Sadri-1992-Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals

Max Weber' s Sociolog y of Intellectual s
This page intentionally left blank
Max Weber' s
Sociology
of Intellectual s
Ahmad Sadr i
With a Foreword by
Arthur J. Vidich
New Yor k Oxfor

d
OXFORD UNIVERSIT Y PRES S
Oxford Universit y Pres s

Oxford Ne w Yor k Toront o
Delhi Bomba y Calcutt a Madra s Karach i
Kuala Lumpu r Singapor e Hon g Kon g Toky o
Nairobi Da r e s Salaa m Cap e Tow n
Melbourne Aucklan d Madri d
and associate d companie s in
Berlin Ibada n
Copyright 199 2 b y Oxfor d Universit y Press , Inc .

First publishe d i n 199 2 b y Oxfor d Universit y Press , Inc .
200 Madiso n Avenue , New York, NY 1001 6
First issue d a s a n Oxfor d Universit y Pres s paperback , 199 4
Oxford i s a registere d trademar k of Oxfor d Universit y Press
All right s reserved . N o par t o f thi s publicatio n ma y b e reproduced ,
stored i n a retrieva l system, o r transmitted , in an y for m o r b y an y means ,
electronic, mechanical , photocopying, recording , o r otherwise ,
without th e prio r permissio n o f Oxfor d Universit y Press .
Library o f Congres s Cataloging-ln-Publication Dat a
Sadri, Ahmad.
Max Weber' s sociolog y o f intellectual s / Ahma d Sadri ;
with a forewor d b y Arthu r J . Vidich.
p. cm . Include s bibliographica l references ,
ISBN 0-19-506556-5
ISBN 0-19-509398- 4 (pbk )
1. Intellectuals . 2 . Weber , Max , 1864-1920 . I . Title .
HM213.S22 199 2 305.5'52dc2
0 92-439
5
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed i n th e Unite d States o f America
on acid-fre e pape r
For my mother
Vadjihah Moulai e
Foreword
Arthur J. Vidich
Ahmad Sadr i begin s with the observatio n tha t neithe r intellectual s

nor anti-intellectual s hav e bee n abl e t o defin e exactl y wha t a n
intellectual is , o r t o distinguis h th e function s o f a n intelligentsi a
from thos e o f intellectuals . I n hi s brie f bu t closel y argue d study ,
Sadri provides a new way of looking a t the intellectual s and intelli gentsia an d a n answe r to question s abou t thei r role s and functions
in society . Ou t o f a vas t rang e o f scholarl y speculation , h e ha s
brought order to a subject that up to now has defied th e best effort s
of socia l theorists .
Sadri assert s that attempt s b y other scholar s t o explai n the role s
and functions of intellectuals and intelligentsi a remain embedded i n
their commitment s t o variou s ideologies . Fo r example , Kar l Mar x
conceives o f th e intellectua l a s a n alienate d membe r o f th e uppe r
classes wh o ca n transcen d th e limit s o f hi s o r he r clas s experience
only a t th e momen t o f impendin g revolution . This actio n enable d
the intellectua l t o a t onc e arriv e a t th e trut h abou t societ y an d t o
become a leade r o f th e proletariat . Sadr i see s thi s positio n a s a
special cas e o f th e revolutionar y intellectual . Kar l Mannheim' s
inversion o f Marx's view defines the intellectua l as someone wh o is
free fro m the blindnes s o f class-bound o r officia l ideology ; thereby,
he o r sh e is able t o se e the trut h an d t o transfor m societ y from th e
perspective o f that truth . Fo r Sadri , however , this does not consti tute a sociologica l explanation , bu t rathe r th e limitin g cas e o f
vii
Viii FOREWOR
intellectual transcendence ; on e tha t lead s t o th e creatio n o f ne w

world images .
In a masterfull y syntheti c revie w o f mos t o f th e literatur e o n
intellectuals, Sadri locates and delimits the perspectives o n intellectuals of such major Europea n author s a s V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxem burg, Geor g Lukacs , Josep h Schumpeter , Hanna h Arendt , Erns t
Bloch, Antoni o Gramsci , Georg e Orwell , Lesze k Kolakowski , and
George Konra d an d Iva n Szelenyi . H e als o examine s th e idea s
about intellectual s to b e found i n such America n author s a s Leste r
Ward, Willai m Graha m Sumner , Talcot t Parsons , Alvi n Gouldner ,
and Russe l Jacoby. Notin g that the term intelligentsia originate d i n
Russia, wher e i t referre d t o th e educate d middl e an d uppe r classe s
whose concern wa s with social, economic, an d politica l philosoph y
and with the arts, literature, an d politics, Sadri goes o n to present a
comprehensive paradig m tha t isolate s thos e characteristic s tha t
distinguish intellectual s fro m a n intelligentsia . Thi s paradig m ap pears i n Chapte r 4 an d provide s a startin g poin t a s wel l a s a
grounding fo r an y futur e scholarl y wor k o n th e subjec t o f a n
intelligentsia o r o n intellectuals.
Sadri's ow n starting point i s Max Weber' s perspective on intellectuals a s i t ca n b e draw n ou t o f th e latter' s sociolog y o f Indian ,
Chinese, Hebrew , an d Wester n religion s an d civilizations . I n hi s
studies o f worl d religions, Webe r aske d suc h question s as : What is
the relatio n o f ideas t o socia l reality? What i s the societa l status o f
the carriers o f ideas? Do suc h carriers create idea s independently or
reflect clas s o r othe r stratum-boun d traditions ? D o the y lea d pro gressive movements in society or do the y observe and follow ? Wha t
are th e rationa l o r irrationa l consequence s tha t flo w fro m a com mitment to a given set of ideas o r values? Keeping in mind Weber' s
questions, Sadr i deconstruct s Weber's analyse s o f religion in orde r
to focu s attentio n o n thos e strat a wh o ar e significan t carrier s o f
a civilization' s religiou s an d secula r values . Suc h carrier s hav e
included th e emissar y an d exemplar y prophet s o f Judaism , th e
priestly clas s o f Brahmins, th e Confucia n literati , an d th e itineran t
Christian missionaries . But , a s Webe r pu t it , thes e carrier s hav e
included apparentl y secularize d representatives :
If one wishes to characterize succinctly, in a formula so to speak, th e
types o f representative s o f th e variou s strat a tha t wer e th e primar y
Foreword i
carriers o r propagator s o f th e so-calle d worl d religions , the y woul d

be the following: In Confucianism, th e world-organizing bureaucrat ;
in Hinduism , th e worl d orderin g magician ; i n Buddhism , th e medi cant monk wanderin g throug h th e world; in Judaism, the wanderin g
trader; an d i n Christianity , th e itineran t journeyman.
Guided by the categories developed by Weber in his studies of world

religions, Sadri notes that Webe r based his sociology of intellectuals
on a "delicate balanc e betwee n two theoretical assumptions" :
First h e postulate d th e "relativ e autonomy " o f th e spher e o f idea s
from socioeconomi c forces . Second, Webe r proceeded wit h a theory
of historical causatio n that we have dubbed "revers e determination, "
whereby th e interes t i s shifted fro m th e origi n t o th e popularizatio n
of a religion accordin g t o th e idea l an d materia l interest s o f variou s
strata an d classes . Th e relativ e significanc e o f thes e assumption s
varies according t o the level of analysis and the empirical characteris tics o f a particula r for m o f intellectualit y unde r investigation .
Citing on e example o f this delicat e balance , Sadr i note s how prob lems abound i n studying the history of ideas and their carriers in the
absence o f th e aforementione d twi n assumptions . T o mak e thi s
point, h e cites a very commo n phenomenon :
The producer s o f idea s whic h ar e inimica l t o th e ideologie s o f th e
intellectual class , o r th e clas s whic h patronize s them , ar e als o intel lectuals.
It i s t o overcom e suc h problem s tha t Sadr i open s an d expand s

Weber's sociolog y o f intellectuals . Similarly , followin g Weber , h e
notes tha t th e disenchantmen t o f the worl d make s a religiou s fligh t
from mundanit y difficult fo r secula r intellectuals. Yet these intellectuals mus t confron t th e irrationalit y o f a world tha t doe s no t allo w
them to escape from it . Intellectual response s to this dilemma, as, for
example, i t is posed b y post-Protestant industrialis m and it s discon tents, ca n lea d t o unexpecte d intellectua l reactions . Amon g thes e is
the reification of instrumental reason in the social sciences. These an d
other observation s mak e i t necessar y fo r Sadr i t o includ e i n hi s
paradigm a variet y o f socia l typesscientists , social critics , this -
X FOREWOR
worldly bureaucrats , researchers , abstrac t theoriststha t migh t no t

otherwise b e identifie d a s intellectuals .
To give coherence t o thi s congeries o f types, Sadri classifie s the m
according, o n the one hand, t o the commitment the y make either to
the discovery of truth o r to a mission they have for the peoplei.e.,
their social engagementand, o n the other, t o their commitment t o
either theoretica l o r practica l reason . Th e fourfol d tabl e derive d
from thes e categorie s ingeniousl y provide s a wa y t o differentiat e
such divers e type s a s scientists , scholars , theorists , theologians ,
priests, bureaucrats , medi a specialists , reformers, lawyers , and re volutionaries b y their attitud e an d socia l function . I t als o evoke s a
set o f idea l type s tha t migh t b e use d b y a researche r engage d i n
further empirica l stud y o f eithe r intellectual s o r a n intelligentsia .
Sadri i s well aware tha t th e creatio n o f idea l type s i n itsel f doe s
not substitut e for empirical research; rather suc h types are heuristic
devices enablin g th e researche r t o conceptualize , analyze , an d re solve a particular problem . Althoug h the pure resolution of conceptual ambiguitie s i s no t th e essentia l tas k o f a socia l science , h e
understands tha t suc h resolution s ar e necessar y whe n ambiguit y
interferes wit h empirica l investigations .
The conceptua l clarificatio n supplie d b y Sadr i woul d no t hav e
been possibl e had h e no t bee n a clos e reade r o f Weber' s methodo logical writings . In hi s first chapter , "Ma x Weber' s Methodology, "
Sadri explain s an d justifie s th e relevanc e o f Weber' s methodolog y
to hi s ow n reconstructio n o f Weber's sociolog y o f intellectuals . A t
issue her e i s th e questio n o f ho w i t i s possibl e t o compar e an d
contrast, fro m th e perspectiv e an d wit h th e language s o f Wester n
civilization, other , nonoccidenta l worl d civilizations . I n th e past ,
such comparisons hav e led to accusation s o f Western epistemologi cal and cultura l imperialis m and t o charge s o f an occidenta l desir e
to monopoliz e th e creatio n o f worl d images . Sadr i explain s hi s
resolution o f thi s problem :
The apparen t "generalizations " o n th e basi s o f whic h ou r mode l i s
based ar e no t inductivel y constructed; concept s such a s intellectuals ,
intelligentsia, me n o f knowledge ar e heuristic devices . Fo r on e thing,
these concept s d o not claim t o represent ontologically significan t an d
universal phenomena . Rathe r the y bea r th e imprin t o f particula r
Foreword x
historical an d geocultura l "valu e relevant interests " of Western civili zation.
Yet whil e recognizin g tha t Weber' s an d hi s ow n concept s ar e

temporally an d geoculturall y grounded, Sadr i does not giv e up th e
task o f comparing an d contrastin g differen t civilizations . T o gras p
Sadri's reaso n fo r beginnin g hi s stud y wit h a n examinatio n o f
Weber's methodology , on e must understand th e logical structur e of
this book, a study which begins and ends in Chapter 4 on the them e
of the relationshi p between the codificatio n o f theory an d a heuristic approach t o theory. The reader wil l find Sadri' s rational e fo r the
defense o f heuristic theory bot h provocativ e an d convincing .
By includin g fiv e appendice s i n hi s study , Sadr i ha s revive d th e
art o f the appendi x a s a device for clarifyin g tangentia l bu t critica l
substantive an d theoretica l issues . I n Appendi x C h e i s le d t o
correct Weber' s interpretation o f Islam a s a warrior religion an d t o
comment o n Brya n S . Turner' s Weber an d Islam, notin g tha t "Is lam's radica l monotheis m (singularit y o f th e divin e i n principle )
would thwar t th e warrior' s characteristi c penchan t fo r polytheism ,
monolatry o r henotheism. " I n thi s appendix , Sadr i provide s a new
starting poin t fo r a reassessmen t an d reinterpretatio n o f Islami c
intellectualism. Appendi x D , "Ideologies an d Counterideologie s of
Intellectuals in Occidental East an d West, " shows the similaritie s in
ideological response s o f intellectual s i n Easter n an d Wester n Eu rope (including the Unite d States) , revealin g that "similar ideologi cal need s ca n generat e simila r ideologies. " Her e Sadr i compare s
two ideologues , Leste r War d an d Lenin , wit h tw o counterideo logues, William G. Sumner an d Ros a Luxemburg . Leni n and War d
opposed th e Spenceria n gospe l o f evolution , arguin g lik e Comt e
that a scientific politics woul d replac e i t and it s irrationalities. Fo r
Ward a stratum o f sociocrats woul d "work fo r al l mankind an d fo r
all time, an d al l they ask is that al l mankind shal l forever benefit by
their wor k . . . the y onl y as k a n opportunit y t o appl y scientifi c
principles to great things. " Lenin call s his elite "a dozen trained an d
talented" person s an d assign s t o the m th e tas k o f shapin g th e
consciousness o f th e proletaria t who m the y woul d als o represent .
Sadri's capacit y t o se e suc h electiv e affinitie s i n th e though t pro cesses o f War d an d Lenin , le t alon e hi s possessio n o f the imagina -
Xll FOREWOR
tion t o ventur e forth i n suc h an enterprise , reveals his capacity fo r

finding intercultural common elements in culturally disparate ideologies.
Treating Sumne r an d Luxembur g a s counterideologues , on e i n
the tradition o f sociology and the other in socialism, Sadr i points to
the affinitie s i n intellectual tactic s that eac h uses . Bot h uphol d th e
value o f evolutio n a s oppose d t o revolutionar y interventio n t o
accomplish socia l change :
the onl y possibl e good mus t com e fro m evolutio n no t revolution .
(Sumner)
Stop th e natura l pulsatio n o f a livin g organis m an d yo u weake n it,
and yo u diminish its resistance and combatativ e spirit. (Luxemburg)
Sumner an d Luxembur g hol d t o a belie f i n th e automaticit y o f

social evolutio n an d oppos e an d criticiz e the interventio n of intellectuals i n th e hop e o f controllin g o r directin g it s trajectory . Th e
reader o f this comparison o f Sumner an d Luxembur g canno t hel p
but b e impresse d b y Sadri' s abilit y t o ente r int o th e intellectua l
world o f the other and to see therein commonalities in thought pat terns tha t cu t acros s nationa l boundarie s an d civilizations.
The autho r o f this book i s himself a product o f two civilizations.
Formed b y a n educatio n i n classica l Persia n scholarship , Sadr i
continued hi s studies in classical and contemporary social theory at
the Graduat e Faculty o f the Ne w School fo r Socia l Research i n the
United States . Hi s willingnes s t o expos e himsel f t o contrastin g
intellectual world views facilitates the originalit y o f his approach t o
his subjectwho before him ha d though t o f comparing Leni n an d
Ward t o Sumne r an d Luxemburg?an d testifies to hi s remarkable
insight int o th e thought-way s an d worl d image s o f a divers e com pany o f th e moder n world' s intellectuals . Hi s reconstructio n o f a
sociology o f intellectuals fro m Weber' s sociology of religion i s itself
a major contribution to Weberian scholarship. Hi s formulation of a
heuristic genera l theor y o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a i s inde pendently significant, a major contribution t o contemporar y socia l
thought.
Contents
1. Methodolog y o f Socia l Sciences , 3

Methodology Again , 3
Escape fro m Methodologica l Nominalism , 5
On Huma n Interes t an d Historica l Causation , 2 2
On Socia l Change , 2 6
2. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Religio n as a Sociolog y

of Intellectuals , 33
Marx an d Webe r o n Intratheoretica l Consistency : Sociologie s
of Knowledg e and Intellectuals , 3 3
Marx an d Webe r o n Sociolog y o f Religion , 37
Religion o f the Masses , 4 3
Religion fo r th e Masses , 4 7
Religion o f th e Warriors , 49
Religion o f th e Civi c Strata , 52
Religion o f th e Intellectuals , 5 8
Intellectuals an d th e Worl d Religions , 61
Religions, Intellectuals , an d th e Rationalizatio n Paradox , 65
3. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Politics as a Sociolog y o f

Intellectuals, 6 9
Relating to Ideologies : Intellectual s and Intelligentsia , 70
Bases fo r Ideologie s o f Occidenta l Intellectuals :
An Idea l Type , 74
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intellectuals , 8 1
Bases fo r Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia : A n Idea l Type , 8 5
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia , 8 8
xiii
XIV CONTENT
Weber's Politica l Agenda : Democracy , Bureaucracy ,

and Mas s Societies , 9 2
Weber's Politica l Agenda : Th e Varietie s o f Irresponsibility , 95
An Ethi c fo r Politica l Action , 9 7
4. Definitions , 10 5
The Troubl e wit h Definin g Concepts , 10 5
The Horizonta l Differentiation , 111
The Vertica l Differentiation , 116
Columns an d Rows , 11 9
Appendices
A. Webe r o n th e "Positivist-Intuitionist " Controversy , 12 5
B. O n Verificatio n o f th e Idea l Types : Winch , Schutz ,
and Oakes , 12 9
C. Webe r an d Islam , 13 3
D. Ideologie s an d Counter-Ideologie s o f Intellectual s
in Occidenta l Eas t an d West : A n Idea l Typica l Model , 13 5
E. Epistemolog y an d Methodology , 13 9
Notes, 14 3
Bibliography, 15 5
Index, 16 3
Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Intellectual s
1
Methodology o f Socia l Science s
Methodology Agai n
It i s neither the conventional etiquette of Weberian scholarship no r
a peculia r logica l predilectio n tha t prompt s u s t o begi n a boo k
about intellectual s wit h a chapte r o n methodology . T o consol e
those wit h a distast e for th e forma l an d th e abstract , le t u s recal l
that Webe r himsel f regarde d th e obsessiv e methodologica l discus sions o f his time wit h a sense o f detachment an d eve n irony. Wh y
then di d h e defer pursuin g hi s main interes t in the grand , substan tive sociological and historical questions, to dedicat e a few years of
his lif e t o methodologica l reflections , ultimatel y contributin g t o
what h e ha d dubbe d th e "methodologica l pestilence" ? Ther e ar e
good reason s t o believ e tha t th e prim e motiv e o f Ma x Webe r t o
work o n methodolog y wa s t o provid e a viabl e answe r t o th e
Methodenstreit, th e protracte d controvers y between th e legac y of
Enlightenment a s represente d i n th e theoreticall y abstrac t argu ments of the Austria n school of economics o n the on e side, and th e
Romantic individualis m and historicis m o f the Germa n historica l
school o n th e other. 1 Withou t rejectin g th e prio r suggestion , I
would like to advance the thesis that the purpose of Weber's methodological reflections was to men d a problem tha t was intrinsic t o his
own univers e o f discourse . Weber' s methodolog y represent s a n
immanent attemp t t o bridg e th e ga p that existed betwee n his own
individualistic epistemologica l an d methodologica l premises , o n
one hand, and th e kin d o f intellectual apparatu s h e needed fo r th e
pursuit o f hi s interes t i n substantiv e civilizationa l an d historica l
analyses, o n th e other . I t i s not reasonabl e t o assum e tha t Webe r
3
4 MA
X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS
was obliviou s t o thi s tension , no r t o regar d hi s methodolog y a s a

whimsical exercis e in solvin g a conceptua l puzzle .
If th e followin g discussio n ha s an y validity , the n i t migh t b e
stated tha t Webe r succeede d i n closin g th e tremendou s cleavag e
that threatene d th e inne r consistenc y o f hi s intellectua l cosmos .
Thus Webe r coul d remai n tru e t o hi s methodologica l axiom s
throughout hi s substantive work.
The main objec t o f this chapter i s to underscore the inne r consis tency o f Weber's work . Weber' s methodolog y ha d a remedial char acter. H e di d no t inten d t o provid e guideline s fo r th e conduc t o f
research eithe r fo r himsel f or for others. 2 Eve n the mos t celebrate d
outcome o f Weber' s methodology , th e idea l typica l analysis , i s
admittedly no t a n inventio n bu t a rediscovery . Webe r believe d
modern historiograph y (Weber , Objectivity, p . 92 ) a s wel l a s ab stract theoretica l expositions in social science s (Weber, Objectivity,
pp. 88-103 ) t o b e suffuse d wit h idea l types . H e merel y suggeste d
that these constructs b e deployed mor e consciously. I n this chapter
we als o hop e t o highligh t the relevance o f Weber's methodolog y t o
our reconstructio n o f his sociology of intellectuals. Throughou t thi s
book w e will deal wit h question s suc h a s the rol e o f intellectuals in
history, th e interpla y o f idea s an d interests , an d th e rol e o f th e
carriers of ideas in the development of ideologies that serv e various
interests. Th e fina l chapte r aspire s t o functio n a s a taxonomica l
guide to project s in a "Weberian sociolog y of intellectuals." By this
we mea n no t onl y the su m tota l o f Weber's observation s o n sociol ogy of intellectuals, which are organize d throughout th e book , bu t
also a se t o f idea l type s an d epistemologica l an d methodologica l
assumptions abou t th e identit y and function s o f intellectuals. Suc h
general concept s canno t b e proposed withou t firs t establishin g the
metatheoretical groundwor k tha t wil l b e suggeste d i n th e presen t
chapter. Thi s chapte r consist s o f three sections.
In th e firs t sectio n w e wil l tr y t o demonstrat e ho w Weber' s
methodology bot h embrace d an d transcende d hi s epistemological
axioms. Ha d these assumptions not bee n modified an d mediate d by
his methodology , the y would hav e create d a n unfi t framewor k fo r
his substantiv e studies . Th e aim s o f thi s sectio n ar e therefor e t o
establish tha t Weber' s sociology of intellectuals i s compatible wit h
and deepl y roote d i n hi s epistemologica l an d methodologica l as sumptions. O f course , understandin g Weber' s substantiv e studies
Methodology of Social Sciences 5
does not presuppos e an explication o f his theory of concept forma tion. Yet , Weber engaged i n such exploration s i n order t o solv e th e
problems tha t aros e i n th e cours e o f hi s empirica l research . Sinc e
such problem s usuall y result fro m th e uncritica l introductio n o f er roneous metatheoretica l assumptions , Weber's attempts usuall y aim
at weedin g out suc h assumption s rathe r tha n establishin g method ology for th e socia l sciences. Regarding the magnitud e of theoretical
and empirica l problem s involve d i n th e sociolog y o f intellectuals , i t
would b e an error to start such a venture without taking precaution s
against th e intrusio n o f metatheoretical errors .
The secon d section of this chapter focuse s on Weber's conceptio n
of historica l causalit y an d it s interdependenc e wit h th e specifi c
interests o f th e historian . Understandin g Weber' s solutio n o f thi s
problem i s crucial fo r al l historical science s i n genera l an d fo r th e
sociology o f intellectuals in particular. Fo r instance , Weber' s asser tion that intellectuals "influence" the trajectory of history, that they
have been , i n certain instances , th e carrier s of ideas, an d tha t the y
have determined the developmenta l cours e of civilizations can eas ily be misconstrued if it i s not understoo d withi n the contex t o f his
theory o f historical causation .
A sociolog y o f intellectual s woul d b e incomplet e i f i t faile d t o
clarify it s stanc e towar d variou s theorie s o f socia l chang e wit h
regard t o th e rol e the y assig n t o th e intellectual s in sociohistorica l
developments. Th e closin g sectio n o f th e firs t chapte r i s dedicated
to a reexaminatio n o f th e theorie s o f socia l chang e i n relatio n t o
Weber's concept o f "social selection." Weber, however, shrank fro m
highlighting th e significanc e o f hi s theor y o f "socia l selection, "
because h e believe d tha t methodologica l argument s canno t guid e
substantive research. Fo r him such arguments onl y served purposes
of self-clarification . Indeed , self-clarificatio n ha d becom e al l th e
more necessary for Weber and his readers because they moved in an
intellectual atmospher e tha t wa s eve r s o heavil y scente d b y th e
philosophies of history propounded i n the two preceding centuries.
Escape fro m Methodologica l Nominalis m
Weber's interpretiv e sociolog y ha d t o overcom e th e formidabl e
obstacle o f constructing th e apparatu s o f a scienc e fit t o stud y th e
6 MA
X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S
grand socia l an d historical problems without using the hypostatized

