Vivarium

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31
1993

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01:49:48 AM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXI (1993)

J.E.Murdochand
J.M.M.H.Thijssen

Introduction

StefanoCaroti

Oresmeon Motion(Questiones
III, 2-7)
superPhysicam,

EdithDudleySylla

and
Commentaries
Aristotelian
Parisian
The
Change:
Scientific
on theCause ofthe
Nominalists
NaturalMotionofInanimate
Bodies

37

EdwardGrant

JeanBuridanandNicole Oresme
onNaturalKnowledge

84

AndrGoddu

Connotative
Conceptsand
Mathematics
in Ockham's
NaturalPhilosophy

106

GeorgeMolland

RogerBacon and theHermetic

inMedievalScience
Tradition

140

WilliamR. Newman

TheCorpuscularTheoryofJ.B.
VanHelmontand itsMedieval
Sources

161

the
Aquinasandsupposition:
limitations
and
oflogic
possibilities
in divinis1

193

HenkJ.M.Schoot

ThomasSullivan

Benedictine
MastersoftheUniversity
ofParis intheLate MiddleAges:
226
PatternsofRecruitment

WilliamC. Charronand
JohnP. Doyle

On theSelfRefuting
Statement
"Thereis no Truth":A Medieval
Treatment

241

Reviews

267

Books Received

275

Announcement

Institut
de Rechercheetd'Histoiredes
Textes(Paris) Constantijn
Huygens
278
Instituut
(La Haye)

01:49:48 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Introduction

J. E. MURDOCH &J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN

The essays collected in this special issue of Vivarium

provide a view
of contemporaryscholarship in the historyof late medieval science.
The authors, all distinguished scholars in the history of medieval
science, have been asked to present the result of their own current
research. Although no specific theme was imposed upon the contributors,their articles all explore topics that fall within the area of
natural philosophy, rather than mathematics, astronomy, optics, or
medicine, to mention only a few of the other branches of medieval
science that have recentlyreceived attention.
Seen froman historiographiepoint of view, the authors here collected have been ' 'working the veins" that had been opened, on the
one hand, by Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), and followed,among others,
by Eduard Dijksterhuis (1892-1965), Anneliese Maier (1905-1971),
and Marshall Clagett (1916- ), and, on the other hand, by Lynn
Thorndike (1882-1965), and Dame Frances Yates (1899-1981). 1
To begin withDuhem, he was firmlyconvinced thatthe usual view
of science in the Middle Ages separated by a deep abyss from the
4'new science' ' of the
early modern period was totallywrong-headed.2
In this way he not only helped to establish the historiographyof
medieval (and Renaissance) science as a legitimate intellectual
endeavor, but the work he had done in erasing this "deep abyss" set
a canon of research topics for subsequent historiansof kne medieval
science.3
1 Thisfigure
ofspeechis borrowed
from
D. B. Durant,Nicole
Oresme
andtheMedieval
Science
16(1941),168,whoapplieditsolelytoPierre
, in: Speculum,
Origins
ofModern
Duhem.
2 P. Duhem,Etudes
surLeonard
deVinci
Le systme
dumonde.
, 3 vols.,Paris1906-1913;
Histoire
desdoctrines
dePlaton
Copernic
, 10 vols.,Paris1913-1959.
cosmologiques
3 SeeJ. E. Murdoch,
Pierre
Duhem
andtheHistory
andPhilosophy
Science
ofLateMedieval
intheLatinWest
difilosofia
medievale
e novecento
, in: Glistudi
, eds.R. Imbachand
fraotto
A. Maier,Roma 1991,253-302fora critical
ofDuhem'scontribution
assessment
toandinfluence
on thehistoriography
oflatemedieval
inthe
science.See alsoScience
Middle
1978,vii-ix.
Ages,ed. D. C. Lindberg,
Chicago-London
1

01:49:54 AM

One ofthe earliestto appreciate what Duhem had accomplishedwas

E. J. Dijksterhuis,whose 1924 Val en worpcontinued to focus on subjects thatDuhem had renderedcanonic, such as projectilemotion, the
acceleration of bodies in freefall, and the intensionand remissionof
forms.4
Over the years, Anneliese Maier and Marshall Clagett had each in
their own way enlarged the nucleus of topics on Duhem' s research
program, although once again the focal point of theirwork remained
substantiallyDuhemian. Thus, in his 1959 Scienceof Mechanicsin the
MiddleAges, Clagett divided his subject into medieval statics- a subject Duhem had also treated in his earlier Les originesde la statique
medieval kinematicsand medieval dynamics, under which rubricshe
ever so more fullyand adequately investigatedthe Duhemian topics
of the theoryof uniformacceleration, the latitude of forms,the continuation of projectile motion, and the free fall of bodies.5
Somewhat earlier, in the five volumes of her Studienzur Natur, Anneliese Maier had examined many of
philosophiederSptscholastik
the same Duhemian topics, also adding appreciably to his analysis of
such subjects as infinityand continuity,the nature of motion, time,
and space.6 Moreover, Maier emphasized the importanceof the intellectual contextin which late medieval scientificideas were developed,
and in this way came to realize more clearly than Duhem that the
accomplishments of late medieval science were of a philosophical
4 E. J. Dijksterhuis,
totdegeschiedenis
Eenbijdrage
Valenworp.
dermechanica
vanAristoteles
totNewton
1924.OftenDijksterhuis
Latinoftheprimary
, Groningen
gavetheoriginal
habitwasto translate
themonly
texts,whichDuhemhad not;Duhem's consistent
intoFrench.
SeealsoE.J. Dijksterhuis,
Demechanisering
vanhetwereldbeeld
, Amsterdam
as TheMechanization
Picture
1950,translated
, Oxford
by C. Dikshoorn
oftheWorld
1961,whichreliesupontheworkofDuhem,Maier,and Clagett.
5 M. Clagett,TheScience
intheMiddle
MadisonWI 1959(herecited
ofMechanics
Ages,
to thesecondeditionof1961),andNicole
Oresme
andtheMedieval
according
Geometry
andMotions
s position
in thehistoriography
of
, MadisonWI 1968.Clagett'
ofQualities
scienceis outlined
medieval
in theIntroduction
toMathematics
anditsApplications
to
Science
andNatural
intheMiddle
inHonor
, eds.
Philosophy
Ages.Essays
ofMarshall
Clagett
E. GrantandJ. E. Murdoch,
1987,ix-xii.
Cambridge
6 A. Maier,Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik
, 5 vols.,Roma 1949-1958,
hereafter
to thetitlesoftheseparate
citedaccording
MitandAusgehendes
volumes,
telalter.
zurGeistesgeschichte
des14.Jahrhunderts,
Gesammelte
3 vols.,Roma1964Aufstze
1977.Maier'sposition
in thehistoriography
oflatemedieval
in
scienceis evaluated
Sicence
, in: Studisul
J. E. Murdochand E. Sylla,A. MaierandtheHistory
ofMedieval
XIV secolo
in memoria
Maier
di Anneliese
, eds. A. Maierand A Paravicini
Bagliani,
Roma1981,7-13,Murdoch,
Pierre
Duhem
Maiere la
, 283-6,andA. Maier,Anneliese
dellanatura
in: Imbachand Maier,Glistudi
tardoscolastico,
, 303-30.
filosofia
2

01:49:54 AM

nature, thatmedieval "scientists" were engaged in a reflectionon the

ontological principles and methods of one's knowledge of nature.7
To turn to the other twentieth-century
historiographietrend in
the
medieval
wealth
of
material
unearthed by Lynn
science,
treating
Thorndike caused historiansof science to reconsiderthe role of magic
in the scientificenterprise.8Thorndike showed that magic formedan
importantand integralpart of medieval thoughtand experience, and
that it was freeof the innuendos of backwardness withwhich his contemporariesassociated magic, and above all had importantconnections with the experimental tradition in medieval science. All the
major intellectualsof the Middle Ages, oftenthe same ones who were
involved in more "respectable" areas of medieval science, had
addressed themselvesto problems that belonged to magic, that is, to
stanproblems that according to nineteenth-and twentieth-century
dards were considered non-scientificand irrational. Thorndike's
monumentalworkput into question the tacit assumption of historians
of science thatmagic and science were two completelyseparated, even
opposed enterprises, that magic was pseudo-science and stood to
science as the irrational to the rational. His suggestion that the
occultisttradition,i.e. the alchemical, astrologicaland magical beliefs,
remained an integralpart of the intellectualresourcesof the medieval
world of learning was taken up, reinforcedand transferredinto the
seventeenth century by Frances Yates.9 She maintained that
"hermeticism" and the rise of modern science shared common
ground in that both were manifestationsof the same intellectual
impulses. The so-called Yates thesis has had a great impact on the
historiographyofearly modern science. It lead to an explorationof the
significance of hermetism understood by Yates and by some
seventeenth-century authors as occultism- for the Scientific
Revolution.10
7 See forexampleMaier,Ausgehendes
Mittelalter
, 2: 457, whereshe speaksof a
"Reflexion
berdie Grundlagen
unddie Methoden
derNaturerkenntnis."
8 L. Thorndike,
A History
8 vols., New York
Science,
ofMagicandExperimental
1923-1953.
9 F. Yates,Giordano
Bruno
andtheHermetic
Tradition
, London1964,whereshealso
referred
to theworkof Thorndike.
BeforeYates,theimportance
of theso-called
hermetic
hadbeenarticulated
tradition
sullamagia
, and
byE. Garinin Considerazioni
nelpensiero
del rinascimento
in his Medioevo
e
, bothrepublished
Magiae astrologia
Rinascimento
Bacone:
Dalla magiaallascienza
, Bari1954,and by P. Rossi,Francesco
,
Torino1957.
10FortheimpactoftheYatesthesison thehistoriography
ofearlymodern
science
see Reason,
andMysticism
in theScientific
Revolution
, eds. M. L. Righini
Experiment
3

01:49:54 AM

The articlesin thisvolume can all be considered as explorationsand

extensions of research topics inaugurated by Duhem-DijksterhuisMaier-Clagett or Thorndike-Yates, respectively. Stefano Caroti
discusses Nicholas Oresme's theoryof motion within the contextof
John Buridan's and Albert of Saxony's views. Both the topic of the
nature of motion and the intellectual frameworkof the " Parisian
school" were already on Duhem's and Maier's canonic roster.11New
in Carotis approach, however, is that he is the firstto systematically
on thePhysics.The rediscoveryof the
focus on Oresme's Commentary
of
this
text, preserved in the manuscript Sevilla, Bibi.
unique copy
Colombina 7-6-30, was announced in 1962 by Guy Beaujouan.12
Although Maier mentionsOresme's Physicsin her later publications,
she never really included it in her discussions.13Caroti's analysis and
devoted to motion fill an
partial edition of the cluster of quaestiones
in
not
with
importantgap
scholarship,
only
respectto Oresme's own
views, but also with regard to the complex relationsbetween Oresme
and the other thinkerswho were once singled out by Duhem and
Maier as the leaders of the Parisian school, namely John Buridan,
Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen.
Edith Sylla also takes up a theme that was previouslydiscussed by
Duhem, Dijksterhuis,Maier, and Clagett, namely the problem of the
natural motion of inanimate bodies (i.e., freefall and gravitation).14
Her point of view, however, is completelydifferentfromthat of these
two scholars. Besides presentingthe views ofJohn Buridan, Albertof
BonelliandW. R. Shea,London1975,and morerecently
B. Vickers,
Introduction
,
in: Occult
andScientific
intheRenaissance
Mentalities
, ed. B. Vickers,
1984,
Cambridge
Natural
andoccultism
inearly
modern
science
1-55,andB. P. Copenhaver,
, hermetism
,
magic
in: Reappraisals
Revolution
andR. S. Westman,
, eds. D. C. Lindberg
oftheScientific
Natural
forthe
1990,261-303.Copenhaver,
, 280-90is fundamental
Cambridge
magic
We haveusedtheterm"occultism"
in Copenhaver's
sense.The term
terminology.
"hermetism"
toCopenhaver,
beusedtoindicate
anaffiliation
with
should,
according
thehermetic
corpusoftexts.Kepler,in a muchquotedpassagein theHarmonies
of
theCosmos
usedit as a termofderision,
to discredit
theworkofRobertFludd.
11See, forexample,Duhem,Etudes
und
, 3: 388-99,A. Maier,Zwischen
Philosophie
Mechanik
Mechanization
, Roma 1958,134-8,and Dijksterhuis,
, 185.
,2 G. Beaujouan,
Manuscrits
mdivaux
dela Bibliothque
Colombine
deSeville
,
scientifiques
in: Proceedings
ontheHistory
Ithaca
1962, Paris
oftheXthInternational
Congress
ofScience,
1964,633.
13A. Maier,ZweiGrundprobleme
derscholastischen
, Roma 1968,358,
Naturphilosophie
382-285,and 389.
14Duhem,tudes
Lesystme,
8: 169-227,
Valenworp,
, 3: 23-34,309-314,
Dijksterhuis,
Science
A. Maier,Ander
60-88,Mechanization,
109-15,Clagett,
, 541-83,andespecially
Grenze
vonScholastik
undNaturwissenschaft
, Roma 1952,143-83.
4

01:49:54 AM

Saxony and (John) Marsilius of Inghen,15her paper also serves the

purpose of providing importantnew material for the study of conwithinthe Aristoteliantraditionof natural
tinuityand transformation
Her
examination
of the mutual influenceof the different
philosophy.16
commentarieson the Physicsby John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and
(John) Marsilius of Inghen, gives an interestingview on the modus
operandiof these authors. Probably, the Parisians took each other's
commentaries,often available in several differentredactions, as the
point of departurefortheirown solutions. At times it is impossible to
establish who has been copying whom. In addition, Sylla studies the
esteem these fourteenth-century
authors held in the eyes of Nicoletto
Vernia and Girolamo Pico, thus giving a Renaissance perspectiveon
the medieval Aristoteliantradition.The close intertwiningof the differentcommentaries on the Physicsso meticuously documented by
Sylla, corroboratesearlier observations by Stefano Caroti concerning
the commentarieson the De generatione
et corruptione
produced by the
Parisian school.17Perhaps we have here come across one of the factors
that may explain the element of unity within Aristotelianism.
Edward Grant's paper centerson two of Duhem's " champions" Oresme and Buridan- but the issue he discusses is entirelyMaierian:
the methodology of science.18 Grant compares Buridan' s and
Oresme 's approaches to scientificknowledge, his analysis focusingon
the possibility of acquiring certain knowledge of nature through
experience. During the Middle Ages, the discussion of the possibility
of 4'natural knowledge" was associated with views on causality and
induction and with Aristotle's remarkson the requirementsof scientificknowledge in the Posterior
AnalyticsII, 19. Buridan was heralded
Maier
of
as
the
defender
by
experience and induction against the

15Theidentity
ofJohnMarsilius
butheshould,
inanycase,not
Inghenisunknown,
beconfounded
withMarsilius
ofInghen.See alsoEdithSylla'sarticle
inthisvolume,
notes16 and 17.
16See J. M. M. H. Thijssen,SomeReflections
on Continuity
and Transformation
of
inMedieval
Aristotelianism
Natural
e studi
, in: Documenti
(andRenaissance)
Philosophy
sullatradizione
filosofica
2 (1991),503-28fora recent
tointerpret
medievale,
attempt
theunityand flexibility
oftheAristotelian
in naturalphilosophy.
tradition
17See inparticular
S. Caroti,Da Buridano
a Marsilio
diInghen:
la tradizione
della
parigina
discussione
dereactione
, in: Medioevo,15 (1989),172-233,and also hispaperin this
volume.
18SeeA. Maier,Metaphysische
dersptscholastischen
, Roma
Hintergrnde
Naturphilosophie
Mittelalter
1955,384-97,andAusgehendes
, 2: 367-428.
5

01:49:54 AM

attacks of Nicholas of Autrecourt.19This picture seems to be corroboratedin Grant's study.One of the resultsofhis comparison is that
Buridan had greaterfaithin the reliabilityof natural knowledge than
Oresme, who time and again emphasizes that knowledge of the
natural world, acquired through sense experience and induction, is
unreliable and uncertain.
The last essay which addresses a topic that was inherited from
Duhem and Maier is by Andr Goddu. He gives an original interpretationof the application of mathematicsin medieval science. Since
the studies of Duhem, Maier, Clagett, and Dijksterhuisinvestigation
of medieval attempts to measure all kinds of phenomena, such as
change, and powers or capacities, has become standardin comprehensive treatmentsof late medieval science. The problem has always been
how medieval effortsof mathematicizingor measuringin natural philosophy should be evaluated. Recent historiographyhas suggestedthat
the application of mathematics was a mode of argumentation, a
4
specific 'linguistic" technique, not unlike the semantic techniques
that were applied in natural philosophy.20Goddu carries this suggestion a bit further.Through an ingenious analysis of Ockham's theory
of connotation, he illustratesthat late medieval philosophers indeed
44
thought of mathematics as a language, as a symbolic formalism
'
capable of many interpretations.' The application of mathematicsto
certain physical problems was unrelated to any specificcommitments
concerningthe status of mathematical objects; mathematicalanalysis
was not determined by ontological considerations. Goddu' s suggestions may become the startingpointfor a reassessmentof the traditionally perceived separation between the analytic Parisian school
and the mathematical Oxford school in late medieval science.21
The essays by George Molland and William Newman pursue the
broader implicationsof the work of Thorndike and Yates on the role
of occultismin science. Molland' s paper examines two specificaspects
of the hermetic tradition, namely, its doxographic role and its
theoretical role, i.e., its conceptual significance in providing new
theories and explanations.22Renaissance thinkershave usually been
19ButseeJ. M. M. H. Thijssen,
andNicholas
onCausality
JohnBuridan
ofAutrecourt
andInduction
ofthisinterpretation.
, in: Traditio,43 (1987),237-55forcriticism
20See Murdoch,
Pierre
Duhem
, 293-99.
21Cf. A. Maier,Die Vorlufer
im14.Jahrhundert,
Galileis
Roma 1949,3-4.
22See Copenhaver,
Natural
, 265.
magic
6

01:49:54 AM

singled out as particularlyinclined to emphasize the value of an idea

fromtheirown age, as proponentsof the notion ofpriscasapientia.The
most importantname in these intellectualgenealogies, in which ideas
were referredto a sanctifyingpast, was Hermes Trismegistus.23However, as Molland's paper demonstrates, already Roger Bacon
in his
attributedan importantrole to thingsancient, to priscaauctoritas
a
for
truth.
he
became
somewhat
himself
Moreover,
quest
ironically,
for many alchemical spuria. In the second part of his
priscaauctoritas
paper, Molland investigatesthe theoreticalaspect of occultism,in particular of natural magic, in Bacon's work.
Newman's article is concerned with the Paracelsian Johannes Baptista van Helmont (1579-1644). He has been praised as an exponent
of the Scientific Revolution, and condemned as a Hermetic and
occultist. The results of Newman's study, however, show that Van
Helmont' s positionin the rise of modern science is farmore complex.
First, as has also been pointed out by Allen Debus, the new approach
to the studyofnature inauguratedby the Paracelsians was, as a matter
of fact, a genuine alternativeand even rival to the world view of the
mechanical philosophers, so readily conceded as dominant in the
ScientificRevolution.24 However, as was not appreciated by Debus
and others,Van Helmont appropriateda medieval corpusculartheory
associated with the name of Geber (Jabir) in his systemof thought,
and combined thiswitha Paracelsian tradition.Both the factthatVan
Helmont took recourse to medieval sources, and that he adopted
corpuscularism- a systemusually associated with mechanism- may
come as a surprise even to those historians of early modern science
who are convinced that Paracelsian-alchemical literature must be
integrated in the historiographical accounts of the Scientific
Revolution.
Harvard University
Department
oftheHistory
Science
of

Katholieke Universiteit
Nijmegen
Instituut
Philosophisch

23Copenhaver,
Natural
, 266-70.
magic
24See A. G. Debus,The
Chemical
Debates
theReaction
toRobert
oftheSeventeenth
Century:
FluddandJeanBaptiste
vanHelmont
, in: Reason
, eds. RiginiBonelliand Shea, 19-49;
TheChemical
Paracelsian
Science
andMedicine
intheSixteenth
andSeventeenth
CenPhilosophy:
2 vols.,NewYork1977,andalsothearticles
in Chemistry,
collected
and
turies,
Alchemy
theNewPhilosophy
, 1550-1700
, London1987.
7

01:49:54 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Oresmeon Motion (Questionessuper Physicam, III ' 2-7)*
STEFANO CAROTI

remarks
1. Preliminary
In their chapter on motion published in Sciencein theMiddle Ages,
John E. Murdoch and Edith D. Sylla mitigate some of A. Maier' s
statementson the disagreementsbetween Ockham and Buridan concerningmotion.1Maier was actually inclinedcategoricallyto contrast2
Ockham' s and Buridan' s views of motion; in fact,she does not mention their common effortin contending against a general theoryof
in
motion that relied upon the necessityof postulatinga ressuperaddita
addition to the thingssufferingalterationand augmentation/diminution ( alteratio
, augmentatio
, diminutio).On the contrary,she emphasizes
the differencebetween Ockham and Buridan on the subject of local
motion, whichforthe latteris not to be identifiedeitherwiththe mobile
or an
or with the space, but with a fluxus, which he considers a conditio
.3 Buridan puts forwardhis proaccidental forminheringin the mobile
* I wishtothank
Alfonso
Maierforhissuggestions
andPietroCorsiforhishelpwith
thetranslation
ofthispaper.
1 J. E. Murdoch,
E. D. Sylla,TheScience
in: D. C. Lindberg
ofMotion,
(ed.),Science
intheMiddle
ofScience
, Chicagoand London1978,217 (The ChicagoHistory
Ages
and Medicine)
2 A. Maier, Zwischen
undMechanik.
zur Naturphilosophie
Studien
der
Philosophie
Raccoltadi studie testi,69).
, Roma1958,53, 117(Storiae letteratura.
Sptscholastik
The opposition
between
Ockhamand Buridanliesin thedifferent
roleassigned
by
Maiertothemin thedevelopment
ofscientific
theformer
is in factviewed
thought:
as thesupporter
of a positionmoredistantfromthe modernthanthoseof his
E.
predecessors
(see pp. 41-2,100and fora morecorrect
appraisal
J. E. Murdoch,
D. Sylla,TheScience
theway,according
toMaier,
, 216-7),thelatter
ofMotion
prepares
to themodern
lawofinertia
, 132-3,151).On A. MaierseeA.
(A. Maier,Zwischen
Maierelafilosofia
dellanatura
in:R. Imbach,
A. Maier
Maier,Anneliese
tardoscolasticay
difilosofia
medievale
traOtto
eNovecento.
Contributo
a unbilancio
(eds.),Glistudi
storiografico.
Attidelconvegno
internazionale.
Roma,21-23settembre
1989,Roma1991,303-30
Raccoltadi studie testi,179).
(Storiae letteratura.
3 "Nos autemdicimusprimoquodomnismotusestsubiective
in mobili,scilicet
in
eo quod movetur,
sicutalbedoessetin pariete",Johannes
perrealeminherentiam
8

01:50:02 AM

posad of consideringlocal motion a conditioor a fluxusinheringin the

mobile(being an adherent in this way to what I shall call a ry-theory)
afterintroducingthe casus of the rectilinearmotion of the universe.
Some years later, Albert of Saxony in his commentaryon the Physics
dealt with local motion where he neady distinguished between a
philosophical and a theological approach: in the formerthere is no
need to have recourseto somethingin addition to the mobile
, in the latter motion is identifiedwith a fluxusinheringto the mobile
.4
Oresme's discussion of motion in the firstseven questions of his
commentaryon the Physics- which Maier thoughtwas lost when she
wroteZwischenPhilosophie
undMechanik- presents some original and
interestingelements in comparison either with Buridan or Albert of
Saxony. Oresme's philosophical attitude - which I shall sometimes
call " nominalis ' withoutchargingthe word with any specificmean- is at
ing and only in order to stress its opposition to a rw-theory5
one with both Buridan or Albert as far as their effortsto reject a res
superadditain their explanations of alteration and augmentation/diminution;he is neverthelessdecidedly more determinedthan
both Buridan and Albert to refutea res-theoryfor local motion.
The firstseven Questiones
of Book III of Oresme's commentaryon
the Physicsare very importantin order to sketcha more complete picture of the medieval dispute about differentviews with respect to
motion. I will limit myself to mention the following, concerning
exclusivelylocal motion: 1) thefluxusturns out to assume, if interpretedin a Buridanian way (which Oresme does not considercorrect),
a definitely"realistic" feature;62) Oresme's new renderingoffluxus
octolibros
Buridanus,
, Paris1509,III, 12, f. 54vb(repr.
Questiones
super
Physicorum
a. M. 1964);see A. Maier,Zwischen
Frankfurt
, 129.
4 Eveninthetitles
ofhisquaestiones
Albert
ofSaxonydistinguishes
thesetwodifferent
"utrumsecundum
Aristotelem
eteiusCommentatorem
ad hocquodaliquid
spheres:
moveatur
localiter
distinctus
a mobiliet
requiratur
aliquaresque sitquidamfluxus
loco" and "utrumadmitientes
casusdivinosoporteat
concedere
quodmotuslocalis
sitaliaresa mobilietloco",Albertus
de Saxonia,Questiones
octo
libros
,
super
Physicorum
Venetiis1504,III, 6 and 7, ff.36rb-37va.
5 In particular,
I usetheterm"nominalist"
torefer
toOckham'sattitude
inrefusing
a rr-theory
formotion,
thatis,a ressuperaddita
from
themobile
different
andinhering
init.On Ockham's
discussion
ofmotion
seeH. Shapiro,
andPlaceAccordMotion
, Time
Ockham
N.Y.- Louvain-Paderborn
, St. Bonaventure
1957,1-191(FraningtoWilliam
ciscanInstitute
Series16); M. McCordAdams,William
Publication,
Philosophy
Ockham
in MedievalStudies.
, 2 vols.,NotreDame 1987,II, 799-827(Publications
The MedievalInstitute
ofNotreDame,26).
University
6 I use thisterm,like"nominalist"
without
a specific
(see theprevious
footnote)
in ordertodescribe
an attitude
a rw-theory.
On the
philosophical
import
favouring
9

01:50:02 AM

' which does not

allows an explanation of 4motus
require an inherentres
superaddita(as Buridan does); Oresme is thus entitled to preserve a
substantially"nominalistic" attitude as did Ockham; 3) this special
solution is based on the equivalence betweenfluxus and conditioseu
modusipsiusmobilis
formedby
, which forOresme is a respuresuccessiva
the differentstates of a moving thing and, in addition, allows him to
maintain the clear-cut distinction between mobile!
respermanensand
1ressuccessiva.
motus
There are, however, furtherreasons to stress the importance of
Oresme' s commentary on the Physicswithin the context of the
medieval dispute on motion, some of them urging us to reconsider
some of Maier's conclusionson thisissue. Firstand foremost,the relationshipbetween Buridan and Oresme,7 described by Maier as a complete dependence of the latteron the former,needs to be reassessed
in view of the fact that Oresme, even though agreeing with Buridan
in viewing motion as a fluxus, neatly departs fromhim in considering
thisfluxusa modusof the mobileand not an accidental forminheringin
it. Moreover, Buridan is not the firstand most convinced supporter
"
' in terms of " aliterse habere
of a definitionof ' motus
quamprius as
as the
Maier claimed; Oresme explicitlyquotes Witelo's Perspectiva
source of this definition.8 Moreover, Oresme' s influence on the
medievaldebateonforma
see Maier,Zwischen
, 61-143and D.C.
fluens!
'fluxus
forme
Science.The European
in
Tradition
Lindberg,The Beginnings
of Western
Scientific
600 B.C. toA.D. 1450, Chicagoand
, andInstitutional
Context,
Philosophical,
Religious
London,1992,292-3.
7 Fora generaloverview
on thistopicsee E. Grant,Scientific
inFourteenthThought
Paris:
andNicole
Oresme
, in: M. PeinerCosmanandB. Chandler
Century
JeanBuridan
World:
Science
andArtintheFourteenth
, NewYork1978,105-25
(eds.),Machaut's
Century
ofSciences,
onlocal
(AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademy
314);as faras thediscussion
motionin thesequaestiones
is concerned
Oresmeseemslesscommitted
thanBuridan
to theological
arguments.
8 I havealready
studiedthisaspectofOresme'
s discussion
inLa perception
dumouvement
selon
Nicole
Oresme
See A. Maier,
III, 1), forthcoming.
(Questiones
super
Physicam,
Zwischen
, 126-7forBuridan.The sourceexplicitly
quotedby Oresmeis Witelo,
thesaurus
Alhazeni
Arabislibriseptem...
Item
, IV, prop.110 (see Opticae
Perspectiva
Witellonis
libridecern
Basel 1572,f. 167).The definition
ofmotionas
,
Thuringopoloni
" aliter
"
sehabere
alsobyOckham,whothinks
thatitis quite
quam
prius is mentioned
identical
withhisown: "est autemistadescriptio
[i.e. thatproposed
byOckham]
eademrealiter
cumilia qua dicitur
quod 'mutariest aliterse haberenuncquam
vel
prius':nonenimaliteraliquidse habetnuncquampriusnisiquia habetformam
locumquempriusnonhabuitvelcaretforma
vellocoquempriushabuit",Guillelmi
de Ockham,Brevis
summa
libri
naturalis
Summula
etQuaestiones
in
Physicorum.
sophiae
philo
libros
Aristotelis
, ed. S. Brown,St. Bonaventure
1984,254,41-5(Opera
Physicorum
philosophica,
6).
10

01:50:02 AM

younger colleagues at the University of Paris, which is not

acknowledged by Maier, is attested by a quotation in Marsilius of
.9
Inghen's commentaryon the Physics
In comparison with the commentaries by the most representative
authors of the Universityof Paris (fromJohn Buridan to Marsilius of
Inghen), Oresme' s10 commentary presents a more systematic and
complete discussion on motion: he scrutinizesand discusses five differentopinions, proposes his own solution and tests its capability in
explaining motion by confrontingit with two definitionsof motion
which were among the most widespread and quoted in the medieval
dispute on the topic (one from Aristotle and the other from
Averroes).11
9 A. Maier,Zwischen
attributed
to
, 139-40;Maier uses onlythe Abbreviations
butshealsomentions
theQuestiones
L.
WadMarsilius,
,
super
by
Physicam
published
articleforMarsilius'quotation.
dingamongScotus'works.See n. 37 ofthepresent
10Thediscovery
ofOresme'
s Questiones
wasannounced
super
Physicam
byGuyBeauaremade)of
whichquotations
jouan,whohadfoundthemin thems. 7-6-30(from
theBiblioteca
Colombina
inSevilla,in 1962atthe10thInternational
ofthe
Congress
ofScience,G. Beaujouan,Manuscrits
mdivaux
dela Bibliothque
History
scientifiques
Colombine
deSeville
International
d'Histoire
deScience
26
, in:Actsdudixime
Congrs
(Ithaca
"
VIII - 2 IX 1962),Paris1964,633. M. Markowski
1-8libros
{Le Questiones
super
"
Aristotelis
de NicoleOresme
retrouves
?, in: MediaevaliaPhilosophica
Physicorum
26 (1982),19-24)ascribes
toOresmea commentary
attributed
Polonorum,
formerly
to Buridan,
without
however
themanuscript
ofSevilla;see thecritical
considering
remarks
ofJ. M. M. H. Thijssen,TheShort
Redaction
Buridan*
s Questions
onthe
o/John
andtheir
Relation
totheQuestions
onthePhysics
attributed
toMarsilius
, in:
Physics
ofInghen
Archives
d'Histoire
et Doctrinale
Littraire
du MoyenAge,52 (1986),238-9.
11I do notintend
todealwiththechronology
ofthiscommentary
(forwhichseeM.
Nicole
Oresme
andtheMedieval
andMotions.
A Treatise
onthe
Clagett,
Geometry
ofQualities
andDifformity
Known
as "Tractatus
deconfigurationibus
etmotuum",
Uniformity
qualitatum
of Wisconsin
Madison,Milwaukee,and London 1968, 646 (The University
inMedievalScience,11));I onlywishtopointouthowthetheory
Publications
ofreactioin BookIII, q. 8 is different
fromthatofhisQuestiones
degeneratione
super
(see S.
a Marsilio
diInghen:
la tradizione
delladiscussione
dereactione
Caroti,Da Buridano
,
parigina
in: Medioevo,15(1989),211):"Quartaconclusio
estquodnumquam
movetur
[seil,
virtute
etmovetur.
Probatur,
qua passumresistit
agens]a passomediante
quia quod
movetestfortius
debiliusmoveret
fortius,
ergo,si motusilliusmoveretur,
quodest
contra
Aristotelem
huius.Sed contrahocestAristoteles
inprimoDe generaseptimo
inagendorepatitur;
tione,quiaomneagensnaturale
secundo,
patetexperientia
quod
ferrum
calidumcalefacit
ab ipsa. Ad primum
dicoquod causa
aquamet frigescit
a passoestquia inutroquesuntpluresqualitates,
ideounaest
quareagensrepatitur
fortior
in agentesecundum
in patiente,
et e converso
una
quamagitin debiliorem
estfortior
inpassosecundum
dicuntur
quamfitreactio.Modoillequalitates
agentia
ideosuntpluresactiones
et pluraagentia.Ad secundum
immediata,
peridemdico
ferri
remittit
sedhumiditas
quodcaliditas
frigiditatem
aque et none converso,
aque
remittit
siccitatem
ferri
ex quo consequitur
velremissio
que estdebilior,
frigefactio
caliditatis.
Et ex hocsequitur:
nonessetnisicaliditaset in
primo,quod si in ferro
nonfieret
toOresme's
reactio",f.35rb-va(theveryfewcorrections
aqua frigiditas
11

01:50:02 AM

In this paper I shall deal with the five opinions presentedand discussed by Oresme, togetherwithhis own solution; I shall omit a comparison between the position Oresme has taken in this commentary
and the one defended in his other writingsquoted by Maier.12
The five opinions considered rationales
by Oresme are summarized
13
in Book III, q. 2. They pertain to the kind of being denoted by
' ratherthan its
motus
existence, which the natural philosophermust
presuppose:
reduciad aliquamistarum:
omnisopiniorationalis
primaestquodmotus
potest
nonestaliquidvelaliqua,ideodicuntquodnihilest.Secundaopinioestquod
itasicse haberead motorem
motusnonestaliquidsedbeneestaliqua,scilicet
ac si essetnomencorrelativum.
Tertiaestquodmotus
etmobileetacquisitum,
estmobile.
Quintaestquod
permotum.
Quartaestquodmotusestacquisitum
a quolibetpermanenti.14
seu accidensdistinctum
estquidamfluxus
Oresme deals with the firsttwo opinions in Book III, q. 2, with the
thirdin q. 3, 15with the fourthin q. 4 and 5, 16and withthe fifthin q.
18
6; 17he puts forwardhis own solution in q. 7, testingit in the follow19
ing quaestio througha comparison withthe two definitionsby Aristotle and Averroes we mentioned above.

textin thequotations
havenotbeennoted;I am goingtopublish
inthenearfuture
thecritical
oftheeightquestions
ontheIII BookofthePhysics).
edition
Theconditions
forreactio
hereproposed
arecensured
intheQuestiones
degeneratione
and
required
super
areidentical
tothatofRichardSwineshead's
. It is inanycaseverydifCalculationes
ficult
toassumeonlyinthisinstance
an influence
ofSwineshead
whenOresmewrites
hiscommentary
onthePhysics
theDegenera, followed
bya changewhenhecomments
tione.
Thepractice
ofmedieval
ofrevising
theircommentaries
moremagisti
prevents,
thechronological
certitude
relations
between
their
over,oneto statewithsufficient
seeJ. Hamesse,"Reportatio"
ettransmission
destextes
, in: M. Asztalos(ed.),
writings;
TheEditing
andPhilosophical
Texts
theMiddle
ofTheological
from
Ages.ActsoftheConferencearrangedby the Department
of Classical Languages,University
of
29-31August1984,Stockholm
StockStockholm,
1986,7-34(ActaUniversitatis
StudiaLatinaStockholmiensia,
holmiensis,
30).
12A. Maier,Zwischen
, 133-8.
13"Utrummotussitaliquid",ff.31ra-31vb.
14F. 31rb.
15"Utrummotussitresmotavelipsummobile",f.31vb-32va.
16"Utrummotussitresacquisitamobilidummovetur"
and"utrummotuslocalis
sitilludquodacquiritur
mobilitalimotu,scilicet
locusin quo etcircaquod mobile
movetur",
III, 4, ff.32va-33ra;
III, 5, ff.33ra-33vb.
17"Utrummotussit ressuccessiva
sivefluxusdistinctus
a rebuspermanentibus
cuiusmodi
suntmobileet resacquisitaad quamestmotus",ff.33vb-34rb.
18"Utrummoverisitaliterse haberecontinue
quamprius",ff.34rb-35ra.
19"Utrummotusbenediffiniatur
quandodicitur
quod estactusentisin potentia
secundum
quod in potentia",f.35ra-35va.
12

01:50:02 AM

3
2. OpinioI: ' (motusestnihil'
The supportersof this opinion could be traced back to the Greek
howphilosopherscriticizedby Aristotlein Book III of the Physics;20
in
contexts
consome
found
the
ever,
typical arguments
sophismatic
verbs
of
or
more
motion
generally
cerning problems raised eitherby
of change21or by the relations between pars and totum
, do, nevertheless,mark an invitationto the examination of more recentdebates.
This opinion is grounded on a special ontologyaccording to which
22
only incomplexe
significabiliaare entitledto denote existentbeings; on
the otherhand, the denotationof 'motus', a complexe
significabile
having
the same meaning of "mobile mover?
' has no place either in the
category of substance or in any other.23
20See e. g. S. ThomasAquinas,In octo
libros
Aristotelis
ed. P. M.
Physicorum
expositio,
In Physicam
1965,III, 1. 3, 294, 149and WalterBurley,
Maggiolo,Torino-Roma
- NewYork
Aristotelis
etquestiones
, Venetiis1501,f.66ra(repr.,Hildesheim
Expositio
a verysimilar
discusses
inhiscommentary
onthePhysics
, III,
1972).Buridan
problem
6: "utrum
motus
localisestvelutrum
hecestvera:"motuslocalisest"", v.Johannes
an
totheSentences
Buridanus,
, f.48va.InJeanofMirecourt's
Questiones
commentary
sedmodisehabendi
towhich" actionihilestnecmotus,
opinionis mentioned
according
rerum'
bearswitness
tothecirculation
ofthisposition
intheuniversity
', which
milieu,
seeA. Maier,Zwischen
DiezweiApologien
desJeandeMire, 333;seealsoF. Stegmller,
in: Recherches
de thologie
ancienneet mdivale,
5 (1933),67-8no. 45.
court,
Oresmedoesnotagreewiththeopinionaccording
towhich1'motus
estnihil
", buthe
' withthemodus
tooconsents,
as weshallsee,totheidentification
of' motus
sehabendi
(mobilis).
"
21For example,Buridan'sSophismata" Omne
movebatur
quodmovetur
prius and
" Nullamutatio
estinstantneo",
v. Johannes
T.
ed.
K.
Buridanus,
,
Scott,
Sophismata
Cannstatt
1977,120-2(Grammatica
Stuttgart-Bad
speculativa
1).
224'Pro primaopinioneestsciendum
incomplexe
quod quedamsuntsignificabilia
sicutmateria,
forma
substantialautaccidentalis;
etaliacomplexe
sicut
compositum,
"hominem
esseanimal","hominem
currere"et sic de aliis.Secundo,notandum
nonestaliud
quod 'motus'nonestsignificabile
incomplexe
proprie,
quia 'motus*
quam "mobilemoveri"et nihilestet ideomotusnihilest", f. 31rb.On complexe
seeG. Nuchelmans,
Theories
andmedieval
Ancient
significabile
oftheProposition.
conceptions
andfalsity
London1973,227-42(North-Holland
, Amsterdamofthebearers
oftruth
ofthenotabilia
ofBookIII, q. 1 Oresmeemphasizes
Series,8). In thefirst
Linguistic
therelationship
between
intuitiva
absoluta
and incomplexe
:
, nomina
cognitio
significabilia
"notandumquod aliquid potestcognoscidupliciter:uno modo intuitiveet
alio modocomplexe,
et secundumhoc quedamnominasignificant
incomplexe,
et quedamcomparative
absolute
velconnotative,
etaliquiddicitur
quando
cognosci
multacomplexa
cognoscuntur
quibusenuntiatur
aliquidde alio", f.30ra.I didnot
haveK. Tachau'sarticleon Oresme'
s theory
ofcomplexe
at mydisposal;
significabile
see P. J. VasquezJaniero,
DunsScoto
e altrimaestri
alV8oCongresso
internafrancescani
zionale
difilosofia
medievale
in: Antonianum,
63 (1988),157,159.
(Helsinki,
1987),
23It is thefirst
"Probaturprimo,quia "mobilemoveri"non est
/?ro-argument:
substantia
necaccidens,quia talisestsignificabile
modoomneensest
incomplexe;
substantia
autaccidens",f. 31rb.In thelastargument
fortheexpression
"mobile
13

01:50:02 AM

Oresme appeals to Aristotle'sauthority(arg. 1), the communis

opinio
(arg. 2) and either the possibilityformotion to be perceived (arg. 5)
or, once its existence is denied, the impossibilityto have adequate
criteriafordiscriminatingmotion fromrest(arg. 6). In the arguments
against this firstopinion Oresme points to some logical and semantic
problems concerningpropositionscontainingverbs of motion. In particular,in the thirdargumentthe existenceof motionis grantedon the
'
basis of the term ' movere
being a genus of special kinds of motion
currere
or
alterare
;24 in the fourth argument, the
exemplified by
of
to be predicated of other complexe
possibility complexe
significabilia
is
in
the
seventhargument,sentenceslike
significabilia acknowledged;25
"
"
aliquid moveturare considered meaningfulbecause it is possible to
locate in the world events such as those they describe.26
3. OpinioII: ' 'motusestaliqua, seil, mobileetilla ad que se habetaliterquam
'
prius1
This opinion, although dealt with more cursorily,deserves particular attentionbecause Oresme will make use of it forhis own solution proposed in Book III, q. 7.
In the conclusion (where this opinion is recorded in its complete
moveri"onlya suppositio
materialis
is allowed,without
a denotation
in theworld:
estaliqui,autergosubiectum
materialiter
"Quarto,ilia:'mobilemoveri
supponit
sicutproiliapropositione
'mobilemovetur',
ettuncbeneestaliquid,sednonestad
vel oratio;aut supponit
et tunc
propositum,
quia estverapropositio
significative,
oratioestincongrua
et nonintelligibilis,
utpatetpergrammaticam",
f.31rb.In the
' is fixedin the
thedenotation
of'motus
or in
repliesto thesearguments
forma
fluens
themobile
: "Tuncad rationes
Adprimam,
diciquod'mobile
primeopinionis.
potest
moveri'estaccidens,
etsi nonsitaccidenstunc
quia aliquidicuntquodestforma...
eritmobilevelaliquidtale,et siceritsubstantia...
Ad ultimam,
quomodosupponit
'mobilemoveri'potest
diciquodsupponit
etestcongrua,
significative
quia supponit
locouniusdictionis",
neutraliter
f. 3lva.
proaliquare et tenetur
24"Tertioomnegenuspredicatur
de sua specieaffirmative,
sedmovere
estgenusad
currere
etalterare
etitade aliis.Et ideoAristoteles
dicitillasspeciesmotus,
ergohec
estvera:"aliquidcurrere
estaliquodmoveri".Et cumde quolibetpredicamento
dicatur'esse' vel 'ens' vel 'aliquid',sequitur
estaliquid",f. 31rb.
quodmoveri
25"Quarto, suppositadivisioneilliusopinionis,
sicutsignificabilia
incomplexe
de se invicem,dicendo"hoc est substantia",ita etiameritde
predicantur
est moveriet esse albumestesse
dicendoquod currere
significabilibus
complexe
f. 31rb.
coloratum",
26"Iterum,saltemsecundum
omnehec est concedenda:
vel
"aliquidmovetur"
"celummovetur",
quia ab eo quodresestvelnon
ergoitaestsicutipsasignificat,
estetc.Sed si estquodaliquidmovetur,
tuncfalsum
estdicerequodaliquidmoveri
nihilest", f. 31rb-va.
14

01:50:02 AM

form27),it is pointed out that in order to fixthe denotation of lmotus'

more things (aliqua) are required, that is the mobileand those things
relativeto which it assumes differentpositions (ilia ad que se habetaliter
quamprius). Even thoughOresme does not state explicitlythe distinction he makes later on (in Book III, q. 7) between internal( intrinseca
)
and external (extrnseca
) referencemarks, these things are external to
the mobile
, as clearly emerges from the two pro- and the second conarguments.28
We shall see how, in his discussion of motion, Oresme is constantly
preoccupied with avoiding the obstacle of postulatinga special being
in addition to the mobileor to the resacquisitaor deperdita
according to
kinds of motions. In this quaestio
the different
, he emphasizes how the
that
is called forth by the
between
different
things
relationship
' ' is not a
' 1aliterse habere
special being in addition
quamprius
expression
to its components.
In the criticalremarksagainst thisopinion, Oresme quotes a theory
of relations which prevents the fixing of the denotation of relative
terms in more than a single thing,29 and which relies on the
synonymitybetween concrete and abstract terms and on a word's
power not only of denoting but also of connoting. These are very
importantremarksforat least two reasons: a) the introductionof connotative terms;30b) the mention of relations could be a hint to the
27"Motusnonestaliquidunumsed aliqua,scilicet
mobileet illa ad que se habet
from
makesreference
tothedefinition
aliterquamprius",f.3lva. Oresmeprobably
ofthisdefinition
to the
Witelo'sPerspectiva
, as can be suggested
byhisattribution
inBookIII, q. 1. Ockhamconsidered
thisdefinition
nottobe different
Polishscholar
fromhisown,see n. 8. ForBuridansee A. Maier,Zwischen
, 124-7.
28"Probatur:
quiaaliterse haberea ad b nonestaliudquama etb sicse habentia,
estinequalia...Secundo,patetquod
estdissimilia
et inequalitas
sicutdissimilitudo
nisipercipiendo
motusnonpercipitur
pluraaliterse habere,ideosignumestquod
a theory
motusestillaplura",f.3lva. In thefirst
probatio
byAristo(alreadyrefuted
also in
is mentioned
to whichmotionis an inequalitas
(it is recorded
tle)according
Aquinas'and Burley'scommentaries).
29"Sed ponoconclusionem
scilicet
quodmotusnonesttaliasicsehabenoppositam,
vel relationes,
sicutpaternitas,
tia. Probatur
etc.,
quia nominarelativa
inequalitas
nonsupponunt
nisiprouno sed connotant
aliud,sicutpaternitas
propatre,cuius
distincta
dicuntquod
estquia omnesqui ponuntquodnonsuntaccidentia
signum
concretum
et abstractum
suntnominasinonimasicutpateret paternitas,
ergo,
motussitconnotativum,
tamensupponit
aliud,sicutpro
quamvis
prounoetconnotat
illa ad que aliterse habet",f. 3lva. In the marginof the
mobiliconnotando
an anonymous
noteascribes
toOckhamtheposition
towhich
according
manuscript
"concretum
et abstractum
suntnominasinonima".
30See n. 29. The importance
is evident
ofconnotation
alsoas faras thedenotation
' is concerned:
oftheterm' inequalitas
"Ad primam
dicoquodillainequalitas
nonest
15

01:50:02 AM

identificationof a possible source of Oresme' s modusseu conditiorei, a

very importantelement forhis solution.31
3a. Res permanentes
and ressuccessiuae
The con-argumentsopening this question concern problems differentfrom those discussed in the firsttwo opinions, but of a considerable importance in the medieval debate on motion; in addition,
Oresme' s own solution calls forfacingsome of these problems. As far
as the followingdiscussion is concerned, the most interestingof these
problems can be summarized in four points: a) ontological problems
(and particularlymereological problems) risingfromthe necessityof
assuming the existence of parts which are at once past and futurein
order to maintain the continuityof motion (arg. 1 and 232); b) the differencebetween motion and beings which are totasimuland so can be
totally grasped in an instant is so great that the very existence of
motion itselfis exposed to the riskof being denied;33c) the difference
of limits{incipit!
desinit)followingfromthese differentontologies; d) as
far as only local motion is concerned, the difficultyof locating the
place of motion in view of its continuity.34
resrealis,sed estrealisconnotando
estpriusde pateraliud,sicutexemplificatum
nitte",f. 3lva.
31I shouldliketo mention
ofrelations,
resand
HenryofGhent'stheory
opposing
rei
modus
Relations.
Medieval
Theories
1250-1325
, seeM. G. Henninger,
, Oxford1989,
53. See alsoJ. F. Wippel,TheMetaphysical
A Study
in
ofGodefrey
Thought
ofFontaines.
LateThirteenth-Century
, Washington
1981,232-6.It is nothowever
Philosophy
possible
tostateprecisely
ifHenry'sorGodefrey'
s writings
arethedirectsources
ofOresme.
The samecanbe saidforanother
as well,menpossiblesource(JohnofMirecourt)
tionedinn. 20 andforPeterOlivi,whoinsomepassagesofhisSentences
commentary
a theory
of motionnotfarfromOresme's("Die
quotedby A. Maier supports
istebenkeinrealesAkzidens,
sondern
nureinmodus
essendi
se
Bewegung
(odermodus
desmobile")'
seeA. Maier,Zwischen
, 314,320,329,n. 92 andnamely321
habendi)
It is worth
outthatforOlivithereference
markofthe
(forthequotation).
pointing
modusse habendi
is external("modus alius et alius se habendiad aliquid
a solutioncensuredby Buridanand Oresme.As faras Roger
extrinsecum"),
Swineshead's
outlineof motionas modus
se habendi
is concerned
see A. Maier,
Zwischen
, 133-4,n. 91.
32"Pars preterita
motusnonestnecparsfutura
ergomotusnonest;consequentia
nonestaliudquamsuepartes.Iterum,
motusnonestnisimedietas
tenet,
quiatotum
et medietas
si nonsuntnonest", f. 3Ira.
futura,
preterita
igitur
33"Tertio,omnequodestestinhocinstanti,
nisiinstans,
sed
quianihilestpresens
motusnonestininstanti,
quianonestnisiantesit,sednonfitnisiin tempore
igitur
etc.", f. 31rb.
34"Quartosic:simotusesttuncmobilemovetur,
verbigradamotulocali;sisic,tunc
inlocoinquoest,ethocnon,quiaiamhabetilludetperconseautmovetur
queritur:
ad illud,et etiamquia nonestacquisitio
in
quensnonmovetur
partispostpartem
locoin quo est;necpotestdiciquod movetur
in locoubinonest", f.31rb.
16

01:50:02 AM

Replying to the firstargument Oresme distinguishes permanent

and successive beings - a very importantdistinctionforhis own solution in Book III, q. 7; he does not think,however, that this distinction is adequate to overcome the objection built into the relationship
- the parspresensconsistsof part
totum!
pars Oresme' s own solution
of the past and part of the future- is close to Buridan' s36 and is
recorded by Marsilius of Inghen in his commentaryon the Physicsas
Oresme' s position.37A solution to the same problem given later in
Book III, q. 738is probably more relevant: Oresme proposes to treat
the problemof the relationbetween the whole and the parts forressucin two differentways: as far as the former
cessivaeand respermanentes
are concerned, he considers this relation as being equivalent to that
between points and a line or instantsand a time interval.
The same distinction between res successivae
, which are to be
can be measured
which
measured only in time, and respermanentes
,
even in an instant, occurs in the reply to the third argument. Here
Oresme - afterpointing to some consequences followingfrom the
"39 - refuses
estmotus
admission of "in instanti
general validityto the
" and
" omne
est
in
instanti
is, therefore,forcedto limit
quodest,
principle
"
'
oris1
the principle omnequodestin aliquo tempore
estin quolibetilliustemp
35Onceonedeniedtheexistence
one
ofonepartofthewhole(in thiscasemotion),
: "Sed contra:totum
isforced
todenytheother
partbecauseofthesignificatus
copulatus
nonest.
estduemedietates;
quodtotum
ergo,siprimanonest,necsecunda,sequitur
concedendo
insensudivisoquodprimamedietas
nonest,necetiam
Adilluddiceretur
cumprimaetsecundasuntde significato
secunda,
copulato,
quiasuntipsemotusqui
est", f.3Iva.
36"Ideo aliterdicoquodmotushabetaliampartem
et
quammedietatem
preteritam
scilicet
ex aliquopreterito
medietatem
futuram,
partem
presentem,
que componitur
et aliquofuturo;
et ideoaliquaparsmotusestsicutilla", f. 3Iva. Buridanas well
on thePhysics
discusses
thistopicin BookIII, q. 6 ofhiscommentary
, in so faras
ofmotionis concerned:
"secundoetiamad hocconcludimus
thepeculiarontology
divisibile
cuiusunaparsestpriusetalia
quodperpresens
oportet
intelligere
tempus
seeJohannes
, f. 48vb.
Buridanus,
Questiones
parsposterius",
37"Respondetur
quia est aliquis motusqui nec est
negandoconsequentiam,
sed compositus
ex preterito
et futuro,
hic dicensOrem",
nec futurus
preteritus
subtilissime
odolibros
Marsilius
de Inghen,Questiones
, Lyon
super
Physicorum
Johannes
a. M. 1964)BookIII, q. 2, f. 36vb.
1518,(repr.Frankfurt
38A different
forrespermanentes
andsuccessive
is required
mereology
bythedefinition
in BookIII, q. 7, see n. 69.
ofsuccessivum
simpliciter
39"Ad tertiam
in instanti
dicuntaliquiquodmotusnonestin instanti,
sedtarnen
estmotusest;et sequitur
estmotus.Contra:in instanti
estmotusergoduminstans
ultra:ergoin instanti
esttempus;
et ultra:ergosubitoesttempus;et iterum:
ergo
estin instanti
sicutmotus;ultra:ergoin hac mensura
acquisitio
partispostpartem
estmotus,ergomensuratur
et continetur
talimensura,
sicutin hoclocoestcorpus
in hocloco", f. 3lva.
ergocorpuscontinetur
17

01:50:02 AM

"
"
40
( Phys. , VI, 6, 236b 19-23). Sentences such as motusest also require
a certain amount of time for theirverification.41
4. OpinioIII : "motusestmobileseu resmota"
9 is not
Even though the term ' mobile
ambiguous, Oresme thinksit
to state
appropriate in the notabiliapreceding the /?ro-arguments
refers
is
not
to
be
the
res
mota
this
to
that
regarded
opinion
precisely
as somethingdifferentfromthe mobile
, like a sort of accident qualifying the substance as a moving one42.That a res-theoryis the constant
targetof this opinion is unequivocally confirmedby the two last pro
arguments, and mostlyby the fourth,in which such a special being
is thoughtto involve a
(here called fluxus)postulated by a r&r-theory,
never-endingregress.43
40To be interpreted
: "et fortemelius
as referring
to respermanentes
exclusively
diceretur
de rebuspermanentibus,
diurnaestinunatota
quodintelligit
quiarevolutio
die et nonin aliquaparte,quia successiva
nonsuntmensurabilia
nisitempore",
f.
3Ivb.
41"Et tuncultraquodcontinue
hecestvera:'motusest';potest
diciquodnumquam
estveraininstanti,
sedpertempus,
sicutnonestitainresicutipsasignificat
nisiper
inBookIII, q. 6 ofhiscomtempus",f.3Ivb. Buridandealswitha similar
problem
on thePhysics'
see Johannes
mentary
Buridanus,
Questiones
, f. 49rb.
42"Secundo,sciendumquod potestintelligi
quod motusest mobileuno modo,
scilicet
motudistincto
etsuperaddito,
etillemotussicmovetur
vel
quodresmoveatur
alio motuvelse ipso,et tuncessetalia resmotaque nonessetmotus...et sicnon
ista opinioprima.Alio modointelligitur
intelligitur
quod omnequod movetur
movetur
se ipsoformaliter,
itaquodnonsitaliquodaccidensvelfluxus
inherens.
Et
sicintelligitur
f. 3Ivb.
positio,et tuncresmotaestmotusete converso",
43"Ducendoad impossibile,
supponoprimocumadversario
quod motusesttalis
fluxus
distinctus.
nisiquiaestilludquo aliquidcontinue
Secundo,quodnonponitur
se habetaliteretaliterad aliquodnonmotum;et ideodicitLincolniensis
quodest
exitusde potentia
ad actumetdicitur
quodestvia,idestquo fit.Contra:sita mobile
etb sitillefluxus;
tuncsic:priusestverumquodb nonestina etposteaquodb est
ina, ergoa estmutatum
ad ipsumb, ergopersuppositionem
secundam
hocestper
a subiecto
mutationem
distinctam
et termino,
aliudnonponitur,
quia propter
ergo
motuseritmotus,
etsicproceditur
ininfinitum,
Aristotelem
septimo
quodestcontra
huius.Et si dicatur
ad b sinemutatione
quodse ipsomutatur
superaddita
ergoetc.,
hocestcontrasecundam
etpariratione
a sinequocumque
mutabitur
suppositionem
fluxusuperaddito",
f. 32ra.As faras theinstantaneous
the
changeis concerned,
ofa ressuperaddita
is demanded
ofparsimony
superfluity
bytheprinciple
("Frustra
fit per plura ubi sufficiant
pauciora", f. 32ra). Once admitted,untenable
in theformer
or theological
casetheexistence
of
follow;
philosophical
consequences
a purely
instantaneous
resmustbe admitted
de mutatione
subita,
("Tertio,probatur
tuncduraret
octavo
solumperinstans,
quiasi essetressuperaddita,
quodAristoteles
huiusreputat
etdesinerei
esse",f.32ra);inthelatimpossibile,
quiasimulinciperet
terGod's creation
ofa singlebeingproduces
a neverendingchainreaction
("Item
etiamDeus nonpossetcreareunamremsolumquincausareimultas",f. 32ra).
18

01:50:02 AM

As an anonymous copyisthas recorded in the marginsof the Seville

manuscript,one of the most renowned supportersof this opinion is
William Ockham, but already Averroes had maintained that this was
Aristotle'sown solution. Even if it can not be traced back exclusively
to Ockham, it is highlyprobable that his position is envisaged in this
opinion. This assumption is grounded not only on the assignmentof

9
' to connotative
' motus
terms,but also on the factthat the term motus
is considered to have been coined for the sake of economy and
elegance in speech in order to avoid dangerous misunderstandings.44
Moreover, a large number of solutions to the dubia in this question
indulge in a logical and semantic analysis of the differentproblems
raised by this opinion.
From this third question to the seventh, the number of the
argumentsfollowingthe titulumis sharply reduced; theyare replaced
by a series of dubiawithinthe questions immediatelyfollowedby their
solutions. In the presentquestion the capacity of this thirdopinion to
solve some objections is revealed through some fourteendubia' but
above all it is shown how this opinion is not at variance with some of
the definitionsof motion by Aristotle, Averroes and, among the
Latins, Robert Grosseteste - whose authorityin this discussion is
confirmedby the constantuse of his solution throughoutthe different
opiniones.
The definitionsthat are opposed, as dubia, to this thirdopinion are
"
the following:a) "motusestactusmobilis
(in connection with which
"
"
like corpusestmotum
otherformulae
", motusestformamobilis", "motus
" are
"
estaccidens", and "motusestquantitas
discussed); b) motusestactus
'
entisinpotentiasecundum
quodhuiusmodV(here we findin the following
discussion Grosseteste's definition: " motusest exitusde potentiaad
'
"
actum
"); c) motusest actus imperfectus'
(on this occasion Averroes'
" and
definitionsare dealt with: " motuscomponitur
ex enteet non ente
" motusestmdiusinter
et actumqui estperfectio
potentiam
potentie
").
44"Sciendum
etquodpropter
breviloprimoquod'motus'estnomenconnotativum
locouniusdictionis
sicutilliusvelconsimilis
"mobilese habetconquiumponitur
tinuealiterquam priusrespectucuiuslibetnon moti", et hoc vel secundum
velsecundum
locumetsicde aliis.Et proeodemsupponit
concretum
et
qualitatem
'motum'et 'motus',et itaconnotai
scilicet
resextrinsecas",
f.32ra.A
abstractum,
textfrom
Averroes'
onthePhysics
is interpreted
as a confirmation
ofthe
commentary
natureof'motus'
: "Et perhocglosatur
dictumCommentatoris
propositional
quarto
exenteetnonente,quia ad hocquod
dicentis
Metaphysice
quodmotuscomponitur
sitverumquodhocmoveretur
sitveraetquedam
requiritur
quodquedamnegativa
f. 32rb.
affirmativa",
19

01:50:02 AM

The replies to these dubia highlightthe importance of penetrating

the real meaning of the different
definitions,discriminatingneatlythe
ontological and the logical sphere. Thus, we find this distinctionin
definitiona) above, where two differentmeanings of the word 1actus9
are proposed:
..
inproposito:
unomodoproaliquaforma
informante.
actusaccipitur
dupliciter
vel subicibili,
alio modo improprie
quod a natura
pro aliquo predicabili
nonde facto,id estin presenti,
sicutdicimus
in actuet improprie
verificatur
estactuspatris;et istomodomotusestactus.45
quod paternitas
It is worth noting, finally,how in his replies to the dubia Oresme
expresses the solutionproposed by thisthirdopinion in termso "aliter
se haberequamprius'', that is in terms of the solution he will put forth
as the more probable in Book III, q. 7. 46
resacquisitamobilidum movetur"
5. OpinioIV: 11
The fourthopinion is discussed more extensivelythan the others,
taking up two whole quaestionesin which alteration and augmentation/diminution(III, 4) are dealt with separately fromlocal motion
(III, 5).
The opinion in question relies upon Aristotle's PhysicsV, 1, 224b
7-847 and, in terms of this particular Aristotelian text, the most
'
"
suitable denotation of ' motus
appears to be resacquisitamobilidum
movetur"
. As far as alterationand augmentation/diminutionare conthis
solution is not far removed from the previous one: the
cerned,
body altered or augmented/diminishedbeing the precise equivalent of
the mobilein local motion. It is, however, exactly local motion that
creates problems for this fourth opinion, because in local motion
'
'
45F. 32ra.The connotative
roleinclarifying
playsa veryimportant
powerof motus
thevariousdefinitions
ofmotionsuchas " motus
estquantitas"Et etiamquodest
mobilesic se haberepertempuslongumdivisibile,
quia connotat
quantitas,
quod
et sicde similibus",
dicitur
f. 32ra.
divisibilis,
quantitas
46Seen. 44-45as faras thefirst
twodubia
areconcerned;
forthethird:
"Imperfectum
estilludquodnatumesthaberealiquidquodnondum
habet,etmobiledummovetur
estnatumesseinlocoinquo nondum
estad quodtendit
sinequietemedia;etsecundumhoc,cumsitperfectibile
dicitur
periliummodumsehabendi,
imperfectum,
quia
et parsrestt
habenda.Et quia
partemhabetvelhabuitde ilioad quodmovebatur
motusindicatetsignificat
mobilesicse habere,ideodicitur
actusimperfectus,
id est
" aliter
connotans
f.32rb.ForOckhamhimself
sehabere
futurum",
aliquid
predicatum
" is
to hisownsolution,
see above,n. 8.
quam
equivalent
47Asprius
clearlystatedin BookIII, q. 4: "Oppositum
patet,quia motusestde genere
termini
ad quem",f. 32va.
20

01:50:02 AM

nothingnew is acquired as it is in the case of alterationor of augmentation/diminution,

given thatthe space traversedis prexistentin local
motion.
5a. Book III , quaestio4
This opinion no longer favoursanymore a res-theorysolution, as is
confirmedby the two firstconclusions concerning,respectively,motus
48
vus.*9In the thirdand last conclusion a proacquisitivus and deperditi
cess of acquisition or loss ("non semperestmotus,sed solumdumacquiritur") is required formotion, whose connotativepower is stressedas in
the previous opinion.
The objections against this opinion are not numerous,50being less
than half of those in Book III, q. 3. Nevertheless, some of them do
deserve attention:in the first- ascribed to Ockham' s followersin a
48"Motusestacquisitio
tenet,quia in aliisest
ergoestresacquisita;consequentia
dieinonestnisidies.Item,sicuttempus
estsuccessio
dierumet
ita,sicutsuccessio
numerus
unitatum
nonestpreter
itamotusnonestnisiacquisitio
unitates,
partium
is pursuedalsoin
withauthority
que nonestpreter
partes",f.32vb.The consensus
thisfirstconclusion:
"Probaturprimo,quia Commentator
dicitquod motusest
ad quamtendit
mobiledoneeperficiatur
partispostaliamilliuspassionis
generatio
et fiatin actu;et subditnecesseestquod motusqui estin substantia
in
inveniatur
etitade aliis...ItemAristoteles
hicdicitexpresse
generesubstantie,
quodmotusnon
estpreter
resetexemplificat
de rebusacquisitis,
sicutestin augmentatione;
itaper
simileestinaliis,sedaugmentatio
estresadditaetacquisita,
undedicit'preexistenti
modo'augmentum'
vel 'additamentum'
nonestnisires
additamentum',
quantitati
additapercommunem
usumet nonillacui fitadditio",f. 32vb.
49"Sicutestindiminutione
itaestinaliis;mododiminutio
nonestnisidistinctio
seu
subtractio
mododiminutum
nonestnisiresque abicitur
velilludquod
quantitatis,
abicitur
ab aliquarevelresabstracta",
f.32vb.In thesearguments
someuntenable
orphysical
arerecorded:
as faras theformer
is concerned,
theological
consequences
ifmotion
is something
different
frommobile,a neverendingregress
is causedbya
God'ssingleintervention
inthefirst
canbe found
conclusion
(suchan argument
too);
forthelatter,
whenlightis corrupted,
oneis forced
toassumethatthisressuperaddita
is produced
velumbratio
bytheagent:"Tertio,in alteratione
que estobtenebratio
vellucissubtractio
talismotusestdeficiens,
sicutpatet,quia nullaresibiacquiritur
velinducitur;
modosi motusestaliquidaliudsuperadditum,
iamilludinduceretur
a motore",f. 32vb.
50In thesedubiathefollowing
sentences
aboutmotion
areexplained
tothe
according
solution
inthisfourth
secundum
proposed
opinion:"motusestactusinpotentia
quod
inpotentia",
"motusestactusimperfectus",
"motusestactusmobilis","motusest
ex affirmatione
etnegatione",
"motusest
mobilis","motusestcompositus
perfectio
actiomotoris",
"motusestpassioinpasso","mobilehabetperfectionem
inactunon
secundum
secundum
inpotentia
secundum
quodestmotusetpassionem
quoddicitur
ad actum"(from
The
quodestmotus","motusestexitusde potentia
Grosseteste).
"
fourth
is able towarrant
also motus
estsensibilis
", see f. 32vb.
opinion'ssolution
21

01:50:02 AM

marginal note in the manuscript51 the opinion in question is confrontedwith a casus in which a simultaneous acquisition and loss of
two differentqualities in the same body seems to forceone to conclude
thattwo contrarymotionsare in the body at once, which is untenable.
of two different
In reply,the simultaneousintensio
and remissio
qualities
are not consideredto be contraryat all, and even space is not regarded
as having absolutelyfixedtermini
, a remarkwhichcovertly,even ifnot
explicitly,might have been raised against Aristotle.52
In the second and in the thirdargumentssome semantic problems
are dealt withand solved, relyingupon the connotativepower of various terms. Thus, in the second argument two contrarymotions like
53 have, in accordance with this fourth
luminis
illuminatio
and corruptio
'
opinion, to be judged as "motuseiusdemspecie? , being both referred
to lumen.In the thirdargument, the difficultiesraised by the denota' are examined
tion of negative termslike ' deperditio
by appealing to the
connotative import of terms used to qualify the results of these
motions.54
5b. Book III, quaestio5
The main problem for the fourthopinion is to account for local
motion, because no alterationtakes place in the mobile.Thus, the first
of the threehypothesesproposed in this question suggestsan entirely
differentsolution for this kind of motion, accepting, as far as local
motion is concerned, the thirdopinion. In order to overcome the difficulty of the evident difference between alteration, augmentation/diminution,on the one hand, and local motion, on the other,
Oresme analyses threedifferenthypotheses.In the first,local motion
51"Tunc contraquartamopinionem
surgitglosaochanica",f. 32vb,marg.int.
52"Ideo nondicitur
veldeorsum
nisiinrespectu.
Etconsimiliter,
aliquidessesursum
nonsuntsimul,tuncidemdiceretur
si diceretur
calidumet frigidum
quodcontraria
solumin respectu,
nonquia haberetduas qualitates,
et sic moveretur
solumuno
et respectu
uniusdiceretur
intensio
alterius
diceretur
remissio",
motu,qui respectu
f. 33ra.
53"Solutio:dicoquodnominaconnotativa
etetiam
dicuntur
diversarum
specierum
etnonpropter
diversas
connotationes
significata
proquibussuppogenerum
propter
nunt",f. 33ra.
54"Solutio:velestsolusacquisitivus
ettuncest
etdenotatur
ab ilio,veldeperditivus
sicut
a nomineillorum
iliummotum,
seddenotatur
que consequuntur
deperditum,
hocdicitur'terminus
ad quem',quia
vel 'tenebratio',
'corruptio'
quia secundum
motusestad hocut talisresnonsit", f. 32ra.
22

01:50:02 AM

is considered a special case which can not be included in this fourth

opinion, just because nothingnew is gained through such motion:
tuncde questione
essetresymaginationes
possunt
speciales.Primaestquodin
motibus
veldeperditur,
motusestquodacquiritur
aliis,ubi aliquidacquiritur
vel deperditur...
Sed in motulocali,perquemnihilfitde novo,motusest
de novotuncmotusesset
mobile,ita quod si motusvel spatiumgeneraretur
sedquia nonest,ideomobile.55
spatium,
Oresme refutesthis solution, because it prevents a unitarydefinition of motion:
contra
si inunomotumotusestilludquodacquiritur
quianonvidetur
arguitur,
motusestunivoca.56
quinetiamin alio,maximequia descriptio
generalis
The importance of Oresme's firmwarning against differentsolutions concerningdifferentkinds of motion is to be emphasized. In all
probability,thiswarningis not simplya general one, because Buridan
- admittedlyon different
grounds - had already proposed dealing
with alteration and augmentation/diminutionseparately from local
motion, a proposal which will be, at least partially,accepted by Albert
of Saxony.
The second hypothesis,considered by Oresme "multumrationalis1
because it is particularlysuited to the avoidance of the absurditiesthat
followfromtheothers,identifiesthe resacquired throughlocal motion
' . It
with the space " inter
is, however,
ceptuminterlateracontinents1
abandoned because it is an unusual imagination, but above all
because it is refutedas untenable by Aristotle.57
In the thirdhypothesis,which is deemed more probable and there' are
foremore adequately testedby the dubia, the denotationsof 4motus
the differentspaces occupied by the mobileduring its motion.58In this
55F. 33rb.
56F. 33rb.
57"Alia estimaginatio
multum
si essetusitata,quod motuslocalisest
rationalis,
locusnoncontinentis,
sed spatium
interlateracontinentis;
vel saltem
interceptum
si esset.Et secundum
quodmotuslocalisnonestaliquid,sedessettalespatium
hoc,
concedere
ponendotale spatium,non oporteret
aliqua absurdaque conceduntur
secundum
aliasvias,sedtarnen,
contraAristotelem
quiahocestexpresse
qui improbatillamopinionem,
ideoconformiter
ad precedentem
f. 33rb.
questionem",
58' 'Tertiaimaginatio
estquodmotuslocalisestlocusipsiusmobilis
dumacquiritur
mobilisuccessive,
vel pluraloca,scilicet
mediumperquod movetur
velsaltemad
f.33rb.It is noteworthy
how
quodse habetaliterquampriuscircaquodmovetur",
in thiscasemotionis explained
in termsof" aliter
sehabere
".
quamprius
23

01:50:02 AM

case the dubia concern only physical problems with no hint of Aristotle's, Averroes' or Grosseteste's definitions.59
a permanentibus
6. Opinio V:60 ' 'motusestressuccessivadistincta
simpliciter
9 is a res
The fifthand last opinion, in which the denotationof ' motus
successivasivefluxus, is very importantbecause, as Oresme declares at
the end of the followingquestion, ifproperlyinterpretedit is the most
probable solution to the problem of motion; if, on the contrary,this
fluxusis regarded as a distinctformit is the worst solution.61In order
to be able to denote a forminheringto the mobile
, 'motus'has to be considered an incomplexe
significabile
(as unequivocally required by the
notabiliaof Book III, q. 1, where it is clearlystated as well that it is not
the case). Oresme' s solution, which anticipates the most probable
opinion put forwardby him in the followingquestion, is grounded on
:
the identificationbetweenfluxusand modusipsiusmobilis
ex predictis
potesteliciquintaopinio,scilicetquod motusest ressuccessiva
a permanentibus.
Et potest
distincta
quod
dupliciter
intelligi:
primo,
simpliciter
et sic nonest
sicutuna forma,
situna resinherens
incomplexe
significabilis
velmodusipsiusmobilis,
et sicestverum.62
verum;secundoquodsitconditio
In order to win forthefluxusa non "realistic" perspective,Oresme
'
proceeds by distinguishingthree differentmeanings of successivum'
59Mostsolutions
ofthemeaning
ofvariousterms.Some
relyupona deep4analysis
1
motumacquiriin
passagesconcernthemeaningof velox("'velox' consignificat
f.33rb)andthecriterion
towhichtwodifferent
velocities
paucotempore",
according
are compared("equalitasvelocitatis
non attenditur
sed
penestotumacquisitum,
sicutconformiter
in motualterations
distantia,
peneslinemqua mensuratur
", f.
33va).
' distinction
60In thecow-argument
Averroes
between
andJorma
is
fluxus
formae
fluens
as oneofthesourcesofthisopinion:"Oppositum
considered
patet,quia motusest
in generepassionis
etCommentator
autpro
distinguit
quodcapitur
profluxuforme
formafluente,
utpatetcommento
f. 34vb.
quinto",
61"Aliaqueponitquodestfluxus
ad modumuniusforme
sicutessetalbedo
distincte,
velanimavel aliquodtale,estomnium
pessima;tamensi intelligatur
quodnonsit
talisformaveltalisres,sed modusvelconditio
tuncessetverissima
ipsiusmobilis,
et probabilioret faciliorinter omnes et concordatdictis Aristoteliset
f. 34vb.Eventhough
no explicit
reference
is madeto Buridan,I
philosophorum",
think
thatin thisfifth
hisposition;
themention
opinionOresmehasin mindexactly
ofalbedo
to be con(quotedexplicitely
byBuridanin thetextofn. 3) is toogeneric
sideredan allusionto Buridan'
s commentary
on Physics.
62F. 34ra.The twofold
involves
in somewaytheopposition
between
res
meaning
and modusrei/complexe
The interinherens/incomplexe
significabile
significabile.
offluxus
velmodus
as a conditio
onefromconsidering
pretation
ipsiusmobilis
prevents
it as a resdistincta
a permanentibus
, see alson. 71.
simpliciter
24

01:50:02 AM

inside an extended ontology - which includes, in addition to

substances and accidents, the modirerum- beings, qualities and modi
rerumwhich are successive in the strictestacceptance of the term.
where the mobileis labelled
In the firstacceptance of ' successivum',
as successivum
, we probably find the firsthint at a different
improprie
solution fromthat of the thirdopinion:
diciturtripliciter:
successivum
que sucprimo,improprie
pro re permanente
dicitur
cessivesecundum
successivum,
equaleesse,sicutmobiledummovetur,
loca...Aliomodominusimproprie
prorecuiusparsest
quiasuccedit
perdiversa
velin acquirisicutcaliditas
dumacquiritur
in factoetparsalia estacquirenda
sicsehabetquodillud
..Ettertio
dicitur
successiva.
proeo quodinnullotempore
quodfuitin primaparteestin secundaparte,sedquolibettempore
acceptoin
unaparteilliusestaliquidtaleilliussuccessivi
etinalia totaliter
aliud,etsicest
de tempore,
quia primaparsnonestquandosecundaest,ideo
ymaginandum
taledicitur
nonpermanens
sed in continuo
fluxuet transitu.63
In the thirddistinction
the modirerum
make, ifnot theirfirst,certainly
theirofficial,appearance in addition to substances and accidents; it is
a veryimportantstatement,because in the next question Oresme pro'
poses them as the proper denotation of motus
suntperse existentes,
aliesuntforme
aliesuntque
accidentales...
aliqueforme
velmodirerum
veltaliter
sehaberesicutquedamrelationes
dicuntur
conditiones
et huiusmodi.64
Oresme' s main effortin the following conclusions is precisely
directedto locating successive (in the strictestsense65)beings, qualities
and modirerum
in thiskind of ontology:the firstto be considered is the
weakest formof ontology,thatis the modirerum
, which include motion
63F. 33vb.In theseconddistinctio
a further
tothedifference
distinction
refers
between
a secundum
whichis identical
withthesecondandthird
quidandan absolute
meaning,
of the previousthreefold
distinction:
dicitur
"Adhuc successivum
acceptances
unomodosecundum
secundupliciter:
quidetcategorematice,
quandononpermanet
dumtotum,tamenaliquodeiussemperestpermanens
sicutilludcui fitcontinua
estaliudetaliudsecundum
sucadditioinquolibet
instanti
totum.
Aliomododicitur
alicessivum
et sincategorematice
se necsecundum
simpliciter
quodnecsecundum
ff.
sicutymaginaretur
de motuettempore",
quidsuipermanet
peraliquodtempus,
33vb-34ra.
64F. 33vb.See alson. 31 as faras relations
areconcerned.
65Thesuccessivum
secundum
"rationabile
estessealiquodsucquidraisesno problem:
cessivum
secundum
reivelsitverusmotus.Undepossibile
est
quidseu sitconditio
instanti
inaliquotempore
sitnovafigura
secundum
totum.
Similiter
quodinquolibet
si sitaccidens
sicutcaliditas,
undein quolibetinstanti
estaliqua
quandointenditur;
Similiter
etiamin substantia,
sicutin
que nondumfuit,licetparseius prefuerit.
tuncinquolibet
instanti
estaliinanimatis,
quandoigniscomburit
aliquodsuccessive,
secundum
se totum",f.34ra.
quisignisqui nonfuitantenecaliquidpermanet
25

01:50:02 AM

and sonusare the examples as faras qualities are

and time.66Illuminatio
concerned (accidental forms). It is not so easy, nevertheless,to single
out a respuresuccessivain the category of substance; in the example
Oresme proposes he is forcedto resortto a veryspecial casus in which
God is imagined to create a being, presumablya man, at each instant
of a continuously changing proportion.67This created being as a
whole ( aggregatum
ex omnibusistis) should be looked at as a successive
(in the strictestmeaning) substance, but it is difficultto see how this
aggregationcould be considereda singleman, as the textseems to suggest.68In the followingcorollary,Oresme tries to softensuch a difficultyby claiming forcontinuous beings a mereologycompletelydifferentfromthat of permanentbeings, quite similar to that regulating
the relationshipbetween a divisiblewhole and itsindivisibleparts,like
a line and its points or a time interval and its instants.69
In the ensuing discussion (where the dubiaare not used to confront
66''Secunda conclusioest de successivosimpliciter,
quod est aliqua conditio
successiva.
in motulocali
Probatur
primode motu,et estmanifestum
simpliciter
estin alioetaliolocoetquodcontinue
se habetaliteretaliter
quodmobilecontinue
a se", f. 34ra.The continuous
ofa proportion
seemsto be a purely
conchanging
tinuous
maioretb minor
etdiminuatur
beingofthiskind:"Secundo,sita quantitas
a successive;
a ad b habetaliametaliamproportionem
tuncinquolibetinstanti
ergo
talisproportio
et quidammodusse
que est per totumtempusdicitursuccessiva
et in nullapartetemporis
habendisuccessivus
habettaliter
essequaliter
se habetin
successivum
iuxtaexpositionem
f.34ra.
sequenti,
priuspositam",
ergoestsimpliciter
A similar
withparticular
reference
tothedenotations
ofterms
to
example,
according
which
thecomparison
isdrawn,
inthefourth
is tobe found
seethefollowconclusion,
It is in anycasenoteworthy
tostresshowthesetofthechangesin the
ingfootnote.
between
twoelements
is - likemotion- a respuresuccessiva
, different
proportion
fromtheelements
and presumably
notinhering
to them.
compared
67"Quarta conclusio:quod non implicaicontradictionem
nec est simpliciter
successiva.
Verbigratia:si a quod
impossibile
simpliciter
quodsitaliquasubstantia
estduplumad b diminuatur
nonestcontradictio
successive,
quodDeus creetunum
subiectum
velhominem
duravit
scilicet
quiprecise
quamdiua eritduplum,
persolum
etsimiliter
etsicde qualibet
aliaproportione;
instans,
quandoeritsesquialterum,
igiturtaleaggregatum
ex omnibus
istisessethomovelsubstantia
successiva
cuiusnihil
fuitin sequenti",f. 34ra.
quoderatin aliquapartetemporis
68A verysimilarexampleis mentioned
in Albert'sofSaxonycommentary
on the
contradictionem
, BookIII, q. 3: "non implicat
Physics
quod substantia
aliqua sit
hocestde termino
substantiali
successiva,
simpliciter
acceptoverificetur
significative
successivum.
immoforte
Patet,quia nonimplicat
contradictionem,
lyenssimpliciter
itaestquodSorcontinue
fitvelproducitur
a primacausarectesicutlumenvelspecies
coloris
velvisibilis
continue
estaliaetaliaimagoseuspecies,siccontinue
Sorestalius
et aliushomo",Albertus
de Saxonia,Questiones
, f.35ra.
69"Et dicocorrelane
nonestpars
quodin talibusilludquodestsolumperinstans
illiussuccessivi,
ad lineametinstans
sedse habetad illamsicutpunctus
ad tempus",
f. 34ra.
26

01:50:02 AM

the position in question with authoritative definitions as in the

previous questions), resand modusrei are carefullydiscriminated. In
the firstdubiumOresme maintains the equivalence betweenfluxusand
"aliterse habere
quamprius'', here called modusrei, to the extentthatthis
the truest if properly interpreted- is very similar to
opinion
Oresme' s own solution in the followingquestion.70 The hypothesis
, upheld
according to which thefluxusis a resdistinctafromthe mobile
in the second, fourthand sixthobjections, has untenable physical(ob.
2 and 6 with a never-endingregress71)or theological (because God
could not create anythingwithoutsuch a fluxus, ob. 472)consequences.
The equivalence betweenfluxus, " aliterse haberequam prius", and
reianticipatesOresme' s own solution in the following
modusseuconditio
question.
})
}s own solution:"motusestaliterse habere
7. Oresme
quamprius
' examined in the difIn addition to the various definitionsof ' motus

ferentopinions, fromthe beginningof thisdiscussion Oresme has con"

stantly resorted to the description aliter se haberequam prius".
' aims to mediate
Oresme 's proposal of a new definitionof 4motus
between the differentopinions previously discussed and is therefore
more general, so much so that the others, as we have seen, could be
formulatedin terms of 44aliterse haberequamprius".
This opinion, like the previous ones, is obviously not favourable to
a res-theory,and forthis reason it is essential to gain a precise deter70Thatis clearly
statedin thereplyto a con-argument
to which
is
according
fluxus
44Sedvidetur
notabletoexplainmotion:
quodnon,quia sufficit
quodillase habeant
aliterquamprius.Sed hocestconcedere
propositum,
quia postquam
oportet
quod
itasitinrequodaliterse habeatquamprius,illud'aliterse habere'vocatur
'modus
rei'", f. 34rb.
talisresexitinessesineadditione
71"Secundo,
sibi,quia tuncessetprosuperaddita
cessusininfinitum...
Solutio:negatur
talisres,
consequentia,
quiamotusnonponitur
sedsolummodo
modusquo aliquidse habetdumacquiritur
f. 34rb.
esse",
aliquod
72' 'Quarto,Deus nonpossetannichilare
unamremsuccessive
aliam,
quincrearet
scilicet
iliumfluxum,
et sicpossetarguide creatione,
quodnonpossetcreareunam
understood
as a respuresuccessiva
andaliter
se
duas",f.34rb.Ifproperly
quincrearet
habere
can notbe separated
neither
quamprius,
fluxus
bymotion,
byGod's absolute
tuncsi Deus
power:"tertio,sinttres:aqua, illefluxuset caliditasin alteratione;
in aqua circumscribendo
caliditatem
iliumfluxum,
tuncalteraretur
sicut
poneret
nunc,ergofrustra
poniturtalisfluxus.Responditur
negandocasum,quia, sicut
Deus nonpotestfacerequod aqua calefaceret
successive
quin haberetse aliteret
aliter,itanecpotesttollereiliummodmse habendiin casuposito",f. 34rb.
27

01:50:02 AM

mination of the meaning of "aliterse haberequamprius". It is a delicate

point in the discussion, because Buridan had grounded his betrayalof
the " nominalist'' cause as far as local motion is concerned just
because he needed to suppose a " referencemark" inside the mobilein
order to solve the casus of a rectilinearmotion of the universe as a
whole; this internalreferencemark, called sometimes disposition,is,
according to Buridan, differentfromthe mobileand inheringto it.
Oresme presents five differentsolutions concerning the proper
"
"
meaning of aliterse haberequam prius and discusses the different
problems raised by them. Firstly,a generic formulationpreventsone
fromdifferentiating
beings in motion frombeings at rest,since thelatter change their position with respect to the beings in motion. The
second solution, according to which the referencemark is fixedin one
or more beings at rest (" continue
se haberealiterad aliquidquiescens
"), is
refutedby Oresme on two differentgrounds: a formal(because of a
, rest being explained in terms of motion73) and a
petitioprincipii
one,
physical
supposing that the whole set of beings is moved.
As faras the physicalobjection is concerned, it is verysimilarto the
untenable as
one put forwardby Buridan who holds the mobile-theory
far as local motion is concerned, preferringinstead a ressuperaddita
inhering in the mobile.Notwithstandingthe complete overlapping of
Buridan's and Oresme's solutions to this problem (both are for an
internalreferencemark) and to the more general problem of motion
'
'
), Oresme
(for both the denotation of motus is a respure successiva
.
explicitly criticizes the inherence of this res successivato the mobile
There is in Oresme' s text no overt criticismof Buridan, but in Book
III, q. 6 he deems thefluxustheoryto be the worst theorywhen the
a
is
as
res
fluxus interpreted
superaddita
inheringin the mobile.Another
element in Oresme' s position permits one to grasp the difference
between this position and Buridan' s : Oresme is convinced that the
fluxus, properlyinterpretedas a modusseu conditioipsiusmobilis,could
in no way be separated from mobile
, not even by God's absolute
power.74
This differencebetween Buridan and Oresme lies in the different
featuresassumed byfluxusin theirrespectivetexts: even though they
73"Primo,quia tuncessetpetitio
etcum
principii,
quia queramquidestquiescere;
nisipermoveri",f. 33rb.
sitprivari
motu,nonpotestdescribi
74See n. 72. The sameremark
is tobe foundin theappraisalofthethirdopinion
inBookIII, q. 7, seebelow,n. 92.
inOresme'sfinalreview
solutions
ofthedifferent
28

01:50:02 AM

), for Buridan it is someagree about its successiveness ( ressuccessiva

an
near
to an accidental form),
accident
(or anyway
thingverynearly
while forOresme it is a modusseu conditioof one and the same mobile,
Oresme moreover does not hint at either the Parisian condemnation
of 1277 or God's absolute power.75
The fourthsolution76takes up the issue of the imagined space discussed in Book III q. 5 (where it is considered as a very rational
hypothesis77),and refutesit as untenable because it is contraryto
Aristotleand in any event not general enough to be utilized for all
kinds of motion.78
"
The " melioret vera solution, the fifth,leaves out of consideration
"
the external referencemarks and thus the "aliterse haberequamprius
:
refersexactly to a referencemark within the mobile
melioret veraestquod moveriestaliterse haberecontinue
quintadescriptio
suietnonrespectu
cuiuscumque
quamipsummobilepriusse habebatrespectu
extrinseci.79
The importanceof this move clearly emerges fromthe suppositiones
1

followingthe conclusion in which Oresme refusesto consider motus

:80
a respermanens
75OresmereliesuponAristotle's
toDe celo
andAverroes'
commentary
Meteorologica
withthe
of themotionof theheavens(together
forthepossibility,
respectively,
is attributed
tothe
oftheearth.Thelatter
earthexcluded)
andthemotion
elements,
oftheconwhichis responsible
interaction
between
contrary
qualities,
uninterrupted
oftheearth.In thethird
as tothecentre
tinualchangeofthecentre
ofgravity
arguseef.34va.The
mentthesimultaneous
beingsis imagined,
changeofallchangeable
to move
whereGod is entitled
to casusdivini
is limited
to thelastargument,
resort
thusanyexternal
evenifitis theonlyexistent
beingintheworld,lacking
something,
unumcorpusDeus possetiliummovere
reference
mark:"Quartosic:si sittantum
et nullumessetquiescens",f. 34va.
76The third
estquod
form
is an extended
ofthesecond:4'Tertiadescriptio
solution
si estvelsi esset",f.34va,forwhich
moveri
estalitersehaberead aliquodquiescens
arevalid.
theprevious
77See n. 57 objections
above.
78"Quartadescriptio
estquodestaliterse haberead aliquodspaciumymaginatum,
quiaperAristotelem
quodessetvacuumsinonessetibicorpus.stanonvalet:primo,
non
talespatium
nonestponendum
quia nihilest.Etiamilladescriptio
ymaginatum
nonse habetaliterad talespatium,
essetniside motulocali,quiailludquodalteratur
f. 34va.
et ita nonestgeneralis",
79F. 34va.In thetwofollowing
themotion
, Oresmeimagines
probationes
(localand
where
argument
qualitative
changeas well)ofonlyonebeing,as intheonlyprevious
God's absolutepoweris quoted,see above,75.
80"Ponoconclusionem
respermanentes
quodmotusestquedammutatio
preter
que
estsuccessiva,
'successivum'
sicutprius",f. 34va.
exponendo
29

01:50:02 AM

estquod nulladuo possuntinvicem

se haberealiter
supponoaliqua:primm
sitmutatum
estquodaliquid
aliquomodo.Secundum
quampriusnisialterum
sicutaliquid
potestaliterse haberead aliudsineeo quodipsumestmutatum,
solumpermutationem
et tuncestineo quedam
sitsimileveldextrum
alterius,
relativa
estquodnihilse habetaliterquam
conditio
que nonfuitante.Tertium
suiipsiusnisisitmutatum.
priusrespectu
Quartumestquodessesicmutatum
sui ipsiushabetaliquamconditionem
quampriusnonhabebat.81
respectu
The mobile'scontinuous internalchanges, which forOresme are the
modior conditiones
different
, are the ressuccessiva
required forexplaining
'82.
the meaning of ' motus
Oresme proposes the explicitequivalence between motion and modi
of the mobilein the final remarks of the casus of a single
or conditiones
body moving and being at rest alternatelyforan hour; it is not possible in thiscase to point an externalreferencemark in orderto establish
the differentposition of the body:
que noneratante,et hocvocatur
ergoin se ipsohabetaliquamconditionem
'movetur'.83
In the thirdargumentin favourof the equivalence between motion
and modusor conditioof the mobile
, Oresme maintains that only this
kind of solution may certifythe motion of the heavens and the condition of rest of the earth, given that their reciprocal position is also
explicable throughthe earth's diurnal motion.84Even the presence of
the mover's forceis not enough forOresme to establish which of two
bodies is moving,85because in a complex systemof moving bodies 81F. 34va.
82An examplein thereplyto thefirst
is veryimportant
to theunderobjection
ofOresme'sposition:"Quia solumestilludquod mobilehabetesseuno
standing
etaliashabetaliummodum,
etsecunmodo,idesthabetunummodumse habendi,
sicutdicimus
dumhocdicitur
alterum
a se improprie,
quodSorsedensestaltera se
a se ipsostante",f. 34va.
ipsostante,veldiffert
83F. 34va.We findthesamethinginthereplytoan objection:
"Secundo,arguitur
sic:sintduocorpora
a etb eta moveatur
circulariter
etb quiescatin primahora,et
in secundae converso:
tunca nonse habebitaliterad b in unahoraquamin alia,
sed omninoeodemmodo,in tantum
quod nullosensupossetpercipiquid eorum
etalterum,
nisiinunoponatur
alimovetur,
qua unummovebitur
pariratione
igitur
qua conditio
que noneritin alio,et hocvocatur'motus'",f. 34va-b.
84"Tertio,nonessetaliquaratioquareterranonmoveatur
motudiurnoet celum
uniusad alterum
movetur
patet,quiaomnishabitudo
quame converso;
consequentia
etaspectus
ex motuterre,
ideo,sicutdicebatur
priusquod
qui fitex motucelifieret
ideononpossetexperiri
utrumterramoveatur
circulariter
motusnonestsensibilis,
autcelum",f. 34vb.
85"Sed diceretur
ad istaquodquandosuntduoetunummovetur
etalterum
quiescit,
etvirtus
cuimovens
sua,etsicnonoportet
applicatur
ponerealiquodilludmovetur
f. 34vb.
quamconditionem",
30

01:50:02 AM

like thatproposed by Oresme of a man on a ship, runningin the opposite directionto the ship's motion - the virtusmotivacould not represent an effectivecriterion.86
It is only a hint,but it is neverthelessnoteworthy,because as Maier
has already pointed out,87even though it is not appropriate to interas a precursor of the
pret this position (rather than impetus-theory)
modern law of inertia,the motion regarded as a modusreicould in fact
have fostereda more kinematic analysis of motion.
We have already seen how Oresme' s proposal is largelyindebted to
ofthe fifthopinion, whicha new interpretationbrings
thefluxus-xhtory
into the "nominalistic" field; the other opinions as well, however,
could have contributedto the establishmentof his own solution. He
does not in any case excuse himselffromreviewingthem at the end
of this question, in which he puts forthhis own solution. In order to
establishthroughhis appraisal of these opinions a possible conceptual
route to his own solution, it is worth mentioningthese last remarks.
Relative to the firstopinion, the denial of motion is grounded upon
the limitationof one's ontologyto merelyrespermanentes
,88The second
if
even
opinion,
regarded unenthusiastically("licetparumvaleat"89), is
to
Oresme
meritoriousforclaiming more than a single elaccording
ement in explaining motion; the epistemologicalanalysis in Book III,
, confirms
q. 1,90in whichmotionsturnsout to be a complexe
significabile
the solutionof this second opinion and the importanceof such a move
forthe polemic against a res-theory.The fourthopinion too deserves
attention,even if only as far as alterationand augmentation/diminution are concerned; Oresme openly criticizesits refusalto consider the
' in local
mobileas the denotation of 4motus
motion.91
In order to bettercomprehend Oresme' s own solution, by far the
most importantopinions are, nevertheless,the thirdand the fifth.The
86"Hoc nonvalet,quia nonsequitur:
movensapplicaivirtutem
suamitafortiter
ut
moveretur
et mobilenonplusresistit
ergomovetur,
quia si hocsitin navimotaet
sitversusunampartem
et curratad alteram
tuncaliqueeiuspartes
equevelociter,
ettarnen
motivaestin operatione
virtus
sua sicutsi moveretur",
f.34vb.
quiescunt
87A. Maier,Zwischen
, 131-3.
88"Primaetiamdicitquodmotusnihilest;
capiendo'aliquid'proeo quodvereest
nonestenssedestentis,
est,sicutdicitAristoteles
aliquid,concedenda
quodaccidens
etiamquia nonestpermanens
sed successivum,
et de istisdicitur
'esse' equivoce",
f. 34vb.
89F. 34vb.
90See above,n.8.
91"Quarta,ponensquodest
etiamestvera,quiaunomodocapitur
acquisitum,
pro
sedfalsaestin eo quodnegataliamacceptionem",
f. 34vb.
acquisito,
31

01:50:02 AM

formeris never overtlyopposed by Oresme, who disagrees only with

99
its identificationof " aliterse haberequam prius with mobile
; in any
and
to
think
that this
exceeds
criticism
Oresme
seems
event, praise
third opinion is the most determined (or the most powerful) in the
The fifth,properlyunderstoodis, as we
struggleagainst a r-theory.92
have already seen, the best and the truestone.93
The only differencebetween the thirdopinion and Oresme' s concerns not, properlyspeaking, the denotationof 'motus9
, but ratherthat
of 4<aliterse haberequamprius99
, which he fixesin the modusrei, a respure
successivaas required by the nature of motion, and not in the mobile
,
a permanent thing, as in the third opinion (and in Ockham). The
Oresmian fluxusis not, nevertheless,identical to Buridan' s dispositio
,
9is forOresme
. The termlmotus
a sortofaccident inheringin the mobile
a complexe
, it is not a simple term,but a disguised oratioand
significabile
as such it cannot simply denote a substantial or accidental form.
As we have seen, the existence of modusrei, which for Oresme is
, is explicitly
equivalent to a fluxusand to "aliterse haberequamprius99
claimed in a specificconclusion of Book III, q. 7; we have, moreover,
seen how it is difficultto single out a successive (in the strictestacception) being in the category of substance. In the dubia presented by
Oresme in the fifthopinion, the identificationof a fluxuswith a res
distincta
fromthe mobileis eagerly refuted.It seems, therefore,thatthe
widening of ontology through the modi rerumnotwithstanding,the
modusrei is to be carefullydistinguished from beings such as those
included in the categoryof substance. The reply to the row-argument
of thisBook III, q. 7 hintsat the different
ontologyof the modusrei:the
a
such
modus
is not a " conditiorealis99
condition ( conditio
) expressed by
99
"
but a passio of the being.94
92"Tertia,que dicitquodestmobile,quia ymaginatur
quodaliterse haberenonsit
vel
nisiressicse habens,secundum
hochabetapparentiam,
quiaetiamistaconditio
sicutmultiymaginantur,
fluxusnonesttalesuperadditum,
necestresseparabilis
sicutestalbedo",f. 34vb.
quacumquevirtute
93See above,n. 61.
94"Dico quodsi iliaconditio
sitrelativa
extrinseci
nonsequitur
respectu
quodprosi tarnen
sitrespectu
sed sufficit
pterhoc sit mutatum,
aliquandoesse mutatum;
talisconditio
tuncestmutatum,
utdictum
est;necdicitur
realis,
suimet,
passio
'ymmo
conditio
between
etc.",f.35ra.Theidentification
') and
(whichis thesameas movetur
is to be locatedin the
passiocouldinduceone to supposethatforOresmemotus
thatOresme'
s position
is verydistantfromthe
of
I
however,
category
" think,
" modus pati,
to a reswhichis substantially
favourable
Jamosiorquotedby Averroes,
seeA. Maier,Zwischen
62-8.In thetextquotedinn. 80 Oresmestatesthat
,
theory,
respermanentes"
.
motionis a " mutatio
prter
32

01:50:02 AM

A notable remark by Albert of Saxony in his commentaryto the

PhysicsIII, 3, constitutes a working aid to the understanding of
Oresme' s position(and thisremarkconcernsa solutionto the problem
of motion which actually is not far from the one put forward by
Oresme):
motum
etitaponentes
nonessealiuda rebuspermanentibus
sedesseipsasres
et taliter
se haberead invicem
taliter
nonconcedunt:
"motusest
permanentes
denumero
beneconcederent
eorumquesunt,sednonde numero
ens",quamvis
entium.95
If we take seriouslyAlbert's indication - and there is nothing in
Oresme' s discussion to oppose it - there are two differentkinds of
thingsto be considered as faras motion is regarded: a respuresuccessiva
to be identifiedin the differentpositions (or dispositions) of mobilepositions(or dispositions) that exist as such, but are not entia- , and
the mobileitself,a real ens.96Oresme tries on his part to grant the
existenceof respuresuccessive
, as we have previouslyseen, but I do not
think that his solution is far fromthat described by Albert. If I am
right,we can conclude this paragraph by pointingout how Oresme' s
positionis substantiallyinspiredby Ockham's criticismof a res-theory,
taking however into account Buridan' s suggestion of considering
1motus'a res
97
puresuccessiva or a fluxus, but disregardinghis final restheory.

