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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
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INTHENETHERLANDS
PRINTED
18:07:55 PM
CONTENTS
Richard A. Lee, Jr.
Giorgio Pini
Daniel
Liscia
Antonio di
Walter Redmond
JamesB. South
Reviews
Harm Goris
Colleen Mccluskey
Angel D'Ors
Isabel Iribarren
Reviews
OF VOLUME
XXXIX (2001)
Book Received
302
18:07:55 PM
aboutSkepticism:
BeingSkeptical
Ockham3
Themes
s AllegedSkepticism
concerning
Methodological
RICHARD A. LEE,JR.
Introduction
In recentyears,the debate concerningwhetherOckham is a skepticor
leads to skepticism
seemsto have come to an end.1The end of the debate,
is
as
however,
problematicas the debate itself.The question of skepticism in Ockham seems to have been answeredbeforewe could question
the very termsof the debate itself.It is striking,
for example, that the
in
of
comes
i.e.,
modernity.Perhaps
relativelyrecently,
charge skepticism
the issue of skepticismis an issue forus in a way thatit could not have
been fora thinkerlike Ockham. This kind of questioning,however,was
never raised in the debate in the scholarlyliterature.
When we look at the debate over Ockham's alleged skepticism,
we see
thatthe questionis phrasedin termsof the "objectivestatus"of our conIn our time,
cepts,and our abilityto approach the world "scientifically."2
that is, we see Ockham as speaking,or failingto speak, to our modern
philosophicalneuroses.We assessa medievaldebate in termswhichbelong
not to the medieval epoch but to our own. While one can imagine a
medievalphilosopherusingall of theseterms,theywould have been used
in such radicallydifferent
ways and the connectionbetween objective
validityand science was never reallyan issue.
In what follows,I would like to thinkthroughthe issue of whether
Ockham was skepticor leads to skepticism.I do not want to rehash the
entiredebate,nordo I necessarily
wantto answernegatively
or affirmatively.
Rather,I want to raise the largerissue of our relationas modernreaders
1
discussion
canbe found
in Volker
DoesOckham3
s Concept
Thougha recent
Leppin,
of
Divine
Power
Threaten
Man'sCertainty
inHisKnowledge
in: Franciscan
Studies,
oftheWorld?,
55 (1998),169-80.
2 Gracia,
hasonlymental
theobjectivity
existence,
e.g.,arguesthat"Iftheuniversal
andscientific
ofourconcepts
is undermined,"
onUniversais
,
validity
J.Gracia,Thomas
Jorge
in:DavidM. Gallagher
andHisLegacy
, Washington
1994,23.
(ed.),Thomas
Aquinas
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2001
Vivarium
39,1
18:08:00 PM
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
18:08:00 PM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
5 Foran overview
ofancient
see Leo Groarke,
Greek
: Anti-realist
skepticism,
Scepticism
Trends
inAncient
Greek
A Study
in
, Montreal
1990,andCharlotte
Thought
Stough,
Skepticism:
1969.
Epistemologa,
Berkeley
6 I usetheterm
to refer
to a skepticism
thatclaimsthattherealization
"therapeutic"
ofourinability
toknow
withcertainty
is insomewayhelpful.
I usetheterm"pernicious"
to refer
to whatI taketo be theissuein thedebateoverOckham's
mostly
skepticism,
thatitis somehow
or suspect.
namely
dangerous
7
is notunknown
in theRenaissance
andforms,
in fact,
an important
Skepticism
part
ofRenaissance
It seemsto me,however,
thattheskepticism
in the
onefinds
philosophy.
is precisely
a kindofethical/therapeutic
Renaissance
form
muchlikeancient
skepticism.
intheRenaissance,
On skepticism
seeDonCameron
Doubs
Boundless
Allen,
Sea,Skepticism
andFaith
1964;Richard
intheRenaissance
TheHistory
, Baltimore
Henry
Popkin,
ofSkepticism
toDescartes
Erasmus
from
, Assen1964.
8 Foran earlytreatment
oftheproblems
ofDescartes'
seethefivesetsofobjecproof,
tionsto hisMeditations.
ofArnauld
these,I findtheobjects
Among
especially
pertinent.
He points
outthatDescartes
needsGod'sexistence
to establish
thetruth
of"clearand
distinct
ideas"andyeta clearanddistinct
ideaofGod is precisely
whatis required
in
theproof
ofGod.RenDescartes,
Meditationes
dePrima
deDescartes,
, in: Oeuvres
Philosophia
ed. Charles
AdamandPaulTannery,
Paris1996,VII, 214;RenDescartes,
Meditations
onFirst
Robert
Stoothoff
andDugaldMurdoch,
in:The
, trans.
JohnCottingham,
Philosophy
1984,150.The proofI havein mindhereis
, Cambridge
Philosophical
ofDescartes
Writings
theproof
oftheThirdMeditation
whosegoal,itseems,
is toestablish
that"clearanddistinct
ideas"aretrue.Thiswillbe usedto movefrom
whatis established
in thecogitoto
outside.
Ifthisproof
someworld
thentheoutside
world
itself
becomes
fails,
questionable.
18:08:00 PM
A. LEE,JR
RICHARD
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
was made have not been called into question. Gilson applies a modern
notion,i.e., a skepticismbased upon the split between the subject and
object (i.e., betweenthe cogito and the world outside)preciselybecause
he wantsto show thatOckham is more like Descartesthan like Aquinas.
Indeed, Gilson refersto the period of medievalphilosophyafterAquinas
as one of "decline and decadence." For Gilson, then,the label "skeptic"
is more than a descriptionof a philosophicalposition.The assumption
- an
is thatskepticismis not a valid epistemologicalposition
assumption
whichGilson does not go on to prove. To label Ockham a skeptic,then,
is an ideologicalmove on Gilson'spart. Not onlyis Ockham a bad epishe is pernicious,a sortof cancerthatshouldhave been removed
temologist,
in itsearlieststages.For Gilson,the term"skeptic"is applied to a philosopositionthatphilosopherholds,
pher not because of some epistemological
but because of a value judgmenton the part of Gilson himself.
In thisway, Gilson is clearlya modernphilosopherwhose distastefor
and distrustof modernityleads him to accuse Ockham (and nominalism
in general)of leadingto the wrongsof modernity.
On thisview,Ockham
"leads to skepticism"because he forcesus to choose betweenknowledge
of God and the externalworld on the one hand and God's absolute
If we chooseknowledge,
thenwe shouldbe Thomists.
poweron theother.13
If we choose God's power,thenwe are on the road to skepticism.What
Gilson'sargumentshowsmostclearlyis thatwe modernshave an almost
impossibletaskwhen it comes to readingmedievalthinkers.It is notjust
that we happen to come afterthe Middle Ages. There is a difference
between philosophyin modernityand philosophyin the Middle Ages.
That difference,
perhaps,cannot be overcome.
The warningwe should draw fromhis argumentis that medievalphilosophyis just as much about us as it is about medieval thinkers.That
is, the approach we take to medievalphilosophy("Does Ockham lead to
skepticism?")
saysjust as much or perhaps even more about our own
philosophicalconcernsand horizonas it does about medievalphilosophy
and its horizon. Our philosophicalvocabulary,conceptualbestiary,and
issues of concernhave a historyof theirown, a historywhich separates
us fromthe medievaltextswe read. This is not to say thatwe are unable
to interprettexts,ratherit is to say thatwe mustreflecton the distance
that separates us and the frameworkwe use to bridge that distance.
13Foran
intothesupposed
relation
between
theabsolute
investigation
powerofGod
andskepticism,
seeLeppin1998(op.cit.,above,n. 1).
18:08:00 PM
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
forinterpretation
is necessary,but no oneframework
Having a framework
is necessary.
Once we turnaway fromGilson and towardsothercommentators
who
in
nominalism
and
Ockham
with
we
do
the
not,
end,
charge
skepticism,
fare much better.MarilynMcCord Adams and T.K. Scott providetwo
such examples.14Both Scott and Adams find that Ockham's epistemolwhen critiqued,does
ogy "leads to skepticism"because his epistemology,
not secure the groundsof knowledgeof the outsideworld.In short,when
we followout Ockham's epistemology,
we findthat he cannot give cerour
the
to
of
external
world,i.e., the world outsidethe
tainty
knowledge
cogito.15
Here we should notice two importantissues.First,while Gilson meant
that nominalismleads to skepticismin an historicsense, i.e., it leads later
thinkersinto skepticism(thusthereis a "road" to skepticism),
Adams and
Scott mean that Ockham himselfis led into skepticismby his own principles. If skepticismis seen as a positiveepistemologicalposition(and one
which is legitimateuntil it has been disproven),however,it cannot be
the case that one is accidentallya skeptic.Skepticismis not a failureof
all of
but is itselfan epistemologicalposition.Furthermore,
epistemology,
these commentatorsthinkthat the label "skeptic"is a negativeone, i.e.,
that once one is labeled a skepticthe work of criticismis done. In this
way, Gilson's use of the term "skeptic" as a value judgment about a
philosophercontinues.Second, and followingfromthe first,both Scott
and Adams do not show that Ockham is a skeptic.What theydo tryto
show is thathis epistemologyfailsto live up to its own claims.Why label
this purportedfailure "skepticism?"There must be some other philosophical concernshidingbehind the charge.
into the presuppositions
What these criticismslack is an investigation
of the kind of skepticismof which theyaccuse Ockham. If a radical separation betweensoul and world is lackingin medieval thought,then no
nominalistcan be a skepticin this sense. In otherwords,it is clear that
modern commentatorsdo not typicallycharge medieval thinkerswith
14Marilyn
Intuitive
andScepticism
in William
Ockham
McCordAdams,
,
Cognition,
Certainty
onEvidence
andIntuition
in: Traditio,
26 (1970),389-98;T.K. Scott,Ockham
, Necessity
, in:
9 (1971),15-41.
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
Journal
" thisis
15Whileneither
of"cogito
what
ScottnorAdamsusesthelanguage
precisely
thesouland the
this
between
in
It
is
have
to
assume
their
separation
arguments.
they
belowwillshowthatno
here.My argument
extra-mental
worldthatI am challenging
occursin medieval
or dichotomous
suchabsolute
thought.
separation
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
18:08:00 PM
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
3. Subjectivity
and Objectivity
in MedievalPhilosophy
Later medieval thinkerswere not unfamiliarwith the terms"subjective"
and "objective."Indeed, medievalthinkersdevelopeda vocabularywhich
betweensubjectivebeing [essesubiecpaid close attentionto the difference
tiveor subiectivum)
and objective being (esseobiective
or obiectivum).
These
formtwo regionsof being, to be sure, but just what are those regions
and how do they differ?Often commentatorswill note that for the
medievaisthesetermshad preciselythe oppositemeaningtheyhave today,
where subjectivebeing is being outside the mind and objectivebeing is
being in the mindonly.Yet thisis to understandthatin medievalthought
thereis exacdy the same splitbetweensubject and object as in modern
thought theirnames are simplyreversed.
The word obiective
does not appear in the Thasaurus
LinguaeLatinae.The
" is
term "subiective
reportedonly in grammaticalinstances,but thereare
no instancesof the word being used in a metaphysicalsense. We can
translatethese terms,in connectionwith the word esse,as the kind of
being a subject has and the kind of being an object has. Thus we are
and obiectum.
In the sense we are
thrownback upon the words subiectum
concernedwithhere, these words come into the philosophicallexicon as
" and "antikeimenon"
translationsof Aristotle's"hypokeimenon
respectively.
"
Thus a "subiectum
it
(substrate)is that which "stands under" attributes,
is that about which somethingcan be said, but it itselfcannot be said
.17The
of anything.Aristotlecalls this"primarysubstance"in the Categories
"
use of this word, then, is quite straightforward.
To have "subiective
esse
is to have the kind of being that a primarysubstancehas or to have
It is to have the kind
existencein thatprimarysubstanceas in a subject.18
of being which admits of accidents,but also to have the kind of being
which standstherein its own right.
18:08:00 PM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
" has
On the otherhand, to have the kind of being that an "obiectum
is not as easy to understand.Again, the Thesaurus
LinguaeLatinaereport
no classicalinstancesof the word used in this sense.19It seems to arise,
accordingto Dewan's excellenthistoryof the word, in the twelfthcentury,and, as noted already, it appears as a translationof Aristotle's
"antikeimenon"
This Greek termwas originallyrenderedquite literallyby
the Latin "oppositum."20For Aristode,antikeimenon
is that which is the
an
the
correlate
to
act
or
of
soul.
Thus, desire,love, and
proper
power
outsidethe soul towardwhich
knowledgewould each have an antikeimenon
a particularpower of the soul tends.21Accordingto Aquinas, e.g., "The
object [of a potency]is compared to passive potencyjust as to a principle and movingcause. The object is compared to an active potencyas
a terminusand end."22If we translateobiectum
as "object" we should
understandit in the sense of the "object of a game" ratherthan in the
sense of an "unidentified
flyingobject." That is, it is that which brings
the power of a soul to its fulfillment
(Latin: termint).Color, e.g., is the
"object" of sightnot in the sense that it is the thingwhich is seen, but
in the sense that it is what sightis all about. Sight providesthe "objecare already bound in a
tivity"of the object. Color and sight,therefore,
with
one
another
need
one anotherin order
necessaryrelationship
they
foreach to be what it is.
We can perhapsunderstandthisbetterby placing the entiretheoryof
knowledge(and even vision) in a largercontext.For medieval thought,
visionand knowledgedo not happen in isolated events.Rather,the fact
that knowledgeis possible,that vision can grasp its object, depends on
the constitutionof the cosmos itself.There is a "natural" connection
betweena power of the soul and its object: "[I]t is impossiblethatthere
be visionand nothingis seen."23Objectivityin thismedievalsense,therefore,presupposesthisbackground,this"cosmos." This, in turn,seems to
19The term
doesappearin thecontext
ofcriminal
however.
accusations,
20Lawrence
ontheInvention
Notes
d'Histoire
Dewan,'Obiectum3:
, in:Archives
ofa Word
et Littraire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,48 (1981),45. The Aristotelian
textis De anima
,
II, ch.4, 415a19-20.
21See
Ensinquantum
Ens:derBegriff
desSeienden
alssolchm
alsGegenstand
Honnefelder,
Ludger
derMetaphysik
nachderLehre
desJohannes
DunsScotus
, Mnster/W
1979,60f.,and Peter
undErkenntnis
beiWilhelm
vonOckham
Sein,
Schulthess,
, Berlin1992,184-93.
Signifikation
esp.
184f.
22ST I, q. 72,a. 3c.
23William
ofOckham,
inLib.PeriHerm.
Aris
t.,ed. Gi 1978(op.cit.,above,
Expositio
n. 18),352.Thistextwillbe citedas Per.Herm
., followed
bypagenumber.
18:08:00 PM
10
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
24Dewan1981(op.cit.,
Dewannotedthattheterm
"obiectum"
above,n. 20),59.Earlier,
Whenoneinquires
moreto thenature
ofa powerthanto itsintelligibility.
after
points
after
a power's
oneinquires
thatoccurs
heremust
Thus,the"striking"
finis.
intelligibility,
becauseofthenature
ofthepower,
thatpower.
The
as thatwhich,
strikes
be understood
attuned
to hearing
thegong.
is already
then,
power,
a I nispointis argued
1achau,Vision
andCertitude
tnthe
Age
quiteclearly
byKatherine
Leiden1988.
andtheFoundations
1250-1345,
ofSemantics
ofOckham:
Optics,
Epistemology
to medieval
texts
canbe found
hereas well.
References
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
11
that theyexist in the connectionthat the soul has with the world. We
shouldnote thatin the Middle Ages the choice was notjust foresseobiectiveor subiectwe
, appetitive
, intellective
, etc.
, but also sensitive
have being
If a medieval philosopherargues that the trees as moving
of
this
lies
neither
outside
the soul
that
the
he
is
obiective,
arguing
origin
nor withinit, but in the veryrelationof the soul to the world.This takes
place withina "cosmos," as I mentionedabove. The connectionof soul
and world is as basic to medieval thoughtas theirseparationis to our
world.It makes sense, then,to say that the movingtreeshave objective
being,but not subjectivebeing because the movingtreesare not hypokeimena
, i.e., they are not subjects in the Aristoteliansense. The moving
treeshave objectivebeing, however,because theyarise out of the relation to the world that our sense of sighthas.
here.He uses manynames for"objecPeterAureoliis indeedinstructive
In his use of
tive" being: apparent,intentional,seen, judged, intuited.26
" to describethe kind of
that
certain
the term"obiective
being
optical illusions have, he seems to be contrastingthat kind of being stronglywith
whathe laterwillcall "real being": "[Images in a mirror]... do not have
some being unless known or apparentbeing. . . Some imagine that the
imagesare in the mirror,and thatthe appearancesthemselvesare in the
medium,whetheror not theyare seen; but both these views are false.
, realbeing."27
Otherwise,it would followthat theyhad true
Does the oppositionbetween"apparentbeing" and "real being" indicate that Aureoli, at least, saw that there is a dichotomybetween the
regionof being inside the soul and the regionof being outsidethe soul?
Or is Aureoliattemptingto carve out a realm of being which is neither
subjectivenor objective in our modern sense of these terms?Such a
regionwould be that very region which opens up preciselybecause of
thewaysin whichour soul reachesout to and touchesthe world.Because
of this,esseintentionale,
seems an excellentchoice fordescribingthisontohave
or esseintentionale
To
esseobiective
is not to exist as a
logica! region.
18:08:00 PM
12
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
13
18:08:00 PM
14
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
lose sightof the fact that the medieval debate about knowledge
especially "intuitiveknowledge" could not be, to use our modern sense of
the term,a debate over the objective
validityof our concepts;(2) theylose
fact
that
of
the
because
this
was
not the debate, the issue of skepsight
ticism as they raise it cannot be a charge leveled against a medieval
between
thinker;and (3) theylose sightof the factthatthereis a difference
a theoryof knowledgewhichfailsand the epistemologicalpositionknown
as skepticism.
4. Nominalism
and Realism
If my argumenthas been successful,then it has become clear what cannot be involvedin the medieval debate about the nature of knowledge
and the role thatuniversaisplay in it. We are not talkingabout our mod- for even if a
ern notion of objectivevalidity
concept arises only in the
soul it does not, therefore,sacrificeits objectivevalidity.Both medieval
realistsand nominalistswould have agreed on the "objectivevalidity"of
our concepts.That is, both the nominalistand the realistwould hold that
conceptshave some object outsideor insidethe mind to whichtheyrefer.
We are also not talkingabout whetheror not knowledgeof the worldis
possible. Both camps would readilyagree that not only is knowledgeof
the outsideworld possible,it in factis the case. What, then,is the issue
dividingrealistsand nominalistsin the Middle Ages?
The relationat stake is not that between soul and world but rather
thatbetweenGod and world.As I have alreadyargued,followingTachau,
knowledge and its object were thoughtalong the lines of vision and
color- the proper object of vision. Consequently,all medieval thinkers
who followAristotleagree that our knowledgeis caused by the things
known. God's knowledge,conversely,is causative of the things.If our
knowledge,caused by the things,is of universais,then to posit the existence of these universaisoutsidethe soul is alreadyto posit a relationship
betweenGod and theseuniversais
i.e., it is alreadyto say thatGod crethese universais.31
ates through
Aquinas provides an instructiveexample here. For Aquinas, God's
knowledgeis causative of the things.Knowledge is always in relationto
31Onecanfind
thinkers
totheAristotelian
latermedieval
throughout
philosophy
appealing
ofuniversais."
is one
statement
that"sensation
is ofsingulars,
This,obviously,
knowledge
ofthemainsitesofcontention
between
nominalists
andrealists.
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
15
the mode of the knowerand knowledgeis alwaysa move towardimmateriality.For the knowerand the known are distinguishedbecause the
knownhas onlyits own form,while the knowerhas the formof itselfas
well as the thingknown.What is knownin the thing,then,is what pertainsto its immateriality
(ST 1, 14, lc). Since God is entirelyimmaterial,
God knowsperfectly.But this knowledgewhich God has is productive
of the thingsknown(ST 1, 14, 8c).
The relationof knowledgeto formis a relationbetween knowledge
and universal,for,Aquinas notes, the universaltakes its ratiofromthe
form.The form,i.e., the universal,is the end of some act of generation.32
creWe know theseformsonly througha processof sensation-phantasm
because our intellectis linkedto our bodies (ST 1, 84,
ation-abstraction
6). The divineintellect(as well as an angelicintellect)graspsformsimmediatelywithoutthis process of sensationleading to abstraction.These
same universaisare called, by Aquinas, "divine ideas" and he findsit
necessaryto posit these divine ideas in the mind of God as the exemplars of creation(ST 1, 15, 1-3). Thus, Aquinas' realismforceshim to
understandthe veryuniversaiswhich existoutsidethe mind as the same
universaiswhich existin the divine mind and are the exemplarycauses
of the universe.Exemplarsare necessarybecause the exemplaris what
guaranteesthatan effectfollowsfroma determinateform(ST 1, 49, 3c).
In the case of artificialproduction,i.e., techne
, the determinateformis in
the mind of the artisan.However,in the case of naturalproduction,the
determinateformmust be reduced to the ideas in the divine mind, for
this determination
of formsis nothingother than the order of the universe (ST 1, 49, 3c).33
While this manner of positinguniversaiscan be seen as allowingfor
much more knowledgeof the divine than is theologicallyacceptable, it
is the peculiarrelationof universaisas the groundbothof our knowledge
of singularsandof God's creativeactivitythatis more interesting.
Aquinas'
- moderate
realism
thoughit may be resultsin the conditionthat our
of thingsoffersup the beingof the thing.In short,knowledge
knowledge
allows the soul to "get behind" the givennessof the thingin its singular
32See,
esse
1, 15, lc: . . necesseestformam
Theologiae
amongotherplaces,Summa
finem
generationis
cujuscumque."
33
often
interms
oftheactofcreation
ofartificial
speaks
Aquinas
production
(e.g.,ST
ofthings
are
15,q. 1,a. lc).Thismeansthathe needstopositthattheforms
produced
in themindoftheproducer.
18:08:00 PM
16
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
34On thisissue,seePhilotheus
Articles
onOckham
Collected
, ed. E.M. Buytaert,
Boehner,
St.Bonaventure
1958,156-74.
Series,
Philosophy
35William
IIOrdinatilo
Primum
Sententiarum
inLibrum
ofOckham,
, Distinctiones
Scriptum
etTheologica,
vol.OT
de OckhamOpera
& G. Gi,Guillelmi
III, ed. St.Brown
Philosophica
do
and"objective"
Noticethattheterms
197,271,14-6.
II, St.Bonaventure
"subjective"
could
thesoul."Thatuniversais
"inside
thesoul"and"outside
totheterms
notcorrespond
For
finalposition
on thematter.
Ockham's
havesubjective
beingin thesoulis precisely
andthatact
arenothing
otherthantheactofunderstanding
universais
itself,
ultimately,
thesubjective
ofthesoulandhasitsbeingfrom
is a quality
beingofthesoul.Ockham
ofbeingis
division
haveonlyesseobiectivum
becausethefirst
laterarguesthatthese
ficta
thesoulis divided
thesoul"andthatbeingoutside
into"insidethesoul"and "outside
He thengoeson to arguethatifwe acceptthata beingin the
intothetencategories.
within
thesoulwillbe some
because
wearemistaken,
soulhassubjective
everything
being,
thereofquality.
thesoulandwillbe underthecategory
accident
Intellection,
informing
Thisarguoutside
ofthetencategories.
in thepartofthedivision
is notcontained
fore,
aresynonyandessesubiectivum
thatesseobiectivum
mentseemsto leadto theconclusion
is
Thisargument
thesoulrespectively.
mouswithbeinginsidethesoulandbeingoutside
in Per
. Herm.,
349& 364-65.
ofthisposition
in histreatment
corrected
36Ibid.,271,16-272,
habensessetalein esseobiectivo
fictum
2: ". . .et estquoddam
qualehabetresextrain essesubiectivo."
18:08:00 PM
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
17
37Ibid.,
modum
videns
272,2-6:"Ethocperistum
quodintellectus
aliquamremextra
animam
consimilem
remin mente,
itaquodsi haberet
virtutem
sicut
fingit
productivam
- numero
- prohabetvirtutem
talemremin essesubiectivo
distinctam
a priori
fictivam,
duceret
extra."
18:08:00 PM
18
RICHARD
A. LEE,JR
18:08:00 PM
BEINGSKEPTICAL
ABOUTSKEPTICISM
19
18:08:00 PM
Betweenthe thirteenth
and the fourteenth
centurythe issue of signification
of names of firstintentionsuch as 'man5 and 'animal' is one of debate
It is agreed that such names signifythingsoutside
among philosophers.1
the mind and independentof our understanding.
In thisrespect,theyare
different
fromthe so-called names of second intention,such as 'species'
and 'genus', which signifyconceptsof the mind.2However, the question
concerned how the names of firstintentionssignifyextramentalthings:
do 'man' and 'animal' signifymen and animalsprimarily,
or do theyprithe conceptsof man and animal,and onlysecondarilymen
marilysignify
and animals in the extramentalworld?
The question concerns mainly,but not exclusively,3
common nouns.
The debate focuses on the interpretation
of a famous passage of Peri
hermeneias
where Aristotledescribeswrittenmarksas symbolsof spoken
sounds, whereas spoken sounds in turnare symbolsof affectionsin the
in the soul, theyare said to be the likenesses
soul. As to these affections
of thingsin the world:
in thesoul,andwritten
aresymbols
ofaffections
marks
aresymbols
Spokensounds
ofspoken
sounds.
Andjustas written
marks
arenotthesameforall,neither
are
Butwhattheseareinthefirst
sounds.
of- affections
ofthesoul
spoken
placesigns
1 SeeJanPinborg,
inderLogik
desXIII.Jahrhunderts
Zimmermann
, in:Albert
Bezeichnung
derRepraesentatio
imMittelalter
York1971,238-81;
, Berlin-New
(ed.),DerBegriff
E.J.Ashworth,
inThirteenth-Century
A Preface
andModes
toAquinas
onAnalogy
, in:
ofSignifying
Logic:
Signification
andTheology,
1 (1991),43-53;ClaudePanaccio,
Medieval
From
Mental
Word
Philosophy
toMental
, in:Philosophical
Language
Topics,20 (1992),125-47.
2 Forthedistinction
between
terms
offirst
andsecondintention,
a distinction
somewiththatbetween
namesoffirst
and secondimposition,
see Christian
timesblurred
Intentions
andImpositions
Norman
Kretzmann
andJanPinborg
, in:Anthony
Knudsen,
Kenny,
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,484-5.On the
ofLater
(eds.),TheCambridge
History
Philosophy
ofsecond
seeDanielO. Dahlstrom,
andLogic:
Scotus
intention
terms
Signification
signification
18 (1980),81-111.
onUniversais
a Logical
Point
, in:Vivarium,
from
ofView
See belowDunsScotus
remarks
s cntical
thesignification
ofsingular
terms
concerning
andthedifficulties
ofsignification
ofwhichhe is aware.
theyposeto thetheories
Vivarium
39,1
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2001
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
22
GIORGIOPINI
7JohnDunsScotus,
I Periherm
omnia
., I, q. 2, in:Opera
I, ed.L. Vivs,Paris1891,
Super
wereprobomnia
Periherm
I, 582-5.Thesecommentaries
., II, q. 1, in Opera
540-4;Super
ofbothpositions
in
account
in Parisin the1290s.I givea moredetailed
ablywritten
in:
intheSecond
Theories
andThing:
Century,
HalfoftheThirteenth
ofSignification
Concept
Species,
andTheology,
8 (1999),21-52.
Medieval
Philosophy
8 On the
From
see LeenSpruit,
oftheintelligible
doctrine
inteltigibilis.
Species
species,
Leiden
1994.
to
,
I,
Knowledge
Perception
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 23
This firstopinion may be representeddiagrammatically
as follows:
a name
represents
primarilysignifies
> a thing
> an intelligiblespecies
secondarilysignifies
an extramental
Accordingto thesecondopinion,a name primarily
signifies
the
of
this
thing.To defendtheircontention,
supporters
positionmake
use of a distinctionconcerningwhat is signified.A mind-independent
thingcan be consideredin two ways, they say. First,a thing can be
worldindependently
regardedas an individualexistingin the extramental
of its being understoodby us. Secondly,a thingcan be regardedinsofar as it is understoodby us, i.e. as an essence understoodor universal
concept. It is in this second way that a thingis signifiedby a name.
Consequendy,thispositionsholds thata name primarilysignifiesneither
an intelligiblespecies nor an individualand existingthing,but a thing
conceivedinsofaras it is understoodby our intellect.Indeed, a name can
also signifyan intelligiblespecies, but only when the intelligiblespecies
is consideredas somethingunderstoodin itselfand not as that by virtue
of whichan extramentalthingis understood.The knowledgeof an intelligible species as somethingin itselfis subsequentto the knowledgeof
the extramentalthing understoodby virtue of the intelligiblespecies.
Accordingly,a name signifiesan intelligiblespecies by virtueof an act
of impositiondifferent
fromand subsequentto the one by whichit signifies
an extramentalthing.
The supportersof the primarysignification
of the thingmaintainthat
a name never signifiesa thinginsofaras it exists.However, they also
stressthata thingconsideredinsofaras it is understoodand a thingconsideredinsofaras it existsare not two different
entities,but one and the
same thingconceivedin two different
ways.
This positionsmay be representeddiagrammatically
as follows:
a name
primarilysignifies
18:08:06 PM
24
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 25
theprimarysignification
of the speciesrepresents
Aristotle'sand Boethius's
of
textsmore accurately,while the doctrineof the primarysignification
the thingseems to be based on betterarguments.10
Otherpassagesin Scotus'scommentaries
on Pe hermeneias
confirmthat
he maintaineda cautious attitudeconcerningwhat a name primarily
In both commentariesScotus devotesan entirequestionto dissignifies.
when its reference
cover whethera term keeps the same signification
exists no more. Indeed, this is the topic of another controversyhotly
debated in Scotus's times.11The case of the so-called emptynames is
usuallydiscussedin questionssuch as whetherthe proposition"Caesar is
a man" is still true when Caesar is dead. Almost everyone(with the
notable exceptionof Roger Bacon)12thinksthat a termkeeps the same
no matterwhat happens to the extramentalthingforwhich
signification,
the termstands.However,opinionsdivergewhen explaininghow thisis
possible.
Scotus takesside with the majoritywith regardto the solutionto the
question. For him there is no doubt that a term does not change its
when the extramentalthingfor which it stands changes or
signification
ceases to exist.13However,he gives two different
accounts of how thisis
possible.
In his firstcommentaryon Peri hermeneias
, Scotus says that a word
a
not
insofar
as
it
but
insofaras it is understood
exists,
signifies thing,
10Super
I Perihem
viarum
., I, q. 1,ed. Vivs1891,544:"Istarum
eligatur
quaevidetur
. . . Primavia videtur
secundum
secundasecundum
auctoritates,
probabilior
probabilior
rationes."
Periherm.
viaestmultum
II, q. 2, ed.Vivs1891,585:"Neutra
necessaria,
Super
sedsecunda
videtur
dictis
Aristotelis
et Boetii."
It mustbe notedthatin
magisconsona
hisfirst
onPerihermeneias
Scotus
thetheory
ofthesignification
ofthe
commentary
presents
as thefirst
andthetheory
ofthesignification
ofthething
as thesecond
species
opinion
in hissecondcommentary
whereas
he follows
theopposite
order.
opinion,
11Alainde Libera,
Bacon
etleproblme
deUappellatio
univoca
, in:H.A.G.Braakhius
Roger
- L.M.de Rijk(eds.),
and
C.H. Kneepkens
Semantics.
From
the
End
the
English
Logic
of Twelflh
totheTime
andBurleigh
Alainde Libera,
, Nijmegen
1981,193-233;
ofOckham
Century
Roger
Baconet la rfrence
vide.Surquelques
antecdnts
mdivaux
duparadoxe
deMeinong,
in:
- Z. Kaluza- A. de Libera(eds.),Lectionum
Varietates.
PaulVigaux
J.Jolivet
Hommage
Paris1991,85-120;StenEbbesen,
about
what
is nomore
, in:Cahiers
(1904-1987),
Talking
de l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
et latin,55 (1987),135-68.
grec
12See K.M.
Bacon
on"Impositio
vocis
adsignificandum",
in:English
and
Roger
Fredborg,
Logic
Semantics
, {op.cit.,above,n. 11),167-91.
13Super
I Periherm.
Periherm.
I, q. 3, ed.Vivs1891,545;Super
II, q. 2, ed. Vivs1891,
586.DunsScotus's
treatment
ofthisproblem
is studied
Utrum
byJacobH. J. Schneider,
haecsitvera:Caesar
esthomo
estanimal,
Caesare
nonexistente.
, Caesar
ZumPeri-Hermeneias- R. Wood- M. Dreyer
Kommentar
desJohannes
DunsScotus
, in:L. Honnefelder
(eds.),
John
DunsScotus.
andEthics
, Leiden-New
York-Kln,
1996,393-412.
Metaphysics
18:08:06 PM
26
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
28
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
30
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 31
In thisway,Favershamcan avoid theproblemswithwhichScotus's
itself.26
is
formulation
of the theoryhas to cope. What is particularly
interesting
that Scotus is aware of the doctrineof the three considerationsof an
essence27but does not allude to that doctrinein his presentationof the
currentpositionson signification.
By contrast,he onlyspeaks of two and
not of threeways in which a thingcan be considered:insofaras it exists
and insofaras it is understood.As it happens,thisis also Sigerof Brabant's
formulation
of the theoryof the primarysignification
of the extramental
It
is
also
worth
that
Scotus's
Antonius
Andreae,does
thing.
noting
pupil,
not hesitateto abandon Scotus on this topic and to adopt Simon of
in his commentaryon Pe hermeneias.28
Faversham'sformulation
This difference
betweenSigerand Scotus,on the one hand, and Simon
of Favershamand AntoniusAndreae, on the otherhand, is a hint of a
whichemergesafter
problemconcerningthe natureof the thingsignified,
Siger. I will come back to thisproblemin what follows.It is remarkable
thatalthoughDuns Scotus is fullyaware of the problemhe providesno
solutionto it. What is sometimesregardedas his personalsolution,namely
that a name signifiesan essence insofaras it is consideredin itself,is
indeed Simon of Faversham'sand AntoniusAndreae'ssolution.And there
is no textualevidence that Duns Scotus ever adopted such a position.
3. Duns Scotuson Signification
in theOrdinario
So far, I have made referenceto Scotus's two commentarieson Pen
hermeneias.
to theprimarysignification
However,Scotus'sallegedcommitment
of the extramentalthingis contained not in his Aristoteliancommentaries,but in a shortpassage of his Lecturaand OrdinatioPSince these
26SimonofFaversham,
Periherm
Padova1957,
., q. 5, ed. PasqualeMazzarella,
Super
154.Faversham's
commentaries
on theArsVetus
aredatedat the1280s.
27See the
on Porphyry's
passagefromScotus's
commentary
Isagoge
quotedabovein
n. 25.
"
28See
velpassionem
nomen
rem
inanima
Andrs
Angeld'Ors, Utrum
significet
(Antonio
y Juan
DunsEscoto)",
in:Archives
et Littraire
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
du MoyenAge,62 (1995),
7-35.
29JohnDunsScotus,
Lectura
omnia
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 51,in:Opera
XVII,Vatican
City
omnia
1966,ed. Commissio
Scotistica,
357;Ordinatio
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 83,in: Opera
VI,
ed. Commissio
VaticanCity1963,97. The Lectura
is datedbyitseditors
at
Scotistica,
butitis likely
tohavebeenwritten
before
1300:seeAllanB. Wolter,
1300-1301,
Reflections
about
Scotus's
in:John
DunsScotus.
andEthics
EarlyWorks,
Metaphysics
(op.at.,above,n. 13),
ontheOrdinatio
in 1300,buthehadnotyetcompleted
37,45.DunsScotus
beganworking
itin 1307,whenhe movedfrom
Paristo Cologne:
seeWolter,
, 39-40,45-6.
Reflections
18:08:06 PM
32
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 33
Since Scotus maintainsthat the inner word is an act of understanding, he refutesthis argument.He implicitlyconcedes the major premise
of the argument,namelythatan utteredword is a sign of an innerword.
He also explicidyconcedes the minor premise,namely that an uttered
word is a sign of an extramentalthing,even though he incidentally
remarksthatthereis a greatcontroversy
over thistopic. However,Scotus
maintainsthat,even if the two premissesare conceded, it is not necessary to conclude that the inner word is the same as the object of the
intellect.For a word can be said to be a sign of an act of understanding, even thoughproperlyspeakinga word is an immediatesign of a
thing.So Scotus intendsto demonstratenot that a word is a sign of a
thing,but that,even if it is assumed that a word is an immediatesign
of a thing,it can stillbe maintainedthata word is in some sense a sign
of an act of understanding.Scotus can so conclude that the theoryof
of the extramentalthingis compatiblewiththe
the primarysignification
doctrineof the innerword as an act of understanding.
In orderto demonstratehis point,Scotus draws a parallelismbetween
being a sign of somethingand being an effectof something.The sun is
the cause of the illuminationof two different
portionsof air, the one
closer,the other furtherfromthe sun itself.Properlyspeaking,the sun
immediatelyilluminatesboth parts of air. Nonetheless,since thereis an
orderbetweenthe two parts,it is also true that the sun illuminatesone
part of air beforethe other.Consequendy,the firstpart of air, closer to
the sun, can be said to be the cause of the illuminationof the second
part of air, not in a properway but because the illuminationof one part
is closer to its cause than the illuminationof the otherpart is. Similarly,
two signs of the same thingmay be ordered in a way that the one is
closerto and the otheris further
fromthe thingof which theyare signs.
When this is the case, both signs are immediatesigns of the thing,but
it is also truethatthe sign thatis further
can be said to be a sign of the
that
is
the
closer
to
for
the
sign
thing,
sign that is furtherwould not be
a sign of the thingif the sign thatis closer were not a sign of the same
thing.Now Scotus remarksthat a writtenmark,an utteredword and a
concept are all ordered signs of the same extramentalthing.Thus, an
utteredword can be said to be a sign of the act of understanding,
even
it
an
is
immediate
the
of
because
can
be
though
sign
thing,
nothing
an
uttered
word
unless
it
is
first
understood
an
act
signifiedby
through
of the intellect.So Scotus can conclude thatan utteredword can be said
both to signifyimmediatelya thingand to be a sign of an inner word
18:08:06 PM
34
GIORGIOPINI
32JohnDunsScotus,Ordinatio
Scotistica
I, d. 27,q. 1-3,n. 83,ed. Commissio
1963,
eiusdem
voxet conceptus,
sicutsuntmulti
97: "Sunttamensignaordinata
littera,
signati
nullusestcausaalterius,
ut patetde soleillueiusdem
effectus
ordinati
causae,quorum
minante
medii;et ubiesttalisordocausatorum,
partes
plures
absquehocquodunumsit
cuiuslibet
eiusdem
causaalterius,
ibiestimmediatio
aliudin
causae,excludendo
respectu
excludendo
aliudinratione
effectus
Ettuncposratione
immediatioris.
causae,nontamen
essecausameffectus
setconcedi
nonproremotioris,
aliquomodoeffectum
propinquiorem
illamquaeestinter
taleseffectus
ad causam;itapotest
conpriorittm
prie,sedpropter
eiusdem
cedide multis
alterius
ordinatis,
signati
signis
quodunumaliquomodoestsignum
nisipriusaliquomodoimmedinonsignaret
quia remotius
ipsum),
(quiadatintelligere
- ettamen,
nonestsignum
sicutex alia
atiussignaret,
hoc,unumproprie
alterius,
propter
de causaetcausatis."
parte
33Ibid.:"Licetmagnaaltercado
fiatde 'voce',utrum
sitsignum
reivelconceptus,
tamen
illudquodsignatur
vocemproprie,
estres."
concedo
breviter
quod
per
34DunsScotus
ofobligations
andofitsvocabulary,
as is shown
is awareofthetechnique
Tracts
ontheGame
12
, in:Vivarium,
ofObligation
byL.M. de Rijk,SomeThirteenth-Centuiy
(1974),95,n. 11.
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 35
he concedesthemonlyto show thattheydo not implythe intendedconclusion. Among the argumentshe concedes there is also the theoryof
the primarysignification
of the thing.
Scotus
Remarkably,
goes on to demonstratethat,even if it is assumed
thatwordssignify
things,conceptscan stillbe said to be what words signify.Thus, he concedesthatwordssignify
thingsonlywiththe qualification
that words are also signs of concepts,althoughnot in a proper sense.
Scotus is here stressingthat concepts occupy an intermediateposition
betweenwords and thingseven in a theoryof the proper or primary
of things.He concedes that concepts are not intermediate
signification
because theyare primarily
whereasthingsare secondarily
signified
signified,
since both conceptsand words are immediatesignsof things.However,
concepts are closer to thingsthan words are, because if somethingis
signifiedby a word it is firstunderstoodby virtueof a concept,whereas
can be understoodby virtueof a conceptwithoutbeingsignified
something
by a word. Consequendy,a word can also be said to be a sign of a concept,because it indicatesthe existenceof a concept even thoughit does
not properlysignifya concept.
of a thing
Admittedly,this formulationof the primarysignification
differs
fromthetheoryScotuspresentsin his commentaries
on Perihermmeias.
In thePerihermmeias
he identifies
the thingsignified
and the conceptunder
the notionof 'thingas understood'.This is the theoryof Aquinas and of
his followers.However, in the Ordinatio
Scotus attacksthat doctrineand
shows that it is possible to maintainthat a word primarilysignifiesa
the thingsignifiedwith the innerword or conthingwithoutidentifying
What
is
cept.
particularly
appealing in thisnew versionof the theoryof
the primarysignification
of the thingis that a word can be said to be
an immediatesign of the thingwithoutrelyingon the dubious doctrine
of the identitybetween concepts and thingsunderstood.All the same,
and not as thingsas underconcepts,conceivedas acts of understanding
in
still
a
not
role
stood,
play
signification, because they are properly
fornothsignifiedbut because theyare a presuppositionforsignification,
ing can be signifiedunless it is firstunderstood.
AlthoughScotus alludes to this theoryonly as a way to answer an
objectionto his doctrineof concepts,his shortand casual remarkswill
exerta lastinginfluence
in thedevelopment
of semantics.However,
certainly
not even thisnew versionof the signification
of thingscan be seen as an
originalelaborationof Scotus. All its elementscan be foundin Henry of
Ghent'sinterpretation
of the famouspassage of Aristotle'sPerihermeneias.
18:08:06 PM
36
GIORGIOPINI
35HenryofGhent,
Summa
ordinariarum
, a. 73,q. 10,Paris1520(repr;St.
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f.272vL (translation
See alsoIrneRosier,
Henri
Bonaventure,
mine).
le Dialctica
desnoms
divins
e studisulla
deGand,
, etl'institution
, in: Documenti
d'Augustin
6 (1995),157-8.I useRosier's
edition
ofHenry's
tradizione
filosofica
medievale,
passage.
auteminlibroPerihemeneias
: Vocessuntnotae
See pp. 158,237:"Secundum
Philosophum
et earumpassionum
et
intellectuum,
quae de rebussuntin anima;quae suntconceptus
nullius
et immediatae,
verbamentalia
sunt,et notaererum
linguae
proximae
quaesi de
notasreivocalesad significandum
resquaerere
re in mentenonessent,
nonpossemus.
mentales
mediisuntinter
verbavocaliaetressignificatas
peripsas.
Propter
quodconceptus
resnisimediante
Non dicomediain significando,
quasiverbavocalianonsignificent
sicscilicet
dietos
dictorum
concepconceptuum,
quodimmediate
significent
signification
suntsignarerum
ad docendum
ea
tus,quiaverbavocaliaimmediate
quandoproferuntur
sicutimmediate
suntsignaconceptuum
quandoproferquaesuntin rebusnobislatentia,
occulta."
untur
ad iudicandum
conceptuum
loquentis
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
38
GIORGIOPINI
estintellectum
constituere
[significare
).36Moreover,the famouspassage on significationin Perihermendas
is viewed as implyingthisparallelismbetween
modes of signifying
and modes of understanding.For the supportersof
this position read Aristotleas saying that a name primarilysignifiesa
thingnot as it is but as it is understoodthrougha concept.In the Summa
Thomas Aquinas providesa versionof thiscontentionwhen he
theologiae
deals with the issue of the names of God:
It mustbe saidthat,
toAristode,
words
aresigns
ofthoughts
andthoughts
according
are likenesses
ofthings,
and so it is evident
thatwordsare referred
to thethings
theconception
oftheintellect.
Therefore
as something
isunderthey
signify
through
stoodbyus so itcanbe namedbyus.37
The parallelismbetween modes of signifying
and modes of understandof
ing is an essentialfeatureof the theoryof the primarysignification
the thingas Aquinas and his followershold it. However, thispositionis
not properto thatapproach to signification.
As I have said above, Henry
of Ghent distinguishes
thingsand conceptsand maintainsthat a word is
an immediatesign of a thingand not of a concept. But since nothing
can be signifiedwithoutbeing understood,Henry maintainsthat thereis
a close parallelismbetweenmodes of understanding
and modes of signifying,as it is clear fromthe fact that the more perfectlysomethingis
understoodthe more perfectly
it is signified.38
Scholars sometimesregard
this parallelismas one of the most typicalcontentionsof those grammarians and logicianscollectivelyknown as modistae
.39
36Perihermeneias
16b19-21.On thediffusion
ofthisformula,
seeAshworth
1991(op.dt,
.,
itinoneofthearguments
infavour
ofthesignification
above,n. 1),44.DunsScotus
quotes
in Super
I Periherm
ofthething
., I, q. 1,ed. Vivs1891,541.
37ThomasAquinas,
Summa
PhilosoI, q. 13, a. 1: "Dicendum
theologiae
quodsecundum
voces
suntsignaintellectuum,
etintellectus
suntrerum
simili
et sic
tudiney,
phum,I Perihermeneias,
ad ressignificandas
mediante
intellectus.
Secundum
patetquodvocesreferuntur
conceptione
sica nobispotest
nominari"
igitur
quodaliquida nobisintellectu
cognosci
potest,
(transto whichthereis a parallelism
lationmine).The tradition
between
modesof
according
andmodesofundestanding
is studied
Ressignificata
etmodus
signifying
byIrneRosier,
Les
d'une
distinction
mdivale
des
, in: S. Ebbesen(ed.),Geschichte
implications
significando
inSptantike
3. Sprachtheorien
undMittelalter
, Tbingen
1995,135-68.
Sprachtheorie.
38HenryofGhent,
Summa
a. 73,q. 10,Paris1520(repr.St.
ordinariarum,
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f. 272vL; ed. Rosier,
Bonaventure,
p. 237: "Quia igitur
conceptus
suntmediiinquaerendo
necessario
verbavocaliainter
resetverbaillassignificantia,
necmodum
essarioigitur
secundum
formatorum
de rebushabent
verbain sua
conceptuum
institutione
ut modusverborum
modoconceptuum.
formari,
Qui enimperrespondeat
fectius
etexpressius
et expressius
earnverbis
remconcipit,
perfectius
exprimere
possit."
39Forsomegeneral
information
seeCostantino
nella
Semiotica
e linguaggio
Scolastica.
Marmo,
La semiotica
1270-1330.
deiModisti
, Bologna
, Erfurt
, Roma1994,139-59.
Parigi
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
40
GIORGIOPINI
properconceptof 'man' or of 'dog5,but onlyof thisor thatbeing underlyingthis or that accident. So we can understanda substanceonly as a
being but we can signifyit more properlyas a specificsubstance.Our
names for substancespreciselysignifyextramentalthingsthat our concepts only impreciselycapture. So Scotus can conclude that our way of
them.
substancesis more precisethan our way of understanding
signifying
and
In this case, there is no parallelismbetween modes of signifying
modes of understanding.42
of two different
elementsinvolved
Scotus also thinksthata consideration
in namingand signifying
showsthattheparallelismbetweenunderstanding
does not hold. On the one hand, thereis that afterwhich
and signifying
a name is imposed to something.On the otherhand, thereis the thing
to whichthe name is imposed.These two elementsmustbe carefullyseparated. While the firstone revealssomethingof what we know about the
thingwe signify,the second one indicateswhat we signify.In order to
illustratethispoint,Scotus uses a famousexample. Let us take the name
'
lapis', stone. Accordingto an etymologytaken fromIsidore of Seville,43
the stonewas called 'lapis'because it hurtsthe foot(laedit
pedem).However,
is what we know of a stone, but it is
the featureof being foot-hurting
not whatwe mean by the word 'lapis'. Now, ifsomethingcould be signified
'
'
only in the way it is understood,the name lapis would not signifya
stone,but the accidentalfeaturethroughwhichwe know a stone,i.e. its
being foot-hurting.44
Such an account of an impreciseunderstandingof substancesseems
to presupposethe doctrineof the univocityof the concept of being. For
Scotus maintainsthatwe can understanda substanceas a being because
we formthe concept of being fromthe accidentswe directlycome to
know. Afteracquiringthe concept of being fromthe accidents,we can
apply it to the subjectin which the accidentsinhere,since the accidents
and their subjects are beings in the same sense. Now, it is commonly
accepted that Scotus elaborates the doctrineof the univocityof being
thatthereseems
onlylate in his career.45Consequendy,it is not surprising
42Lectura
I, d. 22,q. un.,n. 5, 343.
I, d. 22,q. un.,nn.2-3,301;Ordinatio
43Etymologie
Oxford1911.See Rosier1995[op.at
XVI, m, 1, ed. W.M.Lindsay,
above,n. 27),153.
44Ordinatio
I, d. 22,q. un.,n. 5, 343;392-3.
45Fora thorough
see
attitude
ofDunsScotus's
univocity,
concerning
changing
study
inDunsScotus's
TheNotion
P. Marrone,
, in: Franciscan
EarlyWritings
ofUnivocity
Stephen
43 (1983),347-95.
Studies,
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
42
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 43
thereare threedistinctfactorsinvolved.
understandsor a name signifies,
First,thereis the extramentalthingunderstoodor signified.Second, there
is the intelligiblespecies abstractedfromthe extramentalthing,which
is that by virtue of which the intellectgets an understandingof the
extramentalthing.Third, thereis the concept of the extramentalthing,
also called 'inner word'. This concept of the thing is to be carefully
fromthe intelligiblespecies. Both are mentalsimilitudesof
distinguished
the extramentalthing,but the species is the startingpoint of the intelof the thing,while the concept is the end-resultof
lect's understanding
understanding.
betweenthe extraWhat in Aquinas remainsobscureis the relationship
and
of
the
intellect.
mentalthingand the concept
Scholars,interpreters
followersare leftwith two options. On the one hand, there are good
reasonsto regardthe concept of the intellectas identicalwith the extramentalthing,forthe extramentalthingis signifiedinsofaras it is underthe contentof understanding.
stood by the intellectand as constituting
On the other hand, there seem to be no less strongtextualand theoreticalreasons to view the concept of the intellectas a purely mental
product of the intellect,a sort of mental duplicate of the extramental
it but different
fromit.51
thing,representing
Not surprisingly,
the relationshipbetweenthingsunderstoodand conafterAquinas's death. It is genercepts becomes an issue of controversy
first
does not signifyan intelligible
a
name
of
intention
that
ally agreed
species is thatby virtueof which somethingis
species.For an intelligible
not that which is understood{illudquod
understood(illudquo intelligitur),
the intellectunderstands.However,
a
name
what
And
intelligitur).
signifies
it still remainsto be decided whetherthe thinginsofaras it is understood and signifiedis somethingexternalto the intellector not.
does
So Scotus's account in his two commentarieson Peri hermeneias
not reflectthe mostrecentdevelopmentsin the debate over signification.
For, by the end of the thirteenth
century,mostauthorsagree thata name
an
a
not
and
intelligiblespecies.Moreover,theystressthat
signifies thing
and signifying.
The intellithereis a parallelismbetweenunderstanding
is
understood
but not
of
which
that
virtue
is
something
by
gible species
that which is primarilyunderstood.Similarly,the intelligiblespecies is
51See Pini1999(op.cit
doctrine
oftheinnerwordor
., above,n. 7, 47-51).Aquinas's
Middle
inthe
Later
Theories
in:Robert
isanalyzed
Pasnau,
ofCognition
Ages,
Cambridge
concept
1997,256-71.
18:08:06 PM
44
GIORGIOPINI
marilysignified.
This is the positionof some authorsclose to Aquinas, includingPeter
of Auvergne,Peter of Saint Amour (?), and Gerald of Nogent.
Peter of Auvergnenot only maintainsthatwhat is signifiedis the same
as what is understood.He also thinksthatthe mode of signifying
is closely
to
the
mode
of
Now
the
intellect
understands
parallel
understanding.52
two kindsof objects:first,the extramentalthingsby virtueof theirmental similitudes;second, the affections
in the soul or mentalsimilitudesby
virtueofwhichit primarily
understands
theextramental
things.Accordingly,
a name can signifytwo kinds of entities:extramentalthingsand mental
similitudes.In the firstcase, a name is of firstintention.In the second
case, it is of second intention.Since the intellectunderstandsboth extramentalthingsand mentalsimilitudes
names
by virtueof mentalsimilitudes,
either
or
similitudes
virtue
of
mental
similitudes.When
signify
things
by
Aristotlesays thatspoken sounds signifyaffections
in the soul, he intends
to stressthisintermediate
role of mentalsimilitudes
in signifying.
