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13:15:34 PM
TheAncientConceptofcasus and
itsEarlyMedievalInterpretations 1
Paul M.J.E.Tummers
AlbertusMagnus'Viewon theAngle
withSpecial Emphasison His
and Metaphysics
35
Geometry
JoelBiard
L'unitdu MondeselonGuillaume
Ockham
BooksReceived
63
84
ThomasS. Maloney
RogerBacon on Equivocation
85
- Les
PetrusBerchorius
Redivivus
Sermonsde Bersuire
113
JohnP. Doyle
Prolegomenato a StudyofExtrinsic
Denomination
intheWorkofFrancis
121
Suarez,S.J.
13:15:34 PM
Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
The AncientConceptof casus
and its Early Medieval Interpretations
JEROLD C. FRAKES
is that
The essential conflictin Boethius' De Consolatione
Philosophiae
between the principlesof divine order and random events. The problematic is articulated primarilyin terms of the relationshipbetween
the Boethian Prisoner and the personifiedFortuna, the traditionally
is
ficklecontrollerof earthlygoods. Ultimately Fortuna (and fortuna1)
over
control
denied any intrinsicvalue,2 as well as any independent
worldly affairs,since she is subjected to fatum, the manifestationof
divine ordoin the material world, and thus also to divine prouidentia
itself.By thismeans Fortuna is integratedinto the divine ordo, and the
seeming disorder caused by fortunain the world may be explained as
the result of man's epistemological limitations: instances of the
metaphysical hierarchywhich exist on a higher level than man are
beyond his powers of comprehension.3Even afterthe Prisonerhas accepted Philosophia's specificarguments concerningfortuna,however,
he is not yet prepared to accept the abstract principle necessitatedby
this analysis: i.e. that the all-encompassing divine ordoprecludes the
existence of any and all random events.
Thus Boethius presents in Cons. V, pr. 1 a brief analysis of the
abstractconcept of casus. This treatmentis heavily dependent on the
Aristotelianand post-Aristoteliananalyses, but Boethius omits much
1 A terminological
and sometime
between'Fortuna',thepersonification
distinction
in thefollowing
is maintained
, thegeneralconceptof fortune
deity,and 'fortuna'
pages.
2 Thisdenialofvalueisbasedon threearguments:
the
togrant
1) Fortunas inability
bonm
onetruegood,thesummum
goods,
(II, pr.iv,25); 2) thelackofvalueinmaterial
to
duetotheirinherent
andarbitrary
gainandloss,i.e. without
regard
ephemerality
tothedivineorderandthus
ultimate
merit
subjection
(II, pr.iv- pr.viii);3)fortuna's
aretotheediifepistemologically
action(IV, pr.vi).References
obscure,
teleologica!,
1957.
tionoftheConsolatio
byLudwigBieler,CCL 94, Turnhout
3 On theepistemological
see myDie
restrictions
imposedbyBoethius'metaphysics,
zur
durch
undNotker
desBoethius
derneuplatonischen
, in:Beitrge
Alfred
Metaphysik
Rezeption
106(1984).
Geschichte
derdeutschen
SpracheundLiteratur,
1
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
In addition to this analysis of the physical nature of chance, Aristotle also examines its metaphysical nature in order to determine its
causal function.In II, 5 he already notes that chance is no more than
an incidentalcause: 4'and tuchis an incidentalcause, but strictlyit is
are in factinthe cause of nothing" (197al3-14). Tuchand automaton
mentioned:
cidental to the two efficientcauses already
from
areandhowtheydiffer
whatautomation
andtuch
Nowithasbeenexplained
of
eachother.Bothbelongto thetypeofcauseswhichdealswiththemanner
oran intelligent
a natural
foreither
agentis alwaysthecause,butthere
changes,
ofsuchcauses.(198a1-5)
is an infinite
number
This being the case, tuchand automaton
only simulate the teleologyof
the efficientcauses, since theyproduce resultswhich ostensiblymight
have been produced by nous and phusis (and in fact are caused by
them), respectively(198a5-6); the simulation is due to the essential
as unintentional,indeterminateand
character of tuchand automaton
incomprehensible.To take the instance of the buried gold as an example: the burierof the gold hid the treasure(efficientcause) withthe intentionof later recoveringit (final cause); the farmerdug his field(efficient cause) withthe intentionof planting(final cause). His discovery
of the gold is thus incidental to both final and both efficientcauses,
which is however, not to say withoutcause: that the gold was in his
fieldand that he plowed his fieldeach has a clearlydiscerniblecausal
series. That the two 'accidentally' coincide is chance. As Ross aptly
4
summarizes, 'chance is simplya name forthe unforeseenmeetingof
two chains of rigorous causation."11
Thus Aristotle integrates even chance events into his system of
causality. In doing so, he points beyond the immediatepurposes of his
argument, as in indicated at the end of II, 6:
orphusis
be
forwhich
nous
arecausesofeffects
andtuch
Butsinceautomaton
might
and
comestocausethesesameeffects
thecause(whensomething
incidentally),
is priortothatwhichisperse, itis clearthatno
whichis incidental
sincenothing
to
areposterior
andtuch
causeispriortoa causeperse.Thusautomaton
incidental
nomatter
howmuchautomaton
andphusis
nous
; consequently,
maybe thecauseof
and
andphusis
arenecessarily
theheavens,
nous
priorcausesofboththeuniverse
in it.(198a5-13)
manyotherthings
Just as substance must always be antecedent to 'accidents' (attributes
and Ross(ed.
naturalimpulseandthought,
is between
In eachcase thedistinction
in thissense.
areusedsynonymously
andproairesis
thatdianoia
, 518)suggests
Physics
11Aristotle
m
tothatusedinlaterdevelopments
hereis similar
, 78. Ross terminology
causisin Cons.V, pr.i, 13; seebelow,pp. 8-10.
thetradition:
exconfluentibus
4
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
wonder
arechanged
"Now I greatly
around,viceversa
, andthe
whythesethings
whichareduethewicked
thegood,whilethewicked
seize
punishments
oppress
therewards
duethegood,andI wouldliketolearnfrom
youwhatmight
appear
tobe theexplanation
ofsuchunjustconfusion."
(IV, pr.v, 4)
But the differenceis in fact much greaterthan merelyone of degree,
'
'4
forthe Prisoner no longer complains of his personal fortunes,' but
inquires into the nature of a philosphical concept, which he, the
erudite student of philosophy, has found in all systems of ancient
thought.Philosophia's argumentationhas shown that the confusionof
random events, ruled byfortuna
, does not obtain; rather,a rigidsystem
of divine order regulatesthe cosmos. The acceptance of thistenetdoes
little to placate the Prisoner's inquietude, however: "since he frequently grantsdelightsto the good and unpleasant thingsto the wicked, and at other times, grants the wicked theirwishes, while meting
out harshness to the good, why should God's rule seem any different
casibus), unless the cause be
from that of random chance (<a fortuitis
discovered" (IV, pr. v, 6). The confusionin the world is no longer attributedto the personifiedFortuna, since she has disappeared fromthe
work(afterthe firstsectionsof Book III), dispelled fromthe Prisoner's
mind by Philosophia's remedia.The underlyingconcept of random
casibus, remains, however, and is dealt within V, pr.
chance, a fortuitis
1, where the dichotomybetween the supposed orderof the cosmos and
the chaos of everyday actuality is finallyeliminated. As such, this
discussion of chance in V, pr. i is the logical and necessaryconclusion
to the problemoffortuna,as stated in Book I, and not at all a tangential
problem, as Philosophia hints that it mightbe (V, pr. i, 5).
Interveningbetween this last complaint in IV, pr. v and the explanation of chance in V, pr. i are two prose passages and two metra,
in one of which is found Philosophia's expositionof the nature of and
During this discussion, she
relationshipbetweenfatumand prouidentia.
mentions almost as if it were an offhandremarkthat since prouidentia
controlsall things,nothingis leftto chance: "For a certainorder embraces all things, so that whatever departs fromthe appointed order
revertsto another, albeit differentorder, so that nothingin the realm
of providence is leftto chance ( temeritati
)" (IV, pr. vi, 53). The second
the
notion
that "all fortunais absolutely
concerns
interveningpassage
good" (IV, pr. vii, 2), since it is part of the divine plan.
The way has been prepared, therefore,for the final definitionof
chance by also making it subordinate to prouidentia
, which can only be
as
well.
chance
Philosophia denies
beneficent,therebyrendering
good
6
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
' 'Whenever
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
'
fortunaeand casus, which occur incidentallyto the final cause: 'incidentaticause ... of effectsproduced in those things done for some
'
purpose' (1153B). The distinction between tuchand automatonis
maintained, in that acts of fortunapertain to events of human will
, as the
( uoluntas
), while casushas to do with the non-rational{de natura
term is used here; 1153C-D). That such events are teleological is not
emphasized by Boethius in his argument at this point, but since
chance events occur in the contextof natural or volitional acts, they
are by definitionteleological, since uoluntasand naturaare necessarily
purposeful.
In the Consolatio
, on the other hand, there is no explicitanalysis of
any of the three conditions. In V, pr. i, 13 (quoted above, p. 8),
it is indicated that a chance event is one which occurs insteadof the intended outcome of an action; but that the chance event is itself
'
4
teleological is not explicitlystated. The reason for this 'omission'
may be found, however, in the contextof the discussion: since casusis
no more than an 4'event due to a confluenceof causes" (euentus
exconcausis
from
then
is
and
these
causes
derive
casus
,
fluentibus
prouidentia
),
definition
since
the
ultimate
by
teleological,
guided by
orderingprinciple. The exceptional and accidental characterof chance events is also
: theyare exceptional since they
implicitin the contextof the Consolatio
seemto occur outside the controlof divine ordo(IV, pr. v); theyare accidentadinsofaras theyresultexconfluentibus
causisand not froma clearly discernible efficientcause.
Further, Boethius does not explicitly analyze the distinctionbetween tuchand automaton
, which was so importantto the Aristotelian
of
and
which
was retained in the post-Aristotelian
chance,
concept
Boethius'
tradition, including
commentary on Cicero's Topica
(1153C-D), with few exceptions. The traditionalLatin equivalents of
the Aristotelianterms(also used by Boethius in his commentaryon the
- tuchand casus- automaton
, as is seen in Chalcidius'
Topica) arefortuna
on
There
in the Aristotelian
the
Timaeus.
casus
is
retained
commentary
sense, applying to non-rationalbeings and things: "Thus casuswill be
the concurrence ( concursus
), at one and the same time, of accidental
causes without plan ( accidentium
sine rationecausarum
) in inanimate
or
inarticulate
animals"
Comm
in
Tim.
,
things
159). The use offor(
tuna, also strictlyAristotelian,is seen in the passage quoted above (p.
9) from the same chapter of Chalcidius' commentary. Chalcidius
does not, however, retain Aristotle's subordination of the incidental
causes casus and fortunato the efficientcauses phusis and nous, but
10
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
jects and their reaction to natural laws). All essential aspects of the
Aristotelian definitionof chance are thus maintained by Boethius,
althoughtheyundergo a major change of emphasis, due to his concern
withthe largercontextof the metaphysicalorder, ratherthan withthe
details of the specificmanifestationof that order.
The concept of chance is expressed primarilywith the use of the
three termsfortuita!
, temeritas
fortuitus
(and its derivative forms- the
adverb temere
and the adjective temer
arius)and casus.The threeprimary
terms are often found togetherin one sentence in various combinations of adjective and noun forms,withoutclearcut individual distinction in meaning. Both temerarius
and fortuitus
can modifycasus: "Do
the
world
is
that
think,
then,
you
governed by random and chance
events ( temerariis
. . . fortuitisque
casibus), or do you believe that some rational principle ( regimen
rationis)rules it?" (I, pr. vi, 3). The chance
event is contrasted through each term with the rule of reason.
Temerarius
could well be interpretedin its usual sense, "without direction or plan," whilefortuitus
raprovides a similar contrastto regimen
tionisin the common and rathernon-specificsense which it stillhas in
modern Englishfortuitous
,24In the sentence immediatelyfollowingthis
the
terms
seem
almost to be "remixed," and it becomes
example,
clear thatfortuitus
and temerarius!
are not to be interpretedas
temeritatus
I
terms:
could
never
believe thateventsof such
"Certainly
contrasting
temeritate
regularityare due to fortuitoustemerity{fortuita
)" (I, pr. vi,
4). The contrastis ratherto be found between the combined signification of this group of termsof the semantic field "chance" and that of
"divine order." The in-depthanalysis of chance in V. pr. i makes use
of all three terms. But in the two definitionsof chance given by
Philosophia, the term casus alone appears: the term which had tradiand which
tionallybeen used in Latin to render Aristotle'sautomaton
was to become the standard term forchance in subsequent medieval
Latin analyses.25
The question remains, however, what significancethe Boethian
distinctionbetween the two termsfortunaand casusmighthave. It is not
as simple as Patch and Cioffari maintain- that casus is merely the
technical term forthe underlyingprinciple of causless events (Patch
specifies"chance" as conceived by Aristotle),whilefortunais the personificationof thisprinciple.26Fortunais used in a number of verydif24 Thesaurus
Latinae
onfortuitus.
Linguae
(Leipzig1926),VI/1,1172-75
" Ibid.(Leipzig
III, 576-70on casus.
1906-1912),
26Patch,118;Cioffari,
89.
12
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
44
goods which wyrdbrings*39, 10). Yet by this point in Alfred's text,
Wisdom had already been established as the grantor of material
goods, and Boethius' Philosophia has already deemphasized Fortunat
role as agent and begun to concentrate on the material goods
themselvesand the 'state of fortune'which the goods effect(Cons. II,
pr. vi).45 The correspondingterm in the Boethian text at this point is
indeed fortuna
, but it does not signifythe goddess, as the context
shows: ' 'Finally we may draw the same conclusion concerningfortune
as a whole, in which, it is clear, thereis nothingworthseekingand no
intrinsicgood; it is not always associated with good men, nor does it
make those good with whom it is associated" (II, pr. vi, 20). In this
context,the Alfredian "1 seo wyrd brengd" signifiesno more than
'quas sors fert,'with no connotation of a grantingagent.46
47his
Yet Wisdom never denies the existenceof wyrd'
only concernis
to establish its subjugation to providentialcontrol, correspondingto
Philosophia's concern withfatumand fortuna.For this reason, the idea
that wyrdis a forceoperating outside the bounds of divine ordois rejected as consistentlyby Wisdom as by Philosophia. In Mod's initial
complaint, God's control of wyrdis assumed: "Hwy '>u la Drihten
aefrewoldest p seo wyrd swa hwyrfansceolde" ('Why, Lord, would
you ever want wyrdto change so' 10, 17-18 = fortunaI, m. v, 29). It is
only God's allowing wyrdto be capricious that is at issue here, not
wyrs independence of divine control. Further along in the same
metrm,fortunais again translated with wyrd(10, 23-25), and here
again divine control is emphasized, since the independent power of
wyrdis presentedas a hypotheticalconstructand not an existententity.
In his translation of the following prosa, Wisdom summarizes the
reasons for Mod's 'exile' from his native land (of Wisdom/
philosophy), one of which is: "[u] wendest '> seo weord as woruld
44The former
as an exampleof Ilia, 'a perpassageis citedby Bosworth-Toller
sonification,
fate,fortune,'
p. 1288.
45Elsewhere
thepowerofgranting
material
inthetext,Alfred
denieswyrd
consistently
attributes
thegoodstofortuna
(forgoods:e.g. 25,28-31and27,21-22,whereBoethius
ontheConsolatio
tnete
dona
, II, pr.v, 2). TheSt.GallAnonymous
commentary
glosses
and
avoidsanysuchinterpretation
as dee(Einsiedeln
179,121a).Alfred
clearly
fortunae
evenanyambiguity
whichwouldpermit
suchan interpretation.
46Cf. however,
is here"die Gabenverteilerin
Weber(p. 23), whoarguesthatwyrd
in allegorischer
'Fortuna'... zumindest
Vorstellungsweise."
47OttenobjectsthatAlfred's
wecallwyrd1
hatad"('thatwhich
128,18
"f)[)wewyrd
= IV, pr.vi, 10)hasas itspurpose
ofwyrd
thedenialoftheactuality
, sinceWisdom
wordsdirectly
doesnotsay "f>J>wyrdbid" ('thatwhichwyrd
is'); in fact,Alfred's
translate
Boethius'
uocetur.
fatum
18
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
uidentiaorders, fatumexecutes, and fortunais one attributeof fatal execution. Here fortunais no more than earthlyeventsrelevantto the ac'
quisition and loss of material goods, i.e. the state of one's fortunes.'
Alfred accepts Boethius' judgment and translates: "aelc wyrd bio
good" ('every wyrdis good' 137, 3), and adds later: "aelc wyrdis nyt
ara e auder ded, odde laerd, odde wyrcd" (every wyrdis useful
which either instructsor exercises' 137, 21-22) and "aelc wyrd bid
good ... sam hio sy rede, sam hio sie wynsum" ('every wyrdis good ...
whetherit be severe or pleasant' 138, 11-12). He does not, therefore,
deny wyrda place in his cosmology,as Otten argues (p. 69), but in fact
incorporateswyrdinto the systemin the same manner as Boethius integratesfortunainto his metaphysical system.
The Boethian concept offatumundergoes fewerchanges in Alfred's
translationthan does fortuna.In the Consolatio
, fatumis the manifestation of the providential plan in the material world (IV, pr. vi, 10).
Alfredtranslates:"Se foregoneis sio godcunde gesceadwisnes; ... Ac p
1) we wyrd hatad, Jbbid Godes weorc f>he aelce daeg wyrcd" ('Providence is the divine intellect. . . But that which we call wyrd
, that is
God's workwhich he performseveryday' 128, 15-19). Wyrdis related
toforegone
in the same manner as fatumto prouidentia
, and is thus subordinate to providence: "[mos wandriende wyrd{ we wyrdhatad faerd
aefterhis [sc. Godes] foronce7 aeft~hisgeeahte, swa swa he tiohhad
, proceeds accor hit sie" ('This vacillating wyrd,which we call wyrd
ding to his [God's] providence and according to his order,just as he
determinesthat it be' 128, 29-30). On the basis of these passages, it
becomes clear whyAlfreddenies wyrdindependentpower earlierin the
work: forpreciselythe same reasons that Boethius deniesfortunasuch
forpower- since the divine ordois incontrovertible,wyrd(and fatum!
in
the
function
thus
as
the
context
of
can
exist
ordo'
they
only
tuna)
lowlevel ministersof providence in earthlyaffairs.
Man's attributionto chance of the control of earthly affairsis,
therefore, according to Alfred as to Boethius, due to man's
20
13:15:42 PM
epistemologicallimitations:man is by nature incapable of understanding the divine order "Ac hit nis nanum men alefed aethe maege
witan eall p God getiohhod haefd, ne eac areccan b he geworht
haefd" ('But it is grantedto no one to know all that God has planned
nor to explain that which he has done' 135, 6-8; the passage expands
on IV, pr. vi, 56).
In his translationof Boethius' technical analysis of chance in V, pr.
i, Alfreddenies that any events take place by chance: "hit nis nauht p
mon cwid, > aenig ing weas gebyrige" ('it is nothingthat men say,
that anythinghappens by chance' 140, 3-4). While Philosophia bases
her argument(V, pr. i, 8) on the all-encompassingordoand the notion
of nihilex nihilo, Alfred's reasons fordismissingrandom events is quite
simple and his argument quite circular: "Fora aelc ing cimd of
sum ing, forhit ne bid weas gebyred" (Tor everythingcomes
from some cause, since it does not happen by chance' 140, 4-5).
Boethius' argumentis in general drasticallyreduced; in factlittlesurvives intactexcept the exemplum of the buried gold (140, 9-17), which
Alfreduses to illustratethe principlethatchance (weasgebyred)
signifies
no more than unexpected events ( unwenunga
gebirede).No other conditions are presented. That the discoveryof the gold is nonethelessa
caused event is clear, but the justificationis not made in terms of ex
causisor ineuitabili
conexione
confluentibus
(Cons. V, pr. i, 18-19). Wisdom
the
rather
sees
to be simplythe pervasive divine ordo, governcausality
ed by providence: "Ac sio godcunde foretiohhunglaerde one e he
wolde { he gold hydde, 7 eft done e he wolde hit funde" ('But
divine providence taught the one whom he wished to hide the gold,
and afterwardsthe one whom he wished to findit' 140, 15-17 = deproV , pr. i, 19). 49No intermediarycauses between God and
uidentiae
Jonte
earthlyevents, such as Aristotle'sphusisand nous, or even Boethius'
fatumare admitted here, and no term 'chance' can any longer be
legitimatelyused: it was only 'formerly'used ('gio' 140, 10) and has
now ceased even to be a 'sound withoutsignificance'(inanisuoxW, pr.
i, 8), not translatedby Alfred,but retainedin se nama('the name' 140,
7), which translates Boethius' uocabula(V, pr. i, 11). Only in the
reduced sense 'unexpected or inexplicable event' (which is nonetheless
49Theninth-century
ofAuxerre
also
ontheConsolatio
Latincommentary
byRemigius
is glossed"ambitusdispositendsinthedirection
as theonlycause:ordo
ofprouidentia
tionsdei.extraquem,etpraeter
quemnihilumquamfuit.est.auterit"('theorbitof
everwas,is orwillbe' Paris,BN
ofwhichnothing
God'sorder,beyondandoutside
lat. 15090,75r).
