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Vivarium

Volume

39
2001

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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
inparticular
sideofmediaeval
vivarium
is devoted
totheprofane
philosophy
lifeoftheMiddle
andtheintellectual
AgesandRenaissance
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L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)
editors
(Nijmegen)
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(Madison)
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CONTENTS
Richard A. Lee, Jr.
Giorgio Pini
Daniel
Liscia

Antonio di

Walter Redmond
JamesB. South
Reviews

Harm Goris
Colleen Mccluskey
Angel D'Ors
Isabel Iribarren
Reviews

OF VOLUME

XXXIX (2001)

Being Skepticalabout Skepticism:Methodological Themes concerningOckham's


1
Alleged Skepticism
of Names in Duns Scotusand
Signification
Some of His Contemporaries
20
Eine
libro
encadenado":
SammelhandEl
schriftnaturphilosophischer
Schriftenvon
Jean Buridan(Ms. BuenosAires,Biblioteca
Nacional 342R)
52
in
Inference
MexiQuantified
16th-Century
can Logic
87
FranciscoSurez on Imagination
119
Luca F. Tuninetti,"Per se notum".Die
des SelbstverstndlogischeBeschaffenheit
lichenim Denken des Thomas von Aquin
159
(rev.byE.P. Bos)
Tense Logic in 13th-Century
...
161
Theology
The Roots of Ethical Voluntarism
185
PetrusHispanusO.P., AuctorSummularum
(II). Furtherdocumentsand problems .... 209
'Responsio secundum Thomam5 and the
Search foran Early ThomisticSchool .... 255
Panaccio, Claude, Le discours intrieur.
De Platon Guillaume Ockham (rev.by
Ernesto
297
Perini-Santos)
Cecilia Trifogli,Oxford Physics in the
Thirteenth
Century(ca. 1250-1270).Motion,
Place and Time (rev.byEdithSylla) 299
Infinity,

Book Received

302

18:07:55 PM

aboutSkepticism:
BeingSkeptical
Ockham3
Themes
s AllegedSkepticism
concerning
Methodological
RICHARD A. LEE,JR.

Introduction
In recentyears,the debate concerningwhetherOckham is a skepticor
leads to skepticism
seemsto have come to an end.1The end of the debate,
is
as
however,
problematicas the debate itself.The question of skepticism in Ockham seems to have been answeredbeforewe could question
the very termsof the debate itself.It is striking,
for example, that the
in
of
comes
i.e.,
modernity.Perhaps
relativelyrecently,
charge skepticism
the issue of skepticismis an issue forus in a way thatit could not have
been fora thinkerlike Ockham. This kind of questioning,however,was
never raised in the debate in the scholarlyliterature.
When we look at the debate over Ockham's alleged skepticism,
we see
thatthe questionis phrasedin termsof the "objectivestatus"of our conIn our time,
cepts,and our abilityto approach the world "scientifically."2
that is, we see Ockham as speaking,or failingto speak, to our modern
philosophicalneuroses.We assessa medievaldebate in termswhichbelong
not to the medieval epoch but to our own. While one can imagine a
medievalphilosopherusingall of theseterms,theywould have been used
in such radicallydifferent
ways and the connectionbetween objective
validityand science was never reallyan issue.
In what follows,I would like to thinkthroughthe issue of whether
Ockham was skepticor leads to skepticism.I do not want to rehash the
entiredebate,nordo I necessarily
wantto answernegatively
or affirmatively.
Rather,I want to raise the largerissue of our relationas modernreaders

1
discussion
canbe found
in Volker
DoesOckham3
s Concept
Thougha recent
Leppin,
of
Divine
Power
Threaten
Man'sCertainty
inHisKnowledge
in: Franciscan
Studies,
oftheWorld?,
55 (1998),169-80.
2 Gracia,
hasonlymental
theobjectivity
existence,
e.g.,arguesthat"Iftheuniversal
andscientific
ofourconcepts
is undermined,"
onUniversais
,
validity
J.Gracia,Thomas
Jorge
in:DavidM. Gallagher
andHisLegacy
, Washington
1994,23.
(ed.),Thomas
Aquinas
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2001

Vivarium
39,1

18:08:00 PM

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

of medieval textsto the historicalhorizon3of those textsthemselves.In


short,I would like to use this issue to raise questionsabout the method
of reading medieval textsin our own epoch. I will firstinvestigatethe
modernoriginof skepticism,forthe skepticismcharged of Ockham is of
a verypeculiar kind. Second, I will show that the contemporarydebate
about Ockham's alleged skepticismpresupposes the "Cartesian turn."
Third, I will ask whetherthis formof skepticism,i.e., one based on a
distinctionbetween subjectiveand objective,makes sense in Ockham's
horizon. Fourth,I will investigatethe ways in which Ockham's position
on knowledgeand universaisdiffersfromthat of realismin the hands of
Aquinas. Finally,I will returnto the larger question of our relationto
medieval texts.
In the end, what I hope to accomplishby thistaskis to show the need
for reflectionon the methodsby which we approach the thoughtof the
Middle Ages. In so doing, I hope to open the question of who we are,
of how our problemsbecame problematic.In short,I hope to open the
possibilityof using medieval textson our way toward a historyof the
present.4
1. ModernSkepticism
In the historyof philosophy,there have been many varietiesof skepticism, each arisingfroma particularcontextand a particularhistorical
a form
situation.For example,in antiquitywe findPyrrhonianskepticism,
of skepticismwhich takes as its guide the ancient philosophicalgoal of
happiness.This kind of skepticargues that our claims to knowledgeare
3 The phraseis fromHans-Georg
andMethod
2d ed., trans.
Gadamer,Truth
Joel
NewYork1991,306:"Westarted
that
andDonaldG. Marshall,
Weinsheimer
bysaying
thatwe bringwithus. They
is determined
situation
a hermeneutical
bytheprejudices
fortheyrepresent
thatbeyond
which
thehorizon
ofa particular
then,
constitute,
present,
from
thetaskofunderstanding
texts
thepastis the
tosee."ForGadamer,
itis impossible
ofourpresent
andthatpast:"Partofrealunderthehistorical
horizons
taskof"fusing"
of
a
historical
we
...
is
that
concepts
pastin sucha waythattheyalso
regain
standing
ofthem,"
includeourowncomprehension
ibid.,374. I wantto arguethatthedebate
inOckham
is a failure
tothink
"To think
aboutskepticism
means,
historically.
historically
thattheconcepts
ofthepastundergo
whenwe try
in fact,to perform
thetransposition
between
thoseideasand
them.To think
to think
alwaysinvolves
historically
mediating
397.
one'sownthinking,"
ibid.,
4 The ideaofa "history
is central
totheworkofMichelFoucault.
For
ofthepresent"
Critical
/Intellectual
seeMichelFoucault,
a brief
, Philo, in:Politics
History
Theory
description,
D. Kriteman,
NewYork
1977-1984
Interviews
andOther
, ed.Lawrence
, Culture:
Writings
sophy
1988,36.

18:08:00 PM

BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM

preciselywhat lead us to unhappinessas they violate the fundamental


law to "save the appearances."Accordingto thisskepticism,
the onlyway
to save the phenomenais to let thembe. In lettingthe world be, i.e., in
suspendingour claims to knowledge,we can ultimatelyachieve happiness.5Skepticismis therapeutic.6
In modernity,
we oftenread skepticismas somethingwhicharisesafter
Descartespreciselybecause of the Cartesianmovementinto the cogito
, i.e.,
into the subject.7Descartes' famousproblemis that once he has secured
the existenceof the cogitoagainstdoubts,especiallythoseconcerningthe
externalworld,he is unable to get outside of the cogito back into the
world.This is why his proofforthe existenceof God formsthe crux of
his Meditations.
WithoutGod, thereis no knowledgeof the world at all.
Yet his proof for the existence of God is problematic.8When one is
trappedinsidethe cogitowithno means of escape, thenone mustaccept
the claimsof the skeptic.Isolatedwithinthe cogitoor subject,one accepts
the claimsthatone cannot knowwhetheranythingin the world matches
up with what the subject is claimingabout that world. This lack of a
match up arises preciselybecause there may be no world out there at
all. Descartes' groundingof certainknowledgein the cogitois also the

5 Foran overview
ofancient
see Leo Groarke,
Greek
: Anti-realist
skepticism,
Scepticism
Trends
inAncient
Greek
A Study
in
, Montreal
1990,andCharlotte
Thought
Stough,
Skepticism:
1969.
Epistemologa,
Berkeley
6 I usetheterm
to refer
to a skepticism
thatclaimsthattherealization
"therapeutic"
ofourinability
toknow
withcertainty
is insomewayhelpful.
I usetheterm"pernicious"
to refer
to whatI taketo be theissuein thedebateoverOckham's
mostly
skepticism,
thatitis somehow
or suspect.
namely
dangerous
7
is notunknown
in theRenaissance
andforms,
in fact,
an important
Skepticism
part
ofRenaissance
It seemsto me,however,
thattheskepticism
in the
onefinds
philosophy.
is precisely
a kindofethical/therapeutic
Renaissance
form
muchlikeancient
skepticism.
intheRenaissance,
On skepticism
seeDonCameron
Doubs
Boundless
Allen,
Sea,Skepticism
andFaith
1964;Richard
intheRenaissance
TheHistory
, Baltimore
Henry
Popkin,
ofSkepticism
toDescartes
Erasmus
from
, Assen1964.
8 Foran earlytreatment
oftheproblems
ofDescartes'
seethefivesetsofobjecproof,
tionsto hisMeditations.
ofArnauld
these,I findtheobjects
Among
especially
pertinent.
He points
outthatDescartes
needsGod'sexistence
to establish
thetruth
of"clearand
distinct
ideas"andyeta clearanddistinct
ideaofGod is precisely
whatis required
in
theproof
ofGod.RenDescartes,
Meditationes
dePrima
deDescartes,
, in: Oeuvres
Philosophia
ed. Charles
AdamandPaulTannery,
Paris1996,VII, 214;RenDescartes,
Meditations
onFirst
Robert
Stoothoff
andDugaldMurdoch,
in:The
, trans.
JohnCottingham,
Philosophy
1984,150.The proofI havein mindhereis
, Cambridge
Philosophical
ofDescartes
Writings
theproof
oftheThirdMeditation
whosegoal,itseems,
is toestablish
that"clearanddistinct
ideas"aretrue.Thiswillbe usedto movefrom
whatis established
in thecogitoto
outside.
Ifthisproof
someworld
thentheoutside
world
itself
becomes
fails,
questionable.

18:08:00 PM

A. LEE,JR
RICHARD

undoing of certain knowledgeof thingsoutside the cogito.This famous


problemof "solipsism"is located in Descartes only to the extentthatwe
are afraidof a skepticismwhich is not therapeuticbut pernicious.9
We should note that no matterwhich way we take skepticism,one
nor can one "fallinto"skepticism.
cannotbe a skepticaccidentally,
Rather,
assertionthat the world is not knowable.If one
skepticismis the positive
proposes a theorywhich accountsforknowledgeof the world,then even
if that theoryfailsone is not a skepticbut a failureas an epistemologist.
We need to distinguishbetween a theoryof knowledgewhich does not
do what it says it does, and a theorywhich proposes that the world is
unknowable.To my knowledge,most, if not all, modern authors who
with skepticismmean by this charge that
charge medieval nominalists10
medievalnominalismfailsin itsepistemological
goals and not thatmedieval
nominalistsheld that the world is in principleunknowable.
2. TheModernChargeof Skepticism
The modernauthorwhose charge of skepticismagainstnominalism(and
debate was
especiallyOckham) providedthe impetusto the contemporary
Etienne Gilson. In his Unityof Philosophical
, Gilson charges
Experience
Ockham withskepticismbecause he sees in Ockham's use of the absolute
power of God the possibilitythat God could cause knowledgein me of
a state of affairswhich is not the way I know it to be.11While it seems
refutedby sevclear to me that these argumentshave been successfully
eral people,12we ought stillto reflecton the verynature of the charge
in which it
in relationto medieval thoughtpreciselybecause the terms
9 HansBlumenberg
Ockham
's thought
a moreintimate
connection
between
hasargued
ofDescartes
is a transformation
In short,
he arguesthatthe"evilgenius"
andDescartes.
thinkers
likeScotusand Ockham.
oftheabsolute
by medieval
powerof God asserted
thatGod'sabsolute
because
theskepticism
is ableto overcome
Descartes
powercreates
itwithin
andovercomes
thtcogito.
See HansBlumenberg,
he internalizes
theevilgenius
TheLegitimacy
a/M 1988;HansBlumenberg,
derNeuzeit,
DieLegitimitt
2d ed.,Frankfurt
of
M. Wallace,
Mass.1983,especially
Robert
theModern
, trans.
part2.
Cambridge,
Age
10I am wellawareoftheproblematic
in
nature
oftheterm"nominalism"
especially
there
is a relation
I usethetermherestrategically
becauseI think
to Ockham.
reference
ofskepticism.
thederisive
useofthetermandthecharge
between
11Etienne
TheRoadtoScepticism
, NewYork
, in:TheUnity
Gilson,
ofPhilosophical
Experience
in Concerning
William
thissameargument
of
1937,61-91.AntonPegisrehearses
exactly
Ockham
2 (1944),465-80.
, in:Traditio,
12Thefirst
Intuitiva
P. Boehner,
TheNotitia
comesinPhilotheus
refutation
ofNon-Existents
1 (1943),223-75.
toWilliam
, in:Traditio,
ofOckham
According

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

was made have not been called into question. Gilson applies a modern
notion,i.e., a skepticismbased upon the split between the subject and
object (i.e., betweenthe cogito and the world outside)preciselybecause
he wantsto show thatOckham is more like Descartesthan like Aquinas.
Indeed, Gilson refersto the period of medievalphilosophyafterAquinas
as one of "decline and decadence." For Gilson, then,the label "skeptic"
is more than a descriptionof a philosophicalposition.The assumption
- an
is thatskepticismis not a valid epistemologicalposition
assumption
whichGilson does not go on to prove. To label Ockham a skeptic,then,
is an ideologicalmove on Gilson'spart. Not onlyis Ockham a bad epishe is pernicious,a sortof cancerthatshouldhave been removed
temologist,
in itsearlieststages.For Gilson,the term"skeptic"is applied to a philosopositionthatphilosopherholds,
pher not because of some epistemological
but because of a value judgmenton the part of Gilson himself.
In thisway, Gilson is clearlya modernphilosopherwhose distastefor
and distrustof modernityleads him to accuse Ockham (and nominalism
in general)of leadingto the wrongsof modernity.
On thisview,Ockham
"leads to skepticism"because he forcesus to choose betweenknowledge
of God and the externalworld on the one hand and God's absolute
If we chooseknowledge,
thenwe shouldbe Thomists.
poweron theother.13
If we choose God's power,thenwe are on the road to skepticism.What
Gilson'sargumentshowsmostclearlyis thatwe modernshave an almost
impossibletaskwhen it comes to readingmedievalthinkers.It is notjust
that we happen to come afterthe Middle Ages. There is a difference
between philosophyin modernityand philosophyin the Middle Ages.
That difference,
perhaps,cannot be overcome.
The warningwe should draw fromhis argumentis that medievalphilosophyis just as much about us as it is about medieval thinkers.That
is, the approach we take to medievalphilosophy("Does Ockham lead to
skepticism?")
saysjust as much or perhaps even more about our own
philosophicalconcernsand horizonas it does about medievalphilosophy
and its horizon. Our philosophicalvocabulary,conceptualbestiary,and
issues of concernhave a historyof theirown, a historywhich separates
us fromthe medievaltextswe read. This is not to say thatwe are unable
to interprettexts,ratherit is to say thatwe mustreflecton the distance
that separates us and the frameworkwe use to bridge that distance.
13Foran
intothesupposed
relation
between
theabsolute
investigation
powerofGod
andskepticism,
seeLeppin1998(op.cit.,above,n. 1).

18:08:00 PM

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

forinterpretation
is necessary,but no oneframework
Having a framework
is necessary.
Once we turnaway fromGilson and towardsothercommentators
who
in
nominalism
and
Ockham
with
we
do
the
not,
end,
charge
skepticism,
fare much better.MarilynMcCord Adams and T.K. Scott providetwo
such examples.14Both Scott and Adams find that Ockham's epistemolwhen critiqued,does
ogy "leads to skepticism"because his epistemology,
not secure the groundsof knowledgeof the outsideworld.In short,when
we followout Ockham's epistemology,
we findthat he cannot give cerour
the
to
of
external
world,i.e., the world outsidethe
tainty
knowledge
cogito.15
Here we should notice two importantissues.First,while Gilson meant
that nominalismleads to skepticismin an historicsense, i.e., it leads later
thinkersinto skepticism(thusthereis a "road" to skepticism),
Adams and
Scott mean that Ockham himselfis led into skepticismby his own principles. If skepticismis seen as a positiveepistemologicalposition(and one
which is legitimateuntil it has been disproven),however,it cannot be
the case that one is accidentallya skeptic.Skepticismis not a failureof
all of
but is itselfan epistemologicalposition.Furthermore,
epistemology,
these commentatorsthinkthat the label "skeptic"is a negativeone, i.e.,
that once one is labeled a skepticthe work of criticismis done. In this
way, Gilson's use of the term "skeptic" as a value judgment about a
philosophercontinues.Second, and followingfromthe first,both Scott
and Adams do not show that Ockham is a skeptic.What theydo tryto
show is thathis epistemologyfailsto live up to its own claims.Why label
this purportedfailure "skepticism?"There must be some other philosophical concernshidingbehind the charge.
into the presuppositions
What these criticismslack is an investigation
of the kind of skepticismof which theyaccuse Ockham. If a radical separation betweensoul and world is lackingin medieval thought,then no
nominalistcan be a skepticin this sense. In otherwords,it is clear that
modern commentatorsdo not typicallycharge medieval thinkerswith

14Marilyn
Intuitive
andScepticism
in William
Ockham
McCordAdams,
,
Cognition,
Certainty
onEvidence
andIntuition
in: Traditio,
26 (1970),389-98;T.K. Scott,Ockham
, Necessity
, in:
9 (1971),15-41.
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
Journal
" thisis
15Whileneither
of"cogito
what
ScottnorAdamsusesthelanguage
precisely
thesouland the
this
between
in
It
is
have
to
assume
their
separation
arguments.
they
belowwillshowthatno
here.My argument
extra-mental
worldthatI am challenging
occursin medieval
or dichotomous
suchabsolute
thought.
separation

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

Indeed, therapeuticskepticismhad been overcome


therapeuticskepticism.
by Augustineand almost all medieval thinkersacknowledgedthat this
sort of skepticismwas no longer an issue. Augustinewas able to overcome skepticismby replacingits emphasis on knowledgeas "curiosity"
witha quest forknowledgewhich has as its ultimateaim knowledgeof
God and one's relationto the divine. When knowledgeis more than
curiosity,Phyrronianskepticismis overcome. Augustine'semphasis on
love in his epistemology
puts knowledgeon a footingwhich seems unassailable by academic skepticism.
From the investigationinto the charges of skepticismleveled against
medievalthinkersit should be clear that it is the latterformof skeptiwhichis mostoftenappliedto medieval
cism,i.e., post-cartesian
skepticism,
nominalists.This should come as no surpriseto us, as it is only in the
modernperiod,i.e., the period afterDescartes,that the charge of skepticismgets applied to medieval nominalistsat all. Such a charge can
come, however,only if one does not notice that modernity(beginning
withDescartes,at least) has different
philosophicalconditionsand printhan
medieval
ciples
philosophy.16
If what I have been arguingis true,i.e., that the formof skepticism
of which medieval nominalistsmost oftenget accused is the peculiarly
modern sort,then it must be a skepticismbased on the subject/object
splitthatis usuallythoughtto have emergedin Descartes. For thisform
of skepticism
is foundedupon therebeing an "outsideworld,"and thereforean "insideknower."These two sides formseparateand autonomous
worldsor regions(extendedsubstance/thinking
substance).This formsthe
minimalpresuppositionof this formof skepticismand it is this presuppositionthat the accusers never investigate.We should, therefore,
question whetherthissplitcan be foundin the Middle Ages. If it cannot,as
I shall argue, then the charge of skepticismcannot be leveled against
medievalthinkers.
16Thereis indeeda much
issuestanding
behind
thereis a lack
myargument:
larger
onjustwhatthehistory
ofphilosophy
is andwhatmakes
ofreflection
ita history.
Reiner
onBeing
: From
andActing
toAnarchy
Christine
Marie
Schrmann,
, trans.
Heidegger
Principles
ofphilosophy
is a history
of
Gros,Bloomington,
1987,e.g.,hasarguedthatthehistory
inwhich
a givenepochis governed
which
allowcertain
to
byprinciples
"epochs"
things
be thought,
butnotothers.
in MichelFoucault,
One cannoticea similar
The
argument
Order
NewYork,1973.Finally,
HansBlumenberg
1988(op. at.,above,n. 9) also
ofThings,
wants
to think
theissueofjustwhatconstitutes
thehistory
ofphilosophy.
What
through
seemsclearto meis thatthereis a difference
between
medieval
andmodernity
thought
needsto be thematized
andthisdifference
ofphilosophy.
byhistorians

18:08:00 PM

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

3. Subjectivity
and Objectivity
in MedievalPhilosophy
Later medieval thinkerswere not unfamiliarwith the terms"subjective"
and "objective."Indeed, medievalthinkersdevelopeda vocabularywhich
betweensubjectivebeing [essesubiecpaid close attentionto the difference
tiveor subiectivum)
and objective being (esseobiective
or obiectivum).
These
formtwo regionsof being, to be sure, but just what are those regions
and how do they differ?Often commentatorswill note that for the
medievaisthesetermshad preciselythe oppositemeaningtheyhave today,
where subjectivebeing is being outside the mind and objectivebeing is
being in the mindonly.Yet thisis to understandthatin medievalthought
thereis exacdy the same splitbetweensubject and object as in modern
thought theirnames are simplyreversed.
The word obiective
does not appear in the Thasaurus
LinguaeLatinae.The
" is
term "subiective
reportedonly in grammaticalinstances,but thereare
no instancesof the word being used in a metaphysicalsense. We can
translatethese terms,in connectionwith the word esse,as the kind of
being a subject has and the kind of being an object has. Thus we are
and obiectum.
In the sense we are
thrownback upon the words subiectum
concernedwithhere, these words come into the philosophicallexicon as
" and "antikeimenon"
translationsof Aristotle's"hypokeimenon
respectively.
"
Thus a "subiectum
it
(substrate)is that which "stands under" attributes,
is that about which somethingcan be said, but it itselfcannot be said
.17The
of anything.Aristotlecalls this"primarysubstance"in the Categories
"
use of this word, then, is quite straightforward.
To have "subiective
esse
is to have the kind of being that a primarysubstancehas or to have
It is to have the kind
existencein thatprimarysubstanceas in a subject.18
of being which admits of accidents,but also to have the kind of being
which standstherein its own right.

17Ch.5, 2al2-19:"A substance,


ofinthemostfundamental,
andhighspoken
primary
saidofa subject
norpresent
in a subject;
estsenseoftheworldis thatwhichis neither
manoran individual
G.
horse,"
Aristotle,
, trans.
Categories
Hippocrates
e.g.,an individual
meansto either
Grinell
existas a subject
or
1980,3. To existsubjectively,
then,
Aposde,
in thissense.
to existina subject
18Ockham,
in hisdiscussion
ofsubuctwe
ofwhy
quiteclearly
e.g.,showsthismeaning
cannot
existoutside
themind: . . tuncsicutaccidens
universal
substances
est
particulare
in substantia
itaet accidens
universale
eritsubiective
in substantia
subiective
particulari,
in subiecto,"
William
ofOckham,
inLibrum
Praedicamentorum
universali
Expositio
tamquam
etTeleologica,
Aristotelis
de Ockham
OPh.vol.II,
, ed.GedeonGi,Guillelmi
Opera
Philosophica
St.Bonaventure
1978,151-2.

18:08:00 PM

BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM

" has
On the otherhand, to have the kind of being that an "obiectum
is not as easy to understand.Again, the Thesaurus
LinguaeLatinaereport
no classicalinstancesof the word used in this sense.19It seems to arise,
accordingto Dewan's excellenthistoryof the word, in the twelfthcentury,and, as noted already, it appears as a translationof Aristotle's
"antikeimenon"
This Greek termwas originallyrenderedquite literallyby
the Latin "oppositum."20For Aristode,antikeimenon
is that which is the
an
the
correlate
to
act
or
of
soul.
Thus, desire,love, and
proper
power
outsidethe soul towardwhich
knowledgewould each have an antikeimenon
a particularpower of the soul tends.21Accordingto Aquinas, e.g., "The
object [of a potency]is compared to passive potencyjust as to a principle and movingcause. The object is compared to an active potencyas
a terminusand end."22If we translateobiectum
as "object" we should
understandit in the sense of the "object of a game" ratherthan in the
sense of an "unidentified
flyingobject." That is, it is that which brings
the power of a soul to its fulfillment
(Latin: termint).Color, e.g., is the
"object" of sightnot in the sense that it is the thingwhich is seen, but
in the sense that it is what sightis all about. Sight providesthe "objecare already bound in a
tivity"of the object. Color and sight,therefore,
with
one
another
need
one anotherin order
necessaryrelationship
they
foreach to be what it is.
We can perhapsunderstandthisbetterby placing the entiretheoryof
knowledge(and even vision) in a largercontext.For medieval thought,
visionand knowledgedo not happen in isolated events.Rather,the fact
that knowledgeis possible,that vision can grasp its object, depends on
the constitutionof the cosmos itself.There is a "natural" connection
betweena power of the soul and its object: "[I]t is impossiblethatthere
be visionand nothingis seen."23Objectivityin thismedievalsense,therefore,presupposesthisbackground,this"cosmos." This, in turn,seems to
19The term
doesappearin thecontext
ofcriminal
however.
accusations,
20Lawrence
ontheInvention
Notes
d'Histoire
Dewan,'Obiectum3:
, in:Archives
ofa Word
et Littraire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,48 (1981),45. The Aristotelian
textis De anima
,
II, ch.4, 415a19-20.
21See
Ensinquantum
Ens:derBegriff
desSeienden
alssolchm
alsGegenstand
Honnefelder,
Ludger
derMetaphysik
nachderLehre
desJohannes
DunsScotus
, Mnster/W
1979,60f.,and Peter
undErkenntnis
beiWilhelm
vonOckham
Sein,
Schulthess,
, Berlin1992,184-93.
Signifikation
esp.
184f.
22ST I, q. 72,a. 3c.
23William
ofOckham,
inLib.PeriHerm.
Aris
t.,ed. Gi 1978(op.cit.,above,
Expositio
n. 18),352.Thistextwillbe citedas Per.Herm
., followed
bypagenumber.

18:08:00 PM

10

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

be what modem commentatorsdo not thematizein their reading of


medievalepistemology.Perhaps thisis the resultof our own modernloss
of cosmos.
is understoodin this sense, then somethinghas being
When obiectum
obiectiue
when it has being in relationto a power of the soul- or perhaps
even in that verypower itself.In thisway, we can say that a thinghas
, not merelywhen it has being outsidethe soul, but when
being subiective
we are consideringthe kind of being it has in itselfapart froma power
of the soul. When we say that a thinghas being obiectiue
, we are paying
attentionto the way in which thatthingexistsin relationto some power
of the soul. We mightformulateit in thisway: while "subjective"points
fromthe soul to the thing,"objective"pointsfromthe thingto the soul.
If the soul, by its very constitution,
already reaches out into the world
with its powers,then to speak of an oppositionbetween subjectiveand
objective is to miss how, on the one hand, our soul meets that world
and, on the otherhand, how the world reaches out for our soul. "This
'
'
suggeststhat, in using the word obiectumconcerningan apprehensive
power, one is expected to imagine somethingmoving from the thing
apprehended to the one who apprehends:perhaps the best illustration
would be sound travelingfromthe gong or bell to the ear. Color, e.g.,
' would
would be imaginedas behavingsomewhatsimilarly.The 'obiectum
be what is hurledat and strikesthe observer.To call somethingan 'obiectum'would be somethinglike calling it 'striking,''a strikingthing.'"24
We can look brieflyat the example of a sensoryillusion.Trees on the
bank of a riverappear to move to one standingon a passing boat. If
the soul reaches out automatically,as it were, to the world, we would
expect that one should say the moving trees have objective being, i.e.,
theyhave being in relationto the power of vision.This is indeed what
one finds,e.g., in Peter Aureoli and otherlater medieval philosophers.25
" is not
To say, however,that the movingtreeshave being "mereobiective
to say that theyexistin the mind or the soul alone. Rather,it is to say

24Dewan1981(op.cit.,
Dewannotedthattheterm
"obiectum"
above,n. 20),59.Earlier,
Whenoneinquires
moreto thenature
ofa powerthanto itsintelligibility.
after
points
after
a power's
oneinquires
thatoccurs
heremust
Thus,the"striking"
finis.
intelligibility,
becauseofthenature
ofthepower,
thatpower.
The
as thatwhich,
strikes
be understood
attuned
to hearing
thegong.
is already
then,
power,
a I nispointis argued
1achau,Vision
andCertitude
tnthe
Age
quiteclearly
byKatherine
Leiden1988.
andtheFoundations
1250-1345,
ofSemantics
ofOckham:
Optics,
Epistemology
to medieval
texts
canbe found
hereas well.
References

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

11

that theyexist in the connectionthat the soul has with the world. We
shouldnote thatin the Middle Ages the choice was notjust foresseobiectiveor subiectwe
, appetitive
, intellective
, etc.
, but also sensitive
have being
If a medieval philosopherargues that the trees as moving
of
this
lies
neither
outside
the soul
that
the
he
is
obiective,
arguing
origin
nor withinit, but in the veryrelationof the soul to the world.This takes
place withina "cosmos," as I mentionedabove. The connectionof soul
and world is as basic to medieval thoughtas theirseparationis to our
world.It makes sense, then,to say that the movingtreeshave objective
being,but not subjectivebeing because the movingtreesare not hypokeimena
, i.e., they are not subjects in the Aristoteliansense. The moving
treeshave objectivebeing, however,because theyarise out of the relation to the world that our sense of sighthas.
here.He uses manynames for"objecPeterAureoliis indeedinstructive
In his use of
tive" being: apparent,intentional,seen, judged, intuited.26
" to describethe kind of
that
certain
the term"obiective
being
optical illusions have, he seems to be contrastingthat kind of being stronglywith
whathe laterwillcall "real being": "[Images in a mirror]... do not have
some being unless known or apparentbeing. . . Some imagine that the
imagesare in the mirror,and thatthe appearancesthemselvesare in the
medium,whetheror not theyare seen; but both these views are false.
, realbeing."27
Otherwise,it would followthat theyhad true
Does the oppositionbetween"apparentbeing" and "real being" indicate that Aureoli, at least, saw that there is a dichotomybetween the
regionof being inside the soul and the regionof being outsidethe soul?
Or is Aureoliattemptingto carve out a realm of being which is neither
subjectivenor objective in our modern sense of these terms?Such a
regionwould be that very region which opens up preciselybecause of
thewaysin whichour soul reachesout to and touchesthe world.Because
of this,esseintentionale,
seems an excellentchoice fordescribingthisontohave
or esseintentionale
To
esseobiective
is not to exist as a
logica! region.

26Tachau1988{op.cit.,above,n. 25),90. L.M. de Rijk,Quesito


deIdeis.Some
on
Notes
andL.M. de Rijk(eds.),Kephalaion:
anImportant
Studies
, in:J. Mnasfeld
ofPlatonism
Chapter
andItsContinuation
inGreek
traces
thisusagebacktoJames
, Assen1975,204-13,
Philosophy
of"third
notion
ofAscoli.De RijkalsousesPopper's
world"(which
he tracesbackto
tointerpret
thisissue.
Frege)
2 PeterAureoli,
Primm
Sententiarum
, ed. EligiusBuytaert,
O.F.M.,St.
Super
Scriptum
is thatofTachau1988[op.cit.,above,
Bonaventure
1956,vol.2, 698. The translation
n. 25),93.

18:08:00 PM

12

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

mere fictionof the mind (thoughAureolidoes also use the term"cticium"


as well).28What Aureoli is being attentiveto is how the being of such
thingsarisesneitherin the soul by itself,nor in the subjectby itself.That
is, this entireregional ontologyis impossibleunless Aureoli is attentive
to the fact that the soul, by its very nature,is of such a nature as to
reach out to the world in which it is embedded.
All of this is not to say that the phrases "inside the soul" and "outside the soul" have no meaningwhatsoever.It is, rather,to say thatthese
designationsdo not presenta dichotomybut a continuum.In modern
thought,the dichotomybetween"subjective"and "objective"are oftenconnot alwaysdiscussed).Our moderndichotomy
sideredbasic (and therefore
resultsfromthe lack of other regions of being besides these two. The
Aristotelianand medieval picture of the soul is as already embedded
withina world preciselybecause the soul has powerswhich of theirvery
nature reach outside. Indeed, the soul also has powers which of their
very nature reach inside as well. However, in order to tell whethera
power reaches inside or outside the soul we need to analyze the power
), not the things.This
(an analysisthat would include its proper obiectum
notion of a power of the soul only makes sense when the soul is understood as always already being a part of a largerwhole.
,
Knowledge,as a power of the soul which has its own proper obiectum
in termsof a relationbetween
should findits proper analysis,therefore,
inside and outsidethe soul- a relationwhich,in the end, is causal. Since
, the questionis what is the relation,and
knowledgehas a proper obiectum
consequentlywhat are the relata, throughwhich knowledge arises. A
causal analysisof knowledgeis not possible,however,unless some conoutside
nectionhas alreadybeen establishedbetweenthe proper obiectum
the soul and knowledgewithinthe soul. This is indeed the analysisof
who followAristotle.29
knowledgeone findsmostoftenin medievalthinkers
28Tachau1988{op.cit.,above,n. 25),90. One couldalsoarguethattheveryconcept
is a powerofthesoulwhichwouldalsohave
andOckham
in bothAureoli
of"fiction"
in themodern
notbe merely
sense.
andtherefore
obiectum
itsproper
subjective
29It seemsto methatone ofthemainissuesthatseparates
medieval
Anstotehanism
ofthings
is causedby
thedegreeto whichknowledge
is precisely
from
Augustinianism
andthuscan be analyzed
thosethings
e.g.,opposesa causal
causally.
HenryofGhent,
illumination.
He disbasedon divine
withan analysis
ofknowledge
ofknowledge
analysis
This
ofthething.
ofthething
andknowledge
ofthetruth
between
knowledge
tinguishes
is anaofthething
allowshim,insomesense,tohaveitbothways:knowledge
distinction
is anaofthething
ofthetruth
lines,whileknowledge
alongAristotelian
lyzedcausally
sense.
whichis notcausalin theAristotelian
lyzedalongthelinesofdivineillumination
Ordinariarum
Summae
1953,fols.4vC,5rE.
, St.Bonaventure
Quaestionum
HenryofGhent,

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

13

This analysisof knowledgethroughcausalitycan be seen most clearlyin


Aquinas' discussion about the differencebetween our knowledge and
God's: "Natural thingsare the middle between our knowledgeand the
knowledgeof God. We take our knowledgefromthe natural things,of
whichGod is the cause throughdivineknowledge.Therefore,just as natural knowablesare priorto our knowledgeand the measure of it, so also
the knowledgeof God is priorto the naturalthingsand the measure of
them... (ST 1, 14, 8 ad 3)."
Here knowledgeitself,i.e., both our knowledgeand God's knowledge,
are seen in termsof causation. Our knowledgeis caused by the things,
The ground of comparison,howGod's knowledgecauses the things.30
is
causation.
Our
ever, clearly
knowledgecan be caused only if our soul
is, as it were, naturallyattunedto the thingsoutside it. The medieval
issue is not how to bridgethe gap betweenthe soul and the world.The
of knowledgecause that knowlissue, rather,is how does the obiectum
- how can we ensure that the
edge
causality involved guarantees the
knowledgeinvolved.
3.1. Objective
Realityand Skepticism
Since our powers,includingour powers of knowing,have thingsin the
world, i.e., outside the soul, as theircorrelates,Cartesian skepticismis
not an open possibility.
When Descartes argues,e.g., that my senses fail
me when theyshow a large object in the distanceas small and, therefore,the senses are not to be trusted,a medievalphilosophercould and
should respondthat since the small towerhas esseobiective,
the verypossibilityof its appearing as small has a kind of validitythat Descartes
has gone wrong,Aquinas,
ignores.WhereasDescartesarguesthatsomething
Scotus, Aureoli,Ockham and otherswould argue that obviouslysomebecause the towerindeed does appear to be small.
thinghas gone right
To discountthe way in which the verypowersof the soul relateto their
correlatesis to act, exacdy as Descartes does, as if these so-called "failures" are not part of the soul's embeddednessin the world. In short,
readersof Descartes need Descartes' God to do the work
contemporary
of the cosmos.
In thisway,when contemporary
commentators
and
chargenominalists,
with
make
three
mistakes:
skepticism,they
(1) they
especiallyOckham,
30I willreturn
to thisissuebelow.

18:08:00 PM

14

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

lose sightof the fact that the medieval debate about knowledge
especially "intuitiveknowledge" could not be, to use our modern sense of
the term,a debate over the objective
validityof our concepts;(2) theylose
fact
that
of
the
because
this
was
not the debate, the issue of skepsight
ticism as they raise it cannot be a charge leveled against a medieval
between
thinker;and (3) theylose sightof the factthatthereis a difference
a theoryof knowledgewhichfailsand the epistemologicalpositionknown
as skepticism.
4. Nominalism
and Realism
If my argumenthas been successful,then it has become clear what cannot be involvedin the medieval debate about the nature of knowledge
and the role thatuniversaisplay in it. We are not talkingabout our mod- for even if a
ern notion of objectivevalidity
concept arises only in the
soul it does not, therefore,sacrificeits objectivevalidity.Both medieval
realistsand nominalistswould have agreed on the "objectivevalidity"of
our concepts.That is, both the nominalistand the realistwould hold that
conceptshave some object outsideor insidethe mind to whichtheyrefer.
We are also not talkingabout whetheror not knowledgeof the worldis
possible. Both camps would readilyagree that not only is knowledgeof
the outsideworld possible,it in factis the case. What, then,is the issue
dividingrealistsand nominalistsin the Middle Ages?
The relationat stake is not that between soul and world but rather
thatbetweenGod and world.As I have alreadyargued,followingTachau,
knowledge and its object were thoughtalong the lines of vision and
color- the proper object of vision. Consequently,all medieval thinkers
who followAristotleagree that our knowledgeis caused by the things
known. God's knowledge,conversely,is causative of the things.If our
knowledge,caused by the things,is of universais,then to posit the existence of these universaisoutsidethe soul is alreadyto posit a relationship
betweenGod and theseuniversais
i.e., it is alreadyto say thatGod crethese universais.31
ates through
Aquinas provides an instructiveexample here. For Aquinas, God's
knowledgeis causative of the things.Knowledge is always in relationto

31Onecanfind
thinkers
totheAristotelian
latermedieval
throughout
philosophy
appealing
ofuniversais."
is one
statement
that"sensation
is ofsingulars,
This,obviously,
knowledge
ofthemainsitesofcontention
between
nominalists
andrealists.

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

15

the mode of the knowerand knowledgeis alwaysa move towardimmateriality.For the knowerand the known are distinguishedbecause the
knownhas onlyits own form,while the knowerhas the formof itselfas
well as the thingknown.What is knownin the thing,then,is what pertainsto its immateriality
(ST 1, 14, lc). Since God is entirelyimmaterial,
God knowsperfectly.But this knowledgewhich God has is productive
of the thingsknown(ST 1, 14, 8c).
The relationof knowledgeto formis a relationbetween knowledge
and universal,for,Aquinas notes, the universaltakes its ratiofromthe
form.The form,i.e., the universal,is the end of some act of generation.32
creWe know theseformsonly througha processof sensation-phantasm
because our intellectis linkedto our bodies (ST 1, 84,
ation-abstraction
6). The divineintellect(as well as an angelicintellect)graspsformsimmediatelywithoutthis process of sensationleading to abstraction.These
same universaisare called, by Aquinas, "divine ideas" and he findsit
necessaryto posit these divine ideas in the mind of God as the exemplars of creation(ST 1, 15, 1-3). Thus, Aquinas' realismforceshim to
understandthe veryuniversaiswhich existoutsidethe mind as the same
universaiswhich existin the divine mind and are the exemplarycauses
of the universe.Exemplarsare necessarybecause the exemplaris what
guaranteesthatan effectfollowsfroma determinateform(ST 1, 49, 3c).
In the case of artificialproduction,i.e., techne
, the determinateformis in
the mind of the artisan.However,in the case of naturalproduction,the
determinateformmust be reduced to the ideas in the divine mind, for
this determination
of formsis nothingother than the order of the universe (ST 1, 49, 3c).33
While this manner of positinguniversaiscan be seen as allowingfor
much more knowledgeof the divine than is theologicallyacceptable, it
is the peculiarrelationof universaisas the groundbothof our knowledge
of singularsandof God's creativeactivitythatis more interesting.
Aquinas'
- moderate
realism
thoughit may be resultsin the conditionthat our
of thingsoffersup the beingof the thing.In short,knowledge
knowledge
allows the soul to "get behind" the givennessof the thingin its singular

32See,
esse
1, 15, lc: . . necesseestformam
Theologiae
amongotherplaces,Summa
finem
generationis
cujuscumque."
33
often
interms
oftheactofcreation
ofartificial
speaks
Aquinas
production
(e.g.,ST
ofthings
are
15,q. 1,a. lc).Thismeansthathe needstopositthattheforms
produced
in themindoftheproducer.

18:08:00 PM

16

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

existenceto uncover the causal and ontologicalground of the being of


the thing.It is thismove behind the givennessof the thingthatOckham's
and his theoryof knowledge
theoryof universais,in all its configurations,
our
to
cut
off.
For
Aquinas,
knowledgeis not productiveof things,
attempt
but God's knowledgeis. Our knowledge,however,is able to grasp the
way in which God's knowledgeis productiveof thingsand in this way
we are able to know thingsby way of theirproductionand not just by
way of being therein the face of our cognitivepowers.
It is clear today that Ockham changed his positionon the nature of
universaisthroughouthis career.34His earliestposition,that found in I
Sent., d. 2, q. 8, is foundedupon the verydistinctionbetweenessesubiectiveand esseobiectwe.
Indeed, the question asks "Whethera univocal universal is somethingreally existingsubjectivelyin something."Ockham's
in the soul, and has no
answer is that a universalhas only esseobjectivum
neitherin the soul nor outsidethe soul.35Such a unireal essesubiectivum,
versal"is a certainfictum
havingsuch beingin objectivebeing as the thing
outside the soul has in subjectivebeing."36
We have alreadylearned thatif thisuniversalhas objectivebeing,then
its being arises fromsome capacity of the soul which has a relationto
some obiectum
, eitherwithinthe soul itselfor outside the soul. Ockham,
much like Aquinas, argues that the capacityis a productiveone. Yet in
starkcontrastto Aquinas, what is at issue is not the formof the thing

34On thisissue,seePhilotheus
Articles
onOckham
Collected
, ed. E.M. Buytaert,
Boehner,
St.Bonaventure
1958,156-74.
Series,
Philosophy
35William
IIOrdinatilo
Primum
Sententiarum
inLibrum
ofOckham,
, Distinctiones
Scriptum
etTheologica,
vol.OT
de OckhamOpera
& G. Gi,Guillelmi
III, ed. St.Brown
Philosophica
do
and"objective"
Noticethattheterms
197,271,14-6.
II, St.Bonaventure
"subjective"
could
thesoul."Thatuniversais
"inside
thesoul"and"outside
totheterms
notcorrespond
For
finalposition
on thematter.
Ockham's
havesubjective
beingin thesoulis precisely
andthatact
arenothing
otherthantheactofunderstanding
universais
itself,
ultimately,
thesubjective
ofthesoulandhasitsbeingfrom
is a quality
beingofthesoul.Ockham
ofbeingis
division
haveonlyesseobiectivum
becausethefirst
laterarguesthatthese
ficta
thesoulis divided
thesoul"andthatbeingoutside
into"insidethesoul"and "outside
He thengoeson to arguethatifwe acceptthata beingin the
intothetencategories.
within
thesoulwillbe some
because
wearemistaken,
soulhassubjective
everything
being,
thereofquality.
thesoulandwillbe underthecategory
accident
Intellection,
informing
Thisarguoutside
ofthetencategories.
in thepartofthedivision
is notcontained
fore,
aresynonyandessesubiectivum
thatesseobiectivum
mentseemsto leadto theconclusion
is
Thisargument
thesoulrespectively.
mouswithbeinginsidethesoulandbeingoutside
in Per
. Herm.,
349& 364-65.
ofthisposition
in histreatment
corrected
36Ibid.,271,16-272,
habensessetalein esseobiectivo
fictum
2: ". . .et estquoddam
qualehabetresextrain essesubiectivo."

18:08:00 PM

ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL

17

as produced by God, but the capacity of the soul to produce another


thingidentical to the firstbut numericallydistinct.Whereas Aquinas
argued that our knowledgeof the universalis knowledgeof its ground
in production,thatproductionwas forhim the divineproductionthrough
exemplars.This is what allowed him to posit the real (i.e., subjective)
existenceof universaisoutside the soul. Ockham's production,however,
happens on the otherside of the experienceof the singularthing:"This
is such that the intellect,seeing somethingoutside the soul constructsa
similarthingin the mind, such that if it would have productivepower,
just as it has fictivepower, it would produce such a thing numerically
distinctfromthe prior in subjectivebeing outsidethe mind."37
The difference
here is whetherwhat the intellectgraspsis productive
of the thinggrasped or productiveof another thingidenticalwith but
fromthethinggrasped.For bothOckham and Aquinas,
distinct
numerically
the thingis related to an exemplar.For Aquinas, that exemplaris the
groundof itsbeing.For Ockham,thebeingof the thinggraspedin knowledge and concept is given withoutsuch a ground and the exemplaris
productiveof anotherthing.Ockham does not allow the givennessof the
existingsingularthingto be reduced in any way to a prior exemplar.
The thingis given to the soul in its singularexistence,the universalis
constructedon the basis of that givennessand not on the basis of what
givesthat thingto the intellect.
The change fromthisfictum
theoryto his ultimatetheory,viz., thatthe
universalis nothingother than the act of understanding
itself,does not
alter the givennessof the singular.What changes is only the ontological
statusof the universalin its relationto the soul, but not in relationto
its obctum
, the thingoutsidethe soul. Ockham's later positionevacuates
the entireregionof esseobiectivum
in favorof a leaner ontologyof singulars. If the soul is a singularand if outside the soul thereare only singulars,then these very singularsand theirqualities are able adequately
to groundthe universal.
This leaner ontologybegins with an act of understandingsingulars.
"The intellectapprehendinga singularthingelicitsone cognitionin itself
which is only of thissingular. . . this cognitionbeing able, fromits own

37Ibid.,
modum
videns
272,2-6:"Ethocperistum
quodintellectus
aliquamremextra
animam
consimilem
remin mente,
itaquodsi haberet
virtutem
sicut
fingit
productivam
- numero
- prohabetvirtutem
talemremin essesubiectivo
distinctam
a priori
fictivam,
duceret
extra."

18:08:00 PM

18

RICHARD
A. LEE,JR

nature, to suppositfor that singularthing."38The apprehensionof the


singular,therefore,causes a "cognition"or a concept which naturally
signifiesand naturallysuppositsforthat singular.This apprehensionand
the conceptor cognitionthatarisestherefrommustbe understoodcausally,
otherwisethe categoryof "natural sign" would be evacuated. The fact
that thereis causation involvedhere is also illustratedby Ockham's use
of the termpassioanimaein referenceto these concepts.39
Ockham then moves fromthis cognitionand concept of the singular
to the cognitionand concept of a universal:"But outsidethisintellection
which
of thatsingularthingthe intellectformsforitselfotherintellections
are not more of this thingthan of another. . . which thereforedoes not
suppositmore forSocrates than forPlato."40Here again, Ockham refers
to these concepts as suppositingby tkrvetynature.Such universalconcepts, now interpretedas passions of the soul, do not need a regionof
objective being, not because the power of cognitiondoes not naturally
reach out to the world outside the soul, but because the power causes
the act of understandingitself.There is no need for an intermediary.
can only be evacuated in thisway, however,
The realm of esseobiectivum
if the connectionof the soul to the outsideworldis alreadyfirmlyestablished in some otherway. Here Ockham indicatesthat the act of understandingsingularsis enough to establishuniversalconcepts.This act, in
an accidentwhose being
turn,is a real qualityof the soul and, therefore,
is in the subject of which it is an accident.
In thisfinalposition,Ockham stillfirmlymaintainsthe priorityof the
existingsingularand refusesto grantan act of knowingwhich could get
at the ground of those very singulars.Knowledge does not account for
the being of the thingsin the way thatit did forAquinas. It is not merely
the case that Ockham will only hold an ontologythat is committedto
analysingularsand certainqualities.More than that,Ockham's shifting
sis of universaisshows that he is committedto breakingthe linkbetween
our knowledgeof existingsingularsand the reason for theirbeing. His
is the only possible epistemologyleft
celebratedtheoryof notitiaintuitiva
38Per.Herm.,
remsingulrem
elicitunamcogni352,12-4:"intellectus
apprehendens
ex natura
etvocatur
istius
in se quaeesttantum
tionem
potens
singularis,
passioanimae,
sua supponere
proiliare singulari".
39The term
m I Sent.,
d. 2, q. 8 (op.at.,above,n. 35),as well
is usedinthediscussion
ed.
inhisSumma
andfinally
inhiscommentary
on PeriHermenias
as thediscussion
Logicae,
etTheologica
de OckhamOpera
Guillelmi
G. Gi,St.Brown,
Ph.Boehner,
, vol.
Philosophica
between
OPhI, St. Bonaventure
1974,cc. 1 & 14. On therelation
signification,
cogniseeSchulthess
1992(op.cit.,above,n. 21),1-14.
tion,andcausation,
40Per.Herm.,
352.

18:08:00 PM

BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM

19

for one who refusesto maintainthat the ground of knowingand the


ground of being are one and the same that our knowledgecan get
behind the givennessof existingsingularsto theirontologicalground.
5. Conclusion
The investigation
into the role thatuniversaisplay in both Ockham's and
Aquinas' epistemologyallows us now to returnto the question of skepticism.More precisely,it allows us to returnto our own historicalhorizon and to questionwhetherthe debate "thinkshistorically,"
in Gadamer's
sense.41It should be clear that the dichotomyof inside the soul/outside
the soul cannotbe interpreted
as just anotherway of saying"subjective/
objective"or "cogito/world."The distinctionbetweenin animaand extra
animamoccurs on a continuumin which the soul already reaches out to
the world,and the world reaches out to the soul.
If we thinkthatOckham's epistemology
is skeptical,or thatit leads to
thismustmean thatwe are no longerable to thinkthe mind
skepticism,
(soul) as always already in connectionwith the world. For us, it seems,
an epistemology
whichrefusesto allow knowledgeto workits way behind
the givennessof singularsback to theirontologicalorigin can only be
whichpreventsknowledgefromever knowthoughtof as an epistemology
ing anythingoutsidethe mind.
We are obviouslyconcernedwithOckham's refusalto produce an epistemologywhichachievesthe ontologicalgroundof existingsingulars.We
are concernedthatthe issue forhim is not "whyis theresomethingrather
than nothing,"but rather"how can we know thingswhich are merely
given." It is thisgivennesswhich seems to botherus today. It is indeed
troublingthat Ockham attemptsto give no answer about how or why
thingsare given. It is troublingto us that he is all too willingto refer
existingthingsto the divine will, to the absolute power of God, rather
than to the intellectof God. Perhaps Ockham makes us uneasy because
he causes us to reflecton the fact that we no longer have a cosmos.
Skepticismmust be rooted out, because if it turnsout to be true,then
we are leftin a world which is not ours- a world which is given,but
not to us.
Park, PA
University
ThePennsylvania
StateUniversity
41See n. 3 above.

18:08:00 PM

ofNamesin Duns Scotusand SomeofHis Contemporaries


Signification
GIORGIO PINI

Betweenthe thirteenth
and the fourteenth
centurythe issue of signification
of names of firstintentionsuch as 'man5 and 'animal' is one of debate
It is agreed that such names signifythingsoutside
among philosophers.1
the mind and independentof our understanding.
In thisrespect,theyare
different
fromthe so-called names of second intention,such as 'species'
and 'genus', which signifyconceptsof the mind.2However, the question
concerned how the names of firstintentionssignifyextramentalthings:
do 'man' and 'animal' signifymen and animalsprimarily,
or do theyprithe conceptsof man and animal,and onlysecondarilymen
marilysignify
and animals in the extramentalworld?
The question concerns mainly,but not exclusively,3
common nouns.
The debate focuses on the interpretation
of a famous passage of Peri
hermeneias
where Aristotledescribeswrittenmarksas symbolsof spoken
sounds, whereas spoken sounds in turnare symbolsof affectionsin the
in the soul, theyare said to be the likenesses
soul. As to these affections
of thingsin the world:
in thesoul,andwritten
aresymbols
ofaffections
marks
aresymbols
Spokensounds
ofspoken
sounds.
Andjustas written
marks
arenotthesameforall,neither
are
Butwhattheseareinthefirst
sounds.
of- affections
ofthesoul
spoken
placesigns

1 SeeJanPinborg,
inderLogik
desXIII.Jahrhunderts
Zimmermann
, in:Albert
Bezeichnung
derRepraesentatio
imMittelalter
York1971,238-81;
, Berlin-New
(ed.),DerBegriff
E.J.Ashworth,
inThirteenth-Century
A Preface
andModes
toAquinas
onAnalogy
, in:
ofSignifying
Logic:
Signification
andTheology,
1 (1991),43-53;ClaudePanaccio,
Medieval
From
Mental
Word
Philosophy
toMental
, in:Philosophical
Language
Topics,20 (1992),125-47.
2 Forthedistinction
between
terms
offirst
andsecondintention,
a distinction
somewiththatbetween
namesoffirst
and secondimposition,
see Christian
timesblurred
Intentions
andImpositions
Norman
Kretzmann
andJanPinborg
, in:Anthony
Knudsen,
Kenny,
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,484-5.On the
ofLater
(eds.),TheCambridge
History
Philosophy
ofsecond
seeDanielO. Dahlstrom,
andLogic:
Scotus
intention
terms
Signification
signification
18 (1980),81-111.
onUniversais
a Logical
Point
, in:Vivarium,
from
ofView
See belowDunsScotus
remarks
s cntical
thesignification
ofsingular
terms
concerning
andthedifficulties
ofsignification
ofwhichhe is aware.
theyposeto thetheories
Vivarium
39,1

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2001

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 21


NAMES
arethesameforall;andwhatthese
affections
arelikenesses
intheworld
of- things
areindeedthesameforall.4
Betweenthe thirteenth
and the fourteenth
centuryall authorsconcerned
withthe semanticsof names quote thispassage with approval. The crucial questiontheyfurtherask is what kind of thingsthe affections
in the
soul are. The answerstheygive to thisquestionsare widelydifferent.5
In thisarticle,I willfocuson Duns Scotus'sapproachto the signification
of names of firstintention.I will take into considerationthreequestions.
First,what exactlyis Duns Scotus's positionconcerningthe signification
of names? Second, is thereany contrastbetweenwhat Scotus maintains
in his commentarieson Perihermenas
, datingfromthe last decade of the
thirteenth
century,and what he states in his slightlylater Lecturaand
Ordinatici
? Third, is Scotus's positionin any respectoriginalas compared
to what his contemporaries
say on the same topic?6
To answer these questions,I will firstpresent Scotus's position on
in his two commentarieson Perihermenas.
Then I will turn
signification
to his remarkson the same topic in the Lecturaand Ordinatio.
Finally,I
will give a briefaccount of the positionsheld by some authorswriting
in Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth
century.
I will conclude that Scotus's fairassessmentof the two main positions
on signification
is exceptionalamong his contemporaries.
As a matterof
there
is
no
evidence
that
he
ever
one
fact,
prefers
positionover the other.
Specifically,and contraryto what is usually held, there is no evidence
thathe ever commitshimselfto a defenceof the primarysignification
of
the thing.He simplyassumedthatdoctrinein the courseof an argument,
in order to show that it is compatiblewith the doctrineof conceptshe
defends.I will also show thatlate in his career he explicitlycriticisesthe
on which the supportersof the primarysignification
of
presuppositions
base
their
views.
thingsusually
All the same, it is truethatScotus'streatment
of signification
willprove
to be veryinfluential.
For one thing,his commentarieson Perihermeneias
4 Pehermeneias
16a3-8.The translation
is takenfrom
DavidCharles,
Aristotle
onNames
andTheir
, inLanguage
, ed. S. Everson,
1994,41.
Signification
Cambridge
somecommentanes
Aristotle
s passage
aretranslated
intohnglish
concerning
byHans
Aristotle's
anditsTradition.
Texts
500 to1750, AmsterdamArens,
Theory
ofLanmae
from
1984.
Philadelphia
0 On thetheory
o signification
m DunsScotus,
see Costantino
and
Marmo,Ontology
Semantics
intheLogic
Eco and Costantino
Marmo(eds.),On
, in: Umberto
ofDunsScotus
Medieval
DunsScotus
onSignification
, Amsterdam
1989,161-3;Dominik
Perler,
ofSigns
,
Theory
in:Medieval
andTheology,
3 (1993),97-120.
Philosophy

18:08:06 PM

22

GIORGIOPINI

provide a detailed analysisof the issue. Moreover,his scatteredremarks


in the Ordinatopoint towardsa new versionof the theon signification
of the thing,even though Scotus never
ory of the primarysignification
it.
His
most
semantic
original
develops
insightis his criticismof the parThat
allelismbetween modes of signifying
and modes of understanding.
criticismunderminesthe close relationshipbetween semanticsand epistemologycommonlyaccepted in his time.Because of thisinsight,Scotus
may stillbe regardedas a highlyoriginalfigurein the historyof semantics,even if he does not elaborate a new comprehensiveaccount of how
names signify.
1. Duns Scotus3
s Treatment
in his Peri hermeneiasCommentaries
ofSignification
In his two commentaries
on Perihermeneias
Duns Scotusprovidesa detailed
The
of
two
analysis
opposite opinions.7
supportersof both opinionshold
that we have a directunderstandingof mind-independent
things,whose
essence is the properobject of our intellect.However,extramentalthings
are understoodby virtueof mental similitudes,the so-called 'intelligible
species'.8An intelligiblespecies is the resultof an abstractionperformed
by the agent intellect.By virtueof such a species, the possible intellect
acquires an understandingof the thing.The two positionsanalysed by
Scotus agree on the role played by the intelligiblespecies in the theory
is whetherthe intelligiblespeciesalso
of knowledge.What is controversial
in
if
a
role
and, so, what role.
signification,
plays
Accordingto the firstopinion, a name signifiesan intelligiblespecies
primarilyand an extra-mentalthingsecondarily.The supportersof this
position,in the sophisticatedversiondescribedby Scotus, stressthat an
species
intelligible
speciescan be regardedin twoways.First,an intelligible
can be consideredinsofaras it is an entityinheringin the mind.Secondly,
of
it can be consideredinsofaras it is a similitudeand a representation
an extramentalthing.It is in the second way that the species is said to
be what a name primarilysignifies.

7JohnDunsScotus,
I Periherm
omnia
., I, q. 2, in:Opera
I, ed.L. Vivs,Paris1891,
Super
wereprobomnia
Periherm
I, 582-5.Thesecommentaries
., II, q. 1, in Opera
540-4;Super
ofbothpositions
in
account
in Parisin the1290s.I givea moredetailed
ablywritten
in:
intheSecond
Theories
andThing:
Century,
HalfoftheThirteenth
ofSignification
Concept
Species,
andTheology,
8 (1999),21-52.
Medieval
Philosophy
8 On the
From
see LeenSpruit,
oftheintelligible
doctrine
inteltigibilis.
Species
species,
Leiden
1994.
to
,
I,
Knowledge
Perception

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 23
This firstopinion may be representeddiagrammatically
as follows:
a name

represents
primarilysignifies
> a thing
> an intelligiblespecies

secondarilysignifies
an extramental
Accordingto thesecondopinion,a name primarily
signifies
the
of
this
thing.To defendtheircontention,
supporters
positionmake
use of a distinctionconcerningwhat is signified.A mind-independent
thingcan be consideredin two ways, they say. First,a thing can be
worldindependently
regardedas an individualexistingin the extramental
of its being understoodby us. Secondly,a thingcan be regardedinsofar as it is understoodby us, i.e. as an essence understoodor universal
concept. It is in this second way that a thingis signifiedby a name.
Consequendy,thispositionsholds thata name primarilysignifiesneither
an intelligiblespecies nor an individualand existingthing,but a thing
conceivedinsofaras it is understoodby our intellect.Indeed, a name can
also signifyan intelligiblespecies, but only when the intelligiblespecies
is consideredas somethingunderstoodin itselfand not as that by virtue
of whichan extramentalthingis understood.The knowledgeof an intelligible species as somethingin itselfis subsequentto the knowledgeof
the extramentalthing understoodby virtue of the intelligiblespecies.
Accordingly,a name signifiesan intelligiblespecies by virtueof an act
of impositiondifferent
fromand subsequentto the one by whichit signifies
an extramentalthing.
The supportersof the primarysignification
of the thingmaintainthat
a name never signifiesa thinginsofaras it exists.However, they also
stressthata thingconsideredinsofaras it is understoodand a thingconsideredinsofaras it existsare not two different
entities,but one and the
same thingconceivedin two different
ways.
This positionsmay be representeddiagrammatically
as follows:
a name

primarilysignifies

> a thingas understood

The supportersof both opinions thinkthat theycan give a satisfactory


of Aristode'spassage fromPeri hermeneias
I have quoted
interpretation

18:08:06 PM

24

GIORGIOPINI

above. The advocates of the view that the species is primarilysignified


in the soul are identicalwiththe intelligible
species.
say thatthe affections
The advocatesof the view thatthe extramentalthingis primarilysignified
stressesthatan intelligible
speciesis thatby virtueof which{quo)the thing
is representedin our intellect,but not what (quod)is represented.What
our intellectrepresentsand understandsis the thingitselfinsofaras it is
presentto our intellect,namely as a concept produced by our intellect.
Since thisconcept is identicalwith the extramentalthing,fromwhich it
differsonly accordingto a mode of understanding,
the advocates of this
in the soul are the thingsthemaffections
positionsay thatthe Aristotelian
selves,considerednot as existingindividuals,but as universalconceptsof
the mind.
These are the two positionsexamined by Scotus in his two commenI have shown elsewherethat neitherpositionis
taries on Perikermeneias.
new
or
originalwhen Scotus writes.9The theoryof the priparticularly
of
of the
marysignification the species has been held since the diffusion
century.
species theoryin epistemologyin the firsthalf of the thirteenth
This positioncan be regarded as the dominanttheoryuntil the 1260s.
of the thingreflects
By contrast,the theoryof the primarysignification
Thomas Aquinas's position afterhe develops the doctrineof the inner
word as a product of the intellect.This position is adopted by many
others. Among them, Siger of Brabant explicitlydraws the distinction
between a thingconsideredinsofaras it existsand a thinginsofaras it
is understood.
of the primarysignification
of theintelligible
Since the supporters
species
of the extramentalthing,
emphasise its role as a mental representation
they do not seem to be so distantfromthe advocates of the primary
of the extramentalthing,especiallybecause the latterintrosignification
mode underwhichthe thingis signified.
duce a mind-dependent
However,
accordingto Scotus's account, no one maintainsthat a name primarily
signifiesa species consideredas a mentalaccident or a thingconsidered
as an individualand existingentity.
What seems to be peculiar to Scotus is his attitudetowardsthese two
Scotus does not take side with the
alternativeaccounts of signification.
admitsthatneitheropinionis based
Since
he
of
either
position.
supporters
on decisivearguments,he concludesthatthereis no good reason to prefer the one over the other. At best, it can be said that the doctrineof
9 Pini1999{op.cit.,above,n. 7),35-47.

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 25
theprimarysignification
of the speciesrepresents
Aristotle'sand Boethius's
of
textsmore accurately,while the doctrineof the primarysignification
the thingseems to be based on betterarguments.10
Otherpassagesin Scotus'scommentaries
on Pe hermeneias
confirmthat
he maintaineda cautious attitudeconcerningwhat a name primarily
In both commentariesScotus devotesan entirequestionto dissignifies.
when its reference
cover whethera term keeps the same signification
exists no more. Indeed, this is the topic of another controversyhotly
debated in Scotus's times.11The case of the so-called emptynames is
usuallydiscussedin questionssuch as whetherthe proposition"Caesar is
a man" is still true when Caesar is dead. Almost everyone(with the
notable exceptionof Roger Bacon)12thinksthat a termkeeps the same
no matterwhat happens to the extramentalthingforwhich
signification,
the termstands.However,opinionsdivergewhen explaininghow thisis
possible.
Scotus takesside with the majoritywith regardto the solutionto the
question. For him there is no doubt that a term does not change its
when the extramentalthingfor which it stands changes or
signification
ceases to exist.13However,he gives two different
accounts of how thisis
possible.
In his firstcommentaryon Peri hermeneias
, Scotus says that a word
a
not
insofar
as
it
but
insofaras it is understood
exists,
signifies thing,
10Super
I Perihem
viarum
., I, q. 1,ed. Vivs1891,544:"Istarum
eligatur
quaevidetur
. . . Primavia videtur
secundum
secundasecundum
auctoritates,
probabilior
probabilior
rationes."
Periherm.
viaestmultum
II, q. 2, ed.Vivs1891,585:"Neutra
necessaria,
Super
sedsecunda
videtur
dictis
Aristotelis
et Boetii."
It mustbe notedthatin
magisconsona
hisfirst
onPerihermeneias
Scotus
thetheory
ofthesignification
ofthe
commentary
presents
as thefirst
andthetheory
ofthesignification
ofthething
as thesecond
species
opinion
in hissecondcommentary
whereas
he follows
theopposite
order.
opinion,
11Alainde Libera,
Bacon
etleproblme
deUappellatio
univoca
, in:H.A.G.Braakhius
Roger
- L.M.de Rijk(eds.),
and
C.H. Kneepkens
Semantics.
From
the
End
the
English
Logic
of Twelflh
totheTime
andBurleigh
Alainde Libera,
, Nijmegen
1981,193-233;
ofOckham
Century
Roger
Baconet la rfrence
vide.Surquelques
antecdnts
mdivaux
duparadoxe
deMeinong,
in:
- Z. Kaluza- A. de Libera(eds.),Lectionum
Varietates.
PaulVigaux
J.Jolivet
Hommage
Paris1991,85-120;StenEbbesen,
about
what
is nomore
, in:Cahiers
(1904-1987),
Talking
de l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
et latin,55 (1987),135-68.
grec
12See K.M.
Bacon
on"Impositio
vocis
adsignificandum",
in:English
and
Roger
Fredborg,
Logic
Semantics
, {op.cit.,above,n. 11),167-91.
13Super
I Periherm.
Periherm.
I, q. 3, ed.Vivs1891,545;Super
II, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,
586.DunsScotus's
treatment
ofthisproblem
is studied
Utrum
byJacobH. J. Schneider,
haecsitvera:Caesar
esthomo
estanimal,
Caesare
nonexistente.
, Caesar
ZumPeri-Hermeneias- R. Wood- M. Dreyer
Kommentar
desJohannes
DunsScotus
, in:L. Honnefelder
(eds.),
John
DunsScotus.
andEthics
, Leiden-New
York-Kln,
1996,393-412.
Metaphysics

18:08:06 PM

26

GIORGIOPINI

by virtueof an intelligiblespecies. But what changes or ceases to existis


the thingthat existsin the world, not the thinginsofaras it is understood by the intellect.Therefore,the signification
of a word remainsthe
no
what
matter
to
the
same,
happens
existingthing.14As is apparent,
here Scotus adopts the theoryof the primarysignification
of the thingin
order to explain how a word can maintainits signification
when its reference is no more.
By contrast,when we turnto the parallel questionin Scotus's second
solutionto the
, we finda slighdydifferent
commentaryon Perihermeneias
same problem.Here Scotus says that a name signifiesa thingas it is in
thiscontentionin the followingway.
act, not as it exists.He demonstrates
A name primarilysignifiesa mentalsimilitudeof the thing;but the mental similitudeof a thingis its form,which is what the thingis in act;
a name signifiesa thinginsofaras it is in act. Since a mental
therefore,
similituderemains the same when a thingis and when it is no more,
Scotus concludesthat a name univocallysignifiesa thingwhen it is and
when it is no more.15What is interesting
is that Scotus here explicidy
assumes that a name primarilysignifiesa mental similitude(inamnomen,
ut dictum
est, primosignificai
similitudinem
reiin anima).Since Scotus usually
identifies'mental similitude'and 'intelligiblespecies', we can safelyconan intelligible
clude thathe assumesthata name primarily
signifies
species.
The extramentalthingis signifiedonly by virtueof a similitude,namely
when we take into account what the similituderepresents.This seems to
be exacdy what a supporterof the sophisticatedversionof the theoryof
the primarysignification
of the species would say.
Thus, when discussingthe topic of empty names, in his firstcomScotus adopts the doctrine of the primary
mentaryon Peri hermeneias
14
I Periherm.
ad quaestionem
I, q. 3, ed.Vivs1891,545:"Dicendum
Super
quod,facta
in re secundum
nonfittransmutado
in significatane
transmutatione
vocis.
quodexistit,
utexistit,
Cuiuscausaponitur,
sedutintelligitur
quiaresnonsignificatur
peripsamspeciem
sedsivesitsivenonsit,cumtamresutintelligitur
maneant
quamspecies
intelligibilem;
inreutexistit
factatransmutatione
. . . sequitur
intransmutatae
quodresutsignificatur
per
transmutatione
vocemnontransmutatur
factain re ut
ed.'qualicumque
[transmutantur
in significando."
etperconsequens
necvoxsignificans
transmutabitur
existit,
15
Periherm.
uniII, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,586:"Dicendum
quodnomen
significai
Super
etnonexistente.
Adquodsciendum
vocerem,remanente
velexistente
quodhocnomen
Socratem
secundum
Socratem
'Socrates'
quodestin actu,nontarnen
significai
significai
estensinactusuaforma:
namnomen,
utdictum
sedSocrates
est,primo
existere;
significai
reiinanima;illaautem
esteiusforma
similitudinem
significai
quodestinactu.Ideonomen
estquod,siveressitsivenon,
Socratem
secundum
quodestin actu.Aliudintelligendum
Ex istissequitur
essentialiter
suntsignaillarum.
similitudines
univoce
significai
quodnomen
eiusin
secundum
rem,siveressitsivenonsit,quia remrepraesentat
quodsimilitudo
animaestet estsignum."

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 27


NAMES
of a thinginsofaras it is understoodwhereas in his second
signification
of the
commentaryhe assumes the doctrineof the primarysignification
he
This
confirms
that
never
makes
his
mind
as to
intelligible
species.
up
whichpositionis to be preferred.
Even thoughScotus does not have a personalopinion on the issue of
he concludes his question in the firstcommentaryon Peri
signification,
withsome remarkson the advantagesand disadvantagesof each
hermeneias
solution.16
Since these remarksnot only illuminateScotus's positionand
takenby themselves,I will now turnto
attitude,but are also interesting
a briefanalysisof them.
Accounts
2. Weaknesses
oftheCurrent
ofSignification
Scotus noticesthat the most convincingargumentin favourof the priof the species and againstthe primarysignification
of
marysignification
the thingis an argumentconcerningpropositionaltruthand falsity.A
sentenceis said to be true or false only because it is a sign of the real
which, according to Scotus, is the mental compositionof
truth-bearer,
as subjectand predicate.Accordingly,
truthand falconceptsfunctioning
sityare propertiesnot of the thingsthemselvesbut of the compositionof
conceptsthat takesplace in our mind and is meant to reflectwhat goes
on in the extramental
world.Thus, truthand falsity
can pertainto uttered
sentencesonly inasmuchas theyare propertiesof a mentalcomposition.
Therefore,an utteredsentence,in order to be eithertrue or false,must
a mentalcomposition.Hence Scotus infersthatthe partsof a sensignify
the corresponding
tence,namelysubject-and predicate-terms,
signify
parts
of a mentalcomposition.These partsof the mentalcompositionare present to the intellectin the simple understandingof somethingand are
intelligiblespecies. Consequently,if the mentallydependentcharacterof
truthand falsityis to be maintained,a name must signifynot a thing
but a mentalentity,namelyan intelligiblespecies.17
By contrast,Scotus thinksthat the most powerfulargumentin favour
of the primarysignification
of extramentalthingsis based on a considerationof what our intellectprimarilyunderstands.If we concede that
16Super
I Periherm.
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,544.
17Super
I Periherm.
tantum
ventas
etfalsitas
suntin
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,540:"Item,
sermone
utin signo;ergoenuntiatio
illudsignificat
in quo estVeritas
et falsitas;
prolata
illudestcompositio
utdicitAristoteles
citopostinlittera;
comintellectus,
ergoenuntiatio
illudquodestin intellectu
tantum.
positasignificat
composito
Ergoet partesenuntiationissignificant
tantum
ea quaesuntin intellectu
cuiusmodi
estspecies."
simplici,

18:08:06 PM

28

GIORGIOPINI

what is primarilysignifiedis identicalto what is primarilyunderstood,


then what is primarilysignifiedis an extramentalthingand not an intelspecies
ligiblespecies,forit is the extramentalthingand not the intelligible
that is primarilyunderstood.A species can also be understood,but only
in a reflexiveway, namely when the intellectturnsnot towardswhat it
understands,but towardsthe way in which it understands.However,this
knowledgeof the means by which our intellectunderstandssomethingis
reached only througha reflexiveoperation,subsequentto the primary
act of knowledgedirectedtowardsextramentalthings.18
Apart fromthese problemsproper to each solution,Scotus also mentionstwo difficulties
concerningboth positionsbut especiallytroublesome
for the doctrine of the primarysignificationof the species. The first
individualssuch as
consistsin accountingfor names signifying
difficulty
consistsin accountingfornames
Socrates or Plato. The second difficulty
entitiessuch as chimeras.
fictitious
signifying
With regardto names signifying
individuals,Scotus remarksthat indito
viduals do not produce an intelligiblespecies. Therefore,it is difficult
of the speciescan explain
see how the doctrineof the primarysignification
how proper names signifyindividuals.By contrast,the doctrineof the
of the thingcan explainthatindividualsare signified
primarysignification
even if only
since
names,
particularscan be understoodintellectually,
by
in an indirectway.19Presumably,Scotus is here thinkingof an understandingof individualsby reflectionon universalnotionsjust as Aquinas
understood
explains it: an individualman like Socrates is intellectually
when we reflecton the universalconcept of man and compare it with
an individualman existingin the world.20Incidentally,it is remarkable
that no mentionis made of an intuitivecognitionof individuals.21
18Super
et contra
I Periherm.
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,544:"Prosecunda
primam
praeettempore
etnatura
quamintelligatur
species
intelligitur
quiaresprimo
cipueestistaratio,
tanintellectus
ei nomen
quodnomen
imponere,
potest
ergoiniliopriori
perreflexionem;
omnenomen
tumremsignificat.
significare
speciem."
Ergononestnecesse
19
I Periherm.
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,544:"Contra
utrumque,
magistamenconSuper
Licetenimposset
ad significandum
estvisde nominibus
traprimam,
impositis
singularia.
licet
viamsecundam,
salvari
secundum
quiascilicet
singularia
aliquomodointelliguntur,
secundum
nontamenpossetsalvari
nonprimo,
viam,quiaillanullomodofaciprimam
eisimposita
nullomodosignificant
in intellectu;
untspecies
species
intelligiergonomina
bilesin mente."
20ThomasofAquinas,
is analyzed
Summa
I, q. 86, a. 1. Thisdoctrine
by
theologiae
York1993,111-7.
onMind
, London-New
Anthony
Kenny,
Aquinas
21On Scotus's
seeK.H. Tachau,Vision
ofparticulars
oftheintuitive
doctrine
cognition
Foundations
1250-1345
andthe
inthe
andCertitude
,
, Epistemologa
ofSemantics
Optics
AgeofOckham.

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 29


NAMES
With regardto the second difficulty,
namelythe case of names signientities,Scotus argues that this particularkind of entities
fyingfictitious
producesa speciesin the imaginationbut no speciesin the intellect,since
an intelligible
species is produced only by the properobject of the intelentitiesdo not have
lect,i.e. the essenceof a materialbeing,but fictitious
an essence.Consequently,the doctrineof the primarysignification
of the
names
cannot
how
the
fictitious
entities
are
species
explain
signifying
significant.22
the theoryof the primary
Finally,Scotus mentionsa strongdifficulty
If
is
the
faces.
this
of
theory true,therewill followthe
signification
thing
of an actual and real propunwelcomeconsequencethateveryattribution
will
result
a
false
statement.
For if a name signifies
to
a
into
erty
subject
a thinginsofaras it is understood,whateveris predicated of a thing
signifiedis attributedto that thinginsofaras it is understood.But what
is predicatedof a thinginsofaras it is understoodis not a predicateactually and reallyinheringin the thingbut an intentionalpredicate pertainingto the thingonly inasmuch as that thingis understoodand is
Now Scotusthinksthatintensomethingdependenton our understanding.
tionalpredicates,namelypredicatespertainingto somethinginsofar21sit
is understood,are equivocal with respectto the actual and real predicates pertainingto extramentalthingsindependently
of theirbeing understood. Therefore,since only predicatesthat signifypropertiespertaining
to somethinginsofaras it is understoodcan be trulypredicatedof the
of a predicatesignifying
an actual
subjectof a statement,
everyattribution
and real propertyresultsinto a false statement.23
Leiden-New
York-Kobenhavn-Kln
DunsScotus
onIntuition,
1988,68-81;AllanB. Wolter,
DunsScotus,
, andOurKnowledge
, in hisThePhilosophical
ofIndividuals
Memory
ofJohn
Theology
ed. Marilyn
McCordAdams,
Ithaca-London
1990,98-122.
22Super
I Periherm.
convenit
de
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,544: "Consimiliter
arguere
nominibus
ad significandum
licetfaciant
impositis
figmenta,
quiatamillaquamsingularia,
in intellectu,
te imaginativa,
nontarnen
natusestrecipere
quia tantum
speciesin virtu
suiobiecti,
aliorum
autemnon,cumuna
speciem
quodestquodquidestreimaterialis,
nonsitreceptiva
nisiformarum
eiusdem
Theproblem
oftheknowledge
potentia
generis."
and signification
of non-existents
is studied
, in:
by StenEbbesen,TheChimera's
Diary
- J. Hintikka
Dordrecht
S. Knuuttila
1986,115-43.
(eds.),TheLomofBeing,
23Super
I Periherm.
secundam
viamestquodomnis
I, q. 2, ed.Vivs1891,544:"Contra
in esse,quia si nomen
essetfalsaubi subiecto
propositio
aliquisactusrealisdenotatur
remutintelligitur,
tunctalepraedicatum
attribueretur
ei utintelligitur;
et sicei
significet
noninest;
insunt
quiaei utintelligitur
ergoetc.Quodnoninsitei,sicprobo,
praedicata
ad praedicata
et medium
intentionalia
et realiasumitur
sub
intentionalia;
comparatum
in syllogismo,
medium
si concludatur
extraneis
rationibus,
quiasicsumendo
aliquaconfitfallacia
accidentis."
clusio,

18:08:06 PM

30

GIORGIOPINI

This last argumentseems to have devastatingeffectsforthe theoryof


the primarysignification
of the thingas presentedby Scotus in his first
on
In orderto see this,let me recall the docPeri
hermenas.
commentary
trineof the threefoldconsiderationof an essence. This doctrine,originating fromthe writingsof Avicenna, is almost universallyaccepted in
the second halfof the thirteenth
In Duns Scotus's formulation,
century.24
a thingsignifiedcan be consideredin threeways: first,as an individual
in the world,second, as somethingin itself,third,as understoodby the
intellect.Differenttypes of attributescorrespondto each of these consideration.The so-called common accidents,such as 'being white' and
'being black', pertain to a thingconsideredas an individual.Essential
predicates,such as 'being a man' and 'being an animal', pertain to a
thingconsideredin itself.Intentionalpredicates,such as 'being a species'
and 'being a genus', pertainto a thingconsideredinsofaras it is understood.25If a name primarilysignifiesa thinginsofaras it is understood,
any attributepredicatedof a thingsignifiedis an intentionalpredicate,
because it pertainsto the thinginsofaras it is understood,not insofaras
it is an individual in the extramentalworld or an essence in itself.
Consequendy,any statementwherean essentialpredicateis said to inhere
in the thinginsofaras that thingis an essence independentof its being
understoodwill be false, since only intentionalpredicatescan be truly
predicatedof a thingunderstoodand signified.
It is presumablydue to thisdifficulty
that Simon of Favershamadopts
a correctedversionof the theoryof the primarysignification
of the thing.
He is verycarefulin specifying
thatwhat a word signifiesis a thingconsidered not insofaras it is understoodbut insofaras it is somethingin
24See Avicenna,
Liber
dePhilosophia
Prima
sivescientia
divina
, V, 1, ed. S. Van Riet,II,
Thedistinction
Louvain-Leiden
ofthethree
an essence
can
1980,227-238.
waysinwhich
is statedbyauthors
as different
as ThomasAquinas,
be considered
Boethius
de Dacia,
de Dacia,SimonofFaversham,
DunsScotus,
andRadulphus
Mrtius
Brito.See Alain
La querelle
desuniversaux.
De Platon
lafinduMoyen
de Libera,
, Paris1996,201-6.
Age
25JohnDunsScotus,Quaestiones
inlibrum
, q. 9-11,nn. 16-17,in: Opera
Isagoge
Porphyrii
N.Y. 1999,46-7:"Sciendum
tarnen
ter, I, St.Bonaventure,
quodsignificatum
philosophica
veram
minicommunis,
considerali.
Unomodosecunnturm,
significantis
tripliciter
potest
essemateriale
dumessein suppositis,
ei accidentia
eius,ethocmodoinsunt
quoddicitur
modoconsideratur
Secundo
absolute
secundum
essequiditativum;
etsicinsunt
communia.
essentialia.
Tertiomodout performam
ab intellectu
ei praedicata
intelligibilem
appreet sicinsunt
ei intentiones.
Intellectus
enimconsiderans
henditur,
quodestessecognitum;
in natura
sic
et de multis,
naturam
hominis
unamin multis
ab aliquaproprietate
reperta
illinaturae
attribuit
considerata
movetur
ad causandum
et illamcausatam
intentionem;
et a qua accipitur."
cuiusestproprietas

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 31
In thisway,Favershamcan avoid theproblemswithwhichScotus's
itself.26
is
formulation
of the theoryhas to cope. What is particularly
interesting
that Scotus is aware of the doctrineof the three considerationsof an
essence27but does not allude to that doctrinein his presentationof the
currentpositionson signification.
By contrast,he onlyspeaks of two and
not of threeways in which a thingcan be considered:insofaras it exists
and insofaras it is understood.As it happens,thisis also Sigerof Brabant's
formulation
of the theoryof the primarysignification
of the extramental
It
is
also
worth
that
Scotus's
Antonius
Andreae,does
thing.
noting
pupil,
not hesitateto abandon Scotus on this topic and to adopt Simon of
in his commentaryon Pe hermeneias.28
Faversham'sformulation
This difference
betweenSigerand Scotus,on the one hand, and Simon
of Favershamand AntoniusAndreae, on the otherhand, is a hint of a
whichemergesafter
problemconcerningthe natureof the thingsignified,
Siger. I will come back to thisproblemin what follows.It is remarkable
thatalthoughDuns Scotus is fullyaware of the problemhe providesno
solutionto it. What is sometimesregardedas his personalsolution,namely
that a name signifiesan essence insofaras it is consideredin itself,is
indeed Simon of Faversham'sand AntoniusAndreae'ssolution.And there
is no textualevidence that Duns Scotus ever adopted such a position.
3. Duns Scotuson Signification
in theOrdinario
So far, I have made referenceto Scotus's two commentarieson Pen
hermeneias.
to theprimarysignification
However,Scotus'sallegedcommitment
of the extramentalthingis contained not in his Aristoteliancommentaries,but in a shortpassage of his Lecturaand OrdinatioPSince these
26SimonofFaversham,
Periherm
Padova1957,
., q. 5, ed. PasqualeMazzarella,
Super
154.Faversham's
commentaries
on theArsVetus
aredatedat the1280s.
27See the
on Porphyry's
passagefromScotus's
commentary
Isagoge
quotedabovein
n. 25.
"
28See
velpassionem
nomen
rem
inanima
Andrs
Angeld'Ors, Utrum
significet
(Antonio
y Juan
DunsEscoto)",
in:Archives
et Littraire
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,62 (1995),
7-35.
29JohnDunsScotus,
Lectura
omnia
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 51,in:Opera
XVII,Vatican
City
omnia
1966,ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
357;Ordinatio
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 83,in: Opera
VI,
ed. Commissio
VaticanCity1963,97. The Lectura
is datedbyitseditors
at
Scotistica,
butitis likely
tohavebeenwritten
before
1300:seeAllanB. Wolter,
1300-1301,
Reflections
about
Scotus's
in:John
DunsScotus.
andEthics
EarlyWorks,
Metaphysics
(op.at.,above,n. 13),
ontheOrdinatio
in 1300,buthehadnotyetcompleted
37,45.DunsScotus
beganworking
itin 1307,whenhe movedfrom
Paristo Cologne:
seeWolter,
, 39-40,45-6.
Reflections

18:08:06 PM

32

GIORGIOPINI

two passages are closelyparallel,I will referonly to the Ordinatio,


where
the treatmentof signification
is more articulatethan in the Lectura.
In his Ordination
Scotus alludes to a great controversy
over whethera
word signifiesa thingor a concept. It is usuallycontendedthat Scotus
here dismisseshis cautiousattitudeand finallyembracesthe theoryof the
of the thing.However,at a closerinspection,I think
primarysignification
that thereis not enough evidence to maintainthat Scotus commitshimselfto the theoryof signification
usuallyascribedto him.As willbe apparent, Scotus assumes that theoryfroman opponent but does not argue
for it.
This is clear if the contextof Scotus's discussionis takeninto account.
On the
Scotus is not specificallydealing with the issue of signification.
is part of a treatmentof the
contrary,the shortpassage on signification
theologicalquestion concerningthe nature of the inner word (verbum).
Scotus moves againstAquinas's maturedoctrineaccordingto which the
innerword is eitherthe object of the intellector the end-productof the
intellectualoperation.30
Contraryto Aquinas's view,Scotus maintainsthat
the inner word is the intellectionor act of the intellect.
However,Scotus is aware of an argumentaccordingto whichthe inner
word is identicalwith the object of the intellect.This argumentruns as
follows:the innerword is what the externalword signifies;but the external word is a sign of a thingand not of an intellection;therefore,the
inner word is not an act of the intellect,but the object of the intellect.
that the externalword is a
Scotus offersa demonstrationper absurdum
If a word signified
an
intellection.
and
not
of
an
extramental
of
thing
sign
which is not an identity
an act of understandingthen everyaffirmation
statementwould be false, since the subject and the predicate are not
unlesssubjectand
understoodby virtueof the same act of understanding
predicateare identical.31
30Whichof thesetwoviewsis to be adopteddependson whichinterpretation
of
tothefirst
is adopted,
as I haveshown
above.According
oftheverbum
doctrine
Aquinas's
is identical
withthething
as understood.
or concept
theverbum
According
interpretation,
different
orconcept
isa purely
mental
theverbum
tothesecond
utterly
entity,
interpretation,
See Pini1999{op.ciL,above,n. 7),47-51.
from
theexternal
thing.
31JohnDunsScotus,
Scotistica
Ordinato)
1963,63I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 2, ed.Commissio
XV Trinitatis
64: "Item,Augustinus
sont,signum
quodforis
cap. Ila vel26: Verbum,
estsignum
reiet nonintellectioautemexterius
esteiusverbiquodintuslucet;verbum
- alioquinquaelibet
idemde se,quia
affirmativa
essetfalsain qua nonpraedicatur
nis,
estobiectum
licetressitres;ergoverbum
nonestintellectio
subiecti
intellectio
praedicati,
intellectio."
et nonactualis

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 33
Since Scotus maintainsthat the inner word is an act of understanding, he refutesthis argument.He implicitlyconcedes the major premise
of the argument,namelythatan utteredword is a sign of an innerword.
He also explicidyconcedes the minor premise,namely that an uttered
word is a sign of an extramentalthing,even though he incidentally
remarksthatthereis a greatcontroversy
over thistopic. However,Scotus
maintainsthat,even if the two premissesare conceded, it is not necessary to conclude that the inner word is the same as the object of the
intellect.For a word can be said to be a sign of an act of understanding, even thoughproperlyspeakinga word is an immediatesign of a
thing.So Scotus intendsto demonstratenot that a word is a sign of a
thing,but that,even if it is assumed that a word is an immediatesign
of a thing,it can stillbe maintainedthata word is in some sense a sign
of an act of understanding.Scotus can so conclude that the theoryof
of the extramentalthingis compatiblewiththe
the primarysignification
doctrineof the innerword as an act of understanding.
In orderto demonstratehis point,Scotus draws a parallelismbetween
being a sign of somethingand being an effectof something.The sun is
the cause of the illuminationof two different
portionsof air, the one
closer,the other furtherfromthe sun itself.Properlyspeaking,the sun
immediatelyilluminatesboth parts of air. Nonetheless,since thereis an
orderbetweenthe two parts,it is also true that the sun illuminatesone
part of air beforethe other.Consequendy,the firstpart of air, closer to
the sun, can be said to be the cause of the illuminationof the second
part of air, not in a properway but because the illuminationof one part
is closer to its cause than the illuminationof the otherpart is. Similarly,
two signs of the same thingmay be ordered in a way that the one is
closerto and the otheris further
fromthe thingof which theyare signs.
When this is the case, both signs are immediatesigns of the thing,but
it is also truethatthe sign thatis further
can be said to be a sign of the
that
is
the
closer
to
for
the
sign
thing,
sign that is furtherwould not be
a sign of the thingif the sign thatis closer were not a sign of the same
thing.Now Scotus remarksthat a writtenmark,an utteredword and a
concept are all ordered signs of the same extramentalthing.Thus, an
utteredword can be said to be a sign of the act of understanding,
even
it
an
is
immediate
the
of
because
can
be
though
sign
thing,
nothing
an
uttered
word
unless
it
is
first
understood
an
act
signifiedby
through
of the intellect.So Scotus can conclude thatan utteredword can be said
both to signifyimmediatelya thingand to be a sign of an inner word

18:08:06 PM

34

GIORGIOPINI

while maintainingthat an innerword is an act of understanding


and not
the object of the intellect.32
It is doubtfulwhetherthispassage can be takenas evidenceof Scotus's
commitmentto the theoryof the primarysignification
of the extramental thing.Scotus's only move in that directionis his concession that a
word properlysignifiesan extramentalthing:
thereis a greatcontroversy
overwhether
a wordis a signofa thing
or
Although
I briefly
ofa concept,
nevertheless
concede
thatwhatisproperly
signified
bya word
is a thing.33
This is not a positionScotus himselfputs forward.It is the minorpremise
of the argumenthe is going to refute.This means that Scotus does not
intendto defendthe theoryof the primarysignification
of a thingas his
He
own position.
simplygrantsit as valid forthe sake of the argument,
withoutprovidingany positivesupport.He onlyadds the caveatthatthere
' used
over the issue. The term 'concedo
is a great controversy
by Scotus
is reminiscentof the technicalvocabularyof obligationaldisputes.34
This
termdoes not implythat the person who is concedingthe point is committedto defendwhat she or he concedes. All that can be inferredis
that she or he takes the conceded propositionfromsomeone else's argument withoutfurtherinvestigation.Here Scotus is not interestedin discussingwhat a word signifies,but in refutingthose who thinkthat the
withthe object of the intellect.Since Scotus
innerword is to be identified
thinkshe can refutetheirargumentwithoutquestioningtheirpremisses,

32JohnDunsScotus,Ordinatio
Scotistica
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 83,ed. Commissio
1963,
eiusdem
voxet conceptus,
sicutsuntmulti
97: "Sunttamensignaordinata
littera,
signati
nullusestcausaalterius,
ut patetde soleillueiusdem
effectus
ordinati
causae,quorum
minante
medii;et ubiesttalisordocausatorum,
partes
plures
absquehocquodunumsit
cuiuslibet
eiusdem
causaalterius,
ibiestimmediatio
aliudin
causae,excludendo
respectu
excludendo
aliudinratione
effectus
Ettuncposratione
immediatioris.
causae,nontamen
essecausameffectus
setconcedi
nonproremotioris,
aliquomodoeffectum
propinquiorem
illamquaeestinter
taleseffectus
ad causam;itapotest
conpriorittm
prie,sedpropter
eiusdem
cedide multis
alterius
ordinatis,
signati
signis
quodunumaliquomodoestsignum
nisipriusaliquomodoimmedinonsignaret
quia remotius
ipsum),
(quiadatintelligere
- ettamen,
nonestsignum
sicutex alia
atiussignaret,
hoc,unumproprie
alterius,
propter
de causaetcausatis."
parte
33Ibid.:"Licetmagnaaltercado
fiatde 'voce',utrum
sitsignum
reivelconceptus,
tamen
illudquodsignatur
vocemproprie,
estres."
concedo
breviter
quod
per
34DunsScotus
ofobligations
andofitsvocabulary,
as is shown
is awareofthetechnique
Tracts
ontheGame
12
, in:Vivarium,
ofObligation
byL.M. de Rijk,SomeThirteenth-Centuiy
(1974),95,n. 11.

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 35
he concedesthemonlyto show thattheydo not implythe intendedconclusion. Among the argumentshe concedes there is also the theoryof
the primarysignification
of the thing.
Scotus
Remarkably,
goes on to demonstratethat,even if it is assumed
thatwordssignify
things,conceptscan stillbe said to be what words signify.Thus, he concedesthatwordssignify
thingsonlywiththe qualification
that words are also signs of concepts,althoughnot in a proper sense.
Scotus is here stressingthat concepts occupy an intermediateposition
betweenwords and thingseven in a theoryof the proper or primary
of things.He concedes that concepts are not intermediate
signification
because theyare primarily
whereasthingsare secondarily
signified
signified,
since both conceptsand words are immediatesignsof things.However,
concepts are closer to thingsthan words are, because if somethingis
signifiedby a word it is firstunderstoodby virtueof a concept,whereas
can be understoodby virtueof a conceptwithoutbeingsignified
something
by a word. Consequendy,a word can also be said to be a sign of a concept,because it indicatesthe existenceof a concept even thoughit does
not properlysignifya concept.
of a thing
Admittedly,this formulationof the primarysignification
differs
fromthetheoryScotuspresentsin his commentaries
on Perihermmeias.
In thePerihermmeias
he identifies
the thingsignified
and the conceptunder
the notionof 'thingas understood'.This is the theoryof Aquinas and of
his followers.However, in the Ordinatio
Scotus attacksthat doctrineand
shows that it is possible to maintainthat a word primarilysignifiesa
the thingsignifiedwith the innerword or conthingwithoutidentifying
What
is
cept.
particularly
appealing in thisnew versionof the theoryof
the primarysignification
of the thingis that a word can be said to be
an immediatesign of the thingwithoutrelyingon the dubious doctrine
of the identitybetween concepts and thingsunderstood.All the same,
and not as thingsas underconcepts,conceivedas acts of understanding
in
still
a
not
role
stood,
play
signification, because they are properly
fornothsignifiedbut because theyare a presuppositionforsignification,
ing can be signifiedunless it is firstunderstood.
AlthoughScotus alludes to this theoryonly as a way to answer an
objectionto his doctrineof concepts,his shortand casual remarkswill
exerta lastinginfluence
in thedevelopment
of semantics.However,
certainly
not even thisnew versionof the signification
of thingscan be seen as an
originalelaborationof Scotus. All its elementscan be foundin Henry of
Ghent'sinterpretation
of the famouspassage of Aristotle'sPerihermeneias.

18:08:06 PM

36

GIORGIOPINI

, Henry of Ghent had describedwords


Alreadyin 1291-92, in his Summa
as immediatesignsof thingswhile at the same time saving the intermediate role of the concepts,withoutwhich thingscould be neitherunderstood nor signified:
to thePhilosopher,
in thebookPerihermeneias
: Spokensounds
aremarks
According
ofintellections
andofthoseaffections
thatareinthemindaboutthings.
Thoseintellections
andaffections
areconcepts
andmental
words
tonolanguage,
and
belonging
areproximate
andimmediate
marks
ofthings.
Iftheywerenotin themindabout
wecouldnotexpect
vocalsignstosignify
Forthisreason,
mental
conthings,
things.
between
vocalwordsandthings
ceptsareintermediate
signified
bythem.I do not
areintermediate
insignifying,
meanthatthey
as ifvocalwords
didnotsignify
things
unless
thesignification
ofsuchconcepts
those
conthrough
byimmediately
signifying
whentheyareuttered
toteach
cepts.Forvocalwordsareimmediate
signsofthings
whatis hiddento us in things,
whentheyare
justas theyare signsofconcepts
uttered
to indicate
whatis hidden
in thespeaker's
concepts.35
Some conclusionscan be drawn fromthe analysisof Scotus's passage on
in the Ordinato.First,Scotus does not give an extendedtreatsignification
mentof signification,
but an answerto an objectionconcerningthe nature
of concepts.Second, Scotus does not commithimselfto the theoryof the
of things,but concedes it to his opponent only in
primarysignification
orderto givea confutation
of his position.Third,the theoryof signification
of thingsScotushere takesintoaccountis the one he had alreadyanalysed
in his commentarieson Perihermeneias
, namely the one of Aquinas and
his followers.However, Scotus here objects to the identification
of things
as understoodand conceptson which that theoryis based. He now proposes a new version of it, according to which concepts are acts of
Fourth,in 1291-92 Henry of Ghent had alreadyheld the
understanding.
versionof the primarysignification
of thingsScotus refersto. So Scotus's

35HenryofGhent,
Summa
ordinariarum
, a. 73,q. 10,Paris1520(repr;St.
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f.272vL (translation
See alsoIrneRosier,
Henri
Bonaventure,
mine).
le Dialctica
desnoms
divins
e studisulla
deGand,
, etl'institution
, in: Documenti
d'Augustin
6 (1995),157-8.I useRosier's
edition
ofHenry's
tradizione
filosofica
medievale,
passage.
auteminlibroPerihemeneias
: Vocessuntnotae
See pp. 158,237:"Secundum
Philosophum
et earumpassionum
et
intellectuum,
quae de rebussuntin anima;quae suntconceptus
nullius
et immediatae,
verbamentalia
sunt,et notaererum
linguae
proximae
quaesi de
notasreivocalesad significandum
resquaerere
re in mentenonessent,
nonpossemus.
mentales
mediisuntinter
verbavocaliaetressignificatas
peripsas.
Propter
quodconceptus
resnisimediante
Non dicomediain significando,
quasiverbavocalianonsignificent
sicscilicet
dietos
dictorum
concepconceptuum,
quodimmediate
significent
signification
suntsignarerum
ad docendum
ea
tus,quiaverbavocaliaimmediate
quandoproferuntur
sicutimmediate
suntsignaconceptuum
quandoproferquaesuntin rebusnobislatentia,
occulta."
untur
ad iudicandum
conceptuum
loquentis

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 37


NAMES
contributionmerelyamounts to remarkingthat there is an account of
of thingsalternativeto the one of Aquinas and his followers.
signification
This alternativeaccount allows him to maintainthata word is an immediate signof a thingand that,at the same time,thingssignifiedand concepts are not identical.
4. Duns ScotusAgainsttheParallelism
Between
and Understanding
Signifying
Scotus's cursoryremarkson significationin the Ordinatio
are directed
of the thinghe had preagainstthe theoryof the primarysignification
sentedin his two commentarieson Perihermeneias.
The supportersof that
an
maintained
that
a
word
extramental
theory
signifies
thinginsofaras
it is understoodand that the thingas understoodis identicalwith the
inner word. As I have shown, Scotus now thinksthat it is possible to
maintainthat a word primarilysignifiesa thingwithoutidentifying
the
with
the concept of the intellect.
thing
Elsewherein the Ordinatio
Scotus moves against the basic assumption
of the supportersof the signification
of the thingas understood.Their
not identical claims: (i) a name
is
based
on
two
related
but
position
what the intellectunderstands;(ii) a name signifies
what the intelsignifies
lect understandsin the same manneras the intellectunderstandsit.
The firstclaim is the ratherweak claim that signifying
presupposes
ifit is completely
because nothingcan be signified
unknown.
understanding
The second claim is much stronger,for it not only contendsthat the
thingsignifiedand the thingunderstoodare the same, but that thereis
also a one-to-onecorrespondencebetweenmodes of signifying
and modes
of understanding.
This one-to-onecorrespondence
betweenmodes of signifying
and modes
of understanding
is centralto the theoryof the primarysignification
of
the extramentalthingas it is knownto Scotus in his Pe hermeneias
commentaries.Supportersof that theoryargue that not only does a name
signifyan extramentalthingbecause the extramentalthingis what our
intellectunderstands,
but also that a name signifiesan extramentalthing
as a universalessence and not as an individual because our intellect
understandsan extramentalthingas a universalessence and not as an
individual.
The strongclaim that modes of signifying
are parallel to modes of
is
often
that
followsupon
understanding
expressedby saying
signifying
This
is
to
be
understanding.
position thought
impliedby the Aristotelian
maxim according to which signifying
is establishingan understanding

18:08:06 PM

38

GIORGIOPINI

estintellectum
constituere
[significare
).36Moreover,the famouspassage on significationin Perihermendas
is viewed as implyingthisparallelismbetween
modes of signifying
and modes of understanding.For the supportersof
this position read Aristotleas saying that a name primarilysignifiesa
thingnot as it is but as it is understoodthrougha concept.In the Summa
Thomas Aquinas providesa versionof thiscontentionwhen he
theologiae
deals with the issue of the names of God:
It mustbe saidthat,
toAristode,
words
aresigns
ofthoughts
andthoughts
according
are likenesses
ofthings,
and so it is evident
thatwordsare referred
to thethings
theconception
oftheintellect.
Therefore
as something
isunderthey
signify
through
stoodbyus so itcanbe namedbyus.37
The parallelismbetween modes of signifying
and modes of understandof
ing is an essentialfeatureof the theoryof the primarysignification
the thingas Aquinas and his followershold it. However, thispositionis
not properto thatapproach to signification.
As I have said above, Henry
of Ghent distinguishes
thingsand conceptsand maintainsthat a word is
an immediatesign of a thingand not of a concept. But since nothing
can be signifiedwithoutbeing understood,Henry maintainsthat thereis
a close parallelismbetweenmodes of understanding
and modes of signifying,as it is clear fromthe fact that the more perfectlysomethingis
understoodthe more perfectly
it is signified.38
Scholars sometimesregard
this parallelismas one of the most typicalcontentionsof those grammarians and logicianscollectivelyknown as modistae
.39
36Perihermeneias
16b19-21.On thediffusion
ofthisformula,
seeAshworth
1991(op.dt,
.,
itinoneofthearguments
infavour
ofthesignification
above,n. 1),44.DunsScotus
quotes
in Super
I Periherm
ofthething
., I, q. 1,ed. Vivs1891,541.
37ThomasAquinas,
Summa
PhilosoI, q. 13, a. 1: "Dicendum
theologiae
quodsecundum
voces
suntsignaintellectuum,
etintellectus
suntrerum
simili
et sic
tudiney,
phum,I Perihermeneias,
ad ressignificandas
mediante
intellectus.
Secundum
patetquodvocesreferuntur
conceptione
sica nobispotest
nominari"
igitur
quodaliquida nobisintellectu
cognosci
potest,
(transto whichthereis a parallelism
lationmine).The tradition
between
modesof
according
andmodesofundestanding
is studied
Ressignificata
etmodus
signifying
byIrneRosier,
Les
d'une
distinction
mdivale
des
, in: S. Ebbesen(ed.),Geschichte
implications
significando
inSptantike
3. Sprachtheorien
undMittelalter
, Tbingen
1995,135-68.
Sprachtheorie.
38HenryofGhent,
Summa
a. 73,q. 10,Paris1520(repr.St.
ordinariarum,
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f. 272vL; ed. Rosier,
Bonaventure,
p. 237: "Quia igitur
conceptus
suntmediiinquaerendo
necessario
verbavocaliainter
resetverbaillassignificantia,
necmodum
essarioigitur
secundum
formatorum
de rebushabent
verbain sua
conceptuum
institutione
ut modusverborum
modoconceptuum.
formari,
Qui enimperrespondeat
fectius
etexpressius
et expressius
earnverbis
remconcipit,
perfectius
exprimere
possit."
39Forsomegeneral
information
seeCostantino
nella
Semiotica
e linguaggio
Scolastica.
Marmo,
La semiotica
1270-1330.
deiModisti
, Bologna
, Erfurt
, Roma1994,139-59.
Parigi

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 39


NAMES
and understanding
Now, it is exactlythe parallelismbetweensignifying
thatDuns Scotus opposes in a passage presentin the various versionsof
his commentary
on the Sentences
.40When discussingthe issue of the names
of God, Scotus contendsthat thereare some cases where the parallelism
betweenmodes of signifying
and modes of understanding
does not hold,
forsomethingcan be signifiedmore distinctively
than it is understood:
It can be briefly
saidto thequestion
thatthecontention
to manyopincommon
is understood,
so it is also named',is falseifit is
ions,i.e. that'as something
understood
becausesomething
canbe signified
moredistinctively
thanitis
precisely,
understood.41
Duns Scotus is not saying that the parallelismbetween signifying
and
never
holds.
he
remarks
that
it
be
cannot
taken
However,
understanding
as a generalrule,forthereare some importantexceptionsto it. The most
apparent of these exceptions is the case of the names of substances.
Accordingto Scotus,we have no properunderstandingof substancesin
thislife.We postulatethe existenceof somethingactingas a subjectfor
the accidentalfeatureswe observe,and we call that subject 'substance'.
Thus we do not knowa substanceby itsessence,but as somethingunderlying changing accidents. Since the proper concept of a substance is
unknownto us in our presentlife,a substanceis understoodonly under
the common concept of being. For we understandsubstanceas a being
in which accidentsinhere.Nevertheless,
when a name is used to signify
a substance,it does not merelysignifya being conceived under a common concept.Rather,thatname signifies
a specifickindof substance,for
example, a man or a dog. This is so even thoughwe do not have a
40DunsScotus,
Lectura
omnia
I, d. 22,q. un.,nn.2-3,in: Opera
XVII,ed. Commissio
Scotistica
omnia
1966,301;Ordinatio
I, d. 22,q. un.,nn.4-8,in Opera
V, ed. Commissio
Scotistica
from
thefootnotes
1959,340-346;
385,390-393(Appendix
A). We understand
totherelevant
thatDunsScotusmaintains
thesameopinion
also
passageoftheOrdinatio
in hisReportatio
examinata
(theso-called
Rep.I A).
41DunsScotus,Ordinatio
Scotistica
I, d. 22, q. un.,n. 4, ed. Commissio
1963,343
Foran analysis
ofDunsScotus's
doctrine
ofthenamesofGodandits
(translation
mine.)
forhissemantics,
seeOlivier
etnoms
divines
selon
Duns
Boulnois,
consequences
Reprsentation
Scot
e studisullatradizione
filosofica
6 (1995),255-80.Thefirst
, in:Documenti
medievale,
tocalltheattention
tothedifference
between
andunderstanding
inDunsScotus
signifying
wasAllanB. Wolter,
AnOxford
onLanguage
andMetaphysics
in: The Reviewof
,
Dialogue
" DunsScotus
3Merton
31 (1977-78),
A "Reportatio
620;andespecially
Metaphysics,
of
College
onLanguage
andMetaphysics
Zimmermann
undErkenntnis
im
, in:Albert
Dialogue
(ed.),Sprache
Mittelalter
Mediaevalia
andNewYork1981,180-3.See alsoE.J.
(Miscellanea
13.1),Berlin
Ash
"CanI Speak
MoreClearly
I Understand?"
than
A Problem
in
worth,
ofReligious
Language
andOckham
7 (1980),29-38.
, DunsScotus
, in:Historiographia
Henry
ofGhent
Linguistica,

18:08:06 PM

40

GIORGIOPINI

properconceptof 'man' or of 'dog5,but onlyof thisor thatbeing underlyingthis or that accident. So we can understanda substanceonly as a
being but we can signifyit more properlyas a specificsubstance.Our
names for substancespreciselysignifyextramentalthingsthat our concepts only impreciselycapture. So Scotus can conclude that our way of
them.
substancesis more precisethan our way of understanding
signifying
and
In this case, there is no parallelismbetween modes of signifying
modes of understanding.42
of two different
elementsinvolved
Scotus also thinksthata consideration
in namingand signifying
showsthattheparallelismbetweenunderstanding
does not hold. On the one hand, thereis that afterwhich
and signifying
a name is imposed to something.On the otherhand, thereis the thing
to whichthe name is imposed.These two elementsmustbe carefullyseparated. While the firstone revealssomethingof what we know about the
thingwe signify,the second one indicateswhat we signify.In order to
illustratethispoint,Scotus uses a famousexample. Let us take the name
'
lapis', stone. Accordingto an etymologytaken fromIsidore of Seville,43
the stonewas called 'lapis'because it hurtsthe foot(laedit
pedem).However,
is what we know of a stone, but it is
the featureof being foot-hurting
not whatwe mean by the word 'lapis'. Now, ifsomethingcould be signified
'
'
only in the way it is understood,the name lapis would not signifya
stone,but the accidentalfeaturethroughwhichwe know a stone,i.e. its
being foot-hurting.44
Such an account of an impreciseunderstandingof substancesseems
to presupposethe doctrineof the univocityof the concept of being. For
Scotus maintainsthatwe can understanda substanceas a being because
we formthe concept of being fromthe accidentswe directlycome to
know. Afteracquiringthe concept of being fromthe accidents,we can
apply it to the subjectin which the accidentsinhere,since the accidents
and their subjects are beings in the same sense. Now, it is commonly
accepted that Scotus elaborates the doctrineof the univocityof being
thatthereseems
onlylate in his career.45Consequendy,it is not surprising

42Lectura
I, d. 22,q. un.,n. 5, 343.
I, d. 22,q. un.,nn.2-3,301;Ordinatio
43Etymologie
Oxford1911.See Rosier1995[op.at
XVI, m, 1, ed. W.M.Lindsay,
above,n. 27),153.
44Ordinatio
I, d. 22,q. un.,n. 5, 343;392-3.
45Fora thorough
see
attitude
ofDunsScotus's
univocity,
concerning
changing
study
inDunsScotus's
TheNotion
P. Marrone,
, in: Franciscan
EarlyWritings
ofUnivocity
Stephen
43 (1983),347-95.
Studies,

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 41


NAMES
Scotus gives
to be no trace of thispositionin the account of signification
in his commentarieson Perihermeneias.
betweenthat afterwhich a name is imposed and that
The difference
to whicha name is imposedis a difference
commonlyacceptedin Scotus's
time. Since its appearance in the XII th century,it is adopted by many
'
'
authors,includingThomas Aquinas,who oftenuses the example of lapis
to illustrateit,46and Peter of Auvergne,who refersto it as to the dis.47 However, no one
and quodsignificatur
tinctionbetween quo significatur
as underminingthe parallelismbetween
seems to considerthisdifference
and
Admittedly,
Aquinas recognizesthat there
signifying understanding.
and what is signifiedwhen
what
is
understood
between
is a difference
we take into account only the firstand imprecisekind of understanding
we have of something.But this situationis not permanentand the parallelismis soon restoredwhen we reach a perfectunderstanding,as it
of materialsubstances.Alterhappens in the case of our understanding
natively,if our understandingremainsimperfect,our way of signifying
reflectssuch an imperfect
conception,as it happens in the case of God.48
aware
thatsometimessomethingcan be signified
also
is
of
Ghent
Henry
This happenswhensomebodyrepeats
understood.
it
is
morepreciselythan
what someone else has said withoutan adequate understandingof what
she or he is repeating.49
Clearly,this is an extremecases that does not
underminethe generalvalidityof the principleaccordingto whichsomethingis signifiedin the same manneras it is understood.Henry of Ghent
and underhimselfopenly endorses the parallelismbetween signifying
more
who
understand
those
that
he
declares
when
something
standing
and
more
it
more
can
and
more
clearly.50
perfectly
express
clearly
perfectly
Scotus seems to be the only one to thinkthat the exceptionsto the parare not marginalcases that
and understanding
allelismbetweensignifying
46See forexample
of the
Summa
I, q. 13,a. 8. Fora listand an analysis
theologiae
n. 1),
1991
see
Ashworth
a
distinction
such
draws
where
cit.,
above,
(op.
Aquinas
passages
47-9.
47See StenEbbesen,
about
Problems
Debate
LateThirteenthTerms:
Accidental
Concrete
Century
in
Studies
inMedieval
andInference
as 'album
toSuchTerms
Philosophy.
' in: Meaning
Relating
Dordrecht-Boston-London
1988,142;Rosier
, ed. N. Kretzmann,
ofJanPinborg
Memory
1995(op.t.,above,n. 37),152-3.
48See ThomasAquinas,
Summa
I, q. 13,a. 8.
theologiae
4yHenry
ordin
Summa
ofGhent,
., a. IS, q. 1U,vol.il, 1.z/yrrS
(op.at.,above,
quaestt.
n. 35);ed. Rosier1995(op.cit.,above,n. 35),250-1.
50Henry
a. 73,q. 6, vol.II, f.272vL(op.cit.,above,
Summa
ofGhent,
ordin.,
quaestt.
rem
etexpressius
n. 35);ed.Rosier1995(op.cit.,
above,n. 35),237:"Quienimperfectius
verbis
earn
et
potest."
exprimere
perfectiusexpressius
concipit,

18:08:06 PM

42

GIORGIOPINI

can be eventuallydispensedwith,but point to a gap betweenwhat we


know and what we signify.
Thus Scotus's insighton the difference
betweensignifying
and understandingseems to be innovative.By this distinction,Scotus manages to
separate, on the one hand, the epistemologicaland psychologicalquestion: What and how do we understand?,and, on the other hand, the
semanticquestion:What and how do names signify?
Undeniably,his contentionthat the question of signifying
is to be distinguishedfromthe
he does
question of understandinghas a modernflavour.Unfortunately,
not build on his insightnor does he providea completetheoryof significationin accordance with it. His remarks,interesting
and influential
as
theyare, remain briefand scattered.
But is Scotus's approach to signification,
both in his Perihermeneias
and
in his Sentences
different
from
that
of
his contemporaries?
commentaries,
Specifically,do other authors share his non-committalattitudetowards
what a name signifies?
And whichis the dominantopinionon signification
while he is writing?A tentativeanswer to these question could help us
locate Scotus's originalityin semantics.Let us turn,therefore,to what
some of his contemporariessay on the signification
of names.
5. SomeofDuns Scotus'sContemporaries
on Signification
So far,I have taken into considerationScotus's approach to signification
as it emergesfromhis Peri hermeneias
and Sentences
commentaries,and I
have shown that he maintainsa criticalattitudetowards the semantic
held in his time. In his Sentences
commentarieshe critopinionscurrently
icises the identityof thingssignifiedand conceptsproposed by the supof the thing.Moreover,he rejectsthe
portersof the primarysignification
and signifying
on whichthe supporters
parallelismbetweenunderstanding
of the primarysignification
of the thingcurrently
base theirarguments.
Scotus's
However,
contemporariesdo not share his cautious and critical attitude.They do not seem to cast any seriousdoubt on the theory
of the primarysignification
of the thing.Moreover,theydo not challenge
the close relationshipbetween signifying
and understanding.In general,
most of Scotus's contemporariesare stronglyinfluencedby Aquinas's
mature doctrineof the signification
of names, even if not everyonemay
have agreed on how to interpretit.
Let me recall brieflythe centralpoints of Aquinas's doctrineof significationas can be gatheredfromhis writingsdatingfrom1260s and after.
are parallel activities.When the intellect
Understandingand signifying

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 43
thereare threedistinctfactorsinvolved.
understandsor a name signifies,
First,thereis the extramentalthingunderstoodor signified.Second, there
is the intelligiblespecies abstractedfromthe extramentalthing,which
is that by virtue of which the intellectgets an understandingof the
extramentalthing.Third, thereis the concept of the extramentalthing,
also called 'inner word'. This concept of the thing is to be carefully
fromthe intelligiblespecies. Both are mentalsimilitudesof
distinguished
the extramentalthing,but the species is the startingpoint of the intelof the thing,while the concept is the end-resultof
lect's understanding
understanding.
betweenthe extraWhat in Aquinas remainsobscureis the relationship
and
of
the
intellect.
mentalthingand the concept
Scholars,interpreters
followersare leftwith two options. On the one hand, there are good
reasonsto regardthe concept of the intellectas identicalwith the extramentalthing,forthe extramentalthingis signifiedinsofaras it is underthe contentof understanding.
stood by the intellectand as constituting
On the other hand, there seem to be no less strongtextualand theoreticalreasons to view the concept of the intellectas a purely mental
product of the intellect,a sort of mental duplicate of the extramental
it but different
fromit.51
thing,representing
Not surprisingly,
the relationshipbetweenthingsunderstoodand conafterAquinas's death. It is genercepts becomes an issue of controversy
first
does not signifyan intelligible
a
name
of
intention
that
ally agreed
species is thatby virtueof which somethingis
species.For an intelligible
not that which is understood{illudquod
understood(illudquo intelligitur),
the intellectunderstands.However,
a
name
what
And
intelligitur).
signifies
it still remainsto be decided whetherthe thinginsofaras it is understood and signifiedis somethingexternalto the intellector not.
does
So Scotus's account in his two commentarieson Peri hermeneias
not reflectthe mostrecentdevelopmentsin the debate over signification.
For, by the end of the thirteenth
century,mostauthorsagree thata name
an
a
not
and
intelligiblespecies.Moreover,theystressthat
signifies thing
and signifying.
The intellithereis a parallelismbetweenunderstanding
is
understood
but not
of
which
that
virtue
is
something
by
gible species
that which is primarilyunderstood.Similarly,the intelligiblespecies is

51See Pini1999(op.cit
doctrine
oftheinnerwordor
., above,n. 7, 47-51).Aquinas's
Middle
inthe
Later
Theories
in:Robert
isanalyzed
Pasnau,
ofCognition
Ages,
Cambridge
concept
1997,256-71.