Similitudes
are always that by virtueof which names signify.53
it is not clear what Peter means by 'signifying
Admittedly,
something
by virtueof a similitude'.Peter'sview may be seen as the targetof Scotus's
remarkthatwhen we say thatunderstanding
is by virtueof a speciesand
52Peterof
writes
hiscommentaries
on thearsvetus
in the1270s.See Robert
Auvergne
deAbernia,
Petrus
Praedicamentis
de l'Institut
duMoyenAndrews,
Quaestiones
, in:Cahiers
super
on Perihermeneias
is still
gegrecet latin,55 (1987),3. PeterofAuvergne's
commentary
unedited.
Forinformation
on themanuscripts
in whichit is contained,
see CharlesH.
Latin
Aristotle
Commentaries
28 (1972),335-6,to be corrected
in
Lohr,Medieval
, in:Traditio,
thelight
ofA. Tabarroni,
Lopseudo
e un'inedita
delcomcontinuazione
Egidio
(Guglielmo
Arnaldi)
mento
di Tommaso
al Perihermenias,
in:Medioevo,
14(1988),388,n. 27. I makeuseofthe
ms.Madrid,
Biblioteca
Nacional1565.
PeterofAuvergne,
Periherm
Bibi.Nacional1565,ff.2vb-3ra:
"De
., ms.Madrid,
Super
secundo
scilicet
utrum
vocessignificent
velipsasres,quod
quaesito
intelligendum,
passiones
sicutestin intelligendo
ita in significando,
quia significare
(significare]
ms.)
significatur
Et ideodicendum
idemquodintellectus
sequitur
intelligere.
quodipsaevocessignificant
Sedintellectus
respersimilitudines,
sicutmanifestum
etiam
intelligit.
intelligit
est;intelligit
passiones
quaesuntinanima.Itaquod<cum>intellectus
intelligit
ipsamrem,ethocper
similitudinem
ipsiusrei,intellectus
imponit
ipsamvocemad significandum
ipsamremper
similitudinem
rei.Cumautemintellectus
ipsius
intelligit
passiones
quaesuntinanimasive
ethocpersimilitudinem
tuncintellectus
vocem
ad significandum
similitudines,
suam,
imponit
suamquaeestapudintellectum,
passiones
quaesuntinanimapersimilitudinem
quiaquicad significandum,
sivepassiones
siveres,imponit
ad significandum
quidintellectus
imponit
suam.Et ideo[significat]
dicitAristoteles
persimilitudinem
quodvocessuntnotaeearum
nisiperpassiones
sivepersimilipassionum
quaesuntinanima,
quiavocesnihilsignificant
tudines."
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
46
GIORGIOPINI
of the Perihermeneias
interpretation
passage whereAristotlesaysthatspoken
sounds are symbolsof affections
in the soul. They maintainthatAristotle
is only referringto names of second imposition,such as 'species' and
in the soul, and not to names of firstimpo'genus',whichmean affections
sition,which mean extramentalthings.60
In his Quaestiones
in librum
Perihermaneias
writtenin 1301, Walter Burley
maintainsa positionnot dissimilarfromthatof Peterof Auvergne.Burley
stressesthe parallelismbetween understandingand signifying.
In an act
of understanding
thereare threeelements:the intellectthat understands,
the thingthatis understood,and the intelligible
speciesby virtueof which
the thingis understood.Now the intelligiblespecies is not that which is
understoodbut that by virtueof which the extramentalthingis understood. Similarly,in an act of signifying
thereare threeelements:the term
thatsignifies,
the thingthatis signified,
and the speciesby virtueof which
the thingis signified.Similarlyto what happens in understanding,the
species is not that which is signified,but that by virtue of which the
extramentalthingis signified.61
So it is clear that most authorsaccept the distinctionbetween,on the
one hand, the thingunderstoodand signifiedand, on the other hand,
the species by virtueof whichthe thingis understoodand signified.
What
is controversialis whetherthe thingunderstoodand signifiedis a purely
extramentalentityand a thingconsideredinsofaras it is in the mind.
Radulphus Britoexplicitlyposes the questionwhetherthe thingunderstood is in the mind or in the extramentalworld.62He maintainsthat
two elementsmust be distinguished:the thingand the mode of understanding.While the mode in which somethingis understoodis in the
mind, the thingunderstood,insofaras it is understood,is in the extramentalworld.63A name of firstimpositionsignifiesthisextramentalthing
60Paris,BnF,nouv.
hoc littera
debetsic exponi,
acq. lat. 1374,f. 34v:"Secundum
suntin anima,id estconceptuum,
quodvocessuntsignapassionum
ad
quae
quantum
" Cf.
nomina
secundae
Merton
Oxford,
261,f.98va.
College,
61Walter impositions.
in librum
Periermeneias
Quaestiones
Burley,
, q. 1, ed. StephenF. Brownin:
Franciscan
34 (1974),212.
Studies,
62Britois
to havewritten
is commentaries
on thearsvetus
in Parisaround
thought
1300.SeeJanPinborg,
Leben
undWerke
desRadulphus
Brito
, in:Radulphus
Brito,
Quaestiones
- J.
Priscianum
minorem
, eds.H.W.Enders
Cannstatt
super
Pinborg,
Stuttgart-Bad
1980,14.
deAnima
in hisRadulphus
Brito,Super
Brito
Radulphus
, q. 8A,ed.JanPinborg
on
Universais
in: Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
grecet latin,35 (1980),116:"Unde
notandum
dicitduo,quiadicitremquaeestefficiens
intelquodquidicitremintellectam
lectionem
etrationem
rem.Ideonondebetdicisicutquidam
intelligendi,
quaedenominat
utintellecta
estin anima*
Illudfalsum
dicunt,
quodresintellecta
est,quiaqui dicitrem
18:08:06 PM
18:08:06 PM
48
GIORGIOPINI
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 49
understoodand is in the mind,and thirdly,insofaras it is somethingin
itself.In thislast manner,a thingis consideredindependently
of both its
existingas an individualand its being understoodas a universal.Now
Simon of Favershammaintainsthatnames of firstintentionsignify
things
consideredin the thirdway, namely insofaras they are somethingin
themselves.He can thus avoid the alternativeBrito poses. A thing is
signifiedneitheras somethingin the extramentalworld nor as something
in the mind,but as an essence in itself.However, the cost of this solution is veryhigh. For Simon must resortto the Avicenniandoctrineof
the threeconsiderationsof an essence,where it is far frombeing clear
what the thirdconsiderationconsistsin.
Simon of Favershamalso proposesan interpretation
of the Pe hermeneias
on
to
passage
signification.
According him, Aristotlesays that words signifyaffectionsin the soul because a thing is understood before it is
signified,even thoughit is not signifiedinsofaras it is understoodbut
insofaras it is somethingin itself.68
Anotherway out of the alternativeconcerningthe mental or extramentalstatusof the thingsignifiedis sayingthat a name of firstintention signifiesboth somethingextramentaland somethingin the mind.
This is what Henryof Ghent maintainsin a part of his Summaquaestionum
ordinariarum
writtenbetween 1282 and 1284.69He proposes a threefold
divisionof names. Firstthereare names that signifypure thingsexisting
in the world. These are names of individuals,such as 'Socrates' and
'Plato'. Secondly,thereare names that signifypure concepts.These are
names of second intentions,such as 'species' and 'genus', and names of
impossibleentities,such as 'chimera'. Thirdly,thereare names that signifyboththingsand concepts.These are names of universaisof firstintention, such as 'man' and 'animal'.70Presumably,this opinion is not far
from what both Radulphus Brito and Siger of Brabant admit: the
of a name includesa referenceboth to a thingand to the
signification
mode it is understood.Since the thingis in the extramentalworld and
the mode of understandingis in the mind, a name of firstintention
signifiessomethingpardy extramentaland partlymental. Nevertheless,
68SimonofFaversham, Periherm
1957[op.cit.,
., q. 5, ed.Mazzarella
above,n. 26),
Super
154-5.
69
Gmez
dela "Suma"
deEnrique
de Gante
a sus
Cronologia
porrelacin
" Jos in: Caffarena,
38 (1957),133.
QuodlibetosGregorianum,
Summa
ordinariarum
, a. 53, q. 5, Paris1520(repr.St.
HenryofGhent,
quaestionum
N.Y. 1953),vol.II, f.64vH-I.
Bonaventure,
18:08:06 PM
50
GIORGIOPINI
Henry does not simplysay that a name signifiesa thingunder a mental mode. For he openly concedes that both the thingand the concept
are directlysignified.
Martin of Dacia adopts a similar,intermediateposition.An affection
in the soul is a dispositionleftin the patientby the impressionof an
active principle.The active principleseems to be the extramentalthing
itself,which acts on the soul by impressingits understandingthrougha
species.71Accordingto Martin,a name signifiesboth the affectionin the
soul and the extramental
thing.However,he adds thatthe mentalaffection
is primarilysignified.72
He thinksthat,in the first
Roger Bacon deservesa separatemention.73
of
Peri
hermeneias
Aristotle
a
,
chapter
proposes generaltheoryof signs,not
of conventionalsigns such as words.74
just a theoryof the signification
in the soul are the intelliBacon
that
admits
the
affections
Accordingly,
since
words
act
both
natural
as
gible species,
signsof intelligiblespecies
and as conventionalsigns of extramentalthings.For example, the word
tree'is a sign of the existenceof a correspondentintelligiblespecies of
a tree in the mind of the utterer.For a tree cannot be signifiedunless
it is firstunderstoodby virtueof an intelligiblespecies. So a word is a
sign of a species as smokeis a sign of a fire.However,Bacon thinksthat
a word is a sign of a thingin a completelydifferent
way. For a word
a
an
because
of
signifies thing
arbitraryimposition.
Some conclusionscan be drawnfromthisbriefreviewof some of Scotus's
First,by the end of the thirteenth
contemporaries'views on signification.
the
influence
of
doctrine
of concepts is pervasive.
century
Aquinas's
71Martin
ofDacia,Super
Periherm
., q. 6, ed. H. Roos,Hauniae1961,241.The work
at 1280ca.
ofMartin
ofDaciais datedbyhiseditor
72Martin
ofDacia,Periherm
., q. 6, ed. Roos1961(op.cit.,
above,n. 71),243.Byspeakofthesoulimpressed
Martin
of
by thespeciesoftheexternal
ingof 'affection
thing',
Dacia showsthathe is strongly
influenced
notion
ofspecies,
which
bya non-Thomistic
theso-called
derives
from
of'species'
perspectivists,
especially
RogerBacon.Thetwonotions
aredistinguished
1994(op.dt.,above,n. 8), 150-6;seealsoTachau1988(op.cit.,
bySpruit
above,n. 21),3-26.
73See for
1981(op.cit.,above,n. 12);ThomasS. Maloney,
The
example
Fredborg
Semiotics
Bacon
45 (1983),120-54;
Costantino
Studies,
Bacon,
, in:Medieval
Marmo,
ofRoger
AlltheOthers)
onNatural
Aristotle
35 (1997),136-54.
, in:Vivarium,
Inferential
Signs
74 (andBacon,
De Signis,
in: K.M. Fredborg,
L. Nielsen
andJ. Pinborg,
AnUnedited
Roger
PartofRoger
Bacon's
'De signis
Maius3:
34 (1978),133;RogerBacon,
', in: Traditio,
(Opus
York-Kobenhavned.ThomasS. Maloney,
Leiden-New
oftheStudy
ofTheology,
Compendium
Kln1988,68-70.
18:08:06 PM
NAMES
IN DUNSSCOTUSANDSOMEOF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 51
comConsequently,in the debate Scotus describesin his Perihermeneias
mentariesmost authorstake side againstthe primarysignification
of the
intelligible
species.
Secondly,providedthatnames primarilysignify
things,the controversy
concernsthe statusof the thingssignified:are theymentalor extramental entities?There are at least threepositions.Some thinkthat the thing
signifiedis extramentaland the mode under which it is understoodand
is mental.Othersmaintainthatthe thingsignified
is in the mind,
signified
because it is consideredinsofaras it is understood.Finally,some take an
intermediateposition and maintain that names signifythingsthat are
partlyextramentaland partlymental.In any case, no one seems to share
Scotus's non-committal
and cautious attitude.
all
Thirdly, theauthorsI have mentionedaccepttheparallelismbetween
modes of signifying
and modes of understanding.
Therefore,Scotus's criticismof such a parallelismcan be seen as an originalcontribution
in the
of
semantics.75
history
Pisa
ScuolaNormale
Superiore
75Research
forthispaperwascarried
outduring
ofthe
mystayinLeuvenas a fellow
voorWijsbegeerte,
Katholieke
Universiteit
thanks
tofunding
Leuven,
HogerInstituut
providedbytheOnderzoeksfonds
K.U. Leuven.Alessandro
Del Punta,
Conti,Francesco
Massimo
Dominik
Perler
andAndrea
Tabarroni
reada first
draft
ofthisarticle
Mugnai,
andsuggested
corrections
andimprovements.
revised
many
JuanCarlosFlores
myEnglish.
I wishtoexpress
to all ofthem.
mygratitude
18:08:06 PM
El libroencadenadoEine Sammelhandschrift
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bzw.KapiteleinesTextes.
1 Farai1946,Lohr1970und1972,Michalski
1971,Michael1985.
2 Freineallgemeine
Buridans
wie auchfurweitere
derberlieferung
Darstellung
Hinweise
sieheMichaelI, 259-398.
bibliographische
Vivarium
39,1
BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke
18:08:20 PM
ADENADO"
EL LIBROENG
53
18:08:20 PM
54
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
Auch wenn eine genauere materielleBeschreibungimmer noch aussteht,knnen hier dennoch einige provisorischeInformationengegeben
werden. Hs. BN 342R hat eine Eisenkettevon fnfRingen, die- auch
wenn sie die Handschriftnicht an ihre ursprngliche
Bibliothekfestzukettenvermochte mindestensfurihrenargentinischen
Spitznamen"entscheidend war.6 El libro encadenado" bestehtaus in zwei Spalten in
bastardabeschriebenen239 Folien (290 mm x 220 mm).Je nach Hand
gibt es etwa zwischen 48 und 53 Zeilen pro Spalte. Der Text beginnt
auf fol. Ir3 mitdem Incipitdes Physikkommentars
und brichtauf fol.239rb
mittenim Kommentarzu De caeloab. Als Beschreibstoff
diente Papier.
Auf der Innenseitedes Buchdeckels sind Fragmenteeiner lateinischen
Grammatikerkennbar.
Aufdem Rckendes Codex lt sichmitSchwierigkeit die Signatur 342R lesen.7 Mehrere verschiedene Hnde knnen
unterschiedenwerden.8Kein Besitzvermerk
ist erkennbarund nirgendwo
findetman Kopistennamen,Hinweise ber die Frhgeschichte
bzw. Enstehungsumstnde,Zweck usw. der Handschrift.Wie auch im Falle
andererBuridan-Handschriften
handeltes sichhiermitgroerWahrscheinlichkeitum eine Universittshandschrift
aus den erstenDekaden des 15.
oder vielleichtvom Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts.9
Nur an einer Stelle der
lesen wir in dem explicit
des zweitenBuches: explici
quaestiones
physicorum
untquestiones
secundilibriphysicorum
reverendi
Buridanisub annodomini
magisti
la mayor
de Buridn,
clebre
escolstico
francs.
Conestuche.
partede la obrafilosofica
8124/57.(N 1903)."DieseAngaben
lieensich
Muyvalioso.Ingres
porDecreto-ley
demKatalogentnehmen;
die allgemeine
Beschaffenheit
des Codexkonnte
ichinsitu
aberleidernurin Eile- untersuchen.
Ich mchte
michan dieserStellebei Prof.C. F.
Bertelloni
BuenosAires)herzlich
furdenMikrofilm
aufdemdie
(Universitt
bedanken,
hiervorgelegte
basiert.
Untersuchung
6 Wennauchnicht
dieRegelbeidenBuridan-Handschriften,
so bildendochverkettete
catenati
Bcher
desBibliotheksundBuchwesens,
dassichber
{libri
) einbekanntes
Kapitel
das Mittelalter
erstreckt
(dazusieheBlades1852,3-81;Peeters
hinweg
1958).
7 Seitens
derBibliothek
wurdemirmitgeteilt,
da 342Rdie alteSignatur"
vonEl
Encadenado"
nicht
zu klren,
obdieseSignatur
eineeigene
sei;esistjedochbisher
Signatur
in BuenosAiresistodernicht.
derBiblioteca
Nacional
UmMiverstndnisse
zu vermeiden,
ichvor,dieKennzeichnung
342R(alte"Signatur)
furEl Encadenado"
aufrechtschlage
zuerhalten.
8
imMikrofilm
vonVerzerrungen
lassensichdieverschiedenen
HndeleiAufgrund
dernichtgenaubestimmen.
Provisorisch
kannmanmindestens
fesdegen:
Hj = 11^-78^
lassensichjedochnoch3 Hndevermuten);
(hierunter
H2= 79ra-89vb;
H3= 90ra-127va;
=
=
144rb-153ra
mit
auf
dem
f. 144r);
130^-1441^;
(d.h.
Handnderung
gleichen
H4
H5
Die Fragmente
undSchemata
auffol.153vstamHg= 154rM99va;
H? = 199vb-239vb.
menmglicherweise
auchvonH .
9 scheint
jedochrecht
sptzu sein.
H7
18:08:20 PM
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
55
"
millesimo
(fol.40^); aber der Schreiberhat nichtweitergeschrieben.Nach
einer etwa dreizeiligenLcke beginnter erneutmit der tabulaquaestionum
des drittenBuches.10In el libroencadenado"kommenkeineIllustrationen
bzw. geometrischen
Darstellungenweder im Text noch am Rande vor.
Die Randbemerkungen,die im allgemeineninhaltlichirrelevantsind,
beschrnken
sichauf die Gliederungbzw. lemmata
oder maniculae.
Schlielich
sei bemerkt,da Ms. 342R eine sptere- und eigenartige
Folierungmit
Bleistift
schon des 20. Jahrhunderts)
(mglicherweise
aufzeigt:die Folien
sind oben rechtsmit rmischenZiffernbis fol. LXXVIIII (= 79) numeriert.Fol. 80 wird nichtmit LXXX sondernmit IUI numeriert,was
nmlich vier mal zwanzig" bedeuten soll.11Um der bersichdichkeit
willen, werde ich zwischen [ ] die originale Foliennumerierungder
Handschrift
und V {verso)
frdie Folien
(aber mitErgnzungvon V (recto)
und hochgestellte
'a' und b5frjeweils die linke und die rechteSpalte)
nur einmal in der allgemeineninhaltlichenBeschreibungmit angeben;
ansonstenwerde ich sie aus praktischenGrnden weglassen und mich
immerauf die Umwandlungin arabische Ziffernbeziehen.
inhaltliche
2. Allgemeine
Beschreibung
Ms. Buenos Aires,BibliotecaNacional 342R (El libro encadenado") enthlt Buridans Kommentarezur aristotelischen
zu De
Physik(quaestiones),
et corruptione
und quaestiones
(<quaestiones
), zu De anima{expositio
generatione
), zu
den Parvanaturalia
(<quaestiones
) und zum TraktatDe caelo[expositio):
10Eine
durch
Wasserzeichen
derGrenzen
derWasser(d.h.auchinnerhalb
Datierung
istsicherlich
dennes sindsogarimMikrofilm
dreiverschiezeichendatierung)
mglich,
deneguterkennbar:
f. 78v;92r;142r.Dafristeineweitere
devisuder
Untersuchung
Handschrift
erforderlich.
11DieseNumerierungsmethode
wirdallgemein
indemganzen
Codexverwendet:
so da
+ 10)usw.erscheint.
87 als IIII^VII (= [4-20]+7),
90 als IIII^X (= [4-20]
beispielsweise
Fol. 100wirdmitC numeriert
und110mitCX (auch111= CXI; 112= CXII, usw.).
Dannwirdwieder
fol.VI**= 120(= 6*20)undnochmal
und
multipliziert:
multipliziert
+ l). Ich kennekeineandereHandschrift
addiert:
121= VI^I (=[6*20]
mitdieserNumabermirscheint
dieseinHinweis
darauf
zu sein,da Ms. 342Rvon
merierungsweise,
einerspteren
franzsischen
Handnumeriert
da ebendieseZhlweise
inderheuwurde,
franzsischen
furdieZahl80 (quatre-vingt")
nocherkennbar
ist.Seltsamer
tigen
Sprache
istesjedochmitderZahl120(als6*20),
beiderkeinehnlichkeit
mitderfranzsischen
Da Ms. 342RdieseFolierung
besteht.
hatundvondemin Frankreich
Sprache
ttigen
in Frankreich)
Consul
General
erworben
heitnatrlich
da es in
wurde,
nicht,
(vielleicht
Parisgeschrieben
wurdeundes ein Vertreter
derPariser
Texttradition
vonBuridans
Schriften
ist(siehedazuunten
S. 61-2).
18:08:20 PM
56
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
127^: Quaestiones
octo
libros
Aristotelis
1) ff.1raPhysicorum
super
[Ir^-VI^VIIv2]
- ff.64v,91v-94v
und128r-129v:
leer
duoslibros
De generatone
etcorruptione
Aristotelis
Quaestiones
2) ff.130ra-153ra:
super
[Vl^Xr3VlP'XIIIr*]
- f. 153v:Fragment
mitSchemata
vondenfinf
Sinnen[VIP'XIIIv]
intres
r2libros
De anima
Aristotelis
VIII**
3) ff.154rM67vb:
[VIP^XIV
VIIvb]
Expositio
- f. 168r:leer
188rb:Quaestiones
tres
libros
De anima
Aristotelis
4) ff.168V3super
[VlII^VIIIv^IX^VIIIr0]
- ff.l88v-189v:
leer
Parva
libros
naturalia
Aristotelis
:
Quaestiones
5) ff.190ra-220ra:
super
[IX^Xi^-CCXXr2]
De sensu
etsensato
5.1.)ff 190ra-200vb:
De memoria
etreminiscencia
5.2.)ff.201ra-203ra:
De somno
etvigilia
5.3.)ff.203ra-208ra:
De longitudine
etbrevitate
vitae
5.4.)ff.208ra-211rb:
18vb:De morte
etvita
5.5.)ff.211rb-2
De iuventute
etsenectute
5.6.)ff218vb-220ra:
inquattuor
De caelo
libros
etmundo
Aristotelis
6) ff.220^-239^:Expositio
[CCXXv^-XI^XIX
v*5]
3. %u
Texten
einzelnen
3.1. Quaestiones
superoctolibrosPhysicorum
(ff.lra-127va)
Wie bekannthat Buridan mehrfachber die Physikdes Aristotelesgelesen und fanden seine physikalischenIdeen groe Verbreitungin vielen
europischenUniversitten.
Die Forschunghat bislang mindestenssechs verschiedenePhysikkommentarevon Buridanangenommen:3 quaestiones
und 1 dicta}2
, 2 expositiones
sind die quaestiones
Unter den quaestiones
(die hier eigendichinteressieren)
accurtatae
breves(auch genannt quaestiones
)13von den quaestiones
longaezu
ist
wiederum
zu
unterscheiden.Unter diesen quaestiones
zweierlei
longae
zwar
zwischen
und
secundum
ultiunterscheiden,
(a) denjenigenquaestiones
mamlecturam
, die in Paris 1509 (hier = e) gedrucktwurden- welche eine
ordinatilo
des Verfasserssind- und (b) anderen quaestiones
, die nur als eine
BN
werden.
Ms.
Bs.
enthlt
berliefert
As.
342R
(a), d.h. die
reportatio
:
ultimalectura
18:08:20 PM
57
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
Iohannis
reverendi
: Hec esttabulaquestionum
magisti
primilibriphysicorum
Incipit
de omnibus
estscientia
naturalis
scientia
ista:utrum
Etestprima
Buridani.
rebus,
questio
. . . (1ra)
essedemonstratio
quotmodisdicitur
trinonderogat
et impartibilitas
... et estcredendum
quoddietadeisimplicitas
Explicit
sinecompositione
simulenimestdeussimpliciter
nitati
aliquaetunusettripersonarum;
Amen(127i3)
in sculaseculorum.
nusquareestbenedictus
vorangestellt.
Jedem Buch werden die entsprechendentabulaequaestionum
Whrend der Anfangvon e nach der Reihenfolge(1) prologus
(2) tabula
der
ersten
dann
und
quaestioerfolgt,
(3) Behandlungsbeginn
quaestionum
kommtim Ms. 342R zuerst(1) die tabulaquaestionum
, dann (2) der prolo,14Von einigenkleinerenVarianten
gusund (3) der Beginnder erstenquaestio
im
diese
stimmen
quaestiones allgemeinenmit der von Farai
abgesehen,
Liste
berein.15
verffendichten
ist leidernicht
der ultimalectura
Abschrift
Die im Ms. 342R berlieferte
sonenthltnichtdie 10 quaestiones
ganz vollstndig:Buch V (ff.84ra-91rb)
dern nur die ersten8 von ihnen und einen Teil der neunten;die letzte
q. 10 fehlt.Von der q. 9 sind die Argumentepro und die drei ersten
erhalten.In etwa der Mittedes viertenArguments
Argumentead oppositum
Buches lautet: ... et hoc
brichtes ab. Das Ende des fnften
ad oppositum
est verum quia ipsa non est actus totalisqui ista generationegeneratur
sed est actus partialisqui eritpars illiusqui generatur(91rvb;e = f. 91V3,
Zeile 36). TrotztdieserwichtigenLcke und einigerkleinerAbweichungen
14LautMichaelfindet
de
auchin Ms. Lige,Bibliothque
mandieseReihenfolge
natioN 647),(Michael
114C (= Grandjean
II, 585);Ms.Paris,
Bibliothque
l'Universit,
G.IV.IO
Biblioteca
lat.14723,
nalede France,
Nazionale,
II, 585-6);Ms.Torino,
(Michael
lat.445),(Michael
Nationalbibliothek,
II, 588)undMs.Wien,sterreichische
(= Pasini,
II, 593).
5481,(Michael
15Das giltmiteinigen
derFranichtnurfurdiekurzeFormulierung
Abweichungen
tabulae
auchfrdiejedemBuchvorangestellten
imTextsondern
,
quaestionum
gestellungen
aufS. 9,
werden
die vonE. Faraiwiedergegeben
(Farai1946,9-16;seineBemerkung
kannmeiner
selbststammen
vonBuridan
die langeFormulierung
da nmlich
knnte,
im
aufdieFormulierung
Da Faraisichnicht
nachfrrichtig
werden).
gehalten
Meinung
und
im
Text
der
zwischen
Inkonsistenzen
sich
Textbezieht,
Formulierung
ergeben einige
sind:III, q. 3 (vgl.
hiervon
Bcher.
dereinzelnen
derin dentabulae
Beispiele
quaestionum
zu e imMs.
aufe f.42vb;gleich
ine auff.41r3(= Farai)mitderTextformulierung
tabula
vone auff.41ra(= Farai)mit
undIII, q. 11 (vgl.tabula
342Rjeweilsf.40raund41vb);
kann
auff.53vb;e = Ms. 342Rjeweilsf.40rbund51vb).Ferner
derTextformulierung
estmotus"
secundum
7 desV. Bucheskeineswegs
diequaestio
utrum
(Farai,S.
subjectam
ob
sit/est
motus"
substantiam
secundum
sondern
utrum
(dennes gehtdarum,
14)lauten,
Sinne(imotus
imstrengen
alsBewegung
dieVernderung
) ange(imutatio
) nachderSubstanz
Auerdem
sehenwerden
gehtes beiderq. 16
kann;siehee f. 73rb= Ms. 342R84rb).
umeinelinea
bloumeinelineagirativa"
zumIII. Buchnicht
(Farai,S. 12)sondern
beiThijssen
1991,23 = e f.41rbundf.48ra;Ms. 342Rf.
(sieherichtig
infinita"
girativa
40raund56V3).
18:08:20 PM
58
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
59
einzuordnen.Der Anfangspunkt
stand zur Texttraditionder ultimalectura
dieses Versucheslt sich gleich aus ThyssensAnalyseentnehmen.
Durch Vergleichder Abweichungen(oder Akzidentien",wie Thijssen
berlieferung
sagt)ist es ihm gelungen,fastdie gesamtehandschrifdiche
Seine Textanalysefokusiert
auf 25 Anomalien"
einzuordnen.19
provisorisch
in den qq. III, 14-19,ausgehendvon denen zwei unterschiedliche
Familien
knnen.
Da
diese
6 quaeswerden
von Handschriften
auseinandergehalten
kann
man
durch
die
tionesvollstndigin Ms. 342R berliefert
werden,
in der Rekonstruktion
der
Analyseder AkzidentienweitereFortschritte
Texttradition
der ultima
lectura
erzielen,wennman sichauf die von Thijssen
Basis sttztund, unterden Grenzen dieser Analyse,eine erste
gelieferte
provisorische
Einordnungvon Ms. 342R vorschlgt:20
Quaestio14 (53vb-55ra):
velestfinitum
tunc
... velipsum
estinfinitum
ethabetur
1) S. 4-4-5]f.541*:
propositum
finitum
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
distantiam.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
Ms.342R
. . . fortius
2) S. -4-6'f.54V2:
agatad omnem
V WX(Y?)
wieABDEFLMOQR
f.551*:
'vacuum'
... eteodemmododiceretur
'chimera',
3) S. 12-20-23;
quodistitermini
- dico
chimrm
necvacuum
infinitum
et'corpus
infinitum'
nonsignificant
neccorpus
- sedsignificant
si imposibile
sittalia{talia]Ms.:alia]esse
verasressecundum
semper
Et bene.. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
fictos,
conceptos
complexos
19Whrend
Michael
auf29 Handschriften
derultima
lectura
macht
aufmerksam
(II,578die25 Handschriften
auf,diemanfurdenTextderultima
609),listet
(1991,xxiii)
Thijssen
III, qq.14-19bercksichtigen
lectura
mu.DieseDifferenz
ltsicherklren,
dennThijssen
Ms. 11-K Paderborn,
Erzbischfliche
Akademische
Wa 12(daswiederum
Bibliothek,
fugt
Grnden
die 5
ist)hinzuundziehtaus verschiedenen
wegenSchadennichtbrauchbar
Handschriften
ab: Berlin,
Staatsbibliothek
Preuischer
cod.lat.fol.
Kulturbesitz,
folgenden
Wissenschaftliche
852; Erfurt,
Allgemeinbibliothek,
Ampl.F. 357; Louvain,Universinationale
de France,
G 106;Paris,Bibliothque
latin15888;undWien,
teitsbibliotheek,
sterreichische
5408.
Nationalbibliothek,
20IchgehedieListevonThijssen
derenAkzidentien
ichnach
durch,
(1991,xxvi-xxviii)
vonHandschriften
denquaestiones
trenne.
Da Thijssen
eineAuswahl
unde furdieTextherdievomEditor
stammenden
benutzt
derListe
hat,stimmen
Textentscheidungen
stellung
Endtext
wrdich
berein.
(d.h.vorderKlammer
(3-80)nicht
]") mitdemtatschlichen
dieLokalisierung
Ferner
wirdaufderAkzidentienliste
desanalysierten
Akzidents
(xxvi-xxviii)
imText(3-80)nicht
mitangegeben.
ImHinblick
aufeinegnstigere
weiterer
macheichdiepasNachprfung
Forschungen
nachdenfolgenden
Kriterien:
1:Akzidentiennummer
sendeAngabe
von1)bis25);2: die
inThyssens
Text(Thijssen
und(kleiner
1991,3-80),undzwarmitSeitenLokalisierung
Zeilennummer
oderzwischen
undkursivgeschriebener)
3:
2 Seiten38-25/39-/);
(z.B.6-4-5,
vomMs. 342R;4: denText,wieichihnleseaus demMs. (eventuell
dieFolioangaben
zumTextvonThijssen
bzw.mitVergleich
miteinigen
(3-80)zwischen
Verbesserungen
6: die Familiebzw.
denKlammern
{}); 5: die zumAkzident
passenden
Bemerkungen;
vonThijssen
undmitWiederholung
nachderEinordnung
seiner
Gruppenzugehrigkeit
Handschriftenbuchstaben.
18:08:20 PM
60
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
Quaestio15 (55f-56if)'
. . . in concavoorbislunequia tantequantitatis
eratcorpusquod
4) S. 16-1-2]f.55v*:
ibi.. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
... utnecpoliorbislunese tangerent,
nihilessetinter
5) S. 20-18-19;f.56rb:
quamvis
eossecundum
rectitudinem.
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton
Quaestio17 (58f-59if)'
. . . essent
Itemsi.. . . KeineHinzufiigung.
6) S. 35-16;f.581*:
quaternarius.
betreffen
denselben
mitAkzidentien,
diesichgegen7) und8) (S. 43-16-23)
Paragraphen
So zeigtdie Gruppevon Handschriften
DEFLMORVXY ein
seitigausschlieen.
Homoioteleuton
whrend
die GruppeU W stattdessen
die
(= Akz.7 bei Thijssen),
vonjenerGruppe
durchHomoioteleuton
bersehene
Stelleverschoben
undan andererStelleeingesschrieben
hat:Ms. 342Rf.59rblautet:
. . . Dicamigitur
ad istum
sensumquodnulladuosunttria,quianonsecundum
eandem
rationem
discretivam
dicunturduosecundum
triaanimaenimdividendo
duonondiscernit
nisi
quamdicuntur
interhecet illud;et sicde aliis.Et si dicamus
'illedebetmihicentum
poma',non
7: . . . secundum
oportet
intelligere Dementsprechend
giltfurMs. 342R:Akzident
tria.
Anima
enim Homoioteleuton;
alsowieDEFLMORV
XY.Akzident
quamdicuntur
8: KeinTextzu verschieben
Homoioteleuton
imAkz.7.
aufgrund
... et numerando
eas utdicamus
esseviginti
9) S. 44-19-21;f.59v*:
pannum
{viginti]
Ms.:centum}
ulnarum
et columpna
decern
von:
pedumet sicde aliis Auslassung
centum
leucarum
etpondus
decern
talentorum.
Ms.342RwieACGHIJMJVQST.
spatium
ibidem
: ... utsi cuiuslibet
unitatis
unitatis
fuerit
uniuspedis,
10)S. 44-29/45-2;
quantitas
veluniusulne,veluniusleuce,vel<unius>dieietsiede aliis.. . . Auslassung
von:vel
uniussextarii,
velunius
talenti.
Ms. 342Rzuerst
wieAC GHIJNQST
(abermehralsim
Akz.10 beiThijssen,
wo nurderhierin Italicswiedergegebene
TextalsAuslassung
wird).
angegeben
11) S. 45-3-4;ibidem:
. . . quia due ulnenonsunttresulnenec{ne'Ms: vel
} duotalenta
<sunt>triatalenta
vomTextin Italics.
, et omnisulna.KeineAusslasung
Quaestio18 (59if-62rb)'
extensionem,
12)S. 46-16-19;59^: . . . aliquantam
sequitur
quodinfinita
punctaredderentinfinitam
extensionem.
Hoc supponatur
quodex hocapparet,
quiasi duopuncta
reddunt
redderent
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
extensionem,
aliquantam
quattuor
duplam.
: . . . redderent
infinitam
extensionem.
. . . Keine
13)S. 46-23; ibidem
Quod estfalsum.
Hinzufiigung.
fuerunt
dieset anni,plu14)S. 53-20-23;60^: . . . hecestconcedenda:
'quandocumque
resfuerunt
diesquamanni'quiainstantia
53: isto;
342R
proaliquo{aliquo]Thijssen,
wieGruppe
HIWevonThijssen,
. . . Homoioteleuton.
infinito.
53,Anm.85} tempore
Ms. 342RwieADEFWJUMOPRSTUVWXYe.
Similiter
et illa:omninumero
estaliquisnumerus
15)S. 56-1-2;6lr3:... in continuo.
maior.Variante
wieGruppe
DEFLRUWXY
wieinThijssen,
56,1. 1-2).
(d.h.nicht
62ra:Ms. 342R enthlt
die Paragraphen
16)S. 63-76/64-7;
[1], [2] und [3] (diedie
deraufS. 46 vorkommenden
non"
nach
Beantwortungen
quod
Argumente
ausmachen)
derReihenfolge
DEFLMORSUVWXY.
[1],[2] und[3],d.h.wiedieGruppe
18:08:20 PM
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
61
Quaestio19 (62ra-64rb):
etinsecunda
ettertia.
. . . Hinzufugung.
. . . facit
Deuslapidem
; 62V3:
17)S. 67-10-11
pedalem
Ms.342RwiedieGruppe
DEFMRUVWXT.
essevera,quiapono{pono]Thijssen,
67:
ibidem
: . . . universalis
18)S. 67-26/68-7;
potest
simul
vere
67 Anm.20} quodsunt
342RwieGruppeClevonThijssen,
, universalis
posilo;
. . . KeineAuslassung
vom
estvera.
Sedtunc
etiam
minor
dictarationis
prius{?)
apparet.
Textin Italics.
suas{suas]Ms.eius)
62^: . . . lineaB {B] Ms.est}estdivisainomnes
19)S. 68-24/69-7;
Ms. 342RwieDEFLMOmedietates
Et loquor.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
proportionales.
QRUVWXY.
. . . tangeret
extrinsecum.
Ponamus
quod.. . . Homoio20) S. 70-4-7;62vb:
igitur
lapidem
teleuton.
Ms. 342RwieDEFHIJLANOPRSTUVWXYe.
Deuscreare
. . . implicat
contradictionem,
21) S. 7'-10-13;631*:
quiaex quo nonponitur
totum
resultans
essespherinisicorpora
siveorbicularia,
oporteret
spherica
semper
. . . KeinHomoioteleuton.
contradictionem
cum,etimplicat
quodsphericum
etreser. . . quod<omni>diepreterita
Deusfecit
63V2:
22) S. 74-9-70;
pedalem
lapidem
VWXTe.
Ms. 342RwieADEFGH1JLANOPRSTU
vavit.
. . . Homoioteleuton.
. . . quiaistasduaset istascentum
et illasmilleDeuspotest
23) S. 75-8-9;63V2:
separare
. . . Hinzufugung.
Ms.342Rwie
ab invicem
etseparatim
etsicde singulis.
conservare,
EFMUVWXr.
: . . . sumendo
75:capiendo
; Ms.342RwieHIWe
; ibidem
24) S. 75-10-14
{sumendo]
Thijssen,
. . . Auslassung.
vonThijssen
S. 75,Anm.105} 'omnes'collective.
Quintaconclusio.
WXY.
Ms.342RwieDEFLMORUV
. . . Homoioteleuton.
64i*:. . . necconnotat
necsignificai
simultatem
25) S. 78-75-75;
temporis.
Ms.342RwieADEFHJJLMNOPRSTUVWXTe.
Man kann sichjetzt fragen,wie diese Informationen
ber Ms. 342R im
Rahmen der Einordnungvon Thijssen zu interpretieren
sind. Es seien
die folgendenBemerkungengemacht:
1) Ms. 342R kann nichtsehr hoch in ein Stemma gestelltwerden (wie
die Gruppe BCGQ) , denn es zeigt die Akzidentien14, 20, 22 und 25
auf.21
(wie alle anderen Handschriften)
14 von den 25 AkzidentienaufMs.
ist
das
das
342R
2)
einzige Ms.,
Akzidentien:
2, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23,
zeigt(nmlich
24, und 25). Somitkann man behaupten,da Ms. 342 parallel zu keiner anderen Handschriftverluft.
3) Ms. 342R verhltsich nach den Akzidentien2, 7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23,
24 wie ein guterVertreterder Familie II.
4) Es ist zwar deudich,da Ms. 342R wie auch andere Handschriften
ist.Aber seine Kontamination
(z.B.: S, A, ( , M, und 0) kontaminiert
ist vielleichtnicht ganz uninteressant:
bezglich der wichtigenFrage
nach der Verbindungzwischender Familie I, die etwa der Pariser"
21Thijssen
1991,xxxi.
18:08:20 PM
62
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
63
1996.FrBuridans
Degeneratione
etcorruptione
siehezustzlich
Braakhuis
1997undBraakhuis
1999.
26MichaelII, 628-48.
27Es seiauchbemerkt,
da keinederbisher
bekannten
Handschriften
dieserFassung
ausFrankreich
oderItalien
stammen
sondern
mitderBuridan-Tradition
vonPrag,Wien,
KrakauundErfurt
zusammenhngen
(sieheMichaelII, 635-41).
EineandereFassung
derquaestiones
vonBuridan
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
(in
Michael
wirdin3 bislang
bekannten
Handschriften
II, 631-4alsquaestiones
(A)verzeichnet.)
berliefert:
Ms.Cesena,Biblioteca
cod.S. VIII. 5; Vat.lat.2185undVat.
Malatestiana,
lat.3097.Whrend
Buridans
Autorschaft
derimMs.342Renthaltenen
quaestiones
(B) nie
in Fragegestellt
Sie
wurde,
gab die Fassung
(A) Anlazu Meinungsverschiedenheiten.
dieals Verfasser
derFassung
gehenaufMaier(1952,118ff.)zurck,
(A) nichtBuridan
sondern
NicoleOresmesehenwollte.
Die TheseMaierswurde
von
jedochberzeugend
Michael
1986widerlegt.
SieheauchLohr1972,123.
(II, 642-8)undThijssen
29Zu diesen
Abschriften
sieheMichael
DieTitelderquaestiones
dieser
II, 639-40.
Fassung
vonBuridans
zu De generatione
etcorruptione
wurdezuerst
vonCaroti(1996,S.
Quaestiones
77*)aus Ms. Berlin,
69*Staatsbibliothek
Preuischer
cod.lat.fol.387 (ff.
Kulturbesitz,
18:08:20 PM
64
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
Buch I:
- Anfang:
sieheobenincipit
undgleichhierunten
q. 1.
- Ende:. . . Adseptimm
fuit
undeproveniat
dictum
diversitas,
originaliter
quandodicitur
de hocin questione
etc.(144vb)
:
Quaestiones
de generabilibus
etcorruptibilibus
sitscientia.
Et arguitur
1. utrum
quodnonquiaquod
nonestnoncontingit
sciriutpatetprimo
. . . (130V*)
posteriorum
scibilium30
scientia
de eissupposi
toquod
ad corruptionem
rerum
2. utrum
corrumpatur
de illishabetur
scientia
(13Ir2)
1
voxsignificet
idemrecorrupta
et reexistente
3. utrum
(131v15)3
4. utrum
si32imposibile
estelementa
estea alterali
substantialiter,
generari
imposibile
(132rb)
secundum
eiussignum
eius
5. utrum
sitdivisibile
etsecundum
quodlibet
corpus
quodlibet
(132vb)
puncta33
sitaliquidsimpliciter34
6. utrum
(133rb)
generari
posibile
uniussitcorruptio
alterius
7. utrum
omnisgeneratio
(1341*)
in animato
sitalia forma
substantialis
ab anima(134v*)
8. utrum
diffrt
ab alteratione
9. utrum
(135v*)
generatio
sitbonain qua dicitur
esttransmutado
10. utrum
istadescriptio35
'generatio
generationis
in totum
utsubiecto
eodem'(1361*)
huiustotius
nonmanente
aliquosensibili
rarefactio
11. utrum
sitaugmentado
(136rb)
proprie
in augmentatione
viventis
cibusaugeatur
velcorpus
animatum
12. utrum
(136^)
maneat
idemanteet post(137r15)
illudquodaugetur
13. utrum
simpliciter
eiusquodaugetur
14. utrum
(137^)
parsaugeatur
quelibet
fiatsecundum
formales
et nonmateriales
15. utrum
(1381*)
augmentado
partes
a motulocali,a alteratione
et
sitmotus
dietus
distinetus
16. utrum
augmentado
proprie
substantiali
(138v*)
generatione
vonOresme,
Marsilius
129i*undzwarmitVergleich
zu denKommentaren
156vb)
geliefert,
siewieder
vonBraakhuis
wurden
undAlbert
vonSachsen.
vonInghen
(1999,
Neuerdings
- offensicht- vondemVerweis
aufCaroti1996abgesehen
doch
151-2)bekannt
gegeben,
Handschriften
dieseListeentnommen
welchen
lichohneAngabedarber,
wurde;vgl.
mitder
Braakhuis
1999,132,Anm.5, 151Anm.96 und152Anm.98 (zumVergleich
Vondenvielen
Unterschieden
dieBraakhuis
anderen
Vatican-Redaction"
Redaktion,
nennt).
habe
Aires342RunddenenvonCarotiundBraakhuis
derListevonMs.Buenos
zwischen
habenknnten
die inhaltliche
ich nurdiejenigen
Bedeutung
(ausgeschlossen
angemerkt,
eius"[Braakhuis,
wieeiussignum"
z.B.inversiones
wurden
151]
[II,q. 5 hier]fursignum
mir
bedeutsam
erscheinen
Besonders
wennes keineSinnvernderung
undderartiges,
gibt).
beidenquaestiones
dieUnterschiede
I, 17;I, 20 undII, 6.
30scibilium]
undBSB,Clm 19551f.
Mnchen,
BSB,Clm4376f. 125v*
corporalium
bei Caroti(1996,69*)
Braakhuis
106v*;
(1999,151).AlledreiVarianten
corruptibilium
alsvonMichael(II, 635)bernommen.
erwhnt,
31Ed. dieserQuaestio
in Braakhuis
1999,153-6.
32antesil sequitur
add.Caroti(1996,70*).
33
Braakhuis
(1999,151).
punctum
34puncta]
om.Caroti(1996,69*).
simpliciter]
35descriptio]
auchinMnchen,
BSB,4376ist
BSB,Clm19551f. lllvb.In Mnchen,
diffinitio"
(f.131rb).
hingegen
18:08:20 PM
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
65
sed nonquamdiu
vivitmutatur(P)36
vivitaugeatur
17.utrum
omneanimatum
quamdiu
(^r*)37
18.utrum
omneagensin aliquodpassum
ipsumpassum38
(139V2"0)
tangat
et omnepassum
inpariendo
19.utrum
omneagensin agendorepatiatur
reagat(140rb)
sitesseactionem
a proportione
vel etiama proportione
20. utrum
equalitatis
possibile
minoris39
(HCK^)
inequalitatis
elementorum
forme
substantiales
21. utrum
(141Va)
suscipiant
magiset minus
in mixto
maneant
forme
substantial
elementorum
22. utrum
(142^)
mixtio
sitpossibilis
23. utrum
(1431*)
reverti
illudquodsimpliciter
estcorrumptum
idemin numero
24. utrum
(144ra)40
possit
Buch II:
- Anfang:
libride generatione
et corruptione.
Et queritur
secundi
Incipiunt
questiones
utrum
. . . (444vb)
primo
- Ende:sieheobenexplicit
:
Quaestiones
tantum
1. Et queritur
utrum
sintquatuor
scilicet
calidum,
qualitates
prime,
primo
frigihumiditas
etsiccitas
sive:caliditas,
itaquodhicnon
dum,humidum,
siccum;
frigiditas,
. . . (144vb)
fiatdifferentia
inter
abstractum
et concretum
utrum
duesintactive,
secunda
esttalis41:
scilicet
cali2. questio
qualitatum
primarum
et duepassive,
scilicet
humidum
etsiccum
dumetfrigidum,
(145Va)
3. questio
tertia
esttalis:utrum
sintquatuor
elementa
et nonplura(146rb)
4. questio
(146v*)
quartaesttalis:utrum
ignissitcontinuus
aqueetaerterre
etsicposset
5. questio
esttalis:utrum
etiamqueride quofrigida,
quinta
aquasitprimo
sitprimo
libetalioelemento,
scilicet
utrum
terra
siccaetaerprimo
etignis
humidus
calidus
(147^)
primo
6. questio
sextaesttalis:utrum
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
sinteiusdem
rationis42
difeignis
rentes
solumsecundum
<et> itaetiamqueritur
intensionem
et remissionem
de aliis
36mutatur(?)]
nutriatur
Braakhuis
(1999,151).
37Gleiche
derquaestio
in Ms.Mnchen,
BSB,Clm 19551, f. 113vbund
Formulierung
Clm4376,f. 135rb.
ImMs.BuenosAiresBN 342Rkommen
mitten
inderFormulierung
derquaestio
dieWorteutrum
omne
animatum
in einemdichten
vor,undzwarals Lemmata
undgreren
NachCaroti(1996,71*)lautetdiesequaestio
: utrum
omne
Schriftgrad.
animatum
vivataugeatur".
quamdiu
38passum]
om.Braakhuis
(1999,151).
" istselbstverstndlich
39minoris]
om.Braakhuis
(1999,151).Eineproportio
inequalitatis
"
odermaioris
". Beidemletzten
Fallergibt
sichkeinProblem,
minoris
inequalitatis
inequalitatis
denneineBewegung
bzw.eineactio
Nurbeieiner
kannstattfinden.
oder
proportio
equalitatis
minoris
istdie Frage,sinnvoll
zu stellen.
Daheristhierminoris"
erforderlich
inequalitatis
auchbeiCaroti1996,73*).
(minoris"
40FreineEdition
undAnalyse
dieserquaestio
sieheBraakhuis
1997.
41Im
zu denquaestiones
Buchessinddie quaestiones
des ersten
des zweiten
Gegensatz
Buchesnumeriert
unddurchdie Formel
esttalis"eingefhrt.
Dies istvielleicht
questio
eineSachedesSchreibers,
denndaszweite
BuchistganzvoneinerHandabgeschrieben,
dieauff. 114rb
beginnt.
siveeiusdem
(1999,152);sivesintadd.Caroti
postrationis]
specieiadd.Braakhuis
1996(74*).Siehehierdienchste
Anm.
18:08:20 PM
66
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
elementis
ad singulas
eorumqualitates,
videlicet
utrum
humiditas
aeriset
quantum
humiditas
rationis43
. . . (1481*)
aquaesinteiusdem
7. questio
esttalis:utrum
simbula
maneat
eademin generato
septima
qualitas
que fuit
in corrupto
(1491*)
8. questio
octavaesttalis:utrum
elementa
habentia
simbulum
facilius
etcitius
transmutentur
ad invicem
simbulum
quamnonhabentia
(149v*)
9. questiononaesttalis:utrum
duo elementa
nonhabentia
simbolum
quelibet
possint
in quodlibet
transmutan
tertium
et quodhabentia
simbolum
nonpossit
transmutan44
ad tertium
(149vb)
10.questio
decimaesttalis:Utrum
omnemixtum
locumsitcomquodestcircamedium
ex omnibus
positum
simplicibus
(150rb)
11. undecima
esttalis:utrum
sitessealiquodmixtum
etperquestio
posibilis
simpliciter
fectetemperatum
(1511*)
duodecima
esttalis:Utrum
12.questio
humidum
etsiccum,
iste45
calidum,
frigidum,
quatuorqualitates
sintprincipalia
mixtorum
prime,
agendain generatione
(15IVa)
13.questio
tertia
decimaesttalis:utrum
sintgenerationes
etcorruptiones
(152rb)
perpetue
14.ultima
huiusesttalis:utrum
inhocmundo
et
questio
possent
perpetuali
generationes
si nonessent
motus
celestes
corruptiones
plures
(152va)
Ms. 342R berliefert
also die 38 quaestiones
von Buridan zu
De generatione
et corruptione
.
3.3. Expositio
in treslibrosDe anima (154ra-167vb)
Da Buridanals einerder wichtigsten
seinerZeit anzuNaturphilosophen
sehen ist,wird nichtnur durch seine grundlegendeKommentierungder
Physikund des De caelobezeugt, sondern auch und fur die damaligen
43postrationis]
et eiusdem
BSB,Clm19551f. 121^. DemSinn
specieadd.Mnchen,
nachstimmt
Ms.Buenos
Aires
vonBraakhuis
342RmitderVersion
(1999,152:Handschriften
nicht
werden
berein:
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
ratioutrum
erwhnt)
ignissunteiusdem
nissiveeiusdem
diffrentes
solumsecundum
intensionem
etremissionem".
Es wird
speciei
alsodieFragedanachgestellt,
ob diecaliditates
derzweioberen
Elemente
(FeuerundLuft)
derselben
Artsind(oderzurselben
so dasienur
Intensittsunterschiede
Gattung
gehren),
innerhalb
derselben
aufweisen.
Undhnlich
kannflir
zweiandere
Elemente
Gattung
gefragt
z.B. furLuftundWasser
derTrockenheit.
Bei Carotilautethingegen
werden,
bezglich
diequaestio:
caliditas
aerisetcaliditas
rationis
sivesintdiffrenutrum
ignissunteiusdem
tessolumsecundum
intensionem
et remissionem"
(Caroti1999,74*,aus Ms. Berlin,
Preuischer
Staatsbibliothek
cod.lat.fol.387,150v*;
dieLesartCarotis
von
Kulturbesitz,
dieser
Handschrift
wirdhiernicht
htte
Buridan
dieAlternativfrage
angezweifelt).
Demgem
entweder
beidecaliditates
zu derselben
(unddieanderen
gestellt:
gehren
Qualitten)
Gattung
odersie unterscheiden
sichnurnachIntensitt.
Aberdieskannmeiner
nach
Meinung
nichtderSinnderFragesein,sondern:
weildieQualitten
zurselbenGattung
deswegen,
siesichnur
unterscheiden
intensionem
etremissionem".
