethocnonsolum,
quandonullum
impellere
Undeetpotest
ad contrarium.
ad contrarium,
sedetiamquandoestibialiquidinclinans
a virvirtuosus
nonpossetdeclinare
suorum
aliter
inclinationem
habituum,
agerecontra
etrationem
nostrae
fidem
ad vitia. . . Ipsaigitur
essentia
libertatis
tutibus
quamsecundum
esttotainquantum
estlibera,
rectam
nosponere
evidenter
clamat
oportet
quodvoluntas,
D.C. 1995,134.
literactiva.";
cf.BonnieKent,Virtues
, Washington,
oftheWill

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ANSELM
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ON CHOICE

33

As Prof.King stresses,Scotus argues that in a wide varietyof

further.21
a
cases, corporealthingcan move itselfin virtueof therebeing in it some
less than readdistinctionbetweentwo principles,one of which servesas
the agent of the change and the other as the patient. This is genuine
self-motion
since what is reallythe same thingmoves itself,but it is consonantwith the traditionthat nothingstrictlyspeakingcan move itself,
since it includesa distinction(thoughnot a real distinction)
betweenthe
and
the
as
as
mover
moved.
thing
thing
On the subjectof the will itself,Scotus modifieda positionstatedby
Henry of Ghent,22accordingto which the object of the will was in no
cause, but was rathera sinequa noncause. An object of
way an efficient
apprehensionis required for there to be a volition,however it is not
requiredexcept as a sinequa noncause which is not strictly
speakinga
cause in theAristotelian
schemaof causes. Accordingto Scotus,the object
is a truebut partialcause. It cannot act withoutthe concurrenceof the
will. Moreover,since the object is a natural cause, the will is the only
freecause of volition;it is the principalconcurringcause.23Thus Scotus
seems to be struggling
to finda role forexternalends while maintaining
that the will is totallyactive. It is thiseffortto have one's cake and eat
it too which Ockham rejects.
Ockham can be seen as heir to both Olivi and Duns Scotus. He
embracesboth Olivi's pictureof the freedomof the will and much of
the associatedmetaphysicalframework
and Scotus' view thatthe authorfaithand rightreason convergein dictatingthat the case
ityof Aristotle,
of the will is an exceptionto the principlethat "omnequodmovetur
ab alio
moveurT
Ockham goes beyond Olivi and Scotus, however,in arguingnot only
thatthe willis radicallyfreefromoutsideefficient
causation,but thatthe
will is explanatorily
to
final
its
cause.
We
he thinks,influenced
are,
prior
- and some of these are ends
final
causes
by
implantedin us by God
but we are not necessitatedby them.Not only can we not move toward
thembut we can, more radicallydeliberately
rejectthem thatis, actively
refuseto move towardthem and, even further,
we can move towardanyelse
whatever
even
while
that
such movementconflicts
thing
recognizing
21Peter
onthe
Reality
, in:M.L.GillandJ.G.Lennox
King,DunsScotus
ofSelf-change
(eds),
Aristotle
From
toNewton
, Princeton,
Self-Motion:
NJ. 1994,227-90.
22Kent1995,144.
MKent1995,147.

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34

C.G. NORMORE

withmovingtowarda naturalend. In shortwe can set up anythingwhatever as an end forourselvesand move towardit.
One of Ockham's most explicitdiscussionsof the freedomof the will
is in Quodlibet
Iq. 16. There he firstdefinesthe freedomof the will:
andcontingently
tohold
I amableindifferently
I call'freedom'
thepowerbywhich
so thatI amabletocauseandnottocausethesameeffect,
different
things
[poner)
outside
thatpower.24
there
anywhere
existing
beingno difference
Ockham here definesfreedomin such a way that to be free does not
requireus to do anything.We are freesimplybecause we can cause or
refrainfromcausinga giveneffect.Thus freedomon Ockham's view does
not require that we have a second will or affectionin Anselm's sense.
Even an agent with only one such affectioncould manifestits freedom
by not acting on it.
Ockham goes further,insistingthat we can successivelyact and not
act, or vice versa,withoutany change in the conditionsoutsideour wills.
In responseto the objectionthat no agent existingfor a period of time
in essentialpotencyto an act can alteritselfin thisway Ockham writes:
whether
is truein natural
I answer
thattheassumption
theyarecorporeal
agents
ofthesortthe
in freeagents
or spiritual,
butthereis an obvious
counterexample
tothewill,andalltheother
andpresent
willis,becausetheobjectcanbe cognized
fora timeandyetafterwards
can remain
to theactofwilling
[thewill]
requisites
ofits
actionandall thisis because
itsactwithout
is abletoelicit{elicere)
anyoutside
freedom.25
Ockham concludes the discussionby claimingboldly: "To the principal
[objection]I say thatthe same thingis able to be activeand passivewith
)."26This is
respectto the same thing,nor is this unreasonable(repugnant
endorsedin the previousgenera directrejectionof the positionexplicitly
ation by Thomas Aquinas' followerGodfreyof Fontainesand commonly
Ockham's positiongives
in Ockham's day to Aquinas himself.27
attributed
24Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Quodlibet
/,q. 16,ed.J.C.Wey,OTh IX,87:"vocolibertatem
itaquodpossum
eumetcontingenter
diversa
indifferenter
ponere,
potestatem
quapossum
illampotentiam."
existente
alibiextra
nulladiversitate
etnoncausare,
demeffectum
causare
25Ockham,
est
/,q. 16,ed.J.C.Wey,OTh IX, 89: "Respondeo:
Quodl.
assumptum
sedin agente
liberocuiusmodi
sivespirituale,
in agente
naturali
verum
sivesitcorporale
volessecognitum
et praesens
estvoluntas
estinstantia
manifesta;
quiaobiectum
potest
manere
et tamen
ad actumvolendi
untad,et omniaalia requisita
possunt
pertempus,
liberethoctotum
estpropter
suumsineomniactione
elicere
actum
extrnseca;
postpotest
suam."
tatem
26Ockham,
dicoquodidem
/,q. 16,ed.J.G.Wey,OTh IX, 89: "Adprincipale
Quodl.
necistarepugnant."
etpassivum
esseactivum
eiusdem,
potest
respectu
27Godefridus
VI, q. 7, PhB3, 151-8.
de Fontibus,
Quodlibet

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ANSELM
ANDOCKHAM
ON CHOICE

35

thewill a veryspecialplace. Alone among agentseithercorporealor spiritual,the will is able to move frompotencyto act withouta "triggering"
cause. This aspect of the structureof the will is crucial to Ockham's
account.
So far it is not clear that Ockham differsfrom Scotus who also,
famously,claims that even in the presenceof the BeatificVision, a free
agent can fail to be moved. But Ockham does go furtherin two ways.
Not only can a freeagent fail to be moved by the BeatificVision, such
an agentcan also activelyrejectit, and can turntowardany otherobject
whateverinstead.In shorta freeagent can set up any object whatever
as an end foritself,insteadof the end forwhich God implanteda desire
in us. This marks,I suggest,a fundamentalshiftin theoryabout the relationbetween"good" in a metaphysically
descriptivesense and "good" in
an action-guiding
sense.
The medieval traditionis fullyaware that we use the word 'good'
in many ways. Anselm is clear that the criteriafor determining
(bonum)
fromthosefordetermining
the goodnessof horsesare different
the goodness of persons,and he is also clear that thereis a sense of "bonum"in
whichbad humans are betterthan good horses.One problemwhich an
inquiryinto the metaphysicalfoundationsof medieval ethical theories
mustface is thatof sortingout and accountingfortheseuses. This taskis
complicatedand one of the complicationscomes fromthe antique idea
apparentlyunquestionedin the Middle Ages thatin some sense "good"
and "being" convert so thatgoodness,at least in the sense in whichwe
speak of good things,is not a matterof qualitiesbut a matterof essence.
The pic(It is thispoint to which Boethiusdevoteshis De Hebdomadibus).
' can
ture is furthercomplicatedby the etymologicalfact that 'perfectus
and does functionboth in a simpledescriptivesense meaning"complete"
and in a much more evaluativelyladen sense more closelyallied to our
use of 'perfect.'
' hoversbetweena simIf being and goodness convertand if *perfectus
ple sense of completeand a "value-added" sense, then it is a shortstep
to the thoughtthat to aim at being is to aim at goodness.Boethiusalso
arguesthatto aim at being is to aim at unity,because each thing to the
extentthat it exists is unified.Thus alreadyin Boethius,we findwhat
mightbe termedthe "classical" argument:to the extentthat something
- that is its own
tendstowardits own completenessas a thing
unityand
- it tendstoward
idea
that if
there
is
also
the
being
equivalent
goodness;
own
from
it
would
tend
to
its
destruction.
tended
away
something
goodness

18:50:49 PM

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G.G.NORMORE

Maintainingthe connectionbetweenbeing and unityon the one hand

and goodnesson the otheris a trickymatter.On the one side, it is not
obvious why somethingcould not tend naturallyto its own destruction.
On the other,it is not obvious why it has to be the case that different
thingstend to the same end in a sense of 'same5robustenough to keep
cases frombeing equivocal. Of course
'goodness' as used in the different
one can simplyassertboth that each and everythinghas a naturalend
towardwhich it must tend and that end is the same in everycase- but
makingthis more than a mere assertionis non-trivial.Once one recogand self-guiding
nizes the will as a self-moving
power, the separationof
'
seemshard to resist;
sensesof bonurrC
the metaphysicaland action-guiding
Ockham embracesit.
Ockham does indeed believe that the naturaluniverseis orderedto a
singleend. (I suggestthat,forhim, thisorderingis preciselydivineprovidence). But Ockham does not thinkthatwe could prove thisby reason
apart fromrevelation.
IV q. 1 (OTh IX, 295), Ockham is admittingthat
As I read Quodlibet
faithrequiresus to believe that everyeffecthas a final cause properly
de causafinali)
loquendo
namelyGod, whose providential
speaking{proprie
But he also holds thatif we simplyfollowed
plan lies behind everything.
reason we would not suppose so. Rather it is only when a cause does
not act necessarilythat we have reason to ask why it acts ratherthan
not acting.
It is centralto Ockham's account of human choice thathuman actsof
will are not necessary.But Ockham seems to go even further.Not only
can we rejectGod because we falselybelieve that God is an obstacleto
our pleasure,it seems that we can be commandedby God to hate him
and forbiddenby God to love Him.28In such a case we would have a
motivefromlove of God to rejecthim.
This case deservescarefulattentionbecause it shows us that if God
has the power Ockham thinksGod does, it cannot be necessarythat if
28Ockham,
inlib.IV Sent.,
Ill, q. 14,ed.J.C.Wey,OTh IX, 256; Quaestiones
Quodl.
intended
to
Ockham
seriously
q. 16,ed. R. WoodandG. Gi,OTh VII, 352.Whether
As RegaWoodhaspointed
claimthatGodcouldcommand
us to hateGodis doubtful.
onthe
makesthisclaimonlyin hisearlyReportado
out,Ockham
(OTh VII); see Ockham
IN 1997,270.The claimis absentin theparallel
Virtues
, WestLafayette,
passagefrom
howOTh I, 503-6.Forourpurposes,
theOrdinatio
, d. 1 q. 6, ed. G. Gi andS. Brown,
Ockham's
to loveGod,as is clearfrom
thatwe can be forbidden
ever,it is sufficient
mature
Quodlibeta.

18:50:49 PM

ANSELM
ANDOCKHAM
ON CHOICE

37

a creatureexists,it has a finalend. Ockham seems to believe that God

could command us to hate him. But Ockham does not seem to think
that we could obey such a command. Consider the case. To obey the
commandis to do what God commandsus to do because God so commands it- in this case it is to hate God because God commandsus to.
Now in our actual presentstate rightreason dictatesthat God is to be
loved above all else and so Gos will is to be carriedout above all else.
If thatremainsso in the imaginedsituation,thenrightreasonwould then
tellus to obey God's commandto hate him- thatis, to obey God's command not to obey God's command.Like "Ignore thiscommand" it is a
commandwhich cannot be obeyed. On the otherhand we can suppose
that God can so arrangethingsin the imaginedsituationthat rightreason would dictatethat God is not to be obeyed. Then we could indeed
followrightreason and disobey God- but we could not do it because
God commandedit- so we could not obey the command. But if to love
God is to obey all of God's commands,thenhere is a situationwhichGod
- indeed
could create in which we would knowingly
inevitably fail to
love God (even refusein some sense to love God) even thoughwe have
no falsebeliefswhatsoever.
The situationjust imaginedis one Ockham thinksmay be possiblefor
us. But it is a situationin whichwe could not be moved by love of God
as a finalcause. In such a situationwe could not love God. If God is
indeed our finalcause, thenhere is a possiblesituationin whichit would
be impossiblefor us to attain our final end. But the notion of tending
towardthe impossibleis arguablyincoherent.I venturethatthisby itself
showsthatit cannot be part of what it is to be a human being that we
have a finalcause.
- in the
Consider an analogy. Suppose someone is essentiallyrational
sense that s/he always does the rational thing and suppose that it is
part of rationalitythat one not performacts which promoteone's ends
less than an available alternative.Now suppose God announces that he
will ensure that no rationalact attainsits end. Then nothingwe might
- so we cannot be
do would be the rationalthing
essentiallyrational(in
that sense) afterall.
Ockham seems to hold thatthe will can will directlycontraryto right
reason.29Indeed, he seems to thinkthatno reason whatevercan be compellingforthe will and by parityof reasoningthat any reason whatever
29Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, ed.J.C.Wey,OTh VIII, 338.

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38

C.G. NORMORE

can serve the will as a ground for action. Does this make action arbitrary?Not so long as thereis an answer to the question:which acts of
the will are acts of followingrightreason. So long as thereis an objective standardforrightreason, the mere factthat the will has the power
to followit or not does not make what we do arbitrary.
We have come to an importanttangle.Anselmand Aquinas agree that
the objectivityof value claims must be grounded in natural teleology.
Thus it is importantforthemthatit turnout thatthingshave ends which
are simplygiven fromoutside- naturalends. Indeed, somethingstronger
is required.Since the objectivityof value judgmentsis not thoughtto be
a contingentmatter,thatnaturalthingshave ends whose promotionsimply constitutesgoodness is not contingenteither.But Ockham separates
these two issues. Ockham recognizesobjectivemetaphysicalvalue which
is not subject even to the divine will (God could not make it the case
that this ink spot while remainingjust as it is should be nobler than
Mother Teresa just as she was.) But this recognitionis completelydistinctfromthe questionwhetherthingshave naturalends whose promotion is metaphysically
good in this sense.
We have seen that while Ockham does thinkthat thingsas a matter
of fact have a finalcause, this is as a resultof a freeact of God's will
and could have been otherwise.We have also seen thatin our own case
God could create circumstancesin which the notion of our tendingto
our finedend would not even make sense. So it can be at most a conof (their)
tingentmatterthat thingstendingto theirends is constitutive
a
But
it
is
is
not
matter
that
there
goodness.
contingent
independent
goodness.
For Ockham, the libertyof indifference
promotesan end, but that it
does so is a verycontingentmatterof fact.God could have made things
with no final cause at all and could have ordained that the libertyof
indifference
promotedno end. So, I suggest,Ockham is in the end what
we mightterm a modal radical in mattersof teleology.He thinksthat
God has in factset up a worldwhich has the actual teleologicalfeatures
someone like Aquinas would thinkessentialto any created world. But
Ockham does not thinkthese featuresessentialto any created world.
And so it is no part of the essence of God or creaturethatthe worldbe
thisway.
Moreoverjust as some say the possibilityof evil is the price thatmust
be paid for a universewith freecreaturesso, I suggest,Ockham thinks
that the contingencyof naturalteleologyis the price that must be paid
forfreecreatures.

18:50:49 PM

ANDOCKHAM
ANSELM
ON CHOICE

39

The Aristoteliantraditionmaintainsthat the will is a moved mover

and so maintainsthatdeliberationis alwaysabout means and neverabout
ends. I have suggestedthat Anselm,by advocatinghis "two-wills"view
begins the process of freeingus fromthis model but does not complete
it. For Anselmthe willis stilla moved mover,thoughthe choice of which
end to be movedby- temperedor untemperedhappiness,is not itselfdictated.It is the traditionwhichincludesOlivi, Scotus and finallyOckham
which enables fulldeliberationabout ends as well as means. It enables
this,not by denyinga metaphysicalhierarchyof goods, but by denying
that thesegood have any necessaryclaim on our wills.For Ockham we
choose our own ends.
Toronto/LosAngeles
UCLA
University
of Toronto/

18:50:49 PM

1
Scotuson the Will: The RationalPowerand theDual Affections
SUKJAELEE

John Duns Scotus believesit to be undeniablytruethatwe human beings

have freewill. He does not argue forour freedombut ratherexplainsit.
There are two elementswhich are both characteristic
of and essentialto
Scotus5account of human will: namely,1) the will as a self-determining
power foropposites,thus a "rational"power; and 2) the "dual affections
of the will."2The significanceof each elementtaken separatelyis comprehensibleif not obvious. We are puzzled, however,when we attempt
to ascertainthe relationbetween the two. This paper is an attemptto
reach an adequate understanding
of this relation.
will
build
My attempt
John Boler's interupon existinginterpretations.
in
In his illumiwill
of
attention.
be
the
focus
pretation, particular,
my
nating article "Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two
Affections
of the Will,"3Boler arguesthat"thereare good reasonsto keep
the theoryof dual affectiones
distinctfrom the claim of superabundant
Two
tenets
of
his approach,I take it, are the following:
sufficiency."4 key
andkeepseparate
offreedom
twonotions
1) we oughtto distinguish
(oraccounts)
in Scotus:themetaphysical
andthemoral;
is tobe associated
withtheformer,
2) whiletheself-determining
powerforopposites
thedualaffections
shouldbe associated
withthelatter.
1 Anearlier
at a colloquium
on "TheWill
-Problems
version
ofthispaperwasdelivered
I wishto
andPossibilities
: A Medieval
1996)at Yale University.
(September
Perspective"
inparthank
intheconference
andsuggestions,
thosewhoparticipated
fortheir
criticisms
at the
comments
ticular
CalvinNormore
and ScottRagland.
In addition
to hishelpful
andobservation
invaluable
conference,
JohnBolerprovided
through
correspondinsight
earlier
andRegaWood
ence.I thank
Robert
AdamsandAllenWoodforreading
drafts
formanyvaluablesuggestions
thefinalversion
ofthepaper.I givespecial
concerning
thanks
on numerous
andproviding
to Marilyn
McCordAdamsforcommenting
drafts
constant
andencouragement.
guidance
2 Ioannes
Sent.
Ill d. 26 n. 17,OperaomniaXV,Paris1893,340.Almost
DunsScotus,
all thereferences
in AllanB. Wolter,
I maketo Scotusandtheirtranslations
arefound
DunsScotus
ontheWillandMorality
DC 1986.
, Washington,
3JohnBoler,Transcending
theNatural:
DunsScotus
ontheTwoAffections
, in:
oftheWill
American
67 (1993),109-26.
Catholic
Philosophical
Quarterly,
4 Boler1993,115.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:51:03 PM

41

SCOTUSON THE WILL

betweenthe two notionsof freedomthatI wishto

It is Boler's distinction
More
deeply,it is Boler's suggestionthatthereis no close conquestion.
nectionbetween the self-determining
power for opposites and the dual
that I wish to examine. My main reason for questioningthis
affections
suggestionis that it appears to implythat metaphysicalfreedomis possible withoutmoral freedom,and thispossibilitytroublesme. I will first
gives rise to such a possibilattemptto show how Boler's interpretation
ity.Then I will raise questionsconcerningthis possibilitywith the purpose of exposingits problematiccharacter.Such problems,I hope, will
provideus with reasons both to doubt the distinctionof freedomsitself
and to entertainthe possibilityof therebeing a strongertie betweenthe
I will ask threekindsof questions.
rationalpower and the dual affections.
* First,
fitwellwiththetext?
doesthispossibility
* Second,
notion
ofmorality
wouldtheensuing
be acceptable
to Scotus?
* Third,
do we needsucha distinction?
Ultimately,I wish to argue that Scotus has a single conceptionof freedom and the two elementsin question account for this singlenotion of
freedomin different
ways. Moreover,I will suggestthatforScotus superare inseparablyconnectedin
and the dual affections
abundantsufficiency
that one is not possiblewithoutthe other.Let us begin with a preliminarysketchof the two elements.
I. Preliminary
Sketch
A. The Will as Rational Power: Self-Determining
Power for Opposites
As Allan Wolterpointsout, the willforScotus is the onlyrationalpower.5
Scotus seems to agree thatsuch a view calls foran explanation,since he
is aware that the descriptionof will as rationed,let alone as the only
Whetheror
rationalpower,appears to go againstthe views of Aristotle.6
not this view of the will is actually contraryto Aristotleand whether
Scotussuccessfully
reconcileshis view withAristotle'sare questionswhich
do not concernthispaper. What concernsus is that in the course of his
explanationScotus observesa distinctionbetween active potenciesand,
5 AllanWolter,
DunsScotus
ontheWillas a Rational
Adams(ed.),The
, in:Marilyn
Potency
DunsScotus
, Ithaca1990,163-80.
ofJohn
Philosophical
Theology
6 IoannesDunsScotus,Quaestiones
inMetaph.
Arist.
q. 15 n. 1-14,OperaomniaVII,
Paris1893,606-17;Wolter,
144-72.

18:51:03 PM

42

LEE
SUKJAE

identifiesthe will as the "rational"potency,

based on such a distinction,
due to its self-determining
power foropposites.
Following the general Aristotelianscheme, "potencies" or "powers"
should probablybe understoodas "inclinationsor tendenciesto affector
featureof the scheme
be affectedby objectsof a certainkind."7A further
would be compelledto accommodatewas
thatmostdevotedAristotelians
Aristode'sdistinctionbetweenrationaland nonrationalpotencies:
nonrabutevery
bothcontraries,
withreasonis capableofcausing
Everypotency
but
heatcancauseonlyheating,
can causeonlyone.Forexample,
tionalpotency
as wellas health.8
artcancausesickness
themedical
While adheringto thisgeneralpicture,Scotus held thatthe real division
in active potencies was between what he terms "nature" and "will."9
Accordingto Scotus, this primarydistinctionstems fromthe radically
different
way in which theyelicittheirrespectiveoperations:
is conis determined
toact,so thatso faras itself
ofitself
Foreither
(1)thepotency
or(2)itis notofitself
from
itcannot
failtoactwhennotimpeded
without;
cerned,
actor
or caneither
thisactoritsopposite,
either
butcanperform
so determined,
whereas
called"nature,"
ofthefirst
sortis commonly
notactat all.The potency
division
ofactive
oneofthesecondsortis called"will."Hence,theprimary
potenandwill.10
ciesis intonature
The contrastis clear. Agentsthat do not possess this "will" cannot help
but act toward the presentedobject of inclination.For those with will,
however,elicitingacts is not inevitable.Even when all conditionshold,
and
theycan stillrefrainfromacting.Thus the will in its indeterminacy
capacity not to act is characterizedas a rational power, i.e. a power
however,raises the
capable of causing opposites.This characterization,
to
a
such
what
reduces
potency act, if it is of itself
followingquestion:
How can it be a selfor
not
undeterminedin regardto acting
acting?11
determining
power for opposites?
To this question Scotus respondsby presentinga positivenotion of
of "superabundant
one which he calls an indeterminacy
indeterminacy,
7 Marilyn
Sileo(ed.),Via
Power
ontheWillas Rational
DunsScotus
, in:Leonardo
Adams,
Methodologica
DunsScoti
ad mentem
Scoti
, Roma1995,840.
Joannis
8 Aristode,
1-4.
, IX.2, 1046b
Metaphysics
9 Notethat
itis
As seenin thequotation,
Scotus.
from
thisclaimdoesnotoriginate
in:
Rufus
onAristotle's
Richard
called"common."
, II.4, 196b23
See,forexample,
Physics
et
scilicet
natura
In Phys.
Rufus,
II, in: ms.Erfurt,
Q. 312,f. 3ra:"Duo suntprincipia,
I amindebted
to RegaWoodforthispoint.
voluntas."
10Scotus,
150.
InMetaph
., q. 15 n. 4, VII: 609;Wolter,
11Scotus,
152.
InMetaph
., q. 15 n. 5, VII: 610;Wolter,

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

43

(indeterminatio
sufficientiae
superabundant
).12The more familiar
sufficiency"
formof indeterminacy
is insufficiency,
based on potentiality
coupled with
a defectof actuality,in the way thatmatterwithoutformwould be indeterminateas regardsthe actuationprovidedby form.However, thereis
anotherindeterminacy,
that of superabundantsufficiency,
which, based
on unlimitedactuality,can determineitself.
Thus, as a power thatis not exhaustivelyconstitutedby any tendency
or tendenciestowardsobjects,13
the will can determineitselfwithrespect
to opposites.And this power is due to the will having superabundant
sufficiency.14
B. Dual Affections
of the Will
Scotus, followingAnselm,claims that the will has two affections.
They
are the affectionfor the advantageous(affectio
commodi
) and the affection
forjustice (<affectio
We read,
iustitiae).
treats
oftheseextensively
in TheFalloftheDevil,
ch. 14,andTheHarmony
[Anselm]
andPredestination
forjustice
is nobler
, Grace
, ch. 19.Theaffection
ofGod's
Foreknowledge
thantheaffection
fortheadvantageous,
notonlyacquired
understanding
by"justice"
orinfused
butalsoinnate
which
is thewill'scongenital
justice,
justice,
liberty
[libertasingenita
to itself.
] byreasonofwhichit is ableto willsomegoodnotoriented
totheaffection
forwhatis advantageous,
canbe willed
According
however,
nothing
savewithreference
toself.Andthiswewouldpossess
ifonlyan intellectual
appetite
withnoliberty
followed
as senseappetite
follows
sense
uponintellectual
knowledge,
cognition.15
Scotus adds to thisthat,
in itself
or shar[t]olovesomething
[orforitsownsake]is morean actofgiving
actthanis desiring
thatobjectforoneself.
As suchit is an act
ingandis a freer
12Scotus,
InMetaph
152-4.
., q. 15 n. 5, VII: 610,Wolter,
13Adams1995,
842.
Assomereaders
havenoticed,
hereI amtaking
theprimary
character
ofthe
might
willtobe theability
nottoactevenwhentheconditions
foractionaremet.In doingso,
itmight
be saidthatI leavethecharacter
ofthewilldescribed
as a potency
to "perform
either
thisactoritsopposite"
unaccounted
for.Themainpointwouldbe thatperformofan actis different
from
notacting
at all.In other
onemight
ingtheopposite
words,
ofthewillas thepowernotto actdoesnotcapture
all ofthe
arguethatmyemphasis
intuitions
behind
Scotus'understanding
ofthesuperabundant
ofthewill.My
sufficiency
wouldbe thatthough
thismight
be a validpointin itself,
it doesnotaffect
reply
my
Boler's
ForBolertooseemstothink
thatthecrucial
argument
against
interpretation.
point
in voluntary
self-movement
is "thecapacity
ofthewillto refuse
to actno matter
what
theantecedent
conditions"
rather
than"theability
tochoosebetween
alternate
courses
of
action"
(Boler1993,115).
Ill d. 26 q.unican. 17,XV, 340-341;
178.
Scotus,
Sent.,
Wolter,

18:51:03 PM

LEE
SUKJAE

44

act
at least.Theother
tothewill,as theseatofthisinnate
moreappropriate
justice
as ithasanaffection
tothewillinasmuch
foroneself]
pertains
something
[ofwanting
fortheadvantageous.16
There are two obvious points that Scotus wishes to convey in thispascommodi
which
one, the affectio
sage. Firstis thatthe will has two affections:
inclinesthe will to pursue what is good insofaras they are ordered to
sibi); the other,
the agent's own perfection(the desire forgood as bonum
iustitiae
which inclines the will to the intrinsicgoodness of
the affectio
thingsfortheirown sake, apart fromwhetheror not theyare beneficial
to the agent (the desire for good as bonumin se)}1 The second point is
in that it can
commodi
iustitiae
is "nobler" than the affectio
that the affectio
will some good not orientedto itself.What Scotus intendsby nobilityis
comeasier to understandin an example,the love of God. For the affectio
modithelove of God is due to Gos being ourgreatestgood, while for
iustitiae
the love of God resultsfromGod's being themostperthe affectio
and
adorable
ofobjects.
fect
in the will appears to have
iustitiae
Scotus' claim thatthereis an affectio
been motivatedby the wish to resistexplanationsof moralitycouched in
strictlyeudaimonisticterms.This observationis shared by many interpreters,includingBoler and I wish to make clear that I do not disagree
with Boler on thispoint.
An "Aristotelian"conceptionof naturesappears to prescribethat all
constitutivetendenciespursue individualor species advantage. Though
Scotus accepts the general ideological scheme in which naturaltendencies aim at one's own perfection,he also seems to thinkthatwere these
the only inclinationsof the will, there would be no room for morality.
Moral good or evil for Scotus consistsin the abilityof the human will
to transcendone's natural inclinationsby appreciatingthingsfor their
intrinsicworth.
3s
II. JohnBo1er
Interpretation
is "to suggestthe advantageof sitThe gistofJohn Boler's interpretation
uating Scotus" claims for the freedomat stake [i.e., congenitalliberty,
libertas
' in the contextof his beliefsabout the characterof moralingenite
rather
than in the metaphysicalor psychologicalpresuppositions
itself
ity
of moral agency."18
16Scotus,
178.
Ill d. 26 q.unican. 17,XV, 340-341;
Sent.
Wolter,
17Adams1995,843.
18Boler1993,110.

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

45

two sensesof freedomwithinScotus'

For thispurpose,he distinguishes
account: the metaphysicaland the moral.19
"Metaphysical"freedomis identifiedwith the will's self-determining
power foropposites.Boler statesthat "this metaphysicalaccount of free
action is expressedin Scotus' claim that (only) the will has the "superabundantsufficiency"
necessaryforfreeagency."20We are metaphysically
freein the sense that we can refrainfromfollowinga naturaltendency,
and no tendencyby itselfdeterminesus to act accordingly.
"Moral" freedom,on the otherhand, consistsin "the choice of going
(or refusingto go) beyond considerationsof "happiness"in favorof considerationsofjustitiaor bonumin se."2l If metaphysicalfreedomconcerns
our generalpower to choose whetherto act or not act in face of natural
tendency,moral freedomconcernsa special kind of choice, one which
overridesconsiderationsof happinesswith a view to the good in itself.
Such choices,accordingto Boler, are what constitutethe moral dimension for Scotus. This explainswhy Boler, in accountingfor the relation
between the two freedoms,suggeststhat though moral freedommight
they are distinctin that metaphysipresupposemetaphysicalfreedom,22
of the will.
cal freedomis priorto and independentof the dual affections
Later I will focuson the significanceof this independence.
Why does Boler thinkthat the accounts concerningsuperabundant
and the dual affectionsshould be regarded as two distinct
sufficiency
accountsof freedom?His main intuitionappears to be thatwhetherthe
will has dual affectionshas no bearing on whetherone is a voluntary
19It shouldbe notedthatin thepaperitself
are notclearas to
's intentions
Boler
in Scotusor two"freeoffreedom
thereto be two"accounts"
whether
he is suggesting
of
account
whileonp. 113Bolerusesthephrase"thismetaphysical
Forinstance,
doms."
freedom
ofthewill."Through
"the'metaphysical'
onp. 116wefindtheterm
free
action,"
offreeto talkabouttwoaccounts
thathe intended
Bolerhasindicated
correspondence,
couldnothavebeenwhat
He agrees
twofreedoms
thantwoseparate
domrather
freedoms.
thatin the
in thesamecorrespondence
Scotushadin mind.He, however,
acknowledges
offreedom
anda metaphysical
a metaphysical
account
distinction
between
papera careful
hints
thathistwo"accounts"
at thepossibility
wasnotworked
outand,moreover,
freedom
as thequescloseto it.In anyevent,
orcomedangerously
intotwo"freedoms"
collapse
focus
onhisclaimthatsuperabundant
I raiseagainst
Boler's
tions
sufficiency
interpretation
I do notbelieve
as independent
ofeachother,
should
be regarded
andthedualaffections
In other
even
willseriously
affect
ofthismatter
theoutcome
words,
mymainargument.
theviewthattherearetwoaccounts
ifit turned
defend
outthatonecouldsuccessfully
andthedual
inScotus,
as itis heldthatsuperabundant
insofar
ofonefreedom
sufficiency
unaffected.
I think
thatmymainpointwillremain
aremutually
affections
independent,
20Boler1993,113.
21Boler1993,125.
22See Boler1993,110,115-6and 125.

18:51:03 PM

LEE
SUKJAE

46

power for opposites.We mightfirstsusagent with the self-determining

an
that
appetitemust have more than one basic
pect that Scotus holds
inclinationin orderto be metaphysically
free,but Boler believesthiscan
reasons.
be misleading.Boler providesinteresting
One main observationis that"the crucialconditionforthatinterruption
of the influenceof naturalcauses at the pointof voluntaryself-movement
is not the abilityto choose between alternatecourse of action, but the
capacityof the will to refuseto act no matterwhat the antecedentconditions."23If voluntaryagencyconsistsin the abilityto make such a refusal,
he continues,thereseems to be no reason why thiswould not be possible fora will witha singlebasic inclination.From this,he concludesthat
are not necessaryformetaphysicalfreedom.
the dual affections
There is another,perhaps more importantobservation:the dual affecfor voluntaryagency either.Boler invitesus to
tions are not sufficient
envisiona "schizophrenic"agent withtwo affections.
Boler observesthat
or alwayshaveto seek
[thisagent]wouldnotalwayshaveto seekthecommodum
iustitia
fromwhatever
; butitsactionscouldstillfollow
(and"naturally")
unfreely
to be operative.24
qffctio
happened
His idea seems to be thatthe mere factthatwe have dual affections
does
not show us to be voluntaryagents. If the affectionforjustice were to
triggerus to performjust acts, these acts would not be any freerthan
those determinedby the affectionfor advantage. We would be lacking
In fact,Boler
the self-determining
power of superabundantsufficiency.
seems to thinkthatforus to be metaphysically
free,we mustnot be subbut ratherbe able to transcend
ject to the naturalcausalityof affections
all our affections,
even that forjustice.
III. SomeQuestions
One implicationof Boler's interpretation
appears to be that an agent
could be metaphysically
freewithoutbeing morallyfree.For if the dual
affections
are neithersufficient
nor necessaryforan agentto possesssuperabundantsufficiency,
it would followthatthe conditionsformetaphysical
freedomare independentfromthose for moral freedom.This would in
withoutposturn implythat one could have superabundantsufficiency
In
I
a
the
dual
affections.
take
such
to
fact,
sessing
possibility be one of
23Boler1993,115.
24Boler1993,115.

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

47

the core ideas behindBoler'sinterpretation.

Withthisimplicationin mind,
let us turnto a key passage in Scotus' account of the dual affections.
In thispassage, Scotus,followingAnselm,invitesus to envisiona onewilled angel, as it were, which only has the affectio
commodi
while lacking
iustitiae.
the affectio
I sayto beginwiththattheaffctiones
To thefirst
ofthese[objections],
commodi
and
iustitiae
arenot[distinct]
from
freewill[and],as it were,addedto it.Rather,
the
iustitiae
difference.
So thatjustas manis living
subis,as itwere,theultimate
affectio
andanimal
stance
thesearenotproperties
oftheessence
butbelong
to the
, although
- so itispossible
essential
ofman
toconceive
first
ofappetite
andthenofintelconcept
lective
andcognitive
andyetnotconceive
oftheaffectio
commodi
and iustitiae.
And if
therewere an angel,who had a cognitiveappetiteapartfroman affectio
iustitiae
, it wouldlackjusticeand it wouldnotbe a freeappetite.Whence
if [thisintellective
iustitiae
, it wouldthusnatagent]wereto lack an affectio
urallyseekwhatis suitedto theintellect,
just as thesenseappetite[seeks]
whatis suitedto sense; nor would it be any more freethanthe sense
the affectio
iustitiae
is theultimatespecificdifference
of
appetite.Therefore,
thefreeappetite.25
It is clear that thisone-willedAngel is not morallyfree.This is perhaps
why Boler refersto it as the Amoral Angel. But is the Amoral Angel
free?Now as pointedout shortlybefore,I believe Boler's
metaphysically
distinctionbetween the two freedomsallows for the possibilityof the
free while morallyunfree.Moreover, there
Angel being metaphysically
seem to be good reasonsforBoler to thinkthat an Amoral Angel might
be metaphysically
free.
Since Boler argues the dual affectionsare neithersufficient
nor necand since metaphysicalfreedomis
essaryfor superabundantsufficiency
both prior to and independentfrommoral freedom,I take it that an
instead of only one would not render
agent's possessingboth affections
the agent metaphysically
if
it
were not so already. Let me elabofree,
rate.Boler would agree thatthe Angel in questionwould be morallyfree
ifendowedwithboth affections.
Now moral freedomis characterizedas a
kind
of
and as such, presupposesmetaphysical
self-determination,
special
freedom.This, combinedwiththe factthatthe conditionsformetaphysical
freedomare independentfromthose of moral freedom,26
in turn,implies
thatone precondition
of moralfreedomis thatthe agentbe metaphysically
25Ioannes
DunsScotus,
II, d. 6 q. 2, n. 9, Operaomnia,
XXII,Paris1893,
Reportatio
621. Myemphasis.
Thetranslation
is Boler's.
See hisAnImage
fortheUnity
ofWillinDuns
in:Journal
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
32 (1994),30-1.
Scotus,
26Thus,
an agent's
freewouldnotinfluence
thestatus
of theagent's
beingmorally
freedom.
metaphysical

18:51:03 PM

48

LEE
SUKJAE

or not. In otherwords,
freeregardlessof whetherit has both affections
if the Angel were not metaphysically
freein the firstplace it could not
be morallyfreewhen endowed with the dual affections.
There is a relatedreason why Boler mightwant to allow the Amoral
free.If Boler were to argue to the contrary,
Angel to be metaphysically
that
the
is
not
free,thenit would be diffinamely,
Angel
metaphysically
cult to dismissthe observationthat the possessionof the dual affections
does seem to have an effecton the statusof metaphysicalfreedomwithin
the agent. For, in this case, the dual affections
would not only render
theAngelmorallyfreebut also metaphysically
free.This connectionwould
are not reallynecespromptus to question whetherthe dual affections
for superabundantsufficiency.
sary and sufficient
Therefore,I believe that anyone endorsingthe distinctionand separation of the two freedomswould naturallybe committedto the view
thattheAmoralAngelis, or at least,could be metaphysically
free.In some
free
sense, disallowingthe possibilityof the Angel being metaphysically
wouldjeopardize the independenceof superabundantsufficiency
fromthe
dual affections.Now let us pursue the implicationsof the Angel being
free.
metaphysically
The firstproblemthat emergesis textual.Scotus in the cited passage
explicitlystatesthat Amoral Angel's appetiteis not free.As Scotus does
not introducedifferent
notionsof freedomhimself,it is not clear which
of the two freedomshe has in mind. PresumingBoler's distinctionto
hold, suppose that Scotus had metaphysicalfreedomin mind in thispasthe suggestionthat
sage. If so, he then would be directlycontradicting
the Angel is metaphysicallyfree. And this would provide a reason to
questionthe distinctionbetweenfreedoms.
The alternativereadingis that Scotus had moral freedomin mind in
this passage. Unfortunately,
this alternativeappears no more promising,
for it requiresus to adopt a ratherunnaturalreading.Let us see why.
Unless Scotus were using different
notionsof freedomback to back, the
"
freedomin the nextphrase "norwouldit beanymore
freethanthesenseappetite
would also referto moral freedom.But it seems extremelyunlikelythat
Scotus would mentionmoral freedomin connectionwithsense appetite.
In otherwords,if Scotus had moral freedomin mind,he would in effect
be arguingthat the Angel's appetitewould not be any more morally
free
than sense appetite.But whywould Scotus make such a comparisonwhen
it is evidentthat sense appetiteis not even metaphysically
free?
The comparisonmighthave been intendedto show that the Angel's
appetiteis similarto sense appetitein that theyare both metaphysically

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

49

freebut morallyunfree.But the suggestionthatScotus tooksense appetite

freeis highlyimplausible.I thinkit is fairlyevident
to be metaphysically
sense
that for Scotus
power for oppoappetiteis not a self-determining
sites.I take it to be more naturaland coherentto understandScotus as
usingthe exampleto show thatthe Angel'sappetitewould be determined
by naturaltendenciesin just the way sense appetiteis. To conclude,in
whateverway it is understood,Scotus' usage of freedomin the Amoral
Angel passage presentsa problem for takingthe Amoral Angel to be
free.
metaphysically
Now let us turnto my second point. I believe that if the one-willed
free,then it would be responsibleforits actions
Angel is metaphysically
sinceit is withintheAngel'spowerto do otherwise.In otherwords,metafor imputability.But, according to Boler,
physicalfreedomis sufficient
its actionswould
because the Angel does not possess the dual affections,
not be morallygood or bad but ratheramoral.27
of morality
to Scotusa peculiarunderstanding
This,I takeit,attributes
for
peculiarin the sense that the abilityto do otherwiseis not sufficient
back
to
the
it
is
sufficient
for
even
morality
though
imputability.
Going
one-willedAngel, Boler's Scotus would be committedto the view that
the Angel is not morally responsible for its excessive self-love,even
Would
thoughit could have done otherwise,
namely,refrainfromself-love.
Scotus have been comfortablewith such a commitment?If imputability
is not enough for morality,what kind of moralitydoes Boler have in
mind forScotus?28
The followingis what I presumeto be Boler's position:forScotus,the
criterionformoral phenomenais fairlyselectivein that only the actions
of a metaphysically
freeagent with a view to the bonumin se are to be
classifiedas moral or immoralacts. But, if thisis Scotus' view, it brings
about the odd resultthatthoughall of its actionswould be imputableto
the one-willedAngel, its actionswould be devoid of moral character.
These argumentsare based on my suggestionthat Boler's separation
of the two elementscommitshim to the view that the Angel could be
free.It should be noted, however,that Boler never states
metaphysically
27"It is notthatin beingableto do otherwise
(i.e.,in itssuperabundant
sufficiency)
thewillmakes
fortheagentto actmorally."
itpossible
(Boler1993,123)
28Itis important
inthis
ismainly
toremember
thatsuperabundant
sufficiency
regarded
from
inBoler's
thenatuandmostprobably
paperas well,as thepowertorefrain
paper,
ralimpulses
I takeit,insofar
as an
to choosealternatives.
andnottheability
Therefore,
sheis abletodo otherwise
andthusheractions
agent
sufficiency
possesses
superabundant
areimputable
to her.

18:51:03 PM

50

LEE
SUKJAE

nor suggeststhat the Angel is metaphysicallyfree. Rather he points

out that the Angel is "a naturalratherthan a voluntaryagent: it has an
intellectualappetite (because it has an intellectualnature),but it does
not have a freeappetite(i.e. a will).29Therefore,it mightseem unfairto
commitshim to a view whichhe fairlyexcharge that his interpretation
In
other
denies.
words,Boler could respondby arguinghe, too,
plicitly
free.His point would be
does not thinkthat the Angel is metaphysically
that though there are two independentaccounts of freedomin Scotus,
thereis only one freedomand, as Scotus states,the Angel is not free.
The problemwiththisresponseis thatif Scotus did indeed take superand the dual affections
to be independentof each
abundant sufficiency
other,therewould be no good reason forhim to deny the Angel superFor on what groundscould Scotus have ruled out
abundant sufficiency.
free?If, as Boler
the possibilitythat the Amoral Angel is metaphysically
suggests,what it means fortwo accountsto be independentis thatsomethereis nothone could hold one account withoutacceptinganother,30
in
that
the
view
freedom
of the
inconsistent
Boler's
Scotus
takingup
ing
while at the same time
will is grounded in superabundantsufficiency
denyingthe dual affectiontheory.In otherwords,if the dual affections
or not,
are irrelevantto whetheran agent has superabundantsufficiency
there is no reason why Scotus should not thinkthat the Angel is free
I do not thinkthatScotuscan elimdespiteits havingonlyone affection.31
in
and
a non-arbitrary
consistentmanner, the possibilityof an
inate,
commodi
possessingsuperabundantsufficiency,
Angel with only the qffectio
are neithernecwhile at the same time claimingthat the dual affections
for
nor
sufficient
By denyingany strong
essary
superabundantsufficiency.
and the dual affections,
connectionbetween superabundantsufficiency
cannot explain why Scotus statesthat the Angel is
Boler's interpretation
free.
not metaphysically
29Boler1993,114.
otfreedom
as towhyBolerstwoaccounts
Thiscouldbe thebasisforan argument
Ifoneendorsed
a
intotwofreedoms.
closeto collapsing/
or comedangerously
collapse
dualaffections,
onecouldarguethat
whiledenying
sufficiency
powerlikesuperabundant
sheis
whileinsisting
freedom
an agentis metaphysically
freeandthushasmetaphysical
freeandthuslacksmoralfreedom.
notmorally
31I amnotsuggesting
ofthewillon superabunthatanyonewhobasesthefreedom
thatthe
Theposition
dantsufficiency
mustat thesametimeholda dualaffection
theory.
some
endorse
in itself,
forone couldsurely
is plausible
are independent
twoelements
tobe onlyoneaffection
orperthere
whileclaiming
sufficiency
powerlikesuperabundant
tois theviewthatScotustookthesetwoelements
WhatI amobjecting
hapsevenmany.
tobe independent.

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

51

This bringus to the thirdand last question I wish to raise in regard

to Boler's distinction.
Do we reallyneed such a distinctionbetweentwo
freedoms?The motivationbehind the distinction,
I believe, comes from
the aforementioned
intuitionthat affections
can have no part in explainfreeagents.If one were
ing the self-determining
power of metaphysically
to take thisview,one would naturallythinkthatthe dual affections
must
be playinga distinctexplanatoryrole withinScotus' account of the free
fromthat of superabundantsufficiency.
Boler goes
will, a role different
on to identify
this role as that of explainingthe moral characterof our
agency,and thisexplanationappears to fitwell withthe anti-eudaimonistic
strandin Scotus.
As pointedout at the outset,I agree withBoler that Scotus wishedto
resistexplainingmoralityin strictly
eudaimonisticterms.And I also agree
withBoler thatmoralityforScotus consistsin an agent'shavingthe dual
I do not, however,believe thatwe need to insiston the indeaffections.
pendentcharacterof the two accountsof freedomto accommodatethese
betweenthe two freedomsseems
keyobservations.In fact,the distinction
to cause more problemsthan it solves. If we can defusethe motivation
for introducingsuch a distinctionwithoutspoiling the consensus that
1) Scotus wished to divergefromthe eudaimonisticpictureof morality
and 2) he thoughtthatpositingdual affections
justifiedthe divergence,I
believewe willbe betteroffwithoutthe distinction.
Thereforelet us reflect
on the motivationforthe distinctionbetweenthe two freedoms.Accordingly,I willbeginto presentsome of myviewson how we mightinterpret
the relationbetweensuperabundantsufficiency
and the dual affections.
IV. My Interpretation
The motivationfor the distinctionbetween the two freedoms,as mentioned earlier,is that affectionscannot play a role in explainingsuperabundantsufficiency.
We rememberBoler's schizophreniccase. His main
insightwas that having multipleaffectionsdoes not implythat one has
superabundantsufficiency
any more than having one does. This observation takenin itself,I believe,is both penetratingand convincing.But
what Boler takesto followfromthisobservationis misleading.Boler may
have too hastilyconcluded that this insightalso impliesthat for Scotus
voluntaryagencycannot consistin any affectionwhatsoever.This is the
basis of my interpretation.
It is crucial that the dual affections
specifiedby Scotus, are not both
"generic" affectionson par with one another. Agents with the dual

18:51:03 PM

52

LEE
SUKJAE

affectionsare not schizophrenic.As we remember,qffectio

iustitiae
is the
nobler affectionand, by virtueof its being nobler,it is able to restrain
the naturalinclinationforadvantage (qffectio
commodi
). The two affections
are not of equal standingbut are hierarchicallyordered. Restraining
commodi
withqffectio
iustitiae
enables the agentto transcendthe desire
qffectio
for his or her own good (bonumsibi), and this transcendence,I take it,
not only constitutes
the moral dimensionforScotus but also groundsthe
of
human
freedom.In other words, I wish to suggestthat
possibility
Scotus thoughtthe freedomexpressedin our superabundantsufficiency
consistedexclusivelyin the possibilityof restrainingthe qffectio
commodi
iustitiae.
with the qffectio
As one might expect, this proposal has its origin in the view that
the abilityto do otherwiseis enough to renderan agent morallyresponsible. This view could be accommodated if for Scotus superabundant
is not understoodas some generalpowerbut ratheras a specific
sufficiency
ability namely,the abilityto transcendthe pursuitof one's advantage.
Indeed, I believe this readingwould enable us to attributeto Scotus
a less peculiar understanding
of morality,one in which the agent would
be responsiblefor all its actions insofaras the actions were a resultof
the agent'svoluntarypower. The range of freeactionswould in thiscase
coincide withthe range of moral phenomena.Superabundantsufficiency
could be viewed as a descriptionof the power the will possessesprecisely
when endowed with the dual affections
of commodi
and iustitiae.
How does thisproposal relateto the one-willedAngelpassage? I would
argue thatthe Angel is not freein any sense,metaphysicalor moral. For
the Angel lacks the superabundantsufficiency
needed for freedomand
this defectcan be explained in termsof the absence of dual affections.
To thisanswer,an opponentof my readingmightchargethatmyproposal has the bizarre and perhaps unacceptable consequence that the
forjustice is sufficient
formorality.For, since the Angelin quesaffection
tion does possess the affectionforthe advantageous,the absence of dual
The
affections
would in effectbe reducedto the absence of qffectio
iustitiae.
on
to
whether
actions
merelytriggeredby
opponent mightgo
question
the qffectio
iustitiae
should be regarded as free. If the notion of superabundant sufficiency
describedby Scotus depictsthe power withinus to
be self-determining,
how could an agentmerelyactingout of the affection
forjusticebe takenas self-determining?
The opponent'smain pointwould
be that,if one merelyhad the affectionforjustice, one could will the
frombeingjust. To fojust,in additionto
just but thiswould be different

18:51:03 PM

SCOTUSON THE WILL

53

forjustice,one needs the power of self-determination,

havingthe affection
the abilityto transcendone's affections.
I wish to suggest,however,it mightbe the opponentwho is making
the bizarredemand.Now accordingto my opponent'sposition,to bejust,
thatis, to will the intrinsicgood freely,not only must I have the desire
for bonumin se, but I must also be able to overcome that affectionfor
justice. But this means that we are faced with the paradoxical situation
in which,to be just one mustbe able to overcomeone's intrinsicdesire
forjustice.Must we be able to transcendour desireforthe ultimategood
to be just? Is thisdemand coherent?
I propose,Scotus does not believe the
Accordingto the interpretation
willlosesitsfreedomby actingin accordancewithitsaffectio
iustitiae.
Rather
that the will is free.For
it is in actingin accordance with affectio
iustitiae
iustitiae
is the innate freedomof the will.32We read,
Scotus,affectio
which
checkrein
thisaffection
forjustice,
is thefirst
on theaffection
for
Therefore,
as we neednotactually
seekthattowards
whichthelatter
thebeneficial,
inasmuch
affection
inclines
to theextent
to
us,normustwe seekit aboveall else(namely,
- thisaffection
fortheadvantageous)
forwhat
which
weareinclined
bythisaffection
innateto thewill,sinceit represents
isjust,I say,is theliberty
thefirst
checkrein
on thisaffection
fortheadvantageous.33
In otherwords,I wish to argue thatfreedomforScotus does not require
the transcendenceof all inclinationsbut ratherthe particulartranscendence of our natural,generic inclination,namely,the affectio
If
commodi.
the transcendenceof affectio
commodi
is possible when our affectio
iustitiae
functionsas a restraint,
the will should followits inclinationforthe just
ratherthan be able to transcendit. There appears to be a significant
in the possibilityof transcendencewith regard to the dual
asymmetry
while one mustbe able to transcendaffectio
commodi
affections:
, one need
not be able to transcendaffectio
iustitiae.
This interpretation
is corroboratedby the factthatit is difficult
to find
If asked why
Scotus mentioningthe abilityto restrainthe affectio
iustitiae.
32Thiswouldalsobe myresponse
to thepotential
thatmyinterpretation
objection
thatpraiseandblamerequire
action
thekeyAristotelian
goesagainst
insight
voluntary
Thepointofcontroversy,
I takeit,is whether
Eth.Nic.III.i.1,1109b30-l).
(SeeAristotle,
inaccordance
withtheaffection
forjustice,
evenintheabsence
ofthecapacity
not
acting
toactin accordance
withit,canbe regarded
as free.I speculate
thatScotuswouldhave
in theaffirmative,
answered
sinceforScotustheliberty
innate
to thewillis theaffection
forjustice.
inthesecondhalfofAnselm's
which
Had Scotus
engaged
experiment,
thought
an angelwithonlytheaffectio
considers
iustitiae
answer
havebeen
, a moredefinitive
might
Scotusdoesnotconsider
thiscase.
possible.
Interestingly
enough,
33Scotus,
II d. 6 q. 2 n. 8, XII, 386;Wolter,
468-70.
Sent.,

18:51:03 PM

54

LEE
SUKJAE

he did not mentionsuch a need, Scotus mightreply,how could one love

the good in itselfexcessively,especiallyif the object of love is God? Why
would therebe a need to restrainsuch a love?
is whetherit is comOne remainingquestionabout my interpretation
I
with
shared
with
the
Boler,namely,the view thatScotus
insight
patible
a
eudaimonistic
wished to resist strictly
pictureof morality.I see no reason why not. The freedomof human agentsis explainedin termsof the
abilityto transcendone's natural inclination,which happens to be the
desire forone's advantage.My interpretation
merelyadds that thisabilan affectionforthe good
ity resultsfromour having a nobler affection,
in itself.Since all entitiespossess the naturaltendencyto seek theirown
frombrutesor even inanadvantage,in this respectwe are no different
imate objects. It is in respectof our havingthe affectionforjustice that
we reallystand apart fromother creatures.This is perhaps why,as we
iustitiae
is the ultimatespecificdifferrecall,Scotus claims that "the qffectio
ence of freeappetite."34
Of course,if the affectionforjustice is also deemed a "natural"desire
in that it is an essentialconstituentof our will, my readingwould disallow the possibilityof transcendingthis naturalinclination,namely,the
affectionfor the good in itself.And this restrictionmightseem to go
But what do we lose from
againstthe idea of superabundantsufficiency.
for
not being able to transcendthe affection the good in itself?Is this
affectionnot a rare part of our naturewhich resemblesthe divine?
Freedom
I will conclude with a briefsummaryof my interpretation.
forScotus, I have argued,is a singlenotionin the sense that the ability
and the range of imputable
to do otherwiseis sufficient
forimputability
actions coincides with the range of moral phenomena. Moral acts are
not in some special subset of free actions. Rather,all freeactions have
for
moral character.Why? Because the abilityto transcendthe affection
where
the
power
advantage throughthe affectionforjustice is precisely
of freedomhas its source. In otherwords,it is not possibleforthereto
be a free agent who lacks a view to the bonumin se. If superabundant
the
describesthe power of human will to be self-determining,
sufficiency
are the characteristic
desiresof a freewill thatwieldssuch
dual affections
a power. And withsuch power and freedom,comes moral responsibility.
New Haven, Connecticut
Yale University
34See Scotus,
, II, d. 6 q. 2 n. 9 as quotedabove.
Reportado

18:51:03 PM

and Causality
Voluntariness
SomeProblems
forAquinas' Theoryof Responsibility
JEFFREYHAUSE

Aquinas' ethicalwritingstellthe storyof the goal of human life,and how

the goal is won or lost. In the course of the story,we hear about virtue
and vice, law and grace, sin and happiness.Underlyingthe discussionof
all thesesubjectsis Aquinas' account of human action and moral responsibility.And the key elementof Aquinas' account of moral responsibility
is his account of voluntariness.
Only if an agentA is morallyresponsibleare certainattitudestoward
A appropriate.For example,onlya morallyresponsibleagentis the approor friendship'.1
Moreover, only
forgiveness,
priate object of resentment,
if A is a morallyresponsibleagent may one appropriatelydirecttoward
A such actionsas praising,blaming,punishing,rewarding,and showing
mercy.2
But what rendersan agentan appropriateobject of theseattitudesand
actions?Answeringthis question is the main task of a theoryof moral
In addition,we can expecta theoryof responsibility
to exresponsibility.
and
a
is
which
states
of
character
events
responsibleagent responplain
siblefor.Furthermore,
it shouldexplainhow muchpraiseor blame,reward
or punishmenta responsibleagent A is a candidate for.
We can findAquinas' answerto thesekey questionsin his account of
voluntariness.He argues that only those agents capable of voluntary
1 Strawson
andResentment
attitudes."
SeehisFreedom
callsthese"reactive
, in:Proceedings
48 (1962),1-25.
oftheBritish
Academy,
2 Wedo sometimes
in
treat
whoarenotmorally
beings
responsible
(pets,forinstance)
or"reward";
andwhenwetreatthemin a
waysandcallthattreatment
"praise"
positive
We mayeven"show
callthattreatment
negative
"punishment."
way,we do sometimes
we
in doingso,wearenotengaging
inthesamepractices
toourpets.However,
mercy"
inwhenwepraise,
or showmercy
to morally
blame,punish,
reward,
responsible
engage
thecat'sbehavior.
whenwepraisea cat,wearetrying
to condition
Forexample,
agents.
in behavior
we wantthecatto
ourownpleasure
we might
be expressing
Alternatively,
we praise,blame,punishor reward
agents
morally
responsible
engagein. In contrast,
suchtreatment
itis appropriate
theusefulness
has
because
wethink
to do so apartfrom
areworthy
forconditioning
them.
Theseagents
of,or deserving
of,thistreatment.
Vivarium
36,1

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

18:51:13 PM

56

HAUSE
JEFFREY

actionsare responsibleagents;thatonlythosestates,acts,and otherevents

that an agent A voluntarilyeffectsare those A is responsiblefor; and
that the amount of praise or blame, reward or punishmentappropriate
to A for a state,act, or other event that A effectsdepends in part on
how voluntarythat state,act, or othereventis.3To articulatethe conditions of voluntariness,
is to articulatethe conditionsof moral
therefore,
responsibility.
Because human beingsare possessedof both reason and will,theyare
capable of making,adopting,and executingtheirown plans and, therefore,of actingvoluntarily.Those eventsand statesone plans on those
one wills directlyand per se- are among those one bringsabout voluneven
tarily.However,Aquinas arguesthatone can bringabout voluntarily
some eventsand statesone does not plan on:4
. . . something
canbe voluntary
in itself,
either
as whenthewillis bornedirectly
to
as is
it,or in itscause,whenthewillis borneto thecauseandnotto theeffect
evident
in thecaseofsomeone
whogetsdrunk
foron thisbasiswhat
voluntarily;
he doesthrough
drunkenness
is imputed
tohimas voluntary.
wemustnote
Second,
thatsomething
is calledvoluntary
orindirectly:
thewill
, thattowhich
direcdy
directly
is borne;butindirectly
butdidnot.
, thatwhichthewillcouldhaveprevented
Some events and states are voluntarybecause theircause is voluntary;
othersare voluntarybecause one could have, but did not,preventthem.
These conditionsforvoluntariness,
of course,cannot be sufficient
conditions. One does not bring about voluntarilywhatever
is caused by what
one can, but
one plans on; nor does one bringabout voluntarily
everything
does not, prevent.Aquinas does sometimesarticulatefurtherconditions
to restrictthe range of states and events an agent bringsabout voluntarily.However, these discussionsare oftenvague and terse,and it is
unclear that theyresolvethe problemsat issue.
In thispaper, I will focus on just one of theseproblematicissues:the
3 AtSumma
in
between
"thevoluntary
, la Ilae q. 6 a. 2, Aquinas
theologiae
distinguishes
itscomplete
nature"
and "thevoluntary
in itsincomplete
nature."
Aristode,
Following
thatnon-human
whichhe takesnotto be morally
animals,
Aquinasadmits
responsible,
arecapableof"incompletely"
whoarecapableof
acts;butonlythoseagents
voluntary
actsare morally
Forsimplicity's
performing
"completely
voluntary"
responsible
agents.
thispaperto meancompletely
sake,I use"voluntary"
throughout
voluntary.
4 "... aliquidpotest
essevoluntarium
velsecundum
directe
se,sicutquandovoluntas
inipsumfertur;
incausametnonin
velsecundum
suamcausam,
fertur
quandovoluntas
ei impuutpatetineo quivoluntrie
exhocenimquasivoluntarium
effectum,
inebriatur;
tatur
volcommittit.
Secundo
considerandum
estquodaliquiddicitur
quodperebrietatem
autem
untarium
velindirecte:
indirecte
directe
directe
id in quodvoluntas
fertur;
quidem
illudquodvoluntas
sednonprohibet"
(ST,la Ilae q. 77 a. 7c).
prohibere,
potuit

18:51:13 PM

ANDCAUSALITY
VOLUNTARINESS

57

of negligentomissions.These are failuresto act which are

voluntariness
to explainhow such
neitherplannednor foreseen.It is difficult,
therefore,
failurescan be voluntary.AlthoughAquinas' own explanationsare fruscurt,theyare also promising.Beforewe can see theirpromise
tratingly
and assess theirplausibility,
however,we must firstspell them out.
In ST, la Ilae q. 6 a. 1 and q. 6 a. 2, Aquinas argues that human
beingsare responsiblebecause theycan act voluntarily:They can make
and adopt theirown plans of action. Accordingto Aquinas, non-human
animalsmay have some knowledgeof the ends theypursue,but theydo
not understandthattheyare ends because theycannot grasp the concept
end.Human beings,in contrast,can grasp and apply the concepts end
and means.These abilitiesgive them controlover their activities.They
can weigh alternativemeans in lightof an end, and weigh less ultimate
ends in lightof more ultimateends. They can, therefore,considerreasons forand againstpursuingalternativeends and means, take different
revisetheirthoughts,and formulatetheirown plans. Nature
perspectives,
does not determinetheirjudgment about what to pursue; rather,they
determinetheirown reasonsforacting.Because volitionis responsiveto
the reasons for acting that human beings give themselves,human volitions- and the deeds that expressthem- are up to them,and theyare
responsibleforthem.
The conditionsforvoluntariness
presentedat ST ' la Ilae q. 6 a. 1 and
6
a.
and
are
2
q.
relativelyunproblematic.They are, however,
plausible
conditionsforthe voluntariness
of acts.Not all eventsand statesthat are
- in
will
them
voluntary
satisfy
particular,negligentomissionswill not.
Some omissionswill satisfythese conditions,namely,willed omissions.
For instance,if I have an appointmentat 8:45 and, afterdeliberating,I
decide I would rathernot show up, then I move myselfto thisomission
in the same way I mighthave moved myselfto showingup: I plan on
not showingup. In this case, the fact that I make and adopt this plan
explainswhy my not showingup is voluntaryand why I am responsible
for not showingup. However, Aquinas also says that negligent
omissions
are voluntary.If, preoccupiedwithwork,I simplydon't thinkabout the
appointmentand fail to show up at the scheduledtime,that failuretoo
is voluntary,and I am responsiblefor the omission. But if negligent
omissionsare voluntary,what explains theirvoluntariness?If I do not
?
plan on them,what makes these omissionsmine
in
first
discussion
of
omissions
the
ST, la Ilae comes at q. 6
Aquinas'
a. 3, rightafterhis discussionof the voluntarinessof actions. He poses

18:51:13 PM

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HAUSE
JEFFREY

the question,"Can the voluntarybe withoutany act?" In his sed contra

,
he doesn'tmake theusual appeal to an authority,
nor does he call attention
to what he has argued in earlierarticles.He draws insteadon another,
wider conception of the voluntary:that over which we have control
Because our not acting is at least sometimesin our control,
{dominium).0
it is in those cases as voluntaryas our acting. His appeal to this wide
conceptionwithoutbenefitof argumentor authoritative
supportsuggests
thisaccount already
that,in his mind and in that of his contemporaries,
had the weightof authority,and was his own. We should not be surprised,then, to find that he appeals to it elsewhereas he does several
timesin the De maloand the ST, la Ilae (forinstance,at DM , q. 2 a. 1
ad 2, ST, la Ilae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2, and ST la Ilae q. 77 a. 7c).6
If Aquinas5consideredview is thatthe non-performance
of any action
one can performis voluntary,then the listof one's voluntarynonactions
will be remarkablylong- as long as the list of actionsone can but does
not perform.Because one is responsiblefor all one's voluntaryactions
and nonactions,the listof eventsone is responsibleforextendsfarbeyond
what any normalhuman being could ever thinkof. Is thisAquinas' view?
If, late forthe bus, I hurryout the door and forgetto lock it, then my
failureto lock it is voluntary,and I am responsiblefor my not locking
it. But if my neighborforgetsto lock his door too, then my not locking
it forhim is likewisevoluntary,because I can check his door to see if he
has forgotten
to lock it. I voluntarily
did not burn down my house today.
I voluntarilydid not hurl myselfinto Boston Harbor. I am voluntarily
not huntingaardvarksin WesternTexas. I am thereforeresponsiblefor
coundess actionswhich I have never consideredpermy not performing
and
have
no
reason to considerperforming.
forming
What Aquinas goes on to say in the body of Article3, however,should
lead us to one of two conclusions.Perhaps (1) the equation of the voluntarywithwhat is in one's controlis a shorthandformulafor a more
5 "Thatoverwhich
we havecontrol
is saidto be voluntary.
Butwe arein control
of
andwilling
andnotwilling.
are
Therefore,
actingandnotacting,
justas acting
willing
so tooarenotacting
andnotwilling."
dicitur
esse
sumus,
voluntary,
["Illudcuiusdomini
voluntarium.
Sed nosdomini
sumus
eiusquodestagereetnonagere,
velieetnonvelie.
itaet nonagereet nonvelie"(la Ilae 6.3sc)].
Ergosicutagereetvelieestvoluntarium,
" tomeancontrol.
"dominium
Sometimes
uses1potes
tas andsometimes
He makes
Aquinas
"Dominium
" refers
itclearthat,
in thiscontext,
thetwowordshavethesamemeaning.
to
ourcapacity
to choosebetween
alternatives
{ST,la q. 82 a. 1 ad 3, ST, la Ilae q. 6
a. 2 ad 2, Depotentia
, q. 3 a. 7 ad 13)andto willor notwillanygivenobject(ST] la
Ilae q. 109a. 2 ad 1,DM,q. 6 sc 3); "po
tas"refers
tes
to theverysamecapacity
{ST,la
Ilae q. 6 a. 7 ad 3, q. 15 a. 2c).See alsoST, la.Ilae q. 21 a. 2c.

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ANDCAUSALITY
VOLUNTARINESS

59

complicatedaccount,which he elaborateson in the body of Article3.

and more probably,(2) the set of events in my control
Alternatively,
is smallerthan the set of events it is possible for me to bring about.
There mustbe some furtherfeatureof these events,beyond my simply
being able to bring them about, that brings them under my control.
Aquinas writes:7
is from
Whatisfrom
thewillis calledvoluntary.
another
Now,wesaythatonething
from
forinstance,
intwoways:(1)directly,
i.e.,whatproceeds
qua acting,
something
from
theveryfactthatit doesnotact,for
from
heat;and(2) indirectly,
heating
as he failsto pilot.
thepilot,insofar
is from
we saythata ship'ssinking
instance,
ofactionis notalways
traced
on thefailure
Butwe mustknowthatwhatfollows
notacting;
butonly
back,as to itscause,to an agenton thebasisof[theagent's]
in thecasewhen[theagent]can andshouldact.Forifthepilotwereunableto
tohim,itssinking,
which
direct
theship,
orifitspiloting
werenotentrusted
happened
to him.Therefore,
because
theabsence
ofthepilotwouldnotbe imputed
through
andacting,
can impedenotwilling
andnotacting,
andsomethewill,bywilling
areimputed
toitas beingfrom
it.
theverynotwilling
andnotacting
times
should,
without
an external
Andso thevoluntary
can be without
act,
anyact;sometimes
an
withan internal
one,as whenit willsnotto act;butothertimesevenwithout
internal
act,as whenitdoesnotwill.
Aquinas beginsthe body of the articlewitha claim he takesto be uncontroversial:What is fromthe will (a volntate
) is called voluntary.He then
or
two
can
be
proceed fromthe will:directly
distinguishes wayssomething
or indirectly.
Because Aquinas has already discussedin articles1 and 2
the voluntariness
of acts whichproceed directlyfromthe will,we expect
thathe will touch on what he has said in thesetwo articlesand then go
on to explainwhy and under what conditionsomissions
includingnegligentomissions(where one does not decide on and choose inaction)
7 "Dicendum
Ab aliquoautemdicitur
dicitur
quodesta volntate.
quodvoluntarium
ab aliquoinquantum
est
essealiquiddupliciter.
Unomododirecte:
procedit
quodscilicet
sicutcalefactio
a calore.
Aliomodo,indirecte,
exhocipsoquodnonagit:sicutsubagens,
Sed sciendum
mersio
desistit
a gubernando.
navisdicitur
essea gubernatore,
inquantum
id quodsequitur
ad defectum
sicutin causamin
reducitur
actionis,
quodnonsemper
et debetagere.Si enimguberagens,ex eo quodnonagit:sedsolumtunccumpotest
nonimputarevelnonessetei commissa
nator
nonposset
navem
navis,
gubernatio
dirigere,
turei navissubmersio,
contingeret."
quaeperabsentiam
gubernatoris
hocquodestnonvelieet
volendo
et agendo,
voluntas,
"Quiaigitur
impedire
potest
nonagere,et aliquando
ei,quasi
debet;hocquodestnonvelieet nonagere,imputatur
ab ipsaexistens.
Et sicvoluntarium
esseabsqueactu:quandoque
quidemabsque
potest
autemet absque
actuexteriori,
cumactuinteriori,
sicutcumvultnonagere;aliquando
actuinteriori,
sicutcumnonvult."
in ST,la
Norman
Kretzmann
theexample
ofthenegligent
discusses
pilotas itoccurs
Ilae q. 79 a. 1. See hisGodAmong
andSpiritual
theCauses
ofHearts
ofMoralEvil:Hardening
in:Philosophical
(seeinparticular
199-200).
Blinding,
Topics,16 (1988),189-214

18:51:13 PM

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HAUSE
JEFFREY

are voluntary.Finally,we expect that,if the two accounts are different,

of acts
Aquinas will providean overarchingaccount of the voluntariness
and of omissions;or he will explain how the two different
accountsare
connected.
What Aquinas initiallydiscusses,however,is not the voluntarinessof
the act of will or of the omissionto act. He discussesa different
subject:
the voluntarinessof what followsfrom the act of will or omissionto
of the consequencesthe act or omissionhas in the
act- the voluntariness
world. He introducesthese consequences as events that proceed from
the will and are thereforevoluntary.But afterhe introducesthe subject
in this way, distinguishingevents that proceed directlyfrom the will
he ceases to talk about the conditions
fromthose thatproceed indirectly,
under which the event is voluntaryand talks instead about the conditionsunder which the agent causesthe event.In the finalsentence,howhe switchesback fromcausa
ever,when Aquinas summarizeshis findings,
to voluntarium
, concludingthat the voluntarycan be withoutany act.
Article3 is, to say the least, a terse and clumsyeffort.Aquinas runs
more carefully:the voluntatogethertwo subjectshe needs to distinguish
rinessof omissions,and the voluntarinessof an omission'sconsequences.
Moreover,he changesvocabularyin mid-article,
leavingthe readerwonif
he
has
also
dering
changed subjects.Aquinas must be assumingthat,
if one is the cause of an event or state of affairs,that event or state of
affairsmustbe voluntary;but it is far fromobvious that thisis the case.
What is obviousis thatifone plans to bringsomethingabout, attempts
to bringit about, and does in fact bringit about, one causes it, and it
is voluntary.In this case, the agent is an efficientcause of the effect
cause of an effect
peraccidens.
perse. But an agent can also be an efficient
FollowingAristotle,8
Aquinas givesthe exampleof the workerswho, while
digginga grave,stumbleupon a buried treasure(DM q. 2 a. lc). In this
causes both of therebeing a grave and of
case, the workersare efficient
theirfindingthe treasure.However, theyintendonly to bringabout the
firsteffect.The second effect,thoughwelcome,is unintended:They did
not dig in orderto findtreasure.Therefore,while theyare causes of the
One
firsteffect
perse, theyare causes of the second effectonlyperaccidens.
causes perse only what one aims at; one causes an unintendedeffectper
accidens.
The gravediggersin this example may voluntarilyseize the treasure
once they'vefoundit; but it should be clear that theirdiscoveryof the
8 See Aristotle,
., V. 30, 1025a14-24.
Metaphysics

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ANDCAUSALITY
VOLUNTARINESS

61

treasureis not voluntary.It is purelycoincidentalthat the treasurelies

wheretheyare digging,and theyhave no reason to thinktheywill find
anythingother than stones and roots in the graveyardsoil. We might
thereforeattributeto Aquinas the view that, if one is the cause of an
event or state of affairsper se, then one bringsit about voluntarily;but
if one is the cause of that effectonlyper accidens
, one does not bringit
about voluntarily.
But thiscannotbe Aquinas' view. He argues in ST la Ilae q. 6 a. 3c
that the ship's sinkingis imputedto the pilot as voluntary.Of course,
the ship to sink,and mighthave stayedaway
the pilotmighthave wanted
fromhis post so that it would sink.But Aquinas means to say that the
ship's sinkingis imputedeven to a negligentpilot, a pilot who simply
forgetsthat he's on duty.He closes Article3 by notingthat no volition
to refrainfromactingis necessaryif the consequencesof one's inaction
are to be imputedto one as voluntary.In this case, the pilot cannot be
a cause of the sinkingper se; for the sinkingis not an event he intends
and worksto accomplish.In contrast,if a saboteurhad drilledholes in
the ship, intendingthat it sink on the voyage, he would have been the
perse cause of the ship's sinking,and he would have voluntarilycaused
it to sink.The negligentpilot,however,can be only a per accidens
cause
of the ship'ssinking.Aquinas, then,owes his readersfurther
explanation.
Why are some effects
peraccidens
voluntaryand othersnot? In particular,
why,in the case of the negligentpilot,is the discussionof causation relevant to the discussionof voluntariness?
For thisstudy,at any rate,I do not have to solve thispuzzle. Aquinas
tellsus that both the omissionitselfand the event that followsfromit
are voluntaryunder the same conditions:if thereis an act one can and
should perform.This is all we need to know to determinewhetherthe
agent deservesblame. Moreover,it is all we need to know to determine
how much blame the agent deserves;for,on Aquinas' view, the addition
of a bad consequenceto one's failureto act does not change the amount
of blame one deserves.If the pilot fails to steer the ship when he can
and should,and the ship does not sink,the pilot deservesno less blame
for this omissionthan he would deserveif his omissionhad in fact led
to the ship's sinking.What happens as a resultof the failureto steeris
nothingfurtherthe pilot does; it is simplya matterof luck, and luck is
irrelevantto the assessmentof an agent's praise- or blameworthiness.9
Let us focus,then,on the voluntariness
of the omissionitself.Aquinas
9 See,e.g.,DM,q. 2 a. 2 andST, la Ilae q. 20 a. 4.

18:51:13 PM

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HAUSE
JEFFREY

writesthat an omissionis voluntaryif one can and should do what one

failsto do. But does he mean these conditionsto explain why the omission is voluntary?In a relativelyrecentarticle,the philosopherJohn Hall
raisesverymuch the same puzzle, and his discussionis an instructive
foil
forAquinas'.10Hall wondershow one can be responsiblefora failureto
act. Afterall, in order to be responsibleforfailingto performan action
A mustbe in one's control.But, Hall notes(p. 404), agreeA, performing
ing withAquinas, we are in controlof our actionsthroughdeliberation.
Hall argues that,for an agent to be responsiblefor not performing
A,
he or she must have decided not to take steps to ensure that he or she
would performA. And unless the agent actuallymade such a decision,
the failureto performA is not in the agent's control,but is simplyaccidental. For example,unless the pilot of the ship actuallydecided not to
set his alarm clock, or check the schedule,then we cannot reasonably
hold him responsibleforfailingto steerthe ship and forthe ship's subsequent sinking.
Aquinas agreeswithHall thatwe are in controlof our actionsthrough
deliberation.But he disagreeswith Hall's contentionthat the failureto
performan action is outside an agent's controlunless the agent actually
deliberatesand decides not to take steps that will ensure that he or she
will performthe action. Even if settingthe alarm,or checkingthe schedule never even occurredto the ship's pilot,it is stillreasonableto hold
him responsibleforhis failureto steerthe ship. But if thatis so, Aquinas
needs to show thatthisfailureis in the pilot'scontrol;and since,according to Aquinas, one is in controlof one's actions and inactionsthrough
he needs to link this failureto the pilot as a deliberator.
deliberation,11
Otherwisehe will have to admit that the pilot's failureto steerthe ship
is simplyan accident.
AlthoughAquinas does not offerany clear answerto thesechallenges,
I believe an answer is available to him. On his view, one is morally
responsiblefor one's omissionif one can and shouldperformthe action
one failsto perform.Presumably,
he means thesetwo conditionsto explain
the voluntariness
of negligentomissions.Althoughhe does not detail the
explanatoryforceof these two conditions,if we probe into the explanatoryrole of the second condition,I believewe will findan answerto the
questionsat issue. But how so? Why does the factthatsomethingis con10
C. Hall,ActsandOmissions
39 (1989),399-408.
, in:Philosophical
Quarterly,
11John
it at q. 6
at ST' la Ilae q. 109a. 2 ad 1 andimplies
Aquinasmakesthisexplicit
a. 3c.

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ANDCAUSALITY
VOLUNTARINESS

63

traryto the moral law play a role in limitingthose actionsin my power

to those I am morallyresponsiblefor?
PerhapsAquinas would argue along theselines.What makesus responsible agents is our intellectualcapacity,which separates us fromlower
animals.In virtueof thiscapacity,we are principal,or planning,agents,
able to directour own lives. If, then,we are morallyresponsibleforcertain omissions,but only if the moral law requiresperforming
the action
we omit,we mightsee why the fact that one should performan action
if we considerthe role the moral law plays
is relevantto responsibility
in our psychology.
onLaw, which
Aquinas takesup thisissue mostexplicidyin his Treatise
of
la
he
90-108
the
Ilae.
There
maintains
that
ST,
Questions
comprises
God imprintson human reason the most basic preceptsof the natural
law, whichhe sometimescalls the firstand generalprecepts.Amongthese
preceptsare "You shall love God withyourwhole heart" and "You shall
love your neighboras yourself"(ST, la Ilae q. 100 a. 3 ad 1). These
precepts,he maintains,are knownto all human beings,and theirimprinting on the human heart is enough to guarantee that no one can err
about them(ST, la Ilae q. 94 a. 4, q. 94 a. 6).12No one can deny that
he should love his neighbor,unless he or she does not understandthe
termsin the precept.
More specificthan the firstand general preceptsof the natural law
are thepreceptswhichare their"proximateconclusions,"preceptsAquinas
also calls the firstprinciplesof the naturallaw. These too are naturally
knownto all. The acts theyprescribeor forbidare such that,withjust
a littleconsideration,
we judge them required,permissible,or impermissible (ST, la Ilae q. 100 a. lc). These preceptsinclude the injunctions
againstmurderand theft.
More specificstill are the secondaryprinciplesof the natural law,
derivedfromand sometimesspecifications
of primaryprinciples(ST, la
12I should
is notnecessarily
on a doctrine
ofinnate
notethatAquinas
knowlrelying
ideas.In somesenseoftheword"conceptual,"
theseareconceptual
truths,
edgeorinnate
fortheyarepersenota
themselves.
In anycase,Aquinas'
viewthatneg, known
through
omissions
are voluntary
doesnotdependon theplausibility
ofhismoralepisteligent
Itisplausible,
ofanyexplanation
relies
on,thatonecannot
mology.
Aquinas
independently
knowwhoGodis,orwhata human
thatGod
beingis,andwhatloveis,without
seeing
andotherhumanbeings
ourlove.Anyone
deserve
withnormal
whogrows
intelligence
ofotherhuman
willtherefore
cometo see thattheydeserve
up in thecompany
beings
loveas he orshecomestoseewhata human
beingis andwhatloveis,i.e.,in thenormalprocess
ofgrowing
abouttheworld.
up andlearning

18:51:13 PM

64

HAUSE
JEFFREY

Ilae q. 94 a. 4). Unlike the primaryprinciples,theseadmitof exceptions.

However, a secondaryprinciplebinds an agent only under certainconditions(e.g., if that agent can derive it fromprimaryprinciples,or if it
has been promulgatedto that agent as positivelaw).
This summaryof Aquinas' moral epistemology
is extremely
rudimentary,
but it is just enough to let me offerAquinas a solutionto the problemI
have posed forhim. Accordingto Aquinas, the moral law has been promulgatedto every human agent. The weaknessof the human intellect
preventsus frombeing conscious at all times of what the naturallaw
, it takes very littlereflectionto
prescribes.However, as Aquinas stresses
see the truthof thesefirstpreceptsand theirproximateconclusions.Their
truthvalue does not pose a problemwe have to spend timepuzzlingout.
These are, on Aquinas' view, simple, straightforwardly
true precepts
which we can quicklyand easily call to consciousness.Each person,by
reflection,can thereforequicklyand easily apply these preceptsof the
moral law in orderto tell if an action under considerationis permissible
or not.13We have as much accessto the moral law as we need to live
virtuouslives.
But the moral law is not just given to everyhuman being; it is given
to everyhuman being as directive.
This directivefunctiondistinguishes
the
principlesof practical reason fromthe principlesof theoreticalreason,
which are also naturallyknown,but not directive.14
The contentsof the
law are called praecepta
in
, usually captured English by "precepts,"but
which can also be rendered"teachings,""guides,"or "directions."Legal
precepts,Aquinas explains,directus to do what is necessaryor helpful
to attainan end (ST, la Ilae q. 99 a. lc; see also q. 93 a. 3c). But what13It is notas easyto discover
andapplysecondary
hencepartofa legal
principles;
ruler's
human
lawsthatwillmaketheseprinciples
clear.Ifthere
areno
job is toinstitute
suchlaws,andonecannot
workone'swaythrough
thecomplexity
ofthecase,thenthe
lawhasnotbeenpromulgated
after
thatthese
all andso is notbinding.
Note,however,
considerations
do notapplyto thecaseofthenegligent
doesnot
Aquinas
pilot.Although
as clearly
as we might
seemstobe one
like,thecasehe envisions
spelloutthisexample
in whichthepilotsimply
doesnottakethehelmwhenhe is scheduled
to. Unlesshe
received
a mistaken
oris suffering
a disorder
which
hassenthimintoconfrom
schedule,
he cannotarguethathe doesnothaveaccessto themoralruleshe is supposed
fusion,
tofollow.
Itdoesnottakemuchexperience
whatmight
orpower
ofimagination
topicture
ifhedoesnottakethehelm:injury
orlossoflife,
distress
tothefamily
andfriends
happen
oftheinjured
to see that
anddead,lossofproperty.
Nordoesit takemuchreflection
indifference
toothers'
welfare
isincompatible
withtheprecept
ustoloveothers
directing
themostbasicandeasilyaccessible
ofthemoralprecepts.
14Forexample,
is
theproposition
"Thewholeis greater
thananyofitsproper
parts"
a persenota
oftheoretical
reason.
principle

18:51:13 PM

ANDCAUSALITY
VOLUNTARINESS

65

ever end we pursuewe pursue also forthe sake of the ultimateend (ST,
la Ilae q. 1 a. 6c). Accordingly,Aquinas notes that the preceptsof the
naturallaw directus to do what is necessaryor helpfulto attainour ultimate end: happiness(thelivingof a virtuouslife)(ST, la Ilae q. 90 a. 2c).
Aquinas argues earlyin the ST, la Ilae that human beings have a natural appetiteforhappiness,and in the Treatiseon Law he maintainsthat
we knownaturallyand have easy access to the preceptsof the law which
will directus to happiness.Natural appetiteand naturalknowledgeboth
serveto directus to our ultimateend.
Everyhuman agent knows that by failingto followthe law one will
fallshortof the good; one will lose somethingof importance,something
the law directsone to. "Alwaysfollowrightreason" is, Aquinas claims,
one of the general and primarypreceptsof the natural law, known to
everyone.Therefore,when one makes plans, rehearsesthe plans one has
made, or considersrevisingthem,it is reasonable to do what the moral
law requires.But the moral law has been promulgatedto everyrational
agent and plays a directiverole in that agent's psychology.It is, therefore,reasonableforus to expect everyrationalagent to do what the law
requires.Because one knows (even if one is not actuallyawareof) what
action is reasonable and expected, and yet does not performit, one's
omissionto performthat action is voluntary.
I am not sure Aquinas would want to continuehis discussionof voluntaryomissionsin the way I have proposed. My goal is only to see
whether,by appealing to Aquinas' own views,we can make good sense
of his claim that omissionsare voluntaryonly if one not only can, but
should,
performthe omittedact. It seems to me that we can. Whenever
there is an act an agent should perform,that agent findsherselfin a
contextin whichshe is directedto performthe act and, presumably,has
sufficient
indicationsthatthe act is called for.In makingplans thatignore
these directions,the agent is not simplynotperformingan act she can
The agentisfailingto performan act; and thisfailureor fault
perform.15
is imputableto her as a planningagent. Though she does not plan on
the omissionperse, and thoughshe may not take stepsto ensurethatshe
fail to performthe action, it is stillreasonable to attributethe faultto
her as a planner.For this reason, the omissionis voluntary.
Even if my speculationsabout Aquinas on omissionsare accurate,I've
15In earlier
downmyhouseis a caseinwhich
an agent
my
example,
mynotburning
doesnotperform
an acthe canperform.
simply

18:51:13 PM

66

HAUSE
JEFFREY

an account of Aquinas' theory

taken only a small step towardsoffering
There is stillwork to do in exploringwhat he
of moral responsibility.
and
has to say about freedom,about involuntariness,
nonvoluntariness,
about acts which are involuntaryin themselvesbut voluntaryin their
cause. Still,even the littleI've done mightprove to be useful.I suspect,
forinstance,that an explorationof Aquinas on omissionswill help us to
understandhow sin is possible given an action theorylike Aquinas'. But
that is anotherstory.
St.John3
s Seminary
College

18:51:13 PM

Scotuson theDecalogue:WhatSortof Voluntarism}

C.P. RAGLAND

Scotus dividesthe Ten Commandmentsinto two "tables". The firsttable

containsthe firsttwo commandments,and possiblythe third.The second table listsall the remainingcommandments.2
In effect,the firsttable
tellsus to love God above all else,3while the second table tellsus to love
our neighborsas ourselves.4
Accordingto Scotus, the firsttable is necessarilybindingfor us, but
the second table is not. The firsttable binds us necessarilybecause its
truth(thatGod oughtto be loved) does not depend in any way on God's
will. The firsttable is self-evidently
true to every intellect
including
God's and thus not even God can remove our obligationto obey it.5
The second table binds us only contingently
because it is a law that
God has freelyestablishedby an act of will. ThereforeGod can dispense
fromit; like a king he has the authorityto repeal (temporarily
or permanendy)the laws he has set up. And according to Scotus, scripture
proves that God not only can dispense fromthe second table, but has
actuallydone so.6
about part of the moral law. If we asked
Scotus,then,is a voluntarist
Scotus to explain why we must obey the second table, he would appeal
1 Anearlier
version
ofthispaperwaspresented
at theCentral
Division
ofthe
Meeting
ofChristian
at CalvinCollegeon April11,1997.Thanks
to Sukjae
Society
Philosophers
ThomasWilliams,
an anonymous
readerfortheSCP, andother
Lee,CalvinNormore,
conference
forhelpful
andsuggestions.
criticisms
to Marilyn
participants
Specialthanks
McCordAdamsforherdetailed
comments
on earlier
drafts.
2 Thefirst
commandment
theworship
ofanygodbesides
the
(Exodus
20:2-6)prohibits
thenameof
Lord,and thesecondcommandment
(Exodus20:7)prohibits
misusing
theLord.The third
commandment
is to observe
thesabbath.
Scotusis unsure
whether
thethird
commandment
ispartofthefirst
tableorthesecond
DunsScotus,
Sent.,
(Ioannes
Ill d. 37 n. 7, Operaomnia,
ofScotusrefer
XV,Paris1893,826;Wolter,
278).Citations
first
to theWadding-Vivs
thento thetextinAllanB. Wolter,
DunsScotus
onthe
edition,
WillandMorality
D.C. 1986.The translations
areWolter's.
, Washington,
3 Scotus,
Ill d. 37 n. 6, XV, 826;Wolter,
276.
Sent.,
4 Scotus,
Ill d. 37 n. 9, XV, 843;Wolter,
Sent.,
280;seealsoRomans13:9.
5 Scotus,
Ill d. 37 n. 6, XV, 826;Wolter,
276.
Sent.,
6 Scotus,
Ill d. 37 n. 1,XV, 741;Wolter,
270.
Sent.,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:51:22 PM

68

G.P. RAGLAND

to God's freedecrees at some point in his explanation.But at what particularpoint would he do so? As we shall see, thereis more than one
So preciselywhat kindof voluntarismdid Scotus
way to be a voluntarist.
hold? That is the centralquestion of thisessay.
Afterreviewingsome crucial backgroundmaterialin part one, I will
consider five different
of Scotus5voluntarism;each preinterpretations
sents Scotus as a different
kind of voluntarist.In part two, I will examand argue thateach fails.Finally,in part
ine the firstfourinterpretations
I hope that even readers
three I will develop my own interpretation.
will findthis a usefulintroductionto the
who dismissmy interpretation
diversitypossible withintheisticmetaethics an area of philosophyfar
richerthan is oftenacknowledged.
I. Background:
in Scotus
Kindsof Goodness
Beforeexploringthe different
sortsof voluntarismthat Scotus may have
held, it is helpfulto considerhis account of the various kinds,of goodness. His discussionof goodness introducesideas that are usefulboth
in constructing
and rulingout various interpretations
of his voluntarism.
In Quodlibet
, Scotus describestwo kindsof naturalgoodness.7A thing's
or essential
natural goodness is its degree of being, or place in
primary
the hierarchyof being. The more entitya thinghas, the more primary
or accidental
or essentialgoodness it has.8 A thinghas secondary
natural
it
is
or
in
suitedto
goodnessinsofaras
"perfectly
completeharmonywith
somethingelse somethingwhich ought to have it or which it ought
to have."9
Scotus explainshis conceptionof secondarynaturalgoodnessby showing how it applies to both attributesand substances.A given attributeis
suitableto- or "good for"- certainsubstances,if forthose substances"it
is a good or a perfection";so forexample,"healthis said to be good for
man because it suits him."10A substanceis naturallygood if it has all
the perfectionsthat are "appropriateto it"; forexample, "food is called
good because it has an appropriatetaste."11
Scotus says that we can evaluate acts on "both counts" because "an
7 Scotus,
210.
Quodlibet,
q. 18 n. 3, XXVI,230;Wolter,
8 Scotus,
II d. 7 n. 11,XII, 386;Wolter,
218.
Sent.,
9 Scotus,
210.
Quodlibet,
q. 18 n. 3, XXVI,230;Wolter,
10Ibid.
11Ibid.

