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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CECILIA ALMAJOSE, respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
For internal use only
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present
Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the
nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated
November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss,

as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal.
Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the
private respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province
of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay
Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a
Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to
endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of
PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal
before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then
Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private
respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal
Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the
petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since
she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the

appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated
recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner

reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested
position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner
that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum
requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget
officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the
petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the
position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private
respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said
appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally
authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three
years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under
Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a
Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal &
Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the
petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM

validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the
petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against
the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the
matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which

prompted the petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT

SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT

QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING
PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE REQUIRED
QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent
is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the
appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the

recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and
privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed
henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the
local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations,
and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision
of the Ministry of Budget and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the
contested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's
appointment.
There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the
petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by
existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the
appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the

Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon
the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the
PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the
qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the
same code states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of

the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law,
commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college or
university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at
least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.
The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent
behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to the
position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel
of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of
the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in
consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that
his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative
issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31
dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the
recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for
appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the
recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition
sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative.
To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different
interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that
said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision
of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be
gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit,
only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor.
Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local
government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official,
and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided
the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in accordance
with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the
appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or

recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for
the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the
nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one
Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and
Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly
innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy
and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal
since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in
this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers
cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little
grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine

Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first
instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the
Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity
to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable
and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of
their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be
consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both
executive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local
autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in

distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935
Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential
competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be
provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions,
which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier
ruled in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143
[1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case,
supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief
Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the
then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of
municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise,
the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be
taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing

local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the
Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing
Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No.
5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to
local governments governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar
as legal provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under
Article II as a basic principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government
units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It

called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary
alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and
upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy
taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present
Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards
the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to
develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of
the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list
of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must
return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is
the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal
budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the
national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work
within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner
sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments
whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason
that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a
harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this
reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power
between the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the
appointments of Justices and Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution,
nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the
Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and
appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no
reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's
personal choice.
The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that
Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other
names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a
meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized
before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee
had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative
and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion
are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the
value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree
of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of
citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system
of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have
the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the

Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia
Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to
appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees
submitted by the Provincial Governor.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,

Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO
PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The
antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a

member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,

respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew
from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as
members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the

Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with
local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on
the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX
and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your
respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the
Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary

Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID
COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST
TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's

advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I
move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer
and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987
be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me

chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued

enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5,
1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by

respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or

Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on
the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared
and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who
was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for
the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the
record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was
ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries
and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation
of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused
withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the nonpayment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he
had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"
7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner
(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason
simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was
done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court,
it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the
expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the
petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation,
or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10
but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11
Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law,
does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to
begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and
corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded
any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta
by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former
perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks
of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman
act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity
and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and,
unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for
seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the
petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary
requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of
the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject
to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are
"autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called
autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of selfgovernment given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by

Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things,
the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal

administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters
which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20
"which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural

resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."
26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political

power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under
the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than
mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved
herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,
since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao

persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall

exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the

Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture

indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of

such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds
that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the
Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2)
assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic]
his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by
the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short
intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that,
to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by
their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that
protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic]
and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly,
the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the
Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to
convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence,
there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But
while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a
settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a
valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his
attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances,
we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid
"recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was
what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as

establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared
without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we
are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the
Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing
itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time.
In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain
that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang

Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original.
2 Id., 6-7.
3 Id., 134-135.
4 Id., 134.
5 Id.
6 Id., 135.
7 Id.
8 Id., 142.
9 Id., 141.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988.
13 Id., 135.
14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AND THE

LUPONG TAGAPAGPAGANAP NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION XII AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3.
17 Supra.
18 Supra.
19 Supra, sec. 4.
20 Supra.
21 Supra.
22 Supra, sec. 35(a).
23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987), supra, art. sec. 3.
24 Batas Blg. 337, sec 2.
25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
28 Bernas, Joaquin, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.
29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1.
30 Supra, sec. 2.
31 Supra, sec. 15.
32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or not it is constitutional for
the President to exercise control over the Sanggunians is another question.
34 Supra, sec. 7.
35 Rollo, Id., 122.
36 Id.
37 Id., 145-146.
38 Id., 121.
39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).