21
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
all Old High German 4synonyms' given, the Latin term is always
'dfinitive'.56
Following the translation, Notker often adds comments and explanations, some of which take the formof short excurses of several
pages. The comments and excurses never blatantly Correct' the doctrine of the Boethian text, since, as Ingeborg Schrbler points out:
" Notker will nicht
Besserung von etwas Miliebigem geben, sondern
er ist berzeugt von der Rechtglubigkeit seines Textes- oder
wenigstens: er gibt keinem Zweifel daran Raum."57 Yet Notker's
method is that of an exegetical commentator- the Consolatiois seen as
latently Christian and demands exegesis in order to reveal and
elucidate its hidden Christian meaning. This exegesis ultimately
results in major alterations in the Boethian text, oftento the extent
that the Boethian system is scarely recognizable in Notker's translation.58
In his translationof the technicalanalysis of casusin V, pr. i, Notker
does not initiallyattempta translationof casus, but ratherretainsthe
term in his Old High German text. But this is only one of the three
discussions of the general concept. Long beforehand,Philosophia and
the Prisonerbroach the subject, as the latterfirstvoices concern about
the lack of order in the world. In his translation of I, m. v, 45,
"homines quatimur fortunaesalo" ('We men are buffetedby the seas
of fortune'), Notker glosses fortune(retained in his translation) with
uuluundigi
('variability withina brieftime period'),59 indicatingthat
56Jrgen
comments:
"Der Bezugauf die lat. Terminologie
verschafft
Jaehrling
alsoeinerseits
Notker
denRaum,indemersprachschpferisch
kannbis
ttigwerden
hin zum sprachlichen
ohneda ihnbei jeder Abweichung
von der
Experiment,
derVorwurf
der Ungenauigkeit
treffen
kann.Die lat. TerprzisenUbersetzung
ihnandererseits
bewahrt
umjedenPreiszu verdavor,eineUbersetzung
minologie
nichtkorrekten
suchen,d.h. um den Preis einerungenauenoder sprachlich
Notkers
desDeutschen
inseiner
der
Terminologie
Wiedergabe"
[Diephilosophische
Ubersetzung
Aristotelischen
or Notker's
, Berlin1969,140].He impliesthusthatNotker
Kategorien
German(orboth)was sometimes
ofprecisely
Boethius'
textin
incapable
expressing
Old HighGerman,an argument
whichNotker
's creativetranslation
consistently
refutes.
' De consolatione
57Notker
III. vonSt. Gallen
als bersetzer
undKommentator
vonBoethius
Hermaea
n.s.
2
6.
Philosophiae,
(Tbingen
1953),
58Herbert
Bolender
discusses
indetailNotker
's method
ofcommentary
andadaptaSchrbler's
ideaofinterpretado
Christiana
tion,modifying
(Schrber,
1-20)inhisNotker's
Consolatioalswiderpruchsfreie
: EineHypothese
Praktik
zurGeschichte
, Beitrge
Rezeption
derdeutschen
aremore
102(1980),325-38.The adaptations
SpracheundLiteratur,
in themetaphysical
thanin theconcept
ofcasus.
pronounced
system
59Notker's
textis citedbypageandlinenumber
oftheedition
byE. H. Sehrtand
24
13:15:42 PM
his interpretation
ofthe Prisoner's complaintextendsbeyond Fortuna,
the personality,to the abstract problem of unordered events.60
Philosophia's response to the Prisoner(I, pr. vi) initiatesthe discussion of chance as such, and Notker introduceshere many of the terms
with which he will handle the concept throughoutthe work:
Putasnehuncmundum
et fortuitis
casibus?An credisinesseei
agi temerariis
ullumregimen
rationis?
Uunesttudiseuurltlichen
uerlzene
uren.
geskhte
ndestzzelingin?
Aideuunesttudr-nauusendehinarhtifter
redo?
thatthesewordly
events
without
andatrandom,
control,
('Do youthink
proceed
ordo youthink
thereis anyrational
orderin them'51, 7-11).
Nokter's Prisonerthendenies (just as did Boethius') thatthe cosmos is
ruled by chance and affirmsthe beneficentdivine order. Afterhaving
established the fact of God's rule, Philosophia's questioning of the
Prisoner concerningthe governance of the cosmos leads her to delve
furtherinto the actual means of control:quibusgubernaculis.
The phrase
is most reasonably to be understood in this passage in the general
sense 'by what means [of governance]'. Notker translates as mt
uulemo
rodere
('with what kind of rudder' 52, 6-7) and adds the comment: "S uulta in lren dz prospera nde aduersa dero uurlte
gubernacula snt" ('She wanted to teach him that properous and
adverse thingsare the governorsof the world' 52, 7-8). In thiscontext,
roder
may well have no significationbeyond the Boethian 'means of
in
control', but one can also argue that Notker understoodgubernacula
the alternatesense of 'rudder', associated the referencewiththe iconographicallywell-knownrudderof Fortuna, and inferreda referenceby
Boethius here to "prospera et aduersa fortuna" as God's tools of controlin the world (i.e. according to Boethius' finalposition concerning
s place in the divine order).61The incorporationoffortunainto
fortuna'
the divine hierarchyunder God's controllater in the work is not lost
on Notker, and he expands on that notion and manages to include it
Notkers
desDeutschen
Werke
here45,
I, ATB 32-34(Halle/Saale
TaylorStarek,
1933-34),
19-20.
60Othertechnical
references
tounordered
eventsaretranslated
a
without
byNotker
'
consistent
rebus... teuuessldn"('fleeting
fortunes'
strictly
vocabulary:'fortuitis
rebus... an disnzuuelign
86,22-24)and"in hisfortuitis
dingen"('in theseuncertainthings'
havespecific
reference
neither
toFortuna
norto
94, 21-23).Theseterms
theabstract
ofcasus
refer
tothegeneral
ofinevitable
, butrather
concept
simply
concept
change.
61The varioussymbols
associated
withFortuna
areillustrated
and discussed
byR.
Fortuna
Lexikon
der
undrmischen
Peter,
, in:Ausfhrliches
, ed. W. H.
griechischen
Mythologie
Roscher,
1/2,1503-58.
Leipzig1886-90,
25
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
obscure
toeachprinciple,
itisalwayseither
ormanifest,
Withregard
foundation.
itcomesorwhence
toit' 334,
whatitsfoundation
is,whence
something
happens
10-16).
Notkerseems littledisturbedby the relationshipbetween the Christian
exnihiloand the Boethian affirmation
of nihilex
doctrineof God's creatio
nihiloin relation to substance. Yet the passage drew much attention
fromthe ninth-centurycommentatorson the Consolatio.The St. Gall
Anonymous makes the Christian dogma explicit: "conditor ex nihilo
cuncta creauit" ('the creator created all things from nothing' Einsiedeln 179, 173b). Remigius offerstwo comments: "a deo omnia ex
nihilo facta sunt" ('all thingswere made by God fromnothing' Paris
BN Lat. 15090, 74v) and "sciebant enim illi quod conditorex nihilo
cuncta crearet" ('For they know that the creator created all things
fromnothing' ibid.). Here Notkerhas gone intomuch more detail concerningmaterial causality than did Boethius, yet withoutofferingthe
which is otherwisecharacteristicof his translation,
Christiana
interpretatio
and forwhich there were also models in the commentarytraditions.
His rendering of Boethius' arguments concerning casus is quite
direct,preservingthe exemplum of the discovered gold and the salient
aspects of the definition. Chance events are incidental to the final
cause: "So man chd er teuur mbe teuuz tot ... Unde dr
teuunnn eht nderes keskhet . tnne dr-mbe man iz tot ...
Tz heizet casus" ('Thus one says that he does somethingfora purpose ... and for some reason something else happens than that for
which it was done ... That is called casus' 335, 11-15); unusual (since
unexpected): "N moz h chdan geskhtuusen . dz ngeuundo
gebret" ('Now I must call thatcasuswhich takes place unexpectedly'
causis: "Fne zesmine
336, 21-23); and they result ex confluentibus
geullenn dingen . diu man mbe eht tot" ('from the concurrence
of things,which one does for some purpose' 336, 24-25). 68 The efficientcause ofthisconfluenceofcauses is the same as thatpostulatedin
the Consolatio
and in Alfred'stranslation:"diu ordena . s. fati. diu-dir
chmentiu fne gtes prouidentia" ('the order, i.e. of fate, which
comes fromGod's providence' 336, 27-28 = V, pr. i, 19). In this
cause, the teleology of chance events is guaranteed. Boethius' final
comment on the inevitable chain of causality, dependent on prouidentia, promptsNotker to give a precis of the metaphysicalhierarchyby
means of which all eventstake place in theirproperorder: "Prouiden68Remigius
remarks
on theBoethian
definition
(V, pr. i, 18): UERADEFINITIO
CASUS(Paris,BN lat. 15090,75r).
29
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
congeskiht
per se is inaccurate.JrgenJaehrlingmaintains thatgeskiht
sistentlyrenderscasus in the sense of 'chance' in Notker's translation
69Yet the term
of Aristotle'sCategories.
(in various grammaticalforms)
is in fact found in the Categories
consistentlyin the sense 'event/ 'to
happen' or in referenceto grammatical case.70 In Notker's D inter, the standard translationequivalent is again found: allegeskiht
pretation
= quejiunt('that which happens').71 The usage in Notker's Consolatio
is consistentwiththatfhis otherworks. In 51, 7-11 (quoted above, p.
functionsin the phrase diseuurltlichengeskihte
, which taken
25), geskiht
as a unit translateshunemundum
i.e.
'those
events
which
take place
,
agi
in the world.' Geskihtsignifies no more than euentus,which is the
generalsignificationproposed by Schrblerforthe term,in additionto
"das Geschehen" and "quae ... acciderunt."72In fact,geskiht
is rarely
Notker's translationforcasusin the sence 'chance', unlessqualified by
an adjective whichmodifiesthe basic significationsof the term{euentus)
toward the signification 'causeless events.' In 41, 15-17 and
is used withoutadjectival modificationand translates
elsewhere,geskiht
In 79, 2-9 it appears in a commentby Notkeras thetranslation
euentus.
of casus, used as the designation forone of the methods of rhetorical
defense.73Even here, however, a qualifier is necessary in order to
specifymore clearly the meaning of the Latin term:
geskiht('unexpected event' 79, 5).
ngeuundiu
To render the concept 'chance', geskihtalmost always takes a
qualifier which indicates randomness: "de repentiniscasibus . Fne
ghngeskhten" ('concerning unexpected events' 295, 7-8) and "si
misceriomnia fortuitiscasibus crederem . . . be ih llu ding kelubti
turn in nguissn
geskhten" ('If I believed all thingsto be confused
uncertain
events'
289, 24-26). Most clearly illustrativeof the
by
of
necessity qualifyinggeskihtin order to render casus as 'chance' is a
statementby Notker himself: "be dz ngeuundo geskhet . tu
geskihtheizet casus" ('If that happens unexpectedly,the event is call69Jaehrling,
22. He also considers
casusin thesense'Zufall'a non-philosophical
usage,whilein thesenseofgrammatical
case,itis philosophical
[?1.
70In 100,11-15=
case(amr);100,25-27= facta
factaest'100,17-20= grammatical
= une
est
; 94,23-25- abaliquohuiusmodi
telchero
; ed.J. . King.Die Werke
geskihte
Notkers
desDeutschen
V, 73 (Tbingen1972).
71Ed. byJ. .
desDeutschen
Notkers
VI, ATB 81(Tbingen
King,Die Werke
1972),40,
12-13.
72Schrbler,
112.
73The othermethodsmentioned
are necessitasi
not('necessity')and imprudenza/
nuuzenhit
79,6-9).
('ignorance'
31
13:15:42 PM
'
ed casus 338, 4-5). only when somethingoccurs (geskihet)
unexpectedly
may it be called 'chance'.74 This practice correspondsto Alfred's use
of a ' 'butan" -clause with wyrdin order to translate casus.
As noted above, Notker most oftenretains the Latin term casus in
his German textduring the technicaldiscussion of casus.75Toward the
end of the analysis, however, he renders the term twice with geskiht
without adjectival modification,but only afterthe definitionof casus
has been reduced to "improuisus inopinatusque concursus" ('unforeseen and unexpected concurrence' 335, 23-24) and "inopinatus euentus" ('unexpected event' 336, 21); casus no longer signifies'chance'
thus signifiesno more than an euenwhen geskiht
is so used, and geskiht
and beyond the epistemological powers of
tus caused by prouidentia
men.
The other terms in the shortpassage, 51, 7-11, are equally important for the discussion of chance in the remainder of the work. The
semantic significanceof "temerariis et fortuitiscasibus" is translated
the firstof which emphasizes the lack of
and stuzzelingn,
by uerlzene
the
latter
while
order in temerariis
,
(in Old High German used only by
ariusand its derivativeforms
Notker) is a common translationof temer
elsewhere in the work: "productum euentum temerariomotu ... ina
stuzzelingn uurtena geskiht" (332, 18-21); "temerario motu ...
stuzzelingn" (332, 27-333, 2); "temeritas ... stuzzelingn" (333,
15-17).
Just as in the Boethian passage, one findsin Notker's translationa
concern forthe establishmentofclearlydefined,opposing categoriesof
arius etfortuituscasus and rdovs.
order and disorder: ratiovs. temer
The
Prisoner affirmsthe rule of
uerlzenelindestzzelingn
geskihte.
God's ratioand denies the control of disorder: "Atqui inquam nullo
modo existimauerim. ut tam certa moueantur fortuitatemeritate.
Truuo chd ih . tz nechme nomr in mnen sin . tz s gussiu ding
. frn fter uunchelnero nrhti" ('Cerainly, I said, it never occured to me that such certainthingsoccurredaccordingto a vacillating
lack of order' 51, 11-15). Later in the same discussion, the opposition
74Further
useof
ofgeskiht
evidence
ofthebasicsignification
maybe seeninNotker's
Ittranslates
a termfound
works.
msseskht
forasperitas
onlyinNotker's
('misfortune'),
ofragingfortune'
seuientis
tune
26,9-10),aduersa
fortuna
('adversefortune'
('harshness
offortune'
88, 10-12).In eachcase,therefore,
42,4-6)andaduersitas
('adversity
fortune^
the
itexpresses
thestateofbadluck,thenegative
aspectofwhichmaybe takenfrom
useofunwyrd
andtheOld HighGermanmi'ssi-.
Cf.Alfred's
Latinasperitas
, aduersitas
ictibus
offortunae
III, pr.i, 2).
('bytheblowsoffortune'
(50, 17)as a translation
75331,20; 332,20 & 23; 334,22; 335,1.
32
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
13:15:42 PM
Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
AlbertusMagnus3 View on the Angle with Special Emphasis on His
and Metaphysics*
Geometry
PAUL M. J. E. TUMMERS
13:15:51 PM
the nature of the angle. Aristotle's text does not mention the angle,
and thereforetwo questions immediatelyarise: why is this digression
made here in the Metaphysics
, and what could be Albert's source or
sources?
As a provisional answer to the firstquestion one might say that
geometrydeals with quantity, that the angle is a geometricalobject,
and that the angle must thereforehave a place in a chapteron quantity. Aristotle,however, gives as the normal kinds of (mathematical)
continuous quantityonly: line, surfaceand body. To the second question: Avicenna had already made some remarks on the angle in the
place correspondingto those remarks in Albert's work, namely the
Furthermore,a similardiscuschapter on quantityin his Metaphysics.1
sion concerningthe nature of the angle can be foundin the Geometry
(a
commentaryon Euclid), attributedto Albertus Magnus.8
This paper considers these provisional answers with the help of an
analysis and comparison of the discussions on the angle in Albert's
and Metaphysics.
Geometry
The introduction(section 1) gives some remarkson the status of
geometricalobjects in general and on the historyof the problemof the
nature of the angle up to Albert's time.
Section 2 is an examination of the relevant passage in Albert's
Geometry
compared with that of Anaritius' commentaryon Euclid,
which has turned out to be Albert's main source.
and gives a
Section 3 deals withthe passages in Albert's Metaphysics
and
the
the
the
of
of
Geometry
Metaphysics.
comparison
arguments
In section 4 the views of Roger Bacon and other XIII/XIV^1centuryauthors are compared with those of Albert.
In the appendices the text of the relevant passages of Albert's and
will be
Anaritius' commentarieson Euclid and of Albert's Metaphysics
given.
1. Introduction
1.1. Geometrical Objects
Albert's view on the objects of geometryin general is quite clear; it
will thereforebe sufficientto quote only a few passages statingthis
7 See 3.1. G. Verbeke,
in hisintroduction
to theeditionofAvicenna
(seenote50),
doesnotsayanything
aboutthispassage.
8 Seenote4. Thisattribution
toAlbert
theGreatisinmyopinion
correct.
Seemyforedition
thcoming
(Spring1984).
36
13:15:51 PM
: geometria
cummateria
view. One is fromhis Metaphysics
(sit) de conceptia
is
the
:
rationem
another
from
secundum
esseetseparatissecundum
;9
Geometry
theremathematicsis described as the philosophyconsiderans
formamque
rationem
est in materiamobili tarnenestconceptacumipsa secundum
difwhat
the
remains:
Nevertheless,
question
significationdo
finitivam.10
these words have, what objects does Albert have in mind? A look at
Aristotlewill help us to solve this.
For Aristotlethereis a distinctionbetween two kinds of geometrical
objects: on the one hand the line, surfaceand body, togetherwiththeir
principle,the point; on the otherhand the geometricalfiguressuch as
the circle and the square.11 The formerprovide the base, the underly, extening matterof the latter; the nature of the formeris quantitas
as
in
two
and
three
Aristotle
one,
sionality
says in the
(dimensions),
4
in
the
latter
are
considered
be
the
to
;12
Metaphysics
category quality'.
Albert makes the same distinction:in his discussions of Quantity*
he deals with line, surface, body while the figuresare treated in his
chapters on 'quality'. Let us look at these chapters.
:
Albert discusses quantity in his Predicamenta
and in his Metaphysics
in
in the firsttractas mensura
the
substantiae
second
,
corporeae
proutpendet
13Albert
ex ente.In the Predicamenta
says that of the praedicabiliawhich
belong to the nature of the accidents of a substance, the firstis quantity, and he gives the divisions of quantity; one species is the continous,
to which belong: line, surface and body (but also the nonmathematical: tempusand locus). Albert gives the reasons why these
three are continuous quantities (ch. 3): the main reason is that the
point by itsfluxusgenerates the line, the line the surface and so on.
To thishe adds thatthisfluxusis onlyintellectual.14Furtherhe dwellson
several difficultiesconcerning the line, surface and body (ch. 7-8);
in these chapters (as well as in this whole tracton quantity) he gives
the mathematicalpropertiesof these objects and also quotes Euclid in
9 Metaphysica
III 3, 1 (ed. cit. 139,65); see also Metaphysica
11,1 (1); III 2, 13
andAnal.Post.I 4, 7
(135-137);IV 1, 1 (162);VI 1, 2 (304-305);XII 1, 3 (549-551),
vol.2, 105).
(ed. Borgnet,
10MS Vienna,Dom. 80/45,f. 105r(myedition
p. 1).
11See: Ian Mller,Aristotle
on Geometrical
der
, in: ArchivfrGeschichte
Objects
52 (1970),156-171;RogerJ. Rigterink,
Aristotle's
Philosophie,
Conception
ofGeometrie
1973(no. 73-21.176);D. O'Brien,Aristote
etla catgorie
dela
, Diss.Wisconsin,
Objects
Divisions
dela quantit
33 (1978),25-40.
, in: Les Etudesphilosophiques,
quantit.
12
VI 3, 1061a 33.
13Metaphysica
III (ed. Borgnet,
Predicamenta
vol. 1, 194-221).
14ibidem
: 195a-199b.
37
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
Albert
aspect is figurestudied by the geometer.21In the Metaphysics22
definesthe fourthmodus of quality, viz. formavelcircaaliquidconstans
continua
quantiand he
acceptaor as terminatio
figuraas qualitasin quantitate
23
refersto the Predicamenta He goes on to say that it is not the task of
the geometerbut that of the metaphysicianto prove that these figures
exist. In this connection he names the sphere ( sphaera
), the cylinder
the
cone
or
and
the
circle
pyramid {pyramis
{columna),
),
(which is the
of all figures),which are all mathematical figures.
radixetprincipium
Summing up, one can say that for Albert as for Aristotle continuous quantity, or quantity as extension, is the subject for the
geometer,and that the basic objects are line, surface and body while
the point, mathematicallyspoken, is their principle. Figures are the
othermathematicalobjects. They belong to the category'quality', but
they are mathematical only in as far as they are limited quantities.
Figures can have the quality of having angles.
This is the context in which we must place Albert's question: to
which categorydoes the angle belong.
1.2. Discussions on the angle up to Albert's time
Beforewe can go to Albert's text,we must begin witha shortlook at
Euclid's Elementsof Geometry
, the fundamental textbook,specially for
(the definitionsof) the objects of geometry.
Euclid24begin the firstbook of his Elementsof Geometry
with definitions of all the objects of geometry,the firstbeing that of the point.
Successively he definesthe line and the straightline; the surface and
plane surface; the plane angle and its varieties; the boundary and
figure,figurebeing that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries. Then followthe definitionsof varieties of (plane) figuressuch
as the circle and rectilinearfigures.Euclid ends his definitionsin book
I with that of parallel lines. To sum up: Euclid defines all the basic
mathematical objects (except the body, which is treated in a later
book), he definesthe figures,and he also definesthe angle. The angle
21IdemV 9 (ed. cit.,
dicendum
261a).Adhocautemquodde mathematica
objicitur,
mathematica
est,sed rationequantitatis
quod figuranonrationefigurae
cujusest
etab ipsaabsolvinonpotest.
Velpotest
est
dici,sicutdictum
est,quodfigura
qualitas,
mathematica
secundum
secundum
autemquodestterterminata;
quodestquantitas
minatio
a mathematico.
quanti,sicestqualitas,ethocmodononconsideratur
22Metaphysica
V 3, 5 (ed. cit.,263-264).
23Ibidem
263,4-5;264,38-39.
24Euclides,
Elementa
vol.I, Leipzig,1969,1-4.
, ed. Heiberg-Stamatis,
39
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
translatedby Gerard of Cremona in the second half of the XIIth century and was thus known to the Latin West. His discussion will be
treated in section 2.2. But beside Anaritius there were more Arabic
authorswho wroteon this subject, forexample, Ibn al Haitam,31 who
says thatthe angle belongs to the categoryof 'position' but neitherthis
work nor otherswere available in the Latin West.
As regards the Arabic philosophical tradition,Avicenna and Averroes give a few lines to the subject in their Metaphysics
which were
available in a Latin translationin the XIIIth century.These passages
will be looked at in section 3.1.