and collectivisti c notions tha t pervade d th e socia l science s o f hi s
time. H e neede d als o t o advanc e beyon d a n abstrac t negatio n o f
collectivism an d t o rehabilitat e som e o f its concepts t o establis h a
conceptual moorin g fo r a noncollectivis t scienc e o f societ y an d
history. I n 1920 , a fe w month s before hi s death, Webe r wrote:
If I hav e becom e a sociologis t i t i s mainl y i n orde r t o exorcis e th e
specter of collective conceptions which will linger among us. In other
words, sociolog y itself ca n onl y procee d fro m th e action s o f on e o r
more separate individual s and must, therefore, adopt strictly individualistic methods. 3
This statemen t an d th e one s tha t follow, 4 betra y a n extrem e

brand o f methodologica l individualism . Thi s coul d hav e bre d a
skeptical kin d o f sociologica l nominalis m i f no t psychologica l re ductionism. Bu t Webe r chose neithe r path . H e eve n di d no t trea d
the "phenomenological, " socia l interactionist, an d generall y speaking "micro-sociological" route , which he certainly paved fo r other s
to explore . Weber' s sociologica l interest s demande d th e large r do main o f socia l an d intercivilizationa l studies. This lef t hi m wit h a
hiatus within his universe of discourse. Weber developed hi s "interpretive sociology " s o a s t o cros s thi s ga p i n thre e majo r strides :
(1) t o expe l th e "actua l existin g meaning " fro m th e domai n o f
sociology, (2 ) to substitut e th e concep t o f probabilit y o f socia l
action fo r th e notio n o f reciprocit y i n socia l relationships , an d
finally, (3 ) to establis h th e idea l typica l analysi s a s th e principa l
vehicle o f interpretiv e sociology, and o f historica l sciences. 5
Step One: Doing Away with "Actual Existing Meaning"

At the outse t o f his best known methodological work, 6 Ma x Webe r
made i t clear tha t sociology , a s he defined it , is concerned wit h th e
interpretive understandin g o f social action . H e spok e o f action , o f
course, whe n the acting individua l attaches meaning t o hi s "behavior." Bu t he wa s quick to add :
"Meaning" ma y b e o f tw o kinds . Th e ter m ma y refe r firs t t o th e
actual existin g meanin g i n th e give n concret e cas e o f a particula r

actor, o r t o th e averag e o r approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a
given pluralit y of actors ; o r secondl y to th e theoreticall y conceived
pure type o f subjective meaning attributed to th e hypothetica l acto r
or actor s i n a give n typ e o f action . (Weber , Economy I , p . 4)
It i s of cardinal importanc e for a correc t understandin g o f Web er's "interpretiv e sociology " t o bea r i n min d tha t i t scarcel y deal s
with "actua l existin g meaning." 7 Webe r wa s especiall y avers e t o
making th e firs t subcategor y o f actua l existin g meaning (tha t pos sessed b y a give n concret e actor ) th e subjec t matte r o f sociology .
For starters , th e difficultie s concernin g the attainmen t an d verifica tion o f th e actua l existin g meanin g ar e insurmountable . Webe r
offered n o answe r to thi s polemical question o f the positivists : How
can w e get to th e back o f the min d o f a particular actor ? H e agree d
that there is no guarantee that the best reproduction o f the meanin g
that a particular actor ascribe s to his or her behavior, in the mind of
the mos t sympatheti c o f al l observers , woul d correspon d t o th e
actual meanin g i n the min d o f the acto r i n question (Weber , Knies,
pp. 179 , 180) . Besides , th e intuitiv e inne r understandin g o f th e
totality of the feelings o f a particular individua l produces, at best , a
vague an d unverifiabl e imag e tha t ca n hardl y b e calle d "knowl edge," let alone "scientifi c knowledge." 8 By dismissing actual exist ing meanin g fro m th e real m o f sociologica l interes t Webe r save s
himself th e troubl e o f "verifying " these elusiv e meanings. 9
We can trac e Weber's lac k of interest in actual existin g meaning t o
roots othe r tha n th e mer e difficulties o f attainment an d verification .
Even i f a n observe r coul d properl y obtai n an d verif y th e concret e
subjectivity o f a social actor, this knowledge could not be relied upo n
by a Weberia n social scientis t a s anythin g bu t ra w data . I n othe r
words, the ultimate criterion for the validity of the observer's interpretations i s not it s agreement wit h the so-calle d native' s account . This ,
of course , goe s agains t th e conventiona l pictur e o f Webe r a s th e
father o f Verstehen sociology , fo r whic h h e ha s bee n alternativel y
admired (Ritzer, 1975 , p. 86 ) and censure d (Strauss, 1953 , p. 55) . No.
Weber di d no t trus t th e "understanding " o f th e socia l acto r a s th e
ultimate criterio n o f validity for interpretiv e sociology :
The "conscious motives " may well, even to the actor himself , conceal
the variou s "motives " an d "repressions " whic h constitut e th e rea l
8 MA
driving forc e o f hi s action . Thu s i n suc h case s eve n subjectivel y

honest self-analysi s has only a relative value. Then i t is the task o f the
sociologist to be aware o f this motivational situatio n an d t o describ e
and analyz e it, even though i t has not actuall y been concretely part of
the consciou s intentio n o f th e actor ; possibl y no t all , a t leas t no t
fully. (Weber , Economy I , pp . 9 , 10)
Here Webe r is raising th e proble m o f "false consciousness"whic h

until recentl y wa s a popula r moti f i n th e Marxis t literaturet o
undermine th e significanc e o f th e actua l existen t meanin g fo r th e
purposes o f scientific analysis. It i s not onl y the possibilit y of "fals e
consciousness" bu t als o th e prevalenc e o f "semiconsciousness" that
dissuaded Webe r fro m studyin g the intentionalit y o f th e concret e
individual. "Semiconscious " behavio r comprise s al l th e margina l
cases o f meaningful actio n suc h a s affectual, imitative , habitual , o r
traditional actio n (Weber , Economy / , pp . 4-25) . Besides , socia l
actors ofte n act under the influence of a plurality of impulses, which
makes i t difficul t t o arriv e a t a n approximat e estimat e o f th e
relative strengt h o f thei r conflictin g motive s (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 10) . Finally , i t mus t b e mentione d tha t a searc h fo r th e actua l
existing meanin g doe s no t hel p th e caus e o f the science s o f empirical realit y (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft), whic h i s t o overcom e th e
multiplicity o f empirica l reality . I t i s th e tas k o f sociolog y t o firs t
view al l th e meaningfu l phenomen a tha t ar e withi n it s real m an d
then t o fin d a wa y o f scientificall y reducin g th e immensit y o f th e
empirical data . (Weber suggests constructing a model agains t whic h
the relevan t fact s ca n b e measured. ) T o rever t t o th e stud y o f th e
actual existing meanin g blur s the focu s o f sociology an d defeat s the
purpose o f th e selectiv e proces s o f science. 10
The averag e o r approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a give n
plurality of actors i s the secon d variety of actual existing meaning. "
Does thi s constitut e th e subjec t matte r o f interpretiv e sociology ?
Only i n a margina l sense , because :
average types , ca n b e formulated with a relativ e degre e o f precisio n
only wher e they ar e concerne d wit h difference s o f degre e i n respec t
to actio n whic h remains qualitatively the same . Suc h case s d o occur ,
but i n the majorit y of cases o f action importan t t o histor y o r sociol ogy the motive s which determine i t ar e qualitativel y heterogeneous .

Then it is quite impossible t o spea k o f an "average" in the tru e sense .
(Weber, Economy I , pp . 20-21 )
Thus, the ideal types used in economics an d sociolog y shoul d no t

be confused wit h average types, nor shoul d the y be mistaken fo r th e
laws o f behavior pertainin g t o th e uniformities . The quasi-genera l
aspects of social and economic ideal types do not represen t concret e
meanings in the mind s o f actual individuals . They ar e the result s of
"dogmatically ascribed " maxim s an d prioritie s t o th e "hypotheti cal" socia l actors . Thi s mean s tha t th e us e o f averag e type s i s
practically limite d t o th e sociologica l mas s phenomen a (Weber ,
Economy I, p. 9) . This argumen t als o provide s a partial vindicatio n
for th e quantitativ e method s o f empirica l sociology . Webe r woul d
agree tha t th e hypothese s o f thes e studie s mus t b e "verified "
through empirica l researc h becaus e thei r objec t i s a varian t o f
actual existin g meaning. T o enlarge o n this point woul d necessitat e
an elaboratio n o f Weber' s respons e t o suc h trend s a s positivism ,
which contribute d t o th e ris e o f empirica l sociology . Th e wa y i n
which he moved t o mee t thi s challenge is discussed in Appendi x A .
Step Two: From Interactive Reciprocity to
Probabilistic Action
Weber professe d t o hav e don e hi s bes t t o "exorcis e th e specte r o f
collective concepts " fro m th e real m o f sociology. 12 If , whil e doin g
so, h e als o manage d t o avoi d th e pitfal l o f takin g th e elusiv e
facticity o f the concret e intersubjectivit y of particula r socia l actor s
as th e locu s o f interpretiv e sociology , i t wa s partl y becaus e o f hi s
peculiar interpretatio n o f the concept s o f "reciprocity" an d "proba bility." This crucial theoretical mov e leading to th e development of
the theor y o f idea l type s enable d Webe r t o redefine , analyticall y
work out, and eventuall y rehabilitate an d us e some o f those hypos tatized "collectiv e concepts" tha t onc e offende d hi s epistemologica l
taste s o much .
Although Webe r established th e necessity of the mutual intersub jective orientatio n a s the essential componen t o f "social action, " he
radically undermined i t as a constitutive element o f "social relationships." Meaningfu l actio n ca n b e nonsocial; i t becomes socia l onl y
when i t is oriented towar d th e meaningfu l action o f others . Never -
10 MA
theless, symmetr y an d reciprocit y o f the actua l subjectiv e orienta tion i s not th e locu s o f "social relationships" :
The subjectiv e meaning nee d no t necessaril y be the sam e fo r al l th e
parties who are mutually oriente d in a given social relationship; ther e
need no t i n thi s sens e b e "reciprocity. " "Friendship, " "love, "
"loyalty," "fidelit y to contracts, " "patriotism, " o n one side, may well
be faced with an entirely different attitud e o n the other. I n such case s
the partie s associat e differen t meaning s wit h thei r actions , an d th e
social relationshi p i s insofa r objectivel y "asymmetrical " fro m th e
points o f vie w o f th e tw o parties . (Weber , Economy I , p . 27 )
"Social relationship " i s not base d o n intersubjectiv e meeting s of

the mind s but (especiall y for the observer ) o n the "probabilit y tha t
there will be a meaningful course of action." Note how Weber, using
his interpretatio n o f th e concept s o f probabilit y an d reciprocity ,
provides a ne w basi s fo r th e legitimat e us e o f th e collectiv e con cepts.
That a "friendship" o r a "state" exists o r has existed mean s thi s an d
only this : tha t we , the observers , judge tha t ther e i s o r ha s bee n a
probability tha t o n th e basi s o f certai n kind s o f know n subjective
attitudes of certain individual s there will result in the average sens e a
certain specifi c typ e o f action . (Weber , Economy I , p . 28)
Thus, th e actua l psychi c inne r state s o f th e participant s i n socia l

relationships, eve n when the y ar e contradictory , becom e "immate rial" as long a s "in effec t th e probabilit y o f that orientatio n t o th e
agreement actuall y exist s t o a sociologicall y relevan t degree "
(Weber, Logos, p . 160) . Thi s make s i t possibl e t o trea t certai n
complexes o f social actio n "a s if " a unifor m orientatio n towar d a
given orde r exist s amon g th e participants . Th e marke t i s an idea l
typical complex o f actions o f this kind an d exhibit s the characteris tics introduce d befor e (Weber , Logos, p. 167) .
When a worke r accept s "certai n characteristicall y shape d meta l
disks o r slip s o f paper" as remunerations fo r hi s labor, h e doe s s o
knowing tha t a n unspecifie d an d totall y anonymou s multitud e o f
persons know n a s "others" are willing to exchang e certai n neede d
goods fo r hi s "money." H e also reckon s tha t i f someone shoul d tr y
Methodology o f Social Sciences 1
to deprive him of his earned good s "there i s a certain possibility that

people with spiked helmets would respond t o hi s call an d hel p him
get them back" (Weber, Stammler, p. 101) . Mos t sociologica l idea l
types aim at characterizing thes e intersubjectivel y accessible expec tations rather tha n delvin g into the psychic inner states o f the socia l
actors. Weber's specia l treatment o f the concepts of reciprocity and
probability no t onl y moves us farther awa y from th e typ e of inter pretive knowledge of the actua l existin g meaning a t the leve l of the
concrete individual; it also sets the stage for Weber's final statemen t
on the subject of interpretive sociology as he sees it: the ideal typica l
analysis.
Step Three: Interpretive Sociology Based on Ideal Types

Now i t i s reasonabl y clea r tha t th e kin d o f meanin g interpretiv e
sociology i s mainly interested i n is "the theoreticall y conceive d pure
type o f subjectiv e meanin g attribute d t o th e hypothetica l acto r o r
actors" (Weber, Economy I , p. 4). In what remains of this section we
will state fou r o f the mai n characteristics o f ideal types, stressing th e
significance o f each for th e sociolog y of intellectuals. Let u s star t b y
elucidating th e mos t obviou s feature of ideal typica l analysis:
1. Ideal types ar e purely instrumental fo r sociology an d social
sciences. As such they are at once indispensable and insufficient.
There are different kind s of ideal types, 13 but the y all have one thing
in common : the y ar e o f "practical" value fo r sociologica l an d his torical analysi s (Weber , Meaning, p . 42) . The y ar e temporary har bors i n the se a of empirical facts , no t th e fina l destination (Weber ,
Objectivity, p . 104) . T o trea t idea l type s a s anythin g mor e tha n
"instrumental" woul d culminat e i n "reification " o f idea l types. 14
Let us see how Weber recommended th e use of the "rationalistic"
ideal type s o f actio n i n sociology . Realit y i s "messy, " i t i s no t
rational. I n any given course of action, errors in thought o r compu tation can be as consequential for the final outcom e of the action a s
correct thinkin g an d calculation . Nevertheless , Weber suggest s th e
construction o f a rational , thoroughl y "errorless " trajector y fo r
action. Amon g th e varietie s o f collectiv e action , wa r present s a
notoriously jumbled combinatio n o f rational calculation s an d irra tional outcomes . Nevertheles s Weber suggests:
12 MA
To understand ho w a war is conducted, i t is necessary t o imagin e a n

ideal commander-in-chie f fo r eac h sideeve n thoug h no t explicitl y
or in detailed form . Eac h o f these commanders mus t kno w th e total
fighting resource s o f each sid e an d al l the possibilitie s arisin g there from o f attainin g th e concretel y unambiguou s goal , namely , th e
destruction o f th e enemy' s militar y power . O n th e basi s o f thi s
knowledge, the y mus t ac t entirel y withou t erro r an d i n a logicall y
"perfect" way . For only then can the consequences o f the fact that the
real commanders neithe r had th e knowledg e nor wer e they free fro m
error, an d tha t the y wer e no t purel y rational thinkin g machines , b e
unambiguously established . (Weber , Meaning, p . 42)
It i s eviden t tha t th e "rationalistic " characte r o f thi s analysi s i s

purely heuristic; it does no t impl y the predominance o f the rationa l
elements i n huma n thought , muc h les s a valuatio n o f rationalism .
The onl y drawback o f these "rationalistic" ideal type s is their "teleological" nature. B y assuming a rational end for action, thi s metho d
cannot hel p bu t impl y a functionalis t attitud e i n sociology : ever y
action mus t be linked to a prefigured goal regardless o f whether i t is
achieved o r not . Webe r frankl y admit s thi s implicatio n an d state s
(as many sociologist s hav e als o done) that the functiona l approac h
could eve n b e usefu l a s a "preliminary step " in sociologica l investi gations (Weber , Economy I, p. 16) . In criticizing Knies's arguments ,
Weber i s even mor e candi d abou t th e "heuristic " value o f this kin d
of ideal type. Here Webe r implies that the assumptio n o f rationalit y
is a cryptographi c device . W e need t o assum e th e coherenc e o f th e
message i f we ar e t o mak e sens e o f it .
"Interpretation" i n our sens e would b e called fo r onl y in cases o f the
following description . Althoug h th e "meaning " o f a n expressio n i s
not immediatel y "understood, " an d i t i s no t possibl e t o reac h a
practical "understanding " concernin g it s meanin g wit h it s author ,
nevertheless a n "understanding " o f it s meanin g i s o f unconditiona l
practical necessity . Conside r a n exampl e whic h remain s withi n th e
domain o f "everyday" rea l life . A n office r leadin g a patrol receive s a
written militar y comman d whic h i s ambiguousl y draw n up . I t i s
necessary fo r hi m t o "interpret " th e "purpose " of the ordertha t is
to say, to consider the motives responsible for the orderin orde r t o
act o n it . (Weber , Knies, p. 154 )
Ideal types of social actio n mus t hav e a rational core eve n thoug h
action itsel f may lack rationa l structure . Thus a n interrelate d se t of
statistical correlations about a social phenomenon in isolation fro m
an idea l typical meaning construction doe s no t qualif y as "interpre tive sociology. " A t th e sam e time , a perfectl y rational idea l typ e of
action i s also useles s if some kin d o f proof fo r th e probabl e occur rence of the meaningfu l action i s not provide d (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 12) . Thi s mutua l interdependenc e o f idea l type s an d empirica l
data doe s not impl y that the validity of ideal type must be "verified "
by the empirical data. Weber's phraseology for this interdependenc e
is: determinin g th e "causa l adequacy " o f th e "meaningfull y ade quate" course o f action .
Statistical uniformitie s constitut e understandabl e type s o f action ,
and thu s constitute sociologica l generalizations , onl y when they ca n
be regarde d a s manifestation s o f th e understandabl e subjectiv e
meaning o f a course o f socia l action . Conversely , formulations o f a
rational course of subjectively understandabl e actio n constitut e soci ological type s of empirical process only when they can b e empirically
observed wit h a significan t degre e o f approximation . (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 12)
The intuitive "self-evidence" of any subjectively adequate idea l type