95"Notandum
tamenquod notanter
formo
sub hac forma:'utrumde
questionem
numero
eorumque suntaliasintpermanentia
de numero
etc.',nonsubhac:'utrum
entiumquedamsintpermanentia
etc.', quia non de omnitermino
significative
dequoestverificabile
'esse'estverificabile
'ens'.Statim
accepto
patethoc:de nomine
'exercitus'
'esse' sednon'ens', quia quamvis
significative
acceptobeneverificatur
hecsitvera:'exercitus
estens'", Albertus
de Saxonia,
est',hecestfalsa:'exercitus
, f. 34vb.
Questiones
96A distinction
ensandaliqualiter
between
ensperhaps
notfarremoved
from
Albert
ofSaxony'sis tobe foundin RichardBillingham's
: "Utrumidem<sit>Sor
quaestio
etSortem
esse":"Tuncad argumentum
'Sortem
esseestigiillud,negoillud,scilicet
turestaliqui,sedbenesequitur
Etpotest
concediulterius
quodsitaliqualiter.
quod
Sortem
esseestens,nontamenaliquodens,sedaliqualiter
ens",seeM.J.
Fitzgerald,
'
}
*
Richard
's Theory
'DeSignificato
from
PartV
Brinkley
ofSentential
Reference.
Propositionis
of his SummaNova de Logica
, Leiden 1987, 135 (Studienund Texte zur
desMittelalters,
seeG. Nuchel18; I givea different
Geistesgeschichte
punctuation,
man'sreview
ofthevolumein: Vivarium,
26 (1988),153-5).
97A distinctive
feature
oftenrequiredin themedievaldebateon motion,see A.
Maier,Zwischen
, 89, 92, 97, 112.
33

01:50:02 AM

8. Final remarks
9
Ockham regards the descriptionof ' motus as " aliterse haberequam
99identicalwith his
own;98Buridan uses this descriptionin order
prius
9
'
to state that motus is a fluxusand a respuresuccessiva.Oresme on his
part is whollyoriginal,as faras I know, in stressingthe identityof this
, which allows him to
fluxus with the modusseu conditioipsius mobilis
avoid a r^-theorylike Buridan' s and to maintain a unitarytheoryof
motion. This effortseems, however, not to have had a large following:
Albert of Saxony, even thoughmentioningfluxus," aliterse haberequam
99
prius and so on, in his discussion of motion prefersto distinguish
neatly between philosophical research (adhering on these grounds to
the mobiletheory),and casusdivini(accepting in thiscase Buridan' s res
theoryas far as local motion is concerned).
I have reported in some of the footnotessome possible sources of
Oresme' s doctrine of modusse habendi
; they are however neither the
nor
most
ones
the
probable. Anotherpossible source can
perhaps
only
be found in the discussion on the meaning of the proposition."
Oresme seems in factto depart both fromWilliam Ockham and John
Buridan on the meaning of ilaliterse haberequamprius99
, which is the
9 he
4motus
the
as
most
of
probable one.100The
description
proposes
ground forthisdeparture is probably to be foundexactlyin Oresme' s
choice of a modusrei-theoryas far as the meaning of the proposition
is concerned. We have moreover seen how the differencebetween an
was stressedby him over and over,
and a complexe
incomplexe
significabile
above all in order to avoid a restheorylike Buridan's. From a strictly
referentialpoint of view, the distinctionquoted by Albert of Saxony
way Albert's
permitsone to gather how Oresme' s (and in a different
of Saxony and Marsilius' of Inghen afterhim) position is more congenial to Ockham than to Buridan.
Richard Billingham is the supporterof a modusrei-theoryas far as
the meaning of the propositionis concerned;101it is difficult,however,
98See above,n. 8.
99G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
, 274-6.
oftheProposition
100On thedifference
between
seeM. McCordAdams,William
OckhamandBuridan
Ockham
, I, 305-10.
101J. M. Fitzgerald,
Richard
, 3-4,125-50(App.I andII). Themodus
Brinkley's
Theory
is thefirst
De significato
byPaulofVenicein thechapter
r-theory
opinionrecorded
inhisLogica
propositionis
Magna.SecundaPars.Tractatus
MagnaseePauliVenetiLogica
deventate
etfalsitate
etTractatus
designificato
, ed. F. Del Punta
propositionis
propositionis
and M. McCordAdams,Oxford1978,80-5.
34

01:50:02 AM

to determine precisely if Oresme' s direct source is Billingham.102I

thus limit myselfto pointing out a very interestingpassage fromthe
of Albert of Saxony, where he equates
Questiones
superArtemVeterem
modus
rei:
and
significabile
complexe
non significant
Tertiaconclusio:syncathegoremata
aliquamrem quae sit
sedbenesignificant
modumrei,quodab aliisvocatur
substantia
velaccidens,
verifican
de quolibetconPatethoc,nampraedicatum
complexe.
significabile
nonestaliqua
velremoveri
a quolibet
contento
subsubiecto,
tentosubsubiecto,
velaccidens,sedbeneestmodusreietdispositio,
resquae sitsubstantia
puta
benesignificant
etsicsyncathegoremata
subiecti
velpraedicati;
aliquid,proutly
existentiam
reised etiammodumrei.103
aliquidnonsolumsignificai
In the identificationof complexe
with modusrei, the comsignificabile
can be summarized:
demarche
of
on
motion
Oresme's
discussion
plete
'
III
where
Oresme says that 4motusis a comq. 1,
beginningfromBook
"
, until Book III, q. 7, in which the aliterse haberequam
plexesignificabile
" - that
is, what results from human beings' perception of
prius
motion - is identifiedwith thefluxus/res
puresuccessivaand then with
modus
seu
conditio
mobilis.
the
ipsius
The finalremarkabout the meaning of "aliquid" seems, moreover,
to confirm Albert's subtle distinction between " ens" and " esse de
numero
eorumque sunt" in the passage quoted above104fromhis com, or, at least, the different
ontologyof modirerum
mentaryon thePhysics
in comparison with substances and accidents in Oresme' s discussion
(a differencewhich preventsthe recourse to a rej-theoryformotion).
G. Nuchelmans' remark concerning Abelard' s position on the
meaning of the propositioncould mutatismutandiswell summarize the
4
102Contrary
toB. Hansen'sconviction
thatOresmeis perhaps
critical
against'the
natural
Nicole
to
B.
Oresme
and
the
Marvels
logicians'
approach
phenomena", Hansen,
A Study
mirabilium
with
Critical
Edition
andCom, Translation,
ofNature.
ofhis"De causis
Toronto
1985, 227(StudiesandTexts,68),I think
thatheiseffectively
mentary
using
thiskindofapproach
hereas wellas inother
seeS. Caroti,(<Peryodus"
e limiti
writings,
"
didurata
nelleQuestiones
etcorruptione"
diNicole
degeneratone
Oresme
, in:P. Souffrin
super
andA. Ph. Segonds(eds.),Nicolas
Oresme.
Tradition
etinnovation
chezunintellectuel
du
XIVesicle,
efilosofia
dellanatura
: i limiti
1988,209-36;id.,Nuovi
Padova-Parigi
linguaggi
delle
inalcunicommenti
attive
ad Aristotele
in
, in: S. Caroti(ed.), Studies
potenze
parigini
Medieval
Natural
di Nuncius.Studie
, Firenze1989,177-226(Biblioteca
Philosophy
testi,1). On thistopicseeJ. E. Murdoch,TheInvolvement
ofLogicinLateMedieval
Natural
inMedieval
Natural
, in: Studies
, 3-28.
Philosophy
Philosophy
103Albertusde Saxonia, Quaestiones
in ArtemVeterem
, ed. A. Muoz Garcia,
Maracaibo1988,500,767(Quaestiones
librum
Aristotelis
De interpretation)
. See also
super
Theories
G. Nuchelmans,
De 13de
, 241-2and H. A. G. Braakhuis,
oftheProposition
Eeuwse
Tractaten
over
Termen
, vol. 1, Ph.D. Leiden1979,488-90,n.
Syncategorematische
63.
104See above,note95.
35

01:50:02 AM

differencebetween Buridan and Oresme on motion, and particularly

on local motion:
between
therestheory
whichAbelardmentions
The difference
andhisownpositionmaybesummarized
thatforthereists
thesignificate
ofa propositio
bysaying
rerum
is a ressicsehabens
ina certain
state,whileforAbelarditis a quidam
, a thing
se, a certainstateofthings.105
habendi
modus
I cannot claim thatthe apparent originalityof Oresme' s positionon
motion may depend, at least partially, on our inadequate acquaintance with the medieval debate on this topic: many textsare eithernot
accessible in modern editions or not yet sufficientlyexplored. The
importanceof Oresme in the Parisian traditionfromBuridan to Marsilius of Inghen - which was a constantmodel forthe late scholastic
- requires neverthelessa deeper analysis of
thoughtall over Europe
where
his commentaryon the Physicsand above all of the quaestiones
motion is discussed. In the Parisian debate, Oresme' s authoritative
voice fostersnew perspectives which are not a mere repetition of
received convictions.
Apart from the originalityof Oresme' s solution, I think that the
importance of two elements of his discussion have to be stressed: the
and the probable appeal to philosophical
explicitrecourse to perspectiva
and semantic theorieslike those concerningrelationsand the meaning
of the proposition. These two elements deserve attentionby themselves, but they also urge us to a larger and deeper considerationof
the complexity of medieval natural philosophy, a field much more
interestingand complicatedthan what can resultfroman analysis only
concerned with the search of precursors rather than with deepening
our understandingof the historicalcontextfromwhere those theories
originated.106
Firenze
Istitutoe Museo di storiadella scienza
105G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
oftheProposition
, 219.
106The broadening
of theperspectives
on medievalnaturalphilosophy
in recent
toJohnE. Murdoch,
is tobe ascribed
see S. Caroti,Nuove
historiography
prospettive
leproposte
dellastoriografia
distoria
dellascienza
medievale:
diJohn
E. Murdoch
, in:Nuncius,
remarks
ofD. C. Lindberg,
TheBeginnings
,
(1992),231-52.See alsotheintroductory
1-4.

36

01:50:02 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
AristotelianCommentariesand ScientificChange:
The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of theNatural Motion of
Inanimate Bodies

EDITH DUDLEY SYLLA

Following the lead of Pierre Duhem, historiansof medieval science

have long studied the work of medieval natural philosopherswith an
eye to seeing how it led or did not lead to the emergence of modern
science in the seventeenthcentury.1If one accepts the view of Duhem
and others that quite a lot of good natural philosophy was done by
scholastic Aristotelians such as John Buridan,
fourteenth-century
Nicole Oresme, and Albertof Saxony at Paris, and Thomas Bradwardine, William Heytesbury,and Richard Swineshead at Oxford, then
the question may arise why it took so long formodern science to break
away fromscholasticAristotelianismto produce the new physicsof the
likes of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Edward Grant has proposed
that it was, in part, the commentaryformthat brought it about that
scholastic Aristoteliansabsorbed a multitude of small variations on
Aristotle without overturningthe whole system to replace it with
somethingnew and better.2
My project in thispaper is to studyscholasticAristoteliancommentaries on the Physicsto see the impact of theirform,and of the social
and institutionalcontextin which theywere written,on theircontent,
and on how they worked as a formof scientificpractice. There are
obviously too many commentariesof too great a length over far too
1 SeeJohnMurdoch,
Science
andPhilosophy
Pierre
Duhem
andtheHistory
ofLateMedieval
etnovecento
West
difilosofia
medievale
intheMedieval
, eds.R. Imbach
, in: Glistudi
fraotto
and A. Maier,Rome1991,253-302.
2 EdwardGrant,
World
in: History
View
Aristotelianism
andtheLongevity
oftheMedieval
form
of Science,16 (1978),98. Grantsuggests
thattheAristotelian
commentary
newideasinisolated
ofscience
it:burying
byatomizing
helpedtocausethestagnation
theanswerhe gave
neverrequiring
whether
a commentator
toaskhimself
contexts,
toother
wasconsistent
toonequestion
withthemoveshemadeinresponse
questions.
in
ofScienceannualmeeting
This paperbeganas a talkdelivered
at theHistory
EdwardGranton the
in November
1991ina sessionhonoring
Madison,Wisconsin,
was to examinethis
occasionof his sixty-fifth
Partof mymethodology
birthday.
on thisearlier
"Grantthesis."I wantto thankProfessor
Grantforhiscommentary
occasion.
37

01:50:12 AM

long a period to make a global studyofwhat was going on. The Jesuits
writing commentaries at the Collegio Romano, whose works, as
William Wallace has shown, influencedthe young Galileo, may have
had differentmethods and have worked in a somewhat different
institutionaland social context than, say, Buridan and Oresme at
Paris more than two centuries earlier.3 Here I can only do a case
study,to be joined at a later date by furtherstudies of different
questions and contexts.
I chose to begin with a study of the related commentariesofJohn
Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albertof Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen,
often classed togetheras the Parisian nominalists,because they are
oftenconsideredto be among the most outstandingfourteenth-century
scientificthinkersand we have commentarieson the Physicsby each
of them. I could not, however,do a comprehensivestudyof all of their
Physicscommentaries,so, wantingto consider a topic thatthe authors
themselves would have considered central, I chose a question that
degravibuset levibusof ca. 1475 called
Nicoletto Vernia in his Tractatus
the questiophysicagravissima
, namely the question of why heavy bodies
move
and
down
naturally
lightbodies up, a question whichis typically
.4
raised in connection with Chapter 4 of Book 8 of Aristotle'sPhysics
3 See William
A. Wallace,Reinterpreting
Galileo
ontheBasisofHisLatinManuscripts
, in:
A. Wallace,Washington,
Galileo
D.C. 1986,3-28(Studies
, ed. William
Reinterpreting
in Philosophy
and theHistory
ofPhilosophy,
vol. 15).
4 Anneliese
vonScholastik
undNaturwissenschaft
Maier,AnderGrenze
, 2nd.ed., Rome
etlevibus
degravibus
1952,144,quotingNicoletto
Vernia,Tractatus
, Venice1504:
"Haec questiointeromnesphysicas
est." In thispaperI go
quaestiones
gravissima
overground
Maierintheabovework,
butinaddialready
ablycovered
byAnneliese
at opinions
on thecauseofelemental
I trytoundertiontolooking
naturalmotion,
standthescholastic
Aristotelian
tradition
as a wayofdoingsciencewith
commentary
certain
characteristic
Forthetheoretical
whichtheauthors
context
within
properties.
I discusswereworking,
Anneliese
Maierprovides
an excellent
andthorough
survey,
whichI willnotrepeathere.Maiercovers,forinstance,
between
146,thedistinction
motus
between
perseandmotus
peraccidens'
perseandab alio; 147-48,between
potentia
essentialis
and potentia
actus
and actussecundus.
accidentalism
and, 149,between
primus
EdwardMahoneyhas recently
de
madea preliminary
studyofVernia'sTractatus
etlevibus
hehasfound
an edition
of1474or 1476,making
itVernia's
, ofwhich
gravibus
earliest
work.See EdwardMahoney,
andScience
inNicoletto
Vernia
published
Philosophy
andAgostino
di PadovanelQuattrocento
all'Universit
o, in: Scienzae filosofia
, ed.
Nif
Antonino
withGaetanoof
Poppi,Padua 1983,137-42.The workappearstogether
withVernia's
Thiene,De CoeloetMundo
, Padua 1474?.It waslaterprinted
together
Contra
Averrois
deunitale
Vernia's
Venice1505.In Nicoletto
intellectus,
opinionem
perversam
onJohnofJandun's
De animain: Historia
Annotations
MediiAevi
, eds.
Philosophiae
Burkhard
1991,573, Edward
Mojsischand Olaf Pluta,Amsterdam/Philadelphia
a copyofJohnofJandun's
onthePhysics
Mahoneyidentifies
questions
(Venice1488)
intheBiblioteca
found
atPadua(shelfmark
Sec.XV. 665)as originally
Universitaria
38

01:50:12 AM

Because, unfortunately,the only known copy of Nicole Oresme's

Physicscommentary is lacking Book 8, I was not able to include
Oresme in this study.5 On the other hand, I have a fourthrelated
author, namely the unknown author whose work was printedin Lyon
in 1518 and entitledQuestiones
subtillissime
JohannisMarciliiInguensuper
octolibrosphysicorum
secundum
viam.6Taking a cue fromthis
nominalium
title,which belongs to a work closely related to that ofJohn Buridan,
Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen, even if not authentically
by Marsilius of Inghen, I am calling the group to be studiedthe "Parisian nominalists,,,withoutwishing to attach any particularweightto
this label other than as one traditional for the group at issue.7
We are today in a vastly improved situation for studying the
Aristoteliancommentarypractice of the Parisian nominalistsbecause
of recent dissertations at the Free University of Berlin by Bernd
Michael and Jrgen Sarnowsky.8 In volume 2 of his dissertation,
Michael has done a magnificentjob of beginningto sortout the many
versionsof Buridan' s commentarieson the Physics
different
, as well as
of his numerous otherworks. Moreover, in volume 1 Michael breaks
new ground in discussing the nature of natural philosophical practice,
toVernia.I wanttothank
Professor
forproviding
mewith
having
belonged
Mahoney
ofthetextofVerniaandforencouraging
xeroxes
meto workon it.A studyofthe
Parisianfollowers
ofBuridansomewhat
similarto minehas beendonebyStefano
"de
Caroti.See hisDa Buridano
diInghen:
a Marsilio
la tradizione
delladiscussione
parigina
in: Medioevo,15 (1989), 173-233.Besidesconsidering
reactione"
howthetypesof
used on reactionvaryfromBuridanto Marsilius,Caroticonsiders
arguments
andatwhatpoint,influence
ofEnglish
of
whether,
philosophers
appears(specifically
Richard
Swineshead's
ofreaction)
treatment
andtowhatextent
discussion
ofreaction
is partofthelogico-calculatory
tradition.
CarotiusesPietroPomponazzi
foran early
backwards
ontheissue,whileI haveusedNicoletto
VerniaandGirolamo
perspective
Pico.I wasnotawareofthisearlier
workbyCarotiuntilafter
theearlier
drafts
writing
ofmyownpaper.
5 A Physics
inSeville,MS Colombina
7-6-30is currently
as by
commentary
accepted
NicoleOresme.See Anneliese
Galileis
im14.Jahrhundert.
Studien
Maier,Die Vorlufer
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik,
2nd.ed., Rome1966,307 ff.
6 Questiones
subtillissime
Marcilii
secundum
Johannis
Inguen
superoctolibros
physicorum
nominalium
viam
Frankfurt
am Main 1964.The authoris given
, Lyon1518,reprint
thefirst
nameJohannes
alsoin theexplicit
and tableofquestions.
7 In partial
ofthislabelitmight
be notedthatlogicalideasdo enterthe
justification
discussion
thatI studyat leastwithAlbertofSaxony.
8 BerndMichael,
Buridan:
zuseinem
Studien
seinen
Werken
undzurRezepLeben,
Johannes
tion
Theorien
seiner
imEuropa
desspten
Mittelalters.
Ph.D. Freien
Inaugural-Dissertation
Universitt
Berlin1985.Jrgen
Diearistotelischscholastische
Theorie
Berlin,
Sarnowsky,
derBewegung.
Studien
zumKommentar
Alberts
vonSachsen
zurPhysik
desAristoteles
, Mnster
1989.(Beitrge
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
undTheologie
desMittelalters.
N.F.
Bd. 32).
39

01:50:12 AM

both at the Universityof Paris where Buridan himselfwas active and

at the universitiesof Eastern Europe, where Buridan' s works became
textbooks. With regard to the Physics
, Michael firstdistinguishesthe
various versionsof Buridan' s expositionsof the text,in which Buridan
stays quite close to an interpretationof Aristotle's meaning. With
, Michael thenshows withouta doubt
regardto questions on the Physics
that the shortenedversions ( acurtate
) were done afterthe long versions
of the questions, most likelyin Eastern European universities,and not
by Buridan himself.9This leaves the long versions of the questions as
the documentsof greatestinterest.Since thereare long versionsof the
'
4
questions that call themselves the third" and the 'ultimate," it
, withquestions,
appears thatBuridan may have lecturedon thePhysics
at least four times. The most importantsingle version, then, is the
ultimalectura
, which is an ordinatioand is the version printed several
timesbeginningwiththe edition of Paris 1509. I will returnto the tertia
lecturabelow.10
While Bernd Michael has provided the whole contextforan understanding of Buridan's work,Jrgen Sarnowsky has provided a close
reading of Albert of Saxony's questions on the Physicsin particular.
For Albert of Saxony, according to Sarnowsky, there may also have
been two versions of at least of the firstfivebooks of his questions on
11
the Physics.
Moreover, Sarnowsky reportsthat Albert, whose questions on the Physicswere published at Paris in the edition of George
Lockert in 1518, was familiarwitha version of Buridan's questions on
the Physicsdifferentfromthe one that appears in the 1509 printededition, or, in other words, with the tertialecturaversion of Buridan's
Physicsquestions.12It is possible, indeed, according to Sarnowsky,that
in the ultimalectura
of his Physicsquestions, Buridan responded to parts
of Albert's questions on the Physics.13
9 BerndMichael,
Buridan
, vol. 1, 264-8.
Johannes
10Recentstudiesofthevariousversions
ofBuridan'sPhysics
commentaries
and of
theirrelationships
toeachotherhavealsobeenmadebyJ. M. M. H. Thijssen.See
Redaction
onthePhysics
Buridan's
and
J. M. M. H. Thijssen,TheShort
Questions
ofJohn
their
totheQuestions
Relation
onthePhysics
attributed
toMarsilius
, in: Archives
ofInghen
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
etLittraire
du MoyenAge,52 (Anne1985),238-53and264;
Tractatus
and Thijssen,
de infinito.
AnEdition
withan Introduction
and
JohnBuridan's
Indexes
1991,xviii-xix,
, Nijmegen
46-65,and 84-92.
11JrgenSarnowsky,
De aristotelisch-scholastische
Theorie
derBewegung
, 38-40,49-51,
439-41,451-60.See also AngelMuozGarcia,Albert
, in:
ofSaxony,
Bibliography
de Philosophie
Bulletin
Mdivale,32 (1990),161-89,esp. 174-6.
12Sarnowsky,
50, 58.
13Sarnowsky,
51.
40

01:50:12 AM

Not only is there a question of the ascription of entire works, but

some manuscriptscontain sets of questions on the Physicsthatcombine
questions elsewhere ascribed to Buridan with questions elsewhere
ascribed to Albert of Saxony. Thus Cesena MS Malatestiana S.
VIII. 5 begins withwhat Bernd Michael believes to be an older version
of Buridan's questions (preceding the tertialectura)up throughBook 7,
Question 3, and then continues with questions essentiallyidentical to
those printedas Albert's questions in the Paris 1518 edition.14Having
looked at the ErfurtmanuscriptSB Ampl. F 298, which is supposed
to be Buridan's tertialectura
, I can reportthat,at least forthe questions
in Book 8 about the motion of heavy and lightbodies, it is also quite
close to Albert's published questions.15
At least two possible explanations of these similarities spring to
mind. First, Albert, in composing his questions, may have been
heavily dependent on Buridan' s tertialecturaat least in the section of
concern to me. If thiswas the case, one would expect to finda similar
situationthroughoutthe earlier questions- somethingI have not had
the opportunityto check. Or, secondly,perhaps Buridan, in an earlier
reading of the Physicsdid not finish,and eitherAlbert finishedBooks
7 and 8 forhim, or a copyistused Albert's independent questions to
complete Buridan's work (or, third,Albertdid not finishhis reading
of the Physics
, and he or a copyistused Buridan's tertialecturato fillout
the unfinishedparts of Albert's questions). What is a fact is that we
have two manuscripts, in Cesena and Erfurt,with questions on the
Physicsboth ascribed to Buridan, both differentfromBuridan's ultima
14Michael,vol. 2, 568-71.J. M. M. H. Thijssen,in: Buridan,
Albert
and
ofSaxony
anda Fourteenth-Century
Oresme
Collection
onthePhysics
andonDe generatione
ofQuestions
etcorruptione
24 (1986), 70-84,assignsthewholeoftheCesenaB.
, in: Vivarium,
VIII. 5 Physics
Malatest.
toAlbert.
SinceI currently
haveavailableonly
commentary
less-than-ideal
microfilm
offf.lr-6rand BookVIII, ff.61-v-75v,
I havenot
prints
to settlethisdifference
ofopinion.
attempted
15I wouldliketothank
forallowing
metomakeprints
ofBookVIII,
JohnMurdoch
ff.39v-45r,
from
a microfilm
ofthismanuscript.
there
areslight
differences
Although
between
Erfurt
SB Ampl.F 298andthepublished
version
ofAlbert,
allinallI would
takethemtobeverynearly
variants
ofthesamework:theystartwiththesameprinreachsimilar
raisethesameobjections,
etc.BecauseI
conclusions,
cipalarguments,
was notconcerned
abouttheissueofcomposite
setsofquestions
whenI madethe
I didnotchecktheearlier
bookstoseeiftheyarealsothesame,butthequesprints,
tionlists,at least,appeartobe different.
thatthe
J. M. M. H. Thijssenemphasizes
in Erfurt
SB Ampl.F 298 is definitely
a copyofBuridan'stertia
lectura
,
commentary
whereas
thecommentary
inCesenaB. Malatest.VIII. 5 is not.Be thatas itmay,in
thequestions
ofconcern
to methetextsare structurally
similar.See Appendix
for
to Buridan'sQuestion4 and replies.
paralleltextsofthethirdprincipal
argument
41

01:50:12 AM

lectura
, and both ending up with sectionseitherhighlycorrelatedwith
or essentiallyidentical to Albert's questions. Based on my reading of
the questions on my subject as compared to Buridan' s ultimalectura
,
I mightguess that theyrepresenta later intellectualstage ratherthan
an earlier one, yet on Sarnowsky's view Buridan' s ultimalecturamay
have come after
Albertof Saxony's questions. This, clearly,is a subject
that requires furtherstudy.
With regard to Marsilius of Inghen the situation is also quite complicated. I have already mentioned the set of questions on the Physics
published in 1518 at Lyon ascribed to John Marsilius Inguen. The
same set of questions was published in Wadding's 1639 edition of the
works of John Duns Scotus, although it was understood at the time
that it was probably not Scotus's work.16These questions are not now
considered to be by eitherJohn Duns Scotus or Marsilius of Inghen,
althoughtheyseem to be intimatelyrelatedto the questions of Buridan
and Albert of Saxony.17 For Marsilius of Inghen himself,then, the
only known work on the Physicscurrentlyagreed to be by him is the
Abbreviations
, published at Venice in 1521. 18This workseems to be the
one cited by later Eastern European authors.19Given Bernd Michael's
16JohnDunsScotus,In VIIIlibros
Aristotelis
in Opera
Omnia
, ed.
Quaestiones
Physicorum
L. Wadding,vol. 2, Lyon 1634. Waddingsaysinter
alia, 1-4: "Praeterstylm
& methodum
faciliorem,
clariorem,
quamquaeScotisoleatesse,doctrina
ipsadiscormoduslongeinferior
estnervoso
acumineDoctoris
subtilis."
dt,& disserendi
17Anneliese
derScholastischen
Maier,ZweiGrundprobleme
, 3rd.ed.,
Naturphilosophie
Rome1968,277,acceptsthearguments
ofGerhard
Studien
zurSptscholastik
Ritter,
vonInghen
unddieokkamistische
inDeutschland
Schule
der
/,Marsilius
, Sitzungsberichte
Akademie
derWissenschaften,
Phil.-hist.Kl., 1921Heft4, thatthere
Heidelberger
aresuchdifferences
theviewsexpressed
between
in theLyon1518Physics
questions
and theknownviewsofMarsilius
ofInghenthatthelattercouldnotbe theauthor
oftheformer.
ShedoesnotrejectRitter's
thattheLyon1518
however,
suggestion,
editionmight
a sixteenth
ofan earliersetofquestions
represent
century
reworking
I wouldliketothank
meinformation
byMarsilius.
J. M. M. H. Thijssenforsending
concernine
theauthenticity
ofvariousworkson thePhysics
ascribedto Marsilius.
18Marsilii
Doctoris
resolutissimi
abbreviationes
odolibros
Aristotelis
,
inguen
super
physicorum
Venice1521.Stanislaw
RectoroftheCatholicUniversity
ofLublin,is curWielgus,
on a moderneditionof theAbbreviationes.
H. A. G. Braakhuis
of
rently
working
andM. Markowski
ofCracowareheading
an international
teamtoprovide
Nijmegen
moderneditionsof the mostimportant
still-unedited
worksby Marsilius.See
Maarten
vonInghen
zudergeplanten
, Bibliographie.
J. F. M. Hoenen,Marsilius
Appendix
Edition
derwichtigsten
Werke
desMarsilius
vonInghen
de Philosophie
ft1396)in: Bulletin
and M. J. F. M.
Mdivale,31 (1989), 150-95.See also: H. A. G. Braakhuis
ActsoftheInternational
Hoenen,eds.,Marsilius
Symposium
ofInghen.
organized
bythe
Centre
Studies
18-20December
1986,Nijmegen
Nijmegen
forMedieval
(CMS) Nijmegen,
1992(Artistarium,
Supplementa
VII).
19It wasused,forinstance,
Hesse.See Benedictus
Hesse,Quaestiones
byBenedictus
octolibros
ed. Stanislaw
Wroclaw
Aristotelis,
1984,xxxiii.
super
"Physicorum"
Wielgus,
42

01:50:12 AM

discussion of the origins of shortenedcommentarieson Aristotle,one

might ask, however, whetherthis is an abbreviation byMarsilius of
someone else's questions on the Physicsor an abbreviation bysomeone
elseof questions by Marsilius. If the lattercase is true, one would like
to find the original longer version. But in light of the incipit of the
work, and in lightof the questions here studied, I would suggest that
it could be an abbreviationbyMarsilius ^Buridan's questions or those
of some other Parisian nominalist.20
, as
J.M.M.H. Thijssen has argued that Marsilius's modusoperandi
seen in his questions on the Metaphysics
and on De celo, was to take
Buridan' s questions (there is a ninetypercentoverlap in one case and
a more than eightypercentoverlap in the other) as a point of departure forhis own solutions.21Recent authors have also proposed other
candidates for questions by Marsilius, for instance the Cuyk
manuscript, KruisherenkloosterC.12, but these remain so far only
suggestions.22In what follows,for Marsilius of Inghen I will discuss
as the work currentlymost closely associated with
the Abbreviationes
while
him,
referringto the presentlyunknown Parisian nominalist
author of the Questions
on thePhysicsof the Lyon 1518 edition as "John
Marsilius Inguen."
20f.2ra:"Incipiunt
subtiles
libriPhysicorum
edite
doctrinaque
pleneabbreviationes
a prestantissimo
Marsilioinguem
doctore
Parisiensi.
Prohemium.
Divina
philosopho
favente
misericordia
primaabbreviationum
parteminusmalequam potuiscripto
restt
eiusdem
ad secundam
libros
scilicet
manifestata,
accedere,
protectione
partem
naturalis
ac primealiquantulum
in qua talemservaboproabbreviare
philosophie
cessum:quod primophilosophiam
in communi
dividamet modmprocedendi
in
scientiis
ex phisicorum
manifestabo.
Secundoperordinem
indivisione
serprohemio
vatumpromeopossephilosophie
naturalis
librosParisiuslegisolitosabbreviabo."
Theworkends[40vb]"Expliciunt
subtiles
abbreviationes
Excellentissimi
Philosophi
MarsiliiInguenin octolibrosde physicoaudituAristotelis
emendate
St[r]agerite
maxime
a secundo
librocitraperMagistrum
diligentissimeque
recognite
Augustinum
Montifalconium
ordinisEremitarum
Sancti Augustini."I understandthese
statements
to implythatMarsiliushimself
madetheabbreviations,
notnecessarily
from
hisownsetofquestions
on thePhysics
thePhysics
as thencustomarily
, butfrom
'
was later'emended'
Montaughtat Paris. This abbreviation
by Augustinus
tifalconius
forprint.
21Thijssen,TheShort
Redaction
, 262.
22SeeJ. M. M. H. Thijssen,TheShort
Redaction
theascription
, 261-3,reporting
by
E. P. Bos,A Note
onanUnknown
Marsilius
'sPhilosophy
Manuscript
Bearing
upon
ofInghen
of
Nature
Kruisherenklooster
C 12),in:Vivarium,
(ms.CuyckandSt.
Agatha
(TheNetherlands),
17(1979),61-8.Thijssenalsoreports
thatMarkowski
hassuggested
ViennaNB MS
5437 as by Marsilius,
but arguesthatit maybe anotherabbreviated
versionof
Buridan's
on thePhysics
in theultima
lectura.
SB
questions
ThijssensaysthatErfurt
Ampl.F 357,ff.lr-95v,andCracowBJ743,98 ff.containthissameworkandnot
thelongquestions
secundum
ultimam
lecturam.
43

01:50:12 AM

For purposes of this paper, then, I have compared the commentaries of John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and
4
, Book 8, Chapter 4, withthe
'John Marsilius Inguen" on the Physics
idea both of seeing if I can determine theirmodusoperandiand to see
how the later commentariescompare to the earlier ones. Buridan has
the longest treatmentof the subject, followedcloselyby Albertof Saxony, with Marsilius of Inghen, and "John Marsilius Inguen" giving
much briefertreatments.
Of his thirteenquestions on Book 8 of the Physics
, Buridan's fourth
itself
an
moved
and fromwithin
asks
whether
animal
is
by
question
is
not
Aristotle
ex
an
a
but
inanimate
se
et
claimed).
heavy body
(as
(i
se),
In his fifthquestion, Buridan then goes on to ask whether a body
heavy in act in a high position may be moved perse by what[ever]may
move it throughremoval of the impedimentto its motions.231 will describe what Buridan does in some detail and then consider how
Albert's, Marsilius's and "John MarsiliusV treatmentscompare.
The scholasticAristotelianproblem of the cause of natural elemental motion was preeminentlya theoreticaland hermeneuticproblem.
As far as everydayexperience and common sense were concerned, it
was obvious that heavy bodies fall down of themselvesif theyare not
prevented, in the same way that the heavens rotate.24In Aristotelian
science, however, it was not enough to know the phenomena, one also
sought to know the causes of the phenomena. Moreover, Aristotle's
proofof the existenceof one or more prime movers (i.e. his proofthat
immaterial intelligencesmove the heavens) was taken as one of his
chiefachievements. In the course of proving that thereare unmoved
movers of the celestial spheres,Aristotleargued thatinanimate bodies
are not moved by themselves,whereas animals are. Elsewhere, however, he said that naturally moved bodies, by definition,have their
source of motion within themselves and that it is natural for heavy
bodies to move down and lightbodies up. In the Venice 1562 Edition
23Acutissimi
reverendi
Magisti
philosophi
Johannisburidanisubtilissime
questionessuperoctophisicorum
librosAristotelis
etrevisea magistro
diligenter
recognite
Paris 1509, reprinted
Johannedullaertde gandavoantea nunquamimpresse,
Frankfurt
a.M. 1964.f. 112va-113va:
animalmovetur
a se
"Queritur
quartoutrum
et ex se et nongraveinanimatum."
f. 113va-114vb:
quintoutrumactu
"Queritur
a quomoveatur."
sursum
moveatur
graveexistens
perseperremotionem
prohibentis
24Cf.Nicoletto
etlevibus
Vernia,Degravibus
, Padua1474?,f.175vb:"ItemCommentator.
..septimo
Phisicorum
commento
primodicitsensuapparetaliquamoveriex se
motora moto,sicutin quatuorelementis."
absqueeo quoddistinguatur
44

01:50:12 AM

of Averroes, the question of whether heavy and light bodies move

themselves is called by Marcus Antonius Zimara the seventh contradiction of Book 8 of the Physics.25The question of the cause of
motion of heavy and light inanimate bodies was one, then, that had
importantrepercussionsfor the rest of Aristotelianphysics.
In Book 8, Question 4 (whether an animal is moved by itselfand
fromwithinand an inanimate heavy body is not) Buridan firstgave
fourprincipal arguments that animals do not move ex se, that is that
theydo not have the cause of theirown motion withinthem, and two
principalargumentsthatheavy bodies do move themselves.26He then
distinguishedfoursenses in which a thingmightbe said to move exse.
The fourthsense, which he said expressed Aristotle's intention,was
that a thing is said to be moved ex se if it can be moved when
immediatelybeforeit was not moved, withoutat that moment requiring any extrinsicmover to begin its motion, although it may have
required an extrinsicmover earlier.27Taking to be moved exse in this
fourthsense, he then statedtwo conclusions, the firstthatit is possible
foran animal to be moved ex se walking or flyingor swimming,etc.,
and the second that in this sense heavy and lightinanimate bodies do
not move themselvesor are not moved ex se.2BAgainst the second of
25MarcusAntonius
indictis
etAverrois
Contradictionum
Aristotelis
Zimara,Solutionis
, f.
505r.Zimarasays:"Septimacontradictio
estintex.27.Aristoteles
dividit
motum
per
se in illudquodmovetur
ex se, id estperprincipium
existens
in eo, ut
intrinsecum
habentia
ab alio,id esta principio
ut
animas,et in illudquodmovetur
extrnseco,
suntinanimata.
..ubipatetde intentione
etCommentatoris
Aristotelis
fuisse
graviaet
leviamoveri
ab extrnseco.
Cuiustarnen
scribit
in infinitis
Commentator
oppositum
locis...DicimusnosistamfuisseAristotelis
indubitatam
sententiam
qui, in quaestionibus
arduisetdifficilibus,
utinquitThemistius
in 1 deanima
secundum
, loquitur
sermonis
etnonpermetaphoras.
In hocenimipseinplerisque
proprietatem
redarguii
Platonem.
Dico igiturquod proprie
illuddicitur
motumperse ex se quod apparet
moveri
ab aliquoprincipio
nullomotore
extrnseco
sensibiliter
movente
et
intrinseco,
sensibiliter
concurrente
ad talemmotum.Hoc autemestanimalibus
et
proprium...
hoc proprieapudGraecosdiciturmotumex se perse. Tale autemnonvidemus
accidere
inaliquoinanimatorum
sedsemper
videmus
movet
quodaliquodexteriorum
ipsa."
26For the thirdprincipalargument
thatanimalsdo not movethemselves,
see
Appendix.
27Buridan,f. 112v:"Quartomodoqui in proposito
estad intentionem
Philosophi
moveri
ex se quia potestmoveri
cumimmediate
antenonmoveretur
aliquiddicitur
motumsuumindigeat
movente
licetante
extrnseco,
absquehoc quod incipiendo
beneindiguit
movente
extrnseco."
28f. 113r:"Primaestquodpossibile
estanimalmoveri
ex se localiter
ambulando
vel
volandovelnatandoauthuiusmodi.
Constatquodcumhomodormit
velsedetipse
vel motui...ettamenposteavidemusipsum
quiescitquieteoppositaambulationi
necad hocrequireretur
motorextrinsecus.
Immocausain sicincipiendo
ambulare,
45

01:50:12 AM

these conclusions, he made a number of objections based on special

cases in which a heavy or light body mightbegin to move itself,for
instance ifit rottedthrougha beam or burned througha vase. Buridan
responded to these objections by admittingthat in rare cases heavy
and light bodies can initiate their own motion.29
In his fifthquestion, then(whethersomethingheavy in act in a high
place may be moved per se by whatfever]may move it through the
removal of the impedimentto its motion), Buridan began with seven
principal argumentsmostly fromauthoritywhy a heavy body is not
moved by itselfperse afterit is generatedand afterthe removal of what
prohibitsit fromfalling.30For the otherside he then argued that since
motumposttalemquietempotestessequia fumifacientes
sompnum
digeruntur
per
intrinsecum.
..ettuncspeciessensibiles
calorem
reservate
infantasia
velmemoria
possuntmoveresensumcommunem
ad actumcognoscendi
et sequitur
actusappetendi
et tuncab huiusmodi
sensuet appetitumovetur
animal...
et hec
aliqua extrnseca
omniasic moventia
animaleratintrinseca
vel intraipsum...Secundaconclusio
est
nonmovetse veletiamnonmovetur
ex
quodistomodogravevelleveinanimatum
se. Nunquamenimincipit
moveri
cumantenonmoveretur
commovens
quincurrant
concurrat
vel generans
scilicet
aut
[sic,butbetter
movens]extrinsecum,
gravitatem
levitatem
velremovens
prohibens."
4
29f. 113r: 'Deindeetiamarguitur
contrasecundamconclusionem
fortissime
per
casuspossibiles.
si supertrabem
pluresetdiversos
[1] Primuscasusponitur
ponatur
onus grave,tandemsinealio motoreextrnseco
illudonusfranget
trabemminus
debilemexistentem
et ex se removebit
et cadetdeorsumcum prius
prohibens
sursum...quia possibile
estquodilludgravemet
estalterativum
trabiset
quiesceret
et combustivum
et sic trabisvirtute
debilitata
tandemgraveillud
putrefactivum
trabem
etcadetcumantequiesceret.
Ita etiamsi sitexhalatio
franget
igneareclusa
subvaseadustibili
ut nonpossitascendere,
urereilludvas
ipsasic tandempoterat
illudvas et ascendetilla exhalatio.Et ita illa exhalatiolevis
quod perforabitur
removebit
suumprohibens
sinemotoreextrnseco
et ita de factovivumargentum
in vasestagneo
velplumbeosicagetinvas quodtandem
positum
perforabit
ipsum
et cadet.Et hocmodosuntaliicasusmulticonsimiles
in quibusgravevelleveper
virtutem
suam et sibi intrinsecam
sine alio motore
potestmovereprohibens
extrnseco...
Et itavidetur
nonsituniversaliter
verased
quodistasecundaconclusio
sic potestmodificari
quod raroet in paucioribus
contingit
quod graveet leve
inanimatum
movere
se sinepresenta
etconcursu
motoris
posteiusquietem
incipiat
sedsepeet in multis
animaimovetetpotestmovere
se de locoad locum
extrinseci,
sineindigentia
motoris
extrinseci
concurrents
ad incipiendum
motum."A similar
counter
a beamsupporting
itis mentioned
exampleabouta heavybodybreaking
by
in OperaOmnia
, ed. P. CaroloBalieet al., vol. VII,
JohnDuns Scotus,Ordination
Vatican1973,361-2.
30In Question4, a bodyis saidtomoveexseifithasthesourceofitsmotion
within
itself
rather
thanexternally.
ofabalio.HereBuridan
So exseis theopposite
hasaddithatheavybodiesmovethemselves
in mindearlierarguments
in
tionally
peraccidens
inthesensethattheymovethemedium,
whichin turncausesthem
naturalmotion
intended.
In thissense,then,
to move:theirmotion,
then,is notwhatis primarily
ofperaccidens,
anditisanadditional
characteristic
perseistheopposite
beyond
moving
exse.
46

01:50:12 AM

these bodies are moved naturallytheymust be moved by theirnature

or substance.31By way of reply,he began by proving that when what
prohibitsthe motion has been removed, the heavy body's motion cannot be continuedby the generator,by the removerof the impediment,
by the natural place, by the heavens, or by the medium. By process
of elimination,then, it remained that the heavy body must be moved
down by its heaviness.32Finally, he determined the senses in which
this motion could be said to be perse: the motion may be perse in the
sense of being in accordance with the body's nature, but it is not per
se in the sense that nothingbut the heavy body is involved.33
Overall, Buridan' s approach to and solution of these questions is
surprising,because he statedin replyto the fourthquestion thatin one
sense, albeit not the sense Aristotleintended, heavy bodies in natural
motion do move themselvesjust as the heavenly spheres move themselves and animals move themselves.34In each case, there is an internal distinctionbetween mover and moved, as Aristotlehad argued
must be the case. Taking the heavens as the combination of the
spheresand the intelligences,Buridan said that the intelligencesmove
the spheres, the souls move the bodies of animals, and the formsof
heavy bodies move theirmatter. He did not respond to the thirdprin31f. 113v:"Oppositumarguitur
naturaliter,
quia illucigravemovetur
igiturper
suamnaturam.
Et naturareiestde eiussubstantia;
estenimmateria
velforma
eius
utpatetsecundohuius.Igiturmovetur
et hocestmoveri
persuamsubstantiam
per
se."
4
32f. 114r: 'Ultimaconclusio
estquod gravesic movetur
deorsum
a sua gravitate
etlevesursum
immediate
a sualevitate,
conclusionibus
conquia predictis
negativis
cessisnonapparet
a quo debeamus
aliudrestare
dicerequodgravevellevemoveatur
activeet proprie."
33f. 114r-v:"Uno mododicimus
alicuiperse quia convenit
sibi
aliquidconvenire
naturesue convenientem.
.. Et isto modo
per suam naturamvel dispositionem
diceremus
exmateriam]
gravemoveri
persedeorsum,
quiapersuamnaturam
[correxi
etquia etiamillemotuset locusqui periliummotum
estconveniens
sue
acquiritur
idemquodsolitarie...
forme,
que estnaturaeius...Secundomodoperse significat
Et secundum
istamlocutionem
possetdiciquodgravemovetse perse quia licetin
motum
concurrat
benemovens
tamenpostnonoportet
extrinsecum,
incipiendo
quod
concurrat
movens
extrinsecum.
Etsicsolumgravemovet,
nonsicsolumquingravitas
moveatque tamenestalia ab ipsogravi,sed sic solumquia nonconcurrit
movens
extrinsecum.
Sednonperse,scilicet
movetur
solitarie,
quodindiget
quodetiamaliud
extrinsecum
scilicet
moveatur,
medium,
quia dividitur
quod resistit."
34Thisis according
to thethirdsensein whichto be movedexsemaybe taken,f.
112v:"Tertiomodopotestintelligi
a se etex se quia comquod aliquidmoveatur
ex motore
etmotoetpartibus
ponitur
quarumunamovetaliam,etsicdicoutprius
etc.movetur
ex se etetiamanimai,quia animamovet
quodcelumprocongregato,
corpus,et etiamgraveinanimatum,
quia formamovetmateriam..."
47

01:50:12 AM

cipal argument in the fourth question that in both animals and

elements there is nothing moved in act, since in elements there is
nothingbut substantialformand prime matter,and, ifthe soul is the
only substantial formof an animal, it is also the case in animals that
there is nothing in act to be moved- he did not respond because, in
his replyto the question, he as much as admittedthatthereis a mover
and somethingmoved in heavy and lightbodies as in animals.35Thus,
in thispart of his solutionto theproblem, Buridan seems to have given
up an essentialclaim of Aristotelianphysics- at least as understoodby
previous commentators- without thoroughlyarguing his case.
Ernest Moody, in the preface to his edition of Buridan' s On the
Heavens, describes Buridan's styleas ' 'diffuse,leisurely,and personal
in tone," and he says that Buridan:
no particular
or scholastic
sect,andtohave
appearstohavefollowed
authority
utilized
theideasandarguments
ofhispredecessors
andcontemporaries
forthe
endofthediscovery
andstatement
ofthetruth
thethings
concerning
philosophic
thathumanreasonandexperience
whichare,to theextent
themethod
afford
forthisenterprise.36
and thematerials
This characterizationmightalso be applied to Buridan's questions
. In the questions under consideration, Buridan seems
on the Physics
not to have been under much stressto defendhimselfagainst opposing
views, as is exemplifiedby the factthat he did not deal with the issue
of prime matter not being a suitable entityto be moved. The only
previous commentatorhe identifiedin the two questions under considerationis Averroes,called "Commentator."37 AlthoughBuridan's
position was differentfrom that of Aristotle and Averroes on this
his position from
point, he did not self-consciouslytryto differentiate
that of anyone else. Having stated what he said were Aristotle'sconclusions, Buridan went on to recite other differencesbetween the
motion of animals and the elements as they had been mentioned by
35See Appendix.
36Iohannis
Buridani
de CeloetMundo
, ed. Ernest
Quaestiones
superLibrisQuattuor
MA 1942,reprint
NewYork1970,xiv.
Moody,Cambridge,
37Seee.g. f.112v:"Formaenimestmotor
etmateria
estmotautdicitCommentator
estetiamperhocquia ipsummovetur
a principio
quartohuiuset hocmanifestum
intrinseco
veletiamgravitas
estintrinseca
etiamsi
quia forma
ipsigravi.Et oportet
nonmoveretur
a principio
intrinseco
nonmoveretur
sedviolenter.
naturaliter
Ergo
exse. Itemintertio
movetur
CelidicitCommentator
se inquantum
quodlapismovet
estactugravisetmovetur
secundum
deorsum.
Etiaminquarto
quodestinpotentia
Celidicitquodingraviminusdistinguntur
motoretmotum
quaminanimali.Ergo
ex se quamanimal."
eque velmagislapismovetur
48

01:50:12 AM

Aristotle- forinstance that animals can move with contrarymotions

and rest of theirown accord in opposing positions, whereas elements
cannot. An animal, said Buridan, can move fromhome to churchand
back again, whereas a heavy body only moves downward. Buridan
finishedthe determinationof Question 4 by saying, 4'These are the
conclusions and their expositions posited here by Aristotle."38
Against Buridan' s firsttwo conclusions in question 5, that neither
the generatornor the removerof the impedimentcan be the cause of
the continued downward motion, it was objected that it is manifestly
opposed to Aristotle'sconclusions that heavy and lightbodies are not
moved by themselvesbut by their generator or the remover of the
impedimentto theirmotion.39Buridan replied to this that according
to Averroes, when the generator gives the body a form it gives it
everythingthat followsfromthat form,so that the generatorwill act
in this indirect sense. Perhaps Aristotle's intent was not that the
generatorcontinuesto act during the natural motion, he went on, but
only that it gives the body its motive power, namely its form and
heaviness.40
Having reached the conclusion that heavy and light bodies are
moved by theirheaviness and lightness,Buridan raised the possibility
that instead these bodies mightbe moved by theirsubstantialforms,
but, he said, thisappears not to be the case, since the Eucharist, without any substantialform,continuesto falldown as beforeand likewise
water vapor rises despite having the substantial form of water. He
recommended that the reader look at his fifthquestion on Book 2 of
the Physicsfora fullertreatmentof this issue, where he speculated that

38f. 113r: "Itemquodsicmovetur

se motibus
contrariis
sucexse potestsicmovere
de
et postrevertendo
cessive.Sic autemanimalmovetse utde domoad ecclesiam
nonmovetse... Istesuntconcluecclesiaad domum.Sic autemgraveinanimatum
sioneset earumdeclarationes
positehicab Aristotele."
39f.114r:"Sed tudicesquodisteconclusiones
suntmanifeste
contra
Aristotelem
qui
et faciente
dicitsicquodgraviaet levianona seipsismoventur
sedaut a generante
et prohibentia
solvente."
graveet leveaut ab impedientia
40f. 114r: "Et Commentator
dansformam
datomnia
superhocdicitquodgenerans
formam
dictum
estsecundo
quorumunusestmotuslocalis.Itemsolutio
consequentia
secundummuitos
huiusquod aliquiddiciturrespectualicuiusagensimproprie
dicitur
modosattributionum.
Generans
movere
diversos
igitur
ipsumgravead istam
intentionem
nonquodampliusagataliquidin ipsumgravequandogravemovetur,
sed quia egitipsigravidandomotivm,
vel gravitatem,
scilicetformam
a qua sic
ad talemsensum
movetur
dicitur
moveri
a
etiamforte
Similiter
generante
corrupto.
.. "
removente
prohibens.
49

01:50:12 AM

in some cases the substantial form acts and in others the accidental
formof heaviness or lightnessacts.41
Elaborating on the conclusion that heavy and light bodies are
moved by theirheaviness and lightness,Buridan went on in Book 8
Question 5 to say that although a heavy body does need an extrinsic
cause to start its motion (either the generatoror the remover of the
impediment),neverthelessafterthe startit is the heaviness thatmoves
the body. Aristotleand the Commentator, in sayingthatheavy bodies
do not move themselves,probably had in mind, he said, the factthat
a heavy body does not taketimeto move down unless a medium resists,
and indeed in this way animals are differentfromelements because
41f. 114r:"Si enimaliquisdiceret
a sua forma
substantiali,
apparet
quodmovetur
sica sua gravitate
vellevitate.
Undein
magisapparetmoveri
quodnon,veltarnen
in hostiaque anteessetin
sacramento
altarisnonmanetaliquaformasubstantialis
caderetdeorsumsicutante.Et fortequia vapor
ea et tarnen
quia manetgravitas
estlevismovetur
elevatus
ab aqua estadhucsubstantialiter
quiafactus
aqua ettarnen
substansursum
etnonad locumnaturalem
aque,ideosicnonmovetur
performam
recurrendum
est
Tamenquidde hocultrasitdicendum
tialemaque sedlevitatem.
forms
are
secundi
libri."In Book2, he saidthatsubstantial
ad quintam
questionem
buttheymaynotbe the
withtheir
ofactionforeffects
theprinciples
nature,
agreeing
form
would
is foreign
tothem.In thiscasethesubstantial
causeiftheeffect
principal
ofwatervapor.
butnotofitsriseintheform
causeofthefallofwater,
be theprincipal
initself
form
intimated
thatsincetheaccidental
In thecaseoftheEucharist,
Buridan
Godmayactmiraculously
toproduce
theobserved
effect,
along
maynotbe sufficient
form
wouldotherwiththeaccidental
form
tosupplytheactionsthatthesubstantial
mislabelled
xxiiandxxiii:"si terra
wisehavecaused.Book2,Question5, ff.32r-33v,
utrum
substantia
terre
movet
se active
descendit
naturaliter
deorsum
existens
sursum
nonestprin... videtur
michidicendum
substantialis
velgravitas
primoquodforma
et quietessibidisconvenientes,
quia potius
cipiumperse activumad mutationes
substantialis
est
etinclinaret
ad oppositum...
Seddicendum
estquodforma
resisteret
sibiconvenientes...
His visisconcludendum
est
activum
ad mutationes
principium
et
activaad mutationes
tertioquod forme
substantiales
suntprincipia
principaliter
Ad tertiam
credoesse
et nonaccidentia
eis coniuncta...
quietessibiconvenientes
si sitagensextrinsecum
activevaporem
sursum
nonestnisi
dicendum
quodmovens
levitaset fortecaliditasad quam consequitur
levitas,et formasubstantialis
aque
se ad
tamcaliditatem
etreducens
etcorrumpens
quamlevitatem
magisestresistens
Adsextm
concedi
benemoverent
sibiconvenientem...
statum
potest
quodaccidentia
conetquodcumeisnonoporteret
ad movendum
substantiali
licetessentsineforma
aliudprincipale
currere
agenssivemovensquamDeum...etcumhoc
principaliter
Deus etiammiraculose
actiones
que
potestdiciquod in talibusmiraculosis
" supplet
The sixthprincipal
si illa essetsub illisaccidentibus.
essenta formasubstantiali
was:"Itemmagnum
towhichthislastpassageisan answer,
argumentum
argument,
de sacramento
altarisvidelicet
ad propositum
estex eo quodfidecredimus
quodibi
sibisubiectam
ettamenitaagunt
substantiam
accidentia
nobisapparentia
nonhabent
scilicetgravitasmovendodeorsum,caloret sapor
et moventsicutsi haberent,
calefaciendo
vel frigefaciendo
movendosensum,vel frigiditas
tanquamsubstantia
faciunt
hecomnia."
sed quod illecaliditates
subiectanichilad illosmotusconfrt
50

01:50:12 AM

animals have an intrinsicresistance and so do not need an external

medium to move over a period of time. Thus although a heavy body
does not need an external mowr to continue its motion downward, it
does need an external moved body, namely the medium.42
In sum, takingBuridan' s treatmentof this question in isolation, he
seems to be pursuing physical truthabout the cause of the natural
motion of the elements- and to be bringing in particular cases such
as a weight breaking a beam to move down or fireburning through
a vase to move up- , while at the same time he interpretsAristotle's
textso thatAristotle'sintentis understandable and not opposed to his
own conclusions, initial impressionsto the contrarynotwithstanding.
Aristotle said that the elements do not move themselves in natural
motion. Buridan says theysometimesdo move themselveseven to the
extent of startingtheir own motion, but they can only move in one
directionand they need an external resistance if they are to move in
time: whateverAristotlesaid, Buridan implies, was not fundamentally
opposed to such conclusions.
If I turn now to Albert of Saxony's treatmentof the same issue to
see if it fitswith my initial interpretationof Buridan' s position, two
42f. 114v:"Et secundum
istamlocutionem
possetdiciquodgravemovetse perse
motum
concurrat
benemovens
tamenpostnon
extrinsecum,
quialicetinincipiendo
movens
etsicsolumgravemovet:
nonsicsolum
extrinsecum,
quodconcurrat
oportet
moveat
que tamenestaliaab ipsogravi,sedsicsolumquianonconcurquingravitas
ritmovens
extrinsecum.
Sednonperse,scilicet
movetur
solitarie,
quod[sic,butbetter
scilicet
moveatur,
medium,
quodetiamaliudextrinsecum
quiadividitur
quin]indiget
Undevidetur
esseintentio
Aristotelis
etCommentatoris
inquartohuius
quodresistit.
nonessetmotussed mutatioinstantanea.
Sic autem
quod nisimediumresisteret
animalpossetmoveri
movendi.
Sed
perse a seipso,quiaex seipsohabetresistentiam
verum
estquodde facto
animalmovetur
nisiillud
semper
permedium
quoddividitur
mediummoveatur
cumeo quia cumnonpossitnaturaliter
essevacuum,animal
habetundiquecorpussibicontiguum
motoanimali
dividisinon
semper
quodoportet
cumanimali.Aliter
essetpenetrado
moveatur
Sedtamensicestdifferentia
corporum.
non
quantumad hoc interanimalet graveinanimatum,
quia graveinanimatum
habetexse resistentiam
velieAristoteles
etCommentator
proutvidetur
quartohuius.
Ideo si mediumextrinsecum
nonessetmotusequesuccessio.Sed
nonresisteret
animalexcorpore
suohabetresistentiam
animemoventi,
ideoessetmotus
etsuccessio
extrinsecum
nulliusessetresistentie.
Et videtur
michi
temporalis
quamvismedium
voluitnobisAristoteles
notarein illaultimarationequam
quod istamdifferentiam
nonmovetur
ex se,sedanimalbene,
posuitad probandum
quodgraveinanimatum
scilicet
necesseest,si aliquidmoveatur
ex
quia si debeatessemotuscumresistentia,
sescilicet
sineindigentia
motoris
extrinseci
etmotiextrinsici,
quodipsumsitdivisibile
inpartem
et partem
perse moventem
perse motam,intelligendo
perpartem
perse
motamillamque ex se habeatresistentiam
motori.Sic enimbenedivisibile
est
animai,sed nongraveinanimatum."
51

01:50:12 AM

aspects of Albert's treatmentare immediatelynoteworthy.Firstof all,

Albert's treatmentis verycloselyrelatedto Buridan' s , althoughAlbert
reorganized the material somewhat by dividing Buridan' s firstquestion into two, firstasking whetheranimals are moved by themselves
and then in a second question asking whetherheavy and lightbodies
are moved by themselves. With regard to the motion of animals,
Albert's fourprincipalargumentsare the same as Buridan' s fourprincipal arguments on the same issue and arranged in the same order,
includingthe same objection and replyto the thirdprincipadargument
concerningthe impossibilityof dividing an animal into a mover in act
and a moved thing in act.43 Overall, Albert's treatmentof the issue
is perhaps twenty percent shorter than Buridan' s and it is more
logically organized.
Comparing the printedversions of the two texts,it does not appear
thatAlberthad Buridan' s textbeforehim as he wroteand copied from
it, but, judged by content, both men are clearly workingwithinthe
same intellectualcontext. Here, however, I must take note ofJrgen
Sarnowsky's assertion that Albert was workingfromBuridan' s tertia
lecturaand of my observation that the relevant questions in the copy
of Buridan's tertialecturafound in ErfurtSB MS Ampl. F 298 have
essentially the same structure as the printed version of Albert's
commentary.44
Keeping the ambiguous status of these questions in mind, let me
point out several of theirinterestingaspects, continuingto assume, at
least for the time being, that the author is Albert of Saxony. First of
all Albert said clearly in introducing his determinationof the first
question that:
Thisquestion
is notraisedforanyotherreasonexceptso thatitmight
be seen
howAristotle's
statement
thatanimalsaremovedbythemselves
butinanimate
sinceinbothcasesthebodyis moved
heavybodiesarenotis tobe understood,
in it and intrinsic
to it.45
byitsforminhering
43Forthethirdprincipal
and reply,see Appendix.
argument
44I have puttogether
a comparison
of thetwoworksand of Cesena,Malatest.
S.VIII. 5, showing
how,albeitwithvariants,
theyparalleleachotherfrom
argument
toargument,
conclusion
toconclusion,
andobjection
toobjection,
butI do nothave
included
intheAppendix
spacetoincludeithere.I have,however,
paralleltextsfor
thethirdprincipal
to Buridan'sQuestion4 and repliesto it.
argument
45AlbertofSaxony,Questiones
eximii
Doctoris
Alberti
deSaxonia
inodolibros
Magisti
Aristotelis
etdecisiones
..recognitae
virorum.
, in: Questiones
physicorum
physicales
insignium
etemendatae
rursus
summa
accuratione
etiudicio
Lokert
Scoti
, Paris1518,f.
Magisti
Georgii
79v: "Ista questionon est motapropter
aliudnisiut videaturquomododebeat
52

01:50:12 AM

Like Buridan' s ultimalectura

, Albert's solution was that the difference between the two cases is that heavy bodies must have
immediate initiatorsof theirmotion (the generatoror the removerof
the impediment),whereas animals can initiatenew movementon the
basis of images stored in memory. While Buridan' s ultimalecturagave
a complex answer concerning the respective roles of the substantial
form and of the heaviness and lightness in causing these motions,
Alberttook the simplerposition,which he said was common, that the
heavy body is moved principally by the substantial form but
instrumentallyby the heaviness.46 Albert made more explicit than
Buridan' s ultimalectura
, moreover, the potential problem with this
solution if, in both animate and inanimate bodies, the mover is the
substantial form and what is moved is only prime matter, not a
suitable candidate for a moved thing in the Aristotelian system. In
Albert's version, the thirdprincipal argument that an animal is not
moved by itselfstates that:
toAristotle
in thiseighth
bookeverymovedthingis divisible
Third,according
in a persemoverandina partpersemoved,butthisis notthecasein animals,
an
therefore
animalsare notmovedby themselves.
Proofoftheantecedent:
animalis divisible
thesoulis not
intoa bodyanda soul,butthebodywithout
movedbyitself
becausewhatever
is tobe movedbyitself
oughttobe an entity
in actthrough
someform,
thesoul,itappearsthatthebodyis not
butwithout
in actbyanyform.
Andifitis saidthatalthough,
without
thesoul,itis notin
actbyanysubstantial
and
nevertheless
form
itis inactbysomeaccidental
form,
thissuffices,
thenan inanimate
heavybodywouldbe
[I say]no,ifthissufficed
orcouldbe saidtobe movedbyitself,
book.
which
Aristotle
deniesinthiseighth
Theinference
into
isproved
heavybodyisdivisible
bythefactthataninanimate
a partmoving
and intoanother
byitself,
namelyitsform,
partthatis moved,
whichis still,without
theformmovingby itself,
in act by someaccidental
form.47
In reply to this principal argument, Albert denied the minor, i.e.
that an animal is not divisible into mover and moved, and asserted
that in factan animal is divisible into a part perse moving and a part
perse moved, denying that, without the soul, the body is not in act.
On the contrary,he said, it sufficesthatit is an entityin act thatresists
the motor,which is the case foranimals. For inanimate heavy bodies,
dictum
scilicet
ex se et graveinanimatum
Aristotelis,
intelligi
quodanimalmovetur
eorummoveatur
sibiinherentem
et
non,cumtamenutrumque
persuamformam
intrinsecam."
46f. 80v: "Quintaconclusio:
secundum
tenetur
quod communiter
gravemovetur
naturaliter
a suaforma
substantiali
eta sua gravitate
instrumentaliter."
principaliter
47See
Appendix.
53

01:50:12 AM

on the other hand, when the substantialformis taken away, what is

leftremains in act by heaviness, but this heaviness does not resistthe
mover, namely the substantial formof the heavy body. This is why
an animal is said to be moved fromwithin,while an inanimate heavy
body is not.48It may be noted that in this reply Albert accepted that
a heavy body without its substantial form remains in act by its
heaviness and is not simplyprime matter,thoughit does not resistthe
mover.
In order to sort out the relation of Albert's commentary to
Buridan's tertialectura
, it will be usefulto see what theversionin Erfurt
SB Ampl. F 298 contains concerningthis thirdprincipalargumenton
the self-motionof animals and the reply.The principalargumentitself
is very similar to that found in both Buridan' s ultimalecturaand
Albert's printed questions.49 The reply parallels that of Albert's
printed questions, with however the apparent differencethat where
Albert admits that an inanimate heavy body minus its formis stillin
act, althoughit does not resist,the commentaryof ErfurtAmpl. F 298
says that the remainder is not in act in the sense that the act resists
the mover.50Perhaps this is a differenceonly in words and not in
opinion.
Thus, comparing Albert's treatmentof the question to Buridan' s
tertialectura
and ultimalectura
, we see thattheyall come to the same cons tertialecturasays in so many words that
but
while
Buridan'
clusion,
a heavy body without its heaviness is not in act in the sense of
resisting,and Buridan' s ultimalecturadispensed with replyingto the
principal arguments altogether,Albert in addressing the issue raised
by the thirdprincipal argument claims that a heavy body withoutits
substantialformis stillin act, though it does not resist.On this small
issue, then, Albert's commentary seems to represent "progress"
beyond the tertialecturathat is not reflectedin the ultimalectura.Alternately, one could judge that Albert's reply is betterthan that of the
tertialectura
, but say that the ultimalecturarepresentsa stage in which
an earlier controversyabout whether an animal's body without the
soul is in act has died down, so that a nuanced answer was no longer
48See Appendix.
49See Appendix.
forcomI alsoincludetheparalleltextin theCesenamanuscript
parison.
50See Appendix
forparalleltextsin Erfurt,
Amplon.F 298 andCesenaMalatest.
S.VIII. 5.
54

01:50:12 AM

required. The rest of Albert's treatmentcould be seen as a tidied up

versionof Buridan's ultimalectura
, but, in lightof our briefcomparison
we
to the tertialectura
should
,
perhaps admit that thisbriefcomparison
is insufficient
to decide whetherAlbert's workcame beforeor afterthe
.51
ultimalectura
It is notable that when Albert came to discuss the motion of heavy
bodies in particular, he did not say that they are divided into forms
as movers and matter as moved, but, in his second principal argument, called what is moved "the rest" of what is moved.52Contrary
to the usual scholastic form,he answered his sixthquestion (whether
heavy and light bodies may be moved of themselves) in agreement
with the principal arguments, ratherthan with the opposition based
on Aristotle's claim in Book 8 that it is impossible that inanimate
heavy and lightbodies move themselves.53When he came to the end
of the question, then, it was not necessary to answer the principal
arguments,since theyagreed withthe conclusion, but he said that the
principal arguments may go to the streetof Saint James, i.e. to the
Dominicans.54 This would support the hypothesisthat the Parisian
nominalists by this time- perhaps in contrast to the Dominicans were no longer themselvesparticularlyconcerned with the status of a
body taken in separation fromits substantial form.
In his Abbreviations,Marsilius of Inghen essentially followed
Buridan- in fact,as I indicated above, one mightsuppose that Marsilius's work is an abbreviation of Buridan's ultimalectura
, at least for
of
the same arguments and
these questions. Having made many
51IfBuridan
hadAlbert's
whenhewrotetheordinatio
oftheultima
lectura
,
questions
thequestion
iswhyhedidnotadoptAlbert's
ofthesolution.
He saysinqueswording
tionfivethattheremainder
ofa heavybodydoesnotresist
itsheaviness,
buthedoes
notaddresstheissuein so manywordswhether
or howit is in act.
52Thushissecondprincipal
thatheavyandlightbodiescan movethemargument
selvesis,f.80r:"Secundo:illudmovetur
inpartem
quoddividitur
perse moventem
et in partem
et sicestde gravietsimiliter
de levi.Dividitur
enimin
perse motam,
formam
et in residuum
perse moventem
perse motum."
53f.80r:"In oppositum
determinai
Aristoteles
in istooctavodicensgraviaet levia
inanimata
moveri
ex seipsisestimpossibile."
54He says,f.80v:"Rationesvadantad vicumvatum butbetter
[sic,
votum]ad sanctumJacobum."The convent
oftheDominicans
waslocatedon Rue Saint-Jacques.
The Dominicans
werecalled"Jacobins,"
orassociated
withSaintJames,becausea
to SaintJameswasgiventothemwhentheyfirst
movedto Paris.
chapeldedicated
SeeAstrik
L. Gabriel,
Student
Paris.History
andChar, Mediaeval
LifeinAveMariaCollege
, NotreDame, IN 1955,206, n. 13. MS. Cesena,Malatest.
tulary
oftheCollege
S.VIII.5, f.69v,saysonly"Rationesprincipales
vaduntviissuis."
55

01:50:12 AM

distinctions,Marsilius concluded that elements can move themselves

in the sense that they have a part that acts as mover and a part that
acts as what is moved. While in most cases the generator or the
remover of the impediments to motion is necessary to start the element's natural motion, in unusual cases, as when mercury eats
throughits container,inanimate bodies may starttheirown motion.55
Once the motion is started,the substantialformis the principal cause
of motion, and the heaviness or lightnessis the instrumentalcause.56
Considerably shorterthan the two previous works, the most notable
is how closely it followsthe
characteristicof Marsilius's Abbreviations
moves of Buridan.
4
'John Marsilius Inguen," whoever he was, limited himselfto one
question on thisissue, namely to the question whetherheavy and light
thingsmay be moved by themselves. He made the same distinctions
and came to the same conclusions as Buridan, Albert, and Marsilius,
55Marsilii
Doctoris
resolutissimi
abbrevialiones
octolibros
Aristotelis
,
Inguen
super
physicorum
etc.f.36va:"[in marg:Utrumanimalmovetex se etnongraveinanimatum]
Quantumad secundum
estprimonotandum
quod aliquidmoveria se vel ex se potest
intelligi
quadrupliciter...
a principio
Tertioquodsicmovetur
scilicet
exduobus
intrinseco,
quodcomponatur
partibus
quarumuna movetet alia movetur.
Etquartoad propositum
dicitur
vela se quiaad hocquod
aliquidmovere
seipsum
semovere
nonindiget
motore
extrinseco
concurincipiat
posteiusquietem
particulari
rentequamvisanteindigeat...
Tertiapropositio.
Tertiomodotamanimalquamgravesimplex
a seipso.
movetur
movente
movetur
etpermodumsequelead motum
materie.
Patet,quia a sua forma
Proutin pluribusanimai
Quartapropositio
que eratde intentione
Philosophi.
a seipsoquartomodo,etgravesimplex
moveri
Prima
non,nisiinpaucioribus.
potest
animaiposteius quietemut postsomnumpotest
parspatet,quia ut in pluribus
movere
Secundaparspatet,quia si gravesimplex
tunc
seipsum.
quiescatnaturaliter,
movetseipsum,
cumeiusmotusa loconaturali
essetei violentus.
Si autem
nunquam
vel igiturestactugrave,et si sic,tuncquiescitsursumpropter
quiescatviolente,
Aliteractugravenonquiesceret
et perconsequens
ut in
violente,
impedimentum.
ad hocquodmoveatur
movente
extrinseco
removente
pluribus
indiget
particulari
prohibens.Vel estleve,sicutvaporelevatus,
et si sic,tunctaleut in pluribus
indiget
Et additurin conclusione
"ut in pluribus"eo quodnonest
generante
gravitatem.
inconveniens
removere
gravevellevequandoquepersuamnaturam
propropriam
vivuminpiscideligneapotest
etdescendere.
hibens,utargentum
perforare
piscidem
Similiter
ad gravitatem
utvaporsi removeatur
potestquandoqueseipsumreducere
a calefacientibus.
Suppositoquod non concurrat
particulare
generans
gravitatem
aliud ab eo, non minusse reduceretad gravitatem.
Hic est unus modus
respondendi."
56f. 36vb: "Sexta propositio.
Grave sic motumdeorsumnaturaliter
movetur
a sua gravitate
et sua formasubstantiali
immediate
tanquaminstrumento
tanquam
undealias moveretur.
Modi enimalii
principaliter
agente.Patetquia nonvidetur
quibusimaginari
possetipsummoverisuntamoti."
56

01:50:12 AM

albeit in much abbreviated form. Both Buridan and Albert had concluded, withAristotle,thatifthe elements, or the heavens, or animals
are said to move themselves,it is because some part in the thingmoves
some other part and never because the whole moves and is moved.
Buridan had concluded, however, that the formof the heavy body,
and a soul, and an angel do move themselvesas wholes. "John Marsilius Inguen," to the contrary,concluded withAristotlethat a whole
can never move itselfas a whole. Among other arguments,he argued
"a posteriori" that this must be true because, if it were the case that
somethingcould move itselfas a whole, then there would be no way
to prove the existence of separate substances, that is, of Aristotle's
unmoved movers.57 While Albert had in several cases omitted
Buridan' s referencesto analogous cases of the causes of heavenly
motion, "John Marsilius Inguen" included them, and like Buridan,
he dealt with the unusual cases in which a heavy or lightbody might
initiateits own motion, forinstance by breaking or burningwhat was
prohibitingits motion.58
Thus all fourfourteenth-century
commentatorsdefendedAristotle's
words or imputed intentions,while taking a position in favor of a
heavy body's perse continuationof its own motion that went beyond
what Aristotlehad said. Aristotle,by picking apart the meanings of
'
'heavy" and "light" and by claiming that the very words included
the conception of motion to and subsequent rest in the natural place,
attemptedto downplay any efficientcausation that remained aftera
57Questiones
subtillissime
MarciliiInguen
secundum
Johannis
superoctolibros
physicorum
nominalium
viam
modum[quodsecundum
, Lyon1518,f.83r:"Quantumad primum
se totum
etquamlibet
suiestmovens
et motum
itaquodnonestaliquapars
partem
sui quantitativa
vel essentialis
nec aliqua motaquin
que moveatquin moveatur,
estistaprimaconclusio,
estaliquidmoveria se. Proquod impossibile
moveatur]
a se predicto
batur,quiasi aliquidmoveretur
modo,sequeretur
quodipsumomnino
secundum
idemsuiessetin actuetin potentia...
a posteriori
Quartoprobatur
quia
sialiquidpossetsicmoveri
a se,tuncpernullamviampossemus
probare
aliquasesse
substantias
quod est falsumut patetin istooctavoet in duodecimo
' separatas,
'
Metaphysice.
58ff.83r-v:"Quintoprobatur
inistooctavoinductive,
quiacelumratione
intelligence movetet ratione
orbismovetur
et sicsecundum
diversamovetet movetur.
Item
animalmovetur
secundum
materiam
etmovetsecundum
formam
eteodemmodode
ex movente
etmotoutpatetinductive
gravietlevi....omnemobilecomponitur
quia
celumcomponitur
ex intelligentia
et orbe,et animaiex corporeet anima,mixta
inanimata
etelementa
exmateria
etforma,
etsiccumquodlibet
mobile
componuntur
ex movente
et moto,sequitur
a se isto
mobilemovetur
componatur
quodquodlibet
modo.Tertiaconclusio
estde tertio
modo:quodnihilmovetur
a se tertio
modonisi
..
celum.
57

01:50:12 AM

heavy or lightbody was generatedand anythingpreventingits motion

removed. Buridan and his followers,on the contrary,tookthe position
that the motion to the natural place doesneed an additional explanation, and theychose an intrinsicformof the body as thatcause. What
may be surprising,when theirworks are looked at in isolation, is that
they did not acknowledge to a greater extent their deviation from
Aristotle,Averroes, and the earlier Latin writers.Albert of Saxony
says merelythat the apparentlyopposing authoritiesof Aristotleand
the Commentator are to be "glossed" so that they are not in
disagreement.59
What is going on here? In myjudgment, it is impossible to answer
this question reliably withoutlooking more widely at other parts of
these commentaries, at earlier or later commentaries on the same
passages or on other Aristotelianworks, or at other sortsof contemporary works in naturaliphilosophy, theology,or logic. Whether or
not Edward Grant is rightthat the commentaryformatomizes later
medieval natural philosophy, my "case study" method has not
worked in the most obvious sense of allowing clear conclusions to
emerge from study of related commentaries on a single passage. In
what follows, then, I begin to look more broadly for evidence that
would allow greatercertaintyin interpretingmy chosen passages from
four commentators.
One possibility,of course, is that Buridan and his followersdid not
emphasize their deviation fromAristotelianpaths because they were
not original in this deviation. In fact, according to Anneliese Maier's
Secundoarguitur
ex se quia si aliquodgraveponatur
quodgravemovetur
supra
estquodibidem
etmoveatur
deortrabem
trabem,
quiescatetposteafrangat
possibile
sum.Igiturtuncgraveex se movetur
sinepresenta
motoris
extrinseci,
quia illud
nonremovetur
a motoreextrnseco,
seda seipso.
impedimentum
Tertioarguitur
de levi:positoquod ignisponaturin aliquovase faciliter
comtuncignisquiescit
violenter
ab iliovase.Sednonrequiritur
bustibili,
quodprohibitur
motorextrinsecus
ad removendum
comburere
vas
prohibens,
quia ignisde se potest
ex se sinepresenta
extrinseci...
motoris
perquodprohibetur.
Igiturignismovetur
...Et ideodicituraliterquod aliqui talescasuspartiales
benepossuntconcedi,
scilicet
moveatur
ex se sinepresenta
extrinseci
motoris
quodaliquandoelementm
et hocquandoelementm
removet
sedhoc
propriam
peractionem
impedimentum,
raroaccidit,
ideosimpliciter
ex se sed
Aristoteles
dixitquodelementm
nonmovetur
a motore
extrnseco."
59f. 80r: "Auctoritates
et Commentatoris
autemAristotelis
si alique sintin
suntglosande
ad istum
sensum
etremovens
oppositum
quodbenegenerans
prohibens
concurrunt
ad hocetrequiruntur
ad hocquodgraveincipiat
licetnonoportet
moveri,
ea essecontinue
ad hocquod ipsumgravemotumsuummotumcompleat."
58

01:50:12 AM

survey of opinions on this subject, the decisive change in viewpoint

came withJohn Duns Scotus.60It was Scotus, in his commentaryon
the Sentences
with regard to the motion of angels as well as in his com, who firstcame to the conclusion that
mentary on the Metaphysics
heavy and lightbodies do in factmove themselves.61Scotus argued in
this connectionthat it is not impossible forsomethingto act on itself,
especially when what is produced is not of the same nature as the
power producing it. For Aristotle,the paradigm case fordenyingselfaction was alteration: a body cannot heat itselfbecause a heater must
be hot, but to be heated the subject acted upon must initiallybe cool
or at least less hot than the agent. This is a case of a univocal action.
But in the fall of a heavy body the effectproduced is differentfrom
the cause: the cause is heaviness or the substantialformof the heavy
body, but the effectis to be in a low position. In such a case, Scotus
argued, there is no reason why a heavy body cannot act on itself.62
60Maier,An derGrenze
, 164-5:"Die entscheidende
WendungkommtmitDuns
Scotus.Erwillbeweisen
dassauchdiegraviaundleviasichselbstbewegen,
d.h.dass
dieUrsacheihrerBewegung
eininneres
Prinzipsei- aliquidintrinsecum
ipsigravi,
velipsummet
DamitisteineneueFrontgeschaffen,
graveperaliquidintrinsecum...
diesichalsbald,schrfer
als Dunses selbstgetanhat,gegendie thomistische
Lehre
vomgenerans
als Ursachedernatrlichen
stellt.Zu ihrgehrt
Bewegung
brigens
ausserdenAnhngern
desDunsScotusauchderAverroist
vonJandun.
Johannes
61See John
Duns Scotus,Ordination
BookII, dist.2, part2 De Loco Angelorum,
and
Questio5, Utrumangeluspossitmoveride loco ad locummotucontinuo,
, vol. VII, 278-374.
Questio6, Utrumangeluspossitmoverese, in Operaomnia
to Scotus,angelscan move,theyarenotonlymovedmiraculously,
and
According
But
theyare notmovedeffectively
bya body.Hencetheymustmovethemselves.
thatmovesitself,
toAristotle,
mustbe divisible
intoa moverand
anything
according
a moved,whereas
Facedwiththeseconstraints,
and not
angelsarenotso divisible.
thatangelscan movethemselves,
Scotuswas led to questionAristotle's
doubting
claimthatanything
thatmovesitself
mustbe divisible
in two,intoa first
moverand
a first
moved.He arguedfirst
thatangelscanmovethemselves
justas heavyandlight
bodiescanmovethemselves.
Whenitwasobjected
thatheavyandlightbodiescannot
- as Aristotle
- Scotus
so movethemselves
in BookVIII ofthePhysics
saysexplicitly
hadtoshowthatheavyandlightbodiescan movethemselves.
Thisthenbecamea
modelforhow
can movethemselves.
See Ordinatio,
352ff.
62Ibid.,363: angels
in contrarium,
''Respondeotuncad Aristotelem,
qui adducitur
quod
- quodgravemoveat
sitprome(sicutadduxi),
seeffective,
sicutsciensmovet
seeffectivead actumspeculandi.
Etintelligo
sic:sicuthabensformam
aliquamquaenataest
esseprincipium
alicuiusactionis
univocae,potestperillamformam
agerein receptivum
etproportionatum,
sicetiamhabensformam
approximatum
quae nataestesse
alicuiusactionis
principium
aequivocae,
potestperipsamagereaequivoceinpassum
etsi ipsummet
sitreceptivum
illiusactionis
veleffectus
approximatum;
aequivociet
carenseo, exquo estmaxime
etproportionatum
sibiipsi,nonsolum
approximatum
immosummacausabitistumeffectum
in se ipso.Sic etiamestin proposito,
poterit,
- gravitas
estinpotentia
ad ubideorsum,
autemrespectu
sursum,
quialapisexistens
59

01:50:12 AM

Clearly a heavy body can be an agent of downward motion, as it

would be, for instance, if it pulled a light body attached to it
downward. It can likewise be acted upon. So what prevents it from
acting on itself?63
Buridan, in his commentaryon the Metaphysics
, also asked whether
it is possible for the same thing to act on itselfor to be acted on by
itself (Book 9, Question 1). In the arguments ad oppositum
, he
acknowledged thatAristotlesaid thatit is not possible.64Moreover, he
said, ifwe conceded that the same thingcould move itself,then there
would be no way to prove that theremust be intelligencesmoving the
celestial bodies, against Aristotle's demonstrations.65This question,
Buridan said, was treated in Books 7 and 8 of the Physics
, and so he
could pass over immediatelyto his conclusions. His firstconclusion
was thatthe same thingand in the same [part] of itselfcan act on itself
and be acted on by itself,can move itselfand be moved by itself.66For
example, the soul does not only move the body subject to itself,indeed
illiusubi estprincipium
activum
sicutuniversaliter
ubi non
aequivocum,
respectu
movetmobilead alioportet
ponerenisiprincipium
aequivocum
(nonenimmovens
formaliter
sitinactusecundum
illudubi,sedtantum
quodubiquia movens
quiavirilliuseffectus
tualiter).
Quia igitur
ipsumgraveestreceptivum
aequivocietcareteo,
causatinse ipsoprimoistumeffectum,
et in nulloalionisicausandopriusinse..."
I haveremoved
theeditors'
whichseemedtometocausemoreconmarks,
quotation
fusionthanclarification.
63Ibid., 360-1:"Praeterea,quod non movetaliudnisi
priusab alio naturaliter
ab eodemhabetquodmoveat
etquodsitmotum;
sedgravecuialligatum
est
motum,
leve(cuiuslevitasnonexceditgravitatem
eius),movetidemleve,trahendo
ipsum
- et non movetnisi quia motum;igiturpriusest motum
secumad centrum,
naturaliter
a quo movetur
illudsibialligatum:
quammoveat.Et ab eodemmovetur
movetautemet illudperaliud,quia pergravitatem
et se ipsum."
suam;igitur
64JohnBuridan,In Metaphysicen
Aristotelis.
Ioannis
Questiones
argutissimae
Maistri
Buridani
inultima
abipsorecognitae
etemissae:
acadarchetypon
sitae,
praelectione
diligenter
repo
Paris1518,BookIX, Questio1, f.56v:"IteminoctavoPhysicorum
ipsearguitquod
omninoidemnonmovetseipsumet secundum
eandempartem,
quia tunc(ut ipse
cumagensagatsecundum
eiusdem,
dicit)idemessetin actuetin potentia
respectu
secundum
Et hoc
quod in actuet passumsivemotummoveatur
quodin potentia.
Et propter
hoc etiamnititur
Aristoteles
reputatimpossibile.
probarein septimo
movetur
ab alio."
Physicorum
quodomnequod movetur
65Ibid.,f.56v:"Itemsi concederemus
idem
se veletiamagere
quod
potestmovere
inse,sequeretur
esseintelligentias
quodnullaessetviaad probandum
quodoporteat
ad movendum
demonstrationes
Aristotelis.
Etconcelestia,
corpora
quodessetcontra
sequentiaest manifesta,
quia statimpossemusdicerequod ilia corporacelestia
moverent
seipsa.Ideo nonoporteret
quod ab aliismoverentur."
66Ibid.: "De istaquestione
estaliqualiter
tractatum
in viiet viiiPhysicorum
et ideo
de ipsa est faciliter
transeundum
Primaest quod idemet
ponendoconclusiones.
secundum
idemsui agitin se et patitur
a se, movetse et movetur
a se..."
60

01:50:12 AM

it moves the whole thing togetherand any of its parts. Therefore it

followsthat it moves itself.And the same thing holds forheaviness,
which moves the whole heavy body downward.67On the other hand,
he said, in addition to God, who is a universal agent coacting in all
otheractions, all otheragents acting on themselvesdo also have other
assisting agents or things acted on. This Buridan showed by induction: the heavens do not move themselves, but are moved by the
intelligences; heavy bodies require the medium that they divide;
animals are moved by what is understood or desired. Thus it is clear
that in all actions, besides the agent that acts on itself,other agents
concur, eitherprincipal or dispositive agents. Or else there are other
bodies acted on. In this sense, he said, all the authorities and
argumentsof Aristotleand his Commentator should be expounded.68
'
44
, Buridan saved' AristoThus, in his commentaryon theMetaphysics
tle and Averroesby claiming thatthereare in factalways otheragents
or bodies acted on in any motion, despite the factthat agents can act
on themselves. Faced with the same problem, Duns Scotus argued
that,althoughheavy bodies can move themselves,neverthelessAristotle's argumentcan be upheld because an external agent is required to
generate a heavy body beforeit can subsequently move to its proper
place.69
67Ibid.:"Verbigratia,
immototum
animanonmovetsolumcorpussibisubiectum,
simuletquamlibet
eiuspartem.
Ideosequitur
quodipsamovetseipsam.
compositum
Et itaestetiamde gravitate
que movetipsumtotumgravedeorsum."
68Ibid.:"Secundaconclusio
scilicet
ponitur
quodpostprincipalitatem
primiagentis,
Dei, idempotestagerein se <et> patia se tanquamprincipale
agenset tanquam
alterius
quod nihilagitin se sineadiutorio
principale
passum...Tertiaconclusio:
Dei influentiam
universalem
que ad omnem
agentis...Sed modocircumscribamus
actionem
iuxtaillud.Proficit
requiritur
absqueDeo nullusin orbelabor...Et tunc
alterius
utrumidemagitin se sineadiutorio
passi.Et
agentisvel alterius
queritur
videriperinductionem,
primode celomoto:non
respondeo
quodnon,proutpotest
Deindede gravibus
enimmovetse sed intelligentia
movetet orbismovetur.
quia
se totum[correxi
ex
se totummoveatur,
tamennonsecundum
gravelicetsecundum
Et cumhoc
motum]movet.Materiaenimnonmovet,quia nulliusestactivitatis.
mediumquod
ibi essealiudmotumquod nonmovetipsumgrave,scilicet
oportet
actionibus
dividitur.
Hoc apparet
etiamde animali...Etitaapparet
quodinomnibus
vel
aliquodaliudagensvel principale
preterilludagensquod agitin se concurrit
veletiamconcurrit
quodnonagitinseillaactione,
aliquodpassumquod
dispositivum
nonpatitur
a se illapassione...Et ad istumsensum
debentexponiomnesauctoritates
etrationes
Aristotelis
eteiusCommentatoris
etrationes
que fiebant
prosecundaparte
a se quinaliudconcurrat
Nihilenimsicagitin se velpatitur
se habens
questionis.
in ratione
aendivel patiendi."
69Scotus,Ordinatio
si concdt
, 366-7:"Sed si obicisquomodoAristoteles,
gravesic
moveria se effective...
suum,quod ista
quomodohabebitprincipale
propositum
- dicoquod
ab alio,- quodipseintendit
necessario
moventur
probare
principaliter?,
61

01:50:12 AM

Roy Effler,in explaining Scotus' s positionon the selfmovementof

heavy bodies, notes that Scotus presentedhis departurefromAristotle
and Averroesas ifit were not a departure,and he describesthisas the
"
venerable medieval practice of " interpretation or ' 4reverential
70 Scotus, he
says, was quite aware that, except in the
exposition."
case of substantial change, he was rejectingAristotle'sprinciple that
everythingthatis moved is moved by somethingelse. If he did not say
so explicitly,Efflerbelieves, it was only because that was not the normad and polite approach to exposition of an authoritativetext.71
Efflergoes on in his discussion to make another point. Scotus, he
says, was preceded by Avempace in the theory that a heavy body
causes its own downward motion. Avempace, however, treated the
accidental formof heaviness of the heavy body as the mover and its
matter as the moved. This, according to Effler,for Scotus, as for
Averroes and others before him, is impossible, because according to
Scotus the formof a body cannot act on its matterat least in the case
of inanimate substances.72For this reason, according to Effler,Scotus
said that the mover is not the formof the heavy body, but the heavy
body itselfby means of its heaviness. In this way the heavy body in
its entiretyis both the mover and the moved- but this is also in clear
opposition to Aristotle.
We can see how this problem appeared to the scholastic commentators in the period between Scotus and Buridan by looking at the
Physicscommentaryof John of Jandun. In his eleventh question on
Istaenimnonreducunt
satishabethocex distinctione
se ipsade potentia
potentiae.
secundaad actum,nisipriusfuerint
reducta
de potentia
vel
primaad actumprimm
saltempossentreduciad actumprimm...
Sequiturigiturquodlicetgraveetleve
secundaad actumsecundum,
moveant
se de potentia
tarnen
mobileestvelmovetur
a potentia
ab aliquoalioextrnseco,
nonenimoportet
primaad actumprimum;
quod
si omnequodmovetur,
ab aliomovetur,
ab alio,- et
quodin omnimotumoveatur
sufficit
ad aliquodaliudab omnibus
istis,
Philosopho
primum,
quiaperhocdevenitur
moveriab alio sedestomnino
quod necin unomotu,nec in quocumque,
poterit
movensimmobile."
theeditors'quotation
marks.
AgainI haveremoved
" Omne movetur
70RoyEffler,
DunsScotus
andthePrinciple
abaliomovetur
St.
quod
John
NY 1962,113, 122, (Franciscan
Institute
Bonaventure,
Publications,
Philosophy
Series,no. 15).
71AndinsomecasesScotusis explicit
orcontradicts
thatAristotle
is wrong
himself.
Cf.Effler,
sua(quamvis
, 355:"Et sidicasquodilianonestintentio
122,andOrdinatio
enumerans
activasexcludit
sicsonentverba),quia II De generatone
qualitates
grave
- respondeo:
vereactiviset passivis,
Dico quodcontradiceret
et levea qualitatibus
nisialio modointelligeret
sibiipsiin VIII Physicorum
hie
, perilludII De generatone,
et ibi..."
72Effler,
125.
62

01:50:12 AM

Book 8 of the Physics

Jandun asked whetheran inanimate heavy body
moves itself.His principaland otherargumentson the subject include
virtually everythingthat Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of
Inghen, and "John Marsilius Inguen" later discuss. Jandun phrased
the second principal argument of his eleventh question (Whether an
inanimate heavy body may move itself)as follows:
as is
Also,whatis dividedintoa moving
partanda movedpartmovesitself,
clearinthisBook8. Butan inanimate
heavybodyisofthissort,foritisdivided
and theformis themoverand thematter
intomatter
and form,
is thething
moved,as theCommentator
saysin Book4 ofthiswork.Andifyousaytothis
thatthe matterof the heavybodycannotbe thatwhichis perse moved
becausewhatis movedshouldbe an entity
in act,andthismatter
downwards,
oftheheavybodyis notan entity
thatan
in act,againstthisis theargument
animalis saidtomoveitself
in thatitis dividedintoa bodyanda soul,which
<body> is a partoftheanimalopposedto thesoul,butis notsomeentity
said.Therefore
distinct
besidesthesoul,as is commonly
itissimilar
inthiscase:
thematter
whichis partofthestoneis notan entity
inactbesidesits
although
itcouldnevertheless
substantial
be movedperse.As thesoulis theperse
form,
thefactthatitis theact,so theform
mover
ofthestonecouldbe theper
despite
se mover,so it seems.73
In his reply to the main question, Jandun was particularly
interestedin the proximate cause of the motion of a heavy body
downwards. He said:
thisthereis great
Whether,
then,thisheavybodymaymoveitself,
concerning
anddiversity
difficulty
amongthedoctors.
Manyifnotall ofthemsaythatthis
sortofheavybodyexisting
in act < and> in accidental
toa lower
potentiality
Ifitmoveditself
placedoesnotmoveitself
persebutonlyperaccidens.
byitself,
thenitwouldbe necessary
thatitbe divisible
persebothin a partmoving
perse
andina partpersemoved.Butaccording
inthisBook8 thisisimpostoAristotle
whathe says.Forthosepartseither
mustbe quantitative
sible,as is clearfrom
division.
partsoftheheavybodyoressential
parts,bya sufficient
Theyarenot
and
quantitative
parts,becausethequantitative
partsare alikein disposition
toquality,
so thatthereis noreasonwhyonepartwouldbe the
poweraccording
mover
perseandtheotherthemovedpartperse.Norarethepartsessential
parts,
becausetheonlyessential
andprimematter.
Butprimematter
partsaretheform
cannotbemoved
inpurepotency
andhasnoresistance
perse, sinceitisanentity
to themover.Andtheremustalwaysbe resistance,
as theCommentator
says
inBook4 ofthiswork.Therefore
thisheavybodydoesnotmoveitself
byitself.74
Having argued against thisposition and against otherpositions,for
instance the position that the natural place contains the power that
moves the heavy body down, Jandun concluded:
73See Appendix.
74See Appendix.
It appearstomethatthewording
on thisissuein Buridan'sand
Albert's
forinstance
theuseofthesubjunctive
in phrasing
thequescommentaries,
a heavybodymaymoveitself
ortheinterest
tionwhether
inmotion
perseas opposed
toa seandexse, has echoesofJandun.
63