The available sources being so few,it is remarkablethatwe find,in
the Geometry
of Albertas well as in his Metaphysics
, an elaborate discussion on the nature of the angle.
2. Albert'sdiscussionin theGeometry
2.1. Albert's Geometry
Albert's Geometry
, a commentaryon Euclid,32was writtenbeforehis
and
,
Metaphysics
probably in approximately 1260. Internal evidence
1235
as
terminus
gives
postquem, and because the author does not use or
mention Campanus' edition of Euclid ( 1259), which was the most
widelyspread edition of Euclid, we may assume that thisworkcannot
have been writtenmuch afterCampanus ' version. The work is based
largelyon the Adelardus versions33of Euclid and on Anaritius' Comon Euclid, but it incorporatesmore.34
mentary
Definition6 of Book I is concerned withthe angle, and states35that
the plane angle is the connection
of two lines, lying on one surface.
31See B. S.
onthePremises
Elements
,
Hooper,IbnAl-Haytham's
Commentary
ofEuclid's
BookI - VI, Diss.Princeton
1974(no. 75-23.243),
vol.I, 37-40.
32See note4.
33See forthetranslations
andeditions
ofEuclidattributed
toAdelardofBath:
- M. Clagett,TheMedieval Translations
the
Arabic
, with
form
oftheElements
ofEuclid
Lttin
ontheVersions
Special
Emphasis
ofAdelard
ofBath,in: Isis,44 (1953),16-42.
in:Dictionary
, s.v. Euclid,vol.4, 437.
-J. E. Murdoch,
ofScientific
Biography
- SisterMarySt. Martinvan RyzinO.S. F., TheArabic-Latin
Tradition
ofEuclid's
Elements
intheTwelfth
1960(no. 60-3277).
, Diss.Wisconsin
Century
34See my
edition
andanalysis
ofAlbert's
a new
whichincludes
forthcoming
Geometry
edition
ofAnaritius'
commentary.
35Angulus
linearum
alternus
contactus
estsupra
planusestduarum
quarumexpansio
nondirecta.
Translatio
ex arabicodicitsic:angulussupersuperficiem
applicatioque
ficialis
estinclinatio
duarumlinearum
in una superficie
sibiobviancium
nonsecundumrectitudinem
positarum.
(MS cit.,f. 106r,myedition
p. 8).
41
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
reasons he uses, are correct,but note thathe makes no distinctionbetween the plane and the corporeal angle, only implicitlyin the words
Later on, however (/. 41-44), he does make this distincnonnecessario.
tion.
The doubling-argumentis quite peculiar. As faras I know no exact
parallel for this property of quantity can be found in Albert's
Predicamenta
or Metaphysics
, but in his De Celothispropertyis mentionalso
one
in
the Predicamenta
ed;41
passage
might be a parallel, where
Albertsays thatto be divided and to be augmented in infinitum
are conof
but
dividi
is
valid
for
the
continuum
and
sequences quantity,
only
for
numbers.
augerionly
The othertwo argumentsof Albertare not in Anaritius,but one can
where Albert says that to have
compare passages in the Predicamenta
'
to
the
angles belongs
category figure' and is a quality.42
The argumentspro quantitate
are the same as in Anaritius, but one
can compare them also with statementsin Albert's (Metaphysics
and)
:
Predicamenta
The firstargumentcan be compared with the propertyof quantity:
inaequaleand aequale.43Maius etminusare then to be identifiedwithinacquale. There is no referenceto aequale, but that cannot be expected
because the acute angle and the obtuse angle are smaller or bigger
respectively,compared with the rightangle.
Comparisons for the second argument are more difficultto find,
because acuteness and hebetudo
are not mentioned as such, but the
44
passages already quoted of the Predicamentacan be used.
The thirdand fourthargumentreferto the verypropertiesof quanand Metaphysics
.45
tityas stated in the Predicamenta
41De CeloI 2,8
... itaincontinuis
nonest
(ed.ColonV/l, 54,65ff.):sicutinnumeris
intellectum.
aliquamquantitatem,
accipere
quae duplarinonpossitsecundum
Predicamenta
III, 13(ed. cit.,220*):Suntautemetalia multaquantitatem
consequenin continuo
autem
tia,sicutdividivelaugeriin infinitum:
quidemdividi,in numero
augeri.
Thesignificant
ofquantity
areinAlbert's
: divisibility,
Predicamenta
dimenproperties
' non
*
'nonhabere
etminus
inintensione
etremissione'
contrarium'
, esse
sionality,
suscipere
magis
vel
.
See
Predicamenta
III.
aequale inaequale1
42Pred.V 8 (see note
nihiladdit
19); and: ad hocautemquoddicitur
quod figura
dicendum
est:additenimmodumqualitatis
supraquantitatem,
quodfalsum
qui non
est quantitas,
vel
qui est acutumvel rectumvel hebesin angulis,vel rotundum
sedsuntres.(Pred.V 9, ed. cit.,261a).
tantum,
planum:quae nonsuntrationes
43See Pred.III 14(ed. cit.,220):De
earnaequantitatis
proprio
quodestsecundum
qualevelinaequaledici.
44See notes42 and 19.
45Pred.
Ill 1(ed.cit.,194);Metaph.
V 3, 1 (ed. cit.,256):quantum
dicitur
idquodest
divisible
...
45
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
2.
6-9).
Y The angle is not a body, because it has no depth. Between
only twoline there is, indeed, no depth (/. 9-11).
The doubling-argument.But Albert formulatesthis argument
: a doubled quantity remore stringentlythan in his Geometry
mains in the same kind of quantity {in eademspeciequantitatis
et
modo)(/. 12-15).
The firstconclusion ofAlbertis thatthe angle seems, indeed, to be a
special mode of quantity, forin any case it is a quantity.
As argument forthis view Albert brings forward(/. 16-19):
A. a thing that can be called 'bigger and smaller', is a quantity.
sic:Et angulusetiamestparsfigurae
hisduobusmodis,quanpars'*.Potestintelligi
Vel sic:Et angulusetiamdividitur
inngulos:divisio
titate
enim
scilicet
etqualitate.
et qualitatem.
Et ideodubitaverunt
quantitatem
anguliin ngulosest secundum
continetur
quidamin quo generegenerummagnitudinum
angulus.Adeo quod
iliumquartum
quodgenera
magnitudinum
quidameorumfecerunt
genus,etdixerunt
lineaet solidm.
suntquatuor:corpus,superficies,
Notethatone MS. hasangulusin steadofsolidm!
ishereinthe
TheonlyplacewhereAristotle
speaksabouttheangleinhisMetaphysics
V (),25, 1023b 22).
on 'pars':theangleis a partofa definition
{Metaphysica
chapter
theangleonlyin thesamechapter
on 'pars'inthe
ThomasAquinas,too,mentions
theangleis mentioned
ofwhatAverroes
, butnothing
by
saysconcerning
Metaphysics
V 21 (1089):angulusindefinitione
andV 21(1095):
him{Metaph.
trianguli
(ponitur),
sicutspeciei).
angulusautemestparstrianguli
48
13:15:51 PM
B.
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
depth; this is correct for the angle only if one considers the plane
angle.
The second argumentin both tractsis the doubling-argument.The
and the Metaphysics
is that in the latter
differencebetween the Geometry
the argument is stated more stringently.There are- as far as I
know- no parallel referencesto be found discussing this propertyon
other works of Albert's except in De celo(see n. 41).
The thirdand fourthargument of the Geometry
are missing in the
- as has
- there are
but
said
been
Metaphysics
already
passages in the
which can be compared with these arguments.
Predicamenta
It is remarkablethat Albertdoes not mentionthe existenceof hornangles as an argument against the quantity view. These horn-angles
are an importanttopic in the XIVth centuryphilosophical treatiseson
the continuum,but also in the XIIIth centurythese angles and their
propertieswere well known.54Alberthimselfmentionsthistopic in its
III 15) and says that as regards geometry,the
proper place ( Geometry
of
be divided because in geometry'to divide'
cannot
angle contingence
means to divide with a straightline. But logically speaking, Albert
continues,it is shown in the firstbook that the angle is not a quantity
proper, and thereforethere can be an angle which is not to be
divided.55In this manner Albert fitsthe existence of horn-anglesinto
his opinions given in the earlierpassages thatwe have been discussing.
54See myarticle
inVivarium
XVIII (1980),112-142,
.
esp. 131ff
55NotaautemquodSophiste
istudtheorema
dicentes
omnem
quantitatem
inpugnant
esse divisibilem
in infinitum,
etiamdivididebetin inergoanguluscontingencie
finitum.
Etad hocattendendum
nichildicitur
dividinisiquod
quodapudgeometriam
linearectadividitur,
et quod linearectanondividitur,
diciturnonhabensquantitatem.
Et ideo < anguluscontingencie
> etiamminimus
dicitur
quia quantitatem
nonhabet;undeetiamillequi a circumferencia
et diametro
estquia
fit,maximus
a rectoper.id quod quantitatem
diminuitur
nonhabetin geometria.
Potesttarnen
dividicircularibus
divisio
lineis,sedhocideonondicitur
quiaaliamconstituit
figuram
nonhabentem
sicircumducatur.
Ethecquidemresponsio
estsecundum
angulum
propriaistiusscientie.
Potesttamendiciquodinprimoostendimus
estquantitas,
quodangulusnonproprie
etideoaliquisangulusestqui nondividitur.
Adhucetiamdicipotest
quodlicetforma
tamenmateria
eiusque estquantitas
ethec
angulimaneatindivisa,
spacii,dividitur,
solutiomagisestalterius
scientie.
Primaenimgeometrica
est, secundalogica,et tertiaprimephilosophie
(Albert,
ch.2.2.3part1, p. 34).
, III 15,MS cit.,f. 135v.See myedition
Geometry
Anaritius
alsogivessomecomment,
andmentions
oftheangle
e.g. thenondi
visibility
ofcontingence
because'divisible'
means:divisible
lines,andhe
bymeansofstraight
callsthatangle:'cuinonestquantitas'.
(Ms. Madrid10010,f.26r).
51
13:15:51 PM
52
13:15:51 PM
4. Contemporary
and laterdiscussions
4.1. Roger Bacon
Of the authors contemporaneous with Albert, Thomas Aquinas
does not say anythingof interestas to our question.58The philosopher
who is the firstto be looked at when one studies the development of
mathematics in the XHIth century, is, of course, Roger Bacon. He
the
Mathematica:59
has, indeed, a passage on the angle in his Communia
angle is accordingto Avicenna a surfaceor a body, and in general: the
angle is a space contained between more lines which meet in a point.
This definitionis not the Euclidian-Adelardian one, but probably
Roger's own. Afteran application of thisdefinitionto the two kindsof
angle, Roger continues: the plane angle is a surface because it has
lengthand breadth, though it is not closed in all parts; the corporeal
angle is a body because it has the threedimensions; thereforeEuclid's
definitionis incorrect,fora contactbetween lines is in a point and thus
58See note51. R. Grosseteste's
De Angulis
doesnotgiveanything
ofinterest
forour
question.
59Communia
Mathematica
I 2, 3 (ed. cit.,27-28):Capitulum
tercium
de anguloetde
et de divisione
eorum(aliterejus)grossapropter
continue
figura
speciesquantitatis
magiscognoscenda.
circafiguras
aliiscommunibus
Oportet
aliquidde angulisdicietde quibusdam
igitur
incommuni
ea que in sequentibus
nominantur.
propter
secundum
Avicennam
tercioMethaphysice
estsuperficies
velcorpus,
igitur
Angulus
namquidamangulusestsuperficialis
ethicestsuperficies,
et
quidamverocorporalis
hicestcorpus.Angulus
autemincommuni
estspacium
interplureslineas
contentum
in punctoaliquoconcurrentes,
estindirecta.
verosuperquarumapplicacio
Angulus
ficialis
seuplanusestspaciumcontentum
inpunctum
interduaslineasconcurrentes
unumquarumapplicacio
in unasuperficie
estindirecta,
quia cumdirecte
opponitur
unalineaaliinonestangulussedtanquamlinea.Angulus
verocorporalis
seusolidus
estspaciumcontentum
ad minusintertreslineasconcurrentes
in punctum
unum,
nonestdirecta
inunasuperficie
utpatetincorsedincorpore
quarumapplicacio
poribus
angularibus.
Quomodoautemdiffiniatur
angulusaliterpatetexXIo Euclidis,
oportet
nuncaliamdiffinicionem
haberi.Et quoniamangulussuperficialis
est
etlatum,licetnonex omniparteclausum,
etangulus
quiahabetlongum
superficies
estcorpus
latumetprofundum,
ideoinproprie
dicitur
ab
corporalis
quiahabetlongum
Euclidequodangulusestalterius
namhiccontactus
estindivisibilis
secuncontactus,
dumlongum
latumetprofundum,
eo quodsitinpuncto,
etideodiffinivi
angulum
per
Anaricus
verosuperlibrumElementorum
Euclidisin
quantitatem
spaciidivisibilis.
commento
hancquestionem
de angulo,scilicet
an sitspeciesquantitatis,
et
disputt
nichilsolvitquod valeat, pertinet
mathematico
de hoc disputaresed ad
a quo mathematicus
debetveritatem
methaphysicum,
acciperecum exposicione
etfideli... Figuraverodicitur
velterminis
clauditur
ut
simplici
que termino
undique,
contenta
infratresvelquatorlineasetdeinceps;
et secundum
hocangulus
quantitas
nonestfigura,
licetsitsuperficies
velcorpus,
sedcumfigura
dicitur
quamvisnonuntuncangulusestfigura.
diqueclaudatur,
53
13:15:51 PM
indivisible. Thereforethe angle is to be definedas 'quantity of divisible space'. Anaritius also discussed the question of the angle, but that
discussion does not have much value: to dispute the problem of the
angle is not the task of the mathematician,but ofthe metaphysician.A
few lines furtheron, Roger says that in one sense an angle is not a
figure(if a figureis definedas a closed quantity),but in anothersense
it is (if another definitionof figurebe given).
This opinion and treatmentis quite differentfromthat which one
finds in Albert.60 Roger opposes expressly the indiuisibiliscontactus
definitionwhich Albert uses in his Metaphysics.
61
Mathematica
In anotherpassage ofthe Communia
Roger refersagain
to these views. In the as yet unedited continuation of the Communia
62he
Mathematica
says once more that a plane angle is a surfaceand an
incomplete plane figure (incomplete because it is not closed on all
sides).
From these passages one mightconclude that Bacon's only sources
are Euclid, Anaritius and Avicenna and that he does not indicate any
acquaintance with Albert's views.63
A further conclusion is that- in comparison with Roger
have
and in the Metaphysics
Bacon - Albert's discussion in the Geometry
the same general structureand are quite consistent.This conclusion
will be strengthenedif one looks at XlV^-century texts.
60ButinhisQuestiones
libros
Aristotelis,
(ed.
questiode qualitate
Philosophie
prime
supra
vol.X, Oxonii1930,151)RogerBaconmakesthe
R. Steele,Operahactenus
inedita,
autprospacio
as Albert
samedistinction
figure:
Figuraequivocesumitur:
concerning
autpotestsumi
cumsitsuperficies,
et sic estquantitas
infraclausionem,
contento
hie.
estqualitas,etsicsumitur
etsicfigura
proipsaclausione
figura
' is a discussion
theangletobe found.
inthese'Questiones
Nowhere
concerning
61II 3, 1 (op.cit.,101):Recolendum
Avicenestex prioribus
quodsecundum
igitur
estcoretcorporalis
estsuperficies
veritatem
namet secundum
angulussuperficialis
habetedoceresinecontradiccione,
quia hechabetspecies
pus,sicutmethaphysica
esseinquibusestdubitacio.
probare
predicamentorum
62Ms. Oxford,
est
BodleianDigby76, f. 72r:Quia in veritate
angulussuperficialis
et figura
quia nonestundiqueconclusa terincompleta,
superficialis
superficies
minata.
63The possibility
timesof
is ofcourselimited
influence
ofreciprocal
bythedifferent
andRogeris a
oftheworks
ofAlbert
Butthechronology
originoftheseveraltracts.
matter:
verydifficult
ofAlbert 1260(seemyedition).
Geometry
totheColon,ed. p. VIII).
ofAlbert 1264(seeprolegomena
Metaphysics
ofRoger,part1 (ed. Steele,p. 71-135)late1250's(c. 1258);
Mathematica
Communia
part2 (ed. Steele,p. 1-70)after1267.
Science
BaconandhisSearch
, Oxford1952,88;
fora Universal
(See: S. C. Easton,Roger
111;186).
54
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
70Liberdeangulis
, Ms. Firenze,B.N.C. Con. Soppr.J I 32 ( = S. Marco206),f.
in Florenz
S. Marcohandschriften
34r-39v
, in:
(See A. A. Bjrnbo,Die mathematische
3<>F 12,1911/12,
Mathematica
Bibliotheca
207);Paris.B.N. lat.8680A, f.22v-28v.
thantheFirenze
MSS. At first
Theseare twodistinct
sighttheParisMS is better
one,butupona secondlookwe findthatthisis nottrueinallcases.
71Questiones
Wissenschaftliche
Euclidem
Bibliothek,
, XIVthc., MS: Erfurt,
Q
super
344,f.68r-87v.
deNicoleOresme
Euclidis
desQuestiones
, in:
superGeometriam
(See V. Zoubov,Autour
MedievalandRenaissance
Studies,VI, 1968,150-172,
esp. 151).
72MS Firenze
estinqua
Seddubium
(seenote68),f.48r(inmyowninterpunction):
cumsitdivisibilis
sitangulus,
(Busard:delineis),
quianonpunctus
speciequantitatis
a foretperconsequens
excontactu
lineacumconstituatur
earum,superficies
et
tioricorpus.Quodnonsitsuperficies,
pat
- quia angulusclauditur
ut
sicclauditur,
duabuslineisrectis,sed nullasuperficies
petitEuclides.Igitur;
- 2oquiaangulusnoncrescit
vel
ad augumentum
minuitur
(Busard:augmentum)
minutionem
superficiei.
Igitur;
(Busard:diminutionem)
- 3oquiatuncangulusrectus
essetacutus.Patetquianonestmaiorratio(Busard:recillaquam aut; sedsitaliquisilbestsuperficies
to)quareangulus trianguli
internum.
habetur
et
et
lorumrectus
acutus,
rectorum)
aliquis
(MS:
umnullumistorum
istasrationes
esse,sedeorumacangui
quidamdixerunt
Propter
56
13:15:51 PM
13:15:51 PM
previous tract,the questions are not yetedited; and because ofthe fact
that these questions are quite clearlyXIVth centuryand that the starting point forthe question of the angle is only Euclid's definition,it
will not be dealt with here.
4. Conclusion
We have studied two passages in worksof Albertus Magnus on the
nature of the angle, one in the Geometry
(forwhich Anaritius' CommenIf we take
taryon Euclid is the main source) and one in the Metaphysics.
into consideration the differentcontext and purpose of the treatises,
these two treatmentsare consistent, the conclusions as well as the
argumentation.The differencesbetween these two discussionsand the
others in the XIIIth and XIVth century spoken of in section 4,
strengthenthe close kinship between the two passages.
It will now be possible to give a hypothesisabout the question of
was writtenby AlbertusMagnus,
sources. If- as I hold- the Geometry
before his
the theory is as follows: Albert wrote his Geometry
, his main source being Anaritius' commentary.ConcernMetaphysics
our
point of discussion, the nature ofthe angle, Albertadded some
ing
argumentsto those of Anaritiusand gave his own conclusion, different
fromAnaritius but in accordance with view he had also expressed in
For his paraphrase of Aristotle'sMetaphysics
the Predicamenta.
, Albert
took Avicenna' s remarkconcerningthe angle as a startingpoint fora
reintroductionto the question on the angle, withthe discussion of the
in his mind, but adapting this to the purpose of the
Geometry
Metaphysics.
There are, of course, argumentsagainst this theory:it may not explain in all respectsthe differencesbetween the two treatments;there
remain questions which are not answered. It is also strangethatAlbert
.76
in the angle-passage of the Metaphysics
does not referto his Geometry
But if this theoryis not correct,and if Albertus Magnus is not the
author of the Geometry
, more difficultiesarise; firstthe differencesbeand Anaritius are to be explained anew; secondly,
tween the Geometry
one has in any case to suppose that Albert knew Anaritius or the
Albert Geometry
, and borrowed the angle-discussionfromone of these
That would prove beyond doubt
tracts to put it into his Metaphysics.
76Normally
totheminhistracts.
ofhisownhandorrefers
Albert
quotesotherworks
tothe
tootherworks
ButinhisDe Fatoalsotherearenoreferences
(cfr.Prolegomena
Colon,ed., vol.XVII/1,p. XXXIII-XXXIV).
58
13:15:51 PM
10
15
20
25
30
f.
ALBERTUS(MAGNUS),GEOMETRIA,MS. VIENNA,DOMIN. 80/45,
106r(Myedition
p. 9-10).
dubiumutrum
etsi quantitas
Estautemplerisque
est,in
angulussitquantitas,
eo
Suntenimqui dicuntanguium esserelationem,
qua sitspeciequantitatis.
ad suesentencie
confirmationem
rationes
habentes
quaquodvocatur
applicatio,
cumnonnecestuor:- sc.quianonestlineacumhabeatlatitudinem,
neccorpus
susariohabeatprofunditatem,
necsuperficies
cumnonpossitdivididivisione
dividatur
sedsecundum
eo quodnullusangulussecundum
latitudinem
perficiei,
solamutinfrainnonoprobatur
theoremate.
longitudinem
- Adhucomnisquantitas
manet,sedaliquisangulusduplatus
duplataquantitas
nonmanetangulus,
nonmanetquantisc. rectus.
Ergoaliquisangulusduplatus
essevidetur.
se quantitas
tas,ergonecangulussecundum
- Adhucnullaquantitas
acciditquantitati.
autemaccidit
erquantitati,
Angulus
enimsuperficiei
esAccidit
velcorpori
goangulusnonestquantitas.
angulatum
se.