18:51:22 PM

ON THE DECALOGUE
SGOTUS

69

act by natureis apt to be in agreementwithits agent as well as to have

First,we can ask whetherthe act is approsomethingsuitedto itself."12
priate to the nature of the being performingit. For example, braying
would be appropriatefordonkeysbut not for humans. Second, we can
considerthe act as a substanceand ask whetherit has appropriateproperties.Does it involvethe rightobject (forexample,eatingshould involve
food,not stones),occur at the righttime and place, and so on?13
Accordingto Scotus, "the goodness in the act of an agent without
intellectand will is merelynatural."14However, the acts of agents with
intellectand will can possess moralas well as natural goodness. "Such
agents,"says Scotus, "are suited by nature to have an intrinsicrule of
rectitudefor theiractions. Only they can have an act whose goodness
is moral."15
In the followingpassage Scotus explains how moral goodness arises
fromnaturalgoodness:
... itis notenough
thattheagenthavetheability
toadjudicate
theappropriateness
ofhisacts.He mustactually
itoutin accord
passjudgment
upontheactandcarry
withthatjudgment.
Ifsomeone
is in error
andstillactsin accordwiththecorrect
ofanother,
he is notactingrighdy,
forby hisownknowledge
he was
judgment
meantto regulate
hisactions.
. . . Andso it appearsclearhowthemoralgoodness
oftheactliesin itssuitability
to theagent's
reason.16
judgedaccording
right
When a free,intelligentagent correctlyjudges that a potentialaction
would be naturallygood, and thenperformsit becauseshe has so judged,
that action becomes morallyas well as naturallygood.
In additionto its account of moral goodness,the passage just quoted
seems to contain an implicittheoryof moral obligationas well. Scotus
appears to hold that an agent is morallyobliged to performan action A
ifand onlyifthe agentjudges thatA would be "suitable"forher to perform.Because the intellectof each agentcreatesher own individual"rule
of rectitude,"
even the erringconsciencebinds.Clearly,Scotusis hereusing
an Aristotelian
model of moral obligationas rationalself-command.
One
owes it to oneself- not another- to followthe dictatesof rightreason.17
12Ibid.
13Scotusdoesnotspecify
thatan actcan"havesomething
whathe meansbysaying
suited
toitself."
I basemysuggestion
forwhathe meanson hislaterremarks
aboutthe
difference
between
"circumstantial"
and"generic"
moral
ofacts(Scotus,
Quodlibet
,
goodness
18n. 4-6,XXVI,231-7;Wolter,
q. 14
212-6).
Wolter
212.
Scotus,
Quodlibet
, q. 18 n. 4, XXVI:231,
15Ibid.
16Scotus,
212.
Quodlibet
, q. 18 n. 4-5,XXVI,231;Wolter,
17Therecanbelittle
thedictates
doubtthatforScotus,
oftheintellect
arereally
morally

18:51:22 PM

G.P. RAGLAND

70

If Scotus held such an account of moral obligation,thenhe musthave

believed that the rightis prior to the good. An act is morallygood just
in case it is morallyright(i.e., obligatory)for the agent to performit;
and it is morallyrightforthe agent to performit just in case the agent
judges it to be "suitable." Scotus would deny that an action could be
morallygood withoutalso being morallyrightor obligatory.
II. FailedInterpretations
A. Voluntarismabout SuitabilityRelations
Scotus' theoriesof secondarynaturalgoodness,moralgoodness,and moral
obligationall reston his fundamentalconvictionthatsome combinations
of substancesand propertiesare suitableor harmonious,while othersare
not. This suggeststhe firstway in which Scotus could be a voluntarist:
he could say thatin everycase, God freelydecides what sortsof actions
are suitable(or unsuitable)to human nature. Since moral goodnessand
lightnessdepend on our correctjudgementsabout natural goodness or
if all the standardsfor suitabilitydepend on God's will, then
suitability,
so will the standardsformoral goodness and lightness.
The followingremark,which I call the voluntarism
, may mean
principle
thatforScotus,God freelydeterminescreatures'standardsforsuitability:
itis willed
other
thanGodis goodbecause
byGod,andnotviceversa.18
Everything
Because this statementoccurs in a discussionof meritoriousgoodness
(goodnessthatleads to eternallifewithGod), it may not apply to natural
the passage is ambiguous.Even if it
or moral goodness.19Furthermore,
ways:
applies to naturalor moral goodness,it can do so in two different
is willed
otherthanGodis [actually]
goodbecauseit [i.e.,thething]
(1) Everything
[toexist]byGod,andnotviceversa.
is
is goodbecauseit [i.e.,goodness]
otherthanGod [quapossible]
(2) Everything
in thatthing]
willed[toinhere
byGod,andnotviceversa.

andof
oftheaction,
he saysthat"given
thenature
oftheagent,
Forexample,
binding.
to be performed
thatsuchan actionought
theobject,
oneimmediately
concludes
bythis
forthesakeofsuchan
andwanted
tobe chosen
agentforsuchan end,andthisitought
end"(myitalics;
Scotus,Quodlibet,
214).
q. 18 n. 6, XXVI,236-7;Wolter,
18Scotus,
16.
Ill d. 19 n. 7, XIV, 718;Wolter,
Sent.,
19RegaWoodpointed
to
ofattempts
Sheis skeptical
thisoutto mein conversation.
realmofmerit.
thetheological
extend
thescopeofthevoluntarism
principle
beyond

18:51:22 PM

SGOTUS
ON THE DECALOGUE

71

The firstreadingtakes the point of Scotus' remarkto be this:no possible finitenatureis so good that God is compelledto create it; thus,the
actual goodness of creaturesdepends on God's free will. Allan Wolter
adopts this readingwhen he says that "the statementcan only referto
real or actual existinggoodness."20Wolter's reading of the voluntarism
principleallows him to maintainthat when God surveyspossible subjects and attributesprior to creation,his intellectperceivesrelationsof
which springfromor are "demanded by"21
suitabilityand unsuitability
the possible thingsthemselves.AlthoughGod's justice requireshim "to
createa cosmosratherthan somethingbizarreor chaotic,"22
God remains
a
or
to
different
none
at
free create
cosmos,
all; thus the world's actual
naturalgoodness depends on God's will. On Wolter's reading,the voluntarismprincipledoes notimply that possible creatures'standardsof
perfection the same standardswhich determinenatural suitabilityor
unsuitabilitydepend on God's will.
Thomas Williams adopts the second reading of the voluntarism
principle,sayingthat "God is freeto create what he pleases, assignto his
creatures
thrstandards
as he pleases, and confersuch perfecofperfection
tionson themif he pleases."23On thisview,thereare no suitability
relations inherentin possible creaturesprior to God's free decision to put
themthere.
Williams'interpretation
faltersin the face of the followingpassage. In
his discussionof the suitability
that groundssecondarynaturalgoodness,
Scotus says:
. . . either
thissuitability
stems
from
thenature
oftheterms
or,ifitmustgenerally
be traced
backto thejudgment
ofsomeintellect
is themeasure
(sincetheintellect
ofsuitability),
willbe thatof. . . thedivine
this
intellect.
Indeedthisinteljudgement
so itknows
theharmony
ordislect,
justas itknows
every
perfectly
being,
perfectly
ofonething
withanother.24
agreement

20Wolter
1986,18.
21Scotus,
Sent..
IV d. 46 q. 1 n. 9, XX, 426;Wolter,
248.
22Wolter
1986,18.
23Myitalics;
Thomas
TheUnmitigated
at thePacific
Williams,
Scotus,
presented
Regional
of theSociety
of Christian
on April20, 1996at SeattlePacific
Meeting
Philosophers
Williams
thearticle
toappearin:Archiv
frGeschichte
derPhilosophie.
University.
expects
I willbe focusing
on Williams'
thatScotuswasa voluntarist
assertion
aboutsuitability
relations.
As thisquotation
Williams
thinks
thatScotuswasa voluntarist
about
suggests,
otherthings
as well,buttheseotheraspects
ofWilliams'
viewarebeyond
thescopeof
thispaper.
24Scotus,
210.
Quodlibet
, q. 18 n. 3, XXVI,231;Wolter,

18:51:22 PM

72

G.P. RAGLAND

Two featuresof thispassage cause troubleforWilliams' reading.

relationsto the activityof God's intelFirst,Scotus attributes
suitability
lect rather than God's will. If Scotus were really a voluntaristabout
suitabilityrelations,we would expect him to mentionGod's will in this
evidenceagainstWilliams'
passage. The factthat he does not constitutes
interpretation.
Williamsmightrespondas follows.In thispassage, Scotus tracessuitthat we must trace it
abilityback to God's intellectonly on thecondition
back to some intellector other.Therefore,thispassage may not be a full
statementof his positionon the originof suitability
relations.Scotus could
maintainthatpriorto the judgementof God's intellectdiscussedin this
passage, God's will freelydetermineswhat will be suitableto what.
featureofthispassagerulesout Williams'
However,the secondimportant
Scotus
that
possible response.
says
"suitabilitystems
fromthenatureof the
terms This means thatpropositionsabout suitability
are self-evident
and
analytic,and hence cannot be subject to God's will. Elsewhere,Scotus
says that "those propositionswhich are trueby reason of theirterms. . .
have theirtruthvalue prorto anyact ofthewill, or at least theywould be
true even if, to assume the impossible,no act of willingexisted."25The
contextof this passage makes it clear that Scotus intendsthis general
statementto apply even to God'swill. Therefore,therecould be no act
of the divine will prior to the divine intellect'sjudgementsabout suitabilityrelations.
Williamssuggeststhat Scotus's voluntarismabout the moral law stems
froma more fundamentalvoluntarismabout suitability
relations.AccordGod
to
determines
which
are
suitableto creing Williams,
freely
things
with
ated natures,and which not. However,Williamssuggestionconflicts
stemsfromthe naturesof terms(and is hence
Scotus' view thatsuitability
traced back to God's intellectratherthan God's will). Especiallysince
Wolter offersus a workablealternativereadingof the voluntarismprinabout
ciple, it seems implausibleto suppose thatScotus was a voluntarist
relationsin general.
suitability
B. Voluntarismabout Creation
Wolter's reading of the voluntarismprinciplesuggestsa second, very
different
way for Scotus to explain the contingencyof the second table.
Scotus mightmaintainthat the specificcontentof the second table arises
25Myitalics;
Ill d. 37 n. 4, XV, 786;Wolter,
274.
Scotus,
Sent.,

18:51:22 PM

SGOTUS
ON THE DECALOGUE

73

standardsintrinsicto human nature and is thus not

fromthe suitability
to
God's
will.
In otherwords,he mightsay that the followingis
subject
necessarilytrue: if humans exist,then they must obey the laws of the
second table. However, since God could have refrainedfrom making
If God had crehumans,the second table is in forceonly contingently.
ated some other rational creatures,there mighthave been a different
morallaw; but giventhathe made us, the decalogueis necessarilymorally
binding.
This interpretation
has a fatal flaw: it would make dispensationsimIf
it
were
reallynecessarythat any existinghumans must obey
possible.
the second table, then it would not be possiblefor God to suspend portionsof the second table while humans existed.God could take the second table out of forceonly by annihilatinghumanity.But accordingto
Scotus, Scriptureproves that God can take portionsof the second table
out of forceevenwhilehumansexist.He says:
... ifGod cannotcausethisact [ofkilling],
whichundersuchand suchcircumto be no longer
evenunderthesame
stances
wasformerly
prohibited,
- prohibited,
licit
butthathe didso is clearfrom
thenhe cannotmakekilling
circumstances,
instances.26
andin manyother
thecaseofAbraham
Since Scotus clearlyintendshis voluntarismto account forthe possibility
of dispensations,
he could not have been merelya voluntaristabout creation.Voluntarismabout suitability
relationsis too radical forScotus,but
voluntarismabout creationalone is not radical enough.
C. Direct Voluntarismabout ImperativeForce
How are we to explain Gos abilityto dispensefromthe second table
if suitabilityrelationsdo not depend on his will? FrederickCopleston
offersthe followingsuggestion:
an actofthedivine
Inasmuch
as thedivine
considered
as preceding
will,
intellect,
withhumannature,
and
theactswhichare in conformity
theeternal
perceives
in regard
morallawis constituted
to itscontent;
butit acquires
immutable
obligawill.27
force
thefreechoiceofthedivine
tory
onlythrough
The contentof the second table arisesfromhuman natureitselfand cannot be changed by God. So for example, on this reading a statement
like "it is suitableforhumans to refrainfromtheft"would be true from
26Scotus,
Sent.
274.
, III d. 37 n. 3, XV, 785;Wolter,
27Frederick
A History
toScotus
, Westminster,
, Vol. II: Augustine
ofPhilosophy
Copleston,
MD 1950,547.

18:51:22 PM

74

C.P. RAGLAND

the natures of the termsinvolved. However, such a statementcannot

morallybind us unless God so chooses, for "the divinewill is the fount
of obligation."28
fromtheft
Only a divinecommand can make refraining
than
God
can
morallyobligatory(rather
merelysuitable).
dispensefrom
any commandmentin the second table by changingor suspendinghis
commands.
Copleston'selegantreadingrestson a legitimateconceptualdistinction
betweenthe merelygood and the obligatory.The fact that we consider
some acts supererogatory
is proofthat the two conceptscome apart; we
consider such acts good, but not obligatory.Furthermore,Copleston's
does a good job of accountingfordispensations.Copleston
interpretation
artfully
explainswhy Scotus thoughtGod can change our moral obligations simplyby changinghis commands.
However,we saw in part one that Scotus does not separategoodness
and tightness;on his view, wheneveran agent knows that a certainact
is suitable,the agent is obliged to committhat act. No divinecommand
is necessaryto establishmoral obligation.Copleston'sinterpretation
contradictsScotus' own Aristotelianaccount of moral obligationas rational
.
self-governance
To make his interpretation
work,Coplestonmustdeny thata human's
own intellectcan issue "dictates"thatare trulymorallybinding.So he says:
The intellect
in thepractical
as in thespeculative
saysthatthisis trueor untrue,
andthough
it inclines
to actionofa certain
it doesnotdictate
that
sphere,
type,
oneought
to actin thatway.29
But as we have already seen, Scotus uses the word "ought" in connectionwiththe dictatesof individualrightreason.30
it is difficult
Furthermore,
to square Copleston'spictureof the intellectwith Scotus' claim that the
intellect'sdictatesprovidea moral "rule of rectitude"by whichthe individual is "meantto regulatehis actions."31If thejudgementsof my erring
consciencedo not tell me how I ought to act, then how can theybind
me (as Scotus says they can)? In his account of how the intellectturns
28Copleston
1950,547.
Ibid.
30Scotussays:"'to command,'
I say,couldonlypertain
or thewill"
to an appetite
TVd. 14q. 2 n. 5, XVIII,52; Wolter,
bothwrite
as if
andWolter
(Sent.,
27).Copleston
thisremark
ofobligation.
willis thefount
theviewthatthedivine
unequivocally
supports
it doesnot.It is seemscompatible
as a poswiththeideathateachhuman,
However,
sessor
ofappetite
andwill,as wellas intellect,
cancommand
herself.
5 Scotus,
212.
, q. 18 n. 4, XXVI,231;Wolter,
Quodlibet

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SGOTUS
ON THE DECALOGUE

75

merelynaturallygood acts into morallygood acts, Scotus strongly

suggests
thatthe individualintellectis the fountof moral obligation.And if it is,
Copleston'sreadingcannot be correct.
D. IndirectVoluntarismabout ImperativeForce
could be modifiedto accomHowever,Copleston'sgeneralinterpretation
modate Scotus' Aristotelianviews about obligation.On this new interpretation,moral obligationwould depend on God's will because moral
revelationalso depends on it.
Scotus
Accordingto this modificationof Copleston's interpretation,
thinksthat the human intellectcannot adequately determinewhat sorts
of action are suitableto human nature. Though our intellectshave the
Divine comauthorityto oblige us, theylack the necessaryinformation.
God
mands,such as thoseon the second table,providethatinformation.
is the fountof obligationin an indirectway because when he commands
but episus, he therebydisclosesthe factsto our morallyauthoritative,
temicallyweak, intellects.Though God does not freelydeterminewhich
behavior is suitable to human nature, he does freelydeterminewhich
behaviorwe knowto be suitable.We are obliged to obey the laws of the
second table only because God has freelyrevealed those laws to us.
It is not clear how this view would account for dispensations.Once
God has revealed some portionof moral realityto us througha comrevoke the command? Once we had
mand, how could he successfully
seen clearlywhymurderis unsuitable,for example, we would be in a
position to oblige ourselves
against murder for as long as our memory
lasted. Would God then have to erase our memoriesduringthe course
of a dispensation?
But even if this modificationof Copleston's view could explain dispensations,it would stillbe implausible.It has Scotus maintainthat
actsprohibited
to refrain
from
(A)we areobliged
ifGod
bythesecondtableonly
reveals
to us thatthosekinds
ofactsareunsuitable.
But Scotus clearlyalso believesthat
todo whatwebelieve
tobesuitable
(B) wearemorally
obligated
(evenifitis actually
andto refrain
from
whatwebelieve
to be unsuitable.
unsuitable),
So Scotus can hold both(A) and (B) only if he also thinksthat
cannotevenbelieve
divinerevelation,
humans
thatactslikemurder
(C) apartfrom
oradultery
arewrong.

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C.P. RAGLAND

Because (C) is obviouslyfalse, it seems uncharitableto attributeit to

Scotus. In the absence of divine revelation,we may never know for
certain
that murderand adulteryare wrong,but surelyit is at least posunder considerasible for us to believethem wrong. The interpretation
tion is implausiblebecause it must claim that Scotus believed (C).
We have consideredtwo attemptsto paint Scotus as a naturalistabout
about its imperativeforce.
the contentof the moral law but a voluntarist
Copleston maintainsthat Scotus was a "direct"voluntaristabout moral
obligation;however,Scotus' Aristoteliantheoryof moral obligationrules
of Copleston'spositiontries
out Copleston'ssuggestion.The modification
to derive voluntarismabout obligationfroma more basic voluntarism
also fails.
about moral revelation;but as we have seen, thisinterpretation
Because of his views about moral obligation,Scotus could not have been
a voluntaristabout the imperativeforce of the moral law withoutalso
being a voluntaristabout its content.
III. Voluntarism
abouttheSpecification
ofNaturalLaw
But how could Scotus be a voluntaristabout the contentof the second
- a voluntaristabout
table if he was not- as Williamssuggests
suitability
of actions
relationsin general?Note thatvoluntarismabout the suitability
mentionedby the second table simplydoes not entailvoluntarismabout
the suitabilityof everything.
Similarly,even if Scotus thoughtthat human
natureentailssomemoraltruthswhichare necessaryand hence not subject
maintainthat othermoral truths
to God's will, he could consistently
and specifically
those of the second table are freelyestablishedby God.
So we are not forcedto choose betweenthe extremesof Copleston'sand
via mediaby considWilliams'views. I will now develop thisinterpretive
ering Scotus' discussionof naturallaw.
Scotus claimsthatnatural
law,strictly
, is the set of all "firstpracspeaking
tical principlesknown fromtheir terms"32plus any statementsthis set
entails.Scotus' favoriteexample of a strictnaturallaw is "God oughtto
- the
be loved,"33
principleunderlyingthe firsttable of the decalogue
but he also seems to include statementslike "Humans ought to be
in thiscategory. The
or "communitiesoughtto be peaceful"35
healthy,"34
32Scotus,
276.
Sent,III d. 37 n. 5, XV, 825;Wolter,
33Scotus,
Ill d. 37 n. 6, XV, 826;Wolter,
276.
Sent.,
34Scotus,
210.
, q. 18 n. 1,XXVI,230;Wolter,
Quodlibet
35Scotus,
312.
IV d. 15 q. 2 n. 4, XVIII,257;Wolter,
Sent.,

18:51:22 PM

SCOTUSON THE DECALOGUE

77

sensebecause it contains
second table is part of naturallaw in an extended
truths
that
are
"immediatelyrecognizedby all to be in accord"36
practical
withthe strictnaturallaw. There are two ideas to clarifyhere: the notion
of harmonyor "accord" itself,and the requirementthat such harmony
be "immediatelyrecognizedby all."
Scotus seems to have two conceptionsof harmony:negativeand positive.Law A is in negative
with law B just in case both can be
harmony
satisfiedat the same time.37Law A is in positive
withlaw B just in
harmony
of law A is a means to the satisfaction
case satisfaction
of law B. Scotus
seems to be describingpositiveharmonyin the followingpassage:
lawthatlifein a community
Giventheprinciple
ofpositive
or stateoughtto be
it doesnotfollow
thisnecessarily
thateveryone
from
peaceful,
oughtto havepossessions
distinct
from
thoseofanother,
forpeacecouldreign
in a group
. . . evenif
wascommon
Notevenin thecaseoftheinfirm
is private
everything
property.
possession
an absolute
thatsuchpersons
havetheir
ownpossesnevertheless,
necessity;
sionsis exceedingly
withpeaceful
consonant
fortheinfirm
caremoreabout
living,
. . . Anditis thisway,perownthanthey
do aboutcommon
goodsoftheir
property
thereis someoneprinciple
whichserves
laws,foralthough
haps,withall positive
as thebasisforestablishing
theselaws,stillpositive
lawsdo notfollow
withsimple
from
in question
theprinciple
. . . Nevertheless,
theseexplications
[logical]
necessity
in harmony
aregready
withthefirst
universal
principle
theyclarify.38
Strictnaturallaw, which containsthe principlesof positivelaw, is somewhat vague: in many cases, it permitsmore than one course of action.
A principlelike "humans ought to live in a peaceful society"does not
entail "thou shalt not steal," where 'steal' means "take the propstrictly
of
erty another."Instead,it entailsa lengthyconjunctionof conditional
statements:"If you live in social arrangementA (e.g. one with private
you oughtnot X (e.g. steal), and if you live in social arrangeproperty),
mentB, you oughtnot Y, etc." If we do not findourselvesin a specific
social arrangement,
the realm of permissableaction is quite large.
A legitimatepoliticalauthorityclarifies
or explicates
the strictnaturallaw
by settingup a specificsocial arrangement.By trimmingdown the large
number of naturallypermissibleoptions to a manageable list, positive
laws make coordinatedsocial activitypossible; such specificlaws are in
positiveharmonywith the strictnatural law because when we satisfy
36Scotus,
Sent,
262.
., IV d. 17 n. 1,XVIII,504;Wolter,
37Scotussaysthatsome
lawsare "consonant
withthelawofnature
in the
positive
sensethattheyarenotopposed
to it"(Scotus,
IV d. 17 n. 4, XVIII,505;Wolter,
Sent.,
264).
SMyitalics;
Sent
280.
Scotus,
., Ill d. 37 n. 8, XV, 827;Wolter,

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C.P. RAGLAND

them,we also satisfythe more generalnaturallaw. We can furtherdisand conventional

positiveharmony.
tinguishbetweenmaximizing
In the passage above Scotus suggeststhatlaws enforcingprivatepropertyrightsare likelyto maximize human compliance with the natural
law's injunctionto live peacefully.We can imagine many different
systems of positivelaw that could explicate a particularnatural law, but
some of thesewould be easier forus to obey than others.A positivelaw
with a given naturalrequirementjust in
is in maximizing
harmony
positive
case thereare no alternativepossiblelaws thatwould be easier to obey.
This sortof harmonystemsfromfeaturesof both human psychologyand
thepositivelaw. If God wishedto altera givenlaw's degreeof maximizing
harmony,God would have to change human psychologyin some way.
is constituted
Conventional
by the will of a legitimatelawharmony
positive
for
The
law
theft,
example,is in conventionalpositive
giver.
prohibiting
God (the King of the Unilaw
because
with
the
strict
natural
harmony
verse)has so willed it. Accordingto the strictnaturallaw, God oughtto
be loved. ThereforeGod ought to be obeyed. So if God issues a law
(call it X), there is positiveharmonybetweenX and the strictnatural
law- specifically,
betweenX and the requirementthatGod be loved; for
ifwe obey X, we also obey, and thuslove, God. In such a case, the positive harmonyis conventionalbecause it does not arise fromanything
intrinsicto X. God could have issued a different
positivelaw Y instead,
and if God had done so, Y would be in positiveharmonywiththe strict
naturallaw, but X would not.
We are now in a positionto see how Scotus could maintainthat the
contentof the second table- and hence it's obligatoryforce
dependson
God's will. Scotus could maintainthat God is givena verygeneralmoral
law by human nature,but is freeto clarifyor explicateit in a number
of different
ways. Scotus offershis account of the relationbetweenpositive and natural law (quoted at lengthabove) in an attemptto clarify
his positionon the relationbetweenthe secondtableand the (strict)natural law; so he appears to thinkthat the second table resemblespositive
naturallaw.
law in this respect:both clarifyor explicateself-evident
Prior to creation God looks at human nature qua possible,and sees
thatthisnaturedemandsvariousthings:it oughtto have health,forexample, and it ought to live in a peaceful society.So God sees a general,
strictnatural law for humans, but God also sees that a whole host of
specificmoralcodes are in negativeharmonywiththatnaturallaw. When
God sets up a specificmoral code, he must choose fromamong these
negativelyharmoniousoptions. For if he commanded us to violate our

18:51:22 PM

SCOTUSON THE DECALOGUE

79

own natures,he would be withholdingfromus the sort of environment

that our naturesdemand; and Scotus clearlythinksthat such withholding would be unjustof God.39
When God picksone of the specificlaws and issuesit as a command,
he establishesconventionalpositiveharmonybetween that specificlaw
and the self-evident
principlethat God ought to be loved. Once God
makesperforming
a particularaction a means to lovinghim,human reason then sees that action as uniquely suitable to human nature,40and
thus obligatory.
So the second table is clearlyin harmonywithnaturallaw in at least
twodifferent
senses.It is in negativeharmonywiththe demandsof human
nature,and it is in conventionalpositiveharmonywith the requirement
thatwe love God. Must it also be in maximizingpositiveharmonywith
the demandsof human nature?
I suspectthat Scotus would say "Yes," forit mightseem inconsistent
fora generousGod to impose a specificlaw thatis harderto obey than
it need be. However,this raises a worry.If God, due to his faithfulness
to himself,must establishspecificlaws that are in maximizingpositive
harmonywith human nature'sdemands,then if the second table alone
turnsout to have such harmony,the second table would not be contingent afterall. However, Scotus says nothingto suggestthat maximizing
positiveharmonyis a featureof only one specificlaw. Thus, he might
thinkthat even if God is limitedto pickinga law that is relativelyeasy
to obey, God would stillhave more than one option.
What does Scotus mean when he says that the harmonybetweenthe
strictand extendednaturallaw is "immediatelyrecognizedby all"? This
could mean two different
things:(1) the harmonywould be evidentto
the denizensof all possibleworlds,or (2) the harmonyis evidentacross
all culturesand times in the actualworld. All three types of harmony
(negative,maximizingpositive,and conventionalpositive)could be evident in the second way, but conventionalpositiveharmonycould not be
evidentin the firstway. Because I thinkthat Scotus has conventional
positiveharmonyforemostin mind when he discussesthe contingencyof
the second table,I thinkthat he is only concernedwithharmonyin the
actual world.
39Scotus,
Sent.
248.
, IV d. 46 n. 9, XX, 425-6;Wolter,
w lhis is true
knowthatGod hasissuedvanouscommands.
Scotus
onlyii humans
- perhaps
tothink
seems
thateveryone
knows
thedecalogue
itis "prescribed
because
intein theheartofeveryone"
Ill d. 37 n. 14,XV, 851;Wolter,
riorly
(Sent.,
286).

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G.P. RAGLAND

My reading of "immediatelyrecognizedby all" coheres with Scotus'

belief that "whateverpertainsto the law of nature,eitherproperlyor
- in other
is uniform"41
words,not varyingacross culturesor
extensively,
over time.As I understandhim, Scotus thinksthat the second table has
been the moral law for everybodyfromthe moment of creation,and
will remain so forever;its conventionalpositiveharmonywith the strict
moral law is unchangingand hence evidentto all. However,because the
moral order
, God could have set up a different
harmonyis conventional
prior to creation.
On thisreadingof Scotus, thereis only one difference
betweennatural law in the extended sense- such as the second table- and divine
positivelaw: naturallaw is uniform,but divinepositivelaw is not. Ritual requirementsare the best example of divine positivelaw, because
God firstdemanded animal sacrifice,but now requireseucharisticceremony. Any law made by humans is also subject to change, and is thus
positivelaw.42
But here is a problem. I have explained how for Scotus, the moral
law could have been otherwise.But I stillhaven't explained the possibilityof dispensations.If the second table must hold at all times and
places in order to count as naturalratherthan divinepositivelaw, then
how can God dispensefromit? We can overcomethisproblemby modifyingthe criterionforwhat makes a law "uniform."Rather than saying
that uniformlaws are inforceat all timesand places, perhaps we should
law. This
say that uniformlaws are notsubjectto replacement
by a different
would allow God to dispense from the second table by temporarily
repealingit, but thenputtingit back into effect.Divine positivelaws can
not only be suspended,but actuallyreplaced.
resemblesCopleston's to some extent.On my acMy interpretation
count,we are obliged to obey the second table because we are obliged
to love God; so God is in some sense a source of obligation.However,
my account, unlikeCopleston's,does not requireScotus to abandon his
Aristotelianaccount of moralityas a formof self-governance.
On the
model I attributeto Scotus,one does not owe obediencedirectlyto God;
instead,one owes it to oneselfto followrightreason's supremedictate:
"God ought to be loved."
In section two, I surveyedfour failed interpretations.
Of the four,
41Scotus,
IV d. 17 n. 4, XVIII,505;Wolter,
264.
Sent.,
42Scotus,
Sent
262-4.
., IV d. 17 n. 4, XVIII,505;Wolter,

18:51:22 PM

SCOTUSON THE DECALOGUE

81

Williams' and Copleston's were the most plausible. Williams' interpretationfailsbecause Scotus could not have been a voluntaristabout all
relations(thoughhe was a voluntarist
about someof them),and
suitability
- as he
fails
Scotus
did
not
because
suggests hold a straightCopleston's
forwarddivinecommandtheoryof moral obligation.However,as I have
shown,Coplestonwas nearlyright:even with his Aristoteliantheoryof
moral obligation,Scotus could consistentlygive divine commands an
what human reason sees as obligatory.
importantrole in determining
New Haven, Connecticut
Yale University
REFERENCES
A History
toScotus
, VolumeII: Augustine
, Westminster,
Frederick,
ofPhilosophy
Copleston,
MD 1950
omnia
Ioannes
DunsScotus,
, Paris(Vivs)1891-1895
Opera
in:Archiv
derPhilosopie
TheUnmitigated
Scotus
furGeschichte
Thomas,
, forthcoming
Williams,
AllanB.,DunsScotus
ontheWillandMorality
D.C. 1986
, Washington,
Wolter,

18:51:22 PM

and theTrinity
Scotuson theConsistency
of theIncarnation
ALLANBCK

Here I shall investigatehowJohn Duns Scotus shows the doctrinesof

This has a primaryimportance.
theIncarnationand theTrinityconsistent.
of religiousdoctrinehas a logical and
For the problemof the consistency
its claims to
even a psychologicalpriority:if a doctrineis inconsistent,
truthhave vanished,and it matterslittlehow its assertionsmay be analyzed;forthe believerand the potentialconvertthe incoherenceof a doctrinepresentsa greatif not sufficient
reason not to hold it. The medieval
of
were
well
aware
and devoted much effortto show
this,
theologians
such paradoxicaldoctrinesas the Incarnationand the Trinityare consistent. Here I shall deal withthe attemptsof Scotus,whose views certainly
dominatedCatholic theologyat least untilthe Renaissance. As we shall
see, the doctrinesof the Incarnationand the Trinitygo togethernaturallyhere,as Scotus attemptsto show both consistentthroughusingreduplicativequalifications.
Reduplicativepropositionsare thosepropositionsthathave a qualifying
later
phrasewitha connectorlike 'insofaras.5 As the term'reduplicative5
on came to name a certainlogical typeof such propositions,I shall use
to denote any propositionhaving such a qualification.1
'qua proposition5
As earlyas the firstChurchCouncils,qua propositionsassumeda great
importance.For Christian doctrine generates a great need to specify
different
respects:it assertsthat only a single God exists,while at the
same time it maintainsthat there are three divine Persons,the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit; again it claims that the incarnateChrist is per'
1 'Qua' without
is an instance.
italics
is thegeneric
ofwhich
connective,
qua,' initalics,
I shallbe discussing
ofform,
"S is P qua M."
qua propositions
Alltranslations
ofScotusaremine.I haveusedtheOpera
ed. Lyon1639;repr.
Omnia,
Hildesheim
Pariensis
1968;OpusOxoniense
[= Rep.].The pagesnumbers
[= Ox.];Reportata
totheLyonedition
inbrackets
hasnotprogaregiven
after
thecitation.
TheBalieedition
ressed
toBookThree.AlsoQuaestiones
I havealsoconsulted
where
Quodlibetales
[- Quodl.],
theAlluntis
to Hester
edition
thishasbeentranslated
as:
Gelber;
(Madrid1968),thanks
GodandCreatures
F. Alluntis
& A. Wolter,
Princeton
, trans.
1975,andI shallrefer
parento thetranslations
there
whenavailable.
thetically
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vwarium
36,1

18:51:30 PM

84

ALLANBCK

divine,but has these two naturesin a single

fectlyhuman and perfectly
substance.These two doctrines,the Trinityand the Incarnation,evoke
manyparadoxes: God is one and three;the Fatheris and is not identical
to the Son; Christboth is createdand uncreated;Christcan and cannot
sufferpain. Some medieval theologianstried to resolve these apparent
contradictionsthroughspecifyingdifferent
respectsin which the inconsistentpredicatesare true. That is, they used what came to be called
The quesreduplicativepropositionsto tryto resolvethe inconsistencies.
tion then arose: do these qua propositionsin fact resolvethe inconsistlike "God is one and
encies,or do theyimplythe simplecontradictions,
not one" and "Christis created and not created"?
In thispaper I wish to investigatewhatJohn Duns Scotus does on this
topic. As Scotus oftenproceedsby reactingto and amendingthe viewsof
Thomas Aquinas, I shall begin with a summaryof Aquinas' views,and
then proceed to examine how Scotus modifiesand emends them.I shall
claim thatScotus has a new view of qualification,
one, if not inventedby
him,at least stressedand developedby him. Indeed, I shall concludethat
his view of reduplicationappears to offera bettersolutionof problemsof
the Incarnationand the Trinitythan that of Aquinas; indeed it is plausible even today.
Aquinason theIncarnation
In an earlier article,I have presentedand critiquedAquinas' views
on the Incarnation.My main concern therewas whetherhe has shown
and
the doctrineto be consistent.2
For, if the doctrinewere inconsistent,
we came to be aware of that,therewould be no pointin worrying
about
whetherthe doctrineis true or whetherwe should accept it. Aquinas
himselfhas this attitude,and clearlyseparatesthe issues of consistency,
and truthin theologicaldoctrine.3Indeed, recentlysome
or intelligibility
like
theologians, Hans Kung, seem to have feltcompelledto renouncethe
orthodoxdoctrineof the Incarnation,because they find that doctrine,
takenliterally,
to be inconsistent.4
So, my main concern,withthe consistof
view
of
has presentrelevancetoo.
the
Incarnation,
ency Aquinas'
2 AllanBck,Aquinas
ontheIncarnation
56/2(1982),12.
, in:The NewScholasticism,
3 Summa
to be conhasbeenshown
Contra
Gentiles
[CG]IV.1.10.Oncethedoctrine
andanalogy,
to seektograspit,viametaphor
sistent,
Aquinas
saysthatitis appropriate
Summa
Theologiae
[ST] I.q39.a7.r.
4 David
theneglect
oftheseconTheDivine
Brown,
, La Salle1985,223,laments
Trinity

18:51:30 PM

ANDTRINITY
ON INCARNATION
SGOTUS

85

In effect,
my positionon Aquinas was, and is, simple:he failsto show
thatthe orthodoxdoctrineof the Incarnationis consistent.
As I have said, earlyon in Church councils,it was recognizedthatthe
dual nature of Christ generatedapparent contradictions:man is finite,
suffers
pain, is a creature,has a beginningto life,while God is infinite,
does not sufferpain (is impassible),is not a creature,does not have a
beginningto life; but Christ is both man and God. So belief in the
Incarnationlooked incoherent.The way out of this difficulty,
adopted
in the AthanasianCreed and endorsedby medievalscholastics,following
the lead of Peter Lombard, was to specifydifferent
respects:Christqua
man is a creature,while Christqua God is not a creature.5
Aquinas was squarelyin this tradition.Indeed, when commentingon
Lombard'sSentences
, he had to takedefinitestandson whethersuch propoboth
the
sitions,
simpleand the qualified,were true or not. This project
had to be avoided,while
had definitestandardsforsuccess:contradiction
man"
God and perfectly
the orthodoxposition,thatChristwas "perfectly
and possessedfullyall thoseattributes
properto each, had to be affirmed.
Thus whatI said in mypaper was simple:Aquinas failedin his attempt,
as Scotus was to recognizeand demonstrate.In order to show the doctrineof the Incarnationconsistent,
once the move fromthe simpleto the
qualifiedpropositionsis taken,thereneeds to be an analysisof the inference patternsof those qualifiedpropositions.For the qualifiedpropositionstoo mightimplya contradiction.This requirement,thoughtimely
today,is not anachronistic:medieval philosophersspent a great deal of
time analyzingqua propositionswith this end in mind.
Now I claimed thatAquinas offerstwo such analyses:6(A) Sometimes
. Here "Christ qua man is a
he analyzes those propositionsspecificatively
creature"is supposedto have the same logicalformas "an Africanis white
withrespectto his teeth"or "Socrates is curlywith respectto his hair."
In specificative
Such propositionswere traditionallycalled specificative.
ad
the
secundum
inference
(from"S qua M is
quid simpliciter
propositions
P" to "S is P") is invalid.So, taken specificatively,
"Christqua man is a
in thetheology
ofthemodern
andfundamensistency
period,
bybothatheists
problems
inwhat
talists.
these
issues
haveimportance,
fornoonewillbelieve
But,as Aquinas
notes,
Brownproceeds
to "prove"consistency
of
theyfindto be unintelligible.
Unfortunately,
doctrines
Cf.pp. 245-6.
bymaking
analogies!
5 Modern
in favor
Protestants
tendto reject
thisapproach,
ofa kenotic
understanding
oftheIncarnation.
Fora summary
ofthehistory
ofthedogmaoftheIncarnation,
see
DavidBrown,
TheDivine
cit
., n. 4), 224-39.
Trinity
(op.
6 AllanBck,
ontheIncarnation
, 135-42.
Aquinas

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ALLANBCK

creature"and "Christqua God is not a creature"can both be true,and

not implythe contradiction,"Christis a creatureand not a creature."
However,anotherfeatureof specificative
propositionsis thatthe qualification shiftsthe referenceof subject term:so, it is not the Ethiopianwho
is white; rather,the Ethiopian's teeth are white. Likewise,it would not
be Christwho is a creaturebut the complexobject,Christqua man. But
then Christwould not be perfectlyGod and perfectlyman; ratherone
part or aspect of Christ would be God, and another would be man.
However,ChristHimselfneed not be both man and God. Likewise,the
Ethiopian himselfneed not be white,althoughhis teethare white,and
certainlyhe is not both whiteand black. So the specificative
analysisfails
to show the consistencyof the orthodoxdoctrineof the Incarnation.For
it has the effectof makingthe human Christand the divine Christinto
two independentthings,and so not preservinga single substance.As
Aquinas himselfsays elsewhere,if humanitybelongs to Christaccidentally,then Christwould be two things.7
Aquinas seems to have recognizedthisobjection,and so comparesthe
propositionsabout Christ ratherto propositionslike "Socrates is curly
withrespectto his hair" and "Socratesis snub withrespectto his nose,"
where the secundum
inferencelooks valid, at least when
quid ad simpliciter
the simpleproposition,"Socrates is curly,"is taken figuratively.8
Now it is importantto note that Aquinas' solutionrequiresthat such
statements
be takenfiguratively
and not literally.For if "Socratesis curly"
is literallytrue, and the propositionsabout Christ are likewiseliterally
in describingChrist.
true,then thisanalysiswill not avoid contradictions
For then,just as "Socratesis curlyin the hair; therefore
Socratesis curly"
so
too
"Christ
man
is
a
Christ
is a creature"
follows,
creature;therefore
qua
and "Christqua God is not a creature;therefore
Christis not a creature"
follow,and the contradictionremains.
Thus Aquinas seeksto avoid thisconsequenceby claimingthatpropositionslike "Socrates is curly"are not literallytrue,but only figuratively.
For, strictly
speaking,all of Socrates is not curly;only a part of him is.
The advantageof thispositionis thatthe simpleclaim thatChristis man
and has human propertieswould be true. However, as I have argued,
this analysisdoes not suffice:Christwould stillnot be perfectlya man;
human beings are not figuratively
or only partiallyfinite.Once again,
Christis not perfectly
literally a man.
7 S7~III.ql7.a2.r.
ST III.ql6.a8.See Aristotle,
VII.5 forthebasisforthisdoctrine.
Metaphysics

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analysisof the qualifiedpropo(B) Aquinas sometimesuses a different

secundum
.9
the
inferenceis
the
Here
sitions,
quid ad simpliciter
reduplicative
valid, strictlyspeaking.But then the doctrineof the Incarnationwould
not be saved frominconsistency.
Aquinas howevermakes a distinction:
the qualifiedpropositionmay be read as "S insofaras it is M is P" or
as "S insofaras it is this M is P," accordingto whetherthe 'M' term
be taken concretely('this M') or abstractly('being M').10 Because of the
speakingthe abstractreadpredicateposition,Aquinas holds that strictly
is
for
the
former
useful
holds.
Still
reading
ing
explainingthe truthof,
man
is
as
"Christ
is
this
"Christ
God"
man, and that man is
qua
e.g.,
will
the reduplicativeanalysispreventthe
God." But on neitherreading
claims,"Christqua man is a creature"and "Christqua man is not a creature,"fromleading to a contradiction.For they stillwill imply "Christ
is a creatureand not a creature."
So, Aquinas eitherdoes not eliminatethe apparent contradictionsin
the doctrineof the Incarnation(B), or does so at the cost of splitting
Christinto discrete,disjointparts,His humanityand His divinity,and
then attributing
propertiesto those parts and not to Christsimplyand
literally(A). So, I concluded,Aquinas mightsave the Incarnationfrom
but only at the cost of not havinga simple,singlesubject
inconsistency,
that is both perfectlyGod and man. But this cost looks too great for
orthodoxChristianity.
TheIncarnation:
theSpecificative
Analysis
In his discussionof the Incarnation Scotus followsand yet emends
Aquinas in showingthe doctrine'sconsistency.He rejectsthe reduplicativeanalysis,as not resolvingthe contradiction,
and acceptsa specificative
one. However, he has a differentspecificativeanalysis,which avoids
some of the problemsthatAquinas' analysishas. As I shall show, Scotus
modifiesAquinas' specificative
analysisin twoways:(1.1)he makesa better
analogyforhow the unqualifiedpropositionshould be true,when taken
figuratively;
(1.2)he modifiesthelogicalanalysisof specificative
propositions
in general,so thatthe qua phraseis attachedto the predicate,as opposed
to the subject.(Note thatScotus oftenoffersmore than one possiblesolution to the same problem,and thatfrequently
enough the alternativeshe
offersare not congruentwith one another.)
9 Sentences
III X.1.1.3.
10ST III.ql6.all.

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Scotus has an extendeddiscussionof the senses in which "Christis a

creature,""Christis created,"and "Christis not a creature"are true.11
I pass over this,as it does not pertaindirectlyto the questionof the consistencyof the Incarnation,nor to the use of reduplicativepropositions
in his theology.Sufficeit to say, then, that he holds that "Christis a
creature"is, strictlyspeaking,withoutqualification,false. He does hold
that Christcan be born, die, and have a human naturewithoutbeing a
creature.It is true that Christis a man, and man is a creature,he says.
However thismeans only that human natureis a creatureand Christis
a man, having human nature,and not that this man, Christ,is a creature.12At best,then,Scotus admitsthat Christis a creatureis true only
and not literally.
figuratively
thatChristis not a creature,he seems
But if Scotus insiststoo strongly
to rob Christ of His humanity.So he does affirmthe positionin the
Creed and in Lombard's Sentences
, that "Christin virtueof the factthat
He is [a] man is a creature."But this qualificationmatterslittleif the
inferenceis valid. For thenit would followthat
secundum
quidad simpliciter
Christis a creature.Then Scotus would have not saved the doctrineof
the Incarnationfrominconsistency.
Scotus then needs to qualifythe statementsabout Christ'sbeing and
not being withqualificationsthat do not permitthe secundum
quidad simthe
he
needs
to
introduce
at
same
inference
be
valid.
to
Yet,
time,
pliciter
mere
accident
of
make
human
nature
into
a
do
not
that
qualifications
the IncarnateChrist.
Now Scotus recognizesthe two standardtypesof qua propositions:the
on the reduplicative,that inferenceis
reduplicativeand the specificative:
of
Incarnation
and
the
doctrine
inconsistent;on the specificative,
valid,
the doctrineis shown consistentas the inferenceis invalid. Not surprisingly,Scotus concludes that "Christ qua man is a creature"should be
understoodspecificatively:
is falsefrom
theopposition
... I saythatwhenan affirmative
(;repugnan
proposition
elimnot
a
that
does
of
the
it
will
never
be
verified
determination
tia
terms,
)
through
doesnotdiminish
inatethisopposition.
it;
But,'insofar
as,'whenaddedto a term,
what[was]before,
however
itmaysignify:
therefore
itdoesnoteliminate
therefore,
in virtue
"Christ
ofthefactthathe is a manis a
if"Christ
is a creature"
is false,
thatdistorts
is addedto an extreme
creature"
willbe false.Butifsomething
(discannow
wasa virtual
thatformerly
it,itmaybe thata proposition
tratiti)
opposition
11Rep.III.XI [Vol.XI, 458a-460a]
.
12Here
nameusedabstracdy
between
a concrete
Scotusis usingAquinas'distinction
andoneusedconcretely.

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89

is white,"
there
is a virtual
But
be true.E.g.,ifitis said,"an Ethiopian
opposition.
oftheteeth,"
there
is addeda determination
"heis white
invirtue
diminbysaying
butnotin respect
in respect
ofthewhole,
ofthepart.Butif
thepredicate
ishing
in virtue
"an Ethiopian
is white,
ofthefactthathe has
from
thatit be inferred,
in question,
'creature'
thatis improper
in someway.So, in theproposition
teeth,"
is opposed
is a creato'Christ,'
and,ifitis added[ontoso as toget]"Christ
simply
ofthefactthatHe is a man,"heretheopposition
turein virtue
is noteliminated,
in virtue
unlessit is understood
as: Christ
ofmanis a creature,
andso saysthe
inhistext,
invirtue
ofman,i.e.,invirtue
ofhumanMaster
thatChrist
[Lombard]
notas wesaythatbodyis seeninvirtue
ofcolor,sinceherethere
ity,is a creature;
is nodistortion,
Christ
invirtue
ofhumanity
is a creature.
butbysaying:
'Creature,'
as itis predicated
here,is distorted.13
Here Scotus basicallyadopts the approach of Aquinas et al. In "Christ
or
qua man is a creature,"the qua phrase can be taken reduplicatively
If
taken
the
can
be
specificatively.
reduplicatively, qua phrase
validly
dropped,and hence the qua propositionis false,since "Christis a creature" is false. If taken specificatively,
"Christqua man is a creaturecan
be true,while "Christis a creature"is false.Hence Scotus takesthe qua
and compares it to "the Ethiopian is
propositiontaken specificatively,
whitein virtueof his teeth."This is Aquinas' firstsolution(A). But already
Scotus has found this solution"improper"and seeks a betteranalogue
forChrist'sIncarnationthan the Ethiopian'steeth.
(1.1)Like Aquinas,Scotus proceedsto offeranothersolution,or at least
offera better analogy, by introducingsynecdoche. He speaks of the
case, where the whole can be trulydescribed,loosely,by an
"figurative"
13Rep.III.dll.n2[Vol. XI, 460b]:"Ad secundam
dicoquodquando
quaestionem
affirmativa
falsaestex repugnantia
verificabitur
terminorum,
propositio
numquam
per
determinationem
nonauferentem
illamrepugnantiam.
Sed,inquantum
, additum
termino,
nondiminuii
nonaufert
si haecestfalsa,
ipsum:
igitur
quinsignificet,
quodprius:igitur
Christus
estcreatura
secundum
estcreatura
: tamensi aliquid
, istaeritfalsa.Christus
quodhomo,
addatur
licetprius
fuerit
extremo,
virtualis,
quoddistrahit
ipsum,
repugnantia
potest
propositioessevera:ut si dicatur:
estalbus
tamensic
, hicestrepugnantia
virtualis,
Aethiops
estalbussecundum
dentes
determinatio
diminuens
dicendo,
, additur
praedicatum
respectu
nonautemrespectu
Tamensi ex hacinferatur,
estalbus,secuntotius,
partis.
Aethiops
dumquodhabetdentes,
istaestaliquomodoimpropria.
Sic in proposito,
creatura
simetsi additur,
Christus
estcreatura
secundum
Christo,
pliciter
rpugnt
quodhomo;adhuc
nonaufertur
nisisicintelligitur,
Christus
secundum
hominem
estcreatura,
repugnantia,
et sic dicitMagister
in litera,
secundum
hoc est,secundum
hominem,
quodChristus
estcreatura;
nonsicutdicimus
secundum
humanitatem,
colorem,
quodcorpusvidetur
sedsicdicendo,
Christus
secundum
humanitatem
estcreatura;
quiaibinonestdistractio:
creatura
distrahitur."
, uthicpraedicatur,
Cf.Ox.IILdll.a2.n2[Vol.VII.l, 246]:"...si secundum
quodhomo
accipiatur
proprie
neutrum
et ita nontollitur
eorumdistrahitur,
. . . Secundum
reduplicative,
repugnantia
autemquodspecificai,
sivedistrahit,
utnotetcreationem
secundum
ipsumpraedicatum,
concedi:
tamensitimpropria
..."
, sicpotest
quid
quamvis

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attributebelonging strictlyto its proper part, like 'curly.' Yet he has

qualms with this analogy too:
invirtue
oftheprinin thewholeprecisely
arenaturally
... I saythatsomethings
or in virtue
ofall theparts,
areso in virtue
whileothers
cipalpart,likecurliness,
onepartdenomiofthemoreprincipal
mode,whatdenominates
parts.In thefirst
natesthewhole.Butin thesecondmode,or in thethird,
[itholds]onlyifitis in
in all
is naturally
or mostofthem.Butnowifhealth
it in virtue
ofall theparts,
fortheheart,14
ifthatis taken
inthechest,
butprincipally
theparts,
butnotequally,
in equalmeasure,
since
in manyonesprincipally
since,ifitwerenaturally
simply
couldbe in thesame
in another,
contraries
health
canbe in onepart,andsickness
absolutely.
suppositum
thatfrom
thefactthat
... it seems,ifit shouldsolvedspeaking
namely
literally,
wouldhave
itsbeinginsucha part,thechest
from
is inthewholefollows
something
is in it,it is notcomas theprincipal
to be understood
part,suchthat,ifhealth
which
thewholecanbe denominated.
thatsickness
is in another
part,from
possible
ifHe be a
ofhumanity,"
in virtue
is a creature
Butin thepresent
case,"Christ
oneofthatChrist,
in anymode,andifthatpartis notthemoreprincipal
creature
is a creature,
thenit cannotbe arguedfromthisthatChrist
justas thatmanis
is in something
that
creature
can
but
be
in
virtue
of
his
chest,
[it
argued]
healthy
inthewhole
intrinsic
insomething
health
is really
intrinsic
inChrist,
justas [where]
from
that.15
theother
from
part,thewholemaynotbe denominated
Here Scotus begins to emend Aquinas' view. He begins to move away
fromAquinas' analogies of the Ethiopian's teeth and curlinessto one
where the aspect distinguished
by the qua phrase has a more essential,
its
connection
to
subjectand where the attributeis true,literally
organic
of the simplesubject.Scotus sees such a connection
and not figuratively,
in examples like "Socrates is healthyin virtueof his chest/heart."For
14Scotuscorrects
hereAristotle's
physiology.
15Rep.III.qll.n3[Vol.XI, 460b-461a]:
dicoquodaliquanata
"Adaliud5. Physicorum
sicutcrispitudo;
inessetotisecundum
suntpraecise
aliquaverosecunpartem
principlem,
vel secundum
dumomnespartes,
partes.Primomodo,quoddenominat
principaliores
nonnisiinsitsecundum
denominat
totum.
Sed secundo
unampartem,
modo,veltertio,
non
velplures;nuncautemsi sanitasnataestinesseomnibus
omnespartes,
partibus,
si accipitur
sedprincipaliter
tamen
thoraci,
procorde:quiasi nataessetinesse
aequaliter,
alteri
cumunipartipossitinessesanitas,
inessemultis
aequeprincipaliter,
simpliciter
absolute.
contraria
inesseeidemsupposito
simulpossent
infirmitas,
sedde re,cum
noncuratde Logicain ilioexemplo,
Vel aliter
dico,quodAristoteles
sivenon;videsivedenominet
hocest,realiter
dicitaliquidtripliciter
totum,
inest,
moveri,
vocis,quodex hoc,quodinesttaliparti,
quod
tur,si debeatsalvalide virtute
sequitur
non
cuisi inestsanitas,
inesttoti,oportet
intelligat
partem
principlem,
quodperthoracem
Sedin
denominali.
totum
a qua potest
inestalicuiparti,
estcompossibile
quodinfirmitas
et
si quoquomodositcreatura,
estcreatura
secundum
Christus
humanitatem,
proposito:
ideononpotest
istaparsnonestprincipalior
arguiex hoc,quodChristus
ipsiusChristi,
inestalicui
sedquodcreatura
secundum
estcreatura,
sicutquodhomosanatur
thoracem,
in toto,licet
inestalicuiintrinseco
ex aliapartesanitas
in Christo,
sicutrealiter
intrinseco
denominali."
totum
ab iliononpossit
Cf.Ox.IILd2.n3[Vol.VII.l, 460b-461a].

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91

not onlycan the part,the heart,be literallyhealthy,but so can the whole

body. Yet, given that the heart is that part whose state of health determines,principally,the state of the whole organism,the whole body is
healthyin virtueof its heart.
such a typeof qua
Indeed Albertthe Great had alreadydistinguished
and
determination.16
too
had
made
use of the organic
Aquinas
phrase
connectionof the hand to the human being as an analogyof how Christ
has human nature.17However Scotus here takes the novel step of using
such qua phrasescentrallyin his discussionsof the Incarnationand the
Trinity.
Thus far,Scotus has followedAquinas in takingthe qualifiedpropositionsspecificatively.
Scotus has modifiedAquinas' approach onlyby tryto
make
the
Thus,
ing
figurativesense more respectablescientifically.
- an
in
found
insteadof 'curly,'Scotus has 'healthy'
Aristotle's
example
workand hence being scientifically
respectableat his time.
Here Scotus has improvedupon Aquinas' figurative
readingof "Christ
is a creature."Aquinas had compared its truthto "Socrates is curly"or
"Socrates is snub." However, these analogues suggestthat "Christ is a
creature"is not truein the way that "Socratesis a creature"is true.But
human. By comparing
then,as I have said, Christwould not be perfectly
"Christis a creature"insteadto "Socrates is healthy,"Scotus has eliminatedthisobjection.For,just as the healthof a principalpart of Socrates,
his heart,say, determinesthe state of health of Socrates as a whole, so
too the creatednatureof a principalpart of Christ,His human nature,
determinesthat Christbe a creature.Thus a man with a healthyheart
is healthy,and so too Christwitha createdhuman natureis human. So
Scotus has a strongeranalogythatpreservesthe truthof the Creed, that
Christis perfectly
human.
Yet Scotus recognizesthathe has too strongan analogy.Now it looks
as if "Christis a creature"is true,strictly
and simply.For the organism
even
since
its
heart is healthy.But then,
is,
strictlyspeaking,healthy,
since Christis God, and God is not a creature,the contradictionseems
to follow,thatChristis and is not a creature.So makingthe specificative
analysismore scientifically
respectablehas the cost of no longer elimithe
contradiction.
nating
NeverthelessScotus offersa way out. At timeshe suggeststhat "Christ
is a creature"and "Christis the Creator" are both true,but implyno
16Albertus
In Sophisticos
Elenchos,
Magnus,
Lyons1651,I.III.6 [866a-b].
17SCGIV.41.11.
The analogy
comesfrom
VII.10-1.
Aristotle,
Metaphysics

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contradiction.He argues for this view in passing,while discussingan

objection:
is impassive
Still[that]doesnotfollow,
whenthereare two
[Christ]
absolutely.
in [Christ],
natures
ofwhomoneoftheopposites
is saidprivatively.
Whence
itdoes
notfollow:
"thatmanis blind;therefore
heis notseeing,"
thanks
tothematexcept
ofwhich
there
is one[type
Forifhehad
ter,sincehe hasbutonenature,
of]sight.
ofwhichthereweretwo[types
it wouldnotfollow,
twonatures,
of] sight,
except
in virtue
thathe onlywouldnotbe seeingin virtue
ofthatnature,
ofwhichhe is
it doesnotfollow:
ifChrist
blind.Therefore
is a creature,
he is notthe
therefore
of'creature'
unless
themeaning
were'notto be theCreator.'18
Creator,
Here Scotus claims that 'Creator' and 'creature'need not be contraries.
For Christhas two natures,each of which can serve as a distinctbase
for different
dispositionsand attributes.So too, he argues,'sighted'and
'blind' need not be contrariesin the case of an animal with two optical systems(or even with two eyes,just as a piebald horse can be black
and white).They become contrariesonly given the material
, factualconthat
animal
has
one
Scotus
dition,
only
optical system.
suggeststaking
'creature'like 'blind': just as the lattersignifiesthe absence of a power
of sight,so too the formersignifiesthe absence of an activepower ofselfcausation. As Christ'stwo natureseach have powers or theirlacks, to
hold that Christis both Creator and creatureimpliesno contradiction.
I findthissolutionmore satisfactory
than Aquinas'. Still,we may have
lost somethingof the unityof the person Christ.But, I shall now discuss, Scotus makes a change in the analysisof the specificative
proposition that may forestallthis objection.(However,it is not clear thatboth
these changes can be made together,as I shall note.)
(1.2) At least at times,Scotus makes anotherchange in Aquinas' analysis of specificative
propositions:

18Rep.III.d9.a2[Vol.XI, 459a]:"Si tarnen

de negatione
intelligatur
importata
perpriestfalsum,
est
vationem,
Damascenum,
capite50, Christus
assumptum
quia secundum
etimpassibilis,
inaliqua
etnonsequitur,
estimpassibilis,
nonestpassibilis,
passibilis
igitur
insupposito,
tenet
formae.
Tamenquandononestibinisiunanatura
materia,
gratia
gratiamateriae,
etsimiliter
formae
non
ubisuntduae,hocestimpassibile;
tenet,
gratia
igitur
estpassibile
radone
illius
cuiusestimpassibile
tamen
nonsequitur,
ratione
absolute:
naturae,
ubisuntduaenaturae
in ilio,de quo diciturunumprivative
Undenon
oppositorum.
isteestcaecus,igitur
nonestvidens;
nisigratiamateriae,
sequitur,
quia nonhabetnisi
unamnaturam,
duae
cuiusestunavisio.Si enimhaberet
duasnaturas,
quarumessent
nonsequeretur,
illamnaturam,
secunnisiquodsolumnonessetvidens
secundum
visiones,
damquamestcaecus,ideononsequitur:
nonestcreator;
si Christus
estcreatura:
igitur
nisisignificatum
huiusvocabuli
creatura
essetillud,nonessecreatorem."
(Scotusis dis"Christus
et impassibilis.")
estpassibilis
cussing

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93

"invirtue
ofthefactthathe is a man,"be addedtoone
Butifthatdetermination,
so as todistort
itinrespect
ofthesubject,
oftheextremes,
that
saytothepredicate,
ofthepredicate,
thathadbeenofthepredicate
takensimply
in relation
opposition
inrelation
tothesubject,
tothesubject,
wouldbe eliminated.
[butis]nowdistorted
"invirtue
ofthefactthat"properly,
Therefore
thisproposition,
as itis the
bytaking
is false.Butin virtue
ofthereduplication
ofthepredicate,
of
signoftheinherence
so as tonotea creation
ordistorts,
thatpredicate,
secundum
thefactitspecifies,
,
quid
itstillisimproper,
itcanthusbeconceded,
andmust
be analyzed
as:Christ
although
in virtue
ofhumanity
Anexample
is a creature.
ofthisis evident
from
thatexamto whiteness:
is white"
since,
pleoftheEthiopian
compared
justas "theEthiopian
so too"theEthiopian
in virtue
ofthefactthathe hasteethis white"[is
is false,
invirtue
ofthefactthattheproposition
is properly
Butstill"an
false],
reduplicative.
invirtue
ofhisteeth"
is true,
andthis[isso] invirtue
is white
ofthefact
Ethiopian
teeth.
If"invirtue
ofthefactthat"distorts
thepredicate,
thatheis having
still[such
a proposition]
is notthusproperly.19
Scotus again compares "Christin virtueof his humanityis a creature"
to "the Ethiopianis whitein virtueof his teeth."But here he claims that
in both cases the qua phrase qualifiesthe predicate.His claim is somewhatunusual,as a specificative
qua phrasewas generallytakento change
the subjecttermand its reference:the Ethiopianis not white;ratherthe
Ethiopian'steeth,a part of him, is white.20However, Scotus wants to
read the propositionin this way: "the Ethiopian is white-toothed."On
thisreading,"Christqua man is a creature"has a simple subject,and a
complexpredicate.This readinghas the furtheradvantage that the fallacious inferenceto "the Ethiopian is white" hardlylooks tempting;so
too forthe propositionsabout the Incarnation.
Scotus thinksthat he has supportforattachingthe qua phrase to the
1.38. To be sure,
predicatefromAristotle'ssayingthis in PriorAnalytics
Aristotledoes say this. But, I have argued elsewhere,Aristotlesays this
19Ox.III.dll.a2.nl[Vol.VII.l, 246]:"Ad
si secundum
propositum,
quodhomoaccineutrum
eorum
etitanontollitur
si
distrahitur,
piatur
proprie
reduplicative,
repugnantia,
secundum
estcreatura
, quamista,
qua est:et itanonmagisestistavera,Christus
quodhomo,
Christus
estcreatura,
maneteademratiofalsitatis.
Sed si addatur
istadeterquiautrobique
secundum
ut distrahit
minado,
, alteriextremo,
putapraedicato,
quodhomo
ipsumrespectu
istarepugnantia
tolleretur
iamdistraed
ad subiectum,
subiecti,
praedicati
quaefuitpraedicatisimpliciter
ad subiectum.
Haec ergopropositio,
lysecundum
sumpti
accipiendo
quod
utestnotainhaerentiae
falsaest.Secundum
autem
proprie,
reduplicationis
praedicati,
quod
sivedistrahit,
utnotet
secundum
creationem
, sicpotest
specificat,
ipsum
praedicatum,
quid
concedi:
tamensitimpropria,
et exponenda
secundum
humaniChristus
quamvis
peristam,
tatem
estcreatura.
huiuspatetin ilioexemplo
ad albede Aethiope
Exemplum
comparato
dinem:
estalba
secundum
dentes
, itaista,Aethiops
quodhabens
quiasicutistaestfalse,
Aethiops
estalbus
istatamenestvera,Aethiops
estproprie
, secundum
quodpropositio
reduplicativa:
estalbus
secundum
et hoc,secundum
si istudsecundum
dentes,
quodhabensdentes:
quoddistrahit
tamen
sicnonestpropria."
praedicatum:
20Cf.Ockham,
Summa
Totius
St.Bonaventure
1974,IIL4.13,144-52[835-6].
Logicae,

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more
about a different
logical typeof qua proposition,the reduplicative,
Scotus
inference
is
valid.21
ad
or less, where the secundum
quid simpliciter
wants Aristotle'sremarkto apply to all qua propositionsand seems to
thanAristotledid. Thus
in theirlogical characteristics
see more continuity
Scotus impliesthat all reduplicativepropositionsare true specificatively,
althoughnot viceversa.22
On the otherhand, in supportof Scotus,we mightsay that Socrates
So
is curlywith respectto his hair means that Socrates is curly-haired.
too, if Christis a creaturequa man, Christis a created human. Given
inference
thatthe two examplesare parallel,the secundum
quidad simpliciter
should be invalid.Moreover,the qua phrasesshould be attachedto the
simplepredicate,to forma complexpredicate.In thisway claimingthat
Christis both man and God would have no inconsistency.
inference
Scotus argues that here again the secundum
quidad simpliciter
is invalid.He suggeststhat,althoughChristis a createdhuman,it does
not followthat Christis created or a creature.He admitsthat usually,
e.g., if Socrates is a created human, then Socrates is a creature.But
Christ'scase differsbecause He has two natures:
"ifChrist
or uncreated,"
is this,
thenHe is created
itcanbe saidthatthedivision,
human
twonatures.
ofthatwhichincludes
is notvalidin respect
Now,moreover,
neitherefore
twonatures;
themanhasin Himself
nature
is nota man,butChrist
it doesnotfollow:
willhaveto be granted.
ther[disjunct]
Or,letitbe as follows:
musiheis a creature,
is a created
therefore
Christ
human;
justas itdoesnotfollow:
since
therefore
Michaelwillperish[tomorrow],
cal Michaelwillperishtomorrow;
"thewhite
'Christ'
is distorted
bywhatis said,[sc.]'man,'so muchas ifitis argued,
is [annihilated]."23
Socrates
is annihilated;
therefore
Socrates
This view agrees with Scotus' originalclaim, that "Christis a creature"
is false,strictly
speaking.Justas Michael need not be musical,nor Socrates
21AllanBck,OnReduplication
, Leiden,1996,83-4.
22Ockham,
Artis
De Puntate
Summa
, 11.16,160-79[295],andWalter
Burleigh,
Logicae
alsohavea descripTractatus
1955,II.III.3,p. 176,19-32,
, St.Bonaventure
Logicae
Longior
Thisaccount
aretruespecificatively.
allreduplicative
tionaccording
towhich
propositions
becamestandard
later.
23Rep
est
si Christus
. III.all.d2.nl[Vol. XI.1, 460a]:"...potestdiciquoddivisio,
Nunc
duasnaturas.
velincreatus,
nonvaletrespectu
illius,
hoc;igitur
creatus,
quodincludit
ideo
homohabetin se duasnaturas,
autemnatura
humana
nonesthomo,sedChristus
esthomocreatus;
Christus
neutrum
eritdandum.
Vel estoquodsic:nonsequitur,
igitur
corMichalus
musicus
Michalus
estcreatura:
sicutnonsequitur,
eras;igitur
corrumpetur
distrahitur
tantum
homo;sicutsi arguitur,
perhoc,quoddicitur
rumpetur;
quia Christus
Socrates."
Socrates
albusestannihilatus;
igitur
KlausJacobi
1.33.I thank
Prior
Michaelcomesfrom
The example
ofmusical
Analytics
human.'
to 'created
from
'human
creature'
forsuggesting
to changemyformulation

18:51:30 PM

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SCOTUSON INCARNATION

95

white,so too Christ need not have a human nature rightlyso since
Christ,the Word, existsalways,and so also when not incarnate.
Still thisview does have big problems.First,its analogues suggestan
accidentalconnectionbetweenChristand His human nature.Once again
human.
we mightwonderif somethingaccidentallyhuman is perfectly
in
this
Scotus
the
Second,
complicates
ontologyby allowing
analysis
and 'created human.5Like
such complex predicates,as white-toothe
his own tradition,I findthesepredicatesdubious. For, if such predicates
are to be admittedon more than an ad hocbasis, thenit looks as if Scotus
is advocatingreplacinga simplepredicate,having a relationto a simple
subject, like 'white,' with a crowd of complex ones: 'white-toothed,5
etc. SurelyAristotlewould
'white-surfaced5
'white-armed,5
'white-footed,5
look
accidentalto theirsubthese
Moreover,
complex predicates
object!
is perfectlyhuman, if
will
how
Christ
So
this
not
show
jects.
analysis
humanshave theirnaturesessentially,as theydo.
Thus Scotus does make the doctrineof the Incarnationformallyconsistentby modifying
Aquinas5account of specificative
propositionsin various ways: (1.1) Scotus modifiesthe account of in what way, e.g., "Christ
is true specificatively,
so that the unqualified
qua man is a creature55
becomes literallytrueand scientifically
proposition,"Christis a creature,55
like
"Socrates
is
He then apparentlychanges his
healthy.55
respectable,
initialposition,that"Christis a creature55
is false,strictly
speaking.Rather,
he arguesthatit is true,but that"Christis a creatureand is the Creator55
containsno inconsistency.(1.2) Scotus attaches the qua phrase to the
predicate,instead of to the subject. Then he argues that, althoughin
mundanecases, "S is a createdhuman55
thisfolimplies"S is a creature,55
lows onlythanksto the material,factualcircumstancethatmost humans
have only one nature.But it would not followfor Christ,who has two
natures.Scotus then claims that 'the created human (Christ)5has the
same logical structureas 'musical Michael,5and so that the inferenceto
"Christis a creature55
is blocked. Scotus also may avoid havingattributes
of both human and divinenaturesbecome accidentalto Christby arguing thatthe resultingcomplexpredicates,like 'created human5('creature
qua man5)and 'divine Creator5('Creator qua God5) are essentialto their
subject.But thisresultlooks contrivedand ratherad hoc, as well as incongruentwith the Aristotelianphilosophythen dominant.Also Scotus has
and so
admittedall along that the specificativeanalysisis "improper,55
like the reduplicative.
not completelyrespectablescientifically,
Moreover,Scotushas theproblemthatthetwo halvesof his specificative

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analysis(LI & 1.2) do not fittogether.The firsthalf,whichhas the attractionof showinghow Christis perfectly
human,has the simple,unqualified
of
the
said
subject, Christ. But that subject now
predicate ('creature')
a
but
not
complex of two disjointnatures.The second
simple,
appears
half,which has the attractionof showinghow Christ can be a simple
subjectwithtwo natures,has onlyqualifiedpredicates('creaturequa man')
said of the simplesubject.Perhaps Scotus does not need both halves,and
one suffices.But he cannot have all the attractivefeaturesof both halves
at once.
In any event,Scotus seems to have moved towardsanother,more congenial analysisof specificative
propositions,at timesfor the Incarnation,
and nearlyalways for the Trinity,as I shall now discuss.Given his frequent use of it with the Trinity,perhaps with it Scotus has given his
of the Incarnamost definitive
solutionto the problemof the consistency
tion as well.
theAbstractive
The Incarnation:
Analysis
analysisof qua propositionsabout
(II) At times,Scotus uses a different
the Incarnation.For instance,he does so when he considersthe quessitaliquaduo").24
tion,"whetherChristis some two things"SutrumChristus
This questionof course arises since Christis both man and God, and so
seems to be two things,as He has two natures.
On thisquestionAquinas has the positionthat "Christis two persons"
and "Christis some two things"are both false.Althoughit is true that
havChristhas two natures,Christis one thingand a singlesuppositum
"Christ
is
two
natures.25
those
Moreover, Aquinas says,
only one
ing
Christ's
is
Christ
is
that
since
Still,
being God
singlething.26
being" true,
and Christ's being man are two 'beings.' Likewise, we can speak of
Socrates'beingwhiteand Socrates'beingmusicalas two different
'beings,'
but these beings do not belong to Socrates simply,but only in relation
to his havingcertainattributes.These phrasessignify
somethingabstract,
and so indicate only that Christ has two natures.27Likewise,Socrates'
his whitenessand humanbeing human and Socrates' being whitesignify
has
So
Christ
dualityabstractlyand formally,
ity respectively. although
24Ox.III.d6.a2[Vol.VILI, 177].
25ST III.ql7.al.r.
26Gf.ST I.q39.a3.r.
27ST III.ql7.a2.r.

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SCOTUSON INCARNATION

97

with respectto His essentialnatures,stillconcretelyand reallyHe is a

singlethingand a singleperson.Note thathere Aquinas makes a formal
to showhow Christis objectively
distinction
two,thoughreallyone. Scotus
shall followup on thisline of thought.
Scotus agreeswithAquinas that "Christis two" is false,whether'two'
be taken in the masculineto mean 'two persons,' or in the neuter to
mean 'two beings' or 'two supposita
.' The neuter form Scotus takes to
mean 'two substances'or 'two natures':it is false that Christ is human
natureand divinenature,althoughHe has both natures.Hence the latter
versionof the statement
is falsetoo. In all thisScotus agreeswithAquinas.
However Scotus goes on to complicatethe discussion.Problemsarise
when the propositionsin the original Question are qualified by qua
arisesnaturallyfromAquinas'
phrases.Qualifyingthe originalpropositions
initialsolution,that Christis one thingin relationto His divine nature,
and another,in relationto his human nature.28The objectiongoes:
. . . justas there
aretwonatures
in Christ,
so there
willbe twobeings,
sinceChrist
in virtue
ofthefactthatHe is a manis something,
andin virtue
ofthefactthat
He is Godis something,
andnotthesamesomething,
andhencesomething
else.29
Scotus admitsthat "Christin virtueof the factthat He is man is something(<aliquid
)" and "Christin virtueof the factthat He is God is someare
both
true. Moreover, Scotus admits that any attributein a
thing"
categoryis 'a thing.'Differentthings,like 'creature' and 'Creator,' and
'passive' and 'impassive,' then, are true of Christ in these different
respects.So, in different
respects,Christis one thingand another,and,
as these two thingsdiffer,and*indeed are contraries,it mightseem to
followthat Christis two things.However, this resultfollowsonly if the
inferqua phrasescan be dropped,i.e., if the secundum
quidad simpliciter
ences are valid.But theyare not because the qualifications
are specificative
and not reduplicative.
But the usual specificativeanalysis (sc., Aquinas' (A)) does not help
much. For therethe qualification('M') combineswiththe originalsubject
('S') to forma new complex subject('S qua M'). With different
respects,
"Christus
28Thisoccurs
inAquinas,
as hediscusses
secundum
homo
estaliquid."
already
quod
Forthetexts
inAquinas
andtheprevious
ofthisproposition
seeWalter
theological
history
St.Thomas
ontheHabitus
Principe,
, in: E. Gilson(ed.),St.Thomas
Theory
oftheIncarnation
Commemorative
Studies
, vol.1,Toronto
Aquinas:
1974,412-8.
suntin Christo,
sic
Rep.III.d6.a2.[Vol.XI, 444b]:"Contra
ista,sicutduaenaturae
eritduoentia,
secundum
etsecundum
quiaChristus
quodhomo,estaliquid,
quodDeus,
aliudquid."Aquinas
alsointroduces
est,etnonidemaliquid;
aliquid
igitur
quapropositions
intothediscussion,
ST III.ql7.a2.r.

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ALLANBCK

we obtain different
complexes. But, if each complex, 'Christ qua God'
and 'Christqua man,5is a different
thing,then we have lost the identity
and unityof the originalsubject,'Christ.'
Scotus' new specificativeanalysis(1.2) does not help much either.It
could help: for,accordingto it, "Christqua man is a creature"and "Christ
qua God is the Creator," implythat Christis two things,'Creator qua
God' and 'creaturequa man,' just as Socrates' being whiteand his being
human are two things,i.e., two items in the categories.Then Christ
would, once again, be a single subjectwith various complex predicates.
However, Scotus does not use this reply:perhaps because the orthodox
positionrequiresthat "Christ is two things"be denied; perhaps, more
because it does not work well. For the actual proposifundamentally,
tionsin question,"Christqua God is something"and "Christqua man is
something,"do not lend themselvestoo plausiblyto the analysis that
'Christ' is the subject,and 'somethingqua man' or 'somethingqua God'
the predicate.At best thisanalysiscould renderthe qualifiedpropositions
back into "Christis God" and "Christis a man," but the qualifications
do not seem to mean that, and anywaywould then have no effecton
the originalquestion.
In any case, Scotus does not offerthe usual specificativeanalysis,as
Aquinas does, which suggeststhat the respectsbeing stipulatedare accidental to the subject. Nor does he attach the qua phrase to the predicate, to make complexpredicates.Rather,he has the respectsqualifythe
complexes('S qua M') or aspectsof
subject,so as to constitutedifferent
but not really,distinct.Hence
S. For Scotus, these aspects are formally,
the qua phrases do not change the referenceof the unqualifiedsubject
term.Likewise,Aquinas himselfhad suggestedthisby sayingthat Christ
is formallytwo, but reallyone.
This new modificationof the analysisof specificative
propositionscan
be seen more clearlyin the other,mundaneexamplethatScotus discusses:
whenitis
is takenthus,
ofmotion
ofthefactthat'in thedefinition
And'invirtue
in virtue
ofthefactthatit is in
is thatact ofa beingin potency
said:"Motion
oftheinherence'
Forhereit doesnotdenote'in virtue
[i.e.,reduplicapotency."
as Aristotle
ifitdid,motion
wouldbe theactofanybeinginpotency,
, since,
tively]
thatitis every
wantsit:"Ifjusticeis good,in thatitis good,itfollows
good."30
30Rep.III.d6.a2[Vol.XI, 444b]:"Etsicaccipitur,
secundum
motus,
, in definitione
quod
ibi
Nonenimdnott
secundum
inpotentia
Motus
entis
estactus
cumdicitur:
quodinpotentia.
essetmotus
entisinpotentia
secundum
actus,sicvult
inhaerentiam;
quiasi sic,cuiuslibet
Cf. Quodl.
bonum"
ineoquodbonum,
Si iustitia
estbonum,
Aristoteles:
quodestomne
sequitur
& Wolter,
III.n4[Vol.XII, 75;Alluntis
3.27].

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ON INCARNATION

99

Here Scotus speaks of the qualification'smakingthe subject more precise by limitingit to one aspect only. In this case, 'in virtueof the fact
that' (.secundum
?] in virtue of one aspect (rationem)
quod) is said [dicitur
as when it is said "in virtue
other
and
not
aspects,
by
considering
only,
of the fact that he is man," by consideringhim preciselyunder one
aspect."31What is involvedhere is a process of abstraction.To be sure,
this conceptioncan apply to the typicalspecificativecase as well; we
abstractaway all the predicatesof the Ethiopian except for those concerningonly a certainpart of his body, his teeth,and then say what is
it gives
trueof them.But the statementabout motionhas keydifferences:
and
so
the
here
a definition
of motion,the unqualifiedsubject,
qua phrase
is used to narrowdown more preciselythe relevantaspects describing
that subject.But it can do so, and still,it seems, be sure of keepingto
the originalthingbeing qualified:if it did not do that, a qua phrase
could hardlyhave place in a true definition,givingthe essence of the
unqualifiedsubject. Above we have already seen Scotus looking for
qualificationsthat make more precise the predicationwithoutdistorting
it, as when someone is said to be healthyin virtueof her heart.
Examples of such a use of qua phrases in Aristotelianphilosophy
abound: "being qua being is the subject of the Metaphysics
;" "the doctor
builds, not qua doctor but qua builder."32These statementshave great
importancein Aristotelianscience. Moreover,unlikethose that occasion
the secundum
inferencelooks
quidad simpliciter
fallacy,forsuch statements,
invalidonly in a sense. E.g., "the doctor builds" and "being is the sub"
ject of the Metaphysicshave a much strongerclaim to being true than
"the Ethiopianis white":statementsof the formertypeseem even to be
true, albeit vaguely stated,while those of the latter look simplyfalse.
Moreover,in the formerwe seem stillto be speakingof the originalsubwhereasin the latterthe
albeit abstractly,
ject and its originalattributes,
ofAristotle
here:foronething,
Aristotle
not
Scotus
hasa dubious
might
interpretation
foranother,
mindtheconclusion
inpotency
"moves"
thateverything
kinetai);
(i.e.,changes;
I doubtthatthepassagewhere
is defined
in thePhysics
dealwiththesametype
motion
Prior
1.38.Cf.Metaphysics
ofquaproposition
as thepassage
citedfrom
IX.4;Physics
Analytics
III.1. ButI layasidethisissuehere.See myOnReduplication,
ch.2.
31Rep.IILd6.a2.nl[Vol.XI, 444b]:"Aliomodo,secundum
unam
, dicitsecundum
quid
rationem
nonconsiderando
aliasrationes,
utcumdicitur
secundum
tantum,
quodhomo,
considerando
subunaratione."
ipsum
praecise
" alsotodescribe
Thistexthasproblems:
forScotus
uses"praecise
the"first
where
mode,"
thequa phrase
indicates
"theprecise
reason."
StillScotusdoesclearly
saythatwhenthe
is true,andthisdescriponeconcept
qua connective
only"thisproposition
"reduplicates
tionseemstoholdofthespecificative
as Scotusdescribes
it.
32Cf.Aristotle,
III.1.
IV.1; Physics
Metaphysics

18:51:30 PM

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ALLANBCK

of the qua phrase.

subjector attributehas changed withthe introduction
This differencebetween these two typesof the "specificative"becomes
yet more apparentwhen ones of the "new," formertype are compared
with other standardexamples of the fallacyof secundum
:
quidet simpliciter
e.g., "not-beingis illusory;thereforenot-beingis."33Surelyhere the conclusion has littleclaim to truth,and the qualification,"illusory"changes
the meaningof "is."
Scotus faces the riskthat,in makinghis theologicalqua propositions
abstractive,he may not be able to use them to show the doctrinesconinferencesnow hold validly.Yet,
sistent,if thosesecundum
quidad simpliciter
he may reply,strictly,
these propositionsdo not hold, withoutqualification. Thus the two naturesof Christ can be formallydistinct,while a
a doctordoes not
singlesubject,the personChrist,remains.So too strictly
another description.In this
build, but only coincidentallyas satisfying
way, Scotus shows the doctrineof the Incarnationto be as consistentas
the conceptualstructureof Aristotelianscience.
Thus Scotus seems to be movingtowardsa way of markingoffthose
and seem
specificative
propositionsthat have philosophicalrespectability,
to allow, in a loose sense, the secundum
ad
inference.
So
quid
simpliciter
thereare signsthat Scotus is gropingtowardsa thirdtypeof qua proposition, differentfrom the reduplicativeand the traditionallyfallacious
whichI shall call the mereological
, as therethewhole
specificative,
specificative
is
to
have
the
subjectgenerally suppose
predicatesolelybecause its part,
I
has
shall
call
this
We
it.
third
by itself,
type the abstractive
specificative.
shall see him speakinga bit more clearlyabout it in otherdiscussionsof
the Trinity.
and theTrinity
Qua Propositions
Qua propositionsenter a discussionof the Trinityeasily,and did so
early. But in fact the medieval logical analysisof such propositionsdid
not come untilmuch later than for those concerningthe Incarnation.34
33Aristotle,
21a32-3.
167al-20;OnInterpretation
Refiitations
34Foran Sophistical
A Treatise
onImplicit
seeFrancoGiusberti,
around
from
earlytreatise,
Propositions
theTurn
de l'Institut
dumoyen
21 (1977),
, in:Cahiers
oftheTwelfth
Century
gegrecetlatin,
45-115.L.M. de Rijk,haseditedsomeearlytreatises
where
on theprobationes
terminorumi
he haslocatedsomequiteearlytreatises
in:Some
14thCentury
Tracts
on qua propositions
ontheprobationes
Edward
terminorum:
O.F.M.
Martin
, Richard
ofAlnwick
Billingham,
Upton
andOthers
1982.
, ed. L.M. de Rijk,Nijmegen
muchanalysis,
likewise
Scotusearlyon usesqua propositions
butwithout
extensively,
e.g.,Ox.I.d9.al [Vol.V.l, 832].

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101

The orthodoxChristianview of the Trinityhas one God consistingof

threePersonswitha singledivinenature.To avoid the contradictionthat
God is both one and three,it is temptingto view the three Persons as
'
'
aspects of God: indeed, the originalmeaning of persona(npoaanov) is
'faade' or 'aspect,5and then 'role.' However the Greek Fathers and
then Boethiusredefined'person' as 'rational substance.'35Consequently
it was hard to view the divine Personsas aspects,and few qua propositionswere used up to the time of Scotus in proofsof the consistencyof
The problemtoo became harder:forifGod is threePersons,
theTrinity.36
He then seems to be threesubstancesor things,and not one thingwith
threeaspects.By the timeof Scotus the usual move was to hold thatthe
threePersonsare constitutedas distinctby relationsonly,so that God is
one but relationallythree.37Then of course, the realityof
substantially
the threePersonsneeds defense,for different
relationsgenerallydo not
themselves
the
for
there
substancesor
by
provide
ground
being different
things,but presupposerelatathatare substances.The relationsthemselves
would have to providegroundsforattributing
a quasi-substantial
reality,
known
as
a
this
a
is
motivation
for the virtual
traditionally
hypostasis:
realityof Aquinas and the formaldistinctionof Scotus.38
Throughouthis career,Scotus himselfuses qua propositionsextensively
in discussingthe Trinity.Yet he does not discusstheirformalstructure
much untillate, in his Quodlibets.
There he analyzes the qua propositions
thatarise in his discussions,so as to show how, once the qua phrasesare
made explicit,the orthodoxdoctrineof the Trinityavoids contradiction.
To thisend, Scotus spendsmuch effort
in analyzinga seeminglyminor
issue,namelywhetherthe followingpropositionsare consistent:"a relation
35Boethius,
Contra
etNestorium
, cap.Ill, 4-5,ed.Stuart-Rand-Tester,
Eutychen
Cambridge,
Mass./London
oftheGreekPatristic
on theTrinity,
1978,84-5.Fora summary
history
seeDavidBrown,
TheDivine
, (op.cit.,n. 4), 229-30;242-3.
Trinity
36Cf.Aquinas,
ST I.q32.alad 2 on whatproofis possible
forthedoctrine
of the
Trinity.
37Aquinas,
ST 1.28;1.40.2.
r; cf.Scotus,
Rep.1.26.1.S2[136al.
38Cf.Aquinas,
5T I.q39.al;Scotus,
Ox.Ld2.q7.a5.n43.
Thereis somedebatewhether
thesetwodistinctions
arethesame.See Maurice
TheFormal
Distinction
Grajewski,
ofDuns
Scotus
D.C. 1944,1-3;52-5.He says,p. 4: "Theeffects
ofboththeformal
, Washington,
andthevirtual
distinctions
arepurportedly
andthatis where
thesimilarity
ends.
identical,
Thebasesoftheeffects
In thevirtual
aredifferent.
distinction
weassign
theeffects
tothe
theformal
on thecontrary,
theeffects
to
distinction,
producing
thing,
quaens',
consigns
thevarious
within
formalities
theproducing
Butthissolveslittle:
fordoesthe
thing."
' ens
ofthenameofthething
to itsrelated
forqualification,
qua ,' changethereference
not?
or
If so, thenthevirtual
and theformal
distinctions
are thesame.What
mality
lacksisa formal
ofquapropositions,
andso cannot
decidethisquestion.
Grajewski
analysis

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as compared to its correlateis a thing(res)"and "a relationas compared

to the essence is an aspect (ratio
)." For, if theyare consistent,then the
doctrineof the Trinitycan be proved consistent:the formerproposition
justifiesthe Trinity,while the latterjustifiesmonotheism.
For example, the relativeterms,Tather'and 'son' are determinedby
the relationof generation.Thus, 'Father' and 'Son' must signify'things'
to be relatedby generation,and such thingsconstitute
the firsttwo divine
Persons. On the other hand, a relationis a relationof a subject,and
does not exist separately,apart fromits subject. Thus, Father and Son
are of a single subject, God. Hence there can be one God and three
Persons.
For thissolutionto work,the subjecttermmustbe able to be qualified
in incompatibleways withoutresultingin contradiction.So, in analyzing
such propositions,
a specificative
analysissuggestsitself:forsuch qualifications specifyan aspect or part of the subject,and can reconcileincompatiblepredicates.However thereis a danger:it is unusualto requirethat
the partsbe essentialto the subject:a divinePersonhas the divinenature
as its essentiell
nature,not as the Ethiopianhas teethaccidentally.Hence,
forScotusto use such specificative
here,he would
successfully
propositions
have to modifytheirusual analysis,as we have already seen him do in
discussing"Christqua man is a creature"and "Christis two things."
Scotus' main discussionof qua propositionscomes in discussingnot
but a similarone, "the relaone of the propositionsof the main quaestio
tion as compared to the essence is a thing."Still,the point made here
applies generallyto all the qua propositionsthat Scotus uses here. He
and falsereduplicatively.
saysthatthatpropositionis true"specificatively"
In the reduplicativesense it is false,for the M term,"compared to the
essence,"does not indicatethe reasonwhythe relationis a thing.Rather,
being comparedto the essence does notjustifyits being a thing,an inderealityat all,
pendent,self-subsistent
. . . sincethatcomparison
is onlya comparison
withtheessence
ofaspect{rationis).
and'essence,'
dis'relation'
therearenotreally
Forbetween
theextremes,
namely
can compare
and so thereis a relation
tinct[things].
Butstilltheintellect
them,
between
them.39

39QuodiIII.n4 [Vol. XII, 75; Alluntis

& Wolter3.29]: . . quia istacomparatio
nondistincta
ad essentiam
rationis.
Esteniminterextrema
estsolacomparatio
realiter,
et itaestinter
et essentiam,
intellectus
scilicet
relationem,
comparare,
quaetamenpotest
ea relatio."