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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC
DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID
SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.
CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget
and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)
declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .
After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents,
which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for
decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a
"Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to
Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be

categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government
of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation
Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of
the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment
of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen
(13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for
regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Republic of the Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with
the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed
of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into
law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by
petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions
of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is
part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement . The Solicitor
General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having
been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and
ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding
international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether
under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the
provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have
the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international
agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it
would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would
be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a
determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have
been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous
region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on
the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the
outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734
which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite
called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution."
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to
be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the
autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed
over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take
place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific
provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and
fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120)
days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article
II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2)
which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492
(1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim

Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The
question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority
of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in
each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all

the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII,
section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon
its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ...
Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which
reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of
the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used
for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority
of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18
must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other
hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the
autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only
the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and
Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence
in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including
areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which
do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that
Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution
itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by
which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
(1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis,
petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas
in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act
covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include
the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim
areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the
Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he

had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao
should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As
earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by
the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65

Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land
tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA
392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where
the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal
protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by
Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution
itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should
there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code
(still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the
Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners
maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it
part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an
application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art.
VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the
present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called
upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions
the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No.
6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That
the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is
challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which
provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of
the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over
local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict
between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government
units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which
create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region
of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government
by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the
transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the regional
government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from
the organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while

the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight
committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the
regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast
by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast
by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734
requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight
Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is
evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no
bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979,
46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March
11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Art. II, Sec 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 provides that "[t]he plebiscite shall be conducted
in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and
Zamboanga."
2 The provinces enumerated in the Tripoli Agreement are the same ones mentioned
in R.A. No. 6734.
3 With regard to the controversy regarding the alleged inconsistencies between R.A.
No. 6734 and the Tripoli Agreement, it may be enlightening to quote from the
statement of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., the principal sponsor of R.A. No. 6734:
xxx xxx xxx
The assertion that the organic Act is a "betrayal" of the Tripoli Agreement is actually
misplaced, to say the least. Misplaced because it overlooks the fact that the Organic
Act incorporates, at least, 99 percent of the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Misplaced, again, because it gratuitously assumes that the Tripoli Agreement can
bring more benefits to the people of Mulim Mindanao than the Organic Act.
The truth of the matter is that the Organic Act addresses the basis demands of the
Muslim, tribal and Christian populations of the proposed area of autonomy in a far
more reasonable, realistic and immediate manner than the Tripoli Agreement ever
sought to do.
The Organic Act is, therefore, a boon to, not a betrayal, of the interest of the people
of Muslim Mindanao.
xxx xxx xxx
[Consolidated Comment, p. 26].

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lawphil Main Menu

[G.R. No. 93054. December 4, 1990.]
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao

Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor
MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and
TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut);
Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident
REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO;
Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG,
and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO
GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO
IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL
PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL
LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES
GHAMANG, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM,
OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."cralaw virtua1aw library
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed

that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city
voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the
CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first
Monday of March 1991.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on
February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of
the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the nonratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said
petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of
the ratification of the Organic Act.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC
resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum
of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861
and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and
spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220
constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly
and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly
ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the
respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution

that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote

that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D.
No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must
join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the

Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No.
6766 strengthens the petitioners position that the Region cannot be constituted
from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the
Regional Government and local government units. It further provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions

necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the
Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly
districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous
Region.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
If we follow the respondents position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly

shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward
predicament of having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the province
of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,
population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few
people.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development
Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city
mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and
members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The
Boards functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost
similar to those of the Provincial Coordinators (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10,
Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If it takes
only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other
hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level,
it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The
respondents theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province
must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include
Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the
second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above
mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra,
185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain
Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these five
provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard,
September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or
which cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional
Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members
coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents
view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never
have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as
practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of
Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the
region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting
the Region.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate
the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, Et. Al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is
not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in
the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double
majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units."cralaw virtua1aw library
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his
conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of
the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13
(a) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR,
the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably can, alone,
legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the
Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the
Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See
III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall
comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the
same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera.
However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on
whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist
despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute
it.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao
can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not
whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the

Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous
region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order
No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order
No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.

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Today is Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,

Legal Services Division for petitioner.

For internal use only

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss,

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

For internal use only

On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the

In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner

petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM

Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which

A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT

C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT

For internal use only

appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the

In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the

For internal use only

(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of

The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:

For internal use only

appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or

President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in

For internal use only

In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing

For internal use only

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It

Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

For internal use only

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

For internal use only

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the

For internal use only

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,

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Today is Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

For internal use only

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the

For internal use only

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

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4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

10. Tomawis, Jerry

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

For internal use only

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

11. Quijano, Jesus