DiesesMiversecundum
gehren,
stndnis
entsteht
ausdeninderoberen
Funote
Varianten.
Dieseundandere
angegebenen
knnen
erstnacheinem
allerHandschriften
undeinerInhaltsanalyse
des
Fragen
Vergleich
Textesendgltig
beantwortet
werden.
44antetransmutan]
sicadd.Braakhuis
(1999,152).
45iste]idestBraakhuis
(1999,152).
18:08:20 PM
67
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
18:08:20 PM
68
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
- Ende:... et homines
habentes
infantilitatem
velpassionem
vel
impedimentum
propter
aliumcasumindigent
beneutifantasia
et in finercapitult.
. . . (164rb)
Sequitur
Buch III:
- Anfang:
De parte
autem
. Isteesttertius
liberin quo sunttrestractatus.
Primus
estde
secundus
de potentia
etsecundum
locummotiva.
Tertius
intellectiva,
appetitiva
potentia
animepotentiarum50
ad invicem.
Secundus
ibi quoniam
autem
anima.
de comparatione
ibivegetabilem
. . . (164v*)
Tertius
- Ende:sieheobenexplicit
.
Patar
Vergleichendmit Ms. Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek477 transkribiert
nach der vatikanischenHandschrifteinige wenige StellendieserFassung,
die er als tertialecturakennzeichnet.Als einen weiterenBeleg fr die
Zugehrigkeitvon Ms. 342R zu dieser Fassung knnen wir hier jene
Stellen in Ms. 342R anfuhren:51
lat.2162
Ms. Vaticano
Liber
I
1lOr*:Bonorum
. . . (incipit).
1lOv^:Formidandum
...
110vb:Si autem
...
UberII
...
1Mv15:
. . .: ... hoc addiscit
spculons
116rb:
autem
Nunc
autem
...
118^: De tangibili
. . .: ... quaesuntin
119rM19rb:
Dubitabit
...
aere.[Hom.?].Sed si corpora.
Ms.BN342R
I
Liber
1541*.
154rb.
154vb.
Uber11
homoaddiscit
159rb:
160rb.
1621*.
. . . quaesuntin aere.Undepossit
162rb:
sic rationari:sicutest de aqua in hiis
que suntin aqua ita est de aere in hiis
...
que suntin aere. Sed si corpora.
UberLU
UberLH
valet
Sed tu
164V51:
. . . Sed tuquaeresquommodo
autem
122V3122V0:
Necesse
. . . istaconsequentia.
...
est istaconsequentia
quaeresquomodo
Die zweiteVariante ist wichtiger:wenn man den Text von Ms. 342R an
dieser Stelle bernimmt,dann handeltes sich um eine Auslassungdurch
Wie der Text der expositio
Homoioteleutonin der vatikanischenAbschrift.
50
.
animeadd
postpotentiarum]
51In derVergleichstabelle
das
als Uberschnft
derrechten
vonPatarsteht
Spaltenicht
hier
Ms. Vaticano
lat.2162sondern
2164"(Patar1991,715-22,
Ms. Vaticano,
richtige
aufdenichhieraufmerksichumeinenschwerwiegenden
Druckfehler,
715).Es handelt
zuDe anima
lat.2164 aucheinenBuridankommentar
sammachen
mu,weilMs.Vaticano
lectura
nmlich
diequaestiones
detertia
berliefert,
(siehePatar1991,52*;MichaelII, 700).
die
dieserStellen
alleVarianten
Darberhinaushalteiches furunntig,
aufzulisten;
aufbeidenSeitenangegeben.
habeichmitFettschrift
schienen,
drei,die mirwichtiger
18:08:20 PM
69
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
18:08:20 PM
70
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
- Ende:. . . quiacommuniter
t omniasensibilia.
Etsicestfinis
secundi
aprehend
questionum
libride anima(182vb)
Buch III:
- Anfang:
Circatertium
librum
de animaqueritur
utrum
intellectus
noster
sitvirprimo
tuspassivaab intelligibili.
Arguitur
quodnonquia omnequodpatitur
movetur,
quia
. . . (182^)
patiestmoveri
- Ende:sieheobenexplit.
Wie bei anderenAbschriften
dieserFassungwirdin Ms. 342R eine quaestio10 (utrumopus naturalissimum
in viventibussitgeneraresibi simile",
f. 175V*)berliefert.54
Das Werk ist noch immerunediert.
3.5. Quaestiones
superlibrosParva naturalia (190ra-220ra)
Die Parvanaturalia
, die einen Fragenkreiszu den von Krper und Seele
stellendie Verbindungzwischen
gemeinsamenVerrichtungen"55
betreffen,
dem psychologischorientiertenTraktat De animaund den biologischen
Schriftendes corpusaristotelicum
dar. Gerade diese Mittelstellung
hat zu
einergewissenVernachlssigung
ihrerlateinischenText- und Kommentartraditiongegenberden groenphilosophischen
und biologischenWerken
des corpusgefuhrt.56
Buridan hat sich mehrfachmit den Parvanaturalia
auseinandergesetzt,
- wie Michael bemerkt
- die verschiedenenRedakaber bis heutekonnten
tionen noch nicht mit aller wnschenswertenKlarheit" geschieden
werden.57
Es scheintfestzustehen,
da BuridansKommentarezu den Parva
naturaliasowohl in der Form der expositio
als auch als quaestiones
berliefertsind. Letztereliegen in verschiedenenFassungenvor, und zwar nicht
54Diese
inFaralsListenicht
kommt
quaestio
vor,wirdabervonMichael
(II,684)erwhnt.
Ferner
lautet
diequaestio
wiebeiFaraisondern
wiebeiMichael(684):utrum
II, 23 nicht
sensibile
faciat
sensationem
positum
suprasensum
(1811*).
55Aristoteles,
De anima
433b 19-21(Aristoteles
1983, bers.
Gigon,
342).AnderStelle
werden
naturalia
nichtgenannt.
jedochdieParva
EineBasisuntersuchung
firdieKommentierung
liefert
Raedemaecker
1965.Frdie
derKommentare
nicht
zuletzt
dieGliederung
derParva
natuEinordnungsprobleme
spielt
raliaselbst
eineRolle,da derenletzteTexteyDe
morte
etvita
etdeiuventute
et
, derespiratone
senectuteu
unterschiedlich
oderzusammengesetzt
werden.
SchonLacombe
bemerkt
getrennt
interlibrum
De respiratane
et librum
De Morte
nonsemper
eadem
divisio
diesbezglich:
est..." (Aristoteles
ichmichherzlich
bei Prof.Ch.
1939,61). An dieserStellemchte
Lohrbedanken,
dermireinevollstndige
ListederKommentare
zu denParvanaturalia
zurVerfgung
undmirmitvielenwertvollen
zu diesemThema
gestellt
Bemerkungen
hat.
geholfen
57MichaelII, 774.
18:08:20 PM
71
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
18:08:20 PM
72
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
73
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
vitae
et brevitate
3.5.4 ff.208ra-2llrb: De longitudine
- Anfang:
et
calidum
vitequeritur
et brevitate
de longitudine
Circalibrum
primoutrum
nonsunt
sintcauselongevite.Arguitur
humidum
quodnon,quiacauseputrefactionis
causelongevite. . . (208ra)
- Ende:... etsicvirtute
illudproporcordiantequam
etproportionale67
reficiuntur
cordis
de longitudine
etsicestfinis
Et sicpatetquestio
tionale
cordimoriatur.
(211rb)
Ms. 342R gehrtsicherlichauch zur RedaktionB, furdie Michael 8 weiverzeichnethat.68Dafr sprechennichtnur der Anfang
tere Abschriften
und das Ende sondernauch die Tatsachen,da die qq. 1-2 von Lokert2
nichtvorkommen,whrend stattdesseneine neue quaestiomit enthalten
ist (q. 6: utrumplantae debeant esse longiorisvitae quam alia ammalia", ff.210^-21 lrb).69
et vita
3.5.5 ff 211rb-218V0:De morte
an dieser Stelle
Wie oben erwhntist die Gliederungder Parvanaturalia
und
Die
nicht immer gleich.70
Gruppierungder quaestiones
Gliederung
unterscheidensich im Ms. 342R von der gewhnlichangenommenen
Text der Parvanaturalia
zum fnften"
, d.h. zum Traktat
Kommentierung
In Ms.
et
senectute.1*
iuventute
de
de
et vita
bzw. Kapitel: De morte
,
, respiratone
derselben
Handschrift
in
einer
noch
mindestens
342R wie auch
Fassung72
nichtals unabhngigerTraktatangewirdder wichtigeText De respiratone
etvitazusammengehrig.
sehen sondernals mitDe morte
Demgem wervitaezwei
et brevitate
de longitudine
den im Ms. 342R nach den quaestiones
Titel
dem
unter
eine
berliefert:
unterschiedliche
Gruppenvon quaestiones
et vita(hier 3.5.5), die andere,deutlichvon jener getrennt,unter
De morte
etsenectute
dem TitelDe iuventute
(hier3.5.6). Zu einerbesserenberprfung
an.
anhand andererHandschriften
gebe ich hier die tabulaequaestionum
67proportionale]
MichaelII, 762.
perproportionalia
68SieheMichaelII, 762-6.
69Michael
II, 766.
70SieheobenAnm.56. Mindestens
alledreiTexte
nachscheint
derExpositio
Buridan,
uno
modorum:
anzusehen:
als zusammengehrig
istelibersoletintitulan
aliquotrium
modode respiraet vitaet tertio
aliomodode morte
et iuventute,
modode senectute
in hoclibro. . (nachMichaelII, 67).
determinatur
tone,eo quodde ististribus
71
Vgl.Farai1946,34; Lohr1970,178;MichaelII, 769ff.
72Ms. Praha,Knihovna
etvita
demorte
L.29 [1272],quaestiones
Kapituli,
Metropolitn
und
in demExplicit
unddannBuridan
Buridani
zugeschrieben)
(ff.113vb-122rb,
magisti
mitallgemeiner
IndemExplicit
etsenectute
deiuventute
Zuschreibung
(ff.122rb-124rb.
quaestiones
aufdiese1376entstandene
Michael(II, 771)verweist
derParvanaturalia).
zu Buridan
an.
Urteil
michdiesem
ichschliee
mitwohldieseRedaktion";
Abschrift
18:08:20 PM
74
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de morte
etvitaprimo
utrum
corsitprincipium
queritur
sanguietvenarum
nis73
animalibus
habentibus
cor,et nonloquorde primo
principio
simpliciterquiaistudestDeusnecpropter
ad animam
sedloquordeprimo
primitatem
corporis
... (211rb)
principio
corporali
- Ende:. . . valetad
etad mixtionem
digestionem
(?)etad aliaoperavite.74
Ergoconclusionesfactas
solvatis
secundum
Et sicestfinis
de
exigentiam
predictorum.
questionum
morte
etvita.Expliciunt
de morte
etvita(218^)
questiones
:
Quaestiones
1. utrum
corsitprincipium
etvenarum
inanimalibus
habentibus
cor(211r13)
sanguinis75
2. utrum
vitapossitexistere
sinenaturali
caloreveletiam:utrum
animaiet omneseius
haberenaturalem
calorem
ad hoc,quodvivant
partes
oporteat
(212r*)
3. utrum
calidum
naturale
a se ipso(212^)
potest
corrumpi
4. utrum
inviventibus
debeatcorrumpi
calornaturalis
humidi
perconsumptionem
(2131^)
5. utrum
vitaposset
in aliquoanimali
alimenti
perpetuali
perconsumptionem
(213^)
6. utrum
omnevivens
ad salutem
viteindigeat
caloris
naturalis
refrigerio
(214^)
7. utrum
in vasebeneobstructo
ignisdebeatcitocorrumpi
(21r0)
8. utrum
omniaet solaanimalia
habentia
pulmonem
respirant
(216r*)
9. utrum
habeant
sufficiens
calorisvitalisa contiplanteet alia exsanguia
refrigerium
nentiet a nutrimento
(21v3)
10. utrum
viventia
naturaliter
calidadebeant
nutriri
ethabitare
inlociscalidioribus
etfrigidain frigidioribus
(2171*)
11. utrum
in estatemagisrespiremus
et spissius
respiramus
quamin hyeme
(217^)
12. utrum
membra
interiora
scilicet
coretpulmo,
sint
principalia,
eparet eisconsimilia,
in estatecalidiora
velcontra
quamin hyeme
(217v^)
Die quaestiones
8-12 beziehen sich auf De respiratione.
Die handschriftliche
Tradition vertretend,enthltMs. 342R eine Abschriftder Fassung (B),
und von daher berliefertes auch nicht die q. 1 (utrumpropositiosit
vera animal secundumquod animal, impossibileest non vivere"),die in
Lokert2(= Fassung B1) vorkommt.76
3.5.6 ff.218vb-220ra:De iuventute
et senectute
- Anfang:
Circalibrum
de iuventute
etsenectute
utrum
calornaturalis
et
queritur
primo
accidentalis
seuinnaturalis
sunteiusdem
speciei
specialissime.
Arguitur
quodnonquia. . .
(218^)
- Ende:. . . debetdici
debentintelligi
sanitate
quodomniapredicta
supposita
corporis,
nobisdignetur,
sculaseculorum.
Amen.
quampraestare
quiregnat
perinfinita
Expliciunt
naturalium
Buridani.
questiones
parvorum
maistri
(2201*)
73sanguinis]
cm.exsanguinweus.
74vite]
animaMs. Praha,Knihovna
L.29 [1272]f. 122r*'
Metropolitn
Kapituli,
con.exsanguinweus.
sanguinis]
Die quaestio
ausFarai1946,34. SieheMichaelII, 774.
18:08:20 PM
75
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
zu diesem Text:
die 3 folgendenquaestiones
Ms. 342R berliefert
sunteiusdem
1 [13]utrum
calornaturalis
et accidentalis
seuinnaturalis
specieispecialissime(218vb)
sitbonain qua dicitur
viventis
diffinitio
2 [14]utrum
quamdatAristoteles
generationis
animein calefando
estprimaparticipado
(2191*)
generado
suntbone,etquia
viteetmortis
etsenectutis
etetiam
3 [15]utrum
diffinitiones
juventutis
... (21v3)
secundum
viventis
iamdictum
estde diffinitione
generationis
Ms. 342R die
der Fassung(B) berliefert
Wie die anderenHandschriften
die in Lokert2( = B1)
quaestio1 (oder [13] wenn man alle zusammenzhlt),
fehlt.Wenn man 5.5.) und 5.6.) zusammen nimmt,dann sind in Ms.
der Fassung (B) vorhanden,fr die. Michael 12
342R die 15 quaestiones
verzeichnethat.77
weitereAbschriften
Zusammenfassendzu 5.1.-6.): Ms. 342R enthltimmer die Fassung
Tradition entsprichtund von dem Druck
(B), die der handschriftlichen
B'
bei
Michael) abweicht(mitAusnahmevon De sensu
Lokert2(als Fassung
InnerhalbdieserTraditiongehrtes auerdemzur Gruppe von
etsensato).
die alle fnf"Werke berliefernund noch zu denjeniHandschriften,
Buridan zugeschriezu den Parvanaturalia
denen
diese quaestiones
bei
gen,
ben werden.78
librosDe caelo et mundo (220-239i)
in quattuor
3.6. Expositio
Als Kommentare zum Traktat De caelo, der in jeder mittelalterlichen
librinaturales
der Physikunmittelbar
Schuleinordnungder aristotelischen
und
eine
eine
von
Buridan
sind
,
expositio
Sammlungvon quaestiones
folgt,
diesmal aber nichtin unterschiedlichen
Fassungenund in einer bemerDie Quaestiones
berliefert.79
kenswertgeringenAnzahl von Handschriften,
wurdenim Jahre 1942 von Moody anhand der zwei bekanntenHandschriftenediert. Vor kurzem hat Patar eine neue Edition von ihnen
die
und zum erstenMal eine Edition der expositio
angefertigt,
vorgelegt80
77Michael
II, 770-2.
78SiehedieBemerkungen
vonMichaelII, 775-6.
79SieheMichaelII, 617-27.
80Moodys
hocheingeschtzt
Edition
wurde,
(sieheMoody1942),diem derForschung
Clm 19551und Ms. Bruges,
basiertaufMs. Mnchen
Staatsbibliothek,
Bayerische
Mnchner
daaucheinanderer
477.DamalshatMoody
Stadsbibliotheek
Codex,
vermutet,
derFall(sieheMichael
aberdiesistnicht
Clm761,diequaestiones
II, 623;Lohr
berliefert;
zu Buridan).
Beide,Lohr(1970,
1970,170,hltdiesenTexteherfreinenKommentar
Nationalbibliothek
5453
aufMs.Wien,sterreichische
(II,621)weisen
170)undMichael
dieWiener
schliet
neuedierte,
derdiequaestiones
hin.Patar(1996,229-566),
lr-8r
(Fragm.)
dieselbe
aus (Patar1996,70*).Somitbleibtdie handschriftliche
Handschrift
Grundlage
18:08:20 PM
76
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
wiebeiMoody.Der Unterschied
da MoodydieMnchner
Handschrift
liegtnurdarin,
undPatarjetztdiebelgische.
bevorzugte
81Patar1996,5-226;zu dendreiHandschriften
siehe42*-59*.
Die in Lohr1970(170)
erwhnten
(B) sindin Lohr1970D. da Clavasioprovisorisch
quaestiones
zugeschrieben.
StellendieserEdition
wievorher
auchdie anderen
Texte(z.B.
(Patar1996)werden
1991sieheoben,Anm.20) mitSeiteundkleinkursivgeschriebenen
zitiert
oder
Thijssen
z.B. 83-12-14
heitSeite83,vonZeile12 bis 14"usw.Die Lemmata
erwhnt:
schreibe
Da es sichumeinenedierten
ichwiePatarmitFettschrift.
Texthandelt,
werdeichin
mitKlammern
dieVariante
derEdition
mitangeben.
]"
Anmerkungen
82qui nominatur]
nominatus
(Patar1996,5-5).Lemmawirdeingeschlossen.
83iste]
illae(Patar1996,153-30-.?/).
add.loquendo
(Patar1996,88-5).
postnaturaliter]
18:08:20 PM
77
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
Buch II:
- Anfang:
de
determinai
libersecundus
Hic incipit
. . . Quod quidem.85
qui specialiter
estde
secundus
se totum,
Primus
estde celosecundum
trestractatus.
celo.Et continet
89-2-4)
. . . (230V*;
estde terra
tertius
astris,
- Ende:Abgebrochen
sieheobenExplicit.
(Textunvollstndig);
superDe
Verglichenmit dem von Patar ediertenText weist die expositio
von Ms. 342R zahlreicheTextvarianten,Auslassungenund
caeloet mundo
auf. Da es in der Tat zu viele sind, als da sie hier beHinzufiigungen
werden
knnten,gebe ich einigeBeispielean und erwhnenur
rcksichtigt
die auffalligsten
Auslassungenund Umstellungen;in weiterenVerffentauf
die Textproblematik
soll
genauer eingegangenwerden.86
lichungen
von Ms. 342R weistmehrereAuslassungendurchHomoioDie expositio
teleutaauf, die an den entsprechendenStellen den von Patar edierten
Text voraussetzenund von daher davon zeugen, da es sich nicht um
eine besonderszuverlssigeAbschrifthandelt.Beispiele hiervonsind die
ersten6 Flle:
hom.
. . . perfectum]
9-12:quiacorpus
hom.
. . . mixta]
11-58-59:
simplicitatem
hom.
modo. . . potest]
13-32-33:
hom.
16-1-3:
ergoetc.. . . deorsum]
hom.
et sie. . . lineasemicircularis]
22-50-51:
hom.
sicutestaer. . . speciem]
39-36-37:
Es gibtauch zahlreicheAuslassungenvon einzelnenWortenoder Stzen;
von diesen sind zwei zu erwhnen,die einen langen Absatz betreffen:
om.
. . . essetinferior]
Palam autem.Supposuit
133-39-44:
. . . ergoetc.]om.
Adhucomnia.Secunda
152-3-9:
De
An einigenStellen,an denen Buridan ein Lemma des aristotelischen
Ohne Rcksicht
findetman Textumstellungen.
caeloangibtund kommentiert,
auf die inhaldichenUnterschiedesind folgendezu notieren:87
85
quidem]add.igitur(Patar1996,89-2).
86post
und
nurhandschrifdich
dievordem
dieser
VorallemmitderEdition
vorlag
expositio,
kaumzugnglich
vondaherderForschung
geleiwar,hatPatareinenwichtigen
Beitrag
nurmiteinigen
sondern
Bericht
denmanmitdiesem
schmlern,
Bemerkungen
keinesweg
stet,
will.
ergnzen
87Ichnumeriere
furdieReihenfolge
mit[1],[2] usw.,undbenutze
hierParagraphen
auchdieLokalisierung
nachderZahlenordnung
denPfeil Zwischen
[ ]" wirdgleich
beiPatar1996bzw.Ms. 342Rangegeben.
18:08:20 PM
78
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
-+ [2: 16-97inIVohuius]
a) [1: 15-75-16-96:
Oportetautem.Hicvult. . . declarabuntur
17-77:Quod autem circumfertur.
Probatconclusionem
... dictumfuitprius].
Im Ms. 342RnachderReihenfolge
Umstellung:
[2: f.221vb] [1: f.221va]
-* [2: 44-59-69:
Si igitur. . . infert
Sed tarnenet quaeb) [1: 43-54-58:
conclusionem]
. . . aliquidixerunt].
ImMs.342RnachderReihenfolge
cumque.Hicremovet
Umstellung:
-[1: f.224rb]
[2: f.224rb]
-[2: 78-30-40:
77-23-78-29
: Similiterautem... priusarguebatur]
Sed non in
c) [1:
-[3: 78-41-79-66:
quo. Hic. . . priusarguebatur]
Quoniamautem. . . semper
esse]~*
. . . sicutdicebatur].
Im Ms.
[4: 79-67:Necesse negationes.Proponit
Umstellung:
-+ [4: 2291*]
-> [1: 229rb]
-[2: 229rb]
342RnachderReihenfolge
[3: 2291*]
-* [2: 103101-79-103-55:
Causa
autem
ex
. . . quamcircularis]
d) [1:
ipsis.Prosequitur
56-67:Propterquid igitur.Secunda
... estperpetum].
Im
Umstellung: Ms. 342R
-*
nachderReihenfolge
[2: f.232rb]
[1: f.232i*]
De motuautemipisius.Istudsextum
. . . circumscriptis
e) [1: 1l4-38-'15-47:
essereguSi enimirregulariter.
Hicvultprobare
. . . magisquamalibi].
laris]-[2: 15-48-71:
Im Ms. 342R nachderReihenfolge
Der
Umstellung:
[2: f. 2341*]-* [1: f. 234rb].
zweiteParagraph
machtsomitdas Endedesfnften
aus
Kapitels
-+ [2: 151-56-152-2:
Nos autemdicamus.Istud. . . polosmundi]
f) [1: 151-78-85:
Quod
autemimpossibile.Prosequitur
... moverei
Im Ms. 342Rnach
earn].Umstellung:
-[1: f.239vb]
derReihenfolge
[2: f.239V3]
Nach meinerberprfunganhand des aristotelischen
lateinischenTextes
ist die Reihenfolgeder Paragraphenim Text von Patar richtigund im
Ms. 342R unzutreffend.
Im Ms. 342R gibt es auerdem viele Lesarten,die in den Text nicht
aufzunehmensind und nur in dem kritischen
Apparat vermerktwerden
mten(wie z.B. 34-23: capiatur]causatur).Doch sind an einigenStellen
die Variantenvon Ms. 342R nher zu bercksichtigen,
denn sie bieten
meiner Meinung nach einen besserenText. Als Beispiele hiervonkann
man die folgendenerwhnen:
9-18:quasi]quia(2211*)
40-72:eorum]
corpus
(2241*)
128-6:in sono]in celis(2361*)
An anderen Stellen ist der Text von Patar verbesserungsbedrftig,
und
zwar teilweiseunabhngigvon Ms. 342R. Hierbei sind zwei Beispielezu
die jeweils die Anknpfung
an den aristotelischen
errtern,
Text und seine
Auslegungbetreffen:
et impotentiae]
et impossibile
(a) 72-77:potentiae
possibile
(228rb):
Am Anfangdes zweiten Kapitels vom erstenBuch legt Aristotelesdas
der Vergnglichkeit
bzw. Unvergnglichkeit
der Welt
Untersuchungsthema
fest88
linke
(Tabelle,
Spalte, Stelle 1). Wie man darberhinaus in Patars
88De caeloII, 2 280 b 1.
18:08:20 PM
79
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
18:08:20 PM
80
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
81
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
infinitum
etb sitmobile
et b quoda sitmovens
infinitum
quoda sitmovens
ponamus
in quo movetur.
et g sittempus
inquo move- finitum
et tempus
sitmobile
finitum,
moventis
moventisTunccapiamus
tursitg; tunccapiamus
quevocepartem
partem
in eodemtempore
in eodem turad et istamovebit
ad et illamovebit
quae vocetur
sitbz.
et illudminus
mobile
mobile minus
etilludminus
minus
mobile
tempore
sitbz.
estproportio
bzadtotum
Tunc
b,
bz,talisest Tunc
proportio
partis
igitur
qualis
partis
qualis
ergo
a. Et iterum
ad ad totum
talisestproportio
adadtotum
,. . .
, etiterwn,
proportio
ipsius
hocestimpossibile,
hocestimpossibile,
ut prius,
quiaex una
quia ex una utprius,
finita
ad
scilicet
ad parteestcertaproportio,
finiti
scilicet
parteestcertaproportio,
et ex aliapartenonestproporet ex aliapartenonestproportio,finitum,92
finitum,
infietalterum
infinitumtio,quiaunumestfinitum
etalterum
quiaunumestfinitum
zuPatarschrieb nitum
ImUnterschied
(Ms.342R224v*b).
(42-28-43-37.
ichadundbzzusammen.)
Die hier betrachtetenStellen sind nur einige Beispiele von den vielen
Unterschieden,die Ms. 342R im Vergleichzur Edition von Patar aufweist.Es handeltsich jedoch um Unterschiede,die immerim Rahmen
des von Patar ediertenTextes bleibenund schwerlichals Beleg einerweiterenFassung angenommenwerdenknnen.
von Buridan zu De caeloein
Ms. 342R ist also bezglichder expositio
aber angesichtsder geringenAnzahl von Handzwar unvollstndiger
schriftenwertvollerZeuge, ber den man hier nur ganz knapp berichten kann, der aber weitereStudienverdient.93
4. Schlubemerkungen
Ms. Buenos Aires,BibliotecaNacional 342R (El encadenado") ist durchAristotelesaus ein zu bercksichtigender
Zeuge frsechs der wichtigsten
Text
einzelnen
kommentaredes Jean Buridan. Ich hoffe,dies bei jedem
nach dem heutigenForschungsstand
gezeigtzu haben.
" nicht
Aristoteles-americanus
der
ist, ist es
vollstndigerforscht
Solange
mit einer
noch sehrschwereinzuschtzen,wievieleandere Handschriften
werBibliotheken
aufbewahrt
Bedeutungwie diese in lateinamerikanischen
den. Ich kenne keine andere.94
92finitum]
con.exMs.infinitum.
93Die Stelle,die nachPatar(1996,20*-9*)
Geschichte
des Esels
frdie berhmte
sichauchin Ms. 342R,f.239^-239^.
seinsoll,befindet
entscheidend
Buridans
94EinesehrguteForschungsbasis
TexteverRedmond
liefert
1972,derehersptere
enthlt.
berBuridan
keinen
undbrigens
zeichnet
Eintrag
18:08:20 PM
82
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
83
EL LIBROENCADENADO"
Literatur
a Oresmee
Le Quaestione
de sensu"attribuite
Alberto
di Sassonia
, Firenze 1983
Latinus.Codices descripsitG. LaAristoteles
Aristoteles1939
combe, Pars Prior,Roma 1939
De caeloet mundo
Aristoteles1886
(bers.G. von Moerbecke),
siehe Thomas von Aquin 1886
Manuscrits scientifiquesmdivaux de la
Beaujouan, G. 1968
cathdralede Sgovie",in: ActesduXle Congrs
d'histoire
des sciences
international
, 24-31 aot
vol.
15-8
Varsovie
1968,
3,
1965,
Booksin Chainsand otherbibliographical
,
Blades, W. 1892
Papers
London2 1892
Braakhuis,H. A. G. 1997 JohnBuridanand the 'Parisian School' on
the Possibilityof Returningas Numerically
the Same. A Note on a Chapter in the Historyof the Relationshipbetween Faith and
Natural Science", in: S. Caroti/P. Souffrin
,
(Hrgs.), La NouvellePhysiquedu XIVe Sicle
Firenze 1997, 111-40
Braakhuis,H. A. G. 1999 Scientific
Reality.
Knowledgeand Contingent
and
(Natural)
SupKnowledge,Signification
on De generapositionin Buridan's Questions
in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen/
toneetcorruptione",
H. A. G. Braakhuis(Hrgs.), The Commentary
on Aristotle's
Tradition
De generationeet corAncient
Medieval
,
, and EarlyModern
,
ruptione.
Turnhout 1999, 131-61
Buridan,Johannes
super
Physica(ultimalectura)[= e]: Quaestiones
octoPhysicorum
libros
Aristotelis
(Hrsg.v. J. Dullaert Gandavus/Denisse Roce), Paris 1509
am Main 1969]
[ND: Frankfurt
III , 14-19: sieheThijssen,
Buridan,Johannes
(iultima
lectura)
Physica
M.
H.
M.
1991
J.
etquaestiones
deprimalectura
De anima(expositio
Buridan,Johannes
):
B.
1991
siehe Patar,
etdecisiones
De anima[= Lockert
Buridan,Johannes
phyJ: Questiones
sicales. . . Paris 1516 (siehe unten ParvanatuNeue Edition:Patar,B. 1991 (495-695)
ralic).
Agrimi,J. 1983
18:08:20 PM
84
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
85
EL LIBROENGADENADO"
undNaturwissenschaft
vonScholastik
An derGrenze
,
Roma2 1952
w Polscew okresie
przedkopernikaMarkowski,M. 1971
Burydanizm
u.a. 1971
Wroclaw
skim
,
medii
aeriinAristotelem
commmtariorum
Markowski,M./
Repertorium
Cracoviae
in
Bibliotheca
Latinorum
S.
1974
Iagellonica
quae
Wlodek,
u.a.
1974
Wroclaw
asservantur
,
siehe Michael, B. 1985
Michael I; Michael II
Buridan:Studien
zu snmLeben,seiMichael, B. 1985
Johannes
im
seinerTheorien
undzurRezeption
nenWerken
Mittelalters
des
(Inauguralspten
Europa
zur Erlangungdes Grades eines
Dissertation
Doktors der Philosohie des Fachbereichs
der Freien UniGeschichtswissenschaften
seineWerke
versittBerlin),Teil I: DerAutor,
,
seinPublikum
(S. 79-404), Teil II: Johannes
undQuellenBuridan:
, berlieferung
Bibliographie
1985
Berlin
seinerWerke
kritik
(S. 407-940),
libris
Buridani
Iohannis
Quaestiones
quatsuper
Moody, E. A. 1942
tuorDe caelo et mundo,Cambridge,Mass.
1942 [ND New York 1970]
et corruptione
1996
Nicole
,
Quaestiones
superde generatone
Oresme,
1996
Mnchen
hrsg.v. StefanoCaroti,
siehe Bulletinde philosophiemdivale
, 13
Palacz, R. 1971
48
(1971),
Le traitde 13 me de Jean Buridan[de prima
Patar, B. 1991
,
, tudecritiqueet doctrinale
lectura].dition
1991
Louvain-la-Neuve/Longueuil
Ioannis BuridaniExpositioet Quaestionesin
Patar, B. 1996
De caelo. dition, tude critique
Aristotelis
/Louvain/
et doctrinale,Louvain-la-Neuve
Paris 1996
1958
Livres enchans",in: Le Livreet l'estampe.
Peeters,J.
de la Socitdes Bibliophiles
RevueTrimestrielle
de
et Iconophiles Belgique
, 14 (1958), 61-5
histrico
[Publicadobajo la
argentino
Piccirilli,R. /Romay, F. L./ Diconario
Aires 1953-54
Buenos
6
direccin
L.
1953-54
de], Bde,
Gianello,
de
bauche
catalogue des commenRaedemaecker,J. de 1965 Une
tairessur les Parva Naturalia" parus aus
Maier, A. 1952
18:08:20 PM
86
DANIELANTONIO
DI LISCIA
18:08:20 PM
MexicanLogic
in 16th-Centuiy
Inference
Quantified
WALTERREDMOND
of inference,
dealtwiththecomplexities
As Scholasticthinkers
theystretched
sentencepattern.I describehere the
the limitsof theirsubject-predicate
whose
sentences
of
go beyond thispatternin a logic
analysis arguments
summutextbookpublishedin Mexico and Spain from1554, the Recognitio
1
He
and
his
la
Cruz
de
Vera
larumby FriarAlonso Gutirrez
(1504-84).
colleaguestook an extensionalapproach to logic in which the relationof
identity
played a centralrole. I will use a speciallydesignedsymboliclanto
illustratethis systemand compare it with present-daylogical
guage
procedures.2
Afterreviewinga fewof Alonso's ideas on the natureof argument(1),
I introducethe extensionalsymbolismand show how inferencemay be
developed on the basis of the identityrelation(2). Then I analyze two
pattern:argumentscontypesof inferencebeyond the subject-predicate
in
those
i.e.,
terms,
appearing Latin cases other than
taining"oblique"
the nominative(3), and argumentscontainingover threeterms(4). Lastly
I brieflycommenton the semanticsof oblique sentences(5) and add a
is appended.
fewwordson simplifying
logic(6). A listoflogicalabbreviations
1 Syllogistics,
ch.1 and14;I citepageandcolumn
(AorB) oftheSalamanca
especially
Alonsowrotea secondworkon logic,the
of 1573,pp. 94-121,in 20 chapters.
edition
Resolutio.
Dialctica
2 ForScholastic
SenExtensional
extensional
ofGeneral
Interpretation
logicsee Redmond,
ofMexico)13,n. 39 (December
inSixteenth-Century
tences
, in:Crtica
University
(National
Logic
4
andLa logica
dela existencia
divididas
delasunidades
, chapters
1981),45-73;id.,La lgica
Mxico
de
la
Vera
M.
en
Alonso
realidad
and5 in:Pensamiento
Cruz
Beuchot,
(with
Fray
y
Mexican
and16th-Centwy
, in:Crtica,
22,n. 65 (August
1990),23Logic
1987);id Relations
in:
n.
43
in
id.
Modal
31-50;
Crtica,
Mexico,
15,
j
1983),
(April
41);
Logic Sixteenth-Century
dela Vera
defray
Alonso
enla lgica
Cruzand'Reglas
id.,Relaciones
y condicioy unidades
complejas
dela argumenta3 and4 in:La teora
elmarco
nes':
Alonso
, chapters
sujeto-predicado
fray
superando
Alonso
ontheLogic
Mexico1965),andid.,Friar
M. Beuchot,
colonial
cinenelMxico
(with
in:Vivarium,
32 (1994),227-60.
ofGod,
Vivarium
39,1
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001
18:08:35 PM
88
WALTER
REDMOND
1. SomeBasic Points
1. 1 Non-syllogistic
Arguments
The type of argumentationI will examine here involvesquantification
(the conceptsof "all" and "some"), which the logiciansof the timedeveloped in the frameworkof the Aristoteliansyllogistic.However, in their
Alonso
argumentationtheorytheydid not limitthemselvesto syllogisms.
that
texts
explains (116B)
logic
treatsentential
as whenwe arguefrom
a conditional
and
usually
forms,
argument
itsantecedent
to itsconsequent.3
Today we speak of propositionalor sententiallogic, where inferenceis
based on rulesrelatedto the connectives"and," "or," "if' etc. (as in the
argumentin 1.3 below).
1.2 Formalism
At the beginningof his syllogistics,
Alonso distinguished
(95A) the validity of an argumentfromthe truthvalue of its sentences,i.e., fromthe
fact that its sentencesare true or false. Logic studies
theformal
wherein
thetruth
or falsehood
ofpremises
andconclusion
is
syllogism,
as longas proper
moodandfigure
aremaintained,
sincethesyllogism
disregarded,
is formally
validevenwhenitspremises
andconclusion
arefalse.4
and negation,says Alonso,and
Logic ignorescontent,but not affirmation
calls the followingsyllogism"true in formif not in content":
manis a donkey
every
horseis a man
every
therefore
horseis a donkey
every
He sees thisargumentas an entailmentwhere both the "antecedent"(he
means the conjunctionof premises)and the "consequent" (the conclusion) are false. The inferenceis logically sound since when both the
3 "Etiamsoient modi
in hypotheticis,
utsi quisargumentetur
a tota
poni
syllogizandi
"
condi
tionalicumpositione
antecedentis
ad positionem
us
consequents.Alonsorefers
ofsentential
theexample:
ifevery
manruns,
(117A)tohisowntreatment
inference,
giving
an animalruns/
a manruns/therefore:
an animalruns.
4 "Et hictractatus
de syllogismo
a veritate
velfalsitate
formali,
qui abstrahit
propositionum
etconclusionis,
fiatsyllogismus
dummodo
secundum
debitum
modum
etfiguram,
de forma
etiamsi
et conclusio
sintfalsae."
quiaestvalidus
praemissae
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED
89
18:08:35 PM
90
WALTERREDMOND
hypothesis
1 disjunctive
descent.
If Peter is a man, then he is eitherthis one or that one, etc. This type
of descentis called "disjunctive,"since the analysisis a disjunction.The
second step (read "Peter is man-number1 or he is man-number-2or . . .
he is man-number-n")is true even thoughpmj is the only true identity,
because if one disjunctis true,the disjunctionis true as a whole.
The converseoperationis disjunctiveascent:
1 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
hypothesis
2 I p[m]
1 disjunctive
ascent.
Conjunctive descent and ascent have "and" (&) instead of "or." That
Peter is everyanimal (a) is false can easily be seen fromits analysis:
1 I p(a)
hypothesis
1 conjunctive
descent,
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
91
for,assuming"a j" is a correctname of Peter,paj is the only true conjunct, and a conjunctionis falseunless all its conjunctsare true.Alonso
and his colleagues,by the way, discussedvarious ways of dealing with
the problemof indenumerablesets,where all the membersforwhatever
reason cannot be counted.
Scholasticlogiciansused thisprocedureto constructa general system
of predicatelogic. For example, the followingformalproof shows the
analysisof the universalstatement"everyman is an (some) animal." The
abbreviationsof the rules on the rightare explained in the appendix;
also I have simplifiedthe numberinghere and in otherproofs.
1 I (m)[a]
'
2 I inj [a] & m2[a]& ... & mn[a]
3 I m,[a]
4 I m2[a]
I ...
5 I mn[a]
v ... v m,ao
6 I m,a,v
v ... v m2ao
7 I m2a,v m2a2
I ...
v ... v mna
8 I mna,v mna2
v ... v m,a} &
9 I {m,a,v
v ... v m2ao}& ... &
I {m2a!v m2a2
v mna2
v ... v mna0}
I {mna,
h
1 cd
2 ce
2 ce
2 ce
3 dd
4 dd
5 dd
6,7,8ci
no manis an (any)animal
(m)/(a)
somemanis notan animal
[m]/(a).
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
92
2.2 Deduction
By Identities
Let us see how the validityof quantifiedinferencecan be established
throughsuch reductionwithapplicationof an identityrule (the "i-rule"),
of identity,idenalso called Leibniz's law, the law of the indiscernibility
etc.:
elimination
(ie),
tity
1 I (pa
2 I a=b
'
3 I <pb
h
h
1,2i.
h
h
1 cd
3 ce
3 ce
6
7
8
3 ce
2 dd
h (from
7)
I mn[a]
I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
I I pm,
i '
9 I I m,[a]
10 I I p[a]
I
111 I pm2
i '
12 I I m2[a]
4r
8,9i
h (from
7)
5r
7De modo
interminis
divinis
ch. 12,112A-115A;
see
, 1573(Salamanca
syllogizandi
edition),
Redmond
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 2).
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
13|
I p[a]
I ...
14 I I pmn
I '
15 I I mn[a]
16 I I p[a]
17 I p[a]
93
11,12i
h (from
7)
6r
14,15i
de.
7,8-10,11-13,14-16
Note thatthe key operationis the i-ruleapplied in steps 10, 13, and 16.
We need not applythe ascent/descent
rulesto the terma in the above
and
the
in a modernproof:
is
reflected
argument,
simplicity
1 I Ux[Mx> Ax]
2 I Mp
'
3 I Mp > Ap
4 I Ap
h
h
1 uqep/x
2,3mp.
3. ObliqueTerms
I will firstpresentAlonso's general approach to argumentscontaining
"oblique" terms(3.1) and then considerthe two special rules he gives
(3.2).8
3.1
General
Doctrine
3.10 A FirstExample
Here is an example of the genitivecase, Petri("of Peter," "Peter's"):
omnishominis
estasinus
Petrus
esthomo
ergo
Petriestasinus
(ofeveryman thereis a donkey e.g., to everyman therebelongsa don- / Peter is a man/ therefore:of Peter thereis a
key
donkey).9In this
the
middle
term
is
example, says Alonso,
oblique only in one premise
in
It
be
the
also
second
(the first). may
oblique
premise; likewise,the
major or the minorterm(those appearingwith the middle termin the
firstand second premiserespectively)
may be oblique.
8 Ch. 14(116A-117A).
9 Thetranslations
follow
orderoftheLatin.
the(artificial)
regular
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
94
3.11 Extensional
Analysis
To representoblique terms,we need the sign "91" to indicateany relation in thiscontext.Here we have the genitiverelation(e.g., ownership):
9lp: "what is Peter's." Notice the parallelismto the simple proofabove
(1.) whose termsare in the nominativecase.
1 I ft(m)[d]
2 I p[m]
h
h
& ftm2[d]
3 I 9ftm,[d]
& ... & ftmn[d]
4 I 9ftm,[d]
5 I ftm2[d]
1 cd
3 ce
3 ce
6 I mn[d]
7 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
8 I I pm,
i }
9 I I 9tm,[d]
10 I I %[d]
I
111 I pm2
i ^
12 I I JRm2[d]
13|
I 3tp[d]
14 I I pm
I '
15 I I 9ftmn[d]
16 I I 9ftp[d]
17 I 9ftp[d]
3 ce
2 dd
h (from
7)
4r
8,9i
h (from
7)
5r
11,12i
h (from
7)
6r
14,15i
de
7,8-10,11-13,14-16
h
h
1 uqe p/x
2,3mp
But since "Ey[Dy & Oxy]" need not be furtheranalyzed to reach the
conclusion,we can abbreviateit as "<px"and simplifythe proof in this
way:
1 I Ux[Mx> cpx]
2 I Mp
h
h
3 I Mp > <pp
4 I cpp
1 uqe p/x
2,3
18:08:35 PM
LOGIC
MEXICAN
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED
95
3.12 Relational
Interpretation
of
Within the extensionalcontext,we can give another interpretation
oblique termsas "complexive,multiple-sense"complex units (& is the
junctor"and").10The firstpremiseof the oblique syllogismin 3.11 would
be, as it were, "everyman and a donkeyare genitivelyrelated" and its
conclusion"Peter and a donkey are genitivelyrelated." The following
proofis like the preceding(and to the simple syllogismof 1.) with the
exceptionof the added step 3a (g: "the orderedpair whose components
are genitivelyrelated,"e.g., as owner and property):11
1 I [g]l(m)&[d]J
2 I p[m]
3
3a
4
5
I
I
I
I
6 I [g]Lmn&[d]J
7 I pm,v pm2v ... v pmn
8 I I pm,
I '
9 I I [gjK&MJ
10 I I [g]lp&[d]J
I
111 I pm2
I '
12 I I [g]|m2&[d]J
13|
I [g]Lp&[d]J
14 I I pmn
I '
15 I I [g]K&[d]J
16 I I [g]lp&[d]J
17 I [g]lp&[d]J
3.2
h
h
1 cdu
3 dt
3a ce
3a ce
3a ce
2 dd
h
4r
8,9i
h
5r
11,12i
h
6r
14,15i
14-16de.
7,8-10,1
1-13,
Two Rules
3.20 NeedforRules
Note thatin the extensionalproofabove (3.11), 9 keeps the same posiAlonso mentions(116A)- a point that will be incortion throughout.12
poratedin the firstrule (3.21) thatifthe major or minortermis oblique
10See Redmond
1990(<
., above,n. 2),23,39.
op.cit
11Fortherulescduanddt,seeRedmond
1990(iop.cit
., above,n. 2),30.
12Muchas modalandother
seeRedmond
1983(op.cit.,
above,n. 2), 34.
operators;
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
96
h
h
1,2barbara.
The FirstRule
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (M)[J]
2 I (N)9t[M]
h
h
3 I (N)SR[J]
1,2barbara
97
h
h
3 I R(
N)[J]
1,2barbara
and the conclusionis not: (N)5t[J]. Alonso pointsout the mistakenposition of the oblique term,and adds
doesnotfollow
with"Petrus"
in thenominative
case.17
theconclusion
obviously
16"Si alterapraemissarum
estde obliquoet similiter
conclusio
erit,itaquodsi extreinobliquoinpraemissis,
eteritinconclusione.
Si tamenmedium
mitatum
aliquaponitur
in
in
ut
extremitas
cum
altera
observandum
obliquo,
ponatur
quaeponitur medioinrecto,
inconinconclusione
inobliquo,
etquaeponitur
cummedioinobliquoponatur
ponatur
clusione
in recto."
17"... manifestum
in rectononinferri."
estconclusionem
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
98
It is interesting
to compare this rule with a passage Alonso added (98B)
The argumentis
to later editionsin the contextof inferentialdefects.18
invalid,he says, "when the major or minortermsare mixed in the part
or the whole,19as in:
immediate
omnesecundum
sequitur
primum
immediate
secundum
omnetertium
sequitur
erg
omnetertium
immediate
sequitur
primum
(every2 immediatelyfollowsa 1/ every3 immediatelyfollowsa 2/ therefore:every3 immediatelyfollowsa 1). The problemis that only
intheminor
follows
a 1") isrepeated
a partofthemajorterm
premise,
("immediately
shouldrun:"every
3 is a 2".20
butthispremise
If we see the segment"a number that immediatelyfollowsthe number
n" as analogous to oblique termsftn),we have the argumentand its
schema:
I (2JR[1]
I (SjStpq
'
i mm
I (M)[J]
I (N)3t[M]
F
i <mu'.
To solve it, says Alonso, the minormustbecome "(3)[2]," and the result
is a logicallysound syllogismin barbara(with a false premise and conclusion):
I (M)[J]
I (N)[M]
'
I (NJMUL
which complieswith the firstpart of the above rule.21
3.22
The SecondRule
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
99
3.221 Negative
Arguments
Alonso gives (IIA) this example of a negativesyllogismwhose middle
termis oblique:
nullus
equusesthominis
omnis
asinusesthominis
igitur:
nullus
asinusestequus
(no horse is of any man/ everydonkeyis of a man/ therefore:no donkey is a horse):
1 I (h)/R(m)
2 I (d)ft[m]
'
3 I (d)/(h)
h
h
o.
1,2cesar
h
h
h
2 r,uqe
3,4mp
1 r,uqe
5,6mt
3-7ii
3-8uqi.
h
h
1 cd
3 ce
3 ce
3 ce
2 cd
3 ce
3 ce
3 ce
h (negation
of56)22
22Redmond
1981(op.cilabove,n. 2),46-7.
18:08:35 PM
100
WALTER
REDMOND
I
12 I
13 I
I
14 I
15 I
I
16 I
17 I
I
18 I
I
19 I
20 I
'
I d,[h]v d2[h]v...vd[h]
I I d,[h]
I '
I I d,h,v d,h2v... v d,h"
I I I d,h,
I I '
I I I h,/3t(m)
I I I d,/9t(m)
I I
I I I d,h,
I I '
I I I h2/5R(m)
I I I d/9t(m)
21 I
I
22 I
23 I
24 I
25 I
26 I
I
27 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13 dd
h
4r
15,16i
h
5r
18,19i
I I d,hn
I I
I I hn/SR(m)
I I d"/9t(m)
I d,/9t(m)
I d,9t[m]
IA
I d2[h]
I
55 I I A
56 I (d)/(h)
3.222
11dd
h
6r
21,22i
de
14,15-17,18-20,21-23
8r
24,25ne
de
12,13-26,27-40,41-54
11-55ni
The Rule
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
101
18:08:35 PM
102
WALTER
REDMOND
h
h
h
1r
3,4mp
h
6 ce
6 ce
1 r,uqe
7,9mp
10,8 ci
11 eqi
5m6-12eqe
1-13ii
1-14uqi
The conclusiondiffers
fromthatof the invalidsyllogismonlyin the position of the negationsign in the consequent(Ey[~(y=g) & Oyx] instead
of ~Ey[y=g & Oyx]).
Let us compare,using the extensionalsystem,the conclusions(b)/9ft(d)
In the forand (b)9i[-d] of the valid and invalid argumentsrespectively.
mer expression"d" is a general term for the divine and in the latter
- what the Scholasticscalled an "infinite"term
"-d" for the non-divine
(logicians today speak of the "complement"of D). We must allow the
equivalence ("inf"):
S./(T)<> S.-T.
(where S and T are termsand i the index).24An infinitetermmay be
considereda wandertermof any individualthat does not have the propertyin question.For example, Brunellus(withindex 7, let us say) would
not only be called b7 (yon beast of burden),a7 (yon animal), etc., but
also -d7 (yon non-divinething),since b7/(d),-t7(yon non-tree),etc.25
A part of the extensionalproofwould be as follows.Note thatthe only
24
andx a termsymbol.
with-Tx<> ~Tx, whereT es a predicate
Compare
25See
Redmond
1981(op.cit.
, above,n. 2),45-6.
18:08:35 PM
MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
QUANTIFIED
analysisof d is, let us say, dg:
1 I (m)/(d)
2 I (b)9ft
[m]
'
& m2/(d)
& ... & mn/(d)
3 I m,/(d)
4 I m,/(d)
5 I m-d,
& b89ft[m]
& ... & bjft[m]
6 I b7!ft[m]
7 I b79ft[m]
v ... v b79ftmn
8 I b^mj v b7im2
9 I I b7Hm,
i }
10 I I rrij-dj
111 I bjM-d,
v. . . v b.iH-d
v b.SR-d2
12 I I bjSR-d,
13 I I b,H[-d]
k I b79t[-d]
k+1 I b85R[-d]
k+2 I b SR[-d]
& ... & bm^[-d]
k+3 I b)R[-d]& baSR[-d]
k+4 I (b)SR[-d]
103
h
h
1 cd
3 ce
4 inf
2 cd
6 ce
7 dd
h (from
8)
5r
9,10i
11 di
12 da
8,9-13... de
... de
... de
ci
k,k+l,k+2
k+3ca
26We can,ofcourse,
or as argueither
as simple
theseexamples
syllogisms
interpret
and
wantsto spirit"
s: "whatsubjects
Forexample,
is expressed.
where
a relation
ments
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
104
4. OverThreeTerms
ExamplesandAnalysis
4. 11 Laughing
andNeighing
Alonso gives two examples of argumentswith more than three terms.
The first(96B) has six:
omnishomoestrisibilis
et omnisequusesthinnibilis
Petrus
esthomoet Brunellus
estequus
ergo
Petrus
estrisibilis
et Brunellus
esthinnibilis
(everyman is capable of laughingand everyhorse of neighing/Peter is
a man and Brunellusis a horse/ therefore:Peter is capable of laughing
and Brunellusof neighing).
The argument,he says (96B), is "virtuallytwo syllogisms,"
and has the
darii:28pattern(in this analysisthe segments3-5 and 6-8):
91:"thatforwhichit is fitting
to be. . andf (and9ts):"thatto whichit is fitting
to
wantstospirit"
. . . willjudge",andj (anddig):"what
Also,g: "God"and"what
subject
Godwilljudge."
I (m)9t[s] I (m)[f] I (m)SRg | (m)[j]
I [j][m]
I LflM I (p)M
I (p)M
'
>
'
>
I um
I (p)%
I LP[s]
I (p)[j]27"...
expartibus
essentialibus.
fieri
Sedtarnen
Itaquesineillisnonpotest
syllogismus.
nonsequitur
ex hocquodnonpossit
habere
terminos
etplures
dumplures
propositiones,
modosintdebitedispositi
termini
et beneordinatae
propositiones."
28Thedarii
mood:(M)[J]/[N][M]/therefore:
term
issingular.
[N][J];heretheminor
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (m)[1]& (h)[n]
2 I p[m]& b[h]
h
h
3
4
5
1 ce
2 ce
3,4dani
6
7
8
9
I (m)[1]
I p[m]
I pP]
I
I (h)[n]
I b[h]
I b[n]
I
I pP] & b[n]
105
1 ce
2 ce
6,7darii
5,8ci.
Horses
4.12 Running
The second example,he says, basicallycontainsthreeterms:
hominis
albiequuscurrit
cujuslibet
Petrus
velPaulusesthomoalbus
ergo
PetrivelPauliequuscurrit
(of everywhiteman a horse runs/Peter or Paul is a whiteman/ therefore:of Peter or of Paul a horse runs).