18:51:30 PM

ANDTRINITY
SCOTUSON INCARNATION

103

For a relationis an attributeof a substancethat has an essence. In sayYet,

ing this,we do not comparetwo things,but asserta certainstructure.
Scotus says,we can speak of the relationin abstractionfromthe essence,
and even of the relationbetweenthatrelationand thatessence,speaking
abstractly.
So the propositionin questionis true "specificatively":
invirtue
. . . andthenthemeaning
is paternity,
notonlytaken
ofthefact
precisely,
ofthefactthatit is considered
thatit is paternity,
butalsoin virtue
underthat
as itis compared
totheessence,
oras itis in theessence,
is a thing,
{ratione),
aspect
oreliminate
sincethatcomparison
doesnotlessen
butprepaternity's
beinga thing,
it. .
supposes
Scotus claims thatwhen the relationis compared to the essence,it is a
thing(res).For a relationto be comparedto the essence presupposesthat
thereis alreadya 'thing5thereto be compared and so related.But this
'thing'thoughis not reallydistinctfromthe essence, insofaras it is a
of the relativeattributefrom
relationof thatsubstance.Yet the distinction
itssubstanceis no mere mentalfiction,but is groundedin and abstracted
fromreal structuresof existents.Thus Scotus argues that relativeslike
'Father' and 'Son' are formallydistinctbut really identical. The qua
phrasessignifythese formaldistinctions
by signifying
aspects of the real
thing.
Scotussaysthatwe shouldtake thesequa phrases"specificatively",
i.e.,
and not mereologically,sc., not in termsof a part-whole
abstractively
cases like "the Ethiopian
analysisapplicable to fallacious,non-scientific
is whitein respectof his teeth." For note that,although"specificative"
inferenceseems
propositionsare used here,the secundum
quidad simpliciter
to hold forScotus: "the relation,as compared to the essence,is a thing;
the relationis a thing."Or, rather,in subtle Scotistfashion,
therefore,
in one sense it holds,while in anotherit does not: the relationis not a
thingin the sense that a substanceis a thing,but in a sense appropriate
to a relation.Scotus commonlymultipliesthese subtletieswhen making
formaldistinctions.
Moreover,as I have suggested,the secundum
quid ad
inference
but
this
is
characteristic
of the
holds,
simpliciter
only loosely:
abstractivetypeof qua propositions.
40QuodiIII.n4[Vol.XII, 75; Alluntis
& Wolter
3.30]:"Nonergode istointellectu
sedde primo,
et tuncestsensus,
nonsolumpraecise
loquimur,
quodpaternitas
accepta,
secundum
sedetiamsecundum
subistaratione,
utcomquodpaternitas:
quodconsiderata
ad essentiam,
velutestin essentia,
estres,quiaistacomparatio
nonminuit
nec
paratur
destruit
esserem,sedpraesupponit
..."
paternitatem

18:51:30 PM

104

ALLANBCK

when discussingthe problem that

Scotus confirmsmy interpretation
the followinginferenceseemsvalid: "the relationcomparedto the essence
is a relationalthing;thereforethe essence is a relationalthing."41We
have seen whythisshouldpose a problemforhim:in specificative
propositionsgenerally,one of the truthconditionsfora specificative
proposition
("S is P qua M") is "thisM is P." For example,if an Ethiopianis white
with respectto his teeth,his teethare white.Scotus firstnotes that the
inferenceis valid, strictlyspeaking,if the qua phrase is reduplicative
(Indeed,thenthe truthconditionwould be "everyM is P"). But he denies
that the inferenceholds if the propositionis taken "specificatively".
This
is odd, because, as I have pointed out, thisinferenceseems to hold for
the mereological specificativepropositions.Scotus himselfadmits that
this inferencefollows.Yet he offersthe followingsolution:"the essence
is a relationalthing"is true only in the sense of identity,i.e., it is true
that the entitythat has the essence is the thingthat has that relation.
But it is not true formallythat the essence itselfis the relationitself.42
in line withfeaturesof the abstracdifferences,
Again Scotus is specifying
tive type.
So Scotus again is markingoffa special typeof specificative
propositions,where the abstractaspect ('M') has the predicate(T') not simply,
by itself,but only consideredin its relationto the whole [secundum
quid).
Once again we see him separatingout a distinctive
abstractivetype.43
Scotus uses qua propositionssimilarlyin otherquestionsabout the doctrineof the Trinity.For instance,in one place he is concernedabout
what constitutes
God the Fatheras a person.Here again Scotus concedes
that all three divine Persons have a single essence and nature,and so
in theirsubstantialattributes,
are not distinguished
but in havingdifferent
41Quodl.
III.n5[Vol.XII, 78;Alluntis
ad essen& Wolter
3.34]:"Si relatio
comparata
tiamestres,autergoad se,autad alterum;
sitresad se qualitercunque,
quodrelatio
videtur
includere
contradictionem
. . . Istaconsequentia
persimile:
quiasi homo
probatur
etradoneetiam,
secundum
quiapraediintelligit:
quodrationale,
intelligit:
ergorationale
convenit
rei."
convenit
alicuiperrationem
catum,
alicuius,
quod
prius
42Quodl.
Ill.n[Vol.XII, 78; Alluntis
& Wolter
3.40]:"Etcuminfertur;
ergoutest
in simili
intellectu.
Et ultra,
velutidemessentiae,
estresad alterum,
conceditur
essentia,
cumdicisergoessentia
estresad alterum."
modo
velformaliter.
Primo
hocpotest
peridentitatem,
"Respondeo,
intelligi
dupliciter,
et estsensusdicti,quoddivinitas
estres,quae estad alterum,
possetconcedi,
quiaest
suamformam
nonautem
secundum
estconcedendum
formaliter,
paternitas;
quoddivinitas
sitad alterum."
43The subsequent
of reduplication
of thelogicaltheory
bearsthisout.Cf.
history
Summa
etIdeologica
1974,11.16,
Ockham,
, vol.1,St.Bonaventure
Philosophica
Logicae,
Opera
St.Bonaventure
Artis
Tractatus
160-79[p. 295].Walter
De Puntate
Logicae
Longior,
Burleigh,
1955,II.III.3 [175,30-176,10].

18:51:30 PM

ANDTRINITY
SGOTUS
ON INCARNATION

105

relations.The relationof paternityseems to distinguishGod the Father

fromthe otherdivinePersons.The generalproblem,of how a difference
in relationcauses different
persons,becomes especiallyacute forGod the
Father:He is the One which mustbe presupposedin order forthereto
be the relationsconstituting
the otherPersons.So it seems absurd to say
thatthoseveryrelationsconstituteHim who is theirpresupposedbasis.44
Scotus startsto resolve this problem by distinguishing
paternityas a
relationand as a property:as a propertyit constitutesthe Father; as a
relation,it does not; ratherit presupposesthe realityof the Father,and
is concernedwith generatingthe Son, the second Person.45Despite this
Scotus says that paternityexistsin only one way in reality.
distinction,
The same point holds for "a relationcompared with its correlateis a
thing"and "a relationcomparedwithits essenceis an aspect": the subject
of the formerhas the same structureas 'paternityas a property,'and
the latterthe same as 'paternityas a relation.'
All these qua phrases have to hold specificatively
and not reduplicafor
the
are
to
make
the
tively:
qualifications supposed
contrarypredications,of "property"and "relation"consistent.As with the Incarnation,
Scotus uses specificative
propositionsto show the doctrineof the Trinity
consistent.Here he seems to recognizeexplicitlythe two typesof specificativepropositionsthat I have distinguished
above.46
the
time
of
the
Scotus
seems
to have setded upon showQuodlibets
,
By
the
doctrine
of
the
consistent
abstracing
Trinity
by usingqua propositions
tively.He uses these qua propositionsto expresshis formaldistinctions.
The abstractivetype of qua propositionhad much more respectability
44QuodL
IV.n5[Vol.XII, 100;Alluntis
& Wolter
4.29].
45Quod
III.n5[Vol. XII, 100;Alluntis
& Wolter
4.30].
46"Moreover
I askwhatyouunderstand?
whenyousay:paternity
as a property,
either
constitutive
ofa person
is reduplicative,
or (aut)something
{vel)heretheformal
[thing]
inreor(vel)itsformal
constitutive
inintellects
Ifin thesecondway,thengrant
following
ofthatformal
which
thatfollows,
thatitis nothing
butpaternity
as paternity,
constitutive
sincethatmodefollows
andtherefore
theconstitutive
is a perse
onlythatformal
reality,
If in thefirst
fortheother.
ofreason
entity
way,sincetheproperty
givestherelation
it follows
thatthatfirst
Personis constituted
ofreason,
(rationis)
precisely,
bya relation
which
is absurd."
4.n5[Vol.XII, 102;Alluntis
& Wolter
cum
QuodL
4.38].("Praeterea
utpaternitas:
velreduplicatur
ibiformale
constitudicis,
paternitas
quaeroquidintelligis?
tivum
in re,velin intellectu
autaliquidconsequens
formale
constitutivum
eius.
personae:
Si secundo
modo:da ergoilludformale
constitutivum
ad quodsequitur
illud,quodipsum
nonestnisipaternitas,
utpaternitas:
nisiillamrealitatem
quiamodusillenonconsequitur
formalem:
estperse entitas
ad alterum.
Si in primo
modo,cumproergoconstitutivum
relationem
rationis
constituprietas
praecise
importt,
sequitur,
quodillaprimapersona
iturrelatione
rationis:
quodestabsurdum."
I discuss
andinterpret
thispassageinReduplicative
intheTheology
Duns
Propositions
ofJohn
Scotus
Turnhout
1997.
, in:G. Marmo(ed.),Vestigia,
Verba,
Imagines,

18:51:30 PM

106

ALLANBCK

in Aristotelianphilosophythan did the fallaciouslymereological.Scotus

could thenargue thatthe doctrineof the Trinityhas as muchintelligibility
as theclaimsof science.Still,of course,thetruthof thisdoctrineliesbeyond
the limitsof naturalexperience,in revelation.
Summary
Let me then summarizethe theologicalresultsof my investigation.
The Incarnation:Scotus offerstwo waysto understandthe Incarnation.
either(LI) as
The firstis to understandChrist'sattributesspecificatively:
attributes
a
of
whose
to
certain
an
reference
may
part
containing implicit
to the whole, as the healthof the heartimpliesthe health
be transferred
of the whole body. This versionhas the flaw that the originalpredication must be taken more or less figuratively,
by synecdoche.Or (1.2) as
as
divine.' This way provides
'uncreated
'created
as
human';
complexes:
In its defense,it might
and
ad
hoc.
contrived
consistencybut looks rather
be said that such complexityis always there,but is usually not stated
explicitly.
about the Incarnationabstrac(II) The secondway is to treatstatements
as
Scotus does, more clearly,
formal
distinctions,
just
tively,by making
with the Trinity.In this case the simple subject,Christ,has the simple
attributes,such as being created or being uncreated,but in different
the simplesubjectthathas thoseattribrespects.The thingor suppositum,
but not really.Still
that
a
is
is
utes,
formally,
singlething
distinguished,
the distinctionis not merelyconceptual: the subject has predicatedof
it contradictory
aspects
propertiesin virtueof its reallyhaving different
or relations.So too Socrates builds qua builder but does not build qua
doctor.
of thisdoctrinetoo along
The Trinity:Scotus arguesforthe consistency
the same lines as the second way (II). The threedivinePersonsare really
the same, but are distinguished
formallyin virtueof being the objectsof
when
attributes
different
relations.Contradictionis avoided since different
the qualificationof that
predicatedcarrywith them, at least implicitly,
in a loose sense the
in
asserted
to
hold.
which
are
they
Although
respect
This is the mancannot.
can
be
dropped,still,stricdy,they
qualifications
ner in whichAristotlespeaksabout whathas beingwhen discussing"being
qua being."
Scotus then ends up with an abstractiveanalysisof qua propositions
concerningthe Trinityand, at times,for the Incarnation.He ties this

18:51:30 PM

SGOTUS
ON INCARNATION
ANDTRINITY

107

analysisto the then currentstandardsof Aristotelianscience. By parity

of reasoning,he can argue, the theologicalclaims about the Incarnation
and the Trinityhave as much plausibilityas the scientificclaims about
the world of perception.Whatever plausibilityScotus' analyses of the
Incarnationand the Trinityhave followsfrom their having the same
structures
and complexitiesthatmore usual substancesand personshave.
Like Scotus' views on qua propositions,his views on the consistencyof
the doctrinesof the Incarnationand the Trinitypersistedand seemed to
constitutethe High Medieval consensus:even those like Ockham who
criticizedScotus accepted them.47
Kutztown,Pennsylvania
Kutztown
University

47AllanWolter,
Ithaca1990,
DunsScotus
ThePhilosophical
, ed.M. Adams,
theology
ofJohn
onIdentity
andDistinction
26
Ockham
27. However,
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
Adams,
Marilyn
but
Scotusinusingformal
thatOckham
doesnotfollow
distinctions,
(1970),6; 59,claims
disdoesallowformal
shedoesadmit(pp. 62; 71)thatOckham
them.
However,
rejects
etexcedens
themas "singulare
whileregarding
tinctions
whenrequired
dogma,
byCatholic
omnem
intellectum

18:51:30 PM

, Lies, and HumanActionin

Language
s Treatment
Williamof Ockham'
ofInsolubles
MARK REUTER

This paper is inspiredby two remarksof Paul Spade. At the end of his
article on insolubilia
he draws several interestingcontrastsbetween the
medievalattitudetowardslogicalparadoxesand the modern.1The medievals, he says:
didnotseemtohavehadany'crisis
aboutthese
mentality'
paradoxes.
Although
they
wrotea greatdealaboutthem,
thereis no hintthattheythought
theparadoxes
werecrucial
testcasesagainst
whichtheir
wholelogicandsemantics
fail.2
might
Spade has elsewherecontrastedthismedievalview with that of Quine's.
Quine views the paradoxes in just thisway, as crucial testcases. Consequently,our inabilityto solvethemwillmean thatwe mustrepudiate"part
of our conceptual heritage."3Again, Spade suggeststhat the medievais
did not learn much fromtheirtreatmentof the paradoxes. He says:
Themedievais
didnotdrawgreattheoretical
lessons
from
theinsolubles.
Theydid
notseemtothink
theparadoxes
showed
aboutthe
anything
verydeeporimportant
nature
oflanguage
oritsexpressive
Onceagain,contrast
modern
attitudes.
capacity.
Onemight
dowelltospeculate
onthereasons
forthesedifferences
between
medieval
andmodern
semantic
theory.4
The modernattitudementionedhere by Spade is nicelyexpressedin the
recentwork of Keith Simmons.5Simmons thinksthat the Liar paradox
1 PaulVincent
andJan
, in: Norman
Kretzmann,
Spade,Insolubilia
Anthony
Kenny,
Medieval
, Cambridge
(eds.),Cambridge
1982,246-53;the
Pinborg
ofLater
History
Philosophy
contrasts
aredrawn
on p. 253.
2 Ibid.
, 253.
3 W.V.
andOther
, NewYork1966,11;andcf.Spade's
Quine,TheWays
ofParadox
Essays
inRecent
remarks
Research
onMedieval
40 (1979),8; reprinted
inid.,lies,
, in:Synthese,
Logic
andLogic
intheLateMiddle
London1988.
Language
Ages,
Medieval
, in: Cambridge
Spade,Insolubilia
History
ofLater
{op.cit.,n. 1),253.
Philosophy,
5 K.
Ona Medieval
Solution
totheLiarParadox
and Philosophy
Simmons,
, in: History
ofLogic,8 (1987),121-40,
andhismorerecent
andmuchmoredetailed
in
treatment
andtheLiar:Anessay
ontruth
andthediagonal
1993.In addi, Cambridge
Universality
argument
tionto Simmons
I havebenefited
from
therecent
ofFranois
discussions
Une
Recanati,
solution
mdivale
etsonintrt
duparadoxe
duMenteur
lasmantique
, in:Archologie
pour
contemporaine
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,1

18:51:40 PM

OF INSOLUBLES
TREATMENT
WILLIAM
OF OGKHAM'S

109

has a lot to teach us about the expressiveabilityof natural languages.

What is interesting
about Simmons'excellentand extensivetreatmentof
the Liar paradox is that he owes his inspirationforthe solutionhe propounds to various medieval discussionsof insolubles. His painstaking
analysis(nearly200 pages worth)fillsout in great detail the suggestions
presentedby the medievalauthors.But Simmons'analysisin a way confirmsSpade's point:while the medievaisare verymuch interestedin language and logic, they do not seem to draw out at great lengthdeep
lessonsabout languagein the same way thatwe do. Why? Spade is right:
thisis a questionworthspeculatingabout.
And speculateis what I propose to do. In particularwhat I want to
of the Liar paradox. In conis Williamof Ockham's treatment
investigate
trastwith Simmons and Spade who look to the paradox to teach us
as we shall
somethingdeep about human language,Ockham's treatment,
humnus
an
actus
he
calls
on
what
deal
of
a
, "a
see, puts great
emphasis
insolof
the
in
for
the
human act," that is responsible, part,
generation
uble. I shalldevotemostof the paper to speculatingabout what thisterm
mightmean in Ockham and just how this act is responsiblefor generating a paradox. The aim of thispaper, then,will be to offeran interpretationof thistermin Ockham thatfitswiththisparticularcontextas
it will suggestan answerto Spade's
well as withthe corpus.Furthermore,
what
Ockham means by the termactus
we
understand
for
once
question,
humnus
we shall see thatforOckham the treatmentof insolublesis more
an admissionof human frailtyand limitationratherthan as with Quine
a crisisand loss of our intellectualheritage.I shall, however,begin with
a briefsketchof Ockham's resolutionof the Liar paradox. In the light
of Simmons' work such an expositionalmost seems unnecessary,but
the overviewwill locate us in the historicalcontextthat will serve to
for our discussion,introduceus to the main probprovidea framework
lems forconsideration,and suggestan obvious approach forunderstanding thisterm.6

onTerms
3 (1983),251-64;PaulSpade,Ockham
du signe(= Papersin Mediaeval
Studies),
19
in:
Liar
Paradox
on
the
with
Remarks
and
First
and
Second
Vivarium,
,
Intention,
Imposition
of
London1988,
andLogic
intheLateMiddle
in Lies,Language
Ages,
(1981),47-55,reprinted
du
etaudbut
auxiiiesicle
insolubles
despropositions
andMarie-Louise
Roure,La problmatique
in:Archives
etTh.Bradwardine,
W.Burleigh
destraits
de W.Shyreswood,
del'dition
suivi
xive,
etlittraire
du moyen
d'histoire
doctrinale
age,37 (1970),205-326.
in the
tolight
a mistake
becauseitbrings
ofthetextis alsovaluable
Thisexposition
andtheappendix.
text.Cf.note24 below,

18:51:40 PM

110

MARKREUTER

Ockham's most detailed treatmentof insoluble sophisms [insolubilia

7
, 5] is foundin SummaLogicae
sophismata
, III-3, chapter46. A great deal
of the historicalcontextcan be found if we read the opening sentence
of this chapterattentively.
It begins with the followingremark:
insolubles
it mustbe notedthattheyare noton thataccount
called
Concerning
insoluble
becausetheycannotbe solvedin anyway,butbecausethey
bySophistae
aresolvedwithdifficulty.8
A numberof termspromptquestions.To begin with,thereis the term
'insoluble.'By Ockham's time it already has a long history.Earlier uses
of the term,fromthe early twelfthcentury,may have referredto someto deterthingthatwas merely'futile'or to a questionthatwas difficult
mine.9In the later half of the twelfthcenturythe termappears forthe
firsttime in a technicalsense when it is used to referto paradoxical
utterancesor sentences.10
An anonymoustractfromaround thistimehad
defined 'insoluble' as 'a circular and necessarydeduction [leading] to
both halves of a contradiction.'11
And it is this sense of insoluble,as a
which
logical problem
yieldsby deductivereasoninga pair of statements
that are contradictory,
that survivesamong logiciansdown to Ockham's
day. By thistimeit had become one of the set topicsin logic. Compare
the standardtreatmentof fallacies(onlyin this case, however,the topic
continuesto be treatedtoday).

'
'
'
Secondly there are the terms Sophistaeand sophismata
(both plural),
which also bear a technicalsense.12We mightgloss the term Sophista
:'
7 Numbers
refer
tothelinenumbers
ofchapter
46 in theedition
following
quotations
oftheSumma
Logicae,
Opera
Philosophica
[hence:
OPh],Vol.I, edited
Boehner,
byPhilotheus
St.Bonaventure,
N.Y.1974;Ockham's
O.F.M.,Gedeon
Gi,O.F.M.,andStephanus
Brown,
otherdiscussions
ofinsolubles
canbe found
in ibid.,
III-1, chapter
4, andinDe sophisticis
elenchis
Aristotelis
bookII, chapter
section
ed. F. Del Punta,OPh III, 267-8.
,
10,
4,
8 Ed. Boehner
sciendum
estquodnonideodicuntur
e.a.,744,2-4:"Circainsolubilia
a sophistis
sedquiacumdifficultate
solaliquainsolubilia
quianullomodopossunt
solvi,
vuntur."
Alltranslations
offered
in thispaperaremyownunless
otherwise
noted.
9 Forthisusecf.
JohnofSalisbury
, I, 3, lines31-3[= PL 199,
(1110-1180),
Metalogicon
1991(Corpus
Chris829a],in:IoannesSaresberiensis,
, ed.J.B.Hall,Turnhout
Metalogicon
Continuatio
Vol.98).
tianorum,
Mediaevalis,
10Cf. PaulVincent
in theMediaeval
Insolubiliain:
Spade,FiveEarlyTheories
Literature^
25 (1987),24-46.
Vivarium,
11L.M. de
notes
ontheMediaeval
tract
De insolubilibus,
with
theedition
Rijk,Some
ofa tract
theendofthetwelfth
4 (1966),83-115,p. 105:"Insolubile
dahngftom
, in:Vivarium,
century
estad utramque
contradictionis
circularis
et necessaria
deductio."
partem
Fora discussion
oftheseterms
cf.OlgaWeijers,
La spcificit
duvocabulaire
universitaire
duXIIIesuele
dela vieintellectuelle
au moyen
, in:O. Weijers
(ed.),Terminologie
, Turnhout
ge
Medieval
1988,41-6,and Cambridge
Histoiy
, (op.cit.,n. 1),23,545,547,
ofLater
Philosophy
and556-8.

18:51:40 PM

WILLIAM
TREATMENT
OF OCKHAM'S
OF INSOLUBLES

111

(singular)with our own word 'sophomore,'but 'advanced undergraduate' seems more on the mark. It refersto someone who has already
'
made considerableprogressin university
studies.13The term csophismata
refersto a type of disputationconnected with the Faculty of Arts in
medievaluniversities,
whichmembersof the university,
,
includingSophistae
in
on
some
These
known
occasions.
as
,
engaged
disputations,
obligationes
were the medievaldescendantof the public debate outlinedby Aristotle
in the Topics.These debates had a specificformand were governedby
a strictset of rules.14Returningto Ockham's text and pullingall these
termstogether,we can now see thathis discussionof insolubilia
sophismata
would referto the specificsubjectmatterof a particulartypeof disputation engagedin by advanced undergraduates.The specificsubjectwould
be one or more of the logical paradoxes,which by Ockham's time had
alreadybeen discussedby logiciansfor at least two centuries.The type
would be thatof the obligatio
scholastic
of disputation
[formal,rule-governed
senses
of
these
the
technical
terms,a proper
Thus, given
disputation].15
understandingof the medieval treatmentof insoluble sophisms must
locate them withinthe logical curriculumof a medieval universityand
.
the practiceof disputationknownas the obligatio
The treatmentof insolublesby medieval logicians withinthe pracraisesthe questionof theirassociation.Why are thetwo
ticeof the obligatio
treated
commonly
together?An easy answer suggestsitselfat once. If
is a typeof public debate in which one is tryingto get the
the obligatio
logical betterof one's opponent,then one way of tryingto unseat one's
opponentmightbe to introducea paradox into the discussion,to drive
the discussioninto areas that are dark and murkyin the hope that the
opponentwill be trippedup. Indeed, we mighteven thinkthat that is
just the kind of strategyan undergraduatemightadopt. While I findthis
13Cf.theuseofthetermat Summa
39,line19.
III-3,chapter
Logicae,
14Fora
Summa
oftheserulescf.Ockham,
III-3,chapters
39-46;forsome
Logicae,
survey
andE.J.
H.A.G.Braakhuis,
ofobligationes
cf.thepapersbyMikkoYijnsuuri,
discussion
Scholastische
in KlausJacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie:
Ashworth
zu denlogischen
Forschungen
dela disLeiden1993;Alainde Libera.La logique
undsemantischen
korrekten
Folgerns,
Regeln
etConflits
rhandA. Lempereur
cussion
dansl'universit
mdivale
, in:M. Meyer
(eds.),Figures
and
Lavenham's
Edition
Bruxelles
1990,59-81;Paul Spade,Richard
Obligationes:
toriques,
Fland's
33 (1978),225-42,andRobert
di storiadellafilosofia,
Comments
critica
, in:Rivista
42 (1980),41-60;L.M. de Rijk,SomeThirteenth
Studies,
, in:Mediaeval
Century
Obligationes
Tracts
ontheGame
12 (1974),94-123,13 (1975),22-54and 14
, in:Vivarium,
ofObligation
intheHistory
in:TheJournal
TheTechniques
26-49;I. Angelelli,
ofLogic,
ofDisputation
(1976),
deobligationibus
in
TheRoleoftheTractatus
ofPhilosophy,
67 (1970),800-15;M.A.Brown,
26 (1966),26-35.
Mediaeval
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
Logic
15Cf.
Spade[op.cit.,n. 1).

18:51:40 PM

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easy answerplausible I also findit a bit superficial.Hence the following

suggestion.Central to Ockham's treatmentof insolublesis a consideration of the way language is used. In particular,as we shall see, Ockham
is sensitiveto the use of discourseto talk about (uttered)discourse.This
concern,I shall argue, occupies a more prominentplace in his account
than has commonlybeen thought.Thus, I shall tryto show that a key
elementof his resolutionof the paradox concernsnot so much the semantic predicates'true' and 'false,5but ratherthe speech acts in which such
termsare used. I suspectthatthisaspect of Ockham's treatment
has been
overlookedbecause philosophersof language have tended to focus (for
the purpose of analysis)on language more as an abstractartefactrather
than a livinghuman mediumof expression.In the course of such analysis the terms'true' and 'false' are taken to apply to sentences.In contrastthe emphasison the use of language by medievallogiciansis easily
explained by the contextin which these problemswere treated.If this
claim comes as a surprise,it is because we have forgotten
that the contextout of which Ockham's treatmentcomes is that of oral, public disputation.But beforeI takeup thissuggestionlet me firstoutlineOckham's
treatment.
With the precisionnaturalto a logician Ockham beginshis treatment
of insolublesophismswitha definitionand a clear statementof the conditionsunder which theyoccur:
areinsoluble
whenthrough
conseHence,itmustbe notedthatsophisms
apparent
which
seemto be governed
somecontingent
statement
quences,
rules,
bynecessary
itsopposite.
Forthatreason
these[statements]
arecalledinsoluble
it
because
implies
is difficult
toblocksuchconsequences.
Andsucharguments
cannot
be madeexcept
whena <deliberate>
human
act[actus
considers
thisterm'false'(orsome
humnus]16
similar
or thisterm'true'(orsomesimilar
as
term)
affirmatively
term)
negatively,
itis in thecaseofthis[statement]:
"Socrates
or this[one]:
false,"17
says
something
"Socrates
doesnotsaysomething
true"(5-12).18
16The
forthisovertranslation
willbe givenbelow.
justification
"Sortes
I havetranslated
theLiarsentence
dicit
as "Socrates
falsum"
sayssomething
false."
translates
itas "Socrates
Mediaeval
Spadesometimes
falsely"
speaks
(cf.TheOrigins
ofthe
Insolubilia
in:Franciscan
33 (1973),302)andas "Socrates
afabeutters
Literature,
Studies,
"
hood
cf.Spade'sOckham
onSelf-Reference
ofFormal
(myemphasis,
, in:NotreDameJournal
inLies,Language
andLogic
intheLate
Logic,15 (1974),298;n.b.bothpapersarereprinted
Middle
n. 5) translates
itas "Socrates
., n. 3);Simmons
Ages
(op.cit
(op.cit.,
saysa falsehood."
Summa
, III-3,ed. Boehner
e.a.,744,5-12:"Undesciendum
logicae
quodinsolubilia
suntquandoperconsequentias
sophismata
apparentes,
quaevidentur
regulan
perregulas
ex propositione
infertur
sua opposita;
necessarias,
aliquacontingenti
quae ideodicuntur
esttalesconsequentias
Et taliaargumenta
nonpossunt
insolubilia,
quiadifficile
impediri.
fieri
nisiquandoactushumnus
istum
terminm
velaliquem
'falsum,'
respicit
consimilem,

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113

These linesset the programmeforthispaper, fortheysuggestthreequestions:(i) What is an insoluble?;(ii)What does Ockham mean by affirmative
and (iii) What role does the actushumnus
and negativestatements?;
play
in generatingthe insoluble?
First,what is an insoluble? Ockham gives us a descriptionof the
insolublethatis standard.While it resemblesthe definitionfoundin the
Ockham is more explicit
century,19
anonymoustractfromthe late twelfth
in whichsuch problemsoccur. From his remarks
about the circumstances
we can draw out fournecessaryconditions:(i) theremustbe some set of
rules of inference;(ii) theremust be some (contingent)statementoffered
for consideration,such as the Liar claim; (iii) there must be an actus
or
and (iv) the statementmusthave a quality,eitheraffirmative
humanus'
Once these conditionshave been set out, he then goes on to
negative.20
of the Liar paradox (13-21). The casus [or the case
a
version
present
offeredfor consideration]stipulatesthat Socrates only makes this one
statement,the Liar statement,"Socrates says somethingfalse" (the affirmativecase) or "Socratesdoes not say somethingtrue"(thenegativecase).
Ockham then presentsargumentsfor each case to show that the single
statementofferedis both true and false. His presentationof these argumentsmake it clear that the context of this debate is that of the
scholasticdebate].21
[formal,rule-governed
obligatio
actus
humnus
aside
the
(conditioniii) forthe moment,what do
Setting
we have? None of the other conditionspose a problem individually.
Initially,the rules governingthe deductionseem to be in order (condition i). The claim that Socrates says somethingfalse seems a perfectly
acceptablethingto say on some occasions (conditionii). And so it seems
completelyin order to eitheraffirmor deny it (conditioniv). It is the
appearance of an unwelcomeopposing statementthat presentsa problem, forfromapparentlyacceptable circumstances,acceptable premises,
and in accordance with apparentlyacceptable rules of inferencewe
have an unacceptableconclusion.Such then is Ockham's understanding
sicutestde ista
velaliquem
velhuneterminm
consimilem,
'verum,'
affirmative;
negative;
nondicitverum.'"
et de ista'Sortes
'Sortes
dicitfalsum'
19Cf.abovenote11.
20I takeit thatthislastcondition
in questions,
statements
uttered
excludes
wishes,
etc.
prayers
21Note
ofthecasus
inthepresentation
ofan underlying
thepresence
dialogue
especially
"ThenI askyou"[tunc
thechapter:
inlines13-21,
andthroughout
] ifitis trueor
quaero
. . ."
false(line14).Notetoothe"Ifyoushould
say. . ." (lines15and 18),"ifitis argued
(line34),and"ifitis said. . ." (line60).

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lies in knowinghow to block

of an insoluble. For him the difficulty
such inferences.
Once the problemhas been presentedOckham then says:
Andfora
becauseitis solvedwithdifficulty.
is calledinsoluble
Andthisargument
it mustbe notedthatsucha contingent
to thisandall others,
solution
statement,
thisterm'false'(orsomesimilar
contains
either
itsopposite,
thatoughtto imply
Iftheformer,
itmustbe affirmative
orthisterm'true'(orsomesimilar
term).
term)
should
be saidthatitis false.
anditshould
Hence,ifSocrates
begintosay,"Socrates
is false.22
itmustbe saidthatthatstatement
false,"
sayssomething
The above text representshalf of the firststep of Ockham's resolution.
I say "half" because I have only quoted the part treatingthe affirmative
statement.A parallel argumentmust be made for treatingthe negative
a definite
statement.
Ockham'sfirstmove is to assigningthe Liar statement
truthvalue. What determinesthe assignmentis the qualityof the statement.The affirmative
statement("Socratessays somethingfalse")is given
the value false.Or if the negativestatementof the Liar is used ("Socrates
does not say somethingtrue"),thisis given the value true.23What motivates thispairingof assignmentswill become clear when we considerthe
next step.
The next step involves Ockham's attemptto block the problematic
inference.Since his strategyis the same for both affirmative
and negative statements(cf. line 49), I shall present only his treatmentof the
former.The inferencethat needs to be blocked is the following:
A

(1) This is false: Socrates says somethingfalse.24

(2) Socrates says this.
(3) Therefore,Socrates says somethingfalse.25

22Summa , III-3,ed. Boehner

dicitur
insolue.a.,745,22-8:"Istudargumentum
logicae
solvitur.
Etad solutionem
omnium
estsciendum
istius
etaliorum
bile,quiade difficili
quod
talispropositio
ex qua debetinferri
suarepugnans,
velhabethuneterminm
contingens,
'falsum'
vel aliquemconsimilem,
'verum'
vel huneterminm
vel aliquemconsimilem.
Si primomodo,oportet
et debetdiciquodsitfalsa;undesi Sortes
quodsitaffirmativa,
sicloqui'Sortes
dicendum
estquodistapropositio
estfalsa."
dicitfalsum,'
incipiat
23It should
the
be notedthatBradwardine
takestheopposite
He assigns
approach.
statement
thevaluefalseandtheaffirmative
statement
thevaluetrue.Cf.Roure
negative
is
itmight
which
notseemtomatter
(op.cit.,n. 5),241.Primafacie,
waytheassignment
whenmoreattenis moreplausible
made,butas I shallarguebelowOckham's
approach
tionis paidtowhathe meansbythetermactus
humnus.
24Thereis a
Sortes
ditfalwiththetexthere.The textreads"haecestvera:
problem
"
' from
which
has
sum
theterm'falsa
theapparatus
(line54).WhatI havedoneis restore
seetheappendix
tothispaper.
Fora discussion
ofthisproblem
good
manuscript
support.
25Summa , III-3,ed. Boehner
'haecest
e.a.,746,53-5:"Et tuncnonsequitur
Logicae
Sortes
dicitfalsum.'"
falsa[veraed.]:Sortes
et Sortes
dicitfalsum;
dicithanc;igitur

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115

We have already seen that Ockham assigns the affirmative

Liar statement the value false,and given the statementof the case [the casus
] we
know that this is exactlywhat Socrates says. So why not conclude that
Socrates does indeed say somethingfalse?To draw the conclusionis to
enterthe paradox; to deny it would violatethe rulesof inference,forthe
above argumentis a clear instanceof the inferencefrominferiorto superiorand is valid in form.26
An uncontroversial
example of the same argumentwhich Ockham gives is the inferencefromspecies to the genus: if
Socratesis a man, then Socratesis an animal. If thisis a valid inference,
the objectorclaims,whycannot the move in argumentA be sanctioned?
If Socrates says this false statement,then Socrates says somethingfalse.
Surely,thereis no troublewiththe inference,"if Socrates tellsthisjoke,
then Socrates tellssome joke." Both inferencesseem to be of the same
valid pattern.So whyaccept one and rejectthe other?The worrybefore
Ockham is how to preservethisvalid inferencepatternand yet rule out
the problematiccases. There is the further
worryof whetherthiscan be
done in a way that is not purelyarbitrary.Are the problematiccases
ruled out simplybecause theyare problematic?And each of these worries in turnpointsto the generalunderlyingproblemposed by the confrontation
betweenour assumptionsabout language and the paradox.
to the supposiTo block this inferenceOckham applies a restriction
What motivatesthisrestriction
is not immetion of the predicateterm.27
will
of
the
have
to
be
filled
out. What
clear
so
some
diately
reasoning
he says is this:
doesnotsaysomeThegrounds
ofthisrejection
arethatinthisstatement
"Socrates
ofwhich
forthiswholestatement
true"thepredicate
is notableto supposit
thing
not
reason
itispart,
, i.e.thatitispartofit(39-41,
myemphasis).28
forthis
although
precisely

26Cf.Summa , III-3,ed. Boehner

e.a.,746,60-1.
Logicae
27To
thatit
to saying
is equivalent
fora statement
saythatthepredicate
supposits
in for,"or "substitutes
for."Simmons
"takes
theplaceof,""stands
(op.cit.,n. 5, 1993),
in modern
"Fora
thistechnical
201,n. 18 hasnicely
expression
equivalents:
expressed
ofreference;
is roughly
to thenotion
notion
ofsupposition
name,themedieval
equivalent
relaofthesatisfaction
to theconverse
fora predicate,
thenotion
is roughly
equivalent
is to
fora givenutterance
tion.In particular,
then,to saythattheterm'false'supposits
butmoreaccesisintheextension
of'false'."
Fora nolessrigorous
saythattheutterance
etlesingulier
cf.Pierre
Guillaume
d'Ockham
siblediscussion
ofsupposition
, Paris1989,
Alfri,
299-361.
28Summa , III-3,ed.Boehner
est,quia
e.a.,745,38-41:"Etratiohuiusnegationis
Logicae
in istapropositione
nonpotest
'Sortesnondicitverum'
supponere
proista
praedicatum
hocpraecise
totapropositione
nonpropter
cuiusestpars,quamvis
quodestparseius."

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blocks the problematic

The firstthingto consideris how this restriction
inference.Next we shall explorethe reasoningwhichmay have motivated
whatlies behindthephrase"notpreciselyforthisreason."
it,in particular,
thatOckham applies here relatesto the casus[thestateThe restriction
mentof the case] and the assignmentof truthvalues to the Liar statement.
Given the case where Socrates says, "Socrates says somethingfalse"and
that is all he says, Ockham assignsthis affirmative
statementthe value
has
Socrates
not
a
falsehood
other
thanthis
. The quesbecause
uttered
false,
tion remainswhetherhe has said somethingfalse in utteringonly the
Liar statement.In the negativecase, where Socratessays, "Socratesdoes
not say somethingtrue," and that is all he says, Ockham assignsthis
statementthe value true,forno truthother
thanthishas been spoken.And
as beforethe question remainsopen: Has Socrates said somethingtrue
in utteringthis instanceof the Liar statement?Consider the affirmative
case. By restricting
the suppositionof the predicatephrase "something
false" in the Liar statement,Ockham makes it clear that the predicate
cannot suppositfor the whole Liar statement,i.e. the predicatecannot
referto the statementof whichit is a part. Hence, the predicatemustsupposit forsome otherfalsestatementthat Socrates has made. The restriction then forcesargumentA into A*.
A* (1) This is false: Socrates says somethingfalse.
(2) Socrates says this.
thanthis.
(3) Therefore,Socrates says somethingfalse other
The firstpremisestatesthe assignedtruthvalue. The second tell us what
Socratessays. The conclusionshowsexplicidythe forceof the restriction.
Given the statementof the case [the casus
] argumentA* is clearlyfallacious because Socrates only makes one statement.
But let us returnto our earlierexample of a valid move frominferior
to superior.
B

Socrates tells thisjoke.

Therefore,Socrates tellssome joke.

Ockham stillthinksthat this is a valid formof inference.No restriction

is applied here. What thenis the difference
betweenargumentB and the
of
both
which
exhibitthe same form?
followingargument,argumentC,
C

Socrates says this false statement.

Therefore,Socrates says somethingfalse.

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WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM'S
TREATMENT
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117

Ockham explicitly
discussesargumentC in his commentaryon the SophisticalRefutations
of Aristotle.There he imposesthe same restriction
on supwhat
but
is
about
the
discussion
there
is
that
Ockham
position,
interesting
makesclear thatthe restriction
turnsthe problematicinferencesinto clear
instancesof the fallacysecundum
He explains as follows:
quidet simpliciter.
Andso sucha consequent
is notvalid:"Socrates
therefore,
saysthisfalsestatement;
Socrates
butis thefallacy
secundum
Andthis
false,"
sayssomething
quidetsimpliciter.
in thatstatement
because
"Socrates
false"theterm'something
false'
sayssomething
cannot
forthisfalsestatement,
thatis "Socrates
false."29
supposit
sayssomething
This analysisofthefallaciousinferenceraisesa further
question,forit is not
that
the
clear
inference
conforms
to thispattern.30
immediately
troubling
The fallacysecundum
et
involves
the
illicit
quid simpliciter
logical move
a
from statementtaken with restriction
(.secundum
quid) to the statement
31 How the illicit move works can
taken withoutrestriction[simpliciter).
perhaps best be seen by consideringtwo clear instancesof this fallacy.
Ockham discussesthe followingtwo examples.
D

X is producibleby God.
Therefore,* is.

* is not.
Therefore,* is not producibleby God.32

Ockham diagnosesthese fallaciesby pointingout how the presence or

absence of the predicatephrase eitherrestrictsor expands the range of
thesuppositionof the subjectterm.In theseexamplesthe predicatephrase
"producibleby God" expands the suppositionof the subjecttermso that
it ranges over a universalwhole (all possible objects); its absence limits
the suppositionto part of thatuniversalwhole (presendyexistingthings).
In some cases like the above the slide fromthe part to the whole or the
29De
OPh
elenchis
Aristotelis
, BookII, chapter
10,section
4, ed. F. Del Punta,
sophisticis
nonvalet'Sortesdicithocfalsum;
III, 268,lines9-12:"Et itatalisconsequentia
igitur
secundum
Et hoc quia in ista
Sortesdicitfalsum,'
sed estfallacia
quidet simpliciter.
li 'falsum'
'Sortesdicitfalsum,'
nonpotestsupponere
prohoc falso,quodestSortem
dicerefalsum."
30After
n. 1)says:"Nevertheless,
howcommon
thisdiagnosis
wasSpade{op.cit.,
noting
do notfitverywellthepattern
ofthefallacy
secundum
insolubles
, so that
quidetsimpliciter
werealways
suchapproaches
strained"
(p. 247).
I am muchindebted
to Simmons
forhistreatment
ofthisfallacy
andforshowing
howtheruleofrestriction
of
doesturntheproblematic
inferences
intoinstances
really
in muchgreater
thisfallacy.
1987{op.cit.,
He goesintothematter
detail;cf.Simmons
n. 5), 128-32,
or Simmons
1993{op.cit.,n. 5), 89-91.
32Cf.Summa
13.
III-4,chapter
Logicae,

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MARKREUTER

whole to the part may be obvious. In othercases, such as the Liar, this
slip is not as easily detected.Simmons explains Ockham's reasoningin
thisway:
we take'falsehood'
to supposit
infer
theconclusion,
fora
Whenwe illegitimately
fora universal
whenin factit supposits
whole(all thefalsehoods),
universal
part
ofthefallacious
(someofthefalsehoods).
Again,thereis a termin theconclusion
wholeforwhich
we think
thatsupposits
foronlya partoftheuniversal
argument
itstands.33
The impositionof a restrictionon the suppositionof the term 'somethingfalse' in the conclusionturnsargumentC into the fallacysecundum
What is interesting
to note is that in the commentary
quid et simpliciter.
of Aristotle(theearliertreatise)Ockham'sstateon the Sophistical
Refiitations
He says:
ment of the rule looks quite arbitrary.34
Onemustrespond
toallinsolubles
thatmode,namely,
theconthrough
bydenying
from
someterm
taken
witha demonstrative
which
indicates
some
sequence
pronoun,
tothisterm
taken
without
sucha pronoun.
Anithere
is noother
reason
content,
except
thatthecommon
termis notable to supposit
in thatstatement
forthatinferior
insomeother
sentences
itisabletosupposit
forthat(myemphasis).35
[term],
although
Here no explanationforthe restriction
on suppositionis given.It seems
simplyassertedas the way to deal with insolubles.And it is this arbitrarymove to block the paradox that has drawn criticism.Spade in
commentingon anotherpassage (SummaLogicae,III-3, chapter 39, lines
22-34), criticisesOckham forhis arbitraryand ad hocsolution.He says:
Ockham's
viewthenseemstobe thatself-reference
is tobe allowed
where
it
except
- in short,
wouldleadto paradox
itis licitexcept
it is illicit.
In theabsence
where
ofanyindependent
ofwhatmakes
account
casesillicit,
certain
sucha position
is not
AndOckham
no independent
account.36
veryrevealing.
provides
But is Ockham's solutionreallyas ad hocas Spade would have us believe?
of Aristotlethis
Certainlyforthe commentaryon the Sophistical
Refiitations
does seem to be the case. There the problematicinference(argumentC)
was blocked by placing a restriction
on supposition.But this restriction
33Simmons
1987{op.dt., n. 5), 132,or Simmons
1993{op.cit.,n. 5),91.
34Foran overview
ofthedating
cf.OPh I, 47*-56*.
35De
elenchis
Aristotelis
OPh
, bookII, chapter
10,section
4, ed. F. Del Punta,
sophisticis
"Etperistum
modum
estad omnia
III, 268,lines13-19:
insolubilia,
respondendum
negando
scilicet
ab aliquotermino
cumpronomine
demonstrativo
demonconsequentiam
sumpto
strante
ad ipsumterminm
Et nonest
sinetalipronomine.
aliquodcontentum,
sumptum
aliarationisiquiaterminus
communis
nonpotest
in iliapropositione
supponere
proilio
in aliispropositionibus
eo supponere."
inferiori,
quamvis
possit
pro
36Gf.
onSelfSpade,Ockham
Reference
(op.cit.,n. 3),299.

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WILLIAM
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119

was explainedwith referenceto the problematicinferenceof argument

C. Thus, the situationis circular.In lightof Spade's criticism,the question is whetherOckham does say anythingin his later,more complete
workthatbreaksout of thiscircle.37In the Summa
, afterintroducingthe
restriction
on suppositionin termsof wholes and parts,we have already
metthe tantalising
phrase"althoughnot preciselyforthisreason" [quamvis
nonpropter
hocpraecise
, (40)]. Are we at a loss to knowwhat reason Ockham
in
had
mind?
mighthave
- Ockham nowhere
I thinknot. AlthoughSpade is in one sense right
is
develops a complete and independentaccount of why self-reference
- I
to be restricted
to
think
that
Ockham
that
he
is
argue
wrong
gives
us no idea of how such an account is to be developed. Thus, in the
balance of the paper I shall seek to show that there are two pieces of
evidencethatsuggestthat Ockham has a reasonable,independentexplanationforthe eliminationof certainsingular,problematiccases, and that
whileOckham does not provideone, a completeaccount could be developed based upon what Ockham suggests.
The firstpiece of evidenceis WalterBurleigh'streatiseon insolubles.38
Ockham's treatmentof insoluble statementsclosely resembles that of
Burleigh's.Indeed the editorsof Ockham's texteven go so faras to suggestthatOckham had Burleigh'stextin frontof him when he wroteup
his own account.39
Whileit mightbe goingtoo farto suggestthatOckham
"plagiarised"Burleigh,it is at least worthaskingif Burleigh'sown account offersmore than a simple ad hocsolutionto these insolubles.
The second piece of evidence is Ockham's remark about the actus
humnus.
Earlierwe have seen thatOckham opened his treatmentby notthat
insolublestatementsare generatedwhen four conditionsconing
We
have alreadymentionedand discussedrules of inferenceand
verge.
the contingent(paradoxical) statement(the firsttwo). But he goes on to
conditionsthatwe have not yet discussed.These are the
give two further
eitheraffirmative
actushumnus
and the quality of a statement:
(expresssome
or
the
of
statement) negative(expressingthe denial
ing
acceptance
37
39
whatOckham
III-3,chapter
Logicae
saysat Summa
Spadeis ofcoursecriticising
buthefailsto
andso woulddisagree
withthedevelopmental
viewI amgoingtosuggest,
below.
46 whichI go on to develop
mention
considerations
from
III-3,chapter
38References
ofRoure's
thesection
andpagenumbers
to thistextwillbe according
edition
(op.cit n. 5).
to theSumma
Cf.theindex
, ed. Boehner
e.a., 744 wheretheysay:
fontium
Logicae
"Ockham
Burlaei."
tractatum
Gualteri
probabiliter
praeoculishabuit

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of some statement).I take these conditionsfromthe openinglines which

we have already seen:
Andsucharguments
cannot
be madeexcept
whenan "a <deliberate>
human
act"
considers
thisterm"false"
orthis
[actus
humnus]
(orsomesimilar
term)
affirmatively
term"true"(orsomesimilar
term)
negatively.40
The firstthingwe need to get clear about is how to understandthe term
actushumnus
. The translation
is definitely
forcingtheissue.So whatexactly
does Ockham mean? The main problemin answeringthisquestionis that
the term,so faras I know,occursonlyin two otherplaces in the corpus.41
I shall begin firstwith the text fromthe Summaand then pick up these
otheruses as well as the wider traditionin which Ockham is working.
In the above translation
I have glossedthe termas "a deliberatehuman
act." What are the grounds for this? To begin with there is the text.
What Ockham says is that the "actushumnus
..." The Latin verb
respicit.
here is respicere
which means, literally,'to look back at,' but which also
has the extended or metaphoricalsense of the mind looking back at,'
'reflectingupon' or 'considering'some object. It is this last sense that
seems demanded by the context:some formof mentalactivityor deliberativereflectionmust be the subject of the verb. This interpretation
is
1
lines
3-5
where
Ockham
that
the
insoluble
comes
strengthened
by
implies
to lightin two steps. First there is the utterance,in this case Socrates'
sole utterance"Socrates says somethingfalse." Next comes the moment
of reflection.Is what Socrates says true or false?42
This is the firstsmall step. From what we findin the textit is clear
that we should understandthe term as a type of cognitiveor deliberative reflection.But it seems likelythat Ockham means more than this.
40Summa , III-3,
46, ed. Boehner
e.a., 744,8-10:"Et taliaargumenta
Logicae
chapter
nonpossunt
fieri
nisiquandoactushumnus
istum
terminm
velaliquem
'falsum,'
respicit
velhuneterminm
velaliquem
negative."
consimilem,
affirmative;
Verum,'
consimilem,
41A searchoftheindexto the
etTheologica
refOpera
Philosophica
givesonlytwoother
erences
besides
thispassagein theSumma.
Theseare(i) OTh VI, Rep
ortatio,Question
XI
utrum
habitus
virtuosus
sitinparte
ed.Kelley
andEtzkorn,
Ockham
intellectiva,
352,17-8,where
is discussing
views.Item,
inomni
estvirtus
humana
esseprindpium
Aquinas'
potentia
quaepotest
actus
humani.
Herethegeneral
senseis simply
ofvirtue
or principle
of
beingan origin
human
action.
Thephrase
actus
humani
becomes
inlight
ofthetradiprindpium
significant
tioninwhich
itoccurs
thatisdiscussed
morefully
below,
X
(ii)OTh II, Ordination
Question
utrum
creatura
rationalis
sitimago
trinitatis
andGi,552-68.Notethattheindex
, ed. Brown
citesp. 561,butthetermoccursneither
therenorexplicitly
in thequestion.
anywhere
Ockham
's discussion
ofthisquestion,
hisdiscussion
oftwoactus
however,
including
suga lineofinterpretation
thatis developed
below.
gests
42Cf.the"ThenI ask
you"[tunc
(14)].
quaero

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121

For to leave the matterhere would implythat Ockham is simplyintroducing a commonplace,that all he is sayingis that deliberatereflection
on language brings to light certain paradoxes or problems. But that
claim is true of any subject matter,fromtaxonomyto the trades; it is
not just true about language. There must be somethingmore behind
Ockham's term.What this somethingmore is can, I think,be foundin
Burleigh'stext.
When Burleighbegins to presenthis own solutionto the insolubles,
he locatespartof the problemin an act involvingcognitiveself-reflection.
He pointsto situationswhere "the same act is reflectedback upon itself"
:], e.g. the "act of speakingabout an act
[idemactusreectitur
suprase ipsum
actum
dicendi
of speaking5[actusdicendi
(3.02-3.04)]. Moreover,in the
supra
kindsof acts: an 'act
same contextBurleightalksabout severaldifferent
of
an
'act
of speaking' [actusdicendi
] (i.e.
signification'[actussignificatus
],
the meaningof a term)and 'reflection'
or determining
the act of signifying
None of these acts presentproblemsin themselves.The prob[reflexi].
lem enters,Burleighsuggests,when these typesof acts become part of a
when
reflective
hierarchythat comes about when an act is self-reflexive,
it refersback to itselfor considersitself.These types of acts seem to
We do notjust talk;
involvea higher,or second-ordertypeof reflection.
we talkabout what we talk about. We do notjust reason and deliberate;
we deliberateabout our own processesof deliberation.And so on. What
about Burleigh'ssuggestionis that it is just this type of
is interesting
second-orderreflectionthat seems to be a distinctivefeatureof human
What I suggestthenis thatOckham uses the termactushumnus
thought.43
in thispassage to referto this type of second-ordercognitivereflection.
Thus it refersto the same kind of acts mentionedin Burleigh'stext(e.g.
speaking)but refersto them specificallyas they are found
signification,
withina reflective
hierarchy.
let us look again at Burof thisinterpretation
For indirectconfirmation
he notes:
of
statements
insoluble
sources
on
different
In
leigh. commenting
withthisexpresverb44
ofa transitive
theconjunction
Thefirst
sourcecomesfrom
Andso all theseare
of"true."
or withthenegation
or itsequivalent,
sion"false"
43Cf.theinfluential
Freedom
,
ofa Person
oftheWillandtheConcept
paperofH. Frankfurt,
68 (1971),5-20.
ofPhilosophy,
in:Journal
44Roure's
seehowto
ad motum
verbi
texthasexconjunctione
, whichI cannot
pertinentes
theexpresI haveunderstood
itwithverbi.
i.e.taking
HenceI havereadpertinentis
translate.
and
heretomean"transitive
admotum
sionpertinenti
verb";cf.LouisG. Kelly,
Compositio
Koerner
andKonrad
StenEbbesen
in:G.L.Bursill-Hall,
theVerb
inGrammatica
Speculativa,
inMemory
andLinguistic
Grammar
inMedieval
: Studies
De Ortu
Grammaticae
Theory
(eds.),

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MARKREUTER
"I saysomething
insolubles:
"I saysomething
thanthetruth,"
"I think
other
false,"
"I write
andsimilarly
"I do notsaysomething
false,"
false,"
something
something
or "I do notsaysomething
other
thanthefalse"(3.01).45
true,"

In lookingat the verbs of these examples we finda list of distinctively

humanactivities:
speaking,thinking,and writing.It is the conjunctionof
these activitieswith the expression'false' or the negationof 'true' that
presentsa problem.Justwhy theypresenta problemwe shall see more
clearlyin a moment.For now what we need to see is thattheseactivities
are conjoined in a reflectivehierarchy.Burleighis expliciton thispoint
when he later goes on to give his analysisof these insolubles.He says:
thefirst
source
itmustbe notedthatwhenever
thesameactis reflected
Concerning
backuponitself
witha privative
withthisdetermination
'false'
determination,
namely
oritsequivalent,
thentheactis putdownwithrestriction,
as thisshows"I saythat
I amsaying
false":
thisactofsaying
is reflected
backupontheactofsaysomething
whichis a privative
determination.
Thatis why
'false,'
ingwiththisdetermination
"I saysomething
false"is putdownwithrestriction.
Fora termis
[thestatement]
whenitdoesnotimply
itssuperior
putdownwithrestriction
(3.02).46
The rest of the passage makes clear that what is motivatingBurleigh
to apply the restrictionis this idea of an act reflectingback upon itself.Burleigh'srule (in his subsequentdiscussionhe does referto thisidea
as a regula[rule] cf. 4.01, 4.03), however,is not clear, and Ockham does
not explicitlyinvoke it. This omissionseems odd given the numberof
times Burleighinvokesthe rule in the course of his discussion,and in
lightof Ockham's close dependence on Burleigh'saccount.47This is a
silence that calls out for explanation.
But we have no need to look far for one. What I suggestis the following. Ockham was a good logician,perhaps in this case betterthan
Burleigh,formostlogicianscomplainabout the vaguenessof his rule and
ofJanPinborg,
Amsterdam
andid.,La Physique
Aristote
etla phrase
1990,147-159
simple
danslesouvrages
degrammaire
La Grammaire
, in:Andr
spculative
JolyandJeanStefanini
(eds.),
desmodistes
auxidologues
, Lille1977,107-24.
gnrale
45
radixprovenit
exconjunctione
verbi
ad motum
cumhacdictione
"prima
pertinentis*
velcumsuoconvertibili
velcumnegatione
veri.Et sicsuntomnesisteinsolubiles:
falsum
dico
veldicodissimile
scribo
nondicoverum,
nondico
vero,
falsum
, similiter:
cogito
falsum,
falsum
dissimile
."
falso
46"Circa
radiem
estsciendum
idemactusreflectitur
primam
quodquandocumque
scilicet
cumhacdeterminatione
vel
suprase ipsumcumdeterminatione
privativa,
falsum
cumsuoconvertibili,
tuncactusponitur
utpatethicdicomedicere
: hic
diminutive,
falsum
reflectitur
actusdicendi
dicendi
cumhacdeterminatione
supraactum
, queestdeterfalsum
minateprivativa;
ideomedicere
diminutive.
enimponitur
Terminus
diminufalsum
ponitur
tivequandononinfert
suumsuperius.
47Cf.3.02,3.03,
4.01,4.03,4.06,and4.09.

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the lack of a clear formulation.48

But the worrisomepart of the rule is
not the self-reflexive
side, forthisis somethingthatis a commonpart of
our experience.Rather,what would worrya logicianis the way in which
'privation' might end up hiding an important differencebetween
negationand denial.49In the lightof thisworryI suggestthat Ockham
let the notion of privationgo, and instead focused on the idea of selfreflexiveness
as a typeof second ordercognition.It is to thistypeof cognitionthat he gave the label actushumnus.
I have attemptedto capture
this suggestionwith the translation"deliberatehuman act," where the
of the act is meant to capturewhat takesplace in seconddeliberateness
order intentionalreflection.Why thisparticularlabel? We have already
seen thatthe activitiesBurleighuses in his examples seem to be distinctivelyhuman activities.But thereare, I think,two plausible reasons for
his choice of this term that go much deeper. One lies in the tradition
in which Ockham is working.The other lies in Ockham's own understandingof human acts. A considerationof both, I think,will shed light
on Ockham's understanding
of the paradox.
can be found in
this
of the actushumnus
for
understanding
Support
two commonlycited authorswithinthe later medievaltradition:Aquinas
and Aristotle.I begin withAquinas, but as we shall see not far behind
Aquinas' textis Aristotle.
In consideringthe questionwhetherhuman beings act forthe sake of
an end, Aquinas draws a distinctionbetweenactiones
humanae
and actiones
hominis
.50The lattertermrefersto the class of actionsthat are to be attributedto the agent,in the sense thattheyreferto thingsthe agent has
The formerterm
done, but over whichthe agent is not master[dominus'.
refersto actionswhich properlybelong to human beings in as much as
hominis
esthomo
] . Aquinas liminquantum
theyare human [quaesuntpropriae
its this class of actions to those actions over which the agent is master
and he furtherdefinesthese actions as those that come about
[dominus],
et voluntatem].
He then concludes:
reasoned
desire" [per rationem
"through

48I think
andtypical
whenhe says:
Simmons
1993(op.cit n. 5), 203n. 30,is right
a precise
characterisation
of hisrule:it is notclearexactly
doesnotprovide
"Burley
witha privative
determination.
Butwhatis clear
whatcounts
self-reflexive
as something
withthatofthe
withsomegeneral
rulethatdoesnotcoincide
is thatBurley
is operating
all selfthosewhoeliminate
reference]."
[i.e.
restringentes
49Formoreonthis
andJohnEtchemendy,
TheLiar:AnEssay
cf.JonBarwise
suggestion
onTruth
andCircularity
, Oxford
1987,164-70.
50Cf.Summa
6.1.
, IaIIae.1.1;cf.alsoibid.,
Theologiae

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MARKREUTER
from
deliberate
desire
calledhuman
which
Thustheseactions
areproperly
proceed
.51
deliberata]
[exvolntate

FollowingAquinas' distinctionit would be easy to argue that if only the

from"deliberatedesire" are proper human actions,
actions that proceed
then a fortiori
the cognitiveact of deliberatingabout desiresand wantsis
a proper human action.
Nor do I thinkit amiss to push Aquinas' remarksin thisdirection,for
behind Aquinas phrase ex volntatedeliberatamustsurelybe Aristotle's
which the RevisedOxford
Aristotle
translatesas "deliberopeioD>.UTiicr|
ate desire."52And it is with thisAristotelianbackgroundin mind that I
have translatedAquinas' phrase. Moreover,Aristotleconnectsthisnotion
with choice [rcpoocpeai
and choice in turn is connectedto desire and
an
in
with
end
view.53These are two featuresof Aristotle's
reasoning
notion of deliberate desire that we find explicitlytreated in Aquinas'
account.54There is a furtherfeature,however,implicitin Aquinas, but
much more explicitin Aristotle.This is the way Aristotleequates this
notion of deliberatedesire with the person. Aristotleconcludes his discussion of choice by saying:
Hencechoiceis either
desiderative
or intellectual
andsuchan oridesire,
thought
ginofchoiceis man.35
I mentionthese two textsbecause both were widelyknownin the later
Middle Ages, Ockham frequentlyquotes fromboth, and both provide
indirectsupportfor taking 'desiderativethought'or 'intellectualdesire'
to be a distincdyhuman activity.This traditionis part of what is motivatingOckham's choice of the termactushumnus.
51Ibid.,Iallael.l: "Illae
humanae
dicuntur,
ergoactiones
proprie
quae ex volntate
deliberata
Theeditor
oftheMarietti
textglosses
thisphrase
as Quae
procedunt."
(wrongly)
seil,sequitur
deliberationem
rationis
I
"deliberate
desire"
, (cf.belownote55).The translation
borrow
from
theRevised
Aristotle
cf.nextparagraph.
,
Oxford
52Cf.Mcomachean
Ethics
, 3.3 1113all,6.2 1139a23and 1139b4-5.
53Ibid.,cf.
thediscussion
in 6.2 1139a31-11
39b5.
especially
Notehismention
ofliberum
arbitrium
andfinis
in therespondeo.
55EIN,6.2 1139b4-5,
theRevised
Aristotle
textreads:"ii peieuK
; Bywater's
Oxford
iaifToia')TT
Thistextshows
that
voi7ipoapi
Tpei
SictvoTTiKT,
pxr
avpawco."
theglossgivenbytheeditoroftheMarietti
edition
for
(seeabovenote51) is wrong,
Aristotle
andAquinas
butnotOckham,
wanttounderstand
the"will"as a form
(I think),
ofrational
desire.
Henceitis notreasoning
andthendesiring,
orwilling
wanting
(theone
theother),
butrational
desire
from
thebeginning).
ForOckham
following
(thetwotogether
reasonandunderstanding
willanddesire;
cf.OTh II, Ordinatio,
ed. Brown
and
proceed
it is in thelightofAristotle's
useofthe
Gi,558.Furthermore,
phrasethatOckham's
actus
humani
takeson greater
cf.abovenote41.
phrase
princifiium
significance;

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The more directmotivationcomes fromOckham's own explicitunderwhen he comes to discussthe

standingof thistradition.In the Ordinatio,
a
whether
rational
creature
bears the image of the
question(question10)
Trinity,he responds,in part,in the followingway:
Thatis whyI saythattheperfect
account
con[ratio
] oftheimage[oftheTrinity]
theactsofunderstandsistsin thesubstance
itself
ofthesoulandtwoacts,namely
in thesubstance
andwilling
, andit can evenconsist
[uolendi]
intelligendi]
ing[actus
ofthesoulandin twodispositions
itself
to theseacts.56
corresponding
Ockham maintainsthat human beings bear the image of the Trinity,in
as much as they are rationalcreatures.He furtherholds that all acts,
and willwhatevertheyare, can be reduced to these two, understanding
with
the
tradiOckham's
remarks
own
not
then,by aligning
ing.57Why
tion,understandthese two acts as humanacts?
we have next to
Given this understandingof the term actushumnus
considerits role in generatingthe paradox. Earlier in connectionwith
this termwe noted that the actushumnus
considersthe insoluble stateor negatively.We also noted
mentsin eitherof two ways:affirmatively
thatOckham assignsa truthvalue to thesestatementsbased on the quality of the statement.Ockham's way of proceeding,then, presentstwo
or negationto
questions.What motivatesthe assignmentof affirmation
? And, why does thisassignmentin turnaffectthe truth
the actushumnus
Let us considereach of these in turn.
values given to the statements?
To begin withif we recall that the contextof the discussionof insolwas the obligatio
uble statements
[formalscholasticdebate], then it is natural to thinkthat qualitiesof affirmation
or negationcould be assigned
to the actushumnus
dependingon what one eitheraffirmsor denies in
the debate. The actushumnus
would, then,be closelylinkedto the actus
an
act exhibitsthe intentionof the speaker
dicendi
Such
[the speech act].
to eitheraffirmor deny something,and Ockham is clear that it is the
will that gives this intentionality
to the utterance.Hence, the intention
or negative
of the speakerwill give to a statementeitherits affirmative
would
the
other
Within
a
debate, however,
assign
participants
quality.58
a qualityto the statementbased on purelypragmaticconsiderations,
e.g.
56Ordination
and Gi,OTh II, 558-9:"IdeodicoquodcomX, ed. Brown
Question
scilicet
actuintelinipsasubstantia
animae
etduobus
consistit
actibus,
pletaratioimaginis
inipsasubstantia
animae
etinduobus
habitibus
etvolendi,
etedampotest
consistere
ligendi
actibus."
correspondentibus
ipsis
57Cf.ibid.,
561,lines17-19.
Cf.Ordmatio,
ed.Brown
andGi,OTh II, 567,16-7:verbum
quodest
complexum,
nonfitnisimediante
volntate."
affirmativum
determinate
velnegativum,

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whetherI said, "Socratesis wise" or denied thisclaim. Those who heard

me would assign the quality fromthe outside,so to speak. My words
would be taken to stand in for my intentionin the utterance:either
affirmation
or denial. Admittedly,there could easily be circumstances
that make it difficult
to assigna qualityto a remark,e.g. when someone
that
is
Socrates
wise and the tone of voice leaves us wonderingif
says
the statementis seriousor ironic.Is the speakeraffirming
or denyingthe
claim? Withinthe contextof the obligatio
, however,the rules governing
the debate were an attemptto eliminatethese typesof ambiguities.
makesit clear thatthe debate will
Secondly,the contextof the obligatio
for
the
most
about
what
is
said.
The discoursewill,forthe most
be,
part,
part,be a discourseabout discourse.This pointis so obviousthatit might
not seem worthmentioning,
but since sometimesobviouspointsare overlooked it seems worthdwellingon for a moment.
In the contextof an oral debate utterancesare (for the most part)
taken at face value. The statementscome with an attached presumption that theyare advancing claims. This presumptionrarelyhas to be
expressed. To advance the claim that Socrates is wise, I simplysay,
"Socratesis wise." There is no need forme to say, "Socratesis wise and
thisis what I am saying."When as in the last example the presumption
becomes expressed,it is usuallytakenas evidenceof a misunderstanding,
e.g. when I say, "You don't understand;whatI am sayingis etc." Outside
of the immediateoral contextin the reportof some discourse,the presumptionis impliedin the "he said" or "she said" that are tackedon to
the report.What we must rememberis that the discussionof insolubles
took place withinan oral context.Withinthat contextstatementscome
with the presumptionof truthattached.
What role then does the actushumnus
play in generatingthe insoluble? When Socrates standsup and says, "Socrates says somethingfalse"
and nothingelse, how does the actushumnus
affectthe truthvalue of this
utterance?Recall again Ockham's remark:
Andsucharguments
cannot
be madeexcept
whenan "a <deliberate>
human
act"
humnus
thisterm'false5
orthis
[actus
] considers
(orsomesimilar
term)
affirmatively
term'true'(orsomesimilar
etc.(8-11).59
term)
negatively
Ockham's remarkcan now be seen to point to a tension,and the tension seems to be located in the actushumnus
itself.On the one hand,
there is the presumptionbehind Socrates' utterancethat some claim is
59Summa , III-3,ed. Boehner
e.a.,744,8-11;cf.abovep. 120.
Logicae

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On the otherhand, a key part of his statementcontains

being affirmed.
a denial or negation:he is sayingsomethingthat is not true. Thus, the
act of speakingseems to be offering
while the
somethingfor affirmation
or the contentof the statement,
undercutsits own affirmation.
statement,
Ockham impliesthat
Thus, by introducingthe idea of the actushumnus
the root of the problemlies in the tensionbetweenthe pragmaticact of
assertion[an actusvolendi
] and the semanticcontentof what is under. It is here that the notionof instood to be asserted[an actusintelligent]
is important,for Ockham's concise remarksignalsthe clash
tentionality
that of the speech act (on the side of the
of two opposingintentionalities:
On the
of
the
and
that
language (on the side of the understanding).
will)
one hand, the intentionaldirectionof the act of speech seeks to affirm
somethingabout the world. On the otherhand, the intentionaldirection
of the semanticcontentof the statementseeks to deny somethingabout
of thispasthe world.What Ockham claims,then,on my understanding
sage, is that when the two opposing intentionaldirectionsmeet in one
and the same act the resultis paradox.
of Ockham's understandingof the Liar Paradox
This interpretation
it
with
other
paradoxes, notablyone discussedby G.E. Moore.60
aligns
Moore foundparadox in the factthat someone mightsay, "It is raining,
but I do not believe it"; or "It is not raining,but I believe that it is."
Here the affirmation
about the world is at odds not with the semantic
contentof what is said, but withattitudetakentowardsthe statementof
some truthabout the world.The firstexample involvesa disbelief,a failure to realise and so believe a truth;the second involvesa false belief,
thatis a mistakenbeliefabout how the worldis. As withOckham Moore's
of the statementand
problemcomes about when both the affirmation
the opposingattitudetakentowardsit are embodiedin one and the same
He
act. For Moore such acts were absurd, but not self-contradictory.
"fail
to
indeed
that
the
difference
this
might
by
saying
agent
explains
in
realise" or indeed "be mistaken,"but thereis no logical impossibility
of thisparadox
imaginingsomeone in that state. Moore's understanding
locates the problemmore in human weakness.Plain imbecility,senility,
madness,or simple carelessnessmay lead me to utterone or the other
of the above absurdities.The problem here, then, is with human psychology,not logic. Is that Ockham's view?
60Foran overview
ofthisparadoxas wellas an insightful
(towhichI am
analysis
68 (1988),
Some
Paradoxes
much
cf.Andr
, in:Philosophy,
ofCounterprivacy
Gombay,
indebted)
191-210.

18:51:40 PM

128

MARKREUTER

That is, I think,Ockham's view- at least in part. I conclude withone

reservation.In consideringthe Liar's statementas a spoken utterance,
the absurdityof this human act is containedin the fact that the liar is
tellingus that he or she is lying,hardlya successfulstrategyfor a liar
to adopt. I thinkthat Ockham would hold that such an act is absurd,
for althoughit is not a straightforward
it certainly
logical contradiction,
does seem to be a performative
It is thisaspect of the
self-contradiction.
Liar statementthat he clearlyaffirms
leads to somethinginsoluble.That
much at least is my understanding
of his remarksabout the actushumnus.
Here there is no problem with simplylying.I can on some occasions
want to assertsomethingfalse,and to do so means that I mustseparate
my thoughtsand beliefs what I really think frommy words. But I
cannot reallylie and also tell you I am lying.That is absurd. But the
are
questionremainswhetherOckham's remarksabout the actushumnus
meantto be takenfurther,
to be givena more logicalinterpretation.
What
I mean is this. In the case of a lie, I may want to assertsomethingI
know and believe to be false. But can I myselfknow and believe somethingto be falseand stillthinkit? To returnto Moore's example,can I
thinkto myself,"I am now thinkingfalselythat it is raining";or "I am
now holding falselythat it is raining."When taken in the firstperson
these examples seem to be more than absurd; theyseem to be logically
incoherent.While I suspectthat Ockham would agree with this further
point,I thinkthathe would be less inclinedto take thisas a logicalproblem. He would be more inclinedto view it in lightof his anthropology.
For him the move to embrace somethingknown to be false could not
get started,forthe move to embrace is dependentupon and subsequent
to an act of understanding.61
For Ockham, then,logic is not the issue;
human natureis.62

61Cf.Ordination
andGi,OTh,559,7-10:"etproducit
X, ed. Brown
Question
primo
actum
ettuncillaeduaecausae,sciliactusvolendi,
intelligendi,
quiestetiamproductives
cetipsasubstantia
animaeet actusintelligendi
actumvolendi."
Given
possunt
producere
thattheselinesoccurwithin
a simileinvolving
I am notsureI understand
theTrinity,
andso am notsurewhether
them,
theywillultimately
uphold
mypoint.
Aswenotedabove(p. 127)iorMoorehuman
is subject
nature
to imbecility,
senilandsimple
carelessness."
Noneoftheseexplanations,
seemsreleity,madness
however,
vantto thecontext
oftheobligatio.
It is easytothink
thatin thecontext
ofa debateone
a moralfailure,
towards
towinthedebate,
orworse,
maybe tempted
e.g.doinganything
one'sopponent
lookbadrather
thanlearning
orattempting
thetruth
todiscover
making
aboutthematter
underconsideration.
Forthisfailing
andother
ofhuman
nature
aspects
relevant
to medieval
cf.JohnofSalisbury,
IV 40.
logicians
Metalogicon,

18:51:40 PM

WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM'S
TREATMENT
OF INSOLUBLES

129

To sum up then,I have soughtto give an interpretation

of the use of
in Ockham thatwas meant to shed lighton what
the termactushumnus
he says about insolubles,and which was meant to suggestan answerto
Spade's thoughtprovokingquestion: Why do the medievaisview these
logical problemsin such a different
lightfromourselves?If my speculationhas been sound,thenOckham, it seems,has more interestin human
natureand human acts than in logic and language. For him these latter
will alwaysbe viewed in the contextof the former.Logic and language
forhim will be not so much autonomousdisciplines,but tools to be used
to arriveat an understandingof human nature. Admittedlythis interfromseveraldefects.Firstly,
it is speculative;indeed some
pretationsuffers
for
it
think
reads
a
lot
into the termactushumnus
,
may
highlyspeculative,
and more this readingis pieced togetherfroma few scatteredremarks
in the corpus,fromBurleigh'sobscure treatment,
and even more speculativeremarksabout the traditionin whichOckham is working.Secondly,
locatingthe crux of the paradox withina deliberatehuman act, may be
regardedby some as obfuscation,or worse a reversionto Nineteenth
Centuryviews about psychologismin logic. In my defenceagainstthese
objectionsI offertwo claims. To the firstI say that speculationwas necessaryforseveralreasons.Initiallyit was Spade's questionthatwas tempting, but then too Ockham's own remark,about the actushumnus
being
a necessaryconditionforthe generationof an insoluble,requiredexplanation,and as far as I can tell, this remarkhas generallybe ignored.
The second chargeis somewhatharderto address.A treatmentof paradoxes does seem to lead us towardsa reflectivehierarchywhetherwe
wantto admitthisor not.This typeof second-order
cognitionthatinvolves
an utteranceand reflectionabout the utteranceseemed to be displayed
in Ockham's descriptionof the actushumnus
as I have argued. And it is
of
the
actus
humnus
that I have triedto show
this
by giving
description
that thispsychologyinvolvedin Ockham's treatmentmeritsfurtherand
more carefulconsideration.

18:51:40 PM

MARKREUTER

130

Appendix
A Text Problem at SummaLogicae,III-3, chapter 46, ed. Boehner e.a.,
746, line 54.
Lines 53-5 of the receivedtext63read as follows:
et Sortes
Et tuncnonsequitur
"haecestvera:Sortes
dicitfalsum;
dicithanc;igitur
Sortes
dicitfalsum."
The formof the argumentbecomes more perspicuousand the argument
itselfbecomes easier to discusswhen it is set out as follows:
ArgumentI:
(1) Haec estvera:Sortesdicitfalsum.
(2) Sortesdicithaec.
.
(3) IgiturSortesdicitfalsum
The lines quoted above make it explicitlyclear that Ockham takes the
The conclusionseemsto follow,but
argumentas fallacious[nonsequitur].
in fact does not. A reading of chapter 46 makes clear Ockham's reasoningforthinkingthe argumentfallacious.Briefly,the above argument
has been offeredby one of the participantsin the debate who wants to
generatean insolublestatement.Ockham opposes the use of this argument by showingthat the conclusiondoes not followbecause the term
in supposition.
"falsum"in the conclusionis put down with a restriction
Hence, it cannot suppositforthe Liar statementofferedin premisetwo.
Hence, the conclusionis illicit.What is worrisome,however,is the truth
assignmentthat is given in the firstpremise.
In his earlierdiscussionof thesetypesof fallacies,presentedin De sophisticiselenchis
Aristotelis
, book II 10, section4, lines 55-6 Ockham had considered a similarfallacywith the followingform:
ArgumentII:
Sortesdicithocfalsum.
IgiturSortesdicitfalsum.
The worrygenerated by this fallacy (as with that expressedin argumentI) is thatfromthe expressionof the Liar statementitself[hocfalsum
:]
we shall be forcedto conclude that Socratesindeed has "said something
false." Between premiseand conclusionthereis consistencyin the idea
63Summa , edited Philotheus
Boehner,
O.F.M.,GedeonGi,O.F.M.,and
Logicae
by
Brown
vol.I), St.Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1974.
Stephanus
(OperaPhilosophica

18:51:40 PM

TREATMENT
OF INSOLUBLES
WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM'S

131

that what is expressedis false. And once this is conceded we can start
the Liar circuit.Socrates said somethingfalse,but he said that he said
somethingfalse; so what he said must be true, etc. Hence Ockham's
interestin blockingthe conclusionby placing a restrictionon the suppositionof the term'false' in the conclusion.
In the light,however,of thisdiscussionof argumentII thereseems to
be a problemwith argumentI. Given the truthvalue that is assigned
to the Liar statementat this point (premiseone) we should expect the
." But it does not. Between
conclusionto read, "IgiturSortesdicitverum
in
a
the truthvalues that are
is
shift
there
and
conclusion
premises
to
the
expression.
assigned
Nor is thereany need to wonderat what point on the Liar circuitthe
above lines come: afterall Ockham mightbe assumingthe truthof the
Liar statementhere in orderto prove the statementfalse.But the context
of the above lines rules out this idea at once. A carefulreading of the
to the subjectof
chapterwill reveal the followingoutline:(i) introduction
insolubles 1-4; (ii) definitionand conditions generating an insoluble
of the Liar 13-21; (iv)firststep towardsa solution
5-12; (iii)presentation
affirmative
or negativepresentationof the Liar and assign a
distinguish
truthvalue accordingly22-33; (v) a considerationof the negativeversion
34-48; (vi) a considerationof the positivecase 49-59; (vii)how the restrictionblocksthe argumentfrominferiorto superiorin thiscase 60-68; (viii)
conclusion.Therefore,withouteven wonderinghow argumentI is meant
to work,i.e. withouteven climbingon the Liar circuit,I thinkthereare
the above text contradicts
two reasons to correctthe above text:firstly,
insoluble and,
the truthvalue Ockham wants to assign the affirmative
insoluble.Let
of
the
his
treatment
it
does
not
negative
secondly,
parallel
us considerthese reasons more closely.
Ockham begins his resolutionof the paradox by assigningthe Liar
statementa truthvalue. Lines 22-33 make clear that the value assigned
or negativeversionof the Liar
will depend upon whetheran affirmative
statementis offered.Based on thisdescriptionOckham assignsthe statethe value true, and the statementSortesdicit
ment Sortesnondicitverum
falsumthe value false.Why he makes these assignmentsin thisway was
discussedin the body of the paper. All that needs to be noted here is
that early in the chapterhe does make these assignments.Hence, later
Liar it
on in the chapterwhen Ockham comes to discussthe affirmative
is natural to thinkthat he will followthroughhis initial strategyand
assignthe value false.

18:51:40 PM

132

MARKREUTER

Secondly,Ockham treatsthe negativeLiar beforehe treatsthe positiveone (lines34-48). The example of the fallaciousargumentgiventhere
is the following(cf. lines 36-8).
ArgumentIII:
(1) Sortesdicithancpropositionem.
estvera.
(2) Haec propositio
,64
Sortes
dicit
veram
(3) Igitur
propositionem
In this argumentone premiselays down what Socrates says; the other
on suppositionis overlooked,then
assignsthe truthvalue. If the restriction
the two togetherare thoughtto implythe conclusion.In the treatment
of the affirmative
Liar, we should expect a parallel argument.Instead
what we findis argumentI.
ArgumentIII and argumentI can be made parallel if we restorein
line 54 the readingfaba found in several manuscripts.(I shall returnto
thispoint in a moment.)This would give us the followingform:
ArgumentI*
(1) Haec estfalsa: Sortesdicitfalsum.
.
(2) Sortesdicithanc
Sortes
dicit
(3) Igitur
fabum.
The restorationnow makes argumentI* followthe same patternas argumentII, Ockham's earliertreatment
fromtheDe sophisticis
elenchis
Aristotelis.
It also makes Ockham's treatmentin the Summaof both the negativeand
affirmative
versionsof the Liar statementexhibitthe same form.The first
now
assigns the truthvalue. The second premise states what
premise
Socrates says. The only differencebetween the two arguments(I* and
III) is the order of the premises,but the orderingin this case does not
affectthe argument.For these two reasons,then,I thinkthe textneeds
to be corrected.
a second explanationmay be offeredon its own or in
Furthermore,
connectionwith these reasons. Discussionsof the Liar paradox generate
a certainamount of dizzinessor confusion.Hence, it seems plausibleto
thinkthatthe complexityof the discussionon itsown may have generated
the confusion.I can vouch for this last point myself,for in an earlier
draftof thispaper I had at one point reversedthe truthvalues assigned
64No variants
forthesereadings
occurin theapparatus.