01:50:12 AM

thatthissortofheavybodyis a per
I believethatitcanbe saidwithprobability
se moverofitself.75
But against this conclusion Jandun again raised the authorityof
several passages in Aristotleand Averroesand also several arguments,
includingthe argumentthatprime mattercannot be what is primarily
moved. If it cannot be the matter,so the argumentwent, then it must
be the form that is primarilymoved and then the same substantial
formwill be both active and passive with respect to the same effect,
"which seems entirely absurd. " 76 Furthermore,he went on, if a
heavy body moves itselfperse, then Aristotle'sproof of the existence
of unmoved movers will have no efficacy,which would be very
unsuitable. "Thus it would seem that Aristotle's argumentwould be
totallyworthless,which would be foolishto concede."77
In reply to the authoritativetexts,Jandun claimed that Aristotle's
denial thatheavy bodies move themselvesonly applies to the reduction
of the essentialpotentialityto act, thatis to the generationof the heavy
body, and not to the reductionof the second or accidental potentiality
to act, namely to the motion downward.78This is the same tack that
75Ibid.,f. 116v:"Et credoquodprobabiliter
possetdiciquodhuiusmodi
graveest
sui ipsius."
perse motivm
76f.117va:"Ergoipsamateria
nonestilludratione
cuiusgraverecipit
suummotum.
Etsicrelinquitur
formam.
Et constat
ipsumsecundum
quodrecipit
quodagitipsum
secundum
suamformam
substantialem
Et siceritactivum
etpassivum
principaliter.
idemetrespectu
eiusdem
simulsecundum
omnino
effectus,
absurdum,
quodvidetur
quareetc."
77f. 117v:"Itemsi graveessetsuiipsius
tuncprobatio
Aristotelis
perse motivm,
immobilem
nullamefficaciam
haberet,
qua voluitconvincere
aliquemessemotorem
Et patetconsequentia,
quod estvaldeinconveniens.
quia ilia ratioAristotelis
prinsustentatur
ab aliomovetur
etquia non
cipaliter
supereo quodomnequodmovetur
in moventibus
in infinitum
et in mobilibus
devenire
ad motorem
proceditur
oportet
Etsicvidetur
nonvaleret
omnino,
qui nonmovetur...
quodest
quodratioAristotelis
fatuum
concedere,
quare,etc."
78f. 117v: "Ad primm
dicobreviter
nonintendit
istorum
quodAristoteles
negare
essentiali
ad
nisiquod ipsumgraveinanimatum
movetseipsumperse de potentia
de potentia
actum,nonautemdicerevultquod nonsitperse motivm
suiipsius
Ethocmodoponoipsummovere
accidentali.
seipsum
perse,idestpersuinaturam...
et per
Sed actugravebenepotesthabereprincipium
suidescensus,
perse activum
se principium
modopriusdicto.Nec istudintendit
utputo,
Aristoteles,
receptivum
motore
ethoc
negare.Verumenimestquodactugravenonindiget
perseextrnseco,
inistocapitulo...Peridemad auctoritates
Commentatoris,
planedicitCommentator
cumipsedicitin TertioCoelietMundiquoddeclaratum
estde elementis
quodnon
dicoquod ipseintendit
ea nonmovereseipsade potentia
essentiali
ad
moventur,
a generante.
Et hocestquodsubdit,cumnon
moventur
actum,sedex talipotentia
Hoc enimnonpotest
inloconisia generante.
de motugravisactu
moventur
intelligi
in potentia
existentis
cumtalegravemovetur,
accidentali,
quia contingit
generans
64

01:50:12 AM

Scotus took to save Aristotle'sproofof the existenceofunmoved prime

"
movers, but, again, it may be reverentialexposition," since Aristotle explicitlysaid thatheavy bodies do not move themselvesin natural
motion. In replyto the otherarguments,Jandun said thatthe substantial formof the heavy body is the mover in natural motion, and the
same substantial forminsofar as it is in matter receives the motion.
Thus, like Scotus, he avoided referringto prime matter as what is
moved, but at the price of having the same thingbeing both the mover
and what is moved, though not in the same way:
I say,however,
forthesakeoftheyounger,
itis not
thatfortheCommentator
unsuitable
thatoneandthesamething
atthetimeandinthesameessential
part,
to itssubstantial
havean activepotency
anda passive
form,
namely
according
orreceptive
butina different
potency
perseforthesamething,
way.Butinthe
samewayitis indeedimpossible.
NowI saythattheheavybodyin actbyits
as itis form,
form
hastheactive< potency
> ofitsmotion
andby
andinsofar
.. .
it[theform]
ithasa receptive
ofitsmotion
insofar
as itis in matter.
potency
itcan be saidto thecommon
thatthesame
Bythissameargument
argument
with
atthesametimeandinthesamerespect
willbe inactandinpotency
thing
tothesamething,
thisis true;butnotforthesamereasonorinthesame
respect
way,butin different
ways.Andthisis notunsuitable.79
Jandun closed the question with this response to the principal
arguments:
To thearguments
raisedat thestartofthequestion,
theydo notholdagainst
thisposition,
butthatthereis a defectin themwillbe clearto anyonewho
them.Thisis whatI was able to collectaboutthisdifficult
diligently
inspects
Ifanyone
doesnotacceptwhatI havewritten,
itisjustthathedisprove
question.
initsfavor.
itbydemonstration
andresolve
thearguments
sucha perOtherwise
sonshouldnotbe believed.
Letthosewhocomelater,soulfriends
moreoftruth
thanoffame,knowthatI havenotprovedthisposition
entirely
by myown
butfromwhathas beenpassedon bya certain
doctoroftheology,
invention,
whomI regard
as oneofthemostsubtleexpositors
ofAristotle
andhisCommenI haveadded,however,
tatoramongmycontemporaries.
somethingsto the
de iliomotucui correspondei
quod ipseintelligit
Relinquitur
quod estcorruptum.
essentialis."
potentia
79f.118v:"Dico tamenpropter
nonest
Commentatorem
iuniores,
quodsecundum
inconveniens
unumet idemsimulet secundum
eandempartemessentialem
sui,
secundum
formam
substantialem
scilicet
activamet potensuam,haberepotentiam
tiampassivamsivereceptivam
perse eiusdemalio et alio modo,sedeodemmodo
bene essetimpossibile.
habet
Modo, dico quod actu graveper suam formam
> activam
estforma,
< potentiam
suimotus,
etinquantum
etpereamhabetvirtutem
sui motus,inquantum
estin materia...Et causain hocquodinvenitur
receptivam
unomodoinactuetaliomodoin potentia
estquia componitur
etforma.
ex materia
Formaigitureiusmovetin quantumestformaet movetur
secundum
quod estin
materia...Peridempotestdiciad unumargumentum
commune,
quod idemsimul
et secundum
idemeritin actuet in potentia
eiusdem,verumest,sed non
respectu
ratione
eteodemmodo,sedalioetaliomodo.Ethocnonestinconveniens."
eiusdem
65

01:50:12 AM

andconfirmation
ordered
ofthisposition,
whichhavenotbeen
demonstration
unlessbyAristotle
andtheCommentator,
takenup byothers
iftheyare
which,
andtrue,shouldbe held,andiftheyarenot,shouldbe eliminated
probable
by
thetruth
demonstrative
ofthismostdifficult
untilfinally
will
arguments
problem
be apparent.80
Although Duns Scotus died in roughlythe same years thatJandun
was writingthis, he must be the subtle expositor to whom Jandun
refers.Jandun was, then, the likely channel throughwhich Scotus' s
argumentsin a theologicalcontextcame into commentarieson Aristotle's Physics.
One otherpassage fromJandun in thiscontextis revealing. It is the
finalremarkin Jandun' s treatmentof the question whetheran animal
moves itself.His conclusion is that an animal moves itselfin the sense
that in the animal there is a soul that is the mover and a body that is
moved. Against thisconclusion therewas the argument,as in the case
of heavy and lightbodies, that the conclusion is false because the only
essential parts of animals are matterand formand the mattercannot
be what is moved because it is not an entityin act. In response,Jandun conceded that the objection is difficultto reply to, but claimed
that body, as an essential part of an animal and essentiallydistinct
from the soul, is not prime matter separate fromall substantialact,
but indeed is a sort of entityin act compounded of prime matterand
fromthe soul. By
form,withoutsubstantialformin act reallydifferent
this actualitythe body can be subject to motion. In thisway the composition of animals frombody and soul differsfromthe composition
of a stone frommatterand form. "I concede," he says, "that in an
animal there is another substantial formbesides the specificsoul:"81
80ff.118vb-119ra:
"At rationes
in principio
adductaenonconcludunt
quaestionis
contrahanc positionem,
sed quod defectus
sit in eis patetdiligenter
inspicienti
Haec suntquae de istadifficili
praedicta.
quaestione
potuicongregare,
quodsi quis
iustumestutearndemonstratione
positionem
quamscripsinonacceptet,
improbet
enimnonestei credendum.
et rationes
SciantetiamPosteriores
proea solvat.Aliter
veritatis
in animisamici,quodhancpositionem
nonomnino
plusquamfamositatis
cuiusdam
doctoris
mea,sedex traditionibus
probaviex inventione
quem
Theologi,
intermeoscontemporneos
Commentatoris
et
putounumde subtilibus
expositoribus
Addiditamenaliquaad ordinatam
Aristotelis.
huiuspositionis
declarationem
etconetCommentatore,
firmationem,
quae ab aliisnonsuscepinisiab Aristotele
quae,et
si probabiliasunt et vera, teneantur,
si autemnon, removeantur
rationibus
demonstrativis.
Et sic tandemhuiusdifficillimi
Veritas
problematis
apparebit."
81f. 114v:"Quod autemadditur
de materia,
quodnonpossitessemotaperse,diffcilisest. Tamendico breviter
ad presensquod corpusquod est parsessentialis
animalisdistincta
essentialiter
ab ipsaanimanonestipsamateria
primasineomni
actusubstantial^
immoestquoddamensactucompositum
exmateria
primaetforma
sineactusubstantiali
alia ab animarealiter,
percuiusactualitatem
potestsubiici
66

01:50:12 AM

Andyousay,therefore
ofform
anda plurality
inthesame
youconcededegrees
individual.
I saythatthisis true.AndI haveprovenit elsewhere
Certainly,
towhatis objected
AndI havereplied
separately.
againstit.Andinmyopinion
thiswastheintention
ofAristotle
andtheCommentator,
as wasalsoclearinthe
wasfamous
atonetimeamongalltheancients,
sameplace.Indeedthatposition
butafter
thetimeofAlbert
andThomasitwasmaderather
because
improbable
oftheirfame,andbecauseofsomesuperficial
madebythem,which
arguments
thatposition.
Andperhaps
willreturn
itsprobability
theyadducedagainst
again,
ofthearguments
foritareseen,as wellas theweakness
whentheefficacy
ofthe
it.82
arguments
disproving
In sum, the position on the cause of the motion of heavy bodies
taken by John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and
"John Marsilius Inguen" was a position previously elaborated by
John ofJandun based on earlier ideas of Duns Scotus. In the work of
Jandun withregardto animals, it was clear thatthe positiondepended
to a greateror lesser extenton an acceptance of the pluralityof forms
and on a rejection of the arguments of Albert and Thomas for the
unity of substantial forms.With regard to inanimate bodies, on the
otherhand, John ofJandun's response to the thirdprincipalargument
was, in effect,that it is not the matterthat is moved, but the substantial forminsofaras it is in the matter.The Parisian nominalistsagree
with Jandun that after a heavy body has been generated and after
whateverprohibitsits motion has been removed, it is the formof the
heavy body- the substantial form or the heaviness- that moves it
downwards. They also agree withJandun that,in contrastto the situation with animate bodies, in inanimate bodies the rest of the body,
abstractingfromthe intrinsicmover, does not resistnaturatimotion,
so thatifmotionis to take time ratherthan occurringinstantaneously,
a medium must resist. Unlike Jandun, however, the Parisian
nominalistsdeemphasize the issue of what it is that is moved, whether
it is prime matter,or quantifiedmatter,or the forminsofaras it is in
matter,or the whole body, etc. In his very briefanswer to the second
motui.Et in hocdiffert
animalisex corporeet animaa compositione
compositio
et forma...Concedoergoin animaliessealiamformam
substanlapidisex materia
tialempreter
animamspecificam,
virtusmotiva."
quam
consequitur
82f. 114va:"Et tudices,ergoconcedisgradusformarum
et pluralitatem
in eodem
individuo.
Certedicoquodhocestverumetaliasprobaviseorsum
etdixiad ea quae
incontrarium
huicobiciuntur.
Et putoistamfuisseintentionem
Aristotelis
etComut ibidempatuit.Immoilia positioaliquandofuitfamosaapudomnes
mentatoris
sedposttempus
Alberti
etThomaealiquantulum
factaestimprobabilis
antiquiores,
eorumfamositatem
et propter
eorumsuperficiales,
propter
quasdamrationes
quas
contra
istampositionem.
Etforte
iterum
revertetur
ipsiadduxerunt
eius,
probabilitas
"
cumvisafuerit
efficacia
rationum
eiusetdebilitas
rationum
ipsamimprobantium.
67

01:50:12 AM

principal argumentof his Question 5, Buridan seems to say, indeed,

that it is matter that is moved.83
That it was Jandun (and to a lesser extentScotus) who was credited
with originatingthe position on what causes the natural motion of
inanimate bodies can be confirmedby looking at the late fifteenthcenturyworkof NicolettoVernia, mentionedat the startof thispaper.
Vernia begins his Tractatusde gravibuset levibusby saying that he was
motivated to discuss the issue since especially the more modern
expositorshad writteneitherbadly or incompletelyabout it.84In the
firstpart of his question, then, Vernia discussed the views that he
believed to deviate fromAristotle,dividing them into Greek, Arabic,
and Latin. Representingthe Greeks he included only Plato, representing the Arabs, he included only Avempace, and among the Latins,
he argued against the views of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas,
Aegidius of Rome, John of Jandun, John Duns Scotus, certain
theologizers,unnamed philosophers who held that heavy bodies are
moved by their proper places, and others who held that they are
moved by their formbut by accident.85By far his longest treatment
83Buridan,
f. 114v:"Secundaratiobeneprobatquodhecnonestperse veragrave
sedtarnen
illius
movetur,
movetur,
gravepersuammateriam
quiailiaestprincipium
motuspassivum."
84NichoUti
Theatini
De gravibus
etlevibus
1476),f. 174va:"Ego
Questio
(Padua, 1474?/
hocannoopusDe Celointerpretan,
tamen...volui
qui libertumex ipsiusPhilosophi
tumratione
doctrine
secundum
essedebet.QuamremetiamAverrois
dispositione,
ut fuitarabussolertissimus
in explanandaAristotelis
servandam
esse
philosophia
tradidit.
Namsecundum
locumhuicoperiassignavit.
VerumcumAristotelis
intertio
motorem
etleviuminquirat,
inqua materia
invenio
operishuiusvolumine
gravium
eiuspresertim
novosaut maledicereautdiminute
expositores
scripsisse."
85Ibid.,f.175ra:"InterLatinosveroinvenio
Albertm
voluisse
quodgraviaetlevia,
cumfuerint
remoto
moveantur
a seipsisperaccidens
dividendo
prohibente,
generata
f. 175rb-va:
mediumperse ad cuiusmotumipsamoventur..."
"Post istuminter
Latinosinveniogloriosum
doctorem
SanctumThomamde Aquinocompatriotam
effective
autema
nostrum,
qui voluitquod graviaet leviaa se ipsisformaliter,
moveri...Nonhabet,igitur,
activum
generante
gravein se ipsoaliquodprincipium
suimotus,
sedpassivum
tantum."f. 175va:"Posteosinvenio
de Romaqui
Egidium
a se ipsodeorsum
in motunaturali
concordavit
cumAlberto...Ideogravemovetur
de Gandunovoluissequod
peraccidens."175va-b:"Post eos invenio
Johannem
substantialibus,
graviaet leviapostquamsuntgenerataa se, id esta suisformis
itaquodeademformasecundum
moventur
eumestperse movens
et perse mota.
in quantumestin materia."176ra:
Movetenimin quantumestformaet movetur
estconformis
multum
"Unde opinioScotide motugravium
opinioni
Johannis
[de
inomnibus
Sednumquid
conipsegravea se ipsomoveri...
Ganduno]undeconcedit
veniantnon curo ad presensdeclarare."176va: "Post hos invenioquosdam
a gravitate
ab agenteprincipali
quivoluerunt
theologizantes
quodmoventur
tanquam
et primo...Posthoc invenioquosdamdicerequod moventur
a loco..." 176va-b:
68

01:50:12 AM

was devoted to John of Jandun, whose view was, in his judgment,

"remote fromall truth."86 If it were true, he says in what should be
by now a familiarargument,it would destroyAristotle'swhole line of
, where he proved the immobilityof
argumentin Book 8 of the Physics
the prime mover.87It would be ridiculous, Vernia said, to say that
Aristotle's argument is vacuous. As Averroes says in Book 1 of On
Generation
, according to Vernia:
thefirst
master
neversaysanything
without
a strong
reason.AndthesameComin OntheHeavens
mentator
, Book4, comment
25, saysthattheargument
given
in Book8 to provethatoneultimately
unmoved
arrives[ata first
byAristotle
and stronger
thantheargument
mover]is sufficient
givenin Book7.88
In the second part of his question, then, Vernia described what he
said was Averroes's view, which he took to be in line with Aristotle's
intent.Accordingto thisview, aftera heavy or lightbody is generated
and afteranythingpreventingits motion has been removed, then, if
it is out of its natural place, it is moved there naturally by the air,
which has been given impetusby what removed the impedimentto its
motion.89This view, Vernia claimed, is expresslystated by Aristotle
'Tost hosinvenio
a suisformis
quosdamaliosdicerequodipsamoventur
perse que
tamennonperse seipsasmovent,
utJohannes
commovendo
dixit,sedperaccidens
positum
perse."
86Ibid.,f. 175vb:"Sed iudiciomeoillaopinioestab omniveritate
remota."
87Ibid.,f. 176rb:"Itemillaopinione
datadestrueretur
totusprocessus
Philosophi
octavoPhisicorum
ubi probatimmobilitatem
et quod estdevenire
ad
primimotoris
motorem
immobilem."
Scotus'sclaimin
Elsewhere,
primm
simpliciter
discussing
BookII oftheSentences
thatsomething
canactonitself,
Verniasaysthatheis amazed
thatsucha greatmanas Scotuswoulddenya metaphysical
f. 176r:"Sed
principle,
doctorsubtilis
secundoSententiarum
distinctione
29 et in Quolibetis
dicitquodiliaprotalenonpotestfacerese formaliter
taleestfalsa,et
positi agensquodestvirtualiter
si estvera,nonestveranisigratiamaterie
inqua est...Sed miror
de tantoviroquod
istudprincipium
methaphisicum
neget...Unde si ipse verumdiceret,destrueret
totumprocessum
in octavoPhisicorum
utsupradictum
estet infrastatim
Philosophi
Unde opinioScotide motugraviumest conformis
multumopinioni
tangetur.
Undeconcedit
secunda
Johannis.
ipsegravea se ipsomoveriut patetdistinctione
secundiSententiarum
itaquodgravepergravitatem
in se motum
etc." This
producit
is theonlypassagewhereVerniaacknowledges
thatScotus'sopinionon thismatter
is essentially
thesameas Jandun's.
88Ibid.,f. 176rb-va:
"Et sicratioAristotelis
nullaesset,quodridiculosum
estdicere
de eo. NamMagister
utponitCommentator
, nunquam
primus,
primoDe Generatone
ratione.
Et idemCommentator
25
aliquiddixitsineforti
quartoCelitextucommenti
vultquodratioaductaab Aristotelis
in octavoad probandum
etc.
quodestdevenire
estsufficiens
et sufficiencior
ilia
tactafuitin septimo."
89Ibid.,f.176vb:"Quantumadque
secundum
dicendum
estcumAverroe
(quemsolum
internominatos
verumdixisseet Aristotelis
habuisseintentionem
philosophos
suntgenerata
remoto
movetper
quodgraviaetleviapostquam
existimo)
prohibente
69

01:50:12 AM

in Book 3 of On theHeavens, where he says that the power uses the air
as an instrumentin both natural and violent motion.90
Thus Vernia gives a solution to the question- that the removerof
the impedimentgives impetus to the medium that in turn moves the
heavy body down- not given by previous natural philosophersin such
detail for the case of naturally moving bodies. But abstractingfrom
this idiosyncratictwist to his answer, he otherwise gives a response
that might be expected of someone who respected Aristotle's
authority,including Aristotle's conclusion that heavy bodies do not
move themselvesin natural motion.
Slightlylater than Vernia, Girolamo Pico, withoutnaming Vernia
otherthan to call him "a man of our era," took up the same question
with the aim of clarifyingVernia's views insofaras theywere true, or
otherwise correctingthem.91Eight views on this matter have been
found,according to Pico, thatcontradictAristotle.The ninthopinion,
which Pico supported,was the opinion ofJohn ofJandun. According
to thisopinion, Pico said, heavy and lightbodies are moved fromtheir
se et naturaliter
ad sua naturalia
extrailia,ab ipsoaeremotoa
loca,cumfuerunt
Et quod ab eodemaere motomediante
removente
mpetuei dato a
prohibens.
movente
dumperviolentiam
modomoveantur
conomnesphilosophi
perviolenciam,
venerunt."
90f. 176vb:"Hec sentencia
tertioCelitextucomab Aristotele
expresse
colligitur
utitur
menti28. Dicitquodpotentia
aereinutroquemotutanquaminstrumento.
Et
ibidicitquodgraveiuvatgravitate
etleveiuvatlevitate
Commentator
etquodmovet
iliain utroquemotu.
Undeintranslatione
nostrasicinquit:ipsaad amboutitur
aeretanquamorgano,
facitetiamdeorsum.
eademigitur
Hoc idemquantum
ad
que sursumfacitlationem
tactamcontraIohannem
et
motumeorumnaturalem
potestprobariperrationem
aliasopiniones.
Namcumillaperse motoremoto
ad sua locanaturalia
prohibente
et efectus
causamperse et illanonpotestessenisiaer,quia eque
perse requirit
formamovetur
nequelocuset sicde aliis,ergoetc."
91De motu
etlevium
, MS. Venice,Bibi.Marc.VIII 83,f.4r: "In hacmateria
gravium
interomnesphysicas
difficultates
subtilissima
servaboordinem
uniusviriqui etatis
et ampiede huiusmodi
materiatractavit
ut quantum
nostrecoronaexistimabatur
Duo igitur
clariuspatefiat.
faciam.Primorecitabo
veritatis
eiusdietacontineant
opiet quantum
adversari
eas impugnando
nionesque Aristoteli,
videntur,
Averoyque,
illisostendam.
Secundoponamopinionem
benedixerit
istevirincontradicendo
quam
fortiores
contra
et Averoys
credoesseAristotelis
argumentationes
que communiter
illamadducisoientresolvendo."
On thisworkseeCharlesSchmitt,
Picus,
Hieronymus
8
Platonism
andtheCalculator
Studiesin Philosophy,
Renaissance
, in: International
AnderGrenze
Maiermentions,
, 207n. 44,thatPicofollows
(1976),57-80.Anneliese
hisview.Picoderives
hisview
ofthequestion
Vernia'sexposition
although
rejecting
ofSaxony.I wouldliketothank
Edward
Albert
toMaier,from
ofimpetus,
according
ofVenice,Bibl.Marc.MS lat.VIII,
mewithreproductions
Mahoneyforproviding
ofPico'sworkto Vernia's.
me to workon therelations
83 and forencouraging
70

01:50:12 AM

essential potency by the generator, fromtheir accidental potency by

the remover of the impediment to their motion, and their motion is
continued by the substantial form as principal agent and by their
accidental form as instrumentalagent.92 The basis of this opinion,
Pico said, is that every effectthat is intended perse must have some
agentperse, but the motion of heavy bodies down is an effectintended
perse, thereforeit must have an agent perse. That perse agent cannot
be anythingelse than the substantial form.93In this way Pico reaffirmedwhat Anneliese Maier describes as the dominant view of the
later Middle Ages on this question, that is the view ofJandun and of
the Parisian nominalists, a view that diverges from the original
Aristotelianposition.
Judged by this brief look, then, at the perspective of Vernia and
Pico in the late fifteenth
century,it could perhaps be guessed that the
Parisian nominalistsdid not emphasize theirdeviation fromAristotle
because theywere adopting a position thathad already achieved a certain acceptance. Their repetitionof what seems to be the standard
third principal argument against their position- that there was
nothingin act to be moved if the formof an inanimate body was the
mover- could be explained simplyby the factthatthisprincipalargument was part of the standard discourse. In fact, and perhaps this
should have been said much sooner, the argument is explicitly in
Averroes, ifnot implicitlyin Aristotlehimself.In his Comment 30 on
Book 8 of the Physics
, Averroes said:
Iftherefore
someone
saidthatthesearesimplebodiescomposed
ofmatter
and
ofwhicheachis distinct
todefinition
from
theother,
wesayto
form,
according
thisthatprimematter
doesnotexistin act. Andwhatis movedfromwithin
oughttobe dividedintoa moveranda movedin act,sincewhatis in potency
neither
is movednormoves.Iftherefore
a stone,forexample,
weremovedfrom
itwouldhappenthatitwasthemoverandthemovedin thesameway
within,
toitsform,
becausethereis nothing
inact[init]exceptform.
according
existing
Butthisis impossible.
...whatis movedfrom
willbe divisible
within
intoparts
92ff.11v-12r: "Nona opinioestJohannis
deJanduno
et
quamcredoesseAristotelis
tenentis
de potentia
essentiali
a generante,
de potentia
Averoys
graviaetleviamoveri
accidentali
a removente
initiative
a formis
continuative
substantialibus
prohibens,
tanquamab "agenteprincipaliet a formisaccidentalibus
tanquamab agente
instrumentali.
93f. 12r:"Cuius fundamentum
eratistud:omniseffectus
ab aliquo
perse intentus
a
esteffectus
indiget
aliquoagenteperse, sedmotusgravisdeorsum
perse intentus
naturagravis,
nonremovens
ergoindiget
agenteperse. Tale agensnonestgenerans,
nonesse,ettamenmovens
etmotum
essesimul.
debent
prohibens,
quumistapossint
Itemtaleagensnonlocus,nonaer,nonforma
substantialis."
accidentalis,
ergoforma
71

01:50:12 AM

oraccording
todefinition
either
toquantity.
Sincesimplebodiesare
according
thattheyare notmovedfrom
notdividedeitherway,it follows
in any
within
way.94
Perhaps, however, it was notjust thatmany later commentatorson
the Physicspicked up thisargumentfromAverroes,but also thatin the
meanwhile the controversyover the pluralityof substantialformshad
reinforcedthe argument that in a simple body, abstractingfromthe
substantialformas mover, thereis nothingin act to be moved: unless,
that is, like Jandun, one says that it is the same forminsofaras it is
matter that is moved as well as being the mover, or unless one supposes that a body can be said to be in act, in the sense required, by
an accidental ratherthan a substantial form- it is the lattertack that
Albert of Saxony takes. As representativeof the position reinforcing
thisargumentof Averroes in the period betweenAverroesand Scotus,
Aegidius Romanus might be mentioned. Coming to the pertinent
passage of Book 8 of the Physics where Aristotle argues that
homogeneous continua cannot move themselves,Aegidius makes the
standard distinctionbetween essential and quantitativeparts and says
thatin neithersense is a homogeneous body divisible into a moverand
a thingmoved. Aftera long argument,he supportsthe older view that
it is the generator that is the efficientcause of natural motion
downward, while the heaviness serves as a formalcause.95
4'Ex hoc
94See Appendix.
In themargin
nextto thissolution
thereis theremark:
4
substantiales
in simplicibus.
Consimile
videtur
veliequod nonsintpluresforme
to a workat theendof
c. 22, et4 Phys.71. Videcon.Zim." Thislastrefers
Coeloy
indictis
et
Contradictionum
Aristotelis
thevolume:MarcusAntonius
Zimara,Solutiones
above.
AverroiSy
quoted
95AegidiusRomanus,Commentaria
in octolibros
Aristotelis
, Venice1502,
phisicorum
forte
Frankfurt
Unvernderter
Nachdruck,
1968,f. 192v:"Dubitaret
aliquisutrum
he quatuorrationes[Aristotelis]
adductevigoremhabent...Quarta vero ratio
ex se habetpartesdiversarum
huicfundamento
innititur
quodomnequodmovetur
in
inmovens
etmotum
rationum,
quodhuiusmodi
quia estdivisibile
que secundum
non coincidunt.
.. [See Appendixfortherestof thisargument.]
unamrationem
huncmodumquodcorpora
nonmoveant
Simplicia
seipsa
Philosophus
ergopremittit
nonposseesse
moveatmateriam
cumquasiperse notumsitmateriam
quasiforma
cummobileetmotum
nondicatpotentiam
illudquodpersemovetur
puramseddicat
est
actui.Cumenimipsemotussitquidamactus,impossibile
admixtam
potentiam
quod moveturnon esse quodammodoin actu. Hoc igiturmodopraetermisso,
nonmovent
aliummodumquod corporaSimplicia
seipsaquoduna pars
improbat
moveataliam...
quantitativa
concludunt
fortedubitaret
rationes
Ulteriusvisoquomodopredicte
aliquisquia
videtur
quod graviaet leviaseipsamoveantperse. Namei quod perse movetur
descendens
si gravedeorsum
quod
perse movetur,
oportet
respondere
persemovens,
5
patetper id quod dictumest de per se moto...Dicendumquod inscribitur
cause.Quotenimmodisdiverde perse: perse dicitur
equaliter
capitulo
Metaphysice
72

01:50:12 AM

Afterall this, where do we stand with regard to the nature of the

Aristotelian commentary tradition as practiced by the Parisian
nominalists?I began this researchwith the assumption thatthe Physics
commentariesof the Parisian nominalistswould be an ideal place to
startin tryingto understand how scholastic Aristoteliancommentary
traditionsworked. These commentaries are closely related works by
some of the best medieval natural philosophers,and I thoughtI could
examine how the later commentatorsused the commentaries of the
earlier authors, as well as the textsof Aristotle,other textual sources,
and the phenomena of nature. Moreover, I chose the issue of why
heavy bodies move down because it was said at the end of the fifteenth
centuryto be the weightiestf physical problems.
A comparison of the commentariesof Buridan, Albert, Marsilius,
and "John Marsilius Inguen" on this issue shows thatlater commentatorsdid not particularlytryto assert theirown originality.Although
fromAristotle's,
the Parisian nominalists'views diverged significantly
ways were found to justifyand explain why Aristotleand Averroes
could rightlyhave said what theydid. Moreover, later commentaries
used earlier commentaries freelyas sources with no concern about
what we might call plagiarism.96 Not only did later commentators
make use of the workof theirpredecessors,however, but thisoccurred
to the extentthat the manuscript traditionsof the works of different
commentatorsbecame mutually entangled at an early date. In this
single study I have not been able to differentiatefullythe work of
Buridan fromthat of Albert of Saxony. One clear conclusion to be
drawn fromthisproject is thatmore work remains to be done to identifyseparable versions of Aristoteliancommentariesand to differentiate them one fromanother. Only when this has been done can one
causatotmodispotestdiversifican
sificatur
quodestperse... hocergomodomotus
deorsumreducihabetin gravetanquamin causammaterialem
perse. ...si vero
in causamformalem,
de motuhuiussecundum
sicetiam
loquimur
quod reducitur
motusgravisdeorsum
reduciinipsumgravetanquam
inaliquid
nonestinconveniens
motuseffective
autem
esta generante,
formaliter
perse... [f.193r]...Namhuiusmodi
in ipsam
esta forma
huiusmodi
motum
reducere
gravis.Nonergoestinconveniens
naturam
effecgravistanquaminprincipium
perse sednontanquaminprincipium
sedmagisquasiinprincipium
effectivo
tivum,
formale,
quareloquendode principio
graviaseipsanonmovent."
96
Albert
ofSaxony'scommentary
onDe CelotoBuridan's,
Moody,comparing
says,
xxi-xxii:
"Buridan's...
a similar
which
ofSaxony,wrote
setofQuaestiones
pupil,Albert
turnout,onexamination,
tobe littlemorethana rewriting
ofBuridan's
work,with
a fewadditions
and alterations.
All theideasin Buridan'sworkaretakenoverby
often
in almostthesamelanguage..."
Albert,
73

01:50:12 AM

begin to study how later commentatorsrelate their work to that of

their predecessors. Perhaps the conclusion to be reached is that it is
impossible to untangle fullythe work of differentindividuals.
The Parisian nominalists seem to have startedfromthe presumption thatAristotlewas an authorityin physics,but not to have believed
that his views were unquestionable. Since Aristotle seemed to be
inconsistentwithregardto the explanation of thenatural motion ofthe
elements, his texts invited effortsat interpretation.The Parisian
nominalists,then, triedto "save the phenomena" in the broad sense
of explaining what happens in the world and at the same time explaining what Aristotleand Averroes could reasonably have intended in
their texts.
In my reading of the texts, however, I found a perplexing gap in
Buridan' s reasoning, representedby his glossingover the objection to
his view thatprime mattercannot be the thingmoved because it is not
a separate entityin act. Finding an earlier holder of Buridan' s view
in John of Jandun- with John's characteristicallyoutspoken statement of the tension at this point in the theory- confirmedmy sense
that somethingwas missing in Buridan, showing how someone who
reached the same conclusions as Buridan might, at the time, have
been expected to reply. Reading Vernia and Pico confirmedthe view,
however, that it was John of Jandun (although he built upon
arguments ofJohn Duns Scotus) who was given credit or blame for
innovation on this question, whereas the Parisian nominalists were
considered to be followinghis lead.97 Perhaps the whole issue was noncontroversialat the time of Buridan, although for Vernia more than
a hundred years later it was still very much alive.
One conclusion that might be reached on the basis of this line of
inquiry, then, is that, although I tried to choose what contemporaries
thoughtwas a serious question, I neverthelesschose one on which the
authors I chose did not have much original to say- or on which there
was not much controversyat the moment at which theywere writing,
97Verniamentions
AlbertofSaxonyunderthenamesAlbertus
Parvus(175r)and
Albertutius
(177r),Marsilius(177v),GaetanoofThiene( 175r,177r),and aliosterministas
Buridanbyname.Nordoeshe giveanyofthe
( 177r). He doesnotmention
terminists'
viewson thecauseofthenaturalmotion
ofelemental
bodies.Albertof
thanBuridan,
Saxony,rather
mayhavebeenVernia'smainsourcefortheideasof
theParisians.
as thefoundation
ofhistreatment,
he seemstohaveused
Otherwise,
and questions
on thePhysics
, and,ofcourse,he ownedJohnof
Burley'sexposition
s work.
Jandun'
74

01:50:12 AM

though therewas controversybefore and after. One might suppose,

then,thatthisis a case studyofhow an Aristoteliancommentarytradition workswithregard to a question on which the authors do not have
new ideas or very strongor idiosyncraticopinions. If I had chosen a
subject that was more controvertedin the mid-fourteenthcentury,
perhaps I mighthave found a differentstory.
This was not, however, the firstdirection in which my thoughts
turned after I moved back from reading the works of the Parisian
nominalistson this question to reading John Duns Scotus and John
of Jandun. My initial reaction was that if the conclusion that heavy
and lightbodies move themselveswas opposed to Aristotleand controversialforScotus and Jandun, not long before Buridan, and if the
issue had implicationsthat reached out to a number of controverted
theologicalquestions, thenperhaps Buridan and his followerswere, by
theirseeming blandness, somehow attemptingto avoid being caught
up in theological quarrels- one might even suppose that they were
followingthe universityregulation that members of the arts faculty
should not deal with theological matters.98Along these lines, I asked
myselfwhetherBuridan's apparent empiricismand easy-goingsearch
for the truthdid not conceal an effortto avoid heated doctrinal controversiesbetween opposing schools of thought. In several cases, I
noticed, Buridan said, in effect,if you believe A, then this is how I
explain it, but ifyou believe B, thenI have an alternativeexplanation.
He said somethinglike this, for instance, with regard to the issue of
whethera celestial mover is to be taken togetherwith the sphere it
moves as one. Elsewhere, he said as an aside that perhaps only
humans with freewill and not other animals can initiatemotion with
no change in the external circumstances- somethingthat opposed the
whole tenorof his conclusion, but which he leftforanotheroccasion."
98English
translations
ofsomeoftherelevant
documents
areconveniently
available
in EdwardGrant,ed.,A Source
BookinMedieval
Science
Mass. 1974,42, Cambridge,
52. So Buridansays,in BookIV, question
: "someofmylordsand
8, ofthePhysics
masters
in theology
have reproached
me on this,[saying]thatsometimes
in my
I intermix
sometheological
matters
which
do notpertain
toartists.
physical
questions
Butwith[all]humility
I respondthatI verymuchwishnotto be restricted
[with
to this,namelythatall masters
in theartsswearthattheywill
respect]
beginning
disputeno purelytheological
question..."FromGrant,pp. 50-1; translating
Buridan,Physics
, ff.73v-74r.
99f. 113v: "Sic ergoanimaliamovent
naturali
eorumest
seipsaquia in potestate
ubisuntvelmoveri
ad aliumlocumetmoveri
velad conad unampartem
quiescere
etlevibus<in> animatis.
Ethocestpossibile
trariam,
quodnonestitade gravibus
75

01:50:12 AM

This might be compared, then, with Pico's exclamation at Vernia's

treatmentof Averroes's view on celestial movers:
Averroes
But thisdoctor[Vernia]repliesas follows:
saysthattheheavenis
theheavenis notdivided[in act intoa
movedfromwithinand nevertheless
takesthe
moverand something
moved].Oh, madness!I replythatAverroes
andtheheaventakenin thiswayis dividedinto
heavenjoinedwiththemotor,
a partmovingin actand a partmovedin act.100
We know, moreover, thatthe question whetherthe celestial movers
are united to the spheres theymove as souls was included in the condemnations of 1277. 101Was Buridan purposelyavoiding controversial
and contestedpoints? Surely, he must have known thatthe conclusion
that heavy bodies move themselveswas controversialeven if hedged
around with numerous conditions. I leave it, then, as an open question awaiting confirmationor disconfirmationby future studies of
other topics within these commentaries, whether the Parisian
nominalistsin theirAristoteliancommentariesconsciouslytryto avoid
theological controversy.
But howeverthisis settled,when all is said and done, it remainsthat
the Parisian nominalistswere firstand foremostcommentingon the
textof Aristotleratherthan doing natural philosophypure and simple.
They might be more or less willing to say that Aristotlewas in error
or to interprethim in a way that strained credibility,theymightalso
be more or less interestedin findingphysicallyplausible explanations,
but however the emphasis fell,neverthelesstheycontinued to tie their
discussions to Aristotle's text and its interpretationand to the
paedagogic need forcompletenessin theirdiscussions. Moreover, not
only did the Parisian nominaliststie theircommentariesto Aristotle's
text; theyalso tied them to otherprevious commentaries.It is notable
that the same principal arguments, the same distinctions,and the
same conclusions repeat themselvesin Jandun as well as in the Pariremanentibus
omnibuscircumstantiis
liberumarbitrium
hominibus
habentibus,
eisdem,quod nondicoitaessede aliis.Sed de hocestalibiconsiderandum.,'
100Pico,f. lOv: "Sed replicaiistedoctorsic: Averoys
dicitcelumex se moveriet
summit
celumcontamencelumnondividitur.
O insaniarespondeo
quodAveroys
in partem
etpartem
actumoventem
et celumsicsumptum
dividitur
iunctomotore
actumotam.
101See H. DenifleandE. Chatelain,
Universitatis
Parisiensis
Chartularium
, Paris1889bodiesaremovedbyan inter92, "Thatcelestial
97,vol.I, 543-55,e.g. Proposition
whichis a soul..." Proposition
nal principle,
102,"That thesouloftheskyis an
but
of the intelligences,
and the celestialorbs are not instruments
intelligence
fromGrant,Source
Book,49).
organs..."(translations
76

01:50:12 AM

sian nominalists.If the dependency of Albertof Saxony and Marsilius

of Inghen on Buridan is to be explained by the factthat theywere his
followers, in some sense, more surprising is the close relation of
Buridan to Jandun. Was it expected of commentatorsthat theywould
deal witha standard set of principal arguments?In futurerelated case
studiesof how commentarytraditionswork, it would be importantto
trace the lineage of principal arguments as well as of conclusions.
Buridan and his followersintroduced intrinsic causes to explain
both natural motion and projectilemotion. By hindsight,the impetus
theoryof projectile motion seems to representprogress in physics to
a greaterextentthan the explanation of natural motion by heaviness
and lightness.But is it clear that Buridan and his followersmade the
same judgment, i.e., did theyjudge thattheirexplanation of projectile
motionwas more successfulthan theirexplanation of natural elemental motion? Vernia rejected both theories, while Pico accepted both.
If in the eyes of both Vernia and Pico, John ofJandun was identified
with the new theoryof natural elementadmotion, while the Parisian
nominalists were associated with the impetus theory of projectile
motion, this may be explained by the fact that, to Vernia and Pico,
the Parisian nominalists were the innovators concerning impetus
theory,whereasJohn ofJandun was theirprimarysource forthe new
explanation of what causes heavy bodies to fall. Meanwhile the two
innovativetheorieswere evaluated rathersimilarly.But then why did
the Parisian nominalistsdiverge fromAristotlein both of these ways?
Should we, like some previous historians, raise the possibilitythat
these thinkerswere moving in a more empirical and less text-bound
directionthan their predecessors?
What else mightVernia's and Pico's late fifteenth-century
surveys
of previous opinion on the cause of natural elemental motion tell us
about the earlier commentary tradition? If we accept Anneliese
Maier' s view of the trend over the scholastic period from an earlier
emphasis on the generator and remover of the impediment as the
cause of natural elemental motion to a later emphasis on the substantial formor the heaviness and lightness,it may be surprisingto see
Vernia harkingback to the earlier view in the sense that he rejectsan
intrinsicactive cause of natural elemental motion. If there had been
a consensus about progressin medieval natural philosophy,would we
not have expected the later thinkersto agree upon the view that Pico
himself
adopted fromJandun? Was Vernia attemptingto differentiate
from the consensus in order to attract the attention of potential
77

01:50:12 AM

patrons? Did those in the Dominican traditioncontinue to resistthis

Scotistic innovation? Would the standard reaction have been that of
Pico, namely to reassertwhat may have been by then the consensus
view? Was Vernia motivatedby a proto-Renaissance effortto return
to classical views? Afterthe origin of the theoryof elemental natural
motion in Scotus's consideration of angelic motion, was there ever
again a connection made between theories of angelic and natural
elemental motion?
Aside from the historic roots of Jandun's and the Parisian
nominalists' explanation of natural elemental motion in Scotus's
analysis of the motion of angels, the strongestargumentfortheirview
was that a perse effectmust have a per se cause presentwhile it is in
process of production. The generator and the remover of the
impediments, on this view, were insufficientas causes of natural
elemental motion, because they might not even exist as the motion
was occurring. If this was a strong motivation forJandun's theory,
then perhaps it is notable that Vernia' s innovation in explaining the
natural motion of the elements involves giving impetus to the surrounding medium, thus also providinglocal cause fora local effect,a
cause presentwith the body as it is moved, unlike the generatorand
the remover of the impediments. Was there a trend over time to
requiring concurrentefficientcauses?
4
Here, however, I would also like to returnto the 'Grant thesis,"
mentioned at the beginning of my paper, that it was somehow the
commentaryformwith its resultantatomization of thoughtthat held
back concertedchange in medieval natural philosophy. My firstreaction to thisthesisis thatit does not hold withregardto individualcommentators. Buridan, I am convinced, and each of his followers,paid
considerable attentionto the consistencyof their views and how an
answer to one question might impact on possible answers to other
questions. As thisstudyhas shown, the Parisian nominalistswere very
aware of the ties between one part of Aristotelianismand another,and
of which ideas were more fundamentaland which less important.
The Grant thesis mightbe reformulated,however, to concern, not
what was the case about any one of the better commentators,but
rather how one commentator related to another, particularlyhow
commentatorswidely separated in space and time interrelated.John
Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and the other Parisian nominalistswere veryfamiliarwitheach other's ideas and, forthe
most part, did not try to differentiateone person's opinions from
78

01:50:12 AM

another's. In their commentaries, moreover, they did not highlight

those issues on which they thought they were making original contributions,as compared to those issues on which they were giving a
standard view. All of these factorswould make it difficultfora subsequent commentatorto detect where, in fact, they were original. To
Vernia and Pico, workingmore than a hundred years later, the Parisian nominalists' habits of not citing the holders of various opinions
by name, of not highlightingtheir own originality,and of claiming
thattheirviews did not contradictAristotlecould be a cause forconfusion. The Parisians impressed themselves,however, in the minds of
Vernia and Pico as the authors of the impetus theoryof projectile
motion,so thecommentaryformand thelack of ascriptionsof original
opinions was not an insurmountableobstacle to theirrecognition.102
Raleigh, N.C.
NorthCarolinaStateUniversity

102Fora recent
morephilosophical
to attacksomeofthesesamequestions
attempt
ofthenatureofAristotelianism
and itslongevity
as a tradition,
seeJ. M. M. H.
Some
ontheContinuity
andTransformation
inMedieval
Thijssen,
Reflections
ofAristotelianism
Natural
e StudisullaTradizione
Filosofica
, in:Documenti
(andRenaissance)
Philosophy
Medievale.RivistadellaSocietInternazionale
perlo Studiodel MedioevoLatino,
II (1991),503-28.
79

01:50:12 AM

Appendix
ofBuridan'sBookVIII, Question4.
Paralleltextsto thethirdprincipal
argument
tialectura
, Erfurt
Buridan,Physics
, ter
Ampl.F 298,f.41r-v:[Thirdprincipal
"Itemin octavohuius
argument]
dicitur
quodomnemotumex se est
divisibile
in partemperse moventem
et partem
perse motm,sed animal
nonesthuiusmodi,
quia si animal
in animametcorpuset
dividatur
dicaturquodanimaestperse movens,
nonpoterit
diciquodalia parssitper
se mota,scilicet
corpus,quia corpus
animanonestaliquidin
circumscripta
actuet perse motum
debetessealiquidin actu."

lectura
Buridan,Physics
, Paris
, ultima
1509,f. 112v:[Thirdprincipal
argument]"Itemin octavohuiusdicit
omnequod ex se movetur
Aristoteles
essedivisibile
in partemperse
moventem
et partem
perse motam.
Sic autemnonestanimaldivisibile,
positoquodnonsitin animalinisiuna
formasubstantial,scilicet
anima,quia
animalnisiin
tuncnondividitur
animamet in primam
materiam.
Et si
animamoveatperse tamenmateria
nonmovetur
perse. Hoc apparetper
in quintohuiusduplici
Aristotelem
auctoritate.
Primaestquodensin pura
nonmovetur
et taleensest
potentia
est
primamateria.Secundaauctoritas
nonesthocaliquia quod simpliciter
Et
quid,hocnullomodomovetur.
hoc
tamenmateria
nonestsimpliciter
aliquid.Patetergoquodanimainon
estdivisibile
in partem
perse
moventem
et partem
perse motam.

"Et si dicaturquodcorpusciranimaadhucestin actu

cumscripta
accidentali
istud
persua accidentia,
nonvaletquia sicdiceremus
de gravi
in
scilicet
inanimato,
quodsitdivisibile
partemperse moventem
que estforma
et partemperse motam
gravitatis
existentem
in actuque estmateria
accidentibus
actuata,quod tamen
et Commentator."
negantAristoteles

Et ultrasi diceretur
animaiest
divisibile
in partem
perse moventem
et partem
perse motam,dicendoquod
animamovetperse et materia
movetur
perse, itadiceremus
quod
in huiusmodi
partes
graveinanimatum
in
divideretur,
quia dicitCommentator
quartohuiusquodin motuipsius
est
gravisformaestmotoret materia
mota.Ergosi ob hocanimaidiceretur
moveriex se itaoporteret
dicerequod
ex se
moveretur
graveinanimatum
quodnegatAristoteles."

f. 41v: [Replyto thethirdprincipal

"Et rationes
que fiebant
argument]
nonprocedunt
contradicta.Conceditur
enimbenequodanimal
movetur
ab aliquoalio,quia velab
animavela continente,
tamenpotest
moveriet incipere
motumsuumsine
hocquod tuncindigeatur
motore

f. 113v:[Replyto theprincipal
"Rationesautemad
arguments]
in prinutramque
partem
que fiebant
nonprocedunt
contra
cipioquestionis
etc."
determinata,

80

01:50:12 AM

Et ad talemsensumconextrnseco.
ceditur
moveriex se. Et quandodicitur
ex se estdivisibile
quodomnemotum
in partemperse moventem
et partem
perse motam,dicoquodAristoteles
intendebat
quod iliaparsperse mota
estsicin actuquodperiliumactum
motori
et ita grave
resisterei
formasive
inanimatum
circumscripta
nonestin
circummovente103
gravitate
actusedanimalcircumscripta
anima
movente
adhucessetdictomodoin
actu.Corpusenimpersuam
resistit
animemoventi.
Et
gravitatem
intendit
Aristoteles
hancdifferentiam
in Octavohuiusinteranimalet grave
inanimatum."
AlbertofSaxony(?),
AlbertofSaxony,Physics
, Cesena,
, Paris1518,
Physics
S. VIII.5, f. 69ra:
f. 19w.
Malatestiana,
[Thirdprincipal
argument]
"Tertio
"TertionamperAristotelem
in isto
[Thirdprincipal
argument]
namperAristotelem
in istooctavo
in
octavo,omnemotumestdivisibile
omnemotum
ex se estdivisibile
in
et in partem
partemperse moventem
et in partem perse motam,modosic nonestde
partem
perse moventem
animali.Ergoanimalnonmovetur
ex
perse motam,modosicnonestde
animali.Ergoanimalnonmovetur
ex
se. Antecedens
Animalest
probatur.
se. Assumptum
in corpuset animam,modo
probatur,
quia animai divisibile
estdivisibile
in corpuset animam,
animanonestper
corpuscircumscripta
modocorpuscircumscripta
animanon se motum,
hocquodillud
propter
estperse motum
hocquod
propter
quod debetesseperse motumdebet
istudquoddebetesseperse motum
esseensin actuperaliquamformam,
debetesseensactuperaliquemformodocircumscripta
animanonvidetur
mam.Et si dicaturquodlicetnonsit
quod sitcorpusin actuperaliquam
in actuperaliquamformam
substan- formam.
Et si dicaturquodlicetnon
tialemcircumscripta
sitin actuperaliquamformam
anima,adhuc
tamenestin actuperformam
acciden- substantialem
anima,
circumscripta
talemet hocsufficit.
Sed contrasi hoc adhuctamenestin actuperaliquam
sufficeret
tuncgraveinanimatum
formam
accidentalem
et hocsufficit.
ex se quod
Sed contra,si hocsufficeret,
tunc
possetdicimotum
Aristoteles
diceretur
velposset
negatin istooctavo.Prograveinanimatum
baturconsequentia
ex eo quod grave
dicimoveriex se, quodAristoteles
inanimatum
estdivisibile
in partemper negatin istooctavo.Probatur
consese moventem,
eiusformam,
scilicet
et
quentiaex eo quodgraveinanimatum
aliampartemmotam,
in partemperse
que adhucestin estdivisibile
actuperaliquamformam
scilicet
eiusformam,
et in
circumscriptamoventem,
eiusforma
aliampartemmotam,que adhucestin
perse movente."
actuperaliquamformam
accidentalem
eiusformaperse
circumscripta
movente."
f.69rb:[Replyto thethirdprincipal
"Ad tertiam
concedoquod
argument]

ff.79v-80r:[Replyto thethirdprin"Ad tertiam

concedo
cipalargument]
81

01:50:12 AM

in partem
in partemperse
animaldividitur
quod animalestdivisibile
et in partem
moventem
et in partem
perse motam perse moventem
perse
Et quando
motamet sicnegominorem.
et sicnegominorem.
Et quum
animaresiduum arguebatur
anima
circumscripta
arguitur
circumscripta
hoc
nonestperse motumpropter
residuum
nonestperse motum
propquodnonestensin actu,nego.Probo: terhocquodnonestensin actu,nego.
sufficit
Immosufficit
quodsitensin actuperquem
quodsitensin actuproactumrsistt
moventi
et ita estde
moventi
et ita
pterquemactumresistit
animaliscircumscripta
corporeanimalisanimacircumscripta, estde corpore
anima,quia adhuccorpusestin actu
quia adhuccorpusestin actuper
istamgravitatem
perquamquidem
pergravitatem,
perquamquidem
resistit
animemoventi.
Sed gravitatem
resistit
animemoventi.
Sed
gravitatem
sicnonestde graviinanimato,
sicnonestde graviinanimato.
Licet
sed
adhuc
forma
enimformacircumscripta
eiussubstantiali
circumscripta
residuum
maneatin actuper
manetin actuper
adhucresiduum
tamenperillamnon
tamenperillamnon
gravitatem,
gravitatem,
resistit
substan- resistit
scilicet
forme
scilicet
forme
substanmoventi,
moventi,
tialigravis,et ideogravenondicitur tialigravis,et ideogravenondicitur
moveriex se sed animalbene."
moveriex se, sedanimalbene."

Paralleltextsfromearliercommentaries:
inAristotelis
Auditu JohnofJandun,Super
De Physico
OctoLibros
Averroes,
LibriOcto.CumAverrois
variis Aristotelis
Cordubensis
dePhysico
Auditu
Subtilissimae
ineodem
vol. 4, Venice
Commentariis.
Venice1551,reprint
Quaestiones,
Frankfurt
1562,Book8, comment
30, f. 367v:
1969,Book8, Question11,
"Si igituraliquisdixerit
quod suntcor- f. 115r:"[Secondprincipal
argument]
ex materia
et Item,illudquoddividitur
in partem
composita
poraSimplicia
estdistinc- moventem
et partem
motammovet
forma,
quorumutrumque
tumsecundum
a reliquo, seipsum,
definitionem
ut patetin istoOctavo.Sed
dicemusad hocquodprimamateria
esthuiusmodi.
graveinanimatum
nonestexistens
in actu.Et illudquod
Dividitur
enimin materiam
et forex se debetdividiin motorem mam,et forma
movetur
estmovenset materia
et motumin actu,quoniamilludquod resmota,ut dicitur
Commentator
in
estin potentia
nequemovetur
neque
Quartohuius.Et si dicasad hocquod
movet.Si igitur
materia
lapis,verbigratia,
gravisnonpotestesseillud
ex se, contingeret
moveretur
utesset
deorsum,
quodperse movetur
quia
movenset motumeodemmodosecun- quodmovetur
debetesseensactu,et
dumformam,
quoniamnonest
ipsamateria
gravisnondebetesseens
existens
in actunisisecundum
foractu,contrahocestquia animaldicitur
movereseipsumeo quoddividitur
in
mam,quodestimpossibile Deinde
dicit:Secundum
,
igitur
quodestcontinuum
corpuset in animam,quodestpars
etc.id estquodrescontinue,
secundum animalisdistincta
contraanimam,et
nonestaliquodensdistinctum
noncontigue
quodsuntcontinue
praeter
estut recipiant
dicitur,
impossibile
passionem, animamut communiter
ergo
id estmotumex se, cumnondividan- similiter
in proposito,
quamvismateria
turin motorem
et motumnisiessent
quae estparslapidisnonsitensactu
continue
coneiussubstantialem,
formam
copulatesecundum
preter
Et dicithocquia illudquod poterit
tamenesseperse mota,sicut
tiguitatem.
secun- animaestperse movensnonobstante
movetur
ex se auteritdivisibile
dumdefinitionem
autsecundum
quan- quod ipsasitactus.Sic formalapidis
id estpartes,et cumcorpora poterit
esseperse movensut videtur."
titatem,
82

01:50:12 AM

nondividantur
altero
Simplicia
modorum
istorum,
sequitur
quod non
moveantur
ex se omnino....Et iste
sermosiccomponitur:
Corpora
naturalia
suntconsimilium
partium
et iliaque suntconsimplicium,
similium
partium
simplicium
estut moveant
se, ergo
impossibile
se."
nonmoveant
corporanaturalia

f. 115rb-va:
from
determina[Excerpt
tionofthequestion]"Si autem
de motugravisin actu,prout
quaeritur
ad ipsumestpotentia
accidentalis,
verbigratia,cumlapisestsursumet
remoto
descendit
deorsum,
prohibente
utrumtuncipsumgravemoveatseipet
sum,de hocestmagnadifficultas
diversitas
interdoctores.
Et dicunt
et quasiomnesquod
plurimi
inodo huiusmodi
actum
Romanus,Commentaria
Aegidius
gravesecundum
libros
Aristotelis
in potentia
accidentali
ad ubi
, Venice1502, existens
phisicorum
192v:"Quartaveroratioinnititur
huic deorsum
nonmovetseipsumperse,
fundamento
quodomnequodmovetur sed solumperaccidens.Quod probant.
ex se habetpartesdiversarum
Si moveret
seipsumperse, tunc
in movens oporteret
rationum,
quia estdivisibile
quodessetdivisibile
perse et
et motum
in partem
et in
que secundum
quod
perse moventem
huiusmodi
in unamrationem
noncoin- partemperse motamsecundum
cidunt.Corpusergosimplex
si
in istoOctavo.Hoc autem
Aristotelem
dividitur
in plurespartesvelhoceritin estimpossibile,
sicutpatetin litera.
ut in materiam Namillaepartesautessentpartes
plurespartesessentiales
et formam,
velin plurespartesquanquantitativae
ipsiusgravis,autpartes
titativas....
Si igiturtaliacorpora
diviessentiales,
persufficientem
et suntdivisibilia
in
sionem.Nonpartesquantitativae,
seipsamovent
quia
et secundum
plurespartesquarumuna estperse
partesquantitativae
movensetalia perse mota,velhoc
suntuniusdispositionis
et
qualitatem
eritquia forma
ibi eritperse movens virtutis.
Undenullaestratioquareuna
et materia
essetmovensperse et alia perse
perse mota,velquia una
eritibi perse movens mota.Nec partesessentiales,
parsquantitativa
quia
et alia perse mota.Primusautem
omnespartesessentiales
suntformaet
modusstarenonpotest,quia materia materiaprima.Materiaautemprima
nonpotesthabererationem
nonpotestesseperse mota,cumsit
perse
cumdicatquodomninoin
ensin purapotentia
et nullamresistenmotam,
necsecundum
tiamhabetad movens.Semperenim
potentia
quod
huiusmodi
habeataliquidperquod
debetesseresistentia,
ut accipitCommoventi....
possitresistere
Philosophus mentator
Quartohuius.Ergoipsum
huncmodumquodcor- gravenonmovetseipsumperse."
ergopremittit
nonmoveant
118vb: [Replyto principal
poraSimplicia
seipsa
arguments]
cum
"At rationes
in principio
quasiformamoveatmateriam
quaestionis
non
adductaenonconcludunt
contrahanc
quasiperse notumsitmateriam
sed quoddefectus
sitin eis
posseesseilludquodperse movetur positionem,
cummobileet motum
nondicatpoten- patetdiligenter
inspicienti
praedicta."
tiampuramseddicatpotentiam
admixtam
actui.Cum enimipsemotus
sitquidamactus,impossibile
estquod
movetur
nonessequodammodo
in
actu."

103The reading
"circummovente"
seemsclearfrom
themanuscript,
but"circum"
is probably
an error.
83

01:50:12 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresmeon Natural Knowledge
EDWARD GRANT

Any list of "most notable intellects" among scholastic authors in

the Middle Ages would undoubtedly include two fourteenth-century
Frenchmen,Jean Buridan (1300-before 1361) and Nicole Oresme (ca.
1325-1382). Ever since Pierre Duhem firstdrew attention to their
varied and weightycontributionsto medieval science, theyhave been
the focusof considerable attention.1A briefcomparison oftheirstatus,
worksand influenceis instructive.Oresme was both a natural philosopher and theologian, while Buridan' s professionalexpertisewas confined to natural philosophy which he practiced for many years as a
Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts at the Universityof Paris.2 As
a Master of Arts, Buridan commentedalmost exclusivelyon the works
on almost all
of Aristotle,leaving behind a commentaryor questiones
of the latter treatisesand some that were falselyattributedto him.3
Oresme's legacy is quite different.Not only did he comment on at
and Corruption
least six of Aristotle'streatises(the Physics
,
, On Generation
On theSoul, On theHeavens, the Meteorology
, and Small NaturalTreatises
(Parva naturalia)*but he wrote nearly twice as many tractateson a
wide range of topics. Apart fromhis Le Livredu ciel et du monde
, his
French commentaryon Aristotle'sDe celo, Oresme' s most innovative
and original treatisetook the form of tractates( Tractatus
) on themes
1 See P. Duhem,Le systme
Coperdumonde;
histoire
desdoctrines
dePlaton
cosmologiques
surLonard
deVinci,
ceux
andEtudes
nic,10vols.,Paris1913-1959
qu'ila lusetceux
qui
l'ontlu, 3 vols.,Paris1906-1913.
2 The possiblesignificance
willbe considered
below.
ofthismajordifference
3 Fora listof themanuscripts
and editions
ofBuridan'sworks,see C. H. Lohr,
in: Traditio,26
Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries
, Authors:
Juff,
Jacobus-Johannes
(1970),161-83.
4 Indeedheeventranslated
Ethics
s treatises
fourofAristotle
,
Politics,
(OntheHeaven,
were
fromLatinintoFrenchforKingCharlesV. Thesetranslations
andEconomics)
Fora listofmanuscripts
andeditions
ofhis
byFrenchcommentaries.
accompanied
Authors:
LatinAristotle
Aristotelian
see C. H. Lohr,Medieval
Commentaries,
treatises,
NarcissusRichardus
yin: Traditio,28 (1972),290-8.
84

01:50:25 AM

that are largely independent of the traditional question format.

Included in his impressive list of thematic treatises are: De proportionibusproporiionum,
Ad pauca respicientes,
Tractatusde configurationibus
etmotuum
Euelidis, Tractatus
decom, Questiones
qualitatum
supergeometriam
vel incommensurabilitate
motuumceli} Algorismuspropor
mensurabilitate
despera, Tractatus
de mutationibus
monetarum
and a series
tionum,Tractatus
of worksagainst magic and astrology,namely De causismirabilium
(also
known as the Quodlibeta),Questiocontradivinatores
, Tractatuscontra
, and Livrede divinacions.It is in this impressivelist
judiciriosastronomos
of thematic tractates, rather than in his scholastic questiones
on the
worksof Aristotle,thatOresme displays his most original and creative
ideas. In thesetreatisesthe ordinaryconstraintsof scholasticdiscourse
could be ignored and avoided, replaced by a much freerplay of the
imagination.5
In 1978, I published an articlein which I compared the approaches
to science of these two luminaries.6 Although I retain much of what
I said then, new research and studies on both have enabled me to see
deeper and furtherthan was then possible. In this study, I shall
integratewhat seems worthpreservingfrommy earlier articlewiththe
new insightsthat have been made possible by subsequent research. I
shall firstdescribe Buridan' s view of science and, using that as a base,
show in what sense Oresme differed.In what follows,we should at
least be alert to the possibilitythat some of the differencesbetween
Buridan and Oresme may derive from a disciplinary struggle that
went on throughthe Middle Ages between natural philosophy(philosophy in the broadest sense) and theology.7As a Master of Arts, who
5 ByOresme'sday,thequestiones
wasdeeplyrootedforeachofAristotle's
tradition
onwhich
werewritten.
treatises
newquestions
couldbeintroduced
questiones
Although
andoldonesomitted
orbypassed,
mostauthors
tendedtoincludemany,ifnotmost,
ofthesamequestions
andrangeofresponses
as theircontemporaries
andimmediate
Newconcepts
weremoreeasilyintroduced
andthoughts
intotreatises
predecessors.
thatwerenotbasedonanauthoritative
text.Indeed,evencommentaries
ontheworks
ofAristotle
seemtohaveoffered
fornovelty
thanquestiones.
moreopportunities
This
is evidentin thegreater
and depthof Oresme'sFrenchcommentary
on
novelty
De celo
Aristotle's
on De celo.Ifso inclined,
onecould
, as opposedtohisQuestiones
almostanythemes
intodifferent
that
incorporate
partsofa commentary,
something
in an ordinary
wasnotveryfeasible
questiones.
6 Scientific
in Fourteenth-Century
: JeanBuridan
Paris
and NicoleOresme
, in:
Thought
Machaut's
World:
Science
andArtintheFourteenth
, eds. M. P. Cosmanand B.
Century
NewYork1978,105-24(AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademy
ofSciences,
Chandler,
vol. 314).
7 Fora goodaccountofthisdisciplinary
seeD. A. Iorio,TheAristotelians
struggle,
of
Renaissance
N.Y. 1991,chs. 1-4.
, Lewiston,
Italy.A Philosophical
Exposition
85

01:50:25 AM

devoted his professionallifeto the studyof Aristoteliannatural philosophy and who had had no trainingin theology,Buridan stands in contrastto Nicole Oresme who possessed not only a masterof arts degree
from the University of Paris, but also acquired a doctorate in
theology,probably by 1356. Although both may properlybe characterizedas Aristotelians,theirattitudestowardknowledgedifferedconsiderably, if not radically, as we shall see below.

1. Jean Buridan
Jean Buridan was perhaps the quintessentialempiricistof the Middle Ages. He had an abiding faithin human abilityto understandand
describe the operations of nature in terms of cause and effectbased
ultimatelyon sense perception. During the Middle Ages, however,
such convictionshad inevitablyto be reconciledwith faith.Insofar as
can be determined,Buridan had no overt problems withhis faith.He
accepted the truths of revelation as absolute and frequently
acknowledged that God could do anything that was considered
"
naturally impossible",8 which often meant the kinds of natural
"
'
impossibilities, or
thought experiments,' that had become
fashionableas a resultof theCondemnation of 1277.9 Buridan was not
much attracted to the physics and cosmology of ' 4what God might
have done." Indeed, God's uncontested power to do these things,
ought not to implythat He had done so, or would do so. Thus, while
Buridan was prepared to concede that 44we hold on faiththatjust as
God made this world, so could he make another, or others,"10 he
thought it far more plausible to believe that if God chose to create
more creaturesof the kind that appear in our world, He would simply
increase its size by any factor He pleased rather than create other
8 See A. Maier,Das Prinzipderdoppelten
Wahrheit
, in: A. Maier,Metaphysische
dersptscholastischen
, Rome1955,27.
Naturphilosophie
Hintergrnde
9 Forillustrations,
Power
seeEdwardGrant,TheCondemnation
,
of1277,God'sAbsolute
inthelateMiddle
andPhysical
, in: Viator,10 (1979),211-44.
Ages
Thought
10Buridan's
onthePhysics,
occursinhisQuestions
bk.3, qu. 15in:Acutissimi
discussion
libros
Buridani
subtilissime
questiones
philosophi
superoctoPhisicorum
magisti
Johannis
anteanusquam
etrevise
Dullaert
de Gandavo
Aristotelis
magistro
Johanne
recognite
diligenter
infacsimile
underthetitle
Buridanus
, Kommen, Paris1509;reprinted
Johannes
impresse
a.M. 1964,fol.57v,col.2; alsoquotedinGrant,
tarzurAristotelischen
, Frankfurt
Physik
Paris
inFourteenth-Century
, 119,n. 19.
Thought
Scientific
86

01:50:25 AM

worlds.11With equal plausibility,God could create a finiteor infinite

space beyond the limits of our world, but we have no warrant to
believe that He had done so, since the accessible sources of evidence,
namely sense experience, natural reason, and the authorityof Sacred
Scripture, fail to indicate the existence of such a space beyond our
world.12
Although Buridan sought as much as possible to exclude God
from the deliberations of natural philosophy, the two were often
unavoidably intertwined,as was obvious fromthe Condemnation of
1277 with its numerous articlescondemning the eternityof the world
and the denial of absolute powers to God in the execution of natural
4
impossibilities. 'It was a common doctrine in the thirteenthand
fourteenthcenturies," declares J. M. M. H. Thijssen, "that agentia
naturalia operate with necessity, but that their effects may be
prevented. With such agents," he continues, "it is not contradictory
to say that the cause exists and the effectdoes not because the latter
mighthave been impeded peraccidensby some other cause or because
God has miraculouslyintervenedin nature."13 Indeed God mightnot
only intervene miraculously in some spectacular manner- as, for
example, to make fire cold- but He might also substituteHis own
directcausality forthat of the secondary causality of a natural agent.
For example, He mightchoose to make firehot directly,thus replacing the natural agent. If so, we would be unable to determinewhether
any effectwas produced naturallyor supernaturally.Truth in natural
science would thus be impossible.
In his response to this dilemma, Buridan followed a traditionthat
had already been underway. In his Questionson theMetaphysics
, bk. 2,
qu. 1, Buridan asks "whether the grasp of truthis possible forus."14
11Forthetext,seeBuridan'sQuestions
onDe celo
Buridani
, bk. 1, qu. 18in:Johannis
libris
De celoeimundo
Mass.
, ed. E. A. Moody,Cambridge,
Quaestiones
super
quattuor
in
1942,84, 89. The relevant
passageon p. 84 is quotedin Grant,Scientific
Thought
Paris
, 119,n. 18.
Fourteenth-Century
12FortheLatintext,see Buridan'sQuestions
onDe celo
, bk. 1, qu. 17,in Moody's
inFourteenth-Century
edition,
p. 79; thetextis also citedin Grant,Scientific
Thought
Paris
, 119,n. 20.
13J. M. M. H. Thijssen,
Buridan
andNicholas
onCausality
andInducJohn
ofAutrecourt
tion,in: Traditio,43 (1987),240.
14"Queritur
circasecundum
librum
de rebussitnobispossibilis
utrum
comprehensio
In Metaphysicen
veritatis."
Aristotelis
Ioannis
Buridani
in
; Questiones
argutissime
Maistri
ultima
etemissae
ab ipsorecognitae
acad archetypon
cumduplice
praelectione
diligenter
repositae
videlicet
infronte
indicio
materiarum
etquaestionum
inoperis
calce
, Paris1518,fol.8r,col. 1.
87

01:50:25 AM

With regard to natural science, Buridan insiststhatwe can attaintruth

with certaintyby taking evidence "secundumquid or ex supposition 1
which occurs when 4'a common course of nature ( communiscursus
nature)is observed in thingsand in this way it is evident to us that all
fireis warm and thatthe heaven moves, althoughthe contraryis possible by God's power."15 In this statement, Buridan expresses the
medieval doctrineof reasoning exsupposition,in a formsimilarto that
assumed earlier by Thomas Aquinas and described by William
Wallace as a ilsuppositio[or assumption] of the order of nature
unimpeded by external causes, such as chance occurrences within
nature itself or God's miraculous intervention."16The ' 'certain"
truthsBuridan had in mind are indemonstrableprincipleswhich are
the basis of natural science, as he makes clear in his examples that all
fireis warm and that the heaven moves. These principlesneed not be
absolute but can be derived by inductive generalization- that is, as
Buridan puts it, ' 4theyare accepted because theyhave been observed
to be true in many instances, and to be false in none."17 Absolute
evidence is not required. These indemonstrable, inductively
generalized principlesare conditionalbecause theirtruthis predicated
on the assumption of the "common course of nature." Since
Buridan' s methodologyof science is based on the "common course of
15"Sed aliomodoaccipitur
evidentia
utprius
secundum
quidsiveex suppositione,
in entibuscommunis
cursusnatureet sicessetnobis
dicebatur,
quodobservaretur
evidentia
licetcontrarium
sit
quod omnisignisestcaliduset quod celummovetur,
InMetaphysicen
Dei." Buridan,
Aristotelis
, bk.2, qu. 1,fols.8v,
possible
perpotentiam
col. 2-9r,col. 1. The translation
is byEdithSylla,Galileo
andProbable
in:
Arguments,
andScientific
Method
Nature
D.C. 1991,216
, ed. D. O. Dahlstrom,
Washington,
in Philosophy
and theHistory
ofPhilosophy,
vol. 22).
(Studies
16See W. A.
Wallace.Aristotle
andGalileo:TheuseofunOeai
inScientific
(Suppositio)
inAristotle
D.C. 1982,64.
, in: Studies
, ed. D. J. O'Meara, Washington,
Reasoning
17Thetranslation
isbyE. A. Moodyinhisarticle
, in:Dictionary
Buridan,
Jean
ofScienvol.2 (1970),605. Moody'stranslation
con, ed. CharlesG. Gillispie,
tific
Biography
vertsthe following
Latin text:"Imo solumconceduntur
quia sicutvidimusin
invenire
I believe
etin nullispotuimus
instantiam."
singularibus
pluribus
Although
oftheargument,
whichI shallfollow,
hisversion
of"et
Moodyhascaughtthespirit
innullispotuimus
invenire
instantiam"
doesnotseemright.
Theterm"instantiam"
mustsomehow
The textis from
thesenseof"counterinstance."
Buridan's
represent
ontheMetaphysics
Aristotelis
, bk. 2, qu. 2, in In Metaphysicen
, fol.9v,col. 2,
Questions
whereBuridanexplainsthat"Theseprinciples
arenotimmediately
indeed
evident;
we maybe indoubtconcerning
themfora longtime.Buttheyarecalledprinciples
becausetheyareindemonstrable,
andcannotbe deducedfrom
otherpremises
norbe
but theyare acceptedbecausetheyhavebeen
provedby any formalprocedure;
and to be falsein none." (Moody,ibid.,
observedto be truein manyinstances
604-5).
88

01:50:25 AM

'
nature,' God's possible interventionin the causal order now becomes
irrelevant.Although Buridan readily conceded that God could alter
the natural course of events at any time, he neverthelessinsistedthat
"in natural philosophy,we ought to accept actions and dependencies
as if they always proceed in a natural way."18 The occurrence of
miracles would not affectthe validityof natural science. Nor indeed
would chance occurrencesthat mightoccasionally impede or prevent
the natural effectof a natural cause. For as Hansen has rightly
observed, "Phenomena regarded as natural in the Middle Ages were
only those which occur most of the time, in nature's 'habit' or usual
course. The law of nature within the Aristotelian conceptual
frameworkwas not one of rigid necessity,but simplythatof the usual
or ordinaryoccurrence. Habitus and inclinatioare common medieval
expressions for this tendency."19Just because individuals are occasionally born with eleven fingersdoes not negate the fact that in the
common course of nature we can confidentlyexpect ten fingers.20On
this basis, Buridan could proclaim that "for us the comprehensionof
truth with certitude is possible."21 Using reason, experience and
inductive generalizations,Buridan sought to "save the phenomena"
in accordance with the principle of Ockham' s razor- that is, by the
simplestexplanation which fitsthe evidence.
A good example of Buridan' s use of the principleof economy to save
the appearances occurs in his Questionson De celo, bk. 1, qu. 11,
"whether theheaven has matter." In denyingthat the celestial region
contains matter,Buridan observes that substantialtransmutationwas
the only way Aristotlehad for determiningwhether celestial bodies
possessed matter. The essential feature of a substantial transformation, whichwe can all observe, is thatthe generated thingand the corrupted thinghad the same subject. This was a necessary assumption
since it was axiomatic forAristotlethat somethingcould not be made
fromnothing. Buridan now juxtaposes two common, basic assump18"Modo in naturali
etdependentias
nosdebemusactiones
philosophia
accipereac
si semper
modonaturali;..." Questions
onDe celo
, bk.2, qu. 9; p. 164
procederent
in Moody'sedition.MaieralsocitestheselinesinMetaphysische
, 18 and
Hintergrnde
328,n. 22.
19Hansen,Nicole
Oresme
andtheMarvels
63 (forfulltitle,seebelow,n. 25).
ofNature,
20I relyhereon Thijssen,
andNicholas
ofAutrecourt
, 251.
JohnBuridan
21"Immoconcludendum
estquodquerebatur,
scilicet
comquodnobisestpossibilis
veritatis
cumcertitudine."
ontheMetaphysics,
bk.2, qu.
Buridan,
prehensio
Questions
Aristotelis
1, in In Metaphysicen
, fol.9r,col. 1.
89

01:50:25 AM

- that is, neither

tions: the firstthat the heavens are incorruptible
generable nor corruptible and the second that matteris something
that is generable and corruptible. From these two assumptions,
Buridan easily concluded that it would be " absolutely in vain, and
without cogent reason, that we should posit such matter in the
heavens/'
Other explanations for this problem had been proposed. Thomas
Aquinas, Buridan reports,argued that the heaven did indeed possess
than the matterthatappears in the
matter,but it was simplydifferent
or
sublunar
world.
Buridan concedes that it is difficultto
inferior,
demonstratethe contraryof Thomas' interpretation.But the solution
lies at hand by appeal to the principle of simplicity,namely 44that in
nature nothing ought to be assumed in vain," a sentiment that
Buridan attributesto Averroes.22But, as Buridan explains, it is vain
to save appearances by the assumption of more things when those
appearances could be saved by fewerthings.23
In agreeing with Aristotlethat something could not be generated
from nothing, Buridan was well aware that this conflictedwith the
Catholic faith. God could indeed create something from nothing
supernaturally,as when He created the world. But in natural philosophy one ought to adopt principlesthat reflectthe "common course of
nature." That something could not be made or generated from
nothing was one of the most basic of such natural principles. Thus
when arguing about a problem in natural philosophy that was
independent of the faith, and which did not directly impinge on
dogma or theology,it was appropriateto assume the "common course
of nature" and thereforeto assume as true the principle that "something cannot come fromnothing."
Beforewe conclude our briefsummaryof Buridan's ideas, we must
22"Et essetdifficile
demonstrare
nisisicutCommentator
tangit,
quodin
oppositum,
onDe celo
naturanihildebetponifrustra."
Buridan,
, bk. 1, qu. 11(p. 52
Questions
in Moody'sedition).According
to Moody,Averroes,
theCommentator,
mentions,
inhiscommentary
doesnothing
onDe celo
invain.
, bk.1,comment
20,thatnature
Whilethisis probably
thecorrect
doesnotactually
the
enunciate
Averroes
reference,
butrestscontent
todeclarethatifthesubstance
ofmatter
is inpotentiality
principle,
to that matterand nevercomesto actuality,"this potentiality
is vain and
In theedition
ofAristotelis
commentariis
cumAverrois
, Venice1562superfluous."
Opera
1574,see vol. 5, fol.15r,col. 2.
23Following
Buridan'
s De celo
after
theLatinquotation
inn. 22 from
,
immediately
bk. 1,qu. 11(p. 52 ofMoody'sedition),
weread:"Et tarnen
frustra
plura
ponuntur
quia omniaapparentia
possentsalvariperpauciora."
90

01:50:25 AM

say somethingabout his sense of inductivegeneralizationbased on the

statementquoted earlier that natural principles need not be absolute
if "they have been observed to be true in many instances (in pluribus
singularibus
) and to be false in none." Could we formulate an
indemonstrablenatural principle from one or two positive instances
and no counterinstances?The answer has to be yes. The addition of
furtherpositiveinstancesonlydeepens our confidencein the principle,
as Buridan indicates when he declares that "These principlesare not
'
immediatelyevident; indeed,' he continues, "we may be in doubt
concerningthemfora long time" (see note 17). Obviously, the more
positive instances we have, the more confidentwe can be that the
counterinstancewill not occur. But the principleis as serviceable with
one or two instances as with two hundred, or two thousand.
Buridan' s elevation of inductive generalizations to the level of
indemonstrable natural principles that furnish all the certitude
necessaryforscience must also be viewed as part of a long disciplinary
strugglebetween philosophyand theology,which was also an intellectual conflictbetween reason and revelation. It began in the thirteenth
century, when its foremostprotagonistswere Siger of Brabant and
Boethius of Dacia in defenseof philosophy,and St. Bonaventure and
Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, and numerous others on the
side of theology. Jean Buridan may legitimatelybe viewed as one
more powerful voice seeking to develop a natural philosophy with
principlesand a methodologythatwas independentof theologyand of
God's absolute and unpredictable power. Italian Renaissance
philosophers, such as Pietro Pomponazzi, Giacomo Zabarella,
Giacomo Aconcio, and Marcantonio Zimara, continued the struggle.
Dominick Iorio has characterized the tendencies of these secular
, whose advocates were conphilosophers as philosophicalreductionism
vinced that "all truththat lends itselfto rational demonstrationfalls
into the provinceof philosophyand not of theology" fromwhich they
concluded thatarticlesof faith"which could not pass the testof reason
were to be eitherrephrased along rational lines or omittedaltogether
fromthe philosophical enterpriseand left to the realm of 'faith'."24
2. Nicole Oresme
As a natural philosopher-theologian,Nicole Oresme held a more
complex view of nature than did Buridan. On certain basic matters,
24See Iorio,TheAristotelians
ofRenaissance
Italy,18.
91

01:50:25 AM

however, he seems to have been in agreement with Buridan, who

some believe was his teacher. For example, although he does not
,
explicitlypronounce his acceptance of the argument ex suppositione
Oresme seems to have shared Buridan' s acceptance of it. Barring
God's intervention or some impediment in nature, a particular
natural cause would always produce its regular, natural effect.But
Oresme went much furtherand launched a vigorous attack against
those who were quick to invoke magical and supernaturalexplanations
for what seemed to him natural phenomena. In a treatise tided De
causismirabilium
(or On theCausesofMarvels),dated in 1370 and therefore probably one of his later works,25Oresme, at the outset of his
4
treatise, explains his intention 'to show the causes of some effects
which seem to be marvels and to show thatthe effectsoccur naturally,
as do others at which we do not marvel.' ' To reinforcehis position,
Oresme goes on to say that " There is no reason to take recourse to
the heavens, the last refugeof the weak, or demons, or to our glorious
God as if He would produce these effectsdirectly,more so than those
effectswhose causes we believe are well known to us."26 Throughout
his Quodlibetaand other works before and after, Oresme attacked
superstitionin its many forms. As Thorndike has explained:
ofdemonsas a matter
ofreligious
faith
Oresmeadmitstheexistence
Although
and acceptsthemiracles
oftheBible,he doesnothesitate
to censurecertain
frauds
andcertain
whichhavedeveloped
in
ecclesiastical
superstitious
practices
connection
withtheexercise
ofChristian
Notonlydoesheaccusemany
worship.
clericsof excessivecredulity,
he flatlychargesthatmanyecclesiastics
have
devisedfraudulent
miracles
to secureofferings
fortheirchurches...27
Despite Oresme' s firmbeliefthat natural causes are farmore probable to explain the effectswe detect in nature than are supernatural
25TheDecausis
mirabilium
isthesecondpartofa workbyOresmethatcomprises
four
distinct
The first
partswhichhaveusuallybeengiventheoveralltitleofQuodlibeta.
contra
divinatores
Carotiin:
, has beeneditedbyStefano
part,titleQuestio
horoscopios
Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
et littraire
du moyenage, 43 (1976),201-310.The
secondpartis theDe causismirabilium
's titlebutonegivento
, whichis notOresme
itaround1500.It hasbeeneditedandtranslated
byBertHansenwiththetitleNicole
Oresme
andtheMarvels
. Critical
, A Study
Edition,
ofNature
ofHis "De causismirabilium"
andCommentary
as Tabula
, Toronto1985.Thethird
Translation,
part,citedusually
problematum
whicharelittlemorethana listing
consists
of216questions,
ofthetitles
of
The fourth
216 questions.
titled
Solutiones
is a detailed
part,arbitrarily
probleumatum,
44 questions
oftheTabula
discussion
ofthefirst
Fora discussion
ofthe
problematum.
fourparts,see Hansen,ibid.,26-43;forthedateofcomposition,
see 43-8.
26Oresme,De causismirabilium
in Hansen,ibid.,137.
, Prologue,
27LynnThorndike,
A History
Science
, 8 vols.,NewYork
ofMagicandExperimental
vol. 3, 467-8.
1923-1958,
92

01:50:25 AM

and magical causes, he seems to have lacked Buridan' s confidencein

,
detecting them. In the second paragraph of De causis mirabilium
to
Oresme insiststhat it is very difficult( quod estdifficillimum
assign
)
4
particularcauses forparticulareffects.How can we explain 'why an
animal died at such a time, whypepper in small quantitiesis a laxative
and a diuretic in large quantities, why scammony is the opposite (as
Aristotlesays in the firstpart of the Problems
), why the crop failed in
this field," and so on.28 To avoid these difficulties,Oresme says that
"it will suffice for me to show that the things mentioned occur
'
naturally.'
Both Buridan and Oresme were convinced that, barring supernatural intervention,natural causal explanations were appropriate for
all phenomena. But where Oresme stressed the almost insurmountable difficultiesin determiningsuch causes, Buridan seems to have
ignoredthe difficulties.Oresme was contentto argue thatthe kinds of
effectswe have just describedwere caused naturally,but admittedthat
the determinationof the specific natural cause was very difficultor
even unattainable. It is as ifhe concluded thateach effectwas in some
fromeveryothereffect.Indeed, Oresme seems to have
sense different
believed that compounds differsufficiently
from the elements out of
which theyare composed and that these compounds, in turn,differso
much fromone anotherthat,in the words of Lynn Thorndike, "many
and all phenomena of nature are really just as inexplicable as the
action of the magnet."29 In such a world, Oresme believed it more
plausible to assume thateffectswere the productof natural causes. He
thoughtit sufficientto show that naturalicauses were more likely to
produce nature's effectsthan magic or the supernatural.
One may properly doubt, therefore, that Oresme would have
derived natural principles from inductive generalizations of two or
more similar instances, in the manner of Buridan. Where Buridan
emphasized the simplicityof science and its essential knowability,
Oresme emphasized its complexityand difficulties.AlthoughOresme
may have allowed and encouraged "a search forcausal knowledge of
the world,"30 he would probably have doubted the likelihood of its
success and would have disagreed with Buridan that such causal
28Oresme,De causismirabilium
in: NicoleOresme
andtheMarvels
, ed. andtr.
ofNature
Hansen,137.
29Thorndike,
A History
ofMagic,vol. 3, 441.
30See Hansen,Nicole
Oresme
andtheMarvels
, 101.
oj Nature
93

01:50:25 AM

knowledge could be fashioned into suitable inductive generalizations

from which indemonstrablenatural principlescould be formed.
If Oresme was a dedicated opponent of superstitionand hostile to
those who invoked marvelous causes foreffectsfound in nature, what
was his attitudetoward natural knowledge? Did he believe that such
knowledge was readily attainable, that our senses could serve as the
basic instrumentfordeterminingnatural causes? Available evidence
indicates thatOresme was sceptical about human abilityto determine
the causes of natural effects.In the Ad pauca respicientes
, he assumed
that we were ignorant of all celestial ratios in which the distances or
times of any two celestial bodies varied. We must assume thisOresme
insists,because "it is well understoodthatwe cannot even know about
quantities close by because of [our] defectivesenses."31
In the fourthand finalpart of his Quodlibeta,
Oresme twiceexpresses
Socratic doubt about his ability to attain natural knowledge. In the
firstof these unusual passages, Oresme emphasizes that many things
in the Gospels and in the articlesof faithare no less reasonable than
are many things in philosophy. Indeed all things mentioned in the
Gospels are veryreasonable. For although the faithassumes miracles,
as, forexample, the Trinity,penetrationof bodies, and the Resurrec44
tion, it seems to me," says Oresme, "that many things equally
miraculous are assumed in philosophy and are [even] less demonstrated because they are customary [or familiar], as [for example],
what is primematter,and [how] the productionof a new form[occurs]
of which at firstnothingexists, and concerningaccidents, which are
things, and how they exist simultaneously, and concerning the
indivisible soul; [and] indeed, how fireheats [or burns] and what is
the nature and quiddity of things...and why does a stone descend
downward and yetsometimesascends upward naturallyto preventthe
occurrence of a vacuum? What, therefore,moves it upwards?" In
lightof thislistof natural phenomena, "surely," Oresme declares, in
drawing this extraordinaryparagraph to a close, "if you consider the
matterproperly,[you will realize that] many such [natural] thingsare
unknown, more [unknown]than many articlesof the faith.And therefore, indeed, I know nothing except that I know that I know

' ed. and

31See Nicole
and'Adpaucarespicientes
Oresme
: 'Deproportionibus
,
proportionum'
I haveaddedthebracketed
tr.E. Grant,Madison,Wis. 1966,387(suppositio
tertia).
wordto myprevious
translation.
94

01:50:25 AM

nothing."32 And later in the same treatise, again in reference to

natural knowledge, Oresme found occasion to assert that "extraorarise here about the modes and species of operations
dinarydifficulties
and about the number of qualities and their differences; ...and
although they[i.e. these difficulties]appear easy to many, theyseem
difficultto me. Therefore I know nothing except that I know that I
know nothing.''33
Was Oresme' s confessionof ignorance, the act of a humble scholar
who recognizedhis own severe limitations?Or, was it ratherthe assertion of a powerful,and perhaps even arrogant,theologianwho sought
to humble and subvert confidence in natural knowledge in the hope
of leaving the realm of faithalone unscathed? I judge the latterinterpretationthe more plausible in renderingintelligibleOresme' s complex approach to nature and faith.
3. "To BelieveEasily" and Oresme3
s DoubleAgenda
In his Quodlibeta
, Nicole Oresme makes this extraordinary
statement:
It seemstometobelieveeasily(faciliter
is andhasbeenthecauseofthe
credere)
destruction
ofnatural
andalsoinfaith
itmakesandwillmakegreat
philosophy;
anditwillbe thecauseofreceiving
Antichrist
andoftheintroduction
dangers
ofa newlaw.34
Whatever the meaning of this extraordinaryassertion, which may
never be fullyknown, we can be certain of Oresme' s convictionthat
people in general, and scholars in particular, were all too ready and
eager, on the slightestpretext,to believe all sortsof thingsrelevantto
32FortheLatintextdrawnfrom
Florence,
Laur.,Ashburnham
210,fol.46r,col.2,
A History
seeThorndike,
n. 128.The Latinoftheconcluding
ofMagic,vol.3, 469,
sentence
Socraticignorance
is: 4'Certe,si beneconsideras,
istasunt
proclaiming
multum
multo
fidei.Ideoquidemnichilscionisiquia
multi
articuli
ignota
plusquam
sciomenichilscire."Thissentence
is alsoquotedin BertHansen,Nicole
Oresme
and
theMarvels
MS Paris,B.N., lat. 15126,fol.98v,lines29-32.
Nature,
98,n. 7, from
of
33"Hie possent
oririmirabiles
difficultates
de modisetspeciebus
etde
operationum
numeris
et diversitate
earum;... et quamvismultisappareant
faciles,
qualitatum
michitamendifficiles
videntur.
Ideo nichilscio nisi quia me nichilscirescio."
I
Hansen,ibid.,fromMS Paris,B.N., lat. 15126,fol.118v,lines11-5.Although
havenotseenthemanuscript,
Hansenis convinced,
as am I, thatthequotations
thatOresme'sscepticism
indicate
is aboutnaturalknowledge.
34Translation
Oresme
andthe
Marvels
, 97. Latintextonpp.
byHansen,Nicole
ofNature
A History
97-8,n. 6. The Latintextis alsocitedinThorndike,
ofMagic,vol.3, 455,
n. 54. In thetranslation,
I haveaddedthecrucialLatinphrase.
95

01:50:25 AM

natural philosophy and the faith. Because so many of these beliefs

were erroneous or ill-supported,they were potentiallydangerous to
the faith. To understand Oresme' s attitudein the Quodlibeta
, written
late in his career but which may reflecta long-heldattitude,we must
recognize the double agenda that he seems to have pursued in
numerous treatises,and which I hope has been apparent in our description of his approach thus far.
The firstaspect of it was to reject and refuteall causal explanations
that relied on magic and non-Biblical miracles. Throughout his
career, Oresme was a determined foe of superstitionand sought at
every reasonable opportunityto subvert the foundations of magic,
astrology,marvels, and demonic explanations of natural phenomena.
Indeed although he conceded the existence of demons, he did so
largely because faithand sacred Scripturehad affirmedit.35Without
such an affirmation,Oresme could find no convincing independent
evidence for their existence. The innumerable effectsattributedto
demons were explicable by natural causes. For this reason, he championed natural causal explanations of all celestial and terrestrial
phenomena.
As the second aspect of his double agenda, Oresme focuses on
of determinnatural philosophyitself,emphasizing the greatdifficulty
ing the precise natural cause of a particulareffect.Where Buridan was
confidentof our ability to formulateprinciples of science based on
repeated observations of the seeming conjunction of a cause and its
effectwithouta single contraryinstance, Oresme was pessimisticand
emphasized the confusingpanorama of nature's activitieswhich made
it difficult,if not impossible, to ascertain the particularnatural cause
of a particular natural effect.Indeed we are no better able to comprehend the causes of most natural occurrences than we are able to
fathomthe articlesof faith.To thinkotherwiseis to fall victimto the
4
common, but dangerous, syndrome of 'easy belief."
But Oresme' s uncertainty about natural knowledge went much
deeper than the difficultiesof determiningparticular natural causes.
Nature itself,he believed, consisted overwhelminglyof relationships
35In Quodlibet
"whether
itis likely,
23 ofhisQuodlibeta
, Oresmeconsiders
speaking
that"iftheFaithdidnotaffirm
thattherearemanydemons,"andreplies
naturally,
I wouldsaythatfromno naturaleffect
coulditbe proved,because
theirexistence,
all (theirapparent
is by
marvelous
The translation
works)canbe savednaturally."
A History
LynnThorndike,
ofMagic,vol.3, 466. FortheLatintext,seeThorndike,
ibid.,466,n. 114.
96

01:50:25 AM

thatwere incommensurableand inherentlyimprecise. In his De propor

tionibus
proportionum
(On RatiosofRatios),writtenprobably in the 1350s,
Oresme developed ideas that were firstpresented by Thomas Bradof 1328. In the tenth
wardine in the latter's Tractatusde proportionibus
this
of
the
third
of
extraordinarytreatise,Oresme
chapter
proposition
demonstratedmathematicallythatany two unknown ratiosthatmight
be proposed would probably be incommensurable. In the fourth
chapter, he applies his mathematical doctrine to the whole of the
physical world when he enunciates the followingproposition:
whatever
Whenthere
havebeenproposed
anytwothings
acquirable
[ortraveritis probable
that
motion
andwhoseratiois unknown,
sable]bya continuous
that
Andifmoreareproposed,
itis moreprobable
theyareincommensurable.
to any[other].The samethingcan be
any[oneofthem]is incommensurable
whatever.
saidoftwotimesand ofanycontinuous
quantities
Since in Aristotelianphysicsand cosmology,nature is a continuumof
matterand motion, the importof Oresme' s extraordinaryconclusion
is that the relationshipbetween any two relatable natural magnitudes
is probably incommensurable and thereforenot precisely knowable.
At best, such ratios can only be approximated. Thus not only are our
senses largely incapable of knowing much about quantities that are
quite nearby,but even ifour senses were up to the challenge, the relationships they would confrontwould probably be incommensurable
and therebyknowable only approximately. The consequences of this
doctrine for science were potentially far reaching and Oresme
returnedto it frequently,including some dazzling use of it in his last
known treatise,Le Livredu ciel et du monde.
Oresme used the doctrine of incommensurabilityprimarilyin the
treatmentof circular motions, which he could apply hypotheticallyto
orIncommenthe celestialregion.36In the Treatiseon theCommensurability
treatment
of this
the
Motions
his
most
extensive
Celestial
,
of
surability
in
which
included
twelve
incommenpropositions
subject, Oresme
surable relationswere assumed between any two celestial motions.37
In these twelve propositions he sought to derive consequences that
36In thenextfewparagraphs,
inScience
I follow
Oresme
onCertitude
Nicole
myarticle,
etinnovation
Tradition
chezunintellectuel
duXIVesiin:Nicolas
Oresme
andPseudo
-Science,
e innovazione
inunintellectuale
delXIVsecolo
Tradizione
Oresme
, eds.P. Souffrin
cle;Nicolas
andA. Ph. Segonds,Paris/Padova
1988,31-43;37-8.
37Forthesepropositions,
Motion:
'TracOresme
andtheKinematics
seeNicole
ofCircular
motuumceli', ed. and tr.
vel incommensurabilitate
tatusde commensurabilitate
andLondon1971,PartII, 248-83forthetext
EdwardGrant,Madison,Milwaukee,
and 37-67fora summary.
andtranslation;
97

01:50:25 AM

would followfromthose incommensurablemotions. He showed that

if any two celestial motions are incommensurable, as is likely (this
becomes evident fromthe thirdpart of the treatise), the precise positional relationshipsof those bodies would be impossible to determine.
If any two or three celestial bodies entered into a given astronomical
aspect, say conjunction or opposition, they could never again enter
into the same relationshipin the future;indeed it also followedthat
theycould never have been in that same relationshipbefore. Because
of the overwhelming likelihood of celestial incommensurability,
celestial events, such as conjunctions,oppositions,and eclipses, would
necessarily be unique.
At firstglance, the implicationsof the probabilityof celestialincommensurability should have been devastating for the science of
astrology. Astrologersassumed that celestial motions not only influenced terrestrial events- natural philosophers also held this
opinion- but also that the same celestial cause always produced the
same effect.On the assumption of celestial incommensurability,however, no celestial relationships would be precisely repeatable from
which it followedthatthe same cause could never repeat and therefore
neither could its precise effect.
Oresme himselfwas delightedwith this situation. Approximations
were all we could hope forand theyought to be sufficientforhuman
purposes. He would even proclaim that "Any one who announces
resultsthatare freeof noticeable errorwould seem to have determined
" 38
things adequately and beautifully. Indeed, according to Oresme,
the impossibilityof attainingprecise knowledgeabout theheavens was
actually advantageous because it was desirable for humans that
"something should always remain unknown, so that it may be
investigatedfurther.''39To know celestial events with completeprecision would make humans like the immortalgods, an idea thatOresme
found repugnant.
The implications of Oresme' s doctrine of incommensurabilityfor
the scientificstudyof the physicalworld were potentiallyprofound.By
its very nature, the world could not be known with precision. All the
sciences concerned with continuous physical magnitudes were at best
approximative. In astronomy and terrestrialphysics, Oresme was
quite contentto settleforapproximations. He realized that terrestrial
38Ibid.,319.
39Ibid.,321.
98

01:50:25 AM

velocitieswould probably arise that were mutually incommensurable

so thatthe ratiosof forceto resistancethat gave rise to them could not
be derived or inferred.But if the precise ratios of forceto resistance
could not be derived, the next best thing was to
whether
or smaller
investigate
anyratiogiven,or to be givento us, is greater
thansuchanirrational,
andunnameable
ratio...In thiswaywecan
unknowable,
findtworatiossufficiently
closeso thatsuchan unknown
ratiowillbe greater
thanthegreater.
thanthelesserand smaller
Andthisoughtto suffice.40
4. "NaturalImpossibilities"
and EquallyPlausibleAlternatives
toFundamental Aristotelian
Conceptions
We are not yet done with the ways in which Oresme knowingly
weakened confidencein the natural philosophyof his day. A favorite
technique was to show that possible, and even plausible, alternatives
existedto basic Aristotelianprinciplesthatwere widelyheld. Thus did
Oresme findit convenientto use his doctrineof the probable incommensurabilityof the celestial motions to undermine Aristotle's claim
thatwhateverhad a beginningmust have an end and what has no end
cannot have had a beginning.41For Aristotle,the world was a prime
example of the latter condition- as an eternal entity,it had neither
beginning nor end. Using the sun as example, and assuming that at
least one of its three simultaneous motions was probably incommensurable to at least one of the other two, Oresme argued that the apex
of the earth's shadow, which depended on the position of the sun's
center, could never occupy the same celestial point twice. Thus the
apex of the earth's shadow would necessarilyoccupy one point after
anotherin whichit had never beforebeen and to which it could never
again return.In every point it occupied, some portion of the sunlight
in the sky, which had existed there fromall eternity,and was, therefore,withoutany beginning,would be darkened and come to an end.
But at the moment when the apex of the shadow shiftedto the next
point, sunlightwould once again shine on the darkened point thatwas
just vacated and shine there ever after through all future eternity.
Thus did Oresme show that somethingthat had no beginning could
come to an end; and somethingthat had a beginning need not have
40FromOresme's
Deproportionibus
ch.4, Prop.VI, 289-291fortranslaproportionum,
tionand 47-48fordiscussion.
41ForAristotle's
see De celo
discussion,
, bk. 1, chs. 10, 12.
99