18:08:06 PM

44

GIORGIOPINI

that by virtueof which somethingis signifiedbut not that which is pri-

marilysignified.
This is the positionof some authorsclose to Aquinas, includingPeter
of Auvergne,Peter of Saint Amour (?), and Gerald of Nogent.
Peter of Auvergnenot only maintainsthatwhat is signifiedis the same
as what is understood.He also thinksthatthe mode of signifying
is closely
to
the
mode
of
Now
the
intellect
understands
parallel
understanding.52
two kindsof objects:first,the extramentalthingsby virtueof theirmental similitudes;second, the affections
in the soul or mentalsimilitudesby
virtueofwhichit primarily
understands
theextramental
things.Accordingly,
a name can signifytwo kinds of entities:extramentalthingsand mental
similitudes.In the firstcase, a name is of firstintention.In the second
case, it is of second intention.Since the intellectunderstandsboth extramentalthingsand mentalsimilitudes
names
by virtueof mentalsimilitudes,
either
or
similitudes
virtue
of
mental
similitudes.When
signify
things
by
Aristotlesays thatspoken sounds signifyaffections
in the soul, he intends
to stressthisintermediate
role of mentalsimilitudes
in signifying.
Similitudes
are always that by virtueof which names signify.53
it is not clear what Peter means by 'signifying
Admittedly,
something
by virtueof a similitude'.Peter'sview may be seen as the targetof Scotus's
remarkthatwhen we say thatunderstanding
is by virtueof a speciesand
52Peterof
writes
hiscommentaries
on thearsvetus
in the1270s.See Robert
Auvergne
deAbernia,
Petrus
Praedicamentis
de l'Institut
duMoyenAndrews,
Quaestiones
, in:Cahiers
super
on Perihermeneias
is still
gegrecet latin,55 (1987),3. PeterofAuvergne's
commentary
unedited.
Forinformation
on themanuscripts
in whichit is contained,
see CharlesH.
Latin
Aristotle
Commentaries
28 (1972),335-6,to be corrected
in
Lohr,Medieval
, in:Traditio,
thelight
ofA. Tabarroni,
Lopseudo
e un'inedita
delcomcontinuazione
Egidio
(Guglielmo
Arnaldi)
mento
di Tommaso
al Perihermenias,
in:Medioevo,
14(1988),388,n. 27. I makeuseofthe
ms.Madrid,
Biblioteca
Nacional1565.
PeterofAuvergne,
Periherm
Bibi.Nacional1565,ff.2vb-3ra:
"De
., ms.Madrid,
Super
secundo
scilicet
utrum
vocessignificent
velipsasres,quod
quaesito
intelligendum,
passiones
sicutestin intelligendo
ita in significando,
quia significare
(significare]
ms.)
significatur
Et ideodicendum
idemquodintellectus
sequitur
intelligere.
quodipsaevocessignificant
Sedintellectus
respersimilitudines,
sicutmanifestum
etiam
intelligit.
intelligit
est;intelligit
passiones
quaesuntinanima.Itaquod<cum>intellectus
intelligit
ipsamrem,ethocper
similitudinem
ipsiusrei,intellectus
imponit
ipsamvocemad significandum
ipsamremper
similitudinem
rei.Cumautemintellectus
ipsius
intelligit
passiones
quaesuntinanimasive
ethocpersimilitudinem
tuncintellectus
vocem
ad significandum
similitudines,
suam,
imponit
suamquaeestapudintellectum,
passiones
quaesuntinanimapersimilitudinem
quiaquicad significandum,
sivepassiones
siveres,imponit
ad significandum
quidintellectus
imponit
suam.Et ideo[significat]
dicitAristoteles
persimilitudinem
quodvocessuntnotaeearum
nisiperpassiones
sivepersimilipassionum
quaesuntinanima,
quiavocesnihilsignificant
tudines."

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 45


NAMES
is by virtueof a species,we use 'by virtueof' in two different
signifying
senses.In the firstcase, we mean thatthe intelligible
species is the proper
that the intelligimean
we
second
In
the
cause of understanding.
case,
Therefore,Scotus
ble species is a necessaryconditionfor signification.
concludes,wheneverwe draw a parallelismbetween the role played by
we commit
the intelligiblespecies in understandingand in signification,
a fallacyof equivocation.54
of the thingis maintainedalso
The theoryof the primarysignification
writtenat the end of the thirteenth
in a commentaryon Perihermeneias
Amour.55The sectiondevotedto
Saint
of
Peter
to
attributed
and
century
in this commentaryis largelyparallel to that of Gerald of
signification
Nogent'scommentaryon the same work.56Peter of Saint Amour explicbetweenwhatis signifiedand the similitlymentionsAquinas's distinction
He is also aware of
which
of
itude by virtue
somethingis understood.57
is somethingthe
Passio
similitudo.
and
betweenpassio
a distinction
, conceptio,
is somethingthe intellectprointellectreceivesfromoutside. Conceptio
is the conceptof a thinginsofaras it is compared to the
duces. Similitudo
thingitselfand by virtueof which the intellectacquires an understandSimilarly,both Peter and Gerald maintainthat the
ing of something.58
names of firstimposition,such as 'man' or 'animal', signifyextramental
thingsthat exist independendyof our intellect,while names of second
like'genus'and 'species',signify
conceptsthatexistonlybecause
imposition,
we thinkof them.59These authorsalso give an originalbut implausible
54
I Penherm.
DunsScotus,
I, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,541,543-4.
Super
55John
iNouv.
de France,
inthems.Pans,Bibl.nationale
contained
acq.
Thiscommentary,
Tabarroni
to PeterofSaintAmour
butis attributed
lat.1374,is anonymous,
byAndrea
Introduction
seealsoR.A.Gauthier,
, in:SanctiThomae
1988{op.dt.,above,n.52,398-400);
omnia
editioalteraretractata
libri
de AquinoExpositio
I*.l),Rome1989,
(Opera
Peryermenias,
75*.
56The courseon thearsvetus
in
in 1292,is transmitted
rector
byGeraldofNogent,
1989[op.cit
See Gauthier
., above,n. 55),p. 75*,nt.2. Wequotefrom
manuscripts.
eight
Merton
thems.Oxford,
College261, datedat 18June1294.
57Paris,
nonestid quod
BnF,nouv.acq.lat.1374,f.34v: Undenotaquodsimilitudo
re."
de
in
deducitur
medium
sed
cognitionem
quo
significatur,
58Ibid.'"Undedifferunt
mtelPassiodiciturin quantum
conceptus.
passio,similitudo,
format.
in
dicitur
modo
et
sic
[in]
lectus
aliquid
quantum
Conceptio
patitur.
recipit aliquo
de re
ad remrefertur
intellectus
estin quantum
Et similitudo
perquamin cognitionem
reducebatur."
59Paris,BnF,nouv.acq. lat.1374,f.34v: Tertionotandum
estquodquaedamsunt
suntquae
Nomina
secundae.
et
nomina
impositionis
primae
quaedam
impositionis
primae
secunMeo'etc.Nomina
ut'homo',
nonesset,
resdatoquodintellectus
'asinus',
significant
ut
essenisiperintellectum,
res>quaenonhabent
sunt<quaesignificant
daeimpositionis
Merton
etc."Cf.Oxford,
261,f.98va.
College,
'species'
'genus',

18:08:06 PM

46

GIORGIOPINI

of the Perihermeneias
interpretation
passage whereAristotlesaysthatspoken
sounds are symbolsof affections
in the soul. They maintainthatAristotle
is only referringto names of second imposition,such as 'species' and
in the soul, and not to names of firstimpo'genus',whichmean affections
sition,which mean extramentalthings.60
In his Quaestiones
in librum
Perihermaneias
writtenin 1301, Walter Burley
maintainsa positionnot dissimilarfromthatof Peterof Auvergne.Burley
stressesthe parallelismbetween understandingand signifying.
In an act
of understanding
thereare threeelements:the intellectthat understands,
the thingthatis understood,and the intelligible
speciesby virtueof which
the thingis understood.Now the intelligiblespecies is not that which is
understoodbut that by virtueof which the extramentalthingis understood. Similarly,in an act of signifying
thereare threeelements:the term
thatsignifies,
the thingthatis signified,
and the speciesby virtueof which
the thingis signified.Similarlyto what happens in understanding,the
species is not that which is signified,but that by virtue of which the
extramentalthingis signified.61
So it is clear that most authorsaccept the distinctionbetween,on the
one hand, the thingunderstoodand signifiedand, on the other hand,
the species by virtueof whichthe thingis understoodand signified.
What
is controversialis whetherthe thingunderstoodand signifiedis a purely
extramentalentityand a thingconsideredinsofaras it is in the mind.
Radulphus Britoexplicitlyposes the questionwhetherthe thingunderstood is in the mind or in the extramentalworld.62He maintainsthat
two elementsmust be distinguished:the thingand the mode of understanding.While the mode in which somethingis understoodis in the
mind, the thingunderstood,insofaras it is understood,is in the extramentalworld.63A name of firstimpositionsignifiesthisextramentalthing
60Paris,BnF,nouv.
hoc littera
debetsic exponi,
acq. lat. 1374,f. 34v:"Secundum
suntin anima,id estconceptuum,
quodvocessuntsignapassionum
ad
quae
quantum
" Cf.
nomina
secundae
Merton
Oxford,
261,f.98va.
College,
61Walter impositions.
in librum
Periermeneias
Quaestiones
Burley,
, q. 1, ed. StephenF. Brownin:
Franciscan
34 (1974),212.
Studies,
62Britois
to havewritten
is commentaries
on thearsvetus
in Parisaround
thought
1300.SeeJanPinborg,
Leben
undWerke
desRadulphus
Brito
, in:Radulphus
Brito,
Quaestiones
- J.
Priscianum
minorem
, eds.H.W.Enders
Cannstatt
super
Pinborg,
Stuttgart-Bad
1980,14.
deAnima
in hisRadulphus
Brito,Super
Brito
Radulphus
, q. 8A,ed.JanPinborg
on
Universais
in: Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
grecet latin,35 (1980),116:"Unde
notandum
dicitduo,quiadicitremquaeestefficiens
intelquodquidicitremintellectam
lectionem
etrationem
rem.Ideonondebetdicisicutquidam
intelligendi,
quaedenominat
utintellecta
estin anima*
Illudfalsum
dicunt,
quodresintellecta
est,quiaqui dicitrem

18:08:06 PM

IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 47


NAMES
insofaras it is viewed under its mode of understanding{ratiointelligendi).
but is not what
The mode of understandingis part of the signification
is properlysignifiedby a name. By contrast,names of second imposition
merelysignifyconcepts of our mind. Accordingly,Brito proposes two
of the Perhermeneias
Accordingto
passage on signification.
interpretations
in the soul that names primarilysigthe affections
a firstinterpretation,
undertheirmodes of underas
conceived
are
the
extramental
things
nify
in the soul
the affections
a
to
second
interpretation,
standing.According
under which thingsare understoodand
are the modes of understanding
but Aristotlesays that
names signify,
what
are
not
modes
These
signified.
wordsare symbolsof thembecause he wantsto stressthat thingscan be
signifiedonly under such modes.64
Since Britomaintainsthat the thingsignifiedis somethingunderstood
of
but not in the mind, he has to face the problemof the signification
names of non-existingthings,however.For a name signifiesan extramental thingor essence. But this essence perisheswhen the thingperishes. Therefore,Brito seems to be compelled to admit that names lose
when the thingstheysignifyperish.Brito's solutionis
theirsignification
betweenthe thingsignifiedand what is signifiedinsofaras
to distinguish
ut significatimi
it is signified(significatimi
est).Whereas the thingsignifiedis
in the extramentalworld and can perish,what is signifiedinsofaras it is
signifiedis in the mind and persistseven if the thingsignifiedhas passed
what is signifiedinsofaras it is signifiedwith
away. Since Britoidentifies
the mode under which somethingis understoodand signified,his solution seems to be highlyproblematic,however.For on the one hand he
says that a name signifiesan extramentalentity.On the otherhand, he
of a name is the mode
recognisesthat what remainsin the signification
Britoopenlystresses
while
So
whichis a purelymentalentity.
of signifying,
that a thingsignifiedinsofarit is understoodand signifiedis not in the
mind, he is also compelled to admit that what is signifiedis a mental
entity,if he wants to save the significationof names of non-existing
entities.65
On the opposite side there are those who maintain that the thing
signifiedinsofaras it is signifiedis somethingin the mind. This seems to
be the position Scotus presentsin his commentarieson Peri hermeneias
et ideoresintelremetrationem
dicitduo,scilicet
utintellectam
intellectam
intelligendi,
..."
nonestin intellectu
lectautintellecta
64Radulphus
1971(op.cit
Periherm.
., above,n. 1),275-7.
Brito,
q. 3, ed. Pinborg
Super
65Radulphus
1971(op.cit.,above,n. 1),78-01.
Periherm.
Bnto,Super
q. 4, ed. Pinborg

18:08:06 PM

48

GIORGIOPINI

when he expounds the doctrineof the primarysignification


of the thing.
Names signifyextramentalthingsonly insofaras they are understood,
and thingsinsofaras theyare understoodare in the mind. This is parSince
ticularlyevidentin Scotus's second commentaryon Pe hermeneias.
Scotus is therereportingAquinas's view, thisauthorcould be considered
as a partisan of the mental status of the thing as understoodand as
of names
signified.This positioncan easily account for the signification
of non-existing
entities,forthe thingunderstoodis a mentalentitywhich
remains the same no matterwhat happens to the thing in the extramentalworld.However,thispositionalso facesan obviousdifficulty
Scotus
is aware of, as I have already mentioned.Since the thing signifiedis
somethingin the mind, it enjoys mental properties.But mental propertiesare intentional
and dependingon theintellect's
mode of understanding,
not on the thing'sessence.Consequendy,onlyintentionalpredicatescould
be trulypredicatedof somethingsignifiedby a name.
That the affections
of the soul signifiedby names are conceptsobtained
by virtueof the intelligiblespecies is maintainedby anothercommentator writingin the 1280s, whose identityis unknownexcept for his initials,H. de Brox., possiblyto be identifiedwith Henry of Brussels.66
He
is close to Aquinas's approach, as he thinksthat the signification
of a
word is not the intelligiblespecies but somethingderivedfromthe intelligiblespecies. He also claims thatwords immediatelysignifyconceptsin
the soul, while extramentalthingsare signifiedonlyin a secondaryway.67
This formulationis reminiscentof Aquinas's own wordingin his commentaryon Perihermeneias.
Simon of Faversham'ssolutionto the question of signification
can be
seen as a way out of the alternativeconcerningthe mental vs extramental statusof the thingsignified.He maintainsthat names of firstintention direcdysignifythings.However, a thingcan be consideredin three
ways: first,insofaras it existsoutside the mind,secondly,insofaras it is
66On thisauthor
and hisNotabilia
in thems.Paris,BnF,
super
Peryermenias
preserved
nouv.acq.lat.1374,seeTabarroni
1988{op.at., above,n.52),398-9.Seef.62vb:". . . passioestconceptus
rerum
et ideoperipsaspassiones
satisdaturintelperspecies
ipsarum,
ligiresa quibuscausatur
passioin anima."
Pans,BnF,nouv.acq.lat.1374,f.63ra:"Itemnotandum
quodvocessuntpassionum
esseverum,
signa.Hoc nonvidetur
dicit,
quiaPhilosophus
, quodvoces
primoElenchorum
suntsignarerum
nonferimus
resde quibusvolumus
quia ad disputationem
loqui,sed
utimur
nominibus
notisprorebus;
ergohiemaledicit.Adhocdicendum
quodvocessunt
mediantibus
et sic nonestconsignarerum
passionibus
quarumsuntsignaimmediate;
trarietas,
quiahiedicitvocesessesignaimmediata
animae;ergoetc."
passionum

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 49
understoodand is in the mind,and thirdly,insofaras it is somethingin
itself.In thislast manner,a thingis consideredindependently
of both its
existingas an individualand its being understoodas a universal.Now
Simon of Favershammaintainsthatnames of firstintentionsignify
things
consideredin the thirdway, namely insofaras they are somethingin
themselves.He can thus avoid the alternativeBrito poses. A thing is
signifiedneitheras somethingin the extramentalworld nor as something
in the mind,but as an essence in itself.However, the cost of this solution is veryhigh. For Simon must resortto the Avicenniandoctrineof
the threeconsiderationsof an essence,where it is far frombeing clear
what the thirdconsiderationconsistsin.
Simon of Favershamalso proposesan interpretation
of the Pe hermeneias
on
to
passage
signification.
According him, Aristotlesays that words signifyaffectionsin the soul because a thing is understood before it is
signified,even thoughit is not signifiedinsofaras it is understoodbut
insofaras it is somethingin itself.68
Anotherway out of the alternativeconcerningthe mental or extramentalstatusof the thingsignifiedis sayingthat a name of firstintention signifiesboth somethingextramentaland somethingin the mind.
This is what Henryof Ghent maintainsin a part of his Summaquaestionum
ordinariarum
writtenbetween 1282 and 1284.69He proposes a threefold
divisionof names. Firstthereare names that signifypure thingsexisting
in the world. These are names of individuals,such as 'Socrates' and
'Plato'. Secondly,thereare names that signifypure concepts.These are
names of second intentions,such as 'species' and 'genus', and names of
impossibleentities,such as 'chimera'. Thirdly,thereare names that signifyboththingsand concepts.These are names of universaisof firstintention, such as 'man' and 'animal'.70Presumably,this opinion is not far
from what both Radulphus Brito and Siger of Brabant admit: the
of a name includesa referenceboth to a thingand to the
signification
mode it is understood.Since the thingis in the extramentalworld and
the mode of understandingis in the mind, a name of firstintention
signifiessomethingpardy extramentaland partlymental. Nevertheless,
68SimonofFaversham, Periherm
1957[op.cit.,
., q. 5, ed.Mazzarella
above,n. 26),
Super
154-5.
69
Gmez
dela "Suma"
deEnrique
de Gante
a sus
Cronologia
porrelacin
" Jos in: Caffarena,
38 (1957),133.
QuodlibetosGregorianum,
Summa
ordinariarum
, a. 53, q. 5, Paris1520(repr.St.
HenryofGhent,
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f.64vH-I.
Bonaventure,

18:08:06 PM

50

GIORGIOPINI

Henry does not simplysay that a name signifiesa thingunder a mental mode. For he openly concedes that both the thingand the concept
are directlysignified.
Martin of Dacia adopts a similar,intermediateposition.An affection
in the soul is a dispositionleftin the patientby the impressionof an
active principle.The active principleseems to be the extramentalthing
itself,which acts on the soul by impressingits understandingthrougha
species.71Accordingto Martin,a name signifiesboth the affectionin the
soul and the extramental
thing.However,he adds thatthe mentalaffection
is primarilysignified.72
He thinksthat,in the first
Roger Bacon deservesa separatemention.73
of
Peri
hermeneias
Aristotle
a
,
chapter
proposes generaltheoryof signs,not
of conventionalsigns such as words.74
just a theoryof the signification
in the soul are the intelliBacon
that
admits
the
affections
Accordingly,
since
words
act
both
natural
as
gible species,
signsof intelligiblespecies
and as conventionalsigns of extramentalthings.For example, the word
tree'is a sign of the existenceof a correspondentintelligiblespecies of
a tree in the mind of the utterer.For a tree cannot be signifiedunless
it is firstunderstoodby virtueof an intelligiblespecies. So a word is a
sign of a species as smokeis a sign of a fire.However,Bacon thinksthat
a word is a sign of a thingin a completelydifferent
way. For a word
a
an
because
of
signifies thing
arbitraryimposition.
Some conclusionscan be drawnfromthisbriefreviewof some of Scotus's
First,by the end of the thirteenth
contemporaries'views on signification.
the
influence
of
doctrine
of concepts is pervasive.
century
Aquinas's
71Martin
ofDacia,Super
Periherm
., q. 6, ed. H. Roos,Hauniae1961,241.The work
at 1280ca.
ofMartin
ofDaciais datedbyhiseditor
72Martin
ofDacia,Periherm
., q. 6, ed. Roos1961(op.cit.,
above,n. 71),243.Byspeakofthesoulimpressed
Martin
of
by thespeciesoftheexternal
ingof 'affection
thing',
Dacia showsthathe is strongly
influenced
notion
ofspecies,
which
bya non-Thomistic
theso-called
derives
from
of'species'
perspectivists,
especially
RogerBacon.Thetwonotions
aredistinguished
1994(op.dt.,above,n. 8), 150-6;seealsoTachau1988(op.cit.,
bySpruit
above,n. 21),3-26.
73See for
1981(op.cit.,above,n. 12);ThomasS. Maloney,
The
example
Fredborg
Semiotics
Bacon
45 (1983),120-54;
Costantino
Studies,
Bacon,
, in:Medieval
Marmo,
ofRoger
AlltheOthers)
onNatural
Aristotle
35 (1997),136-54.
, in:Vivarium,
Inferential
Signs
74 (andBacon,
De Signis,
in: K.M. Fredborg,
L. Nielsen
andJ. Pinborg,
AnUnedited
Roger
PartofRoger
Bacon's
'De signis
Maius3:
34 (1978),133;RogerBacon,
', in: Traditio,
(Opus
York-Kobenhavned.ThomasS. Maloney,
Leiden-New
oftheStudy
ofTheology,
Compendium
Kln1988,68-70.

18:08:06 PM

NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 51
comConsequently,in the debate Scotus describesin his Perihermeneias
mentariesmost authorstake side againstthe primarysignification
of the

intelligible
species.
Secondly,providedthatnames primarilysignify
things,the controversy
concernsthe statusof the thingssignified:are theymentalor extramental entities?There are at least threepositions.Some thinkthat the thing
signifiedis extramentaland the mode under which it is understoodand
is mental.Othersmaintainthatthe thingsignified
is in the mind,
signified
because it is consideredinsofaras it is understood.Finally,some take an
intermediateposition and maintain that names signifythingsthat are
partlyextramentaland partlymental.In any case, no one seems to share
Scotus's non-committal
and cautious attitude.
all
Thirdly, theauthorsI have mentionedaccepttheparallelismbetween
modes of signifying
and modes of understanding.
Therefore,Scotus's criticismof such a parallelismcan be seen as an originalcontribution
in the
of
semantics.75
history
Pisa
ScuolaNormale
Superiore

75Research
forthispaperwascarried
outduring
ofthe
mystayinLeuvenas a fellow
voorWijsbegeerte,
Katholieke
Universiteit
thanks
tofunding
Leuven,
HogerInstituut
providedbytheOnderzoeksfonds
K.U. Leuven.Alessandro
Del Punta,
Conti,Francesco
Massimo
Dominik
Perler
andAndrea
Tabarroni
reada first
draft
ofthisarticle
Mugnai,
andsuggested
corrections
andimprovements.
revised
many
JuanCarlosFlores
myEnglish.
I wishtoexpress
to all ofthem.
mygratitude

18:08:06 PM

El libroencadenadoEine Sammelhandschrift
naturphilosophischer
vonJeanBuridan
Schriften
Nacional342R)*
, Biblioteca
(Ms. BuenosAires
DANIEL ANTONIO DI LISCIA

Es ist seitlangem gut bekannt,welche herausragendeStellungdie Gestalt


des Buridan in der sptmittelalterlichen
Philosophieeinnimmt.Jedoch,
ist man in der Forschung
und trotzder vielenverdientenUntersuchungen,
zu keinemendgltigenUrteilber den Kanon seinerWerke gekommen.1
Bercksichtigtman die umfangreicheUntersuchungvon Michael, ein
unerllichesund beraus hilfreiches
bio-bibliographisches
Werkzeugfur
man
weitere
stellt
nicht
nur
wieviel
erforscht
bisher
fest,
jede
Forschung,
es
noch
zu
tun
Der
sondern
auch
wieviel
wurde,
gibt.
Hauptgrunddafr
bestehtsicherlichin nichtsanderem als in der Komplexittder Sache
zudem in unterschiedselbst:Buridanhat zahlreicheSchriften
hinterlassen,
existieren.Bezieht
lichenFassungen,von denen meistensviele Abschriften
man fernerden EinfluBuridans auf die Schulphilosophiedes 14., 15.
und sogar des 16. Jahrhundertsmit ein, ergibtsich das uerst vielfalderen Verworrenheit
nur langam aufgelst
tige Bild einer berlieferung,
werden kann.2
Whrend die Schriftenvon Buridan eingeordnet,ediert,bersetztund
mitfastjedem neuen Beitrag
ausgelegtwerden,und die Buridanforschung

* Die folgende
wurdedurchdiegrozgige
derFundacin
Untersuchung
Untersttzung
tabulae
Die aus Ms. 342Rzitierten
Stellen
Antorchas
Explicit,
quaestw(Incipit,
ermglicht.
in derRegelimTextso zitiert,
wieichsie imMs.
num
Stellen
, einzelne
usw.)wurden
wurden
sie verbessert
odereinigeVarianten
aus eineranderen
342Rlese.Gelegentlich
ausMichaelII oderausCh. Lohroderanderen
Handschrift,
QuellenmiteinerFunote
In diesem
FallwirddasWortunten
mitderKlammer
und
]" aufgenommen
angegeben.
Zwischen
Worte
worden.
Umderbersichtlichkeit
kommentiert.
< >" sindeinige
eingefgt
imTextgemacht.
nichtin Funoten
sondern
willenwurdediesfurdenFallderPhysik
" beziehen
sichjeweilsaufeinenText,Anfang"
undEnde"auf
undExplicit
Incipit"
Bcher
bzw.KapiteleinesTextes.
1 Farai1946,Lohr1970und1972,Michalski
1971,Michael1985.
2 Freineallgemeine
Buridans
wie auchfurweitere
derberlieferung
Darstellung
Hinweise
sieheMichaelI, 259-398.
bibliographische
Vivarium
39,1

BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke

18:08:20 PM

ADENADO"
EL LIBROENG

53

einen strkerenimpetus"gewinnt,scheintes nichtsdestoweniger


sinnvoll
zu sein,die Suche nach unbekanntenTextzeugenfortzufhren
und jedes
Stck so genau wie mglichzu untersuchen.
In dem hiervorgelegtenBeitragsoll ber einen bedeutsamenBuridanFundus berichtetwerden. Es handelt sich um einen der wenigen mittelalterlichenCodices, die in der BibliotecaNacionalvon Buenos Aires
aufbewahrt
werden,und auf den ich michim folgendenmitseinerSignatur
als Bs. As. BN 342R (bzw. nur Ms. oder Hs. 342R) oder gelegentlichnach
seinerim Bereichder Bibliothekumgangssprachlichen
Kennzeichnungals
el libroencadenado"(das verkettete
Buch)beziehenwerde.Die Handschrift
Bs. As. BN 342R, el libro encadenado", enthltin der Tat eine Sammlung von Buridans Kommentarenzur Naturphilosophiedes Aristoteles.
eine erste
HauptabsichtdieserArbeitistes, der Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft
und allgemeineBeschreibungdieser bishernichtbekanntenHandschrift
zu liefern.Soweit es mir mglichist,werde ich zudem versuchen,einige
Informationen
ber den Codex zu vermittelnund die in ihm enthaltenen Texte dem heutigen Forschungsstandentsprechendeinzuordnen.
WeitereUntersuchungenwerden die vorliegendeArbeit erweiternbzw.
verbessern.
1. Zu demCodex
Es scheintfestzustehen,
da Ms. 342R in Frankreicherworbenwurde.
wo es vermutlichdie letztenfnfzig
Nach Argentinien,
Jahre unbeachtet
in der Biblioteca
Nacionalverbrachte,kam es als Geschenkdes damaligen
argentinischenCnsulGeneralin Frankreich,Fernando Maine, an den
de la Nacin
, Juan Domingo Pern.3Jedenfallsist El
damaligenPresidente
libroencadenado" in die Biblioteca
Nacional4imJahre 1949 durchDecreto
Ley N 8124/57 (1903) eingegangen,und es ist soviel ich wei in der
bis heute unbeachtetgeblieben.5
Buridanforschung
3 DerCodexwirdseitdem
in einerschwarz/bordeaux
farbenen
Schachtel
aufbewahrt,
aufdersichdiefolgende
lesenlt:AIexcelentsimo
SeorPresidente
de la
Widmung
Maine.CnsulGeneral
General
Donjuan D. Pern.Fernando
enFrancia.
Nacin,
Pars,
Io de enerode 1949".Wederin Piccirilli
1953-54
nochin Cutolo1968-85
sindweitere
zu Mainezu finden.
Zurdamaligen
sieheRock
politischen
LageinArgentinien
Angaben
1987(Kap.VII: TheApogeeofPern,1946-1955",
262-306).
4 berdieBiblioteca
berichtet
kurzSabor1968.
Nacional
5 Die Information
im Karteikarten-Katalog
derBiblioteca
Nacionallautet:Buridan,
naturelle.
Manuscrito
delsigloXIV,tapasde madera
Jean. . . 342R.Philosophie
original
recubiertas
conpielde gamuza,
clavode cobrey cadenaconargolla
de hierro.
Contiene

18:08:20 PM

54

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Auch wenn eine genauere materielleBeschreibungimmer noch aussteht,knnen hier dennoch einige provisorischeInformationengegeben
werden. Hs. BN 342R hat eine Eisenkettevon fnfRingen, die- auch
wenn sie die Handschriftnicht an ihre ursprngliche
Bibliothekfestzukettenvermochte mindestensfurihrenargentinischen
Spitznamen"entscheidend war.6 El libro encadenado" bestehtaus in zwei Spalten in
bastardabeschriebenen239 Folien (290 mm x 220 mm).Je nach Hand
gibt es etwa zwischen 48 und 53 Zeilen pro Spalte. Der Text beginnt
auf fol. Ir3 mitdem Incipitdes Physikkommentars
und brichtauf fol.239rb
mittenim Kommentarzu De caeloab. Als Beschreibstoff
diente Papier.
Auf der Innenseitedes Buchdeckels sind Fragmenteeiner lateinischen
Grammatikerkennbar.
Aufdem Rckendes Codex lt sichmitSchwierigkeit die Signatur 342R lesen.7 Mehrere verschiedene Hnde knnen
unterschiedenwerden.8Kein Besitzvermerk
ist erkennbarund nirgendwo
findetman Kopistennamen,Hinweise ber die Frhgeschichte
bzw. Enstehungsumstnde,Zweck usw. der Handschrift.Wie auch im Falle
andererBuridan-Handschriften
handeltes sichhiermitgroerWahrscheinlichkeitum eine Universittshandschrift
aus den erstenDekaden des 15.
oder vielleichtvom Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts.9
Nur an einer Stelle der
lesen wir in dem explicit
des zweitenBuches: explici
quaestiones
physicorum
untquestiones
secundilibriphysicorum
reverendi
Buridanisub annodomini
magisti

la mayor
de Buridn,
clebre
escolstico
francs.
Conestuche.
partede la obrafilosofica
8124/57.(N 1903)."DieseAngaben
lieensich
Muyvalioso.Ingres
porDecreto-ley
demKatalogentnehmen;
die allgemeine
Beschaffenheit
des Codexkonnte
ichinsitu
aberleidernurin Eile- untersuchen.
Ich mchte
michan dieserStellebei Prof.C. F.
Bertelloni
BuenosAires)herzlich
furdenMikrofilm
aufdemdie
(Universitt
bedanken,
hiervorgelegte
basiert.
Untersuchung
6 Wennauchnicht
dieRegelbeidenBuridan-Handschriften,
so bildendochverkettete
catenati
Bcher
desBibliotheksundBuchwesens,
dassichber
{libri
) einbekanntes
Kapitel
das Mittelalter
erstreckt
(dazusieheBlades1852,3-81;Peeters
hinweg
1958).
7 Seitens
derBibliothek
wurdemirmitgeteilt,
da 342Rdie alteSignatur"
vonEl
Encadenado"
nicht
zu klren,
obdieseSignatur
eineeigene
sei;esistjedochbisher
Signatur
in BuenosAiresistodernicht.
derBiblioteca
Nacional
UmMiverstndnisse
zu vermeiden,
ichvor,dieKennzeichnung
342R(alte"Signatur)
furEl Encadenado"
aufrechtschlage
zuerhalten.
8
imMikrofilm
vonVerzerrungen
lassensichdieverschiedenen
HndeleiAufgrund
dernichtgenaubestimmen.
Provisorisch
kannmanmindestens
fesdegen:
Hj = 11^-78^
lassensichjedochnoch3 Hndevermuten);
(hierunter
H2= 79ra-89vb;
H3= 90ra-127va;
=
=
144rb-153ra
mit
auf
dem
f. 144r);
130^-1441^;
(d.h.
Handnderung
gleichen
H4
H5
Die Fragmente
undSchemata
auffol.153vstamHg= 154rM99va;
H? = 199vb-239vb.
menmglicherweise
auchvonH .
9 scheint
jedochrecht
sptzu sein.
H7

18:08:20 PM

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

55

"
millesimo
(fol.40^); aber der Schreiberhat nichtweitergeschrieben.Nach
einer etwa dreizeiligenLcke beginnter erneutmit der tabulaquaestionum
des drittenBuches.10In el libroencadenado"kommenkeineIllustrationen
bzw. geometrischen
Darstellungenweder im Text noch am Rande vor.
Die Randbemerkungen,die im allgemeineninhaltlichirrelevantsind,
beschrnken
sichauf die Gliederungbzw. lemmata
oder maniculae.
Schlielich
sei bemerkt,da Ms. 342R eine sptere- und eigenartige
Folierungmit
Bleistift
schon des 20. Jahrhunderts)
(mglicherweise
aufzeigt:die Folien
sind oben rechtsmit rmischenZiffernbis fol. LXXVIIII (= 79) numeriert.Fol. 80 wird nichtmit LXXX sondernmit IUI numeriert,was
nmlich vier mal zwanzig" bedeuten soll.11Um der bersichdichkeit
willen, werde ich zwischen [ ] die originale Foliennumerierungder
Handschrift
und V {verso)
frdie Folien
(aber mitErgnzungvon V (recto)
und hochgestellte
'a' und b5frjeweils die linke und die rechteSpalte)
nur einmal in der allgemeineninhaltlichenBeschreibungmit angeben;
ansonstenwerde ich sie aus praktischenGrnden weglassen und mich
immerauf die Umwandlungin arabische Ziffernbeziehen.
inhaltliche
2. Allgemeine
Beschreibung
Ms. Buenos Aires,BibliotecaNacional 342R (El libro encadenado") enthlt Buridans Kommentarezur aristotelischen
zu De
Physik(quaestiones),
et corruptione
und quaestiones
(<quaestiones
), zu De anima{expositio
generatione
), zu
den Parvanaturalia
(<quaestiones
) und zum TraktatDe caelo[expositio):

10Eine
durch
Wasserzeichen
derGrenzen
derWasser(d.h.auchinnerhalb
Datierung
istsicherlich
dennes sindsogarimMikrofilm
dreiverschiezeichendatierung)
mglich,
deneguterkennbar:
f. 78v;92r;142r.Dafristeineweitere
devisuder
Untersuchung
Handschrift
erforderlich.
11DieseNumerierungsmethode
wirdallgemein
indemganzen
Codexverwendet:
so da
+ 10)usw.erscheint.
87 als IIII^VII (= [4-20]+7),
90 als IIII^X (= [4-20]
beispielsweise
Fol. 100wirdmitC numeriert
und110mitCX (auch111= CXI; 112= CXII, usw.).
Dannwirdwieder
fol.VI**= 120(= 6*20)undnochmal
und
multipliziert:
multipliziert
+ l). Ich kennekeineandereHandschrift
addiert:
121= VI^I (=[6*20]
mitdieserNumabermirscheint
dieseinHinweis
darauf
zu sein,da Ms. 342Rvon
merierungsweise,
einerspteren
franzsischen
Handnumeriert
da ebendieseZhlweise
inderheuwurde,
franzsischen
furdieZahl80 (quatre-vingt")
nocherkennbar
ist.Seltsamer
tigen
Sprache
istesjedochmitderZahl120(als6*20),
beiderkeinehnlichkeit
mitderfranzsischen
Da Ms. 342RdieseFolierung
besteht.
hatundvondemin Frankreich
Sprache
ttigen
in Frankreich)
Consul
General
erworben
heitnatrlich
da es in
wurde,
nicht,
(vielleicht
Parisgeschrieben
wurdeundes ein Vertreter
derPariser
Texttradition
vonBuridans
Schriften
ist(siehedazuunten
S. 61-2).

18:08:20 PM

56

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

127^: Quaestiones
octo
libros
Aristotelis
1) ff.1raPhysicorum
super
[Ir^-VI^VIIv2]
- ff.64v,91v-94v
und128r-129v:
leer
duoslibros
De generatone
etcorruptione
Aristotelis
Quaestiones
2) ff.130ra-153ra:
super
[Vl^Xr3VlP'XIIIr*]
- f. 153v:Fragment
mitSchemata
vondenfinf
Sinnen[VIP'XIIIv]
intres
r2libros
De anima
Aristotelis
VIII**
3) ff.154rM67vb:
[VIP^XIV
VIIvb]
Expositio
- f. 168r:leer
188rb:Quaestiones
tres
libros
De anima
Aristotelis
4) ff.168V3super
[VlII^VIIIv^IX^VIIIr0]
- ff.l88v-189v:
leer
Parva
libros
naturalia
Aristotelis
:
Quaestiones
5) ff.190ra-220ra:
super
[IX^Xi^-CCXXr2]
De sensu
etsensato
5.1.)ff 190ra-200vb:
De memoria
etreminiscencia
5.2.)ff.201ra-203ra:
De somno
etvigilia
5.3.)ff.203ra-208ra:
De longitudine
etbrevitate
vitae
5.4.)ff.208ra-211rb:
18vb:De morte
etvita
5.5.)ff.211rb-2
De iuventute
etsenectute
5.6.)ff218vb-220ra:
inquattuor
De caelo
libros
etmundo
Aristotelis
6) ff.220^-239^:Expositio
[CCXXv^-XI^XIX
v*5]
3. %u

Texten
einzelnen

3.1. Quaestiones
superoctolibrosPhysicorum
(ff.lra-127va)
Wie bekannthat Buridan mehrfachber die Physikdes Aristotelesgelesen und fanden seine physikalischenIdeen groe Verbreitungin vielen
europischenUniversitten.
Die Forschunghat bislang mindestenssechs verschiedenePhysikkommentarevon Buridanangenommen:3 quaestiones
und 1 dicta}2
, 2 expositiones
sind die quaestiones
Unter den quaestiones
(die hier eigendichinteressieren)
accurtatae
breves(auch genannt quaestiones
)13von den quaestiones
longaezu
ist
wiederum
zu
unterscheiden.Unter diesen quaestiones
zweierlei
longae
zwar
zwischen
und
secundum
ultiunterscheiden,
(a) denjenigenquaestiones
mamlecturam
, die in Paris 1509 (hier = e) gedrucktwurden- welche eine
ordinatilo
des Verfasserssind- und (b) anderen quaestiones
, die nur als eine
BN
werden.
Ms.
Bs.
enthlt
berliefert
As.
342R
(a), d.h. die
reportatio
:
ultimalectura

12Hierbeifolgeich Thijssen1991,xii-xx.Zu den einzelnen


Handschriften
und
sieheMichaelII, 560-616.
SieheauchLohr1970,167-9.Die dicta
Einordnungsproblemen
selbst
stammen.
nichtunmittelbar
vonBuridan
sindExzerpte,
diehchtswahrscheinlich
13ImEinklang
hierfr
dieKennmiteinigen
Handschriften
(1991,
xvii)
schlgt
Thijssen
" vor.Ausfhrlicher
dazusieheThijssen
1985(a).
accurtatae
zeichnung
quaestiones

18:08:20 PM

57

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

Iohannis
reverendi
: Hec esttabulaquestionum
magisti
primilibriphysicorum
Incipit
de omnibus
estscientia
naturalis
scientia
ista:utrum
Etestprima
Buridani.
rebus,
questio
. . . (1ra)
essedemonstratio
quotmodisdicitur
trinonderogat
et impartibilitas
... et estcredendum
quoddietadeisimplicitas
Explicit
sinecompositione
simulenimestdeussimpliciter
nitati
aliquaetunusettripersonarum;
Amen(127i3)
in sculaseculorum.
nusquareestbenedictus
vorangestellt.
Jedem Buch werden die entsprechendentabulaequaestionum
Whrend der Anfangvon e nach der Reihenfolge(1) prologus
(2) tabula
der
ersten
dann
und
quaestioerfolgt,
(3) Behandlungsbeginn
quaestionum
kommtim Ms. 342R zuerst(1) die tabulaquaestionum
, dann (2) der prolo,14Von einigenkleinerenVarianten
gusund (3) der Beginnder erstenquaestio
im
diese
stimmen
quaestiones allgemeinenmit der von Farai
abgesehen,
Liste
berein.15
verffendichten
ist leidernicht
der ultimalectura
Abschrift
Die im Ms. 342R berlieferte
sonenthltnichtdie 10 quaestiones
ganz vollstndig:Buch V (ff.84ra-91rb)
dern nur die ersten8 von ihnen und einen Teil der neunten;die letzte
q. 10 fehlt.Von der q. 9 sind die Argumentepro und die drei ersten
erhalten.In etwa der Mittedes viertenArguments
Argumentead oppositum
Buches lautet: ... et hoc
brichtes ab. Das Ende des fnften
ad oppositum
est verum quia ipsa non est actus totalisqui ista generationegeneratur
sed est actus partialisqui eritpars illiusqui generatur(91rvb;e = f. 91V3,
Zeile 36). TrotztdieserwichtigenLcke und einigerkleinerAbweichungen
14LautMichaelfindet
de
auchin Ms. Lige,Bibliothque
mandieseReihenfolge
natioN 647),(Michael
114C (= Grandjean
II, 585);Ms.Paris,
Bibliothque
l'Universit,
G.IV.IO
Biblioteca
lat.14723,
nalede France,
Nazionale,
II, 585-6);Ms.Torino,
(Michael
lat.445),(Michael
Nationalbibliothek,
II, 588)undMs.Wien,sterreichische
(= Pasini,
II, 593).
5481,(Michael
15Das giltmiteinigen
derFranichtnurfurdiekurzeFormulierung
Abweichungen
tabulae
auchfrdiejedemBuchvorangestellten
imTextsondern
,
quaestionum
gestellungen
aufS. 9,
werden
die vonE. Faraiwiedergegeben
(Farai1946,9-16;seineBemerkung
kannmeiner
selbststammen
vonBuridan
die langeFormulierung
da nmlich
knnte,
im
aufdieFormulierung
Da Faraisichnicht
nachfrrichtig
werden).
gehalten
Meinung
und
im
Text
der
zwischen
Inkonsistenzen
sich
Textbezieht,
Formulierung
ergeben einige
sind:III, q. 3 (vgl.
hiervon
Bcher.
dereinzelnen
derin dentabulae
Beispiele
quaestionum
zu e imMs.
aufe f.42vb;gleich
ine auff.41r3(= Farai)mitderTextformulierung
tabula
vone auff.41ra(= Farai)mit
undIII, q. 11 (vgl.tabula
342Rjeweilsf.40raund41vb);
kann
auff.53vb;e = Ms. 342Rjeweilsf.40rbund51vb).Ferner
derTextformulierung
estmotus"
secundum
7 desV. Bucheskeineswegs
diequaestio
utrum
(Farai,S.
subjectam
ob
sit/est
motus"
substantiam
secundum
sondern
utrum
(dennes gehtdarum,
14)lauten,
Sinne(imotus
imstrengen
alsBewegung
dieVernderung
) ange(imutatio
) nachderSubstanz
Auerdem
sehenwerden
gehtes beiderq. 16
kann;siehee f. 73rb= Ms. 342R84rb).
umeinelinea
bloumeinelineagirativa"
zumIII. Buchnicht
(Farai,S. 12)sondern
beiThijssen
1991,23 = e f.41rbundf.48ra;Ms. 342Rf.
(sieherichtig
infinita"
girativa
40raund56V3).

18:08:20 PM

58

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

bestehtkein Zweifeldaran, da es sich um eine durchausbeachtenswerte


handelt.16
berlieferungder ultimalectura
Die fhrendeRolle, die dieser Text im Bereich der sptscholastischen
Naturphilosophieeinnimmt,stehtim krassenGegensatzzu dem Faktum,
da immer noch keine kritischeEdition vom ihm vorliegt.171991 hat
Thijssen eine Edition des sogenanntenTraktatsDe infinito
(III, qq. 13-19)
verffendicht.
Insoferndiese eine semi-critical"Edition ist, halte ich es
nicht fr sinnvoll,hier alle Unterschiedezwischen ihr und Ms. 342R
durchzugehen,und auerdemfindeich im VergleichmitMs. 342R keine
Anlsse zu Emendationsvorschlgen
eines Textes, der an sich sehr gut
brauchbar ist und die Grundlagenfur weitereTextstudienschafft.18
Es
kann hierjedoch versuchtwerden,das Ms. 342R gem dem Forschungs16Zurhandschriftlichen
derultima
lectura
sieheMichaelII, 578-609und
berlieferung
Die vorigen
unddie nachher
VerThijssen1991,xxix-xxxiv.
Erwhnungen
folgende
in diesem
Aufsatz
Beweisdafr
daes sich
gleichsanalyse
mgenalszureichender
gelten,
umdie ultima
lectura
vonBuridan
wasmichdersonstnotwendigen
Zitatealler
handelt,
undBuchenden
enthebt.
Buchanfange
171971hatPalaczdie
einerkritischen
berdieich
Vorbereitung
Ausgabe
angekndigt,
keineweitere
Nachrichten
in derLiteratur
fand.ZurZeitwirdeinevollstndige
Edition
vonBuridans
secundum
ultimam
lecturam
vonDirk-Jan
OlafPluta
Quaestiones
physicorum
Dekker,
undJ.M. M. H. Thijssen
anderUniversitt
forMedieval
andRenaissance
(Center
Nijmegen
Natural
vorbereitet.
Philosophy)
Etwasanderes
mitdemVorhaben
vonPatar(1996,9*),derdieTranskription
geschieht
derPhysikkommentare
Stadsbibliotheek
(bzw.dieEdition)
hat,dieimMs.Bruges,
angekndigt
477enthalten
sindunddieerwunderlicherweise
anscheinend
Buridan
zuschreibt.
Solange
wiraufdieArgumente
PatarsfrdieErklrung
diesermystre"
nochwarten,
kannich
darauf
daJ. Sarnowsky,
dersichuerst
intensiv
mitAlberts
beschfhinweisen,
Physik
zursptscholastischen
nichtuntigthatunddessenUntersuchungen
Naturphilosophie
beachtet
werden
drfen
Buchzu Albert
nichteinmal),
(dochPatarerwhnt
Sarnowskys
diesenKommentar
fiirein echtesWerkdes Albert
vonSachsenhlt(sieheSarnowsky
1989,X, XII und461).
18Selbstverstndlich
diejedochdenTextvonThijssen
gibtes zahlreiche
Abweichungen,
meines
Erachtens
nichtwesentlich
auchwennsie sicherlich
in einekritische
verbessern,
Editionaufgenommen
werden
mssen.
AlsBeispiel
hiervon
kannmandie aufflligsten
Unterschiede
zu derersten
vonThijssen
edierten
erwhnen
14:Thijssen
quaestio
{quaestio
ab jetztheitz.B.:3-75Seite3, Zeile15):
1991,3-13undMs. 342Rff.53^-551**;
= We;
3-75:extensionem]
om.(53V3);
eddunt
om.(53V3)
partes
extensionem]
3-22:corpora
naturalia
generantur
naturalia]
generantur
corpora
(53vb);
4-/0:igitur
. . . maius]hom.
6-13:virtutem]
velocitatem
(54ra);
(54rb);
I-6-7:Et ideo. . . ignis]hom.
7-8:postaer]infinitus
add.(54rb);
(54rb);
8-5:quam. . . agat]hom
(54V3);
nam. . . deorsum]
8-13-14:
om.(54V3);
9-3:positum]
(54V3);
incompositum
9-10:et]est(54V51);
9-14:alio]aliquo(54v*);
10-72:
add.(54vb);
postquia]tuncinfinitum
II-77:finitum]
infinitum.

18:08:20 PM

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

59

einzuordnen.Der Anfangspunkt
stand zur Texttraditionder ultimalectura
dieses Versucheslt sich gleich aus ThyssensAnalyseentnehmen.
Durch Vergleichder Abweichungen(oder Akzidentien",wie Thijssen
berlieferung
sagt)ist es ihm gelungen,fastdie gesamtehandschrifdiche
Seine Textanalysefokusiert
auf 25 Anomalien"
einzuordnen.19
provisorisch
in den qq. III, 14-19,ausgehendvon denen zwei unterschiedliche
Familien
knnen.
Da
diese
6 quaeswerden
von Handschriften
auseinandergehalten
kann
man
durch
die
tionesvollstndigin Ms. 342R berliefert
werden,
in der Rekonstruktion
der
Analyseder AkzidentienweitereFortschritte
Texttradition
der ultima
lectura
erzielen,wennman sichauf die von Thijssen
Basis sttztund, unterden Grenzen dieser Analyse,eine erste
gelieferte
provisorische
Einordnungvon Ms. 342R vorschlgt:20
Quaestio14 (53vb-55ra):
velestfinitum
tunc
... velipsum
estinfinitum
ethabetur
1) S. 4-4-5]f.541*:
propositum
finitum
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
distantiam.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
Ms.342R
. . . fortius
2) S. -4-6'f.54V2:
agatad omnem
V WX(Y?)
wieABDEFLMOQR
f.551*:
'vacuum'
... eteodemmododiceretur
'chimera',
3) S. 12-20-23;
quodistitermini
- dico
chimrm
necvacuum
infinitum
et'corpus
infinitum'
nonsignificant
neccorpus
- sedsignificant
si imposibile
sittalia{talia]Ms.:alia]esse
verasressecundum
semper
Et bene.. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
fictos,
conceptos
complexos
19Whrend
Michael
auf29 Handschriften
derultima
lectura
macht
aufmerksam
(II,578die25 Handschriften
auf,diemanfurdenTextderultima
609),listet
(1991,xxiii)
Thijssen
III, qq.14-19bercksichtigen
lectura
mu.DieseDifferenz
ltsicherklren,
dennThijssen
Ms. 11-K Paderborn,
Erzbischfliche
Akademische
Wa 12(daswiederum
Bibliothek,
fugt
Grnden
die 5
ist)hinzuundziehtaus verschiedenen
wegenSchadennichtbrauchbar
Handschriften
ab: Berlin,
Staatsbibliothek
Preuischer
cod.lat.fol.
Kulturbesitz,
folgenden
Wissenschaftliche
852; Erfurt,
Allgemeinbibliothek,
Ampl.F. 357; Louvain,Universinationale
de France,
G 106;Paris,Bibliothque
latin15888;undWien,
teitsbibliotheek,
sterreichische
5408.
Nationalbibliothek,
20IchgehedieListevonThijssen
derenAkzidentien
ichnach
durch,
(1991,xxvi-xxviii)
vonHandschriften
denquaestiones
trenne.
Da Thijssen
eineAuswahl
unde furdieTextherdievomEditor
stammenden
benutzt
derListe
hat,stimmen
Textentscheidungen
stellung
Endtext
wrdich
berein.
(d.h.vorderKlammer
(3-80)nicht
]") mitdemtatschlichen
dieLokalisierung
Ferner
wirdaufderAkzidentienliste
desanalysierten
Akzidents
(xxvi-xxviii)
imText(3-80)nicht
mitangegeben.
ImHinblick
aufeinegnstigere
weiterer
macheichdiepasNachprfung
Forschungen
nachdenfolgenden
Kriterien:
1:Akzidentiennummer
sendeAngabe
von1)bis25);2: die
inThyssens
Text(Thijssen
und(kleiner
1991,3-80),undzwarmitSeitenLokalisierung
Zeilennummer
oderzwischen
undkursivgeschriebener)
3:
2 Seiten38-25/39-/);
(z.B.6-4-5,
vomMs. 342R;4: denText,wieichihnleseaus demMs. (eventuell
dieFolioangaben
zumTextvonThijssen
bzw.mitVergleich
miteinigen
(3-80)zwischen
Verbesserungen
6: die Familiebzw.
denKlammern
{}); 5: die zumAkzident
passenden
Bemerkungen;
vonThijssen
undmitWiederholung
nachderEinordnung
seiner
Gruppenzugehrigkeit
Handschriftenbuchstaben.

18:08:20 PM

60

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Quaestio15 (55f-56if)'
. . . in concavoorbislunequia tantequantitatis
eratcorpusquod
4) S. 16-1-2]f.55v*:
ibi.. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
... utnecpoliorbislunese tangerent,
nihilessetinter
5) S. 20-18-19;f.56rb:
quamvis
eossecundum
rectitudinem.
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
Quaestio17 (58f-59if)'
. . . essent
Itemsi.. . . KeineHinzufiigung.
6) S. 35-16;f.581*:
quaternarius.
betreffen
denselben
mitAkzidentien,
diesichgegen7) und8) (S. 43-16-23)
Paragraphen
So zeigtdie Gruppevon Handschriften
DEFLMORVXY ein
seitigausschlieen.
Homoioteleuton
whrend
die GruppeU W stattdessen
die
(= Akz.7 bei Thijssen),
vonjenerGruppe
durchHomoioteleuton
bersehene
Stelleverschoben
undan andererStelleeingesschrieben
hat:Ms. 342Rf.59rblautet:
. . . Dicamigitur
ad istum
sensumquodnulladuosunttria,quianonsecundum
eandem
rationem
discretivam
dicunturduosecundum
triaanimaenimdividendo
duonondiscernit
nisi
quamdicuntur
interhecet illud;et sicde aliis.Et si dicamus
'illedebetmihicentum
poma',non
7: . . . secundum
oportet
intelligere Dementsprechend
giltfurMs. 342R:Akzident
tria.
Anima
enim Homoioteleuton;
alsowieDEFLMORV
XY.Akzident
quamdicuntur
8: KeinTextzu verschieben
Homoioteleuton
imAkz.7.
aufgrund
... et numerando
eas utdicamus
esseviginti
9) S. 44-19-21;f.59v*:
pannum
{viginti]
Ms.:centum}
ulnarum
et columpna
decern
von:
pedumet sicde aliis Auslassung
centum
leucarum
etpondus
decern
talentorum.
Ms.342RwieACGHIJMJVQST.
spatium
ibidem
: ... utsi cuiuslibet
unitatis
unitatis
fuerit
uniuspedis,
10)S. 44-29/45-2;
quantitas
veluniusulne,veluniusleuce,vel<unius>dieietsiede aliis.. . . Auslassung
von:vel
uniussextarii,
velunius
talenti.
Ms. 342Rzuerst
wieAC GHIJNQST
(abermehralsim
Akz.10 beiThijssen,
wo nurderhierin Italicswiedergegebene
TextalsAuslassung
wird).
angegeben
11) S. 45-3-4;ibidem:
. . . quia due ulnenonsunttresulnenec{ne'Ms: vel
} duotalenta
<sunt>triatalenta
vomTextin Italics.
, et omnisulna.KeineAusslasung
Quaestio18 (59if-62rb)'
extensionem,
12)S. 46-16-19;59^: . . . aliquantam
sequitur
quodinfinita
punctaredderentinfinitam
extensionem.
Hoc supponatur
quodex hocapparet,
quiasi duopuncta
reddunt
redderent
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
extensionem,
aliquantam
quattuor
duplam.
: . . . redderent
infinitam
extensionem.
. . . Keine
13)S. 46-23; ibidem
Quod estfalsum.
Hinzufiigung.
fuerunt
dieset anni,plu14)S. 53-20-23;60^: . . . hecestconcedenda:
'quandocumque
resfuerunt
diesquamanni'quiainstantia
53: isto;
342R
proaliquo{aliquo]Thijssen,
wieGruppe
HIWevonThijssen,
. . . Homoioteleuton.
infinito.
53,Anm.85} tempore
Ms. 342RwieADEFWJUMOPRSTUVWXYe.
Similiter
et illa:omninumero
estaliquisnumerus
15)S. 56-1-2;6lr3:... in continuo.
maior.Variante
wieGruppe
DEFLRUWXY
wieinThijssen,
56,1. 1-2).
(d.h.nicht
62ra:Ms. 342R enthlt
die Paragraphen
16)S. 63-76/64-7;
[1], [2] und [3] (diedie
deraufS. 46 vorkommenden
non"
nach
Beantwortungen
quod
Argumente
ausmachen)
derReihenfolge
DEFLMORSUVWXY.
[1],[2] und[3],d.h.wiedieGruppe

18:08:20 PM

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

61

Quaestio19 (62ra-64rb):
etinsecunda
ettertia.
. . . Hinzufugung.
. . . facit
Deuslapidem
; 62V3:
17)S. 67-10-11
pedalem
Ms.342RwiedieGruppe
DEFMRUVWXT.
essevera,quiapono{pono]Thijssen,
67:
ibidem
: . . . universalis
18)S. 67-26/68-7;
potest
simul
vere
67 Anm.20} quodsunt
342RwieGruppeClevonThijssen,
, universalis
posilo;
. . . KeineAuslassung
vom
estvera.
Sedtunc
etiam
minor
dictarationis
prius{?)
apparet.
Textin Italics.
suas{suas]Ms.eius)
62^: . . . lineaB {B] Ms.est}estdivisainomnes
19)S. 68-24/69-7;
Ms. 342RwieDEFLMOmedietates
Et loquor.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
proportionales.
QRUVWXY.
. . . tangeret
extrinsecum.
Ponamus
quod.. . . Homoio20) S. 70-4-7;62vb:
igitur
lapidem
teleuton.
Ms. 342RwieDEFHIJLANOPRSTUVWXYe.
Deuscreare
. . . implicat
contradictionem,
21) S. 7'-10-13;631*:
quiaex quo nonponitur
totum
resultans
essespherinisicorpora
siveorbicularia,
oporteret
spherica
semper
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
contradictionem
cum,etimplicat
quodsphericum
etreser. . . quod<omni>diepreterita
Deusfecit
63V2:
22) S. 74-9-70;
pedalem
lapidem
VWXTe.
Ms. 342RwieADEFGH1JLANOPRSTU
vavit.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
. . . quiaistasduaset istascentum
et illasmilleDeuspotest
23) S. 75-8-9;63V2:
separare
. . . Hinzufugung.
Ms.342Rwie
ab invicem
etseparatim
etsicde singulis.
conservare,
EFMUVWXr.
: . . . sumendo
75:capiendo
; Ms.342RwieHIWe
; ibidem
24) S. 75-10-14
{sumendo]
Thijssen,
. . . Auslassung.
vonThijssen
S. 75,Anm.105} 'omnes'collective.
Quintaconclusio.
WXY.
Ms.342RwieDEFLMORUV
. . . Homoioteleuton.
64i*:. . . necconnotat
necsignificai
simultatem
25) S. 78-75-75;
temporis.
Ms.342RwieADEFHJJLMNOPRSTUVWXTe.
Man kann sichjetzt fragen,wie diese Informationen
ber Ms. 342R im
Rahmen der Einordnungvon Thijssen zu interpretieren
sind. Es seien
die folgendenBemerkungengemacht:
1) Ms. 342R kann nichtsehr hoch in ein Stemma gestelltwerden (wie
die Gruppe BCGQ) , denn es zeigt die Akzidentien14, 20, 22 und 25
auf.21
(wie alle anderen Handschriften)
14 von den 25 AkzidentienaufMs.
ist
das
das
342R
2)
einzige Ms.,
Akzidentien:
2, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23,
zeigt(nmlich
24, und 25). Somitkann man behaupten,da Ms. 342 parallel zu keiner anderen Handschriftverluft.
3) Ms. 342R verhltsich nach den Akzidentien2, 7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23,
24 wie ein guterVertreterder Familie II.
4) Es ist zwar deudich,da Ms. 342R wie auch andere Handschriften
ist.Aber seine Kontamination
(z.B.: S, A, ( , M, und 0) kontaminiert
ist vielleichtnicht ganz uninteressant:
bezglich der wichtigenFrage
nach der Verbindungzwischender Familie I, die etwa der Pariser"
21Thijssen
1991,xxxi.

18:08:20 PM

62

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

berlieferungentspricht,und der Familie II, die die deutsch-polnische" berlieferung


(etwa Prag, Wien und Krakau) wiedergibt,weist
zu
Recht
auf
eine Anzahl von Handschriftenhin, die aus
Thijssen
verschiedenenGrnden mit beiden Familienzusammenhngen.22
Ms.
342R ist ein guterKandidat als Vermittler
zwischenbeiden Familien;
und vielleichtsogar noch besser als die anderen. Denn einerseitsnhertes sich sehr der Krakauer-GruppeDEF durch die Akzidentien2,
7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23 (bis auf D) und 24 an, die auch in anderen
Vertreternder Familie II vohanden sind. Aber andererseitstrgtes
dazu die Akzidentien9 und 10, die typischfr die Familie I sind.
Nun gibt es dazu eine einzige Krakauer Handschrift,
nmlichG (Bibi.
wie Thijssen
Jagiellnska1771), die sich mit einigenSchwierigkeiten,
zeigt der erstenFamilie zuordnenlt und mit Sicherheitaus Paris
stammt.23
Da sie die zwei fr die Familie I typischenAkzidentien9
und 10 aufweistund diese- wie gesagt- auch im Ms. 342R vorkommen,drfenwirvon daher zunchsteinmalmitVorsichtdie Vermutung
vielleichtmit
aufstellen,da der im Ms. 342R enthaltenePhysiktext
dieser Krakauer Abschriftzusammenhngt.
wir hier
haben
Jedenfalls
auch eine weitereEvidenz dafr,da die Textberlieferung
der ultima
lectura
noch sehr viel Mhe und
, deren vollstndigeRekonstruktion
Zeit in Anspruchnehmen wird, quite complicated"ist.24
3.2. Quaestiones
superduoslibrosDe generationeet corruptione
(130ra-153ra)
Unsere Kenntnisseder Kommentartradition
zu dem TraktatDe generatione
et corruptione
des Aristotelesist immernoch fragmentarisch.
Die Buridanforschung,die sich lange Zeit dieser Lage nichtentziehenkonnte,befindet sichjetzt dank einer Reihe neuer Beitrgezur Textberlieferung
und
auf
einem
sicheren
Kurs.25
Begriffsgeschichte
22Thijssen
1991,xxx-xxxi.
23
Bibliotheka
1771enthlt
nurdieses
Thijssen1991,xxxi.Ms. Krakow,
Jagiellnska,
Werk(siehedazuMarkowski
/Wlodek,
71; MichaelII, 584).
So Thijssen
sowohlzurTextberlieferung
wie
(1991,xxxi),demwirvieleBeitrge
zumVerstndnis
derNaturphilosophie
Buridans
zu verdanken
haben.
25MirsindwederalteDruckenochkritische
Editionen
(auchnichtin Vorbereitung)
Buridans
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
bekannt.
berdie
irgendeiner
Kommentarfassung
inDegeneratione
etcorruptione
vonBuridan
errterten
naturphilosophischen
Fragen
giltDie
Struktur
dermateriellen
Substanz"
vonMaier1952,(3-140;berBuridan
selbst118ff.)
als grundlegend.
NeueBeitrge
zurKommentartradition
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
findetmaninJ. M. M. H. Thijssen/H.
A. G. Braakhuis
(Hrgs.)1999;sieheauchCaroti

18:08:20 PM

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

63

Laut Michael26sind zwei expositiones


(A und B) und zwei quaestiones
(A
und B) von Buridan zu De generatione
et corruptione
zu unterscheiden.Ms.
342R enthltkeine expositio
sondern quaestiones
zu De generatione
et corruptione
und
zwar
nicht
eine
Abschrift
der
sondern
der
,
quaestiones
(A),
quaestiones
(B), die laut Michael in 11 weiterenCodices vorhandensind.27
Burdani
de generatione
et corruptione.
Incipit
(Proem):
Incipiunt
questiones
superlibrum
Circaprimm
librum
de generatione
et corruptione
notandum
huiuslibri
quodscientia
estquedamparsscientiae
naturalis.
Ideoad videndum
quemlocumteneatinterpartes
scientiae
naturalis
enuncietur
illepartes
scientiae
naturalis
. . . (ISOr2).
principales
principales
. . . istispertractatis
nihilplusrestt
in scientia
naturali.
Notandum
Expl.(Proem).:
quod
comunis
scilicet
Romanus
facitilludpreambulum
hiesecundum
expositor
Egidius
magis
manifeste.
Nuncigitur
descendendum
ad libros
de quointendimus,
scilicet
de generatione
etcorruptione,
talisformetur
utrum
de generalibus
. . . (130V51)
quaestio
prima:
etecontrario
cessaret
actioearumetsecundum
ea quedictasuntprocedunt
ratioExplit.
nesque febant
anteoppositum
viisviissuis.Et sic estfinisistarum
questionum
super
librum
et corruptione
reverendi
Iohannis
Burdani
(sic)de generatione
magisti
parisii(?)
subtilisimi
Benedictus
dominus
deusin sculaseculorum
Amen(1531*)
philosophi.
Die in der Forschung angenommene Zuschreibung zu Buridan wird
zweifach,nmlichin dem Incipit und in dem Explicitdieser Abschrift,
besttigt.28
Wie die tabulaquaestionum
dieser Fassung letztendlichgenau aussehen
soll, kann nur nach einem lckenlosenVergleich aller Handschriften
bestimmtwerden. Bis dahin kann man hier die tabulavon Ms. 342R
bekanntgeben, die ich gegen die zwei Mnchener Handschriftender
BayerischenStaatsbibliothek
(= BSB), Clm 4376 und Clm 19551, kontrolliert
habe:29

1996.FrBuridans
Degeneratione
etcorruptione
siehezustzlich
Braakhuis
1997undBraakhuis
1999.
26MichaelII, 628-48.
27Es seiauchbemerkt,
da keinederbisher
bekannten
Handschriften
dieserFassung
ausFrankreich
oderItalien
stammen
sondern
mitderBuridan-Tradition
vonPrag,Wien,
KrakauundErfurt
zusammenhngen
(sieheMichaelII, 635-41).
EineandereFassung
derquaestiones
vonBuridan
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
(in
Michael
wirdin3 bislang
bekannten
Handschriften
II, 631-4alsquaestiones
(A)verzeichnet.)
berliefert:
Ms.Cesena,Biblioteca
cod.S. VIII. 5; Vat.lat.2185undVat.
Malatestiana,
lat.3097.Whrend
Buridans
Autorschaft
derimMs.342Renthaltenen
quaestiones
(B) nie
in Fragegestellt
Sie
wurde,
gab die Fassung
(A) Anlazu Meinungsverschiedenheiten.
dieals Verfasser
derFassung
gehenaufMaier(1952,118ff.)zurck,
(A) nichtBuridan
sondern
NicoleOresmesehenwollte.
Die TheseMaierswurde
von
jedochberzeugend
Michael
1986widerlegt.
SieheauchLohr1972,123.
(II, 642-8)undThijssen
29Zu diesen
Abschriften
sieheMichael
DieTitelderquaestiones
dieser
II, 639-40.
Fassung
vonBuridans
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
wurdezuerst
vonCaroti(1996,S.
Quaestiones
77*)aus Ms. Berlin,
69*Staatsbibliothek
Preuischer
cod.lat.fol.387 (ff.
Kulturbesitz,

18:08:20 PM

64

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Buch I:
- Anfang:
sieheobenincipit
undgleichhierunten
q. 1.
- Ende:. . . Adseptimm
fuit
undeproveniat
dictum
diversitas,
originaliter
quandodicitur
de hocin questione
etc.(144vb)
:
Quaestiones
de generabilibus
etcorruptibilibus
sitscientia.
Et arguitur
1. utrum
quodnonquiaquod
nonestnoncontingit
sciriutpatetprimo
. . . (130V*)
posteriorum
scibilium30
scientia
de eissupposi
toquod
ad corruptionem
rerum
2. utrum
corrumpatur
de illishabetur
scientia
(13Ir2)
1
voxsignificet
idemrecorrupta
et reexistente
3. utrum
(131v15)3
4. utrum
si32imposibile
estelementa
estea alterali
substantialiter,
generari
imposibile
(132rb)
secundum
eiussignum
eius
5. utrum
sitdivisibile
etsecundum
quodlibet
corpus
quodlibet
(132vb)
puncta33
sitaliquidsimpliciter34
6. utrum
(133rb)
generari
posibile
uniussitcorruptio
alterius
7. utrum
omnisgeneratio
(1341*)
in animato
sitalia forma
substantialis
ab anima(134v*)
8. utrum
diffrt
ab alteratione
9. utrum
(135v*)
generatio
sitbonain qua dicitur
esttransmutado
10. utrum
istadescriptio35
'generatio
generationis
in totum
utsubiecto
eodem'(1361*)
huiustotius
nonmanente
aliquosensibili
rarefactio
11. utrum
sitaugmentado
(136rb)
proprie
in augmentatione
viventis
cibusaugeatur
velcorpus
animatum
12. utrum
(136^)
maneat
idemanteet post(137r15)
illudquodaugetur
13. utrum
simpliciter
eiusquodaugetur
14. utrum
(137^)
parsaugeatur
quelibet
fiatsecundum
formales
et nonmateriales
15. utrum
(1381*)
augmentado
partes
a motulocali,a alteratione
et
sitmotus
dietus
distinetus
16. utrum
augmentado
proprie
substantiali
(138v*)
generatione
vonOresme,
Marsilius
129i*undzwarmitVergleich
zu denKommentaren
156vb)
geliefert,
siewieder
vonBraakhuis
wurden
undAlbert
vonSachsen.
vonInghen
(1999,
Neuerdings
- offensicht- vondemVerweis
aufCaroti1996abgesehen
doch
151-2)bekannt
gegeben,
Handschriften
dieseListeentnommen
welchen
lichohneAngabedarber,
wurde;vgl.
mitder
Braakhuis
1999,132,Anm.5, 151Anm.96 und152Anm.98 (zumVergleich
Vondenvielen
Unterschieden
dieBraakhuis
anderen
Vatican-Redaction"
Redaktion,
nennt).
habe
Aires342RunddenenvonCarotiundBraakhuis
derListevonMs.Buenos
zwischen
habenknnten
die inhaltliche
ich nurdiejenigen
Bedeutung
(ausgeschlossen
angemerkt,
eius"[Braakhuis,
wieeiussignum"
z.B.inversiones
wurden
151]
[II,q. 5 hier]fursignum
mir
bedeutsam
erscheinen
Besonders
wennes keineSinnvernderung
undderartiges,
gibt).
beidenquaestiones
dieUnterschiede
I, 17;I, 20 undII, 6.
30scibilium]
undBSB,Clm 19551f.
Mnchen,
BSB,Clm4376f. 125v*
corporalium
bei Caroti(1996,69*)
Braakhuis
106v*;
(1999,151).AlledreiVarianten
corruptibilium
alsvonMichael(II, 635)bernommen.
erwhnt,
31Ed. dieserQuaestio
in Braakhuis
1999,153-6.
32antesil sequitur
add.Caroti(1996,70*).
33
Braakhuis
(1999,151).
punctum
34puncta]
om.Caroti(1996,69*).
simpliciter]
35descriptio]
auchinMnchen,
BSB,4376ist
BSB,Clm19551f. lllvb.In Mnchen,
diffinitio"
(f.131rb).
hingegen

18:08:20 PM

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

65

sed nonquamdiu
vivitmutatur(P)36
vivitaugeatur
17.utrum
omneanimatum
quamdiu
(^r*)37
18.utrum
omneagensin aliquodpassum
ipsumpassum38
(139V2"0)
tangat
et omnepassum
inpariendo
19.utrum
omneagensin agendorepatiatur
reagat(140rb)
sitesseactionem
a proportione
vel etiama proportione
20. utrum
equalitatis
possibile
minoris39
(HCK^)
inequalitatis
elementorum
forme
substantiales
21. utrum
(141Va)
suscipiant
magiset minus
in mixto
maneant
forme
substantial
elementorum
22. utrum
(142^)
mixtio
sitpossibilis
23. utrum
(1431*)
reverti
illudquodsimpliciter
estcorrumptum
idemin numero
24. utrum
(144ra)40
possit
Buch II:
- Anfang:
libride generatione
et corruptione.
Et queritur
secundi
Incipiunt
questiones
utrum
. . . (444vb)
primo
- Ende:sieheobenexplicit
:
Quaestiones
tantum
1. Et queritur
utrum
sintquatuor
scilicet
calidum,
qualitates
prime,
primo
frigihumiditas
etsiccitas
sive:caliditas,
itaquodhicnon
dum,humidum,
siccum;
frigiditas,
. . . (144vb)
fiatdifferentia
inter
abstractum
et concretum
utrum
duesintactive,
secunda
esttalis41:
scilicet
cali2. questio
qualitatum
primarum
et duepassive,
scilicet
humidum
etsiccum
dumetfrigidum,
(145Va)
3. questio
tertia
esttalis:utrum
sintquatuor
elementa
et nonplura(146rb)
4. questio
(146v*)
quartaesttalis:utrum
ignissitcontinuus
aqueetaerterre
etsicposset
5. questio
esttalis:utrum
etiamqueride quofrigida,
quinta
aquasitprimo
sitprimo
libetalioelemento,
scilicet
utrum
terra
siccaetaerprimo
etignis
humidus
calidus
(147^)
primo
6. questio
sextaesttalis:utrum
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
sinteiusdem
rationis42
difeignis
rentes
solumsecundum
<et> itaetiamqueritur
intensionem
et remissionem
de aliis
36mutatur(?)]
nutriatur
Braakhuis
(1999,151).
37Gleiche
derquaestio
in Ms.Mnchen,
BSB,Clm 19551, f. 113vbund
Formulierung
Clm4376,f. 135rb.
ImMs.BuenosAiresBN 342Rkommen
mitten
inderFormulierung
derquaestio
dieWorteutrum
omne
animatum
in einemdichten
vor,undzwarals Lemmata
undgreren
NachCaroti(1996,71*)lautetdiesequaestio
: utrum
omne
Schriftgrad.
animatum
vivataugeatur".
quamdiu
38passum]
om.Braakhuis
(1999,151).
" istselbstverstndlich
39minoris]
om.Braakhuis
(1999,151).Eineproportio
inequalitatis
"
odermaioris
". Beidemletzten
Fallergibt
sichkeinProblem,
minoris
inequalitatis
inequalitatis
denneineBewegung
bzw.eineactio
Nurbeieiner
kannstattfinden.
oder
proportio
equalitatis
minoris
istdie Frage,sinnvoll
zu stellen.
Daheristhierminoris"
erforderlich
inequalitatis
auchbeiCaroti1996,73*).
(minoris"
40FreineEdition
undAnalyse
dieserquaestio
sieheBraakhuis
1997.
41Im
zu denquaestiones
Buchessinddie quaestiones
des ersten
des zweiten
Gegensatz
Buchesnumeriert
unddurchdie Formel
esttalis"eingefhrt.
Dies istvielleicht
questio
eineSachedesSchreibers,
denndaszweite
BuchistganzvoneinerHandabgeschrieben,
dieauff. 114rb
beginnt.
siveeiusdem
(1999,152);sivesintadd.Caroti
postrationis]
specieiadd.Braakhuis
1996(74*).Siehehierdienchste
Anm.

18:08:20 PM

66

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

elementis
ad singulas
eorumqualitates,
videlicet
utrum
humiditas
aeriset
quantum
humiditas
rationis43
. . . (1481*)
aquaesinteiusdem
7. questio
esttalis:utrum
simbula
maneat
eademin generato
septima
qualitas
que fuit
in corrupto
(1491*)
8. questio
octavaesttalis:utrum
elementa
habentia
simbulum
facilius
etcitius
transmutentur
ad invicem
simbulum
quamnonhabentia
(149v*)
9. questiononaesttalis:utrum
duo elementa
nonhabentia
simbolum
quelibet
possint
in quodlibet
transmutan
tertium
et quodhabentia
simbolum
nonpossit
transmutan44
ad tertium
(149vb)
10.questio
decimaesttalis:Utrum
omnemixtum
locumsitcomquodestcircamedium
ex omnibus
positum
simplicibus
(150rb)
11. undecima
esttalis:utrum
sitessealiquodmixtum
etperquestio
posibilis
simpliciter
fectetemperatum
(1511*)
duodecima
esttalis:Utrum
12.questio
humidum
etsiccum,
iste45
calidum,
frigidum,
quatuorqualitates
sintprincipalia
mixtorum
prime,
agendain generatione
(15IVa)
13.questio
tertia
decimaesttalis:utrum
sintgenerationes
etcorruptiones
(152rb)
perpetue
14.ultima
huiusesttalis:utrum
inhocmundo
et
questio
possent
perpetuali
generationes
si nonessent
motus
celestes
corruptiones
plures
(152va)
Ms. 342R berliefert
also die 38 quaestiones
von Buridan zu
De generatione
et corruptione
.
3.3. Expositio
in treslibrosDe anima (154ra-167vb)
Da Buridanals einerder wichtigsten
seinerZeit anzuNaturphilosophen
sehen ist,wird nichtnur durch seine grundlegendeKommentierungder
Physikund des De caelobezeugt, sondern auch und fur die damaligen
43postrationis]
et eiusdem
BSB,Clm19551f. 121^. DemSinn
specieadd.Mnchen,
nachstimmt
Ms.Buenos
Aires
vonBraakhuis
342RmitderVersion
(1999,152:Handschriften
nicht
werden
berein:
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
ratioutrum
erwhnt)
ignissunteiusdem
nissiveeiusdem
diffrentes
solumsecundum
intensionem
etremissionem".
Es wird
speciei
alsodieFragedanachgestellt,
ob diecaliditates
derzweioberen
Elemente
(FeuerundLuft)
derselben
Artsind(oderzurselben
so dasienur
Intensittsunterschiede
Gattung
gehren),
innerhalb
derselben
aufweisen.
Undhnlich
kannflir
zweiandere
Elemente
Gattung
gefragt
z.B. furLuftundWasser
derTrockenheit.
Bei Carotilautethingegen
werden,
bezglich
diequaestio:
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
rationis
sivesintdiffrenutrum
ignissunteiusdem
tessolumsecundum
intensionem
et remissionem"
(Caroti1999,74*,aus Ms. Berlin,
Preuischer
Staatsbibliothek
cod.lat.fol.387,150v*;
dieLesartCarotis
von
Kulturbesitz,
dieser
Handschrift
wirdhiernicht
htte
Buridan
dieAlternativfrage
angezweifelt).
Demgem
entweder
beidecaliditates
zu derselben
(unddieanderen
gestellt:
gehren
Qualitten)
Gattung
odersie unterscheiden
sichnurnachIntensitt.
Aberdieskannmeiner
nach
Meinung
nichtderSinnderFragesein,sondern:
weildieQualitten
zurselbenGattung
deswegen,
siesichnur
unterscheiden
intensionem
etremissionem".
DiesesMiversecundum
gehren,
stndnis
entsteht
ausdeninderoberen
Funote
Varianten.
Dieseundandere
angegebenen
knnen
erstnacheinem
allerHandschriften
undeinerInhaltsanalyse
des
Fragen
Vergleich
Textesendgltig
beantwortet
werden.
44antetransmutan]
sicadd.Braakhuis
(1999,152).
45iste]idestBraakhuis
(1999,152).

18:08:20 PM

67

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

Interessenvielleichtnoch mehr- durchseine intensiveAuseinandersetzung


mit dem TraktatDe animades Aristoteles.Mehr als bei jedem anderen
KommenzahlreicheHandschriften
Werkberliefern
naturphilosophischen
und
wie
blich
denen
sich
tare zu De anima
unter
,
expositiones quaestiones
befinden,
Einordnung
Fassungen.Eine endgltige
jeweilsin unterschiedlichen
einer einzelnenHandschriftwie hier 342R wird erstmglichsein, wenn
aller bekanntenZeugen der Buridanes eine abgesicherteKlassifizierung
De
zu
anima
gibt.
Kommentierung
Ms. 342R enthltdie von Michael genannteexpositio
C, die er in zwei
- auch DarmHandschriften
findet:Vaticano,lat. 2162, und- Lohr folgend
516.46Patar-derbristadt,Hessische Landes- und Hochschulbibliothek
Darmstadter
Handschrift
die
lectura
ediert-zieht
deprima
gens die expositio
ab und fgtMs. Erfurt,Wissenschaftliche
Ampl. F.
Allgemeinbibliothek,
298 hinzu.47
tres
alteram.
continet
autem
Istelibertotalis
honorabilium
noticiam
Bonorum
opinantes
magis
Incipit
totalis
libriet de opinionibus
Primus
liberestde prohemio
libros
antiquorum.
partales.
et
animeet cumhocde potentiis
diffinitione
Secundus
liberestde communi
vegetativis
et de potentia
de potentia
sensitivis.
Tertius
liberestde potentia48
intellectiva,
appetitiva
Textusincietin textm.
liberdividi
turinprohemium
locummotiva.
Primus
secundum
huiusscientie
bonitatem
. . . (154ra)
In prohemio
autem.
proponit
primo
pitibiprincipium
eissignifican.
Et additultiestutaliquidpossit
. . . auditus
verodatusanimalibus
Explicit
aliissignificare
licet
ut possint
momodo
perloquelam,
quodlinguadataesthominibus
tertii
libride anima(167vb)
Et sicestfinis
magisdatasitpropter
gustum.
Buch I:
- Anfang:
sieheoben
- Ende:. . . DicitergoIncipit.
Aristoteles
invenitur
et
quodinpluribus
vegetativa
quamsensitiva
nonsuntscilicet
ab invicem
sicinaliquibus
estseparata,
sedubiin eodeminveniuntur
libride animaet sequitur
libersecundus,
Et sicfinitur
de erroribus
tractatus
separate.
scilicet
a prioribus
. . . (156rb)
quequidem
Buch II:
- Anfang:
deanima
scientia
de animademonstraRecitatis
, hicincipit49
antiquorum
opinionibus
determinat
secundo
deeiuspotentiis.
Secundum
tive.Etprimo
diffinitiones
anime,
inquirit
In primoinvestigai
duocapitula.
ibipotentiarum
autem
anime.
Primaparscontinet
quasdamdiffinitiones
anime.In secundo
. . . (156rb)
46MichaelII, 682-3;Lohr1970,173.
47Patar1991,52*;undzwarohneHinweis
der
(indemganzenBuch)aufMichael,
dieseErfurter
Hs.fureineandere
hat(Michael
B"derexpositio
II, 680).
Fassung
gehalten
ZurDarmstdter
Handschrift
sieheauchPatar1991,49*-50*.
w potentia]
om.Ms. 342Radd.exMichael(II, 682).
49
add.determinare
Michael(II, 682).
postincipit]

18:08:20 PM

68

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

- Ende:... et homines
habentes
infantilitatem
velpassionem
vel
impedimentum
propter
aliumcasumindigent
beneutifantasia
et in finercapitult.
. . . (164rb)
Sequitur
Buch III:
- Anfang:
De parte
autem
. Isteesttertius
liberin quo sunttrestractatus.
Primus
estde
secundus
de potentia
etsecundum
locummotiva.
Tertius
intellectiva,
appetitiva
potentia
animepotentiarum50
ad invicem.
Secundus
ibi quoniam
autem
anima.
de comparatione
ibivegetabilem
. . . (164v*)
Tertius
- Ende:sieheobenexplicit
.
Patar
Vergleichendmit Ms. Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek477 transkribiert
nach der vatikanischenHandschrifteinige wenige StellendieserFassung,
die er als tertialecturakennzeichnet.Als einen weiterenBeleg fr die
Zugehrigkeitvon Ms. 342R zu dieser Fassung knnen wir hier jene
Stellen in Ms. 342R anfuhren:51
lat.2162
Ms. Vaticano
Liber
I
1lOr*:Bonorum
. . . (incipit).
1lOv^:Formidandum
...
110vb:Si autem
...
UberII
...
1Mv15:
. . .: ... hoc addiscit
spculons
116rb:
autem
Nunc
autem
...
118^: De tangibili
. . .: ... quaesuntin
119rM19rb:
Dubitabit
...
aere.[Hom.?].Sed si corpora.

Ms.BN342R
I
Liber
1541*.
154rb.
154vb.
Uber11
homoaddiscit
159rb:
160rb.
1621*.
. . . quaesuntin aere.Undepossit
162rb:
sic rationari:sicutest de aqua in hiis
que suntin aqua ita est de aere in hiis
...
que suntin aere. Sed si corpora.

UberLU
UberLH
valet
Sed tu
164V51:
. . . Sed tuquaeresquommodo
autem
122V3122V0:
Necesse
. . . istaconsequentia.
...
est istaconsequentia
quaeresquomodo
Die zweiteVariante ist wichtiger:wenn man den Text von Ms. 342R an
dieser Stelle bernimmt,dann handeltes sich um eine Auslassungdurch
Wie der Text der expositio
Homoioteleutonin der vatikanischenAbschrift.
50
.
animeadd
postpotentiarum]
51In derVergleichstabelle
das
als Uberschnft
derrechten
vonPatarsteht
Spaltenicht
hier
Ms. Vaticano
lat.2162sondern
2164"(Patar1991,715-22,
Ms. Vaticano,
richtige
aufdenichhieraufmerksichumeinenschwerwiegenden
Druckfehler,
715).Es handelt
zuDe anima
lat.2164 aucheinenBuridankommentar
sammachen
mu,weilMs.Vaticano
lectura
nmlich
diequaestiones
detertia
berliefert,
(siehePatar1991,52*;MichaelII, 700).
die
dieserStellen
alleVarianten
Darberhinaushalteiches furunntig,
aufzulisten;
aufbeidenSeitenangegeben.
habeichmitFettschrift
schienen,
drei,die mirwichtiger

18:08:20 PM

69

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

zu erstellenist und in welcherBeziehungdie Handschriften,


lectura
de tertia
tatschlichzueinanderstehen,mu die Aufgabeeiner
die sie berliefern,
weiterenArbeitbleiben. Vorerstmag es ausreichen,mit den vorherigen
auf die dem Ms. Buenos Aires, BN 342R zukommende
Informationen
Bedeutunghinzuweisen.
3.4. Quaestiones
supertreslibrosDe anima (168va-188rb)
ber den TraktatDe animagehren zu den Texten von
Die quaestiones
bereitethaben.52
Buridan,die sovielInteresseerwecktwie Schwierigkeiten
- ohne Vorwort- die von Michael
Ms. 342R berliefert
genannten
in treslibrosde animaAristotelis
)" bzw.
Quaestiones
[sednonde ultimalectura
lectura
die von Patar genanntesecunda
, von der etwa 15 weitereAbschriften
von Farai nach Ms. Vendme,
bekanntsind,und deren tabulaquaestionum
169
wiedergegebenwurde.53
BibliothqueMunicipale,
animasitproprium
Utrum
libride animaqueritur
Circainicium
primoutrum.
Incipit:
huiuslibriquisoletvocariliberde anima.Et arguitur
subiectum
quodnon,immo
primo
. . . (168v*)
animatum
quiamagisilludestponendum
magiscorpus
hecdicta
Et sic secundum
velinfutati.
contrarii
. . . sequitur
acceptivi
appetitus
Explkit
Deo gratias
viissuis.Et sicestfinis
hincinde
formate
rationes
(188rb)
procedunt
Buch I:
- Anfang:
Sieheobenincipit.
- Ende:... Adconfirmationem
resolvi
evidentiam
omnem
dicendum
estquodnonoportet
tot
suntprincipia
demonstrabilia
immoquamplurima
in primum
proprie
principium,
nuncalia queAristoteles
ut declarat
suntconclusiones
Sequitur
primoPosteriorum.
stio...(170v)
Buch II:
- Anfang:
utrum
animasitsubstantia:
librum
de animaqueritur
Circasecundum
argui. . . (170^)
estomnisubstantie
turquodnonquiacommune
52Vgl.Farai1946,25-30;Lohr1970,173-4;
Biblioteca
Ms.Segovia,
Michael
II, 684-735.
bereits
1965(sieheBeaujouan
cod.44,dasBeaujouan
de la Catedral,
1968,16)erwhnt
undzwar
lectura
etultima
alsmglicher
wirdnurvonMichael
erwhnt,
hatte,
Zeugedertertia
vor"(II, 700,705,Anm.2).
zumCodexliegennicht
mitdemHinweis
Informationen
53Farai1946,27-9.Patar1991(inUbersicht,
Handschnften,
52*;zu deneinzelnen
sieweiwieMichael(II, 684-9)aufundordnet
Handschriften
fastdieselben
listet
33*-7*)
Ms.Mnchen,
ein.Er fgt
undGruppen
ternachVersionen
BSB,Clm4376,ff.1051*hinzu(siehe35*;
alsff.91rM18rb
nach35*,in52*flschlich
124vb
angegeben)
(Folierung
Versionen"
die Verkrzte
beiMichael[730]unter
wirdhingegen
dieseAbschrift
eingenatioimMs.Paris,Bibliothque
erwhnten
undziehtdievonMichael
Exzerpten
ordnet)
72'fiab.
latin15888,ff7Or2nalede France,

18:08:20 PM

70

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

- Ende:. . . quiacommuniter
t omniasensibilia.
Etsicestfinis
secundi
aprehend
questionum
libride anima(182vb)
Buch III:
- Anfang:
Circatertium
librum
de animaqueritur
utrum
intellectus
noster
sitvirprimo
tuspassivaab intelligibili.
Arguitur
quodnonquia omnequodpatitur
movetur,
quia
. . . (182^)
patiestmoveri
- Ende:sieheobenexplit.
Wie bei anderenAbschriften
dieserFassungwirdin Ms. 342R eine quaestio10 (utrumopus naturalissimum
in viventibussitgeneraresibi simile",
f. 175V*)berliefert.54
Das Werk ist noch immerunediert.
3.5. Quaestiones
superlibrosParva naturalia (190ra-220ra)
Die Parvanaturalia
, die einen Fragenkreiszu den von Krper und Seele
stellendie Verbindungzwischen
gemeinsamenVerrichtungen"55
betreffen,
dem psychologischorientiertenTraktat De animaund den biologischen
Schriftendes corpusaristotelicum
dar. Gerade diese Mittelstellung
hat zu
einergewissenVernachlssigung
ihrerlateinischenText- und Kommentartraditiongegenberden groenphilosophischen
und biologischenWerken
des corpusgefuhrt.56
Buridan hat sich mehrfachmit den Parvanaturalia
auseinandergesetzt,
- wie Michael bemerkt
- die verschiedenenRedakaber bis heutekonnten
tionen noch nicht mit aller wnschenswertenKlarheit" geschieden
werden.57
Es scheintfestzustehen,
da BuridansKommentarezu den Parva
naturaliasowohl in der Form der expositio
als auch als quaestiones
berliefertsind. Letztereliegen in verschiedenenFassungenvor, und zwar nicht
54Diese
inFaralsListenicht
kommt
quaestio
vor,wirdabervonMichael
(II,684)erwhnt.
Ferner
lautet
diequaestio
wiebeiFaraisondern
wiebeiMichael(684):utrum
II, 23 nicht
sensibile
faciat
sensationem
positum
suprasensum
(1811*).
55Aristoteles,
De anima
433b 19-21(Aristoteles
1983, bers.
Gigon,
342).AnderStelle
werden
naturalia
nichtgenannt.
jedochdieParva
EineBasisuntersuchung
firdieKommentierung
liefert
Raedemaecker
1965.Frdie
derKommentare
nicht
zuletzt
dieGliederung
derParva
natuEinordnungsprobleme
spielt
raliaselbst
eineRolle,da derenletzteTexteyDe
morte
etvita
etdeiuventute
et
, derespiratone
senectuteu
unterschiedlich
oderzusammengesetzt
werden.
SchonLacombe
bemerkt
getrennt
interlibrum
De respiratane
et librum
De Morte
nonsemper
eadem
divisio
diesbezglich:
est..." (Aristoteles
ichmichherzlich
bei Prof.Ch.
1939,61). An dieserStellemchte
Lohrbedanken,
dermireinevollstndige
ListederKommentare
zu denParvanaturalia
zurVerfgung
undmirmitvielenwertvollen
zu diesemThema
gestellt
Bemerkungen
hat.
geholfen
57MichaelII, 774.

18:08:20 PM

71

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

immer fr alle Texte der Parva naturaliasondern unterschiedlich.Der


Klarheitzugunstenhalteich michim allgemeinenan die Einordnungvon
B. Michael nach den einzelnenTexten.58
siehe5.1.(Anfang)
Incipit:
siehe5.6.(Ende;Buridan
Explicit
zugeschrieben).
3.5.1 ff.1901^-200^: De sensuet sensato
- Anfang:
et potencie
secundum
Potencie
sensitive
vegetative
ipsiusanimeet potencie
et ideohuiusmodi
suassineorgano
locummotive
nonexcercunt
operationes
corporeo
. . . (190r*)
nonsuntsolumipsiusanimesedsuntsimulanimeet corporis
operationes
- Ende:... etitaetiam
nonbenesimul
ad gradum
intensionis
albedinis
attendens
multum
etsicestfinis
Et hecdictasufficiant
de sensuetsensato
attendet
quantasitsuperficies.
(200vb)
Nach der Klassifizierung
von Michael ist der von Ms. 342R berlieferte
B" einzuordnen,59
Text unterdie quaestiones
von denen Michael 11 weitereAbschriften
verzeichnethat und die im Gegensatzzu den anderen
- mit der
Texten der Parvanaturalia
Ausgabe von Lokert(Paris 1516, hier
=
Ms.
zu den
bereinstimmen.
342R
beginntmitdem Prohemium
Lokert2)
mit Lokert2die 21 quaestioParvanaturalia
und enthltbereinstimmend
nes, von denen Farai nur die Titel der 10 erstenverffentlicht
hat.60Die
mit
der
Ms.
wurde
tabula
342R
,
bereinstimmt,
quaestionum
vollstndige
von Agrimiwiedergegeben.61
et reminiscencia
3.5.2 ff.201ra-203ra:De memoria
- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de memoria
et reminiscencia
sit
memoria
queritur
primoutrum
solum
veletiampresentium.
preteritorum
Arguitur
quodsitpresentium,
quiaobiectum
cuiusestpotentia
aliqua. . . (2011*)
58Esseihinzugefugt,
dadiezweivonMichael
erwhnten
Abschriften
Basel,UniversittsF.V.10(MichaelII, 740,747,755)undSanktGallen,Stiftsbibliothek,
775
bibliothek,
werden.
Lohr
II, 750,756,764,771)vonLohr1994(85-8und249-50)
(Michael
besttigt
1994(141-3)ergnzt
die ListenochmitMs. Basel,Universittsbibliothek,
F.VIII.17,ff.
133r-204v.
59Michael
II, 739.
60Farai1946,33; siehedazuMichaelII, 744.
61
mitMs.342Rschliet
dievonAgrimi
1983,43-5(dieUbereinstimmung
Agnmi
angefhrten
Varianten
desMs.Milano,
Biblioteca
Ambrosiana
G 71 Sup.aus).ImUnterschied
imMs.342Rdieq. 8: utrum
etgustus
zu Faraiundhnlich
wiebeiAgrimi
lautet
tactus
sintterrae
a dominio"
WieschonMichael(II, 744)angemerkt
die
hat,wurden
(f.193rb).
in Faraifehlenden
TitelnachCod. Vat.lat. 11575vonRuysschaert
(Codices
mitgeteilt
Latini.
Codd.
11414-11709
, CittdelVaticano,
1959,327).

18:08:20 PM

72

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

- Ende:. . . licetbeneetsufficienter etintentiones


reservate
suntinvirtute
memospecies
Etsicrationes
rativa.
nonprocedunt
contra
dicta.Etsicestfinis
de memoquestionum
riaet reminiscencia
(2031*)
Alle fnfquaestiones
kommen im Ms. 342R vor. Der Text ist auch als
B"
quaestiones anzusehen,eine Fassung brigens,die nach Michael in 13
weiterenHandschriftenberliefert
wird und nicht mit Lokert2(= quaestionesB') bereinstimmt.62
3.5.3 ff 203ra-208ra:De somnoet vigilia
- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de sompno
et vigilia
sitprivatio
queritur
primoutrum
sompnus
debetprovenire
ex defectu
causarum
habitus
vigilie.
Arguitur
quodnonquia privatio
et nona causispositivis,
sedsompnus
. . . (2031*)
- Ende:. . . quodnonpossunt
infantasia
facere
sufficientes
ad posteaiterum
impressiones
movendum
notabiliter
sensum
ideononsitrememoratio.
Secundum
dicta
communem,
solvatis
rationes63
sicudvobisplacetet sic estfinisquestionum
de sompno
et vigilia
(2081*)
Im Ms. 342R sind 10 quaestiones
enthalten,jedoch nicht diejenigen,die
in Lokert2(= quaestiones
B1) gedrucktwurden. Nach Anfang,Ende und
nach der tabulaquaestionum
handelt es sich auch hier um eine Abschrift
der quaestiones
verzeichnet
B", von der Michael 14 weitereAbschriften
hat.64Die tabulastimmtsogar der Reihenfolgenach mit der von Michael
verffentlichten
tabulaberein (d.h. im Ms. 342R sind die qq. 7 und 8
nicht umgestellt,wie in Lokert2).65
Dazu kommtdie von Michael zum
Vergleichzwischender Redaktion B und der Redaktion B' angegebene
4 (Lokert^f. 45rb),die - von einigenSchreibabweichungen
Stelleder quaestio
- im Ms. 342R
(fol. 205V*)parallel zur Stelle der Redaktion
abgesehen
B (bei Michael nach Ms. Vat. lat. 11575, f. 114vb)luft.66
62DerExplicit
vondemDruckLockert2,
denMichael
alsquaestiones
B,ueingeordnet
dicendum
estquodipsautebatur
hoc
. . . Sed ad auctoritatem
hat,lautet:
consequenter
nomine
memoratio
nonpromemoria
sedproreminiscentia
et illaauctoritas
sufficit
pro
nobisetsicestfinis.
Deo gratias"
f.48i*;sieheMichael
II, 751).BeideFassungen
(Lokert2
B undB1berliefern
dieselbe
tabula
mit5 quaestiones
sindinbei, abernurdiezweiersten
denFassungen
die brigen
3 quaestiones
in B' eineweitere
gleich.NachMichaelstellen
derselben
dar(Michael
II, 752).
Bearbeitung
berlieferung
63rationes]
MichaelII, 754.
rationis
64MichaelII, 755-6.
65MichaelII, 759.
66MichaelII, 777ff.Einenicht
unbedeutende
imMs.342Ristpotentiae
Abweichung
" fur
"
intelUctwae
nutritivae
linkeSpalte= Redaktion
ibid.,
B, Zeilen
(Michael,
potentiae
sichsicherlich
umeinenSchreibfehler,
derauerdem
keineRolle
5-6).Aberes handelt
fiirdenVergleich
mitderRedaktion
B' spielt,
denngeradean dieserStellesindbeide
B undB' gleich.
Redaktionen

18:08:20 PM

73

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

vitae
et brevitate
3.5.4 ff.208ra-2llrb: De longitudine
- Anfang:
et
calidum
vitequeritur
et brevitate
de longitudine
Circalibrum
primoutrum
nonsunt
sintcauselongevite.Arguitur
humidum
quodnon,quiacauseputrefactionis
causelongevite. . . (208ra)
- Ende:... etsicvirtute
illudproporcordiantequam
etproportionale67
reficiuntur
cordis
de longitudine
etsicestfinis
Et sicpatetquestio
tionale
cordimoriatur.
(211rb)
Ms. 342R gehrtsicherlichauch zur RedaktionB, furdie Michael 8 weiverzeichnethat.68Dafr sprechennichtnur der Anfang
tere Abschriften
und das Ende sondernauch die Tatsachen,da die qq. 1-2 von Lokert2
nichtvorkommen,whrend stattdesseneine neue quaestiomit enthalten
ist (q. 6: utrumplantae debeant esse longiorisvitae quam alia ammalia", ff.210^-21 lrb).69
et vita
3.5.5 ff 211rb-218V0:De morte
an dieser Stelle
Wie oben erwhntist die Gliederungder Parvanaturalia
und
Die
nicht immer gleich.70
Gruppierungder quaestiones
Gliederung
unterscheidensich im Ms. 342R von der gewhnlichangenommenen
Text der Parvanaturalia
zum fnften"
, d.h. zum Traktat
Kommentierung
In Ms.
et
senectute.1*
iuventute
de
de
et vita
bzw. Kapitel: De morte
,
, respiratone
derselben
Handschrift
in
einer
noch
mindestens
342R wie auch
Fassung72
nichtals unabhngigerTraktatangewirdder wichtigeText De respiratone
etvitazusammengehrig.
sehen sondernals mitDe morte
Demgem wervitaezwei
et brevitate
de longitudine
den im Ms. 342R nach den quaestiones
Titel
dem
unter
eine
berliefert:
unterschiedliche
Gruppenvon quaestiones
et vita(hier 3.5.5), die andere,deutlichvon jener getrennt,unter
De morte
etsenectute
dem TitelDe iuventute
(hier3.5.6). Zu einerbesserenberprfung
an.
anhand andererHandschriften
gebe ich hier die tabulaequaestionum
67proportionale]
MichaelII, 762.
perproportionalia
68SieheMichaelII, 762-6.
69Michael
II, 766.
70SieheobenAnm.56. Mindestens
alledreiTexte
nachscheint
derExpositio
Buridan,
uno
modorum:
anzusehen:
als zusammengehrig
istelibersoletintitulan
aliquotrium
modode respiraet vitaet tertio
aliomodode morte
et iuventute,
modode senectute
in hoclibro. . (nachMichaelII, 67).
determinatur
tone,eo quodde ististribus
71
Vgl.Farai1946,34; Lohr1970,178;MichaelII, 769ff.
72Ms. Praha,Knihovna
etvita
demorte
L.29 [1272],quaestiones
Kapituli,
Metropolitn
und
in demExplicit
unddannBuridan
Buridani
zugeschrieben)
(ff.113vb-122rb,
magisti
mitallgemeiner
IndemExplicit
etsenectute
deiuventute
Zuschreibung
(ff.122rb-124rb.
quaestiones
aufdiese1376entstandene
Michael(II, 771)verweist
derParvanaturalia).
zu Buridan
an.
Urteil
michdiesem
ichschliee
mitwohldieseRedaktion";
Abschrift

18:08:20 PM

74

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de morte
etvitaprimo
utrum
corsitprincipium
queritur
sanguietvenarum
nis73
animalibus
habentibus
cor,et nonloquorde primo
principio
simpliciterquiaistudestDeusnecpropter
ad animam
sedloquordeprimo
primitatem
corporis
... (211rb)
principio
corporali
- Ende:. . . valetad
etad mixtionem
digestionem
(?)etad aliaoperavite.74
Ergoconclusionesfactas
solvatis
secundum
Et sicestfinis
de
exigentiam
predictorum.
questionum
morte
etvita.Expliciunt
de morte
etvita(218^)
questiones
:
Quaestiones
1. utrum
corsitprincipium
etvenarum
inanimalibus
habentibus
cor(211r13)
sanguinis75
2. utrum
vitapossitexistere
sinenaturali
caloreveletiam:utrum
animaiet omneseius
haberenaturalem
calorem
ad hoc,quodvivant
partes
oporteat
(212r*)
3. utrum
calidum
naturale
a se ipso(212^)
potest
corrumpi
4. utrum
inviventibus
debeatcorrumpi
calornaturalis
humidi
perconsumptionem
(2131^)
5. utrum
vitaposset
in aliquoanimali
alimenti
perpetuali
perconsumptionem
(213^)
6. utrum
omnevivens
ad salutem
viteindigeat
caloris
naturalis
refrigerio
(214^)
7. utrum
in vasebeneobstructo
ignisdebeatcitocorrumpi
(21r0)
8. utrum
omniaet solaanimalia
habentia
pulmonem
respirant
(216r*)
9. utrum
habeant
sufficiens
calorisvitalisa contiplanteet alia exsanguia
refrigerium
nentiet a nutrimento
(21v3)
10. utrum
viventia
naturaliter
calidadebeant
nutriri
ethabitare
inlociscalidioribus
etfrigidain frigidioribus
(2171*)
11. utrum
in estatemagisrespiremus
et spissius
respiramus
quamin hyeme
(217^)
12. utrum
membra
interiora
scilicet
coretpulmo,
sint
principalia,
eparet eisconsimilia,
in estatecalidiora
velcontra
quamin hyeme
(217v^)
Die quaestiones
8-12 beziehen sich auf De respiratione.
Die handschriftliche
Tradition vertretend,enthltMs. 342R eine Abschriftder Fassung (B),
und von daher berliefertes auch nicht die q. 1 (utrumpropositiosit
vera animal secundumquod animal, impossibileest non vivere"),die in
Lokert2(= Fassung B1) vorkommt.76
3.5.6 ff.218vb-220ra:De iuventute
et senectute
- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de iuventute
etsenectute
utrum
calornaturalis
et
queritur
primo
accidentalis
seuinnaturalis
sunteiusdem
speciei
specialissime.
Arguitur
quodnonquia. . .
(218^)
- Ende:. . . debetdici
debentintelligi
sanitate
quodomniapredicta
supposita
corporis,
nobisdignetur,
sculaseculorum.
Amen.
quampraestare
quiregnat
perinfinita
Expliciunt
naturalium
Buridani.
questiones
parvorum
maistri
(2201*)

73sanguinis]
cm.exsanguinweus.
74vite]
animaMs. Praha,Knihovna
L.29 [1272]f. 122r*'
Metropolitn
Kapituli,
con.exsanguinweus.
sanguinis]
Die quaestio
ausFarai1946,34. SieheMichaelII, 774.