18:51:40 PM

OF INSOLUBLES
TREATMENT
WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM'S

133

to the Liar statementby Ockham. This mistakewent unnoticedby me

more than once, and also escaped the attentionof a learned audience.65
New Haven
Yale University,
ofPhilosophy
Department

65I wishto
ofa post-doctoral
research
thesupport
fellowship
givenby
acknowledge
madepossible
the
Council
ofCanadawhich
andHumanities
Research
theSocialScience
CalvinNormore
forhispersonal
ofthispaper.I shouldalsoliketo thank
finalrevision
ofthispaper,andtheopportudraft
comments
on an earlier
andhelpful
encouragement
in Toronto.
seminar
on Ockham
itto hisgraduate
nitytopresent

18:51:40 PM

On theDatingofAbailarsDialogus: A Replyto Mews

JULIE A. ALLEN

Abailars corpuscontainsonlytwo shortworkswhichdeal specifically

withthesubjectof ethics.These primarytextsare: Dialogusinter
,
Philosophum
et Christianm
, whichis also knownand referred
, and ScitoTeipsum
Judaeum
to as the Etlica)A naturaland perhapsfruitful
approach to the studyof
Abailars moral philosophywould be to assess the developmentof his
of the sequence in which he
thoughtbased upon a clear understanding
issued these works.Unfortunately,
as I will argue, this approach is not
available to us in Abailars case. The mysteriessurroundingthe overall
chronologyof his writingsare ones which continueto resistsolution.As
MarilynMcCord Adams notes: 'the precise chronologyof [Abailars]
worksremainsa vexed questionforseveralreasons:theirauthorrepeatedly
revisedthem; not many manuscriptsremain; and Abailars own crossis ambiguous.'2
referencing
There are six extantmanuscriptcopies of the Dialogus.RudolfThomas

1 A number
ofAbailars
other
works
alludeto ethical
orfocus,
in part,on
questions
moral
Thesetexts
are:Commentario,
inEpistolam
PauliadRomanos,
problems.
Christiana,
Theologia
'Scholarium
SicetNon
Rule
Women.
E.M. Buytaert
, andAbelard's
Theologia
forReligious
produceda critical
edition
ofCommentario
inEpistolam
Pauliad Romanos
in 1969.Thistextis
a versebyversecommentary
on Paul'sLetter
to theRomans.
Abailars
comments
on
Pauline
doctrine
therolesofMosaicandnatural
lawinrelation
toChristianity
concerning
aregermane
tohisviewsofintention,
ofsalvation
whichreceive
law,andtheconditions
in theprimary
moredirect
treatment
texts.
hasalsore-edited
Abailars
theoBuytaert
1and
theTheologia
'Summi
'Scholarium'
works,
Christiana,
boni,
logical
including
Theologia
Theologia
fortheCorpus
Continuatio
Mediaevalis
i Abaelardi
series:Petr
Christianorum,
I,
opera
theologica
Commentario
inEpistolam
Pauliad Romanos,
contra
ed. EligiusBuytaert,
Bernardum
Apologia
*
Turnhout
Abaelardi
Scholarium,
1969,Petri
II, Theologia
Christiana,
opera
theologica
Theologia
Petri
haeresum
Abaelardi
ed. EligiusBuytaert,
Turnhout
(recensiones
,
breviores),
Capitula
1969,
'Summi
*Scholarium
andPetri
Abaelardi
ed. E.M.
III, Theologia
boni,'
opera
theologica
Theologia
1987.J.R.McCallum's
account
ofAbailars
theolBuytaert
j andG.J.Mews,Turnhout
ofsubstantial
of the Theologia
sections
Christiana:
ogyweavestogether
glosstranslations
Abelard's
Christian
Selected
andtranslated
Oxford
1948.
Theology.
McCallum,
byJ. Ramsay
2 Marilyn
McCordAdams,
Introduction
toPeter
Ethical
HisEthics
or*Know
Abelard,
Writings:
9andHis
between
a Philosopher,
a Jewanda Christian
PaulSpade,IndianaThyself
, trans.
Dialogue
polis1995,viii.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,2

18:46:34 PM

136

JULIEA. ALLEN

MS 819;
theseas: [ V] Wien, sterreichische
identifies
Nationalbibliothek,
[5] Oxford,Balliol College, MS 296; [L] London, BritishLibrary,Royal
MS, 11 A V; [.R] Oxford,Queen's College, MS 284; [C] Oxford,Corpus
ChristiCollege,MS 312 and [T] Cambridge,TrinityCollege,MS 0.5.14.3
4
- the Vienna
Two of thesemanuscriptsare primary
manuscript[V] and
the Balliol manuscript[].5 With the exceptionof [L], the remaining
Oxfordand Cambridgemanuscriptsare derivative
likelylatertranscripcenThe Vienna manuscriptis a twelfth
tionsof the Balliol manuscript.6
in
later
it
was
transcribed
to
Pierre
and
Payer
according
turymanuscript
editionsand is the basis of the Migne edition(PL 178).7 The Balliol mancenturymanuscriptwhichincludescorrectionsand
uscriptis a fourteenth
additions.8Rudolf Thomas provided us with a critical edition of the
Dialogasin 1970. As Payer rightlynotes,Thomas' use of the Balliol manuscriptyieldsa textsuperiorto that foundin the Migne edition.
There are five extant medieval copies of Abailard's Ethica?Two of
these are twelfthcenturymanuscriptsand both are now located in the
theseas: 'A]
Bavarian State Libraryin Munich. D.E. Luscombe identifies
Codex Latinus Monacensis 14160 and [B] Codex Latinus Monacensis
28363.10These two copies containessentiallythe same textand are similar in length.The fourteenth
centuryBalliol manuscript(Balliol College,
most
is
the
MS 296)
completeextantcopy and Luscombe refersto it as
3 Petrus
Edition
Textkritische
etChristianm.
Iudaeum
inter
Abaelardus,
Philosophum,
Dialogus
Cannstatt
vonRudolf
1970,18-29.
Thomas,
Stuttgart-Bad
4 Vienna,
MS 819,ff.lr-59v.
sterreichische
Nationalbibliothek,
5 Oxford,
MS 296,ff.161r-189v.
BalliolCollege,
6 Thomasprovides
stemma:
us withthefollowing

I
R

Thomas(<
., aboven. 3),29. X andT arenotextant.
op.cit
7 Payer,
with
a Jewanda Christian
Abelard
toPeter
Introduction
,
, A Dialogue
ofa Philosopher
Toronto
Translated
1979,5, n. 10.
byP.J.Payer,
8 According
'corrects
aboven. 7), 13,theBalliolmanuscript
to Payer[op.cit.,
many
a laterredaction
which
additions
several
andincorporates
homoioteleuta
suggest
significant
ofthework.'
9 Luscombe
and a
of thestateof thesemanuscripts
discussion
a detailed
provides
account.
Luscombe's
from
is
derived
sketch
each.
of
of
the
contents
My
description
thorough
withintroduction,
Anedition
Abelard'
s Ethics.
Introduction
See Luscombe,
English
, in:Peter
Oxford
andnotes,
translation
1971,xxxviii-lxi.
byD.E. Luscombe,
10Luscombe
aboven. 9),xli-xlv.
(op.cit.,

18:46:34 PM

DIALOGUS
ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

137

[C].11The remainingmanuscriptsare both fifteenth

centurycopies, [D]
MS. Lat. 76 and [E ] Codex Latinus Monacensis
Mainz, Stadtbibliothek,
18597. In virtueof their close resemblance,[A] and [iE] are grouped
togetherand [] and [C] forma second group. [D] standsalone but the
threegroupsare onlydistinguished
by minorvariantsor by lengthin the
case of the Balliol manuscript.
Three editionsof Abailars Ethicacurrently
exist.The firsteditionwas
the
of
Bernard
Pez.12
This editionis reproproducedthrough patronage
duced in Migne, PL 178, cols. 633-78. This early editionis incomplete
the disadvantageof restingupon only one of the twelfth
and suffers
cenA
second
edition
was
turymanuscripts
(Bavarianmanuscript[A]).
printed
V.
C.
Cousin13
and
Ottaviano
an
additional
producedby
provided
fragment.14
Togetherthesecomprisea completetextand Cousin's editionis a
clear improvementover the first.Nonetheless,Luscombe maintainsthat
Cousin and Ottaviano eitherdid not use or did not have access to all
fivemanuscripts.15
Luscombe re-editedthe Ethicain 1971 and it boasts
the level of reliability
which can only be attainedthroughon a complete
examinationand collationof all extantmanuscripts.
As previouslyindicated,the precise datingof these worksis a matter
of great dispute.There have been two traditionalsides to the debate.
These have fallenon eitherside of the council of Sens.16The older tradition,followingG. Robert, and includingJ. Jolivet and R. Thomas,
identifies
the Dialogasas Abailard'slast work,supposedlywrittenat Cluny
just prior to his death in 1142. This traditionsuggeststhat the Dialogas
was composedafterthe Ethica}1Contraryto Robert,Buytaerthas argued
11 Thismanuscript
a continuation
contains
oftheEthics
which
isnotfound
in [/I]or[.B].
Thisuniquematerial
a first
bookandbegins
a secondbook.
completes
12Thesaurus
anecdotorum
novissimus
Vindelicorum
et Graecii
, tom.Ill, parsii, Augustae
1721,cols.625-88;cf.Luscombe,
iop.cit
., aboven. 9),xl,n. 8.
13Petri
Abaelardi
Paris1859,593-642.
, ii,ed. V. Cousin,
Opera
14C. Ottaviano,
Frammenti
abelardiani
di cultura,
12 (1931),425-45.
, in:Rivista
15According
toLuscombe,
Cousin
didnotusetheBalliol
butinstead
referred
manuscript
toan incomplete
ofthismanuscript.
See Luscombe
aboven. 9),li-lii.
cit.,
transcript
{op.
16Following
thecouncil
ofSens,June2, 1140,several
ofAbailard's
viewswerecondemned
andhe is documented
to haveretired
to a monastery
at Clunyundertheprotection
ofPetertheVenerable.
Fordetails
thelistofpropositions
concerning
by
compiled
William
ofSt.Thierry
andSt.Bernard,
seeA.J.Luddy,TheCaseofPeter
Abelard
, Dublin
ofAbailard's
accounts
TheSchool
1947,andformoregeneral
life,seeD.E. Luscombe,
of
Peter
Abelard.
TheInfluence
s Thought
intheEarly
Scholastic
1970
ofAbelard'
Period^
Cambridge
andJ.G.Sikes,Peter
Abailard
1932.
, Cambridge
17Payer,
Ablard
etlephilosophe
et
., aboven. 7), 7. Alsosee,JeanJolivet,
(op.cit
(Occident
Islam
auXIIesicle
desreligions,
164(1963),181-9,
andR. Thomas,
), in:Revuede l'histoire

18:46:34 PM

138

JULIEA. ALLEN

that the Dialogasought to be dated earlierand he pinpoints1136 as the

most likelycandidate.18D.E. Luscombe maintainsthat both textswere
writtenconcurrently
between 1134 and 1139.19On the basis of Buytaert
and Luscombe'sworkit has been generallyacceptedthattheDialogaswas
issued beforethe Ethicabut afterthe TheologaChristiana
and the Ethica
in Epistolam
Pauli ad Romanos
followedboth the Commentaria
and the third
book of the TheologacScholarium.m
More recently,ConstantMews has argued thatboth the Dialcticaand
the Dialogasshouldbe dated much earlierin Abailard'slifethan has hithMews maintainsthatAbailardcomposedthe Dialogas
ertobeen thought.21
around 1125 whilehe was teachingat the Paraclete.In thispaper I challenge the validityof thisclaim.
Mews makesthe mostof the sparsenumberof factsavailablefordelineatingthe generalboundarieswithinwhichthe textmusthave been composed. He subsequentlyendeavorsto pinpointthe date on the basis of a
complicatedweb of comparisonsand conjectures.The reasonablyhard
are limitedand easy to list:
facts,based on textualreferences,
22
1) Abailard praises his theology' in the prefaceof his Dialogus
2) Abailard refersto the persecutionof thisworkand the unsuccessful
efforts
of those who soughtto 'bear it away'23
and finally,
undinden
Iudaeum
etChristianm
imDialogus
inter
DiePersnlichkeit
Peter
Abaelards
Philosophum,
Ablard
oder
desPetrus
Venerabiiis:
?,in:R. Louis(ed.),Pierre
bereinstimmung,
Epistolae
Widerspruch
is
to Mews,Robert's
Pierre
le Vnrable
, Paris1975,256-60.According
by
dating accepted
La
aboven. 15)267-8;D. VanDenEynde,
a number
ofscholars,
Sikes{op.cit.,
including,
37 (1962),467-80;B. Geyerand
descrits
d3
Ablard
Hlose
, in: Antonianum,
chronologie
undscholastische
F. Ueberweg,
derPhilosophie
Grundriss
derGeschichte
,
, II. Diepatriotische
Philosophie
La disLaphilosophie
aumoyen
Berlin1922,216;E. Gilson,
, Paris1934,292;R. Oursei,
ge
inPeter
Abelardos
TheSignificance
, Paris1959,82; H. Liebeschutz,
ofJudaism
puteetla grce
ofJewish
12 (1961),1-18.Fora complete
list,seeC.J.
Studies,
, in:TheJournal
Dialogus
Doctrinale
et Littraire
d'Histoire
Abelard
theWorks
, in:Archives
Mews,OnDating
ofPeter
du MoyenAe,52 (1985),73-134,
esp.105,n. 2.
18Payer(op.cit
tobeingperthatAbailard's
reference
., aboven. 7),7. Buytaert
argues
ofSensand
rather
thanto thecouncil
ofSoissons
secuted
is a reference
to thecouncil
of
after
thecouncil
maintains
thatAbailard
wouldhavefelttoodefeated
further
Buytaert
inthepreface
totheDialogue.
claims
theself-congratulatory
Senstohavewritten
presented
44 (1969),
SeeE.M.Buytaert,
Abelardos
Collationes
33-8;id.,Abelardo
, in:Antonianum,
Expositio
aboven. 17),105.
inHexaemeron
43 (1968),163-94andMews{op.cit.,
, in:Antonianum,
Luscombe
at.,aboven. y),xxx.
{op.
20Luscombe
aboven. 9) xxvii;xxx.
{op.cit.,
21Mews{op.cit.,
n. 2.
aboven. 17),73-134,
22See below,
paere140,note30.
23Ibid.

18:46:34 PM

ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

DIALOGUS

139

in his Expositio
in Hexae3) There is a referenceto Abailars Collationes
meron
.24Providedit is grantedthatcollationes
refersto the Dialogusand not
more generallyto a 'conversation,'then it can be concluded that the
The explicitreferencein the
Dialoguswas writtenbeforethe Hexaemeron.
Hexaemeron
to a discussionof the meaningof lgoo and 'evil' in the 4colla'
'
' refersto the
tiones
supportsthe suppositionthat collationes
Dialogus.The
second collatioof the Dialogusconcludes with an analysisof 'good' and
'evil.'25However,thereis no fixeddate for the Hexaemeron.
Mews maintains that the Hexaemeron
was writtenc. 1133-37, but he admitsthat his
evidence is largely circumstantial.26
Others have maintained that the
Hexaemeron
was writtenafterthe council of Sens.27
The Dialogus
, itself,presentsscholarswitha numberof obstacles.First,
it is a literarywork. Four 'characters'figurein its plot: the Jew, the
Philosopher,the Christianand the Judge. Through the course of the
philosophicaction the questionnaturallyarises,who, or more generally,
what position,does each of these 'characters'representand where does
Abailard positionhimselfin relation to these? Abailard explicitlycasts
himselfas the Judge but implicitlyexhibitshimselfas philosopherand
Christian.In the preface the Judge is describedby the Philosopherin
both of these ways:28
workentided
whichenvyneither
couldbearwith
Indeed,thatadmirable
Theology
norhasprevailed
tobearaway,butwhich
moregloriously
under
grows
persecution,
is sureproof
tous ofyourintellectual
acumen
andin howmuchphilosophical
and
sacredlearning
thetreasury
ofyourmemory
overand abovetheusual
abounds,
24Expositio
inHexaemeron
bonum
ac perse,scilicet
sine
, PL 768B:'Quidautemproprie
velquidmalum
siveindifferens
insecunda
collatione
adiectione,
dicatur,
nostra,
quantum
satisestdefinitum.';
seeMews(op.cit
arbitror,
., aboven. 17),118,n. 58.
25Dialogus,
ed.Thomas
aboven. 3), 159-71,
tr.Payer{op.cit.,
{op.cit.,
esp.160-2{Dialogue,
aboven. 7), 157-69,
157-60).
esp.
26Mews{op.cit.,
aboven. 17),118-20:(120)'Although
theevidence
is circumstantial,
themostlikely
datefortheExpositio
is in theearly1130's,perhaps
soonafter1132/33,
whenAbelard
couldresume
on theMontSte Genevive
whilecontinuing
to
teaching
withthecommunity
of theParaclete.
The Dialogus,
referred
to in the
occupyhimself
inHexaemeron,
musthavebeenwritten
sometimebefore
thisdate.'
Expositio
27For
Martne
andDurand,
toExpositio
inHexameron,
(PL 178,729-30)
example,
referring
PL 752A-753D
aboven. 17),118).On theotherhand,Buytaert
(citedbyMews{op.cit.,
musthavebeencomposed
before1140(Buytaert
above
arguesthattheExpositio
{op.cit.,
n. 18),163-94).
28Dialogus,
ed. Thomas{op.cit.,
aboven. 3), 42: 'Comperi
ldeosstultos,
Xpistianos
ut cumsalvepace tua,qui Xpistianus
istaloquar.'{Dialogue,
tr.Payer
insanos,
diceris,
aboven. 7),21:'I havediscovered
theJewstobe stupid
andtheChristians
{op.cit.,
insane,
ifI maysaythelatter
without
youwhoarecalleda Christian').
disturbing

18:46:34 PM

140

JULIEA. ALLEN
in both
studies
Fromthisit is evident
thatyouhavesurpassed
in yourschools.29
inthe
whohavewritten
fields
notonlyyourownmasters
butalsoothers
oflearning
wholerangeoflearning.30

This referenceto the persecutionof Abailars 'theology'suggeststhat

the Dialogaswas notcomposed priorto the council of Soissonsin 1121.31
at
Whetheror not thisis a referenceto Abailars trialsand tribulations
and followingthe council of 1121, or a referenceto the persecutionof
his work leading up to and followingthe Council of Sens is a question
which has receivedconflicting
answers.In short,we can onlybe certain
sometimebetween
was
that the Dialogus
writtenprior to the Hexaemeron
1121 and 1142.
Abailars selfcharacterization
(above) also providesus withan indication of the perspectivefromwhich we, as judges, must approach the
Dialogus.From thisdescriptionwe shouldexpecta broad displayof knowledge fromthe 'treasuryof his memory'and we should expect his own
view to surpasswhat has hithertobeen suggestedconcerningthe supreme
good in eitherphilosophyor theology.We should also expect to have to
doctrines.
takecarefulaccountof thetextualcontextof specificphilosophical
A second obstacle is created by the mysteryof the Vanishingjudge.'
' interlocutors
The Dialogus
agree to subjecttheirviewsto Abailars judgment but thisjudgmentis never rendered.In fact,apart fromhis pre29Thischaracterization
of
characterization
is notunlikeSt. Bernard's
ofAbailard
himthus:'Here
describes
In hisletter
Bernard
Abailard.
toInnocent
Abailard,
II, against
anoldDoctor
ofDialectics,
from
inFrance
ofTheology,
wehavea newProfessor
developed
now
a manwho,after
all hislifewiththelogical
amused
himself
art,is beginning
having
condemned
Certain
to makewildworkwiththeHolyScriptures.
errors,
longsinceand
to
he is endeavouring
nowalmost
someofthemhisownandsomeborrowed,
forgotten,
above
or
intheheavens
is nothing
andis evenaddingto themothernewones.There
revive,
hisignotoknow,
howtoacknowledge
ontheearth
hedoesnotprofess
beneath
which
nothing
except
II After
toInnocent
theCouncil
Abelard
seeLetter
, trans.
, Addressed
rance';
ofSens
byBernard
Against
58-9.
in:Luddy(op.dt
A.J.Luddy,
., aboven. 16),Appendix,
30Dialogus
., aboven. 7),
., aboven. 3),42-3Dialogue
, tr.Payer(op.cit
, ed.Thomas(op.cit
memsententiis
etdivinis
tuisitacumen,
21-2):'Quodveroingenii
quantum
philosophicis
tuarum
consueta
scolarum
orietuethesaurus
studia,
abundet,
quibusin utraque
preter
scientiarum
etiamtuissiveipsisquoquerepertarum
doctrina
scrippreomnibus
magistris
these nobisprebuit
constat
tefloruisse;
certum
toribus
experimentm
opusilludmirabile
sed gloriosius
persequendo
potuitnec auferre
prevaluit,
ologie,quodnec invidiaferre
effecit.'
31PayernotesthatBuytaert
to his'Theology':
claimsthata reference
byAbailard
"
" and
ifAbailard
"Scholarium.
"Summi
boni
'means
bothhisTheologia
Consequently,
Theologia
it
weidentify
before
wemustshowgoodreason
in another
workrefers
tohis"Theologia
I (op.cit.,
aboven. 1),
Petri
Abaelardi
withoneofthetwo.'See E. Buytaert,
theologica
opera
xxii(citedbyPayer(iop.cit
., aboven. 7),22,n. 5).

18:46:34 PM

DIALOGUS
ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

141

the 'Judge'only makes one otherappearance and

liminaryinvolvement,
it is a philosophically
inconsequentialone. The Judge'sre-entrancemarks
the transition
fromthe conversationbetweentheJew and the Philosopher
to the conversationbetweenthe Philosopherand the Christian.However,
as Payer and Thomas both note, the originalmanuscriptonly indicates
the entranceof theJudge by a shiftfromdirectspeech to a narrative
account.32This shiftcomes at the veryend of a long monologueby the
Philosopherwho indeed is given the last word in the firsthalf of the
theJudge makes no judgmentbut prefersto hear
Dialogas.Furthermore,
the argumentsof all beforerenderinga decision.33What are we to make
of this minimalrole played by the Judge'? Some have taken it to be
both an indicationand a consequenceof the incompleteness
of thiswork.
However,quite apart fromthe fact that the work is incomplete,it does
not followthattheJudgewould have played any major role or have rendered finaljudgmentif the work had been completed.In fact,the plot
of the Dialogasis not set up so as to naturallylead to such a climax.The
opponentsdo not presentcases, in the manner of the prosecutionand
defence,whichwill ultimately
requireadjudication.The Dialogasdoes not
eitherculminatein or tend towardsa point where two or more competing views concerningthe supreme good have been distinguishedand
substantiatedon the basis of either reason or faith such that we, or
Abailard,mustnow pass judgmentand decide which has made the better case. Rather, as is especiallyevidentin the discussionbetween the
Philosopherand the Christian,the plot evolves as each characterintroduces elementsand issueswhich are intendedto push the discussionforward.34Even thoughwe can divide the second collatio
of the Dialogasinto
two parts: the first,where the Philosopher acts as presenterand the
Christianacts as criticand the second, where the Christianacts as prewe cannot discern
senterand the Philosopheracts as critic,nevertheless
two distinctviewsof the supremegood since the Christian'spresentation
of his own view builds upon the positionhe has negotiatedbetweenthe
Philosopherand himself.Abailard'sjudgmentsare inherentthroughout
thisprogression.Consequently,we mustrecognizethatthereis a progression and we must be cautious about assumingthat early developments

32See Payer(op.cit.,
aboven. 7),p. 71,n. 118,andThomas(op.cit
., aboven. 3),84.
33Payer
aboven. 7),71,andThomas(op.cit.,
aboven. 3),84-5.
(op.cit.,
34Fora philosophical
oftheDialogue's
A Commentary
onthesecanalysis
plotseeJ.Allen,
ondcollatio
Abailard's
ofToronto)
1996.
ofPeter
(Dissertation,
Dialogus,
University

18:46:34 PM

142

JULIEA. ALLEN

in the DialogasfairlyrepresentAbailars own views,even at the timeof

composition.
A failureto appreciatethisprogressionhas led some scholarsto view
the Philosopher'spositionand the Christian'spositionas competingdoctrines.This has even led some to attach undue weightto the fact that
the Philosopher'sposition is the only 'complete ethical doctrine'presentedin the Dialogus
. Mews, forexample, takes the completenessof the
Philosopher'spositionas a sign of Abailard's deep sympathyfor pagan
forthe philosopheris shownby the comphilosophy:'Abelard'ssympathy
of
of
his
the
ideas. The Christianexplainshis view
pleteness
exposition
of man's final end, the vision of God, but does not deliveran opinion
on the way in whichman can attainbeatitude,concludingonlywithdiscussion of the meaningof "good" and "evil."'35
However,it is importantthatwe not overlookthe factthatthe Philosopher'spositionis, in fact,defeatedby the Christian.The 'complete'picture presentedby the Philosopheris rejectedbecause it is found to be
fatallyflawed.The Philosopherdefinesthe supremeevil of man as the
Abailard clearly
punishmentinflictedupon human beingsin the afterlife.
this
Since
God's
is
rejects
suggestion.
punishment necessarilyjust, the
moral faultby which human beingsincursuch afflictions
is judged to be
a greaterevil than the evil of the affliction
itself.Thus, Abailard insists,
such a picturegeneratesthe conclusionthat the supremeevil of man is
to be definedas man's fault,since the greatestevil is the supremeevil.
However, man's faultis a featureof this life,not a featureof the next
life. Christiandoctrine,as Abailard sees it, demands that the supreme
evil and supremegood of man be foundin the futurelife.The supreme
evil of man cannot be definedas man's faultwithoutcontradicting
this
most fundamentalprinciple. Consequently,Abailard maintainsthat a
view whichdefinesman's supremegood as heavenlybeatitudeand man's
supremeevil as hellishtormentis a view which is marredby an insurmountabledifficulty.
Thus, the Christianof theDialogusproceedsto develop
from
his own view
thispoint forward.The Christianpresentsa view of
the supremegood forhuman beingswhich he thinkswill avoid the previous pitfall.36
Consequently,it is a mistaketo suppose, on the basis of
35Mews(op.cit
., aboven. 17),117-8.
36TheChristian
as thehatred
defines
thesupreme
evilforhuman
ofGodwhich
beings
is a consequence
oftheguilty.
The supreme
ofGod'sjustpunishment
goodforhuman
arepunis theloveofGodwhichis a consequence
ofthebeatific
vision.
Agents
beings
ofGodandarerewarded
love
tocontempt
forintending
ishedforthefault
ofconsenting
ofGod.

18:46:34 PM

DIALOGUS
ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

143

the completenessof the Philosopher'spositionand the assumptionthat

Abailard was more sympathetictowardpagan philosophyin youththan
in maturity,
thatthe Dialogusmusthave been composed duringAbailars
'youth.'
Finally,thereis an obstaclegeneratedby the factthat the workis incomplete.The implicationsof this incompletenessturn in part on the
question of dating the Dialogus.As noted earlier, Robert,Jolivet and
Thomas defendthe view thatthiswas one of the latestif not in factthe
verylast of Abailard'sworks,while Buytaertdates it in 1136, well before
the
Abailard'sdeath and Mews dates it as earlyas 1125.37Furthermore,
note:
on
the
following
Dialogusabruptlyends,
tohaveshown,
forinstance,
I ammistaken,
I havesaidenough
forthepresent
Unless
whenitis takensimply
fora goodthing,
howtheterm'good'mustbe understood
ofthings
orevenwhenitis appliedto theoccurrence
rei]or towhatare
[eventus
the
If something
is leftin theinvestigation
concerning
bypropositions.
expressed
to
shouldbe questioned
further,
youarepermitted
goodwhich
youthink
supreme
on towhatremains.38
introduce
itor to hurry
Such an endingis no finaleand it naturallygivesriseto questionsconcerningwhat 'remains' and where the Dialoguswould have gone had
Abailard continuedwriting.Did Abailard fail to keep writingbecause of
his death,if the Dialogusis dated late, or is it incompletesimplybecause
he failedto finishit, if the workis dated early,or does it end as it does
because the discussionof the supremegood has been completed,or finally
did Abailardconsciouslyabandon the workbecause he encounteredsome
insolublepuzzle? Such an open ended terminationprovidesmuch grist
for the mill of conjectureand opinions will vary accordingto disagreeand purposeforwritingtheDialogus
mentconcerningAbailard'sinspiration
consideredon the whole.
fixedboundaries.The Dialogusmust
Mews beginswithuncontroversial
have been written,
at leastafterthe Council of Soissonsof 1121, and sometime beforeAbailard's death in 1142. Regrettably,many of the further
37Payer,
Introduction
., aboven. 18),
., aboven. 7),6-7.See alsoE. Buytaert
(op.cit
(op.cit
aboven. 17),181-9.
andJean
aboven. 17),256-60;
33-8;alsoThomas
Jolivet
(op.cit.,
(op.cit.,
38Dialogus
aboven. 7),
tr.Payer(op.cit.,
aboven. 3), 171(Dialogue,
, ed.Thomas(op.cit.,
ad ostendendum
inpresentiarum
satisestmedixisse
videlicet,
qualiter
169):'Hec,nisifallor,
velquandoetiam
nomen
boniestintelligendum,
sumitur,
quandoprorebonasimpliciter
rerum
velquea propositionibus
dicuntur,
eventibus,
Quodquiaexinquisitione
applicatur.
licettesubinsummi
bonipendebat,
si quidsuperest,
quodde ipsoulterius
quericenseas,
ferre
velad reliqua
festinare.'

18:46:34 PM

144

JULIEA. ALLEN

suppositionswhichMews requiresforhis estimateof c. 1125 as the year

of compositionare subjectto conflicting
interpretations.
Consequently,his
woven
remains
inconclusive
and
controversial
tightly
argument
despiteits
to
Mews'
1
the
sophistication.39
timetable, Dialogas(c. 125) preAccording
cedes the Commentario,
in Epistolam
Pauli ad Romanos
(1133-1137) which,in
and the
turn,precedestheEthica(1138-1139).40His comparisonoftheDialogus
Ethicafocuseson referencesin the Dialoguswhich definesin as an 'evil
will.' This definition,
Mews insists,more closelyparallelsthe Commentaria
than it does the Ethica.The core of Mews' argumentis as follows:
Atseveral
theDialogus
Abelard
refers
tosin,notas an actora deed,41
placeswithin
butas a badwill(imalavoluntas
samedefinition
as he givesin thecommentary
), the
'
on Romansandin theTheologia
Scholarium
.H2Thisdefinition
is refined
quiteconin theEthica:
a distinction
is drawnbetween
thewillto sin,notin itself
siderably
and consent
to thatmalavoluntas
thetruesin.43
Abelard
sinful,
, whichconstituted
thusretained
hisemphasis
on theinterior,
nature
ofmoralwrong,
but
subjective
hisanalysis
ofman'sgeneral
inclination
to sin,whichwasnotsinful
in
deepened
itself.
ThattheDialogus
sharesthesameearlier
definition
as thecommentary
on
'Scholarium
*
Romansand Theologia
a strong
thattheDialogus
provides
argument
waswritten
before
theEthica.
It is alsoconsistent
withtheearlier
observation
based
on thedifferent
accounts
ofcircumcision,
thattheDialogus
waswritten
before
the
'
on Romans,
itself
Z44
Scholarium
commentary
priorto BookIII ofTheologia
However,in thiscomparisonof texts,Mews failsto considerthe contextsin which referenceis made to faultingevil wills and he overlooks
significant
parallelsbetweenlater portionsof the Dialogusand Abailard's
views in the Ethica.
39A gooddealofMews'
thedating
oftheDialctica
derives
from
argument
concerning
hisscholarly
ofthevarious
andadditions
corrections
within
Abailard's
thedrafts,
analysis
works.
Theportions
ofhisargument
which
focuson theethical
works,
ological
especially
theDialogus
andI shallherelimit
to thosepoints
sincemy
, aremoresuspect
myreview
ofthiswork.
argument
pertains
onlyto thedatine:
40Mews(oto.cit
., aboven. 17),130-2.
41In fact,
in thepassageMewscites,sinis potentially
located
in either
an evilwillor
inaction.
In theEthics,
ofcourse,
Abailard
bothofthesesuppositions.
argues
against
42Commentaria
cit.
Scholarium
, ed. Buytaert
, aboven. 1),206;Theologia
III, ed. Cousin
(op.
., aboven. 13),107.
(iop.cit
43Ethics
aboven. 9), 12-4:'Nonitaqueconcupiscere
mulierem
, ed. Luscombe
(op.cit.,
sedconcupiscentiae
consentire
concubitus
seduoluntatis
conest,necuoluntas
peccatum
sensus
est.'
dampnabilis
44Mews
aboven. 17),115.Mews'earlier
observation
thediscussion
(op.cit.,
compared
ofcircumcision
inthefirst
collatio
oftheDialogue
withAbailard's
discussion
ofcircumcision
andbaptism
in bothSermo
3 andtheCommentary
onRomans.
Mews(112-3)concludes
that
thearguments
in thesermon
are 'virtually
in the
identical
to thoseofthephilosopher
'thediscussion
ofthepurpose
andthelimitations
oftheLaw,andinpar,' while,
Dialogus
ofcircumcision,
ticular
is muchmoredeveloped
intheCommentary
onRomans
thanineither
theDialogus
or thesermon.'

18:46:34 PM

ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

DIALOGUS

145

There are, indeed, five separate referencesto the voluntas

of rational
in
the
.45
The
first
reference
withinthe
occurs
beings
Dialogus
significant
account
of
the
the
to
In
Philosopher's
path
supremegood.
responseto the
Christian'squestion,the Philosopherdescribesthe path to goodness in
the followingway:
thestudy
ofmoralliterature
or exercise
to gaincontrol
overtheflesh,
with
Surely
theresult
thata goodwillstrengthened
intohabitcanbe calledvirtue.46
Here the Philosopheris explaininga purelyphilosophicdefinitionof
the supremegood and the moral lifeby whichit is attained.The citation
whichis Mews5main piece of evidenceoccursearlyin the secondcollatio
of
theDialogusas part of the Christian'scritiqueof the Philosopher'saccount.
The Christianis arguingagainst the Stoic suppositionthat all sins are
equal and that all good men are equally good. He statesthe following:
doesnotunderstand
thatitis theheight
ofinsanity
tosaythatallsins
Who,finally,
areequal?Forwhether
sininthewillorinaction,
itis clear
that
evilmen
youlocate
among
onehasa more
evilwillthan
another
andactsina more
orworse
Thewillof
harmful
way.*1
course
leadstoaction,
andwhentheopportunity
forharming
is present
oneperson
doesmoreharmthananother
orpersecutes
somejustperson
morebecause
hehates
himmoreand desires
to inflict
moretorment.
all goodpeopledo not
Similarly,
do goodorwishtodo so.Fromthisitis clearthatgoodmenarenotequal
equally
to oneanother
norare evilmen;norshouldtheirmerits
be equatedso thatthe
reward
is alsounderstood
to be equal.48
This is a generalattackagainstthe positionwhich has been presented
by the Philosopherto thispointin theirdiscussion.The Christianis arguing thatno matterwhat account one gives of meritand fault,meritand
faultare thingswhich admit of degrees.From thisalone, we should not
inferthat the Philosopher'sdefinitionof sin at thispoint in the Dialogus
constitutesAbailard's own definitionof sin at the time of composition.
45Dialogus
cit
tr.
, ed. Thomas(iop.
., aboven. 3), 84; 100; 102-3;111; 162-5{Dialogue,
., aboven. 7),70; 90; 93-4;104;161-4).
Payer(<op.cit
46Dialogus
tr.Payer(op.cit.,
aboven. 7),
, ed. Thomas(iop.cit
., aboven. 3), 100(Dialogue,
moralis
lectionis
studium
veldomande
carnisexercitium,
ut bonain
90):'Ipsumprofecto
habitm
solidata
voluntas
virtus
diciqueat.'
47Thisis the
ofthepassagewhich
Mewscites.
portion
48Dialogus
aboven. 3), 111(Dialogue,
tr.Payer(op.cit.,
aboven. 7),
, ed. Thomas(op.cit.,
sitdicereomniapeccataparia
104):'Quisdenique,
quinonintelligat,
quaminsanissimum
esse?Siveenim
involntate
siveinoperatione
clarum
estinmalis
hominibus
alium
constituas,
peccatum
alionequiorem
habere
voluntatem
etamplius
nocere
sivedetenus
Voluntas
agere.
quippead actum
et cumfacultas
nocendi
hiequamillenocetvelmagisaliquem
perducit,
datur,
amplius
iustum
Similiter
necomnes
boniequaliter
persequitur,
quiapluseumoditetaffligere
cupit.
velprodesse
volunt.
Ex quoliquidum
estnecbonosparesinvicem
necmalosexisprosunt
tereneceorum
merita
utremunerado
equaridebere,
quoqueparesseintelligatur.'

18:46:34 PM

146

JULIEA. ALLEN

More importantly,
the Christianprovidesa fullerdiscussionof the nature
of an evil voluntas
much later in the Dialogasi He argues that the same
desire or will may be subject to diverseevaluationsdependingupon the
objectiveof the agent:
Andso iftheyperhaps
seemto havedonesomething
good,nonetheless
theymust
notbe saidto haveactedwell.Or iftheydidor willed
to happenwhatGodwills
tohappen,
orifthey
should
havethesamewillas Godindoingsomething,
arethey
saidtoactwellbecause
do whatGodwillstooccur,
ordo they
thereby
they
thereby
havea goodwillbecausetheywillwhatGodwills?Notin anyway!Forevenif
theydo orwillto do whatGodwillsto be done,nonetheless
theydo notdo itor
willto do it becausetheybelieveGodwillsit to be done.Noris God'sintention
andtheirs
thesamein thesamedeed;andalthough
theywillwhatGodwillsand
their
willandGod'scantherefore
be saidtobe thesamebecause
willthesame
they
nonetheless
theirwillis eviland Gos goodsincetheywillit to occurfor
thing,
different
reasons.50
In thispassage,the Christianintroducesthenotionof intention,
together
withthe claim thatthe moral value of desiresand deeds derivesfromthe
value of an agent's intentionand not fromthe value of the agent'swill.
These claims are clearlya piece withAbailard's positionin the Ethical
The Christianfurtherremarks:'And what is amazing here is that the
will is even sometimesgood when someone wills evil to be done by
At thispointin the
another,because he willsit witha good intention.'52
the
Christian
draws
distinctions
between
,
Dialogus
clearly
willingsomeand
well
or
and
thing
willingsomething
wickedly
doing somethingand
doing it well or wickedly.This discussiondraws preliminarydistinctions
betweensin and havingan evilwillor performing
an unfitting
deed which
are reiteratedin the Ethical In the Dialogus
the
,
emphasisplaced on the
49Mewsdoesnotmention
at all.
thelaterdiscussion
50Dialogus
, ed. Thomas(op.
, tr.Payer(op.
cit.,aboven. 3), 164-5(Dialogue
cit.,above
n. 7), 162-3):
'Et si forte
ideo"bonum"
sunt
nontarnen
dicendi
fecisse,
aliquodvideantur
"bene"fecisse.
Autsi etiamfecerint
id velfieri
voluerint,
Deus,veleanquodvultfieri
deminfaciendo
voluntatem
ideobenefacere
habeant,
aliquid
quamDeushabet,
numquid
dicendi
autideobonmhabent
volunsunt,quia scilicet
faciunt,
quodDeus vultfieri;
Et si enimfaciant
velfacere
tatem,
id,quodDeus?Nonutique!
velint,
quiavolunt
quod
Deusvultfieri,
nontamenid faciunt
velfacere
Deumid veliefieri;
volunt,
quiacredant
neceademintentio
estin eodemfactoillorum
id velint,
que Dei, et quamquam
quod
malatamen
etDei voluntas
ideodicipossit,
Deus,eademqueillorum
quodidemvolunt;
eorum
voluntas
estetbonaDei,cumscilicet
id diversis
fieri.'
de causisvelint
51Ethica,
ed. Luscombe
aboven. 9),4-5;8-9;14-5;22-31;48-9.
(op.cit.,
52Dialogus
tr.Payer(op.cit.,
aboven. 3), 165(Dialogue,
aboven. 7),
, ed.Thomas(op.cit.,
etiambonaestvoluntas,
cumquisvult
est,nonnunquam
163):'Et,quoddictumirabile
ab alteromalum
bonaintentione
vult.'
fieri,
quiaid videlicet
53Thisdiscussion
alsofeatures
which
arecommon
toboththeDialogue
examples
specific
of
andtheEthics
: 1)theexample
ofthetwomenwhohanga criminal,
2)Judas'betrayal

18:46:34 PM

DIALOGUS
ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

147

intentionof the agentin measuringfaultor merit,whetherthe agentis a

clear. Mews passes
humanbeing,an angel,Satan or God is unmistakably
over this late discussion of intentionbut it seems to me that it is a
passage which cannot simplybe ignored.
significant
The Christian'sdiscussionof angels in the Dialogasalso featuresthe
notionof 'consent'whichis prominentin the Ethica.The angels who did
not fall,receivethisvision fortheirmerit,since:
In fact,
all angels,
suchthattheycouldactbothwell
justas all men,werecreated
intheir
andevilly.
thosewhodidnotsinwouldhavehadnomerit
refusal
Otherwise
toconsent54
to thesinsoftheothers.55
There is also a correlationbetweenthe Dialogasdiscussionof the various meanings of 'good' referredto in the Hexaemeron
and Abailard's
in
Ethica.
In
about
its
varied
the
the
, the
Dialogas
assumptions
meanings
Christianinsiststhat'good' appliesto a diversity
of thingsand itsmeaning,
like the meaningof many adjectives,derives,at least in part, fromthe
subjectit modifies.No one meaningapplies to all cases. The Christian's
tr.Payer(op.cit
Christ;
, ed. Thomas(op.cit
., aboven. 3), 164){Dialogue,
., above
(.Dialogus
n. 7), 162)andEthics
, ed. (Luscombe
., aboven. 9), 29).
(i
op.cit
54In hisCommentant
ed. Buytaert
aboven. 1),206(= PL 178,802A),Abailard
[op.cit.,
writes:
'. . . undead damnandum
de perversa
scilicet
volntate
irascatur,
priusquamde
hocquodsuperbiendo
voluit
Herewe have
opere.Nonenimdiabolus
operecomplevit.'
an example
ofthekindofevidence
thatwouldbe citedinsupport
ofthesupposition
that
theDialogus
waswritten
laterthantheEthica.
In theCommentarla,
Abailard
speaksofthe
'will'{voluntas)
ofthosewhofell.In theDialogus,
hespeaks
oftheir
consent
rather
[consensus)
than[voluntas).
In theEthica,
Abailard
theclaimthatsinis in thewillandhe takes
rejects
thegeneral
term
from
the[consensus
which
is the
[voluntas)
great
painstodistinguish
animae)
locusofsin.Hisunselfconscious
useof'consensus'
hereandlaterintheDialogus
indicates
thatthedistinction
drawn
in theEthica
in hisownmindbythetime
, waswellsolidified
hewrote
theDialogus.
55Dialogus,
ed. Thomas[op.cit.,
aboven. 3), 136[Dialogue,
tr.Payer[op.cit.,
aboven. 7),
'Omnesquippeangelisicutet homines
talescreatisunt,
utetbeneagerepossent
132-3):
etmale.Alioquin
de hocipso,quodceteris
nonconhi,qui nonpeccaverunt,
'peccando
Thephrase'bene
meritum
nonhaberent.'
etmale
is classic
Abailard.
senserunt,
agere
possent
intheEthics.
He usessimilar
often
from
theEthics
(ed.Luscombe
phrases
Examples
[op.cit.,
aboven. 9) include:
nonactiofacti,
Deum
(30-1)'. . . uidesquia solaintentio
precepti,
excusat
cumid beneprecepit
('. . . yousee thattheintention
quodnonestbonumfieri.'
ofthecommand
ofthedeed,excuses
alone,nontheexecution
God,sincehe didwellto
command
whatis nota goodthing
tobe done');(44-5)'Operaquippequae,. . . prointentioneagentis
bonauel maladicendasunt,nonuidelicet
quia bonumuel malumsitea
sedquia beneuel malefiunt,
. . .' ('Works
in fact,shouldbe calledgoodor evil
fieri,
theintention
oftheagent,
not,thatis,becauseitis goodorbadforthemtobe
through
. . .'). The Christian's
useofthenotion
of
done,butbecausetheyaredonewellorbadly,
'consent'
is alsoa keyelement
ofAbailard's
account
ofsinintheEthics
(seeed.Luscombe
aboven. 9),4-9;14-7;20-7;30-5;42-5;54-9;66-71;88-91).
[op.cit.,

18:46:34 PM

148

JULIEA. ALLEN

and 'good
examplesinclude,cgood man,' 'good horse,' 'good workman,5
thief.'56
Accordingto the Christian,in the case of 'good man,' 'good'
means 'morallygood'; in the case of 'good horse,' 'good' means 'strong
and speedy'; in the case of 'good thief,''good' means he is 'sly, clever
and what not.' In the Ethics
, Abailard writes:
Whenonespeaks
ofa goodintention
. . . thegoodness
andofa goodaction,
ofthe
intention
andthename'good'doesnotkeepthesamemeaning
aloneis indicated
so as to enableus to saythereare moregoodthings
(plurabona).Forexample,
whenwesaya manis simple
anda saying
that
is simple,
wedo nottherefore
grant
theseareseveral
is employed
here
sincethename'simple'
simple
things,
differendy
and differently
there
... we cannotrightly
saythatthereare several
goodthings
whichtheword'good'doesnotfitin a single
way.37
The parallelsbetweenthe finalsectionsof the Dialogasand Abailard's
positionand use of identicalexamples in the Ethicatell against Mews'
suggestionthat therewas fourteenyears betweenthese two texts.More
if we were to accept Mews' dating and chronology,while
significantly
, we would be forcedto conacknowledgingthe contentsof the Dialogus
clude that c. 1125, Abailard
,
i) definedsin as an evil voluntas
early in the Dialogus
late in the Dialogusand
ii) rejectedthe view that sin is an evil voluntas
instead definedsin in termsof consentsand intentions,
thenbetween1133-1137 wrotethe Commentarla
inEpistolam
Pauliad Romanos
in which he,
iii) withoutcommentor argumentapparentlyabandoned the view of
sin presentedlate in the Dialogus
,
and
,
iv) returnedto definingsin as an evil voluntas
and finally,between 1138-1139 Abailard wrotethe Ethicaand
v) once again rejectedevil wills as the locus of sin,
and
56Dialogus
, tr.Payer(op.citaboven. 7)
, ed. Thomas(op.cit
., aboven. 3), 160(
Dialogue
autbonusequusetsimilia,
bonushomovelbonusfaber
158):'Quippecumdicitur:
quis
hominem
diversum
mutuare
nesciathoc nomen"bonus"ex adiunctis
sensum;
quippe
ex scientia,
et velocitate
bonumex moribus
fabrum
vel,que
dicimus,
equumex viribus
ad usumeiuspertinent.'
57Ethics,
et bona
ed. Luscombe
above,n. 9), 52-3:'Cumenimbonaintentio
(op.cit.,
nomen
necineademsignificatione
. . . solabonitas
intentionis
dicitur,
designatur,
operatio
Namet cumdicimus
hominem
boniretinetur,
utplurabonadicerepossimus.
simplicem
cumhoc
esseet simplicem
nonideohaecesseconcedimus
dictionem,
pluraSimplicia,
. . . necplurabonarectedicere
ibisumatur
aliter
hicetaliter
nomen
possimus
"simplex"
unomodoconuenit.'
illaquibusboniuocabulum
nequaquam

18:46:34 PM

ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

DIALOGUS

149

vi) once again developedan account of sin in termsof an agent'sconsentsand intentions.

Acceptanceof Mews' datinggeneratesa ratherstrangepictureof the
'progression'of Abailard's ideas.
If we set Mews' chronologyaside and compare the contentof the texts
more carefully,
we findthat the Ethicafeaturesrefinements
in Abailard's
account of sin as compared to the Dialogus
while
the
,
Dialogusalso goes
the
limited
definition
of
sin
of
the
Commentario..
beyond
Indeed, Abailard's
of the relationbetweendesireand sin showssignsof modunderstanding
ificationand refinement
throughthe course of the Dialogusitself.This
to
Mews'
suggests,contrary
proposal,that the Dialogusshould be viewed
as a transitory
written
afterthe Commentaria
and beforethe Ethica.
piece,
If the conclusionthat the Dialoguswas composed in between the other
two worksis accepted,thenit musthave been writtenc. 1134-1138 and
thiswould be consistentwith the argumentsadvanced by Buytaertand
Luscombe.
if we were to accept Mews' timetable,thenit would folFurthermore,
low thatAbailardwrotehis HistoriaCalamitatum
around 1132-33 afterthe
If
that
in
were
fact
the
then
it
would
be odd thatAbailard
case,
Dialogus.
makes no mentionin the Historiaof having composed a work on moral
philosophyor divinity,
especiallyin lightof his claim in the Dialogusthat
'divinity'is the highestdisciplineto which all othersare to be indentured.In the Dialogus
, Abailard writes:
Whatyoucallethics,
thatis,moraldiscipline,
we areaccustomed
to calldivinity.
ournamearises
from
whatitis aimedatcomprehending,
thatis,God,yours
Clearly,
from
thosethings
itis attained
which
thatis,from
there,
through
goodmoralactions
which
youcallvirtues.58
Given Abailard's flagrantlack of humilityconcerninghis abilitiesin
logic and theology,it would be surprisingif we were forcedby chronolin divinogy to imaginethat he was bashfulabout his accomplishments
ity.It would also be odd to suppose thatAbailard then waited fourteen
years before returningto the subject matterof this highestdiscipline.
However,if we reject Mews' chronology,then the suppositionthat the
Dialoguswas composed afterthe Historiaexplains the lack of a reference
to the formerin the latter.
58Dialogus
tr.Payer(op.
, ed.Thomas(op.
cit.,aboven. 3),88-9(Dialogue,
cit.,aboven. 7),
vosethicam,
id estmoralem,
nosdivinitatem
nominare
consuevimus.
76):'Quamquidem
Nosillamvidelicet
ex eo, ad quodcomprehendendum
id estDeum,sicnuncutenditur,
vosex illis,perque illucpervenitur,
hocestmoribus
vocatis.'
pantes
bonis,quasvirtutes

18:46:34 PM

150

JULIEA. ALLEN

, the textitselfperiodFinally,in the second halfof the second collatio

in favourof datingtheDialogasjust priorto Abailars death.
icallytestifies
their
By
verytone and texturethe finalsectionsof the textgive us the
impressionthat theywere writtenin a rush. The subjectsdiscusseddo
not receivethe rigorousanalysistypicalof earliertopics.The Philosopher
stringsquestionstogetherin a seriesand the Christian'sanswerstake the
formof long monologues.The Philosopheralso does not demand approof the argumentspresentedin theselong monologues.
priate clarification
Both the Philosopherand the Christianexplicitlyremarkon therebeing
a shortageof time. At one point in the text,the Philosophersays: 'But
on now to what remains.'59Somewhat later, the
let us hurry
(festinemus)
to circumscribeaccuratelyeveryChristianremarks:'It is very difficult
in
thingwith theirproper definitions such a manner that theycan be
nowsincewe are notgranted
fromall other things,particularly
distinguished
.'60
thetimetothink
our
the
through definitionsFinally, extanttextof theDialogas
comes to its abrupt end thus: 'if somethingis leftin the investigation
concerningthe supremegood whichyou thinkshould be questionedfur.'61
ther,you are permittedto introduceit or to hunyon to whatremains
This sense of a time shortagemust be attributedto the author of the
work.Afterall, it is not as thoughthe Philosopheror the Christianhad
somewhereelse to go or some otherproject demandingtheirattention.
Consequently,we are naturallyled to wonder what it was that made
Abailard feel increasingly
pressedfortime while he was workingon this
in supIn
this
of
the
text.
respect,the textitselfseems to testify
portion
Abailard's
latest
was
that
the
works,
Dialogus
among
portof the supposition
writtenjust beforehis death at Cluny. These bits of evidencecan by no
means be counted as definitive;
yet we must grantthat if it is claimed
withit,
that Abailard simplyabandoned the work due to dissatisfaction
some
then
or
new
a
of
some
or as consequence
distraction,
intervening
other reasonable account for these allusionsto an urgencywill have to
be provided.62
59Dialogus
tr.Payer(op.cit
., aboven. 7),
., aboven. 3), 145(Dialogue,
, ed.Thomas(op.cit
142):'Sed nuncad reliquafestinemus.'
60Ibid..,
diffinitionibus
estomniaferepropriis
161(Payer,
159):'Difficillimum
equidem
maxime
aliisea separari
siccircumscribere,
utab omnibus
nunc,cumnobisad
queant,
nonconcedatur.'
diffinitiones
moratemporis
excogitandas
61Ibid.)171(Payer,169):'Quod quia ex inquisitione
si quid
summi
bonipendebat,
festinare.'
velad reliqua
licettesubinferre
de ipsoulterius
quericensas,
superest,
quod
62According
and
Christiana
to composing
theTheologia
in addition
toMews'timetable,
c. 1125-26,
theDialogus
wroteandabandoned
it Abailard
works
immediately
preceding

18:46:34 PM

ON THE DATINGOF ABAILARD'S

DIALOGUS

151

An acceptance of Mews' early placement of the Dialoguswithinthe

general chronologyof Abailard's works generatesa number of serious
Mews' timetablefailsto acknowledgethe extentto
problems.Primarily,
whichAbailard's conceptionof sin in the Dialogussurpassesthe account
If Mews is right,then Abailard wrote the
presentedin the Commentano,.
whichwas also priorto the Ethica.If that
Dialogusbeforethe Commentario
is right,thenwe willbe forcedto concludethatAbailardrevertedto definafterclearlyarguingagainstthis
ing sin as a bad will in the Commentario
view in the Dialogus.Thus, the textitselfprovidesgroundsfor rejecting
Mews' mostrecentsuggestion.Only one conclusionclearlyemergesfrom
our surveyof conflicting
evidence.A definitivecase has not been made
foreitherside of the traditionaldebate. There are considerationswhich
corroborateRobert and Thomas' argumentsin favourof a date following the council of Sens, just prior to Abailard's death in 1142. On the
otherhand, the many and varied parallelsbetweenthe later portionsof
the Dialogusand Abailard'smoral positionsin the EthicasupportBuytaert
and Luscombe's suggestionsthat the two workswere produced in close
proximity.
The presentstate of interminablecontroversy
over the precise dating
of theDialogusgeneratesa constraintratherthan a conclusion.We cannot
reach out beyond the boundariesof the textitselfforinterpretative
aids
'
which requireor presupposeany degree of certaintyabout the Dialogus
properplace withinthe evolutionof Abailard'sthought.Since our understandingof the textcannotrelyon our placementof it,we can onlyhope
to place it by betterunderstanding
it.
Toronto, Ontario
University
of Toronto

ofthecommunity
oftheParaclete
andpriorto hisappointment
to
priorto thecollapse
St.Gildas-de-Ruys.
Whiletheprecise
dateofthisappointment
is notknown,
Mewsargues
forsometimein 1127.See Mews(op.dt
be reasonable
to
., aboven. 17),122-5.It might
thattheworkremained
because
itwasinterrupted
conjecture
incomplete
byhisdeparture
from
theParaclete
andthevarious
distractions
oflifeat St.Gildas.Thissupposition
would
notexplain
thesenseofhurry
evident
in thetextunlesswe alsosuppose
thatAbailard
felta pressing
needto finish
thework.However,
itis difficult
to sustain
thissupposition
in light
ofthefactthattheworkremained
foranother
seventeen
incomplete
years.

18:46:34 PM

in Early Thirteenth
Paris:
Obligations
Century
The Obligationes ofNicholasof Paris(?)
(Ms Paris, B. JS.lat., 11.412)1
H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS

Not much is knownas yet about the originand earlydevelopmentof

the logical genreDe obligationibus
?
This may help to explain the fact that some people have argued that
the Obligationes
treatisewhichis attributedto Williamof Sherwoodis not
as earlyas Williamof Sherwood,that on the contraryit dates no earlier
than the veryend of the thirteenth
centuryand thatit may be an early
workby Walter Burley.3
These argumentshave been linkedwithotherdoubtsabout the correctness of the dates given for the four shortanonymoustreatiseson oblidefalsipositione
Emmeranus
,
gationsthatwere editedby de Rijk: the Tractatus
Parisienses
the Obligationes
the Tractatus
Emmeranus
de impossibili
,5
positioned
and the Tractatus
depetitionibus
contrariorum.6
Sorbonnensis
Indeed,de Rijk takes
the Obligationes
Parisienses
to be fromthe beginningof the thirteenth
century
on the basis of a comparisonwith the treatiseattributedto William of
Sherwood.7 Such considerationsmay suggestthat, leaving aside short
treatiseson separate points relatingto obligationalmatters,such as the
Tractatus
Emmeram
treatises,such
, the longer,more-structured
Obligationes
as the one attributedto William of Sherwood,originatedno earlierthan
1 Research
voor
from
theStichting
a grant
forthispaperwasmadepossible
through
Research
forScientific
en Theologie
Filosofie
NWO).
(Netherlands
Organisation
2 Fora veryuseful
withthegenreoftheObligationes
connected
ofthematerial
survey
andtheedithemanuscripts
ofthetreatises,
seeAshworth
1994,whopresents
catalogues
on thissubject.
ofmodern
literature
a bibliography
tionsandalsoincludes
3 Formoreinformation
on thisview,see Spade& Stump1983,passim
; and Stump
ofStump1980),177.
1982,316-7;cf.alsoStump1989(a revised
reprint
4 Forboththesetreatises,
seede Rijk1974.
5 See de Rijk1975.
6 See de Riik1976.
7 See Stump1982,317 and Spade& Stump1983,13,n. 20; in facttheTractatus
attributed
with
thetreatise
Emmeram
werealsodatedbydeRijkonthebasisofa comparison
cf.de Rijk1974,98 and 101-102.
to Sherwood:
Vivarium
36,2

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

18:46:47 PM

IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
CENTURY
PARIS
OBLIGATIONS

153

the end of the thirteenth

centuryand certainlynot in the firsthalf of
that century.8
Althoughthese suppositionshave been rejected by some authors9
and rightly
so in my view thereare thosewho have continuedto refuse
others still leave the question
to acknowledgeSherwood's authorship;10
open and preferto speak of the putativeSherwood treatise.11
Given thisratherambivalentsituation,whichnot onlyaffectsour views
on the developmentof the theoryof obligationsin the thirteenth
century
but also has a bearingon our viewson the developmentof othersubjects
, it would be usefulto obtainevidencefrom
relatingto the logicamodemorum
an independent"witness",a textwhichcan be dated withreasonableceraims preciselyat presentingsuch a text,
tainty.The presentcontribution
whichprovidesproofthat the genre of the Obligationes
alreadyexistedin
a fully-fledged
formca. 1230-1250.The relevanttextcan be foundin ms
Paris, BibliothqueNationale,latin, 11.412.
Ff. 25-105v of thismanuscript12
forma separatepart,and may even have
formeda separatemanuscriptat one time;it seems to consistof a collection of courseson logic for students'personal use, judging in particular
by thematerialin ff. 102v-105, which consistsof a selection of philoand distinctions
thatcould have been used to prepare
sophicaldefinitions
forexams.13
The contentsof thispart of the manuscriptare as follows:
8 See Spade& Stump1983,10-1and 19.Theirviewsalsoaffect
related
such
matters,
as thedevelopment
ofthetheory
ofconsequences.
Cf.ibid.,
statethatthere
19,where
they
is certainly
in Sherwood's
timeliketherelatively
treatment
ofconnothing
sophisticated
in thetreatise
attributed
to him.
sequences
9 Seed'Ors1990,149-54,
whoargues
thatthedifferences
between
thetreatise
attributed
toSherwood
andthetreatise
areso greatthatthey
cannot
be theworks
byBurley
possibly
ofoneandthesameauthor
andwhofurther
outthatthelogical
doctrines
contained
points
in thefirst
treatise
werealready
in existence
in thetimeoftheParvipontani.
See also
Martin
to thesecondpointmadebyd'Orsandrefers
to the
1993,362,whoalsorefers
in thetreatise
discussion
ofthepositio
vicaria
to Sherwood
attributed
theposition
; whereas
thatnothing
movesis labelled
as thatofa nominalis
itas theposition
of
, Burley
presents
an example
thatwouldmakesenseto hiscontemporaries.
Zeno,thusproviding
10See Schupp1993,XXVI,andnote35 in
"Da dervonGreen,1963,
particular:
edierte
undvonihmSherwood
vonSherwood,
Traktat
nicht
sondern
von
zugeschriebene
einem
Zeitgenossen
drfte
seitSpade-Stump,
erelten."
stammt,
Burleighs
1983,alsgesichert
11See e.g.Knuuttila
1993,124and 127.
12Anextensive
ofthismanuscript
hasalready
beengiveninHaurau1891,
description
t. II, 30-48;seefurther
de Rijk1967,Vol.II/l, 81-4.
13Thenotion
thatff.25-105vform
a separate
other
from,
partmaybe gathered
among
thespecialnumeration
ofthequiresofwhichthispartofthemanuscript
consists.
things,

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

ff.25-40
ff 41-81
ff 83-87
ff 88-91va
ff 92-10 1
ff 102M05

Summede dialctica
{Summe
Metenses)XA
Nicholai15
Sincategoreumata
magisti
Appellationes
magistiJohannisPagi16
17
Insolubilia
Obligationes
and notes
philosophicaldefinitions

Elsewhereit was argued that the Summeand the Sincategoreumata

are the
work of one and the same author,who could be identifiedas Nicholas
of Paris, and whose workson the arts should in all likelihoodbe dated
around 1240.18He mightpossiblyalso be identified
as the MestreNicole
who is presentedin Henry d'Andelys'sLa batailledes SeptArtsas one of
the commandersof the armed forcesof Dame Logic- withJohnle Page,
amongstothers who marched fromParis to take up arms againstthe
humanistgrammariansfromOrlans. The logical worksofJohn le Page
are dated mostlyaround 1225-1235.19On the basis of these dates and
in view of the special natureof the part of the manuscriptin which the
is found,we may be reasonablycertainthatthe Obligationes
date
Obligationes
fromapproximatelythe same period.
There is more evidence, however.These Obligationes
have a peculiar
of
a
for
discussion.
For
way
introducing point
example, at the startof
the discussionthat deals with the Obligationes
as a whole we findthe followingtext:
Ad cuiusreievidentiam
scireoportet
et quidobligatio,
quidsitobligare
quotet
velquotsintspecies
eius.20
quibusmodishabeatfieri,
At the beginningof the discussionof the positiowe find:
Dicendum
estigitur
sitista,etquaredicitur
falsapositio,
etquidfaciat
quidpositio
ibihecadditio
etde regulis
etsophismatibus
hancprovenientibus.21
secundum
"falsa",
14Anextensive
ofthisworkwasgivenbyde Rijk1967,II/1,449-90.
analysis
15Thisworkis editedin Braakhuis
1979,Vol.II.
16Thisworkis edited
in de Libera1984.
17An
ofthistract
wasgivenin de Rijk1966,93-8.
18Seeanalysis
Braakhuis
Grabmann
1979,Vol.I, 317-28.Forthisdate,cf.also:already
1926,
andPinborg
Gauthier
222-48,
1967,26-7and35-6;andfurther
1989,54*and66*-7*;
in collaboration
Lafleur
withCarrier
1994,197,n. 99.
19Seede Rijk1972,LXXXVI-LXXXVII,
Braakhuis
1979,Vol.I, 168-9anddeLibera
1984,193-4.
20See infra
, p. 19,11-2.
21See infra
, p. 21,5-7.

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155

we find:
At the startof the discussionof the depositio
videndum
estquidsitdeposiin hacobligatione
Ut igitur
artificialius,
procedamus
etde regulis
eiusetprocessibus
et
etquotmodishabeatfieri,
tio,etquiddeponere,
earnopponuntur
et solvuntur.22
de sophismatibus
que secundum
The discussionof the dubitatio
begins with the followingtext:
etquotetquibusmodisfiatdubietquiddubitare,
Notandum
quiddubitatio,
igitur
etregulas
ad hancartem
et sophismata
tatio,
pertinentia.23
Finallythe discussionof the petitiostartswith:
a positione,
etde quo sitpetitm,
et
Sciendum
etutrum
diffrt
igitur
quidpetitio,
sintrecipiende
et que petitiones
et que non,et de regulis
et sophisfiat,
quomodo
matibus
circahancobligationem.24
From thiswe can see thatthe authorof the textordersthe different
elementsof thediscussionin a particularway:firsthe givesa clearexplanation
of the point under discussion;then he liststhe different
ways or modes
thatcan be distinguished,
and finallyhe discussesthe rulesand sophisms
thatpertainto it.25
In the Sincategoreumata
by Nicholas of Paris we findthata rathersimilar
has
been
followed
and that the points of the discussionhave
procedure
been formulatedin the same way. Thus at the startof the discussionof
the verb "est" we find:
De hocergoverbo"est"primoqueritur
sitsincategoreuma;
utrum
secundoquid
tertio
etsophissignificet
inquantum
sincategoreuma;
queparssit;quartode regulis
matibus
circahocincidentibus.26
The discussionof the adverb "non" begins with:
estquidsignificet
hocadverbium
sitpars
"non";et utrum
Propter
quodquerendum
etinquampartem
inspeciereducitur;
etutrum
addicuilibet
orationis;
possit
compoaddividendm
sitioni
etde diversa
divisionis
illam;
acceptione
importate
perhancdictionem
etsophismatibus
circahancdictionem
"non"incidentibus.27
"non";etderegulis
At the startof the discussionof the exclusivetermswe find:
22See infra
, p. 55, 18-21.
23See infra
, p. 71, 17-8.
24See infra
, p. 77,9-11.
25It should
in factdoesnotalways
be notedthattheauthor
adhereto theorderin
discussion
as strictly
as itis announced.
26See Braakhuis
1979,Vol.2, p. 8, 11-3.
27See ibid.,
35,8-13.

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156

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
De quibus(= dehiisdictionibus
"tantum"
et"solus"),
estprimo
exclusivis
querendum
tertio
de officio
secundo
earum;
quidsignificent;
quartode
quaresienuneupentur;
etsophismatibus
circahasprovenientibus.28
regulis

A fairlysimilarformulation
can be foundat the beginningof thediscussion
of the othersyncategorematic
terms.29
Sometimesa similarprocedureis also foundin the Summede dialctica
Summe
At the startof the treatisewe find:
(i
Metenses).
et
et undedicatur
estquidsitdialetica
Dialeticam
primovidendum
ingredientibus
quidintendat.30
The discussionof the restrictio
begins with the followingtext:
etquidrestringi
etde cauVidendum
etquidhabeatrestringere
igitur
quidrestrictio
sisrestrictionis
et quotmodisfiatrestrictio.31
The beginningof thechapteron relativepronounsis particularly
interesting:
De relativis
tractatum
facientibus
estquidrelatio,
primoconsiderandum
quidrelativum
et de diversitate
etde
relativorum
et de difficultate
eorumcircagramaticam
circahecincidentibus.32
sophismatibus
" is also
The startof the discussionof the sign "omnis
revealing:
Interqueprimo
De quoqueritur
videndum
estde hocsigno"omnis".
quidsignificet
etutrum
ingenere
contineatur
etquidsiteiusofficium
etde regulis
predicamentali
etsophismatibus
circaipsumcontingentibus.33
I thinkwe
On the basis of this similarityin proceduralcharacteristics,
are justifiedin consideringNicholas of Paris to be the author of these
ifwe bear in mindthatthere
The case is further
Obligationes.
strengthened
is no evidenceof a similarprocedurein the logicalworksofJohnle Page,
or in the worksof Peter of Spain or William of Sherwood.
it can be establishedthat thiswork originatedin Paris.
Furthermore,
In the section on depositio
the question is raised as to whether,when a
trueproposition
true
contingent
propositionis deposited,any (contingent)
"
28See ibid.,
hereas
", is found
87, 10-2.Notethatthesameverb,namelyprovenientibus
in thediscussion
in theObligationes.
ofthepositio
29See ibid.,129,9-11(exceptive
246,4-7
223,10-5("nisi"),
176,"9-10("i"),
terms),
hereagaintheverb
1 ("necessario
and"desini),
and"contingenter
12-281,
280,
("incipit"
"
"
336,4-8("an") and373,5-9("vel
").
occurs),
provenientibus
orderof
ofthisworkdoesnotalways
follow
theannounced
the
strictly
Again author
discussion.
30See de Rijk1967,II/1,452.
31See ibid.,
462.
32See ibid.,
479.
33See ibid.,
483.

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157

thatis compossiblewiththe depositum

can be proved,in the same way that
falsepropositionthatis compossiblewiththepositum
can
any (contingent)
be proved or conceded when a contingentfalse propositionis posited.34
Proofis presentedin the replythatthisis indeed possible;here thepropo" is
sition"tues Parisius
trueproposition
givenas an exampleof a contingent
thatis compossiblewith(part of) the depositum
,35From thiswe may conclude that the addresseeof the example was stayingin Paris.36
In summarywe may conclude the following.Firstly,it is very likely
thattheseObligationes
date fromca. 1230-1250. Secondly,it is certainthat
theywere writtenin Paris. Thirdly,it may be surmisedthat theywere
writtenby Nicholas of Paris or, at any rate, by someone in Nicholas of
Paris' circle.
These Obligationes
in which the specificnature
startwithan introduction,
of obligationaldisputationis discussedin relationto other typesof disputation.Accordingto the author, obligationaldisputationis, in part,
relatedto dialecticaldisputation,
withrespectto its mannerof proceeding,
and, in part as far as its methodsand intendedaim are concerned,with
the sophisticaldisputation.37
In the sectionon thepositiothe authorreturns
to thatsame pointin a preliminary
questionwhichaskswhetherobligational
disputationis a similartechnique(ars)to thatpresentedin Book VIII of
,38The answer given here is similarto the replygiven in the
the Topica
34See infra
, p. 69, 32-4:"Dubitalipotestutrum,
sicut,quolibet
contingenti
posito,
falsum
illi,utrum,
probari
potestquodlibet
compossibile
contingenti
quolibet
deposito,
verum
illi."
probari
possit
quodlibet
compossibile
35See infra
in reiveritate
Sortes
, p. 70, 1-7:"Et quoditavidetur
perhocsophisma:
estalbus;deponatur
Sortem
essealbum
etteesseParisius
essedissimilia.
Quo deposito,
proponatur'Sortes
estalbus'.Hoc estantecedens
deposito;
ergonegandum.
Quo negato,
pro'tues Parisius'.
Hoc sequitur
expositoetbenenegato,
essealbum
ponatur
quiasi Sortem
etteesseParisius
suntdissimilia,
etSortes
nonestalbusvelfalsum
sitSortem
essealbum,
tues Parisius.
Et sicpatetpropositum."
36Cf.similar
attributed
argumentation
presented
byde RijktoprovethattheObligationes
to Sherwood
in Paris(de Rijk1976,37-8)andalsohisargumentation
werenotwritten
thattheObligationes
in Paris(deRijk1975,24).
Parisienses
werewritten
It couldbe objected
thattheproposition
"/wes Parisius"
neednotbe an actualtrue
butmight
be onlyan example
ofa trueproposition.
In myview,however,
proposition,
just
"
as wenormally
a proposition
consider
like"tuesepiscopus
, p. 51,23) to
(cf.e.g.alsoinfra
be an actualfalseproposition
andnotonlyan example
ofa falseproposition,
we should
" to be an actualtrue
theproposition esParisius
consider
proposition.
37See infira
considerali
istadispu, p. 20, 1-11:"Dicendum
quodduobusmodispotest
tado.Velsecundum
modum
etsicsubdialetica
continetur Si veroconprocedendi,
in relatione
sideretur
ad finem
velad cavillationes
et cautelas
sicestsub
quibusutitur,
hocquodexercitatum
estad doriamvelad victoriam."
sophistica,
quiapropter
reddit,
38See infra
siteademarsde qua tractatur
in octavo
, p. 21, 7-8:"Et primoutrum
, superquo quidamdubitant."
Topicorum

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

the procedureof obligationaldisputationis the same as that

introduction:
of topical disputation,the only difference
being thatthe firsttypeof disfrom
false
putationproceeds
suppositions,while the latterproceedsfrom
or
probable
reputablesuppositionsand that, whereas the firstaims at
and
victory,the latteraims at reliable opinion; both kindsof disglory
The remarksof the author
putation,however,aim to provide exercise.39
.40
Parisienses
are somewhatsimilarto the openingremarksin the Obligationes
Yet thereis a difference.
Whereas our authorstatesthatbothkindsof disParisienses
putationaim at providingexercise,the authorof the Obligationes
mentionsthat aim with respect to obligational disputationonly. Our
authorreturnsto the comparisonbetweenobligationaland dialecticaldis, where he statesthat
putationin his discussionof the meaning of positio
in
positio obligationaldisputesis not identical,but onlysimilar,to thepositioused in the Topical
It is striking
thatour authordiscussesthe natureof obligationaldisputation so explicitlyin relationto dialecticaldisputationas it is presentedin
the Topica.As yetthe onlytextin whichsuch a relationis knownto have
,42
been discussedis Boethius of Dacia's Quaestiones
superlibrumTopicorum
However,as M. Yrjnsuurihas shown,the descriptiongivenby Boethius
fromwhat
of theway in whichan obligationaldisputationproceedsdiffers
in
on
ours.
is assumed most treatises obligation,including
Accordingto
seemsto be a tool
Boethius'sdescription,
obligationaldisputation
primarily
for discussingimplicitlyinconsistentdescriptionsof situationsand paradoxical situationsand in this manner obligationaldisputationresembles
.43Thus our
contrariorum
what is presentedin the treatisesDe petitionibus
39Seeinfra
esteademquoad
, p. 21,22-9:"Dicendum
quod,sicutprehabitum,
parti<m>
aliternonestprocedere:
datqui respondet;
modum
quiapetitqui opponit,
procedendi,
et repugnantia
cumilio;hec
convertibilia
observatur
antecedentia,
consequentia,
positum,
sednichil
falsaprobabilia
exfalsis,
illaexprobabilibus;
tarnen
esse,utibihabitm
prohibet
ad
sedutraque
et opinionem;
illaveroad fidem
et victoriam,
est.Item.Hec ad gloriam
exercitium."
40See de Riik1975,26-7.
41See infra
est:prefixio
, prouthicaccipiatur,
, pp.23,30-24,6: "dicendum
quodpositio
etscitifalsiuthabeatur
falsienuntiabilis
alicuius
falsa
quodetiamdicitur
provero;propter
ut ad ipsumrespondeatur
ac si essetverum,
in qua ponitur
falsum,
, idest:positio
positio
Unde
ad ipsumet negandorepugnantia.
et convertibilia
concedendo
consequentia
talem
illius
a positione
sumitur
, quiasicut
opinionem
positionis
Topicorum
positor
transsumptive
inoctavoTopicorum
utsignificatur
etomniaquead ipsamfaciunt,
, etabnegat
oppoaccipit
Et ex hoc
etcontraria
eametque secuntur
sita,itaiste,cuifitistapositio,
negat.
suscipit
sedad similitudinem
nonestpositio
solutio
sumpta."
Topicorum
patet
quesita,
quiahecpositio
42See Ashworth
to is to be
workreferred
1988,147,n. 20. The placein Boethius's
& Pinborg
in Green-Pedersen
found
1969,329-31.
43SeeYrjnsuuri
contrariorum
Depetitionibus
1993,esp.66-9,andid.1994,30-5.A treatise
in de Rijk1976.
is edited

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159

is the onlytextthatwe know of to date in whichthe standard

Obligationes
approach to obligationaldisputationis linkedwiththe Aristoteliantheory
of disputationpresentedin the Topical
The structure
of the treatiseas a whole and the subsequentsubdivision
of the textintothe different
typesof obligationis describedin itsintroduction. However, there is somethingstrangeabout this description.The
authorsets out to describea divisionintopositio,depositio
and dubitatio
as
the
three
reactions
can
we
have
with
to
the
reflecting
possible
regard
(sup).45Next he mentionstwo otherpartsor typesof obligation:sitverum
positum
and appellet
(<appellatio
). The lattertypeis the same as thatwhichis referred
in other treatises.The former,it is said, may be reduced
to as institutio
to thepositio
and the lattermay occur in each of the otherpartsor types.46
Based on thisdescriptionone would expect to finda divisioninto three
parts;however,the authorannounces a divisioninto fivepartsinstead.47
In fact,the treatiseitselfpresentsyet another fivefolddivision,namely
into:positio,
and sitverum
or reiventas
, dubitatio,
, of whichthe
depositio
petitio
last part is no more than a shortnote on unacceptablereiveritates.
Withregardto the divisionintopositio,
and dubitatio
, it is remarkdepositio
able that the authorputs much emphasison the fact that this structure
reflectsand correspondsto the possible ways in which we can react or
He does this not only in the introduction,48
but
respondto the positum.
also in his discussionof thepositio
,49and at the beginningof De dubitatione

44In this
ourtreatise
confirms
whatYrjnsuuri
1993aimedto show,namely
respect
thatthetheory
ofobligations
canbe seenin thecontext
oftheAristotelian
ofdistheory
andmayhaveevolved
from
medieval
oftheTopica.
putation
interpretations
45See infra
fieri
nisialiquidsuppo, p. 20, 23-8:"Quod(= obligare)
quia nonpotest
cumcircasuppositum
tribus
modispossimus
noshabere,
tribus
modis
nendo,
propterea,
fieri
Audito
enimpositopotest
consentire
in eo quodposipotest
obligado.
aliquisstatim
tumest,etsicestunaspecies,
etsicalia,quedicitur
, veldissentire,
quedicitur
positio
depovelindifferenter
se habere,
et sictertia,
dubitetur."
sitio,
que dicitur
46See infra
sitverum
reducitur.
, p. 20,28-9:"Aliavero,quevocatur
, ad positionem
Alia,
istarum."
, circuit
quamdicunt
appellet
quamlibet
47See infra
etquinqu
tractatus
huius
, p. 20,30-1:"Etsicsunt
particule
"quasiquinqu
artisveludquinqu
species
obligations.
48See thetextquotedabove,n. 45.
49Seeinfra
hieaccipiatur,
est:prefixio
alicuius
, p. 23,30-3:"dicendum
, prout
quodpositio
falsienuntiabilis
etscitifalsiuthabeatur
,
provero;propter
quodedamdicitur
falsapositio
idest:
inqua ponitur
utad ipsum
ac si essetverum,
. . and
falsum,
positio
respondeatur
de hocquoddicitur
estprefixio
alicuius
falsiut
p. 25, 24-34:"Dubitatur
quod'positio
habeatur
debuisset
dixisse
provero,quodpotius
'profalso', Dicendum
quodhocdictumesthabito
ad statum
verum
respectu
respondentis,
quise habetad verum
inquantum
inconcedendo,
ad falsum
innegando.
falsum
estideoposiinquantum
Quiaergopositum
tumutconcedatur,
licetsitfalsum,
dicitur
'uthabeatur
propterea
provero'."

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in particular.50
In thisrespectour treatiseis more similarto the Obligationes
Parisienses
than to Sherwood(?)'streatise.51
Withrespectto the above it shouldbe notedthatour author'sdefinition
of thepositio
: positioestprefixio
etscitifalsi) uthabeatur
alicuius
falsi (enuntiabilis
52
Parisienses:
obligatio
pro vero is more like the one given in the Obligationes
53
estprefacio
enuntiabilis
ad habendum
provero thanto thatgivenby Sherwood(?):
Est autem
estpraefocio
enuntiabilis
secundum
aliquemstatum
obligatio
enimde
statustriplex,
scilicet
desustinendi
dubie
, sustinendi,
,
Intelligimus
respondendi.
in our treastaturespondentis
enuntiabilis
.54Nevertheless,
the definition
respecta
tise is similarto the formulation
givenby Sherwood(?)in thatour author
also refersto the statusrespondentis
fromtime to time.55
The sectionon thepositio
after
some introductory
remarks,is divided
,
into two parts.The firstpart discussesthe principalruleswhichformthe
guidelinesforthe respondentand the second part deals withsome more
Closer
specificprecautionsthat should be followedby the respondent.56
- and
of
it
that
in
what
is
is
discussed
both
reveals
scrutiny
exactly
parts
- that our treatiseis more similarto
thisis somewhatsurprising
Burley's
thanto eitherSherwood(?)'streatiseor the Obligationes
Parisienses.
Obligationes
50See infra
utpresignificatum
, p. 71, 7-14:"Quoniam,
est,omnisstatus
disputationis
a nobisutvera
esttriplex
cumauditur
velaccipitur
enuntiatio,
quoadnos,quia statim
velut falsaautneutro
dubitare,
modo,secundum
propterea
quodcircaillamcontingit
cuiconsentitur,
enuntiationi
vere,
responsio.
Quiaverevelcredite
tamquam
triplex
congruit
a qua dissentitur,
Verumest';falsevelcredite
false,tamquam
respondetur
respondetur
Talsum
modonoshabemus,
est';dubitate
vero,cuineutro
respondetur
'proba'.Cumigiattendamus
turcuiuslibet
inter
etrespondentem
exercitium
quid
disputationis
opponentem
hos
cumobligatoria
fiatsecundum
ad exercitium
conveniat,
disputado
utrique
propterea
dividitur
tresmodosse habendi
circaenuntiationem
et respondentem,
obligopponentem
inpositionem,
atioprimo
in tresspeciales
etdubitationem."
partes:
depositionem
51FortheObligationes
also
Parisienses
, cf.de Rijk1975,27, 28-31and in particular
ofDe dubitatione)
andp. 47, 7-9(beginning
ofDe depositione).
Cf.also
p. 43,2-4(beginning
thebeginning
Green1963,Vol.2, p. 1,5-11,
ofthecorresponding
partsin Sherwood(?),
27, 16-7andp. 32,2-4.
p. 52
See infra
, p. 23,30-2andp. 25,24-5;cf.alsoabove,n. 49.
53See de Riik1975,28, 12.
54See Green1963,Vol.2, p. 1,5-9.
55See infra
, p. 25,30-1andp. 71,2-3;cf.thetexts
quotedabovein nn.49 and50.
56See forthefirst
huius
videre
de propriis
principiis
part:infra)
p. 26,9-12:"Sequitur
Etprius
artis.
veroad respondentem.
Quorum
quedamad opponentem
pertinent,
quedam
exresponnecessitais
dehiisquead respondentem
videtur,
eoquodtotahuiusartis
pertinent
and 26, 29-31:"Sequuntur
dentedependeat.";
principia
specialiora
que ipsumresponad consequentia,
ad positum,
dentem
rectificant,
quedam
quedam
pertinent
quedam
quorum
ad repugnantia."
cautelis
de specialibus
Andforthesecondpart:infra
, p. 33, 10-1:"Hocvisosequitur
rectificantibus
circaea que sunthuiusartis."
respondentem

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In his discussionBurleydividesthe rulesof thepositiointo two categories:

thosewhichare constitutive
to its practice(de esse)and thosewhichguarantee that the art is practisedwell (de beneesse);the lattercategoryare
also describedas merelyuseful(solumutiles).51
Now the rules that are discussedby our authorin the firstpart coincidewiththoseBurleyconsiders
to be the essentialrules,while the rules discussedin the second part are
the usefulrules.There is onlyone notable
regardedby Burleyto constitute
exception:the rule thatis consideredby our authorto be the most fundamentalone, namely that all responsesmust be directedto the same
instant(omnesresponsiones
suntad ideminstans
retorquende
),58is regardedby
as
one
of
his
useful
rules.
Burley
One of the introductory
remarksin thissectionis reallya shortdiscussion on the typesof consequencewhich are acceptable in an obligational
Here the authormakes a distinctionbetweenconsequences
disputation.59
in whichthe antecedentcannotbe truewithoutthe consequent- such as
consequencesex impossibili, consequences in which the consequent is
understoodin the antecedent,and consequences in which the truthof
the antecedententails the truthof the consequent.The last two kinds
are consideredto be the only acceptable consequencesin an obligational
In thiscontextwe have to take as the minimalrequirement
disputation.60
for a consequence the requirementthat the antecedentcannot be true
withoutthe consequent- this in view of the truthconditionfor a consequence as it is traditionally
given61 , which means that the firsttype
of consequence mentionedabove fulfillsthis requirementonly,whereas
the othertwo typesfulfillthis requirementas well as another.
57See Green1963,Vol.2, 46 and52; cf.alsoYrinsuuri
1994,44ff.
58See infra
huiusartiset tanquam
introductivum
, p. 26, 13-5:"Estigitur
principium
ad aliahoc:omnes
sunt
ad idem
instans"
responsiones
retorquende
It should
be notedthatWilliam
Buserin hisObligationes
from
treatise,
1360,also
dating
thisruleas fundamental
regarded
(seePozzi1990,96,cf.alsoYrjnsuuri
1994,74).Buser
refers
tosomeofhiscontemporaries
withdisapproval
andaimstoreturn
tothepositions
oftheprimitivi
readsprimitim).
In
1993,passim
; Pozzi1990,68,erroneously
(seeKneepkens
viewoftheimportance
ourauthor,
tolaterauthors,
attaches
totheruleinquescontrary
be considered
as oneoftheprimitivi
Buserrefers
to.
tion,he might
perhaps
Forsomediscussion
oftheimportance
attached
to therulein question
in fourteenth
cf.Ashworth
discussions,
1996,352f.
century
obligational
59See infra
, p. 21,30ff.
60See infra
tribus
modis.
Velitaquodantecedens
, p. 22,8-15:"Quoditerum
contingit
nonpossit
starequinsitconsequens;
etsicestconsequentia
ex impossibili;
de qua iterum
nichil
ad presens
Vel itaquodconsequens
sitde intellectu
etde esseantecedenpertinet.
animal.Tertiomododicitur
tis,ut ad hominem
sequitur
consequentia,
quandoVeritas
estcausaveritatis
antecedentis
Et de hiisduabusultimis
esthieintendo."
consequentis.
61Cf. PeterofSpain,Tractatus
conditionalis
(deRijk1972),9, 15-6:"Adveritatem
e.g.

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H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS

In his Sincategoreumata
between
Nicholasof Parismakesanotherdistinction
consequences,namelybetweennaturaland unnaturalconsequences.Natural
consequencesare consequencesin which the antecedentcannot be true
withoutthe consequentand in which the consequentis containedin the
antecedent;unnaturalconsequencesare those in which anythingfollows
fromthe impossibleor the necessaryfollowsfromanything.62
in theterminology
It mightseem therefore
thatthereis some incongruity
used in the Obligationes
. It appears, however,
and in the Sincategoreumata
thatthe authorof our Obligationes
considersthe two typesof consequence
that are acceptable in an obligationaldisputeas formsof naturalconsequence. This becomes clear in his discussionof the rule statingthatwhen
a false possible propositionis posited,any falsepropositionthat is compositode quolibet
falsocompossiblewithit mustbe conceded {falsopossibili
It is here thathe statesexplicitlythat
possibiliUlidebetconcedi
ipsumesse).63
not everytypeof consequence can be accepted in a positio
falsa but only
thosethatare naturally
valid.64Anotherclear exampleoccursin thesection
on deposition
when the rule is discussedthateveryantecedentto the depositummustbe denied.65In thiscontextour authorstatesthata proposition
of
nonpossitesseverumsineconsequents"
; cf.alsoNicholas
exigitur
quodantecedens
dedialctica
Metenses
Paris,Summe
[Summe
), de Rijk1967,II/l, 453: "Adcuius(= condiveritatem
esseverum
sineconsequenti."
nonpossit
tional)
exigitur
quodantecedens
62See Braakhuis
con3: "Item.Quodsoletdistingui
1979,Vol.2, 199,17-200,
duplex
etnaturalis;
naturalis
estinqua antecedens
nonpotest
scilicet:
innaturalis
autem
sequentia,
inantecedenti,
esseverum
sineconsequenti
ut'siesthomo,
etinqua clauditur
consequens
hancregulam
estanimali';
innaturalis
estinqua eximpossibili
, secundum
que
sequitur
quiclibet
"Adhoc
sicdicit.Etpropterea
estutrum
illaregula
sitvera.";203,15-204,1:
querendum
In connaturalis
etnonnaturalis.
dicendum
est,consequentia:
est,utdictum
quodduplex
cumilio.
naturali
nichil
ex impossibili
nisialiudimpossibile
convertibile
secutione
sequitur
aliudnisi
In consequentia
innaturali
nichilprohibet
sequiquiclibet,
quiaillanonquerit
necessitatem
aliud,
propterea
impossibili
ponitur
equaliter
quiclibet
positionis;
quiaergoposito
ex impossibili
aliud.";204, 14-6:"Quiacumregulaprecedenti
positosequitur
quiclibet
illasequitur
soletdarihecregula,
adquiclibet
scilicet
ista.";
, discussa
quodnecessarium
sequitur
sedconsead quiclibet),
206,14-6:"Dicendum
sequitur
quodimmo(quodnecessarium
utvisum
nonnaturali,
entipositoponitur
est,quiaquocumque
quodnonpotest
quentia
nonesse,utprobatum
est."
in theframeForan interesting
discussion
ofNicholas
ofParis's
viewon consequences
ofconsequences,
ofearly
thirteenth
ofthevalidity
work
ofa discussion
century
conceptions
seeSpruyt
1993,passim.
63See infra
, p. 51, 19ff.
64Seeinfra
debeant
false
4: "Nontarnen
dicoquodconsequentie
, p. 52,30-53,
positionis
Undenon
naturaliter.
sedtantummodo
accipisecundum
genus
consequendi,
unumquodque
estsimilede hac 'Sortesestalbuset tu es asinus'et de hac 'Sortesestalbuset tues
cumposito,
et itasequitur,
oppositum
quiaoppositum
episcopus',
primeestnecessarium
etitanonsequitur."
secunde
estcontingens
verum,
65See infra
, p. 59,3ff.

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CENTURY
IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
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163

and therefore
should be considered to be antecedent to the depositum
followsnaturallyfromthat
should be denied, only when the depositum
Stillanotherexample occursin thatsame section,when the
proposition.66
whethera necessarypropositionmay be used as a
is
discussed
question
.67In his answer our author states that a necessarium
per accidens
depositum
can only be used as a depositum
, in the same way that an impossibile
per
conthat
natural
and
he
adds
accidens
can onlybe used as a positum
,
only
and that the rules ex
sequences are to be consideredin the obligationes
ad quidlibet
are not valid there.68
and necessarium
quidlibet
impossibili
We see then that our author'sdistinctionactuallycorrespondsto the
in
distinction
; consequendythe difference
presentedin the Sincategoreumata
mentionedabove appears to be only superficialand certainly
formulation
does not constitutecounter-evidencefor the suppositionthat the two
worksmay have been writtenby one and the same author.
With regard to the principalrules discussedin this firstpart of the
section on positio
, it should be noted that they all contain the phrase
"
essetale (and knownto be such).69Only the rule concerningthe
Uscitum
does not contain this phrase,70but it has been noted that it
impertinens
would not be of great importancein that context.71
66See infra
velnonsequatur,
utamur
veroscireutrum
, p. 59, 13-9:"Volentes
sequatur
in antecedenti
utrum
in condi
tioneilludquoddubitamus
hacarte:ordinantes
antecedat,
naturaliter
etnegari
inconsequenti,
etdepositum
debet,
esse,estantecedens
et,sisequatur
si autempossit
esseverum
sinedeposito,
tunc
ut,'si Cesarestalbus,Cesarestcoloratus',
nisialiudobstiterit."
etpotest
nonantecedit
concedi,
67See infra
, p. 69,5ff.
68See infra
sicutimposde necessario
, p. 69,25-31:"Quodconcedimus
peraccidens,
sunttanattendende
sibileperaccidens
quodin hiisobligationibus
potest
poni,dicentes
in antecedenti
cumconsequens
et consequentia
scilicet
antecedentia
tummodo
naturalis,
etcumconsequens
denecesessenonpotest,
sineconsequenti
etcumantecedens
clauditur,
'eximpossibili
hiclocumillaregula:
sitate
est;etitanonhabebit
est,si antecedens
quicli<ad> quiclibet
be,'necessarium
sequitur'."
etquidsequitur
5: "Etsivelimus
scirequidantecedit
Cf.further
alsoinfra
, pp.73,35-74,
dubitainprecedenti
determinato:
artificio
utamur
etquando,
quodordinetur
obligatione
inconditione,
autsequatur,
etsi dubitatum
utrum
antecedat
tumcumeo de quodubitatur
si autemantecedat,
sic
sicilluderatantecedens,
ad illudconsequentia
naturali,
sequatur
'si Cesarest
essecoloratura
Ut si dubitetur
Cesarem
et conditionetur
illuderatconsequens.
sunt
'si Cesarestcoloratus,
Cesarestqualis',heeconditiones
albus,Cesarestcoloratus',
estmelius
"Veldicendum
Andalsoinfra
naturales."
concedi,
, pp.74,35-75-3:
quodpossit
nisiper
dicendum
et cumopponitur
quodhocnonestverum
quodB estnecessarium,
<nisi>
nonaccipiuntur
etconsequentie
etregule
antecedentie
accidens
quehicattenduntur,
ad quicli'eximpossibili
et'necessarium
Undeilledueregule
secundum
accidens.
quiclibet'
autconsequuntur."
antecedunt
hielocum,
nisisecundum
bet'nonhabent
quodnaturaliter
69See infra
, p. 28, 15-8andp. 28,20-2.
70See infra
, p. 28,24.
71See Yrjnsuuri
1994,51-3.

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164

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

With respectto the second part of the sectionon positio

, in whichsome
more specificprecautionsare discussed,I will only focus on the most
importantpoints.
Thus, it can be seen that our treatisedevotesa ratherelaborate dis"
In fact this
cussion to the (non)possibility
of "falsum
poni as a positum.12
discussionis really a recapitulationof different
views on the insolubilia
,
even containinga referenceto such a treatise.73
It should also be noted that our treatisedoes not containa separate
the author only gives as a firstrule that
subsectionon positioimpossibilis'
an enuntiabilethat cannot be conceded should not be posited:si aliquod
folenuntiabile
sittalequodnonpossitconcedi
, nondebet
poniand immediately
"
lows this with a discussionon the (im)possibility
of "falsumponi as a
In this respectour treatiseis again shown to bear resemblance
positum.
to the Obligationes
.75
Parisienses
In this part there is also a discussionof the rule that,when a false
possiblepropositionconcerningthe presentinstanthas been posited,then
it has to be denied that that instantexists[falsopossibili
positode instanti
est
est
The
here
is that our
,
quod
negandum ipsumesse).76
interesting
point
authorrejectsthe validityof thisrule. Accordingto him thereis nothing
thatpreventsthe presentinstantfrombeing conceded to existduringthe
72See infra
, pp. 33, 19-35,14.
73See infra
fallaciam
secundum
secundum
, p. 35, 13-4:"Aliietiamsolvunt
quidet
in tractatu
Insolubilium
habebitur
cuiusdeclaratio
simpliciter;
In viewofthefactthatthere
is someagreement
between
thediscussion
ofthedifferent
andfallacy
secundum
withthat
solutions
as itis found
here(restrictio
usualis
quidetsimpliciter)
in ourmanuscript
found
in theInsolubilia
treatise
elsewhere
(cf.de Rijk1966,
occurring
ofthat
thatourauthor,
Nicholas
ofParis(?),
is alsotheauthor
be suggested
93-8),itmight
treatise.
74See infra
, p. 33, 18.
75Cf.de Rijk1975,28,28-30and34, 19-35,5.
in this
onpositio
thatde Rijkpresents
ofthediscussion
Withregard
to thesubdivision
Prima
thatp. 34,4 should
be readas:"Solutio.
itshould
benoted
treatise,
positio
recipienda
etimponi"Deenuntiabilibus
est,"andthatonp. 34, 19a newitemis introduced:
ponibilibus
a positione"
"Deenuntiabilibus
cadentibus
bilibus".
newitemis introduced:
On p. 35,6 another
,
be readas (cf.alsothecorrections
which
is reintroduced
atp. 36, 16.P. 36, 16-18should
Quoddamenuntiabile
potest
poniet
proposed
byMartin1993,371,n. 32): "Preterea.
ut 'Sortesestalbus';quoddam
et <non> caderea positione,
potest
permanere
positum
itshould
be
sed[non]potest
Furthermore
caderea positione."
poniet<non>permanere
should
be incerte
ofindeterminate
notedthatonp. 42,26,27 and32,thecorrect
reading
cf.ibid.,
28, 1-3and 19-22).
(forthiscorrection
76See infra,
pp. 43,28-47,26.
ofit,see
in relation
withScotus's
ofthisrule,in particular
Fora discussion
rejection
in particular
Knuuttila
1993,
1981,228ff.,
Spade& Stump1983,20-4and Knuuttila
144-54.