4.121 ModernAnalysis
Let us firstsee how the argumentcan be analyzed in modernlogic. The
sentencescould be thus translated(u: "Paul"):
I Ux[[Mx& Wx]> Ey[Hy& Oxy& Ry]]
I [Mp & Wp]v [Mu & Wu]
I ...
I Ey[Hy& Opy& Ry]v Ey[Hy& Ouy& Ry]
But as the conjunctionMx & Wx and the bracketedconjunctionEy[Hy
& Oxy & Ry] vary only in x and its instantiationsp and u (cf. the
in 3.11), we can rewritethem respectivelyas (px (being a
simplification
whiteman) and 0x (being owner of a runninghorse),and we have this
proof:
> 0x]
1 I Ux[(px
2 I <ppv <pu
3
4
5
I <pp> 0p
I <pu> 0u
I I (pp
i I-
h
h
1 uqe p/x
1 uqe u/x
h (from
2)
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
106
6 I I cpp> 0p
7 I I 0p
8 I I 0p v 0u
I
9 I I (pu
i '
10 I I (pu> 0u
11 I I 0u
12 I I 0p v 0u
13 I 0p v 0u
3r
5,6mp
7 di
h (from
2)
1 uqe u/x
9,10mp
11,di
de
2,5-8,9-12
The second premise and the conclusion are molecular sentences (disjunctions),and the threetermsAlonso speaks of are <p,0 and x (plus the
instantiations
p and u).
4. 122
Extensional
Analysis
h
1 rp=
2 dd (2)
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
107
h
h
1 cd
3 ce
3 ce
6 I Mcp[T]
7 I p[(p]v u[(p]
8 I I p[<p]
I '
v . . . v p<pn
9|
I p<p,v p<p2
10 I I I pep,
i i '
11 I I I SP,m
12 I I I 9tPm
I I
13 I I I p<p,
I I '
14 I I I
15 I I I SRp[<]
16 I
I
17 I
18 I
19 I
20 I
I
21 I
I
22 I
23 I
I
24 I
25 I
I
26 I
I
I I p<p
I !
I I 5R<pm
I I 9tp[4<]
I StpfK)
I Mpm v Stuff]
I u[<p]
>
v ... v u<pn
I uq>,v u(|>2
I I u<p,
I '
I I 9t(p,[]
I I SRufP]
I
I I u(f>2
I '
3 ce
2 rp=
h (from
7)
8 dd
h (from
9)
4r
10,11i
h (from
9)
5r
13,14
h (from
9)
6r
16,17i
de
9,10-12,13-15,16-18
19di
h (from
7)
21 dd
h (from
22)
4r
23,24i
h (from
22)
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
108
27 I
28 I
I
I
I Sd<p2m
I Mum
29 I I I u<p
I I '
30 I I I SWq)nm
31 I I I StupK]
32 I I
33 I I
v 9tu[Y]
34 I SRpmv 5Hu[>P]
35 I SRpvupK]
5r
26,27i
h (from
22)
6r
29,30i
de
22,23-25,26-28,29-31
32 di
de
7,8-20,21-33
34 rp=
I NM
^
i M,[j]
I N,[J]i.
Conditions
FirstCondition
The firstconditionis:
unit
intheother
bea whole
term
should
themiddle
,31
premise
which, however,he does not seem to qualify.The premisesof the folarranged:
lowing argument,he claims, are incorrectly
30"Addebitam
taminterse quamin ordinead concludispositionem
praemissarum
suntrequisitae."
conditions
sionem,
quatuor
31"Medium
in alterapraemissarum.
debetessetotaleextremum
18:08:35 PM
INFERENCE
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
109
hominis
cujuslibet
equuscurrit
quilibet
hominis
equusquiescit
cujuslibet
ergo:
etquiescit
equuscurrit
(of everyman everyhorse runs/of everyman a horse rests/therefore:
a horse runs and rests),since (q symbolizes"rests")
theexpression
"ofevery
man"takenas themiddle
termis nota wholeunitin the
other
premise.32
In the case of more than two terms,the relationsign 9 has the effect
of joining the firsttwo terms,and the conclusioncontainsa "complexive, single-sense"unit:33
I (mXh)[r]
I NMM
I [h][lr&qj].
The premisesof the followingmodernproof,ifR and Q are inconsistent,
but the proof is valid (the firstpremisemust be
entail a contradiction,
added to expressthe existentialimport,tacitlyassumed by Alonso):
1 I ExMx
2 I Ux[Mx> Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]]
3 I Ux[Mx> Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]]
h
h
h
4 I X I Mx
i
'
5|
I Mx > Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]
6I
I Uy[[Hy& Oxy]> Ry]
7I
I Mx > Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]
8I
I Ey[Hy& Oxy& Qy]]
9|
I y I Hy& Oxy& Qy]]
i
i
'
10 I
I
I Hy& Oxy
111
I
I [Hy& Oxy]> Ry
12 I
I
I Ry
13|
I
I Hy& Ry& Qy
14 I
I
I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]
15 I
I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]
16 I Ey[Hy& Ry& Qy]
h
2 r,uqe
4,5mp
3 r,uqe
4,7mp
h
9 ce
6 r,uqe
10,11mp
10,12ce,ci
13 eqi
8,9-14eqe
1,4-15eqe
32"... lycujuslibet
in
hominis
promediononesttotaleextremum
quodassumitur
alterapraemissarum."
33Notetheorderconvention,
1981(<
Redmond
., above,n. 2), 51, 64-5;Alonso
op.cit
ofthesection
takesR andQ tobe inconsistent;
thelastexample
(97B)has:"twohorses:
seeRedmond
onerunsandtheotherdoesnot".Fortheconclusion
1990(op.riL,
above,
alsocouldbe expressed
as complex
unit.
n. 2); thepremises
18:08:35 PM
110
WALTER
REDMOND
In the extensionalargument,the segmentin the middle termaccompanying (m) is differentin each premise: "9 . . . (h)" and "91 . . . [h]."
Actually,the situationis complex; the combinationof quantifiersin the
segmentaffectedby the relation(3t) have will determinethe validityof
such arguments.34
On the otherhand, Alonso's second example,35in which the segment
"JR. . . [a]" does not vary:
animalestalbum
hominis
cujuslibet
hominis
animalestnigrum
ergo:
animalnigrum
estalbum
(of every man an animal is white/ of some man an animal is black/
therefore:a black animal is white),
I Sft(m)[a][w]
I [m][a][b]
I [[a&bj][w],
is an invalid argument,since the antecedent,Alonso explains,may be
true withoutthe conclusionbeing true,the case where each man has a
white animal and some man also has a black horse.36
4.22
SecondCondition
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
MEXICAN
LOGIC
INFERENCE
QUANTIFIED
111
(the Father begets (g)/ the Father is the divine Essence/ therefore:the
divine Essence is the Father Who begets),because, he says, if the middle term"Father" did not formpart of the conclusion,we mightdraw
the theologicallyincorrectconclusion
essentia
divinagenerat
(the divineEssence begets),and in thiscase the argumentwould have a
true antecedentand a false consequent.
the invalidargumentseems to followboth in present-day
Nevertheless,
and in extensionallogic (e: "divine Essence"):
1 I f[b]
2 I fe
'
3 I e[b] 1,2i
1 I Bf
2 I f=e
'
3| Be 1,2ie.
- the last
Alonso would accept- with some reservations
step of the followingproofas orthodox;it translates"the divine Essence is the Father
Who begets":
h
1 I Gp
h
2 I p=e
'
ia
3 I p=p
4 I p=e & p=p & Gp
1,2,3ci
4 eqi,
5 I Ex[x=e& x=p & Gx]
since he would admit- in some sense- thatthereis
somethingthatis the
divine Essence, is the Father,and begets. The Friar treatsthe complex
identityproblemsin a chapter on "divine terms,"where he worksout
ways of blockingheterodoxinferencesand allowingacceptable ones to
go through.38
Nonetheless,he adds that "it would not be right"forthe middle term
as in:
to enterthe conclusion"needlessly",39
omnis
homodisputt
Petrus
esthomo
ergo:
Petrus
esthomoqui disputt
Petrus
sed. . . solum:
disputt.
38See Redmond
1994(<
., above,n. 2).
op.cit
39
...
non
recte
concluderetur
necessitate
Absque
18:08:35 PM
112
WALTER
REDMOND
(everyman disputes/Peter is a man/ therefore:Peter is a man who disputes); he only would allow the conclusionthat Peter disputes.
It is hard to see why the firstconclusion("Peter is a man who disputes")is "not right."Is it falsebecause "who disputes,"like "Who begets,"
is a restrictive
clause "as middle"? That is, does he thinkit impliesthat
as the divineEssence,thoughbeingidenticalto the begettingFather,does
not beget,so it is possible thatPeter,being identicalto a disputingman,
does not dispute?In this case, we must examine the teachingof Alonso
and his colleagues on identitymore closely.
4.23
ThirdCondition
1 I *K(M)[h][J]
2 I N[M]
3 I 3tp[h][r]
3 I ttN[h][J],
h
h
1 uqe
2,3mp
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
1 I (m)[a]
2 I biH[m][h]
!>
3 I bffi[a][h]
113
1 I (M)[J]
2 I Nft[M][h]
I
3 I NSR[J][h]
1 I m(J)[h][M]
2 I m[N][h]/(M)
'
3 I [N]/(J).41
40"Id
ex partemediiinmajori
debetse tenere
ex parteminoris
extremquodse tenet
itatisin conclusione,
et quodse tenetex partemediiin minori
debetapplicalimajori
inconclusione,
extremitati
etdebetconcludi
minor
ineodemcasuquo sumitur
extremitas
in majori
medium
et majorextremitas
in eodemcasuquo statmedium
in minori."
41Ux[Hx>
Ey[Cy& Pxy& Ry]]& Ex[Lx& Ey[Cy& Pxy& ~Ry]]doesnotimply
Ex[Lx& ~Hx].
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
114
The conditionruns:
unless:
should
bewhole
inthe
as intheconclusion,
themajor
andminor
terms
units
both
premises
themiddle
term
tomaintain
oran addition
is added
accompanies
logical
propriety
something
with
thethird
themajor
andminor
terms
inkeeping
which
should
[intheconclusion]
affect
condition.42
are not whole in the premises
The major and minortermsof the syllogism
and the conclusion,apparentlybecause in the premisestheyinclude an
addition("91 . . . [h]") missingin the conclusion.Specifically,the segment
obviouslydoes not apply to the middle term,and Alonso explains the
defectin thisway:
ofthepremises
arethemajor["9^(J)[h]"]
andminor
ifthewholesubjects
[h]"]
["9t[N]
terms,
["[N]"and"(J)"],andiftheyare
theyarenotwholeunitsin theconclusion
arenotwhole
terms
inthepremises.43
theonlydeterminations
[intheconclusion],
they
He adds in the later editionthat the antecedentof the argumentis true
and the consequent false in the case where each man has two horses,
one that runs and the other that does not.
5. Semantics
examinethe semanticsof oblique terms,taking"semanNow I shallbriefly
tics" as the relationbetween termsin the sentenceand what theyrefer
to or signify.
A comparisonof steps 8 and 9 of the simplesyllogismin 2.2 and the
same steps of the oblique syllogismin 3.11 (the steps to which the i-rule
In the formerargument,step 8
is applied) revealsa semanticdifference.
is an identitywhereinthe two terms(p and m{) referto ("suppose for,"
as the Scholasticssaid) the same thing(Peter).Hence mj may replace p
in step 10. Supposing that the true disjunctof p[a] is pab the termsp
and aj both obviouslyreferto Peter.
Let us say that
The case of the oblique syllogism(3.11) is different.
the
true
of
9
and
true
is
the
9im1d5
disjunctof 10, and
disjunct
dtpd5
thatd5 refersto Platero,the donkeybelongingto Peter.Step
furthermore
in 9 can go through
8 is a simpleidentity(pni), and so the substitution
indices (1 and 5), the terms
to yield 9pd5 (9ip[d]). Despite the different
42"Extremitates
tamin praemissis
debentessetotaliaextrema,
quamin conclusione,
cummedioquod
velaliquidponatur
nisiidponatur
ad servandam
logicalem
proprietatem
in tertia
conditioned'
debeatapplicali
extremitatibus,
juxtapraedicta
M ... namsitotalia
mpraemissis
nonsunttotalia
sumantur
subjecta
proextremitatibus,
inpraemissis."
extrema
etsi solaedeterminationes,
nonsunttotalia
inconclusione,
extrema
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
115
of 9 and 10 (Slmj, d5, and 9lp) referonly to Platero (not to Peter and
Platero). Since Platero has the propertyD (donkey),he has the name
(wanderterm)d5, and since he has the relation 9 to "this man," mj
(Peter),he has the name Sim!. This lattername could be construedas
anotherwandertermor it may be taken as a proper name (or description):"the propertyof or thingowned by thisman," indicatingPeter.
The propername 9im! (or the correspondingwanderterm)would be of
a special type,since it containsa wanderterm(mj).
Let us also considerthe argumenthaving an infiniteterm (-d: "nondivine")in 3.222. The expressions"91[-d]" and "9t-d2"may likewisebe
takenas proper names of a special type since theycontain a quantified
term([-d]) or wanderterm(-d2).Note that the indices in step 11 "b79idi" obviouslydo not referto the same thing;b? refersto "yon beast of
burden"(Brunellus)and -di to "thisman" (mi). However,the unitsmaking up the sentence the wandertermb7 ("yon beast") and the proper
name 9t-d2("the propertyof this non-divineobject")- do referto the
same thing:Brunellus.So b79l-di may be read "yon beast of burden is
the propertyof thisman."
6. Simplifying
Logic
Friar Alonso workedwithina logical traditionlaunched by a group of
Spaniards associatedwith the Universityof Paris afterthe restorationof
the Nominalistsin 148 1.44Returningto Spain at the turnof the century,
These
theyand theirfollowerspublishedin the firstthirdof the century.45
humanists
for
the
were
soon
attacked
by
supposed extravagance
logicians
and barbarityof their "useless questions,"46and at mid centurylogic
and abridge
teachersthemselves,
among themAlonso, soughtto simplify
theircoursework.The friarsaid he regrettedhis own youthfuloverindulgence in "nonsense,"and in his textbookaimed to avoid the logical "labyrinth."47
This logical"goldenage," as he calledit,this"Saturniankingdom,"
he took withhim to America.48
44See W. Redmond,
inLatin
American
/TheColonial
,
Self-Consciousness
Philosophy
Experience
toappear.
45Vicente
hasta
MuozDelgado,
1600/
Notas
, Salamanca,
Lgica
hispano-portuguesa
bibliogrficas
1972.
46Thebestknown
wasJuanLuisVives,Inpseudo-dialectkosi
1520.
47
in istissinefructu.
Postexantlatos
"Expertus
loquor,et doleoannosconsumptos
nihilpotuiinvenire
extendens
manum
nisitempus
irrelabores,
conatus,
postjuventutis
essemus
... a Daedalilabyrintho
liberi"
mediabile,
deperditum.
(IIA).
48"Venerunt
veroSaturnia
revertuntur
ad sanammentem
Saeculum,
Regna,
jamAureum
18:08:35 PM
116
WALTER
REDMOND
18:08:35 PM
IN 16TH-CENTURY
INFERENCE
MEXICAN
LOGIC
QUANTIFIED
117
centauri
et centimani
et laestrigones
in
gygesveriquecyclopes
qui majorem
stragem
mentibus
edunt
monstra
facerent
damnisi natura
illaprocreasset?"
quamhaecportentosa
2, first
(p.55
prologue).
"Primo
animadverto
hanclogicam,
neoterici
parvam
(quam"summulas"
praesertim
nonessecaptuadmodum
nonnihilum
tumregfacilem,
difficilem,
appellant),
quinforsan
ularum
etdivisionum
multitudine
(utlibereloquar)incertitudine,
quumearundum
utpote
communi
modoconcipiendi
dumtaxat
innituntur,
pleraeque
quarum
atqueloquendi
qui
nonpotest
nonesseancepsetquandoque
ac proinde
titubare
illasnonnunquam
ac
varius,
veluti
ruinam
minari.
ac firmes
eas reddere,
natura
reclamante,
Qui verostabiles
ipsarum
estindisciplinam
conantur
indefesse
necesse
condensas
tenebras
ind(etconantur
plurimi),
innumeris
distinctionibus
futilibus
ac lapsantibus
aducant,
utendo,
plurimas
exceptiones
artiscancellos
totregulae
ac distinctiones
traditae
sintut
mitiendo,
quumintraproprios
inminorem
conduceret
numerum
etargumentis
in
(sifieri
plurimum
posset)
redigerentur,
efficacibus
solutiones
vixargumenta
solventes."
regulas
objectis
aggregando
(secondprologue,lrB.)
18:08:35 PM
WALTER
REDMOND
118
elimination
eqe: existential
quantifier
introduction
eqi: existential
quantifier
h: hypothesis
(premise)
i: identity
(thei-rule)
ia: identity
axiom
ie: identity
elimination
ii: implication
introduction
ofnegation
inf: equivalence
andinfinite
term
middle
termin secondpremise)56
J: majorterm(with
in bothpremises)
M: middle
term(present
mp: modusponens
mt: modustollens
N: minor
term(withmiddle
termin secondpremise)
ne: negation
elimination
ni: negation
introduction
r: reiteration
(intoa subproof)
definition
of"divided
sense"
rp=: (repetition)
elimination
uqe: universal
quantifier
introduction
quantifier
uqi: universal
Austin,Texas, USA
56The middle,
to PeterofSpain.
terms
aredefined
according
major,andminor
18:08:35 PM
FranciscoSurezon Imagination*
JAMESB. SOUTH
Vivarium
39,1
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JAMES
18:08:44 PM
FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
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B. SOUTH
JAMES
1. TheNumber
SensePowers
and ScopeofInternal
It is well known that Thomas distinguishesfour such internalsense
powers:commonsense,imagination,the estimativepower (called the cogitativepower in humans) and memory.I shall brieflyreviewhis description of each power and then discuss more generallythe significanceof
his account. The crucial move in his account is the separationbetween
the common sense on the one hand and imagination,estimationand
memoryon the other. The common sense is the root of the external
senses and completesthem. Unlike the individualexternalsenses,which
are limitedto their own proper objects, the common sense is able to
judge among the various objects of the proper senses. So, while vision,
forexample,can judge betweencolors,onlythe common sense can judge
that a color is not a sound. Thus, the actionsof the externalsensesindividuallyflowinto the common sense and the common sense is aware of
all the sensoryexperiencesat one time.9However, the common sense
straddlesthe line between externalsenses and internalsenses and, while
technicallyan internalsense power, it has much more in common with
the externalsenses than the otherinternalsenses.One way thatThomas
marksthe distinctionis by refusingto name the product of the activity
of commonsense a "phantasm."The phantasmis the paradigmaticproduct and object of the internalsense powers and, moreover,plays a most
importantrole in intellectualcognitionsince the agentintellect"abstracts"
the intelligiblecontent,the natureor essence of a reality,fromthe phantasm. Withoutthe phantasm,human intellectualcognitionwould not be
possible.10
The threepowers more properlytermedinternalsenses,the imaginaand memoryare clearlydescribedby Thomas
tion,theestimative/cogitative
and each has a specificfunction.Imagination(;imaginatio
), sometimescalled
9 ForThomas's
account
ofthecommon
deanima
sense,see Quaestiones
, q. 13;Summa
ofhistreatment
ofthecommon
I, q. 78,a. 4. Fordiscussion
theohgiae
sense,see E. J.
Communis"
inthePsychology
Ryan,TheRoleofthe"Sensus
, Carthagena,
ofSt.Thomas
Aquinas
Ohio1951,127-46;
R. W. Schmidt,
TheUnifying
Sense:
in:TheNewScholasticism,
Which?,
57 (1983),1-12;Francois-Xavier
La sensdela rflexion
Paris
chezThomas
Putallaz,
d'Aquin,
1991,45-58.
10A standard
thomistic
Summa
See,forexample,
I, q. 84,a. 7. For
position.
theologiae
Thomas's
refusal
to callthespeciesin thecommon
sensea phantasm,
see Summa
theoloContra
Gentiles
discussion
ofthesepasgiaeI, q. 89,a. 5 andSumma
, II, c. 73. Forhelpful
P. Mahoney,
Intellect
andImagination
inAlbert
andSiger
Sense,
, Thomas
sages,seeEdward
, in:
Norman
Kretzmann,
Anthony
KennyandJanPinborg
(eds.),TheCambridge
ofLater
History
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,607.
Philosophy
18:08:44 PM
FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
123
the phantasy(phantasia
), performstwo essentialfunctions:(a) it receives
and storesthe sense impressions
gatheredby the externalsensesand common sense and (b) it joins togetherotherwisediscreteexperiencesto create new phantasmssuch as gold mountainsor wingedhorses.Analogously,
sense memoryis retentiveof sensoryexperiences.It differsfromimagination in two basic ways. First,it is responsibleforthe characterof the
that our sense experiencescan possess. Second, it is
past (iratiopraeteriti)
primarilyreceptiveand retentiveof a certaintype of experiences,those
that resultfromthe estimative
/cogitativepower.11This latterpower has
a peculiar characterin that it relatesprimarilyto sensiblequalitiesthat
cannotbe reducedto one of the fiveexternalsensiblequalities.Thus, for
example, in animals,the estimativepower senses intentions,or notions,
thatare agreeable[conveniens)
or disagreeable(<disconveniens
) or more broadly,
in
is
the
result
of a kindof natWhile
animals
this
and
useful.
dangerous
ural instinct,in humans the cogitativepower takes on a functionvery
close to reasoning.This functionof the estimativepower is rathercurious and the point is broughtout well by the traditionaldesignationof
such sensiblefeaturesas "insensible"(;insensatae
). The basic idea here is
that the animal must be sensingsomethingover and above the sensible
accidentsreadilyapparent.A sheep, forexample,is not sensingjust the
collectionof sensiblequalitiesthat constitutethe wolf- such accidentsas
color, shape, and smell- but also the "danger" presentby virtueof the
natureof theseinsensiblesensationsis a
wolf'spresence.The mysterious
problemthatworriesSurez. Now, in addition,to thispeculiar function
of the estimativepower, Thomas assigns a varietyof other operations,
that are peculiar to the estimativepower as it existsin human, that is,
the cogitativepower. So, for example, it is the cogitativepower that
apprehendsan individualas an instanceof a naturalkind and Thomas
is led by this functionto call the cogitativepower the particularreason
and compare
(ratioparticularis)
pointingto its abilityto investigate(inquiro)
In
it
is
for
incidental
the
sensation,
(confer). addition,
power responsible
thatis, the abilityto sense the individualas the subjectof all the proper
I
sensiblequalitiesit possesses.So, forexample,in seeing an individuell,
sense immediatelythroughmy five senses all the sensible qualities the
11Thecentral
oftheroleoftheinternal
forThomas's
demarcation
sensepowpassages
deanima
ersare Summa
I, q. 78, a. 4 and Quaestiones
, q. 13. R. Brennan
(The
theobgiae
Thomistic
15 (1941),149-61)
, in:The NewScholasticism,
oftheImagination
Concept
givesa
ofthevarious
oftheimagination.
functions
goodexposition
18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
JAMES
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SUREZ
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125
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B. SOUTH
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18:08:44 PM
ON IMAGINATION
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127
18:08:44 PM
128
B. SOUTH
JAMES
A poweras suchis directed
to an act.Therefore
we mustderivethenature
ofthe
ofa power
theacttowhichitis directed;
andconsequently
thenature
powerfrom
is diversified
as thenature
oftheactis diversified.
ofan
Nowthenature
according
to thevarious
actis diversified
natures
oftheobjects.21
according
18:08:44 PM
FRANCISCO
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ON IMAGINATION
129
rationum
diversae
sunt.
. . . Secundum
tiaecognoscentes
sensibiles
diversarum
perspecies
in praesentia
estquodin potentiis
sensitivis
et
fundamentum
obiecti
cognoscens
potentia
in absentia
Nampotentia
in praesentia
suntdistinctae.
Probatur.
debetesse
cognoscens
in absentia
veropotentia
facileimmutativa
et apprehensiva,
debetesseconcognoscens
istaautemduononpossunt
servativa
et retentiva
convenire
eidempotentiae
specierum;
ex humiditate,
incorporalibus
namfacilis
retentio
veroex
materiali;
provenit
apprehensio
inorgano
eiusdem
siccitate;
praedominari
potentiae;
ergo."A quick
quaeduononpossunt
inwhich
hediscusses
ofThomas
thefour
internal
sense
ofthemajortexts
perusal
Aquinas
to Summa
showssuchprinciples
at work.In addition
I, q. 78,a. 4, see
theologiae
powers
deanima
, a. 13; InII De anima
, 1.6.
Quaestio
18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
JAMES
24Summa
estanimali
ut quaerataliquavel
I, q. 78, a. 4: "Sed necessarium
theologiae
velnonconvenientia
ad sentiendum,
sedetiam
nonsolumquiasuntconvenientia
fugiat,
et utilitates,
sivenocumenta;
sicutovisvidens
lupum
aliquasaliascommoditates
propter
indecentiam
colonsvel figurae,
sed quasiinimicum
natunonpropter
venientem
fugit
huiusmodi
estergoanimali
rae.. . . Necessarium
intentiones,
quasnonperquodpercipiat
exterior."
cipitsensus
18:08:44 PM
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SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
131
25Summa
ofAvicenna's
1952
I, q. 78,a. 4. Fordiscussion
view,seeKlubertanz
theologiae
cit.
, above,n. 6),92-7.
(op.
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18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
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18:08:44 PM
SUAREZ
FRANCISCO
ON IMAGINATION
135
thatThomas's
Positingan internalsensewiththewide varietyof functions
cogitativepower has in effectseparatesthe sensitivepowers of humans
too radicallyfromthatof animals.The consequenceof thissecond motithata much broaderrange
vation,of course,is to recognizethepossibility
of human activityis instinctual.So, when the sheep only senses the wolf
as its bundle of sensibleaccidents,it instinctively
flees.By the same reaa
when
a
senses
soning,then,
person
particularthreateningobject, she
does not sense anythingspecial, but ratherinstinctively
respondsto the
sensoryexperience.Of course,Surez would, no doubt,point to the role
thatintellectand will could play in teachingus to overcomesuch instinctual behavior,but the fact would remain that much of our sensorylife
is instinctual.
As we saw above, one of the featuresof the cogitativepower,according
to Thomas, was its functionof incidentalsensation,that is, its abilityto
sense the individualunder the collectionof propersensiblesattainableby
the externalsenses.Surez singlesout thisfunctionin particularand subjects it to a critique.He gives the traditionaldefinitionof incidentalsensationas thatwhichin no way immutesa sense power,but is onlyknown
throughthe immutationof anotherobject to whichit is conjoined.30With
thisunderstanding
of incidentalsensationas a base, he can explain how
a substance,an individualof a kind, is sensed because while the substance itselfdoes not immutea sense power, the sensibleaccidentsthat
are conjoined to the substancedo. In otherwords,fromthe power (vis)
of the sensationof a thingthat is perse sensible,somethingelse is perceived incidentally.
That means the whitethatimmutesthe eye immutes
it insofaras it existsin a subject,and thatsubjectis what we sense incidentally.So far so good. However, Surez also wants to insure that we
do not have some exaggeratedopinionabout the capabilitiesof the internal sensepower.Afterall, the incidentalsensible,separatefromthe proper
sensibles,would be anothertypeof unsensedspecies,and we have already
seen that Surez has no use forsuch species. The resultis that thereis
no propersensedspeciesof the substanceitself.Instead,we properlysense
only its accidents.Consequendy,for Surez, incidentalperceptionis of
30Thomasdiscusses
incidental
sensation
at Sentencia
libri
De anima
, BookII, lectio13;
De ventate
seeDe anima
discussion,
II, 6. W. Bernard
q. 1, a. 11.ForAristotle's
(Rezeptivitt
undSpontaneitt
derWahrnemung
beiAris
toties,
Baden-Baden
thatincidental
1988,75-86)argues
has an intellectual
sensation
He is followed
on
component.
byCharlesKahn(Aristotle
in: Nussbaum-Rorty
cit
1992(op.
., above,n. 5), 368).Fora different
view,see
Thinking,
S. Cashdollar,
Aristotle's
Account
18 (1973),156-75.
, in:Phronesis,
ofIncidental
Perception
18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
JAMES
18:08:44 PM
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
SUREZ
137
18:08:44 PM
138
B. SOUTH
JAMES
18:08:44 PM
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ON IMAGINATION
139
18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
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rememberat some later time what that food would have tasted like if
she was not runninga feverthat blunted her abilityto taste it. In the
same way, the ecstaticperson who sees a burningbush does not see the
bush withoutflamesat the same time.
These objections,focusingas theydo on the factthatthe positedmultiplicationof the species would in fact resultin distortionin the internal
account of the relationof externalsensationto
sense, suggesta different
internalsensation (and, by extension,the relation of internalsense to
intellect).Such an account would consistin the claim that the crucial
preconditionof the activityof internalsense must be the act itselfof
externalsensation,or, as Surez puts the point: "The sensed species of
the internalsense does not arise froman externalobject by a mediate
species,but froman externalsense by a mediate act of its cognition."38
A littlebackgroundon Surez's account of externalsensationwill help
us to understandthis positionmore clearlyand he helpfullyprovidesit
forus:
. . . through
an actofknowing
thereis produced
itsintrinsic
whichis a repterm,
resentative
of [a known]
in secondact.Therefore,
thisqualquality
reality
through
theexternal
senseforms
within
onecanbelieve
withprobability
that
itself,
ity,which
there
isproduced
intheinternal
sensea species
ofthesameobject
. . .39
representative
This passage is ratherconcise and needs to be unpacked a bit. The
basic idea is that the externalsense power in its initial state is purely
potentialin respectto the act of sensing.It must be actualized by the
receptionof an externalsensible species produced by a sensibleobject.
Once a species is receivedin the externalsense, the power is in a position to sense the externalsensibleobject. However,Surez holds thatthe
mere receptionof the sensible species, while necessary,is not sufficient
forthe act of sensingto take place because the power that has received
the sensiblespecies has been actualized,but only up to a point. It is no
longer purelypassive, but it also is not yet actually sensing.This first
level of actualitymust be raised to the act of sensingitself.This actualization is the work of the sense power itself.This second level of actuality is simplythe act of sensingand resultsin a qualitativechange in
the sense power.The major pointforSurez is thatthe qualitativechange
38DA,VI.2.10(vol.II, 482).
39DA,VI.2.10(vol.II,
482):"...quod peractionem
cognoscendi
producitur
quidam
intrinsecus
terminus
reiin actusecundo;
illius,
qui estqualitasrepraesentativa
perhanc
in se ipsoformat,
exterior
crediproduci
ergoqualitatem,
quamsensus
potest
probabiliter
in sensuinteriori
eiusdem
obiecti.
..."
speciem
quamdam
repraesentativam
18:08:44 PM
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
141
is chieflythe workof the sense power itselfin cooperationwiththe determinationbroughtto it by the externalsensiblespecies. While he is willing to call the act of sensation,as qualitative change, an "expressed
species,"he does not thinkthatthisspeciesis some productdistinctfrom
the act of sensationitself.The two levels of actualitywithinsensation
explain why he is unwillingto accept that the sensiblespecies is simply
transmitted
to the innersense. If the sensiblespecies is not able to cause
act of externalsensation,it cannot be expectedto cause the
itself
the
by
act of internalsensation.Moreover,since the expressedspecies is only
the completedact of sensation,thereis no leftover "product"in the act
to the internalsense.40
of externalsensationto be transmitted
This briefsummaryof the externalsensoryprocessenables us to understand the basic frameworkfor internalsensation.Just as externalsensaso too does internalsensation.
tionrequirestwo successive"actualizations,"
the
that
Surez
states
when
Hence,
species of internalsensationarises
fromexternalsensation,he is arguingthat the firstlevel of actualityof
internalsensationis dependent on externalsensation,not the sensible
species of externalsensation.Again, caution is in order. We must not
to the
concludethatthe act of externalsensationis somehowtransmitted
internalsense power. Surez has alreadydealt with the problemsraised
by any transmissionaccount: a resultof externalsensationwould still
have to "jump the gap" between the less perfectpower and the more
perfectinternalsense power. Moreover,thereis an importantdifference
betweeninternaland externalsense powers that mustbe factoredinto a
account. Externalsensationrelieson the presenceof a sentransmission
sible object forboth its originand conservation.Such is not the case with
internalsensation.Also,sincea speciesshouldbe proportionalto itspower,
the fact that internaland externalsenses are different
powers requires
Surez's conclusionis clear and succinct:
that theirspecies be different.
the expressedspecies of external
sensation,that is, the actual activityof
sensationare really disthe
and
sensation,
impressedspecies of internal
an
account of the relation
us
with
he
must
As a result,
tinct.41
provide
40ForSurez'saccount
in Alejandro
discussions
see thehelpful
ofexternal
sensation,
lesscosensible
Essaisurla connaissance
1948[op.
d'aprs
at.,above,n. 13),219-27;G. Picard,
4 (1926),1-93;Cubells1962(op.cit
de philosophie,
in:Archives
., above,n. 13),
lastiquesi
A Scholastic
Sense
Allison
, in:Philosophical
Simmons,
Challenge
Perception:
143-55;
Explaining
sensation
can be foundat DA,
ofexternal
73 (1994),257-75.Surez'saccount
Studies,
V.5 (vol.II, 368-412).
41DA,VI.2.11(vol.II, 484).
18:08:44 PM
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B. SOUTH
JAMES
18:08:44 PM
FRANCISCO
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
143
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144
B. SOUTH
JAMES
samegeneral
is nocausalinteraction
there
between
thesoul'spowers.
point:
Consequently,
thesoulitself
mustplaysomerolein theactivities
ofthesevarious
sensepowers.
45DA,II.3.10(vol.1, 174).
18:08:44 PM
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SUREZ
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146
B. SOUTH
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18:08:44 PM
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SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
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18:08:44 PM
148
B. SOUTH
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modeofdetermination
insofar
as
there
is another
It is saidthatin thesoul'spowers
acthasa necofanother,
orinsofar
as onepower's
thematter
onepowerprepares
withtheother's
act.55
connection
essary
18:08:44 PM
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FRANCISCO
SUAREZ
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18:08:44 PM
150
B. SOUTH
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ON IMAGINATION
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B. SOUTH
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63Previous
Surez's
account
havebeenspliton thewhether
amounts
toa verscholars
andFrench
Classical
sionofinnatism,
, NewYork
(Saint
Thought
Augustine
NigelAbercrombie
thatSurezis clearly
committed
to a form
ofthe1938edition],
1972[reprint
82) states
on thepasofinnatism.
See also,Ludwig1929(op.cit
., above,n. 44),56-7whocomments
1994-95
above,n. 37),vol.II, 304rejects
anyinnatism
(op.cit.,
sagecitedinnote60.Spruit
in Surez.However,
passagediscussed
by
appearstomissthefactthatthecrucial
Spruit
butalsoaboutthehumanintellect.
is notjustaboutangelic
Alejandro
cognition,
Ludwig
and
1948(op.cit.,
above,n. 13),186-8,
dinmica)
(potencia
onlyofa "dynamic
power"
speaks
force"
an "innate
(Juerza
ingnita).
64Fordifferent
inDominic
Recollection
seethehelpful
remarks
varieties
of"innatism"
Scott,
anditsSuccessors
andExperience:
Plato's
1995,91-5.
, Cambridge
Theory
ofLearning
18:08:44 PM
SUAREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
153
explicitpre-existent
knowledge.Afterall, he wantsto save a place forthe
concurrenceof imaginationand intellectand the linkbetweenthemseems
ratherstrongerthan talk about a kind of platonic recollection.Indeed,
he explicitlyrejectsPlato's account of knowledgesayingthat it ignores
the naturalunion of soul and body. Moreover,he endorses the claim,
attributedto Aristode,that the intellectis a tabularasa.65Nonetheless,the
factremainsthatthe knowledgeof the senses,both externaland internal,
is not causallyconnectedto the activityof the intellect.The intellectproduces the intelligiblespecies fromwithinitselfwith the mere "determination" or "example" of the senses to work with. Consequently,he is
jugglingtwo concernsand theymix ratheruneasily.The conclusionthat
theremustbe some formof innatismin the case of intellectis inescapable.
Consider the followingpassage fromDescartes by way of comparison:
... ifwebearwellinmindthescopeofoursenses
andwhatitisexactly
thatreaches
ourfaculty
ofthinking
wemustadmitthatinnocasearetheideas
bywayofthem,
ofthings
to us bythesenses
themin ourthinking.
So
presented
justas we form
muchso thatthere
is nothing
in ourideaswhichis notinnate
to themindor the
ofthinking,
withthesoleexception
ofthosecircumstances
whichrelateto
faculty
suchas thefactthatwejudgethatthisorthatideawhich
wenowhave
experience,
ourmindrefers
before
toa certain
situated
outside
us.We make
immediately
thing
sucha judgement
notbecausethesethings
transmit
theideasto ourmindthrough
thesenseorgans,
butbecause
transmit
atexactly
thatmoment,
which,
they
something
to form
theseideasbymeansofthefaculty
innate
to it.66
givesthemindoccasion
The similarities
are strikingbetween the teachingof
(and differences)
thispassage and Surez's account.While Surez betraysno concernabout
the potentialdisagreementbetweenthe intelligiblespecies and the phantasm that determinesit, he nonethelessis as emphatic as Descartes is
about the way in which these species flow fromthe intellectitselfwith
internalsensoryexperienceprovidingonly the occasion for the production of the species.Indeed, in a discussionof the way in which accidents
flowfroman essence,Surez givesan important
explanationof theprocess:
Formisnotactive
unless
there
isa naturally
resultant
from
iscalled
it,which
activity
a "flowing"
without
an action
is difficult
tounder(dimanatio
), foran effective
flowing
stand.Similarly,
it is saidthatthesamereality
doesnotactin itself
exceptin this
65DA, IX.2.2(vol.Ill, 80).
ona Certain
Comments
Broadsheet
, in: ThePhilosophical
, tr.John
Writings
ofDescartes
RobertStoothoff
and DugaldMurdoch,
1985,vol. 1, 304 (=
Cottingham,
Cambridge
Oeuvres
de Descartes,
ed. C. AdamandP. Tannery,
Paris1964-76),
vol.VIII B, 358-9.
Abercrombie
1972[1938](op.citabove,n. 63),86 suggests
thatSurez's
version
of"occasionalism"
isconsiderably
lessvaguethanDescartes's.
Foradditional
discussion
ofthispasseeScott1995(op.cit.,
above,n. 64),91-6.
sagein Descartes,
18:08:44 PM
154
B. SOUTH
JAMES
thatis,a result,
orcertainly
thatitdoesnotactunless
as a power
genusofaccident,
ofgenerating.67
18:08:44 PM
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
155
18:08:44 PM
156
B. SOUTH
JAMES
that usually denotes a distinctpower. One cannot help but sense that
Surez is strainingto be creativewithina traditionalscholasticvocabulary, and that the traditionalvocabularyboth providesan access to his
thoughtand obscures,at firstanyway,the novel ways in which he is
using it.70
Conclusion
In thispaper, I have triedto providean overviewof the main themes
of Surez's account of internalsensationby stressingtwo main issues.
The firstinvolveshis reductionof a multiplicity
of such internalpowers
to just one power. The second involves the complex relationshipthat
obtains between the internalsense power and the other cognitivepowers (the externalsenses and the intellect).I now want to conclude by a
makinga few general remarksabout his account. The most strikingfeatureof his theoryis the way in which he downplaysany progressivecognitiverole for the internalsense. The strongimpressionwe get is that
the internalsensejust replicatesand synthesizesthe information
received
fromthe externalsenses. Of course, one of its operationsis a kind of
creativeimaginationwherebyI can constructfictionalobjectssuch as gold
mountains.However,he resistsimportinginto the internalsense any real
abilityto reason about its objects.The internalsense becomes littlemore
than an instinctivecapacity. There is no reasoninginternalto it so its
workis prettymuch automatic.Now, he recognizesthatreason can direct
the activityin some way, but thatfeaturerefersmore to the way in which
the intellectmightdirectthe attentionof the internalsense.
Lost in Surez's account is any of the richnesspresentin Thomas's.
The internalsense in humans is littledifferent
than the internalsense in
animals. It is worthconsideringwhy Surez mightabandon this richer
account of internalsensation. The justificationcan be found in their
conceptionsof the role of intellect.It is a well-knownfact that
differing
for Thomas the proper object of the intellectis the common nature or
essence present in material singular objects.71Consequently, the gap
of sense and the universality
between the particularity
of intellectionis
a
rich
account
of
internal
sensation,Thomas
quite large. By developing
mediatesthisgap by importingquasi-reasoning
featuresintointernalsense.
70DA, IX.8.18(vol.Ill, 234-6).
71Summa
I, q. 85,a. 1.
theologiae
18:08:44 PM
SUREZ
ON IMAGINATION
FRANCISCO
157
Surez has no such worry.He holds that the proper object of the intelIt is the work of the intellect,
lect is the materialsingularobject itself.72
afterits initialknowledgeof the singular,to discernthe universalfeatures
of nature.Accordingly,the only mediatingfunctionappropriateto the
the seninternalsense is providinga synthesizedphantasmrepresenting
sible accidentsof a singularobject in a unifiedmanner.I need a phantasmof thattreebeforeI can have thattreepresentto my intellect.Thus,
of the universalnatureprethe intelligible
species is not a representation
sent in materialobjects, but is only an immaterialrepresentationof a
materialphantasm.The agent intellect'soperationinvolvesno universalstartingpoints,it seems unproblematicthat
izing. Given these different
Surez rejectsall the mediatingwork that Thomas's account of internal
sensationsupplies.
This rejectionof the rich mediationof internalsense also leads to a
account of the relationof the internalsenses to the
different
strikingly
othercognitivepowers.By makingeach of the cognitivepowersself-contained, he isolates the intellectfromthe sense powers. His convoluted
theoryof the non-causal mechanismsof cognitionsuggesta dissatisfaction with accounts of human cognitionthat do not take into consideration the radical dualism implicitin the distinctionbetweenthe materialof intellect.Most impressiveis the way
ityof sense and the immateriality
/interin whichhe setsup the parallelbetweenthepairs externalsensation
This structural
/intellect.
nal sensationand internalsensation
parallelshows
that the issue is not just one of immaterialpower/materialpower, but
of powers.The resultis thatthe soul itself
ratherconcernsthe distinctness
mustplay a role in cognition.Specifyingthat role, as we saw, is quite
but it at the veryleast we can thinkof it as a kind of general
difficult,
awarenessof the contentsof the distinctpowers. However, while it is
unclear if that awareness is conscious or preconsciousin some way, it
remainsthe case thatthe separateactivitiesof the powersare insufficient
in and of themselvesto account for our cognition.The commitmentto
the distinctionof powers seems to rest on two foundations:the radical
betweenmaterialpowers and immaterialpowers as well as
discontinuity
the inabilityto discoversome mechanismby which the externalsenses
to the internalsenses.The imprescould communicatetheirinformation
sion one gets is that Surez was drivento his account because no other
accountwas unproblematic.While his own account may seem excessively
72DA, IX.3 (vol.Ill, 106-52).
18:08:44 PM
158
B. SOUTH
JAMES
18:08:44 PM
Review
"Perse notum".
Dielogische
desSelbst-verstndlichen
imDenken
LucaF. Tuninetti,
Beschaffenheit
Leiden-New
York-Kln
desThomas
vonAquin.
1996,pp. xii+ 216.ISBN
E.J.Brill,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
90 04 103686. (Studien
Bd.Xlvii;
- University
a Ph.D. thesis,
ofMunich1994.)
ofPhilosophy
originally
Faculty
constitute
an interesting
inthe
Self-evident
(propositiones
persenotae)
propositions
problem
ofphilosophy,
andmedieval
notonlyin theancient
butalsoin modern
history
periods,
inthesearch
Onecouldsaythata scientist
cannot
forreajustgo onendlessly
philosophy.
Ata givenpointit makesno senseto askwhy.
sonsofstatements.
Theremustbe selfarealsocalled(R.G.Collingwood).
evident
orabsolute
as they
propositions,
presuppositions,
in theformof
Theseare thebasisforposingfurther
and finding
answers
questions
statements.
The challenge
is to identify
thesepresuppositions,
and metaphysics
and its
areofgreathelp.
history
LucaF. Tuninetti
haswritten
an important
contribution
to ourunderstanding
of 'per
3
in ThomasAquinas.
senotum
His bookis important
notonlyforthecase
('self-evident')
ofAquinas,
butalsoforthehistory
as such.Aquinas'
ofthenotion
viewon thematter
wasnottheonlyoneinmedieval
reacted
toitandthusAquinas'
Manythinkers
philosophy.
somewhat
scattered
remarks
becamethestarting
pointofevenmoreinteresting
subsequent
in thefourteenth
Tuninetti
mentions
views,
particularly
century
(esp.JohnDunsScotus).
ofotherscholars'
without
muchdiscusson
I mustsay;
views,
manybooksin thenotes,
he writes
thereference,
which
is notalways
clear.
usually
'vgl.'('cf.')before
Tuninetti
is primarily
in thelogicalapproach
interested
of'perse notum'.
He realizes
thatthere
areother
in whichthenotion
metaaspects
playsa part,viz.epistemological,
or psychological
oftheseaside(pp.93 f.),
ones,buthe leavesa fulldiscussion
physical
andjustifiably
so. It woulddistract
thereader
from
themaintheme
ofthebook,viz.the
of'perse notum'
as such.Tuninetti
concentrates
onAquinas,
buthisbook
understanding
stimulates
further
thanks
to thebibliographies
included
in thenotes,
research,
especially
in whichhe listsprimary
and secondary
studies
on specific
and comments
on
subjects
them.
In thisrespect,
I found
hissurvey
ofscholastic
andpostscholastic
authors
on the
subject
quitehelpful
(pp.5 f.).
' as 'Selbstverstndliches'.
Intheintroduction,
Tuninetti
histranslation
of'per
senotum
explains
Thisdiscussion
to ourunderstanding
contributes
ofthenotion
as such.He alsotouches
theproblem
oftherelevance
ofthechronology
ofAquinas'
works
(p. 13).
In chapter
discusses
useof'perse notum',
inconnection
1,Tuninetti
Aquinas'
notably
withhisdiscussion
ofwhether
God'sexistence
is self-evident.
The question
whether
and
towhatextent
God'sexistence
is self-evident,
is a traditional
starting
pointformedieval
in thisdomain.
As Tuninetti
thefactthat'God is' is notselfconcludes,
investigation
tousmeansthatourknowledge
evident
ofGodis indirect
andlimited,
manis
although
connected
withGodin hispursuit
ofhappiness.
Mandepends
on hissenses,
andforhis
he is dependent
on God'sinitiative
happiness
(p. 188).
Tuninetti
a largenumber
oftexts,
as he doesthroughout
thebook,rendering
presents
a goodservice
to thereader.
Thomasis indebted
to bothAristotle
and Boethius,
and
thedistinction
between
self-evidence
initself
andwith
tous.Tuninetti
calls
develops
regard
thelatter
thesubjective
sideandtheformer
theobjective
condition
ofself-evidence.
HereI notethreeminor
leavesthepuzzling
lastsentence
of
points
(p. 30).Tuninetti
Posterior
'and <understanding>
as a wholewillbe
II, 19 outofhisdiscussion:
Analytics
related
to thewholeobject'(translation
Second:does'katholou'
similarly
J. Barnes).
just
mean'general',
as Tuninetti
suggests
(p. 31),or shouldoneread'kath'holou'withDe
itas 'ofitsentire
which
seemsplausible?
nature',
Rijk,andtranslate
(See L.M. de Rijk,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2001
Vivarium
39,1
18:08:58 PM
160
REVIEW
'Ockham's
His Use ofAristotle's
kath'holou
and kath'hauto
Theoryof Demonstration:
in W. Vossenkuhl
andR. Schnberger,
Die Gegenwart
Ockhams
, 1990,pp.
Requirements',
inAristode
observes
a certain
dissociation
ofthelogical
struc233-240).
Lasdy,Tuninetti
tureof scienceand itslinguistic
without
further
On
presentation,
giving
explanation.
notesthatAlgazelcreates
roomamongdemonstrative
fordata
p. 77,Tuninetti
premises
ofsense-experience,
butthatthissuggestion
wasinitially
notaccepted.
One is curious
to
knowwhichotherauthor
thissuggestion,
andtowhatextent.
accepts
In thenextchapter
Tuninetti
discusses
inthescholastic
tradition
before
'perse notum'
Thomas.Again,he brings
Aristode
andBoethius
to thefore.HereliesTuninetti's
greatI feel.He pointsespecially
estoriginality,
to theimportance
ofAristotle's
Prior
Analytics
As hasbeennoted,
witha viewto oursubject.
self-evidence
alsoplaysa partas regards
thehumansoulanditspowers,
as regards
as regards
thedemarcation
science,
especially
between
andnatural
andas regards
theproofs
forGod'sexistence.
sciences,
theology
In thethirdchapter
Tuninetti
thelogicalpointofviewofself-evidence.
investigates
Thereis an objective
and subjective
in Thomas,he thinks.
aspectto be distinguished
totheobjectively
thesubject
must
be universal
andthepred(a concept)
aspect,
According
icatemustsignify
a partofthedefinition
ofthesubject,
e.g.'manis an animal'(p. 166).
a knowing
mustknowthemeaning
ofthedefinition
ofthesubject.
Subjectively,
subject
thesedefinitions
areknown
totheintelligence
ofknowing
so
However,
according
subject,
in different
measures.
theyareknown
In thefinalchapter,
Tuninetti
to therelevance
ofthetopicto important
theopoints
as mentioned
above.He discusses
forms
ofthought
logical
problems,
(e.g.species
intelligibilis)
as opposedto contents
ofthought
as wellas thenotion
ofratio.
He
internus),
(e.g.verbum
oflogicas a science.
further
discusses
Thomas'notion
Thomas'viewsleadto interesting
ThomasSutton,
andDunsScotus.Havingdiscussed
criticisms,
e.g.byHenryofGhent,
Tuninetti
theviewsheldbythoseauthors,
toThomas,
'theproper
that,
explains
according
taskofthesubject
inthestatement
istoidentify
thatofwhich
issaid.Therefore,
something
in a proposition
we mayconsider
whatis identified
as a subject,
andnot,howitactually
In thissensewe might
condition
ofselfis identified
bysomeone.
speakofan objective
evidence.
remains
trueevenwhenitis notknown
as such.The
(. . .) Thesamestatement
initself,
samestatement
isself-evident
notwithregard
tous.'(p. 180,cf.I. Boh's
although
windsup thischapter
review
ofTuninetti's
book,Speculum
, 1998,pp. 911-2).Tuninetti
knownto us fromwhatis
whatis better
that,in Aquinas'view,we maydistinguish
in itself,
butwe muststart
from
theformer
better
known
(p. 185).
an admirably
In sum,Tuninetti
haswritten
clearbook.Theargumentation
is lucidand
Animportant
butdifficult
is verywellpresented
partofThomas'thought
easilyfollowed.
alsoto students
ofother
ofphilosophy.
andthebookcanbe fruitful
periods
in thebackseemsexhaustive.
The bibliography
One couldadd twoolderstudies
by
in das Problem
derEvidenz
in derScholastik',
in Beitrge
'ZurEinfuhrung
zur
J. Geyser,
desMittelalters
derPhilosophie
and
Geschichte
, Supplementband
, 1923,161-182,Mnster,
zumProblem
derpropositio
undihreRolleindenGottesbeweisen',
persenota
'Systematisches
Studien
Franziskanische
, 19 (1942),pp. 73-115.
ofTuninetti's
book:D.-M.Gallagher,
in Review
Otherreviews
consulted
,
ofMetaphysics
in Philosophisches
1999106(1),pp. 245-7.
1998,p. 963-4;M. Thurner,
Jahrbuch
E.P. Bos
Leiden
18:08:58 PM
TenseLogicin 13th-Gentwy
Theolog))
HARM GORIS
Vivarium,
39,2
18:06:50 PM
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18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
163
18:06:50 PM
164
HARMGORIS
18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
165
18:06:50 PM
166
HARMGORIS
18:06:50 PM
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY
167
of tensesand
expressone and the same truthor falsehood.A difference
of other indexical temporalexpressionslike 'tomorrow'or 'today' that
referto different
momentsof time dependingon when theyare uttered,
leads merelyto verbalvariants,but theselinguisticchangeshave no bearof the enuntiabile.
They are logicallyirrelevant.
Although
ing on theidentity
thisnominalisttheoryon tensesmay have its originsin grammar,it developed into a logical theorybased on a specificsemantics.Many 13thcenturymasterspoint out in their summariesof the theorythat the
tensedsentencesto the unity
reduced the identityof differently
Nominales
of the truthexpressedby them.In itsturn,the unityof the truthexpressed
followedfromthe identityof the extramentalevent being reported.In
short,the nominalistview was based on a purelyextensionalsemantics.