18:08:20 PM

75

EL LIBROENGADENADO"
zu diesem Text:
die 3 folgendenquaestiones
Ms. 342R berliefert

sunteiusdem
1 [13]utrum
calornaturalis
et accidentalis
seuinnaturalis
specieispecialissime(218vb)
sitbonain qua dicitur
viventis
diffinitio
2 [14]utrum
quamdatAristoteles
generationis
animein calefando
estprimaparticipado
(2191*)
generado
suntbone,etquia
viteetmortis
etsenectutis
etetiam
3 [15]utrum
diffinitiones
juventutis
... (21v3)
secundum
viventis
iamdictum
estde diffinitione
generationis
Ms. 342R die
der Fassung(B) berliefert
Wie die anderenHandschriften
die in Lokert2( = B1)
quaestio1 (oder [13] wenn man alle zusammenzhlt),
fehlt.Wenn man 5.5.) und 5.6.) zusammen nimmt,dann sind in Ms.
der Fassung (B) vorhanden,fr die. Michael 12
342R die 15 quaestiones
verzeichnethat.77
weitereAbschriften
Zusammenfassendzu 5.1.-6.): Ms. 342R enthltimmer die Fassung
Tradition entsprichtund von dem Druck
(B), die der handschriftlichen
B'
bei
Michael) abweicht(mitAusnahmevon De sensu
Lokert2(als Fassung
InnerhalbdieserTraditiongehrtes auerdemzur Gruppe von
etsensato).
die alle fnf"Werke berliefernund noch zu denjeniHandschriften,
Buridan zugeschriezu den Parvanaturalia
denen
diese quaestiones
bei
gen,
ben werden.78
librosDe caelo et mundo (220-239i)
in quattuor
3.6. Expositio
Als Kommentare zum Traktat De caelo, der in jeder mittelalterlichen
librinaturales
der Physikunmittelbar
Schuleinordnungder aristotelischen
und
eine
eine
von
Buridan
sind
,
expositio
Sammlungvon quaestiones
folgt,
diesmal aber nichtin unterschiedlichen
Fassungenund in einer bemerDie Quaestiones
berliefert.79
kenswertgeringenAnzahl von Handschriften,
wurdenim Jahre 1942 von Moody anhand der zwei bekanntenHandschriftenediert. Vor kurzem hat Patar eine neue Edition von ihnen
die
und zum erstenMal eine Edition der expositio
angefertigt,
vorgelegt80
77Michael
II, 770-2.
78SiehedieBemerkungen
vonMichaelII, 775-6.
79SieheMichaelII, 617-27.
80Moodys
hocheingeschtzt
Edition
wurde,
(sieheMoody1942),diem derForschung
Clm 19551und Ms. Bruges,
basiertaufMs. Mnchen
Staatsbibliothek,
Bayerische
Mnchner
daaucheinanderer
477.DamalshatMoody
Stadsbibliotheek
Codex,
vermutet,
derFall(sieheMichael
aberdiesistnicht
Clm761,diequaestiones
II, 623;Lohr
berliefert;
zu Buridan).
Beide,Lohr(1970,
1970,170,hltdiesenTexteherfreinenKommentar
Nationalbibliothek
5453
aufMs.Wien,sterreichische
(II,621)weisen
170)undMichael
dieWiener
schliet
neuedierte,
derdiequaestiones
hin.Patar(1996,229-566),
lr-8r
(Fragm.)
dieselbe
aus (Patar1996,70*).Somitbleibtdie handschriftliche
Handschrift
Grundlage

18:08:20 PM

76

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

brigensauf den drei bisher bekanntenHandschriftenberuht: Bruges,


Stadsbibliotheek
477; Vaticano, Vat. lat. 2162 und Wien, sterreichische
Nationalbibliothek
5302.81
Ms. Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Nacional 342R enthltals letztenText
eine unvollstndige
der expositio
berDe caeloetmundo
von Buridan.
Abschrift
Es istjedoch anzunehmen,da diese Abschrift
bevor die
war,
vollstndig
dem Blatt 239 folgendenFolien verlorengegangensind; denn hier sind
" oder
weder Exzerpten noch abbreviations
irgendwelcheBearbeitungen
eines Buridankommentars
vorhandensondernder Text selbstder exposibesteht
tionder bis zum Codexende sehrsinnvollverluft.Buridansexpositio
aus vier Bchern,jeweils mitTraktaten,die wiederumin Kapiteln untergliedertsind. In Ms. 342R ist das ersteBuch vollstndigund das zweite
Buch etwa bis zur Hlfte von Kapitel 3 des drittenTraktateserhalten.
- Incipit.
Postlibrum
de naturalibus
etearumprincipiis
etpasPhysicorum
quiconsidrt
sionibus
in communi
isteliber,
De celoetmundo
, quiconsidrt
sequitur
qui nominatur82
inspeciali
de rebus
naturalibus
secundum
motus
localessimplices
. . . (220V3;
quodearum
Es folgt
das Prohemium
desobenerwhnten
5-3-tf).
(5-3-20;einschlielich
Incipit)
- Explicit.
. . . sedad similes
rectos
Et nott
Aristoteles
ngulos
quiaundique
superterram.
moveantur
simulad medium
terreet ad medium
mundi,
quodlicetisteglebe83
quia
idemestmedium,
tamennonmoventur
153-29-32).
fehlt
Abbruch;
(239vb;
Fortfhrung
Buch I:
- Anfang:
Primus
libercontinet
Primus
estde perfectione
mundi,
quatuortractatus.
secundus
de eiusfinitate,
tertius
de eiusunitate,
de eiusperpetuitate
. . . (220v*;
quartus
5-22-24)
- Ende:. . . Aliter
istetractatus
nonhaberet
multam
efficaciam
equenaturaliter84
eque
(230V3;
88-4-5)
supernaturaliter

wiebeiMoody.Der Unterschied
da MoodydieMnchner
Handschrift
liegtnurdarin,
undPatarjetztdiebelgische.
bevorzugte
81Patar1996,5-226;zu dendreiHandschriften
siehe42*-59*.
Die in Lohr1970(170)
erwhnten
(B) sindin Lohr1970D. da Clavasioprovisorisch
quaestiones
zugeschrieben.
StellendieserEdition
wievorher
auchdie anderen
Texte(z.B.
(Patar1996)werden
1991sieheoben,Anm.20) mitSeiteundkleinkursivgeschriebenen
zitiert
oder
Thijssen
z.B. 83-12-14
heitSeite83,vonZeile12 bis 14"usw.Die Lemmata
erwhnt:
schreibe
Da es sichumeinenedierten
ichwiePatarmitFettschrift.
Texthandelt,
werdeichin
mitKlammern
dieVariante
derEdition
mitangeben.
]"
Anmerkungen
82qui nominatur]
nominatus
(Patar1996,5-5).Lemmawirdeingeschlossen.
83iste]
illae(Patar1996,153-30-.?/).
add.loquendo
(Patar1996,88-5).
postnaturaliter]

18:08:20 PM

77

EL LIBROENCADENADO"

Buch II:
- Anfang:
de
determinai
libersecundus
Hic incipit
. . . Quod quidem.85
qui specialiter
estde
secundus
se totum,
Primus
estde celosecundum
trestractatus.
celo.Et continet
89-2-4)
. . . (230V*;
estde terra
tertius
astris,
- Ende:Abgebrochen
sieheobenExplicit.
(Textunvollstndig);
superDe
Verglichenmit dem von Patar ediertenText weist die expositio
von Ms. 342R zahlreicheTextvarianten,Auslassungenund
caeloet mundo
auf. Da es in der Tat zu viele sind, als da sie hier beHinzufiigungen
werden
knnten,gebe ich einigeBeispielean und erwhnenur
rcksichtigt
die auffalligsten
Auslassungenund Umstellungen;in weiterenVerffentauf
die Textproblematik
soll
genauer eingegangenwerden.86
lichungen
von Ms. 342R weistmehrereAuslassungendurchHomoioDie expositio
teleutaauf, die an den entsprechendenStellen den von Patar edierten
Text voraussetzenund von daher davon zeugen, da es sich nicht um
eine besonderszuverlssigeAbschrifthandelt.Beispiele hiervonsind die
ersten6 Flle:
hom.
. . . perfectum]
9-12:quiacorpus
hom.
. . . mixta]
11-58-59:
simplicitatem
hom.
modo. . . potest]
13-32-33:
hom.
16-1-3:
ergoetc.. . . deorsum]
hom.
et sie. . . lineasemicircularis]
22-50-51:
hom.
sicutestaer. . . speciem]
39-36-37:
Es gibtauch zahlreicheAuslassungenvon einzelnenWortenoder Stzen;
von diesen sind zwei zu erwhnen,die einen langen Absatz betreffen:
om.
. . . essetinferior]
Palam autem.Supposuit
133-39-44:
. . . ergoetc.]om.
Adhucomnia.Secunda
152-3-9:
De
An einigenStellen,an denen Buridan ein Lemma des aristotelischen
Ohne Rcksicht
findetman Textumstellungen.
caeloangibtund kommentiert,
auf die inhaldichenUnterschiedesind folgendezu notieren:87

85
quidem]add.igitur(Patar1996,89-2).
86post
und
nurhandschrifdich
dievordem
dieser
VorallemmitderEdition
vorlag
expositio,
kaumzugnglich
vondaherderForschung
geleiwar,hatPatareinenwichtigen
Beitrag
nurmiteinigen
sondern
Bericht
denmanmitdiesem
schmlern,
Bemerkungen
keinesweg
stet,
will.
ergnzen
87Ichnumeriere
furdieReihenfolge
mit[1],[2] usw.,undbenutze
hierParagraphen
auchdieLokalisierung
nachderZahlenordnung
denPfeil Zwischen
[ ]" wirdgleich
beiPatar1996bzw.Ms. 342Rangegeben.

18:08:20 PM

78

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

-+ [2: 16-97inIVohuius]
a) [1: 15-75-16-96:
Oportetautem.Hicvult. . . declarabuntur
17-77:Quod autem circumfertur.
Probatconclusionem
... dictumfuitprius].
Im Ms. 342RnachderReihenfolge
Umstellung:
[2: f.221vb] [1: f.221va]
-* [2: 44-59-69:
Si igitur. . . infert
Sed tarnenet quaeb) [1: 43-54-58:
conclusionem]
. . . aliquidixerunt].
ImMs.342RnachderReihenfolge
cumque.Hicremovet
Umstellung:
-[1: f.224rb]
[2: f.224rb]
-[2: 78-30-40:
77-23-78-29
: Similiterautem... priusarguebatur]
Sed non in
c) [1:
-[3: 78-41-79-66:
quo. Hic. . . priusarguebatur]
Quoniamautem. . . semper
esse]~*
. . . sicutdicebatur].
Im Ms.
[4: 79-67:Necesse negationes.Proponit
Umstellung:
-+ [4: 2291*]
-> [1: 229rb]
-[2: 229rb]
342RnachderReihenfolge
[3: 2291*]
-* [2: 103101-79-103-55:
Causa
autem
ex
. . . quamcircularis]
d) [1:
ipsis.Prosequitur
56-67:Propterquid igitur.Secunda
... estperpetum].
Im
Umstellung: Ms. 342R
-*
nachderReihenfolge
[2: f.232rb]
[1: f.232i*]
De motuautemipisius.Istudsextum
. . . circumscriptis
e) [1: 1l4-38-'15-47:
essereguSi enimirregulariter.
Hicvultprobare
. . . magisquamalibi].
laris]-[2: 15-48-71:
Im Ms. 342R nachderReihenfolge
Der
Umstellung:
[2: f. 2341*]-* [1: f. 234rb].
zweiteParagraph
machtsomitdas Endedesfnften
aus
Kapitels
-+ [2: 151-56-152-2:
Nos autemdicamus.Istud. . . polosmundi]
f) [1: 151-78-85:
Quod
autemimpossibile.Prosequitur
... moverei
Im Ms. 342Rnach
earn].Umstellung:
-[1: f.239vb]
derReihenfolge
[2: f.239V3]
Nach meinerberprfunganhand des aristotelischen
lateinischenTextes
ist die Reihenfolgeder Paragraphenim Text von Patar richtigund im
Ms. 342R unzutreffend.
Im Ms. 342R gibt es auerdem viele Lesarten,die in den Text nicht
aufzunehmensind und nur in dem kritischen
Apparat vermerktwerden
mten(wie z.B. 34-23: capiatur]causatur).Doch sind an einigenStellen
die Variantenvon Ms. 342R nher zu bercksichtigen,
denn sie bieten
meiner Meinung nach einen besserenText. Als Beispiele hiervonkann
man die folgendenerwhnen:
9-18:quasi]quia(2211*)
40-72:eorum]
corpus
(2241*)
128-6:in sono]in celis(2361*)
An anderen Stellen ist der Text von Patar verbesserungsbedrftig,
und
zwar teilweiseunabhngigvon Ms. 342R. Hierbei sind zwei Beispielezu
die jeweils die Anknpfung
an den aristotelischen
errtern,
Text und seine
Auslegungbetreffen:
et impotentiae]
et impossibile
(a) 72-77:potentiae
possibile
(228rb):
Am Anfangdes zweiten Kapitels vom erstenBuch legt Aristotelesdas
der Vergnglichkeit
bzw. Unvergnglichkeit
der Welt
Untersuchungsthema
fest88
linke
(Tabelle,
Spalte, Stelle 1). Wie man darberhinaus in Patars
88De caeloII, 2 280 b 1.

18:08:20 PM

79

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

Editionund in Ms. 342R sehen kann (Tabelle, zentraleund linkeSpalte,


die Analyse
nach Buridansexpositio
Stelle 1),mu eine solcheUntersuchung
mit einbeziehen.89
et impotentia
der Terminipotentia
In der zweitenStellejedoch, die an die ersteanknpft(und von daher
Anla zu Miverstndnissen
geben kann),legtAristotelesdie Behandlung
fest.Dies wird
et impossibile)
von Mglichemund Unmglichem( possibile
irrtmlich
wird
aber
es
in
Ms.
aus
Buridans
deutlich
342R,
expositio
ganz
Patar
von der Editionvon
etimpotentia
als potentia
wiedergegeben(vgl. alle
drei Spalten zur Stelle 2).
Buridan:
De caelo
Aristoteles:
(Ms.342R)
(ed.Patar) Buridan:
Expositio
Expositio
(i)
(i)
m
zu dieserStelle
zu dieserStelle
expositio
II, 2, 280bl et sq.
expositio
est
Istud
autem.Istudest
autem.
Primm
Primm
autem
determinatis,
His
huius capitulum
secundum
in- capitulum
dicamus
[
posthaecutrum
-*
Et estde distincetutrumtractatus.
autgenitus,
]
Auslassung
genitus
et
et
distinctione
de
tione
aut
generabilis
corruptibi- generabilisingeneraincorruptibilis
et
et incor- ingenerabilis,
lissitmundus,
bilis,corruptibilis
corruptibilis
pertranseunEtprimo
disEtprimo
aliorum
tesprius
distinguit
incorruptibilis.
ruptibilis.
suspiciones"
istanomina;
De celo
secundo,
secundo,
, in: dictanomina;
quia tinguit
(Aristoteles,
sunt
ThomasvonAquin,Operailla nominaacceptasunta quiaistanomina
accepta
etimpotentiis,
et impotentiis,
Omnia
ipse
89, potentiis
ipse a potentiis
III, Ed. Leonina,
sunt
suntdocet
determinande
determinandae
docet
Text.Arist.
quomodo
quomodo
101)
et impotentie
etimpotentiae
(Ms.
(Ed.Patar potentie
potentine
die Kursivie-BuenosAires,BN, 342R
1996,69-98-3;
vonmir). 227vb).
stammen
rungen
(2)
(2)
)
zu dieserStelle
zu dieserStelle
expositio
II, 2, 281a 1 et sq.
expositio
Si itaquehaecsichaberent,Itaque si hoc. Hic vult Itaque similiter.Hic vult
determinandocerequomododetermiconsiderandum
quomodo
quomodo docere
etimposetimpotennandesuntpossibile
. dae suntpotentiae
etimpossibile
dieimus
possibile
...
sibile.
Et primoproponit
. . . tiae.Et primo
enimdictum
proponit
Propriissime
BN342R,
ibidem
Aires,
(Ms.Buenos
, S. (Ed.Patar1996,12-71).
(Aristoteles,
op.rit.,
228rb).
100,Text.Arist.
115).90
b (224vb).
b z] add.ad totum
(b) 42-33:postpartis
. . . (224vb).
a. Et iterum
. . .] ad ad totum
et iterum
42-34:ipsiusad ad totum,
89ZurProblematik
vonBuridan
orientierten
dersprachphilosophisch
Naturphilosophie
Studievon
siehedie hervorragende
derMathematik
aufseineAuffassung
im Hinblick
1985
Thijssen (b).
90An dieserStelleistauchderKommentar
vonThomasvonAquinsehrdeutlich:
et
et ingenitum,
dicitur
modis
ostendit
corruptible
genitum
quot
Philosophus
Postquam
et impossibile
huiusquoddicitur
hicexponit
(...).
possibile
significationem
incorruptibile,
etimposdicatur
considerare
duofacit
Circaprimm
aliquid
possibile
quomodo
(. . .) oportet
"
vonAquin1886,100).
sibile
(Thomas

18:08:20 PM

80

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Die Auslassungvon ad totum


an der Stelle 42-33 in der Edition
macht einen ziemlicheinfachenGedanken unverstndlich.
Er wird noch
dunklerdurchdie zusztlicheAuslassungdes Buchstabens" frdas totum
.
Es geht kurz gesagtum Folgendes:im Einklangmit der aristotelischen
Argumentationfr die rumlicheEndlichkeitder Welt mu man nach
BuridansRekonstruktion
eine Reihe von conclusiones
beweisen,von denen
die fnfte,
die uns hierbeschftigt,
lautet:impossibile
estfinitum
pativelmoved
ab infinito
.91Das Argumentverluftetwa so:
a = movens
; ad = (endlicher)Teil von a
infinitum
=
b mobile
finitum; bz = (endlicher)Teil von b (d.h. < b)
=
g
tempus
Die Termini in dieser Weise definiert,
und das Gegenteilvon dem, was
man beweisen will, vorausgesetzt(d.h. angenommen,da finitum
pati vel
moveri
ab infinito
possibileest)sucht man jetzt das Absurdum,da Unvergleichbares(nmlich Unendliches mit Endlichem)verglichenwird, was
keine Proportionbildet. Sodann bewegt das movens
a das mobile
infinitum
in
b
der
Zeit
Wenn
das
finitum
stimmt,dann bewegt ein Teil ad von
g.
ihm (und jetzt haben wir ein movens
finitum
) in derselbenZeit zwar nicht
den ganzen mobilen , sondern nur einen Teil bz von ihm, der auch
endlich und natrlichkleinerals b ist. Nun also- und das ist der springende Punkt genauso, wie die Proportionvon bz zu b steht,so steht
auch die Proportionvon ad zu a. Aber dies kann nicht sein, denn fr
bz: b - ad: a bildetsich an der linkenSeite ein Verhltniszwischenendlichen Gliedern(d.h. bz und b sind beidefinita
), das legitimals Proportion
werden
aber
an
der
rechtenSeite ist der Zhler etwas
kann;
angesehen
Endliches (ad), whrend der Nenner hingegenetwas Unendliches(a) ist,
was keine Proportionausmacht. Soweit der Gedankengangder aristotelischenStelle (275 a 14) in der AuslegungBuridans.
Dieser Sachverhaltwirdin PatarsText nichtwiedergegeben
und scheint,
auch mit Hilfe der Variantenin dem kritischen
Apparat nichtrekonstruierbar zu sein. Ms. 342R hingegenliefertdie entsprechendeStelle eindeutigrichtig:
Buridan:
decaelo(Ed. Patar)
Buridan:
decaelo(Ms.342R)
Expositio
Expositio
Sed adhucneque.Hicprobat
istam
conclusioquin- Adhucneque probatquintam
tamconclusionem,
scilicet
estfinitum
quodimpossibilenem,scilicet
quod impossibile
estfinitum
ab infinito.
ab infinito.
pativelmoveri
Quia pativelmoveri
Quia ponamus
91Patar1996,42-28-29.

18:08:20 PM

81

EL LIBROENGADENADO"

infinitum
etb sitmobile
et b quoda sitmovens
infinitum
quoda sitmovens
ponamus
in quo movetur.
et g sittempus
inquo move- finitum
et tempus
sitmobile
finitum,
moventis
moventisTunccapiamus
tursitg; tunccapiamus
quevocepartem
partem
in eodemtempore
in eodem turad et istamovebit
ad et illamovebit
quae vocetur
sitbz.
et illudminus
mobile
mobile minus
etilludminus
minus
mobile
tempore
sitbz.
estproportio
bzadtotum
Tunc
b,
bz,talisest Tunc
proportio
partis
igitur
qualis
partis
qualis
ergo
a. Et iterum
ad ad totum
talisestproportio
adadtotum
,. . .
, etiterwn,
proportio
ipsius
hocestimpossibile,
hocestimpossibile,
ut prius,
quiaex una
quia ex una utprius,
finita
ad
scilicet
ad parteestcertaproportio,
finiti
scilicet
parteestcertaproportio,
et ex aliapartenonestproporet ex aliapartenonestproportio,finitum,92
finitum,
infietalterum
infinitumtio,quiaunumestfinitum
etalterum
quiaunumestfinitum
zuPatarschrieb nitum
ImUnterschied
(Ms.342R224v*b).
(42-28-43-37.
ichadundbzzusammen.)
Die hier betrachtetenStellen sind nur einige Beispiele von den vielen
Unterschieden,die Ms. 342R im Vergleichzur Edition von Patar aufweist.Es handeltsich jedoch um Unterschiede,die immerim Rahmen
des von Patar ediertenTextes bleibenund schwerlichals Beleg einerweiterenFassung angenommenwerdenknnen.
von Buridan zu De caeloein
Ms. 342R ist also bezglichder expositio
aber angesichtsder geringenAnzahl von Handzwar unvollstndiger
schriftenwertvollerZeuge, ber den man hier nur ganz knapp berichten kann, der aber weitereStudienverdient.93
4. Schlubemerkungen
Ms. Buenos Aires,BibliotecaNacional 342R (El encadenado") ist durchAristotelesaus ein zu bercksichtigender
Zeuge frsechs der wichtigsten
Text
einzelnen
kommentaredes Jean Buridan. Ich hoffe,dies bei jedem
nach dem heutigenForschungsstand
gezeigtzu haben.
" nicht
Aristoteles-americanus
der
ist, ist es

vollstndigerforscht
Solange
mit einer
noch sehrschwereinzuschtzen,wievieleandere Handschriften
werBibliotheken
aufbewahrt
Bedeutungwie diese in lateinamerikanischen
den. Ich kenne keine andere.94

92finitum]
con.exMs.infinitum.
93Die Stelle,die nachPatar(1996,20*-9*)
Geschichte
des Esels
frdie berhmte
sichauchin Ms. 342R,f.239^-239^.
seinsoll,befindet
entscheidend
Buridans
94EinesehrguteForschungsbasis
TexteverRedmond
liefert
1972,derehersptere
enthlt.
berBuridan
keinen
undbrigens
zeichnet
Eintrag

18:08:20 PM

82

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Um mgliche Miverstndnissezu vermeiden,sei festgehalten,da


Ms. 342R fast alle der wichtigstenund nur naturphilosophische
Texte
vonJean Buridan,d.h. keine moralphilosophischen
oder logischenTexte,
enthlt.95
und Textberlieferung
sei schlieBezglichBuridansIdeenverbreitung
lich die folgendeBemerkungerlaubt:Es ist eine bekannteTatsache, da
die europischeintellektuelle
Elite in der frhenNeuzeit ihrenAristoteles
in el Nuevo Mundo" mitgebracht
und ihn unmittelbar
frihreInteressen
eingesetzthat. Nicht nur im Bereich der politischenund sozialen Ideen
sondernauch in der Logik und in der Naturphilosophie.96
Von daher ist
es durchaus denkbar- und einer umfassendenForschungwrdig- , da
zusammen mit dem Empfangsptscholastischer
Aristoteles-Kommentare
auch irgendwelcheburidanischenIdeen und vor allem Texte, die uns
immer noch verborgensind, mit angekommenwren. Doch damit hat
Ms. 342R nichtszu tun. Das Schicksalvon El libro encadenado" hat
eher politische"bzw. persnliche"Hintergrnde;seine unmittelbare
Geschichtehngtmehrmitdem Peronismo"als mitdem Buridanismus"
zusammen (da Pern sich mit der Impetustheorie
befathat, dies steht
nicht fest).
Mnchen
95Michael
daeinervonden280Buridan-Codices
imKriegzerstrt
(I, 307)berichtet,
wurdeundeinanderer
verloren
ist".AndieserStellegibterkeineweiteseitlngerem
renInformationen
an. DerimKriegzerstrte
CodexistLouvain,
Universiteitsbibliotheek,
G 106(dazuMichaelII, 585).Derverschollene
Codexmueinersein,dereinederfrhesten
Schriften
Buridans
enthalten
habensoll,nmlich
diedeter(polemische"
Schriften)
"
minati
bzw.'tractatus'
dediversitate
adspeciem
generis
II, 425).Ms.342Rkann
(sieheMichael
kaumderzweite
Codexsein,es seidenn,mannhmean,da dieseTexte
(verschollene)
unter
denab demf.239verlorenen
Blttern
vorhanden
wren(wasicheherausgewesen
schlieen
wrde).
96Als
hiervon
kannmanAlonsode la Veracruz
der
Beispiel
erwhnen,
(1504/7-1584)
eineRecognitio
summularum
cumtextu
Petri
etAristotelis
Hispani
(Mxico1
1554),eineDialctica
resolutio
cumtextu
Aristotelis
1557und
(Mxico1
1554)undeinePhysica
speculatio
(Mxico1
Salamanca
NachCastros
kurzem
Bericht
1562,1569,1573)verfate.
(1997)solldiePhysica
immer
, inderA. de la Veracruz
siehedarber
speculatio
(auchwennnicht
verstndnisvoll;
demberhmten
Dominikaner
Wallace,
de Soto(14951969,231)seinem
Lehrer,
Domingo
Standardstoff
De caelo,
will,dendamalsnaturphilosophischen
1560),treubleiben
{Physica,
Degeneratone
etcorruptione,
undDe anima
zumTractatus
; dazumiteinemAnhang
Meteorologica
desphaera
vonSacrobosco)
zusammenfassend
undetwaden Studiengang
der
abgedeckt
in Michoacnwiedergegeben
die Studiengnge
der
Augustiner
haben,derwiederum
Universitten
ParisundAlcalwiederspiegelte.
Den besten
fr
damaligen
Ausgangspunkt
weitere
zu A. de la Veracruz
miteinerumfangreichen
undweiForschungen
Bibliographie
terenbiographischen
bildetLohr1988(179)undLohr1977(711-2)(inbeiden
Angaben
Fllenunter
demNamenGutierrez
a VeraCruce,Alphonsus,
O.E.S.A.").

18:08:20 PM

83

EL LIBROENCADENADO"
Literatur

a Oresmee
Le Quaestione
de sensu"attribuite
Alberto
di Sassonia
, Firenze 1983
Latinus.Codices descripsitG. LaAristoteles
Aristoteles1939
combe, Pars Prior,Roma 1939
De caeloet mundo
Aristoteles1886
(bers.G. von Moerbecke),
siehe Thomas von Aquin 1886
Manuscrits scientifiquesmdivaux de la
Beaujouan, G. 1968
cathdralede Sgovie",in: ActesduXle Congrs
d'histoire
des sciences
international
, 24-31 aot
vol.
15-8
Varsovie
1968,
3,
1965,
Booksin Chainsand otherbibliographical
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Blades, W. 1892
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Braakhuis,H. A. G. 1997 JohnBuridanand the 'Parisian School' on
the Possibilityof Returningas Numerically
the Same. A Note on a Chapter in the Historyof the Relationshipbetween Faith and
Natural Science", in: S. Caroti/P. Souffrin
,
(Hrgs.), La NouvellePhysiquedu XIVe Sicle
Firenze 1997, 111-40
Braakhuis,H. A. G. 1999 Scientific
Reality.
Knowledgeand Contingent
and
(Natural)
SupKnowledge,Signification
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in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen/
toneetcorruptione",
H. A. G. Braakhuis(Hrgs.), The Commentary
on Aristotle's
Tradition
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Medieval
,
, and EarlyModern
,
ruptione.
Turnhout 1999, 131-61
Buridan,Johannes
super
Physica(ultimalectura)[= e]: Quaestiones
octoPhysicorum
libros
Aristotelis
(Hrsg.v. J. Dullaert Gandavus/Denisse Roce), Paris 1509
am Main 1969]
[ND: Frankfurt
III , 14-19: sieheThijssen,
Buridan,Johannes
(iultima
lectura)
Physica
M.
H.
M.
1991
J.
etquaestiones
deprimalectura
De anima(expositio
Buridan,Johannes
):
B.
1991
siehe Patar,
etdecisiones
De anima[= Lockert
Buridan,Johannes
phyJ: Questiones
sicales. . . Paris 1516 (siehe unten ParvanatuNeue Edition:Patar,B. 1991 (495-695)
ralic).
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18:08:20 PM

84

DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA

Parva naturalia[= Lockert


et decisiones
?]: Questiones
virorum
: Albertide Saxonia. . .
physicalesinsignium
Thimonis
. . . Buridaniin treslibrosde anima
, librum
De sensuet sensato,librum
De memoria
et reminiscenDe somnoetvigilia,librum
De longitudine
et
tia,librum
brevitate
librum
De
et
senectute
.
.
.
vitae,
juventute
.
.
.
Lockert
Scoti
.
.
Recognitae magisti
., Paris
Georgii
1516. WeitereAngaben bei E. Farai 1946, 26-7.
(Exemplar von Mnchen, BayerischeStaatsbibliothekA. gr. b. 325)
De caelo{quaestiones):
siehe Moody, E. 1942
Buridan,Johannes
De caelo(expositio
etquaestiones
Buridan,Johannes
): siehe Patar,B. 1986
siehe Oresme, Nicole
Caroti, S. 1996
Natural
Castro, S. 1997
Alonsode la Veracruzas an Aristotelian
Philosopher",in: D. A. Di Liscia/ E. Kessler/
Ch. Methuen (Hrsg.),Methodand Orderin RenaissancePhilosophy
of Nature.The Aristotle
Commentary
Tradition
Aldershot
u.a. 1997, 177-82
,
Cutolo, V.O. 1968-85 NuevoDiccionario
Biogrfico
Argentino
(1750-1930), 1
Bde, Buenos Aires 1968-85
Farai, E. 1946
,Jean Buridan: Notes sur les manuscrits,les ditionset le contenude ses oeuvres",in:Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
duMoyen
, 21 (1946), 1-53
Age,
Lockertj
siehe oben Buridan,De anima
siehe
oben Buridan,Parvanaturalia
Lockert2
Ch.H.
1970
Commentaries.
Authors:
Lohr,
Medieval Latin Aristotle
, 26 (1970),
Jacobus-JohannesJuff",in: Traditio
135-216
Commentaries.
Addenda
Lohr, Ch.H. 1972
MedievalLatinAristotle
et corrigenda",in: Bulletinde philosophie
mdivale
,
14 (1972), 116-26
Commentaries:
Authors
Lohr, Ch.H. 1977
RenaissanceLatinAristotle
in:
Renaissance
30
681-741
G-K",
,
Quarterly
(1977),
Latin Aristotle
Commentaries
II: Renaissance
Authors
Lohr, Ch.H. 1988
,
Firenze 1988
Aristotelica
Helvetica.Catalogascodicumlatinorum
in
Lohr, Ch.H. 1994
bibliothecis
Heheticae
asservatorum
Confederationis
quibus
versiones
Aristotelis
continentur
,
expositionesque
operum
1994
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undNaturwissenschaft
vonScholastik
An derGrenze
,
Roma2 1952
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przedkopernikaMarkowski,M. 1971
Burydanizm
u.a. 1971
Wroclaw
skim
,
medii
aeriinAristotelem
commmtariorum
Markowski,M./
Repertorium
Cracoviae
in
Bibliotheca
Latinorum
S.
1974
Iagellonica
quae
Wlodek,
u.a.
1974
Wroclaw
asservantur
,
siehe Michael, B. 1985
Michael I; Michael II
Buridan:Studien
zu snmLeben,seiMichael, B. 1985
Johannes
im
seinerTheorien
undzurRezeption
nenWerken
Mittelalters
des
(Inauguralspten
Europa
zur Erlangungdes Grades eines
Dissertation
Doktors der Philosohie des Fachbereichs
der Freien UniGeschichtswissenschaften
seineWerke
versittBerlin),Teil I: DerAutor,
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seinPublikum
(S. 79-404), Teil II: Johannes
undQuellenBuridan:
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1985
Berlin
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kritik
(S. 407-940),
libris
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Moody, E. A. 1942
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Quaestiones
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Palacz, R. 1971
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Journal
forthe
, 4 (1969), 221-32
History
of Science

18:08:20 PM

MexicanLogic
in 16th-Centuiy
Inference
Quantified
WALTERREDMOND

of inference,
dealtwiththecomplexities
As Scholasticthinkers
theystretched
sentencepattern.I describehere the
the limitsof theirsubject-predicate
whose
sentences
of
go beyond thispatternin a logic
analysis arguments
summutextbookpublishedin Mexico and Spain from1554, the Recognitio
1
He
and
his
la
Cruz
de
Vera
larumby FriarAlonso Gutirrez
(1504-84).
colleaguestook an extensionalapproach to logic in which the relationof
identity
played a centralrole. I will use a speciallydesignedsymboliclanto
illustratethis systemand compare it with present-daylogical
guage
procedures.2
Afterreviewinga fewof Alonso's ideas on the natureof argument(1),
I introducethe extensionalsymbolismand show how inferencemay be
developed on the basis of the identityrelation(2). Then I analyze two
pattern:argumentscontypesof inferencebeyond the subject-predicate
in
those
i.e.,
terms,
appearing Latin cases other than
taining"oblique"
the nominative(3), and argumentscontainingover threeterms(4). Lastly
I brieflycommenton the semanticsof oblique sentences(5) and add a
is appended.
fewwordson simplifying
logic(6). A listoflogicalabbreviations

1 Syllogistics,
ch.1 and14;I citepageandcolumn
(AorB) oftheSalamanca
especially
Alonsowrotea secondworkon logic,the
of 1573,pp. 94-121,in 20 chapters.
edition
Resolutio.
Dialctica
2 ForScholastic
SenExtensional
extensional
ofGeneral
Interpretation
logicsee Redmond,
ofMexico)13,n. 39 (December
inSixteenth-Century
tences
, in:Crtica
University
(National
Logic
4
andLa logica
dela existencia
divididas
delasunidades
, chapters
1981),45-73;id.,La lgica
Mxico
de
la
Vera
M.
en
Alonso
realidad
and5 in:Pensamiento
Cruz
Beuchot,
(with
Fray
y
Mexican
and16th-Centwy
, in:Crtica,
22,n. 65 (August
1990),23Logic
1987);id Relations
in:
n.
43
in
id.
Modal
31-50;
Crtica,
Mexico,
15,
j
1983),
(April
41);
Logic Sixteenth-Century
dela Vera
defray
Alonso
enla lgica
Cruzand'Reglas
id.,Relaciones
y condicioy unidades
complejas
dela argumenta3 and4 in:La teora
elmarco
nes':
Alonso
, chapters
sujeto-predicado
fray
superando
Alonso
ontheLogic
Mexico1965),andid.,Friar
M. Beuchot,
colonial
cinenelMxico
(with
in:Vivarium,
32 (1994),227-60.
ofGod,
Vivarium
39,1

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001

18:08:35 PM

88

WALTER
REDMOND

1. SomeBasic Points
1. 1 Non-syllogistic
Arguments
The type of argumentationI will examine here involvesquantification
(the conceptsof "all" and "some"), which the logiciansof the timedeveloped in the frameworkof the Aristoteliansyllogistic.However, in their
Alonso
argumentationtheorytheydid not limitthemselvesto syllogisms.
that
texts
explains (116B)
logic
treatsentential
as whenwe arguefrom
a conditional
and
usually
forms,
argument
itsantecedent
to itsconsequent.3
Today we speak of propositionalor sententiallogic, where inferenceis
based on rulesrelatedto the connectives"and," "or," "if' etc. (as in the
argumentin 1.3 below).
1.2 Formalism
At the beginningof his syllogistics,
Alonso distinguished
(95A) the validity of an argumentfromthe truthvalue of its sentences,i.e., fromthe
fact that its sentencesare true or false. Logic studies
theformal
wherein
thetruth
or falsehood
ofpremises
andconclusion
is
syllogism,
as longas proper
moodandfigure
aremaintained,
sincethesyllogism
disregarded,
is formally
validevenwhenitspremises
andconclusion
arefalse.4
and negation,says Alonso,and
Logic ignorescontent,but not affirmation
calls the followingsyllogism"true in formif not in content":
manis a donkey
every
horseis a man
every
therefore
horseis a donkey
every
He sees thisargumentas an entailmentwhere both the "antecedent"(he
means the conjunctionof premises)and the "consequent" (the conclusion) are false. The inferenceis logically sound since when both the
3 "Etiamsoient modi
in hypotheticis,
utsi quisargumentetur
a tota
poni
syllogizandi
"
condi
tionalicumpositione
antecedentis
ad positionem
us
consequents.Alonsorefers
ofsentential
theexample:
ifevery
manruns,
(117A)tohisowntreatment
inference,
giving
an animalruns/
a manruns/therefore:
an animalruns.
4 "Et hictractatus
de syllogismo
a veritate
velfalsitate
formali,
qui abstrahit
propositionum
etconclusionis,
fiatsyllogismus
dummodo
secundum
debitum
modum
etfiguram,
de forma
etiamsi
et conclusio
sintfalsae."
quiaestvalidus
praemissae

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED

89

antecedentand consequentare false,the implicationas a whole is true


(an implicationis falseonlyin case where the antecedentis true and the
consequentfalse).
1.3 Two TypesofModality
ruleshave two senses,saysAlonso (95B), and theycorGeneralsyllogistic
, quantification
Analytics
respondto two worksof Aristotle.In the Postenor
in the work
studied
in
"natural
matter"
since
the
be
understood,
may
the termsare necessarilylinked.For example, the sentence"a man has
sense knowledge,"since nothinglackingsense knowledgecan be human,
is inferentially
equivalentto "everyman has sense knowledge."But the
be expressed.
formallogic of the PriorAnalytics
requiresthatquantification
For when we say that a conclusionfollows"necessarily"fromthe premises,says Alonso (95B), we are speakingof the necessity"of the inference," not "of the consequent,"and
itmustalsobe truethatsomeandadmitted,
havebeensetforth
oncethepremises
is necessary.5
notthatthisthing
follows,
thing
And in his example,
ifonerunsonemoves,
necessarily,
the modal expressiondoes not apply to "one moves", but means:
thatonemovesis a sound.6
theinference
thatoneruns,
giventheantecedent
Today we would say: not DM, but [[[R > M] & R] > M]. This argument,of course, is not a syllogism,but involvesrules of propositional
logic.
2. Extensional
Logic
Identity
2.1 Symbolism
Scholasticsin Alonso's time distinguishedtwo types of termsfor individual things:proper names like "Peter" and "vague" termsor "wanderterms"like "this man"- referring,
say, to Peter. The lattercombine
a generalterm("man") witha demonstrative
("this,""that,"yon" . . .). I
will use lower case lettersas individualterms:forexample "p" forPeter
5 "... oportet
non
etiamsitverum
quodaliquidsequitur,
positisetconcessis,
praemissis
esse."
tarnen
dicitnecessarium
b "... quodposito
inbonaconsequents
antecedenti
quodmoveatur.
sequitur
quodcurrat,

18:08:35 PM

90

WALTERREDMOND

and "m" forman. Numericalsubscriptswill serveas demonstratives;


thus
the wanderterm"this man" is symbolizedas mji "man-number-one,"
Peter,say. Peter is called "this man" if and only if he has the property
of being a human being.
When we say "Peter is this man," the relationbetween the termsis
one of identity,the sense being that Peter is identicalto this man, or
thatPeter as it were has two names: "Peter" and "thisman." To express
this relationsymbolically,I simplyjoin the two terms:pmi. To negate
sentencesI use a slash; ifm2refersto, say, Paul, thenp/m2is true:"Peter
is not that man," referring
to Paul.
Scholasticsconsideredan identitysentencelike pmi, which has only
individualterms,as basic. To forma general sentencelike "Peter is a
(some) man" we need quantification.I use bracketsfor "a (at least one)
man," [m], and parenthesesfor "everyman," (m). Bracketsand parentheses then functionas particularand universalquantifiersrespectively.
Thus p[m] ("Peter is a man") and p/(m) ("Peter is not everyman") are
both true sentences.
The Scholastic logicians definedquantificationin termsof the complementaryoperations of "descent" and "ascent" (or "induction"). In
descent the general sentence is analyzed in terms of identitiesjoined
togetherby "or" (v):
1 I p[m]

hypothesis

2 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn

1 disjunctive
descent.

If Peter is a man, then he is eitherthis one or that one, etc. This type
of descentis called "disjunctive,"since the analysisis a disjunction.The
second step (read "Peter is man-number1 or he is man-number-2or . . .
he is man-number-n")is true even thoughpmj is the only true identity,
because if one disjunctis true,the disjunctionis true as a whole.
The converseoperationis disjunctiveascent:
1 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn

hypothesis

2 I p[m]

1 disjunctive
ascent.

Conjunctive descent and ascent have "and" (&) instead of "or." That
Peter is everyanimal (a) is false can easily be seen fromits analysis:
1 I p(a)

hypothesis

2 I pa, & pa2& ... & pan

1 conjunctive
descent,

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

91

for,assuming"a j" is a correctname of Peter,paj is the only true conjunct, and a conjunctionis falseunless all its conjunctsare true.Alonso
and his colleagues,by the way, discussedvarious ways of dealing with
the problemof indenumerablesets,where all the membersforwhatever
reason cannot be counted.
Scholasticlogiciansused thisprocedureto constructa general system
of predicatelogic. For example, the followingformalproof shows the
analysisof the universalstatement"everyman is an (some) animal." The
abbreviationsof the rules on the rightare explained in the appendix;
also I have simplifiedthe numberinghere and in otherproofs.
1 I (m)[a]
'
2 I inj [a] & m2[a]& ... & mn[a]
3 I m,[a]
4 I m2[a]
I ...
5 I mn[a]
v ... v m,ao
6 I m,a,v
v ... v m2ao
7 I m2a,v m2a2
I ...
v ... v mna
8 I mna,v mna2
v ... v m,a} &
9 I {m,a,v
v ... v m2ao}& ... &
I {m2a!v m2a2
v mna2
v ... v mna0}
I {mna,

h
1 cd
2 ce
2 ce
2 ce
3 dd
4 dd
5 dd
6,7,8ci

For generalvalidity,the descentand ascentprocessesmustbe begun from


theleft.It is easy to see thatthe normalsquare of oppositionis as follows:
manis an animal
every
(m)[a]
somemanis an animal
M [a]

no manis an (any)animal
(m)/(a)
somemanis notan animal
[m]/(a).

Accordingto Scholasticextensionalidentitylogic, then,generalsentences


can be reduced throughascent and descent operationsto conjunctions
and/or disjunctionsof identitiesof singularterms,and general sentences
are equivalentto these stringsof identities.Hence only thejuxtaposition
of two individualterms,as in pap is basic here and only it direcdyindicates the identity
such as p[a] and (m)[a],
relation;all othercombinations,
may be understoodon the basis of theirreductionto identities.

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

92

2.2 Deduction
By Identities
Let us see how the validityof quantifiedinferencecan be established
throughsuch reductionwithapplicationof an identityrule (the "i-rule"),
of identity,idenalso called Leibniz's law, the law of the indiscernibility
etc.:
elimination
(ie),
tity
1 I (pa
2 I a=b
'
3 I <pb

h
h
1,2i.

If "two" things(a and b) are identical,thenwhat is attributed(<p)to one


is attributedto the other.
We may understandthis identityapproach to argumentsin the followingway. As faras I know the Scholasticsdid not carryout such procedures,but in his treatiseon argumentshaving "divine terms"Alonso
did examineseveralanalysesanalogous to the rulesfortransitivity
of idenWe
formalize
and
ie.7
the
may
tity
simple syllogism
manis an animal
every
Peteris a man
therefore
Peteris an animal,
in this schematicproof:
1 I (m)[a]
2 I p[m]

h
h

3 I m,[a]& m2[a]& ... & mn[a]


4 I m,[a]
5 I m2[a]

1 cd
3 ce
3 ce

6
7
8

3 ce
2 dd
h (from
7)

I mn[a]
I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
I I pm,
i '
9 I I m,[a]
10 I I p[a]
I
111 I pm2
i '
12 I I m2[a]

4r
8,9i
h (from
7)
5r

7De modo
interminis
divinis
ch. 12,112A-115A;
see
, 1573(Salamanca
syllogizandi
edition),
Redmond
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 2).

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
13|
I p[a]
I ...
14 I I pmn
I '
15 I I mn[a]
16 I I p[a]
17 I p[a]

93

11,12i
h (from
7)
6r
14,15i
de.
7,8-10,11-13,14-16

Note thatthe key operationis the i-ruleapplied in steps 10, 13, and 16.
We need not applythe ascent/descent
rulesto the terma in the above
and
the
in a modernproof:
is
reflected
argument,
simplicity
1 I Ux[Mx> Ax]
2 I Mp
'
3 I Mp > Ap
4 I Ap

h
h
1 uqep/x
2,3mp.

3. ObliqueTerms
I will firstpresentAlonso's general approach to argumentscontaining
"oblique" terms(3.1) and then considerthe two special rules he gives
(3.2).8
3.1

General
Doctrine

3.10 A FirstExample
Here is an example of the genitivecase, Petri("of Peter," "Peter's"):
omnishominis
estasinus
Petrus
esthomo
ergo
Petriestasinus
(ofeveryman thereis a donkey e.g., to everyman therebelongsa don- / Peter is a man/ therefore:of Peter thereis a
key
donkey).9In this
the
middle
term
is
example, says Alonso,
oblique only in one premise
in
It
be
the
also
second
(the first). may
oblique
premise; likewise,the
major or the minorterm(those appearingwith the middle termin the
firstand second premiserespectively)
may be oblique.

8 Ch. 14(116A-117A).
9 Thetranslations
follow
orderoftheLatin.
the(artificial)
regular

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

94
3.11 Extensional
Analysis

To representoblique terms,we need the sign "91" to indicateany relation in thiscontext.Here we have the genitiverelation(e.g., ownership):
9lp: "what is Peter's." Notice the parallelismto the simple proofabove
(1.) whose termsare in the nominativecase.
1 I ft(m)[d]
2 I p[m]

h
h

& ftm2[d]
3 I 9ftm,[d]
& ... & ftmn[d]
4 I 9ftm,[d]
5 I ftm2[d]

1 cd
3 ce
3 ce

6 I mn[d]
7 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
8 I I pm,
i }
9 I I 9tm,[d]
10 I I %[d]
I
111 I pm2
i ^
12 I I JRm2[d]
13|
I 3tp[d]
14 I I pm
I '
15 I I 9ftmn[d]
16 I I 9ftp[d]
17 I 9ftp[d]

3 ce
2 dd
h (from
7)
4r
8,9i
h (from
7)
5r
11,12i
h (from
7)
6r
14,15i
de
7,8-10,11-13,14-16

A proofin currentlogic runs parallel to this argument(O: "owning"):


1 I Ux[Mx> Ey[Dy& Oxy]]
2 I Mp

h
h

3 |Mp > Ey[Dy& Opy]


4 |Ey[Dy& Opy]

1 uqe p/x
2,3mp

But since "Ey[Dy & Oxy]" need not be furtheranalyzed to reach the
conclusion,we can abbreviateit as "<px"and simplifythe proof in this
way:
1 I Ux[Mx> cpx]
2 I Mp

h
h

3 I Mp > <pp
4 I cpp

1 uqe p/x
2,3

18:08:35 PM

LOGIC
MEXICAN
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED

95

3.12 Relational
Interpretation
of
Within the extensionalcontext,we can give another interpretation
oblique termsas "complexive,multiple-sense"complex units (& is the
junctor"and").10The firstpremiseof the oblique syllogismin 3.11 would
be, as it were, "everyman and a donkeyare genitivelyrelated" and its
conclusion"Peter and a donkey are genitivelyrelated." The following
proofis like the preceding(and to the simple syllogismof 1.) with the
exceptionof the added step 3a (g: "the orderedpair whose components
are genitivelyrelated,"e.g., as owner and property):11
1 I [g]l(m)&[d]J
2 I p[m]
3
3a
4
5

I
I
I
I

& . . . & mn&[d]J


& m2&[d]
[g]|m,&[d]
& ... & [g]K&[d]J
& [g] [m2&[d]J
[gjLm,&[d]J
[g]m,&[d]J
[g][m2&[d]J

6 I [g]Lmn&[d]J
7 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
8 I I pm,
I '
9 I I [gjK&MJ
10 I I [g]lp&[d]J
I
111 I pm2
I '
12 I I [g]|m2&[d]J
13|
I [g]Lp&[d]J
14 I I pmn
I '
15 I I [g]K&[d]J
16 I I [g]lp&[d]J
17 I [g]lp&[d]J
3.2

h
h
1 cdu
3 dt
3a ce
3a ce
3a ce
2 dd
h
4r
8,9i
h
5r
11,12i
h
6r
14,15i
14-16de.
7,8-10,1
1-13,

Two Rules

3.20 NeedforRules
Note thatin the extensionalproofabove (3.11), 9 keeps the same posiAlonso mentions(116A)- a point that will be incortion throughout.12
poratedin the firstrule (3.21) thatifthe major or minortermis oblique
10See Redmond
1990(<
., above,n. 2),23,39.
op.cit
11Fortherulescduanddt,seeRedmond
1990(iop.cit
., above,n. 2),30.
12Muchas modalandother
seeRedmond
1983(op.cit.,
above,n. 2), 34.
operators;

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

96

and he gives this


in one premise,is must also be so in the conclusion,13
example:
esthominis
omnejumentum
omnisequusestjumentum
ergo
omnisequusesthominis
(everybeast of burden is of belongs to a man/ everyhorse is a beast
of burden/ therefore:everyhorse is of a man).
The argumentseems to followaccordingto ordinarysyllogisticrules:
1 I (b)9ft[m]
2 I (h)[b]
'
3 I (h)$t
[m]

h
h
1,2barbara.

But Alonso says (116B) that in order to gain correctinferencesin this


rules,we mustfoltypeof argument,besides observinggeneralsyllogistic
low two special rules.14
3.21

The FirstRule

The firstrules applies to


no matter
whatfigure
areaffirmative,
all moodswherebothpremises
theybelong
to.15
The essentialpoint is that a relation91 must occupy a certainposition
in the structureof the proof (and in the descent/ascentprocess).
Before givingthe rule, let us see one of Alonso's examples, the following syllogismwith an oblique middle term:
homoestanimal
quilibet
omnisequusesthominis
ergo:
omnisequusestanimalis
non. . omnisequiestanimal
(everyman is an animal/ everyhorse is of some man/ therefore:every
horse is of some animal- not: of everyhorse thereis some animal). The
argumentbelongs to this schema:
13"Si contingat
sicdebetponiin conclusione."
aliquam,
obliqueponiextremitatem
14"Ad recteconcludendum
attendenda
in istisvisintellectus
potiusquamad syllogisduaeregulae."
morum
tas,licetpossint
ponisaltem
regulas
supra
posi
15"In omnibus
affirmativa
ubiutraque
modisaffirmativis
est,cujusque
praemissarum
sitfigurae."

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (M)[J]
2 I (N)9t[M]

h
h

3 I (N)SR[J]

1,2barbara

97

The conclusionis not, as he says: 9l(N)[J].


The rule expressesa general requirementand distinguishes
two cases
whereit applies: (1) when a major or minorterm,and (2) when a middle term,is oblique in a premise(in the above example the middle term
is oblique in the second premise).
contains
anoblique
term
2 oftheschema
], theconclusion
[3] willalsoconifonepremise
[step
tainone,insuch
wisethat'
orminor
term
is oblique
ina premise
,
, itwillbesointheconclusion
[1] ifa major
term
is oblique
inonepremise
besuretheterm
["RM"in2]} wemust
[2] andifa middle
with
themiddle
term
when
thelatter
is nominative
"(M)"in1] is oblique
appearing
["J"with
intheconclusion
term
theterm
with
themiddle
when
thelat["dlj" in3], andthat
appearing
teris oblique
intheconclusion
["N"in2] is nominative
["N"in3].16
The rule is obviouslyverifiedof the above syllogism,and also of this
example:
hominis
estequus
cujuslibet
esthomo
Petrus
ergo:
Petriestequus
non... : Petrus
estequi
of Peter there
(of everyman thereis a horse/Peteris a man/ therefore:
is a horse- not: Peter is of a horse),givingthe schema:
1 I <K(M)[J]
2 I (N)[M]

h
h

3 I R(
N)[J]

1,2barbara

and the conclusionis not: (N)5t[J]. Alonso pointsout the mistakenposition of the oblique term,and adds
doesnotfollow
with"Petrus"
in thenominative
case.17
theconclusion
obviously

16"Si alterapraemissarum
estde obliquoet similiter
conclusio
erit,itaquodsi extreinobliquoinpraemissis,
eteritinconclusione.
Si tamenmedium
mitatum
aliquaponitur
in
in
ut
extremitas
cum
altera
observandum
obliquo,
ponatur
quaeponitur medioinrecto,
inconinconclusione
inobliquo,
etquaeponitur
cummedioinobliquoponatur
ponatur
clusione
in recto."
17"... manifestum
in rectononinferri."
estconclusionem

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

98

It is interesting
to compare this rule with a passage Alonso added (98B)
The argumentis
to later editionsin the contextof inferentialdefects.18
invalid,he says, "when the major or minortermsare mixed in the part
or the whole,19as in:
immediate
omnesecundum
sequitur
primum
immediate
secundum
omnetertium
sequitur
erg
omnetertium
immediate
sequitur
primum
(every2 immediatelyfollowsa 1/ every3 immediatelyfollowsa 2/ therefore:every3 immediatelyfollowsa 1). The problemis that only
intheminor
follows
a 1") isrepeated
a partofthemajorterm
premise,
("immediately
shouldrun:"every
3 is a 2".20
butthispremise
If we see the segment"a number that immediatelyfollowsthe number
n" as analogous to oblique termsftn),we have the argumentand its
schema:
I (2JR[1]
I (SjStpq
'
i mm

I (M)[J]
I (N)3t[M]
F
i <mu'.

To solve it, says Alonso, the minormustbecome "(3)[2]," and the result
is a logicallysound syllogismin barbara(with a false premise and conclusion):
I (M)[J]
I (N)[M]
'
I (NJMUL
which complieswith the firstpart of the above rule.21
3.22

The SecondRule

The second rule applies only to negativearguments.Beforepresentingit,


let us examine a negativesyllogismwith an oblique term.
18Ch. 2 and3, .97-8.
19"... estpermixtio
in partevelin toto."
extremitatum
20" . . . quoniam
majorextremitas,
quaeesthocimmediate
sequitur
primum,
replicatur
in minori,
sedminor
sicformetur:
omnetertium
estsecundum."
secundum
partem
21Note,however,
9ft
is simply
"follows"
thateveniftherelation
"immediate"),
(without
is invalid,
sincenoteveryrelation
is transitive
theargument,
without
another
premise,
doesnotentailUx[3x> <plx].
(Ux[2x> (plx]& Ux[3x> <p2x]

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

99

3.221 Negative
Arguments
Alonso gives (IIA) this example of a negativesyllogismwhose middle
termis oblique:
nullus
equusesthominis
omnis
asinusesthominis
igitur:
nullus
asinusestequus
(no horse is of any man/ everydonkeyis of a man/ therefore:no donkey is a horse):
1 I (h)/R(m)
2 I (d)ft[m]
'
3 I (d)/(h)

h
h
o.
1,2cesar

Its validityis easily seen ((pxis an abbreviationof Ey[My & Pyx]):


1 I Ux[Hx> <px]
2 I Ux[Dx> <px]
'
3 I X I I Dx
I
I '
4I
I I Dx > (px
5I
I I (px
6I
I I Hx > ~<px
7I
~Hx
II
8I
I Dx > ~Hx
9 I Ux[Dx> ~Hx]

h
h
h
2 r,uqe
3,4mp
1 r,uqe
5,6mt
3-7ii
3-8uqi.

Part of the extensionalproofwould run (A in steps 26 and 55 indicates


"the absurd" resultingfroma contradiction):
1 I (h)/3t(m)
2 I (cpM
'
3 I h,/9t(m)
& h2/9t(m)
& ... & h/31(m)
4 I h,/8(m)
5 I h2/St(m)
I ...
6 I h/9l(m)
7 I d,SW[m]
& d2H
[m]& ... & d.^[m
8 I d,9t[m]
9 I d29t[m]
I ...
10 I d3t[m]
11 I I [d][h]

h
h
1 cd
3 ce
3 ce
3 ce
2 cd
3 ce
3 ce
3 ce
h (negation
of56)22

22Redmond
1981(op.cilabove,n. 2),46-7.

18:08:35 PM

100

WALTER
REDMOND
I
12 I
13 I
I
14 I
15 I
I
16 I
17 I
I
18 I
I
19 I
20 I

'
I d,[h]v d2[h]v...vd[h]
I I d,[h]
I '
I I d,h,v d,h2v... v d,h"
I I I d,h,
I I '
I I I h,/3t(m)
I I I d,/9t(m)
I I
I I I d,h,
I I '
I I I h2/5R(m)
I I I d/9t(m)

21 I
I
22 I
23 I
24 I
25 I
26 I
I
27 I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

13 dd
h
4r
15,16i
h
5r
18,19i

I I d,hn
I I
I I hn/SR(m)
I I d"/9t(m)
I d,/9t(m)
I d,9t[m]
IA

I d2[h]
I

55 I I A
56 I (d)/(h)
3.222

11dd
h

6r
21,22i
de
14,15-17,18-20,21-23
8r
24,25ne

de
12,13-26,27-40,41-54
11-55ni

The Rule

The second rule also has two parts:


when
a syllogism
contains
a premise
with
a term
inthenominative
andanother
with
anoblique
term:
theoblique
term
is negative,
theconclusion
willabobenegative
and
[1] ifthe
premise
containing
willcontain
anoblique
termy
theoblique
term
is affirmative
andthat
theterm
in
[2] butifthepremise
containing
containing
theconclusion
thenominative
is negative,
willnothavethesame
form.23
Alonso illustratesthe firstpart of the rule with two syllogisms.The first:
nullius
animalis
estaeternitas
omnishomoestanimal
ergo
nullius
hominis
estaeternitas
23"Quandosyllogismus
sitex alterade rectoet alterade obliquo,si negativa
sitde
si veroaffirmativa
de obliquoet negativa
de recto,non
similiter;
obliquoet conclusio
similiter
concluditur."

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

101

(of no animal is there eternity/every man is an animal/ therefore:of


no man is thereeternity).Here the firstpremiseand the conclusionare
negativeand containan oblique term.In the second example (in thefestinomood) the oblique termappears in the dative case:
intellectus
nonestbruto
simiaestbrutum
ergo
simiaenonestintellectus
(thereis no understandingto a beast/ a monkeyis a beast/ therefore:
to a monkeythereis no understanding).
The second part of the rule aims at blockinginferencessuch as:
nullus
homoestbrutum
omnis
equusesthominis
ergo:
nullus
equusestbruti
(no man is a beast/ everyhorse is of a man/ therefore:no horse is of
a beast). The followinginterpretation
is indeed an invalid argument:
I Uy[My> -By]
I Ux[Hx> Ey[My& Oyx]]
'
I ...
I Ux[Hx> ~Ey[By& Oyx]].
The fact that a man differsfroma beast does not mean they cannot
have the same relationto something.Here the conclusioncould be false
(a mare may be "of" a stallion,etc.). The second example has the same
form(but containsa proper name, "God"):
nullus
homoestDeus
omnejumentum
esthominis
ergo:
nullum
estDei
jumentum
no beast is of God),
(no man is God/ everybeast is of a man/ therefore:
and it is invalid for the same basic reason. This parallel argumentis
invalid:
I Uy[My> y*g]
I Ux[Bx> Ey[My& Oyx]]
'
i ...
I Ux[Bx> ~Ey[y=g& Oyx]].

18:08:35 PM

102

WALTER
REDMOND

But, says Alonso, the same premisesyield this conclusion:


omnejumentum
estalicujus
quodnonestDeus
(everybeast is of somethingthat is not God). The followingproof,formalizingthisconclusionas Ux[Bx > Ey[y*g & Oyx]], shows he is right:
1 I Uy[My> y*g]
2 I Ux[Bx> Ey[My& Oyx]]
3 I X I I Bx
I
I '
4 I
I I Bx > Ey[My& Oyx]
5 I
II
Ey[My& Oyx]
6 I
I I y I My& Oyx
i
i i
'
7I
I I
I My
8 I
I Oyx
II
9 I
I I
I My> y*g
10 I
II
I y*g
111
I I
I y*g& Oyx
& Oyx]
12 I
II
I Ey[y*g
& Oyx]
13 I
II
Ey[y*g
14 I
& Oyx]
I Bx > Ey[y*g
& Oyx]]
15 I Ux[Bx> Ey[y*g

h
h
h
1r
3,4mp
h
6 ce
6 ce
1 r,uqe
7,9mp
10,8 ci
11 eqi
5m6-12eqe
1-13ii
1-14uqi

The conclusiondiffers
fromthatof the invalidsyllogismonlyin the position of the negationsign in the consequent(Ey[~(y=g) & Oyx] instead
of ~Ey[y=g & Oyx]).
Let us compare,using the extensionalsystem,the conclusions(b)/9ft(d)
In the forand (b)9i[-d] of the valid and invalid argumentsrespectively.
mer expression"d" is a general term for the divine and in the latter
- what the Scholasticscalled an "infinite"term
"-d" for the non-divine
(logicians today speak of the "complement"of D). We must allow the
equivalence ("inf"):
S./(T)<> S.-T.
(where S and T are termsand i the index).24An infinitetermmay be
considereda wandertermof any individualthat does not have the propertyin question.For example, Brunellus(withindex 7, let us say) would
not only be called b7 (yon beast of burden),a7 (yon animal), etc., but
also -d7 (yon non-divinething),since b7/(d),-t7(yon non-tree),etc.25
A part of the extensionalproofwould be as follows.Note thatthe only
24
andx a termsymbol.
with-Tx<> ~Tx, whereT es a predicate
Compare
25See
Redmond
1981(op.cit.
, above,n. 2),45-6.

18:08:35 PM

MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
QUANTIFIED
analysisof d is, let us say, dg:
1 I (m)/(d)
2 I (b)9ft
[m]
'
& m2/(d)
& ... & mn/(d)
3 I m,/(d)
4 I m,/(d)
5 I m-d,
& b89ft[m]
& ... & bjft[m]
6 I b7!ft[m]
7 I b79ft[m]
v ... v b79ftmn
8 I b^mj v b7im2
9 I I b7Hm,
i }
10 I I rrij-dj
111 I bjM-d,
v. . . v b.iH-d
v b.SR-d2
12 I I bjSR-d,
13 I I b,H[-d]
k I b79t[-d]
k+1 I b85R[-d]
k+2 I b SR[-d]
& ... & bm^[-d]
k+3 I b)R[-d]& baSR[-d]
k+4 I (b)SR[-d]

103

h
h
1 cd
3 ce
4 inf
2 cd
6 ce
7 dd
h (from
8)
5r
9,10i
11 di
12 da
8,9-13... de
... de
... de
ci
k,k+l,k+2
k+3ca

Alonso, as we saw, gives examples of oblique termsin cases other than


"for
the genitive.Here is anotherexample (116B) of the dative (homing
a man"):
convenit
omnihomini
spiritui
subjicere
appetitum
esthomo
juvenis
erg
subjicere
spiritui
appetitum
juveniconvenit
to subjectwants to spirit/a youthis a man/
(foreveryman it is fitting
to subjectwants to spirit).The followfora youthit is fitting
therefore:
,- to judge
ing argumenthas a term in the accusative case (homines
"human beings"):
Deus
omneshomines
judicabit
saeculisunthomines
potentes
ergo
Deus
judicabit
potentes
(all men God willjudge/ the powerfulof the world are men/ therefore:
the powerfulGod willjudge).26

26We can,ofcourse,
or as argueither
as simple
theseexamples
syllogisms
interpret
and
wantsto spirit"
s: "whatsubjects
Forexample,
is expressed.
where
a relation
ments

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

104
4. OverThreeTerms

The generalrule thata syllogismshould onlyhave threetermsand three


sentences,says Alonso (96B), is to be understoodof its
whicha syllogism
butit doesnotfollow
essential
cannotbe formed;
partswithout
thatit cannothavemoreterms
and sentences,
as longas theterms
are dulyarandthesentences
wellordered.27
ranged
It may be a concatenationof sentences(a sorites)or it may containsentences showingseveralpatternsmore complex than that of subject-predicate. Alonso gives (97A-B) four "conditions"for syllogisms,and all the
examples he gives to illustratethem have more than threeterms.Let us
considerfirstthese examples (4.1) and then the conditions(4.2).
4.1

ExamplesandAnalysis

4. 11 Laughing
andNeighing
Alonso gives two examples of argumentswith more than three terms.
The first(96B) has six:
omnishomoestrisibilis
et omnisequusesthinnibilis
Petrus
esthomoet Brunellus
estequus
ergo
Petrus
estrisibilis
et Brunellus
esthinnibilis
(everyman is capable of laughingand everyhorse of neighing/Peter is
a man and Brunellusis a horse/ therefore:Peter is capable of laughing
and Brunellusof neighing).
The argument,he says (96B), is "virtuallytwo syllogisms,"
and has the
darii:28pattern(in this analysisthe segments3-5 and 6-8):

91:"thatforwhichit is fitting
to be. . andf (and9ts):"thatto whichit is fitting
to
wantstospirit"
. . . willjudge",andj (anddig):"what
Also,g: "God"and"what
subject
Godwilljudge."
I (m)9t[s] I (m)[f] I (m)SRg | (m)[j]
I [j][m]
I LflM I (p)M
I (p)M
'
>
'
>
I um
I (p)%
I LP[s]
I (p)[j]27"...
expartibus
essentialibus.
fieri
Sedtarnen
Itaquesineillisnonpotest
syllogismus.
nonsequitur
ex hocquodnonpossit
habere
terminos
etplures
dumplures
propositiones,
modosintdebitedispositi
termini
et beneordinatae
propositiones."
28Thedarii
mood:(M)[J]/[N][M]/therefore:
term
issingular.
[N][J];heretheminor

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (m)[1]& (h)[n]
2 I p[m]& b[h]

h
h

3
4
5

1 ce
2 ce
3,4dani

6
7
8
9

I (m)[1]
I p[m]
I pP]
I
I (h)[n]
I b[h]
I b[n]
I
I pP] & b[n]

105

1 ce
2 ce
6,7darii
5,8ci.

Horses
4.12 Running
The second example,he says, basicallycontainsthreeterms:
hominis
albiequuscurrit
cujuslibet
Petrus
velPaulusesthomoalbus
ergo
PetrivelPauliequuscurrit
(of everywhiteman a horse runs/Peter or Paul is a whiteman/ therefore:of Peter or of Paul a horse runs).
4.121 ModernAnalysis
Let us firstsee how the argumentcan be analyzed in modernlogic. The
sentencescould be thus translated(u: "Paul"):
I Ux[[Mx& Wx]> Ey[Hy& Oxy& Ry]]
I [Mp & Wp]v [Mu & Wu]
I ...
I Ey[Hy& Opy& Ry]v Ey[Hy& Ouy& Ry]
But as the conjunctionMx & Wx and the bracketedconjunctionEy[Hy
& Oxy & Ry] vary only in x and its instantiationsp and u (cf. the
in 3.11), we can rewritethem respectivelyas (px (being a
simplification
whiteman) and 0x (being owner of a runninghorse),and we have this
proof:
> 0x]
1 I Ux[(px
2 I <ppv <pu
3
4
5

I <pp> 0p
I <pu> 0u
I I (pp
i I-

h
h
1 uqe p/x
1 uqe u/x
h (from
2)

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

106
6 I I cpp> 0p
7 I I 0p
8 I I 0p v 0u
I
9 I I (pu
i '
10 I I (pu> 0u
11 I I 0u
12 I I 0p v 0u
13 I 0p v 0u

3r
5,6mp
7 di
h (from
2)
1 uqe u/x
9,10mp
11,di
de
2,5-8,9-12

The second premise and the conclusion are molecular sentences (disjunctions),and the threetermsAlonso speaks of are <p,0 and x (plus the
instantiations
p and u).
4. 122

Extensional
Analysis

Presupposingthe doctrineon complex units (v and & are the junctors


"or" and "and"),29we can representthe argumentextensionallyin this
way:
I 9t([m&wJ)[[h&rJ]
I pvu[[m&wj]
'
I 9ftpvu[h&rJ]
Notice firstthatthe phrases "whiteman" and "runninghorse" are interpreted as "complexive,single-sense"complex units,and that theyfunction as wanderterms.Furthermore,the second premise consistsof two
complexunits,the firstdividedand the second complexive,and the analysis runs:
1 I pvu[|h&r|]
'
2 I p[[h&rj]v u[[h&rj]
v ... v p[h&rjj v ... v
3 I {p|h&rj,v p[h&r|2
v ... v uh&rjj
I {u[h&rj,v u[h&rj2

h
1 rp=
2 dd (2)

(step 3: Peter is thiswhiteman or thatwhiteman or . . . yon whiteman,


or Paul is thiswhite man or that white man or . . . yon white man).
Now, since for purposes of inferencewe need not analyze the units
[m&wj or [h&rj, which show no internalvariation,we replace them by
the symbols<p("both human and white")and
("runninghorse" here
29Redmond
1990(op.citabove,n. 2),24-5,
1987a(op.cit
., above,n. 2) andRedmond
ofc/d.
33; &/vinstead

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

107

not 0: "what owns a runninghorse"). Alonso says that the syllogismis


in simplified
in the dariimood, and when the argumentis rewritten
form,
it indeed appears as a variationof this mood (but the minor term is
dividedratherthan quantified):
i i
2 I pvu[<p]
3 I 3tpvu[>].
The identityproofruns:
1 i sR(<p)m
2 I pvu[p]

h
h

& 9t92M& ... &


3I
4I
5 I SK<p2[>F]

1 cd
3 ce
3 ce

6 I Mcp[T]
7 I p[(p]v u[(p]
8 I I p[<p]
I '
v . . . v p<pn
9|
I p<p,v p<p2
10 I I I pep,
i i '
11 I I I SP,m
12 I I I 9tPm
I I
13 I I I p<p,
I I '
14 I I I
15 I I I SRp[<]
16 I
I
17 I
18 I
19 I
20 I
I
21 I
I
22 I
23 I
I
24 I
25 I
I
26 I
I

I I p<p
I !
I I 5R<pm
I I 9tp[4<]
I StpfK)
I Mpm v Stuff]
I u[<p]
>
v ... v u<pn
I uq>,v u(|>2
I I u<p,
I '
I I 9t(p,[]
I I SRufP]
I
I I u(f>2
I '

3 ce
2 rp=
h (from
7)
8 dd
h (from
9)
4r
10,11i
h (from
9)
5r
13,14
h (from
9)
6r
16,17i
de
9,10-12,13-15,16-18
19di
h (from
7)
21 dd
h (from
22)
4r
23,24i
h (from
22)

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

108
27 I
28 I

I
I

I Sd<p2m
I Mum

29 I I I u<p
I I '
30 I I I SWq)nm
31 I I I StupK]
32 I I
33 I I
v 9tu[Y]
34 I SRpmv 5Hu[>P]
35 I SRpvupK]

5r
26,27i
h (from
22)
6r
29,30i
de
22,23-25,26-28,29-31
32 di
de
7,8-20,21-33
34 rp=

The argumentis a double syllogism,


because the second premiseand the
conclusionare virtualdisjunctionswhere each part (1, 8-19 and 1, 2132) resemblesthe argumentof 2.1. Also, the steps where the i-rule is
applied (10-12, etc.) can be compared to those of the proofin the normal dariipattern(to the right):
10 I p<p,
}
h 1
12 I SKpm
4.2

I NM
^
i M,[j]
I N,[J]i.

Conditions

At the end of the firstchapterAlonso- sketchily


lays down (97A)
themselves
ofthepremises
between
fortheduearrangement
four
conditions
required
to theconclusion.30
andin relation
The syllogismshe gives as examples consistof more than three terms,
and the "conditions"indeed seem to have the effectof extendingthe
rules developed for simple syllogismsto more complex cases.
4.21

FirstCondition

The firstconditionis:
unit
intheother
bea whole
term
should
themiddle
,31
premise
which, however,he does not seem to qualify.The premisesof the folarranged:
lowing argument,he claims, are incorrectly

30"Addebitam
taminterse quamin ordinead concludispositionem
praemissarum
suntrequisitae."
conditions
sionem,
quatuor
31"Medium
in alterapraemissarum.
debetessetotaleextremum

18:08:35 PM

INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

109

hominis
cujuslibet
equuscurrit
quilibet
hominis
equusquiescit
cujuslibet
ergo:
etquiescit
equuscurrit
(of everyman everyhorse runs/of everyman a horse rests/therefore:
a horse runs and rests),since (q symbolizes"rests")
theexpression
"ofevery
man"takenas themiddle
termis nota wholeunitin the
other
premise.32
In the case of more than two terms,the relationsign 9 has the effect
of joining the firsttwo terms,and the conclusioncontainsa "complexive, single-sense"unit:33
I (mXh)[r]
I NMM
I [h][lr&qj].
The premisesof the followingmodernproof,ifR and Q are inconsistent,
but the proof is valid (the firstpremisemust be
entail a contradiction,
added to expressthe existentialimport,tacitlyassumed by Alonso):
1 I ExMx
2 I Ux[Mx> Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]]
3 I Ux[Mx> Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]]

h
h
h

4 I X I Mx
i
'
5|
I Mx > Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]
6I
I Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]
7I
I Mx > Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]
8I
I Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]]
9|
I y I Hy& Oxy& Qy]]
i
i
'
10 I
I
I Hy& Oxy
111
I
I [Hy& Oxy]> Ry
12 I
I
I Ry
13|
I
I Hy& Ry& Qy
14 I
I
I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]
15 I
I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]
16 I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]

h
2 r,uqe
4,5mp
3 r,uqe
4,7mp
h
9 ce
6 r,uqe
10,11mp
10,12ce,ci
13 eqi
8,9-14eqe
1,4-15eqe

32"... lycujuslibet
in
hominis
promediononesttotaleextremum
quodassumitur
alterapraemissarum."
33Notetheorderconvention,
1981(<
Redmond
., above,n. 2), 51, 64-5;Alonso
op.cit
ofthesection
takesR andQ tobe inconsistent;
thelastexample
(97B)has:"twohorses:
seeRedmond
onerunsandtheotherdoesnot".Fortheconclusion
1990(op.riL,
above,
alsocouldbe expressed
as complex
unit.
n. 2); thepremises

18:08:35 PM

110

WALTER
REDMOND

In the extensionalargument,the segmentin the middle termaccompanying (m) is differentin each premise: "9 . . . (h)" and "91 . . . [h]."
Actually,the situationis complex; the combinationof quantifiersin the
segmentaffectedby the relation(3t) have will determinethe validityof
such arguments.34
On the otherhand, Alonso's second example,35in which the segment
"JR. . . [a]" does not vary:
animalestalbum
hominis
cujuslibet
hominis
animalestnigrum
ergo:
animalnigrum
estalbum
(of every man an animal is white/ of some man an animal is black/
therefore:a black animal is white),
I Sft(m)[a][w]
I [m][a][b]
I [[a&bj][w],
is an invalid argument,since the antecedent,Alonso explains,may be
true withoutthe conclusionbeing true,the case where each man has a
white animal and some man also has a black horse.36
4.22

SecondCondition

The second conditionis:


notenter
themiddle
term
theconclusion,
, as middle
, should
or
butitis notunfitting
when
itis asserted
tokeep
theampliation
accidentally,forexample
.37
restriction
Alonso approves of this argument:
Patergenerat
Paterestessentia
divina
ergo:
essentia
divinaestPaterqui generat
34Sevenforms
thepremises
contain
areinvalid
(where
[h]. . . /[h]. . . and/or[c]. . ./
ExHxandEyCy,mustbe expressed
existential
(3 times
import,
[c]. . .); in thevalidforms
each).
35"Instatur
hie.. . ."
36Ux[Hx> Ey[Ay& Pxy& Bx]]& Ex[Hx& Ey[Ay& Pxy& Nx]]doesnotentail
Ey[Ay& Ny& By].
37"Medium
tamennon
subratione
mediinonintret
de peraccidens
conclusionem,
utsi ponatur
ad servandam
aut
restrictionem."
inconvenit,
ampliationem

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED

111

(the Father begets (g)/ the Father is the divine Essence/ therefore:the
divine Essence is the Father Who begets),because, he says, if the middle term"Father" did not formpart of the conclusion,we mightdraw
the theologicallyincorrectconclusion
essentia
divinagenerat
(the divineEssence begets),and in thiscase the argumentwould have a
true antecedentand a false consequent.
the invalidargumentseems to followboth in present-day
Nevertheless,
and in extensionallogic (e: "divine Essence"):
1 I f[b]
2 I fe
'
3 I e[b] 1,2i

1 I Bf
2 I f=e
'
3| Be 1,2ie.

- the last
Alonso would accept- with some reservations
step of the followingproofas orthodox;it translates"the divine Essence is the Father
Who begets":
h
1 I Gp
h
2 I p=e
'
ia
3 I p=p
4 I p=e & p=p & Gp
1,2,3ci
4 eqi,
5 I Ex[x=e& x=p & Gx]
since he would admit- in some sense- thatthereis

somethingthatis the
divine Essence, is the Father,and begets. The Friar treatsthe complex
identityproblemsin a chapter on "divine terms,"where he worksout
ways of blockingheterodoxinferencesand allowingacceptable ones to
go through.38
Nonetheless,he adds that "it would not be right"forthe middle term
as in:
to enterthe conclusion"needlessly",39
omnis
homodisputt
Petrus
esthomo
ergo:
Petrus
esthomoqui disputt
Petrus
sed. . . solum:
disputt.

38See Redmond
1994(<
., above,n. 2).
op.cit
39
...
non
recte
concluderetur
necessitate
Absque

18:08:35 PM

112

WALTER
REDMOND

(everyman disputes/Peter is a man/ therefore:Peter is a man who disputes); he only would allow the conclusionthat Peter disputes.
It is hard to see why the firstconclusion("Peter is a man who disputes")is "not right."Is it falsebecause "who disputes,"like "Who begets,"
is a restrictive
clause "as middle"? That is, does he thinkit impliesthat
as the divineEssence,thoughbeingidenticalto the begettingFather,does
not beget,so it is possible thatPeter,being identicalto a disputingman,
does not dispute?In this case, we must examine the teachingof Alonso
and his colleagues on identitymore closely.
4.23

ThirdCondition

Before presentingthe third condition,let us studythe valid syllogisms


Alonso offersto explain its import.The firstexample illustratesthe first
part of the condition:
hominis
cujuslibet
equuscurrit
esthomo
Petrus
ergo:
Petriequuscurrit
(of everyman a horse runs/Peter is a man/ therefore:of Peter a horse
runs),and if we mark the termsas Alonso wishes,
1 I 9t(m)[h][r]
2 I p[m]

1 I *K(M)[h][J]
2 I N[M]

3 I 3tp[h][r]

3 I ttN[h][J],

we see thatthe segment"51 . . . [h]" does not vary.This simplicity


is reflectedin a modernversion(<pxrepresentsEy[Hy & Oxy & Ry]):
1 I Ux[Mx> <px]
2 I Mp
'
3 I Mp > <pp
4 I <pp

h
h
1 uqe
2,3mp

His second example, correspondingto the second part of the condition,


followsthe same pattern:
omnishomoestanimal
Brunellus
esthominis
equus
ergo:
Brunellus
estanimalis
equus
(every man is an animal/ Brunellus is of a man a horse/ therefore:
Brunellusis of an animal a horse).

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (m)[a]
2 I biH[m][h]
!>
3 I bffi[a][h]

113

1 I (M)[J]
2 I Nft[M][h]
I
3 I NSR[J][h]

Neitheris the segment"Sft. . . [h]" alteredhere, and its proof,where <p


represents[b=y & Hy], is also simple:
I Ux[Mx> Ax]
I Ey[0y& Ex[Mx& Oxy]]
'
I ...
I Ey[0y& Ex[Ax& Oxy]].
- somewhat
Here is a translation
rearranged of the thirdcondition:
tofirst
what
themiddle
term
inthemajor
1; i.e.,
[1- corresponds
affects
[step
example]
premise
thesegment
"H. . . [h]"]should
theminor
intheconclusion
term
3J,andthisterm
affect
[step
intheconclusion
should
inthemajor
belikethemiddle
term
["iftN[h]"]
["fR(M)[h]"],
premise
tothesecond
themiddle
term
intheminor
andwhat
[2 corresponds
example]
affects
premise
[step
"H. . . [h]"]should
beapplied
tothemajor
intheconclusion,
andthis
in
term
2; i.e.,the
segment
theconclusion
should
belikethemiddle
term
intheminor
.w
[h]"]
["fft[}][h]"]
[<{Ul[M]
premise
4.24 FourthCondition
The fourthconditionaffectsthe "wholeness"of the major and minor
terms.Alonso uses (97B) this invalid syllogismto show how the fourth
conditionis not fulfilled:
hominis
cujuslibet
equuscurrit
risibilis
equusnoncurrit
ergo:
risibile
nonesthomo
a horse
(of everyman a horse runs/ of somethingcapable-of-laughing
does not run/therefore:
of
a
is
not
somethingcapable laughing
man). It
be
thus:
might represented
1 I tt(m)[h][r]
2 I 9ftp][h]/(r)
'
3 I P]/(m)

1 I m(J)[h][M]
2 I m[N][h]/(M)
'
3 I [N]/(J).41

40"Id
ex partemediiinmajori
debetse tenere
ex parteminoris
extremquodse tenet
itatisin conclusione,
et quodse tenetex partemediiin minori
debetapplicalimajori
inconclusione,
extremitati
etdebetconcludi
minor
ineodemcasuquo sumitur
extremitas
in majori
medium
et majorextremitas
in eodemcasuquo statmedium
in minori."
41Ux[Hx>
Ey[Cy& Pxy& Ry]]& Ex[Lx& Ey[Cy& Pxy& ~Ry]]doesnotimply
Ex[Lx& ~Hx].

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

114
The conditionruns:

unless:
should
bewhole
inthe
as intheconclusion,
themajor
andminor
terms
units
both
premises
themiddle
term
tomaintain
oran addition
is added
accompanies
logical
propriety
something
with
thethird
themajor
andminor
terms
inkeeping
which
should
[intheconclusion]
affect
condition.42
are not whole in the premises
The major and minortermsof the syllogism
and the conclusion,apparentlybecause in the premisestheyinclude an
addition("91 . . . [h]") missingin the conclusion.Specifically,the segment
obviouslydoes not apply to the middle term,and Alonso explains the
defectin thisway:
ofthepremises
arethemajor["9^(J)[h]"]
andminor
ifthewholesubjects
[h]"]
["9t[N]
terms,
["[N]"and"(J)"],andiftheyare
theyarenotwholeunitsin theconclusion
arenotwhole
terms
inthepremises.43
theonlydeterminations
[intheconclusion],
they
He adds in the later editionthat the antecedentof the argumentis true
and the consequent false in the case where each man has two horses,
one that runs and the other that does not.
5. Semantics
examinethe semanticsof oblique terms,taking"semanNow I shallbriefly
tics" as the relationbetween termsin the sentenceand what theyrefer
to or signify.
A comparisonof steps 8 and 9 of the simplesyllogismin 2.2 and the
same steps of the oblique syllogismin 3.11 (the steps to which the i-rule
In the formerargument,step 8
is applied) revealsa semanticdifference.
is an identitywhereinthe two terms(p and m{) referto ("suppose for,"
as the Scholasticssaid) the same thing(Peter).Hence mj may replace p
in step 10. Supposing that the true disjunctof p[a] is pab the termsp
and aj both obviouslyreferto Peter.
Let us say that
The case of the oblique syllogism(3.11) is different.
the
true
of
9
and
true
is
the
9im1d5
disjunctof 10, and
disjunct
dtpd5
thatd5 refersto Platero,the donkeybelongingto Peter.Step
furthermore
in 9 can go through
8 is a simpleidentity(pni), and so the substitution
indices (1 and 5), the terms
to yield 9pd5 (9ip[d]). Despite the different
42"Extremitates
tamin praemissis
debentessetotaliaextrema,
quamin conclusione,
cummedioquod
velaliquidponatur
nisiidponatur
ad servandam
logicalem
proprietatem
in tertia
conditioned'
debeatapplicali
extremitatibus,
juxtapraedicta
M ... namsitotalia
mpraemissis
nonsunttotalia
sumantur
subjecta
proextremitatibus,
inpraemissis."
extrema
etsi solaedeterminationes,
nonsunttotalia
inconclusione,
extrema

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

115

of 9 and 10 (Slmj, d5, and 9lp) referonly to Platero (not to Peter and
Platero). Since Platero has the propertyD (donkey),he has the name
(wanderterm)d5, and since he has the relation 9 to "this man," mj
(Peter),he has the name Sim!. This lattername could be construedas
anotherwandertermor it may be taken as a proper name (or description):"the propertyof or thingowned by thisman," indicatingPeter.
The propername 9im! (or the correspondingwanderterm)would be of
a special type,since it containsa wanderterm(mj).
Let us also considerthe argumenthaving an infiniteterm (-d: "nondivine")in 3.222. The expressions"91[-d]" and "9t-d2"may likewisebe
takenas proper names of a special type since theycontain a quantified
term([-d]) or wanderterm(-d2).Note that the indices in step 11 "b79idi" obviouslydo not referto the same thing;b? refersto "yon beast of
burden"(Brunellus)and -di to "thisman" (mi). However,the unitsmaking up the sentence the wandertermb7 ("yon beast") and the proper
name 9t-d2("the propertyof this non-divineobject")- do referto the
same thing:Brunellus.So b79l-di may be read "yon beast of burden is
the propertyof thisman."
6. Simplifying
Logic
Friar Alonso workedwithina logical traditionlaunched by a group of
Spaniards associatedwith the Universityof Paris afterthe restorationof
the Nominalistsin 148 1.44Returningto Spain at the turnof the century,
These
theyand theirfollowerspublishedin the firstthirdof the century.45
humanists
for
the
were
soon
attacked
by
supposed extravagance
logicians
and barbarityof their "useless questions,"46and at mid centurylogic
and abridge
teachersthemselves,
among themAlonso, soughtto simplify
theircoursework.The friarsaid he regrettedhis own youthfuloverindulgence in "nonsense,"and in his textbookaimed to avoid the logical "labyrinth."47
This logical"goldenage," as he calledit,this"Saturniankingdom,"
he took withhim to America.48
44See W. Redmond,
inLatin
American
/TheColonial
,
Self-Consciousness
Philosophy
Experience
toappear.
45Vicente
hasta
MuozDelgado,
1600/
Notas
, Salamanca,
Lgica
hispano-portuguesa
bibliogrficas
1972.
46Thebestknown
wasJuanLuisVives,Inpseudo-dialectkosi
1520.
47
in istissinefructu.
Postexantlatos
"Expertus
loquor,et doleoannosconsumptos
nihilpotuiinvenire
extendens
manum
nisitempus
irrelabores,
conatus,
postjuventutis
essemus
... a Daedalilabyrintho
liberi"
mediabile,
deperditum.
(IIA).
48"Venerunt
veroSaturnia
revertuntur
ad sanammentem
Saeculum,
Regna,
jamAureum

18:08:35 PM

116

WALTER
REDMOND

He and other reformersharshlycriticizedprevious mastersfor burharmful"puzdening theirstudents's"tenderminds" with "counterfeit,


and loathe this "useful,
zles, causing them to drop out of the university
necessarysubject."49Who can read theirworks,he asks,
for
without
Whocanusetheminlogic?
After
them
carefully
studying
getting
angry?
evenyears,all youcan sayis: "Master,
we havetoiledthewhole
manymonths,
andgrasped
through
nothing.50
night
Logicians today, of course, may be intriguedby the "useless questions"
that Alonso cut fromhis syllabus,as forexample variationsin semantic
"c" and "d"
reference,dialogicallogic,and the use of complexquantifiers
"a"
and
But
what
is
so
did
is
the
(he
"b"!).51
explain
striking
complexity
of his simplification.
His logic book containsover 100,000Latin-words
(hardly
exceptionalin his time),his styleis unencumberedand dense, and except
when he is merely"coveringthe matter,"meticulous.The presentartiof his analysis of inferencein
cle clearly shows the technical difficulty
ordinarylanguage.
Mexican Dominican Toms Mercado was as keen on simplifying
logic
teaching as Alonso.52He, too, confessedhis own excesses,but said he
could now laugh at himselfand pityhis unrepentantcolleagues.53Again,
logicianstoday may findtopicsMercado eliminatedphilosophicallyinteresting,such as quantificationproblemsand logical paradoxes.54But his
tunctemporis
conversi
si adessent
insanierunt,
sunt,etqui obcaecati
erant,
qui aliquando
Resolutio
rectasaperent."
, MexicoCity,1554).
nobiscum,
{Dialctica
49"Deterruerunt,
ab hac tamutiliet necessaria
fateor,
quamplurimos
qui
disciplina
et sophismatibus
intricatis"
eamadulterinis
(HA).
dogmatibus
impleverunt
50"Quispoterit
virosleghujusclassis
absquebili'Encinam-sine-Glandibus'
ceterosque
eis uti?Quosad menses
immoad annos,si audiaset
erevelin artedialctica
muitos,
nihilcepimus,"
noctem
dicerepoteris,
laborantes,
(IIA;
'Praeceptor,
pertotam
diligenter,
Luke5:5).
51HB. Fordialogical
Manheim
Metamathematik,
1962,
): P. Lorenzen,
logic(oppositions
alssemantische
vonLogikkalklen
furmatheandK. Lorenz,
, in:Archiv
Dialogspiele
Grundlage
11(19xx).
matische
36A,36B,38 and,38B;
Quantifiers:
LogikundGrundlagenforschung,
where"A" is "animal"
and"H"
e.g.,"homoestb animal"means3x[Ax&Vy[Hy>x=y]],
"homo."
52Commentarvi,
intextm
Petri
andInLogicam
Aristotelis
lucidissimi
Commentarii
Hispani
magnam
autore
textus
ab eodem
eliminatcumnovatranslation
, Seville1571.Buthe cautioned
against
ingtoomuch(pp.2-3,first
prologue)
53"Namnostri
italimites
utquietiam
illisinfestamur
excedunt
noverexcessus
apprime
inconfertissimis
nuncdialcticos
senticetis
irretitos
imus,etnuncnostras
nugasirridemus,
collacrimemur"
etpungentissimis
praepeditos
sophismatum
vepretis
(p. 4, first
prologue).
54"Quidsuntmachinationes
institutis
commiscere
illaequasverisdialecticae
sophistiscomcumulantes
literarum
velutihoc immensum
chaosquodexcogitarunt,
simisoient,
nisi
ac reflexivarum
mentitias
'aaa.bbb,'insolubilium
laqueosinenodabiles,
rapsodias

18:08:35 PM

IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED

117

misgivingson the logical analysis of ordinarylanguage are especially


relevantto Alonso's workthat we have been examining.Formal logic is
hard to learn, said Mercado, because of
themanyrulesandclassifications
their
Formostare
and,to be frank,
uncertainty.
andtalking
thatcannot
basedon ourordinary
helpbutbe ambiguwayofthinking
andthreaten
tocollapse.
ousandsometimes
andso theyoccasionally
fickle,
stagger
- toshoreup andstabilize
- andmanytrytirelessly
their
21s
Butthosewhotry
rules,
in countless
woulddemand,
mustbedarken
their
their
nature
bybringing
teaching
in so
brittle,
distinctions,
(sincetheysqueezed
byallowing
manyexceptions
rickety
andby
their
number
hadtobe cutwherever
manyrulesanddistinctions,
possible),
totheir
do them
topowerful
rulesthathardly
objections
justice.55
piling
up answers
Indeed. While admiringthe analyticskillsof Alonso and his colleagesand
of theseproballowingtheirinsightsto influenceour own understanding
that recent logic has
lems, we may be thankfulfor the simplification
achieved by allowingpredicatesand quantifiersto affectseveral individual terms.
Abbreviations
ca: conjunctive
ascent
cd: conjunctive
descent
in complexive
cdu: conjunctive
descent
unit
ce: conjunction
elimination
ci: conjunction
introduction
da: disjunctive
ascent
dd: disjunctive
descent
de: disjunction
elimination
di: disjunction
introduction
in complexive
unit
dt: distribution

centauri
et centimani
et laestrigones
in
gygesveriquecyclopes
qui majorem
stragem
mentibus
edunt
monstra
facerent
damnisi natura
illaprocreasset?"
quamhaecportentosa
2, first
(p.55
prologue).
"Primo
animadverto
hanclogicam,
neoterici
parvam
(quam"summulas"
praesertim
nonessecaptuadmodum
nonnihilum
tumregfacilem,
difficilem,
appellant),
quinforsan
ularum
etdivisionum
multitudine
(utlibereloquar)incertitudine,
quumearundum
utpote
communi
modoconcipiendi
dumtaxat
innituntur,
pleraeque
quarum
atqueloquendi
qui
nonpotest
nonesseancepsetquandoque
ac proinde
titubare
illasnonnunquam
ac
varius,
veluti
ruinam
minari.
ac firmes
eas reddere,
natura
reclamante,
Qui verostabiles
ipsarum
estindisciplinam
conantur
indefesse
necesse
condensas
tenebras
ind(etconantur
plurimi),
innumeris
distinctionibus
futilibus
ac lapsantibus
aducant,
utendo,
plurimas
exceptiones
artiscancellos
totregulae
ac distinctiones
traditae
sintut
mitiendo,
quumintraproprios
inminorem
conduceret
numerum
etargumentis
in
(sifieri
plurimum
posset)
redigerentur,
efficacibus
solutiones
vixargumenta
solventes."
regulas
objectis
aggregando
(secondprologue,lrB.)

18:08:35 PM

WALTER
REDMOND

118

elimination
eqe: existential
quantifier
introduction
eqi: existential
quantifier
h: hypothesis
(premise)
i: identity
(thei-rule)
ia: identity
axiom
ie: identity
elimination
ii: implication
introduction
ofnegation
inf: equivalence
andinfinite
term
middle
termin secondpremise)56
J: majorterm(with
in bothpremises)
M: middle
term(present
mp: modusponens
mt: modustollens
N: minor
term(withmiddle
termin secondpremise)
ne: negation
elimination
ni: negation
introduction
r: reiteration
(intoa subproof)
definition
of"divided
sense"
rp=: (repetition)
elimination
uqe: universal
quantifier
introduction
quantifier
uqi: universal
Austin,Texas, USA

56The middle,
to PeterofSpain.
terms
aredefined
according
major,andminor

18:08:35 PM

FranciscoSurezon Imagination*
JAMESB. SOUTH

The sixteenthcenturyJesuit philosopherFrancisco Surez has long


been recognizedas an importantfigurein the historyof thought.He
whosethought,
standsnear theend of a long traditionof scholasticthinkers
of thinkhad
the
dominant
mode
broadlyinspiredby Aristotle,
provided
ing about philosophicalproblemsin an academic settingfor over three
hundredyears. In addition,his thoughtcontinuedto exert an influence
long afterhis death and long afterDescartesinauguratedthe modernera
of philosophy.1In this paper, I want to discuss the account of internal
sensationthat he providesin his massivecommentaryon Aristotle'sDe
influenced
anima?The notionof an internalsensewas integralto Aristotelian
* Anearly
on
draft
ofthefirst
Congress
partofthispaperwasreadattheInternational
MI inMay1998.I wanttothank
theMarquette
Medieval
Studies,
Kalamazoo,
University
mewitha reduced
course
loadin Spring
forproviding
1999that
Philosophy
Department
andexpandtheinitial
to EdwardP.
paper.I am grateful
gavemethetimeto rewrite
LisskaandRichard
C. Taylorformanyhelpful
conversations.
Anthony
Mahoney,
1 The standard
dela Compagnie
ofSurezis RaoulScorraile,
Surez
Franois
biography
deJesus
discussions
include
, 2 vols,Paris1911.Morerecent
J. E. Gracia,Francisco
Jorge
: TheManinHistory
Catholic
55 (1991),
Surez
, in:TheAmerican
Philosophical
Quarterly,
andthe
Catholic
Surez
259-66;
Carlos,
Norea,
, in:American
Quarterly,
Jesuits
Philosophical
La proyeccin
sobre
55 (1991),267-86;Foroverviews
ofSurez'sinfluence,
seeJ. Irriarte,
deungranmetafisica
en& filosofia
enlosdasdelBarroco
, o Surez
, in: Razny Fe,
Europa
etlesystem
dela mtanmero
Surez
Courtine,
extraordinario,
(1948),229-65;
Jean-Franois
- TheMan
andHisInfluence
Paris1991,405-18;
, His Work
,
JohnP. Doyle,Surez
physique,
L1V
in:Francisco
Surez,
' trans.
1995,1-15.Fora
Disputation
JohnP. Doyle,Milwaukee
of Surez,see M. Solana,Historia
delafilosofia
espaola,
epocadel
catalogof theworks
Renacimiento
, vol.III, Madrid1941,333-40.
2 Francisco
in libros
unacumquaestionibus
Aristotelis
De anima
Surez,Commentario
, ed.
I willcitethisworkas DA,
Salvador
3 vols.,Madrid1978-1991.
Henceforth,
Castellote,
followed
Thisworkhasa rather
texandparagraph.
bydisputation,
question
complicated
is theresult
tualhistory.
theCommentaria
ofSurez'searlyteaching
at
Briefly,
assignment
in Surez'slifetime.
towards
However,
Segoviain 1572.The workwasneverpublished
thematerial
forpublication.
theendofhislife,Surezdecidedto rework
He replaced
withthatof"book"and"chapter"
thenomenclature
of"disputation"
and"question"
and
theentire
first
andthefirst
sixquestions
to rework
ofthesecond
managed
disputation
P. Alvarez
before
hisdeathin 1617.Whenhiseditor,
thefinal
disputation
puttogether
edition
oftheworkin 1621,he usedtherevised
first
books(basedon thefirst
18 quesoftheearly
andtheearlymanuscript
tomakea complete
tions
work.
Castellote's
version)
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001

Vivarium
39,1

18:08:44 PM

120

B. SOUTH
JAMES

accounts of cognitionfor a reason broughtout clearlyin the following


passage fromThomas Aquinas:
It mustbe saidthatsensedoesnotapprehend
theessences
ofrealities,
butonlytheir
exterior
accidents.
doesnotapprehend
theessences
ofrealiLikewise,
imagination
ofbodies.Theintellect
theessences
ties,butonlylikenesses
alone,then,
apprehends
ofrealities.3
Surez echoes this sentiment:
Thereis a greatdifference
between
senseandintellect
becausesensestopsat (sistere)
ofsensible
thecognition
external
accidents.
doesnotstopthere
Intellect,
however,
itadvances
butfrom
thecognition
ofaccidents
tocontemplating
thoserealities
that
Andtherefore
itis called"intellect"
as from
areconcealed
(latere
) undertheaccidents.
within"4
"reading
By demarcatingthe respectivespheresof sensationand intellectin such
a way, both thinkersappear to be causing themselvessome real problems. How, afterall, can the intellectknow an essence if the human cognitiveapparatusis never in directcontactwithsuch an essence?Are we
riskinga view in which the intellectmust simplycreate an essence from
with which it works?To solve such potential
the accidentalinformation
and
Surez delineatea theoryin whichthe interboth
Aquinas
problems,
nal senses play an essentialmediatingrole betweenexternalsensationof
accidentsand intellectualknowledgeof essences. For both thinkers,the
internalsense is the location of the phantasms,that is, images (imagines)
of a particularsensibleobject. These phantasms,
or likenesses(similitudines)
as we shall see soon, are required for any intellectualcognitionand so
their nature and status in the internalsense power is crucial for any
account of internalsensation.
Now, Aristodehad posited the notionof an internalsense as a means
to bridgethe gap between the radicallydiscreteactivitiesof the external
is theoneI follow
here.Forthefullmanoftheentire
edition
recent
critical
earlyversion
introduction
tovol.1,xxxvii-lxviii.
oftheCommentario,
seeCastellote's
history
uscript
3 Summa
nonapprehendit
essenI, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2: "Dicendum
theologiae
quodsensus
accidentia
tantum.
Similiter
sedapprehendit
sedexteriora
tiasrerum,
equeimaginatio,
AlltransIntellectus
autem
solusapprehendit
essentias
rerum."
solassimilitudines
corporum.
from
Basic
Saint
Thomas
New
are
from
theSumma
lations
,
Writings
of
theologiae
Aquinas York
withan introduction,
C. Pegis.Latintexts
arefrom
andannotated,
1945,edited
byAnton
Medievalium
ad textum
Studiorum
Summa
Ottaviensis,
, curaet studioInstitti
theologiae
Ottawa1941-45.
S. Pii Pp.V iussuconfectum
recognita,
4 DA IX.4.1(vol.Ill: 152):"Estdifferentia
sensum
etintellectus
quodsenmagnainter
verononsic,sedex
intellectus
accidentium
sensibilium
susinexternorum
sistit,
cognitione
et
latentingreditur,
ea quae subaccidentibus
ad contemplanda
accidentium
cognitione
dietus
estquasiintus
ideointellectus
legens."

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

121

sensesand our everydayawarenessof the unityof perception.Moreover,


the internalsense was used to explain such phenomena as dreams,creative imaginationand the like. Finally,the internalsense provided an
that was concomitantwith the activityof intellectand, in
intermediary
fact, necessary for intellectual cognition.5Subsequent generations of
Aristotelianthinkerstook up Aristotle'scommentson the internalsense
and elaboratedcomplexschemesof multipleinternalsensepowersdesigned
to account fora wide varietyof mentalactivities.6
My aim in thispaper
is not to deal witheveryaspect of Surez's account of internalsensation,
that mightbe. Instead I want to focus on two prihoweverinteresting
that
were
the subject of great controversythroughoutthe
issues
mary
later middle ages: 1) the numberof the internalsenses and 2) the relation of the internalsense apparatus to both the externalsenses and the
intellect.I hope to show that his discussionof the internalsenses succeeds in its purpose of accountingfor the relationbetween sense and
withintheAristotelian
intellect
problematicwhileat the same timeadvancingseveralrathernovelthesesconcerningtheinternalsenses.Unfortunately,
it would be far beyond the scope of the paper to considerall attempts
priorto him to enumeratea theoryof the internalsenses.7Accordingly,
I shall considerhis versionof the theoryin some abstraction.The one
point of referenceI shall use is the one that Surez himselfthinksis the
second most plausible account of internalsensation available: that of
Thomas Aquinas.8
5 Rcccnt
Martha
G. Nussbaum,
include:
oftheimagination
accounts
ofAristotle's
theory
andInterpretive
with
Translation
Text
"Demotu
animalium":
Aristotle's
, Princeton
, Commentary,
Essays
onthe
Aristotle
Malcolm
, in:G. E. R. LloydandG. E. L.
Scofield,
1978,221-69;
Imagination
Aristotelicum
onMindandtheSenses:
Owen(eds.),Aristotle
,
oftheSeventh
Symposium
Proceedings
C. Nussbaum
andAmelie
O. Rorty
in:,Martha
(eds.),
1978,99-140,
reprinted
Cambridge
Roleof
Frede(TheCognitive
"Deanima",
Oxford1992,249-77.Dorthea
onAristotle's
Essays
themediating
role
"Deanima",
onAristotle's
inAristotle
, in:Essays
279-96)stresses
phantasia
and
intellectual
between
sense
thatimagination
cognition.
cognition
plays
6 Fordevelopments
see HarryA.
sensesafter
in thetheory
oftheinternal
Aristotle,
in:Harvard
Arabic
andHebrew
inLatin,
TheInternal
Senses
Texts,
Wolfson,
Philosophic
Theological
andGeorgeH. Williams
in:Isadore
Review
(eds.),
2,8(1935),69-133,
Twersky
reprinted
Mass. 1973,250-314;
vol. 1, Cambridge,
andReligion,
in theHistory
Studies
ofPhilosophy
andDoctrine
Sources
Power:
TheDiscursive
According
Klubertanz,
ofthe"VisCogitativa"
George
TheInward
Wit.Psychological
St.Louis1952;E. RuthHarvey,
toSt.Thomas
Theory
Aquinas,
andtheRenaissance
intheMiddle
, London1975.
Ages
7 Foran ideaofthecomplexity
in theprementioned
ofsucha task,seethestudies
viousnote.
8 ForSurez's
seeDA,VIII.1.13 (vol.
ofThomas
s account,
oftheplausibility
statement
Ill: 28).