- Adhucnihilsecundum
se speciesexistens
estquantitas.
Sedangulus
qualitatis
estspecies
enimingenere
incidit
qualitatis,
figuergononestquantitas.
Angulus
reethecestde speciebus
qualitatis.
In contrarium
huiussuntetiamrationes
quatuor:
- cuienimaccidit
estquantitas.
essemaiusetminus,
Sedhecaccidit
angulo,ergo
angulusestquantitas.
Expansusenimestmaiorrectoetacutusminor.
- Adhuccuiconvenit
etsubiectum.
Acuitasautemethebetudo
passio,convenit
suntquantietconveniunt
passiones
angulo,ergoestquantitas.
- Adhuccuiperseconvenit
anessedivisibile,
estquantitas.
Hicautemconvenit
nonotheoremate
enimdividihabetur,
guloutinfra
ergoestquantitas.
Angulus
tursecundum
longum.
- Adhucomnehabensdimensionem
veldimensiones,
Sedangulus
estquantitas.
habetdimensiones,
sc. etlatitudinem,
longitudinem
ergoestquantitas.
Videtur
autemdicendum
sedangulatio
estqualitas
quodangulusestquantitas,
accidensquantitati.
rationem
autemprimamad secundum
Propter
problema
dixitSambelichyus
estmedium
interlineametsuperfiquodangulussuperficialis
etnonsecundum
earndividitur,
ethaciem,quiahabetdimensionem
superficiei
betdimensionem
lineeetsecundum
earndividitur.
autemcorporeus
est
Angulus
59
13:15:51 PM
nontarnen
divietcorpus,
mdiusintersuperficiem
quialicethabetprofundum,
latitudinem
ditursecundum
etlongitudinem.
ipsum,sedsecundum
meHocautemprobat
quisicdiffmit
angulum
tamquam
permagnum
Apollonium
autcorporis
ad unumpunctum
35 dium,dicens:angulusestconiunctio
superficiei
lineisterlineisnondirecte
sibioccurentibus
autsuperficie
que comprehenditur
sibioccurreminata.Dicitautem"nondirecte",sicutetEuclides
quia si directe
sedlinemunam.Aganyz
etiamquasiinhocconsennonfacerent
rent,angulum
duasvel
habensdimensiones
tirevidetur
dicensquodangulus< est> quantitas
ad punctum
unum.
40 tres,cuiusextremitates
proveniunt
diffnire
dicens:angulusestquantitas
autemvidetur
Convenientissime
Yrynus
ad unumperveeo existens,
vicinior
simplicior
quamcomprehendit
quantitas
lineisquia mediusestinter
enimcomprehenditur
nienspunctum.
Superficialis
unamethabentem
duasdimensiones,
etipsehabetduas;
habentem
quantitatem
mediusexistens
inter
haautemsuperficiebus
45 corporeus
terminatur,
superficiem
duasetcorpushabenstresdimensiones.
bentem
APPENDIXII
ANARITIUS, COMMENTARY ON EUCLID'S ELEMENTS. MS. MADRID, B.N. 10010,f. 14v(Myedition,
p. 131-132;See ed. Curtze,p. 12-14).
10
15
20
25
30
inhacdifinitione
secundum
hocquoddicitur
quodangulusnon
Quidamputant
tamenquodsitquantiVidetur
etquodnonsitquantitas.
sitnisirelatio
tantum,
tas.
- Cumenimangulusexpansus
etmaius
sitmaiorrectoetacutusrectositminor,
etminussintinquantitate,
ergoangulusestquantitas.
- Angulus
etacuitasquesuntinansc. quiaexpansio
quoquehabetqualitatem,
gulis,suntqualitates.
- Angulopreterea
innonafigura
utdividatur
induomediaquodcontingit
accidit
in duomedianonestnisiquantitas.
seddivisum
primepartislibriEuclidis'
- Preterea
etlatitudo.
cumlinea, si essetlongitudo
angulusdividitur
dividitur
cumlineainlonhocquodquequesuperficies
Verumtamen
secundum
de punctoad punctum
inlongitudine
etangulusdividitur
etlatitudine,
gitudine
- quoniamangulusnonminuitur
in latitudine
et nondividitur
partes
propter
comlineas
superduaslineasangulum
que protrahuntur
propter
que proveniunt
- ideoquevidetur
quodangulusnonhabetlatitudinem.
prehendentes
- Angulus
eo quodsecundum
nonhabetprofunditatem,
proquoquecorporeus
funditatem
nondividitur.
- Amplius
verorecremanet
cumduplatur,
etiamquantitas
quantitas.
Angulus
nonremanet
tuscumduplatur,
angulus.Ergoangulusnonestquantitas.
in
invenitur
ideodifinivit
Forsitan
tamenEuclides
ipsumperid quodmanifeste
linemetsuperfieo, sc. relatio,
quoniamproculdubioangulusestmedisinter
difinivit
universalem
ad quantitatem.
ciemquantum
angulum
IdeoqueApolonius
difinitione
et convenientiori
breviori
quod ipsesitmediusin
qua significatur
ad
aut corporis
cumdixitquod angulusest coniunctio
superficiei
quantitate,
acuta.Exhoc
a lineacurvaautsuperficie
unumpunctum
que comprehenduntur
estmedians,
etsignificavit
enimsignificavit
quodeiusspecies
quodestquantitas,
ea linea
etquodcomprehendit
ad unumpunctum
cumdixitquodconiunguntur
exverosociusAganiz
acuta.Noster
curvaautsuperficies
, eo quodvidit
Apolonium
uthecsituniversalis
suam,cumdixitquodnonconvenit
cepissepostdifinitionem
difinivit
ad coniungendas
sedconvenit
difinitio,
angulum
speciesetnumerandas,
cuiusextremitates
habensdimensiones
hocmododicens:angulusestquantitas
60
13:15:51 PM
35
40
45
50
10
15
20
25
13:15:51 PM
30
35
40
45
ciem.Inquantum
enimpunctofinitur
sicutlinea,sequitur
non
ipsumlatitudine
autemestterminus
dividi,sedlongitudine.
Inquantum
superficiei
planae,sequituripsumduabuslineiscontineri.
Etquodangulusduplatus
rectus
sitnonanguex esseangulirecti,
diametri.
Cumenimsuper
lus,hocaccidit
quiaestmedium
liceatcircumduci
lineamfinitam
silineaperpencirculum,
quamlibet
descriptam
etincentro
diculariter
contactus
immobilis
pescircini
superlineamducatur,
pouniuspartislineaecirculus
circumscribatur,
natur,et ad quantitatem
angulus
rectus
etsi dupletur,
subtendetur
circuii
est,cuisubtenditur
quartaparscircuii,
tuncaliquidpraeter
medietas.Et ideononremanet
diametrum
circuii,nullo
circuii.
Idemautemaccidit,
modolinea
existente
siquocumque
anguloincentro
et angulusrectusdupletur
ducaturin continuum,
supeream. Cessanteautem
tamencontinuum.
anguloet sublato,remanet
accidere
continuo
Tamenpropter
huiNosautemdiximus
terminato.
angulum
essemedium
interlineametsuusmodiradonesQUIDAM dixerunt
angulum
Sedsecundum
istiussapientiae
dicendum
estmodopraeperficiem.
proprietatem
sedpotiussidicto,quia nonponitentitatem
aliquamquantialiamab inductis,
a lineatolliinunaparteetremanere
esse
terminans
cut,si intelligatur
punctum
lineainfinita,
itacumangulussitterminus
continui
si
lineae,remanet
expansi,
inrectianguli,remanet
tolliintelligatur
continuum
expansum
perduplationem
finitum.
NosenimSUPRAostendimus,
quodnonestdeessesuperficiei,
inquanlineavellineis,sicutnecestdeessecorporis,
tumestsuperficies,
quodterminetur
estcorpus,quodterminetur
velsuperficiebus.
inquantum
superficie
de modisquantietquantitatis
Haec igitur
dictasinta nobis;hicenimaliterhabentdeterminan
quamincategoriis.
62
13:15:51 PM
Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
L'unit du Monde selon Guillaume d'Ockham
(ou la logiquede la cosmologie
ockhamiste)*
JOEL BIARD
13:16:01 PM
d'autantplusautoriss
Noussommes
deLogique.
dansla Somme
seront
systmatiss
nousavertit
ainsique,commenousvenonsde la voir,Guillaume
quelesdifprocder
en se fondant
maisse dveloppent
du savoirnesontpas autonomes
domaines
frents
l'un surl'autre.
3 Cf Time
de
de Platon,t.II, Bibliothque
in Oeuvres
franaise
Completes
(traduction
"La Pliade",Paris,1969),30 b: "... ce monde,vivantdouen vritd'meet
manifestation
de l'ordreimpos
vivantestla premire
Ce caractre
d'intelligence".
il l'amena l'ordre,
"de ce dsordre,
la matire:
que
ayantestim
parle dmiurge
mieuxque celui-l"(ibid.,30 a).
vautinfiniment
celui-ci
64
13:16:01 PM
IX, StBonaventure,
New-York,
Opera
1980,1.25-27p. 667;ilfaitallusion
Theologica
lespredicaments
V, qu. 21, p. 559).Maiscettequestion
Quodl.
n'envisage
que dans
leurglobalit,
entantqu'ilssontlescatgories
dedireoudepenser
l'treet
permettant
uneporte
Ds ce niveautoutefois,
onpeuttout
ayantdanscettemesure
ontologique.
aussibiendired'unautrepointdevuequ'ilsdsignent
destermes.
cetteaffirSurtout,
mation
gnrale
perdde sonsens,dslorsque l'ondistingue
parmilesdivers
predicale rapport
l'trereln'tantpas le mmepourtous.
ments,
6 Expos,
inLib.Praedc. 12,1. 101-105,
p. 242.CfaussiS.L., I, c. 49,1.68-70,p.
156.
65
13:16:01 PM
qui est pre7; mais "pre" est un termerelatifparce qu'il ne peut tre
employ correctementdans une propositionpour signifierun individu
que si on lui ajoute un autre terme au gnitif.
Concernant le monde ou l'univers8,cetteconceptionde la relationa
une consquence qui apparat dans la Sommede Logiquesous la forme
d'une objection possible:
"Itemunitasuniversi
inordinepartium;
siergorelatio
consistit
nonestaliares,
illeordononeritalia res,et itauniversum
nonessetunum"9.
Dans la Sommede Logique, l'objection reste sans rponse. Mais le
: Utrumuniproblme est traitdans la Question8 du septime Quodlibet
tas universivel approximatio
causarumvel distantiarerumimportent
respectus
a rebusabsolutis.A cette question l'auteur rpond ngativedistinctos
ment. La principale raison invoque est le principe d'conomie:
verificabreviter
quodnon.Cuiusratioest,quiaquandopropositio
"Respondeo
turprorebus,si pauciores
sufTiciunt,
pluressuperfluunt"10.
Mais pour que l'argument ait quelque porte, encore faut-iltablir
que ce que l'on nomme "ordre" dans l'univers n'est pas quelque
chose qui vient s'ajouter aux parties de ce tout pour lui confrerunit
et totalit. Telle est bien la position de Guillaume d'Ockham:
"Ordo et unitasuniversi
nonestquidamrespectus,
quasi quoddamligamen
ad invicem,
quasi iliacorporanonessent
liganscorporaordinatain universo
ordinatanec universum
vereessetunumsinetalirespectu
(...) Sed illeordo
solumipsaabsolutaquae nonfaciunt
unamremnumero,
interquae
importt
unumab eodemplusdistatet aliudminus,etunumpropinquum
alterietaliud
distareplusvelminussineomnirespectu
itaquodinteraliquasit
inhaerente,
medium
universi
etinter
connexio
sinetaliresaliquanon.Etitameliussalvatur
pectuquamcumtalirespectu,,n.
7 "Paternitas
increaturis
nonimportt
hominem
etistum
plusnisiistum
quigenuit
vereisteest
hominem
est,quia istispositiset omnialio circumscripto,
qui genitus
I, dist.30,qu. IV, p. 367,1. 18-21);etaussi:"Et non
pateretilleestfilius"(InSent.,
sed
inilioqui estpatervelinilioquodestduplum,
estaliquaressubiective
exsistens
intentionem
estquaedamvoxquaeestad aliquidetnonresabsoluta;
quia secundum
vel
in ilioqui estpaternullaestresimaginabilis
Philosophi
quinsitverasubstantia
veraaualitas"(Exos.inPraed..c. 12.1. 38-42.d. 239-240V
8 Mundus
dugreccosmos
estla traduction
habituelle
, au sujetduquelseposela ques la totalit
deschoses
de sonunit.Ce mondequivaut
tionde sonordre,constitutif
estimepossible
crestantque Tonn'imagine
mondes.Or Guillaume
pas plusieurs
devient
demondes
La question
alorscelledel'unitdeVunivers.
unepluralit
(cfinfra).
Maisenralit,
Ockhamn'estpastoujours
prcisdansl'emploide l'unou l'autrede
In Sent.,I, dist.44, qu. unica).
cestermes
9 S.L., I,(cf
c. 54,1. 33-34,p. 178.
10Quodl
., VII, qu. 8, 1. 23-25,p. 727.
11Ibid.,1. 56-66,p. 728-729.
66
13:16:01 PM
On remarque un certainnombre de dplacements et de transformations dans les concepts et les questions. En premier lieu, le concept
Mme si l'univocit
central n'est pas celui de relatiomais de respectus.
n'est pas totale dans l'emploi de ces termes,on peut leur assigner une
diffrence.La catgorie de relatioayant t vide de son sens rel et
rduite qualifierdes termes,le problme subsiste de prciserce qui
faitqu'un termeest ou non relatif.Le respectus
seraitalors le rapporttel
que, selon certains du moins, il existe dans les choses. C'est cette
notion que Guillaume emploie de prfrencedans les Quodlibeta
ou le
Commentaire
des Sentences.Mais il s'attache constamment montrer
qu'il n'existe pas de tels rapportsindpendants des choses absolues12.
L'ordre de l'univers aurait pu tre considr comme un tel rapport
rel. Mais il n'en est rien, comme le montrela question 8 du septime
. A la question pose, il est tout simplementrpondu par la
Quodlibet
ngative. Et plus bas, il est expliqu:
"Destructo
iliorespectu
ordouniversi,
adhucuniversum
ordinabitur
quivocatur
absolutae
universi
tuncsicutnunc,sipartes
maneant
nondestructae
necmutatae
secundum
locum"13.
En ce point, il fauttreminutieux. Guillaume ne nie pas qu'il y ait un
ordre dans l'univers; au contraire, l'univers ockhamiste est, en un
sens, parfaitementordonn; son propos n'est pas une ngation simple
de l'ordre, faisantde l'univers un chaos. De la mme manire, il faut
admettrel'existence de relationsde causalit - charge de prciserce
qu'il fautentendrepar l - dans le cours naturel du monde14.Mais
son unit se rduitprcisment cet ordre15.La question est donc de
savoir comment penser un tel ordre.
Qu'est-ce, dans la perspective ockhamiste, qu'un ordre entre des
objets multiples? Guillaume se dmarque de la position scotiste qui
rduit bien l'unit de l'univers son ordre mais conoit ce dernier
12Cfparexemple
In Sent.,I, dist.30, qu. II, p. 322,1. 4-5.
13Quodl
., VII, qu. 8, 1. 45-47,p. 728.
14Surcettedifficile
de la causalit
onpeutse reporter
l'article
naturelle,
question
de M. Me. CordAdams,WasOckham
a Humean
about
, in: Franciscan
efficient
causality?
Studies
reconnaissance
del'efficace
y39(1979),pp.5-48.Ajoutons
qu'unecertaine
proestdcisivepourtoutl'difice
de la smiologie
ockhamiste
predes causessecondes
entantquesignenaturel,
estcausparcedont
(doncdela logique)puisqueleconcept,
il estsigne.
1
15 4Secundum
intellectum
debetconcediquodunitasuniversi
estordo
Philosophi
ad invicem,
esseunum'est
partium
quianihilaliudintelligit
quamquod'universum
'partessicordinari'"(In Sent.,I, dist.30,qu. 1, p. 317,1. 6-9).
67
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
creaturae
ad Deumnondiffert
realiter
a creatura"28.
quodrelatio
"Ipseostendit
Et cela correspond bien tel passage de VOrdinatioscotiste:
omnicreaturae,
estidemrealiter
"Relatioad Deum,communis
fundamento;
nontamenidemformaliter
praecise
idem(...) Quia illudquodproprie
dicitur
inessealicui,sinequoilludnonpotest
estidemsibirealiessesinecontradictione,
inestlapidi,etsineea nonpotest
ter,relatioautemad Deumproprie
lapisesse
sinecontradictione"29.
L'tre-cr ne diffrepas rellementde la cratureelle-mme; ce n'est
pas quelque chose qui s'y ajoute car cela constitueson tre. Mais l
s'arrtentles convergences. Au nom de la conceptionque nous avons
dj expose, Guillaume d'Ockham critique tout aussi bien l'identit
relle de la relation et de son sujet:
seddicoquodvel
"Non ponoquodrelatioestidemrealiter
cumfundamento,
in animaimporsedtantum
intentio
etconceptus
relatio
nonestfundamentum
et
tanepluraabsoluta,velestpluraabsoluta,sicutpopulusestplureshomines
sitmagissecunnullushomoestpopulus.Quae tamenistarum
propositionum
dumproprietatem
sermonis
discutere
quamad theolomagisad logicm
pertinet
gm"30.
Guillaume d'Ockham rcuse donc totalement,on le voit une fois de
plus, la problmatique qui consisterait s'interrogersur l'identit ou
la diffrencerelles de la relation et de son sujet. Du mme coup se
trouventinvalides simultanmentet l'ide d'une distinctionformelle
a parterei, et celle d'une relationde raison. Il est bien connu que la distinctio
formalisa parterei, dans la perspectivescotiste,n'est ni la distinctio
realisqui concerne les choses physiquementsparables, ni la distinctio
rationis
qui ne correspond aucun objet formelsaisissable comme tel et
antrieur l'acte intellectuel.La distinctio
formalisa partereise double
d'une identitrelle dans le sujet, et c'est justementce que Guillaume
critiquedans le texteci-dessus en rappelant que la relationdsigne un
type de concept ou de signe, ne pas confondreavec l'objet dsign.
Mais la relation n'est pas pour autant conue comme relationde raison; cela va de soi ds lors que l'on dfinitla relationde raison comme
l'effetd'une opration de comparaison par l'intellect.
Dans la Somme de Logique, Guillaume d'Ockham semble aller
jusqu' rcuser la distinction entre relation relle et relation de
raison31. Dans les oeuvres antrieures, il conserve cependant, avec
28Ibid.,p. 295,1. 21-22.
29
DunsScot,Ordination
II, Dist. 1, q. 4-5,nn260-261,t. VII, p. 128-129.
30Jean
In Sent
., I, dist.30, qu. I, p. 314,1. 14-21.
31CfS.L., I, . 52,1.62-63,p. 173:"ApudAristotelem
nullaerattalisdistinctio
interrelationem
rationis".S'il se couvrede l'autorit
realisetrelationem
d'Aristote,
72
13:16:01 PM
une certaine prudence et quelque distance, cette terminologiehabituelle. Une relation sera dite de raison si elle dpend exclusivement
d'un acte de l'intellect,comme c'est le cas pour la relation du sujet et
du prdicat. Mais il fautse garderde gnraliser l'ensemble des relations. Car une relation telle que la ressemblance n'est certes pas
4'relle" si l'on entend
par l qu'elle dsignerait quelque chose de
de
la
et des qualits; mais elle est bien relle
distinct
substance
rel,
dans la mesure o elle signified'une certaine manire des choses relles et que celles-ci sont sans interventionde l'intellect telles qu'elles
sont signifiespar le terme relatif:
"Et ideosecundum
eum[sc.Philosophum]
itavereet realiter
suntistarelativa
alia"32.
sicutquaecumque
'causa', 'dominus'ethuiusmodi
Socrate et Platon se ressemblentparce qu'ils sont rellementblancs.
Une telle relationne dsigne pas un trede raison, pas plus qu'elle ne
rsulte d'une simple opration de l'intellect.
En ce sens, la cration elle-mme est bien une relation relle:
dicialiquomodorealis,nonquidemquodistarelatiositali"Potestistarelatio
verasresquae nonrequirunt
intellectus
qua res,sedquia importt
operationem
ad hocquoduna sitcreansetalia sitcreata"33.
Dieu est rellementcrateur et le monde est rellement cr. Rien
n'est moins fictifque cette relation.
Mais est-ce dire, pour en revenir notre interrogationinitiale,
que ce monde porte en lui une marque de la cration divine?
Reportons-nous la premire question du septime Quodlibet.Elle
porte sur la cration et sur la conservation; il s'agit de savoir si elles
diffrentrellementdes choses absolues. Comme on peut dsormais
s'y attendre,la rponse est ngative, et pour justification,se trouve
'
prcis ce que dsigne, propos d'un tre du monde, le terme 'cration":
"Creatiolapidissiveactivasivepassivanonsignificai
distincaliquidpositivm
tuma Deo et lapide,sed importt
et connotat
negationem
lapidisimmediate
esse lapidis,hoc est,importt
praecedere
quod lapismodositet quod prius
immediate
nonfuit.Et quandocumque
sicest,sineomnialio respectu
dicitur
Deus crearelapidemetlapiscrearia Deo"34.
Guillaume
Thomasd'Aquin:cfSomme
, I. qu. 28,
s'opposeimplicitement
Thologique
a, resp.
32S.L., I, c. 52,1.59-60, 173;dansle mmesens,cfInSent.
I, dist.30,qu. V, p.
p.
385,et Quodl.
VI, qu. 25, pp. 678-679.
33In Sent.,
I, dist.30,qu. V, p. 385,1.9-12.
34Quodl.
, VII, qu. 1,1. 45-51,p. 705.