The most famous proponentsof the nominalistposition were Peter
Abelard and Peter the Lombard, but by the middle of the 13th century
it was commonlyconsideredto be outmoded.AlberttheGreat,Bonaventure
whose thesisthat differently
and Aquinas talk about the antiquiNominales
is repudiatedby
tensedsentencesconstituteone and the same enuntiabile
11The Nominales have ceased to be a distinctschool that
all moderni.
by
may
time,but a closerlook will show thatthe nominalistpositionwithregard
to tenseswas not as dead as Albert,Bonaventureand Aquinas suggest.
in TenseLogic:1240-75
2. LaterDevelopments
In the 13th centurythe question about the identityof the enuntiabile
in
tensed expressionswas an almost exclusive topic for theologians.The
main logical textbooks,viz. the compendia of Peter of Spain, William of
Shyreswoodand Lambertof Auxerre,remainsilenton the issue,nor have
I foundrelevantdiscussionsin 13th-century
commentaries
on the Categories
and Perihermeneias
that have been edited. The only exception,as Sten
Ebbesen has pointedout,was the discussionby the artistae
of the sophisma
"God knows whateverHe knew" (Deus seitquicquidscivit).12
It is a rare
11Albert,
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 6, ed. Borgnet
vol.26, 350: . . antiquam
Nominalium
. . Aquinas,
S.Th.Ia q. 14 a. 15 ad 3: ". . . antiquiNominales
. . and
opinionem
I Sent.
modernis
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5: "Undeab omnibus
conceditur
quodsuntduodiversa
III Sent.
Socratem
currere
etcucurisse
. . Bonaventure,
d. 24 a.l q. 3: ". . .
enuntiabilia,
iliaNominalium
. . . communiter
nonapprobatur."
The demiseoftheNominales
positio
as a distinct
around1210andbyIwakuma
schoolis datedbyCourtenay
around1180:
William
Introduction
30 (1992),1-3,p. 3.
, Vivarium,
Courtenay,
12S. Ebbesen,
with
verba
.
, in:C. Marmo(ed.),Vestigia,
Doing
theology
sophismata
imagines,
andlogic
inmedieval
Semiotics
texts
The sophisma
runsas
, Louvain1997,151-69.
theological
18:06:50 PM
168
HARMGORIS
artistsdiscussingspecifically
theologicalquestions.
example of 13th-century
And vice versa, mastersof theologywere familiarwith this discussionin
literatureand referto it.13
the Sophismata
Afteraround 1220 almost all theologiansdeclare that the nominalist
view on tenses is to be rejected. The three main argumentsthat they
broughtin againstit were all derivedfromAristotle'sworks.Two of these
were logical argumentswhile the thirdone was based on Aristotelian
psy, new viewpoints
chology.In view of the objectionsagainst the Nominales
were developed on the role of tensesin propositions.I shall discusseach
of the objectionsand the new solutionsin more detail below.
However, the general criticismon the nominalistposition does not
mean thatit had become actuallyobsoletein the 13thcentury.Although
not overtlyendorsed,it did survivein different
ways. Richard Fishacre
in
(d. 1248) presentsa nominalistposition terminologicaldisguise.The
discussionsby Williamde la Mare (d. 1285) and Giles of Rome (1247-1316)
is not
make clear that one of the main objectionsagainst the Nominales
a criticalanalysisof Bonaventure's
as decisiveas manythought.And,finally,
will show that,froma systematicviewtheoryof the tenselessenuntiabile
a
real
alternativeto the nominalistview.
it
does
not
constitute
point,
2.1
A Nominalist
TenseLogicin Disguise
Fishacre:
In his commentary
on the Sentences
, writtenaround 1245, Richrd Fishacre
to
the
formulateshis solution
problemof the unityof faithwithoutmenand withoutusing theirtraditionalwordingsbut he
tioningthe Nominales
takes a position that actually is identicalto theirs.14
First,Fishacre disnon-indexical
between
temporalexpressions(absolute
veryclearly
tinguishes
dates) which are said "withrespectto the timein which the thing/event
was" and indexicalones (e.g. tenses)which are said "withrespectto the
it is the
time at which the words are uttered."In Fishacre'sterminology,
te nasciturum,
sedscivit
"Deusseitquicquid
follows:
scivit,
ergoseitteessenasciturum."
tr.9, 21-23(ed.L.M.de Rijk,
It is alsodiscussed
byPeterofSpaininhisSyncategoreumata
wasthat
butafter
about1250often
Leiden1992,420-2).The classical,
rejected,
response
' withan
of
dictionis
shift
from
thecategory
a fallacy,
viz.a Jigura
it contains
illegitimate
as thecategory
oftime{quando)
but
identified
toanother
substance
usually
category,
[quid.)
ofquality
andquantity.
as thecategories
sometimes
13Cf.Albert
Summa
vol.26,350f.;
InI Sent.
d. 41 a. 6, ed.Borgnet,
theGreat,
Theobgiae
inIII
vol.31,824,827;Robert
tr.19q. 77 m.3 a. 5, ed. Borgnet
Quaestiones
Kilwardby,
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1 ad 2
Sent.
t. 2 q. 5 ad 3, ed. Leibold,
20; PeterofTarantasia,
in contr.,
Toulouseed. 1652,vol.1, 342.
14Chenu1923(<
the
thatHugoofSt.Cherusesalmost
.,aboven. 3),136n. 1,remarks
op.t
to.
Chenurefers
themanuscript
as Fishacre
butI havenotexamined
sameformulations
18:06:50 PM
TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY
169
18:06:50 PM
170
HARMGORIS
Two Arguments
AgainsttheNominalesfiomAristotle's
Logic
The firstlogical objection against the view that 'Christ will be born',
'Christis being born' and 'Christhas been born' are one and the same
enuntiabile
was takenfromAristotle'sdefinition
of the nomen
as voxsignificativa
in De Int. 1, 16a19. In thisdefinition'vox' is understoodas the genus and
'
as the specificdifference
. But, it is said, if the genus (in this
significativa
case the vox)changes,thereis also a change of the definiendum
(in thiscase
the nomri).
thatalbus,alba, albumare
Therefore,the claim of theNominales
one and the same nomen
is unwarrantedand so is theirpositionthatthree
tensed
are one enuntiabile.
sentences
This refutation
of the nomdifferently
inalistargumentis alreadygivenin the Summa
Aureaof Williamof Auxerre,
writtenbetween 1215 and 1220, and repeated afterhim by others.18
The second and more interesting
logical argumentbroughtin against
the Nominales
is Aristotle'sremarkin Cat. 5, 4a25ff.thatan oratio/
propositio
or an opiniois susceptibleto contraries,i.e. to contradictory
truthvalues,
because one and the same propositio
or opiniothat firstis true, may be
false later. Aristotle'sexample is the propositio
'Socrates sits', which is
17The Summa
Alexandi
Halensis
renders
thenominalist
as follows
in III q. 68
position
m. 7 a. 5, Quaracchi
sintenuntiaed.,vol.IV.2, 1094:"Aliidicunt
quodlicetmutata
articuli
suntmutati
vocessuntunumnomenutalbus,
bilia,nontarnen
quiasicutplures
suntunusarticulus."
In similar
alba,album,ita pluraenuntiabilia
wordings
Philipthe
Summa
deBonoIII.3.2Bq. 9, ed. N. Wicki,
Bern1985,vol.II, 616.Cf.also
Chancellor,
S.Th.Ia q. 16 a. 7: "Enuntiabile
enimet estin intellectu,
et estin voce."
Aquinas,
Cf.William
ofAuxerre,
Summa
III tr.12 c. 7 q. 2 ad 3, ed. Ribaillier,
Aurea
vol.
Hoc nomen'albus'esthecvox'albus';sedhecvox'albus'estalia
3.1,221: "Instantia.
voxquamhecvox'alba';ergoet estaliudnomen."
In I Sent.d. 41 art.2
Bonaventure,
'alba3and'album
3
theviewpoint
ofgrammar
ed.,740,saysthatfrom
'albus3,
q. 2, Quaracchi
are indeedone nomen
but
are
not:
consideret
in
nomen
,
logically
they
"[C]umlogicus
estvoxexpressiva,
undedfinit
verbum
etorationem
nomen,
quantum
pervocem
tamquam
necesseestmultiplican
inferius."
Thisdistinction
pergenus;et multiplicato
superiori,
between
a grammatical
anda logicalconsideration
ofthenomen
is alsofound
in Peterof
In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouseed. 1652,vol.1, 342;Aquinas,
In I Sent.
Tarantasia,
d. 41 q.l art.5 ad 3 andRichard
ofMiddletown,
In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1, Brixen
ed.
Frankfurt
1591[repr.
a. M.: 1963],vol.1, 369.
18:06:50 PM
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TENSELOGICIN ITH-CENTURY
171
18:06:50 PM
172
HARMGORIS
18:06:50 PM
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY
173
for it turns
From the viewpointof logic, this argumentis less satisfying
the truth-function
of propositionsinto a secondary,accidentalfeature.
In a way that is similarto Giles's argumentbut withoutmentioning
the notion of truth,the anonymousauthor of Sophisma10 in ms. Vat.
lat. 7678 triesto reconcilethe Aristotelianand the nominalistview. A
sentence (oratio),he says, can be seen either in relation to its mental
in anima
) and thatis how Aristotletakesit in Cat. 4a25,
(species
significate
as the Nominales
do. In the firstcase
or to the extramentalthing/event,
'Socrates sits' when utteredat different
times,is one and the same sentence because the mental significatedoes not change. But when related
thereare two different
sentencesbecause
to the extramentalthing/event,
'now'.24
each refersto a different
In contrastwith Giles, othersfocusedon temporallydefinitepropositionsby takingthe absolutedate into account. In doing so, theyhad two
otherpossibilitiesto interpretthe argumentfromCat. 4a25ff.,depending
on the choice of typeof semantics.One may adopt a purelyextensional
semantics,with the consequence of ending up with the position of the
William de la Mare seems to followthisline. In his commenNominales.
, writtenaround 1270, he firstquotes the argument
taryon the Sentences
fromCat. 4a25ff.as an objectionagainst the nominalistview. But then
Williamcontinuesby acknowledgingthe view of the Nominales
as a legitimate alternative,and he tacitlyrejectsAristotle'sargument:25
Butnotethatalthough
itis saidin thisway,yetthefirst
whichis saidto
opinion,
be oftheMasterand theNominates
, is considered
bymanyand greatmento be
hadbetter
be called
moretrueandaccording
to themthosewhoheldthatopinion
Reales
thanNominales
becausewhentheysaythat'Sortes
willrunat timeA', 'Sortes
runsat timeA', 'Sortes
ranat timeA' is thesameenuntiabilei
theysaythisbecause
24Sophisma
10 from
Vat.lat.7678,editedbyS. Ebbesen,
GIMAGL,62 (1992),188.
at thefirst
halfofthe13thcentury.
Ebbesen
datesthissophisma
25InI Sent.
d. 41 q. 6 ad 2, ed.Krami1989,504:"Notaautemquodlicetitadicatur,
etnominalium
a multis
eta maximis
tarnen
verior
prima
opinioquaedicitur
Magisti
repilliqui fuerunt
illiusopinionis
utataestet venussecundum
eos dicerentur
realesquam
nominales
'Sortescurret
in A tempore',
quia quandodicunt
quodestidemenuntiabile
in A', 'Sortes
in A', hocideodicunt
currit
cucurrit
a parte
'Sortes
quianonestvariatio
et aliquando
fuitpraesens
et modoest
temporis
quiaidemesttempus
quodfuitfuturum
et si nonestvariatio
a partetemporis,
ergoneca partereienuntiatae
praeteritum,
quia
eiusdem
eademresnonpotest
se difformiter
habere
Variatur
respectu
temporis.
ergoenuntiabile
secundum
vocemtantum
et futuro,
quandofitenuntiatio
propraeterito,
praesenti
sedresnonvariatur
etideonecenuntiabile
debetdicialiudetaliud,sedidem."Cf.also
14thcentury),
an anonymous
YukioandStenEbbesen
Notula
(13th/
quotedbyIwakuma
A ListofSources
inLogico-Theological
Schools
the
Second
, in:Vivarium,
from
Halfofthe12thCentury:
debent
dicirealeset econverso
30 (1992),173-215,
. . ."
p. 209:". . . potiusnominales
18:06:50 PM
HARMGORIS
174
oftimethat
thereis nota changeon thepartoftime,forit is thesamemoment
andnowis past,andifthereis nota changeon
wasfuture
andoncewaspresent
because
is there
onthepartofthething/event
thenneither
thepartoftime,
reported
of time.
to thesamemoment
cannotchangewithrespect
thesamething/event
whenan enunciation
is madeforpast,
theenuntiabile
variesonlyvocally
Therefore
doesnotvaryandtherefore
neither
butthething/event
andfuture
(tenses),
present
be saidto be different,
butrather
tobe thesame.
musttheenuntiabile
tensesin temporallydefinitepropoThe otherpossibilityof interpreting
but to
sitionsor sentencesis not to focuse exclusivelyon extensionality,
take the intensionalaspect into account. This makes up a thirdway in
scholars dealt with the argumentin Cat. 4a25. We
which 13th-century
's discussionof the immutabilfindthis line of reasoningin Bonaventure
on the Sentences
between
(written
ityof divineknowledgein his commentary
1250-55):26
a verbin thepresent
tense
thisor thatman,likewise
[A]s 'man'doesnotsignify
in general,
itjoinsor
butthepresent
whether
thisor thatpresent
doesnotsignify
noris another
as 'man'doesnothaveanother
Andthatis why,
meaning
consignifies.
termifitsupposits
nowforPeterandthenforPaul,likewise
nounor an equivocal
doesnothave
whether
itis uttered
a verbin thepresent
tense,
todayortomorrow,
enuntiabile.
Andthatis
and therefore
it doesnotmakeanother
another
meaning
it is the
time'thatyouwillbe born',is uttered,
whyit is clearthat,at whatever
wastrueandthenfalse.
whichfirst
sameenuntiabile
and supBonaventureadopts the basic distinctionbetween signification
the
of
usual
context
of
from
its
transfers
it
and
analysis a noun
position
elementof
withina sentence,to the tensedverb- the otherconstitutive
its
the sentence.The presenttense of a verb does not change
meaning
momentsof time.27
when it is utteredat and, hence, refersto different
26In I Sent.
'homo'nonsignificai
ed. 1882,740f.:"[SJicut
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2, Quaracchi
illudvelilludpraenonsignificai
sicverbum
velilium,
hominem
istum
praesentis
temporis
Etindeestquod,sicut'homo'
sivecopulaivelconsignificat.
incommuni,
sens,sedpraesens
si modosupponat
necaequivocum,
necestaliudnomen
nonhabetaliamsignificationem
hodie
sivepronuntietur
modoproPaulo;sicnecverbum
praesentis
temporis,
proPetro,
aliudenuntiabile.
Etpropterea
etideononfacit
siveeras,nonhabetaliamsignificationem,
teessenasciturum,
quodidemestenuntiabile,
proferatur
tempore
patetquod,quocumque
wasthecommon
Notethat"teessenasciturum"
modofalsum."
quodpriusfuitverum,
tasia
scivi(seen. 12 above).PeterofTaran
'Deusseitquicquid
in thesophisma
exemplum
butis essential
to theverbin isolation,
notesthatconsignificatio
maybe accidental
temporis
ed. 1652,vol.1,342:". . . etlicet
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouse
InI Sent.
to theproposition:
et accidentalis
haecconsignificatio
verbo,
significato
H.G.) sitaccidentalis
(viz.temporis,
nontantum
sedmodm
essentialis
esttarnen
actum,
enunciabili,
quiaenunciabile
perverbum,
d. 41.2ad 4,Veniceed. 1521,218.
GilesofRome,In I Sent.
Likewise
actussignificai."
27I havenotfound
forone
Modernorum
oftheLogica
in texts
discussions
similar
, except
com"Dicoquodverbaproprie
remark
madebyPeterofIreland:
consignificant
praesens
verbietde comde communitate
Et estidemiudicium
muniter
etnondiscrete.
temporis
18:06:50 PM
TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY
175
be born' is ambiguousfor it
However,Bonaventure'sexample 'you
This
is
not the case withAquinas's
is a temporallyindefinite
proposition.
elaborationof the argumentfromCat. 4a25ff.As example he does not
use one and the same (temporallyindefinite)expression-type,
but two
the
tensed
that
refer
to
same
event
and,
differently
propositions
particular
are
definite:28
thus,
(virtually)
temporally
iftheenuntiabile
hasitsunity
from
theunity
ofthething/event,
then
Furthermore,
ithasitsdiversity
forthesamereason
from
thediversity
Andso theenun(thereof).
tiabile
'thatSocrates
at different
moments
oftime,
wouldnotbe one,
runs',uttered
norwoulda nounthatsignifies
different
be one.In thiswaybothequivocathings
tionandunivocity
wouldperish,
eachofwhichrequires
theunity
ofa nounthat
befits
more(things).
allmoderni
concede
that'thatSocrates
runs'and'that
Therefore,
Socrates
ran'aretwodifferent
enuntiabilia
evenifthey
refer
tothesameactofrunning.
In this text the argumentfrom Cat. 4a25ff.does not hinge upon two
different
eventsthatoccur at two distinctmomentsof time,but also holds
in the case of one and the same event to which two differently
tensed
refer.This is also clear in anothertextwhereAquinas answers
propositions
to the (nominalist)objectionthat as the cause of truthof 'Socrates sits',
'Socrates will sit' and 'Socrates sat' is the same, viz. Socrates' act of sitthe truthis one and the same. Aquinas refutesthe argument
ting,therefore
with an implicitreferenceto the threefolddivisionof the AristotelianBoethian theoryof signification
between language, understandings
(conand
cepts)
reality:29
munitate
cuiuslibet
termini
communis
. . ." (Glosulae
inLibrum
Aristotelis
PerHermeneias
Maistri
Petri
deHibernia
in:CIMAGL,43 (1982),3-44:p. 39 lines
, ed.KarenElisabeth
Dalgaard,
thisremark
ina discussion
on temporally
andtheir
13-5).Petermakes
vaguepropositions
is whether
thetenses
oftheverbsignify
time
(seenote2 above);thequestion
negations
discrete
orcommuniter
ifthelatter,
whether
or determinate).
(and
confuse
28In I Sent.
d. 41 q. 1 a. 5: "Et praeterea
si ab unitate
reienuntiabile
haberet
unieademratione
ex diversitate
haberet
etitahocenuntiabile,
Socratem
tatem,
diversitatem;
diversis
nonessetunum,nec aliquodnomensigni
ficans
currere,
temporibus
prolatum,
diversas
resunumesset;etsicperirei
tamaequivocatio
quamunivocatio,
quarum
utraque
unitatem
nominis
convenit.
Undeab omnibus
modernis
requirit
conceditur,
quodpluribus
Socratem
currere
et cucurisse,
etiamsi ad eumdem
enuntiabilia,
quodsuntduodiversa
cursum
referantur."
Cf.alsoDe Ver.
". . . intellectus
q. 10 a. 2 ad 3 in contr.:
cognoscit
differentias
secundum
communes
rationes."
temporum
29De Ver.
veritatis
nontantum
ex identitte
q. 1 a. 6 ad 6: ". . . identitas
rei,
dependet
sedetiamex identitte
intellectus
. . . Quamvis
autemsiteademresquaesignificatur
illis
tribus
nontarnen
estidemintellectus
earum
..." The claimthatidentity
propositionibus,
of reference
is nota sufficient
reasonfortheidentity
of truth
is also mentioned
by
Peter
ofTarantasia
d. 41 q. 4 a. 1,Toulouse
ed. 1652,vol.1,342)andRichard
(InI Sent.
ofMiddletown
d. 41 a. 4 q. 1,Brixen
ed. 1591,vol.1, 369).
(InI Sent.
18:06:50 PM
176
HARMGORIS
ontheidentity
ofthething/
. . . theidentity
ofthetruth
doesnotonlydepend
event,
. . . Although
thesamething/
eventis
butalsoon theidentity
oftheunderstanding
is notthesame. . .
bythesethreesentences,
yettheir
understanding
signified
enuntiabile
The Theory
of theTenseless
18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
177
withoran enuntiabile
Forfaith
toitssubstance
something
complex
regards
according
that
difference
oftime,
butrather
somedictum
intoaccount
a determinate
outtaking
wouldsuffer'
... in thisway
like'thatChrist
to all times,
is general
andindifferent
inkind.
faith
so thatitweredifferent
timedoesnotchange
a change
ofdeterminate
that was broughtin against the resThe counter-argument
theoryand
viz.
that
it does not
the
solution
of
the
omnitensed
disjunction,
against
allow for a distinctionbetweenJews or hereticsand Christians,seems
also to applyto the theoryof the tenselessproposition.In orderto exclude
fromthe Christianfaithheterodoxviewsas e.g. the opinionthatthe coming of the Messiah is future,Bonaventureuses the distinctionbetween
implicitand explicitfaith:while (implicit)faith regards essentiallythe
of tensesin explicit
tenselessenuntiabile
, thereis an accidentaldetermination
of
on
the
situation
the
believer.
This is basihistorical
faith,depending
the
was
also
the
same
that
adopted by
proponentsof the
cally
strategy
restheoryin order to refutethe objection.32
Bonaventure'ssolutionof the tenselessenuntiabile
expressedgrammatically by a futureperfecttense or, as other scholastictexts have it, a
like Christum
, or a presenttense
fiiisseincarnandum
gerundive-construction
in explicitfaithbecame a
as in Christum
incarnariand its determination
half
in
of the 13th century.33
the
second
commonlyaccepted position
a
of
Bonaventure's
critical
However,
analysis
argumentto safeguard
the unityof faithshows that it is flawed.Bonaventure'smove to bring
in thedistinction
betweenimplicitand explicitfaithseemsto be unnecessary
nonvariat
... sicetvariatio
determinati
utsitaliaetaliasecunfidem,
passurum
temporis
dumspeciem."
Bonaventure
wasnotthefirst
onewhocameup withthissolution.
It is
in the12th-century
on theSentences
found
already
commentary
(PL
byMasterBandinus
ofGodfrey
ofPoitiers,
written
around1220
192,1021
A) andinthecommentary
probably
inLandgraf
1943(op.cit
com., above,n. 3), 187):"[A]liidicunt
(quoted
quodenuntiabilia
omnetempus
suntarticuli,
utChristum
fuisse
nasciturum."
Anditis mentioned
placentia
in Summa
ofAuxerre
III tr.12c. 7 q. 2 ad 4, ed. Ribaillier,
Aurea
22If.: . .
byWilliam
ad omniatempora,
enuntiabile
commune
sci.FiliumDei fuisse
incarnandum."
Cf.also
G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
Ancient
andmedieval
ofthe
proposition.
conceptions
ofthebearers
oftruth
andfalsity
/London
, Amsterdam
1973,183-4.
"Bonaventure,
In111Sent.
d. 24 a. 1 q. . PhiliptheChancellor,
theoutstanding
representative
oftheresalsoassumes
an accidental
determination
oftimein answertheory,
Thisdetermination,
he says,belongs
to themodeofbelieving
ingthesameobjection.
notto thesubstance
deBonoIII.3.2.2 q. 9, ed.Wicki,
offaith:
Summa
vol.
(modus
credendi),
answer
is adopted
Alexandri
II, 616-7.Philip's
Halensis
verbally
bytheSumma
Quaracchi
In III Sent.
ed. vol.IV.2, 1095-6.Cf.alsoAlbert
theGreat,
d. 24 a. 5 ad sc. 2.3,ed.
vol.28,453.
Borgnet,
33Itwasfollowed
d. 41 exp.text),
Richard
ofMiddletown
bytheyoung
{InI Sent.
Aquinas
d. 24 a. 1 q. 2, Brixen
ed. 1591,vol.3, 266),PeterofTaran
tasia(InIII Sent.
(InIII Sent.
d. 24 q. un.a. 3; Toulouseed. 1652,vol.3, 186)andGilesofRome(InI Sent.
d. 41
exp.txt.;Veniceed. 1521,f.218).
18:06:50 PM
178
HARMGORIS
TheArgument
Psychology
AgainsttheNominalesfiomAristotle's
18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGICIN 13TH-CENTURY
179
18:06:50 PM
HARMGORIS
180
a nounor an enuntiabile
can be different
either
Therefore,
(1) becauseofa vocal
in whichthevoxis different
difference
butthe
only,as is thecase in synonyms
thesame;or (2) witha vocaldifference
therecan alsobe a
signified
altogether
difference
ofunderstandings
either
in thething
under(2.1.)becauseofa difference
in themodeofunderstanding.
stoodor (2.2.)becauseofa difference
Andthelatter
in consignification,
whenthereis a difference
whichfollows
uponunderhappens
clearin time,whichis perse
oneand thesamething.
Thisis especially
standing
withthecomposing
anddividing
ofthehuman
as is said
intellect,
mingled
operation
Andtherefore
itis tobe saidthat'thatSocrates
inIII De Anima.
sits','thatSocrates
sat'or 'thathe willsit'are notthesameenuntiabile]
but'thatSocrates
sits'is the
sameenuntiabile
forit is thesamevoxandthesamemodeofsignifying.
Andtherethatthesameenuntiabile
cansometimes
be true,sometime
foreitis shown
false.
in this passage, albeit
Again we find the argumentfromintensionality
with a temporallyindefiniteproposition.The identityof the enuntiabile
,
is
not
determined:
the
modus
claims,
,
only extensionally
intelligent
Aquinas
which includesthe tenses,is equally decisive.The new thingin his argument is that the grammaticaland logical role of tenses (consignificatio
)
receives a psychologicalfoundation:time is included by the "operation
of the composingand dividingintellect",usuallycalled the "second operation of the intellect"by Aquinas- the one that resultsin the formation
of propositions.
As far as I know,Aquinas is the only one to use Aristotle'stextin De
An. Ill, 6, 430b 1 as the argumentthatlays the psychologicalfoundations
he does not elabofor the logical irreducibility
of tenses.Unfortunately,
rate in detail on the psychologicalmechanismsby way of which time is
implied in the second operationof the intellect.A few passages indicate
In
sio ad phantasmatd'
that it has to do withthe intellect'sso-called "corner
a discussion on the contrastbetween angelic and human knowledge,
Aquinas says:37
withtheir
It is alsoclearthattimeis notmingled
(i.e.theangels,
H.G.)intellectual
thefactthat
timedoestouchourintellectual
from
. . . however,
operation,
operation
from
which
a determinate
time.Andthatis
wederive
knowledge
regard
phantasms,
but
or division,
ourintellect
addsa pastor future
time,
always
whyin composition
37ScGII c. 96 nr.10: "Palamestetiamquodintellectuali
nonadmiseorum
operationi
nostrae
adiacet
ex
eo
a phanautem
intellectuali
.
.
.
cetur
tempus,
quod
tempus Operationi
Etindeestquod
tasmatibus
quaedeterminatum
respiciunt
tempus.
cognitionem
accipimus,
noster
velfutuintellectus
incompositione
etdivisione
semper
adiungit
tempus
praeteritum
intelrum:nonauteminintelligendo
quodquidest.Intelligit
quodquidestabstrahendo
illamoperationem,
undesecundum
conditionibus:
a sensibilium
nequesubtemligibilia
rerum
sensibilium
comprehendit.
Componit
intelligibile
porenequesubaliquaconditione
ad res:et in hac applicatione
autemaut dividit
applicando
intelligibilia
priusabstracta
Cf.alsoS.Th.Ia q. 85 a. 5 ad 2: "Etex ea partequa se
necesse
estcointelligi
tempus."
intellectus
et divisioni
ad phantasmata
convertit,
tempus."
adiungitur
compositioni
18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
181
is. Foritunderstands
whata thing
is by
ofwhata thing
notin theunderstanding
to
ofthesensibles.
theconditions
from
Therefore,
according
abstracting
intelligibles
oftimeoranycondition
ofsentheintelligible
thisoperation,
itgrasps
irrespectively
thepreviously
abstracted
or divides
itcomposes
siblethings.
However,
byapplying
time.
itis necessary
to co-understand
andin thisapplication
to things;
intelligibles
It is well beyond the scope of thispaper to enterinto the intricaciesof
Aquinas's philosophyof mind. The basic idea behind the passage quoted
above may be gathered fromwhat Aquinas says elsewhereabout the
workingsof the human intellect.In his later writings,he claims that in
its second operationthe intellectnot only 'turns' (convertit
) to the phan- but also
tasms for that is equally necessaryin the firstoperation
,
'returns'(redit)to the phantasmsin some sort of spontaneousreflection
with the (indirect)intellectual
(ireflexio
).38Aquinas associatesthis reflection
humans
have
of
that
singularthingsas such and with
may
knowledge
All thissuggeststhat in the forthe formationof singularpropositions.39
somehowresumesthephantasms,
thehumanintellect
mationofpropositions
and hence includesagain to some extenttheparticular,sensibleconditions
of the extramentalobject fromwhichit had prescindedin the processof
abstraction.One of these particularconditionsis the time in which the
concreteextramentalobject exists.Resumingthe phantasmin the second
operationleads in one way or otherto the inclusionof tenses.The details
of Aquinas's explanationwhy and how the second operationof the intellect involvestensednessremainto be examined in furtherdetail.40
2.5
withModernTenseLogic
Comparison
18:06:50 PM
182
HARMGORIS
- which cannot
The theoryof the 12th-century
Nominales
meaningfully
be distinguished
fromthe positionof Fishacreor Bonaventure
's tenseless
- coincideswith
enuntiabile
at
least
until
was the commonly
what,
recently,
accepted view among logicians on the logical role of tenses:tenses(and
other indexical temporalexpressions)can and should be eliminatedfor
they are logicallyirrelevant.Quine's distinctionbetween 'occasion sentences' and 'eternalsentences'is the classical representative
of thisview.
This is the positionthat nowadays is labelled as the "old tenselesstheory of time".
In the 1980s the so-called "new tenselesstheoryof time" superseded
the old one. Those who favourthis theoryagree with the adherentsof
the "tensedtheoryof time" in thattheyacknowledgethattensesdo have
a specific,
irreducible
The meaningsexpressedby thetokens
logicalfunction.
'Socrates sits', utteredtoday, and 'Socrates sat', utteredtomorrow,are
not the same. This is very similarto the argumentfromintensionality
that was used by Bonaventure,Aquinas and othersin the 13th century.
Apart fromgrammatical,logical and psychologicalconsiderationsof
on theirontologicalaspect in 13thtenses,thereare also some reflections
in
texts.
However,
centurytheological
comparisonto moderndiscussions
on tense logic,in which the ontologicalimplicationsof tensesare heavily
debated, these medieval textscontain littleon questionsconcerningthe
realityof time. The modern 'new tenselesstheoryof time' admits that
tensedpropositionscannot be translatedinto tenselessones withoutsome
loss of meaningbut, it is argued,thisdoes not prove thatthe extramental
eventsthemselveschange frombeing futureto being presentand being
to deduce metaphysical
past. Intensional differencesare not sufficient
differences.
There did not existan exact parallel of thisdiscussionamong
medieval theologians.Some of them talk about the identityof the resor
eventus
, whetherit is past,presentor future,and thismay suggesta tenseless
view on time. On the other hand both Bonaventureand Aquinas state
thatthesame resbeingfuture,
modes
presentor past,indicatesthreedifferent
se habendi
or modus
of being {modus
and
this
seems
to
a
essendi)
suggest tensed
view on time. In criticisingthe nominalistposition,Bonaventuresays:43
43In I Sent.
d. 41 a. 2 q. 2: "[EJnuntiabile
nonsignificai
se habendi;
rem,sedmodum
et cumperverbum
et futuri
resalio modose habere,
praesentis,
praeteriti
significetur
estte essenasci
turum
et te essenatum."
Cf.
quodaliudenuntiabile
patetde necessitate
alsoad 1: "[QJuamvis
sitreducibilis
ad unamreiveritatem,
sicutaccidens
ad subiectum,
et modusessendi
ad entitatem,
tarnen
cummodusessendi
habeatsuamveritatem,
ettres
suntmodiessendi,
ideosunttresveritates."
S.Th.la q. 16 a. 8 ad 4: ". . . sesAquinas,
sioSocratis,
huiuspropositionis
'Socrates
sedit'noneodemmodo
quaeestcausaveritatis
18:06:50 PM
THEOLOGY
TENSELOGIGIN 13TH-CENTURY
183
18:06:50 PM
184
HARMGORIS
truth-values
dependingon the momentof utterance,was somewhatmuddled because of an ambiguoususage of the term4enuntiabil
and because
of lack of a clear distinctionbetween temporallydefiniteand indefinite
propositions,caused by a confusionover non-indexicaltemporalexpressions and indexicalones. This did not preventscholarslike Bonaventure
in favourof
and Aquinas to develop the argumentfromintensionality
of tenses.Aquinas is the only one who uses
the logical indispensability
the psychologicalargument,which has III De An. 430b 1 as its authoritativetext,in order to underpinhis logical theoryon tenses: the working of the intellectin the formationof propositionsexplainsthe essential
role of tenses.
Scholastictheoriesin tense logic exhibitstriking
parallelswithmodern
views: the theoryof the omnitensedcomplex,the old and new tenseless
theoriesand the tensed theoryhave 12th-and 13th-century
equivalents.
A major difference
is that metaphysicalimplicationsof tense logic with
regardto the natureof time,which formthe focusof the currentdebate,
are relativelylittlediscussedby medieval scholars.On the otherhand, I
don't know of any modern attemptto take psychologicalargumentsinto
account in the way Thomas Aquinas did.
Utrecht
Universitt
Katholieke
Theologische
18:06:50 PM
1 Whatfreedom
of
controversial.
Therewerea number
towasrather
amounts
actually
formaintaining
"theability
famous
Anselm's
definition,
candidates,
uprightness
including
themainfocusofthispaper,Philip
thatinfluenced
ofwillforitsownsake,"a definition
andtheabsence
todo whatonewants
include
theability
Other
candidates
theChancellor.
until
Possibilities
ThePrinciple
ofAlternative
ofcoercion.
(PAP)wasbyandlargerejected
wanted
to maintain
sincemedieval
thelaterpartofthethirteenth
century,
philosophers
in heavenactfreely
eventhough
thatGodandthesaints
theyareunableto actsinfully.
offreedom.
PAPtobe an essential
element
seemsto havethought
however,
Scotus,
Vivarium
, 39,2
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001
18:06:57 PM
186
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
2 PeterLombard,
Book
Grottaferrata
distinctae
inIV libris
Sententiae
1971-81,
, ed.I. Brady,
bonum
rationis
etvoluntatis,
estfacultas
arbitrium
qua
II, dist.24,C.3,452-3:"Liberum
"
arbitrium
I leavetheterm"liberum
velmalumeademdesistente."
assistente,
gratia
eligitur
it.
becauseI believethatthereis no non-question-begging
untranslated
wayto translate
whatliberum
wasat leastin partto specify
arbitrium
on liberum
oftreatises
The purpose
as ifthe
will"makesitappears
thetermas "freechoice"or "free
is.Translating
arbitrium
or "free
itas "free
ofthewill.Translating
in favor
hasbeendecided
judgment"
question
I will
in
view.
of
the
in
the
direction
the
decision"
Therefore,
intellect,
my
question
begs
involved
arbitrium
andthedifficulties
ofliberum
Fora discussion
untranslated.
leavetheterm
seeJ.B. Korolec,Freewillandfreechoice
at a satisfactory
in arriving
, in:
translation,
Medieval
A. Kenny,
N. Kretzmann,
,
ofLater
Philosophy
History
(eds),TheCambridge
J.Pinborg
1982,629-41.
Cambridge
3 One can see thistrendoccurring
In hisrelatively
in theworkofThomasAquinas.
In Summa
arbitrium.
ofliberum
discussion
a detailed
includes
De veritate
, Aquinas
earlywork,
toitinthe
oneshort
liberum
arbitrium
question
devoting
, he mentions
onlybriefly,
theologiae
in terms
of
actionalmost
human
first
solely
partand,laterin thesecondpart,discussing
andvoluntas.
ratio
4 OdonLottin,
auxXIIeetXIIIeSicles
etMorale
, 6 vols,Louvain-Gembloux,
Psychologie
vol.1, 225.
1942-60,
5 Vernon
, vol.1, GardenCity1970,138and 147.
Bourke,
ofEthics
History
18:06:57 PM
187
18:06:57 PM
188
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
18:06:57 PM
189
18:06:57 PM
190
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
has reacheda conclusion,and the notionthatthe willcannotact in opposition to knowledgecurrentlybeing consideredby intellect.16
The condemnationof these articlesbroughtabout an emphasis on freedomin
the will. In turn,this emphasis raised suspicionsin the minds of many
philosophersconcerningearliertheoriesof action and in particular,that
of Thomas Aquinas. AlthoughAquinas is not named in the condemnations, philosopherssuch as William de la Mare argued that Aquinas's
conceptionof the will as a power responsiveto the judgmentsof intellect commits him to a denial of freedomin the will. This set up a
vigorousdebate betweenAquinas's followerson the one hand, who had
to show how to preservefreedomin the will in Aquinas's account, and
his detractorson the otherhand, who argued thatAquinas's accountfails
to preservefreedomin the will.17This debate paved the way forthe rise
of ethicalvoluntarism.Thus, Kent arguesthatthe condemnationof 1277
had the effectof raisingissues that were never a concern for philosoarbitrium
earlierin the century.18
phersengaged in the discussionof liberum
Kent is surelyrightto argue that ethical voluntarismrose to prominence in the later part of the thirteenth
century,in large part, because
of the condemnationof 1277. However, I shall now tryto establishthat
at least some of its centralnotionsappear in the earlierwork on liberum
writtenby Philip the Chancellor.19
arbitrium
2. Philip'sConception
ofFreedom
It is not immediatelyapparent that Philip is an advocate of ethicalvoluntarism,forhe identifiestwo senses in which thereis freedomboth in
the intellectand in the will. The firstsense has to do with theirbeing
immaterialpowers.20Philip argues thathuman beings act freelyin virtue
of certainpowers (intellectand will) which are not composed of matter.
16Kent1995(op.cit..above,n. 7), 77-8.
17Kent1995(ob.cit. above,n. 7. 104-6.
18Kent1995 cit.,above,n. 7), 110-1.
(op.
19
Cancellarius
Summa
debono
Parisiensis,
, ed. NicolaiWicki,2 vols.,Bern
Philippus
1985.The relevant
material
forthispaperis found
in thesection
ofDe bono
nature
called
De bono
nature
, partfour(Debono
quodnonestdiminuibile
permalum
culpe
quodestexcorporali
etintellectuali
creatura
in question
one(Quidsitanima
two(Depoten), especially
) andquestion
Withrespect
tiisanime).
to question
arearticle
articles
one(Dediffrentiis
two,therelevant
etmotiv
articletwo(De libero
arbitrio
five(De
potentiarum
cognoscitivarum
arum),
), and article
I shallcitetherelevant
ifnecessary
therelevant
article
anditspart,
volntate).
question,
therelevant
linenumbers,
andpagenumbers.
20Summa
debono
vol.1, 173:"Adobiectaautemita
(hence:SDB), q. 2, a.2a,251-59,
18:06:57 PM
191
This is in contrastwith non-rationalanimals,whose behavior is determined in virtueof theirbeing whollymaterial.In his discussionof the
arbitrium
definitionof liberum
, Philip appeals to the authorityof Aristotle
and ofJohn Damascene:
is abletounderstand
intellect
Justas thePhilosopher
saysthatthepossible
contrary
in virtue
from
becauseit is separate
ofitsnature
or separable
both,so too
things
willbe thesortofthing
because
thepractical
intellect
thatcanrelateto opposites,
itis freefrom
ofmatter.
ingeneral
thatis septheobligation
Therefore,
everything
to itsownact.Butbothreasonandwillarepowers
of
arableis freewithrespect
thissortandon account
ofthis,freedom
willbe bothin reasonand in thewill.
a human
ortheratio'Foreither
JohnDamascene
beingwillnotbe rational
argues,
nalbeingwillbe themaster
ofhisownactsandfreein hisjudgment.
Thus,nonrational
tojudgment,
fortheyareacteduponby
arenotfreewithrespect
beings
butat thesame
nature
morethantheyact.Thus,theydo notcontradict
appetite,
timethattheyhavea desire,
intoan act.Buta human
theyarepropelled
beingas
a rational
morethanhe is acteduponbyit.Thus,whenone
beingactson nature
ifhe should
feelsa desire,
to restrain
hisappetite
or
wish,he hasthepowereither
tofollow
it.'21
estquodlicetex verbis
Iohannis
Damasceni
libertas
communiter
respondendum
respiciat
omnes
actuspredeterminatos
rationis
etvoluntatis
utsupra:'Libereinquirit,
liberediiudicatetc.libere
ex consequenti
sicut
vul,tarnen
rationem,
voluntatem,
principaliter
respicit
ad hocconsonant.
Dicitur
Bernardi,
Anselmi,
patetexauctoritatibus
Augustini,
quiquantum
tamen
libertas
commune
scilicet
ratioetvolunquidutrique.
Propter
quodcumutraque,
immaterialitatem
eiuslibertatem
habetfaciendi
tas,respiciat
faciendum,
propter
quodvult
etquantofuerit
tantohabetampliorem
sicutcontingit
earn
libertatem,
magisimmaterialis,
dicisecundum
De hocenininfra
determinabitur."
Thispassageis found
magisetminus.
in Philip's
ofthedefinition
ofliberum
discussion
arbitrium.
to a
Here,Philipis responding
basedon theauthority
ofJohnDamascene
whoclaimsthathuman
preliminary
objection
a number
of activities
and being
deliberation,
beingsperform
freely,
including
willing,
movedto act(movevi
secundum
someoftheseactiviBut,theobjection
continues,
impetum).
tiesbelongto powers
otherthanintellect
andwillandso thosepowers
wouldperform
their
activities
to Philip's
as well,contrary
freely
position.
21SDB, q. 2, a.2a, 157-67,
vol. 1, 170:"Ostensio
autemesthecquodliberum
arbitrium
estin utroque
et volntate].
NamsicutdicitPhilosophus
[ratione
quodintellectus
secundum
nturm
autseparabilis
contraria,
possibilis
potest
intelligere
quiaestseparatus
ab utroque,
itaeritin practico
intellectu
in opposita,
ab obliquodpotest
quialiberatur
materie.
Generaliter
in suoactu.Sed tamratio
estliberum
gatione
ergoomneseparabile
sunthuiusmodi
et propter
hoceritlibertas
tamvoluntatis
quamvoluntas
quamrationis.
Et Iohannes
'Autenimnoneritrationale
Damascenus:
aut rationale
ensdominus
erit
actuum
et liberum
arbitrio.
Undeirrationabilia
nonsuntliberaarbitrio;
enim
aguntur
sedsimulquodappetierunt
quamagant.Ideo noncontradicunt
magisnatura
appetitui,
ad actum.
Homoautemrationalis
ensmagisagitnaturam
ab ea;
impetunt
quamagatur
si velitpotestatem
habetut appetitum
refrenet
velut sequatur.'"
The
ideoqueappetens
Damascene
comesfrom
Defideorthodoxa
M. Buytaert,
, ed. Eligius
O.F.M.,St.
quotefrom
N.Y. 1955,153,11.17-26:"Siverohocexnecessitate
exsistit
rationali
liberum
Bonaventure,
autenimnoneritrationale
autrationale
eritactuum
etliberarbiarbitrium;
ens,dominus
trio.Undeet irrationalia
nonsuntliberaarbitrio;
enimmagisa naturaquam
aguntur
18:06:57 PM
192
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
18:06:57 PM
193
ofliberum
discussion
arbiad hocconsonant."
Anselmi,
Philip's
Throughout
qui quantum
to theactsofintellect
andwillin sucha waythatitis clearthathe has
trium
, he refers
in mind.
Damascene's
enumeration
25Damascene
intellect
andwill,and
discusses
thevarious
ofthesoul,including
powers
37
inbookII, chapter
36 ofDefideorthodoxy
ed.Buytaert,
their
132-42.
activities
Chapter
hasadditional
information
on thissubject
(142-4).
26See note24.
27SDB,q. 2, a.2a,410-18,vol. 1, 178-9:"Adilludveroquodsequitur
propter
quid
dicendum
acturationis
et a primovoluntatis
denominationem
videtur
capereab ultimo
utfiatestprimo
de faciendo
ultimum
actumrationis
estquodsecundum
quiestiudicium
consenrecti
tudoauterror
infieri,
undeaccidit
utconsentiat
determinatio
rationis
primo
de quibussupra.Nonsicautemest
aliosultimum
sus,nonautemsecundum
precedentes
itaquod
eiusin bonmvelmalum,
de volntate,
immoin primoactuestdeterminatio
dicitur.
Etcontingit
essealiquo
omnis
actussequens
impedimentum
peneshunevoluntarius
secuninistaveronullomodo.Et ideorecteestlibertas
modoinactibus
consequentibus,
HerePhilipis responding
voluntatis."
rationis
etsecundum
dumactumultimum
primm
ofthedefinition
arbitrium.
The
inhisdiscussion
ofliberum
toanother
objection
preliminary
a worry
it seemsto involve
overwhichofthe
is unclear;
issuein theoriginal
objection
actsandwhichofthewill'sactsdoesjudgment
intellect's
(iarbitrium
) haveto do with(see
in
thedifferent
173,11.246-50).
waysin whichthereis a determination
Philipexplains
formypurposes
is
actofwill.Whatis important
andtheinitial
thefinalactofintellect
hisfinalclaimaboutthelocusoffreedom.
28SDB, q.2, a.2a, 417-8,vol. 1, 179:"Et ideo recteestlibertas
secundum
actum
ofthisquotation,
Forthecontext
see
voluntatis."
et secundum
ultimum
rationis
primum
note27.
29See,forexample,
vol.1, .176:"Adilludveroquodobicitur
SDB, q.2,a.2a,349-55,
18:06:57 PM
194
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
ingeneral
ofJohnDamascene,
freedom
hastodo withall
from
thewords
Although
actsofreasonandwillas wassaidabove,'oneinquires
thepredetermined
freely,
withthewill,
it hasto do primarily
discerns
nevertheless,
etc.,willsfreely,'
freely,
and
withreason,
thetexts
ofAugustine,
whichis clearfrom
Bernard,
consequently
whoagreeon thismatter.30
Anselm,
to themoralconsideration,
it mustbe saidthatknowing
andwillWithrespect
ofacting
withordercometogether
to frame
thenotion
well[ad
ingin accordance
hasto do withjudgment,
rationem
bene
], ofwhichthefirst,
agendi
namely,
knowing,
is primary.31
andthesecondis thewill,whosefreedom
To whatwasobjected
to Anselm's
definition
thatfreedom
is onlyin thewill,it
mustbe saidthat,as wassaidabove,although
freedom
is common
to bothreason
. . . nevertheless,
it hasto do mainly
withthewill.Therefore,
he defined
andwill,
freedom
as 'a powerfordoingwhatonewants,'
andhe didnotcallita powerfor
doingwhatonejudgesor reasons.3'2
liberum
arbitrium
essevoluntatis
tantum
dicendum
estquodquantum
ad primam
rationem
nontarnen
libertatis
estinvolntate,
secundum
rationem
immoquantum
ad arbiarbitrii,
trium
materiale
merendi
estinratione,
ad libertatem
volendi
quodestprincipium
quantum
merendi
estliberum
arbipenesvelieinquo estcomplementum
que consistit
principaliter
trium
in volntate.
Et secundum
hocprocedunt
diversimode
radones
astruentes
liberum
arbitrium
essein ratione
et liberum
arbitrium
essein volntate."
Also,SDB,q.2, a.2a,
arbitrium
essevoluntatem
dicuntquod
359-67,vol. 1, 177:"Illiqui ponuntliberum
diffinit
liberum
arbitrium
actus
penesusum.Et quiain eiususuconcurrunt
Augustinus
rationis
et actusvoluntatis
ideode utroque
consiliata,
precedens
sequensut sitvoluntas
facitmentionem
in diffinitione
cumdicit:'Facultas
voluntatis
et rationis,'
nonquodsit
Et dicunt
liberum
nondicivoluntatem
arbitrium
sedliberum
arbiarbitrariam,
utrumque.
trium
sicutpersimum
nasusetnoninrectitudine
etper
loquendi,
permodum
significatur
Priamidem
italiberum
arbitrium
diciturquasilibertas
arbitrii.
Et fallacia:
volPriamus,
untasestliberum
immoarbitrii.
Sed priorsolutio
verior
arbitrium,
ergoestarbitrium,
est
videtur."
Also,SDB, q.2, a.2a, 368-71,vol. 1, 177:"Ad obiectiones
respondendum
estmalusususliberi
arbitrii
etc.etconcedimus
conclusionem:
liberum
quodomnepeccatum
in quantum
arbitrium
estvoluntas,
sednonsolavoluntas
voluntas,
quiaratio,
quialiberet rationis,
seddiversis
tasestvoluntatis
modis."
Thesepassages
in Philip's
areall found
ofliberum
arbitrium
discussion
ofthedefinition
andareresponses
tovarious
that
arguments
in terms
liberum
arbitrium
shouldbe defined
ofthewillalone.
30SDB, q.2, a.2a, 251-4,vol. 1, 173:"Licetex verbisIohannis
Damasceni
libertas
omnesactuspredeterminatos
communiter
rationis
etvoluntatis
utsupra:'Libere
respiciat
etc.liberevult,'tamenprincipaliter
liberediiudicat
ex
voluntatem,
inquirit,
respicit
sicutpatetexauctoritatibus
rationem,
Bernardi,
Anselmi,
consequenti
Augustini,
quiquantumad hocconsonant."
31SDB, q.2, a.2a, 405-7,vol. 1, 178:"Secundum
autemmoralem
considerationem
estquodscireetveliesecundum
ordinem
dicendum
conveniunt
ad rationem
beneagendi,
scilicet
secundum
estvoluntas
cuiuslibertas
est
scire,respicit
arbitrium,
primum,
quorum
primo."
32SDB,q.2, a.2a, 297-303,
vol. 1, 175:"Ad id veroquodobicitur
perdiffinitionem
libertatem
essein volntate
Anselmi
dicendum
estquod,sicutdictum
estsupra,
tantum,
sitin ratione
et volntate,
in iliapotentia
libertas
licetcommuniter
scilicet
ad
quantum
esttamenprincipaliter
ad voluntatem.
Undediffiniebatur
libactum,
quantum
utrumque
faciendi
ertas'potestas
faciendi
autratiociquodvult,'etnondixit'potestas
quodiudicat
Theorigin
natur'."
ofthephrase"thepowerfordoingwhatonewants"
is a bitobscure.
In thispassage,
it to Anselm
whileelsewhere
he attributes
it to Bernard
Philipattributes
ofClairvaux
theGreatattributes
it bothto Bernard
ofClairvaux
(176,11.345).Albert
18:06:57 PM
195
Thus, whilePhilipreadilyacknowledgesa certainfreedomin the intellect, he emphasizesthat ultimatelyhuman beings act freelybecause of
theirwills.Althoughthe finalact of intellect,that is, the finaljudgment
about what to do, comes about freely,Philip insiststhat,unlikethe will,
intellectsuffersfromcertainconstraintswhich limitits freedom:
Truth
is theorigin
thatis in thesoulandthatis whyitconstrains
ofthetruth
reasonto itsconsent.
Butthisis notthecasewithrespect
to thegood,becausehowis good,it is [inthepowerof] thewillto willthatthing
evermuchsomething
or
nottowillit.Thus,itcomesaboutthatifoneconsents
tosomething
thatitis true,
thewillis notconsequently
directed
toward
thereality
ofthatthing
becauseitis not
a good.Nevertheless,
onecannotdenythatit is true.However,
he doesnot
itself
willitbecauseitis nota goodforhim.33
Foralthough
thejudgment
or reason[involved
an interior
in]an actionis from
it depends
ofa
andtherefore
is within
us,nevertheless
principle
upona cognition
inusfrom
thatthing.
which
isreceived
Butthewillisinuswithout
qualification
thing
to
andthusfreedom
is notso muchin accordance
withreasonas itis withrespect
thewill'sact.34
The intellecthas to do withthe truth,withfactsabout ourselvesand the
in which we findourselves.Philip impliesfromthese pascircumstances
one comes to recognize what is true about her surthat
once
sages
and
her
situation,she is not in a positionto deny that truth.
roundings
Thus, once I come to recognizethat thereis a table in frontof me, I
am not in a positionto deny that there is a table in frontof me. Of
course,we can manipulatethe world to a certainextent;I can remove
myselffromthe room in which the table is located and then I could
in a workbyClement).
As faras I can tell,the
and PetertheApostie
(viaa citation
withnoneofthesethinkers.
Laterin thisquestion,
Philipwillincorpophraseoriginates
offreedom
ratethenotion
intohisownaccount
(see186,11.93-6).
33SDB,q.2, a.2a, 384-89,vol. 1, 17-78:"Si obiciatur
de conclusionibus
respondeo:
estveritatis
verum
est.Veritas
autem
principium
que estin animaetideocogitrationem
sitbonum,
in voad suumconsensum.
Sed nonestitain bono,quia quantumcumque
de alilntate
estquodvelitilludvelquodnonvelit.Hinccontingit
quodsi consentitur
in remillius,
et hocquianonest
estvoluntas
sit,nonconsequenter
qua requodverum
nontarnen
vultilludquia nonsibi
ipsibonum;tamennonpotestnegareesseverum,
ofliberum
Atthispoint,
iswrapping
ofthedefinition
arbibonum."
Philip
uphisdiscussion
theindividual
trium
hisfinalcomments.