18:08:44 PM

122

B. SOUTH
JAMES

1. TheNumber
SensePowers
and ScopeofInternal
It is well known that Thomas distinguishesfour such internalsense
powers:commonsense,imagination,the estimativepower (called the cogitativepower in humans) and memory.I shall brieflyreviewhis description of each power and then discuss more generallythe significanceof
his account. The crucial move in his account is the separationbetween
the common sense on the one hand and imagination,estimationand
memoryon the other. The common sense is the root of the external
senses and completesthem. Unlike the individualexternalsenses,which
are limitedto their own proper objects, the common sense is able to
judge among the various objects of the proper senses. So, while vision,
forexample,can judge betweencolors,onlythe common sense can judge
that a color is not a sound. Thus, the actionsof the externalsensesindividuallyflowinto the common sense and the common sense is aware of
all the sensoryexperiencesat one time.9However, the common sense
straddlesthe line between externalsenses and internalsenses and, while
technicallyan internalsense power, it has much more in common with
the externalsenses than the otherinternalsenses.One way thatThomas
marksthe distinctionis by refusingto name the product of the activity
of commonsense a "phantasm."The phantasmis the paradigmaticproduct and object of the internalsense powers and, moreover,plays a most
importantrole in intellectualcognitionsince the agentintellect"abstracts"
the intelligiblecontent,the natureor essence of a reality,fromthe phantasm. Withoutthe phantasm,human intellectualcognitionwould not be
possible.10
The threepowers more properlytermedinternalsenses,the imaginaand memoryare clearlydescribedby Thomas
tion,theestimative/cogitative
and each has a specificfunction.Imagination(;imaginatio
), sometimescalled
9 ForThomas's
account
ofthecommon
deanima
sense,see Quaestiones
, q. 13;Summa
ofhistreatment
ofthecommon
I, q. 78,a. 4. Fordiscussion
theohgiae
sense,see E. J.
Communis"
inthePsychology
Ryan,TheRoleofthe"Sensus
, Carthagena,
ofSt.Thomas
Aquinas
Ohio1951,127-46;
R. W. Schmidt,
TheUnifying
Sense:
in:TheNewScholasticism,
Which?,
57 (1983),1-12;Francois-Xavier
La sensdela rflexion
Paris
chezThomas
Putallaz,
d'Aquin,
1991,45-58.
10A standard
thomistic
Summa
See,forexample,
I, q. 84,a. 7. For
position.
theologiae
Thomas's
refusal
to callthespeciesin thecommon
sensea phantasm,
see Summa
theoloContra
Gentiles
discussion
ofthesepasgiaeI, q. 89,a. 5 andSumma
, II, c. 73. Forhelpful
P. Mahoney,
Intellect
andImagination
inAlbert
andSiger
Sense,
, Thomas
sages,seeEdward
, in:
Norman
Kretzmann,
Anthony
KennyandJanPinborg
(eds.),TheCambridge
ofLater
History
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,607.
Philosophy

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

123

the phantasy(phantasia
), performstwo essentialfunctions:(a) it receives
and storesthe sense impressions
gatheredby the externalsensesand common sense and (b) it joins togetherotherwisediscreteexperiencesto create new phantasmssuch as gold mountainsor wingedhorses.Analogously,
sense memoryis retentiveof sensoryexperiences.It differsfromimagination in two basic ways. First,it is responsibleforthe characterof the
that our sense experiencescan possess. Second, it is
past (iratiopraeteriti)
primarilyreceptiveand retentiveof a certaintype of experiences,those
that resultfromthe estimative
/cogitativepower.11This latterpower has
a peculiar characterin that it relatesprimarilyto sensiblequalitiesthat
cannotbe reducedto one of the fiveexternalsensiblequalities.Thus, for
example, in animals,the estimativepower senses intentions,or notions,
thatare agreeable[conveniens)
or disagreeable(<disconveniens
) or more broadly,
in
is
the
result
of a kindof natWhile
animals
this
and
useful.
dangerous
ural instinct,in humans the cogitativepower takes on a functionvery
close to reasoning.This functionof the estimativepower is rathercurious and the point is broughtout well by the traditionaldesignationof
such sensiblefeaturesas "insensible"(;insensatae
). The basic idea here is
that the animal must be sensingsomethingover and above the sensible
accidentsreadilyapparent.A sheep, forexample,is not sensingjust the
collectionof sensiblequalitiesthat constitutethe wolf- such accidentsas
color, shape, and smell- but also the "danger" presentby virtueof the
natureof theseinsensiblesensationsis a
wolf'spresence.The mysterious
problemthatworriesSurez. Now, in addition,to thispeculiar function
of the estimativepower, Thomas assigns a varietyof other operations,
that are peculiar to the estimativepower as it existsin human, that is,
the cogitativepower. So, for example, it is the cogitativepower that
apprehendsan individualas an instanceof a naturalkind and Thomas
is led by this functionto call the cogitativepower the particularreason
and compare
(ratioparticularis)
pointingto its abilityto investigate(inquiro)
In
it
is
for
incidental
the
sensation,
(confer). addition,
power responsible
thatis, the abilityto sense the individualas the subjectof all the proper
I
sensiblequalitiesit possesses.So, forexample,in seeing an individuell,
sense immediatelythroughmy five senses all the sensible qualities the

11Thecentral
oftheroleoftheinternal
forThomas's
demarcation
sensepowpassages
deanima
ersare Summa
I, q. 78, a. 4 and Quaestiones
, q. 13. R. Brennan
(The
theobgiae
Thomistic
15 (1941),149-61)
, in:The NewScholasticism,
oftheImagination
Concept
givesa
ofthevarious
oftheimagination.
functions
goodexposition

18:08:44 PM

124

B. SOUTH
JAMES

individualpossesses.At the same time,incidentally,


I sense the subjectof
those sensiblequalities.The extensionof the estimativepower to include
this scope of operationsis possible for Thomas because he believes the
and nearness (affinitas
et propiniquitas)
to
cogitativepower has an affinity
the intellect.Consequently,the cogitativepower is, as it were, elevated
beyond its mere estimativefunctionsand includesthese additionalfunctions by reason of its likenessto the intellect.Here we see one of the
centralways in whichThomas triesto elucidatethe peculiarstatusof the
internalsenses as intermediariesbetween the restrictedexternalsenses
and the intellect.By attributing
functionsto the cogitaquasi-intellective
tive power, Thomas goes a long way towardsmakingthe operationof
the intellectless discontinuousfromsensoryprocessesthan it mightotherwise be.
Now at thispoint it is importantto note thatThomas has committed
himselfto the existenceof four internalsenses and that three of them
are associated with the phantasm,which Thomas definesas the "likenessesof individuals"(similitudines
individuorum).12
By contrastSurez argues
that in fact thereis only one internalsense power, one that he usually
calls "phantasia"Surez's argumentfor his thesistakes place in explicit
dialogue with Thomas Aquinas's account of the internalsense powers.
Indeed, as mentionedabove, he admitsthatThomas's positionis the second most plausible theoryavailable, second only to his own. Hence in
rejectingThomas's account, he is indirectly,but forcefully,
arguingfor
his own alternateaccount.
Surez begins his discussion of the internalsense by doing a little
attribvocabularywork.He describesand definesseventermstraditionally
uted to the internalsenses. These are: 1) common sense (sensuscommunis
),
2) phantasy( phantasia
), 3) imagination(;imaginatio
), 4) estimation(<aestimatio
),
and 7) reminiscence(remini5) cogitation(cogitatici),
6) memory(memoria),
What
unites
these
terms
is
that
all
scentia).
they signifysome operationof
sense distinctfromthe activityof the fiveexternalsenses.13The emphasis on functionor operationis importantsince he will proceed to fixthe
referentof each of the traditionaltermsby providingsome functional
role for each term.
12Summa
I, q. 85,a. 1,ad 3.
theologiae
13DA,VIII.
1.1(vol.Ill, 14).The mostextensive
discussion
ofSurez'saccount
ofthe
internal
sensepoweris SalvadorCubells,
DieAnthropologie
desSurez
, Munich1962,13745. See also,thebriefremarks
inJ. M. Alejandro,
La gnoseologia
delDoctor
Eximio
y l
acusacin
nominalista
, Santander
1948,227-9.

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

125

Beginningwith"commonsense,"Surez tellsus thatthe termis proper


all the propersensibles
to thatoperationby which we cognize (cognoscere)
of the externalsenses and are therebyin a positionto judge (<discernere
)
or
as
the
common
source
them.
It
is
described
principle
among
typically
of the externalsenses and as well as the terminusto which the external
senses"flowtogether"(influere).H
) refers
By contrast,"phantasy"(phantasia
to the operationwherebywe know all sensibleobjects,includingexternal sensible objects in their absence. In other words, it conservesthe
species or images of thingssensed and can know them "abstractively",
thatis, when the originalsensibleobject is no longerpresent.In thisway,
phantasyis contrastedto the common sense, which can know only the
species of objects sensed externallywhen the objects are presentto the
It shouldbe notedthatSurez's use of theterm"abstract"
externalsenses.15
in the contextof discussionsabout knowledgerefersto the absence of an
object only while the correlativeterm "intuitive,"means only that the
object is present.We should not make the mistakeof thinkingthat one
is mediatedby a specieswhile the otheris not. Rather all cognitiveoperations,whetherintuitiveor abstractivetake place by means of a species,
eithersensibleor intelligible.
So, the commonsense,as much as the phan) refers
tasy,requiresa species forits operation."Imagination"(imaginatio
to the same operationas phantasy,but adds the featureof being able to
composeand dividesensibleobjectsas well as to createimpossibleobjects.
It is what allows us to be able to thinkabout such itemsas gold mountains,Pegasus, and the like.16So far,we have been talkingabout internal sensoryactivitiesthat are relativelyunproblematicin that they are
dependentsimplyon the ordinarysensibleaccidentsof externalobjects.
Even in the case of gold mountainsand flyinghorses,the imaginationis
simplyputtingtogetherpriorsensoryexperiencesin new ways. However,
the operationknowas "estimation"introducesa new factorinto the internal sensoryprocess. Estimationinvolvesthe apprehensionof a sensible
object under an aspect such that the sensitiveappetite is moved and
directedas a result.It is, forexample,what allowsanimalsto sense objects
notjust as theirsensibleaccidentspresentthemselves,but also as agreeable or disagreeableto them,as somethingto approach or somethingto
flee.17
The same operationin humansis customarily
givena special term:
14DA, VIII.1.2(vol.Ill: 14-16).
15DA,VIII.1.3(vol.Ill: 18).
16DA, VIII.1.8(vol.Ill: 22).
17DA, VIII.1.9(vol.Ill, 22).

18:08:44 PM

126

B. SOUTH
JAMES

"cogitation."While I shall discuss this operation in more detail below,


rightnow I want to stressthat Surez, here at the beginningof his discussion,explicitlydenies to the cogitativeoperationany abilityto reason
(:ratiocinari
) or to judge about particulars.He states:
is thought
sensitive
that
The cogitative
bymanyto be a certain
powerin humans
butthatpower
andthatcancompose
anddivide,
canreason
concerning
particulars
meansnothexceedsthelimits
ofthesensitive
part.. . . Andtherefore
"cogitative"
sensitive
and
ingmorethantheinterior
poweritself
discerning
amongtheagreeable
In thismanner
as it existsin a specialwayin humans.
it has some
disagreeable
becausenotonlyis it led byan instinct
ofnature,
butalsoby
greater
perfection
andexperience
increased
andoften,
too,itis directed
knowledge
byreason.18
In denyingany intrinsiccapacityforreasoningto the cogitativeoperation, Surez makes one of his mostimportantbreakswiththe Thomistic
tradition.As we saw above, Thomas views the cogitativepower as perhaps the most importantof the internalsensorypowers and ascribesto
it a broad range of activities,includingthe sensingof the particularas
an instanceof a type. Presumably,it is at this point that the accidents
sensed by the externalsenses are renderedsuitable for abstractinguniversal content.It is preciselysuch a role for the cogitativepower that
Surez denies here. The cogitativepower has access to nothingmore
than the sensibleaccidentspresentedto it by the actions of the external
senses.Moreover,in his discussionof the functionsof estimationand cogitation,he is focusingon the fundamentalfactthatthereis nothingmysterioustransmitted
duringthe process of sensation.A sheep fleesa wolf
not because
because the sheep sees, smellsand hearsitssensibleproperties,
in
a
wolf.
other
such
it senses danger or some
property
The finaltwo termsused to describeoperationsof the internalsense
and "reminiscence"(reminiscentia).
are "memory"(memoria)
Obviously,we
can know the past as past and we experiencea sense of time. Memory
is simplywhat allows us to performthese two operations.It is also the
corresponding"abstractive"operationin relationto the estimativepower,
just as the imaginationis the abstractiveoperationcorrespondingto the
intuitiveknowledgeof the common sense. The basic idea is thatwe can
18DA,VIII.1.10(vol.Ill, 22-4):"Cogitativa
a multis
essepotentia
putatur
quaedam
circaparticularia
etcomponere
et dividere.
Sed haec
ratiocinari
sensitiva
hominis,
potens
nihilaliudsignificai
... Et ideocogitativa
virtus
exceditlimites
quam
partissensitivae
et disconveniens,
interiorem
discernentem
inter
conveniens
sensitivm
ipsamet
potentiam
etiniliohabetmaiorem
modoinhomine
existit;
quia
aliquam
perfectionem,
speciali
prout
et
etexperientia,
naturae
sedetiamex maiori
nontantum
ex instinctu
ducitur,
cognitione
dirigitur."
saepeetiama ratione

18:08:44 PM

ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
SUREZ

127

rememberobjects in theirabsence.19More complexly,"reminiscence"is


the memoryof past experiences,but it is distinguished
also used to signify
from memory,insofar as its operation is supposedly more complex.
Reminiscencefunctionsdiscursivelyand in cooperationwith the imagination. While Surez accepts that this is a common enough usage, he
worriesthat it attributesmore knowledgeto the internalsenses than is
warrantedand suggestsinsteadthatsuch a knowledgeof the past is really
the workof the intellect:
theintellect,
at leastin relation
arisesfrom
ThusI judgethatreminiscence
chiefly
areaddedtointellect.
which
andcompositions
toreasoning
Now,because
(discursus)
reason
different
whentheintellect
sensealways
intellect,
through
places
accompanies
thatarisesin senseis nota
it.Thatinquiry
andtimes
thesensealsoaccompanies
one
from
ofapprehension
butis a kindofsuccession
proceeding
reasoning,
proper
on
andan operation
ofsensedependent
andcanbe calledreminiscence
toanother
oftheintellect.20
a previous
reasoning
of the scope of the internal
restriction
Again, we see his characteristic
sense power at work here inasmuch as any complex assessmentof the
past or process of reasoninginvolvingpast experienceis said to be an
intellectualprocess,albeit one dependenton sense.
I have run throughin a briefmanner the discussionof the meaning
of termsused to describe internalsensoryoperationsfor two reasons.
First,it is importantto see that Surez is fullycognizantof the variety
of teachingsconcerningthe internalsenses At the same time,though,I
hope to have made it clear that in his discussionhe refusesto beg any
questionsabout the nature of internalsensation.He has done no more
than recognizecommon internalsensoryexperiencesin which humans
and higheranimals engage. Most importandy,he has refusedto make a
simple enough inferencefroman operation to a power on which the
way of arguingfor the existenceof
operationdepends. A characteristic
a separatepower of the soul is to argue that each operationthat has a
properobject requiresthe existenceof a distinctpower.Thomas Aquinas,
forexample,states:

19DA, VIII.1.11(vol.Ill: 24).


20DA,VIII.1.12 (vol.Ill, 24-2):"Quareiudicoreminiscentiam
fieri
ab intelpotissime
semetcompositiones,
ad discursum
lect^saltem
quaeilliadmiscentur,
quiaverosensus
discurrit
locaet tempora,
ideoquandointellectus
intellectum,
perdiversa
percomitatur
et iliaindagatio,
sensus
etiamcomitatur,
discursum,
que fitin sensu,nonperproprium
ab unainaliamprocedendo,
dicipotest
succesionem
sedperquamdam
apprehensionum,
discursu
a praevio
intellectus."
et operatio
reminiscentia
sensus,
dependens

18:08:44 PM

128

B. SOUTH
JAMES
A poweras suchis directed
to an act.Therefore
we mustderivethenature
ofthe
ofa power
theacttowhichitis directed;
andconsequently
thenature
powerfrom
is diversified
as thenature
oftheactis diversified.
ofan
Nowthenature
according
to thevarious
actis diversified
natures
oftheobjects.21
according

As mentioned,among the viewsarguingfora pluralityof internalsense


powers, Surez findsmost probable the view of Averroesand Aquinas
that there are foursuch powers and it is this view that he criticizesin
mostdetail. Indeed, despitethe weightof such impressiveauthority,
however, Surez wants to argue that in factthereis only one internalsense
power, one that he calls, generally,phantasiaNow, his basic argumentative strategyis to disputethe divisionof internalsenses that is based on
the existenceof different
typesof objects, that is, the ordinarysensible
qualitiesavailable to the fiveexternalsensesand the more peculiarintentionsof danger,utilityand the like accessibleto the estimative/cogitative
,
power.22Hewing closely to Thomas's expositionin the Summatheologiae
he views the latter'sposition as restingon two foundationalprinciples.
The point of both principlesis to demonstratethat the objects of internal sensoryexperienceare radicallydifferent.
Here is how he sets forth
the basic point:
and Thomas],
whichis themoreprobable
The fourth
opinion[thatofAverroes
hasa two-fold
foundation:
Thefirst
is thatsensitive
amongthosementioned,
cognisensedspecies
tionarisessometimes
andsometimes
(species
sensatae)
through
through
andpowers
themaredistinct.
unsensed
insensatae)
through
species(species
cognizing
different
ofspecies
arethemselves
...
Forpowers
different.
cognizing
through
types
a powercognizing
inthepresence
Thesecondfoundation
is thatinsensitive
powers
in theabsence
ofan objectaredistinct
ofan objectanda powercognizing
powers.
inthepresence
Thisis proven
sincea powercognizing
ofan objectought
tobe easand beingimmuted,
in the
whilea powercognizing
ilycapableofapprehending
tobe conserving
andretentive
Nowthesetwo
absence
ofan objectought
ofspecies.
in corpocannot
existin thesamematerial
powerforeasyapprehension
properties
from
moisture
whileretention
from
realbodiesoriginates
These
originates
dryness.
in theorganofthesensepower,
therefore.
. . ,23
twocannot
predominate
21Summa
secundum
illudquodest
I, Q. 77,a.3.: "Dicendum
theologiae,
quodpotentia,
rationem
ad actum.Undeoportet
ordinatur
potentiae
accipiex actuad quem
potentia,
utdiversificatur
et perconsequens
diversificetur,
ordinatur;
quodratiopotentiae
oportet
secundum
diversam
rationem
obiecti."
ratioactus.Ratioautemactusdiversificatur
22In addition
heputsforth
thethesis
ofa multiplicity
ofintertotheargument
against
ofAristotle
nalsensepowers,
Surezalsotriesto showthattheauthority
is on hisside.
DA, VIII.1.21(vol.Ill, 40-4).In thisassertion,
he mayin factbe corSee,forexample,
rect.See Klubertanz
1952(op.dt
., above,n. 6), 24-8.
23DA,VIII.1.14 (vol.Ill, 28-30):"Quartaergoopinio,
citatas
estprobabilquaeinter
Primum
aliamfieri
habetfundamentum:
estcognitionem
sensitivm,
ior,duplex
perspecies
nampotenetpotentias
aliamperinsensatas,
sensatas,
cognoscentes
perillasessediversas,

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUAREZ
ON IMAGINATION

129

In this passage we have two principlesworkingin tandem to deliver


betweentypesof sensory
fourdistinctinternalsense powers:a distinction
betweenintuitiveand abstractivepowers.I
information
and a distinction
shall call the formerthe "unsensedspecies principle"and the latterthe
"presence/absenceprinciple."The former,perhaps,is the most difficult
pointand the one thatSurez spendsthe mosttimeworryingover,while
the distinction
premisedon the presenceor absence of the sensibleobject
is ratherstraightforward.
A brieflook at thecorresponding
textsof Aquinas willshow thatSurez
ratheraccuratelyrepresentshis thoughtin this regard.So, for example,
in Summatheologiae
, I, q. 78, q. 4, Aquinas does indeed state that a crucial attributeof a subset of the internalsenses involvestheirabilityto
performtheirproperoperationsin the absence of the sensibleobjectwhile
the otherinternalsensepowersrequirethepresenceof the sensibleobject:
animaltheanimalshould
Nowwemustobserve
thatforthelifeofa perfect
apprebutalsowhenitis absent.
henda thing
notonlyat theactualtimeofsensation,
From thisprinciplehe concludes that two of the internalsense powers, the common sense and the estimativepower, must be capable of
receivingeasilythe species fromsensibleobjectswhile the othertwo,the
imaginationand memory,must be able to retainspecies once received.
There is as well a physiologicalconsequence that followsfromthis distinction:the receptionof species requiresthe internalsense powers be
"moist"in orderthatthe apprehensionof species occurs in
appropriately
an optimalmannerwhile retentivepowersmustbe "dry."Thomas's conclusionis straightforward:
since the same power cannotbe both primarily
moistand primarilydry,it followsthat such powers mustbe distinct.In
betweenreceptiveand retensum,then,thisbasic physiologicaldifference
betweenpowersthatrequirethe
tivepowerscorrespondsto the distinction
presenceof theirobjectsand thosethatdo not.The resultis a demarcation

rationum
diversae
sunt.
. . . Secundum
tiaecognoscentes
sensibiles
diversarum
perspecies
in praesentia
estquodin potentiis
sensitivis
et
fundamentum
obiecti
cognoscens
potentia
in absentia
Nampotentia
in praesentia
suntdistinctae.
Probatur.
debetesse
cognoscens
in absentia
veropotentia
facileimmutativa
et apprehensiva,
debetesseconcognoscens
istaautemduononpossunt
servativa
et retentiva
convenire
eidempotentiae
specierum;
ex humiditate,
incorporalibus
namfacilis
retentio
veroex
materiali;
provenit
apprehensio
inorgano
eiusdem
siccitate;
praedominari
potentiae;
ergo."A quick
quaeduononpossunt
inwhich
hediscusses
ofThomas
thefour
internal
sense
ofthemajortexts
perusal
Aquinas
to Summa
showssuchprinciples
at work.In addition
I, q. 78,a. 4, see
theologiae
powers
deanima
, a. 13; InII De anima
, 1.6.
Quaestio

18:08:44 PM

130

B. SOUTH
JAMES

of the common sense and estimation,as receptive,and imaginationand


memory,as retentive.
What remainsunclear is why four such internalsenses are required.
Why notjust have a sense power that is receptiveand one thatis retentive?The answer,of course, is that thereare two typesof sensoryinformationreceivedand consequentlytwo typesretained.Thomas arguesthat
thereare two typesof sensoryinformation
available to the internalsense
that
which
is
sensed
the
external
sensesand thatwhichis not
by
powers:
sensed by the externalsenses. He writes:
Buttheanimalneedsto seekor to avoidcertain
notonlybecausetheyare
things,
or otherwise
to thesenses,
butalsobecauseofotheradvantages
anduses,
pleasing
ordisadvantages;
notbecauseofits
justas thesheeprunsawaywhenitseesa wolf,
. . . Animals,
needtoperceive
such
colororshape,butas a natural
therefore,
enemy.
whichtheexterior
sensedoesnotperceive.24
intentions,
In Surez's terminology,
this is the distinctionbetweensensed species
and unsensedspecies {species
He explainsthisdis(.species
sensatae)
insensatae).
tinctionby saying that sensed species are those that representsensible
objects in the internalsense in the same way that theyare represented
in the externalsenses.This is not to say thatsuch species are themselves
actuallysensed, it is just to say that the sensiblequalities sensed by the
in some way to the internalsensesas well.
externalsensesare transmitted
The green on the tree that I see is receivedin the common sense as an
awarenessof green. Unsensed species, by contrast,are those that represent sensibleobjects in some othermanner,under some different
aspect,
than objects are representedin the externalsenses. The standardexample is the way that a sheep perceives a wolf as dangerous. The main
point is that thereis nothingin the sensed species of a wolfthat would
lead a sheep to such a perception.So, there must be some additional
available to the internalsense powers allowingthem to recinformation
that
danger.Again, the conclusionfollowsratherstraightforwardly:
ognize
if two sense powers sense different
typesof species,theymust be really
distinctpowers.

24Summa
estanimali
ut quaerataliquavel
I, q. 78, a. 4: "Sed necessarium
theologiae
velnonconvenientia
ad sentiendum,
sedetiam
nonsolumquiasuntconvenientia
fugiat,
et utilitates,
sivenocumenta;
sicutovisvidens
lupum
aliquasaliascommoditates
propter
indecentiam
colonsvel figurae,
sed quasiinimicum
natunonpropter
venientem
fugit
huiusmodi
estergoanimali
rae.. . . Necessarium
intentiones,
quasnonperquodpercipiat
exterior."
cipitsensus

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

131

In summary,then,the two principlesgeneratean account of internal


sensationthatrequiresfourdistinctpowers.We have two receptivepowers, the common sense and the imagination.The formeris receptiveof
the sensed species,the latterreceptiveof the unsensedspecies. The two
retentivepowers,the estimationand memory,are respectivelyretentive
of sensed and unsensedspecies. The question we must now consideris
why Surez rejectsthis derivationof internalsense powers. As we have
seen, Surez does not disputethatthereare many operationsthatmatch
up with termssuch as common sense, imagination,etc. However, he
wants to argue that the only reason to posit diverse powers for each
operationwould be if operationsexistedthat the same power could not
perform.In otherwords,the numberof non-compossible
operationsdetermines how many distinctinternalsense powers we must posit. In addition,he believesthatwe should not posit a distinctinternalsense power
based simplyby restricting
its range of operations.What he means is that
if thereis one sense power that receivesunsensed species and another
thatboth receivesand retainssuch species,we shouldonlypositone sense
power the one that has the greatestrange of operations.The power
with the more restrictedrange would be redundant.In fact,he invokes
an argumentused by Thomas himselfwho stated that in the case of
humanswe should not posit more interiorsense powersthan are present
in the perfectanimals.If we should discoverin humans some more perfectsensoryoperation,it is not because of some additionalpower thatit
has, but ratheris due to the greaterperfectionof the sense power in
humans. In fact,Thomas explicidyuses this principlein rejectingthe
Avicenniandistinctionbetweenphantasia(the retentionof sensed species)
and theimagination(theabilityto creatively
combinesuch species)because
in humans the imaginationcan performboth operations.25
Surez proceedsto rejectthe firstof Thomas's foundationalprinciples,
namely,the presence/absence principlethatrequiresdistinctpowers due
to the need forsuch powers to have different
physicalnatures(moistvs.
In
this
both
the
common
sense
dry).
way,
/phantasyduo and the cogitaduo are reduced to one power for each set. In one fell
tive/memory
we
swoop,
go fromfourpowers to two. His argumentfor rejectingthe
involves
principle
recognizingthat a power knowingin the absence of

25Summa
ofAvicenna's
1952
I, q. 78,a. 4. Fordiscussion
view,seeKlubertanz
theologiae
cit.
, above,n. 6),92-7.
(op.

18:08:44 PM

132

B. SOUTH
JAMES

an object must have previouslyreceived a species of the absent object.


So, for example,in order to rememberthe tree in the park I sat under
yesterday,I must have sensed the tree in the park and formeda phantasm of it. If the originalexperiencegeneratesa phantasm,thereis no
reason to thinkthatthe phantasmI use the followingday is any different
fromthe original.If it were, it would have arisen in the absence of the
originalobject,yet such a possibilityis ruled out by the verypassivityof
sensoryexperience.Afterall, a sensible object immutesa sense power
only when it is presentto the power. Consequently,the common sense
and imagination,which are immutedonly thanksto the externalsenses,
must both be immutedin the presence of the object. In this way both
are able to know in the presence of the object. Thus, Surez concludes
thata power thatcan know in the absence of an object can knowin the
presenceof the object as well. His pointhere is rathersubde,but amounts
to the claim that receptionand retention,apprehensionand conservation, are not differentiated
by the presence and absence of the object.
The image I retainof the tree is the veryimage of the tree that resulted
frommy original,presentexperience.In brief,if the common sense is
incapable of retainingsensed species,it cannot be the source of my later
imaginationand the resultis thatthe imaginationmusthave been immuted
at the same time as the common sense, that is, when the object is present. Moreover,the case of gold mountains,centaursand the like,while
more complicated,are nonethelessreducibleto experienceshad in the
presence of objects.
evidence that the imagination
Surez takes thisargumentas sufficient
is immutedin the presence of the object. Hence the distinctionbetween
the receptionand retentionof species does not prove that theremustbe
separate powers to performboth functions.Rather, it shows that both
the apprehensivefunctionof the common sense and the retentivefunction of the imaginationtake place in the same power. In this way the
receptionand retentionof sensed species by the same power shows that
- no
such operationsare compossibleand his firstprinciple
positingof
is
satisfied.
The
same line
for
different
powers
compossibleoperations
of reasoningshows that the distinctionbetweenthe estimativepower and
memorycollapsesas well. The estimativepower and memoryare posited
as havinga special typeof object, the unsensedspecies. Puttingaside for
the momentany questionsof the existenceof such species,it is clear that
there is no more reason to distinguishbetween the reception of the
unsensed species in the presence of the object and the conservationof

18:08:44 PM

ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
SUREZ

133

the same species.Again, the memorymustreceivesuch species to retain


at the same time as the estimativepower apprehendsthem.26
The problemthat remainsforSurez's reductivestrategyis the argument concerningthe physicalcompositionof the internalsense powers.
Since drynessis supposed to be crucial for retentionand moistnessfor
apprehension,Thomas argued that we must posit two separate powers,
one moist,one dry,for these two different
operations.Surez responds
receive
material
that
both
substances
to
impressionsand retain
by pointing
In addition,he points out that the
them,for example, lead [plumbum).
is
of
and
retention
species not a whollymaterialprocess,but
reception
ratheris an intentionalprocess.While thereis a materialcomponentto
apprehensionand retentionin the internalsense,the crucial aspect is the
causing of knowledgeand that arises,he says, withoutany resistance.27
Finallysince the imaginationcan receivesensed species as well as retain
them,any attemptto posit a separatecommonsense thatmerelyreceives
sensed species runsafoul of Surez's second intuitively
plausible claim as
well, namely,that thereis no need to posit a power with a lesser range
of operationwhen there is a power that performson a broader level.
Thus, the mere presenceor absence of a sensibleobject is not sufficient
to requirea multiplicity
of sense powers.
The second "foundation"provided by Thomas Aquinas for the distinctionbetween internalsense powers involved the "unsensed species
principle"and capturedthe idea thatanimals are aware of more than is
provided to them by the externalsenses. Surez views the distinction
betweentypesof species to be the primarymotivationfordistinguishing
between the common sense/phantasyduo and the estimative
/memory
betweensensed and unsensed
duo. He wantsto argue thatthe distinction
species is untenable,and in this way remove any remainingfoundation
fora distinction
of powers.The focusof his attackis on the significance
of the difference
betweenthe sensed and unsensedspecies. Consider the
the
sheep sensing
danger of a wolfpresentto it and recognizingthat it
must flee. Surez states that experiencesuggeststhat there is a simultaneityin the sensingof the wolfand the fleeing.This sortof simultaneity
only makes sense, however,if it is one and the same species that presentsthe wolf to the sheep and also presentsthe danger. Such sensory

26DA, VIII.1.17 (vol.Ill, 34-6).


27DA,VIII.1.18 (vol.Ill, 36).

18:08:44 PM

134

B. SOUTH
JAMES

knowledgeis possiblebecause animals have builtin naturalinstinctssuch


that when they perceive somethingthat is a danger, for instance,they
flee. Nonetheless,what they perceive is simplythe sensible qualities of
the externalobject as presentedto the common sense via the fiveexternal senses. Surez, then,is at a loss even to describewhat an unsensed
species would be. How can a sensiblespecies representa wolfunder the
aspect of "enemy"?The only way a sensiblespecies can representanythe sensiblequalitiesof the wolf:its color,shape,
thingis by representing
scent,etc.28
Surez concludesfromtheseconsiderations
thatthe internalsensepower
is reallyand formallyone power, and that the various termsused of it
show only a diversityimposed by reason both because the acts of the
and because we thinkabout the power with inadepower are different
He
quate concepts.
points out that his position on the internalsense
is
similar
in
inspirationto the more common view that the intelpower
lect and will constituteone power althoughit performsa multitudeof
described actions.Just as the intellectgoes by many names:
differendy
intellect,reason, memory,speculativeintellect,practical intellectwhile
remainingone power, so too the internalsense power is describablein
multipleways, but those ways are compatiblewith its being only one
power.29
With this rejectionof the existenceof unsensedspecies,we get to the
heart of Surez's account of internilisensation.Not only does he remove
a foundationforthe view that the various functionsof the internalsense
are operationsof separate powers,he also shows resistanceto expanding
the cognitiverole of internalsensation.It appears that he has two essential motivations.First,he wants to give pride of place to the role of the
externalsenses. They provide us with immediatecontact to the world
to
around us and, along with the action of the intellect,are sufficient
of
the
world.
the
role
internal
our
of
the
Hence,
understanding
ground
sensesis littlemore than a means of "transferring"
experience,as it were,
fromthe excessivelymaterialexternalsenses to the immaterialintellect.
sense becomes basicallya mere intermediary,
with littleto
The interrigli
do on its own other than unitingthe varietyof externalsensoryexperiences into a unifiedwhole. Second, he wants to stressthe continuity
between internalsensationin animals and internalsensationin humans.
28DA, VI.2.16(vol.II, 492).
29DA, VIII.1.24(vol.Ill, 44-6).

18:08:44 PM

SUAREZ
FRANCISCO
ON IMAGINATION

135

thatThomas's
Positingan internalsensewiththewide varietyof functions
cogitativepower has in effectseparatesthe sensitivepowers of humans
too radicallyfromthatof animals.The consequenceof thissecond motithata much broaderrange
vation,of course,is to recognizethepossibility
of human activityis instinctual.So, when the sheep only senses the wolf
as its bundle of sensibleaccidents,it instinctively
flees.By the same reaa
when
a
senses
soning,then,
person
particularthreateningobject, she
does not sense anythingspecial, but ratherinstinctively
respondsto the
sensoryexperience.Of course,Surez would, no doubt,point to the role
thatintellectand will could play in teachingus to overcomesuch instinctual behavior,but the fact would remain that much of our sensorylife
is instinctual.
As we saw above, one of the featuresof the cogitativepower,according
to Thomas, was its functionof incidentalsensation,that is, its abilityto
sense the individualunder the collectionof propersensiblesattainableby
the externalsenses.Surez singlesout thisfunctionin particularand subjects it to a critique.He gives the traditionaldefinitionof incidentalsensationas thatwhichin no way immutesa sense power,but is onlyknown
throughthe immutationof anotherobject to whichit is conjoined.30With
thisunderstanding
of incidentalsensationas a base, he can explain how
a substance,an individualof a kind, is sensed because while the substance itselfdoes not immutea sense power, the sensibleaccidentsthat
are conjoined to the substancedo. In otherwords,fromthe power (vis)
of the sensationof a thingthat is perse sensible,somethingelse is perceived incidentally.
That means the whitethatimmutesthe eye immutes
it insofaras it existsin a subject,and thatsubjectis what we sense incidentally.So far so good. However, Surez also wants to insure that we
do not have some exaggeratedopinionabout the capabilitiesof the internal sensepower.Afterall, the incidentalsensible,separatefromthe proper
sensibles,would be anothertypeof unsensedspecies,and we have already
seen that Surez has no use forsuch species. The resultis that thereis
no propersensedspeciesof the substanceitself.Instead,we properlysense
only its accidents.Consequendy,for Surez, incidentalperceptionis of
30Thomasdiscusses
incidental
sensation
at Sentencia
libri
De anima
, BookII, lectio13;
De ventate
seeDe anima
discussion,
II, 6. W. Bernard
q. 1, a. 11.ForAristotle's
(Rezeptivitt
undSpontaneitt
derWahrnemung
beiAris
toties,
Baden-Baden
thatincidental
1988,75-86)argues
has an intellectual
sensation
He is followed
on
component.
byCharlesKahn(Aristotle
in: Nussbaum-Rorty
cit
1992(op.
., above,n. 5), 368).Fora different
view,see
Thinking,
S. Cashdollar,
Aristotle's
Account
18 (1973),156-75.
, in:Phronesis,
ofIncidental
Perception

18:08:44 PM

136

B. SOUTH
JAMES

littlemoment.Basicallythe internalsense power unitesinto a phantasm


the likenessesof the proper sensiblesof a sensibleobject, proper sensibles that by theirvery nature are themselvesunited withinsome subwithThomas's view,
stance. Nonetheless,despitesome verbal similarities
Surez is insistentthat the sense does not know the individualas individual and hence has no cognitionof the individualas an instanceof a
kind.The completedphantasmis no more than a collectionof accidents.
Recall thatwhen discussingthe term"cogitativepower,"Surez was careful to restrictits meaning to the functionsof the estimativepower as it
existsin humans. What this meant was that it was under the direction,
at least part of the time,of reason. It should come as no surprise,then,
to findthatSurez ascribesto reason and the intellectthe abilityto know
individualsas instancesof a kind. The knowledgeof the substanceof a
singular object is the result of discursiveand inferentialreasoning. It
amountsto knowingthe accidentsof a subjectand notinghow theseaccidentschange over time.By noticingthese changes,the intellectcomes to
recognizethatsomethingstandsundertheseaccidentsand is able to arrive
at the conceptionof a substanceas somethingthat supportsaccidents.31
I shall returnto a discussionof the significanceof placing such a restriction on the internalsense in my concludingremarks.For now, though,
I hope it is sufficient
to note how restrictedis the scope of the internal
sense power forSurez. He in effectblockseveryattemptThomas makes
to enhance the power of the internalsense,reservingthoseextendedpowers to the intellect.The cogitativepower is denied,accordingly,any transitionalrole in the processof cognition.It does not itselfreason or impart
not alreadypresentto the exterto the phantasmany note of intelligibility
nal senses. Such a resultof his account of the internalsense power puts
into starklightthe two problemswe must next address. Given that the
internalsense providesno preparationof the phantasm,that is, it adds
nothingto the informationreceivedby the internedsenses,it seems that
Surez could be accused of positinga power that itselfis superfluous.32
Moreover,the problematicwith which we started,how the intellectcan
fromthe data of sense, is even more manifest.The
extractintelligibility
31DA, IX.4.6(vol.Ill, 160).
i Thomasholdsthatone oftherolesol theinternal
sensesis to prepare
thephanSee thediscussion
illumination
andabstraction
tasms
bytheagentintellect.
priorto their
whereThomasdiscusses
in Klubertanz
1952(<op.dt
., above,n. 6), 259 fora listoftexts
thisissue.

18:08:44 PM

ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
SUREZ

137

gap betweenthe phantasmand the intellectappearsjust as great as that


betweenthe intellectand the externalsenses. He owes us an account of
some role that cannot
the necessityof the internalsense as performing
be carriedout by the externalsensesalone, and he mustexplain the relation betweenintellectand phantasmin such a way thatthe gap between
the two can be crossed.
Powers
Senseto theotherCognitive
2. TheRelationof theInternal
In additionto the number and scope of the internalsenses, there is
anothertraditionalissue thatSurez takesup thatis centralto his account
of internalsensation.That issue is the relationof internalsensationto
externalsensationand to intellectualcognition.Here Surez is best seen
as reactingagainsttwo typesof views.Both viewsproposethatthe process
of cognitionis essentiallya causal one. The idea here is that at each of
the stepsof cognition,the precedingstep plays a directcausal role in the
succeedingstep. The firstview holds to a kind of transmissionaccount
itsspeciesto the interin which,forexample,the externalsense transmits
nal sense whereuponthe internalsense produces the phantasm.On this
view cognitionis essentiallya passive operationin whichsomethingmust
be receivedat each step along the way- the sensiblespeciesin the external senses,the phantasmin the internalsense and the intelligiblespecies
in the intellect.The second view is best seen as a subde variantof the
firstreplacingthepurelypassiveaccountof cognitionwithone thatallows
for a more active role for each cognitivepower in relationto its own
act. So, for example, on such a view, the sensiblespecies in the external sense plays some causal role in the productionof the phantasmin
the internalsense. The causalityinvolvedhere is usuallythat of instrumentalcause to principlecause: the sensiblespecies is the instrumental
cause in the productionof the phantasm.Despite the priorityof the principle cause, the causalityof the precedingcognitivestep is necessary,but
not sufficient
forthe laterstep. The intellectcomplicatesthe issue greatly
since on eitherof these views,theremustbe some way to explain how
an essentiallymaterialentity,the phantasmexistingin the internalsense
power,can effecta change in an immaterialpower such as the intellect.
the role of the phantasmto instrumental
Even restricting
cause and givthe
in its abstraccause
to
the
work
of
the
intellect
principle
agent
ing
tiveprocessrequiresthatwe explain how the agent intellectcan causally
interactwith the materialphantasm.

18:08:44 PM

138

B. SOUTH
JAMES

Again, Surez uses Thomas Aquinas as the backgroundagainstwhich


he will work out his own position.As we saw above, Thomas straightforwardlyassertsthat the common sense, as the root and principleof
Moreover,
sensation,is thepowerin whichall externalsensationterminates.
the common sense is able to discriminateamong the various sensible
aware of the activspecies it receivesand is thatpower thatis reflexively
In
he
the
common
sense fromthe
of
addition,
distinguishes
ity sensing.
sense
suitable
that
the
common
is
physiologically
imaginationby stressing
for the receptionof sensiblespecies,while the imaginationis physiologically suitableforthe retentionof such species. By parallel reasoning,the
receptionof the insensibleintentionsin the cogitativepower are distinI suggest,then,thatthis
guishedfromtheirretentionin sense memory.33
kind of unproblematicreception in the internalsenses of the species
receivedin externalsensationis thatagainstwhichSurez wantsto react.
Surez offerstwo argumentsin supportof rejectingthe notionthatan
externalsensiblespecies can direcdyeffectthe internalsense. The first
statusof the internalsense.
argumentinvolvesthe more perfect{perfectior)
Surez takesit as axiomaticthat the species mustbe proportionalto the
power in whichit inheres.Since the internalpower is more elevatedthan
to perform
the externalpower,the externalsensiblespeciesis insufficient
the role of the totalimmediateprincipleof the internalsensiblespecies.34
Now in thisobjectionhe is rejectingonly the purelypassive view of the
of the sensiblespeciesto the internalsense such thatby itself
transmission
it cannot account forthe phantasm.Nonetheless,thisargumentfromthe
that
"more perfect"statusof the internalsense leaves open the possibility
the externalsensiblespecies plays some causal role in the transitionfrom
externalto internalsensation.The second argumentis a bit more complicated. Surez accepts the standardview that the internalsense power
is located in the brain. Now, given that the externalsense powers are
to
located in the sense organs, some explanationmust be forthcoming
to the
show how a species in an externalsense power can be transmitted
internalsense power. Surez believes that supportersof the traditional
account have two options. First,one could claim that there are interveningmedia betweenthe externalpowers and the internalsense power
fromthe formerto the latter.
such that the species can be transmitted
Surez pressesan empiricalobjectionagainstsuch an accountto the effect
33Summa
deanima
a. 13.
I, q. 78,a. 4; Quaestiones
theologiae
34DA, VI.2.9(vol.II, 478).

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

139

that the media linkingexternalsense organs and powers to the internal


sense power in the brain are neitherdiaphanous nor illuminated.Of
course,in externalsensationthe medium has both of these characteristics and if eitherof these conditionsis missing,it is likelythat sensation
willbe somehowaffected.As a result,Surez pointsout thatifthe species
and opaque media between the
were to travelvia the non-illuminated
externaland internalsense, it would sufferdistortionin the process.35
Obviously,any such distortionwould raise grave skepticalpossibilities.
view have
Surez concedes that supportersof the passive transmission
anotheroptionopen to them.They could argue thattheresimplyare no
media betweeninternaland externalsense powers. In other words, the
externalpower acts directlyon the internalpower. As he quicklypoints
out, though,a theoryalong theselines mustbe able to explain how such
directactivitycan occur given the spatial distancebetween the powers.
If the speciesof the externalsense caused the speciesin the internalsense
at a distance,then wheneversomethingis sensed by the externalsense,
the internalsense would receive the same species. Experience,however,
externalsense can
to demonstratethata perfectly
is sufficient
functioning
receivea specieswithouttherebysensing.He mentionssuch examplesas
the way in whichobjectswithinour fieldof perceptionremainunnoticed
by us, cases of apoplexy,deliriumand even mysticalecstasy.The problem for the supporterof the transmissionaccount is that if the mere
receptionof a speciesin the externalsense immediatelycauses the reception of the same species in the internalsense, then it would be possible
for the deliriousor ecstaticperson to rememberthingsthat they could
have seen,but did not see.36We mustbe carefulhere. Surez is not committinghimselfto the view thatwe onlysense thatof whichwe are actuallyaware. In fact,he takesnoticeof thephenomenathatwe sense aspects
of our environmenteven when we are focused on other aspects.37His
point is ratherthat the only thingsthat we can imagine are those that
we have actuallysensed. Perhaps we can get at his point with an example. Considerthe personwhose only experienceof a sweetfood came at
a timewhen she was runninga fever.Surez's point is that she cannot
35DA,VI.2.9(vol.II, 478).
36DA,VI.2.9(vol.II, 480).
37DA,VI.2.9(vol.II, 480-2).LeenSpruit
toknowledge
,
intelligibles:
fiom
perception
(Species
ofthe
remarks
on thecentrality
vol.2, 299)hassomeinteresting
2 vols.,Leiden1994-95,
hima way
thatitprovides
ofcognition,
inSurez'saccount
notion
of"attention"
arguing
sidesofcognition.
theactiveandpassive
todemarcate
effectively

18:08:44 PM

140

B. SOUTH
JAMES

rememberat some later time what that food would have tasted like if
she was not runninga feverthat blunted her abilityto taste it. In the
same way, the ecstaticperson who sees a burningbush does not see the
bush withoutflamesat the same time.
These objections,focusingas theydo on the factthatthe positedmultiplicationof the species would in fact resultin distortionin the internal
account of the relationof externalsensationto
sense, suggesta different
internalsensation (and, by extension,the relation of internalsense to
intellect).Such an account would consistin the claim that the crucial
preconditionof the activityof internalsense must be the act itselfof
externalsensation,or, as Surez puts the point: "The sensed species of
the internalsense does not arise froman externalobject by a mediate
species,but froman externalsense by a mediate act of its cognition."38
A littlebackgroundon Surez's account of externalsensationwill help
us to understandthis positionmore clearlyand he helpfullyprovidesit
forus:
. . . through
an actofknowing
thereis produced
itsintrinsic
whichis a repterm,
resentative
of [a known]
in secondact.Therefore,
thisqualquality
reality
through
theexternal
senseforms
within
onecanbelieve
withprobability
that
itself,
ity,which
there
isproduced
intheinternal
sensea species
ofthesameobject
. . .39
representative
This passage is ratherconcise and needs to be unpacked a bit. The
basic idea is that the externalsense power in its initial state is purely
potentialin respectto the act of sensing.It must be actualized by the
receptionof an externalsensible species produced by a sensibleobject.
Once a species is receivedin the externalsense, the power is in a position to sense the externalsensibleobject. However,Surez holds thatthe
mere receptionof the sensible species, while necessary,is not sufficient
forthe act of sensingto take place because the power that has received
the sensiblespecies has been actualized,but only up to a point. It is no
longer purelypassive, but it also is not yet actually sensing.This first
level of actualitymust be raised to the act of sensingitself.This actualization is the work of the sense power itself.This second level of actuality is simplythe act of sensingand resultsin a qualitativechange in
the sense power.The major pointforSurez is thatthe qualitativechange
38DA,VI.2.10(vol.II, 482).
39DA,VI.2.10(vol.II,
482):"...quod peractionem
cognoscendi
producitur
quidam
intrinsecus
terminus
reiin actusecundo;
illius,
qui estqualitasrepraesentativa
perhanc
in se ipsoformat,
exterior
crediproduci
ergoqualitatem,
quamsensus
potest
probabiliter
in sensuinteriori
eiusdem
obiecti.
..."
speciem
quamdam
repraesentativam

18:08:44 PM

SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO

141

is chieflythe workof the sense power itselfin cooperationwiththe determinationbroughtto it by the externalsensiblespecies. While he is willing to call the act of sensation,as qualitative change, an "expressed
species,"he does not thinkthatthisspeciesis some productdistinctfrom
the act of sensationitself.The two levels of actualitywithinsensation
explain why he is unwillingto accept that the sensiblespecies is simply
transmitted
to the innersense. If the sensiblespecies is not able to cause
act of externalsensation,it cannot be expectedto cause the
itself
the
by
act of internalsensation.Moreover,since the expressedspecies is only
the completedact of sensation,thereis no leftover "product"in the act
to the internalsense.40
of externalsensationto be transmitted
This briefsummaryof the externalsensoryprocessenables us to understand the basic frameworkfor internalsensation.Just as externalsensaso too does internalsensation.
tionrequirestwo successive"actualizations,"
the
that
Surez
states
when
Hence,
species of internalsensationarises
fromexternalsensation,he is arguingthat the firstlevel of actualityof
internalsensationis dependent on externalsensation,not the sensible
species of externalsensation.Again, caution is in order. We must not
to the
concludethatthe act of externalsensationis somehowtransmitted
internalsense power. Surez has alreadydealt with the problemsraised
by any transmissionaccount: a resultof externalsensationwould still
have to "jump the gap" between the less perfectpower and the more
perfectinternalsense power. Moreover,thereis an importantdifference
betweeninternaland externalsense powers that mustbe factoredinto a
account. Externalsensationrelieson the presenceof a sentransmission
sible object forboth its originand conservation.Such is not the case with
internalsensation.Also,sincea speciesshouldbe proportionalto itspower,
the fact that internaland externalsenses are different
powers requires
Surez's conclusionis clear and succinct:
that theirspecies be different.
the expressedspecies of external
sensation,that is, the actual activityof
sensationare really disthe
and
sensation,
impressedspecies of internal
an
account of the relation
us
with
he
must
As a result,
tinct.41
provide

40ForSurez'saccount
in Alejandro
discussions
see thehelpful
ofexternal
sensation,
lesscosensible
Essaisurla connaissance
1948[op.
d'aprs
at.,above,n. 13),219-27;G. Picard,
4 (1926),1-93;Cubells1962(op.cit
de philosophie,
in:Archives
., above,n. 13),
lastiquesi
A Scholastic
Sense
Allison
, in:Philosophical
Simmons,
Challenge
Perception:
143-55;
Explaining
sensation
can be foundat DA,
ofexternal
73 (1994),257-75.Surez'saccount
Studies,
V.5 (vol.II, 368-412).
41DA,VI.2.11(vol.II, 484).

18:08:44 PM

142

B. SOUTH
JAMES

betweenexternalsensationand internalsensationthatboth allows forthe


activityof externalsensation,but avoids the traditionalview that there
is some sort of transmission
of a species betweenthe externaland internal sense powers.
While it mightbe thoughtthathe has driventoo deep a wedge between
the two sense powers,this is not so. While the inner sense is the more
perfectpower, the act of externalsensationis the more perfectact. So
it is at least possible for the highergrade of actualityto be productive
of a lower level of actuality.That is all Surez needs. He is lookingfor
somethingthat can bring the internalsense power to the firstlevel of
actuality.He findsit in the second level of actualityachieved by the
externalsense.
Nowyousay:ifthese
andinternal]
differ
inkind,
theinternal
[external
species
species
willbe a moreperfect
thanexternal
sensation
becauseitis an actofa more
species
noblepower.
itcannotbe produced
I respond
Therefore,
(producere)
bytheformer.
thefirst
forthecomparison
is notcorrect.
in
bydenying
consequence,
Therefore,
thefirst
actofonepowerto thefirst
actofanother,
thatoneis more
comparing
whichis an actofa moreperfect
andit is thesamein comparing
perfect
power,
thesecondactstoeachother.
incomparing
a secondactofa lessperNevertheless,
fectpowerto thefirst
actofa moreperfect
theformer
willbe moreperfect
power,
becausein itsownnature
itis constituted
in a higher
gradeofactuality.42
However, while he has shown that it is possible for the lower power
to produce a species in the higherpower, he has not yet explained the
productiveprocess.
In fact,it turnsout that to speak of a productiveprocess betweenthe
externaland internalsense powersis quite misleading.We cannot understand the externalsense as productivein the mannerin whichan efficient
cause is productive.His claim, which sounds ratherstrangeon the surface, is that the internalsensiblespecies is reallythe resultof the activity of the internalsense power itself.This is due to the fact that no act
of cognitionever produces any qualitydistinctfromitself.43
This is a cru42DA, VI.2.12(vol.II, 484):
namcompara"Respondetur
negando
primam
sequelam,
tio nonrectefit;comparando
uniuspotentiae
ad actumprimum
ergoactumprimum
illeestperfectior,
et idemestcomparando
actus
alterius,
qui estperfectoris
potentiae;
secundos
interse. Tarnencomparando
actumsecundum
minusperfectae
ad
potentiae
actumprimum
illeeritperfectior,
estin altiori
potentiae
perfections,
quiaex suogenere
Fora helpful
discussion
ofgrades
ofactuality
andpotentiality
in
graduactusconstitutes."
see WalterM. Neidl,DerRealittsbegriff
desFranzSurez
nachden"Disputationes
cognition,
, Munich1966,12-7.
Metaphysicae"
is "probable,"
not
DA,VI.2.13(vol.II, 486)WhileSurezstatesthatthisposition
nonetheless
he seesit as thebestexplanation.
I willsimply
viewit
certain,
Accordingly,
as Surez'sconsidered
opinion.

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

143

ciai elementof his theory.The point he is makinginvolvesthe relation


between the act of cognitionas act and the product of the act, the
betweenact
expressedspeciesor concept.By denyingany real distinction
and resultingproduct,he aims to safeguardthe directnessof cognitional
activityat the same time that he takes away any kind of species that,
separatedfromits originaryact, could be passed along to anotherpower.
The resultof the cognitiveactivitysimplyis the cognitiveactivityand
thereis no otherresultof cognitiveactivity,no distinctspecies,that can
be multipliedto anotherpower.
If the transmission
account of speciesdoes not explain how one power
entersinto the operation of anotherpower (or, in the terminologyhe
used above, how the externalsense can be productiveof the activityof
the internalsense),we stillneed an account of how the imaginationcan
theproduce its own species. Here, Surez has recourseto an interesting
While
the
of
the
soul.
various
the
between
the
relation
about
powers
ory
and
the
internal
sense
powers,for example the various externalsenses,
the intellect,are all reallydistinctfromone another,nonetheless,theyall
flowfromthe same soul and consequendy,to use his term,are "rooted"
in the same soul. He states:
in thesamesoul,andthusitis
arerooted
senses
andexterior
Theinterior
{radicare)
Thereis,
andimagines
vision
thesamesoulthatseesthrough
through
imagination.
theveryfact
sincefrom
a natural
therefore,
(consensio
) amongthesepowers
harmony
forms
a likeness
itimmediately
somereality
thatthesoulperceives
(similitude
>)ofthat
not
means
the
of
the
in
its
itself,
by
imagination
through
power
reality imagination
sensafrom
theimagination.
ofa powerdistinct
So, forexample,
givenan external
ofthesoulitself
sensefrom
theactivity
intheinterior
results
tion,a species
naturally
inthepresence
ofsensation,
theactivity
notfrom
theimagination,
although
through
sensed.44
ofthereality
44DA, VI.2.13(vol.II, 486):"Sensusinterior
in eademanimaradicantur,
et exterior
estergo
et perimaginationem
undeeademestanimaquaevidetpervisum,
imaginatur;
interhaspotentias,
haecnaturalis
consensio
quodeo ipsoquodanimaaliquidvisuperab
illiusreiinimaginatione
similitudinem
statim
format
sua,nonmediante
potentia
cipit,
ita ut positasensatione
eiusdem
sed pervirtutem
distincta,
imaginations,
imaginatione
sed
in interiori
resultet
naturaliter
sensationis,
sensu,nonex activitate
extrinsica,
species
See
tamenreisensatae."
ad praesentiam
ex activitate
ipsiusanimaeperimaginationem,
remains
ofthesoul'spowers
alsoIIL3.21(vol.II, 148).The mostextensive
Joseph
study
inderErkenntnislehre
desSurez
derSeelenvermgen
Dasakausale
,
(sympathia)
Zusammenwirken
Ludwig,
Surez'swriting
andshowsthatthis
discusses
Munich1929.Ludwig
throughout
passages
inearlier
thosetyphasroots
ofthesoul'spowers
viewoftherelation
thinkers,
especially
that
classified
as "Augustinin."
., above,n. 38),302recognizes
(<
op.cit
Spruit1994-95
ically
thesoul'spowor "harmony"
between
ofa kindof"sympathy"
in addition
to speaking
thisharmony.
finds
this
"root"thatcanexplain
ofa common
ers,Surezalsotalks
Spruit
andGilesofRome
ofideastakenfrom
a melding
JohnPeterOlivi(sympathy)
together
in thesamesoul).I takeit thatin factthesemetaphors
ofpowers
pointto the
(rooting

18:08:44 PM

144

B. SOUTH
JAMES

The basic negThis importantpassage is not immediatelytransparent.


ative point is clear, though:the actionsof the externalsenses are not the
cause of the productionof a specieswithinthe internalsense power itself.
For thatwe need to posit the soul itself,presentequally to both powers,
which is somehow able to provide the internalsense with the resultof
the activityof the externalsenses.
Surez is sketchyon the detailsof this process,simply
Unfortunately,
the
notion
of the soul's presence to the internalsense sufficeas
letting
an explanatorydevice. Nonetheless,the basic idea is sufficiendy
clear:
while vision, for example, performsthe operationof visual perception,
the soul, as its source, perceives. In other words, the soul "perceives"
throughvision. Now, Surez cannot mean "perceives"here in a purely
literalmanner.Afterall, the sense power of visionperceivesand one of
Surez's argumentsconcerningthe nature of external sensible species
points out that theycannot immutethe soul directlyinsofaras theyare
materialrealities,but insteadmustimmutethe sense power.45Hence, he
must mean somethingmore like an awareness that the soul has of its
powers' operations.Somethingmore is at work in this view as well, I
believe. He is pointingto the fact that the soul's cognitivepowers are
also dependenton the soul itselffor theirexistenceinsofaras theyflow
fromthe soul at the firstmomentof the soul's creation.In otherwords,
while the powers retain theirdistinctnessfromthe soul, it remainsthe
case that the soul is theirsource and origin.Consequendy,there must
existsome relationbetweenthe soul and its powerssuch that the soul is
both aware of the powers' activitiesand in some way is productiveof
those activitiesas well.
We shall soon see how he cashes out the "awareness"about which I
am now speaking.Now, though,I want to bring out one furtherissue
stemmingfromhis claims about the relationbetween cognitivepowers.
There is, afterall, a fundamentaldifference
betweeninternaland external sense. The externalsenses are dependenton objects in the external
world for theiroperations.The internalsense, though,being a step further along in the cognitionalprocess is dependentproximatelyon the
externalsense powers, not the externalworld. At the same time,how-

samegeneral
is nocausalinteraction
there
between
thesoul'spowers.
point:
Consequently,
thesoulitself
mustplaysomerolein theactivities
ofthesevarious
sensepowers.
45DA,II.3.10(vol.1, 174).

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION

145

ever, it can also act independentlyof the externalsenses in such cases


as dreaming,remembering
past sensoryimages,and otherlike operations.
Hence, the role that soul plays in internalsensorycognitionis going to
than the one it plays in externalsensation.Recall that
be quite different
in externalsensation,the sense power is broughtto its firstlevel of actualitywhen it receivesthe sensiblespecies.At thatpoint,the sense power
itselftakesover and raisesitselfto the second level of actuality.Now, the
internalsense power does not, as we have seen, receive a species from
the externalsenses,nor does it receiveone fromthe soul. There is simof any species at all. This crucial differencein the
ply no transmission
of the role
internaland externalsensespointsus to a basic understanding
of the soul in internalsensation.It mustin some way contributeto the
level of firstactualityin the internalsense. Tying thingstogethera bit,
the soul's awarenessmustcontributeto the elevationof the internalsense
to the firstlevel of actuality,that is, to its productionof a phantasm.
At thispoint Surez owes us an account of the mechanismby which
the soul acts. He has already begun by assertingan essentiallynegative
cause of the act of the internalsense
point,namely,thereis no efficient
other than the power itself.Therefore,we should not view the soul's
cause of the
awarenessof the act of seeing,forexample,as the efficient
cause, what
imagination'sact of imagining.If the soul is not an efficient
kind of role does it play in the imagination'soperation?To answer this
question,we musthave recourseto his accountof the activityof the intellect. Like the imagination,the intellectis a power reallydistinctfromthe
soul as well as the otherpowers of the soul. So far,he has argued that
the sensoryapparatusconsistsof two clustersof cognitionalactivity,each
but relativelyconnected:externalsensation,and
self-contained,
essentially
sensationis dependenton its own activexternal
internalsensation.Now,
ityin concurrencewiththe actual sensibleobject's species while internal
sensationis dependenton the activityof externalsensation,but thatactivityhas no directeffecton the internalsense. Instead, the internalsense
is somehowaware of the resultof the externalsense throughthe intermediaryawarenessof the soul itself.The intellectis a thirdsuch component
of cognitiveactivityand, as we mightexpect,is not directlydependent
on the activityof the internalsense. Indeed, the internalsense has no
directeffecton the intellect,althoughthe intellectis dependenton the
activityof the internalsense in much the same way that the internal
sense is dependenton the externalsenses. The reason for this complicated pictureof the activityof the intellectis clear enough, given that

18:08:44 PM

146

B. SOUTH
JAMES

the phantasmitselfis materialand the intellectis immaterial,46


but that
cannot be the only reason. Rather, the intellectis just a special case of
the primaryindependenceand relativedependenceof the soul's powers.
There will be, then, a strikingparallel in the relationbetween internal
and externalsensationand the relationbetween internalsensationand
intellect.If we can understandthe latter,we should be in a positionto
understandthe formeras well.
Surez goes to great lengthsto argue that not only does the internal
sense have no directrole in the workof the agent intellect,but also that
the agent intellectdoes not do anythingto the phantasmin orderto produce the intelligiblespecies,therebyrepudiatingany theoryof the agent
intellectin which it is assertedthat "thereis a certainspiritualpower in
us . . . whose work is to illuminate{illustrare)
phantasmsand in this way
to make {efficere)
the intelligiblespecies."47The basic implicationof such
a view is that the agent intellectand the phantasmmust concur in the
) of the intelligiblespecies since if the agent intellect
production{producere
were able to produce the intelligiblespecies withoutany dependence on
the phantasmit would simultaneously
be able to produce the species of
all realitiesand would have no dependenceon sensationat all.48So, while
he wants to preservesuch a concurrence,he mustbe carefulto explain
what the concurrentactivityis and he does thisby firstdiscussingwhat
the activityis notHe accepts the followingas essentialdata that mustbe
saved in any explanationof the relationof phantasmand agent intellect:
(a) The agent intellectnever creates (<efficere
) a species unless it is determined by the cognitionof internalsense.49
cannot arise fromthe efficacyof the phantasm,
(b) Such a determination
that is, the phantasmis not the efficient
cause of the agent intellect's
act.50
Now, (a) is relativelyunproblematicgiven the essentialunion between
body and soul, and is a mainstayin Aristotelian
inspiredaccountsof intellectual cognition.He states:
46Forthemateriality
ofthephantasm,
seeDA, IX.2.2(vol.Ill, 78),where
Surezstates
that"thephantasm
is material"
autemmateriale
bluntly
("phantasma
est").
47DA,IX.2.3(vol.Ill, 82). Fordiscussion
abouttheroleof theagentintellect,
see
1948{op.
cit.,above,n. 13),329-33;Cubells1962(<op.cit.
, above,n. 13),190-3;
Alejandro
1994-95
above,n. 37),vol.II, 301-5.
Spruit
(op.cit.,
48DA.IX.2.4
(vol.Ill, 82).
49DA,IX.2.11 (vol.Ill, 94).
50DA,IX.2.12 (vol.Ill, 94).

18:08:44 PM

FRANCISCO
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ON IMAGINATION

147

Thesoul,whileitis in thebody,hasan intrinsic


on thephantasy,
that
dependence
unless
itoperates
theintellect
a phanis,itcannot
actually
through
operate
through
tasmat thesametime.
themselves
are understood,
. . . Notbecausethephantasms
themthephantasy
withtheintelthatis,arecognized,
butbecausethrough
operates
lectsimultaneously.51
It is (b) thatis the crux of Surez's positionand in supporthe appeals
to the exact same principlethat he used to explain the relationbetween
externaland internalsenses. The internalsense and the agent intellect
are rootedin the same soul and hence theyhave an order{ordo)and harAs a result,thereis no directcausal
) in theiroperations.52
mony(iconsonando
connectionin eitherdirection,thatis, the phantasmhas no directcausal
role in theworkof the agentintellectand the agentintellecthas no direct
causal action in regard to the phantasm. Instead, there is some sort
of "determination"involvedin the relationbetween agent intellectand
phantasm:
of
itis determined
a species
unless
never
effects
Theagentintellect
bythecognition
to
is indifferent
thephantasy.
. . . Nowthereasoncan be: fortheagentintellect
"these"or "those",
it
so thatit might
effect
all speciesandconsequently,
effecting
itcanbe determined
elsebywhich
Butthere
is nothing
somedeterminant.
requires
thephantasy's
cognition.53
except
Notice thathere in discussingthe relationbetweenphantasmand agent
intellectwe have an emphasison the second level of actuality(the phanin exactlythe same way in which the
tasy'scognition)as determinative
externalsensoryoperationsare relatedto the internalsense. Yet in that
case we saw that the determinationwas in fact ratherindirect.There
was no transmissionof species fromthe externalsense to the internal
sense, but ratherthe soul's "awareness"played the key role. The same
intellectrelation:the phantasm,by virtue
is true forthe phantasy/agent
of its existencein the internalsense, acts as a kind of "matter"in relation to the agent intellect,"eitherthroughexcitingthe soul or at least as
an exemplar."54
Now, the relationbetweenthe phantasmand the agent
intellectis not an arbitraryor accidentalone:
51DA, IX.7.6(vol.Ill, 202):"Anima
habetintrinsecam
dumestincorpore
dependennisisimulactuoperetur
id est,nonpotest
tiama phantasia,
operari
per
perintellectum
id est,cognoscantur,
sedquod
. . . Nonquodipsaphantasmata
intelligantur,
phantasma.
cumintellectu."
simuloperetur
periliaphantasia
52DA, IX.2.12(vol.Ill, 96).
53DA, IX.2.11(vol.Ill, 94):"Intellectus
efficit
nisia phantasiae
species
agensnumquam
nam
intellectus
estindifferens
esse
.
.
.
Ratio
autem
determinetur.
agens
potest,
cognitione
hasvelillasindiget
et ideo,utefficiat
omnesspecies,
ad efficiendas
aliquodeterminante;
nisia phantasiae
determinari
nihilestautemaliuda quo possit
cognitione;
ergo."
54DA, IX.2.12(Vol.Ill, 96).

18:08:44 PM

148

B. SOUTH
JAMES
modeofdetermination
insofar
as
there
is another
It is saidthatin thesoul'spowers
acthasa necofanother,
orinsofar
as onepower's
thematter
onepowerprepares
withtheother's
act.55
connection
essary

The picturethat is emergingfromthese ratherenigmaticstatements


is one in which thereis no causal connectionbetweenpowers,although
there is a necessaryone. Hence when Surez talks of "matter"in this
context,we cannot take him to mean "materialcause," but insteadmust
understandmatterhere in some loose sense at a determininginfluence.
In addition,we have an added piece of the puzzle in his mentionof an
"excitingof the soul" that takes place when one power operates.
Returningto the activityof the internalsense in relationto the external sensesin lightof the discussionof the relationbetweenphantasmand
agentintellect,the phantasmis producedby the imaginationdirectlyusing
the data of the externalsenses as a kind of matter.The kind of necessaryconnectionreferredto in the discussionof the agent intellectapplies
here as well, yet the talk of "necessaryconnection"is somewhatproblematic. Clearly,the assertionof the necessaryconnectionbetweensense
and imaginationand imaginationand intellectis designedto accomplisha
couple of philosophictasks.First,and foremost,it is designedto alleviate
the discomfort
that mightbe caused in his rejectinga view accordingto
which one act of cognitiondirectlycauses the next until we reach the
finalstep of intellectualcognition.In other words,in denyinga continknowluous and directline of causationfromsensibleobject to intellectual
it
that
he
is
a
be
note
of
introducing
edge, might thought
skepticisminto
his accountof cognition.However,by pointingto the necessaryconnection
of the independentoperationsand powers of externalsensation,internal
sensationand intellect,he seems to avoid such a consequence.Of course,
the mere assertionof a necessaryconnectionis not sufficient,
but we are
not yet in a position to judge his success in avoiding skepticalconsequences. I shall returnto a considerationof the issue of skepticismin the
conclusionof the paper. The second philosophicaltask accomplishedis
to markthe factthat the power itself,while responsibleforproducingits
act, stillmaintainssome dependence on acts thathave preceded. Indeed,
to the contentsof sensoryexperience,and even
the phantasmis restricted
its creativeaspects is limitedby its prior sensorycognitions.

55DA, IX.2.13(Vol.Ill, 98):"Dicitur in potentiis


animaeestaliusmodusdeterquod
minationis
velinquantum
actiounius
unapotentia
materiam
alteri,
inquantum
praeparat
habetnecessariam
connexionem
cumactione
alterius."
potentiae

18:08:44 PM

ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
SUAREZ

149

There is one remainingproblemthatmustbe addressedbeforewe can


understandhis account fully.Surez's theoryof cognition,and more particularlyof the productionof the phantasm and intelligiblespecies, is
dependenton therebeing a structuralsort of analogy betweenimagination and intellect.In facthe tellsus thatthe intelligiblespecies arises "in
the same way" as the phantasm.56
Now, the problemariseswhen we consider that the agent intellectis productiveof the intelligiblespecies,but
thereis no power in the internalsense analogous to the agent intellect,
at least in the traditionaldelineationof sense powers. This would seem
to threatenthe structural
analogybetweenthe twopowers.In fact,though,
he arguesthatin the internalsense power thereis an abilitythatdeserves
to be called an agent internalsense and that it producesphantasms.Of
course,he recognizesthatthereis no warrantin eitherthe textof Aristotle
or in the authorityof Thomas for calling the internalsense an "agent"
power:
that
thathenever
ofAristotle,
Buttothenegative
spokeofthis,I respond
authority
It is truethat
he alsoofneverspokeofnortreated
manyothermatters.
precisely
of
St. Thomas(Summa
I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 1) seemsto denythisactivity
Theologiae
to thefirst
ofsensesin regard
he is speaking
sense,butperhaps
speciesto every
thenarisestheprowhich
there
from
theobject,
thatarisesfrom
ofspecies
reception
ofsomeotherspecies.57
duction
The ratherdefensivetone of this passage is noticeable and suggests
out on his own and thatallusionsto the trathathe knowshe is striking
ditionare not goingto be relevantforthe explicationof his theory.Now,
raisesa problem.Surez,
thepositingof an agentsensepowerimmediately
as we have seen, argued extensivelyfor the unityof the internalsense

56DA, IX.2.12(vol.Ill, 96).


57DA,VI.2.16(vol.II, 492-4):"Adauctoritatem
veronegativam
Aristotelis,
quia hoc
Verum
tractavit.
alianondixit
etiam
nequeexacte
dixit,
quodmulta
respondetur
numquam
hancactivitatem
I p.,q. 79,a. 3, ad 7, videtur
estquodD. Thomas,
denegare
specierum
ad primam
desensibus
Sedforte
sensibus.
omnibus
specierum,
receptionem
quantum
loquitur
inthe
alterius
exqua oritur
Thomas,
speciei
productio."
cuiuscumque
quaefitab obiecto,
thesoul;andhencethere
in actoutside
arefound
"Sensible
states:
things
passagecited,
inthenutritive
itis clearthat,
is so needforan agentsense.Therefore
part,all thepowbutin theintellectual
in thesensitive
whereas
ersareactive,
part,
partall arepassive,
inveniunactiveandsomething
is something
there
["Dicendum
quodsensibilia
passive."
sensum
Et sicpatetquod
et ideononoportuit
turactuextraanimam;
agentem.
ponere
inparteautemsensitiva,
omnespassivae;
suntactivae;
omnespotentiae
inpartenutritiva
Thomasis clearin
et aliquidpassivum."]
estaliquidactivum,
in parteverointellectiva
elseintowhatThomassaysis an
to readsomething
thispassageandSurez'sattempt
thetwoviews.
between
oftherealdistance
indication

18:08:44 PM

150

B. SOUTH
JAMES

power,yet the existenceof an agent sense power appears to threatenthat


unity.Is he afterall committedto therebeing two powers:an agentinternal sense and a potentialinternalsense? The answer is no, but to see
that, we need to take another briefdetour throughhis account of the
intellect.
Surez is aware of a range of views concerningthe agent and potential intellects.He recognizesthat both Aristotleand Thomas, for examand that
ple, speak of the two intellectsas distinctrealities[resdistinctae)
Averroes,followinga Greek tradition,argues thattheyare separate substances distinctfrom the human soul.58Nonetheless,he views as most
the teachingof AugustinoNifo, in his De intelprobable {valdeprobabilis)
lect that in factthe agent and potentialintellectsare one and the same
power.59The argumentsin supportof this teachingnot only provide us
with the means of understandinghow the agent intellectfunctions,but
also, by extension,how the internalagent sense is and is not relatedto
sensoryexperience.While Surez presentsseveral argumentsin support
of thisthesis,he places greatestemphasison the way in whichhis account
providesa role forthe agent intellect,both in thislifeand in the one to
come. The basic idea is that the human intellectis midwaybetweenthat
of angels and that of animals with purelysensitivesouls. Angelic intellects have no need of abstractingspecies fromphantasms,so species exist
) in them,while the sensitivesoul, having no such innate
innately(;inditae
species requires the agency of external objects to initiate the sensory
process. The crucial passage reads:
Theangelic
intellect
hasfrom
itsnature
innate
ofallrealities
as itwere,
that,
species
flowfrom
theproper
as (quasi)
an essence.
flowfrom
poweroftheintellect
passions
thesensitive
theexternal
lackspecies
and
However,
senses,
power,
especially
(maximi)
receive
them
from
outside
Nowourintellect
alsobyitsnature
lacksspecies
objects.
- nevertheless
in whichit alsofallsshortoftheperfection
ofan angelic
intellect
it
hasa certain
withit,namely,
thatas soonas oursoulknows
somerealagreement
thephantasy
a species
thatreality
flows
from
the
itythrough
representing
(dimanare)
intellect
itself.
is morein themanner
ofa certain
emanation
ofthe
So, thisagency
from
theintellect,
andthusthatagency
is nota distinct
species
power.60
58He discusses
theviewofAristotle
andThomasat DA,IX.8.16(vol.Ill, 232-4)and
at DA,IX.8.3(vol.Ill, 214).
theviewofAverroes
59DA,IX.8.17(vol.Ill, 234).ForNifoonthedenialofa realdistinction
between
agent
in therational
and potential
intelllects
invia
soul,see Augustini
NiphiSuessani
philosophi
Aristotelis
De intellectu
librisex,Venice1554,IV, f. 35 v. Fordiscussion,
see EdwardP.
Doctrinethe
PierNicolaCastellani
andAgostino
in:
Intellect,
Mahoney,
NifoonAverroes
of Agent
Rivista
Critica
di StoriadellaFilosofia,
andSaintThomas
25 (1970),400-3;id.,Agostino
Nifo
in:Memorie
7 (1976),210-1.
Domenicane,
Aquinas,
60DA,IX.8.18(vol.III, 234-6):
enimintellectus
ex natura
suahabetinditas
"Angelicus

18:08:44 PM

SUAREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO

151

of the nature of the agent


Here we have a prettyradical rethinking
intellect.The agent intellectbecomes, in effect,the name given to an
internalagency withinthe intellect,an emanation,by which the species
arises in the intellectwhen the internalsense power performsits proper
operation.This passage providesus with the only discussionof an alternativemechanismto the literalreceptionof a species.The intellectsimply
does not receive a species fromoutside itself.And, just as the intellect
does not receive the phantasmfromthe internalsense so too it follows
thattheinternalsense does not receivethe sensiblespeciesfromthe external senses.
the notion of the agent intelOne reason, he believes,for rethinking
lect is that the naturalness,as it were, of the agent intellectis protected,
since if it were distinctfromthe potentialintellect,afterthe currentlife,
it would have nothingto do. However, the idlenessof a distinctagent
intellectin the afterlife
would mean thattheintellectin thislifeis arranged
in an ad hoc manner.The idea here is that the agent intellectonly has
a job to do, on a more traditionalinterpretation,
when it abstractsand
illuminatesthe phantasm.Hence, the soul separatedfromthe body and
deprivedof phantasmswould have no need for an agent intellect.By
withinthe intelclaimingthat the agent intellectis simplyan efficiency
lectitselfby whichthe speciesthroughwhichwe knowarise,he is preserving a role forit independentof any particularstatein which the intellect
as a whole findsitself.61
In addition,the comparisonof the way thatspeciesflowfromthe intellect withthe mannerin which a passioflowsfroman essence is of some
betweena passioand common accident
importance.Surez differentiates
a
that
cannot
be
by noting
passio
separatedfroman essence,while a common accidentcan be so separatedand the reason forthis inseparability
is based on the factthat the passiois "rooted" (radicare
) in the essence in
a way that a common accidentis not.62While we should be carefulnot
to push too farthe analogybetweenspeciesand intellecton the one hand
and essence and passioon the other,nonethelessthe analogy does signify
omnium
a virtutute
rerum,
intellectus,
species
quaequasidimanant
propria
quasipassiones
ab essentia;
exteriores
et speciebus
autemsensitiva,
maxime
carentet illasab
potentia
- in
intellectus
autemnoster
et ex natura
extrinscis
obiectis
sua speciebus
caret
recipiunt;
- , habettarnen
convenientiam
cumilio,sciliquoeta perfectione
angelidclint
aliquam
ac animanostra
remaliquam,
cetquodstatim
dimanat
ab ipso
cognoscit
perphantasiam
remillam.Undehaecefficientia
intellectu
speciesrepraesentans
potiusestpermodum
etitanonestpotentia
cuiusdam
emanationis ab intellectu,
distincta
illaefficientia."
61DA, IX.8.18(vol.speciei
III, 236).
62DA,III.1.21(vol.II, 78-80).

18:08:44 PM

152

B. SOUTH
JAMES

the extremelyclose connection,perhapseven inseparability,


of the species
and the intellectfromwhich it flows.
One importantconsequence of this line of thoughtis that the denial
of a causal connectionbetween the phantasm and the agent intellect,
otherthatthe concomitanceof the internalsense and the intellect,shows
a commitmentto a formof "occasionalism"insofaras the work of the
internalsense is an occasion for,but not a cause of, the activityof the
intellect.However, he does provide us with some context for understandinghow the one power occasions the otherby tellingus that it is
as matteror exemplarthatthe externalsense relatesto the internalsense.
Such an occasionalismeven in the case of internalsensationmay strike
us as odd, but it followsfromhis fundamentalpremiseof the non-causal
relationexistingamong all cognitivepowers and he is driven to assert
that non-causal connectionbecause he can findno causal account that
works.Moreover,this occasionalismalong with the fact that the species
flowsfromthe intellectitselfimmediatelyraisesthe possibilitythatSurez
is committedto some formof innatism.In otherwords,the species are
already presentin the intellectand simplyneed some determinate,but
non-causalexperience,say the soul's awarenessof the activityof the internal sense, to be produced.
It is necessaryto be carefulin the ascriptionof innatismto his account
and we mustbe clear on the definitionof innatismin this case.63On at
the term"innate" extendsnotjust to actual prleast one understanding,
but
also
to latentand dispositionalknowledge.Latent
existentknowledge,
knowledgeis that which is presentin the soul but not such as to have
been known prior to the experiencethat causes the knowledgeto surface, while dispositionalknowledgeis a kind of structuralprincipleor
the typeof knowledgewe
principlesthat accounts forand predetermines
can have.64Now, it is clear that Surez is not committedto any formof

63Previous
Surez's
account
havebeenspliton thewhether
amounts
toa verscholars
andFrench
Classical
sionofinnatism,
, NewYork
(Saint
Thought
Augustine
NigelAbercrombie
thatSurezis clearly
committed
to a form
ofthe1938edition],
1972[reprint
82) states
on thepasofinnatism.
See also,Ludwig1929(op.cit
., above,n. 44),56-7whocomments
1994-95
above,n. 37),vol.II, 304rejects
anyinnatism
(op.cit.,
sagecitedinnote60.Spruit
in Surez.However,
passagediscussed
by
appearstomissthefactthatthecrucial
Spruit
butalsoaboutthehumanintellect.
is notjustaboutangelic
Alejandro
cognition,
Ludwig
and
1948(op.cit.,
above,n. 13),186-8,
dinmica)
(potencia
onlyofa "dynamic
power"
speaks
force"
an "innate
(Juerza
ingnita).
64Fordifferent
inDominic
Recollection
seethehelpful
remarks
varieties
of"innatism"
Scott,
anditsSuccessors
andExperience:
Plato's
1995,91-5.
, Cambridge
Theory
ofLearning

18:08:44 PM

SUAREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO

153

explicitpre-existent
knowledge.Afterall, he wantsto save a place forthe
concurrenceof imaginationand intellectand the linkbetweenthemseems
ratherstrongerthan talk about a kind of platonic recollection.Indeed,
he explicitlyrejectsPlato's account of knowledgesayingthat it ignores
the naturalunion of soul and body. Moreover,he endorses the claim,
attributedto Aristode,that the intellectis a tabularasa.65Nonetheless,the
factremainsthatthe knowledgeof the senses,both externaland internal,
is not causallyconnectedto the activityof the intellect.The intellectproduces the intelligiblespecies fromwithinitselfwith the mere "determination" or "example" of the senses to work with. Consequently,he is
jugglingtwo concernsand theymix ratheruneasily.The conclusionthat
theremustbe some formof innatismin the case of intellectis inescapable.
Consider the followingpassage fromDescartes by way of comparison:
... ifwebearwellinmindthescopeofoursenses
andwhatitisexactly
thatreaches
ourfaculty
ofthinking
wemustadmitthatinnocasearetheideas
bywayofthem,
ofthings
to us bythesenses
themin ourthinking.
So
presented
justas we form
muchso thatthere
is nothing
in ourideaswhichis notinnate
to themindor the
ofthinking,
withthesoleexception
ofthosecircumstances
whichrelateto
faculty
suchas thefactthatwejudgethatthisorthatideawhich
wenowhave
experience,
ourmindrefers
before
toa certain
situated
outside
us.We make
immediately
thing
sucha judgement
notbecausethesethings
transmit
theideasto ourmindthrough
thesenseorgans,
butbecause
transmit
atexactly
thatmoment,
which,
they
something
to form
theseideasbymeansofthefaculty
innate
to it.66
givesthemindoccasion
The similarities
are strikingbetween the teachingof
(and differences)
thispassage and Surez's account.While Surez betraysno concernabout
the potentialdisagreementbetweenthe intelligiblespecies and the phantasm that determinesit, he nonethelessis as emphatic as Descartes is
about the way in which these species flow fromthe intellectitselfwith
internalsensoryexperienceprovidingonly the occasion for the production of the species.Indeed, in a discussionof the way in which accidents
flowfroman essence,Surez givesan important
explanationof theprocess:
Formisnotactive
unless
there
isa naturally
resultant
from
iscalled
it,which
activity
a "flowing"
without
an action
is difficult
tounder(dimanatio
), foran effective
flowing
stand.Similarly,
it is saidthatthesamereality
doesnotactin itself
exceptin this
65DA, IX.2.2(vol.Ill, 80).
ona Certain
Comments
Broadsheet
, in: ThePhilosophical
, tr.John
Writings
ofDescartes
RobertStoothoff
and DugaldMurdoch,
1985,vol. 1, 304 (=
Cottingham,
Cambridge
Oeuvres
de Descartes,
ed. C. AdamandP. Tannery,
Paris1964-76),
vol.VIII B, 358-9.
Abercrombie
1972[1938](op.citabove,n. 63),86 suggests
thatSurez's
version
of"occasionalism"
isconsiderably
lessvaguethanDescartes's.
Foradditional
discussion
ofthispasseeScott1995(op.cit.,
above,n. 64),91-6.
sagein Descartes,

18:08:44 PM

154

B. SOUTH
JAMES
thatis,a result,
orcertainly
thatitdoesnotactunless
as a power
genusofaccident,
ofgenerating.67

The implicationfromthispassage is thatthe productionof the species


is a "naturallyresultantactivity"fromthe power itself.It is hard to see
how the species, then, could be consideredanythingbut innate, not in
the sense of the platonic theoryas he understandsit, but as some sort
of dispositionalor latent theory.
Now, thereis one crucialway in whichthe analogybetweenDescartes's
and Surez's accountsbreaksdown. Descartes is talkingabout full-blown
innate ideas, that is, bits of knowledge.Surez, however,is discussing
only the generationof the intelligiblespecies and does not identifythese
speciesis onlya "parspecieswithactual knowledge.Since the intelligible
immediate
instrument"
immediatum
instru(partialiter
complens
tiallycompleting
to
that
our
are
innate
mentum
he is not committed the claim
J,68
concepts
in any way otherthan Thomas would be. They are innate because they
are produced by the intellectitself.Where he divergesfrom Thomas
would be the denial of causality between the internal sense and the
intellect.
This account of the agent intellectis all we have fromwhich we can
extrapolatehow the internalsense is properlynamed an "agent" internal sense. We have noted above that the externalsenses have no direct
causal role in the formationof an act of internalsensationotherthan as
a kind of "matter"or determinationof the internalsense. It follows,as
odd as it may sound, that the species withinthe internalsense by which
it imagines,remembers,cogitatesand performsits other functionsmust
in factbe its own product,a productoccasioned by, but not caused by,
the activityof the externalsenses.Now, Surez does statethatthe senses
lack species and thus need the agency of somethingexternal.However,
he qualifiesthat claim by pointingout that such a requirementapplies
to the externalsenses.69In factby immediatelyadding
especially[maxime)

67DA, III.3.14(vol.II, 136):"Forma


ex
naturaliter
resultanti
nonestactivanisiactione
difficile
Et
namdimanatio
effectiva
sineactione
dimanado,
ilia;quae dicitur
intelligitur.
dicitur
similiter
actionis,
scilicet,
perresultanquodidemnonagitin se,nisiistogenere
tiam,velcertequodnonagit,nisiutvirtus
generantis."
68DA,V.4.16(vol.II, 366).Picard1926{op.cit.,
1948
above,n. 40),38-41,Alejandro
above,n. 13),112-7all correctly
above,n. 13),196-9and Cubells1962(op.cit.,
(op.ciL,
ofcognition.
inthecontext
oftheimmanent
stress
theinstrumentality
ofthespecies
process
b9See
quoteabove,note59.

18:08:44 PM

SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO

155

this qualification,he is pointingto the much more complicatedpicture


of internalsensationwithwhich he furnishesus, one in which the internal sense lacks a species in only a qualifiedmanner,namelybecause it
needs some determination
fromthe externalsenses in order to produce
itsown specieswithinitself.So, unlikeexternalsensoryexperience,which
requiresthat the power receive a species fromthe sensible object, the
it followsfrom
internalsense producesits own species.Most importandy,
internal
and
intellectthat
sense
between
the structural
parallelsobtaining
the productsof the internalsense are innate. Such a conclusioncannot
help but sound odd to us, but I can see no otherway to account forthe
strictsimilaritiesthat Surez mentionsin discussingthe two powers. It
follows,then,thatinternalsensiblespecies,phantasms,flowfromthe very
agency of the internalsense power in accordance with a determination
fromthe soul. The soul itselfis affectedby (is excitedby),but not effected
by externalsensation.Hence, it reallydoes seem that if we have a noneffective
"exciting,"that the soul itselfmustbe activelyaware of what is
happeningin itspowers.Only such an activeawarenessaccountsforboth
role in both internal
of the soul and its determinative
the non-passivity
sensationand intellect.
There is, then,a striking
parallelbetweenthe need foran agent internal sense and an agent intellect.Both are requiredbecause the intellect
and the internalsense cannot know withoutsome determinationfrom
outside themselves,yet at the same time, nothingoutside the relevant
power is causallypresentin the two powers.Consequently,Surez posits
a "resultantiawithineach of the two powers.He can then
an efficiency,
argue that the power itselfproduces the species by which it knows so
that all causalityresidesin the power itself.At the same time, though,
while the species arises fromthe power itself,theremustbe some determinationthat prompts,as it were, the power to create one species and
not another.In the movementfromexternalsensationthroughinternal
sensationto intellectualcognition,each power produces an act of cognition and a proper species throughwhich it knows. However, the effect
of that cognitiveact is severelycircumscribed.One power's act of cognitionis not the cause of the next power's act. Instead,each act of cognitionmerelyhas some effecton the soul in which the power is rooted
such that the soul determinesthe succeedingpower's cognitiveact. In
the case of both internalsensationand intellectualcognition,he uses the
term"agent" to point to a certainactivitypresentwithinthe power itself
that allows it to know,and he is willingto call that activityby a name

18:08:44 PM

156

B. SOUTH
JAMES

that usually denotes a distinctpower. One cannot help but sense that
Surez is strainingto be creativewithina traditionalscholasticvocabulary, and that the traditionalvocabularyboth providesan access to his
thoughtand obscures,at firstanyway,the novel ways in which he is
using it.70
Conclusion
In thispaper, I have triedto providean overviewof the main themes
of Surez's account of internalsensationby stressingtwo main issues.
The firstinvolveshis reductionof a multiplicity
of such internalpowers
to just one power. The second involves the complex relationshipthat
obtains between the internalsense power and the other cognitivepowers (the externalsenses and the intellect).I now want to conclude by a
makinga few general remarksabout his account. The most strikingfeatureof his theoryis the way in which he downplaysany progressivecognitiverole for the internalsense. The strongimpressionwe get is that
the internalsensejust replicatesand synthesizesthe information
received
fromthe externalsenses. Of course, one of its operationsis a kind of
creativeimaginationwherebyI can constructfictionalobjectssuch as gold
mountains.However,he resistsimportinginto the internalsense any real
abilityto reason about its objects.The internalsense becomes littlemore
than an instinctivecapacity. There is no reasoninginternalto it so its
workis prettymuch automatic.Now, he recognizesthatreason can direct
the activityin some way, but thatfeaturerefersmore to the way in which
the intellectmightdirectthe attentionof the internalsense.
Lost in Surez's account is any of the richnesspresentin Thomas's.
The internalsense in humans is littledifferent
than the internalsense in
animals. It is worthconsideringwhy Surez mightabandon this richer
account of internalsensation. The justificationcan be found in their
conceptionsof the role of intellect.It is a well-knownfact that
differing
for Thomas the proper object of the intellectis the common nature or
essence present in material singular objects.71Consequently, the gap
of sense and the universality
between the particularity
of intellectionis
a
rich
account
of
internal
sensation,Thomas
quite large. By developing
mediatesthisgap by importingquasi-reasoning
featuresintointernalsense.
70DA, IX.8.18(vol.Ill, 234-6).
71Summa
I, q. 85,a. 1.
theologiae

18:08:44 PM

SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO

157

Surez has no such worry.He holds that the proper object of the intelIt is the work of the intellect,
lect is the materialsingularobject itself.72
afterits initialknowledgeof the singular,to discernthe universalfeatures
of nature.Accordingly,the only mediatingfunctionappropriateto the
the seninternalsense is providinga synthesizedphantasmrepresenting
sible accidentsof a singularobject in a unifiedmanner.I need a phantasmof thattreebeforeI can have thattreepresentto my intellect.Thus,
of the universalnatureprethe intelligible
species is not a representation
sent in materialobjects, but is only an immaterialrepresentationof a
materialphantasm.The agent intellect'soperationinvolvesno universalstartingpoints,it seems unproblematicthat
izing. Given these different
Surez rejectsall the mediatingwork that Thomas's account of internal
sensationsupplies.
This rejectionof the rich mediationof internalsense also leads to a
account of the relationof the internalsenses to the
different
strikingly
othercognitivepowers.By makingeach of the cognitivepowersself-contained, he isolates the intellectfromthe sense powers. His convoluted
theoryof the non-causal mechanismsof cognitionsuggesta dissatisfaction with accounts of human cognitionthat do not take into consideration the radical dualism implicitin the distinctionbetweenthe materialof intellect.Most impressiveis the way
ityof sense and the immateriality
/interin whichhe setsup the parallelbetweenthepairs externalsensation
This structural
/intellect.
nal sensationand internalsensation
parallelshows
that the issue is not just one of immaterialpower/materialpower, but
of powers.The resultis thatthe soul itself
ratherconcernsthe distinctness
mustplay a role in cognition.Specifyingthat role, as we saw, is quite
but it at the veryleast we can thinkof it as a kind of general
difficult,
awarenessof the contentsof the distinctpowers. However, while it is
unclear if that awareness is conscious or preconsciousin some way, it
remainsthe case thatthe separateactivitiesof the powersare insufficient
in and of themselvesto account for our cognition.The commitmentto
the distinctionof powers seems to rest on two foundations:the radical
betweenmaterialpowers and immaterialpowers as well as
discontinuity
the inabilityto discoversome mechanismby which the externalsenses
to the internalsenses.The imprescould communicatetheirinformation
sion one gets is that Surez was drivento his account because no other
accountwas unproblematic.While his own account may seem excessively
72DA, IX.3 (vol.Ill, 106-52).

18:08:44 PM

158

B. SOUTH
JAMES

baroque, he never accepts needless complexity.This radical distinctness


of powers also leads, in the end, to his acceptance of the innate presence, whetherlatentor merelydispositional,of species in both the internal sense and the intellect,requiringonly some logicallyprior occasion
to bringforththe species.
Milwaukee
Marquette
University

18:08:44 PM

Review
"Perse notum".
Dielogische
desSelbst-verstndlichen
imDenken
LucaF. Tuninetti,
Beschaffenheit
Leiden-New
York-Kln
desThomas
vonAquin.
1996,pp. xii+ 216.ISBN
E.J.Brill,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
90 04 103686. (Studien
Bd.Xlvii;
- University
a Ph.D. thesis,
ofMunich1994.)
ofPhilosophy
originally
Faculty
constitute
an interesting
inthe
Self-evident
(propositiones
persenotae)
propositions
problem
ofphilosophy,
andmedieval
notonlyin theancient
butalsoin modern
history
periods,
inthesearch
Onecouldsaythata scientist
cannot
forreajustgo onendlessly
philosophy.
Ata givenpointit makesno senseto askwhy.
sonsofstatements.
Theremustbe selfarealsocalled(R.G.Collingwood).
evident
orabsolute
as they
propositions,
presuppositions,
in theformof
Theseare thebasisforposingfurther
and finding
answers
questions
statements.
The challenge
is to identify
thesepresuppositions,
and metaphysics
and its
areofgreathelp.
history
LucaF. Tuninetti
haswritten
an important
contribution
to ourunderstanding
of 'per
3
in ThomasAquinas.
senotum
His bookis important
notonlyforthecase
('self-evident')
ofAquinas,
butalsoforthehistory
as such.Aquinas'
ofthenotion
viewon thematter
wasnottheonlyoneinmedieval
reacted
toitandthusAquinas'
Manythinkers
philosophy.
somewhat
scattered
remarks
becamethestarting
pointofevenmoreinteresting
subsequent
in thefourteenth
Tuninetti
mentions
views,
particularly
century
(esp.JohnDunsScotus).
ofotherscholars'
without
muchdiscusson
I mustsay;
views,
manybooksin thenotes,
he writes
thereference,
which
is notalways
clear.
usually
'vgl.'('cf.')before
Tuninetti
is primarily
in thelogicalapproach
interested
of'perse notum'.
He realizes
thatthere
areother
in whichthenotion
metaaspects
playsa part,viz.epistemological,
or psychological
oftheseaside(pp.93 f.),
ones,buthe leavesa fulldiscussion
physical
andjustifiably
so. It woulddistract
thereader
from
themaintheme
ofthebook,viz.the
of'perse notum'
as such.Tuninetti
concentrates
onAquinas,
buthisbook
understanding
stimulates
further
thanks
to thebibliographies
included
in thenotes,
research,
especially
in whichhe listsprimary
and secondary
studies
on specific
and comments
on
subjects
them.
In thisrespect,
I found
hissurvey
ofscholastic
andpostscholastic
authors
on the
subject
quitehelpful
(pp.5 f.).
' as 'Selbstverstndliches'.
Intheintroduction,
Tuninetti
histranslation
of'per
senotum
explains
Thisdiscussion
to ourunderstanding
contributes
ofthenotion
as such.He alsotouches
theproblem
oftherelevance
ofthechronology
ofAquinas'
works
(p. 13).
In chapter
discusses
useof'perse notum',
inconnection
1,Tuninetti
Aquinas'
notably
withhisdiscussion
ofwhether
God'sexistence
is self-evident.
The question
whether
and
towhatextent
God'sexistence
is self-evident,
is a traditional
starting
pointformedieval
in thisdomain.
As Tuninetti
thefactthat'God is' is notselfconcludes,
investigation
tousmeansthatourknowledge
evident
ofGodis indirect
andlimited,
manis
although
connected
withGodin hispursuit
ofhappiness.
Mandepends
on hissenses,
andforhis
he is dependent
on God'sinitiative
happiness
(p. 188).
Tuninetti
a largenumber
oftexts,
as he doesthroughout
thebook,rendering
presents
a goodservice
to thereader.
Thomasis indebted
to bothAristotle
and Boethius,
and
thedistinction
between
self-evidence
initself
andwith
tous.Tuninetti
calls
develops
regard
thelatter
thesubjective
sideandtheformer
theobjective
condition
ofself-evidence.
HereI notethreeminor
leavesthepuzzling
lastsentence
of
points
(p. 30).Tuninetti
Posterior
'and <understanding>
as a wholewillbe
II, 19 outofhisdiscussion:
Analytics
related
to thewholeobject'(translation
Second:does'katholou'
similarly
J. Barnes).
just
mean'general',
as Tuninetti
suggests
(p. 31),or shouldoneread'kath'holou'withDe
itas 'ofitsentire
which
seemsplausible?
nature',
Rijk,andtranslate
(See L.M. de Rijk,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2001

Vivarium
39,1

18:08:58 PM

160

REVIEW

'Ockham's
His Use ofAristotle's
kath'holou
and kath'hauto
Theoryof Demonstration:
in W. Vossenkuhl
andR. Schnberger,
Die Gegenwart
Ockhams
, 1990,pp.
Requirements',
inAristode
observes
a certain
dissociation
ofthelogical
struc233-240).
Lasdy,Tuninetti
tureof scienceand itslinguistic
without
further
On
presentation,
giving
explanation.
notesthatAlgazelcreates
roomamongdemonstrative
fordata
p. 77,Tuninetti
premises
ofsense-experience,
butthatthissuggestion
wasinitially
notaccepted.
One is curious
to
knowwhichotherauthor
thissuggestion,
andtowhatextent.
accepts
In thenextchapter
Tuninetti
discusses
inthescholastic
tradition
before
'perse notum'
Thomas.Again,he brings
Aristode
andBoethius
to thefore.HereliesTuninetti's
greatI feel.He pointsespecially
estoriginality,
to theimportance
ofAristotle's
Prior
Analytics
As hasbeennoted,
witha viewto oursubject.
self-evidence
alsoplaysa partas regards
thehumansoulanditspowers,
as regards
as regards
thedemarcation
science,
especially
between
andnatural
andas regards
theproofs
forGod'sexistence.
sciences,
theology
In thethirdchapter
Tuninetti
thelogicalpointofviewofself-evidence.
investigates
Thereis an objective
and subjective
in Thomas,he thinks.
aspectto be distinguished
totheobjectively
thesubject
must
be universal
andthepred(a concept)
aspect,
According
icatemustsignify
a partofthedefinition
ofthesubject,
e.g.'manis an animal'(p. 166).
a knowing
mustknowthemeaning
ofthedefinition
ofthesubject.
Subjectively,
subject
thesedefinitions
areknown
totheintelligence
ofknowing
so
However,
according
subject,
in different
measures.
theyareknown
In thefinalchapter,
Tuninetti
to therelevance
ofthetopicto important
theopoints
as mentioned
above.He discusses
forms
ofthought
logical
problems,
(e.g.species
intelligibilis)
as opposedto contents
ofthought
as wellas thenotion
ofratio.
He
internus),
(e.g.verbum
oflogicas a science.
further
discusses
Thomas'notion
Thomas'viewsleadto interesting
ThomasSutton,
andDunsScotus.Havingdiscussed
criticisms,
e.g.byHenryofGhent,
Tuninetti
theviewsheldbythoseauthors,
toThomas,
'theproper
that,
explains
according
taskofthesubject
inthestatement
istoidentify
thatofwhich
issaid.Therefore,
something
in a proposition
we mayconsider
whatis identified
as a subject,
andnot,howitactually
In thissensewe might
condition
ofselfis identified
bysomeone.
speakofan objective
evidence.
remains
trueevenwhenitis notknown
as such.The
(. . .) Thesamestatement
initself,
samestatement
isself-evident
notwithregard
tous.'(p. 180,cf.I. Boh's
although
windsup thischapter
review
ofTuninetti's
book,Speculum
, 1998,pp. 911-2).Tuninetti
knownto us fromwhatis
whatis better
that,in Aquinas'view,we maydistinguish
in itself,
butwe muststart
from
theformer
better
known
(p. 185).
an admirably
In sum,Tuninetti
haswritten
clearbook.Theargumentation
is lucidand
Animportant
butdifficult
is verywellpresented
partofThomas'thought
easilyfollowed.
alsoto students
ofother
ofphilosophy.
andthebookcanbe fruitful
periods
in thebackseemsexhaustive.
The bibliography
One couldadd twoolderstudies
by
in das Problem
derEvidenz
in derScholastik',
in Beitrge
'ZurEinfuhrung
zur
J. Geyser,
desMittelalters
derPhilosophie
and
Geschichte
, Supplementband
, 1923,161-182,Mnster,
zumProblem
derpropositio
undihreRolleindenGottesbeweisen',
persenota
'Systematisches
Studien
Franziskanische
, 19 (1942),pp. 73-115.
ofTuninetti's
book:D.-M.Gallagher,
in Review
Otherreviews
consulted
,
ofMetaphysics
in Philosophisches
1999106(1),pp. 245-7.
1998,p. 963-4;M. Thurner,
Jahrbuch
E.P. Bos

Leiden

18:08:58 PM

TenseLogicin 13th-Gentwy
Theolog))
HARM GORIS

Suppose that yesterdayI said 'therewill be a sea-battletomorrow'and


todayI say 'thereis a sea-battletoday'. It is clear thattheseare different
utterancesor declarativesentences(both as tokensand
statement-making
as types),but do they also signifydifferent
statementsor propositions?
in meaningin the
Are theymerelyverballydistinctwithouta difference
same way as the utterances'therewill be a sea-battletomorrow'and 'il
y aura une bataille navale demain' differonly in wordingbut not in
terms'tomorrow'and 'today'
meaning?The indexicalor token-reflexive
are not the same and the tensesdiffer
but what about their
grammatically,
Are theysemanticallyand truth-functionally
relevant?
logical functions?
in
these
are
raised
discussions
on
the
Nowadays
questions
compatibilon divineforeknowledge
and, espeityof omniscienceand immutability,
cially,in the debate on the realityof time. Of these three topics, only
of God's knowledge,was a locus
part of the firstone, viz. the immutability
fortenselogic in the 12thand 13thcentury.1
The standardquestionwas
- sometimesalso formu'does God know now all that He knew before?'
lated in termsof the immutability
of God's power or will. Apart from
this,also the theologicaldoctrineof the unityof faith,accordingto which
the Fathersof the Old Covenantbelievedthe same as Christiansdo now,
occasionedthe Scholasticsto considerthe logical role of tenses.Motivated
by thesespecifically
theologicaldoctrinestheyelaboratedquestions,soluin
and
tions
positions the fieldof tense logic that go far beyond the few.
scatteredremarksin the logical worksof Aristotle.Aristotle'sdivinebeing
is enwrappedin self-contemplation
and, unlikethe divine providenceof
this
is
not
concerned
with nor has knowledgeof the
Christianity, god
vicissitudesof the sublunaryworld. Furthermore,
as a scientist,Aristotle
in universalknowledgeof the necessaryand unchangis mainlyinterested
ing nature of things.Christiantheologians,on the other hand, deal ex
1 Thomas
thebearing
tenselogichas on thedoctrine
of foreAquinasrecognises
IV q. 9 a. 2).
butdoesnotelaborate
it:"Sedhocestaltioris
(Quodl
inquisitionis"
knowledge,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2001

Vivarium,
39,2

18:06:50 PM

162

HARMGORIS

professowith the contingentfacts of the historyof salvation.Although


the Scholasticsnever developed a fully-fledged
tense logic as a separate
treatisein theirlogical textbooks,theydid innovateAristotelianlogic in
this field.Subsequently,theirinnovationswere to be forgottenfor more
than six centuries.In the late fiftiesof the 20th centuryArthurPrior
broughtthe role of tensesagain to the attentionof logicians,who, unaware
of the medieval discussions,have developed solutionsand theoriesthat
bear great resemblanceto those of the Scholastics.
During the 12th and 13th centuries,discussionson the logic of tenses
also occurredin othercontextsthan those of divineimmutability
and the
of theologicalpropositionslike 'God is',
unityof faith.The interpretation
of universalstatementslike 'man is an animal' or 'a rose is a flower',of
temporallyvague propositionslike 'Easter is a beautifultime' or 'he is
on his way to Rome' and the questionon the eternityof enuntiabilia
provoked some importantand interestingthoughtson the logical statusof
tenses.2However, these discussionsdo not deal with singular,contingent
sentences(and propositions)that have different
tenseswhile referring
to
In
the same event.
this paper I shall limitmyselfto these, as they are
also the ones on which contemporarytense logic focuses.
From about 1140 onward, a numberof different
views were put forward in order to maintainthe theologicaldoctrinesof God's immutabiltensedpropositionsas
ity and of the unityof faithin view of differently
objects of both divine knowledgeand human belief.Chenu rediscovered
this debate some eightyyears ago. Since then a group of 12th-century
- to be
scholars who were called Nominales
distinguishedclearly from
- and who held a
nominalism
14th-century
veryspecificview on the logic
of tenses,has been the subject of more detailed researchbut later developments in the debate on tense logic, esp. in the 13th century,have
received less attentionso far.3The aim of this paper is to give both a
2 Cf.G.H. Kneepkens,
From
Eternal
Truths:
A NoteontheMediaeval
toPerpetual
History
of
Ch.1, 16al8, in:Vivarium,
FordiscusAristotle
32 (1994),161-185.
, De Interpretatione,
of enuntiabilia
s Account
sionson theeternity
, see Neil Lewis,William
ofAuvergne'
ofthe
andtheDoctrine
Truths
itsRelations
toNominalism
33
Enuntiabile:
, in:Vivarium,
oftheEternal
In theFallaciethediscussion
on temporally
113-136.
tradition,
(1995),
vague
propositions
3andtheir
'rex
csacerdos
cantat
missam
like'Pascaestpulchrum
3}*istevadit
Romam'
venatur'
tempus
between
the
of
led
to
the
distinction
and
(con-)signification
confusum
praesens
negations
Modernorum
determinarmi
cf.L.M. de Rijk,Logica
, Assen1962,vol.I, 534,600,
praesens
De 13eeeuwse
tractaten
over
618,vol.II.1, 337,460 andvol.II.2, 341,629;H. Braakhuis,
termen
, s.l. 1979,vol.II, 27-30.
syncategorematische
3 Cf.M.-D. Chenu,Contribution
l'histoire
dutrait
delafoi.Commentaire
delia
historique
llaeq. 1 art.2, in:Mlanges
Thomistes.
Thomiste
, vol.3,Le Saulchoir
1923,123-140.
Bibliothque

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TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY

163

historicaloutline and a criticalanalysisof these 13th-century


developments.FirstI shall summarisethe main positionstakenbefore1240. Next,
I shall take a closer look at later solutionsas they are exemplifiedby
Fishacre,Bonaventureand Aquinas. Finally,I shall make a comparison
betweenScholasticand modernpositionsin tense logic.
1. Historical
Survey
from1140 to 1240
Though Peter the Lombard was not the firstto discussthe problem,he
was responsiblefor introducingthe logical role of tenses as a standard
problemin medievaltheology.He did so by addressingthe subjectin his
in OmnesEpistolasD. Pauli,
two most influentialwritings:the Collectanea
were
whichas part of the Glossatura
,
incorporatedinto the exegetMagna
ical textbookof the Middle Ages, the Glossa Ordinaria
, and in his four
books of the Sentences
, whichwere to become the theologicaltextbook.In
the former,when commentingon 1 Cor. 10:3 ("all have drunkthe same
spiritualdrink")and on 2 Cor. 4:13 ("havingthe same spiritof faith"),
Peter quotes Augustine:4
thathewould
butthey(believed)
is thesamefaith,
underdistinct
signsthere
Surely,
...
seethesigns
webelieve
thathehascome. . . Staytheninthefaith,
come,
changed
wouldcome,
thatChrist
becausetheybelieved
butnotfaith,
tenses
havechanged,
hascome,has
butwebelieve
thatChrist
wouldsuffer,
wouldriseandwouldascend;
intoheaven.
hasrisenandhasascended
suffered,
et
Doctrinale
d'Histoire
auxXIIeetXIIIesicles
etthologie
AlsohisGrammaire
, in:Archives
sicle
revised
inLa thokgue
au douzime
Littraire
du Moyenge,10 (1936),5-28;slightly
,
William
tenselogicbyGabriel
ofmedieval
Paris1957,90-107.Thesurveys
Nuchelmans,
from
on Chenu.Independently
KnealeandSimoKnuuttila
andMartha
dependheavily
oftexts
onthedoctrines
oftheNominales.
a largenumber
collected
Arthur
Chenu,
Landgraf
is only
ofwhichthelogicalroleoftenses
covera wideareaofthemes,
Thesedoctrines
I Nominalismus
indenthedeszwlften
Studien
butone:A. Landgraf,
zurTheologie
Jahrhunderts.
1 (1943),183-210.
deszwlften
Werken
derzweiten
, in:Traditio,
Jahrhunderts
Hlfte
ologischen
inthelateeighties
ofthe20thcentury
under
revived
in 12th-century
nominalism
Interest
in
A conference
andCalvinNormore.
oftheworkofWilliam
theinfluence
Courtenay
to earlynomiin an issueofthisjournaldedicated
resulted
Wisconsin
1991in Madison,
30 (1992).
nalism:
Vivarium,
4 PetertheLombard,
D. Pauli(PL 191,1619C)on 1 Cor.
in Omnes
Collectanea
Epist.
nosvenisse
credimus
...
sedilliventurum,
eademestfides,
10:3:"Insignis
utiquediversis
andon 2 Cor.4:13(PL 192,33D):"Tempora
videte
Maneteergoinfide,
signavariata"
et
sednonfides,
Christum,
resurrecturum,
sunt,
passurum,
quiailliventurum
ergovariata
Christum
nosautemcredimus
ascensurum
venisse,
esse,resurrexisse,
crediderunt;
passum
Tractatus
ForAugustine
see In Iohannis
in coelumascendisse."
, XLV.9(CCSL
Evangelium
etConcupiscentia
Enarr.
inPs.L.17(CCSL 38,612)andDeNuptiis
, 11.24(CSEL
36,392-93);
Summa
Sententiarum
42,277).Alsotheanonymous
(PL 176,46D),datedaround1140,quotes
De Nuptiis
etCone.
thepassagefrom
Augustine's