01:50:25 AM

an end.42While Oresme 's argumentis not a refutationof the eternity

of the world, it seems to suggestthat, ' 'naturally speaking,'' it is also
possible thattheworldmighthave a beginningand no end; or it might
have a beginningand an end, which was the traditionalbelieffromthe
standpoint of faith.Although he believed that Aristotle'sposition on
the eternityof the world was contraryto the faith,Oresme explains
the purpose of his counterargument: "I want to demonstrate the
opposite according to natural philosophy and mathematics. In this
way it will become clear that Aristotle's arguments are not conclusive."43 Aristotle's arguments are ultimately indecisive because
Oresme has imagined natural, ratherthan supernatural,alternatives
and counterinstancesthat are possible, and perhaps even plausible on
the assumption of celestial incommensurability.
In a similarvein, Oresme argued about the possibilityof a plurality
of worlds, which Aristotlehad denied. Here again, Oresme shows the
inconclusivenessof Aristotle's position by formulatingpossible alternatives, which Aristotlehad thoughtimpossible. One conceptionof a
pluralityof worlds was to imagine concentricworlds- that is, worlds
withinworlds, or, as Oresme expressed it, "at one and the same time
one world is inside another so that inside and beneath the circumference of this world there was another world similar but
smaller." Indeed Oresme envisioned worlds even beyond ours that
surround us concentricallyand even suggests that similar worlds
might exist within the moon. He admits that this is a mere speculation, one that he wanted "to toy with as a mental exercise {par esbatement
)." But Oresme explains that "Although this is not in fact the
case, nor is at all likely,nevertheless,it seems to me thatit would not
be possible to establish the contrary by logical argument."44 Nor
indeed is thereany "proof fromreason or experienceor otherwisethat
such worlds do exist." "Therefore," Oresme continues, "we should
not guess nor make a statementthat somethingis thus and so forno
reason or cause whatsoever against ail appearances; nor should we
support an opinion whose contrary is probable." Nevertheless,
42ThisexampleoccursinOresme'sLe Livre
ducieletdumonde
, bk.1,ch.29 in:Nicole
Oresme:
Le Livreducieletdumonde
, eds. A. D. MenutandA. J. DenomyC.S.B; tr.
A. D. Menut,Madison,Wis.1968,199.Formoreonthissubject,
seeGrant,
Scientific
inFourteenth-Century
Paris:JeanBuridan
andNicoleOresme
, 113-4and 123,n.
Thought
43.
43Thispassageis fromLe Livreducieletdumonde
, ed. cit.,195-7.
44Ibid., 167.
100

01:50:25 AM

Oresme concludes by reiteratinghis main purpose: 4' it is good to have

considered whethersuch opinion is impossible."45
But what of the more traditionaland plausible concept of a plurality
of worlds, where the worlds exist simultaneously,each lying entirely
outside of every other? Oresme offersa brilliantseries of arguments
of the existenceof othersimto show the plausibilityand intelligibility
worlds.
In
the
ultaneous, separate
process, he redefinesthe concept of
natural place and up and down.46 Moreover, he even accepts the
existence of an infinite,extracosmicvoid space in which these worlds
could exist.47Although, by His omnipotence, God could create such
worlds, and neitherAristotlenor any one else could prove the contrary,Oresme concludes that "of course, therehas never been nor will
therebe more than one corporeal world, as was statedabove."48 Once
again, Oresme is contentto adopt the traditionalAristotelianopinion.
But he makes certain that the alternative interpretationis made as
plausible as possible, so plausible, in fact, that it renders Aristotle's
dominant opinion inconclusive. Indeed he has contradictedAristotle:
what was impossible in Aristotle's natural philosophy, Oresme has
been shown to be possible, intelligible,and even plausible.
5. Buridanand Oresme:On thePossibleAxial Rotationof theEarth
Both Buridan and Oresme considered whether the astronomical
phenomena could be betterexplained by the earth at restin the center
of the world with the heaven moving around it; or, whetherthe converse was true, namely that the earth was in daily rotation at the
centerof the world and the heavens at rest above. They were agreed
that the astronomical phenomena were compatible with either
hypothesisand offeredsome brilliantargumentsto sustain theirpositions. Buridan, however opted for the traditional opinion of an
immobile earth because of certain observational consequences that
should have followedfromhis impetus theory.49If the earth actually
rotated, an arrow shot upward ought to follow the earth's rotatory
45Ibid., 171.
46Fora briefsummary,
see Grant,Scientific
inFourteenth-Century
Paris:Jean
Thought
Buridan
andNicole
Oresme
, 114-5.
47See Le Livre
ducieletdumonde
, 177.
48Ibid., 179.
49Fortheremainder
oftheparagraph,
I follow
inFourteenthGrant,Scientific
Thought
Paris:JeanBuridan
andNicoleOresme
, 110-1.
Century
101

01:50:25 AM

path and fall back to the approximate place fromwhich it was shot.
Buridan denied this consequence by appeal to his famous impetus
theory.When the arrow is projected, a sufficientquantityof impetus
is impressed into that arrow to allow it to resistthe lateral motion of
the air as the latter accompanies the earth in rotatorymotion. In
resistingthe motion and push of the air, the arrow should lag behind
earth and air and drop noticeablyto the west of the place fromwhich
it was launched. Since this is contraryto experience, Buridan concludes that the earth is at rest.
Unlike Buridan, Oresme, in a lengthytreatmentof thisthemein his
Le Livredu cieletdu mondeof 1377, could findno experiencethatwould
enable him to determine the issue. Nor indeed could he find any
rational arguments that could tip the scale in either direction. But
Oresme foundsome impressivenon-astronomicalargumentsbased on
simplicityand harmony which seemed to favoran axial rotation. He
even invoked theJoshua miracle in its favor. At the end of his lengthy
discussion, however, Oresme opted for the traditionalopinion of an
44
immobile, non-rotatingearth. He conceded, however, that, after
consideringall thathas been said, one could thenbelieve thattheearth
moves and not the heavens, for the opposite is not clearly evident."
Although one might with equal justificationadopt the earth's daily
rotation over that of the heaven, Oresme rejects this move because
Psalms 92:1 says that 44God hath establishedthe world which shall not
be moved" and also because the earth's axial rotation44seems as much
against natural reason as, or more against natural reason than, all or
many of the articlesof our faith." He goes on to add thatwhat he said
as an intellectual exercise or a diversion {par esbatement)
may prove
useful against 4'those who would like to impugn our faithby argument."50 Oresme categorizes the axial rotationof the earth as a concept that is against natural reason and even more against natural
reason than are the articles of faith. Here, as he did in 1370 in his
, Oresme invokes the faith in order to denigrate natural
Quodlibeta
knowledge. Immediately preceding his profession of Socratic
, Oresme insists, as we saw earlier, that
ignorance in the Quodlibeta
about
natural
knowledge are more unknownthan are the
many things
articlesof faith.Seven years later, in his Le Livredu cieletdu monde
, he
insiststhat the earth's possible axial rotationseems more contraryto
44natural reason" than
many or all articlesof the faith.Thus Oresme
50See Le Livreducieletdumonde,
537-9.
102

01:50:25 AM

used his faithas a measure fordeterminingthe statusof natural reason

as applied to natural phenomena. In his judgment, the application of
natural reason produced results that were, in many instances, less
plausible than the articles of faith.
Both Buridan and Oresme deserve high praise for their unusual
argumentsin favorof a rotatingearth. Each, however, rejected it for
different reasons, thereby revealing how dissimilar were their
approaches and attitudes. Buridan arrived at his conclusion on the
basis of rationalargumentsand the senses, completelyignoringScripture and faith; Oresme ultimatelydecided the issue on the basis of
Scripture and faith.
6. The Final Comparison
If one examined certaintreatisesthatBuridan and Oresme wrote in
common, say their Questionson De celo, or perhaps their Questionson
De anima, it would probably appear that theirapproaches were rather
similar. Both emphasize natural causes and both assume thatthe common course of nature is rarelyinterruptedand that we mighthave to
settleforapproximationsratherthan absolute precision and certainty.
One might even be tempted to adopt Edith Sylla's interpretation,
which assumes that "Oresme's position on the epistemological status
of natural philosophywas similar to Buridan' s . Thus forhim natural
philosophy would not be absolutely certain, but it would be suffi"51
ciently certain ex suppositione - that is, on the assumption of the
"common course of nature." It is only when we leave Oresme' s questions on the works of Aristotleand examine his thematic treatises,
along with his French commentary on Aristotle's De celo, that we
discover an Oresme who is separated fromBuridan by an intellectual
abyss.
Although Oresme was convinced that natural causes - not God or
demons- were responsible for virtually all seemingly magical and
marvelous effects,we saw how firmlyconvinced he was that those
natural causes were rarely determinable or identifiable. Our senses
were too easily fooled.
Part, perhaps a large part, of the differencebetween Buridan and
Oresme may derive fromtheirdisciplinaryallegiances. As a Master
of Arts and professionalnatural philosopher, Buridan sought to free
51Galileo
andProbable
, 217.
Arguments
103

01:50:25 AM

natural philosophy fromtheologyand to make of it an independent

discipline using reason as contrastedwith theology's dependence on
revelation. Reason and revelationwere distinctand must not be conflatedor intertwined.Buridan emphasized reason, sense-perception,
and experience and trustedthem all. Faith provided truthsthat were
not intelligibleto reason. As a professionalnatural philosopher,it was
not in Buridan' s interestto downgrade the essential instrumentsof
natural philosophy: reason, sense-perception,and experience.
Oresme' s approach was radically different.For him therewas only
a single truthwhich was sought by both philosophy and faith. The
eternityof the world, forexample, was not somethingthatwas plausible fromthe standpointof reason except for the mere inconvenience
thatGod had chosen to create our world supernaturally.For Oresme,
therewas only one unequivocal truth:the world had a beginning not
only because God had created it, but also because the attributionof
a beginning to it was compatible with reason. The eternityof the
world was simplyuntrue, although Oresme could not demonstrateit.
He could only show, by use of his incommensurabilitydoctrine,that
the major argumentforeterntiywas inconclusive, namely that somethingthathad a beginningmust have an end and what has no end cannot have had a beginning.
In stark contrast to Buridan and almost all natural philosophers,
Oresme chose to blur, ifnot obliterate,thedistinctionsbetween reason
and faith.52He was convinced, as we saw, that the articles of faith
were as reasonable and knowable- and perhaps even more reasonable
and more knowable- than many natural occurrences,many of which
are at least equally unknown, as, for example, prime matter, the
nature of accidents, the generationof new forms,how fireburns, and
indeed the verynature of things.It was, at least on the face of it, such
basic human limitations that prompted Oresme's confession of
Socratic ignorance. Where Buridan always emphasized our abilityto
acquire natural knowledgeand the means to do so, Oresme laid heavy
emphasis on pitfalls and limitations in the acquisition of natural
knowledge. Not only were our senses inadequate and untrustworthy,
52Thorndike
remarks
ofMagic,vol.3, 469-70)thatOresmewasunwilling,
(AHistory
"as onemight
infer
from
hisremark
thatnotruth
iscontrary
toothertruth,
toaccept
andtodiscussmatters
ofphilosophy
andscience
religious
dogmaas onebodyoftruth
obtrudes
apartfromit as a separateaffair.He sometimes
theological
dogmainto
scientific
discussion."
104

01:50:25 AM

but his doctrineof incommensurabilityshowed that nature was probably inherentlyimprecise and thereforenot exactly knowable. By
and knowability
emphasizingan approximateequality in intelligibility
of philosophyand faith,Oresme appears to have intendeddeliberately
to denigrate natural philosophy and its pretensions to natural
knowledge. If the truthsof revelation and Scripture are accepted on
faith, on what basis do we accept the propositions of natural
knowledge?They seem to require as much of an act of faithas do the
truthsof revelation.
Oresme' s double agenda was thus an effortto replace superstitious
explanationsof phenomena withexplanations based on natural causation, while at the same time depicting natural causation and natural
knowledgeas no more intelligiblethan the articlesof faith.In the final
analysis, Oresme' s goal was to make faith the centerpiece of all
knowledge. In terms of reason it was as plausible and intelligibleas
much of natural knowledge. But it had the advantage of being
absolutely certain by virtue of divine revelation, an advantage that
natural knowledge lacked.
What we may have here is a disciplinarydifference.Buridan, the
quintessential natural philosopher, emphasizes the reliability of
natural knowledge,which can be had withreason and experiencewith
all the accuracy that is required. Oresme, the theologian trained also
in natural philosophy,regularlyassumes the common course of nature
with its natural causality but tirelesslyemphasizes the unreliability
and uncertaintyof natural knowledge,which may have less credibility
fromthe standpointof reason than the articles of faith.
Bloomington, Indiana
Indiana University

105

01:50:25 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
ConnotativeConceptsand Mathematicsin Ockham}s Natural Philosophy
ANDR GODDU

Introduction
In William of Ockham's logic of terms and concepts, one of the
most importantdistinctionsthat he makes is that between absolute
terms and concepts and connotative terms and concepts. This essay
presupposes some acquaintance with Ockham' s notions of signification, supposition, and mental language, focusing immediately on
absolute terms and concepts. Aside from texts where Ockham' s
analysis applies his notions and distinctions,his most explicit treatment is found in the SummaLogicae.1
Ockham begins his account by indicating what absolute termsare
not- absolute terms do not signifyone thing primarilyand another
thingor the same thingsecondarilybut ratherprimarilysignifyeach
thing equally.2 For example, the term 'animal' primarily signifies
cows, asses, and men equally.3 The term does not signify one
primarilyand the others secondarily, nor does it require that something be expressed in a nominative case and something else in an
oblique case. Absolute terms do not have nominal definitions,for
nominal definitionsrequire that some thingsbe expressed in different
grammatical cases or adverbially.
Even ifan absolute termis understood in different
ways, as long as
the differentdefinitionsdo not signifysomethingin the same way as
another definition,then the definitionsare not nominal definitions
and hence the term is an absolute term. In the list of absolute terms
provided by Ockham we may finallynote that it includes concrete
1 Summa
GedeonGi, and StephenBrown,Opera
, ed. Philotheus
Boehner,
Logicae
referred
toas SL, andcitedbypart,
I, St. Bonaventure
1974,henceforth
Philosophica
and pages.
chapter,
2 SL 1. 10,pp. 35-6.
3 I adoptheresinglequotation
marks
after
theedition
andinconformity
withmodern
useofdoublequotarather
thanthemoregrammatically
correct
logicalconventions
tionmarks.
106

01:50:33 AM

individual substances, concrete continuous objects such as bodies of

water, and abstract qualities.
We may surmise that absolute termsinclude abstractand concrete
substance termsand some abstractquality terms,and that such terms
have real, not nominal, definitions. By 'real definition' Ockham
means "a concise phrase that expresses the whole nature of the thing
and that does not referto anythingextrinsicto the thing deflned.,,4
Hence, an absolute termhas a real definitionexpressingthe nature of
the things falling under the definition. Ockham distinguishes
metaphysical definitions, real definitions that include only
nominative-caseterms, fromnatural definitions,real definitionsthat
also include oblique-case expressions under the condition that those
expressions signifyonly the essential parts of the thing. Examples
given by Ockham are, respectively,"Man is a rational animal" and
"Man is a substance composed of body and intellectivesoul."
In Summa Logicae 1. 10, Ockham defines connotative terms
immediatelyafterhis definitionof absolute terms.5Taking up characteristics mentioned in the definition of absolute terms, Ockham
definesconnotativetermsas termshaving nominalidefinitions.Under
connotative terms Ockham includes concrete quality terms such as
'white'. It bears emphasis that Ockham defines absolute terms in
termsof or by contrastwith connotative terms.
Ockham explicates connotativetermsat greaterlength,adding that
the concrete terms that signifythings in ways that their abstract
counterpartsdo not signify(for example, 'white' and 'whiteness*or
'just' and 'justice') are connotative terms, because such concrete
terms signifyone thing directly(in the nominative case) and somethingelse in an oblique case. For example, the nominal definitionof
'white' such as 'something having whiteness' has a term in the
nominative case and another in an oblique case.6
Next, Ockham includes relative terms among and under connotativeterms,7and he maintains thatall termsbelongingto the genus
of quantity are connotative terms.8 Ockham concludes this chapter
4 SL 1.26,p. 85: "...accipitur
hocnomen'definitio'
etsicestsermocompenstricte,
totamnaturarti
rei definitae
diosus,exprimens
rei, nec aliquid extrinsecum
declarans."
5 SL 1. 10,pp. 36-7.
* Ibid., 37,
11.52-8.
7 Ibid.,p.
p. 37, 11.59-64.
8 Ibid.,pp. 37-8,11.65-80.
107

01:50:33 AM

distinguishingabsolute fromconnotative termsby listinga varietyof

terms that include transcendentalterms such as 'true', 'good', and
'one', and several other termsthat satisfythe conditions that he has
set out.9
In his explanation of 'nominal definition' in SummaLogicae1. 26,
Ockham maintains that termsof non-existent,indeed, even of impossible ' 'things" can be definedwithoutthe implicationthatthe putative
things do exist. Terms of such putative things have nominaddefinitions. It bears emphasis that several of these termsare expressed in a
negative formor imply a negative. Other termsseem to be artificially
compounded from absolute terms. Both the negative as well as the
artificiallycompounded terms are connotative terms. In sum, then,
we may say that all concrete quality termsand some abstractquality
terms, all the terms in the other eight accidental categories, relative
terms, fictionterms, and transcendentalterms (except 'being') are
connotative and have nominal definitions.10
So much foran initial descriptionof Ockham' s distinctionbetween
absolute and connotative terms. This essay is also concerned with
Ockham' s interpretationof mathematical "objects." With respect to
mathematical entities such as numbers and geometricalfiguressuch
as points and lines, contemporarynominalistshold that such entities
are mere abstractionsand do not really exist, that is to say, they are
abstract, mental entities, not concrete, real entities. Ockham agrees
with contemporarynominalists in the sense that he does not regard
mathematical terms and concepts as absolute terms and concepts.
Ockham regards them as connotative terms and concepts. As connotative, these termsand concepts do not referto some one distinctly
existingthingand yettheydo signifyin some fashionreal things.This
essay will returnto these issues below in Part 2.
Before we can proceed, however, we must come to grips with the
current standard account of connotative terms and concepts. This
essay argues that the standard, analytic accounts of Ockham on connotation have committedan errorso serious and so fundamentalthat
they are unable to appreciate, let silone explain, Ockham' s theoryof
9 Ibid., p. 38, 11.81-94.
10Ibid.,p. 88,11.114-21.Wemayalsoaddthatifitmakessensetospeakofsubstance
termsas fictional
or negative,
thensomesubstance
termsare alsoconnotative.
On
theotherhand,Ockhammayhaveregardedtheexpression
"fictional
substance
term"as an oxymoron.
108

01:50:33 AM

connotation and the absolutely indispensable role that connotative

termsand concepts play in Ockham' s discussion of basic concepts in
natural philosophy such as motion, time, and place, as well as
Ockham' s treatment of mathematical concepts and the role of
mathematicsin natural philosophy.
Unfortunately,this essay can go only one step furthertowards a
constructive account of Ockham' s view of connotation, because
analysis over the past two decades has been bogged down by very
influentialreductivistaccounts that must be dislodged before a constructiveanalysis will even be possible. This task is undertakenwith
some reluctancebecause my understandinghas benefiteda great deal
from the methods and approaches of analytic philosophers. Nevertheless,analyticphilosophershave not displayed the same openness to
non-analyticapproaches, especially those that stand squarely in the
traditionof the historyof ideas and of the historyof science. To make
the controversialdimension of this essay complete, we must point out
that the nearly classic reductivistinterpretationin the analytic style
appeared in the pages of this veryjournal.11
The implications of this critique of the standard account for our
natural philosophy,especially of
understandingof fourteenth-century
a Mertonian variety, are important. This essay will conclude with
concrete suggestionsin this direction, but its complete delineation is
anotherproject. Indeed, as indicated, even withrespectto Ockham on
connotation,thisessay will conclude witha challenge and suggestions
ratherthan attemptto provide a definitiveanalysis. Hence, the essay
is principallydiagnosticand it suggestshow a less reductivistapproach
to Ockham' s textsmay lead to a betterunderstandingof fourteenthcenturynatural philosophy, and especially of Mertonian mechanics.
1. A Selective
s ConnotationSurveyof Interpretations
of Ockham'
Theory
Although Paul Spade's account has been accepted by some of the
most competent analytical philosophers of medieval thought, there
were historians12
who expressed misgivingsand even one analyticphi11Paul V. Spade, Ockham's
Distinctions
Absolute
andConnotative
between
Terms
, in:
13 (1975),55-76.
Vivarium,
12See JohnMurdoch,Scientiamediantibus
in Late
vocibus:Metalinguistic
Analysis
Medieval
NaturalPhilosophy
und Erkenntnis
im Mittelater,
Miscellanea
, in: Sprache
Mediaevalia
this[Spade'sinterpreta, 13/1(1981),73-106,esp.76,n. 8: "Yetperhaps
to makethingstoo 'neat'; Ockhamneverexplicidy
tellsus, to my
tion]attempts
109

01:50:33 AM

losopher, Claude Panaccio, who has attacked it vigorously.13That

attack appeared in a publication which, so far as I can tell, has
generated littlereaction or response. So, while Panaccio's critique is
thoroughin its treatment,its neglectenjoins us to summarize Spade's
thesis,cite the supportforit by Marilyn Adams, Calvin Normore, and
AlfredFreddoso, summarize Panaccio's critique, and then attemptto
place the interpretativehistoryin contextso as to bring it up-to-date
and to suggest a direction for the furtherelaboration of Ockham' s
account of connotativeconcepts. Only then can we focus on the relevance of these issues forfourteenth-century
Aristoteliannatural philosophy.
1.1. Spade's Analysis
Paul Spade presented his account modestlyas restrictedto part of
Ockham's connotation-theory,
namely, thatpart thatrequires no new
notions
those
already required for the theory of
primitive
beyond
absolute terms. At the end of the section I shall returnto Spade's
restrictionto only a part of Ockham' s connotaiion-theory.Early in his
on Ockham' s
essay, Spade foundit necessaryto supply interpretations
behalf that are then attributedto Ockham even though in Ockham,
by Spade's own admission, no explicit statement in support of the
interpretationand its generalization can be found. As Spade puts it,
"the generalizationseems plausible." Typical of thiskind of analysis,
views are attributedto Ockham on the basis of what the interpreter
thinks logic and consistencydemand. This is not an unusual procedure, and this is especially true forinterpretationsof Ockham who
often leaves the reader to speculate about his complete meaning.
Spade occasionally seeks support forhis interpretationin the textsof
John Buridan who is occasionally more explicit in enunciating some
principles.The strategyamounts to the followinginference:ifwe want
knowledge,
justwhichkindsoftermsare to be allowedin a mentallanguage."In
at oddswiththemostcomprehensive
addition,
Spade'saccountwasclearly
studyof
andtheology
inanylanguage,
Miethke's
Ockhams
Ockham'sphilosophy
Jrgen
Weg
zurSozialphilosophie
seminal
MaryBerlin1969andtheevenearlier
study
byGottfried
zurOntologie
derOrdnungen
vonOckham,
, Berlin1949.
tin,Wilhelm
Untersuchungen
13Claude Panaccio,Connotative
Termsin Ockham's
MentalLanguage
, in: Cahiers
no. 9016,Montral1990.See alsoJohnBoler,Connotative
Terms
in
d'pistmologie,
2 (1985),21-37,an articlethatpartly
ofPhilosophy
Ockham
, in: History
Quarterly,
Mostimportantly,
withSpade'sanalysis.
Boler's disagreedisagrees
agreesandpartly
ofdenominative
and relative
terms.
mentis withSpade'streatment
110

01:50:33 AM

to preserveOckham 's thoughtas coherentand consistent,then these

additional principlesmust be attributedto him. Indeed, Spade calls
one of these the AdditivePrinciple
. 14
The crucial reductivistmove is made by Spade in his section on
mentallanguage where Spade makes two assumptionsthat are central
to his analysis.15The firstreads: "(5) There is no synonymyin mental
'
language.'
Spade places great emphasis on Ockham' s insistence that a term
having a nominal definitionuses an expression one part of which
signifiessomethingnot conveyed in the same way by another part of
the otherexpression. Spade transformsthis explanation into an affirmative biconditionalthat constituteshis second centralassumption:16
expressing the quid nominis(what we
(7) A term has a definition
more commonlycall a "nominal definition,,)ifand only ifall the
expressionsexpressingits quid nominissignifythe same things"in
the same way".
Spade shortlythereafteroffersthe followingprinciple on Ockham' s
behalf:17
(9) All the expressions expressingthe quid nominisof a term t are
synonymousifand only ift is itselfsynonymouswitheach of those
expressions.
From (9) by way of (5) Spade furtherconcludes:18
(10) There are no simple connotative terms in mental language;
all simple or non-complex concepts are absolute mental terms.
And the last inferencerelevant to this analysis is:19
(11) Every connotativetermis synonymouswitha fullyexpanded
14Spade,58: "(1) A complex
thesumtotalofwhat
expression
justexactly
signifies
is signified
terms."
byitsconstituent
non-complex
categorematic
15Ibid.,63.
16Ibid.,64.
17Ibid.,67.
18Ibid.,67.
19Ibid.,70. In thefootnote
forthisconclusion
SpadecitesErnestMoody,TheLogic
"If connotative
, NewYork1935,especially
ofWilliam
ofOckham
p. 35 forsupport:
terms
couldnotbe defined,
oranalysed,
intofunctions
ofabsoluteterms,
wewould
havenomeansofdemonstration,
either
orelsedemonstration
wouldinvolve
infinite
orcircularity."
In myview,Moodyis correct,
butMoodydoesnotsay,howregress
intofunctions
ofabsolute
terms
mustbecompletely
reducever,thatsuchan analysis
tive.Whatsatisfies
a definition
oranalysis
intofunctions
isnotspecified,
butthecomcriterion
is a further
reductive
condition.
Notetheremark
pletely
by Boler(n. 13
,
above)36, n. 38, on Moody,and comparewithmyPhysics
of William
ofOckham
Leiden1984,15-9and 210-9.
Ill

01:50:33 AM

nominal definition, each of whose constituent non-complex

categorematicterms is absolute.
This conclusion expresses what Spade set out to show, namely, that
...connotation
orat leastthatpartofitpresented
nonew
here,requires
theory,
notionsbeyondthosealreadyrequiredforthetheory
of absolute
primitive
terms.20
It should be clear now that Spade's restrictionto part of Ockham' s
theoryof connotationis a tautology:the reductivistassumptionsapply
to only part of Ockham' s theory and hence is true for that part,
whatever else Ockham' s theory may include. Spade does not even
suggest,however,how any otherpart of connotationtheorymightnot
have to conform to this requirement. The implication is clear that
those other parts would either have to conformto the same requirement or there would be an inconsistencyin Ockham's theory. The
resultwould then be the same- the reductivistanalysis works forthe
and if it fails to work forthe rest, then the
part that is self-consistent,
rest is inconsistent.
1.2. Adams, Normore,and Freddoso
Paul Spade focused his attentionon Ockham's SummaLogicae.The
1975 paper does not betray a wide or deep acquaintance with
Ockham's texts, hence one could excuse Spade for relyingtoo narrowly on Ockham's explicit statementsin a logical text withoutadequate comparison with other contexts.
But it could hardly be said that Marilyn Adams is unacquainted
with Ockham's texts. Like most analytic philosophers, she seems to
have neglected,relativelyspeaking, Ockham's polemical treatises,but
she has read ail of Ockham's non-polemical works carefullyand often
minutely.That someone as acquainted with Ockham as she is should
subscribe to some of the most questionable assumptions in Spade's
analysis is surprising,especially in light of a paper that appeared in
a collection dealing with questions about how philosophers treat
"hows."21
Adams contendsthat Ockham's "examples and discussions suggest
the view that a fully expanded nominal definitionof connotatives
20Ibid.,p. 55.
"Hows orOckham
21See Marilyn
McCordAdams,Things
Versus
onPredication
and
Are
, in: How Things
, ed. JamesBogenand JamesE. McGuire,DorOntology
drecht/Boston
1984,175-88.
112

01:50:33 AM

would include only absolute terms and primitive syncategorematics

not capable of furtherdefinitionthemselves."22 Adams agrees with
Spade's account although the remainder of her paper suggested that
there was strongpressure to extend Ockham' s analysis to admit the
existenceof modes or accidents into his ontology.23But Adams rightly
concludes that such solutions were not available to Ockham. Adams
formulatesa cautious propositional interpretationthat does not lead
to a hypostatizationof modes of being or how thingsare. Althoughshe
concludes that Ockham never completed the reductive program "by
statingtruth-conditionsforstatementsabout how things are related,
quantified, active, etc., using absolute terms that name only
substances and qualities",24 there were issues raised by Adams that
promised progresstowardsa more adequate interpretationof Ockham
on connotative terms and concepts.
That hope has unfortunatelynot been fulfilled,as is clear fromher
The relevant passage reads:26
account in WilliamOckham.20
a nominaldefinition
notonlyidentifies
theextension
of a
Strictly
speaking,
- thisitwoulddo ifitweretruly
term
andhencedirectly
all
predicable
signified
- butalsoissynandonlythosethings
aboutwhich
thetermwastruly
predicable
withit,andhencesubordinated
tothesameconcept
orconcepts
in the
onymous
not
mental
withanother,
language.Foronetermorphraseto be synonymous
butalso theirsecondary
mustbe thesame;and
onlytheirprimary
significata
theirsecondary
thesameway.Ockham'
s examples
theymustsignify
significata
ofnominaldefinitions,
as wellas hislumpingtogether
ofsyncategorematics,
in Ordinatio
and negatives
thethesis
connotatives,
I, d.2, q.8, makeattractive
thaton his view,a fullexpandednominaldefinition
of connotatives
would
andprimitive
include
terms
notcapableoffuronlyabsolute
syncategorematics
therdefinition
themselves.
Insofaras he holdsto thisclaimthatthereis no
in thementallanguage,
Ockhamwillbe committed
to theviewthat
synonym
connotative
termsin conventional
to arraysof
languageare subordinated
andabsolute
terms
inthemental
Andthe
primitive
syncategorematics
language.
conventional
ofwhattheterms[sic]signifies,
thatcounts
explanation
language
as a nominal
definition
ofthattermwillbe subordinate
to thesamearray.

22Ibid., 177.
23In hernote6, pp. 187-8,AdamsalsopointsoutthatSpade'sformula
foridentifyofa termis toonarrow,
butshedocsnotrejecttheadeingthesecondary
significata
quacyofSpade'sanalysisforwhatitdoescover.
24Ibid., 187.
25Marilyn
McCordAdams,William
Ockham
NotreDame1987.See Paul
, 2 volumes,
andConnotation:
A Critical
Adams's
Notice
, Adams
, William
Spade,Ockham
ofMarilyn
Ockham,in: The Philosophical
Review,99 (1990),593-612.In thisessayreview,
thereductive,
thesis.
Spaderepeats
eliminability
26Ibid.,I, 322-3.
113

01:50:33 AM

There are again some indications in this passage that Adams is not
altogether comfortable with Spade's reductivist analysis, yet she
accepts the premisses,seems to cite Spade approvinglyin the relevant
footnote,and she offersno reason for not accepting Spade's thesis.
These arguments sometimes take the form that Ockham shouldhave
heldcertain views or principles, even if explicit evidence is lacking:27
term'white'and theabstractterm
...to decidewhether
boththe concrete
needstoconsider
areincluded
inthemental
he [Ockham]
'whiteness'
language,
with'whiteness',
butwhether
or not
notonlywhether
'white'is synonymous
oftermsfoundin the
withsomeothertermor complex
eitheris synonymous
Ockhammaintains
mentallanguage:e.g., with'something
havingwhiteness'.
ofnominal
theway'white'
terms
aresusceptible
definitions
thatallconnotative
terms
are
thatall connotative
conclude
is. Anda development
ofhislogic...would
andabsolute
terms
ofprimitive
withcomplexes
syncategorematics
synonymous
allcon..Ifso,Ockhamshould
have...regarded
orqualities.
thatnamesubstances
and
otherthansubstance
notative
termsand henceall termsin thecategories
eliminable
in favorofsuchcomplexes.
(Italicsadded.)
qualityas in principle
This is basically the same strategythatwe detectedin Spade. Adams's
recognitionthat the full development of Ockham' s proposal requires
the formulationof truth-conditionsfor statementsabout how things
are related, quantified, active, and so forthis surely correct,yet the
has been frustratedby an
conditionforthe possibilityof its fulfillment
implausibly narrow, overreductionisticinterpretationof Ockham' s
connotation-theory.
In the context of the issues discussed here, Normore's focus has
been on Buridan, and he seems to have developed a clear understanding of what Buridan was about. But on Ockham he accepts
Spade's conclusion thatthereare no simple connotativetermsin mental language:28
this
haveonlyprimary
Ockhamclaimsthatfrom
...absolute
terms
signification.
His argument
seemstobe that
itfollows
thattheyhaveno nominal
definition.
is synonymous
withitsdefinition...
anytermwhichhas a nominaldefinition
connotative
terms
do. Ifmental
do nothavenominal
Absolute
terms
definitions;
thensincea termand itsnominal
definition
must
languagehasno synonyms,
which
be synonyms,
thereis no placein mentallanguageforboth.The terms
haveotherusesandso
ofa connotative
termtypically
appearin thedefinition
willusuallybe requiredfortheexpressive
adequacyof mentallanguage.It
27Forinstance,
thisis howAdamsputsit,I, 297-8.See Spade'sessayreview
(n. 25)
fornewobservations,
and detailsofdifferences
between
himself
and
suggestions,
insistence
on theeliminability
ofconnotative
terms
Adams,butalsonotecontinued
in mentallanguage.
28CalvinNormore,
Ockham
onMental
Foundations
, in: Historical
Language
ofCognitive
Science
, ed. J-C. Smith,Dordrecht/Boston
1990,53-70,esp. 58.
114

01:50:33 AM

Ockhamappearsneverto drawtheconclusion
seems,then,though
explicitly,
thatifmentallanguagehas no synonyms
ithas no simpleconnotative
terms.
Likewise, in an articleon the Eucharist, Freddoso repeats this view:29
...itis sufficient
tonotethatthisdistinction
absoluteandconnotative
[between
To put it sucmetaphysical
terms]has rathercontroversial
underpinnings.
thannominal)
absolute
terms
havereal(rather
definitions
becausethey
cinctly,
ina metaphysically
basicandprivileged
connotative
signify
things
way,whereas
termsare non-basic
and in theory
in favorof formulas
eliminable
(nominal
whoseonlycategorematic
terms
The implicit
areabsolute.
definitions)
assumptionis thatwe couldin principle
of
adequatedescription
givean ontologically
theworldwithout
terms.
usinganyconnotative
Sadly, what all of this amounts to are analyticallymore rigorous
versions of the nonsense proposed and disseminated by P. Doncoeur.30 Now Doncoeur focused his attentionon relative terms and
concepts, but it is especially in this type of connotative term that
Spade, Adams, Normore, and Freddoso should have noticed the
implausibility,indeed, impossibilityof the overreductionisticinterpretation.Doncoeur's analysis was demolished by GottfriedMartin,31
but it does not appear thatSpade, Adams, Normore, or Freddoso read
Martin, or iftheydid so, thentheymissed the point. Be thatas it may,
Claude Panaccio has now laid out a devastating critique of Spade's
analysis, that is necessarilydamaging for the views of Adams, Normore, and Freddoso.
1.3. Panaccio's Critique
Panaccio has read Ockham widely, and it seems to him on the face
of it impossible that Ockham could have held the views attributedby
Spade to Ockham. If Spade were correct, it would be fatal for
Ockham, for"it is logically impossible to constructall relational concepts exclusively from non-relational simple ones," from which it
follows that there must be simple connotative terms in mental
language and simple relationalconcepts.32But aside fromthe discom29AlfredFreddoso,Logic
and Ockham's
, Ontology
, in: The New
Christology
57 (1983),293-330,esp. 323. In fairness
to Freddosoit shouldbe
Scholasticism,
outthathe laterrejected
thisinterpretation
in an oralresponse
to Marilyn
pointed
Adams'sbook,buttomyknowledge
hiscritique
hasnotappeared
inprint.
anywhere
30P. Doncoeur,
LeNominahsme
deGuillaume
Occam.
La Thorie
dela relation
, in: Revue
de philosophie,
23 (1921),5-25.
no-scolastique
31Gottfried
Relationstheorie
Nominalismus?
Martin,Ist ckhams
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,32 (1950),31-49.
32Panaccio,p. 2. Foranother
oftheSpade-Adams
reductionist
veryrecent
critique
Elimination
Terms
andhis
view,seeMartinTweedale,Ockham's
Supposed
oj Connotative
115

01:50:33 AM

fortingpossibilitythatOckham' s doctrinewould be doomed to failure

as a consequence of Spade's interpretation,Panaccio demonstrates
that Ockham never uttered the doctrine attributedto him.
Panaccio shows that Ockham posited a real distinctionbetween
absolute, connotative,and relativeconcepts, maintainingthattheydo
not coincide except as superior to inferior,and citing examples that
on theSentences
use simple terms.33In his Commentary
, Ockham asserts
that God can be known by us through a simple connotative and
negative concept that is proper to him.34Hence, thereare simple connotative terms in mental language. As forthe claim that connotative
terms are identical with theirnominal definitions,Ockham says that
a definitionis not identical with what is defined; indeed, a definition
is more explicit than what is defined.35
The thesis that all connotative terms are liable to fullyexpanded
nominal definitions, "each of whose constituent non-complex
categorematic terms is absolute," cannot possibly be true for correlative terms such as 'father', 'child', 'double', and 'half. In fact,
Ockham himselfasserts that when two relative termsare mutual, the
nominal definitionof one cannot be expressed except through the
other.36The complete nominal definitionof each of these termsmust
include its correlative,hence "some relationalterms(if not all) cannot
be defined withoutrecourse to other relational terms," and since all
relational terms are connotative, it furtherfollows that connotative
termsare not dispensable in mental language as Ockham understands
it.37
I Parsimony
Review/Revue
cana, in: Dialogue,CanadianPhilosophical
Ontologica
31 (1992),431-44.Tweedaleagreeswiththeprincipal
claim
diennede philosophie,
andtheir
inPanaccio,namely,
thatconnotative
terms
definitions
occurinOckham's
and
mentallanguage;however,
he alsopointsoutseveralimportant
disagreements
In myview,Tweedale'
andsolution.
s diagnosis
andsolution
offers
another
diagnosis
termsin his
aboutwhyOckhamrequires
connotative
leavefundamental
questions
a satisfactory
mentallanguagewithout
explanation.
33Ibid.,p. 6. PanacciocitesOckham'sQuodlibeta
,
, V, q. 25, OperaTheologica
septem
IX, 583.
34Panaccio,7, citingOrdinatio
I, d. 3, q. 2, OThII, 405.
35Panaccio,6-7,citingQuodlibeta
V, q. 15, OThIX, 541; SL 1. 26, OPhI, 88; SL
Naturalis
I, c. 3,
3.3.22,OPhI, 680;SL 3.2.15,OPhI, 530; andSummula
Philosophiae
OPhVI, 162.
36Quodlibeta
VI, 24, OThIX, 676.
37Panaccio,pp. q.
SL 3.3.26,OPhI, 690.In myview,theobservation
10-1,citing
by
to
construal
doesnotrequire
Tweedale(n. 32) thata broader
of'definition'
recourse
termdoes notadequately
otherrelational
termsin thedefinition
of a relational
ofa complete
addressthecondition
nominal
definition.
here,namely,
stipulated
116

01:50:33 AM

In sum, Panaccio has shown that 1) ' 'definitionsare always distinct

fromthe termstheydefine"; 2) 4'some connotativeconcepts are sim'
ple"; and 3) 'relative concepts cannot all be definedwiththe sole help
of absolute termsand syncategoremata."38In the last two parts of his
paper, Panaccio shows, contrary to Spade, Adams, and Normore,
that "nothing in Ockham' s writings requires that there be a total
synonymybetween a connotativetermand its definition"; in fact,the
principles attributedto Ockham by Spade and the others lead to
inconsistencieswith explicit statementsthat Ockham does make. For
instance,Ockham maintains thatnon-relativeconnotativetermssuch
as 'quantity', 'motion', 'time', 'figure', 'density', and 'rarity' have
a relative term, that is, a connotative term, in their nominal definitions.39Panaccio summarizes his two intermediateconclusions thus:
"connotative termscannot always be seen as strictlysynonymouswith
termsin
their nominal definitions" and " thereare simpleconnotative
s mentallanguage
Ockham3
," leading to his principal conclusion:40
so crucialforhis whole
His [Ockham'
theoryof connotation,
s] nominalist
ofrelaelimination
in no wayrequires
the(impossible)
program,
philosophical
and
onthecontrary,
isexplicitly
tionalterms.
Theirindispensability,
recognized
takenintoaccount.
consistently
In other words, Panaccio demonstrates that nothing in Ockham' s
attributedto
theorycommitshim to the reductivistconnotation-theory
him by Spade and others. Ockham' s nominalism relies heavily on
connotation theory, connotation plays a central role in Ockham' s
analysis of the language of natural philosophyand mathematics,and
the theorypermitsOckham to deny the existenceof any realitydistinct
fromthat of singular substances and qualities. Because connotation
plays such a crucial role, why, Panaccio asks rhetorically,would
anyone thinkthatconnotativetermsand concepts are absent fromthe
deep structuresof mental language?41
Adams's earlier, promising conclusion bears emphasis here:42
36Panaccio,11.
39Expositio
libros
EUnchorum
2.16, OPhIII, 302.
super
40Panaccio,20-1.
41Panaccio,4. As Panacciopointsoutin hisnote7, myPhysics
(n. 19 above)"is
inOckham'
aboutthecentral
roleofconnotation
s analysis
ofthe
particularly
explicit
languageofphysics."
42Adams
(n. 21), 186. Noteas welltheobservation
byBoler(n. 13), 36, n. 37:
...provides
inter
aliaforthedistinctions
"Signification
conjunctim
amongthetraditional
Aristotelian
whichOckhamexplicitly
notin which
describes
as differing
categories
butin thewaystheysignify
things
theysignify
things..."[emphasis
added].
117

01:50:33 AM

It is notonlywhichthings
(res)exist,buthowtheyexistthatmaybe- in many
whether
or byconvention.
cases- priorto theirbeingsignified,
naturally
But the implication of that suggestion seems to be that some simple
connotativetermsdo belong to the deep structureof mentallanguage;
indeed, that Ockham' s program cannot guarantee the objectivityof
things being co-specific, co-generic, related, quantified, active,
passive, located in space and time, and so forth, without his
connotation-theory, for these ways of being are prior to being
signified, and Ockham's connotation-theory is an attempt to
guarantee their objectivity without addition to whichthings exist,
namely, substances and qualities.
1.4. Martin's Challenge
The project that remains, however, is more than an adequate
analytic approach seems capable of delivering. The challenge was
clearly laid down by GottfriedMartin in 1949, but it has been virtually ignored by Anglo-American authors, and it seems pointless to
proceed withoutfacingup to the factthat Martin's analysis and most
of those dependent on it are inaccessible because writtenin German.43
The entire book cannot be summarized let alone translatedhere, but
a selective summary with translation of indispensable passages is
requisite if the challenge is to be met.
The central point of Martin's analysis was to analyze Ockham' s
account of transcendentalconcepts and to determinetheirfunctionin
Ockham's ontology and semantics. It seemed to Martin that
transcendentalconceptsare not only connotativebut also fundamental
for a complete understanding of Ockham's conceptualist program.
The concepts on which Martin focused his study are 'unity',
'number', 'extension', and 'relation'. At the outset Martin expressed
43See note12. Inasmuch
as myPhysics
was partly
motivated
byMartin'sanalysis,
MarkHenninger,
Relations
understood.
it follows
thatmystudywas incompletely
,
ofconthecentrality
Medieval
Theories
1250-1325
, Oxford1989,119-45,recognizes
notativeconceptsin Ockham'saccountof relation,
yet,remarkably,
Henninger
He doesnotevenciteSpade's
termsand concepts
leavesconnotative
unanalyzed.
isinprincibuthedoesciteAdams'sbook,anditdoesappearas ifhisanalysis
article,
On theother
withthoseofSpade,Adams,andNormore.
hand,Hennplecompatible
andperhaps
evenrelieson Martinforone
ingerdoesciteMartin'sbookandarticle,
interms
of
Martin'ssolution
missesorignores
claim(131),butotherwise
Henninger
seemsnevertocome
forexample,
transcendentais,
p. 133.In anyevent,Henninger
to gripswithMartin'sinterpretation.
118

01:50:33 AM

sensitivityto textual problems, especially limitations in the Summa

Logicae, a text that oftenexpresses Ockham' s views in a very sketchy
and introductoryfashion, and hence Martin recognized the need to
on the Sentencesin order to support his
depend on the Commentary
analysis.44The centralproblem thatdrove Martin to his interpretation
is stated early and clearly:45
Thisstudytriesto showthatthestarting-point
ofOckham'sanalysisis essenofunity.Ockhamdisputes
thereality
ofquantity,
relation,
tiallytheproblem
and ofall thecategories
asidefromsubstance
and quality.According
to the
standard
therejection
ofthereality
ofthelasteightcategories
interpretation,
meansthattheseeightcategories
aretobe understood
as mereconontologically
indeedas merenames.
ceptions,
Martin was aware, of course, of the centralityof the problem of
universais, but he purposely defined his study in order to concretely
verifythe followingthesis:46
...thatOckham'sontological
on theproblem
ofthebeingofthelast
standpoint
and especiallyof quantityand relation,shouldnot be
eightcategories,
as ''nominalism."Ockhamratherdesignates
thebeingof these
designated
as a transcendental
categories
being.
Martin supported this interpretationprimarilyby means of a comparison of the views of Ockham with those of Thomas Aquinas and
Duns Scotus, specificallyin the distinctionsmade by Thomas and
Scotus between transcendentaland accidental being. As we have seen,
Ockham regardstranscendentaltermsand concepts as connotative. It
bears emphasis that generallyamong the scholastics and certainlyin
Scotus' s hands, transcendental concepts refer to the " abstract but
very real concepts that escape classification in the Aristotelian
categories by reason of their greater extension and universalityof
application.''47 It was standard scholastic doctrine to distinguish
44Ockham
, iv-vand60-3.
45Ibid.,vii-viii:"Die vorliegende
versucht
zu zeigen,da Ockham
Untersuchung
vomProblem
wesentlich
derEinheit
ist.Ockhambestreitet
dieRealitt
ausgegangen
derQuantitt
unddieRealitt
derRelation,
erbestreitet
dieRealitt
allerKategorien
auerderSubstanz
undderQualitt.Die Bestreitung
derRealitt
dieserachtletzten
wrdenachder blichen
da dieseKategorien
bedeuten,
Kategorien
Auffassung
als bloeVorstellungen,
werden."
ontologisch
ja als bloeNamenverstanden
46
Ockhams
imSeinsproblem
deracht
Ibid.,8: "...da derontologische
Standpunkt
letztenKategorien,insbesondere
der Quantittund der Relation,nichtals
Nominalismus
bezeichnet
werden
darf.Ockhambestimmt
vielmehr
das Seindieser
Kateeorien
als ein transzendentales
Sein."
47Cf. AllanWolter,TheTranscendentais
andtheir
Function
in theMetaphysics
ofDuns
Scotus
, St. Bonaventure
1946,1.
119

01:50:33 AM

between the transcendentalnotions of metaphysicsand logic and to

maintain that metaphysical,transcendentalnotions have referenceto
the order of realityand existence.48Startingout fromthe distinction
made by Thomas and Scotus, Martin maintained that Ockham:49
ofthedistinction.
Mustone reallydistinguish,
thenecessity
asks
...questions
and accidentalunity,transcendental
and
Ockham,betweentranscendental
Is notthebeingof
and accidental
accidental
transcendental
relation?
number,
andrelation
as transcendental
secured
whenunderstood
number,
being?
unity,
As Martin pointedly and correctlyemphasized, Ockham does not
understand transcendental terms and concepts as mere names or
terms:50
of
comestotheresult
thata completely
nominalistic
Ouranalysis
interpretation
in Ockham.
transcendental
beingis notfoundexpressly
Martin's challenge to a reductionistinterpretationis clear. As forhis
"transcendental" interpretation, Martin recognized the need to
explain how he was using the term,but we may remindthe reader that
Ockham himselfregards properlytranscendentaltermsand concepts
such as 4one', 'true', and 'good' as connotative. In brief,it was Martin's contention that the possibilities for interpretingthe beings to
which connotativetermsreferare real, accidental, merelyconceptual,
and transcendental.The principalpoint of Martin's studywas to show
48Ibid.,4.
4
49Ockham
einersolchen
, viii-ix: '...er fragtaber dann nachder Notwendigkeit
Mu
zwischeneiner
Unterscheidung. man, das wirdOckhamsFrage,wirklich
undeinerakzidentalen
einertranszendentalen
transzendentalen
Einheit,zwischen
undeinerakzidentalen
einertranszendentalen
undeinerakzidentalen
Zahl,zwischen
Relationunterscheiden?
Wennauchdietranszendentale
dietranszendentale
Einheit,
Relation
bleibt
einrealesSeinimweiteren
Sinnedarstellen,
Zahl,dietranszendentale
danndieRealitt
vonEinheit,
ZahlundRelationnichtauchdanngesichert,
so fragt
alleZahlen,alleRelationen
als transzendentale
Ockham,wennmanalleEinheiten,
versteht?"
50Ibid., ix: "UnsereUntersuchung
da eine solche
kommtzu dem Ergebnis,
nominalistische
des transzendentalen
Seinssichbei Ockham
Gesamtinterpretation
InNominalismus
vorfindet."
thepoint
nichtausdrcklich
(n. 31) 47,Martinexpressed
thus:"Die Bestreitung
desrealenUnterschiedes
a relation
anditsfoun[i.e.between
alsonicht
derRealitt
unddieBestreitung
dieBestreitung
aissolcher
dation]bedeutet
des realenUnterschiedes
kanndahernichtals Nominalismus
werden.
aufgefat
und
Verstehtman die Relationstheorie
Ockhamsaus diesen systematischen
historischen
dannwirdmandie Angriffe
schwerlich
Doncoeurs
Zusammenhngen,
frdie prdikamentalen
finden.
Es istrichtig:
RelaOckhamleugnet
gerechtfertigt
Aber
tionen
denrealenUnterschied
zwischen
derRelation
undihrenFundamenten.
dieRealitt
derprdikamentalen
Relationen
Ockhamleugnet
damitnicht
berhaupt,
er versteht
vielmehr
die prdikamentalen
Relationenseinsmig
vom Sein der
Relationen."
transzendentalen
120

01:50:33 AM

that in view of Ockham' s rejection of accidental being and of the

merelyconceptual reduction,Ockham was committedto the view that
connotativetermsreferto which thingsexist, as real, and to the ways
in which thingsexist, as transcendental.
Ockham' s view that the last eight categories and connotativeterms
do not referto absolute accidents is universally acknowledged. The
refutationof the completelyreductivistanalysis shows that Ockham
was not only not a radical nominalist but also that Ockham did not
intendto reduce all talk of being to whatthingsexist- he was sensitive
to the problem of the waysthings exist.51
It mightfairlybe said that Martin was driven to his conclusion by
the implausibilityof reductivistinterpretations.Does, for example,
Ockham's denial of the realityof motion as an absolute thingor as an
accidentcommithim to the view thatmotion is not real? Must we conclude that, according to Ockham, bodies do not really move? The
implication is absurd on the face of it, but beyond that there are
indicationsin Ockham' s textsthat his principlespossess the resources
to supply a more sensible interpretation.
As for what Ockham means by "transcendental being," Martin
concluded that there are only two candidates and that they are not
"
mutually exclusive: connotation and multaeres." In the following
quotation, the reader can see most clearly the relevance of Martin's
workformy critiqueand, above all, forthe contributionthathe made
(could have made, can stillmake) to our understandingof Ockham' s
theoryof connotation:52
51Ibid.,217.Spade,(n. 25),606,offers
a solution,
unavailable
toOckham,
though
thatmakesOckham's"doctrine
ofthecategories
ofKant's,
reminiscent
obviously
insofar
as inboththeories
thecategories
arisefrom
thebasicforms
ultimately
ofjudgment
, thefundamental
Still,onewouldnotwanttopush
waysofcombining
concepts.
thisanalogyveryfar."CompareagainwithBoler'scomment
quotedabovein note
42.
52Ibid.,251: "Ockhamhates frseinewichtigste
ontologische
Aufgabe
gehalten,
immerwiederzu zeigen,da die Quantitt
Sein
unddie Relationkeinabsolutes
darstellen WennOckhamdietranszendentalen
alsWeisenderEinheit
Kategorien
so versteht
er sie zugleich
als Weisendes Seins,das heitalsoals Weisen
versteht,
der Existenz.Diese Kategorien
sindalso frOckhamnichtmehrKlassenvon
Dingen,so wiees auchfrOckhamnochdie SubstanzunddieQualittist.Es gibt
daherzwar Substanzenund Qualittennebeneinander,
aber nichtSubstanzen,
undRelationen
nebeneinander.
Es gibtvielmehr
frOckhamnurzwei
Qualitten
Klassenabsoluten
unddieQualitt.AlleandereKategorien
sind
Seins,dieSubstanz
keineneuenDingegegenber
derSubstanzundderQualitt,sondern
nurWeisen
des Zusammenseins
von Substanzenund Qualitten.Wir knnenalso die
transzendentalen
frOckhamnichtnurals WeisenderEinheit,
sondern
Kategorien
auchals Weisendes Seinsoderals WeisenderExistenz
bestimmen."
121

01:50:33 AM

taskinontology
Ockhamhelditforhismostimportant
toshowrepeatedly
that
absolutebeings...WhenOckham
quantityand relationdo not represent
transcendental
as waysofunity,he understands
understands
them
categories
as waysof being,thatis, also as waysof existing.
These
simultaneously
arethusforOckhamnolonger
classesofthings
suchas substance
and
categories
quality...Thereare forOckhamonlytwoclassesofabsolutebeing,substance
Allothercategories
arenotnewthings
inaddition
tosubstance
andquality.
and
butrather
substances
andqualities
existtogether.
Therequality,
waysinwhich
toOckhamnotonlyas
fore,we candefinetranscendental
categories
according
butalsoas waysofbeingor as waysofexisting.
waysofunity,
We must address an obvious problem with Martin's analysis,
namely, the meaning of "transcendental" and the anachronism of
referringto categories as "transcendental." The term "transcendental" is highlyambiguous. In its proper sense, it refersto conceptsthat
are trans-categorical, that is, that fail outside of the Aristotelian
categories. But inasmuch as Ockham considers the properly
transcendentalterms(except 'being') as connotative,53how can Martin interpretconnotative terms, most of which are not the properly
transcendental terms, as transcendental? There are clearly other
senses of "transcendental" being employed here. Connotative terms
in different
either referto one thingunderstood
ways or manythingstaken
is also meant to include
"transcendental"
or
Hence,
together collectively.
terms that indicate plural ways or plural thingsand, accordingly, fall
outside of any single category. This explanation is not intended to be
exhaustivebut merelyto indicate thatthe ambiguityof "transcendental" as used by Martin is not fatal to his interpretation.54
53Ockham,SL 1.38,emphasizes
oftheterm'being',callingit
thespecialcharacter
L.
in "twosenses,"and "transcendental."
Nevertheless,
"equivocal,"predicable
andOckhamists,
ed. E. P. Bosand
andOntology
inOckham
M. de Rijk,Logic
, in: Ockham
'ens' as "synH. A. Krop, Nijmegen1987, 25-39, esp. 34-6, interprets
and "absolute." Generallyspeaking,Ockham dividesonly
categorematic"
SeeAdams(n. 25)1,319and
intoabsolute
orconnotative
terms.
terms
categorematic
textOckhamsetstheterm'ens' between
II, 958-60.Notehowin thefollowing
a clearindication
as to whichgroup
termswithout
absolutetermsand connotative
vocantur
SL 1. 11,p. 40,11.65-71:"Nominaautemprimaeintentionis
'ens' belongs.
omniaalia nominaa praedictis,
aliquasresquae nonsunt
quae videlicet
significant
suntomniatalia'homo','animal',
taliasigna,cuiusmodi
signa,necconsequentia
'Sortes','Plato','albedo','album','ens', 'verum','bonum'ethuiusmodi,
quorum
proaliis,aliqua
praeciseresquae nonsuntsignanatasupponere
aliquasignificant
when
taliasignaet simulcumhocaliasres." 'Ens' seemstobe absolute
significant
ofthe
whenpredicated
and qualities,butconnotative
God, substances,
signifying
othereightcategories.
54Accordingly,
Einekritische
DiskusOckham
, eintranszendentalphilosoph?
J. A. Aertsen,
andOckhamists
sionmitG. Martin
, in: Ockham
(n. 53),3-13,doesnot,inmyview,adeoftheterm'ens'inSL 1.38; moreofOckham'sanalysis
theambiguity
quatelyreflect
122

01:50:33 AM

Finally, however, it would be premature to propose a definitive

resolutionof the ontological problems generated by Ockham' s theory
of connotative concepts, nor can this summary do justice to the
historical dimension of Martin's study. As suggested, an attempt
focussingon transcendentalconcepts holds the greatest promise for
success, but thisis leftas a challenge to analyticphilosophersto either
provide a betteralternativeor to work out the implications of such a
suggestion that will satisfytheir appetite for rigor and clarity. Certainly,the speculative characterof Martin's suggestion and his Kantian reading of Ockham' s doctrineare open to question; nevertheless,
the reductivistinterpretationof connotativeconcepts is demonstrably
impossible. To conclude this section, I reformulatethe challenge to
understand Ockham' s connotation-theoryas presupposing ways of
being priorto theirbeing signified,and requiringthe recognitionthat
Ockham' s ontology includes beings properly understood as ways of
being as well as real beings.55
2. Some Implicationsfor Understanding
the Natural Philosophyof the
Fourteenth
Century
Much of the attentiongiven to fourteenth-century
natural philosissues
and
the
has
concentrated
on
supposed conseophy
ontological
doesnotadequately
ofthefactthat
over,Aertsen
pointout Martin'srecognition
severaltranscendental
terms
terms
Ockhamenumerates
amongconnotative
(p. 224)
Aertsen
Martin'smotivation
doesnotsufficiently
and arguand,finally,
represent
ofa broader
mentinbehalf
ofconnotative
terms
based
transcendental
interpretation
on Ockham'srejection
ofreductive
ofconnotation
interpretations
(216-20and 228toHansThijssenforpointing
outthepapersbyDe RijkandAert34). I amgrateful
senandforproviding
I findtheiraccounts
mewithcopiesofthem.As indicated,
of
and refer
theterm'ens' inadequate
thereadertoAdams,II, 958-60.
55Accordingly,
understudiesbasedon Martin'sviewhavealsobeenincompletely
stood.The mostimportant
studyofOckhamin
exampleis themostcomprehensive
Miethke'sOckhams
anylanguage,
Weg(n. 12), 139,201-27and 512-5.Cf.
Jrgen
Philotheus
onOckham
St. Bonaventure
Collected
Articles
1958,pp. 20-1.See
Boehner,
von
alsoJanBeckmann,
Das Subjekt!
Prdikat-Schema
unddieFragenachderMglichkeit
vonOckham
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,59 (1977),1-14,esp.
Metaphysik
byWilhelm
11-14.Note1) Beckmann
torender
transcendental
terms
and
's suggestions
properly
and2) hisconclusion
thatpredicability
as "transcategorical"
musthavea
concepts
namely,
beingsandb) thisindividual
ground,
a) thereareindividual
beingis freeof
It shouldalsobe notedthatBeckmann
contradiction.
doesnotexplicitly
analyzeproan essay,Nihilscitumnisi
as connotative;
however,
perlytranscendental
concepts
VonderSach-zur
derMetaphysik
amBeispiel
, in: Miscellanea
complexum.
Satzwissenschaft
ofOckham'streatMediaevalia
consequences
(forthcoming,
1993)mayaddressfurther
mentoftranscendental
concepts.
123

01:50:33 AM

quences of realist-versus-nominaliststarting-points.These connections are oftenstated in termsof the supposed logical consequences of
a realistor nominalistontology,but in my view the argumentsmaking
these connectionsare unpersuasive because the assumptionsand conclusions are too narrow, implausible, and primafacie improbable. For
instance, Ockham' s denial of motion as an absolute entityhas been
taken to have consequences for his analysis of acceleration, for if
motion is not an entity, then how can it undergo change?56 The
answer, of course, is thatifmotion is thoughtof as nothingmore than
a body's change of place over time, then the specificcharacterof that
change is a matter of accurately describing that change: uniform
motionor some varietyof non-uniformmotion. From Ockham' s point
of view it is not the motion that is undergoing change, but rathera
body that is undergoing a change of a certain kind.
in FourteenthNatural
2.1. Metalinguistic
Century
Analysisand Mathematics
Philosophy
This essay now shiftsthe focus to suggestions, followingon John
Murdoch and Amos Funkenstein, for a re-evaluation of fourteenthcentury Aristotelian natural philosophy, suggestions that place less
emphasis on ontological issues than they do on the meaning of the
mathematical or functional or operational analyses provided by
Aristotle and some of his fourteenth-century
followers: Ockham,
Thomas Bradwardine, and others associated with the so-called Merton School, William Heytesbury and John Dumbleton.
In a seminal article, John Murdoch shiftedthe discussion from
ontological issues to the logical, semantical, and metalinguistictechniques developed especially in the fourteenthcentury. Murdoch
pointed out how the metalinguistictreatmentof connotative terms
rendered such terms into sets of explaining propositions.57Murdoch
56Forexample,
Anneliese
derscholastischen
Maier,ZweiGrundprobleme
,
Naturphilosophie
Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik
, Volume2, 2d ed., Rome1955,159-60;
andJamesWeisheipl,
Ockham
andSome
in: MediaevalStudies,30 (1968),
Mertonians,
163-213.
57Metalinguistic
discussions
of
Analysis
(n. 12), 80-2. For threerecent,important
Aristotle's
and thetransformations
ofAristotle's
, medieval
Aristotelianism,
Physics
and ofAristotelianism
in theMiddleAges,see HelenLang,Aristotle's
arguments
andItsMedieval
Varieties
Some
, Albany1992;J. M. M. H. Thijssen,
Physics
Reflections
onContinuity
andTransformation
inMedieval
Natural
PhiofAristotelianism
(andRenaissance)
e studisulla tradizione
filosofica
Rivistadella
, in: Documenti
medievale,
losophy
124

01:50:33 AM

went on to show how Ockham justifiesthe use of such fictivetermsas

'point', 'line', and 'surface' withouttheleast embarrassment.According to Ockham, mathematicaltermsand concepts are properlystated
in conditional form. No knowledgeable mathematician declares that
parallel straightlines extended to infinitynever intersect,but rather
formulatesit thus: "If two parallel straightlines were extended to
infinity,theywould never meet." In other words, it is not necessary
formathematiciansto suppose the real existenceof such fictiveentities
in order to employ them usefully,foreven a counterfactualtreatment
is of use to the mathematician, just as it has proved useful to the
theologian.58
No one has been more insistenton the implications of Ockham' s
approach fortheologyand natural science than Amos Funkenstein.59
Funkenstein recognized not only that mathematical notions are
altogetherconnotativeforOckham, but also thatconnotativenotions,
though not without some foundation in reality, should not be
,
hypostatizedeither. To Ockham as well as to some of the Calculatores
it was not necessary to view mathematics as an inventory of
mathematicalobjects; theyoftentook the view thatonly mathematical
concepts or arguments that are necessary for the interpretationof
nature are worthyof consideration, even when the application was
dictated by formal considerations rather than empirical ones. The
obscurityof the precedingsentencecan be clarifiedby referenceto the
standard interpretationof Aristotle's dynamics, an alternativeinterpretation,and reflectionon the meaning of Bradwardine's Rule.
2.2. Aristotelian
Dynamics
To provoke fundamentalre-examination,I begin with a rehabilitation of the Aristoteliananalysis. Whatever the origin of the standard
way, at least in pedagogical contexts, for representingAristotle's
account of motion, namely, V a -,
R

there are statements from

societinternazionale
latino,II, 2 (1991),503-28;and
perlo studiodel medioevo
Luca Bianchiand EugenioRandi,Le Verit
dissonanti:
Aristotele
allafinedelmedioevo
,
Romeand Bari1990(Biblioteca
di culturamoderna,
99IV
58Murdoch(n. 12),90-3.As foritsuse the
in a variety
ofways,see
by theologian
PowerofGod, in: Franciscan
EugenioRandi,Ockham,
JohnXXII andtheAbsolute
Studies,46 (1986),205-16.
59Medieval
andtheScientific
the
Middle
CenTheology
from
Imagination
AgestotheSeventeenth
Princeton
1986,esp. 307-17.
tury,
125

01:50:33 AM

Aristotlehimselfthat render this formula a gross oversimplification

and overgeneralization,but even if we take it as approximatingwhat
Aristotlehad in mind, it still requires some modification.
Aristotle's conception of the relation between speed, force and
resistanceas presentedin PhysicsVII was an intentionalsimplification
of a more complex analysis. In De Celo IV, chapter 6, Aristotle
includes the shape of a body as a factorthat accounts in part forthe
speed of a body. The context suggeststhat Aristotleintended the factor of resistance to include the density of the medium as well as the
relation of the shape of the bodies moving and resisting.Hence, the
standard formula- that velocity is directlyproportional to force or
weight and inverselyproportionalto the resistanceof the medium
seems hardly adequate to express Aristotle's evidently more complicated notion. There are also practical considerations that make
Aristotle's acceptance of the standard formuladubious.
Suppose that we compare two bodies of the same dimensions, one
weighing 100 pounds and the other! pound. Accordingto the formula
Vat,

the heavier body should fall 200 times fasterthan the lighter

one in the same medium:

V2

V2

a (^1) x (|^),
W2
Ri

where Ri = R2. Then

= i = 200, then - = 200! If this does not

= }thmSince
W2
1
W2
V2

seem persuasive, then consider a furtherconsequence fromthe same

example. Let us assume that in one second, the !-pound body falls
one foot,then in the same second the 100-pound body would fall 200
feet!Or imagine the 100-pound body fallingone foot,thenin the same
unit of time thei-pound body would fallonly

of a foot,nearly

of an inch. Of course, it is possible that Aristotlenever consideredhis

supposed formulain such concrete terms. It may be that his commitment to common sense led him to take the general idea as incontrovertible, namely, that whateverthe actual finalvelocityof a fallingbody
may be, common sense tells us that its finalvelocityis dependent on
the weight of the body and the resistance of the medium.
Let us return to the reminder that Aristotle's analysis applies to
126

01:50:33 AM

bodies moving, not in a void, but in a plenum. An appropriate

metaphorfora medium filledwithbodies is of a tank filledwithwater
and some fish. In light of this metaphor there is a correspondence
between Aristoteliantheoryand a fundamentalphenomenon of fluid
mechanics. The phenomenon involves objects moving througha fluid
with a certain velocity. Physicistshave determineda value known as
a "Reynolds number," which is the ratio of inertialforcesto viscous
forces.In Aristoteliantermswe may regard viscous forcesas the factorscorrespondingto resistance.When the ratio or Reynolds number
is small, thatmeans thatviscous or resistanceforcesdominate. For our
purposes the importantconsequence is that fortwo bodies of different
mass moving through the same fluid medium, their velocities are
directlyproportional to their masses. If the Reynolds number for a
man swimmingin water is 104, fora goldfish102, then forvery small
animals about a micron in size the Reynolds number would be as
small as 10"r' For such small animals, inertia is irrelevant,that is,
forobjects and media with a low Reynolds number, inertia plays no
role whatsoever! The velocities of two bodies at very low Reynolds
numbersare entirelydeterminedby the forcesexertedon them at that
moment. The ratio of the velocities of the two bodies in the same
medium is equal to the ratio of the forces acting on them. In
In addition, the continuous motion of a
R
body at a low Reynolds number requires a continuous cause or the
continuous exertionof a force. The case imagined is clearly a special
case, but for that special case Aristotle's mechanical principles are
generallycorrect.To be consistent,an empiricistwould have to admit
that Aristotelianmechanics is not false but true withina certain and
limited domain of validity, which can be derived from the laws of
classical mechanics!60
Of course, the example indirectlystipulateswhat is wrong with the
Aristotelian analysis, but even this requires a modification of the
standard account. The Aristoteliananalysis is not always wrong; the
correctionachieved by classical mechanics was of its generalization
and application to bodies fallingfreelyfromrest througha relatively
thin medium such as air.

Aristotelianterms,Va-!

60See E. M. Purcell,
Number
andOurWorld
, in:Physics
, AIP ConLifeatLowReynolds
ference
No. 28,ed. K. Huang,NewYork1976,49-64.IfLang(n. 57)
Proceedings,
is correct,
thenthisanalysis
viewbutto
however,
properly
appliesnottoAristotle's
themechanics
oftheAristotelian
tradition.
commentary
127

01:50:33 AM

2.3. MertonianMechanics
The relevance of the above example to my analysis is at hand. Prior
to Bradwardine's law, "forces could be representedas velocities or
'motions' directly,and an increase of forcecould be representedby a
proportionaladdition or subtractionof lines representingmotion."61
Bradwardine criticizesthe Aristoteliangeneralizationas based on the
false assumption that any force, however small, can move any
resistance, however large, when, in fact, it is obvious that motion
occurs only if the force is greater than the resistance. A true
generalization,Bradwardine recognizes, mustbe valid foreveryvariation of ratio, and it must eitherrule out the possibilityof zero velocity
or show thatno motion arises only when the ratio of forceto resistance
is one to one. Expressed in modern form,he realizes that to double
a velocity,the ratio of forceto resistancemust be squared. For example, ifthe ratio of forceto resistanceof a given motion is threeto one,
then to double the velocity the ratio of force to resistance must be
squared, that is, increased to nine to one. Only the ratio squared can
double the velocity,only the ratio cubed can triple the velocity,and
so forth. Conversely, to halve the velocity the ratio of force to
resistancemust be reduced to the square root. For example, to halve
the velocityof a body with a force-to-resistance
ratio of nine to one,
ratio must be reduced to threeto one. Bradwarthe force-to-resistance
dine' s mathematicalformulais valid forevery variation of ratio, and
it rules out the possibilityof motion where the resistance is equal to
the force,for,according to Bradwardine's law, the velocityof a body
witha ratio of forceto resistanceof one to one is zero. In general form,
Bradwardine's conclusion means that the velocity increases
arithmetically as the ratio of force to resistance increases
geometrically.
In other words and to the point, Bradwardine's law assumes that
incrementsof velocitydepend on an exponential increase of the ratio
of forceto resistance; hence, forcecan be representedonly indirectly,
forincrease of forceis measured by the rate of increase of velocity.It
makes no matterthat Bradwardine was a realist about 'motion'. It is
absolutely clear that his analysis proceeds from the mathematicsof
ratios and not fromsome empirical, let alone experimental,falsification of the Aristotelian account; nevertheless, Bradwardine
61Funkenstein
(n. 59), 311-2.
128

01:50:33 AM

demonstrates the ability to state in a general form the medieval

mathematicsbehind his function,and to use his analysis to correctthe
Aristoteliangeneralization.62
William Heytesbury and John Dumbleton did not share the
ontological anxieties of Bradwardine or other fourteenth-century
natural philosophers. Heytesbury is especially importantfor linking
discussions and traditions that emerged out of the topical and
sophistical literature of the twelfthand thirteenthcenturies with
developmentsin natural philosophy and mathematics. He based his
discussions on foundations that derive from distinctionsand techniques of logic and more explicitlyon ontologicallyreductiveassumptions in natural philosophy. In spite of a lack of attention to
empiricallycomplex cases, it was Heytesbury, of course, who contributedto thekinematicalanalysis of local motionsthe so-called Merton mean-speed rule: a moving body acquiring or losing velocity
uniformlyover a given period will traverse a distance equal to the
distance it would traverseif it were moved continuouslyin the same
period at its mean velocity.The rule was not applied to bodies falling
from rest, nor was there any effort,so far as we know, to test it
experimentally,rather did Heytesbury construct an account that
seemed to meet the demands of logical coherence and conceptual
clarity. In De probationibusconclusionumtractatusregularumsolvendi
sophismata(circa 1335), Heytesbury proves from the mean-speed
theorem the consequence that in the second equal time interval the
distance traversedby a body acceleratinguniformlyfromrest will be
threetimesthe distance that it traversesin the firstinterval.A general
formof this resultstates that in each intervalthe distances traversed
by a body acceleratinguniformlyfromrest will increase as the series
of odd numbers beginning from unity, that is, 1, 3, 5, 7, and so
forth.63
Heytesbury's reliance on Ockham in logic and natural philosophy
for some basic notions has been acknowledged, however reluctantly,
62Thereareseveralreliable
butthestandard
ofBradwardine'
s treatise,
descriptions
istheedition
andtranslation
reference
Bradwardine.
byH. LamarCrosby,
Jr.,Thomas
deProportionibus.
ItsSignificance
His Tractatus
,
fortheDevelopment
ofMathematical
Physics
itshouldbe remembered
Madison1955.Incidentally,
thatJamesClerkMaxwell's
ofelectromagnetic
waveswasdemanded
ofhistheory
hypothesis
bythemathematics
and notbasedon experimental
evidence.
63Especially
Medieval
recommended
areCurtisWilson,William
Logicand
Heytesbury:
on Heytesbury
theRiseofMathematical
in
, Madison1956,andWilson'sentry
Physics
theDictionary
, Volume6, NewYork1972,379-80.
ofScientific
Biography
129

01:50:33 AM

even by James Weisheipl.64 It is sufficientto point out that

Heytesbury's acceptance of Ockham' s doctrinesof substance, quality,
motion, and time did not thwart his kinematical-mathematical
analysis of local motion; the supposed negative consequences of the
reductivistextremesof nominalistthinkershave obviously been exaggerated.
Dumbleton, like Heytesbury,seems to have been a disciple of both
Ockham and Bradwardine. More than Heytesbury, however,
Dumbleton adheres openly to Ockham' s doctrines, even though
Dumbleton never cites Ockham by name. It is to Dumbleton that we
owe the explicit clarificationof Bradwardine's dynamical law, for
Dumbleton expresses it as "the proportionof proportions," that is,
the ratio of two velocitiesis treatedas the exponentof the ratio of force
to resistance: - = (- ) V2/V1. In Dumbleton's case thereare some
Ri
R2
indicationsof interestin real cases and oflinkinghis mathematicswith
his physics, yet it also seems to be the case that ontological commitmentsare minimal. In astronomy, Dumbleton believes that the
geometryshould reflectthe actual motions of the heavenly bodies, yet
in optics there is no indication of a commitmentto the superfluous
entities of "light metaphysics."65To Ockham and Dumbleton, the
conclusion that visual rays are real entities does not square with
Aristotle'squalitative analysis of light.On the otherhand, it would be
wrong to conclude that geometryhas no functionto performin the
analysis of light and vision. Dumbleton's basically Aristotelianconception of mathematicalabstractionsdoes not commithim to the view
that all mathematical descriptionsare referentialor that they are all
referentialin the same way; some mathematical descriptions, like
some concepts, are functional and utilitarian, and as connotative,
mathematicalconcepts can be interpretedontologicallyas referringto
64Weisheipl's
beststudyoftheMertonians
is hisunpublished
doctoral
dissertation,
' with
Fourteenth
Merton
'School
toDumbleton
and
Century
Early
Physics
ofthe
Special
Reference
OxfordUniversity,
, Ph.D. dissertation,
1956,esp. 78-84.
Heytesbury
65By farthemostimportant
studiesofDumbleton
havebeenprovided
by Edith
andMathematical
Calculators
's
Sylla. Cf. Sylla, TheOxford
JohnDumbleton
Physics:
Summalogicaeetphilosophiae
PartsII andIII , in: Physics,
and
naturalis,
Cosmology,
J300-1700: Tensionand Accommodation
, ed. Sabetai Unguru(DorAstronomy,
drecht/Boston
1991(BostonStudies
inthePhilosophy
ofScience,Volume126);Sylla,
Medieval
: The'Merton
School
forHistory
ofExact
' in:Archive
ofQualities
Quantifications
Sciences,8 (1971),9-39,esp. 13-27.
130

01:50:33 AM

ways in which some objects exist. What is genuinely significantin

Dumbleton's consideration of physical problems employing a
mathematical analysis is that his approach is not Platonic- for
Dumbleton themathematicsis not more fundamentalthan the physics
even thoughhis account suffersfromlimitationsin both mathematical
technique and empirical measurement.
That the mathematizationof physics that occurred in the seventeenth centurywas more empirical and less dominated by idealized
mathematicsis now somethingof a commonplace, but the undue focus
on ontological questions has obscured the service performed by
fourteenth-century
logicians and natural philosophers in shifting
attention from mathematics as mere discussion about objects and
entitiesto mathematicsas a language, "a symbolicformalismcapable
of many interpretations."66Little wonder, then, that mathematical
formalismand metalinguisticformalismcame to be applied to all
disciplinesincludingtheology. If mathematicsis primarilythoughtof
as a language and not as a category of beings, then the prohibition
against using mathematicsto representothercategoriesof being loses
its force.
2. 4. The Mathematical
and Ars Nova
Foundations
ofMedievalPolyphony
Funkenstein's observation about mathematics in the fourteenth
century is confirmedby a development that he did not even consider.67 Indeed, this is an area of the quadrivium that has been
relativelyneglectedby scholars,and it is ironicallythe one area where
we do possess evidence of theoretical responses to empirical or, at
least, practicaldevelopments.68The storyis complex, but here we can
66Funkenstein
(n. 59), 312-14.
67Evenin thisrespect,
thenewstyleof
however,
312-5,recognized
Funkenstein,
of thefourteenth
mathematical
somemathematicians
century
reasoning
whereby
becameawareofthediscrepancy
between
andthecomplexity
ofactual
simpletheory
analysis.
68Notableexceptions
are JohnMurdoch,MusicandNatural
Hitherto
Philosophy:
Unnoticed
in:Manuscripta,
Questiones
byBlasius
ojParma(?),
20(1976),119-36;
Jamie
ofScience,22 (1982),103-39;
Kassler,Musicas a ModelinEarlyScience
, in: History
V. Zoubov,NicoleOresme
etla musique
, in: Mediaevaland Renaissance
Studies,5
TheMathematical
Foundation
de Vitri's
Ars
(1961),96-107;andEricWerner,
ofPhilippe
oftheAmerican
9 (1956),128-32.Although
nova,in:Journal
Musicological
Society,
David Lindbergmentions
Bocthiantheory,
his recentsurveycompletely
ignores
musicaldevelopements
in thethirteenth
and fourteenth
centuries
and thereactions
thattheyprovoked
andnaturalphilosophers.
See Lindberg,
amongmathematicians
TheBeginnings
Science
, Chicago1992.
ofWestern
131

01:50:33 AM

find some evidence of reconsideration of mathematical ideals. The

dilemmas provoked by developments in medievalipolyphonyand in
ars novaseem to have been excruciatinglypainful. Even the innovative
thinkerswere to
responses indicate how hesitant fourteenth-century
authors
standard
several
did
so, and however
theory, yet
question
exceptional or insecure they may have been, they provide a glimpse
of the modern interpretationof mathematicsand of the regulationof
mathematics by experience. Only a brief summary and referenceto
the principal texts and innovations are indicated here:69 Boethian
theoryin the Middle Ages, some of the innovationsin polyphonyand
ars nova, and the reactions of Walter Odington, Johannes de Mris,
and Nicole Oresme.
Boethian theoryis primarilyPythagorean. According to Pythagorean tuning, only simple number ratios are legitimate(in the formof
a ratio a:b which is either a) a whole number, or b) a fractionthat
n + *, the so-called
"superparticular" ratio). As a consequence,
n
the Pythagoreansystemtends to rigidity,and thisrigidityis extended
to the acceptance of only three ratios as consonant: the octave (2:1),
the fourth(4:3), and the fifth(3:2). In Pythagorean tuning,the third
is represented by the ratio 81:64 (the product of two whole tones

equals

~ X 2)^ lying between thejust major thirdand the perfectfourthand

8
8
not as pleasant sounding as thejust major third(5:4). Until polyphony
became more widespread, the Pythagorean systemremained satisfactory,but polyphonic music led to greateruse of thirdsand sixths. In
addition, more complex rhythms were introduced. These
developments in musical practice tended to drive a wedge between
academic, mathematical theoryand musical practice, and as a result
musical practice diverged from mathematical theory.70In other
words, academic mathematicianswere reluctantto modifytheoretical

69Thissummary
is dependent
on a lenghtier
and moredetailed
paper,Musicas Art
intheFourteenth
andScience
Mediaevalia
, in: Miscellanea
Century
(1993,forthcoming).
70Fordetailsandqualifications,
cf.Boethius,
Fundamentals
, tr.CalvinBower,
ofMusic
NewHaven/London
Geschichte
derMusiktheorie
imIX.1989,xx-xxix;
HugoRiemann,
XIX.Jahrhundert
, 2d ed., Berlin1920,BookII; EdwardLippman,ThePlaceofMusic
intheSystem
Arts
andRenaissance
Music
, in:Aspects
, ed.JanLaRue,
ofLiberal
ofMedieval
NewYork1966,545-59;andTheodoreKarp,Music
Liberal
Artsinthe
, in: TheSeven
Middle
1983,169-95.
, ed. DavidWagner,Bloomington
Ages
132

01:50:33 AM

ideals even if incompatible with practice, but there were notable

exceptions.
Around 1300, Walter of Odington wrote a musical treatise, De
musicae
, which mentions the common use of major sixths
speculatione
and, more importantly,observes that major and minor thirds were
intuitivelytuned by human voices in the ratios of 5:4 and 6:5 instead
of the ratios given by the Pythagorean monochord (81:64 and
71
32:27). It was clear to Walter that major and minor thirdsare not
necessarilydissonant. The more frequentuse of sixths suggests that
the late medieval ear was becoming attuned to previously unacceptable intervals. The importance of this shift cannot be overemphasized. The introductionof thirds and sixths as consonances is
indispensableforthe introductionof harmonicchords witha tonic(for
example, the C-E-G chord of the C-major scale). Walter may have
been influencedby a Welsh predilectionformajor and minor thirds;
in any case, the practice is consistent with the observation that
fourteenth-century
composers were more concerned than earlier com4
posers, relativelyspeaking, withthe sonorityor 'vertical" dimension
of theirmusic. This point can be exaggerated, forresolutionwas still
dominated by fourthsand fifths;nevertheless,the use of thirdsand
sixthsin accented places and notjust in intervalsof shortduration and
occasionally even in the final chord of a piece indicates a growing
tolerance for thirdsand sixthswithout the need to resolve them.72
The problem formusical theorywas how to account for these new
consonances so thattheycould be fullyintegratedinto musical theory.
The process went on forover a centuryand a half. Although familiar
in academic circles,the new styleof compositionof the fourteenthcentury, the ars nova, was not compatible with the rigid principles of
71I haveconsulted
deMusicaMediiAevi
thefollowing
editions:
, ed. C. E.
Scriptorum
musicae
despeculatione
H. Coussemaker,
Volume1, Paris1864,182-250andSumma
,
deMusica,Volume14 (n.p.: American
ed. Frederick
Hammond,Corpus
Scriptorum
textwhereWaltertreats
thethird
as conInstitute
ofMusicology
1970).The relevant
sonantappearsin PartII: Coussemaker,
198-9;Hammond,69-70:"In qua proetsemiditonus
etutrum
numerorum
sintditonus
[minor
portione
[majorthird]
third]
sintsymphoniae...
Verumtamen
quiavicinaesuntsesquiquartae
[5:4]etsesquiquintae [6:5] habitudinibus
idcircoplurimos
estimant
quarumunitasfacitdifferentiam,
sua
esse.Etsi innumeris
nonreperiantur
vocestarnen
hominum
consonas
consoni,
subtilitate
suavemet penitusin consonum
ipsosducuntin mixturam
quandoque
in vocisruditate
offendit
auditum."Brackets
notafitsuaveetconsonum,
dulcedine
added.
72Cf. H. F. Cohen,Quantifying
Music
, Dordrecht/Boston
1984,3-4,46, and250-9.
133

01:50:33 AM

Pythagorean theory, and as a consequence it generated a crisis in

academic theory.In ars nova, musical practicedeparted radicallyfrom
rigid Pythagorean ideas in both harmony and rhythm,driving Pope
John XXII to distraction.73The introductionof polyphonyand in the
thirteenthcentury of the so-called hoquetus(the division of a line
between two voices by singingits individual notes in rapid alternation)
became characteristicof ars novain the fourteenthcentury.Prior to the
appearance of polyphony, western music had a distinctlyhorizontal
character to it marked by a single melodic line composed principally
in triple meter. Accordingly,intervalswere created successivelyand
not simultaneously.The evidence shows that the compositionof early
polyphonywas successive, thatis, beginningwithone line and adding
the otherlines successively. Hence, early polyphonyis stillhorizontal
in characterbecause each voice is an independentline, but since these
were sung together,simultaneous intervalswere also produced. The
result, as suggested, was the use of intervalsregarded as illegitimate
by Pythagoreans and the appearance of more complex rhythmicpat. 74
ternsgenerated by the introductionof duple meterand the hoquetus
The rhythmicdevelopmentsof ars novaare usually considered to be
its most important innovation. Around 1260, Franco of Kln's Ars
cantusmensurabilis
introduced a systemof notation with a set of rules
that summarized the rhythmicconventionsof ars antiqua.One of the
most importantfeaturesof Franco's systemis the distinctpreference
for triple meter, a preference that was due to the belief that the
number 3 is a symbol of perfection.In fact, Franco did not admit
duple meter. Consequently, even binary modes were altered to make
themconformin the notationto triplemeter.One of theconsequences
of successive composition of early polyphonic motets was greater
rhythmicindependence of the parts. This featurewas reinforcedby
or hocket. It was especiallythe
the increasingpopularityof thehoquetus
importationof thistechnique into sacred music that so unsettledPope
John XXII.75
73Cf.Johannes
Lib. III,
Decretales
XXII, Extravagantes
Communes),
(Extravagantes
IurisCanonici
Tit. I, De Vitaet Honestate
, ed. A. L.
Clericorum,
Cap. un., Corpus
ParsII, Decretalium
Richter
andA. Friedberg,
Collectiones,
Leipzig1881,columns
andEarlyRenaissance
See alsoAlecHarman,Medieval
1255-1257.
Music,Manandhis
Music
, Volume1, NewYork1969,122-4.
74See, forexample,Harman,109.
75CompareHarman,49-50,113-25withAlbertSeay,MusicintheMedieval
World
,
Cliffs1975,109-23.
2d ed., Englewood
134

01:50:33 AM

The two principalinnovationsof ars novacan be expressed as ending

the dictatorshipof Pythagoreanharmonyand triplemeter. The result
was the more frequent appearance of thirds and sixths and a far
greatervarietyof rhythm.Philippe de Vitry, one of the foundersof
ars nova, admitted duple and triple meter and even the use of both
metersin the same piece. In the face of rhythmicanarchy, the composers of arsnovadeveloped a rhythmicstructureknown as isorhythm,
the divisionof a voice or voices into identicallyrepeated rhythmicpatterns,which provided a means of unifyinga motet.76
The incorporation of these ideas and the problems that they
generatedinto the medieval universitycurriculummay not have been
typical, but there is significantevidence, however exceptional, of a
profoundimpacton mathematicsand natural philosophy.77There was
evidentlymuch opposition to the innovations, which seem to parallel
other disputes involving mathematical and philosophical analyses of
quality, quantity, continuity,and motion.
In his Notitiaartismusicaeof 1321, Johannes de Mris addressed
problems of notation generatedby the metricinnovations of ars nova.
Johannes was known primarilyas an astronomer,but he was a friend
of Philippe de Vitry and, evidentlyinfluencedby Philippe, took an
interestin the problem of notation fromthe point of view of the division of notes into their smallest possible measures. Johannes himself
makes the contextand his view about the relationof theoryand practice clear:78
Nos autempropterbonumcommuneet rationeveritatis,
quae diu latuit,
ostendendae
circaartemmusicaeproponimus
intendentes
circaearn
vigilare,
duobreviter
enodare:primotheoricam,
secundo
cuinonestinconvepracticam,
niensquodammodo
quamdamtheoricam
implicari.
76Cf.Harman,123-9andSeay,129-36.On
seeDieHarmonik
derArsnova
,
isorhythm,
ZurTheoriederisorhythmischen
Berliner
Musikwissenschaftliche
Motette,
Arbeiten,
ed. CarlDahlhausandRudolfStephan,
Volume5, Mnchen1973.On Philippe,
see
ErnestSanders,TheEarlyMotets
de Vitry
, in: Journalof theAmerican
ofPhilippe
28(1975),24-45.In general
onarsnova
, seeEdwardLowinsky,
Musicological
Society,
MusicintheCulture
ofIdeas,15 (1954),
, in:JournaloftheHistory
oftheRenaissance
509-53.
77The evidence
is literally
evenifnottypical.
See, forexample,Nancy
outstanding
Academic
andFifSiraisi,TheMusicofPulseintheWritings
ofItalian
Physicians
(Fourteenth
teenth
Centuries
50 (1975),689-710.
), in: Speculum,
78See theindispensable byMax Haas, Studien
I:
zurmittelalterlichen
Musiklehre
study
Eine Ubersicht
berdieMusiklehre
im Kontext
derPhilosophie
des13. undfrhen
14.
, in: Aktuelle
, Forum
Jahrhunderts
Fragender Musikbezogenen
Mittelalterforschung
BaslerBeitrge
zur Musikgeschichte,
Volume3, ed. Hans Oesch
Musicologicum,
andWulfArlt,Winterthur
1982,323-456,esp.,395.
135

01:50:33 AM

The connectionbetween the theoreticaland the practical, between the

universal and the experientialis used by Johannes to assert thatwhile
a continuum is infinitelydivisible, in natural things,such as a musical
tone, thereare necessarilynatural limitsto magnitudeand divisibility,
that is, a maximum and a minimum. If the maximum is designated
as 1, then the minimum(the smallestpossible division of a tone) is
of the maximum. The technicalsignificanceof thistextwill shortlybe
made clear, but the immediately relevant point is that Johannes
legitimates so-called imperfectrelations in contrast to conservative
academicians, likeJacques de Lige, who continued to insiston essential perfectionand on the priorityof mathematicaltheoryover actual
experience.79
The technical limitationsof Johannes's analysis may have already
been noticed by Philippe de Vitry who seems to have been concerned
with the mathematical soundness of ars novapractice. Notice the differencein the concern: not a matterof saving the prevailingtheorybut
rather of discovering or inventing a mathematically sound theory
justifyingthe practice. Philippe apparently asked Gersonides for a
demonstrationof the musical postulate, whetherall pairs of harmonic
numbers are mathematicallydistinguishableexcept the following: 1
and 2,2 and 3,3 and 4,8 and 9. A harmonic number is definedas any
number divisible down to unity by 1,2, or 3, and whose factorsare
also divisible down to unity. When Philippe introducedduple time on
an equal footingwithtripletime, it was thoughtthat the largestpossible number of minimaewas 81 (34), and the smallest number was 16
(24). This was, in fact,the conclusion to whichJohannes de Mris had
come. What Gersonides, then, had been asked to prove was whether,
with the exception of the pairs 1 and 2,2 and 3,3 and 4,8 and 9, the
numbers that are powers of 2 and 3 and theircorrespondingproducts
differfrom one another by more than unity. With such a proof, it
would not be necessary to examine each case individually, for the
resultwould be a mode of division extendingover the entirenumber
system beyond the previous limit of 81. What Gersonides proved is
that ' 'duple and triple time, respectively,can be recognized in each
mensural unit" and that "the sum total of the smallest units deter79Fordetails,see Haas, 393-408.On Jacquesde Lige,see hisSpeculum
musicae,
ed. Coussemaker
Scriptorum,
(n. 69), Volume2, Paris1867,193-434.
136

01:50:33 AM

mines for each case one and onlyone basic mode of division."80 In
modern mathematicalterms, forall multiples of the powers of 2 and
3 beyond the numbers 8 and 9,
if m and n are integers,
and if m> 1 and n> 2, then 3m+ 1 ^ 2n;
and if m> 2 and n> 3, then 3m-l=2n.81
Musicologists are agreed on the importance of this proof for the
development of musical notation and on the effect that the
mathematicaldiscussions had on the developmentof westernmusic:82
Thusitwasthemathematicians
whoopenedthewayandcreated
thenotational
meansforthewholevastdevelopment
ofrhythmic
andpoly-rhythmic
figurations
in Western
music.
No less a figurethan Nicole Oresme, also a friendof Philippe de
,
Vitry, was familiar with this proof. In Le Livre du ciel et du monde
Oresme presented the result in the form of a table that makes it
entirelyclear:83
1

16

12

24

48

18

36

27

54

108

32

81
243
729
Finally, we should not overlook passages where Oresme indicates a
preferencefor practice over theory:
ne peutestreque ellene soiten miexou en nonItem,aussicommemutacin
miexcombien
soittresbien,si commeunchant
que aucunefoistoutensamble
de pluseurs
voieztresbonne seroitpas si bonse lesvoiesestoient
ou
tousjours
tresmeilleur
selonla variacin
de la musiqueinsensible
acort,samblablement
du cielleschosesce cibassontunefoisen meilleur
disposicin
que en autre,..84
Adhucautemaliavia procedemus.
Que estistacantilena
que piacereisepeaut
80Mysummary
follows
andis almostentirely
on Werner
closely
dependent
(n. 68),
128-32.
81Werner,
131.
82Lowinsky
(n. 76), 543.
83Adaptedfromtheeditionof AlbertMenutand Alexander
Denomy(Madison
29.
479,figure
1968),
84Ibid.,482.
137

01:50:33 AM

Ymo certe,et
multotiens
Nonnetalisuniformitas
gignitfastidium?
repetita?
Necessetreputatus
novitasplusdelectat.
cantoroptimus
sedcuculus,qui non
in infinitum.85
possetmoduosmsicosvariarequi suntvariabiles
In both textsOresme, clearlyaware of the incompatibilitybetweenthe
simple arithmetical theory of the Pythagorean system and the
aesthetically more pleasing variation of consonances and rhythms,
recognizes the delight that we take in change and variation. Oresme
does not rejectPythagoreanharmony,but in allowing theear to be the
final arbiter of aestheticjudgment of musical sounds, he does in fact
depart fromPythagorean theory.86
Again, the point of this seeming digressionis that theoristsinclined
to let practice adjudicate questions of value were admitting
mathematicalprinciplesthat conformto practice ratherthan allowing
theoretical principles to dictate practice. The insistence on simple
numerical ratios and proportionshad dictated musical composition
and practice, but in the fourteenthcentury ars nova challenged
mathematiciansto discover or constructthe principlesthatconformto
the new harmonies and rhythms.Clearly in such contexts,the conception of mathematicsas a language superseded ontological considerations. Althoughno composer and no theoristof the fourteenthcentury
could bring himself to state the conclusion explicitly, some had
implicitlycome to the conclusion that the ratios of Pythagoreanharmonic theoryare not privileged.
3. Conclusion
The " rehabilitation" of Aristotelian mechanics suggested above
may seem fanciful,but perhaps it seems less so when read in conjunction withdevelopmentsin medieval musical theory.The changes that
occurred in mathematicalanalysis in the fourteenthcenturywere not
decisive, yet they constituted a challenge to prevailing academic
theoryand as such sustained anomalies thatprovoked later programs.
When the Aristotelian analysis fell before another agenda that
superseded it, adherents of Aristotelianism understandably overreacted, thus obscuring even more the subtle effectsof correctionsof
Aristotle within the Aristotelian tradition. Seen properly, classical
85 Tractatus
decommensurabilitate
velincommensur
abilitate
motuum
celi, ed. EdwardGrant,
andtheKinematics
NicoleOresme
Motion
ofCircular
, Madison1971,316.
86The implications
forthetheory
ofacoustics
inMusic(n. 69). See
areelaborated
Kasslerand Zoubov(n. 68).
138

01:50:33 AM

mechanics did not refuteAristotelianmechanics, ratherit superseded

it by achieving a new generalizationand simplificationthatcompleted
the process of correctionof Aristotleby correctingthe falsegeneralizations of Aristotelian mechanics. There is a differencebetween the
claim that Ptolemaic hypothesesare empirically false and the claim
that Pythagorean harmonic theory and Aristotelian mechanics are
truewithina domain of application more restrictedthan Pythagoreans
and Aristoteliansrealized.
Metalinguisticanalysis of the fourteenthcentury,whetherinclined
to realism or nominalism, attempted to correct Aristotle within a
basically Aristotelianframework.It is not surprisingthat it took the
adoption of a new framework,the Copernican, to realize the fulfilment of that process of correction.Ockham' s account of connotative
concepts represents one effortamong others to replace putatively
superfluousontological commitmentswithexpressionsor paraphrases
that indicate the required and appropriate ontological commitments
and the conditionsof substancesand qualities thatobtain priorto their
being signified. Mertonians who were satisfied with Ockham' s
ontologicalcommitmentsincluded mathematicalformulasand expressions as part of a metalinguistic approach to philosophical and
theological problems. There is no single, complete, or pervasive
application of these ideas in the fourteenthcentury, but there are
indications of a shift in the interpretation and application of
mathematics, and hence a connection with later developments in
acoustics, astronomy,and mechanics.
The standard reductivistinterpretationof Ockham' s connotationtheoryhas been overreductionisticand hence damaging to the effort
to understandOckham and, accordingly,the place and meaning of his
effortsin fourteenth-century
natural philosophy.The time to abandon
overreductionisticassumptions in the reading of Ockham' s theoryof
connotation is long overdue. As Panaccio has incisively put it, the
range of connotativetermsis rich and economical, and the same judgmentholds formetalinguistictechniques in fourteenth-century
natural
philosophy.
North Easton, MA
StonehillCollege

139

01:50:33 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J.Brill,Leiden
Roger Bacon and the HermeticTradition in Medieval Science