is deceptive. Weber warns against confusin g this image of action with
the empirica l certaint y tha t th e sociologis t mus t achieve 15 (Weber ,
Knies, p . 180 ; Meaning, p . 42) . W e mus t b e awar e tha t withou t a
rigorous methodologica l screenin g o f th e sociologica l concepts , th e
ideal types of rational actio n might come innocentl y to presen t them selves a s the "law s o f human action, " while the historica l idea l types
might appea r a s "logical trend s o f history." Logically speaking , idea l
types ar e bu t stylize d image s obtaine d throug h abstraction s an d
generalizations, elimination s an d exaggerations . Thei r onl y ai m is to
substitute th e "infinit e multiplicit y o f successivel y and co-existentl y
emerging and disappearin g events " (Weber, Objectivity, p . 72). Thes e
ideal types , whe n compare d wit h th e infinit e richnes s o f empirica l
data, ar e relativel y empty o f concret e conten t (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 20) . Weber admits tha t eve n historical ideal type s are i n this sens e
"unhistorical" (Weber, Social, p . 294) .
14 MA
Weber furthe r underscore d th e instrumenta l natur e o f the socio logical idea l type s b y pointin g ou t tha t the y ar e neithe r logica l
definitions no r genera l statement s abou t a clas s o f facts ; the y ar e
purely fictitiou s "hypotheses" tha t ar e use d t o mak e a "scientific "
understanding o f th e infinitel y ric h "empirica l reality " humanl y
possible. Wit h numerou s examples , Webe r illustrate d tha t i n thos e
cases wher e idea l typica l construction s see m t o influenc e th e con crete cours e o f action , th e proces s i s alway s mediate d b y actua l
social actors . I n th e cas e o f direc t influenc e o f th e lega l orde r o n
conduct, fo r instance , i t is not th e "law" bu t "th e empiricall y ascertainable maxim o f the concret e conduc t o f human beings " (Weber ,
Stammler, p. 130 ) that influence the actio n o f others. Peopl e orien t
their behavio r according t o the probabilities that certain individuals
(say judges ) woul d tak e th e lega l idea s a s th e maxim s o f thei r
action. Therefore , th e lega l orde r i n fac t exist s a s a se t o f maxim s
(Weber, Stammler, p, 129) : "It i s a norm whic h can be conceived a s
having 'axiologica l validity. ' Therefore, i t i s quit e obviousl y no t a
form o f bein g o r existence , bu t rathe r a standar d o f valu e b y
reference to which empirical existence ca n be evaluated." It is in this
sense tha t Webe r attribute s causa l significanc e to rationality .
Underestimating Weber' s clarit y o f vision regardin g th e differenc e
of idea l type s of generalized actio n an d thos e referrin g to th e histor ical cours e o f action , Talcot t Parson s maintaine d tha t Webe r ha d
confused tw o different kind s of ideal types and thu s attributed histor ical realit y t o th e idea l typica l constructio n o f rationalizatio n (Par sons, 1964) . Thi s i s unlikely. Weber was wel l awar e o f th e fictitiou s
nature of the idea l type of rationality. However , he also believed that
an ideal type, if mediated b y human agent s (i n which case it becomes
a "maxim" for th e concret e actors) , i s capable o f influencing the ac tual course of action and , consequently, of becoming a force in history.
Intellectuals, as we will see in the forthcomin g chapter, ofte n acte d
as such mediators; the y are th e bearer s o f different level s an d mode s
of rationality . Th e rationalizatio n o f th e spher e o f idea s occur s
through intellectual s wh o hav e a stak e i n constructin g eve r mor e
consistent images of the world. This general statement ca n be used as
a guide to study the substantively diverse contents o f various civilizations and the role intellectuals have played in creating and developin g
the mai n thrus t o f idea s o f tha t particula r culture . I t i s alway s
instructive to remembe r that theoretical (o r practical fo r that matter )
rationalization i s not a n independent force but a maxim in the minds

of a grou p of individuals. Ideal type s
enable u s to se e if, in particular trait s o r i n their total character , th e
phenomena approximat e on e of our constructions : to determin e the
degree o f approximatio n o f the historica l phenomeno n t o th e theo retically constructed type. To this extent, the construction is merely a
technical ai d whic h facilitates a mor e luci d arrangemen t an d termi nology. Yet , under certai n conditions , a constructio n migh t mea n
more. Fo r th e rationality , i n th e sens e o f logica l o r teleologica l
"consistency," o f a n intellectual-theoretica l o r practical-ethica l atti tude ha s an d alway s has ha d powe r ove r man , howeve r limited an d
unstable this power is and alway s has been in the face o f other forces
of historica l life . Religiou s interpretation s o f th e worl d an d ethic s
of religion s created b y intellectual s an d mean t t o b e rationa l hav e
been strongl y expose d t o th e imperativ e o f consistency . (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 324 )
This is the reason behin d Weber' s suggestion that "the trut h value
of idea s i s the guidin g value in writin g of intellectual history. " The
ideal type s are not b y themselves concrete forces in history, they do
not constitut e a mode o f being (Weber, Objectivity, p . 93), yet their
assumption, lik e that o f the numerica l order , help s one to sor t ou t
and comprehen d th e existing world. When they are taken seriously
as maxim s o f actio n b y certai n strat a (e.g. , intellectuals) , the y
become "real. " Ou r las t chapte r contain s a serie s o f interrelate d
ideal type s of intellectuals. These ar e admittedl y only empty vessels
that ma y o r ma y no t b e fille d i n a give n cas e o f civilizationa l
analysis. The y becom e rea l i n s o far a s th e agent s (intellectual s o r
intelligentsia) embod y them . Bu t i t mus t als o b e emphasize d tha t
this manner o f classification is itself as much a logical conjectur e as
it i s a culturall y specifi c one . I t i s not par t o f realit y bu t rathe r o f
logic and culture . To better understan d thi s we need t o explai n ou r
second statemen t i n relatio n t o idea l types . Her e w e modif y th e
already emphasize d fictitiousnes s of the idea l type s and encourag e
reflection o n th e natur e o f their falseness .
2. Ideal types stylize th e concrete reality, yet their distortions are

by no means arbitrary; their falseness is a reflection of the observer's rootedness in time and space, and not the product of an
artistic falsification. Thi s distortion i s not onl y logicall y necessary .
16 MA
X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS
It i s als o indispensabl e fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e "sociolog y o f

knowledge." It is our historica l interest s that determine th e cultura l
significance o f the happenings o f the past . Accordingly , a historica l
ideal typ e i s the resul t o f one-side d accentuatio n an d a systemati c
stylization o f historical fact s (Weber , Objectivity, p . 90) . A histori cal idea l typ e i s warpe d an d lopsided , fo r i t carrie s mor e logica l
consistency an d les s factua l o r historica l detai l tha n th e realit y i t
represents; an d als o becaus e i t favor s certai n element s o f objectiv e
reality as "relevant" and "significant " t o the exclusion o f others. All
ideal type s reduce empirica l realit y t o a Utopia n mode l i n orde r t o
overcome th e overwhelmin g multiplicit y o f th e concret e data .
Weber doe s no t clai m tha t th e chose n fact s ar e i n an y wa y mor e
"essential," but rathe r the y ar e mor e significan t fo r th e observers .
Thus th e selectio n o f dat a organize d i n idea l type s mus t no t b e
regarded a s an instanc e o f arbitrarily simplifyin g th e complexit y of
historical even t (Weber , Social, p . 294) . I f ou r limitednes s in tim e
and space , an d ou r particularit y o f interest s i s a disadvantage ,
Weber turn s i t int o a n advantage : w e com e t o understand , no t i n
spite o f our prejudice s but precisel y because o f them. 16 The liberat ing effec t o f thi s ide a stem s directl y fro m a sens e o f modest y tha t
underlies it. Weber took a bold ste p when h e recognized tha t "our "
history inevitabl y bears th e imprin t o f ou r particula r interes t i n it .
Thus, h e liberate d sociologist s a s well a s other socia l scientist s an d
particularly historian s fro m th e burdensom e pretensio n o f Germa n
idealism, whic h require d the m t o b e selfles s oracle s o f reaso n (o r
revolution). I t als o pulverize d th e puritanica l obsessio n o f Frenc h
positivism wit h cleansin g th e min d o f th e socia l scientis t fro m th e
contagion o f values and interests. 17 The use of ideal type s enables u s
to accep t an d utiliz e rather tha n t o figh t th e fac t tha t w e confront
our societ y an d histor y a s finit e huma n being s whos e interest s
define th e pas t a s muc h a s they ar e define d b y it .
The fac t tha t fo r Webe r th e criterio n o f meaningfulnes s o f idea l
types is not th e abstrac t an d universa l principl e o f logic bu t rathe r
"subjective adequacy"whic h amount s t o agreemen t wit h "com mon sense," 18 also epitomizes th e liberatin g modesty of his meth odology:
The interpretatio n o f a coheren t cours e o f conduc t i s "subjectivel y
adequate" (or "adequat e o n th e leve l o f meaning") , insofa r as , ac -
cording to our habitua l mode s of thought an d feeling , it s componen t

parts take n i n thei r mutua l relatio n ar e recognize d t o constitut e a
"typical" complex o f meaning. I t i s more common t o sa y "correct."
(Weber, Economy I , p . 11 )
An idea l type , therefore , i s subjectivel y adequat e a s soo n a s i t i s

constructed an d a s long a s it meet s Weber' s rathe r modes t criteria .
Of course , ther e i s n o guarante e tha t "ou r habitua l mode s o f
thought an d feeling " woul d reflec t th e truth . But , i n Weber' s view ,
embracing th e metaphysica l trut h i s not th e goa l fo r whic h sociol ogy o r an y o f th e socia l science s mus t strive . I n n o case , Webe r
argues, does the "meaning" sociology strives to apprehend (whethe r
"actual existing"concrete or averageor "the pur e type") refer t o
an objectivel y "correct " meanin g o r on e whic h i s "true " i n som e
metaphysical sense . Instea d o f verifying the m w e simply determine
the empirica l validit y o f th e subjectivel y adequat e idea l type s b y
estimating th e odd s o f thei r occurrence , i.e . thei r "causa l ade quacy." I t i s thi s whic h distinguishe s th e empirica l science s o f
action, suc h a s sociolog y an d history , fro m dogmati c discipline s
such a s jurisprudence, logi c an d aesthetic s whic h see k t o ascertai n
the "true" and "valid" meanings associate d wit h the objects o f their
investigation (Weber , Economy I , p . 4).
In th e real m o f comparativ e sociology , whic h i s indispensabl e
for sociolog y o f intellectuals , we nee d t o dea l wit h cultura l con cepts o f alien civilizations . Althoug h the prior distinction seem s t o
relieve th e socia l science s fro m th e tas k o f judging th e validit y o r
legitimacy o f othe r cultures , stil l a nonjudgmenta l understandin g
of alie n culture s remain s problematic. 19 On e migh t as k i f "our
habitual mode s o f thought an d feeling " can legitimatel y constitut e
the criterio n fo r th e subjectiv e validit y o f idea l types ; an d i f th e
guiding ligh t fo r selectio n an d definitio n o f socia l problem s als o
originates i n "our " interests , woul d i t no t b e impossibl e fo r th e
observer t o reac h a n interpretiv e understanding o f culture s othe r
than one' s own ? Ho w ar e w e suppose d t o chec k th e subjectiv e
adequacy o f th e idea l type s w e mak e abou t othe r cultures' ? Ho w
can w e define thei r socia l problems ? How do w e select the "signifi cant" fact s fro m thei r history ? Th e sociologica l stud y o f alie n
cultures thu s ha s t o conten d wit h th e sam e problem s tha t bese t
historical investigations.
18 MA
The strengt h o f Weber' s respons e t o bot h thes e problem s lie s i n

his bol d recognitio n o f the limit s tha t huma n finitud e impose s o n
knowledge. A s a hermeneutical consciousness o f our rootednes s in
time render s destructiv e prejudice int o constructiv e historica l in sight, als o a n awarenes s o f ou r define d presenc e i n geocultura l
space can turn cultural distance int o intellectual leverag e for under standing. I n studyin g th e worl d o f predecessor s o r i n examinin g
different layer s of the worl d o f contemporaries, 20 the huma n inter ests present a Janus face. While denial o r self-righteous assertio n of
these interests greatly impedes understanding, a n awareness of ones
rootedness in time and space turns the blind spot of human particu larity into a lens for scientific , that is , selective an d discriminating ,
study of empirical reality. Hence Weber conceded tha t hi s theory of
concept formatio n wa s "anthropomorphic" (Burger , p. 80). W e can
even cal l i t "ethnocentric. " Bu t here , ethnocentrism , rathe r tha n
being an expression o f the self-righteousness of a dominant culture ,
testifies t o th e consciou s adaptatio n o f th e scienc e o f ma n t o th e
"human condition. " Unles s we have an "Archimedean point, " i.e., a
particular value-relevan t (and scientific ) interest, i t becomes impos sible for u s to "scientifically " stud y any alie n culture. 21 The subjec t
of investigation therefore must be "valuable" for the social scientist .
This also holds true for the realm of history. The observer canno t
help bu t loo k a t histor y fro m hi s o r he r ow n poin t o f view . Th e
concept o f "value relevance," however , transcends narrow utilitarian interest s and individua l biases. Weber rejected Meyer's restric tion o f th e value-relevan t interes t of th e historia n onl y to effective
history; tha t i s to thos e historical elements that hav e been causally
effective i n bringing about th e "present " (Weber , Meyer, p . 157) .
For Weber , even th e mos t historicall y inconsequential facts of a n
alien civilizatio n (e.g., thos e o f th e Inca s an d Aztecs ) ca n becom e
the subjec t o f th e value-relevan t interes t o f th e historia n bot h a s
"heuristic instruments " fo r th e formatio n o f theoretica l concept s
appropriate t o th e stud y o f cultur e a s such, 22 an d a s "historica l
individuals" studie d with respect t o thei r "relevance to values" 23
(Weber, Meyer, p . 156) . Weber' s ow n attempt s to com e t o grip s
with civilizationa l an d historica l complexes neithe r aime d a t cap turing their totality nor claime d to have reproduced th e world view
of thei r "natives." Hi s mai n "interest " wa s to discove r th e rol e o f
the religiousl y grounded economi c ethic s o f thes e civilizations .
He sough t a n answe r t o th e followin g question (an d thi s wa s his

"Archimedean point") : Why did the causa l nexus of events in these
civilizations fail to produce "capitalism," which stood a t the current
end of the European historica l development? Our ai m in the present
study is to examin e th e rol e o f intellectuals i n historically and geo culturally distan t time s an d places . I n orde r to accomplis h thi s we
do no t nee d t o transcen d histor y o r culture , bu t onl y t o erec t a
logically consisten t (i f culturall y specific) structur e fo r containin g
data abou t th e rol e o f intellectual s i n (historicall y an d geocul turally) distan t civilizations . I n th e cas e o f th e so-calle d cultura l
diffusion, intellectual s o f thes e ver y civilization s hav e borrowe d
from eac h other .
In ever y case, fro m th e extraordinar y resistanc e o f Judais m t o
elements o f Egyptian an d Babylonia n neighbors t o th e easy sprea d
of Hinduis m i n the subcontinent , th e intellectual s have considere d
cultural product s availabl e fo r borrowing , i n th e ligh t o f thei r
civilizational prioritie s a s wel l a s i n vie w o f thei r ow n idea l an d
material interests , before optin g t o adop t o r rejec t the m (Weber ,
Judaism, pp . 190 , 203-205; India, pp . 9 , 16) . There i s no reaso n t o
exclude th e Wester n scientifi c proces s fro m thi s practice . Th e las t
important cavea t abou t th e idea l type s i s that:
3. Ideal types d o no t subsume reality. I t i s th e reality that ap proximates th e ideal types. W e hav e alread y mentione d tha t th e
adequacy a t th e leve l of meanin g o f a n idea l typ e must b e comple mented b y measurin g its causa l adequacy :
The interpretatio n o f a sequence of events w i l l . .. be called causally
adequate insofa r as , accordin g t o establishe d generalization s fro m
experience, ther e i s a probability tha t i t will always actuall y occu r in
the sam e way . (Weber , Economy I , p . 11 )
This, however, does no t mea n tha t idea l types must b e "validated"

or "verified " i n th e sam e wa y tha t hypothese s ar e verifie d i n th e
natural sciences. Ideal types are unlike the hypotheses of the natura l
sciences, as conceived by English empiricists since Bacon ; ideal types
are no t prematur e theories . Th e constructio n o f "general theories "
(e.g., the rationalisti c ideal types of typical action) i n the socia l an d
cultural science s i s no t th e ultimat e goa l o f thes e disciplines ; th e
theories ar e mer e instrument s in achievin g "th e knowledg e o f th e
20 MA
concrete reality." 24 The sam e i s true fo r th e historica l idea l types. 25

Obviously bot h historica l an d sociologica l idea l type s ca n assum e
the for m o f lawlike statements. Thi s is only apparent . Sociologica l
ideal type s ar e no t th e resul t o f a n inductiv e verification o f hypoth eses. Indeed , the y ar e nothin g bu t th e elaboratio n o f a se t o f
"teleological" or "dogmatically" ascribe d assumptions . Thos e socia l
scientists wh o insis t o n enthronin g thes e idea l type s a s "law s o f
social an d economi c behavior " no t onl y reject th e centralit y o f th e
concrete realit y a s th e subjec t matte r o f socia l science s bu t als o
delude themselve s abou t th e origi n o f thes e so-calle d laws. 26 I n
summary, ideal types are neither overreachin g laws nor all-embrac ing logica l definitions. 27 Th e mai n functio n o f a n idea l typ e i s t o
provide a basi s fo r comparison :
Its functio n i s th e compariso n wit h empirica l realit y i n orde r t o
establish it s divergence s o r similarities , to describ e the m wit h th e
most unambiguously intelligible concepts, an d t o understan d an d
explain the m causally . (Weber, Meaning, p . 43)
Therefore, th e logica l paralle l o f idea l typica l analysi s i s neithe r

inductive no r deductiv e an d no t eve n analogica l reasoning. 28 Th e
use of ideal type s rather resemble s a simple rhetorical us e of analogies. Excep t tha t her e th e exampl e (idea l type ) i s no t borrowe d
ready made , bu t i s meticulously reconstructed throug h selectio n of
the mos t "relevant " feature s of the reality . I n thi s sens e idea l types
are "exemplary." A n example cannot b e verified or falsified. I t only
can b e judge d a s subtle , relevant , an d appropriat e o r otherwise ,
crude, irrelevant , an d inappropriate. 29
An ideal type is a measuring device, a "precision instrument. " I t is
absurd t o attemp t t o prove or disprove the measuring rod. On e can
only use one in order to determine how the reality "measures up " t o
it (Weber , Stammler, p . 111) . I t i s a heuristi c devic e fo r framin g
hypotheses (Weber , Stammler, p. 113) . The idea l type is a model of
meaning tha t th e observe r associate s (Weber , Stammler, p . I l l )
with th e actio n tha t i s either historicall y observe d o r theoreticall y
possible (Weber , Logos, p. 160). 30
Although actua l researc h i s no t mean t t o confir m o r refut e th e
ideal type, in the course of empirical research we can and constantl y
do judge th e relevanc e an d sensitivit y of ou r idea l types . A searc h
for confirmatio n (o r refutation ) o f the idea l typ e is as meaningles s

as trying to validate the yardstick by seeking objects that ar e exactl y
one yard long. The questio n therefore is not whethe r the idea l typ e
holds bu t t o wha t exten t i t does . I n idea l typica l analysi s we mus t
ask ho w doe s th e actua l dat a approximat e th e meanin g w e hav e
arrived a t eithe r b y historica l stylizatio n o r throug h a one-side d
"rationalistic" an d "teleological " ratiocination . W e d o no t as k
whether o r no t ou r idea l typ e is valid; rathe r th e questio n is , how
must the actio n procee d if the conduct i s to correspon d to th e idea l
type? Thus, Webe r does not clai m to kno w how a particular perso n
"will" o r shoul d ac t bu t onl y ho w h e "must " ac t i n orde r fo r hi s
conduct t o correspond to the respective ideal type of action w e have
constructed (Weber , Stammler, p. 111) .
It i s onl y i n th e ligh t o f thes e consideration s tha t th e followin g
passage of Roscher and Knies, i n which Weber contrasts the hypoth eses o f natural science s to idea l types, can b e properly understood :
A hypothetica l "la w o f nature " whic h i s definitivel y refute d i n a
single cas e collapse s a s a n hypothesi s onc e an d fo r all . I n contrast ,
the idealtypical construction s o f economicsi f the y ar e correctl y
understoodhave no pretensions a t al l to general validity. A "law o f
nature", on the othe r hand , must clai m t o b e generally valid . Other wise i t lose s it s meaning . (Weber , Knies, p. 190 )
The question , then , i s t o wha t exten t th e actua l conduc t corre sponds t o thi s rationa l scheme . Tak e th e exampl e o f "Gresham' s
law" i n economics . I t i s
a rationall y clea r interpretatio n o f human actio n unde r certai n con ditions an d unde r th e assumptio n tha t it will follow a purely rationa l
course. Ho w far an y actua l cours e o f action correspond s t o thi s ca n
be verifie d onl y b y th e availabl e statistica l evidenc e fo r th e actua l
disappearance o f under-value d monetar y unit s fro m circulation .
(Weber, Economy I , p . 10 )
Weber suggeste d tha t a n unrea l worl d o f idea l type s b e con structed, i n orde r t o orde r scientificall y th e actua l existin g world .
One-sidedly stylized , teleological, an d rationalisti c i n nature, idea l
types are but "utopian" models tha t hav e only instrumental valu e in
22 MA
attaining th e goa l o f cultura l sciences : the knowledg e o f concret e

reality. Idea l type s ar e no t skeleton s aroun d whic h th e realit y
should b e formed; the y are scaffold s tha t ar e discarde d a s soo n a s
they fulfil l thei r function . To do otherwise , e.g., to trea t idea l types
as th e genera l theorie s o f th e natura l sciences , woul d b e t o reif y
(Weber, Stammler, pp. 113-114 ) this fictitious world o f images an d
examples. Thi s is how w e use ideal type s in the presen t study : only
as vessel s whose actua l utilit y must b e examine d i n th e proces s of
actual research. Weber's theory of ideal types enables him to refer t o
such concept s a s "the religio n o f intellectuals, " "rationalizatio n o f
magic i n India, " and "th e Chines e patrimonia l bureaucracy " with out violatin g hi s methodologica l individualism . Th e constitutiv e
role assigned t o th e value-relevant interest of the investigator i n the
construction o f idea l type s justifies difference s o f perspectiv e an d
guarantees th e open-ende d reconstructio n o f th e sociohistorica l
phenomena i n th e socia l sciences . The presen t stud y ha s benefited
from thi s methodologica l argumen t i n suggestin g new idea l type s
such a s "Religio n fo r th e Masses, " a s wel l a s i n recastin g an d
restructuring th e existin g ideal type s i n ne w configurations .
On Huma n Interes t an d Historica l Causatio n
What i s historical causation ? A solid objectiv e chain o f events or a
subjectively reconstructe d affai r mediate d b y subjectiv e considera tions (interests, values, cultural categories, etc.) of the historian ? By
the tur n o f the century, "intuitionism" and "historica l materialism "
had provide d th e mos t distinc t answer s t o thes e question . Th e
famous debat e betwee n the tw o school s ha d s o charged th e atmos phere tha t neutra l historica l researc h coul d no t hav e bee n con ducted withou t takin g a positio n o n thi s debate . Webe r opte d t o
propose hi s own solution . Hi s response i s of central importanc e t o
our projec t becaus e on e o f the mos t tenaciou s problem s o f sociol ogy of intellectuals is to determine their role in creating as well as in
recapitulating th e historica l process.
Weber settle d th e problem s o f "historica l determination " an d
"historical interest " b y linkin g th e tw o togethe r throug h th e cate gory o f "objectiv e possibility. " We hav e alread y pointe d ou t tha t
Weber's notio n of historica l interest was muc h broader than that of