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164

HARMGORIS

The backgroundof these commentsis the theologicaldoctrineof the


Church fromAbel {Ecclesiaab Abel). The just of the Old Covenant are
said to be membersof the One Church in the same way as contemporarybelievers;theyall have One Lord and share the same faith.
The second way in which the Lombard introducedtenselogic,was by
his discussionson the immutability
of God's (fore-)knowledge
in I Sent.
d. 41 c. 3- witha parallel discussionon the immutability
of God's power
in I Sent.d. 44 c. 2- and on the unityof faithin III Sent.d. 25 c. 1.
He quotes again the same phrasesfromAugustine,whichwould become
common places in medieval tense logic fromthe second half of the 12th
centuryonward.
In the 12th and the 13th centurydifferent
theorieswere developed
with regard to the object of (divine)knowledgeand (human) beliefand
the role of tensestherein.Some held that what is known or believed is
). Usually,thiswas understoodto be
somethingnon-complex(incomplexum
the extramentalthingor event (resor euentus
), althoughThomas Aquinas
that
it
is
an
intramental
was
suggests
concept.5The incomplexum-xhzory
a.o.
of
held
by Robert Melun (d. 1167), Prevostinof Cremona (d. 1210),
Stephen Langton (d. 1228) and by Philip the Chancellorin his Summade
Bono, writtenaround 1228. The latterbecame the officialpatron of this
position and his solution was verbally copied by the SummaAlexandi
Halensis.Also Albert the Great defendeda kind of r^-theory,although
.6
he claims that the resis a complexum
Two main objectionswere raised against the incomplexumtheory.The
firstwas that it could not account for a distinctionbetween a Jew or a
hereticand a Christian.Also theJew believesthe comingof the Messiah
Christi
adventm
), but contraryto Christianfaith,he believesthatthe
[credit
Messiah will come. Likewise,one may believe the (general)resurrection,
but believingthat it has already occurredis heretical.And in the view
of Aquinas, even a pagan may be said to believe the incarnation,forit
5 Aquinas,
InIII Sent.
ds.24 art.1 qa. 2 sol.:"Undeilliquidixerunt
quodfideiobjecvocemignoraverunt.
tumestincomplexum,
'credoincarnaQuodenimdicitur
propriam
in formando
nonpotest
incarnationis,
tionem',
intelligi
conceptionem
quiasicquilibet
qui
crederet
incarnationem."
pernomen,
intelligit
quid
significatur
6
thearticle
is notan incomplexum
buta "rescomplexa
to Albert,
ordinata
According
becausefaith
is an actofconsenting
andtherefore
ad omnetempus"
(consensus)
requires
Paris1890-99,
a complexum:
InIII Sent.
d. 24 a. 5, ed.S. Borgnet,
vol.28,452.Thisextraofenuntiabilia.
The copulais an essential
ofthelatmental
resis thetruth-maker
element
an actofthemind
butthistensed
terandis essentially
tensed,
onlyfrom
copularesults
III tr.3 c. 1, Cologneed.,
to it in reality:
cf.De Anima
and hasnothing
corresponding
de
Theol.
tr.19q. 77 m. 3 a. 5, ed. Borgnet,
vol.31,825-7,Liber
vol.VII.l, 208,Summa
vol.38, 74.
Missae
tr.2 c. 10 a. 12,ed. Borgnet,
Sacrificio

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THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY

165

merelymeans thathe knowsthe meaningof the word 'incarnation'.The


second major objectionto the incomplexumtheorywas that the object of
that
is
eithertrue or false and an
and
is
belief
something
knowledge
is not truth-functional.
Only somethingthat is composed of
incomplexum
a subject and a predicate can be true or false. For these reasons, the
scholarsrejectedthe incomplexum-theory
majorityof 12th-and 13th-century
or
to
the
and adhered
complexum enuntiabile-theory.
the problemof a difference
of
For the defendersof the enuntiabile-theory,
a numberof
tensescould not be dismissedas easily.One can distinguish
different
solutionsamong these scholars.
Williamof Auxerreargued in his SummaAurea
, writtenc. 1215-29,that
in tenseyieldsan essentialchange of the enuntiabile
a difference
, which is
characterdoes
the articleof faith,but thatits formaland its performative
articlessignifythe very same goodnot vilange: the essentiallydifferent
- and
ness and power of God- which are theirformor perfection
they
provokedexactlythe same fear and love of God in the Fathers of the
Old Covenant as theydo among contemporaryChristians.No one else
supportedthe pragmaticview of William and it was generallyheld to
prove too littleabout the unityof faith.7
Anothersolution,foundin some anonymoustextsfromthe 12th and
early 13th century,was that the articleof faithconsistsof a disjunction
tensedenuntiabilia
of threedifferendy
, like 'Christwill be born or is being
born or was born'. This solutionwas rejectedby most,because, like the
betweena Jew or
theory,it does not allow fordistinguishing
incomplexumhereticand a Christian.8
7 William
Summa
Aurea
III tr.12 c. 7 q. 2, ed.J. Ribaillier,
ofAuxerre,
Paris/Rome
knowlin thediscussion
on theimmutability
ofdivine
vol.3.1,219f.However,
1980-87,
Aurea
I tr.9 c. 3,ed.Ribaillier,
seems
tosidewiththeNominales:
Summa
vol.1,
edgeWilliam
tasia(later
William
as a nominal180-1;alsoPeterofTaran
V) presents
popeInnocence
ist:PeterofTaran
d. 24 a. 3, Toulouse
ed. 1652vol.3 [reprint
tasia,In III Sent.
RidgetextWilliam
thattheunity
is guaranteed
woodNJ1964],186.In another
offaith
argues
articles
havethesamesubject
(viz.God)andthesameground
bythefactthatthedifferent
teaches
Aurea
III
fortheircredibility
(viz.becauseGod,theFirstTruth,
it):cf.Summa
He usesthisargument
thecontext
tr.12c. 3 (202f.).
oftheunity
offaith
as
onlywithin
thetwelve
distinct
articles
offaith,
notas againstone articlehavingdifferent
against
andappliedit alsoto the
others
widened
thescopeoftheargument
tenses.
Apparently
aboutdifferently
tensed
articles:
cf.Robert
inIII Sent.
t. 2
Quaestiones
Kilwardby,
question
G.
Mnchen
19.
This
view
is
mentioned
and
5
ad
ed.
refuted
Leibold,
1985,
2,
by
q.
In III Sent.
d. 24 a. 1 q. 3.
Bonaventure,
8 Theomnitensed
is reported
ofCremona,
seeChenu1923(op.cit.,
theory
byPrevostin
Summae:
1943[op.cit.,
above,n. 3), 131.It is alsofoundin twoanonymous
Landgraf
textis attributed
to thePorretani.
above,n. 3), 187n. 33,203f.The latter
byLandgraf

18:06:50 PM

166

HARMGORIS

The oldest solution is the one ascribed to the Nominales


,9 who summarised theirview in the statement"what once is true,is always true"
estveruni).
, semper
{quodsemelestverum
Systematically
speaking,this means
that a differenceof tenses does not affectthe enuntiabile
: 'Christwill be
born', 'Christis being born' and 'Christwas born' are one and the same
enuntiabile.
It seemsthatthisview had its rootsin grammarwherea declension like albus,alba, albumdoes constitutedistinctvoces
, while thereremains
one and the same nomen
and where the conjugationof a verb does not
affectthe verb as a lexical unit.At some timein the firsthalfof the 12th
centurythisview was expanded fromsimplelinguisticexpressionsto composed ones. 'Christwill be born', 'Christis being born', and 'Christwas
born' are threedifferent
declarativesentences(propositions
or orationes
), but
have
one
and
the
same
that
one
is, theyexpress
they
significate,
propoor dictum
sition (enuntiabile
As, accordingto most medieval
propositionis).]0
which is strictly
true or false,while the senlogicians,it is the enuntiabile
tence only signifiestruthor falsehood,these differently
tensed sentences
9 On theNominates
Freecreatures
God.Thomas
onGod's
, seeH. Goris,
ofaneternal
Aquinas
andirresistible
will
, Louvain1996,112f.,117f.(including
infallible
foreknowledge
references).
thetextsmentioned
otherrepresentatives
ofthenominalist
viewhave
there,
Apartfrom
NeilLewishasshownthatalsoWilliam
beenfound.
ofAuvergne
adoptsthenominalist
viewontenses:
s Account
seehisWilliam
itsRelations
toNominalism
ofAuvergne'
oftheEnuntiabile:
Truths
andtheDoctrine
33 (1995),113-36,
, in:Vivarium,
oftheEternal
esp.pp. 115-8,126.
Lewisalsotouches
has
upontheviewofAlexander
Nequam:ibid.
pp. 122f.StenEbbesen
found
some13th-century
thatadoptormention
the
("Deusseitquicquid
Sophismata
scivit")
Deusseitquicquid
scivit.
nominalist
Twosophismata
Vat.lat.7678anda reference
from
position:
toNominales
Selected
texts
, in: CIMAGL,62 (1992),179-95and Thirteenth-centuiy
, in:
Logic.
to Dr Ebbesen
forbringing
thesetextsto
CIMAGL,65 (1995),213-361.I am grateful
A certain
Master
Hermann
1139):"Utme
after
saysin hisSentences
(written
myattention.
modovelhodielegereab aeterno
in
(sci.Deus,H.G.) [melecturum
hodie],
quippescivit
seietmelegisse
hodie.Et notaquodhujusmodi
aeternum
adverbia
eodemtempore
proutsi mododicam:Legiheri,legohodie,legameras.Diversa
latadiversa
sunt
significant,
me legisse
heriet me legerehodie,et me lecturum
eras.Diverso
verotempore
prolata
ut si quisdicatHermannus
idemsignificant
legeteras,qui idemdicatHermanus
legit
ac si quodegohodielegerim.
Idemnamque
estmeherifuisse
hodie
hodie,idemsignificat
et erasmehodielegisse.
et mehodielegere,
verbaveltempora,
lecturum,
Ipsasiquidem
verum
licetsintmutata,
idemtarnen
On thisfollower
(PL 178,1728D-1729A.)
permanet."
whoisotherwise
ofAbelard,
seeD.E. Luscombe,
Theschool
unknown,
Abelard,
wholly
ofPeter
A nominalist
is alsoexpressed
in Sententie
1969,158-64andpassim.
Cambridge
position
I pars1,pp.4, 26-27,ed.A. Landgraf,
crits
del'cole
Parisienses
d'Ablard.
Textes
thologiques
sedperdiversa
Indits
, Louvain1934,1-60:"Idemverum
significatur,
tempora."
10Historically
themselves
didnotexpress
the
their
view
Nominales
speaking,
' or12th-century
*dictum'.
like'enuntiabile
Fromaround1300,theologians
beganto summausingterms
risethenominalist
Iwakuma
intwelfth-century
Yukio,Enuntiabilia
position
usingtheseterms:
verba.
andlogic
inmedieval
theandtheology
Semiotics
, in:C. Marmo(ed.),Vestigia,
imagines,
logic
texts
, Louvain1997,19-35,
p. 26.
ological

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TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
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167

of tensesand
expressone and the same truthor falsehood.A difference
of other indexical temporalexpressionslike 'tomorrow'or 'today' that
referto different
momentsof time dependingon when theyare uttered,
leads merelyto verbalvariants,but theselinguisticchangeshave no bearof the enuntiabile.
They are logicallyirrelevant.
Although
ing on theidentity
thisnominalisttheoryon tensesmay have its originsin grammar,it developed into a logical theorybased on a specificsemantics.Many 13thcenturymasterspoint out in their summariesof the theorythat the
tensedsentencesto the unity
reduced the identityof differently
Nominales
of the truthexpressedby them.In itsturn,the unityof the truthexpressed
followedfromthe identityof the extramentalevent being reported.In
short,the nominalistview was based on a purelyextensionalsemantics.
The most famous proponentsof the nominalistposition were Peter
Abelard and Peter the Lombard, but by the middle of the 13th century
it was commonlyconsideredto be outmoded.AlberttheGreat,Bonaventure
whose thesisthat differently
and Aquinas talk about the antiquiNominales
is repudiatedby
tensedsentencesconstituteone and the same enuntiabile
11The Nominales have ceased to be a distinctschool that
all moderni.
by
may
time,but a closerlook will show thatthe nominalistpositionwithregard
to tenseswas not as dead as Albert,Bonaventureand Aquinas suggest.
in TenseLogic:1240-75
2. LaterDevelopments
In the 13th centurythe question about the identityof the enuntiabile
in
tensed expressionswas an almost exclusive topic for theologians.The
main logical textbooks,viz. the compendia of Peter of Spain, William of
Shyreswoodand Lambertof Auxerre,remainsilenton the issue,nor have
I foundrelevantdiscussionsin 13th-century
commentaries
on the Categories
and Perihermeneias
that have been edited. The only exception,as Sten
Ebbesen has pointedout,was the discussionby the artistae
of the sophisma
"God knows whateverHe knew" (Deus seitquicquidscivit).12
It is a rare
11Albert,
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 6, ed. Borgnet
vol.26, 350: . . antiquam
Nominalium
. . Aquinas,
S.Th.Ia q. 14 a. 15 ad 3: ". . . antiquiNominales
. . and
opinionem
I Sent.
modernis
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5: "Undeab omnibus
conceditur
quodsuntduodiversa
III Sent.
Socratem
currere
etcucurisse
. . Bonaventure,
d. 24 a.l q. 3: ". . .
enuntiabilia,
iliaNominalium
. . . communiter
nonapprobatur."
The demiseoftheNominales
positio
as a distinct
around1210andbyIwakuma
schoolis datedbyCourtenay
around1180:
William
Introduction
30 (1992),1-3,p. 3.
, Vivarium,
Courtenay,
12S. Ebbesen,
with
verba
.
, in:C. Marmo(ed.),Vestigia,
Doing
theology
sophismata
imagines,
andlogic
inmedieval
Semiotics
texts
The sophisma
runsas
, Louvain1997,151-69.
theological

18:06:50 PM

168

HARMGORIS

artistsdiscussingspecifically
theologicalquestions.
example of 13th-century
And vice versa, mastersof theologywere familiarwith this discussionin
literatureand referto it.13
the Sophismata
Afteraround 1220 almost all theologiansdeclare that the nominalist
view on tenses is to be rejected. The three main argumentsthat they
broughtin againstit were all derivedfromAristotle'sworks.Two of these
were logical argumentswhile the thirdone was based on Aristotelian
psy, new viewpoints
chology.In view of the objectionsagainst the Nominales
were developed on the role of tensesin propositions.I shall discusseach
of the objectionsand the new solutionsin more detail below.
However, the general criticismon the nominalistposition does not
mean thatit had become actuallyobsoletein the 13thcentury.Although
not overtlyendorsed,it did survivein different
ways. Richard Fishacre
in
(d. 1248) presentsa nominalistposition terminologicaldisguise.The
discussionsby Williamde la Mare (d. 1285) and Giles of Rome (1247-1316)
is not
make clear that one of the main objectionsagainst the Nominales
a criticalanalysisof Bonaventure's
as decisiveas manythought.And,finally,
will show that,froma systematicviewtheoryof the tenselessenuntiabile
a
real
alternativeto the nominalistview.
it
does
not
constitute
point,
2.1

A Nominalist
TenseLogicin Disguise
Fishacre:

In his commentary
on the Sentences
, writtenaround 1245, Richrd Fishacre
to
the
formulateshis solution
problemof the unityof faithwithoutmenand withoutusing theirtraditionalwordingsbut he
tioningthe Nominales
takes a position that actually is identicalto theirs.14
First,Fishacre disnon-indexical
between
temporalexpressions(absolute
veryclearly
tinguishes
dates) which are said "withrespectto the timein which the thing/event
was" and indexicalones (e.g. tenses)which are said "withrespectto the
it is the
time at which the words are uttered."In Fishacre'sterminology,
te nasciturum,
sedscivit
"Deusseitquicquid
follows:
scivit,
ergoseitteessenasciturum."
tr.9, 21-23(ed.L.M.de Rijk,
It is alsodiscussed
byPeterofSpaininhisSyncategoreumata
wasthat
butafter
about1250often
Leiden1992,420-2).The classical,
rejected,
response
' withan
of
dictionis
shift
from
thecategory
a fallacy,
viz.a Jigura
it contains
illegitimate
as thecategory
oftime{quando)
but
identified
toanother
substance
usually
category,
[quid.)
ofquality
andquantity.
as thecategories
sometimes
13Cf.Albert
Summa
vol.26,350f.;
InI Sent.
d. 41 a. 6, ed.Borgnet,
theGreat,
Theobgiae
inIII
vol.31,824,827;Robert
tr.19q. 77 m.3 a. 5, ed. Borgnet
Quaestiones
Kilwardby,
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1 ad 2
Sent.
t. 2 q. 5 ad 3, ed. Leibold,
20; PeterofTarantasia,
in contr.,
Toulouseed. 1652,vol.1, 342.
14Chenu1923(<
the
thatHugoofSt.Cherusesalmost
.,aboven. 3),136n. 1,remarks
op.t
to.
Chenurefers
themanuscript
as Fishacre
butI havenotexamined
sameformulations

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TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
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169

distinctionbetween "time accordingto its essence" (.secundum


suamessen"time
its
tiam
i.e.
the
absolute
and
to
differences"
date,
),
(.secunaccording
he
dumsuas dijferentias
i.e.
the
tenses.
Next
that
the
latter
),
says
belongs
, but not to its truth[ventasenuntiabilis):
only
essentiallyto the enuntiabile
the absolute date is part and parcel of the truthand it is one and the
same truththat is expressedby the threeenuntiabilia
that have different
tenses.Fishacrewrites:15
In onewaytimebelongs
ofthearticle,
inanother
totheessence
waytotheessence
tothearticle
oftheenunciabile.
Fortimebelongs
toitsessence,
butaccordaccording
inthesame(moment
allofwhich
caninhere
itbelongs
of)time,
ingtoitsdifferences,
to theessenceof theenunciabile.
becausethesametruth
is underthe
Therefore,
determination
ofpast,present
andfuture,
it is clearthat'Christ
hasbeenbornat
A' and'willbe bornat A' and'is beingbornat A' arethesamearticle.
Andyet
oftime.Fromthisitis clearthat
arethree
enunciabilia
because
ofthedifferences
they
it doesnotfollow:
theenunciabile
has changed,
therefore
thearticle
has changed;
butrather
thetruth
oftheenunciabile
becausethearticle
is nottheenunciabile
itself,
,
whichis numerically
thesamein thethreeenunciabilia
thatdiffer
to the
according
differences
oftimeandstillspeakofoneandthesame(moment
of)time.
I once suggestedthatFishacremightmake a verysophisticatedthreefold
distinctionbetween declarativesentences,theirmeaning {enunciabile)
and
but
from
the
the propositiontheyexpress(Veritas
context
it
is
clear
that
),
' to be the sentenceitselfas the
he takes 4enunciabile
linguisticsign (sermo,
A
of
truth
the
significatum).
signum)
signified(ventas,
change of tensesbelongs
the
or
but
it
does
not
to
modus
affectthe signified,
that
only
sign
loquendi
is the truththatis uttered,"as the same wine is signifiedby different
cirtimes."16Apparentlythe clear-cutterminologicaldistinccles at different
tion of the 12th centurybetweenoratio/
as the signifying
sentence
propositio
15Cf.Fishacre,
III Sent.
Ms British
Super
Library,
Royal10 B VII, c. 922-23.Also
continues:
"Ad2 dicoquod
., aboven. 3), 135-6.Fishacre
quotedbyChenu1923(op.cit
articulus
estVeritas
determinata
sedtalitempore
rationem
tempore
quodnechabetspecialem
necpresents,
necfuturi.
Sedpotet
essedesignificatum
harum
differentiarum
preteriti
qualibet
utdictum
est.Sicutscientia
Dei praevidet
scitorum
essein tempore
determinato
secundumessenciam
utin A, nontarnen
in A futuro,
velpreterito,
velpresenti,
sedabstracto
et communi
ad hoc [tempus].
vel
Tempusenimconsignificatum
perverbum
preteritum
futurum
dicitur
nonrespectu
in quo
sermo,
temporis
respectu
proquoprofertur
temporis
resfuit."
A critical
edition
ofbookIII.2 ofthiscommentary
is beingprepared
byKlaus
Rodlerandwillbe published
ofSciences
and Humanities
in
bytheBavarian
Academy
to Dr. Ria vanderLecqforherhelpin reading
2001.I amgrateful
themanuscript.
Ibid.:"Ad3 patetquodarticulus
nonestmutatus
immutata
est.Sed
quiailiaVeritas
modus
circaillamveritatem
mutatus
est.Iliaenimmutatio
esttantum
scilloquendi
signi,
icetsermonis,
nonsignati
est[three
scilicet
veritatis
wordsdeleted]
sicut
quae articulus
idemvinum
diversis
diversis
circulis
Formyformer
temporibus
significetur."
interpretation
ofFishacre's
seeGoris1996(op.cit.,
aboven. 9), 11*9-20.
position,

18:06:50 PM

170

HARMGORIS

and the enuntiabile


as the signifiedpropositionbecame blurredin the 13th
It
is
century.17 veryunlikelythatFishacredid not know the theoryof the
Nominales
, but eitherhe misunderstoodit because of the terminological
shiftsor he did not want to subscribeto it openlybecause by the time
he wrote his commentaryon the Sentences
, it was commonlyrejectedby
the mastersin theology.These mastersbroughtin threeAristotelianargumentsagainstthe view of the Nominales.
2.2

Two Arguments
AgainsttheNominalesfiomAristotle's
Logic

The firstlogical objection against the view that 'Christ will be born',
'Christis being born' and 'Christhas been born' are one and the same
enuntiabile
was takenfromAristotle'sdefinition
of the nomen
as voxsignificativa
in De Int. 1, 16a19. In thisdefinition'vox' is understoodas the genus and
'
as the specificdifference
. But, it is said, if the genus (in this
significativa
case the vox)changes,thereis also a change of the definiendum
(in thiscase
the nomri).
thatalbus,alba, albumare
Therefore,the claim of theNominales
one and the same nomen
is unwarrantedand so is theirpositionthatthree
tensed
are one enuntiabile.
sentences
This refutation
of the nomdifferently
inalistargumentis alreadygivenin the Summa
Aureaof Williamof Auxerre,
writtenbetween 1215 and 1220, and repeated afterhim by others.18
The second and more interesting
logical argumentbroughtin against
the Nominales
is Aristotle'sremarkin Cat. 5, 4a25ff.thatan oratio/
propositio
or an opiniois susceptibleto contraries,i.e. to contradictory
truthvalues,
because one and the same propositio
or opiniothat firstis true, may be
false later. Aristotle'sexample is the propositio
'Socrates sits', which is
17The Summa
Alexandi
Halensis
renders
thenominalist
as follows
in III q. 68
position
m. 7 a. 5, Quaracchi
sintenuntiaed.,vol.IV.2, 1094:"Aliidicunt
quodlicetmutata
articuli
suntmutati
vocessuntunumnomenutalbus,
bilia,nontarnen
quiasicutplures
suntunusarticulus."
In similar
alba,album,ita pluraenuntiabilia
wordings
Philipthe
Summa
deBonoIII.3.2Bq. 9, ed. N. Wicki,
Bern1985,vol.II, 616.Cf.also
Chancellor,
S.Th.Ia q. 16 a. 7: "Enuntiabile
enimet estin intellectu,
et estin voce."
Aquinas,
Cf.William
ofAuxerre,
Summa
III tr.12 c. 7 q. 2 ad 3, ed. Ribaillier,
Aurea
vol.
Hoc nomen'albus'esthecvox'albus';sedhecvox'albus'estalia
3.1,221: "Instantia.
voxquamhecvox'alba';ergoet estaliudnomen."
In I Sent.d. 41 art.2
Bonaventure,
'alba3and'album
3
theviewpoint
ofgrammar
ed.,740,saysthatfrom
'albus3,
q. 2, Quaracchi
are indeedone nomen
but
are
not:
consideret
in
nomen
,
logically
they
"[C]umlogicus
estvoxexpressiva,
undedfinit
verbum
etorationem
nomen,
quantum
pervocem
tamquam
necesseestmultiplican
inferius."
Thisdistinction
pergenus;et multiplicato
superiori,
between
a grammatical
anda logicalconsideration
ofthenomen
is alsofound
in Peterof
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouseed. 1652,vol.1, 342;Aquinas,
In I Sent.
Tarantasia,
d. 41 q.l art.5 ad 3 andRichard
ofMiddletown,
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1, Brixen
ed.
Frankfurt
1591[repr.
a. M.: 1963],vol.1, 369.

18:06:50 PM

THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN ITH-CENTURY

171

truewhileSocratessitsbut whichis falselater,when Socrateshas risen.19


Refutationsof the nominalistviewpointthat referto this text are common fromabout 1245 onward.20
However,froma systematic
viewpointthereis a problemwithAristotle's
statementin Cat. 5, 4a25ff.Aristotle'sexample of 'Socrates sits (now)' is
a temporallyindefinitesentenceor propositionand, hence, is logically
incomplete.If one turnsit into a temporallydefinitepropositioneither
by adding an absolute date like 'time A' or by replacingan indexical
temporalexpressionlike 'now' by a non-indexicalexpression,it becomes
clear thatthe statement'Socrates sitsat timeA', statedwhile Socratesis
actuallysitting,and the statement'Socrates sits at time B', stated after
Socratesgot up, are not one and the same statementwithvaryingtruthUnlike Aristotle,
statements.21
values as Aristotleclaims,but two different
scholarswere aware of the distinctionbetweennonmany 13th-century
indexicaltemporalexpressions(absolutedates) and indexical expressions
althoughtheydid not always apply it clearlyand unambiguously.As we
"time accordingto its essence" from
alreadysaw, Fishacre distinguishes
and Bonaventurenotes the difference
"time accordingto its differences"
between non-indexical"signifiedtime" {tempus
) and indexical
significatimi
time"
).22
(tempus
consignificatum
"consignified
19Cf.Aristoteles
Latinus
I 1-5,Categoriae,
ed.L. Minio-Paluello,
1961,12-3.
Bruges/Paris
is alsofound
inMetaphysics
Fora recent
discusThesamestatement
VIII, 10 1051bl3fF.
ontheTruth
see:PaoloCrivelli,
Aristotle
Studies
siononthispassage,
, in:Oxford
ofUtterances
in Ancient
17 (1999),37-56,esp.pp. 42-50.Actually,
is
Aristotle's
example
Philosophy,
"thatsomeone
sits"("aliquem
sedere"
or "tomOrjaGa
uva" in Greek).
Thiscomplicates
butalso a quantitatively
matters
further
becauseit is notonlya temporally
indefinite,
indefinite
sentence.
Fromthecontext
itis clearthatAristotle's
interest
concerns
onlythe
roleoftenses
andnotthesubject(s)
to.Thatseems
andthemoment
ofutterance,
referred
tobe thereason
theexample
intoa singular
Scholastics
sentence
whymany
changed
using
theproper
nameSocrates.
I havedonethesamehere.
20Albert
vol.26,350-1;Bonaventure,
InI
theGreat,
InI Sent.
d. 41 a. 6 ed. Borgnet
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5, and S.Th.Ia q. 14
Sent.
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2; ThomasAquinas,
InI Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 2 c. 1,Toulouse
a. 15ad 3; PeterofTarantasia,
ed. 1652,vol.1,
dela Mare,InI Sent.
d. 41 q. 6, ed.H. Krami,
Mnchen
342;William
1989,503;Richard
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1,Brixen
ed. 1591,vol.1, 369.
ofMiddletown,
21Cf.Jaakko
Time
Studies
inAristotle's
andNecessity.
Hintikka,
, Oxford
Theory
ofModality
1973,150-1andpassim.
22InI Sent.
d. 41q. 1 a. 5. Insummarising
theargumentation
oftheNominales
Bonaventure
sitprimofuturum,
deindepraesens,
tertio
cumidemtempus
says:"Rursus,
praeteritum,
scilicet
essevel
rei,quodsignificatur
perorationem;
tempus
quodestmensura
quamvis
velforeconsignificent
triatempora,
ratione
nondiversificant
fuisse
enuntiaconsignificati
soluma partetemporis
Cf.alsoAlbert
InIII Sent.
theGreat,
bile,sedvariatur
significati."
d. 24 a. 5 obj.4, ed. Borgnet
vol.28,452:"SitergoChristus
passusin A instanti:
ergo
aliudtempus
faceret
aliudenuntiabile:
et si passusessetin B, nonessetidemarticulus,
sci.Christum
essein B."
passum

18:06:50 PM

172

HARMGORIS

With thisproblemin mind,we can distinguishthreedifferent


ways in
which 13th-centurytheologians dealt with Aristotle's claim that the
truth-value
of a propositionmay change. The firstone is to considertemporally indefinitepropositionsor sentences as basic. Others, however,
assumed that froma logical point of view propositionsor sentencesare
and in thatcase two otherpossibilities
temporallydefinite,
presentedthemselves: eitherone adopted a purely extensionalsemanticsor the intensional aspect was also taken into account.
The firstapproach, viz. to reason fromtemporallyindefinitepropositions,is exemplifiedby Giles of Rome. In his commentaryon the Sentences
(writtenprobably before 1277), he relates Aristotle'sstatementin Cat.
4a25ff.to Anselm'sdistinctionbetween,on the one hand, a sentencesignifying"ad quodsignificandum
factaest",i.e. mere,non-truthfunctional
predication or mentioninga statementand, on the other hand, a sentence
that signifies"quodaccepitsignificare
", i.e. assertionor using a statement.
Giles also adopts Anselm'sview thatparallel to thisdistinctiona sentence
has a double truth:the firstone belongsto the sentenceimmutabiliter,
semaliter,and the second one mutabiliter
, accidentaliter
, nonsemper
per and natur
and secundum
usum.From this,he says,it followsthat a sentencealso has
a twofoldtime.The firstone is the tenseof the verband thistimebelongs
essentialiter
and immutabiliter
to the sentenceso thata change of tenseresults
in another sentence or enuntiabile.
In other, more contemporarywords,
Giles statesthattensesbelong essentiallyto the expression-type.
The other
time,he says,regardsthe momentat which a sentenceis expressed,so it
has to do with what nowadays is called the sentenceas an expressiontoken.And the lattertime,Giles says,belongsaccidentaliter
and mobiliter
to
the sentence. That the sentence 'Socrates runs' happens to be uttered
at a timewhen Socrates is in factrunning,and thushappens to be true,
does not belong essentiallyto the sentenceor enuntiabile
itself.In Giles'
it
the
is
that
is
token.23
view,
basic, not the expressionexpression-type
23GilesofRome,In I Sent.
d. 41 p. 2 q. un.,Veniceed. 1521[repr.
Frankfurt
a. M.
see:De Ventate
c. 2, ed. F. Schmitt
vol.I, Stuttgart
1968,
1968],f. 218F.ForAnselm,
178-9.In an anonymous
tracton insolubilia
datedbyBraakhuis
aroundthe
, tentatively
middleof the 13thcentury,
theauthordistinguishes
between
numerical
and
explicitly
ofpropositions,
thatis,between
andexpression-type.
identity
specific
expression-token
Only
thelatter,
he says,allowsofsuccessive,
different
truth-values.
The author
makesthedisina discussion
tinction
onpropositional
self-reference
butheusesitalsotoexplain
Aristotle's
statement
in Cat.4a25ff.:
cf.H.A.G.Braakhuis,
Thesecond
tract
oninsolubilia
inParis,
found
with
ananalysis
BJV.Lat. 16.617.Anedition
5 (1967),
, in:Vivarium,
ofthetext
ofitscontents
theanonymous
ofthispaperforpointreferee
111-45,
esp.pp. 113-5and 127-8.I thank
ingthistextoutto me.

18:06:50 PM

TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY

173

for it turns
From the viewpointof logic, this argumentis less satisfying
the truth-function
of propositionsinto a secondary,accidentalfeature.
In a way that is similarto Giles's argumentbut withoutmentioning
the notion of truth,the anonymousauthor of Sophisma10 in ms. Vat.
lat. 7678 triesto reconcilethe Aristotelianand the nominalistview. A
sentence (oratio),he says, can be seen either in relation to its mental
in anima
) and thatis how Aristotletakesit in Cat. 4a25,
(species
significate
as the Nominales
do. In the firstcase
or to the extramentalthing/event,
'Socrates sits' when utteredat different
times,is one and the same sentence because the mental significatedoes not change. But when related
thereare two different
sentencesbecause
to the extramentalthing/event,
'now'.24
each refersto a different
In contrastwith Giles, othersfocusedon temporallydefinitepropositionsby takingthe absolutedate into account. In doing so, theyhad two
otherpossibilitiesto interpretthe argumentfromCat. 4a25ff.,depending
on the choice of typeof semantics.One may adopt a purelyextensional
semantics,with the consequence of ending up with the position of the
William de la Mare seems to followthisline. In his commenNominales.
, writtenaround 1270, he firstquotes the argument
taryon the Sentences
fromCat. 4a25ff.as an objectionagainst the nominalistview. But then
Williamcontinuesby acknowledgingthe view of the Nominales
as a legitimate alternative,and he tacitlyrejectsAristotle'sargument:25
Butnotethatalthough
itis saidin thisway,yetthefirst
whichis saidto
opinion,
be oftheMasterand theNominates
, is considered
bymanyand greatmento be
hadbetter
be called
moretrueandaccording
to themthosewhoheldthatopinion
Reales
thanNominales
becausewhentheysaythat'Sortes
willrunat timeA', 'Sortes
runsat timeA', 'Sortes
ranat timeA' is thesameenuntiabilei
theysaythisbecause
24Sophisma
10 from
Vat.lat.7678,editedbyS. Ebbesen,
GIMAGL,62 (1992),188.
at thefirst
halfofthe13thcentury.
Ebbesen
datesthissophisma
25InI Sent.
d. 41 q. 6 ad 2, ed.Krami1989,504:"Notaautemquodlicetitadicatur,
etnominalium
a multis
eta maximis
tarnen
verior
prima
opinioquaedicitur
Magisti
repilliqui fuerunt
illiusopinionis
utataestet venussecundum
eos dicerentur
realesquam
nominales
'Sortescurret
in A tempore',
quia quandodicunt
quodestidemenuntiabile
in A', 'Sortes
in A', hocideodicunt
currit
cucurrit
a parte
'Sortes
quianonestvariatio
et aliquando
fuitpraesens
et modoest
temporis
quiaidemesttempus
quodfuitfuturum
et si nonestvariatio
a partetemporis,
ergoneca partereienuntiatae
praeteritum,
quia
eiusdem
eademresnonpotest
se difformiter
habere
Variatur
respectu
temporis.
ergoenuntiabile
secundum
vocemtantum
et futuro,
quandofitenuntiatio
propraeterito,
praesenti
sedresnonvariatur
etideonecenuntiabile
debetdicialiudetaliud,sedidem."Cf.also
14thcentury),
an anonymous
YukioandStenEbbesen
Notula
(13th/
quotedbyIwakuma
A ListofSources
inLogico-Theological
Schools
the
Second
, in:Vivarium,
from
Halfofthe12thCentury:
debent
dicirealeset econverso
30 (1992),173-215,
. . ."
p. 209:". . . potiusnominales

18:06:50 PM

HARMGORIS

174

oftimethat
thereis nota changeon thepartoftime,forit is thesamemoment
andnowis past,andifthereis nota changeon
wasfuture
andoncewaspresent
because
is there
onthepartofthething/event
thenneither
thepartoftime,
reported
of time.
to thesamemoment
cannotchangewithrespect
thesamething/event
whenan enunciation
is madeforpast,
theenuntiabile
variesonlyvocally
Therefore
doesnotvaryandtherefore
neither
butthething/event
andfuture
(tenses),
present
be saidto be different,
butrather
tobe thesame.
musttheenuntiabile
tensesin temporallydefinitepropoThe otherpossibilityof interpreting
but to
sitionsor sentencesis not to focuse exclusivelyon extensionality,
take the intensionalaspect into account. This makes up a thirdway in
scholars dealt with the argumentin Cat. 4a25. We
which 13th-century
's discussionof the immutabilfindthis line of reasoningin Bonaventure
on the Sentences
between
(written
ityof divineknowledgein his commentary
1250-55):26
a verbin thepresent
tense
thisor thatman,likewise
[A]s 'man'doesnotsignify
in general,
itjoinsor
butthepresent
whether
thisor thatpresent
doesnotsignify
noris another
as 'man'doesnothaveanother
Andthatis why,
meaning
consignifies.
termifitsupposits
nowforPeterandthenforPaul,likewise
nounor an equivocal
doesnothave
whether
itis uttered
a verbin thepresent
tense,
todayortomorrow,
enuntiabile.
Andthatis
and therefore
it doesnotmakeanother
another
meaning
it is the
time'thatyouwillbe born',is uttered,
whyit is clearthat,at whatever
wastrueandthenfalse.
whichfirst
sameenuntiabile
and supBonaventureadopts the basic distinctionbetween signification
the
of
usual
context
of
from
its
transfers
it
and
analysis a noun
position
elementof
withina sentence,to the tensedverb- the otherconstitutive
its
the sentence.The presenttense of a verb does not change
meaning
momentsof time.27
when it is utteredat and, hence, refersto different
26In I Sent.
'homo'nonsignificai
ed. 1882,740f.:"[SJicut
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2, Quaracchi
illudvelilludpraenonsignificai
sicverbum
velilium,
hominem
istum
praesentis
temporis
Etindeestquod,sicut'homo'
sivecopulaivelconsignificat.
incommuni,
sens,sedpraesens
si modosupponat
necaequivocum,
necestaliudnomen
nonhabetaliamsignificationem
hodie
sivepronuntietur
modoproPaulo;sicnecverbum
praesentis
temporis,
proPetro,
aliudenuntiabile.
Etpropterea
etideononfacit
siveeras,nonhabetaliamsignificationem,
teessenasciturum,
quodidemestenuntiabile,
proferatur
tempore
patetquod,quocumque
wasthecommon
Notethat"teessenasciturum"
modofalsum."
quodpriusfuitverum,
tasia
scivi(seen. 12 above).PeterofTaran
'Deusseitquicquid
in thesophisma
exemplum
butis essential
to theverbin isolation,
notesthatconsignificatio
maybe accidental
temporis
ed. 1652,vol.1,342:". . . etlicet
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouse
InI Sent.
to theproposition:
et accidentalis
haecconsignificatio
verbo,
significato
H.G.) sitaccidentalis
(viz.temporis,
nontantum
sedmodm
essentialis
esttarnen
actum,
enunciabili,
quiaenunciabile
perverbum,
d. 41.2ad 4,Veniceed. 1521,218.
GilesofRome,In I Sent.
Likewise
actussignificai."
27I havenotfound
forone
Modernorum
oftheLogica
in texts
discussions
similar
, except
com"Dicoquodverbaproprie
remark
madebyPeterofIreland:
consignificant
praesens
verbietde comde communitate
Et estidemiudicium
muniter
etnondiscrete.
temporis

18:06:50 PM

TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY

175

be born' is ambiguousfor it
However,Bonaventure'sexample 'you
This
is
not the case withAquinas's
is a temporallyindefinite
proposition.
elaborationof the argumentfromCat. 4a25ff.As example he does not
use one and the same (temporallyindefinite)expression-type,
but two
the
tensed
that
refer
to
same
event
and,
differently
propositions
particular
are
definite:28
thus,
(virtually)
temporally
iftheenuntiabile
hasitsunity
from
theunity
ofthething/event,
then
Furthermore,
ithasitsdiversity
forthesamereason
from
thediversity
Andso theenun(thereof).
tiabile
'thatSocrates
at different
moments
oftime,
wouldnotbe one,
runs',uttered
norwoulda nounthatsignifies
different
be one.In thiswaybothequivocathings
tionandunivocity
wouldperish,
eachofwhichrequires
theunity
ofa nounthat
befits
more(things).
allmoderni
concede
that'thatSocrates
runs'and'that
Therefore,
Socrates
ran'aretwodifferent
enuntiabilia
evenifthey
refer
tothesameactofrunning.
In this text the argumentfrom Cat. 4a25ff.does not hinge upon two
different
eventsthatoccur at two distinctmomentsof time,but also holds
in the case of one and the same event to which two differently
tensed
refer.This is also clear in anothertextwhereAquinas answers
propositions
to the (nominalist)objectionthat as the cause of truthof 'Socrates sits',
'Socrates will sit' and 'Socrates sat' is the same, viz. Socrates' act of sitthe truthis one and the same. Aquinas refutesthe argument
ting,therefore
with an implicitreferenceto the threefolddivisionof the AristotelianBoethian theoryof signification
between language, understandings
(conand
cepts)
reality:29

munitate
cuiuslibet
termini
communis
. . ." (Glosulae
inLibrum
Aristotelis
PerHermeneias
Maistri
Petri
deHibernia
in:CIMAGL,43 (1982),3-44:p. 39 lines
, ed.KarenElisabeth
Dalgaard,
thisremark
ina discussion
on temporally
andtheir
13-5).Petermakes
vaguepropositions
is whether
thetenses
oftheverbsignify
time
(seenote2 above);thequestion
negations
discrete
orcommuniter
ifthelatter,
whether
or determinate).
(and
confuse
28In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5: "Et praeterea
si ab unitate
reienuntiabile
haberet
unieademratione
ex diversitate
haberet
etitahocenuntiabile,
Socratem
tatem,
diversitatem;
diversis
nonessetunum,nec aliquodnomensigni
ficans
currere,
temporibus
prolatum,
diversas
resunumesset;etsicperirei
tamaequivocatio
quamunivocatio,
quarum
utraque
unitatem
nominis
convenit.
Undeab omnibus
modernis
requirit
conceditur,
quodpluribus
Socratem
currere
et cucurisse,
etiamsi ad eumdem
enuntiabilia,
quodsuntduodiversa
cursum
referantur."
Cf.alsoDe Ver.
". . . intellectus
q. 10 a. 2 ad 3 in contr.:
cognoscit
differentias
secundum
communes
rationes."
temporum
29De Ver.
veritatis
nontantum
ex identitte
q. 1 a. 6 ad 6: ". . . identitas
rei,
dependet
sedetiamex identitte
intellectus
. . . Quamvis
autemsiteademresquaesignificatur
illis
tribus
nontarnen
estidemintellectus
earum
..." The claimthatidentity
propositionibus,
of reference
is nota sufficient
reasonfortheidentity
of truth
is also mentioned
by
Peter
ofTarantasia
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouse
ed. 1652,vol.1,342)andRichard
(InI Sent.
ofMiddletown
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1,Brixen
ed. 1591,vol.1, 369).
(InI Sent.

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176

HARMGORIS
ontheidentity
ofthething/
. . . theidentity
ofthetruth
doesnotonlydepend
event,
. . . Although
thesamething/
eventis
butalsoon theidentity
oftheunderstanding
is notthesame. . .
bythesethreesentences,
yettheir
understanding
signified

The view of the Nominales


supposes a purelyextensionalsemantics:enuntiabiliaare identicaland expressone and the same truthwhen theyrefer
to the same singular,extramentalreality.In contrast,Bonaventureand
Aquinas argue that the identityof the extramentalthing/eventsignified
is not enough forthe identityof the enuntiabile.
They point at the intenas an essentialelement. Because
sional aspect of significatio/consignificatio
tensedpropositionsare not identical
tensesdifferintensionally,
differently
even if theyreferto the same event.
of God's knowledge,
With regardto the problem of the immutability
most 13th-century
scholarsadmit,unliketheNominales
, thatGod does not
taken
or
know now every enuntiabile
(when
significativetruth-functionally)
that He knew before,but- it is claimed- thisdoes notjeopardise divine
For knowledgeis a transientact, implyinga relation,and
immutability.
it is onlyone of the relatathatchanges,viz. the extramental
objectknown,
and not the divine knower.30
2.3

enuntiabile
The Theory
of theTenseless

However, the argumentfromthe relationalityof knowledgeby way of


of God's knowledgeis secured,will not do in the
which the immutability
case of the beliefsof historicaland mutablehuman beings.To safeguard
the unityof faith,the Scholasticswho rejectedthe nominalistpositionhad
to come up with another solution.The most influentialone is the thein which the argumentfromintensionality
ory of the tenselessenuntiabile
no longerplaysa role. Bonaventuredefendsthe unityof faithas follows:31
30See e.g.Bonaventure,
theGreat,In I Sent.
d. 41
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2; Albert
of
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5 ad 1; Richard
vol.26, 350f.;Aquinas,
a. 6, ed. Borgnet,
ed. 1591,vol.1, 369;GilesofRome,In
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1, Brixen
Middletown,
ed.
I Sent.d. 41 p. 2 q. un.,Veniceed. 1521,218;Anonymus
Victorinus,
Sophismata,
first
10 from
Vat.lat.7678- probably
S. Ebbesen,
CIMAGL,65 (1995),233f.;Sophisma
- , ed. S. Ebbesen,
from
The argument
half13thcentury
CIMAGL,62 (1992),184,186f.
ofAuxerre,
he thinks
is alsomentioned
ofknowledge
therelationality
byWilliam
though
I
Summa
Aurea
andPeterLombard:
is morein linewithAugustin
solution
thenominalist
180f.Laterin hiscareer,
tr.9 c. 3, ed. Ribaillier,
givesa different
explanation
Aquinas
actofknowledge:
status
oftheobjectoftheimmanent
on theintentional
whichfocuses
S.TTi.
Ia q. 14 a. 15 ad 1.
31InIII Sent.
comad suamsubstantiam
d. 24 a. 1 q. 3: "Namfidesquantum
respicit
immo
determinatam
nonconcernendo
differentiam,
temporis
plexumsiveenuntiabile,
fuisse
sicutChristum
et indifferens
ad omnetempus,
quodestcommune
aliquoddictum,

18:06:50 PM

THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY

177

withoran enuntiabile
Forfaith
toitssubstance
something
complex
regards
according
that
difference
oftime,
butrather
somedictum
intoaccount
a determinate
outtaking
wouldsuffer'
... in thisway
like'thatChrist
to all times,
is general
andindifferent
inkind.
faith
so thatitweredifferent
timedoesnotchange
a change
ofdeterminate
that was broughtin against the resThe counter-argument
theoryand
viz.
that
it does not
the
solution
of
the
omnitensed
disjunction,
against
allow for a distinctionbetweenJews or hereticsand Christians,seems
also to applyto the theoryof the tenselessproposition.In orderto exclude
fromthe Christianfaithheterodoxviewsas e.g. the opinionthatthe coming of the Messiah is future,Bonaventureuses the distinctionbetween
implicitand explicitfaith:while (implicit)faith regards essentiallythe
of tensesin explicit
tenselessenuntiabile
, thereis an accidentaldetermination
of
on
the
situation
the
believer.
This is basihistorical
faith,depending
the
was
also
the
same
that
adopted by
proponentsof the
cally
strategy
restheoryin order to refutethe objection.32
Bonaventure'ssolutionof the tenselessenuntiabile
expressedgrammatically by a futureperfecttense or, as other scholastictexts have it, a
like Christum
, or a presenttense
fiiisseincarnandum
gerundive-construction
in explicitfaithbecame a
as in Christum
incarnariand its determination
half
in
of the 13th century.33
the
second
commonlyaccepted position
a
of
Bonaventure's
critical
However,
analysis
argumentto safeguard
the unityof faithshows that it is flawed.Bonaventure'smove to bring
in thedistinction
betweenimplicitand explicitfaithseemsto be unnecessary
nonvariat
... sicetvariatio
determinati
utsitaliaetaliasecunfidem,
passurum
temporis
dumspeciem."
Bonaventure
wasnotthefirst
onewhocameup withthissolution.
It is
in the12th-century
on theSentences
found
already
commentary
(PL
byMasterBandinus
ofGodfrey
ofPoitiers,
written
around1220
192,1021
A) andinthecommentary
probably
inLandgraf
1943(op.cit
com., above,n. 3), 187):"[A]liidicunt
(quoted
quodenuntiabilia
omnetempus
suntarticuli,
utChristum
fuisse
nasciturum."
Anditis mentioned
placentia
in Summa
ofAuxerre
III tr.12c. 7 q. 2 ad 4, ed. Ribaillier,
Aurea
22If.: . .
byWilliam
ad omniatempora,
enuntiabile
commune
sci.FiliumDei fuisse
incarnandum."
Cf.also
G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
Ancient
andmedieval
ofthe
proposition.
conceptions
ofthebearers
oftruth
andfalsity
/London
, Amsterdam
1973,183-4.
"Bonaventure,
In111Sent.
d. 24 a. 1 q. . PhiliptheChancellor,
theoutstanding
representative
oftheresalsoassumes
an accidental
determination
oftimein answertheory,
Thisdetermination,
he says,belongs
to themodeofbelieving
ingthesameobjection.
notto thesubstance
deBonoIII.3.2.2 q. 9, ed.Wicki,
offaith:
Summa
vol.
(modus
credendi),
answer
is adopted
Alexandri
II, 616-7.Philip's
Halensis
verbally
bytheSumma
Quaracchi
In III Sent.
ed. vol.IV.2, 1095-6.Cf.alsoAlbert
theGreat,
d. 24 a. 5 ad sc. 2.3,ed.
vol.28,453.
Borgnet,
33Itwasfollowed
d. 41 exp.text),
Richard
ofMiddletown
bytheyoung
{InI Sent.
Aquinas
d. 24 a. 1 q. 2, Brixen
ed. 1591,vol.3, 266),PeterofTaran
tasia(InIII Sent.
(InIII Sent.
d. 24 q. un.a. 3; Toulouseed. 1652,vol.3, 186)andGilesofRome(InI Sent.
d. 41
exp.txt.;Veniceed. 1521,f.218).

18:06:50 PM

178

HARMGORIS

and to depend only upon omittingthe tempus


, i.e. the absolute
significatimi
that
the
inclusionof the
be
For
it
can
enuntiabile.
from
the
date,
argued
is
enuntiabile
the
tenseless
within
not
or
whether
date
absolute
specified
enough to exclude such views as that the birthof the Messiah is (now)
stillfuture.Believingthat Christ is- tenselessly
being born at time A,
would sufficeto unite both the Fathers of the Old Covenant and contemporaryChristiansin the same faith,but it would not be shared by
Jews. The only function,then,of the distinctionbetween
contemporary
and
explicitfaithwould be to indicatethat the Old Fathersdid
implicit
not know exacdy but only vaguelywhat the absolute date, the time A,
is, while we know thatit is the year 1 CE. Abraham believed thatit was
some date later than- let's say- the year 5 afterleaving the cityof Ur,
or whatever calendar he might have used. But for pointing out this
between the explicitfaithof the Old Fathersand of contemdifference
of tensesin
poraryChristians,it is not necessaryto include a difference
in the specificationof the absolute date
the article:a gradual difference
The onlysemanticfuncwould be sufficient.
withinthe tenselessenuntiabile
tion of tenses in Bonaventure'sargumentfor the unityof faithis that
they referto a (more or less specified)absolute date. The conclusionis
is not compatiblewith a rejecthat the theoryof a tenselessenuntiabile
the
both of them coincide.
In
tion of the nominalistview.
fact,
that was used in the discussionon
The argumentfromintensionality
of God's knowledgeis the only valid argumentleftfor
the immutability
refutingthe nominalistview. As we shall see next,Aquinas turnsto it in
his later workswhen discussingthe unityof faith.He abandons the the, which he had endorsedearlier and argues,
ory of a tenselessenuntiabile
are essentiallytensed.
on psychologicalgrounds,that enuntiabilia
2.4

TheArgument
Psychology
AgainsttheNominalesfiomAristotle's

The thirdargumentthatwas levelledagainstthe nominalisttheoryis not


a logical, but a psychologicalone: the formationof propositionsby the
textis takenfromAristotle'sDe
intellectincludestense.The authoritative
Anima.At the beginningof chapter 6 of De Anima
, bk III, Aristotlediswhich
became knownin
of
tinguishesbetweentwo modes understanding,
the Latin West as the two 'operationsof the intellect'.The firstone concernsindivisibleconceptsand does not allow of falsehood.The otherone
is the combiningof thoughtsinto a unityand thatis where falsehoodor
truthis. In otherwords: the second operationof the intellectis the formation of a proposition.With regard to the formationof the proposi-

18:06:50 PM

THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY

179

tion,Aristotlethen adds in 430b 1: "When it is of thingspast or future,


and composes time."34
(the intellect)also understands(cointelligit)
1
An.
430b
does not occur as frequently
The argumentbased on De
as the two logical argumentsfromDe Int. 16a19 and Cat. 4a25ff.to refute
of
the nominalistposition.It is used in the commentarieson the Sentences
Thomas Aquinas(around 1253) and Peterof Tarantasia(between1257-59).
In both these cases, though,it is not interpretedas a decisiveargument
determinatum
for includingdeterminatetime (tempus
,
) withinthe enuntiabile
time so that it does not conbut only indeterminate
or vague {confusum)
.35However,a fewyears after
tradictthe theoryof the tenselessenuntiabile
, Aquinas changed his opinion.
writingthe commentaryon the Sentences
The referenceto De An. 430b 1 now serves as proof that tenses are an
and it is considered to be the psychoessentialpart of the enuntiabile
logical explanationforthe logical doctrineof Cat. 4a25ff.This change of
q. 12 a. 14 (writtenbetween
viewpointis alreadyapparentin De Ventate
in
it
but
is
most
1256-59),
clearlyexpressed Quodl.4 q. 9 a. 2, which
dates fromabout 127 1:36
34William
whichwasprobably
in 1266or 1267,
ofMoerbeke's
finished
translation,
etfuturorum,
etcomponens."
Gf.Aquinas,
reads:"Si autem
factorum
tempus
cointelligens
LibrideAnima
Sentencia
, Leonineed.,vol.45,1p.' 224.The old translation
byJacobof
from
1150,doesnothavethewordcointelligens
introduced
Venice
around
', butitwasalready
cf.ibid,
theLatintranslations
ofAvicenna
andAverroes:
footnote
on p. 225.
through
35In answering
toan objection
thatargues
fortheinclusion
oftenses
inenuntiabilia
with
toDeAn.430b1,Aquinas
reference
states:
determinatum
estde hisquaeacci"[TJempus
dentaliter
se habent
ad fidem,
ad praedicatum
sicutetiamse habetaccidentaliter
et subet dividit
intellectus."
d. 24 a. 1 qa. 2 ad 4). To the
{InIII Sent.
quaecomponit
jectum,
sameobjection
Petersays:"Quamvis
incidat
inteltempus
aliquomodoin compositione
lectus
et enunciabilis
et articuli,
nontarnen
nisiperaccidens,
sed
determinatum,
tempus
. . (InIII Sent.
confusum
d. 24 a. 3 ad 4, Toulouseed. 1652,186).The psychological
is alsomentioned
theGreatthough
without
reference
toDe
argument
byAlbert
explicit
an.430b1: cf.note6 above.
36"Potest
velenuntiabile
essealiudetaliud,velpropter
diversitatem
vocis
ergonomen
sicutestin synonymis,
in quibusestdiversa
tantum,
vox,sedidemsignificatum
omnino;
veletiamcumdiversitate
vocispotest
essediversitas
sivepropter
diversitatem
intellectuum,
reiintellectae,
sivepropter
diversitatem
modum
ethoccontingit
intelligendi;
quandocumque
estdiversitas
modum
unamet eamdem
rem;
consignificationis,
quaesequitur
intelligendi
etpraecipue
hocapparet
intempore,
intellectus
humani
operationi
quodpersecommiscetur
et dividends,
ut dicitur
in III De Anima.Et ideodicendum
est,quodnon
componentis
estidemenuntiabile
Socratem
etSocratem
velsessurum
sedisse,
sedere,
esse;sedSocratem
sedere
estidemenuntiabile,
Et ideopatet
quiaesteademvoxetidemmodussignificando
esseverum,
falsum."
References
to
quodidemenuntiabile
potest
quandoque
quandoque
De An.430b1 in arguing
tensedness
ofpropositions
in De
fortheessential
are frequent
Ventate
andinAquinas's
laterwritings:
De Ver.
q. 1 a. 5, q. 1 a. 6 ad 6, q. 10a. 11sc 3,
S.U. Ia q. 16a. 8 ad 4.

18:06:50 PM

HARMGORIS

180

a nounor an enuntiabile
can be different
either
Therefore,
(1) becauseofa vocal
in whichthevoxis different
difference
butthe
only,as is thecase in synonyms
thesame;or (2) witha vocaldifference
therecan alsobe a
signified
altogether
difference
ofunderstandings
either
in thething
under(2.1.)becauseofa difference
in themodeofunderstanding.
stoodor (2.2.)becauseofa difference
Andthelatter
in consignification,
whenthereis a difference
whichfollows
uponunderhappens
clearin time,whichis perse
oneand thesamething.
Thisis especially
standing
withthecomposing
anddividing
ofthehuman
as is said
intellect,
mingled
operation
Andtherefore
itis tobe saidthat'thatSocrates
inIII De Anima.
sits','thatSocrates
sat'or 'thathe willsit'are notthesameenuntiabile]
but'thatSocrates
sits'is the
sameenuntiabile
forit is thesamevoxandthesamemodeofsignifying.
Andtherethatthesameenuntiabile
cansometimes
be true,sometime
foreitis shown
false.
in this passage, albeit
Again we find the argumentfromintensionality
with a temporallyindefiniteproposition.The identityof the enuntiabile
,
is
not
determined:
the
modus
claims,
,
only extensionally
intelligent
Aquinas
which includesthe tenses,is equally decisive.The new thingin his argument is that the grammaticaland logical role of tenses (consignificatio
)
receives a psychologicalfoundation:time is included by the "operation
of the composingand dividingintellect",usuallycalled the "second operation of the intellect"by Aquinas- the one that resultsin the formation
of propositions.
As far as I know,Aquinas is the only one to use Aristotle'stextin De
An. Ill, 6, 430b 1 as the argumentthatlays the psychologicalfoundations
he does not elabofor the logical irreducibility
of tenses.Unfortunately,
rate in detail on the psychologicalmechanismsby way of which time is
implied in the second operationof the intellect.A few passages indicate
In
sio ad phantasmatd'
that it has to do withthe intellect'sso-called "corner
a discussion on the contrastbetween angelic and human knowledge,
Aquinas says:37
withtheir
It is alsoclearthattimeis notmingled
(i.e.theangels,
H.G.)intellectual
thefactthat
timedoestouchourintellectual
from
. . . however,
operation,
operation
from
which
a determinate
time.Andthatis
wederive
knowledge
regard
phantasms,
but
or division,
ourintellect
addsa pastor future
time,
always
whyin composition
37ScGII c. 96 nr.10: "Palamestetiamquodintellectuali
nonadmiseorum
operationi
nostrae
adiacet
ex
eo
a phanautem
intellectuali
.
.
.
cetur
tempus,
quod
tempus Operationi
Etindeestquod
tasmatibus
quaedeterminatum
respiciunt
tempus.
cognitionem
accipimus,
noster
velfutuintellectus
incompositione
etdivisione
semper
adiungit
tempus
praeteritum
intelrum:nonauteminintelligendo
quodquidest.Intelligit
quodquidestabstrahendo
illamoperationem,
undesecundum
conditionibus:
a sensibilium
nequesubtemligibilia
rerum
sensibilium
comprehendit.
Componit
intelligibile
porenequesubaliquaconditione
ad res:et in hac applicatione
autemaut dividit
applicando
intelligibilia
priusabstracta
Cf.alsoS.Th.Ia q. 85 a. 5 ad 2: "Etex ea partequa se
necesse
estcointelligi
tempus."
intellectus
et divisioni
ad phantasmata
convertit,
tempus."
adiungitur
compositioni

18:06:50 PM

THEOLOGY
TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY

181

is. Foritunderstands
whata thing
is by
ofwhata thing
notin theunderstanding
to
ofthesensibles.
theconditions
from
Therefore,
according
abstracting
intelligibles
oftimeoranycondition
ofsentheintelligible
thisoperation,
itgrasps
irrespectively
thepreviously
abstracted
or divides
itcomposes
siblethings.
However,
byapplying
time.
itis necessary
to co-understand
andin thisapplication
to things;
intelligibles
It is well beyond the scope of thispaper to enterinto the intricaciesof
Aquinas's philosophyof mind. The basic idea behind the passage quoted
above may be gathered fromwhat Aquinas says elsewhereabout the
workingsof the human intellect.In his later writings,he claims that in
its second operationthe intellectnot only 'turns' (convertit
) to the phan- but also
tasms for that is equally necessaryin the firstoperation
,
'returns'(redit)to the phantasmsin some sort of spontaneousreflection
with the (indirect)intellectual
(ireflexio
).38Aquinas associatesthis reflection
humans
have
of
that
singularthingsas such and with
may
knowledge
All thissuggeststhat in the forthe formationof singularpropositions.39
somehowresumesthephantasms,
thehumanintellect
mationofpropositions
and hence includesagain to some extenttheparticular,sensibleconditions
of the extramentalobject fromwhichit had prescindedin the processof
abstraction.One of these particularconditionsis the time in which the
concreteextramentalobject exists.Resumingthe phantasmin the second
operationleads in one way or otherto the inclusionof tenses.The details
of Aquinas's explanationwhy and how the second operationof the intellect involvestensednessremainto be examined in furtherdetail.40
2.5

withModernTenseLogic
Comparison

There are some interesting


parallelsbetweenScholasticand modernviews
The theoryof an omnitensedcomplex,which
on thelogicalroleof tenses.41
was held by a numberof 12th-and 13th-century
scholars,has in more
recenttimesalso been defendedby NicholasWolterstorff
and Alan Padgett.42
38Cf.S.U. Ia q. 86 a. 1,S.Th.IIa Ilae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1,andInIII DeAn.lc. 8 n.713.
39S.U. Ia 86
q. a. 1.
40Fora tentative
reconstruction
seeGoris1996(op.cit
., above,n. 9), 196-209.
41Foran overview
see:RobinLe Poidevin,
Ue Past,
ofthemodern
debateon tenses,
Present
andFuture
about
Tense
, in: R. Le Poidevin
(ed.),Questions
oftheDebate
ofTimeand
introduction
intocontemporary
Tense
1998,14-42.A veryaccessible
, Oxford
philosophy
andFreedom:
oftimeis:Quentin
Smith
andL. Nathan
anIntroduction
Time,
Oaklander,
Change
toMetaphysics
, London(etc.)1995.
42Formedieval
adherents
oftheomnitensed
seenote8 above.Among
complex
theory
andtheNature
see:AlanPadgett,
modern
tenselogicians,
God,
, NewYork,
Eternity
ofTime
AndNicholas
GodEverlasting
andL. Smedes
, in:C. Orlebeke
1992,108-19.
Wolterstorff,
inhonour
Stob
, GrandRapidsMI 1975,188-92.
(eds),GodandtheGood.
Essays
ofHenry

18:06:50 PM

182

HARMGORIS

- which cannot
The theoryof the 12th-century
Nominales
meaningfully
be distinguished
fromthe positionof Fishacreor Bonaventure
's tenseless
- coincideswith
enuntiabile
at
least
until
was the commonly
what,
recently,
accepted view among logicians on the logical role of tenses:tenses(and
other indexical temporalexpressions)can and should be eliminatedfor
they are logicallyirrelevant.Quine's distinctionbetween 'occasion sentences' and 'eternalsentences'is the classical representative
of thisview.
This is the positionthat nowadays is labelled as the "old tenselesstheory of time".
In the 1980s the so-called "new tenselesstheoryof time" superseded
the old one. Those who favourthis theoryagree with the adherentsof
the "tensedtheoryof time" in thattheyacknowledgethattensesdo have
a specific,
irreducible
The meaningsexpressedby thetokens
logicalfunction.
'Socrates sits', utteredtoday, and 'Socrates sat', utteredtomorrow,are
not the same. This is very similarto the argumentfromintensionality
that was used by Bonaventure,Aquinas and othersin the 13th century.
Apart fromgrammatical,logical and psychologicalconsiderationsof
on theirontologicalaspect in 13thtenses,thereare also some reflections
in
texts.
However,
centurytheological
comparisonto moderndiscussions
on tense logic,in which the ontologicalimplicationsof tensesare heavily
debated, these medieval textscontain littleon questionsconcerningthe
realityof time. The modern 'new tenselesstheoryof time' admits that
tensedpropositionscannot be translatedinto tenselessones withoutsome
loss of meaningbut, it is argued,thisdoes not prove thatthe extramental
eventsthemselveschange frombeing futureto being presentand being
to deduce metaphysical
past. Intensional differencesare not sufficient
differences.
There did not existan exact parallel of thisdiscussionamong
medieval theologians.Some of them talk about the identityof the resor
eventus
, whetherit is past,presentor future,and thismay suggesta tenseless
view on time. On the other hand both Bonaventureand Aquinas state
thatthesame resbeingfuture,
modes
presentor past,indicatesthreedifferent
se habendi
or modus
of being {modus
and
this
seems
to
a
essendi)
suggest tensed
view on time. In criticisingthe nominalistposition,Bonaventuresays:43
43In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2: "[EJnuntiabile
nonsignificai
se habendi;
rem,sedmodum
et cumperverbum
et futuri
resalio modose habere,
praesentis,
praeteriti
significetur
estte essenasci
turum
et te essenatum."
Cf.
quodaliudenuntiabile
patetde necessitate
alsoad 1: "[QJuamvis
sitreducibilis
ad unamreiveritatem,
sicutaccidens
ad subiectum,
et modusessendi
ad entitatem,
tarnen
cummodusessendi
habeatsuamveritatem,
ettres
suntmodiessendi,
ideosunttresveritates."
S.Th.la q. 16 a. 8 ad 4: ". . . sesAquinas,
sioSocratis,
huiuspropositionis
'Socrates
sedit'noneodemmodo
quaeestcausaveritatis

18:06:50 PM

THEOLOGY
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183

buta modeofbeing;andas bya verbin


a thing,
doesnotsignify
[Theenuntiabile
thatthething
is in a different
it
is
future
tense
or
thepresent,
way,it
signified
past
is necessarily
clearthat'thatyouwillbe born'and'thatyouareborn'aredifferent
enuntiabilia.
This mightindicatethat Bonaventureand othersassume a metaphysical
tensed enuntiabilia.
foundationfor the logical distinctnessof differently
limited
and
too
too
evidence
is
the
textual
However,
ambiguous to justifysuch conclusions.
While 13th-century
theologiansdid not explicitlydiscuss the relation
between tense logic and the metaphysicsof time, some mastersin the
artsfacultydid. In discussionson the sophism"God knowswhateverHe
knew" thereare some referencesto the eternal(tenseless)presenceof all
/eventsto God as the metaphysicalfoundationof the view that
things
tensesare logicallyirrelevant.44
3. Summary
Discussionsabout the logical role of tensesin propositions,which began
in responseto thetheologicaldoctrines
of theimmutabilin the 12thcentury
in the 13th cenof
continued
divine
and
the
of
faith,
unity
knowledge
ity
in
but
the arts faculty.
also
masters
of
not
only among
theology,
tury,
Afterabout 1225, the common opinionwas that the theoryof the 12thon the logical irrelevancyof tenseswas to be rejected.
centuryNominales
Neverthelessthis theorysurvivedboth in terminologicaldisguiseand in
the theoryof the tenselessenuntiabile
, critical analysis of which shows
that it cannot meaningfully
be distinguished
fromthe nominalistview.
Three argumentstaken fromAristotlewere adduced to corroborate
the refutationof the nominalistview. The elaboration of Cat. 4a25ff,
where it is said that the same sentence/propositioncan have different
etantequamsederet.";
Peter
ofTarantasia,
etpostquam
dumSocrates
sehabet
sederit,
sedet,
diverIn I Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouseed. 1652,vol.1, 342: . . ab unarepropter
tresdifferentias
. . ibid,
ad
secundum
reifittriplex
enunciabile
summodum
temporum
nonsolumsecundum
id quodest,sed
6: "Veritas
reiestcausaveritatis
enunciabilium,
et eorum
modum
secundum
est,undeetenunciabilia
quo est:illeautemmodusdiversus
rerum
modushabendi
se
hadalready
stated:
Veritas."
Abelard
diversificatur
"[QJuidam
tr.
1.
ed.
res
Dialctica
L.M.
non
2,
,
1,
(.
aliquae
designantur."
exprimitur,
perpropositiones
de Rijk,Assen1970,160.)
'Deusseit
44Richard,
ofthesophisma
scivi
Master
oftheAbstractions,
discussion
,
quicquid
in
65
Hervaeus
extract
from
edited
S.
Ebbesen
extract
CIMAGL, (1995),220;
by
Sophista,
andofHerveaus
edited
hisAbstractiones
221.BoththetextofRichard
ibid.,
byS. Ebbesen,
of the 13thcentury).
And:Anonymous,
are datedby Ebbesenat thesecondquarter
topreDistinctiones
238ff.
ibid.,
2.13,ed. S. Ebbesen,
(datedbyEbbesen
1270).
Sophismatum

18:06:50 PM

184

HARMGORIS

truth-values
dependingon the momentof utterance,was somewhatmuddled because of an ambiguoususage of the term4enuntiabil
and because
of lack of a clear distinctionbetween temporallydefiniteand indefinite
propositions,caused by a confusionover non-indexicaltemporalexpressions and indexicalones. This did not preventscholarslike Bonaventure
in favourof
and Aquinas to develop the argumentfromintensionality
of tenses.Aquinas is the only one who uses
the logical indispensability
the psychologicalargument,which has III De An. 430b 1 as its authoritativetext,in order to underpinhis logical theoryon tenses: the working of the intellectin the formationof propositionsexplainsthe essential
role of tenses.
Scholastictheoriesin tense logic exhibitstriking
parallelswithmodern
views: the theoryof the omnitensedcomplex,the old and new tenseless
theoriesand the tensed theoryhave 12th-and 13th-century
equivalents.
A major difference
is that metaphysicalimplicationsof tense logic with
regardto the natureof time,which formthe focusof the currentdebate,
are relativelylittlediscussedby medieval scholars.On the otherhand, I
don't know of any modern attemptto take psychologicalargumentsinto
account in the way Thomas Aquinas did.
Utrecht
Universitt
Katholieke
Theologische

18:06:50 PM

The RootsofEthical Voluntasm


COLLEEN MCCLUSKEY

Many (ifnot all) medievalaccounts of action focusupon the interaction


betweenintellectand will in order to explain how human action comes
about. What moves the agent to act are certaingoals or desiresthe agent
has and her deliberationabout what it will take to accomplishthosegoals
thosedesires.Thus, medievalphilosophersexplainhuman action
or satisfy
to the operationsof intellector reason, which accounts for
by referring
the deliberativeaspect, and the will,which accounts forthe desiderative
aspect. This is not to say that they ignore other influenceson action,
such as passions or emotions.But the basic model of action focuseson
the intellectand will. These basic notionsalso play a role in explaining
the freedomof human actions.Medieval philosophersargue that human
beingsact freelyin virtueof a poweror powersthattheypossess.According
to theseaccounts,the factthat a givenpower performsits activityfreely
enables the human being to act freely.1A human being acts freelyin
virtueof therebeing freedomin a given power or powers.
Scholars of medieval philosophyhave argued that medieval accounts
of freeaction shiftedtheiremphasisduringthe course of the thirteenth
century.Throughoutmuch of the Middle Ages beginningwithAugustine
in the fifthcenturyand continuinginto the early thirteenthcentury,
arbitrium.
philosophersdiscussedhuman freedomunderthe topic of liberum
or
"free
choice"
"free
as
translated
This term,often
decision,"refersto
the power or powerswhichenable human beingsto act freely.This term
is found in a passage in Peter Lombard's Sentences
, in which Lombard

1 Whatfreedom
of
controversial.
Therewerea number
towasrather
amounts
actually
formaintaining
"theability
famous
Anselm's
definition,
candidates,
uprightness
including
themainfocusofthispaper,Philip
thatinfluenced
ofwillforitsownsake,"a definition
andtheabsence
todo whatonewants
include
theability
Other
candidates
theChancellor.
until
Possibilities
ThePrinciple
ofAlternative
ofcoercion.
(PAP)wasbyandlargerejected
wanted
to maintain
sincemedieval
thelaterpartofthethirteenth
century,
philosophers
in heavenactfreely
eventhough
thatGodandthesaints
theyareunableto actsinfully.
offreedom.
PAPtobe an essential
element
seemsto havethought
however,
Scotus,
Vivarium
, 39,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001

18:06:57 PM

186

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

as "a facultyof reason and will."2In the firsthalf


arbitrium
definesliberum
of the thirteenth
providedthe startingpoint
century,Lombard's definition
of
human
freedom.
for the discussion
Philosophers involved in this
referredto the intellect,the
arbitrium
discussionconsideredwhetherliberum
to
a
different
or
or
will, both, perhaps
power altogether.In the laterpart
of
the discussionmoved away from
direction
the
of the thirteenth
century,
libera(free
and toward the topic of voluntas
arbitrium
the topic of liberum
will).3Recent scholars of medieval philosophytake this change in language as evidence that a new and novel approach to action theorywas
philosoevolving.Thus, Odon Lottinnotesthatbeginningat mid-century,
and
arbitrium
phersdropped theirpreoccupationwiththe natureof liberum
will.4
the
influence
and
reason's
in
will
the
freedom
upon
began discussing
He argues that the new concernsfirstarose with Bonaventure'sSentences
and continuedwith the controvercommentaryand Aquinas's De ventate
sial workof the mastersin the arts facultyat Paris, many of whose positions were ultimatelydenounced in the 1270 and 1277 condemnations.
between an earliertraditionthat he claims
Vernon Bourke distinguishes
Bonaventure,
began withAlexanderof Hales and continuedwithhis student,
whichBourkecalls "ethicalvoluntarism."5
and a latermovement,
According
to Bourke,the earlierschool of thoughtemphasizesthe broadlyvolitional
aspectsof human nature.This view acknowledgesan appetitiveaspect in
the mechanicsof human action but failsto assertthe primacyof the will

2 PeterLombard,
Book
Grottaferrata
distinctae
inIV libris
Sententiae
1971-81,
, ed.I. Brady,
bonum
rationis
etvoluntatis,
estfacultas
arbitrium
qua
II, dist.24,C.3,452-3:"Liberum
"
arbitrium
I leavetheterm"liberum
velmalumeademdesistente."
assistente,
gratia
eligitur
it.
becauseI believethatthereis no non-question-begging
untranslated
wayto translate
whatliberum
wasat leastin partto specify
arbitrium
on liberum
oftreatises
The purpose
as ifthe
will"makesitappears
thetermas "freechoice"or "free
is.Translating
arbitrium
or "free
itas "free
ofthewill.Translating
in favor
hasbeendecided
judgment"
question
I will
in
view.
of
the
in
the
direction
the
decision"
Therefore,
intellect,
my
question
begs
involved
arbitrium
andthedifficulties
ofliberum
Fora discussion
untranslated.
leavetheterm
seeJ.B. Korolec,Freewillandfreechoice
at a satisfactory
in arriving
, in:
translation,
Medieval
A. Kenny,
N. Kretzmann,
,
ofLater
Philosophy
History
(eds),TheCambridge
J.Pinborg
1982,629-41.
Cambridge
3 One can see thistrendoccurring
In hisrelatively
in theworkofThomasAquinas.
In Summa
arbitrium.
ofliberum
discussion
a detailed
includes
De veritate
, Aquinas
earlywork,
toitinthe
oneshort
liberum
arbitrium
question
devoting
, he mentions
onlybriefly,
theologiae
in terms
of
actionalmost
human
first
solely
partand,laterin thesecondpart,discussing
andvoluntas.
ratio
4 OdonLottin,
auxXIIeetXIIIeSicles
etMorale
, 6 vols,Louvain-Gembloux,
Psychologie
vol.1, 225.
1942-60,
5 Vernon
, vol.1, GardenCity1970,138and 147.
Bourke,
ofEthics
History

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

187

as theoriginof freeaction.On the otherhand, ethicalvoluntarism


emphasizes free will rather than free choice (as Bourke translates liberum
and originateswiththe workof PeterJohn Olivi (d.1298) in the
arbitrium)
late thirteenth
Thus, accordingto Bourke,an emphasison the
century.6
will as freedelineatesethicalvoluntarismfromthe earliermore general
of the freedomof
notion,markingthe beginningof a new understanding
human action. More recently,Bonnie Kent followstheseleads to further
the claim that a distinctivedevelopmentin action theoryarose in the
later part of the thirteenthcentury.7Thus, among commentatorsof
medieval philosophyin the twentiethcentury,there has been general
agreementthat later theoriesof freedomexhibitsome ratherdistinctive
modifications
and novel ideas that never occurredto those workingon
the topic of freedomearlierin the thirteenth
century.
I thinkthat thispictureis misleadingand that many of the elements
in latertheoriesare presentalready
thatKent and othersfindso distinctive
in the work produced in the firsthalf of the thirteenth
centurydespite
the factthat these elementswere discussedunder the heading of liberum
It is importantto examine thisearlierworkin order to gain a
arbitrium.8
more accuratepictureof the developmentof action theoryin the Middle
Ages. Despite the innovationsof the betterknown theoriesof thinkers
such as Thomas Aquinas or John Duns Scotus, it is surelyimplausible
to suppose that they sprungout of whole cloth and did not draw on,
borrowfrom,or react to the writingsof theirpredecessors.Considering
these earlier theorieswill assist us in understandingthis later body of
work. Moreover, by takinga freshlook at earlier texts,we may find
approaches and ideas that would be usefulto the work currentlybeing
done on action theory,an area of philosophythathas been the focusof
a great deal of attentionin recentyears.
In thispaper, I shall argue thatmanyof the importantideas thatstrike
scholarsof latermedievalphilosophyas new and innovativecan be found
in the work of philosopherswritingin the firsthalf of the thirteenth
century.In particular,I shall focuson the workof Philip the Chancellor
6 Bourke
1970(op.cit.,above,n. 5), 147.
7 BonnieKent,
Virtues
intheLateThirteenth
,
ofEthics
oftheWill:theTransformation
Century
D.C. 1995.
Washington,
8 In fact,
ofmanyoftheideasdeveloped
I suspect
thattheorigins
on thistopicin the
latethirteenth
fourteenth
centuries
aretobe found
evenearlier
intheinfluential
andearly
butdeniesthatBernard's
workofBernard
ofClairvaux.
Kentgrants
Bernard's
influence
ofthewillmatches
thatofthelaterethical
see section
3 ofthis
voluntarists;
conception
aboutherclaim,butI willnotpursue
theissuein thispaper.
paper.I havemydoubts

18:06:57 PM

188

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

(d. 1236), whose Summade bonodates from sometimein the 1220s or


1230s.9I have chosen Philip'sworkforseveralreasons.First,his writings
than earlierthinkon freeaction are more extensiveand more systematic
ers such as William of Auxerre or Peter Lombard. Moreover, there is
evidence that Summade bonowas read widelyand influenceda number
of importantscholarslater in the thirteenth
century,in particular,Albert
the Great.10I shall argue that Philip endorsesat least two of what Kent
identifiesas three key ideas of the later ethical voluntarists.I focus on
Kent's workfora numberof reasons. First,it representsthe most recent
scholarshipon theseissues.Secondly,Kent has providedmore fullydeveloped argumentsfor the view put forthby Lottin and Bourke. Finally,
of ethical
Kent articulatesespeciallyclearly the definingcharacteristics
to
which
the
extent
it
to
determine
easier
voluntarism,making
theyare
work
useful
Kent's
in
earlier
theories.
found
Thus,
scaffolding
provides
from which to examine Philip's theoryof action and its place in the
developmentof ethical voluntarism.
Accordingto Kent, the hallmarksof ethicalvoluntarisminclude ideas
such as the will is nobler than the intellect,freedomof action derives
fromthe will ratherthan fromthe intellect,and the will is free to act
Thus, ethicalvoluntarismemphaagainstthejudgmentsof the intellect.11
sizes the importanceof the will in the explanationof freeaction. Human
beingsact freelybecause theyfreelywill the actionstheyperform,regardless of the particularconclusionsat which theyarrive.Kent argues that
one does not finda commitmentto these ideas in the discussionsof the
century.Althoughshe recognizesthatphilosophers
earlyto mid-thirteenth
of the earlierage did talk about the will and its relationto freedom,she
denies that they incorporate any of the importanttheses of ethical
voluntarisminto theirwork. First,I shall considerher rationalefor this
9 Philipenjoyed
career.He was bornsometime
ecclesiastical
a longand prosperous
In 1217,
a master
oftheology
there.
atPariseventually
around1160.He studied
becoming
he helduntilhisdeathin
which
ofNotreDame,a position
chancellor
he wasappointed
ofmedieval
on thesubsequent
wasa majorinfluence
debono
1236.Summa
development
was
also
renown
forhis
the
transcendentais.
in
the
area
of
Philip
particularly
philosophy,
accountof hislifeand career,
For an especially
and hispoetry.
sermons
interesting
ContributheChancellor's
andPolyphony:
seeThomasBlackburn
Politics,
Philip
PayneII, Poetry,
ofChicago1991,vol.1,
DameSchool
tiontotheMusicoftheNotre
, Ph.D.diss.,University
1.
chapter
10See forexample,
A proposito
deltrattato
De bono
Tarabochia
Alessandra
Caavero,
di filosofia
de natura
bonidiAlberto
nelTractatus
naturae
neoscolastica,
, in:Rivista
Magno
76 (1984),354-73.
11Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),96.

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

189

position.Then, I shall attemptto show that at least some of the central


claimsof ethicalvoluntarismare presentin the earlierworkof Philip the
Chancellor.
1. KensRationale
Kent has two reasonsforholdingthe view that ethicalvoluntarismdoes
not ariseuntillate in the thirteenth
century.First,she considersthe nature
of the discussionon freedomin the early to the middle part of the
thirteenth
century.She notes thatpriorto the 1270s, the subjectof freedom was approached exclusivelyin terms of liberumarbitrium
, which
Kent translatesas "free decision," ratherthan voluntasliberaor libertas
voluntatis
, that is, freewill or freedomof the will.12Kent recognizesthat
the meaningof this notion was a matterof some controversyand that
the will was an importantpart of thisdiscussion.However, accordingto
her, the fact that the debate centeredaround free decision ratherthan
freewill precludesa commitmentto ethical voluntarism.Free decision
has to do withboth intellectand will; therefore,
specificconcernsabout
freedomin the will do not arise.13
Kent's second pillar of supportis the failureto findexplicitmention
of the centralthesesof ethicalvoluntarism
priorto the 1270s. She examinesthetextsofsome of theearlyFranciscanmastersincludingBonaventure,
whose work,accordingto her,exemplifies
voluntarismto a greaterextent
than that of his predecessors,for it containsa greateremphasis on the
will.Yet she concludesthateven he did not endorseethicalvoluntarism.14
Bonaventurenever discussessuch centralnotionsas whetherthe will is
noblerthan the intellector whetherthe will can command the intellect.
Even more tellingin Kent's eyes is Bonaventure
's failureto assert that
the will's freedomconsistsin being able to oppose the dictatesof the
intellect.
Accordingto Kent, the catalystfor the eventualprominenceof ethical voluntarismwas the condemnationof 1277.15Among the articles
condemnedwere a numberthat had to do withhuman freedom.These
includedthe notion that the will must pursue what intellecthas judged
to be done, the notion that the will does not remain free afterintellect
12Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),98-9.
13Kent1995[op.cit.,above,n. 7),99-100.
14Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 101-4.
15Kent1995{op.cit.,above,n. 7), 104-6,110.

18:06:57 PM

190

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

has reacheda conclusion,and the notionthatthe willcannotact in opposition to knowledgecurrentlybeing consideredby intellect.16
The condemnationof these articlesbroughtabout an emphasis on freedomin
the will. In turn,this emphasis raised suspicionsin the minds of many
philosophersconcerningearliertheoriesof action and in particular,that
of Thomas Aquinas. AlthoughAquinas is not named in the condemnations, philosopherssuch as William de la Mare argued that Aquinas's
conceptionof the will as a power responsiveto the judgmentsof intellect commits him to a denial of freedomin the will. This set up a
vigorousdebate betweenAquinas's followerson the one hand, who had
to show how to preservefreedomin the will in Aquinas's account, and
his detractorson the otherhand, who argued thatAquinas's accountfails
to preservefreedomin the will.17This debate paved the way forthe rise
of ethicalvoluntarism.Thus, Kent arguesthatthe condemnationof 1277
had the effectof raisingissues that were never a concern for philosoarbitrium
earlierin the century.18
phersengaged in the discussionof liberum
Kent is surelyrightto argue that ethical voluntarismrose to prominence in the later part of the thirteenth
century,in large part, because
of the condemnationof 1277. However, I shall now tryto establishthat
at least some of its centralnotionsappear in the earlierwork on liberum
writtenby Philip the Chancellor.19
arbitrium
2. Philip'sConception
ofFreedom
It is not immediatelyapparent that Philip is an advocate of ethicalvoluntarism,forhe identifiestwo senses in which thereis freedomboth in
the intellectand in the will. The firstsense has to do with theirbeing
immaterialpowers.20Philip argues thathuman beings act freelyin virtue
of certainpowers (intellectand will) which are not composed of matter.
16Kent1995(op.cit..above,n. 7), 77-8.
17Kent1995(ob.cit. above,n. 7. 104-6.
18Kent1995 cit.,above,n. 7), 110-1.
(op.
19
Cancellarius
Summa
debono
Parisiensis,
, ed. NicolaiWicki,2 vols.,Bern
Philippus
1985.The relevant
material
forthispaperis found
in thesection
ofDe bono
nature
called
De bono
nature
, partfour(Debono
quodnonestdiminuibile
permalum
culpe
quodestexcorporali
etintellectuali
creatura
in question
one(Quidsitanima
two(Depoten), especially
) andquestion
Withrespect
tiisanime).
to question
arearticle
articles
one(Dediffrentiis
two,therelevant
etmotiv
articletwo(De libero
arbitrio
five(De
potentiarum
cognoscitivarum
arum),
), and article
I shallcitetherelevant
ifnecessary
therelevant
article
anditspart,
volntate).
question,
therelevant
linenumbers,
andpagenumbers.
20Summa
debono
vol.1, 173:"Adobiectaautemita
(hence:SDB), q. 2, a.2a,251-59,

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

191

This is in contrastwith non-rationalanimals,whose behavior is determined in virtueof theirbeing whollymaterial.In his discussionof the
arbitrium
definitionof liberum
, Philip appeals to the authorityof Aristotle
and ofJohn Damascene:
is abletounderstand
intellect
Justas thePhilosopher
saysthatthepossible
contrary
in virtue
from
becauseit is separate
ofitsnature
or separable
both,so too
things
willbe thesortofthing
because
thepractical
intellect
thatcanrelateto opposites,
itis freefrom
ofmatter.
ingeneral
thatis septheobligation
Therefore,
everything
to itsownact.Butbothreasonandwillarepowers
of
arableis freewithrespect
thissortandon account
ofthis,freedom
willbe bothin reasonand in thewill.
a human
ortheratio'Foreither
JohnDamascene
beingwillnotbe rational
argues,
nalbeingwillbe themaster
ofhisownactsandfreein hisjudgment.
Thus,nonrational
tojudgment,
fortheyareacteduponby
arenotfreewithrespect
beings
butat thesame
nature
morethantheyact.Thus,theydo notcontradict
appetite,
timethattheyhavea desire,
intoan act.Buta human
theyarepropelled
beingas
a rational
morethanhe is acteduponbyit.Thus,whenone
beingactson nature
ifhe should
feelsa desire,
to restrain
hisappetite
or
wish,he hasthepowereither
tofollow
it.'21

estquodlicetex verbis
Iohannis
Damasceni
libertas
communiter
respondendum
respiciat
omnes
actuspredeterminatos
rationis
etvoluntatis
utsupra:'Libereinquirit,
liberediiudicatetc.libere
ex consequenti
sicut
vul,tarnen
rationem,
voluntatem,
principaliter
respicit
ad hocconsonant.
Dicitur
Bernardi,
Anselmi,
patetexauctoritatibus
Augustini,
quiquantum
tamen
libertas
commune
scilicet
ratioetvolunquidutrique.
Propter
quodcumutraque,
immaterialitatem
eiuslibertatem
habetfaciendi
tas,respiciat
faciendum,
propter
quodvult
etquantofuerit
tantohabetampliorem
sicutcontingit
earn
libertatem,
magisimmaterialis,
dicisecundum
De hocenininfra
determinabitur."
Thispassageis found
magisetminus.
in Philip's
ofthedefinition
ofliberum
discussion
arbitrium.
to a
Here,Philipis responding
basedon theauthority
ofJohnDamascene
whoclaimsthathuman
preliminary
objection
a number
of activities
and being
deliberation,
beingsperform
freely,
including
willing,
movedto act(movevi
secundum
someoftheseactiviBut,theobjection
continues,
impetum).
tiesbelongto powers
otherthanintellect
andwillandso thosepowers
wouldperform
their
activities
to Philip's
as well,contrary
freely
position.
21SDB, q. 2, a.2a, 157-67,
vol. 1, 170:"Ostensio
autemesthecquodliberum
arbitrium
estin utroque
et volntate].
NamsicutdicitPhilosophus
[ratione
quodintellectus
secundum
nturm
autseparabilis
contraria,
possibilis
potest
intelligere
quiaestseparatus
ab utroque,
itaeritin practico
intellectu
in opposita,
ab obliquodpotest
quialiberatur
materie.
Generaliter
in suoactu.Sed tamratio
estliberum
gatione
ergoomneseparabile
sunthuiusmodi
et propter
hoceritlibertas
tamvoluntatis
quamvoluntas
quamrationis.
Et Iohannes
'Autenimnoneritrationale
Damascenus:
aut rationale
ensdominus
erit
actuum
et liberum
arbitrio.
Undeirrationabilia
nonsuntliberaarbitrio;
enim
aguntur
sedsimulquodappetierunt
quamagant.Ideo noncontradicunt
magisnatura
appetitui,
ad actum.
Homoautemrationalis
ensmagisagitnaturam
ab ea;
impetunt
quamagatur
si velitpotestatem
habetut appetitum
refrenet
velut sequatur.'"
The
ideoqueappetens
Damascene
comesfrom
Defideorthodoxa
M. Buytaert,
, ed. Eligius
O.F.M.,St.
quotefrom
N.Y. 1955,153,11.17-26:"Siverohocexnecessitate
exsistit
rationali
liberum
Bonaventure,
autenimnoneritrationale
autrationale
eritactuum
etliberarbiarbitrium;
ens,dominus
trio.Undeet irrationalia
nonsuntliberaarbitrio;
enimmagisa naturaquam
aguntur

18:06:57 PM

192

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

Philip links Aristotle'sidea that materialthingsare determinedto a


particularpath with Damascene's idea that non-rationalbeings cannot
resistbeing moved by theirappetites.Thus, he implies that the explanation forthe lack of freedomin a non-rationalanimal is the lack of an
immaterialpower or powers. AlthoughPhilip does not explain why the
absence of an immaterialpower rules out the possibilityof actingfreely,
his reasoning seems to be along the followinglines. What determines
the behavior of a non-rationalanimal are its physicalstates,over which
the animal has no control. If the apprehension of some blueberries
stimulatesa desire for food in a non-rationalanimal, the animal will
pursue the berries.But intellectand will are immaterialpowers and so
escape the determiningforces that operate on matter.22According to
of intellectand will enables human beingsto act
Philip,the immateriality
freelyfor "somethinghas more freedomto the extentthat it has more
immateriality."23
The second sense of freedomhas to do with the process of bringing
about an action.PhilippresupposesDamascene's accountof action,accordan action.These
ing to which a numberof stepsare takenin formalizing
of action which
courses
the
various
include
considering
desiring,
stages
will satisfyone's desires,deliberatingover those courses of action,judgwillingand choosinga particularaltering which one is to be performed,
native,and initiatingthe action.24Some of these stages have to do with
facisedsimulappetunt
naturali
quid,impetum
appetitui,
agant.Ideononcontradicunt
untad actum.Homoautem,rationalis
ens,agitmagisnturm
ideoque
quamagatur;
vel sequieum.Unde
habetrefrenare
si equidem
velit,potestatem
appetitum
appetens,
et
homoautemet laudatur
irrationalia
nequevituperantur;
quidemequelaudantur
vituperatur."
22SDB,q. 2, a.2a,256-7,
ratioetvolunscilicet
vol.1, 173:"Propter
quodcumutraque,
habetfaciendi
immaterialitatem
eiuslibertatem
faciendum,
quodvult."
tas,respiciat
propter
in note20,whichmaybe
discussed
to theobjection
Thisclaimis partoftheresponse
there.
viewedin itsentirety
23 SDB, q. 2, a.2a,257-8,vol.1, 173:"Etquantofuerit
tanto
habet
immaterialis,
magis
Thisclaimis
earndicisecundum
sicutcontingit
libertatem,
magiset minus."
ampliorem
as evidence
thatPhilip
alsopartofthepassagequotedinnote20.I takethisexplanation
offreedom.
account
a compatibilist
wouldreject
24JohnDamascene,
Defideorthodoxa
138,109-13:"Liberearbitrio
, ed. Buytaert,
igitur
iudietliberearbitrio
etscrutatur,
etliberearbitrio
vult,etliberearbitrio
inquirit
apptit,
et
et liberearbitrio
et liberearbitrio
facit,
impetum
cat,et liberearbitrio
eligit,
disponit,
sunt."Cf.SDB, q. 2, a.2a,
naturam
in hiisquae secundum
liberearbitrio
agitsemper
Iohannis
estquodlicetexverbis
251-5,vol.1, 173:"Adobiectaautemitarespondendum
et volunrationis
omnesactuspredeterminatos
libertas
communiter
Damasceni
respiciat
etc.libere
liberediiudicat
tatisutsupra:'Libereinquirit,
vult,'tamen
respicit
principaliter
sicutpatetex auctoritatibus
ex consequenti
Bernardi,
rationem,
Augustini,
voluntatem,

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

193

the intellectwhile othersare activitiesof the will.25Thus, forDamascene


as for Philip, an action resultsfroma series of steps produced by the
workingsof intellectand will. Damascene also argues that human beings
performeach of these steps freely.26
Philip acknowledgesDamascene's
but
that
acts
the
listedby Damascene that have
position
argues
among
to do withthe intellect,what is freeis the finalresultof deliberation,the
judgmentmade by the intellectabout what alternativeto perform.27
Philip
argues that fromamong ail of the courses of action an agent considers,
he is freeto determinewhich one he will carryout. In addition,his act
of willingis free;he freelywills to carryout that action. Furthermore,
because the prioract of willingis free,the subsequentaction will be free
as well. Thus, Philip concludes,"Rightly,thereis freedomaccordingto
the finalact of reason and accordingto the firstact of the will."28
to a
Philip is adamant that both intellectand will make contributions
human being's acting freely.29
Nevertheless,he holds that freedomis a
functionof the will primarily,and intellectonly secondarily.This is
evidentfromthe followingpassages taken fromPhilip's discussionof the
:
arbitrium
definitionof liberum

ofliberum
discussion
arbiad hocconsonant."
Anselmi,
Philip's
Throughout
qui quantum
to theactsofintellect
andwillin sucha waythatitis clearthathe has
trium
, he refers
in mind.
Damascene's
enumeration
25Damascene
intellect
andwill,and
discusses
thevarious
ofthesoul,including
powers
37
inbookII, chapter
36 ofDefideorthodoxy
ed.Buytaert,
their
132-42.
activities
Chapter
hasadditional
information
on thissubject
(142-4).
26See note24.
27SDB,q. 2, a.2a,410-18,vol. 1, 178-9:"Adilludveroquodsequitur
propter
quid
dicendum
acturationis
et a primovoluntatis
denominationem
videtur
capereab ultimo
utfiatestprimo
de faciendo
ultimum
actumrationis
estquodsecundum
quiestiudicium
consenrecti
tudoauterror
infieri,
undeaccidit
utconsentiat
determinatio
rationis
primo
de quibussupra.Nonsicautemest
aliosultimum
sus,nonautemsecundum
precedentes
itaquod
eiusin bonmvelmalum,
de volntate,
immoin primoactuestdeterminatio
dicitur.
Etcontingit
essealiquo
omnis
actussequens
impedimentum
peneshunevoluntarius
secuninistaveronullomodo.Et ideorecteestlibertas
modoinactibus
consequentibus,
HerePhilipis responding
voluntatis."
rationis
etsecundum
dumactumultimum
primm
ofthedefinition
arbitrium.
The
inhisdiscussion
ofliberum
toanother
objection
preliminary
a worry
it seemsto involve
overwhichofthe
is unclear;
issuein theoriginal
objection
actsandwhichofthewill'sactsdoesjudgment
intellect's
(iarbitrium
) haveto do with(see
in
thedifferent
173,11.246-50).
waysin whichthereis a determination
Philipexplains
formypurposes
is
actofwill.Whatis important
andtheinitial
thefinalactofintellect
hisfinalclaimaboutthelocusoffreedom.
28SDB, q.2, a.2a, 417-8,vol. 1, 179:"Et ideo recteestlibertas
secundum
actum
ofthisquotation,
Forthecontext
see
voluntatis."
et secundum
ultimum
rationis
primum
note27.
29See,forexample,
vol.1, .176:"Adilludveroquodobicitur
SDB, q.2,a.2a,349-55,

18:06:57 PM

194

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
ingeneral
ofJohnDamascene,
freedom
hastodo withall
from
thewords
Although
actsofreasonandwillas wassaidabove,'oneinquires
thepredetermined
freely,
withthewill,
it hasto do primarily
discerns
nevertheless,
etc.,willsfreely,'
freely,
and
withreason,
thetexts
ofAugustine,
whichis clearfrom
Bernard,
consequently
whoagreeon thismatter.30
Anselm,
to themoralconsideration,
it mustbe saidthatknowing
andwillWithrespect
ofacting
withordercometogether
to frame
thenotion
well[ad
ingin accordance
hasto do withjudgment,
rationem
bene
], ofwhichthefirst,
agendi
namely,
knowing,
is primary.31
andthesecondis thewill,whosefreedom
To whatwasobjected
to Anselm's
definition
thatfreedom
is onlyin thewill,it
mustbe saidthat,as wassaidabove,although
freedom
is common
to bothreason
. . . nevertheless,
it hasto do mainly
withthewill.Therefore,
he defined
andwill,
freedom
as 'a powerfordoingwhatonewants,'
andhe didnotcallita powerfor
doingwhatonejudgesor reasons.3'2

liberum
arbitrium
essevoluntatis
tantum
dicendum
estquodquantum
ad primam
rationem
nontarnen
libertatis
estinvolntate,
secundum
rationem
immoquantum
ad arbiarbitrii,
trium
materiale
merendi
estinratione,
ad libertatem
volendi
quodestprincipium
quantum
merendi
estliberum
arbipenesvelieinquo estcomplementum
que consistit
principaliter
trium
in volntate.
Et secundum
hocprocedunt
diversimode
radones
astruentes
liberum
arbitrium
essein ratione
et liberum
arbitrium
essein volntate."
Also,SDB,q.2, a.2a,
arbitrium
essevoluntatem
dicuntquod
359-67,vol. 1, 177:"Illiqui ponuntliberum
diffinit
liberum
arbitrium
actus
penesusum.Et quiain eiususuconcurrunt
Augustinus
rationis
et actusvoluntatis
ideode utroque
consiliata,
precedens
sequensut sitvoluntas
facitmentionem
in diffinitione
cumdicit:'Facultas
voluntatis
et rationis,'
nonquodsit
Et dicunt
liberum
nondicivoluntatem
arbitrium
sedliberum
arbiarbitrariam,
utrumque.
trium
sicutpersimum
nasusetnoninrectitudine
etper
loquendi,
permodum
significatur
Priamidem
italiberum
arbitrium
diciturquasilibertas
arbitrii.
Et fallacia:
volPriamus,
untasestliberum
immoarbitrii.
Sed priorsolutio
verior
arbitrium,
ergoestarbitrium,
est
videtur."
Also,SDB, q.2, a.2a, 368-71,vol. 1, 177:"Ad obiectiones
respondendum
estmalusususliberi
arbitrii
etc.etconcedimus
conclusionem:
liberum
quodomnepeccatum
in quantum
arbitrium
estvoluntas,
sednonsolavoluntas
voluntas,
quiaratio,
quialiberet rationis,
seddiversis
tasestvoluntatis
modis."
Thesepassages
in Philip's
areall found
ofliberum
arbitrium
discussion
ofthedefinition
andareresponses
tovarious
that
arguments
in terms
liberum
arbitrium
shouldbe defined
ofthewillalone.
30SDB, q.2, a.2a, 251-4,vol. 1, 173:"Licetex verbisIohannis
Damasceni
libertas
omnesactuspredeterminatos
communiter
rationis
etvoluntatis
utsupra:'Libere
respiciat
etc.liberevult,'tamenprincipaliter
liberediiudicat
ex
voluntatem,
inquirit,
respicit
sicutpatetexauctoritatibus
rationem,
Bernardi,
Anselmi,
consequenti
Augustini,
quiquantumad hocconsonant."
31SDB, q.2, a.2a, 405-7,vol. 1, 178:"Secundum
autemmoralem
considerationem
estquodscireetveliesecundum
ordinem
dicendum
conveniunt
ad rationem
beneagendi,
scilicet
secundum
estvoluntas
cuiuslibertas
est
scire,respicit
arbitrium,
primum,
quorum
primo."
32SDB,q.2, a.2a, 297-303,
vol. 1, 175:"Ad id veroquodobicitur
perdiffinitionem
libertatem
essein volntate
Anselmi
dicendum
estquod,sicutdictum
estsupra,
tantum,
sitin ratione
et volntate,
in iliapotentia
libertas
licetcommuniter
scilicet
ad
quantum
esttamenprincipaliter
ad voluntatem.
Undediffiniebatur
libactum,
quantum
utrumque
faciendi
ertas'potestas
faciendi
autratiociquodvult,'etnondixit'potestas
quodiudicat
Theorigin
natur'."
ofthephrase"thepowerfordoingwhatonewants"
is a bitobscure.
In thispassage,
it to Anselm
whileelsewhere
he attributes
it to Bernard
Philipattributes
ofClairvaux
theGreatattributes
it bothto Bernard
ofClairvaux
(176,11.345).Albert

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

195

Thus, whilePhilipreadilyacknowledgesa certainfreedomin the intellect, he emphasizesthat ultimatelyhuman beings act freelybecause of
theirwills.Althoughthe finalact of intellect,that is, the finaljudgment
about what to do, comes about freely,Philip insiststhat,unlikethe will,
intellectsuffersfromcertainconstraintswhich limitits freedom:
Truth
is theorigin
thatis in thesoulandthatis whyitconstrains
ofthetruth
reasonto itsconsent.
Butthisis notthecasewithrespect
to thegood,becausehowis good,it is [inthepowerof] thewillto willthatthing
evermuchsomething
or
nottowillit.Thus,itcomesaboutthatifoneconsents
tosomething
thatitis true,
thewillis notconsequently
directed
toward
thereality
ofthatthing
becauseitis not
a good.Nevertheless,
onecannotdenythatit is true.However,
he doesnot
itself
willitbecauseitis nota goodforhim.33
Foralthough
thejudgment
or reason[involved
an interior
in]an actionis from
it depends
ofa
andtherefore
is within
us,nevertheless
principle
upona cognition
inusfrom
thatthing.
which
isreceived
Butthewillisinuswithout
qualification
thing
to
andthusfreedom
is notso muchin accordance
withreasonas itis withrespect
thewill'sact.34
The intellecthas to do withthe truth,withfactsabout ourselvesand the
in which we findourselves.Philip impliesfromthese pascircumstances
one comes to recognize what is true about her surthat
once
sages
and
her
situation,she is not in a positionto deny that truth.
roundings
Thus, once I come to recognizethat thereis a table in frontof me, I
am not in a positionto deny that there is a table in frontof me. Of
course,we can manipulatethe world to a certainextent;I can remove
myselffromthe room in which the table is located and then I could

in a workbyClement).
As faras I can tell,the
and PetertheApostie
(viaa citation
withnoneofthesethinkers.
Laterin thisquestion,
Philipwillincorpophraseoriginates
offreedom
ratethenotion
intohisownaccount
(see186,11.93-6).
33SDB,q.2, a.2a, 384-89,vol. 1, 17-78:"Si obiciatur
de conclusionibus
respondeo:
estveritatis
verum
est.Veritas
autem
principium
que estin animaetideocogitrationem
sitbonum,
in voad suumconsensum.
Sed nonestitain bono,quia quantumcumque
de alilntate
estquodvelitilludvelquodnonvelit.Hinccontingit
quodsi consentitur
in remillius,
et hocquianonest
estvoluntas
sit,nonconsequenter
qua requodverum
nontarnen
vultilludquia nonsibi
ipsibonum;tamennonpotestnegareesseverum,
ofliberum
Atthispoint,
iswrapping
ofthedefinition
arbibonum."
Philip
uphisdiscussion
theindividual
trium
hisfinalcomments.
He hasfinished
andmaking
examining
prelimicomments
aboutsomeofthem
hewillmakesomefurther
general
nary
objections
although
before
thissection.
ending
34SDB, q.2,a.2a,303-5,vol.1, 175:"Iudicium
enimautratioactus,licetsita princia cognitione
reique ab ipsareaccippiointraetitain nobisest,tamenactusdependet
in nobisestet itanontantalibertas
autemsimpliciter
secundum
iturin nobis;voluntas
discussion
ad actuseius."Thisisa continuation
ofPhilip's
oftheobjecrationem
quantum
toAnselm,
freedom
is found
tionthataccording
onlyin thewill;seenote32 forthefirst
of
the
part
passage.