He hasfinished
andmaking
examining
prelimicomments
aboutsomeofthem
hewillmakesomefurther
general
nary
objections
although
before
thissection.
ending
34SDB, q.2,a.2a,303-5,vol.1, 175:"Iudicium
enimautratioactus,licetsita princia cognitione
reique ab ipsareaccippiointraetitain nobisest,tamenactusdependet
in nobisestet itanontantalibertas
autemsimpliciter
secundum
iturin nobis;voluntas
discussion
ad actuseius."Thisisa continuation
ofPhilip's
oftheobjecrationem
quantum
toAnselm,
freedom
is found
tionthataccording
onlyin thewill;seenote32 forthefirst
of
the
part
passage.
18:06:57 PM
196
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
deny that there is a table in frontof me. But once we've finishedour
manipulations,our perceptionof the worldas it existsat thatpoint structuresour beliefs.The structureof realityprovidesthe foundationforthe
contentof our beliefs.This restriction
applies to judgmentsabout action
as well. Once I have come to see what is true about my situationand
what my optionsare and what reasonsI have foractingone way rather
than another,I am not in a positionto deny any of those things.In the
on the judgmentsof
passages above, Philip implies that this restriction
the intellectimpactsfreedomin the intellectin a significant
way. Thus,
while the intellecthas a contributionto make in the bringingabout of
a free action, ultimately,the freedomof that action will rest with the
will. This is because Philip thinksthat regardlessof what judgment the
intellectmakes, the will is freeeitherto act on thatjudgmentor not to
act on thatjudgment.In the finalanalysis,thisabilityof the will,rather
than the judgment arrivedat by the intellect,determinesthe particular
action the agent performs.The fact that the agent could have chosen a
different
alternativein virtueof her will means that the freedomof that
action restswith the will.
In the passages above, Philip implies that the will is entirelyunrestricted.This is a bit misleading.Philip followsthe medieval traditionof
holdingthat the will is an appetitefor the good. He definesthe will as
"an inclinationto a thingin accordance withthe concept of the good."35
He believes that whateverchoices human beings are attractedto, they
are so because theyregardthe object theypursue to be good. Thus, the
will being an appetite for the good moves the agent to pursue what is
good. However, an object's being good is only a necessaryconditionfor
its being chosen,not a sufficient
condition.Philipbringsup a case where
an agent acknowledgesthat an act of penance would be a good thingto
do yet is unmoved by thisjudgment to performthe act of penance.36
35SDB,
inremsecundum
inclinatio
rationem
q.2,a.2a,264,vol.1, 173:"Etestvoluntas
boni."Thisdefinition
arisesin a discussion
oftheactsofwillandintellect
andtheir
freedom.HerePhilipalsointroduces
hisideathatthewillandtheintellect
areoneandthe
an ideathathewilldiscuss
samepower,
inmoredetaillaterinthesection
on liberum
arbiI willaddress
thisideain section
trium.
3 (below,
202-203).
36SDB, q.2,a.5b,10-13,vol.1, 223:"Item,
de aliquareutfiat,
scilaliquisconsentit
icetab aliquo,sednonvultearnfacere
etinterrogatus
si estbonum
facere,
respondei
quoniambonum,
utfacere
ettarnen
nonfaciet
necvultfacere.
Videtur
operapenitentie,
ergo
sit."Thiscaseis partofa preliminary
towhich
quodnonuniuspotentie
argument
Philip
neverresponds.
hisownviewalthough
it is in keeping
with
Thus,it maynotrepresent
18:06:57 PM
197
18:06:57 PM
198
COLLEENMGCLUSKEY
desire. Philip makes this explicitin the second part of the passage. He
claims thatthe will is capable of incliningitselfaway fromwhat the intellect decrees and towardwhat it itselfwants. Thus, the will is capable of
willingin oppositionto the intellectand need not followthe judgments
of the intellect.The constraintsidentifiedin the intellectdo not affect
the will. Philip regardsthe will as freein ways in which the intellectis
not.
From the passages cited above, it is clear that Philip thinksof the will
as the primarysource of freedomforhuman actions.Nevertheless,Philip
attacksthe positionthat the intellectand the will are oftenat odds with
each other:
thewillandviceversa,
itmustbe saidthatthe
To theclaimthatreasoncontradicts
in accordance
Forthewillis an appetite
withreawilldoesnotcontradict
reason.
son.39
This passage appears worrisome,since here,Philipseems to divergefrom
the earlierstatementthat the will is able to choose what is contraryto
the intellect'sjudgment.
His remarkthatthe will
Philip does not directlyaddress thisdifficulty.
does not contradictthe intellectis buried withinhis replies to prelimiprobnary argumentsand perhaps he did not regardit as a significant
lem. In his discussionof the will,he bringsup a numberof cases where
an agent arrivesat a particularconclusionabout what is to be done or
would be good to do but failsto act on the conclusion.Among the cases
he considersare the case of penance thatI mentionedon p. 196 (see note
36), the case of the devils who admit that it is just for God to punish
them but who do not wish to submitto the punishment,and the case
of an individualwho agrees that friendshipis betterthan gold but who
failsto presenthis friend'sgold to his friend'sheir.40Each of these cases
to theintellect's
tionpointsoutthatthewillcan pursuean objectthatis contrary
thatthetwoareseparate
evidence
whichin theviewoftheobjector
provides
judgment,
powers.
39SDB, q.2,a.2a,306-7,vol. 1, 175:"Adid veroquoddicitur
rationem
contradicere
Estenimvolrationi
noncontradicit.
dicendum
estquodvoluntas
ete converso,
voluntati
rationem."
secundum
untasappetitus
40SDB, q.2,a.5b,10-23,vol.1, 223:"Item,aliquisconsentit
de aliquareutfiat,
sciletinterrogatus
si estbonum
icetab aliquo,sednonvultearnfacere
facere,
quorespondet
ettarnen
nonfaciet
necvultfacere.
Videtur
utfacere
niambonum,
ergo
operapenitentie,
velfacere
Deumesseiustum
diabolus
sit.Similiter
interrogatus
quodnonuniuspotentie
hocnonvultet veliet
et tarnen
estverum,
idemetiamestbonumnonnegabit
iustitiam
nonfacere
utpenameffugere
iustum
nonesseet iustitiam
posset.Et superlocumilium
filiihominum'
dicitGlosa:
recteiudicate,
Psalmi:'Si vereutiqueiustitiam
loquimini,
18:06:57 PM
199
aurofidem.'
Et ponitur
ibi talis
preponis
'Interrogates
quidsitmeliusauruman fides,
et decessit
et mortuus
herecasus:'Amicus
venitet testenulloaurumtibicommendavit
suumaurumtibicommendasse.
aurum
demreliquit
qui nescit
patrem
Cogitate similiter
ab amicotuofilio
nulloteste
aliicommendasse,
heredem
tuoprestari,
Quodvelies
reliquisse.
amicitui.Sedaliudiubetavaritia
aurum
Priusautem
hocfacias
heredi
tua,scilicet
negare.
et in iudiciotuodixisti
velduxisti
iudicasti
melius
essefidem
melius
esse
quamaurum,
ofthispassage.
aurum.'
See note36 forthecontext
18:06:57 PM
200
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
opposes a judgmentof the intellectand thatthe will is a desirein accordance withthe intellect.In thisexample,the will acts in accordance with
the (implicit)judgment that smokingis pleasurable and won't hurt one
in the short term while the will acts in opposition to the (explicit)
judgment that the agent reallyought to quit smoking.The case of the
unwillingpenitent,the demons, and the greedyfriendcould be handled
in analogous fashion.Philip will have to conclude in each case thatit is
up to the will to specifythe particularjudgmentof intellectthatbecomes
operativein orderto preservehis claim thatthe willis the primarysource
of freedom.The passages I have examined previouslyimplythat Philip
does in factbelieve that the will possessesthis ability.41
In her discussionof the early thirteenth
centurydebate, Bonnie Kent
characterization
of
freedom
as the power of human
recognizesPhilip's
and
his
claim
that liberum
for
what
arbitrium
is a
beings
theywant,
doing
functionof the will. Despite theseacknowledgments,
she denies thatthere
is evidence of ethicalvoluntarismin Philip'swork.42But my examination
of Philip's textsupportsthe claim that he was committedto at least two
of the most importantthesesof ethicalvoluntarism,despitethe factthat
he did not discussthemunder the headingof "voluntas
libera
." As we have
he
maintains
that
freedom
has
to
with
do
the will and
seen,
primarily
that the will is able to rejectjudgmentsof the intellect.
However,as we have also seen, Philip'spositionis ambiguousin places,
forhe argues thatthe intellectplays a role in a freeaction. Nevertheless,
this claim does not conflictwith his positionthat freedomis primarilya
functionof the will. Even those more stronglycommittedto voluntarism,
such as John Duns Scotus, argue that there must be a prior act of the
intellectin orderforthereto be an act of the will.43This is because the
will, as an appetitivepower, lacks the abilityto discoverviable alternatives for action and therefore,depends upon the intellectfor its object.
the intellectis a necessarycondition
Thus, even for ethical voluntarists,
for a free action.44Philip has a strongerview; he argues that at least
41See p. 197formvdiscussion
ofthisissue.
42Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),p. 99.
43See forexample
inMetaphysicam
IX, q.15 in:A.B.Wolter,
on
DunsScotus
Quaestiones
theWillandMorality
D.C. 1986,156-7;cf.B. Ioannes
DunsScotus,
, Washington,
Qaestiones
Libros
LibriVI-IX,
lib.IX,q.15, a.2,parag.38,ed.R. Andrews,
Aristotelis,
metaphysicorum
super
G. Etzkorn
N.Y. 1997,685,20-2.
e.a.,St.Bonaventure,
44Kentacknowledges
thispoint;cf.Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 106,108,115-6,
121-3,127-8.
18:06:57 PM
201
These claims reflectsome of the same ideas as the claims cited by Kent
Kent claimsthatBernard's
as hallmarks
of ethicalvoluntarism.
Nevertheless,
fromthatof the late thirteenth
notionof the will differs
centuryscholastics. She implies that therefore,Bernard should not be considered an
ethicalvoluntarist.47
Presumablyshe would raise the same concernabout
Philip's theory.Therefore,in order to establishthe claim that ethical
voluntarismarises much earlierthan Kent and otherssuspect,I need to
look at Philip's conceptionof the will.
Kent describesthe scholasticconceptionof the will as "a rationalor
intellectualappetite,distinctfromsense appetite,on the one hand, and
intellector reason, on the other."48This conceptionof the will involves
45Kent1995(ob.cit.,above,n. 7), 111-2.
46Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 112-3.
47Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 113.Whether
she'sright
aboutthisis beyond
the
thenthecentral
theses
ofethical
voluntarism
have
scopeofthispaper.Butifsheiswrong,
in thetwelfth
their
muchearlier
thanKentmaintains.
century,
origins
48Kent
1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 113.Presumably
theethical
voluntarists
holdthis
18:06:57 PM
202
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
threeconditions:the willis (1) an appetitivepower,(2) capable of respondand (3) separate fromboth the coging to judgmentsof the intellect,49
nitivepower and the sensoryappetite.
Philip conceives of the will as an appetitivepower responsiveto the
judgmentsof the intellectforin his discussionof the definitionof liberum
he definesthe will as "an inclinationto a thingin accordance
arbitrium^
withthe conceptof the good"50and maintainsthatthe willis "an appetite
in accordance with reason."51He notes that Damascene calls the will a
that has to do with deliberation[vorationalappetite [appetitus
rationalis]
luntascumConsilio].52
Moreover,Philip claims that "desiringthe good and
fleeingevil in responseto reason resultsfromthe will."53He adds, "For
desiringthe good and fleeingfromevil is an act sometimesconsequent
Kentnever
makes
thisclaim.Furthermore,
ofthewillas wellalthough
explicitly
conception
and"intellectual
areequivalent
thattheterms
"rational
Kentimplies
appetite"
appetite"
between
thetwoand
ThomasWilliams
arguesthatScotuswoulddistinguish
expressions.
infactrejects
ofthewillas an intellectual
cf.Th.Williams,
HowScotus
thenotion
appetite;
Catholic
69 (1995),
, in:American
Quarterly,
from
Happiness
Philosophical
Separates
Morality
recent
footnote
6. Forfurther
discussion
of thisissue,see Williams'
425-45,especially
MoralPhilosophy
Foundations
62 (1998),
, in: The Thomist,
ofScotus's
paper,TheLibertarian
becauseKentincludes
Thisissueis interesting
Scotusas an ethical
193-215.
voluntarist,
account
ofthewill.Itwould
Scotusdoesnotholdthescholastic
is correct,
yetifWilliams
condition
for
ofthewillis nota necessary
thatadopting
thescholastic
follow
conception
an ethical
voluntarist.
being
49I takethephrase"rational
to
thatis ableto respond
to meanan appetite
appetite"
made
the
intellect
then
an
the
intellect.
made
by
Judgements
give
agent
by
judgements
It doesnotfollow
from
thisthatthewill'svolionewayor another.
reasons
foracting
onemayholdsimply
thata judgment
tionsaredetermined
bytheintellect's
judgments;
neverdefines
foran actofthewill.Kentherself
is a necessary
condition
bytheintellect
in chapter
that
herdiscussion,
sheimplies
thetermalthough
three,
throughout
especially
in thissense;cf.Kent1995(op.cit.,above,n. 7),
"rational
shetoounderstands
appetite"
84, 106,108,115-6,121-3,127-8.
50SDB, q.2,a.2a,264,vol.1, 173:"Estvoluntas
rationem
inclinado
in remsecundum
ofthispassage.
boni."See note35 fora discussion
51SDB,q.2,a.2a,306-7,vol.1, 175:"Estenimvoluntas
secundum
rationem."
appetitus
52SDB,q.2, a.l, 29-33,vol. 1, 160:"Appetitivas
autemita [Iohannes
Damascenus]
et
estvirtus
eiusquodestsecundum
naturam
naturaliter
inserta
'Anime
dividit:
appetitiva
etvocatur
thelisis
et
contentiva
etiamnature
assunt
omnium
voluntas,
que substantialiter
rationalis
ad aliquamrem,et hecvoluntas
Bulisis
autemestappetitus
eiusactusthelima.
sumConsilio,
esteorumque suntin nobiset que nonsuntin nobis.Et esthecvoluntas
In thissecetisteprimus
motus
dicitur
consiliario."
ettuncesteorum
que suntad finem,
on liberum
treatise
on thesoulanditspowers
tionofPhilip's
(ofwhichthetreatise
larger
terms.
thecognitive
andappetitive
he discusses
is a part),
arbitrium
powerin general
53SDB,q.2,a.l, 75-6,vol.1, 161:"Namappetere
malum
secundum
bonum
etfugere
Here
secundum
desiderium."
autemsensualitatem
rationem
voluntatem,
sequitur
sequitur
withsensory
a judgment
oftheintellect,
thewill,which
follows
desire,
Philipis comparing
andappetitive
ofthecognitive
all within
hisgeneral
discussion
powers.
18:06:57 PM
203
18:06:57 PM
204
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
18:06:57 PM
205
61SDB,
estquodsi estunasubq.3,a.5a,43-8,vol. 1, 221-2:"Adquoddicendum
et sensibilis,
stantia
rationabilis
velsuumoppositum
cuiussuntheepotentie
quodtamen
ex sacraScriptura
noninveni,
sedinveni
tuncnon
Augustinum
superhocdubitantem,
etconcupiscibilem
estnecesse
duasessevires,
sensibilem
sed
concupiscibilem
intelligibilem,
eritseparabilis
erituna que respectu
a corpore,
concupiscibilium
quorumdam
respectu
in se autemsimpliciter
eritinseparabilis
a corpore,
Thisis Philip's
aliorum
separabilis."
toan objection
thatthetwosorts
ofappetitive
mustbe separate
powers
response
(i.e.the
intellective
or thewill,andthesensory
appetite).
appetite
62SDB,q.2,a.5a,55-7,vol.1, 222:"Et tuncsolvendum
estad ea que supraobjecta
nonquantum
ad substantiam,
cumeadem
ad rationem,
suntperdifferentiam
quantum
licetnonsecundum
sithecillisecundum
rationem."
substantiam,
18:06:57 PM
206
COLLEENMCCLUSKEY
thecaseforthosepowers
whichare motive
alonefortheydo notreceive
powers
theirdiversity
a thing
from
sincetheyreceive
from
a thing
on thepartof
nothing
in whichtheyinhere.63
thesubstance
18:06:57 PM
207
and intellective)
has to do withwhat moves the agent.If the agentmoves
in response to what Philip calls an impulse (impetus),
then the sensory
If
in
is
involved.65
the
moves
to
appetite
agent
response a precedingact
of deliberation(deliberatio
), then an intellectivepower has moved
precedens
the agent.66This matchesthe common descriptionof those thinkerswho
argue for a genuine separationbetweenthe powers,althoughfor Philip
of course,it is purelyon the conceptuallevel. Nevertheless,Philip'sconare sufficiendy
robustto satisfyKent's thirdcondition
ceptualdistinctions
fora scholasticaccount of the will. What's crucial is not the claim that
will,intellect,and sensoryappetiteare separatepowersperse but rather
that therebe a clear distinctionbetweenacts of willingand acts of reasoningand desiring.For it is in virtueof its activitiesthat the will is said
to be a rationalappetitedistinctfromintellectand sensoryappetite;its
appetitiveactivitiesdistinguishit from the intellectwhile its abilityto
respond to the intellect'sjudgments distinguishesit from the sensory
appetite.Certainly,these notionsare presentin Philip; thus he satisfies
the spiritof the scholasticdefinitionof will. A furtherinsistenceupon a
real distinction
among cognitiveand appetitivepowerswould be an arbitrarydemand.
What I have shown is that Philip'sconceptionof the will is in line with
the conceptionfoundlater in the thirteenth
century.Moreover,Philip is
committedto two of the most importantvoluntaristclaims. Therefore,I
would argue that Philip qualifiesas an ethicalvoluntarist.
There is no doubt that Kent would agree that the work on liberum
arbitrum
done earlierin the centuryprovidesa foundationforethicalvoluntarism.Moreover,thereis no doubt thatphilosophersin the laterpart
of the thirteenth
centuryexpresseda much more explicitcommitmentto
65Philipdoesnotdescribe
whatan impulse
is. The termimplies
somesortofnonthesortofthing
thathappens
whenoneunreflectively
stimulus,
cognitive
perhaps
grabs
a freshly
bakedchocolate
onthekitchen
chipcookieofftheplatethatonehasspiedsitting
counter.
66SDB,
utnonintelligat
q.2,a.5a,57-61,vol.1, 222:"Etsicsolvitur
primaobiectio,
Iohannes
Damascenus
vimconcupiscibilem
essealiamin substantia
potentie
que est
sensibilis
ab illa que estintelligibilis,
sed secundum
et hec secundum
rationem,
quod
sensibilis
moveatur
secundum
secundum
autemquodintelligibilis
moveatur
impetum,
deliberatione
autdivinoinstinctu
autnature."
The viewis attributed
to an
precedente
butthere
is no indication
thatPhiliphimself
authority,
disagrees.
18:06:57 PM
208
COLLEENMGCLUSKEY
18:06:57 PM
PetrusHispanusO.P., AuetorSummularum
(II):
and problems*
documents
Further
ANGEL D'ORS
Elementos
The articleby J.F. Meirinhos,PetrusHispanusPortugalensis?
para
Petrus
with
own
de autores
uma diferenciao
,! together
Hispanus
my
paper
to a traSummularum2
have put an end, in myview definitively,
O.P., auctor
in the twenditionwhicharose duringthe Renaissanceand was furthered
tiethcenturyby the work of Martin Grabmann. In this tradition,there
has been a tendencyto regard any work attributedto someone by the
"
name of "Petrus
Hispanus as the workof a singleauthor,who is identified
"
as being Petrus
", Pope John XXI. A major Corpushas come to
Julini
be attributedto this author,encompassingworksabout logic and theology,medicineand naturalphilosophy,bullaeand sermons,and even works
on alchemyand mathematics.As a resultof this,John XXI has come
to figureas an eminentintellectualof the thirteenth
century,almostcomwith
St
Albert
Great
the
or
St
Thomas
parable
Aquinas.
Althoughsome earlierstudiesbroughtto lightthe doctrinalinconsistencybetweensome of the worksincludedin the Corpusascribedto John
XXI, beforethepublicationofJ.F. Meirinhos'sarticleattemptswere made
to explain this inconsistency
by recourseto a supposed developmentin
" which ran
"
the thoughtof PetrusHispanus
parallel to the gradual reception of Greek and Arab medicineand Aristotle'sthought;or by denying
to "PetrusHispanus
the authenticity
of the attribution
". Meirinhoswas the
* I wishto thank
I. Angelelli,
C.H. Kneepkens,
J.M.Gambra,
J. GoniGaztambide,
S. Ebbesen,
E. PrezRodrguez
andM. de Asa,whoreadtheinitial
verL.J.Bataillon,
andencouragement,
sionofthisarticle,
fortheir
observations
which
me
to
helped
sharpen
andcomplete
someofmyanalyses.
1 Revista
deFilosofia
Medieval
Meirinhos
, 3 (1996),51-76.In thisstudy,
Espaola
argues
fortheexistence
ofat leastthree"Petrus
", amongwhomtheworks
Hispanus
previously
attributed
toJohnXXI oughttobe redistributed.
wouldseemtobe
Meirinhos
However,
hisearlier
somedoubts
albeitmoreinconnection
withissues
conclusions,
having
regarding
inPortuguese
cultural
thanwithquestions
thespecific
of"Petrus
politics
concerning
problem
do
P.
Calafate
Historia
Pensamento
vol.
Idade
Hispanus'''
(see
(ed.),
Filosofico
Portugus,I,
Mdia,
Lisbon1999,364).
2 A. d'Ors,Petrus
Summularum
35 (1997),21-71.
O.P.,Auctor
, in:Vivarium,
Hispanus
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001
Vivarium
39,2
18:07:04 PM
2 1O
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
211
4 RamnHernndez,
actasdeloscaptulos
dela Provincia
de
O.P.,Lasprimeras
provinciales
5 (1984),5-41.
, in:Archivo
Dominicano,
Espaa
18:07:04 PM
2 12
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
213
PetrusHispanusconversus
the Legenda
, is attributed),
(who was a memprima
"
Petrus
in Bologna),a first"Magister
ber of the earlyDominican community
(who signedas witnessa documentconcerningthe nuns of the Convent
"
of Santa Maria in Tempulo in Rome in 1220), and a second Magister
"
as "rector
Petrus
(to whom Grard de Frachet refersin his VitaeFratrum
"
scholarum
Burdegalisaround 1238).
Tugwell says nothingabout the other two candidates I put forward:
"Petrusnatione
s" (mentionedby pseudoGallus,in FranciaPriorprovinciali
,
Henri of Ghent and Tritemius)and Fray Pedro Espaol (discussedby
Thomas of Cantimprand Qutif-Echard,
amongothers).Tugwell'ssilence
on theselast two figuresis probablydue firstto the manifestimpossibilwith "Petrus
the "auctorSummularum"
, nationeGallus,in
ity of identifying
from
a
communication
to
who
FranciaPrior
personal
provincialis", according
O.P.
Reims
with
Pierre
of
identified
L.J. Bataillon O.P. ought to be
(11247), Prior of Paris, Provincialof France, Bishop of Agen (in 1245),
and authorof threecollectionsof sermons.7Secondly,because of the comabout the figureof Fray Pedro Espaol
plete lack of preciseinformation
which makes any kind of argumentabout his identification
impossible.
"
"Petrusnatione
Prior
in
Francia
for
reasons
Gallus,
,
provincialis
proposing
My
"
"
"
on the basis of the name Petrus
Summularum
as thepossible auctor
Hyspani
"
comnes
homines
in
the
Gallici found
' chieflyrested on the
Compilationes
"
"
name "Petrus
", my hypothesesabout the link between PetrusHispanus
and the Court of the Kings of Navarre,and the fact that I knew nothing of Pierrede Reims. Now that the latterhas been identified,I think
thathe can be excluded fromthe list of possiblefigureswithwhom the
"auctorSummularum
" can be identified.
However, there is no reason to
removeFray Pedro Espaol fromthat list.
"
" fromthislistof
Petri
Tugwell'sreasonsforexcludingthe two magisti
"
"
possibleauthorsof the Summulaeseem to me to be too weak. In Tugwell's
view, the information
concerningthese two figuresdoes not allow us to
" were either
Petri
conclude that these two "magisti
Spanish or members
to the"auctor
Summularum
buriedin Estella,
", and should
strictly
theyreferred
speaking
oftheperson
wedecideshould
as referring
tothelatter,
therefore
be understood
regardless
be identified
as the"auctor
Summularum
7 I thank
fortheattention
he paidtomyfirst
article
on Peter
Bataillon
LouisJacques
whichhaveenabledmeto amendsomeofmy
observations
ofSpainandforhisprecise
research.
To himI alsoowetheinformation
about
andredirect
errors
mysubsequent
deecclesiasticis
to HenriofGhent:
itought
oftheLiber
incorrect
attribution
scriptoribus
perto HenriofBrussels.
hapsto be attributed
18:07:04 PM
2 14
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
215
" is buried in
His reason is basically as follows:the "auctorSummularum
"
"
Estella,Pedro Ferrandois buried in Zamora, PetrusHispanasconversus
(a
in Bologna)shouldbe identified
memberof theearlyDominicancommunity
"
with "PetrusHispanasconversus
(a memberof the early Dominican communityin Milan, his last documentedplace of residence,which thereis
it can be assumed that
no recordofhishavingleft,and where,therefore,
he died and was buried),and therefore,
since no one can be buried in
two places at the same time,neitherPedro Ferrandonor "PetrusHispanas
" can be identifiedas the "auctorSummularumBut if it were not
conversus
" is buried in
"
true that the uauctorSummularum
Estella, or that Petrus
"
is buried in Milan (thereis no reason to doubt that
Hispanusconversus
Pedro Ferrandois buried in Zamora), would therebe any other reason
to rejectthe attribution
of the Summulae
to Pedro Ferrando or to "Petrus
"?
Hispanusconversus
In Tugwell's view there is at least one other reason that rules out
"
"Petrus
, which is
Hispanusconversusas a possible author of the Summulae
"
his veryconditionas conversusAccordingto the informationprovided
we have about thisman comes
by Tugwell,the oldestpiece of information
Predicatorum
fromthe Libellasde initiisOrdinis
byJordanof Saxony in which
he appears, withoutan actual name, as "frater
conversui'the companion
who
was
one
of
the
second
of "frater
Christianu'
group of Preacherssent
8
It
was Galvano della Fiamma, in
by St. Dominic to Bologna in 1218.
his Chronica
Maior (now lost, but quoted by AmbrosioTaegio), who first
" the name of "Petrus
"
".9 It is doubtlessthese
Hispanus
gave this conversus
whichformthe basis forthe later recordin theAnnalesOrdinis
testimonies
Praedicatorum
in my earlierarticle.
by T.M. Mamacho,10to whichI referred
8 Libellus
deprincipiis
ordinis
auctore
lordano
deSaxonia
, ed. H. Gh.Scheeben,
praedicatorum
Monumenta
Histrica
SanctiPatrisnostri
fase.II, Rome1935,25-88(n. 55,
Dominici,
Dominicum
fratres
videlicet
frater
Bononiam,
p. 51):"Missisunta Romapermagistrm
Iohannes
de Navarra
etquidam
frater
verofrater
Christianus
cum
Bertrandus,
postmodum
fratre
converso."
See alsoTugwell1999[op.cit
., above,n. 5),p. 112.
9 G. Odetto
dell'ordine
domenicano
deGalvano
Fiamma
O.P.,La cronaca
, in:Archivm
maggiore
Fratrum
on p. 344: "Fratres
10 (1940),297-373,
autemqui missisunt
Praedicatorum,
Bononiam
a beatoDominico
fr.Ioannesde Navara,fr.Bertrandus
fuerunt
et fr.Petrus
conversus."
Hyspanus
10T.M. Mamacho,
Annales
Praedicatorum
Ordinis
, t. I, Rome1756,466:"XXVII.Eo jam
etantequam
indeab initio
anniMCCXVIIIpostpascha,
inOrdinem
Reginaldus
cooptarea Dominico
Fr.Johannes
deNavarra,
vnrant
Lutetiam
tur,
praemissi
quemannosuperiore
Fr.Bertrandus,
Parisiorum
abirejussum
nihilcomdemonstravimus,
nomen,
cujuspraeter
habemus
enima Bertrando
fuisse
Fr.Christianus,
constat),
(diversum
pertum
Garrigiensi
Fr.Petrus
et Fr.Riardus
senexvirgravissimus,
vitae
conversus,
Hispanus
singularique
innocentia
de Uzero,etFr.Dominicus
excellens;
atquenondiupostFr.Michael
Hispanus
18:07:04 PM
2 16
ANGELD'ORS
" mentioned
This "conversus
byJordan of Saxony is called "fraPietroconverso romano" by D'Amato and Alce.11I do not know theirreasons for
indicatthis,but later D'Amato refersto him simplyas "fiaterconversu'
whichmightguaranteeGalvano'sidentification
ing thelack of documentation
" with a "Petrus
".12
of this "conversus
Hispanus
" thusraises two
This "PetrusHispanusconversus
importantquestions.On
"
"
the one hand, that concerningwhat the word conversusmeans in the
frameworkof the era in which the Order of Preacherswas founded;on
the other,that as to why Galvano della Fiamma came to identifythe
"
" mentioned
"conversus
".
by Jordan of Saxony with a PetrusHispanus
As far as the firstof these points is concerned,in my 1997 articleI
"
consideredtwo possible meanings of the word conversusa convertto
ChristianityfromJudaism or Islam, or a member of a religiousorder
who had not been ordained to the priesthood(lay brother).Because I
regardedthe "Estella tradition"as reliable,and because therewas a sizeable Jewishcommunityin Estella, I inclinedat that time to favourthe
that he was a convertfromJudaism. This was the result
interpretation
of a purelyhypotheticalreflectionbased only on the fact that thisword
had been used withthismeaningon otheroccasions.Now thatmy belief
in the "Estella tradition"has been undermined,I can findno arguments
eitherforor againstthisinterpretation.
Tugwell favoursthe second inter"
"
"
pretationof the word conversui'and takes PetrusHispanusconversusto
be a member of the Order of Preacherswho had not received ordination (lay brother).In keepingwiththisview, he regardsit as improbable
"
that this "PetrusHispanusconversusshould have worked on intellectual
reversi
eodemDominici
ex Hispaniis,
jussu
quodibiex usuOrdininonessent,
propterea
pervenerunt."
11A. D'Amatoand V. Alce,Bologna
Domenicana
, Bologna1961,101:"In un ospizio
e fraGiovanni
allafinedi apriledel 1218fraBertrando
allachiesasi stabilirono
annesso
fraCristino,
Neimessisuccesivi
a Bologna.
inviati
da San Domenico
di Navarra,
giunsero
e fraRiccardo."
romano
converso
fraPietro
12Alfonso
diBologna
e l'Universit
D'Amato
O. P.,I Domenicani
, Bologna1988,p. 32:"In
n. 55.
converso
e
un
fratello
fra
Cristiano
anche
manda
a
(8).(8) Libellus
Bologna
seguito
chesar
deipredicatori,
el monacoCisterciense,
forse
FraCristiano
passatoall'Ordine
di Colonia(Vicairepp. 446-7,452,631-2).Del fratello
delconvento
unodei fondadori
di Spagna(cfr.
lo chiamaPietro
il nome.GalvanoFiamma
nonsi conosce
converso
AFP,
Vicaire
la
asserzione."
sua
che
documenti
10 (1940),p. 344).Nonesistono
provano
per
"
"
"
ofBologna
to the conversus
ofthename"Petrus
thatthegiving
alsoconsiders
Hispanus
au convers,
"Le nomde Pierre
invention:
wasGalvano's
qu'ondonneparfois
d'Espagne
deSaint
de Galvano,
estuneinvention
O.P.,Histoire
AFP,X (1940),344",(M.H. Vicaire,
, II, Paris1957,111,n. 44).
Dominique
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
217
18:07:04 PM
218
ANGELD'ORS
conversui'a member of the communityin Milan. TugwelPs interpretation, given Galvano's personal linkswith the Dominican communityin
Milan, seems likely,and could be accepted. However,since Galvano says
"
",
nothingexplicidyto us about the relationshipbetweenthe two conversi
"
"
or about the earlierstay of the Milan PetrusHispanus in Bologna, this
can only be taken as a hypothesisawaiting furtherdata
interpretation
which will enable us to accept or refuteit.
of the word "couver
sus",on which he bases his
TugwelPs interpretation
"
"Petrus
the
identification
of
Hispanusconversus
possible
argumentsagainst
with the "auctorSummularum",
is perfectlyconsistentwith the use of this
word in the contextof the Cistercianorder and, later, in the Order of
Preachers,and it would thereforeseem quite reasonable to accept it. If,
of Galvano's testo this,we add the doubts regardingthe trustworthiness
"conversus
" with a "Petrus
which
identifies
this
", it seems
Hispanus
timony
" from
"
justifiedto join Tugwell in rulingout this PetrusHispanusconversus
"
the fieldof researchsurroundingthe auctorSummularum".
However,I am
On the
this
conclusion
as
definitive
for
two
reasons.
to
unwilling accept
one hand, there is a traditionconnectedwith the editionsof La Divina
"
Commedia
, to which I shall referbelow, which conveysto us that Petrus
"
"
", was a "lectorin Bologna", and Petrus
Hispanus",the auctorSummularum
"
"
is the only Petrus
HispanuswithlinkswiththeDominican
Hispanusconversus"
that we know about. On
century)16
friaryin Bologna (in the thirteenth
the other hand, as there was a "Petruslecto to whom the Provincial
jointlywiththe "subpriorof Rome",
Chapter in Rome in 1244 entrusted,
the task of revisingthe liturgicalOffice17
("fra Pietro conversoromano",
mentionedby D'Amato and Alce, could be the resultof confusingthe
" and the
two members of this commission,"Petruslector
"subprior of
Rome").
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
219
" whom
of the "conversus
The identification
Jordan of Saxony mentions
" mentioned
"
withthe two PetrusHispanusconversus
by Galvano, and with
the "Pietroconversoromano" mentionedby D'Amato and Alce, withthe
"Petruslector
" in the recordsof the 1244 Roman Provincial
Chapter,and
with the "lector in Bologna" ("auctorSummularum
") mentionedby some
editionsof La DivinaCommedia
, is an improbablehypothesiswhichis hard
to prove,but whichshould not be ruled out. One or severalfiguresmay
have been confused,but as long as the relationsbetween this "Petrus
"
"
Hispanus and this Petruslecto are unclear, it would be imprudentto
"
" fromthe field of our research
remove PetrusHispanusconversus
(above
all when we rememberthat Luis de Valladolid also attributedthe combeatiDominicito the "auctorSummularum!'').
positionof the Officium
Obviously,ifa singlefigurelies at the bottomof thisplethoraof names,
"
the precisemeaningof the word "conversus
oughtto be an object of furtherresearch.Canonical traditionoffersus a wide rangeof meaningsfor
the word "conversus",
which go far beyond the two which we have considered so far; among these are the meanings "monachus
", in its widest
and
At
the
"novice".18
time
of
the
of
the
Order
of Preachers
sense,
founding
we knowtherewas close collaborationwiththe membersof the Cistercian
Order, and that many Cisterciansjoined the new order in one way or
another.19It is not unlikelythat when the recentlyfounded Order of
Preachersexpanded,some difference
shouldhave been establishedbetween
thosewho had enteredthe orderfromsecularlife,and thosewho joined
fromotherreligiousorders.Might this not be the meaning of the word
"conversus
" not have been a Cistercian
"? Might "PetrusHispanusconversus
monk,or one fromsome otherorder,who had joined the new Order of
Preachers?I shall returnto thisproblembelow, but it may be usefulto
18MaTeresaBarbadillo
de la Fuente,
VidadeSanto
deGuzmn.
Edicin
,
Domingo
y estudio
Madrid1985,vol.I, 303-4:"Converso
es en el lenguaje
cannico
sinnimo
de hermano
fundador
de la congregacin
benedictina
de Valleumbrosa,
es quien
lego.San Gualberto,
esadiferencia.
Carecan
ordinariamente
de cultura
o habanllevado
enel mundo
introdujo
unavidade escndalo
Llevaban
hbitodistinto
al de losreligiosos
de coro,
y disipacin.
en lo tocante
a votosde religin
Su escapulario
perono se diferencian
y vidamonstica.
eranegroo grisy as ha persistido
hastamuyrecientemente.
[. . .] Converso
equivala
tambin
a novicio
la tonsura
o aquellos
hermanos
queanno hanalcanzado
quese ocu"
materiales
de losconventos".
See also Conversi"
mediae
, in Glossarium
pande lasnecesidades
etinfimae
conditum
a Carolo
duFresne
domino
Du Cange
latinitatis,
, II. Band,Graz1954,547-8.
19Galvano
dellaFiamma
in reference
to thePreachers
whomadeup thesechimself,
"
ondmission
to Bologna,
tellsus thatthey"adhuc
habitm
portabant
regularem
(seeabove,
"
n. 14).Moreover,
toD'Amato,
"Fr.Christianus
our"conversus
", whoaccompanied
according
on thesecond
to
had
been
a
Cistercian
monk.
See
n.
12.
above,
journey Bologna,
18:07:04 PM
220
ANGELD'ORS
that "fuit
recall that Philip of Ferrara said of the author of the Summulae
"Petrus
de
ordine
.
not
this
indicate
that
this
fratrum
predicatorum"
postea
Might
" had
belonged to some other religiousorder beforejoining the
Hispanus
Order of Preachers?
of Dominican spirituality
On the otherhand, given the characteristics
a
the
status
of
mendicant
from
order,the internalorganresulting
special
had
differ
from
thatof the Cistercian
to
isationof the Order of Preachers
"
"
Order, and so it would come as no surpriseif the term conversushad
acquireda new meaningwhich,unlike"baptised","lay brother"or "monk",
could expressa transitory
condition,ratherthan a stable or permanent
"
", then,could expressthe
one, of the person whom it denotes. Conversus
conditionof a novice who had not been ordained to the priesthoodbut
"
who was preparingforthis.20
Hispanus
Mightthisnot be the case of Petrus
"? In eithercase, Tugwell's argumentagainst the possible idenconversus
" withthe "auctorSummularum"
would
tificationof "PetrusHispanusconversus
lose much of its vigour.
"
"
If "conversus
simply means novice, the identificationof the Petrus
"
"
"
in Milan,
in Bologna withthe Petrus
Hispanusconversus
Hispanusconversus
both mentionedby Galvano, mightturn out to be more problematic,
above all if we bear in mind thatJordan of Saxony refersto the former
"
"
"
using the word conversusalone, withoutgivinghis name. This conver"
sus" mightnot have been PetrusHispanus
", and this name mightonly
"
"
have been the name of the conversusof Milan, which Galvano trans" of
theremighthave been
ferredto the "conversus
Bologna. Alternatively,
' in
"
Galvano
could have confused
whom
a PetrusHispanuslector*
Bologna
"
"
of
mentioned
conversus
with the
Saxony (in this case, the
by Jordan
"
"
would be irrelevant).Nor should we rule
meaningof the word conversus
"
"
"
out the idea that we mightbe looking at the same conversui' Petrus
by name, who spent his novitiatein both Bologna and Milan, and who
"
then perhaps returnedto Bologna where he was lecto. Obviously all
these reflectionsare purelyhypotheticalin characterin the lightof the
"
"
testimoniesregarding PetrusHispanus who was lector in Bologna and
"Petruslectowho revisedthe
liturgicalOffice.Furtherresearchwould be
needed to confirmor reject these possibilities.
Among these hypotheses,the mostprobablyand likelyis, in my view,
" of whom
"
thatwhichpresumesthatGalvano confusedthe conversus
Jordan
"
"
of Saxony writeswith a PetrusHispanus who had also resided in the
20See above,n. 18.
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
221
" is not
"
one, but two
Bologna priory.In thiscase, PetrusHispanusconversus
"
"
"
who
a
Petrus
a
and
conversus
",
Hispanus
mightbe
(lay brother),
people:
As I shall show below, various testimonies
the author of the Summulae.
". Furthermore,
indicate the Navarrese origin of the uauctorSummularum
the house of Santa Maria della Mascarella, where the firstDominican
communityin Bologna was formed,was dependenton the Augustinin
Prioryof Roncesvalles (Navarre), and was the place where Navarrese
clergystudyingin Bologna used to live. When St. Dominic arrivedin
Bologna he was receivedin this Cell; it was among Navarrese students
therethathe began his apostolicworkin Italy,and therealso thatBrother
Reginaldjoined the Order of Preachersand startedout on his apostolic
labours.Some of theNavarresewho livedin Santa Maria della Mascarella
at the time collaborated with St. Dominic and even joined the new
Order.21
This seems to be the case withBrotherRicardo, taken to be the first
Prior of the Dominican communityin Bologna, who, unlike the other
membersof this early community,arrivedin Bologna not under orders
fromSt. Dominic, but as a memberof the Navarresecell dependenton
Roncesvalles.BrotherRicardo seems not to have been the onlyNavarrese
in theMascarellacommunity
tojoin thenew Order of Preachers.According
to D'Amato, St. Dominic had already drawn over one or two of the
Canons of Roncesvalleslivingin Mascarella beforehis returnto Rome,
afterhis firstjourney to Bologna.22The firsthistoriansof the Order of
Preachersseem to have been puzzled by the factthattherewere Spaniards
among the firstmembersof the firstDominican communityin Bologna
21D'Amato
unospizio
O.P. 1988(op.cit.,
esiste
above,n. 12),30: "A Bologna
perpele si trovaalla periferia
tenuti
dai canonici
di Roncisvalle;
norddella
legrini
spagnoli;
Di questisuoiconnazionale
la chiesadi S. MariadellaMascarella.
Domenico
citt,
presso
il viagforse
ospite
nelsuobrevesoggiorno
Certamente,
bolognese.
primadi reprendere
unoo duedi queicanonici
allasua causa.Il primo
gioperRoma,Domenico
conquista
a Bologna
infatti
uncertoRiccardo,
deifrati
chenon fraquellida
priore
predicatori
lui inviati
in questacitt.Moltoprobabilmente
uno dei canonicidell'ospizio
della
a S. Nicolfindall'inizio;
ed detto'priore
Mascarella
deifrati'
(3).(3) FraRiccardo
between
theAugustinin
of
e 'vecchio'
190-1)."On therelations
(Vitae
fratrum,
Priory
seeP. Tamburri
Roncesvalles
anditscellSantaMariadellaMascarella,
Presencia
Bariain,
enBolonia
in: Hispania
institucional
deRoncesvalles
sacra,49 (1997),n 99,
XIII-XVI),
(siglos
E. Ramrez
La comunidad
deSanta
MaradeRoncesvalles
XII363-408;
Vaquero,
regular
(siglos
de Viana,54 (1993),357-401;
F. Miranda
Roncesvalles.
Garca,
XIX),in:Prncipe
Trayectoria
XII-XIX
1993.I wishtothank
forlet), Pamplona
JosGoniGaztambide
patrimonial
(siglos
aboutthese
works
ontherelationship
between
SantaMariadellaMascarella
tingmeknow
ofRoncesvalles.
andthePriory
22See above,n. 21.
18:07:04 PM
222
ANGELD'ORS
who had not been includedin any of the expeditionswhich St. Dominic
sent to that city,and they attemptedto integratethem into these missions. T.M. Mamacho, probably followingan earlier tradition,regards
BrotherRicardo as a furthermember of the second expeditionformed
" and the "conversus"
"
.23Could it not be the case that
by FraterChristianus
"
"Petrus
", was this second Canon of
", the auctorSummularum
Hispanus
Roncesvalleswho joined the Order of Preacherswith BrotherRicardo,
and whom Galvano (who did not know of the existenceof thisNavarrese
cell of Mascarella and the incorporationof some of its membersinto the
" of unknownname as the
new order) identifiedwith the "conversus
only
way of accounting for his presence among the members of the first
Dominican communityin Bologna?
In fact, Galvano seems to have had some knowledge of a "Petrus
"
Hispanus among the membersof the primitiveDominican communityin
Bologna, but knew nothing of this cell in Bologna depending on the
AugustininPrioryof Roncesvalles or the incorporationof some of its
membersinto the Order of Preachers.For thisreason,he seems to have
"
" mentioned
identifiedthe "conversus
by Jordan of Saxony with Petrus
"
Hispanus in order to explain the latter'spresence among the members
of this community.If this were the case, we could easily explain and
"
"
make compatiblethe traditionswhichlink Petrus
Hispanus withBologna
with those that link him to Navarre, as well as the confusionarising
" as a resultof his
around the figureof "PetrusHispanus
being identified
"
"
howsent by St. Dominic to Bologna. Unfortunately,
withthe conversus
ever well thismightseem to fit,it is stillnothingmore than a hypothesis
whichwould requirefurtherresearchbeforebeing accepted or discarded.
It remainsforus to scrutinisethe reasonswhy Tugwell considersthat
Pedro Ferrando should be excluded fromthe field of researchinto the
"auctorSummularum".
However, this problem calls for a carefulexamina"
all
the
issues
tion of
surroundingthe attributionof the Legendaprima"
"
Sancti
and the "Leyenda castellana",and also the historyof the Legendae
Dominici"and the biographicalitineraryof Pedro Ferrando. These are
highlycomplex issues which I would prefernot to address here, and
which I intendto make the subject of a separate article.24In my opin23See above,nn.10 and 11.
" are
24Asfaras the"Legendae
some
contains
Dominici
Sancti
concerned,
my1997article
wasto
in thisforthcoming
whichI mustrectify
paper.Mymainerror
majorinaccuracies
as a mere
to PedroFerrando,
attributed
aboutSt Dominic,
castellana"
taketheLeyenda
to him.
whichis alsoattributed
ofthe"Legenda
translation
prima",
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
223
article,Tugwell's
ion, however,as I shall tryto show in my forthcoming
of
Pedro
Ferrando
with the
the
identification
possible
argumentsagainst
"auctorSummularum
" are not
in
neither
the
attribuconclusive; my view,
" to Pedro
nor
the
of
tion of the "Legenda
reconstruction
Ferrando,
prima
which
fromGil de Santarem'stestimony,
Ferrando'sbiographicalitinerary
are widelyaccepted,are as solid as Tugwell seems to believe. In the present paper I shall thereforeleave the decisive issues surroundingPedro
Ferrandoto one side, and confinemyselfto reportingsome new findings
"
" thathave come to
lightsince the pubregardingthe auctorSummularum
licationof my 1997 article.
to my1997 Article
2. Additions
My 1997 articlewas devoted exclusivelyto the problem of the identity
". It was not my intentionto examine the much
of the "auctor
Summularum
" and the workswhich formthe
"
widerproblemof PetrusHispanus
Corpus
XXI
F.
Meirinhos
had
set
out
attributed
to
(whichJos
formerly
John
I
in explicitand definitive
to
the
form).25 only sought investigate problem
as to whetherthe Tractatus
ought to be attributedto John XXI, as had
generallybeen thoughtuntilthen,or whetherit was the workof a member of the Order of Preachers,in accord witha long and ancienttradition.
foundin fourdifferent
By analysisof the testimonies
literarytraditions
on La DivinaCommedia
, historiesof the Order of Preachers
(commentaries
and Spanish writers,historiesof the popes and Portuguesewriters,manand the commentarieson them),I
uscriptsand editionsof the Tractatus
was able to show thatthe mostancienttestimony
the Tractatus
attributing
toJohnXXI was in theincunableeditionof Iodocus Trutvetter's
Explanado,
and thatthisattribution
had laterspreadvia othereditionsof the Tractatus
,
Gessner's Bibliotheca
Universalis
and Colmariense's edition of Johannes
Tritemius'De scriptoribus
ecclesiasticis.
The outcome of all thiswas thatthis
attribution
was handed down to our own timeas a unanimouslyaccepted
view in all theseliterarytraditions.I also showed that all the testimonies
workattributed
the Tractatus
to a mempriorto the editionof Trutvetter's
ber of the Order of Preachers;that thistraditionhad been kept alive up
till the publicationof Simonin's work in 1930; that the reasons given
by Qutif-Echardwere not firmlygrounded;and
againstthisattribution
in thetradition
thatsomeof theerrorsencountered
theattribution
defending
25See above,n. 1.
18:07:04 PM
224
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
225
" to
relates"PetrusHispanus
Pope John XXI. Althoughthis source might
in principlebe of particularinterestand importance,as Barrosis the first
"
"
Portuguesewriterknownto relate PetrusHispanus toJohn XXI, it turns
as it does not even mentionthe Tractatus
out to be completelyirrelevant,
,
information
and seems to depend veryheavily
contributesno significant
on the traditionof the historyof the popes (a late and poorly founded
tradition,as I establishedin my 1997 paper).
I shall now examine the otherfoursources,and some furtherpieces
of evidence,which serve to supportthe conclusionsI drew in 1997.
a) Lo qualgi lucein dodicilibelli
In the area of the traditionwithineditionsof and commentarieson La
Divina Commedia
writtenin 1416, the work of Iohannes de Serravalle,27
1417, does not contributeany relevantinformation
concerningthe problem of the identityof "Pietro Ispano": Dante's work is translatedinto
is thathe identifiesthe "dodLatin, and de Serravalle'ssole contribution
ici libelli" with the Tractatus.
On my search for this book, however,I
foundout about a further
ancientcommentary,
the Chiose(latine)al Paradiso
,
which I have been unable to consult so far, but which could be of
relevance.28
I have not undertakenthe task of examiningsystematically
the modern editionsand translations
ofLa DivinaCommedia.
This would be extremely
because of both the massivenumbersof textsinvolvedand the
difficult,
existenceof revisededitionsof some of the classic annotatededitionsin
which the footnoteshave been changed, which I would have to track
back to theirearlierversions.In some of the editionsI have examined,as
would be expected,the identification
of "Pietro Ispano" with Pope John
thesamenamewhowasroyalnotary
at thecourtofJohnIII ofPortugal
between
1546
and 1547.
27"Hie suntIlluminatus
et Augustinus
de sotiisSanctiFrancisci),
(fuerunt
Hugode
SanctoVictore,
Petrus
Petrus
Nathanpropheta,
Chrisostomus,
Mangiadorius,
Hispanus,
Anseimus
etDonatus,
Rabbanus
etAbbasIochinus"
duodecim
(p. 958,capituli
Summarium);
"... e Pietro
Spano,/ El qualgilucein dodicilibelli"
(p 967a);". . . etPetrus
Hispanus,
/ Quiiamlucetinduodecim
libellis"
967b);"etPetrus
Hispanus
quiiamlucetinduodecim
in duodecim
libellos"
Giovanni
libellis,
Tractatus,
quiaipsefecit
quosdivisit
(967,notes),
Bertoldi
da Sarravalle,
e commento
dellaDivinaCommedia
di DanteAlighieri
Traduzione
, San
Marino1986(Fratris
Iohannis
de Serravalle,
ord.min.,episcopi
et principis
Firmani,
Translatio
etcommentum
totius
libri
Dantis
cumtextu
italico
Fratris
Bartholomaei
a Colle,
Aldigherii,
eiusdem
nunc
edita
ordinis,
, Prati1891).
primm
28Chiose
al Paradiso
nelvol.II deimanoscritti
Palatini
de Firenze,
, cantiX-XXXIII,
(latine)
ordinati
ed esposti
da F. Palermo,
Firenze1860.
18:07:04 PM
226
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
227
a curadi Ettore
Milano1931,
notedelTommaseo
e d'altri
illustri
commentatori
Fabietti,
- Libelli:Libri,
dodicilibridi logica.
a Bologna
e scrisse
502:"- Pietro
Ispano.Insegn
in sensobuono".
37La Divina
Comedia
deDante
traducida
, connotasde PaoloCostaadicionadas,
Alighieri,
al castellano
1871,425,n. 5: "Espaol,
porD. ManuelAranday Sanjun,Barcelona
fulector
en Bolonia."
de lgicaque escribi:
filsofo
famoso
pordocelibros
38DanteAlighieri,
de NicolsGonzlezRuiz,sobre
Obras
castellana
, versin
Completas
la interpretacin
literal
M. Bertini,
Madrid1965(first
de Giovanni
B.A.C.,secondedition,
en Bolonia".
ed. 1956),p. 425,n. 20: "Espaol,
lector
39I owetheinformation
of thisfamily
of editions
ofLa Divina
abouttheexistence
to JosGoniGaztambide.
Commedia
"Pietro
linking
Ispano"to thecityofBologna
40Dante
La Divina
Commedia
ricavate
dai migliori
che
, connotedichiarative
Alighieri,
conargomento
dei tempidelpoetafinoai nostri
e sommarii
critici
ne scrissero
tempi,
E. Tria e G. Vago,Napoli1892,
a ciascuncanto,per curadai professori
premessi
392-3:"Pietro
Ispano.Famosoperdodicisuoilibridi logicaed altridi teologia."
41La Divina
diDante
colcomento
di Raffaele
Commedia
Firenze
Andreoli,
1906,
Alighieri,
"
Famosoperdodici
edition
ofRaffaele
263 (first
Andreoli,
Ispano.
Napoli1856): - Pietro
suoilibridi logicaed altrodi teologia."