GEORGE MOLLAND

Roger Bacon would no more have wished to be called a Hermeticist

than to be called a magician. For him magic was by its very nature
bad, but thisdid not stop him fromindulgingbeliefsand practicesthat
bordered on the magical. Similarly,although he had no great or very
favourable image of Hermes Trismegistus, his writingsare infused
with a spiritakin to what in a loose understandingof the term have
been called Hermetic trendsin Renaissance thought,and especiallyto
the "Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science".1
In excitingscholarshipdating back some thirtyyears and more, a
group of scholars, some closely associated with the Warburg Institute
in London, demonstratedthe vitalityin Renaissance thoughtof quasimagical traditions associated (sometimes rather remotely) with
writingsattributedto the supposed ancient Egyptian sage Hermes
Trismegistus, and urged their importance for a proper historical
assessmentof the nascent ScientificRevolution.2 The impact made by
these studieshas produced the impressionthat " Hermetic'' influences
upon science were in essence a Renaissance phenomenon and had
1 The phraseis fromFrancesA. Yates' oft-cited
in
Tradition
article,TheHermetic
in theRenaissance,
Renaissance
Science
ed. CharlesS.
, in: Art,Science
, andHistory
Baltimore
in F. A. Yates,IdeasandIdealsinthe
1968,255-74,reprinted
Singleton,
III , London1984,227-46.
North
Renaissance:
Collected
, Volume
European
Essays
2 Amongimportant
in thisgenre,together
withsomemorecritical
ofit,I
writings
citehere:F. A. Yates,Giordano
Bruno
andtheHermetic
Tradition
, London1964;id.,The
Rosicrucian
andDemonic
, London1972;D. P. Walker,
from
Enlightenment
Spiritual
Magic
Ficino
toCampanella
inChristian
Platonism
Studies
, London1958;id.,TheAncient
Theology:
PhilostotheEighteenth
Perennial
theFifteenth
, London1972;C. B. Schmitt,
from
Century
toLeibniz
oftheHistory
ofIdeas,27 (1966),505Steuco
, in:Journal
ophy:
from
Agostino
inRenaissance
inSchmitt,
Studies
andScience
32, reprinted
, London1981;P.
Philosophy
From
London1968(originally
Bacon:
, tr.S. Rabinovitch,
Rossi,Francis
MagictoScience
in Italian1957);P. J. French,
Dee: TheWorld
,
published
ofanElizabethan
John
Magus
Dee'sNatural
Between
Science
andReligion
London1972;N. H. Clulee,John
,
Philosophy:
London1988;J. E. McGuire&P. M. Rattansi,
Newton
andthe(PipesofPan', in:Notes
&
and RecordsoftheRoyalSociety
ofLondon,21 (1968),108-43;R. S. Westman
Revolution
andtheScientific
, Los Angeles1977.
J. E. McGuire,Hermeticism
140

01:50:44 AM

negligible medieval precedents. The aim of the present article is to

help redressthe balance, and, while by no means denyingRenaissance
originality, to show that important ideas now often regarded as
characteristicallyRenaissance, were very much alive in the Middle
Ages. To this end I shall consider two facets of the work of Roger
Bacon: the role that he ascribed to prisca auctoritas
, or ancient
naturalise
some
his
to
and
apparentlymagical pracauthority,
attempt
tices by means of the doctrine of multiplicationof species.
1. PriscaAuctoritas
The role of things ancient- I adhere to this translation against
Schmits preferred' 'venerable' ' - in Renaissance thoughthas been
well summarised by the late Charles B. Schmittin an article centred
on Agonisto Steuco:
The wordpriscus
besttranslated
as "venerable",is onewhichrecurs
, probably
often
inSteuco.He speaksofpriscis
informer
saeculis,
centuries,
philosophi,
prisci
and
to "thevenerable
, andprisci
alone,referring
prisca
philosophers
philosophia
Noneofthisis accidental.
a singlefountain,
as
from
Truthflows
theologians".
it were,butis manifested
in variousforms.
therevelation
oftruth
Moreover,
datesbacktothemostancient
saecula
times,totheprisca
, andwecanfindtruth
in thewritings
derived
fromthisperiod.The wisdomofearliest
timesis then
transmitted
to thelatercenturies,
truthand wisdombeingas old as man
himself.3
But, forall its other virtues,Schmits article paid scant attentionto
the Middle Ages. In like vein D.P. Walker, afterdiscussing the fortunes of what he called Ancient Theology in the early Christian
period, continued, "When in the Renaissance the Ancient Theology
was revived..."4 It is as if Renaissance scholars were launching a
counter-attackto the "revolt of the medievalists"5 which would have
antedated many of the Renaissance's more traditionalvirtues, and
stakinga claim fororiginality,or rather genuine rebirth,in this less
familiarand primafacie rather 4'irrational'' territory.But here again
their claim must be modified, as I hope that the example of Roger
Bacon will demonstrate.
The phrase prisca auctoritasoccurs in the opening passage of
3 Schmitt,
Perennial
, 520.
Philosophy
4 Walker,
Ancient
, 2.
Theology
5 To use thephraseofWallaceK.
TheRenaissance
inHistorical
,
Ferguson,
Thought
MA 1948,ch. 11.
Cambridge,
141

01:50:44 AM

Boethius's Arithmetica
, which was oftenquoted by medieval scholars,
including Bacon himself:
whowithPythagoras
Amongall menofancientauthority
(priscae
auctoritatis),
witha purerframe
ofmind,itwasmanifestly
established
that
leadingblossomed
couldattainthesummit
ofperfection
inthedisciplines
ofphilosscarcely
anyone
ofprudence
or
ophywhodidnotpursuesuchnobility
bya sortofquadruvium
fourfold
conway, whichwill not escape the awarenessof the correctly
templating.6
This passage was applied towards establishingthe absolute necessity
of mathematicsin otherbranches of learning,but forBacon the notion
of prisca auctoritaswas also firmly embedded in an elaborate,
sophisticated and untidy epistemological structure,closely allied to
theological concerns.
In a sense, all knowledgeforBacon was contained in the Scriptures,
whence it should be elicited by the aid of philosophyand canon law.
But these themselves had to come from somewhere, and so Bacon
placed rathermore emphasis on an initial revelationto the patriarchs
and prophets near the beginning to time:
wasgivenbyGod to thesamepeople
I saythenthatthepowerofphilosophy
so thatthereshould
as HolyScripture,
namelythesaintsfromthebeginning,
tomen,foronlythepatriarchs
thusappeartobe onecomplete
wisdom
necessary
thatis notonlyGod's
whoknewall things,
weretruephilosophers
andprophets
forHolyScripture
itself
showsus thisclearly
Law butall partsofphilosophy,
to Pharaoh'sprinces
andthe
enough,whichsaysthatJosephtaughtprudence
eldersof Egypt,and thatMoses was skilledin the wholewisdomof the
Egyptians.7
Accordinglytransmissionbecomes of crucial importance, and Bacon
produced an elaborate genealogy of knowledge. For the earlier period
Josephus was an invaluable source of reference,fromwhom it could
be gathered that Noah and his sons taught mathematicalsciences to
the Chaldeans, and Abraham to the Egyptians.8Later on Augustine
provided profuse and detailed aid, and his euhemeristictendencies9
meant that Bacon's account includes many gods, for example, Isis,
Minerva and Apollo, as inventorsand transmittersof the arts.
6 A. M. T. S. Boethius.
arithmetica
I. 1,ed. G. Friedlein,
De institutione
Leipzig1867,
ed.J. H. Bridges,
7. Cf. The"OpusMajus"oj Roger
Oxford1897-1900,
Bacon,
I, 98;
Inedita
Baconi
Fratris
Hactenus
Communia
Mathematica
, ed. R. Steele,Opera
,
Rogeri
Rogeri
XVI, Oxford1940,8.
7 Opusmams,
ed. Bridges,
III, 53-4.
8 Antiquities
I. 8. The Latintranslation
ofBooksI-V is editedin F. Blatt,TheLatin
TV, Copenhagen
andText:TheAntiquities
1958.
. V. I: Introduction
Josephus
9 Cf.J. Seznec,TheSurvival
anditsPlace
Tradition
ofthePaganGods:TheMythological
andArt
inRenaissance
Humanism
, NewYork1961,11 sqq.
142

01:50:44 AM

As we shall soon see, the process of transmission was not

immaculate, and forthis reason among othersAristotleheld a pivotal
position:
ofpreceding
andincreased
He clearedawaytheerrors
philosophers
philosophy,
he could
tothefullness
thattheancientpatriarchs
possessed,
although
aspiring
forlaterpeoplecorrected
himin somethings
and
theparticulars,
notperfect
and moreover
to hisworks,
addedmanythings
theywillbe addedto untilthe
in humanfindings,
as was
end of the world,becausenothingis perfect
above.Naturestrengthened
him,as Averroes
saysinBookIII ofOn
expounded
theSoul, so thatshe wouldeffect
theultimate
of a man.10By the
perfection
andthere
ofall greatphilosophers
he surpasses
testimony
philosophers,
[other]
time
is tobe ascribed
tophilosophy
Thusat thepresent
onlywhatheasserted.
he is antonomastically
namedPhilosopher,
as regards
philosophy's
authority,
ofsacredwisdom
Paulisunderstood
bythenameApostle.
justas intheteaching
on accountofthehiddenness
or ofdifand rarity
ofexemplars,
Butwhether
orofenvy,or ofwarsin theEast,Aristotle's
ficulty,
philosophy
layquietand
whenAvicenna,
silentforthemostpartuntilafterthetimesofMuhammad,
andothersrecalledit to thelightoffullexposition.11
Averroes
This passage indicates an adulation forAristotlethat almost matches
that displayed by Averroes. And for Bacon an especially important
work of Aristotle's was the Secretum
Secretorum
, whose author had the
virtue of backing up Bacon's view of the original revelation of
knowledge in a passage that Bacon enthusiasticallyquotes:
all wisdom
tohisprophets
andjustones,andsomeothers
whom
God revealed
withthespiritofdivinewisdom,
andhe endowed
he preelected
and illumined
ofknowledge.
Fromthese,succeeding
menhad
themwiththegifts
philosophical
andoriginofphilosophy,
andGreeks,
theprinciple
Indians,Latins,Persians,
oftheartsand
downtheprinciples
andsecrets
forfrom
themtheyhadandwrote
but
becauseintheir
is found
sciences,
false,nothing
rejectable,
writings
nothing
had all thingsfromthem,and
all approved
bythewise,forthephilosophers
theGreeks,becausetheywerethemorestudious.12
especially
In his discussion of Aristotle,as elsewhere in his writings,Bacon
seems to come close to affirmingthe idea of scientificprogress,13but
thiswas always in strongtensionwith the realityof decline, which fol10Averroes,
in Aristotelis
De AnimaLibros
Commentarium
, ed. F. Stuart
Magnum
MA 1953,433:"Credoenimquodistehomo[Aristoteles]
fuit
Crawford,
Cambridge,
ultimam
quod Naturainvenitad demonstrandum
regulain Natura,et exemplar
in materiis."
humanam
perfectionem
11Opusmo.ius
III, 66.
, ed. Bridges,
12Opusmaius
secretorum
etNotulis.
TracIII, 54. Cf.Secretum
, cumGlossis
, ed. Bridges,
tatus
brevis
etutilis
addeclarandum
obscure
DictaFratris
i, ed. R. Steele,Opera
quedam
Roger
hactenus
indita
Fase.V, Oxford1920,64. Thelastpartofthequotation,
Baconi,
Rogeri
"forthephilosophers
... studious"is due moreto Baconthanto pseudo-Aristotle.
13On thiscf.A. G. Molland,Medieval
IdeasofScientific
, in:Journalofthe
Progress
ofIdeas,39 (1978),561-77,espec.567-71.
History
143

01:50:44 AM

lowed almost inevitablyfromhis epistemologicalscheme and the doctrine of the Fall of man:
as first
ofmenwhoabusedthewaysofwisdom,
On accountofthewickedness
andMercurius
andAtlasandPrometheus
NimrodandZoroaster
Trismegistus
like
andApolloandMinervaandthelike,whowerehonoured
andAesculapius
and
thefoolish
ofwisdom,
Goddarkened
heartofthemultitude,
godsonaccount
itagainand
untilSolomon
recalled
declined
ofphilosophy
thepractice
gradually
bookoftheAntiquities.
teachesin theeighth
it,as Josephus
altogether
perfected
Andonceagainon accountofmen'ssinsthestudyofwisdomgradually
disapitandhissuccessors
it,while
expanded
peareduntilThaesofMiletusresumed
it so faras was possibleforthattime.Buttheylearntall
Aristotle
completed
, as was
says in the BookofSecrets
thingsfromthe Hebrews,as Aristotle
above.14
expounded
Thus the general position is that decline was inevitable,but could still
be resisted, and Bacon, in a frequentlyrepeated schema, sees three
occasions on which resistancewas especially successful.The firstwas
with Solomon, and the second with Aristotle; the third was to be
ascribed to Avicenna, who forBacon was Averroes' superior and the
chief expositor of Aristotle. "In this way philosophywas four times
but twice altogethercomplete, namely first
delivered up sufficiently,
by the sons of Adam and Noah, and secondlyby Solomon. The other
fortheirtimes,but theydid not altogether
two deliveredit sufficiently
infidels."15Bacon was adamant that
were
because
it,
they
complete
it had not yetbeen similarlyrestoredamong the Latins, and thereare
stronghintsthathe saw himselfas the man to performthis task, and,
given that he was not an infidel,thiswould surelymake him the rival
of Solomon.
The question was how to do it, and forthis Bacon offereda variety
of strategies.One was the way of scholarship. Bacon said of his own
effortsin establishingthe genealogy of knowledgethat, "No sapiential
chapter is so much work as the certificationof this matter,because it
is the great foundationof all human comprehension,and conflictsand
doubts multiplyintermingle,and authorsand volumes must be turned
over more abundantly than forany other articlethat is worthfinding
in any study of wisdom.''16 Bacon was very prone to exaggerate his
14Opusmaius
III, 67-8.
, ed. Bridges,
15Ft.
I. - Opustertium
Hactenus
Inedita
BaconOperaQuaedam
;
, Vol./,containing
Rogeri
In
from
the
London
24.
III. - Compendium
II. - Opusminus;
1859,
,
quoting
philosophiae
whichI am in thecourse
I use theneweditionwithEnglishtranslation
Opustertium
ofpreparing.
16Opusmatus
III, 53.
, ed. Bridges,
144

01:50:44 AM

own labours, but thisappears to have been less the case here than elsewhere, for the careful collations of Josephus, Augustine and others
seem to have been his own work and not drawn fromflorilegio,
or other
intermediatesources. This scholarship then provided the epistemic
backdrop for furtherendeavours, and also pointed to potentially
fillablegaps in the knowledge of Latin Christendom.
These seemed to call in particularfortranslationsinto Latin. Many
had of course been made in the 150 years before Bacon's time of
writing,but much remained to be done. In particular, Bacon held
(exaggeratedly) that a huge amount of Aristotle's work remained
untranslated,and also much of Avicenna, including all of his ''oriental philosophy".17But perhaps more importantlymost of the existing
translationswere corruptand misleading, and Bacon set exceedingly
high standards:
Whileit is necessary
thatan interpreter
shouldknowexcellently
thescience
andthetwolanguages
whichand intowhich
whichhewishestotranslate
from
he translates,
knewfullythe powerof
onlyBoethiusthe firstinterpreter
andonlytheLordRobertcalledGreatHead,latelyBishopofLincoln,
languages
knewthesciences.
Someothermiddling
Michael
ones,likeGerardofCremona,
theGerman,
theEnglishman
andHermann
whomwesawat Paris,
Scot,Alfred
lackedmuchbothinlanguages
as thesameHermann
andsciences,
confessed
of
himself
this.18
andtheothers.Andtheirtranslation
displays
The remedywas obviously going to be exceedingly difficult,and in
writingto the Pope Bacon emphasised the expenses that would be
involved.19 He himself projected a fourfold grammar of Greek,
Hebrew, Arabic and Chaldean, and wrote at least a substantial
amount of theGreek part, and a littleof the Hebrew.20 His knowledge
of Arabic remainsproblematic.21Meantime Bacon could conveniently
blame bad translationsforopinions withwhichhe disagreed but which
appeared to come fromrespected authorities,especially Aristotle.
17Opusmatus
OrientalPhilosophy
, ed. Bridges,
III, 85. On BaconandAvicenna's
cf.A. Birkenmajer,
Avicennas
Vorrede
zum'Liber
undRoger
in:Revue
Bacon,
Sufficientiae'
de la Philosophie,
36 (1934), 308-20,reprinted
in Birkenmajer,
Noscholastique
Etudes
d'Histoire
desSciences
etdela Philosophie
duMoyen
, I),
Age( = StudiaCopernicana
Wroclaw1970,89-101.
18Opusmatus
91.
, ed. Bridges,
III, 82; cf.Opustertium
, ed. Brewer,
19Cf. Opustertium
34.
, ed. Brewer,
20 TheGreek
Grammar
Bacon
anda Fragment
Grammar
, ed. Edmond
ofRoger
ofhisHebrew
Nolan& S. A. Hirsch,Cambridge
1902,3.
21Cf.M. Bouyges,
Bacona-t-il
ludeslivres
arabes
d'Histoire
Doc?, in:Archives
Roger
trinale
et Littraire
du MoyenAge,5 (1930),311-5.On Baconand languagesin
seeS. A. Hirsch,Roger
BaconandPhilology
Bacon:Essays
, in: Roger
general
, ed. A. G.
Little(Oxford,1914),101-51.
145

01:50:44 AM

New and better translations were an obvious way of gaining

knowledgeby latchingmore securelyonto an earlierpoint in the chain
of translations,but therewas also a possibilityof restoringknowledge
independently of the pre-existing historical chain. And here we
encounter the way of experience, and Bacon's famous doctrine of
experimentalscience. It is importantto take thison its own terms,for
otherwise misunderstandingsarise:
senses...Andthisexperience
is twofold.
One kindis bytheexternal
Experience
tothegracegiven
ishumanandphilosophical,
as muchas mancando according
is notsufficient
to him,butthisexperience
forman,becauseitdoesnotfully
anditdoesnot
makeknownaboutcorporeal
becauseoftheirdifficulty,
things
ones.Therefore
man'sintellect
mustbe
reachanything
spiritual
concerning
andprophets,
whofirst
way,andso theholypatriarchs
gave
helpedinanother
sciences
to theworld,received
internal
illuminations
anddidnothaltat sense.
after
Andsimilarly
forthegraceoffaith
illuminates
Christ,
manyofthefaithful
withdivineinspirations,
notonlyinspiritual
butincormatters,
much,together
as Ptolemy
ofphilosophy,
according
saysintheCentiloporealandinthesciences
onebythe
thatthewayofcomingtotheknowledge
ofthings
is twofold,
quium
ofphilosophy,
andtheotherbydivineinspiration,
whichas he says
experience
is muchthebetter.22
Thus, although, as Bacon himself makes clear, knowledge may be
created or restoredby means akin to modernexperimentalscience, the
type of revelatoryexperiences that were accorded to prophetswas to
be preferred.
Also the mentionof Ptolemysuggeststhat such illuminationswould
not be confined to ancientJews and to Christians, and elsewhere in
the Opus maius it is made clear, albeit rather cagily, that this was
indeed the case:
themselves
werededicated
totruths
andtoall goodness
Sincethephilosophers
so
oflife,despising
andhonours
andaspiring
to future
riches,
delights
felicity
faras humanfrailty
overhumannature,
asJerome
could,andweremadevictors
writesofDiogenesin theBookagainst
, it is no wonderifGod, who
Jovinianus
illuminated
themin theselessermatters,
accordedthemsomelightsofgreat
andifnotprincipally
fortheirownsakesthenforours,so thatbytheir
truths,
theworldwouldbedisposed
towards
faith.
AndforthisHe arranged
persuasions
thatmanySibylswerefound,thatis tenprophetesses,
as all thesaintsagree,
in BookXVIII oftheCityofGod, and Isidorein BookVII
suchas Augustine
oftheEtymologies
Andhistories
andpoets
andphilosophers
, andothers
similarly.
divine
universally
agreeabouttheSibyls,butit is certainthattheyrecounted
andwhatareheldaboutChrist
andfuture
andthelike.Therethings,
judgment
foreitis muchmoreprobable
thatthewisest
andbestphilosophers
received
such
truths
fromGod.23
22Opusmaius
, cd. Bridges,
II, 169-70.
23Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
III, 73.
146

01:50:44 AM

when commentingon this passage Bacon was

And in the Opus tertium
terserand more direct: "It pleased God to give wisdom to whom He
willed, forall wisdom is fromthe Lord God, and He revealed it to the
philosophers,to infidelsas well as to the faithful.,,24
Experimental science included as part of what Bacon called its
second prerogative,the search for the prolongation of life, and this
tied in symbioticallywith his epistemological scheme:
in BookI oftheAntiquities
saysthat,sincethesonsofAdamthrough
Josephus
menandmadebyGodhimself,
God gavethemsixhundred
Sethwerereligious
inwhich
oftheglorious
yearstoliveonaccount
partsofphilosophy
theystudied,
so thatwhatGod revealed
to themtheycouldexperience
oflife.25
bylength
Since that time things had got much worse, but clearly a greatly
increased lifespan was eminentlydesirable for the good of science:
buta further
Medicalarthasnoremedy
otherthanregimen
ofhealth,
extension
oflonglifeispossible.
wasgreatprolongaFromthebeginning
oftheworldthere
tionoflife,butnowitis shortened
thecause
beyondmeasure.Manyreckoned
ofthislengthening
andshortening
tobefrom
fortheyreckoned
that
theheavens,
theheaven's
wasbestatthebeginning,
andthatwiththeworldgrowdisposition
thatthestarswerecreatedin more
ingold all thingswasteaway,reckoning
of
to diversity
places... and in a bettermutualratioaccording
appropriate
ofrays,and thattheygradually
recededfrom
projection
aspectsand invisible
thatstate,andaccording
tothisreceding
oflifeup to
theyposittheshortening
somefixedterm,in whichthereis a halt,butthishasmanycontradictions
and
ofwhichit is nowto speak.26
difficulties,
Bacon was usually a strongproponent of astrological influences,but
in this instance he opined that the main cause was a bad regimen of
life, whose effectswere transmittedthroughthe generations.
A potentremedyhad been available in veryearly times, knowledge
of which was purveyed by the pseudo-AristotelianSecretum
Secretorum:
Thereis a medicine
thatis calledtheInestimable
Gloryand thePhilosophers'
whichfully
rectifies
thewholehumanbodyandwhichis saidtohave
Treasure,
beendiscovered
byAdamorbyEnoch,andreceived
bya vision,as [Aristotle]
itwasnotfully
certified
whichofthemhadfirst
it.
relates,
although
perceived
Butthisandsimilarmostsecretofsecrets
werealwayshiddenfromthecrowd
ofphilosophers,
andespecially
menbegantoabusewisdom,
after
toevil
turning
whatGodhad concededformen'shealthand fullutility.27
24Opustertium
32.
, ed. Brewer,
25Opusmaius,
ed. Bridges,
III, 54.
26Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
II, 204.
27Opusmaius
hasgloria
, ed. Bridges,
II, 208-9.Bridges
, butelsewhere
inefjabilis
(III,
oftheOpusmaius
inestimabilis
, itisgloria
, as alsointheLatinversion
58) inhisedition
oftheSecretum
secretorum
thatBaconannotated
hactenus
inedita
, V, 98-9).On this
( Opera
medicine
see R. Steele,A Medieval
Panacea
oftheRoyalSocietyof
, in: Proceedings
147

01:50:44 AM

Bacon himself toyed, theoreticallyif not practically, with this and

other quasi-alchemical remedies, and this helped to give him a firm
place in the later English medical tradition.28Also his name became
attached to many alchemical spuria, which togetherwith his genuine
alchemical writings,contributedto his subsequent reputation.
29
2. Magic and theMultiplication
of Species

"
Alchemy may be regarded as quintessential^ Hermetic", but for
the second part of this paper I wish to dwell instead on another way
in which Bacon bordered upon magical traditions. We may startby
quoting one of Bacon's more famous passages, which to his contemporaries and medieval and Renaissance successors would have been
far more redolent of magic than it was for later ages:
ofnavigation
can be madewithout
menforrowing,
so thatgreat
Instruments
ships,bothriverandsea going,maybe bornealongwithjustonemansteering,
andwithgreater
canbe made
speedthaniftheywerefullofmen.Alsochariots
an animalwithinestimable
to movewithout
force,as we reckonthescythed
in ancient
times.Alsothere
chariots
tohavebeenwhichwereusedforfighting
witha mansitting
inthemiddle
oftheinstrucanbe madeinstruments
offlying
a contrivance
mentandrevolving
bymeansofwhich
artificially
composed
wings
bird.Alsoan instrument,
smallinquantity
forraising
beattheair,likea flying
forby
andlowering
almostinfinite
ismoreuseful
inadversity,
weights.
Nothing
an instrument
three
andwidth
thesame,orevenofsmaller
ofheight
size,
fingers
a manmaysnatchhimself
and hiscomrades
fromeverydangerofprison,by
An instrument
anddescending.
couldalsoeasilybe madewhereby
one
raising
a thousand
menviolently
andagainst
theirwill,and
manwoulddragtohimself
forattracting
otherthings.
Instruments
mayalsobe madeforwalking
similarly
intheseaorinrivers,
tothebottom,
without
bodilydanger.ForAlexander
right
ofthesea according
to theaccount
theGreatusedtheseforseeingthesecrets
ofEthicustheastronomer.
Theseweremadein ancienttimes,and havebeen
forflying,
madeinourowntimesas iscertain,
unlessitbe theinstrument
which

BacononAlphonse
Medicine,10 (1917),93-106;C. C. J. Webb,Roger
, in:
ofPoitiers
toReginald
LanePoole
, presented
, ed. H. W. C. Davis,Oxford1927,
EssaysinHistory
Health:
Baconian
andPharmacy
290-300;F. M. Getz,ToProlong
LifeandPromote
Alchemy
Tradition
intheEnglish
Learned
inMedieval
Culture
, in: Health
, DiseaseandHealing
, ed.
S. Campbell,NewYork1991,135-45;VV.R. Newman,TheAlchemy
Bacon
ofRoger
'
Attributed
toHim, forthcoming.
See generally
andtheTresEpistolae'
onthequestion
of
A History
theProlongation
oflife,G.J. Gruman,
prolongation
ofIdeasabout
ofLife( =
1966.
Transactions
, 612, Part9), Philadelphia
oftheAmerican
Philosophical
Society
28See thearticle
Alchemical
andParacelsian
by Getzcitedabove,and C. Webster,
Medicine
andMortality
intheSixteenth
Cam, in:Health
, Medicine
, ed.C. Webster,
Century
bridge1979,301-34.
29Thesecondpartofthisarticle
: Magicand
Bacon
substantially
incorporates
myRoger
wasscheduled
the
toappearina specialvolume
ofPaideia
, which
ofSpecies
Multiplication
cometo publication.
thatdid notactually
148

01:50:44 AM

I havenotseen,norhaveI knowna manwhohadseenit,butI knowa wise

Andalmostinfinitely
manwhohasthought
outhowtobringaboutthisartifice.
without
columns
or
overrivers
manysuchthings
maybe made,suchas bridges
anddevices.30
and unheardofcontrivances
anysupport,
As recentlyas 1960 J.R. Partingtonsaw in the passage "predictions"
(he was carefulto place the word in invertedcommas) of the motor
car, aeroplane, divingbell, submarine, and suspension bridge,31while
otherrecentscholars,wary of the perils of anachronism, have tended
simply to ignore Bacon's list. It is admittedlydifficultto reconstruct
exactly what he had in mind,32 but the passage does bear ample
witness to his faithin man's practical possibilities.
Bacon held that the above instrumentsdepended on art alone.
Another instrumentdepended upon deeper powers of nature, and it
was particularlythe province of experimentalscience to findit out. A
mathematiciancould make a spherical astrolabe of the type described
by Ptolemy:
butforittobe movednaturally
witha diurnalmotion
is notin themathematithat
cian'spower.A faithful
andwonderful
is striving
however,
experimenter,
one be madefromsuitablematerial
and withso muchartifice
thatit would
be turned
aboutwiththeheavens'33
diurnalmotion.
It wouldseemto
naturally
be possible
todo thisbecausemanythings
of
areborneaboutwiththemotion
suchas comets,
andthesea in itsflux,andotherthings
eithertotally
celestials,
orin theirparts.Thiswouldbe a greater
thanall theaforesaid
andof
miracle
almostinfinite
Forthenallastronomical
wouldbe obsolete,
instruments
utility.
bothspecialised
andcommon,
toa singleking's
anditwouldbearnocomparison
treasury.34
Bacon mentionsthe subject of magnetismin a nearby passage, and he
is clearly thinkingof Petrus Peregrinus, who held that a properly
pivoted magnet would rotate followingthe heavens' motion. Peter
said that if one did not succeed in accomplishing this, it would be
throughlack of skill rather than a defect of nature; if one did, one
would no longer need a "timepiece".35
30De secretis
artis
etnature
Hactenus
Inedita
533.
, ed. Brewer,
, in: Opera
Quaedam
operibus
Cf.Communia
Mathematica
Inedita
Hactenus
, ed. Steele,Opera
, XVI, 43-4;PartoftheOpus
Tertium
Bacon
a Fragment
nowPrinted
, ed. A. G. Little,
, including
ofRoger
fortheFirstTime
Aberdeen
contains
1912,18; MS Vatican,Reg. Lat. 1317,f. 104r.Thismanuscript
oftheOpusminus
thatare notyetavailablein print.
portions
31J. R. Partington,
A History
FireandGunpowder
1960,72.
, Cambridge
ofGreek
32Forsomeearlierattempts
on BaconinBiographia
at this,seethearticle
Britannica
,
I, London1747,341-64.
33Readingcoelorum
forBrewer's
coelum.
34De secretis
537.
, ed. Brewer,
operibus
35"Per hoc auteminstrumentum
ab omnihorilogio."S. Radelet-de
excusaberis
Grave&D. Speiser,
Le De magnete
dePierre
deMaricourt:
Traduction
etCommentaire
, in:
149

01:50:44 AM

The fact that Bacon's proposed astrolabe would employ celestial

influenceprompts us to turn aside for a moment. In the Cityof God
Augustine referredto a famous passage in the HermeticAsclepiusconcerning man-made gods. Asclepius spoke of them as statues, but
Hermes emphasized that they were much more:
whatan infidel
Statues?My dearAsclepius,
youare! Statuesendowedwith
such
and spirits;statueswhichperform
souls,fullyequippedwithsensibility
itby
the
and
foretell
and
wonderful
statues
which
foreknow
future,
works;
great
which
meansofthelot,bymeansofseersanddreamsandmanyothermethods;
sadnessorjoy,according
senddiseases
uponmenandalsocurethem,
bestowing
to deserts.36
In the SummacontraGentiles
(1259-64) Aquinas denied thatsuch statues
could be moved by celestial virtue:
on havinga soul,foritis a proprium
ofanimate
follows
To be movedbyoneself
thatitbe brought
It is therefore
thattheymovethemselves.
impossible
things
be movedby
inanimate
bodiesthatsomething
aboutbyvirtueofthecelestial
aboutbymagicalartsthatsomestatuesare
Butit is saidto be brought
itself.
or giveouta voice.It is therefore
notpossiblethatthe
movedbythemselves
virtue...
A natural
effect
effect
aboutbycelestial
ofmagicalartsbe brought
proFor
ducedbytheheavens'virtue
maybe foundintheabsenceofart'soperation.
and
thegeneration
offrogs
shouldperform
evenifbysomeartifice
something
If
without
it wouldyethappenthatfrogsbe generated
suchlike,
anyartifice.
artobtaintheprincistatues
ofthiskindthataremadebynecromantic
therefore
ofsuchwillbe found
bodies'virtue,thegeneration
ple oflifebythecelestial
thatsuchlike
artofthiskind.Butthisis notfound.It is cleartherefore
without
oflifenorare movedbythecelestial
statuesdo nothavetheprinciple
body's
virtue.37
The analogy with Bacon's astrolabe is by no means precise, but the
discussion does reveal Bacon as operating near the borderlands of
magic. The legend of the brazen head pushed the point more
dramatically,forin it Bacon and his collaborator Bungay sought the
advice of a devil in order to make the head that theyhad constructed
speak.38
Bacon was adamant that he was not advocating magic, but his
repetitivevehemence shows that he was conscious that he could be
Bookin
28 (1975),193-234at 220;E. Grant,A Source
Revued'Histoire
desSciences,
MA 1974,373.
Medieval
Science
, Cambridge,
36De civitate
theCity
thePagans
from
Dei, VIII. 23; translation
,
Concerning
ofGodagainst
ed. A. D. Nock
tr.H. Bettenson,
Harmondsworth
Hermeticum,
1972,331.Cf.Corpus
andHermesseeYates,Gior&A.-J.Festugire,
Paris1945-54,
II, 326.On Augustine
danoBruno
, 9-12.
37Summa
iussaimpenOmnia
contra
Gentiles
, lib.3, cap. 104,inThomasAquinas,Opera
Leonis
XIII P.M. edita
, Rome1882- , XIV, 325-6.
saque
38EarlyEnglish
2ndedn.London1858,I, 205-11.
Romances
Prose
, ed. W. J. Thorns,
150

01:50:44 AM

suspected of it. He held that a principal faultof magicians was their

real or attemptedmeddlingwith demons forthe productionof certain
effects.39
They deluded themselvesas to the extent to which demons
were amenable to human control,but Bacon believed thatmany magicians' effectscould be, and oftenwere, produced by the power of art
imitatingnature, without the employment of anything extraneous.
And indeed the ultimate source of many magical practices was in
works of true wisdom:
Solomon
ordained
ofthiskind,whichwereperformed
outwith
the
manythings
courseofnature,as Josephus
customary
saysin BookVIII.40Andbecausehe
waswiserthanall whocamebefore
andafter,
as HolyScripture
andJosephus
theseworks,
in enigmas,
andso leftmanywritings
teach,hecouldnotneglect
whichwerelaterturned
tobad usebymagicians,
andwerebadlyinterpreted,
and manyenormities
weremixedin bydeceivers.41
Bacon himselfwas intenton providinga rationale foreffectsthatcould
all too easily be dubbed magical, and fromhis theoreticalstructureto
derive practices that could be used for the greater good of Christendom. And for this end he was particularlyprone to make use of the
analogy of optics.
Bacon thoughtthat optics itselfcould be put to many useful purposes.42 He had been particularlyfascinatedby the constructionof a
burning mirrorby Petrus Peregrinus, and later had several made for
himself.Such mirrorscould be a wonderfulaid against the Saracens,
as also could 4'broken mirrors", used forproducing the illusion that
an army was much bigger than it really was. Also perspect glasses
could be arranged to allow us to see small things at an incredible
distance, "for thus it is reckoneddid Julius Caesar on the seashore in
France by huge mirrorsobserve the disposition and arrangementof
the castles and cities of Greater Britain."43 These somewhat
extravagant claims gained a certain plausibility from the conjuring
tricksof contemporaryjugglers, but Bacon also saw the whole science
of optics as embedded in the wider doctrine of the multiplicationof
species.
39On Bacon'sviewofmagicsee L. Thorndike,
A History
ofMagicandExperimental
Science
Baconas Magician,
, NewYork1923-58,
II, 659-77,andA. G. Molland,Roger
in: Traditio,30 (1974),445-60,at 458-60.
40Antiquities
VIII.2.
41Opusmaius,
ed. Bridges,
be assigned
to
I, 392.Thispassageshouldmoreproperly
theOpusminus-,
cf.Roger
Bacon:Essays
, ed. A. G. Little,Oxford1914,389.
42On thesubjectmatter
of thisparagraph
see Molland,Roger
Baconas Magician
,
452-8.
43De secretis
, ed. Brewer,
534; cf.Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
II, 165.
operibus
151

01:50:44 AM

In thisdoctrinesubstances and qualities sent out likenessesof themselves in all directions(unless impeded), by means of which theyacted
on objects thatwere separated fromthemby a medium. From thelight
of the Sun thereproceeded species of lightin the medium, whichcould
produce lightin the Moon and the stars.44But, despite what some had
said, lightwas not the substantialformofthe Sun, and, moreover,the
species of an accident could not exist without the species of a
substance. Therefore the medium also transmittedspecies of the Sun
itself,although these could not act in the same way as the species of
light, for otherwisethe Moon and the stars would be convertedinto
the Sun. Species had the same specificnature as the original, but less
complete being (esse), and sometimes much less:
can makestrong
Somethings
species,likecolourandlightandheat,andother
such...Butas muchas thingsare nobler,likecelestialbodiesand manand
suchlike,
species...Andso the
byso muchdo theymakea moreincomplete
speciesofcolourandlightandheatcanmorebe calledlightandheatandcolour
thanthespeciesoftheSun or a manbe calledmanor Sun.45
A natural agent always gave out species in the same way, for it was
only agents with free will that could on their own account act difformly.46
Bacon was the firstLatin writerto assimilate withany thoroughness
Alhazen's theory of vision, in which sight was effectedby formsof
light and colour entering the eye.47 Although Bacon was much less
mathematicallyastute than Alhazen, he gave more attentionthan had
the Arabic writerto an ontological determinationof what was going
on in the medium. In producing species the agent does not give somethingout, forthiswould resultin corruptionof the original substance,
whereas "the most active things, such as spiritual substances and
celestial bodies, are not corruptible."48Instead (and thisensures that
we do not have two bodies in the same place) the transmissionproceeds by "a natural changing and drawing out of the potentialityof
44Roger
A Critical
Bacon
's Philosophy
Edition
Introduc, with
Translation,
ojNature:
English
andDespeculis
andNotes,
comburentibus
, ed. D. C. Lindtion,
ofDemultiplication
specierum
berg,Oxford1983,12-4.
45De mult,
10-2.
spec.,ed. Lindberg,
46De mult,
18.
spec.,ed. Lindberg,
47A. C. Crombie,TheMechanistic
andtheScientific
, in:
Study
Hypothesis
of Vision
& G. L'E. Turner,Cambridge
Historical
ed. S. Bradbury
1967,
Aspects
ofMicroscopy,
Theories
al-Kindi
toKepler
3-112,at 27; D. C. Lindberg,
, Chicago1976,
ofVision
from
109.
48De mult.
44.
, ed. Lindberg,
spec.
152

01:50:44 AM

the matter of the patient."49 The result is that the medium has
superimposed on it the nature of the agent:
The individual
to firein thenatureof
part(individuum
) of air is assimilated
in it.Therefore
fieriness
it is calledfiredair.
bythespeciesofthefirepresent
Foritis notairalone,norfirealone,norprincipally
fired
fire,butprincipally
airalone.Andso whatis thereoffireis theincomplete
individual
partoffire
in something
morecomplete.50
existing
The transmissionis not strictlycontinuous but takes place in a stepwise fashion,withthe species in one small part of the medium drawing
out itslikenessin the next. But even here thereare difficulties
concernat
a
for
action
there
to
be
distance,
ing
only appears
superficialcontact
between the two parts, whereas the agent must act on the depths of
the patient. Bacon's answer, which is not altogethersatisfactory,is
thatalthoughthe agent is not in the depths of the patient it does touch
it sufficiently.51
We are remindedof how at a much later date Michael
was
confronted
with similar difficultiesin his account of the
Faraday
propagation of action.52
Normally species were transmittedin straightlines, but iftherewas
a change of densityand the species were not approaching the interface
perpendicularly,refractionoccurred. On meetinga particularlydense
body there was reflection. In discussing these matters Bacon was
drawing principallyon the optical tradition,and his examples usually
concerned light. Neverthelessit is clear that he meant his account to
apply to species in generad,although he does not dwell on what particulardifferencestheremay be in the modes of propagation of species
of differentkinds. Also taken fromthe optical traditionwas Bacon's
frequenttalk of pyramids(including what in modern termsare called
cones). These were used to illustratethe convergence of species from
the source or sources of radiation to the particular point of interest,
whichformedthe vertexof thepyramid. In the case of vision thispoint
was the eye. In animate bodies the species could also followa tortuous
path along the nerves. This applied not only to vision but, for
instance, to the species of taste, which startedalong the nerve of the
tongue and eventually reached a place near the heart.53
49Ibid.
50De mult,
spec.,ed. Lindbere,16.
51De mult.
52: "Dico quodagenstangit
, ed. Lindberg,
spec.
profundum
primepartis
quantumsufficit."
52See, forexample,M. B. Hesse,Forces
andFields
, London1961,199-200.
53De mult,
102.
spec.,ed. Lindberg,
153

01:50:44 AM

Unlike accidents, substances were not directlyperceived by the five

externalsenses, nor by the common sense. Neverthelessthe species of
a substance could impinge on the soul:
andestimation,
Itcanwellbehadina waybycogitation
bywhicha sheepsenses
and harming
theorganofthe
thespeciesof thewolfscomplexion
infecting
andso itfleesthewolfatfirst
estimative
glance,evenifithasneverseen
[virtue],
Andthisisthespeciesofa substance
andhostile
tothesheep.
hurtful
onebefore.
andagreeable
substance
ofanother
On theother
hand,thespeciesofthefriendly
theestimative
's instrument,
andso onesheepdoesnot
sheepcomforts
[virtue]
fleeanother.Therefore
thesensitive
soul can wellperceivesubstance
by its
species.54
Bacon was drawing the example of the sheep and the wolf from
Avicenna' s account of estimation,55but the expression in termsof the
estimativevirtue's abilityto perceive the species of substances appears
to be his own.
Avicenna's place in Bacon's genealogy ofknowledgeguaranteed his
role as a special hero of science, and Averroesand Alhazen, as we have
seen, both commanded his greatrespect.Among otherArabic writers,
Bacon occasionally alludes to Alkindi, but significantlyin the works
forthe Pope he does not referto thatwriter'sDe radiisstellaris
, although
it would be hard to deny a strong influence from this short work,
whose Latin version may be found in a fine edition by M.-T.
d'Alverny and F. Hudry.56 The connection was not lost on later
writers,such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who grouped Bacon
and Alkindi togetherwith William of Auvergne as writerswho had
understood the nature of good non-demonic magic.
The reason for Bacon's reticencemay be gathered froma (probably) later writingof his going under the titleDe laudibusmathematice.
Here Alkindi's work is brieflydescribed but withoutmention of the
author's name:
of
theconsideration
is themagicalart,whichusurpstoitself
Falsemathematics
a
and superstitious
withcharacters,
celestials
sacrifices,
charms,
conjurations,
deformed
consideration
happen
byvariousfrauds.Andit positsthatall things
from
either
theconstellations'
ofnecessity
virtues,
way,nothing
nothing
through
chanceor fortune
nothingfromcounsel...And thesethingsare expressly
54De mult,
24.
spec.,ed. Lindberg,
55Opusmaius
Hactenus
Naturalia
II, 7-8;Communia
, ed. R. Steele,Opera
, ed. Bridges,
Latinus.
deAnima,
Inedita
Baconi
Liber
, II-IV,Oxford
n.d.-1913,
II, 17;Avicenna
Rogeri
seuSextus
deNaturalibus
IV-V, ed. S. vanRiet,Louvain& Leiden1968,38-9.
56M.-T. d'Alverny
& F. Hudry,Al-Kindi
: De radiis,in: Archives
Docd'Histoire
du MoyenAge,41 (1974),139-260.
trinale
et Littraire
154

01:50:44 AM

asserted
ina magicalbook,whosetitleis infamous,
namelyTheory
oftheMagical
havechanged
intoBookofRays
Art
several
, becausethebook'sauthor
, which
puts
of rays,whichare
forward
manyexcellent
thingsaboutthemultiplication
andtrue,so thathemaythebetter
drawthereaders'mindstothe
philosophical
hepositsthemall tohapthatishisprincipal
intent.
Wherefore
poisonoffalsity
theheavenbynecessity,
andhepresumes
tojudge
bythisnecessity
penthrough
butthismathematics
is condemned
notonlyby
ofall future
things,
infallibly
saintsbutbyphilosophers.57
This puts the book into a favouritecategoryof Bacon's, that of works
whichare in general to be eschewed, but which stillneed to be studied
by the cognoscention account of the portionsof genuine wisdom that
theycontain. Bacon was very carefulto avoid any imputationthat he
advocated magic, and ironically Alkindi was a great aid in this by
postulatinga naturalisticexplanation of phenomena that mightotherwise be regarded as magical.
Like Bacon, Alkindiused optics as providinga paradigm case of the
communication of action. But while Bacon spoke of species and virtues, Alkindi usually contended himselfwith referencesto rays, and
gave littleattentionto their ontological determination.All stars and
all thingsthathave actual existencein the elementaryworld emit rays,
and these have multifariouseffectsaccording to the differentnatures
of their sources and the differentpositionings of the sources with
respectto the recipients.At one level at least, all action in the elementaryworld, even contact action, is to be explained by the infusionof
rays. Action at a distance is sometimesmanifestto the senses, as when
a magnet attractsiron or a mirrorpresentsimages to the eyes, but at
other times it is more hidden. Both Bacon and Alkindi attach particular importance to the rays that proceed from the heavens, or as
57*4Falsa mathematica
estars magicaque sibiusurptconsiderationem
celestium
caracteribus
carminibus
coniurationibus
etsacrificiis
etfraudibus
variis
superstitiosis
deformatam.
Et ponitpervirtutem
constellationum
omniade necessitate
contingere
nihilad utrumlibet
nihila casunecfortuna
nihila Consilio...
Ethecexpresse
asseraninfamis
TheoricaArtisMagice,quem
turin libromagicocuiustitulus
est,scilicet
inLibrum
mutaverunt
de Radiis,quiaauctorilliuslibrimultapreclara
plures
premittitde radiorum
suntetverautmagisalliciatnimos
que philosophica
multiplicatione
ad venenum
falsitatis
undeistaomniaponitper
intendit,
quodprincipaliter
legentium
celumde necessitate
et presumit
infallibiliter
de
contingere
perhancnecessitatem
omnibus
sedistamathematica
estnonsoluma sanctis
iudicare
futuris
sed
dampnata
a philosophis."
MSS Oxford,
Bodleian,
Digby218,f.98v;London,British
Library,
Bacon:Essays
, ed Little,393-4.In MS Oxford,
Royal7 F.vii,f. 72v. Cf. Roger
SeidenSupra79,p. 26a,BrianTwynenotedwithreference
tothispassage
Bodleian,
esthieBaconumtractatum
istumAlkindi
de radiisintellexisse,
that,"Verisimile
qui
ascribit."
aperteomnianecessitate
155

01:50:44 AM

Alkindi usually says, the celestial harmony. But here importantdifferencesbegin to arise, forAlkindi was a more rigorous thinkerthan
it would have been wise for Bacon to be. And even if Alkindi can
sometimes remind us of Leibniz, Giles of Rome found littledifficulty
in listingeighteen errors fromthis short work alone.58
Important among these was the fact that Alkindi was a rigid
astrological determinist.Whatever may seem to be the case, things
below were caused down to the minutestdetail by the action of the
heavens:
ofthecelestial
Thusitis thatonewhohadthetotalcondition
known
harmony
to himwouldknowthings
withthosepresent
Conand future.
pasttogether
ofoneindividual
ofthisworld,
thecondition
wouldpresent
known,
fully
versely
thewholecondition
ofthecelestial
as ifbya mirror
sinceeachthing
harmony,
ofthisworldis an imageoftheuniversal
harmony.59
The pre-eminence of the heavens made Alkindi in the last analysis
deny the action of one body in the elementaryworld on another, and
he distinguishedwhat is true according to physics fromwhat is true
according to metaphysics:
to sucha consideration
on thepartof thecrowdwe saythatone
According
actsonanother
toascertained
truth
elementary
thing
byitsrays,whileaccording
it doesnotact,butthecelestial
aloneworksall things.
Therefore
in
harmony
thepassionintroduced
elementary
bysuchactiontherewill
thingssustaining
whichwenameactionandpassion.Whenweconsider
onlybe a concomitance,
ofelementary
themutualconditions
andcolligations
without
to
things
respect
thecelestial
willbe physical,
whether
thethings
be concause,theconsideration
in place.But whenwe investigate
eventsby
joinedor separated
elementary
celestial
causeswe adopta metaphysical
consideration.60
The God of Alkindi's treatmentis highlytranscendental,and can only
be described apophatically. Names such as cause of causes, god of
gods, lord of lords, firstprinciple,creatorare inappropriate;better,if
still not satisfactory, are negative expressions such as infinite,
uncreated, immortal,impassible.61It is not to be supposed that such
a completely immobile being should be moved by men's prayers,
although these can have great effectby their action on elementary
matter, or rather,to speak metaphysically,by means of the celestial
disposition.62
58GilesofRome,Errores
, ed. J. Koch,Milwaukee1944,46-59.
Philosophorum
59De radiis
& Hudry,223.
, ed. d'Alverny
60De radiis
, 228-9.
61De radiis
, 244-5.
62De radiis
, 246-7.
156

01:50:44 AM

It is doubtfulthat such views would have been popular in Islam; in

Christian Europe theywere impossible, and, as we
thirteenth-century
have seen, necessitarianismwas one of the main faults that Bacon
found in Alkindi's work. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that great
power proceeds fromthe heavens, although this does not coerce the
yet nobler rational soul:
A personmaybe inducedto goodor bad, bothpublicand private,
by the
weseethatmen
butwithout
heavens'virtues,
compulsion,
justas, forexample,
of
and thepresence
friends
and fellows,
changetheirwillsbecauseofmasters,
newthings,
and in manyotherways,butwithout
compulsion.63
Moreover, if astrologyforetellscertain events, the wise man, even if
he cannot preventthem, may take remedial action. For example (and
secretorum
here Bacon draws on the pseudo-AristotelianSecretum
) we
of
a
cold
the
advent
spell by stocking
particularly
may guard against
up with medicaments, warm clothes, etc...64 And Isaac Israeli had
said that,when the best mathematiciansknew the days on which men
going down to sea or into battle were due to die, theycould provide
sufficientprotectionfor them.65
In his discussions of astrologyBacon did not labour the doctrineof
the multiplication of species, but it is clear that it provided the
theoreticalunderpinningforthe subject. It was particularlyuseful for
explaining the immense diversitythat resulted from celestial influence. Not only is the celestial configurationcontinuallychanging, but
each point of the Earth's surface is the centre of a differenthorizon,
and so receives a differentpyramid of rays from the sky.66This
explained the simultaneous production of differentherbs in nearby
places and even the differencesof twins in the same womb. In this
Bacon was coming perilouslynear to denying the predictivepower of
astrology,for if such minute differencesin celestial influenceare so
important in effect,then surely it will be possible neither for the
astrologer to tabulate them, nor to make measurements of the
required accuracy. In the next century similar considerations led
Nicole Oresme to deny the usefulnessof astrologyas a tool forknowing the futurein any detail.67But Bacon did not take up this point,
63Opusminus
ed. Bridges,
in: Opusmaius,
I, 393. (Cf. n. 41 above.)
64Opusminus
in: Opusmaius
secretorum
, ed. Bridges,
I, 390. Cf. Secretum
, cumGlossis
etNotulis
hactenus
Roeeri
Baconi
inedita
, ed. Steele,Opera
, V, 61.
65Opusminus
in: Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
I, 391.
66Opusmaius
in Opusmaius
, ed. Bridces,I, 138;Opusminus
, ed. Bridges,
I, 380.
67See, forexample,Molland,Medieval
IdeasofScientific
Progress
(n. 13 above),576.
157

01:50:44 AM

and if pressed would probably have said that exact knowledge of the
futurewas impossible to human kind, but that this did not prevent
predictionsof a middling sort of detail being possible.
For both Alkindi and Bacon human beings, as well as the heavens,
were particularlyimportantsources of rays. In this Alkindi appealed
to a macrocosm-microcosmconception and held that man was acting
as a similitudeof the heavens, whereas Bacon simplyappealed to the
rational soul being nobler than the heavens. For both writersdifferent
psychologicalstateswere particularlyimportant,and althoughtheydo
not use the analogy in preciselythe same way, both appeal in thisconnection to the example of adding scammony to a medicine.68Again
both give particularattentionto the efficacyof words in producingthe
desired results, and both insist on this being a natural process that
does not rely on the action of demons or spirits.69I shall not here
attemptany detailed comparison between theirviews, but concentrate
on Bacon. He is conscious that he may seem verynear to dabbling in
magic, and makes particular appeal to the doctrine of multiplication
of species as an alternativeview:
ofspeciesis unknown
nor
Becausethismultiplication
tothecrowdofstudents,
to anyoneamongtheLatinsexceptthreeor four,and that[only]in optics(in
themultiplication
ofthespeciesoflight
andcolourforvision,
), namely
perspectivis
on thataccountwedo notperceive
actionsofnature
[as such]themarvellous
before
oureyes,butweestimate
them
thatalldayaremadein us andinthings
abouteitherbya specialdivineoperation,
or byangels,or by
to be brought
Butitis notso,exceptso faras everyoperaorbychanceandfortune.
demons,
is insomewayfrom
God.Butthisdoesnotprevent
theoperationofa creature
tonatural
becausenatureis an instrument
tionsbeingmadeaccording
reasons,
ofdivineoperation.70
Magicians are in fact impotent, although the devil may sometimes
mischievouslymake it appear otherwise.71
A successfuloperation withwords needs strongpsychologicalbacking. There should be profoundthought,great desire, rightintention,
and strongconfidence.For a good act holiness of lifeis important,and
fora bad act the opposite. The excited soul has a stronginfluenceon
the body, and modifies the species that it produces, so that we have
a mingling of species: from the voice modifyingthe air, from the
68De radiis
& Hudry,232; Opusminus
in Opusmaius,
ed. Bridges,
, ed. d'Alverny
I,
398.
69De radiis
& Hudry,247; forBaconsee below.
, ed. d'Alverny
70Opustertium
99-100.
, ed. Brewer,
71Opustertium
96, 98.
, ed. Brewer,
158

01:50:44 AM

rational soul, and fromthe body.72 Moreover, the utterancesshould

be made at the rightastrologicaltime so thatto these species are added
the appropriatecelestial ones. It is thus thatthe efficacyof charms and
incantationsis to be explained. The writtenword may have similar
power, for if characters are fashioned at the due time, they receive
celestial virtue and are able to retransmitit. All of this naturalised
magic has greatpower. "Bodies are healed, venomous animals are put
to flight,and brutesof all kinds are called to hand, both serpentsfrom
caves, and fishesfromthe depths of the water."73 It is also fromthis
source thatarises the power of fascinationand casting the evil eye, and
Bacon goes so far as to suggest a holier application. "A sign of [the
great efficacyof words] is that almost all the miracles that have been
performedby the saints fromthe beginning were performedby the
power of words."74
In writingof these mattersto the Pope, Bacon introduceda note of
particular urgency, for Antichrist,whose day was fast approaching,
would use this power of wisdom to evil ends. It was imperative that
Christians be forearmedwith similar skills. Moreover, the Saracens
and Tartars were already using such weapons, and Bacon drew an
example from his own experience. In 1251 there had occurred in
France the uprising of the Pastoureaux, an anti-intellectualrabble
with a charismaticleader, said to be fromHungary, who announced
an intentionof going to the East to rescue Louis IX fromprison.75For
Bacon he was clearly a Tartar or Saracen agent, and his power came
fromthe type of knowledge that Bacon advocated:
WithmyowneyesI sawhimopenlycarrysomething
in hishandas ifitwere
a sacredobject,andas ifhewerea manbearingrelics,andhewentwithbare
ofarmedmen,butdispersed
in the
feet,andaroundhimtherewasa multitude
fields
insucha waythathecouldbe seenbyall thefollowers
withthat
together
whichhe carriedin hishandwithgreatdisplay.76
Matthew Paris reportsthatthe leader continuallyclutchedin his hand
what he claimed to be a missivefromthe Virgin Mary.77Bacon clearly
72See especially
96-8.
, ed. Brewer,
Opustertium
73Opusminus
in Opusmaius,
ed. Bridges,
I, 395.
74Opusminus
in Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
I, 399.
75S.
A History
Runciman,
, Cambridge
1951-54;repr.Harmondsworth
oftheCrusades
Reason
andSociety
intheMiddle
1965,ill, 279;A. Murray,
Ages,Oxford1978,244-5;
etdePastoureaux
Croisades
auMoyen
J. Delalande,LesExtraordinaires
, Paris
d'Enfants
Age
1961,41-52.
76Opusminus
in Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,
I, 401-2.
77Matthew
Paris,Chronica
, ed. H. R. Luard(London1872-83),
V, 247.
Majora
159

01:50:44 AM

did not believe this, but the object was certainlysomethingof great
power, and was doubtless sending out forcefulspecies.
Bacon was a firmadvocate of the power of mind over matter,and
as an example of what even the lower facultiesof the soul could accomplish he liked to tell a storyof Avicenna' s about a hen, who frompride
out of winning a fightwith a cock, immediatelygrew a spur on her
leg.78 For Bacon both spiritual and corporeal action were to be subsumed under a single science of multiplicationof species, formedfrom
the analogy of optics. Centuries later there did arise a generalised
optics, the science of electromagneticradiation, which gave rise to
marvels thateven Bacon did not envisage, although not includingthe
mental and the spiritual. To claim forBacon any significantinfluence
on thisdevelopmentwould be fanciful,but he did exertan appreciable
influenceon anotheroptical generaliser,namelyJohn Dee, who wrote
a work (now lost) called, "Mirror of Unity, or Apologia for Friar
Roger Bacon the Englishman, in which it is shown thathe did nothing
by the aid of demons, but was a most great philosopher, and performednaturallyand in ways allowable to a Christian man the great
thingswhich the unlearned crowd is wont to ascribe to the actions of
demons.''79
Which brings us back to Renaissance Hermeticism. I thinkthat it
is now clear that, when we constructany genealogy of "Science and
the Hermetic Tradition", a significant medieval place must be
accorded to Roger Bacon. But the question of how many other
medieval links therewere in the chain, and of what nature, must wait
upon furtherresearch.80And moreover, there stillremains the vexed
problem of the effectof all this on the actual developmentof science.
Aberdeen
University
ofAberdeen
78Opusminus
in Opusmaius
, ed. Bridges,I, 402; Opustertium
, ed. Brewer,96;
f. 40v.
Avicenna,
, Venice1508,De animalibus,
Opera
79John
DeeonAstronomy:
,
Propaedeumata
(1558and1568),LatinandEnglish
Aphoristica
ed. &tr.W. Shumaker,
int.J. L. Heilbron,
1978,116.Cf.myessayreview
Berkeley
ofthisvolume,Mathematical
andAngelic
fortheHistory
, in: British
Astrology
Journal
toBacon,seeespecially
ofScience,13(1980),255-8.On Dee andhisrelation
Clulee,
Dee'sNatural
John
Philosophy
(n. 2 above).
80I amcurrently
a paperon ThomasBradwardine's
stancetowards
prisca
preparing
auctoritas.

160

01:50:44 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 1 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
The CorpuscularTheoryofJ . B. Van Helmontand its Medieval Sources
WILLIAM R. NEWMAN

1. Van Helmontand Lasswitz

One common view of the scientificrevolutionis as a period in which
the 4'mechanical philosophy" came ever more to dominate the
natural sciences. Although the term "mechanical philosophy" is
a convenientway of definingit may be found
fraughtwith difficulty,
in Robert Boyle, who labelled it as the attempt to reduce natural
explanations to those "two grand and most catholick principles of
bodies, matterand motion".1 In this definitionBoyle was of course
followingthe lead of Descartes, and if it does less than perfectjustice
to his own system,at least it allowed Boyle and many othersan ideal
for which to strive.2
It may come as a surprisethen to learn thatone branch of the scientific revolution "reformed" a perfectlystraightforwardcorpuscular
theoryof matter,devoid of the despised substantial formsand occult
qualities of the scholastics, by investing it with vitalism. I have in
mind the "the philosopher by fire", or chemical philosopher,Joan
Baptista Van Helmont, and his hitherto unnoticed reworking of
medieval corpuscular notions. The average early modernistmay be
inclinedat thispoint to turnaside, forVan Helmont is oftenregarded
as an obscure followerof Paracelsus von Hohenheim who contributed
little to the mainstream of the scientificrevolution. Such a view is
radicallymistaken,however, forVan Helmont was one of the earliest
chemiststo debunk the Paracelsian theorythat threeprinciples,mercury, sulfur, and salt, pre-existed in material substances, and his

1 RobertBoyle,Works
alsoIV, 68-69,and IV, 77-78.Forsome
, 1772,III, 16. See
of theproblems
in theterm" mechanical",
cf. E. J. Dijksterhuis,
The
implicit
Mechanization
theWorld.
Picture
, Oxford1961,495-501.
of
2 I.B. Cohen,Revolution
inScience
MA 1985,153-7.
, Cambridge
161

01:50:55 AM

Van Helattack formedthe basis of Robert Boyle's ScepticalChymist.3

mont was also an avid attackerof astrology,and an inveterateopponent of the metaphorical speech employed by Paracelsus.4 He was a
criticof the writeron talismanic magic Jacques Gaffarel,and an ally
of Pierre Gassendi against Robert Fludd.5 Van Helmont corresponded with Gassendi, and a number of letters from him to
Mersenne have survived.6 These concern such diverse topics as the
nature of the soul and the cause of springnessin steel.7
The recentstudy of Van Helmont by Walter Pagel, while givinga
masterfulportrayalof the Belgian's biological views, seems to be quite
unaware of the factthat Van Helmont entertainedcorpuscular views
of matter.8The fact has not entirelyescaped scholarlynotice, however, for the brillianthistorian of atomism, Kurd Lasswitz, already
brought attentionto Van Helmont' s corpuscularismover a century
ago.9 Lasswitz wrotea penetratinganalysis of several treatisesappear, in which he came to gripswith
ing in Van Helmont' s Ortusmedicinae
the Helmontian theoryof evaporation. As Lasswitz pointed out, Van
Helmont asserts in his Gas aquae that water cannot be turned into air,
but it can be attenuated to the point of becoming 4Vapor" or if still
more rare, "gas". These products are merely "extenuated water",

3 AllenG. Debus,FireAnalysis
andthe
andtheElements
inthe
Sixteenth
Seventeenth
Centuries
,
A History
AnnalsofScience,23 (1967),127-47.
, London
J.R. Partington,
ofChemistry
1961,Vol. II, 222 and 500-1.
4 BrianVickers,
andScientific
Occult
Mentalities
intheRenaissance,
1984,1-55
Cambridge
and 95-163,passim.
5 Correspondance
duP. MarinMersenne
, Paris1945,Vol. II, 532,whereVan Helmont
as onewho"faictrapsodie
criticizes
Gaffarel
du superstitieux..."
andVol. II, 584,
wherehe rejectsFludd.
6 Correspondance
duP. MarinMersenne
, Paris1945,Vol. II, andParis1969,Vol. III.
7 ItisclearthatMersenne
thisinformation
from
Van Helmont,
wasactively
soliciting
intheform
toquestions.
forthelatter's
areoften
written
ofitemized
letters
responses
Cf. Epistolae
189,191,and 194forexamples.
8 WalterPagel,JoanBaptista
vanHelmont
1982.
, Cambridge
9 KurdLasswitz,
Geschichte
derAtomistik,
andLeipzig1890,I, 343-51.CorHamburg
ofMersenne's
wasalsoawareofthis.Cf.Corresponnelisde Waard,theeditor
letters,
dance
duP. Marin
Mersenne
, Paris1969,Vol. Ill, 49: "Il apparat
que lesvuesde Van
Helmontne s'loignaient
de la matire,
dontil
corpusculaire
gured'une thorie
attention
identifie
les poresavecle magnaleTwo otherauthors
whohavebrought
however
are thefollowing:
Parto Van Helmont's
tendencies,
corpuscular
briefly,
A History
, London1961,II, 224,andReijerHooykaas,TheConofChemistry
tington,
. ofHetBegrip
H.H. Kubbinga,
trans.,
cept
Element),
(privately
printed,
ofElement
(trans
1983),167-72.
162

01:50:55 AM

'
4
brought into that state by 'local division" and 'extraversion of
parts".10
This "extraversin" of water particles is critical to the understanding of Van Helmont. Following Paracelsus, Van Helmont
asserts that water is itselfcomposed of the three principles,mercury,
sulfur,and salt.11These three cannot be separated in water, but they
can exchange places. When water is heated, the salt, which cannot
tolerateheat, is forcedupward, and since the mercuryand sulfurcannot be divided fromit, they follow the salt. If the vapor then passes
into yet higherregions, mercurycan "no longer keep its salt in solution",12 so it becomes a "gas". In order to protectthe mercuryand
salt, the warmer sulfur formsa skin over them, but in doing so, it
becomes attenuated. In the process, the mercuryand salt also become
attenuated, since they are attached to the sulfur. This attenuation
occurs by a divisionof the water into "the smallestpossible particles",
that is, "gas".13 Lasswitz makes the followingobservationsabout this
process:

oftheprinciples
bythedifferent
Vaporandgasarethusdistinguished
ordering
intheir
inthecaseofvapor,as inthatofwateritself,
thesulfur
smallest
particles:
back
andthisis againchanged
isenveloped
inthemercury,
bythesaltdissolved
andsalt
intowatermerely
bycoolingoff.Butinthecaseofthegas,themercury
arefrozen
towater,
The gasofitself
doesnotreturn
andcovered
bythesulfur.
nordescendagainwithout
an external
bytheBias,that
agent;thisis provided
thegasbackdown....14
movement
fromthestars,whichforces
is,an expulsive
The upshot of this is thatwater is vaporized by mere attenuationor
attritionof its particlesinto "atoms". But gas is produced when these
10Van Helmont,Gasaquae
medicinae
enim
, in Ortus
, 46, no. 10: "Non intercedit
essentiae
ubisolaestlocalisdivisio,& partium
extraversio"
. Allquotations
mutatio,
fromVan Helmont's
workwillbe drawnfromthe1667LyonseditionofhisOrtus
medicinae
noted.
, unlessotherwise
11Here Van Helmontacknowledges
thathe is speakinganalogically,
despitehis
inclination
toavoidmetaphor.
hesaysthatheis usingthesame
general
Interestingly,
method
as astronomers
do whentheydescribe
theireccentrics
(46, no. 8-9).
12Lasswitz,
345.
13Lasswitz,
345.
14Lasswitz,345-6:"Dunst und Gas unterscheiden
sichalso durchverschiedene
inihrenkleinsten
derGrundsubstanzen
Teilen;beimVaporistwiebeim
Anordnung
WasserderSulphur
vondemimMercurius
Sal eingehuellt,
undjenervergeloesten
wandelt
sichdaherbeiblosser
wiederinWasser.BeimGasedagegenist
Abkuehlung
Mercurius
undSal erstarrt
undvomSulphur
Das Gas wirddahernicht
eingehuellt.
vonselbstwiederzu Wasserundsteigtnichtvonselbstwiederherab,sondern
es
bedarfdazu einesaeusseren
diesengibtdas Blas, das isteinevonden
Antriebes;
Sternen
herwehende
welchedas Gas wiederherabdrueckt...."
Bewegung,
163

01:50:55 AM

are furtherdivided and literallyturned inside out by an "extraversin". These particles or "atoms"15 are forced to descend by the
exhalations of the stars,whereupon theyencounterthe tepid air of the
lower atmospheric regions. There the sulfurouscovering of the corpuscles breaks "just like a burstingskin, or like glass which is broken
when transferredfroma tepid environmentto a cold one".16
This interestingtheory surely owes as much to Van Helmont's
baroque imagination as it does to empirical observation, and yet it
shows several signs of advance over Van Helmont's contemporaries.
The notion of gas as somethingdistinctfromvapor, and the accompanying awareness that there can be differentgases, is Helmontian.
More than this, as Lasswitz realized, Van Helmont's theory had
"particular importanceforthe developmentof corpuscular theory".17
Van Helmont considered not only the "quantitative relation" of the
three principles to one another, but also their "spatial disposition":
in an extraversion
of
The passagefromthevaporto thegaseousstateconsists
thesulfur.This, however,
of distinct
corimplicitly
supposestheexistence
is alsoreferred
toundertherubric
offurther
division
puscles,whoseformation
The principles
arehereopenlythought
ofalreadyas thesmallest
[ofparticles].
ofthebody....WaterandGas arethesame,butina different
particles
ordering
theindividual
ofthecomponents
within
particles....18
Lasswitz thus accepted that Van Helmont's water corpuscles were
made up of real sub-particlesin the formof mercury,sulfur,and salt.
Therefore Van Helmont's water particle is a complex corpuscle,
which as Lasswitz states, "verges on the molecule theory" of modern
chemistry.19Although one might argue with the finer points of
Lasswitz' s interpretation,he was surely rightin arguing that within
the water corpuscle, Van Helmont allocated spatiallydistinctlayers to
and intraversio
the principles. The theory of extraversio
implies- as

15Van Helmont,
Gasaquae
, in Ortus
medicinae,
47, 20-21.
16Van Helmont,
medicinae
Gasaquae
, in Ortus
, 47, 20-21:"Tepornempesuavis,in
atomosGas deciderefacit,suo sulfure
aere tranquillo,
contectos,
qui velutpelle
delatifrangitur"
autvitriinstar,a tepido,in frigus
repente
disrupta,
17Lasswitz,350.
18Lasswitz,350: "Die Uebergang
in einem
vomDampfzumGaszustande
besteht
das
des Sulphurs.Das aber setzt doch stillschweigend
Nachaussenkehrung
von getrennten
auch unter
Vorhandensein
voraus,derenEntstehung
Korpuskeln
wird.Die Grundsubstanzen
sindhier
demNamenderweiteren
Teilungerwaehnt
Teile der Koerpergedacht....Wasserund Gas sind
offenbar
bereitsals kleinste
indeneinzelnen
Partikeln "
derBestandteile
dasselbe,nurinanderer
Anordnung
19Lasswitz,350.
164

01:50:55 AM

Lasswitz said- that there is no real differencebetween water and Gas

other than the ordering of their internal principles.
2. Van Helmontand Alchemy
2.1. Jbir ihnHayyn
Writingin the late nineteenthcentury,Lasswitz was in no position
to address the matterof Van Helmont's sources. It is possible now to
see the confluence of two alchemical traditions in Van Helmont's
44shell
theory", however, as we shall proceed to show. One of these
derives from the sixteenth-centuryiatrochemist Paracelsus von
Hohenheim, the other from the medieval school associated with the
name of ' "Jbir" or in its Latin form, ' 4Geber". According to the
traditionalbio-bibliographyof the Muslims, Jbir ibn Hayyn was a
Persian alchemistwho lived at some time in the eighth century,and
wrote a wealth of books on virtuallyevery aspect of natural philosophy. Fortunately,the brilliantworkof Paul Kraus in the 1940's allows
us to say with some certaintythat the vast majorityof the surviving
worksascribed toJbir are in factforgeries,many penned a good centuryafterthe master's death.20Kraus argued with great perspicacity
that the name of Jbir ibn Hayyn became a sort of "trademark"
under which a school or schools of IsmclTauthors promoted their
scientificand eschatological views.
For our purposes the importance of the Jbir corpus lies in the
"theory of the balance", a doctrine that Jbir did not invent, but
which he or his epigones promoted at great length. The "balance"
was based on an assumption thatevery materialsubstance contains its
opposite, but in a "hidden" fashion.21Thus everysubstance has a btn
and zhir, an "occult" and a "manifest" ( occultum
and manifestum
in
an
"interior"
or
and
"exterior".
this
terLatin),
Jbir employs
minologyof "occult" and "manifest" interchangeablywith "center"
and "circumference". Hence lead, which is cold and dry "externally", contains the opposite qualities, hot and wet, "internally".
Gold, on the other hand, is hot and wet "externally", and cold and
dry "internally". Now since Jbir argues that "the transmutationof
20PaulKraus,Jabir
ibnHayyn,
Contribution
l'histoire
desides
dansl'Islam
,
scientifiques
I, Cairo1943,XVII-LXV.
21Kraus,op.cit.,II, 228.
165

01:50:55 AM

metals is reducible to a simple interchangeof the elementaryqualities",22 it is obvious thatsuch knowledgecould serve to one's materiali
advantage. By "inverting" the interiorqualities of lead, one could
arrive at gold.
This concept of an inversionof the internaland the external surely
owes a debt to that groundstone of Aristotle's physics, the passage
frompotency to act. But Jbir's theorywas differentin that it reified
the Aristoteliandoctrine of potency and opened up the possibilityof
physically locating the "occult" and "manifest" components of a
material respectivelyin the "interior and "exterior" thereof.As I
shall show in due course, this "localization" of the occult and the
manifestdid not, indeed could not, occur until the alchemical writers
adopted a corpuscular theoryof matter. As long as one viewed mixtures of the elementsas being homogeneous and continuous, it would
have been nonsensical to localize act and potency. Hence when Jbir
uses such seemingly spatial language as "interior or "exterior", he
must be interpretedmetaphorically.
The alchemists of the thirteenthcenturydid indeed adopt a corpuscular theoryof matter,and over a long period of time, this theory
convertedJbir's reificationof potency and act into one of spatially
distinct layers of hidden and manifestcorpuscles or components of
corpuscles. Whereas Jbir's energies were devoted primarilyto the
arithmological manipulation of qualities, which he inherited from
ancient pharmacology, the main stream of his followersin the West
appropriated only the terminologyof the occult and the manifestand
theirspatial synonyms,applying it to theirown ends. This was quite
natural, since the major Jbirian work that was translated,the Seventy
Books, contained only a qualitative treatmentof the theory of the
balance. As we shall see, the theoryin this formwas to have a long
history.
2.2. Geberand theSummaperfectionis
The Seventy
BoohsofJbir was translatedby Gerard of Cremona or
his assistantsin the twelfthcentury.23The alchemy contained therein
is one that employs a varietyof natural substances. Hair, eggs, and
22Kraus,op.cit.,II, 2.
23Dictionary
ofthe
, XV (1978),Supp.I, 185,fortheinclusion
ofScientific
Biography
L. septuaginta
in thelistoftranslations
madebyGerardand hissocii.
166

01:50:55 AM

blood, forexample, serve as the startingpoints forproducing artificial

sal ammoniac, or ammonium chloride. Urine and vinegar provide the
basis of strong waters. In addition, Jbir introduces a plethora of
"salts" - by which he means any substance that is burnt and then
leached to arrive at a lixivium. One major thrustof the work lies in
Jbir's desire to analyze the elementedcomponents of the metals and
other substances. The strongreagents alluded to above, in combination withoperations such as fermentationand distillation,provide the
alchemist with his analytical tools: by corroding a given substance,
they separate its elemental composition, and free its fire,air, water,
and earth. These pure substances, once arrived at, are supposed to
work in a highly efficacious manner in producing transmutative
elixirs.
The Seventy
Books in short provides a microcosm of the rich and
powerfultechnologyknown to the alchemistsof medieval Islam. The
work was widely diffused among European readers by the midthirteenthcentury. Indeed, Jbir was so highly regarded that he
spawned a variety of imitators in the West. Written under the
Latinized formof "Geber", a corpus of Latin alchemy grewup in the
thirteenthand fourteenthcenturiesthat in effecttried to supplant the
Books. The chief and original member of this
authorityof the Seventy
ascribed to Geber. This work, as I
corpus was the Summaperfectionis
have argued elsewhere, was writtenaround the end of the thirteenth
century,probablyby an obscure Franciscan monk.24While the author
does not fullyunderstand the Seventy
Books, he succeeds nonethelessin
naturalizing it, by making it conformableto scholastic physics.
of AlbertusMagnus, the
Basing himselfin part on the De mineralibus
- Geber as I shall call him- took the
author of the Summaperfectionis
radical step of rejectinganimal and plant substances in his alchemy.
The myriadpreparationsof blood, urine, and vegetaljuices employed
. Geber has decided that
byJbir findno echo in the Summaperfectionis
the alchemist must "follow nature wherever possible", that is, he
must use the same principles as does she in transmutingthe metals.
These principlesare mercuryand sulfur.25Nature congeals mercury
withinthe earth by means of sulfur,to produce the differentmetals.
Only by this means may the alchemistproduce metals that can resist
the refiner's fire. What is more, mercury contains its own sulfur
24W. Newman,TheSumma
perfectionis
oftseudo-Geber
, Leiden1991,57-108.
25Newman,
, i-iv,134-8,204-8.
pseudo-Geber
167

01:50:55 AM

within itself.26Since mercury is not inflammable, like sulfur, the

alchemist would thereforedo well to avoid any reagent but mercury
in preparing his transmutativeelixir, now called the "philosophers'
stone".
While Geber still allows the use of ' 'salts, niters,and boraxes" in
preparinghis mercury,he does not view theseas persistingin the final
product. They are means of purifyingthe mercury,but they do not
unite withit. Thus Lynn Thorndike dubbed Geber's modus operandi
the " mercuryalone" theory,as the philosophers' stone is viewed by
him as consisting solely of purifiedmercury,although this mercury
still contains a sulfur"inherent" in itself.27Geber praises "God the
blessed and glorious" for creating mercury, since it is a unique
substance in that it can be led to "metallic perfection".28Let us now
consider how this purificationtakes place. Geber views mercury,and
indeed all mineral substances, as being composed of tinycorpuscles,
called "minimal parts" or "subtle parts" ( minima
, or subtiles
partes).29
Geber states as a given that bigger corpuscles are more difficultto
sublime than their smaller counterparts. But natural mercury is
unusual in that its corpuscles are all roughly the same size. Hence
upon the application of heat, mercurysublimes withoutleaving any
residue. Nonetheless, naturally occurring mercury does contain
heterogeneous impurities, in the form of a "burning sulfur" and a
"filthyearth". The alchemistmust remove these imperfectionswhile
also "drying out" his mercuryby sublimingit with salt. The resultin Geber's eyes- will be that the mercury becomes even more
homogeneous than it was, and that its particlesare now more closely
packed. As a result,it acquires "fixity", the abilityto withstandheat
withoutsubliming. This is an essential propertyforthe philosophers'
stone, since withoutfixity,the mercurywill not be able to withstand
the assayer's fire. Thus Geber says that his mercury is that which
"conquers the fireand is not conquered thereby,but reststhere in a
friendlyfashion, taking pleasure in it".30 In modern terms what
Geber has produced is corrosive sublimate, mercuryII chloride. He
believes, however, that by continually subliming and dissolving this
26Newman,
-Geber,
76ra,16-23.
pseudo
27LynnThorndike,
A History
Science
, NewYork1934,III,
ofMagicandExperimental
58.
28Newman,
75va,33-8.
pseudo-Geber,
29Newman,pseudo-Geber
, 143-67.
30Newman,
, 75va,39-40.
pseudo-Geber
168

01:50:55 AM

product,he can make its particlesattain such minutenessthattheywill

be able to penetratethroughthe pores of a base metal and transmute
it into gold. Geber expresses this increased subtlety in terms of a
tripartitescale: he lists "medicines" of the first,second, and third
order. The tinycorpusclesof a purifiedmercurybelongingto the third
order will infixthemselvesin the intimate structureof the metal and
supply the augment of weightnecessary to bring any metal up to the
specific gravityof gold. Moreover, the newly entered particles will
block the excess pores of base metals that accounted fortheirerstwhile
susceptibilityto corrosion, thus making them incorruptible.
The terminologyby which Geber expresses his mercury'sabilityto
penetratedeeply into gold and modifyits structure,is not surprisingly
the "occult" and "manifest" of Jbir ibn Hayyn. Hence he refers
to the "depth of the occult" of tin,31or simply the "depth" or "profundity"of lead.32 Inferiormedicines cannot cure the imperfectionin
a metal's "profundity"- this is for those of the third order alone.
Mercury itselfhas a twofoldsulfurwithinitself:one sulfuris "sealed
up in the profundityof its substance", whereas the otheris "supervenient".33 The second may be removed by art, but the first,because
of its radical nature, is difficultor impossible to eradicate.
It is temptingto argue that Geber himselfhas attributeda spatial
sense to the occult and manifestofJbir ibn Hayyn. In a loose sense
this is perhaps true, since the Summaspeaks of a penetrationthrough
the smallestparticles( perminima)up to the profundityof a base metal.
The author may have in mind an agglomerationof particlesthat can
be broken down into smaller components, and that the occult or profound level is attained only with such an analysis. Nowhere does he
describe such a second-ordercomposite particle, however, leaving the
possibilityopen that forGeber, the occult and the manifestare stillto
some degree synonymouswith Aristotelianpotency and act, and so
must be interpretedtropologically.
It is a remarkablefactthat the Summaperfectionis
nowhere mentions
the Aristotelianduality of matterand form.Indeed, Geber's explanations are of such a uniformlycorpuscular nature that on one occasion
at least, a seventeenth-century
followerof his has been viewed as parin
a
"mechanical
ticipating
re-thinkingof alchemy" under the
31Newman,
pseudo-Geber
, 77vb,3.
32Newman,
, 77vb,7.
pseudo-Geber
33Newman,
, 76ra,18-19.
pseudo-Geber
169

01:50:55 AM

putative influenceof the "new science" of the early modern period!34

But Geber was not a mechanical philosopher: as we have elsewhere
shown, his sources lie above all in the traditionof the fourthbook of
Aristotle'sMeteors
, a work of marked corpuscular tendencies. Geber's
corpuscular reworking of Jbirian alchemy rationalizes the
multifarious processes of chemical technology in full accord with
scholastic physics.
2.3. ParacelsusvonHohenheim
The cool rationalismof Geber could not seem more differentfrom
the world of the sixteenthcenturymagus Paracelsus von Hohenheim.
Composing with such chaotic abandon that he has been accused of
writingwhile inebriated, Paracelsus lays fortha universe in which all
matteris ensouled.35It is difficultat firstto see how a thinkersuch as
Van Helmont could have fused elements from such wildly different
systems as those of Paracelsian and Geberian alchemy. In order to
understand how he did so, we must firsttake a glimpse, however
briefly,at Paracelsian cosmology as a whole.
Paracelsus is famous for asserting that all things are composed of
threeprinciples,mercury,sulfur,and salt. This is in part a reworking
of the Arabic theorythat metals are made of sulfurand mercury,to
which Paracelsus has given a trinitariantwistby adding salt.36Indeed,
in his BookofMeteors,Paracelsus argues thatall thingsare made "from
three" because the fiat lux by which God created the world was
necessarilythree-fold,37
being the expression of the Father, Son, and
But
Holy Spirit.
preciselyin this same locus we also learn that there
are four elements, which are fire, air, water, and earth, just as in
Aristoteliancosmology. Paracelsus argues that these elements act as
"mothers" to produce the material world. They are as it were
stamped with the trinitarianactivityof the three principles.
and Fruitsof the
In a closely related work, the Book of theGeneration
Four Elements
, Paracelsus relates that these four immaterial mothers

34B.T.T. Dobbs,TheFoundations
Cambridge
ofNewton's
1975,82.
Alchemy,
35D.P. Walker,Spiritual
andDemonic
FicinotoCampanella
, London1958,
Magicfrom
96-7,101.
36WalterPagel,Paracelsus
, Basel1958,100-4.
37Theophrast
Saemtliche
Werke
Mnchen
vonHohenhein,
, I. Abt.,ed. KarlSudhoff,
1931,XIII, 134-6.
170

01:50:55 AM

produce four distinct physical layers in the cosmos, the totalityof

which he calls Domor.38 These elemental layers are paired so that the
outer one consistsof air or "chaos" on its external side, and fireon
the internal,while the innerpair is made up of earth on the outer and
water within. This is somewhat artificial,however, for Paracelsus
admits that products of fire exist in the air, such as the sun which
4Swims' ' in the "chaos".
Similarly,brooks and streamsobviously are
found on the earth's surface.
The outer borders of each element are referredto as its Yliadum.
At the internal surface of each sphere, the material element is produced by its "mother", which is evidently intangible, whereas the
externalYliadum is thepoint at which the element "dies" and returns
to the immaterial. In typically Paracelsian fashion, however, the
Yliadum is not only a physical border; it is also the maturationpoint
of a given elemental "fruit". When a fruitof earth, such as a chestnut
tree, grows to the end of earth's Yliadum, it begins to penetrate the
sphereof fire,and so dies. The putrefactionof vegetable matterby the
heat of the sun, which "consumes" it, is thus viewed as the resultof
a given "fruit's" trespass on the neighboring elemental sphere:
" . . .each
thing,when it arrivesat its Yliadum, is subjected to putrefacand
rots".39Thus Paracelsus describes the Yliadum of the earth
tion,
as not proceeding beyond the surface of the earth more "than the
height of growing things."40This area is the "lower chaos", which
Paracelsus distinguishesfromthe "upper chaos" where the element
of fireis located.
Despite this delimitation of Yliada, the fruits of the respective
elements depend on their neighbors:
... in thesamewayas theelement
ofearthholdsitsfruit
in thebodyofchaos,
so theearthis thebodythatsupports
thegrowth,
oftheelement
tree,andfruit
ofwater.Forthere
isnoelement
doesnothavea bodyinwhich
which
itisborne.
Thechaosbearsimpressions,
theelement
offirebearsthefruits
oftheearth,the
earththewater,
andthewatertheair,so thatthefruit
ofeachelement
is borne
in theotherelement.41
38Theophrastus
Bcher
undSchrifften,
Husered., Basel 1590
Paracelsus,
Johannes
Theil
1972,IV] Achter
, 55.
reprint
[Olms
39Huser,Achter
Theil
, 126.
40Huser,Achter
Theil
, 126.
41Huser,Achter
Theil
weiss/wie
das ElementTerrae
sein
, 124: "Dann zu gleicher
Frucht
imCorpusChaoshalt:Alsodermassen
istdie Erddas Corpus
, das da auffenthalt/die
dessBaums[dess]Element
Gewechs/Beum/und
Fruecht
Wasser.Danndo
istkeinElement/es
musshabeneinCorpus
wird.Der Chaostregt
, darinnes getragen
dieImpressiones
Fewrtregt
demErdtrich
seinFruecht/das
Erdtrich
dem
, dz Element
171

01:50:55 AM

Hence there is a symbiosis between the neighboringelements. As

Paracelsus says in another "meteorological" passage, a tree on the
surface of the earth 'Tills up the air", while metals, which are products of water, fillup "the pores of the earth".42 Water and earth can
be related to the non-neighboring air because in reality air or
"chaos", being the realm of God, is presentto some degree in all the
otherelements,and supplies lifeto them all.43The intenselybiological
character of this doctrine can hardly be overstated. In order to make
this yet more clear, let us consider the example of a single element,
water. In the case of water, the elemental motherexudes its product,
apparently at the core of the earth. The water thus produced then
branches out like a vast tree, both to produce mineral veins and to
formthe riversof the world. The riversin turnemptythemselvesinto
the sea, where they die and putrefy,to become brine. The image of
a watery tree is well described by Paracelsus, and deserves to be
quotedoftheearth,and therefinds
[Water]... goesin itsYliadumup to thesurface
terminate
theirYliadumin the
whichis itsend ... all thebranches
itsheight,
a topand
Foras thereis a root,so it produces
sea, whereall cometogether.
an umbel
is no trunk
ortree,butrather
umbel:thisis thesea. The sea ofitself
from
theroot,butfrom
ofstalks,and itdoesnotgrowimmediately
composed
thebranches.44
The emphasis that Paracelsus places on the distal relationship
between the canopy, or sea, and the root of the waterytree may be
intended to suggest the increasing materialityof the manifestedelement as it proceeds away fromits mother: hence the point of greatest
densityis also that of its demise and returnto the immaterial.45Now
it is fair to wonder how this fantasticcosmology can relate to the
restrained and sober theories of Geberian alchemy. Paracelsus was
certainly no corpuscular philosopher, and betrays little first-hand
knowledgeof Geber. The connection, as I statedearlier, is an indirect
in demandernEleFruecht
Wasser/das
WasserdemLufft/also/das
jedes Elements
mentgetragen
werden".
42Sudhoff,
III, 37.
43Huser,Achter
Theil
, 61.
44 Huser,Achter
Theil
auffdie EbenederErden/do
, 126: "... gehtin sein Yliadum
ihrYliadum
imMeer/do
erwindt
istseinEnd... alleEstbeschliessen
sejnhoehi/und
kommt
allezusammen.
Dannwiees EinWrzist/also
es inEinSpitzund
kommens
Baum/allein
Dolden/der
istdasMeer.Das MeerfuersichselbstistkeinStamm/noch
wachst
fuersichselbst/sondern
derDoldenderStammen/und
nichtaussderWurtzen
was es nimbtdurchdie Est".
45Huser,Achter
Theil
, 126.
172

01:50:55 AM

one, and to see it we must returnto the Paracelsian image of a giant

waterytree. The waterywomb has more than one efflorescence,as it
produces not only liquid water, but minerals. Thus Paracelsus views
mineral veins as being trees or branches in their own right. These
subterraneantreeshave a "harvest" just as theirsurfacecounterparts,
at which time they too produce ' 'fruits" or "nuts". In a striking
example of thisorganic image, Paracelsus argues thatthisaccounts for
the fact that metals have to be refinedfromtheir ores:
Therearesometreeswhichgivetheir
fruit
notpurebutmixed,
justas a chestnut
or thelikehasan external
rawshell,thenanother,
over
andthena membrane
thekernel.
Themetals
andgeneraofminerals
ofmeatsand
whicharecomposed
skinsarealsolikethis,suchas ironore,silverore,andotherores,so thatone
mustseparatethemtherefrom
ifone is to findthefruit
within....46
It is precisely because the various ores are produced by metallic
treesthattheydo not usually yield metals in a pure state. The ores are
literally the "nuts" produced by the subterranean branches, and
thereforetheymust be hulled of theirimpurities.Now the division of
shell, membrane, and kernel resurfacesin other Paracelsian descriptions of minerals as well. In his work Of NaturalThings, forexample,
Paracelsus claims that sulfurhas a kernel, membrane, and shell. He
calls the three types of sulfur "metallic", "embryonic", and
"mineral".47 One can easily see why Paracelsus would have labelled
one sulfur"mineral", and allocated it to the external shell, given that
many common ores are sulfideswhich would release theirsulfurupon
being refined.The "embryonic" sulfur,on the otherhand, has a long
historyin the discoveryand use of ethylether, since Paracelsus tried
to arrive at thissulfurby distillinga mixtureof sulfuricacid and ethyl
alcohol, arrivingat an impure ether. Paracelsus, incidentally,fed this
ether to chickens and observed its narcotic properties.48As for the
metallic sulfur,this is the component of metals that causes theircongelation, just as the medieval sulfur-mercury
theorywould have it.
One can see, at least in rough outline, how Paracelsus' elaborate
biological cosmology served him in classing differentchemicals,
especially sulfurcompounds. His method, as so oftenin this writer,
is to apply the macrocosm-microcosmanalogy in such a way as to
transpose the structureof one natural phenomenon onto another.
46Sudhoff,
III, 38.
47Sudhoff,
II, 126-145.
48Pagel,Paracelsus
, 276-7.
173

01:50:55 AM

Thus 4'the tree" becomes a sort of ideal form that finds itself
manifested on all levels of existence. This leads us into a delicate
problem, namely the question of literalness in Paracelsus' thought.
Just how exactly did he propose that minerals mimicked the formof
'
trees, and their 'fruit" that of nuts? One can see how in the case of
mineral veins, the image has a strikingand visual appropriateness.
Indeed, native silveris sometimesfound in long black formationsthat
really do have the appearance of twistedstalks. But in the case of the
"nut", with its tripartiteshell, the visual parallelism seems to break
down. This would not have bothered a mind like Paracelsus' who
believed thatmen who act in a swinishfashion,forexample, reallyare
pigs.49To him it is the internalessence of a thing that dominates its
being, although the external appearance reveals importantclues.
As we shall see, however, certain of Paracelsus' followerswere not
contentwith such a tropologicalassociation between minerali"fruits"
and theirsurfacecounterparts.This leads us back to our main theme,
which was the association of the Geberian corpuscular theorywith the
occultum/manifestumcomplex of his masterJbir ibn Hayyn. For
the followers of Paracelsus, steeped in the tradition of Geberian
alchemy, found nothingmore natural than the graftingof his "fruit"
onto the more solid body of a Geberian corpuscle. Afterall, had not
Geber himself stated that matter had an "interior" and an
"exterior?" What could be more reasonable, then, than to superimpose a nut, with its shell at the circumferenceand its kernel at the
center, onto the image of a single Geberian minimal part? This
association was all the more probable in that Paracelsus too equated
the external shell with the naturally occurring, visible product,
whereas the kernelwas somethingsecretedaway in the occult recesses
of the mineral, demanding a separation by the refiner'sart. In order
to arrive at a spatially determined particle, one had merely to take
Paracelsus' comments about generalized ores and sulfurs, and
transpose them onto an individual corpuscle.
This, I believe, is preciselywhat Van Helmont did. Echoing Geber,
Van Helmont states that mercuryhas two sulfurs,one superfluous,
the other intrinsic.The intrinsicsulfuris "very profoundlymixed"50
to the mercury, and cannot be affectedby corrosives.51This is all
49Huser,Zehender
Theil
, 13.
50Van Helmont,
meteori
medicinae
Progymnasa
, in Ortus
, 43, 14.
51Van Helmont,
medicinae
meteori
, in Ortus
, 43, 17.
Progymnasa
174

01:50:55 AM

orthodox Geberian doctrine: the reader will recall that the Summa
spoke of a "double sulfureity"in mercury,one part sealed up in the
"beginning ofits mixture", the otherpart "supervenient".52 But Van
Helmont goes on to clothe his Geber in the language of Paracelsus.
The supervenientsulfurof Geber here becomes the "external sulfur"
of the Paracelsian mineral tree.53The intrinsicsulfurof Geber, on the
other hand, is now said to exist "in the center", where it makes up
"the interiorkernelof the mercury'' ,54This interiorkernelof the mercury "cannot be reached by dissolvents,much less bored out".55 Thus
Van Helmont has fusedGeberian corpuscularismwiththe Paracelsian
theoryof the mineral tree, in order to arrive at a complex particlewith
clearly defined internal space.
3. Van Helmont
's TheoryofMixture
3.1. Minima Naturalia
It should be fairlyeasy to see how Van Helmont could have married
Geberian corpuscularism with the Paracelsian language of "shells"
and "kernels" to come up withsomethingrathernovel. But the incorporation of Geberian mattertheoryis not Van Helmont' s only debt
to medieval corpuscularism.As I shall now show, Van Helmont borrowed important elements from the scholastic theory of minima
naturaliaas well. These borrowingssurface in Van Helmont' s theory
of mixture.Unlike the atomistsof antiquity,Van Helmont denies that
substances genuinelycombine by a juxtaposition of theirminute cor, as also the Opusculamedicainaudita,
puscles.56 In the Ortusmedicinae
Van Helmont distinguishesbetween "mere apposition" of particles
and true "wedlock". The firstis a "bare commingling," which Van
Helmont contraststo the genuine "marriage" thatcan occur between
substances thathave undergone "a verydeep connecting... as it were
of two sexes".57 As in modern chemistry,Van Helmont asserts that
52Newman,
, 76ra,16-23.
pseudo-Geber
53Van Helmont,
meteori
, in Ortusmedicinae
, 43, 14: "sulphurexterProgymnasa
num...."
54Van Helmont,
meteori
medicinae
Mercurii
, in Ortus
, 43, 17: "... interior
Progymnasa
Nucleus...."
55Van Helmont,
meteori
medicinae
, in Ortus
, 43, 17: "... a dissolventibus
Progymnasa
nonattingitur,
multominusterebratur".
56A briefbutgoodtreatment
ofancientatomism
maybe foundin G.S. Kirk,J.E.
ThePresocratic
Raven,and M. Schofield,
Philosophers
, Cambridge
1983,402-33.
57Van Helmont,
De lithiasi,
24,1and 18,5.
175

01:50:55 AM

what we would today call a "mechanical mixture", such as the juxtaposition of sand and grains of salt, is not a compound at all, but a
"bare commingling." But here the similarityends. For where modern
chemistry knows of compounds held together by chemical bonds
between recoverable elements, Van Helmont speaks of "indissoluble
marriages". Only "spirits", that is, volatile substances, can partake
of such permanent conjugal bliss, and this in a restrictedfashion. If
one triesto mix grossermatter,such as water and earth,the resultwill
be a mere "affusion" or apposition, not the sought-forcoalescence
(coalitus)
At firstface, then, it sounds as though Van Helmont is proposing
thatall substances must be volatilized or subtilizedbeforetheycan be
trulycombined. This is indeed true to his thought,but one must add
the caveat that a mere mixtureof spiritsis not properly"marriage"
as such. What happens, rather,is that the spiritsmust be transmuted
,
not merely mixed. The followingpassage explains this nicely:
so thattheycannotbe further
ifthe
Whenbodiesarefully
subtilized,
[reduced],
shouldcontinue,
substance....58
subtilizing
theywillfinally
passintoanother
The import of this passage is that there is a natural limit to
divisibility,beyond which a substance, qua substance, cannot pass. If
it should surpass that limit, it will then become another substance.
The same idea is expressed in the language of atomism, as follows:
I havefoundthatso oftenas a bodyis dividedintosmalleratomsthanthe
ofitssubstance
canstand,a transmutation
ofthatbodywillcontinually
necessity
follow,
exceptin thecase ofan element.59
It is highlylikely that Van Helmont is basing himselfhere on the
medieval concept of minimanaturalia
, an offshootof Aristotelianmatter
IV
of
In
Book
the Physics
, Aristotleasserts that
I, Chapter
theory.
animals and plants have an upper and a lower size limit,and that the
same must be said of theirparts.60From thisratherobscure reasoning,
- smallest
the scholastics concluded that there are minimanaturalia
natural parts out of which living, and even inanimate things, are
58Van Helmont,
meteori
sub, 42, 7: ''Corporaenimdumad summum
Progymnasa
siperseveretur
utamplius
nonpossint,
tandem
abeuntinaliam
tiliantur,
subtiliando,
cumretentione
seminalium".
substantiam,
proprietatum
59Van Helmont,
in
, 72,23: "Cognovienim,quotiescorpusdividitur
fermenti
Imago
ferat
continuo
subtiliores
etiamsequicoratomos,quamsuaesubstantiae
exigentia,
porisilliustransmutationem,
exceptoelemento".
60Anneliese
im14.Jahrhundert
Galileis
Maier,Die Vorlufer
, Roma 1949,180.
176