18:06:57 PM

196

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

deny that there is a table in frontof me. But once we've finishedour
manipulations,our perceptionof the worldas it existsat thatpoint structuresour beliefs.The structureof realityprovidesthe foundationforthe
contentof our beliefs.This restriction
applies to judgmentsabout action
as well. Once I have come to see what is true about my situationand
what my optionsare and what reasonsI have foractingone way rather
than another,I am not in a positionto deny any of those things.In the
on the judgmentsof
passages above, Philip implies that this restriction
the intellectimpactsfreedomin the intellectin a significant
way. Thus,
while the intellecthas a contributionto make in the bringingabout of
a free action, ultimately,the freedomof that action will rest with the
will. This is because Philip thinksthat regardlessof what judgment the
intellectmakes, the will is freeeitherto act on thatjudgmentor not to
act on thatjudgment.In the finalanalysis,thisabilityof the will,rather
than the judgment arrivedat by the intellect,determinesthe particular
action the agent performs.The fact that the agent could have chosen a
different
alternativein virtueof her will means that the freedomof that
action restswith the will.
In the passages above, Philip implies that the will is entirelyunrestricted.This is a bit misleading.Philip followsthe medieval traditionof
holdingthat the will is an appetitefor the good. He definesthe will as
"an inclinationto a thingin accordance withthe concept of the good."35
He believes that whateverchoices human beings are attractedto, they
are so because theyregardthe object theypursue to be good. Thus, the
will being an appetite for the good moves the agent to pursue what is
good. However, an object's being good is only a necessaryconditionfor
its being chosen,not a sufficient
condition.Philipbringsup a case where
an agent acknowledgesthat an act of penance would be a good thingto
do yet is unmoved by thisjudgment to performthe act of penance.36

35SDB,
inremsecundum
inclinatio
rationem
q.2,a.2a,264,vol.1, 173:"Etestvoluntas
boni."Thisdefinition
arisesin a discussion
oftheactsofwillandintellect
andtheir
freedom.HerePhilipalsointroduces
hisideathatthewillandtheintellect
areoneandthe
an ideathathewilldiscuss
samepower,
inmoredetaillaterinthesection
on liberum
arbiI willaddress
thisideain section
trium.
3 (below,
202-203).
36SDB, q.2,a.5b,10-13,vol.1, 223:"Item,
de aliquareutfiat,
scilaliquisconsentit
icetab aliquo,sednonvultearnfacere
etinterrogatus
si estbonum
facere,
respondei
quoniambonum,
utfacere
ettarnen
nonfaciet
necvultfacere.
Videtur
operapenitentie,
ergo
sit."Thiscaseis partofa preliminary
towhich
quodnonuniuspotentie
argument
Philip
neverresponds.
hisownviewalthough
it is in keeping
with
Thus,it maynotrepresent

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

197

The mere recognitionof a good is not enough to move an agent to act


even thoughif he were to perform,say, an act of penance, the reason
he would give for doing so is his beliefthat it was a good thingto do.
Accordingto Philip,the fact that an agentjudges that a given object is
good does not determinethat he will it:
in. . . thewill,forevenafter
resides
onehasjudgedfreely
that
Freedom
principally
is good,there
is thefreedom
towillor notto will.37
something
Thus, thejudgmentthat a given object is good does not necessitatethe
will's choice. The will remainsfree eitherto pursue or reject an alternative,even if the intellecthas judged it to be good.
Moreover,Philipimpliesthatno judgmentof the intellectcould necessitatethe will. Thus, an agent could conclude that a particularaction is
to be performedyet choose in oppositionto thatjudgment:
*'iat will
the chooses
whatis contrary
towhathasbeenjudgedcomesaboutfrom
ihefactthatit doesnotfollow
reason(towhichit is ordered)
on account
ofevil
desires[fomes]
it and on accountof itsfreedom
whichis capableof
distracting
ittoward
whatitwantsto be inclined,
which
itusesbadlyaccording
turning
things
to itspleasure.38
Here Philip considersthe case in which the intellectjudges that a particularaction is sinfulor harmful,and therefore,not to be done, yet
under the influenceof certainphysicaldesires {fomes),the will chooses
the sinfulact. A standardmedievalexample is the case of fornicationin
which the agent knows that fornicationis wrongyet engages in an act
of fornicationanywayunder the influenceof sexual desire. If the agent
had acted in accordance with his judgment,he would not have sinned.
the agent does sin in virtueof his will's givingin to desire.
Nevertheless,
Of course,thisimpliesthatthe will has the freedomto inclineitselfeither
toward the alternativedecreed by the intellector the one favoredby
whatPhilipsayselsewhere.
Thispassagecomesfrom
treatise
on thewill.In this
Philip's
he is concerned
withtheissueofwhether
thewillis thesameas
section,
particular
consent.
This
is intended
to showthatthetwoarenotidentical.
argument
37SDB, preliminary
autemprincipaliter
residet
q.2,a.2a,264-6,vol.1, 173:"Libertas
apudillam
in quantum
estvoluntas,
namcumlibereiudicaverit
essebonum,
adhucest
potentiam
libertas
utvelitvelnonvelit."
hisclaimthatintellect
andwill
Philiphasjustintroduced
arethesamepower
inreality
butaredenominated
acts.He goesontodescribe
bydifferent
thoseactsandto discuss
which
onesarebrought
aboutfreely.
38SDB,q.2,a.2b,32-5,vol. 1, 180:"Ad
aliudrespondeo.
Quodvoluntas
eligitcontrarium
exeo quodnonsequitur
iudicato
rationem
ad quamestordinata
contingit
propter
fomitem
et libertatem
trahentem
estad id ad quodvultinclinari,
que vertibilis
qua male
utuntur
secundum
libitum
suum."
Thisis a response
toa preliminary
toPhilip's
objection
viewthatthewillandtheintellect
differ
andnotin reality.
The objeconlyconceptually

18:06:57 PM

198

COLLEENMGCLUSKEY

desire. Philip makes this explicitin the second part of the passage. He
claims thatthe will is capable of incliningitselfaway fromwhat the intellect decrees and towardwhat it itselfwants. Thus, the will is capable of
willingin oppositionto the intellectand need not followthe judgments
of the intellect.The constraintsidentifiedin the intellectdo not affect
the will. Philip regardsthe will as freein ways in which the intellectis
not.
From the passages cited above, it is clear that Philip thinksof the will
as the primarysource of freedomforhuman actions.Nevertheless,Philip
attacksthe positionthat the intellectand the will are oftenat odds with
each other:
thewillandviceversa,
itmustbe saidthatthe
To theclaimthatreasoncontradicts
in accordance
Forthewillis an appetite
withreawilldoesnotcontradict
reason.
son.39
This passage appears worrisome,since here,Philipseems to divergefrom
the earlierstatementthat the will is able to choose what is contraryto
the intellect'sjudgment.
His remarkthatthe will
Philip does not directlyaddress thisdifficulty.
does not contradictthe intellectis buried withinhis replies to prelimiprobnary argumentsand perhaps he did not regardit as a significant
lem. In his discussionof the will,he bringsup a numberof cases where
an agent arrivesat a particularconclusionabout what is to be done or
would be good to do but failsto act on the conclusion.Among the cases
he considersare the case of penance thatI mentionedon p. 196 (see note
36), the case of the devils who admit that it is just for God to punish
them but who do not wish to submitto the punishment,and the case
of an individualwho agrees that friendshipis betterthan gold but who
failsto presenthis friend'sgold to his friend'sheir.40Each of these cases
to theintellect's
tionpointsoutthatthewillcan pursuean objectthatis contrary
thatthetwoareseparate
evidence
whichin theviewoftheobjector
provides
judgment,
powers.
39SDB, q.2,a.2a,306-7,vol. 1, 175:"Adid veroquoddicitur
rationem
contradicere
Estenimvolrationi
noncontradicit.
dicendum
estquodvoluntas
ete converso,
voluntati
rationem."
secundum
untasappetitus
40SDB, q.2,a.5b,10-23,vol.1, 223:"Item,aliquisconsentit
de aliquareutfiat,
sciletinterrogatus
si estbonum
icetab aliquo,sednonvultearnfacere
facere,
quorespondet
ettarnen
nonfaciet
necvultfacere.
Videtur
utfacere
niambonum,
ergo
operapenitentie,
velfacere
Deumesseiustum
diabolus
sit.Similiter
interrogatus
quodnonuniuspotentie
hocnonvultet veliet
et tarnen
estverum,
idemetiamestbonumnonnegabit
iustitiam
nonfacere
utpenameffugere
iustum
nonesseet iustitiam
posset.Et superlocumilium
filiihominum'
dicitGlosa:
recteiudicate,
Psalmi:'Si vereutiqueiustitiam
loquimini,

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involvesan agentwho arrivesat one conclusionabout what is to be done


yet performssome other action or fails to performthe action in question. Thus in each case, it appears that the will,which moves the agent
to act, opposes a conclusionof the intellect.These cases appear to be
to Philip'sclaim thatthe will does not oppose the intelcounter-examples
lect but ratheracts in accordance with the intellect.
thatis, the
Philipmakesno attemptto reconcilehis two commitments,
commitmentthat the will is freeto act in oppositionto a judgment of
intellectand the commitmentthat the will is an appetitein accordance
withthejudgmentof intellect.Philip does not discussthe way in which
the situationsdescribedabove createsa tensionforhis theoryof action.
In fact,he uses thesecases to addressan entirelydifferent
issue,the issue
if
we
considerwhat
fromconsensus.
ofwhetherthewilldiffers
Nevertheless,
is going on in cases where it appears that the will contradictsthe intellect,we can see a way in which Philipcould resolvethe apparentinconsistency.In these cases, it appears that the intellectmakes a judgment
alternative.But the
about one alternativewhile the will desiresa different
will is not a cognitiveor apprehensivepower; it is incapable of assessing
what alternatives
are available fromwhichit may select.It depends upon
the intellectto identify
goods thatare worthpursuingbeforeit is able to
a
make particularchoice. Therefore,in these situations,it must be the
case that the intellectitselfbroughtup the particularalternativethe will
has chosen. Consider an individualwho explicidyacknowledgesthat she
ought to quit smokingand believes that she could do so, should she
choose to do so. But she gets a certain pleasure from smoking and
doesn'tbelievethatshe'll trulyend up badly offif she continuesto smoke
fora whilelonger.Thus, she recognizes,althoughperhapsnot consciously,
thatthereare certaingroundsupon which she is able to justifyher continuingto smoke. It is in view of the latterimplicitjudgment that her
will moves her to smoke even in lightof her explicitacknowledgment
that she reallyought to quit smoking.This sort of situationshows that
Philipwould be able to hold both that thereare cases in which the will

aurofidem.'
Et ponitur
ibi talis
preponis
'Interrogates
quidsitmeliusauruman fides,
et decessit
et mortuus
herecasus:'Amicus
venitet testenulloaurumtibicommendavit
suumaurumtibicommendasse.
aurum
demreliquit
qui nescit
patrem
Cogitate similiter
ab amicotuofilio
nulloteste
aliicommendasse,
heredem
tuoprestari,
Quodvelies
reliquisse.
amicitui.Sedaliudiubetavaritia
aurum
Priusautem
hocfacias
heredi
tua,scilicet
negare.
et in iudiciotuodixisti
velduxisti
iudicasti
melius
essefidem
melius
esse
quamaurum,
ofthispassage.
aurum.'
See note36 forthecontext

18:06:57 PM

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COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

opposes a judgmentof the intellectand thatthe will is a desirein accordance withthe intellect.In thisexample,the will acts in accordance with
the (implicit)judgment that smokingis pleasurable and won't hurt one
in the short term while the will acts in opposition to the (explicit)
judgment that the agent reallyought to quit smoking.The case of the
unwillingpenitent,the demons, and the greedyfriendcould be handled
in analogous fashion.Philip will have to conclude in each case thatit is
up to the will to specifythe particularjudgmentof intellectthatbecomes
operativein orderto preservehis claim thatthe willis the primarysource
of freedom.The passages I have examined previouslyimplythat Philip
does in factbelieve that the will possessesthis ability.41
In her discussionof the early thirteenth
centurydebate, Bonnie Kent
characterization
of
freedom
as the power of human
recognizesPhilip's
and
his
claim
that liberum
for
what
arbitrium
is a
beings
theywant,
doing
functionof the will. Despite theseacknowledgments,
she denies thatthere
is evidence of ethicalvoluntarismin Philip'swork.42But my examination
of Philip's textsupportsthe claim that he was committedto at least two
of the most importantthesesof ethicalvoluntarism,despitethe factthat
he did not discussthemunder the headingof "voluntas
libera
." As we have
he
maintains
that
freedom
has
to
with
do
the will and
seen,
primarily
that the will is able to rejectjudgmentsof the intellect.
However,as we have also seen, Philip'spositionis ambiguousin places,
forhe argues thatthe intellectplays a role in a freeaction. Nevertheless,
this claim does not conflictwith his positionthat freedomis primarilya
functionof the will. Even those more stronglycommittedto voluntarism,
such as John Duns Scotus, argue that there must be a prior act of the
intellectin orderforthereto be an act of the will.43This is because the
will, as an appetitivepower, lacks the abilityto discoverviable alternatives for action and therefore,depends upon the intellectfor its object.
the intellectis a necessarycondition
Thus, even for ethical voluntarists,
for a free action.44Philip has a strongerview; he argues that at least

41See p. 197formvdiscussion
ofthisissue.
42Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),p. 99.
43See forexample
inMetaphysicam
IX, q.15 in:A.B.Wolter,
on
DunsScotus
Quaestiones
theWillandMorality
D.C. 1986,156-7;cf.B. Ioannes
DunsScotus,
, Washington,
Qaestiones
Libros
LibriVI-IX,
lib.IX,q.15, a.2,parag.38,ed.R. Andrews,
Aristotelis,
metaphysicorum
super
G. Etzkorn
N.Y. 1997,685,20-2.
e.a.,St.Bonaventure,
44Kentacknowledges
thispoint;cf.Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 106,108,115-6,
121-3,127-8.

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THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

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some of the intellect'sactivitiesare free.But thereis no incompatibility


betweenholdingthispositionand endorsingthe claims of ethicalvoluntarism.It remainspossible that the will is able to will in oppositionto
certainjudgmentsof the intellect,even if thosejudgmentscome about
freely.
3. TheNatureoftheWill in EthicalVoluntarism
The positionI establishin section2 would not satisfyKent. She acknowledges that therewere thinkersin earlierages who held claims similarto
and who influencedtheselater theories,but who
the ethicalvoluntarists,
because theydo not hold the scholasdo not count as ethicalvoluntarists
includeAnselmof Canterbury
ticconceptionofthewill.These earlierfigures
(1033-1109)and Bernardof Clairvaux(1090-1153).Kent stressesBernard's
She citesthreeimportantclaims made by
workas especiallysignificant.45
Bernard that help set up the discussionin the second half of the thirteenthcentury:
-

Althoughthe will can neveract withoutreason,it can act againstreason's judgment.


- Where the will is, thereis freedom.
- If reason
imposedany necessityon the will,the will would not be free,
and where thereis no freedom,thereis no moral responsibility.46

These claims reflectsome of the same ideas as the claims cited by Kent
Kent claimsthatBernard's
as hallmarks
of ethicalvoluntarism.
Nevertheless,
fromthatof the late thirteenth
notionof the will differs
centuryscholastics. She implies that therefore,Bernard should not be considered an
ethicalvoluntarist.47
Presumablyshe would raise the same concernabout
Philip's theory.Therefore,in order to establishthe claim that ethical
voluntarismarises much earlierthan Kent and otherssuspect,I need to
look at Philip's conceptionof the will.
Kent describesthe scholasticconceptionof the will as "a rationalor
intellectualappetite,distinctfromsense appetite,on the one hand, and
intellector reason, on the other."48This conceptionof the will involves
45Kent1995(ob.cit.,above,n. 7), 111-2.
46Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 112-3.
47Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 113.Whether
she'sright
aboutthisis beyond
the
thenthecentral
theses
ofethical
voluntarism
have
scopeofthispaper.Butifsheiswrong,
in thetwelfth
their
muchearlier
thanKentmaintains.
century,
origins
48Kent
1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 113.Presumably
theethical
voluntarists
holdthis

18:06:57 PM

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COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

threeconditions:the willis (1) an appetitivepower,(2) capable of respondand (3) separate fromboth the coging to judgmentsof the intellect,49
nitivepower and the sensoryappetite.
Philip conceives of the will as an appetitivepower responsiveto the
judgmentsof the intellectforin his discussionof the definitionof liberum
he definesthe will as "an inclinationto a thingin accordance
arbitrium^
withthe conceptof the good"50and maintainsthatthe willis "an appetite
in accordance with reason."51He notes that Damascene calls the will a
that has to do with deliberation[vorationalappetite [appetitus
rationalis]
luntascumConsilio].52
Moreover,Philip claims that "desiringthe good and
fleeingevil in responseto reason resultsfromthe will."53He adds, "For
desiringthe good and fleeingfromevil is an act sometimesconsequent
Kentnever
makes
thisclaim.Furthermore,
ofthewillas wellalthough
explicitly
conception
and"intellectual
areequivalent
thattheterms
"rational
Kentimplies
appetite"
appetite"
between
thetwoand
ThomasWilliams
arguesthatScotuswoulddistinguish
expressions.
infactrejects
ofthewillas an intellectual
cf.Th.Williams,
HowScotus
thenotion
appetite;
Catholic
69 (1995),
, in:American
Quarterly,
from
Happiness
Philosophical
Separates
Morality
recent
footnote
6. Forfurther
discussion
of thisissue,see Williams'
425-45,especially
MoralPhilosophy
Foundations
62 (1998),
, in: The Thomist,
ofScotus's
paper,TheLibertarian
becauseKentincludes
Thisissueis interesting
Scotusas an ethical
193-215.
voluntarist,
account
ofthewill.Itwould
Scotusdoesnotholdthescholastic
is correct,
yetifWilliams
condition
for
ofthewillis nota necessary
thatadopting
thescholastic
follow
conception
an ethical
voluntarist.
being
49I takethephrase"rational
to
thatis ableto respond
to meanan appetite
appetite"
made
the
intellect
then
an
the
intellect.
made
by
Judgements
give
agent
by
judgements
It doesnotfollow
from
thisthatthewill'svolionewayor another.
reasons
foracting
onemayholdsimply
thata judgment
tionsaredetermined
bytheintellect's
judgments;
neverdefines
foran actofthewill.Kentherself
is a necessary
condition
bytheintellect
in chapter
that
herdiscussion,
sheimplies
thetermalthough
three,
throughout
especially
in thissense;cf.Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),
"rational
shetoounderstands
appetite"
84, 106,108,115-6,121-3,127-8.
50SDB, q.2,a.2a,264,vol.1, 173:"Estvoluntas
rationem
inclinado
in remsecundum
ofthispassage.
boni."See note35 fora discussion
51SDB,q.2,a.2a,306-7,vol.1, 175:"Estenimvoluntas
secundum
rationem."
appetitus
52SDB,q.2, a.l, 29-33,vol. 1, 160:"Appetitivas
autemita [Iohannes
Damascenus]
et
estvirtus
eiusquodestsecundum
naturam
naturaliter
inserta
'Anime
dividit:
appetitiva
etvocatur
thelisis
et
contentiva
etiamnature
assunt
omnium
voluntas,
que substantialiter
rationalis
ad aliquamrem,et hecvoluntas
Bulisis
autemestappetitus
eiusactusthelima.
sumConsilio,
esteorumque suntin nobiset que nonsuntin nobis.Et esthecvoluntas
In thissecetisteprimus
motus
dicitur
consiliario."
ettuncesteorum
que suntad finem,
on liberum
treatise
on thesoulanditspowers
tionofPhilip's
(ofwhichthetreatise
larger
terms.
thecognitive
andappetitive
he discusses
is a part),
arbitrium
powerin general
53SDB,q.2,a.l, 75-6,vol.1, 161:"Namappetere
malum
secundum
bonum
etfugere
Here
secundum
desiderium."
autemsensualitatem
rationem
voluntatem,
sequitur
sequitur
withsensory
a judgment
oftheintellect,
thewill,which
follows
desire,
Philipis comparing
andappetitive
ofthecognitive
all within
hisgeneral
discussion
powers.

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

203

on the will, namely,on the part of reason, and sometimeson desire,


he claims that
namely,on the part of the sensorypower."54Furthermore,
"the will is taken as the consentwhich is in reason. . . and is the inclination of the power of the will for its own act, which is willing,"55
and
finally,that"precedingacts of reason and subsequentacts of the will concur so that there is a deliberatedwill [voluntas
."56 These pasconsiliata]
that
will
show
for
the
an
that
is
is capable of
sages
Philip,
appetite
respondingto the intellect'sjudgment. Some of the claims that I have
listeddemonstrate
as we have seen,
Philip'spositionon the willindirectly;
to hold thatthe will is an appetitein accordance withthe intellectcould
mean thatthe will never opposes intellect,a claim that createsa tension
for Philip's account. But regardlessof how one interpretsthat claim, it
followsthat a will that acts in accordance with intellectis a will that is
responsiveto the judgments of intellect.Stating that the will inclines
toward an object "in accordance with the concept of the good" also
impliesa priorjudgmentof the intellect,forthe willis incapable of determiningwhethera given object is good. A determinationof this sort
requiresa prioract of intellect.To say thatthe will is the consentwhich
is in the intellectalso impliesthat a close associationwith the intellect.
It impliesthat in the course of choosing and implementingan action,
first,the intellectmakes a judgmentabout a given alternativeand then
the will consentsto it, once again suggestingthat the will is a power
responsiveto thejudgmentsof intellect.Thus, Philip'saccount of the will
satisfiesKent's firsttwo conditions.
with respectto the third
However, thingsare not so straightforward
condition.AlthoughPhilip recognizes a conceptual distinctionamong
intellect,will, and sensory appetite, he denies that there are actual
distinctions
among these powers. Thus, for Philip, the will differsfrom
54SDB, q.2,a.l, 76-9,vol.1, 161-2:"Estenimappetere
bonum
etfugere
malum
actus
scilicet
exparterationis,
desidevoluntatem,
quandoque
consequens
quandoque
consequens
scilicet
ex partesensualitatis."
Thisis a continuation
ofthepassaeein note53.
rium,
55SDB, a.l, 152-3,
vol.1, 164:"Voluntas
q.2,
accipitur
proconsensu
quiestinratione,
insensualitate,
sicutdesiderium
etestinclinatio
voluntatis
ad actumsuumquiest
potentie
velie."
56SDB,
liberum
arbitrium
essevolunq.2,a.2a,359-63,vol.1, 177:"Illiqui ponunt
tatem
dicunt
diffinit
liberum
arbitrium
quodAugustinus
penesusum.Et quiain eiususu
concurrunt
actusrationis
et actusvoluntatis
ut sitvoluntas
consiliata,
precedens
sequens
ideode utroque
facit
mentionem
in diffinitione
cumdicit:'Facultas
voluntatis
et rationis,'
nonquodsitutrumque."
herea viewwhichhe attributes
to Augustine,
Philippresents
neverstating
whether
itis alsohisview.However,
thisstatement
comesaboutin a reply
to an objection
andI findno evidence
thatPhilip
wouldreject
thisview.

18:06:57 PM

204

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY

the intellectonly conceptuallyand not in reality,as one can see from


the followingpassages:
thatreasonandwillareoneandthesamepowerin accordance
It mustbe known
withtheir
buttheyaredenominated
substance,
byoneor theotheract.57
arbitrium
[In liberum
] thereis onlyone powerwithtwoacts,nottwoseparate
powers.58
I answer
andjudging
thatalthough
areseparate
acts,nevertheless,
willing
they
areordered
withrespect
toeachother,
because
is ordered
towilling
as what
judging
is priorto it.Andalthough
therecan be theoneactwithout
theother,
neverthetheir
to a single
it
less,nothing
prevents
belonging
justas, on thecontrary,
power,
doesnotfollow
thata universal
is comprehended
bya different
powerthanthesintheone is not[separate
theother;rather,
gularis. Therefore,
from]
theyareone
exceptconceptually.59
Philip gives many argumentsin supportof this position.Whetherthose
formypurargumentssucceed in establishingthe positionis unimportant
All
firm
here.
that
matters
is
assent
to
the
Philip's
positionthatthe
poses
will and the intellectare not separate powers of the soul.
Philip holds an analogous position regardingthe distinctionbetween
the will and sensoryappetite, concludingonce again that there is no
actual distinctionbetween the will and what he calls the concupiscible
power, only a conceptualdistinctionbetweenthem.Medieval psychology
divides the sensoryappetiteinto two parts: the concupisciblepower and
the irasciblepower. The formerhas to do with pursuitof the pleasant
and the fleeingof danger (thingsthat an agent wants to pursue) while
the lattermoves the agent to perseverein arduous tasks(thingsthat an
agent doesn't want to pursue but recognizesthat she ought to do so).60
57SDB, q.2, a.2a,260-1,vol. 1, 173:"Sciendum
autemquoduna et eadempotentia
sedab alteroetalteroactudenominata."
estratioet voluntas,
secundum
substantiam
58SDB,
seduna estper
q.2, a.2a,296-7,vol. 1, 174:"Nonenimsuntduepotentie,
ofexplaining
Bernard
ofClairvaux's
makes
thisclaiminthecontext
actusduplicata."
Philip
arbitrium
as a consensus
ofintellect
andwill.
ofliberum
definition
59SDB,q.2,a.2b,27-31,vol.1, 180:"Adid autemquodobicitur
licetactus
respondeo:
tarnen
ad invicem
iudicare
ad
velieet iudicare,
sintseparati
ordinati,
quiapreordinatur
tarnen
nichil
velie.Et licetalterum
impedit
quinsintuniuspotenpossitessesinealtero,
ab aliapotentia
nonsequitur
tie,sicute contrario
quoduniversale
quam
comprehenditur
ad rationem."
Thisis
Ergohocnonestillud,immounumsuntnisiquantum
singulare.
andjudging
areseparate
and
thatsincewilling
to theobjection
a response
acts,intellect
willmustbe separate
powers.
60See forexample,
autemvelfugaerunt
SDB,q.2, a.l, 56-8,vol.1, 161:"Appetitus
This
sicutirascibili."
velinvi nataad arduum,
utconcupiscibili,
velinvinataad bonum,
these
between
ofthepowers
ofthesoul.Thedistinction
a general
discussion
comesfrom
treatment
ofit in ST
ThomasAquinas's
twopowers
is a common
one;see forexample
la, q.81.

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

205

Here, Philip discussesonly the concupisciblepart and not the sensory


appetiteas a whole, but he statesunequivocallythat appetitivepowers,
whetherrationalor sensory,have no actual distinctions
among them:
thesensory
It is notnecessary
thattherebe twopowers,
concupiscible
powerand
willbe a single
butthere
theintellectual
power.61
power,
concupiscible
totheir
notwithrespect
totheir
Andthey
differ
withrespect
substance,
concepts,
to itssubstance,
not
is thesameas theformer
sincethelatter
according
although
to itsconcept.62
according
Here Philip refersto an intellectualconcupisciblepower ratherthan to
the will. It is clear, however,that he means the will since the opening
line of thissectionraises the questionof whetherthe will (and here it is
is the same as the concupisciblepower. Calling themboth con"voluntas")
cupsciblepowers in the subsequentdiscussionis perhaps Philip's way of
emphasizinghis claim that in realitythereis no distinctionbetweenthe
two.
Anotherinteresting
point in Philip's psychologicaltheoryis his insistence on a real distinctionbetweenthe sensoryapprehensivepower and
the intellectualapprehensivepower. Afterdenyinga genuine distinction
among appetitivepowers,Philip discusseshis reasons for maintaininga
distinctionamong apprehensivepowers:
It is notnecessary
on account
ofthistospeakina similar
wayabouttheintellectual
cognoscitive
poweror motive
cognoscitive
powerandthesensory
poweror powers
to apprehension
comesaboutthrough
withrespect
becausecognition
theapprewhich
hension
Butaninseparable
isthephantasm
ofa corruptible
ofa likeness.
likeness,
as it takesplacein thesensesandin theimagination,
anda separable
likething
cannot
be suitedto oneandthesamerecepness,whichis theintelligible
species,
withrespect
tivepower,
forparticular
differ
to whattheyareable
receptive
powers
willbe onepowerthatis receptive
to receive.
Andthisis whythere
ofthesensible
thatis receptive
oftheintelligible
andthey
willbe different
andanother
species
species
thiswillbe thecaseforphantasia,
andsense.Butit is not
intellect,
reason,
powers;

61SDB,
estquodsi estunasubq.3,a.5a,43-8,vol. 1, 221-2:"Adquoddicendum
et sensibilis,
stantia
rationabilis
velsuumoppositum
cuiussuntheepotentie
quodtamen
ex sacraScriptura
noninveni,
sedinveni
tuncnon
Augustinum
superhocdubitantem,
etconcupiscibilem
estnecesse
duasessevires,
sensibilem
sed
concupiscibilem
intelligibilem,
eritseparabilis
erituna que respectu
a corpore,
concupiscibilium
quorumdam
respectu
in se autemsimpliciter
eritinseparabilis
a corpore,
Thisis Philip's
aliorum
separabilis."
toan objection
thatthetwosorts
ofappetitive
mustbe separate
powers
response
(i.e.the
intellective
or thewill,andthesensory
appetite).
appetite
62SDB,q.2,a.5a,55-7,vol.1, 222:"Et tuncsolvendum
estad ea que supraobjecta
nonquantum
ad substantiam,
cumeadem
ad rationem,
suntperdifferentiam
quantum
licetnonsecundum
sithecillisecundum
rationem."
substantiam,

18:06:57 PM

206

COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
thecaseforthosepowers
whichare motive
alonefortheydo notreceive
powers
theirdiversity
a thing
from
sincetheyreceive
from
a thing
on thepartof
nothing
in whichtheyinhere.63
thesubstance

In additionto the actual distinctionbetweensensoryapprehensionand


intellectualapprehension,Philip once again denies an actual distinction
among motivepowers,which presumablyinclude not only the will and
the sensoryconcupisciblepower, but also the irasciblepower. Moreover,
Philip includes an actual distinctionbetween ratioand the other apprehensivepowers.This is interesting
because as I mentionedearlier(p. 204),
Philip denies any genuine distinctionbetween the will and ratio.Given
this denial and his denial of an actual distinctionbetween the will and
the sensorymotivepowers,it followsthat thereis no actual distinction
betweenthe sensorymotivepowersand ratioalthoughof course thereare
conceptual distinctions.Thus, Philip includes an apprehensive power
among the motivepowers. I suspect that he does this because of ratio's
close association with action, which in turn is closely associated with
motivepowers.64
The conceptual distinctionbetween the two motive powers (sensory
63SDB,
hocsimiliter
dicerede
q.2, a.5a,62-71,vol. 1, 222: "Nequeoportet
propter
velmotiva
etsensibili
ad apprehensionem
etaliamotiva
cognoscitiva
intelligibili
cognoscitiva
estperapprehensionem
similitudinis.
Nonpotest
autem
perapprehensionem,
quiacognitio
reicorruptibilis,
similitudo
utfitin sensibus
et inymagiinseparabilis
que estphantasma
et similitudo
essenatain una et eadem
natione,
separabilis
que estspeciesintelligibilis
enimpropria
secundum
differunt.
receptiva
potentia
receptiva;
receptibilia
Quareunaerit
sensibilis
etalteraspeciei
etitaerunt
similiter
diverse,
receptiva
potentia
speciei
intelligibilis
et ratioetsensualitas.
etintellectus
Nonsicautemestde illisque solummotive
phantasia
a re suamdiversitatem
cumnichil
a re recipiant
ex partesubsunt;nonenimrecipiunt
inqua sunt."
In thispassage,
a distinction
stantie
between
intellectus
andratio.
Philipmakes
intellect
is a cognitive
offact.Reason,
powerthatjudgesaboutmatter
Strictly
speaking,
on theotherhand,is thepractical
thepowerthatmakes
aboutwhat
reason,
judgments
andreasonaretypes
ofcomputing
is tobe done.Thus,bothintellect
theformer
powers,
factsabouttheworldandthelatter
a computing
a computing
powerconcerning
power
factsaboutwhatis to be done.ForPhilip's
discussion
ofthisdistinction,
see
concerning
in remutsitvel
SDB, q.2,a.5b,24-9,vol.1, 224:"Etestdicendum
quodestconsensus
de veroetestconsensus
in remutfiat.Consensus
itaestetestiudicium
in rem
quoniam
autpotentie
intellective
utsitestvirtutis
tumpercipit
esseverum.
que estpurecognitiva;
motive
Consensus
autemutfiatestvirtutis
secundum
que estratio,
quodratioetvoluntas
cadunt
inratione
liberi
enimnoncaditutsupra."
unasuntpotentia,
intellectiva
arbitrii;
prout
a discussion
whether
thewillis a typeofconsent.
Thispassageis takenfrom
concerning
64
thattherational
andsensory
areestablished
(fiindantw
powers
) in
Philipalsoargues
on thesoul).One might
wonder
onesubstance
aboutthecon(SDB,q. 3 in histreatise
I think
ofhisposition
commitments.
thateverything
canbe sorted
sistency
givenhisother
butI willnotattempt
theproject
hereas itwouldtakemebeyond
outin Philip's
favor,
thescopeofthispaper.

18:06:57 PM

THE ROOTSOF ETHICALVOLUNTARISM

207

and intellective)
has to do withwhat moves the agent.If the agentmoves
in response to what Philip calls an impulse (impetus),
then the sensory
If
in
is
involved.65
the
moves
to
appetite
agent
response a precedingact
of deliberation(deliberatio
), then an intellectivepower has moved
precedens
the agent.66This matchesthe common descriptionof those thinkerswho
argue for a genuine separationbetweenthe powers,althoughfor Philip
of course,it is purelyon the conceptuallevel. Nevertheless,Philip'sconare sufficiendy
robustto satisfyKent's thirdcondition
ceptualdistinctions
fora scholasticaccount of the will. What's crucial is not the claim that
will,intellect,and sensoryappetiteare separatepowersperse but rather
that therebe a clear distinctionbetweenacts of willingand acts of reasoningand desiring.For it is in virtueof its activitiesthat the will is said
to be a rationalappetitedistinctfromintellectand sensoryappetite;its
appetitiveactivitiesdistinguishit from the intellectwhile its abilityto
respond to the intellect'sjudgments distinguishesit from the sensory
appetite.Certainly,these notionsare presentin Philip; thus he satisfies
the spiritof the scholasticdefinitionof will. A furtherinsistenceupon a
real distinction
among cognitiveand appetitivepowerswould be an arbitrarydemand.
What I have shown is that Philip'sconceptionof the will is in line with
the conceptionfoundlater in the thirteenth
century.Moreover,Philip is
committedto two of the most importantvoluntaristclaims. Therefore,I
would argue that Philip qualifiesas an ethicalvoluntarist.
There is no doubt that Kent would agree that the work on liberum
arbitrum
done earlierin the centuryprovidesa foundationforethicalvoluntarism.Moreover,thereis no doubt thatphilosophersin the laterpart
of the thirteenth
centuryexpresseda much more explicitcommitmentto

65Philipdoesnotdescribe
whatan impulse
is. The termimplies
somesortofnonthesortofthing
thathappens
whenoneunreflectively
stimulus,
cognitive
perhaps
grabs
a freshly
bakedchocolate
onthekitchen
chipcookieofftheplatethatonehasspiedsitting
counter.
66SDB,
utnonintelligat
q.2,a.5a,57-61,vol.1, 222:"Etsicsolvitur
primaobiectio,
Iohannes
Damascenus
vimconcupiscibilem
essealiamin substantia
potentie
que est
sensibilis
ab illa que estintelligibilis,
sed secundum
et hec secundum
rationem,
quod
sensibilis
moveatur
secundum
secundum
autemquodintelligibilis
moveatur
impetum,
deliberatione
autdivinoinstinctu
autnature."
The viewis attributed
to an
precedente
butthere
is no indication
thatPhiliphimself
authority,
disagrees.

18:06:57 PM

208

COLLEENMGCLUSKEY

ethical voluntarism.However, I hope that I have shown that at least


some of its more importantclaims alreadysurfacein the firsthalfof the
thirteenth
century.67
Saint Louis, MO
SaintLouis University

67I wouldliketo thank


ScottMacDonald,
Eleonore
andThomasWilliams
for
Stump,
onearlier
comments
versions
ofthispaper.I readversions
ofthispaper
their
many
helpful
MedievalCongress
at theInternational
'99,July12-15,1999,Leeds,UK and at the
Annual
Mid-South
27,28,1998,University
Conference,
February
Twenty-Second
Philosophy
fortheir
ofMemphis,
TN. I wishto thank
at bothconferences
Memphis,
myaudiences
ofmypaper,andI wishtothank
discussion
mycommentator,
CraigBoyd,at
stimulating
Conference
forhisinputas well.
theMid-South
Philosophy

18:06:57 PM

PetrusHispanusO.P., AuetorSummularum
(II):
and problems*
documents
Further
ANGEL D'ORS

Elementos
The articleby J.F. Meirinhos,PetrusHispanusPortugalensis?
para
Petrus
with
own
de autores
uma diferenciao
,! together
Hispanus
my
paper
to a traSummularum2
have put an end, in myview definitively,
O.P., auctor
in the twenditionwhicharose duringthe Renaissanceand was furthered
tiethcenturyby the work of Martin Grabmann. In this tradition,there
has been a tendencyto regard any work attributedto someone by the
"
name of "Petrus
Hispanus as the workof a singleauthor,who is identified
"
as being Petrus
", Pope John XXI. A major Corpushas come to
Julini
be attributedto this author,encompassingworksabout logic and theology,medicineand naturalphilosophy,bullaeand sermons,and even works
on alchemyand mathematics.As a resultof this,John XXI has come
to figureas an eminentintellectualof the thirteenth
century,almostcomwith
St
Albert
Great
the
or
St
Thomas
parable
Aquinas.
Althoughsome earlierstudiesbroughtto lightthe doctrinalinconsistencybetweensome of the worksincludedin the Corpusascribedto John
XXI, beforethepublicationofJ.F. Meirinhos'sarticleattemptswere made
to explain this inconsistency
by recourseto a supposed developmentin
" which ran
"
the thoughtof PetrusHispanus
parallel to the gradual reception of Greek and Arab medicineand Aristotle'sthought;or by denying
to "PetrusHispanus
the authenticity
of the attribution
". Meirinhoswas the
* I wishto thank
I. Angelelli,
C.H. Kneepkens,
J.M.Gambra,
J. GoniGaztambide,
S. Ebbesen,
E. PrezRodrguez
andM. de Asa,whoreadtheinitial
verL.J.Bataillon,
andencouragement,
sionofthisarticle,
fortheir
observations
which
me
to
helped
sharpen
andcomplete
someofmyanalyses.
1 Revista
deFilosofia
Medieval
Meirinhos
, 3 (1996),51-76.In thisstudy,
Espaola
argues
fortheexistence
ofat leastthree"Petrus
", amongwhomtheworks
Hispanus
previously
attributed
toJohnXXI oughttobe redistributed.
wouldseemtobe
Meirinhos
However,
hisearlier
somedoubts
albeitmoreinconnection
withissues
conclusions,
having
regarding
inPortuguese
cultural
thanwithquestions
thespecific
of"Petrus
politics
concerning
problem
do
P.
Calafate
Historia
Pensamento
vol.
Idade
Hispanus'''
(see
(ed.),
Filosofico
Portugus,I,
Mdia,
Lisbon1999,364).
2 A. d'Ors,Petrus
Summularum
35 (1997),21-71.
O.P.,Auctor
, in:Vivarium,
Hispanus
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001

Vivarium
39,2

18:07:04 PM

2 1O

ANGELD'ORS

firstto propose explicitlythe need to recognisethe existenceof several


"
"Petrus
Hispanus and to divide the worksthatmake up this Corpusaccordingly.Meirinhosargues that it is necessaryto distinguishat least three
"
"
"Petrus
and
Hispanus PetrusHispanusO.P.", PetrusHispanusPortugalensis"
"Petrus
went
same
own
article
the
medicus"?
lines,
arguMy
along
Hispanus
"
"
Summularum'
HispanusO.P.",the auctor
ing fortheneed to distinguishPetrus
"
from PetrusJulini
", Pope John XXI (who, paradoxically,would seem
"
neverto have been knownas "PetrusHispanus untilthe worksof the var"
ious genuine uPetrus
Hispanus began to be attributedto him;John XXI
not only acquired other scholars'works,but also theirname).
In my view,the publicationof these two articleshas preparedthe way
towards a betterunderstandingof the works grouped togetherin this
Corpusand the complex relationsbetweenthem,one which does not rule
but which no
out the existenceof developmentsand false attributions,
longerpresupposesa need to seek consistencywithinthe ideas contained
therein.None the less, the resultsof the two studieshave been mainly
"
"
negativein character,and have leftresearchinto PetrusHispanus bereft
thatmight
of the necessaryprecisebiographicalor chronologicalreferences
enable us to examine these worksin theirstricthistoricalcontext.These
articlesgive explicitexpressionto the problemsthat were latent,but fail
to providefreshdocumentswhichcould enable us to respondto the problems that arise as a resultof the new situation.We know hardlyany"
",
Hispanus
thingabout the biographicalitinerariesof thesedifferentPetrus
or about the relationsbetween them. Nor should we assume that they
works or authors:we are probablylookingat
are all thirteenth-century
a group of writersand writingsscatteredacross a period of two hundred
years,fromthe second half of the twelfthcenturyto the firsthalf of the
fourteenth
century.
now necessaryto undertakefreshresearchto reconstruct
It is therefore
"
"
the biographicalprofilesof the various PetrusHispanus and seek criteria
3 In myview,thedivision
rather
thanbeing
is stillinsufficient:
byMeirinhos
proposed
ofa
thedivision
hisdivision
resembles
intoitslowerindividuals,
ofa species
thedivision
"
"Petrus
"Petrus
several
are
several
there
into
O.P.",
Hispanus
Portugalensis
Hispanus
genre species:
"
"
be
can
not
Petrus
medicus
andseveralPetrus
XXI,
", PopeJohn
certainly "
Julini
Hispanus
with"Petrus
with"Petrus
identified
O.P.",nor,to mymind,
Portugalensis
Hispanus
Hispanus
thenames
In myopinion,
refer.
to whomsomemanuscripts
medicus
or "Petrus
",
Hispanus
" areintended
" or "Petrus
"Petrus
to distinmedicus
precisely
Hispanus
Portugalensis
Hispanus
"
"
"Petrus
" from
"
O.P.",whois Petrus
Hispanus
par"excelHispanus
Hispanus
guishthesePetrus
andnot Petrus
havebeencalled"Petrus
Julini"
lence,whilePopeJohnXXI wouldalways
O.P."
that"Petrus
thenthiswouldindicate
is accepted,
Hispanus
HispanusIfthishypothesis
all theother"Petrus
Hispanus
predates

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

211

fordividingup the variousworksin this Corpusamong them.This is the


purpose of the presentarticle which, though focused like my previous
"
", is intendedto shed some
paper on the figureof the auctorSummularum
"
.
the
on
the
web
of
light
problemssurrounding various PetrusHispanus"
"
"
The problemis whether,afterthe various PetrusHispanus have been
mergedtogetherforover fivecenturies,it is now in any way possibleto
to identify
betweenthem,and particularly
the "auctor
Summularum"
distinguish
who, accordingto the resultsof my previousarticle,must have been a
memberof the Order of Preachers.The Records of the Chapter of the
Spanish Provinceof the Order of Preachersheld in Toledo in 1250 (the
of "Petrus
,
year,accordingto Dominican tradition,of the "floruit"
Hispanus
auctorSummularum
reason to abandon any
"), could be taken as sufficient
"
and to writeoffas insoluble
attemptto identifythe auctorSummularum"
the generalproblemof "PetrusHispanus"and the true attributionof the
worksin the Corpusformerlyascribed to Pope John XXI, unless fresh
documentsshould appear which can aid us in this endeavour. I shall
refrainfromoverwhelming
the reader and confinemyselfto reproducing
a
few
of
the
entriesconcerningmovementsand deathsin
only
fragments
these records:4
. . . Fratrem
Petrum
Alfonsi
de conventu
. . fratrem
(p. 30):1.11:Toletano
Palentino,
Petrm
Garciaconversum.
. . . fratrem
1.12:Cordubensi
Didacum
Petride Stellaqui
estBurgis
. . . fratrem
Petrum
Asturicensem
de conventu
fratrem
Petrum
Colimbriensi,
deTaurodeconventu
fratrem
Petrum
de Pace,... de conventu
SalamanZamorensi,
tino.1.13:DomuiHispalensi
. . ., fratrem
Petrum
Ferrandi
de conventu
...
Toletano,
fratrem
Petrum
Illerdensem
. . . de conventu
Caesar(p. 31): 1.15:Pampilonensi
. . . fratrem
Petrum
Garciaede conventu
Maioricense
... 1.16:Caesaraugustano,
. . fratrem
Petrum
de Borau,fratrem
Petrum
de Boil,fratrem
Petrum
augustano
Oscensem
... (p. 36):Haec suntnomina
fratrum
defunctorum
hocanno
novitium,
in Provincia
. . . De conventu
. . ., frater
Petrus
conversus,
. . .,
Hispaniae
Segoviensi
frater
Petrus
... De Compostellano
frater
Petrus
Alfonsi.
Bertrandi,
The proliferation
of membersof the Order of Preacherscalled "Petrus
",
all of Spanish origin,of whom thereis scarcelyany record other than
theirname, the place theyare fromand theirdestination,does not give
us much hope of being able to identify
the "auctorSummularum
", of whom
we knowlittlemore than the name "Petrus",
his Spanish origin,and that
he veryprobablybelongedto the Dominican Order. Still less does it aid
us in distinguishing
and identifying
the different
figuresconcealed under

4 RamnHernndez,
actasdeloscaptulos
dela Provincia
de
O.P.,Lasprimeras
provinciales
5 (1984),5-41.
, in:Archivo
Dominicano,
Espaa

18:07:04 PM

2 12

ANGELD'ORS

the generic name of "PetrusHispanus",whom we know nothingabout


except theirname and area of origin.
These problemscan only be solved if new documentscome to light
"
which, preciselybecause of the confusionof "PetrusHispanus withJohn
XXI, mighthave gone unnoticedto date. None the less, I feel that it
will be hard to find the new and decisive documentsneeded to solve
these problemsif researchis not encouraged and guided in the proper
direction.To this end, it is necessaryto subject the scantydocumentation we have to detailedanalysisin orderto rid ourselvesof possibleprejudices whichpreventus fromlookingin the rightplaces, and to advance
new hypotheseswhichlead us to seek in areas thatare as yetunexplored.
In the presentstudy,readerswill not findany hithertounknowndocumentof decisiveimportance,but only an analysisof documentsthatare
mostlyalreadyknownand hypotheseswhichobligeus to reconsiderfirmly
establishedbeliefs.My purpose is to add some new documentsconcern' to those I included in
"
my 1997 article;to
ing the auctorSummularurr
reviewmy analysesin that articlein order to rectifysome errorswhich
have been pointedout by Simon Tugwell O.P.; and to examine some of
Tugwell's argumentsagainst some of the hypothesesI put forward.
Conclusions
on TuguuelVs
1. GeneralObservations
onSomeProposed
In his articlePetrus
,5Simon
Identifications
Hispanus:Comments
"
"auctor
Summularum
of
the
identification
the
possible
Tugwellarguedagainst
with four of the six figureswhom I had suggested,purely by way of
hypothesiswith a view to definingobjectivesfor futureresearch,in my
The fourfigures
whomTugwell
Summularum.
articlePetrus
HispanusO.P.,Auctor
rules out are:6 Pedro Ferrando (to whom the firstLegendaSanciiDominici
,
5 S.
37
onSome
Comments
Petrus
, in: Vivarium,
Identifications
Proposed
Hispanus:
Tugwell,
ofthewritofhisedition
makesuseofthefruits
Tugwell
(1999),103-13.In hisarticle,
Dominico
deSancto
Bernardi
Guidonis
Gui on St. Dominic:
,Rome
Scripta
ingsof Bernardo
as Tugwell1999andTugwell1998respectively.
to thesetwoworks
1998.I shallrefer
6 In my1997article,
in
wereverydifferent
PedroFerrando
concerning
myhypotheses
seemsnotto havepaidmuch
naturefromthoseabouttheotherfivefigures.
Tugwell
to the
wasproposed
as an alternative
PedroFerrando
to thismajordifference.
attention
" should
" buried
"Petrus
Summularum
as the"auctor
whocouldbe identified
inEstella,
Hispanus
and
is unreliable
thatthe"Estellatradition"
it be proven
(theideathatPedroFerrando
" buried
in Estellacouldhavebeenoneandthesamehadbeenruled
the"Petrus
Hispanus
to reconstruct
in an attempt
wereproposed
The fiveotherfigures
theoutset).
outfrom
as I accepted
in myarticle,
Summularum
ofthe"auctor
thebiographical
Although
profile
"
to the"Petrus
withreference
I formulated
thesehypotheses
theEstellatradition,
Hispanus

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

213

PetrusHispanusconversus
the Legenda
, is attributed),
(who was a memprima
"
Petrus
in Bologna),a first"Magister
ber of the earlyDominican community
(who signedas witnessa documentconcerningthe nuns of the Convent
"
of Santa Maria in Tempulo in Rome in 1220), and a second Magister
"
as "rector
Petrus
(to whom Grard de Frachet refersin his VitaeFratrum
"
scholarum
Burdegalisaround 1238).
Tugwell says nothingabout the other two candidates I put forward:
"Petrusnatione
s" (mentionedby pseudoGallus,in FranciaPriorprovinciali
,
Henri of Ghent and Tritemius)and Fray Pedro Espaol (discussedby
Thomas of Cantimprand Qutif-Echard,
amongothers).Tugwell'ssilence
on theselast two figuresis probablydue firstto the manifestimpossibilwith "Petrus
the "auctorSummularum"
, nationeGallus,in
ity of identifying
from
a
communication
to
who
FranciaPrior
personal
provincialis", according
O.P.
Reims
with
Pierre
of
identified
L.J. Bataillon O.P. ought to be
(11247), Prior of Paris, Provincialof France, Bishop of Agen (in 1245),
and authorof threecollectionsof sermons.7Secondly,because of the comabout the figureof Fray Pedro Espaol
plete lack of preciseinformation
which makes any kind of argumentabout his identification
impossible.
"
"Petrusnatione
Prior
in
Francia
for
reasons
Gallus,
,
provincialis
proposing
My
"
"
"
on the basis of the name Petrus
Summularum
as thepossible auctor
Hyspani
"
comnes
homines
in
the
Gallici found
' chieflyrested on the
Compilationes
"
"
name "Petrus
", my hypothesesabout the link between PetrusHispanus
and the Court of the Kings of Navarre,and the fact that I knew nothing of Pierrede Reims. Now that the latterhas been identified,I think
thathe can be excluded fromthe list of possiblefigureswithwhom the
"auctorSummularum
" can be identified.
However, there is no reason to
removeFray Pedro Espaol fromthat list.
"
" fromthislistof
Petri
Tugwell'sreasonsforexcludingthe two magisti
"
"
possibleauthorsof the Summulaeseem to me to be too weak. In Tugwell's
view, the information
concerningthese two figuresdoes not allow us to
" were either
Petri
conclude that these two "magisti
Spanish or members

to the"auctor
Summularum
buriedin Estella,
", and should
strictly
theyreferred
speaking
oftheperson
wedecideshould
as referring
tothelatter,
therefore
be understood
regardless
be identified
as the"auctor
Summularum
7 I thank
fortheattention
he paidtomyfirst
article
on Peter
Bataillon
LouisJacques
whichhaveenabledmeto amendsomeofmy
observations
ofSpainandforhisprecise
research.
To himI alsoowetheinformation
about
andredirect
errors
mysubsequent
deecclesiasticis
to HenriofGhent:
itought
oftheLiber
incorrect
attribution
scriptoribus
perto HenriofBrussels.
hapsto be attributed

18:07:04 PM

2 14

ANGELD'ORS

of the Order of Preachers.But in realitynor does this information


permit us to rule out thispossibility.Regardingthe firstof the two,Tugwell
may be rightin consideringthat his role as witnessin this case (determiningthe relationsbetween the nuns of Santa Maria in Tempulo and
"
Petrus
the Order of Preachers)should lead us to thinkthatthis "Magister
was not a memberof the Order of Preachers.But we ought not to forget that this documentwas signed in 1220, that is, only fouryears after
the foundingof the Order of Preachers,and only two years afterit first
"
went to Italy, and that the circumstancesof this "MagisterPetrus
might
have changed in lateryears. It is my view thatthe situationof these two
" is similar to that of
"
"
"
Petri
maistri
concerningthe auctorSummularum
welldefinedforan identification
FrayPedro Espaol:theyare not sufficiently
" to be confirmedor
with the "auctorSummularum
rejected. Unless these
"
", can be filledout, I thinkthat
figures,or that of the auctorSummularum
it would be betternot to exclude themfromthe list of people on whom
that Philippus
researchshould be carriedout. Nor should it be forgotten
"
to the auctorSummularum
of Ferrara,when referring
", tells us that "fiiit
or that Trutvetterrefersto the "auctor
fiatrum
predicatorurr'
posteade ordine
" as "Petrus
Summularum
, and that thisname, whethercorrect
Burdegalensis"
or not, requiresan explanation.
As far as the othertwo figureswhom Tugwell wishesto exclude from
"
the
the listare concerned,Pedro Ferrandoand PetrusHispanusconversus",
In
his
book
for
more
careful
and
calls
is
more
analysis.
complex
problem
and article, Tugwell contributesnew data of relevance to both these
figures,but sadlyhis entireargumentbuilds on acceptance of the "Estella
withthe Prioryof St. Dominic
tradition"linkingthe "auctorSummularum"
" was buried.
in Estella where,accordingto thistradition,"PetrusHispanus
In my 1997 paper I took the "Estella tradition"as being the most con"
"
Summularum
sistent,specificand credibleof the traditions
linkingthe auctor
with the Order of Preachers,which was why I used it as a basis formy
hypothesesintendedto guide futureresearch.However, my subsequent
research,forreasonswhich I shall explain below, has shed doubt on the
of the "Estella tradition".And if the "Estella tradition"is
trustworthiness
abandoned, Tugwell's arguments,thoughof greatinterestwithregardto
"
the figureof Pedro Ferrando,the author of the Legenda
, or Petrus
prima
", have absolutelyno relevance to the problem of the
Hispanusconversus
"auctorSummularum
Leaving aside other,doubdess important,details,let us concentratefor
the momenton the reason why Tugwell rules out Pedro Ferrando and
" fromthe listof
"Petrus
possibleauthorsof the Summulae.
Hispanusconversus

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

215

" is buried in
His reason is basically as follows:the "auctorSummularum
"
"
Estella,Pedro Ferrandois buried in Zamora, PetrusHispanasconversus
(a
in Bologna)shouldbe identified
memberof theearlyDominicancommunity
"
with "PetrusHispanasconversus
(a memberof the early Dominican communityin Milan, his last documentedplace of residence,which thereis
it can be assumed that
no recordofhishavingleft,and where,therefore,
he died and was buried),and therefore,
since no one can be buried in
two places at the same time,neitherPedro Ferrandonor "PetrusHispanas
" can be identifiedas the "auctorSummularumBut if it were not
conversus
" is buried in
"
true that the uauctorSummularum
Estella, or that Petrus
"
is buried in Milan (thereis no reason to doubt that
Hispanusconversus
Pedro Ferrandois buried in Zamora), would therebe any other reason
to rejectthe attribution
of the Summulae
to Pedro Ferrando or to "Petrus
"?
Hispanusconversus
In Tugwell's view there is at least one other reason that rules out
"
"Petrus
, which is
Hispanusconversusas a possible author of the Summulae
"
his veryconditionas conversusAccordingto the informationprovided
we have about thisman comes
by Tugwell,the oldestpiece of information
Predicatorum
fromthe Libellasde initiisOrdinis
byJordanof Saxony in which
he appears, withoutan actual name, as "frater
conversui'the companion
who
was
one
of
the
second
of "frater
Christianu'
group of Preacherssent
8
It
was Galvano della Fiamma, in
by St. Dominic to Bologna in 1218.
his Chronica
Maior (now lost, but quoted by AmbrosioTaegio), who first
" the name of "Petrus
"
".9 It is doubtlessthese
Hispanus
gave this conversus
whichformthe basis forthe later recordin theAnnalesOrdinis
testimonies
Praedicatorum
in my earlierarticle.
by T.M. Mamacho,10to whichI referred
8 Libellus
deprincipiis
ordinis
auctore
lordano
deSaxonia
, ed. H. Gh.Scheeben,
praedicatorum
Monumenta
Histrica
SanctiPatrisnostri
fase.II, Rome1935,25-88(n. 55,
Dominici,
Dominicum
fratres
videlicet
frater
Bononiam,
p. 51):"Missisunta Romapermagistrm
Iohannes
de Navarra
etquidam
frater
verofrater
Christianus
cum
Bertrandus,
postmodum
fratre
converso."
See alsoTugwell1999[op.cit
., above,n. 5),p. 112.
9 G. Odetto
dell'ordine
domenicano
deGalvano
Fiamma
O.P.,La cronaca
, in:Archivm
maggiore
Fratrum
on p. 344: "Fratres
10 (1940),297-373,
autemqui missisunt
Praedicatorum,
Bononiam
a beatoDominico
fr.Ioannesde Navara,fr.Bertrandus
fuerunt
et fr.Petrus
conversus."
Hyspanus
10T.M. Mamacho,
Annales
Praedicatorum
Ordinis
, t. I, Rome1756,466:"XXVII.Eo jam
etantequam
indeab initio
anniMCCXVIIIpostpascha,
inOrdinem
Reginaldus
cooptarea Dominico
Fr.Johannes
deNavarra,
vnrant
Lutetiam
tur,
praemissi
quemannosuperiore
Fr.Bertrandus,
Parisiorum
abirejussum
nihilcomdemonstravimus,
nomen,
cujuspraeter
habemus
enima Bertrando
fuisse
Fr.Christianus,
constat),
(diversum
pertum
Garrigiensi
Fr.Petrus
et Fr.Riardus
senexvirgravissimus,
vitae
conversus,
Hispanus
singularique
innocentia
de Uzero,etFr.Dominicus
excellens;
atquenondiupostFr.Michael
Hispanus

18:07:04 PM

2 16

ANGELD'ORS

" mentioned
This "conversus
byJordan of Saxony is called "fraPietroconverso romano" by D'Amato and Alce.11I do not know theirreasons for
indicatthis,but later D'Amato refersto him simplyas "fiaterconversu'
whichmightguaranteeGalvano'sidentification
ing thelack of documentation
" with a "Petrus
".12
of this "conversus
Hispanus
" thusraises two
This "PetrusHispanusconversus
importantquestions.On
"
"
the one hand, that concerningwhat the word conversusmeans in the
frameworkof the era in which the Order of Preacherswas founded;on
the other,that as to why Galvano della Fiamma came to identifythe
"
" mentioned
"conversus
".
by Jordan of Saxony with a PetrusHispanus
As far as the firstof these points is concerned,in my 1997 articleI
"
consideredtwo possible meanings of the word conversusa convertto
ChristianityfromJudaism or Islam, or a member of a religiousorder
who had not been ordained to the priesthood(lay brother).Because I
regardedthe "Estella tradition"as reliable,and because therewas a sizeable Jewishcommunityin Estella, I inclinedat that time to favourthe
that he was a convertfromJudaism. This was the result
interpretation
of a purelyhypotheticalreflectionbased only on the fact that thisword
had been used withthismeaningon otheroccasions.Now thatmy belief
in the "Estella tradition"has been undermined,I can findno arguments
eitherforor againstthisinterpretation.
Tugwell favoursthe second inter"
"
"
pretationof the word conversui'and takes PetrusHispanusconversusto
be a member of the Order of Preacherswho had not received ordination (lay brother).In keepingwiththisview, he regardsit as improbable
"
that this "PetrusHispanusconversusshould have worked on intellectual

reversi
eodemDominici
ex Hispaniis,
jussu
quodibiex usuOrdininonessent,
propterea
pervenerunt."
11A. D'Amatoand V. Alce,Bologna
Domenicana
, Bologna1961,101:"In un ospizio
e fraGiovanni
allafinedi apriledel 1218fraBertrando
allachiesasi stabilirono
annesso
fraCristino,
Neimessisuccesivi
a Bologna.
inviati
da San Domenico
di Navarra,
giunsero
e fraRiccardo."
romano
converso
fraPietro
12Alfonso
diBologna
e l'Universit
D'Amato
O. P.,I Domenicani
, Bologna1988,p. 32:"In
n. 55.
converso
e
un
fratello
fra
Cristiano
anche
manda
a
(8).(8) Libellus
Bologna
seguito
chesar
deipredicatori,
el monacoCisterciense,
forse
FraCristiano
passatoall'Ordine
di Colonia(Vicairepp. 446-7,452,631-2).Del fratello
delconvento
unodei fondadori
di Spagna(cfr.
lo chiamaPietro
il nome.GalvanoFiamma
nonsi conosce
converso
AFP,
Vicaire
la
asserzione."
sua
che
documenti
10 (1940),p. 344).Nonesistono
provano
per
"
"
"
ofBologna
to the conversus
ofthename"Petrus
thatthegiving
alsoconsiders
Hispanus
au convers,
"Le nomde Pierre
invention:
wasGalvano's
qu'ondonneparfois
d'Espagne
deSaint
de Galvano,
estuneinvention
O.P.,Histoire
AFP,X (1940),344",(M.H. Vicaire,
, II, Paris1957,111,n. 44).
Dominique

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

217

believesthatthe lattercould not have been the "auctor


tasks,andtherefore
.
Summularum"
Concerningthe second of these issues, Galvano della Fiamma would
In fact,in his Chronica
seem to be a source of unreliableinformation.13
"
he does not identifyhim
Minor
to this same conversus",
, when referring
with a "PetrusHispanus",but with the same "fiaterChristianus"whom
Jordanof Saxonysayshe accompaniedon thissecondjourneyto Bologna.
The two figuresmentionedbyJordan of Saxony in his Libellusare thus
"
Christianus
reducedby Galvano to a singleperson,whom he calls "frater
Maior. In
in his Chronica
PetrusHyspanus"in his Chronica
Minor
, and "fiater
view of these two texts,it is not easy to see that Galvano had precise
" sent
information
about the identityof this "conversus
by St. Dominic to
Bologna.
who was a member
Galvano also tellsus of a "Petrus
Hispanusconversus"
in
he introducesto
whom
of the primitiveDominican community Milan,
"
us as BeatiDominicisocius"
,15but whom he does not relate explicitlyto
" in
in
the "conversus
Bologna. Tugwell considersthat Galvano is referring
and
that
his
of
this
both cases to the same "conversus
",
very knowledge
"Petrus
in Milan makes Galvano identifyhim with the
Hispanusconversus"
"
"conversus
" in
Bologna and assign the name of PetrusHispanus"to him.
"
must have moved to Milan from
In this case, PetrusHispanusconversus"
and
the descriptionuBeatiDominici
where
St
Dominic
sent
him,
Bologna
socius"mightindicate nothingmore than the personal relationshipwith
St. Dominic. In this view, Galvano, whose Chronica
Minoridentifiedthe
"conversus
" who
Christianus"
with
the
"fiater
accompanied him, must have
" in his Chronica
Maiorwhen he found
Christianus
eliminatedthe name "frater
"
in Bologna was none otherthanthe "Petrus
out thatthe conversus"
Hispanus
13According
to T. Kepelli,
GalvanodellaFiammaoriginated
the(apparently
false)
of severalbiographies
and Conrad.See
attribution
of St. Dominicto Brothers
Justin
deSaint
: frre
T. KepelliO.P.,Deuxprtendus
etfrre
Conrad
, in:
biographes
Dominique
Justin
Antonianum
20 (1945),pp. 227-244.
14B.M.Reichert,
Cronica
Fratris
dela Fiamma
Ordinis
Praedicatorum
ab anno1170
Galvagni
annodominiM.CC.XVIII0beatus
ad 1333, Rome1897,p. 14: "20. Incipiente
usque
Dominicus
duosfratres
misitBononiam,
scilicet
fratrem
Iohannem
et fr.Beltrandum
et
unumconversum,
habitm
Christianus,
qui adhucportabant
qui dietusestfrater
reguMariamde Mascarella
habitaverunt."
larem,
apudSanctam
15G.qui
Odetto
O. P. 1940{op.cit.,
ibifuerunt,
videlicet
above,n. 9): "Tresetiamconversi
Petrus
beatiDominici
fr.Gulielmus
de Benexio
et fr.
frater
socius,
Hyspanus
qui fuerat
inprefato
deModoetia"
conversi
conventu
videlicet
fuerunt,
Delphinus
(p. 321);"Tresetiam
fr.Gulielmus
de Benesio
fr.Petrus
et
fuit;
Hyspanus,
quisociusbeatiDominici
aliquando
fr.Dalphinus
de Modoetia"
1999{op.cit.,above,n. 5), 112.
(p. 348).Vid.S. Tugwell

18:07:04 PM

218

ANGELD'ORS

conversui'a member of the communityin Milan. TugwelPs interpretation, given Galvano's personal linkswith the Dominican communityin
Milan, seems likely,and could be accepted. However,since Galvano says
"
",
nothingexplicidyto us about the relationshipbetweenthe two conversi
"
"
or about the earlierstay of the Milan PetrusHispanus in Bologna, this
can only be taken as a hypothesisawaiting furtherdata
interpretation
which will enable us to accept or refuteit.
of the word "couver
sus",on which he bases his
TugwelPs interpretation
"
"Petrus
the
identification
of
Hispanusconversus
possible
argumentsagainst
with the "auctorSummularum",
is perfectlyconsistentwith the use of this
word in the contextof the Cistercianorder and, later, in the Order of
Preachers,and it would thereforeseem quite reasonable to accept it. If,
of Galvano's testo this,we add the doubts regardingthe trustworthiness
"conversus
" with a "Petrus
which
identifies
this
", it seems
Hispanus
timony
" from
"
justifiedto join Tugwell in rulingout this PetrusHispanusconversus
"
the fieldof researchsurroundingthe auctorSummularum".
However,I am
On the
this
conclusion
as
definitive
for
two
reasons.
to
unwilling accept
one hand, there is a traditionconnectedwith the editionsof La Divina
"
Commedia
, to which I shall referbelow, which conveysto us that Petrus
"
"
", was a "lectorin Bologna", and Petrus
Hispanus",the auctorSummularum
"
"
is the only Petrus
HispanuswithlinkswiththeDominican
Hispanusconversus"
that we know about. On
century)16
friaryin Bologna (in the thirteenth
the other hand, as there was a "Petruslecto to whom the Provincial
jointlywiththe "subpriorof Rome",
Chapter in Rome in 1244 entrusted,
the task of revisingthe liturgicalOffice17
("fra Pietro conversoromano",
mentionedby D'Amato and Alce, could be the resultof confusingthe
" and the
two members of this commission,"Petruslector
"subprior of
Rome").

16D'Amato1988{op.cit.,above,n. 12)tellsus ofa Pietro


to the
di Spagnaattached
of
whowasa master
in Bolognaat theendofthefourteenth
Dominican
century,
friary
chesarpromosso
la
di Spagna,
maestro
"Maestri
presso
deglistudi fraPietro
theology:
Documenti
Statuti
diBologna
dell'Universit
facolt
, p. 302;Ehrle,
,
(vid.Piana,Nuovi
teologica
di Spagna,che maestro
(1394)"
deglistudiin S. Domenico
p.107)"(p. 201);"fraPietro
(p. 214).
17L. Rousseau,
Fratrum
Praedicatorum
secundum
ordinationem
venerabilis
De ecclesiastico
officio
711-30(p. 723):"Iungimus
deRomanis
Humberti
, in:A.S.O.P.XVII,an.XXXIV(1926),
magisti
utipsiomnes
omnium
Romanoinremissionem
etsuppriori
fratri
Petrolectori
peccatorum
et
et Evangelia,
Orationes,
Constitutiones,
Kalendarium,
Capitula,
Regulam,
Epistolas
et punctent
secunet versiculent,
et postmodum
rsumant
Collectas
diligenter
corrigant,
in libris
Conventus
Romani."
dumpunctadebitaet circumflectiones,

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

219

" whom
of the "conversus
The identification
Jordan of Saxony mentions
" mentioned
"
withthe two PetrusHispanusconversus
by Galvano, and with
the "Pietroconversoromano" mentionedby D'Amato and Alce, withthe
"Petruslector
" in the recordsof the 1244 Roman Provincial
Chapter,and
with the "lector in Bologna" ("auctorSummularum
") mentionedby some
editionsof La DivinaCommedia
, is an improbablehypothesiswhichis hard
to prove,but whichshould not be ruled out. One or severalfiguresmay
have been confused,but as long as the relationsbetween this "Petrus
"
"
Hispanus and this Petruslecto are unclear, it would be imprudentto
"
" fromthe field of our research
remove PetrusHispanusconversus
(above
all when we rememberthat Luis de Valladolid also attributedthe combeatiDominicito the "auctorSummularum!'').
positionof the Officium
Obviously,ifa singlefigurelies at the bottomof thisplethoraof names,
"
the precisemeaningof the word "conversus
oughtto be an object of furtherresearch.Canonical traditionoffersus a wide rangeof meaningsfor
the word "conversus",
which go far beyond the two which we have considered so far; among these are the meanings "monachus
", in its widest
and
At
the
"novice".18
time
of
the
of
the
Order
of Preachers
sense,
founding
we knowtherewas close collaborationwiththe membersof the Cistercian
Order, and that many Cisterciansjoined the new order in one way or
another.19It is not unlikelythat when the recentlyfounded Order of
Preachersexpanded,some difference
shouldhave been establishedbetween
thosewho had enteredthe orderfromsecularlife,and thosewho joined
fromotherreligiousorders.Might this not be the meaning of the word
"conversus
" not have been a Cistercian
"? Might "PetrusHispanusconversus
monk,or one fromsome otherorder,who had joined the new Order of
Preachers?I shall returnto thisproblembelow, but it may be usefulto
18MaTeresaBarbadillo
de la Fuente,
VidadeSanto
deGuzmn.
Edicin
,
Domingo
y estudio
Madrid1985,vol.I, 303-4:"Converso
es en el lenguaje
cannico
sinnimo
de hermano
fundador
de la congregacin
benedictina
de Valleumbrosa,
es quien
lego.San Gualberto,
esadiferencia.
Carecan
ordinariamente
de cultura
o habanllevado
enel mundo
introdujo
unavidade escndalo
Llevaban
hbitodistinto
al de losreligiosos
de coro,
y disipacin.
en lo tocante
a votosde religin
Su escapulario
perono se diferencian
y vidamonstica.
eranegroo grisy as ha persistido
hastamuyrecientemente.
[. . .] Converso
equivala
tambin
a novicio
la tonsura
o aquellos
hermanos
queanno hanalcanzado
quese ocu"
materiales
de losconventos".
See also Conversi"
mediae
, in Glossarium
pande lasnecesidades
etinfimae
conditum
a Carolo
duFresne
domino
Du Cange
latinitatis,
, II. Band,Graz1954,547-8.
19Galvano
dellaFiamma
in reference
to thePreachers
whomadeup thesechimself,
"
ondmission
to Bologna,
tellsus thatthey"adhuc
habitm
portabant
regularem
(seeabove,
"
n. 14).Moreover,
toD'Amato,
"Fr.Christianus
our"conversus
", whoaccompanied
according
on thesecond
to
had
been
a
Cistercian
monk.
See
n.
12.
above,
journey Bologna,

18:07:04 PM

220

ANGELD'ORS

that "fuit
recall that Philip of Ferrara said of the author of the Summulae
"Petrus
de
ordine
.
not
this
indicate
that
this
fratrum
predicatorum"
postea
Might
" had
belonged to some other religiousorder beforejoining the
Hispanus
Order of Preachers?
of Dominican spirituality
On the otherhand, given the characteristics
a
the
status
of
mendicant
from
order,the internalorganresulting
special
had
differ
from
thatof the Cistercian
to
isationof the Order of Preachers
"
"
Order, and so it would come as no surpriseif the term conversushad
acquireda new meaningwhich,unlike"baptised","lay brother"or "monk",
could expressa transitory
condition,ratherthan a stable or permanent
"
", then,could expressthe
one, of the person whom it denotes. Conversus
conditionof a novice who had not been ordained to the priesthoodbut
"
who was preparingforthis.20
Hispanus
Mightthisnot be the case of Petrus
"? In eithercase, Tugwell's argumentagainst the possible idenconversus
" withthe "auctorSummularum"
would
tificationof "PetrusHispanusconversus
lose much of its vigour.
"
"
If "conversus
simply means novice, the identificationof the Petrus
"
"
"
in Milan,
in Bologna withthe Petrus
Hispanusconversus
Hispanusconversus
both mentionedby Galvano, mightturn out to be more problematic,
above all if we bear in mind thatJordan of Saxony refersto the former
"
"
"
using the word conversusalone, withoutgivinghis name. This conver"
sus" mightnot have been PetrusHispanus
", and this name mightonly
"
"
have been the name of the conversusof Milan, which Galvano trans" of
theremighthave been
ferredto the "conversus
Bologna. Alternatively,
' in
"
Galvano
could have confused
whom
a PetrusHispanuslector*
Bologna
"
"
of
mentioned
conversus
with the
Saxony (in this case, the
by Jordan
"
"
would be irrelevant).Nor should we rule
meaningof the word conversus
"
"
"
out the idea that we mightbe looking at the same conversui' Petrus
by name, who spent his novitiatein both Bologna and Milan, and who
"
then perhaps returnedto Bologna where he was lecto. Obviously all
these reflectionsare purelyhypotheticalin characterin the lightof the
"
"
testimoniesregarding PetrusHispanus who was lector in Bologna and
"Petruslectowho revisedthe
liturgicalOffice.Furtherresearchwould be
needed to confirmor reject these possibilities.
Among these hypotheses,the mostprobablyand likelyis, in my view,
" of whom
"
thatwhichpresumesthatGalvano confusedthe conversus
Jordan
"
"
of Saxony writeswith a PetrusHispanus who had also resided in the
20See above,n. 18.

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

221

" is not
"
one, but two
Bologna priory.In thiscase, PetrusHispanusconversus
"
"
"
who
a
Petrus
a
and
conversus
",
Hispanus
mightbe
(lay brother),
people:
As I shall show below, various testimonies
the author of the Summulae.
". Furthermore,
indicate the Navarrese origin of the uauctorSummularum
the house of Santa Maria della Mascarella, where the firstDominican
communityin Bologna was formed,was dependenton the Augustinin
Prioryof Roncesvalles (Navarre), and was the place where Navarrese
clergystudyingin Bologna used to live. When St. Dominic arrivedin
Bologna he was receivedin this Cell; it was among Navarrese students
therethathe began his apostolicworkin Italy,and therealso thatBrother
Reginaldjoined the Order of Preachersand startedout on his apostolic
labours.Some of theNavarresewho livedin Santa Maria della Mascarella
at the time collaborated with St. Dominic and even joined the new
Order.21
This seems to be the case withBrotherRicardo, taken to be the first
Prior of the Dominican communityin Bologna, who, unlike the other
membersof this early community,arrivedin Bologna not under orders
fromSt. Dominic, but as a memberof the Navarresecell dependenton
Roncesvalles.BrotherRicardo seems not to have been the onlyNavarrese
in theMascarellacommunity
tojoin thenew Order of Preachers.According
to D'Amato, St. Dominic had already drawn over one or two of the
Canons of Roncesvalleslivingin Mascarella beforehis returnto Rome,
afterhis firstjourney to Bologna.22The firsthistoriansof the Order of
Preachersseem to have been puzzled by the factthattherewere Spaniards
among the firstmembersof the firstDominican communityin Bologna
21D'Amato
unospizio
O.P. 1988(op.cit.,
esiste
above,n. 12),30: "A Bologna
perpele si trovaalla periferia
tenuti
dai canonici
di Roncisvalle;
norddella
legrini
spagnoli;
Di questisuoiconnazionale
la chiesadi S. MariadellaMascarella.
Domenico
citt,
presso
il viagforse
ospite
nelsuobrevesoggiorno
Certamente,
bolognese.
primadi reprendere
unoo duedi queicanonici
allasua causa.Il primo
gioperRoma,Domenico
conquista
a Bologna
infatti
uncertoRiccardo,
deifrati
chenon fraquellida
priore
predicatori
lui inviati
in questacitt.Moltoprobabilmente
uno dei canonicidell'ospizio
della
a S. Nicolfindall'inizio;
ed detto'priore
Mascarella
deifrati'
(3).(3) FraRiccardo
between
theAugustinin
of
e 'vecchio'
190-1)."On therelations
(Vitae
fratrum,
Priory
seeP. Tamburri
Roncesvalles
anditscellSantaMariadellaMascarella,
Presencia
Bariain,
enBolonia
in: Hispania
institucional
deRoncesvalles
sacra,49 (1997),n 99,
XIII-XVI),
(siglos
E. Ramrez
La comunidad
deSanta
MaradeRoncesvalles
XII363-408;
Vaquero,
regular
(siglos
de Viana,54 (1993),357-401;
F. Miranda
Roncesvalles.
Garca,
XIX),in:Prncipe
Trayectoria
XII-XIX
1993.I wishtothank
forlet), Pamplona
JosGoniGaztambide
patrimonial
(siglos
aboutthese
works
ontherelationship
between
SantaMariadellaMascarella
tingmeknow
ofRoncesvalles.
andthePriory
22See above,n. 21.

18:07:04 PM

222

ANGELD'ORS

who had not been includedin any of the expeditionswhich St. Dominic
sent to that city,and they attemptedto integratethem into these missions. T.M. Mamacho, probably followingan earlier tradition,regards
BrotherRicardo as a furthermember of the second expeditionformed
" and the "conversus"
"
.23Could it not be the case that
by FraterChristianus
"
"Petrus
", was this second Canon of
", the auctorSummularum
Hispanus
Roncesvalleswho joined the Order of Preacherswith BrotherRicardo,
and whom Galvano (who did not know of the existenceof thisNavarrese
cell of Mascarella and the incorporationof some of its membersinto the
" of unknownname as the
new order) identifiedwith the "conversus
only
way of accounting for his presence among the members of the first
Dominican communityin Bologna?
In fact, Galvano seems to have had some knowledge of a "Petrus
"
Hispanus among the membersof the primitiveDominican communityin
Bologna, but knew nothing of this cell in Bologna depending on the
AugustininPrioryof Roncesvalles or the incorporationof some of its
membersinto the Order of Preachers.For thisreason,he seems to have
"
" mentioned
identifiedthe "conversus
by Jordan of Saxony with Petrus
"
Hispanus in order to explain the latter'spresence among the members
of this community.If this were the case, we could easily explain and
"
"
make compatiblethe traditionswhichlink Petrus
Hispanus withBologna
with those that link him to Navarre, as well as the confusionarising
" as a resultof his
around the figureof "PetrusHispanus
being identified
"
"
howsent by St. Dominic to Bologna. Unfortunately,
withthe conversus
ever well thismightseem to fit,it is stillnothingmore than a hypothesis
whichwould requirefurtherresearchbeforebeing accepted or discarded.
It remainsforus to scrutinisethe reasonswhy Tugwell considersthat
Pedro Ferrando should be excluded fromthe field of researchinto the
"auctorSummularum".
However, this problem calls for a carefulexamina"
all
the
issues
tion of
surroundingthe attributionof the Legendaprima"
"
Sancti
and the "Leyenda castellana",and also the historyof the Legendae
Dominici"and the biographicalitineraryof Pedro Ferrando. These are
highlycomplex issues which I would prefernot to address here, and
which I intendto make the subject of a separate article.24In my opin23See above,nn.10 and 11.
" are
24Asfaras the"Legendae
some
contains
Dominici
Sancti
concerned,
my1997article
wasto
in thisforthcoming
whichI mustrectify
paper.Mymainerror
majorinaccuracies
as a mere
to PedroFerrando,
attributed
aboutSt Dominic,
castellana"
taketheLeyenda
to him.
whichis alsoattributed
ofthe"Legenda
translation
prima",

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

223

article,Tugwell's
ion, however,as I shall tryto show in my forthcoming
of
Pedro
Ferrando
with the
the
identification
possible
argumentsagainst
"auctorSummularum
" are not
in
neither
the
attribuconclusive; my view,
" to Pedro
nor
the
of
tion of the "Legenda
reconstruction
Ferrando,
prima
which
fromGil de Santarem'stestimony,
Ferrando'sbiographicalitinerary
are widelyaccepted,are as solid as Tugwell seems to believe. In the present paper I shall thereforeleave the decisive issues surroundingPedro
Ferrandoto one side, and confinemyselfto reportingsome new findings
"
" thathave come to
lightsince the pubregardingthe auctorSummularum
licationof my 1997 article.
to my1997 Article
2. Additions
My 1997 articlewas devoted exclusivelyto the problem of the identity
". It was not my intentionto examine the much
of the "auctor
Summularum
" and the workswhich formthe
"
widerproblemof PetrusHispanus
Corpus
XXI
F.
Meirinhos
had
set
out
attributed
to
(whichJos
formerly
John
I
in explicitand definitive
to
the
form).25 only sought investigate problem
as to whetherthe Tractatus
ought to be attributedto John XXI, as had
generallybeen thoughtuntilthen,or whetherit was the workof a member of the Order of Preachers,in accord witha long and ancienttradition.
foundin fourdifferent
By analysisof the testimonies
literarytraditions
on La DivinaCommedia
, historiesof the Order of Preachers
(commentaries
and Spanish writers,historiesof the popes and Portuguesewriters,manand the commentarieson them),I
uscriptsand editionsof the Tractatus
was able to show thatthe mostancienttestimony
the Tractatus
attributing
toJohnXXI was in theincunableeditionof Iodocus Trutvetter's
Explanado,
and thatthisattribution
had laterspreadvia othereditionsof the Tractatus
,
Gessner's Bibliotheca
Universalis
and Colmariense's edition of Johannes
Tritemius'De scriptoribus
ecclesiasticis.
The outcome of all thiswas thatthis
attribution
was handed down to our own timeas a unanimouslyaccepted
view in all theseliterarytraditions.I also showed that all the testimonies
workattributed
the Tractatus
to a mempriorto the editionof Trutvetter's
ber of the Order of Preachers;that thistraditionhad been kept alive up
till the publicationof Simonin's work in 1930; that the reasons given
by Qutif-Echardwere not firmlygrounded;and
againstthisattribution
in thetradition
thatsomeof theerrorsencountered
theattribution
defending
25See above,n. 1.

18:07:04 PM

224

ANGELD'ORS

to a member of the Order of Preacherscould easily be


of the Tractatus
a
as
consequence of the doubts raised by the conflictbetween
explained
the two opposing traditions.
By way of conclusionto these analyses,I proposed the followingtwo
points:
the Tractatus
to Pope John
i) that it is impossibleto go on attributing
and
XXI,
should be attributedto a member of the Order
ii) that the Tractatus
of Preachers.
In my subsequentresearchI have encounteredno evidence that would
oblige me to make any changes to these two principalconclusions.On
the contrary,furtherfindingshave consolidatedthem.
which
In my 1997 articleI indicatedthe existenceof eighttestimonies
I had been unable to locate: the worksof Graziolo de'Bambaglioliand
Iohannes de Serravallein the area of the traditionwithineditionsof and
on La DwinaCommedia
commentaries
; theworksof Taegio, Plodius,Jacobus
Pio and Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,
Michele
Giovanni
Brunus da Scigliano,
withinthe Order of Preachers
in the area of the traditionamong historians
and the logicaltraditiondescendingfromthe Tractatus
and Spanishwriters,
;
and the worksofJoo Barros withinthe traditionof Portuguesewriters.
Since thattime,I have onlybeen able to locate fiveof theseeightsources.
The otherthree,the worksof Graziolo de' Bambaglioli(I have onlyfound
his commentaryon the Inferno
, and have not been able to determine
whetheror not he actuallycommentedon the Paradiso
), Taegio (I have
"
in any
not managed to locate any referenceto the auctorSummularum"
of his survivingworks)and Plodius (whom I have not even been able to
which could be of great interestbecause of theirantiquityand
identify),
theirimportantrole in the formationof some of the literarytraditions
involvedin this case, have so far proved elusive.
Of the fivesourcesI managed to locate,onlyone, thatofJoo Barros,26
26"IssomesmoPedroHispano,
e medicina,
de Lisboa,Varona Philosophia
natural
foipapa emRomaese chamou
no ha muitoque tambm
Joovigesexcellentessimo;
simo2o"(n.e.:"Bemclaroestassim:2o;parece,
7o"),
que deveser:Joo,vigessimo
porm,
e Minho
e Tras-os-Montes
d'entre
Douro
dacomarca
, Coleco
JoodeBarros
peloDoutor
Geographia
oftheoriginal
inditos
de manuscritos
V, Porto1919,16 (edition
agoradados estampa
I thank
scarLilaoforhelpdo Porto).
PblicaMunicipal
in theBibliotca
manuscript
and
whowasquotedbyNicolsAntonio
ThisJooBarros,
ingmeto locatethissource.
seemsnottohavebeenthe
inmy1997article,
towhatI believed
other
authors,
contrary
ofhiswith
whowrotetheDcadas
famous
, buta contemporary
JooBarros(1496-1570)

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

225

" to
relates"PetrusHispanus
Pope John XXI. Althoughthis source might
in principlebe of particularinterestand importance,as Barrosis the first
"
"
Portuguesewriterknownto relate PetrusHispanus toJohn XXI, it turns
as it does not even mentionthe Tractatus
out to be completelyirrelevant,
,
information
and seems to depend veryheavily
contributesno significant
on the traditionof the historyof the popes (a late and poorly founded
tradition,as I establishedin my 1997 paper).
I shall now examine the otherfoursources,and some furtherpieces
of evidence,which serve to supportthe conclusionsI drew in 1997.
a) Lo qualgi lucein dodicilibelli
In the area of the traditionwithineditionsof and commentarieson La
Divina Commedia
writtenin 1416, the work of Iohannes de Serravalle,27
1417, does not contributeany relevantinformation
concerningthe problem of the identityof "Pietro Ispano": Dante's work is translatedinto
is thathe identifiesthe "dodLatin, and de Serravalle'ssole contribution
ici libelli" with the Tractatus.
On my search for this book, however,I
foundout about a further
ancientcommentary,
the Chiose(latine)al Paradiso
,
which I have been unable to consult so far, but which could be of
relevance.28
I have not undertakenthe task of examiningsystematically
the modern editionsand translations
ofLa DivinaCommedia.
This would be extremely
because of both the massivenumbersof textsinvolvedand the
difficult,
existenceof revisededitionsof some of the classic annotatededitionsin
which the footnoteshave been changed, which I would have to track
back to theirearlierversions.In some of the editionsI have examined,as
would be expected,the identification
of "Pietro Ispano" with Pope John
thesamenamewhowasroyalnotary
at thecourtofJohnIII ofPortugal
between
1546
and 1547.
27"Hie suntIlluminatus
et Augustinus
de sotiisSanctiFrancisci),
(fuerunt
Hugode
SanctoVictore,
Petrus
Petrus
Nathanpropheta,
Chrisostomus,
Mangiadorius,
Hispanus,
Anseimus
etDonatus,
Rabbanus
etAbbasIochinus"
duodecim
(p. 958,capituli
Summarium);
"... e Pietro
Spano,/ El qualgilucein dodicilibelli"
(p 967a);". . . etPetrus
Hispanus,
/ Quiiamlucetinduodecim
libellis"
967b);"etPetrus
Hispanus
quiiamlucetinduodecim
in duodecim
libellos"
Giovanni
libellis,
Tractatus,
quiaipsefecit
quosdivisit
(967,notes),
Bertoldi
da Sarravalle,
e commento
dellaDivinaCommedia
di DanteAlighieri
Traduzione
, San
Marino1986(Fratris
Iohannis
de Serravalle,
ord.min.,episcopi
et principis
Firmani,
Translatio
etcommentum
totius
libri
Dantis
cumtextu
italico
Fratris
Bartholomaei
a Colle,
Aldigherii,
eiusdem
nunc
edita
ordinis,
, Prati1891).
primm
28Chiose
al Paradiso
nelvol.II deimanoscritti
Palatini
de Firenze,
, cantiX-XXXIII,
(latine)
ordinati
ed esposti
da F. Palermo,
Firenze1860.

18:07:04 PM

226

ANGELD'ORS

XXI is defended.A fewexamplesof thisare the editionsby: E. Camerini,29


G.L. Passerini(f
1915),30and D. Provenzal.31But in others,such as those
P. Fraticelli,35
of P. Costa (177 1-1836),32N. Tommaseo,33G.B. Francesia,34
E. Fabietti36
and G.M. Bertini(whichI have been unable to locate), and
29La Divina
commenti
daimigliori
connotetratte
Comedia
diDante
percurade
Alighieri,
Fu
d'unmedicodi Lisbona.
Milano1879,346:"Pietro
Camerini,
Ispano,figlio
Eugenio
XXI.
e nel 1276papa Giovanni
di Tusculo,
e vescovo
di Braga,poi cardinale
vescovo
edidi unapartedelpalazzopapale."(Original
sottole rovine
Nel 1277morin Viterbo
Milano1868-69).
tionbyEugenio
Camerini,
30La DivinaCommedia
con 105illusda G.L. Passerini,
di Dante
, commentata
Alighieri
trazionida Giotto,Botticelli,
Stradano,
Zuccari,Dor,Firenze1918,cols. 729-80:
"- Pietro
e vescovo
diFrascati,
cardinale
da Lisbona
(1226-1277):
Ispano:PierodiGiuliano
il Thesaurus
di medicina,
XXI. Scrisse
un trattato
poipapa(1276)col nomedi Giovanni
Par
delle
Summulae
nei
dodici
libri
di
filosofia
un
trattato
e
(dodici
libelli)
logicae.
pauperum
infisica
del
dottore
se egli quellostesso
nelloStudiosenese,
cheda giovine
insegnasse
del
'47
Un
atto
sotto
anni
di
Bicherna
1248-1252.
i
libri
ricordo
serban
ci
pel
gli
quale
dellaSelvadelLago,proverebbe
delconvento
unaBibbiaal Priore
qualeP. Ispanovendeva
dellacitt,
stanzanelpiumilequartiere
e vi presse
a Sienain quell'anno,
ch'egliarriv
la liberalit
di
chespiegherebbe
osserva
lo Stapper,
dellasua miseria.
a cagione
Miseria,
scholdeipoveri
e al bisogno
comene ebbeel modo,allenecessit
in soccorrere,
Pietro,
ari."
31DanteAlighieri,
2aed.,1945
a curadi DinoProvenzal,
Commedia
La Divina
(Paradiso),
filosofo
e teologo:
da Lisbona,
medico,
Ispano:Pietrodi Giuliano
(Ia ed. 1938):"Pietro
XXI" (p. 734,n. 134);"Lo qualecc.:
fupapadel 1276al 1277col nomedi Giovanni
e nelmondo{gi
dodicilibridi Summulae
fral'altro,
Pietro
) ha fama
Logicales
Ispanoscrisse,
in graziadi essi"(n. 135).
{luce,
risplende)
32I havenothadtheopportunity
edition
to consult
theoriginal
byPaoloCosta.The
in this
I haveconsulted
twoeditions
undated)
saynothing
(onefrom1830andtheother
rinomato
"Pietro
{LaDivina
perdodicilibridi logicaque scrisse"
Ispano,filosofo
respect:
nuovamente
connotedi PaoloCostada luiperquestaedizione
diDante
Comedia
Alighier,
diDante
Firenze1830,635,n. 134;La DivinaComedia
ed emendate,
riviste
, con
Alighieri
libraio
EnricoCrotti
Volumeprimo,
e correzioni,
notedi PaoloCostaconnuovegiunte
whosaysheisindebted
version
theSpanish
Novara,
byM. Aranda,
editore,
632).However,
inBolonia".
Given
PeterofSpaintobe "lector
n. 37),considers
toPaoloCosta(seebelow,
I am inclined
to think
as corrected
arepresented
I consulted
thattheeditions
editions,
it might
thisstatement,
couldcontain
edition
theoriginal
thatperhaps
equally
although
editions.
wellhavebeenaddedto subsequent
33DanteAlighieri,
ed introcon le notedi NiccolTommaseo,
La DivinaCommedia,
Lessea
Torino1922,162:"- Ispano.
duzionedi Umberto
Cosmo,vol.III, Paradiso,
- Libelli.
nelConvito.
E
Perlibri
dodicilibridi logicae altridi teologia.
scrisse
Bologna:
edition
ofNiccol
di forma
sonodiminutivi
e articolo
anchecapitolo
pichedi senso"(first
Milano1865).
Tommasseo,
34La Divina
raccolti
commentaton
connotedelpicelebri
diDante
Commedia
Alighieri,
vol.III,Torino1897,107:"Pietro
dodicesima
Giov.Batt.Francesia,
delSac.Prof.
edizione,
scrisse
dodicilibridilogicaed altriditeologia."
diSpagna.Lessea Bologna:
Ispano,
35Laperch
Nuovaedizione
Fratricelli.
di Pietro
diDante
Divina
Commedia
, colcomento
Alighieri
il quale,
Firenze1907,483:"Pietro
G. Barbra,
da un Letterato
riveduta
toscano,
Ispano,
libridi dialettica,
di fama, chiarogiin terra,
libelli,
ch'egli
perdodici
luce,risplende
- Libelli
anchenelConvito
in Bologna.
Fu lettore
scrisse.
perlibri
36DanteAlighieri,
con
conla vitade Dantedi NiccolTommaseo,
La Divina
Commedia,

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

227

derivedfromthese,such as thoseof M. Aranda


some Spanish translations
N.
Gonzlez
and
Ruiz,38"PietroIspano" is consideredto be
y Sanjun37
in
The
a lector Bologna.39
editionswhich I have inspectedby E. Tria
are not explicitin thisrespect,but
and G. Vago,40and by R. Andreoli,41
seem closer to the second tradition,as theypresent"Pietro Ispano" as
the author of workson theology(not medical treatises).I do not know
what mightlie at the originof thisfamilyof editionsor what the basis
forthisstatementis, but its veryexistenceobliges us to pay attentionto
"
"
"
", the only PetrusHispanus conBologna and to PetrusHispanusconversus
nectedwithBologna (in the thirteenth
century)of whom we know. The
" with
"
, auctorSummularum
origincould be a confusionof PetrusHispanus
Pietrodi Spagna, a masterof Theology at the Universityof Bologna at
the end of the fourteenthcentury,or with "Petruslector to whom the
Roman ProvincialChapterof 1244 entrustedthe taskof revisingthe litur"
gical Office,but it could also point to the links between the auctor
"
with the Dominican house in Bologna.
Summularum
The "Estella tradition"also findsan echo in the literaturesurrounding Dante in the work of Roberto Rossi de Spinola,42who refersback
to the book by Ludwig Noack, althoughin the editionof the latterwhich
" is identifiedas
I have consulted,"PetrusHispanus
Pope John XXI and
not as the Dominican buriedin Estella.43I do not knowwhat source was

a curadi Ettore
Milano1931,
notedelTommaseo
e d'altri
illustri
commentatori
Fabietti,
- Libelli:Libri,
dodicilibridi logica.
a Bologna
e scrisse
502:"- Pietro
Ispano.Insegn
in sensobuono".
37La Divina
Comedia
deDante
traducida
, connotasde PaoloCostaadicionadas,
Alighieri,
al castellano
1871,425,n. 5: "Espaol,
porD. ManuelAranday Sanjun,Barcelona
fulector
en Bolonia."
de lgicaque escribi:
filsofo
famoso
pordocelibros
38DanteAlighieri,
de NicolsGonzlezRuiz,sobre
Obras
castellana
, versin
Completas
la interpretacin
literal
M. Bertini,
Madrid1965(first
de Giovanni
B.A.C.,secondedition,
en Bolonia".
ed. 1956),p. 425,n. 20: "Espaol,
lector
39I owetheinformation
of thisfamily
of editions
ofLa Divina
abouttheexistence
to JosGoniGaztambide.
Commedia
"Pietro
linking
Ispano"to thecityofBologna
40Dante
La Divina
Commedia
ricavate
dai migliori
che
, connotedichiarative
Alighieri,
conargomento
dei tempidelpoetafinoai nostri
e sommarii
critici
ne scrissero
tempi,
E. Tria e G. Vago,Napoli1892,
a ciascuncanto,per curadai professori
premessi
392-3:"Pietro
Ispano.Famosoperdodicisuoilibridi logicaed altridi teologia."
41La Divina
diDante
colcomento
di Raffaele
Commedia
Firenze
Andreoli,
1906,
Alighieri,
"
Famosoperdodici
edition
ofRaffaele
263 (first
Andreoli,
Ispano.
Napoli1856): - Pietro
suoilibridi logicaed altrodi teologia."
42Roberto
Dante
e la Spagna
PalacioReal,
Rosside Spinola,
, Milano1929(manuscript,
ci tramanda
deiDomenicani
chePietro
more
Madrid),
Ispanovisse,
p. 311: "La tradizione
inNavarra
Phil.Geschichte.
fusepolto
nelConvento
Stella
Lexikon
,pg. 664."
(3). . . (3)L. Noack,
43Ludwig
Handwrterbuch
zur
Lexikon,
Noack,
Philosophie-geschichtliches
Historisch-biographisches
Geschichte
derPhilosophie
, Leipzig1879.

18:07:04 PM

228

ANGELD'ORS

used by Rossi de Spinola, but he does not reallycontributeany relevant


information:his work is only valuable as a sign that the two traditions
(thatfromthe editionsof Dante and the "Estella tradition")actuallymet.
The new testimoniesexamined in the frameworkof this literarytrawhich might
ditiondo thereforenot contributeany relevantinformation
"auctorSummularum
of
the
the
of
the
us
to
solve
identity
help
problem
on the contrary,they raise a freshproblem concerningthe originand
basis of thistraditionwhich takeshim to be "lectorin Bolonia"- a problem which is not entirelyseparate fromthat surroundingthe figureof
"Petrus
".
Hispanasconversus
b) De OrdinePredicatorum
In the sphereof the traditionamong historiansof the Order of Preachers,
"
" are conas far as sources referring
explicidyto the auctorSummularum
cerned,we mustadd to the worksof Giovanni Michele Pio (f c. 1644)44
Praedicatorum
of Seville.45Pio's accounts,
the importantManuale Fratrum
because of theirlateness and theirdependence on Taegio's works(and
onlyin thattheyswell
probablythoseof Antoniode Sena), are interesting
"
"
the listsof writerswho maintainedthat the auctorSummularum
belonged
to the Order of Preachersand was buried in the Prioryof St Dominic
Praedicatorum
of Seville introduces
in Estella. However,the ManualeFratrum
a new factorwhich forcesus to reexaminesome of the analysesI carried out in my 1997 article.Its words are as follows:
Summularum
Petrus
auctor
creditur
floruisse
frater
Eodemetiamtempore
Hispanus,
inconventu
ordinis
sanctus
homoetinartibus
doctissimus,
quiamore
sepullogices,
tusest(cap.VI,iur).
" is
In this text,the referenceto the "auctorSummularum
explicit,but his
in
the
house
is
as
Dominican
burial
of
Zamora, not
pinpointed
place

44F. Giovanni
di S. Domenico
huomini
illustri
MichelePio,Dellevitedegli
, Bologna1607
Pietro
di natione
volgarmente
HispanochiamSpagnola,
(Pavia1613):"1249.FraPietro
nelleScuoletrali
checomunemente
ato,compose
s'adoprano,
Logicali,
quelleSummule
la dottrina
d'Aristotele,
nellaqualesi chiudein Epitome
logicale
taeg.pp.";
principianti,
l'oadi F. Pietro
chequivilesse,found,
di Stella,ovegiacciono
"S. Domenico
Hispano,
delP.S.Domenico
etgenerosa
Michele
PioBolognese,
Dellanobile
del1264",F. Giovanni
progenie
Bartolomeo
inItalia,libri
Cochi,1615,p. 160b.
due,inBologna
, appresso
45Chronica
manuale
Praedicatorum
etgeneralis
Ordinis
breois
fratrum
Impressum
(.Explicit
predicatorum.
in Manuale
Fratrum
Praedicatorum
a Salmantica),
Ioannem
Varela
abilem
virum
perhonor
Hispali
Sancii
PauliHispalensis
ordinatum
Fratrum
Praedwatorum
totum
Manuale
religiosum
perquemdam
{Explicit
third
ofthesixteenth
eiusdem
(?)].
century
ordinis)
[s.d.,first

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

229

Estella, and so it comes into conflictwith the "Estella tradition".This


testimonylies at the root of my presentdoubts regardingthe trustworthinessof the "Estella tradition",and thereforemeritsspecial attention
(see sectionc).
In the area of the traditionarisingout of the Tractatus
(editionsand
commentarieson thiswork,and the traditionsurroundingthe Summulae
in general),to the testimonies
ofJacobus Brunusda Scigliano46and Pedro
Snchez Ciruelo47we must add those ofJohn Mair,48Domingo de San
like
Juan del Pie del Puerto49and Domingo Bez.50Bez's testimony,
that of Pio, is interesting
in
that
it
adds
to
the
list
of
writers
who
only
"
maintainedthatthe"auctor
Summularum
belongedto the Order of Preachers.
The testimonies
ofJacobus Brunusda Scigliano,John Mair and Domingo
de San Juan del Pie del Puertodo not even explicitly
say thathe belonged
to the Order of Preachers,althoughin the case of the first,the indica" would seem to
tion of 1250 as the "floruit"
of "PetrusHispanus
point to
the writer'sdependence on the Dominican tradition(which means that
it can be added to the same list). In the case ofJohn Mair, the reference to Peter of Spain as a religiousis clearlyevidence that Mair does
not identifyhim with Pope John XXI, but rathersees him as a member of the Order of Preachers.In the case of Domingo de San Juan del
Pie del Puerto,who was himselfof Navarrese origin,the referenceto
46Breviarium
dialecticum
Summulas
Auctore
A.R.P.M.F.
IacoboBruno
a Scigliano
vocant,
quod
Ord.Praedicat.
etinCollegio
Provincia
Calabriae
ExTypogr.
Messanae,
Rhegino
Regente,
Illustriss.
1663(Praeludium
De definitane,
et
Sentus,
obiecto,
apudPaulumBonacota,
primm.
Artis
Summulisticae
anno1250,
, p. 2): "QuoadI. N. Mag.Petrus
fine
Hyspanus,
qui floruit
& Summularum
Auctor
sicdfinit
Summulam:
Summula
estquoddam
primus,
Compendium
et generaliter
Arist.
et in
breviter,
ea, quae in libris
diffus,
compraehendens
logicalibus
tractantur."
speciali
47See below,
n. 57.
48Summulae
artium
acsacre
doctoris
acutissimi
Maioris
Scoti
, inInclytarum
pagine
maistri
Joannis
libri
incollegio
Montis
Acuti
Parisius
inlucem
emisit
quosinartibus
, Lugduni
1516,fol.
regentando
XXVIIIra:"Etcumfuerit
verisimile
estquodfuerit
in theologia:
religiosus
magister
quia
nonsuntmagisti
inartibus
termino
taceo:neblandreligiosi
regulariter
[. . .] De septimo
itorvidear
inhispanorum
EtiamsicutdicitSalustius:
malode Cartilagine
tacere
presenta.
de ea loqui."
quam
parum
49
Fratris
Dominici
deSancto
Iohanne
delPiedelPuerto
, Salmanticae
Oppositiones
1522,fol.
XXIIIvb:"Subalternae
verocomputantur
a magistro
PetroHispano
meointer
compatriota
tas."
opposi
50
minoris
vocant
Dominicum
Bez,Institutiones
Dialecticae,
,per
Domingo
quasSummulas
fratrem
ordinis
sacrae
Salmanticae
excudBaes,
Praedicatorum,
Salmanticae,
Theologiae
antiquum
professorem
ebatAndreas
ordinis
Renaut,
MDXCIX,p. 4r: "UndePetrus
Hispanus,
praedicatorum
minores
sunt,
insignis
magister,
quemmodernorum
novitiis,
plurimi
sequuti
proerudiendis
breviter
Tractatus,
vocavit,
quosdam
quodSummulas
composuit."

18:07:04 PM

230

ANGELD'ORS

" shows
meo
Peter of Spain as " compatriota
clearlythat he did not identify
him with Pope John XXI, who was of Portugueseorigin,but with that
member of the Order of Preachersconnectedwith the town of Estella
(Navarre).The testimonyof Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,which is particularly
"
significantas he himselfwas not a Dominican, recognises the auctor
"
ex sacro
as a memberof the Order of Preachers("virreligiosus
Summularum
divipatrisDomini") of Navarrese origin ("prope
ordine
fratrum
predicatorum
is also worthyof special attenvicinus
conterrneos
"). This testimony
patriaque
with
a
us
definitive
solutionto one of the probin
it
that
tion,
provides
lems surrounding"PetrusHispanu' albeit a secondaryone (see sectiond).
"
ordinis
sepultasest
c) "Qui amorein convento

Praedicatorum
of Seville declaresthat "PetrusHispanu'
The ManualeFratrum
"
the auctorSummularum
", is buried in the Dominican house at Zamora,
the "Estella tradition"accordingto which the tomb of
thus contradicting
" is in the Dominican
the "auctorSummularum
Prioryat Estella. For this
reason, we need to re-examineour analyses of the testimoniesin this
tradition.
with
Praedicatorum
If we compare the testimonyof thisManualeFratrum
those that conveythe "Estella tradition",it would seem to be the latter
which is the more reliable,both because of the numberof authorswho
reflectit, theirgreaterantiquityand the type of evidence theymention.
Praedicatorum
The ManualeFratrum
, publishedin firstthirdof the sixteenth
" is
"
century,is the only knowntextto declare thatthe auctorSummularum
buried in Zamora, and it providesno detailsas to his tomb,or any evidence for this assertion.On the other hand, the "Estella tradition"is
of elevenwriters51
backed up by the testimonies
(thefirstof these,Baltasar
who
describe the precise
Sori, was writingbetween 1516 and 1522),
place of the grave and give the textof his epitaph,which some mention
seeing personally.This traditionalso has the backing of the anonymous
, fromthe fourteenthor fifteenth
century,
commentaryon the Tractatus
in
which
of
of
the
in
2080
Salamanca,
University
manuscript
preserved
" is
"Petrus
- which links
oriundas"52
as
"de
Stella
to
us
Hispanus presented
51BaltasarSori(| 1557),Juande Marieta(f 1611),FranciscoDiago (f 1615),
MichelePio (f c. 1644),
Giovanni
A.S. Peregrino
(| 1656),JuanLpez(1524-1632),
de Lezaun(s. XVII),Josde Sarabiay
de Oteiza(s. XVII),Baltasar
Bernardo
Francisco
See
Lezana(s. XVIII),TomsMadalena(s.XVIII)y Pascualde Larrainzar
(1716-1797).
andn. 44 ofthepresent
nn.55 to 66 ofmy1997article
paper.
52See d'Ors1997(op.cit.,above,n. 2),48.

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

231

"
"Petrus
Hispanus with the town of Estella even though it says nothing
about his tomb and of the testimoniesof Domingo de San Juan del Pie
del Puertoand Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,who recognisethe Navarreseori"
to
which mightlend greaterverisimilitude
gin of the auctorSummularum",
the othertestimonies.
It is my view that the nature of these eleven testimonieswhich go to
make up the "Estella tradition"does not allow us to doubt the existence
of thistomb,withits inscription"Hie iacetreuerendus
fr. Petrus
patermagister
auctor
Summularum
".
There
is
no
reason
to
doubt
Francisco
,
Hispanus
Bernardode Oteiza who, in 1688, acting as apostolic notary,described
the precisepositionof the grave and the textof its inscription.None the
less, the existenceof such a grave withthisinscriptionat thisdate is not
enough to prove the reliabilityof the "Estella tradition".The epitaph
describedby Oteiza seems not to have been a medieval one, but one
datingfrommodern times.The doubt thereforearises as to whetherit
was the originalepitaphwhich inspiredthe beliefthatthiswas the grave
of the "auctorSummularum",
or whetherit was the beliefthat thiswas the
" that led later
of
the
uauctor
Summularum
grave
generationsto add this
inscription.My view is that thereare reasons to thinkthat the latteris
the mostprobable hypothesis,which raises major doubts concerningthe
value of the testimoniesbelongingto the "Estella tradition".
If we leave aside the argumentsconcerningthe chronologyassignedto
"Petrus
"
Hispanus and the date at which the Prioryof Santo Domingo in
Estellawas founded(between1258 and 1264), which Qutif-chardused
to object to the testimoniesin the "Estella tradition",and which I scrutinisedin my 1997 article,concludingthat theywere inconclusive,there
are at least three reasons to doubt the reliabilityof this tradition.The
whichlies at the root of thisrevisionof my 1997 analysis,is related
first,
to the ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
, which Toms Madalena, a figurein
the "Estellatradition",
was acquaintedwithbut quoted onlyin fragmentary
form:"Eodemetiamtempore
creditur
Fr. Petrus
Summularum
, auctor
floruisse
Hispanus
. Toms Madalena does not
, sanctushomo,et in artibusdissertissimus"
Logices
"
quote the decisivefinalphrase in the textof the Manuale: qui amorein
conventu
ordinis
est". The omissionof thisfinalpart, which creates
sepultus
a major difficulty
forthe adherentsof thistradition,can only arouse susThe
lateness
of Toms Madalena's testimonymeans that we do
picions.
not have to creditthis apparentmanipulationof the textof the Manuale
Fratrum
with any particularimportance,but it does prompt
Praedicatorum
the questionas to whetherlater supportersof thistraditionreallydid not
know thisinformation,
or whethertheysimplykept quiet about it.