his contemporary , Eduard Meyer, who confine d i t to th e discover y
of th e causa l sequenc e o f historica l events that ha d brough t about
"the present " (Weber , Meyer, pp . 153-156) . Ye t fro m Meyer ,
Weber seem s t o hav e appropriate d th e metho d o f "ascen t fro m
effect t o cause" : "Th e totality o f al l conditions bac k t o whic h th e
causal chai n fro m th e "effect" lead s ha d to "act jointly i n a certai n
way an d i n no othe r fo r the concret e effect t o b e realized" (Weber ,
Meyer, p . 187) . B y definition ever y historica l happening , withou t
exception, i s "necessitated " b y a countles s numbe r o f historica l
"causes." A historia n wh o follow s the cause s dow n t o a certai n
effect i s ap t t o imagin e th e outcom e wa s "necessitated" fro m th e
outset. Suc h a methodolog y wil l lea d t o a n optica l illusion : th e
vision o f a ideologicall y movin g specte r replace s history . Weber' s
reversal o f the directio n of research (fro m effects t o cause s no t th e
other wa y around) togethe r wit h his alternative concep t o f historical determinatio n (adequat e causation ) avoid s th e deterministi c
fallacy. Weber' s notio n o f historica l determination , fo r instance ,
incorporates th e possibilit y of "historical accidents. " Th e proble m
with thi s approac h i s tha t i t i s neithe r possibl e no r desirabl e t o
track "all " of the cause s o f an even t (which are infinitel y multiple) .
Weber's solutio n was to us e the "historica l interest " o f the investigator a s the criterio n of selection o f the relevan t causes. Historica l
interest woul d orien t th e retrospectiv e ques t fo r thos e fe w "rele vant" an d "significant " causa l connection s that la y behin d historical event s (Weber , Meyer, pp . 151-152) . Bu t ho w ca n suc h a
method avoi d anthropomorphizin g the history ? How ca n w e propose tha t th e value s o f th e historia n gover n th e selectio n o f dat a
without turning history into a n ever changing private tale o f histo rians?
The answe r i s t o b e foun d i n th e prope r us e o f th e categorie s o f
"adequate causation " an d "objectiv e possibility " (Weber, Meyer,
p. 186) . It was th e utilizatio n o f these tw o concepts in the process of
ascent fro m effect s t o th e "significant " cause s tha t enable d Webe r
to bypass many dangerous methodological rapids of materialistic or
idealistic historical determination. How?
Historical causatio n fo r Webe r i s no t a separat e typ e o f causa tion, i t is objective causation viewe d from the perspectiv e of huma n
interests. 31 T o facilitate th e conversio n o f "objective" int o "histori -
24 MA
cal" causation, Webe r devise d an d use d th e categorie s o f "objectiv e

possibility" an d "adequat e causation. " The y modif y th e historica l
interest o f th e investigato r a s i t delve s int o th e pas t i n orde r t o
discern and scientificall y arrange a n arra y o f facts and concept s that
are "significant" fro m hi s point of view. I n this manner the "value relevant interest " o f th e investigato r is converted into a tool fo r re creating a scientific image o f th e past .
But firs t th e fetis h o f a n unchangeabl e pas t tha t confront s th e
historian a s an "invincible rock " mus t b e broken. Neithe r th e advo cates o f idea l o r materia l determinis m no r th e practitioner s o f
traditional historiograph y ar e exemp t fro m thi s challenge . Webe r
fought th e tyrann y of the pas t by cutting off the chain o f events that
seem t o hav e "necessitated " a give n historica l happening . T o solv e
this proble m Webe r invente d what i s now know n a s counterfactual
trajectories i n historiograph y i n orde r t o dissolv e th e solidit y of
history,
Starting wit h the question : "What woul d hav e happene d if ? . . ."
the historia n imagine s alternativ e trajectorie s fo r th e history . O f
course i t i s th e historica l interes t o f th e investigato r tha t fill s th e
dotted lin e an d determine s whic h lin k i n th e causa l successio n o f
causes leadin g t o th e even t i n questio n i s t o b e hypotheticall y
removed. Fo r example , a politica l historia n woul d b e intereste d i n
estimating the historica l significance of a voluntaristic decision o f a
political leader . I n th e real m o f th e sociolog y o f knowledg e th e
causal significanc e of ideas and i n the sociolog y of intellectuals th e
role o f th e bearer s o f thes e idea s constitut e th e subjec t o f interest.
Therefore i n the questio n "What woul d hav e happened if ? . . ."i t is
always the subjec t o f "interest" tha t is hypothetically removed fro m
the causa l chai n leadin g to a historical event. Throug h thi s type of
questioning a distanc e i s created betwee n the historica l cause s an d
their effects , allowin g a certai n leewa y for exploratio n o f possibilities an d als o fo r comparativ e historica l analysis.
Now, i f the answe r to th e counterfactua l question i s positive (i.e.,
that th e even t i n questio n woul d stil l hav e happene d withou t "thi s
particular" link) , it i s to b e inferre d tha t th e even t i n questio n ha d
been "objectivel y possible " a t th e tim e i t cam e t o pass . Retrospec tively we refer to suc h a n event as having been "adequately caused. "
Such a n even t canno t b e describe d a s a "historica l accident " eve n
though i t migh t appea r t o hav e bee n objectivel y triggere d b y a
fortuitous event . I n suc h a cas e th e fortuitou s characte r o f th e

proximate caus e is of no significance. Like the proverbial straw that
breaks th e camel' s back , lik e th e "las t tur n o f th e screw, " suc h a n
immediate caus e merel y happen s t o "necessitate " a n even t tha t
would i n al l probabilit y materializ e i n an y case . Suc h a n even t i s
"adequately caused" ; i t i s no t a n instanc e o f "historica l accident. "
From th e poin t o f vie w o f th e presen t time , a futur e developmen t
can b e calle d "objectivel y possible " onl y whe n w e hav e evidenc e
that it is on the verge of happening and a further regula r accumula tion o f event s "i n it s favor " includin g shee r accident s migh t wel l
"necessitate" i t o r haste n it s materialization. 32
The logical opposite of an adequately cause d even t is a "historical
accident." T o subsume a sudden tur n o f events unde r thi s categor y
it is not enoug h for its proximate caus e to b e a "fortuitous" one . A n
event qualifie s a s a historica l acciden t whe n i t coul d b e sai d o f i t
that i t woul d neve r hav e happene d i n an y shap e o r for m ha d th e
immediate fortuitous cause not bee n present. For th e contemporar ies o f th e historica l event i n question , th e objectiv e possibility o f a
historical acciden t i s nil . T o pu t i t i n a mor e anthropomorphi c
language, whe n a n even t happen s withou t havin g a considerabl e
array o f othe r event s weighin g o n it s side , w e sa y i t i s no t "ade quately caused" ; i t i s a "historica l accident." 33
The tas k o f determining the typ e of causation involve d in a given
historical development is entrusted t o the empirical research guide d
by the historical interests of the investigator who weighs the relative
significance o f certai n historica l cause s leadin g u p t o th e even t i n
question.
In dealing with the interface of ideas an d interest s in history (e.g.,
in sociologies o f knowledge and intellectuals ) we are called upo n t o
make judgments of this sort. One cannot answe r this in metatheory.
Each cas e mus t b e decide d o n empirica l grounds . I n certai n case s
Weber refer s t o "concrete " historical o r "accidental " determinant s
(Weber, Judaism, p . 167 ; Economy I , p. 40 ) of a historical configu ration (Weber , India, p . 240) , while o n othe r occasion s h e calls a n
entire historica l developmen t a "historical accident. " Fo r instance ,
the sprea d o f Buddhis m t o Southeas t Asi a i s calle d b y Webe r a
"historical accident " (Weber , India, p . 230) . Thi s obviousl y mean s
that it was not a n objectively possible development for Buddhism t o
spread beyon d it s origina l grounds . Suc h a developmen t coul d
26 MA
therefore b e judged t o hav e bee n exclusivel y caused b y the conver sion o f Kin g Ashuka , wh o zealousl y sough t t o internationaliz e hi s
religion. Her e th e proximat e caus e i s th e rea l one . O n th e othe r
hand, Buddhism' s activ e oppositio n t o th e rulin g strata , althoug h
lacking i n ancien t Buddhism , wa s alway s a "laten t possibility " in
view o f it s denunciatio n o f th e India n socia l orde r an d o f cast e
ritualism (Weber , India, p . 240) . Thus , whe n actualized , th e latte r
development cannot b e called a "historical accident, " becaus e i t was
always "objectivel y possible. "
In another example , Webe r deem s i t entirely legitimate (althoug h
he doe s no t tak e side s o n thi s specifi c question ) t o argu e tha t th e
assassination attemp t tha t heralde d th e Firs t Worl d Wa r b e dis carded a s insignificant if it is sufficiently clea r that the internationa l
situation o f th e tim e wa s volatil e enoug h t o b e se t ablaz e b y "any "
spark (Weber , Meyer, p . 166) . Knowin g tha t th e Firs t Worl d Wa r
was starte d b y a Serbia n student' s bulle t tell s u s nothin g abou t
whether i t was a "historical accident. " The sociolog y o f intellectuals
must make these type s of judgments whenever intellectual s advance
a historicall y consequential "ideology." Thes e question s canno t b e
settled ahea d o f tim e i n a metatheoretica l argumen t bu t mus t b e
resolved i n th e proces s o f fiel d research .
On Socia l Chang e
A Weberia n answe r to th e question : "How i s history possible? " ca n
be provide d o n th e basi s o f th e categorie s o f "objective possibility "
and "adequate causation," which integrate human interes t into, and
recognize i t a s a n integra l par t of , th e methodolog y o f historica l
sciences. Wha t woul d b e lef t o f a give n "historica l development " i f
we wer e t o depriv e ourselve s o f th e advantag e o f huma n perspec tive? Weber' s vie w o f th e "objective " directio n o r mechanic s o f
historical chang e a s reflecte d i n hi s theor y o f "socia l selection, "
while resemblin g th e approac h o f socia l Darwinis m o r tha t o f th e
theories o f social conflict , i s devoid o f their melioristi c o r rational izing overtones . Fo r on e thing , Webe r doe s no t assum e tha t th e
outcome o f socia l conflic t o r competitio n i s alway s determine d b y
the intrinsi c superiorit y o f th e survivin g individuals , groups , o r
sociocultural forms . "Survival" ca n b e th e resul t o f quit e concret e

extrinsic historica l circumstance s o r "accidents." The decidin g fac tor i n "social selection " is the "differentia l advantage" of the surviving group s o r forms , which i s not necessaril y indicative o f "fitnes s
to survive " or o f a superior "adaptedness, " but ca n resul t from an y
number o f socia l o r natura l changes . Surviva l ma y als o b e a n
unintended consequenc e o f actions o f any o f the partie s involved in
the "competitiv e struggle " (Weber , Economy I , pp . 38-40) .
Weber considered th e us e of concepts suc h a s "fitness t o survive "
or "adaptedness," which had becom e popula r in the wake of biolog ically imbue d theorie s o f evolution, t o b e beggin g th e questio n an d
charged wit h surreptitious value judgments. H e declared: "The fac t
that a give n specifi c socia l relationshi p ha s bee n eliminate d fo r
reasons peculia r to a particula r situation, prove s nothin g whatever
about it s 'fitness t o survive ' in genera l terms " (Weber, Economy I ,
p. 40) . A close examination o f the belie f that fitness to surviv e alone
accounts fo r surviva l shows that i t is a close relativ e of the determin istic fallacy , whic h Webe r avoide d b y suggestin g tha t th e flo w o f
reasoning b e revise d (fro m effect s t o cause s no t vic e versa) . "Th e
totality o f 'all' the condition s bac k t o whic h the causa l chai n fro m
the 'effect ' lead s had t o 'act jointly' i n a certain way an d in no othe r
for th e concrete effec t t o be realized " (Weber , Meyer, p . 187) . I n the
same vein the survival of a group o r a social for m can b e adequately
or accidentall y cause d b y a numbe r o f intrinsi c qualities, extrinsi c
circumstances, intende d a s wel l a s unintende d consequence s o f
human action . T o convenientl y simplif y thi s comple x proces s b y
stating tha t onl y th e fittes t wil l survive is t o reduc e th e scienc e o f
history t o fallacy : onl y th e fittes t survive ; anythin g tha t survive d
must hav e bee n fit!
In censurin g another aspec t o f socia l Darwinis m an d evolution ism invoke d i n th e ideolog y o f moder n technocrati c elites , Weber' s
critique aim s a t th e logica l foundation s a s wel l a s th e ideologica l
ramifications o f th e concep t o f "adaptedness":
Strictly an d exclusivel y empirica l analysi s ca n provid e a solutio n
only wher e it is a question of a mean s adequat e t o th e realizatio n of
an absolutel y unambiguously given end . Th e proposition : x i s th e
only means by which y ca n b e attained, is in fact merely the revers e of
the proposition : y i s the effec t o f x. Th e ter m "adaptedness" (and al l
28 MA
other relate d terms ) d o no t providean d thi s i s th e mai n thing

even the slightes t hint about th e value-judgments which they contain
and whic h they actually obscure. . . . Depending on how one uses the
term, eithe r everything or nothin g i n societ y i s "adapted. " (Weber,
Meaning, p . 26)
Weber was especially weary of value judgments implicit i n major

theories o f socia l change . Th e us e o f th e concep t o f "progress "
characterizing the inevitabl e benignity of the evolutio n of mankin d
could no t b e condone d b y Weber . H e maintaine d tha t th e wor d
"progress" be legitimatel y applied onl y i n a nonevaluative - context
where i t signifie s the "'continuation ' o f som e concret e proces s o f
change viewed in isolation" (Weber, Meaning, p . 27) . For instance ,
progress i n the real m o f art ca n b e discerne d not i n its aestheti c o r
evaluative sense but onl y with regard t o "the technica l means which
a certai n typ e o f artisti c impuls e applie s whe n the en d i s definitely
given" (Weber , Meaning, p . 29) .
In th e realm o f social psychology also, on e could elaborat e on a n
objective proces s o f progressiv e differentiatio n "i n th e 'scope ' o r
'capacity' o f a concret e 'mind,' " but , Webe r added , "whethe r on e
designates progressiv e differentiatio n as 'progress ' i s a matte r o f
terminological convenience " (Weber, Meaning, pp . 27 , 28). In a yet
different leve l o f analysis , Webe r advance d beyon d exposin g th e
fallacies a s wel l a s evaluative undercurrent s in the theorie s o f "progress" and questione d thei r single-minded optimism :
Whoever wishe s t o stat e a value-judgmen t regardin g th e fac t o f
differentiation a s suchwhic h n o empirica l discipline can forbid
and seek s a poin t o f vie w fro m whic h thi s ca n b e done , wil l com e
upon th e questio n a s t o th e pric e whic h i s "paid " for th e process .
(Weber, Meaning, p . 28 )
Compared wit h th e theorie s o f evolutio n (and , i n particular ,

social Darwinism) , Weber' s theor y o f socia l selectio n i s "valu e
neutral" and nonteleological . But it is also true that i t lays no clai m
to hav e explanator y o r predictiv e powers . No r doe s i t presum e t o
scientifically arriv e at practical social policies. Yet it is far from pure
mental exercise. Indeed, Weber' s theory is a parody o f the objective
theories of social change an d a s such it serves pedagogical purposes.
It ca n b e perceive d a s a too l fo r weanin g th e socia l science s fro m

prematurely impose d pattern s o f change an d warnin g them agains t
the fals e sens e o f securit y suc h theorie s impart .
It mus t als o b e note d tha t ou r critiqu e o f th e theorie s tha t
subsume Webe r as a "conflict sociologist " is not mean t t o den y th e
universal significanc e o f th e concep t o f conflic t i n Weber' s worl d
view. Webe r perceive d th e worl d a s a n utterl y unrationalizabl e
conglomerate o f contradiction s among , a s wel l a s within , th e
spheres o f life. 34 Onl y when this is accepted a s an ontologica l axio m
would i t follow tha t th e sol e corresponding theological depictio n of
such a worl d mus t b e polytheistic , recognizin g a s inevitabl e th e
irreconcilable an d uncompromisin g deat h struggle s betwee n th e
gods (Weber, Meaning, p. 17 ; Politics, p . 123) . Weber observe d that
attempts a t transcending thes e contradiction s i n thought hav e tim e
and agai n produce d th e revers e effect. B y drawing attentio n t o th e
problems they attemp t t o solve , suc h overl y rationalized image s o f
the worl d are likel y to ro b people o f the onl y protective shield they
wear agains t th e disturbin g influenc e of the contradiction s o f thei r
world: their ignorance of them (Weber, Meaning, p. 18) . The rul e of
thumb here is: The more rationally consistent a theoretical image of
the world , th e mor e useles s i t become s (Weber , Social, p . 275 ;
Economy I , p. 526) . In the religiou s sphere, therefore, the theoreti cal rationalizatio n o f the worl d imag e come s int o conflic t wit h th e
primitive practica l rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s life . A s th e
former increasingl y favor s radica l abnegatio n o f th e worl d fo r it s
recalcitrant refusa l t o evinc e the meanin g i t is supposed t o contain ,
the latter's conciliator y an d piecemea l approac h t o th e problem s of
evil an d meaninglessnes s i n th e worl d i s condemne d an d pushe d
aside (Weber , Economy I , p . 424 ; Rejections, p . 355) .
In th e spher e o f politica l ethics , Webe r rejecte d a s naiv e an d
ultimately dangerou s th e monis m o f th e "cosmi c ethica l 'ratio nalist'" wh o disregard s th e eterna l an d unresolvabl e conflic t o f
ethical maxim s (Weber , Politics, pp . 122-123 ; Meaning, pp . 15 , 16).
Therefore th e intellectualistic , overl y rationalize d imag e o f th e
world i s declared b y Webe r t o b e unfi t fo r practica l an d politica l
action, a s it is bound t o foste r dogmatic adherenc e t o the "ethics of
ultimate" ends an d generat e politica l irresponsibility. 35 Th e logica l
opposite o f this worl d view , which Webe r seem s t o recommen d t o
the politicians , is a warrior's ethi c o f following only one' s own go d
30 MA
or demon, o f heroically confronting one's fate in an irrational worl d

of man y deitie s (Weber , India, p . 27 ; Social, p . 283) .
Despite Weber' s commitmen t t o a philosophy o f eternal conflict,
however, h e neve r hypostatize d i t a s th e "drivin g force " o r th e
"pivot" of objective socia l change . O n th e sociologica l plan e Webe r
deemed conflic t t o b e bot h ineradicabl e an d ubiquitou s (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 39) . Bu t th e fac t tha t conflic t ca n b e properl y de fmed onl y whe n th e intentionalit y o f concret e actor s i s concerne d
(and thi s i s consonant wit h Weber' s methodologica l individualism)
disqualifies conflic t a s th e determinan t o f th e directio n o f socia l
change. Fo r Weber , th e scop e o f socia l conflic t i s rathe r limite d
because it can accoun t fo r socia l change onl y insofar as such chang e
originates i n conflictua l o r competitiv e socia l action . Conflic t i s
only on e amon g man y necessar y component s o f Weber' s theor y of
social change . I n a n exceptionall y revealin g passage , Dahrandor f
uses a n analog y likenin g the socia l conflic t vie w of the societ y to a
hyperbola, while the mode l o f the integratio n o r consensu s theorie s
is said t o b e an elliptica l one (Dahrandorf , Social Conflict, p . 106) .
Weber's image o f society and especiall y his theory of social selection
are fa r to o comple x an d multifoca l t o resembl e an y o f th e afore mentioned geometrica l models . Conflict o f various status groups o r
classes tha t mak e u p th e society , thei r variou s "way s o f life " tha t
constitute th e "culture, " an d thei r competitiv e struggl e fo r socia l
and cultura l predominanc e ar e rightl y depicted b y Bendi x t o char acterize Weber' s anticollectivisti c vie w o f th e subjec t matte r o f
sociology (Bendix , 1977 , p. 261) . But th e theor y o f socia l selectio n
recognizes conflict and competitio n onl y as two spoke s no t th e hu b
of th e turnin g whee l o f history . They ar e indispensabl e t o bu t no t
exclusively constitutiv e o f socia l change . Th e followin g passage ,
often quote d b y th e follower s o f th e conflic t schoo l o f though t
(Coser, 1956 , p . 21) , indicate s onl y th e indispensabilit y o f conflict ,
not it s centralit y to Weber' s theor y o f socia l change .
Conflict canno t b e exclude d fro m socia l life . On e ca n chang e it s
means, it s object, eve n it s fundamental directio n an d it s bearers, bu t
it cannot be eliminated . . . "peace" is nothing more than a change in
the for m o f the conflic t o r i n the antagonist s o r i n the object s o f th e
conflict, o r finall y i n th e chance s o f selection . (Weber , Meaning,
pp. 26-27)
As al l (intentional) action leadin g to change , conflict-oriente d an d

competitive actio n ar e als o liabl e t o b e undon e b y thei r ow n unin tended consequences. Even accidental natura l an d social change s can
intervene t o creat e certai n "differentia l advantages, " whic h may , de spite all rationally directe d conflictua l an d competitiv e action , decid e
which group or class survives. The concept o f conflict, as an insepara ble par t o f th e proces s o f socia l selection , refer s t o actio n oriente d
intentionally t o carryin g ou t th e individua l actor's ow n wil l agains t
the resistanc e o f the othe r part y or parties . A peaceful and regulate d
conflict i s called "competition." As opposed t o conflic t an d competi tion, "social selection" does not requir e the intentional predisposition
of th e social actors : "th e struggle , ofte n latent , whic h take s plac e
between huma n individual s o r socia l types , for advantage s an d fo r
survival, bu t withou t a meaningfu l mutua l orientatio n i n term s o f
conflict wil l b e calle d selection " (Weber , Economy I , p . 38) .
Social "selection " and "socia l conflict" must b e ascribed t o socia l
relationships a s far a s the probabilitie s of meaningful action o n th e
part o f individual actor s (b e it a conscious effor t agains t th e wil l of
others o r mer e struggl e t o achiev e persona l goals ) ar e concerned .
But can w e also conceive of conflict between social relationships (as
most theorist s o f conflic t hav e done) , o r o f social selectio n amon g
them? Webe r reject s thi s formall y but condone s it s metaphorica l
use (Weber , Economy / , p . 39 ) as lon g a s th e followin g i s kep t i n
perspective: "Thi s s o calle d 'selection ' ha s nothin g t o d o wit h th e
selection of types of human individuals " (Weber, Economy I, p. 40) .
Weber favore d th e us e o f th e metapho r o f selectio n instea d o f
that o f conflic t fo r describin g th e "objective " proces s o f socia l
change. Th e lac k o f the axio m o f mutual intentional predispositio n
of th e actor s i n socia l selectio n allow s a certai n leewa y fo r th e
exploration o f individual cases wher e the significanc e o f the inten tionally oriente d actio n varie s greatly . Socia l conflic t ma y o r ma y
not b e decisiv e i n determinin g th e outcom e o f socia l selectio n
depending o n th e individua l cases . Socia l selection , therefore , i s a
blind mechanism ; it has a logic but n o teleology. Whe n understoo d
in huma n terms , i t migh t b e studie d a s a selectiv e fulfillment o f a n
assortment o f objective possibilities. Like overl y rational theodicie s
of evil , th e theor y o f socia l selectio n tha t account s fo r al l o f th e
accidental an d rationa l element s is rendered useless. 36 Weber' s the ory i s such a theory : uselessnes s i s its goal .
32 MA
One ca n thin k o f Weber's theor y o f social selectio n a s a "transi tional object, " a pacifier of sorts that help s one unlearn th e habit o f
seeking pattern s i n th e past . Althoug h i t firs t appear s t o b e a n
objective philosoph y o f history , onc e understoo d i t collapse s int o
itself an d reveal s that i t can no t generat e a theory of social change ,
let alone a philosophy of history. The sterility of the theory of social
selection mirror s th e penur y o f an y "objective " theor y o f socia l
change i f i t i s strippe d o f hidde n valu e judgments an d mystifyin g
circular logic . Th e shadow y presenc e o f the theor y o f socia l selec tion i n Weber' s sociolog y o f intellectual s i s fel t mor e a s a neutra l
ether t o preven t erroneous conjecture s than a s a positive theory of
social change. A s in other field s o f sociology, Weber's methodolog y
helps on e to tur n to empirica l research rathe r tha n t o see k answers
in philosophica l conjecture . I t help s on e t o avoi d pitfall s rathe r
than provid e a guid e t o th e correc t path .
2
Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Religio n
as a Sociolog y o f Intellectual s
Marx an d Webe r o n Intratheoretica l Consistency:

Sociologies o f Knowledg e and Intellectuals
Like th e them e o f rationalit y i n Weber' s works , th e sociolog y o f
intellectuals is a pervasive motif, not a distinct aspec t o f his sociol ogy. Sociolog y o f intellectual s i s nevertheles s a substantivel y ric h
and theoreticall y fecun d regio n o f Weber' s univers e o f discourse ,
and w e hope t o demonstrat e thi s by reconstructin g i t i n this book .
The mos t salien t featur e o f Weber's sociolog y o f intellectual s i s its
extraordinary lucidit y exactl y i n th e area s wher e alternativ e at tempts (namel y thos e o f th e Marxis t school ) hav e produce d onl y
obscure o r obscurantis t formulations .
This chapte r i s based o n th e assumptio n tha t th e consistenc y of
Weber's epistemological stance with his sociology of knowledge and
their join t contributio n t o hi s substantiv e sociologie s o f religio n
and politic s are responsible for th e clarity of pivotal definitions and
explanations upo n whic h a sociolog y o f intellectual s i s built . O f
course, suc h consistency , desired a s it ma y be , i s neither necessar y
nor sufficien t fo r the constitution o f a viable theory of intellectuals.
Indeed, th e stud y o f th e Marxis t theor y o f intellectual s demon strates tha t a degre e o f intratheoretica l ambiguit y betwee n th e
spheres o f epistemology, sociolog y o f knowledge, an d sociolog y of
intellectuals can spark man y intriguing debates amon g the protagonists of various versions of "the rea l intent" of the texts i n question.
This ha s le d t o a shar p delineatio n o f th e tension s an d problem s
33
34 MA
that had bee n neglected by Marx. W e intend to star t this chapter by

comparing an d contrastin g Weber' s view s o n sociolog y o f religio n
to thos e o f Mar x an d Marxist s i n orde r t o highligh t th e rol e o f
intratheoretical consistenc y (lac k thereof ) i n th e stud y o f sociolo gies o f religio n an d o f intellectuals . The n w e wil l continu e b y
reconstructing a serie s o f idea l type s fo r th e religion s o f variou s
classes an d strat a an d b y contrastin g thes e religiou s needs to thos e
of intellectuals .
To consider Marxist an d sociologica l text s a s integral parts of the
sociology o f intellectual s require s th e adoptio n o f a broade r per spective than that provided b y the conventiona l standard s o f either
discourse. Transcendin g th e field-specifi c jargo n o f both field s wil l
reveal that the two disciplines constitute parallel universes ; that for
every argumen t an d counterargumen t concernin g th e rol e o f intellectuals in one there is an analogous debat e i n the other. A compar ative stud y i n parallel field s o f sociology an d Marxis m wil l under line th e importanc e o f intratheoretica l consistenc y fo r th e clea r
formulation o f a sociolog y o f intellectuals.
In comparin g th e tw o field s on e wil l als o fin d tha t academi c
sociology's discussio n o f intellectuals , sedat e a s it migh t appea r a t
the outset , doe s not entirel y lack the liveliness and enthusias m wit h
which simila r question s ar e discusse d b y Marxist theorists . I n fact ,
such forerunner s o f sociolog y o f intellectual s a s Kar l Mannhei m
and Emil e Lederer, who contributed t o th e establishmen t o f sociology o f intellectual s a s a n independen t branc h o f sociology , ha d
more tha n dispassionat e academi c interes t i n th e subjec t (Mann heim, 1936 ; Lederer , 1940) . Indeed , lik e som e o f thei r Marxis t
counterparts, the y sough t t o fin d a n ideolog y for , rathe r tha n a
sociology of , intellectuals (Mannheim , 1943) . For man y othe r soci ologists, constructin g a scientifi c theory o f intellectual s ha s pose d
the challeng e o f ultimat e reflexivity ; fo r thos e wit h platoni c com plexes o r ambition s i t ha s becom e a foun t o f profoun d self-doub t
and a sourc e o f legitimation crises .
Weber viewed the questio n o f intellectuals with bot h passio n an d
perspective. Hi s sociology o f religion reflects hi s theoretical interes t
in the matter; hi s political sociology reveals his ideological interests ,
his hopes, fears , an d worrie s regarding the future of his civilization.
Weber dedicate d tw o o f hi s mos t profoun d lecture s t o th e pur e
calling o f a scientis t an d th e politica l missio n o f a citizen/intellec -
Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 3
tual (Weber , Science; Politics). Befor e substantivel y discussin g

these themes , however , w e mus t recogniz e tha t i t wa s Weber' s
intratheoretical consistenc y that allowed him to lucidly debate thes e
issues.
The vaguenes s of Marx's sociolog y of knowledge leaves hi s soci ology of intellectuals virtually eclipsed: What i s the relation of ideas
to socia l reality ? Wha t i s the statu s o f th e carrier s o f idea s i n th e
social system? Do the y create ideas independently, or simply reflect
class contradictions ? Mus t the y lea d th e progressiv e movemen t o f
the society, or should the y only observe and follow? The subsequen t
acrimonious debat e regardin g these question s amon g hi s follower s
is indicativ e o f Marx' s fundamenta l ambivalence . However , elimi nating contradiction s an d impartin g theoretica l clarit y hav e rarel y
been the driving force behin d thes e vitriolic debates. Rather , theor ists of the lef t hav e debated th e rol e of intellectuals i n relation t o its
practical valu e fo r socialis t movements . Ros a Luxembur g consid ered th e resolutio n o f th e ideologica l controvers y ove r th e rol e o f
party "intellectual " i n th e workers ' struggl e a s vita l fo r th e ver y
survival o f th e globa l revolutionar y movemen t o f which sh e wa s a
part (Luxemburg , 1990) . Lenin , he r theoretica l opponent , havin g
actually le d the firs t successfu l Bolshevi k revolution di d no t attac h
less importanc e t o th e questio n o f th e rol e o f intellectual s (insid e
and outsid e the party) . Hence , th e famous indirect debat e betwee n
the tw o (Lenin , 1973) .
Only the later academicall y oriente d Marxist s hav e attempte d t o
treat th e questio n o f intellectual s wit h a consideratio n fo r consis tency o f th e axiom s o f sociologie s o f knowledg e and intellectuals .
Among the latter , Alvi n Gouldner, a self-professed lef t Hegelian , is
a majo r cas e i n point .
He too k th e Marxis t axio m o f the socia l determinatio n o f con sciousness an d seriousl y tried to construct a sociology o f intellectuals o n tha t basis . Wha t h e discovere d wa s tha t th e lef t Hegelia n
legacy ha d bee n betraye d b y it s mos t famou s heir : Marx . Th e
Marxist sociolog y o f intellectuals, Gouldne r observed , is based no t
only o n ignoranc e an d fals e consciousnes s bu t als o o n deceptio n
and distortio n (Gouldner , 1979 , pp . 9 , 11 , 57, 85) . Postulatin g a
strictly Marxis t sociolog y o f knowledge endowed Gouldne r wit h a
keen eye for recognizin g "ideologies" of intellectuals masqueradin g
as transcendenta l voice s o f reaso n o r revolution . Th e followin g
36 MA
example wil l illustrate that, indeed , intellectuals' zeal for intratheo retical consistenc y might radically undermine an ideological system
rather tha n furtherin g it s development and refinement . Philosophical Marxis m maintain s tha t th e proletaria t i s the sol e subjec t an d
the "we" o f history. Gouldner doubts tha t Mar x eve r believed this.
He quote s the passag e i n which Mar x seem s to hav e subscribe d t o
the idea : "W e expressly formulate the battl e cry : the emancipatio n
of th e workin g clas s mus t b e conquere d b y th e workin g clas s
themselves"; but , Gouldne r interdicts , "Wh o wa s th e w e wh o for mulated th e battl e cry? " (Gouldner , p . 75) .
Let u s ventur e beyon d recognizin g the contradictio n i n orde r t o
locate it s roots . Th e penur y of Marx' s sociolog y of knowledge has
allowed th e axio m o f th e socia l determinatio n o f knowledg e t o
degenerate int o a kin d o f reductionis m tha t Mar x seeme d mor e
eager t o defen d tha n t o disavow . Th e decisiv e rol e tha t Marxis m
assigns to a n advanced proletaria t i n breaking throug h "the antino mies o f bourgeois thought, " a s reflected upon b y George Lukac s i n
the proble m o f "labor-time, " carrie s th e implicatio n tha t contem plative intellectualization canno t b y itself achieve th e knowledg e of
the socia l totality , le t alon e constitut e a basi s fo r revolutionar y
praxis i n orde r t o chang e i t (Lukacs , 1971 , pp , 167-172) . Th e
knowledge o f the totalit y is held to flo w fro m th e immediat e expe rience o f tim e spen t unde r th e condition s o f exploitatio n no t th e
time spen t o n tome s o f scientifi c analysi s o f it. Coupl e thes e obser vations wit h the aversio n o f "committed thinkers " toward th e irre sponsibility o f pur e "seeker s o f pur e knowledge, " an d tha t o f th e
left towar d inherentl y untrustworthy "bourgeois intellectuals, " an d
one ha s reason s enoug h t o accoun t fo r Marx' s lac k o f interes t i n
elaborating th e rol e o f intellectual s in effectin g th e socialis t trans formation. Marx' s blatan t neglec t o f th e issu e deprive d hi m o f
reflexivity, of , to quot e Gouldner , "being abl e t o accoun t fo r him self."
Marx, preferre d to defe r th e issue indefinitely. But Lenin's histor ical rol e compelle d hi m t o tackl e th e proble m mor e explicitly .
Rather tha n offerin g a theoretical resolution , however , Leni n con centrated o n practical necessitie s such as the fundamental indispensability of the intellectual core of the workers' movement: the party .
Lenin preferre d to dodg e th e clas s analysi s o f ideas an d ideologie s
and t o avoid invokin g the Marxist principl e of the social determina-
tion o f consciousness . Wit h a n od d mixtur e o f ingeniousnes s an d

political shrewdnes s he als o suspende d th e typica l Marxis t suspi cion abou t th e motive s o f those intellectual s wh o becam e "profes sional revolutionaries. "
What di d al l thi s mean ? Wh y woul d bourgeoi s intellectual s renounce thei r ow n class and no t onl y join but als o lead member s of
an opposin g clas s to victor y against thei r ow n class? Havin g mad e
history, Leni n wa s not to o kee n o n justifying hi s theoretical gam bits. Hi s socialist opponent s coul d fus s ove r these weak theoretica l
links in what appeared to be an enormous practica l success , and the
debate continue d fo r decades . Sociolog y o f ideas (knowledge) an d
their carrier s (intellectuals ) need s a soli d theoretica l standpoint ,
which i s lacking i n Marxism .
The flourishin g o f Weber' s sociolog y o f religion , hi s politica l
sociology, and, o f course, the clarit y o f his sociology of intellectuals
are al l due t o hi s clea r stanc e regardin g th e interpla y o f ideas an d
interests i n the spher e of the sociolog y of knowledge. The postula tion o f relatively autonomous sphere s for ideas and interests, whic h
also led Weber to oppos e th e attempt s o f dogmatic historical mate rialists t o trac e al l idea s (includin g religiou s ones ) bac k t o th e
economic infrastructure , allowe d fo r th e fre e exploratio n o f th e
dialectics of ideas and interests . This is best illustrated, for example,
by the basi c concepts upo n whic h Weber constructed hi s sociology
of religion .
Marx an d Webe r o n Sociolog y o f Religio n
The widespread acceptanc e o f proto-Marxist historica l materialism
among hi s contemporarie s (e.g. , Kautsky ) inspire d Webe r t o at tempt a clandestine refutation of that school. Thi s "debate with the
ghost o f Marx " consist s o f a serie s o f scattere d an d indirec t bu t
persistent refutation s o f historica l materialism . Thus , Webe r re fused t o assum e tha t "th e specifi c natur e o f a religio n i s a simpl e
'function' o f the socia l situatio n o f the stratu m whic h appear s a s its
characteristic bearer , o r that it represents the stratum's ideology, or
that i t i s a 'reflection ' o f a stratum' s materia l o r idea l interes t
situation" (Weber, Social, pp. 269-270) . I n other words, "the natur e
of a stratum' s religiosit y ha s nowher e bee n solel y determine d b y
38 MA
economic conditions " (Weber , China, p . 196) . H e maintaine d tha t

even when the influenc e o f economic factors i n the religiou s sphere
is obvious , stil l "th e idiosyncrati c autonom y o f th e religiou s do main" remain s ascendan t (Weber , Economy I , p . 433) . Weber' s
methodological stanc e i s clear: h e espouse d th e relativ e autonom y
of th e spher e of ideas . Th e Weberia n sociolog y o f knowledg e does
contain allusion s t o "affinities " betwee n idea s an d economi c con stellations (Weber , Economy I , p . 480) , th e "wedding " o f certai n
thought product s an d a particula r socia l order , (Weber , India,
p. 131 ) and a t time s allow s for a "co-determination" o f the conten t
of religion by extra religious factors (Weber, Judaism, p . 80 ; China,
p, 249) . Bu t Webe r neve r "explained" religiou s phenomena a s eco nomic product s o r vic e versa .
According t o Weber , th e prohibitio n o f usur y b y th e Catholi c
church wa s no t cause d b y th e absenc e o f interest o n capita l unde r
the natura l economy , a s was claimed b y th e proponent s o f histori cal materialism . H e note d tha t th e church , an d eve n th e Pop e
himself, partoo k i n unscrupulou s usur y durin g th e Middl e Ages .
The prohibitio n o f usury was a later phenomenon : th e resul t o f th e
consummation o f th e proces s o f theoretica l rationalizatio n o f th e
religious domai n (Weber , Economy I , p . 584) . Webe r advance d a
similar argumen t t o refut e th e materialisti c explanatio n o f th e
origin o f Jainism in India. Althoug h Jainis m originate d a t the tim e
of the ris e of the India n cit y and wa s enthusiastically received in th e
new urba n centers , i t wa s no t " a 'product ' o f th e 'bourgeoisie,' "
rather, "i t stemmed fro m Kshatriy a speculation an d la y asceticism "
(Weber, India, p. 202) . Weber also refused to treat Jewish prophec y
in terms of the economic infrastructure. Jewish prophets came from
diverse origin s (Weber , Judaism, p . 277) , h e pointe d out , ye t the y
often conveye d a simila r message , addressin g th e negativel y privileged an d uneducate d strata . Thei r prophec y o f doo m wa s hardl y
marketable, an d thei r intellectua l effort s wen t unremunerate d
(Weber, Economy I , p . 441) . Despit e tie s t o th e traditiona l intelli gentsia, the y fough t agains t th e dominan t culture d strat a an d
prophets o f good fortune , as well as their patrons , th e Jewis h king s
(Weber, Judaism, pp . 109 , 278).
A carefu l readin g o f Webe r wil l reveal tha t h e di d no t inten d t o
"substitute fo r a on e side d materialisti c a n equall y on e side d
spiritualistic causa l interpretatio n o f cultur e an d history " (Weber ,
Protestant, p . 183) . Webe r maintaine d tha t religio n ca n pla y a

significant rol e i n economi c chang e onl y whe n powerfu l drive s
toward a n economic transformation ar e also present in the existing
constellation o f relationship s an d interest s (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 577) . He expressed hi s position in the well-know n passage: "Not
ideas, but materia l interests, directly govern men's conduct. Ye t very
frequently th e 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have,
like switchmen, determined the tracks alon g whic h actio n ha s bee n
pushed b y th e dynami c o f interest " (Weber , Social, p . 280) . If ,
when, where, and how an idea or its reinterpretation might come t o
determine th e trajector y o f histor y wa s deeme d b y Webe r t o b e a
matter o f empirical research, i t could no t b e deduced fro m an y set
of overreachin g axiomati c o r evolutionar y law s (Weber , Economy I , p . 480).
Although Webe r criticize d thos e theorists wh o wer e in the habi t
of automaticall y assumin g materialisti c base s fo r an y historicall y
significant se t of ideas, he did no t exclude , in the name o f methodo logical principles, the possibility of a "materialistic" explanation o f
an idea . Indeed , Webe r did occasionall y offe r certai n explanation s
that were not far from theorie s of historical materialism. Fo r exam ple, he argued tha t the existence of irrigation system s in Mesopota mia and Arabia wa s probably one source of the notion o f a god who
had create d th e eart h an d ma n ou t o f nothing , rathe r tha n b y
procreating them (Weber, Economy I, p. 449) . Moreover, he attrib uted the religious disinclination of the modern bourgeois and prole tarian classe s t o th e fac t tha t the y ar e no longe r dependen t o n th e
course of natural an d meteorological processe s (Weber, Economy I ,
p. 485) . Finally , Webe r wen t beyond observin g an affinit y betwee n
organismic socia l theories an d thos e socioeconomi c circumstance s
that give rise to various forms o f a "welfare state." Recognizing that
socioeconomic an d consequentl y political structure s ca n determin e
the contour s o f socia l philosophy , h e generalize d abou t variou s
philosophical legitimation s o f th e welfar e state : "Naturall y suc h
ideas sugges t themselve s t o an y politica l welfar e organization "
(Weber, India, p. 143 ; Judaism, pp . 257-258) . I n other words, ideologies o f intelligentsia entrenche d i n patrimonia l bureaucracie s con verged o n th e ide a o f state interventionis m in th e nam e o f materia l
or spiritua l welfar e o f th e masses , regardles s o f thei r civilizationa l
differences (w e will com e bac k t o thi s issu e in Chapte r 3) .
40 MA
The Marxis t sociolog y o f religion , i n s o fa r a s i t exists , i s a

sociology of mass religiosity. Even in this area Weber' s observations
are fa r mor e elegan t compare d wit h thos e o f Marx . Thi s i s partly
due t o Marx' s lack o f interest in religion. The youn g Mar x ha d o f
course reflecte d o n th e origi n of religio n an d wha t i t represented,
but tha t h e lacke d interes t (bot h persona l an d philosophical ) i n
religion i s evident i n hi s late r writings . After all , thi s proble m ha d
already bee n obsessivel y explore d b y on e o f hi s predecessors ,
namely, Feuerbach. I n contrast to Feuerbach , Weber , not touchin g
on the questio n of the origi n of religious ideas, pursued a sociology
of religio n that focuse d o n th e interpla y o f religiou s ideas , o n th e
one hand, an d th e interest s of various social strat a an d classes , o n
the other. Hence, the Marxis t sociolog y of religion overlaps certain
aspects o f Weber's, allowin g for th e clai m that Weber' s orientatio n
embraced an d elaborated idea s on the subject that Marx had developed earlier. 1
In vie w o f th e fac t tha t Marx' s sketch y remark s o n th e socia l
implications o f religio n hav e len t themselve s to a variet y of inter pretations, ranging from a Leninist conspiracy theory of religion to
Bloch's Marxis t theology , is it necessar y t o qualif y th e preceding?
We think not, becaus e Weber's sociology of religion is wide enough
to include , an d broa d enoug h t o anticipate , th e man y interpreta tions o f Marx . Conside r th e tw o aforementione d extreme s o f th e
Marxist sociolog y of religion: Lenin's conspiracy theory of religion
versus Bloch' s Marxis t theology .
Lenin's militan t antireligiou s attitud e ha s a dua l root , on e o f
which i s hi s admittedl y eighteenth-centur y atheism ; thi s i s no t a t
issue here . Th e secon d i s hi s reductionis t sociolog y o f religion ,
which is inspired by Marx's statement: "Religion is the opium o f the
people." B y this Leni n mean t tha t i n th e hand s o f th e exploiter s
religion is a mere instrument for stupefying and eventually oppress ing th e masse s (Lenin , 1935 , pp . 7 , 12 , 14 , 45 , 46) . Thi s lin e o f
reasoning, which became ver y prevalent in th e wak e of the success
of th e Russia n Revolution , wa s late r challenge d b y a numbe r o f
heterodox Marxis t interpreters . Erns t Bloc h denounce d th e legac y
of eighteenth-century "bourgeois philistines," holding it to be nothing more than "banal atheism" masquerading a s the Marxist theor y
of religion (Bloch, 1970 , p. 37) . Attempts were also made to demystify Lenin' s sloga n b y restorin g i t withi n th e origina l contex t o f
Marx's critiqu e o f Hegel' s philosophy of law: "Religious distres s is