01:50:55 AM

composed. Roger Bacon, writingin the thirteenthcentury, argued

that although matter may be infinitelydivisible in principle, the
smallera particleis, theless it can exercise its natural power on others.
Thus if a particle of fire,forexample, becomes too small, it will lose
its power of heating. As a result, the elements qua elements have a
lower terminusbeyond which they cannot be divided. If they should
be divided further,theywould effectively
cease to be elements at all.
There can be little doubt that Van Helmont has tapped the minima
naturaliatheoryforhis own idea of chemical combination. Indeed, the
very language of his paradoxical claim that if "the subtilizing" of
bodies should be made to continue after "they cannot be further
[reduced]", they "will finallypass into another substance", echoes
similarclaims made by the late thirteenthcenturyfollowerof Thomas
Aquinas, Aegidius Romanus. As Aegidius says, the division of a
"natural body" may not proceed into infinity:
... butitwillarriveat something
whichis notdivisible
in thisfashion,
andifit
shouldhappenthatitbefurther
itwouldbestripped
ofitsownnature.61
divided,
Van Helmont could easily have been exposed to the works of
Aegidius Romanus while a student at Louvain, but there is no need
to insiston that point, since the work of Anneliese Maier has shown
that the minimanaturaliatheorywas widespread among the scholastics
at large.
The upshotof Van Helmont' s theoryis thatthereis no intermediate
state between mechanical mixture and transmutation.A compound
such as cinnabar, mercurysulfide,is illusory,since its componentsare
easily recovered by decomposition. As he says himself:
themercurial
Although
partin metals,to thesamedegreeas thebodyofmerofvitriol,
takeon themasks[larvae]
can on accountofadditives
oil,
curyitself,
oftheeye.Thisis becausethe
butimpostures
salt,orwater,thesearenothing
to
thereaccording
from
these,foritwasalwayspresent
mercury
alwaysreturns
itsnatureand all itsproperties.62

61Anneliese
in eo quodcorpusnaturale,
sic
Maier,op.cit.,p. 182: "Si intelligatur
ad aliquidquodsecundum
immoestdevenire
nonvaditdivisioin infinitum,
quod
huiusmodinon est ulteriusdivisibile,et si contingeret
ipsumulteriusdividi,
a naturasua".
expoliaretur
62Van Helmont,
Triaprima
, 255,59: "Igiturquanquamparsmercurialis
chymicorum
larvas
in metallis,
adiuncta,suscipiat
corpore,
propter
adeoque& in ipsoMercurii
vitrioli,
olei,salis,vel aquae: nonsuntnisioculorum
imposturae.
Quippesemper
inderedit,
&omnesproprietates,
inest".
Mercurius
naturam,
quiasecundum
semper
177

01:50:55 AM

In the case of spiritsthat undergo a radical interpntration,on the

other hand, the result is "an inseparable offspringof mixture, a
transmutedproduct, a thirdthing fromeach".63 In otherwords, one
can have an "offspringof mixture", but not a chemical compound as
such. Strictlyspeaking, Van Helmons theoryreplaces the real combination of two volatile substances with transmutationof the two
substances into somethingelse. The point may seem pedantic, but it
had a vast impact in the direction of laboratory practice: to the
Helmontian, two substances that had undergone transmutationcould
not be reduced into their original constituents.64The production of
such "compounds" - the existence of which violates the very notion
of the chemical compound as we know it- formed a major goal of
Helmontian chemistry.Before approaching this subject, however, we
must ask a question that has been lurkingin the background. If two
substances are reduced into such minute corpusclesthattheylose their
original character, as enunciated above, what relation will the tertium
neutrum
j the product of their transmutation,bear to its progenitors?
Since they have lost their original characteristicsby virtue of their
reduction into "atoms", how can theirproduct be related to them at
all?
and Semina
3.2. Fermentation
Van Helmons answer to these questions will bringus directlyinto
his theoryof fermentation.As he says in his Imagofermenti
, "ferments
are the predecessors wholly necessary to every transmutation"....65
Indeed, fermentsare the "parents" of transmutationin general.66
What precisely are the mysteriousfermentsof which Van Helmont
speaks? He definesthem thus: "The mediadtools by which the semina
dispose materials, I call ferments".67 The ferments, then, are
63Van Helmont,
De lithiasi,
25, 7: "...cumpermistione
radicali,
estqueconstitutum
ex ambobus,inseparabilis,
mistionis
est productum,
proles,hoc transmutatum,
neutrum
ab utroque".
64Van Helmont,
De lithiasi
non
, 19, 13: "Obiterhieadnoto,quodin transmutatis
ad id,undetransmutatum
sitregressus
immediatus
est:nonmagisquama privatione
cum
ad habitm
... Idcircoenimtransmutata
servant
novientisessentiam,
propriam
concreti
prioris
neglectu".
65Van Helmont,Imago
: 69, 1: "Etenimut fermenta
omninoad omnem
fermenti
transmutationem
praevia,atquenecessaria...."
66Van Helmont,
, 72, 23.
Imago
fermenti
67Van Helmont,
De lithiasi
, 29,[5]: "Media autemorgana,quibusseminamaterias
voco".
fermenta
disponunt,
178

01:50:55 AM

instrumentsby which the indwellingseeds of all things,or semina, go

about theirbusiness. As is well-known,Van Helmont believed thatall
mattercontains these tiny activating particles , or semina.Quoting
Michael Sendivogius, he says that 4'every semen(according to the
chemical Cosmopolite) is barely the 8200th part of its body".69 Van
Helmont goes much fartherthan Sendivogius in his claims for these
seeds, however. According to Van Helmont, it is the seminaalone that
transmute elemental water into the myriad substances that we
encounterin the phenomenal world. All thingsare reallymade out of
water, but water that has undergone the transmutativeaction of the
semina:it is the fermentsthat allow these seeds to work:
Allbodiesprimitively
and materially
drawtheiroriginfromwater,thesemen
arelost,thebodies
Andwhenthesemina
beingacquiredbymeansofferment.
return
intotheirformer
ofwater.70
finally
dwelling
It is the semina
, then, that provide elemental water with specific
characteristicsof matteras we know it. So what is the role of the ferment? Afterasserting that fermentationis the parent of transmutation, we foundVan Helmont statingthatwhen a body is reduced into
smaller "atoms" than "its substance can stand", the body will be
transmuted.This transmutationoccurs by the followingmeans:
theforesaid
Theimbibed
ferment,
atoms,imbuesthemwithitsownalien
seizing
ofwhichthereoccurdivisions
oftheparticles.
character,
duringthereception
The resolution
ofthematter
follows
theseheterogeneities
anddivisions
ofthe
andprescribed
Chemistry
up to nowhasno doubtdigested
particles.
putrefactionsso thatoncea ferment
is taken,theparticles
.71
divideintominima
A ferment,then, is a physical substance having the abilityto divide
othermatterinto the minimal particlesor minimadescribed above. At
the same time, the fermentitselfis the bearer of the specificcharacteristics that are imparted to the newly transmutedmatter. Elsewhere
68Pagel,VanHelmont
, 35-95.
69Van Helmont,
mistionum
, 66, 12: "Estqueomnesemen,suicorComplexionum
atque
vix8200.pars...."
poris(iuxtaChymicum
Cosmopolitam)
70Van Helmont,Imagofermenti
, 73, 33: "Corpora cuncta primitive,
atque
materialiter
ex aqua solafiant;acquisito
semine,quodqueexantlatis
perfermentm
rtrocdant".
seminibus,
corporatandemin pristinum
aquae hospitium
71Van Helmont,
, 72, 23: "Quatenushaustum
fermentm,
Imago
fermenti
arripiens
in cuiussusceptione
fiuntdiviatomos,eos alienosui charactere
imbuit,
praefatos
sionespartium,
1652,93,23 has
quaspartium
heterogeneitas
[sic!edition
ofAmsterdam
& divisiones,
resolutio
materiae
Hactenusnimirum
heterogeneitates],
consequitur.
ac putrefactiones
utacceptofermento
in
Chymiadigerit,
praemittit,
partesdehiscant
minima".
179

01:50:55 AM

Van Helmont tells us that this imbuing of the "atoms" or corpuscles

witha new charactercan take place in two ways. That is because there
are two types of fermentin nature. One type of fermentcontains in
itselfa "flowing aura" ( aurafluxibilis),while the other acts only as a
"beginning of motion" ( initiummotus)or principle of generation. To
simplify Van Helmont' s discourse, the first type of ferment is
endowed with semina, whereas the second is not. In the case of the
second, seedless type of ferment,"only the odor of the ferment" is
absorbed by the matter, and this "odor" is a "contagion fromthe
containing vessel or ambient atmosphere".72 It is not hard to see that
Van Helmont is tryinghere to explain the differencebetween sexual
and spontaneous generation. Thus the herb basil, when subjected to
a fermentwithsemina, produces more basil. But if it should be placed
between two bricks,and subjected to the influenceof the ambient ferment, it can yield a scorpion.73
When Van Helmont speaks of fermentsas the impartersof specific
characteristics,he is thereforereferringto the fermentas a host and
purveyerof semina.It is the seminathat are the real sources of material
difference,forat the most fundamentadlevel, nothingexistsbut semina
and water. The seeming confusion of Van Helmons account arises
fromthe factthatgenerationcan occur even ifthe fermentin question
does not contain semina:in such a case the fermentacts as a prime
mover to the act of generation,and the seminaare simplydrawn from
the atmosphere or another source.
To go furtherinto Van Helmons theorywould necessitatea foray
into his psycho-sexualconcept of generation,which would lead us too
farastrayat present. For the moment, let us instead recapitulatewhat
we have learned so far in this section. Van Helmont views all
substances as composed of water acted on by semina.The fermentsare
substances thatrelease, stirup and incitethe seminato activity,in part
by means of a mechanical division of matter into minima.We are
72Van Helmont,Imago
in natura.
, 70, 8: "Sunt ergodupliciafermenta
fermenti
in se auramfluxibilem,
Unumquidemcontinet
Archeum
seminalem,
qui suofluxu
in animamviventem
verosaltemcontinet
initiummotus,sive
aspirat.Alterum
reiinrem".(71, 11) "In prioribus
seminibus,
generationis
ergo,&vitalibus
generans
& auramvitalem,
cumsui similitudine,
una cumseminis
massa.
Archeum,
inspirt
In posterioribus
tantumfermenti
aut
vero,insufflatur
odor,a vasiscontinentibus,
moxinplantam
ambientis
velinsectam
forcontagio.
Quae ubiritecoaptatafuerint,
mantur,excitatanimirum
aura, ab odore,& fermento
fracedinis,
quae dein in
Archeum
rectorem
exaltatur".
73Van Helmont,
, 71, 13-4.
fermenti
Imago
180

01:50:55 AM

thereforein a good positionto answer the question posed by us several

pages ago: what is it that transmutestwojuxtaposed substances when
they are broken down into smaller corpuscles than their nature can
bear? The answer clearly is the semina, foreven when the bodies have
passed into "another substance", their "seminal properties" can be
retained.74Aftertwo substances have been divided into minimal particles, theirseminaare freeto act on one another. Only in this fashion
mightelementsbe "mixed", as in the followinghypotheticalexample:
toloseitsownbeing(esse)andbe reduced
into
earthwouldhavefirst
Therefore
withseedby its
juice,beforeit mightmarrywater.The latterimpregnated
wouldpassthenintothefruit
determined
seed.75
embrace,
bytheconceived
The language used by Van Helmont, with such termsas "marry",
"conceived", "impregnated", and "embrace", is obviously sexual.
In effect,what he has done is to unite the minimanaturaliatheoryof
medieval scholasticismwith the hylozoism of his teacher Paracelsus,
to arrive at a vitalisticcorpuscularism. But Van Helmont is not contentwiththisfusionof traditions.He adds yet another element to the
mix: his knowledgeof Geberian alchemy. It was this,as we shall show,
that led him to one of the lynchpinsof his system,the theoryof the
alkahest.
4. The Helmontian
Alkahest
It is well known that Van Helmont invented neither the term
alkahest
, nor the idea that this substance could reduce matterinto its
ultimate constituents.76The Paracelsian work De renovatione
et restora- a term
tion already contains the notion that there is a sal circulatum
used also by Van Helmont as a synonymforthe alkahest- which can

74Van Helmont,
meteori
sub, 42, 7: "Corporaenimdumad summum
Progymnasa
siperseveretur
utamplius
nonpossint,
tandem
abeuntinaliam
tiliantur,
subtiliando,
cumretentione
seminalium".
substantiam,
proprietatum
75Van Helmontin factbelievedthatearthcouldnotbe transmuted
intowater
becauseofitselemental
He introduces
theexampleonlyforthesakeof
simplicity.
meteori
discussion.
Cf. Progymnasa
, 43, 11: "Terraitaque,deberetpriussuumesse
amittere,
atque in succumredigi,priusquamaquae nuberet,ut hanc semine
in fructum
traduceret
seminidestinatum".
impraegnatam,
amplectendo
concepto
76LadislaoReti,
VanHelmont
andtheAlkahest
, Boyle
, in: SomeAspects
ofSeventeenth& Science:
Medicine
Readata Clark
Seminar
October
12, 1968, Los
Century
Papers
Library
Angeles1969,3-19.
181

01:50:55 AM

return substances to theirprimmens or primordial substance.77But

Van Helmont proceeded farbeyond Paracelsus in providinga theory
for the alkahest, and this he did by employing his medieval
meteori
predecessors. His Progymnasa
openly reveals that much of Van
Helmons theorizingabout the elementwater is borrowedfromcomabout mercury. Assertingthat
ments made in the Summaperfectionis
water is the simplestand most homogeneous of substances, Van Helmont states that it is "most similar to the internal mercuryof the
metals' ' 78Paraphrasing the medieval alchemistGeber, Van Helmont
says the following:
HenceGeberwasgiventheoccasionofsayingthatanyhumidity
in theorder
due to itshomogeneous
of thingsthatis similarto mercury,
will
simplicity,
all flyaway,unchanged
forever
inthetorment
offire.It willeither
in
persevere
inthefire.I confess
itsnature,
or,iftransmuted
byseed,thewholewillremain
formypartthatI learnedofthenatureofwaterunderthetutelage
oftheferula
and caduceusofmercury.79
The key idea here is the notion thatany moisturesimilarto mercury
will remain unchanged in fire,"due to its homogeneous simplicity".
The importance of this simplicitycannot be overstatedin Van Helmons theoryof the alkahest. Before proceeding further,let us quote
the followingsingular descriptionof it:
a bodythatwouldplaya symphony
is intent
on discovering
withus
Chemistry
ofsuchpurity
thatitcouldnotbe destroyed
Andfinally
bya corrupter.
religion
ofa liquidwhich,rcducedto thesmallest
is stupefied
atoms
bythediscovery
ofanyferment.
The
possiblein nature,wouldchastely
spurnthemarriages
ofitis despaired
transmutation
than
of,as itmaynotfinda bodymoreworthy
itselfto whichit mightbe married.
Buttheworkofwisdomhas createdan
77Paracelsus,
Derenovatione
etrestoratione
undSchriJJten
, in:Buecher
, ed.Johannes
Huser,
Basel1590,Sechster
Theil,113[Olmsreprint
1972,III]. Forthetermalkahest
Reti,op.
cit., 18,givesTheophrast
vonHohenheim
Werke
, Smtliche
, ed. Karl
gen.Paracelsus,
Munich&Berlin1930,Vol. Ill, 25.Thereference
De viribus
istoParacelsus,
Sudhoff,
membrorum
, BookIII, Chapter6.
78Van Helmont,
meteori
metallorum
, 42, 8: "Aqua itaque,estinterno
Progymnasa
Mercurio
simillima...."
79Van Helmont,
meteori
occasiodicendi,
ullam
, 42, 8: "Hinc dataGebro
Progymnasa
inrerum
Mercurio
serie,humiditatem,
similem,
propter
simplicitatem,
homogeneam
in ignistormento,
sibi perpetuoconstantem.
Siquidemvel totus,in sui natura
ab igne evolat:vel totus,per seministransmutationem,
in igne
immutatus,
Van Helmontis paraphrasing
thefollowing
perseverai".
passagefromGeber(ed.
nullascausasexvivumpropter
Newman1991,75va,29-33):"Quia igitur
argentum
illiusdividipermittit,
se in partescompositionis
terminationis
quia aut cumtota
in eo
aut cumtotain iliopermanet
sui ex ignerecedit,
substantia
stans,notatur
causa".
necessaria
perfectionis
182

01:50:55 AM

thecommixture
ofanyferment
anomalyin nature,whichhas arisenwithout
from
thevenom,
and
recovered
hasbitten
from
itself.
Thisserpent
diverse
itself,
henceforth
cannotdie.80
The context of this passage, the reduction of substances to water,
makes it quite clear that the unnamed liquor is the alkahest. The
importis thatthe alkahestacts like a catalyst,withoutitselfbeing acted
upon. This is what Van Helmont means when he says that it
"chastely" spurns marriage. He reiteratesthis idea many times, say'
'
ing that the alkahest is 'immortal", 'immutable", and capable of
acting "without reaction".81 This is due to the absolute purityof the
alkahest, and to the factthatit "has attained the finallimitof subtlety
in nature...."82
80VanHelmont,
sollicita
estcor, 72,27-28:"Chymiaenimindagando
Imago
fermenti
colluderet
nobiscum,ut a corrumpente
pori,quae tantaepuritatis
symphonia
Ac tandemstupefatta
estreligio,
latice,qui ad minimos
nequirent
reperto
dissipari.
redactusatomos,naturaepossibiles,
coelebsomnisfermenti
connubiasperneret.
cuinuberet:
Desperataideoesteiustransmutatio,
digniusse,corpusnonreperiens,
in naturafecit,quodabsquefermento
Sed laborSophiae,anomalum
commiscibili,
ac mori
a se diverso,surrexit.
a venenorevixit,
Serpensseipsumistemomordit,
- to
nescit".Thispassageis sufficiently
andindeedungrammatical
obscure
deinceps
makeit desirableto quotetheGermanversionprepared
by Van Helmont'sson
andKnorrvonRosenroth,
Kunst
Francis
Mercurius
derArtzney(Sulzbach
1683)
4Aufgang
'
Mnchen
aberistbemuchet
[Ksel-Verlagreprint,
1971],157: Die Chymia
gewesen
einensolchen
inderGleichheit
einersolchen
mit
Coerperzu erfinden/der
Reinigheit
ervondenzerstoerenden
unsuebereinstimmete/dass
Dingennichtkoente
gertrennet
hatsichgeistlich
werden.Undendlich
man
undweltlich
verwundern
muessen/dass
in die kleinesten
ein Wasserfunden/welches
Staeubleinals der Naturimmer
worden/und
hernach/ausser
der Eh verbleibend/aller
Vermueglich/gebracht
miteinigem
Urhebentsaget.
Dannenhero
an seiner
hatmanverzweifelt
maehlung
mankeinen
vortrefflicher
waerealssolches
Coerpergefunden/der
Verwandlung/weil
selbst/damit
manes verehlichen
koenne.Aberdie ArbeitderWeissheit
hatin der
Naturetwasungemeines
entstanden
istohnUrheb/der
sichmitihm
gemacht/welches
vermischen
liesseundvonihmeunterschieden
waere.DieseSchlange
hatsichselber
nachderVergifftung
wiederlebendigworden/und
kanhernachnicht
gebissen/ist
mehrsterben".
81Van Helmont,
Potestas
medicaminum
, 292,24: "Summusautematquefelicissimus
saliumest,qui ultimam
& subtilitatis
metamin naturaattigit,
cunctaperpuritatis
. .." Van Helmont,
actio
vadit,solusqueagendomanetimmutabilis.
, 204, 11:
Ignota
omniatotiusuniversicorpora
"Quibus scilicetunicus& idemliquor,Alkahest,
in vitameorundem
reducit
tangibilia
perfecte
primam,
absqueulla sui mutatione,
A soloautemsuocompari,
diminutione.
subter
viriumque
atqueperjugumtrahitur,
mutatur".
Van Helmont,
Arcana
Paracelsi
esteiusliquorAlkahest
, 481: "Eminentior
& salcirculatus
immutabilis
omnecorpus
immortalis,
eius,qui reducit
aqua solvens,
inliquorem
suiconcreti.
Defebribus
idem
, 102,10: "Quod liquorAlkahest,
tangibile,
innumero,
&activitate
tantum
valetmillesima
actionequantum
pondere
prima.Quia
agitsinereactione
patientis."
82
Van Helmont,
Potestas
medicaminum
& sub, 292, 24: "... qui ultimam
puritatis
tilitatis
metamin naturaattigit
183

01:50:55 AM

What is unusual about the above passage is the profusionof themes

derived from alchemical descriptions of mercury. The ourobouros
dragon, the serpentthat devours its own tail, is an ancient metaphor
forquicksilverthatwas transmittedby the medieval texts.83Van Helmont is also drawing on his alchemically colored view of mercury
when he speaks of the alkahest as acting "without being acted on",
for this propertytoo he attributedto quicksilver.84As in the case of
his descriptionof water, Van Helmont is borrowinghis concept of the
alkahestfromalchemical descriptionsofthe "philosophers' mercury",
of Geber.
and again one of his major sources is the Summaperfectionis
If we now returnto the passage in which Van Helmont openly cites
Geber, several facts will emerge. There Van Helmont said that any
humiditythat is "similar to mercury" will remain unchanged in fire,
due to its "homogeneous simplicity". It is the absence of
heterogeneitythat makes mercury "impenetrable", preventing its
division by corrosiveagents.85We know, however, fromthe passages
subsequently cited, that the alkahest is just such a humidity"similar
to mercury", forit is its puritythat preservesit fromcorruption.The
Summa spells this out in more detail than Van Helmont, however.
According to Geber, purity means above all homoeomerity, the
predominance of like particles. Because mercury contains few large
"earthy particles", it furtherescapes the presence of large interstitial
gaps in its substance. This ensures that mercurylacks large pores by
which corruptingagents, such as fireand corrosive salts, mightenter
and destroyit.86
83The Liberdealuminibus
etsalibus
fromArabicattributed
to
, a translation
wrongly
alchemical
works
tohavecirculated
inthemedieval
Rz,andoneofthemostpopular
ofquicksilver:
"It istheserpent
West,saysthefollowing
itself,
enjoying
impregnating
andonedaygiving
birth.It killsall animalsbymeansofitspoison.It fleesthe
itself,
in a longor shorttime.Butquicksilver
canbyno meansbe
fire,andkillsall things
est
cerseparated
] sinceitfleesthefire.Butthesageshaveinvented
[byfiredelendum
taintechniques
bywhichitmaybe madeto remainfixedin thefire".(Das Buchder
Alaune
undSalze, JuliusRuskaed., Berlin1935,59. BarbaraObrist,Lesdbuts
de
severalilluminations
ofmoreexplicitly
, Paris1982,reproduces
l'imagerie
alchimique
at theillustrations
inherbooknumbered
32,64,91, 100.It is not
dragons
tail-eating
sure,ofcourse,thatall ofthesesymbolize
mercury.
84Van Helmont,De lithiasi
, 26, 14: "NoteturactioMercuriiabsquerepassione
substantiae
suae. Estquecontemplatio
essentiali
magnimomenti".
85Van Helmont,TriaPrima
53-9: Mercuryis "homogeneus,
,
254,
simplex,&
& virtute
indivisibilis" "Ex sola videlicet
seminis
aqua dementali,
simplicissimi
& inseparabile,
coaluitin corpusindivisibile,
mercurialis,
quodinter
impenetrabile,
naturanonpotestpenetrare
ad dividengenerata
parnonhabet....Quandoquidem
dum,ubi nullusestnodus,autheterogeneitas".
86Newman1991,150.
184

01:50:55 AM

But there was another factorin the alkahest's ability to withstand

4
4
corruption its 'subtlety". As Van Helmont said above, 'reduced to
'
4
the smallestatoms possible in nature", the alkahest would chastely
spurn the marriages of any ferment". The same idea was reiterated
where Van Helmont argued that the alkahest had 44attained the final
limitof subtletyin nature." It is not merelypurity,therefore,but also
the small size of its constituentparticlesthatallow the alkahest to resist
the overturesof other reagents. This too comes fromthe alchemy of
Geber. As we have described, Geber' s Summa lays out a theory
postulatingthatmercuryis the primaryconstituentof metals, but that
it is acted upon by sulfur.Ordinary mercuryis composed of tinyparticles whose close-packing gives it great weight. Let us quote the
Summa*
s descriptionof gold:
led forth
to fixation,
andthe
theverysubtlesubstance
ofquicksilver
Therefore
matter
ofsulfur,
ofthesame,alongwiththeverysubtle,
fixed,
unburning
purity
its
matter
ofgold Becauseithadsubtle,fixedparticles,
is thewholeessential
andthiswasthecauseofitsgreat
couldtherefore
be muchcompressed;
particles
weight....87
In part because mercuryis composed of such tinyparticles, it can
be closely packed together,resultingin a great specificweight. Thus
subtletycombines with purityto yield gold- a heavy metal resistent
to corrosion. Now the goal of alchemical practice, according to the
Summa, is the acquisition of an ever more subtle ' 'philosophical mercury", that can penetrate the depth (profundum
) of base metals and
transmutethem profoundly.Thus the philosophers' stone is simply
"vulgar mercury" thathas been furtherpurifiedand subtilized. Such
4
ultra-pure, subtilized mercury will 'rest quiet in the fiercenessof
fire", unmoved by the ardent assault of flame.88
Geber's philosophical mercury is surely the model for Van Helmont's alkahest. Like the alkahest, it has been broughtto the utmost
purityand subtletypossible. And like the alkahest, it can withstand
the attackof that "ultimate" corruptiveagent, fire.Not only did Van
Helmont learn of water "under the tutelageof the ferulaand caduceus
of mercury": it was quicksilverthat taughthim the alkahest. It is not
surprising,given the profusion of hints comparing mercury to the
alkahest, that Van Helmont' s editors viewed quicksilver as the start87Newman1991,725.Fora
oftheSumma'
s theory
ofmatter,
cf.op.cit.,
description
143-167.
88Newman1991,784.
185

01:50:55 AM

4
ing material for the 'universal dissolvent". The indices to the Ortus
contain several assertionsthat "the alkahest ... is made from
medicinae
89
mercury", and at one point Van Helmont himselfcommands that
one "abstract the liquor alkahest from vulgar, store-bought
"90
mercury
Whatever Van Helmont' s arcane process forprocuringthe alkahest
may have been, it is clear that his inspiration for this marvellous
substance came not only from Paracelsus, but from the traditionof
Geberian alchemy. Just as Van Helmont appropriated the so-called
"atoms" of his mixture theory from the medieval minimanaturalia
theory, so he borrowed the "subtle particles" or minimaepartesof
Geberian alchemy for his descriptionof the alkahest. In either case,
Van Helmont' s corpuscular tendencies descend from the material
theories of the Middle Ages.
5. Vitalismin Van Helmont
It would be a gross mistake, however, to thinkthat Van Helmont
appropriated these medieval theories unaltered. As we have seen, he
grafted his notion of fermentsand seminaonto the minimanaturalia
theory, thereby producing what I called before a vitalistic corpuscularism. To one who is accustomed to seeing the seventeenthcenturyas a period when the "mechanical philosophy" flourishedat the
expense of older, vitalistictheories,it may come as a shock to findthat
Van Helmont took the corpuscular theoryof Geber- perfectlydevoid
of hylozoism- and supplied it with the apparatus of his vitalismseminaand ferments.The Summa, as we will recall, explained the
resistenceof the internalmercuryof metals to corrosion in terms of
the close-packingof its subtle particles. It was the densityof substance
arising therefromthat preventedthe entryof corrosiveagents.91Now
Van Helmont appropriated this theory,and added to it the idea that
"the internalkernel of mercury" existing at the center of a metallic
corpuscle, could not be "bored out" by acids.92 According to Van
89Van Helmont,
meteori
to Progymnasa
etverborum
Indexrerum
, reference
, 43, 14.
90Van Helmont,
Defebribus
, 102,10: "A Mercurio
liquorem
vulgovenali,abstrahe
Alkahest...."
91Newman1991,143-67.
92Van Helmont,Progymnasa
meteori
sal est,
, 43, 17: "Proutsal in aqua solutum,
si dissolvens
sinesalismutatione.
manet,etinderepetitur,
Quodsanesicnonfieret,
& nonsisteretur
illiusconcreti.
a Mercurio
dissolvendo,
Ergo
perminima:
iungeretur
nonattingitur,
multominusterebratur".
interior
Mercurii
Nucleus,a dissolventibus
186

01:50:55 AM

Helmont, however, mercurydoes not rely solely on these factorsfor

its impassibility.In the course of rejectingGeber' s notion that mercury is composed of mixed water and earth in favor of the view that
it is only transmutedwater, Van Helmont says the following:
The grounds
are at handin mercury
ofindestructibility
itself,
just as in the
a certain
sincethere
istobe found
inmercury
external
containelements,
sulfur,
ing theoriginaldefectof themetal.Becausethisis originalit is therefore
ifthisis separated
removed
withdifficulty.
Nonetheless,
byart,saytheskilled,
the mercuryis cleansedof its superfluous
sulfurand excesshumidity.
Thenceforth
itcan be precipitated
in theformofearthbyno fire,on account
ofitsverygreatsimplicity,
forwhichit is compared
to water.93
Here Van Helmont argues that mercuryitselfhas in its original,
'
'vulgar' form,a sulfurmixed in, which acts as a corruptingagent.
This is whyordinarymercurycan be "precipitated", that is, made to
congeal and fall to the bottom of a sublimatory,by firealone. Van
Helmont views the formationof mercury oxide as the result of an
"innate" sulfursolidifyingits host mercury: here once again he is
employing the Geberian "mercury alone" theory.94Van Helmont
says thatthissulfuror "earth" existsin the "center" of the mercury's
"essence".95 He goes on to add that the mercury that has been
purifiedof such innate sulfuris "mercury frommercury", describing
this artificialsubstance as follows:
'

Therefore
cleansed
ofitsoriginal
doesnotallowitself
stain,andvirgin,
mercury
further
tobe seizedbysulfurs
andsemina
: rather
itsuddenly
consumes
theseand
as itwerekillsthem,exceptforitscomrade.96
93Van Helmont,
meteori
, 43, 14: "EstqueideoinipsoMercurio,
Progymnasa
proutin
ratiopropinquaindestructibilitatis.
elementis,
Siquidem,in Mercuriodeprehendi
metallilabem continens.Quae quia
quoddamsulphurexternum,
originalem
ideo & difficulter
ab eo tollitur.
originalis,
Qua tandemnihilominus
per artem
aiuntperiti,
Mercurium
& hmido
mundatum.
sulfure,
separata,
superfluo
superfluo
nulloigni,potest
informam
terrae
ob simplicitatem
sui
Quippedeinceps
praecipitari,
maximam,
qua aquae elemento
comparatur".
94Thorndike,
HMES III, 58. Newman,1991,204-8.
95Van Helmont,
meteori
, 43, 14: "Amisitnamqueterram
Progymnasa
(idest,sulfur)
quae terrain centrosuae essentiae...."
96Van Helmont,
meteori
labe mun, 43, 14: "Mercuriusergooriginali
Progymnasa
a sulfuribus,
autseminibus
datus,atquevirgo,nonsinitse amplius
quin
apprehendi,
haecconfestim
ac velutconficiat,
suo compari".The curious
consumt,
excepto
' 'comrade"finds
reference
tomercury's
itsechoinanother
Helmontian
description
ofthealkahest
in hisIgnota
actio
, 204, 11: "Quibus scilicetunicus& idemliquor,
omniatotius
invitameorundem
universi
reducit
Alkahest,
corpora
perfecte
tangibilia
diminutione.
A soloautemsuocomprimam,
absqueullasuimutatione,
viriumque
pari,subter
jugumtrahitur,
atquepermutatur".
187

01:50:55 AM

As one can see, despite the Geberian origin of this passage, Van
Helmont makes no recourse here to Geber' s use of close-packingand
the absence of porosity. It is simply the mercury's virginity,so to
'
speak, that accounts for its resistence to chemical 'marriage" . But
why is it that such virginityprotectsthe mercuryfrominsemination?
The answer lies once more in Van Helmont' s theoryof ferments.As
the titleof his treatiseon fermentsannounces, it is "the image of the
fermentthatimpregnatesa mass withseed' ' .97In his descriptionof the
two ways in which fermentscan operate, Van Helmont argued that
seminaare produced in sexual generation by the imagination of the
98
progenitor,"making an image of himselfby means of libido". This
doctrine,which makes the productionof human seed a directfunction
of lustfulimagination, stems fromParacelsus.99 As Pagel has put it,
the Helmontian theorydictates that "[a]ll thingshave theirorigin in
images; images are their architects".100The corollary to this is that
withoutimages, therecan be no generation. Even in the case of spontaneous generation,Van Helmont thinksthatmatter,breathingin the
"odor of the ferment", produces an image thatleads to the formation
of life.101It would seem, then, that Van Helmont thoughtthat his
"mercury frommercury," deprived of any primordial stain, lacked
the means of engendering libidinious images, or of receiving them
fromwithout.
This interpretationreceives some support from Van Helmont' s
theoryof disease. Indeed, the corruptionof mercuryby sulfurcan just
as well be considered a disease as a generation. Van Helmont argued
that disease too is due to semina, which attack the body fromwithout.
In order to understand what follows, it is necessary to introduce
another Helmontian borrowingfromParacelsus, theArcheus.The root
idea of thearcheusis- as its name implies- thatof a dominatingor rul, which governs its
ing faculty. The human body has an archeus
97Van Helmont,
massam
semine
, 69.
Imago
fermenti
impraegnat
98Van Helmont,
a conceptu
, 71,12:"Fiuntitaquesemina,
Imago
fermenti
generantis,
velab odorefermenti,
facientis
sui,perlibidinem,
disponit
imaginem
quodmateriam
ad ideamreipossibilis".
99Paracelsus,
inderVernunfft
derEmpfindlichen
Das BuchvonderGeberung
, Huser,
dingen
Theil
Erster
, 337-46.Cf. 339.
100Pagel,VanHelmont
, 24.
101Van Helmont,
, 71, 12: "Etenimproutab odore,materiahaurit
fermenti
Imago
transmutationis
sicab imaginedeinceps
fitmateriae
dispositionem:
dispositio,
quae
in generation,
fermentm
Forimagination
specificum
procuret,
atquepromoveat".
see Pagel,VanHelmont
, 97.
188

01:50:55 AM

unconscious activities.Seminalikewise have theirown archei

, by which
Thus
Van
Helmont
are
directed
to
says the
specific goals.
they
following:
inwhichthereis an Archeus,
whichis a spiritual
Gas
The semen
is a substance
a ferment,
and
an imageofthething[tobe produced],
within
itself
containing
information
ofthethings
tobe done[inthecourseof
aboveall thepreparatory
generation].102
The archeusis thereforea spiritual substance which can reside in a
given semen.It is the archeusthat directsthe course of generation,and
in disease, of corruption. Disease, however, is not merely the result
of an invading archeuspenetratingthe human body. Rather disease
resultswhen an alien archeusor other agent irritatesthe innate archeus
already residentwithinthe body. An image of fear or horroris then
engendered in the human archeusthat leads, in a complicated fashion,
to illness or even death. Such phenomena as fevers, shaking, and
sweats, are the result of the innate archeushaving become enraged by
The upshot of all this is that withoutthe resithe invading entity.103
dent archeuswithinthe human body- the guardian and ruler of vital
processes- disease itselfcould not take root.
Disease, then,like generation,is due to the imagination of the recipient, althoughthe imaginationmay be stimulatedby externalagents.
To returnto Van Helmont' s tmercuryfrommercury", one may suppose that its absolute puritymakes it incapable of imagining the corruption that would result in disease, while also depriving it of the
libido necessary for generation. The same is true of Van Helmont' s
alkahest, modelled as it is on his interpretationof the alchemists' mercury. Because the alkahest is utterlylacking in lust or putridity,it cannot engage in the sympatheticreactions necessary either for generation or corruption.
Van Helmont thereforetook two straightforward
theoriesof material composition- the idea of minimanaturaliaand the Geberian view
of mercury- and combined them withhis own psychologizingview of
matter.As in the case of his shell-theoryof matter,thisinvolved above
all the integration of Paracelsian ideas with those of his medieval
forebears.What makes Van Helmont so difficultto understand is the
102Van Helmont,
in qua iam
, 71, 12: 'Semenautemsitsubstantia,
Imago
fermenti
et
Archeus
Gas
continens
inse fermentm,
inest,qui
rei,atque
spirituale,
imaginem
notitiam
rerumagendarum".
Cf. Pagel,VanHelmont
, 96-102.
insuper
dispositivam
103I am highly
on Pagel,VanHelmont
, 142-6here.
dependent
189

01:50:55 AM

persistence of these older corpuscular theories alongside his own

entrenchedhylozoism. In the same breathVan Helmont can attribute
the productionof an indissoluble compound to a transmutationof its
"smallest particles'' and to its components' lustfuldesire for coitus.
Perhaps this should not surpriseus, foras John Henry has shown, the
attributionof vitalism to insensible corpuscles was widespread in the
generation before Newton. Such natural philosophers as Matthew
Hale, William Petty, and Walter Warner were already granting
powers or viresto matterby the 16 70' s or before.104These active principles imparted, as Hale said, "a kind of life" to theirmaterial host,
which would otherwisehave remained passive.105What is surprising,
then, is not the presence of vitalism alongside corpuscularismin Van
Helmont, but rather the degree to which he was revising the corpuscular theories of his medieval predecessors. As we have shown,
Van Helmont started with Geberian alchemy, a tradition that
employed neither active principles nor substantial forms. There is
very little that a mechanical philosopher in the Boylean sense could
have found objectionable about Geber' s Summa. Van Helmont then
took this straightforward
corpuscularismand fused it with the minima
naturaliatheoryand the Paracelsian language of the shell and kernel.
Aside from arriving at an internallyordered corpuscle, Van Helmont's major contributionlay in the vitalisticreformthat he brought
to bear on his medieval sources. And yet Van Helmont was no less a
part of the scientificrevolutionthan Gassendi or Mersenne. Indeed,
Van Helmont considered his importation of vitalistic fermentation
into mattertheoryto be an innovation of the highestsignificance.He
that beforehis time, the term "ferment"
claimed in his Imagofermenti
had been ignored by all but bakers: it was he, Van Helmont, who had
broughtthe term and its ramificationsinto natural philosophy.106All
of this suggests that terms such as "scientific revolution" and
"mechanical philosophy" may lead us into a false sense of
homogeneity about a period where alternate systemscould flourish
104JohnHenry,Occult
andtheExperimental
inPreActive
Qualities
Philosophy:
Principles
Newtonian
Matter
ofScience,24 (1986),335-81.
, in: History
Theory
105Henry,342.
106Van Helmont,
utnullainScholisieiunior,
, 69, 1: "Notitiafermenti,
fermenti
Imago
itanullautilior.
Fermenti
nisiinpanificio:
Cumattamen
nomen,ignotum
hactenus,
nullain rebusfiatvicissitudo,
auttransmutatio,
persomniatum
appetitum
hyles:sed
duntaxat
soliusfermenti
utfermenta
omnino
ad omnem
transmutaopera Etenim
"
tionem
claimoforiginality
isofcourse
praevia,atquenecessaria Van Helmont's
overstated.
See Pagel,VanHelmont
, 71-87.
highly
190

01:50:55 AM

and derive productiveends fromquite different

means. Instead of conceivingof the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesas the time in which
44the scientific
enterprise" coalesced to form a "mechanized world
we
thinkof the period as one in which rival systems
should
system",
were operating under quite differentconceptions of reform.When
Van Helmont combined the traditionsof Paracelsianism and medieval
corpuscular theoryhe was, in his own eyes, reformingboth.
Cambridge, Mass.
HarvardUniversity

191

01:50:55 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
: the possibilities and limitationsof logic in
Aquinas and supposition
divinis1

HENKJ.M. SCHOOT

Medieval theoryof supposition, being a part of medieval theoryof

meaning, has been and remains a subject of particular interestof
present-dayphilosophers. Ever since it was discovered that there are
peculiar parallels between modern and medieval theoryof meaning,
considerable efforthas been made to describe its origins and development. The parallel, in short, is a similar distinction between the
significationof a word and its actuad meaning in use. Frege' s
(reference),like Carnap' s
conceptual pair ofSinn(sense) and Bedeutung
Connotation
and Denotation
and
Extension
of
Intension
), were
pair
(
and
discovered to echo the medieval distinctionsbetween Significatio
and
and
between
Suppositio
Significatio
(end
Appellatio(around 1100),
12th and 13th century). Among the many present-day effortsto
understand the medievais, the work of L.M. de Rijk is eminent. De
Rijk suggeststwo sources forthe theoryof supposition, itselfa part of

1 I wouldliketothank
c.s.c.,
prof.dr.H.A.G. Braakhuis,
prof.dr.DavidB. Burrell
drs.H.J.M.J.Goris,prof.dr. F.J.A. de Grijs,dr. C.H. Kneepkens
andprof.dr.
fortheircritique.
H.W.M. Rikhof
Partofthispaperis contained
in myChrist
the
'name'
onnaming
Christ
, Louvain1993.
ofGod.Thomas
Aquinas
are fromtheeditionof Aquinas'workby theCommissio
Leonina
, if
Quotations
andotherwise
theedition
from
inBusa'sOpera
contained
Omnia.
Abbreviaavailable,
tionsusedareBusa'sas well,whereas
inbrackets
numbers
tothelines
usuallyrefer
ofBusa'sedition.
Without
further
reference
reference
is madetothecorpus
indicated,
articuli
or solutio.
libros
Sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi
Scriptum
super
Magisti
(SN),Summa
contra
Gentiles
De Unione
Verbi
Incarnati
(ScG),Summa
Theologiae
(ST), Quaestio
Disputata
in Communi
(QDI), QD De Potentia
((DP), QD De Ventate
(QDV), QD de Virtutibus
Errores
Graecorum
Quodlibetales
(QDW),Quaestiones
(QDL), Contra
(OCE), De Rationibus
Fidei(OCG),Compendium
Perihermeneias
Theologiae
(OTT), In Libros
(CPE), In Libros
in brackets
referto Marietti
's edition),In Librum
Metaphysicorum
(CMP; numbers
Boethii
De Trinitate
De Divinis
Nominibus
Isaiam(CIS),
(CBT),InDionysii
(CDN),Super
Matthaei
Super
Epist.ad Romanos
( CRO), SuperEvangelium
(REM), SuperEvangelium
Johannis
(REI), Super
Epist.I ad Corinthios
(C1C-R1C),Super
Epist.adEphesios
(REP),
Generis
Super
Epist.I ad Timotheum
(RT1)' De Fallaciis
(DP3), De Natura
(DPG).
193

01:19:42 AM

: the studyof grammarand the

the terminist
logicof the logicamodernorum
fallacies.2
of
study
There is however a considerable gap in our knowledgeof the theory
of supposition. Apart fromtheologianslike Anselm, Ablard, Gilbert
of Poitiersand othersfromthe 11thand 12thcentury,no recentstudy
has been made of the great theologians of the 13th century.I would
suggestone reason: anotherparallel between the Middle Ages and the
twentiethcenturyhas obstructed our vision, that between Ockham
(and Albert of Saxony) and Russell.3
Like Russell, Ockham tried to devise a logic which was purelyformal, attemptingto leave all metaphysicsout of it, while accusing his
predecessors of doing exactly the opposite, to the detrimentof logic
itself. Subscribing to the Ockhamist view, present-dayphilosophers
of the thirteenthcentury,
skipped the great philosophers/theologians
of
s approach. Peter
for
Ockham'
12th
centuryanticipations
searching
of Spain, who wrotehis treatisepossiblyin the earlythirtiesof thethirteenth century, presented this interpretationwith a formidable
problem: why does he distinguish a kind of supposition ( suppositio
naturalis)which seems to blur the sharp distinctionbetween signification and supposition?A similarkind of suppositionwas mentionedby
the two otherproponentsof 13thcenturylogic, William of Sherwood4
and Lambert of Auxerre. In my opinion, no satisfactorysolutions
have been found forthis problem of textual and historicalinterpretation. It seems to me that it will be helpfulto investigatethe natural
2 L.M. de Riik,LogicaModernorum.
A contribution
tothehistory
terminist
logic
,
ofearly
Assen1962-1967.
3 This approachis takenin all generalliterature
on medievallogic,Bochenski
Formale
, Karl Alber1956; PhiloteusBoehner,
Logik
excepted;I.M. Bochenski,
1250-C.1400
Medieval
, Manchester
1952;Alexoj itsdevelopment
from
Logic.Anoutline
Medieval
tomedieval
anderBroadie,Introduction
, Oxford1987;D.P. Henry,
Logic
logic
AModern
andConsequence
Introduction
andMetaphysics.
, London1972;E.A.Moody,Truth
imMit1953(1976);JanPinborg,
inMediaeval
, Amsterdam
LogikundSemantik
Logic
Canstatt
Einberblick
telalter.
1972;De Rijk,o.e.; TheCambridge
, Stuttgart-Bad
History
Medieval
, ed. NormanKretzmann,
Anthony
Kenny,
JanPinborg,
Philosophy
ofLater
etc. 1982,thefirstfivechapters,
9-382;cf. also Heinz W. Enders,
Cambridge
undderSemantikbegriff.
Ein historischTraktate
desMittelalters
systematischer
Sprachlogische
dersemantischen
zurFrage
, Mnchen/Paderborn/Wien
Grundlegung
formaler
Systeme
Beitrag
in
SinnundReferenz
derproprietates
terminorum:
1975and CarlosA. Dufour,Die Lehre
1989.
mittelalterlicher
, Mnchen/Hamden/Wien
Logik
4 H.A.G. Braakhuis
cannot
habitualis
hasshownthatSherwood's
however
suppositio
be identical
naturalis
withPeterof Spain'ssuppositio
, as, amongothers,De Rijk
andTheir
Relation
onSomeSemantical
TheViews
Topics
ofSherwood
thought,
ofWilliam
XV (1977),111-142.
Bacon
toThose
, in: Vivarium,
ofRoger
194

01:19:42 AM

contextof logic in the thirteenthcentury,which is theology,instead

of skippingit entirelyjust because one doesn't expect anythingfrom
it.5 As it turns out, the theology of Thomas Aquinas gives ample
evidence forthe need of a semantic concept like natural supposition.
This may be one reason forthe lack of a studyof suppositionin the
workof Aquinas, yet I see anotherone as well. Gilbertof Poitierswas
in Reims
'convicted' on the occasion of a post-conciliarconsistorium
in
commenhis
which
he
defended
of
four
on
account
positions
(1 148)
with
trinitarian
three
concerned
Trinitate
De
Boethius's
,
tary on
theology and one with christology.6Without going into detail, we
seem to have here an example of a theologian with remarkablelogical
skill,who does not want to take leave of the rules of logic when speaking about God. So, he did not consider it convenientto say "God is
Divinity" (Deus est Deitas), but only admitted of saying "God is
throughDivinity" {Deus estDeitate).1No individual is identicalwithits
nature, and even though God's simplicity,preciselystatingthis identity,be acknowledged,we should not accept this kind of talk. Gilbert
of Poitiers did not understand that God's unicity and complete
othernessmay make imperativea certain type of propositionswhose
very goal it is to express that God transcends the logic of created
things. Bernard of Clairvaux, Gilbert's main opponent, and Peter of
Lombard, probably presentat Reims in Bernard's company, as well
as the Pope, did endorse such a type of propositions. And so did
Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did know of Gilbert's case, and, more
importantly,placed divine simplicityat the very beginning of his
SummaTheologiae.He makes it quite clear that divine simplicityis the
major reason why any investigationof God's essence should be entitled Quomodonon sit, and it has recentlybeen shown that Aquinas'
insistenceon simplicityin God - both in its origins as well as in its
5 Cf. De Rijk:"Andwhenonethinks
ofmethod
as method
withitsdirectimplicaofthosedisciplines
hasaccomplished
tions,oneshouldrealizethatThomasinseveral
and epistemological
logical,semantical
nothing(...)> namelythoseconcerning
envernieuwing,
Middeleeuwse
Assen/Amsterdam
1977,
; Traditie
problems.",
Wijsbegeerte
- hs).
183(mytranslation
t^.1
1neology
Atudy
. LaugeUlaNielsen,
intne1weljtn
andrhitosophy
Century;
ojGilbert
Porreta
's Thinking
andtheTheological
the
Expositions
oftheDoctrine
oftheIncarnation
during
Period
1130-1180
, Leiden1982,30-9.
7 H. Denzinger,
etdeclarationum
Enchiridion
derebus
Symbolorum,
Definitionum
fideiet
morum
Ed. XXXVII, Freiburg
i.B/Basel/Rom/Wien
, ed. P. Hnermann,
1991,nr.
wasaccusedofrejecting
estincarnata
745.Cf.ST I 28.2.Gilbert
Divinanatura
as well.
4.1.
Cf. section
195

01:19:42 AM

immediate consequences (the divine attributesand the discussion of

the divine names containingAquinas' thoughtabout 'analogical usage
of words') - displays great logical and linguisticsophistication.8This
leads to the hypothesisthat to put profane logic to divine uses poses
a considerable challenge to some medievais, and thatAquinas was one
of them. So we have the second reason why Aquinas' work has not
been the subject of a studyof his use of supposition, at least in recent
times.9It poses too many difficulties.How can we begin to distinguish
where, when talkingabout God One, Triune or Christ, he is fracturing profanelogic, and where he is merelydevelopingit?10On the other
hand, this approach to Aquinas' authorship is relativelynew: few
interpretationsleave room fora grammar of divine mystery;most of
them tend to use Aquinas for apologetic reasons.
In the following I will try to show the plausibility of such a
characterizationof Aquinas' authorship: extremelycautious and circumspectwhen speaking about God in a reflexivemanner, not exactly
fracturingthe rules of logic but pushing it to its limits. The theoryof
supposition is one of his tools, and an importantone. Along the way,
8 Cf.DavidB. Burrell,
GodandAction,
LondonandHenley1979;MarkD.
Aquinas.
Wisdom.
TheHierarchy
Discourses
in Aquinas
Jordan,Ordering
ofPhilosophical
, Notre
Dame 1986;H.W.M. Rikhof,
Over
GodSpreken.
Eentekst
vanThomas
vanAquino
uitde
"Summa
envanaantekeningen
voorzien
Vertaald}
, Delft1988.
Theologiae".
ingeleid
I havetoadd recent, sinceneo-thomist
handbooks
do contain
somepassageson
Aristotelico-Thomisticae
supposition.
E.g. JosephGredt,Elementa
, Friburgi
Philosophiae
1937( 19519),Vol. I: 42-5,Vol. II: 127-34.Anexcellent
limited
Brisgoviae
although
andoutdated
DieSprachphilosophie
deshl. Thomas
vonAquin
studyis FranzManthey's
,
undihre
derTheologie
1937.The theory
ofsupposi, Paderborn
Anwendung
aufProbleme
tionisnottreated
inRobertW. Schmidt
toSt.Thomas
s.j., Thedomain
oflogic
according
ofmodesofsignification
, The Hague 1966.Regarding
Aquinas
Aquinas'shandling
cf.alsoL.G. Kelly,GodandSpeculative
in: L'Hritage
desgrammairiens
latins
Grammar,
del'antiquit
auxlumires
2-4septembre
, Actesdu colloquede Chantilly,
1987,Irne
Rosier(ed.), Louvain/Paris
Grammar
inSt.
1988,205-13;F. Cunningham,
Speculative
Thomas
in: Laval Thologique
et Philosophique,
1961(17) 76-86;andJ.
Aquinas,
Elments
desrapports
entre
la grammaire
etl'ontologie
au Moyen
Jolivet,
pourunetude
Age,
in:Miscellanea
Medievalia
York1981,135-64;Cf.alsotheinterpreted
13.1,Berlin-New
of AlbertKeller,Arbeiten
zurSprachphilosophie
Thomas
vonAquins,
in:
bibliography
undPhilosophie,
49/2-3(1974),464-76.
Theologie
10The factthatAquinasmaybe theauthorofa treatise
De Fallaciis,
doesnothelp
becausehisauthorship
is uncertain,
andevenifhe weretheauthor,
here,precisely
itseemstobe a workofyouth.It'ssupposed
ona workofPeterofSpain
dependency
is mereguesswork.
Cf. Weisheipl,
FriarThomas
, Washington
1983,34, 35
d'Aquino
and386;Cf.H. F. Dondaine,
totheedition
invol.43oftheCommissio
Leonina
preface
,
Roma1976,386b:"dansl'tatactuelde notreinformation,
il n'apparat
pas exclu
de l'ouvrage".
que SaintThomaspuissetre l'origine
196

01:19:42 AM

I will show whyit would be fruitful

forphilosophersto take the context
of the theory of supposition into consideration: there are good
theologicalreasons fordeveloping the concept of natural supposition,
while keeping significationand supposition strictlyapart.
The first paragraph will elaborate the link between divine
and the (in)adequacy of talk about God, in order
simplicity,mystrium
to make intelligiblethat in Aquinas all analysis of the human way of
speaking provides both possibilities and limitations. In the second
paragraph I will investigateAquinas' use of the termmodussignificandi
and show that it is linked with supposition. The thirdparagraph proceeds with a study of the distinctionof supposition and signification,
a studyof the various modisupponendi
that Aquinas distinguishesand
witha comparison of it to threelogical tractsfromthe thirteenthcentury(Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre).
Both paragraphs mentionthe word naturalisand so a fourthparagraph
will be needed to explain the influenceof modes of significationupon
modes of supposition, and the double meaning of the term supponere
in Aquinas.
naturaliter
1. A Grammar
ofDivineMystery
When the fourthLateran Council (1215) defines the faithagainst
the Albigens and others, it opens with words that cannot rightlybe
called a 'definition':
Firmiter
credimus
et simpliciter
confitemur,
quod unussolusestverusDeus,
etinefimmensus
etincommutabilis,
aeternus,
incomprehensibilis,
omnipotens
Pateret Filiuset Spiritus
Sanctus.11
fabilis,
How can we definethe One who is said to be inexpressibleand incomprehensible?Aquinas is fullyaware of this dilemma, and he opens his
SummaTheologiaeby grasping it: of God we don't know what He is;
only what He is not. Question 12 of this firstpart is devoted to God's
and question 13 may be said to be devoted to his
incomprehensibility,
The
"on naming God", question 13, represents
treatise
ineffability.
the linguisticarticulationof God's simplicity,treated in question 3
and elaborated in questions 4-11. Helen Waddell once called the idea
of divine simplicity"perhaps the deepest word of medieval philosophy
or religion".12 In fact it is more of a denial than an informative
11H. Denzinger,
Enchiridion
, o.e., nr.800.
Symbolorum
12TheWandering
Scholars
, London1927,xxviii.
197

01:19:42 AM

positivefeatureof God. It denies any compositionof matterand form,

of individualityand nature, of being and essence in God. This compositeness of anythingcreated is so familiarto us that even the structure of our language expresses it. And since our nouns cannot be but
either concrete or abstract and our enunciations cannot be but composed of subject and predicate, God's single unity cannot be adequately expressed in it. Divine simplicityis a denial of the adequacy
of the human mode of signification.
itself in the context
Aquinas does not. use the word ineffabilis
indicated above. He seems to have a predilectionforusing this word
forthe second of the two principal divine mysteries,that of the union
of God and man in Christ. To give one example out of a lesser known
tract:
unitum
mododicimus
Deumfuisse
etineffabili
Quodamergoincomprehensibili
sicutceteris
naturae
inChristo
nonsolumperinhabitationem,
humanae
sanctis,
sedquodamsingulari
modo,itaquodhumananaturaessetquaedamFiliiDei
natura( OCG6 [102]).
The expression 'The Son of God is a man', is an incomprehensible
and ineffableexpression. When taken literally,the phrase 'ineffable
expression' is a contradictionin terms,and so Aquinas intendsto say
that our words fall shortof adequately expressingthis unique person:
Etcumhabeatab aeterno
nonpermodum
divinam
sed
naturam,
compositionis,
dicitur
etiamhypostasis
velpersona
divinaenaturae,
secunidentitatis,
simplicis
dumtamenquoddivinahumanis
verbisexprimi
possunt
(o.e.6 [205]).
Both the union itself,as well as Christ's being identicalwithhis divine
nature, are comprehended under the term 'ineffable'. So we see that
divine simplicityplays an importantrole in christologyas well, by calling attention to our (lack of) knowledge and ability to express adequately what we believe.
Aquinas is not usually that explicit in providing his readers with
disclaimers of his insights. This is however only the surface of his
texts. One can easily mistakeAquinas' use of the word mystrium
with
a technicalusage of terms,as thoughforhim to speak about 'the incarnation' would be the same as to mention 'the mysteryof the incarnation'. Close scrutinyof his texts reveals the opposite. According to
Aquinas, the sum of the Christian faithconsistsof two mysteries:the
mysteryof God One and Triune, and the mysteryof the Incarnation.
All articles of faith revolve around these two mysteries.We are not
dealing here with a temporary, terrestrialhandicap, which will be
liftedwhen God will be ' all in all'. The beatificvision will be a vision
198

01:19:42 AM

of the One who dwells in an inaccessible light,who is and remains the

Incomprehensible. Revelation is the revelation of the Hidden One.
Aquinas links this epistemological stance with his doctrine of the
sacraments,with the way Jesus Christ teaches, and with the way the
Bible signifies.We should read Holy Scripture in the same way, in
which the Old Testament spiritually signifieswhat is described in the
New Testament, which is the same way in whichJesus taught,i.e. in
. The way in which Christ
parables and likenesses: secundum
mystrium
is present in the Old Testament, resembles the way in which Christ
13
is present in the sacrament of the Eucharist: secundum
mystrium.
'
Far from being a technical term, the use of the word mystrium
expressesa deep-feltand omnipresenttheologicalattitudeand conviction. God is ever greaterthan we can know and say, ever greaterthan
that which our modes of understandingand our modes of signifying
can attain.
and signifying
theDivine
2. Modes ofsignification
Aquinas did not possess a theoryof the modes of signification,in
the sense in which the speculative grammarians expounded one in
theirtreatisesde modissignificandi,
composed at the end of the 13thand
of
the
14th
These
so-called Modistaewere engaged
century.
beginning
in a project in which they tried to justify grammar by way of correlating modes of being with modes of signification,expressing a
typicallymedieval conviction that there exists a certain isomorphy
between realityand language.14
We know littleabout the development and sudden break-down of
speculative grammar, and about the relationships among its proponents.15We know even less about Aquinas' relationshipto them.
13Cf. mypaperAquinas'
as a theological
1990
useofMysterium
reminder
, in:faarboek
teUtrecht
Thomas
Instituut
, Utrecht
1991,24-48.
14The bestvisualrepresentation
ofthisisomorphy
thatI knowofcanbe foundin:
H. Roos,DieModiSignificandi
desMrtius
deDacia,Mnster/Kopenhagen
1952,1539. Consider
alsoDufour,o.e.,77 wherea moregeneralschemeis given.In general
cf. F. Crowe,St.Thomas:
Theisomorphism
anditsproper
, in:
ofhuman
knowing
object
13 (1961),167-190.
SciencesEcclsiastiques,
15The latest'Forschungsberich:
TheModistae
revisited
G.L. Bursill-Hall,
, in:
desgrammairiens
del'antiquit
latins
auxlumires.
Actesdu colloquede ChanL'Hritage
1987,IrneRosier(ed.), Louvain/Paris
1988,215-32;cf.also
tilly,2-4septembre
IrneRosier,"0 Magister
... Grammaticalit
etintelligibilit
selon
unsophisme
duXlIIe
sicle
du moyen-ge
, in: Cahiersde l'Institut
grecet latin,56 (1988),1-102;and of
thesameauthortheinteresting
etsacrements;
etla grammaire
Thomas
d'Aquin
Signes
199

01:19:42 AM

The earliest of the Modistae seems to be Martin of Dacia. Concordin

ance research of Aquinas' texts,looking up Martin's key-terms16
of
So
it
seems
that
does
not
admit
relationship.
any
Aquinas
Aquinas,
in
belonged to a pre-modisticphase.17 He does use modussignificandi
a technical manner, but without systematicorganization.
and modus
Aquinas' actual use of the terms modussignificationis
of
a
contexts
and
reveals
wide
spectrum
meanings. The use
significandi
that medieval grammariansmake of Priscian's well-knowndefinition
of nomen
, leads Aquinas to the observation that there is a mode of
signification that grammarians discern: significaresubstantiamcum
This featuredistinguishesa noun froma verb and a particiqualitate.18
A
verb
expresses an action, and an action is always of someone
ple.
or something,and thereforenever exists by itselfor is thoughtto exist
by itselfand thus is never to be signifiedas such. Nouns differfrom
verbs and participles, but they also differfrom demonstrativeand
relative pronouns.19 Apart from these basic distinctions between
modes of significationof separate grammatical classes of words,
Aquinas knows of at least 23 other distinctionsbetween modes of
signification:
words20
between
male,femaleand neutral
1) thedistinction
in words21
between
and accident
as expressed
substance
2) thedistinction
between
different
timesofa verb22
3) thedistinction
and actas expressed
in words23
between
potency
4) thedistinction
in
betweenan operation
and its objector resultas expressed
5) thedistinction
24
words
74 (1990),
et Thologiques,
, in: Revue des SciencesPhilosophiques
spculative
392-436.
16Thesearetheterms
inmodum
inmodum
thatwerechecked:
, in
communis,
appropriati
inmodum
adiacentis
alteri
modum
, permodum
, permodum
specialem,
generlem
persestantis,
do not
coniuncta.
Mostofthesephrases
unientis
ornantis
coniuncta
, permodum
permodum
meanoccurinAquinas,andiftheyoccurtheydo nothavea logicalorgrammatical
im Mittelalter
der Sprachtheorie
,
ing. Accordingto Pinborg,Die Entwicklung
1967,69 note 19, Aquinasdid notknowthetextsof the
Mnster/Kopenhagen
modistae.
17So saysPinborg,
o.e., 183and
DieEntwicklung
, 48 and69 (note69). Cf.Manthey,
198.
18CPE I 1+4 + 5; ISN 9.1.2; 1*W22.1.1ad 3; 3V6.1.3;STI 13.1ad 3; III 78.5.
19ST I 13.1ad 3; 1SW22.1.1ad 3.
20ISN 9.1.1 ad 2; DP3 10; cf.STI 31.2 ad 4; ST III 17.1.
21ISN 9.1.2; 22.1.1ad 3; QDP 7.4 ad 1,2; 8.2.
22ISN 9.2.2 ad 2; ISN 22.1.1ad 3; moreregularly
calledconsignijicatio.
23l&V 18.1.2.
24ISN 10.1.2ad 3; STI 37.1 ad 2; STI 41.4 ad 3; QDV23A ad 7 + 11; cf.QDV
sitiotextus.
23.4 ad 7 and ISN 18expo
200

01:19:42 AM

between
and abstract
nouns25
concrete
6) thedistinction
modesofsignification
between
absoluteand relative
ofwords26
7) thedistinction
in words27
between
formand subsistence
as expressed
8) thedistinction
and negation28
between
affirmation
9) thedistinction
activeandpassivemodesofverbs29
between
10)thedistinction
between
different
cases30
11)thedistinction
is itspeculiarmodeofsignification31
ofa proposition
12)thecompositeness
a certain
wordsthatimply
between
habitudo
orrelatio
andthosethat
13)thedistinction
do not32
between
substance
andrelation
as expressed
inwords33
property,
14)thedistinction
wordsthatimplychange,andthosethatdo not34
between
15)thedistinction
ofnumber35
16)thedistinction
between
suchas perandabthatimplya relation,
and
prepositions
17)thedistinction
thosethatdo not36
between
relation
and accident
as expressed
in words37
18)thedistinction
substance
and essenceas expressed
between
in words38
19)thedistinction
ofall tenAristotelian
as expressed
in words39
20) thedistinction
categories
between
as a whole,andas a part,resulting
inpredica21) thedistinction
signifying
40
andobliquo
tionrecto
between
substantive
and adjective
terms41
22) thedistinction
between
and formas expressed
in words.42
23) thedistinction
operation
One is tempted to distinguishthose instances where the phrase "as
expressed in words" is used fromthe rest, and to make two separate
lists: grammaticaland logical modes of signification.As a matterof
fact, Aquinas himself distinguishes a logical from a grammatical
understandingof the categories. The proper understandingis the one
25ISN 4.1.2;22.1.2ad 4; 24.2.2ad 2; 33.1.2sol. + ad 4; 3V4.2ad 2; ScGI 30.3;
ST I 39.4;I 39.5corpus
+ ad 3; III 16.5ad 1; QDP 1.2 ad 7; 8.3 ad 10;REI I 1 [557];
OCE 1.4 [75]; CMPVII 1.8-12(1252-1256);
cf.QDP 8.2 ad 7; CPE I 4.5.
26ISN 23.1.3adsedcontra;
32.1.1ad 1; STI 29.4; QDP 9.6 ad 2; REI I 1 [796];cf.
QDP 9.4.
27ISN 26.1.1ad 3; 34.1.2sol + ad 1; cf.ST III 2.2 ad 1; I 40.3.
28ISN 34.3.2("...cum convenientissimus
modussignificandi
divinasitpernegationem");ST I 13.12ad 1.
29ISN 40.1.1ad 1 (Parma-edition);
35.1.1ad 5; 457V
257V
38.2.3.1ad 2; 57"I 41.1
ad 3; I 54.1 ad 3.
30'SN 41.1.5ad 3.
31STI 13.12ad 2 + 3.
32ST I 19.2ad 1.
33157V
textus
23 expositio
; ST I 40.1; cf.ST I 41.1 ad 2; QDP 8.2.
34ST I 45.2 ad 2.
35ST III 3.7 ad 2.
36QDP 1.1 obiectum
and ad 1+6.
5, corpus
37QDP 8.2; cf.DP3 10.
38QDW 1.11ad 4; cf.DP3 10.
39DP3 10.
40ISN 25.1.1ad 3; QDL 2.2.2 ad sedcontra.
41ISN 9.1.2; ST I 39.3; cf.357V5 expositio
textus
; ST I 39.5 ad 5.
42 157V
32.2.1.
201

01:19:42 AM

held by the logician, and the grammatical understandingis accepted

Whiteness is grammaticallya substance,
quantumad modumsignificandi.
but logically an accident.43But to distinguisha grammaticalmeaning
froma logical meaning of a word is not the same as distinguishinga
grammatical mode of significationfrom a logical mode of signification. In fact,thereis no such thingas a logical mode of signification.
All modes of significationbelong to grammatical analysis. Some
modes of being (the ones which the logician discerns and expresses)
are reflectedin the grammaticalmodes of signification,and othersare
not. Some grammaticalmodes of significationreflectmodes of being
while othersdo not. For instance, some passive verbs reflectreal passion of the subject of the verb, but others do not.44 It is not the job
of the grammarian nor of the logician, but of the philosopheror the
theologianto determinewhethermodes ofbeing are reflectedin modes
of signification,or not.
Almost every instance in which Aquinas uses the phrase modus
significandirepresents this kind of activity: to map the differences
between God and our deficientmode of signifyinghim and his operations. The prepositionsper and ab in sentences such as Operatiodivina
suamimplya relation
estab essentiadivinaand Deus operatur
peressentiam
between divine operation and divine essence, contrary to divine
simplicity,but this only belongs to the human level of thinkingand
the human way of speaking.45 The grammar of 'to create' and 'to
make' is the same, but in realitythe latterimplieschange, whereas the
formerdoes not.46 When talking about the divine persons, we use
substantivetermsthathave a substantivemode of signification,implying substances, whereas there are not three substances in God, but
only three relations.47These are only three examples out of many
instancesin whichAquinas calls attentionto the modes of signification
in order to determinewhere it is that our language in divinisfails,and
which rules should be followed in order to give a true interpretation
of authoritativestatements.48
43 157V
22.1.1ad 3; cf.257V35.1.1ad 5 andST I 41.1 ad 3; cf.457V38.2.3.1ad 2
andDP3 8.
44 157V40.1.1ad 1 (Parma-edition);
457V38.2.3.1ad 2; 57"I 41.1 ad 3.
45QDP 1.1 obiectum
and ad 1+6.
5, corpus
46ST I 45.2 ad 2.
47 157V23.1.3ad sedcontra
; ST I 29.4.
4Brorinstance,
whenAugustine
a substance,
Aquinasintersignifies
saysthatpersona
substantiae
itself;157V
, notsubstance
pretshimas sayingthatit signifies
permodum
23.1.3 ad 1; cf.OCE 1.4.
202

01:19:42 AM

This procedure usually takes the form of a semantic distinction

between what is realiter!
remire
secundum
the case, and how this state of
affairsdiffersfromthe state that our mode of signifyingor our mode
of thinking suggests: secundummodumsignificandiand rationistantum!
rationed Of the same object we can have e.g.
secundumrationem!
and
physical,geometrical
grammaticalknowledge,and so it is thatwe
need different
words to understandand express
conceptsand different
this object. In this respect our knowledge and speaking is never perfect.50When we tryto understandGod, and speak about him, we are
faced with a similar problem. Moreover, all our language bears the
marks of a language apt for signifyingcreation, and so our mode of
signifyingalways importtconditionescorporalessuch as time and
compositeness51.E.g. words such as 'father' or 'principle' withwhich
we signifyGod are always taken fromour discussion of creation. And
so Aquinas distinguishesthe mode of signification,which in this case
is the generadfeatureof being taken fromcreation-talk, imponere
a quo,
fromwhat we intend in using these words, the result of imponere
ad
the
of
this
quem.52Indicating
importance
general distinction,Aquinas
says:
Respondeodicendum,
quod sicutsupradictumest,sapientiaet bonitas,et
omniahuiusmodi,
suntomninounumrein Deo, seddifferunt
ethaec
ratione;
rationonesttantum
ex parteipsiusratiocinantis,
sedex proprietate
ipsiusrei.
Ad cuiusrei evidentiam,
ut diligenter
explicetur,
quia ex hoc pendettotus
intellectus
eorumquae in I librodicuntur,
videre(ISN 2.1.3).
quatuoroportet
All of our understandingof what is contained in Peter of Lombard's
firstbook, depends on understandingthe distinctionbetween resand
49Thisdisplays
Aristotle's
basictenetthatourwordssignify
whichsignify
concepts,
"
et intellectus
suntrerum
ST
similitudines",
things:vocessuntsignaintellectuum,
I 13.1; cf.CPE I 2; thehumanmodeofsignifying
follows
thehumanmodeof'receivin thecreatedworld:ISN 22.1.2sol + ad 1; ST I 13.3.
ing'God'sperfection
50
ISN 35.1.1ad 2; cf.W 2.1.3; ST I 13.4.
51ST I 13.3corpus
+ ad 3.
52Somenames
thatfrom
whichtheyaretaken,
andinthatcasetheyaretaken
signify
fromtheessenceofthethingto be signified.
Somehowever
are takenonly
directly
from
a property
or a superficial
andin thatcase
aspectofthethingtobe signified,
andsignification
arenotidentical.
AllnamesforGodaretakenfrom
creaetymology
tion,so all ofthembelongto thesecondcategory.
Notethatthisdistinction
from
a quo/imponere
idcuiisalsousedtodistinguish
imponere
textus
and 3SN 6.1.3;
signification
(a quo)fromsupposition
{idcui)in 1SN 2 expositio
ISN 22.1.2;22 exp.textus
; 23.1.2ad 1; 24.2.2ad 2; 25.1.2sol + ad 3; 29.1.1ad 1;
34 exp.textus
; ScGI 30.3; STI 13.2ad 2; I 13.6; I 13.8; I 13.11ad 1; I 33.2 ad 4;
QDP1A ad 1 + 9; CPE I 4.9; cf.STIMI 1.6 ad 3; II-II 92.1 ad 2; CDN I 1 (029).
203

01:19:42 AM

ratio, ratiobeing a name of second imposition,i.e. a name fora human

concept of a thing insofaras it representsa human intention:names
or suppositum.We shall returnto this shortly.
like genus, definitio,
In order to signifyGod, we have to fulfillan impossible task: to
transcend the very mode in which we speak. Aquinas sums it all up
for us in this argument froma discussion of divine simplicity:
in dictionibus
Modus significandi
sequitur
quae a nobisrebusimponuntur
enimsignificant
intellectuum
ut
dictiones
modumintelligendi;
conceptiones,
autemnoster
hocmodointelligit
esse
inprincipio
"Periher".Intellectus
dicitur
inrebusinferioribus
a quibusscientiam
capit,inquibusesse
quomodoinvenitur
sedinhaerens.
Ratioauteminvenit
nonestsubsistens,
quodaliquodessesubsistenssit:et ideolicethocquoddicuntesse,significetur
permodumconcreesse Deo TRANSCENDIT modum
attribuens
tionis,tamen intellectus
Deo idquodsignificatur,
nonautemmodum
attribuens
significandi
significandi,
(QDP 7.2 ad 7).
Apart fromexplaining how the attentionto modes of significationfits
in with a typical theological outlook, this list of modes is given here
and final mode of significationwhich
because of this twentyfourth
Aquinas discerns, and which underlines a basic characteristicof most
of the modes earlier mentioned:
as a suppositum
andas a form.53
between
beingsignified
24) thedistinction
Each nature is individuated by matter. Such a nature is the formof
the individual, and the individual is the suppositumof the form.
of human nature, and thereforewhen we say
Socrates is a suppositum
4Socrates is a human
being', human nature is the formof Socrates.
'Human being' however is not the form itself,nor does it have the
mode of significationof a form,although 'human nature' does. For
obvious reasons we cannot say Socrates is human nature'. But can we
say 'Socrates is of human nature'? Only when an adjective is added,
as in sentences such as ista mulierest egregiae formaeor istehomoest
A thingthathas a certainform,can only be signified
perfectae virtutis.
to beofa form,when a special determinationis added. This is a mode
of being of created thingsthat is reflectedin our mode of signifying:
the subject-termis signified as the thing having a form, and the
predicate as the formthatis had. The subject-termstandsforthe thing
as actually referred
having a form,and this thing-as-being-signified,
. It is a creational mode of significationthat we
to, is called suppositum
cannot but follow, indeed have to follow, when we think about the
53 ISN 33.1.4 sol. + ad 4; ST I 39.2; I 40.1 ad 2 + 3; cf.ST I 32.2 ad 2; I 40.2; cf.
frominabstracto.
also QDP 8.2 ad 7 wherepermodum
is distinguished
suppositi
204

01:19:42 AM

relationshipbetween the three divine persons. The Council of Nicea

endorsed homoousion
, and Aquinas approves of its Latin translationas
uninsessentiae
, employing the line of argumentationjust mentioned.
the isomorphyof language and realityvery seriously,
takes
Aquinas
and does not simply accept a phrase that seems to put the real state
of affairsupside down: a nature does not have the individual, but the
individualhas a nature. Therefore,withoutspecial determination,persona est essentiae(note the shorthand-characterof this phrase) is not
admitted, whereas essentiaestpersonaeis.54
means being signifiedas something
Being signifiedas a suppositum
having a nature, or as something performinga certain kind of
is a certain mode of significaaction.55Being signifiedas a suppositum
tion. When a word has supposition, somethingis signifiedas a supmeans that it is signifiedby a
positum.Something being a suppositum
word that has supposition.56
Looking back now upon all the modes that we encountered in
Aquinas' writings, we recognize the distinction between being
or as a formin at least fifteenother distincsignifiedas a suppositum
tions. The driving force behind them all is to determine a way of
speaking that conformsto the thing spoken about: is it a subsisting
thingor an aspect of such a thing. This makes supposition belong to
the heart of the theological use of the doctrine of the modes of
signification.57
And so it seems thatthereexista link betweenmodes of signification
and the theoryof supposition, and that supposition can be definedas
54ST I 39.2.
55ST I 40.1 ad 3; thephraseactiones
is axiomatic
in Aquinasand
suntsuppositorum
omnipresent.
56 lhe mainarguments
bothas an ontologica!
foraccepting
subject, the
suppositum
arethese:
common
view,and as a resultofa rational
operation,
oftheisomorphy
oflanguageand
demonstrated
presupposition
a) Aquinas'clearly
theres
demonstrated
a presupposition
reality,
bytheveryprocessofdistinguishing
ofhumanmodes
oftheappropriateness
from
themodus
, andbytheverydiscussion
indivinisi
ofsignification
as a nomen
secundae
thatAquinasaccepts
indicate
impositions,
suppositum
b) Severaltexts
a secondary
i.e. conceptof a concept,existing
intention,
onlyin themind,even
inre' 'SN 2.1.3; 26.1.1ad
theremaybe, or evenshouldbe, a fundamentum
though
3; 3iS7V
6.1.1.1;ST I 29.2; QDI 2; DPG 6 [328].
57Pleasenotethatthesurvey
ofmodesofsignification
thatI havegivencoversonly
those texts in which Aquinas himselfexplicitlyuses the phrase modus
. Thereare manymoretextsin whichhe distinguishes
significations
per
significandi/
to thetheory.
x from
modum
permodum
y whichseemtobe pertinent
205

01:19:42 AM

a mode of signification.Being a mode of signification,the laws of supposition should both be respected in divinisand be provided with a
disclaimer: it does not imply any composition in God, it does not
imply that God's mode of being concords with the modes of being
implied by the mode of significationsupposition is. It leaves us with
a burning question though. If supposition is a mode of signification,
and if modes of significationform part of the larger concept of
signification,how does Aquinas account for the differencebetween
supposition and signification?
to theDivine58
3. Modes of supposition
and referring
3. 1 Someexamplesofsemanticanalysis
One and the same word may have differentmeanings in different
contexts. The interpretationof Scripture, fathersor other written
sources as well as proper reasoningneeds to be alert. One reason may
be that the significationor rationominisis equivocal or analogical.
Another reason may be that a differentmode of significationcauses
a differentmode of supposition. E.g. alius and aliud have the same
meaning, i.e. alietas, but a differentmode of signification,and thereforea differentmode of supposition,which causes Paterestalius a Filio
to be true,but Paterestaliuda Filio to be false.59Humananaturaand homo
have the same meaning, but one signifiesabstractlyand the otherconis false, since it implies that
cretely.ThereforeDeus assumpsithominem
the hypostatic union took place by way of adoption of an already
existingindividual, but Deus assumpsithumanamnaturamis true.60This
illustratesthe basic necessity to develop doctrines of signification,
modes of significationand modes of supposition.61Quite regularlyone
and profindsAquinas giving a reverentexposition of some auctoritas
58It shouldbe notedthatall listsoftextsthatare givenbelow,areintended
tobe
otherwise.
unlessindicated
exhaustive,
59 'SN 9.1.1 ad 2.
60ST III 4.3 corpus
+ ad 2 and 4.4.
61Aquinasoccasionally
and
"Sed diferunt
talksaboutmodus
supponenti:
(relatio
in re,quiautrumque
nomen
secundum
modumsignificando
qui fundatur
hypostasis)
etiamquantumad
suam in Deo; et ideo differunt
habetveramsignificationem
aliud.Sicutenimdicimus
unononsupponitur
modumsupponendi,
quia supposito
et
itadicimus
etdeitasnongenerat:
quodhypostasis
distinguitur
quodDeus generat
textus.
ISN 26.1.1ad 5; cf.ISN 5 expositio
relatiodistinguit",
206

01:19:42 AM

hibitingto extend speech in such a way.62 Also quite regularlyone

findsAquinas detectinga fallacyin the opponent's argument, based
on a differentsignificationor a differentsupposition.63Deus assumpsit
humanamnaturamalso illustrates that significationand supposition
does not have (pershould be distinguished.Because humanamnaturam
form
or
nature
as such, such
but
the
only signifies
sonal) supposition,
a proposition truly expresses the personal unity in Christ. Because
thereis only a differencein suppositionbetween Deus generat
and Deus
estgenitus,and not in signification,theydo not express that Father and
Gods. Because only the supposit which is denoted by
Son are different
homoin Iste homoest Christusis differentfromthe one denoted in Iste
homoestSocrates
, and not its signification,Christ's human nature is the
same nature as the one all human beings participate in.64
In fact,the whole of christologyis built on the distinctionbetween
significationand supposition. If homoin Homo estDeus were to signify
and supposit the same, the resultwould be an identificationof both
natures.Homosignifieshuman nature, but suppositsforthe individual
that has human nature, i.e. the Son of God. If Deus in Deus esthomo
were to signifyand supposit the same, the distinctionbetween the
threedivine persons would be lost. Deus signifiesdivine nature, but in
thiscase suppositsforone of the individuals that 'have' divine nature,
i.e. the Son of God.
between
and supposition
3.2 The distinction
signification
To keep significationand suppositionapart is of major interest.But
doesn't the fact that, as has been shown, supposition is the heart of
Aquinas' usage of modes of signification,blur this distinction?I do
not thinkso. In factthe word suppositionhas (in this respect) two differentmeanings say both William of Sherwood and Lambert of Aux62One exampleoutofmany:PopeInnocentius
III hassaidabouttheSon ofGod:
butsinceno existing
"personaconsumpsit
personam",
personwasassumedin the
thiscanonlybe understood
as improper
useofwords;thewordsmean
incarnation,
thatthehumannaturethatwas assumeddid nothavea personality
of itsown;
3SN 5.3.3 ad 4.
Aquinassays:"Unde nonestex hocextendendum",
63One exampleoutofmany:thisis a fallacia
dictionis
velaccidentis
: "Deus est
figurae
FiliusestDeus,ergoFiliusestingenitus";
inthefirst
Deussupingenitus,
proposition
Deussignifies
thedivine
positsfortheFather,whereasin thesecondproposition
secundum
rem
inGod,butnotsecundum
modum
nature;
personandnatureareidentical
ST III 3.6 ad 3.
significando
64This is expressed
nonfacitaequivocationem,
sed
by: "Diversitas
suppositionis
diversitas
3SN6.1.3 ad 1; cf.ScGIV 49.12;QDP9A ad 6; QDI 2
significationis":
ad 4; QDL 3.2.2 ad 1; cf.alsoST I 13.9; OTT I 211 [137].
207

01:19:42 AM

erre:65one indicates a certain mode of signification,and the other

what nowadays is called denotation or extension.
Sherwood gives definitions of four proprietatesterminorum
(5.0.1-5.0.2):
alicuiusformaead intellectum
praesentatio
significatio
ordinatio
alicuius
intellectus
sub alio
suppositio
ordinatio
alicuius
intellectus
supraalium
copulatio
termini
convenientia
, i.e. proprietas
, secundumquam
appellatio praesens
termini
hocverbo'est3
potestdici de aliquo, mediante
significatum
He draws attentionto the factthat suppositionand copulation dicuntur
nomina
actumautsecundum
, autsecundum
, sicutmultahuiusmodi
multipliciter
habitm.The definitionsjust given are definitionsof actual supposition
and copulation, whereas the followingare definitionsof habitual supposition and copulation:
66
alicuiusutsubsistentis.
Quodenimtaleest, natum est
suppositio significatio
ordinarisub alio.
alicuiusut adiacentis.Quod enimtaleest, natumest
copulatio significatio
ordinarisupraaliud.
It is quite clear that habitual supposition is a mode of signification.
Sherwood gives furtherclarificationof this point by linkingsupposition with substantives,pronouns and words used substantivelyonly.
All words that can supposit have signification,but not all words that
have significationcan supposit: only those that significant
remut subsistentem
et ordinabilem
sub alio. When Sherwood continues with his
expositionof the varietiesor modes of supposition,it is not in the sense
of habitual supposition i.e. as a mode of significationthathe uses the
word, but in the sense of actual supposition.
Lambert of Auxerre points out that significationis priorto supposition, since supposition is the property of terms that already have
signification.Both are furtherdistinguishedinasmuch as signification
only regards the understandingof the thing to be representedby a
65PeterofSpainislessexplicit,
butBraakhuis
hasshown
thatPeteremploys
theword
ina twofold
sense:"namelyof:reisubstantive
supponete
representare
(805)andof:tostand
(said of a substantive
term)forsomething
(801415)",o.e. note79, 138; Petrus
Tractatus
Summule
HispanusPortugalensis,
Logicales
(calledafterwards
), FirstCritical
Editionfromthemanuscripts
withan Introduction
byL.M. de RijkPh.D., Assen
Introductions
inlogicam
1972;WilliamofSherwood,
, ed. CharlesH. Lohr,withPeter
Kunze and Bernhard
Mussler,in: Traditio,XXXIX (1983),219-99;Lamberto
Lamberti
cord'Auxerre,
Logica
(Summa
), ed. FrancoAlessio,Firenze1971(as tacitly
rectedin Braakhuis,
o.e.).
66NoteSherwood's
use oflanguagehere:natum
esti.e. itis designed
; see
bynature
belowon naturalsupposition.
208

01:19:42 AM

sub ilia re,

word, whereas supposition regards also the suppositacontenta
i.e. the thingsof which the word can trulybe said.67 Lambert continues by pointingout that the word supposition has differentmeanings, two of which are relevant here:
reidesignatio
velsignado
suppositio substantiva
conprose siveproresua} velproaliquosupposito
suppositio acceptiotermini
tentosub re sua velpro aliquibussuppositiscontends
sub re sua.
The firstkind of suppositiohe calls quaedamsignificatio
et
specialistermini
non terminiproprietas
whereas
the second kind is the one to be
,
investigatedby the logician.68
What Sherwood calls suppositiosecundumhabitm
, Lambert calls
termini
and
what
Sherwood
calls
substantivi,
significatio
copulatiosecundum
calls
habitm
Lambert
termini
The
adiectivi.
same
,
distinction,
significatio
thoughless explicit,can be found in Peter of Spain. This leads to the
conclusion that the thirteenthcenturylogic of supposition draws a
sharp distinctionbetween significationand supposition as two meanings of the termsupposition. One focussesupon the mode of signification with its (be it rightor wrong) implication of a certain mode of
being,69the other upon the denotation or referenceof terms actually
used.70
67"Verbigratia,
hominis
nonad contenta
solumextenditur
ad hominem,
significatio
nonSortemnecPlatonem.
subhomine:"homo"enimsignificai
Potest
hominem,
tarnen
"homo"supponere
proSorteet proPlatoneet prohomine",o.e., 206.
68"Dividitur
communiter
dietainsuppositionem
dietam
et
autemsuppositio
proprie
Communiter
enimloquendosupponunt
termini
substantivi
et adieccopulationem.
etcopulatio
terconvenit
terminis
substantivis,
tivi;sedproprie
loquendosuppositio
remfixametperse
minisadiectivis.
Et estsuppositio
dietaacceptio
termini
proprie
secundum
vel
stantem
quamteneri
representantis
potest
proresuavelprosupposito
subre sua."; o.e., 207.
contends
suppositis
69Lambertsays:"...si querataliquisquaresuppositio
substantivis,
approprietur
ex dictisquid sitdicendum
enimestperse
adiectivis,
copulatio
patet:supponere
et remsuamfixamrepresentantis.
Per se autemstareet remsuamfixam
stantis
est substantivorum;
et rem
proprium
copularevero est adiectivis
representare
adiacereveroet remdependentem
dependentem
representantis:
representare
proideo proprieloquendosuppositioest substantivorum,
priumest adiectivorum:
o.e., 208;I cannotbutreadthisas stating
veroadiectivorum.";
theretobe
copulatio
themodeofsignification
andthethingtobe signified,
a parallelism
between
which
to mymindshouldalsobe theproperinterpretation
ofthispassagefromPeterof
aliaestreisubstantive
ethabetfieri
Spain:"Significationis
pernomensubstantivum,
ut'homo';aliaestreiadiective
ethabetfieri
velperverbum,
pernomenadiectivum
ut'albus'vel'curri.Quareproprie
nonestsignificatio
substantiva
veladiectiva,
sed
et aliquidadiective,
substantive
vel substanaliquidsignificatur
quia adiectivatio
tivadosuntmodirerumque significantur,
et nonsignificationis";
o.e., 7r. VI,2,
79/80.
70Aquinasmentions
neither
norhisfellow-Dominican
andprobPeter,norWilliam,
209

01:19:42 AM

3 . 3 Aquinas on supposition
as a modeofsignification
Aquinas is not primarilya logician, but a theologian. He neither
nor one of supposigives an independentdefinitionof signification,71
tion. What comes closest to a distinctionbetween the two of them, is
mentioned above concerningequivocation (which belongs to the level
of signification)and supposition. If someone were to say that homois
used equivocally, Aquinas answers that equivocation (or univocation
or analogous use of words for that matter) belongs to the semantic
level of significationand not to the semantic level of (personal) supposition. Equivocation is caused by a diversityof significationand not
by a diversityof supposition. However, this does not reveal whether
theword suppositionitselfhas two meanings in Aquinas' writings.For
this, we have to look to the theoryof supposition 'at work'. Aquinas'
conception of the distinctionis embedded in his trinitariantheology
and christology.
A large number ofmore than 2500 instancesofmentioningsupposition, is devoted to indicating the supposition of Deus: does it stand
indistincte
fordivine persons, or distincte
forone or more of them? The
logic of suppositionis especiallyneeded to provide a glimpseof understandingof the mysteryof the Trinity: how can the Nicene Creed say
Deum de Deo (genitum)and not imply that the divine essence was
brought forth( essentiagenuitessentiam
) or fall back into polytheism?

ofSt.Jacquesin ParisLambert
ofAuxerre,
thesethreebeing
ablyfellow-inhabitant
theauthors
ofthethree
mostfamous
oflogicinthethirtheenth
compendiums
century.
Allofthemseemtosharea common
tradition
of12thand 13thcentury
logic,instead
ofbeingdependent
theoneon theother(e.g. Peteron WilliamofSherwood).
At present
indications
are certain:
onlya fewminorhistorical
- thereis a striking
resemblance
between
onfallacies
Peter'stract
andAquinas'
s, that
is ifAquinasis theauthor,
whichseemsto suggest
a common
source(De Rijk);
- Aquinas'De propositionibus
modalibus
seemstobe
, thatis ifAquinasis theauthor,
on theworkofWilliamofSherwood
Kretzmann,
dependent
(Prantl,Grabmann,
H.F. Dondaine);
-Aquinasusestheterm
naturalis
which
canbefound
inPeterofSpain'sTrac
suppositio
tatusand in theLogicaof LambertofAuxerre,
butnotin Williamof Sherwoods
Introductiones
inlogicam
Lamberti
however
was notpublished
before1260,
; theSumma
whereas
on PeterofLombard's
IV LibriSentenAquinasalreadyin hiscommentary
tiarum
mentions
theterm.
(1254-1256)
71Cf. his commentary
on PeriHermeneias
that
, firstfivelessons;the definition
Lambert
termini
est
givescomesclosesttotheonegivenbyAristotle:
"Significado
intellectus
reiad quemintellectum
reivoximponitur
ad voluntatem
instituentis",
o.e., p. 205.
210

01:19:42 AM

Aquinas' firstdistinctionis between the significationof Deus and its

supposition. Deus signifiesthe divine essence, but it stands, in an
indistinct, undetermined way, for the divine persons. Aquinas
locutionum,
prefaceshis solution with these words: Sed in proprietatibus
estressignificata
nontantumattendendo,
, sed etiammodussignificandi
( ST I
of
Deus
is
i.e.
it
of
mode
The
concrete,
signifiesthe
signification
39.4).
divine nature as possessed by an individual, just like homosignifiesa
personof human nature. In general the proper supposition of Deus is
a standingforan individual of divine nature, a propertythe termowes
to its concrete mode of signification.
Aquinas' partnersin discussion subscribe to the opinion that only
the contextof a predicate which belongs to one or more persons, a
'notional' predicate, makes Deus to stand fora person. By its nature
suamnturm)it stands forthe divine essence. Both in
secundum
(proprie
Summa
and
, Aquinas mentions this position, and
Theologiae
Scriptum
both times he respectfullyyet firmlyrejects it.72 Divine simplicity
means that God's essence and God's subsistence are one, unlike
anythingelse we know of. But human modes of significationare fitto
talk about what we know of, i.e. created things. That means that
divine simplicitycannot be the reason forbypassingthe propertythat
the term Deus as a concrete noun in our language has.73 A concrete
noun normallystands foran individuated nature and not fora nature
or essence as such. Theology apparently should speak as logically as
possible, with the accent on both 'logical' and 'as possible'. Logic
demands that a certain kind of supposition follows upon a certain
mode of signification,while the limitationsof our speech demand that
we leave room for the unique and unknown God, in whom essence
and supposit are identical.
We may conclude thatwhile Aquinas distinguishessignificationand
supposition of words,74he must also show how this distinctionoften
' ' ST 139.4.
72"Et haecopiniovidetur
verior
esse" , 1SN4.1.2; *' aliimeliusdixerunt
,
73"Et haecopinioprocessisse
divinaesimplicitatis,
ex consideratone
videtur
quae
etsic'habensdeitatem',
quod
quodinDeo idemsithabensetquodhabetur:
requirit
locuhoc nomen'Deus', est idemquod 'deitas'.Sed in proprietatibus
significai
sedetiammodussignificandi.
Et
estressignificata;
attendenda
nontantum
tionum,
essentiam
utinhabente
divinam
ideo,quiahocnomen'Deus' significat
ipsam,sicut
aliimeliusdixerunt
insupposito;
hocnomen'homo'humanitatem
quodhoc
significat
habetutproprie
nomen'Deus' ex modosignificandi
possitsupponere
propersona,
sicutet hocnomen'homo'",ST I 39.4.
74Othertextswherethedistinction
and signification
between
is made:
supposition
211

01:19:42 AM

fails to obtain in divinis. Yet a theologian must respect it, lest

theological howlers occur. This is made quite obvious in the twinquestion of the one that we have just discussed (Deus genuitDeum?):
? The termessentiain thispropositionis a shortEssentiagenuitEssentiam
hand termforall those nouns thathave the abstractmode of signification and express some aspect of God that is of God's essence, and not
distinctlyof a divine person. The rejected reasoning is simple: ifthere
is an identityof essence and supposit in God, then the termsexpressing each are interchangeable as well. The interpretationof Essentia
genuitEssentiamwould then be: PatergenuitFilium.Aquinas rejectsthis
view, since essentiadoes not have the mode of significationwhich
would make the predication of personal propertiespossible.
The same kind of argument can be found in Aquinas' christology.
'Given that the Son of God has suffered,and Son and divine nature
are identical, divine nature can be said to have suffered',is unacceptable since it doesn't respect the differentmodes of significationof
Filius and Divina natura.15
We wanted to know whetherAquinas uses supponere
in a twofold
sense. The firstpart ofthe answer can now be given: Aquinas uses sup1SN 4.1.2sol + ad 2; 5 expositio
textus
; 32.2.2.1ad 1; 3Af
6.1.3; 7.1.1ad 2,4,5;QDP
8.4 ad 6; STI 39.4 ad 1; III 3.6 ad 3; III 16.1;III 16.9ad 3; REP I 1 [134];OTT
I 211 [141];cf.ISN 9.1.1 ad 2.
This corresponds
withanotherdistinction:
are takenformaliter
and
predicates
materialiter
: 1SN 21.1.1.2;21.2.1obiectum
4; 3SN 1.2.5ad 5; 5 expositio
subject-terms
textus
; 6.1.3 ad 3; 6.2.1 ad 7; 11.2ad 3; 22.1.2;STI 13.12;I 31.3ad 2; III 16.7ad
4 ("terminus
insubiecto
tenetur
idestprosupposito;
vero
materialiter,
positus
positus
in praedicato,
tenetur
idestpronaturasignificata");
III 16.9;III 16.10;
formaliter,
III 17.1ad 3; cf.1W21.2.1
ad 1; STI 3.3; QDP9A; CMPIX 11.4(1898);REI I
1 [868].
truth-conditions
these,therearemanytextsinwhichAquinasdiscerns
Apartfrom
ofpropositions,
whereratione
is distinguished
from
orratione
ratione
significati
suppositi
3SN 7.1.1 ad 5; 7.2.1 ad 4; 12.1.1;ST I 39.4
identitatis'
textus'
e.g. ISN 23 expositio
obiectum
2; REP I 1 [135].
The wholelogicofreduplicative
statements
("Christussecundum
quodx esty")
3SN 10.1.1.1corpus
+ ad 2 + 3; 10.1.1.2sedcontra
1+
dependson thisdistinction:
sol; ST III 16.10corpus
+ ad 2; III 16.11;III 16.12.
75Aquinasexpresses
theverdict
on thiskindofargumentation
withthedenialofthe
is saidofa subjectcanstandforthesubject("omne
rule:eachpredicate
whichtruly
de aliquopotestsupponere
quod verepraedicatur
proipso"). This ruledoesnot
ofan essenceofoneofthedivinepersons,
is nota normal
apply,sincethepredication
in accordance
withthecommon
modesofsignification:
uno,
predication
"supposito
nonsupponitur
aliud"; 1SN 4.2.2 ad 5; 5.1.1obiectum
2; 26.1.1ad 5; 3SN 6 prologus
[157];ScGIV 38.8; ST I 39.1 ad 2; I 39.5 ad 4; (DI 1 ad 12; cf.alsothereverse:
ST III 16.1; OTT I 211 [144].
212

01:19:42 AM

ponerein the sense of mode of signification.There is one major differencewith the logicians that we have discussed. Aquinas links suppositionnot so much withsubstantiveterms,as opposed to copulation
and adjective terms,but with concrete terms, as opposed to abstract
ones. Aquinas is familiarwiththe distinctionbetween suppositionand
,76but fromthe
copulation, a theorythat he attributesto the sophistae
frequencythathe mentionsthe distinctionbetween abstractand concrete significationin connectionwith supposition we may gatherthat
he deems this distinctionmore suitable forhis purposes.
3.4 Aquinason supposition
as denotation
Terminist logicians such as Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood
and Lambert of Auxerre treat modes of supposition as modes of
denotationi.e. a termis interpretedto stand eitherforitself,or forthe
concept/natureit signifies,or for individual(s) that participatein the
naturesignified.The lattertwo even explicitlysay so, as we have seen.
Their treatmentof suppositionconsistsof the constructionof a 'tree',
in which pairs of modes are ordered hierarchically.
Aquinas is well acquainted with the technicalnames foreach of the
modes, used in the logicamodernorum
, even though we can only finda
few textsin which he employs these termsexplicitly.On the basis of
his usage of theseterms,however, we are able to reconstructa scheme
of varieties of supposition which is quite similar to a scheme of
medieval logic in general, reconstructedby Spade on the basis of
manuals of logic.77
76On thedistinction
between
andcopulatio
see 3SN6 prologus
suppositio
[229];7.1.1
ad 5; 7.2.2; 12.1.1;ST I 39.5 ad 5; and especially
QDP 9.4.
the sophistae
fourtimes:"...sicut dicuntsophistaedictio
Aquinasmentions
exclusiva
immobilitat
terminm
cuiadiungitur
ratione
implicitae."
negationis
(ISN
21.1.1ad 2); 4'...quia,utsophistae
dictioexclusiva
immobilitat
terminm
cui
dicunt,
utnonpossitfieri
subeo descensus
adiungitur,
proaliquosuppositorum."
(ST I 31.3
ad 3); "...quia, utsophistae
terminus
idemsignificat
etsupponit"
dicunt,
singularis
dicuntquod nominasubstantiva
(ST I 39.4 obiectum
1); "...unde sophistae
suppoverononsupponunt,
sedcopulant."(STI 39.5ad 5). So itseemsthat
nunt,adiectiva
intends
theterminist
whenhe sayssophistae
.
Aquinas
logicians
77PaulVincent
Medieval
', in: Cambridge
Spade,Thesemantics
ofterms'
History
ofLater
tantum!
, 188-96;Thedistinction
distributiva,
Philosophy
confusa
givenbySpadeas a subdivision
ofconfusa
tantum
, I haveleftout.The termconfusa
Aquinasdoesnotuse,and
distributive
is mentioned
insixtextsalbeitonlyina general
sense(ST I 31.4ad 2; 2SN
40.1.5ad 7), or as a characterization
ofsyncategoremata
3SN 5
, semper,
(omnis,
ubique
CMPW21.24(1108);ISN 37.2.3ad 2). I havefound
oneother
textus'
expositio
attempt
to reproduce
Enders,o.e.,79. However,
Aquinas'usageofthelogicofsupposition,
213