73
13:16:01 PM
On peut donc dire tout aussi bien que l'tre-crne diffrepas rellement de la crature35et que la cration connote quelque chose de tout
fait extrieur la chose telle qu'elle existe actuellement: sa nonexistence antrieure. Dans cette perspective, il n'y a aucune place
pour cette espce de caractre internepar lequel, selon d'autres thologiens, la chose cre faisait signe vers son crateur.
Ce qui vaut pour un tre cr vaut, de ce point de vue, pour le
monde dans son ensemble. Aucun caractreparticulierne peut treen
lui la marque signifiantedu crateur. De mme par consquent que
son unit se rduit la dispositionde ses lments, de mme il serait
vain d'y chercher une organisation dont l'tre divin serait l'origine
fondamentale,le garant et le signifiultime.
D'aucune manire par consquent, l'unit du monde n'est une relation distinctedes objets multiples qui le constituentet l'ordre n'est
rien d'autre que la dispositiondes parties. Cette conceptionmodifiela
vision de l'univers comme unit organique, conception hrite de
l'antiquit. Dans ce dernier cas, le monde, dont tous les composants
taient dpendants d'un seul principe, ne pouvait qu'tre unique. Il
n'en va plus de mme.
III. L'Unicit du Mondeen Question
La question de la pluralit des mondes est aborde par Guillaume
d'Ockham dans la question unique de la distinction44 de son Commen: ' 'Utrum Deus posset faceremundum
tairedu Premier
LivredesSentences
melioremisto mundo". La question ainsi pose est plus complexe que
celle de la pluralitdes mondes. Elle recoupe le problme du mal et de
sa rationalitdans la cration, et introduitun aspect qui l'on pourrait
dire "qualitatif". Ce faisant, elle recoupe galement notre premire
interrogation,puisque la notion d'ordre peut treprise soit en un sens
descriptif,o un ordre se distingue d'un autre ordre possible - tendance qui est apparue comme celle d'Ockham - soit en un sens qualitatif,o l'ordre seraitquelque chose de mieux que le dsordre.Je laisserai ici ces aspects de ct, pour ne considrerque la question de la
pluralit des mondes.
Guillaume d'Ockham estime probable {probabile
), c'est--dire
dmontrablepar des raisonnementssusceptiblesd'emporterla conviction mme s'il ne s'agit pas de certitudeabsolue, que Dieu pourrait
faire un autre monde (et, en l'occurrence, un monde meilleur) que
35CfIbid.,1.81-82,p. 706.
74
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
velindifvelpraecise
nente;ethocdupliciter,
quaesuntsubstantiae,
propartibus
ferenter
proomnibus"38.
La modificationconceptuelle laquelle procde Guillaume d'Ockham apparat nettementsi l'on compare cette dfinition celle de
Richard de Middleton, un de ses prdcesseursdans l'affirmationde
la pluralit des mondes, qui le Venerabilis
Inceptor
emprunteune partie de sa dfinitionet certains arguments:
44
infra
unamsupercreaturarum
universittm
vocandouniversum,
Respondeo
infra
illamuniversitcontinetur
fciem
contentarum,
quaea nullaaliasuperficie
continentem"39.
etiamsuperficiem
tm,compraehendendo
La deuxime partie de la dfinitionpropose par Guillaume d'Ockham est proche de celle de Richard de Middleton. Mais le dbut est
original. Outre la caractre typiquementockhamistede la dmarche
consistant distinguer les multiples acceptions d'un terme, il faut
noter l'clatement du mot ' 'monde" en totalitdu cr d'une part et
totalit restreinte, physiquement dtermine d'autre part. A ce
momentdu raisonnement,aucun de ces deux sens n'est encore privilgi. Guillaume d'Ockham prcise seulement qu'il entendra par
4'monde" un ensemble de
substances, excluant donc la considration
des accidents. Mais cette distinctionparat tre une subdivision du
second sens. On peut donc estimerque l'auteur a cart de son propos, par dcision mthodologique de vocabulaire, l'ide du monde
comme totalitdu cr. Rien n'empche ds lors de penser plusieurs
mondes, la seule condition de pouvoir rcuser les objections de
nature proprementphysique.
Une telle dcision n'est pas une simple convention. Elle suppose
que le monde ne soit pas autre chose qu'un ensemble d'individus,
autrementdit que ce soit seulement de manire impropre,comme on
l'a dj vu, que le monde est dit 4'un". Certes, ces tres individuels
doivent tre contenus dans un lieu dtermin; n'importe quel agrgat
ne constitue pas un monde. Mais en mme temps, ce lieu lui-mme
n'est pas distinctrellementdes choses localises en et par lui.
Le problme est ainsi transpos sur le terrainde la physique.
38In Sent.,I, dist.44, qu. unica,p. 651,1.9-14.
39Clarissimi
Petri
Sententiarum
libros
deMediavilla
Riccardi
quatuor
super
Maistri
Theologi
Subtilissimae
Lombardi
(Brixiae,1591),L. I, dist.XLIIII, art.1,qu. 4, f.392
Quaestiones
datedesannes1280.
b. Ce commentaire
76
13:16:01 PM
physique
proprement
b) Une argumentation
Le problme de la pluralit des mondes, pris au sens strictc'est-dire sous son aspect quantitatif,comporte l'vidence une dimension
physique, tant pour des raisons internesque pour des raisons historiques.
Car ce problme a une histoire.Dans le Traitdu Ciel, Aristoteavait
dnonc comme absurde l'ide qu'il pt v avoir plusieurs mondes:
13:16:01 PM
que le ciel est bien compos de toute la matire qui est dj faitemais
pas de toute celle qu'il est possible de crer45.Il apparat d'ores et dj
que s'opposent la vision antique du cosmos comme totalitparfaiteet
la conceptionchrtienned'un monde qui n'est rien en regardde l'infinie puissance divine.
L'autre objection consiste dire que s'il y avait plusieurs mondes,
la terrede l'autre monde se mouvraitvers le centrede ce monde-ci46.
En son fond,la rponse revient multiplierles centresen mme temps
que les mondes. Mais l encore, il est intressantde saisir les nuances
entrele raisonnementde Guillaume d'Ockham et celui de Richard de
Middleton. Celui-ci affirmesimplement, comme une vidence, que
chaque monde ayant un centre, la terre de chacun des mondes tendrait naturellementvers le centre de son monde47. En toute rigueur
aristotlicienne,cela suscite une difficult:attribuerainsi deux terres
des lieux naturels diffrents,c'est leur attribuerdes formessubstantiellesdiffrentes
et les rangerpar consquent dans des espces distinctes. A vrai dire, Richard de Middleton ne tombe pas dans ce pige
puisqu'il prcise que la terred'un autre univers, si elle tait place au
centre de ce monde, y reposerait48.Mais Guillaume d'Ockham va
pousser plus loin le raisonnement,ce qui quivaut remettreen chantierla notionde lieu naturel. C'est la fonctiond'un dveloppementsur
le feu qui ne figurepas chez Richard de Middleton.
Si l'on prend en considrationdeux feux,placs en des endroitsdiffrentsde la terre,ils vont se mouvoir vers des lieux numriquement
savoir vers des points diversde la vote cleste. Pourtant,
diffrents,
ces feux sont de la mme espce. Certes, dans le cadre de sa rflexion
et "partout
o l'essenceestralisedansla matire,
lestresspcifiquement
identiilrpond
la multipliquessontmultiples";
cependant
qu' "on nedevrapasconclure
citrelleou possibledes cieux,si notreciel nousestform
de la totalit
de la
matire.
Or cettehypothse
bien la ralit".CfGuillaume
d'Ockham,
correspond
loc.cit.,p. 656,1. 19-21.
45Ibid., p. 660,1. 8-11.
46CfAristote,
Trait
duCiel, I, 8, 276a: "Ds lors,c'estverscecentre-ci
queseportentnaturellement
lesparties
de terre
de l'autremonde,etverscetteextrmit-ci
que
se portele feude l-bas.Or celane se peut:si celase passaitainsi,c'estncessairementversle hautque,danssonmondepropre,
la terre;
le feu,lui,gagneseporterait
raitle centre".
47"Sicutterraistiusuniversi
naturaliter
incentro
huiusuniversi,
etita
quiesceret
terraalterius
universi
naturaliter
in centro
alterius
universi"
quiesceret
(Richardde
loc.cit.,f.392b).
Middleton,
48"Et si terrailliusuniversi
in centrohuiusuniversi,
naturaliter
ibi
poneretur
huiusuniversi,
etterra
sia Deo poneretur
incentro
alterius
natuuniversi,
quiesceret;
raliter
etiamibiquiesceret"
(ibid.)
78
13:16:01 PM
49Cfparexemple
Guillaume
d'Ockham,loc.cit.,d. 656. 1.2. et d. 657.1. 3.
50Cf Trait
duCieLI, 8, 276b 1-5.
51CfGuillaume
d'Ockham,loc.cit.,d. 657,1. 2-11.
52CfGuillaume
loc.cit.,p. 658,1.6-9:"Si dicatur
d'Ockham,
quodistudnonest
caeliestunuslocusnumero
simile,
quiatotacircumferentia
ipsiusignis,nonsicsunt
diversamediaindiversis
mundisunuslocusnumero,
ergononestsimile..."
53Ibid., p. 658,1. 23 - p. 659,1. 2.
79
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
81
13:16:01 PM
13:16:01 PM
aristotlicien59.
La manire dont Guillaume d'Ockham traiteles questions affrentes l'unit du monde, manire dont nous avons vu
qu'elle n'est pas indpendante de sa logique, rcuse, de fait,certains
principes de base de la cosmophysique aristotlicienne:unit organi, unicit du monde, et jusqu'au lieu naturel qui, sans
que du cosmos
tre remis en cause, faitl'objet d'une approche diffrente
voire d'une
certaine dvalorisation: sans tre critiqu de front,ce concept est
apparu peu opratoire dans les passages mentionns.
Le progrsen histoiredes sciences n'est ni rectiligneni univoque. Et
sans doute Guillaume d'Ockham innove-t-ilplus en logique qu'en
physique. Lorsque dans ce dernier domaine il fait preuve d'originalit, ses propositionssont en porte--fauxpar rapport au mouvement
historique- qu'il s'agisse de son analyse de la quantit, de son refus
de Y impetus
comme de toute virtusimpressa
, de la pluralitdes mondes.
Il n'en participe pas moins, sa manire, un vaste mouvement de
remise en cause de l'univers aristotlicien,qui se dessine nettement
ds le XIVo sicle. Il ne s'agit certes que d'un lment parmi beaucoup d'autres. La ruptureentre pense mdivale et pense classique
ne sera consomme, au terme d'un long processus, que lorsqu'un
espace infiniet susceptiblede gomtrisationaura t substituau cosmosgrec. Nous en sommes loin: la pluralit des mondes n'implique
pas par elle-mme la pense de l'infini. Elle est tout de mme une
absurdit du strictpoint de vue de la doctrine aristotlicienne.Cela
signifie,pour ne pas en rester des formulesngatives, que ds cette
poque, travers des lments disparates, et par des avances dont
certainesse rvlerontdes impasses, une autre conceptionde l'univers
commence apparatre.
Paris
C.N.R.S.
59A. Koyrle rappelle
lui-mme:
cfEtudes
Galilennes
, Paris,Hermann,1966,p.
15.
83
13:16:01 PM
Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
BooksReceived
TestidellaI Settimana
in San Bonaventura
e San Tommaso.
Il concetto
di "sapientia"
ottobre1981.A
Residenzialedi StudiMedievali,Carini,Villa Belvedere,
di
: Premessa
Palermo1983.Contents
curadi Alessandro
Musco,Enchiridion,
alla
e scuole
ordini
mendicanti:
Alessandro
Musco;G. Barone,Universit
Parigi
degli
nelconcetto
di
cristiana
classica
e innovazione
met
delXIII secolo
; A. Poppi,Eredit
dell'atto
e Tommaso
inS. Bonaventura
; C. Fabro,L'emergenza
d'Aquino
"sapientia"
Determinae la rottura
delformalismo
scolastico
inS. Tommaso
diessere
; N. Incardona,
sullaconannotazione
Fr.Corvino,
dellacognitio
e cognitio
zione
Qualche
sapientiae;
X + 95 pp. lire10.000
inBonaventura
da Bagnoregio.
cezione
della"sapientia"
. Editedby David L. Wagner,Indiana
TheSevenLiberalArtsin theMiddleAges
1983. Contents:D. L. Wagner,TheSeven
UniversityPress, Bloomington
the
K. F. Morrison,
Incentives
Liberal
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forStudying
Scholarship;
M. Camargo,Rhetoric
Liberal
; E. Stump,DialecGrammar,
Arts;
J. F. Huntsman,
tic; M. Masi,Arithmetic
; CI. Kren,
; L. R. Shelby,
; Th. C. Karp,Music
Geometry
theLiberalArts.XVI + 282 pp. $ 25.00
; R. Mclnerny,Beyond
Astronomy
ISBN 0 253 351855
Wiborada.
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Lebensbeschreibungen
Historischer
vonWalterBerschin,
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kritische
besorgt
VereindesKantonsSt. Gallen, St.Gallen1983,237pp.ISBN 3 90639530 8
oftheSupA FirstCritical
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: Treatises
ontheProperties
Marsilius
oj Terms.
ojInghen
withIntroducand Alienationes
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Ampliationes
positions,
Notes and Appendicesby EgbertP. Bos, D. Reidel
tion,Translation,
Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster
1983, X + 274 pp.
ISBN 90 277 1343X
ontheNature
theBoundaries
Holcot,
Questions
ofGodbyRobert
oj Reason.Three
Exploring
OP. EditedbyHesterG. Gelber,PontificalInstituteof MediaevalStudies,
Toronto1983,VIII + 139pp. ISBN 0 88844062 6
' Elementen
derGeometrie.
'. Commentaar
Albertus
P. M.J. E. Tummers,
opEuclides
(Magnus)
en uitgave
vanBoek1, 2 vols.,Ingenium
Inleidende
studie
Publishers,
} analyse
Nijmegen1984,329 pp.+370 pp. ISBN 90 7041907 6
The
DesmondPaul Henry, Thatmostsubtlequestion
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andContemporary
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A cura
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Heidelberg
13:16:12 PM
Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
Roger Bacon on Equivocation
THOMAS S. MALONEY
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
division. An utterance,
presentthe same threetypesbut in a different
he says, signifiesmany things:9
(1) bysignification
(1.1) equally{depari)
sense{perpriusetposterius)
andsecondary
(1.2) in a primary
(2) byconsignification.
When we turn to William of Sherwood we findthatthe examples give
evidence thatthe threetypesof equivocation remain the same but that
William, while willing to recast the Aristoteliantypes into a double
division (thereby recalling Peter's second division) does this froma
point of view quite differentfrom Peter's. An utterance, he says,
signifiesmany things:10
{dese)
(1) byitself
(proprie
). E.g., 'dog'.
(1.1) properly
sense{transumptive).
E.g., 'runs'.
(1.2) in a transferred
term.
with
another
'suffering'.
E.g.,
(2) byconjunction
William notes that equivocation (2) is possible only in cases where the
utterancewas imposed as a sign of a complex intentthat involved the
"
relation "primary/secondary," i.e., when it is a sign of an intentio
. ,,
priusetposterius
participataa pluribussecundum
Around 1252 Roger Bacon also addressed the Aristoteliandivision
and presentsus with a thirdvariation. Equivocation occurs:12
et
andequallytomany{principaliter
is related
principally
(1) whenan utterance
adplura).E.g., 'dog'.
sehabet
equaliter
ina transferred
andanother
andofitself
onething
properly
(2) whenitsignifies
et
unum
etperseetaliudtransumptive
senseandlessproperly
proprie
(.significai
minus
E.g, 'runs'.
proprie).
onething,
whichofitself
manywhen
signifies
signifies
(3) whenan utterance,
.i3
term.E.g., 'sitting
(sedens)'
joinedtoanother
Now while it is severelytemptingat thispoint to attemptto discover
what nuance these authors intended in retextualizingAristotlethe differentway each did, my purpose in alluding to them is simplyto illustratethe statusof formaltreatmentson equivocation at thehalf-way
mark in the 13thcentury.While the definitionof equivocation (based
on Categories
1) is virtuallycanonical, these authors are anythingbut
9 Ibid.,p. 105.14-20.
10Introductiones
inlogicam,
pp. 87.19-88.38.
11Ibid.,p. 88. 25-34.
12Sd, pp. 331.17-333.5.
13Cf. ractatus
ofequivocaas an example
wherePeteralsouses'sitting'
, p. 104.1-4,
tionin thismode.
88
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
predicaments,but here he was lacking and Bacon feltthe need to supWhat was needed, he thought,was a listof the
ply forthe deficiency.18
principalways thingsdiffer,a more precise theoryof equivocation, an
application of his own theoryof imposition,and the resultwould be a
classificationof the proper modes of equivocation and analogy. He
but also on his Physics
would draw not just on Aristotle's Categories
,
and
Arab
sources.
,
Metaphysics
Since Bacon offersthis treatise on the degrees of equivocation in
a question arises as
studiitheologiae
both the Opusmaiusand Compendium
to which should here be adopted as the principal textforanalysis.19I
have adopted thelatterforvarious reasons. First,being his last workit
representshis final thoughts. Second, being a summary or a more
briefre-workingof the earlier material it reveals clearly what he took
to be essential to the presentationof his new classification.Third, it
sheds additional light on the way others treated the semantics of
names. And fourth,it adds a sixthmode to the fivementioned in his
Communianaturalium
and discussed in his Opus maius.
II
Treatments of equivocation in 13th century philosophical and
theologicalliteratureall presuppose that it along withunivocation and
ad placitum).20
analogy are formsof significationat pleasure {significado
18Baconwasnotbeyondexpressing
in Aristotle.
Becausethelatter
disappointment
matter
thecomposite's
topointoutclearly
thatthenameofa composite
failed
signifies
him.
and notat pleasureAverroes,
and formnaturally
saysBacon,misinterpreted
(Cst,p. 48.1-6.)
19Itshouldalsobe notedthatalongwiththeformal
found
ofequivocation
treatments
a schematic
ofthevariousmodesis also
outline
inDs 36-88andCst, pp. 64.4-68.23,
inhisCommunia
n. d., p. 51.4-15,
naturalium
found
2, Oxford
(ed. RobertSteele,Opera
in his
thatthemodesweredescribed
henceforth
citedas Cn)wherehe alsomentions
Fratris
in a partas yetundiscovered.
, presumably
Rogeri
(See Metaphysica
Metaphysics
instudio
Minorum
deviciis
contractis
Ordinis
Fratrum
, ed. RobertSteele,Opera1,
theologie
thatatleastPartTwo
evidence
n. d., pp.iii-v.)Thisalongwithother
Oxford
suggests
oftheCn(andprobably
before
theOpusmauis.
PartOne)werewritten
(See alsobelow,
n. 76) It couldalsobe pointed
outthatin theOpusmaius
(Ds 37) Baconspeaksofthe
an attempt
to
butI havenotfound
inhisworks
anywhere
manymodesofunivocation,
theseas he doesin regardtoequivocation.
distinguish
20Baconpresents
ofsignsinbothhisOpusmaius
classification
an original
(Ds 3-8)and
ofsignification
is a subclass
at pleasure
Cst(pp. 38.19-24and39.17-20).Signification
fromnaturalsignification.
For a studyof
whichin turnis distinguished
by intent
in his
Bacon'ssemiotics
and thewayin whichvocalsoundsare shownto signify
fortheclaimthatthisclassification
various
modesofsignification
is
as wellas support
45
seeThomasMaloney,TheSemiotics
Bacon)in: MediaevalStudies,
ofRoger
original
(1983),120-154.
91
13:15:08 PM
In thisvein, and as we have seen, authorstraditionallydistinguishbetween univocation and equivocation on the basis of whether a term
names one thingonly or more than one, such that a differenceis involved in the definitionsof the term. Where the differenceis absolute
one can speak ofpureequivocation; where it existswithsome degree of
similarityone can speak of analogy, the resultbeing that analogy is a
subclass of equivocation taken broadly.21While Bacon would agree
with the substance of these notions, he introduces variations which
revolve around a veryprecise understandingof the notion and consequences of impositions,and it is these that lie at the basis of what is
original in his classification of the degrees of equivocation and
analogy.
First, says Bacon, since imposition is an act of a free, rational intent, only that is named which a speaker intends. Granted, concepts
are the means by which thingsoutside the mind are known and named, when one names a thingoutside the mind it is not the concept that
is first named but the thing itself, for this is the object of the
impositor's intent.22
Second, when thingswere firstnamed the originalimpositorintended to name existing things only, and this, says Bacon, is simply a
fact.23Hence proper names of original impositionname existingin21Baconalsospeaksofa kindofanalogy
In
thatisnotequivocation.
(SeeDs 100-133.)
ofthis
Foran analysis
ofas connotation.
theCstitis spoken
(See Cst, pp.46.16-52.2.)
Bacon
see ThomasMaloney,TheSemiotics
, in:
ofRoger
typeofdoublesignification
MediaevalStudies,45 (1983),131-132.
22Cst,p 44.28-45.7.
toBaconthesevocalsoundsare
According
(See alsoDs 162-167.)
features
that
in question.Herewe canseecertain
onlynaturalsignsoftheconcepts
no directlinkhasyet
willlaterbecomeemphasized
byWilliamofOckham,though
ofBacon'stheory
seeKarin
ofimposition
Foran excellent
beendiscovered.
analysis
in: English
Vocisad Significandum',
Baconon'Impositio
Margarita
Fredborg,
Roger
, op. cit., pp. 167-191.Fredborgsuggeststhe names of
Logicand Semantics
Ps.-Albert,
andJohnofDenofAuxerre,
Lambert
Ps.-Grosseteste,
Ps.-Kilwardby,
Foran
histheory.
sources
markas possible
againstwhomBaconmayhavedeveloped
ofsignsin theOpusmaius
oftherelation
ofBacon'sgeneraltheory
(Ds) tohis
anlysis
: A Newly
Recovered
PartoftheOpus
seeJanPinborg,
BacononSigns
semantics
Roger
Mediaevalia,13(1981),403-412andThomasMaloney,The
maius,in: Miscellenea
120-154.