at the same time the expression of real distress an d a protest agains t
real distress . Religio n i s the sig h o f the oppressed , th e hear t o f th e
heartless world, just a s it is the spiri t of the spiritles s situation. I t is
the opiu m o f th e people " (Marx , 1967 , p . 250) . Va n Leeuwe n
warned that we must guard agains t distortin g the phrase "opium o f
the people " int o "opiu m fo r th e people " (Va n Leeuwen , 1972 ,
p. 11) .
Weber seem s to hav e been awar e o f the "o f an d for " duality . H e
not onl y put forth the characteristics o f "a religion of the people" i n
historical detai l (in the manner o f Bloch and Van Leeuwen) but als o
elucidated th e formations an d mechanisms tha t are associated wit h
those constructe d "for the people" in each historically specific situation. Weber' s stud y o f mas s religiosity , therefore, cover s bot h ex tremes o f the Marxis t theor y o f religion. This , however , is but on e
aspect o f Weber' s sociolog y o f religion , a s hi s reflection s o n th e
characteristics o f the religiosit y of intellectuals , warriors , an d civi c
strata clearl y demonstrate. The Weberian reflection s on religions of
various socia l classe s an d strat a ar e base d o n a more fundamenta l
concept o f "religious needs. "
Weber's basi c postulatio n o f th e concep t o f religiou s need s i s
related t o hi s thesi s tha t "ideas " d o no t neatl y intermes h wit h
"interests" (Weber , Social, p . 268) . If they do intermesh, the process
is usuall y mediate d b y a secondar y intellectua l activit y calle d th e
"reinterpretation o f ideas. " Religiou s reinterpretations , Webe r ob served, "adjus t th e revelation s t o th e need s o f th e religiou s com munity." I f this (th e reinterpretation s o f the reveale d ideas ) occur s
"then i t is at least usua l that th e religiou s doctrines ar e adjuste d t o
the religious needs" (Weber , Social, p . 270) . Weber' s analysi s o f
religion i s no t onl y base d o n "th e metaphysica l need s o f huma n
mind" bu t als o o n th e ideologica l need s o f variou s strat a an d
classes:
The kin d o f empirica l stat e o f blis s o r experienc e o f rebirt h tha t i s
sought afte r a s th e suprem e valu e b y a religio n ha s obviousl y an d
necessarily varie d accordin g t o th e characte r o f th e stratu m whic h
was foremost i n adoptin g it . The chivalrou s warrio r class , peasants ,
business classes , an d intellectual s wit h literar y educatio n have natu rally pursue d differen t religiou s tendencies . A s wil l become evident ,
42 MA
these tendencie s hav e no t b y themselves determine d th e psychologi cal characte r o f religion ; the y have , however , exerte d a ver y lastin g
influence upo n it. The contrast betwee n warrio r an d peasan t classes ,
and intellectua l an d busines s classes , is of special importanc e (Weber ,
Social, p . 279) .
Some Marxis t theorist s have recognized a need to g o beyond pole micizing agains t religio n as a social force and hav e com e t o appre ciate Weber' s accomplishment s i n explorin g th e psychologica l sig nificance o f religio n (Bloch , 1971 , p. 79 ; Birnbaum , pp . 133-34) .
Yet Weber' s treatmen t o f religio n a s a respons e t o th e particula r
ideal an d materia l interest s o f various classe s and socia l strat a stil l
remains undiscovered by Marxist thinkers . Weber's approac h i n his
search fo r th e "religious needs " of different strat a an d classe s could
be instructiv e fo r thos e Marxis t theorist s wh o ar e intereste d i n
studying th e ideologica l natur e o f certai n religiou s phenomena .
Ideas an d ideologica l needs , religion s an d religiou s need s fi t to gether a s a mortise an d teno n joint; the stud y o f one i s inextricably
bound t o th e learnin g o f th e other . Th e followin g examples shal l
demonstrate that when empirical evidence suggested, Weber did not
shrink from offerin g classica l materialistic interpretations abou t th e
origin o f ideas .
Weber maintained, fo r instance, that the dependence of the peas ants o n organi c processe s an d natura l event s an d thei r distanc e
from rationa l systematizatio n o f th e economi c lif e generat e a n
inclination fo r animisti c magic o r ritualism as well as a resistance t o
ethical rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s real m (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 468) . He also concurred wit h Marx tha t th e modern proletariat' s
dependence o n purel y socia l factors account s fo r thei r indifferenc e
to o r rejection of religion (Weber, Economy I , p. 485) . Ideas can be
autonomous fro m th e materia l surroundings , bu t thi s i s not neces sarily th e case .
Weber wen t beyon d th e spher e of mas s religiosity . Fo r instance ,
he considere d th e spher e o f religiou s mythologie s a s a mirro r re flecting socia l conflict s o f variou s strat a i n th e religiou s mytholo gies. Conside r th e followin g examples : for Webe r the inferiorit y of
the eart h divinitie s to persona l god s residin g i n cloud s an d moun tains signifie d the triump h o f knightly ethos ove r peasan t religion s
(Weber, Economy / , p . 410). Also , the Vedi c tensio n betwee n Var-
una an d Mitra , th e guardian s o f the sacre d order , o n one side, an d

Indra, a formidabl e warrior-god , o n th e other , wa s take n a s a n
indication o f th e conflic t betwee n "th e priesthood , strivin g fo r a
firm regulatio n an d contro l o f life, an d th e powerfu l warlike nobility" (Weber, Economy I, p. 417) . The ascension of celestial or astra l
gods i n the pantheon no t onl y reflected "th e priesthood' s propaga tion o f systematize d sacre d ordinances, " which woul d ensur e th e
fixation o f morality and judicial decisions, it would als o rationaliz e
the subordination o f subjects to their overlords (Weber, Economy I ,
pp. 410 , 417). Weber viewe d the occidenta l religion s wit h a similar
theoretical bent , observin g that the concept of Yahweh had change d
from a war god to a city-dwelling, wise governor o f the univers e in
order t o accommodat e th e religiou s conception s o f th e leadin g
strata i n variou s period s o f Jewis h histor y (Weber , Judaism,
p. 133) .
Despite th e richnes s o f Weber' s observation s regardin g th e reli gious need s o f th e urba n masses , th e peasantry , th e warriors , th e
bureaucrats, an d th e variou s type s o f intellectuals , h e di d no t at tempt a forma l classificatio n o f thes e idea l typica l construction s
because suc h a project would have been of secondary importance i n
view o f hi s particula r interes t i n worl d religions : tha t is , thei r
relative conducivenes s to capitalism . Yet , a rathe r basi c class-or iented categorizatio n o f religious need s is legitimate an d necessar y
for th e purpose s o f the present study : a religion o f intellectuals ca n
be mos t fruitfull y studie d onl y i n contras t t o religion s o f othe r
classes and strata. We will start with the study of mass religiosity. In
order t o brin g t o a clos e th e serie s o f comparisons betwee n Mar x
and Weber , we will couch Weber' s observatio n i n this are a in terms
of th e Marxis t debat e ove r religion s of/fo r th e masses .
Religion o f the Masse s
A clea r paralle l ca n b e discerne d betwee n tw o pair s o f idea l type s
that Webe r use d t o characteriz e th e religiou s inclination s o f th e
masses. O n th e on e hand , mas s religiosit y i s counterpose d t o th e
religion o f th e contemplative , asceti c o r mysti c virtuosos (Weber ,
General, p . 364 ; Judaism, p . 246 ; Social, pp . 287-290 ; Rejections,
p. 343) . O n th e other , religion s o f th e communit y (includin g th e
44 MA
cults o f state, tribe , o r kinsmen ) ar e describe d a s distinct fro m an d

generally unresponsiv e t o th e religiou s need s o f the la y individuals
(Weber, Social, p . 272) . Th e similarit y betwee n th e religiou s need s
of th e masse s an d thos e o f the "individual " (e.g. , nee d fo r persona l
explanation o f specifi c misfortune , an d a mechanis m fo r reversin g
it), a s liste d b y Weber , can b e explained i f we conceive o f the mas s
as a n unorganize d aggregat e o f uneducate d an d ofte n "religiousl y
unmusical" individual s (Weber , Rejections, p . 289) .
The individua l need s fo r a persona l theodic y an d fo r concret e
help whil e i n distres s ar e rarel y me t b y th e communa l deitie s wh o
are i n the busines s o f guaranteeing victor y ove r the enemy , contro l
of th e meteorologica l conditions , an d succes s i n boot y an d th e
hunt. Hence , th e immens e popularit y o f th e sorcerer s who catere d
to th e need s o f th e individual s irrespectiv e o f thei r communa l
affiliations; a popularit y tha t coul d potentiall y transcen d loca l
boundaries an d provid e for a transnational communit y o f the devo tees. In this process the sorcerers can develop into mystagogue s and
even prophet s (Weber , Social, p. 277 ; Judaism, p . 166) . It i s in this
sense tha t Webe r claimed : "Th e magicia n ha s bee n th e historica l
precursor o f the prophet , o f the exemplar y a s well a s the emissar y
prophet an d savio r (Weber , Rejections, p . 327). 2
For thi s reason, the natura l allie s o f the prophet s ar e the laity, as
their natura l foe s ar e th e priesthoo d o f the communa l temple . Yet,
irrespective o f th e initia l hostilit y betwee n th e priest s an d th e
prophets, the y have , i n occidenta l religion s a t an y rate , collabo rated i n th e caus e o f th e ethica l rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s
sphere. I n thi s sens e th e messag e o f th e prophet s o f Wester n reli gions ha s bee n th e pola r opposit e o f tha t o f magicians , wh o i n a
genetic an d functiona l sense are held to b e close relatives of proph ecy. "Prophet s an d priest s ar e th e twi n bearer s o f the systematiza tion an d rationalizatio n o f religiou s ethics " (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 439) . In the process of substantive routinization o f the content o f
the propheti c revelations, the priest s often compromise th e unit y of
the origina l messag e an d th e rigo r o f it s "ethic s o f ultimat e ends "
(Weber, Economy I , pp.460 , 465-466) . I n China , th e communa l
religions (th e cul t o f th e stat e an d th e ancestors ' cults) , whil e
preventing the satisfactio n o f the individual' s ques t fo r a mysti c or
ascetic salvation , tolerate d th e recours e o f th e masse s t o magi c a s
long as the magicians kep t their claims moderate an d di d not boas t
of bein g mystagogue s o r prophet s (Weber , China, pp . 177-178 ,

200).
The uneducate d masse s d o no t usuall y fin d th e intellectua l an d
the virtuos o religiou s promise s palatable . Thus , Webe r assume d
that al l types o f mas s religiosit y res t o n simila r form s o f religiou s
experience. A transcendental god, a n impersona l cosmi c order , o r
attainment o f a stat e o f blis s i n a nirvana d o no t appea l t o th e
religious tastes of the masse s o f peasantry an d urba n lowe r classes.
This aversio n t o abstrac t religio n i s in par t th e resul t o f th e eco nomic situatio n o f thes e groups : withou t th e necessar y persona l
resources o r leisure, they lack means to achiev e such transcendenta l
states of awareness. Furthermore , such abstract conception s ar e not
responsive t o thei r ow n needs fo r a tangibl e emotiona l experienc e
of th e sacre d an d fo r emergenc y suppor t whe n i n distress . Thes e
primarily psychologica l need s hav e bee n behin d th e ubiquitou s
disinclination o f th e masse s towar d thos e rationa l concept s tha t
characterize al l soteriologies propounded b y the intellectua l strat a
(Weber, India, p . 236).
Weber wa s not to o circumspec t abou t venturin g generalization s
about religiou s needs of social classes. He suggested that a universal
propensity for magic, idolatry, hagiolatry , and savior worship characterizes al l mas s religion s o f th e world , an d tha t the y hol d i n
common a n interes t i n a semirationa l "theodicy " of sufferin g tha t
has ofte n take n th e for m o f nee d fo r a just compensatio n i n th e
hereafter (Weber , Economy I , p . 492) . Als o th e interes t i n direc t
(often emotiona l o r sensual ) an d noncontemplativ e experienc e o f
the hol y ha s universall y existe d an d le d t o mas s popularit y o f
orgiasticism, whic h wa s originall y a n exclusiv e trai t o f peasan t
religions (Weber , Social, p. 283) .
Religions bor n amon g othe r socia l strata , a s wel l a s th e grea t
prophetic movements of the "occidental religions, " have come int o
conflict wit h the religiou s tendencie s o f the masses . Sometime s th e
world religion s hav e bee n abl e t o temper , rationalize , o r i n rar e
cases, eve n eliminat e certai n religiou s belief s o f th e masses . A s a
rule, however, the intellectualistic or prophetic religion s themselves
are liabl e t o underg o drasti c modification s t o accommodat e thos e
lay group s tha t ar e no t particularl y o r professionall y concerne d
with th e cultivatio n o f intellectualism . Suc h change s o f characte r
are inevitable , especiall y whe n a religio n o f intellectual s i s t o b e
46 MA
introduced t o negativel y privilege d strat a t o who m contemplativ e

religiosity i s bot h economicall y an d sociall y inaccessibl e (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 487) .
The originall y intellectualis t Buddhis m adopte d Tantrism an d
mantrism a s the mos t usabl e source s o f ritualism fo r th e consump tion o f the masses . Shivais t Brahmanhoo d achieve d th e sam e goa l
by incorporating phalli c an d apotropai c ecstas y an d magi c (Weber,
India, p. 302) . Also the transformation o f the impersonal "Brahma "
into a personal deity in orthodox Hinduis m wa s a concession t o lay
needs (Weber , India, p . 173) . To keep bot h th e intellectua l an d la y
groups intereste d an d content , som e religion s hav e develope d a
rigorous dua l organizatio n o f th e lait y an d th e asceti c o r mysti c
virtuosi, an d designate d separat e ethica l obligation s fo r the m
(Weber, Economy I , pp . 505 , 506) . Succes s i n thi s linkag e i s a
matter o f survival for a n originall y elitist religion, a s the alternativ e
fates o f successful Jainism and defeated Buddhis m i n India have s o
clearly demonstrate d (Weber , India, pp , 196 , 233 , 291) .
Besides incorporating element s of mass religiosity and organizin g
the laity , th e intellectualisti c religion s hav e occasionall y opte d t o
live side by side with religious heterodoxie s tha t ar e favored b y th e
masses. A s indicate d earlier , th e Confucia n stat e cul t allowe d th e
plebeian Taois t priest s and Buddhis t monk s t o continu e t o cate r t o
the need s o f th e masse s (Weber , China, p . 201 ; India, p . 327) . I n
Weber's view , thi s parallele d th e toleratio n o f philosophica l meta physics b y th e Hellenisti c popula r religion . I n th e latte r cas e th e
state demande d onl y tha t th e "subjects" observ e thei r culti c dutie s
in orde r t o war d of f collectiv e misfortune , whil e th e philosopher s
were allowe d t o elaborat e o n th e dutie s o f th e "citizens " (Weber,
China, pp . 175 , 176).
The religiou s need s o f the masse s ar e characterize d b y Webe r i n
yet another language , tha t o f Feuerbach an d Nietzsche : "What they
[the underprivileged ] canno t clai m t o be , they replace b y the wort h
of wha t the y wil l on e da y become. " Weber , however , pushe d thi s
argument further . A s th e negativel y privilege d an d th e oppresse d
need psychologica l comfor t i n the fac e o f "unequal distributio n o f
good an d ba d luck, " s o do the privileged. I t is not onl y for the sak e
of expedienc y tha t th e privilege d strat a an d classe s hav e religiou s
pretensions. A s a rule, the fortunate one is not conten t wit h the fac t
that h e is happy; h e desire s a "right" to hi s happiness , an d wil l b e
inclined t o embrac e an y ideology that assure s hi m that h e deserves

what h e ha s (Weber , Economy I , p . 491).
Religion for th e Masse s
Whatever it s psychologica l valu e fo r variou s strata , religio n ha s
always bee n a concret e politica l forc e i n history . On e o f it s func tions, a s see n by bot h Mar x an d Weber , is its tranquilizing effect ,
allowing i t t o b e use d fo r th e purpose s o f politica l domination .
The subjugate d masse s o f conquered land s wer e frequently sub jected t o thi s kin d o f manipulation. "[It ] was . .. the quite consis tently pursue d polic y o f th e Persia n kings , alway s t o plac e th e
priesthood i n the saddl e a s a usefu l too l fo r tamin g th e dependen t
peoples." Webe r considere d i t "objectively possible " tha t a Persia n
victory in Marathon woul d change the history of the Hellenistic and
ultimately occidenta l civilization s by offerin g th e Delphi c an d Or phic priests and prophets position s comparable t o those hel d by the
Babylonian an d Israelit e priesthood s unde r Persia n king s fro m
Cyrus t o Artaxerxe s (Weber , Economy I , pp . 454-455 ; Judaism,
pp. 348-349) . Evidenc e suggested t o Weber that th e priesthoods tha t
serve a political function unde r grea t empire s generally flourish afte r
the annihilatio n o f thos e politica l entities , shoul d th e conqueror s
choose t o us e the priest s as instrument s o f pacifying th e subjugate d
masses. Th e Islami c conques t o f Indi a brough t abou t th e demis e o f
the prestigiou s rulin g warrior cast e (Kshatriya ) while sustainin g th e
most revered , but no t necessaril y powerful, priestl y caste (Brahman )
as instruments o f socia l contro l (Weber , India, p . 125) .
Religion a s a n "opiu m fo r th e people " ha s als o bee n use d i n
domestic politic s a s a means o f controlling the masses . Th e cas e of
China i s a goo d exampl e o f th e legitimizin g an d thu s stabilizin g
effect o f religious ideas. The Confucia n literat i o f China, asid e fro m
cultivating th e notio n o f filia l piet y a s a basi s fo r legitimizin g th e
political order , als o passivel y tolerate d certai n element s o f mas s
religiosity becaus e i t "guarantee d th e docilit y o f th e masses "
(Weber, China, p . 164) . I n Japan , "Buddhis m wa s imported fro m
India a s a mean s o f .. . tamin g th e masses, " a polic y that appar ently continue d int o th e presen t centur y (Weber , China, p . 195 ;
India, p . 271).
48 MA
In India , th e pacifyin g characte r o f Hinduis m wa s on e o f th e

most important reason s for its successful receptio n by Indian tribes.
Notwithstanding th e relativel y inferio r position s give n t o thes e
communities, Hinduis m perpetuate d th e dominanc e o f th e rulin g
strata withi n these tribes an d therefor e was naturally favore d by all
those wh o had a stake in preserving and perpetuatin g th e socioeco nomic statu s qu o (Weber , India, p . 16) .
During th e restoratio n o f Hinduism , it s legitimizin g aspect s
also playe d a decisive role i n defeating Jainist an d especiall y Bud dhist heterodoxies . I t was perceived as "an irresistibl e social force "
that "coul d provid e a n incomparabl e religiou s suppor t fo r th e
legitimation interes t o f th e rulin g strata " (Weber , India, p . 18) .
Although occidenta l religion s were of an entirel y different cast e
and thei r relatio n t o th e structur e o f dominatio n wa s a t varianc e
with thos e o f Easter n religions , examples o f manipulation o f reli gion fo r politica l end s ar e b y n o mean s scarc e i n the West . I n th e
Byzantine Empire , "Secula r authoritie s wer e intereste d i n usin g
the monk s a s a mean s o f domesticatin g th e masses " (Weber ,
India, p . 245) . Th e politicall y motivate d toleranc e towar d mas s
religiosity ( Volksreligiositat) b y the dominan t group s is best exem plified i n th e contemptuou s indifferenc e o f th e bureaucrati c offi cials o f al l time s towar d th e magical , emotiona l an d irrationa l
expressions o f th e religiosit y o f th e masse s (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 476-477 ) .
In a passionat e passag e Webe r return s t o thi s subjec t whil e dis cussing the attitud e o f the moder n "privilege d strata " whose scorn ful indifferenc e t o religious practices does not preclud e their partici pation i n th e forma l ritual s o f it . Ye t th e possibilit y o f th e
emergence o f a ne w congregationa l religio n b y o r amon g the m i s
considerably lessene d becaus e the y ar e inten t t o preserv e thei r
social distanc e fro m th e masses . Th e elite' s abhorrenc e o f mas s
enlightenment a s a potential threa t t o thei r prestig e is anchored i n
"the possibilit y that some new creed acceptabl e t o large segments of
the population coul d supplan t the traditional creed s (from the texts
of whic h everyon e interpret s somethin g away , orthodox y te n per cent an d liberal s ninet y percent) " (Weber , Economy I , pp . 516 517).
Examples suc h a s these , scattere d throughou t Weber' s substan tive wor k o n th e worl d religions , suppor t a Leninis t sociolog y o f
religion, but ar e onl y one facet o f Weber's theory of religion. Whil e