18:07:04 PM

232

ANGELD'ORS

The secondreasonhas to do withthe testimonies


concerningtheinscription on the tomb in Estella. Francisco Bernardo de Oteiza is the first
writerto give the full epitaph,in 1688: "Hie iacetreverendus
patermagister
". Before him, onlyJuan Lpez, in
fi. PetrusHispanus,auctorSummularurri
on thisgrave,but he describesit differently:
1613, mentionsthe inscription
". In my articleof 1997
"Hie fat (sic) reverendus
paterfiaterPetrusHispanus
betweenthe two authors'descriptionsof the
I thoughtthatthe difference
could
be
explained by the indirectnature of Juan Lopez's
inscription
is
no
evidence that he had actuallyseen the tomb in
there
as
account,
an earliertraditionin someto be transmitting
seem
Estella and he would
form.However, the silence regardingthis inscription
what fragmentary
on the part of Baltasar Sori and, above all, Juan de Marieta (who
describesthe positionof the gravein some detail),now makesme inclined
to thinkthat the finalpart of the inscriptionwas added after1613, once
" was buriedin thattomb had been
Summularum
a traditionthatthe "auctor
to the existence
consolidated.The absence of older testimoniesreferring
thisview.
to
favour
also
seem
would
an
with
such
a
tomb
of such
epitaph
The thirdand final reason, which is perhaps littlemore than a postscriptto the second, derivesfromthe testimonyof Baltasar de Lezaun
in 1698 (thatis, onlytenyearsafterthatof FranciscoBernardode Oteiza),
" buried in
"
who identifies"PetrusHispanus
Estella,
", the auctorSummularum
with Pedro Vitoria,whom we are told by Pascual de Larrainzarwas a
master of logic and was stillalive in 1375. Larrainzarrightlyconsiders
as
the "auctorSummularum"
that Lezaun had been erroneousin identifying
Larrainzar
that
the
conclusions
draw
we
but
Pedro Vitoria,
mightequally
"
"
too had been mistakenin thinkingthat it was the auctorSummularurri
and not Pedro Vitoria who lay buried there.In view of the late origins
of the "Estella tradition",the different
ways in which informationhas
been handed down concerningthe tomb and the inscriptionon it, and
the presence of Pedro Vitoria in connectionwith the Prioryof Santo
Domingo in Estella, it would seem veryprobable that it was the latter,
Summularurri
and not the "auctor
", who was buriedthere.The name "Petrus"
and his statusas masterof logic mighteasily account forthis confusion.
However, quite apart fromthe testimoniesbelongingto this "Estella
tradition"surroundingthe tomb in the Prioryof Santo Domingo, MS
"
to the town of
Salamanca, UL, 2080 also linksthe auctorSummularum"
Estella. This could provide a furtherreason forthe originof this confu"
was connectedwith
sion concerningthe grave (ifthe auctorSummularum"
withPedro Vitoria,
confused
was
that
he
not
it
is
then
Estella,
surprising

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

233

masterof logic,who was buriedin Estella),but at the same time,it means


thatwe cannotentirelyrule out the "Estella tradition".It may be swathed
in doubtsand suspicions,and clouded by confusionsand imprecision,but
we cannot conclude fromthis that it was definitely
despite everything,
" who was buried in the
not the "auctorSummularum
grave in the Priory
of Santo Domingo.
All these inconclusivereflections
which have shed doubt on the reliabilityof the "Estella tradition"have theiroriginin the testimonyof the
"
"
ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
, which states that the auctorSummularum
was buried in Zamora. But, as I have said before,as this is a single,
it does not offersufficient
reasonsforus to creditit
imprecisetestimony,
withgreaterreliability
than the "Estella tradition".However,its imprecise
naturemightbe explainedby the eventfulhistoryof the Dominican house
in Zamora, whichwas builtthreetimesand also demolishedthreetimes:
probablyby the beginningof the sixteenthcentury,when the Manuale
was published,no remainsof the originalDominican house were left,nor
were thereany tracesof the grave of the "auctorSummularum
", and it was
no longerpossibleto describeits site,or reconstruct
or describeany possible inscription.53
Moreover,its isolatednaturemightbe explainedby its
which
was less widespreadand less influential
than the hisliterarygenre,
toriesof writersor learned men which passed on the "Estella tradition".
On the otherhand, we oughtperhapsnot to regardit as being as isolated as it mightappear at firstsight.AlthoughI have postponed discussionof the issues surroundingPedro Ferrandountila later paper, we
know that Pedro Ferrandowas buried in Zamora, and the statementin
"
"
theManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
Summularum
mightindicatethatthe auctor
was identifiedwith Pedro Ferrando, to whom the first"LegendaSancii
Dominiciwas attributed.In this case, the Manualeseems to fall in with
Luis de Valladolid (whomit mightbe echoing),who attributeda History
of St Dominic to the "auctorSummularum
".
53We havescarcely references
to theancient
Dominican
houseat Zamora,
which
any
seemsto havebeensituated
to thenorth
ofthetown,
cf.Guadalupe
Ramosde Castro,
El arteromnico
enla provincia
deJamora,
Provincial
de Zamora1977,62: "Al
Diputacin
de losjudos,y donde
N.,la de la Vega,dondese hallabaunasinagoga
y el cementerio
SantoDomingo
fund
su convento."
TheEnciclopedia
about
Espasagivesus information
"A la invasin
itseventful
de losfranceses
se remonta
la ruinadelconvento
de
history:
SantoDomingo,
antestitulado
de SanIldefonso,
ricode memorias
delsantopatriarca
que
lo fund,
de las predicaciones
de San Vicente
Ferrer
tres
tradiciones,
y de milcuriosas
vecesedificado
Universal
Ilustrada
Americana
, v. 70,
y tresdestruido",
Enciclopedia
Europea
S.A.,Madrid-Barcelona
1966,938-9.
Espasa-Calpe

18:07:04 PM

234

ANGELD'ORS

The ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
raises major doubts concerningthe
"Estella
of
the
tradition"
and
forcesus to consideran opposreliability
" was buried in
"auctorSummularum
tradition
which
holds
that
the
ing
even
Zamora and not Estella.These two traditionscannotbe reconciled,54
both
consistent
with
in
of
are
the
the
2080
testimony
manuscript
though
"auctor
of
Salamanca
to
that
the
Summularum
is
",
(there nothing say
University
"de Stellaoriundu'mightnot be buried not in Estella but in Zamora).
But nor does this mean that the evidence in MS Salamanca, UL, 2080,
deserves to be
which tells us of the origin of the "auctorSummularuni'
relied on more than any of the testimoniesabout the tomb,except,perhaps on groundsof its greaterantiquity.The testimonies
preservedabout
the "auctorSummularum
are mutuallycontradictory,
and some have to be
discarded. In my 1997 article I rejected any testimoniesthat identified
him withPope John XXI because of theirlatenessand the way in which
theyarose, in favourof the older accountswhichtook him to be a member of the Order of Preachers.We now find that these too contradict
each other,and that some of these have to be discarded.But the decision we face this time is much more difficult.
"
/"PetrusHispanusrecentio
d) PetrusHispanusantiquio

" is not
The problem surroundingthe identityof the "auctorSummularum
a new one. In my 1997 article I pointed out that, alongside the two
major traditionswhichidentifiedhim as Pope John XXI on the one hand
and a memberof the Order of Preacherson the other,therewere also
other authors,like Nicols Antonio,who recognisedthat the testimonies
that had been preservedwere not enough to enable us to pronouncein
favourof one or otherof these traditions("Absquetamen
veritatis,
praeiudicio
alus quorumintererit
duo an unusPetruscognomento
Hispanusjuerit
relinquentes
aliumponimus
nospraeter
Ioannem
examinare
, interim
"). Moreover,
Papamprivatum
authorssuch as Qutif-Echardrejectedboth traditions("Etsi autemillenon
sit noster
,nonindesequitur
JoannesXXI, dietusantea
quodsit SummusPontifex
PetrusHispanussimplicite
Petrus
r"). In my earlierarticle,
Julini& quandoque
"
I showed that the evidence in favourof the "auctorSummularum
being a
member of the Order of Preacherswas much strongerthan that which
54In reality,
evenbe thatthesetwo
it might
intoaccountall thepossibilities,
taking
to saythat,after
oneofthedestrucarenotincompatible,
as thereis nothing
traditions
" couldnothave
housein Zamora,thetombof"Petrus
tionsoftheDominican
Hispanus
aside
for
the
I
shall
leave
this
beenmovedto Estella.
However,
present.
possibility

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

235

supportedhis identityas Pope John XXI, and that the reasons which
Qutif-Echardbroughtto bear againstthese testimonieslacked all basis.
In principle,it seems that there is no reason to doubt that the "auctor
"
Summularum
belongedto the Order of Preachers,and no groundsto give
credenceto a thirdhypothesis.
However,thisonlysolvesa smallpart of the problemsince,apart from
his belongingto the Order of Preachers,we scarcelyknowanythingabout
the identityand biographyof the "auctorSummularum
". We have already
seen thatthereis contradictory
evidenceabout his burial place, and that
" is stillin doubt.
the identityof the "auctorSummularum
With a view to clearingthe way forwardtowardsa solution,it would
be usefulto removea spuriousproblemthathas arisenaround the figure
"
of "Petrus
Hispanus whichhas engenderedneedlessduplications,obscured
the nature of the problem, and entangled the question of the "auctor
" withotherissues
Summularum
concerningthe historyof medievalthought
whichhave, in principle,nothingto do withour "PetrusHispanus
". I refer
to the distinctionsometimesmade between a "PetrusHispanusantiquio
"
(senioror older)and a Petrus
Hispanusrecentio
(junior or younger),which
was introducedby Nicols Antonioin his Bibliotheca
Hispana Vetuson the
basis of Pedro Snchez Ciruelo's account, and which has subsequendy
"
had repercussions
on the problemof "Petrus
Alfonsiand the problemsof
the authorsof the Summatotiuslogiceand the De consolatone
rationis.
This
is what Nicols Antoniosays:
163.Sed& aliquidhabemus
hisex eodemPetroCiruelo
Alterum
adiungere.
nempe
is Petrm
huneSummularum
Hispanum,
praeter
priorem
inventorem,
cognitum
cmtempore,
tumprofessione
vitaediversum.
In
habuit,
quemiuniorem
appellai:,
clericali
enimstatuhonestissim
fuitatquetheologus
vivens,
doctissimus,
philosophus
bonarum
artium
excultus:
omniumque
disciplinis
aevum,
utpote
quemnonbarbarm
sedcultior
aetastulit.
Huictribuit
Ciruelus
commentarla
I. In spheram
Ioannis
utique
de Sacro-bosco.
II. In arithmeticam
et geometriam
ThomaeBravadini.
III. In perCantuariensis.
IV. In Aristotelis
seucategorias,
et posterispectivam
praedicamenta
oraanalytica.
164.HuiusquoquePetri
iunioris
nomini
circumferri
aitinantiquis
adscriptum
quibusdamexemplis
Summularum
PetriHispanirecentioris
opushoc titulo:
opusculum
Summularum
ad magnam
Aristotelis
introduetorium.
Hocindenatum
logicam
aiunt,
hicPetrus
conterranei
fui& sibicognominis
Petrialterius
dolensvicem,
quodiunior
cuiuslibellus
scilicet
ortoiamdisciplinarum
siderepropter
ruditatem
stilicontemnebatur:
eidemlimamiudiciiac sermonis
inductis
admoverit,
insuper
quae necesincommodiorem
ordinem
saria,
essent,
deductisque
prudenter
quaesuperflua
omniaque
redegerit.
In my 1997 study,I paid no attentionto this passage from Nicols
Antonio,as I hoped to consultPedro Ciruelo's original.Accordingto the
"
latter,therewere two PetrusHispanus
", fromalmostthe same place, one

18:07:04 PM

236

ANGELD'ORS

"
"
predatingthe other,both of whom wrote Summulae(one the inventor,
the other in a spiritof reform),and both of whom were eminenttheologians and philosopherswell versed in all the arts. In later centuries,
thisduplicationwas to have surprising
consequences.Scholars have taken
this passage as being an explanationfor the existenceof two opposing
"Petrus
traditionsaround the identityof the "auctorSummularum":
Hispanus
"
", is held to be Pope John XXI,
antiquio'the author of the Summulae
who reformedthe latter'swork, is a
whereas "PetrusHispanusrecentiof'
with
memberof the Order of Preachersand can supposedlybe identified
"Petrus
the
Dominican
in
whom
defenders
of
some
buried
Estella,
Alfonsi
traditionregardedas the author of the Tractatus
(thiswould also explain
"
considered"Petrus
Hispanus
whysome adherentsof the Dominicantradition
or even earlyfourteenth-century
to be a late thirteenth-century
figure).
" had been built
Once the figureof "PetrusAlfonsi
up in thisway as a
"
"
fourteenth-century
Spanish Dominican who wrote Summulaeon logic,it
"
came to be thoughtthat these " Summulaewere the verySummatotiuslogice,which was regardedas an expressionof Thomistlogic and the work
" has also
"
of a Spanish author.55This figureof PetrusHispanusrecentior
.36I shall not
rationis
been proposed as the possibleauthorof De consolatione
textshows
Pedro
Ciruelo's
as
in
but
detail
into
these
here,
problems
go
55MartinGrabmann
see
thishypothesis:
was thefirstscholarto put forward
desPetrus
undFunde
M. Grabmann,
zu denphilosophischen
Schriften
Handschriftliche
Forschungen
Akademie
derBayerischen
XXI(f 1277),Sitzungsberichte
desspteren
Papstes
Johannes
Hispanus,
Phil.Hist.Abteilung
derWissenschaften,
9, Munich1936,3-137(pp.24-5).Otherauthors
romana
Desdela poca
hasta
dela Filosofia
latertookthisup:G. FraileO.P.,Historia
Espaola.
- Dominico
delconvento
XVII, Madrid1971,169:"PedroAlfonso.
delsiglo
burgals,
fines
Se
identificar
conPedroHispano.
hanquerido
a quienindebidamente
de Estella,
algunos
traduntur
Grabmann
unasSummulae
haberescrito
le atribuye
pueris.
logicales
quaecommuniter
totius
Aristotelis
a la Summa
de que quizrespondan
la hiptesis
, atribuida
Logicae
propuso
obrade algnautorespaol,
a SantoToms.Es,indudablemente,
puesdice:"ethocidem
". Es unaobra
namdicimus
nosinlingua
mo,ubilyel estarticulus
, el correr
vulgri,
facimus
de
un
nominalista,
peroque fue
buena,
conceptualismo
penetrada
quiz poco
muy
de l". See C.H. Lohr,Medieval
porJuande SantoTomsy otrosdespus
aprovechada
in:Traditio,
Authors:
28 (1972),333-4.
Commentaries.
Latin
Aristotle
Narcissus-Richardus,
"
56De consolatione
Petri
rationis
R-II-14,33v-53r:Incipit
, MS Escorial
Maistri
prohemium
. See Casimiro
Domini
inhonorem
deConsolatione
Rationis,
Compostellani"
Archiepiscopi
Compostelani,
de
olvidado
Pedro
Uncompostelano
El Maestro
TorresRodrguez,
, in:Cuadernos
Compostelano.
Madrid1975,65-101,p. 100.On the
Estudios
XXIX,fases.87-89(1974-75),
Gallegos,
rationis
andhisDe consolatione
ofPedroCompostelano
, seealsoPedroBlancoSoto,
problem
of
duo
1912(transcription
Rationis
libri
deConsolatione
Petri
, Mnster
Compostellani
' dePetrus treatise);
rationis
a la obraDe consolatione
entorno
Problemtica
CsarRaaDafonte,
,
Compostelanus
entre
elmundo
0 (1993),165-8;id.,El combate
de Filosofa
in:Revista
Medieval,
y
Espaola
Pedro
la raznsegn
Medieval,1 (1994),
, in: RevistaEspaolade Filosofa
Compostelano
27-36.

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

237

"
"
"
Alfonsidoes not exist: PetrusHispanus
quite clearly,thisfigureof Petrus
is none otherthanPedro Snchez Ciruelohimself.
recentio
Nicols Antonio
failedto understandCiruelo'ssense of humour:Ciruelo publishedhis own
Summulae
as the workof a "PetrusHispanusrecentior
":
Venientes
huiusopusculi
dicimus
titulum,
ergoad nostri
quodipsetrescausaseius
materialem
etformalem.
id est,
brevissime
Causamefficientem,
efficientem,
prenotat:
dicens
"Petri
Sedquiaaddidit
recenautorem,
ostendit,
Hispani".
agnomen
imprimis
innuit
nomenclature
duoseiusdem
autores
alterum
tioris,
Summularum,
antiquiorem
et alterum
recentiorem.
Petrus
fuitvirreligiosus
ex sacro
igitur
Hispanus
antiquior
ordine
fratrum
divipatris
Dominici,
predicatorum
qui cumessetdoctorParisiensis
omnesAristotlicos
librosqui suntin usuapudlatinos
perlegissetque
philosophos,
inter
aliamultaeiusoperaperegregia,
decrevit
ad eruditionem
noviciorum
suereliedereunamfacilem
introductionem
ad magnam
Aristotelis,
gionis
logicam
que profectoin primoeiusadituapparet
difficilis
et obscura
valde,doneepreviaquadam
vocabulorum
et planaregularum
declaratione
fuerit
illustrata.
Hanc
precognitione,
suamintroductionem
scilicet
diminutivo
vocbulo,
logicam
ipseSummulas
appellavit,
breves
tractatus
seulibelli
illius
summe
Aristotelis.
quodessent
quidam
respectu
magne
Recentior
Petrus
fuitetiamphilosophus
et theoloatqueposterior
Hispanus
pariter
Aristotelis
diutius
exercitatus.
Hic eratsacerdos
gusdoctissimus,
atquein doctrina
etvixit
in habitu
clericali
sancti
Petriapostoli.
in suoerudiIs videns
honestissimus,
tioriseculologicam
adeo
Petri,
ubiquedocereexaetius
quamolimin etatealterius
ut iamapudlogicoshuiustemporis
Summule
suipredecesoris
predicte
parviestiinstituit
eidemopusculo
Summularum
limam
suecorrectionis
hoc
mentur,
admovere,
nonnulla
ordinem
et
est,quedamaddere,
demere,
atquealia in meliorem
redigere
hac sua elucidatione,
Summule
isteet faciliores
et utiliores
commutare,
quatenus
in scholis
Hoc munus
correctionis
huiusopusculi
iurevendiapparerent
logicorum.
tumquiaetipsePetrus
etipseHispanus
cavit,
erat,atquepropeconterraneus
patrisuopredecessori,
tumquiahicseculum
invenit
in logaquevicinus
magiseruditum
ica disciplina
Summularum
autor,tumdeniquequia quum
quampriorillePetrus,
essetinliberalibus
scientiis
etinuniversa
doctissimus
eius
philosophia
(quodpluraque
iamsibilicuerat
aliorum
autorum
libros
suoexamine
opuscula
ostendunt),
quosdam
utSpheram
Ioannis
de Sacrobustro,
Arithmeticam
etgeometriam
Thome
perlustrasse,
et nonnullos
alios.Adhucet duoslibros
Bravadini,
Cantuariensis,
Perspectivam
difficillimos
Predicamenta
scilicet
etPosteriora
suis
analitica,
magne
logiceAristotelis,
commentarius
effecerat
clariora.
Petri
hocSummularum
iniuriam,
Quarecitraalterius
suumdicerepotuit
in hoctitulo.
AitenimdivusHieronymus
in prologo
opusculum
crebius
vertendo
etemendando
etdidiscimus
ettenemus,
Galeato,
solicitus,
quicquid
nostrum
est.Eodemiure,et Buridanus,
Summulas
a se correctas,
suasessedixit;
vocantur
enimSummule
Buridani.
Hec de autore"
(fol.XCIXvb).57
In view of this text,as both the tide and colophon of the editionof his
work confirm,as does the list of works attributedto him, there is no
doubt thatthis "PetrusHispanusrecentio
was one and the same as Pedro
57PedroSnchezCiruelo,
Summule
Petri
nunc
recenter
ac bone
conecte,
Hispani,
solideque
logicedocumentis
libellis
cumpreclarissimo
commentano.
MDXXXVII.
illustrate,
distincte,
septemque
Absolutum
esthocPetri
mentions
Summularum
inalmaSalmanticensium
Colophon:
Hispani
Opusculum,
anno
a partu
dieXVIIdecembris.
Academia,
MDXXXVII,
Virginis

18:07:04 PM

238

ANGELD'ORS

Snchez Ciruelo. Nor is there any doubt that Ciruelo identifies"Petrus


Hispanusantiquioas a member of the Order of Preachers,and not as
"
" has
Pope John XXI. PetrusHispanusrecentior
nothingto do eitherwith
the authorof the Summatotius
rationis.
This
logiceor withthe De consolatione
"Petrns
a
of
the
Dominican
and
four",
Alfonsi supposedly Spanish
logician
" on
teenthcenturywho wrote "Summulae
logic, never existed.The problem of "PetrusAlfonsi
", which I shall examine below, is of a different
nature.On the basis of the testimonies
foundin the courseof myresearch,
I would like to put forwardthe hypothesisthat the author of the Summa
totiuslogicewas Gratiadeus de Asculo,58althougha furtherstudywould
be necessaryto solve this problem.
This textby Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,whichenablesus to solvedefinitively
"
the problemof "PetrusHispanusrecentior
does, however,raise some probthe
with
the question of the "auctor
lems both concerning
relationship
"
" and the more
". The attriSummularum
Hispanus
generalproblemof Petrus
"
bution to PetrusHispanusrecentio(Ciruelo) of certain mathematicalor
astronomicalworksraises the questionas to whetherthistextis the basis
for the attributionof various titlesof this sort to "PetrusHispanus
", in
which case theyshould be excluded and leftout of the Corpusattributed
To answer this,we
to John XXI, which we now have to distribute.59
must findout what the oldest evidence for this attributionis.
" is
As far as the specificproblemof the "auctorSummularum
concerned,
whichcould be of interPedro Ciruelo providesus withsome information
est,but whichmay not be reliable,as it seems to be more rhetoricalthan
"
"
strictlyhistoricalin character.Ciruelo introduces PetrusHispanus to us
"
"
as doctor
Parisiensi'and as the author of multaoperaperegregia"
(without
58SanAntonino
Chronicorum
DiviAntonini
de Florencia
Florentini,
(1389-1459),
Archiepiscopi
in
et aliiscriptores
tertia
1586,Tit.XXIII,cap. 11,2,p. 681b:"Fuerunt
, Lugduni
pars
inlogicalibus
fecit
totius
etaliis,quietiamSummam
diversis
materiis.
Frater
Gra[tia]deus
De scriptoribus
ecclesiasticis
II,
, ColoniaeMDXLVI (Additiones
logicae";IoannesTrithemius,
&
S. Dominici,
& sacraepaginae
457:"Gratiadeus
monachus
ordinis
oftheColmariense),
Idemmagnas
& parvasquaestiones
Summam
totius
logicaescripsit.
peritus,
philosophiae
. . . authore
omnium
Bibliotheca
Universalis
inphysica
, swecatalogus
scriptorum
locupletissimus,
scripsit";
ordinis
doctore
medico
Conrado
Gesnero
monachus,
, Tiguri1545,277: "Gratiadeus
Tigurino
Gratiadei
totius
Volaterranus.
Summam
S. Dominici,
Quaestiones
logicae.
Raphael
scripsit
inhis(unpubsuntinItalia".
etparvae,
James
J.Cannon,
magnae
impressae
superPhysica,
inthe
School
TheDevelopment
Dominican
doctoral
thesis,
1961),
ofLogic
(YaleUniversity
lished)
ofthe
Aristotelis
toan ItalianDominican
oftheSumma
Totius
defends
theattribution
Logicae
toconsult
whomhe doesnotidentify
fourteenth
(I havenothadtheopportunity
century,
seeDissertations
Abstracts
thisresearch;
(1967-68), n 1467).
59See Meirinhos
1996(op.cit
., above,n. 1).

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

239

as a work intended
givingany othertitle),and he presentsthe Tractatus
for internaluse withinthe frameworkof the studiescarried out in the
suereligionis
noviciorum
Order of Preachers{"ad eruditionem
"). These data may
lose
a
certain
reflecthistoricalreality,but they
credibilitywhen he also
"
"
"
tellsus that it was PetrusHispanus who hancsuamintroductionem
logicam
" was
" Tractatus

as
De
has
Summulas
shown,
Rijk
appellavi because,
ipse
"
"
its originalname whereas Summulaewas a titleassignedto it at a later
date. Be this as it may, none of these pieces of informationis relevant
in the quest forthe identityof the "auctorSummularum".
SummuOf greaterinterestis the hintas to the birthplaceof the "auctor
larum
". Pedro Ciruelo,who was fromDaroca in the provinceof Zaragoza,
a regionborderingon Navarre, declares that he himselfis "propeconterraneuspatriaquevicinussuo predecessori
", which might be understood as
"
". This
the
Navarrese
origin(Estella)of the auctorSummularum
confirming
in MS Salamanca, UL, 2080, which recordsthat
fitswiththe testimonies
and of the Navarrese Domingo de San Juan
he was "de Stellaoriundus",
del Pie del Puerto,who says he was his "compatriota".
These testimonies
could be related to each other and Ciruelo, who taughtat Salamanca,
Ciruelo tells
mighthave known of them and used them. Unfortunately,
us nothingabout where the "auctorSummularum"
was buried, and so he
does not help us to solve the problemsurroundingthe grave.
"
e) "Petrus
Alfonsi
"
Now that we have eliminatedthe spuriousfigureof "Petrus
Alfonsi as a
Spanish Dominican of the fourteenthcentury,the author of supposed
"Summulae
" on
logic, who took shape fromNicols Antonio's misunderof
Pedro
Snchez Ciruelo'sjoke when he called himself"Petrus
standing
.
' we can confrontthe genuineproblemof "Petrus
Alfonsi"
Hispanusrecentiof
This problemis rooted in a venerableDominican traditionrepresented
by the Catalogues of Stams, Pignon and Saint Ann, which attributesthe
60
Summulae
to a "Petrus
Alfonsi".
These threeCatalogues are listsof Dominican writers(not of books or
and theycoincidein givingthename of "Summulae"
to theTractatus
libraries),
think
of "PetrusHispanus
which
leads
us
to
that
the
second
two might
",
have followedthe first,and so no particularmeritattaches to the fact
thatthereare threeaccounts.However,the date of the Stams Catalogue
60See d'Ors1997{op.cit.,above,n. 2),49.

18:07:04 PM

240

ANGELD'ORS

(early fourteenthcentury)means that its importancecannot be denied,


"
and that we ought to devote some attentionto this PetrusAlfonsi who
one.
was a thirteenth-century
Dominican, not a fourteenth-century
"
In the thirteenth
centurythere were many "PetrusAlfonsi who were
of the Order of Preachers.The Records of the
and
members
Spanish
ProvincialChapter of the Order of Preachersheld in Toledo in 1250,
"
,
Alfonsi"
quoted at the beginningof thepresentarticle,tellus of two Petrus
one who died in the Dominican house at Santiago de Compostela,and
fromPalencia to Toledo. We may rest
the other who was transferred
the
were
not
that
assured
only two. There is no reason to thinkthat
they
"
"
"
one of these two PetrusAlfonsi could be the auctorSummularum
", but
nor can we exclude thispossibility.The itineraryof the second, who was
from one centre of learning,Palencia, to another,Toledo,
transferred
"
". But neitherthese
might well fit with that of the auctorSummularum
Records of the ProvincialChapter,nor the Catalogues of Dominican writers, equip us to pursue this line of researchfurther.The Records only
give us a name; the Catalogues confine themselvesto associatingthe
".
with this name: "PetrusAlfonsi
Tractatus
The evidence from these Catalogues does not contradictany other
knownaccount. If the tomb in Estella was the burial place not of Pedro
"
", there is nothingto say
Vitoria, but of the genuine auctorSummularum
"
". Althoughthe notion that he was
that his name was not PetrusAlfonsi
buriedin Zamora makes us thinkof the figureof Pedro Ferrando,it does
"
not rule out the possibilitythat a PetrusAlfonsi
", who was not the same
house at Zamora. Nor
in
Dominican
the
buried
was
as Pedro Ferrando,
do the testimoniesof MS Salamanca, UL, 2080, of Domingo de San
Juan del Pie del Puerto or Pedro Ciruelo come into conflictwith this
Dominican tradition.Nor does thisname allow us to make any comment
and "Petrus
Summularum"
betweenthe "auctor
about the possiblerelationship
"
"
"
Petri to whom I referredin my
or one of the magisti
Hispanusconversus
1997 article.
"
"
In principle,the name PetrusAlfonsi only seems to clash with the
name "PetrusFerranti"(Pedro Ferrando),which was never explicitlyasso"
but which was suggestedby his link
ciated with the auctorSummularum"
as the authorof a Historyof St Dominic.
withZamora or his identification
"
The Stams, Pignon and Saint Ann Catalogues, which give the auctor
the name "PetrusAlfonsi
Summularum"
", only seem to exclude the possibut
are consistentwithany othertesPedro
was
this
that
Ferrando,
bility
"Petrus
.
None
the less, even this contradicHispanus"
timonyconcerning
tion is onlyrelative,as it depends on the meaningwe attachto the names

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

241

"
"
"Petrus
FerrarteliIf we take thesenames as being genAlfonsiand Petrus
then it is obviouslyimposuine birthnames of the "auctorSummularum",
sible for them to belong to the same person. But it mightbe that only
one of them,or neither,was his real name, and that the other,or both,
" and the Court of the
"
expressedthe linksbetweenthe auctorSummularum
reign
Kings of Castile and Len: in Castile,afterthe briefbut conflictive
of his uncle, Henry I,61FerdinandIII the Holy succeeded his grandfather,AlfonsoVIII; meanwhilehe also succeeded his fatherAlfonsoIX
in Len, and was followedby his son AlfonsoX the Wise. The factthat
these two names coincide with those of the kingsof Castile and Len,
" seems to be
Summularum
withwhomPedro Ferrandoas the "auctor
linked,
leaves a shadow of doubt over the realityof the apparentmutual exclusivenessof these two names. I shall examine below the apparent links
" and the Court of the
betweenthe "auctorSummularum
Kings of Castile
and Len.
However,the basis formy doubtsconcerningthe reliabilityof the evidence in the Catalogue of Stams, and those of Pignon and Saint Ann
which seem to depend on it, is not to be found in the somewhatcon" and
trivedargumentabout the meaning of the names "PetrusAlfonsi
"
"
"Petrus
Ferrand'but ratherin the fact that the name PetrusAlfonsi is
the same as that of another eminentfigurein twelfth-century
Spanish
thought,theJew Moiss Sefard(c. 1062-c. 1140).62Moiss Sefardwas
"
"
baptisedin Huesca in 1106 with the name of PetrusAlfonsi (in honour
61Thefraught
I ofCastile,
ofHenry
whocametothethrone
in 1214agedonly
reign
ofAlvaro
de Lara,wasin myviewofdecisive
10 andremained
undertheguardianship
forthehistory
ofSpanish
universities.
TheLarafamily,
whogoverned
Castile
importance
untilHenry's
deathin 1217,washostile
to thefamily
ofTelloTllezde Meneses,
the
a fewyearspreviously
whostrove
to promote
itsuniversity
(founded
bishopofPalencia
doubtless
affected
theprocess
oforganisation
anddevelVIII).Theseconflicts
byAlfonso
After
III cametothethrone
ofthenewuniversity
ofPalencia.
Ferdinand
ofCastile
opment
in 1217,thepolitical
continued
as hisfather,
IX ofLeon,disapproved
conflicts
Alfonso
Alfonso
waspromoting
thefoundation
oftheUniversity
of
ofhiscoronation.
Meanwhile,
in hisownkingdom,
at thesametimeas theOrderofPreachers
Salamanca
wasbecomin Spain.ThisOrderprobably
found
a morepropitious
environment
for
ingestablished
activities
there
thaninPalencia.
After
theunionofthekingdoms
ofCastile
andLeon
their
ofFerdinand
III theHoly,andtherenewal
ofefforts
to achieve
in 1230in theperson
no longer
theneedsofboththeuniversities
theReconquest,
economic
difficulties
allowed
inthekingdom
tobe met,andSalamanca
found
itself
better
itself
and
placedtomaintain
andultimately
thanPalencia,
which
fellintoa decline
closed.
grow
62On thisfamous
seeMaraJessLacarra(coord.),
Estudios
sobre
PedroAlfonso,
Pedro
Literatura
latina
deHuesca
, Zaragoza1996;JosLuisMoralejo,
Alfonso
hispano(siglos
V-XVI),
Historia
delasliteraturas
nocastellanas
in:J.M. DiezBorque(coord.),
, Madrid1980,
hispnicas
13-137.

18:07:04 PM

242

ANGELD'ORS

of the King of Aragon, AlfonsoI the Warrior),and was the author of


3 he seems to
the Dialoguscontra
Iudaeos(1106) and the Disciplinaclericalist
have lived in England,where he may have been the teacherof Adelard
"
of Bath. Might not the fact that this "Petrus
Alfonsiwas so famoushave
led the compilerof the Stams Catalogue to transferhis name to the less
well-known"auctorSummularum
"?
" from our field of
It would not be rightto remove "PetrusAlfonsi
research,but I feel that the testimonieswhich attributethe authorshipof
the Tractatusto him do not exclude the possibilitythat it was Pedro
Ferrando who was the "auctorSummularum
". I shall returnto this figure
"
"
of Petrus
Alfonsilater in thispaper, but he also needs to be investigated
in the contextof Pedro Ferrando and the problemof the author of the
"
Legenda
primd' which will formthe subjectof a futurepaper. However,
for the momentnothingfurthercan be extractedfromthe evidence in
these Catalogues.
3. FreshLinesofResearch
In my 1997 article,as I have indicated above, my search for evidence
"
" focusedon the examconcerningthe identityof the auctorSummularum
inationof fourrelativelyindependentliterarytraditions:commentarieson
La DivinaCommedia
, historiesof the Order of Preachersand Spanish writers, historiesof the Popes and Portuguesewriters,and the manuscripts
and editionsof the Tractatus
and commentarieson it. At thattimeI paid
no particularattentionto analysingthe Tractatus
itself(which I regarded
as not containingrelevantinformation
the
mere geographicalrefbeyond
erence to the cities of Len, Astorga and Zamora), or to the tradition
connectedwiththe Cantigas
of AlfonsoX, whichsome authorshave associated with the figureof "PetrusHispanu' but which De Rijk's analysis
detached from the problem concerningthe identityof the
definitively
"auctorSummularum"had
(I
accepted his analysiswithoutdiscussion,as a
in
the "Estella tradition",and this led me to
of
belief
consequence my
focus my attentionon the Court of the King of Navarre ratherthan on
that of the King of Castile and Len).
Althoughto date neitherof these freshapproaches has provided me
withany conclusionsas to the identityof the "auctor
Summularum
", I think
63PedroAlfonso,
clericalis
and notesbyMaraJessLacarra,
, Introduction
Disciplina
translation
edition),
byEsperanza
Ducay(bilingual
Zaragoza1980.

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

243

that both open up new paths which mightlead to significant


resultsin
the future.I thereforedecided to explore these freshroutes.
contra
estmalum"
a) "ErgoAstoricenses
^amorenses
pugnare
In Tractatus
V. 3 (ed. De Rijk, 58, 4-8) Peter of Spain is discussingthe
"
" as the fourthkind of
argument,and he providesus with the
exemplum
followingexample:
Ut 'Legionenses
contra
Astoricenses
estmalum;
pugnare
ergoAstoricenses
pugnare
contra
Zamorenses
estmalum';
enimestaffines
contra
affines
utrumque
pugnare.
This example,whichis an adaptationof what Aristotleused to illustrate
the same issue (AnaliticaPrioraII, 24, 68b41-69al0), can be considered
in which there is a trace of the author's
the only part of the Tractatus
own identity.The fact that he replaced "Athenians","Thebans" and
" and "
"
"
"Phocians" by "legionenses
zamorenses
", astoricenses
point to a rela"Petrus
" and the ancient
between
tionship
Hispanus
kingdomof Len. But
whatpreciselycould thisrelationship
have been? L.M. de Rijk interpreted
this in purely geographical terms,taking this adaptation of Aristotle's
example to indicatethe geographicalarea in which Peter of Spain was
workingwhile writingthe Tractatus.
Consequently,as De Rijk assumes
that the courtwas in Len, which was the most importantof the three
cities,De Rijk believesthatPeterof Spain may have writtenthe Tractatus
in Len.64
In my view, a more detailed analysisof this example adapted from
Aristotlecould enable us to draw anotherkind of conclusionconcerning
not the geographicalarea where the Tractatus
was written,but the date
of its composition.However, beforewe look at this,we must make a
small correction.Our example does not refer,as De Rijk thought,to
Len, Asturiasand Zamora, but ratherto Len, Astorgaand Zamora;
" in the
the "astoricenses
example are not the inhabitantsof Asturias,but
those of Astorga.Astorga,a cathedraltown which had been of importance since Roman times,and whichis situatedto the southeast of Len
and the northof Zamora, fulfilsthe functionof the middle term,which
is its role in this argument,betterthan does Asturias(whichlies to the
northof Len).

64Peterof
called
Summule
FirstCritical
Edition
from
Spain,Tractatus,
afterwards
Logicales.
theManuscripts
withan Introduction
byL.M. de Rijk,Assen1972,pp. LIX-LXI.

18:07:04 PM

244

ANGELD'ORS

But in the Tractatus


Peter of Spain does not confinehimselfto a mere
geographicaladaptationof Aristotle'sexample. Not only does he replace
"
and "Phocians"
"Athenians"by " legionenses"
, "Thebans" by astoricenses"
"
but he also translates"rcp^ipoD"(neighbourswith
by zamorenses",
"
a common border) as " contraaffines
which, despite its etymological
link
to
a
closer
than that of mere geographical
seems
affinity,
express
nearness.The Reconquest of Spain was stillin fullswing,and the decisive batde of Navas de Tolosa on 1212 was a recent memory;against
thisbackground,merelybeing neighbourswould not sufficeto draw conclusionsas to the evil of war. Such a conclusionwould have to be limthat is, to Christiankingdomsand lords. This aspect of
ited to "affines")
the adaptationof Aristotle'sexample seems to show thatwe are not looking at a case of mere mechanicaladaptation,in whichthe names of unfamiliarplaces are substitutedby those of places knownto the readers(as
in later adaptationsof the Tractatus
was to occur frequently
),65but rather
at a case of conscious adaptation in which attentionis paid to all the
aspects of the argument.
then it is strikingthat Peter of Spain
If we accept this interpretation,
did not restricthimselfto replacingAristotle'sgeographicaltermswith
the names of Christiankingdoms(Len, Castile and Navarre, forexample), but that he focused on places as specificas Len, Astorga and
Zamora. This hints at the possibilitythat Peter of Spain was not just
replacingthe names of the Greek citiesmentionedby Aristotlein a mere
to real historicalconflicts
geographicaladaptation,but was in factreferring
In
these
three cities took the
between these three Christiancities.
fact,
leading role in the struggleforsuccessionin the Kingdom of Len after
the death of AlfonsoIX on 24 September1230, a date veryclose to the
was probablywritten.66
time when the Tractatus
65See De
Rijk1972[op.cit.,above,n. 64),LVII-LVIII.
66In thestrict
waswritten
is uncertain.
In the
sense,thedateat whichtheTractatus
themostlikely
dateas being
to hisedition
oftheTractatus
Introduction
, De Rijksuggested
fortheearlier
between
1230and 1245,"witha marked
preference
yearsofthisperiod"
tothesupposed
forthisdate,which
areclosely
related
biogLXI).Buthisreasons
{op.cit.,
"
andthe"ante
are
ofJohnXXI as faras boththe"postquern"
quemareconcerned,
raphy
to the
De Rijklinkedthewriting
of theTractatus
To fixthe"postquem",
inconclusive.
in that
ofSalamanca,
"about1227-28",
"theonlyuniversity
oftheUniversity
founding
to theUniversity
of
in thethirteenth
(LIX).De Rijkpaidno attention
century"
region
inthe
in thefirst
decadeofthethirteenth
wasprobably
founded
which
Palencia,
century,
alsobe
oftheTractatus
withwhichthewriting
ofCastile,
might
kingdom
neighbouring
andthefoundfrom
hasbeendissociated
linked.
OncetheTractatus
JohnXXI'sbiography
to ruleoutthe
ofSalamanca,
therewouldseemto be no reasons
ingoftheUniversity

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

245

FerdinandIII the Holy, the son fromthe second marriageof Alfonso


IX of Len, to Berenguela,the eldestdaughterof AlfonsoVIII of Castile,
had ascended to the throneof Castile in 1217 (afterthe death of his
uncle Henry I and the abdicationof his motherBerenguela,Henry'ssister, in favourof her son), against his father'swill, who then ceased to
regardhim as heir to the throneof Len in favourof Sancha and Dulce,
his daughtersfromhis firstmarriageto Teresa, the daughterof Sancho
I of Portugal.On the death of AlfonsoIX, a struggleforsuccessionbegan
in Len between the followersof FerdinandIII (who was already king
of Castile) and the supportersof Sancha and Dulce. This strugglewas
made worse by the fact that both of AlfonsoIX's marriageshad been
In this
annulledby Pope CelestineIII on the groundsof consanguinity.
the
and
cause
of
Ferdinand
Len
III,
conflict,
Astorgainitiallysupported
whileZamora tookthepartof Sancha and Dulce. The agreementsreached
in Valencia de Don Juan betweenthe two wives of AlfonsoIX, Teresa
and Berenguela,were successfulin stoppingthe conflictfromattaining
greaterproportions,and made it possible forthe kingdomsto be united
a decadeor twobefore
thattheTractatus
havebeenwritten
theperiod
possibility
might
In my1997article
De Rijksupposes.
to favour
(op.cit.,above,n. 2), 69,I wasinclined
thatthewriting
theperiodfrom1220to 1235,as I thought
oftheTractatus
have
might
within
withtheorganising
ofinternal
studies
theOrderofPreachers
beenconnected
after
in 1221.Butthelinking
with
thedeathofSt Dominic
ofthecomposition
oftheTractatus
ofstudies
theUniversity
ofPalencia
or theorganisation
within
theOrderofPreachers
is
De Rijk'sviewrests
stilla merehypothesis.
the"ante
on thesupposed
quem",
Concerning
ofthecommentaries
on theTractatus
Arnaldi
1235and
byGuillelmus
(between
dating
has
1240and 1250)(LVII),whichlaterresearch
1244)andRobertus
Anglicus
(between
ledus to rectify
andplacelater.As faras Guillelmus
Arnaldi
is concerned,
S. Ebbesen
onthedatesproposed
sheddoubt
resemblances
between
byDe Rijk,onthebasisofstylistic
theLectura
Tractatuum
ofthe1270s(seeS. EbbesenandJ. Pinborg,
and othertreatises
inthelogical
toBoethius
deDacia
Studies
attributed
, in:CIMAGL3 (1970),44, n.),a
writings
which
hasbeendefinitively
which
demonwork,
byR.A.Gauthier's
dating
proven
wrong
strates
howArnaldi's
Lectura
Tractatuum
on St ThomasAquinas'
commentaries
on
depends
Omnia
thePerikermeneias
Libri
, TomusI* 1,Expositio
(seeStThomas
Aquinas,
Opera
Peiyermenias,
editioalteraretractata,
us to movethedating
of
Rome-Paris,
1989,52*),whichobliges
thiscommentary
on theTractatus
forward
tothelastdecadesofthethirteenth
As
century.
faras Robertus
is concerned,
andI. RosierhavedatedthetwocomS. Ebbesen
Anglicus
mentaries
attributed
tohimtobetween
1250and1270,buthavealsoshown
theexistence
ofa complex
tradition
at thisperiod(1250-1270)
aroundtheTractatus
, which
manuscript
leadsus tothink
thatitcertainly
after1260(seeS. Ebbesen
couldnothavebeenwritten
onPeter
andI. Rosier,
Robertus
andP. Prez-Ilzarbe,
Medieval
, in:I. Angelelli
ofSpain
Anglicus
inSpain
York2000,61-95).Thesedifferent
andRenaissance
, Hildesheim-Zrich-New
Logic
reasons
enableus toopenup thepossible
dateofcomposition
oftheTractatus
tobetween
thefactthatDe Rijk'sreasons
havebeenshown
tobe unfounded
1210and1260.However,
doesnotmeanthathisdating
is incorrect.
herewouldseemtosupport
the
Mydiscussion
notion
thatDe Rijk'sinitial
is accurate.
dating

18:07:04 PM

246

ANGELD'ORS

definitively
throughthe treatyof Benavente,signedon 11 December 1230,
under the rule of FerdinandIII.
This conflict,in which Len and Astorga initiallytook sides with
FerdinandIII while Zamora supportedthe claims of Sancha and Dulce,
andwhichtookplace in 1230, givesmeaningto the example of the "exem
" in the Tractatus.
If we accept thesearguments,thenwe can say that
plum
in
Tractatus
the
must have been writtenin the last months
this passage
of 1230 or the monthsthat followed(duringwhich these conflictsmay
and we can fixthe years 1230 and 1231 as
stillhave been newsworthy),
the most probable dates of composition.
If thisis the meaningof thispassage, Peterof Spain clearlyshowshimself to be on the side of Ferdinand III, concerned about the conflicts
between Christiankingdomswhich were distractinghim from concentratingon the Reconquest. But in this case we should not thinkof his
immediatelinkswith the Kingdom of Len, where these conflictswere
takingplace, but ratherof his connectionswith FerdinandIII, who was
already king of Castile, and perhaps with Palencia (where St. Dominic
The University
of Palencia,foundedby Alfonso
studied)and itsUniversity.
and from1220 onwardsit took on
VIII, was the firstSpanish university,
a new lease of lifethanksto FerdinandIII and Bishop Tello. Among its
teachers in those years we can find "Peter the grammarian".67Len,
illustratenot the geographicalbackAstorgaand Zamora would therefore
ground against which Peter of Spain may have taughtand writtenhis
Tractatus
, but the scene of his politicalconcernsat a crucial momentin
the historyof the Reconquest.
"
the "auctor
Summularurri
On thebasis of theseanalyses,therefore,
appears
as a figureclose to King Ferdinand III who is concerned about the
conflictsthathave flaredup around the successionof AlfonsoIX of Len
and the continuationof the Reconquest, but a figurewho is not necessarilycloselylinked to the immediategeographicalarea in which these
conflictswere takingplace. The dates of the eventsmightenable us to
67Santiago
deSanto
deGuzman:
Palencia
enla poca
Instituciones
FranciaLorenzo,
Domingo
Santo
de Caleruega
O.P. and L.V. Diaz Martin,
Eclesisticas
,
, in: C. AnizIriarte
Domingo
Pedroque dedicounagramtica
en
on p. 192:"El gramtico
Salamanca1994,161-95,
a
PrezRodrguez,
Untratado
degramtica
dedicado
versoal obispodonTello."See Estrella
delI Congreso
deHistoria
dePalencia
TelloTllez
deMeneses
, T. IV, Palencia1987,
, in:Actas
crtica
XIII(Estudio
Unagramtica
castellana
delsiglo
), Valladolid
71-78;id.,El 'Verbiginale'.
y edicin
see Gonzalo
ofPalenciaanditsfirst
oftheUniversity
1990.On thefoundation
masters,
de
Revisin
crtica
dePalencia.
Diez S.I., La Universidad
Martnez
", in:ActasdelII Congreso
Historia
dePalencia
, Palencia1990,155-91.

18:07:04 PM

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PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

247

was written:c. 1230fixrelatively


preciselythe date at whichthe Tractatus
1231.
"
Summularum
the "auctor
However,thisroutetowardsidentifying
opened
"
"
foundin the Tractatus
up by our analysisof the example of the exemplum
"
immediatelycomes up againstan obstacle,a fresh PetrusHispanu' first
Canon of Palencia Cathedral,then memberof the Order of Preachers,
and also versed in liberal arts and close to Ferdinand III and Bishop
Tello. This is Pedro Gonzlez, betterknown as San Telmo (the patron
of sailors),who died around 1250 and was buried in the Cathedral at
Tuy. Pedro Gonzlez could be the "Peter the grammarian",a masterof
but thereis no reason to thinkthathe had anything
Palencia University,
"
Our lack of knowledgeabout the
to do with the auctorSummularurri'm
us
hinders
fromadvancingany further
of
Palencia
along
University
history
thispath.
The figureof FerdinandIII the Holy calls for furtherconsiderations.
His mother,Berenguela,was the daughterof Eleonor of England and
the elder sisterof Blanca of Castile, the Queen of France and motherof
St Louis. His wife,Beatriceof Swabia, was a daughterof Philipof Swabia
and Irene of Byzantium(thatis, granddaughterof FrederickBarbarossa,
Emperorof the West and Isaac Angelos,Emperorof the East), and therefore also a cousin of FrederickII, the king of Sicily. The Court of
had close familyconnectionswiththe mostimporFerdinandIII therefore
tant courtsin Europe. During his reign the Christiankingdomsin the
in the conquestof Murcia,
Iberianpeninsulaexpandedgreatly,
culminating
All
meant
that
the
Court
of FerdinandIII provided
and
Seville.
this
Jan
an appropriateplace for the receptionof Arab and Greek cultureand
its diffusionthroughoutthe kingdomsof Europe. Referencesto Queen
Blanca of Castile, or to FrederickII, in some manuscriptsof the works
68The identity
of"Peterthegrammarian",
theauthor
ofthe" Verbiginale
", is wrapped
in
to
those
the
ofthe"auctor
Summularum
raised
": the
by problem
analogous
up problems
" hasbeenattributed
oncemore.The " Verbiginale
to
"Peters"
involved
herearemultiplied
"
" or to someother
Palentinus
see:
Blasensis
PeterofBlois,to "Petrus
", to Petrus
"Petrus",
whenwe take
PrezRodrguez
1990{op.cit.,above,n. 67).Theseproblems
proliferate
" whowrotethecomthetwo"Petrus
theproblem
ofidentifying
intoaccount
Hispanus
liberor "Strenuum
on Priscian
known
as "Absoluta
cuius
mentaries
, whomI shall
negotiatorem"
inmyforthcoming
in
oftheproblems
raisedbyPedroFerrando.
discuss
the
context
paper
HetLeerstuk
vandeConstructio
inde2deHelft
Hetiudicium
constructionis.
See C.H. Kneepkens,
eninleidende
studie
vol.I, EenVerkennende
vande12deEeuw,
, Nijmegen
1987,515-32;id.,The
notes
onitstransmission
andtheusemade
absoluta
attributed
toPH. Some
cuiuslibet
ofitbyRobert
Medieval
andRenaissance
Bacon
P. Prez-Ilzarbe
andRoger
, in:I. Angelelli,
(eds.),
Logic
Kilwarby
inSpain
York,2000,373-402.
, Hildesheim-Zrich-New

18:07:04 PM

248

ANGELD'ORS

which make up the Corpusformerlyattributedto John XXI, lead us to


thinkthat the Court of Ferdinand III was not only connectedwith the
"
but also with the complex
particularproblemof the auctorSummularurr'
of problemssurroundingthe genericname of "PetrusHispanus
".
33
b) "NenPeroGarcianeriPerod3Espanha/ Nen PeroGalegononir cmego
AlfonsoX the Wise, the son of FerdinandIII who accompanied him in
the campaignsof the Reconquest and was king of Castile from 1252 to
1284, makes mentionof a "Peter of Spain" in one of his Cantigas
, which
is thoughtto have been writtenafter 1260. This is Cantiga CBN 472
(= CB 365), which reads as follows:69
Peroque ei oramngua
de companha,
NenPeroGarcianenPeroEspanha,
NenPeroGalego[Galengo]
nonircmego.
E bemvo-lojuroparSantaMaria:
Que PeroEspanhanenPeroGarcia,
NenPeroGalegononirancmego.
Nuncacingaespadaconba bainha,
Se PeroEspanhanenPeroGalinha[Garcia(?)],
NenPeroGalegofororacmego.
ircmego.
Galego,Galego,outren
Experts on the Cantigasregard this one as belongingto the group of
"cantigasde escarnioy de maldecir",and suggestthatthe "Pero Garcia",
"Pero Espanha" and "Pero Galego" referred
to by AlfonsoX are Castilian
knightswho have refusedto accompany him on his campaigns for the
Reconquest,and whom he is thereforereproachingfortheircowardice.70
No one has undertakento identifythese threeCastilian knights,or troubled to justifythisinterpretation.
69Cantigas
d'escarnho
e demaldizer
doscancioneiros
medievais
, ed.M. Rodrigues
galego-portugueses
illustrated,
1995,21-2.See alsoFernando
Vigo-Lisboa
Lapa,3rdedition,
MagnAbelleira
andothers,
Mercedes
Brea(coord.),
Lirica
deCompostela
, vol.I, Santiago
profana
galego-portuguesa
1996,158,andElzaPacheco
MachadoeJosPedroMachado(eds,),
daBiblioteca
Cancioneiro
Colocci-Brancuti
de Portugal,
Nacional
, in:Revista
Lisboa,vol.II, 1950,329.
Antigo
70
de umasriede cantiabove,n. 69),21:" a primeira
Rodrigues
Lapa 1995(op. cit.,
de grande
emque o reicastelhano
a suaindiggas,algumas
poderexpressivo,
desafoga
os cavaleiros
ao seuchamamento,
talvezporocasioda
naocontra
que no acudiram
contra
os reisde Murciae Granada,
em 1264.O cronista
informa:
'Muchos
campanha
de las villasse excusaban
de lo servir
porel llamamiento
que lesfaciade cadaanopara
la frontera,
en aqueltempo
ivacadauno servir
tresmesesporlo que avia,ca el Rey
- Crnicade Don Alfonso
nonlesdabanadade las fonsaderas'
Dcimo,Madrid,1925,
cap.XII."

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

249

However,scholarsinterestedin the figureof Pedro Gallego and Peter


of Spain (the "auctorSummularum
"), withthe exceptionof De Rijk,71have
believedthatthiscantigamightcontainan explicitreferenceto thesetwo
men. The CarrerasArtau brothersseem to have been the firstto relate
andJ.M. Da Cruz Pontes73
thiscantigaby AlfonsoX to thesetwofigures;72
and M. de Castro74have assumed that thereis indeed a connection.De
Rijk,whilerulingout the idea thatthe "Pero Espanha" to whomAlfonso
Summularum
X refersis the "auctor
", acknowledgesthatthisissue has some
linkwiththe "problem"of the "auctorSummularum
Accordingto De Rijk, this "Pero d'Espanha" could be identifiedwith
"
a "fiater
Petrus
who, in the company
predicatorurn
Alfonsi
Hispanusde ordine
of "Pero Garcia", the treasurerof Braga, was presentin Paris in 1245
when PrinceAlfonsoof Portugalvisitedthe Court of Louis IX. It could
"
"
"
be the confusionbetween this "PetrusAlfonsi and Petrus
Julini (John
XXI) whichlies at the root of the erroneousattributionof the Summulae
"
to a memberof the Order of Preachers.
to "Petrus
Alfonsiand consequently
"
"
De Rijk's argumenttakes us back again to the figureof PetrusAlfonsi
to whom the Stams Catalogue attributesthe Tractatus
, in order to rob
the
this attributionof credibilityand leave open the way to identifying
"auctor
as Pope John XXI. If we rejectthe notionthatJohn
Summularum"
in
and accept the possibilitythat the attribution
XXI wrotethe Tractatus
"
"
the Stams Catalogue is correct,since this Petrus
Alfonsi is a figurewho
"
"Petrus
like
the
an
invented
not
existed
one,
Alfonsi of the
(and
really
thentherewould be nothfourteenth
centurywhom Grabmannmentions),
"
".
is
the
genuine auctorSummularum
ing to stop us accepting that he
"
"
However,nor is thereany reason to thinkthat this Petrus
Alfonsiis any
"
more likelythan any other known "PetrusAlfonsi to have writtenthe
We can draw no firmconclusionsin this respect.
Summulae.
"
"
One problem which remainsin this case is that this PetrusAlfonsi
could be identifiedwith the "Peter of Spain" to whom the cantiga by
AlfonsoX alludes. If we examine this issue not fromthe point of view
" but
of the questionssurroundingthe "auctorSummularum
directly,from
the perspectiveof the cantiga by Alfonso X, De Rijk's interpretation
71De Rijk1972(op.cit.,above,n. 64),XXIII,n. 1.
72TomsyJoaqun
de
cristiana
Historia
dela Filosofia
Carreras
Artau,
Filosofia
Espaola.
Artau
XIIIal XV,t. I, Madrid1939,13,n. 12;seealsoJ.Carreras
hssiglos
yJ.Tusquets
Louvain-Paris
del'occident,
chrtienne
laphilosophie
1962,17,n. 1.
Terrats,
hispaniques
Apports
73
dafilosofia,
in:
na historia
Pedro
Parasituar
Portugalense
Hispano
J.M.Da CruzPontes,
de Filosofia,
24 (1968),21-45(21,n. 1).
Revista
Portuguesa
74See note75.

18:07:04 PM

250

ANGELD'ORS

(which I myselfpreviouslyaccepted) is fairlysurprising.Both this "Pero


"
", are figuresconGarcia", the treasurerof Braga, and this Petrus
Alfonsi
nected with the Portuguesecourt who, as far as we know, had no connectionwith AlfonsoX and who thereforedo not enable us to explain
the meaning of this cantiga.
It is obviouslyrash to claim that a literarytext,particularlya poem
like this cantiga,can always be interpretedand given a historicalmeaning. The name "Peter", as we have seen, was too common in thirteenthcenturySpain, and AlfonsoX may have used it in thispoem forreasons
of metre alone. The repetitionof the name in these lines in different
orders shows that literarydevices are being employedhere. The variation of the names "Garcia", "Galego" and "d'Espanha" may be part of
to histhis wordplay.And even if we accept that AlfonsoX is referring
as
in
are
still
left
with
the
torical persons, he does
other cantigas,we
twofoldproblem of findingout whetherwe are faced with a singleperson (Pedro Garcia who is Spanish and fromGalicia), or three different
people (the alternationof singularand plural verb formsintroducesthis
ambiguity),and what the relationshipwas between this figureor these
figuresand the author of the cantiga. What we know about AlfonsoX,
the conqueringking and poet who fosteredGreco-Arab culturein his
itinerantCourt, leaves too many possibilitiesopen.
Were these men Castilian knightswho took part (or refusedto do so)
in the campaignsof the Reconquest? We cannot progressfar down this
route. Were they "juglares", poets who, like their king, furtheredthe
lyrics?Pero Garca d'Ambroaor Pero
developmentof Galician-Portuguese
Garca Burgalscould be our "Pero Garcia", while Pero da Ponte, Pero
Gmez Barroso,Pero d'Armea, Pedro Amigo and a long etceteramight
be our "Pero Galego" and "Pero d'Espanha". Either of these firsttwo
hypotheseswould uncouple this cantiga fromthe problemswhich inter.
est us concerningthe "auctorSummularum"
But these men could equally well be men of learningattached to the
Court, or advisers.In this case, as this cantiga is thoughtto have been
writtenin the firstyears of the reignof AlfonsoX about people he seems
to miss,we need to thinkabout people of the generationof his father,
FerdinandIII, who had played a partin the Court and in PrinceAlfonso's
education. Even if we assume all this, it is still hard to interpretthe
cantiga, as there were many bishops and religiouscalled Peter moving
in and around this Court.
Of the threemen who may be mentionedin thiscantiga,"Pero Garcia",
"Perod'Espanha" and "Pero Galego", it is the last who seems to offer

18:07:04 PM

SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)

251

the best potentialfor explainingthe meaning. We have some information about a Pedro Gallego who was closely linked to the person of
AlfonsoX. This was the Franciscan,Pedro Gallego,75probablyborn in
Santa Maria de Ortigueira(La Coruna) around 1207.76He enteredthe
Franciscan Order in the Prioryof Bastida (Toledo), which had been
foundedin 1219, where he became guardian.In 1236 he was appointed
Provincialof Castile,and he was made Bishop of Cartagenaaround 1250.
He died on 19 November 1267, and his tombis stillpreservedin Murcia
Cathedral,where his remainswere translatedon 22 March 1291. This
Pedro Gallego was a friendof FerdinandIII and the confessorof Alfonso
X, whom he probablyaccompanied on the campaignforthe reconquest
of Murcia in 1243-44, and on whose initiativehe was probably made
Bishop of Cartagena. Three worksare attributedto Pedro Gallego: Liber
domusand Summaastronomica
.79
de animalibus
,77De regitiva
If we look at the close relationshipbetween this Pedro Gallego and
AlfonsoX, and his possiblepart in the Murcia campaign,then it comes
to him in this cantiga,
as no surprisethat AlfonsoX mightbe referring
and thathe mightmisshim since,once he was made Bishopof Cartagena,
he must have moved away fromthe Court and ceased to participate
directlyin the Reconquest campaigns.If, on the otherhand, we remember that Pedro Gallego died in 1267, that is, a date relativelyclose to
75A. Lopez,Fr.P. Gallego
de Cartagena
in: Archivo
Ibero, primer
(1250-1267),
obispo
Untraducteur
inconnu:
Pierre
etpre24 (1925),65-91;A. Pelzer,
Americano,
franciscain
Gallego,
mier
deCarthagne
Francesco
Ehrle.
Scritti
diStoria
e Paleografia,
(1250-126?
), in:Miscellanea
vque
Etudes
vol.I, Roma1924,407-56(rep.in:Auguste
d'histoire
littraire
surla scholasPelzer,
Pedro
, Louvain-Paris
1964,188-240);M. de Castro,Gallego,
, in: Gran
tiquemdivale
1974,98-9.
, T. XV, Santiago-Gijn
Enciclopedia
Gallega
76G. Diaz Diaz considers
thathe wasbornin 1197(seeHombres
dela
y Documentos
while
that
believes
, III, E-G,Madrid1988,335-6),
J.M.Da CruzPontes
Filosofia
Espaola
dateis obviously
hewasbornin 1236(seeabove,n. 72).Thislatter
becausePedro
wrong,
wasappointed
Provincial
inthatyear.Ashispresence
ofCastile
inToledoaround
Gallego
ofJuanGil de Zamora,thedateof 1207
1220seemsto be confirmed
bythewitness
wasprobably
which
M. de Castroprovides
seemstobe toolate;hisbirth
between
these
twodates:1197and 1207.
77MS Vat.lat.1288,fols.131r-161r: "Incipit
liber
deanimalibus
etdenaturali
diverssitate
et
illorum
exlibro
moribus
eorum
ac demembris
astucia
etaccidentibus
translatus
etAveroys
et
Aristotelis
auctorum
arabum
etaliorum
comentorum
."
78MSS Vat.Barberini,
& Paris,BnF,lat.5818,fols.28r-30v:
lat.52, fols.22r-24r
de
"Breviatio
abreviata
Petri
Antecer
inregitiva
domus"
fratris
cartaginensis
speculatane
episcopi
79Sarmano,
ms.E. 108,fols.46-49;Madrid,
Biblioteca
Bibi.Nac.,
Comunale,
Maserata,
3delvescovo
indito
ms.8.918,fols.49rb-56vb.
G. Melani,Unfragmento
della'Summa
astronomica
Pietro
in:
Studi
40
Garcia
Medical
,
Francescani,(1943),79-89;
Ballester,
francescano Gallego
inThirteenth-Century
Problems
andProspects
Science
Castile:
oftheHistory
ofMedicine,
, in:Bulletin
61 (1987),183-202.

18:07:04 PM

252

ANGELD'ORS

that when thiscantiga is supposed to have been written,we cannot rule


out the possibilitythat Alfonso X might be referringhere not to his
appointmentas Bishop of Cartagena but to his death.
If we accept that the "Pero Galego" mentionedby AlfonsoX in this
cantiga is the FranciscanPedro Gallego, thenwe could deduce thatboth
"Pero Garcia" and "Pero d'Espanha" mightalso be figuresclose to the
Court of the King of Castile. We saw in the previoussection how the
"
"auctorSummularum
seems to give
", throughthe example of the exemplum",
evidencethathe was connectedwiththe Court of FerdinandIII. It would
thereforenot be surprisingif this were our "Pero d'Espanha", whether
" or Pedro Ferrando
this be "PetrusAlfonsi
(who, it seems, also had links
*'
is
with the Court). He must in any case be a Dominican,whose 'floruit"
and
died
between
that
Ferrando
1254
know
Pedro
as
1250
(we
given
1258), and whose companyAlfonsoX mightwell be missingat the time
of writingthis cantiga.
the thirdof thesefigures,"Pero
We are leftwiththe taskof identifying
in this respect is that of De
I
know
of
The
Garcia".
only suggestion
Rijk,whoseems to identifyhim with the treasurerof Braga who visited
Paris in 1245 on the occasion of the visitby Prince Alfonsoof Portugal
"
to the Court of Louis IX in the company of a Petrus
Alfonsi
Hispanusde
to
for
the reaill-founded
which
seems
a proposal
ordine
me,
predicatorurr'
about any other"Pedro
sons I have set out above. I have no information
Garcia" who, by virtueof his activities,mighthave a similarprofileto
the FranciscanPedro Gallego and the Dominican Peter of Spain. None
the less, there is a "Petrus
", who is Bishop of Zamora and whose surname is unknown,who is linkedby variousdocumentswiththe Franciscan
Pedro Gallego (Bishop of Cartagena), and who, like the latter,has close
ties with Ferdinand III the Holy.80This is Bishop Pedro I of Zamora
who died in 1255, and who is buried in his own Cathedral where his
"
huiusno- / minisepiscograve bears the words: Hie iacetD Petrus/primus
/
Ferdinandi
et
/
/
zamorensis
qui / Hispalima mauris/
familiarisregis
pus
to have occurred in
death
would
seem
/
anno
1254s'
Obiit
(his
caepit.
80"Inocencio
a Pedro,
IV faculta
y a PedroI, obispode Zamora,
obispode Cartagena,
a los clrigos
las censuras
y a loslaicosque acudanjuntocon
y levantar
paraabsolver
lossarracenos
enAfrica"
contra
III enla guerra
de Fernando
lastropas
(doc.n579,12a los obisposPedrode Cartagena
IV faculta
y PedroI de
X-1252,p. 184);"Inocencio
Fernando
a los clrigos
Zamoraparaautorizar
III, a que
y religiosos
que lespresente
losusureros,
a dichoreycuantotengan
que se desconozsiempre
que restituir
apliquen
a quienesse debesatisfacer"
canlas personas
(doc.n580,p. 184),JosCarlosde Lera
de Zamora
de'amora
dela Catedral
medievales
delosdocumentos
, Diputacin
Maillo,Catlogo
1999.

18:07:04 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)

253

earlyJanuary1255 accordingto the presentchronology).We know little


more of this Bishop Pedro I who died in Zamora in 1255 as Pedro
Ferrando probably also did, and perhaps also the "auctorSummularum
",
and who complicatesstillfurtherthe problemof "PetrusHispanus".
It is not possibleto claim thatthe foregoinganalyseshave yieldedany
kind of conclusionas to eitherthe real meaning of the cantiga or the
of "Pero d'Espanha",or as to theidentity
of the "auctor
Summularum".
identity
My examinationof the subject only permitsus to reinforceveryslighdy
in thiscantiga to
the weak hypothesisthatAlfonsoX mightbe referring
our "PetrusHispanus",and to add furtherthreadsto the complex web of
"Petrus
"
Hispanus who will have to be accounted for when we come to
the Corpusattributeduntilrecentlyto Pope John XXI.
redistribute
4. By Wayof Conclusion
Since we stillawaitan analysisof theproblemsconcerningPedro Ferrando
"
"
and the relationsbetweenthe authorof the "Legenda
prima and the auctorSummularum
' which will formthe object of my forthcoming
article,I
believe that it is possible to say that,by means of the freshdocumentation providedhere, I have given some furtherconfirmation
to the idea
"
thatthe "auctor
Summularum
to
the
Order
of
Preachers
and that
belonged
his originsmay have been Navarrese. The problem of "PetrusHispanus
" has been
recentior
resolved,throughcarefulreading of Pedro Ciruelo's
work;while the questionsconcerningthe author of the Summatotiuslogice have been partiallycleared up by the testimoniesof St Antoninoof
Florence,Gessnerand the Colmariense.
The ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
of Sevilleplaces in questionthe "Estella
" who is buried
tradition"whichmaintainsthatit is the "auctor
Summularum
in the tomb in the Prioryof Santo Domingo, but does not undermine
the notionthat he may have had linkswiththe town of Estella, regarding which the worksof Domingo de San Juan del Pie del Puerto and
Ciruelo have joindy added supportto the testimonyof MS Salamanca,
UL, 2080. One of the traditionssurroundingthe historyof the editions
"
of La DivinaCommedia
has reinforcedthe hypothesisthat "PetrusHispanus
had linkswiththe cityof Bologna,whichobligesus to interpretGalvano's
"
"
testimonyas the resultof confusingtwo different
figures:the conversus
"
sent to Bologna by St. Dominic, and PetrusHispanus",who was probably a memberof the communityof Santa Maria della Mascarella, a cell
of the AugustininPrioryof Roncesvalles,and who laterjoined the new
Order of Preachers.

18:07:04 PM

254

ANGELD'ORS

It has also been shown that, contraryto the argumentin my 1997


"
' would seem to have been
paper, the figureof the auctorSummularurri
closer to the Court of the King of Castile and Len than to that of
"
"
Navarre. This linkingof "PetrusHispanas
(not only the auctorSummularum
") to the Court of FerdinandIII the Holy calls out fora freshexamination of the cultural legacy of his reign, which has generallybeen
regarded as a period in which the process of receptionof Greek and
Arab learningwas paralysed and there was a returnto Visigothicculture, but which can now be seen to have been a period which played
an active part in thisprocess of rediscoveryand absorption,followingon
naturallyfromthe activitiesof the translatorsof Toledo.
I also believe that I have shown that the reasons broughtforwardby
Tugwell against some of the hypothesesI suggestedin my 1997 article
are not conclusive,and that researchinto the figureof "PetrusHispanus
"
conversus
(and also, above all, Pedro Ferrando)is worthpursuing.There
are good reasons to thinkthat it mightbe possible to identifyone of
". It is my view that the only one of
these men as the "auctorSummularurri
the six candidatesI proposed in my 1997 articlethat can be ruled out
.
is "Petrus
, nationeGallus,in FranciaPriorprovincialis"
definitively
But the principalmeritof the presentstudyis, in my view, the fact
that I have gatheredtogethertestimoniesfromverydifferent
areas, and
been
examthat
had
hitherto
between
formedconnections
only
problems
ined separately,but which are doubtlesscloselyinterrelated.The probwhich had already been associated with
lem of the "auctorSummularurri'
the historyof the editionsand commentarieson La DivinaCommedia
, and
with the Cantigasof Alfonso X the Wise, and which needs also to be
"
broughtinto a relationshipwiththe problemof the authorof the Legenda
primd' has been connectedwiththe historyof the cell of the Augustinin
Prioryof Roncesvalles at Santa Maria della Mascarella and the beginningsof the Order of Preachersin Italy,as well as withthe politicaland
culturalhistoryof Spain in the thirteenth
century(a decisive era in the
and
the
of
the
receptionof Arab and Greek cultures)
history
Reconquest
and with the historyof the Universitiesof Bologna and Palencia. Only
with the cooperationof researchersin all these fieldswill it be possible
to findfreshdocumentsto help solve the complex web of problemssur"
roundingthe name of PetrusHispanus
Madrid
Universidad
Complutense

18:07:04 PM

3 and theSearch an

School
secundum
Thomam
for EarlyThomistic
Responsio
ISABEL IRIBARREN

1. The Parisand Oxford


and thrConnection
to ThomasAquinas
Condemnations
It has been generallyassumed that followingthe aftermathof the Paris
and Oxford condemnationsof 1277 and 1284 respectively,in which
importantThomistictheses1were at least indirectlycompromised(in the
case of the condemnationat Paris),a "movement"in defenceof Thomas
Aquinas' doctrineemergedwhich eventuallyresultedinto a "Thomistic
of this movementwere not only deschool".2The main representatives
fendingthe person of theirfellowbrother,but also "the meaning and
implications"of the "Thomist innovations",3theiracceptance of which
constitutesthe characteristicmark of the members of this movement.
Thus as earlyas the 1280s therewas a Thomisticschool of thoughtbeing
formedmainlyas a responseto ecclesiasticalintervention,
and led by a
who
of
and
French
Dominicans
understood
the
fullimport
group English
of the currentThomistictenets.
1
ofsubstantial
form
andtheexistence
theunicity
ofmatter
without
form.
Particularly
ed. P. Glorieux,
in:Lespremires
See William
de la Mare'sCorrectorium
, art."31, 127-129,
thomistes:
Le Correctorium
Kain 1927.
QuareLe Saulchoir,
polmiques
Corruptorii
2 SeeF.E. Kelley,
TheThomists
andTheir
atOxford
inthe
LastPartoftheThirteenth
Opponents
PhD thesis,
1977(MS.Bodleian
Oxford
D.Phil.D. 6258),
, unpublished
University
Century
"In theyearsfollowing
the1277conintroductory
p. ii. Kelley's
passagerunsas follows:
until
theendofthecentury,
demnation
ofSt.Thomas'teaching
at Oxford
there
appeared
to thecondemnation
whatonemight
calltheearly
Thomistic
movement.
bywayofreaction
Itsliterary
remains
are ampleenough
to enablethehistorian
to forma picture
ofthe
SeealsoF.J.Roensch,
ofthisschool
Thomistic
[ ..
p. i. (Myitalics)
Early
principal
persons
School
Iowa 1964,ix: "[.. .] thedoctrine
oftheunicity
ofsubstantial
in
form
, Dubuque,
themostbasicyardstick
tojudgethecharacter
creatures
constituted
ofanyearly
bywhich
or rejection
Thomist
at thetime.[...]. It is bytheacceptance
ofthesetheses[viz.the
thespirituality
ofform,
thepurepotentiality
ofprimary
ofseparated
submatter,
unicity
thattheThomism
correct
ofan earlydefender
of
stances]
alongwiththeir
understanding
St. Thomasmustbe judged".Subsequently,
Roensch
embarks
on a bio-bibliographical
oftherepresentations
school"andan "early
account
ofan "early
French
school".
English
as Kelleybetween
"Thomism"
Roensch,
then,seemsto makethesameequation
(i.e.a
and/ortheological
to Aquinas'maintenets)
and a "Thomistic
philosophical
allegiance
school".
3
TwoEarly
Thomists:
Kelley1977{op.cit.,above,n. 2),4. AlsoseeF.E. Kelley,
English
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2001

Vivarium
39,2

18:07:10 PM

256

ISABELIRIBARREN

This approach, in its turn,has been based on a traditionalunderstanding of the 1277 and 1284 condemnations,particularlythat of 7
March 1277 in Paris.4Accordingto thisview,Bishop StephenTempier's
condemnation was a reaction to "heterodox" Aristotelianismat the
facultyof arts. Tempier was acting afterthe ordersof Pope John XXI,
who had asked him to conduct an inquiryconcerningdangerous docAs a result,Tempier
trinesreportedto be circulatingat the University.5
formeda commissionof sixteentheologians,includingHenry of Ghent,
- so that
and had a list of 219 propositionsdrawn up somewhathastily
the orderof the propositionsappears disorganisedand the names of scholars behind thesepropositionsdo not appear specified.Withoutreporting
back to the Pope, Tempier issued this condemnationon 7 March 1277
on his own authority.Within ten days, on 18 March, a prohibitionby
the Archbishopof Canterbury,Robert Kilwardby,was issued in Oxford,
thistime envisioningdirecdyAquinas' thesison the unicityof substantial
form. On 29 October 1284, in a visit to the Oxford Chapter,John
Pecham, Kilwardby'ssuccessoras Archbishop,ratifiedhis predecessor's
45 (1981),345-87.Cf.
andRobert
vs.Henry
Thomas
Sutton
, in:The Thomist,
ofGhent
Orford
no.
atOxford
ofLondon,
D.A. Callus,TheCondemnation
, TheAquinas
Society
ofSt.Thomas
Oxford
lesthses
thomistes
Comment
5 2nded. 1955[19461].P. Glorieux,
furent
proscrites
in:RevueThomiste,
32 [nouv.srie10] (1927),259-91,andid.,Lescorrec(1284-1286),
etmdietphilosophie
ancienne
de thologie
aupoint
Essaidemise
toires.
, in:Recherches
which
anda cole
naissante
milieu
Thomiste
talksabouta certain
vale,14 (1947),286-304,
oftheaforesaid
conflicts.
inthemidst
inParisandOxford
hemaintains
Likewise,
emerged
thomiste
travaux
depolmique
Premiers
P. Mandonnet,
, in:RevuedesSciences
Philosophiques
1964[op.cit.,above,n. 2), 19:
7 (1913),46-70& 245-62.AlsoRoensch
etThologiques,
in
histeaching
St. Thomas,butunderstood
notonlydefended
. . earlyDominicans
See especially
thesamewayhe didhimself."
pp. 185-9.
exactly
4 Among
etl'averdeBrabant
ofthisview,areP. Mandonnet,
themainupholders
Siger
Louvain1908-11,
rosme
latinau XIIIesicle
I, 28-9,59-63,142-95;F. Van
, 2 volumes,
auXIIIesicle,
Louvain1955,198-208;
Aristotle
intheWest,
id.,La Philosophie
Steenberghen,
Matre
deBrabant
seconded.,Louvain1991,354-59;andalsobythelatter,
, Louvain
Siger
du 7
Parisienne
dansla censure
le Grand
etThomas
Albert
1977,149-58;R. Hissette,
Aquin
15(1982),226-46,
1277, in:Miscellanea
mars
246;JohnF.
Mediaevalia,
esp.235,237-41,
Milwaukee
FaithandReason,
Between
totheEncounter
Reactions
Medieval
1995;id.,
Wippel,
72 (1995),233andtheCondemnation
Thomas
Schoolman,
of1277,in:The Modern
Aquinas
de la Mare,
suchas William
itis clearthat,as contemporaries
72. ForWippel,
however,
of
in their
different
andJohnofNaplesindicate
ofFontaines,
ways,a number
Godfrey
atAquinas
on 7 March1277wereaimeddirecdy
condemned
thepropositions
(cf.Wippel
from
thatof
differs
1995(Thomas
notably
position
), 241,268-9).In thisWippel's
Aquinas
to masters
werecommon
someofthepropositions
whobelieves
that,although
Hissette,
affected
thecondemnation
ofartsandAquinas,
indirectly
Aquinas.
3 Froma letter
sentbyJohnXXI to Stephen
1277,ed.
Tempieron 18January
- E. Chatelain,
Paris1889,I, 541.(Hereafter,
Chartularium
Universitatis
H. Denifle
Parisiensis,
Chartularium
).

18:07:10 PM

THE SEARCHFORANEARLYTHOMISTIC
SCHOOL

257

the thirty"erroneous and ridiculous"


censure,and this time condemned
masters
stillmaintainedin disobedienceof
that
the
Oxford
propositions
condemnation
at Oxford is therefore
censure.6
The
actual
Kilwardby's
a
of Franciscan,Pecham, who, being
seen as the deliberateintervention
juridicallyincapable of enactingan explicitcensureon Aquinas in Paris,
ratifiedwhat was only a prohibitionin Oxford. By extension,the censureof Thomistictheseshas been perceivedas a questionof "Order rivalries",and of "Augustininprinciples"versus"Aristotelian"metaphysics.7
Later contributions,
however,have challengedthe prevailingview of
the condemnations.In order to revisethe assumptionthat the Paris and
Oxfordcondemnations
of an "earlyThomisticschool",
led to theformation
it would be worthwhileto take a brieflook at what these recentcontributionstell us about the condemnations.
Based on the sources of the 1277 condemnation at Paris, Robert
Wielockx8claimsthatAquinas was object of a separateprocessboth from
the 7 March 1277 condemnationand from Giles of Rome's censure.
Wielockx'smain sources are (1) a letterwrittenby ArchbishopPecham
of Canterbury
on 7 December 1284 to the Chancellorand RegentMasters
at Oxford;(2) some remarksmade by Henry of Ghent in the firstversion of his Quodlibet
X, q.5 (1286); (3) remarksmade by William de la
Mare in his Correctonum?
it, the letterby Pecham refershow Tempier,
(1) As Wielockxinterprets
theBishopof Paris,had thoughtabout proceeding[procedere
cogitarei)
against
in
the
the
See
after
the
Aquinas. However, during
vacancy
Apostolic
death ofJohn XXI (20 May 1277) and beforethe election of Nicholas
III (25 November 1277), some cardinals of the Roman Curia ordered
Tempier to abandon his cause. However, Pecham differentiated
clearly
the case fromOxford,and added that the canonicaljudgementregarding Aquinas was only restrictedto Paris.10
X that
(2) In Advent 1286, Henry of Ghent mentionsin his Quodlibet
ten years earlier (that is, between Christmas 1276 and Easter 1277),
6 Chartularium,
625.
7 See
Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,
above,n. 3);Callus1946/1955
above,
particularly
(op.cit.,
n. 3).
8 R. Wielockx,
Autour
duprocs
in:A. Zimmermann
deThomas
von
d'Aquin,
(ed.),Thomas
Werk
undWirkung
imLicht
neuerer
SeealsoWielockx,
's
, Berlin
1988,413-38.
Aquin.
Forschungen
edition
ofGilesofRome'sApologia
Romani
Omnia
, in:Aegidii
, III, 1,Florence
1985,
Opera
92-6,215-24.
9 Wielockx
1988(op.cit.,above,n. 8),413.
10Chartuiarium,
1988(op.cit.,above,n. 8),413-4.
I, 624-6,n. 517.Wielockx

18:07:10 PM

258

ISABELIRIBARREN

Tempier, supportedby the Papal Legate Simon de Brion, summoneda


meetingin which the Parisian masterswould have examined a number
to Aquinas5SummaTheologiae
of articles,one of themliterallycorresponding
scilicet
anima
esttantum
unaformasubstantialis,
la, q.76, a.4 ("Quod in homine
to
at
the
masters
had
unanithis
intellectiva").
meeting
According Henry,
mously maintained,with only two exceptions,that the aforesaidthesis
was false.11
(between 1277 and 1279), William de la Mare
(3) In his Correctorium
confirmsthe evidence given by Pecham and Henry of Ghent. According
to William, the mastersat Paris had reprovedthe thesis that in man
there is only one substantialform.The formulationof the thesisagain
correspondsto Aquinas' Summala., q.76, a.4.12
Wielockxadds further
argumentsin favourof a separateprocessagainst
on
two
based
aspects: on the one hand, the distinctivephrasAquinas,
ing of the censured propositionsas they appear in the three different
censures.On the other hand, the slightchronologicalgap which separates the syllabusof 7 March 1277 fromGiles of Rome's censure,and
the latter from the process against Aquinas (whose articles are finally
examinedsometimebetween2 April 1285 and 14 April 1286).13Whether
Wielockx'sthesisis accepted in its entiretyor not, his main contribution
residesin having connected the questioningof Aquinas' theses to Giles
of Rome's censure.
Wielockx's thesishas received mainlytwo reactions,the firstone by
John F. Wippel,14and the second one by J.M.M.H. Thijssen.15As for
sources
Wippel, he revisesWielockx'sview based on the three different
to
the
reconstructs
the
evidence
advanced by him. According
way Wippel
of Pecham's referenceto Tempier and his plans to move againstAquinas,
it is certainthatTempier was thinking
ofproceedingto a discussionof the
11TextofHenryof Ghent'sQuodlibet
ber
die
X editedbyL. Hdl,NeueNachrichten
in: Scholastik,
39 (1964),178-96.Wielockx
derthomasischen
Pariser
Formlehre,
Verurteilungen
1988(op. cit.,above,n. 8), 414.
12ForWilliam's
see Glorieux
text,
{op.cit.,above,n. 1),127-9.
13ForWielockx's
inconnection
forthechronology
forAquinas'
toGiles'
process
proofs
forGiles'
1988{op.cit.,above,n. 8), 422-30.Forthechronology
see Wielockx
censure,
seepp. 433-7.
to the7 March1277condemnation,
in connection
censure
14JohnF. Wippel,
A Separate
Process
andThomas
Against
Stephen
Aquinas:
Bishop
Tempier
furPhilosophie
undTheologie,
44 (1997),117-36.
Zeitschrift
in:Freiburger
Aquinas?,
15J.M.M.H.Thijssen,
attheUniversity
andHeresy
Censure
, 1200-1400,
ofParis
Philadelphia
A newInterpretation
thisissuein moredetailin 1277Revisited:
treats
1998,40-55.Thijssen
35 (1997),
andGilesofRome
, in: Vivarium,
ofThomas
Aquinas
Investigations
oftheDoctrinal
72-101.

18:07:10 PM

SCHOOL
THE SEARCHFORANEARLYTHOMISTIC

259

notice.
articlesin questionbut was prohibitedfromdoing so untilfurther
more
into
be
seems
to
as
sees
it,
Wielockx, Wippel
reading something
thetextwhenhe suggeststhattheprocesswas alreadyunderway.Pecham's
letterof itself,however,does not supportthis evidence.16
Similarly,Henry of Ghent'sreference(Advent1286) to the meetingof
the mastersin 127717concerningthe thesisof the unicityof substantial
form,does not necessarilyallude to a separate censureagainstAquinas.
Again, taken alone, Henry's textdoes notjustifythe conclusionthat the
to deal withAquinas'
meetingof the masterswas summonedspecifically
views.18
AlthoughWippel acknowledgesthat William de la Mare's remarksin
constitutean explicitstatementconcerningthe masters'
his Correctorium
of
the
unicitythesis,William's testimonyis not howeverclear
rejection
about whetherthe meetingof the masterswas not simplya part of some
otherprocess (like Giles').19
In conclusion,as regardsWielockx's claim, Wippel considersthat it
whethertheprocesscomingafter7 March
stillremainsto be demonstrated
a separatecensureagainstAquinas. For it is possiblethat
1277 constitutes
the later discussionon the unicityof substantialformwas part of the
meeting concerned with Giles' rehabilitationto Universityfunctions.
Therefore,Wielockx'sevidence,althoughpossible,is not conclusive.20
Thijssen'smain complaintabout Wielockx'sthesisis that the proposal
of a separateinquiryagainstAquinas presupposesthathe was not direcdy
targetedby any of the errorsincludedin the syllabusof 7 March 1277.
like Wippel, Thijssen also questionsWielockx'sinterpretaFurthermore,
tion of the evidence and argues that it is not sufficiendy
compelling.21
16Wippel1997(op.cit
., above,n. 14),121-2.
17Thisepisodemustnotbe confused
withanother
meeting
reported
by Henryof
X Quodlibet.
Thissecondmeeting
tookplacein 1285,whentheregent
andnonGhent's
a listofarticles
on theorders
ofPope
masters
to examine
oftheology
regent
gathered
inthelistwasthethesis
on theunicity
ofsubstantial
form.
IV. Included
Honorius
Again,
wasfalse.See Thijssen
all masters,
1997,
excepttwodissenters,
agreedthatthearticle
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),76.
18Wippel1997(op.cit.,above,n. 14),123-6.
19
at leastin whatregards
Furthermore,
Wippel1997(op.cit.,above,n. 14),126-30.
ofmatter
without
suchas Richard
thethesis
ofthepossible
existence
form,
contemporaries
took
andJohnofParisappearto doubtor evento denythatsuchmeetings
Knapwell
see Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1), 116.ForJohnofParis,see
place.ForRichard,
deJeanQuidort
Le Correctorium
"Circa"
deParis,
Rome1941,
Mller,
Corruptorii
Jean-Pierre
137.
20
1997(op.cit.
, above,n. 14),135-6.
21Wippel
1997(op.cit.,above,n. 15),72-3.
1998(op.cit.,above,n. 15),53; Thijssen
Thijssen

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260

ISABELIRIBARREN

put forwardby Wielockx,namely


Accordingto Thijssen,the testimonies
that of John Pecham, Henry of Ghent, and William de la Mare, may
also be explained as referencesto the inquiryagainst Giles of Rome.22
What is decisivein theiraccount,is thatthe latterinquiryconcernsviews
of Aquinas. Thijssen believes that the process takingplace at that time
of Thomistic
of Giles of Rome could be characterisedas an investigation
theses (viz. the unicityof substantialform,the existenceof matterwithout form).Therefore,if we are to take into account Pecham's letter,the
inquirywhich was interruptedin 1277 by the command of the Roman
Curia, could have well been Giles'. Moreover,the evidence concerning
Giles of Rome's process and career afterhis convictionsuggestthat the
case againsthim was suspended.23In agreementwithWielockx,Thijssen
with
believes that the reason why the papal court mighthave interfered
the proceedings against Giles, is mainly due to a strong Dominican
presence at the curia which happened also to be in favourof Aquinas.24
Giles of Rome, therefore,escaped an officialcondemnationon account
between his theses and those of Aquinas.25
of the similarity
In conclusion,Thijssen holds that Tempier was involvedin two doctrinalprocessesin 1277, both of whichimpliedthesesthatwere also held
by Aquinas: one againstunspecifiedmembersof the arts faculty(thatof
7 March 1277), and anotherone againstthe theologianGiles of Romeonly the formerhaving been broughtto completion.26
Beyond his reaction to Wielockx's thesis,however, Thijssen's main
contributionto the discussionover the understandingof the 1277 condemnationis twofold.On the one hand, Thijssen connects the events
leading up to 7 March 1277 with the process againstSiger of Brabant.27
22Thijssen
1997(op.cit.,above,n. 15),87-8.
23Thijssen1998(op.cit.,above,n. 15),54-5;Thijssen1997[op.cit.,above,n. 1),
90-101.
24See Wielockx
theabstentoWielockx,
1988(op.cit.,above,n. 8),427-9.According
someThomistic
thesesas false
tionoftwomasters
(in 1277and 1285)fromcensuring
masthatthey
weretwoDominican
inhisQuodlibet
X) indicates
regent
byHenry
(reported
bothat Paris
from
theDominican
withthesupport
counted
andthatthey
authorities,
ters,
atthecuria:cardinal
Giovanni
TheOrderhadpowerful
andatthepapalcourt.
protectors
William
ofMoerbeke.
GiacomoSavelli,
cardinal
GaetanoOrsini,
(SeeA. Potthast,
Regesto.
indeab anno1198ad annum
Romanorum
1304,t. 2, Berlin1875.)Moreover,
John
Pontificum
at Parisfrom1264to 1283,was
of Verceil,theGeneralMasterof theDominicans
from
theGeneral
at Milan(1278)
as canbe concluded
favourable
to Aquinas,
Chapters
andParis(1279)presided
byhim.
25Thijssen
1998(op.cit.,above,n. 15),55.
26Thijssen
1997(op.cit.,
1998(op.cit.,
above,n. 15),95-101.
above,n. 15),55;Thijssen
27Thijssen
1998(op.cit.,above,n. 15),44-9.

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On the other hand, and more to our purpose, Thijssen connects


Aquinas' thesesto the membersof the arts facultyas targetof the 1277
condemnation.The targetsof the 1277 condemnationare unspecified
membersof the arts facultyat Paris- in fact,theycould have well been
that
studentsand not necessarilymasters.28
Thijssen considers,therefore,
to identifythe names
one of the reasons why it has seemed so difficult
has been based
behind the condemnederrors,is that the examination29
on the assumptionthat Tempier's condemnationonly envisionedfaculty
of arts masters.Some propositionsmay well be connected to Arabic
sourcesand otherscould be derivedfromthe teachingof theologianssuch
as Aquinas, but propagatedby arts members.30
Based on the discussionabove, thisarticlewill take into account three
main ideas concerningour understanding
of the Paris and Oxford condemnations.First,the two condemnations,althoughconnected,belong to
situationsin Paris and in
different
proceedingsand respondto different
Oxford. The Paris condemnationof 7 March 1277 envisioneda series
of generalthesespronouncedor propagatedby membersof the arts faculty,some of the theses entailingproblematictheologicalrepercussions.
Whetheror not attemptingto disguisea particulartarget,it is clear that
Bishop Tempier wanted to check a general intellectualtendencyin the
arts facultythe fullimportof which could prove detrimentalto certain
mattersof dogma. In thislight,ArchbishopKilwardby'saction at Oxford
in 1277 could well be seen as a prudentialprocedure inspiredby the
recentmeasurestaken at Paris. As forthe condemnationcarriedout by
Pecham in 1284, it is most likelythat its more explicitcharacteris due
to certaincontumacyon the part of Oxfordmasterswho had been resistIn thatcase, Pecham,as Tempierand Kilwardby
ingKilwardby'sauthority.
himself,could have initiallyonly intended a general admonitoryword
against intellectual trends with controversialtheological significance.
actionagainstindividualOxfordDominicans(likeKnapPecham'sfurther
well in 1286) could have well been caused by provocativeaction on the
28In
thepreface
ofthisclaim,Thijssen
to the1277condemnaquotesfrom
support
in artibus".
Parisius
studentes
tion:"[. . .] nonulli
, I, 542.)Myitalics.
(Chartularium
29Notably
surles219articles
condamns
Parisle7 mars
1277,LouvainHissette's,
Enqute
Paris1977,317.
30Thijssen
1998(op.cit.,
above,n. 15),50-2.NotethatalsoWippel1997(op.cit.,
above,
in favour
ofthisview.AlsoWippel's
1995(op.cit.,above,n. 4), 269,were
n. 14)argues
de la Mare,Godfrey
suchas William
ofFontaines,
andJohn
hestates
thatcontemporaries
ofthearticles
in different
thata number
of
ofNaplesindicate
wayshowtheythought
at Aquinas.
7 March1277hadbeenaimeddirectly

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ISABELIRIBARREN

part of Oxford members. That they happened to be Dominicans is


understandable, for they were perhaps incited by a certain espritde
corpsto defendthe name and the person of a fellowbrother this time
affecteddirectlyby an explicitcondemnation.
Second, whetheror not therewas a separateprocessundertakenagainst
Aquinas, what is importantfor our purposes is that the 1277 condemnation at Paris already envisionsAquinas' theses. Although nominally
the censure concernedthe arts faculty,it involvedtheologicaltheses,or
at least thesespropoundedby theologians.As faras Aquinas' unicitythesis is concerned,it was consideredworrisomefor theologicalreasonsIn any
somethingwhich appears clearer at the Oxford condemnation.31
a medievalinterpretation
of Aristotelian
case, the unicitythesisis ultimately
physics,and to thatextentit was more likelyto appeal to the artiststhan
the theologians.
Third, Dominicans and Franciscans were not evenly distributedin
favour of Aquinas and the condemnationsrespectively,in a way that
could suggesta "partisan" reading of the events.It is a matterof fact
thatalreadyat the timeof the 1277 condemnationtherewere Dominicans
at importantposts who happened to favourAquinas- but whetherthey
subscribedto his views,or were ratherattemptingto preventa partisan
developmentof the affairs,is uncertain.On the other hand, therewere
also influentialDominicans, notably Robert Kilwardby,Archbishopof
Canterbury,and William of Hothum, prior of England, who explicitly
rejectedthe unicityof substantialformthesis.In William'scase, the defence
of Aquinas seems to have respondedeitherto a desire to safeguardthe
Order's dignity,or to theologicalpriorities.32
31In Pecham's
letter
of7 December
on theolog1284,we readhowtherepercussions
icalmatters
ofthebodiesafter
himabove
(asthenumerical
resurrection)
identity
prompted
all to "detest"
theerror
Mostinterestingly,
it is upon
this
propounded
byAquinas.
hearing
thatWilliam
is purported
ofHothum
tohaveacquiesced
(i.e.thetheological
repercussions)
to Pecham's
cause.See Chartularium,
1997(op.cit.,above,
I, 624-26,n. 517.Gf.Thijssen
n. 15),83-5.
32In thisrespect,
Pecham's
letter
of7 December
inwhat
interest
1284is ofparticular
thecensured
itreveals
ofWilliam
ofHothum's
attitude
towards
In that
Thomistic
theses.
on an earlier
conversation
Pecham
hehadentertained
withWilliam
letter,
reports
regardattitude
towards
theDominican
Order.ButapartfromPecham's
reassuringPecham's
's 1277prohibition
on howhisrenewing
doesnotbearill will
ingremarks
Kilwardby
theDominicans,
itisWilliam's
toPecham's
areofinterwhich
against
response
allegations
est.Uponhearing
aboutthetheological
William
oftheunicity
thesis,
repercussions
replies
to Pechamthathe maysurely
thiserror
withhisknowledge
andconsent
condemn
(hunc
errorem
secure
demeaconscientia
Chartularium
, I, 624-6,n. 517.
condemnetis),

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263

Closely connectedto the bipartisanview of these events,is the handling of authorities,in particularAristotleand Augustine.Aristotlehas
been traditionally
consideredas the main influenceforthe unicityof substantialformthesis,while the pluralistsare seen as primarilyindebtedto
Augustine.As will be seen, however,the sourcesbehind the unitarianor
the pluralistthesisare much less clear-cutand oftenoverlap.
Based on the revisedview of the Paris and Oxford condemnations,
the purposeof thisstudyis to reexaminethe statementthat,as a resultof
the condemnations,
a "Thomisticschool" had emergedby the end of the
thirteenth
This
examinationwill be carriedout in threestages.
century.
First,it will attemptto give a definitionof "school" according to what
thetermcould have signified
by the end of the thirteenth
century.Second,
on
of
the
the
of
substantial
form,
focusingspecifically
unicity
question
the main tenetsof the unitarianand pluralistoutlookswill be outlined.
The purposeis a fairerassessmentof the sourcesand authoritiesbehind
Aquinas' thesisand the pluralistview. Third, and inasmuchas the unicitythesiswas perceivedas entailingproblematictheologicalconsequences,
we willconcentrateon the specifictheologicalissue of the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody livingand dead. This was perceivedas perhaps the
most crucial theologicalquestion in relation to the significanceof the
unicitythesis.The developmentof thistheologicalissue will be followed
firstin Aquinas, then in William de la Mare as a negativereactionto
Aquinas' view,and finally,as positivereactionsto Aquinas' thesis,in two
members of the Dominican Order, namely Richard Knapwell (from
Oxford)and Giles of Lessines (fromParis). The way in which Richard
and Giles handle the fullimplicationsof the unicitytheoryin contrastto
William de la Mare's, mightprove relevantfor an assessmentof the
natureof the Dominican defenceof Aquinas which emergedat the end
of the thirteenth
century.
2. TheDefinition
ofa "School"33
By "school" we generallyunderstanda "school of thought",as a body
of people or pupilsadheringto a certainset of principles,doctrines,methThe cohesionof thisgroup of people is based on their
ods, or authorities.
fixedallegianceto that doctrineor set of principles,an allegiance which
33Forthesensesin whichwe can
before
thefourteenth
speakof"schools"
century,
thisarticle
willbe mainly
basedonW.J.Courtenay,
Schools
andScholars
inFourteenth-Century
, Princeton,
England
N.J.1987,171-5.

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ISABELIRIBARREN

is clearlydifferentiated
fromsimpleprejudicein that it is not motivated
unreasoned
by
opinion. Thus, the adherenceto a school should presupa
pose "speculativeawareness" of the doctrinewhich the school represents,in the sense that the membersof the school should understandthe
fullimplicationsof the doctrineand accordingto that choose to adhere
to that particularview.
century,however,the term"school" was
By the end of the thirteenth
never understoodin this sense as a "school of thought"attached to an
abstractideologicalcurrent,but it was alwayspersonifiedin the doctrine
of a leadingfigurein a way stilltoo individualistic.
Justlike PeterAbelard
in the twelfth
century,Aquinas attractedboth followersand critics.It was
the way in which these individualfiguresexercisedreason withina theological question,which aroused eithercensureor adherence. What the
scholar associated with the term "school" was a
late thirteenth-century
place of study and its standard curriculumof teaching,ratherthan a
specificphilosophicalcommitment.Thus, a "Dominican school" did not
referred
, but moreimmediately
necessarily
implya particulardoctrinalcredo
to the mastersthat belonged to the Order. In thissense, Kilwardbywas
no less a member of the Dominican school than enthusiasticdefenders
of Aquinas such as Knapwell and John of Paris.
By the same token, a "school" was not necessarilyconstrainedby
geographicalfactors,as it was not determinedby membershipto one
and sourcesused by the late thirThe terminology
particularuniversity.
the
connectionbetween the learning
masters
reveal
close
teenth-century
between
in Paris and Oxford.Indeed, it would be futileto draw differences
the approach and methods of the Oxford and Parisian mastersin an
attemptto delineatetwo separated"schools".By the end of the thirteenth
centuryintellectualfiguressuch as Robert Kilwardby,John Pecham, and
Williamde la Mare belonged to the Parisianworldas much as to Oxford
and many of them had in fact been sent to Paris to obtain theirdoctorate.34Oxford theologians were concerned primarilywith issues of
Parisian origin,and Aquinas' theseswere seen as one of these imports.
There was a unityin the intellectualtraditionsof the two universities
and subjectsof
which was expressedin the same methods,terminology,
Both
Oxford
and Paris proliterature
testifies.
as
the
correctoria
discussion,
duced treatisesas well as defensiveworks.Giles of Lessines handled the
34FortheParisian
cf.Courtenay
1987{op.cit.,above,
in English
influence
education,
in thirteenththenotionof a "schoolofthought"
wherehe questions
n. 33), 147-51,
scholastic
landscape.
century

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265

matterunder discussionas soberlyas did Thomas Sutton,and Richard


Knapwell's Quareserved as a referenceto John of Paris'35own replyto
Williamde la Mare.
Therefore,the centripetalforce that was at work in the Dominican
of teaching
Order between 1280 and 1305 conferringsome uniformity
into it was not necessarilyindicativeof a "school of thought".Rather,
this forcepartlyrespondedto a defensivemove against the condemnationsof 1277, and partlyto a rivalrywiththe Franciscansforintellectual
This correspondencebetweena religiousorder (Dominicans,
superiority.
Augustinians,Franciscans)and a particularteachingtradition(Aquinas,
Giles of Rome, Scotus) was howevertemporaryand began to disappear
in thisrespect
century.It is significant
by the firsthalfof the fourteenth
there
was a shift
thatalreadyat the beginningof the fourteenth
century
in intellectualinterestsas Oxford began to defineitselfindependentlyof
Paris.Followersof Aquinas neverreachedthe staturethatlaterFranciscan
figuressuch as Ockham achieved. Franciscansbecame a decisive presence in Oxfordwhen theybegan to send theirstudentsthereratherthan
to Paris, and the exclusivereferenceto Aquinas in Oxford remainedas
a trendpeculiar to the last part of the thirteenth
century.The affinitive
connectionbetween Oxford and Paris was, therefore,a temporaryfeature determinedby the eventssurrounding1277. It was the theological
consensuswhich reignedoutside the Dominican Order which acted as
one of theprincipalcorrosiveforceson the adherenceto Thomisticteachin Oxford.As we shall see, thistheologicalconsensusis
ing, particularly
in the debate over the unicityof formthesis.
manifest
particularly
and Sources
and Plurality
3. Unicity
ofForms:Basic Principles
Both the pluralistsand the unitarianswere agreed that the originof the
intellectualsoul was creation.The conflictbetweenthemratherconsisted
in definingthe relation between the intellect and other faculties of
the soul. Aquinas avoids the issue altogetherby discardingone of the
terms.To the question"Is it possiblethata compositebe essentiallyone,
if thereco-existmany substantialforms?"he statesthat the rationalsoul
sufficesas the source of man's existence,and that once it arrives,the
sensitive
soul and theformswhichprecedeit willdisappear.It is superfluous
35JohnQuidort
"Circa"
before
sometime
theCorrectorium
ofPariswrote
1284,andafter
deParis
"Circa"
deJeanQuidort
Cf.Le Correctorium
, ed. Mller
Quare.
corruptorii
Knapwell's
1941[op.cit
., above,n. 19).

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ISABELIRIBARREN

to assume a pluralityof formsin a single composite substance. The


real unityof being requiresthe unicityof the formalprinciple:ensetunum
convertuntur.m
Essentially,the doctrineof the unicityof substantialformis an interpretationof Aristotelianphysics,and is deeply rooted in the theoryof
The qualificationof form as "substantial"is of great
hylemorphism.37
and
must
not be overlooked.The substantialform,accordimportance
ing to Aquinas, is the absolute determiningprinciple,the sole source of
perfectionand activityin the composite.Consequently,it is not possible
fora compositesubstanceto have more than one substantialform.This
of one compositeis due to the
is held on the groundsthat the existence
of
one
"substantial"
form
and "one" formare therefore
form:
presence
In
of
human
terms.
the
case
beings,the intellectualsoul (and
equivalent
not the vegetativeor the sensitivesoul) is ultimatelyman's substantial
formin that it is the principlewhich accounts for man being a human
and not an animal substance.What makes a human being such is the
intellectualsoul. Therefore,the intellectualsoul- and not the sensitive
him from
is what makes man a human substanceand what differentiates
an animal. The vegetativesoul (or power)and the sensitivesoul (or power)
are also principlesof actualityin a human compositein that they are
also forms.But theyare not be "substantial"formsbecause althoughthey
can explain how a human being belongs to the wider realm of living
beings which includes plants and animals, they are not what definesa
human being as such. What it is to be a human being is only ultimately
explained by the intellectualsoul.
This tenetrespondsto Aquinas' beliefthatin all corporealbeings,apart
fromthe matter-form
composition,thereis compositionbetweenessence
and existence(esse).In introducingthe notion of an act of being (esse)
36Forthemainpassages
themetaphysical
oftheunicity
ofsubpremises
containing
thatfollow,
cf.Aquinas,
la, q.76,a.3; Contra
Gentiles
formand theprinciples
stantial
,
, II, lect.l.
II, C.57;In De anima
37The theory
constitutes
thebasisofAristotelian
as
ofhylemorphism
Physics,
physics.
Natural
arethose
which
ofnature
as a whole.
understood
Aristotle
it,is thescience
objects
within
andphysics
is therefore
the
forchangeor movement
havea capacity
themselves,
themselves
which
andoftheobjects
science
ofsuchnatural
Hylemorphism
changes
change.
ofchange.Everylivingbeingis
and formas theprinciples
is thedoctrine
of matter
matter
withthebody)
ofmatter
andform,
(identified
beingwhatpossesses
potencomposed
intheseterms,
withthesoul)whatpossesses
andform
actuality.
(identified
Change,
tiality
matter.
The
toactuality
ofpotential
andthebringing
ofa form
is thegradual
acquisition
of natural
thusdrawsattention
to thecontinuity
ofpotentiality
and actuality
doctrine
change.

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whicheven actualisesthe form,Aquinas was makinga pluralityof forms


unnecessary.For if "form"is understoodas the proper receiverof the
act of being,the compositionof essewithseveralformswould necessarily
entailseveralsubstantialforms,and hence severalactuallyexistingbeings.
to identify
formwithactuIt is a featureof the unicitythesis,therefore,
in
the
case
the
not
which
is
pluralistview.38
necessarily
ality something
Since forAquinas the one and onlybeing (esse)a substancehas comes
entirelyand immediatelyfromthe actualisingform,all precedingforms
Whateveris posteriorto thisactualisingformis consemustdisappear.39
accidental
(and not substantial)to the composite.In otherwords,
quendy
betweenan accidentalformand
The distinction
nonfitmotusin substantia.
a substantialformis crucial forAquinas, and is one of his main reasons
for not acceptinga pluralityof forms.Whereas the recipientof a suban accidentalform
stantialformis somethingwhich is pure potentiality,
arrivesin somethingwhich is alreadyan actual existent.If, followingthe
pluralistclaim, thereis more than one substantialformin a composite,
the conditionsfora substantialform.
alreadythe lowestformwould satisfy
Moreover,any higherformwould be characterisedas an accidentalform,
since it would arrive in an already existingsubstance. The difference
betweena substantialand an accidentalform,then,would no longerhold
unlesswe accept a unitarianprinciple.
One of the consequencesof this teachingis to deny "universalhylemorphism".Defendersof thistheorygenerallyheld that all beings,apart
fromGod, are composed in thattheyinclude potentiality
(i.e. matter).It
was believed that in man thereare two instancesof matter,one which
is intrinsicto his soul and inseparablefromthe formof his soul, and
anotherwhich is extrinsicto the soul and is the corporealmatterof the
body.40Accordingto Aquinas, by contrast,the presenceof matterwithin
38See Aquinas,
Contra
Gentiles
De ente
etessentia
VII, 2; Summa
, II, c.54;
, c.5;Depotentia,
ST la, q.3,a.4; q.5,a.3.
39See
on embryoST la, q.118,a.2,ad 2 (thishadparticular
consequences
Aquinas,
oneandproduces
theeffects
thatthelatter
theinferior
Thesuperior
form
replaces
logy).
a form
Thereare no intermediate
wascapableofcausing.
forms;
beingpureactuality,
in another.
theunionbetween
contained
orbe "virtually"
cannot
Consequently,
pre-exist
De spiritualibus
creaturis
is immediate.
See alsoAquinas,
andsubstantial
form
matter
,
prime
a.3; SCG, cc.57and58.
40
ofAvicebron
De ente
backtotheFonsVitae
thisdoctrine
traced
,
(seeAquinas
Aquinas
to showthatit owedits
ofthisposition,
Bonaventure,
notably
attempted
C.4).Defenders
inquattuor
libros
Sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi
Commentantes
SeeBonaventure,
toAugustine.
,
origin
de la
in:Opera
omnia
II, d.17, a.l, q.2. William
1882-1902,
, AdClarasAquas(Quaracchi)
forthedocwhich
couldprovide
wasawareofthesupport
Mare,forexample,
Augustine
William
from
and in thisspirit
textssuchas Confessions
trineofspiritual
matter,
profits

18:07:10 PM

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ISABELIRIBARREN

an intelligenceis incompatiblewiththe latter'scapacityto performintellectual operations.41Prime matter42has no actualitywhatsoeverunless


it has no properties,and is thereunitedto a form;it is pure potentiality,
fore unintelligible.
Thus, Aquinas5main tenetsconcerningthe unicityof substantialform
were also accompanied by basic principlesof Aristotelianphysics,not
of
necessarilydeduced of themselvesfrom the axiom of convertibility
being and unity.Two instancesof such an incorporationof Aristotelian
physicsby Aquinas are the potentialcharacterof prime matterand the
of prime matterof itself.Note, however,that the conunintelligibility
and unintelligibledoes not
ception of prime matteras pure potentiality
of itselfformpart of the debate over the unicityof substantialform.
However, such an understandingof prime matterdid contributeto give
rise to the debate, insofaras the denial of all actualityin matterat least
calls fora union of matterand formwhere the latterplays an exclusive
Moreover,
actualisingrole in the compositeas the sole sourceof perfection.
a prime matterwhich had no positivevalue whatsoeverwas problematic
in accountingfor continuityin naturalchange.
As forthe pluralists,theyrarelyagree in theiraccounts of matterand
formand the relationbetweenthe two, beyond an acceptance of certain
degree of actuality in matter something strictlyconnected to their
theologicaland doctrinalconcerns.The generalpluralistview definesmatter in termsof accounts of change wherebymatterstandsindependently
from the form.43However, a double conceptionof matteris generally
onGenesis
hadtentatively
attrib5, 5, inwhich
XII, 6, andtheLiteral
Augustine
Commentary
de la Mare,Correctorium,
ed. Glorieux
See William
to all living
1927
utedmatter
beings.
cit.,above,n. 1),49-50.
(op.
33des. Thomas , ed. M.-D.Roland-Gosselin,
41See
etessentia
Le "Deente
d'Aquin
Aquinas,
Paris1948,31-2.
42Notethat"prime
thesameas "matter".
"Matter"
isdescribed
matter"
isnotnecessarily
initself
is neither
a something
as "thatwhich
VII, 3, 1029a20-21)
(Metaphysics
byAristotle
is determined".
Thisled
noranyofthoseotherthings
nora quantity
bywhicha thing
as purepotenandGilesofRome,toviewmatter
suchas Aquinas,
somethinkers
Albert,
andofitself
itscorresponding
devoidofactuality
thatis,as completely
apartfrom
tiality,
in thatitis notunderin thissensewascalled"prime
Matter
form.
substantial
matter",
"Matter"
ontheother
thecomposite.
stoodwithin
hand,isusumatter"),
(andnot"prime
ina composite,
thatwhich
ofpotentiality
subsists
under
the
as theprinciple
allydescribed
actualised
form.
For
the
notion
of
matter"
as
is
therefore
of
form
and
by
"prime
change
seeArthur
Aristotle
anditslaterinterpretations,
itwaspropounded
article,
Hyman's
by
3'
'First
in:H.A.Wolson
andL.W.
Matter3
andAvicenna'
s andAverroes
Aristotle's
Form3,
Corporeal
A.
son
Schwarz
1965,vol.1, 385-406.
Volume,
Jerusalem
(eds.),Harry Wolf Jubilee
43Forthecommon
cenviewin thethirteenth
ofthepluralist
metaphysical
principles

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269

a simplematter,that is, the subject of


maintained,where we findfirstly
substantialform,and secondly,matteras the subjectof change. Avicenna
and Averroes,attempting
to harmonisethe two accounts,set out to show
how "firstmatter"could also be said to be a substance.As part of this
attempt,they introducedthe notion of "corporeal form" to show that
"firstmatter"was a substancein the sense of havingsome sortof "form".
or as an active
Thus, "matter"can be seen eitheras pure potentiality,
and it is in the lattersense that one could speak of a forma
potentiality,
corporeitatis.AA
Henceforth,the commentators'accounts of "corporealform"became
an elementof medievaldiscussionsabout "firstmatter".The notionof a
.45Those who
formae
"corporealform"was then conceived as an inchoatio
in the thirteenth
in
an
admitted
nature
inchoatio
formaeheld that
century
translatedin an initialactivity,so
matterpossessedan active potentiality
thatthe distinctand completeformto be achieved at the end of the genwithinmatter'sactivepower.46
erativeprocessexistedalready,ifincomplete,
The notionof an inchoatio
, therefore,
formae
supposes the developmentof
an imperfectforminto a more perfectone, thus excludingthe possibility of a successionof forms.For this reason, the notion of an "original
form"as some sort of materialprincipleremainsirreconcilablewith the
unitarianthesis.
As the pluralistthesissaw it, closelyrelatedto the notion of a corporeal formwere two principles,mainlyidentified
withAugustine:universal
seeR. Zavalloni,
Richard
deMediavilla
etla controverse
surlapluralit
des
, inLouvain
formes
tury,
1951,310-4.
44Forthetracing
oftheconnected
of"prime
matter"
notions
and "corporeal
form"
andtheir
tomedieval
seeHyman's
introduction
article
discussions,
{op.cit.,above,n. 42).
Fortherelevant
inAvicenna,
seeAl-Shifa
, Metaphysics
IV, 2, 85v,2; II, 2, 75r,
passages
to theFrench
Introduction
Avicenne
2; OnDefinition
, translated
, Paris
byA.M. Goichon,
Orbis
seeDe Substantia
on
1933,60, 394-5.ForAverroes,
I, V, 320r,B; LongCommentary
onMetaphysics
I, com.63,IV, 29v,D; com.70,IV, 32r,C; LongCommentaiy
VII,
Physics
com.9.
45The terminchoatio
forthefirst
timein Robert
De luceseu
Grosseteste,
formae
appears
Werke
deinchoatione
desRobert
Grosseteste,
, ed. L. Baur,in:Diephilosophische
formarum
Bischofs
vonLincoln
seeslifeas thefirst
which
, Mnster/W
1912,51 ff.Grosseteste
form,
impresses
inmatter.
Grosseteste
dimensions
Thisfirst
form
identifies
with
Avicenna's
spatial
explicitly
The term,
of inchoatio
therefore,
, appearsonlyin Scholasticism.
forma
formae
corporeitatis.
as willbe seen,theconception
behind
theterm
wastraced
backbyscholastics
However,
to denote
doctrine
ofseminal
reasons.
Augustine's
46Forthosescholastics
whosupported
thisview,seePeterofTarantasia,
Sent.
II, d.18,
Sent.II, d.18, q.l, a.2. Forthoseagainst
thenotionof an inchoatio
q.l; Bonaventure,
Gilesof Rome,In De Physico
auditu
, see notably
, II, lect.l,dub.9: Sent.II, d.l,
formae
II, q.22.
p. 1,q.2,a.4; d.l8, q.2,a.l; Quodlibet

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270

ISABELIRIBARREN

and the rationes


seminales
.48Accordingto the first,if the
hylemorphism47
is
a
of
and
thenit mustbe understood
matter
form,
soul, too,
compound
as a substancesusceptibleto intrinsicchange and not as the only and
immutableprincipleof all being in the composite.The vegetativeand
sensitivesouls can coexistwith the intellectualsoul, all playinga part in
the composite's being and perfection.49
According to the second prinin
the constitutionof a new submatter
is
believed
to
contribute
ciple,
stancein virtueof an actual set of propertiesof whichit has been endowed
in its own right.Matter,it is argued, has some degree of actuality,that
is, it is a positiveentitywhich is capable of being perfectedby the intel-

47The
of universal
was as suchprothetheory
ofwhether
hylemorphism
question
natural
itwasat leastinherent
toAugustine's
orwhether
nounced
philosobyAugustine
thatsucha theory
believed
formed
ThomasofYork,forexample,
phy,is muchdebated.
Vat.Lat.
6771,fol.88d,quoted
(seeThomasofYork,Sapientale,
thought
partofAugustine's
inAugustine,
could
1951(op.cit.,
however,
above,n. 43),443).Somepassages
byZavalloni
tothesoul.SeeAugustine,
somematter-form
theviewthatheattributed
composition
support
et anima,
onGenesis
Literal
, VII, c.6,PL 34, col. 359,n. 9: "Fortasse
potuit
Commentary
vel
cuiusvel pulchritudo
ea ipsa naturafieret,
virtus,
quae animadicitur,
antequam
adlitteram
materiam
virtium
defformitas
,
est,habere
[Degenesi
prosuogenere
spiritulem"
aliquam
See alsoibid.,
ed.J.Zycha,PragueVII,c.27,PL
1894,224-5].Myitalics.
Vienna-Leipzig
ofuniversal
ofthetheory
34, col. 369,n. 39 [ed.Zycha,206].The attributions
hylelot.Aquinas
attribmakeup a rather
in thethirteenth
heterogeneous
century
morphism
in hisDe ente
etessentia
utesittoAvicebron
, c.4;Sent.
II, d.3,q.l, a.l. See alsoA. Forest,
selon
saint
Thomas
duconcret
La structure
, Paris1931[2ed. 1956],109-10.
d'Aquin
mtaphysique
in hisSent.
it withAugustine,
Bonaventure
tendsto identify
II, d.17,a.l, q.2; II, d.18,
Laphilosomodern
F. VanSteenberghen,
scholars,
a.2,q.l; II, d.17,a.2,q.2,ad 6. Among
as
, Louvain1966,46-7,150,245-46,249,seesuniversal
hylemorphism
phieauXIIIesicle
1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),422,442,on theother
influence.
Zavalloni
Avicebron's
hand,
influence.
theAugustinin
rather
stresses
48The conception
andforthatmatter
ofan inchoatio
ofa corporeal
, was
form,
formae
in thatinbothcaseswefindtheidea
ofseminal
reasons
notion
seenas akintoAugustine's
is potentiality.
Aswefinditin
thenature
ofwhich
of(material)
ofprinciples
production,
areto
whichcontain
all thecreatures
which
reasons
arelatent
seminal
germs
Augustine,
in time.See Augustine,
De Trinitate
be gradually
, III, c.9, PL 42, col. 877,
developed
onGenesis
1968(CC 50),143];Literal
Turnhout
n. 16 [ed.W.J.Mountain,
, VI,
Commentary
reasons
c.ll, PL 34, col.346,n. 18 [ed.Zycha(op.cit.,above,n. 47), 183-5]Seminal
on accountofwhicha humanbeingengenders
havetheirownnatureand efficiency,
SeeAugustine,
Literal
ofanother
andnotananimal
human
another
Commenta
species.
being
the
onGenesis,
IX, c.17,PL 34,col.406,n. 32 [ed.Zycha,290-2].The latter
supported
withan inchoatio
andtheefficient
of
reasons
seminal
identifies
viewwhich
formae,
principle
in matter.
thenotionofa corporeal
witha certain
reasons
seminal
However,
actuality
twodecisively
introduced
intotheWestthrough
form
was,as we haveseen,mostlikely
andAverroes.
Avicenna
Aristotelian
authors,
namely
49Examples
Sent.
inBonaventure,
ofthisviewarefound
II, d.17,a.l, q.2,ad 6; Matthew
Paris
deanima
ofAquasparta,
164,fol.80v),ed.A.-J.Gondras,
XIII, q.4 (Aedil.
Quaestiones
1961,51-73.Cf.Zavaloni1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),311.