01:19:42 AM

The varieties of supposition that Aquinas uses in his theology,can

be taken togetherin this scheme:
SUPPOSITIO
MATERIALIS

FORMALIS

/'
DISC RETA/SINGULARIS/COMMUNIS
NATURALIS

ACCIDENT ALIS

SIMPLEX^^^^^^PERSONALIS
DETERMINATA
IMMOBILIS^

CONFUSA
MOBILIS

Examples fromthe texts of Aquinas elucidate this scheme:

78
est verbum
suppositiomaterialis: curro
Pateret Filius suntunusDeus 79
:
suppositiodiscreta
andBochenandonlyonthebasisoftheresearch
Endersforms
twotrees,
ofManthey
ski.Endersneedstwotrees,sincehethinks
'formal'
and
thatAquinasusestheterms
'material'
inopposedways,formal
sometimes
supposition
simplex
indicating
suppositio
and sometimes
However,in thosetexts,and theyaremany,in
suppositio
personalis.
whichthefirst
is used,Aquinasdoesnottalkaboutsuppositio formalis
,
meaning
butaboutteneri
rather
Enders
thansupposition.
, whichindicates
formaliter
signification
andimmobilis/mobilis,
omitsthedistinction
between
discreta/
andhe
-communis
singularis
reverses
naturalis/
accidentalis.
78CPE I 5.6; otherexamples
are:
- scioistum currere 1SN 38.1.5ad 4
- dicoSocratem
currere (ibidem)
- dicosolem moveri (ibidem)
- hocestcorpusmeum1Cor11.55andMt 26.26- ST III 78.5; R1C XI 5
[402];REM XXVI 3 [298];
- detrahe
Isaiah8.1 - CIS VIII 1 [48]
spolia,praedare
- nonscioeumJohn8.55 - REI VIII 8 [355]
- Socratem
1SN 41.1.5
currere
thetermsuppositio
materialis!
, butusesthephrase
Aquinasdoesnotmention
formalis
: thedistinction
and a
sumere
between
a termstanding
foritself
materialiter/formaliter
termhavingsupposition
on thebasisofitssignification.
79CompareST I 39.3withI 39.4obiectum
1 anditsanswer,
andISN 4.12ad 3 where
and a
Aquinasusesthisexample.The termDeusis botha commonor universal
termitis notusedinpluralintheexample
term.Due toitbeinga singular
singular
see
between
terminus
communis
andterminus
discreta,
singularis!
given.On thedistinction
further
ISN 21.2.1ad 4; 3SN1.2A ad 6; cf.STI 13.9;DP3 10 [91].Cf.thesupposi214

01:19:42 AM

:
suppositionaturalis
:
suppositio
simplex
:
suppositiodeterminata
:
immobiliter

Deus
estPateret Filius et SpiritusSanctus80
Deus
creai81
82
Solus Deus
general
83
creat.
So/or Deus

I thinkit is justified to take natural supposition to be a part of this

scheme of varietiesof actualsupposition: the denotation of words used
in a certaincontext.The instancesin which Aquinas uses thisconcept
show thatit is not merelyvirtualor potentialsupposition,on the basis
tionofChristus
, e.g. ST
1; $SN 15.4.6.2ad 1 andofistehomo
, e.g. 3SN 11.2sedcontra
be:
III 16.10-12.Fromthiswe gather
thatotherexamples
might
-Iste homo estDeus;
- C h r i s t u s estDeus.
803iSN 1.2.4ad 6; otherexamples
are:
- istesolush o m o estPateret Filiuset Spiritus
Sanctus(ibidem)
- "Regi saeculorum,
1.17- ST
soliD e o" etc.( 'Timothy
immortali,
invisibilii,
I 39.4)
- "Unus solusverusDeus" (Augustine
- 3SN 1.2.4 ad 6)
- Hie estD e u s, et nonaestimabitur
aliusab ilio" {Baruch
3.36 - ibidem)
Cf.alsoST I 39.5; III 4.3; III 17.1;III 16.1;REI I 1 [550];theseareall textswhere
as willbe shownbelow,notall of
is usedin connection
naturaliter
withsupposition;
thesetextshowever
inthesenseoftostandforall things
concern
natural
supposition
inthenaturesignified
orfuture;
thatparticipate
bytheterm,whether
past,present
thefirst
accidentalis
is used.
textmentioned
is theonlytextin whichsuppositio
81ST I 39.4; another
of
exampleis theunusualinterpretation
estDeus (ST III 16.7),and
Homo factus
H o m o estspecies(ST I 39.4 ad 3; DP3 10 [91])
seethetextsmenOn thedistinction
between
andsuppositio
personalis
simplex
suppositio
tioned,andST I 39.6 ad 1 as well.
82ST I 39.4 ad 3; another
examplegivesus theexactdifference:
- Pateret Filiussuntunump r i n c i p i u m,ergoautunum
p r i n c i p i u m quodestPater,autunump r i n c i p i u m quodnonest
Pater.
The first
timeprincipium
has confused
butthesecondand thirdtime
supposition,
determinate
theargument
is fallacious
Therefore
supposition.
(STI 36.4ad 4, cf.ad
the
5 and 6). Thisdistinction
and confusa
between
determinata
verymuchresembles
distinction
between
distincte
andindistincte
contexts
, adducedin trinitarian
discussing
thesupposition
ofDeus: ISN 4.1.2solandad 1 +2; 4.2.2 ad 4 + 5; 5.1.2sol + ad 1;
21.2.2ad 3; 24.2.2ad 2; 29.1.4ad 2; 3SN 1.2.4ad 6; STI 39.4ad 3; III 17.1corpus
and ad 4; OCE I 4 [63].
thewordconfuse
theabsenceoftheinfluence
Sometimes
indicates
ofa consignified
timeupontheactualsupposition
whichresults
insupposition
forthings
past,present
nisi
andfuture:
ISN 43 expositio
textus
, ST I 25.5 ad 2 (both:Deus nonpotestfacere
textus
; REMXXIV 3 [40];REI
quodiustum est);cf.also3SN3 expositio
primae
partis
XVI 6 [52].
83ST I 31.3 ad 3; ISN 21.1.1ad 2; another
example:
- Solushomoestanimalrationale
mortale
(ibidem).
withimmobile
do notadmitofanydescent
tosingulars,
like
Propositions
supposition
"OnlytheHolySpiritcreates"or "Only Socratesis a rationalmortalanimal";
ofmobilesupposition
Aquinasdoesn'tgiveexamples
(Spade,o.e., 196:"Everyman
is an animal").
215

01:19:42 AM

of the substantivemode of significationa word has, abstracted from

the contextof the propositionin which it is used.84Deus in Deus estPater
etFilius etSpiritusSanctusactually stands forall the 'individuals" that
'
"
participate' in the divine nature signifiedby the word.
This all shows thatAquinas is well-versedin thelogic of supposition
and thathe employsit throughouthis theology.More than merelyone
of his logical instruments,it is an essential instrument.This may be
illustratedfromhis christology.
The mysteryof the Incarnation revolves around the nature of the
union of God and man. How is it possible thatChrist is trulyGod and
truly man? Faced with three ways of accounting for the hypostatic
union, Aquinas adheres to the second opinion which Peter of Lombard discusses,85yet which Aquinas avers to be the truth: the same
, the same person 'has' both natures. Aquinas is well aware
suppositum
of the factthat the divine nature is not literallyhadby the Son of God.
He also states clearly that suppositum
, literallymeaning some sort of
not
does
subordination,
apply literally to God.86 So his rational
account has its limits too. The other two opinions, however, are
clearly false: one posits only an habitual union of both natures which
would endanger human salvation, while the other holds that there is
one person but two supposita
, which is unthinkable.If thereis one peras well.
son in Christ, there must be one and only one suppositum
What is interestinghere is that both opinions that Aquinas rejects,
can be and are formulatedin termstaken fromthe theoryof supposition. Those who defend the theory of an habitual union, accept a
significationof the term homowhich is only aequivocal, since they
deny, for fear of teaching some sort of adoption of a man and thus
endangering Christ's unity, that body and soul are mutuallyunited.
Moreover, theythinkthat the termDeus when used in the proposition
Deus esthomoonly copulates, and does not have supposition,just like
Hoc album est homo}1 This expresses in logical categories, what in
84Thisis theinterpretation
and
Boehner
thatDe Rijkin 1971putforward,
following
versionofthisarticleappearedin hisbook
to a certain
extentMoody.A rewritten
thatcan
ofthisvariety
hisinterpretation
Middeleeuwse
, inwhichhealtered
Wijsbegeerte
and madea choicefor
in PeterofSpainand LambertofAuxerre
be encountered
See below.
ofactualsupposition.
indeedas a variety
naturalsupposition
85IV LibriSententiarium
6.
, III, distinctio
86 ISN 34.1.1ad 3; cf.3SN 5.2.1 ad 3 + 4; ST I 39.1 ad 3.
873SN 7.1.1 ad 5; thiswouldalso runcounterto theacceptedteaching
thatonly
notsubstantives.
copulate,
adjectives
216

01:19:42 AM

metaphysicalcategories may be called a denial of the presence of a

substantialhuman nature in the Son of God Incarnate.
The otheropinion says that there is only one person in Christ, but
two supposits. Thus the so-called Assumptus-Homo
theoryverifiesthe
the
is
Deus
est
homo
as:
one
who
God
is
the
same as the one
proposition
who is man. Aquinas however thinksthat the proper interpretation
should be: the one who is God subsistsessentiallyin a human nature.
essenThe predicationof homois notperidentitatem
but perinformationem
.88
tialem
receivesthe predicationof operations
Moreover, only thesuppositum
in Christ other
and natural properties,and if therewere a suppositum
than the eternal one, we would no longer be able to read Holy Scripture,and predicatedivine actions and propertiesof(Christus)homo
, nor
and
Deus.
In
we
human actions
could no
fact,
propertiesof (Christus)
longer uphold Christ's unity.89
in a twofold
We wanted to know whetherAquinas uses supponere
sense. The firstpart of the answer has been given: Aquinas uses supponerein the sense of mode of signification.The second part may be
concluded fromhis usage of the technicaltermsinvolved in the distinction of varieties of actual supposition: Aquinas also uses supponere
in
the sense of a propertyof a (concrete) word to stand for or denote
eitheritself,its conceptual content,or individual(s) that participatein
the nature signified.Supponere
in Aquinas means both a certain mode
of significationand actual denotation.
4. Supposition
and modesof signification:
naturalsupposition
'
}
4.1 A twofold
meaningof natural
Let me call to mind once again this peculiar statementof William
of Sherwood: Et notandum
etcopuladodicuntur
, quodsuppositio
multipliciter,
883SN7.1.1; cf.thetextual
variant
262,and ad 5: "et
givenin theMoos-edition,
hocestsingulare
in materia
ista,quia nunquamalibiinvenitur
quodsitsuppositum
induabusnaturis
unumessentialiter
The theory
subsistens".
ofsupposition
provides
withan acceptedmeansofverification
butnotwitha modelto comchristology
whatis said.
prehend
89iSTIII 2.3; cf.thedemandofCyril,bishopofAlexandria,
quotedbyAquinas:"Si
duabusvel subsistentiis,
eas quae suntin Evangelicis
et Apostolicis
quis personis
voces,aut de Christoa Sanctisdictasaut ab ipsode se, et
Scripturis
impartitur
illudex Deo Verbumspecialiter
intellecto
quasdamquidemveluthomini,praeter
soliex Deo PatreVerbo:anathema
sit";
applicat,
quasdamverovelutDeo dicibiles,
cf.ST III 16.4and ScGIV 38.8.
217

01:19:42 AM

sicutmultahuiusmodinomina
, aut secundumactumaut secundumhabitm
a
William
,
gives featuretypicalforwords like supposition
(o.e. 5.0.1).
and copulation, so he says. I thinkthisstatementofWilliam's is highly
significant.He draws attention to the fact that whenever one uses
language to discern semantic laws that are at work in actual use of
language in order to be able to distinguishdifferentmeanings of the
same words in differentpropositions, one is likely to add one more
level of meaning to language itself. On this level one has to be
extremelycarefulnot to make the verymistakethe avoidance of which
is the primarygoal of designing this second order language.
. A theologianwithlogical
Take a propositionlike Deus estincarnatus
skills might remark: Deus potestsupponete.What does the theologian
say? Does he indicate the fact that Deus, unlike Divina Essentia, has a
concretemode of significationand thereforemay denote a divine person? Does he indicate thatDeus can have personal suppositionforthe
Son of God, but that the word can also have suppositio
, i.e. for
simplex
divine nature as such, since Divina naturaestincarnatais also true? Or
does he indicate the factthat ifDeus supposits forthe Son of God, the
propositionis true? All threemeanings are possible. The phrase potest
turns out to have at least three differentmeanings: it may
supponete
indicate a differencebetween modes of signification,it may indicate
the differencebetween modes of supposition, and it may indicate that
for some individuals the proposition is true whereas for others it is
not.90Only the firsttwo of these meanings appear on a level different
from the level of Deus est incarnatus
, since the meaning of the third
can
possible interpretation easily be expressed by givingan alternative
So we are leftwitheitherthedifexpressionlike FiliusDei estincarnatus.
ference between modes of significationor the differencebetween
modes of supposition. This is exactlywhat William in those fewwords
wanted to emphasize, and we are able to show that Aquinas had in
mind somethingsimilar. It is hidden in Aquinas' twofolduse of the
in connection with supponete.
word naturaliter
naturalisAquinas uses only twicethroughThe literaltermsuppositio
out his work: the noun Deus (...) habetnaturalemsuppositionem
pro
91
persona . The contextis the question concerningthe truthofthe prop90Putdifferently:
a) potest& nonpotest
x & potesthaberesuppositio
y
b) potesthaberesuppositio
proy.
prox potestsupponere
c) potestsupponere
91ST I 39.4 ad 2; cf.3SN 1.2.4 ad 6.
218

01:19:42 AM

osition Deus genuitDeum, as opposed to EssentiagenuitEssentiam.The

natural suppositionof Deus is an aptitude which resultsfromthe concrete mode of significationof that term:
Namhocnomen'Deus', quia significat
divinamessentiam
ut in habente,
ex
modosuaesignifications
naturaliter
habetquodpossitsupponere
propersona
(ST I 39.5).
In fact there are very few texts in which 'natural' is connected with
It is not
supposition,but relativelyquite many with the termpotest.92
mere coincidence that in similar cases, i.e. the supposition of Deus or
, Aquinas seems to address the possible or potentialsupposiPrincipium
tion of the term. Natural suppositionconcernsthe abilityof a concrete
substantivetermto referto an individual. When Deus is said to have
natural supposition, it is meant that the concreteness of the noun
makes it apt fora certain actual use. Deus, unlike Divina Essentia, has
thisaptitude, but the actual use of the term,its propositionalcontext,
will tell us what kind, what varietyof supposition it has, forexample
:
suppositionaturalisor suppositioaccidentalis
Sicutisteterminus
'Deus' supponit
in praedictis
solus
locutionibus
(e.g. <(unus
verus
Deus" - Augustine)
remnaturae
divinaeindistincte.
Et haecestsuppositio
suanaturalis,
etquasitermini
communis
trium
respectu
personarum.
Suppositio
autemqua supponit
et quasi termini
proPatevel Filio,estsibiaccidentalis
discreti
(3SN 1.2.4 ad 6).
A concretenoun signifyingGod as a common term, needs some sort
of addition in order to stand for a distinctperson.93Its natural supposition is to stand for all persons indistinctly.

92 ISN 4.1.2 sol + ad 2; 5.1.1 obiectum

2 + ad 4; 3SAM.2.4obiectum
6; 4.1.2.1;ST
I 39.4obiectum
2 + corpus
+ obiectum
4 + corpus
+ ad 4; III 16.1;
; I 39.5 videtur...
III 16.2;III 35.4; QDV 7.2 ad 1; QDI 1 ad 12; OCE I 4 [63]; REI I 1 [550];DP3
8 [49,51, 64, 70].
93"Ex adiuncto
determinatur
eiussuppositio
ad personam",
ST I 39.4 ad 3. This
reverses
toa certain
extent
thelogicofcreated
homo
needsan addition
inorder
things:
tostandforhumannatureas such("homoestspecies"),but"Deus perse supponit
pronaturacommuni"
(ST I 39.4 ad 3). In ourdailyspeech,personal
supposition,
whether
itbe foroneormoredistinct
orleftindeterminate,
is thenormal
individuals,
of supposition.
variety
, wherethetermhavingthissupposition
Suppostilo
simplex
stands
forthenature,
thequality
israre.YetsinceGod'snature
signified
bytheterm,
thisis theperse (notto be confused
with'natural')supposition
ofDeus.
subsists,
thepersesupposition
ofDeus, looking
Aquinasinfactdistinguishes
uponthesignified
form
ofthename,from
thesupposition
ornaturaliter
ofDeus, looking
proprie
uponits
modeofsignification.
In itself,
thisdistinction,
onceagain,is a concession
to our
modeofsignification,
becauseournouns"significant
substantiam
cumqualitate".
219

01:19:42 AM

one indicatingthe
So we are faced with a twofolduse of naturaliter.
mode of significationwhich makes a term apt for(personal) supposition (in stead of copulation or instead of signifyingabstractly),and one
indicating a certain type of actual supposition (in stead of accidental
supposition in which the range of referenceof the term is restricted
because of the words added).94 The term natural supposition either
distinguishesmodes of signification,or modes of supposition.
4. 2 The interests
of theology
Aquinas has writtenonly one or two textsin which he uses natural
supposition to distinguishmodes of supposition. He shows that the
fact that Deus sometimes supposits for all three divine persons
indistinctlyand sometimesforone or two persons distinctly,concords
with accepted logic. More importantforhis purposes however is the
use of 'natural supposition' to distinguishmodes of signification.It
enables theologyto explain why propertiesbelonging to only one or
two persons can be predicated of Deus but not ofEssentia, even though
remGod is identical to his essence:
secundum
Ad veritatem
nonsolumoportet
considerare
ressignificatas,
sed
locutionum,
etiammodumsignificandi,
utdictum
est.Licetautem,secundum
rem,sitidem
'Deus' quod 'deitas',nontarnen
estidemmodussignificandi
Nam
utrobique.
ut in habente,
hocnomen'Deus', quia significai
divinamessentiam
ex modo
94The recenthistory
ofinterpretation
ofnaturalsupposition
showshowall interfeelforced
tomakea choicebetween
on theonehand'natural'indicating
the
preters
modeofsignification
oftheterm,
andontheotherhandindicating
thebroadest
range
ofreference
ofa word,including
andfuture.
De Rijkexemplifies
things
past,present
hisopinionfromthefirst
thisin changing
tothesecondalternative:
TheDevelopment
naturalis"
in Mediaeval
, in: Vivarium,IX (1971), 71-107;XI
of "Suppositio
Logic
. Traditieen vernieuwing,
(1973), 43-79; De Rijk, Middeleeuwse
Wijsbegeerte
Assen/Amsterdam
Een toetssteen
voor
1977;(Chapter8: "Natuurlijke
suppositie:
Theorigins
wijsgerige
standpunten",
233-57).His mostrecent
publication,
ofthetheory
, in: Cambridge
, 161-73,is
oftheproperties
ofterms
History
ofLaterMedieval
Philosophy
unclearin thisrespect,
butseemsto avoidanychoice.Fordifferent
interpretations
cf.J.M. Mullally,The"Summulae
Logicales"
ofPeter
ofSpain,NotreDame1945;intro-lviii;Boehner,
xxxviii
o.e., 27-36;Moody,o.e., 21-2;De Rijk,Logica
Moderduction,
norm
11,1,571-8.
The secondalternative
is tiedup withthelogicalproblems
whether
a wordcan
thatis univocally
common
tobeingandnonbeing,andwhether
a
signify
anything
wordcan looseitssignificance
o.e. on RogerBaconandWilliamof
(cf.Braakhuis
andtheTradition
Sherwood;cf. PeterRaedts,Richard
Rufusof Cornwall
ofOxford
wasnotengagedin thisproblem,
as
, Oxford1987,32ff).Aquinashowever
Theology
histreatment
Christus
mortis
ofthequestion
Utrum
intriduo
shows(3SN22.1.1;
fuithomo
ST III 50.4; QDL 2.1.1; QDL 3.2.2).
220

01:19:42 AM

suaesignificationis
naturaliter
habetquodpossitsupponere
propersona:et sic
ea quae suntpropria
de hocnomine'Deus', ut
praedicari
personarum,
possunt
dicatur
vel'generans',
sicutdictum
est.Sedhocnomen
quod'Deus estgenitus'
'essentia'nonhabetex modosuae significationis
quod supponat
propersona:
essentiam
ut formam
abstractam.
Et ideoea quae suntpropria
quia significat
nonpossunt
essentiae
attribui:
personarum,
quibusab invicem
distinguuntur,
inessentia
enimquodessetdistinctio
in
divina,sicutestdistinctio
significaretur
suppositis
(ST I 39.5).
The question thatprecedes thisdeterminationis even more expliciton
the subject, and adds anothermode of supposition, i.e. one thatdenies
the concrete mode of significationof Deus:
dicendum
Respondeo
quodquidamdixerunt
quodhocnomen'Deus' etsimilia,
propriesecundumsuam nturmsupponunt
pro essentia:sed ex adiuncto
trahuntur
notionali
ad supponendum
propersona.Et haecopinioprocessisse
ex consideratione
videtur
divinaesimplicitatis,
quae requirit
quodin Deo idem
sithabensetquodhabetur:
etsic'habensdeitatem',
hocnomen
quodsignificat
'Deus', estidemquod 'deitas'.
Sed inproprietatibus
nontantum
attendenda
estressignificata,
locutionum,
sedetiammodussignificando
Etideo,quiahocnomen'Deus' significat
divinam
essentiam
utinhabente
ipsam,sicuthocnomen'homo'humanitatem
significai
insupposito,
aliimeliusdixerunt
quodhocnomen'Deus' ex modosignificandi
habetutproprie
possitsupponere
propersona,sicutet hocnomen'homo'.
utcumdicitur
'Deus
QuandoqueergohocnomenDeussupponit
proessentia,
crea:quiahocpraedicatum
subiecto
formae
ratione
competit
significatae,
quae
est deitas.Quandoqueverosupponit
ut cum
personam:vel unamtantum,
dicitur
'Deus genera;velduas,utcumdicitur
'Deus spira;veltres,utcum
dicitur
soliDeo' etc.(I Tim1,17)(ST
immortali,
invisibili,
'Regisaeculorum,
I 39.4).95
Aquinas uses here the phrase supponit
pro essentiaas well, but since of
all essences or natures only God's essence subsists this is a unique
category.Only in the case of God does a common nature subsist. This
kind of supposition, which resembles suppositiosimplex
, is not caused
by the mode of significationof Deus} but is a consequence of the doctrine of divine simplicity:
Etideode se habetquodpossitsupponere
etnonhabetquodsuppropersona,
ex modosignificandi
sedtantum
ex ratione
divinae
nominis,
ponatproessentia
in qua idemestre essentiaet suppositum.
simplicitatis,
Cf.ad 1: hocnomen
Deus importt
nisipersonali
indistinctum,
suppositum
quod nondistinguitur
utpaternitate
velfiliatione.
proprietate
adjuncta,
Cf.ad 2: quamvishocnomen
Deus significet
estde se,supponit
habentem
essenessentiam,
tamen,quantum
95Confusing
as itmaybe,supponere
secundum
suamnaturam
isnotaninstance
ofnatural
in eitherway,as I interpret
supposition,
Aquinas.Instead,Aquinasdistinguishes
- significatam)
between
thenaturesignified
suamnaturam
and themodeof
(secundum
Theconcrete
modeofsignification
entails
a natural,
signification
(exmodo
significandi).
i.e. according
nottothenaturesignified
butto thenatureofthewordused,ability
to standfor(a) concrete
person(s).
221

01:19:42 AM

etiamnonintellectis
Unde
tiam,etremnaturae,
personis,
quas fidesdistinguit.
Etquiasupponit
etiamsi
ab aliononrestringatur.
propersona,
supponere
potest
ideopoteststareinlocutione
et
indistincte,
proquacumque
persona:
personam
veram.Undein hac propositione
'Deus generat
sicredditlocutionem
Deum',
statproPatre,in appositoproFilio(ISN 4.1.2.c).96
in supposito
Following the concretemode of signification,Deus normally,naturally
has suppositionforthe divine persons indistinctly.The actual supposition is determined by the context, as Aquinas' explanation of the
eratapud Deum97 demonstrates:
Johannine Verbum
sed
Sciendum
estergoinprimis
divinitatem,
quodhocnomen'Deus' significat
deitatemin
in suppositoet concrete;hoc vero nomen'Deitas' significat
et absolute:et indeestquod nonpotestsupponere
abstracto,
propersonaex
sed supponit
solummodo
naturali
virtute
et ex modosignificando
pronatura.
ex modosignificandi
Hoc veronomen'Deus' habetnaturaliter
quodsupponat
sicuthoc nomen'homo' supponitpro supposito
pro aliqua personarum,
velipsumpraedicatum
Veritas
et ideoquandocumque
locutionis,
humanitatis,
ut
propersona
propersona,tuncsupponit
exigituthocnomenDeus supponat
cumdicimus,'Deus generatDeum'. Et ita cum hic dicitur'apud Deum',
necesseest quod 'Deus' pro personapatrissupponat,
quia haecpraepositio
Verbi,quodessedicitur
'apudDeum'. Et licet
significat
'apud' distinctionem
inpersona,
nontarnen
innatura,cumeademsitnatura
distinctionem
significet
voluitpatrispersonam
perhocquod
igitur
patrisetfilii.Evangelista
significare
dixit'Deum' (REI II).
To put it sharply:the word Deus, because of its mode of signification,
eratapudDeumit does
has natural supposition,and therefore,in Verbum
not have natural supposition,but accidental supposition,standingfor
the Father. The first'natural' indicates the mode of signification,the
second the mode of supposition.
The distinctionbetween modes of signification,one resultingin
natural supposition and the other not, not only helps a theologianto
speak withlogical accuracy in mattersregardingthe Holy Trinity,but
also in mattersregardingthe hypostaticunion in Christ.
Regarding Christ, the main distinction is not the one between
The truth
modes of supposition,but between modes of signification.98
96Sometimes
withsupseemsto be interchangeable
thephrasesupponere
proessentia
Deus esttrinus,
: "Similiter
cumdicitur:
indistincte
quod
significatur
ponere
propersona
tuncvelessentiam
inunaessentia,
undely"Deus" supponit
esthabenstrespersonas
(ISN 24.2.2ad 2).
indistinctum"
vel suppositum
97Thisisoneofthetwotexts
onHolyScripture
contained
inAquinas'commentaries
The otheroneis hiscomofsupposition.
forhisconception
thatareveryimportant
est
totheRomans:"De FilioSuo,qui factus
theletter
onthispassagefrom
mentary
estfilius
ei ex semineDavidsecundum
Dei..."; CROI
carnem,
Qui praedestinatus
2 + 3.
98The distinction
is omnipremodesofsignification
concrete
andabstract
between
is also called(in ST III):
Concretesignification
sentin Aquinas'christology.
222

01:19:42 AM

of Christ being trulyGod and trulyman can only be expressed when

due considerationis given to concreteand abstractmodes of signification. In Deus esthomo, not only the significationofDeus and homoneeds
to be true, but the predication as well:
naturam
communem
inconcreto
Nomenenimsignificans
potest
supponere
pro
innaturacommuni:
sicuthocnomen'homo'potestsupcontentorum
quolibet
Et itahocnomen'Deus', ex ipsomodo
hominesingulari.
ponereproquolibet
suae significationis
propersonaFiliiDei, ut in PrimaParte
potestsupponere
est(39.4).De quolibet
autemsupposito
alicuiusnaturae
vereet
habitm
potest
inconcreto:
illamnaturam
sicutde Socrate
nomensignificans
proprie
praedicari
'homo'.Quia ergopersona
FiliiDei, pro
etPlatoneproprie
etverepraedicatur
naturae
vereetprohocnomen'Deus', estsuppositum
humanae,
qua supponit
de hocnomine
'Deus', secundum
praedicari
quod
priehocnomen'homo'potest
propersonaFiliiDei (ST III 16.1).
supponit
The propositionis not onlyfigurativelyspeaking true,as when we say,
because of some connectionbetween the two, 'Peter is John', but properly.We do not predicatehuman nature of divine nature, nor divine
nature of human nature, and thus teach something impossible and
blasphemous i.e. a mixing of divine with human nature.
Attentionto modes of significationis essential forthe core doctrine
of 'communicationof idioms', i.e. the predication of both divine and
human propertiesof the same person:
in concreto
naturam
Omnenomensignificans
aliquam,potestsupponere
pro
illiusnaturae.Cum autemunioincarnationis
sit factain
qualibethypostasi
sicutsupradictum
estquodhocnomenDeus potest
est,manifestum
hypostasi,
habente
humanam
naturam
etdivinam.
Et ideoquidprohypostasi
supponere
divinaenaturaevelhumanae,potestattribu
illipersonae:sive
quidconvenit
secundum
divinamnaturam;sive
quod pro ea supponitnomensignificans
nomensignificans
secundum
humanam
naturam
quodproea supponit
(ST III
35.4)."
The theologian puts the natural ability of concrete words to his own
use.100The concept of natural supposition,understoodas a distinction
habensnaturam,
uttotum,
insupposito,
"significare
significare
significare
significare
subsistentis,
proutestinaliquosupposito,
permodum
significare
significare
proutest
in singularibus,
perse subsistens".
significare
quiddam
99Cf.ST III 3.7 ad 3.
100Aquinassometimes
:
usesnataestin steadofnaturaliter
- "Hoc autemnomen'homo'significai
humanam
naturam
proutestnata in supsicuthocnomen'Deus' significai
'eumqui
positoesse:quia,utdicitDamascenus,
habetdivinam
itahocnomen'homo'significai
'eumqui habethumanam
naturam',
naturam'.
Etideononestproprie
dictum
hominem,
quodFiliusDei assumpsit
supet una
ponendo,sicutreiveritasse habet,quod in Christositunumsuppositum
hypostasis".
(STIII 4.3)
- "Sed humananaturanonpotestpraedicari
de Christo
secundum
se in abstracto,
sedsoluminconcreto,
in supposito.
Nonenimverepotest
proutscilicet
significatur
223

01:19:42 AM

between modes of signification,serves a typicaltheologicalinterest.It

enables a theologian to interpretpassages fromScripture and fathers
properly.It enables him to justifythe unityof Christ and the doctrine
of the communication of idioms. It enables him to attributedistinct
personal propertiesto God, withouttherebyimplyinga divided divine
essence. Of course, theremay be other logical devices to do the same
job. Natural suppositionmay not be absolutelynecessaryto theology,
but Aquinas' semantic analyses show that he has found this device
extremelyuseful. The way he uses it, it doesn't blur the distinction
between significationand supposition at all, because it expresses that
very distinction:some words can and others cannot fulfillthe logical
functionof personal supposition.
Conclusion
Aquinas' use of the logical doctrine of supposition shows how far
thirteenthcenturytheologygoes in tryingto give a proper interpretation of texts,and to build proper argumentsaccounting forthe principal mysteriesof Christian faith. It shows the possibilities of this
logic, but its limitationsas well.
Possibilitiesare offeredinasmuch as an increasingawareness of the
modes of significationof words and their influenceupon the actual
supposition of words in use, promotes clear and true language in
divinis.The distinctionbetween significationand supposition reflects
the metaphysicaldistinctionbetween essence and supposit. The word
pro has the double meaning of significationand supposition,
supponete
but does not promote a blurringof both distinctsemantic properties,
just like the metaphysical categories are not improperlymixed, and
just like the concept of natural suppositionhas the same double meaning withoutresultingin confusion. The double meaning expressesthe
fact that only concrete words can have personal supposition.
Aquinas' use of the doctrine of supposition bears a close
dici quod 'Christussit humananatura',quia 'naturahumana'non est nata
de suo supposito..."(ST III 17.1).
praedicari
whodoesnottalkof
Thisis quiteimportant
to note,sinceWilliamofSherwood,
butofhabitualsupposition,
usesestnataas well:"Secundum
naturalsupposition
alicuiusut subsistentis.
autemquod suntin habitu,dicitursuppositio
significatio
subalio. Et dicitur
significatio
copulatio
Quod enimtaleest, natum estordinari
alicuiusut adiacentis.
supraaliud."(o.c.,
Quod enimtaleest,natum estordinari
5.0.1).
224

01:19:42 AM

resemblanceto the ones expounded by William of Sherwood, Peter of

Spain and Lambert of Auxerre, but it is not identical to any one of
these. Most technical terms for modes of actual supposition can be
encountered in Aquinas' writings. But *natural supposition' is not
only, as it is in Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre, a mode of
actual supposition,but, in a way which resembles Sherwoods habitual
supposition, a distinctionbased on modes of significationas well.
Moreover, Aquinas adds to all threeof them his interestin the mode
of significationof concrete and abstract words, instead of only the
mode of significationof substantives and adjectives. Moreover, the
trinitariancontextdoes not provide Aquinas with the need to go into
detail intonatural suppositionforthingspast, presentand future:God
is eternal.
In several instances Aquinas emphasizes the necessity to speak
properlyaccording to the modes of signification.He is prompted to
do so, since some theologians take the ultimate denial of the
applicabilityof modes of significationto God, expressed in the docas a permitforwhat Aquinas considers to
trineof divine simplicity,101
be improperor even falseuse of words and argument:supposito
unonon
is
His
be
to be
aliud.
God
but
'God'
said
Nature,
may
supponitur
but
'His
At
the
same
Nature'
not.
time, however,
brought forth,
Aquinas himself is necessitated to state unique logical phenomena
such as Deus that sometimes supponitpro essentiadespite its concrete
mode and still denotes something that subsists, such as Deus being
both a universal and a singular term, and such as homothat supposits
(and not copulates) fora person that 'has' another substantialnature
as well. Like all modes of signification,supposition falls short of
representingGod as He is, designed as it is to be fitfortalkingabout
creatures,but its laws should be respected as well.
CatholicTheologicalUniversity
at Utrecht
101"Deumcognoscimus
ex perfectionibus
in creaturas
ab ipso;quae
procedentibus
inDeo suntsecundum
eminentiorem
modum
quidemperfectiones
quamincreaturis.
Intellectus
autemnoster
eo modoapprehendit
eas,secundum
quodsuntincreaturis;
etsecundum
itasignificat
quodapprehendit,
pernomina.In nominibus
igitur
quae
est duo considerare:
Deo attribuimus,
scilicetperfectiones
ut
ipsas significatas,
etmodumsignificandi.
ad id quod
bonitatem,
vitam,ethuiusmodi;
Quantumigitur
huiusmodi
nomina,proprie
Deo, et magisproprie
significant
competunt
quamipsis
de eo. Quantumveroad modumsignificandi,
et perpriusdicuntur
non
creaturis,
de Deo; habentenimmodumsignificandi
dicuntur
proprie
competit."
qui creaturis
(STI 13.3).
225

01:19:42 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E J. Brill,Leiden
BenedictineMasters of the Universityof Paris in theLate Middle Ages:
Patternsof Recruitment
THOMAS SULLIVAN

Until recently,historiansof medieval education have largely concerned themselveswith the institutionsand internal organization of
schools and universities.1In the past decade or two, however,scholars
have become increasinglyinterestedin the broader contextin which
these schools and universitiesemerged, grew, prosperedand declined.
They have studied the recruitmentof studentsand the employmentof
graduates as an indicatorof the dialogue between societyand institutions of learning. Scholars such as J. W. Baldwin have noticed that
this interactionproceeds in a double direction: by tracingpatternsof
recruitmentit indicates pressures placed on the universityby the
world, and by studyingthe employmentof graduates in Church and
state, it measures, to some degree, the university'simpact on society.2
The methodologyhistoriansemploy in such studies is that of prosopography,i.e., "the investigationof the common backgroundcharacteristicsof a group of actorsin historyby means of a collectivestudy
of their lives."3 When applied to university populations, prosopographyasks the questions: who went to the university?wheredid
1 Thisarticle
is an expanded
ofa paperreadat theTwenty-Seventh
version
InternationalCongress
onMedievalStudiesheldinMay1992atWestern
UniverMichigan
a sessionsponsored
Benedictine
sity,Kalamazoo,Michigan,
during
bytheAmerican
Academy.
2 Recentprosopographical
studiesoftheschoolsand thestudium
ofmedieval
Paris
includeJ. W. Baldwin,Masters
at Parisfrom1179to1215:A SocialPerspective
, in:
Renaissance
andRenewalin theTwelfth
ed. R. L. BensonandG. ConCentury,
stableOxford,1982,p. 139; StephenC. Ferruolo,
'Quid dantartesnisiluctum?'
andCareers
in theMedieval
, Ambition,
, in: Historyof Education
Learning
University
28 (1988),1-22;ReuvenAvi-Yonah,
Career
Trends
Masters
Quarterly,
ofParisian
of
6 (1986-87),47-64.For a pro, in: Historyof Universities,
, 1200-1320
Theology
ofthetheologians
oftheUniversity
ofParisin thefirst
thirdofthesixsopography
teenth
seeJamesK. Farge,'Qui suntistitheologi?'
A prosopography
century,
ofParis
andReform
in EarlyReformation
France:The
, in: Orthodoxy
, 1500-1536
graduates
ofParis,1500-1543,
Leiden1985,55-114.
FacultyofTheology
3 Lawrence
Stone,Prosopography
, in: Daedalus,100(1971),46.
226

01:19:57 AM

they come from?when did they arrive and how long did they stay?
what course of studies did they follow? and what career did they
choose afterleaving the university?4The population here chosen for
investigationis the monachinigri, either Benedictine or Cluniac, who
were promoted to the doctorate in theology or canon law at the
Universityof Paris between 1229 and 1500. When prosopography
addresses this population, it asks the question (in a modified form)
foundin the book of Revelation (7: 13), "Hi qui amidi suntstolisnigris,
?"
qui suntet undevenerunt
- eighty-fourBenedicI have identifieda total of 126 monachinigri
tine and forty-two
Cluniac monks who as monks were promoted to
the doctorateat the Universityof Paris in the later Middle Ages.5 A
number of prominentmonachinigri, who studied at the Universityof
Paris but were not promoted to the doctorate there, have been
excluded. These include: Guillelmus de Grimoard, the futurePope
Urban V (1362-70), a doctor of Montpellier, who lectured canon law
de maneat Paris6 and Guillelmus de Montelauduno, a studentat Paris
in his youth but a doctor of a universityother than Paris.7 Also
excluded fromthe sample is Johannes Fabri, a doctor of the Universityof Paris before taking the habit at the monasteryof Saint-Vaast
in the diocese of Arras.8
Many of the masters in the sample would proceed to claim the
highest places in ecclesiastical administration, serving as popes,
cardinals, archbishopsand bishops, and abbots; other masters would
hold only middling posts or none at all, serving as obedientiaries in
theirmonasteriesor priorsof dependencies. This study,however,concentratesprimarilyon patternsof recruitmentas opposed to those of
4 Jacques
Peut-on
desprofesseurs
desuniversits

Verger,
faireuneprosopographie
franaises
lafinduMoyen
de Rome.MoyenAge,Temps
Age?,in:Mlangesde l'colefranaise
100(1988),55-62.
moderne,
5 Biographies
ofthesemasters
andanother
538monachi
whoattended
theUnivernigri
sityofParisduringthisperiodcan be foundin myforthcoming
book,Benedictine
Monks
at theUniversity
A Biographical
, AD 1229-1500:
ofParisin theLateMiddle
Ages
, to be published
Register
byE. J.Brillin Leidenin thenearfuture.
6 Chartularium
universitatis
, eds. HeinrichDenifle,mileChatelain,Paris
parisiensis
v. 3, 433, #1531(hereafter
citedas CUP).
1889-97,
1 Themostcomplete
ofGuillelmus
deMontelauduno
canbefound
inPaul
biography
Guillaume
deMontlauzun,
in: Histoire
littraire
dela France
Fournier,
canoniste,
, vol. 35
467-503.
(1921),
8 SeeJeanFranois,
descrivains
deVordre
deSaintBenot
, Bouillon,
Bibliothque
gnrale
v. 1, 308.
1777-78,
227

01:19:57 AM

futureemployment- focusingon chronological distribution,regional

origins, and facultychoice.
Distribution
[A] Chronological
The chronological distributionof the 126 black-monkmasters can
be divided into threedistinctperiods. The distributionshows a major
concentrationof masters- eighty-four,or two-thirdsof the sampleclusteredin the second period, in the hundred yearsbetween 1340 and
1440. Within that centurypeak activitytook place in the generation
dated 1400 to 1420, when twenty-sixmonachinigriearned their doctorates and a total of forty-threeblack monks were active on the
Faculties of Theology and Canon Law as regent-masters.The concentration of masters evidenced in the second period is rendered more
dramatic when compared with that of the first.During the initial
period- from1215 to 1340- the monachinigriproduced only fourteen
masters, nine Cluniac and five Benedictine.9Their tardyappearance
on the universityscene and the scarcityof black-monkmastersin the
first century of the university's existence may lead scholars to
downplay the role of the black monks in universityhistory,but a look
at the second and third periods points to the conclusion that the
monachinigrihad a more dominant and influentialrole to play than
previously thought.
A look at the second part (1300-40) of thisinitialperiod reveals that
the firstBenedictine regenton the Parisian Faculty of Theology was
Johannes de Sancto Germano, a monk of WorcesterCathedral Priory
and bachelor of theologyfromOxford. He leftEngland for study in
Paris in 1310, was promotedto the doctoratein theologyaround 1312,
and was regentuntil 1315, when he returnedto his monasteryat the
command of the prior of Worcester.10Cluniac productionof masters
continued during this period, only to halt around 1325, when
Johannes de Lixiaco firstappears in the recordsdescribed as a doctor
oftheology.11The nextCluniac theologianswould not appear untilthe
9 Guidode Pernesmakeshisfirst
in university
records
in quodlibetical
appearance
debatesdatingto 1287/1288;
see PalemnGlorieux,La littrature
, Le
quodlibtique
Saulchoir1925-35,v. 2, 111-2.
10A. B. Emden,A Biographical
v.
, Oxford1957-59,
Register
oftheUniversity
oj Oxford
matre
deParisetcopiste
deWorcester,
3, 1626;PalmonGlorieux,
JeandeSaint-Germain
Louvain1947,513-29.
11JeanXXII (1316-1334).
Lettres
communes
v.
, ed. Guillaume
Mollat,Paris1921-47,
5, 433, #22970.
228

01:19:57 AM

1350s, when threeCluniac masterswere promotedone afterthe other:

12
13
Johannesde Pinu (ca 1350), Simon de Brossa (ca 1351), and Petrus
14
de Corbeton (ca 1352). The Cluniac general chapterof 1345, reviewing the previous twenty years, noted with chagrin that "in domo
scholarum
a vigintianniscitranullusdoctor
sacrescientie,
sive
Cluniacensium,
'
'
pauci baccalaurei
fuerintibidemcreati.. . and triedensure graduations by
structuringand limitingthe amount of time studentscould spend in
any disciplinewithoutevidentprogress.15The negligibleproductionof
mastersduring this generationmay reflecta decline in population in
the Cluniac Order, from a high point around 1289 to a low in the
16
period 1320-30.
How can we account for the significantincrease of masters in the
second period, beginning in 1340 and lasting through 1440? An
, pubimportantconsiderationmust be the papal bull, Summimagisti
lished on 20 June 1336 by Pope Benedict XII (1334-42), a Cistercian
and formermaster of the University of Paris, demanding that the
monachinigrisend to the universityone for every twentymonks and
prescribing generous allowances for monk-scholars and masters.17
12Paris,Archives
Nationales
LL 1337,f. 185;PierreAnger,O.S.B., Le College
de
Cluny
j Paris1916,127.
13On 16 November
1350PopeClement
VI ordered
thechancellor
ofParisto promoteSimonde Brossato thedoctorate
in theology
within
twomonths
(CUP, v. 3,
tothedoctorate
in 1351,hemayhavebeen
3, #1194andn. 1). Admitted
probably
theSimonforced
todenycertain
inhisVesperdisputation
in 1351
opinions
putforth
(CUP,v. 3, 11-12;cf.CUP, v. 2, 654,n. 17to #1175).Simonde Brossais described
VI as a doctoroftheology
whenthelattergranted
himthepriory
byPopeInnocent
ofSt-Christophe-en-Halatte,
a dependency
ofLa Charit-sur-Loire,
on 24January
1355(Suppliques
VI(1352-1362),
d'Innocent
ed. Ursmer
O.S.B., Rome1911,
Berlire,
de Pinuwouldbecome
242, #572and n. 3). BothSimonde BrossaandJohannes
abbotsofCluny,rulingrespectively
from1362to 1369and from1369to 1374.
14Paris,Bibliothque
Nationalemslat5657-A,f. 1.
15Statuts
etvisites
del'ordre
deCluny
, chapitres
, ed. GastonCharvin,O.S.B. ,
gnraux
Paris1965-82,
v. 3, 392 (hereafter
citedas SCGV).
16Guyde Valous,Le monachisme
clunisien
dsorigines
auXVesicle
, 2nded. rev.,Paris
1970,vol. 1, 212.
17C. Cocquelines,
Bullarium
Romanm
Racinet
, Rome1741,v. 3, 214-40.Philippe
has investigated
thesituation
ofBenedictine
monasticism
1300-50forthenorthern
halfofFranceinhisarticle
La rforme
deBenot
XII etla situation
desmonastres
bndictins
aunord
dela Loiredanslapremire
moiti
duXlVesicle
, in: Naissanceetfonctionnement
des rseauxmonastiques
et canoniaux:Actesdu premier
du
colloqueinternational
in EnglandofBenedict's
C.E.R.C.O.M., St-Etienne
1991,551-92.The reception
- thethreebullspublished
XII forthereformation
legislation
reforming
byBenedict
oftheCistercians
sicut
stella
andofthe
(Fulgens
), oftheBenedictines
(Summi
magisti),
- has beenstudiedin PeterMcDonald,The
canons(Addecorem
Augustinin
ecclesie)
andMonastic
Observance
intheLater
Middle
inEngland,
in:
Papacy
Ages:TheBenedictina
ofReligiousHistory,
14 (1986),117-32.
Journal
229

01:19:57 AM

Benedict XII prescribedan inquiryinto the possessions and resources

of each house and their charges and obligations. The evidence
gathered would be used to establish the number of monks to be supported in each house, which in turn would determinethe number of
monks to be sent to the schools.18
The Benedictine provinces in France began the work of the inquest
in 1338; the records gatheredprovide a gold mine of informationconcerning the economic life of monasteries in the mid-fourteenthcentury.19The general chapter of the Order of Cluny in April 1339
ordered a census to be taken throughoutthe Cluniac provinces to
determinethe exact number of monks dwellingin each domus
, so that
the proper number of monks to be sent to the universitiescould be
decided. The abbots, priors, and other administratorsof the order
99forexaminationfor
etmeliores
were commanded to send their" aptiores
possible entrance to the universities.The chapter dealt not only with
the numbers to be sent but theirfinancialsupportwhile at the universities. Those priors who paid pensions or bursaries for the Parisian
scholars were freed from any additional obligation; the remaining
that is, a
superiors were to pay an annual tax called a quadrigesima,
fourthpart of the titheowed yearlyto the abbot of Cluny ; those priors
and obedientiaries not regularlytaxed would have to pay an annual
tax at a rate establishedby two commissionersappointed by the abbot
of Cluny.20
We have evidence that the demands of the Summimaistri
, supwere
not
the
mandates
of
the
Cluniac
general chapter,
plemented by
without effectat the Cluniac house of studies in Paris; indeed their
implementationmay have been too enthusiasticforthe situation.The
Order's visitors related to the general chapter in 1342 that the new
"
constitutionum
dominipape," complained bitterly
scholars, missivirtute
of their mistreatmentat the hands of the older students. The senior
scholars would not allow the new students to share in surplus funds
gathered as a result of pensions for students paid by priors even
though they had not sent studentsto the college. The antiquischolares
forthe communityfromamong the new
would not choose procuratores
18Cocquelines,
op.cit.,v. 3, 210-3.
19LopoldDelisle,Enquete
en1338,
del ordre
deSatnt-Benoit
surlafortune
destablissements
de la Bibliothque
des manuscrits
in: Noticeset extraits
Nationale,39 (1910),
359-408.
20SCGV,v. 3, 289-90.
230

01:19:57 AM

studentsbut only fromthe old and even though food was purchased
fromthe common funds,the older studentswithheldsalt, bread, wine
and pittancesfromthe novischolares
, Finally, the older studentswould
not allow the servantsof the house to wait on the new studentsor to
prepare theirfood in the common kitchen.21The sudden influxof new
students,whose financialsupportwas derived fromdifferentsources,
appears to have caused some disruption in the established economy
and procedures of the house.
An additional reason forthe growthin numbers after1340 may be
the shiftin the way religious- includingmonks- viewed the utilityof
a universityeducation. Prior to the 1270s, the doctorate in theology
was considered as preparatorymainly for a teaching career in the
studiaof the order; afterthe 1270s, the degree was also seen as a solid
background forleadership in the religiousorders, especially the mendicants.22The possibilityexists that monks may have begun to attend
the universityin thehope of career advancement, not onlywithintheir
monasteryor orderbut also withinthe wider Church; theyhad before
them the evidence of two Cluniac masters appointed bishops in the
period 1300-1320: Guido de Pernes, designated bishop of Toul by
23
Pope Boniface VIII (1296-1304) in 1306, and Deodatus de Svrac,
named bishop of the newly-erectedsee of Castres by Pope John XXII
24
(1316-34) in 1317.
The thirdperiod, thatis, from1440 through1500, saw only twentysix monachi
nigripromoted. This drop in productionof mastersmay be
a resultof the two crises the universityendured in the firsthalfof the
fifteenth
century.25The year 1418 witnessedthe turmoilfollowingthe
21SCGV, v. 3, 335.In response,
thedefinitors
ofthegeneral
settled
thematchapter
terbydenying
newstudents
theright
to sharein theprofits
from
thepenaccruing
sionspaidforstudents
notsentto thehouse.Procurators
wereto be chosenfrom
and withtheconsent
ofbothnoviand theantiqui
scholares
amongwholecommunity
v. 3, 335-6).
(SCGV,
22Avi-Yonah,
op.cit.,57-8.
23ConradEubel,Hierarchia
catholica
mediiaevi, 2nd ed., Pavia 1960,v. 1, 502
citedas HCMA).Avi-Yonah,
(hereafter
Miethke,
,
op.cit.,58,following
Jrgen
Papst
undUniversitt
in derPariser
des13. Jahrhunderts
, in: Die
Ortsbischof
Theologenprozesse
anderPariser
Universitt
imXIII. Jahrhundert,
ed.A. ZimAuseinandersetzungen
New York 1976,93-4,whichsuggeststhatBonifaceVIII mayhave
mermann,
favored
theregulars
in
to
ecclesiastical
posts.
24HCMA,v. 1, 172. appointmentshigh
25Can thisfallin thenumber
ofmasters
be explained
produced
bya dropin the
numberof sources,thatis, by a reduction
in theevidential
base? Actually,
the
ofthemedieval
historian
is better
servedin thefifteenth
thanin
university
century
either
oftheprevious
two.Tworegisters
drawnup intheseventeenth
andeighteenth
231

01:19:57 AM

Burgundian capture of Paris and the subsequent slaughter of

Armagnac supportersas well as a severe epidemic. The whole universitysufferedat this time: ten regentsand a number of studentswere
killed,theCollge de Navarre was ransacked, lectureswere suspended
in some faculties, enrollment in the faculties dropped, revenues
dwindled and universityprivilegeswere contested.26The historyof the
fourregent-mastersof theologyfromthe royal abbey of Saint-Denisen-France, an Armagnac stronghold,27demonstratesthe disruption:
Johannes Generi alias Legendre, dead of unknown causes, perhaps
plague, in March;28 Benedictus Gentiani, murdered by the Burgundians in May;29 Petrus de Versaliis, in exile at the abbey of SaintMaixent in Poitiers afterMay;30 and Philippus de Villette, abbot of
Saint-Denis, dead of the plague in June.31The effectsof this dislocation on the two facultiescan be seen in the fact that the subsequent
generation, 1420-40, saw only nine monks promotedto the doctorate,
a significantreductionfromthe twenty-sevenin the previous period,
1400-20.
centuries
theRegistrum
Facultatis
ordolicentiatorum,
1373-1694
respectively,
theologiae,
deslicencis
dela Facult
de
de Thologie
(Paris,B.N. mslat5657-A) and theCatalogue
Parisdepuis
1373-1774
thelicentia
docendi
(Paris,B.N. mslat15440)record
by
granted
- though
theFacultyofTheology
in 1374.Of thetworegisters,
thefirst
beginning
forthedecade1414through
information
1424- is mostuseful,noting
not
missing
butalsothedatesofthepromotion
tothedoctorate
onlythenamesofthoselicensed
as wellas thereligious
orderandcollege,
wherepossible.
MarcelFournier's
La Facult
dedcret
del'Universit
deParisau XVesicle
thestatutes
of
(Paris1895-1942)
presents
theFacultyof CanonLaw at theUniversity
of Parisand,moreimportantly,
the
dean's minutes
of faculty
heldfrom1415through
1448and from1473
meetings
1503.The twenty-five
on canonlawyers,
through
yearlacunaininformation
though
is notseriousenoughtocallintodoubtthetrendbegunas earlyas 1400
regrettable,
andconfirmed
ofnotevenonemonkas a doctorin canonlawin
bytheproduction
thelasttwenty
ofthefifteenth
years
century.
26JacquesVerger,University
Years'War,in: UniverofParisattheEndoftheHundred
sitiesinPolitics:
Case Studiesfrom
theLateMiddleAgesandEarlyModernPeriod,
ed.JohnW. Baldwin
andRichard
A. Goldthwaite,
Baltimore
1972,52;JeanFavier,
Nouvelle
histoire
deParis
: Parisau XVesicle
1380-1500
Paris1974,73, 229.
(
),
'
27SeeGuyThompson,
the
Saint
Denis
under
' hisabbey
} andhistown
Monseigneur
English
in:
Power,
Culture,and Religionin Francec. 1350-c.1550, ed.
Occupation
Allmand,
Christopher
Woodbridge,
Eng. 1988,15-36.
28CharlesSamaran,Etudes
siennes.
II. Unncrologe
indit
del'abbaye
deSaintsandiony
Denis
de l'coledes Chartes,104(1943),55, #299.
, in: Bibliothque
29Samaran,op.cit.,54, #264;Chronique
dureligieux
deSaint-Denys
, ed. andtrans,by
M. L. Bellaguet,
Paris1839-52,v. 6, 234,246.
30EdmondMartne,O.S.B. , and UrsinDurand,O.S.B. , Thesaurus
anecnovus
Paris1717,v. 1, 1723;Heinrich
desglises,
monastres
dotorum,
Denifle,La dsolation
,
ethpitaux
enFrance
la guerre
decent
ans, Paris1897-99,
v. 1, 573, #1037.
pendant
31Samaran,op.cit.,54, #263;Chronique
deSaint-Denys
dureligieux
, v. 6, 272.
232

01:19:57 AM

From 1436 to 1439, the universityendured a second crisisfollowing

the French reconquest of English-held territories,especially in Normandy, and another epidemic. The number of universitybachelors
reading fellfromsixty-nineto thirty-onein canon law and thirty-one
to seventeenin theology;in 1438-39, only twenty-nineregentmasters
could be found teaching on both faculties.32The number of masters
produced fromamong the monachinigriin the years 1440-60 was only
six, reflectingthe disorder of the previous generation,when many of
the candidates forthe doctoral degrees would have begun theircourse
of studies. Around 1450, however, the university population
recovered and would be fairlystable throughoutthe rest of the century.33The black monks graduated twenty-onemastersof theologyin
the two generationsbetween 1460 and 1500, twelveCluniac and nine
Benedictine; these figuresare above the pre-1340 levels but below the
level of their heyday, when an average of thirteenmonachinigriper
generationassumed magisterialchairs. The Cluniac promotionsare a
reflectionof the population growth in the French province of the
Order of Cluny. The disturbancesof the late fourteenthcenturyand
the firsthalf of the fifteenth
centuryhad emptied the monasteries of
the Order; it was only ca 1454 that the previous demographic peak,
experienced ca 1289, was regained.34
Distribution
[B] Geographical
A study of the regional origins of our masters needs to be
carried out in two steps, the firstto assess the monasteries
ofprofession
of the Benedictine masters and the second the monasteries
offirst
appearancefor the Cluniac masters. This two-stages approach is
necessarybecause of the differencesin the nature of monastic profession of the Cluniac monks and the Benedictines. Benedictines made
their professionsto a particular monastery, Cluniacs - for the most
part- to the Order of Cluny rather than to any of its constituent
monasteries.We have a fairlycomplete knowledge of the monasteries
of professionof the eighty-fourBenedictines in the sample: forfortythree our data is sure and for another thirtyprobable. For seven
mastersit is likelythat theywere professedat a monasteryotherthan
32Favier, cit.,74.
33Ibid. op.
34Valous,op.cit.,v. 1, 212.
233

01:19:57 AM

that at which they first make an appearance in the records. No

monastery is noted for only four of the eighty-fourBenedictine
masters.
The majority- eighty-fiveper cent- of the Benedictine masters
with identifyingmonasteries originated fromfour regions: the first,
the region of Paris (with the dioceses of Beauvais, Chartres, Meaux,
Noyon, Paris, Soissons, Senlis represented), provided twenty-six
masters. Normandy provided eighteen masters (from the dioceses of
Avranches, Bayeux, Coutances, and Rouen); the North of France
(fromthe dioceses of Amiens, Arras, Throuanne, and Tournai) nine
masters;and the Pays de la Loire (representingthe dioceses ofAngers,
Le Mans, Orlans, Sens, and Tours) fourteen.Of the remainingfifteen percent,or twelve masters, threeprofessedat monasteriesin the
diocese of Langres in the region of Burgundy and three others at
monasteriesin the diocese of Poitiers in the region of the West. Two
of the more ecclesiastically successful Benedictines, Petrus Rogerii,
who would become Pope Clement VI (1342-52), and Guillelmus de
Chanac, promoted a cardinal in 1371 by Pope GregoryXI (1370-78),
were professedat monasteries outside the main four regions sending
monks to the Universityof Paris. Guillelmus de Chanac, a monk of
St-Martial of Limoges, was the grandnephew and nephew of two
bishops of Paris, Guillelmus de Chanac and Fulco de Chanac respectively; under the patronage of his uncle, he was sent to Paris forstudies
in canon law.35 Petrus Rogerii, a monk of La Chaise-Dieu in the
diocese of Clermont, was sent to studytheologyat Paris, sponsoredby
his abbot and the bishop of Le Puy.36
Because the researchercannot be sure forthe Cluniac mastersthat
the houses named in the recordsare the monasteriesof origin(i.e., the
house at which a monk was received into the Order), the house at
which the Cluniac master firstmakes an appearance in the records
must serve as the referencepoint forthis study. Of the fortyCluniac
masters named in the sample, monasteries are named for thirtysix;
three of these thirty-sixmonasteries are Benedictine abbeys or
priories: Lagny-sur-Marne in the diocese of Paris, given to the
35GuillaumeMollat,Chanac(Guillaume in: Dictionnaire
etgographie
d'histoire
de),
, Paris1912- , v. 12, 350-1.
ecclsiastique
36JohnF. Wngley,
VIbefore
hispontificate:
Clement
theearly
, 1290/91lifeofPierre
Roger
1342, in: CatholicHistorical
VI:
Review,1970(56), 433-73;Diana Wood,Clement
ThePontificate
andIdeasofanAvignon
1989.
, Cambridge
Pope
234

01:19:57 AM

Cluniac masterDeodatus de Svrac;37 Samer-aux-Bois in the diocese

of Throuanne, the monasterywhere the Cluniac master Galterus de
Gamaches firstappears;38 and the priory of Cayeux-sur-Mer in the
diocese of Amiens, a dependency of the abbey of St-Germer-de-Flay,
held by the Cluniac bachelor in theology,Petrus de Belloponte.39Of
the remaining thirty-three,twenty-sevenor 82% are from three
regions: the regionofParis provided fifteenmasters;thatof the North,
fivemasters; and Burgundy,seven masters,fiveof the latterfromthe
motherhouse of Cluny in the diocese of Mcon. Notably absent from
the list is the region of Normandy and the Pays de la Loire; Cluniac
monasticism,never strongin theseterritories,was representedby only
seven small prioriesin Normandy and fourin the Pays de la Loire.40
As would be expected, there is a fairlystrongcorrelationbetween
the number of Cluniac monasteriesnoted in the rosterof monasteries
of firstmention and the Cluniac houses responsible for maintaining
studentsin the Collge de Cluny. Of the sixteen Cluniac monasteries
listed, ten (including the mother house of Cluny) had this rightand
obligation.41The remainder among the monasteries of firstmention
were one each from Savoie, the Franche-Comt, the Dauphin, the
region of the Northeast, and the Low Countries.
Analysis of the total sample- Benedictines and Cluniacs
combined- reveals that eight out of ten masters originated in the
northernhalf of France and from five regions in particular. The
- came fromthe region of
largestconcentrationof masters- forty-two
Paris. Normandy provided eighteenmasters,the North of France sixteen masters, and the Pays de la Loire fourteen. The fifthregion,
Burgundy (with representatives from the dioceses of Auxerre,
Langres, and Mcon), produced ten masters. The remainingtwentytwo monks came from seven additional regions, including the
previouslymentioned English monk, Johannes de Sancto Germano,
monk of Worcester Cathedral Priory. In the whole sample, thirtythreedioceses are representedand sixty-two monasteries.This picture
37Denisde Sainte-Marthe,
inprovincias
GalliaChristiana
ecclesiasticas
distributa
, Paris
v. 7, c. 502.
1715-1865,
38Ibid.,v. 10,c. 1096.
39Le Livre
desprieurs
deSorbonne
ed. RobertMarichal,Paris1987,171,
(1431-1465),
#611.
40SCGV,v. 6, 326,328.
41Fora fulllistofCluniachousesobligedto maintain
scholars
at theCollgede
ClunyseeAnger,op.cit.,27, n. 1.
235

01:19:57 AM

of monastic recruitmentmirrorsthat of the Universityof Paris at the

beginning of the fifteenthcentury: it is a universityof the northern
half of France with strongrepresentationfromNormandy, the Paris
basin, Picardy, French Flanders, and Champagne.42
A comparison of regional origins of masters in the fourteenth
centurywith mastersof the fifteenth
centuryshows that as the middle
the
catchment
area
diminished. In the fourteenth
ages progressed,
of
ten
of
out
the
black-monk
masterscame fromthe five
century,eight
mentioned
were
drawn fromtwenty-seven
above; they
major regions
dioceses and forty-four
monasteries. In thefifteenth
century,however,
the same fiveregions produced nine out of ten masters,and only two
came from outside the northern half of France. The number of
dioceses representeddecreased fromtwenty-sevento twenty-one,and
the number of monasteriesfromforty-four
to thirty-three.
Just as the
university'sgeographic base in northernFrance became much more
evidentin the fifteenth
than in the fourteenthand thirteenthcenturies,
so the zone of monastic recruitmentincreasinglyrestricteditselfto the
same regions.
The population decline and contractionof the recruitmentareaespecially after1440- reflectsnot only thatera's political troublesbut
also competitionfromuniversitiesnewly created in the fifteenth
centhe
of
Dole
in
that
of
in
Louvain
1423,
1425, of
University
tury:
Poitiers in 1431, that of Caen in 1432, and the Universityof Nantes
in 1461.43Monks were now able to attend universitiescloser to home
and perhaps less expensive.
The greatest producers of masters were the influentialParisian
houses of Saint-Martin-des-Champs and Saint-Denis-en-France,
eleven and eight respectively,and Marmoutier with eight. The Norman abbey of Fecamp saw six of its monks promoted,while Cluny was
responsible for five and Corbie four. These six monasteries- out of
- were responsibleforonesixty-twosending monks to the university
thirdof the sample. Each of these monasteriesenjoyed great wealth,
- dues amounas revealed by an examination of the servitiacommunia
ting to one-thirdthe gross annual income paid the Apostolic Camera
by bishops and abbots on the occasion of theirnomination,on the con42JacquesVerger,
Lerecrutement
audbut
desuniversits
duXVesicle
gographique
franaises
lessuppliques
de1403, in: Mlangesd'archologique
et d'histoire,
82 (1970),
d'aprs
894.
43Astrik
L. Gabriel,Universities
, NewYork1982-89,
, in:Dictionary
oftheMiddle
Ages
v. 12, 285.
236

01:19:57 AM

firmationof theirelection,on theirconsecration,and on theirtranslation to anothersee or abbey.44Of all the monasteriesin Europe, those
assessed the highestsums were Cluny and Fcamp at 8000 goldflorins
,
Marmoutier at 7000, and Corbie and Saint-Denis-en-France at 6000
oldflorinseach45- a good match withthose monasteriesgeneratingthe
highestnumber of masters, if Saint-Martin-des-Champsis subsumed
under Cluny.
[C] Courseof Study
When monachi
nigriarrived at the Universityof Paris theirchoice of
was
limited
faculty
by law and traditionto the studyof theologyand
canon law. The studyof medicine was forbiddenand the studyof the
arts unnecessary (monks had theoreticallyprepared for work on the
higher faculties by training in the scientiaprimitivain their home
monasteries). The majority of black monks in the sample chose
theologyover canon law- the ratio stands at three to two; though it
should be noted that fora time, from1360 through1400, the number
of canon lawyers promoted outnumbered the theologians by more
than two to one.
The firstblack-monkcanon lawyers promoted do not appear until
1349- ninetyyears afterthe appearance of the firstmonk-theologian
in 1259. Why did it take so long forthe monachinigrito involve themselves in the studyof canon law? A possible explanation may be found
in thedemands of the canons themselves.The intentof canon law was
that monks should neitherstudynor practice law of any kind, civil or
canon; exceptions were to be rare and only under special circumstances. Indeed, Pope Boniface VIII held thatany monk studying
law was excommunicatedipsofacto,46By 1336, however, the situation
had changed; Pope Benedict XII, in the Summi magisti
, not only
the
demanded that a quota of monks be sent to
university for
advanced study but also provided for the study of canon law as well
as that of theology.47
44G. Mollat,ThePopesatAvignon,
1305-1378
, London1963,trans,fromtheninth
Frenchedition,
319.
45M. H. Hoberg,Taxaeprocommunibus
servitiis
abanno
exlibris
solvendis,
Obligationum
1295ad annum
1455confectis
, VaticanCity1947,374.
46Corpus
iuriscanonici
, ed. EmilFriedberg,
Leipzig1879,v. 2, 1065(VI 3.24.2).
47CUP, v. 2, 463,464, #1002:" Quiaexpedire
monachi
inscientiis
dinoscitur
utpostquam
velcanonum
statuimus
eruditi
ad sacretheologie
transeant
et
fuerint,
facultates,
primitivis
utecclesie
etalialocahujusmodi
. . dequolibet
ordinamus
vicenario
, monasteria
, prioratum
singula.
237

01:19:57 AM

Three years later, on 30 April 1339, Benedict feltit necessary to

compel under pain of ecclesiastical censure the mastersof the Parisian
facultyof canon law to admit black monks to lecturingon the decretum
as well as the decretals. He gives no reason forthis move, except to
state that there is no profitin promulgatingstatutes(presumably in
unless theycan be put into practice.48Perhaps the
the Summimagisti)
canon lawyers, fearingan on-slaughtof black-monkmasters, refused
to admit the monks to the magisterial chair, basing their opposition
on Boniface VHP s antagonism to monastic lawyers and on the
monastic reputationforlitigiousness.49A more likelyexplanation for
the Faculty of Canon Law's reluctance may have been the need to
restrictthe number of 4'chairs" in canon law, maintainingtherebythe
prestigeof chair-holdingand guaranteeingthat facultyincome would
not diminishbecause of the need to share thatincome among a greater
number of masters.
The firstmonachinigrito surface as masters on the Parisian faculty
of canon law appear on a rotulus
seekingbeneficesof Pope Clement VI
in 1349. The petition names three Benedictine monks among the
seventeen canon lawyers seeking papal favors: Johannes de Sancto
Dionysio, monk of Saint-Laumer in the cityof Blois; Petrus Amelhii,
prior of Alloue, a dependency of Charrou; and Robertus Couroye,
professedof the Norman monasteryof Le Bec-Hellouin. The entryfor
Johannes de Sancto Dionysio supplies the helpfulinformationthathe
was the firstof the Benedictines to be promoted to the doctorate,
doctorato
Parisiusintersui Ordinispropresumablyin canon law (primitus
fessores
).50
In the sample, Benedictine and Cluniac theologians were almost
equal in number, but Benedictine canon lawyers outnumbered
Cluniac canon lawyers nine to one. This dramatic differencemay be
attributedto the factthat, forthe most part, the Cluniac Order used
other universitiesfor the study of canon law- Orlans, Toulouse,
Montpellier, and Avignon51 and that the Collge de Cluny in Paris
scientie
seusolemnia
monachorum
adgeneratici
numero
unum
acquirendo
aptum
profructu
majoris
The bulllegislates
theamountto be paid
teneantur
.
furthermore
studiamittere
at thestudia
and canonlawyers
fortheirsupport
, theamountoftime
theologians
cursus
bothintheology
andcanonlaw;
allowedforthevariousstagesoftheacademic
cf.JamesBrundage,
TheMonkas Lawyer
39 (1979),425,430.
, in: TheJurist,
48CUP, v. 2, 628, #1163.
49Brundage,
op.cit.,428.
50CUP, v. 2, 628, #1163.
51SCGV, v. 1, 137, #110,168, #166.
238

01:19:57 AM

was foundedprimarilyfortheological studies.52Of the fifteenCluniac

mastersknown to have been members of the Collge de Cluny, all of
them were graduates in theology, none in canon law. The Order of
Cluny did, however, make a serious attempt to fosterthe study of
canon law at Paris. At the general chapterof 1378, the abbot of Cluny
ordered that six of the priors who had each formerlymaintained a
theologianat Paris should now be responsibleforcanon lawyers; that
the priors of Saint-Martin-des-Champs and La Charit-sur-Loire,
who had each maintained two theologians, should now each support
one theologian and one canon lawyer; and that two of the four pensions forwhichhe held himselfresponsibleshould be transferredfrom
support of those studying theology to that of two monks studying
canon law. These canon lawyers would not take up residence at the
Collge de Cluny but would live at another Cluniac prioryin Paris,
Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre,a dependency of the prioryof Longpont with
a long and close association with the university.53
Regional production of theologians and canon lawyers from the
Universityof Paris shows some strikingdifferences.Two regions, the
Northand Burgundy,sponsored equal numbersof canon lawyersand
theologians.The regionsof Paris and of the Pays de la Loire each produced double the number of theologians than canon lawyers. The
reputationof the Parisian facultyof theologyas well as the easy access
scholars in these lattertwo regions had to other prominentcentersof
legal studies, primarilythe University of Orlans, may explain the
numericaldisparity.Normandy generatedalmost threetimesas many
canon lawyersas theologians. The Norman preferenceforcanon law
depends perhaps on the great wealth of the Norman abbeys and the
notion that where there is wealth, there also are lawyers. According
to the assessments made for the servitiacommunia
, the eighteen
monasteries of monachinigripaying the highest rates (from 8000 to
4000 gold florins)54included three of the seven monasteries sending
52SCGV,v. 1, 65, #18.
53SCGV,v. 4, 130.Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre
servedtheuniversity
as a meeting
place
fortheelection
ofitsrector
andfortheceremonies
newmasters
ofartsas well
making
as formeetings
oftheArtsfaculty
andofthenations.In October1379,sixmonths
theabbotofClunyordered
after
toserveas theresidence
for
Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre
ofcanonlaw,theuniversity
students
VII to grantvisitors
to
beggedPopeClement
so thatnecessary
Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre
indulgences,
repairscouldbe madeto the
and thedivineoffice
couldbe celebrated
priory
{SCGV,v. 3, 245). The university
wouldpayfortherestoration
ofthepriory's
in 1458(SCGV,v. 5, 236).
windows
54Hoberg,op.cit.,374provides
thefollowing
information
on taxation
ratesforthe
ofFrance:Cluny,Fcamp,Saint-Germain-des-Prs
greatmonasteries
(until1387)
239

01:19:57 AM

monks to Paris forcanon law studies: Fcamp, Saint-Ouen in Rouen,

and Saint-Wandrille. An additional two of the seven Norman houses
were at the next level of assessment at 3000 gold florins: Le BecHellouin and Jumiges.55It should be noted thatuntil the foundation
of the facultiesof law at the Universityof Caen in 1432 the University
of Paris was the closest to the Norman monasterieswith a facultyof
canon law, prestigiousand useful in obtaining career advantages for
its graduates.
Conclusion
Because the nature of our sources precludes rigorousinvestigations
into the mobility, power, and motivations of a group such as the
mastersof Paris among the monachinigriin the late middle ages, a prosopographical study such as this can only have the simple goal of
learning as much as possible about the geographical origins and
educational choices of universitymonks living during a period of
historywhen death and renewal confrontedeach other in dramatic
fashion. Future research, focusingon the careers of these monks and
the role theyplayed on the individual universityfaculties,will help the
historianunderstand the complex interactionof the universityand a
studied and perhaps harshlyand unjustly
monasticism insufficiently
judged.
Conception, Missouri
Conception
Abbey
(8000fl.)' Marmoutier
(7000fl.)' Corbie,Saint-Denis-en-France
(6000fl.)' SaintRmi(5200fl.)' Saint-Pierre
inGhent(5000fl.)' Anchin,
Saint-Vaast
d'Arras,
Dols,
Saint-Bavon
in Ghent,Moissac,Molesmes,Saint-Germain-des-Prs
(from1387),
SaintSaint-Ouenin Rouen,Saint-Riquier,
Saint-Martin
de Tournai
Wandrille,
(3000fl.).
55Hoberg,op.cit., 222,297.

240

01:19:57 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
"
Statement There is no Truth":
On theSelf-Refuting
A Medieval Treatment

WILLIAM C. CHARRON andJOHN P. DOYLE

It is commonly known that 14th and 15th centurylogicians were

deeply interested in the properties of self-referring statements.
Perhaps, however, it could be betterknown that medieval theologians
were also interestedin them. In this regard, one importantdiscussion
centered around the proposition ' 'There is no truth'' ("Nulla Veritas
est"). Construed as a universal negative about an entireclass of items
of which it itselfis a member, it is partially self-referring.And just
if it is true,
it also seems to be self-refuting:
because it is self-referring
thenit is false; ifit is false,then somethingis true. Thus, its contradictoryis necessarilytrue, namely "There is some truth".
The history here goes back many centuries through a line of
theologians and ultimately to St. Augustine.1 Following him, St.
Anselm, St. Bonaventure, and others claimed to have found in the
of the denial of trutha foundationalpremise adequate
self-refutation
to supportotherclaims about God and immortality.But this was not
without opposition from theological colleagues and successors,
includingAquinas, Scotus, and in the post medieval period, Cajetan,
and Toletus. Criticism came at either of two points: the critics
characterof the denial of truthdoes
objected (a) thatthe self-referring
not entail the truthof what is claimed, or (b) that the truthwhich the

1 Interest
in self-refutation
is commonamongancientGreekand Hellenistic
SextusEmpiricus
of theallegedselfphilosophers.
providesa notablestatement
oftheproposition
refutation
inwhichweareinterested.
SextusEmpiricus,
the
Against
, Cambridge
, I 398-9,II 55, ed. and tr.R.G. Bury,LoebClassical
Logicians
Library
arefalse,... theyare
1935,II, 213,265. "Now as tothosewhoassertthatall things
'All things
confuted.
arefalse,thestatement
arefalse,' beingone
Forifall things
willbe false.Andifthestatement
'Allthings
ofthe'all things',
arefalse'is false,its
'Notallthings
arefalse,'willbe true.Therefore,
ifall things
arefalse,
contradictory,
notallthings
arefalse."(p. 265)Forthehistory
ofthenotionofselfsee
refutation,
in LaterGreek
M.F. Burnyeat,
and Self, in: The
Protagoras
Refutation
Philosophy
Review,85 (1976),44-69.
Philosophical
241

01:20:06 AM

is purportedto establish is not itselfsufficientto found

self-refutation
the metaphysicalconstructionsit is furtherclaimed to found.
An unraveling of this ancient debate- beginning our story with
Augustine in the 4th centuryand ending it withToletus in the 16th
reveals the appreciation among these theologiansof ever more powerfultools of logical analysis, tools thathave proven to be of lastinguse.
I. Self-Reference
As a preliminary,let us make a fewcommentsabout self-reference.
Not every self-referringstatement is logically problematic; for
evidence, take the statement,"This sentence contains five words".
or (ii)
However, some are problematic: theyare either(i) self-refuting
paradoxical.2 Our sentence "There is no truth" can be either,
depending upon assumptions about the contextof its assertion.
statementsthat are
(i) Consider firstself-refutation.Self-referring
and not the whole
themselves
merely self-refutingundermine only
apparatus of thought,as do paradoxes. Several sortsof self-refutation
have been distinguished. To locate ourselves, consider each sort
statement: a
self-refuting
briefly.Of concern to us is the absolutely
statement that is falsifiedby its own content. Assuming that the
operator "it is truethat" is prefixableto any statement,thenthe statement "There is no truth" is absolutely self-refuting:if there is no
truth,then it is truethatthere is no truth;but this entails in turn that
thereis truth;so the originadstatemententails its own falsity,and its
opposite, "There is some truth", is necessarilytrue. The reasoning
here turns on the assumption of the necessary prefixabilityof the
assumption
operator "it is truethat." As we shall see, the prefixability
is a centralpoint of dispute among the theologians. Modern logicians
3A
have identifiedseveral other sorts of self-refutation.
pragmatically
self-refutingstatement is one in which the way the statement is
presented is inconsistentwith the content of the statement,as when
one writes "I am not writing". This sentence would not be selfrefuting,ofcourse, were themode of its expressionan utterancerather
2 Foranother
between
andauthenofthedistinction
discussion
merely
self-refuting
selfseeA.N. Prior,Ona Family
, in: Notre
reference,
ofParadoxes
tically
paradoxical
ofFormalLogic,2 (1961),16-32.
DameJournal
3 Our discussion
is takenfrom
of self-refutation
ofthetypesand properties
J.L.
- A Formal
14(1964),
, in:ThePhilosophical
Mackie,Self-Refutation
Analysis
Quarterly,
193-203.
242

01:20:06 AM

self-refutingstatement is one
than an inscription. An operationally
whose content is such that it is in conflictwith any assertion of the
statement,no matterin what manner one may choose to assert it. "I
believe nothing" is operationally self-refuting,since anyone who
asserts anythingis implicitlycommitted to the expanded statement
that one believes that which one asserts. In this case, one would be
committed to the incoherence that one believes that one believes
nothing.Now it may be that in factone believes nothingand merely
happens to say so, but, the statementis nonethelessabsurd, although
true. Other operationallyself-refuting
statementsinclude "I am not
thinking", "I know nothing", and "No statementis intelligible",
since in assertingany statementp , one is implicitlycommittedto the
expanded statements"I believe that/>", "I know that/?", and "It is
intelligiblethat/>". Thus to say "No statementis intelligible" is to be
committedimplicitlyto the expanded statement,"It is intelligiblethat
no statementis intelligible".
(ii) Consider next paradoxical self-reference.The sentence "This
sentenceis false" is paradoxical in the extreme: if it is true, then it is
false; ifit is false,thenit is true; thus, it is true ifand only ifit is false.
Since the conclusion of thisline of reasoning is a formalcontradiction,
and since it is reached by accepted ways of reasoning fromindividually
crediblepremises,we are at a point of crisisand mustmeet a challenge
to therationalityof our way of thinking.If it is assumed thatour statement "There is no truth" is the only statementmade, then it too
would be a paradox generatingstatement.
Historically,several ways out of paradox crises have been pursued:
(a) Deny that this or any statementpurportingto be self-referring
(call it "S") achieves what it purports. In this way, one rejects the
premises of the crisis generatingargument. Historically, this is the
approach of Ockham among medievais and Austin among moderns.4
4 William
ofOckhamisinterpreted
as atleastdenying
thatthosepropositions
areselfiftheyweresuch,wouldgenerate
referential
See hisSumma
which,
paradoxes.
Logicae
ed. Boehner,Gal, et Brown,I, 476-78,St.
III, 3, c. 46, in: Operaphilosophica,
N.Y. 1974.Butsee Paul VincentSpade,Ockham
onSelfin:
Bonaventure,
Reference,
NotreDameJournal
ofFormalLogic,15 (1974),298-300.
- thatis,tostate
deniesthatanystatement
torefer
toitself
JohnAustin
purporting
itsowntruth
refers
to- doesin factdo so. On this
value,or to statewhatit itself
thestatement
is false",uttered
withtheintention
ofselfaccount,
"Everystatement
"misfires"
in failing
to achievethereflexivity
intended.
Its "absurdity"
reference,
restsinitsbeinga performative
failure
andnotin itsgenerating
a logicalcontradicsincethelatter
wouldrequire
selfsuccessful
reference.
Thewayoutofparadox,
tions,
243

01:20:06 AM

(b) Deny thatthe laws of logic specificallythose of bivalence or of

the excluded middle apply to statement S. The idea here is that
statementS is taken to be neithertrue nor false, consequently,no selfcontradiction emerges. Russell and Whitehead and some
Wittgensteinianstake this way of meeting the challenge.5
and that the
(c) Accept the fact that statementS is self-referential
classical laws of logic apply to it, recognizingthe inconsistencyof any
language allowing for both of these conditions. In turn, constructa
hierarchyof languages, free of this inconsistency.Tarski offersthis
alternative.6
(d) Avoid the crisis by denying the implicationof a vicious circle.
Recognizing that the truthof statementS implies its own falsity,dny
thatits falsityimplies its truth,on the ground thatthe truth-conditions

one'suseofthenatural
There
ofdisciplining
then,is thesimpleexpedient
language.
in
of(ideal)languages
is no needforitsradicalreconstruction,
say,as a hierarchy
is impossible.
of self-reference
See his article,Truth
whicheventhepurport
, in:
Oxford1961,92nl,94n2,
, ed.J.O. UrmsonandG.J.Warnock,
Papers
Philosophical
withWords
Oxford1962,esp. 16,
, ed.J.O. Urmson,
96-7n2,andHowToDo Things
18, 135-8.
5 Bertrand
claimthat statements
about allproposiWhitehead
RussellandAlfred
truenorfalse.As such,thelogicallaws
tions'aremeaningless"
and,hence,neither
middleareinapplicable
tothem,
andthelogicalderivaandtheexcluded
ofbivalence
See theirPrincipia
Mathematica
is onlyapparent.
tionofanyself-contradiction
, Camin Some
Jorgensen
bridge1910,I, esp. 37, 61. The sameclaimis madebyJorgen
onReflexivity
, in: Mind,63 (1953),289-300.
Reflections
woulddissolve
theproblem
ofWittgenstein,
GarthHallet,inthetradition
bydenyare eithertrueor false.The idea is that
statements
ing thatparadox-generating
of
is false"lackan appropriate
statements
suchas " Everystatement
background
ifthelawsof
a truth
value.Accordingly,
and,
hence,a normfordetermining
usage
or statement
be eithertrueor false,"so
sentence
logicrequirethatanyindicative
andTruth
muchtheworseforthelawsoflogic."See hisLanguage
, NewHaven1988,
137-8,190-4.
6 Alfred
ofselfstatements
that
Tarskidoesnotdenythemeaningfulness
referring
implycontradictions,
they
generate
paradoxes;he reasonsthatsincetheylogically
do havecontradictory
mustbe trueand false.Becausesuchsentences
implications,
- is
- forinstance,
anynaturallanguage
anylanguagein whichtheyhavea home
Tarski
riddledwith"antinomies."In orderto securea self-consistent
language,
rule:no selfsentence
is a partofthelanguage
he
an exclusionary
referring
stipulates
is false"is admissible
uses.Accordingly,
thesentences
onlyifitis
"Everysentence
aboutlowerorder
as a higherordersentencein a "meta-language"
construed
inits"objectlanguage."SeeTarski,TheSemantic
Consentences
itself)
(notincluding
in: Philosophy
and Phenomenological
andtheFoundations
ofSemantics,
ception
ofTruth
andParadox
,
Research,4 (1944),52-84,esp. 58-62.J.L. Mackie[Truth,
Probability
themeaningfulness
ofreflexive
sentence
suchas
Cambridge1973,242-3]defends
offalse".
"Everystatement
244

01:20:06 AM

of the statementare not satisfied,since it is false. StatementS then is

merely false. This is the approach of John Buridan.7
In this connection, let us also remark certain problems connected
withthe translationand reconstructionof the argumentsoriginallyset
in medieval Latin texts. It is oftendifficultto determinethe supposition of an expression, that is, whetherit is intended to be concerned
with a real state of affairs,the proposition or concept formedin the
mind in thinkingof that state, or autonymously, with itself as a
linguistic item. The medievais did not have Frege' s device of
systematicallyindicating autonymy by quotation marks about the
expression mentioned. While at times medieval authors partlymake
up for such lack by using the Old French article "ly", or later the
Greek "t", there is no consistencyamong them in this. This must
be coupled with the difficultyof translatingthe Latin accusative and
infinitivein indirectdiscourse. Making foreven more problems is the
lack of eithera definiteor an indefinitearticlein Latin. This, together
withthe accusative and infinitivedifficulty,
frequentlyclouds the issue
of supposition. On occasion, such complications have confused the
medievais themselvesand have made it hard for them as well as for
us to separate logical or linguistic issues from issues that are
epistemologicalor even metaphysical.
In light of these difficulties,the adoption of certain conventionsis
in order. We use double quotation marks around words or sentences
to signifythat they are being mentioned, rather than used. Single
quotation marks are used to set off sentences mentioned within
sentencesthatare themselvesmentioned,or to mark sentencesthatare
the direct discourse of an author being discussed. To set the stage
chronologically,especiallywhere the textis short,we forthe most part
give exact translationsand reproducethe Latin in footnotes.But as the
discussion develops, and as we encounterlater thinkerssummarizing
earlier ones, we are contentwith close paraphrases of relevant texts.
Within translationsbrackets, "[ ]", are used to indicate words not
expressed but understood in the original text. Parentheses, "( )",
are employed for alternativetranslationsand also to highlightLatin
words. Usually, these will involve sentences in direct discourse, as
opposed to states of affairswhich they express.
7 J. Buridan,
Buridan:
onMeaning
and
, c. 8, n. 7 & n. 11,in:John
Sophismata
Sophisms
Truth
Tractatus
deconsequents,
, tr.T.E. Scott,NewYork1966,191-200,
203-6;idem,
andConsequence
I, c. 5, ed. Hubien,Louvain1976,26. See alsoE.A. Moody,Truth
inMediaeval
, Amsterdam
1953,103-10.
Logic
245

01:20:06 AM

II. The Augustinin

Argument
0. The Basic Argument
Not until Bonaventure are we given the fulleststatementof the
of truth's
argument for the existence of God fromthe self-refutation
denial, as it mightwell be named. With an eye on his work, we begin
with a formalreconstructionof the complete argument. In this way,
we can more easily track Augustine, Anselm and Bonaventure's
cumulativeelaborationsof a complete and coherentargument,and we
give ourselves a common point of reference in discussing those
premises that become objects of debate among Aquinas, Scotus, and
the others, who challenge its premises.
Informally,the argumentis this: If there is no truth,then it is true
" thereis no truth".
Moreover, ifthis is true, then somethingis true.
But it also follows that if there is no truth,then there is no truth.
Hence, the denial of truthimplies a contradiction.But no proposition
implyinga contradictioncan be true, so it is not true that thereis no
truth,or, in other words, there is truth. Now if there is truth,then
there is God who is the primal truth. Hence God exists.
To formalize the argument, let "T" mean ' 'There is something
that is true", " 'T' " (in single invertedcommas) be the name of the
'
proposition "T", and "G" mean 'Primal Truth, which is another
be the
name forGod, exists". As in modern logic, let "-" and
the
To
of
and
praccapture
conjunction, respectively.
signs negation
tice of our medievais, let "--> " be the sign of the conditional,where
'
'
- >
- '
q' is true ifand only if 'p & q' is not possible. Accordingly,
'p
thisconditionalconnectiveis strongerthan the materialimplicationof
modern logic. Let "d" stand forthe proposition-forming
operator "it
is true that", "h-" is our sign for strictimplication; it can convenientlybe read as "therefore". The argumentis displayed as follows:
-T - > d
Modal Premise
T'
(51)
'-Modal Premise
> T
(52) d T'
from(SI) and (S2)
T > T
I- (S3)
- T --> - T
: p - > p
Tautology
(S4)
from(S3) and (S4)
I- (S5) - T - > (T & - T)
- (T & - T)
: - (p & -p)
Tautology
(S6)
from (S5) and (S6)
T
I- (S7)
from(S7)
f- (S8) T
--> G
Premise
T
Metaphysical
(S9)
from(S8) and (S9)
h- (S10) G
246

01:20:06 AM

Since the argumentis valid, the interestingobjections of criticsfocus

on one or more of the premises. Modal premises (SI) and (S2),
tautology(S4), and the metaphysicalpremise (S9) are targetsof productive controversy,provoking employmentof importantanalytical
distinctions.We begin with the earliest presentationof the argument
in Augustine.
1. St. Augustine
St. Augustine(354-430) appears to be the firsttheologianto be concerned with the self-refutationof the denial of truth. This concern
occurs in his Soliloquies
, where,withinan argumentforthe immortality
of the soul, he has argued forthe eternal characterof truthas follows:
Eveniftruth
shouldperish,
woulditnotbe truethattruth
hadperished?
... But
in no waywill
couldnotbe true,iftruth
werenot....Accordingly,
something
truth
perish.8
The rhetoricalquestion in this quotation amounts to the claim that
iftruthperished,thenit would be true thattruthperished. The second
claim is that if truth perished, then it would not be the case that
anything were true, including, presumably, that truth perished.
Given these implications of the supposition of truth's perishing,
Augustinedraws the conclusion that it is not the case thattruthmight
perish. The underlyinglogic of his argument is this: any supposition
that implies a contradictionmust itselfbe false. Put schematically:p
- >
(q & -q) I p. The contradictionAugustine sees is, presumably,
a function of the indirect self-referenceof the idea of all truth
perishing,includingthetruthabout itself.Thus, we have here the core
of the argument that is elaborated down the centuriesamong Christian theologians.
2 . St. Anselm
In the prologue to his Monologium
, St. Anselm of Canterbury(1033declares
his
adherence
to
the
1109)
thoughtsof St. Augustine. In line
withthis, it is no surpriseto findin this same Monologium
(chapter 18)
8 "Quid si ipsaVeritas
occidisse?
... Verum
occidat,nonneverumeritveritatem
autemnonpotest
nonsit.... Nullomodoigitur
occidet
Veritas."
Soliloesse,siVeritas
deSanAugustin
, ed. P. FelixGarcia,O.S. A., Madrid
quia,II, c. 2, n. 2, in: Obras
1957,I, 548.
247

01:20:06 AM

a paraphrase of the Augustinin argument on the eternityof truth.