allowing fo r bot h categorie s o f "religion o f the masses " an d "reli gion fo r th e masses, " Weber consistentl y oppose d th e reductio n o f
the religiou s phenomen a t o eithe r th e psychologica l need s o f th e
masses o r th e ideologie s o f the rulin g classes .
Weber wa s equall y avers e t o th e glorificatio n o f religio n a s th e
revolutionary ideolog y o f th e oppresse d masses . Bu t h e admitte d
first, tha t the prophetic religion s have often formed a "protectorate
of th e weak, " benefitin g th e sociall y downtrodde n group s an d
strata (Weber , Economy I , p . 582) . Second , h e announce d tha t
although th e prophet s almos t neve r directl y descende d fro m o r
represented th e depresse d classes , "in the grea t majorit y of cases, a
prophetically announce d religio n o f redemptio n ha s ha d it s per manent locu s among th e less-favored socia l strata " (Weber, Social,
p. 274) . Finally , h e pointe d ou t tha t th e practica l ramification s o f
certain religious doctrines, such as the Buddhist indifference towar d
caste ritual , has benefite d the lowe r echelon s of the societ y (Weber,
India, pp . 240 , 256) .
Weber perceived a variety of religious needs among th e masse s of
peasantry an d proletariat , a s wel l a s amon g th e warriors , th e civi c
and bureaucratic strata, and the intellectuals. Given the central rol e
intellectuals hav e playe d i n th e developmen t an d incorporatio n o f
these need s int o th e bod y o f religiou s literature , w e shall focu s o n
the various tensions and compromises that have linked the religios ity o f thes e strat a t o th e theoretica l predilection s an d ideologica l
manipulations o f intellectuals.
Religion o f th e Warrior s
Warriors an d th e masse s hav e i n commo n a n aversio n t o th e ab stract theoretica l conception s o f intellectuals . Fo r instance , i t i s
characteristic o f heroi c religion s tha t instea d o f belie f i n "provi dence," "predestination," o r in regarding salvation a s a gift o f grac e
bestowed b y a transcendenta l an d omnipoten t god , suc h religion s
have gravitate d t o yard th e ide a o f irrational "fate " an d "destiny, "
which i s said t o gover n huma n being s an d divinitie s alik e (Weber ,
Social, p. 283 ; Economy I, p. 572) . This oppositio n is best exempli fied i n th e aforementione d mythologica l conflic t betwee n th e pas -
50 MA
sionate hero-go d Indr a an d Varuna , th e omniscien t functiona l god

of eterna l orde r (Weber , India, p . 27) .
The idea o f an impersonal cosmic and socia l orde r foun d either in
the intellectuals ' speculativ e religion s (such a s Chines e "Tao " an d
Hindu "Rita" ) o r th e bureaucrati c metaphysic s of the intelligentsi a
(e.g., Confucian "Li" ) coul d no t brin g solac e to th e turbulent world
of th e warrior s (Weber , Economy I , p . 431) . Th e basi c psychologi cal experience for th e warrior , Weber emphasized, is as a matte r o f
course t o fac e deat h an d th e irrationalit y o f huma n destiny .
Indeed, the chance s and adventure s o f mundane existenc e fil l hi s lif e
to suc h an extent that h e does not requir e of his religion (and accepts
only reluctantly ) anythin g beyon d protectio n agains t evi l magi c o r
ceremonial rite s congruen t wit h hi s sens e o f status , suc h a s priestl y
prayers fo r victor y o r fo r a blissfu l deat h leadin g directl y int o th e
hero's heaven . (Weber , Economy I, pp . 472-473)
The warriors als o nee d t o kno w that the god whom they implor e
is different fro m that of their enemy . Their nex t bes t alternativ e t o
overt polytheis m i s therefor e monolatr y (th e exclusive worshi p o f
one o f severa l deities ) o r henotheis m (flatterin g onl y on e go d i n
order t o solicit his favor). The martial hero might eve n demand tha t
his go d b e physicall y presen t a t th e battlefiel d (Weber , Judaism,
p. 133) . Unlike the priestl y and bureaucrati c intelligentsia , warrior s
do no t see k t o legitimiz e their victory a s a divine compensatio n fo r
their piety . A s they ten d t o regar d thei r god s "a s being s t o who m
envy i s no t unknown, " thei r heroi c feat s ar e ofte n accomplishe d
despite thei r god s no t becaus e o f the m (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 491-492) . Thi s characteristi c o f heroi c religiosit y set s i t apart
from bot h mas s an d intellectua l religions .
In regar d t o thei r nee d fo r a tangibl e go d tha t respond s t o th e
particular pligh t o f th e individual , th e warriors ' religio n overlap s
the religiosit y o f the masses ; thei r heroi c sens e o f pride lead s awa y
from th e humility of the masse s and fro m plebeian concept s suc h as
sin an d salvatio n (Weber , Economy I, p . 472).
With th e nobilit y an d th e bureaucrati c elite , warrior s shar e a
sense o f superiorit y to , o r a t leas t ar e i n competitio n with , th e
priestly circle s an d therefor e d o no t easil y genuflec t befor e th e
prophet o r pries t (Weber , Economy I , p . 472) . Thus th e highe r
Sociology of Religion as a Sociology of Intellectuals 5
echelons of knightly orders in ancient India felt a t ease with a proud

denial o f an y for m o f belie f i n go d espouse d b y Samkhy a philos ophy (Weber , India, p . 176) . The consolidatio n o f the cast e syste m
in Indi a an d th e organi c divisio n o f labo r betwee n pries t an d
warrior caste s were less than idea l for th e latter , a s the cast e dutie s
(dharma) o f warriors di d no t allo w the m t o transcen d th e monot ony o f everyday life throug h meditatio n an d othe r esoteri c means .
The warriors' unwillingness to accep t a n inferior status generate d a
tension tha t wa s conducive t o th e creatio n o f heterodo x salvatio n
religions i n Indi a (Weber , India, p . 181) . This tensio n ha s every where generated a n oppositio n agains t th e monopol y o f the priest hood ove r th e source s o f knowledge. I n th e case s o f India n Ksha triya an d Japanes e cour t knighthood , warrior s hav e als o emerge d
as a stratum o f independent, literally schooled warrior-intellectual s
(Weber, India, p . 333) .
In an essay dealing wit h the more general aspect s of the theory of
religion ("Religious Rejection s of the Worl d an d thei r Directions") ,
Weber went beyond elaborating on the distinctive religious needs of
warriors an d thei r ideologica l struggl e agains t th e religiou s idea s
propounded b y priestl y groups. Webe r argue d tha t wa r make s fo r
an unconditionally devoted communit y among th e combatants an d
thus "release s a n activ e mas s compassio n an d love " fo r thos e in volved. Thei r feeling s ten d t o brea k dow n al l th e naturall y give n
barriers o f associatio n an d foste r a brotherliness o f war that com petes wit h th e brotherlines s o f th e religiou s communit y (Weber ,
Rejections, pp . 335-336) . Religion s hav e responde d t o thi s chal lenge, abov e all , b y rejecting the worldl y pride o f the her o (Weber ,
Social, p. 291) . Yet Weber believed that the religion s ca n offe r onl y
two consistent solution s for thi s problem: (1 ) a mystic world flight ,
which implie s a radica l antipolitica l attitud e an d seek s an acosmi c
and benevolen t brotherliness, or (2) a puritan inner-worldl y ascetic
solution setting out to impose God's reveale d commandments upo n
the world , withou t excludin g th e us e o f violence .
Finally, referenc e mus t b e mad e t o a classificatio n o f religion s
that Webe r develope d b y associatin g worl d religion s wit h th e spe cific ethos o f the leading strata that emerged a s their majo r bearers :
"as a rul e on e ma y determin e th e strat a whos e style s o f lif e hav e
been a t leas t predominantl y decisiv e for certai n religions " (Weber ,
Social, pp. 268 , 269). I n Economy an d Society h e sums it up thus :
52 MA
If on e wishes to characterize succinctly , in a formula s o to speak , th e

types representativ e o f th e variou s strat a tha t wer e th e primar y
carriers o r propagator s o f the so-calle d worl d religions, they would
be following : In Confucianism , th e world-organizin g bureaucrat ; i n
Hinduism, the world ordering magician; i n Buddhism, the mendican t
monk wanderin g throug h th e world; in Islam, th e warrior seeking to
conquer th e world ; in Judaism, th e wanderin g trader ; an d i n Chris tianity, th e itineran t journeyman. (Weber , Economy I, p . 512)
Although thi s classificatio n i s clearly consisten t wit h th e premise s

of hi s sociolog y o f knowledge , Webe r onc e mor e emphasize s tha t
all these types must no t b e taken a s exponents o f their ow n occupa tional o r materia l "clas s interests, " bu t rathe r a s th e ideologica l
carriers o f th e kin d o f ethica l o r salvatio n doctrin e whic h rathe r
readily conforme d t o thei r socia l position . (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 512 )
The point o f contention, however , is an empirical not a methodo logical one . A n empirically plausible case may wel l be made agains t
Weber's clai m tha t Isla m wa s th e religio n o f "worl d conquerin g
warriors," o r " a knigh t orde r o f discipline d crusaders " (Weber ,
Social, p . 269) . Here , w e shal l refrai n fro m launchin g suc h a n
extensive project . However , a brie f argumen t o n th e inconsistenc y
of thi s assertio n wit h Weber' s ow n quasi-genera l law s concernin g
the elective affinities betwee n religious doctrines and the ideologica l
needs o f th e warrior s wil l be presente d i n Appendi x C .
Religion o f th e Civi c Strat a

Max Weber' s generalizin g observation s abou t electiv e affinities be tween th e idea l interest s o f socia l strat a an d th e conten t o f thei r
religiosity ar e leas t conclusiv e i n th e cas e o f plebeia n o r civi c
groups, tha t is , thos e cit y dweller s wh o neithe r shar e i n politica l
power o f a militar y o r corve e stat e no r belon g t o th e influentia l
nobility o f th e citie s (Weber , Judaism, p . 224) . Th e civi c petite bourgeoisie an d artisa n group s see m t o hav e generall y gravitate d
toward a variet y o f diverse, eve n contrastin g religiou s concepts .
These hav e include d cast e taboo s an d magica l o r mystagogi c reli gions o f both the sacramental or orgiasti c type s in India, animis m i n
China, dervis h religion i n Islam, an d pneumati c enthusiasti c congre gational religio n o f earl y Christianity , practice d particularl y i n th e
eastern hal f o f th e Roma n Empire . Stil l othe r mode s o f religiou s
expression amon g thes e groups ar e deisidaimonia a s well as orgiasti c
worship o f Dionyso s i n ancien t Greece , Pharisai c fidelit y t o th e la w
in ancien t urba n Judaism , a n essentiall y idolatrou s Christianit y a s
well a s al l sort s o f sectaria n faith s i n th e Middl e Ages , an d variou s
types o f Protestantis m i n earl y moder n times . (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 481)
These strikin g disparities led Weber to reasser t the main premise

of hi s sociolog y o f knowledg e concernin g th e autonom y o f th e
sphere o f ideas . I t wa s obviou s tha t variou s form s o f traditiona l
capitalism ha d no t automaticall y produce d unifor m ethical o r religious forms . Ye t he suggeste d tha t "a n affinit y betwee n economi c
rationalism and certain types of rigoristic ethical religion" may have
always existe d (Weber , Economy I , p . 480). Bu t Webe r di d no t
characterize th e natur e o f thi s affinit y i n terms o f class ideologies;
instead, h e explaine d i t i n a wa y tha t conform s t o ou r earlie r
description o f "reverse determination" : onc e a religio n tha t i s po tentially conduciv e to th e need s o f th e civi c strata emerges , i t ca n
easily wi n follower s amon g variou s rank s o f plebeian s (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 484) . I n hi s mos t misunderstoo d book , Th e Protestant Ethic an d th e Spirit o f Capitalism, Webe r attempte d t o
underline exactl y thi s point . Th e intellectuall y autonomou s ye t
historically consequential break with Christian theology introduced
by Reformatio n thinker s facilitate d th e unitin g o f th e idea l an d
material interest s of the occidental bourgeoisie in the form o f Protest ant wor k ethics , providin g a crucia l impetu s fo r th e emergenc e o f
modern capitalism . Th e latte r developments , whic h ha d bee n a n
"objective possibility" at the time of the disintegration o f feudalism in
the West, was "adequately caused" 3 by favorable economic and cultu ral situations. Weber' s comparative studies demonstrated that capital ism may otherwis e hav e remaine d dorman t in Europe , as it did
elsewhere, an d tha t th e introductio n o f the Reformatio n an d it s enthusiastic reception by the Christian civic strata playe d a n indispensable role i n this most decisiv e of the socia l change s i n the Occident .
54 MA
The occidenta l pat h toward capitalis m was also alread y paved b y

the successfu l eradicatio n o f magic that wa s achieved b y the Israel ite prophets . Abandonmen t o f the rura l wa y o f lif e an d settlemen t
in th e citie s see m t o hav e universall y encourage d th e proces s o f
"demagification," a s th e nee d fo r magica l manipulatio n o f natur e
was progressivel y replaced b y a nee d fo r ethicall y rationa l regula tion o f urban life . Ye t a total demagification o f the religiou s real m
was thoroughl y consummate d onl y i n th e Wes t (Weber , Social,
p. 284) . Similarly, in general, the weakening of the bloo d grouping s
and clan s i n urba n setting s coul d hav e se t th e stag e fo r th e emer gence o f congregationa l religion s a s wel l a s occupationa l guil d
organizations. Bu t thes e characteristic civi c developments wer e no t
to appea r i n Chines e o r India n civilizations , as they were thwarte d
by th e lingerin g significanc e o f ancestral cul t an d cla n exogam y i n
the forme r an d th e rigo r o f religiou s cast e taboo s i n th e latte r
(Weber, Economy I , p . 482) .
These "exceptions " t o th e "rule " ar e fa r to o significan t t o b e
discarded a s anomalie s o r eve n "exceptions. " I t i s onl y i n vie w of
Weber's value-relevan t interes t i n Wester n capitalis m tha t the y ap pear so . Besides , Webe r wishe d t o demonstrat e tha t th e universa l
penchant o f th e civi c strat a fo r a n ethicall y rationalize d religio n
remained ascendan t b y contrastin g th e religion s o f the civi c strat a
to thos e o f the peasantr y an d th e military . Fo r instance , th e nee d
for calculabilit y and instrumental rationalit y can be perceived in the
inclination o f civic strata towar d a compensator y religiou s mecha nism (Weber , Economy I , p . 483) . The peasants , lik e th e warriors ,
were resistan t t o thi s concept ; i t loomed to o remot e fo r th e forme r
and to o trit e fo r th e latter . Conversely , th e violen t an d heroi c
mythologies o f the warrior-god s coul d no t sooth e th e sentimenta l
and edifyin g inwardnes s o f the urba n strata . Thu s the emergence of
the bourgeoisi e has everywher e changed th e focu s o f the secondar y
sources o f religiou s literature :
This middle-clas s transformatio n o f religio n i n th e directio n o f do mesticity i s illustrate d b y th e emergenc e o f th e god-suffuse d bhakti
piety in all Hindu cults, both in the creation o f the Bodhisattv a figure
as wel l a s i n th e cult s o f Krishna ; an d b y th e popularit y o f th e
edifying myth s o f th e chil d Dionysos , Osiris , th e Chris t child , an d
their numerou s parallels . (Weber , Economy I, p . 488)
The nee d o f th e urba n strat a fo r a compensator y syste m ha s

compelled eve n th e mos t uncompromisingl y intellectualisti c reli gions t o introduc e change s i n their promise s o f salvation. Thu s a s
the Buddhis t contemplativ e mendican t mon k desire d t o ente r
nirvana ( a state tha t i n the ancien t text s is identified with absolut e
annihilation), th e lait y wer e allowe d t o see k compensatio n i n th e
hereafter an d to develop what Weber called "a n extremel y colorless
'bourgeois' ethic, " whic h aime d a t attainin g presen t reward s o f
riches an d worldl y fame (Weber , India, pp . 215 , 228) . Buddhism ,
however, was originally attractiv e t o th e urba n laity , as it held th e
promise o f liberatio n fro m th e rigi d Hind u socia l bonds , namely ,
that o f restrictin g educatio n t o th e highes t cast e (Weber , India,
pp. 240 , 256).
Although Confucianism stands out as the quintessential exemplification o f the bureaucrati c religion , o r rathe r irreligion , it s sobe r
and optimisti c rationalism , it s inner-worldl y morality, an d it s emphasis o n the cosmi c and socia l orde r see m to hav e als o engrosse d
the attentio n o f la y an d civi c groups (Weber , Economy I , p . 476) .
As a religio n o f bureaucrati c intelligentsi a an d gentee l literati ,
however, i t scorne d th e commo n man' s searc h fo r thi s worldl y or
other worldl y theodicies an d develope d i n the directio n o f a n eso teric belief i n an unfathomable providence (Weber, China, pp. 152 153, 206-207). Thus, Confucian sage bureaucrats share d the Jewish
belief that onl y the fulfillment o f the commandment s o f heaven ca n
safeguard th e destiny of the state. The similarity, however, is merely
incidental, a s th e socia l carrier s o f Judais m wer e not aestheticall y
cultured literat i bu t plebeia n intelligentsi a wh o emerge d a s th e
exponents o f a rationa l religiou s ethi c (Weber , Judaism, p . 224).
The beginning s o f a simila r plebisti c religiosit y can als o b e de tected i n ancient Egyp t and Babylon , where further rationalizatio n
and systematizatio n o f th e workada y ethi c wa s prevente d b y th e
persistence o f magic . Th e continue d significanc e of magica l prac tices i n thes e civilization s ca n b e explaine d b y th e fac t tha t the y
served th e materia l interest s o f the respectiv e priesthoods, wh o no t
only tolerate d bu t als o systematize d an d develope d magi c (Weber ,
Judaism, pp . 222 , 249). I n contrast , th e substantiv e messag e o f the
Israelite prophec y made i t impossible for the priesthoo d t o pande r
to th e religiou s demands o f th e masses . Instead , b y advocatin g a
puritanical, antiorgiastic , anti-idolatrous , an d antimagica l religios -
56 MA
ity, the y altered th e countenanc e o f occidental religiosit y decisively

and permanentl y (Weber , Judaism, pp . 223-224) . Th e rabbinica l
priesthood, whic h wa s the mai n instrumen t o f this oppositio n an d
represented institutionalize d Judaism , wa s profoundl y civi c an d
plebistic; mos t o f th e personalitie s recognize d i n th e Talmu d wer e
neither poo r no r predominantl y wealth y bu t gainfull y employe d
artisans (Weber , Judaism, pp . 393-394) . A s a stratu m o f plebeian
intellectuals, "th e rabbi s rejecte d asceticis m a s wel l a s the intellec tual mysticis m o f a salvatio n aristocracy " (Weber , Judaism,
pp. 392-400) . The contras t o f Judaism to th e Chines e cas e is especially striking because the plebeian intelligentsia in China produce d
a clas s o f priest-magician s wh o i n th e guis e o f Taois t heterodox y
indulged th e mas s interes t i n subject s suc h a s achievin g longevity
and ultimatel y rationalize d an d systematicall y incorporated popu lar magi c int o th e originall y intellectualist Taois m (Weber , China,
pp. 199-201 ) .
The discussio n o f plebeia n intellectualit y indicate s tha t Webe r
did no t restric t intellectual manipulation o f symbols to th e socially
and economically privileged groups. It also shows that the diversity
of cultura l idea s an d thei r autonom y fro m th e spher e o f materia l
interests render s an y stric t economicall y deterministi c interpreta tion o f ideologie s impossible . A thoroug h comparativ e stud y o f
Chinese an d Judai c plebeia n intellectuals could provid e a convinc ing cas e fo r th e limit s o f abstrac t clas s analysi s o f religious ideolo gies. O f course , a s w e descen d int o th e lowe r layer s o f th e civi c
strata, th e correspondenc e betwee n idea s an d interest s become s
more evident.
The quasi-proletaria n intellectualis m of th e lowes t urban strat a
and that of the self-taught peasant group s display a radical original ity i n contemplatin g th e meaning s o f th e cosmos , socia l conven tions, and religiou s dogma. Webe r observed that the intensity of the
"pariah intellectualism " o f thos e group s tha t compris e th e lowe r
rungs o f the socia l hierarchy i s due to th e fact that they "stand t o a
certain exten t o n th e poin t o f Archimede s i n relatio n t o socia l
conventions, bot h i n respect to the external orde r an d in respect t o
common opinions " (Weber , Economy I , p . 507) . Relativ e freedo m
from th e bounds o f social conventions an d materia l considerations
accounts fo r th e originalit y an d emotiona l intensit y o f thei r reli gious experiences. In his Ancient Judaism Webe r offer s a n interest-
ing parallel t o thi s line o f reasoning. I n that study, instead o f being