42Roberto
Dante
e la Spagna
PalacioReal,
Rosside Spinola,
, Milano1929(manuscript,
ci tramanda
deiDomenicani
chePietro
more
Madrid),
Ispanovisse,
p. 311: "La tradizione
inNavarra
Phil.Geschichte.
fusepolto
nelConvento
Stella
Lexikon
,pg. 664."
(3). . . (3)L. Noack,
43Ludwig
Handwrterbuch
zur
Lexikon,
Noack,
Philosophie-geschichtliches
Historisch-biographisches
Geschichte
derPhilosophie
, Leipzig1879.
18:07:04 PM
228
ANGELD'ORS
44F. Giovanni
di S. Domenico
huomini
illustri
MichelePio,Dellevitedegli
, Bologna1607
Pietro
di natione
volgarmente
HispanochiamSpagnola,
(Pavia1613):"1249.FraPietro
nelleScuoletrali
checomunemente
ato,compose
s'adoprano,
Logicali,
quelleSummule
la dottrina
d'Aristotele,
nellaqualesi chiudein Epitome
logicale
taeg.pp.";
principianti,
l'oadi F. Pietro
chequivilesse,found,
di Stella,ovegiacciono
"S. Domenico
Hispano,
delP.S.Domenico
etgenerosa
Michele
PioBolognese,
Dellanobile
del1264",F. Giovanni
progenie
Bartolomeo
inItalia,libri
Cochi,1615,p. 160b.
due,inBologna
, appresso
45Chronica
manuale
Praedicatorum
etgeneralis
Ordinis
breois
fratrum
Impressum
(.Explicit
predicatorum.
in Manuale
Fratrum
Praedicatorum
a Salmantica),
Ioannem
Varela
abilem
virum
perhonor
Hispali
Sancii
PauliHispalensis
ordinatum
Fratrum
Praedwatorum
totum
Manuale
religiosum
perquemdam
{Explicit
third
ofthesixteenth
eiusdem
(?)].
century
ordinis)
[s.d.,first
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
229
18:07:04 PM
230
ANGELD'ORS
" shows
meo
Peter of Spain as " compatriota
clearlythat he did not identify
him with Pope John XXI, who was of Portugueseorigin,but with that
member of the Order of Preachersconnectedwith the town of Estella
(Navarre).The testimonyof Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,which is particularly
"
significantas he himselfwas not a Dominican, recognises the auctor
"
ex sacro
as a memberof the Order of Preachers("virreligiosus
Summularum
divipatrisDomini") of Navarrese origin ("prope
ordine
fratrum
predicatorum
is also worthyof special attenvicinus
conterrneos
"). This testimony
patriaque
with
a
us
definitive
solutionto one of the probin
it
that
tion,
provides
lems surrounding"PetrusHispanu' albeit a secondaryone (see sectiond).
"
ordinis
sepultasest
c) "Qui amorein convento
Praedicatorum
of Seville declaresthat "PetrusHispanu'
The ManualeFratrum
"
the auctorSummularum
", is buried in the Dominican house at Zamora,
the "Estella tradition"accordingto which the tomb of
thus contradicting
" is in the Dominican
the "auctorSummularum
Prioryat Estella. For this
reason, we need to re-examineour analyses of the testimoniesin this
tradition.
with
Praedicatorum
If we compare the testimonyof thisManualeFratrum
those that conveythe "Estella tradition",it would seem to be the latter
which is the more reliable,both because of the numberof authorswho
reflectit, theirgreaterantiquityand the type of evidence theymention.
Praedicatorum
The ManualeFratrum
, publishedin firstthirdof the sixteenth
" is
"
century,is the only knowntextto declare thatthe auctorSummularum
buried in Zamora, and it providesno detailsas to his tomb,or any evidence for this assertion.On the other hand, the "Estella tradition"is
of elevenwriters51
backed up by the testimonies
(thefirstof these,Baltasar
who
describe the precise
Sori, was writingbetween 1516 and 1522),
place of the grave and give the textof his epitaph,which some mention
seeing personally.This traditionalso has the backing of the anonymous
, fromthe fourteenthor fifteenth
century,
commentaryon the Tractatus
in
which
of
of
the
in
2080
Salamanca,
University
manuscript
preserved
" is
"Petrus
- which links
oriundas"52
as
"de
Stella
to
us
Hispanus presented
51BaltasarSori(| 1557),Juande Marieta(f 1611),FranciscoDiago (f 1615),
MichelePio (f c. 1644),
Giovanni
A.S. Peregrino
(| 1656),JuanLpez(1524-1632),
de Lezaun(s. XVII),Josde Sarabiay
de Oteiza(s. XVII),Baltasar
Bernardo
Francisco
See
Lezana(s. XVIII),TomsMadalena(s.XVIII)y Pascualde Larrainzar
(1716-1797).
andn. 44 ofthepresent
nn.55 to 66 ofmy1997article
paper.
52See d'Ors1997(op.cit.,above,n. 2),48.
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
231
"
"Petrus
Hispanus with the town of Estella even though it says nothing
about his tomb and of the testimoniesof Domingo de San Juan del Pie
del Puertoand Pedro Snchez Ciruelo,who recognisethe Navarreseori"
to
which mightlend greaterverisimilitude
gin of the auctorSummularum",
the othertestimonies.
It is my view that the nature of these eleven testimonieswhich go to
make up the "Estella tradition"does not allow us to doubt the existence
of thistomb,withits inscription"Hie iacetreuerendus
fr. Petrus
patermagister
auctor
Summularum
".
There
is
no
reason
to
doubt
Francisco
,
Hispanus
Bernardode Oteiza who, in 1688, acting as apostolic notary,described
the precisepositionof the grave and the textof its inscription.None the
less, the existenceof such a grave withthisinscriptionat thisdate is not
enough to prove the reliabilityof the "Estella tradition".The epitaph
describedby Oteiza seems not to have been a medieval one, but one
datingfrommodern times.The doubt thereforearises as to whetherit
was the originalepitaphwhich inspiredthe beliefthatthiswas the grave
of the "auctorSummularum",
or whetherit was the beliefthat thiswas the
" that led later
of
the
uauctor
Summularum
grave
generationsto add this
inscription.My view is that thereare reasons to thinkthat the latteris
the mostprobable hypothesis,which raises major doubts concerningthe
value of the testimoniesbelongingto the "Estella tradition".
If we leave aside the argumentsconcerningthe chronologyassignedto
"Petrus
"
Hispanus and the date at which the Prioryof Santo Domingo in
Estellawas founded(between1258 and 1264), which Qutif-chardused
to object to the testimoniesin the "Estella tradition",and which I scrutinisedin my 1997 article,concludingthat theywere inconclusive,there
are at least three reasons to doubt the reliabilityof this tradition.The
whichlies at the root of thisrevisionof my 1997 analysis,is related
first,
to the ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
, which Toms Madalena, a figurein
the "Estellatradition",
was acquaintedwithbut quoted onlyin fragmentary
form:"Eodemetiamtempore
creditur
Fr. Petrus
Summularum
, auctor
floruisse
Hispanus
. Toms Madalena does not
, sanctushomo,et in artibusdissertissimus"
Logices
"
quote the decisivefinalphrase in the textof the Manuale: qui amorein
conventu
ordinis
est". The omissionof thisfinalpart, which creates
sepultus
a major difficulty
forthe adherentsof thistradition,can only arouse susThe
lateness
of Toms Madalena's testimonymeans that we do
picions.
not have to creditthis apparentmanipulationof the textof the Manuale
Fratrum
with any particularimportance,but it does prompt
Praedicatorum
the questionas to whetherlater supportersof thistraditionreallydid not
know thisinformation,
or whethertheysimplykept quiet about it.
18:07:04 PM
232
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
233
18:07:04 PM
234
ANGELD'ORS
The ManualeFratrum
Praedicatorum
raises major doubts concerningthe
"Estella
of
the
tradition"
and
forcesus to consideran opposreliability
" was buried in
"auctorSummularum
tradition
which
holds
that
the
ing
even
Zamora and not Estella.These two traditionscannotbe reconciled,54
both
consistent
with
in
of
are
the
the
2080
testimony
manuscript
though
"auctor
of
Salamanca
to
that
the
Summularum
is
",
(there nothing say
University
"de Stellaoriundu'mightnot be buried not in Estella but in Zamora).
But nor does this mean that the evidence in MS Salamanca, UL, 2080,
deserves to be
which tells us of the origin of the "auctorSummularuni'
relied on more than any of the testimoniesabout the tomb,except,perhaps on groundsof its greaterantiquity.The testimonies
preservedabout
the "auctorSummularum
are mutuallycontradictory,
and some have to be
discarded. In my 1997 article I rejected any testimoniesthat identified
him withPope John XXI because of theirlatenessand the way in which
theyarose, in favourof the older accountswhichtook him to be a member of the Order of Preachers.We now find that these too contradict
each other,and that some of these have to be discarded.But the decision we face this time is much more difficult.
"
/"PetrusHispanusrecentio
d) PetrusHispanusantiquio
" is not
The problem surroundingthe identityof the "auctorSummularum
a new one. In my 1997 article I pointed out that, alongside the two
major traditionswhichidentifiedhim as Pope John XXI on the one hand
and a memberof the Order of Preacherson the other,therewere also
other authors,like Nicols Antonio,who recognisedthat the testimonies
that had been preservedwere not enough to enable us to pronouncein
favourof one or otherof these traditions("Absquetamen
veritatis,
praeiudicio
alus quorumintererit
duo an unusPetruscognomento
Hispanusjuerit
relinquentes
aliumponimus
nospraeter
Ioannem
examinare
, interim
"). Moreover,
Papamprivatum
authorssuch as Qutif-Echardrejectedboth traditions("Etsi autemillenon
sit noster
,nonindesequitur
JoannesXXI, dietusantea
quodsit SummusPontifex
PetrusHispanussimplicite
Petrus
r"). In my earlierarticle,
Julini& quandoque
"
I showed that the evidence in favourof the "auctorSummularum
being a
member of the Order of Preacherswas much strongerthan that which
54In reality,
evenbe thatthesetwo
it might
intoaccountall thepossibilities,
taking
to saythat,after
oneofthedestrucarenotincompatible,
as thereis nothing
traditions
" couldnothave
housein Zamora,thetombof"Petrus
tionsoftheDominican
Hispanus
aside
for
the
I
shall
leave
this
beenmovedto Estella.
However,
present.
possibility
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
235
supportedhis identityas Pope John XXI, and that the reasons which
Qutif-Echardbroughtto bear againstthese testimonieslacked all basis.
In principle,it seems that there is no reason to doubt that the "auctor
"
Summularum
belongedto the Order of Preachers,and no groundsto give
credenceto a thirdhypothesis.
However,thisonlysolvesa smallpart of the problemsince,apart from
his belongingto the Order of Preachers,we scarcelyknowanythingabout
the identityand biographyof the "auctorSummularum
". We have already
seen thatthereis contradictory
evidenceabout his burial place, and that
" is stillin doubt.
the identityof the "auctorSummularum
With a view to clearingthe way forwardtowardsa solution,it would
be usefulto removea spuriousproblemthathas arisenaround the figure
"
of "Petrus
Hispanus whichhas engenderedneedlessduplications,obscured
the nature of the problem, and entangled the question of the "auctor
" withotherissues
Summularum
concerningthe historyof medievalthought
whichhave, in principle,nothingto do withour "PetrusHispanus
". I refer
to the distinctionsometimesmade between a "PetrusHispanusantiquio
"
(senioror older)and a Petrus
Hispanusrecentio
(junior or younger),which
was introducedby Nicols Antonioin his Bibliotheca
Hispana Vetuson the
basis of Pedro Snchez Ciruelo's account, and which has subsequendy
"
had repercussions
on the problemof "Petrus
Alfonsiand the problemsof
the authorsof the Summatotiuslogiceand the De consolatone
rationis.
This
is what Nicols Antoniosays:
163.Sed& aliquidhabemus
hisex eodemPetroCiruelo
Alterum
adiungere.
nempe
is Petrm
huneSummularum
Hispanum,
praeter
priorem
inventorem,
cognitum
cmtempore,
tumprofessione
vitaediversum.
In
habuit,
quemiuniorem
appellai:,
clericali
enimstatuhonestissim
fuitatquetheologus
vivens,
doctissimus,
philosophus
bonarum
artium
excultus:
omniumque
disciplinis
aevum,
utpote
quemnonbarbarm
sedcultior
aetastulit.
Huictribuit
Ciruelus
commentarla
I. In spheram
Ioannis
utique
de Sacro-bosco.
II. In arithmeticam
et geometriam
ThomaeBravadini.
III. In perCantuariensis.
IV. In Aristotelis
seucategorias,
et posterispectivam
praedicamenta
oraanalytica.
164.HuiusquoquePetri
iunioris
nomini
circumferri
aitinantiquis
adscriptum
quibusdamexemplis
Summularum
PetriHispanirecentioris
opushoc titulo:
opusculum
Summularum
ad magnam
Aristotelis
introduetorium.
Hocindenatum
logicam
aiunt,
hicPetrus
conterranei
fui& sibicognominis
Petrialterius
dolensvicem,
quodiunior
cuiuslibellus
scilicet
ortoiamdisciplinarum
siderepropter
ruditatem
stilicontemnebatur:
eidemlimamiudiciiac sermonis
inductis
admoverit,
insuper
quae necesincommodiorem
ordinem
saria,
essent,
deductisque
prudenter
quaesuperflua
omniaque
redegerit.
In my 1997 study,I paid no attentionto this passage from Nicols
Antonio,as I hoped to consultPedro Ciruelo's original.Accordingto the
"
latter,therewere two PetrusHispanus
", fromalmostthe same place, one
18:07:04 PM
236
ANGELD'ORS
"
"
predatingthe other,both of whom wrote Summulae(one the inventor,
the other in a spiritof reform),and both of whom were eminenttheologians and philosopherswell versed in all the arts. In later centuries,
thisduplicationwas to have surprising
consequences.Scholars have taken
this passage as being an explanationfor the existenceof two opposing
"Petrus
traditionsaround the identityof the "auctorSummularum":
Hispanus
"
", is held to be Pope John XXI,
antiquio'the author of the Summulae
who reformedthe latter'swork, is a
whereas "PetrusHispanusrecentiof'
with
memberof the Order of Preachersand can supposedlybe identified
"Petrus
the
Dominican
in
whom
defenders
of
some
buried
Estella,
Alfonsi
traditionregardedas the author of the Tractatus
(thiswould also explain
"
considered"Petrus
Hispanus
whysome adherentsof the Dominicantradition
or even earlyfourteenth-century
to be a late thirteenth-century
figure).
" had been built
Once the figureof "PetrusAlfonsi
up in thisway as a
"
"
fourteenth-century
Spanish Dominican who wrote Summulaeon logic,it
"
came to be thoughtthat these " Summulaewere the verySummatotiuslogice,which was regardedas an expressionof Thomistlogic and the work
" has also
"
of a Spanish author.55This figureof PetrusHispanusrecentior
.36I shall not
rationis
been proposed as the possibleauthorof De consolatione
textshows
Pedro
Ciruelo's
as
in
but
detail
into
these
here,
problems
go
55MartinGrabmann
see
thishypothesis:
was thefirstscholarto put forward
desPetrus
undFunde
M. Grabmann,
zu denphilosophischen
Schriften
Handschriftliche
Forschungen
Akademie
derBayerischen
XXI(f 1277),Sitzungsberichte
desspteren
Papstes
Johannes
Hispanus,
Phil.Hist.Abteilung
derWissenschaften,
9, Munich1936,3-137(pp.24-5).Otherauthors
romana
Desdela poca
hasta
dela Filosofia
latertookthisup:G. FraileO.P.,Historia
Espaola.
- Dominico
delconvento
XVII, Madrid1971,169:"PedroAlfonso.
delsiglo
burgals,
fines
Se
identificar
conPedroHispano.
hanquerido
a quienindebidamente
de Estella,
algunos
traduntur
Grabmann
unasSummulae
haberescrito
le atribuye
pueris.
logicales
quaecommuniter
totius
Aristotelis
a la Summa
de que quizrespondan
la hiptesis
, atribuida
Logicae
propuso
obrade algnautorespaol,
a SantoToms.Es,indudablemente,
puesdice:"ethocidem
". Es unaobra
namdicimus
nosinlingua
mo,ubilyel estarticulus
, el correr
vulgri,
facimus
de
un
nominalista,
peroque fue
buena,
conceptualismo
penetrada
quiz poco
muy
de l". See C.H. Lohr,Medieval
porJuande SantoTomsy otrosdespus
aprovechada
in:Traditio,
Authors:
28 (1972),333-4.
Commentaries.
Latin
Aristotle
Narcissus-Richardus,
"
56De consolatione
Petri
rationis
R-II-14,33v-53r:Incipit
, MS Escorial
Maistri
prohemium
. See Casimiro
Domini
inhonorem
deConsolatione
Rationis,
Compostellani"
Archiepiscopi
Compostelani,
de
olvidado
Pedro
Uncompostelano
El Maestro
TorresRodrguez,
, in:Cuadernos
Compostelano.
Madrid1975,65-101,p. 100.On the
Estudios
XXIX,fases.87-89(1974-75),
Gallegos,
rationis
andhisDe consolatione
ofPedroCompostelano
, seealsoPedroBlancoSoto,
problem
of
duo
1912(transcription
Rationis
libri
deConsolatione
Petri
, Mnster
Compostellani
' dePetrus treatise);
rationis
a la obraDe consolatione
entorno
Problemtica
CsarRaaDafonte,
,
Compostelanus
entre
elmundo
0 (1993),165-8;id.,El combate
de Filosofa
in:Revista
Medieval,
y
Espaola
Pedro
la raznsegn
Medieval,1 (1994),
, in: RevistaEspaolade Filosofa
Compostelano
27-36.
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
237
"
"
"
Alfonsidoes not exist: PetrusHispanus
quite clearly,thisfigureof Petrus
is none otherthanPedro Snchez Ciruelohimself.
recentio
Nicols Antonio
failedto understandCiruelo'ssense of humour:Ciruelo publishedhis own
Summulae
as the workof a "PetrusHispanusrecentior
":
Venientes
huiusopusculi
dicimus
titulum,
ergoad nostri
quodipsetrescausaseius
materialem
etformalem.
id est,
brevissime
Causamefficientem,
efficientem,
prenotat:
dicens
"Petri
Sedquiaaddidit
recenautorem,
ostendit,
Hispani".
agnomen
imprimis
innuit
nomenclature
duoseiusdem
autores
alterum
tioris,
Summularum,
antiquiorem
et alterum
recentiorem.
Petrus
fuitvirreligiosus
ex sacro
igitur
Hispanus
antiquior
ordine
fratrum
divipatris
Dominici,
predicatorum
qui cumessetdoctorParisiensis
omnesAristotlicos
librosqui suntin usuapudlatinos
perlegissetque
philosophos,
inter
aliamultaeiusoperaperegregia,
decrevit
ad eruditionem
noviciorum
suereliedereunamfacilem
introductionem
ad magnam
Aristotelis,
gionis
logicam
que profectoin primoeiusadituapparet
difficilis
et obscura
valde,doneepreviaquadam
vocabulorum
et planaregularum
declaratione
fuerit
illustrata.
Hanc
precognitione,
suamintroductionem
scilicet
diminutivo
vocbulo,
logicam
ipseSummulas
appellavit,
breves
tractatus
seulibelli
illius
summe
Aristotelis.
quodessent
quidam
respectu
magne
Recentior
Petrus
fuitetiamphilosophus
et theoloatqueposterior
Hispanus
pariter
Aristotelis
diutius
exercitatus.
Hic eratsacerdos
gusdoctissimus,
atquein doctrina
etvixit
in habitu
clericali
sancti
Petriapostoli.
in suoerudiIs videns
honestissimus,
tioriseculologicam
adeo
Petri,
ubiquedocereexaetius
quamolimin etatealterius
ut iamapudlogicoshuiustemporis
Summule
suipredecesoris
predicte
parviestiinstituit
eidemopusculo
Summularum
limam
suecorrectionis
hoc
mentur,
admovere,
nonnulla
ordinem
et
est,quedamaddere,
demere,
atquealia in meliorem
redigere
hac sua elucidatione,
Summule
isteet faciliores
et utiliores
commutare,
quatenus
in scholis
Hoc munus
correctionis
huiusopusculi
iurevendiapparerent
logicorum.
tumquiaetipsePetrus
etipseHispanus
cavit,
erat,atquepropeconterraneus
patrisuopredecessori,
tumquiahicseculum
invenit
in logaquevicinus
magiseruditum
ica disciplina
Summularum
autor,tumdeniquequia quum
quampriorillePetrus,
essetinliberalibus
scientiis
etinuniversa
doctissimus
eius
philosophia
(quodpluraque
iamsibilicuerat
aliorum
autorum
libros
suoexamine
opuscula
ostendunt),
quosdam
utSpheram
Ioannis
de Sacrobustro,
Arithmeticam
etgeometriam
Thome
perlustrasse,
et nonnullos
alios.Adhucet duoslibros
Bravadini,
Cantuariensis,
Perspectivam
difficillimos
Predicamenta
scilicet
etPosteriora
suis
analitica,
magne
logiceAristotelis,
commentarius
effecerat
clariora.
Petri
hocSummularum
iniuriam,
Quarecitraalterius
suumdicerepotuit
in hoctitulo.
AitenimdivusHieronymus
in prologo
opusculum
crebius
vertendo
etemendando
etdidiscimus
ettenemus,
Galeato,
solicitus,
quicquid
nostrum
est.Eodemiure,et Buridanus,
Summulas
a se correctas,
suasessedixit;
vocantur
enimSummule
Buridani.
Hec de autore"
(fol.XCIXvb).57
In view of this text,as both the tide and colophon of the editionof his
work confirm,as does the list of works attributedto him, there is no
doubt thatthis "PetrusHispanusrecentio
was one and the same as Pedro
57PedroSnchezCiruelo,
Summule
Petri
nunc
recenter
ac bone
conecte,
Hispani,
solideque
logicedocumentis
libellis
cumpreclarissimo
commentano.
MDXXXVII.
illustrate,
distincte,
septemque
Absolutum
esthocPetri
mentions
Summularum
inalmaSalmanticensium
Colophon:
Hispani
Opusculum,
anno
a partu
dieXVIIdecembris.
Academia,
MDXXXVII,
Virginis
18:07:04 PM
238
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
239
as a work intended
givingany othertitle),and he presentsthe Tractatus
for internaluse withinthe frameworkof the studiescarried out in the
suereligionis
noviciorum
Order of Preachers{"ad eruditionem
"). These data may
lose
a
certain
reflecthistoricalreality,but they
credibilitywhen he also
"
"
"
tellsus that it was PetrusHispanus who hancsuamintroductionem
logicam
" was
" Tractatus
as
De
has
Summulas
shown,
Rijk
appellavi because,
ipse
"
"
its originalname whereas Summulaewas a titleassignedto it at a later
date. Be this as it may, none of these pieces of informationis relevant
in the quest forthe identityof the "auctorSummularum".
SummuOf greaterinterestis the hintas to the birthplaceof the "auctor
larum
". Pedro Ciruelo,who was fromDaroca in the provinceof Zaragoza,
a regionborderingon Navarre, declares that he himselfis "propeconterraneuspatriaquevicinussuo predecessori
", which might be understood as
"
". This
the
Navarrese
origin(Estella)of the auctorSummularum
confirming
in MS Salamanca, UL, 2080, which recordsthat
fitswiththe testimonies
and of the Navarrese Domingo de San Juan
he was "de Stellaoriundus",
del Pie del Puerto,who says he was his "compatriota".
These testimonies
could be related to each other and Ciruelo, who taughtat Salamanca,
Ciruelo tells
mighthave known of them and used them. Unfortunately,
us nothingabout where the "auctorSummularum"
was buried, and so he
does not help us to solve the problemsurroundingthe grave.
"
e) "Petrus
Alfonsi
"
Now that we have eliminatedthe spuriousfigureof "Petrus
Alfonsi as a
Spanish Dominican of the fourteenthcentury,the author of supposed
"Summulae
" on
logic, who took shape fromNicols Antonio's misunderof
Pedro
Snchez Ciruelo'sjoke when he called himself"Petrus
standing
.
' we can confrontthe genuineproblemof "Petrus
Alfonsi"
Hispanusrecentiof
This problemis rooted in a venerableDominican traditionrepresented
by the Catalogues of Stams, Pignon and Saint Ann, which attributesthe
60
Summulae
to a "Petrus
Alfonsi".
These threeCatalogues are listsof Dominican writers(not of books or
and theycoincidein givingthename of "Summulae"
to theTractatus
libraries),
think
of "PetrusHispanus
which
leads
us
to
that
the
second
two might
",
have followedthe first,and so no particularmeritattaches to the fact
thatthereare threeaccounts.However,the date of the Stams Catalogue
60See d'Ors1997{op.cit.,above,n. 2),49.
18:07:04 PM
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ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
241
"
"
"Petrus
FerrarteliIf we take thesenames as being genAlfonsiand Petrus
then it is obviouslyimposuine birthnames of the "auctorSummularum",
sible for them to belong to the same person. But it mightbe that only
one of them,or neither,was his real name, and that the other,or both,
" and the Court of the
"
expressedthe linksbetweenthe auctorSummularum
reign
Kings of Castile and Len: in Castile,afterthe briefbut conflictive
of his uncle, Henry I,61FerdinandIII the Holy succeeded his grandfather,AlfonsoVIII; meanwhilehe also succeeded his fatherAlfonsoIX
in Len, and was followedby his son AlfonsoX the Wise. The factthat
these two names coincide with those of the kingsof Castile and Len,
" seems to be
Summularum
withwhomPedro Ferrandoas the "auctor
linked,
leaves a shadow of doubt over the realityof the apparentmutual exclusivenessof these two names. I shall examine below the apparent links
" and the Court of the
betweenthe "auctorSummularum
Kings of Castile
and Len.
However,the basis formy doubtsconcerningthe reliabilityof the evidence in the Catalogue of Stams, and those of Pignon and Saint Ann
which seem to depend on it, is not to be found in the somewhatcon" and
trivedargumentabout the meaning of the names "PetrusAlfonsi
"
"
"Petrus
Ferrand'but ratherin the fact that the name PetrusAlfonsi is
the same as that of another eminentfigurein twelfth-century
Spanish
thought,theJew Moiss Sefard(c. 1062-c. 1140).62Moiss Sefardwas
"
"
baptisedin Huesca in 1106 with the name of PetrusAlfonsi (in honour
61Thefraught
I ofCastile,
ofHenry
whocametothethrone
in 1214agedonly
reign
ofAlvaro
de Lara,wasin myviewofdecisive
10 andremained
undertheguardianship
forthehistory
ofSpanish
universities.
TheLarafamily,
whogoverned
Castile
importance
untilHenry's
deathin 1217,washostile
to thefamily
ofTelloTllezde Meneses,
the
a fewyearspreviously
whostrove
to promote
itsuniversity
(founded
bishopofPalencia
doubtless
affected
theprocess
oforganisation
anddevelVIII).Theseconflicts
byAlfonso
After
III cametothethrone
ofthenewuniversity
ofPalencia.
Ferdinand
ofCastile
opment
in 1217,thepolitical
continued
as hisfather,
IX ofLeon,disapproved
conflicts
Alfonso
Alfonso
waspromoting
thefoundation
oftheUniversity
of
ofhiscoronation.
Meanwhile,
in hisownkingdom,
at thesametimeas theOrderofPreachers
Salamanca
wasbecomin Spain.ThisOrderprobably
found
a morepropitious
environment
for
ingestablished
activities
there
thaninPalencia.
After
theunionofthekingdoms
ofCastile
andLeon
their
ofFerdinand
III theHoly,andtherenewal
ofefforts
to achieve
in 1230in theperson
no longer
theneedsofboththeuniversities
theReconquest,
economic
difficulties
allowed
inthekingdom
tobe met,andSalamanca
found
itself
better
itself
and
placedtomaintain
andultimately
thanPalencia,
which
fellintoa decline
closed.
grow
62On thisfamous
seeMaraJessLacarra(coord.),
Estudios
sobre
PedroAlfonso,
Pedro
Literatura
latina
deHuesca
, Zaragoza1996;JosLuisMoralejo,
Alfonso
hispano(siglos
V-XVI),
Historia
delasliteraturas
nocastellanas
in:J.M. DiezBorque(coord.),
, Madrid1980,
hispnicas
13-137.
18:07:04 PM
242
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
243
64Peterof
called
Summule
FirstCritical
Edition
from
Spain,Tractatus,
afterwards
Logicales.
theManuscripts
withan Introduction
byL.M. de Rijk,Assen1972,pp. LIX-LXI.
18:07:04 PM
244
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
245
18:07:04 PM
246
ANGELD'ORS
definitively
throughthe treatyof Benavente,signedon 11 December 1230,
under the rule of FerdinandIII.
This conflict,in which Len and Astorga initiallytook sides with
FerdinandIII while Zamora supportedthe claims of Sancha and Dulce,
andwhichtookplace in 1230, givesmeaningto the example of the "exem
" in the Tractatus.
If we accept thesearguments,thenwe can say that
plum
in
Tractatus
the
must have been writtenin the last months
this passage
of 1230 or the monthsthat followed(duringwhich these conflictsmay
and we can fixthe years 1230 and 1231 as
stillhave been newsworthy),
the most probable dates of composition.
If thisis the meaningof thispassage, Peterof Spain clearlyshowshimself to be on the side of Ferdinand III, concerned about the conflicts
between Christiankingdomswhich were distractinghim from concentratingon the Reconquest. But in this case we should not thinkof his
immediatelinkswith the Kingdom of Len, where these conflictswere
takingplace, but ratherof his connectionswith FerdinandIII, who was
already king of Castile, and perhaps with Palencia (where St. Dominic
The University
of Palencia,foundedby Alfonso
studied)and itsUniversity.
and from1220 onwardsit took on
VIII, was the firstSpanish university,
a new lease of lifethanksto FerdinandIII and Bishop Tello. Among its
teachers in those years we can find "Peter the grammarian".67Len,
illustratenot the geographicalbackAstorgaand Zamora would therefore
ground against which Peter of Spain may have taughtand writtenhis
Tractatus
, but the scene of his politicalconcernsat a crucial momentin
the historyof the Reconquest.
"
the "auctor
Summularurri
On thebasis of theseanalyses,therefore,
appears
as a figureclose to King Ferdinand III who is concerned about the
conflictsthathave flaredup around the successionof AlfonsoIX of Len
and the continuationof the Reconquest, but a figurewho is not necessarilycloselylinked to the immediategeographicalarea in which these
conflictswere takingplace. The dates of the eventsmightenable us to
67Santiago
deSanto
deGuzman:
Palencia
enla poca
Instituciones
FranciaLorenzo,
Domingo
Santo
de Caleruega
O.P. and L.V. Diaz Martin,
Eclesisticas
,
, in: C. AnizIriarte
Domingo
Pedroque dedicounagramtica
en
on p. 192:"El gramtico
Salamanca1994,161-95,
a
PrezRodrguez,
Untratado
degramtica
dedicado
versoal obispodonTello."See Estrella
delI Congreso
deHistoria
dePalencia
TelloTllez
deMeneses
, T. IV, Palencia1987,
, in:Actas
crtica
XIII(Estudio
Unagramtica
castellana
delsiglo
), Valladolid
71-78;id.,El 'Verbiginale'.
y edicin
see Gonzalo
ofPalenciaanditsfirst
oftheUniversity
1990.On thefoundation
masters,
de
Revisin
crtica
dePalencia.
Diez S.I., La Universidad
Martnez
", in:ActasdelII Congreso
Historia
dePalencia
, Palencia1990,155-91.
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
247
18:07:04 PM
248
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
249
18:07:04 PM
250
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
SUMMULARUM
PETRUSHISPANUS
O.P.,AUGTOR
(il)
251
the best potentialfor explainingthe meaning. We have some information about a Pedro Gallego who was closely linked to the person of
AlfonsoX. This was the Franciscan,Pedro Gallego,75probablyborn in
Santa Maria de Ortigueira(La Coruna) around 1207.76He enteredthe
Franciscan Order in the Prioryof Bastida (Toledo), which had been
foundedin 1219, where he became guardian.In 1236 he was appointed
Provincialof Castile,and he was made Bishop of Cartagenaaround 1250.
He died on 19 November 1267, and his tombis stillpreservedin Murcia
Cathedral,where his remainswere translatedon 22 March 1291. This
Pedro Gallego was a friendof FerdinandIII and the confessorof Alfonso
X, whom he probablyaccompanied on the campaignforthe reconquest
of Murcia in 1243-44, and on whose initiativehe was probably made
Bishop of Cartagena. Three worksare attributedto Pedro Gallego: Liber
domusand Summaastronomica
.79
de animalibus
,77De regitiva
If we look at the close relationshipbetween this Pedro Gallego and
AlfonsoX, and his possiblepart in the Murcia campaign,then it comes
to him in this cantiga,
as no surprisethat AlfonsoX mightbe referring
and thathe mightmisshim since,once he was made Bishopof Cartagena,
he must have moved away fromthe Court and ceased to participate
directlyin the Reconquest campaigns.If, on the otherhand, we remember that Pedro Gallego died in 1267, that is, a date relativelyclose to
75A. Lopez,Fr.P. Gallego
de Cartagena
in: Archivo
Ibero, primer
(1250-1267),
obispo
Untraducteur
inconnu:
Pierre
etpre24 (1925),65-91;A. Pelzer,
Americano,
franciscain
Gallego,
mier
deCarthagne
Francesco
Ehrle.
Scritti
diStoria
e Paleografia,
(1250-126?
), in:Miscellanea
vque
Etudes
vol.I, Roma1924,407-56(rep.in:Auguste
d'histoire
littraire
surla scholasPelzer,
Pedro
, Louvain-Paris
1964,188-240);M. de Castro,Gallego,
, in: Gran
tiquemdivale
1974,98-9.
, T. XV, Santiago-Gijn
Enciclopedia
Gallega
76G. Diaz Diaz considers
thathe wasbornin 1197(seeHombres
dela
y Documentos
while
that
believes
, III, E-G,Madrid1988,335-6),
J.M.Da CruzPontes
Filosofia
Espaola
dateis obviously
hewasbornin 1236(seeabove,n. 72).Thislatter
becausePedro
wrong,
wasappointed
Provincial
inthatyear.Ashispresence
ofCastile
inToledoaround
Gallego
ofJuanGil de Zamora,thedateof 1207
1220seemsto be confirmed
bythewitness
wasprobably
which
M. de Castroprovides
seemstobe toolate;hisbirth
between
these
twodates:1197and 1207.
77MS Vat.lat.1288,fols.131r-161r: "Incipit
liber
deanimalibus
etdenaturali
diverssitate
et
illorum
exlibro
moribus
eorum
ac demembris
astucia
etaccidentibus
translatus
etAveroys
et
Aristotelis
auctorum
arabum
etaliorum
comentorum
."
78MSS Vat.Barberini,
& Paris,BnF,lat.5818,fols.28r-30v:
lat.52, fols.22r-24r
de
"Breviatio
abreviata
Petri
Antecer
inregitiva
domus"
fratris
cartaginensis
speculatane
episcopi
79Sarmano,
ms.E. 108,fols.46-49;Madrid,
Biblioteca
Bibi.Nac.,
Comunale,
Maserata,
3delvescovo
indito
ms.8.918,fols.49rb-56vb.
G. Melani,Unfragmento
della'Summa
astronomica
Pietro
in:
Studi
40
Garcia
Medical
,
Francescani,(1943),79-89;
Ballester,
francescano Gallego
inThirteenth-Century
Problems
andProspects
Science
Castile:
oftheHistory
ofMedicine,
, in:Bulletin
61 (1987),183-202.
18:07:04 PM
252
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
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O.P.,AUCTORSUMMULARUM
(il)
253
18:07:04 PM
254
ANGELD'ORS
18:07:04 PM
3 and theSearch an
School
secundum
Thomam
for EarlyThomistic
Responsio
ISABEL IRIBARREN
Vivarium
39,2
18:07:10 PM
256
ISABELIRIBARREN
This approach, in its turn,has been based on a traditionalunderstanding of the 1277 and 1284 condemnations,particularlythat of 7
March 1277 in Paris.4Accordingto thisview,Bishop StephenTempier's
condemnation was a reaction to "heterodox" Aristotelianismat the
facultyof arts. Tempier was acting afterthe ordersof Pope John XXI,
who had asked him to conduct an inquiryconcerningdangerous docAs a result,Tempier
trinesreportedto be circulatingat the University.5
formeda commissionof sixteentheologians,includingHenry of Ghent,
- so that
and had a list of 219 propositionsdrawn up somewhathastily
the orderof the propositionsappears disorganisedand the names of scholars behind thesepropositionsdo not appear specified.Withoutreporting
back to the Pope, Tempier issued this condemnationon 7 March 1277
on his own authority.Within ten days, on 18 March, a prohibitionby
the Archbishopof Canterbury,Robert Kilwardby,was issued in Oxford,
thistime envisioningdirecdyAquinas' thesison the unicityof substantial
form. On 29 October 1284, in a visit to the Oxford Chapter,John
Pecham, Kilwardby'ssuccessoras Archbishop,ratifiedhis predecessor's
45 (1981),345-87.Cf.
andRobert
vs.Henry
Thomas
Sutton
, in:The Thomist,
ofGhent
Orford
no.
atOxford
ofLondon,
D.A. Callus,TheCondemnation
, TheAquinas
Society
ofSt.Thomas
Oxford
lesthses
thomistes
Comment
5 2nded. 1955[19461].P. Glorieux,
furent
proscrites
in:RevueThomiste,
32 [nouv.srie10] (1927),259-91,andid.,Lescorrec(1284-1286),
etmdietphilosophie
ancienne
de thologie
aupoint
Essaidemise
toires.
, in:Recherches
which
anda cole
naissante
milieu
Thomiste
talksabouta certain
vale,14 (1947),286-304,
oftheaforesaid
conflicts.
inthemidst
inParisandOxford
hemaintains
Likewise,
emerged
thomiste
travaux
depolmique
Premiers
P. Mandonnet,
, in:RevuedesSciences
Philosophiques
1964[op.cit.,above,n. 2), 19:
7 (1913),46-70& 245-62.AlsoRoensch
etThologiques,
in
histeaching
St. Thomas,butunderstood
notonlydefended
. . earlyDominicans
See especially
thesamewayhe didhimself."
pp. 185-9.
exactly
4 Among
etl'averdeBrabant
ofthisview,areP. Mandonnet,
themainupholders
Siger
Louvain1908-11,
rosme
latinau XIIIesicle
I, 28-9,59-63,142-95;F. Van
, 2 volumes,
auXIIIesicle,
Louvain1955,198-208;
Aristotle
intheWest,
id.,La Philosophie
Steenberghen,
Matre
deBrabant
seconded.,Louvain1991,354-59;andalsobythelatter,
, Louvain
Siger
du 7
Parisienne
dansla censure
le Grand
etThomas
Albert
1977,149-58;R. Hissette,
Aquin
15(1982),226-46,
1277, in:Miscellanea
mars
246;JohnF.
Mediaevalia,
esp.235,237-41,
Milwaukee
FaithandReason,
Between
totheEncounter
Reactions
Medieval
1995;id.,
Wippel,
72 (1995),233andtheCondemnation
Thomas
Schoolman,
of1277,in:The Modern
Aquinas
de la Mare,
suchas William
itis clearthat,as contemporaries
72. ForWippel,
however,
of
in their
different
andJohnofNaplesindicate
ofFontaines,
ways,a number
Godfrey
atAquinas
on 7 March1277wereaimeddirecdy
condemned
thepropositions
(cf.Wippel
from
thatof
differs
1995(Thomas
notably
position
), 241,268-9).In thisWippel's
Aquinas
to masters
werecommon
someofthepropositions
whobelieves
that,although
Hissette,
affected
thecondemnation
ofartsandAquinas,
indirectly
Aquinas.
3 Froma letter
sentbyJohnXXI to Stephen
1277,ed.
Tempieron 18January
- E. Chatelain,
Paris1889,I, 541.(Hereafter,
Chartularium
Universitatis
H. Denifle
Parisiensis,
Chartularium
).
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notice.
articlesin questionbut was prohibitedfromdoing so untilfurther
more
into
be
seems
to
as
sees
it,
Wielockx, Wippel
reading something
thetextwhenhe suggeststhattheprocesswas alreadyunderway.Pecham's
letterof itself,however,does not supportthis evidence.16
Similarly,Henry of Ghent'sreference(Advent1286) to the meetingof
the mastersin 127717concerningthe thesisof the unicityof substantial
form,does not necessarilyallude to a separate censureagainstAquinas.
Again, taken alone, Henry's textdoes notjustifythe conclusionthat the
to deal withAquinas'
meetingof the masterswas summonedspecifically
views.18
AlthoughWippel acknowledgesthat William de la Mare's remarksin
constitutean explicitstatementconcerningthe masters'
his Correctorium
of
the
unicitythesis,William's testimonyis not howeverclear
rejection
about whetherthe meetingof the masterswas not simplya part of some
otherprocess (like Giles').19
In conclusion,as regardsWielockx's claim, Wippel considersthat it
whethertheprocesscomingafter7 March
stillremainsto be demonstrated
a separatecensureagainstAquinas. For it is possiblethat
1277 constitutes
the later discussionon the unicityof substantialformwas part of the
meeting concerned with Giles' rehabilitationto Universityfunctions.
Therefore,Wielockx'sevidence,althoughpossible,is not conclusive.20
Thijssen'smain complaintabout Wielockx'sthesisis that the proposal
of a separateinquiryagainstAquinas presupposesthathe was not direcdy
targetedby any of the errorsincludedin the syllabusof 7 March 1277.
like Wippel, Thijssen also questionsWielockx'sinterpretaFurthermore,
tion of the evidence and argues that it is not sufficiendy
compelling.21
16Wippel1997(op.cit
., above,n. 14),121-2.
17Thisepisodemustnotbe confused
withanother
meeting
reported
by Henryof
X Quodlibet.
Thissecondmeeting
tookplacein 1285,whentheregent
andnonGhent's
a listofarticles
on theorders
ofPope
masters
to examine
oftheology
regent
gathered
inthelistwasthethesis
on theunicity
ofsubstantial
form.
IV. Included
Honorius
Again,
wasfalse.See Thijssen
all masters,
1997,
excepttwodissenters,
agreedthatthearticle
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),76.
18Wippel1997(op.cit.,above,n. 14),123-6.
19
at leastin whatregards
Furthermore,
Wippel1997(op.cit.,above,n. 14),126-30.
ofmatter
without
suchas Richard
thethesis
ofthepossible
existence
form,
contemporaries
took
andJohnofParisappearto doubtor evento denythatsuchmeetings
Knapwell
see Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1), 116.ForJohnofParis,see
place.ForRichard,
deJeanQuidort
Le Correctorium
"Circa"
deParis,
Rome1941,
Mller,
Corruptorii
Jean-Pierre
137.
20
1997(op.cit.
, above,n. 14),135-6.
21Wippel
1997(op.cit.,above,n. 15),72-3.
1998(op.cit.,above,n. 15),53; Thijssen
Thijssen
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Closely connectedto the bipartisanview of these events,is the handling of authorities,in particularAristotleand Augustine.Aristotlehas
been traditionally
consideredas the main influenceforthe unicityof substantialformthesis,while the pluralistsare seen as primarilyindebtedto
Augustine.As will be seen, however,the sourcesbehind the unitarianor
the pluralistthesisare much less clear-cutand oftenoverlap.
Based on the revisedview of the Paris and Oxford condemnations,
the purposeof thisstudyis to reexaminethe statementthat,as a resultof
the condemnations,
a "Thomisticschool" had emergedby the end of the
thirteenth
This
examinationwill be carriedout in threestages.
century.
First,it will attemptto give a definitionof "school" according to what
thetermcould have signified
by the end of the thirteenth
century.Second,
on
of
the
the
of
substantial
form,
focusingspecifically
unicity
question
the main tenetsof the unitarianand pluralistoutlookswill be outlined.
The purposeis a fairerassessmentof the sourcesand authoritiesbehind
Aquinas' thesisand the pluralistview. Third, and inasmuchas the unicitythesiswas perceivedas entailingproblematictheologicalconsequences,
we willconcentrateon the specifictheologicalissue of the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody livingand dead. This was perceivedas perhaps the
most crucial theologicalquestion in relation to the significanceof the
unicitythesis.The developmentof thistheologicalissue will be followed
firstin Aquinas, then in William de la Mare as a negativereactionto
Aquinas' view,and finally,as positivereactionsto Aquinas' thesis,in two
members of the Dominican Order, namely Richard Knapwell (from
Oxford)and Giles of Lessines (fromParis). The way in which Richard
and Giles handle the fullimplicationsof the unicitytheoryin contrastto
William de la Mare's, mightprove relevantfor an assessmentof the
natureof the Dominican defenceof Aquinas which emergedat the end
of the thirteenth
century.
2. TheDefinition
ofa "School"33
By "school" we generallyunderstanda "school of thought",as a body
of people or pupilsadheringto a certainset of principles,doctrines,methThe cohesionof thisgroup of people is based on their
ods, or authorities.
fixedallegianceto that doctrineor set of principles,an allegiance which
33Forthesensesin whichwe can
before
thefourteenth
speakof"schools"
century,
thisarticle
willbe mainly
basedonW.J.Courtenay,
Schools
andScholars
inFourteenth-Century
, Princeton,
England
N.J.1987,171-5.
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ISABELIRIBARREN
is clearlydifferentiated
fromsimpleprejudicein that it is not motivated
unreasoned
by
opinion. Thus, the adherenceto a school should presupa
pose "speculativeawareness" of the doctrinewhich the school represents,in the sense that the membersof the school should understandthe
fullimplicationsof the doctrineand accordingto that choose to adhere
to that particularview.
century,however,the term"school" was
By the end of the thirteenth
never understoodin this sense as a "school of thought"attached to an
abstractideologicalcurrent,but it was alwayspersonifiedin the doctrine
of a leadingfigurein a way stilltoo individualistic.
Justlike PeterAbelard
in the twelfth
century,Aquinas attractedboth followersand critics.It was
the way in which these individualfiguresexercisedreason withina theological question,which aroused eithercensureor adherence. What the
scholar associated with the term "school" was a
late thirteenth-century
place of study and its standard curriculumof teaching,ratherthan a
specificphilosophicalcommitment.Thus, a "Dominican school" did not
referred
, but moreimmediately
necessarily
implya particulardoctrinalcredo
to the mastersthat belonged to the Order. In thissense, Kilwardbywas
no less a member of the Dominican school than enthusiasticdefenders
of Aquinas such as Knapwell and John of Paris.
By the same token, a "school" was not necessarilyconstrainedby
geographicalfactors,as it was not determinedby membershipto one
and sourcesused by the late thirThe terminology
particularuniversity.
the
connectionbetween the learning
masters
reveal
close
teenth-century
between
in Paris and Oxford.Indeed, it would be futileto draw differences
the approach and methods of the Oxford and Parisian mastersin an
attemptto delineatetwo separated"schools".By the end of the thirteenth
centuryintellectualfiguressuch as Robert Kilwardby,John Pecham, and
Williamde la Mare belonged to the Parisianworldas much as to Oxford
and many of them had in fact been sent to Paris to obtain theirdoctorate.34Oxford theologians were concerned primarilywith issues of
Parisian origin,and Aquinas' theseswere seen as one of these imports.
There was a unityin the intellectualtraditionsof the two universities
and subjectsof
which was expressedin the same methods,terminology,
Both
Oxford
and Paris proliterature
testifies.
as
the
correctoria
discussion,
duced treatisesas well as defensiveworks.Giles of Lessines handled the
34FortheParisian
cf.Courtenay
1987{op.cit.,above,
in English
influence
education,
in thirteenththenotionof a "schoolofthought"
wherehe questions
n. 33), 147-51,
scholastic
landscape.
century
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47The
of universal
was as suchprothetheory
ofwhether
hylemorphism
question
natural
itwasat leastinherent
toAugustine's
orwhether
nounced
philosobyAugustine
thatsucha theory
believed
formed
ThomasofYork,forexample,
phy,is muchdebated.
Vat.Lat.
6771,fol.88d,quoted
(seeThomasofYork,Sapientale,
thought
partofAugustine's
inAugustine,
could
1951(op.cit.,
however,
above,n. 43),443).Somepassages
byZavalloni
tothesoul.SeeAugustine,
somematter-form
theviewthatheattributed
composition
support
et anima,
onGenesis
Literal
, VII, c.6,PL 34, col. 359,n. 9: "Fortasse
potuit
Commentary
vel
cuiusvel pulchritudo
ea ipsa naturafieret,
virtus,
quae animadicitur,
antequam
adlitteram
materiam
virtium
defformitas
,
est,habere
[Degenesi
prosuogenere
spiritulem"
aliquam
See alsoibid.,
ed.J.Zycha,PragueVII,c.27,PL
1894,224-5].Myitalics.
Vienna-Leipzig
ofuniversal
ofthetheory
34, col. 369,n. 39 [ed.Zycha,206].The attributions
hylelot.Aquinas
attribmakeup a rather
in thethirteenth
heterogeneous
century
morphism
in hisDe ente
etessentia
utesittoAvicebron
, c.4;Sent.
II, d.3,q.l, a.l. See alsoA. Forest,
selon
saint
Thomas
duconcret
La structure
, Paris1931[2ed. 1956],109-10.
d'Aquin
mtaphysique
in hisSent.
it withAugustine,
Bonaventure
tendsto identify
II, d.17,a.l, q.2; II, d.18,
Laphilosomodern
F. VanSteenberghen,
scholars,
a.2,q.l; II, d.17,a.2,q.2,ad 6. Among
as
, Louvain1966,46-7,150,245-46,249,seesuniversal
hylemorphism
phieauXIIIesicle
1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),422,442,on theother
influence.
Zavalloni
Avicebron's
hand,
influence.
theAugustinin
rather
stresses
48The conception
andforthatmatter
ofan inchoatio
ofa corporeal
, was
form,
formae
in thatinbothcaseswefindtheidea
ofseminal
reasons
notion
seenas akintoAugustine's
is potentiality.
Aswefinditin
thenature
ofwhich
of(material)
ofprinciples
production,
areto
whichcontain
all thecreatures
which
reasons
arelatent
seminal
germs
Augustine,
in time.See Augustine,
De Trinitate
be gradually
, III, c.9, PL 42, col. 877,
developed
onGenesis
1968(CC 50),143];Literal
Turnhout
n. 16 [ed.W.J.Mountain,
, VI,
Commentary
reasons
c.ll, PL 34, col.346,n. 18 [ed.Zycha(op.cit.,above,n. 47), 183-5]Seminal
on accountofwhicha humanbeingengenders
havetheirownnatureand efficiency,
SeeAugustine,
Literal
ofanother
andnotananimal
human
another
Commenta
species.
being
the
onGenesis,
IX, c.17,PL 34,col.406,n. 32 [ed.Zycha,290-2].The latter
supported
withan inchoatio
andtheefficient
of
reasons
seminal
identifies
viewwhich
formae,
principle
in matter.
thenotionofa corporeal
witha certain
reasons
seminal
However,
actuality
twodecisively
introduced
intotheWestthrough
form
was,as we haveseen,mostlikely
andAverroes.
Avicenna
Aristotelian
authors,
namely
49Examples
Sent.
inBonaventure,
ofthisviewarefound
II, d.17,a.l, q.2,ad 6; Matthew
Paris
deanima
ofAquasparta,
164,fol.80v),ed.A.-J.Gondras,
XIII, q.4 (Aedil.
Quaestiones
1961,51-73.Cf.Zavaloni1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),311.
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describedas somethingintermediary
betweenformand nothingness(proin
the
sense
of
a
nihil
, which has served as supportfor
pre nihil)
aliquid
in
matter
some
kind
of
form.
This statementhas been seen as
asserting
furtherconfirmedby a passage of De verareligione
were Augustineholds
that matterinformsinsofaras it can receivea form.62
There is, then,an
the
resonance
to
notion
a
of
Augustinin
corporeal form (which in
Scholasticismwas also identifiedto the idea of an inchoatio
formae
), inasmuch as in some passages in Augustinematteris founddescribedas posThe notionof a corporealformas such,
sessingsome degreeof formality.
a
is
of
clear
Aristotelian
however,
background.