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OBLIGATIONS
IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
CENTURY
PARIS

165

time of the positio.This resultsin only an accidental impossibility,

and
thereis no logical rule whatsoeverthat could forceus to deny such an
Earlier, the author explains what he understandsby an
impossibility.77
se
: an impossibile
impossibile
per and an impossibile
per accidens
perse is what
cannotbe truenow nor could be truein the past nor can be truein the
is
future,i.e. it is an omnitemporally
impossible;an impossibile
peraccidens
whatwas trueonce but can no longerbe truenow.78It is remarkablethat
our treatisewith regardto thispoint of view shows a strikingsimilarity
withthe Obligationes
Parisienses
, which also rejectsthe validityof this rule
on the basis of a distinction
betweenthe impossibile
perse and the impossibile
the
of
this
peraccidens
rule, our authorsticks
Notwithstanding rejection
to a temporalnotionof possibility,
to
which
the possibility
that
according
a contingent
be
well
true
as
as
false
is linkedto a change
propositionmay
in time. This becomes clear in the discussionthat follows,in which he
explainsthatwhen (the instantof) time referredto is taken to be broad
enough to allow forsuch a change,the rule should be rejected,and that
the rule should be followedonly when the instantof time referredto is
taken to constituteindivisibletime.80
The discussionin the sectionson the depositio
and dubitatio
generally
followsthe lines of thoughtthatwere presentedin the sectionon positio
;
therefore
we leave out a discussionof these sectionshere.
Aftersomeintroductory
thesectionon petitio
remarks,
is, in fact,restricted
to a listingof petitiones
that cannot be accepted. Interestingly
enough,in
this contextour author refersto what is assigned by Sherwood(?)and
77See infra
dicentes
, p. 44, 13-20:"Aliialiterrespondent
quodnichilprohibet
posse
concedi
instans
in tempore
et cumopponitur
'concessisti
presens
positionis,
impossibile',
dicendum
Accidit
enimimpossibile,
Sortem
est,scilicet
quodverum
impossibile
peraccidens.
essealbum
etA essesimul
concessionem
sedequeconsequentie
scilicet,
propter
positi;
eque
de necessitate
repugnantie
equeequipollentie
equeconvertibilitates
cogunt
negari
impossibileperaccidens,
utsupraostensum
estin quodamsophismate."
It couldbe arguedthatin thisplaceourauthor
to theopinion
ofothers
onlyrefers
andthathedoesnotexpress
hisownview.To mymind,
sinceourauthor
endsthediscussionofthispointwiththisreference
andsincehe alsorefers
tosomething
thathasbeen
we maybe confident
thathe is,in fact,expressing
hisownview.
earlier,
proved
78See infra
scilicet
, p. 38,31-7:"Item.Cumduplexsitimpossibile,
perse etperacci- perseautem
dens
estilludquodnecpotest
necpotuit
necpoterit
esseverum,
impossibile
ut:hominem
esseasinum
estquodaliquando
fuitverum
sediamnonpotest
; peraccidens
- dicunt
esseverum,
ut:te non
sanum
de per
fuisse
quodreguladatasupradebetintelligi
se impossibili
necestinconveniens
concedere
propter
positionem
possibilem
impossibile
peraccidens."
79SeedeRijk1975,32.Fora
discussion
oftherelevant
seeYijnsuuri
pertinent
passage,
1994,67-9.
80See infra, 45, 12-47,22.
pp.

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166

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

: the positiovicaria,
, namely the petitioin which
Burley to a special positio
the opponentis requiredto answer accordingto the viewpointof some
otherperson.The example used by our authoris the same as thatgiven
by Sherwood(P)and Burley,i.e. theviewpointthatnothingmoves,ascribed
by our author,as well as Burley,to Zeno.81
is in fact nothingmore than a shortnote on
The sectionon sit verum
reiveritates
thatcannot be sustained.As is the case in the comparablesection in Burley'streatise,the emphasishere is on the epistemicaspectsof
a positio.
is a well organised
From the above it may appear that our Obligationes
and systematictreatisethat discussesthe proceduresand problemsrelating to the artofthe obligationaldisputationin a thoroughand quite articit is verysimilarto the Obligationes
ulated manner.Internallyor doctrinally
Parisienses
with regard to several points. In view of the more elaborate
and sitverum
structureof our treatise,e.g. the separatediscussionofpetitio
and the internalsubdivisionof the discussionof the rules of the positio
,
it may be gatheredthatits date of originis some timelater than thatof
these Obligationes
Parisienses
and thatconsequendythislattertreatiseshould
indeed be dated to the early decades of the thirteenth
century.In view
of what our treatisepresents,thereseems to be no longerany reason to
doubt thatWilliamof Sherwood's(P)treatisecould have originatedin the
firsthalf of the thirteenth
century.In comparisonwith our treatisethe
structure
of William'streatiseis less developedand the sophismsdiscussed
are less complicated.Thereforeit seemsplausiblethatit was writteneven
earlierthan our treatise.This date of originmightwell coincidewiththe
most likelyperiod when William of Sherwood was active in the fieldof
the artes
, that is ca. 1230-1240.82Remarkablyenough our treatisewith
withBurley'streatise,which
to
regard its structureshows some similarity
could perhaps mean that our treatisehas influencedthe latterwriter.
At any rate it is clear that our treatiseprovidessubstantialproofthat
the stateof the art of the theoryof obligationswas alreadyfullydeveloped
81See infra
secundum
, p. 81, 1-4:"Sicutsi fiatpetitio
positionem
quodturespondeas
et negares
nichilmoveri>et sequentia,
<concederes
Zenonis,
qui posuitnichilmoveri,
secundum
nichil
moveri
Sedsiproponatur
tibi'tuconcedis
tuam',
opinionem
repugnantia.
nonconcederes
Zenoconcederei."
hoc,quamvis
to Topica
AsYrjnsuuri
VIII,5,
1994,63,points
out,thisexample
maybe a reference
as
whenanswering
moves
ofgranting
thatnothing
where
alsousestheexample
Aristode
Zenowould.
82Forthisdate,cf.Brands
& Kann1995,XIV.

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IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
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PARIS
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167

in the firsthalfof the thirteenth

centuryin Paris.83As such it also forms
an importantsourceforthe earlydevelopmentof the theoryof obligations
and of relatedpointsof logical theoryin general.
KatholiekeUniversiteit
Nijmegen
Instituut
Philosophisch
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AnIntroduction
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Treatise,
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dela Bibliothque
Nationale
, t. II, Paris1891
3s
1993 C.H. Kneepkens,
Willem
Buser
"ObrogaKneepkens
ofHeusden
Obligationes-Treatise
A Ressourcement
tum".
intheDoctrine
?, in: K. Jacobi(Ed.),ArgumenofLogical
Obligation
tationstheorie:
Scholastische
undsemantischen
korrekten
zurdenlogischen
Forschungen
Regeln
, Leidenetc.1993,344-362
Folgems
83In viewofthispointandalsooftheinternal
withtheObligationes
Parisienses
similarity
on theonehandandsomeaspects
oftheObligationes
treatise
Buseron the
byWilliam
other(cf.above,n. 58) ourtreatise
as evidence
foran autonomous
maybe considered
continuous
tradition
in logicaltheory
in thethirteenth
and earlyfourteenth
at
century
Paris(cf.Braakhuis
1993,325-6).

18:46:47 PM

168

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

1981 S. Knuuttila,
Knuuttila
Time
andModality
inScholasticism
theGreat
, in:Id. (Ed.),Reforging
Chain
Studies
etc.1981,163-257
, Dordrecht
ofBeing.
oftheHistory
ofModalTheories
Knuuttila
1993 S. Knuuttila,
Modalities
andNewYork1993
inMedieval
, London
Philosophy
Lafleur
incollaboration
withCarrier
1994Cl. Lafleur,
avecla collaboration
deJ.Carrier,
La Philosophia
d'Herv
leBreton
leBreton)
etlerecuai
d'Introductions
a laphilosophie
(aliasHenri
dums.Oxford,
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
Christi
283 (le partie
), in:Archives
Corpus
College
et Littraire
du MoyenAee,61 (1994),149-226
de Libera1984 A. de Libera,LesAppellationes
d'Histoire
deJeanle Page
, in: Archives
et Littraire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,51 (1984),193-255
Martin
1993 C.J.Martin,
andLiars
inMedieval
, in:S. Read(Ed.),Sophisms
Logic
Obligations
andGrammar
etc.1993,357-381
, Dordrecht
d'Ors1990 A. d'Ors,Ex impossibili
in:Archives
d'Histoire
(Walter
Burley),
quodlibet
sequitur
et Littraire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,57 (1990),121-154
1967 J.Pinborg,
DieEntwicklung
derSprachtheorie
imMittelalter
zurGeschichte
Pinborg
(Beitrge
derPhilosophie
undTheologie
desMittelalters,
1967
42/2),Mnster-Kopenhagen
Pozzi1990 L. Pozzi,La coerenza
delle
del
nellateoria
medioevale
l'edizione
(con
logica
obbligazioni
" di
trattato
Parma1990
Buser),
"Obligationes
Guglielmo
de Rijk1966 L.M.de Rijk,Some
notes
ontheMediaeval
tract
De insolubilibus
theedition
, with
theendofthetwelfth
in:Vivarium,
4 (1966),83-115
ofa tract
from
dating
century,
de Rijk1967 L.M.deRijk,Logica
Modemorum.
A Contribution
ToTheHistory
Terminist
ofEarly
Vol.II, p. 1: TheOrigin
AndEarly
, Assen
Logic.
Development
OfTheTheory
OfSupposition
1967
de Rijk1972 L.M.de Rijk,Peter
TRACTATUS
called
ofSpain(Petrus
Hispanus
Portugalensis).
SUMMULE LOGICALES.
FirstCritical
with
an
Edition
theManuscripts
afterwards
from
Introduction
, Assen,1972
onTheGame
de Rijk1974 L.M.de Rijk,Some
Tracts
Thirteenth
I, in:
Century
ofObligation.
12(1974),94-123
Vivarium,
de Rijk1975 L.M.de Rijk,Some
Thirteenth
onTheGame
Tracts
II, in:
ofObligation.
Century
13 (1975),22-54
Vivarium,
de Rijk1976 L.M.de Rijk,Some
onTheGame
Ill, in:
Thirteenth
Tracts
Century
ofObligation.
14 (1976),26-49
Vivarium,
De obligationibus.
dieVerpflichtungen
ber
. Textkritisch
herSchupp1993 Martinus
Anglicus,
1993
ausg.. . vonF. Schupp,
Hamburg
andtheObligationes
Attributed
Walter
Spade& Stump1983 P.V.SpadeandE. Stump,
Burley
toWilliam
in:History
andPhilosophy
ofLogic,4 (1983),9-26
ofSherwood,
ontheRule"eximpossibili
1993 J.Spruyt,
Positions
,
sequitur
quidlibet"
Spruyt
Thirteenth-Century
und
semanin:K.Jacobi(Ed.),Argumentationstheorie:
Scholastische
zurdenlogichen
Forschungen
tischen
korrekten
, Leidenetc.1993,161-193
Regeln
Folgems
in: Historiographia
Treatise
onObligations,
ofSherwood's
Stump1980 E. Stump,William
7 (1980),177-193
in Stump1989)
Linguistica,
(reprinted
totheearly
A. From
thebeginning
, in:
fourteenth
century
Stump1982 E. Stump,Obligations:
N. Kretzmann,
A. KennyandJ. Pinborg
ofLater
(Eds.),The Cambridge
History
Medieval
etc.1982,315-334
Philosophy,
Cambridge
Dialectic
andItsPlaceinthe
, Ithacaand
ofMedieval
Logic
Development
Stump1989 E. Stump,
London1989
andMedieval
1993 M. Yrjnsuuri,
Aristotle's
, in:
Yrjnsuuri
Topics
Obligational
Disputations
96 ( 1993),59-82
Synthese,
14thCentury
Duties
1994 M. Yrjnsuuri,
(Acta
Yrjnsuuri
ofDisputational
Obligationes.
Logic
Fennica
1994
55),Helsinki
Philosophica

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169

Divisio textus*
INTRODUCTIO
DE POSITIONE
De principiisque ad respondentempertinent
De principiisrectificantibus
respondentemque ad

DE
DE
DE
DE

positumpertinent
De principiisrectificantibus
respondentemquoad
propositum
De specialibuscautelisrectificantibus
respondentem
de enuntiabilibusnon ponibilibus
de "falsumponi" et convertibilibus
de concessioneimpossibilis
de posito in temporepositionis
de temporepositionis
de transcasu
de positionedependente
de disciplinaliquestione
de quibusdam aliis regulis
DEPOSITICENE
DUBITATIONE
PETITIONE
"SIT VERUM"

p. 19
p. 21
p. 26
p. 26
p. 28
p. 33
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.

33
35
39
42
47
48
49
50
55
71
77
82

* Thanks
areduetoProfs
L.M.de RijkandA. d'Ors,whoprovided
useful
comments
on an earlier
draft
ofthisedition.

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170

H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS
<Nicholas of Paris(?) Obligationes>
(Ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 11.412, ff.92-101)
<INTR0DUCTI0>

in libro Topicorum
aut Elenchorum
,85
[f. 92] Sicut84significaiAristotiles
ars disputativaad triaviam pestat:ad secundumphilosophiam86
diset ad obviationeset ad exerciveritatis,
ciplinas,idestad inquisitionem
5 tationes.87Quia ergo exercitadoaliis duobus facultatemaggenerat,
qui enim exercitatisuntmagis possunt,idcircoad presensde disputatane prout est ad exercitiumvideamus.Prenotandoquod duobus
modis fitdisputado:vel nichil supponendo a quo disputetur,et de
hac nichilad presensintendimus;
vel aliquid supponendo,que dicitur
10 obligatoria
circa
disputado,
quam presensversaturintendo.
Ad cuius rei evidentiamscire oportetquid sit obligare et quid
obligatio,quot et quibus modishabeat fieri,vel quot sintspecieseius.
Et primo edam sub quo genere disputationisaccipiatur.
88
In libro enim Elenchorum
distinguunturdisputationumgenera
15 quatuor; sed nulla illarumest ista; ergo non est disputado,cum non
sitin generequod non sitin aliqua specierum,ut habeturin TopicisP
Probado: doctrinalisdisputadoest ex necessariis;sed ista est ex falsis; ergo non est doctrinalis.Item: doctrinalisest ad scientiam;hec
tantumad exercitium;ergo etc. Item. Non est dialetica,que dialedca
20 est ex probabilibus;hec vero ex manifestefalsiscontingentibus.
Item:
dialedca est ad fidemvel opinionem;hec autem ad exercitiumut ad
finem;ergo non est dialetica.Pretereanec temptativa,quia temptativa est ex communibusuniuscuiusquedisciplineet est ad experientiamsumendamde alio; sed hec nichilhorumhabet;ergoetc. Preterea
25 nec est sophistica,de qua magisvidetur,quia sophisticaest ex apparenterprobabilibuset est ad redargutionem
vel ad falsumvel inopinabile concedendumab adversario,in hiis enim coniectantqui circa
orationemcorixantur;sed obligationec in hiis nec ad hec est; ergo
non est sophistica.Ergo nec disputado.
84In marg.
sup.INCIPIUNTOBLIGATIONESET PRIMOFALSAPOSITIO.
85Topica
I 2, 101a 26-28(Auel36,2).
86ad secundum
excollatione
autsecundum
Aristotel
P.
philosophiam!
philosophias
87exercitationesl
P etsicfere
excercitationes
semper.
88De sotoh.
el.,165a 38ss.
89Topica
IV 1, 121a 27-29[Auel36,57).

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171

Dicendum quod duobus modis potest consideranista disputatio.

Vel secundum modum procedendi,et sic sub dialetica continetur.
,90ubi dicitquod nos disputationem,
Quod patetin principioTopicorum
idestpositionem,sustinentes
nichildicamusrepugnans,et in octavo,91
5 ubi dicitquod opus bene opponentis92
est facereorationem,supple:
conclusam,videriinprobabilissimam,
opus autem bene respondentis
est ita facerequod non propterargumentationem
sed propterpositionemvideaturaccidere. Si vero considere
turin relationead finem
vel ad cavillationeset cautelas quibus utitur,sic est sub sophistica,
10 quia propterhoc quod exercitatumreddit,est ad gloriam vel ad
victoriam.
Quod obicitquod non est ex probabilibusnec ex apparenterprobabilibus,dicendumquod immo, quia nichilprohibet93
quedam falsa
.94
probabilioravideriquibusdamveris,ut habeturin octavo Topicorum
15 Ad fidemvero vel opinionemnon est immediate,ad redargutionem
vero etc. est manifeste,ut apparebitpostea.
Hoc habitovidendumestquid sitobligareet ceteraque propositasunt.
Sciendum ergo quod obligatio
est, secundum quod hie sumitur:alicuius ad aliquid ex petitioneopponentiset concessionerespondentis
20 astrictio.
Et obligare
est:aliquemad aliquidconcedendumvel negandum
non
concederet
vel negaret,in petendoopponentemet responquod
dentemconsentiendo,
voluntarieautemet remotacoactione.
astringere,
Quod quia non potest fierinisi aliquid supponendo,propterea,
cum circa suppositumtribusmodispossimusnos habere,tribusmodis
25 potestfieriobligatio.Auditoenim positopotestaliquis statimconsentirein eo quod positumest,et sic est una species,que diciturpositio
,
vel dissentire,
et sic alia, que diciturdepositio
se habere,
, vel indifferenter
etsictertia,que diciturdubitetur.
Alia vero,que vocatursitverum
, ad positionemreducitur.
circuit
Alia,quam dicuntappellet
,
quamlibetistarum.
30
Et sic suntquasi quinqu particuleet quinqu tractatushuius artis
velud quinqu species obligationis.95

90Topica
I 1, 100a 20-21.
91Topica
Vili 4, 159a 18-22.
92opponentis]
P.
oponentis
93prohibet]
P etsicsaepius.
proibet
94Topica
Vili 11,161a 30-31.
95In fact,thetreatise
is divided
intofiveother
dubitatio,
parts,
namely
positio,
depositio,
andsitverum.
petitio

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172

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
<DE POSITIONE>

Inter quas primo querendumest de positione,que non solumpositio

sed etiamfalsa positiodicitur.
Dicendum est igiturquid positio sit ista, et quare diciturfalsa
5 positio,et quid faciatibi hec additio "falsa",et de reguliset sophismatibussecundumhanc provenientibus.

10

15

20

25

30

Et primo utrumsit eadem ars de qua tractaturin octavo Topicorum

,
super quo quidam dubitant.
Quod non sit eadem ars videtur:pars non ex<c>edit totumnec
pars subiectisubiectum;sed illa ars est dialetica et subiectumeius
est sillogismusdialeticus,ut patet per totumlibrum;ergo non est ibi
aliquid quod non sit aut pars dialeticeaut sillogismidialetici;sed ista
ars nec est pars96dialeticenec sillogismidialetici;ergo non est idem
cum traditioneoctavi.
Item. Illa proceditex probabilibusdialetice,ut ibi habetur;97
hec vero
ex falsiset quandoque sophistice;ergo non est eadem.
Contra. Aristotiles
ibi98docet opus respondentiset opponentisnec
nisi quia illa ars est opus utriusque.
Preterea.Docet qualiterse habet uterque ad positum.
Preterea.Ibi cautelas et cavillationesilluminavit,que et hic observantur,ut patebitpost. Ergo hec ars eadem est cum illa.
Dicendum quod, sicut prehabitum,99
parti<m> est eadem quoad
modum procedendi,quia petitqui opponit,dat qui respondet;aliter
non est procedere: observaturpositum,consequentia,antecedentia,
convertibiliaet repugnantiacum ilio; hec tarnenex falsis,illa ex
probabilibus;sed nichilprohibetfalsa probabiliaesse, ut ibi100habitm est.
Item. Hec ad gloriamet victoriam,illa vero ad fidemet opinionem;
sed utraque ad exercitium.
Quia tamen ad evidentiamcuiuslibetobligationisnecessariumest
scirede consequentiiset repugnantiis,
super quas multeregulehuius
artisfundantur,
interprimavidendumest quid consequentia
et repugnantia
in hac parte accipiatur.

96pars]add.Pc.
97Cf.Topica
Vili 5, 159a 31ss.
98Cf.Topica
Vili 1, 155b 3ss.et 4, 159a 15-18.
99
p. 20, 1-11.
100Supra,
Supra,
p. 20, 13-4.

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173

Et sciendum,ut habeturin Phisicis,m

consequentersuntinterque
non est mediumeiusdemgeneris.Quod contingitdupliciter:in loco
et in tempore.In loco, cum locus a loco sequituret interea non
est locus medius,ut domus ad domum et non est domus media. In
tempore,ut que suntin temporeeodem et non est tempusmedium.
Quod contingitdupliciter:vel quoad aliquod tempus;quod facitconsequentiamadiunctivam;de qua nichilad presens;vel quoad tempus
quodlibet.102Quod iterum contingittribus modis. Vel ita quod
antecedensnon possit stare quin sit consequens; et sic est consequentia ex impossibili;de qua iterumnichilad presenspertinet.Vel
ita quod consequens sit de intellectuet de esse antecedentis,ut ad
hominemsequituranimal.Tertio modo diciturconsequentia,quando
Veritasantecedentisest causa veritatisconsequentis.Et de hiisduabus
est: indistanultimisest hic intentio.Que sic describitur:consequentia
secundumverumvel secundum
tia eorumque sunteiusdemgeneris103
contrariaconsignificant,
falsum.Et quia qui bene [f. 92v] diffiniunt,
, scilicet: distantia
propterea ex oppositis patet quid sit repugnantia
eorum que suntsub eodem genereper aliquod mediumvel eiusdem
generis vel alterius. Hec ergo duo, consequens et repugnans,ad
enuntiabiliacirca propositumnegotiumcoartantur.

Hiis habitis,cum de falsa positioneprior sit intentiointer ceteras

obligationis
species,eoquod ad depositionemse habeat tanquamhabiinterque dubitatioest medium,prenotandumest
tus ad privationem,
hie
dicatur
et quid faciatibi hec additio "falsa".
quid positio
dicitur:extranea
25
Positioautemin libro TopicorumOA
opinioalicuiusnotoin
libro
Sex
diciturpositio:
rumsecundum
;
principiorum105
philosophiam
etgenerationis
ordinatio.
quidamsituspartium
vel si quo alio modo, dicitur
istorum
modorum,
Queriturergo quo
hie positio.
< 1> Quod autemprimomodo non dicaturpatet,quia: positioque
30
hic dicitur,semperest de falso,ut, si Sortesest albus,poniturSortem
essenigrum;sed illa que est in Topicis
, est de vero aut de opinatovero.

101
V 3, 226b 34-227a 1 [Auel2,160).
Physica
102
P.
quodlibet]
quiclibet
103
que suntadd.P.
generis]
104Topica
. 36,9).
I 11,104b 20-21(Auct
105
VI [60],p. 48, 14-15ed. Minio-Paluello.

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174

10

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
est idem quod probleumamodo transsumpto
Item. Positio Topicorum
et est principiumsillogismidialetici;ista106
vero non; ergo etc.
Item. Positio secundum quod est situs partium,est principium
predicamentaleet est in generabilibuset rebusnature;ista vero non;
ergo etc.
<2> Preterea.Omnis positio est vel in loco secundumquod est
vel aliquo modo alio;
res eius, vel in temporesecundumexistentiam,
est
modo
ista
queriturergo quo
positio.
<3> Item. Cum omnis determinadosit aut diminuensde ratione
ut patetper singula,queritur
aut specificans
determinati
determinatum,
t.107
de hac adiectione"falsa", utrumdiminutvel specifice
Et quod diminutvidetur,quia: sicut verum
et ens convertuntur,
itafalsumet nonens;ergo debentconverti
falsapositioet nonenspositio.
Item.Sequitur:"falsusdenarius;ergo non ens denarius";ergosimiliter:
"falsa positio;ergo non ens positio".
Item. Dicit Isaac:108ventas est rei existentia;ergo ab oppositis
: falsitas
rei
non
non
a
est
existenspositio, coniugatis.
existentia;
ergo falsapositio
Vel si dicatur secundum quosdam: falsa positio est falsi vel de
falso positio,quia ibi poniturfalsumut videaturquid accidat,<4> contra:ut109
habeturin libro Topicorum
,110duplexestpeccatum:
mentiriet transgredilocutionespositas; sed falsummendaciumest;
ergo peccat qui falsumponit.
11
Item. Ut significat
Aristotiles,1
possibileest quo posito non accidit
sed
falso
accidit
scilicetfalsiconseinconveniens; posito
inconveniens,
quentisconcessio; ergo falsumnon est ponendum.
<5> Item. Si dicaturquod hec additio"falsa" diminuiide ratione
sed secundum
manifestum
estquod non estpositiosimpliciter
positionis,
cum
hoc
verbum
posisimpliciter
quid; ergo per
"ponatur",
significet
tionem,non debet fieri.
Solutio. <ad 1> Ad primum dicendum quod positio
, prout hic
est:
alicuius
falsi
sciti
falsi
ut habeatur
enuntiabilis
et
accipiatur, prefixio
etiam
dicitur
idest:
,
falsapositio
positioin qua
pro vero; propterquod
ac si essetverum,concedendo
poniturfalsum,ut ad ipsumrespondeatur
tia. Unde
ad ipsumet negandorepugnan
consequentiaet convertibilia

106
istaladd.Pc.
107specifice
ti specificai
P.
108
Liber
dedefinionibus
, p. 322,10-11ed. Mucide.
109utlsequitur
inP.
rasura
12 litt,
fere
110Topica
II 1, 109a 28-29.
111
Anal.Priora
I 13,32 a 19-20(Auct.
34,12).

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175

sumitura positione Topicorum

, quia sicut positorillius
transsumptive
positionistalem opinionemaccipit et omnia que ad ipsam faciunt,
112et
ut significatoin octavo Topicorum,
abnegat opposita,ita iste,cui
fitista positio,suscipitearn et que secunturet contrarianegat. Et
5 ex hoc patetsolutioquesita,quia hec positionon est positioTopicorum
sed ad similitudinem
sumpta. Similiterquodammodo ad illam Sex
et con, quia positoaliquo ponunturcum eo convertibilia
principiorum,
11
3 ut
et
et
et
sic
est et
contenta,
sequentia partes
patet per regulas;
situspartiumet generationisordinario.
10
<ad 2> Quod ergo queriturin quo est ista positio, dicendum
quod in tempore,scilicetdisputationis,
quod durt ab eo quod dicitur"ponatur",<usque>114dum dicatur"cedat tempus";quod dicitur
15

20

25

30

tempus
positionis.
<ad 3> Quod queriturde hac adiectione"falsa",dicendumquod
non diminuitde rationepositionis,sed additurut significet
de quo
est positio,quia de falso,ut videaturquid accidat in exercitandocirca
ipsam;et sic quodammodospecificat.Nec ibi ponit115
positionemtaneius
sed
de
est
eius
quam significans
qualitatem
quo
positio,scilicet116
enuntiabilispositi.
<ad 4> Quod obiciturquod falsumnon debet poni, dicendum
quod duplex est positioalicuius.Vel gratiasui ut concedatur,et sic
117
non debet falsumponi; quia tamen diciturin octavo Topicorum
quod118quedam que non sunt, magis probabilia sunt veris,nichil
Vel etiampotestponi aliquid
prohibet falsumquin probabileponat.119
et
hoc
modo
hic
ponitur falsum,nec est inconveniens
gratiaalterius;
concederefalsumex falsoposito consequens in temporepositionis.
<ad 5> Ad aliud, dicendum quod verum est quod hoc verbum
"ponatur" per se positionemsimplicitersignificat;sed cum dicitur
"Sortes est albus; ponatur esse nigrum",non fitpositio simpliciter
sed quoad ilium120
ad quem disputatur.Sed non sequitur"ponitur
tibi; ergo ponitursimpliciter".

112
expicorum
VIII 5, 159a 38ss.
con.Pc.Cf.Topica
Topicorum]
113
P etsicsaepius.
contenta]
contempta
114
excollatione
usque]suppl.
p. 26, 17.
115
seil,adiectio
"falsa".
116
scilicet!
sedP.
117
VIII 11,161a 30-31.
Topica
118
rasura
2 litt,
inP.
quod]sequitur
fere
119
quinprobabile
ponat]quia. . . ponitP.
120
illudP.
ilium]

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Item. Quia diciturpositio,prout hie accipitur,prefixio,cuiusmodi
proptereaqueriturutrum
prefixionon fitsine consensudisputantium,
consensus
sicut
et
exigatur.
respondentis
opponentis
Quia si hoc, tuncvideturquod nullomodo debetartarerespondentem ad enuntiabilein quo impliceturfalsumponi, cum hoc a respondente nunquam debeat concedi; quod est falsum,quia multotiens
astringitopponens respondentemad falsumponi sub aliqua latentia,
ut patebitpost.
Item.Si non exigaturconsensusopponentis,tuncequaliterpotestponere impossibilesicutet possibileet multofortius,
quia ve<he>mentius
angeretpositio impossibilissusceptaquam possibilis;hoc autem falsum, cum habeaturpro regulaquod nichilest ponibilequod non est
possibile.121
Ad hoc dicendumquod sine dubio exigiturconsensusrespondentis,qui diciturconcessio falsi122
tanquam veri in temporepositionis,
vel
non
non
consentiente
ponente,si negaretpositumvel
quia ipso
cum ilio in temporepositionis,
consequentiaad ipsumvel convertibilia
dicendumquod
nullumessetinconveniens.De consensuopponentis123
debet concedere in hoc quod positumpossit concedi, vel videatur
Et hoc ultimo
posse concedi,in temporepositionissine inconvenienti.
modo nichil prohibetposse includi falsumponi secundumaliquam
scilicetmutandoquid in quale vel econversovel simplifantasiam,124
citerin <secundum> quid vel econverso.

Item. Dubitaturde hoc quod diciturquod "positio est prefixioalicuius

falsi ut habeatur pro vero",125quod potius debuissetdixisse
25
"pro falso",quia quod propterse est tale, magis est tale quam quod
propteraliud; sed falsumpropterse, non propterverum ponitur;
ergo potius debet dici "pro falso" et non "pro vero".
Item. Dicitur falsa positioque est de falso positio.
Dicendum quod hoc dictumest habito respectuad statumrespon30
dentis,qui se habet ad veruminquantumverumin concedendo,ad
falsuminquantumfalsumin negando. Quia ergo positumest ideo
positumut concedatur,licetsitfalsum,proptereadicitur"ut habeatur
pro vero".
121Cf.o. 30,33ff.
122
P
falsi]fieri
123
Pc.
con
. exrespondentis
opponentis]
124= fallaciam;
cf.infra
, p. 56, 14.
125Supra,
p. 23,30-3.

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177

Hiis visis, <videndum> de causis huius artis. Scilicet de efficiente,

que est duplex,scilicetagens et instrumentalis.
Agens vero est opponens et respondens.Instrumentalis
vero est hoc verbum "sit", cui
respondet[/ 93] possibilitaspositi,et hoc verbum "ponatur",cui
5 aptitudo possibilitatis.
Pretereade finali,que est exercitium.Preterea
de materiali,que est falsumenuntiabile,possibiletarnen.Et de formali, que modus est disputandiobviativuset exercitativus.
<De principiisque ad respondentempertinent>
Sequiturvidere de propriisprincipiishuius artis. Quorum quedam
10 ad opponentempertinent,quedam vero ad respondentem.
Et prius de hiis que ad respondentempertinentvidetur,eoquod
tota huius artisnecessitasex respondentedependeat.
Est igiturprincipiumhuius artis et tanquam introductivumad
alia hoc:
15
omnesresponsiones
suntad ideminstans.
retorquende
est quod, cum instans
voceturtempus
Quod ita intelligendum
positionis
in quo durtpositio,scilicetab eo quod dicitur"ponatur"usque dum
dicatur"cedat tempus",positumet omnia convertibiliacum ilio et
omnia consequentiaad ipsum et bene concessa et convertibiliacum
20 eis et consequentiaad hec debentconcediac si proferrentur
in eodem
temporein quo concedereturpositum.Similiteromnia repugnantia
positovel convertibilibus
positivel consequentibuseius et bene concessis<cum> positodebentnegariac si in temporeconcessioniseius
proferrentur.
25
Si ergo queraturutrumhoc sit intelligendum
de principiovel de
medio vel de finetemporisdisputationis
dicendumquod intelligendumest indefinitetum pro toto tum pro
partibustemporisin quo durt positum.
Sequunturprincipiaspecialioraque ipsum respondentemrectificant,
30 quorum quedam pertinentad positum,quedam ad consequentia,
De hiis ergo secundum ordinemprosequedam ad repugnantia.126
et regulam
et maximam
idem dico.
quamur notando quod principium
<De principiisrectificantibus
respondentem
que ad positumpertinent>
35 De hiis ergo que ad positumpertinentprimo videndum.Quorum
primumest:
126
Theselatter
twoprinciples
areinfra
takentogether
as principia
, p. 28,9ff,
rectificantia
respondentem
quoad
propositum.

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178

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
* sub
velsubforma
subformavocis
propositum,
quafuitpositura,
positum
est
tale
in
idem
scitum
esse
est,
,
tempore
positionis
quod
positipropositum
concedendum.
Cuius verificadopatet sic, quia posito quod Tullius curratet dicatur
"Cicero currit",non est concedendumnisi dicto quod sint nomina
et nesciaturesse positum
currere
eiusdem. Item. Si sit positumSortem
et proponatur,non propterhoc est concedendum. Item. Si extra
tempuspositionisponaturpositum,non propterhoc concedendum.
"sub eadem formavocis",potest
Sed quantumad hoc quod dicit127
obici quod positumponiturin dicto et proponiturin enuntiatione;
non est autem eadem formavocis "Sortemcurrere""Sortescurrit";
ergo f<r>ust<r>a apponitur.128
currere
et
Item. Si Sortes est nomen Marci et positum sit129Sortem
non
est
eadem
"Marcus
concedendum
sed
est;
currit",
proponatur
forma"Marcus currit""Sortes currit";ergo.
Ad hoc dicuntquidam quod eadem formaest rectiet obliquorum,
scilicet"Sortes" et "Sortis"etc., "currit"et "currere"etc., et propter
hoc una est forma"Sortes currit""Sortem currere".
Alii aliterdicunt,et melius,quod per hoc "formavocis" non significaturexterna figuratiovocis sed identitasrationissignormet
sign<ific>atorum,ut sit sensus quod positumsub eadem130ratione
debet proponi sub qua fuitpositum. Et propterhoc, cum ponitur
albumessenigrum
secundumquod est possibile,scilicetproutest intelsi tamenproponatur
ligenda oratiode re presentirelata ad futurum,
albumessenigrum
, negandumest, eoquod hec oratio non spectatnisi
ad presenstantum,alteravero ad presenset futurum,
ut essetsensus:
albumnuncessenigrum
postea.
Quod obiciturde hac: si Sortes est nomen Marci, dicendumquod
hec "Marcus131currit"est facta sub eadem formavocis cum posito,
cum dictumest "sit Sortes nomen Marci".
Item.Videturquod de positoconcedendonon deberetdari regula,
estverumvel possibile
quia positumest de eo cuius oppositumvel132
esse verum, eoquod de necessariis vel impossibilibus non fiunt

* Cf.p. 27,9:subeadem
vocis
, butp. 31, 12 again:subforma.
forma
127sc. regula.
128
sc. clausula
"subeademforma
vocis".
129
Pc.
exproponatur
positum
sit]corr,
130eadem]illud(?)
P.
131Marcus]Sortes
P.
132
vel]quodadd.P.

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179

positiones.Igiturcum propterhoc ponaturvel concedatur,de concessione eius nulla debet dari regula.
Dicendum ad hoc quod duobus modis potestfieripositio.Vel ut
ad earn disputetur;et talem non oportetconcedi nisi probatam.Vel
5 fitpositio ut videa<n>tur consequentiavel repugnantiaad ipsam;
quod non potestfierinisi ipsa concessa. Quia igiturfalsuminquantum falsumnon est concedendum,propterea datur hie regula de
huiusmodifalsa concessione.
10

15

20

25

30

<De principiisrectificantibus
respondentem
quoad propositum>
Hoc habitosequiturde principiisrectificantibus
respondentemquoad
propositum.Que triasunt,quia133omne quod proponituraut sequitur ex posito,aut rpugntposito, aut est impertinens.
Si sequitur,tunc datur hec regula:
omne
expositovelex concesso
cumpositovelex concessis
vel
falsumsequens
ex opposito
benenegativel ex oppositis
benenegatorum
scitumessetalein
est concedendum;
verumtale est concetempore
positionis
ergomultofortius
dendum.
De repugnantidatur talis regula:
omneverum
velconcessis
cumpositovelopporpugnons
positovelconcesso
sitobenenegativeloppositi<s>benenegatorum
scitum
essetalein tempore
est
tale
est
positionis negandum;
ergomultofortius
falsum
negandum.
De impertinenti
talis datur regula:
omneverum
concedendum
, omne
impertinens
fabumimpertinens
negandum.
Unde diciturquod
ad quodlibet
estsecundum
sui qualitatem.
impertinens
respondendum
est:
Propositum
quidem
quod factapositioneprimoproponitur.
Sequens
autem: quod ad positum vel concessum sequitur.Repugnans:
quod
vel incompossibiliter
posito vel concesso contrarievel contradictorie
: quod nec sequiturnec anteceditneque est
componitur.Impertinens
idem neque convertibileposito vel concesso vel negato vel negatis.
Primeillarumregularumpatet veritas,quia, dato quocumque, quicquid ad ipsum sequitur,datur cum ilio.
Quod patet primo134ostensiveper verbum Aristotilis dicentis135

133
quia]con.ex.etP.
134
P.
primo!
primm
135
Cf.Metaph.
IV 4, 1006a 36-b4; cf.etiamDe interpr.
11,20 b 31-35.

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180

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
, dicit animal
,
quod qui dicit unum, dicit multa,ut qui dicit hominem
dicit substantiam
, dicit rationale
, et risibile
, et cetera omnia que in ilio
vel de ilio de necessitatesunt.
Pretereapotesthoc idem ostendiducendoad impossibile.Quod patet:
sitreiventasSortemnon esse,ponaturSortem
currere.
Deinde proponatur
"Sortes currit".Hoc est positumsub formapositipropositum;ergo
concedendumest per regulam supra136datam. Item, proponatur137
"Sortes movetur".Aut est concedendum aut non? Si sic: sed est
falsumsequens ex posito, et conceditur;ergo eadem rationecetera
falsa. Si non: ergo negandum;sed ad negationemsuperiorissequitur negatio inferiorisde necessitate;138
ergo sequitur "Sortes non
Sortes
non
currit".
Hoc
habito
dicatur "cedat temmovetur;ergo
in
pus, negastipositum temporepositionis"vel "concessistiduo contraria in eodem temporepositionis139
non astrictusad impossibile;
male
sed
nonnisi
ergo
respondisti;
quia negasti140
sequens ex posito
in temporepositionis".Ergo concedenda sunt consequentia.
Eodem modo potestverificari
de concessiset de oppositisnegatorum.
Item. Secunda sic verificandaest: Sorte non existente,et ponatur
Sortem
essealbumet proponatur"Sortes non est coloratus".Hoc est
verumsed repugnans,quia si non est coloratus,non est albus; ergo
cum Sortem
essealbumsitpositum,hoc Sortem
nonessecoloratum
interimit
positum.Aut hoc ergo estconcedendumaut negandum.Si negandum:
habeo propositum,quia simile est de ceterisveris. Preterea,dicit
Aristotiles141
quod bene respondentis
opus est nichildicererepugnans.
Si concedendum:ducam te ad inconveniens,quia cum Sortem
esse
albumsit positum,in tempore positionisest concedendum; sed si
Sortes non est coloratus,Sortes non est albus; ergo concesso quod
non est coloratusconcederetur non esse album. Hoc dicto, "cedat
in eodem
tempus;concessistiduo repugnantia[f. 93v] incompossibilia
temporepositionis;ergo male respondisti,nonnisiquia non negasti
repugnans".Ergo negandumest.
Verificadotertieregule patet ex hoc quod dicit142
Aristotilesin
octavo Topicorum
quod discoli est et malignantisimpedirecommune

136Supra, 27, 1-3.

p.
137
P etsicsaepius.
proponatur]
proonatur
138necessitate]
necessitatis
P.
in eodemtempore
in tempore
eodemser.sedcon.P.
positionis]
positionis
140negasti]
con.exconcessisti
P.
141Cf.Topica
I 1, 100a 20-21.
142Topica
Vili 11,161a 38-39.

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181

vel ponendo
negotium;quod fitin non concedendoverummanifestum
falsummanifestum
utrumqueimpertinens.
et eorum que in
Item. Ad verificationem
precedenti<s> regule143
ea dicuntur,potestampliusintendisic: rei veritatese habente quod
Sortes non sit et positumsit Sortem
, deinde proponatur"Sortes
legere
legit". Hoc est positum etc.; ergo concedendum.Item proponatur
"tu legis".Hoc est verumnon repugnansposito eque concesso etc.;
ergo concedendumper tertiamregulam.Inde proponatur"te legere
et Sortem144
legere sunt similia". Hoc est falsumsequens ex posito
et
et concesso,quia sequitur,si Sortes legit et tu legis, Sortem
legere
telegere
suntsimilia;ergo concedendum.Inde proponatur"tu non es
homo". Hoc est falsumnon sequens ex posito scitumesse tale; ergo
negandumper tertiam.Deinde proponatur"Sortemlegereet te esse
hominemsuntsimilia".Hoc est falsumsequens ex positoet opposito
bene negati;ergo concedendum.Similiterpotestfieride aliisconcessis
et de oppositisbene negatorum.
Ad evidentiamsecunde145
potestita procedi: manente eadem rei
et proposito
veritatequod Sortes non sit et posito quod Sortescurrat
"Sortesnon146
movetur";hoc estverumrepugnansposito,quia sequitur
"si Sortes non movetur,Sortes non currit";ergo negandum. Item
proponatur"tu sedes". Hoc est verum non repugnans;ergo concedendumper tertiam.Item proponatur"te sedere et Sortemcurrere
sunt dissimilia".Hoc est verum non sequens,147quia sequitur,si
et te sederesunt similia,non
currere
Sortes curritet tu sedes, Sortem
Item
illud
proponatur"homo non
negandum.
ergo dissimilia;ergo
est animai".Hoc est falsumnon sequens;ergonegandumper tertiam.
Inde proponatur"homo est animai". Hoc est oppositumbene negati;
Inde proponatur"Sortemcurrereet hominem
ergo concedendum.148
Hoc est falsumsequens,*quia si suntsimisunt
similia".
esse animal
lia et hominemesse animai est verum,Sortem currereerit verum;
quod est falsum.
Et sic patet verificatiosecunde. Tertia vero satis patet.
Item. Habetur pro regula quod

143
videsupra
sc.primae
, p. 28, 15-18.
regulae,
144
P.
Platonem
Sortem]
145
videsupra
, p. 28,20-22.
146
add.Pc.
non]
147
sedesP.
sequensl
148
add.Pc.
ergoconcedendum]
* falsum
P.
verum
repugnans
sequens]

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182

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

estponendum
,
equeimpossibile
manifestum
equenecessarium
equeverum
sed.solum
falsumpossibilevelcreditum
falsum.
Contra quod sic obicitur:sit rei ventas te non scribereet ponatur
te scribere;
videturquod positumsit impossibile,quia impossibileest
5 duas contradictorias
simul esse veras; sed hec est vera te nonscribere
in temporepositionis,et in temporein quo est vera,hec est impossibilis "tu scribis";ergo positumest impossibile.
Dicendum quod positum non poniturut sit, sed ut sustineatur
vel concedatur.Sed aliquid non esse et eius oppositumconcedi in
10 eodem temporenon est impossibileeque inconveniensastrictoper
obligationem.

15

20

25

30

35

Item. Contra illam regulam "positumsub formaetc.est concedendum"149sic potestobici: sit verumquod non es et ponaturteesse
, et
"tu
concedendum
est
es";
proponatur
per regulam;sed per hoc verbum "es" consignificatur
tempusprolationisin quo verumest te non
esse; ergo impossibileest in eodem te esse; et hoc concedis;ergo concedis impossibile.Sed regula est quod, falso possibiliposito, nichil
propterhoc concedendumest impossibile.Sed te esseest falsumet
possibile; et propterhuius concessionemsequiturimpossibile;ergo
non est concedendum;nec negandum,cum sit positum;nec dubitandum,cum sitscitum;ergo ad ipsumnon est respondendum.Ergo
non fuitproponendum,cum nichildebeat proponiin disputationead
quod non possitresponden.Ergo nullumpositumestproponendum.150
Dicendum quod, cum dicitur"ponaturhoc" vel "ponaturillud",
fitampliatioad tempusin quo possibileest positumesse verum,non
ad illud in quo est ponens. Et proptereasoletdici "verumest Sortem
non esse et possibileest Sortemesse et ponibile,ponatur";sic fitampliatio per "possibile"ad tempusnon ens.
Item. Contra istam "omne falsumsequens ex posito etc.concedendum"151potest queri utrumfiat artatio ad concessionemunius
tantumvel plurium.Si uniustantum:non ergoomniafalsaconsequentia
concedenda; sed qua rationeunum,et reliquum;aut ergo omnia aut
nulla; sed non nulla, quia qui conceditprius,de necessitateconcedit
posterius.Si plurium: ergo cum proponiturpositum,debent dari
hec "suntneista bona?",
plures responsiones,sicut si interrogaretur

149
Videsupra
, p. 27, 1-3.
P.
proponendumj
propositum
151
Videsupra
, p. 28, 15-18.

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183

demonstrato
bono et malo; ad quod debet respondenvel "sic et sic",
vel "non et non", vel "sic et non", vel econverso.
Dicendum quod per principiumillud significatur
debere concedi
omnia consequentiaex posito et concesso et ceteris,sive vera sint
sive falsa,secundumsui successionem.
dicendumquod non
Quod obiciturquod debetdaripluresresponsiones,
alterum
cum
alterum
ex
oportet,
petaturperprius,
consequenti.Nec est
similede hac "suntneistabona?", in qua plurapetuntureque per prius.

Item. Visis pro parte generalibusprincipiishuius artis, antequam

notandumquod, sicuthabemusquandamvocem
specialiaaggrediamur,
per quam fitconstitutio
positionis,scilicethoc verbum"ponatur",ita
habemus quandam vocem per quam fitdestitutiopositionis,scilicet
hanc vocem"cedattempus".Unde sicutsensusest,cum dicitopponens
ad concedendum
"ponatur":petout restringaris
positumet omneconvertibile
15 cumilio et consequens
ad ipsumetc., ita, cum dicitur"cedat tempus",
sensusest: recedat
nonrestringaris
, idest:iamamplius
tempus
positionis
propter
ad
concedendum
vel
idest:
te
habeas
ad unumquodque
,
positum aliquid
negandum
secundum
sui qualitatem.
10

Sed potestdubitariutrum,cum dicitur"cedat tempus",adhuc duret

20 positionecne.Si non duret:ergo frustra
petitde cessandopositionem,*
cum iam ad aliquid propterearn non astringeretur.
Si duretadhuc:
sed regulaest quod omne repugnansposito in temporepositionisest
negandum;sed hec oratio"cedat tempus"rpugnt;ergo cum dicitur
"cedat tempus",debet respondensdicere"non cedat". Probatioquod
25 rpugnt:concessoquod cedat tempus,si ponereturpositum,negaretur
nonnisiper hanc vocem "cedat temimpune;ergo eratinteremptum,
sed
omne
interimit
pus";
quod
positum,rpugntposito; ergo.
Item. Videturquod respondensnon teneaturconsentire;cum enim
opponensnon opponat nisi ut in aliquod inconveniensducat respon30 dentemet non possitmanifestari
inconveniensnisi hac orationesusvidetur
debeat152
cepta,
quod numquam
suscipere.
Dicendumad primumquod cumdicitur"cedattempus",adhuc durabat tempuspositionis,sed postea non durabitut petivit(?)opponens.
Quod obicitquod rpugntposito,dicendumquod non. Quod patet,
35 quia non153sequiturex opposito positivel alicuius convertibilis
cum
ilio vel sequentisad ipsum, sed est quiddam possibile. Sicut enim
* positionem]
P.
positum
se. respondens.
153non]add.Pc.

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

positio ideo fuitpositio,quia possibiliserat, ita similiter,cum tempus positioniscessissesitpossibilenec propteripsumaccidat inconvecurnonpetaturetconcedatur.
niens,utpatetsatis,nichilestinconvenientia
non
teneatur
obicit
consentire,dicendum
Quod
quod respondens
5 quod immo;aliterenimessetdiscoluset impedireicommunenegotium
fineproprio.Ad hoc enim fuitfalsipossed frustrarei
disputationem
sibilispositio,ut videreturquid inde accideret;quod non possetesse
nisi cessantetemporepositionis.[f. 94]
<De specialibuscautelisrectificantibus
respondentem>
10 Hoc viso sequiturde specialibuscautelisrectificantibus
respondentem
circa ea que sunthuius artis.Quarum quedam circumstant
positum,
quedam sumunturex conditionibuspositi,quedam ex temporemensurad, quedam ex sequentibuset repugnantibusposito, quedam ex
concedendo quolibet necessario et negando quolibet impossibili,
15 quedam ex non danda responsionead disciplnalesquestionesin hac
arte; quarum ordo per se patet.

20

25

30

35

Inter quas prima est quod

si aliquodenuntiabile
sit talequodnonpossitconcedi
, nondebet
poni
Unde dicitur pro regula quod
cumiliopotest
hocenuntiabile
falsumponi necaliquodconvertibile
poni,
quia posito et concesso sequiturinconveniens.
Quod patet sic:154dicat opponens "ponaturfalsumponi", et dicat
respondens"ponatur",postea dicatur "cedat tempus",et queratur
"positumaut fuitverum aut fuitfalsum?".Si verum: sed positum
fuitfalsumponi; ergo verum fuitfalsumponi' ergo falsumponebatur;
sed quod ponebatur,fuitpositum;ergo falsumfuitpositum;non ergo
verum. Si dicat quod falsumfuitpositum:sed positum fuitfalsum
poni; ergo falsumfuitfalsumponi' ergo falsumnon ponebatur;et aliquid ponebatur,ergo verum;sed quod ponebatur,eratpositum;ergo
positum fuitverum; non ergo falsum. Sequitur ergo(?) quod hoc
enuntiabili
falsumponiposito si dicaturquod positumsit verum,erit
et
falsum, econverso.Quod est impossibile.Ergo non est possibile
poni falsumponieque convertibilecum ilio.
Item. Sicut aliquod enuntiabileest quod de se poni non potest,
ita quedam conditionessunt cum quibus non potest poni, scilicet
locus, aut tempus,aut persona. Verbi gratia:falsumponi [est]in hoc
loconon potestponi in hoc loco, velfalsumponihodienon potestponi

154
inP.
10 litt,
cir
citer
rasura
sic]sequitur

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185

hodie, vel falsumponi a Sortenon potest poni a Sorte, quia, posito

quocumque illorum,sequitur quod, si dictum fueritpositum esse
verum,quod sit falsumet econverso.
Item. Nichil convertibilecum eo quod estfalsumponipotestponi,
ut est ponioppositum
, vel falsumconcedi
, vel te concedere
positiesseverum
adfalsum
.
, vel te respondere
falsum
adfalsum;hoc est possibileet
Quod patet sic: ponaturte respondere
tunc
'tu
ponibile,ponatur;
proponatur respondesad falsum'.Hoc est
sub
forma positi etc.; ergo concedendum. Hoc concesso
positum
dicatur"cedat tempus".Tunc queratur"positumaut fuitverumaut
fuitfalsum?".Si verum:ergo verum fuitte respondere
ad falsum
, quia
hoc fuitpositum;ergo respondistiad falsum;sed non respondistinisi
ad positum;ergo positumfuitfalsum;et dixerisquod verum.Si falsum:sed positumfuitterespondere
adfalsum]ergofalsumfuitterespondere
adfalsum
; ergo non respondistiad falsum;et respondistiad aliquid;
nisiad positum;ergo positumfuit
ergoad verum;sed non respondisti
et
dictum
est
falsum.
Similisdeductiopatet in aliis.
verum;
quod
Proptereadicunt aliqui quod neque hoc enuntiabilefalsumponi
vel similiapossuntponi, eoquod accidatinesse155
eque ei convertibilia
vel
falsumsimul,quia dicit157
impossibile aliquid idem esse verumet156
in libroPriorm
Aristotiles
quod possibileest,quo posito,nichilaccidit
est
impossibile;ergo cum, hoc posito,accidat impossibile,manifestum
quod ipsum poni non est possibile.
Alii autemsubtiliusintuentesdicuntposse ponifalsumponiy
eoquod
possibile est falsumponi, sic arguentesad hoc: omne, quo posito
nichilaccidit impossibileest ponibile,hoc est communeprincipium
et concessumab omnibus;sed possibileest huiusmodi,ut significai
in libro Priorm,
Aristotiles
; ergo omne possibileponibile. Quod concedunt quod per se possit poni, sed copulatum cum alio falso vel
disiunctumvel comparatumfacitinsolubile,et ita non propterse sed
propteraliud est <insolubile>;quod trahuntab Aristotile
significante158
quod non fitinsolubilefalso possibiliposito nisi propterinperitiam
respondentis.
Alii aliterdicunt quod, cum sit regula quod terminuspositusin
appellatane dicti non supponit pro oratione cuius est pars que

155
add.Pc.
inesse]
156
velP.
et]
157
Anal.Priora
I 13,32 a 19-20(Auct.
34,12).
158
el 180b 2-5.
Cf.De soph,

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H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS

- unde cum dicitur

est alibi159
regulaverificata
falsum
poni, isteterminus
"falsum"non potestsupponerepro hac oratione"falsumponi" sed
usuali restrictione
<restringitur>ad supponendumpro aliis falsisab
hoc falso et non pro hoc. Cum ergo proceditur"ponatur falsum
5 poni" et dicitur
falsumponi, potestconcedi. Et cum queritur"positum
aut fuitverumaut fuitfalsum?",potestdici quod verum;cum ergo
arguitur"verum fuitpositum,ergo verum fuitfalsumponi; ergo
falsumponebatur;sed nonnisihoc; ergo fuitfalsum";procedebatur
ac si iste terminus"falsum"supponeretpro hoc falso "falsumponi".
10 Unde facithanc argumentationem:
"verumest poni aliquod falsum
aliud ab hoc "falsumponi"; ergo hoc falsum"falsumponi" ponitur";
quod est fallacia consequentis.
Alii etiam solvuntsecundumfallaciamsecundumquid et simpliciter;cuius declaratiohabebiturin tractatuInsolubilium.
15 Item. Regula est quod
hocconcedendum
falsopossibili
positononestpropter
impossibile.
Contra quod sic opponitur:in rei ventate Sortes est niger,ponatur
Sortem
essealbum
; tuncproponitur"Sortesest albus". Hoc est positum
sub formapositi; ergo concedendum.Item proponatur"Sortes est
20 affectusalbedine". Hoc sequiturex posito; ergo in temporepositionis est concedendum,quia sequitur:"si Sortes est albus, Sortes est
affectusalbedine". Item proponatur"color Sortis est albedo". Hoc
sequiturex concesso, quia sequitur:"si Sortes est affectusalbedine,
color Sortis est albedo"; ergo concedendum.Si concedatur,dicatur
25 "cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibilefacta positionepossibili;ergo
male respondisti".
Probatio:"nigredoest albedo", hec est impossibilis;
sed color Sortis est nigredo,ut dicit rei Veritas;ergo quando concessisticolorem Sortis esse albedinem, concessistinigredinemesse
albedinem;ergo concessistiimpossibile.
30
Ad hoc dicendumquod duplex est suppositiotermini,scilicetvera
et apparens;vera est quam habet a sua primaimpositione,apparens
est que imponiturei ab appellationevel a suppositione.Cum ergo
dicitur"in veritate Sortesest niger",iste terminus"color Sortis"supvera suppositione;et cum dicitur"ponatur
ponit pro nigredine160
35 Sortemesse album" et recipiturpositum,iste terminus"color Sortis"
supponitapparenterpro albedine; et ita in temporepositionis"color
159ubinam?
160nigredine]
P.
con.exalbedine

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187

Sortisest albedo" hec est vera de apparentisuppositione;et sic est

fallaciaequivocationis.
Alii solvuntper fallaciam consequentis,quia dicunt quod, cum
istudargumentuminnuiturin precedentibus"impossibilealbedinem
Sortisesse nigredinem;ergo impossibileest coloremSortisesse albead superiusnegando,cum hoc nomen
dinem",procediturab inferiori
virtutem
Unde cum Sortes sit
"impossibile"
negationisobtineat.161
ita
esse
et
licet
albedo
non possit fieri
albus, potest postea
niger;
nigredo, color tarnen Sortis potest mutari de albo in nigrum et
econverso.
Item secundumhoc queraturde hoc sophismate:sit A ultimum
instansmee positionis,et ponaturA esse; tunc proponatur"A est".
Si neget,dicatur"negastipositumin temporepositionis;ergo male
respondisti".Si concdt,dicatur"cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibile factapositionepossibili;ergo male respondisti".Probatio:A fuit
ultimuminstans positionis; ergo facta positione iam non fuit A,
pretereunteenim positione et preteriittempus eius; sed cum proponebatur"A est", preterierat
positio;ergo erat aliud tempusquam
sed
impossibileest esse unum tempus aliud vel
tempuspositionis;
duo temporaesse simul; ergo impossibileest non tempuspositionis
esse tempuspositioniset econverso;sed hoc concessisti,cum concessisti"A est"; ergo concessistiimpossibile.
Dicendum ad hoc quod, cum [f. 94o] proposuit"A est", debet
Cum obicitur"hoc
negarisicutfalsum,cum iam positiopreteriisset.
est positum",dicendum quod non, quia, cum preteriissetpositio,
instantiaeius,et ita, cum A situltimuminstanspositionis,
preterierunt
A
cum
preteriit
positione,et A esse similiter;et proptereanegandum.
Item ad idem. Sit in veritatesolus Sortes,ponatur Platonem
esse'
inde proponatur"Plato est". Hoc est positumsub formapositi;ergo
concedendum.Item proponatur"unus solus homo est". Hoc est verum non repugnansposito; ergo concedendum;probatio:oppositum
eius non sequiturex posito, quia non sequitur:"si Plato est, non
unus solus Homo est"; ergo concedendum.Quo concessoproponatur
"ille est Plato". Hoc sequiturex posito et concesso,quia si Plato est,
et unus solus homo est,ille est Plato; ergo concedendum.Quo concesso dicatur "cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibilefacta positione
possibili; ergo male respondisti".Cum enim dicitur "unus solus

161
P.
obtineat]
optineat

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
homo est", ibi ponituriste terminus"homo" cum hoc verbo "est",
quod estverbumde presentinon habentivim ampliandi;ergo restrinsit presens,"homo" supgiturad presentes;ergo cum solus Sortes162
ad Sortem;
relativum
"ille"
solo
hoc
Sorte; ergo
refert[ur]
ponit pro
ergo sensus est: SortesestPlato; sed hoc impossibile,et hoc concessisti;ergo male.
Ad hoc dicuntquod positiopossibilisest et ista possibilis"ille est
Plato", cum hoc pronomen "ille" referthune terminm"homo"
unde sensusest: homoestPlato.Sed cum fitargusumptuminfinite;163
mentum"impossibileest Sortemesse Platonem;ergo impossibileest
illumesse Platonem",arguiturab inferiori
ad superiuscum hac dictione"impossibile";quod est fallaciaconsequentis,sicuthic: "impossibile est hominemesse asinum;sed homo est animai; ergo impossibile
est animai esse asinum".
Aliterpotestdici quod est duplex tempus:tempusrei veritatiset
tempuspositionis;et tempuspositionisduplex, scilicettempusactus
positioniset tempusdurationispositionis.Cum ergo dicitur"in hac
oratione"unus solus homo est" isteterminus"homo" per tempuspresens restringitur
ad presentes",dicendumquod illud tempuspresens
est tempuspositionis,in quo, cum positumsit Platonem esse, iste
terminus"homo" per illud tempuspresenscoartaturad supponendum pro Platone,et sic idem est "ille est Plato" quod: PlatoestPlato.
Si vero tempuspresensnon coartareturper positionem,supponeret
et tunchaberetlocumquod opponis.
pro temporepresentirei veritatis,
Item. Gratia relationisad idem queraturde hoc sophismate:in
rei veritatealiquis homo est, de quo sum enuntiaturus
post positum
"possibileest patremeius esse"; et ponibile,ponatur.Quo suscepto
proponatur"pater eius est". Si neget: "negastipositumin tempore
positionis,ergo male respondisti".Si concdt: "cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibilefacta positionepossibili,ergo male respondisti".
Probatio:per hoc pronomen"eius" refertur
ille de quo sum enuntiaturusprimo164
fu<er>it,<est>
postpositum;sed ille de quo enuntiatum
pater; ergo referturad patrem; ergo significatoaliquem sui ipsius
esse patrem;quod est impossibile,et hoc concessisti;ergo.
Dicitur ad hoc quod illa rei veritateexistenteilla positio uno165

162Sortes]
homoP.
163Cf.Prise.Inst,
vol.II, p. 20,21-30.
XIII, 31,ed. Hertz,
gramm.
164
add.Pc.
primo]
165uno]add.Pc.

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189

casu contingentepoteratponi, in alio non. Contingenteenim quod

primoproponereturpropositum,ita "pater eius est", sic fuitpositio
im<com>possibiliscum rei veritate,nec potuitponi, [con] contingente
vero quod non <primo> proponeretur
sed aliquid aliud, sic eratpossibile positumet poteratponi.
Aliterpotestsolviper distinctionem
relationis,quod hoc pronomen
"eius" potueritfacere relationemsimplicem,sicut hie: "mulierque
damnavit,salvavit",et sic vera et sic erat possibilispositio,vel potest
facerepersonalem,et sic falsa.
Item ad idem. Sint Sortes et Plato in veritate,Plato est albus et
Sortesniger;ponaturillumessealbum'quo susceptoproponatur"alter
istorum est niger".Hoc est verum non repugnansposito,quia non
sequitur:"si ille est albus, non alter istorumest niger";ergo concedendum.Quo concessoproponatur:"ille est albus". Hoc est positum
sub forma positi; ergo concedendum. Quo concesso proponatur
"album est nigrum".Hoc sequiturex concessoet posito,quia si alter
istorumest nigeret ille est albus, album est nigrum;ergo concedendum. Si concedatur,dicatur "cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibile
factapositionepossibili;ergo". Hec est enim impossibilis"album est
nigrum",et eam concessisti.
Ad hoc dicuntquod, cum positumsit principiummaterialetotius
ordinationisconsequentiarumsecundumquas proceditilla ars, ideo
oportetquod a nullo antecedentidependeat,sed alia ab ipso. Cum
a parteante,166
non irratioigiturrelativumdependenssitet infinitum
nabiliterdiciturnon deberia relativoposituminchoari.Et propterea,
cum dicitur"ponatur",debet dici "non potestponi".
Vel potestdici quod impossibileest positum,si debeat hoc proponi
"alter istorumest niger",quia tunc oportetfierirelationemad hoc
nomen"alter",et ita significatur
illumqui est nigeresse album; quod
est impossibile.
Item. Cum duplex sit impossibile,scilicetper se et per accidensper se autem impossibileest illud quod nec potest nec potuit nec
esseasinum
; per accidens est quod alipoteritesse verum,ut: hominem
fuit
verum
iam
sed
non
esse
quando
verum,ut: te nonfuisse
potest
- dicunt
sanum
data
debet
quod regula
supra
intelligide per se impossibili nec est inconvenienspropterpositionempossibilemconcedere
impossibileper accidens.

166
Cf.Prise.Inst,
vol.II, p. 20,21-30.
XIII, 31,ed. Hertz,
gramm.

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Quod patet sic: sit A instansmee petitioniset B instanspresens

sitsuperiusad teaffirmative
et tebenerespondere
tue responsionis
respondere
tur:
ad
tune
et
et ad te negative
procedi
utrumque,
responderesequatur
167
Tune
A
B
inter
et
et
te
est
bene
, ponibile,ponatur.
respondere
possibile
5 propono"tu negativerespondes".Si neget,proceditur:"negastiverum
non repugnans,quia non sequitur: csi bene respondes,negative*
respondes'; ergo male". Si concdt, proponatur "tu affirmative
> "et in eadem disputationenegative responrespondes" <
bene
disti; ergo
respondisti;sed impossibileest in eadem disputaio tione te affirmative
et negativebene respondere,et hoc concessisti;
concessisti
impossibilefactapositionepossibili".Si dicaturquod
ergo
hoc fuitin relatione ad diversa, dicendum quod hoc non potest
esse,cum omnesconditionespositiad idem tempusdebeantretorqueri.
Dicendum ad hoc, sicutdicebat regula,quod nichilprohibetcon15 cedere impossibileper accidens; licet positumsit possibilesicut hic,
scilicette benerespondere
consequenter(?)facrespondendoaffirmative,
tumest impossibile,quia bene respondesrespondendonegative.Unde
facis fallaciamconsequentis,et deberetaddi "concessistiimpossibile
non per accidens"; et tunc sequereturconclusio;at hoc falsum.
20 Item. Solet dari pro regula quod
nonestconcedendum
depositoin tempore
ipsumessefalsum.
positionis
esse
sic
obici:
Contra quod168videtur posse
positum falsumest possibile,
essefalsum.Si
et ponibile,ponatur.Quo susceptoproponaturpositum
male
in
respondisti".
neget:"negastipositum temporepositionis;ergo
25 Si concdt: ergo positum est falsum;sed positum est positumesse
; ergo falsumest positumesse falsum;ergo positumnon est169
falsum
falsum;ergo est verum.
esse
Item ad idem. Sit in ventate Sortes niger,et ponaturSortem
non
verum170
Hoc
est
est
falsum".
deinde
album'
proponatur"positum
30 repugnans;ergo concedendum.Eadem positioneretenta171
proponatur "omnes regulesunt sustinende(?)in hac falsapositione".Hoc est
verum non repugnans;ergo concedendum.Quo concesso proponatur "positumest falsum".Hoc est verumsequens,quia sequitur:"si
167
bene]nonP.
* negative]
P.
affirmative
168
cumP.
quod]
169
inP.
6 litt,
circiter
rasura
est]sequitur
170
P.
verum]
positum
171retenta]
P etsicsaepius.
retempta

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191

omnes regule sunt sustinendein hac falsa positione,hec positio est

falsa"; ergo et hoc positum.Ergo patet quod in temporepositionis
potestconcedi positumesse falsum.
Ad hoc sciendumquod hec est duplex "concedendumest positum
- et sic
esse
5
falsum",scilicetvel id quod est positumesse falsum
potest
concedi positumesse falsum,cum in falsa positionenon sit positio
- et sic in
niside falso;vel positumin rationepositi,
temporepositionis
non est concedendumpositumesse falsum,cum ideo fiatpositum,
ut sustineaturpro vero in temporepositionis.[f. 95]
10 Item. Sciendum quod iste voces "concedendum" et "negandum"
duobus modispossuntponi in oratione:vel nominalitervel participialiter. Secundum quod172nominaliter,prout sunt nomina verbalia,
sic debent exponi per infinitivm
passivi et hoc nomen "dignum"
vel "debitum",et sic accipiturin173falsapositionede positoet conseunde sensusest "positumest concedendum",idest:debitum
15 quentibus;174
estconcedi.
Secundum vero quod exponiturper "dignum",sic debet
dici de vero non repugnantiet de necessariis;unde sensus est "hoc
est verumnon repugnans;ergo concedendum",idest: dignum
concedi.
Secundum vero quod participialiter,
sic debent exponi per futurum
20 passivi, et sic est sensus "concedendum" quod: concedatur'
sed hoc
sensunon utimurin hac disputatione.Similiterest de negando modis
contrariis.
Item. Sciendumquod suntquedam orationesque uno sensu possunt
poni et alio non,ut suntorationesdplicesde dictoet de re, ut: "possi25 bile est album esse nigrum"et "possibileest non scribentemscribere"
et "utrumqueoppositorumcontingentium
esse verum". Quod patet
sic: rei Veritasest impossibileesse duo contradictoriasimul esse
vera; sintA et B duo contradictoriacontingentiaet demonstrentur
per hoc pronomen"istorum";tuncprocedo: "possibileest utrumque
30 istorumesse verum",et ponibile,ponatur.Tunc propono "utrumque
istorumest verum".Si neget:"negastipositumin temporepositionis;
Si concdt:"cedat tempus,concessistiimposergomale respondisti".
sibile facta positionepossibili;ergo male respondisti";hoc enim est
impossibile"utrumqueistorumest verum".
35
Ad hoc dicendum quod hec est duplex "possibile est utrumque
172
quod]add.Pc.
173
exde P.
in]corr
174
P.
consequentibus]
concedentibus(?)

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

192

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35

istorumesse verum",quia potestesse de re vel de dicto. Si de dicto,

sic est falsaet impossibilisneque potestponi, et est sensus:illuddictum
33est
istorum
estverum
; quod est falsum.Si sit de re,
"utrumque
possibile
sic est possibiliset potestponi, et est sensus: de utroque115
istorum
est
sit
verum
et
sic
;
possibile
quod
potestponi. Cum ergo susceptapositione
<proponit> "utrumqueistorumest verum",debet negari; sed cum
dicit "hoc est positum",debet responderiquod non, quia ergo coartarisad unicum tempus,et poniturutrumqueesse verumin eodem
tempore,sed cum dicebatur "possibile est utrumqueistorumesse
verum", respiciebaturad diversa tempora et ponebatur utrumque
istorumesse verumin diversistemporibus.Similiterest de hoc "possibile est album esse nigrum"et de talibus.
Item ad idem. Sint A et B duo contradictoriacontingentiaet
ostendanturper hoc pronomen"istorum",tuncproceditur:"alterum
istorumest verum,possibile est relicumesse verum". Probatio: est
contingens,ergo potest esse verum. Ergo est possibile,et ponibile,
ponatur.Quo susceptoproponatur"alterumistorumestverum".Hoc
est verum et non potestesse falsum;ergo necessarium;ergo concedendum. Quo concesso proponatur"relicumest verum". Si neget,
"negasti positum in tempore positionis;ergo male". Si concdt,
"cedat tempus,concessistiimpossibilefactapositionepossibili;ergo"
etc. Probatio:concessistialterumistorumesse verumet relicumesse
verum;sed alterumet relicumest utrumqueistorum;ergo concessisti
utrumqueistorumesse verum;sed hoc impossibile;ergo.
Dicendum quod hoc nomen "relicum"potestduobus modisreferri
ad hoc nomen "alterum":vel secundumquod est sub predicato,vel
secundumquod non est. Si secundumquod est sub predicato:hec
est duplex "possibileest relicumesse verum";secundumquod est de
33<non>
istorum
estverum
re, sic est vera, et est sensus:licethec ((alterum
sitverade reliquo,
tamen
estquodsitverum
;
possibile
postea,cumsitcontingens
secundumvero quod est de dicto, sic est falsa,et est sensus:relicum
esseverum
altero
estpossibile
existente
vero'quod non potestesse. Si referatur
ad ipsum secundumquod non sub predicatoest: sic fitpositioet est
possibilis.Et cum dicitur"alterumistorumest verum",debet concedi, quia hoc est positum sub alia forma. Cum vero proponitur
"relicumest verum", debet negari, quia proponituraliud a posito
sub formapositi.

175utroque]
P.
utrumque

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Item. Datur pro regula quod

in tempore
nonestconcedendum
,
positionis
oppositum
positi
simul
in
sic
duo
esse
vera
eodem
quia
opposita
tempore.
ponerentur
Contra quod sic obicitur:possibileest temalerespondere
, et ponibile,
ponatur. Quo susceptoproponatur"tu male respondes".Si neget:
"negastipositumin temporepositionis,ergo male". Si concdt:176
"tu concedispositumin temporepositionis;ergo bene respondes";si
concdt: "cedat tempus,concessistioppositumposito in tempore
positionis;ergo male". Eadem positioneretentaprocedatursic: "tu
male respondes".Hoc estpositum;ergo concedendum.Quo concesso
dicatur"tu concedis177
nichilnisipositum".Hoc estverumnon repugeius
nans,quia
oppositumnon sequiturex posito; non enim sequitur
"si male respondes,concedis aliud a posito"; ergo concedendum.
Quo concessoproponatur"ad nichilrespondesnisi ad positum;ergo
bene respondes;cedat tempus,concessistioppositumpositiin tempore
positionis,ergo male".
Ad hoc solvendumest178
per fallaciamsecundumquid et simpliciter,179
quia non sequitur:"tu bene respondesquoad positum;ergo
bene respondessimpliciter",
nec sunt opposita te malerespondere
et te
benerespondere
et
non
sunt
concessa
duo
quoadquid' propterea
opposita180
in temporepositionis.

Sed quia factaest mentiode temporepositionis,proptereanotandum

quod tripliciter
accipiturtempusin hac disputatione,scilicettempus
vel iudicii,et tempusresponsionis.
positionis,et tempusdeliberationis
25 Tempus autempositionisvel enuntiationis
est in quo proferuntur
que
vel
vel
enuntiari
ab
peti
poni
opponenteoportet.Tempus iudiciivel
deliberationisest in quo respondensde unoquoque iudicat vel dlibrtsecundumquod viderit.Tempus responsionisest in quo respondei petitisvel positisvel enuntiatisproutad disputationem
pertinent.
30
Ex cuius rei considerationesustineatur181
hoc sophisma:rei Veritas
est quod Sortes est niger,ponatur Sortem
essealbumdoneeproponatur
, hoc enim est possibile. Quo susceptoproponatur"Sortes
negandum,
est niger". Si concdt: "cedat tempus,concessistioppositumpositi
176
P.
concedas
concdt]
177
add.Pc.
concedis]
178est]add.Pc.
179
secundum
add.Pc.
quidet simpliciter]
180
con.extempora
P.
opposita]
181
sostinetur
P.
sustineatur]

18:46:47 PM

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
in temporepositionis;ergo male". Probatio: cum propositumfuit
Sortem
essenigrum
, concessistiillud; ergo non proponebaturnegandum;
essealbum'ergoconcessisti
ergoadhuc durabatpositum,quod eratSortem
duo opposita182
in eodem tempore.Si neget: "cedat tempus,negasti
verumnon repugnans;ergo male". Probatio:cum positumfuitSortem
essenigrum
, negastiillud; ergo proponebaturibi negandum;ergo iam
non durabat positum;ergo Sortem
essenigrum
erat verumnon repugnans posito; et ipsum negasti;ergo male.
Dicendum quod ista duo adverbia "donee" et "usque" duobus
modispossuntteneri,sive temporaliter
sivelocaliter,scilicet:vel inclusive vel exclusive respectueius ad quod183se habent(?).Si autem
teneaturhec dictio"donee" exclusive,sic non durttempuspositionis
nisi usque ad primum instans <in> quo loquitur(?)propositum(P)
"Sortes est niger". Et sic cum proponiturhec "Sortes est niger",
potestconcedi, quia iam cessitpositum,et cum opponit"concessisti
oppositumpositi(?)in temporepositionis",dicendumquod non, quia
iam non erat positum,ut patet per petitionem.Si autem teneatur
hec dictio "donee" inclusive,sic durt positum usque ad ultimum
instanstemporisin quo profertur
hec "Sortes est niger".Cum ergo
debet
et
negari, cum dicitur "cedat(?) tempus(?),
proponiturhec,
dicendumquod immo,quia
negasti(?)verum(?)non(?) repugnans(P)",
in temporepositipropositumfuerat.
Vel potest solvi [f. 95v] distinguendotempus enuntiationisvel
Pro temporeergo enuntiationis
ista debet negari"Sortes
responsionis.
est niger",eoquod adhuc duraretpositio cum enuntiaretur;
pro tempore vero responsionispotest concedi, quia facta enuntiationeiam
cessitpositio,eoquod positumest negandum.

Hoc habito datur talis regula de temporepositionis:

estipsumesse.
falsopossibili
positode instanti
quodest, negandum
30 Quod potestsic ostendi:in rei ventateSortesest nigeret A sittempus
essealbum
, et ponibile,ponatur.Quo suspresens;possibileest Sortem
cepto proponatur"A est". Si neget:"negastiverumnon repugnans",
quia oppositumnon sequiturex184posito,scilicet:"si Sortesest albus,
non est A"; ergo concedendum;et negasti;ergo male. Si concdt,
35 proponatur"Sortes est albus". Hoc est positum,ergo concedendum.
Concesso dicatur"cedat tempus;concessisti
impossibilefactapositione
182
P.
opposita]
tempora
183
P.
quod]
quem
184
exnonsequitur
P.
nonsequitur
oppositum
ex]corr.
oppositum

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195

possibili; ergo male". Probatio: concessistiA esse et Sortem esse

album; ergo necesse est concedere Sortem esse album in A, per
regulamque dicit quod quicquid sequiturex posito et concesso in
temporepositionisconcedendum;sequiturenim "si Sortes est albus,
et A est, Sortes est albus in A". Ergo cum rei Veritassit quod sit
nigerin A et A sit,185
impossibileest ipsum esse album in A. Et hoc
concessisti
concessisti;ergo
impossibile.
Dicunt quidam quod positofalsocontingenti
de presentinegandum
est ipsum esse, quia si concedaturet186necesse sit positumconcedi
in temporepositionis,ex hiis duobus sequiturpositumesse verumin
ilio tempore;cuius contrariumcum sit verum,necesse est hoc non
esse verum.
Alii aliterrespondentdicentesquod nichilprohibetposse concedi
instanspresens in tempore positionis,et cum opponitur "concessistiimpossibile",dicendumquod verum est, scilicetimpossibileper
accidens. Accidit enim impossibile,Sortem
esse albumet A essesimul
scilicet,propterconcessionempositi; sed eque consequentieeque
repugnantieeque equipollentieeque convertibilitates
cogunt de
necessitatenegari impossibileper accidens, ut supra187
ostensumest
in quodam sophismate.
Item ad idem. Possibileest te concedere
de instanti
positionis
ipsumnon
esse
debes
, quia potestponi falsumet falso posito de instanti
positionis
esse
aliter
ut
visum
est.
negareipsum , quia
sequereturinconveniens,
hoc188
est
et
Ergo
possibile, ponibile,ponatur.Quo susceptodicatur
"cedat tempus",et queratur"positumaut fuitverum aut falsum?".
Si verum: sed vero posito de instantipositionisnon debes negare
ipsumesse; ergocum positumsitverum,ut dicis,non debes negare de
instantipositionisipsum esse; ergo falsumest te debere negare; sed
hoc fuitpositum;ergo positumfuitfalsum.Si falsum:sed regula est
quod falso possibiliposito189negandum est de instantipositionis190
ipsumesse; ergo verumest debere negari;sed hoc est positum;ergo
verum.
Ad hoc dicendumquod hoc tedebere
de instanti
negare
positionis
ipsum
essenon potestponi, quia convertitur
cum eo quod estfalsumponi.

185
inA etA sit]con.exalbusin A niger
P.
niger
186et]
add.Pc.
187
Videsupra,
p. 39, 1-19.
188
Sc. falsopositode instanti
debesnegare
positionis
ipsumesse.
189
de tempore
add.Pc.
posito]
positionis
190
P.
positionis]
positione

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Quod patet,quia dictoquod positumsitverum,sequiturquod falsum,
et econverso.
Vel potest solvi per fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter,ut
supra visum est, in quo de talibussophismatibus.191
Item.Rei ventatese habentequod Sortessitnigeret A sit,ponatur
Sortem
essealbum
, ut supra.192Quo posito proponatur"A non est".
Hoc sequiturex posito et quodam necessario;ergo concedendum.
et
Probatio: sequiturenim si Sortes est albus, quod est positum;193
non est albus in A, ut se habet rei Veritas;ergo A non est. Patet
data quod falsopossibiliposito de instantipreigiturregula supra194
sentinegandumest ipsum esse.
Sed contra: eadem positioneretentaet rei ventate proponatur"A
est". Si neget: "negastiverum non repugnans,quia eius oppositum
non sequitur,scilicet'si Sortes est albus, non A est'; ergo male".
Ergo propterpositionemfalsam possibilemnon est negandum de
instantipresentiipsum esse.
Item ad idem. Eadem positioneretentaproponatur"Sortes erit*
albus in futuro".Hoc est falsumnon sequens; ergo negandum.Item,
"Sortes non fuitalbus in preterito".Hoc est necessarium;ergo concedendum.Sed Sortesfuitfuturusalbus; et non fuitalbus in futuro
eque in preterito;ergo est albus in presenti.Sed si Sortesest albus
in presenti,presensest. Sed A est presens;et Sortesest albus;195
ergo
A est. Item. A fuitfuturum,sed A non fuit;hec enim necessaria;
ergo concedenda. Item, "A erit",hec est falsa; ergo neganda. Sed
si A fuitfuturumet non fuiteque erit;ergo est. Ergo manifestum
quod de instantipresenticoncedendumsit ipsum esse.
Sed si hoc, contra: Sortes est albus; hoc est positum;et A est;
hoc est concessum;ergo Sortes est albus in A; sed hoc est impossibile, cum sit niger in A; ergo facta positionepossibiliconcessisti
impossibile;sed nonnisipropterconcessionempresentstemporis.
Si dicatur"hoc est positum;196
proponatur
ergo concedendum",197
"Sortes est albus". Quo concesso198proponatur"A est". Hoc est

191
Videsura
, p. 33, 19ff.
192
Videsupra
, p. 43,30ff.
193
add.sedexp.P.
et estpositum
positum]
194
Videsupra
, p. 43, 29.
* erit]estP.
,yaet
Sortes
estalbusladd.P .
196Sc. Sortem
essealbum.
197hocestpositum
add.Pc.
ergoconcedendum]
198
add.Pc.
quo concesso]

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repugnans;199
ergo negandum.Quo negato proponatur"A non est".
Hoc est falsumsequens; ergo concedendum.Quo concesso dicatur
"Sortes est albus et non est albus in A; ergo fuit(?)albus vel erit200
in alio201temporeab A; sed A est presenstempus;ergo Sortes est
albus in temporealio ab presenti;sed hoc est impossibile;ergo concessistiimpossibilefacta positionepossibili;ergo male."202
Item videturquod neque negantide temporepresentiquod [non]
sit neque concedenti203
quod sit sit possibile evitare inconveniens.
, sed modo
Quod patet sic: possibile est te non uniformiter
respndete
et
modo
et
affirmative,
negative
ponibile, ponatur. Quo suscepto
proponatur"tu non uniformiter
respondes".Hoc est positum;ergo
concedendum.Quo concessoproponatur"A est". Si concdt:"cedat
tempus;positumfuitte non uniformiter
respondere;et uniformiter
fuit
et
falsum,
respondisti;
ergopositum
possibile.Sed per regulamde
falsopossibiliposito204
de(?) temporepresentidebuistinegare ipsum
et
esse; concessisti;ergo male". Si neget:"cedat tempus;positumerat
te non uniformiter
respondere;et ita respondisti,
quia alterumaffirmando alterumnegando; ergo positumfuitverum;sed vero existenti
positode temporepositionisnon est negandumipsumesse; et negasti;
ergo male".
Dicendum quod tempuspositionisduobus modis potestsumi,scilicet:communitervel discrete.Si autem communiter:tunc potestde
temporepositionisconcedi205
ipsum esse, nec aliquod accidit inconveniens.Si autem discrete:tune non potestconcedi,206
dum sit falsa
positio.
Vel potestsolvialiterquod207hoc nomen<A> in(?)"A est"significai
tempusdivisibilevel indivisibile.Si indivisibile:sic debet negari "A
est", quia tempusindivisibilenulliusest actionisvel passionis,cum
mensurari,ut probaturin Libro
impossibilesitdivisibileab indivisibili
Phisicorum.m
Si autemdivisibile:tuncest corrupdbilevel incorruptibile.

199
hocestrepugnans]
add.Pc.
200velerit]
add.Pc.
201alio]aliquoP.
202impossibile male]i. f.
sicsaepius
P.
p. p. e. m. ethicinde
203concedenti]
con.exde consequenti
P.
204falsopossibili
add.Pc.
posito]
205concedi]
con.exconcedendi
P.
206concedi]
falsapositio
add.seddel.P.
207quod]add.Pc.
208Cf.Physica
VI 1, 231b lOss.

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Et voco incorruptibile:
quod salvaturin successioneinstantis unius
ex equifluviisinstantibusa principiotemporisusque ad finemcontiEt de209talipotest
nuati,proutdiciturquod tempuspars est eternitatis.
concedi ipsum esse, nec sequiturinconveniens,quia est necessarium.
Quia cum arguitur"Sortes est albus; et A est; ergo Sortesest albus
in A", dicendumquod sequiturnon rationetemporisin quo est niger
sed temporisin quo potestesse albus; quod si estpossibile,et possibile
in temporecuius possibilitatisgratia facta est positio. Si A(?) in(?)
"<A> est" significet
et voco corruptibile
tempuscorruptibile,
tempus:
in adveniendo et recedendo,cuius pars preterita
quod corrumpitur
et pars futura:tunc aut illud totumin quo durtpositioab eo quod
dicitur"ponatur"usque quod dicatur"cedat tempus":et sic iterum
cum dicitur"A est", potestconcedi, quia est verumnon repugnans
cum enim Sortem esse nigrumsit verum
posito, ut habitmest,210
et
Sortem
esse
album
sitfalsumcontingens,
contingens
potestin tanto
alterum
in
alterum
alterali.
Unde
cum
dicitur
"esse album
tempore
et esse nigrumsimul est impossibile;sed Sortes est niger in A, et
concessistiesse album in A; ergo concessistiimpossibile",dicendum
quod sequeretur,si tenereturA pro tempore indivisibili,sed hoc
non est verum. Vel potest teneriA pro temporemensurantefieri
tantum:et tuncdebet negariA esse,quia concessosequepositionis211
renturinconvenientiasupra212
posita.
Hac visa distinctionefacile est solvere ad obiecta, quia negato
quod A sit, si dicaturquod A fuitvel erit,concedendumest, quia
sequiturex concesso et quodam necessario,ex eo scilicetquod A
fuitfuturum,
quod est necessarium,et ex hac concessa "A non est".
U-96]

Item. Sciendumquod potestaliquid tale poni ex quo sequiturtrans: quando idem enuntiabilemutaturde
casus. Dicitur autem transcasus
30 vero in falsumpro diversistemporibusvel de una(?) veritatein aliam
vel de una falsitatein diversam.Ut cum manus mea clausa est, si
tuncproferatur
'"manus mea est clausa",hec estvera,si in proferendo
tunc
est falsa oratio,et mutaturde veritatein falsitatem.
aperiatur,
Cavendum
estigitur
ab huiusmodi
transcasu.
209del ex P
2,0Videsupra
, p. 196,5.
2,1positionis]
excon.P.
212Videsupra
, p. 196,27ff.

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199

In rei veritateSortesest niger,possibileest Sortem

essealbumvelSortem
esse albumesse concedendum
, et ponibile, ponatur. Tunc proponatur
"Sortemesse albumestconcedendum".Si concdt,contra:"concessisti
falsumnon sequens; ergo male". Non enim sequitur,"si Sortes est
albus vel Sortem esse album est concedendum,Sortem esse album
est concedendum".Si neget:"cedat tempus.Positum aut fuitverum
aut fuitfalsum?".Si verum:ergo verumfuitSortemesse album vel
Sortem esse album esse concedendum;sed Sortem esse album fuit
et
falsum;ergo verumfuitSortemesse album esse concedendum,213
non repugnans;et negasti;ergo male. Vel aliter:positumfuitverum;
sed positumfuitSortemesse album vel Sortemesse album esse concedendum;et non pro hac partefuitverum"Sortemesse album"; ergo
pro altera; ergo pro illa214debuit concedi;215et non est concessum
Sortemesse album; ergo positumfuitfalsum.Si falsum:ergo falsum
fuitSortem esse album vel Sortem esse album esse concedendum;
ergo Sortes non fuitalbus vel Sortem esse album non fuitconcedendum;sed Sortesnon fuitalbus; ergo Sortemesse album fuitconcedendum;ergo positumfuitverum a parte.
Dicendum quod ibi est transcasus,quia ante concessionemvel
216velSortem
essealbum
essealbum
negationempositumest verumSortem
esseconcedendum
sed
cum
hec
"Sortem
esse album est conce;
negatur
dendum",transmutatur
positumde vero in falsum.Et ita fittranscasus, sicutme tacentehec oratioest vera "ego taceo", statimtamen
cum proferoipsam, ipsa est falsa.