Bacon
Semiotics
, in: MediaevalStudies,45 (1983),
ofRoger
23Cst, pp.54.24-31and59.20-24,
at 59.23" nomen
for" nomen
reading
[non]
significai"
" inthetext. harmonize
indicate
adwithRashdall'susesquarebrackets
(To
significai
dialectices
Thisprinciple
washeldbyBaconas earlyas theSumule
(ca. 1252)
ditions.)
hesaysthatnames,ofthemselves
ofsupposition
inthelanguage
where,
theory,
(dese),
forexisting
(andinone
things
only.(Sd, p. 280.16-34.)Later,intheDe signis
supposit
how
heindicates
is evenmentioned)
ofthefewplacesinthatworkwheresupposition
other
foranything
and supposition
are related:no termmaysupposit
signification
tosignify.
thanthatforwhichitwasimposed
(Ds 50.)
92
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
SecondMode Equivocation
Pursuing the movement from pure equivocation toward univocation, Bacon next focuses on things which exhibit only a minimal
degree of communality.53Such he findsin thingssharinginternallyin
nothingabsolutely common but related in some way and he provides
various examples.
The firstis quite clear, namely, the case of the Creator and any
creature: the only thing they have in common is the relation of
dependencythatobtains between the latterand the former.Hence any
termpredicatedof both would be said to equivocate in this mode.54A
second example draws on the differencebetween substance and any of
the nine classes of accidents, but he immediatelyfallsinto the problem
ofhandling denominativetermslike ' ens9 and ' unum9thatcan function
as adjectives or substantives.55 This double use itself involves
equivocation, but it is not precisely this kind of differencethat is at
issue in this mode.56Rather it is what is predicated differently
in such
'
'
'
expressionsas "A dog is an entity' and 'Black is an entity.' In a text
that bears comment he writes:
9and4vnum
' andthelikefor
'ens
AndhereI amtaking
secondsignificates,
[their]
for
a
and
unitati
etentitati
namely,
thinghavingunity entity
(proresubtracia
),
becasuethefirstsignificate
of these[terms],whichis unityand entity,
is
common
toa substance
andan accident,
as accidents
arecomjust
[univocally]
' canbe takenin
montomanysubjects,
as 'album*
and4nigrum
toqualities
regard
themselves
orin regard
toa thing
subiectam
(rem
having[them]
).57
The problem he faces is this. In Latin lvnum9can be taken adjectivally
and be translated by 'one' as in "One horse is red." As such it
signifiesan accidental forminhering in a horse and such formsare
predicated univocally of substances or accidents since oneness is the
9 can also be taken
same no matterof what it is predicated. But 4vnum
as a neuter substantiveadjective and be translatedby 'unit' as in "A
car is a unit." The second significateof this term,then, is notjust an
accidental formbut a substance having the formof unity. Now both
substances and accidents are entitiesand units, but theyare not such
53Cst,p. 64.24-27.
54Cst, p. 64.27-32.
55Forthecomplete
at
ofthisexamplesee Cst,pp. 64.32-65.12,
discussion
reading
"
''
conueniunt"
in thetext.
65.3 *'predicamenta
conueniunt
against predicamenta
[non]
56Baconrefers
intheOpusmaius
tothisdoublekindofequivocation
andacknowledges
thatall adjectives
suchcases.(See Ds 53 and 70.)
(in Latin)provide
57Cst, p. 65.6-12.
101
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
'
4'
with universais and particularsfillthe bill.61Here the overlap' between thingssignifiedis considerablygreater,enough to allow him to
4
speak of 'some absolute agreement," without,however, it providing
the basis forunivocal predication. Thus Bacon argues that any term
predicatedof a composite and eitherits matteror formequivocates in
thismode. As just seen, ifone predicated 'substance' ofmatteror form
one equivocates in the second mode, forthe two have nothingin common but their mutual relations; but since matter and form are the
essential parts of a substance thereis a greatercommunalitybetween
one of the parts and the whole than that provided by the previously
describedrelations. Hence to predicate 'substance' of a composite and
its matteror formis to equivocate in a thirdmode.
While Bacon's example in the Compendiumstudii theologiaeis
restrictedto wholes and parts, in the Opusmaiushe gives an analysis of
the equivocation that arises when one predicates a termof a universal
and one of its particulars.62If 'man' is taken as the name of a species
and then reimposed to designate Socrates, the second imposition
equivocates with the first.In this vein he also rejects the theorythat
simplybecause the universal is always in a particularthe name of the
universal somehow automatically gives one to understand a particular. A new imposition, says Bacon, is required to designate the
particularand it is equivocal.63
Other examples of equivocation in this mode are presented in the
Opusmaiusbut not mentionedin the later work, at least not expressly,
as cases of equivocation. A vocal sound imposed for itself (as in
"'Man' is a vocal sound") becomes equivocal when imposed for a
vocal sound, a term,an utterance(<dictio
name, a signifying
), or a part
"
of speech, as in 'Man' is a part of speech."64 Each of the latterare
vocal sounds, but to say 'man' of any one ofthemis to say somethinga
littledifferentfromsaying it is a vocal sound.
'Chance' is equivocal when said of chance occurrences in general
and eitherthat which occurs in nature or in human affairs.65'Indic61Cst, pp. 66.23-67.9.
thattheyall
Thisandthenexttwomodeshaveitincommon
in an absolute
naturebutwithsome
instances
wherethereis an agreement
represent
See Ds 41, at thebeginning.
difference.
62Ds 47.
63Ds 50. In Ds 48 and86headdsthata termtakenwiththevariouskindsofsupposisee thereandSd,p.
in thismode.Forhisdivisions
ofsupposition
tionequivocates
269.3-36.
64Ds 85.
65Ds 41.
103
13:15:08 PM
tion' can signifya period of ten years or any one of these years.66
'Rose', taken as the name of somethingbeautiful, is equivocally the
name of a floweror a person.67'Clement' is equivocally the name of a
certain characteristicand a (proper) name of the person having that
characteristic.68Other common terms like 'good' and 'man', when
conjoined, become proper names, as 'Goodman', along with some
'
complete expressionslike Beneueniatis' the lattercommon among the
Italians, he notes.69
FourthMode Equivocation
Bacon's fourthmode presents certain problems of interpretation,
not in regard to his intent,but in diviningthe theorybehind some of
his claims. He presentsthis mode as follows:
wecanagainfindanother
absolute
thanbefore,
like
Fourthly,
agreement
greater
theequivocations
[that]lie hiddenin genus,as Aristotle
saysin theseventh
shareinsomerootnature,
, [i.e.,]wheresignificates
[book]ofthePhysics
granted
thatitwouldbedifferentiated
inaccordwithitsdifferent
beingswhenitdescends
intothem(thedifferences).
Thustheessenceofgenusofitself
isonerootcapable
if beingdifferentiated
intodifferent
species[thatwould]not [be] complete
accidental
differences
butevenbefore
becauseof[their]
[theessenceofgenus]is
understood
in them.Forexample,
thesimilar
essenceproduced
intheseedofa
horseandintheseedofa donkey
isonerootessence,
butyetithasvarious
beings
before
thisessencewouldbe leddownintothedifferences,
andthusthebeings
areessential.
Becauseofthistherootessence
ofgenusisessentially
differentiated.
66Ibid.
67Ds 48. In thisonecasea nameofan individual
ofonespecies(flower)
is reimposed
to signify
an individual
ofanother
species(man).Baconsaysthatone can do this
becausethebasis{ratio)
ofthetransference
is thebeautyfoundin bothsignificates.
withan eyetotheobjection
thathehashereconfused
with
Presumably
equivocation
he adds:' Wherefore
a namecan be transferred
more[fittingly]
toa parmetaphor
ticular
ofitsownspeciesbecausethelikeness
andidentity
inthisregard
{conveniencia)
{a
sincethereis a substantial
likeness."
partret)is considerably
stronger
{lonpe
ualidior)
68All(Latin)adjectives
aresaidtobe equivocal
inthesecondmode(seeabove,n. 56);
orsubstantively
tosignify
a quality
theycan be takeneither
adjectivally
respectively
anda subject
Thus'clement
couldbe imposed
either
for
havingthatquality.
{clemens)'
itselfor foranysubstance
clemency
havingit and,onceimposedforboth,would
theclaimthat'clement'also
equivocatein thesecondmode.In orderto justify
in thethirdmodeBacon implicitly
drawson an additional
factnot
equivocates
thatcommon
andproper
terms
differ
tohow
inregard
mentioned,
previously
namely,
takensubstantively
completely
theysignify
things.Latinadjectives
(like 'album')
a substance
a certain
in
buttheydo notdesignate
thesubstance
signify
having
quality
toallitsqualities.
Theseterms
takenasproper
namesdesignate
in
anindividual
regard
itsentirety.
Thus'clement'
namefor
fora personal
attribute
andas a proper
imposed
an individual
twothings
as partandwhole.
relatedrespectively
signifies
69See Ds 49. The equivocation
be
assertedin theseexamplesshouldpresumably
in theprevious
note.
analyzedalongthelinessuggested
104
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
equivocation can arise in certain cases where just one term and one
significateare involved.81 Obviously the degree of differencehere
would be even less than that described in the previous mode.
Drawing on Priscian's remark that the parts of speech are
distinguishedin virtueof the way theysignifyand not what is signified
Bacon offersone typeof example of equivocation in thismode by poin*2
tingto the term 'amans' His use of a presentparticiplehere reminds
discussed
one of the example employed by the authors of the summulae
and ' sedens' and Peter of Spain's explicitstatement
earlier, llaboransy
that such, when joined with verbs of the past tense in an expression,
become instances of equivocal consignificationbecause of different
), the weakest of the threemodes of
ways of signifying( modisignificandi
is
that in Bacon's new classification
it
clear
However,
equivocation.
the kind of equivocation he himselfand Peter and William called attention to by such examples would now be firstmode equivocation:
the differencebetween a presentact and a past one is the same as that
between an entityand a nonentity,and it is the intentto reflectjust
such diversitythat constitutesfirstmode equivocation. The result is
'
'
that when Bacon applies Priscian's remarkto a term like amans his
attentionis directed to the grammatical featuresof the term itselfindependentlyof any differentintentan impositormighthave in mind
when using it in an expressionwitha verb ofthe past tense. Thus, says
'
4
Bacon, amans signifies love but, depending on the intent of the
speaker, it does this eitheras a noun or a participle.83The difference,
but in how it is done
he claims, is not in what is signified(ressignificata)
he
modus
Grammaticallyspeaking, implies, such a termis
significandi).
(
in
each
case
in virtueof a different
(grammatical) property
employed
.84 The English term 'love' would be a closely
(sub diversaproprietate)
allied example, being capable of being taken as a noun or a verb.
81See above,n. 25.
82Cst, pp. 67.25-68.1.ForPriscian's
see aboven. 47.
remark
83Whatall thisboilsdownto is thatall present
in Latinwhenusedwith
participles
verbsofthepasttensewouldbe considered
byBacontobe doublyequivocalin the
sensesjustdescribed.
84Curiously,
thesame
theterm'amo'andsaysthatitsignifies
Baconalsomentions
'
GivenBacon's
(Cst,p. 67.28-30.)
thingas amans'takenas a nounanda participle.
inthat
andeither
butitis notthesametermas 'amans'
thisis trueenough,
principles
In theparalleltextin
no basisforequivocation.
connection
oron itsownitprovides
forit
andthiswouldbe a parallelexample,
'amor1
theOpusmains
(Ds 43) hementions
inthelater
oflamoy
thenthatthemention
canbe takenas a nounanda verb.I suspect
the
ofhastein recapitulating
workis an error,eithera scribalslipor theproduct
Ds 43.
from
material
108
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
13:15:08 PM
112
13:15:08 PM
Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
PetrusBerchoriusRedivivus -
13:15:17 PM
C'est que, jeune Franciscain, il avait jet une fois son frocaux orties
pour vagabonder assez longtempsdans le monde, dsertiondontJean
XXII n'avait pas t averti:
Verumquiaidemreligiosus,
dumindictoordinefratrum
minorum
exiiuvenis
sterai
ordinem
fuerat
etdimisso
habituregulri
, semeldictum
egressus
aliquamdiuperseculum
ad ordinem
tarnen
revertens
fuerit
divagatus
persuossuperiores
ad gradumpristinum
dubitattamenidemreligiosus
restitutus,
quod quia de
dictaprecedenti
nonfuitfactamentio
adhuc
apostasiain predicta
dispensatione
occasione
eiusdemaliquanotainfamie
existt...
innodatus
Cette rvlationexplique le silence que Bersuire,dans ses ouvrages, a
gard sur son pass franciscain6.C'est seulementla craintede perdre
ses bnficesqui, des annes plus tard, l'a pouss avouer sa dfaillance.
La supplique fait connatre aussi dans quelles circonstancesBersuire s'est faitBndictin. Ayant obtenu de son suprieurle consentement de quitterl'ordre des Franciscains, il avait rencontr Avignon
le frreJean, abb du monastrede San Salvador de la Torre, au diocse de Tuy {monasteriiSanciiSaluatorisde Turre, Tudensisdicesis
), qui
l'avait accueilli comme membre de sa congrgation.Enfin, par l'acte
du 3 aot 1332, Jean XXII avait ratifison passage aux Bndictins.
Torre, un village appartenant aujourd'hui la commune de Viana
do Castelo, en Portugal, est situe sur la Lima, 40 kilomtresenviron au sud de Tuy7. C'est ce mme monastreque futtransfren
1353, du moins pour la forme,l' ex-dominicainJean de Thermis, qui
sous Clment VI avait t charg de composer un travail sur la
rformedu calendrier8.D'aprs les suppliques de deux autres moines
de La Torre, adresses galement Clment VI, l'abbaye tait
l'poque dans un tristetat: elle tait ruine par les guerres,de sorte
que les moines n'avaient pas de quoi vivre et il n'y avait plus
d'observance9.
6 Samaran
numrant
, p. 263,n. 6, se trompe
cependant
quandil ditque Bersuire,
a omisles
lesprincipaux
ordres
dansarticle
ABYSSUSde sonRepertorium
mendiants,
"
& quamendicantes...
Franciscains:
sunt
quatuor
quatuor
Equietiam
rufi
quadrigae
religiones
distincta.
.. , Cologne,1730-1731,
III,
drigasuntMinores..'1
(Operaomniain 6 tomos
p. 32 L).
7 Le monastre
San Salvadorde la Torreestmentionn
parAntonio
LinageConde
enla Peninsula
Iberica
dans: Los orgenes
delmonacato
benedictino
, Leon, 1973,t. III:
" Monasticon
, p. 431,n 1552.D'aprsunenoticede 1068,le monastre
Hispanum"
etconfesetrdifi
auraittfond
parOrdoo,"frater
parle "duxPaioBermudes"
sor''
8 U. Berlire,
25 (1908),pp. 240-241.
Revuebndictine
9 U. Berlire,
19(1902),pp. 319-320.
Revuebndictine
114
13:15:17 PM
13:15:17 PM
Cette fonctionexigeait la rsidence et, jusqu' sa morten 1362, Bersuire a d mener de frontses tches de prieur et d'crivain.
Il serait intressant de savoir si la prdication faisait partie des
devoirs de Bersuire en qualit de prieur de Saint-Eloi. Tritenheim,
dans dition princeps de sa biographie d'crivains ecclsiastiques,
affirmeque Bersuire tait un grand prdicateur(in declamandis
sermonibus ad populumexcellentis
ingenti)et lui attribue un recueil de sermons
divers (sermones
varios)en 2 livres15.Il est suivi en cela par d'autres biotels
graphes,
que Philippe de Bergame, qui cependant omet le ad populum (<declamator
verbidivini valde insignis)16,Gesner17, Fabricius18 et
Ziegelbauer19.
Ce recueil n'a jamais t retrouv.De plus, l'item manque dans le
canon de ses ouvrages, tabli par Bersuire dans le prologue de sa traduction de Tite-Live et dans la Collationprofine operis(une sorte de
morale
, date de 135920),et
postface la seconde dition du Repertorium
" de son
il manque aussi dans l'numration des "opera solemnia
pitaphe21.
Que pourtantTritenheimne se soit pas tromp,cela a t dmontr
par Engels dans son article sur les Pseudo-Bersuires22.Examinant
l'ouvrage d'un Bndictin espagnol, Michael Ximenez Barranco, qui
s'tait propos de prouver que Bersuire tait l'auteur d'un commentaire sur les Psaumes23, l'attention d'Engels futattirepar 3 citations
15Johannes
siveliber
Trithemius,
ecclesiasticorum,
Ble,1494,f.91v.
Catalogus
scriptorum
16JacobusPhilippusBergamensis
chronicarum
, Venise,
(1434-1520),Supplementum
la chronique
un autrePhilippe
de Bergame,
1513,f.254.Samaran
, p. 421,attribue
de Bersuire;
erreurrectifie
, dans:
parJ. Engels,LesPseudo-Bersuires
contemporain
3 (1965),pp. 128-129.
Vivarium,
17Conradus
Bibliotheca
universalis
omnium
Gesnerus,
, siveCatalogus
scriptorum
locupletissimus...jZurich,1545,f.545v(ne mentionne
que le recueilde sermons).
18Johannes
Albertus
Bibliotheca
latinamediae
etinfimae
aetatis
Fabricius,
, Hambourg,
de Bergame).
1736,V, p. 728(reproduit
Philippe
19Magnoaldus
ordinis
Historia
reiliterariae
S. Benedirti...,
etc.,
Ziegelbauer,
Augsbourg
"
eteleganter
".
etdocte
1754,III, p. 185: sermones
plures
compositi
20Vivarium,
citsci-dessus,
3 (1965),pp. 158-159.Outreles3 ouvrages
Bersuire
s'y
morale
etd'uneCosmographia
seuMundi
dclarel'auteur
d'unBreviarium
, ouvrages
mappa
du prologue
du Tite-Live,
dans:Samaran
, pp. 359-360.
perdus.Cf.la transcription
21Transcription
Lesantiquitez
etsingularitez
deParis,
, histoires
d'aprsGillesCorrozet,
de France
villecapitale
du Royaume
, pp. 300-301;
, Paris,1550,f. 35, dans: Samaran
surPierre
Bersuire
2 (1964),p. 65.
, dans:Vivarium,
Engels,Notice
bibliographique
22Vivarium,
3 (1965),pp. 147-148.
23Incognitus
Monach.
siveDissertato
, inquaPetrm
Berchorium,
comparativa
persecognitus.
in Psalmos
nomine
Benedictinum
verum
Auctorem
Expositionis
vulgatae
propugnai
Incogniti
Ximenez
Barranco...
R.A.P.M.F.Michael
, Madrid,1720,p. 16; pp. 65-66.
116
13:15:17 PM
morale
du Repertorium
, o Bersuirerenvoiele lecteurpour de plus riches
des
sermons,dont il cite incipit. Voici ces renvois,
dveloppements
avec leur contexte immdiat, cits d'aprs l'dition de 173124:
LAETITIA,LAETUS (IV, p. 455A): Nota,quodlaetitiaidemestquodgauCumergode istisomnibus
exultatio
&jubilatio.
dium,jucunditas,
supraad suffiest
modicum
hincest,quodde laetitiaquoadpraesens
sittractatum,
cientiam
&insermone
Lattare
steriLaetare
Hierusalem:
cuminsermone,
maxime
dicendum,
- Cf.infine(p. 456): Sed accipedide ea sittractatum.
lis, satis& sufficienter
Hierusalem
Laetare
, & poneeas hic...
stinciones,
quae suntin sermone:
MARIA(V, p. 29 F): Videsivisinsermone,
Quaeestista, ubimultade laudibus
VirVideetiamsupradeAdventu,
ubidevirginitate
invenies:
gloriosae
Virginis
multainvenire.
poteris
ginis,& filliconceptione
Haeccine
reddis
Domino
CHRISTI PASSIO (III, p. 296,infine):Videinsermone
,
& insipiens?
Ponehictotumquod ibi,quia sub alia formaponitur
stulte,
popule
& sole.Et si vispulchra
Itemvidesuprade sanguine,
seriespassionis.
originalia
hic
< ubi> multaposui,quapropter
videinsermone
dictoHaeccine
depassione,
paucadixi.
L'emploi de la premire personne dans le dernier passage montre,
sans qu'on puisse en douter, que Bersuire renvoie des sermonscrits
par lui-mme. D'ailleurs, quand il lui arrivede renvoyer un sermon
d'un autre auteur, il ne manque jamais de le nommer. Cela se voit,
par exemple, dans l'article HIERUSALEM25, o Bersuire commence
par numrerles 4 sens que peut avoir ce nom, en se rfrantau serin Sermon LaetareHierusalemd'Innocent III (SicutenimdicitInnocentius
.
Puis
Hierusalem.
272
dicitur
Laetare
moneQuadragsima*
, quae
A),
.)26.
(p.
aprs un courtdveloppementde chaque membre de cettedistinction,
il renvoiele lecteursoit d'autres articles("tituli") du Repertorium
, soit
des sermons,dans lesquels il avait dj traitde ces sens, mais sparment:
Hierusalem
multa& mirabilia
De istaigitur
dici,sedquia
possent
quadruplici
estde eisdem,idcirco
dictum
locisparticulatim
supersedeo
quoadpraepluribus
sens.
de Hierusalem
Videigitur
ADDUCERE, iniliaauctorisuperiori
supraintitulo
inHierusalem
tate:Elevavit
mespiritus
, Ezec. 8.
, & adduxit21
24Voirci-dessus,
le Repertorium
dansla sriede mss.contenant
n. 6. Mmesrenvois
Haeccine
selitdansle ms.
au sermon
Le renvoi
Paris,B.N. lat.16788-16790.
complet,
X, non la fin,maisau dbutde l'article
16790,sousla lettre
(f.453ra).
25Ed. cite
, IV, pp. 271-275.
26Migne,PL 217,393-398;cf.J. B. Schneyer,
des
derlateinischen
Sermones
Repertorium
t.4, p.
i. W., 1969-1980,
Mittelalters
, 9 tomesparus,Mnster
frdieZeitvon1150-1350
43,n 18.T 22.