As forthe doctrineof universalhylemorphism,
whichalso profitedfrom
it is closelyrelatedto the pluralistdoctrineof form
Augustine'sauthority,
as "dispositiveprinciple".For ifthe soul is constituted
of matterand form,
the union of body and soul, ratherthan signifying
a pure potentiality
being entirelyinformedby an active principle,entailssomehow two substancesin some way determinedalthoughincomplete.Some advocatesof
the pluralist thesis have maintained that universal hylemorphismis
inherentin Augustine's natural philosophy.63Again, it is a matterof
and even believersin the unicityof substantialformhave
interpretation,
foundsupportin Augustine.64
There are clearercases in Augustine,howwhich
seem
to
some
ever,
suggest
compositionin the soul.65At least in
what concernsuniversalhylemorphism,
it seems thatAvicebron
therefore,
{pace Cavalloni)is a more directsource for the pluralistview. Augustine
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the diverseoperationsof one and the same being could emerge from
different
sourceswhile leavingintactthe substantialindependenceof the
As Aquinas would retort,if the soul were united to the
moved.
thing
as
body merely a mover,we could say that it is not in the body as a
whole but only in one part whence it could move the remainder.76
Whetheror not Aquinas' understandingof Aristotlewas "less contaminated"than the pluralists',it seems clear that Aquinas was primarily
Aristode.This is not
acting as a naturalphilosopherwhen interpreting
to say thatthe pluralistswere by contrastactingas theologians,but their
connectionof Aristotelianphysicsto an Augustininview of creation
and the rationes
semi(hence the connectionbetween a formacorporeitatis
nales)certainlycontributedto safeguard a continuitywith theological
dogma. On the otherhand, the (metaphysical)disagreementbetweenthe
of
of hylemorphism
resultedin an incommensurability
two interpretations
the unitarianand the pluralistprinciples.Given theirexclusiveattribution of actualityto formand its total absence in matter,the supporters
as necof a unitarianview understoodthe notion of a formacorporeitatis
in
a
of
the
existence
of
certain
linked
to
type actuality matter.
essarily
However,it is importantto note that the beliefin some sort of actuality in prime matter,althoughwidespreadamong the pluralists,did not
necessarilyimplythe positingof a "corporealform"as equivalentto an
"intellectualsoul". Unlike the unitarians,the pluralistview does not make
in value. These led to a seriesof conactualityand forminterchangeable
fusionson both parts the consequences of which were acutely revealed
in a theologicalcontext.
TheNumerical
4. A Theological
Problem:
of Christ's
Body
Identity
Perhaps the most crucial of the theologicalissues regardingthe controversyover the unicityof formwas the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody
livingand dead. For, if matterdoes not offera dispositionof its own, if
the body is what it is whollyin virtueof the soul, then,in the separation of body and soul, Christ'sdeath leads to one of two possibilities.
withhis livingbody,or Christ
Eitherhis dead body ceases to be identified
Both tenets
would have had to assume anotherbody in the resurrection.
were contraryto dogma.
76See Aquinas,
ST la, q.76,a.3.
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ISABELIRIBARREN
4. 1. ThomasAquinason theNumerical
of Christ's
Identity
Body
In the thirdbook of his Commentary
,77Aquinas' argumentabout the numerical identityof Christ'sbody is based on his definition
of man as a unity
of body and soul ( Videtur
Christus
in
ilio
triduo
quod
fiierit
homo).UnlikeHugh
of Saint Victor, who identifieshuman nature wholly with the soul,78
for Aquinas the separation of body and soul at death signifiesa substantialchange entailingcorruptionand notjust alteration.Consequently,
Christ as a man can be said to be the same living and dead only
equivocally.
In the Quodlibets
the discussionis presentedin a more explicittheosense
Utrum
in Christus
in triduo
mortis
In
logical
(
fueritidemhomonumero).19
II
affirms
the
of
the
dead and living
Quodlibet (1269) Aquinas
identity
Christonly as an identitysecundum
quidand not as an identitysimpliciter.
He reasons as follows.In Christ,body and soul are united not only in
one personbut also in one nature.His divinity,
however,is unitedto the
body and soul of Christin person but not in nature.That is why in the
separationof body and soul Christcan stillbe referredto as idemnumero
, thatis, in virtueof the hypostaticor personalunion. As human
simpliciter
on
the death
nature, the otherhand, thereare two ways of understanding
of Christ.If we consider Christ'sdeath as referring
to his humanityas
a whole (<quantum
ad totam
therecan be no identitybetweenChrist
naturarli),
and
the
dead, given
living
separationof body and soul. Considering,howthe
that
ever,
parts
compose his humanity,his soul can be said to be the
same because the substantialformitselfdoes not sufferchanges, and it
is to the substantialformthat the person of Christis united. His body,
on the other hand, is the same not simpliciter
but secundum
quid, that is,
to
matter.
is
careful
not
to
attribute
according
Aquinas very
any kind of
actuality to the remainingmatter after the body's death.80However,
Aquinas oftenresortsto the categoryof quantityin order to supply a
guarantee of continuityin change, given the impossibilityof a forma
As in the question of transubstantiation,
the accidents of
corporeitatis.
77
Sentences
III, dist.22,q.l, a.l.
78Aquinas,
See Hughof St Victor,
De Sacramente,
BookII, part1, chapters
IX and XI (ed.
PL 176,393D-399B,
Migne,
401B-411D).
79
Quodlibet
II, q.l, a.l.
Aquinas,
Theremaining
matter
couldperhaps
be hereunderstood
as quantitas,
thethree-dimenofwhichwouldpermit
us to refer
to it as a body,butwherestrictly
sionality
speaking
there
is no individual
there
is no evidence
that
However,
(hocaliquid)
composite
anymore.
Aquinasactually
putsitin thoseterms.
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the bread that our senses stillperceive afterit has become the body of
Christinherein dimensivequantityas theirsubject.81
The unicityof formthesis,Aquinas believes,is capable of offering
a
account
of change.However,thereis some difficulty
in explainsatisfactory
ing continuityfrom the corruptionof one form to the generationof
another,thus appearing as if every change entailed transubstantiation.
The pluralists
have theoppositeproblem,wherewhatremainsafterchange
always has some kind of actualityand the simple advent of a superior
formdeterminingthe previous ones sounds more like mere alteration
than a true generativeprocess.
In Quodlibet
III. 2, a.2 (Easter 1270), Utrum
oculusChristi
postmortem
fiierit
ocultis
, Aquinas applies the same principleto individualparts of
aequivoce
the body. If the body of Christas man is the same onlyequivocally,then
his eyes and any otherpart of his body whichsuffered
substantialchange
afterseparationfromthe soul are therebythe same onlyequivocally.The
groundsof this argumentare found in the SummaTTieologiae
, q.76, a.8:
"Whetherthe whole soul is in each part of the body". According to
Aquinas, the relationof the soul to the whole of the body is not the
same as its relationto the parts.For the soul is relatedto the whole primarilyand essentiallyas to its object,whereasits relationto the partsis
secondaryinasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. Consequently,
just as the soul bears the formand identityof the body, in like manner
the parts of the body, inasmuch as they participatein the body as a
affectedby the soul's departure.
whole, are substantially
In Quodlibet
IV.5 (Easter 1271) thereappears to be a change in Aquinas'
or at leastin the way in whichhe expressedhis view. In response
stance,82
to the question Utrum
in cruceetin sepulcro
situnumnumero
corpusChristi
, the
81By"dimensive
it is meantthethree-dimensionality
whichmaterial
bodies
quantity"
onaccount
oftheir
ofquantity.
Material
bodiesare
possess
beingaffected
bytheaccident
"extense"
becausetheyareseenunderthecategory
ofquantity.
In theEucharist,
howofquantity
without
ever,AquinasholdsthatChrist's
bodyis undertheaccident
being
affected
substantiae.
dimensive
byit,thatis,permodum
(ST Ilia, q.76,a.1.)It is ultimately
which
accounts
forChrist's
realpresence
inthesacrament.
ForAquinas'
therefore,
quantity,
account
oftransubstantiation
and hisaccountof the"realpresence"
of Christ
in the
seeST Ilia, qq.75-77.Cf.A. Kenny,
TheUseofLogical
inTheology
Eucharist,
, in:
Analysis
A. Kenny
andReligion:
inPhilosophical
Oxford
(ed.),Reason
Essays
1987,3-20.For
Theology,
theproblems
account
oftherealpresence
entailed
forAristotelian
Aquinas'
philosophy,
seeE. Sylla,E. (1975),
Autonomous
andHandmaiden
Science.
St Thomas
andWilliam
Aquinas
of
Ockham
intheEucharist
andE. Sylla(eds.),TheCultural
Context
, in:J.E.Murdoch
ofMedieval
, Dordrecht-Boston
1975,349-96.
Learning
82Cf.Zavalloni
1951(op.cit.,above,n. 43),267-8.
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93Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,
fora very
lucidaccount
oftheintroabove,n. 1),132.Again,
ofa notion
duction
ofa "corporeal
form"
(orin thatcasesomesortof"form"
previous
to thesubstantial
seeHyman's
article
1965(op.cit.,above,n. 42),385-406.
form),
94Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1),134.
95Glorieux
1927{op.cit.,above,n. 1), 133.As Aquinassawit,ifthereis morethan
onesubstantial
in thecomposite,
form
relate
as actdoestopotentheymustnecessarily
theconditions
forsubstantial
which
mustmanifest
theunity
Otherwise,
tiality.
predication,
ofthesubject,
cannot
be met.See Aquinas,
ST la, q.118,a.2.
96
ST la, q.50,a.5.
Particularly
Aquinas,
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100Glorieux
etinAristotelis
see Isagoge
1927(op.cit above,n. 1),.408.ForPorphyry,
commentarium
, ed.A. Busse,Berlin1887.
Categorias
101One ofthepluralist
thattheunitarians
explicitly
denyis thatprivation
principles
To theunitarians
cannot
a form,
canbe identified
to an inchoatio
formaje.
privation
signify
however
becauseitdoesnotbearanyactuality.
imperfect,
102Glorieux
407.
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),Correctorium
"Quare":
103
Tractatus
deformis,
underthenameofHerveus
Forexample,
Natalis;Contra
pluraliin:S. Thomae
omnia
tatem
,
formarum,
(ed.P. Mandonnet,
Aquinatis
Opuscula
byThomasSutton
5 vols,Paris1927,V, 308-46);Contra
, GilesofRome;De unitate
, Gilesof
formae
gradus
we findmanifestations
Lessines
(ed.M. De Wulf1901)(op.cit.,above,n. 52).Although
ofthistypein Dominicans
at Oxford,
result
ofthePariscontheywerea moretypical
demnation
of 1277.
104
William
de la Mare's
we findParisian
polemical
monographs
against
Although
it wasprimarily
at Oxford
thatthereaction
treatise,
adoptedthisshape.We knowof
between
theyears1279and 1284,each
three
Oxford
Correctoria
, which
corruptorii
appeared
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ISABELIRIBARREN
icismsof Aquinas' teaching.These twinlines of defencewere closelyconnected,as we can see frompassages in Knapwell's Correctorium
"Quare",105
fromThomas Sutton'sContra
where he borrowsextensively
forpluralitatem
of substantialformin matter.107
marum}^in his account of the introduction
In a "firstphase",108rangingmore or less between the 1277 condemnation and Knapwell's excommunicationby Pecham in 1286, earlier
Oxonians such as Knapwell had no share in broaderintellectualquestions
that developed later. They seemed to be drivenby loyaltyratherthan
by abstractenquiry,and were no less incitedby authoritariandiscouragement.Hence the defensivecharacterof Knapwell's Quareand its rather
ad hoc replies. However, for all its limitations,this kind of work does
provide an approximateidea of the polemical characterof the times.
and
We know verylittleabout Knapwell's lifebeforethe controversy,
in factthe turningpointsof his career seem to have been markedrather
and"Questione".
For
word,
namely
bytheopening
"Quare","Sciendum"
beingidentified
of"Sciendum"
seeEhrle
theauthorship
of"Quare"seebelown. 105.Fortheauthorship
1947(op.cit.,above,n. 3); Mandonnet
1913
., above,n. 90),37; Glorieux
1913,(op.cit
(op.cit.,above,n. 3); andRoensch1964(op.cit.,above,n. 2). Ehrleleavesthepossibility
toitas the"ruhigere
Correctorium
andrefers
corruptorii"
openforitbeingDurandellus,
and unforced
Glorieux
thehypothesis
of
carefree
due to itsrather
response.
presents
whereas
Mandonnet
seemscomfortable
withthepossibility
ofHugues
William
Macclesfield,
in Paris.Roensch
is certain
it is Orford's
work.The incomplete
de Billom,
"Questione"
Ehrlesimply
and itsexactdateis notknown.
leavesit as "das
is lessstraight
forward
MS 276".Glorieux
forwards
desMerton
theuncertain
Correctorium
desAnonymus
posto Mandonnet
theauthorcouldbe Robertof
of Huguesof Billom.According
sibility
Dominican
whocomposed
around
thesametimea defence
of
another
Hereford,
English
takestheauthor
as being
HenryofGhentandGilesofRome.Roensch
Aquinasagainst
William
Macclesfield.
103Therehasbeenmuchdiscussion
abouttheauthorship
oftheCorrectorium
"Quare".
. . ."
"dasdemAegidius
deRomazugeschriebene
Correctorium
Ehrlecallsitrather
sceptically
to be a Dominican.
Glorieux
thatin facttheauthoris mostlikely
1927
and affirms
suchas GilesofRome,JohnofParis,
contenders
possible
(op.cit.,above,n. 1) discards
andarrives
totheconclusion
thatwearedealing
here
andDurandellus
ofBillom,
Hughes
conDominican.
Further
resemblance
between
withan English
"Quare"and passages
follows
demnedbyPechamleadshimto assertthattheauthoris Knapwell
(Roensch
of 1947(op.cit.,above,n. 3), Glorieux
in 1964).Lateron,in hisrevision
thisopinion
in "Quare"to Sutton's
andtheexplicit
references
Contra
conclusion
confirms
hisformer
work.
Thisis
Mandonnet
seemsto takeit,too,as beingKnapwell's
formarum.
pluralitatem
ofthepresent
thatitcanbe
here.Forthepurposes
theviewadopted
paperitis enough
Dominican.
to an English
attributed
106ThomasSutton,
Contra
1927(op.cit.,above,
, ed. Mandonnet
formarum
pluralitatem
n. 103).
107Correctorium
there
is an analogous
utilisation
art.32. See alsoart.85,where
"Quare",
treatise.
ofSutton's
108Forfurther
anda thourough
movement"
detailon the"twophases"ofthe"Oxford
elaboration
oftheothermasters,
see Kelley1977(op.cit.,above,n. 2).
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289
illudbenedictum
in vitaet in morte
substantialem
aliam et aliam dicatur
formam
1,6
habere).
In other words, Christ'sbody, as a body, is the same only secundum
117
in triduoquoadaliquidnon
quid.Again in article 107 {QuodcorpusChristi
fuitidemquodprius),Knapwell makes a similarparaphraseof the secundum
quid.Williamde la Mare's objectionhad appealed to a logical difference
betweenbeing "animated" and "unanimated",in a way that death does
not entail any change forthe body in quantum
but is to be undercorpus
stood only as a "privation"of life. In his reply,Knapwell is quick to
et contraomnem,
ut crediphilosophiam
reproveWilliam's argumentas contra
tur
, veritatem
perhaps too quick consideringthat the problemof substantial formwas believedby otherunitariansto be a metaphysicalone and
thus not necessarilya threat to the integrityof any truthbeyond it.
Accordingto Knapwell's reasoning,the conceptionthat a change in the
is a completefiction.Whereas states
substantialformis a matterofprivatio
of habit or privationare categoriesthatreferto accidentsand hence can
be referredto the same subject,being unanimatedhas to do with the
substanceand thereforeentails a change in the subject's very identity.
To be "unanimated"can be seen as a privationonly fromthe standTherefore,in other
point of primarymatter,which is pure potentiality.
as
of
a
Christ's
words,
body, being part
composite,cannot preserveits
identityafterdeath.
Knapwell's intentionto reconcilethe pluralityand the unicitytheses
on the groundsof theologicalneutrality
is made explicitin his later disDe
Unitate
Formae.
There, Knapwell's main concern is to
puted question
show that the unicityof formdoes not preventsome degree of numerical identityexistingin the substancebeforeand aftercorruption.As a
entailed by the unicitydoctrine,the
statementof the main difficulty
ran
as
follows:
Utrumsecundum
humanae
fidemde essentia
disputedquestion
naturae
verbooporteat
.
in
1
e plures
285 (and
formasDelivered some time
poner
certainlyafterPecham's 1284 condemnation),Knapwell did, then,make
a public stand of determiningthat the unicityof formwas a safe thesis
to uphold as far as faithand reason are concerned.There is indeed a
note of moderationand a search foran agreement:"it is of chiefimporto considerthose aspects on which one and the other
tance, therefore,
positionnecessarilyagree".118
116Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),136.
117Glorieux
1927(op.cit.,above,n. 1),408.
118
Kelley(op.cit.,above,n. 1),138.
Quotedfrom
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THE SEARCHFORANEARLYTHOMISTIC
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293
13) That the body livingand dead is the same body only equivocally.
Moreover,thatthe dead body, as a body, is the same as the livingbody
et mortuum
vivum
estequivoce
etcorcorpus,
onlysecundum
quid{Itemquodcorpus
sit corpussecundum
secundum
pus mortuum
quodcorpusmortuum
quid).132
In responseto Kilwardby'sposition,Giles is firstof all concernedin
givinga true assessmentof Aquinas' metaphysicalterminologyin order
to clarifyall possible ambiguities.Potentia
, Giles explains,has two very
It can be understoodas the oppodistinctsensesin Aquinas' thought.133
siteof actus
, and as such it signifies
receptivityin thissense it is the aptitude in a subjectto be determinedthroughchange. It can also mean a
proximateprincipleof the substance'sactivity in thissense it belongsto
theAristotelian
categoryof quality.It is the lattermeaning,Giles believes,
which broughtso much ambiguityin definingthe presence of the elementsin the composite.For the pluralistsit was inconceivablethat the
elementsshoulddisappearonce the compositewas completedby the final
substantialform.In order to give a coherentaccount of the physical
changeswithinthe body and to maintaina clear distinctionbetweenthe
spiritualspecies of the soul and the materialbody, the elementshad to
be potentiallypresentin the final composite.The superiorsubstantial
formis a mediatedperfectionof previousformsthat stillfunctionpotentially.Aquinas, on the other hand, cannot accept the coexistenceof a
pluralityof formsin act. The elementsremain potentiallyin the composite once the intellectualformarrives,but this "potentially"does not
mean "less perfect"or "incomplete".The quality
of the elementsis always
in
the
and
is
not
this
to
that
the substantialform
present
say
composite,
the
(soul) adopts a materialquality,but that it is capable of performing
functions
of thepreviousformsonce thesehave disappearedasforms.
Thus
the elementsare in the composite"potentially",that is, in quality.
Aftergivinga briefexpositionof the general notions of matterand
formas viewed froma unitarianstandpoint,Giles deals with the question of the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody. Giles' approach to this
questionproceeds134
througha distinctionbetweenmatteras the generic
the
of
concept
living and sensitivesubstance,and formas the specific
of
the
rational
concept
being. Althoughthe general Christologicalconclusion attainedby Giles coincideswith Aquinas', Giles' argumentation
132
Chartularium
, I, 559.
133
De Wulf1901(op.cit
., above,n. 52),79,c. IV.
134
De Wulf1901(op.cit.
, above,n. 52),85.
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295
Thomam
5. Responsio
secundum
There is no doubt thatAquinas' solutionof the unicityof formattracted
many followers,not only forits noveltybut also forits internalstrength.
"
"
Thomam
However, it is more likelythat secundum
(whichwas surreptia
label
of
convenienceagainst
read
as
"Thomism") represented
tiously
which some masterswould place other solutions.Thus, in the oftendebated questionof the numericalidentityof Christ'sbody, "Thomism"
referredto Aquinas' solutionratherthan to a school of thoughtin its
own right.The group's fixedallegiance revealed by these disputesdoes
affiliation
to a
not seem to have gone beyond a faithfuland ad litteram
of
a
"determining" question.
particularway
alone goes, all we can say is
As far as the evidence of the correctoria
thatcertainreactionsfromthe traditionaltheologianspromptedan ad hoc
defenceof the teachingsand the personof Aquinas,whichat best resulted
in lucid clarifications
of importanttheoriessuch as the unicityof substantial form. The influence exercised by Aquinas' teachings upon
Dominicans at the end of the thirteenth
centurydid not manifestitself
in any homogenousway. Not all Dominicans welcomed Aquinas' innovations(recallKilwardby,or WilliamHothum),and even ifsome of them
stillacted in the defensive,theyseem to have been promptedmore by
a certainesprit
de corpsthan by philosophicalconviction.Moreover,there
in favour of Aquinas.
were quite a few non-Dominicanmanifestations
withAquinas' theses
Some of thesewere drivenby philosophicalaffinity
(like Giles, an Augustinin),otherswere simplyoutragedat the spiritof
the censures(like Godfreyof Fontaines,a secular master).
As for those who wrote criticalpieces in defence of Aquinas, they
displayheterogeneousintellectualtempersand theirreactionsreveal to
than has been believed. Some of them seem
be far more individualistic
to have been punctuatedby methodicalconsiderations,
otherswere clearly
to
external
intervention.
Richard
Thus,
responding
Knapwell was driven
not so much by the significance
of an attackthatcame fromthe Franciscans (Kilwardby,for that matter,set the standard),but by his personal
confrontation
withPecham. Knapwell had been busy replyingto William
de la Mare's directattack,thus overlookingthe prohibitionlaunched by
but also a Dominican. KnapKilwardby,not onlyan episcopalauthority,
well's piece of defence transpiresthe urgencyof the events surrounding him, so that he is initiallyquite belligerentand only afterPecham's
condemnationdoes he reveal contrition.He dedicates little time to a
speculativeelaborationof the unicitythesis,and his writingcontributes
18:07:10 PM
296
ISABELIRIBARREN
18:07:10 PM
Reviews
Guillaume
d'Ockham
intrieur.
De Platon
, Coll.Des Travaux.
Panaccio,
Claude,Lediscours
Seuil,Paris1999,345p. ISBN2 02 0358352
du langagemental
ne sontplus
ockhamienne
et la forcede la thorie
L'importance
Il nouslivremaintenant
la longue
et ClaudePanaccio
dmontrer,
y estpourbeaucoup.
ellerpond.
ou plutt
celledesexigences
histoire
de sa constitution,
thoriques
auxquelles
Ockham
etmme
dansl'immense
Si le critre
de choixde textes,
corpus
quiva de Platon
estl'attention
auxexpresdesdcennies
auxauteurs
immdiatement,
porte
quile suivent
l'ordre
du langage
ou du dissionscomposes
renvoyant,
"parl'unde leurscomposants
ou de l'intriorit"
au domaine
du mental
etparl'autre
coursen gnral,
(23),le ressort
du langage
menla thorie
ockhamienne
quellesdemandes
du livreestbienthorique:
misesenplace?La reconnaissance
descontextes
se sont-elles
talrpond-elle,
etcomment
de voirl'intrt
de ce
nullement
philosophique
n'empche
argumentatifs
d'mergences
hisne gomme
les diffrences
des thories
critique
qui merge,
pas plusque l'examen
au coursd'une
d'unethorie
du dveloppement
La profonde
comprhension
toriques.
assez
rendre
cetteopposition
semble
parailleurs
que ce livrenousoffre
longuehistoire
artificielle.
avecPlaton.La description
l'histoire
commence
en philosophie,
Commesouvent
pladesobjetsdesattitudes
undialogue
l'identification
tonicienne
de la pensecomme
permet
etde valeur
dansl'meayant
desporteurs
de valeur
de vrit
cognitive
propositionnelles,
orales.Ce dveloppement
aveclesphrases
un certain
esquiss
parPlaton
isomorphisme
la pensesurle modledu langage
de traiter
continue
chezAristote
oral,
qui, dfaut
etd'implication.
La thse
lesrelations
de contrarit
dansle logos
intrieur
localise
logiques
cheztous",auquelrenvoient
leslangues
d'undiscours
aristotlicienne
mental,
"identique
etpartant
avecPlaton,
dansl'valuation
de communication,
estencontinuit
smantique,
la pense.Il n'estpeutauxunits
desrapports
dansl'attribution
quiconstituent
logiques,
un dplacement
du "sensprofond
trepas ncessaire
d'yvoir,commele faitPanaccio,
on pourrait
considrer
la
du recours
au modle
(41); la suitede Hintikka,
linguistique"
unapprofondissement
de Yelenchus
comme
thorie
du syllogisme
socratique.
Quoiqu'ilen
la correvoient
le caractre
despenses,
soit,si aussibienPlatonqu'Aristote
complexe
faire
"la proposition
etl'tatde chosesreste
entre
(46).Maiscomment
globale"
spondance
sansunesmantique
desentits
desvaleurs
de vrit
unethorie
complexes
compositionexactede cesentits
De ce dpart
on
nelle?Quelleestla structure
athnien,
complexes?
de la pensecapabled'expliquer
sonrlecomme"lieu
retiendra
d'unethorie
l'exigence
- et ceciesttrsimportant
- de ce qu'on
indissociable
des rapports
logiques,
originaire"
ne
semble
entirement
satisfaite.
sa
smanticit,
qui
pas
exigence
appelleaujourd'hui
Le dbatquiopposeplatoniciens
de cettehistoire.
et
Il existe
d'autres
sources
grecques
et le premier
sicleavantnotrere, proposde la rationaentre
le troisime
stociens,
le discours
la distinction
entre
intrieur
etle discours
extrieur.
conduit
litdesanimaux,
unlieucommun
enAsieMineure
endiathetos
devient
Plustard,l'expression
et,sortant
logos
dansdesdiscussions
concontexte
de sonpremier
apparat
d'mergence,
argumentatif
ou encore
l'laboration
d'unepsychologie
sacrsou littraires,
cernant
destextes
l'exgse
a lieu,le disA partir
siclede notre
cruciale
du troisime
re,unebifurcation
cognitive.
d'oviennent
deuxautorits
fondansdeuxcontextes
coursmental
distincts,
apparaissant
Le De Trinitate
de ce dernier,
BoceetAugustin.
damentales
dansla discussion
mdivale,
incorde
unedistinction
destine
connatre
un grandsucdu verbum
, offre
parsa thorie
cellequisparel'image
mentale
des
mdivales
du discours
csdanslesthories
intrieur,
intrieur
aucunelangue.
duverbe
mots
relevant
d'unelangue
quin'appartient
particulire
mdivale
de cettediscussion
estle deuxime
comUn autretextecentral
dansl'histoire
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2001
Vivarium
39,2
18:07:17 PM
298
REVIEWS
On ne saurait
de la distinction
mentaire
bociendu Perihermeneias.
l'importance
exagrer
de discours,
oralet mental,
ordrede
crit,
ayantun certain
qu'illgueentretroistypes
le discours
mental
ne reoit
linNanmoins,
pasunedescription
proprement
dpendance.
La premire
dfense
de l'application
destermes
au disexplicite
grammaticaux
guistique.
surle Priscien
du Pseudo-Kilwardby,
coursmental
vientd'uncommentaire
Majeur
quifait
inmente
Le pointestextrmement
du sermo
l'objetproprede la grammaire.
important.
aux langues
des concepts
C'estseulement
parl'extension
appliqus
parles la pense,
ou logiques,
une thorie
que peutse constituer
capablede
qu'ilssoientgrammaticaux
la structure
dcrire
logiquede la pense.
trois
discussions
mdivales
autour
dulangage
mental.
L'Auteur
ensuite
Le preprsente
du conentre
deuxthories
mierdbatmetenplace,au longdu XIIIesicle,
l'opposition
et commeacte,ayantdesconsquences
tout fait
pistmologiques
cept,commeidolum
- cetgard,on notera
miseau pointconcernant
la thorie
de
l'intelligente
importantes
de Thomasd'Aquin.
C'estl'histoire
autour
de la
la connaissance
d'uneautreopposition,
dusignifi
desmots,
ensuite
Panaccio.
L'idequele concept
estunsigne
nature
qu'expose
au coursdu XIIIesicle,imposant
"unparalllisme
de plus
se rpandprogressivement
et la pense"(225).Le dernier
la dtermination
de
en plustroit
entre
le langage
point,
en quelquesortele pointde dpart
athnien:
quelssontles
l'objetde la logique,
rejoint
et desrelations
L'idede quelquechosecommeunlangage
de vrit
logiques?
porteurs
chezJeanDunsScot,qui semble
mental
dansYenunciatio
inmente
parexemple,
apparat,
auxlangues
etdoncnepastreuniverselle.
treassocie
nanmoins
Gauthier
devoir
parles,
mental
soit
et Richard
refusent,
raisons,
que le discours
Burley
Campsall
pourdiffrentes
l'objetde la logique.
on l'auracompris,
estunerponse
ces
ockhamienne
du langage
La thorie
mental,
des valeurs
et exigences.
Les porteurs
de vritet des proprits
diffrentes
questions
dansla dernire
version
de sa
dansl'esprit.
Le langage
sontlesphrases
mental,
logiques
leschoses,
toutcommelesmotsparlset
estcompos
d'actesmentaux
thorie,
signifiant
La structure
et les composants
dansl'mesont
desphrases
crits
qui leursontassocis.
au langage
mental
touslestraits
dtermins
smantique:
perparuncritre
appartiennent
il "doitpossder
une
de la valeurde vrit
des noncs,
tinents
pourla dtermination
au moinsaussigrande
que cellede n'importe
quellelangueparleou
expressive
capacit
esten faitexplique
dont
crite"
(266).Cettecapacit
parle langagemental,
expressive
desconcepts
la notique
et
de la logiqueterministe
la description
associela finesse
mais
la logiquequiy trouve
son"lieuoriginaire",
Ce n'estpas seulement
l'pistmologie.
desconcepts,
lesrelations
et de contraet la smanticit
aussil'acquisition
d'implication
desengageetleurreconnaissance
ouencore
rit
entre
lesphrases
l'explicitation
parl'esprit,
vrais.Touteslesexigences
mises
enplaceau longde cette
desdiscours
ments
ontologiques
- parla thorie
- et en quelquesortemisesen lumire
ockhamihistoire
sontrespectes
les
trois
li
la notique
et l'pistl'ordre
entre
discours
enne:l'universalit, explicatif
la pense,
une
la smantique
et,surtout,
applique
permettant
compositionnelle
mologie
et desrelations
de la structure
desporteurs
de valeurde vrit
satisfaisante
description
du discours
dansla thorie
intrieur
L'"intervention
ockhamienne"
s'imposa
logiques.
au longdu XIVesicle,
contrairement
unecerclde la viamoderna
unlment
comme
danslesgnrations
Sansdoutey
taineimaged'unOckham
peuinfluent
qui le suivent.
- etil y en eut- d'autres
cesmmes
Rienn'oblige
de rpondre
a-t-il
faons
problmes.
dansle langage
mental
ockhamien
doivese trou considrer
que toutce qui se trouve
- la thorie
de la proposito
inrede Gauthier
verdansunemmethorie
Burley,
parexemmaisnon tous.Il n'enrestepas moins
de cesproblmes,
certains
que le
ple,rpond
du discours
des exigences
de fond
danssa doctrine
nominaliste
matre
intrieur,
runit,
ensmantique,
maisnonseulement,
de problmes
uncertain
nombre
depuis
quitravaillent
de cettelonguehistoire
PlatonetAristote.
du ressort
permet
philosophique
L'explicitation
et notamment
des phnomnes
ausside tirerdes leonscontemporaines,
l'importance
la structure
mmede la pense"(313).
smantiques
"pourcomprendre
18:07:17 PM
REVIEWS
299
nousavaithabitu
et la prcision
d'argumentation
auxquelles
L'intelligence
d'analyse
cettefoisdansla reconstil'Auteur
danscetouvrage,
se retrouvent
dployes
pleinement
tution
de l'histoire
d'unproblme
l'imporqui luitient cur,et dontil nousmontre
livrereutle prixGrammaticakis-Neumann
Cetexcellent
tancebienau deld'Ockham.
de l'Institut
de France.
Morales
et Politiques
de l'Acadmie
desSciences
Paris
ErnestoPerini-Santos
intheThirteenth
Motion
Place
CeciliaTrifogli,
, Infinity,
(ca.1250-1270).
Century
Oxford
Physics
andTime.
Leiden
/Boston
/Kln2000.289 pp. ISBN 90 04 116575 (Studien
Brill,
desMittelalters,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
72).
ausder
undPhysik
desAristoteles
Kommentare
In his1971Verzeichnis
zurMetaphysik
ungedruckter
in a largenumber
Zimmermann
listedthequestion
titles
, Albert
Zeitvonetwa1250-1350
andunknown
authors.
On the
ofAristotelian
commentaries
byknown
permodum
questionis
thesamequestions
onecouldseehowoften
wereasked
basisofZimmermann's
catalogue,
ofthequestions,
which
almost
inthesamecontexts
indifferent
The authors
manuscripts.
werenot"veryconcerned
arosein connection
withuniversity
about
teaching,
certainly
In some
followed
earlier
commentaries
closely.
(Trifogli,
originality"
p. 28),butfrequently
twocollections
ofquestions
thefactthatboth
casesthesimilarities
between
mayreflect
connected
toteaching
indifferent
werewritten
bythesamecommentator,
perhaps
years.
in Zimmermann's
Twooftheanonymous
setsofquestions
catalogarein factearlysets
ofquestions
on thePhysics
to hislatercom, whichmaybe compared
byWalter
Burley
- as Burley's
an author's
ideascandevelop
did
mentaries.
Since,overa periodofyears,
- differences
withtheideasofWilliam
ofOckham
as a result
ofhisstruggle
between
two
arenota proof
thatthey
arenotbythesamecommentator.
setsofquestions
these
(Along
herediscusses
howRogerBacon'sopinions
onplacechanged
from
onework
lines,
Trifogli
to another.)
On theotherhand,similarity
between
setsofquestions
doesnotprovethat
ofThomasWylton's
andWalter
theyhadthesamecompiler
(comparison
Burley's
questionson thePhysics
showsthecloseconnection
theremayhavebeenbetween
thequestioncollections
ofteacher
andstudent).
Sincetheearly1990sSilviaDonatiandCeciliaTrifogli
havebeenmaking
systematic
studies
oftheworks
in Zimmermann's
whichtheyhaveattempted
to
appearing
catalog,
In thisbookCeciliaTrifogli
concentrates
on tenquesclassify
bydateandplaceoforigin.
- twobynamed
- thatmost
tioncommentaries
onthePhysics
andeight
authors
anonymous
in
derived
from
Oxford
the
after
first
in
the
probably
roughly period1250-70,
availability
LatinofAverroes's
and before
thecommentary
on thePhysics
ofThomas
commentary
Theauthors
ofthesequestions
didnotknowtheworkofRobert
Grosseteste
on
Aquinas.
in theirtime,mayhaveexisted
thePhysics
ca. 1228-32),
which,
(written
onlyas glosses
inthemargins
ofa single
Thereare,however,
ofthePhysics.
connections
bemanuscript
tween
theworks
studies
RufusofCornwall's
hereandRichard
on the
Trifogli
questions
toRegaWood,wereproduced
at Parisabout1235.Theauthors
, which,
Physics
according
oftheseworks
alsoknewRogerBacon'sQuestiones
altere
on thePhysics
at Parisin
disputed
the1240s.The lateronesknewtheworkon thePhysics
ofAlbertus
Magnus.
Threeofthesetsofquestions
studied
herederivefrom
a singlemanuscript,
Oxford,
toGalfridus
de Aspall(probably
Merton
setascribed
written
ca.
Collegems.272,thefirst
andtheothertwosetsanonymous.
1255-1265)
Trifogli
pairseachofthesethreesetsof
inMerton
setofquestions:
ms.272withanother
related
closely
questions
Aspall's
questions
inTodi,Biblioteca
arelinked
toa setofquestions
communale
ms.23,andthetwoanonymoussetsofquestions
arelinked,
tosetsofquestions
inCambridge,
Gonville
respectively,
ms.367andinLondon,
andCaiusCollege
Wellcome
Historical
MedicalLibrary
ms.333.
BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke
Vivarium
39,2
18:07:17 PM
300
REVIEWS
In addition
to thesethreepairedsetsofquestions,
finds
an earlier
Trifogli
pairedset
oneofwhich
wascomplied
de Clifford
Peterhouse
ms.157)
byGuillelmus
(Cambridge,
andanother
contains
thesamequestions
onBookIV, reorpair,eachofwhich
essentially
material
from
Guillelmus
deClifford
inCambridge,
andfrom
thequestions
ganizing
exegetical
Gonville
andCaiusCollegems.367.Throughout
thebook,Trifogli
refers
totheauthors
of
theanonymous
setsofquestions
byhermanuscript
sigla,e.g.to G1,M3,P, S, etc.,which
makesit difficult
to developa familiarity
withindividual
or compilers,
authors
although
it is hardto imagine
authors
anybetter
wayofkeeping
eightanonymous
straight.
a tentative
orderforthetensetsofquestions,
Although
Trifogli
proposes
chronological
shedoesnotattempt
to investigate
whether
thereis a developing
intellectual
tradition
within
butinstead
treats
themhereas representing
moreor lessa single
chronothem,
within
whichtheearlier
setsofquestions
whilethelater
logicalmoment,
maybe shorter,
aremoreelaborate,
butnotnecessarily
moreadvanced.
questions
doctrinally
Exceptfor
thesetofquestions
thatTrifogli
assumes
tobe earliest
Communale
(Siena,Biblioteca
degli
Intronati
ms.L.III.21 pairedwithGuillelmus
de Clifford),
noneoftheseworks
covers
all
concentrates
on questions
motion,
eightBooksofthePhysics.
Trifogli
concerning
infinity,
in BooksIII andIV, bothbecausetheserepresent
basicconcepts
place,andtimefound
ofAristotelian
andbecausetheyareincluded
in mostofthetenworks
studied.
physics
Thisbookrepresents
thefruit
ofground-breaking
research
on manuscript
sources
(as
SilviaDonaticompletely
transcribed
theworks
studied
here
partofa collaborative
project,
andhaspublished
andgeneral
characterizations
ofthem).
command
descriptions
Trifogli's
oftheLatintexts
is impeccable,
andtheediting
ofthisbookis suchthatitis notobviousthatEnglish
is notTrifogli's
first
theverysignificant
taskofreading
Beyond
language.
andmaking
often
inuniqueanddifficult
toreadcopies,
goodsenseoflongtexts,
perhaps
thehighest
thatTrifogli
facedin writing
thisbookwas to drawenlightening
challenge
ofmaterial,
conclusions
from
masses
muchofwhichmight
havebeenthought
to
general
be unremarkable.
on questions
thatAnneliese
Maiershowed
to be imporConcentrating
in effect
tantfora laterperiod,
a first
writes
forsomeofMaier'stopics,
Trifogli
chapter
a periodforwhichMaierlackedmanuscript
sources.
covering
I can heremention
issuesthatTrifogli's
onlya fewofthemanythought-provoking
raises.
Sheconcludes
thatingeneral
theEnglish
authors
ofquestions
on thePhysics
study
in theperiod1250-70
wererealists
ofmotion
thenature
andtime.In light
of
concerning
thisbackground,
we cannowseethatThomasWylton
andWalter
Burley,
writing
quesin theearlyfourteenth
tionson thePhysics
werefollowing
thecommon
century,
opinion
oftheschools
whentheylikewise
assumed
thatmotion
and timeare successive
entities
in nature.
In thisconnection
concludes
thatherauthors
wereantireally
existing
Trifogli
Averroes's
solutions
toproblematic
within
Aristotle's
Averroists,
rejecting
frequently
points
Averroes's
distinction
between
as an "incomplete
motion
form"
and
text,as forinstance
In fact,
as a "waytowards
form."
thesecommentaries
motion
showmuchabouttheway
medieval
authors
whentheyweremoreinfluenced
thought
byAristotle's
logicalworks
thanby hisphysical
ones.Thusthecommentators
advocatethethree-dimensional
or
"immersive"
ofplacefoundin Aristotle's
without
its
conception
Categories
clearly
facing
withthedefinition
ofplaceas theinnermost
surface
ofthesurrounding
incompatibility
in BookIV ofthePhysics
Aristotle
. Likewise,
theprobbodyforwhich
argued
concerning
ofplace,mostofthesecommentators
lemoftheimmobility
stick
witha solution
suggested
in thetwelfth
Albertus
to Gilbertus
which
century
(which
Magnusascribes
Porretanus),
communis
oneofthemcallstheopinio
(p. 197).
oftheworks
thedistinctive
doctrines
herestudied,
in addition
to their
Among
theory
outwhattheyhaveto sayabouttheactualinfinity
of"immersive
singles
place,"Trifogli
ofnumbers.
As throughout
thebook,herapproach
to thisquestion
is philosophical
and
witha survey
ofrecent
evaluative
rather
thanmerely
historical
anddescriptive.
Shebegins
Aristotle's
and thenstudies
workconcerning
ideasaboutpotential
and actualinfinites
whether
herEnglish
commentators
makeprogress
towards
therealproblems
resolving
18:07:23 PM
REVIEWS
301
forinstance
thedivisions
hadsaidthatsomethings,
within
Aristotle's
Aristotle
position.
infinite.
No matter
how
butcannotbe actually
arepotentially
ofa continuum,
infinite,
arepossible,
butonecannever
further
divisions
a continuum,
times
onehasdivided
many
were
a continuum
intoactually
havefinished
infinitely
manyparts.Numbers
dividing
thepartsthat
forinstance
to arisefrom
understood
things,
counting
physical
byAristotle
is divided.
whena continuum
areproduced
do
commentators
thattheearlyEnglish
to Trifogli,
theevidence
"suggests
According
and theactualinfinite"
nothavea fullgraspof thelogicof thepotential
(p. 114).
is ofgreatinterest
in number
theearlyEnglish
debateabouttheinfinite
Nevertheless,
which
itreveals
aboutnumber
commitments
oftheontological
because
(p. 115).
especially
about
Godis connected
to assertions
theearliest
considers
In whatTrifogli
commentary,
infinites.
So it is argued(cf.p. 117n)thatGod counts
absolute
justas actual
potential
theparts
thisview,saying
The author
that,tobe counted,
rejects
partsofa continuum.
Butonepairof
andthereby
actualized.
ordesignated
mustinsomewaybe distinguished
in numbers,
referthatthereis an actualinfinity
to thecontrary,
commentaries
argues,
numbers:
unitsin counting
whichonedrawsadditional
higher
ringto thesourcefrom
ofthenext
addition
whichtheendless
from
thatthing
derives
from
in numbers
"infinity
Gonville
a quoestcontinua
onederives
)" (Cambridge,
appositio
{abeodem
parttothepreceding
the"source"
thisargument,
andCaiusCollegems.367,f. 142va).As Trifogli
interprets
as a wholeandnotas a
takenatemporally
at issuehereis theseriesofpositive
integers
ofnumbers,
extended.
Foran infinity
at anygiventimebe further
thatmight
series
finite
number
since
one
is
not
ofnumbered
onthisview,an infinity
potenmay
required,
things
as wellas entities
as wellas actualonesandnon-entities
(p. 129n,
things
tially
existing
Merton
to Oxford,
Collegems.272,f. 157ra;seealsop. 130).Ifthisinterprereferring
had a morePlatonic
commentators
thenthemid-thirteenth
tationis correct,
century
undertheinfluence
who
fell
more
than
later
numbers
to
commentators,
firmly
approach
ofmathematics.
to thephilosophy
withregard
andAverroes
ofAristotle
authors
do notcome
in thisstudy,
theseparate
GivenTrifogli's
anonymous
approach
andspecialchardifferences
so thatonehasa clearsenseoftheir
intofocus
individually,
ideasaboutplaceortime?).
alsohavedistinctive
forinstance,
acteristics
(dotheinfinitists,
a basic
inproviding
hassucceeded
as a whole,
thetenworks
Nevertheless,
Trifogli
taking
thatwillbe veryuseofthethirteenth
inthethird
century
quarter
physics
mapofOxford
Itwouldbe wonuncharted
ofthisup-to-now
fulforlaterandfuller
territory.
explorations
in electronic
evenideally
makeavailable,
DonatiandTrifogli
derful
form,
if,eventually,
Thisbookrestsuponan enormous
works.
of theseAristotelian
theirfulltranscriptions
ofwhat
overview
from
ofspadeworkas wellas benefitting
amount
Trifogli's
clearsighted
to light.
hasbeenbrought
EdithSylla
North
Carolina
Raleigh,
18:07:23 PM
BooksReceived
:
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
Contents
, 71 (2000)283 pp. ISSN 0591-0358
grecetlatin
TheRepertories
Musical
Melodies
inByzantine
Chr.Troelsgrd,
-,
ofModel
(Automela)
Manuscripts
Toledan
tables
inthe:Toledan
F. Goubier,
et
F.S. Pedersen,
Tables',
Influences
prdicatives
unaspect
del'approche
terministe
dela premire
moiti
duXIIIesicle
;
rfirentielles:
consquences
onAristotle's
andSignification
in 13th-century
S. Ebbesen,Words
Questions
Metaphysics;
Medieval
onPriscian's
A. Luhtala,
Institutiones
R. Andrews,
Early
Commentary
grammaticae;
A Noteon Ockham's
TheDefensorium
Ockham:AnEdition
; S. Ebbesen,
;
Defender
to cimagl67,68, 70
Corrigenda
Gramticas
Latinas
deTransicin:
Carmen
. Ediciones
Codoer,
fuandePastrana
y Fernando
Nepote
Salamanca
2000151pp. ISBN 84 7481925 3
Universidad,
etdialectique
de Cuse.
chezNicolas
Counet,
Jean-Michel
J. Vrin,Paris2000
Mathmatiques
de philosophie
mdivale,
80) 456 pp. ISBN2 711614603
(tudes
Lore
andinEarly
toJerusalem.
Medecine
inHellenized
Christian
Literature.
Edited
From
Athens
Jewish
M. Horstmanshoff,
G. Baader,G. Ferngern.
Erasmus
by S. Kottek,
Publishing,
Rotterdam
2000279pp. ISBN 90 5235135X
Evrard
AnneGrondeux,
Le Graecismus
deBthune
travers
sesgloses.
Entre
grammaire
posiduXIIeauXesicle.
tive
etgrammaire
Turnhout
2000(Studia
Artistarum,
spculative
Brepols,
8) vii& 552pp. ISBN 2 503 510183
De animaintheLatinWest.
The Warburg
Institute/Nino
Hase,Avicenna's
Dag Nikolaus
London/Turin
Institute
Studies
andTexts,1) x &
2000(Warburg
Editore,
Aragno
350pp. ISBN0 854811257
Ethics
& Littlefield
Lanham-Boulder-New
, N. Thompson
Publishers,
(ed.).Rowman
Instilling
York-Oxford
2000xv& 235pp. ISBN0 847697452
DunsScotus,SeineSpiritualitt
undEthik.Herausgegeben
vonH. Schneider
Johannes
Kevelaer
O.F.M.Butzon& Bercker,
2000(Verffentlichungen
derJohannes-DunsScotus: A. Vos,Hauptlinien
derScotischen
Akademie,
10)ISBN 3 766602934 Contents
Ethik
Leben
liebevolle
Gottes
Wille
zulassender
;
Tat'E. Dekker,
; N. denBok,Ewiges
fureine
Das moralisch
Gute
beiJohannes
H.-M.Stamm,
DunsScotus
DieAktualitt
; H. Schneider,
desseligen
DunsScotus
derScotischen
; A. Vos,EinProfil
Johannes
Spiritualitt
Lesthories
dela disposino
etlegrand
Claudine
uvre
deRonsard.
HonorChampion
Jomphe,
Paris2000(tudes
etessaissurla Renaissance,
diteur,
xxiv)410pp.ISBN2 7453
02620
desphilosophisch-anthropologischen
Th. W. Khler,
Diskurses
imdreizehnten
Grundlagen
Jahrhundert.
DieErkenntnisbemhung
umdenMenschen
imzeitgenssischen
Verstndnis.
Leiden-BostonBrill,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
Kln2000(Studien
desMittelalters,
71)xi & 745
pp. ISBN90 04 116230
- Hoffnung
Gottes
des Menschen.
von H. Schneider
Menschwerdung
Herausgegeben
& Bercker,
Kevelaer
O.F.M.Butzon
(Johannes-Duns-Scotus-Akademie,
12) 162pp.
: J. Schneider,
ISBN 3 76660347 7 Contents
Inkarnation
beiFranziskus
undKlaravon
- Hoffnung
Gottes
wider
allerHoffnung?
Assisi'
J. Schlageter,
Menschwerdung
Christologischer
aus
Rckblick
Petrus
Olivi
aktuellen
A. Vos,Inkarnation
undReinkarnation
Anlass;
;
auf
dersupralapsarischen
H. Veldhuis,
desJohannes
Duns
/irhermeneutischen
Bedeutung
Christologie
Inkarnation
undFragilitt
desMenscshen
Scotus
Die
; G.B. Langemeyer,
; D. Wiederkehr,
- theologisch
Gottes
Gottes
in einer
; J.W.Einhorn,
gesehen
Menschwerdung
Menschwerdung
maior
desheiligen
derLegenda
Bonaventura
Mentis
amore
Lateinische
Bilderhandschrift
ligati.
undDichterfreundschaft
inMittelalter
undNeuzeit.
Freundschaftdichtung
Festgabe
frReinhard
B. Krkel,
T. lichtund
von
Mattes
zum65.Geburtstag.
Herausgegeben
J. Wiendlocha.
Dchting
2001x & 618 pp. ISBN 3 93097813 X
Verlag,
Heidelberg
BrillNV,Leiden,2001
Koninklijke
Vivarium
, 39,2
18:07:33 PM
BOOKSRECEIVED
303
andJack
Buridan
TheMetaphysics
andNatural
, edited
byJ.M.M.H.Thijssen
Philosophy
ofJohn
andEarlyModern
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2001(Medieval
Science,
2) xvii
Zupko.Brill,
& 302pp.ISBN90 04 115145
andKnowledge
TheLight
Science
Steven
P. Marrone,
ofGodintheThirteenth
ofThyCountenance.
Vol.II: GodattheCore
Vol.I: A Doctrine
Illumination.
Brill,
ofCognition.
ofDivine
Century.
intheHistory
ofChristian
Leiden-BostonKln2001(Studies
98)xi& 611
Thought,
pp.ISBN90 04 119477 (set)
Edited
LeideninMedieval
Some
EastandWest.
Nature
Brill,
byC. Koyama.
Thought.
Approaches
desMittelalters,
Boston-Kln
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
2000(Studien
73)xiv
& 186pp.ISBN90 04 119663
vonTheoKobusch.
Primus
desMittelalters.
EineEinfuhrung.
Verlag,
Philosophen
Herausgegeben
Darmstadt
2000vii& 283pp. ISBN3 89678156 1
indasmittelalterliche
Weltbild.
Robert
DerMikrokosmos
Ramon
Hulls.EineEinfuhrung
Pring-Mill,
AusdemKatalanischen
bersetzt
vonUlliRoth.Frommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
2001xii& 141pp. ISBn3 772820026
Marsilius
von
undTheologie
desausgehenden
Mittelalters.
unddasDenken
seiner
Inghen
eit,
Philosophie
Bakker.
Leiden-Boston-Kln
vonM.J.F.M.
HoenenundP.J.J.M.
Brill,
herausgegeben
2000X& 322pp.ISBN90 04 109129
Revue
d'histoire
destextes
: G.-D.de
, XXIX (1999)311 pp. ISBN 2 271 057493. Contents
La tradition
desuvres
deMarcleMoine
Neues
zumKolophon
; K.-H.Uthemann,
Durand,
TheGenesis
desParisinus
Graecus
1115?'K. Schepers,
ofGlossaTripartita
SuperCantica;
Evidence
fortheHistory
B. Victor
et B. Quesnel,
The Colometric
oftheTerenceMannon
deSaint-Oyen
dans
Textin theEarlyMiddleAges;A.-M.Turcan-Verkerk,
Lesmanuscrits
dela Grandechronique
l'histoire
dela transmission
destextes
; G. Labory,
duXIVeetduXVesicle
de Normandie
; D.M. Searby,TheSources
oftheso-called
El cdice
Parisinum
G.1 dela Catedral
Ineditm;
Valverde,
J.Fernndez
Gnomologium
arabumdeRodrigo
deSchott
dela Historia
deRada
deSegorbe
; A.
Jimnez
y la edicin
La rvision
duGraecismus
d'Evrard
deBthune
Grondeux,
; indexdes
parJeandeGarlande
manuscrits
cits
andthe
atParis,
Peter
Auriol
1316-1345.
Chr.,Theology
Schabel,
ofdivine
problem
foreknowledge
andfuture
2000
contingents
Aldershot-Burlington,
U.S.A.-Singapore-Sidney
Ashgate,
de filosofa
de la Universidad
revista
19 (2000)332pp. ISSN 01
Panamericana,
Tpicos,
88-6649
Laurentii
De linguae
traVallensis
latinae
2 vols.,Introduccin,
edicincrtica,
elegantia.
duccin
de Extremadura
1999
y notasporSantiago
LpezMoreda.Universidad
Humanistica.
SerieTextos.
(Grammatica
3) 833pp.ISBN84 77233578 (vol.1)&
84 77233586 (vol.2)
Letravail
desarts
deParis:
textes
etmatres
intellectuel
la Facult
(ca.1200-1500),
OlgaWeijers,
Turnhout
4. H-J(jusqu'
2001(StudiaArtistarum,
C.).Brepols,
Johannes
9) 169pp.
ISBN2 503 511759
secundum
Henrik
de animarationali
substantiam
desNicolaus
Baldeiii
Wels,DieDisputatio
dem
Pariser
Codex
zurAblehnung
desAverroismus
BN. lat.16627.EineStudie
5.J.nach
Romanm
zu Anfang
undAlexandrismus
am Collegium
des 17.Jahrhunderts.
B.R.
Amsterdam
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
2000(Bochumer
Grner,
30)VII
/Philadelphia
& 153pp.ISBN90 6032357 2
TntheFootsteps
TheOrigins
RonaldG. Witt,
Ancients'.
Lovato
toBruni.
ofHumanism
ofthe
from
in Medieval
andReformation
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2000(Studies
Brill,
74)
Thought,
xiii& 562pp. ISBN90 04 113975
18:07:33 PM