25 Item. Sciendum quod

nullapositiodependens
a fiituro
estrecipienda
,
simpliciter
ut si ponaturpositum
essedissimile
a me.Quod patet217
sic:
proponendo
possibileest positum esse dissimileproponendo a me, et ponibile,
ponatur.Quo posito218
proponatur"homo est animai".Hoc est neces30 sarium;ergo concedendum.Concesso dicatur"cedat tempus";et queratur"positumaut fuitverumaut fuitfalsum?".Si verum:ergo verum
fuitpositum et propositumesse dissimilia;ergo fueruntdissimilia;
sed propositumfuitverum;ergo positumfuitfalsum.Si falsum: ergo
213esseconcedendum]
iter.
P.
214
add.Pc.
ergo
pro
illa]
215
add.Pc.
216concedi]
Sortem
essealbum]Sortes
estalbusP.
217
P.
patet]
potest
218posito]
P.
positione

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

falsumfuitpositumet propositumesse dissimilia;ergo non fuerunt

dissimilia; sed fueruntsimilia aut dissimilia;non dissimilia;ergo
similia;sed propositumfuitverum;ergopositumfuitverum;non ergo
falsum.Et sumiturhic "similitudo"pro identitate
, non secundumillud
5 "nichilest illud cui est simile".
Ad hanc ergo positionemet similesdicendumquod uno219casu
contingentepossuntponi, in alio non. Contingenteenim quod proponaturverum,non potestponi, si proponaturfalsum,tunc potest.
Econversoest de istopositum
etpropositum
essesimilia
, quia si futurum
10 sitpropositumfalsum,idem est quod positumesse similefalso;quod
idem est quod positumesse falsum;quod patet intuenti.
Item. Sciendum quod aliqua est positio que uno temporepotest
poni, in alio non. Ut falsumponi in A non potestponi in A; in alio
autemtemporenichilprohibet, ut in B, et nulla sequiturcontradictio,
15 ut patet intuenti.
Item. Regula est in falsa positionequod
33
dicto<(cedat
reiveritatem
,220
tempusdebetconfiten
idestad verum221
quod est,debetrespondensecundumquod se habet.
Si obiciturquod, cum dicat Aristotiles222
quod bene respondentis
20 officium
est ita sustinere disputationem
ut nihilvideaturdicererepugnans, sed cum in temporepositionisconcesseritaliquod falsumquod
sciebat esse falsumobligatusper positionem,si post "cedat tempus"
idem negaveritsicut ad veritatemrespondens,sic sibi contradicet
dicendumquod nullumest inconveniensin falsapositioneconcedere
25 in temporepositionisquod extrapositionemnegaret,cum essetobligatus et non concederitillud quia verumsed quia positumaut sequens.
Item. Datur pro regula quod
ad disciplinaient
infalsa positione
nonest respondendum
, quia
questionem
nonpossetcertifican,
ad discretivam
autempotest.
30 Et voco disciplinaient
: que fitper ista nomina vel adverbia
questionem
etc.,que a Prisciano
"quis", "qualis", "quantus","qualiter","quot",223
dicuntur224
dictionum.Voco autem questionem
discretivam:
interrogativa
"ne", "an" et "utrum",que queruntde
que fitper hasvconiunctiones
inherentiapredicatiad subiectum.
2,9uno]con.exin hocP.
220veritatem]
ventasP.
221verum]
unumP.
222Topica
I 1, 100a 20-21.
223quot]quantum
P.
224Inst.
vol.II, p. 121,16-21.
XVII,22,ed. Hertz,
gramm.

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201

Hoc autemquod diciturpatetsic: si ponaturquod sitAntechristus,

et proponatur"Antechristus
est", concedendumest sicutpositum.Et
si inferatur
"est aliqualis",concedendumest sicutsequens ex posito.
Sed si queratur "qualis?", non potest responden,quia si diceretur
5 "niger"vel "albus", infere
tur"tu concedisfalsumsciturnesse falsum",
falsum
Antechristum
est
esse; ergo falsumest ipsumesse album;
quia
est aliqualis; ergo
et non sequens, quia non sequitur"Antechristus
est albus". Excusandumest ergo de responsione.
Antechristus
Similiterde qualibet alia questione disciplinalidicendum "non
10 possum respondere".
Item. Regula est quod

15

20

25

30

35

nondebetconcedi
,225
impossibile
positionem
possibilem
propter
quia si positiodebet esse de falsopossibiliet cum ex possibilinum,226maniquam sequatur impossibile,ut probatur in libro Priorm
festumquod neque propterpositum,cum ex possibilinon sequatur
neque propterse, cum non possit esse verum,potest
impossibile,227
concedi impossibile.
Sed contra.Possibileest teconcedere
, et ponibile,ponatur.
impossibile
nisi
nihil
concedis
"tu
positum".Hoc est
Quo susceptoproponatur
concesso
concedendum.
verumnon repugnans;ergo
proponatur
Quo
"positumest tantumpossibile". Hoc iterumverum,nec rpugnt;
ergo concedendum.Tunc arguo: "positumest tantumpossibile;et
nihil concedis nisi positum;ergo nihil concedis nisi possibile;cedat
oppositumpositiin temporepositionis;ergomale".
tempus;concessisti
Si neget hanc "positumest tantumpossibile": "ergo male recepisti,
cum debeat esse positiotantumde falso possibili".
Dicendum quod positio possibilisest et potest suscipl. Sed ista
debet negari "tu nihil concedis nisi positum",quia rpugntposito
et bene concedendo,scilicetei quod est "tantumpositumest possibile", quia cum proponitur,concedi debet. Sed si proponeretur"tu
aliquid concedispreterpositum"debet concedi, quia est verum nec
rpugnt,et si queratur "quid?",228respondendumquod est disciplinalis questio, ad quam in hac arte non est respondere.Quod
igiturarguii"positumest tantumpossibile,et nihilconcedisnisipositum; ergo concedisoppositumpositi",dicendumquod non sequitur,

225Cf.supra
, p. 35, 15-6.
226
I 13,32 a 19-20(Auct.34,12).
Anal.Priora
227ex possibili
Pc.
con.exnonsequatur
. . . impossibile]
22H
scilicet
positum?".
preter
"quidestquodconcedis

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202

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
quia possibilinon est oppositumnisi impossibile;ergo cum positum
sit te concedere
, et hoc sit possibile,nihil ei rpugntquod
impossibile
concedis possibile.

Item. Alia regula est quod

necessarium
falsopossibili
,
positononestnegandum
quia cum necessariumsequatur ad quiclibet et ita ad impossibile,
multofortius
ad possibile,et sic verum et concedendum.229
Sed contra.Possibileest te negare
necessarium
, et ponibile,ponatur.
"tu
Proponatur
negas necessarium".Hoc est positum;ergo conce10 dendum. Ergo patet quod regula230
est falsa.
Dicendum ad hoc quod hac positioneretenta,si proponatur"tu
male respondes"et hec "nihilnegas nisiverum",debetconcedi,quia
sese sequunturinvicem.Sequiturenim "si nihilnegas nisiverumnon
obligatusad hoc, tu male respondes";similitereconversoa destructione
15 consequentis
"si <non> male respondes,tu negas verumnon obligatus".
Ad predictamergo oppositionemdicendumquod, cum poniturte
non negaturnecessarium,
sed concediturte posse
negarenecessarium,
negare,inquantumpossibileest.
5

20

25

30

35

Item. Datur231pro regula quod

Ulidebet
concedi
esse
.
falsopossibili
positode quolibet
falsocompossibili
ipsum
esse
Quod patet sic: in rei veritateSortes est niger,ponatur Sortem
album
, hoc est possibile, et ponibile, ponatur. Postea proponatur
"Sortes est albus et tu es episcopus".Istud autem teesseepiscopum
est
falsum,sed possibile est esse verum cum hoc scilicet "Sortes est
albus"; ergo per regulamdebet concedi; et sic habeturpropositum.
Si dicaturquod non, [f 96v] proponatur"Sortes est albus et tu
non es episcopus".Si concedatur,contra:hec est quedam copulativa
cuius altera pars est falsa; ergo tota falsa; ergo neganda. Item, hoc
est falsumnon sequens ex posito,quia non sequitur"Sortesest albus;
ergo Sortes est albus et tu non es episcopus"; ergo negandum.Si
negetur,inferatur
"ergo non Sortesest albus et tu non es episcopus;
sed Sortes est albus per positionem;ergo non tu non es episcopus;
ergo tu es episcopus, quia due negationesfaciuntaffirmationem".
Ergo patet quod concedendumest falsumpossibile,si cum posito
proponatur.

229verum
et
add.Pc.
230regula] concedendum]
P.
nulla(?)
231datur]dicitur
P.

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203

Sed contra.Nihil habet totumnisi a suis partibus;sed copulativa

totum232
est; ergo eque veritatemneque concessionemhabet nisi a
partibus;sed neutrapartiumest vera; ergo neque copulativa.Item.
Alterapars est falsa non sequens ex posito; ergo per se neganda.233
Item. Etsi positum,quia positum,per se concedendum,tamencopulatumcum falsonon propterhoc est concedendum,quia illud copulatumnec est positumnec est sequens ex posito;ergo cum sitfalsum,
negandumest. Et ita videturregula falsa.
Item. Eodem modo videturquod possitfieride impossibilicopulato
cum posito.Eadem positioneretentaproponatur"Sortesest albus et
tu es asinus". Si concedatur,contra: hec est copulativacuius altera
pars est falsa;ergo tota; ergo neganda est. Non pro hac parte "Sortes
est albus", cum sit positum;ergo pro hac "tu es asinus"; debet ergo
concedi "Sortesest albus <et> tu non es asinus". Sed si hoc, contra:
hoc est falsumnon sequens ex posito, quia non sequitur"si Sortes
est albus, Sortes est albus et tu non es asinus"; ergo sua contradictoria concedenda,scilicethec "non Sortes est albus <et> tu non es
asinus"; sed Sortesest albus per positum;ergo non tu non es asinus;
ergo tu es asinus. Sic ergo reditidem quod prius.
Dicendum ad hoc quod diverside illa reguladiversimodesentiunt.
Alii dicuntquod vera est,et sustinent234
eam per dictasrationes.Alii
dicunt quod falsa est, cum sit copulatum falsumnon positumnec
sequens ex posito nec ex concesso nec ex oppositonegati etc.
Sustinentibus
regulamrespondendumest ad ultimumobiectum235
dicitur
"Sortesest albus et tu es asinus",illud debet concum
quod,
cedi et hoc negari "Sortes est albus et tu non es asinus".236Et si
dicendumest quod falsum
"hoc238est falsumnon sequens",239
dicat237
ex
duobus
sit
cum
est,
<sequens>
quorum utrumqueconcedendum,
quia sequiturad
quia positumpropterpositionem,et necessarium,240
quiclibet. Non tamen dico quod consequentie241false positionis
debeant accipi secundum unumquodque genus consequendi, sed

232totum]
nonadd.necnon
exp.P.
233Sc.:
copulativa.
234sustinent]
P.
sistinent
235Videsupra
, p. 52, lOff.
236asinus]
add.P.
nonsequens
et sicfalsum
237Cf.supra
, lin.15.
238Sc. "Sortes
estalbuset tunones asinus".
239etsi
corr.
exad quodPc.
nonsequens]
240Sc.: "tunones asinus".
241consequentie]
P.
corr.
exsequentie

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H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS

204

tantummodonaturaliter. Unde non est simile de hac "Sortes est

albus et tu es asinus" et de hac "Sortesest albus et tu es episcopus",
quia oppositumprime est necessariumcum posito, et ita sequitur,
verum,et ita non sequitur.
oppositumsecunde est contingens242
5
de
Quod opponitur copulativa quod nihil habet nisi a partibus,
dicendumquod verumest, sed duobus modis potestconsiderali:vel
quo ad presensin quo est, et sie est falsa et parteseius false;vel ad
tempus sue possibilitatis,cuius gratia ponitur et conceditur;unde
sensusest "Sortes est albus et tu es episcopus":equepossibile
estSortent
10 essealbumet te esseepiscopum.

15

20

25

30

Item. Sciendum quod

si cumposito
necessarium
debet
concedi
, si proponatur3
,
falsopossibili
copuletur
necmalumaccidit.
Ut si sit verum quod Sortes est niger,et ponatur Sortem
essealbum
,
et proponatur"Sortes est albus et Deus est", debet concedi. Quia si
non conceditur,et de quolibet sit vera affirmatio
vel negatio,tunc
debet concedi "non Sortes est albus et Deus est"; sed non pro ista
parte "Sortes est albus", cum sit positume[s]t concedendum;ergo
pro hac "non Deus est";quod estfalsum.243
Ergopatetquod copulativa
fuitconcedenda.
Tamen si obviaturipsa concessa "concessistifalsumnon sequens,
scilicethoc "Sortes est albus et Deus est", quia copulativaest falsa
cuius altera pars est falsa"dicendumquod falsumest, scilicetquod non concessinon sequens,
immo concessi sequens, scilicettotum copulatum,cuius altera pars
habitmest.
sequiturpro posito,altera quia necessarium,ut supra244
Volebant tamen alii dicere quia negabaturtalis copulativa,non
pro partibussed pro se tota,et erat sensus:nonestverum
quodperhanc
dicitur"Sortes
estalbusetDeus est"dicendumtamenquod aliud est hic esse verumet esse concedendum,
quia multa non vera hic concedenda sunt et multa vera neganda.

Item.
Si copuletur
cumfalso possibilipositoverumcontingens
, ut "Sortes est
albus et tu scribis",concedendum
est,
35 alterumpro posito, alterumquia verum non repugnans;et procedendum ut supra.
242contingensl
iter.
P.
243quodestfalsum]
add.Pc.
244Videsupra
, p. 52,27-30.

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205

Item.
Si cumpositopossibili
concedendum
, et si
falso copuletur
falsumcontingens,
,
,
negandum
impossibile
habitmest.
ut supra245
Item.
verum
concedendum
est.
Si cumfalsopossibili
positodisiungatur
contingens,
vel
tu
"Sortes
est
albus
dicatur
eadem
retenta
si
positione
Quod patet:
scribis".Quia, si negetur,sequitur:"ergo non Sortesest albus vel tu
scribis;sed Sortes est albus; ergo non tu scribis";quod est falsum.
.
similiter
concedendum
Si disiungatur
falsumcontingens,
totum
disiuncte
et
altera
disiunctum;sed
ponitur
Quia posita
parte
alterumdebet poni per positum;ergo totum;ut: "Sortes est albus
vel tu es episcopus".
Et si opponaturquod falsa est disiunctacuius utraque pars est
falsa; sed hec est talis; ergo est falsum<non> sequens
dicendumquod falsumest,quia ad quicquid-sequiturpars disiuncte,
et totum disiunctum;et prima pars sequitur ad positum,ergo et
totum;et iterumconcedenda non causa veritatissed causa positi.
Item.
246est;nec
Si disiungatur
, concedendum
aliquidmali.
sequitur
impossibile
Ut: "Sortes est albus vel homo est asinus"; quod patet intuenti.
Et hec de falsa positionead presenssufficiant.247

245Videsupra
, pp. 51, 19-53,10.
246concedenduml
P.
negandum
247sufficiant]
EXPLICITFALSAPOSITIO INCIPITDEPOSITIO add.P.

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206

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
<DE DEPOSITIONE>

10

15

20

habitmest quod obligationisuna species est

<Q>uoniam supra248
se
habet ad positionemsicutprivatioad habitm,vel
depositio,que
se habentut contraria,completosermonede falsapositione,de regulis
et sophismatibuset processu eius, consequens est de depositioneet
de circa earn contingentibus
hic considerare.
Sciendum igitur quod habet a se sua principia communia et
propria,regulas,processuset sophismataad proportionemet similitudinemfalse positionis.Et sicut ibi fiebatpositio ab opponente
per hoc verbum "ponatur" et recipiebatura respondenteper hoc
verbum "sit" et deponebaturper hanc orationem"cedat tempus",
similiterhic fitdepositioab opponenteper hoc verbum"deponatur"
et recipiturper hoc verbum "sit" et deponiturtempusdepositionis
per hanc orationem"cedat tempus".
Sciendum item quod sicut erat positio de falso possibili,ut concedereturin temporepositionis,similiterest depositiode vero contingenti,ut negeturin temporedepositionis.
Ut igiturin hac obligationeprocedamusartificialius,
videndumest
quid sit depositio,et quid deponere,et quot modis habeat fieri,et
de reguliseius et processibuset de sophismatibus
que secundumearn
et
solvuntur.
opponuntur

Sciendum ergo quod depositio

est: obligatioqua aliquis coartatur,ut
enuntiabile
se
neget
quod per
propositumnon negaret;et deponere
est: eiusmodi249
enuntiabileconstituereut negeturin temporedepo25 sitionisquod propterse non250negandumest.
Et sicutin falsapositioneomne sequens ex positoerat concedendum,
et sequeretur
quia eo negatoet antecedens(P)
contradictio,251
negaretur(?)
in
sic
[f. 97]
depositione
252est
omneantecedens
ad depositum
,
negandum
30 quia concesso antecedenticoncedereturet consequens.
Omneautemverum
et nonantecedens
vel
sequensex deposito
potestconcedi
eo
et
faciendum
sed
,
negaviquia
negato negatur depositum;quod
est;
eo concesso non propterhoc antecedensconceditur;concessioenim
248Videsupra,
p. 22,22-4.
249
P.
eiusmodi]
eiusdem(?)
250propter
se nonicon.expropter
auodP.
251sequeretur
add.Pe.
contradictio]
252
con.expositum
P.
depositum]

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207

non enim sequitur:si est

superiorisnon facitconcessioneminferioris,
animal, quod sit homo.
Item.
estconcedendum
ita quodnonantecedat,
Omneverum
,
impertinens
5 quia eo concesso nullumaccidit inconveniens.
Item.
velsi non
Omne
, estnegandum
, vel etiamsi sequatur
, si antecedat
falsum
inconveniens
accidit.
nullum
eo
ilio
,
negato
quod
pertineat
Item.
253
etomne
necessarium
inhocobligatione
10
Omneimpossibile
simpliciternegandum
concedendum
,
simpliciter
cum non debeat fieridepositionisi de vero contingentiaut de eo
quod est aut potestesse verum.254
15

20

25

30

Item.Ne ex huiusdictionis"depositio"fantasiadecipiamur,notandum
quod duobusmodisaccipiturdepositio:vel secundumquod estprivatio
positionisvel deobligatiode positione,que fitper hanc orationem
"cedat tempus",sed de hac nichilad presens;et itemdiciturdepositio:
contrariapositioniobligatio,et sie de hac hic intenditur.
De qua si obiciatur quod frustradatur ars de depositione255
dicendo256
quod habemus artemde positione,scilicetde concessione
positi; positum autem et depositum sunt contrariaet circa idem
- in hoc
habent fieri
ergo quod datur ars de concedendo posito,
datur de negando eius opposito, ergo de negando deposito,quod
eadem sit disciplina,
est oppositumpositi- ; cum igiturcontrariorum
data disciplinapositionissuperfluaest disciplinadepositionisdicendum quod duobus modis est considerare oppositum positi:
vel inquantumgratiapositi debet negari,et sic non est ars alia de
eo et de concessionepositi;vel inquantumpropterse ipsum habet
suam negationemet suam concessionem,et sic est de ipso obligatio
per se et ars per se, que257hic traditur.
Preterergo data principiaest aliud principiumquod
itaoppositum
estnegandum
skutdepositum
, quiadepositum,
concedendum,
depositi
quia eiusoppositum.

253simpliciter
neeanduml
P.
neerandum
simpliciter
254aut
add.Pc.
esseverum]
potest
2Mde depositione]
add.Pc.
2%dicendo]
P.
dicendum
257que]qui P.

18:46:47 PM

208

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Et gratiaeius queraturde hoc sophismate:sit rei Veritasquod Sortes
multa videt, et appellet A Platonem
esse
, B visuma Sortenonvideria
Platone
; deponaturA velB esseverum.
Quo susceptoproponatur"A
vel B est verum".Hoc est depositumsub formadepositipropositum;
ergo negandum.Quo negato proponatur"Sortesvidetaliquid". Hoc
est verumnon antecedensdeposito,quia non sequitur"Sortes videt
aliquid; ergo A vel B est verum";ergo concedendum.Quo concesso
proponatur"Plato est". Hoc est antecedensdepositi,quia sequitur
"si Plato est,A est verum",et "si A est verum,A vel B est verum";
ergosi Plato est,depositumestverum;ergohoc "Plato est" estnegandum. Quo negato proponatur"Plato non est". Hoc est oppositum
negati;ergo concedendum.Tunc arguo "Sortesvidetaliquid et Plato
non est; ergo visum a Sorte non videtura Platone. Item, visum a
Sorte non videtura Platone; ergo B est verum; ergo A vel B est
verum.Cedat tempus;concessistidepositumin temporedepositionis;
ergo male respondisti".
Dicendum quod hec "Sortesvidetaliquid" debet negari,quia anteceditad depositumnon per se sed cum oppositodepositi.Depositum
enim est disiunctum;ergo cum debeat esse falsum,quelibetpars est
falsa,scilicet"Plato est" vel "visuma Sorte non videtura Platone".
Ergo verumest non Platonemesse;258ergo si Sortesvidet aliquid et
> Plato
non Plato est, visum a Sorte non videtura Platone, <
si
Sortes
A
videt
vel
B
verum.
est
Sed
si
visum
est;259
ergo
aliquid,
a Sorte non videtura Platone, B est verum;sed si B est verum,A
vel B est verum;sed si A vel B est verum,depositumest verum.Et
sic patetquomodo ex concessionehuius"Sortesvidetaliquid"sequitur
concessio depositi;ergo negandum.

Item. Sciendum quod

sicutfalsumponi nonpotest
cumilio, itaeque
poninecaliquidconvertibile
30
cumilio, et sicutfalsum
deponi potestdeponiequealiquidconvertibile
, et sicutfalsumponi
poni in A nonpotest
poni in A, sic nequedeponi
in hoc loco nonpotestponi in hoc loco,ita neque[falsum]deponi
, et
sicutfalsumponi a Sorte nonpotest
a
Sorte
ita
,
poni
nequedeponi.
Quod sic patet: deponaturfalsumdeponi.
Quo susceptodicatur"cedat
35 tempus",et queratur "depositumaut fuitverum aut falsum?".Si
verum: ergo verum fuitfalsumdeponi'ergo falsumdeponebatur;et
258esse]sequitur
rasura
rciter
20 litter
arum
inP.
259est]sequitur
rasura
circiter
16 litterarum
inP.

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209

non deponebaturnisi depositum;ergo depositumfuitfalsum.Si falsum: ergo falsumfuitfalsumdeponi

; ergo falsumnon deponebatur;et
sed
non deponebaturnisidepositum;
verum;
aliquiddeponebatur;ergo
est quod falsum.
et
dictum
fuit
verum;
ergo depositum
Sic ergo patetquod obligatiodepositoriasequiturregulaspositorie
obligationis.Unde sciendumquod
260
si in eademdisputatone
, nonpotentesse
fiatpositiodefalso possibili
concessioni
contrarium
sit
,
positi
depositum
aliquidquod
statutoquod positumet depositumfuturasinteiusdemfortune,idest
quod manenteuno261et maneat aliud et cadente cadit.
Ut patebit per hoc sophisma: in rei veritate Sortes est albus;
- hoc dico
te quod aliquid eritpositumet aliquid depositum
certifico
nonessealbum
PonaturSortem
ad cautelamrespondentis.
, et deponatur
et voco aliterrespondere
te aliterrespondere
large, sive
quam affirmative,
sive
dicas
"nichil
de
te
sive
excuses
sive
dubie
responsione
negative
dicis" si<ve> quomodolibetaliter.Pretereapeto quod si depositum
fueritverum,non maneat, si falsum,maneat, et manente deposito
maneatpositumet non manentenon maneat.Tunc propono "Sortes
Si respondeatur"verumest": "cedat tempus;concessisti
est albus".262
oppositumpositi in temporepositionis;ergo male respondisti".Si
respondeatur"falsumest" aut quocumque modo alio: procedo "tu
respondes negative vel dubie vel modo alio; ergo non respondes
est verum;
affirmative;
ergo te responderealiter quam affirmative
non
est
manet; ergo neque positum;
verum; ergo
ergo depositum
ergo
ergonegastiquoddam verumscitumesse verumnon obligatus;263
male respondistiper regulamfalse positionis".
Dicendum quod cum proponitur"Sortesest albus", debet excusari
de responsioneet dici "non possum respondere".
ad verumscitum
Et si obicit"tu respondesaliterquam affirmative
verum ergo non manet depositumneque positum non obligatus;
ergo male"
dicendum quod fallitsecundum consequens, quia omittit;deberet
enim addi "et poteras respondereaffirmative".
Vel potest dici quod in posito et deposito existenterei veritate
insolubile.
includitur264

260
P.
dispositione
261disputatione]
uno]alioP.
262albus]sequitur
inP.
2 litt,
rasura
263obligatus]
I. 30.
excollatione
add.P, seddelevi
ad contrarium
264includitur]
P.
excluditur

18:46:47 PM

210

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Item. Quia precedentiumpreceptorumnondumest elucidataVeritas,
proptereasubiungendaest hie eorum evidentia.
Et primoilliusquod diciturquod "quicquid sitdepositum,omne265
antecedensad ipsum est negandum".266
Eo enim fitdepositumut negeturin temporedepositionis,sicut
positumut concedaturin temporepositionis.Voco autem antecedens
ad depositum
: omne illud quo positoin esse necesseest depositumponi
in esse, vel ex quo depositihabeturverificatio.Et quia depositum
concedendumnon est,ideo omne tale antecedensest negandum.Ut
si deponaturCesarem
essecoloratura
, et proponatur"Cesar est albus",
eo
concesso
essecoloest,
[f. 97v] quia
negandum
sequereturCesarem
ratum.Similitersi proponatur"Cesar est niger",vel "medio colore
coloratus",et sic de aliis. Volentesvero scireutrumsequaturvel non
sequatur,utamurhac arte: ordinantesin conditioneillud quod dubitamus utrumantecedat,in antecedentiet depositumin consequenti,
et, si sequaturnaturaliteresse, est antecedenset negaridebet,ut, "si
Cesar est albus, Cesar est coloratus",si autem possit esse verum
sine267deposito,tunc non antecedit268
et potest concedi, nisi aliud
obstiterit.
Ad cuius rei evidentiamqueraturde hoc sophismate:in rei veritate
tu scis multa que Sortes nescit; appellet A: ignoratum
a te ignoran
a
Sorte
velnonomnealiudquamA269ignoratum
, et de[p]ponaturA esseverum
a teignorari
a Sorte
, et sit totumdisiunctumdepositum.Si ergo proponatur "A est", debet negari tanquam antecedens ad depositum.
Probatio:si enim A est verum,A esse vel non omne270aliud quam
A ignoratuma te ignoraria Sorte est verum;sed si A esse vel non
omne271aliud quam A ignoratuma te ignoraria Sorte est verum,
depositumest verum;ergo cum depositumsit negandum,et illud ex
Item. Cum
quo sequitur erit negandum; ergo hoc A esse verum}12
depositumsit habendum pro falso, et depositumsit quoddam disiunctum,necesse est illud disiunctumpro qualibetparte esse falsum;
ergo pro hac "A est"; sed nullumfalsumscitur; ergo omne falsum

265omne]corr.
exnonP.
266Cf.
55,29.
supra,
p.
267sine]corr.
exsubP.
268antecedit]
exconsequitur
corr.
P.
269A] suppleui,
1 litt,
lacuna
inP.
270omne]esse(?)P.
in omne]
esse(?)P.
272verum]
add.necnondel.P.
ergodebetconcedi
quodestfalsum

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2 11

ignoratur;ergo A esse ignoratura te; sed273id quod274est ignoratum

a te275ignoratura Sorte; ergo ignoratuma te ignoratura Sorte.
Item. Cum totumdisiunctumsit falsum,ultimapars est falsa,scilicet
hec "non omne aliud quam A ignoratuma te ignoratura Sorte";
est verum,scilicet"omne aliud quam A ignora5 ergo contradictorium
tum a te ignoratura Sorte." Tunc arguo: "ignoratuma te ignoratur
a Sorte;et omne aliud quam A ignoratuma te ignoratura Sorte; ergo
omne quod ignoratura te ignoratura Sorte;cedat tempus;concessisti
antecedensdeposito in tempore depositionis; ergo male". Sequitur
10 enim "si omne quod ignoratura te ignoratura Sorte, ignoratuma
te ignoratura Sorte"; et si ignoratuma te ignoratura Sorte,A est
verum;et si A est verum,verumest A esse vel non omne aliud quam
A ignoratuma te ignoralia Sorte; sed hoc est depositum;ergo depositumest verum.
15
Dicendum quod non potestillud disiunctumrecipi pro deposito,
, ut patuitper deductiones.
quia implicaturibi falsumdeponi
Dicunt tamen alii quod potest depositumrecipi, sed276cum per
"A estverum",quia ex ipso et oppositodepositisequitur
se proponitur
verum et concedendum.
esse
depositum
20 Item. Aliud est principiumhuius obligationisquod
debetconcedi
verum
sicutinfalsa positione
, ita in depositane,
impertinens
ad depositum,
antecedit
non
in depositione:quod
et vocaturimpertinens
idest quod si est
vel per cuius veritatemdepositumnon verificatur,
verum.
est
hoc
non
verum,
depositum
propter
25
Quod fitevidens per hoc sophisma: sit rei VeritasSortem esse
sanum, et peto gratia disputationissustinerihoc principiumquod
velnullum
esseegrum
depositiofitsolumad negandum,deponaturSortem
nullum
eo
enim
hoc
esse
est,
concedendum'
negato
quia
deponibile
falsum
Tunc propono "nulla obligatioalia a depositione
acciditinconveniens.
vel ostendatur
30 est". Hoc est verum,quod satispatet,et impertinens,
pertinentia;ergo concedendum secundum regulam supradictam.
Concesso dicatur"cedat tempus;concessistiantecedensad depositum
in temporedepositionis;ergo male respondisti".Probatio: si nulla
alia obligatioa depositioneest,nullumfalsumest concedendum,quia
35 obligatioque est depositio,non obligat ad concedendum,ut supra
273sed]sequitur
inP.
lacuna
fere2 litt,
274quod]add.Pc.
275estignoratum
a te]add.Pc.
276sed]anmelius
inscilicet?
corrigendum

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

habitmest,277
eque verumeque falsum;sed si nulla alia obligatio
a depositioneest vel nullumfalsumest concedendum,Sortesest eger
vel nullumfalsumest concedendum;sed nulla alia obligatioa depositioneest; ergo Sortesest eger vel nullumfalsumest concedendum;
5 sed verum est nullam obligationemaliam a depositioneesse; ergo
verumest Sortemesse egrumvel nullumfalsumesse concedendum;
sed hoc est depositum;ergo Veritasdepositisequiturad veritatem
huius "nulla obligatioete"' ergo anteceditad ipsum; et hoc278concessisti;ergo male.
10
Dicendum quod cum proponiturista "nulla alia obligatioa depositione est", licet sit verum, tarnennegandum, quia anteceditad
depositum,ut visum est.
Vel potestdici quod potestconcedi.Sed cum eo concessoproceditur
"nulla alia obligatioa depositioneest; ergo nullumfalsumest conce15 dendum",dicendumquod non sequitur,quia etsisitprincipiumquod
de depositoet de
depositioest ad negandum,hoc est intelligendum
eis que pertinentad veritatemdepositiprimoet principaliter;
ex consequent! vero nihil prohibetconcedi aliqua, quia si depositumest
negandum,et eius oppositumest concedendum.
20 Item. Sciendum pro regula quod
estquodpotestdeponiveroproposito,
aliquodenuntiabile
falso autem
propositononpotest.
Ut est hoc depositum
etpropositum
essesimilia.Quod patetsic: deponibile
est depositum
etpropositum
essesimilia
, quia negari potestnec sequitur
25 inconveniens;
deponaturergo.Quo susceptoproponatur"tu es capra".
Quicquid respondeat,dicatur"cedat tempus",et queratur"depositum
aut fuitverumaut fuitfalsum?".Si verum:ergoverumfuitdepositum
et propositumesse similia;ergo fueruntsimilia;sed propositumfuit
falsum;ergo depositumfuitfalsum;et dictumest quod verum.Si fal30 sum: ergo falsumfuitdepositumet propositumesse similia;ergo non
fueruntsimilia;sed fueruntaliqualia, ergo dissimilia;sed propositum
fuitfalsum;ergo depositumfuitverum;et dictumest quod falsum.
Dicendumergo,279
cum deponeretur,280
quod uno casu potestdeponi,
alio non, quia si proponaturverum,potest,si autem falsum,non
35 potest.
277Cf.supra
, p. 55,3Iff.
278Sc.: hocquodest"nulla
aliaa depositione
est".
obligatio
279ergo]quodadd.necnondel.
P.
280deponeretur]
P.
proponeretur

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213

Similiterse habet de hoc depositum

etpropositum
essedissimilici
, quia
falsopropositopotestdeponi, vero autem propositonon potest.
Item. Sciendum quod
estaliquodenuntiabile
cumverononpotest
, cumfalso
quoddisiunctum
deponi
5
autemdisiunctum
,
posset
ut hoc disiunctum:deponaturte essehominem
veltantum
alteram
partem
disiuncti
essever
am. Quo susceptodicatur"cedat tempus",et queratur
de hac parte "tantumaltera pars disiunctiest vera", utrumhoc sit
verum vel falsum.Si verum: ergo tantumaltera pars disiunctiest
10 vera, non ergo utraque;sed hec est vera "tu es homo"; ergo hec est
falsa"tantumalterapars disiunctiest vera"; et dictumest quod vera.
Si falsum: ergo falsum est tantum alteram partem disiunctiesse
veram; ergo non tantumalterapars disiunctiest vera, ergo utraque;
ergo hec "tantumalterapars etc" est vera; et dictumest quod falsa.
15
Sic ergo patet quod, cum deponitur,debet dici "non potestcum
vero deponi, cum falso autem potest",quia negato nullum accidit
inconveniens;quod patet intuenti.

20

25

30

35

Item. Positumest pro principioquod

sicutponi nonpotestaliquidin quo implicita
sintduo contradictoria,
ita
;
nequedeponi
quod maxime potestexcerceriin dubitatis.
Ut patet in hoc sophismate:sit Marcus nomen tui vel Sortis,et
nesciscuius; et certificote quod, si depositumsitverum,Marcus erit
nomen tui,si autem falsum,Marcus eritnomen Sortis,et si nihilsit
Sortiset te 'deber'
depositum,habeas pro(?) posito Marcumessenomen
, et deponatur:Marcumnonesse
partipositiessedissimile
respondere
posito
nomen
tuietMarcumessenomen
Sortis.Qiao susceptodicatur"depositum
aut fuitverumaut fuitfalsum?".Si verum:ergo Marcus fuitnomen
tui per certificationem;
ergo falsumfuitMarcum non esse nomen
tui; ergo falsumfuitMarcum non esse nomen tui et Marcum esse
nomen Sortis; sed hoc fuitdepositum;ergo depositumfuitfalsum;
et dictum est quod verum. Si falsum: ergo per certificationem281
Marcus fuitnomen Sortis; ergo Marcus non fuitnomen tui; ergo
verum fuitMarcum non esse nomen tui et Marcum esse nomen
Sortis; sed hoc fuitdepositum;ergo depositumfuitverum; et dictum est quod falsum.Si dicat quod nihil est depositum:tunc per

281certificationem]
certitudinem
P.

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10

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25

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35

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Sortiset te responlegem supra positampositumest Marcumessenomen
hoc
Sit
derepartipositiessedissimile[m]
positum.Quo susposito. ergo
Hoc sequiturex
nomen
Marcus".
est
Sortis
"solius
cepto proponatur
Probatio:si
concedendum.
posito; ergo per regulamfalse positionis
Marcus est nomen Sortis,et te responderead partempositiest dissimileposito,si respondesad partempositi dissimiliter
posito,solus
Sortes habet hoc nomen Marcus; [f 98] sed ita est; ergo solius
Sortisest hoc nomen Marcus. "Cedat tempus;ego certificote quod
Marcus est nomen Sortis et quod B est instanstue responsionisad
hanc "solus Sortes habet hoc nomen Marcus"". Tune quero "positum aut fuitverum aut fuitfalsum?".Si verum: ergo pro utraque
parte, cum sit copulatum;ergo pro hac "te responderead partem
positiest dissimileposito"; ergo verumest te responderead partem
positi esse dissimileposito; sed te responderead partem positi est
verum,quia ad hanc "solus Sorteshabet hoc nomen Marcus"; ergo
positumest falsum;et dictumest quod verum. Si falsum:sed non
pro hac parte "solus Sortes habet hoc nomen Marcus", cum sit
certificata;
ergo pro hac "te responderead partempositiest dissimile
posito"; ergo falsumest te responderead partempositiesse dissimile
posito;ergo verumest te responderead partempositiesse similepoad partem
;
positi
sito; ergo positumest simile ei quod est te respondere
sed te responderead partempositiestverum;ergopositumestverum;
et dictumest quod falsum.
Dicendum ad primumquod illud non potestdeponi Marcumnon
essenomentui et MarcumessenomenSortismanentibusdictis certificationibus,quia obligaturad duo contradictoria,scilicet ad Marcum
Sortis
Sortiset Marcumnonessenomen
essenomen
, quia cum deponitur,
obligaturad negandum;fitenim depositio,ut dictumest, ad habendum pro falso.
Ad secundumde posito dicendumest quod non potestponi hoc
ad partem
Marcumet te respondere
haberehocnomen
solumSortem
positiesse
B
dissimile
positomanenteinstantepositionis contingentequod debeat
vel positum
proponipars positi,quia includunturduo contradictoria
esse dissimilevero vel positumesse similefalso;quod est idem quod
falsumponi.
Item. Ad idem queraturde hoc sophismate:appellaretA: Deumesse>
unomodo
B: terespondere
, et dicaturrespondere
large quocumque modo,
C appellaretoppositumdepositi;deponibileest A velB essesimileC,
quia eo negato nihil accidit inconvenientis.Tunc propono "Deus

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215

est". Hoc est necessarium,quod scis esse necessarium;ergo concedendum. Quo concesso proponatur"Deus est". Hoc est verumnec
potestesse falsumnec anteceditdeposito,ut patet;ergo concedendum.
Concesso proponaturitem"Deus est". Quicquid dicat,dicatur"cedat
tempus;depositumaut fuitverum aut fuitfalsum?'.Si verum:ergo
verum fuitA vel B esse simile C; sed tam A quam B est verum;
ergo C est verum; sed C est oppositumdepositi; ergo oppositum
et dictumest quod
depositiest verum;ergo depositumest falsum;282
verum.283
Si falsum:ergo falsum est A vel B esse simile C; ergo
verumest A vel B esse dissimileC; sed tam A quam B est verum,
est verum;
quia Deum esse est verum et te respondereuniformiter
est
sed
C
est
C
est
falsum;
ergo
depositum
depositi;
oppositum
ergo
falsum.
est
et
dictum
verum;
quod
Ad hoc dicuntquidam quod, cum dicitur"cedat tempus",debet
dici "non cedat", quia concessosequiturinconvenienscontradictionis.
Contraquod sic opponiturquod opus bene respondentisest nulli
consentirecuius recessui consentiresit inconveniens;propterea si
convenienterrecipiturtempus positionisvel depositionis,eiusdem
temporisrecessuisine calumpnia debet consentiri.
Proptereadicendum aliter quod manentibusappellationibusnon
potest deponi A velB essesimileC, quia idem est quod oppositum
depositi esse simile vero, et ita depositumesse falsum,vel falsum
deponi.

de hoc sophismatepotestqueri: appellaretA: depoItem. Ad idem284

25 situmesseinsolubile
; et peto quod tu concedis de quolibet enuntiabili
sive solubilisive insolubiliipsum esse verumvel falsum;B appellaret
verum
Sortem
, et nscias quid; C sit instansalicuiuspropositi,et
ponere
D
nscias cuius; appellaretsecundo propositum,quicquid ipsum sit.
Tunc procedo: deponibile est A et B essesimilia
, quia dicto "cedat
30 tempus" non accidit inconveniens;deponatur ergo. Quo suscepto
proponatur"non A et B sunt similia". Hoc est oppositumdepositi;
ergoconcedendumin temporedepositionis.Quo concessoproponatur
secundo "Sortes est asinus vel aliquid sequi ex eo esse simile C".
Quicquid dicatur,"cedat tempus;ego certificote quod C fuitinstans
35 primo propositi,et quod Sortes posuit Platonem ponere verum,et
282falsum]
P.
con.exverum(?)
283verum]
P.
con.exfalsum(?)
284idem]queratur
add.necnonexp.P.

18:46:47 PM

216

10

15

20

25

30

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

Plato A et D esse similia".Tune quero: "depositumaut fuitsolubile

aut fuitinsolubile?".
Si solubile:aut verum aut falsum.
Si verum:ergo verumfuitA et B esse similia;ergo A et B fuerunt
similia;sed A fuitfalsum,quia A fuitdepositumesse insolubile,et
dixistiquod depositumest solubile; ergo A fuitfalsum;ergo B fuit
falsum;sed B fuitSortem ponere verum; ergo falsumfuitSortem
ponere verum;ergo Sortesnon posuitverum,et posuitaliquid; ergo
falsum;sed posuitPlatonemponereverum;ergo falsumfuitPlatonem
ponere verum;ergo Plato non posuitverum,sed posuitaliquid; ergo
falsum;sed Plato posuit A et D esse similia;ergo falsumfuitA et
D esse similia;ergo non fueruntsimilia;sed fueruntsimiliavel dissimilia; ergo fueruntdissimilia;sed A fuitfalsum,ut habitmest;285
ergo D fuitverum;sed D fuitSortemesse asinum vel aliquid sequi
ex eo esse simileC; sed falsumfuitSortemesse asinum;ergo verum
fuitSortem esse asinum vel aliquid sequi ex eo esse simile C; sed
hoc pronomen"eo" ad hoc
aliquid sequebaturex eo, et referatur286
Sortem
esseasinum
, ex quo sequituraliquid, quia si Sortes est asinus,
Sortes est animal; ergo verum est aliquid sequi ex eo; ergo verum
est C; sed C287fuitinstansprimo propositi;ergo primo propositum
fuitverum; sed primo propositumfuitnonA et B essesimilia
; ergo
verum fuit <non>288 A et B esse similia; sed hoc fuitoppositum
depositi; ergo oppositum depositi fuitverum; ergo depositumfuit
falsum;et dictumest quod verum.
Si falsum:ergo falsumfuitA et B esse similia;ergo non fuerunt
similia;sed fueruntsimiliavel dissimilia;non similia;ergo dissimilia;
sed A fuitfalsum,ut supra patuit;289
ergo B fuitverum;sed B fuit
Sortem
verum
fuit
Sortem
verum'
ponere
ergo
ponereverum;ergo Sortes
posuitverum;sed SortesposuitPlatonemponere verum;ergo verum
fuitPlatonemponere290
verum; ergo Plato posuit verum; sed Plato
A
D
esse
et
similia;
posuit
ergo verumfuitA et D esse similia;sed
A fuitfalsum;ergo D fuitfalsum;ergo pro utraque parte; ergo pro
1
hac "aliquid sequi ex eo esse simileC"; ergo falsumfuitaliquid sequi

285Videsura
, 11.5-6.
28breferatur]
ad add.necnonexp.P.
287G] con.exsc P.
288non]supplevi
1 litt,
inP.
, rasura
289
P. Cf.supra
, 11.5-6.
patuit]
patet
290ponere]
add.Pc.

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217

ex eo esse simileC; ergo verumfuit291

aliquid sequi ex eo esse dissimileC; sed aliquid sequi ex eo fuitverum; ergo C fuitfalsum;292
sed C fuitprimo propositum,quod fuitnonA et B essesimilia
; ergo
falsumfuitnon A et B esse similia;ergo verumfuitesse similia;sed
hoc fuitdepositum;ergo depositumfuitverum;et dictumest quod
falsum.
Similis deductio est de deposito, si dicatur quod sit insolubile.
Tunc queritur:"aut fuitverumaut fuitfalsum?".
Si verum:ergo verumfuitA et B esse similia;ergo A et B fuerunt
similia;sed A fuitverum,quia verumfuitdepositumesse insolubile,
ut dictumest; ergo B fuitverum; ergo verum fuitSortem ponere
verum;ergo verumfuitPlatonemponere verum;ergo verumfuitA
et D esse similia; sed A fuitverum; ergo D fuitverum,non pro
prima parte; ergo pro hac "aliquid sequi ex eo esse simile C"; sed
aliquid sequi ex eo fuitverum; ergo C fuitverum; sed C fuitnon
A et B esse similia,quod est oppositumdepositi;ergo depositumfuit
falsum;et dictumest quod verum.
Similisdeductioest si dicaturquod falsum.293
[f 98v]
Si falsum:ergo falsumfuitA et B esse similia;ergo non fuerunt
similia;sed fueruntsimiliavel dissimilia;non similia;ergo dissimilia;
sed A fuitverum,quia verumfuitdepositumesse insolubile,ut dictum
est; ergo B fuitfalsum;ergo B non fuitverum; sed B fuitSortem
ponere verum; ergo falsumfuitSortem ponere verum; ergo Sortes
non posuit verum,et posuit aliquid; ergo falsum;sed Sortes posuit
Platonemponere verum; ergo falsumfuitPlatonemponere verum;
ergo Plato non posuit verum; sed posuit aliquid; ergo falsum;sed
PlatoposuitA et D esse similia;ergofalsumfuitA et D esse <similia>;
ergo A et D non fueruntsimilia;sed fueruntsimiliavel dissimilia;
non similia;ergo dissimilia;sed A fuitverum;ergo D fuitfalsum.294
Dicendum ad hoc quod non potestdeponi A etB essesimilia
; conet
vertitur
enim cum eo quod est:falsumdeponi
de
, sequitur deposito,
dicto quod sit falsum,quod sit verumet econversopresuppositis(P)295
manentibus.Quod patet,quia si dictumsit quod depositumsit solu-

291fuit]
nonadd.Pc.
292falsum]
P.
verum
293falsum]
circiter
10 litt,
inP.
lacuna
sequitur
294falsum]
lacuna
circiter
inP. Thelacunamust
havecontained
a deduc1,25lineae
sequitur
tionthatifD wasfalse,
thedepositum
wastrue,similar
to theonethatis found
above
11.13-17,
orat leasta reference
tosucha deduction.
295Cf.autem
, p. 67, 13:"precedentibus".
infra

18:46:47 PM

218

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

bile, A eritfalsum;ergo B falsum;ergo Sortemponere verumsit falsum; ergo et Platonem; ergo A et D esse similia erit falsum;ergo
cum A sit falsum,D eritverum,et non pro hac "Sortesest asinus";
ergo pro illa "aliquid sequi ex eo esse simileC"; ergo cum aliquid
5 sequi ex eo sit verum,C erit verum; ergo oppositumdepositierit
verum;ergo depositumeritfalsum.Similiter,si dictumsit quod falsum, sequeturquod verum.Sic ergo patet quod non potuitsustineri
illa depositio,quia ex ipsa sequunturduo contradictoria.
Alii aliterdicuntquod possibileest depositumet totumquod dici10 tur usque dum certificatur,
sed cum dicitur "ego certificote quod C
instans
fuit(?)
primopropositiet quod SortesposuitPlatonemponere
verum et Plato ponit A et D296 esse similia", non possunt(?)hec
recipi manentibusprecedentibus,quia idem est quod deponifalsum
, sive dicatur quod positum sit solubile sive insolubile,sive
deponi
15 verum sive falsum;et satis evidensest deductio.

20

25

30

35

Item. Potestqueri, cum principiahuius obligationissintsimiliaprincipiis falsepositionis,utrumsicut omne sequens ad positumin falsa
positioneest concedendum,ita sequens ad depositumin depositione
sit negandum.
Et videturquod sic, quia: si oppositumest causa oppositi,et propositumpropositi;sed positio et depositiosunt opposita,similiterconcedere et negare suntopposita;ergo si gratiapositiconcedendasunt
consequentia,gratia depositiconsequentiasunt neganda.
Ad hoc dicendum quod non omnimoda similitudoest interfalsam positionemet depositionem,sed sicut in positioneerat positum
concedendumet nihil negandumquod ex eo sequereturneque negandum erat ex quo sequereturpositi negatio, ita in depositione
curandumest, cum depositumsit ad negandum,
concedatur
ne[c]concedatur
depositum'
aliquidex cuiusconcessione
De
concessionevero consemaxime
antecedentia.
ad
pertinet
quod
quentium non multum curatur,quia non propter eorum concessione<m> oporteretconcedi antecedens depositum;et ita possent
Sciendum tarnenquod duplex est consequentia:
concedi impune.297
in
in eque se habentibus,et in talibusverum
terminis
est
quedam
est quod oporteretnegari298
consequensad depositumet antecedens
ad positum,<ut> si proponeretur"si est homo, est risibile";et est

296ponitA etD] con.A et D ponitP.

297impune]
P etsicsaepius.
impugne
298negari]
P.
con.exnegare

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219

consequentiain terminisexcedentibuset excessis,ut est "homo" et

"animal",et in talibusnegaripotestimpuneantecedenspositiet concedi consequensdepositi.
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Item. Quia diciturcommuniterquod multa principiadepositioniset

falsepositionissuntcommunia,potestdubitariutrumhoc sit verum.
Et videturquod non, quia: oppositorumoppositesunt cause; sed
positioet depositio<sunt opposita>; quod patet cum alterumsit ad
alterumad negandum;ergo manifestum
est quod non
affirmandum,
habere
eadem
possunt
principia.
Preterea.Quorum principiasunt communia,et ipsa in aliquo concum dicatAristotiles299
venant; sed contrariain nulloconveniunt,
quod
contrarietasest perfectadistantia;sed positio et depositiosunt contraria;ergoin nulloconveniunt;
ergonon habentcommuniaprincipia.
Ad hoc dicendumquod duobus modis possuntconsiderari.Vel in
relationead suum superius,genus eius, quod est obligatio,et sic,
sicuthominiset asini,inquantumcommuniuntin animali,multasunt
communia,sicutquod utrumquesitsubstantia,
quod utrumquecorpus,
quod utrumquesensibile,et ita de aliis,ita positioniset depositionis,
inquantumutraque est obligatio,nihil prohibetcommunia quedam
esse principia.Secundumvero quod in se considerantur,
sic utriusque
suntpropria(?)principia.
Communia sunt hec:
aut depositum
nonestnegandum
propter
positum
necessarium;
tampositum
quamdepositum
fiendasuntdepossibili;
33
post cccedat
tempusfatendaestreiVeritas;
ad utrique
estsecundum
sui qualitatem;
impertinens
respondendum
propter
possibilenullumimpossibile
concedendum;
de presenti
vel depositionis
est
positionis
pro tempore
utriusque
negandum
esse.
ipsum
Et regulesupradicteutriqueobligationiconveniunt.
Sed quia propriapositionissuprahabita[m] sunt,dicendumde propriis
depositionis.
Quorum primmest:
omnedepositum
subformadepositi
in tempore
est
propositum
depositionis
negandum.
Item: omneantecedens
ad depositum
et convertibile
cumilio estnegandum;
omneoppositum
et convertibile
cumilio estconcedendum;
depositi

299Cf.Metaph
V 10,1018a 25-29.

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220

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
cumillo(?)est
vel ex beneconcesso
omnesequensex opposito
depositi
concedum;
nonestcertificando,.
questioin tempore
depositionis
disciplinalis
De consequentiahabendum est, ut predictumest.300

10

15

20

25

30

Item. Dubitali contingitutrumnecessariumpossitdeponi.

Quod non videtur:habeturpro regula quod necessariumsequitur
ad quiclibet;ergo si necessariumfueritdepositum,illud depositum
sequeturad quiclibet;sed regulaest quod omne antecedensad depositumest negandum;ergo depositonecessarioquiclibetest negandum;
quod est inconveniens;ergo illud ex quo sequitur,scilicetnecessarium deponi.
Item.301Inconveniensest in eadem disputatone concedi et negari
idem; sed hoc acciditnecessariodeposito;ergo. Probatio:depositum
sequiturad quiclibet;ergo ad oppositumsuum; ergo si proponatur
oppositumdepositi,erit negandum;sed regula est quod in tempore
depositionisoppositumdepositiest concedendum,quia cuius oppositumest concedendum,ipsumest negandumet econverso;ergoidem
erit concedendumet negandum.
Item. Regula est quod propterpositionempossibilemaut depositionem non debet concedi impossibileneque negari necessarium;sed
si deponeretur,oporteretnegari; ergo non potestdeponi.
Contra:impossibileet necessariumsuntcontraria,positumet depositumsuntcontraria;sed impossibilepotestesse positum;ergo necessariumdepositum.
Quod concedimusde necessarioper accidens,sicutimpossibileper
accidenspotestponi, dicentesquod in hiis obligationibusattendende
sunttantummodoantecedentiaet consequentianaturalis,scilicetcum
consequens in antecedenticlauditur,et cum antecedenssine consequent! esse non potest,et cum consequensde necessitateest,si antecedens est; et ita non habebit(?)hic locum illa regula:"ex impossibili
quiclibet","necessarium<ad> quiclibetsequitur".
Item.Dubitali potestutrum,sicut,quolibetcontingenti
posito,probari
utrum
falsum
illi,302
quolibet303
compossibile
[f. 99] potestquodlibet
verum304
compossibileilli.
depositoprobaripossitquodlibet
contingenti

300Videsura
and52, 30-53,4.
, pp. 21,30ff
301Item]idemadd.P.
302Cf.supra,
p. 51, 19-35.
r.
nquantum(r)
quolibetj
304verum]
P.
con.exfalsum

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221

Et quod ita videturper hoc sophisma: in rei veritateSortes est

essealbumet teesseParisiusessedissimilici.
albus; deponaturSortem
Quo
deposito,proponatur"Sortesest albus". Hoc est antecedensdeposito;
ergonegandum.Quo negatoproponatur"tu es Parisius".Hoc sequitur
ex positoet bene negato,quia si Sortemesse album et te esse Parisius
sunt dissimilia,et Sortes non est albus vel falsumsit Sortem esse
album, tu es Parisius.Et sic patet propositum.

Item. Notandumpro regula quod

nonpotestdeponi.
quicquidnonpotest
poni, dus oppositum
10 Ut patetin talibusdisiunctis:deponaturSortem
nonessealbumvelSortem
essecolor
atum.Quo susceptoproponatur"Sortesnon est albus". Hoc est
antecedensad depositum;ergo negandum.Quo negato proponatur
"Sortesest coloratus".Hoc sequitur,quia si Sortesnon est albus vel
est coloratus,et non non est albus, est coloratus;ergo concedendum.
15 "Cedat tempus;concessisti
antecedensad depositum;ergomale", quia
"si
Sortes
est
coloratus,Sortesnon est albusvel est coloratus".
sequitur:
Dicendum quod nullumtale disiunctumpotestdeponi in quo discum affirmatione
sicuthoc
iungaturnegatioantecedentis
consequentis,
"non esse hominemvel esse animai",et hoc "non currerevel moveri
20 Sortem",sicutneque eorumoppositapossuntponi, ut di<s>iunctum
ex affirmato
antecedenticum negatoconsequenti,ut: "currereSortem
vel non moveri Sortem", quia idem est quod ponere antecedens
verumet consequensfalsum;quod est impossibile.
Et hoc ad presensde depositionesufficiat.305

305sufficiat]
DICTO DE DEPOSITIONEDICENDUM EST DE DUBITATIONE
add.P.

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H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
<DE DUBITATIONE>

est,306omnis status disputationisest

Quoniam, ut presignificatum
statim
cum auditurenuntiatio,vel accipitur
triplexquoad nos, quia
a nobis ut vera vel ut falsa aut neutromodo, secundumquod circa
5 illam contingitdubitare,proptereaenuntiationitriplexcongruitresponsio. Quia vere vel creditevere,tamquam cui consentitur,
respondetur"verumest"; falsevel creditefalse,tamquama qua dissentitur,
"falsumest";dubitatevero,cui neutromodo nos habemus,
respondetur
tur
responde "proba". Cum igiturcuiuslibetdisputationisexercitium
10 interopponentemet respondentemattendamus307
quid utriqueconveniat,proptereacum obligatoriadisputadoad exercitiumfiatsecundum hos tresmodos se habendi circa enuntiationem
opponentemet
dividi
tur
in
tres
respondentem,
obligatioprimo
speciales partes: in
tionem
et
dubitationem.
Prosecu
tisigitureis que ad
positionem,deposi
15 positionemet depositionempertinent,consequensest de dubitatione
et de suis pertinentiis
prosequi.
Notandumigiturquid dubitatio,et quid dubitare,et quot et quibus
modisfiatdubitatio,
et regulaset sophismataad hanc artempertinentia.
Sciendumigiturquod "dubitare"duobusmodissumitur.Primo,secun20 dum quod estprivadocognitionis
vel notitie vel apprehensionis
rerum
vel causarumin esse speciali cum suppositionegeneralisnotitie. Que
privadocausatura duobus:vel propternullamaut minimamcausarum
scientificarum308
vel propterrationumutrimqueconapprehensionem,
multitudinem.
De qua ultimahabeturin libro Predicamentingentium
25 torum
:309"dubitarede singulisnon est inutile",idest: conari invenire
ad utramquepartemcontradictionis
radones dubitarefacientes.Sed
sic non sumiturhie dubitatio.Diciturautemdubitatio
alio modo,prout
hic sumitur:positio alicuius enuntiabilisper quam obligaturaliquis
ut de veritatevel falsitateeius dubitetur.Et dubitare
est enuntiabile
30 aliquod accipere tamquam dubitatum,scilicetad quod neutromodo
sit respondendum,scilicet"verumest" vel "falsumest", sed "proba".
Unde cum dicitur"dubitetur
te concedere",sensusest:ad hocenuntiabile
tehabeasita quodnecproveronecprofalso ipsumaccipias,sedprodubitato.

306Videsupra,
, p. 20,23-28.
307attendamus]
attendendo
P.
scientihcaruml
ancorrigendum
inscientmcamr
309
7, 8 b 23-24(Auct.
Categ.
31,30).

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223

Sciendumigiturquod omnesreguleque in falsapositioneet depositione

locum habuerunt,hie locum habent et etiam quedam proprie ad
earum hic accipiuntur.
similitudinem
affectus
Et sicutper hoc verbum"ponatur"exprimitur
<op>ponentis
5 et posituminstituitur,
et per hoc verbum"deponatur"depositum,ita
hic per hoc verbum "dubitetur"exprimituraffectusopponentiset
dubitatum.Et per hanc orationem"sit ita" in omnibus
instituitur
consensusrespondentis.
exprimitur
Item. Observandumest tempusdubitationissicuttempuspositionis
10 et depositionis.Et sicutper hanc orationem"cedat tempus"receditur
a temporepositionisvel depositionis,ita per eandem hic a tempore
dubitationis.
Item. Sicut positumponiturad concedendumet ei respondetur
"verumest", et depositumad negandumet ei respondetur"falsum
15 est", ita dubitatumad dubitandumet ei respondetur"proba".
Item. Sicut positio de falso contingentiet depositiode310vero311
contingenti
possibili,ita dubitatiode possibiliest fienda.

20

25

30

35

Hoc habito videndumest de regulis.Et primo de generalibus.

Quarum una est hec:
falnonpotest
sicutinfalsa positione
ponifalsumponi necin depositione
dubitari.
falsum
dubitari
sum deponi, ita necin dubitatone
potest
Quo susceptodicatur"cedat
falsumdubitari.
Quod patetsic: dubitetur
verum aut fuitfalsum?";
fuit
aut
"dubitatum
et
queratur
tempus",
et patentdeductiones,si dicaturquod sit verum,quod erit312
falsum,
et econverso.
Item. Aliud est principiumquod
et omneconvertibile
subformapositipropositum
sicutin positione
positum
cumsuo
est
et
suum
concedendum
cumilio in tempore
oppositum
positionis
sub
in
et
sicut
convertibili
depositione
depositum formadepositi
negandum,
cumsuo conet suumoppositum
cumsuo convertibili
negandum
propositum
subformadubitati
ad dubitatum
concedendum
vertibili
, ita in dubitatione
dubitati
cumsuo
ad
et
ad
suum
convertibile
et
preterea oppositum
propositum
est
convertibili
respondendum"proba".
essealbum
, et posteaproponatur"Sortes
Quod patet:si dubiteturSortem
est albus" vel "Sortesest Candidus",respondendumest "proba". Quia

310del velP.
311vero]velfalsoadd.P, sedcf.supra,
p. 55, 15-18.
312erit]corr.
exsitPe.

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224

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

si diceretur "verum est" vel si diceretur"falsumest", dieto "cedat

tempus" opponeretur:"ad dubitatumsub forma [f 99v] dubitati
propositumrespondisti"verum est" vel "falsumest", cum deberes
dubitare;ergo male". Item si proponatureodem dubitato"Sortesest
5 niger",et respondeatur"verum est", tunc sequeretur"ergo Sortem
esse album est falsum",et dicto "cedat tempus" diceretur"negasti
dubitatumin temporedubitationis;ergo male". Similiter,si ad idem
diceretur"falsum est", opponeretur"ergo Sortem esse album est
verum",et dicto "cedat tempus":"concessistidubitatumin tempore
10 dubitationis;ergo male".
Sic ergo patent regule supra dicte.

15

20

25

30

35

Item. De regulis antecessioniset consecutionissecus est quam in

precedentibusobligationibus.
Quia dicuntquod sicut dubitatumin temporedubitationisdebet
dubitari,ita antecedentiaet consequentiaad dubitatum,si proponantur,debent dubitarivel respondendumest ad ea "proba", sicut
ad dubitatum.
Sed contra: dubitato Cesarem
essecoloratum
, si proponatur"Cesar
est albus", et dicatur"falsumest", nichilinconvenientis
accidit,quia
non sequitur"si Cesar non est albus, Cesar est coloratus",neque
"Cesar non est coloratus".Ergo patet quod negaripotestantecedens
ad dubitatumimpune nec propterhoc oportetdubitariaut concedi
dubitatum.
Item. Dubitato Sortem
essealbum
, si proponatur"Sortesest coloratus",
concedi potest impune, quia ad eius concessionem non sequitur
Sortem esse album neque Sortem non esse album.
Proptereaergo dicendumquod
ad omneantecedens
ad dubitatum
est "falsum"
vel "proba"et
respondendum
nunquam<everum3'
quia, antecedenti ad dubitatum concesso, necesse esset concedi
dubitatum.
Item.
Ad omneconsequens
ad dubitatum
"verum
est" vel "proba"
potestresponden
et nunquam"falsum
est",
quia, negatoconsequent!ad dubitatum,necesseessetdubitatum
negari.
Et si velimusscirequid anteceditet quid sequituret quando, utamur artificioin precedentiobligationedeterminato:313
quod ordinetur
dubitatumcum eo de quo dubitaturutrumantecedataut sequatur,

313Videsupra
, p. 59, 13-19.

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225

in conditione,et si dubitatumsequaturad illud consequentianaturali,

sic illuderatantecedens,si autemantecedat,sic illuderat consequens.
Ut si dubiteturCesar
em essecolor
atumet conditionetur"si Cesar est
albus, Cesar est coloratus","si Cesar est coloratus,Cesar est qualis",
5 hee condtiones sunt naturales.Unde manifestumest quod Cesarem
essealbumest antecedensad dubitatum,et Cesarem
essequalemest conad
idem.
sequens
Item.
Ad omneimpertinens
dubitato
estsecundum
sui qualitatem.
respondendum
10 Et vocaturimpertinens
: quod neque anteceditneque consequiturneque
cum dubitatoneque est oppositumei neque convertibile
convertitur
cum opposito;quod facileest considerare.

15

20

25

30

35

Ad quorum evidentiamquerendum est de hoc sophismate:in rei

veritateSortesest albus, et peto quod Marcus sit nomen concedentis
essealbum
, B appellarci:
primopropositumet <A> appellaret:Sortem
hocnomen"Marcus"'dubiteturA etB essesimilia.Hoc
tefuissehabiturum
enimestdubitabile,
quia eo* propositoresponso"proba"et dicto"cedat
tempus"nullumaccidit inconveniens;dubiteturergo. Quo suscepto
proponatur"Sortesest albus". Hoc est verum,quod scis esse verum,
dubitato,quod neque anteceditneque consequiturneque
impertinens
convertitur;
quod patet;ergo concedendum.Concesso dicatur"cedat
tempus, concessistiantecedens ad dubitatumin tempore dubitationis;ergo male". Probatio:tu concessistiprimopropositum,scilicet
Sortemesse album; ergo B fuitnecessarium,quia erat verumet non
poterai non esse verum hoc concesso, quia B fuit te habiturum
hoc nomen "Marcus" et Marcus erat nomen concedentis primo
propositum;ergo B fuitnecessarium;sed necessariumsequiturad
quiclibet; ergo ad hoc quod est "Sortes est albus"; sed Sortem
esse album fuitverum;ergo sequebatur"si Sortes est albus, A et B
sunt similia". Sic ergo patet quod Sortem esse album anteceditad
dubitatum.314
Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod observatisrei veritate,petitioneet
et susceptodubitatonon poteratconcedi Sortemesse
appellationibus,
album, cum sit antecedens,ut probatumest.
Vel dicendumest melius quod possit concedi, et cum opponitur
quod B est necessarium,dicendumquod hoc non est verumnisi per
accidenset reguleantecedentieet consequentieque hic attenduntur,

* eo] ei P.
314dubitatum]
add.Pc.

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226

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
non accipiuntur<nisi> secundumaccidens.Unde ille due regule"ex
impossibiliquiclibet"et "necessariumad quiclibet"non habent hic
locum,nisi secundumquod naturaliteranteceduntaut consequuntur.

10

15

20

25

30

Item. Gratia dictorumqueriturde hoc sophismate:<A> appellaret

a me, B appeloppositumconsequentisprimeconditionalisprolate315
et sitquedam conditional
laret:tenonposserespndete
adprimo
proposition,
A etB essesimilia
"si nichildubitatur,nichilest dubitatum";dubitetur
,
est
eo
enim
dieto
"cedat
non
dubitato
et
dubitabile,
tempus"
quia
acciditinconvenienset ad ipsum potestresponden"proba" impune;
dubiteturergo. Quo susceptoproponatur"tu es asinus". Quicquid
dicat,dicatur"cedat tempus",et queratur"dubitatumaut fuitverum
aut fuitfalsum?".
Si verum:ergo verumfuitA et B esse similia;ergoverumfuitoppositum consequentisprime conditionalisprolate a me et te non posse
responderead primopropositumesse similia;sed falsumfuitte non
posse responderead primo propositum;ergo B fuitfalsum;ergo A
fuitfalsum;sed A fuitoppositumconsequentisprime conditionalis
prolate a me; ergo oppositum consequentis316
prime conditionalis
a
me
fuit
fuit
nichil
sed
esse dubitatum;
falsum;
prolate
consequens
falsum
fuit
esse
nichil
fuitdubitatum;
dubitatum;ergo
ergo
aliquid
dubitatum
non
fuit
et
dictum
est
verum;
ergo
quod verum.
Si falsum:ergo falsumfuitA et B esse similia; ergo non fuerunt
similia;ergo fueruntdissimilia;sed B fuitfalsum,quia te non posse
responderead primo propositumfuitfalsum; ergo A fuitverum;
ergo oppositumconsequentisprime conditionalisprolate a me fuit
verum;sed hoc fuitaliquid esse dubitatum;ergo verumfuitaliquid
esse dubitatum;sed esse et esse verumconvertuntur;
ergo verumfuit
et
dictum
est
falsum.
dubitatum;
quod
Ad hoc diciturquod hoc "A et B esse similia" convertitur
cum
eo quod est "falsumdubitali";et proptereanon potestdubitari.Unde
cum dicitur"dubiteturA et B esse similia",debet dici "non potest
cum eo quod est "falsumdubitari"";quod
dubitari,quia convertitur
deductiones.
[f 100].
patet per

et in hac daturpro regula

Item. Sicut in precedentibusobligationibus
35 quod
nonpossitterminali
questio.
disciplinalis
315prolate]
l. 14ff.proferente
excollatione
P.
3,6consequentis]
add.Pc.

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10

15

20

25

227

Item. Quod
omnesresponsiones3il
suntad ideminstans
;
retorquende
et sumatur"instans"ut prius.318
Item. Quia dictumerat319
quod dubitatoaliquo enuntiabili,si proponeretursuumoppositum,<non>320deberetnegariet respondendum
> sed videtur quod hoc sit falsumet
est ad ipsum "proba"; <
scito
quod
aliquo oppositopossitdubitarisuum cooppositumet econverso. Quod patet in contrariis:scis enim an Maurus sit albus, quia
seis ipsum non esse album, dubitastarnenan sit niger,quia dubitas
an sit. Ergo patet quod uno oppositorumdubitatonon propterhoc
oportetrelicumdubitarinec altero scito debet alterumsciri.
Idem videturde privativis,
quia <si> noverisMarcum ab heri et
sciverisipsum esse cecum, hec est vera "scis an Marcus sit videns",
quia scis non esse videntem,dubitastamen an sit cecus, quia dubitas
an sit. Et ita manifestumest de privativisquod altero scito non
propterhoc oportetalterumscirinec dubitatodubitari.
Idem videturde relativiset contradictoriis.
Quod patet intuenti.
Sed contra:sicutse habet scientiaad scibile,ita dubitatioad dubiAristotilesin libro Predicamentorum
tabile; sed dicit321
quod qui novit
unum oppositorum,novitrelicum;ergo qui dubitai de uno, dubitat
de reliquo.
Item. In libro Topicorum
:322"qui bene diffiniunt,
contrariaconsignificant": nonnisiquia in cognoscendounum est cognoscererelicum.
Item. In libro Predicamentorum
:323"relativasunt simul natura".
Ad hoc dicendum quod in oppositis relative et contradictoriis
non potestunum cognosci et alterumdubitari,in contrariisautem
et privativisnichilprohibet.
Et hoc de dubitationead presenssufficiat.324

317responsionesl
P.
condi
tiones
3,8Videsura,
p. 26, 15-28.
3,9Videsupra,
p. 72,32-33.
320non]supplevi
excollatione
p. 73,6-9.
321Catee.7, 8 a 35-37(cf.Auel31,28).
322Topica
VI 2, 140a 19-20.
323Categ.
7, 7 b 15.
324sufficiat]
DICTO <DE> DUBITATIONEDICENDUM EST DE PETITIONE
add.P

18:46:47 PM

228

H.A.G.BRAAKHUIS
<DE PETITIONE>

Quoniam inter cetera verba <et> nomina obligationideservientia

sumiturhoc verbum "peto" et hoc nomen "petitio",proptereade
obligationeque petitiodicitur,in hac parte videtur.Et convenienter
5 post precedentia,quia omnis obligatioprecedensfiebatabstrahendo
ab omnipersona,et ideo per verba impersonaliafiebant,ut "ponatur"
vel "deponatur"vel "dubitetur",hec autempersonamdiscerni
t; unde
non dicitur"petatur"sed "peto".
Sciendum igiturquid petitio,et utrumdiffrt
a positione,et de
10 quo sit petitm,et quomodo fiat,et que petitionessintrecipiendeet
que non, et de reguliset sophismatibuscirca hanc obligationem.

15

20

25

30

35

Petitioigiturest: conventio(?)qua obligaturaliquis ad se habendum

ut petitur,vel ad faciendumquod petitur,cum iam traducaest in
esse actuali, quia sic accipiturhie ut, si petaturquod tu concedas
Sortemesse asinum,si proponatur"Sortesest asinus",debetconcedi.
Sed tunc videturquod nichildiffrt
a positione,quia: positioest
ut concedaturpositum,similiter
petitioobligatut concedaturpositum;
non
videntur
differre.
ergo
Dicendum quod immo, quia positio non est nisi de concessione
ita se habendi ut, si ponatur te concedere
Sortem
esseasinumet proponatur"Sortes est asinus", debet negari,quia non est positum,sed si
proponatur"tu concedis Sortem esse asinum", debet concedi, quia
hoc est positum. Sed petitio est ad faciendumquod petitur,ut si
petatur"peto quod tu concedis te esse asinum" et proponatur"tu
es asinus",recepta [pejpetitionedebet concedi, quia est petitm.Et
sic patet differentia,
quia alio modo est positio ad concedendumet
alio petitio.
Sed contra:nulla obligatioobligatad impossibile;sed te esse asinum est impossibile;ergo petitionon obligabitad hoc.
Dicendum quod aliud est te esse asinum,ad quod non est obligacum hoc sitimpossibile,
et aliud est te contio,scilicetut sis325
asinus,326
cederete esse asinum,quod estpossibilead quod obligatpetitio.Unde
petitioobligat ad concessionemdicti simplicis,positio vero obligat
ad dictumcompositum.Unde positumnon potest <esse> te327esse
asinum
te esse
, licet sit petitm,sed positum potest esse te concedere
asinum.

325 sitP.
326sis]
asinus!quodestimpossibile
add.necnondel.P.
327te]add.Pc.

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229

Fit autem petitioper hoc verbum"peto" sub discretionepersone

petentis,ut loquentisde se dicendo "peto", cum verbo concessionis
ut: "peto te concedereSortemcurrere",
vel negationisvel dubitationis,
vel "te negare Sortem esse hominem",vel "dubitare an celum sit
5 rotundum";et fitcum consensu respondentisdicendo "sit ita", vel
"deturquod petis" vel "do".
Item. Fit petitio de dicto quocumque, vel impossibilivel necesvero vel falso,quia propterhoc nulla differentia
sario vel contingenti
intersit.
10 Hoc viso videndum est que petitiones sunt recipiende328et que
non. Sciendum ergo quod petitio cuius subiectumest verum aut
vel aliquid
falsumpossibilenon implicansaliquam contradictionem
in
et
ad
inconvenientis
temporepetitionispotest responden
quam
"verumest", si proponaturgratiapetitionis,susceptibilisest.
15
Et propterhoc,
non
ac si essetcertus,
utrespondeat
ad incertum
sifiatobligatio
respondentem
.
potestrecipi
Ut si dicatur"peto quod tu respondeasac si sciresastra esse paria".
"Si potest hoc recipi, recipiatur";hoc dicitur,quia videturposse
20 recipl. Hac recepta proponatur"astra sunt paria". Si respondeas
"verumest": contra:si sciresan astrasintparia, fortassis
responderes
"falsumest"; ergo cum per petitionemdebeas respondereac si scires,
male respondes"verum est". Si respondeas"falsumest": contra: si
sciresan astra sintparia, fortassisresponderes"verumest"; et debes
25 respondereac si scires;ergo male respondes"falsumest". Si respondeas "proba": contra: tu respondes"proba"; ergo dubitas; sed per
debes respondereac si sciresan astra sintparia; <ergo
petitionem329
per petitionem>responderes"verumest" aut "falsumest"; ergo male
respondes.
30
Dicendum quod hec petitio nec alia similis debet recipi, quia
obligatresponderead nescitasicutad scita; quod vix aut numquam
sine inconvenienti
potestesse.
Simileest hic "peto quod male respondeasquicquid dicas". Contra:
"aut bene aut male respondes?".Si male: ergo facis quod petitm
35 est, quia petitioest te male respondere,et ita respondes;ergo bene
respondes.Si dicas "bene": sed petitmest quod male respondeas;
328recipiende]
P.
con.exaccipiende
329petitionem]
add.P.
ergoperpetitionem

18:46:47 PM

230

10

15

20

25

30

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
et non respondeseo modo quo est petitm;ergo male respondes.Si
respondeas"proba": contra:tu respondes"proba"; ergo dubitas;sed
non dubitares;si non dubitares,non male responsi bene responderes,
100v
deres; [f
] ergo cum petitmsit te male respondereet non ita
responde<a>s, male respondes;sed hoc seis; ergo male respondes
"proba".
Dicendum quod petitio<ni> sue non est acquiescendum, quia
implicai sui ipsius interemptionem.
Simile est hic "peto quod <non> acquiescis petitioni".Possibile
est,quia potestrecipi;recipiatur.Qua receptadicatur"aut acquiescis
petitionimee aut non?". Si sic: sed petitioest quod tu non acquiescas
petitionimee; ergo non acquiescis petitionimee; et dixistiquod
acquiescis. Si non: sed petitiomea est quod non acquiescas petitioni
mee; ergo satisfacispetitionimee; ergo acquiescis petitionimee; et
dictumest quod non.
Ad hoc dicendumquod nec illa petitioest accipienda,quia idem
est330
si acquiescas, <quod> non acquiescas, et econverso.
Idem est hic: petat Sortesa Platone quod non acquiescatpetitioni
Ciceroniset331
Cicero petata Platonequod acquiescatpetitioniSortis.
Inde sic: Plato aut acquiescitpetitioniSortisaut non acquiescit?Si
acquiescit: et Sortes petit quod non acquiescat petitionisCiceronis;
ergo Plato non adquiescit petitioni Ciceronis; sed Cicero petit
quod332acquiescat petitioniSortis; ergo Plato non acquiescit petitioniSortis.Sed si non acquiescitpetitioniSortis:aut adquiescitpetitioniCiceronisaut non? Si acquiescit:et Cicero petitquod acquiescat
petitioniSortis;ergo acquiescitpetitioniSortis.Si vero non acquiescit petitioniCiceronis:et hoc petitSortes;ergo Plato acquiescitpetitionisSortis.Si dicas333"proba": aut adquiescit334
aut non? vel, sicut
tu male respondesad quiclibetsive ad disiunctionem.
superius,335
Dicendum est ergo quod talis petitio non est recipienda. Cum
enim Sortes petat a Platone quod non acquiescat petitioniCiceroni

330est]quodadd.P.
331et]
Platopetata Cicerone
Sortiset Ciceroa Sorte
quodnonacquiescat
petitioni
Platonis.
Tuncqueritur:
aut Sortesacquiescit
quod nonacquiescat
petitioni
petitioni
Ciceronis
autnonCiceroadd.necnonexp.P.
332quod]nonadd.P.
333dicas]dicatP.
334acquiescit]
P.
acquiescis
335Cf.supra
, p. 78,34ff.

18:46:47 PM

IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
OBLIGATIONS
CENTURY
PARIS

10

15

20

25

30

231

et Cicero petat336
quod acquiescat petitioniSortis,idem petitSortes
ac si peteretquod acquiesceretpetitionisue.
Item. Rei Veritasest quod Sortesest niger,sed peto quod respondeas ac si scires Sortem esse album esse tibi propositum.Si potest
dicere
Inde "cedattempuspositionis".
Quod debeas337
recipi,recipiatur.
"concedo" probatursic. Quia: si sciresSortem esse album esse tibi
propositumet tibi diceretur "cedat tempuspositionis",responderes
"concedo"; sed debes respondereac si sciresSortemesse album esse
tibi <pro>positum, et tibi dicitur"cedat tempus positionis";ergo
debes respondere"concedo". Et si hoc dicatur,<pro>ponatur hec
postea "Sortes est albus". Si concedisi contra: si scires Sortem esse
album esse tibi <pro>positum et tibi dictum esset "cedat tempus
tibiSortemesse album,responderes
positionis"et posteaproponeretur
secundumveritatem"ego concedo"; sed debuistirespondereac si
sciresSortemesse album esse tibi<pro>positum,et dictumest "cedat
<et pro>positumestSortemesse album;ergodebes
tempuspositionis",
concedere ipsum secundum qualitatem; ergo debes negare, cum
contra: aut manet petitioaut non manet? Si
sit falsum.Si neges:338
manet: ergo debes respondereac si scires Sortem esse album esse
tibi<pro>positum; et tibipropositum<est> Sortemesse album;ergo
debes concedere;negas ergo male. Si vero non manetpetitio:contra:
per hanc vocem "cedat tempus positionis"non cadit petitio; erat
autem positum,ergo adhuc manet; negas ergo male.
Solutio:recipiendaestpetitio.Sed ad hoc "cedat tempuspositionis"
respondendumest "nugaris",nichil enim positumest. Et non valet
hec argumentado"si sciresSortemesse album esse tibi<pro>positum
et tibi diceretur"cedat tempuspositionis",responderes"concedo";
sed debes respondereac si scires;ergo debes respondere"concedo",339
eo modo nisicirca
talisnonobligatad respondendum
quoniampetitio340
essealbumet consequentiaad ipsum, et repugnantianegares.
Sortem

33b
petitP.
337petat]
P.
debeat(?)
debeas]
338neges]neget
P.
339Cf.supra.
11.6-8.
340petitio]
P.
positio

18:46:47 PM

232

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS
Sicut si fiat petitio quod341tu respondeas secundum positionem342
Zenonis, qui posuit nichil moveri, <concederes nichil moveri> et
sequentia,et negares repugnantia.Sed si proponaturtibi "tu concedis nichilmoverisecundumopinionemtuam",non concedereshoc,
quamvis Zeno concederei.343

341quod]etP.
342
P.
petitionem
343positionem]
DICTO DE PETITIONEDICENDUMEST DE SIT VERUMadd.P
concederet]

18:46:47 PM

OBLIGATIONS
IN EARLYTHIRTEENTH
CENTURY
PARIS

233

<DE "SIT VERUM" >

10

15

20

25

30

Videnturautem multe rei veritatesesse que sustinendenon sunt.

Unde soletdici quod hec non est sustinenda:"rei Veritasest quod
solus Sortes seit regem esse Parisius". Si enim sustineatur,
sequitur
contradictio.Si enim scis quod solus Sortes seit regemesse Parisius,
seis quod Sortes seit regemesse Parisius;sed scis quod Sortesnichil
seit nisi verum;ergo scis quod regemesse Parisiusest verum,et ita
scis regemesse Parisius;ergo non solus Sortes seit. Et propterhoc
solet dici quod talis rei Veritasnon est recipienda.
Tamen sciendumquod hec argumentadonon valet"tu scishoc esse
verum;ergo scis hoc". Scis enimprimampropositionem
geometricam
esse veram,et tamennon scis illam. Est enimVeritasequalitaspropositions et rei; tunc dicimuspropositionemesse veram, quando nec
plus nec minus significaiquam sit in re. Unde propositionemesse
veramestpropositionem
esse equalem rei.Sicutergonon valet hec argumentado"tu scis quantitatemhuius linee esse equalem quantitati
illiuslinee; ergo scis quantitatemhuius linee", similiternon valet "tu
scishancpropositionem
esse veram;ergotu scishanc propositionem".
Similiterhec rei Veritasnon est recipienda"rei Veritasest Sortera
essealbumet tenescire
Sortem
esse<album> esse similia".Si enim potest
Inde
sic:
"aut
tu scis Sortemesse album aut non?".
recipi,recipiatur.
Si scis: ergo Sortem esse album est verum; sed te nescire Sortem
esse album est344
simileilli; [f 101] ergo verumest te nescireSortem
esse album. Vel sic: aut tu scis Sortemesse album <aut non scis>.345
Si scis: et te nescireSortemesse album est346
simileilli; ergo scis te
> estverum;et scisquod verumest;
nescireSortemesse album <
ergoscis te nescireSortemesse album,et scis Sortemesse album esse
simileilli; ergo scis Sortemesse album; et dictumerat quod non scis.
Et propterhoc dicimusquod ilia rei Veritasnon est recipienda,quoniam <si> scis ilia duo esse similia,scis ilia esse vera aut scis ilia esse
falsa;sed non scisilla esse falsa,quoniam non possuntesse falsasimul,
quoniam si Sortemesse album est falsum,et te nescireSortemesse
> est verum;ergo scis ilia esse vera; et sic scis Sortem
album <
esse album et non scis Sortemesse album; quod est impossibile.347

344est]esseP.
345autnon
1 litt)scisser.sedexp.P.
aut(+ lacuna
346est]essescis]
P.
347impossibile]
EXPLICIUNTadd.P; EXPLICIUNTINSOLUBILIAAMENEXPLICIUNTINSOLUBILIAadd.aliaemanus
sedperperam.

18:46:47 PM

:
Ethik
BuridansKommentare
zurNikomachischen
Literalkommentare
Drei unechte

CHRISTOPH FLELER

Das erfolgreichste
Werk von JohannesBuridan waren seine Quaestionen
zur Nikomachischen
Ethik.1Der umfangreiche
Kommentaristin mindestens
und wurde viermalgedruckt.2Nur wenige
93 Handschriftenberliefert
haben eine vergleichbare
Aristoteleskommentare
mittelalterliche
Verbreitung
um
Diese
uns
vielleicht
so
erstaunlicher
Tatsache
erscheinen,
mag
erlangt.
da BuridandiesenKommentarnichtvollendenkonnte.Wir wissennmlich,
von der folgenden
da er die 5. Frage des 10. Buches noch diskutierte,
und kurz danach starb.3Doch
dann allein die Frage formulierte
Qustio
im Mittelalterkaum die
Unvollendetes beeintrchtigteoffensichtlich
so
eines
Werkes
und
wurde
Buridans
Moralphilosophiebis
Verbreitung
ins 16. Jahrhundert
besondersfleissigrezipiert.
Die meisten,wenn nicht alle Kommentare von Johannes Buridan,
scheinen in der Schule entstandenzu sein.4Auch die Quaestionenzur
NikomachischenEthikdrftenan der PariserUniversittgelesenund als
wordenzu sein.Jedenfalls
Reportationenvon einem Schlerfestgehalten
1 Vgl.B. Michael,
Werken
undzurRezeption
Buridanus.
Studien
Leben
zuseinem
, seinen
Johannes
imEuropa
Mittelalters
seiner
Theorien
desspten
, Diss.Berlin1985,829-88.Einenwichtigen
Leser
in:Buridans
zu seinem
fundamentalen
, ihre
Werk,
Schriften
moralphilosophische
Nachtrag
Theorie
im14.
imspten
Mittelalter
Das Publikum
undBenutzer
, in:J. Miethke
politischer
(hrg.),
zumHandschriftenundKorrekturen
1992,139-51(Ergnzungen
, Mnchen
Jahrhundert
nochzwei
knnen
n. 16).Zu den91 Codices,
dieMichael
verzeichnis,
142-3,
katalogisiert,
hat.(Basel,UB,
CharlesLohrin Baselentdeckt
die neulich
werden,
ergnzt
Fragmente
Aristotelica
Helvetica
F.VI.25,f.lvundBasel,UB,A.X.44,f.12v,
beschrieben
bei:Ch.Lohr,
,
Freiburg
i. Ue. 1994).
2 Die Qustiones
decern
libros
Ethicorum
sindauchin einemNeudruck
zugnglich:
super
Frankfurt
a. M.1968).
DruckvonParis1513(Reprint:
3 Cf.Erfurt,
morte
WAB,CA F.296,f.316v:"Noncreditur
preventus,
plusscripsisse
inpace,amen."oderStuttgart,
cuiusanimarequiescat
LB,cod.HB X
Wrttembergische
recessum
Biridano
nonestdeterminata
17,f.318va:"Etillaa venerabili
propter
magistro
in paceet estfinis
animesu a corpore
ut reficitur
quaesquae animasua requiescat
. . .," vgl.auchMichael1985{op.cit FN 1),831-63,
tionum
872,n. 31.
4 Vgl.auchmeineArbeit:
From
to Written
Commentaries
OralLecture
, in: S. Ebbesen&
PhilosofMedieval
School
"TheCopenhagen
R. Friedman
(eds.),ActsoftheSymposium
1998(imDruck).
ophy",
Copenhagen
Vivarium
36,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1998
Koninklijke

18:46:55 PM

KOMMENTARE
ETHIK
BURIDANS
ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN

235

die darauf hindeuten,da es

besitzenwir bisher keine Anhaltspunkte,
Wenn der Ethikkommentar
haben sollte.5
sichbei der Ethikandersverhalten
im universitrenSchulbetriebentstandenist, dann knnte neben dem
berliefert
auch ein Literalkommentar
Kommentarin Quaestionenform
sondern
Werk wurde nicht nur diskutiert,
sein, denn ein Aristotelisches
vorerstSatz frSatz (wenn auch nichtimmerWort frWort) ausgelegt.
Tatschlich findenwir in den Verzeichnissenvon Lohr und Michael6
nichtnur den Hinweis auf einen einzigen,sonderngleich auf drei verzur NikomachischenEthik, die Johannes
schiedene Literalkommentare
Buridan als Verfasserangeben. Da neben den Quaestionenauch ein
erhaltenist,wre in der Tat nichtsauergewhnliches.
Literalkommentar
Von den meisten AristotelischenWerken, die Buridan kommentierte,
Seine Expositiones
besitzenwir neben den Quaestionenauch eine Expositio.7
wesentlichschmalerim Umfang und sind fr
waren wenigerverbreitet,
besaen sie aber
Im PariserUnterricht
seinePhilosophiegewizweitrangig.
in
ltesten
den
und
durchauseine gleichwertige
Handschriften,
Stellung
die noch zu Lebzeitendes PikardischenMeistergeschriebenwurden,sind
wie die Quaestionen.8
diese ebenso starkvertreten
Allerdingsstelltsich die
Ethik tatschlich
zur
Aristotelischen
Literalkommentare
ob
diese
Frage,
vom berhmtenPariserMagisterstammen.
kann einer von ihnen gleich zu
Von diesen drei Literalkommentaren
X librorum
Es
sichum ein Compendium
handelt
werden.
Beginnausgeschieden
s Freilich
In
was"edite"bedeutet.
in diesemZusammenhang
mte
werden,
geprft
da
undKolophonen
wirdin denberschriften
13 Handschriften
mindestens
vermerkt,
PrAndere
Iohanne
a magistro
zurEthik"edierte"
dieQuaestionen
Buridan
buridan).
{edite
kommen
oderLiteraturgattung
diedie Herstellung,
betreffen,
berarbeitung
zisierungen,
aufihren
sicherlich
wirddieseHinweise
Edition
vor.Einekritische
nurvereinzelt
sorgfltig
derSchrift
zu prfen
haben.Bisdahinkannberdie Redaktionsform
Informationswert
einesKommentars
DassdieEntstehung
werden.
keine
komplexer
gemacht
Aussage
przise
wirdauchvonStenEbbesenundIrne
als bisher
zu seinscheint
wurde,
angenommen
Rhetorikkommentars
vonBuridans
anhanddes "Entwurfes"
Rosier-Catach
vgl.
gezeigt;
in:O. Weijers
et L. Holtz
la Facult
desartsi
Le trivium
et I. Rosier-Catach,
S. Ebbesen
xiiie-xve
sicles
etOxford,
desarts(Paris
la Facult
desdisciplines
). Actesdu
(edd.),
L'enseignement
desides
"la circulation
Turnhout
1997,97-128(vorallem,114-22:
international,
colloque
desarts").
dansla Facults
6 Vgl.FN 1 und11.
7 Indenberschriften
werden
dieLiteralkommentare
derHandschriften
undKolophonen
oderDictagenannt.
meistens
Buridans
Expositio)
(oderauchim Singular:
Expositiones
vor.
Diesemehrheitliche
nur
vereinzelt
kommen
Lectura
wie
Commentum
oder
Bezeichnungen
die Gattungsbezeichnung
Literalkommentare
Terminologie
legtes nahe,frBuridans
desTextes)
zu verwenden.
sichaufdiemndliche
bezieht
Expositio
(Dicta
berlieferung
H
FN 4).
1998(op.cit.y
Vgl.Fleler

18:46:55 PM

236

FLELER
CHRISTOPH

Ethicorum
eine Kopie der SummaAlexandrinorum
ist.10
,9 das in Wirklichkeit
Bernd Michael hat deshalb zu Recht dieses Compendium
aus der Liste der
BuridanischenWerke eliminiert.In Michael's Verzeichniswerden somit
11
zwei Literalkommentare
eine Sententia
libros
Ethicorum
angefhrt:
superdecern
und ein Fragmenteines Literalkommentars.12
Diese beiden Kommentare
sollenim Folgendengenauer untersucht
werden.Dabei soll einerseitsdie
Buridansgeprft
werden,aber vor allem auch untermglicheAutorschaft
sucht werden, inwieferndiese beiden Literalkommentare
von frheren
Kommentaren
Die
eines
Kommentars
von frheren
abhngen.
Abhngigkeit
Kommentarenliefertnicht nur wertvolleHinweise zur Arbeitstechnik
eines Kommentators,sondernvermagauch zu zeigen,welchenOrt und
welche Bedeutungein Kommentarin der Traditionder Kommentierung
eines bestimmtenWerkeseinnimmt.
I
Von der umfangreicheren
Sententia
existierenzwei Abschriften,
die beide
Buridanals Verfassernennen.13Beide Handschriften
berliefern
den gleichen Text. Trotzdemist die bereinstimmung
keinBeweisfrdie Autorschaft.Die beiden Handschriftensind nmlich lediglich zwei weitere
9 Venezia,
Biblioteca
cod. 1984(Zan.lat.262),f.4-15.(Aristoteles
latinus.
Marciana,
Nr. 1643).
Codices,
10Edition
G.B. Fowler,
Admont
608 andEngelbert
Manuscript
(c. 1250-1331).
ofAdmont
14. SummaAlexandrinorum,
in:Archives
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
et Littraire
du
Appendix
57 (1982),195-252.
Moyen
Age,
11CittdelVaticano,
1v;Venezia,
Bibi.Marciana,
BAV,Vat.lat.6384(XV.Jh.),f.1r-6
cod. 1984(Zan.lat.262),f. 16ra-83rb;
Einedritte
sichnachMichael
in der
Kopiefindet
Handschrift
Paris,BnF,lat.6464(XIV.Jh.),f. lra-68va
anonymen
(f.68va:"Etsicestfinis
sententie
totius
libriethicorum
Aristotelis.
Deo gratias
Amen.
sententia
libriethicoExplicit
Beidieser
Handschrift
handelt
essichnachMichael1985(op.cit.,
letzten,
rum").
anonymen
- wennauchgeringfgig
FN 1),827:"imPrinzip
umdenselben
Text
bzw.erweigekrzt
tert."Zuschreibung
schonbei Ch. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries.
Autors
, in:
26(1970),135-216
habeichderHandschrift
Citt
Traditio,
(hier,
179).DenTiteldesWerkes
delVaticano,
vd. Michael1985(op.cit.,FN 1),826-8.
BAV,Vat.lat.6384entnommen;
12Editiert
B. Korolec,
vonJerzy
do "Etyki"
w rkopisie
komentarza
Fragmenty
anonimowego
w Paryzu
Lat.17831
Nationale
12 (1970),29-71,
, in: StudiaMediewistyczne,
Bibliothque
bes.40-71;veri.
Michael1985(o.cit.,FN l, 824f.
13CittdelVaticano,
1v (f.61v:"Sententia
buriBAV,Vat.lat.6384(XV.Jh.),f. 1r-6
danicorreptoris
10
libros
cod.
Venezia,Bibi.Marciana,
antiquorum
super
ethicorum");
1984(Zan.lat.262),f. 16ra-83va
sententie
conclusive
totalis
libri
(f.83va:"Et sicsitfinis
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
secundum
Ioannem
Buridanum
doctorem
solemnissimum
magistrm
etcomplete
Coloniensis
dicesis
almannum.
Annoincarnationis
domini
permeH. clericum
nostri
lesuChristi
hora23, in domofiliorum
1394,die 27 mensis
octobris,
quondam
Iofredi
magisti
Ferrarie").