27Ms. 16789,f. 119va]induxitd,
1731.
117
13:15:17 PM
l'article
en
suire l'a insr, quelque peu abrg,
appendice
(VI, pp. 201 b 209 b). Dans l'dition il est prcd de la mentionsuiAuctorfaci'
vante: " Sermo
, de quo per Dictionariumsaepe mentionem
l'introduction
originale:
remplaant
de
etmateriam
semelpraedicaui
Et notaquodquiaistumsermonem
sequentem
duxi31.
ideoipsumhicponereetinserere
VIDERE ibisatisaccumulaui,
dignum
13:15:17 PM
Le thme du sermon, qui est construitentirementd'aprs les pr, a t choisi dans TEptre de S. Paul aux
ceptes des artespraedicandP2
5:
Videte
, le prothme dans le
quomodocauteambuletis
Ephsiens, 5,
lumen.Il a comme incipitnon
psautier, 35, 10: In luminetuovidebimus
ad
visionem
nonsolumestnecessaria
charissimi,
Quia
scripturaire:
corporalem
et
se
termine
sur
une
citation
de S. Augustin:
,
objectipraesentatio...
erit
desideriorum
sinefastidioamanostrorum,
'Ipse finis
qui sinefinevidebitur,
933.
laudabitur*
Christus
bitur,sinefatigatione
, & . ExpliQuodnobisconcdt
34
cat sermo .
La leon du prothme, savoir que pour discernerentrele bien et le
mal, la visiomoralis
, qui est le sujet principaldu sermon,on a besoin de
la lumiredivine, est dveloppe au moyen de 4 arguments,emprunts 1) aux faitsde la nature ( naturaliter
): les oiseaux commenant leur
chant au lever du soleil; 2) aux figuresde la Bible {figur
aliter
): les lande
feu
en
de
l'effusion
du
la
littrature
gues
signe
Saint-Esprit; 3)
profane ( exemplariter
): la fable des arbres du soleil et de la lune; 4)
Evangile (scripturaliter):
la gurison du sourd-muet. Reprenant
donne
de
la
fable,le prothmese terminepar une exhorl'explication
tation la prire: ilIgiturcharissimi
ad
, pro istoluminecoelestiimpetrando,
nostraduo lumina,Solem& lunam}i.e. Christum
& Mariam recurramus.
.." .
La divisiondu thme, en 3 parties, est nonce dans un schma rim:
inaspectumentali
VIDETE,
sapientiaesplendorcm:
Habcamus
decorem: QUOMODOCAUTE,
ergoinaffectumoralimoderantiae
inprofectu
reali diligentiae
vigorem: AMBULETIS.
De cettetripartition,
le premiermembreest dvelopp longuement(13
col.) au moyen d'une subdivision en 8 parties de l'autorit confirma& videde loco,in quo nunces,
tive, Gen. 13, 14: Leva oculostuosin directum,
ad aquilonem& meridiem,
ad orientem
& occidentem.
ET SIC DICO, QUOD TU DEBES VIDERE:
est
LEVA OCULOS TUOS,
DEUM,
qui
" " superior:
interior
: IN DIRECTUM,
TEIPSUM,
'
" " exterior:
ET VIDE,
PROXIMUM,
" " inferior:
DE LOCO, INQUO NUNC ES,
MUNDUM,
" " sterilior:
AD AQUILONEM,
EGENUM,
" " deterior:
AD MERIDIEM,
IMPIUM,
" " felicior
: AD ORIENTEM,
PARADISUM,
FINEMSEU TERMINM, " " asperior:
AD OCCIDENTEM.
32Cf.Th.-M. Charland,
Artes
Contribution
l'histoire
dela rhtorique
aumoyen
praedicandi.
La prdication
1936,pp. 109-226;
ge,Paris-Ottawa,
J. Longre,
mdivale,
Paris,1983,
pp. 195-202.
33Civ.DeiXXII, 30, 33-35
(CCL 48).
34Sauferreur,
le sermon
n'estpas mentionn
parSchneyer,
op.cit.
119
13:15:17 PM
13:15:17 PM
Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
Prolegomenato a Studyof
ExtrinsicDenomination
in the Workof Francis Suarez, S.J.
JOHN P. DOYLE
Introduction
At the beginningof the CritiqueofPureReason, Immanuel Kant compares himselfwithCopernicus. As that man had invertedthe order of
heaven and earth, so Kant would invert the order between things
known and knowers. Where previous philosophershad regarded concepts and our knowing apparatus itselfas diaphanous media through
which thingsin themselvesare clearly seen, Kant would regard them
as in fact constitutiveof things, precisely as those thingscome to be
known.1
But whatever Kant may have thought about the 4'dogmatic"
metaphysicsof precedinggenerations,the idea thatthe knoweraffects
what he knows was indeed a common one among earlier Scholastics.
Even in the moderate realisttraditionof St. Thomas, it was axiomatic
- in effect
that: cognitasunt in cognoscente
secundummodumcognoscentis2
that human subjects somehowenter into the constitutionof objects
which theyknow.3And, of course, this idea was much more dominant
in the medieval traditionsof conceptualism and nominalism.4
While Francis Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617) is not ordinarilyclassified
as a conceptualistor a nominalist, his philosophywas in major ways
influencedby thesemedieval traditions.5Since moreover,Suarez truly
1 Cf. I. Kant,Critique
tothe2ndedition
, Preface
ofPureReason
(B, xvi).
2 Cf.Summa
, II-II, q. 1, a. 2; De Ventate
, q. 1, a. 2.
Theologiae
3 Forsomeoftheramifications
ofthis,seeJ. P. Doyle,IpsumEsseas God-Surrogate
:
ThePointofConvergence
in: The Modern
ofFaithandReason
forSt. Thomas
Aquinas,
L (1973),293-296.Butforsharpcriticism
ofa Thomistic
a
"intellectual
Schoolman,
andTruth
inAquinas,
in:MediaevalStudies,
32(1970),
", seeJ. OwensJudgment
priori
138-158.
4 In linewiththis,I believeno mistake
is madewhenmodern
Scholastic
manualists
locatetheKantiantheoretical
itself
underthetitleofConceptualismus
; cf.
philosophy
, 2nded. (BuenosAires,1939),I, p. 218.
e.g. C. Boyer,S.J.,Cursus
Philosophicus
5 Forthechargeofnominalism
leveledat Suarez,cf.L. Mahieu,Franois
Suarez.
La
etlesrapports
a avecsathologie
, Paris1921, 288,499,500,501, 504,505
philosophie
qu'elle
and522;alsoj. Marchal,
dedpart
delaMtaphysique,
Paris1923-26-27,
S.J.,Lepoint
Vol. I, 185.Forreply,cf.P. Descoqs,S.J., Thomisme
etSuarzisme,
in: Archives
de
121
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
other side of the coin is that those same creatures are "possible",
Suarez tells us, by extrinsicdenomination fromthe power of God.32
Other examples come fromeconomic, social, and morad realities.
Money, forinstance, becomes the price of a thing,or somethingelse
becomes collateral (pignus
), by extrinsicdenomination.33All contracts
between buyers and sellers, or even those between husbands and
wives, inasmuch as theyproceed fromthe will of the contractingparties, are constituted and are binding by extrinsic denomination.34
Again, the mutual designationsof master and slave, teacher (and student), king (and subject), as well as jurisdiction(ownership) and servitude themselves, reduce to extrinsic denominations.35 Likewise,
fame and honor are ultimatelymatters of extrinsicdenomination.36
And human acts, especially acts commanded in other powers by the
will, are free,moral, good, bad, prohibited,or prescribedby extrinsic
denomination.37
Signs especially arbitrary(ad placitum)signs- speech itself(which,
ofcourse, entails the order thatis syntax),and, in the area of theology,
sacraments,seem all to be mattersof extrinsicdenomination.38Second
intentionsfollowingthe threeoperations of conception,judgment and
inference(e.g. universal, species, genus, subject, predicate, proposition, antecedent, consequent, etc.), have the status of rational relations proximatelyfounded upon extrinsicdenominations.39
whichis onlyextoinnote39,below)aresaidtobe distinct
referred
bya distinction
denominated
"rationis".
trinsically
32Cf.e.g. "... perdenominationem
extrinsecam
a potentia
Dei, ..." Disp.Metaphys.,
a
denominationem
disp.31, sec. 2, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 230); "... perextrinsecam
potentia
agente..." ibid.,disp.43,prol.(p. 633).Alsocf.below,notes128,143,158,
163,164,165,166,174,193,and 194.
33Disp.Metaphys
St.
., disp.30, sec. 5, no. 5 (Vol. 26, p. 87). Suarezacknowledges
De Trinitate
It shouldbe noted,
V, c. 16,as thesourceoftheseexamples.
Augustine,
thatSt. Augustine
doesnotspeakof"extrinsic
denomination"
as such.
however,
34Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54,sec.6, no. 6 (Vol. 26,p. 1040),textinnote192,below.
35Ibid.; alsodisp.39,sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 512);andSuarez,De bonitate
etmalitia
humanorum
actuum
, disp.1, c. 2, no. 19(Vol. 4, p. 285),textin note187,below.
36Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54, sec.4, no. 1 (Vol. 26, p. 1028);ibid.,no. 8 (p. 1030).
37Ibid., disp.19,sec.
5, no.3 (Vol. 25,pp. 711-712);
ibid.,no. 17(p. 716);ibid.,disp.
39,sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 512);disp.54, sec.2, no. 17(p. 1023);andSuarez,De
, . 15,no. 4 (Vol. 5, p. 145).
Legibus,
38Disp.Metaphys
., disp.41,sec.3, nos.1-2(Vol.26,pp.595-596);ibid.,disp.54,sec.
denomination
withrespect
tosacraments,
cf.notes
6, no.6 (p. 1040).Butonextrinsic
54 and208,below.
39Ibid.,disp.6, sec.6, no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 228);sec.7, no.4 (p. 230);disp.54,sec.6,
nos.8-9(Vol. 26,pp. 1040-1041).
Letus note,however,
thatforSuarezsacraments
cannotbe reducedtomerely
extrinsic
on this,cf.notes54 and208,
denominations;
below.
127
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13:15:24 PM
As noted in the last section,thingsmay be denominatedextrinsically inasmuch as they are the objects of knowing powers or their activities.46The most salient case of this is when thingsare designated
known or conceived, thatis to say " objective concepts", fromthe formal concepts to which they are related as objected.47Other instances
are provided by sense powers. Thus, things may be extrinsically
denominatedseen or visible, heard or audible, fromsightand hearing,
whose objects they are.48 In these and other cases of extrinsic
denomination, thingsdesignated are in no way affectedintrinsically.
They are in themselvesthe same before and after.49
is
wherethere
., disp.45,sec.4, no.9 (Vol. 26 pp. 750-751),
Also,seeDisp.Metaphys
an interesting
relation
ofextrinsic
and
denomination
to thereality
(?) ofprimary
exhere,at timesSuarezdoesnotso sharply
Finally
distinguish
secondary
qualities.
trinsic
denomination
from
an imposition
ofnames;cf.e.g. De Legibus,
I, . 2, no. 2,
textin note58,below.
46Cf. in note10,above.
47Cf.esp.Disp.Metaphys
treat., disp.2, sec. 1,no. 1 (Vol. 25,pp.64-65).Forfuller
andtheobjective
mentofthedistinction
theformal
seeJ. P. Doyle,
between
concept,
Suarez
ontheAnalogy
ofBeing
(citedinnote29,above),esp.pp. 224-228.A cluetothe
in theuse ofsignsmaybe detected
whenformal
conroleofextrinsic
denomination
"... non
arecalled"things
concepts
ceptsarecalled"signs"andobjective
signified";
de signisipsis,sedde resignificata,
de conceptibus
sedde
tractamus
formalibus
..." Disp.Metaphys
., disp.29, sec.3, no. 34 (Voi. 26,p. 59).
objectivis
48Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.3, sec.1, no. 7 (Voi. 25,p. 105);ibid.,disp.16,sec.
1,no. 24(p. 574);disp.54,sec.2, no.9 (Voi. 26,p. 1020);anddisp.47,sec. 14,no.
5, textin note50 below.
49Cf."... resutcognita,
velutrepraesentata,
etrepraesenquandoverecognoscitur
illudquodin se habet;quodsolum
tatur,nonhabetaliudesseobjectivum,
praeter
a cognidicitur
actuesseobjectum
talicognitioni
extrinsecam
perdenominationem
tionequae terminatur
ad ipsum,sicutresvisa in esseobjectivo
visus,si
respectu
seu in actuprimo,nihilaliuddicitpraeter
sumatur
in aptitudine,
ipsumessecoloratumautlucidum,
utactuvisa,nihiladdit
quodinse reshabet.Si autemsumatur
nisidenominationem
a visione;..." Disp.Metaphys
extrinsecam
., disp.8, sec.1,no.4
like"known"or"seen",whilethey
(Voi. 25,p. 276).Noteherethatdenominations
tothethings
or
areextrinsic
denominated,
presuppose
aptitudes
(e.g. "knowability"
tobe so denominated.
inthosethings
areultimately
not
Theseaptitudes
"visibility")
ofthosethings.
A fewpointsonthis:(1)
different
from
thebeing(actualorpotential)
Prima
or nottheaptitudes
or
as to whether
of"knowability"
faciethereis question
are reallydifferent
fromthe "similarity"
which,in the instanceof
"visibility"
a totally
"similar"things,
denomination
extrinsic
prevents
(cf.note20, above).For
whichis invarying
foruniversal
can
suchsimilarity,
thefoundation
degrees
concepts,
itself
beeither
actualormerely
., disp.6, sec.2, no.
aptitudinal
(cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
14(Vol. 25, pp. 210-211).(2) The aptitudes
in question
herearenotdifultimately
ferent
from
realessences,
as theyare"apt" to
whichare,in fact,realonlyinasmuch
back
., disp.2, sec.4, no.3 (Vol. 25,p. 88). (3) Referring
exist;cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
ofa scientonote27,above- whileSuarezis ambivalent
oftheunity
onthequestion
tific
sometenuous
denomination
habit,he doesavoidtotalextrinsic
bymaintaining
intheobject(i.e. thescibile)
itself:
cf."Cumergoestsermode objecto
scibili,
aptitude
129
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13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
whichexpresses
thenatureofbeingthrough
thisrelation,
is calledan at(verum),
tribute
orproperty
ofit."84
What must be noticed here is that even though it alone is not constitutiveof the property,nevertheless,an extrinsicdenomination of
the intellectis somehow involved in truth,and it is preciselythiswhich
supplies the distinctionof truthfrombeing as such.85
much the same can be said of the propertyof
Servataproportione,
is
There
the added nuance that in goodness a double exgoodness.86
trinsicdenomination is involved, since beings, in order to be good,
must be true.87But, like truth,the propertyof goodness does not consist in extrinsic denomination alone. Primarily, what goodness
signifies is the intrinsic perfectionof being,88 and what it further
denominates is a certain " suitability'' (convenientia)
or "appetibility"
or
either
for
itself
to
another.90
the
identificationof
(iappetibilitas
),89
By
and
in
the
of
is
secured:
being
goodness re,
reality goodness
by the connotation of suitabilityor appetibilitythe distinctionof goodness and
being in rationedis preserved.92
84"... nonasserimus
solamdenominationem
esseproprietatem,
sedipsamentitatem
subtaliratione
nullanovaperfectio
aut
conceptum.
Quo fitutperhocveriattributum
realisratioinipsoenteexplicetur,
sedsolumdeclaretur
ratioentisper
amplius
ipsamet
ad cognitionem,
... Et,quiahaechabitudo
habitudinem
accidit
quodammodo
ipsienti
utsic,etestaliquomodosaltem
secundum
rationem
illa(quamvissemper
sit
posterior
cumilioconjuncta),
ideoverum,
declarat
naturam
entis,
quodperhanchabitudinem
seuproprietas
attributum
., disp.8, sec.7, no. 36 (Vol.
ejusdicitur."Disp.Metaphys
cf.St. Thomas,De Veritate
25, p. 307). Fora verysimilar
doctrine,
, q. 1, a. 8.
85Disp.Metaphys.
, disp.3, sec. 1, n. 11 (p. 106); ibid.,sec. 2, nos. 3 and 7 (pp.
as a property
ofbeingforSuarez,seeHansSeigfried,
On truth
Wahrheit
und
108-109).
beiSuarez
, Bonn1967,esp. 118-127andp. 130.It maybe notedherethat
Metaphysik
a viewthatwouldmaketranscendental
Suarezrejects
truth
consist
in,orevenformally
a relation
ofreason:"... passioentisrealisnonpotest
inpraedicta
consistere
include,
includere."
relatione,
., disp.8, sec. 7, no. 11
nequeillamformaliter
Disp.Metaphys
(Vol. 25, p. 298).
86Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.10,sec. 1,no. 14(Vol. 25,p. 333);ibid.,no. 20(p. 335).
87Ibid.,disp.3, sec.2, n. 9 (pp.109-110);
ibid.,no. 14(p. Ill); alsodisp.8, prol.(p.
274).
88Ibid.,disp.10,sec.3, no. 10(pp. 349-350).
89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91Thisdistinction
is rational,
witha foundation
in reality
ratiocinatae
);
(i.e. rationis
disp.10,sec. 1, no. 12 (Vol. 25, p. 332). As such,itis enoughto
Disp.Metaphys.,
will(among
thepriority
ofbeingoveritsproperty
ofgoodness,
which
priority
ground
otherthings)permitmathematical
sciencesto prescind
fromgoodness(and from
and to focusuponbeingas quantified;
cf.
demonstrations
finalcausality)
through
seemsallthatis
ibid.,sec.3, nos.19-23(pp.352-353).Alsonotethatsucha distinction
cf.ibid.,disp.
fora (scientific)
inference
a priori
from
oneproperty
toanother;
required
47, sec. 5, no. 3 (Vol. 26, p. 894).
136
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2. The Categories
ofBeing
Tracing its ancestryback to the Liber de sexprincipiistraditionally
ascribed to Gilbert de la Porree (d. 1154), 93 a common opinion in
Suarez' s day was that the last six categories (actio,passio, quando, ubi,
situs, habitus)are nothingmore than extrinsicdenominations.94Suarez
himself, in a number of places, has flatlycontradicted this view.95
Against it, his main argument is that accidents are real beings with
their own intrinsicentity;but it would be impossible forthem to be
such simplyby extrinsicdenomination, because (despite any location
it mighthave under ens reale
) this denomination posits nothingin the
denominated.96
thing
92Cf. Elisabeth
dessittlich
DieMetaphysik
Guten
beiFranzSuarez
Gemmeke,
, Freiburg
hasmuchofvalueon extrinsic
in
denomination
andgoodness
1965,154.Gemmeke
andpp. 171-177.On the
Suarez;see esp. pp. 29-32,p. 89, note145,pp. 151-157,
within
thecontext
of
general
pointbeingmadeinthetextabove,cf.Suarez,speaking
thedistinction
between
theDivineEssenceanditsattributes:
"De transcendentibus
...
entitatem
includunt
velconnotationem
seu expraeter
negationem
aliquamrationis
rationecujus concipiuntur
vero
entitatem.
trinsecam,
tanquamextra
Quidquid
realisineisest,essentiale
estentireali.'' DeDivinaSubstantia
, I, . 11,no.
perfectionis
7 (Vol. 1, p. 35).
93CriticaleditionbyA. Heysse,Liberdesexprincipiis.
in
Gilberto
Porretano
ascriptus,
ettextus
i. W. 1929(revised
character
ofthe
, Munster
Opuscula
1953).On theincorrect
cf.L. Minio-Paluello,
SexPrincipiorum
terza
, in: StudiMedievali,
ascription,
Magister
to Gilbert
in thiscontext,
see Disp.
serie,VI (1965),123-155.ForSuarezreferring
., disp.51, sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 973).
Metaphys
94Cf. Disp.Metaphys
., disp.52, sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 1007),whereSuarezattributes
thisopinion
toFonseca,"5 Metaphys.
c. 15,qu. 7". Cf.Commentariorum
Petri
Fonsecae
InMetaphysicorum
Aristotelis
Libros
, TomiQuatuor
.,
(Coloniae,1615),5 Metaphys
c. 15,q. 7, sec.3 (Vol. 2, col.868); alsoibid.,. 7, q. 2, sec. 3 (cols.435-436).
95Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.52,sec. 1,no. 2 (Vol. 26,p. 1007);ibid.,disp.39,sec.2,
nos.13-14(p. 513);ibid.,disp.51,sec.1,no.25(p. 979),andno.4 (p. 973)wherehe
also attributes
thisviewto St. Thomas:"Unde favethuicsententiae
D. Thomas,
docetomniaultimapraedicamenta
esseextrinsece
quatenusin 2 Metaph.generatim
1 part.,quaest.110,art.3, ait:
Etspecialiter
denominantia,
quodnonnulli
sequuntur.
nonestinpotentia
Mobile
secundum
locum
inquantum
ad aliquidintrinsecum,
sed
hujusmodi,
solum
adaliquid
adlocum.
Idemferehabetquaest.6, de Potent.,
art.
extrinsecum,
scilicet,
dicit:Aliquando
denominatur
abeo,quodestextra
3, et2 cont.Gent.,c. 13,expresse
aliquid
uta locodicitur
essealiquid
alicubi
localemacquiratur
et
; ergocumpermotum
ipsum,
amittatur
D. Thomas,formam
ipsumUbi, apertesentit
ipsiusUbi, esselocumextrinsecum."
as constitutive
On extrinsic
denomination
ofthelastsixcategories,
cf.A.
de la relation
..., esp. c. 20, pp. 426-452.Couplingsucha
Krempel,La doctrine
denomination
withan identification
ofquantity
(based,he says,on modern
physics)
and quality,Krempelhimself
willreducethenumberof realcategories
to three:
andrelation;
substance,
ibid.,pp. 84-85.
quality,
96Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys.,
toa
disp.32,sec. 14(Vol. 26,p. 323).Forwhatamounts
brief
onthispointbya present-day
cf.J. Owens,AnElementary
Christian
Thomist,
reply
Milwaukee
1963,191-192.