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271

lectualsoul.30Once separated,we can stillreferto a cadaver as the same


body because it preservesan actualityof its own which is independent
fromthe soul. Form is only a determining
principlewhich preparesthe
In this context,then, "potencompositefor subsequentdeterminations.
under the
in
a
are
understood
and
way unintelligible
"actuality"
tiality"
unitarianprinciples.WhereasAquinas and his followersclearlydistinguish
and assign them separatelyto formand matactualityfrompotentiality
and a forma
the pluralistsbelieve in a materiauniversalis
ter respectively,
Form in this contextcan be said to possess a certainpotenuniversalis.
formcan be supersededand intrinsically
pertialityin thata pre-existent
a "subordination"of forms
There is, therefore,
fectedby a new form.51
clasheswiththe unitarianbeliefin the immutaa claimwhichimmediately
form.
of
bility
As far as the sources go, mainlyAugustineand Aristotlehave been
claimed as authoritiesforeitherthe unitarianor the pluralalternatively
ist view. There is a generalconsensusamong modrnscholars,however,
in identifying
Augustineas the main pluralistinfluence,and in seeing
the unitarianthesis.52
Aristotelian
Avicebron,as another
physicsas befitting
main source, has enjoyed more unanimityin being identifiedas the
50In support
to a passageof
haveappealedin particular
of thisclaim,pluralists
Turnhout
1981,
, XII, 6 (PL 32,col.828,n. 6 [ed.L. Verheijen,
Confessions
Augustine's
between
form
and
thatmatter
is "something
intermediate
CC 27,218-9]),
where
hestates
The "aliquid"
was
is in facta "nihilaliquid".
, andthatmatter
(propre
nihil)"
nothingness
in matter.
Thisis furthermore
to argueforsomeform
byAugustine's
supported
enough
as it can receive
a form
informs
insofar
statement
thatmatter
, c.18,PL
[Deverareligione
Turnhout
1962(CC 32),209]).
34,col. 137,n. 36 [ed.J. Martin,
51Thisentails
a different
substantial
form.
thattoeachessential
perfection
corresponds
a different
form
foreachofitsoperations.
This
every
beingimplies
Bythesametoken,
a hierarchy
whichaccounts
for
offorms
in a substance,
however,
expresses
multiplicity
inscholastics,
ofthistenet
seePeter
Forexpressions
theunity
ofthecomposite.
JohnOlivi,
AdClarasAquas(Quaracchi)
librum
ed.B.Jansen,
1922insecundum
Sententiarum,
Quaestiones
Degradu
ofMediavilla,
1951(op.cit.,
above,n. 43),
, ed.Zavalloni
26,50;Richard
formarum
Sent.
1951,310.
II, d.15,a.1,q.2,ad 3. Cf.Zavalloni
140;Bonaventure,
52See forexample
mdival
tinianaeG. Thry,
, in:ActaHebdomadae
L'augustinisme
Augus
onp. 146;E. Gilson,
Thomisticae
1931,140-200,
, Turin-Rome
History
ofChristian
Philosophy
cases(which
to ourjudgement
intheMiddle
3rded.,London1989,416-20.In other
Ages,
theconflict
is notseenas one of
withtheprevious),
do notfundamentally
disagree
butofunequally
forms
ofAristotelianism,
versus
Aristotelianism
developed
Augustinianism,
See Van Steenberghen,
themoreauthentic.
de
where
considered
Siger
Aquinas'is often
dansl'histoire
deVaristotlisme
indites
Brabant
sesuvres
, vol.2: Siger
, Louvain1942,719;
d'aprs
a direct
heascribes
anddecisive
influence
1951(op.cit.,
Zavalloni
above,n.43),422,where
he speaksof a "contaminated
overthepluralist
ofAugustine
view;pp. 472-73,where
" deGilles
deLessines
Letrait
"Deunitate
M. De Wulf,
, Louvain1901,
Aristotelianism";
formae
in
to thepluralist
fauss"
he
of
where
13,
referring
understanding
speaks "peripattisme
ofthephilosopher.

18:07:10 PM

272

ISABELIRIBARREN

of the pluralistview.53In assessingthesesources,howprimaryforerunner


a
main
distinction
should be made betweenwhat can be attributed
ever,
to each of theseauthoritiesas part of theirdoctrinalprinciples,and what
has been claimed fromthem by unitariansor pluralistsfor the sake of
polemical argumentagainst the oppositeview.
To startwith the least controversial,the fundamentalprincipleleading Avicebron'sdoctrineas shown in his Fons Vitaeis the conceptionof
universalmatterand universalform.Except for God, all substancesare
composed of matterand form.54What distinguishesone creaturefrom
anotheris the additionof a singleor manycomplementary
forms,accordas
a
a plant,
to
which
each
creature
is
determined
mineral,
simple
ing
an animal, or a human being. This representsa clear propoundingof
and to that extentit seems fair to state that
universalhylemorphism,
Avicebron is at least one of the sources behind the pluralist view.55
R. Zavalloni,56on the other hand, has identifiedPhilip the Chancellor
as a more proximateinfluenceof the pluralistdoctrine.57
Philip appeared
to have propounded a pluralityof formsin connectionwith universal
hylemorphism
approximatelyfortyyears beforethe firstcondemnations.
Althoughadmittingthat Avicebron's influenceupon the pluralistconceptionis remarkable,Zavalloni holds thathe mustnot be consideredas
For that matter,more
the theory'sexclusiveor preponderantforerunner.
53In Thecondemnation
at Oxford
that
ofSt Thomas
{op.cit.,above,n. 3) Callusaffirms
is theoffspring
oftheJewish
"there
canbe nodoubtthatthepluralist
theory
philosopher
in hisstudy
ofGilesofLessines'
De
hisFonsVitaeAndDe Wulf,
Avicebron,
through
de la matire
etde
unitate
franciscaine
formae
{op.cit.,above,n. 52),20: "L'interpretation
dansle FonsVitae
estle corcontenue
d'Avicebron
. . . Avicebron
la forme
estpleinement
de la theorie
rupteur
hylmorphique."
54Avicebron,
exArabico
inLatinum
trans
latusabJohanne
et
FonsVitae
Avancebrolis
Hispano
Mnster
Gundissalino
Dominico
I, c.5,p. 7; II, c.24,p. 69;
1892-95,
, ed. Cl. Baeumker,
substantiae
III, 23,p. 133;III, 26,p. 142,V, 18,p. 290;III, 32,pp. 154-155
("Formae
multaesunt");IV, c.l, p. 211; IV, c.5,p. 220; V, c.12,p. 278. See also
compositae
1951{op.cit.,above,n. 43),421.
Zavalloni
55In thisrespect
to notethat,although
universal
could
it is important
hylemorphism
offorms,
theconverse
is notequally
true.Ifweadmit
a plurality
wellbe seenas implying
andform,
theunionofsoulandbodydoesnotconofmatter
thatthesoulis composed
butof twosubstances
to someextent
detersistin theunionofcorrelative
principles,
ifincomplete.
to holdthatform
is a dispositive
and matter
However,
mined,
principle
doctrine
hasbeenmoreor lesscharacterised),
somehow
a positive
(as thepluralist
entity
ofmatter
and
entailthatall beingsapartfrom
God arecomposed
doesnotnecessarily
thesisis seenas implying
universal
the
as thepluralist
form.Insofar
hylemorphism,
one.
a legitimate
thetwocouldbe considered
between
connection
56Zavalloni
1951{op.cit.,above,n. 43),422.
57See
debono,
ed. N. Wicki,
Bern1985.
Summa
Cancellarius
Parisiensis,
Philippus

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273

than to Avicebron,the pluralistsare indebtedto Avicenna who- as we


saw- developed the notion of a corporealformfromAristotle'sphysics
Avicenna (and forthat matteralso Averroes)sets out
and metaphysics.58
to show how Aristotle's"prime matter"could also be said to be a substance.As part of thisattempt,he positedthe notionof "corporealform"
to show that"primematter"was a substancein the sense of havingsome
kind of "form".59
In the case of Augustine,mainlytwo pluralistprinciplesare claimed
to have derivedfromhis doctrine:one, that there is some actualityin
matter,or more precisely,the notionof a corporealform;the other,universalhylemorphism.
As forthe firstprinciple,it has been clearlystated
thatit was introducedintothe West by two decisivelyAristotelian
authors,
In
it
is
doubtful
Avicenna
and
Averroes.
whether
fact,
Augustine
namely
ever spoke explicitlyof a formacorporeitatis.
However, the notion might
have been perceivedas possessingan Augustinincharacterinasmuchas
some passagesin Augustineappear to describematteras a positiveentity.
The theoryof matterin Augustineis closelyconnectedto the doctrine
of creation,and hence the relationusuallyfoundbetween the notion of
The latterat least calls
a corporealformand Augustine'sratioseminalis.
the
of suba
inasmuch
as
it
admits
thesis
perfectibility
upon pluralist
seminales
execute the simultaneouscrestantialform.Indeed, the rationes
- if
ation of all creatures,and as such have some "form"
incomplete
whichdevelopsinto somethingcompleteand more perfect.Moreover,in
matena
his LiteralCommentary
on Genesis
, Augustinespeaks of an informis
,60
fromotherpassages in his works
the natureof whichhas been interpreted
we findmatterbeing
as possessingsome positivevalue.61In the Confessions
58ForAvicenna
andthenotion
of"corporeal
seeHyman's
article
1965(op.cit.,
form",
above,n. 42),395-403.
59Avicenna,
to
II, 2, 75r,2; IV, 2, 85v,2; OnDefinitions
, trans,
, Metaphysics
Al-Shifa
Avicenne
French
A.M.Goichon,
Introduction
, Paris1933,60,394-395.
by
60
Literal
onGenesis
, I, c.15,PL 34,col. 257,n. 29 [ed.Zycha
Commentary
Augustine,
materia
formatis
rebustem1894(op.cit.,above,n. 47),21, 7-15]:"Nonquiainformis
simulconcreatum,
etundefactum
est,etquodfactum.
porepriorest,cumsitutrumque
estverborum,
verbaveroformatam
vocemindicant
Sicutenimvoxmateria
[. . .] itacreatorDeusnonpriore
fecitinformem
materiam."
AlsoLit.Comm.
onGenesis
, V,
tempore
sedcausali
c. 5, PL 34,col.326,n. 13 [ed.Zycha,146,6-8]:"Nonitaquetemporali,
et corporalis,
et spiritualis
de qua
ordine
materies,
formabilisque
priusfactaestinformis
Manich
fieret
faciendum
esset".Cf.De Gen.Contra
., II, c.3,PL 34,col. 198,n. 4.
quod
61In whatfollows,
to specific
in thefollowing
we willbe referring
works
passages
by
1981(op.cit.,above,
XII, 6, PL 32,col.828,n. 6 [ed.Verheijen
Confessions
Augustine:
Literal
onGenesis
n. 50],218-9];
, lib.imperf.,
IV,c.12,PL 34,col.224 [ed.Zycha
Commentary

18:07:10 PM

274

ISABELIRIBARREN

describedas somethingintermediary
betweenformand nothingness(proin
the
sense
of
a
nihil
, which has served as supportfor
pre nihil)
aliquid
in
matter
some
kind
of
form.
This statementhas been seen as
asserting
furtherconfirmedby a passage of De verareligione
were Augustineholds
that matterinformsinsofaras it can receivea form.62
There is, then,an
the
resonance
to
notion
a
of
Augustinin
corporeal form (which in
Scholasticismwas also identifiedto the idea of an inchoatio
formae
), inasmuch as in some passages in Augustinematteris founddescribedas posThe notionof a corporealformas such,
sessingsome degreeof formality.
a
is
of
clear
Aristotelian
however,
background.
As forthe doctrineof universalhylemorphism,
whichalso profitedfrom
it is closelyrelatedto the pluralistdoctrineof form
Augustine'sauthority,
as "dispositiveprinciple".For ifthe soul is constituted
of matterand form,
the union of body and soul, ratherthan signifying
a pure potentiality
being entirelyinformedby an active principle,entailssomehow two substancesin some way determinedalthoughincomplete.Some advocatesof
the pluralist thesis have maintained that universal hylemorphismis
inherentin Augustine's natural philosophy.63Again, it is a matterof
and even believersin the unicityof substantialformhave
interpretation,
foundsupportin Augustine.64
There are clearercases in Augustine,howwhich
seem
to
some
ever,
suggest
compositionin the soul.65At least in
what concernsuniversalhylemorphism,
it seems thatAvicebron
therefore,
{pace Cavalloni)is a more directsource for the pluralistview. Augustine

1894{op.cit.,above,n. 47),466,5-21;De vera


, c.18,PL 34,col. 137,n. 36 [ed.
religione
Martin1962{op.cit.,above,n. 50),209].
62Augustine,
De verareligione
, c.18,PL 34, col. 137,n. 36 [ed.Martin1962{op.cit.,
is ofitself
some"thing"
ofform,
andto that
above,n. 50),209]:Matter
independently
its(matter's)
in thedivine
extent
alsopreexists
ideas.
reality
63See for
ThomasofYork,Sapientale
, Vat.Lat.6771,fol.88d.Cf.Zavalloni
example
1951{op.cit
., above,n. 43),443.
64In De immortalitate
animae
1981{op.cit.,
, c.15,PL 32,col. 1033,n. 24 [ed.Verheijen
statesthatthewholebeingofa living
from
the
above,n. 50)],Augustine
bodyderives
soul.The unitarians
couldwellhaveseenthereat leasta denialofthedevelopment
of
substantial
form.
To thisthepluralists
retorted
from
Retractationes,
byquoting
Augustine's
Turnhout
I, C.53,PL 32,col.591 [ed.A. Mutzenbecher,
1984,16,28-17,3],wherehe
withdraws
hisformer
William
statement.
de la Mare,forexample,
refers
tothelatter
pasin hisCorrectorium
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1),131).
, a.31 (Glorieux
sage
65Augustine,
Literal
onGenesis,
VII, c.6,PL 34,col. 359,n. 9 [ed.Zycha
Commentary
1894{op.cit.,
etanima,
ea ipsanatura
above,n. 47),206,1-4]:"Fortasse
antequam
potuit
cuiusvelpulchritudo
veldeformitas
vitium
fieret,
virtus,
est,habere
quae animadicitur,
materiam
See also,Lit.Comm.
onGenesis
, VII,
aliquam
prosuogenere
spiritulem
Myitalics.
C.27,PL 34,col.369,n. 39 [ed.Zycha,225,4-12].

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seems to have operatedmore noticeablyover the pluralistthesisin what


concernsthe notionof matteras a positiveentity,ratherthan regarding
the perfectibility
of form.
- which has been
already
Apart fromthe notion of a formacorporeitatis
establishedas of clear Aristotelianorigin , Aristotleequally served for
explainingthe idea of continuityin change (in favour of the pluralist
view),and the relationof the intellectualsoul to otherforms(used alterThe firstidea is closelyconnected
nativelyby pluralistand unitarians).66
to the doctrineof the embryonicdevelopment.67
The pluralistsbelieved
thattheywere legitimately
entitledto appeal to the philosopher'sauthorityinsofaras theycould show thatAristotle'snaturalphilosophyimplied
a continuousprogressin substantialform,thus suggestingthe idea of a
animalium
,68Aristotlesays that "the
gradual completion.In De generatione
animal and the man are not made at the same time",but the sensitive
soul comes firstand is generatedfromour parents.Followingthis line,
the pluralistscontendedthat the sensitivesoul is graduallyperfected(to
Aquinas thiswould mean "alteration",not generationproper)69in accordance withthe temporaldevelopmentof the embryo.Furtheron theintellectual soul arrivesand constitutesa substantialunitywith the sensitive
soul, the most perfectformin the natural order. It is a true metaphysical union and not a mere juxtapositionof forms.70
Aristotle'sdoctrine
of the developmentof the embryo,however,does not necessarilyentail
a plurality
of forms.Aquinas' theoryof the successionof formscan be inas
terpreted an effortto adapt the principlesof hylemorphismto his
own formulationof matterand form.Indeed, the thesisof the gradual
perfectionof substantialform culminatingin the intellectshares some
aspects with the Aristotelianaccount of change. However, as will be
66Cf.Zavalloni
cit.,above,n. 43),463-8.
1951(o/>.
67SeeAristotle,
Degeneratione
animalium
Works
, II, 3, 376a35-b5
(in:TheComplete
ofAristotle,
ed.J. Barnes,
Princeton
1984,vol.1).
68Aristotle,
Degeneratione
animalium
, IL3
69See Aquinas,
on whichKnapwell
at
I, q.6. Thisis oneoccasion
Quodlibet
supplies,
least
thanthatofAquinas'.
Seeart.32 ofKnapwell's
, a moresatisfactory
facie
prima
argument
"Quare
"
Correctorium
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),143).
(Glorieux
Corruptorii
70William
de la Mareadoptsthisgeneral
in hisCorrectorium
, in the
pluralist
argument
to thequestion
To theobjection
solution
oftheembryo.
thatgeneratio
unius
estcorruptio
Degeneratione
alterius
etcorruptione
maintains
thattheprinciple
, I, 4, 17),William
(Aristotle,
which
cannot
tothesimple
coexist
In thecomelements,
onlyapplies
amongthemselves.
there
is a hierarchy
offorms
in virtue
ofwhichthere
is a trueessential
however,
posite,
subordination
oftheforms,
thusguaranteeing
thesubstantial
ofthecomposite.
See
unity
Glorieux
. . ., a.102("Quodimpossibile
est
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1): Correctorium
"Quare"
formas
substantiales
essein eodem"),
395-6.
plures

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ISABELIRIBARREN

subsequentlyseen, the pluralistsoftenoverlookedthe fact that Aristotle


consideredthe intellect,however ambiguously,as a superiorand separate substancecreated directlyby God. To that extent,the doctrineof
the intellectdoes not directlyaffectthe continuityof naturalchange.
The second of the Aristotelianloci classicithen, concerns the muchdebated doctrineof the intellect.The pre-existenceof previousformsin
the compositeposes the question for the pluralistsof the hierarchyof
souls. As a response, the pluralistsmainly appealed to a passage in
Aristotle'sDe animaII, 3,71where he explains the relationbetween the
vegetativeand sensitivesouls using the example of geometricalfigures.
The sensitivesoul is said to contain the vegetativesoul as the pentagon
completesand perfectsthe quadrilateral.This image servedthe pluralists
as an argumentin supportof theirthesisof the progressiveevolutionof
substantialform.However, Aristotlenever mentionsthe intellectualsoul
in these passages, and the comparisonwith the geometricfigurescould
well have referredto the vegetativeand sensitivesouls only.
On the otherhand, some othertextsfoundin Aristotlecould support
a unitarian thesis. In what concerns the pure potentialityof matter,
a particularpassage in De generatione
et corruptione
seems to suggestthat
matter
is
of
itself
devoid
of
form.72
Likewise in the
prime
completely
matter
is
described
as
all
,
Metaphysics
lacking
positive characteristics.73
Furthermore,as the unitarianssaw it, it is once such an (Aristotelian)
understandingof prime matter and its correspondingrelation to substantial formis established,that the pluralityof formsbecomes a non
If matteris by nature pure potentiality,
the soul is necessarily
sequitur.
in
and
is
the
whole body and in
united to the body as a form
therefore
,
each of its parts as a unity.Any other way of conceivingthe relation
between body and soul is not substantialbut accidental,such that the
composite would be seen as a juxtapositionof parts with no unifying
thatman is an aggreBy the same token,the Platonistthesis75
principle.74
gate of two complete beings where one moves the other,is a position
that could logicallyentail a pluralityof formswithoutcontradiction.For
71Aristotle,
De anima
, II, 3, 414b28-32.
72Aristotle,
etcorruptione
Degeneratione
is thatthere
is
II, 1 (329a,24-26):"Ourdoctrine
a [first]
matter
existence".
[...], butithasno separate
73Aristotle,
matter'
I meanthatwhich
, VII, 3 (1029a,20-21):"[. . .] by'first
Metaphysics
a particular
to anyother
is neither
norofa certain
norassigned
quantity,
category
thing,
bywhichbeingis determined".
74See Aquinas,
Summa
Contra
Gentiles
, II, cc.57and58; ST la, q.76,a.8.
75See Plato,Timaeus
, 69e.

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the diverseoperationsof one and the same being could emerge from
different
sourceswhile leavingintactthe substantialindependenceof the
As Aquinas would retort,if the soul were united to the
moved.
thing
as
body merely a mover,we could say that it is not in the body as a
whole but only in one part whence it could move the remainder.76
Whetheror not Aquinas' understandingof Aristotlewas "less contaminated"than the pluralists',it seems clear that Aquinas was primarily
Aristode.This is not
acting as a naturalphilosopherwhen interpreting
to say thatthe pluralistswere by contrastactingas theologians,but their
connectionof Aristotelianphysicsto an Augustininview of creation
and the rationes
semi(hence the connectionbetween a formacorporeitatis
nales)certainlycontributedto safeguard a continuitywith theological
dogma. On the otherhand, the (metaphysical)disagreementbetweenthe
of
of hylemorphism
resultedin an incommensurability
two interpretations
the unitarianand the pluralistprinciples.Given theirexclusiveattribution of actualityto formand its total absence in matter,the supporters
as necof a unitarianview understoodthe notion of a formacorporeitatis
in
a
of
the
existence
of
certain
linked
to
type actuality matter.
essarily
However,it is importantto note that the beliefin some sort of actuality in prime matter,althoughwidespreadamong the pluralists,did not
necessarilyimplythe positingof a "corporealform"as equivalentto an
"intellectualsoul". Unlike the unitarians,the pluralistview does not make
in value. These led to a seriesof conactualityand forminterchangeable
fusionson both parts the consequences of which were acutely revealed
in a theologicalcontext.
TheNumerical
4. A Theological
Problem:
of Christ's
Body
Identity
Perhaps the most crucial of the theologicalissues regardingthe controversyover the unicityof formwas the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody
livingand dead. For, if matterdoes not offera dispositionof its own, if
the body is what it is whollyin virtueof the soul, then,in the separation of body and soul, Christ'sdeath leads to one of two possibilities.
withhis livingbody,or Christ
Eitherhis dead body ceases to be identified
Both tenets
would have had to assume anotherbody in the resurrection.
were contraryto dogma.

76See Aquinas,
ST la, q.76,a.3.

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ISABELIRIBARREN

4. 1. ThomasAquinason theNumerical
of Christ's
Identity
Body
In the thirdbook of his Commentary
,77Aquinas' argumentabout the numerical identityof Christ'sbody is based on his definition
of man as a unity
of body and soul ( Videtur
Christus
in
ilio
triduo
quod
fiierit
homo).UnlikeHugh
of Saint Victor, who identifieshuman nature wholly with the soul,78
for Aquinas the separation of body and soul at death signifiesa substantialchange entailingcorruptionand notjust alteration.Consequently,
Christ as a man can be said to be the same living and dead only
equivocally.
In the Quodlibets
the discussionis presentedin a more explicittheosense
Utrum
in Christus
in triduo
mortis
In
logical
(
fueritidemhomonumero).19
II
affirms
the
of
the
dead and living
Quodlibet (1269) Aquinas
identity
Christonly as an identitysecundum
quidand not as an identitysimpliciter.
He reasons as follows.In Christ,body and soul are united not only in
one personbut also in one nature.His divinity,
however,is unitedto the
body and soul of Christin person but not in nature.That is why in the
separationof body and soul Christcan stillbe referredto as idemnumero
, thatis, in virtueof the hypostaticor personalunion. As human
simpliciter
on
the death
nature, the otherhand, thereare two ways of understanding
of Christ.If we consider Christ'sdeath as referring
to his humanityas
a whole (<quantum
ad totam
therecan be no identitybetweenChrist
naturarli),
and
the
dead, given
living
separationof body and soul. Considering,howthe
that
ever,
parts
compose his humanity,his soul can be said to be the
same because the substantialformitselfdoes not sufferchanges, and it
is to the substantialformthat the person of Christis united. His body,
on the other hand, is the same not simpliciter
but secundum
quid, that is,
to
matter.
is
careful
not
to
attribute
according
Aquinas very
any kind of
actuality to the remainingmatter after the body's death.80However,
Aquinas oftenresortsto the categoryof quantityin order to supply a
guarantee of continuityin change, given the impossibilityof a forma
As in the question of transubstantiation,
the accidents of
corporeitatis.
77
Sentences
III, dist.22,q.l, a.l.
78Aquinas,
See Hughof St Victor,
De Sacramente,
BookII, part1, chapters
IX and XI (ed.
PL 176,393D-399B,
Migne,
401B-411D).
79
Quodlibet
II, q.l, a.l.
Aquinas,
Theremaining
matter
couldperhaps
be hereunderstood
as quantitas,
thethree-dimenofwhichwouldpermit
us to refer
to it as a body,butwherestrictly
sionality
speaking
there
is no individual
there
is no evidence
that
However,
(hocaliquid)
composite
anymore.
Aquinasactually
putsitin thoseterms.

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the bread that our senses stillperceive afterit has become the body of
Christinherein dimensivequantityas theirsubject.81
The unicityof formthesis,Aquinas believes,is capable of offering
a
account
of change.However,thereis some difficulty
in explainsatisfactory
ing continuityfrom the corruptionof one form to the generationof
another,thus appearing as if every change entailed transubstantiation.
The pluralists
have theoppositeproblem,wherewhatremainsafterchange
always has some kind of actualityand the simple advent of a superior
formdeterminingthe previous ones sounds more like mere alteration
than a true generativeprocess.
In Quodlibet
III. 2, a.2 (Easter 1270), Utrum
oculusChristi
postmortem
fiierit
ocultis
, Aquinas applies the same principleto individualparts of
aequivoce
the body. If the body of Christas man is the same onlyequivocally,then
his eyes and any otherpart of his body whichsuffered
substantialchange
afterseparationfromthe soul are therebythe same onlyequivocally.The
groundsof this argumentare found in the SummaTTieologiae
, q.76, a.8:
"Whetherthe whole soul is in each part of the body". According to
Aquinas, the relationof the soul to the whole of the body is not the
same as its relationto the parts.For the soul is relatedto the whole primarilyand essentiallyas to its object,whereasits relationto the partsis
secondaryinasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. Consequently,
just as the soul bears the formand identityof the body, in like manner
the parts of the body, inasmuch as they participatein the body as a
affectedby the soul's departure.
whole, are substantially
In Quodlibet
IV.5 (Easter 1271) thereappears to be a change in Aquinas'
or at leastin the way in whichhe expressedhis view. In response
stance,82
to the question Utrum
in cruceetin sepulcro
situnumnumero
corpusChristi
, the
81By"dimensive
it is meantthethree-dimensionality
whichmaterial
bodies
quantity"
onaccount
oftheir
ofquantity.
Material
bodiesare
possess
beingaffected
bytheaccident
"extense"
becausetheyareseenunderthecategory
ofquantity.
In theEucharist,
howofquantity
without
ever,AquinasholdsthatChrist's
bodyis undertheaccident
being
affected
substantiae.
dimensive
byit,thatis,permodum
(ST Ilia, q.76,a.1.)It is ultimately
which
accounts
forChrist's
realpresence
inthesacrament.
ForAquinas'
therefore,
quantity,
account
oftransubstantiation
and hisaccountof the"realpresence"
of Christ
in the
seeST Ilia, qq.75-77.Cf.A. Kenny,
TheUseofLogical
inTheology
Eucharist,
, in:
Analysis
A. Kenny
andReligion:
inPhilosophical
Oxford
(ed.),Reason
Essays
1987,3-20.For
Theology,
theproblems
account
oftherealpresence
entailed
forAristotelian
Aquinas'
philosophy,
seeE. Sylla,E. (1975),
Autonomous
andHandmaiden
Science.
St Thomas
andWilliam
Aquinas
of
Ockham
intheEucharist
andE. Sylla(eds.),TheCultural
Context
, in:J.E.Murdoch
ofMedieval
, Dordrecht-Boston
1975,349-96.
Learning
82Cf.Zavalloni
1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),267-8.

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ISABELIRIBARREN

solutiongiven is est idemnumero


in cruceet iacensin
corpusChristi
appensum
a
There
stress
on
the
then,
is,
sepulcro.
identitybetweenthe dead
stronger
of
Christ
and
his
when
body
body
living.Aquinas5argumentno longer
restson metaphysicalconsiderationsof the compositenatureand on the
definitionof a human being, but on purely Christologicalreasons. In
tryingto avoid Arianism(wherebythe Word in Christtakes the place of
the human soul- so that the hypostaticunion is consequentlydissolved
84
at death)83it is necessaryto state the identitysecundum
suppositum(that
is, according to the divine person, the Son) of Christ livingand dead.
On the otherhand, thereis the riskof the Gaianite85heresy,which contends that Christ'sbody is incorruptible
because his divinityis unitedto
him in natureand not onlyin person- in whichcase we mustdifferentiate
his body living and dead. Aquinas concludes in favour of the identity
between the crucifiedChrist and the dead Christ,because primaunitas
maiorestquamsecundadifferentia.
Aquinas does not resortin thislast passage as he had done in his last
to a differencebetween Christ as the Son of God and
two Quodlibets
Christas a man. Perhaps the condemnationof 10 December 1270 and
to the unicitytheoryinfluencedthe
the oppositionof the Paris masters86
83Distinctive
ofArianism
ofChrist,
Arius,
(from
d.336)is a denialofthefulldivinity
buta creature.
thathe wasnotGod bynature,
rather
thanstatConsequently,
holding
a humannature
identifies
thedivine
ofChrist
, Arianism
person
ingthattheSonassumes
withhishuman
soul.
84The termsuppositum
whichmeansliterally
"subcomesfrom
theGreekimoTaai,
usuIn christological
theterm"substance"
stance".
andtrinitarian
discussions,
however,
esenceornature,
as opposed
tothethree
which
aremore
thedivine
persons,
allysignifies
inthesenseofa substantial
as supposita
individual
Itwasmainly
reality.
commonly
qualified
oftheCappadocian
Fathers
thattheterminology
wasclarified
and
undertheinfluence
formula
fortheTrinity
became"ThreeHypostases
so thattheaccepted
standardized,
inChristology,
Christ
is theunionoftwonatures
human
in oneOusia".Likewise
(oGa),
oftheTrinity.
The
andonesuppositum
anddivine,
, thatis,theSonas thesecondperson
a
the
union
refers
therefore
to
or
union
personal
"supposital"
whereby
person
hypostatic
an identity
a human
nature.
secundum
ofChrist's
oftheSonassumes
Accordingly,
suppositum
notaccording
toChrist's
humannature
anddead,is an identity
(forthisone
bodyliving
who
ofbodyandsoul),butaccording
to hisdivine
at theseparation
person,
disappears
thebodily
death.
indeedwithstands
85Gaianites:
oftheV century.
Thenameis derived
sectat thebeginnings
monophysite
ofChrist's
thedoctrine
oftheincorruptibility
whofirst
from
Gaianos,
developed
body.
86
thirteen
on 10 December
condemned
1270,all moreor less
propositions
Tempier
or Averroist
ofAristotle.
Thereis a letter
related
to a "radical"
(c. 1273interpretation
to Albert
a listoffifteen
theGreatcontaining
errors
1276)written
byGilesofLessines
at thattime,thirteen
of
whichwerebeingtaught
masters
oftheartsfaculty
byleading
withTempier's
condemned
The additional
whichcoinciding
propoexactly
propositions.
listed
sitions
byAquinas.
Prop.14is basedonAquinas'Quodlibets
byGilesweredefended

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IV. If thisis certain,however,thenit is only


theologicaltenorof Quodlibet
a parenthesisin the course of Aquinas' line of argument,since we see
him going back shortlyafterwards(around 1272-1273) to his earlier
distinctionof the divine and human naturesin Christin the thirdpart
In questions25 and 50, the identityof Christ
of the SummaTheologiae.
the man is understoodas existingonly secundum
quid that is, according
to his soul. And althoughaware (as seen at the beginningof q.50, a.4)
that Christ'sdeath is an articleof faith,Aquinas neverthelessmaintains
that Christ'sidentitycan be said to exist simpliciter
only regardingthe
union.87
hypostatic
Althoughthe debate over the unicityof formadopts a theologicalcharacter,Aquinas' doctrinefollowsa sustainedmetaphysicalline which puts
forwardsuch neatly determinedprinciples that there is little for his
followersto add. Accordingly,subsequentworks on this issue seem to
elaboration.
providelittlemore than circumstantial
Corrective
4.2. Williamde la Mare and thePluraliste'
William de la Mare, the "accuser" in Knapwell's Lament,88can be
seen as one of the firstlinks between the doctrinal interventionsof
Kilwardby and Pecham. His correctiveinaugurates the philosophical
debates later developed by masterssuch as Richard of Middleton,Peter
Duns Scotus. William's Correctorium
John Olivi, and most significantly,
fratrisThomae(c. 1278)89is the resultof an examinationof a numberof
in cruce
et positum
II, III andIV, andreads"QuodcorpusChristi
jacensin sepulcro
sedsecundum
nonest,velnonidemfuitidemsemper,
quid".As fortheother
proposithesimplicity
ofangelic
substances:
et animasunt
tion,15,itconcerned
"Quodangelus
ad compositionem,
necperaccessum
sedtantum
nonabsoluta
per
simplicitate
simplices,
If thesepropositions
werenotoriginally
for
a summosimplici".
recessum
targeted
thattheywereincluded
in Giles'list.Forthe
itis at leastverysignificant
condemnation,
Le "De quindecim
to Giles'letter,
see F. Van Steenberghen,
listand Albert's
response
A. Pelzer
d'Albert
le Grand
, in: L. Nole.a. (Eds.),Mlanges
, Louvain1947,
problematibus"
415-39.
87
between
ST III, q.50,a.5,ad 1 seemsto wantto fillthehiatus
Quodlibets
Aquinas,
thebodyofChrist
III andIV resorting
to thedifference
between
andthebodyofordinarymen.
88Knapwell
intheCorrectorium
hisdefence
ofAquinas
'Quare'
corruptorii
byquotbegins
ingJob,6, 25-31(ed. Glorieux1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1), 5): "Quaredetraxistis
cume vobisnullus
sitquipossitarguere
me?Ad increpandum
tansermonibus
veritatis
nitimini
amicum
vestrum.
tumeloquia
etsubvertere
concinatis,
obsecro,
Respndete,
absque
inlingua
meainiquitatem,
necinfaucibus
etnoninvenietis
meisstultitia
contentione,
personabit".
89William's
withtheabbreviated
Correctorium
should
notbe confused
workDeclarationes.

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ISABELIRIBARREN

of 118 objectionablepropoAquinas' worksand the extractiontherefrom


sitionsdeemed "erroneous"or "pernicious"fromthe standpointof orthodox Christiandogma. Thirteenof thosepropositionswere condemnedby
Tempier in 1277 a fact which William is only too quick to point out
his case. In its second, and standard,version,datin order to strengthen
from
around
1278, the text assumed some of the characterof an
ing
its adoption by the Franciscan General Chapter
after
document
official
thus came to be a qualiin Strasbourgin 1282.90William's Correctorum
Franciscan
Order's officialview
texts
and
the
of
statement
Aquinas'
fying
of them.
in its
is transmitted
The standardversionof the FranciscanCorrectorum
"Quare",in which William de
entiretyby Richard Knapwell's Correctorum
la Mare's argumentsare incorporatedand followedby a counter-reply
William's
of Aquinas' arguments,
fromKnapwell.As a methodicalcriticism
argumentsare, by necessity,driven to operate at a metaphysicallevel.
And althoughhe is keener in refutingthe unicitytheorythan in constructinga positivepluralistdoctrine,we can stillperceive in William's
argumentscommon elementsof pluralistpresuppositions.
Thus, on the one hand, William maintainsthat prime matteris conceived as an entitypossessingsome actuality,if very imperfect;on the
otherhand, that substantialformis seen as the determining
principlein
the sense of creatingdispositionfor furtherdetermination.91
Just as the
pentagon containsthe quadrilateralin potency,the rationalsoul presupposes the sensitivesoul as an incompletebeing. However, the vegetative
and the sensitivesouls are not of the same speciesas the intellectualsoul.
essencesbearing among them
They are, on the contrary,threedifferent
an essentialrelation.The intellectualsoul does not give the compositeits
but it completesand perfectsthe
whole being (nondat illudiesse totum),
forms.92
the
Indeed, the vegetative,sensitiveand
preceding
being givenby
ofwhich
are
ofsixty
ofa rejection
consists
The latter
thirty-two
byAquinas,
propositions
wasmistakenly
attributed
toWilliam
TheDeclarationes
condemnation.
in Tempier's
found
S. Thomae
dela MareO.F.M.devariis
sententiis
Guilelmi
Declarationes
Magisti
(seeF. Pelster,
, Mnster
1956).
Aquinatis
90"Itemminister
mulministris
quodnonpermittant
imponit
provincialibus,
generalis
hoc
rationabiliter
et
nisi
lectores
Thomae
fratris
"Summam"
intelligentes,
apud
tiplicari
sedin
Wilhelmi
de Mara,nonin marginibus
fratris
cumdeclarationibus
nonnisi
positis
secularem".
nonscribantur
declarationes
ethuiusmodi
Quotedfrom
peraliquem
quaternis;
nach
seinem
von
indenersten
deshl.Thomas
umdieLehre
DerKampf
F. Ehrle,
fnfzig
Jahren
Aquin
37 (1913),266-318.
furkatholische
Tode
, in:Zeitschrift
Theologie,
91Glorieux
art.31: 134.
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1): Correctorum
"Quare",
92Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1), 134.

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intellectualsouls constitutethreeformswhich are nonethelessrelated in


and in thatway theyconvergetowardsthe essendegreesof potentiality,
tial unityof being. The rationalsoul is the actualisingand completing
form,whereasthe othertwo are incompleteand account for the potentialityof the body. Thus, in man thereis not so much one substantial
formbut ratherone soul whichcomprehendsmany[quodpluresconcedunt
).93
To the standard unitarian objection that in a plurality of forms
any power of the soul which is in act would not necessarilyimpede the
operationof another power, William respondsthat there is in fact an
essentialconnectionbetween soul and body which would impede the
of operations.Their connectionis not on accountof an essensimultaneity
tial single source, but by reason of their mutual relationas perfection
and perfectible.94
Each formdoes not implyan actuality,althoughthere
is a certaindegree of perfectionin everyone of them. This is reflected
in the modes of predication95
where "man is an animal" is understood
as a substantialpredicationand not merelya predicationper accidens.
"Animal" is part of the definitionof the subject "man", and thus meets
the conditionsof substantialpredication,just as more imperfectforms
referto the rationalsoul as theirsuppositum.
reveals
This, furthermore,
how the pluralists,unlikethe advocatesof the unicitythesis,did not necessarilyidentifyactualitywith form.The presence of many formsin a
or individual
compositedoes not have to entail a pluralityof supposita
formsin respectto the most
beings.There is a subordinationof imperfect
perfectform,which alone respondsfor the creature'sspecificnature.
On the specificissue of Christ'sidentity,William's main objections
and in his II,
regardAquinas' view as shown in his SummaTheologiae96
III and IV Quodlibets.
As was seen, in both instancesAquinas tries to
defendthe identityof the livingand dead body of Christby appealing
to the hypostaticunion. All that remainsafterthe death of created substancesis matter,whichis not sufficient
to guaranteethe identitybetween

93Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,
fora very
lucidaccount
oftheintroabove,n. 1),132.Again,
ofa notion
duction
ofa "corporeal
form"
(orin thatcasesomesortof"form"
previous
to thesubstantial
seeHyman's
article
1965(op.cit.,above,n. 42),385-406.
form),
94Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1),134.
95Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1), 133.As Aquinassawit,ifthereis morethan
onesubstantial
in thecomposite,
form
relate
as actdoestopotentheymustnecessarily
theconditions
forsubstantial
which
mustmanifest
theunity
Otherwise,
tiality.
predication,
ofthesubject,
cannot
be met.See Aquinas,
ST la, q.118,a.2.
96
ST la, q.50,a.5.
Particularly
Aquinas,

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ISABELIRIBARREN

the livingand the dead body. When Christdies, however,not onlyprime


matterbut also the divine suppositum
remainsthe same. The hypostatic
union thus constitutesthe groundsfor arguingin favourof the numerical identityof Christ'sbody.
William's understandingof Aquinas' view was QuodcorpusChristi
mortuumin trduoquoadaliquidnonfuit idemquodprius?1It is interestingthat
Williamshouldincludethe termaliquidin the phrasingof Aquinas' proposition. For it is a legitimateobjection for anyone to ask that, if prime
mattercan survivethe body's death, thenwhyis it not prime matterthe
real substance?98However, the objection itselfalready presupposes in
primemattersome kindof actualitysusceptibleto being a particularthing
of its own right.Aquinas denies that prime mattercould be considered
as a hocaliquidin the sense of being some individualthingwe could point
to. Matter does not have any actualityperse, but is called a being only
in termsof its potentiality
to the substantialform.By the same token(a
would
Christ's
dead body would not correspondto the
pluralist
gather)
same hocaliquidthatwas living.Pluralists,in fact,would like to thinkthat
Christ'sbody preservesits numericalidentitysimpliciter
, that is, by reason
of the metaphysicalnatureof the body itselfand not only on account of
the divine suppositum.
According to Aquinas, if we are referringto the
human Christ,we cannot ignorethat"being animated"constitutes
a subin man and that,conversely,
stantialdifference
"beingunanimated"entails
true corruption.The body of the compositegets its being froma single
substantialform,so thatthe dead body would be anotherform,the form
of a cadaver. We are not dealing then withthe same body- at least not
simpliciter.
Consequently,regardingChrist's human nature as a totality,
that is, as the union of body and soul, we cannot but speak of an iden).
quid(thatis, accordingto the divinesuppositum
titysecundum
William respondsto this based on a particularnotion of the human
as the livingbody
body." Christ'sdead body is the same body simpliciter
was, not only on account of the hypostaticunion but also due to the
union and identityof the substantialformand the body in quantum
corof the body as body,
pus. To be animatedis not a substantialdifference
but of the body as a livingthing.Corruption,then,is a substantialchange
that happens to the lifeof the body, not to its intrinsicnature,which is
97Glorieux
a.107:407.
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),Correctorium
"Quare",
98Cf.M. McCordAdams,William
2 vols,NotreDame,Ind.1987,vol.2, 637.
Ockham,
99Glorieux
407.
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),Correctorium
"Quare":

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285

independentfrom the soul. The form by which a body is a body is


fromthat by which it is animated. Referringexplicitlyto the
different
William conof Porphyry(privado,habitus,
differentia,
divisio),100
terminology
in
tends that if we take "inanimatimi" a privativesense, we can speak
of Christ'sbody as having numericalidentity.For if privationdoes not
entail a constitutivedifferencefor the body (that is, a differencethat
would produce a substantialdefinition)nor does it divide it so that it
would become two bodies.101
Likewise,being unanimatedcan followaniesttenendum
mationin Christ'sbody. Et catholice
quidfiiit
quodnonsecundum
scilicet
cormateriam
et
substantialem
eadem
habuit
idemsedsimpliciter
formam
quia
here
and
"life"
understood
The differentiation
between"being"
poralem.102
could constitutea very strongpluralistargument.For if we grant,with
the unitarians,that being is altogetherconferredby a sole substantial
of the body livform,then thereis no question about the non-identity
entailed by being itself,
ing and dead. If we considerlife as a property
of the body where its
however,we could argue in favourof a continuity
a privationof some
a
substantial
but
dead
would
not
change
signify
being
as
a
unitarian
Giles of Lessines
As
will
be
even
seen,
rigorous
quality.
would accept the validityand truthof this argument.
4.3. KnapweWs
Reply
The Dominican reaction to the censures against Aquinas was initially manifestedin two ways: by treatisesconcentratingon the problem
corand by the sarcasticallyentitledCorrectoria
of the unicityof form,103
thatis, workscomposedin answerto Williamde la Mare's critruptorii,m

100Glorieux
etinAristotelis
see Isagoge
1927(op.cit above,n. 1),.408.ForPorphyry,
commentarium
, ed.A. Busse,Berlin1887.
Categorias
101One ofthepluralist
thattheunitarians
explicitly
denyis thatprivation
principles
To theunitarians
cannot
a form,
canbe identified
to an inchoatio
formaje.
privation
signify
however
becauseitdoesnotbearanyactuality.
imperfect,
102Glorieux
407.
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),Correctorium
"Quare":
103
Tractatus
deformis,
underthenameofHerveus
Forexample,
Natalis;Contra
pluraliin:S. Thomae
omnia
tatem
,
formarum,
(ed.P. Mandonnet,
Aquinatis
Opuscula
byThomasSutton
5 vols,Paris1927,V, 308-46);Contra
, GilesofRome;De unitate
, Gilesof
formae
gradus
we findmanifestations
Lessines
(ed.M. De Wulf1901)(op.cit.,above,n. 52).Although
ofthistypein Dominicans
at Oxford,
result
ofthePariscontheywerea moretypical
demnation
of 1277.
104
William
de la Mare's
we findParisian
polemical
monographs
against
Although
it wasprimarily
at Oxford
thatthereaction
treatise,
adoptedthisshape.We knowof
between
theyears1279and 1284,each
three
Oxford
Correctoria
, which
corruptorii
appeared

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ISABELIRIBARREN

icismsof Aquinas' teaching.These twinlines of defencewere closelyconnected,as we can see frompassages in Knapwell's Correctorium
"Quare",105
fromThomas Sutton'sContra
where he borrowsextensively
forpluralitatem
of substantialformin matter.107
marum}^in his account of the introduction
In a "firstphase",108rangingmore or less between the 1277 condemnation and Knapwell's excommunicationby Pecham in 1286, earlier
Oxonians such as Knapwell had no share in broaderintellectualquestions
that developed later. They seemed to be drivenby loyaltyratherthan
by abstractenquiry,and were no less incitedby authoritariandiscouragement.Hence the defensivecharacterof Knapwell's Quareand its rather
ad hoc replies. However, for all its limitations,this kind of work does
provide an approximateidea of the polemical characterof the times.
and
We know verylittleabout Knapwell's lifebeforethe controversy,
in factthe turningpointsof his career seem to have been markedrather
and"Questione".
For
word,
namely
bytheopening
"Quare","Sciendum"
beingidentified
of"Sciendum"
seeEhrle
theauthorship
of"Quare"seebelown. 105.Fortheauthorship
1947(op.cit.,above,n. 3); Mandonnet
1913
., above,n. 90),37; Glorieux
1913,(op.cit
(op.cit.,above,n. 3); andRoensch1964(op.cit.,above,n. 2). Ehrleleavesthepossibility
toitas the"ruhigere
Correctorium
andrefers
corruptorii"
openforitbeingDurandellus,
and unforced
Glorieux
thehypothesis
of
carefree
due to itsrather
response.
presents
whereas
Mandonnet
seemscomfortable
withthepossibility
ofHugues
William
Macclesfield,
in Paris.Roensch
is certain
it is Orford's
work.The incomplete
de Billom,
"Questione"
Ehrlesimply
and itsexactdateis notknown.
leavesit as "das
is lessstraight
forward
MS 276".Glorieux
forwards
desMerton
theuncertain
Correctorium
desAnonymus
posto Mandonnet
theauthorcouldbe Robertof
of Huguesof Billom.According
sibility
Dominican
whocomposed
around
thesametimea defence
of
another
Hereford,
English
takestheauthor
as being
HenryofGhentandGilesofRome.Roensch
Aquinasagainst
William
Macclesfield.
103Therehasbeenmuchdiscussion
abouttheauthorship
oftheCorrectorium
"Quare".
. . ."
"dasdemAegidius
deRomazugeschriebene
Correctorium
Ehrlecallsitrather
sceptically
to be a Dominican.
Glorieux
thatin facttheauthoris mostlikely
1927
and affirms
suchas GilesofRome,JohnofParis,
contenders
possible
(op.cit.,above,n. 1) discards
andarrives
totheconclusion
thatwearedealing
here
andDurandellus
ofBillom,
Hughes
conDominican.
Further
resemblance
between
withan English
"Quare"and passages
follows
demnedbyPechamleadshimto assertthattheauthoris Knapwell
(Roensch
of 1947(op.cit.,above,n. 3), Glorieux
in 1964).Lateron,in hisrevision
thisopinion
in "Quare"to Sutton's
andtheexplicit
references
Contra
conclusion
confirms
hisformer
work.
Thisis
Mandonnet
seemsto takeit,too,as beingKnapwell's
formarum.
pluralitatem
ofthepresent
thatitcanbe
here.Forthepurposes
theviewadopted
paperitis enough
Dominican.
to an English
attributed
106ThomasSutton,
Contra
1927(op.cit.,above,
, ed. Mandonnet
formarum
pluralitatem
n. 103).
107Correctorium
there
is an analogous
utilisation
art.32. See alsoart.85,where
"Quare",
treatise.
ofSutton's
108Forfurther
anda thourough
movement"
detailon the"twophases"ofthe"Oxford
elaboration
oftheothermasters,
see Kelley1977(op.cit.,above,n. 2).

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From his Quaestio


by academic conflictand authoritarianinterventions.
De
Unitate
in
which
Formae
he
"determines"
the orthodoxyof
,109
Disputata
the unicityof formthesis,we can inferthathe probablyinceptedaround
1284, that is, afterwritinghis responseto William de la Mare. We also
knowthatKnapwell experienceda change in his intellectualoutlookfrom
his early days at Oxford,when he was stillinquiringopenly on metaphysicalmatters,to his later work,largelyapologetic.In QuareKnapwell
himselfdeclareshavingevolved in thismanner:Et eccecoramDeo quia non
mentior
dissolvere
, si scirem
argumenta
quae hoc [the unicityof form]ostendunt
ut quandoque
credebam
, responsionem
persingulaposuissem.uo
Well aware of the pluralists'theologicalworries,KnapwelPs main point
as seen in his replyto William's Correctorium
, is to establishthe theological neutrality
of the unicityof formthesis.As the openingparagraphto
auteminproposito
e quodnulhis replyin article3 1 says:Nostrum
et ostender
luminconveniens
velhaeresis
ex ilia [circaunitatem]
, et quodisti
sequitur
positione
[Williamet alii] persuas responsiones,
fratrisThomaenonevadunt.u
argumenta
In this spirit,Knapwell refutesWilliam's correctiveand establishesthat
the gradualperfection
and completionof the formsin the compositeuntil
the finalsubstancedoes not implytrue generation.The followingargument112
constitutes,
perhaps,Knapwell's mostcomprehensivestatementof
principles,gatheringtogetherthe main unitarian premises. The final
substantialform,he says,does not confera mainsperfecta
existenceto the
previousone, for therecannot be "more and "less" in the same genus.
It is a different
substantialformaltogether,perfectin itself,and the prinof
all
and perfection.Consequently,where thereis more
existence
ciple
than one form,thereare in facttwo beings,113
whichis impossible.Being
(esse)is the actualityitselfof a thing,so that everycomplete being disfortwo fully
tinguishesitselffromall others.It is thereforecontradictory
actualisedbeingsto constituteone essence.For no otherformgivesbeing
substantially
exceptthe substantialform.And if we came upon (inveniatur)
some substantialformthat is not actual in thisway, such a formwould
participateverylittle,or not at all, in the principleof perfection so that
when finallythe act of subsistencearrives,that formwould not be substantialbut accidental.In that case, the finalformwould be introduced
109
EditedbyF.E. Kelley,
Richard
deunitate
Quaestio
, Paris1982.
Knapwell.
disputata
formae
110Glorieux
1927[op.cit.,above,n. 1),206.
111
Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),135.
112Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),142-3.
113Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),143.

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ISABELIRIBARREN

as actualisingan imperfectform,and the subsequentchange would be


alterationratherthan true generation.
Following the same tone of his opening paragraph,Knapwell closes
in hac
the argumentwith conciliatorywords: Undequidquidsit de veritate
est ormino
, pluralitatem
, per modumquo istiponunt
, impossibile
formarum
parte
in eodemsustinere.
substantialium
Ergomodusalius, si quidempossibileest, inveinfidevelphilosophia
expositione
invento
nihil
erroris
niatur
; quo
quaeponit
amplius
It is significant
thatKnapwell should allow
unitatem
formaeconcludi
potet.UA
to rationalargumentation{modusalius, si quidem
so much flexibility
possiin order to meet a desired metaphysicalconclusion.
bile est, inveniatur)
Whetherthis attitudewas reallydrivenby a (partisan,perhaps) motivaof the unicitythesisis not certain.In any
tion to preservethe "integrity"
in
which
the
circumstances
case,
Knapwell wrotethisreply,and its apolothat
it
was more a matterof loyal sentiment
seem
to
suggest
getic tone,
than a true understandingof Aquinas' doctrine.
In article 31,115Knapwell borrowshis argumentfromAquinas when
two ways of understandingsimhe (Knapwell) startsby differentiating
forthe identityof Christ'sbody livingand dead. Christis the same
pliciter
only in termsof the hypostaticunion. That is, Christ is the
simpliciter
same "absolutely"because no otherbody has been added. Christis not
the same simpliciter
, however,if we referto the compositeof body and
soul that is his humanity(for the presence or absence of soul indeed
impliesa substantialchange). Knapwell is verycarefulnot to suggestrelquid. Instead, he cunninglyadds
ativityby explicitlyusing the secundum
that to say that Christsufferedchange afterdeath is heretical.Although
the body suffers
changewithdeath,thisdoes not implythatChristassumes
a new nature,for mainlytwo reasons. On the one hand, what remains
at death (i.e. the cadaver) is not assumableper se, for if it has no form
it cannotbe qualifiedas a (human)nature.On the otherhand, the human
nature assumed by Christ,althoughtransformed
by death, risesagain in
virtue of the unscathed hypostaticunion, just as wine, Knapwell adds
turnsinto vinegarwithouta new
(in not the most suitable illustration),
in.
Thus
Christ's
body was one and the same body
liquid being poured
We must not infer
livingand dead on account of the divine suppositum.
fromthis that Christincarnatedagain, even if his body is said to have
adopted a substantialformin life and anotherone at death (licetcorpus
114Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1),143.
1,5Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1),135.

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illudbenedictum
in vitaet in morte
substantialem
aliam et aliam dicatur
formam
1,6
habere).
In other words, Christ'sbody, as a body, is the same only secundum
117
in triduoquoadaliquidnon
quid.Again in article 107 {QuodcorpusChristi
fuitidemquodprius),Knapwell makes a similarparaphraseof the secundum
quid.Williamde la Mare's objectionhad appealed to a logical difference
betweenbeing "animated" and "unanimated",in a way that death does
not entail any change forthe body in quantum
but is to be undercorpus
stood only as a "privation"of life. In his reply,Knapwell is quick to
et contraomnem,
ut crediphilosophiam
reproveWilliam's argumentas contra
tur
, veritatem
perhaps too quick consideringthat the problemof substantial formwas believedby otherunitariansto be a metaphysicalone and
thus not necessarilya threat to the integrityof any truthbeyond it.
Accordingto Knapwell's reasoning,the conceptionthat a change in the
is a completefiction.Whereas states
substantialformis a matterofprivatio
of habit or privationare categoriesthatreferto accidentsand hence can
be referredto the same subject,being unanimatedhas to do with the
substanceand thereforeentails a change in the subject's very identity.
To be "unanimated"can be seen as a privationonly fromthe standTherefore,in other
point of primarymatter,which is pure potentiality.
as
of
a
Christ's
words,
body, being part
composite,cannot preserveits
identityafterdeath.
Knapwell's intentionto reconcilethe pluralityand the unicitytheses
on the groundsof theologicalneutrality
is made explicitin his later disDe
Unitate
Formae.
There, Knapwell's main concern is to
puted question
show that the unicityof formdoes not preventsome degree of numerical identityexistingin the substancebeforeand aftercorruption.As a
entailed by the unicitydoctrine,the
statementof the main difficulty
ran
as
follows:
Utrumsecundum
humanae
fidemde essentia
disputedquestion
naturae
verbooporteat
.
in
1
e plures
285 (and
formasDelivered some time
poner
certainlyafterPecham's 1284 condemnation),Knapwell did, then,make
a public stand of determiningthat the unicityof formwas a safe thesis
to uphold as far as faithand reason are concerned.There is indeed a
note of moderationand a search foran agreement:"it is of chiefimporto considerthose aspects on which one and the other
tance, therefore,
positionnecessarilyagree".118
116Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),136.
117Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),408.
118
Kelley(op.cit.,above,n. 1),138.
Quotedfrom

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ISABELIRIBARREN

However,Knapwell's attemptsto bringreconciliationbetweenthe pluralistand unitarianstandpointsbackfired,thusprovokingan unfavourable


reactionon the part of the authorities.In a letterdated 1 June 1285 and
Pecham mentionsa sarcasticpamaddressedto the bishop of Lincoln,119
which
he believed to have come from
written
himself,
against
phlet
This
booklet,togetherwith the formerdisputed
incriminating
Knapwell.
direct
was
Pecham's
targetin the 1286 excommunicationand
question,
it markedthe end of Knapwell'scareer.At the urgingof WilliamHothum,
his provincialsuperior,Knapwell refusedto accept Pecham's actions as
havingany validityon canonical groundsand travelledto Rome in order
to appeal his case. On the way he stopped in Paris and discussedthe
III testifies
to his
situationwith Godfreyof Fontaines.Godfrey'sQuodlibet
reaction. In such questions, Godfreyargues, "one need not heed the
authorityof the Pope or the Fathers of the Church or any othermaster.
The only correct guides are the Holy Writ or rational argument".120
and his action
GodfreyregardedPecham to have exceeded his authority,
and
to have been mirum
,
peculum.m
grande
thatPecham gave to Kilwardby'sproAlthoughthe legal interpretation
hibitionwas more openly hostile, Pecham was certainlyfollowingthe
spiritof his predecessor.The action taken in 1277 was not supposed to
be tantamountto eradicatingheresy.It was rathera veto for teaching
certain doctrines"in the schools", eitherbecause they were deemed to
be philosophically false, or because they could entail opposition to
theologicaldogma. Like Pecham, Kilwardbyalso received his own call
formoderationin the figureof the Dominican Peter of Conflans,at that
timeArchbishopof Corinth.In a letterto Kilwardby,Conflansdiscusses
the reasons for the prohibition.He examines diversetheses on natural
philosophy,subscribingto some and thus criticisingKilwardby'sdisapproval. The archbishopof Canterbury,in his turn,replied with a pice
123
122
explainingthe motivesthatincitedhim to intervene.In 1278
justificative
119Registrum
3 vols,London1885,
Pecham
, ed. C.T. Martin,
frats
Johannis
epistolarum
III, 862.
120Lesquatre
de Godefroid
deFontaines
, ed. M. De Wulf- A. Pelzer,
Quodlibets
premiers
Louvain1904,2, p. 198.
121Ed. De Wulf-Pelzer
1904{op.cit.,above,n. 120),207-8.
122Cf.Robert
ttera
adPetrum
deConfleto
zurGeschichte
, ed.F. Ehrlein:Beitrge
Kilwardby,
frLiteraturundder
Aristotelismi^
Scholastik
dermittelalterlichen
, in:Archiv
, II: DerAugustinismus
from
Peter
ofConflans
Theletter
5 (1889),603-35.
desMittelalters,
undKirchengeschichte
is notextant.
to Kilwardby
123
ofCanterbury"
to the"archbishop
directs
hisobjections
GilesofLessines
Although
thattheperson
it is stillbelieved
and in 1278Pechamhad alreadybeenappointed,

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Giles of Lessines,a Dominican masterin Paris, wrote a treatiseagainst


Kilwardbybased on the latter'sletterto Conflans.This treatisecame to
4
be knownas the De Unitate
formae.n
4.4. TheIntervention
of GilesofLessines
It was to Kilwardby'sformulationof the unicitydoctrinethat Giles of
in Paris,
Lessinesreacted.AlthoughGiles of Lessineswas predominantly
and
the fact
the way he treatsthe issue in his treatiseDe unitate
formae
thathe writesexplicitlyagainstKilwardby,rathermake him a witnessof
the situationat Oxford. However, his interventionis prompted by a
turmoilthan that of Knapwell's and the other Oxford masters.
different
The "defensive"literaturewrittenin supportof Aquinas as a particular
productof William de la Mare's declarationhad not yet taken place as
the characteristicagent which bound Oxford Dominicans together.By
the time Giles was writinghis treatise,radical Aristotelianmasterssuch
as Siger of Brabantwere at the peak of theirinfluence,and internaldisputes between secular theologiansand the mendicant orders had just
started.It is in this atmospherethat Giles decided to devote himselfto
a strictelaborationof Aquinas' thesisof the unicityof substantialform.
The influencethat Kilwardby exercised on the Franciscan Pecham
tendsto makeus overlookthefactthatKilwardbywas in facta Dominican.
If it was a matterof "Order rivalries",we mightwell ask ourselveswhy
he did not exercisemore (episcopal)ascendancyamongsthis brothers.It
would be too easy to say that Kilwardby'sphilosophicalpoint of view
was an "out-dated" one from the middle of the centuryand that it
remainedisolated for lack of touch with Aquinas' innovations.In fact,
Kilwardby'sinfluenceat the time of the 1277 ban did provokea whole
campaign against the Thomistic doctrines,translatedinto works and
treatiseswhere those theses were clearlyattacked.It was not until the
generalChapter in Milan in 1278 thatsome change was broughtabout.
In that year, two Dominican brothers,providedwith fullpowers,were
sent to Oxfordto enforceAquinas' doctrine.125
By 1279, at the General
refered
toin histreatise
is Kilwardby.
in theyearsof 1277(years
Gileswrote
ofturmoil
whenTempier
andKilwardby
andPecham
weretheprotagonists)
didnotactually
assume
hisoffice
until1279.Before
that,he wasin Rome.Cf.De Wulf1901(op.cit.,above,
n. 52),81.
124
Ed. De Wulf1901(op.cit.,above,n. 52).
125See ActaCapitulorum
Generalium
Ord.Fr.Praed.,
ed. B.M. Reichert,
vol. 1, Rome1898,199.
Stuttgart

18:07:10 PM

292

ISABELIRIBARREN

therewas no mentionof any specifichostility


Chapter in Paris,126
against
an
and
of
the
Thomistic
theses
all
Aquinas
expansion
against opposition
was advised.
Kilwardbysubscribesto the commonpluralistview and maintainsthat
each formdeterminesmatterin an incompleteway, and that it is the
functionalconvergenceof all formsthrougha dispositivesubordination
that guarantees the unity of substantialformin the composite. Thus,
Kilwardbyholds the essentialindependenceamong the determining
principles, where the intrinsicnature of the inferiorformis not involvedin
the perfectionof the superior.127
On the otherhand, the diverseorigins
of the vegetative,the sensitive,and the intellectualsouls proves thatman
is indeed composedof threesubstantialforms.128
The firsttwo are a product of naturaloperation,whereas the intellectualsoul is created by God.
To the objection that two realitiesin act cannot constituteone single
being, Kilwardbyrespondsthat the vegetativeand sensitivesouls are not
completelyin act and that it is finallythe intellectualsoul that perfects
matter.In otherwords,and despiteKilwardby'sambiguousterminology,
the soul is composed of three essences meaning by these three incomplete substances.129
Kilwardby'sconcern to eradicate the unicitytheoryis clear in several
propositionscontainedin the 1277 Oxford prohibition:
130
2) That the previous formscompletelydisappear at the advent of
in purenihil).131
the superiorform{Itemquodformacorrumpitur
3) That thereis no actualitywhatsoeverin matter(Itemquodnullapotentia activaestin materia).
12) That the vegetative,the sensitive,and the intellectualsouls constituteone simple form (Itemquod vegetativa,
sensitiva
et intellectiva
sintuna
formasimplex).
126
1898[op.cit.,above,n. 125),204.
See Reichert
127
De Wulf1901(op.cit.
, above,n. 52),93.
128
De Wulf1901(op.cit
., above,n. 52),92.
129Chartularium
, I, p. 277.
130
ofKilwardby's
bannedpropositions
in thepresent
The numbering
adopted
paper
in hisLe trait
De Wulfusesthesamenumbering
to theChartularium.
(op.cit.,
corresponds
above,n. 52).
131Thatis,iftheforms
thatprecedethefinalsubstantial
form
disappear
completely
whatis thenleftis oneandonlyprinciple
inpurenihil),
ofbeing:theintellec{corrumpitur
oftheevolution
oftheembryo,
forexample,
a unitarian
would
tualsoul.In thequestion
withthefinalintelnotacceptthattheprevious
andsensitive
soulscancoexist
vegetative
theadventofthe
haveto disappear,
lectualsoul.The otherforms
theycannotsurvive
finalform
as lessperfect
principles.

18:07:10 PM

THE SEARCHFORANEARLYTHOMISTIC
SCHOOL

293

13) That the body livingand dead is the same body only equivocally.
Moreover,thatthe dead body, as a body, is the same as the livingbody
et mortuum
vivum
estequivoce
etcorcorpus,
onlysecundum
quid{Itemquodcorpus
sit corpussecundum
secundum
pus mortuum
quodcorpusmortuum
quid).132
In responseto Kilwardby'sposition,Giles is firstof all concernedin
givinga true assessmentof Aquinas' metaphysicalterminologyin order
to clarifyall possible ambiguities.Potentia
, Giles explains,has two very
It can be understoodas the oppodistinctsensesin Aquinas' thought.133
siteof actus
, and as such it signifies
receptivityin thissense it is the aptitude in a subjectto be determinedthroughchange. It can also mean a
proximateprincipleof the substance'sactivity in thissense it belongsto
theAristotelian
categoryof quality.It is the lattermeaning,Giles believes,
which broughtso much ambiguityin definingthe presence of the elementsin the composite.For the pluralistsit was inconceivablethat the
elementsshoulddisappearonce the compositewas completedby the final
substantialform.In order to give a coherentaccount of the physical
changeswithinthe body and to maintaina clear distinctionbetweenthe
spiritualspecies of the soul and the materialbody, the elementshad to
be potentiallypresentin the final composite.The superiorsubstantial
formis a mediatedperfectionof previousformsthat stillfunctionpotentially.Aquinas, on the other hand, cannot accept the coexistenceof a
pluralityof formsin act. The elementsremain potentiallyin the composite once the intellectualformarrives,but this "potentially"does not
mean "less perfect"or "incomplete".The quality
of the elementsis always
in
the
and
is
not
this
to
that
the substantialform
present
say
composite,
the
(soul) adopts a materialquality,but that it is capable of performing
functions
of thepreviousformsonce thesehave disappearedasforms.
Thus
the elementsare in the composite"potentially",that is, in quality.
Aftergivinga briefexpositionof the general notions of matterand
formas viewed froma unitarianstandpoint,Giles deals with the question of the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody. Giles' approach to this
questionproceeds134
througha distinctionbetweenmatteras the generic
the
of
concept
living and sensitivesubstance,and formas the specific
of
the
rational
concept
being. Althoughthe general Christologicalconclusion attainedby Giles coincideswith Aquinas', Giles' argumentation
132
Chartularium
, I, 559.
133
De Wulf1901(op.cit
., above,n. 52),79,c. IV.
134
De Wulf1901(op.cit.
, above,n. 52),85.

18:07:10 PM

294

ISABELIRIBARREN

is stilldrivenby an originalapproach.Aquinas' accountwas determined135


by two ways of consideringChrist'sbody eitherin respectto the human
In the firstcase it was necnature or in respectto the divine suppositum.
essary to conclude that Christ'sdead body was the same only secundum
quid, by virtueof the separationof the soul as the substantialform.In
the second sense, Christretainedhis numericalidentityby reason of the
Christ's
union.Giles,too, poses two different
waysof considering
hypostatic
body, but his is a more logical than purelyChristologicalconsideration.136
Christcan be seen as the subject of death (thatis, fromthe standpoint
of matter)or as an individual (fromthe standpointof the substantial
form).In the firstinstance,as a subjecthis body sufferedprivationin its
separation from the soul. Habits and privations,however,as Aristotle
taught,are predicatedof the same subject.Therefore,Christ'sdead body
is the same as the body that was the subject of life,the lack of which
signifiesthe loss of an importantqualityof being but not the loss of being
et veretarnen
itself.Et hocmodoloquuntur
, quod
, quodilludcorpusChristi
omnes,
numero
et
in
utero
in
in
cruce
iacuit
,
[idem
fuit]}31
virginis
sepulcro fiierat
pependit
enough, William de la Mare, followingPorphyryantermiInterestingly
nology,arrivesat the same conclusion.
In the second instance,as an individual,the formof Christ's dead
body is not the soul any more. For an individualto be so, it has to be
its whole
constitutedof matterand form,the latterof which conferring
in
not
so
much
number
the
bodies
differ
Thus
and
individuality.
being
but in genus. Giles insiststhat the view of the pluralists,who phantastice
considrant
naturasrerum
,138would lead to the absurditythatbodies differing
in genus (animatedand unanimated)are the same numerically.The iden, but by the same
tityof the body is guaranteed,not by a formacorporeitatis
and only subject (matter)that in one way sufferedthe determinationof
the substantialform,and in anotherway sufferedprivationin death. It
is to the compositeof matterand formthat Christ'sdivinityis united,
and it is on account of matteras it is deprivedof life that we speak of
the genericidentityof the body. Moreover,anotherunion was not necessary for the resurrection,since the intellectualsoul remained always
attached to Christ'sdivinity.139
135
See Aquinas,
II, q.l, a.l.
Quodlibet
136
De Wulf1901(op.cit.
, above,n. 52),85.
137
De Wulf1901(op.cit.,above,n. 52),85.
138
De Wulf1901(op.cit
., above,n. 52),86.
139
De Wulf1901(op.cit.,above,n. 52),87.

18:07:10 PM

THE SEARCHFORANEARLYTHOMISTIC
SCHOOL

295

Thomam
5. Responsio
secundum
There is no doubt thatAquinas' solutionof the unicityof formattracted
many followers,not only forits noveltybut also forits internalstrength.
"
"
Thomam
However, it is more likelythat secundum
(whichwas surreptia
label
of
convenienceagainst
read
as
"Thomism") represented
tiously
which some masterswould place other solutions.Thus, in the oftendebated questionof the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody, "Thomism"
referredto Aquinas' solutionratherthan to a school of thoughtin its
own right.The group's fixedallegiance revealed by these disputesdoes
affiliation
to a
not seem to have gone beyond a faithfuland ad litteram
of
a
"determining" question.
particularway
alone goes, all we can say is
As far as the evidence of the correctoria
thatcertainreactionsfromthe traditionaltheologianspromptedan ad hoc
defenceof the teachingsand the personof Aquinas,whichat best resulted
in lucid clarifications
of importanttheoriessuch as the unicityof substantial form. The influence exercised by Aquinas' teachings upon
Dominicans at the end of the thirteenth
centurydid not manifestitself
in any homogenousway. Not all Dominicans welcomed Aquinas' innovations(recallKilwardby,or WilliamHothum),and even ifsome of them
stillacted in the defensive,theyseem to have been promptedmore by
a certainesprit
de corpsthan by philosophicalconviction.Moreover,there
in favour of Aquinas.
were quite a few non-Dominicanmanifestations
withAquinas' theses
Some of thesewere drivenby philosophicalaffinity
(like Giles, an Augustinin),otherswere simplyoutragedat the spiritof
the censures(like Godfreyof Fontaines,a secular master).
As for those who wrote criticalpieces in defence of Aquinas, they
displayheterogeneousintellectualtempersand theirreactionsreveal to
than has been believed. Some of them seem
be far more individualistic
to have been punctuatedby methodicalconsiderations,
otherswere clearly
to
external
intervention.
Richard
Thus,
responding
Knapwell was driven
not so much by the significance
of an attackthatcame fromthe Franciscans (Kilwardby,for that matter,set the standard),but by his personal
confrontation
withPecham. Knapwell had been busy replyingto William
de la Mare's directattack,thus overlookingthe prohibitionlaunched by
but also a Dominican. KnapKilwardby,not onlyan episcopalauthority,
well's piece of defence transpiresthe urgencyof the events surrounding him, so that he is initiallyquite belligerentand only afterPecham's
condemnationdoes he reveal contrition.He dedicates little time to a
speculativeelaborationof the unicitythesis,and his writingcontributes

18:07:10 PM

296

ISABELIRIBARREN

littlemore than a gestureof comradeship.Giles of Lessines,on the other


hand, appears as a more conscientious scholar in his elaboration of
Aquinas' thesis,and certainlydisplays an awareness of its full import.
to an intelligent
and (seemingly)
However,althoughtestifying
unprejudiced
adherence to Thomisticprinciples,isolated cases like Giles' can hardly
account fora general,pervasiveand uniformemergenceof a "Thomistic
school"- theywere just responding"accordingto Thomas".
the significance
of Williamde la Mare's correctiveshould
Furthermore,
not be underestimated,
not so much because he was a Franciscan,but
because the correspondenceof some of his articleswith Tempier's condemnation(whichWilliamwas carefulto pointout),retrospectively
added
a whole new meaning to Tempier's 1277 intervention.
The latterhad
indeed involved Thomistic theses, but only indirectlyand somewhat
camouflagedby the general characterof the condemnation.Now, with
William'spolemicalpiece, the correspondencebetweenthe two listsserved
as a sort of highlightof the Thomistic theses previouslyonly hidden
amongst the morass of Tempier's articles. This dialogue between a
Franciscanreactionand an official,episcopal,condemnationis morelikely
what triggereda Dominican responseand tingedthe whole controversy
with a partisantone.
Aquinas' theses thereforecertainlyspurred some cohesion among
and "nomDominicans,but thisseems to have been more circumstantial
inal", as it were, than a profoundintellectualmovement at least not at
the end of the thirteenth
century.Aquinas had lefta markin his Order
and indeed in the learned world as a profoundand originaltheologian.
It was thenunderstandablethatthe blemishof his name could have been
seen as havinga directnegativeimpactin thatof his Order's. Hence the
reactionsfromDominicans (and non-Dominicans)fromall quartersand
positionsup to the Roman Curia, the latterperhaps incited(we do not
know) by more mundane reasons than we want to believe.
Oxford
Balliol College

18:07:10 PM

Reviews
Guillaume
d'Ockham
intrieur.
De Platon
, Coll.Des Travaux.
Panaccio,
Claude,Lediscours
Seuil,Paris1999,345p. ISBN2 02 0358352
du langagemental
ne sontplus
ockhamienne
et la forcede la thorie
L'importance
Il nouslivremaintenant
la longue
et ClaudePanaccio
dmontrer,
y estpourbeaucoup.
ellerpond.
ou plutt
celledesexigences
histoire
de sa constitution,
thoriques
auxquelles
Ockham
etmme
dansl'immense
Si le critre
de choixde textes,
corpus
quiva de Platon
estl'attention
auxexpresdesdcennies
auxauteurs
immdiatement,
porte
quile suivent
l'ordre
du langage
ou du dissionscomposes
renvoyant,
"parl'unde leurscomposants
ou de l'intriorit"
au domaine
du mental
etparl'autre
coursen gnral,
(23),le ressort
du langage
menla thorie
ockhamienne
quellesdemandes
du livreestbienthorique:
misesenplace?La reconnaissance
descontextes
se sont-elles
talrpond-elle,
etcomment
de voirl'intrt
de ce
nullement
philosophique
n'empche
argumentatifs
d'mergences
hisne gomme
les diffrences
des thories
critique
qui merge,
pas plusque l'examen
au coursd'une
d'unethorie
du dveloppement
La profonde
comprhension
toriques.
assez
rendre
cetteopposition
semble
parailleurs
que ce livrenousoffre
longuehistoire
artificielle.
avecPlaton.La description
l'histoire
commence
en philosophie,
Commesouvent
pladesobjetsdesattitudes
undialogue
l'identification
tonicienne
de la pensecomme
permet
etde valeur
dansl'meayant
desporteurs
de valeur
de vrit
cognitive
propositionnelles,
orales.Ce dveloppement
aveclesphrases
un certain
esquiss
parPlaton
isomorphisme
la pensesurle modledu langage
de traiter
continue
chezAristote
oral,
qui, dfaut
etd'implication.
La thse
lesrelations
de contrarit
dansle logos
intrieur
localise
logiques
cheztous",auquelrenvoient
leslangues
d'undiscours
aristotlicienne
mental,
"identique
etpartant
avecPlaton,
dansl'valuation
de communication,
estencontinuit
smantique,
la pense.Il n'estpeutauxunits
desrapports
dansl'attribution
quiconstituent
logiques,
un dplacement
du "sensprofond
trepas ncessaire
d'yvoir,commele faitPanaccio,
on pourrait
considrer
la
du recours
au modle
(41); la suitede Hintikka,
linguistique"
unapprofondissement
de Yelenchus
comme
thorie
du syllogisme
socratique.
Quoiqu'ilen
la correvoient
le caractre
despenses,
soit,si aussibienPlatonqu'Aristote
complexe
faire
"la proposition
etl'tatde chosesreste
entre
(46).Maiscomment
globale"
spondance
sansunesmantique
desentits
desvaleurs
de vrit
unethorie
complexes
compositionexactede cesentits
De ce dpart
on
nelle?Quelleestla structure
athnien,
complexes?
de la pensecapabled'expliquer
sonrlecomme"lieu
retiendra
d'unethorie
l'exigence
- et ceciesttrsimportant
- de ce qu'on
indissociable
des rapports
logiques,
originaire"
ne
semble
entirement
satisfaite.
sa
smanticit,
qui
pas
exigence
appelleaujourd'hui
Le dbatquiopposeplatoniciens
de cettehistoire.
et
Il existe
d'autres
sources
grecques
et le premier
sicleavantnotrere, proposde la rationaentre
le troisime
stociens,
le discours
la distinction
entre
intrieur
etle discours
extrieur.
conduit
litdesanimaux,
unlieucommun
enAsieMineure
endiathetos
devient
Plustard,l'expression
et,sortant
logos
dansdesdiscussions
concontexte
de sonpremier
apparat
d'mergence,
argumentatif
ou encore
l'laboration
d'unepsychologie
sacrsou littraires,
cernant
destextes
l'exgse
a lieu,le disA partir
siclede notre
cruciale
du troisime
re,unebifurcation
cognitive.
d'oviennent
deuxautorits
fondansdeuxcontextes
coursmental
distincts,
apparaissant
Le De Trinitate
de ce dernier,
BoceetAugustin.
damentales
dansla discussion
mdivale,
incorde
unedistinction
destine
connatre
un grandsucdu verbum
, offre
parsa thorie
cellequisparel'image
mentale
des
mdivales
du discours
csdanslesthories
intrieur,
intrieur
aucunelangue.
duverbe
mots
relevant
d'unelangue
quin'appartient
particulire
mdivale
de cettediscussion
estle deuxime
comUn autretextecentral
dansl'histoire
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001

Vivarium
39,2

18:07:17 PM

298

REVIEWS

On ne saurait
de la distinction
mentaire
bociendu Perihermeneias.
l'importance
exagrer
de discours,
oralet mental,
ordrede
crit,
ayantun certain
qu'illgueentretroistypes
le discours
mental
ne reoit
linNanmoins,
pasunedescription
proprement
dpendance.
La premire
dfense
de l'application
destermes
au disexplicite
grammaticaux
guistique.
surle Priscien
du Pseudo-Kilwardby,
coursmental
vientd'uncommentaire
Majeur
quifait
inmente
Le pointestextrmement
du sermo
l'objetproprede la grammaire.
important.
aux langues
des concepts
C'estseulement
parl'extension
appliqus
parles la pense,
ou logiques,
une thorie
que peutse constituer
capablede
qu'ilssoientgrammaticaux
la structure
dcrire
logiquede la pense.
trois
discussions
mdivales
autour
dulangage
mental.
L'Auteur
ensuite
Le preprsente
du conentre
deuxthories
mierdbatmetenplace,au longdu XIIIesicle,
l'opposition
et commeacte,ayantdesconsquences
tout fait
pistmologiques
cept,commeidolum
- cetgard,on notera
miseau pointconcernant
la thorie
de
l'intelligente
importantes
de Thomasd'Aquin.
C'estl'histoire
autour
de la
la connaissance
d'uneautreopposition,
dusignifi
desmots,
ensuite
Panaccio.
L'idequele concept
estunsigne
nature
qu'expose
au coursdu XIIIesicle,imposant
"unparalllisme
de plus
se rpandprogressivement
et la pense"(225).Le dernier
la dtermination
de
en plustroit
entre
le langage
point,
en quelquesortele pointde dpart
athnien:
quelssontles
l'objetde la logique,
rejoint
et desrelations
L'idede quelquechosecommeunlangage
de vrit
logiques?
porteurs
chezJeanDunsScot,qui semble
mental
dansYenunciatio
inmente
parexemple,
apparat,
auxlangues
etdoncnepastreuniverselle.
treassocie
nanmoins
Gauthier
devoir
parles,
mental
soit
et Richard
refusent,
raisons,
que le discours
Burley
Campsall
pourdiffrentes
l'objetde la logique.
on l'auracompris,
estunerponse
ces
ockhamienne
du langage
La thorie
mental,
des valeurs
et exigences.
Les porteurs
de vritet des proprits
diffrentes
questions
dansla dernire
version
de sa
dansl'esprit.
Le langage
sontlesphrases
mental,
logiques
leschoses,
toutcommelesmotsparlset
estcompos
d'actesmentaux
thorie,
signifiant
La structure
et les composants
dansl'mesont
desphrases
crits
qui leursontassocis.
au langage
mental
touslestraits
dtermins
smantique:
perparuncritre
appartiennent
il "doitpossder
une
de la valeurde vrit
des noncs,
tinents
pourla dtermination
au moinsaussigrande
que cellede n'importe
quellelangueparleou
expressive
capacit
esten faitexplique
dont
crite"
(266).Cettecapacit
parle langagemental,
expressive
desconcepts
la notique
et
de la logiqueterministe
la description
associela finesse
mais
la logiquequiy trouve
son"lieuoriginaire",
Ce n'estpas seulement
l'pistmologie.
desconcepts,
lesrelations
et de contraet la smanticit
aussil'acquisition
d'implication
desengageetleurreconnaissance
ouencore
rit
entre
lesphrases
l'explicitation
parl'esprit,
vrais.Touteslesexigences
mises
enplaceau longde cette
desdiscours
ments
ontologiques
- parla thorie
- et en quelquesortemisesen lumire
ockhamihistoire
sontrespectes
les
trois
li

la notique
et l'pistl'ordre
entre
discours
enne:l'universalit, explicatif
la pense,
une
la smantique
et,surtout,
applique
permettant
compositionnelle
mologie
et desrelations
de la structure
desporteurs
de valeurde vrit
satisfaisante
description
du discours
dansla thorie
intrieur
L'"intervention
ockhamienne"
s'imposa
logiques.
au longdu XIVesicle,
contrairement
unecerclde la viamoderna
unlment
comme
danslesgnrations
Sansdoutey
taineimaged'unOckham
peuinfluent
qui le suivent.
- etil y en eut- d'autres
cesmmes
Rienn'oblige
de rpondre
a-t-il
faons
problmes.
dansle langage
mental
ockhamien
doivese trou considrer
que toutce qui se trouve
- la thorie
de la proposito
inrede Gauthier
verdansunemmethorie
Burley,
parexemmaisnon tous.Il n'enrestepas moins
de cesproblmes,
certains
que le
ple,rpond
du discours
des exigences
de fond
danssa doctrine
nominaliste
matre
intrieur,
runit,
ensmantique,
maisnonseulement,
de problmes
uncertain
nombre
depuis
quitravaillent
de cettelonguehistoire
PlatonetAristote.
du ressort
permet
philosophique
L'explicitation
et notamment
des phnomnes
ausside tirerdes leonscontemporaines,
l'importance
la structure
mmede la pense"(313).
smantiques
"pourcomprendre

18:07:17 PM

REVIEWS

299

nousavaithabitu
et la prcision
d'argumentation
auxquelles
L'intelligence
d'analyse
cettefoisdansla reconstil'Auteur
danscetouvrage,
se retrouvent
dployes
pleinement
tution
de l'histoire
d'unproblme
l'imporqui luitient cur,et dontil nousmontre
livrereutle prixGrammaticakis-Neumann
Cetexcellent
tancebienau deld'Ockham.
de l'Institut
de France.
Morales
et Politiques
de l'Acadmie
desSciences
Paris

ErnestoPerini-Santos

intheThirteenth
Motion
Place
CeciliaTrifogli,
, Infinity,
(ca.1250-1270).
Century
Oxford
Physics
andTime.
Leiden
/Boston
/Kln2000.289 pp. ISBN 90 04 116575 (Studien
Brill,
desMittelalters,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
72).
ausder
undPhysik
desAristoteles
Kommentare
In his1971Verzeichnis
zurMetaphysik
ungedruckter
in a largenumber
Zimmermann
listedthequestion
titles
, Albert
Zeitvonetwa1250-1350
andunknown
authors.
On the
ofAristotelian
commentaries
byknown
permodum
questionis
thesamequestions
onecouldseehowoften
wereasked
basisofZimmermann's
catalogue,
ofthequestions,
which
almost
inthesamecontexts
indifferent
The authors
manuscripts.
werenot"veryconcerned
arosein connection
withuniversity
about
teaching,
certainly
In some
followed
earlier
commentaries
closely.
(Trifogli,
originality"
p. 28),butfrequently
twocollections
ofquestions
thefactthatboth
casesthesimilarities
between
mayreflect
connected
toteaching
indifferent
werewritten
bythesamecommentator,
perhaps
years.
in Zimmermann's
Twooftheanonymous
setsofquestions
catalogarein factearlysets
ofquestions
on thePhysics
to hislatercom, whichmaybe compared
byWalter
Burley
- as Burley's
an author's
ideascandevelop
did
mentaries.
Since,overa periodofyears,
- differences
withtheideasofWilliam
ofOckham
as a result
ofhisstruggle
between
two
arenota proof
thatthey
arenotbythesamecommentator.
setsofquestions
these
(Along
herediscusses
howRogerBacon'sopinions
onplacechanged
from
onework
lines,
Trifogli
to another.)
On theotherhand,similarity
between
setsofquestions
doesnotprovethat
ofThomasWylton's
andWalter
theyhadthesamecompiler
(comparison
Burley's
questionson thePhysics
showsthecloseconnection
theremayhavebeenbetween
thequestioncollections
ofteacher
andstudent).
Sincetheearly1990sSilviaDonatiandCeciliaTrifogli
havebeenmaking
systematic
studies
oftheworks
in Zimmermann's
whichtheyhaveattempted
to
appearing
catalog,
In thisbookCeciliaTrifogli
concentrates
on tenquesclassify
bydateandplaceoforigin.
- twobynamed
- thatmost
tioncommentaries
onthePhysics
andeight
authors
anonymous
in
derived
from
Oxford
the
after
first
in
the
probably
roughly period1250-70,
availability
LatinofAverroes's
and before
thecommentary
on thePhysics
ofThomas
commentary
Theauthors
ofthesequestions
didnotknowtheworkofRobert
Grosseteste
on
Aquinas.
in theirtime,mayhaveexisted
thePhysics
ca. 1228-32),
which,
(written
onlyas glosses
inthemargins
ofa single
Thereare,however,
ofthePhysics.
connections
bemanuscript
tween
theworks
studies
RufusofCornwall's
hereandRichard
on the
Trifogli
questions
toRegaWood,wereproduced
at Parisabout1235.Theauthors
, which,
Physics
according
oftheseworks
alsoknewRogerBacon'sQuestiones
altere
on thePhysics
at Parisin
disputed
the1240s.The lateronesknewtheworkon thePhysics
ofAlbertus
Magnus.
Threeofthesetsofquestions
studied
herederivefrom
a singlemanuscript,
Oxford,
toGalfridus
de Aspall(probably
Merton
setascribed
written
ca.
Collegems.272,thefirst
andtheothertwosetsanonymous.
1255-1265)
Trifogli
pairseachofthesethreesetsof
inMerton
setofquestions:
ms.272withanother
related
closely
questions
Aspall's
questions
inTodi,Biblioteca
arelinked
toa setofquestions
communale
ms.23,andthetwoanonymoussetsofquestions
arelinked,
tosetsofquestions
inCambridge,
Gonville
respectively,
ms.367andinLondon,
andCaiusCollege
Wellcome
Historical
MedicalLibrary
ms.333.
BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke

Vivarium
39,2

18:07:17 PM

300

REVIEWS

In addition
to thesethreepairedsetsofquestions,
finds
an earlier
Trifogli
pairedset
oneofwhich
wascomplied
de Clifford
Peterhouse
ms.157)
byGuillelmus
(Cambridge,
andanother
contains
thesamequestions
onBookIV, reorpair,eachofwhich
essentially
material
from
Guillelmus
deClifford
inCambridge,
andfrom
thequestions
ganizing
exegetical
Gonville
andCaiusCollegems.367.Throughout
thebook,Trifogli
refers
totheauthors
of
theanonymous
setsofquestions
byhermanuscript
sigla,e.g.to G1,M3,P, S, etc.,which
makesit difficult
to developa familiarity
withindividual
or compilers,
authors
although
it is hardto imagine
authors
anybetter
wayofkeeping
eightanonymous
straight.
a tentative
orderforthetensetsofquestions,
Although
Trifogli
proposes
chronological
shedoesnotattempt
to investigate
whether
thereis a developing
intellectual
tradition
within
butinstead
treats
themhereas representing
moreor lessa single
chronothem,
within
whichtheearlier
setsofquestions
whilethelater
logicalmoment,
maybe shorter,
aremoreelaborate,
butnotnecessarily
moreadvanced.
questions
doctrinally
Exceptfor
thesetofquestions
thatTrifogli
assumes
tobe earliest
Communale
(Siena,Biblioteca
degli
Intronati
ms.L.III.21 pairedwithGuillelmus
de Clifford),
noneoftheseworks
covers
all
concentrates
on questions
motion,
eightBooksofthePhysics.
Trifogli
concerning
infinity,
in BooksIII andIV, bothbecausetheserepresent
basicconcepts
place,andtimefound
ofAristotelian
andbecausetheyareincluded
in mostofthetenworks
studied.
physics
Thisbookrepresents
thefruit
ofground-breaking
research
on manuscript
sources
(as
SilviaDonaticompletely
transcribed
theworks
studied
here
partofa collaborative
project,
andhaspublished
andgeneral
characterizations
ofthem).
command
descriptions
Trifogli's
oftheLatintexts
is impeccable,
andtheediting
ofthisbookis suchthatitis notobviousthatEnglish
is notTrifogli's
first
theverysignificant
taskofreading
Beyond
language.
andmaking
often
inuniqueanddifficult
toreadcopies,
goodsenseoflongtexts,
perhaps
thehighest
thatTrifogli
facedin writing
thisbookwas to drawenlightening
challenge
ofmaterial,
conclusions
from
masses
muchofwhichmight
havebeenthought
to
general
be unremarkable.
on questions
thatAnneliese
Maiershowed
to be imporConcentrating
in effect
tantfora laterperiod,
a first
writes
forsomeofMaier'stopics,
Trifogli
chapter
a periodforwhichMaierlackedmanuscript
sources.
covering
I can heremention
issuesthatTrifogli's
onlya fewofthemanythought-provoking
raises.
Sheconcludes
thatingeneral
theEnglish
authors
ofquestions
on thePhysics
study
in theperiod1250-70
wererealists
ofmotion
thenature
andtime.In light
of
concerning
thisbackground,
we cannowseethatThomasWylton
andWalter
Burley,
writing
quesin theearlyfourteenth
tionson thePhysics
werefollowing
thecommon
century,
opinion
oftheschools
whentheylikewise
assumed
thatmotion
and timeare successive
entities
in nature.
In thisconnection
concludes
thatherauthors
wereantireally
existing
Trifogli
Averroes's
solutions
toproblematic
within
Aristotle's
Averroists,
rejecting
frequently
points
Averroes's
distinction
between
as an "incomplete
motion
form"
and
text,as forinstance
In fact,
as a "waytowards
form."
thesecommentaries
motion
showmuchabouttheway
medieval
authors
whentheyweremoreinfluenced
thought
byAristotle's
logicalworks
thanby hisphysical
ones.Thusthecommentators
advocatethethree-dimensional
or
"immersive"
ofplacefoundin Aristotle's
without
its
conception
Categories
clearly
facing
withthedefinition
ofplaceas theinnermost
surface
ofthesurrounding
incompatibility
in BookIV ofthePhysics
Aristotle
. Likewise,
theprobbodyforwhich
argued
concerning
ofplace,mostofthesecommentators
lemoftheimmobility
stick
witha solution
suggested
in thetwelfth
Albertus
to Gilbertus
which
century
(which
Magnusascribes
Porretanus),
communis
oneofthemcallstheopinio
(p. 197).
oftheworks
thedistinctive
doctrines
herestudied,
in addition
to their
Among
theory
outwhattheyhaveto sayabouttheactualinfinity
of"immersive
singles
place,"Trifogli
ofnumbers.
As throughout
thebook,herapproach
to thisquestion
is philosophical
and
witha survey
ofrecent
evaluative
rather
thanmerely
historical
anddescriptive.
Shebegins
Aristotle's
and thenstudies
workconcerning
ideasaboutpotential
and actualinfinites
whether
herEnglish
commentators
makeprogress
towards
therealproblems
resolving

18:07:23 PM

REVIEWS

301

forinstance
thedivisions
hadsaidthatsomethings,
within
Aristotle's
Aristotle
position.
infinite.
No matter
how
butcannotbe actually
arepotentially
ofa continuum,
infinite,
arepossible,
butonecannever
further
divisions
a continuum,
times
onehasdivided
many
were
a continuum
intoactually
havefinished
infinitely
manyparts.Numbers
dividing
thepartsthat
forinstance
to arisefrom
understood
things,
counting
physical
byAristotle
is divided.
whena continuum
areproduced
do
commentators
thattheearlyEnglish
to Trifogli,
theevidence
"suggests
According
and theactualinfinite"
nothavea fullgraspof thelogicof thepotential
(p. 114).
is ofgreatinterest
in number
theearlyEnglish
debateabouttheinfinite
Nevertheless,
which
itreveals
aboutnumber
commitments
oftheontological
because
(p. 115).
especially
about
Godis connected
to assertions
theearliest
considers
In whatTrifogli
commentary,
infinites.
So it is argued(cf.p. 117n)thatGod counts
absolute
justas actual
potential
theparts
thisview,saying
The author
that,tobe counted,
rejects
partsofa continuum.
Butonepairof
andthereby
actualized.
ordesignated
mustinsomewaybe distinguished
in numbers,
referthatthereis an actualinfinity
to thecontrary,
commentaries
argues,
numbers:
unitsin counting
whichonedrawsadditional
higher
ringto thesourcefrom
ofthenext
addition
whichtheendless
from
thatthing
derives
from
in numbers
"infinity
Gonville
a quoestcontinua
onederives
)" (Cambridge,
appositio
{abeodem
parttothepreceding
the"source"
thisargument,
andCaiusCollegems.367,f. 142va).As Trifogli
interprets
as a wholeandnotas a
takenatemporally
at issuehereis theseriesofpositive
integers
ofnumbers,
extended.
Foran infinity
at anygiventimebe further
thatmight
series
finite
number
since
one
is
not
ofnumbered
onthisview,an infinity
potenmay
required,
things
as wellas entities
as wellas actualonesandnon-entities
(p. 129n,
things
tially
existing
Merton
to Oxford,
Collegems.272,f. 157ra;seealsop. 130).Ifthisinterprereferring
had a morePlatonic
commentators
thenthemid-thirteenth
tationis correct,
century
undertheinfluence
who
fell
more
than
later
numbers
to
commentators,
firmly
approach
ofmathematics.
to thephilosophy
withregard
andAverroes
ofAristotle
authors
do notcome
in thisstudy,
theseparate
GivenTrifogli's
anonymous
approach
andspecialchardifferences
so thatonehasa clearsenseoftheir
intofocus
individually,
ideasaboutplaceortime?).
alsohavedistinctive
forinstance,
acteristics
(dotheinfinitists,
a basic
inproviding
hassucceeded
as a whole,
thetenworks
Nevertheless,
Trifogli
taking
thatwillbe veryuseofthethirteenth
inthethird
century
quarter
physics
mapofOxford
Itwouldbe wonuncharted
ofthisup-to-now
fulforlaterandfuller
territory.
explorations
in electronic
evenideally
makeavailable,
DonatiandTrifogli
derful
form,
if,eventually,
Thisbookrestsuponan enormous
works.
of theseAristotelian
theirfulltranscriptions
ofwhat
overview
from
ofspadeworkas wellas benefitting
amount
Trifogli's
clearsighted
to light.
hasbeenbrought
EdithSylla

North
Carolina
Raleigh,

18:07:23 PM

BooksReceived
:
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
Contents
, 71 (2000)283 pp. ISSN 0591-0358
grecetlatin
TheRepertories
Musical
Melodies
inByzantine
Chr.Troelsgrd,
-,
ofModel
(Automela)
Manuscripts
Toledan
tables
inthe:Toledan
F. Goubier,
et
F.S. Pedersen,
Tables',
Influences
prdicatives
unaspect
del'approche
terministe
dela premire
moiti
duXIIIesicle
;
rfirentielles:
consquences
onAristotle's
andSignification
in 13th-century
S. Ebbesen,Words
Questions
Metaphysics;
Medieval
onPriscian's
A. Luhtala,
Institutiones
R. Andrews,
Early
Commentary
grammaticae;
A Noteon Ockham's
TheDefensorium
Ockham:AnEdition
; S. Ebbesen,
;
Defender
to cimagl67,68, 70
Corrigenda
Gramticas
Latinas
deTransicin:
Carmen
. Ediciones
Codoer,
fuandePastrana
y Fernando
Nepote
Salamanca
2000151pp. ISBN 84 7481925 3
Universidad,
etdialectique
de Cuse.
chezNicolas
Counet,
Jean-Michel
J. Vrin,Paris2000
Mathmatiques
de philosophie
mdivale,
80) 456 pp. ISBN2 711614603
(tudes
Lore
andinEarly
toJerusalem.
Medecine
inHellenized
Christian
Literature.
Edited
From
Athens
Jewish
M. Horstmanshoff,
G. Baader,G. Ferngern.
Erasmus
by S. Kottek,
Publishing,
Rotterdam
2000279pp. ISBN 90 5235135X
Evrard
AnneGrondeux,
Le Graecismus
deBthune
travers
sesgloses.
Entre
grammaire
posiduXIIeauXesicle.
tive
etgrammaire
Turnhout
2000(Studia
Artistarum,
spculative
Brepols,
8) vii& 552pp. ISBN 2 503 510183
De animaintheLatinWest.
The Warburg
Institute/Nino
Hase,Avicenna's
Dag Nikolaus
London/Turin
Institute
Studies
andTexts,1) x &
2000(Warburg
Editore,
Aragno
350pp. ISBN0 854811257
Ethics
& Littlefield
Lanham-Boulder-New
, N. Thompson
Publishers,
(ed.).Rowman
Instilling
York-Oxford
2000xv& 235pp. ISBN0 847697452
DunsScotus,SeineSpiritualitt
undEthik.Herausgegeben
vonH. Schneider
Johannes
Kevelaer
O.F.M.Butzon& Bercker,
2000(Verffentlichungen
derJohannes-DunsScotus: A. Vos,Hauptlinien
derScotischen
Akademie,
10)ISBN 3 766602934 Contents
Ethik
Leben
liebevolle
Gottes
Wille
zulassender
;
Tat'E. Dekker,
; N. denBok,Ewiges
fureine
Das moralisch
Gute
beiJohannes
H.-M.Stamm,
DunsScotus
DieAktualitt
; H. Schneider,
desseligen
DunsScotus
derScotischen
; A. Vos,EinProfil
Johannes
Spiritualitt
Lesthories
dela disposino
etlegrand
Claudine
uvre
deRonsard.
HonorChampion
Jomphe,
Paris2000(tudes
etessaissurla Renaissance,
diteur,
xxiv)410pp.ISBN2 7453
02620
desphilosophisch-anthropologischen
Th. W. Khler,
Diskurses
imdreizehnten
Grundlagen
Jahrhundert.
DieErkenntnisbemhung
umdenMenschen
imzeitgenssischen
Verstndnis.
Leiden-BostonBrill,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
Kln2000(Studien
desMittelalters,
71)xi & 745
pp. ISBN90 04 116230
- Hoffnung
Gottes
des Menschen.
von H. Schneider
Menschwerdung
Herausgegeben
& Bercker,
Kevelaer
O.F.M.Butzon
(Johannes-Duns-Scotus-Akademie,
12) 162pp.
: J. Schneider,
ISBN 3 76660347 7 Contents
Inkarnation
beiFranziskus
undKlaravon
- Hoffnung
Gottes
wider
allerHoffnung?
Assisi'
J. Schlageter,
Menschwerdung
Christologischer
aus
Rckblick
Petrus
Olivi
aktuellen
A. Vos,Inkarnation
undReinkarnation
Anlass;
;
auf
dersupralapsarischen
H. Veldhuis,
desJohannes
Duns
/irhermeneutischen
Bedeutung
Christologie
Inkarnation
undFragilitt
desMenscshen
Scotus
Die
; G.B. Langemeyer,
; D. Wiederkehr,
- theologisch
Gottes
Gottes
in einer
; J.W.Einhorn,
gesehen
Menschwerdung
Menschwerdung
maior
desheiligen
derLegenda
Bonaventura
Mentis
amore
Lateinische
Bilderhandschrift
ligati.
undDichterfreundschaft
inMittelalter
undNeuzeit.
Freundschaftdichtung
Festgabe
frReinhard
B. Krkel,
T. lichtund
von
Mattes
zum65.Geburtstag.
Herausgegeben
J. Wiendlocha.
Dchting
2001x & 618 pp. ISBN 3 93097813 X
Verlag,
Heidelberg

BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke

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18:07:33 PM

BOOKSRECEIVED

303

andJack
Buridan
TheMetaphysics
andNatural
, edited
byJ.M.M.H.Thijssen
Philosophy
ofJohn
andEarlyModern
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2001(Medieval
Science,
2) xvii
Zupko.Brill,
& 302pp.ISBN90 04 115145
andKnowledge
TheLight
Science
Steven
P. Marrone,
ofGodintheThirteenth
ofThyCountenance.
Vol.II: GodattheCore
Vol.I: A Doctrine
Illumination.
Brill,
ofCognition.
ofDivine
Century.
intheHistory
ofChristian
Leiden-BostonKln2001(Studies
98)xi& 611
Thought,
pp.ISBN90 04 119477 (set)
Edited
LeideninMedieval
Some
EastandWest.
Nature
Brill,
byC. Koyama.
Thought.
Approaches
desMittelalters,
Boston-Kln
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
2000(Studien
73)xiv
& 186pp.ISBN90 04 119663
vonTheoKobusch.
Primus
desMittelalters.
EineEinfuhrung.
Verlag,
Philosophen
Herausgegeben
Darmstadt
2000vii& 283pp. ISBN3 89678156 1
indasmittelalterliche
Weltbild.
Robert
DerMikrokosmos
Ramon
Hulls.EineEinfuhrung
Pring-Mill,
AusdemKatalanischen
bersetzt
vonUlliRoth.Frommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
2001xii& 141pp. ISBn3 772820026
Marsilius
von
undTheologie
desausgehenden
Mittelalters.
unddasDenken
seiner
Inghen
eit,
Philosophie
Bakker.
Leiden-Boston-Kln
vonM.J.F.M.
HoenenundP.J.J.M.
Brill,
herausgegeben
2000X& 322pp.ISBN90 04 109129
Revue
d'histoire
destextes
: G.-D.de
, XXIX (1999)311 pp. ISBN 2 271 057493. Contents
La tradition
desuvres
deMarcleMoine
Neues
zumKolophon
; K.-H.Uthemann,
Durand,
TheGenesis
desParisinus
Graecus
1115?'K. Schepers,
ofGlossaTripartita
SuperCantica;
Evidence
fortheHistory
B. Victor
et B. Quesnel,
The Colometric
oftheTerenceMannon
deSaint-Oyen
dans
Textin theEarlyMiddleAges;A.-M.Turcan-Verkerk,
Lesmanuscrits
dela Grandechronique
l'histoire
dela transmission
destextes
; G. Labory,
duXIVeetduXVesicle
de Normandie
; D.M. Searby,TheSources
oftheso-called
El cdice
Parisinum
G.1 dela Catedral
Ineditm;
Valverde,
J.Fernndez
Gnomologium
arabumdeRodrigo
deSchott
dela Historia
deRada
deSegorbe
; A.
Jimnez
y la edicin
La rvision
duGraecismus
d'Evrard
deBthune
Grondeux,
; indexdes
parJeandeGarlande
manuscrits
cits
andthe
atParis,
Peter
Auriol
1316-1345.
Chr.,Theology
Schabel,
ofdivine
problem
foreknowledge
andfuture
2000
contingents
Aldershot-Burlington,
U.S.A.-Singapore-Sidney
Ashgate,
de filosofa
de la Universidad
revista
19 (2000)332pp. ISSN 01
Panamericana,
Tpicos,
88-6649
Laurentii
De linguae
traVallensis
latinae
2 vols.,Introduccin,
edicincrtica,
elegantia.
duccin
de Extremadura
1999
y notasporSantiago
LpezMoreda.Universidad
Humanistica.
SerieTextos.
(Grammatica
3) 833pp.ISBN84 77233578 (vol.1)&
84 77233586 (vol.2)
Letravail
desarts
deParis:
textes
etmatres
intellectuel
la Facult
(ca.1200-1500),
OlgaWeijers,
Turnhout
4. H-J(jusqu'
2001(StudiaArtistarum,
C.).Brepols,
Johannes
9) 169pp.
ISBN2 503 511759
secundum
Henrik
de animarationali
substantiam
desNicolaus
Baldeiii
Wels,DieDisputatio
dem
Pariser
Codex
zurAblehnung
desAverroismus
BN. lat.16627.EineStudie
5.J.nach
Romanm
zu Anfang
undAlexandrismus
am Collegium
des 17.Jahrhunderts.
B.R.
Amsterdam
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
2000(Bochumer
Grner,
30)VII
/Philadelphia
& 153pp.ISBN90 6032357 2
TntheFootsteps
TheOrigins
RonaldG. Witt,
Ancients'.
Lovato
toBruni.
ofHumanism
ofthe
from
in Medieval
andReformation
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2000(Studies
Brill,
74)
Thought,
xiii& 562pp. ISBN90 04 113975

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