18:46:55 PM

BURIDANS
ZURNIKOM
KOMMENTARE
AGHISCHEN
ETHIK

237

und einflureichen
Ethikkommentars
Alberts
Kopien des weitverbreiteten
von Sachsen.MehrereTextvergleiche
verteiltber alle Bchervermochten
dies vollstndigzu besttigen.Es scheintmir deshalb zureichend,wenn
ich die bereinstimmung
mit zwei kurzenProben belege:
CittdelVaticano,
de Saxonia,
indecern
libros
BAV,Vat.lat.6384(vgl. Albertus
Expositio
'
Michael1985(op.cit.,n. 1),881).14
Ethicorum
, li. II, tr.2 c. 1 "Posthocautem
[1105b19] (Basel,UB, F.II.3,f.2ra-76ra).15
f. Il1: Notaprolittera
differentiam
inter f. 14vb:
Notaprolittera
differentiam
inter
etdesiderium,
namconcu- concupiscentiam
etdesiderium.
Namconcuconcupiscentiam
estrespectu
delectationis
estrespectu
delectationis
piscentia
corporalis,
corporalis,
piscentia
delec- sed desiderium
estrespectu
seddesiderium
respectu
cuiuscumque
cuiuscumque
tabilis
indifferenter.
Itemnota,quodzelusidemest
Nota,quodzelusidem indifferenter.
dehocquoddeficit
estquodtristitia
quamhomohabetde hoc quodtristitia
quamhabet
mise- ab hiisque habentalii,misericordia
vero
ab hisquaealiihabent,
quoddeficit
malis. esttristitia
de alienis
malis.
de alienis
ricordia
veroesttristitia
- Haecestsecunda "Passiones
"Passiones
igitur
quidem."Secundaparsprinciquidem."
in
trium
quoddicto- palis.Inquaostendit
parscapituli, qua ostendit,
quodpredictorum
rumtrium
membrorum
nonestvirtus,
et membrorum
nonestvirtus,
etexlittera
duas
Prima:
duoconclusiones.
estilla:virtutes
notaexlittera
quod conclusiones,
quarum
prima
et vitiamoralia
nonsuntpassiones.morales
nonsuntpassiones.
virtus
etvitiamoralia
Probatur
absolute
Primo,
quia secun- Probatur,
quiasecundum
passiones
multipliciter:
dumnullaspassiones
absolute
consideratas
nondicuntur
boninequemali,
consideratas
Tenetconse- sedsecundum
virtutes.
etc.Prointeldicimur
bonivelmali,igitur.
Igitur
virtutem
et vitia lectuantecedentis
notaquodsi quisirasciquentia,
quia secundum
dicimur
boniet mali.Notaprointellectuturvelhuiusmodi
non
passiones
aliqualiter
ex hoc,quodaliquisirasciturdicitur
antecedentis
bonusvelmalus,sedsi agitsecunhabetpassionem
non dumillampassionem
velaliquam
huiusmodi
nondebet,
qualiter
dicitur
bonusvelmalus,
sedsi agatsecun- tuncdicitur
malus.
non
dumistampassionem
taliter,
qualiter
malus.
tuncdicitur
debet,
ratio:
secundum
nonlau- Secundaratio:
Secunda
secundum
neclaupassionem
passiones
sedsecundum
vir- damurnecvituperamur,
damur
necvituperamur,
sedsecundum
viret vitia,ergo.Nota,quodsi tutes.
tutesmorales
etc.Nota,sisecundum
Igitur
aliquam
secundum
ut passionem
utputasecundum
verelaudamur,
laudamur,
aliquam
passionem
verecundiam,
quia diceturcundiam,
putasecundum
quia dicitur
quartohuius,quod
estpassio verecundia
iniuvenibus,
estpassiolaudabilis
quartohuius,quodverecundia
in iuvenibus,
laudamur
ex ista nonlaudamur
laudabilis
exiliapassione
boni,
tanquam
nontamquam
ad bonitatem.16
boni,sedtamquamsedtamquam
passione
dispositi
modocumdicitur
ad bonitatem,
dispositi
necvitunonlaudamur
secundum
passiones
bonivel
intellectualiter
peramur
tamquam
mali.
b
14Vgl.Venezia,
derselbe
Bibi.Marciana,
cod.1984(Zan.lat.262),f.27ra
Text).
(eindeutig
,r'f. 3vb:
lectura
de
circalibrosethicorum";
alberti
Rickmerstorp
magisti
"Sequitur
librum
f.76ra:
dictaReuerendi
Alberti
de racmenstorp
ethicorum
magisti
super
"Expliciunt
M cccc69/
annoincarnationis
domini
1473."
16Modocumdicitur
- velmali]omisit
Basel,UB,F.II.3.

18:46:55 PM

238

CHRISTOPH
FLELER

Es handelt sich offensichtlich

um den gleichenText, obwohl wir zum
Teil deutlicheredaktionelle
knnen.Die meisten
Abweichungenfeststellen
lassen
ohne
sich
auf
die Freiheit des
Abweichungen
Schwierigkeiten
zurckfhren.17
von
Kommentaren
wurden
Kopisten
Kopien
reportierten
an anderen Universittenvon Studentenund Magisternfrdas eigene
Studiumerstellt.
Da diese Kopien meistenssehrschnellangefertigt
wurden
und die Vorlage gewhnlichschwerzu lesen war, sind die Abweichungen
bei dieser Literaturgattungbesonders zahlreich. Eine Bewertungder
nur ein Vergleichder gesamten
Abweichungenknnteselbstverstndlich
handschriftlichen
berlieferung
geben.
Der anonymeKommentarder PariserHandschriftBN lat. 6464, den
Michael trotz starkenAbweichungenals weitereKopie der genannten
Sententia
ist eine leichtberarbeiteteRedaktionvon Alberts
katalogisierte,
wie ein kurzerVergleichzu zeigen vermag(Paris,BnF,
Ethikkommentar,
lat. 6464, f. 8vb-9ra,
ed. Korolec, op. cit., (FN 12), 38f.):18
Notandum
litteram
de differentiam
propter
(!) inter
(!),quiaconcuconcupiscentiam
estrespectu
delectationis
seddesiderium
piscentia
corporalis,
respectu
cuiuscumque
delectabili
Notandum
(!) indifferenter.
secundo,
quodzelusidemestquodtristitia
ab hisquaehabent
esttrisquamhomohabetde hocquoddeficit
alii,misericordia
titiade alienis
malis.
"Passiones."
Conclusio.
morales
etvitiamoralia
nonsuntpassiones.
Quodvirtutes
Probatur
nullaspassiones
saltim(?) consideratas
absolute
primo,quia secundum
dicimur
bonivelmali,igitur.
Tenetconsequentia,
et vitia
virtutes
quia secundum
dicimur
bonivelmali.Notandum
conclusionem
exhoc,
(!)antecedentis
proponentem
habetpassionem
nondicitur
bonus
quodars(!) irrascitur
(!) velaliquamhuiusmodi
vel malus,sed si agatillampassionem
nondebet,dicitur
malus.
taliter,
qualiter
Secunda
secundum
nonlaudamur
sedsicsecundum
ratio,
passiones
equevituperamur,
virtutes
et vitia,ergo.Notandum,
laudamur
quodsi secundum
aliquampassionem
utputasecundum
est
verecundiam,
quia dicere(!) quartohuius,quodverecundia
laudabilis
deiuvene,
nonlaudamur
exillapassione
passio
boni,sedtamquam
tamquam
ad bonitatem
modocui(!) dicitur,
nonlaudamur
dispositi
quodsecundum
passiones
intellectualiter
boni.
tamquam
17Ichhabevonden
dieAlberts
Ethikkommentar
dieBasler
Handschriften,
enthalten,
Handschrift
UB F.II.3 direkt
unddie Innsbrucker
Handschrift
UB cod. 159in einer
einsehen
knnen.
Ferner
ichauchdieTextbeispiele,
konnte
dieHeidingsfelder
Xeroxkopie
nachderErfurter
Handschrift
WABCA F.365(A.D.1371)zitierte,
mitdenbeiden
Buridan
Handschriften
Die Innsbrucker
Handschrift
istimJahre1365
zugeschriebenen
vergleichen.
worden,
ethicorum
datawienne
geschrieben
(f.66va:"Expliciunt
reportata
superlibrum
albertum
rectorem
ibidemet pronunciata
perreuerendum
magistrm
perreuerendum
Ludworum
An derobenzitierten
Stellegleicht
derTextder
magistrm
(?) quondam".
Innsbrucker
Handschrift
mehrderVatikanischen
wiesievonMichaeltranHandschrift,
skribiert
wird.Die schlechte
Handschrift
es mirleiKopiederInnsbrucker
verunmglichte
Stellenachdereigentlich
besseren
Handschrift
zu zitieren.
der,diebetreffende
18Die
vonKorolecsindleiderrecht
Transkriptionen
unsorgfaltig.

18:46:55 PM

BURIDANS
KOMMENTARE
ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN
ETHIK

239

Als zustzlichesBeispiel mge ein Ausschnittaus dem 5. Buch gengen, den ich hier nach der VenezianischenHandschriftwiedergebeund
mit der frhenHandschriftF.365 der AmplonianischenSammlung in
Erfurtvergleiche,so wie dieses Textstckbei Heidingsfelderabgedruckt
wird (Venezia, Bibi. Marciana, cod. 1984 (Zan. lat. 262), f. 49va, 5-29
li. V
verglichenmit H - Albertusde Saxonia, Dicta superlibrosEthicorum,
"
tr. 2, c. 2, p. princ.2, "Iustorum
autem
[1135a6]), ed. Heidingsfelder1927
{op. cit, FN 23), 105 (nach Erfurt,WAB, CA F.365):19
Notaprointellectu
et prosequentibus,
eorum,
que dictasuntin istocapitulo
quod
differunt
ab inuicem:
iustificatio.
Namiusdicitur
ius,iustum,
lex,iustitia,
preceptum
seuordinatio
circasubditos,
ad ea, que possunt
caderesub
principantis
quantum
etsecundum
estdeusuelnatura
uelhomo,
subditorum,
potestate
quodtalisdominus
secundum
hocilludiusdicitur
diuinum
uelnaturale
uelhumanuni.
Exhacdiffinitione
nonhabetiusinstituere.
Sediustum
dicitur,
patet,
quodparinparem
quodunicuique
secundum
domini
uelordinem
ius,(add.i. e. H) secundum
(ordinationem
preceptum
H ) concessum
si dominus
H ) uelordinauit,
aliest,uerbigratia,
(precipit
precepit
tunciniusta
H ) estistaessepriuata,
etsi econtra
qua essecommunia,
(injustum
(add.
H ). Sed lexdicitur
econtra
in libro(inlibroom.H ) uelmentalis
litteralis
scriptura
in animapreceptum
domini
et debitum
subditi
notificans.
Unde,quiaex precepto
domini
subditi
ad iustum,
necessaria
esteos(eisH) scriptura
in
litteralis
obligantur
in(exH ) qua possunt
memorari
de hiis,ad que tenentur,
etde hiis,que(add.
libro,
eisH) debentur.
Sed iustitia
esthabitus,
inclinatur
ad precipiendum
quo dominus
uelordinandum
circaea, que prodesse
et hocquantum
ad iustisubditis,
possunt
tiamdomini,
uel habitus,
inclinatur
ad preceptum
uel ordinationem
quo subditus
domini
et hocquantum
ad iustitiam
subditi.
Sed iustitia
obseruandum,
(iustificatio
exterior
a iustitia.
H) dicitur
operado
proueniens
Alle diese Handschriftenkopien
gehen auf denselbenText zurck,der mit
Recht Albertvon Sachsen zugeschriebenwird. An der Autorschaft
kann
nichtgezweifelt
werden.Denn in mehrerenHandschriften
wirdder EthikkommentarausdrcklichAlbert von Sachsen zuschreiben.20
Ausserdem
findensich hufigin der gleichenHandschrift
neben dem Ethikkommentar
auch AlbertsExpositiozur Yconomica
.21 Ein Vergleich der beiden Kommentarezeigtjedoch zahlreicheformaleund inhaltlichehnlichkeiten
auf.
Die falscheZuschreibung
von AlbertsKommentaran Buridanistauerdem
19
auchInnsbruck
UB 159,f.32vb.
20Vgl.
NachJrgen
Die astotelischscholastische
Theorie
derBewegung.
Studien
zum
Sarnowsky,
Kommentar
Alberts
vonSachsen
desAristoteles
zurPhysik
, Mnster
1989,446f.gibtes insgesant
zehnHandschriften,
diedenEthikkommentar
Albertus
de Saxonia(Albertus
de Ricmestorp)
zuschreiben,
dieZuschreibung
derInnsbrucker
obenFN 16).
(vgl.zustzlich
Handschrift,
21Wiederum
nachSarnowsky
1989(op.cit.,FN 20),ibid.,
22 gltige
gibtes insgesamt
dieEthica
vonAlbertus
ZehnHandschriften
BnF,lat.14383enthlt
(Paris,
Kopien.
Magnus).
enthalten
auchAlberts
konomikkommentar,
FN 22 und25).
(vgl.auchunten

18:46:55 PM

240

FLELER
CHRISTOPH

weist
kein Einzelfall,auch eine Handschriftdes konomikkommentars
diesen Fehler auf.22
Der Kommentarvon Albertvon Sachsen wurdein einerbemerkenswerten
daran
Bemerkenswert
Studievon Georg Heidingsfelder1927 untersucht.23
ist die Sorgfalt,mit der Heidingsfelderdie durchaus unselbstndige
Arbeitsweisedarlegt.Sein Urteil ist nchtern:Der Kommentarist eine
"rein kompilatorische
des Walter Burleigh"
Kopie des Ethikkommentars
(S. 95). Aber auch WalterBurleysKommentarkannnichtals selbstndiges
Werkverstandenwerden,da er sich weitgehendauf den Ethikkommentar
von Thomas von Aquin sttzt.Der BehauptungHeidingsfelders,
da der
Einfludes Ethikkommentars
Albertsvon Sachsen auf die Folgezeit"nicht
sehr gro gewesen zu sein (scheint),"24
kann hingegennichtzugestimmt
werden. Dafr zeugen einerseitsdie vielen Handschriften,von denen
Heidingsfeldernur ein kleinerTeil bekanntwar,25aber auch mehrere
Kommentarean mitteleuropischen
die mitunseremKomUniversitten,
mentarhnlichkeiten
aufweisenund eine Kenntnisdieses PariserKommentarsvoraussetzen.Der Kommentarvon Albertwurde an mehreren
Universittenals Grundlagefrden Ethikunterrichts
bentzt.26
22Berlin,
und
Cf.Chr.Fleler,
SBPK,cod.lat.fol.934,f.337rb-341va.
Interpretation
Rezeption
der
Aristotelischen
Politica
imspten
Mittelalter
, 2 Bd.Amsterdam
1992,Bd.II, 2. Diesefalschen
wobeimandabeikauman
finden
sichalleinitalienischen
Handschriften,
Zuschreibungen
einenZufalldenken
mag.
23G. Heidingsfelder,
Albert
vonSachsen.
SeinLebensgang
undsnKommentar
zurMkomachischen
Ethik
desAristoteles
1927.
, Mnster
24Heidingsfelder
1927(op. cit.,FN 23),141.
25Zu
sindnoch
den22 beiSarnowsky
1989{op.cit.,FN 20)angefhrten
Handschriften
diebeiden
Handschriften
dieBuridan
alsVerfasser
nennen
delVaticano,
(Citt
hinzuzufgen,
- mit
cod. 1984(Zan.lat.262)und
BAV,Vat.lat.6384undVenezia,Bibi.Marciana,
- dieanonyme
Vorbehalt
Handschrift
lat.
f.
die
eine
etwas
unterParis,BN, 6464, 1-68,
in Basel,UB, F.I. 30 (XIV),f.64v-139r
schiedliche
Redaktion
enthlt.
AuchdieGlossen
stammen
in derselben
ausAlberts
Kommentar
undnichtvonJohannes
obwohl
Buridan,
amunteren
Handschrift
RanddieQuaestionen
despikardischen
Meisters
sind.;
beigefgt
vgl.
Lohr1994(op.cit
bisher
bekannt.
26 handschriftliche
., FN 1).Es sinddemzufolge
Zeugen
26Die Hinweise
vonKorolec
nicht
dieWirkungsgeschichte
desfragmentarischen
belegen
Literalkommentars
vonAlberts
Ethikkommentars;
(Paris,BnF,lat. 17831),sondern
vgl.
istauerdem
ein
Korolec1970(op.cit.,FN 12),40. DervonKorolec
Kommentar
edierte
BeimkonomikvonAlberts
Ethikkommentar
ZeugefrdieWirkungsgeschichte
(vgl.unten).
kommentar
vonAlbert
vonSachsen
ltsicheinehnliche
feststellen.
Insgesamt
Verbreitung
Anzahl
sindvondiesem
Kommentar
einegroe
bekannt.
Dochexistieren
21 Handschriften
stehen
vonweiteren
diein eindeutiger
zu diesem
Kommentar
Kommentaren,
Beziehung
unddiesenergnzen,
verkrzen
oderbearbeiten;
vgl.Fleler1992(op.cit.,FN 22),Teil
vonAlbert
anmehreren
mitteleurovonSachsen
diente
2,2-4.DerYconomica-Kommentar
Yconomica.
alsGrundlage
frdieKommentierung
deraristotelischen
Universitten
pischen

18:46:55 PM

ETHIK
ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN
KOMMENTARE
BURIDANS

241

II
wird seit kurzem ein Fragmenteines
Auer der besprochenenSententia
Die einzigeHandschrift
Buridanzugeschrieben.27
Ethikkommentars
(Paris,
zur
Nikomachiin
Linie
Buridans
erster
lat.
enthlt
BnF,
Quaestionen
17831)
schen Ethik.28Das Fragment(von nun an: FragmentP), von dem hier
die Rede ist, ist kein selbstndigerText, sondernist in die Quaestionen
Nach der 13. Frage des 2. Buches folgtnicht etwa- wie in
integriert.
- die
von Buridans Quaestionenkommentars
allen anderen Handschriften
der
nchsteFrage, sonderneine Expositio
(f. 45ra),von der offensichtlich
"
1
bei
105a
18:
Der
Literalkommentar
fehlt.
(f.45ra): Sequitur
beginnt
Anfang
autemaliquis[ars]. Aristoteles
aliudcapitulum,
ostendit,
quodincipitibi: Quaeret
ex
vir
tuo
movendo
virtus
sis,
dubitationem,
operationibus
quomodo
generatur
qualiter
virtuosis
ex operationibus
..." (ed. Korolec 1970
esse
, quodvirtus
generatur
potest
wird
ein
mit
FN
Erlutert
, dann
capitulum zwei conclusiones
12), 40).
[op.cit.,
des zweiten tractatus
(mit drei conclusiones
), bevor
folgtdas erste capitulum
nunccircatertiam
concluwird (q. 14.): "Quaeritur
zur 14. Frage bergeleitet
sit
. . ."29
et
XIIII
in
ordine
utrum
virtus
habitus
sionem
libri,
praecedentis
capituli
vierFragendes 2. Bucheswerdendurcheine Auslegung
Auch die restlichen
Im drittenBuch folgtnach der tabulaqmstionum
der erstetraceingeleitet.
tatus(mit vier capitula
), dann brichtdas FragmentP ab und leitet zur
erstenFrage des drittenBuches ber: (f. 54vb)"Et ideo iuxtapraedictam
secundum
et maxime
iuxtaprimicapituli
conclusionem
quotationem30
partem
primam
istamquaestionem
:
sanciiThomaeinvenio
, quae estprimahuiustertii
libri,videlicet
cutrum
ceteris
omnibus
sitpossibile
eodemmodose habentibus
deter, quodvoluntas
ad unumoppositorum
minetur
ad aliud. . . V'31JerzyKorolec
, aliquando
aliquando
27Beschreibung
inW. Seko,
Commentariorum
Aevi
inAristotelem
Medii
Latinorum
Repertorium
Publicis
Parisiis
asservantur
1982,Fasz.2,94-8,vgl.auchMichael
, Warszawa
quaeinBibliothecis
auchin derEdition
vonJ. Korolec
1985(op.cit.,FN 1),825und851;weitere
Angaben
1970(op.cit.,FN 11).
28Paris,BnF,lat. 17831(Pergamenths.),
f. 1ra-250: Johannes
in
Buridanus,
Questiones
Die Handschrift
I-Xlibros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis.
wirdvonKorolec1970(op.cit.,FN 12)ins
14.Jh.undvonSeko1982(op.cit.,FN 27)in dieersteHltedes 15.Jh.datiert.
29Johannes
libros
Paris1514(repr.1968),f.xxxii.
decern
Buridan,
Ethicorum,
Super
30Korolec:
Mitdiesem
wiederkehrenden
scheint
derEditor
quaesitationem.
hufig
Begriff
wieKorolecan verschiedenen
besondere
Mhezu haben.Ichschlage
(undnicht
quotatio
odercotatio)
wie"Einteilung"
:
Stellen:
totatio
heit
vor,washiersoviel
quaestitatio,
(vgl.quotare
teilen).
31Nichterwhnt
wirdeinePrzisierung
desselbenKommentator
nachder2. Frage
f.58vl):
"Iuxtatabulam
des3. Buches,
nonintendo
sedmagis
prius
positam
insequi,
ponere
in fineque eritprimetabulecorectivam
tabulam
correctiva
et
(!, melior.
et)explanativa,
Alberti
domini
commento
etiamet ex
quiaetiamex dictis
ymmo
primosuperius
allego,

18:46:55 PM

242

CHRISTOPH
FLELER

hat das FragmentP von den Quaestionengetrenntund nur dieses herausgegeben(ed. Korolec 1970 (op. cit.,FN 12), 40-71).
Korolec verffentlichte
dieses Fragmentals Werk eines unbekannten
Bernd
Michael
vertrittdagegen die These, da der Autor
Magisters.
JohannesBuridan gewesensein mu. Das FragmentP verweistnmlich
wiederholtauf die folgendenQuaestionen,die der Schreiberals Werk
Buridans ausweist.32Diese Verflechtungvon Expositiound Questiones
sei
zwar schonein deutlicherHinweisauf die Echtheitdes Literalkommentars,
den Beweis erbringejedoch der Schlusatz:"invenio
." Das
istamquaestionem
" invenio
" deutetMichael im Sinne von:
"Ich, der KommentatorBuridan,
denke mir folgendeFrage aus." Nach Michael handeltes sich bei dem
von Korolec ediertenText mglicherweiseum die "Original-Expositio"
Buridans,die Sententia
, die, wie wir nun wissen,von
superlibrosEthicorum
Albertvon Sachsenstammt,sei mglicherweise
eine sptereberarbeitung.
Die beiden Kommentare stehen auer Zweifel in einem Abhngigkeitsverhltnis.
Aber wer hat wen beeinflut?War das FragmentP die
wie aus Michaels AnnahmengeVorlage von AlbertsEthikkommentars,
schlossenwerden mte, oder verhlt es sich eher umgekehrt?Wenn
Buridan der Kommentatordes FragmentsP ist,wre eine Abhngigkeit
Ferner
Albertsvon seinemlterenKollegen tatschlichwahrscheinlicher.
findensichin unseremKommentarzahlreichewrtliche
Zitateaus Thomas'
die bei Albertfehlen.Man knntesomitmeinen,da
Ethikkommentar,
das FragmentP zuerst geschriebenwurde. In der Tat verhltes sich
umgekehrt:Das FragmentP ist in direkterAbhngigkeitvon Alberts
Kommentar entstanden.Der Kommentar Albertssowie derjenigevon
Thomas mssendirektneben dem Kommentatordes Fragmentsgelegen
haben. Die fragmentarische
AuslegungfolgteTraktatfrTraktat,Kapitel
frKapitel meistenswortwrtlich
AlbertsEthikkommentar
und fgtihm
dann und wann eine Unterscheidung,
eine Fragestellung
oder ein Argument
von Thomas bei und verknpft
die Auslegungmit BuridansQuaestionen.

estprimacausaliberlectura
Aristotelis
eorumquodvoluntas
esseex intentione
apparet
etiamiuxtaquestionem
ideoadhuccircaprimam
conclusionem
eteiusprobationem
tatis,
actum
volendi
ad earumdeclarationem
formatur
secunda
(!):Utrum
questio
precedentem
inipsavolntate
alteractusautaliaquecumque
autvolendi
(!)autnolendi
prcdt
aliquis
. . vgl.Seko1982(op.cit.,
fiatin ipsavolntate
mediante
dispositio
qua actusvolendi
FN 27),II, 96.
32DieseZuschreibung
tabule
findet
sichan zweiStellen:
(f.52v>) . . et sicestfinis
Buridani
. . (f.94vn:) . . de
a magistro
libriethicorum
tertii
Johanne
questionum
Buridani
deo gracias."
sicsitfinis...istiustabulequestionum
(vgl.Seko1982(op.cit.,
FN 27),II, 95f.).

18:46:55 PM

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KOMMENTARE
ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN
ETHIK

243

Zu eigenen berlegungenhat es keinen Platz. BurleysKommentar,die

hat unser Kommentatorhingegen
Vorlage von AlbertsEthikkommentar
nicht direktbentzt.Aus diesem Sachverhaltalso, da Albert sich in
ersterLinie auf Burley sttzt,und unser KommentatorAlbert kopiert,
kanndie Abhngigkeit
der beidenKommentareeindeutigbestimmt
werden.
An vielen Stellen verkrztnmlich das FragmentP die Argumentation
enthaltenist.Eine punktuelle
Burleys,die in AlbertsAuslegungvollstndiger
macht
dies
deutlich:
Gegenberstellung
Gualterus
Albertus
deSaxonia
Burley
Anonymus
1481(GW5778) Basel,UB F.II.3
(ed.Venezia,
Paris,BN,lat.17831,
, ed.Korolec,
40f.)
(InEthicam
f. 38v(e7v):"Queretautem
aliud
f.
autem
. . Istudestcapitu- 14'B: "Quereret
capitulum,
Sequitur
utique
lumquartum
quartumquod incipitibi: "Quaeret
Capitulum
primitracta-utique".
etsolvi- inquoostendit
tus,inquomovetur
qualiter
gen- autemaliquis[ars]."Aristovirtus
telesostendit,
exoperationibus
eratur
virtus
turquarta
qualiter
questio
principalis
ex operationibus
Ethabettrespartes generatur
huiussecundilibri,scilicetvirtuosis.
movendo
dubitaInquarum
virtus
ex principales.
prima virtuosis,
qualiter
generatur
Etcontinetmovendopropositionemtionem,quomodopotest
virtutis.
operibus
ex
trespartes movetunamdubitationem,
istudcapitulum
esse,quodvirtus
generatur
cum
hoc
scilicet
In
virtuosis,
operationibus
quomodo
potest
principales. primaponit
nullus
ex itanonsitin artibus;
In se- essequodvirtus
et solvit
generetur
questionem.
ex enimoperatur
bonisutiustitia
ibi:"Resquidem
cunda,
operaartis,
igi- operibus
artem.
iustiscumtarnen nisipriushabuerit
tur",ponitet probatunam operibus
nullus Unde,licetaliquisloquereconclusionem
perquamap- nonfitsiein artibus;
princialis
paretsolutio
ques- enimfacitoperaartis,nisi tura casuunamorationem
hoc non esset
habeat
tionis.In tertiaibi: "Sed prius
artem,
quomodo congruam,
sicutet casu
enim
removet
multi",
grammaticae,
aliquis
loqueretur
gramquemdam
faciens
iustam
nisihabeat
Prima
errorem.
operationem
grammatiparscontinetmatice,
nonpropter
videtur
Inprima
tres
quod vel virtuosam
poni- cam.Ergoetiam
partculas.
iuste.
faciat
et ratioquestio-nullus
turquestio
operavirtuosa,hocoperatur
nis.In secunda,ibi: "Vel nisipriushabeatvirtutem
similiter
ponituret perconsequens
equein artibus",
nongeneretur
In ter- quod virtus
unasolutio
questionis.
virtutis
sedmagis
autem
tia,ibi:"Adhuc
eque exoperibus
alia solutioeconverso.
simile",
ponitur
In
ad eandemquestionem.
movepartcula
prima
igitur
ratio
etponitur
turdubitatio
dubitationis.
Quiaenimdictumest,quodvirtus
generaturex operationibus
bonis,
ut ex iustisoperationibus
ideo
efficitur
aliquisiustus;
hoc
movetur
questio,
qualiter
esse,quodex operapotest
virtionibus
virtutis
generetur
iustis
tus,utexoperationibus
iustitia.
Ratiohuiusdubitationis
est,quiailluddictum

18:46:55 PM

244

FLELER
CHRISTOPH

esseverum
nonvidetur
pro
eo,quodsicutestinartibus,
sed in
ita estin virtutibus,
estsic,quodnullus
artibus
nisihabens
facit
operaartis,
artem.Nullusenimfacit
nisi
operagrammaticalia,
necmusicalia,
grammaticus;
nisimusicus.
Ergoeodem
facit
modonullus
operaiusta,
Etperconsequens
nisiiustus.
nonfitaliex iusteoperari
quiaeoipsoquod
quisiustus,
estiusiusteoperatur
aliquis
tus.Unde cumidemnon
et generatum
sitgenerans
cumnihil
eiusdem,
respectu
se, et iusteoperari
generet
a iustitia,
esteffective
sequitur
nec
nonefficitur
quodiustitia
ex iusteoperari,
generatur
cumsiteconverso.
"Vel enim in artibus".
..
"Velequein artibus
in
Hec estsecundapartculaSecundaparsprincipalis,
dubiin qua poniturqua soluitpredictam
partis
prime
Ethabettresparuna solutio
que estperin- tationem.
huiuspropo- tculas.In quarumprima
teremptionem
sitionsacceptein ratione soluiteamunomodo,scilillamprodubitationis,
que est ista: icetinterimendo
scilicetnullus
nisi positionem,
Nullusfacitoperaartis,
nisihabeat jekil
habensartem,quia non facit
operaartis,
potestfacere artem.Undealiquispotest
grammaticus
congruam
opera artisgrammatice,loquiorationem
nam aliquisidiotapotest excasu,quinonesset
gramverumtamenest,
orationemmaticus,
a casuproferre
congruam.Nullustamen quodnonessetgrammatice.
hoc est Aliquis
(?)operaproducens
potestgrammatice,
nisi
iustam,
secundum
artificialiter
aliquam
gram- tionem
Undefacitoperfacere
maticam
operagram- ex habitu.
sednoniuste,
bonm
ationem
nisigrammaticus.
maticalia,
iustihabitm
Et eodemmodoaliquisnon sedsecundum
iustuspotestfacereopera tie.
iusta,nontameniuste,sed
iustitie.
habitm
secundum
quod [non] MrlRXl
Intelligendum
CiLkr
faciens
iustus
operaiustanon
a casusedperse,
operatur
virsi intendit
generationem
tutis,
quia facitoperaiusta
exispracticam
perrationem
inipso,queestprintentem
ad generacipiummovens
virtutis.
tionem

18:46:55 PM

KOMMENTARE
ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN
ETHIK
BURIDANS

245

Wie der Kommentatorarbeitete,wird zum Beispiel nach der 15. Frage

wieder aufnimmtund mit einem
deutlich,wo er den Literalkommentar
Am
des Zitatesvermerkter: "Et
Thomas-Zitat
einleitet.
Schlu
lngeren
."33
ibi
istud
nullam
noviexpositores
nota
, quod assignatur capitulum;
partem
assignant
novosexpositores
oder secundum
modernos
taucht an
Die Wendung secundum
mehrerenStellen auf und verwendetunser Kommentator,um die von
von derjenigendes
Albertvon Sachsen bentzteEinteilung(divisiotextus)
Der Kommentar von Albert
Thomas von Aquin zu unterscheiden.34
wirdim FragmentP als das Werkder "neuen" oder "modernenAusleger"
bezeichnet.Das Fragment"basiertin ersterLinie auf dieser modernen
Auslegung,doch bevorzugtder Kommentatoran mehrerenStellen die
von Thomas und macht diese zu seinerzweitenReferenz.
Sententia
Originalittbeanspruchtunser Kommentarnichtund es wre meines
danach zu suchen. Es war nicht die
Erachtensfalschoder irrefhrend
Absichtdes Kommentatorseine eigenstndigeAuslegungvorzulegen,die
sogar versucht,da und dort die eigene Anschauungsichtbarwerden zu
lassen. Ziel der Auslegungwar eine Zergliederungdes Aristotelischen
Wie sollteOriginalitt
Textesund die Herausarbeitung
der Argumentation.
bei der starkenAbhngigkeitvon anderen Kommentarennoch mglich
sein?Bedenkenwirdoch, da unserKommentarweitgehendwrtlichvon
Albertvon Sachsen und Thomas von Aquin abhngt,Albertwiederum
sichweitgehendauf Burleysttzt.Burleyschlielichbaut seinenKommentar auf dem Kommentarvon Thomas auf. Ren-AntoineGauthierhat
von Thomas abschtzig"sciencemorte"
einmaldie Aristoteleskommentare
wie
Doch
und prziserist der
durchsichtiger
ursprnglicher,
genannt.35
Kommentarvon Thomas im Vergleichzum Kommentarvon Albertvon
Sachsen und dem Kommentar,den Korolec edierte!

33vgl.Korolec1970(ob.cit
., FN 12),47,Z. 169/70.
34Korolec1970(op.cit
novosexpositores";
S. 47.170:
., FN 12),44.96:"secundum
estquartaconclusio
noviexpositores";
S. 47.174:"et
"nullam
partem
assignant
principalis
huiustractatus
secundi
secundum
S. 49.212:"etsecundum
hociste
modernos";
capituli
estcapitulum
secundum
beatum
Thomam
et aliud
tractatus
habettriacapitula:
primm
S. 50.246:"liceta modernis
ibiassignatur
divisionem
secundum
modernorum";
quaedam
S. 64.610:"secundum
(Korolec:
quotationem
praecedentis
capituli";
quaesitationem)
partcula
: quaesitationem)
modS. 65.653:"secundum
modernorum";
(.Korolec
aliquorum
quotationem
S. 66.678:
modernorum
"secundum
ernorum";
(Korolec'.
quotationem
quaesitationem)
aliquorum
S. 67.701:"secundum
modernorum
(Korolec:
expositorum";
quotationem
quaesitationem)
S. 67.712:"secundum
S. 69.776:"secundum
modernorum";
expositorum";
aliquorum
quomodernorum."
tationem
(Korolec:
quaesitationem)
aliquorum
35ThomasvonAquin,Sentencia
libriDe anima
, ed. R.A. Gauthier,
(LeoninaXLV.1),
RomaParis1984,p. *294.

18:46:55 PM

246

CHRISTOPH
FLELER

Trotz oder geradewegenseinerAbhngigkeit

scheintmirdas Fragment
P eine rechttypischeArbeitdes Schulbetriebesdes 14. Jahrhunderts
zu
sein. Es ist selten,da ein Kommentarjener Zeit sich nichtauf andere
Kommentare sttzt.Wir mssen immer wieder fragen:Wer hat wem
ein und desselbenTextes fr
abgeschrieben?Wie Handschriftenkopien
eine kritischeEdition auf ihre stemmatischen
untersucht
Abhngigkeiten
die
werden,mte bei einer kritischenEdition eines Literalkommentars
"stemmatische"
eines
in
KomKommentars
der
Tradition
der
Einordnung
Werkesuntersuchtwerden,
mentierungeines bestimmtenAristotelischen
um die verschiedenenAbhngigkeiten
und Einflssezu erfassen.Das Ziel
ist hier selbstverstndlich
ein anderes. Die "stemmatische"Einordnung
eines Kommentarsin die Kommentartradition
diente nichtder Rekonstruktioneiner ursprnglichen
sondern
knntevielmehrdie
Auslegung,
und unterschiedliche
vielfaltige
Verflechtung
Bentzungder Kommentare
der Kommentarliteratur
fhrtnicht
aufzeigen.Die allgemeineVerflechtung
zu einemeinzigen,authentischen
ihn
sondern
lst
auf.
Das
Text,
Fragment
P liefert
dazu ein gutesBeispiel.Zu unterscheiden
sinddirekteund indirekte
Abhngigkeiten.Direkt abhngig ist der Kommentar vom EthikkommentarAlbertsund Thomas', indirektabhngigist er fernervon Burleys
Kommentar,den er selberwohl nichtdirektkannte,der aber die Vorlage
seinerVorlage war. AhnlicheAbhngigkeiten
lieen sich leichtfrandere
Kommentarezeigen.Die verschiedenen
KommentareeinesAristotelischen
Werkesbilden ein Geflechtvon Abhngigkeiten,
das es illusorischmacht,
einenKommentarlosgelstvon den anderenKommentarenzu betrachten.
Die direktenund indirekten
eines Kommentarsvon anAbhngigkeiten
derenKommentarenwirftauch die Frage auf,wie ein solcherKommentar
ediertwerdensoll.Wie wirgesehenhaben,basiertunserKommentar
kritisch
auf drei Hauptquellen: der lateinischenbersetzung der Nikomachischen Ethik, dem Ethikkommentar
von Thomas von Aquin und dem
Kommentar der moderni
, den wir als denjenigenAlbertsvon
expositores
Sachsen identifizieren
konnten.Korolec weistim Quellenapparatnur die
Zitate nach, die entwedervon Aristotelesoder Thomas stammen.Der
Quellenapparatist deshalb unzureichendund erklrtnur ungengenddie
Arbeitsweise
des Kommentators..
Die Editionerwecktden falschenEindruck,
da sich neben Zitatenaus dem kommentierten
Text und
Aristotelischen
dem Ethikkommentar
von Thomas rechtviel eigeneberlegungenfinden,
da der Kommentarsogarals Quelle frdie Beurteilung
der authentischen
des
Verfassers
kann.
werden
Philosophie
herangezogen
Mittelalterliche
Kommentatorenhaben aber nicht nur von frheren

18:46:55 PM

ZURNIKOMACHISCHEN
BURIDANS
ETHIK
KOMMENTARE

247

Kommentaren"abgeschrieben",sie haben auf verschiedeneWeise "abgeschrieben".Die strengsteForm der Abhngigkeitsind weitgehendwrtlicheAbschriften

, die in unseremKommentarsehr zahlreichund umfansind.
Andere
Stellen sind reine Paraphrasen
, die sich strengans
greich
Vorbild halten, aber den Text zum Teil umformulieren
und straffen.
SchwchereFormenvon Abhngigkeiten
knnteninhaltliche
bereinstimmungen
und (inhaltliche
oder formale)Anlehnungen
genanntwerden,und schlielich
und implizite
findenwir auch zahlreicheexplizite
ptate.Alle diese und
nochweitere Formender Abhngigkeiten
mtensorgfaltig
mglicherweise
und
werden.36
Diese
studiert
unterschieden
Abhngigkeitensind auch
eines Kommentars.Da die meisten
grundlegendfr die Interpretation
Kommentarevon frherenKommentaren abhngen, drfteeigentlich
keineInterpretation
unternommen
werden,bevordie Quellen und Abhnbestimmt
worden sind. Ein Kommentarbesteht
nicht
gigkeiten
sorgfltig
aus mehrerenSchichten.ber den Aristotelischen
Text, der grundlegenden
Besonderswichtigsind
Schicht,legensich mehrereltereInterpretationen.
im
die
Laufe
dabei Standardkommentare
sich
der
,
Kommentatorenttigkeit
als besondershilfreichund traditionsbildend
erwiesen.In unseremFalle
sind dies die Kommentarevon Thomas, Albert dem Groen, Walter
Burleyund schlielichAlbertvon Sachsen. Nachdem alle diese Schichten
und der Kommentarin seinemzeitgenssischen
Kontexterfat
freigelegt
knnte
schlielich
mit
der
des Textes
wurde,
philosophischen
Interpretation
ist somitimmerder
begonnenwerden.Die philosophischeInterpretation
letzteSchritt.
Diese methodologische
istentscheidend
frdie Interpretation
Feststellung
mittelalterlicher
als philosophischerText und litAristoteleskommentare
erarischeGattung.Ich habe schon vorhergesagt,da die "stemmatische"
der Kommentartradition
nichtzu einemreinenauthentischen
Verflechtung
Text fhrt,sondern ihn gleichsam auflst.Das FragmentP kann als
BeispieleinesKommentarsdienen,der nach der FreilegungallerSchichten
sich vollstndigaufzulsen scheint, die Originalittdes Kommentars
schmilzt
wie Schneeim Frhling.
Hier istmglicherweise
eine Einschrnkung
Ich
in
natrlich
Linie
erster
von
den
Literalkommentaren.
ntig.
spreche
36Die verschiedenen
Formen
zu unterscheiden
des "Kopierens"
versucht
J.J.Walsh,
Some
between
Gerald
Odo'sandJohn
Buridan's
Commentaries
onAristotle's
in:
"Ethics}'
Relationships
Franciscan
35 (1975),237-75.In diesemanregenden
Artikel
beweist
Studies,
JJ. Walsh,
da Questiones
decern
vonJohannes
libros
Ethicorum
Buridan
zumgroenTeil von
super
Gerardus
Odonisabhngt.
Die Konsequenzen
frdieInterpretation
dieser
Erkenntnis
von
Buridans
wurden
meines
Wissens
nochnichtuntersucht.
Moralphilosophie

18:46:55 PM

248

CHRISTOPH
FLELER

Die Quaestionenkommentaren
folgenanderen,wenn auch vergleichbaren
ist von derjenigender Literalkommentare
Tendenzen. Ihre berlieferung
zu unterscheiden.
Aber auch sie drfennichtisoliertbetrachtetwerden,
auch sie bilden untereinanderein Netz von Abhngigkeiten.37
Kann
Literalkommentar.
Doch zurck zu unseremfragmentarischen
der Kommentar tatschlich,wie Michael meinte,Johannes Buridan
da das Fragment P als
zugeschriebenwerden? Es ist offensichtlich,
zu
Buridans
Quaestionengeschriebenwurde. Einige przise
Ergnzung
Querverweiseerhrtendies. Wenn es nichtBuridanwar, der den Literalmindestensals
kommentarverfate,mute er seinen Literalkommentar
zu
Buridans
haben.
Der
betrachtet
ausschlaggebende
Quaestionen
Ergnzung
Satz ist in der Tat, wie Michael feststellte,
die uerung:"Et ideoiuxta
conclusionem
secundum
etmaxime
iuxtaprimicapituli
primam
quopraedictam
partem
libri. . ."38
istamquaestionem,
tationem
sanciiThomae
invenvo
quaeestprimahuiustertii
Der Satz ist jedoch zweideutig.Michael hat, wie schon oben bemerkt
als "ich, Buridan, denke mir aus" gelesen. Die konsewurde, "invenid"
von lectura
und quaestiones
und der VerweisaufThomas
quenteVerflechtung
an Bedeutunggewinnt,
von Aquin,der in BuridansQuaestionenkommentar
mache diese Deutung glaubhaft.Andererseitsknnteaber der Verfasser
des Literalkommentars
auch sagen wollen,da "er diese (folgende)Frage
obwohl der
auffindet".Diese Deutung scheint sogar wahrscheinlicher,
Verfasserdie Frage nicht eigentlichgefundenhat, sondern schn der
Reihe nach die Fragen Buridansaufeinanderfolgenlt. Gegen Michaels
von Expositio
und
Deutung sprichtauch die Tatsache, da das Verflechten
da
sonst
die
Literalkommentare
Buridan
Quaestionenbei
einmaligwre,
immervon den Quaestionenkommentaren
getrenntsind und sogar eine
in
derselben
Handschrift
eher die Ausnahme
gleichzeitigeberlieferung
durchaus
bildet.39Ferner zeigt Buridan in seinen Literalkommentaren
37Zu Buridans
Buridan
undseiner
J.J.Walsh,
Quaestionenkommentar
Quellenbentzung:
and
andSeneca,
in:Journal
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
27 (1966),23-40;idem,
Nominalism
: Some
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
theEthics
Remarks
about
Buridan3
s Commentary
, in:Journal
und
4 (1966),1-13;vergleiche
derGroe
auchdie anregende
Arbeit
vonO. Pluta,Albert
undder
Buridan
, in: MJ.F.M.HoenenundA. de Libera(Edd.),Albertus
Magnus
Johannes
York-Kln
Kultur
desMittelalters
Albertismus.
Deutsche
1995,91-105.
, Leiden-New
philosophische
38Korolec1970(op.dt., FN 12),71. Ich habehier
- quaesitationem
- wieoben
ersetzt
FN 26).
durchquotationem
(cf.
39Dies trifft
cod.
Biblioteca
del CapitolCatedral,
auchaufdie Handschrift
Tortosa,
texf.
cum
aufweist:
74v:
108zu,diefolgendes
expositione
"Expliciunt
quaestiones
Explicit
tussupraArtem
Veterem
a magistro
et fuitreportata
ab AlanopraeBuridan
Johanne
libri
enthlt
zuerstdie "Quaestiones
Et sic sitfinisetc."Die Handschrift
positoetc.
"
eineExpositio
Michael1985(op.cit.,FN 1),473)undanschlieend
(f.26r-42v,
Peryermenias

18:46:55 PM

ZURNIKOMAGHISCHEN
ETHIK
BURIDANS
KOMMENTARE

249

und schlielichkonnte noch keine vergleichbare

mehr Selbstndigkeit,
AbhngigkeitBuridans von Albert in anderen Werken aufgezeigtwerkaum persnlicheZge
den.40Selbst wenn bei einem Literalkommentar
sichtbarwerdenund deshalb eine Zuschreibungaufgrundvon formalen
zu sein scheint,entspricht
Kriterienimmerproblematisch
und inhaltlichen
dieser Kommentarin keinerWeise anderen Kommentaren,die wir mit
SicherheitBuridan zuschreibenknnen. Aufgrunddieser berlegungen
zur
da kein einzigerLiteralkommentar
scheintes eher wahrscheinlich,
ist.
NikomachischenEthikvon Buridan berliefert
Fribourg
de Fribourg
Universit

zurArsvetus
Michael1985(op. cit
Buridan., FN 1),455).Einigederltesten
(f.43r-74v,
Handschriften
Handschrift
dieQuaestiones
enthalten
unddie(dazugejedochinderselben
: Brugge,
Hessische
StB,477 (De celo),Darmstadt,
LuHB,Hs. 516
hrende)
Expositio
De SSens.,
MRem.),
Erfurt,
WAB,CA F.298(Physica,
Erfurt,
WAB,CA Q. 325
(Metaphysica),
etcorruption
Vendme,
BV, 169
(Degeneratione
e), Paris,BnF,lat. 16131(Metaphysica),
(Deanima).
40Grundstzlich
isteinsolcher
Einflu
nicht
Die Quaestionen
zuMeteora
auszuschlieen.
hatBuridan
FN 1),659-75).
nachAlbert
1985(op. cit.,
Auchdieletz(Michael
geschrieben
te Fassung
lectura
des Physikkommentars
nachAlberts
Kommentar
(ultima
) hatBuridan
an seinerfrheren
da er dortaufAlberts
Kritik
geschrieben,
Kommentierung
reagiert.
FN 20),50ff.).
1989(op.cit.,
AuchBuridans
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Questiones
(Sarnowsky
super
zumTeilnachAlberts
sindmindestens
Ethikkommentar
ImJahre1356hat
entstanden.
NationdieErlaubnis
einbeliebiges
BuchderMoralAlbert
vonderEnglischen
erhalten,
zulesen.ZweiJahre
ereinhnliches
erhielt
frVorlesungen
spter
philosoph
Zugestndnis
& Ae. Chatelain,
berdiePolitica,
Univ.
Paris1935,I,
Par.,ed. H. Denifle
(vgl.Auctarium
S. 199und225undChr.Fleler,
undInterpretation.
. ., Teil 1, 153)).Die Kopie
Rezeption
in derHandschrift
CittdelVaticano,
vonAlberts
Ethikkommentars
BAV,Pal.lat.1030
f. 19lv:"Ethicorum
istaufdasJahr1355datiert:
dietaAlberti
de Saxoniaannodomini
1355Parisius"
imJahre1359,
1927(op.t.,FN 23),63).EinJahrspter,
(Heidingsfelder
laserwahrscheinlich
dieTconomica.
19XX(op.cit.,FN 22)Teil2, 2). Da die
(vgl.Fleler
ausdreiBchern
bekanntlich
unddieEthikdas grundlegende
besteht,
Moralphilosophie
Buchderpraktischen
daAlbert
zuerst
war,kanndarausgeschlossen
werden,
Philosophie
dieEthik
derEthikkommentar
in denJahren
1355/6bis 1358entstanden
las,undsomit
seinmu.Reinchronologisch
wrealsoeineAutorschaft
Buridans
nichtauszugesehen
da dieQuaestionen
zu densptesten
Werken
Buridans
schlieen,
gehren.

18:46:55 PM

Reviews
andAlasdair
A. MacDonald(eds.),Centres
and
JanWillem
Drijvers
ofLearning.
Learning
Location
inPre-Modem
andthe
NearEast.Brill,
Leiden1995xiv+ 340pp.ISBN
Europe
90 04 101934 (Brill's
Studies
in Intellectual
History,
61).
The Centre
forClassical,
Mediaeval
andRenaissance
Studies
Oriental,
(COMERS)at
theUniversity
of Groningen,
is an interdisciplinary
research
institute
around
organized
thegeneral
andtheTransmission
ofKnowledge
from
ancient
times
project,
"Knowledge
totheRenaissance,
inbothEastandWest."Thisvolume
through
represents
origipapers
at an international
conference
at Groningen,
theestablishment
of
nallypresented
marking
COMERSas a research
institute
in 1993.Organized
tofour
"From
themes,
according
major
anAntique
andSchools,"
and"Expanding
Land,""Exoriente
Lux,""Cloisters
Horizons,"
thecollection
consists
oftwenty-six
allpublished
articles
inEnglish,
theestabfrom
ranging
oftwomajorschools
lishment
or academies
ofUr
byShulgi,
kingoftheThirdDynasty
c. 2100-2000
BCE and theEdubacurriculum,
"thefirst
and
whichoffered
articulated
ofliterature,
notmerely
on record,
butin history
as such,"(16)to
explicit
generic
system
theinfluence
oftheScottisch
in thelatesixteenth
andearly
ChapelRoyalon education
seventeenth
centuries.
thediversity
ofsubjects
theeditors
treated,
Acknowledging
express
theirhope"thatthecentral
oflearning'
willnonetheless
to this
topicof'centres
impart
a realmeasure
volume
ofthematic
coherence.
a combination
ofhuman
Knowledge
implies
andmaterial
a particular
resources
within
socialcontext,
andthetransmission
ofknowla socialandintellectual
which
orinformally,
edgepresupposes
reflects,
dynamic,
formally
a particular
institutional
or religious
environment."
and
(xiii)Whiletheinterdisciplinary
contextualized
forthecollection
is tobe admired,
theextent
towhich
theediperspective
tors'hopehasbeenrealized
remains
Formanyoftheessays,
it is notso
questionable.
muchthemutual
influence
oflearning
andlocation
thatis thefocus,
butsimply
learning
ina givenlocation.
Somecontributions
do notevenaddress
thecentral
theme
inanybut
themostindirect
inandofthemselves
thespaceallotted
merit
fashion,
them;
though
they
areJohnW.Watt's
Eastward
andWestward
Rhetoric
Transmission
such,forexample,
,
ofClassical
FredLeemhuis'
TheKoran
anditsExegesis:
From
and
toLearning,
, (91-102),
(63-75),
Memorising
Wolfhart
Heinrichs'
TheClassification
andtheConsolidation
inClassical
oftheSciences
ofPhilology
Thevolume,
is notinterdisciplinary,
buta multidisciplinary
colIslam,
moreover,
(120-39).
lection
ofrather
traditional
intellectual
withlittle
or no attempt
or
at temporal
history,
cultural
withthemajorexceptions
ofGeorge
and
Makdisi's
comparison,
Baghdad,
Bologna,
Scholasticism
andHanJ.W.Drijvers'
TheSchool
Greek
andLocal
, (141-57)
ofEdessa:
Learning
Culture
A thematic,
rather
thanstrictly
a chronological
have
, (49-59).
organization,
might
facilitated
forthereader
inanycase,whensuchan important
andoften
overcomparison
oflearning
lookedcenter
as thefamily,
forexample,
is thefocusforJanN. Bremmer's
TheFamily
andOther
Centres
inAntiquity
AnneMarieDe Gendt's
, (29-38),
ofReligious
Learning
Aucuns
: "Home-Made"
Books
inMedieval
France
andA.A.
, (279-88)
petisenseignemens
Courtesy
MacDonald's
TheRenaissance
Household
as Centre
Thereis muchtobe
, (289-98).
ofLearning
learned
from
thisbook,butuponreading
thefinalpage,oneis notonlyenriched,
but
alsoleftwondering
it wouldnotbe titled
whether
the
moreaccurately:
Learning
Through
A Miscellany.
Ages:
In addition
to theoverall
lackofcohesion,
thevolume
suffers
from
theproverbial
diseaseplaguing
inthequality
In
conference
variation
ofcontributions.
namely,
proceedings,
it maynotbe all thatsurprising
thislight,
to findsuchinfelicitous
factual
errors
as the
dateofMichaelofCessena's
from
ofOckham
and
withWilliam
flight
Avignon
together
ofBergamo
to
than26 May,withreference
Bonagratia
givenas Marchof 1328,rather
Michaelat thattimeas the"former
oftheFranciscan
order"
(237).The
minister-general
shouldhaveprevented
theprinting
oftheerroneous
assertion
editors,
however,
perhaps
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,2

18:48:52 PM

REVIEWS

25 1

ofOckham's
deathhaving
in 1349,on thebasisofwhich
occurred
theargument
is made
thatOckham
thusoutlived
ofBavaria
which"partially
the
bytwoyears,
Ludwig
explains
thatintheendOckham's
toLudwig's
contribution
wasmoreimportant
impression
policy
thanthatofMarsilius,"
thatOckham
(241-2)whenforovera decadeithasbeenknown
diedon April10,1347.
Andyet,there
aresometruly
articles
thatshould
notbe missed.
Particular
noteworthy
mention
should
be madeofMayke
deJong's
OldLawandNew-Found
Power:
Hrabanus
study,
Maurus
andtheOldTestament
F.A.vanLiere's
Andrew
, (161-76),
(d.1175):Scholar
ofSt.Victor
MarciaL. Colish'sThedevelopment
Between
Cloister
andSchool
(187-96),
ofLombardian
Theology,
1160-1215
andtheHereford
PeterBinkley's
Dominicans
and
, (207-28),
, (255-64),
John
Bromyard
"
Catrien
Liberation
theTrivial
Yoke":
Dutch
andtheir
Renaissance
Educators
Cultural
from
Santing's,
thelastofwhichis oneofthefewcontributions
andSocio-Political
to
, (315-28),
Objectives
andlocation,
andtestifies
to thevalueof
therelationship
between
address
directly
learning
doingso whendonewithexpertise.
inworth
exceeds
thevalueofthepaperrequired
toprint
it.
Centres
Overall,
ofLearning
andthedistance
from
thestated
itslimitations
is,the
goalthefinalproduct
Recognizing
oflearning
often
be praised
forcalling
attention
to locations
volume
should
passedover
whorarely
lookbeyond
theinstitutions
ofschool
andtheologians
byhistorians,
philosophers
mentioned
it wasthefamily
anduniversity.
Whether
(seearticles
above),thecourt(see
andT. van
M. deJong,D.E.H. de Boer,A.J.Vandeijagt,
articles
byM.E. Vogelzang,
oflearncenters
oreventheReclusorium
(seearticle
byA.B.Mulder-Bakker),
Heijnsbergen),
tothe"ivory
tower"
andtheclose
confined
makes
clear,werenever
ing,as thiscollection
theextent
callsintoquestion
andpower
illustrated
between
association
throughout
learning
in thefirst
ancient
wasivory
to whichthetower
Mesopotamia
(Vogelzang)
place;from
ofpowerpolitics
and
wasan instrument
to Renaissance
learning
Burgundy
(Vanderjagt),
makes
Centres
Thedegree
towhich
ofideology.
andmaintenance
ofthecreation
ofLearning
renders
the
withsomeofitsoutstanding
individual
thisevident,
contributions,
together
final
in thecollection's
ofF. Akkerman's
conclusion
a contemporary
confirmation
volume
wasan intellecnever
Modern
inEarly
Latin
Literature
, (330-40):
"Groningen
Groningen
essay,
farexceeds
the
Paduaor Paris,butitsimportance
likeAlexandria,
tualcentre
Baghdad,
in
a
somewhat
off-centre
of
Europe."
city
atmosphere
provincial
regional,
E.L. Saak

Groningen

Aldershot
Mathematics
andtheMedieval
1995,
Variorum,
Molland,
Ancestry
ofPhysics.
George
xii+ 336pp.
to thesort
is notsubject
ofmathematics
assume
thatthehistory
Mostmathematicians
andother
to havetakenplacein astronomy,
ofrevolutions
chemistry,
physics,
supposed
- howcouldtwoplustwoequalanything
If theproofs
butfour?
of
branches
ofscience
of
thantheyneedto havebeen,thetheorems
aremorecumbersome
Euclid's
geometry
andpostulates.
Butevenif
do follow,
Euclidean
definitions,
givenitsaxioms,
geometry
in whichmathematics
hasbeenexpressed
theforms
do notchange,
truths
mathematical
itis neverwithitself,
consistent
remains
AndevenifEuclidean
havechanged.
geometry
non-Euclidean
truethatonecandevelop
theless
geometries.
- an essayreview
articles
of
ofpreviously
ofthiscollection
In a keyarticle
published
A
Introduction
and
Historical
andMogens
OlafPedersen
Pihl,Early
(London
Physics Astronomy:
- George
vs.matter
todistinofform
Molland
usestheterminology
andNewYork1974)
oftheories
to or implied
have
beencommon
what
(thematter)
bya number
may
guish
in histerms,
"howa theory
theoretical
from
whatwasspecial
toa particular
formulation,
that
to themindsof itspropagators"
(IX.55). Suggesting
actually
appeared
integrally
Vivarium
36,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1998
Koninklijke

18:48:52 PM

252

REVIEWS

and
the"formal"
Pedersen
and Pihlin theirbookundervalued
aspectofearlyphysics
as "metascience"
Molland
notto takemodern
mathematics
guiding
astronomy,
proposed
inthe
ofmathematics
butinstead,
thewriting
ofthehistory
(as advocated
byKarlDurr),
to treatmathematical
as "a complex
ofself-contained
wordsofOswaldSpengler,
history
andindependent
an ever-repeated
ofbringing
to birth
newformdevelopments,
process
and sloughing
alienform-worlds"
and appropriating,
worlds,
(IX.56).The
transforming
- withDescartes
- , saidSpengler,
"Western
soul"
as itsagent
"hadto winitsownby
in
and
but
theessentially
alienEuclidean
apparently
destroying
altering perfecting, reality
In thehistory
ofmathematics,
Mollandconcluded,
it is dangerous
to translate
system."
intomodern
is evertempting,
mathematical
terms.
"Suchtranslation
pastmathematics
often
Buton manyoccasions
itcangreatly
mislead."
done,andsometimes
justified.
Asan example
oftranslation
ofthedangers
intomodern
mathematical
Molland
terms,
tookthecaseofBradwardine's
law.In hisDeproportionibus
inmotibus
velocitatum
, dated1328,
ThomasBradwardine
a theory
ofoperations
on ratiosthatenabledhimto
expounded
a novelinterpretation
ofAristotle's
statements
therelations
offorces,
propose
concerning
andvelocities.
Sincetheseventeenth
mathematicians
haveunderstood
resistances,
century
- adding,
ratiosas rational
numbers
or fractions,
arithmetical
on ratios
taking
operations
- as identical
and so forth
to thesameoperations
on
subtracting,
multiplying,
dividing,
fractions.
Thishashadtheresult
thathistorians
ofscience
andmathematics
havefound
it nearlyimpossible
to explainbothclearlyand non-anachronistically
Bradwardine's
- howhecouldinsomesense
oftherelations
offorces,
andvelocities
resistances,
theory
proareproportional
to thelogarithm
oftheratioofforceto resistance
posethatvelocities
whenlogarithms
hadnotyetbeeninvented.
- TheGeometrical
In theearliest
article
here
tothe"Merton
School"
in:
reprinted
Background
- Molland
British
fortheHistory
ofScience,
4 (1968),108-25
madea concerted
Journal
to explain
themathematical
whichBradwardine's
statement
attempt
background
against
couldbe understood
as heunderstood
it.Ratios,
onBradwardine's
arenot
understanding,
rational
butrelations
between
twomagnitudes.
In a series
ofthree
ormorepronumbers,
theratioofthefirst
to thethird
is understood
to be
portional
magnitudes,
magnitude
"double"
theratioofthefirst
tothesecond.
Moregenerally,
continuous
ratios
the
(where
denominator
ofoneratiois thesameas thenumerator
ofthenext)canbe understood
tobe "added"bytaking
theratioofthenumerator
ofthefirst
ratioto thedenominator
ofthesecond:
(A:B)+ (B:C)= (A:C),

where
theaddition
inboldtosignalitis notsimple
in themodaddition
signis printed
ernsense.Bya similar
to "subtract"
theratio(B:C)from
theratio(A:C)
understanding,
wouldresult
in theratio(A:B).Wherethetworatios
areequal,theratio(A:C)is "double"theratio(A:B),whichmight
be written
as:
(A:C): (A:B)= 2:1,
where
theproportion
inboldtosignify
thatitis beingusedinsomesignis againprinted
other
thanthenormal
sense.
thing
ThenBradwardine's
lawoftherelations
offorces,
andvelocities
couldbe
resistances,
written:

V,:VJ-(F1:R1)s(F1:RI),
wheretheright
handsideoftheequation
is a "ratioofratios"
in thisspecialsense.As
Mollandindicated,
Anneliese
Galileis
in 14.Jahrhundert
Maier,in Die Vorlufer
(1949)was
thefirst
modern
writer
to emphasize
thespecialcharacteristic
ofBradwardine's
probably
in Giovanni
Marliani
andLateMedieval
law,whileMarshall
Clagett,
(1941)hadgiven
Physics
intoitsdifference
from
thetraditional
Aristotelian
view.Withhissustained
effort
glimpses
toexplain
"thegeometrical
to theMerton
Molland
togo
School,"
background
attempted

18:48:58 PM

REVIEWS

253

a stepfurther,
to bring
readers
intothe"form-world"
offourteenth-century
ratiotheory,
inhisownterms,
sothatthey
understand
howBradwardine's
rule"actually
could,
appeared
- ifthescholarly
to theminds
ofitspropagators."
It wasa nobleeffort
world
integrally
is notyettotally
thismaybe explained
notbyanyfailing
ofMolland's,
but
enlightened,
toowellto layit asidewhiletrying
knowtheir
mathematics
to
bythefactthatreaders
understand
an earlier
mathematical
"form-world."
- AnExamination
inthiscollection,
In byfarthelongest
article
then
GeoofBradwardine's
- Molland
19
describes
in:
Archive
for
of
Exact
the
Sciences,
(1978),113-75
History
metiy,
inhis
indetail,
a workwhich
hehadedited
contents
ofBradwardine's
Geometria
Speculativa
in
ofCambridge
heultimately
doctoral
dissertation
1967)andwhich
published
(University
to usetheGeometria
to
revised
version
Speculativa
(FranzSteiner
Verlag,1989).Attempting
andtherelation
ofthistoother
see"what
itreveals
ofmedieval
consciousness
geometrical
fields
ofintellectual
MollandquotesPedroSanchezCirvelo,
who,in 1495,
endeavour,"
that
all thegeometrical
conclusions
workas "gathering
described
Bradwardine's
together
Internal
ofAristotle"
ofartsandofthephilosophy
aremostneededbystudents
(1.120).
waswritten
before
thattheGeometria
indicates
to Molland,
evidence,
Speculativa
according
theGeometria
datedin 1328.Interestingly,
inmotibus,
velocitatum
Deproportionibus
Bradwardine's
thepointofviewtakenin De proportionibus
hasrulesofratiosthatsupport
(for
Speculativa
is composed
from
theratiosofthemeans,"
"Theratiooftheextremes
1.127),
instance,
withratios,
oneclosertothemodforanother
butitalsoprovides
wayofdealing
support
or
So it saysthat"Ratiosaresimilar
numbers.
ofratios
withrational
ernidentification
ofa ratiois
are equal,"wherethe"denomination"
equalofwhichthedenominations
oftheratio2:1would
orfraction
thenumber
equaltoit- as thedenomination
essentially
"Iftherearefourcontinuously
Bradwardine
be 2. Likewise,
writes,
quantiproportional
is equalto therecofthefirst
intothefourth
themultiplication
ties,whatis madefrom
ofthesecondintothethird"
themultiplication
thatis madefrom
Thus,
(I.128).1
tangle
as iftheyarethesamething
withratios
witha wayofdealing
Bradwardine
wasfamiliar
witheachother).
oftheratioarecommensurable
as fractions
is,so longas theterms
(that
as relations
inDeproportionibus
, he expounded
When,
quite
onlytheviewthattakesratios
within
which
a narrower
framework
he wasconsciously
different
from
fractions,
creating
hadto
ofwhatAristotle
rule"couldseemto be a natural
"Bradwardine's
interpretation
in thePhysics.
andvelocities
offorces,
resistances,
sayabouttherelations
as it
wasas wellknown
function
to Bradwardine's
thegeometrical
Before
background
havebeen
function
thatBradwardine's
hadproposed
is now,MichaelMcVaugh
might
forinstance,
which
ofcompound
fortheeffect
from
earlier
models
supposed,
drugs,
adapted
theeffective
thatas theratioofhotto coldgrewgeometrically,
degreegrewarithmetithemodelforhis
itself
If Mollandis right
thatmathematics
gaveBradwardine
cally.2
- , thenitshould
- andI think
ifwefind
notbe surprising
heis right
function
dynamical
I havearguedthatthisway
Bradwardine.
" la Bradwardine"
wellbefore
treated
ratios
Butifthiswasthecase,what
as earlyas Euclid.3
withratios
wasin existence
ofdealing
of ratiosto reinterpret
to makeuse ofthisformof themathematics
led Bradwardine
What
andwidely
so rapidly
law?Andwhywashisproposal
Aristotle's
adopted?
dynamical
whilefor
thatmadeitaccept"Bradwardine's
wasitaboutthescholastic
rule,"
community
As MollandsugAristotelian
to espousea generally
themostpartit continued
physics?
of musicmostlikely
provided
discipline
gests,theuse of ratiosin themathematical
continuous
ratios
source(IX.69).In musicas in Bradwardine,
immediate
Bradwardine's
theform
In thisway,understanding
theratiooftheir
extremes.
were"added"bytaking
connecintolikely
historical
it provides
ruleas he understood
ofBradwardine's
insight
doesnot.
formulation
whilea modern,
tions,
"mathematically
equivalent"
has beenthemostfoundational
Whilehisworkon Bradwardine's
partof
geometry
thebreadth
ofinterests
with
contained
hereindicate
theshorter
articles
Molland's
oeuvre,
has
work.
SecondonlytoBradwardine
hisBradwardinian
Molland
hassurrounded
which
inthepreface
andstillcontinuing
focus.
Asheexplains
beenRogerBaconas an enduring

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254

REVIEWS

to thisbook,Mollandtookup theeffort
to contrast
mathmedieval
andearlymodern
ematics
and mathematical
in partbecausehe hada sensethatStillman
Drake
physics
"hadputhisfinger
on something
butthathisinterpretation
wasaskew"
(x).A
important,
Molland
seesbetween
themedievais
andtheearly
is one
modern
authors
majordifference
ofstyle.
Whereas
thescholastics
hada "probing
which
"aimedprincipally
fora
attitude,"
ofexisting
authors
madea "morethrustdeeper
understanding
knowledge,"
earlymodern
forprogressing
outwards
intonewfields,"
andwhich
attack,
ingandaxiomatic
designed
led"totheproudandconscious
creation
ofnewsciences"
be
(x).On thisscale,itmight
Molland's
ownworkresembles
thatofthescholastics
muchmorethanit resemnoted,
blesthatofearlymodern
authors.
Butthere
werealsodifferences
between
scholastic
andearly
modern
mathematical
physics
ofa moretechnical
nature.
Molland's
research
thecharacterization
often
generally
supports
associated
withAlexandre
towhich
likeGalileo,
scientists
Koyr,
according
earlymodern
- so thatDescartes
andNewton
hada muchmorerealistic
viewofmathematics
Descartes,
couldclaimthathisphysics
was "nothing
butgeometry"
hereby Molland,
(quoted
- whereas
scholastics
suchas Albertus
mathematical
entities
as
XIV.463)
Magnustreated
as characteristics
concepts
existing
onlyin themathematicians'
or,at most,
imaginations
ofphysical
bodiesconceived
in abstraction
fromthosebodies.In Shifting
the
foundations.
Descartes's
in:Historia
Mathematica
3 (1978):21-49,Molland
transformation
ofancient
geometry,
cashedoutSpengler's
claimthatDescartes
had"destroyed"
in detail
Euclid,byshowing
- forinstance
thewaysinwhich
Descartes's
differed
from
Euclid's
procedure
byincluding
theimagination
ofmathematical
instruments
andbytheuseofnewer
methods
ofartificial
symbolism.
In attempting
todistinguish
Galileo's
mathematical
from
thatofthelaterMiddle
physics
Drakehadpointed
to instances
in whichGalileocompared,
the
Ages,Stillman
pairwise,
infinite
elements
oftwomotions
whereas
themedievais,
(suchas instantaneous
velocities),
hesaid,tended
toconsider
motions
as wholes.
In TheAtomisatxon
onlycompleted
ofMotion:
A Facet
Revolution
in theHistory
andPhilosophy
ofScience,
13
oftheScientific
, in:Studies
Molland
triedtopullapartwhatwasaccurate
from
(1982),31-54,andin related
articles,
- orpolite
- inhiscriwhatwasmisguided
inDrake'sview.He was,however,
so oblique
between
hisviewand thatofDrakewerenotalways
tiquethatthedifferences
entirely
clear.In myviewDrakefloated
a number
ofmistaken
theories
aboutmedieval
mathe- alwaysas the"other"
matical
to whatGalileohaddonebetter,
andgenerally
physics
- whichtheories
without
an extended
or sympathetic
ofthemedieval
sources
will
study
continue
toconfuse
views
of
medieval
until
medievalists
and
people's
physics
painstakingly
shootthemdown.
successfully
Thereis alsounfinished
business
inMolland's
ofPederson
andPihl,where
essayreview
he raisesimportant
aboutJordanus
de Nemore,
Gerard
ofBrussels,
andJohannes
points
de Tinemue
Melchisedec
waswithout
father
andmother,
andwithout
(IX.69ff).
descent,
Molland
is rightly
abouttheories
thathaveno
amusingly
says,butthehistorian
skeptical
Pederson
andPihlintroduce
Gerard
ofBrussels's
De motu
ancestry.
, whichtheyplacein
thefirst
halfofthethirteenth
as ifit reliedon no previous
work.Thereare,
century,
in ascertaining
theorigins
andcultural
context
ofa wholesetofwritindeed,
problems
inthesamemanuscripts:
Gerard
ofBrussels'
De motu
ingsthatoften
appeartogether
; variousworks
ofJordanus
deNemore;
andJohannes
deTinemue's
Decurvis
superficiebus.
Heiberg
asserted
thatDe curvis
wasa translation
from
theArabic.
Marshall
first
superficiebus
Clagett
withHeiberg,
butlatersuggested
thatitmayhavebeentranslated
from
theGreek.
agreed
thattheworkhada Latinorigin.
Theworks
ofJordanus
however,
G.J.Toomer,
argued
on statics
havelikewise
beensupposed
bysometo havehadan Arabicor evenGreek
andbyothers
to havebeenLatincreations.
origin
Several
oftheworks
ofJordanus
andtheothers
existinmultiple
ofwhich
one
versions,
whileothers
are apparently
neweditions
maybe theoriginal,
of,or commentaries
on,

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255

or not.But,having
thatfirst
whether
reviewed
thestatus
thatwasa translation
version,
Molland
concludes
anticlimatically:
questionisi
rather
thantoprovide
a
ofthissection
hasbeentopointup a problem
Thepurpose
I amtempted
all three
to regard
authors
as writing
in
Forwhatit'sworth,
resolution.
intwelfth
ina Greek
cultural
cenbutmoving
orhaving
moved
ambience,
Latin,
perhaps
ofGreek
mathematical
someofthespirit
where
orByzantium,
tury
Sicily
they
acquired
on Greek
mathematical
Theirworks
wouldthenbe drawing
works,
heavily
procedures.
thetruth
. . . Butwhatever
butwouldnotbe meretranslations.
nolonger
extant,
many
ofscholarstate
ofthiskindmaybe,itis atleastclearthatinthepresent
ofconjectures
Latin
werea direct
ofmedieval
toassume
thatthese
works
product
shipitis dangerous
culture
(IX.67).
ofSicilyor
one- and eventhesuggestion
is a veryconservative
Whilethisconclusion
- I aminclined
does
thanMolland
farther
ispushing
as a context
typically
things
Byzantium
or earlythirteenth-century
seemoutofplacein thelatetwelfth
to agree.Theseworks
in
thanis found
mathematical
ina moresophisticated
LatinWestandtobe written
style
andPihl'sneglect
of
in thattimeandplace.WhilePederson
works
thatoriginated
other
behind
the
forces
thedynamical
to understand
itimpossible
makes
form
orcontext
lying
to
inmoving
tooboldly
there
is a danger
mathematical
ofmedieval
physics,
development
sufficient
evidence.
without
tryto resolve
mysteries
tothesameproblem
theapproach
In thisregard
onemight
Knorr,
byWilbur
compare
of
of
thepleasures
will
the
death
whoserecent
community
scholarly
deprive
premature
words
touseMolland's
forprogressing
. . . attack,
histypical
outwards,"
designed
"thrusting
aliasJohn
InJohn
authors.
ofLondon:
emerging
portrait
ofTynemouth
earlymodern
describing
23 (1990),
ofScience,
fortheHistory
mathematician
medieval
, in:British
Journal
ofa singular
thevarious
of regarding
Knorrmadetheprogressive
that,instead
293-330,
suggestion
of
Gerard
de Nemore,
ascribed
toJordanus
inthecorpus
manuscript
copiesoftheworks
we
setofworks,
as variants
ofa single
ofBath(!)
andAdelard
Brussels,
JohnofTinemue,
the
eachreedited
andtheothers
ofBrussels,
Gerard
that
assume
rather
JohnofTinemue,
ediwouldhavebeenJohnofTinemue's
Thusthere
works.
ofmathematical
wholecorpus
wouldhavecreofBrussels
De quadratura
De curuis
tionofEuclid,
, etc.,Gerard
superfiebus,
of
deductions
etc.By a seriesoflinked
ofall theworks,
atedhisownversions
worthy
thatJohnofTinemue
Knorrendsup bysuggesting
Sherlock
(alternately
John
Holmes,
to byRogerBaconin hisOpusTertium
ofTynemouth)
is theJohnofLondonreferred
oftheday
mathematicians
oneofthetwo"perfect"
as, alongwithPeterofMaricourt,
waslikely
to Knorr,
aliasJohnofLondon,
ThisJohnofTynemouth
according
(303-4).
IIIA" andalsothe
to as "Adelard
referred
ofEuclidcommonly
oftheversion
theeditor
Knorr
ofwordusage(298-301),
ofDecurvis
author/editor
assigns
Byananalysis
superciebus.
inFlorence
found
circuii
ofDe quadratura
theversion
inaddition,
tothissingular
(MS
John,
ofDefiguris
f.9v-12v)
andtheversion
Bibi.naz.,conv.soppr.
ysoperimetris
J.V.30,14cent.,
ofeach
different
versions
inOxford
found
Havingattributed
(MSDigby174,f.178v-79r).
a like
on toascribe
Knorrthenforges
author/
unnamed
toa second,
ofthesetexts
editor,
or diswhomhe takesas an associate
ofBrussels,
to Gerard
editions
ofworks/
collection
- on
toDe motu
, Knorrargues
(315).In addition
cipleofhisJohnofTynemouth/London
De
circuii
of
of
the
version
author/
editor
was
the
that
Gerard
quadratura
grounds
linguistic
ofa version
f.65v-66v),
inNaples(MS Bibl.naz.lat.VIII.C.22.thirteenth-century,
found
in thephrase
to byGerardin De motu
butreferred
ofDe curvis
(notknown,
superficiebus
" librum
edited
cuiuslibet
oftheArtis
depiramidibus
consummatio,
"), and,mostsurprisingly,
per
- a date
to 1193
reference
anddatedbyhimon thebasisofan internal
byS.K. Victor
colofBrussels,
to makeGerard
withKnorr's
muchtooearlyto be compatible
attempt
to RogerBacon,itsauthor.4
oftheJohnofLondonknown
leagueordisciple

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256

REVIEWS

Knorr's
chainofidentifications
witha reading
of"comUnfortunately,
amazing
begins
" in an
mentimi
deLond(oniis)
cummonoculo
oftheDigby174copyof
Johannis
uppermargin
"Adelard
III"- hencesupporting
theclaimthat
of
JohnofLondonwastheauthor/editor
Adelard
III. Butthephotograph
ofthisheading
thatKnorr
shows
provides
(302,
2)
Figure
thatwhatitsaysis,not"commentami
but"quatemi
leaf
," whileonthefront
clearly
Johannis
"liber
ofthesamemanuscript
is written
deLond(oniis)
delibrano
sancti
Cant"
Johannis
August.
It is known
thatthemanuscript
wasinfactgiventothelibrary
ofSt.Augustine's
Abbey,
butKnorrsaysonly,
"Therelation
ofthetwoJohns
Canterbury
byoneJohnofLondon,
hasyetto be clarified."
thetwoJohns
areobviously
thesame
SadlyforKnorr's
theory,
andtheidentification
oftheJohnofLondonmentioned
person
byRogerBaconwiththe
editorofAdelard
III breaks
wonderful
houseof
down,and,withit,muchofKnorr's
cards.Bycomparison,
Molland's
toleavetheproblem
ofthecontext
ofthese
willingness
authors
stillunresolved
nowseemsonlyprudent.
I return,
tothevolume
ofGeorge
Molland's
articles
hereunderreview.
Molland
then,
makes
thekindof"thrusting
. . . attack,
forprogressing
outwards."
On the
rarely
designed
otherhand,Molland
hasa broadanddeepacquaintance
witha widerangeofmedieval
andearlymodern
mathematical
andphysical
hisjudgment
is typically
soundifcauwork,
a convincing
of "howa theory
tious,and he is oftenable to present
picture
actually
totheminds
ofitspropagators."
is whathistorians
of
appeared
integrally
That,I believe,
medieval
mathematics
andscience
should
aimfor.Weshould
be grateful
forevenmodest
success.
NC
Raleigh,

EdithDudleySylla

1 Herethetranslation
of"quodfitex ductu"by"whatis made(orarises)
from
the
is misleading
ifitis thought
ofin arithmetic
whereas
Bradwardine
multiplication"
terms,
is thinking
a rectangle
withtwogivensides.
geometrically,
forming
2 Michael
Arnald
Villanova
andBradwardine'
s Law, in:Isis,58(1966),
56-64.
McVaugh,
of
3Edith
Ratios:
Bradwardine
andthe
edition
, Oresme,
Sylla,Compounding
,
first
ofNewton's
Principia
in: Everett
Mendelsohn
andTradition
intheSciences.
Presented
to
(ed.),Transformation
Essays
I. Bernard
Cohen)
1984,11-43.
4 Knorr Cambridge
thatthedateis to be takennotas thedateoftheworkat issue,but
argues
as thedateofitssource.
Robert
Grosseteste:
NewPerspectives
onhisThought
andScholarship
, ed.JamesMcEvoy.
Brepols,
Turnhout
1995438pp. ISBN 2-503-50541-4
Patristica
(Instrumenta
XXVII).
Thisbookis a timely
one.Sincethepioneering
workofS. Harrison
Thomson
(1940)
and thecollection
of commemorative
essayseditedbyD.A. Callus(1955),Grosseteste
studies
haveseenthepublication
ofseveral
editions
ofhiswritings
andat leasttwomajor
somewhat
different
viewsofthemainlinesofhisdevelopment
books,
general
expressing
Southern
number
ofstud(James
McEvoy1982andRichard
1986),as wellas a growing
ieson hismultifaceted
andepiscopal
activities.
Muchworkhasbeeninitiated
scholarship
thelasttwodecadesor so,butitwasnoteasytocollect
all thefruits
of
during
together
theseprojects.
Thisbook,whichhad itsrather
distant
in a Conference
at the
origins
Institute
in 1987,is aimedat offering
sometasteofthesefruits,
andalthough
Warburg
someareclearly
moremature
thanothers,
theessays
do makea valuable
contogether
tribution
to ourknowledge
andappreciation
ofthatversatile
scholar
andpastor.
Readers
whocometo thisbookin theexpectation
offinding
theultimate
solution
to
themanyquestions
Grosseteste
's careerandchronology
ofhisworks
willbe
concerning
The opening
article
disappointed.
however,
byJ. Goering,
goesa longwaytowards
pre Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivaum
36,2

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257

as theologian,
a convincing
ofGrosseteste's
on the
development
offering
senting
picture
of Grosseteste's
aboutthevexedquestion
Oxford
wayalsoa suggestion
chancellorship.
andconfessional
on Grosseteste's
whichGoering
Basedin particular
penitential
writings,
editedandoften
redated
havecarefully
himself
andF.A.C.Mantello
studied,
(toan earcomestothesuasio
lierperiod,
thatisbefore
) thatGrosseteste
1230),
(nota persuasio
Goering
inParisaround1225,thereby
andtheology
studied
willy-nilly
reopenperhaps
philosophy
ofcontinental
Grosseteste
wasindependent
(thatis Parisian)
ingthedebateas towhether
As is wellknown,
Grosseteste's
Southern
stressed
studies
andthought
idiosynpatterns.
ofa nativeEnglish
ofmind,whichhe sawas a product
frame
craticandindependent
andthelucidity
withwhich
it
Thatpicture,
forallitsplausibility
tradition
ofscholarship.
A sojourn
in Francein the1220s
toosimple.
wasadvocated,
mayhavebeensomewhat
in
ofhisworks
forthedating
hisearlyuseofAverros
couldexplain
(withimplications
andWilliam
Grosseteste
ofAuvergne,
between
thesimilarities
which
hequotesAverros),
andimmediacy
ofhisconandthenumber
Summa
ofAuxerre's
hisuseofWilliam
Aurea,
masters
ofthe1220s.DuringtheseyearsGrosseteste
tactswithParisian
beganto study
he evercomin a systematic
level,butwhether
wayandat a moreadvanced
theology
a moot
master
undera regent
formal
studies
(andifso,whereandwhen)remains
pleted
sucha view.It
I think,
to thoseadvocating
ofproof,
beginsto shift
point;theburden
fora
thatmadehima suitable
candidate
credentials
thislackofformal
maybe precisely
thana masin Oxford,
rather
arrived
Franciscans
in theschoolofthenewly
lectureship
forthefact(ifwe
It mayevenaccount
from
theschools.
master
orregent
teroftheology
theeventin 1295)thatGrosseteste's
whorelated
aretobelieve
predecesBishopSutton,
"IfGrosseteste
tobe called"chancellor":
toGrosseteste
refused
sor,Bishop
permission
Hugh,
ofarts,thebishop
whilehewasstillonlya master
schools
waschosen
toheadtheOxford
ofsuchan unconventional
aboutthepropriety
wellhavehadreservations
ofLincoln
might
the
oftheevent(whatever
art.cit.,
reading
49).It is an attractive
(Goering,
appointment"
thewording
of
butI think
whichis notverygreat),
ofSutton's
trustworthiness
report,
morebythetitleofthe
thatBishopHughwasoffended
claimclearly
Sutton's
implies
this
himself.
thanbythecandidate
chancellor
ofOxford
office
created
Moreover,
newly
chancelas
election
date
of
Grosseteste's
the
down
not
does
supposed
interpretation pin
of
lateto thehigher
as coming
ofGrosseteste
discipline
lor,butgivenGoering's
picture
reafor
different
had
Southern
his
career
late
in
Oxford
be
it
must
suggested
(as
theology,
so far.
thanaround1214.Thewholeissueis a crucial
one,yetundecided
sons),rather
in
fordatesmakeallthedifference
on thisimportant
elaborated
I haveslightly
article,
surethatGrosseteste's
It seemstomethatwecannowbe reasonably
studies.
Grosseteste
andscientific
waspreceded
oftheology
preoccupations.
byhisphilosophical
study
scholarly
arose
treatises
wasthattheoptical
ofSouthern's
book,however,
(Oneofthemainpoints
inthebookunderreview).
nottreated
is unfortunately
butthistheme
outofhistheology,
in practical,
wasinfluenced
thatGrosseteste's
It is alsoevident
byhisinterests
theology
ofacaThis"fruitful
andthecuraanimarum).
blending
(theconfessional
questions
pastoral
an idealbasis
withpractical
in thesciences
demicexpertise
(Goering)
provided
theology"
writofhistheological
andmuchoftheidiosyncracy
oftheology,
forGrosseteste's
study
andpractical
oferudite
inthiscombination
pastoral
scholarship
ingsseemstolieprecisely
concerns
(ina widesense).
totheriches
andthemes,
individual
concern
thatfollow
Thearticles
texts,
manuscripts,
for
Moreton's
evenbeginto dojusticehere.Jennifer
I cannot
ofwhich
reconsideration,
leadsher
toGrosseteste,
ascribed
onthecalendar
ofthefourtreatises
commonly
example,
- apartfrom
about1225
from
correctorius
theauthentic
that
to theconclusion
Computus
is an
thenameofits"genre")
ecclesiasticus
minor
theComputus
byherafter
(calledcomputus
notbyGrosseteste
ofComputus
thana recension
rather
abbreviation
I, andinalllikelihood
it is
at all;oftheKalendarium
(inwhich,
interestingly,
maybe authentic
onlythepreface
is
In thesamecategory
ofParis).
withthemeridian
areconsonant
thatthetables
remarked
an
A.III.
MS
Cathedral
of
Durham
E.B.King's
12,
manuscript
important
study
preliminary

18:49:08 PM

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REVIEWS

in Oxford
Thiscombackto thedaysofGrosseteste's
(ca. 1225/30).
dating
lectureship
and glosseson thePsalms.Kinggivesa
contains
dicta,sermons,
plicated
manuscript
on previous
and improves
identifies
somemiscatalogued
items,
helpful
survey,
greatly
MS.
accounts.
Meridel
Holland's
ofa Greek-Latin
ofArms
Lexicon
(London,
study
College
and
Arundel
thedifficulties
thatGrosseteste
as translator,
encountered
9) vividly
presents
thewayshe triedto solvethem.Grosseteste
's famous
Tabula
(anindexoftheBibleand
theFathers)
is thesubject
W. Rosemann's
ofPhilipp
in
contribution
(hisedition
appeared
Mediaevalis
thisvolume
wasinprint).
The
Continuatio
130whilst
CorpusChristianorum,
Tabula
hasbeenwellstudied
in thepast,butthesuggestion
as to howtheonlysurvivcameto Lyons(possibly
twoEnglish
Franciscans
whomayhad
ingmanuscript
through
studied
underGrosseteste
at Oxford)
wasnewto thisreviewer.
thatfallina somewhat
Articles
different
classarethoseontexts
andtheir
that
subjects,
havenotalways
beenthoroughly
studied
before.
CandiceTaylor
therelaHogandiscusses
ofGrosseteste's
andactions
tohiscommerce
with
theworks
tionship
ecclesiological
thought
ofPseudo-Dionysius,
andargues
thatthecentral
ideaofhierarchy
andother
notions
derived
fromthisand thewayit wasputintopractice
wereinfluenced
byGrosseteste,
byhis
workon theDionysian
drawsattention
in
toa striking
scholarly
corpus.
McEvoy
passage
Grosseteste's
on Galatians,
on teaching
as an expression
oflovewiththe
commentary
as theloving
andthepupilas thechildin whichthewordis
father,
teacher/preacher
Grosseteste
madegooduseoftheprocreative
Andinanother
conprocreated;
metaphor.
tribution
discusses
thelonger
andmorepersonal
reflections
on kingship,
friendMcEvoy
andwife,
andtheprocreation
andeducation
in Grosseteste's
ofchildren,
shipofhusband
onAristotle's
Ethics
Mcomachean
the"personal
voice"
ofGrosseteste
VIII,although
commentary
thatMcEvoy
so clearly
hearsin theseobservations
is notalways
heardso clearly
bythis
reviewer.
Grosseteste's
venture
intoJewish
andlanguage
is thesubject
ofDavid
thought
fruitful
one.
J. Wasserstein's
paper,andhe showsthatitwasa lateandnotparticularly
Grosseteste's
scientific
do notfigure
in thisvolume,
there
Although
writings
prominently
aretwointeresting
B. RossiandJeremiah
Hackett.
Rossireconsiders
the
papersbyPietro
in Grosseteste's
on thePosterior
objectofscientific
knowledge
, while
Commentary
Analytics
Hackett
revisits
thenotion
of"scientia
in Grosseteste
andRogerBacon,
experimentalis"
that"inbothwriters,
theconcern
withtheresults
ofthesciences,
concluding
especially
andwiththeir
ledto an emphasis
on experience
as thatelement
verification,
astronomy,
whichfalsifies
or verifies
theresults
ofpurely
deductive
He couldhave
argumentation."
addedthatmuchoftheAristotelian
andcosmological
waseither
inprinciple
physical
theory
orinpractice
no thentestable
in hismagnum
byobservation
(cf.thelateA.C. Crombie
intheEuropean
Tradition
7
opus,Styles
ofSrientific
, 3 vols.,i, 323;muchofchapter
Thinking
ofthefirst
volume
is aboutmedieval
"scientia
experimentalis").
In sucha collection
as this,it is hardly
thatsomeessays
arelesssuccessful
surprising
thanothers.
Grosseteste's
ofmystical
inhiscommentary
onPseudounderstanding
theology
remains
somewhat
A caseis madefortheinfluence
Dionysius'
Mystical
Theology
mystical.
ofGrosseteste's
ideasofpastoral
careon Pierre
de Peckham's
La Lumire
as Laisibutthe
linkis extremely
tenuous.
TheroleofAnselm
in Grosseteste's
is documented
but
thought
notdeveloped
intoa comparison
between
thethought
ofthesetwothinkers.
Onewould
haveexpected
a discussion
ofGrosseteste's
useofAnselm's
notion
of
here,forexample,
freewillin theformer's
De libero
: boththinkers
arbitrio
consider
as a form
freedom
ofa
creature's
to actin accordance
withtheproper
function
ofitsnature.
voluntary
ability
Forboth,freedom
is nota formal
to choosebetween
an array
ofalternatives,
but
ability
is a question
ofkeeping
theplacethathasbeenallotted
toitin theuniverse.
Grosseteste,
triestoreconcile
thisviewwiththatofPeterLombard
andothers,
that
however,
namely
manhastheability
to willoneoftwoopposites.
(Thereis ofcoursemuchmoreto be
onhisintimate
draws
andunsurpassed
ofeverything
said.)Fortunately,
McEvoy
knowledge
Grossetestian
to offer
suchan example,
Grosseteste's
extension
oftheProslogion
discussing
argument.