With Anselm it is explicitlyspelled out in two directions. Truth has
neithera beginningnor an end. For ifone conceives a situationbefore
truthbegan to be, it would then be true that truthis not yet. And
equally, if one thinks of a situation in which truthhas perished, it
would then be true that truthis not any more. In either case, since
somethingcannot be true withoutthe existence of truth,truthwould
exist, when by supposition it did not exist- that is, before any supposed beginning or equally after any supposed end of truth,truth
'
exists.9 But since each of these implications is "most unfitting'
it would followthat truthis eternal. Anselm later
{inconvenientissimum),
in two places in his treatise On Truthmakes the same argument.10
3 . St. Bonaventure
In the thirteenthcentury, St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) has taken
up the Augustinin reasoning in at least fourplaces. In the FirstBook
of his Sentences
, d. 8, pars. 1, art. 1, qu. 2, he has raised
Commentary
the question "Whether the Divine Reality is so true that it cannot be
thoughtnot to be?" ( Utrumdivinumesse estadeo verumquod nonpossit
cogitarinonesse.) Among the argumentshe gives in supportof an affirmative answer is the following:
No sentence
is morenegative
thanthis:"thereis no truth"(nullaest
(sermo)
entails(ponit
in theSoliloquies
showsthatthissentence
ButAugustine
)
Veritas).
exists.And
thatsometruth
exists.Forifnotruth
exists,itis truethatno truth
ifthis[sentence]
is true,thensome
is true,something
is true.Andifsomething
truth
exists.11
While Bonaventure agrees with an affirmativeanswer to the principal question concerning the Divine Reality, he does have reservations about this last argument, and, in effect, challenges modal
9 Cf. "Denique si Veritashabuitprincipium
vel habebitfinem:antequamipsa
etpostquam
finita
verumerattuncquia noneratVeritas;
erit,verumerit
inciperet,
Eratigitur
tuncquia noneritVeritas.
Atquiverumnonpotestessesineveritate.
et eritVeritaspostquamfinitaeritVeritas;
VeritasantequamessetVeritas;
quod
deSanAnselmo
c. 18,ed. F. Schmitt,
in:Obras
inconvenientissimum
est."Monologium,
,
Madrid1952,I, 238.
10Cf. De Veritate
, cc. 1 and 10,Madrid1952,I, 490,520.
11"... nullussermoestmagisnegativus
quamiste:nullaestventas.SedAugustinus,
in Soliloquiis
esse; quia si nulla
probatquod sermoisteponitaliquamveritatem
Veritas
esse;etsi hocestverum,
est,verumestnullamveritatem
aliquidestverum,
et si aliquidestverum,aliquaVeritas
est:ergoetc." In I. Sent.
, d. 8, pars1, a. 1,
selecta
, ed. minor,Quaracchi1934,I, 119.
q. 2, g, in: Opera
theologica
248

01:20:06 AM

premise (SI) of the basic argument above. Thus in the body of his
response he writes: [Note: Any bracketed numbers within any block
quotation in this paper key the statementimmediatelyfollowingthe
number one of the ten lines of the basic argument above.]
A negative
does notimplythat[Godor truthexists]exceptin a
proposition
it
existsorthatthereis no truth,
sophistic
way.Hence,fromthisthatnothing
is notpossibleto concludeor inferthattruthexists.For thisproposition,
alltruth.
exists"(nihil
itthere
from
doesnot
Therefore,
"Nothing
esse),destroys
andthisis false:"If nothing
follow
itis truethatnothing
exists,
anyaffirmation
exists"[(SI)]. Andifitis saidthateveryproposition
whatitsays,that
implies
issobutifthereisnothing,
there
is noproposition
noranything
else.Augustine,
doesnotmakesuchan argument
withapproval,
butrather
moreover,
byway
ofinquiry.12
Withina year or so of writingthis,however, St. Bonaventure in his
De mysterio
Trinitatis
indubitabile
, ). I, art. 1 ( UtrumDeumessesitverum
),
a
more
unfavorable
and
his
detailed
reverses
presentation
gives
evaluation of St. Augustine's argument. Thus in argument26 (out of
29) in supportof an affirmativeanswer to the question raised in article
one, he presents St. Augustine's argument with the modal premises
(SI) and (S2), and the metaphysical premise (S9) as underived
premises:
canbeenunciated.
Whatever
canbethought,
Butinnowaycanitbeenunciated
thatGod does notexist(or as a possibletranslation
of theaccusativeand
with
infinitive
construction:
"God doesnotexist")without
itbeingenunciated
thisthatGod doesexist(or "God exists").Thisis clearas follows:
ifthereis
notruth,
itistruethatthere
isnotruth
[(SI)]; andifthisis true,thensomething
is true,theFirstTruthExists[(S9)]. Thus,ifit
is true[(S2)]; andifsomething
be enunciated
cannot
thatGoddoesnotexist[or"God doesnotexist"],neither
can itbe thought
[(S10)].13
12"Propositio
autemnegativa
noninfert
ut dicunt.Undeex
ipsamnisisophistice,
hoc quod estnihilesse,vel nullamveritatem
concludere
nec
esse,noncontingit
veritatem
esse.Haec enimpropositio:
nihilesse,destruit
omnemveritatem.
inferre,
Et ideoad ipsamnonsequitur
et haecestfalsa:si nihilest,nihil
aliquaaffirmatio,
esseestverum.Et si dicatur,
verumest,sedsi
infert
dictum,
quodomnispropositio
nihilest,nullapropositio
estnecaliquid.Augustinus
autemtaleargumentum
non
facitapprobando,
sed inquirendo."
ibid.,incorp.,p. 120. Notethephrase"Haec
enimpropositio,
nihilesse" hereas bringing
outsomeoftheambiguity
in
inherent
Latingrammar;
cf.alsonote14, below.
13"Quidquidcontingit
sednullomodocontingit
enunenuntiare;
cogitare
contingit
Deumesse.Et hocpatetsic:quia,
tiare,Deumnonesse,quincumhocenuntietur,
si nullaVeritas
est,verumest,nullamveritatem
esse;etsi hocestverum,
aliquidest
verumest:ergosi nonpotestenuntiari,
verum,et si aliquidestverum,primm
Deumnonesse,neccogitari."De mysterio
Trinitatis
de
, I, 1, n. 26 quodsic, in: Obras
SanBuenaventura
, ed. Aperribay,
Oromi,y Oltra,Madrid1958,V, 104.
249

01:20:06 AM

The balance of the underived premises of the complete argument,

namely, the tautological premises (S4) and (S6), is introduced by
Bonaventure in the process of answering a possible objection. In his
ad contrarium
rationes
, Bonaventure considers two objections, numbers
4 and 5, of which number 5 specificallyquestions whetherconclusion
'
(S8), the affirmation 'There is truth", "T", is ultimatelyderivable
from its opposite, the denial of truth, "-T", the antecedent of the
modal premise (SI). This objection we translateas follows:
whenhe provesthatthrough
thisproposiofAugustine,
Againstthereasoning
of (SI)], thereis
tion,"Thereis no truth"(nullaVeritas
est)[theantecedent
ifthere
doesresult
is sometruth
thisthatthere
{est)
implied
[(S8)],itis objected:
"Thereis sometruth",
ithasa [character]
conthistrueproposition,
namely,
Butnoonecontradictory
orposits,indeed
implies
tradictory
[toitsantecedent].
thisproposition,
"There
rather
ittakesaway,itsopposite.
Therefore,
through
exists.14
thatsometruth
is no truth",it is notto be concluded
In his replyto the overall question in article 1 here in the De mysterio
Trinitatis
, St. Bonaventure has accepted all of the arguments on the
affirmativeside. No longer does he show any of the hesitationhe has
In particular then, replyingto argument
in the Sentences
Commentary.
5 ad contrarium
as just stated, he distinguishestwo differentsorts of
implication of any proposition: (a) any proposition implies itself:
p - > p; and (b) any proposition also implies the assertion of itself:

p - > d 'p' Thus, the proposition 'There is no truth" implies the

'There is no truth"
proposition
(tautological premise (S4)), and it
also implies the proposition " 'There is no truth' is true" (modal
premise (SI)), which in turnimplies thatthereis truth(modal premise
(S2)). And hence, fromthese conditional propositions,a contradiction
follows(conclusion (S5)). But since no contradictionis true (premise
(56)), it followsthat it is not the case thatthereis no truth(conclusion
(57)), or equivalently, there is truth(conclusion (S8)). As Bonaventure puts it:
ofAugustine,
To thatwhichis objected
thata contradicagainstthereasoning
as
itmustbe saidthatthisis trueinsofar
torydoesnotimplyitscontradictory,
thatan affirmative
itis a contradictory.
Butitmustbe understood
proposition
14"Item,obiicitur
contrarationem
quandoprobat,quodperhancproAugustini,
nullaVeritas
esse.Si enimesthaecproest,infertur,
positionem:
aliquamveritatem
sednullacontradictoria
est,habetergocontradictoriam;
posinovera:aliquaVeritas
infert
vel ponit,immopotiusprivatsuamcontradictoriam;
ergoperhocquodest,
nullamveritatem
essenonconcluditur,
esse." ibid.
, 5 quodnon
, p.
aliquamveritatem
106. AgainforthevagariesofLatingrammar,
thephrases" hancproposicompare
"
"
'
'
est"herewiththe Haecenim
tionem
: nullaVeritas
est and haec
propositio:
aliquaVeritas
" in note12 above.
nihilesse
propositio,
250

01:20:06 AM

ofa subject,
and
hasa twofold
a predicate
affirmation:
one,bywhichitasserts
itis distinitself
ofthefirst,
tobe true.In respect
another,
bywhichitasserts
a subject.
a predicate
from
from
a negative
whichremoves
guished
proposition,
forboth
Butinrespect
ofthesecond,itis thesame[as a negative
proposition],
a negative
assertthemselves
to be true[(SI)].
and an affirmative
proposition
- butnotthesecond
- there
Withrespect
isa contradiction.
Butwhen
tothefirst
as itdenies
est
insofar
itissaid,"thereisnotruth"(nullaVeritas
), thisproposition
whichis,
a predicate
ofa subjectdoesnotimplyits[contradictory]
opposite,
as itasserts
thatit
"sometruth
exists"(aliquam
veritatem
insofar
esse).However,
itself
exists[(S2)]. Neither
is thatremarkis true,itdoesimplythatsometruth
"thereis
able,forjustas everyevilpresupposes
good,so thisfalse[statement],
- sinceon accountofitsremoval
ofa predicate
veritatem
no truth"(nullam
esse)
from
all truth
ofitself
a subjectitdestroys
[(S4)] andonaccountofitsassertion
bothpartsofa conexists[(S3)]- includes
tobe trueitpositsthatsometruth
from
it[(S5)],anditis falsein
bothpartscanbe inferred
tradiction.
Therefore,
itself
andunintelligible
whichrightly
it[(S7)]. And
apprehends
byanyintellect
thisis whatAugustine
meansto say.15
Bonaventure returnsto our self-refutation
argumentbeforethe end
of the De mysterio
Trinitatis
(Q. V, art. 1) where his concern is with the
Divine Eternity( Utrumdivinumessesitaeternum
). One of the arguments,
which
he
in
advances
its
is
that
favor
truth
(#5),
(which in one of its
uses is anothername forGod) cannot be eitherthoughtor said not to
be. For if there is no truth,there is some truth.This is so because if
no truthexists, it is true that there is no truthor that truthdoes not
exist.16Finally, in the Collationes
in Hexaemeron
, writtenin 1273, speakof
"the
the
soul"
of
lux
animae
ing truth,
light
(
), he once more repeats
the Augustinin argument, this time to the effectthat if anyone says

15"Ad illudquod obiicitur

contrarationem
non
Augustini,
quod contradictoria
infert
suamcontradictoriam:
dicendum,
quodverumestsecundum
quodcontradicaffirmativa
toria;sed intelligendum
est,quod propositio
duplicemhabetaffirmationem:
de subjecto,
seesseveram.
unam,qua asserit
aliam,qua asserii,
praedicatum
In primadistinguitur
a propositione
a subjecto;
negativa,
quae removet
praedicatum
insecundaverocommunicat
cumilia,quiatampropositio
quamaffirmativa
negativa
seesseveram.Quantum
ad primam
attenditur
nonquantum
ad
asserit,
contradictio,
secundam.
Cum verodicitur:nullaVeritas
in quantumnegat
est,haecpropositio,
a subiecto,
noninfert
suamoppositam,
esse.
praedicatum
quaeest,aliquamveritatem
In quantum
autemasserit,
se esseveram,infert
esse;necmirum,
aliquamveritatem
infert
verum.Et ideohoc
bonum,sicfalsum
quia,sicutomnemalumpraesupponit
esse- cum propter
remotionem
a
falsum,quod est, nullamveritatem
praedicati
subiecto
destruat
omneverum,et propter
se esseveram,
assertionem,
qua asserit,
esse- includit
ideoutraponat,aliquamveritatem
contradictionis;
utramque
partem
ex
ilia
et
etinintelligibile
ab intellectu
recte
inferri,
que
potest
ipsuminseessefalsum
Et hocestquodvultdicereAugustinus."
ibid,ad 5, p. 116.Once
apprehendente.
oftheLatintextherewillbringoutitsgrammatical
more,a closereading
ambiguity.
16Ibid., n. 5 quodsic, p. 278.
251

01:20:06 AM

that thereis no truth,he is in factcontradictinghimself.For he is saying that it is true that there is no truth.17
One point worthmakinghere is thatBonaventure's own undoubted
spiritualityand his almost wanton use of metaphorical language frequently lead to interpretationsof him as a mystic,an intuitiverather
than analytic thinker,influencedexcessivelyby Pseudo-Dionysius or
even Joachim of Fiore, etc. While one may not deny all truthto such
interpretations,it is importantto realize that they do not express in
particular the fact that in these passages we have considered, as well
as in others from his work (for example, his treatmentof future
contingents18),Bonaventure displays uncommon logical talent.
III.

and Replies
The Counter
Arguments

4. St. ThomasAquinas
In his Summa Theologiae
, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) has
rehearsed the reasoning of St. Augustine within the context of an
4
argument for the self-evidentcharacter of the proposition 'God
exists". As Thomas gives it, this argument runs:
'
existsis self-evident
Thattruth
''Truthexists'
{persenotum)
(ortheproposition
is self-evident).
Forwhoever
deniesthattruth
exists(ortheproposition,
"Truth
exists")concedesthattruthexists(or "Truthexists").Foriftruthdoesnot
exist,it truethattruthdoes notexist.But if thereis something
true,it is
thattruth
doesexist.ButGod is Truth,etc.19
necessary
Again let us note the complications which arise out of the lack of
quotation marks in medieval manuscripts and from Latin indirect
discourse. But in particular here let us furtherremark that St.
Thomas' overall concern at this place in his theologicalSummais first
withtheproposition"God exists", but thenthroughthatwiththe selfevidence attaching to the fact of God's existence.20
17Collationes
inHexaemeron,
coll.4, n. 1, ed. Amoros,
y Oromi,Madrid
Aperribay,
1957,III, 254.
18On this,cf.,e.g., I Sent.
, d. 38, a. 2, qq. 1-2,ed.minor.
I, 535-43.
19"rraeterea,
ventatem
esseestperse notum:quia qui negatveritatem
esse,conesse:si enimVeritas
nonest,verumestveritatem
ceditveritatem
nonesse.Si autem
estaliquidverum,oportet
sit.Deus autemestipsaVeritas,
..." Summa
quodVeritas
I, 2, 1, ob. 3.
Theologiae
20Whilethismaynotbe immediately
fromtheaccusative
infinitive
conapparent
itbecomesevident
ofthequestionitself
Deumessesitpersenotum),
struction
( Utrum
as wellas hisanswerto thequestionin
fromSt. Thomas'answerto thisquestion,
is with
Deumessesitdemonstrable).
In bothinstances,
hisfirst
concern
article
2 ( Utrum
propositions.
252

01:20:06 AM

In his replyto the Augustinin argument, St. Thomas is brief. He

concedes that truthin general {in communi)exists. Or, perhaps more
accurately, he concedes that the fact of truth or the proposition
"Truth exists" is self-evident,understandingtruthin general. Thus,
in effect,he concedes the soundness of the basic argument from
premise (SI) through conclusion (S8). His objection is with the
metaphysicalpremise (S9); thus he denies that the factof truthor the
self-evidenceof the proposition "Truth exists'' itself implies the
existence of God as First Truth.21
St. Thomas has mentioned the argument fromthe Soliloquiesin at
de veritate
where
least one otherplace. This is in his earlier Quaestiones
an argumentto prove the self-evidenceof God's existence (or of the
proposition "God exists") is phrased as follows:
Butnoonecanthink
Godis truth
itself.
thattruth
doesnotexist,for
Moreover,
ifitcannotexistthenitfollows
thatitdoesexist.Foriftruth
doesnotexist,then
doesnotexist.Therefore,
no onecan thinkthatGod does
itis truethattruth
notexist.22
To this Thomas has replied:
To thethird[argument]
it mustbe said thattruthis founded
uponbeing.
Whence
thatbeingincommon
so also[itis selfexists,
justas itis self-evident
tous thatsome
thattruth
exists.Butitis notself-evident
evident]
[incommon]
FirstBeingexists
whichisthecauseofall [other]
faith
being,untileither
accepts
thisordemonstration
is itself-evident
thatthetruth
provesit.Whence,neither
froma FirstTruth;accordingly,
it doesnot
ofall [other]thingsis [derived]
4'God
follow
thatGod'sexistence
exists")is self-evident.23
(or theproposition
While in theDe Ventate
replySt. Thomas has spelled out his thought
in more detail, his reaction to the Augustinin argument is the same
as that found in his Summa. Thus in both places he accepts the argument to the point that there must be truth,since the denial of truth
21Cf."Ad tertium
esseincommuni,
estperse notum:sed
dicendum
quodveritatem
veritatem
Theol.
esse,hocnonestperse notumquoadnos." Summa
I, 2, 1,
primam
ad 3.
22"Praeterea,
Deus estipsaVeritas.
Sed nulluspotestcogitare
veritatem
nonesse,
nonesse,sequitur
earnesse:sienimVeritas
nonest,verum
estveritatem
quiasipotest
nonesse.Ergonulluspotestcogitare
Deumnonesse." De Ventate
, q. 10,a. 13,ob.
3, ed. Spiazzi,Taurini1949,218.
23"Ad tertium
unde,sicutensessein
dicendum,
supraensfundatur;
quodVeritas
communi
estperse notum,ita etiamveritatem
esse.Nonautemestperse notum
ensquod sitcausaomnisentis,quousquehocvelfides
nobis,essealiquodprimm
a
omnium
accipiat,veldemonstratio
probet;undenecestperse notumveritatem
veritate
primaesse.Undenonsequitur
quod Deumessesitperse notum."ibid.,
ad 3, 220.
253

01:20:06 AM

What he rejects is that the existence of God as First

is self-refuting.
Truth is therebyestablished.
5. Duns Scotus
John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) criticizesthe Augustinin argument
on two points: first,like St. Thomas, he denies that the existence of
God is evident from the existence of truth; but second, unlike St.
Thomas, he argues against the necessary prefixabilityof "it is true"
to everystatement,specifically,to the statement"There is no truth".
Thus he denies that thislatterstatementis absolutelyself-refuting.In
effect,then, metaphysicalpremise (S9) and the modal premise (SI)
are under attack. His discussion is found in two different
works,each
not
the
whether
or
of
time withinthe context asking
proposition"God
exists" is self-evident.First, in his early Lectura
, we find him giving
the followingreconstructionof the Augustinin argument:
The
etc.[Godexists].
exists(veritatem
thattruth
It is self-evident
esse),therefore,
itsowncontradictory
from
isthatanything
whichfollows
oftheantecedent
proof
thattruth
Buttruthis ofsucha character.
is self-evident.
For,ifyouaffirm
exists.[Butlikethenitis truethatyouareaffirming
this,andthustruth
exists,
doesnotexist.And
thenitis truethattruth
exists,
wise],ifyoudenythattruth
exists.24
thus[also],sometruth
This, we believe, is the poorest restatementof the Augustinin
argument we have to deal with in this article. Scotus has shiftedthe
focusfromthe statement"There is no truth"- and, thereby,fromthe
by virtueof its content
self-refuting
question of whetherit is absolutely
alone- to the acts of its affirmationand its denial. This is a gratuitous
argument
complication. Furthermore,Scotus turnsthe self-refutation
into an obvious non-sequiturwhen he construesits second premise as
the claim that, ifone denies that truthexists, it is true thattruthdoes
not exist, ratherthan, ifone denies thattruthexists,it is truethatone
denies that truthexists. Fortunately,his subsequent critique of the
, does not turn on these difficulties.His
argument,even in the Lectura
criticismin the Lecturais this:
thattruth
Whenitis arguedthatit is self-evident
exists,I answerin oneway
from
a fallacy
oftheconsequent,
thereis involved
thatintheargument
arguing
24"Praeterea,
etc.Probatio
antecedentis:
illud
veritatem
esseestperse notum,
igitur
ex suo opposito;
sedventasesthuiusmodi,
estperse notumquodsequitur
quia si
et itaVeritas
veritatem
affirmas
est;si neges
esse,tuncverumestte hocaffirmare,
nonesse.Et itaaliquaventasest." Lectura
veritatem
esse,tuncverumestveritatem
omnia
, ed. Vat. 1960,XVI, 114,n. 10.
I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, in: Opera
254

01:20:06 AM

in generaltothistruth,
truth
whichis God. I answerin another
waythat[the
"Truthexists"(veritatem
Andwhenit is
esse),is notself-evident.
proposition]
doesnotexist,itis truethattruth
doesnotexist,I saythat
arguedthatiftruth
theconsequence
in
is notvalid.Fortruth
doesnotexistexceptfundamentally
orformally
and
intheintellect.
Butifnothing
is true,thennothing
exists,
reality
as a result
isinnothing.
itdoesnotfollow
truth
thatiftruth
Accordingly,
(Veritas
)
is true,namely,
"Whatis true{verum)
doesnotexist,therefore
thisdictum
does
notexist".25
Some years after, in his Ordinatio
, Duns Scotus repeats his
criticisms.26In his reply to the Augustinin argument, he again says
that it is not valid to make the inference" 'Truth in general exists' is
self-evident{per se notum),thereforeGod exists". There is here a
fallacyoftheconsequent, forthe antecedentcan be trueforsome other
reason than the existence of God. In this respect, Scotus seemingly
agrees with St. Thomas in rejectingmetaphysicalpremise (S9) of the
Augustininargument.But thenhe goes beyond St. Thomas by again
4
'
denying that the statement 'Truth in general exists' is self-evident
from the self-refutationof the denial of all truth. For, when it is
claimed- as in the modal premise (SI) of the basic argument- that,
if there is no truth,then it is true that there is no truth,the consequence is invalid. In other words, "it is true" is not a necessarily
prefixableoperatorin this case. His reasoning is this: truth(" truth")
may be taken in two senses. It can be taken forthe foundationof truth
in extramentalreality (that is, for fundamentaltruth), or it can be
taken fortruthin the act of the intellectcomposing and dividing (that
is, forformaltruth). But if there is no truth,it is not true that there
is eithersort of truth,that is, the fundamentaltruthof realityor the
formaltruthof the intellectcomposing and dividing- for there is no
intellect.However, what does followis this: If there is no truth,then
it is not true 'thereis some truth',-T - > -d'T' But it does not follow:
Thereforeit is true that there is not any truth,d'-T' Rather there is
25"Ad aliud,quandoarguitur
esseestpersenotum',
dicounomodo
quod'veritatem
estfallaciaconsequentis,
in communi
ad
quod in argumento
arguendoa veritate
veritatem
esse.'
'hanc',quaeDeusest;aliterdicoquodnonestperse nota'veritatem
Etquandoarguitur
nonest,verum
estveritatem
nonesse',dicoquod
quod'siVeritas
nonvalet,quiaVeritas
nonestnisiinrefundamentaliter
velinintellectu
consequentia
sedsinihilsitverum,
tuncnihilest,etperconsequens
innulloVeritas
est.
formaliter;
Etideononsequitur
nonest,igitur
verum
estilluddictum
'verumnon
quodsiVeritas
esse'." ibid.
, p. 123,n. 36. Letus notethattheinternal
quotesinthistexthavebeen
addedbythemodern
theirownwrestle
withtheLatin.
editors,
displaying
Cf. Ordinatio
delDoctor
Sutil
I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 12,in: Obras
, JuanDunsEscoto
,
Madrid1950,371.
255

01:20:06 AM

here again a fallacyof the consequent, that is, passing froma negative
proposition having two possible causes of its truthto an affirmative
proposition about one of those causes.27
As we shall see, Scotus' objections to the modal premise (SI) of the
Augustinin argument receive differingreconstructionsin the hands
of both his followersand critics.
6. Cajetan
Two centurieslater, Cajetan (1468-1534) takes Duns Scotus to task
for his criticismof the firstmodal premise of the Augustinin argument. In effect,then, Cajetan upheld St. Thomas in his apparent
acceptance of the self-evidenceof the existenceof truth,given the selfrefutationof its denial. Cajetan's reconstructionof Scotus picks out
two distinctargumentsin the latter's objection to the modal premise
(SI). Scotus, while admittingit is valid to say that thereis no truth,
thereforeit is not true that there is some truth,-T-> - d'T', denies
the validityof saying there is no truth,thereforeit is true there is no
truth,-T - > d'-T' The grounds are these:
(i) As Scotus argues, in the firststatement, the consequence is
negative, -d'T', and, thus, it validly followsfromthe negative antecedent, -T; but in the second, the consequence is affirmative,d'-T',
and, thus, it does not so follow fromthe antecedent.28
(ii) As Scotus argues, truthis taken either fundamentallyor formally. But ifthereis no truth,then in neitherway is it trueto say truth
remains. Not fundamentally,for no "founding reality'' ( resfundans)
remains. And not formally,forno intellectin which such formaltruth
27"Ad tertium
dicoquod'veritatem
incommuni
esseestperse notum,
ergoDeum
aliterpotestnegarimaior.Et cum
esse' nonsequitur,
sed estfallaciaconsequentis;
4si nullaVeritas nullam
veritatem
esseverumest',consequentia
non
est,
probatur
inactu
autaccipitur
veritatis
inre,autproveritate
valet,quiaVeritas
profundamento
et dividente;
sed si nullaVeritas
intellectus
est,necverumestnullam
componente
in intellectu
comveritatem
rei,quia nullaresest,necveritate
esse,nec veritate
'si nullaVeritas
etdividente,
est,ergo
ponente
quia nullusest.Benetamensequitur
ultra'ergoverumestalinonestverumaliquamveritatem
esse',sednonsequitur
non esse'; fallaciaconsequentis,
a negativahabenteduas causas
quam veritatem
veritatis
ad affirmativam
quae estuna istarum."ibid.,n. 37, pp. 384-5.
28Cf. "Scotustamen,... reprehendit
hancconsequentiam,
dicenseam peccare
a pluribus
fallaciaconsequentis,
causisveritatis
ad unamillarum.Tumquia, licet
esse;nontamenvalet,
est,ergononestverum
valeat,nullaVeritas
aliquamveritatem
In
istaaffirmativa."
esse,iliaenimestnegativa,
ergoestverumnullamveritatem
Summam
, Rome1888,IV, 29.
I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3, no. 9, ed.Leonina
Theologiam
256

01:20:06 AM

would reside would be posited as remaining. Accordingly,the affirmative consequent, d'-T', does not follow, but rather only the
negative, -d'T'.29
Cajetan's general replyto Scotus' rejectionof the necessaryprefixabilityof the modal operator is this:
from
ofgoodlogicthatthereis theverybestconsequence
Sinceitis a matter
toa modalproposition
oftruth
deinesse)
ofinherence
a trueproposition
(vera
(de
towhat
is nota modewhichaddsanything
becausetruth
andconversely,
vero)
ofit(praejacentem
liesin front
), itis causeforwonderthatanyonecouldoppose
that
here.Forjustas itisvalidtosay,4'Socrates
theconsequence
runs,therefore
that
"Socratesdoes notrun,therefore
Socratesrunsis true,,or similarly,
before
doesnotrunis true",so intheinstance
Socrates
us, "Thereis no truth
for"Thereis no
thatthereis no truthis true".Thisis confirmed,
therefore
as Aristotle
truth"is a certain
Therefore,
says
enuntiatio).
proposition
(quaedam
trueor false.Butforthose
in thePerihermeneias
something
[cf.c. 4], itsignifies
it signifies:
whatis true;therefore,
whoenunciate
it,thisproposition
signifies
"It is truethatthereis no truth".30
Against objection (i) of Scotus, Cajetan replies that thereis here no
fallacy of the consequent. For both an affirmativeand a negative
modal consequent follow. But it is the affirmative,d'-T', which
and the negative, -d'T', which follows mediately.
follows immediately
this:
The idea is
the affirmativemodal consequent hinges only upon
(pertinet
ad) the consistencyof the proposition in itself.However, the
negativemodal consequent hinges upon the negation of the contradictoryopposite of the propositionin question. Now although the negation of the contradictoryopposite of a propositionfollowsimmediately
( statim
), the negation of that contradictory'scorrespondingmodal formulation follows only in virtue of the rule that any proposition of
inherenceis equivalent to a modal proposition of truth. So it is that
'
the proposition "There is no truth' only mediately implies the
negative modal "It is not true 'there is some truth'". From this,
29Ibid.
30"Adhocbreviter
bonamlogicam,
a propositione
vera
dicitur
quod,cumsecundum
ete converso,
deinesse
devero
ad suammodalem
, sitoptimaconsequentia,
quiaverum
miror
huicconsenonestmodusaddenssuprasuampraeiacentem:
quomodoarguens
estverum
currere
: et
currit,
quentiaese opposuit.Valetnamque,Socrates
ergoSocratem
: et patetin omnibus.Et
noncurrere
estverum
noncurrit
Socratem
Socrates
similiter,
, ergo
- Etconfirmatur:
est:ergo
nullam
esseestverum.
sicinproposito,
nullaVeritas
veritatem
quia
velfalsum,
est
verum
nullaVeritas
, estquaedamenuntiatio:
ista,scilicet
ergosignificans
verum:ergosignificai
nullamveritatem
exPeriherm.
Sedapudeossignificai
esse,esse
I Sent.d.
verum."ibid.,n. 10. Forthisruleof"goodlogic",cf.St. Bonaventure,
modalibus
I, 119;St. Thomas,De propositionibus
,
8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, arg.e, ed.minor
Paris1949,461; alsosee:JohnofSt. Thomas,Logica
n. 1, ed. Perrier,
, IP., L. II,
c. 20, ed. Reiser,Taurini1930,I, 48.
257

01:20:06 AM

Cajetan reasons, Scotus even as he denied the consequence unwittinglyconceded it as he conceded another founded upon it.31
Against objection (ii) of Scotus, Cajetan replies that truthis taken
here at least fundamentallyand that,when Scotus says thatno foundation remains, this is to be denied. For it seems clear that in order that
therebe an abiding foundationfornegative truths,it is not necessary
that any thingremain. Hence the truthof this proposition 4'Nothing
is nothing'' fundamentallyremains, even in the absence of everything
and intellect.This is because, if there would be an intellect,it could
"
adequate objectively" ( adaequareobjectaliter
) its own act of composition to that condition, by composing the proposition "Nothing is
nothing", and this kind of "remaining" ( remansio
) is enough. Hence,
even now, thisproposition"Nothing is nothing" has a foundationon
the side of the thing signifiedonly in this way ( mododicto).But when
it is said that truth fundamentallyis being (,entilas
), this is true of
not
of
the
however
truth.
For
foundationof
truth,
negative
positive
32
is
not
but
truth
negative
being
non-being.
Cajetan's theoryof negative truthsinvites comparisons with Bertrand Russell's theoryof "negative facts" firstadvanced in the third
of his 1918 lectureson Logical Atomism. Assuming a correspondence
theoryof truth,Russell argued that if some proposition 'p' is false
(equivalently,proposition-p' is true), thenit can only be so ifthecorresponding fact which makes it false (or true) is a negative fact:
Aretherenegative
facts?Aretheresuchfactsas youmightcall thefactthat
thatthere
'Socratesis notalive'?I haveassumedinall thatI havesaidhitherto
thatforexample
ifyousay"Socratesis alive"there
iscorrearenegative
facts,
intherealworldthefactthatSocrates
tothatproposition
isnotalive.33
sponding
Cajetan and Russell would seem to be of one mind on the issue of
the explanation of negative truthsand of falsity.
7. FrancisLychetus
What Cajetan had been to St. Thomas, Francis Lychetus (d. 1520)
was to Duns Scotus. That is to say, he was the best known commen31Cf. "Et sic Scotus,negandoconsequentiam,
concessit
illamnesciens,
dumconIn Summam
cessitaliamsuperradiceilliusfundatam."
, I, 2, 1, ad 3, n. 11.
32Ibid.
33B. Russell,ThePhilosophy
Atomism
1902, in: LogicandKnowledge:
Essays
ofLogical
1950,ed. R.C. Marsh,London1956,211.
258

01:20:06 AM

tator on the chief work of Scotus, the Ordination Not surprisingly,

then, in the course of his commentary Lychetus considered the
Augustinin argument, defending Scotus against the attacks of
Cajetan.
Lychetus, in effect,rehearseswithapproval Duns Scotus' objection
to the metaphysicalpremise (S9) of the Augustinin argument: from
the statement"There is no truth", it followsonly thattruthin general
exists and not that the particulartruthwhich is God exists. To think
otherwisewould involve the fallacyof the consequent and would be an
argumentnot dissimilarto one which ran: "An animal exists, therefore a man exists."35
However, in regard to Scotus' rejection of the modal premise (SI)
of the Augustinin argument, Lychetus supplements Scotus' objections with another: he affirmsit as "a rule of insolubles" ( una regula
is someproposition
thatwhenthere
whichincludes
contradictories,
insolubilium)
it is to be deniedin everyinstance
, for only possible instances should be
allowed.36Put schematically:p - > (q & - q) I- p. Thus froma proposition of inherence{de inesse
) which implies incompossible things, it
is invalid to inferthe modality of truth{de vero
) of that proposition,
contraryto the claim of Bonaventure that every proposition has a
twofoldaffirmation:one of inherence by which it asserts a predicate
of a subject, and one of modalityby which it asserts itselfto be true.
But such an invalid inferenceis involved in the case at hand, when it
is said, "there is no truth,thereforeit is true 'there is no truth'", for
thispropositionof inherenceimplies a contradictionand, thus, it does
34On Lychetus,
cf.E. Gilson[History
intheMiddle
, New
ofChristian
Philosophy
Ages
York1955,300,n. 77]: "The Commentary
ofLychetus
on theOpusOxoniense
is an
to thestudyofScotism."
excellent
guide
35"Primaresponsio
talisest,quia nonsequitur
veritatem
essein communi
estper
se notum;ergoDeumesseperse notum.Committitur
fallaciaconsequentis,
a positioneconsequents
ad positionem
ac si argueret:
Animal
est
homo
antecedentis,
, ergo
est;
..." Lychetus,
In Quaestiones
Sententiarum
, I, d. 2, q. 2, ed. WadJ.D. Scotiinprimam
ding,Paris1893,VIII, 413,n. 21.
36 htnota,quodestunaregulainsolubilium:
estahquapropostilo
includens
con(mando
tradictoria
inomni
casu, quiasolumcasuspossibilis
debetadmitti."
Ibid.
, ipsaestneganda
herethecardinal
number,
"una",usedas an indefinite
(Letus remark
article).On
thisrule,cf.D. Soto:"Nihilominus
est,quodnullasitpropositio,
opiniocommunis
iliaestdefinido
scilicet
quaenonsitveravelfalsa,postquam
propositionis,
quaevere
velfalsesignificai.
Et ideodicuntquodpropositio
asserens
se essefalsam,
estfalsa."
Summulae
in thecontinuation
, V. C. 9, ed. 2a, Salmanticae
1554,152v.Sotohimself
ofhistextwillnotgoalongwiththis"common
use,
opinion".Fortheruleinearlier
cf.J. Buridan,
, c. 8, n. 7, tr.Scott,191-6.
Sophismata
259

01:20:06 AM

not implythe modal propositionthatit itselfis true. The implied contradictionis this: On the one hand, if there is no truththen neither
is it itselftrue, -T --> - -T. On the otherhand, if it is true that there
is no truth,then it itselfis true, because it signifiesthatthe factis such
as it is, - T --> -T. Accordingly,it is itselfboth true and not true at
the same time, - T - > (- -T & -T).37
Reenforcing Scotus' claim that an inference from T to d'-T'
involves the fallacy of the consequent, Lychetus accuses Cajetan of
failing to argue to the point against Scotus.38 Admittedly,when an
argument is constructedfrom a trueproposition of inherence to one
with the modalityof truth,the consequence is quite good. For example, "Socrates runs, thereforeit is true thatSocrates runs". But in the
case in point: "There is no truth,thereforeit is true that thereis no
truth"- it is clear thatCajetan did not understandDuns Scotus. For,
as is shown by the textof Scotus, an argumentis not being made from
a trueproposition of inherence: that is to say, "There is no truth" is
not true.39In general, accuses Lychetus, whateverCajetan has to say
on this matter proceeds froma misunderstandingof Scotus.40
In an attemptto correcta growingmisunderstandingof Scotus' fundamental argumentas it is found in the OrdinationLychetusprovides
a summaryrestatement:The causes of the truthof the claim thatthere
is no truth,-T, could be two, namely, that it is not true that some
truthexists, -d'T', or it is true that some truthdoes not exist, - T'
Of these, the firstis negative, the second affirmative.Given, then,
that thereis no truth,-T, it would followthat no truthexists, neither
in realitynor in the intellect,and, thus, also followsthe negative, it
is not true that some truthexists, -d'T'; but, it would not followthat
no truthexists, and, thus, also followsthe affirmative,it is true that
37Cf."... etsicistapropositio:
NullaVeritas
est
, falsificai
seipsam,
quiasinullaVeritas
sit,tuncipsaestvera,
est,tuncnecipsaestvera,et si verumestquodnullaVeritas
itaessesicutest;ergoipsaestveraetnonverasimul."Lychetus,
In
quia signiflcat
VIII, 413,n. 21.
Quaestiones
J.D. Scoti..., I, d. 2, q. 2, ed. Wadding,
38Cf."... illenovusexpositor
SanctiThomaenonarguit
ad propositum
contra
Doccumdicitquodhicnoncommittitur
fallaciaconsequentis,
..." ibid.,n. 22.
torem,
39Cf. "... quia quandoarguitur
a propositione
verade inesse
ad suammodalem
de
vero
currere
est
Socrates
Socratem
, estoptimaconsequentia,
currit;
quiabenesequitur:
ergo
verum.
Sicinproposito,
nullaVeritas
esse,estverum;
est;ergonullamveritatem
patet
a propositione
verade inesse
, ut
Doctorem,
quia hicnonarguitur
quodnonintelligit
in littera
Doctoris."ibid.
patet
40Cf. "Et sequentia,
ex malointellectu
eorum
quae dicitisteexpositor,
procedunt
quae hicdicuntur."ibid.
41Ibid., 413-4.
260

01:20:06 AM

some truthdoes not exist, -T' In thislattercase, therewould be an

argumentfroma propositionwhich has two possible causes of its truth
one negative and one affirmativeto only one, the affirmative,and
hence a fallacy of the consequent.42
8. FrancisToletus
One of the firstJesuit philosopher-theologians of note, Francis
Toletus (1533-1596), has leftus a readable and thoughtfulcommenof St. Thomas, in the course of which he
taryon the SummaTheologiae
has taken up this question of the self-evidenceof truth.Toletus' own
position is a defense of Aquinas against Scotus, but he is dissatisfied
with Cajetan's earlier attemptto do the same.
Toletus provides the clearest reconstructionof Scotus' arguments
against the modal premise of the Augustinin argument. In respectto
the denial of ail truth,Scotus only admits the validityof the negative
inference"There is no truth,thereforeit is not true 'there is some
truth'", "-T - > -d'T' ",43 Scotus, as Toletus understandshim, had
advanced three arguments against the modal premise 4'There is no
truth,thereforeit is true 'there is no truth'", "-T - > d'-T'
(i) Scotus argues that the consequence of the modal premise
involves the fallacy of the consequent inasmuch as it passes from a
more universal to a less universal conclusion (a superiori
ad inferius
), for
it proceeds froma propositionhaving more than one cause of its truth
to just one of these causes. To elaborate: that proposition is said to
have several causes of its truthwhich can be true in a number of ways.
Thus, the proposition"An animal runs" becomes true if a lion runs,
if a man runs, or if any other animal runs. Accordingly,if someone
were to argue "an animal runs, thereforea man runs", thisargument
would not be valid. Similarly,this proposition, "There is no truth",
can be true fortwo reasons: eitherbecause of this modal proposition,
"It is true 'there is no truth'" or because the factis such as thisprop42Cf."Vel dicatur
etmelius,
scilicet
nullaVeritas
est
istius,
quodcausaeveritatis
, sunt
nonestverum
veritatem
esse
veritatem
nonesse
istae,scilicet
, ahquam
, velestverum
, aliquam
,
ethaecsecundaestaffirmativa.
Licetergosequatur
nullaVeritas
est,necin re,nec
inintellectu;
esse,sedpostnonsequitur:
ergononestverum
aliquamveritatem
Ergo
estverum,
veritatem
nonesse
enima propositione
habente
duascausas
, arguitur
aliquam
ad affirmativam
illarum."ibid.414.
3Qf "Perindeest,ac si dicatScotus:si
tuncista
aliquisomnemveritatem
negaret,
essetfalsa,nullaestVeritas;
et nonvera,utdicitS. Thomas."Francisci
propositio
S. Thomae
Toleti,In Summam
I, 2, 1, and 3, Romae1869,I, 58.
theologiae
Aquinatis,
261

01:20:06 AM

osition signifies.To argue fromthis to one reason only is fallacious.44

(ii) Scotus argues that froma negative premise no valid affirmative
conclusion follows. But the proposition "There is no truth'' is
"
negative, while the proposition"It is true 'there is no truth' is affirmative.45
(iii) Finally, Scotus argues to this effect:if the proposition"There
is no truth" is true, it is true by either a fundamentalor a formal
truth;but neitherof these is possible. By fundamentaltruthis meant
an extramentalthing which exists in the way it is signified. Formal
truth,however, is in the concept or the word ( in conceptuvel voce)46
when it signifiessomethingas it exists. But by neitherof these can the
proposition in question be true. For whoever says that there is no
truth,denies or takes away everythingin extramentalrealityand thus
he takes away everything.Hence fundamentaltruthdoes not remain.
Further,when he takes away everything,he takes away the intellect
itself.Thus, formaltruthalso does not remain. Accordingly,the proposition in question is not true.47
In the attempt to understand Toletus' response to Scotus' objections, it is well to make some distinctionsin respectof the interpretation of the denial of truth,-T. As Toletus recognizes, Scotus' objections interpretedin one way are compelling; interpreteddifferently,
they are not. Two interpretativequestions are to be distinguished:
(I) Is -T to be taken as a denial of fundamentaltruth,or only formal
truth?
or not?
(II) If the latter, is -T to be taken as self-referring
As regards question (I), Toletus would have no objection to saying
that if -T is taken as a denial of all truth,both fundamentaland formal, then Scotus is correctin saying that d'-T' is not a consequence
of -T, for the very reason Scotus gives; namely, if there is no truth,
then everythingis taken away, including,this proposition,and hence
it would not followthat it would be true that thereis no truth,ifthere
were no truth.48
44Cf. ibid.,58-9.
45Ibid.,59.
46Strictly
isintheintellectcomDunsScotushassaidthattruth
formally
speaking,
rather
than
posinganddividing"
(cf.note27,above)thatis tosay,inthejudgment
in theconceptor muchless in theword.This is just loosenessofexpression
on
Toletus'partand nota changeofdoctrine.
47Toletus,loc.cii.. 59.
48Ibid.
262

01:20:06 AM

Furthermore,Toletus will not accept Cajetan's attemptto save the

modal premise by the introductionof the theoryof non-entityas a
foundation of negative formal truth. With nothing existing there
would not be any fundamentaltruth,since there would be nothing.
Here he rejects Cajetan's differentiationbetween the conditions of
negative and affirmativetruth. As Toletus sees it, there is no fundamental negative truthwithout formal truth,even though there is
fundamentalaffirmativetruthwithoutformaltruth.49Hence, thereis
no negative truth,unless one posits a thoughtor a proposition, for
example, expressing: "That (illud) [i.e. some item under discussion]
does not exist.' ' But if Cajetan posits some proposition or thought,
with that he is positing some formaltruth.And yet he is not positing
it, for granted that nothing would exist except this proposition,
'
"Nothing exists' or "There is no truth", then it would be false
because it falsifiesitself.For if the fact is such as it says it is- that it
itselfdoes not exist- it is also the fact that it is not true.50
On the otherhand, if as regards question (I) the antecedent of the
modal premise is construed as referringonly to formal,and not fundamental, truth,then Scotus' objection (iii) has no force. As Toletus
would have us interprethim, St. Thomas is speaking not about fundamental, but ratherformaltruth when he says, in effect,that -T
impliesthatd'-T'. That is, one would in some way say somethingtrue
who would say this proposition, "There is no truth", if in fact there
were no formadtruth. For this reason, it would be valid to say,
"Therefore it is true that truthdoes not exist". For in so far as the
fact would be as the proposition says, there would seem to be some
truthin thisproposition. However, absolutely{absolute),one must say
that this proposition, "-T", is not true.51
49Qf "Primosi DominusCaietanusvelit,quodnullaexsistente
retuncestVeritas
nosnonadmittimus;
fundamentalis,
quumenimnihilsit,noneritVeritas.
Quod si
recurrat
ad differentiam
interaffirmationem
etnegationem,
eodemrecursu
profecto
nonadmitto
suamdoctrinam;
namVeritas
inhocab aflrmativa
differ,
negativa
quod
nonestfundamentalis
negativasineformali,
afirmativa
autemsic." ibid.
50Cf. "Unde nisidetconceptum
vel propositionem
illudnonesse,
exprimentem
nullaestVeritas
iam
negativa.
Quod si ponatpropositionem
aliquamvelconceptum,
veritatem:
immonechancponit;quia datoquodnihilessetnisiista
ponitformalem
nihilest,velnullaestVeritas;
tuncessetfalsa,quia se falsificai.
Si enim
propositio,
itaest,utperipsamdicitur,
quod ipsanonest;et sicnonestvera." ibid.
51Cf."Dico ergoproS. Thoma,quodloquitur
de veritate
formali,
quae estinproetquodin iliocasu,nullaestVeritas,
verum,qui ita
posinone;
aliquomododiceret
sinullaesset:ob idvalet,ergoverumestveritatem
nonesse.Quatenusenim
diceret,
itaest,sicutdicit,aliquidverividetur
dicendum
inesse:tarnen
absolute
est,quodnon
essetvera." ibid.
263

01:20:06 AM

- Toletus
As regards question (II) - whether"-T" is self-referring
recognizes thatifit be so taken, then(again) Scotus is correctin rejecting the modal premise. Toletus' thinkingis this: Just as logicians
have shown that the reflexiveproposition "This propositionis false"
must be false,52so the proposition ' 'There is no truth", when taken
reflexively,must be false.53Hence, Scotus rightlysaid it does not
follow" 'There is no truth'is true", ifthereis no truth.Accordingly,
it does not immediatelyfollow that a propositionis true because the
- as the logicians point out withregardto cerfactis such as it signifies
tain reflexivepropositions.54
On the other hand, the forceof Scotus' objection can be avoided,
provided "-T" is construedas a non-reflexiveproposition.It is to be
noted thatToletus is not takingtheline of Ockham thatno proposition
is self-referring.55
The evident understandingof what Toletus is sayand in this case,
ing is that propositionscan be used non-reflexively,
St. Thomas did not intend that this proposition T" in the modal
premisehave reflexionback upon itself.56And as a non-reflexivepropT" does imply "d'-T'
osition,
In raising the question of reflexivity,
Toletus links himselfwiththe
were
of
the
who
logicians
day
grappling with problems of selfreference. However it is well to remember the distinctionwe have
noted in Section I above, that between merelyself-refuting
and truly
paradoxical self-reference.Our theologiansare workingonly with the
former;Buridan and otherlogicians are primarilyconcerned withthe
'
latter, the so-called 'insolubles" ( insolubilia
) which (apparently) lead
to a vicious circle: admission of theirtruthimpliestheirfalsity;admis52Forthis,see,e.g.,JohnofSt.Thomas,Logica
, I P., L. II, c. 6, ed. ReiserI, 24-5;
deconsequents
or earlier:
, I, c. 5, ed. Hubien,26.
J. Buridan,Tractatus
53Cf. "Sicut dicuntlogicide ista propositione,
haec est falsa,quae se ipsam
omnesenimtuncfalsamproclamant,
nec estlogicus,qui oppositum
demonstret;
dicat:itade illa,nullaestVeritas."
Toletus,loc.cit.,59-60;cf.J. Buridan,Tractatus
17 and 26.
..., I, cc. 1 and 5,
54Cf. "Unde benepp.
dixitScotusillamnonsequi,verumestnullamveritatem
esse:
nonenimquia itaest,sicutpropositio
statim
sequitur
quod sitvera,ut
significat,
reflexivis."
docentomneslogiciin propositionibus
ibid.,60.
55ForOckham,cf.Summa
and
III, 3, c. 45, as givenbyE.A. Moody,Truth
Logicae
inMediaeval
cf.
, Amsterdam
1953,103.ForBuridan'sopposition,
Consequence
Logic
. ; andSophismata
ibid
n. 7, tr.Scott,192.
,
VIII,
56Cf. " Potesthocetiamdici,quodveraestetiamilia
propositio,
quia negatalia,
nonenim
quaeextrase sunt,etnonse. Et inhocsensuputoS. Thomamintellexisse:
voluitillamreflexionem
considerare."
Toletus,loc.
superipsammet
propositionem
cit.y60.
264

01:20:06 AM

sion of their falsity implies (or seems to imply) their truth. As

Buridan' s account makes clear, our statement,"There is no truth"
(or its equivalent "Every sentenceis false"), suggeststhisparadoxical
circle only if one accepts certain restrictiveassumptions: (a) that the
truth-denyingsentence concerns only formal (sentential) truth, (b)
thatall true sentencesshould be destroyedand only falseones remain,
and (c) that the only sentence subsequently uttered is "There is no
truth" (or "Every sentence is false"). On these assumptions, one
faces this circle of inference:if the last utteredsentence is true, then
thereis no truth,and, so, it is false, since this sentenceis true; on the
otherhand, ifit is false, then no sentence is true, and hence it is true.
Buridan, as we have noted, claims to resolve this sort of paradox by
claiming that the circle is only apparent, since the falsityof the
sentence in question does not, in fact, imply its own truth,although
its truthimplies is falsity,and hence it is false.57
But, of course, our theologians have no need for, nor interestin,
making such restrictiveassumptions in respect of the statement
"There is no truth." Their concern is not with the logic of paradox,
but with a statement alleged to be self-refutingand, accordingly,
implicativeof theabsolute truthof its contradictory,"There is truth".
IV. ClosingRemark
At the beginningof this article, the point was made that those who
would be considered in it were not working simply in logic. Their
principleconcern was metaphysicalor theological. Indeed, Toletus at
the end of his discussion of our issue says as much.58
At the same time, these theologians were aware of logical issues
involved in thisproblem of self-refutingself-reference.It would be an
absurd claim to say that they were as sophisticated about this as
modern logicians have come to be. Even apart from symbolization,
modern logicians have all sorts of tools available to them which our
theologians did not have. These would include well developed (i.e.,
beyond considerationsof "first" and "second intentions") notions of
language hierarchies, clear distinctions(at least for some) between
57Buridan,
, VIII, n. 7, tr.Scott,191-6.Cf.C.I. Lewis& C.H. Langford,
Sophismata
, 2nded., NewYork1932,ch. XIII, 438ff.
Symbolic
Logic
58Cf. "Sufficiant
istade rebuslogicis,quia logicm
nonagimus,sedtheologm."
loc.cit., 60.
265

01:20:06 AM

sentences and propositions, the explicit differentiationof sentence

types and sentence tokens, the "use-mention" distinction,and the
like. Our theologians were defacto, if not dejure, kept from an easy
familiaritywith such points by the grammatical conventionsof their
Latin as well as by their writingpractices.
But, also in comparison with such medieval logicians as Ockham
and Buridan, our theologians appear rather simple. Thus, albeit we
can praise the logical prowess of a St. Bonaventure, we must admit
that he has little intimation of the semantic and syntacticnuances
which will come in later medieval terministtheory. Moreover, even
in the instance of later figuressuch as Cajetan and Toletus, who demonstrate deep appreciation of the problem of the foundation of
negative truthand of differentuses of propositions,the treatmentof
our apparently self-refutingstatement is, when compared to, say,
Buridan's treatmentof "insolubilia",59elementary- and at least in the
case of Toletus, we believe, slanting toward eclecticism.60And yet,
primitivethough theymighthave been, theirdiscussion lets us enjoy
the strokesof more than one philosophical Grandma Moses. While
theirthoughtscan never hang in a museum, we thinktheydo deserve
a place in the historyof philosophy.
St. Louis University
of Philosophy
Department
59Forthissee theworksofScottand Hughescitedabove.
60Whatis hinted
at inToletusis muchmoreobviousin thesemi-nominalistic
treatfoundin theThomist,DomingoSoto,op. cit.,V, c. 9, fol.
mentof insolubilia
151v-155r.

266

01:20:06 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Reviews
DesmondPaul Henry,Medieval
, Amsterdam-Philadelphia
Mereology
(B.R. Grner)
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
1991,XXV + 609pp. ISBN 90 6032318 1 (Bochumer
hrsg.vonK. Flasch,R. Imbach,B. Mojsisch,O. Pluta,Band 16)
The secondwordin thetitleofthepresent
bookrefers
to thetheory
concerning
sensethatwas developed
partsand wholesin theconcrete
by thePolishlogician
Stanislaw
Lesniewski
and elaborated
whowas Mr.
byhispupilCzeslawLejewski,
at theUniversity
ofManchester.
Forthebenefit
ofthosereaders
Henry'scolleague
whowanttodelvesomewhat
further
intothesystematic
thatis thesource
mereology
ofinspiration
andthebackground
fortheactualcontent
ofthebooktheauthorprovidesa clearsurvey
ofessentials
inChapter10(pp. 541-591).Although
this
studying
willcertainly
be helpful,
itis notnecessary
forunderstanding
thehistorical
appendix
sincethroughout
theworktechnical
are lucidlyand informally
matters
doctrines,
as theycomeup. As thefirst
wordin thetitleindicates,
thebookis about
explained
thevariedfortunes
ofviewson thepart-whole
relationship
duringtheMiddleAges.
hisregret
thathe hasbeenunabletodo full
Thoughtheauthorfrequently
expresses
ofthesources,
hehasadmirably
succeeded
inmaking
available
justicetotherichness
an anthology
ofrepresentative
textsthatwillconvince
everyreaderoftheimportance
whichmereological
themes
had formedieval
thinkers.
The numerous
textsthatare
and commented
paraphrased
Latin,so thatthe
uponare alsogivenin theoriginal
can be checkedrightaway.
interpretations
After
somepreliminaries
andan exposition
ofBoethius'
doctrine
intheDe divisione
a lengthy
toAbelardandhiscontemporaries
chapter
(pp. 64-217)is devoted
Joscelin
ofSoissons
andGilbert
ofPoitiers.
A curiouspointon whichspeciallightis thrown
inthismereological
context
isRoscellin
ofCompigne's
letter
inwhich
hecruelly
sugofthatpartwhichconstitutes
hima man,
geststhatAbelard,
havingbeendeprived
is nolonger
tobe calledPetrus
butrather
Petrus.
In Chapter
3 (pp. 218-328)
imperfectas
theauthordiscussesseveralmereological
aspectsof ThomasAquinas'writings,
literature
a newfertile
whichthisphilosothereby
addingtotheimmense
anglefrom
a brief
elucidation
ofsomeBuridanian
follows
Then,after
phercanbestudied.
theses,
5 (pp. 341-382)inwhichsomesubjects
tothedoctrine
offallacies
Chapter
belonging
are dealtwith,amongthemthefallacy
ofsecundum
and theLiar
quidetsimpliciter
Paradox.Thelatter
hasa mereological
facetinthatsuchan isolated
as This
utterance
sentence
isfalseprompts
thequestion
whether
a termoccurring
insomestretch
ofspeech
canstandforthewholeofwhichitis a part,andhencewhether
itcan in thatsense
be selfAs is madeclearin Chapter6 (pp. 383-405),a rather
referent.
devianttype
ofmereology
wasdefended
in thesecondhalfofthefourteenth
cenbyJohnWyclif
feature
ofhisdoctrine
is thethesisthattheintegral
whole
tury.Themostinteresting
ofmenis a man:allmencollectively
areoneperson,
andthataggregate
personis not
formed
from
all ofthem,andthisis
anyoneofitsintegral
partsbutis an aggregate
an individual
substance
ofa rational
truly
nature,a homo
, quiesttotum
magnus
genus
humanum.
7 (pp.406-461)
thenotions
ofwholeandpart
Next,Chapter
together
brings
andthedistinction
between
andsyncategorematic
categorematic
signs.The sentence
Totus
Sortes
estminor
Sorte
to be ambiguous
between
a
, forexample,wasconsidered
anda syncategorematic
Takenin a categorematic
categorematic
sense,the
reading.
sentence
is false,sincethecomplete
Socratesmadeup fromall hispartsis notless
thanSocrates.
On theother
hand,ifthewordsaretakenina syncategorematic
sense,
thesentence
is true,forthenwhatis conveyed
is thatanypartofSocrates
is lessthan
thewholeSocrates.Finally,in Chapter8 (pp. 462-537),calledVenetianHarvest,
267

01:20:18 AM

Treatise14 ofPartI ofPaul ofVenice'sLogicamagna

is
(De toto
categorematice
tento)
and elucidated
edited,translated
bymeansofnotesand comments.
a bibliography
The book,whichalso contains
and an index,is a mostwelcome
ofa genreofinvestigations
thatis urgently
neededinthehistoriography
of
specimen
oflanguage:
ormonographs
articles
onthevicissitudes
ofcertain
logicandphilosophy
semantic
therelations
between
fields,
terms,
dealingwiththetechnical
specialized
and therelevant
to somecoherent
thoseterms,
distinctions
domain.For
belonging
section
ofphilosophical
oneimportant
an impressive
vocabulary
Henryhaswritten
overview
thatis a trulyilluminating
mineof reliableinformation
foranyonewho
wantstoknowmoreaboutconceptions
ofthepart-whole
in theMiddle
relationship
ofpost-medieval
Agesand in a longstretch
philosophy.
Leiden

GabrielNuchelmans

etrpertoires
au moyen
O. Weijers,Dictionnaires
ge, Turnhout
(Brepols)1991,212pp.
ISBN 2 503370047 (CIVCMA, 4)
wirft
Lichtaufeinenbishergrtenteils
Vorliegende
Untersuchung
vernachlssigtenGegenstand
derMedivistik,
aufdieArbeitsmethoden
und-techniken
dermittellateinischen
UnterVerwendung
einerbetrchtlichen
AnzahlmittellaLexikographie.
derivationes
undDiktionre,
teinischer
u.a. des Glossarium
Ansileubi
Glossarien,
, der
Balbi
WerkedesPapias,OsbernvonGloucester,
HuguciovonPisaunddesJohannes
Verf.aus, welchesdie Methoden
zu nennen),fhrt
der
(um nurdie wichtigsten
desVerweisens
undZitierens,
derMaterialsammlung,
derWortAlphabethisierung,
etc.waren.NebendenGlossarien,
derivationes
setztsich
undDiktionren
erklrung
Verf.mitangrenzenden
mittellateinischen
auseinander,
Systematisierungsversuchen
mitRepertorien,
distinctiones
Bibliothekska, juristischen
Konkordanzen,
juristischen
undBibliographien.
AusjederSeitevonWeijers'Studiegehthervor,
wiesehr
talogen
sichdiemittelalterlichen
Lexikavonmodernen
Kaumetwasdarfhier
unterscheiden.
als selbstverstndlich
betrachtet
nichteinmaldiedurchgehende
werden,
AlphabethivonGuillelmus
BritoundJohannes
sierung
(s. S. 14-23),dieerstim13.Jahrhundert
aberauchdannnichtals einzigeMethodeverwendet
Balbieingefhrt,
wurde.Eine
wardiederderivationes
alternative
, d.h.derZusammenfwichtige
Ordnungsmethode
die aufein bestimmtes
verbum
Es istein
gungallerWrter,
simplex
zurckgehen.
dadasmittellateinische
eineMaterialGewinn,
Schrifttum,
groer
lexikographische
bishervoralleminhaltlich
wurde,
gruppe,aus welcher
geschpft
jetztauchaufdie
ihmzugrundeliegenden
Methoden
hinuntersucht
wurde.Vorliegende
Arbeitzeichnetsichdurcheinetransparente,
durchprofunde
Prsentationsweise,
systematische
Materialkenntnis
unddurcheineguteDokumentation
aus.Besonders
ntzlich
istdie
Liste mittellateinischer
der Repertorien,
Werke(einschlielich
lexikographischer
distinctiones
anbieetc.),diedieVerf.ineinembibliographischen
Anhang
(S. 180-206)
wirdeinePflichtlektre
tet.Vorliegende
frjedenMedivisten
bilden,
Monographie
der in irgendeiner
Weise mit mittellateinischen
in
Systematisierungsversuchen
- unddieseEinschrnkung
wirdwohlnurweinige
kommt
Medivisten
Berhrung
ausklammern.
Leiden

Karl A.E. Enenkel

268
Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden

01:40:53 AM

&Marmo,Costantino
Medieval
Eco,Umberto
ofSigns
Theory
(eds.),Onthe
( = FoundationofSemiotics
1989,ix +
21), Amsterdam/Philadelphia
(JohnBenjamins)
9027221081
1556190751
224pp. ISBN 90 27232938 (hardback).
(paperback);
(USA, paperback).1
This bookconsistsof six papersby a remarkable
groupof youngBolognese
- RobertoLambertini,
and thecoAndreaTabarroni,RobertoPellerey
scholars
- whoattended
a seminar
Marmo
editorCostantino
givenbyEco in 1982/3,
plusa
Allpaperswerefirst
written
in Italianandmostofthem
himself.
paperbythemaster
toomuchwith
in thatlanguagein 1984.The original
published
languageinterferes
butrarely
so muchas to makereadingreallydifficult.
theEnglish,
intotwosections.
Section1 isdominated
section
Thebookisdivided
bythemaster,
2 bytheapprentices.
intootherperiodsofhistory,
theyears1260-1325
Thoughthereare excursions
withspecialfocuson RogerBacon,Thomas
receivethelion'sshareofattention,
ofOckham.Baconeasilyacquires
thehero'srole
Aquinas,DunsScotusandWilliam
in a semiotician's
accountofhistory,
and in thisvolumehe receives
perhapsmore
He was,after
ofsorts.Atthepresent
thanhisdueshareofglory.
all,an outsider
stage
totreathimas ifhewerejustanother
ofknowledge
itappearsdangerous
important
withthesamechanceas moreconformist
medieval
thinker
docpeopleto influence
trinaldevelopments.
oftwopapers.The first,
Sectionone consists
co-authored
by Eco, Lambertini,
dealswithanimallanguage.Itis interesting
inconcentrating
MarmoandTabarroni,
andmedieval
discussions
ofsignification.
Is a dog's
on a marginal
themeinancient
ofthesamesemiotic
barka phenomenon
statusas a man'sgroansofpain?Or where
ofsoundsorofsigns?Thoughthepaperrangesover
doesitbelongina classification
Aristotle
basisis rather
toAquinas,itstextual
and
some1,500years,from
narrow,
forsomeclaims,as forinstance
thereaderis lefttowonder
abouttheevidence
that
ch.1 inGreekandrecognized
thedifference
between
RogerBaconreadPerihermeneias
in PaperN 2). Yet thepaperis valuablefor
and ar^ieta(claimrepeated
oujJtoXa
toa cluster
ofproblems
attention
which,
though
drawing
marginal,
oughttobesolved
ofsignification.
byanytheory
totracethesemanIt isanattempt
Thenextarticle,
byEco,iscalled'Denotation'.
of'denotare'
anditsderivatives
inordertoelucidate
thebackground
ticdevelopment
of words.Once again,we are taken
of 19th-and
use of thisfamily
20th-century
and onceagainthetextualbasis is too narrow.Thus,
through
manycenturies;
denotatur
Ockham'suse ofthelocution'per istampropositionem
quod
(e.g.
"per istam'Sortesest albus' denotatur
quod Sortesest ilia res, quae habet
as ifitwerea novelty
is examined
withOckhamthough
onecan find
albedinem")
fromthepreceding
it.
ofauthors
anynumber
century
employing
Thepapersinsection
2 trytodo lessbutachievemorethanthoseofsection1. Not
thattheiraimsare quitemodest,though.Pellerey
undertakes
to explainThomas
on "naturalsemiotics
and theepistemological
process";Marmo
Aquinas'thoughts
andsemantics
inthelogicofDunsScotus";andTabarroni
"mentalsigns
"ontology
andrepresentation
inOckham".Vastanddifficult
as treated
subjects
bythreegreat
thinkers.
contribution
is noticeable
notleastforitslaudableattempt
to spellout
Pellerey's
Thomas'statement
aboutcognitive
notonlyinother
wordsbutalsobyproprocesses
Themeticulous
oftheroleofphantasms,
sensible
ducingflow-charts.
species
charting
etc. thenissuesin a grandand provocative
conclusion
to theeffect
thatin the
ofThomas"The signification
ofreality
is a naturalrelation,
semiotics
communicationis a necessary,
mechanical
actofknowledge,
thecodeis reality
itself."
Marmo'spaperonScotusmovesoverground
thatmanyhavestudied
butnotdown
269
Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden

01:41:06 AM

ofrecent
inthestudy
well-trodden
bytaking
advantage
progress
paths.Itis refreshing
Scotus'definition
ofsimplesupposition
with
of13th-century
logic.Thushecompares
toseewhether
PeterofSpainandLambert
ofAuxerre
ofSherwood,
thoseofWilliam
or totheBritish
tradition.
The latterturnsoutto
Scotusis closertothecontinental
oftheinsulartradition.
as a representative
be thecase,at leastifwe takeSherwood
as a synthesis
oftheFrench
and
Scotus'semantics
describes
Marmoinhisconclusion
- a synthesis
butwhoseisolawithcertain
features
extensionalist
theBritish
tradition,
someof
allowedhimtoovercome
tionofa distinct
sphereofmeanings
(formalities)
its ownbecauseof the
whileintroducing
theproblems
thatbesetextensionalism
'
"halfstatus
difference"
ofthecontracting
(i.e. thehaecceity)
ontological
'ambiguous
andindividuals."
formalities
waybetween
s conception
of mentallanguage,a
in Ockham'
Tabarronisees a development
itssignsare "determined
thatmakesit propositional:
onlyby their
development
reference
to an objectandbythewayin whichtheyreplaceitin a mental
proposiofa mentaltermis mediated
function
tion"- anyclaimthatthesignificative
bya
orthelikehastobe dropped.
Thisis theconsequence
relation
ofsimilarity,
causality
termsto synthestatusofnaturalsignsfrommentalcategorematic
of extending
atthesametimeas abandoning
Ockhamseemstoperform
ones,which
categorematic
thefictumtheory.
of the
Lambertini'spaper on "Directionin contemporary
interpretations
Modistae"ostensibly
has a moremodestaim thantheothers.He reviewsand
suchas squeezeitinto
ofmodisttheory,
criticizes
modern
especially
interpretations
areforonce
modi
modern
mouldsthatitdoesnotfit.The oftmaltreated
significarteli
It couldbe considered
to sympathetic
treatment.
baskingopendoorsto
subjected
but Lambertini
refuteEnders'interpretation,
managesto makethe refutation
of scholarswho see the
as his discussion
interesting,
thoughnot as interesting
claimthat
withChomskian
medieval
eyes.Theymaketoomuchofthemodist
theory
doesnotquitedojusticetothe
is universal.
On theotherhand,Lambertini
grammar
to disregard
Latinpeculiarities.
abilities
ofsomemedievais
Theydid notspellout
that
Buttheydidthink
thedepthstosurface.
rulesto takeus from
transformational
- through
inquitedifferent
thesamemodi
couldbe expressed
ways
separate
significandi
ofDacia explains
the
ThusBoethius
forinstance.
lexicalitemsorthrough
inflection,
thatGreeknounsand
and Latinnotbytheassumption
factthatGreekhas articles
of
verbsdo not inflectfor gender,case, numberand person,the function
from
between
suchmodisignificandi
(singular
pluraletc.)beingcardistinguishing
ofthenouns
insteadofbeingdonebyinflection
riedbyspecialwords,thearticles,
donotappeal
outthatthemodists
andverbsthemselves2.
Lambertini
correctly
points
to innatism
to explainwhyall menemploythesamegrammar,
onlyaccidentally
But
modists
diversified;
appealtothefactthatwedo noteachhaveourownreality.
someaddthatnot
itself
wouldallthink
thatreality
justimposes
uponus,orwouldn't
to
viz. thatreality
doesnotchangeaccording
onebuttwoconditions
are satisfied,
to graspitin the
havean innatepropensity
and thatall humanobservers
observer,
onetrueway?
thispaperis no lessproBericht,
Thoughcastin themodestformofa Forschungs
vocativethanitscompanions.
Sten Ebbesen
Copenhagen
1 It wasthereviewer's
thatthisreview
thereviews
intention
be placedbetween
ofJ.
thesereviewswere
Magee and Bramspublishedin vol. 29 (2). Inadvertently,
ofthiserrora reference
totheBolognese
scholars
As a result
separated
bytheeditor.
intheair.Furthermore,
wewouldliketocorrect
(29/2,p. 154)hasbeenlefthanging
a misunderstanding
intheproofs
onpp. 150-1ofthatissue:thenoninthecorrections
270

01:41:06 AM

sensicalword"prootoo"appearedinsteadoftheintended
"prootoon".The editor
offers
fortheseinconveniences.
hisapologies
2 Boethius
de Dacia, ModiSignificant
Dacus,Summa
(CPhD 4) qu. 114;Johannes
Grammatica
(CPhD 1) 55
AzucenaAdelinaFraboschi,
Cronica
dela Universidad
deParis
y deunahuelga
y susmotivos
( 1200-1231
), Buenos Aires (Institutode EstudiosGrecolatinos''Prof.
F. Nvoa") 1991,143pp. ISBN 950 998200 8.
workis primarily
Fraboschi's
a studyofuniversity
sermons
delivered
at thetime
ofthegreatstrike
attheUniversity
ofParis,1229-1231
. Inordertoplacethatmaterial
in context,
theauthorbeginsherworkwithan overview
ofthedevelopment
ofthe
intheearlythirteenth
itsinstitutional
andtheevents
university
century,
organization,
calledin March1229.Thisfirst
sectionincluded
numerous
leadingup tothestrike
of documents
in theChartularium
Universitatis
PariSpanishtranslations
published
siensis
The
, editedby H. Denifleand E. Chatelainat theendofthelastcentury.
oftheworkisa study
secondsection
ofuniversity
oforganizaitsmethods
preaching,
tionand use of rhetoric,
withparticular
attention
to thesermons
of the1230-31
ofimportant
period.Heretheauthorprovides
Spanishtranslations
passagesfrom
deartepraedicatoria
, Alainde Lille'sSumma
, and
Hughof St. Victor'sDidascalicon
ThomasChobham's
Summa
dearte
ThelastpartofFraboschi's
workconpraedicatoria.
tainstranslations
offiveuniversity
sermons
from
the1230-31
the
periodplacedfacing
Latinversions
inM. M. Davy'sLessermons
universitaires
previously
published
parisiens
de1230-1231
shehas chosento includearebyWilliam
(Paris,1931).The sermons
ofAuvergne
as bishopofParis),PhiliptheChancellor,
Gerardof
(in hiscapacity
friar.
Laon,JohnofSt. Giles,anda Franciscan
Whilethereis notmuchnewhereforscholars
on theUniversity
of
specializing
Parisinthethirteenth
Fraboschi's
bookdoesprovide
a goodintroduction
for
century,
ofthehistory
anddocuments
oftheearlyuniversity.
Herworkalso
Spanishreaders
focusesattention
on an important
but insufficiently
studiedgenreof university
sermonliterature.
In thelast decadetherehas been renewedscholarly
writing:
interest
in thestructure
andtextualtransmission
ofmedieval
sermons,
particularly
thoseofthethirteenth
It is in thisarea,alongside
thecontributions
ofL. J.
century.
NicoleBriou,
thatFraboschi's
workwill
Bataillon,
Hamesse,andothers,
Jacqueline
makea contribution
andhelpbringthosesourcesto a wideraudience.
Madison,WI

WilliamJ. Courtenay

Miseenpageetmiseentexte
dulivre
manuscrit
de Henri-Jean
Martin
, sousla direction
- Promodis)
du Cerclede la Librairie
etJeanVezin,Paris(Editions
1990,472
dont64 de couleur,ISBN 2-7654-0446-1.
pp., 445 illustrations,
Ce livre,certainement
l'undesplusbeauxparuscesdernires
s'il
annes,confirme
en estbesoinle rayonnement
destudesmdivales
en France.Pourrester
dansle
seuldomainede l'histoire
intellectuelle
on peutciterLe livre
au moyen
ge>paruaux
du CNRS en 1988 l'occasiondu cinquantenaire
de l'Institut
de Recherche
presses
et d'Histoire
desTextesetHistoire
desbibliothques
volume
, dontle premier
franaises
concerne
LesBibliothques
mdivales
duVIesicle
1530etqui a tpublien 1989par
la mmemaisond'dition
ici.Ces troispubliquele livredonsnousrendons
compte
cations
deluxeneconstituent
devulgarisation
destipasdutoutunesimple
entreprise
ne vendre
le moyenge. Au contraire,
il s'agitdanschacundestroiscas d'un
volumecollectif
trssrieux,
compos
parunequiped'excellents
spcialistes
qui ont
271
Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J. Brill,Leiden

01:41:15 AM

de recherches
soitmmeeffectu
soitfaitle pointsurlesrsultats
desrecherrcentes,
Maison a prisle partide fairerivaliser
la qualitdu travail
chesnouvelles.
scientifitrssoigneet miseenvaleurparsa qualitesthtique.
que aveccelled'unedition
A partir
de l'tranger
on peutregarder
ce phnomne
avecunecertaine
enviepour
la doublerichesse
celled'unpublicd'amateurs
clairs
franaise:
prts payerle prix
de la connaissance
etde la beautrunies
ende superbes
fort
pourprofiter
ouvrages,
celleaussidu milieuprofessionnel
du derAinsi,parmiles19auteurs
qui lesproduit.
lesautrestantdesspcialistes
niervolumeonnecompte
franque troisAmricains,
il n'yen a que deuxqui ontgalement
au
contribu
ais. Et parmices 16 Franais,
Parisestl'undescenvolumecitplushautsurle livreau moyen
ge. Dcidment,
les plusimportants
et les plusproductifs
en ce domaine.
tresde recherche
Pouren venirau livresurla miseen pageetla miseen textedu livremanuscrit,
trerenilva de soique dansunerevuecommeVivarium,
oncherchera
davantage
intellectuelle
pourl'histoire
que surlesaspectscodicologiques.
seignsursonintrt
estdu restevident.
L'activit
de lireetcelled'crire
sontdeuxpratiques
Cetintrt
de touteactivitintellectuelle,
fondamentales
qui n'taientpas, avantles XIIe XIIIe siclesaussinaturellement
liesque nousles concevons
Comme
aujourd'hui.
A. Petrucci
danssonarticle
LireauMoyen
l'criture
l'a expliqu
n'taitpas,dans
Age1,
le hautmoyenge,au service
de la lecture,
maispoursuivait
un butprincipalement

commeellel'taitpardesscribes
professionnels
peuhabitus
esthtique,
pratique
Ce clivagesetraduit
notamment
la lecture.
continue
etl'absencede touparl'criture
tessortes
d'aides la lecture
la miseenpageetquiappaprcisment
quepeutfournir
au coursdes XIIe etXIIIe sicles:criture
de plusen plusfrquentes,
sur
raissent,
deuxcolonnes,
du textesouligne
des marquesde
articulation
pardes rubriques,
destitres
etc.Unpeuplustard
desinitiales
detaillediffrente,
courants,
paragraphes,
de livres,
encoreonvoitnatre
d'autres
crits
eux-mmes
enlantypes
parleslecteurs
ou produits
guevulgaire
pourla cour,avantde retourner
pardesateliers
pourainsi
dire unecriture
quasiclassiqueaux pagesareset harmonieuses.
PaulSaenger
danslevolumequinousintresse
ici,revient
qui signdeuxarticles
surLa naissance
de la coupureetde la sparation
desmots(pp. 446-449)etCou- sujets
desmotssurle Continent
au MoyenAge(pp. 450-455)
pureet sparation
il
avait
consacr
tudes2
malheureusement
sans
auxquels
dj
plusieurs
rpondre
aux critiquesformules
explicitement
par Petruccidans l'articlecit plus haut
de poser montourquelquespointsd'interrogation,
sur
(p. 606).Je me permets
de Saenger.L'observation
d'autresaspectsde l'argumentation
de
que l'introduction
faireadopterla pratique
textesnouveauxet caractre
aitcontribu
scientifique
dela sparation
desmotsmeparattout faitvraisemblable,
maispourquoi
l'criture
motssparstellequ'ellemerge
Fleury
versla findu Xe siclene serait-elle
pas
celledes coloniesirlandaises
et anglo-saxonnes
desVIIIe et IXe sicomparable
de typed'criture,
caroline
d'unepart,lettres
cles?3La diffrence
minuscule
deforme
insulaire
de l'autre,nesemblepasconstituer
unobstacle
la comparaison.
Etlesrais'estproduit
danslesdeuxcas,connaissance
sonspourlesquelles
ce phnomne
limi comprendre
tedu latind'un ct,difficult
des textescompliqus
de l'autre,ne
ilya au moins
semblent
nonplus.S'il n'ya pasd'emprunt
direct,
pastroploignes
si le terme
certain.
unparalllisme
On peutse demander
galement
parlequel
signa,
la nouvelle
lesmodistes
lesmots,renvoie
valeurgraphique
dsignaient
(p. 455).Cet
unetouteautrediscussion,
emploise rapporte
qui n'a, monavis,rien voiravec
le moded'criture.
Si j'ai abordce livre peuprsparla fin,ce n'estpas parcequeje veuxmettre
niparcequele dbutseraitmoinsintresdesrserves
surla faondontilestcompos
sant.Procdant,
dela maindeJacquesMonfrin,
dulivre
aprsunebelleintroduction
antiquejusqu'aulivreimprim,
parchapitres
thmatiques
(dontun surla Bible,un
autresurles livresd'tudes,etc.),on faitjustement
dansla premire
moitides
272

01:41:26 AM

dcouvertes
diffdansdescivilisations
surla faondonton procdait
passionnantes
rentes
trs
untextesurpapieretcrerce que nousappelons
d'unterme
pourcoucher
unlivre.Ainsi,le premier
surle livreantiquedansle bassinmdignral
chapitre,
de l'Egypte
de PascalVernussurlesmanuscrits
terranen,
comprend
quatrearticles:
ancienne
(pp. 16-23),de ColetteSiratsurle livrehbreuenPalestine
(pp. 24-29),de
de la littrature
JeanIrigoinsurquatreexemples
grecque(pp. 30-43),etde Robert
au codex
Marichal
surle passagedu volumen
de conpermet
(pp. 44-54).Ce voisinage
staterde ses propres
entreles rouleauxde Qumranet par
yeuxles ressemblances
ils'agitd'unemiseencolonnes,
celuiquicontient
LesSyconiens
de Mnandre:
exemple
estdtermine
dontla hauteur
verticale
de la feuille
parla dimension
qu'ondroule,
- lesmainsqui doivent
la largeur
le rouleau,les
physiques
dplier
pardesimpratifs
- , tandisque le texteestaligndu cto comleslignes
yeuxquidoivent
parcourir
mencel'criture
cas, gauchedansle second),maispasde
( droitedansle premier
l'autrect.
Le codexreprsente
un changement
videmment
dcisif
dansla miseen texte.Le
n'enchangera
dontil tait
plusjusqu' nosjours,quelleque soitla matire
principe
etquellesque soientlesdiffrences,
etsignificatives,
dansla faon
compos
multiples
dontona occupl'espaceoffert
Le livreenquestion
estnaturellement
parce support.
cesdiffrences,
consacr
carde mmeque il n'ya pasdeuxtres
sujetmerveilleux,
humains
entirement
il n'ya pasdeuxlivresmanuscrits
C'est
semblables,
identiques.
unevidence,
maisqu l'ona enviede souligner
cettepublication
aprsavoitparcouru
la foissomptueuse
et claire.
Dans l'ensemble
on peutdire, monsens,que c'estautantl'utilisation
du livre,
la
l'objectif
auquelil devaitrpondre,
que descritres
artistiques
qui ontdtermin
du texte.Passantsurleschapitres
consacrs
la Bible, la liturgie,
la
disposition
etauxtextes
lesmanuscrits
contenant
patristique
classiques,
je veuxciterenexemple
la littrature
latinede distraction,
prsents
parPascaleBourgain
(pp. 161-172),et
leslivres
d'tudes.Dansle premier
unemiseenpage,d'ailleurs
cas,ila falluinventer
assezsimple
surtout
au dbutdel'existence
maisorigide ce nouveaugenrelittraire,
naleetenjouepourla posielyrique.
Leslivres
inteld'tudes,
conuspourle travail
lepoidsdescommentaires
subissent
la pagesousforme
de glolectuel,
quienvahissent
ses diffrents
niveaux:la Bibled'unmatre
dominicain
de Paris(prsent
parGuy
comment
le texteoriginel
s'croulesousles gloses
Lobrichon,
pp. 181-183)montre
la Glossaordinaria
et le commentaire
tandisque le Talmud
interlinaires,
ultrieur,
unsystme
185Talmudcomplet,
prsente
comparable
(ColetteSirat,Le premier
contenant
lesDecrtales
Ramdesmanuscrits
187),ainsique parexemple
(Jacqueline
baud,pp. 204-209).
En ce qui concerne
lesmanuscrits
universitaires
(RobertMarichal,
pp. 211-217),
4 n'a pas encore
la publication
la plusrcente
tpriseen compte.On y
surla pecia
trouvera
desprcisions
surl'origine
de ce systme5
de l'influet aussidesexemples
encequ'ila euesurla miseentexte.Surla division
du texte
dansce genrede manusstructurs
enlivres,
etautressubdivisions,
ce
crits,
chapitres,
questions
paragraphes,
consultables
de leurspages
quilesrendplusfacilement
l'impression
malgr
compacte
trsremplies,
il y a dsormais
l'articletrsintressant
de NigelPalmer6,
qui touche
la disposition
matrielle
du texte.
galement
Le dernier
article
duchapitre
surleslivres
d'tudeestconsacr
auxConcordances
etindex(pp.219-228).RichardetMaryRousey reviennent
surunsujetqu'ilsconbienetqui prsente
naissent
videmment
unintrt
particulier
pourla miseen page
nouveaux
puisqu'ils'agitd'instruments
pourlesquelsil a doncfallucrerdesformes
nouvelles.
Etd'ailleurs
l'invention
del'indexmodifia
la conception
dela miseentexte
partirde la findu XIIIe sicle.Dornavant,
elle-mme
est
un livreimportant
nonseulement
d'unetabledesmatires,
de titres-courants,
derubriques,
etc.,
pourvu
maisgalement
d'unetablealphabtique
uneutilisation
qui permet
rapideetponctuelle.
273

01:41:26 AM

dschacun unseulauteur:Traductions
Suivent
deuxgrands
etlittrachapitres
etmise
tureen languevulgaire
Hasenohr,
pp. 229-352)etIllustration
(Genevive
en page(HlneToubert,
Ce sontdestudestrsrichesetfouilles,
pp. 353-420)7.
l'poqueo l'onapproo l'onvoitapparatre
unenouvelle
conception
esthtique
chede l'imprimerie.
et l'imprim,
on arrive
surLe manuscrit
Aprsun chapitre
traitant
de la faondontona aidle lecteur,
notamment
au dernier,
parla ponctuation(JeanVezin,pp. 439-445)etparla sparation
desmots(voirplushaut).On y
trouveaussiquelquesbeauxexemples
de pomesfigurs
(JeanVezin,pp. 436-438)
la
et de livresde forme
insolite
(mmeauteur,pp. 457),qui nousfontcomprendre
mesurede l'originalit
de mmeque le plaisircalligraphique
deslivresmanuscrits,
leursproducteurs,
commed'ailleurs
dansle cas
qu'ilsontd quelquefois
procurer
l'cricritenFrance(Colette
duplusbeaumanuscrit
hbreu
Sirat,pp. 100-104)o
turedevient
dessin.
Biensr,on pourrait
le rver
extraordinaire.
Voildoncun livred'unerichesse
encore.Pourma part,j'auraistcombleparunetudesurla mise
pluscomplet
entransentextedesglossaires
etdictionnaires,
instruments
pourainsidirevivants,
Mais n'insistons
formation
constante.
pas surce qui auraitpu treajout.Dj tel
ditorial
enscience,
ensavoir-faire
qu'il est,le volumepselourd:enpoidsmatriel,
et en prestige.
Olga Weyers

's-Gravenhage

1 Dans Mlanges
- Temps
Modernes
96 (1984)
del'EcoleFranaise
deRome
, Moyen
Age
pp. 603-616.
2 Silent
andSociety
13(1982)pp.367onlatemedieval
itsimpact
, dansViator
Script
Reading:
Du
I. Lelivre
del'dition
deliremedivales
, dansHistoire
414;Manires
conqurant.
franaise,
duXVIIesicle
au milieu
, Paris,1982,pp. 131-141.
Moyen
Age
3 Cf. p. 452.
4 La production
auMoyen
etPecia
dulivre
universitaire
, d. L.J.Bataillon,
Age:Exemplar
B.G. Guyot,R.H. Rouse,Paris(CNRS) 1988.
5 II taitenusage Bologneavantd'avoirtadopt Paris.Pourl'apparente
rf mon
universitaire
dansle contrat
de Verceil,
rence la rglementation
je renvoie
etthologiques
73 (1989)p. 571.
dessciences
philosophiques
compterendudansla Revue
6 N.F. Palmer,Kapitel
Bcher
undBuch.Zu denGliederungsprinzipien
mittelalterlicher
, in
Frhmittelalterliche
Studien
23 (1989)pp. 43sqq.
7 II fautrapprocher
les articles
exacteso les
de ce dernier
consacrs
aux sciences
la miseen page(ColetteSirat,Euclide
dterminent
,
imagesexplicatives
galement
etgomtrie,
Poulle, Astronomie
pp. 192-199).
pp. 189-191:Emmanuel

274

01:41:26 AM

Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J.Brill,Leiden
Books Received

De generatione
etcorruptione.
Quaestiones
super
AegidiusAurelianensis,
Herausgegeben
vonZ. Kuksewicz.
B.R. Gner,Amsterdam/Philadelphia
1993xxvii& 237 p.
StudienzurPhilosophie,
ISBN 90 6032323 8 (Bochumer
18)
- DreiBcher
De inventione
libritres
RudolfAgricola,
ber
dieInventio
dialctica.
Kritisch
bersetzt
und kommentiert
von LotharMndt.Niemeyer,
herausgegeben,
Tbingen1992xxvii& 764p. ISBN 3 484 365110 (FrheNeuzeit,11)
. Uebersetzt,
descientia
VomWissen
Christi.
Christi
Bonaventura,
Quaestiones
disputata*
Felix
kommentiert
undmitEinleitung
hrgg.vonA. Speer.Lateinisch-Deutsch.
Meiner,Hamburg1992lxii& 252 p. ISBN 3 787310479
del'Institut
Cahiers
duMoyen-Ages
etlatin(Universit
deCopenhague
), Vol. 62 (1992),
grec
Apreliminary
: L.B. Mortensen,
onSecular
232p. - Contents
History
HughofSt.Victor
edition
Alkhwarizmi
's astronomical
ofchapters
fromhisChronica;F.S. Pedersen,
R. Quinto,Die Quaestiones
Rules:YetAnother
LatinVersion;
desStephan
Langton
ber
dieGottesfurcht
toLogic,,
S. EbandByzantine
; S. Ebbesen,Western
Approaches
Twosophismata
lat.7678anda reference
to
scivit.
besen,Deusseitquicquid
fromVat.
Nominales
Texts
inErfurt,
; S. Ebbesen,SmallFinds.Philosophical
Hamburg,
Oxford
andParis
; J. Raasted,ThePrinceton
Heirmologion
Palimpsest.
Avicenna
HerbertA. Davidson,Alfarabi,
onIntellect.
TheirCosmologies,
, andAverroes
Theories
andTheories
OxfordUniversity
Intellect,
ofHumanIntellect.
oftheActive
1992x & 363 p. ISBN 0 19 5074238
Press,NewYork/Oxford
Documenti
e studi
sullatradizione
medievale.
RivistadellaSocitInternazionale
filosofica
Fase.
Latino,II, 1 & 2 (1991)vii& 664p. - Contents:
perlo Studiodelmedioevo
1: S. Donati,Studi
I : Le opere
delleopere
diEgidioRomano.
prima
perunacronologia
" dellalettura
"
del1285.I commenti
di
aristotelici
(parteII); C. Luna,La Reportado
III
delle
Romano
sul
libro
Sentenze
e
il
dell'
dell'autenticit
Egidio
(Clm.8005) problema
"Ordinatio"
e la
(parteII); P. Porro,"Ex adiacentia
temporis":
EgidioRomano
nelcommento
ai
e predicazione
categoria
"quando";A. Tabarroni,Figuradictionis
Elenchi"di EgidioRomano
e la dottrina
; C. Trifogli,
"Sophistici
EgidioRomano
Ilfilosofo,
ilprincipe
e la virt.
Notesullaricearistotelica
; R. Lambertini,
dell'infinito
zione
e l'usodell'"EticaNicomachea"
nel"De regimine
diEgidioRomano
;
principm"
C. Marmo,Hocautem
... Egidio
Romano
e Tommaso
sulle
etsipotest
tollerari
d'Aquino
dell'anima.
Fase.2: A.D. Conti,La composizione
dell'ente
corpassioni
finito
metafisica
alla
di Tommaso
Sutton
deicommenti
; S. Donati,Perlo studio
poreonell'ontologia
"Fisica"delXIII secolo.
I: Commenti
diprobabile
anni1250-1270
origine
inglese
degli
ca. (parteI); C. Trifolgi,
sullibro
III della"Fisica"inalcuni
Le questioni
commenti
intorno
allamet
delsec.XIII (parteI); J. M. M. H. Thijssen,
Some
inglesi
reflections
onContinuity
andTransformation
Natural
inMedieval
ofAristotelianism
(andRenaissance)
diAristotele:
scotista
della"Metafisica"
; G. Pini,Unalettura
Philosophy
l'"Expositio
inlibros
diAntonio
Andrea
Die Qualitt
derZahlen.
; N. Schneider,
Metaphysicorum"
Diearistotelische
Zahlentheorie
nachMetaph.
V(Delta)14 undihre
mittelalterliche
KomundUmdeutung
inlibro
De Causis".La rece; C. D'Ancona,"Philosophus
mentierung
zione
del"Liber
deCausis"come
dello
aristotelica
neicommenti
diRuggero
Bacone,
opera
di Bocfeld
di Gande dello
Indicedei
; Indicedei manoscritti;
ps. Enrico
ps. Adamo
nomi.
DunsScot,Leprincipe
individuation.
etnotesparG. Sondag.
traduction
Introduction,
Librairie
philosophique
J. Vrin,Paris1992217 p. ISBN 2 711611299
Heinrich
intheTenth
Mentalies
Translated
andSocialOrders.
Fichtenau,
Living
century.
ofChicagoPress,Chicagoand London
byPatrick
J. Geary.The University
1991xxi& 472 p. ISBN 0 226 246213
275

01:41:34 AM

imspten
MitundInterpretation
derAristotelischen
Politica
Fleler,Rezeption
Christoph
2 Tin, B.R. Grner,
1992xv & 335 p. + vii
telalter,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia
& 209p. ISBN 90 6032335 1 (Tl 1) 90 6032336X (Tl 2) (Bochumer
Studien
zurPhilosophie
19/1.2)
etlibert
Oxford
auXlVesicle.
cre
Genest,Prdtermination
Buckingham
Jan-Franois
contre
Bradwardine.
Librairie
philosophique
J. Vrin,Paris1992327 p. ISBN 2
711611140
andCommentaries
onAristotelian
. The Syriac,ArabicandMedieval
Glosses
LogicalTexts
London1993
EditedbyC. Burnett,
The Warburg
LatinTraditions.
Institute,
andTextsXXIII) - ConInstitute
192p. ISBN 0 854810854 (Warburg
Surveys
Tradition
: Preface',
S. Brock,TheSyriac
tents
; H. Hugonnard-Roche,
Commentary
naarabe
del'Organon
lemanuscrit
Paris
surla tradition
, Bibliothque
d'aprs
Remarques
inArabic
Form
andGenre
ar. 2346; D. Gutas,Aspects
Works',
Logical
tionale,
ofLiterary
LatinGlosses
onAristotelian
Medieval
andCommentaries
Texts,
J. Marenbon,
Logical
onAristotelian
Medieval
LatinGlosses
c. 1150AD]S. Ebbesen,
andCommentaries
before
Centuries
andThirteenth
Texts
; IndexesofNames,Manuscripts,
oftheTwelfth
Logical
and Incipits.
inLateMedieval
Divine
ofInghen.
Thought.
E.J.
M.J.F.M.Hoenen,Marsilius
Knowledge
Brill,Leiden1993XIII & 287 p. ISBN 90 04 095632 (Studiesin theHistory
vol. 50)
ofChristian
Thought,
M. Ferriani,
a Bologna
nelXIV secolo
dellalogica
, a curadi D. Buzzetti,
L'insegnamento
A. Tabarroni,Bologna1992 x & 648 p. (Studie memorieper la storia
: G.C. Alessio,Il
di Bologna.Nuovaserie,Vol. Vili) - Contents
dell'universit
etles
deBologne
diDacia',I. Rosier,Mathieu
da Cingoli
a Martino
commento
diGentile
Sermones
inlodedella
e dellalogica
duprmodisme'
G. Fioravanti,
divers
filosofia
aspects
&Ch. Crisciani,
Medicina
e logica
met
delXIVsecolo
a Bologna
nella
' J. Agrimi
prima
Il come temi
diricerca-,
M. Bertagna,
traDuee Trecento:
inmaestri
problemi
bolognesi
daCingoli.
Unapresentazione',
R. Lamberattribuito
a Gentile
mento
primi
agliAnalitici
a Matteo
Fonti
e linee
di
da Cingoli
da Gubbio.
delleintentiones
dagentile
tini,La teoria
dellerelazioni
neicomenti
alleCategorie
da Gentile
da
C. Marmo,La teoria
tendenza',
sul
Gentile
da Cingoli
e Angelo
d'Arezzo
da Gubbio
a Matteo
; A. Tabarroni,
Cingoli
a Bologna
all'inizio
delXIVsecolo
e i maestri
dilogica
; A. Conti,Il comPeryermeneias
di
e alleCategorie
da Piacenza
mento
di Giacomo
; P. B. Rossi,Il commento
all'Isagoge
ai Tractatus
secondi
da Gubbio
Matteo
; A. Maier,I commenti
bolognesi
agliAnalitici
sulDe interpretaLe Questiones
diMesino
deCodronchi
diPietro
G. Roncaglia,
Ispano',
al De tribus
diautore
e ontologia
neicommenti
tion,D. Buzzetti,
bolognese
Linguaggio
e indicia curadi A.
di William
; Notiziebiografiche
Heytesbury
praedicamentis
Tabarroni
'
WithSpecialEmBrianLawn,TheRiseandDecline
Quaestio
disputata'.
oftheScholastic
of
and Science.E.J. Brill,Leiden
the
Medicine
in
on
its
Use
Teaching
phasis
- NewYork- Kln1993176p. ISBN 90 04 097406 (Education
in
andSociety
theMiddleAgesand Renaissance,
2)
von
. Herausgegeben
des11. bis13.Jahrhunderts
nachQuellen
Kunsterleben
Mittelalterliches
1993
Cannstatt
G. Binding
undA. Speer,Frommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart-Bad
mitA. Speer,VomVerstehen
: Vorwort;
346 p. ISBN 3 7728 15383. Contents
desHugovonSt.
N. Senger,DerOrtder(<Kunst"imDidascalicon
telalterlicher
Kunst',
in
vonSt. Viktor
Richards
arca.ZurErkenntnislehre
R. Kmmerlings,
Viktor,
Mystica
vonSaintDie Kirchweihbeschreibungen
De gratia
; H.P. Neuheuser,
contemplations
desAbtes
G. Binding,
Denisu~idihre
Suger;
frdasSchnheitsempfinden
Aussagefhigkeit
Robert
F. Hentschel,
vonSaint-Denis-,
zurArchitekturverstndnis
beiAbtSuger
Beitrge
kunsttheoretischer
omnium
imSpiegel
Grossetestes
De unica
Interpretationen',
forma
Brief
etreparatione
decombustione
undseinTractatus
vonCanterbury
B.R. Tammen,Gervasius
inDijon.Untersuchung
L. Keller,DieAbteikirche
Cantuariensis
ecclesiae',
Saint-Bnigne
Indices
derBaubeschreibung
ausdem11.Jahrhundert',
276

01:41:34 AM

Friedrich
andtheElect.Guiltin Western
culture
, witha Foreword
Ohiy,TheDamned
by
Press,Cambridge1992xiv & 211 p.
GeorgeSteiner.Cambridge
University
ISBN 0 521382505
: F. Bertelloni,
Patristica
etmediaevalia,
XIII (1992),127p. (BuenosAires)- Contents
"
dela doctrina
consecuencias
dantesca
"Homoestmedium
Contexto,
yfuentes
(Monarchia,
'
Acerca
delafrmula
Deusestomnia'
III, xv);G.A. Piemonte,
eriugeniana
y susfuentes
enOresme.
D.A.Di Liscia,Aceleracin
Sobre
la inneoplatnicas'
y cadadelosgraves
delteorema
de la velocidad
media
Derecho
internacional
; R. Schnepf,
aplicabilidad
y
laforma
soberana
de Vitoria.
dela argumentacin
enlasReflectiones
enFrancesco
(Sobre
"
deCusa, De Sapientia":
Unnuevo
de
Theologicae
concepto
)' Cl. D'Amico,Nicols
a la luzdela tradicin
medieval
sabidura
; Cronica& Recensiones.
& Renaissance
EmilJ. Polak,Medieval
& FormLetters.
A Censusof
Letter
Treatises
Foundin EasternEurope& theFormer
USSR. E.J.Brill,Leiden
Manuscripts
1993xxii& 324 p. ISBN 90 04 096671 (Davis MedievalTexts& Studies,8)
Revue
d'histoire
destextes.
TomeXX (1990)258p. ISBN 2 222045525. Contents:
Tables
I (1971)- XIX (1989)sousla direction
de P. GautierDalch,Paris1993
MusicinRenaissance
The
a Historiography
GaryTomlinson,
Magic.Towards
ofOthers.
ofChicagoPress1993xvi& 291 p. ISBN 0 226 807916
University
&Money.
The Windows
oftheTradesat Chartres
Bread,Wine,
JaneWelchWilliams,
The University
ofChicagoPress,Chicago- London1993xi & 263
Cathedral.
p. & 151platesISBN 0 226 899136

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Vivarium
XXXI, 2 (1993) E.J.Brill,Leiden
Announcement
Institutde Rechercheet d'Histoire des Textes(Paris)
ConstantijnHuygens Instituut(La Haye)

de recherche:
Programme
ParisetOxford
desartsdanslesuniversits
mdivales:
La facult
rcenrecherches
fassent
Bienquelesuniversits
mdivales
l'objetde nombreuses
dont
auxautresfacults,
tesou encours,la facult
desartsa tnglige
parrapport
sontaujourd'hui
etdedroitnotamment
cellesde thologie
beaucoupmieuxconnues.
desdisciplines
la facult
Pourtant
desarts,avecla richesse
enseignes,
quiytaient
du moyen
dela vieintellectuelle
unlment
essentiel
constitue
pourla comprhension
etcelle,nonmoinsspectad'ailleurs,
parl'volution
rapidedessciences
geetpermet
certains
surla langue,demieuxcomprendre
etdesrflexions
dela dialectique
culaire,
moderne.
de la culture
scientifique
dveloppements
unprogramme
de recherche
endeuxvolets:d'une
nousprsentons
C'estpourquoi
ultrieures
un fondement
grce
plussrpourlesrecherches
part,il s'agitde prparer
thmes
de longuehaleine,d'autrepartcertains
des travauxcollectifs
importants
d'tretudisds prsent.
mritent
I. Travaux
collectifs
desmatres
s artsparisiens
1. Il estindispensable
du rpertoire
de faireunervision
en
desmatres
de Glorieux
(publien 1971etbeaucoupmoinssrque le rpertoire
du mmeauteur).
thologie
ilfaudra
desartsquirestent
manant
dela facult
2. Parmila massedestextes
indits,
de comfiables
et pourvues
choisir
lesplusimportants
pouren donnerdes ditions
mentaires.
desartsetlesrapports
de la facult
surle milieuintellectuel
3. Unetuded'ensemble
simultanment.
treentreprise
de Pariset d'Oxfordpourrait
entreles universits
etle
ettextesanonymes
desauteurs
le rpertoire
Il va de soique pourcestraveaux

seront
des
textes
des
l'IRHT,
latins,
indispensables.
prsents
incipits
rpertoire
II. Etudes
thmatiques
la facult
1. Lesmthodes
lesprogrammes
etlesexamens
desarts.
d'enseignement,
unecomparaison
entreprogrammes
devrait
notamment
Cetterecherche
comprendre
danslesstatuts)
etrgles
d'examend'unepart,
d'enseignement
(telsqu'onlestrouve
de l'autre.
la production
destextesmanantde la facult
le statut
etl'volution
dessciences
etla placerespective
desdisciplines;
2. Le contenu
leschangements
exactes.Il s'agitde dfinir
ce qui taitrellement
provoenseign,
relative
desdisde nouveaux
textes,
l'importance
qusparexemple
parla dcouverte
danslecontenu
etl'impact
dessciences.
dansle curriculum,
lesmodifications
ciplines
dans
de chercher
3. Les thories
desarts.Il serancessaire
de la facult
linguistiques
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diffrentes
les indicesd'un changedisciplines,
dialectique,
grammaire,
rhtorique,
mentprofond
dansle concept
mmede la langueetl'analysede sonfonctionnement
etde sa structure.
Pourraliser
ce programme,
nousavonsconstitu
un groupede travailqui comde la partde l'IRHT les personnes
suivantes:
prendactuellement
Jean-Franois
Genest
Marie-Henriette
de Pommerol
desuniversits);
(philosophie);
Jullien
(histoire
ClaireMatre(musicologie);
de la partde l'Acadmie
desPaysRoyaledessciences
Bas (Gonstantijn
Nous
HuygensInstituut):
Olga Weijers(histoire
intellectuelle).
nousproposons
d'associer
d'autreschercheurs
ce programme
etde constituer
ainsi
un rseauinternational.
Nousenverrons
unelettre
d'information
auxparticipants
intresetauxpersonnes
sespourles tenirau courant
des travauxentrepris
et des progrs.
Lesrsultats
desrecherches
seront
sousforme
d'articles
dansdiffpublisenpartie
rentes
des monographies
et des ouvrages
collectifs
nous
revues;pourla publication
decrerunecollection,
sipossible
encodition
aveclespresses
duCNRS
envisageons
et cellesde l'Acadmie
nerlandaise
des sciences.
Nousdemandons
auxchercheurs
travaillant
surlemmeterrain
deprendre
contact
avecnousen vued'ventuels
de coopration.
ou autresformes
changes
IRHT (Paris)

CHI (La Haye)

279

01:41:44 AM