Metaphysics,
137
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13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
13:15:24 PM
oftheuniverse
tothecentre
thanthe
plantas itsupperpart,inspiteofitsbeingnearer
: DeAnima,
ed. andcomm.(London,1961),
restoftheplant."SirDavidRoss,Aristotle
cf.Disp.
p. 229(at416a2-5).ForSuarezontherealorderofthepartsoftheuniverse,
., disp.47,sec.1, no. 14(Vol. 26,p. 785);andibid.,disp.51,sec. 1,no. 15
Metaphys
- calldenomination
ofextrinsic
(p. 977).Threemorepoints:(1) Eventheparadigm
- ultimately
"left"or"right"
hasa foundation
intherealsituation
of
ingthecolumn
theright
andleftsideofa manoran animal;ibid.,sec.5, no. 29 (p. 847);onthissee
St.Thomas,InPhysic.
Ill, 1.5(ed. Leon.,n. 15)andibid.V, 1.3(ed. Leon.,n. 8). (2)
hereis questionable
Aristotle's
as intheCategories
inasmuch
, c. 7; 6b 12,he
authority
of relation;cf. Suarez,Disp.
to the category
appearsto reduceposition(0<xi)
Metaphys.,
disp.52,sec.1,no.3 (Vol. 26,p. 1007)andno. 5 (p. 1008),wherehesays
ownopinion.(3) On theuniverse
thatthisis notreallyAristotle's
itself
as animated,
andthisgiving
De CeloII, 2, 285a29-32.
risetoabsolute
cf.Aristote,
directions,
117Disp.Metaphys.,
NotethatSuarez
disp.52,sec.1,no. 11(Vol.26,pp. 1009-1010).
fromintrinsic
situsas an intrinsic
rationis
mode,distinct
regards
placebya distinctio
similar
tothatbetween
actionandpassion;ibid.,no. 9 (p. 1009).
(ratiocinatae)
ne Qf "e<rci
tgjvrcp
ti otovet,
oxatx toioctoc
oiOeai,
0at."
aaOrjai,
7)|),
. 7,6b2-3.ForSuarez's recognition
toAristotle's
ofthedifficulty
attached
Categories,
textandalsoforhisinterpretation,
cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec. 1,nos.5-7(Vol.
26,pp. 783-784)andibid.,sec.4, nos. 17-19(pp. 800-801).
119Cf. "... oovi ioiTpixfj
tcv
Ttti yvo
Boxet
elvat
ti."
aTfj
^ lm<rrr'[Lr'
7tp
7ip
V., c. 15,1021b5-6;cf.Suares,Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47, sec. 1,nos.5 and6 (Vol.
26,p. 783);ibid.,sec.4, nos,17-18(pp. 801-802).
120Forexamples:
intheCategories
hementions:
double,similar,
smaller,
larger,
equal,
he mentions:
double,measurable,
unequal,master,and slave;in theMetaphysics
as among" 7tp
ti."
knowable,
perceptible,
equal,and similar
141
13:15:24 PM
tion", but instead employs the adjectival phrase rcpti, which emphasizes the extrinsiccharacter of a relation.121
Next to be said is that Suarez, followingSt. Thomas Aquinas,122
refuses to reduce relation to a merely extrinsic denomination.123
Neither will he contrariwisereduce extrinsicdenomination to a relation.124Again, an extrinsicdenomination cannot be the foundationof
a real categorical relation.125At the same time, every real relation,
transcendental126as well as categorical, involves an extrinsic
denomination of its term.127 Conversely, every real extrinsic
denomination involves a real relation, either categorical or
and real extrinsicdenominationsare foundedupon
transcendental,128
121On partofwhatis involved
relahere,cf.Cajetan:"... ly "relatio"significai
tionem
utconceptam
et nonutexercitam,
secunpropter
quodad aliudnondicitur
"
4
*
dumilludnomen,.... Lyvero relativumsignificat
relationem
utexercendam
magis
tiamenimquandamimportt
ad referendum.
quamut exercitam;
poten
Ly autem
'
"ad aliquid' relationem
utexercitam:
ipsamsignificai
importt
siquidem
respectum
ut terminatur
ad aliud,quodest,ut sic liceatloqui,relationis
tuncsiexercitium,
exercitio
cumad aliudrespicere
quidemrelatioinveroet proprio
ponitur
ponitur."
Commentaria
inPraedicamenta
Aristotelis
, ed. M.-H. Laurent,O.P. (Romae1939),p.
111.
122Cf.e.g. Cont.Gent.
ofcategories
inthe
II, . 13.AlsonoteSt. Thomas'grouping
courseofcommenting
onthetextofAristotle:
InPhys.
Ill, lect.5 (ed. Leon.n. 15)and
InMetaphys.
V, lect.9 (ed. Cathalan. 892).
123Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47, sec. 11,no. 8 (p. 833);cf.ibid.,sec.2, no. 22 (p. 792)
andibid,
ysec. 1, no. 11(p. 784).
124Cf. "... si essetdenominado
ut sicnonessetrespectiva,
extrnseca,
quia potius
essetveluti
formae
extrinsecae
ad subjectum
denominatum,
applicatio
quamhabitudo
ad terminm
extrinsecum."
ibid.,disp.47, sec. 2, no. 11 (p. 789).Thisis
subjecti
foundconfirming
an argument
infavor
ofa modaldistinction
a realrelation
between
anditssubjectas wellas itsfoundation.
Suarezdisagrees
withthemodaldistinction
buthedoesseemtoacceptthevalidity
ofthepointmadeinitsconfirmation.
doctrine,
125Cf.e.g. "... ratiomensurae
relanonestperse aptaad fundandam
quantitativae
denominatio
..." Disp.Metaphys
tionemrealem,cumsolumsitextrnseca
rationis,
.,
denomination
of"measure"here,
disp.47,sec. 10,no. 15(p. 825).On theextrinsic
cf.notes193and 195,below.
126ForSuarezontranscendental
thecategory
as distinct
from
thosewithin
relations,
ofrelation,
cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47,sec.3, nos.10-13andsec.4, nos.1-21(Vol.
VI, . 6, no. 24 (Vol. 2, pp. 663-664).
26, pp. 797-805);also:De Angelis
127Cf. "... relatio
suaessentia
sinealiacausalitate,
solumquiaex intrnseca
respicit
remvisamsinevera
iliumdenominat
Sicutvisiodenominat
terminantem.
terminm,
undesicutnon
sedex eo solum,quodestcumtaliintrnseca
causalitate,
habitudine;
ita nonpriusnaturaest quam
priusnaturaest quam habeatillamhabitudinem,
denominei
visum."Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47, sec. 16,no. 25 (Vol. 26, p.
objectum
to in notes101and 126,above.
854); alsosee thetextsreferred
128Cf. Disp.Metaphys
disp.54, sec. 2, no. 10,textin note45, above.Alsosee the
nowabout
texts,
question
e.g.,onactioninnotes14and 101above.Thereis another
from
as possible
thepowerofGod(cf.note32,
theextrinsic
denomination
ofcreatures
142
13:15:24 PM
Suarezseemstoadmita transcendental
relation
on the
above).Evenhere,at times,
"
ex parte
partofGod (cf.e.g.: Respondeo,... nonpossetolliillampossibilitatem
a Deo positiva
ac subindesciencraturarum,
quintollatur
omnipotentiae,
perfectio
tiae,et totiusdiviniesse." De Trinitate,
IX, . 6, no. 20 [Vol. 1, p. 740]andDisp.
atother
Suarez
., disp.30,sec.16,no.42 [Vol.26,p. 1971).Generally
times,
Metaphys
is moreorthodox,
all transcendental
relations
denying
(and,ofcourse,allcategorical)
inGod(cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47,sec.4, no.4 [Vol.26,p. 800]).Suarez'sambivalence
onthishasbeennotedbyDiegode Alarcon,
"Ex quibus
S.J.(1585-1634):
nonnulli
docentomnipotentiam
Auctoribus
divinamrealiter
referri
perrelationem
ad quamlibet
transcendentalem
adeoutqualibet
minima
etiam
creaturam;
deficiente,
... etaliquandoitasensit
P. Suarez:namlib.9 de Trinitate,
c. 6,
ipseDeusdeficieret
n. 20,fatetur
deficiente
alicuiuscreaturae
necessario
defecturam
in Deo
possibilitate
ettotius
essedivini:oppositum
tamenvidetur
perfectionem
omnipotentiae,
positivam
in Metaphys.
docuisse
d. 30, sec. 15,n. 26 etlocissupracitatis,
ubicummultis
aliis
docetnullamessein Deo relationem
realemintrinsecam
ad creaturas."Prima
Pars
Scholasticae
(Lugduni,1633),Tract.II, disp.2, cap. 2 (p. 96a),as citedby
Theologicae
N. J. Wells,Sttarez
Truths
ontheEternal
LVIII
, PartII, in: The ModernSchoolman,
ofSuarezhavingchanged
his
(1981),171,n. 120.Prof.Wellshasraisedthequestion
mindonthispoint.Butforanother
cf.Disp.Metaphys.
resolution,
, disp.47,sec.3, no.
8 (Vol. 26,p. 796),wherethedivineomnipotence
is saidtobe relative
secundum
dici,
itorexplainitotherwise:
becausewecannot
conceive
"Sic enimdivinam
omnipotenesserelativum
tiamdicimus
secundum
necexdici,... quia illamnonconcipimus,
nisinonconcomitantia
ad quodestin potentia,
et permodum
alterius,
plicamus,
habentis
habitudinem
ad illud.";also: "Ut in exemplo
Dei, propositode potentia
babiliusestnonincludere
etiamtranscendentalem,
etiamsi
relativa
secunrespectum
dumdiciappelletur.
nonestidemquodrelatio
dicitantum,
Igiturrelatiosecundum
..." ibid.,no.9 (p. 797).ForSuarezbriefly
transcendentalis;
uponthesubtouching
sistent
relations
thePersons
whichconstitute
oftheTrinity,
cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.
47, sec.4, no. 21 (Vol. 26, p. 805).
129Ibid.:alsocf.ibid..disp.47,sec. 1, no. 12(Vol. 26,p. 784)andno. 14(p. 785).
130Cf.e.g. "... sicenimnaturam
esseabstractam,
seuuniversaliter
non
conceptam,
additnaturae,nisiessequoddamconveniens
illiperextrinsecam
denominationem,
Sicutessevisumvelessecognitum
nonestaliquod
quodesseobjectivam
appellatur.
esse reale additumrebus,nec formaliter
in relationerationis,sed in
consistit
denominatione
ab actuvidendivelcognoscendi,
proveniente
superquampotestintellectus
fabricare
..." Disp.Metaphys
relationem
rationis,
., disp.6, sec. 6, no. 10
denomination
(Vol. 25, p. 228).On occasion,Suarezseemsto saythatan extrinsic
can be a foundation
foronlya relation
ofreason;cf. "Ab ilioautemesse,quod
inDeo habent,
creaturae
sedhaecsolumestdenominatio
denominantur
excognitae,
trnseca
inillis,solumque
essepotest
fundamentum
alicuiusrelationis
rationis."
Ibid.,
thepossible
of
disp.30,sec. 15,no. 27(Vol. 26,p. 178).Notice,however,
ambiguity
the"solumque"
, as wellas ofour"only",here.
143
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and otheritemsobserved
in Suarez's use of
IV. Someconventions
extrinsic
denomination
The following catalog of conventions and items observed in
Suarez' s use of extrinsic denomination is not as complete or as
systematicas I would like it. Certainly, it is not finad.Nevertheless,I
thinkit does provide insightsinto Suarez's philosophy. Moreover, in
view of Suarez's place in history,such insights should help also in
understanding other medieval and post-medieval philosophies.131
Therefore,withoutadded comment here, let me say that forSuarez:
1. Every extrinsicdenomination involves: (a) a thingdenominated
), (b) a form denominating {formadenominans),() a
{res denominata
union, disposition, coordination or relation {habitudo)between the
thing denominated and the form denominating, and (d) the actual
denominationitself.Examples are: of(a) a wall or a man, of(b) the act
of seeing (visto)or a garment,of (c) the relationof seeing to the wall or
the placing of the garment around the man, and of (d) seen or
clothed.132
131Mr. DarylWennemann,
hasbrought
at St. LouisUniversity,
a graduate
student
after
Suarezhave
a number
ofplacesinwhichmodern
tomyattention
philosophers
de
Meditationes
cf.:(1) Descartes:
denomination.
Forsomeofthese,
extrinsic
mentioned
continens
, VI, (ed. A.T., t. VII, p. 85); (2) Spinoza:Appendix
cogitata
philosophiae
prima
Vol. I, p. 246);ibid.,parsII, cap.2 (p. 252);
, parsI, cap.6 (ed. Gebhardt,
metaphysica
demonstrata
Ethica
ordine
, parsII, def.4 (Vol. II, p. 85); ibid.
, parsII, prop,
geometrico
Def. xlviii,explic.(p. 203); Korte
xliii,scholium
(p. 124); ibid.,parsIII, Affect.
endeszefs
Welstand
vanGod,deMensch
, Deel I, cap. 2 (ed. VlotenetLand:
Verhandeling
Emendatone
tatus
deIntellectus
(VlotenetLand;Vol. 1,
Hagae,1914;Vol. 4, p. 14); Trac
Vol. IV, pp. 506and513);
(ed. Gerhardt,
pp. 21 and31); (3) Leibniz:De ipsanatura
essais
sur
realia
abimaginariis
Demodo
(Vol.VII, p. 321);Nouveaux
distinguendi
phaenomena
l'entendement
, II, c. 25,n. 5 (Vol.V, p. 211);ibid.,. 27,. 3 (p. 214);ibid.,IV, . 6, .
deadinventorum
4 (pp. 381-383);Primae
veritates
pp. 519-521);Specimen
(ed. Couturat,
and
Vol.VII, p. 311).In someofthese,
naturae
arcanum
mirandis
(ed. Gerhardt,
generalis
denominations
areanyabsolutely
extrinsic
other,
places,Leibnizhasdeniedthatthere
The
alsocf.FranzBrentano
inthings.
(1838-1917),
Comingup intothe20thcentury,
andN. Guterman,
TheHague1981,25-26,
tr.R. M. Chisholm
oftheCategories,
Theory
94-95,103,153-155,156-159,171,and 174.
132Cf. e.g. "... omniailia reveraita suntin re, sicutcognoscuntur,
scilicetres
denominaet illa qualiscunque
unio complens
formadenominans,
denominata,
tionem,
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.54,sec.2,no. 14(Vol.
quaepotiusestrealishabitudo."
esthomo,verbigratia,
estvestisipsa:subjectum
26,p. 1021);"Formaigitur
qui inindumenti
iliomodo,
seuadjacentia
duitur;uniohicnonestalia,nisicircumpositio
conseutegumentum
estad ornamentm,
subjecti
quodvestitur;
qui accommodatus
indutum."
velincomplexe,
autemest totum
cretum
Ibid.,disp.
hoc,homovestitus,
53, sec. 1, no. 3 (p. 1012);also,cf.ibid.,disp.16,sec. 1, no. 24,(Vol. 25,p. 574).
videtur,
quodindenominatione
JohnofSt.Thomas:"Sedverius
Compareandcontrast
seu apet adiacentia
istaconcurrunt
duo,scilicet
ipsa formaut ratiodenominans,
144
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facetsand many roles to play. Among these, some that I have treated
remain open to much deeper and more detailed discussion. Others,
which I have barely touched, offerthe prospect of almost virgin territoryforhistorians of philosophy.
For random examples, I think of sign theory,language, and communication, including a consideration of teaching, along the lines of
St. Augustine's linguisticconcern in his De Magistro.I furtherthinkof
morality,moving out especially fromPlato's question of whetherthe
pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is (intrinsically)holy, or
holy (extrinsically)because it is beloved,by the gods.205In a similar
vein, theory of art comes to mind with its ancient question: Is the
beautiful in things themselves, or is it merely in the eye of the
beholder? Moving back into theoreticalareas, I thinkonce more of the
status of "the possibles" as extrinsicallydenominated fromthe power
of God.206 Not entirelyunconnected with this are problems regarding
the foundation and character of mathematics, as well as of "intermediate sciences' ' such as astronomy, music and optics. In ways
that I have alluded to in notes above, there are questions here, in a
periodjust priorto Newton and Leibniz, about the absolute or relative
characters of time and space, as well as of local motion itself.
In the area of metaphysicsundergirdingtheology,I thinkof knowing and naming God in termsderived fromcreatures, as well as of the
very designation of the "supernatural" itself,involving an extrinsic
denomination fromthe natural. In line with this last, I am intrigued
(especially recallingtheAd MajoremDei Gloriammottoof theJesuits) by
connectionsbetween extrinsicdenomination and the extrinsicgloryof
nonestresipsa,quae ad subjecsignificatili-.
Quodveropervocemillamsignificatur,
autquicquidilludsit,quodinter
remillametsubjectum
tumrefertur,
sedordopotius,
intercedit.
SicdicitArist.ex&tv,
quodbauddubie
quodad decimam
Categ.pertinet,
externa
denominatio
est,nonesseeumqui vestemhabet, vestemillam,sed
Illudveroquemadmodum
nonestomnino
xaltooe'xovro
ttjvlafjTa.
eafjTO,
[
nihil,itaquoquenonestveraresautEns reale,sedmediumquippiaminterEns et
LibriDuo.OpusPosthumum
nihil."Franconis
Institutionum
Metaphysicarum.
Burgersdici,
textcf.
1640),Lib. I, . 4, th. 7 (pp. 28-29).ForAristotle's
(LugduniBatavorum
V, . 20, 1022b7-8.
Metaphysics
205" atovcmatovlaTivcptelTat
oaiovaTiv;
tmotg)vecov,
r oti cpieTai
ofPlato'squeswhenhe writes
9E-10A.A. Koyreis scarcely
Euthyphro
exagerrating
whichbecamelaterthecruxofthe
tion:"This,bytheway,is a verydifficult
problem
NewYork1960,
Plato
medieval
Christian
, tr.L. Rosenfield,
philosophy."
Discovering
58, n. 6a.
206Cf. esp.notes32, 128,and 143,above.
158
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God as the end of man and, indeed, as the end of all creation.207Then
I think of sacraments, questions of effectsproceeding ex opereoperato
,
the Real Presence of Christ in the Euch)rist, or the realityof the marriage bond. Not far offare issues of the realityof rightsand duties,
contracts between buyers and sellers, and ownership itself. But
perhaps what most interestsme here goes beyond Suarez, into the
17thcenturyProtestantphilosophyand theologyinfluencedby him.208
It goes, for example, to the role of extrinsic denomination in
4
understandingjustification as a cloaking over" with the merits of
Christ, or in understandingvarious denials of the Real Presence. Of
course, Suarez himselfrejecteddoctrineslike these: but he did see how
they involved extrinsic denomination.209The thing to notice is that
such doctrines, with their involvement made explicit after Suarez,
represent more and more a denial of the Ding an sich, in a theology
which has a bi-lateral relationshipwith philosophy.
In fact,all of the issues which I have mentionedhere, and numerous
others besides, have been treated in differentdegrees by Suarez and
his 17th century successors, both Catholic and Protestant. Most of
that treatment,however, is almost virgin territoryfor present day
historians. Like some great philosophical Indies, it now lies in wait for
207Cf. "... quodenimDeus sitid cujusgratiaresfit,nonestaliquidintrinsecum
in
Dei a rebusipsisdesumpta."
extrnseca
rebus,nequeinDeo ipso,sedestdenominatio
., disp.23,sec.4, no. 3 (Vol. 25,p. 859);alsocf.Suarez,Deoratione
, I,
Disp.Metaphys
. 14,nos.5 and6 (Vol. 14,pp. 56-57),esp.no. 6, wherehemakesa distinction
betweentheextrinsic
gloryofGod and thatoftheSaints:"Respondeodifferentiam
Dei etSanctorum;
quiaDeo ex
quamdamconsideran
posseinterextrinsecam
gloriam
nihilintrnseca
aut
accrescit,
gloriaextrnseca
nequeutilitas
aliqua,neccommoditas,
AtveroSanctis,etiamChristi
denominatio.
sedsolaextrnseca
humanitati,
voluptas,
velsaltem
extrnseca
nascitur
ex gloriaetclaritate
semper
aliquaintrinseca
perfectio,
Thismayprompt
another
lookat note148,above.
actalegaudiumaccidentale."
208On this,cf.esp. M. Wundt,Diedeutsche
des17.Jahrhunderts
, TbSchulmetaphysik
enla
La proyeccin
sobre
deunagranmetafisica
, o Surez
Europa
ingen1939,andJ. Iriarte,
delosdiasdelbarocco
, in: Razny Fe 138(1948),229-265.
filosofia
209Cf. e.g. "Primusenimerrorcavendusesthaereticorum
dicentium
nostraopera
in se, sed constitui
nonhaberemeritum
formaliter
in esse meritorio
permeritum
ChristiUlisapplicatum,
mediantefide.Sicutenimdicunthominem
fierijustum
denominatione
tantumextrnseca
perapplicationem
justitiaeChristi... sic dicere
meritum
nonessein ipsisintrinsece,
sed esseipsum
operumnostrorum
potuerunt
meritum
Christi
..." Demerito
, . 19,no. 2 (Vol. 10,p. 116);cf.alsoibid.,esp.nos.5,
Degratia,
lib.6, c. 1,no. 1(Vol.9, p. 2); ibid.,lib.7,c. 7 (pp.
12,14,16(pp. 117-123);
In Primam
cf.D. Banez(1528-1604),
Partem,
observation,
qu.
130-144).Fora similar
est
observanda
6, art.4 (ed. Urbano,Madrid1934),p. 194:"Doctrinahujusarticuli
sedsolum
homines
essebonosnonbonitate
contraLutheranos,
inhaerente,
quivolunt
Cf. alsonote54, above.
bonitate
etjustitiaChristi
extrnseca."
159
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its Columbus. And when that man comes, he may well discover in its
vast expanse much more than a prevenience of Kant's Copernican
revolution.
Saint Louis, Missouri
SaintLouis University
160
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