18:49:08 PM

REVIEWS

259

thisvolume,
After
onerealises
onceagainthatthere
is a priceto be paidfor
reading
andhowtruetheeditor's
willbe found
wordis thatthevolume's
"merit
specialisation,
tolieinrangeanddiversity
rather
thatwasso ostenthaninoverall
Thevision
synthesis."
on every
from1955,hasbeenreplaced
in most
sibly
present
pageoftheCallusvolume
textor manuscript.
ofoneparticular
so,
Necessarily
papers
bya detailed
fragment,
study
writes
inhisIntroduction
tothisvolume,
"wecannot
butas Southern
begintoworkseriand
somehypothetical
structures
ofhislife,studies,
audience
onGrosse
teste
without
ously
thatthisvolume,
in advancing
ourknowlcircumstances."
It is therefore
to be expected
willprovide
a firmer
fornewvisions
andsyntheses
andthemes,
foundation
edgeoftexts
tocome.
LodiNauta

Groningen

withan introduction
demodis
Critical
Edition
de Marbasio,
Summa
Michael
by
significandi.
1995lxi+ 199p. ISBN 3
L.G. Kelly.Froman-Holzboog,
Canstatt,
Stuttgart-Bad
772816894 (Grammatica
5).
Speculativa,
Alberti
demodis
lesQuaestiones
L.G.Kelly,
modiste,
significandi
quiavaitdjdituntrait
demodis
de la Summa
1977),raliseavecl'dition
critique
(Amsterdam,
JohnBenjamins,
Il
mdivale.
l'histoire
de la linguistique
(ca. 1270)unecontribution
capitale
significandi
contemcrit
degrammaire
(10mss.),
parunauteur
spculative
important
s'agitd'untexte
porainde Bocede Dacie(ca. 1270-1280).
ainsicomL.G.Kellymontre
est souligner.
ducaractre
de l'dition
L'intrt
critique
desdoctrines.
D'unct,
de l'histoire
etde l'tude
la philologie
ment
peuttreau service
les manuscrits
"de l'Ouest"d'un
de deuxfamilles,
et l'existence
l'tudedesmanuscrits,
etlesmanuscrits
la Bibliothque
etpresque
tousconservs
Nationale,
ct,plusanciens
etpourcertains
"del'Est"de l'autre,
(dont
parJeanJossede Marville
gloss
plusrcents,
bienle dveloppela Summa),
confirment
trait
modiste
versifi
lepropre
accompagne
parfois
desArtsde Paris,dans
n la facult
de grammaire
mentde ce courant
philosophique,
de cesnombreuses
del'Est.Ensecond
del'Europe
nouvelles
lesUniversits
lieu,l'existence
du
nouveau,
surla fonction
s'interroger,
conduit
danslesdiffrentes
variantes,
copies,
lesdeux
maisdiffrenciant
variantes
livremdival.
Certaines
anodines,
systmatiquement
vs.patei
demanuscrits
ensembles
),peuvent
prfrences
parde simples
s'expliquer
(type
igitur
et analyss
sontsignals
Maisd'autres,
dontplusieurs
ou habitudes
de scribe.
exemples
des
clairement
dansl'introduction
(parex. p. XXVI,XXXII),manifestent
parl'auteur
matre
Maisdeschoixde qui?Du nouveau
choixthoriques.
qui se faitfaireunecopie
le probsaitparexemple
d'introduire
en se permettant
Lorsqu'on
quelques"rvisions"?
de
surle classement
Donatet Priscien
entre
la dissension
lmequ'a laiss la postrit
desdcisions,
absentes
devoirquecertains
onestintresss
copistes
prennent
l'interjection,
lesadverbes
heuetpapae
de classer
endcidant
desversions
(p. XXXIII).
anciennes,
parmi
ditl'avoircomMichelde Marbais
de ce typed'ouvrage?
Quellepeuttrela fonction
et
sescollgues
sesconfrres,
meorum
sociorum
??).Il s'agitd'untrait
(seslves,
pospreces
Le
de cellesde Bocede Dacieparexemple).
nonde questions
( la diffrence
disputes
du discours,
en revuelesparties
estceluidu "Priscien
contenu
analyses
passant
Majeur,"
modesde signifier
selonunplantrssystmatiquement
essentiels,
puismodesde
appliqu:
estla formule
introducdu genre"trait"
accidentels
(p. X-XI).Caractristique
signifier
celledes"commentaires
est
de. . . dicendum
tivedeschapitres:
, paropposition
Consequents
de la dterestestla marque
Le dicendum
de. . . queritur.
typique
Consequents
parquestions":
et la scansion
du texte
La prsence
de cettestructure
mination
systmatique
magistrale.
L.G.
le soutient
comme
treinterprte,
vraiment
doit-elle
standardises
pardesformules
au style
de ceroral(p. X-XIII)?Paropposition
d'unenseignement
l'indice
comme
Kelly,

commeindiquant
voirces marques
tendance
nousaurions
tainesreportationes,
plutt
Vivarium
36,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1998
Koninklijke

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ce qui
l'inverse
littraire,
que le texteque nousavonssouslesyeuxestun purproduit
une
A ce propos,
un enseignement.
n'exclut
signalons
pas biensrqu'ilaitpu servir
la Facult
desdisciplines
au rcent
surl'enseignement
colloque
question
quia tdiscute
mai1995).Lorsque
desuniversits
desArts
lesstatuts
(Paris,
imposent
quel'on"aitentendu"
Priscien
ou Priscien
conserve,
tre,parmila production
Mineur,
Majeur,quelspeuvent
les ouvrages
en relation
descommentaires
aveccetenseignement:
que l'onpeutmettre
pardescommentaires
senstis,
(littera,
dubitabilia),
complets
parquestions
(quise multiplient
celuides
tirdesannes1270),ce typede trait
dontle contenu
exactement
correspond
On notera
lesarguments
que si l'onne trouve
prcdents?
pas chezMichelde Marbais
suivant
l'intitul
duchapitre,
lescommentaires
permodum
quesproetcontra
quicaractrisent
tionimi
doctrinal
estici le plussouvent
suivide la discus, l'expos
qui ouvrele chapitre
Tu
siond'une(ouplusieurs)
souvent
introduites
(ou "instance"),
objection
parla formule:
laquelleune rponseestimmdiatement
dices
Dicoad hoc
, objection
forte
apporte:
. . . (voir
le dveloppement
initial
sontlesmmes
introduites
p. 35).Cesobjections,
quod
aprs
contra
danslescommentaires
avant
de
noncs,
que lesarguments
l'expos
parquestions,
la solution
retenue.
Ces deuxtypesde marques
de la
et instances)
(arguments
peuvent,
mmemanire,
treutilises
comme
indices
dutypede relation
entre
unsophisme
existant
conserv
et unedispute
relle.1
Surle plande la doctrine,
le trait
de Michelde Marbais
leslments
caracprsente
du modisme.
L'ony retrouve,
commele montre
bienL.G. Kellydansl'introtristiques
les questions
surla scientificit
de la grammaire,
de la
duction,
gnrales
l'application
thorie
du motus,
la thorie
des modesde signifier,
avecles distinctions,
physique
dj
en partiedansla Summa
Priscianum
entre
minorem
de RobertKilwardby,
prsentes
super
modesessentiels
et spcifiques)
et modesaccidentels
et absolus),
les
(gnraux
(relatifs
surVimpositio
et le paralllisme
entremodi
modi
modi
dveloppements
significandi,
intelligendi,
essendi.
Surce point,Michelde Marbaisestl'undes premiers
introduire
la
auteurs
distinction
entremodesde signifier
des
passifs
{passive
dicti'proprits
(ou modesd'tre)
chosesen tantqu'elles
sontsignifies,
etmodesde signifier
actifs
de
(active
dicti),
proprits
"existant
dansle sonvocalsignifiant
. . . poursignifier
lesmodesde signifier
signification
entendus
de manire
existant
dansla chose"(p. 16).Cettedistinction,
passive
que l'on
en termes
retrouve
assezproches
chezJeande Dacie et dansun commentaire
surles
Elenchi
l'obscurit
lespremiers
traits
,2clarifie
Sophistici
modistes,
queprsentaient
puisque
la notion
demodus
taitparfois
entendue
au sensdeproprit
dela chosesignifie
significandi
de Dacie),parfois
au sensde proprit
du sonvocalsignifiant
(Martin
(Bocede Dacie).3
Il estintresssant,
surle planhistoriographique,
d'entendre
Michelrapporter
que cette
innovation
a suscit
descontroverses
doctores
, ce quitmoigne
parmilesmoderni
grammatiae
la foisde la conscience
cesnouveauts
et,plusgnralequi accompagnait
thoriques,
desdbatsqui existaient
de la facult
desarts.
ment,
parmilesmatres
Un autrepointde discussion,
l'intrieur
du courant
estceluide la libert
modiste,
de Yimpositor:
sa guiseimposer
desmodesde signifier,
ou biendoit-il
peut-il
respecter
certaines
ce qui ruinerait,
du moins,
le caractre
adpladtum
du
contraintes,
partiellement
Cettequestion
a plusieurs
etconcerne
la relation
notamment
modes
entre
facettes,
langage?
de signifier
etmodesde signifier
essentiels
ou accidentels
135:47spcifiques
(p. 27:16-22,
entrelesmodesaccidentels.4
A proposdesaccidents,
notre
54),ou encorecelleexistant
auteur
plusieurs
n'a pas suivre
l'ordre
reldes
rpte
reprises
quel'ordre
d'imposition
modi
essendi
dontilssonttirs(non
habeant
ordinem
inter
sesecundum
oportet
quodmodi
significandi
ordinem
essendi
rerum
a quibus
, p. 36:41).Ceciestvraiparexemple
capiuntur
pourlesprorelles
auxdegrs
de comparaison,
la perau genre,
au nombre,
prits
correspondant
l'espce:
"siparexemple
le nomhomo
n'avait
ceci
sonne,
pastimpos
poursignifier,
soitde l'espce
drive"
n'empcherait
pasquele mothumanitas
(p. 54);la drivation
qui
- on pourrait
se produit
surle plan"vocal"estaccidentelle
trsbienposerque la lettre
"b" estd'espcedrive, le modede signifier
driv
un motqui dsigne
advient
la
chosequ'ilsignifie
subessesecundario
ditl'auteur,
(p. 53,74, 113).Notreintellect,
intellige

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261

d'abordun modus
essendi
maisil esten sonpouvoir
, puisun autre,
(inpotestate
sud)d'imle modede signifier
au dernier
modus
essendi
Il n'exposerd'abord
correspondant
intellig.
istepasentre
lesmodesde signifier
entreun terme
et un driv)
(parexemple
principal
le mmeordrencessaire
entredes"choses"
rellement,
qui existe
parexemple,
places
dansla catgorie
de la relation,
commele preet le fils(p. 73-4).Michelapporte
ce
faisant
unenotepersonnelle
la thorie
intressante
desmodesde signifier:
le moded'tre
n'estpasla causesuffisante
dumodede signifier,
toutcomme
il n'estpasla causesuffisante
du moded'intelliger.
C'estle moded'treet le moded'intelliger,
en tantqu'accompagde l'impositeur
etmodus
nsparla volont
essendi
cumvolntate
(modus
intelligendi
impositoris)
"trois
chosessontdoncrequises
quisontlescausesdesmodesde signifier:
pourl'imposiet la volont
de dsigner"
Il
tion,la chose,l'intellection,
qu'a l'impositeur
(p. 36:59-65).
de causalit,
et doncpas de relation
d'ordre
entreun
ncessaire,
n'ya pas de relation
modedesignifier
accidentel
etunautre(parexemple
entre
le nominatif
etlescasobliques,
ou entre
lesgenres,
<les genres>il n'ya pas d'ordre
essentiel
p. 49:9-16,
p. 40):"entre
il n'ya aucunordrecausalentre
ou ordred'invention;
diffrent
selonl'espce,
puisqu'ils
de l'unneprsuppose
de l'autre"
eux,de sorte
quel'invention
pasl'invention
(p. 40:4-7).5
la "volont"
uneconception
de l'institution
Ce recours
mcaniste
du langage,
corrige
reproduire
la ralit,
selonlaquelle
l'instituteur
aurait
trduit
servilement
ense conformant l'ordre
ou auxrelations
relles
deschosesou de leursproprits.
n'estpassansrapport
desthses
On peutremarquer
avecla troisime
quecette
question
le 18 mars1277,les deuxpremires
condamnes
de ces thses
par RobertKilwardby
une autrediscussion,
tantd'ailleurs
surla personne
du nom(introd.
sous-jacentes
commetelle,au
p. XLIII).6Il s'agitde savoirsi unepartiedu discours
peutsubsister
cas o elleestprivede ses accidents.7
Michelde Marbaisdfend
bienla proposition
mmes
du censeur:
". . . omnibus
his
diffrentes
etdanslestermes
condamne,
reprises,
in
ablatis
sivecorruptis,
verbum
adhucremanet
fuerit,
[= accidentia]
quicumque
perfecte
commetelparun modede signifier
essensuaspecie"(p. 85:8-10).8Le verbeestdfini
unverbemmesi sesautres
n'existent
tielgnral,
etreste
modesde signifier
pasou plus.
proposdu nom,que s'iln'avaitpas de modesde signifier
L'auteur
ajoutecependant,
il ne serait
n'aurait
accidentels
pasutile"dansla grammaire,"
paslesmodesde
puisqu'il
avecun autreconstructible.
d'treconstruit
signifier
quiluipermettraient
est
surle plansmantique,
Un autreaspectde ce mmeproblme,
plusfondamental
le modede signifier
celuide la relation
entre
d'unnometla chosequ'ilsignifie,
question
en cho ces
propos
desnomsdivins.9
Michelde Marbais,
discute
parlesthologiens
plusieurs
surla smantique
du nomDeus(parex.p. 25
rflchit
discussions,
reprises
Il explique,
ou p. 41, proposdu nombre).
commeles
proposde la qualitnominale,
etdonne
de sesuvres
qu' partir
(p. 26:74-9)
thologiens,
queDieunepeuttresignifi
surce qu'estcetteressignifie
desprcisions
parlesnoms(outouteautreparimportantes
un tant
maisunenature
Ce n'estpas unechosespcifique,
tiedu discours).
commune,
ou privation,
disposition
p. 132:89),
quidoitpou(qu'ilsoittant
parsoiou paraccident,
et recevoir
lesdeuxmodesd'treque sont,dansle cas
voirtreconuparnotre
esprit,
"de mmeque la matire
et le modede la qualit,
du nom,le modede la substance
maisuntantquipeuttredtermin
n'estpasuntantdtermin
parlui-mme,
prime
de
de l'indiffrence
L'onreconnat
l la thseavicenienne
(p. 21:63-76).
paruneforme"
bienque la chosequ'ilsigLe nomDeuspeutdonctrede nombre
l'essence.10
singulier,
toutcommele nomangeli
essentielle
ou accidentelle,
n'aitpas d'unit
nifie
peuttrede
ou accidentelle,
essentielle
bienqu'ilnesignifie
nullement
unemultiplicit
nombre
pluriel,
n'tant
l'unit
ou la multiplicit
que desaccidents
(p. 41:19-50:42).
desmodesde signifier
ou
de cesdiscussions
surle fondement
La dimension
notique
une
proposde la question
estdveloppe
de la signification
qui constitue
parl'auteur
du XIIIesicle:unmotse voit-il
de la seconde
moiti
controversia
chezleslogiciens
magna
de sonsignifi
ou de la chose
ou dchude sonsignifi
dtruit,
parle faitde la destruction
de manire
dcider
si unmotpeutsignifier
quirevient
univoque
qu'ilsignifie,"
question

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la premire
On saitque Baconrpond
destants
etdesnon-tants.
quespositivement
la seconde.12
Etantdonnlesdveloppements
tionetngativement
quenousavonsrapla
dfend
Tonne serapas tonn
de voirque Michelde Marbais
antrieurement,
ports
le nomCaesar
Bacon.Celuiqui entend
thsedes intentionistae
violemment
critique
par
unvrai
etse forme
une"vera
auxdiffrences
natura"
indiffrente
temporelles,
apprhende
faitensuite
la
L'auteur
de
comme
si Csarexistait
rellement
concept chose,
(p. 11:97-9).13
n'existent
la notique
les chosessensibles
intervenir
averroste.14
plus,il subsiste
Lorsque
" de ceschoses
dans
et des"phantasmata
." Les "species
doncdemeurer
desimages
peuvent
de l'action
de l'intellect
l'intellect
possible,
parl'intermdiaire
agentsurcesphantasmes
de la chose
de leursconditions
ainsi la ratio
sensibles,
intelligendi
qu'ilabstrait
permettant
de subsister
dansl'intellect
dans
Etgrce cetteratio
(p. 10:84-101:94).
intelligendi
prsente
le motpeutrester
etqui
l'intellect,
signifiant
grce la ratio
significandi
quiluicorrespond,
le constitue
comme
mot(p. 11:105-7).
unegnration
Michelappartient
cellede l'innoqui estencore,
pourlesModistes,
affirmant
sesprdcesconsciente
seschoixthoriques
vation,
d'elle-mme,
parrapport
seursou sescontemporains.
Nousen avonsdjvu unexemple
avecl'introduction
de la
distinction
entre
modesde signifier
actifs
etpassifs.
A plusieurs
Michelrapporte
reprises,
aux antiqui
doctores
ou pour
ainsi,pourlesjustifier
(ou impositores)
parrapport
grammaticaei
lesdiscuter,
lesopinions
desmodernes
(parexemple
p. 18:8,19:2,36:66,59:30etc.).Les
Priscien
etDonatquinepeuvent
desreforse laisser
ramener
parrapport
originalits
mulations
d'indications
dansleurstraits
plusadquates
quiseraient
prsentes
{dicta
antiquorum
sanetame
intellects
sontrelgues
en finde chapitre,
, parex.p. 102:10-2),
parexemde modesde signifier
la construction
desverbes
avecles
plel'introduction
quigouvernent
utalterius,
modus
alteri
au pronom
extension
, p. 101),oul'importante
{modus
obliques
acquisibilis
dela distinction
sonttout fait
substantif/adjectif
(p. 78).Cesnouveauts
lgitimes,
puisque,
"lessciences
L'auteur
notetrsminutieusement
l'auteur,
prcise
procdent
parajouts."15
lespoints
de dsaccord
entre
nostri
doctores
eninsistant
surlespositions
de cergrammaticae
tainsmatres
ingrammatica
ets'efforce
de trouver
, p. 110:42,158:9),
plusrenomms
{magni
dessolutions
ou originales,
consensuelles
conformes
auxprincipes
de la thorie
gnrale,16
en renvoyant
cellesqu'ila djtablidanssesquestions
de syntaxe.17
Les
frquemment
difficults
etapories
s'affrontent
lesModistes
de la dernire
nesont
auxquelles
gnration
En ce sens,il seraintressant
manifestes.
de comparer
le trait
de Michelde
pas encore
Marbais
celuidesModistes
de sa gnration
(L.G.Kellynousen donnele moyen,
par
l'indication
desparallles
avecBocede Dacie),etd'valuer
ensuite
l'volusystmatique
tionque manifestent
les Modistes
tardifs
Raoulle Breton,
maisaussiles
(notamment
Modistes
da Cingoli).18
comme
Gentilis
italiens,
Il esttoujours
fascinant
de voir,commedanscetteSumma
, quelpointle discours
les enjeuxtechniques
surtelou telpointde doctrine
surle
grammatical,
(parexemple
ou les accidents
desparties
sontmls desquestions
de nature
signifi
indclinables),
l'poque,
dbattues
et desdveloppements
denature
smiologique,
largement
ontologique.
Ungrammairien
"artiste"
de la seconde
moiti
duXIIIesiclese devait
de s'expliquer
sur
l'intellect
du fonctionnement
du langage
agentet l'intellect
pourrendre
possible
compte
et descatgories
La qualitremarquable
de l'dition
ici
linguistiques.
que nousprsente
L.G. Kellyoffre
l'amateur
de tellesspculations
unmorceau
de choix.
Paris

I. Rosier-Catach

1Voirla discussion
el la bibliographie
citedansI. Rosier,
Unsophisme
modiste
de
grammatical
matre
Gauthier
dans:Cahiers
de l'Institut
duMoyen
d'Ailly,
AgeGrecetLatinde Copenhague,
Surlescommentaires
de typeuniversitaire,
S. Ebbesen,
voirnotamment
59,(1989),181-232.
Latin
Medieval
Glosses
andCommentaries
onAristotelian
Texts
andThirteenth
Centuries
,
ofthe
Twelfth
Logical
dans:Ch.Burnett
andcommentaries
onAristotelian
texts
>London
1993;A.Maier,
(d.).Glosses
logical
' laFacult
inMedieval
York1994;O. Weijers,
La (disputatio
, Leiden-New
University
Training
Europe
desarts
deParis
environ
1995.
), Turnhout
(1200-1350
(Brepols)

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263

2 VoirCostantino
Semiotica
e linguaggio
nella
scolastica:
1270-1330,
Marmo,
Parigi,
Erfurt
Bologna,
La semiotica
PalazzoBorromini)
deiModisti
1994,par.4.1.2.
, Roma(nellasededell'Istituto
3 VoiraussiRoberto
"Sicut
tabernarius
vinum
directions
Lambertini,
significai
percirculum:
in:Umberto
Eco& Costantino
incontemporary
Modistae
Marmo
(ds.).Onthe
ofthe
interpretations
medieval
1989,107-42,
, Amsterdam
ofsigns
p. 113.
theory
4 VoirI. Rosier,
ducolloque
etlesdivers
dupr-modisme
Mathieu
deBologne
, dans:lesActes
aspects
a Bologna
nelXIVsecolo
dellalogica
1990,ed. D. Buzzetti,
, Bologne,
septembre
L'insegnamento
' Universit
voi.
diBologna
e memorie
dell
M. Feriani,
A. Tabarroni
, nuovaserie,
(Studi
perla stona
73-164,
Vili).Bologna
p. 79-83.
5 Michel
la mme
". . . in eisnonestordoessentialis
velinvenformule:
toujours
rpte
nullam
inter
se habendo
cumdifferunt
secundum
tionsvelimpositionis
causalitatem,
speciem
propos
des
nonpraesupponit
inventionem
alterius"
itaquodinventio
unius
(parex.97:10-5,
duverbe).
temps
6 VoirO. Lewry,
andLogic
Condemnations
TheOxford
, in:H.A.G.,
Braakhuis,
of1277inGrammar
theEndoftheTwelfth
andSemantics
& L.M.de Rijk,(ds.).English
C.H. Kneepkens,
from
Logic
I. Rosier.
"0
andBurleigh.
totheTimes
1981,235-78,
Nijmegen
p. 237-40;
ofOckham
Century
" . . . Grammatical
56
duXIIIesicle
selon
unsophisme
itetintelligibilit
MAGISTER
, dans:CIMAGL,
1-102,
(1988),
p. 40-6.
7 "Item,
accidentibus."
Chartularium
omnibus
manens
verbum
privari
quodverbum
potest
I. 558,n. 474.
Parisiensis
Universitatis
1889-1897,
, Paris,
8 Id.pourle nom:". . . omnibus
sivecorruptis
ablatis
istis
modis
accidentalibus,
significandi
insuaspecieestsiveremanet"
adhucnomen
fuerit,
(26:8-27:10),
pourle
perfecte
quicumque
etc.
(138:8-139:11),
(114:1-15),
participe
pourl'adverbe
9 VoirL.G.Kelly,
desgrammairiens
Grammar
GodandSpeculative
, in:I. Rosier
(d.),L'hritage
et modus
Ressignificata
auxLumires.
Louvain1988,205-13;I. Rosier,
del'Antiquit
latins,
mdivale
distinction
etthologiques
d'une
Lesenjeux
, in: S. Ebbesen
(d.),
linguistiques
significandi.
la bibliographie
Mittelalter
und
inSptantike
1994,135-68
, Tbingen,
[voir
cite].
Sprachtheorien
10Voirl'introduction
Prima
siveScientia
Liber
dePhilosophia
Avicenna
de G. Verbeke,
Latinus,
Divina
1977,p. 62*sq.
, I-IV,Louvain-Leiden,
11P. 10:82-83:
in
remanere
ratiosignificandi
estvidere
"Sedtunedifficultas
postest
qualiter
secundum
existere."
dictione
ipsarecorrupta
12Voir,enparticulier,
vide.
Surquelques
antcdents
mdietla rfrence
A. deLibera,
Bacon
Roger
Z. Kaluza,A. de Libera(ds.),Lectionum
duparadoxe
deMeinong
vaux
varietates,
, in:J.Jolivet,
attestant
de cettecontrolestextes
Paris1991,85-120,
PaulVignaux,
quinumre
Hommage
affrente.
etla bibliographie
verse
13Cf.parexemple
estanimal
homo
denecessitate
omnis
, d. par
Sophisma:
Sigerde Brabant,
Louvain-Paris
etdephysique,
demorale
delogique,
deBrabant
B.Bazn,
dans:Siger
1974,
, crits
48-9.
14VoirAlainde Libera,
Contre
Averros
Thomas
, Paris1994,45 sq.,65-72.
d'Aquin.
15"Etvidequodcircahocquodnonsolum
fuerunt
tores
etPriscianus
Donatus
imposi
gramnon
a DonatoetPrisciano
multis
Undeutuntur
doctores
sedmulti
maticae,
ipsisposteriores.
. . ." (176:58:60).
inventae
taliter
suntperaddimenta
inventis.
Quareenimscientiae
16L'auteur
nos". . . quidam
nesontpasobservs:
critique
quandcesprincipes
peuttretrs
non
ordoinest
etmagni
dicunt
trorum
doctorum
coniunctioni,
quodhuiusmodi
grammaticae
modus
inexistens
acccidentalis
solum
ei,sedpotius
tamquam
passioaccidentaliter
tamquam
viripotentes
totettanta
tanti
miror
Sedveremultum
accidentalis.
specuqualiter
significandi
enimconCommunis
ad illudquoddicunt.
ordine
nonattendunt
larisubtiliter
de huiusmodi
nisiinrealiquam
dicimodus
debet
estquodnihil
omnium
sensio
significandi
grammaticorum
illum
in redesignet
modus
essendi
cumomnis
sivemodum
significandi
dsignt
proprietatem
Sedconstat
modointelligendi.
mediante
a quohabet
modum
essendi
quodisteordoin
accipi,
essendi"
sivemodum
renullam
(158:2-11).
dsignt
proprietatem
17Parexemple:
avecl'adverbe
duverbe
deconstruction
est-il
unprincipe
letemps
(98:46-48)?
18Onsereportera
trssysdeC. Marmo,
l'excellent
cit.,
quifaituneprsentation
ouvrage
extraits
detextes
denombreux
enintroduisant
dumodisme,
detouslesaspects
indits,
tmatique

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notamment
du bolognais
au XIVesicle,
et sa
Gentiiis
da Cingoli.
L'volution
du modisme
Parmi
lespublidiffusion
danslesUniversits
estencore
trsmalconnue.
centrale,
d'Europe
cations
Paris,
onrappellera
surtout
deZnonKaluza,
Lesquerelles
doctrinales
rcentes,
l'ouvrage
etRalistes
auxconfins
duXIVeetduXVesicles
Nominalistes
1988.
, Bergamo
Nicholas
A Critical
ofAutrecourt,
His Correspondence
Master
with
Giles& Bernard
ofArezzo.
Edition
& English
Translation
Leiden-New
York-Kln,
1994,
byL.M.de Rijk.Brill,
ISBN90 04 099883
Withthisvolume
we finally
a critical
oftexts
edition
andEnglish
translation
possess
from
a really
dramatic
inthehistory
ofmedieval
Thesearetheextant
chapter
philosophy.
first
twoofthenineletters
Nicholas
ofAutrecourt
ofArezzo(quoted
wroteto Bernard
hereas I or II withparagraph-numbers),
Master
Giles'letter
to Nicholas
as III)
(quoted
andNicholas'
as IV). Lambert
in addition
Mariede Rijk'sedition
contains
reply
(quoted
tothetexta setofhelpful
a critical
edition
ofa document
onthetrial
notes,
explanatory
Nicholas
theVatican
from
Secret
Archives
listof
against
A) andofa separate
(Appendix
thecondemned
articles
as handed
downinsomemanuscripts
andfound
insomeeditions
ofPeterLombard's
Sententiae
listtofillingapsin
(Appendix
B). De Rijkusestheseparate
thedamaged
Vatican
andviceversa.TheIntroduction
document
witha rather
conbegins
- including
cisesurview
on Nicholas'
life
hiscondemnation
andrecantation
in 1346/7
andworks.
It continues
witha description
ofthemanuscriptal
evidence
fortheextant
letan explanation
on Leonino
ofPadua'sDecasLogica
as a source
forpartsofNicholas'
ters,
second
letter
andwitha noteontheshortcomings
ofearlier
editions
andtranslations.
Next
is an introduction
to thecontent
oftheextant
a reconstruction
ofthefifth
letter
letters,
to Bernard
somehintson theprinciples
oftheedition
a glossary
and,finally,
including
howsomeoftheterms
haveto be understood
in a specific
manner
showing
depending
on thespecialcontext.
Thisfirst
andformal
indicates
one ofthespecialfeatures
ofthis
description
already
i.e.ittreats
thetechnical
withimpressing
whilemostly
refrainedition,
apparatus
precision
on theintellectual
thatarepresent
in thesetexts
and
ingfrom
speculations
developments
on influences
on theparticipating
authors.
De Rijkjustgivesshort
hints
on thefactthat
a labeling
ofthisdiscussion
as a debatewithin
theOccamist
seemstobe obsomovement1
- authors
letein thelightofrecent
results
andTachau2
likeNicholas
and
byCourtenay
Bernard
weremostlikely
notevenfamiliar
withOckham's
on intuitive
and
thoughts
- , andfollows
abstractive
as exposed
inhiscommentary
onthesentences
Kaluza's
cognition
thateventheobvious
similarities
between
theposition
thatis imposed
onBernard
opinion
andsomeworks
ofPeterAuriol
should
notleadtotheconclusion
thatthere
byNicholas
is an undoubted
historical
connection
(3ss.).
oftheextant
In hisfirst
letters?
to Bernard,
letter
Nicholas
Now,whatis thecontent
starts
withinfering
theproposition
Omnis
riostra
deexistentia
habemus
obiectoapparentia
quam
rum
esse
from
Bernard's
on theSentences
potest
falsaoutoftwopropositions
commentary
further
thatforBernard
theinference:
"Whiteness
is seen;therefore
(I 3). He concludes
there
is whiteness"
wouldnotbe valid(I 4). Hereagainitseemsclearthatthediscussion
is notinOckham's
sinceforOckham
there
is noinference
from
ournotitia
intuitradition,
tivato thethings
weperceive,
wejustknowthattheyarehere(OThI, 70,TachauI.e.
Bernard
becausethiswayBernard
couldnotbe sureeither
127).Nicholas
argues
against
oftheobjects
ofthefivesensesor ofhisownacts(I 11),notevenofhisactus
credendi
ofsociallifeandofthefaith,
of
(I 13).Thiswouldleadto thedestruction
e.g.thefaith
theaposdesthatChrist
hadrisenfrom
thedead(I 14).It wouldfurther
to
be difficult
howonecouldreachmuchmoreobscure
liketheprime
mover
This
explain
objects
(1,15).
chainofarguments
can be seenas Nicholas'
reservation
Bernard's
tooextreme
against
Antiaristotelianism
Nicholas'
(seealsop. 24 ofthepresent
book).But,perhaps,
argument
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

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265

ofnatural
andsupernatural
casesofperception
theseparation
is mainly
directed
against
I 5-10seemtopointthis
maintain.
andother
as Bernard
Ockham,
authors,
way.
including
ofthesenses
basedonthetestimony
ofknowledge
seemstotrytosavetheunity
Nicholas
Sincehe also emphasizes
God's
intervention.
of a supernatural
thepossibility
against
ofsenseperception
wouldimply
thattheunreliability
he seemsto think
absolute
power,3
i.e. a simple
self-contradiction.
a divine
Or,at least,Bernard's
wayoutoftheproblem,
ofour
wherewe canbe sureofthetestimony
ofcasesofthenatural
order,
separation
doesnot
be surebecauseofGod'sintervention,
wecannot
andthosecases,where
senses,
listofall possible
to givea complete
to him,sincehe asksBernard
appearconclusive
a vainenterprise.
causesofcognition
is,ofcourse,
(I 9) which
thislettexthe wrote;
themostfamous
is probably
to Bernard
secondletter
Nicholas'
ofDavidHume.Andindeedwe
as a forerunner
hisprominence
founded
terespecially
ofinduction
oftheproblem
be readas anticipations
thatmight
findsentences
(II 11,II
letter
toBernard
ofthefifth
thereconstruction
C, 1 (p. 35):"nulla
potest
24,seealsofrom
demonstretur
existentia
causarum
essedemonstratio
effectus"),
quaex existentia
simpliciter
from
themotives
different
them
weresurely
forformulating
Nicholas'
motives
very
although
thatHumehad.4
thatcontrathePrime
is toexplain
themaintopicoftheletter
Principle,
Nevertheless,
anditsconsequences.
true(II 2),itscorollaries
be simultaneously
cannot
dictories
Bythe
at Paris
inthediscussion
werenotas dominant
's works
thefactthatOckham
way,despite
it
tobe fora longtime,
as theyhadbeenconsidered
ofthe14thcentury
in themiddle
hadtaken
ofparadigms
likea change
seems
clearthatsomething
placesinceDunsScotus'
the
ofmetaphysics
diverse
Whereas
Scotusdiscusses
De primo
including
aspects
principio.
first
Nicholas'
labeledas "ontological,"
thatarenowadays
andsubjects
causalorder
prinButithastremendous
character.
facieofpurely
ontological
methodological
cipleis prima
thefactthatsomething
foroneofitslogicalconsequences
is,that"from
consequences,
tothefirst
reduced
be inferred
tobe itcannot
is known
princibyevidentness
evidently,
is someother
thatthere
ofthefirst
(II 11).From
thing"
principle,
ple,ortothecertitude
our
truths
do notincrease
sinceanalytic
a modern
logicalpointofviewthisis evident,
thatAristotle
draws
thefurther
Nicholas
thatexist.
aboutthethings
consequence
knowledge
thanhisownsoulifsubstance
substances
ofother
couldnothavehadevident
knowledge
from
theobjects
different
senseas something
inthe"technical,"
isunderstood
metaphysical
these
ofthefivesenses(II 22),andthatno onehassuchknowledge
(II 25).Of course,
ofthefourteenth
in themiddle
conclusions
wereaudacious
century.
to MasterGiles'
arecan be seenin hisreply
conclusions
Nicholas'
Howfar-reaching
thatone
on thepresupposition
ofsomeAristotelian
defense
Obviously
relying
principles.
ofan underlying
on theexistence
ofan accident
from
theexistence
caninfer
substance,
answers
a substrate"
transmutation
Gilesclaimsthat"a natural
(II 19).Nicholas
implies
is
there
is a substrate"
therefore
"Thereis a natural
thattheconsequence
transmutation;
as something
ofan accident
valid(valdebona)butthatitis validbydefinition
completely
withan
thatis always
a manas something
Ifwedefine
thatis witha substrate.
together
thereis an ass"(IV 12,
"Thereis a man;therefore
ass,itwouldalsobe validto infer:
oftheAristotelian
on theveryfundaments
an attack
IV 13).Thisimplies
syscategorical
interreandtheir
andaccidents
ofsubstance
temthatis basedon theconcepts
complex
"Ve
In hisletter
oftranssubstantiation.
on thetheory
effect
withan immediate
lations,
toBernard
inhissixth
letter
tohavewritten
michi"
tothepopeheconfesses
"quod,pane
ostendi
evidenter
nonpotest
demonstrato
quinibi sitaliquaresque nonsitaccidents"
of Christian
in
theheartof bothcomponents
hits
Nicholas'
B
So,
[30]).
(Appendix
of thetime,persecution
withthepremises
Aristotelianism.
by ecclesiastical
Therefore,
"natural"
wasa nearly
authorities
consequence.
hadthe
tosaythathenever
motives.
ofNicholas'
thequestion
Thisraises
Unnecessary
fidei"
certitudine
states
that"excepta
He explicitly
faith.
Christian
toundermine
intention
ofthefirst
butthecertitude
thereis no othercertitude
(II 7). As mentioned
principle

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ofGod'sabsolute
thetheological
reflections
above,at leastforsomeofNicholas'
principle
is ofeminent
Nicholas
takesthecommon
strictly
(34ff.).5
opinion
simply
importance
power
thatcontains
nocontradiction.
forgranted
thatGodcando everything
Interestingly
enough,
ifan objectofthefivesensesdoesnotexist,
he seemsto see an implied
contradiction
it"(III 35,
as forGiles"insofar
as thesea battleexists,
Godcannotannihilate
similarly
in
Thescandalon
thiscontention
is notreplied
tointheextant
answer).
partofNicholas'
forhim,notso muchthecontingency
oftheactualfacts
Nicholas
works
seemstobe that,
thatAristoteandOckham,
butthediscovery
seems
tobe as important
as itwasforScotus
ontheprinciple
ofnon-contradiction.
lianmetaphysics
wasinitsgreater
partnotfounded
hehadcontended
before
Nicholas'
torecallnearly
readiness
Nevertheless,
might
everything
alsoindicate
tothemasters
at Pariswasnotcompletely
thathisclaiminhisletter
wrong:
A 8, 9).
thathe hadjusttriedouthowfarcertain
conclusions
couldreach(Appendix
A short
Gilesdistinto Nicholas
be allowed.
noteon themerits
ofGiles'letter
might
allother
is separated
from
between
a precisive
withwhich
thething
guishes
apprehension
thecircumanda coacceptive
wherethething
is lookedat within
things
apprehension
ifwetakeinto
stances
seemstobe quiteplausible
is moreperfect
(III 11).Thatthelatter
ifwedo notonlyseean
account
thatweknowmoreabouta thing,
a camera,
e.g.gratia
indefinable
blackboxbutalsothatitis heldbysomebody
at a certain
placeanddirected
to somebody
elsestanding
Gileslinesoutthecoherentist
character
ofourpernearby.
ceptions.
Therearemanyother
in thisas in theother
one
letters,
interesting
points
e.g.whether
can really
outofitssurroundings
thattherearethings
without
pickonething
implying
in thesurrounding
thataredifferent
thepicked-out-one
from
(III 17),oron theontologicalstatus
ofpropositions
edition
andtranslation,
(III 34).Now,sincethereis a reliable
allthese
arealsoopened
tothediscussion
thatarenotspecialised
ofphilosophers
questions
on thehistory
ofmedieval
thementioned
debateanditsoutphilosophy.
Documenting
comethepresent
volume
thusgivesan impression
oftherichness
andfascination
ofphilodiscussion
in themiddle
sophical
ages.
MatthiasKaufmann
Halle-Wittenberg
1 Francesco
La scienza
Rimini
ss.
Bottin,
Occamisti,
1982,111
degli
2 Seee.g.Katherine
andCertitude
inthe
, Leiden1988,335ss.
Tachau,Vision
AgeofOckham.
3 See,e.g.
A Study
in 14thCentury
NewYork
Nicolaus
ofAutrecourt.
J.R.Weinberg,
Thought,
1969,92s.
4 See Dominik
Perler's
Introduction
to theImbach-edition
ofNicholas'
letters
(Hamburg
1988).
5 See alsoJ.R.Weinberg,
TheFifth
Letter
toBernard
in:J.F.
ofNicholas
ofAutrecourt
ofArezzo
Ross(ed.),
into
Medieval
A Collection
inHonor
P. Clarke
, Westport
(Conn.)
Inquiries
Philosophy.
ofFrancis
1971,315-24.
Alessandro
D. Conti,Esistenza
e verit.
Forme
e strutture
delreale
e nelpensiero
inPaoloVeneto
deltardo
medioevo.
Istituto
storico
italiano
filosofico
peril medioevo,Roma1996,VI +
324p. (Nuovistudistorici
33)
ofPaulofVenice(1369-1429)
arenota terra
in thevastlandscape
Theworks
incognita
In recent
inhismonuofmedieval
there
hasbeenan increasing
interest
years,
philosophy.
ofthelatescholasmental
, oneofthemostcomprehensive
magna
logichandbooks
Logica
ticperiod.
andpsychological
works
havebeenneglected
Yethismetaphysical,
epistemological
in thefootsteps
almost
ofC. Prantl,
P. DuhemandB. Nardi,many
entirely.
Following
in
in metaphysics
andan Averroist
assumed
thatPaulwasa nominalist
scholars
simply
andpsychology.
In hisoriginal
A. Conticonvincingly
shows
thatthese
study,
epistemology
BrillNV,Leiden,1998
Koninklijke

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nor
a nominalist
Paulwasneither
buthistoriographical
arenothing
myths.
assumptions
a certain
defended
he explicitly
On thecontrary,
an Averroist.
(mostly
typeofrealism
andhesubscribed
movement
theOckhamist
against
byDunsScotusandWyclif)
inspired
Averroist
from
himself
toAristotelian
monopsychism.
distancing
psychology,
useof
His extensive
ofPaul'sbiography.
witha reexamination
Contiopenshisstudy
intotraditional
thathaveslipped
ofmistakes
a number
himtocorrect
enables
manuscripts
at theUniversity
ortaught
studied
thatPaulnever
accounts.
Thus,heshows
biographical
in an
duetoa mistake
Sucha claimis simply
ofscholars
claimed.
ofParis,as a number
universitate
was
"in
that
Paul
wrote
scribe
the
Oxford
parisina"
erroneously
manuscript;
theconcise
Perusiae"
of"inuniversitate
instead
introduction,
biographical
(p. 12).After
ofcatetheproblem
themaintopicsin Paul'smetaphysics:
anddiscusses
Contipresents
ofuniversais
andact(ch.2), thetheory
between
potency
(ch.1),therelationship
gories
andacciofsubstance
andbeing(ch.4), thestructure
ofessence
(ch.3),thedefinition
andsemanoutthelinkbetween
hepoints
dents
metaphysics
chapter
(chs.5-6).In thefinal
- one ofthemostcontroversial
ofthecomplexe
theproblem
ticsbyanalyzing
significabile
the
Contisketches
In allhisdiscussions
debates.
inlate14thandearly15th-century
issues
bothhisimmediate
of Paul'stheories,
context
intellectual
(espeprecursors
examining
13th-century
andinfluential
totheschoolof"Oxford
theauthors
realism")
belonging
cially
makes
Thiscontextual
DunsScotus).
Thomas
theGreat,
authors
approach
Aquinas,
(Albert
Paulwas
toseetowhatextent
becauseithelpsthereader
valuable
thestudy
particularly
Conti's
a giventradition.
followed
hesimply
thinker
andtowhatextent
an original
analyoftheextant
andcomprehensive
basedona thorough
sesarealways
manuscripts.
reading
richinformaitprovides
valuable:
Thisis another
extremely
pointthatmakeshisstudy
For
or evenforgotten.
beenneglected
thathaveoften
tionabouttextsand arguments
refers
to Paul's
Contifrequently
of universais,
oftheproblem
in hisanalysis
instance,
deuniversaandto hisQuaestio
in 8 manuscripts)
Universalia
(extant
Porphyrii
super
Expositio
shows
that
Theauthor
thathavenotyetbeenexamined.
twoworks
libus
(5 manuscripts),
of
foran adequate
is ofcritical
oftheseworks
a closereading
understanding
importance
to realism.
commitment
becausetheyprovehisstrong
Paul'smetaphysics,
between
isanisomorphism
thatthere
relies
Paul'smetaphysics
uponthebasicassumption
ofourlinguistic
andextramental
reality
(pp. 20, 296):thestructure
thought,
language,
matches
in turn,
the
ofourthinking
thestructure
matches
which,
perfecdy
expressions
A number
ofauthors
notan original
Thisis,ofcourse,
ofmaterial
structure
insight.
things.
- wouldhavesubofmodism
in thetradition
thoseworking
Paul- especially
preceding
Butsucha claimimmemust
be somekindofisomorphism.
totheclaimthatthere
scribed
or"match"
levelscanhavethesamestructure
ofhowdifferent
raisesthequestion
diately
andthe
ofreality
theelements
between
a one-to-one
Is there
eachother.
correspondence
ContishowsthatPaulofVenicedid
or linguistic
ofourconcepts
elements
expressions?
thekeytoan adequate
In Paul'sopinion,
solution.
notoptforsucha simple
understanding
ofourlinguistheelements
offormal
distinction
is thetheory
ofisomorphism
(pp.20ff.):
thatmaybe onlyformally
in reality
to elements
or concepts
ticexpressions
correspond
ofthesentence
distinct.
andnotreally
Thus,we shouldnotassumethatthetwoterms
is no
in reality;
there
items
distinct
totworeally
is a human
"Socrates
being"correspond
andthespecieshumanbeing.In order
Socrates
theindividual
between
suchdistinction
arereally
andspecies
we needto realizethatindividual
tohavea correct
understanding,
factcanweunderthiscrucial
distinct.
butformally
identical,
Onlyifwetakeintoaccount
in reality,
to or "matches"
sentence
standthatthepredicative
something
corresponds
items.
distinct
ofreally
is no fragmentation
there
although
wasnotnewinthemedieval
ofisomorphism
totheproblem
sucha solution
Ofcourse,
introduced
out(p. 23).Theformal
as Conticorrecdy
distinction,
byDuns
context,
points
toolin
a
as
his
followers
and
established
was
methodological
Scotus, already
byWyclif
different
ButPaulusedthistoolin a slightly
debates.
way(pp. 30f.).His
metaphysical
and
in reality?,"
arethere
"Whatkindofdifferences
starting
pointwasnotthequestion

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REVIEWS

hisaimwasnottopostulate
newentities
newtypes
ofdifferences
ordisbyintroducing
tinctions.
He rather
"Whatkindofunity
inreality?,"
is there
and
beganwiththequestion
he intended
to explain
thevarious
ofa single,
unified
to the
aspects
byappealing
thing
formal
distinction.
It seemstomethatthisis an important
notjust
pointthatshedslight
onPaul'smetaphysics,
butontheentire
offormal
distinction.
Thistheory
doesnot
theory
as somecritics
anditdoesnotleadtoan overabundant
entities,
simply
multiply
thought,
It instead
triesto givea metaphysical
forthedifferent
that
ontology.
explanation
aspects
canbe found
in oneandthesamething,
andtheseaspects
arebyno meanssuperfluous
entities.
Asonemight
theformal
distinction
alsoplaysa crucial
roleinPaul'stheory
of
expect,
- themost
In hisdiscussion
universais.
ofthistheory
detailed
oftheentire
book
analysis
Contipoints
outthatPaultriedto steera middle
coursebetween
twopositions:
nominalism
andextreme
realism.
On theonehand,he wanted
to avoidnominalism,
because
he thought
thatthedefenders
ofthisposition
andBuridan)
werenot
(aboveall Ockham
twocrucial
capableofresolving
problems
(i)Theywereunabletoexplain
(pp.97ff.).
why
therecan be a natural
between
individuals
if
to thesamespecies,
similarity
belonging
there
is no common
nature
thatguarantees
thissimilarity,
unable
(ii)Theywereequally
to explain
universal
ifthere
is no foundation
fortheseconwhywe canform
concepts,
world.
Thesetwocriticisms
arenotentirely
as Conti
ceptsin theextramental
justified,
remarks
thefactthatOckhamhadprovided
an
correctly
(p. 104),forPauloverlooked
forthesecondproblem
withhisnewtheory
ofsignsandwithhistheory
of
explanation
abstractive
cognition.
On theotherhand,Paulalso triedto avoidthetypeof extreme
realism
thatwas
defended
Paul'smaincriticism
wasdirected
twodevabyWalter
Burley
(pp.11Off).
against
ofthisposition,
is really
distinct
theindifrom
stating
consequences
(i) If theuniversal
noessential
willbe possible.
Forinstance,
wecannot
"human
vidual,
predication
predicate
because"human
to a completely
distinct
being"of"Socrates",
being"refers
(ii)If
entity,
theuniversal
isreally
distinct
from
theindividual,
noarbor
willbepossible
either.
porphyriana
Wecannot
climbupthetreebystarting
withan individual
andcontinuing
with
(Socrates)
etc.Therewillbe nosingle
treebutdifferent
levels
(human
species
being),
genus(animal),
ofentirely
distinct
entities.
To avoidall theseproblems,
Paulclaimsthattheuniversal
is neither
a mereconcept
nora really
distinct
It is a metaphysical
constituent
thatis really
identical
but
entity.
with,
distinct
from
theindividual
which
is obviously
formally
(p. 122).Thisposition,
veryclose
to Scotus's,
has someinteresting
one ofwhichconcerns
theproblem
of
consequences,
Paulasserts
thattwotypes
ofpredication
needto be distinguished
predication.
(p. 125).
A predication
suchas "Manis an animal"
is a praedicatio
identica
, becausetheitems
subject
andpredicate
term
arereferring
toarereally
isnotsomething
disidentical;
animality
really
tinct
from
Buta predication
suchas "Manis formally
an animal"
is a praedicatio
humanity.
theexpression
indicates
thatdifferent
needtobe considered
formalism
"formally"
aspects
that
be
in
one
and
the
same
but
are
nevertheless
disaspects may present
thing,
formally
tinct.
Thatis whyanimality
canneither
be reduced
identified
to,norcompletely
simply
Contiaptlyexplains
thedifference
between
thesetwotypes
ofpredicawith,
humanity.
tionbymeansofthedistinction
between
extension
andintension
(p. 126).In thefirst
type
ofpredication,
thetwoterms
havethesameextension;
in thesecondtype,
theexpression
indicates
thatthetwoterms
havea different
intension.
"formally"
Pauldoesnotseemtobe awareofthedifficulties
inthetheory
involved
Unfortunately,
offormal
distinction.
He doesnottakeintoaccount
thecritical
which
Ockham
arguments
hadalready
adducedagainst
Scotus.Forinstance,
howcanit be thathumanity
is one
andthesameforSocrates,
is really
identical
witheachofthese
Plato,etc.,ifhumanity
individuals?
Does therealidentity
withindividuals
notimply
a realmultiplication
ofthe
common
Andhowcanitbe thathumanity
nature?
is formally
distinct
from
Socrates,
yet
cannot
be separated
from
him?Ifx is distinct
from
from
y,thenx canbe separated
y, at

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269

leastbydivine
It seemstomethatPaul'suseoftheformal
distinction
wouldbe
power.1
theseproblems,
whichare serious
to a
convincing
onlyifhe weretackling
challenges
inthese
Scotist
ofrealism.
Butheseemstolackanyinterest
form
Thisconfirms
problems.
Conti's
thesis
thatPaulwasworking
within
thetradition
ofrealism.
He aimedat
general
moredetailed
solutions
totheproblems
within
thistradition,
buthe did
arising
providing
aboutchallenges
from
notparticularly
outside.
worry
coming
sideofPaul'stheory
ofuniversais.
Thisside
theepistemological
Contialsoexamines
andhuman
to Conti,there
includes
an account
ofbothdivine
is a
According
cognition.
thesetwotypes
ofcognition
ideas
between
areuniversal
striking
parallelism
(p. 137):there
andbothtypes
ofideashavenotonlya subbothinthedivine
andinthehuman
mind,
butalsoan objective
Paul
obiectivum).
subiectivum),
jective
being(esse
Unfortunately,
being(esse
He simply
theproblems
from
thisdistinction.
doesnotseemto takeintoaccount
arising
ideashavean objective
states
thatuniversal
beingbecausetheyalwayshavesomething
"as theknown
obiectum
; p. 138).Buthe doesnotspelloutthe
cognitum
object"(tamquam
oftheknown
Is thisobjectsimply
theexternal
status
objectconsidered
ontological
object.
Is itan immaterial
a certain
insofar
as itis known)?
under
aspect(namely
objectexisting
intheintellect
Or is ita specialkindofobject
andcorresponding
to theexternal
object?
withtheexternal
whichcan neither
be identified
objectnorwithsomekindofmental
I think
thatPaul'sdistinction
and objective
between
subjective
beingwouldbe
object?
a detailed
In anycase,
answer
to thesequestions.
onlyifhe wereproviding
convincing
" shows
innocent
"esse
obiectivum
thathewasnotconcerned
hissomehow
useoftheexpression
raisedbyHervaeus
PeterAureol,
Ockham
andotherearly
abouttheproblems
Natalis,
authors.
fourteenth-century
Paul'smetaphysical
discussions
wereclosely
linked
to andpartly
byhisinterinspired
as thelastchapter
ofConti'sstudy
illustrates.
Thischapter
estin semantics,
dealswith
Paulclaimed
thata proposition
thefamous
ofthesignificatum
must
problem
propositionis.
itcouldnotcorrespond
in reality
otherwise
to something
anditcould
something,
signify
is indeedthetruth-maker
ButPauldecinotbe true.The significate
fora proposition.
theview,defended
ofRimini
and others,
dedlyrejected
byAdamWodeham,
Gregory
towhich
a special
oneneedstointroduce
theso-called
complexe
according
entity,
significabile,
inorder
He claimed
toexplain
thesignificate.
thatthesignificate
buttheextrais nothing
- nottheisolated
ofcategorematic
mental
(theyare thesignificates
terms),
things
things
he certainly
a hostofontological
buttherescomplexae
avoided
(p. 280).Withthissolution
theisomorphism
andhe successfully
maintained
andreality:
between
problems,
language
ofterms
in a proposition
thecomplex
combination
tothecomplex
combinacorresponds
ofthings
inreality.
YetPaul'ssolution
tionofthings
oraspects
didnotprovide
an answer
to all questions.
is thesignificate
ofpropositions
or
aboutfictitious
What,forinstance,
rescomplexae
in thesecases?In his
future
things,
giventhatthereareno actually
existing
in answering
In his
ContishowsthatPaulhesitated
thistricky
detailed
analysis,
question.
in reality,
is nothing
saidthatthesignificate
ofsuchpropositions
neither
hesimply
Logica
In hisCommentaries
atomic
norsomething
on theDe anima
andon
complex.
something
he claimed
itsownreality:
a negative
theCategories
thatitis something
, however,
having
Withsuchan answer,
Paulsuccessfully
mainor non-existing
stateofaffairs
(pp.288f.).
evena proposition
suchas "Thechimera
is white"
tainedhisprinciple
ofisomorphism;
hadtheunavoidable
is madetruebysomething
in reality.
Butthisanswer
consequence
hisontology.
Notonlyarethererealthings
andrealstates
thatPaulnowhadto revise
in theworld,
butalsonon-existing
ofaffairs
andnon-existing
states
ofaffairs.
things
andlucidly
written
is an important
contribution
tocurrent
Conti's
highly
study
original
on 14thand15th-century
Besides
detailed
research
providing
metaphysics.
philosophical
an important
and historical
information
aboutPaulofVenice,it illustrates
pointthat
in further
shouldnotbe neglected
research:
theschoolof "Oxford
realism"
thatwas
inthesecond
halfofthe14thcentury
hada strong
onthedevelopment
flourishing
impact
ofphilosophy
ofthisschool
notonlyinEngland,
butalsoontheContinent.2
Themembers

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REVIEWS

and
William
and others)
(Robert
Milverley
JohnSharpe,William
Penbygull,
Alyngton,
- partly
was
their
because
recent
research
havefallen
almost
intooblivion
entirely
disciples
andtheOckhamist
interested
in(nottosay:obsessed
Ockham
tradition,
with)
mostly
partly
in modern
Thanksto Alessandro
becausetheir
works
arenotaccessible
editions.
Conti,
willbe rescued
from
there
is somehopethattheseneglected
authors
obscurity.
Basel

Perler
Dominik

1 See In I Sent.(Ordinatio),
and
dist.2, q. 6, OperaTheologica
II, ed. byS. Brown
G. Gi,St. Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1970,p. 181(forthefirst
andp. 179(forthe
problem)
secondproblem).
2 A. Contiprovides
"studio
an excellent
introduction
to thisschoolin hisextensive
in:Johannes
critico"
211-336.
Firenze,
Quaestio
universalia,
Sharpe,
super
imSpannungsfeld
von
Ihre
Aristotelismus,
Andreas,
(ed.)DieBibliotheca
Speer,
Amploniana:
Bedeutung
&
und
Berlin
Nominalismus
Humanismus.
medievalia
deGruyter:
23)Walter
(= Miscellanea
NewYork1995ISBN0544-4128
A university
and
reveals
muchabouttheacademic
orientation
oftheinstitution
library
themajorrolesthelibrary
indexto theintellectual
plays.As wellas beingan important
climate
andtheteaching
itgivessomeideaoftheintellectual
clirolesoftheuniversity,
mateofthetimes.
heldin
The bookunderreview
is theproceedings
ofa symposium
March1993bytheThomas-Institut
ontheAmplonian
oftheUniversity
ofCologne
Library
at Erfurt
as itwasat theendofthefifteenth
Itseditor,
Andreas
century.
Speer,situates
thebookwitha short
anditcloseswithan Index
Thismassive
colnominum.
introduction,
lection
ofpapersis notunlike
in
thetypeofassessors'
thatis increasingly
common
report
of
Canadian
andBritish
Likesuchreports
ourbooktreats
thegenesis
University
systems.
thelibrary,
andthescholarly
workitserved.
itsholdings,
The beginnings
are recounted
ofviewby
ofthelibrary
from
different
slightly
points
and Henryk
collecKadenbach
Anzulewicz.
The library
Johannes
beganas theprivate
tionofthefifteenth-century
an
de Bercka
(1365/67-1434/5),
Rating
polymath,
Amplonius
avidbookcollector
withthemoney
andprofessional
senseto do itwell.Amplonius
took
in 1385/6andin 1387he becameMaster
hisBAfrom
ofArts,
buthiscollecting
Prague
in 1384,at theverybeginning
tooka
ofhisuniversity
career.
In 1392Amplonius
begins
inMedicine
atErfurt.
There
Baccalaurat
from
before
tothenewuniversity
Cologne
going
he becameRector
oftheStudium
Generale
His interests
thenmovedto Law
(1394-95).
he wentto a Chairin Vienna,
andTheology.
FromErfurt
andtravelled
to Italyin the
trainoftheArchbishop
ofCologne,
Frederic
III. Likemanyfifteenth-century
academics,
hemoved
butheusedErfurt
as a base.Asa manwithprivate
meanshebought,
around,
andbought
which
he
Thosebookshecouldnotbuy,hecopied.Hiscollection,
copiously.
wasbequeathed
totheUniversity,
andsupplemented
carefully
byfurther
acquicatalogued,
ofthe
sitions
andusefully
toprevious
studies
after
hisdeath.Botharticles
refer
copiously
at Erfurt,
in particular
thosebyBischoff
(1966)andSchum(1887).Anzulewicz
holdings
hassomefinereproductions
ofmanuscripts.
in theAmplonian
do notattempt
to duplicate
the
Discussions
oftheholdings
library
Markowski's
oftheAristotelian
commentaries
heldbythelibrary
(1987).
Johannes
Repertorium
with
owncatalogue
ofa bibliophile
Kadenbachs
discussion
ofAmplonius's
givesa picture
of
thescholar's
zealforclassifying
thematerial
he ownsanduses.Thewideprovenance
witheach
thebooksin theAmplonian
communicated
shows
justhowmuchuniversities
in thatperiod,
other
muchofthatcommunication
out
wasdueto a wanderlust
though
Latincommentators
onAristode
ofplacein ourmoreregulated
modern
world.
rangein
Vivarium
36,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1998
Koninklijke

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271

to thefifteenthto Prague,
andin timefrom
Albertus
from
Magnus
England
provenance
ofthecollection
intheearly
fourteenth
cenwith
Ulricde Presst,
themajor
weight
century
ofindividual
authors.
Anzulewicz's
ontheholdings
articles
Thereareseveral
Henryk
tury.
ofhis
thediversity
ofAlbertus
ofthemanuscripts
discussion
Magnus
highlights
important
whileConcetta
Lunadiscusses
the
attheuniversity,
andtherangeofinterests
competence
andofthecritical
in thelightofotherlibrary
collections
Romanus
ofAegidius
holdings
itseems,
on Aristotle,
arerepreinprogress
at themoment.
Arabcommentators
edition
of
oftheproblems
RolandHissette's
discussion
in thislibrary
sented
onlybyAverroes.
Fol.
318
on
the
Perihermeneias
the
Averroes
a
edition
of
critical
commentary
(Ampl.
making
anddamofthehazards
account
ff.44r-51v)
copyists
posedbytranslation,
givea sobering
ofthethirteenth-century
English
agetoa text.I wasalsogladtomaketheacquaintance
ofhisSpeculum,
discussion
Richard
Rufus,
RegaWood'simportant
through
philosopher,
SilviaDonati's
andofitsinfluence.
on thePhysics
Western
animae
, thefirst
commentary
on
Pariscommentaries
oflatethirteenth-century
on theErfurt
article
holdings
interesting
as theintellectual
howthesetextskepttheirimportance
demonstrates
Aristotle's
Physics
raised
discusses
thecritical
Gottschall
andDagmar
climate
bythemany
problems
changed;
remark
thatthe
to Aristotle.
EdithSylla'sopening
ascribed
science
texts
falsely
physical
in Erfurt
thanin Oxford
is eloquent
arebetter
Oxford
Calculators
testimony
represented
accorded
thestudy
ofthe
andthecrucial
ofmanuscripts
toboththemortality
importance
in Erfurt.
world
physical
reflects
on
thatPhilosophy
is a wayin whicha culture
remarks
Gnther
Mensching
andKrieger,
showthatErfurt
Hoffmann
andothers
itself.
article,
byWhler,
Mensching's
thrived
on realthatnominalism
in theNominalist
wasdefinitely
camp,butitis evident
ofthecloserelationship
remains
essential.
Butyetlanguage
isttexts.
Sylla'sexamination
in theworkof theOxford
sciences
and physical
between
theology
logic,philosophy,
and
thata terminology,
a medieval
version
oftheprinciple
Calculators
furnishes
theory
whichaimsat bothconsistency
arecoterminous
in a science
thephenomenon
analyses
climate
all ofthosewhoexamine
thephilosophical
andaccurate
knowledge.
Practically
curbetween
beliefand theUniversity
at Erfurt
castlighton theintimate
relationship
to usetheword
The wayin whichthisissueis dealtwithmakesme hesitate
riculum.
moreto the
theology
playsa largeparthere,butthereis obviously
"religion":
granted
was.
thantheintellectual
fourteenth-century
study
theology
question
Hamesse's
claimthatthefifteenth-century
forJacqueline
Thereis amplejustification
of theperiod.Albert
interests
of theintellectual
overview
givean excellent
holdings
"TheDarkAges,"highlights
two
humanist
on thatenduring
article
Zimmermann's
sneer,
andthecontribution
ofthe
oftheMiddleAges:theflowofideasintoGermany,
aspects
The essential
ofthesixteenth
MiddleAgesto theRenaissance
century.
pointunderlined
oftheMiddleAges,themedieval
is theintellectual
articles
continuity
bytheseandother
Of
oldevidence.
hisideasbyreassessing
to support
wasas ableas anymodern
scholar
andBuridan.
Ockham
ofthelegacyofScotus,
arethediscussions
importance
particular
shown
valuesis graphically
andreligious
ofacademic
Thecloseinterweaving
byWilliam
andJeandeMirecourt.
deAutrecourt
ofNicholas
account
ofthecondemnation
Courtenay's
routines
ofsuchan investigaoftheadministrative
account
us an excellent
Besides
giving
wasmore
there
thatinthemedieval
shows
tion,Courtenay
university
joyoveroneerrant
One can
whodidnotneedrepentance.
whorepented
thanoverninety-nine
academic
establishofthecaution
oftheacademic
ofthesetwoas a result
viewthemisadventures
ofeccleandthepossibility
wasmadegraver
ment.
Thesituation
byitsdoctrinal
aspects,
- after
whom
werecommenting,
allPeter
aswellas academic
censure
siastical
Lombard,
they
withthetraditionalists.
hadhadhisproblems
seemto be thinon the
andcommentaries,
forthatage ofglosses
originals
Fittingly
forusein
andglossed
texts
contain
theusualflorilegio,
The Amplonian
holdings
ground.
who
forthemedieval
is notan easyauthor,
Aristotle
theclassroom.
student,
particularly
Thepicture
ofteaching
thanthemodern
student.
andlessmature
wasgenerally
younger

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is notparticularly
Hamesse
Sheis concerned
with
practice
givenbyJacqueline
flattering.
basicproblems
in thestudent
likeliteracy
oflecturing,
ofhandbody,routines
problems
under
ofinteipreting
a difficult
difficulties
author
andwhatcanonlybe
writing
pressure,
as a fallin academic
construed
standards.
underOr is thisjusta viewofthenormal
world
which
todo,withthemosteconomical
effort
graduate
gotby,as ourstends
possible?
Erfurt
wastheuniversity
ofbothMeister
Eckhart
ondMartin
bothofwhom
Luther,
arerepresented
inthelibrary.
Sturlese
isconcerned
withthecopying
oftheEckhart
history
andspeculates
on their
forscholarship
on Eckhart.
Allofthem
manuscripts,
importance
comefrom
thefourteenth
andcouldhavebeencopiedfrom
Thisarticentury
originals.
cleshould
be readalongside
on nominalism
andmysticism,
a useful
article
Schnberger^
whosehistorical
thereaderfrom
oftheseterms
depthstrongly
discourages
seeingeither
as univocal
or straightforward.
HorstSeidlfocuses
on thedispute
between
Luther
and
overfreewill.Hisarticle
Erasmus
is an excellent
which
traces
pieceofintellectual
history,
thedifficult
issueoffreewill,sinandhumanresponsability
Aristode,
through
Augustine
andAquinas.
Ofthetwodisputants,
thereformer,
while
seemsthemoremedieval,
Luther,
Erasmus
seemsthemoreradical.SeidlshowshowErasmus
wastrying
to finda modus
vivendi
between
andChristian
Humanism
while
Luther
wasfocussing
onanalmost
theology,
medieval
viewoftherelationship
between
GodandMan.
Theingratitude
oftheHumanists
to theMiddleAgeshasalways
struck
me.Butthen
think
radicals
their
immediate
arefools.
Thelastimportant
theme
discussed
predecessors
is theevidence
in thelibrary
on thetransition
totheRenaissance
ofthe
bytheCongress
sixteenth
Albert
Zimmermann
considerable
themedieval
century.
spends
spaceindiscussing
to humanism.
Thisis oneimportant
's article.
ButwhileSeidllooks
legacy
aspectofSeidl
at thistimethrough
from
theviewpoint
oftheuniversity
theologian's
eyes,Tewesargues
Thiswasa timewhentheviaantiqua
andmasters
andstudents
were
professor.
reappeared,
on themovearoundEuropeto avoidthetaintofwhichever
theywereescapapproach
Tewesgivesa picture
ofan intolerant
timein whichtheoldguardwassplit
ingfrom.
intofactions,
andthenewguardlookedat tradition
witha jaundiced
eye.He hassome
remarks
on thechangeoforientation
from
towards
important
philosophy
poetics.
I havelikened
thisexcellent
bookto thesortofreport
on academic
resources
thatis
inBritain
morecommon
andCanada.Thereis plenty
ofinterdisciplinary
meat
becoming
foranymedievalist
here.Ourbookdrawsattention
toresources
somewhat
since
forgotten
theSecondWorldWarandthedescent
oftheIronCurtain.
Butas an academic
report
on theuniversity,
whatdoesittellus?First,
itgivesus an account
ofa university
world
inwhich
theunifying
ofbelief
ensured
thatlearning
a fully
remained
principle
integrated
whole.Second,
wecandrawfrom
thisbooka necessarily
oftheflow
account
incomplete
ofideasaround
after
thenominalist
oftheearly
fourteenth
Third,
Europe
quarrels
century.
itunderlines
thecontinuity
between
theMedievais
andHumanists.
ittellsusmuch
Finally,
abouttheteaching
oftheuniversity,
methods
andbyimplication,
aboutthe
something
I personally
ofthestudents.
wouldliketoknow
moreaboutwhatAmplonius
chancy
quality
wastaking
on whenhe wentto Erfurt
from
ifsuchinformation
is accessible.
Cologne,
After
all Erfurt
hadhadsomestatus
as a centre
oflearning
before
thefoundation
ofthe
on 1392.I alsowouldhavelikedto see moreon thescientiae
sermocinales
; but
University
theninspectors
dealbestwiththeirownspecialities,
andthereis no evidence
ofgrammarians
on theteam.Itsrangeoflanguages,
ItalianandGerman,
howFrench,
English,
ita difficult
booktohandle:
bookslikethisarean excellent
illustration
ofthe
ever,makes
medieval
ofhaving
an international
convenience
ofscholarship.
Oneis leftwonlanguage
whatothermedieval
libraries
needto be assessed
andpublicised
dering
bya booklike
thisone.
DarwinCollege,
Cambridge

L.G. Kelly

18:49:42 PM

BooksReceived
Andreae
de SanctoVictore
inLibrum
, ed. F.A.van
Opera.II: Expositio
Hysterica
Regum
& 158pp.ISBN 2 503 035337/035345
1996cxxxiii
Liere,Turnhout
" Peter
onCreation.
ontheSentences
1.
, Book2,Distinction
1,Question
of Lombard
Writings
Aquinas
withan introduction
and notesby St.E. Baldnerand W.E. Carroll.
Translated
Pontifical
Institute
ofMediaeval
Toronto
1997x + 166pp.ISBN0 88844
Studies,
2858
Averrois
SeriesB. Averroes
Latinus
XII: Commentum
medium
Libro
PeriHermeneias
Opera.
super
Aristotelis.
Translatio
Wilhelmo
deLunaattributa.
Edidit
R. Hissette.
Leuven1996
Peeters,
viii& 164*& 224pp.& 8 pl. ISBN90 6831859 4
d Ockham.
etphilosophie.
PUF, Paris1997 124 pp. ISBN
JolBiard,Guillaume
Logique
2 13 0483119
del'Institut
Cahiers
duMoyenetLatin.
Universit
deCopenhague
, vol.65 (1995)362pp.
AgeGrec
inmemoriam;
Contents:
Raasted
C. Adsuara,
TheKalophonic
Sticherarion
Sinai
Jorgen
gr.J251;
andtheToledan
Material
in Trinity
ms0.8.34
; Chr.Schabel,
J.D. North,
"Aragonensis"
Peter
Aureol
onDivine
andFuture
; St.Ebbesen,
Knowledge
Contingents
Thirteenth-century
Logic.
Selected
texts.
I. Godsknows
whatever
heusedtoknow
II. TwoEnglishman
on
Introduction;
,
"Tantum
unum
est
maius
esttanto
minus
IV.Logicalia
Parisian
," III. Quanto
videtur,
aliquid
from
Manuscripts
MarcioChaves-Tanns,
A ticadePedro
Abelardo.
Ummodelo
medieval
deaplicao
da lgica

moral.
da Universidade
Editora
Federal
de Uberlndia,
Uberlndia
1996
Edufu,
D. Conti,Esistenza
Forme
e strutture
Alessandro
e verit.
delreale
inPaoloVeneto
e nelpensiero
deltardo
medioevo.
Istituto
StoricoItalianoPerII MedioEvo,Roma 1996
filosofico
vi & 324pp.ISSN 03918475
NicoDen Bok,Communicating
A Systematic
theMostHigh.
andTrinity
in the
Study
ofPerson
Paris
/Turnhout
1996540pp.ISBN
ofRichard
Theology
ofSt.Victor
(+ 1173).Brepols,
2 503505309
e studi
Documenti
medievale.
Rivista
sullatradizione
dellaSocietdelMedioevo
Latino,
filosofica
5 (1994)573pp.ISBN88 79887440 Contents
: A. Longo,Proposta
uniperunalettura
taria
del"DeMagistro"
diAgostino
Gottes
bei
; R. Rehn,DieArgumentation
furdieExistenz
vonCanterbury
Anselm
undRen
Descartes
La discussione
sull'eternit
delmondo
; M. Barontini,
allafacolt
diParigi
neiprimi
trenta
annidelXIIIsecolo.
e tradizione
Aristotelismo
teoteologica
R. Wood,Richard
atParisbefore
& J. Carrier,
1240;Cl. Lafleur
Rufiis:
logica;
Physics
Uninstrument
dervision
la licence
destine
auxcandidats
dela Facult
desartsdeParis
, le
"Decommunibus
artium
liberalium"
U.R.Jeck,
transMatena,
substantial,
(vers
1250?);
forma
mutatio.
Frhe
Alberts
desGroen
und
H. Anzulewicz,
zurNaturphilosophie
Alchemie;
bemerkungen
von"Deprincipiis
motus
II, 2 desAlbertus
Neuaufgefundenes
Texfragment
processivi"
Magnus
imKodex
sterreichische
Nationalbibliothek
An
Wien,
2303;R.C. Dales,Gilbert
ofStratton.
s Teaching
onthePossibility
World;
Defense
ofAquinas'
EarlyOxford
ofa Beginningless
L.J.
Sermoni
e orazioni
d'ambiente
universitario
nelsec.XIII;C. Casagrande
Bataillon,
parigino
S. Vecchio,
La classificazione
deipeccati
trasettenario
e decalogo
XIII-XV);C. Rigo,
(secolo
Romano
nella
cultura
ebraica:
leversioni
di Yehudah
b.Mosheh
A. Melamed,
Romano;
Egidio
TheAnonymous
Hebrew
Translation
"DeRegimine
AnUnknown
ofAegidius'
Principm":
Chapter
inMedieval
Political
D. Perler,
Ockham
ber
Prdikation
undInhrenz;
Jewish
Philosophy;
O. Grassi,
II "Deobiecto
actus
credendi"
diRobert
M. Bertagna,
La teoria
dell'inHolcot;
nelle
diRichard
Indicedeimanoscritti;
Indicedeinomi
ferenza
opere
Ferrybridge;
Henricus
Divinorum
etQuorundam
PartsXX-XXIII:TheHeavens,
Naturalium.
Bate,Speculum
TheDivine
andTheFirst
Intellect.
Edited
Movers,
byC. Steel& G. Guldentops.
University
Leuven1996lvi& 563pp.ISBN 90 61867762
Press,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1998

Vivarium
36,2

18:49:50 PM

274

BOOKSRECEIVED

nouama suppositions
liber
. Editionem
Scottiseu Eriugenae
primus
Johannis
Periphyseon
in qua uicissitudines
ditatam
ueroappendice
opens
quidemadditamentis
purgatam,
Turnholti
1996
curauit
E.A.Jeauneau.
exhibentur
Brepols,
synoptice
deTocco
Thome
deAquino
deGuillaume
Ystoria
sancti
Clairele Brun-Gouanvic,
(1323).dition
1996
Toronto
ofMediaeval
etnotes.
Institute
Pontifical
introduction
Studies,
critique,
andTexts127)
viii& 298pp.ISBN0 888441274 (Studies
contra
inSumma
TheMetaphysics
}sNatural
Norman
Kretzmann,
Theology
ofTheism.
Aquinas
3
0
19
xii
ISBN
823660
1997
&
302
I.
Oxford
Clarendon
Press,
pp.
gentiles
Actesducol-XVe
etOxford
la Facult
desarts(Paris
desdisciplines
, XIIIe
sicles).
L'enseignement
Turnhout
et L. Holtz,CNRS/Brepols,
ditsparOlgaWeijers
loqueinternational
1997562pp.ISBN2 503 505716 (StudiaArtistarum
4)
tot1700.
I. De periode
inNederland.
De geschiedenis
vandekindergeneeskunde
M.J.vanLieburg,
1997351pp.ISBN90 52350418
Rotterdam
Eramus,
Press1977373pp.
Abelard.
ThePhilosophy
Cambridge
lohnMarenbon,
ofPeter
University
ISBN 0 521 553970
toMedieval
AnIntroduction
Press,
Edinburgh
University
Edinburgh
C.J.F.Martin,
Philosophy.
1996vii& 148pp.ISBN0 748607900
LondonandNewYork1998
Medieval
, editedbyJohnMarenbon.
Roudedge,
Philosophy
Volume
ofPhilosophy,
xxxiii
& 510pp.ISBN0 415053773 [Routledge
III]
History
1500-1900.
F. Huisman,
Medische
inregionaal
C. Santing
Groningen
(red.),
geschiedenis
perspectief
1997184pp.ISBN 90 52351074
Rotterdam
Erasmus,
vonJ.C.King& P.W.Tax.
Diekleineren
Notker
derDeutsche,
Schuften.
Herausgegeben
1996cxxxii
& 349pp.ISBN3 484212098 (Geb.
MaxNiemeyer
Verlag,
Tbingen
2 (Kart.Ausg.)
Ausg.)/
Published
fortheBritish
William
Politica
IV.Edited
Academy
Ockham,
byH.S. Offler.
Opera
Press,1997xviii& 486pp.ISBN0 19 7261272
University
bytheOxford
intheUniversity
A Short-title
andPrint
inthe
Netherlands.
of
Library
ofPublications
Plague
Catalogue
Erasmus
and L. Noordegraaf.
Amsterdam
, compiled
Publishing,
by P. Dijstelberge
1997360pp. ISBN90 5235 1260
Rotterdam
: articles:M. Hecquet-Devienne,
Revue
d'histoire
destextes
, tomeXXIV(1994)500pp.Contents
La costituzione
danslesmssL etA; M. Bandini,
Lecture
del'OediperoideSophocle
nouvelle
ad oggi
di Senofonte
dalQuattrocento
deltesto
d Commentarii
Socratici
; V. Fromentin,
romaines
deDenys
I etl'pitom
desAntiquits
dulivre
Lesmanuscrits
rcents
d'Halicarnasse;
M. Cacouros,
Uncommentaire
desLettres
P. Ghin,
Nouveaux
d'vagre;
fragments
grecs
JeanChortasmnos
attribuable
au deuxime
livre
desSecondsAnalytiques,
indit
;
byzantin
-XIIesicle),
Il; V. Ortoleva,
latins
desmanuscrits
B. MnkOlsen,Chronique
(IXe
classiques
o
deterior
Recensior
di Vegezio.
dellaMulomedicina
La cosidetta
tradizione
"epitomata"
de
deHautvillers;
indit
d'Almanne
indiretta
traduzione
technique
?; D. Poirel,Unpome
LestraducH. Hugonnard-Roche,
et histoiredes textes:avant
traduction
propos',
delogique,
ducorpus
etla constitution
dePorphyre
tions
de/'Isagoge
F.J.
syriaque
syriaques
et
detraduire
auMoyen
dela manire
L'volution
chezlesSlaves
Thomson,
Age.Comparaison
lrne
etd'unPseudo-Augustin
depassages
slavonnes
dition
traductions
dedeux
;
sicles)
(Xe-XIVe
dugrec
Apropos
Fr.Dolbeau,
d'un
, traduit
parMose
biblique
florilge
appendice
parJ.Noret;
deRhazs
latine
duKitabal-Mansuri
surla traduction
deBergame'
D. Jacquart,
Note
; P.-Y.
" Lestraductions detextes
traduction.
de
Rothschild,
,
Lambert,
historiques
J.-P.
celtiques
"Style
Le
D. Bguin,
nouvelles:
Lestraductions
duLivredescausesetleurs
; mthodes
copies
surCD-Rom
etmdivale
latine
La littrature
CLCLTdeBrepols.
; index
interrogeable
patristique
cits
desmanuscrits
Textesrunis
au XVIIesicle.
del'Antiquit
traditions
etcommentaires
La rhtorique
d'Aristote:
par
Paris1998356pp.ISBN2 711613070
Dahanet IrneRosier-Catach,
Gilbert
Manchester
andGender.
S.H. Rigby,Chaucer
in Context.
UP, Manchester/
Allegory
Society,
NewYork1996xii& 205pp.ISBN0 719042364
EditedbyJ. McEvoy,
andScholarship.
onHis Thought
Grosseteste:
Robert
NewPerspectives

18:49:50 PM

BOOKSRECEIVED

275

1996438pp.ISBN2 503505414 Contents:

;
Preface
J.McEvoy,
Steenbrugge/Turnhout
When
andWhere
didGrosseteste
Introduction
R.W.Southern,
; J. Goering,
Study
Theology?;
Robert
andtheObject
Grosseteste
P.B. Rossi,Robert
; J. Moreton,
Knowledge
ofScientific
to
Grosseteste
From
Robert
Scientia
andtheCalendar
Grosseteste
; J. Hackett,
Experimentalis:
MS
Arms
and
Greek
Translations
Robert
Grosseteste's
M.
Bacon
Holland,
of
College
;
Roger
: A "New"
onAristotelian
Grosseteste's
Arundel
Commentary
9;J.McEvoy,
Friendship
Reflections
onthe
Robert
Grosseteste's
D. Carabine,
Ethics
onMcomachean
VIII.8-14;
Mystical
Commentary
andthe
; C. Taylor
ofRobert
Ecclesiology
Hogan,Pseudo-Dionysius
ofPseudo-Dionysius
Theology
Franciscan
andthe
Evolution
Robert
Grosseteste
: a Fruitful
Grosseteste
; S. Gieben,
ofthe
Symbiosis,
Tradition
andthe
Franciscan
Grosseteste
Saint
Anselm
Order
; J.McEvoy,
, Robert
; M. Robson,
MS
Cathedral
Anselm
UseoftheArgument
Robert
Grosseteste's
; E.B. King,Durham
ofSaint
' Homiletical
on
Robert
Grosseteste
Works
A.111.2andtheCorpus
; J. McEvoy,
ofGrosseteste
onthe
Soul's
Care
Grosseteste
R.C.Dales,Robert
Educative
; P.W.Rosemann,
Love;
forthe
Body
Christian
theJewsandMedieval
Tabula
Grosseteste's
Robert
Grosseteste,
; D.J.Wasserstein,
CareonVernacular
Pastoral
TheImpact
Hebraism
; M. Hessenauer,
Religious
ofGrosseteste's
Chteau
d'Amour
K. Sajavaara,
dePeckham;
asLaisbyPierre
literature:
La Lumire
;J.McEvoy,
andSome
Desiderata
andinProgress,
Planned
Editions
; Discussions
;
fortheFuture
ofGrosseteste
1970-1991
S. Gieben,
Robertus
Grosseteste:
; Indices
Bibliographia
A Translation
oftheHexameron
OntheSixDaysofCreation.
Robert
Grosseteste,
byC.F.J.
Press1996ix & 373 pp. ISBN
Oxford
The British
Martin,
Academy,
University
0 19 7261507
AmsterdamM. vanMulken.
inStemmatology.
EditedbyP. vanReenen,
Studies
Benjamins,
1996xvi& 311 pp. ISBN 90 272 2153 7/1 55619507 9 Contents:
Philadelphia
ortheResurrection
Cladistics
P. vanReenen& M. vanMulken,
; B. Salemans,
Prologue
and"Best-Text"
Stemmatic
Method
, P. Robinson,
Analysis
Computer-Assisted
ofLachmann
ofthe
Traditions'.
Shock
Waves
inText
& M. vanMulken,
Historical
; E. Wattel,
; E. Wattel
Editing
Formal
E. Wattel
& M. vanMulken,
Trees;
Weighted
of
Support
Stemmatological
Clusering
andChains
Traditions
TheAnalysis
Islamic
A.D.vanReenen,
a Pedigree;
ofTransmisofEarly
W.R.Veder,Textual
Medieval
Dossiers
andModem
Stemmas;
sions;
IncompatiJ.B.Voorbij,
Variants
areUseful
inDiscovering
K.-H.Uthemann,
Which
andMany-Pronged
Stemmata;
bility
P. vanReenen& L. Schlosler,
Tradition
theDeepStructure
ofa Text?;
oftheManuscript
toPedigree
intheCharroi
de Nmes;Index.
Variant
From
I-III.Testolatino
a fronte.
Francesco
Introduzione,
traduzione,
Surez,
metafisiche
Disputazioni
Milano1996622pp.ISBN88 18
di Costantino
notee apparati
Rusconi,
Esposito.
701541
e artidellinguagdiscorso
contrarietatis.
Phantasia
LuisaValente,
Contraddizioni
scritturali,
teologico
Firenze1997
Cantore
di Pietro
Editore,
(+ 1197).Olschki
loquendi
gionelDe tropis
252pp.ISBN88 22244974
universits
intellectuelles
l'poque
despremires
Le maniement
dusavoir.
Pratiques
OlgaWeijers,
Turnhout
1996266 pp. ISBN 2 503 505317 (Studia
(Xni'-XIVsicles).
Brepols,
Artistarum.
Subsidia,
3)
imWerke
Semiotik
undGedchtnistheorie
Gedchtnis.
Das kosmische
Kosmologie,
Wildgen,
Wolfgang
am Main 1998278 pp. ISBN
PeterLang,Frankfurt
Brunos
Giordano
(1548-1600).
3 631 329539

18:49:50 PM