in th e lowes t strata o f the society , th e denizen s of the geographica l
margins o f a dominan t cultur e occup y th e poin t o f Archimedes :
Rarely hav e entirel y ne w religiou s conception s originate d i n th e
respective center s o f rationa l cultures . Rationa l propheti c o r re formist innovation s wer e firs t conceived , no t i n Babylon , Athens ,
Alexandria, Rome , Paris , London, Cologne , Hamburg , Vienna , bu t
in Jerusale m o f pre-exilic, Galilae a o f late Jewis h times , i n the lat e
Roman provinc e of Africa, in Assisi, in Wittenberg, Zurich, Genev a
and i n th e margina l region s o f th e Dutch , lower-German , an d
English cultura l areas , like Frisia and Ne w England. T o be sure this
never occurre d withou t th e influenc e o f a neighborin g rationa l
civilization. Th e reaso n fo r thi s i s always th e same : prerequisit e t o
new religiou s conception s i s that man mus t no t ye t hav e unlearne d
how t o fac e th e cours e o f th e worl d wit h question s o f hi s own.
Precisely the man distan t fro m th e great culture center s has cause t o
do s o whe n thei r influenc e begin s t o affec t o r threate n hi s centra l
interests. Man livin g in the midst of the culturally satiated area s and
enmeshed i n their technique addresses such questions just as little to
the environmen t as , fo r instance , th e chil d use d t o dail y tramwa y
rides woul d chanc e t o questio n ho w th e tramway actuall y manage s
to star t moving .
The possibilit y o f questionin g th e meanin g o f th e worl d presup poses th e capacit y t o b e astonishe d abou t th e cours e o f events .
(Weber, Judaism, pp. 206-207 )
Between th e "proletariod " and th e middl e civi c strat a on e find s
an intellectualis m representin g th e idea l interest s o f th e journey men. O n th e on e hand , the y wer e influence d b y th e ethicall y ra tional religiosit y of the petit e bourgeoisie , fo r the y aspire d t o joi n
them b y eventuall y settin g u p thei r ow n shop . O n th e other , thei r
constant teeterin g on th e edge s o f the minimu m subsistence , "thei r
workaday deprivations , th e fluctuation s in th e pric e o f thei r dail y
bread, thei r job insecurit y an d thei r dependenc e o n fraterna l assis tance" mad e the m mor e receptiv e t o th e unofficia l heterodoxie s
(Weber, Economy I , pp. 484-486) . Christianity , Webe r argued, was
originally a religio n o f itineran t journeyme n an d artisan s wit h
strong petit e bourgeoisi e an d civi c leaning s (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 462 , 512 ; Social, p . 269) .
58 MA
Religion o f th e Intellectuals
As mentioned before, Weber' s numerous allusions to the intellectuality o f th e warriors , the petit e bourgeoisie , the journeymen , and
the proletaria t indicat e tha t h e di d no t confin e th e productio n o f
rational (practical o r theoretical) concepts to any particular stratu m
or class . Indeed, the sociolog y of intellectuals ca n giv e full reig n to
speculative generalization s concerning th e correspondenc e o f ideas
and interests , only when studying the intellectualit y of nonintellectual strata . I n thes e case s th e electiv e affinitie s betwee n idea s an d
interests ar e mor e clearl y delineated . Thi s correspondence , how ever, become s obscured i n the cas e o f intellectuals as they produce
"ideas" that do no t necessarily reinforce their material o r even ideal
interests. T o cop e wit h this problem, Webe r base d hi s sociolog y of
intellectuals o n a delicat e balance o f two theoretica l assumptions .
First, he postulated th e "relativ e autonomy " o f the spher e o f idea s
from socioeconomi c forces . Second , Webe r proceede d wit h a the ory o f historical causation that w e have dubbed "revers e determination," whereby the interest is shifted fro m th e origin to the popularization o f a religion accordin g to th e idea l an d materia l interes t of
various strata an d classes. The relative significance of these assumptions varie s accordin g t o th e leve l o f analysi s an d th e empirica l
characteristics of the particular form of intellectuality under investigation.
While, fo r Weber , intellectuals may compris e a separate stratu m
or clas s wit h it s ow n particula r idea l an d materia l interests , th e
assumption o f the relativ e autonomy o f the spher e of ideas prohibits th e categorica l attributio n o f a n ideologica l characte r t o al l of
the though t product s o f a n intellectua l stratum . Intellectuals , a s
producers o f idea s an d maker s o f ideologies , bot h fo r themselve s
and othe r strat a an d classes , canno t b e understoo d i n term s o f a
monolithic (emanationist o r materialistic) theory of knowledge. An
emanationist theor y woul d b e unabl e t o accoun t fo r eithe r th e
ideological dimensio n o f huma n though t o r fo r it s historicall y
determined character . A materialisti c sociolog y o f knowledge , o n
the othe r extreme, is also unabl e to procee d wit h a consistent clas s
analysis o f ideas produce d b y intellectua l strata . Ho w ca n suc h a n
approach accoun t fo r a very common phenomenon : the producer s
of idea s tha t ar e inimica l to th e ideologie s of the intellectua l class,
or th e clas s whic h patronize s them , ar e als o intellectuals . Th e

chilling effect o f this irony on theories not equipped with the prope r
intellectual apparatu s t o dea l wit h i t i s eviden t i n th e histor y o f
Marxist thought . Eve n thos e Marxis t theorist s wh o realize d thi s
dilemma an d trie d t o com e t o grip s wit h i t treate d i t a s a mer e
practical questio n o f party politics and stoppe d shor t o f integrating
the solutio n int o thei r theoretica l perspectiv e (Lenin , 1973) . Be sides, in the spher e of religious ideas it is a very common phenom enon that th e proponent s o f both side s of a n orthodox-heterodo x
controversy belon g t o th e sam e clas s o r stratu m o f intellectual s
(Weber, China, pp. 183-185 ; India, pp. 192-193 ; Judaism, pp. 167 168).
According to Weber , although intellectual s do i n most instance s
constitute a separat e stratum , the y d o no t necessaril y pursu e thei r
status "interests " i n thei r ow n intellectua l contemplations . Thi s
leaves onl y intellectuals, not worker s (and eve n som e Marxis t the orists agre e o n thi s wit h Weber) , abl e t o transcen d thei r clas s
interests because they are the bearer s o f various forms and level s of
"rationality" (mainl y substantive-theoretical rationality), which follow thei r ow n relativel y autonomous developmenta l rule s (Kola kowski, 1968 , p . 159). 4
We hav e i n th e cours e o f thi s chapte r allude d t o th e fac t tha t
intellectuals have fel t a profound disdai n fo r irrationa l element s of
mass religiosit y suc h a s orgiasticism , mortificator y practices , an d
magic. Whether this attitude has been translated int o activ e opposi tion to , reconstructio n an d rationalizatio n of , o r a distan t calcu lated toleranc e towar d suc h element s i s a matte r o f individua l
civilizational diversities.
Generally speaking , however , intellectuals have alway s been th e
exponents o f theoretical rationalis m (Weber , Social, p, 279). 5 I t i s
this aspec t o f the idea l interest s o f intellectuals, no t thei r narrowe r
material interests , whic h ha s ha d th e mos t lastin g effec t o n th e
development o f religious though t (Weber , Rejections, p . 352) . Th e
penchant o f intellectual s fo r theoretica l rationalit y i s eve n mor e
pronounced whe n contrasted t o the practical rationality o f the civic
strata, whic h is geared t o th e solutio n o f everyday practical needs .
Although th e tw o type s o f rationalit y ar e bot h genericall y an d
historically related , the y have ha d ver y diverse influences upon th e
development o f religiou s ideas . Ther e is , fo r instance , a n electiv e
60 MA
affinity betwee n otherworldl y mysticism or a desire to b e the vesse l

of th e divin e an d th e intellectuals ' ques t fo r salvation . Conversely ,
the inner-worldl y asceti c desir e to b e conceive d a s the "instrumen t
of a god" i n the world has resonated wit h the practical need s of civic
strata (Weber , Social, pp . 285 , 286).
The effect s o f intellectualizatio n o n th e economi c ethic s o f th e
world religion s hav e bee n profoun d an d heterogeneous . Fo r in stance, instea d o f steerin g masse s toward a methodica l wa y o f lif e
(as ha d happene d i n th e occidenta l religions ) th e intellectualisti c
religions of India hav e condoned an d benefite d from th e economi c
irrationality i n regard t o accumulatio n o f property an d th e evalua tion o f capital (Weber , India, p. 328) . As a rule, within the sphere of
religion, intellectuals have universally strived to attain a meaningful
picture o f the worl d precisel y because the y experience d i t a s sense less "thus, the deman d ha s been implied: tha t th e world orde r i n its
totality is , could , an d someho w shoul d b e a meaningfu l 'cosmos. '
This quest , th e cor e o f genuin e religiou s rationalism , ha s bee n
borne precisel y b y strat a o f intellectuals " (Weber , Social, p . 281) .
The creatio n o f a well-organized pantheon o f gods, like the appear ance o f rationalize d magic , i s indicative o f th e presenc e o f system atic thinking and ultimatel y o f an intellectual effor t towar d theoret ical or at least forma l rationality (Weber , Economy I, p. 407 ; India,
p. 152) . Thus, the religions of intellectuals, when unable to promot e
transcendental monotheism , ten d t o exul t th e heavenl y god s an d
the lord s o f th e star s whos e cours e i s regulate d an d fixe d foreve r
(Weber, Judaism, p . 153 ; Economy I , p . 410) . Th e intellectual s
have naturall y welcome d thos e worl d religion s tha t promot e th e
idea o f a n absolutel y transcendental , omnipotent , an d omniscien t
god (Weber , Economy I , pp . 419 , 518). 6
Weber repeatedly emphasized that the prerequisit e for the accep tance o f intellectual s i n organize d religion s i s a "sacrific e o f th e
intellect" (Weber , Economy I , p . 567 ; Science, p . 154 ; Rejections,
p. 351) . The implicatio n i s that a universal skepticis m is also char acteristic o f the intellectuals , whic h h e pronounce s mor e explicitl y
in anothe r context : "Th e skeptica l point o f view has bee n commo n
to th e intellectua l strat a o f ever y period . I t i s evident i n th e Gree k
epitaphs and i n the highes t artistic productions o f the Renaissance ,
such a s th e work s o f Shakespeare ; i t ha s foun d expressio n i n th e
Sociology of Religion as a Sociology of Intellectuals 61
philosophies o f Europe , China , an d India , a s wel l a s i n moder n

intellectualism" (Weber, Economy I , p . 568). 7
Having touched upo n som e characteristic inclination s evince d i n
the religion s of intellectuals, we will now turn to the rol e of intellectuals i n th e developmen t o f the world' s religions .
Intellectuals an d th e Worl d Religion s
A set o f ideas tha t ha s a n electiv e affinit y with , or i s responsive to ,
the need s of intellectuals is likely to b e consolidated int o a religio n
of intellectuals. Such a development has been actualized t o varying
degrees onl y in the religion s o f India an d China , bu t it s nuclei ca n
also be found i n occidental religions. Even when fully realize d (as in
the case of ancient Buddhism) , religions of intellectuals hav e had t o
come int o contac t wit h othe r type s o f religiosity . Tension s an d
compromises tha t hav e resulte d fro m thes e contact s ar e depicte d
throughout Weber' s sociolog y o f religion.
The fact tha t Weber referred t o occidenta l religion s as "plebeian"
not "intellectualistic, " as he called India n an d t o som e extent Chi nese religions , doe s no t mea n tha t i n hi s vie w intellectual s ha d
nothing t o d o wit h th e developmen t o f Judaism an d Christianity .
On th e contrary , thei r anti-intellectualism , a s elsewhere, is usually
connected t o intellectuals . Th e tendenc y towar d theoretica l ra tionalization o f the religiou s sphere, fo r example , i s evident i n th e
development o f thes e religion s (Weber , Rejections, p . 351) . Th e
increasing consistenc y with whic h idolatr y i s condemned an d mo nism i s promote d i n th e Ol d Testament , a s wel l a s th e textur e o f
certain postexili c sections of it (namely, Deuteronomy), illustrates a
"theological zea l for consistency" that is characteristic o f intellectualism (Weber , Judaism, p . 70) . Furthermore , th e fundamenta l
change o f Yahwe h fro m a war go d o r a maste r o f rainfal l int o " a
wise governor o f the Universe, " not t o mentio n th e belie f in divin e
providence, could no t hav e bee n developed withou t the presenc e of
intellectuals an d thei r idea l interest s i n th e proces s o f intellectua l
rationalization (Weber , Judaism, pp . 129 , 311) .
But Judais m neve r became a religio n o f intellectuals becaus e o f
the decisiv e presence o f its unique phenomeno n o f prophecy. Jew -
62 MA
ish prophecy exemplifies the autonom y o f the spher e of ideas, as its

nature canno t b e explaine d b y a n analysi s o f th e ideologie s o f
intellectuals or any other social group. Prophet s wage d war agains t
and successfull y obliterate d th e intellectualit y o f royal court s (i.e. ,
the prophec y of good fortune ) and subjugate d the plebeia n intellectuality o f the priests . This prevente d a total monopolizatio n o f the
culture b y th e intellectualis t strata , whic h ha d happene d i n India .
Jewish prophec y als o kille d th e embry o o f cour t intellectuality ,
which could have developed into a Confucian-type cul t of the state .
Christianity carrie d th e anti-intellectualis m o f th e Jewis h
prophets t o it s extreme. Jesus , lik e other Jewis h prophets , clashe d
with th e plebeia n intellectualis m o f the Pharisees . Christianit y i s a
"non-intellectual's proclamatio n directe d t o non-intellectuals , t o
the 'poor in spirit'" (Weber, Economy I, p. 631) . The early Christian
church followe d sui t b y suppressin g autonomou s intellectualisti c
movements, namely , Gnosticism . Thi s battl e wa s continue d b y
priestly intelligentsi a who , throug h proclaimin g "dogmas, " re strained th e irresponsibilit y o f pur e intellectualis m (Weber , Economy I , pp . 462-63) .
The sam e anti-intellectualisti c powe r o f prophec y als o achieve d
unparalleled victorie s in curbin g th e centra l tendencies o f occiden tal mas s religiosity . Th e orgiasti c worshi p o f agricultura l deitie s
(known unde r th e ter m Baal) wa s strictl y condemne d b y th e Ol d
Testament (Weber , Judaism, p. 189) . Judaism an d then Christianity
fought agains t magi c wit h considerabl e success . However , the his tory of Judeo-Christian opposition to mass religiosity is not entirel y
devoid o f compromises . T o mentio n onl y on e example : certai n
modified version s of hagiolatry a s well as savior worship have bee n
tolerated b y the Catholi c church .
Nevertheless, th e fundamenta l anti-intellectualisti c attitud e o f
Christianity remaine d unchanged . Th e belie f survive s still that "th e
intellectual master y o f the worl d lead s awa y fro m god , no t towar d
him," for the charisma o f faith was granted b y God t o childre n an d
minors rathe r tha n t o scholar s (Weber , Economy I , pp . 553 , 568) .
A striking contrast to th e occidenta l religion s is presented b y the
soteriology o f Indian an d Chines e intellectuals . Despit e th e differ ences i n India n an d Chines e civilizations , ther e existe d i n bot h a
status group compose d o f genteel literati whose charisma reste d o n
knowledge. Both groups develope d the same pride in education an d
a simila r rationalis m t o figh t th e irrationalit y o f mas s religiosit y

(Weber, India, pp . 137 , 139).
Ironically, thes e intellectualisti c religion s wer e les s successfu l
than th e so-calle d "plebeia n religions " in fighting th e tendencies of
mass religiosity . Intrinsicall y dependen t and historicall y bound t o
magical charisma , th e India n Brahmanhoo d wa s unabl e t o figh t
magic. Yet, an attempt wa s made, a s it is expected o f intellectuals to
rationalize an d sublimat e th e magica l hol y state s (Weber , India,
p. 152) . The banning of certain extreme ecstatic and orgiasti c semimagical practice s a s well as the rationalizatio n an d modificatio n of
magically relate d mysticis m ar e th e result s o f thi s Brahmanica l
intellectual influenc e (Weber, India, pp . 148-149) .
In hi s "Religiou s Rejection s O f Th e Worl d An d Thei r Direc tions," Webe r argue d tha t becaus e o f a n irreconcilabl e tensio n
between the religiou s and intellectua l spheres, all religions demand
of religious intelligentsia a n "intellectual sacrifice " that amount s t o
a limitatio n o f thei r untempere d rationalis m (Weber , Rejections,
p. 351) . What happened in India, however, far exceeded this. In the
process of reforming Hinduism, the Brahmanical priesthood, partly
to compet e with the Buddhis t heterodoxy and partl y because o f its
immediate materia l interests , populate d th e relativel y empty pan theon o f the Hind u religio n wit h loca l demigods , agricultura l dei ties, an d deifie d saviors . Hagiolatr y and deificatio n o f live or dea d
gurus as "saviors in need" were also introduced into modern Hindu ism. Th e orgiasti c ecstas y o f Tantrism , however , ha d stil l t o b e
greatly modifie d befor e findin g it s nich e i n late r Hind u practice s
(Weber, India, p . 297) . Bot h Shivais t an d Vishnuis t forms o f late r
Hinduism are, thus, historical altar s on which the most extravagan t
"sacrifice o f intellect " ha s bee n performe d (Weber , India, p . 309) .
As Christianit y carrie d th e anti-intellectualisti c tendencie s o f
Judaism t o th e extreme , so Buddhism carried th e origina l intellectualism o f Hind u religio n t o it s logica l conclusion . "Buddhis m i s
the mos t consisten t o f the salvatio n doctrine s produced befor e an d
after b y th e intellectualis m o f educate d India n strata " (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 628) . I t behoove d thi s "uncompromisingl y consis tent" soteriolog y o f Hind u intellectual s t o announc e tha t neithe r
greed no r lus t bu t stupidit y is the sourc e o f al l evil (Weber, India,
pp. 233 , 252). Yet witness how Buddhism , b y disregardin g th e reli gious need s of the masses , lost the battl e to moder n Hinduis m an d
64 MA
was reincarnated onc e again onl y when it became a "religion for th e

masses" in Chin a an d Japa n an d a "religion o f the masses " in th e
forms o f later Mahayan a Buddhis m and Lamaism . Whe n i t finall y
emerged i n Japan a s Zen Buddhism , it assume d th e characte r o f a
"religion o f warriors" (Weber, India, pp. 256 , 270, 278). Its original
intellectualistic quest fo r nirvana , it s promise o f absolute annihila tion afte r death , a s wel l a s it s prou d renunciatio n o f bot h worl d
and deities , wer e eventuall y drastically modified , i f no t forgotte n
(Weber, India, p . 215).
In China , bot h orthodo x Confucianis m an d heterodo x Taois m
were originall y religion s o f th e intellectuals . The forme r exempli fied th e bureaucrati c indifference towar d religiou s feelings, and th e
latter epitomize d the escapis m o f ivor y tower intellectuals (Weber ,
China, pp . 143-192) . Confucia n mandarin s cultivate d th e inner worldly moralit y o f layme n an d admonishe d th e masse s t o adjus t
themselves to th e imperial socia l syste m said t o directl y mirror th e
cosmic harmony . No t unlik e othe r ideologie s forged t o legitimiz e
patrimonial systems , Confucianis m emphasize d filia l piet y a s th e
ultimate virtue and trie d t o exten d it s domain beyon d the limit s of
family an d clas s organization s t o regulat e als o th e relatio n o f th e
masses t o stat e official s an d ultimatel y t o th e pontifex . Whil e
tolerating certain traits of mass religiosity, such a s ancestor worship
and magic , Confucia n ethic s despise d an d o n occasion s fough t
against Buddhis t as well a s Taoist individualisti c escapism . I t mus t
be mentione d tha t Taois m als o ha d t o reac h som e kin d o f com promise wit h mas s religiosity . This di d no t tak e th e shap e o f ra tionalization o f magic (as in Hinduism) o r a mere distant toleratio n
of i t (as in Confucianism) , but rathe r a coarse coexistenc e with , or
at time s a thoroug h incorporatio n o f i t (Weber , China, pp . 152 153, 191-192) .
The characterizatio n o f idea l typica l electiv e affinitie s betwee n
religious idea s an d spiritua l a s wel l a s materia l interest s i s mor e
problematic i n the cas e o f the intellectua l strata. Thi s is due to tw o
major causes . First, th e substantive rationalization o f the content of
religion b y th e elit e o f a religiou s intelligentsia can produc e unex pected ideologica l results, such a s anticlerical o r anti-intellectualis tic ideologie s dividing the rank s o f consolidated intellectua l strat a
or preventin g suc h consolidation . Second , ideologica l chasm s
deepen betwee n th e rank s o f intellectual s wheneve r some o f the m
consciously all y themselve s wit h othe r strat a o r classe s promotin g

anti-intellectualism. Furthermore , th e dissimilarit y of the religiou s
needs o f the la y intellectual s an d thos e o f the clerica l intelligentsia
has contribute d t o th e recurren t ris e of heterodoxies a s well a s new
anticlerical orthodoxies .
Religions, Intellectuals , an d the Rationalizatio n Parado x
Intellectuals hav e bee n th e bearer s o f variou s level s an d form s o f
rationality. A s such , the y hav e alway s bee n close r t o th e autono mous core of ideas that develop through intellectual contemplation .
Besides producin g relativel y abstract idea s an d concepts , the y als o
play a rol e i n the reinterpretatio n o f ideas. The y construc t ideolo gies not onl y for themselves but als o for the other strat a and classes .
We have alread y enlarge d o n th e pivota l rol e th e intellectual s hav e
played i n th e systematizatio n an d rationalizatio n o f th e "ethica l
religions" (Judais m unde r Persia n kings , Buddhism in Japan, etc.).
Yet intellectuals leave thei r imprin t o n mas s religiosit y in a variet y
of othe r way s as well.
In thei r searc h fo r th e meanin g o f the universe , especially wherever the process of demagification has been completed, intellectuals
have trie d t o fi t th e worl d int o thei r rationa l schem a (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 350) . In doing so they have also imparted meanin g t o
suffering, whic h otherwis e woul d b e experience d a s unjus t an d
meaningless. Th e formulatio n o f theodicie s i s a n intellectua l by product fo r whic h ther e i s a grea t demand , especiall y amon g th e
masses. O f course , intellectual s to o hav e a nee d fo r theodic y be cause, bot h a s individuals and member s o f a distinct statu s group ,
they als o experienc e th e unequa l distributio n o f goo d an d ba d
fortune (Weber , Social, p. 275) . But they do mor e than provid e for
a rationa l understandin g o f thei r ow n plight . The y als o giv e clue s
for decipherin g th e "meaning " o f th e sufferin g o f th e othe r strat a
and classes. All theodicies are first share d onl y by intellectual strat a
(Weber, Judaism, p . 305) . Thi s i s usuall y no t a servic e bu t a n
"unintended consequence " o f intellectua l activit y o f th e culture d
strata. Bu t n o matte r wh o eventuall y benefit s fro m th e variou s
cultural products o f intellectuals, the fact remain s tha t they ar e the
carriers of a rationalism that itself is not determine d by the materia l
66 MA
or idea l interests o f any stratum, includin g their own . By suggesting

this, Webe r rejecte d al l theorie s o f th e materialisti c a s wel l a s
psychologistic determination o f ideas without denying the influence
that suc h "interests " might exer t o n th e proces s o f reinterpretatio n
of idea s an d th e creatio n o f "ideologies."
Although late r Buddhis m catere d t o th e psychologica l an d emo tional need s o f th e masse s a s wel l a s t o th e materia l need s o f
tyrannical ruler s befor e finall y turnin g int o th e gospe l o f "disci pline-seeking warriors," its intellectualism originally addressed "th e
metaphysical need s o f the huma n min d a s i t i s driven to reflec t o n
ethical an d religiou s questions, drive n no t b y material nee d bu t b y
an inne r compulsio n t o understan d th e worl d a s a meaningfu l
cosmos an d tak e u p a positio n towar d it " (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 499). 8
To tak e thi s discussio n beyon d th e spher e o f sociolog y an d th e
study of the interplay of ideas and interests, let us suggest that there
is stil l anothe r sourc e o f tension : th e fundamenta l incongruit y be tween th e rationalizin g processe s an d th e ontologicall y unrational izable "nature" of the world. Intellectuals, Weber argues , expose th e
religious interpretatio n o f th e worl d t o th e imperativ e o f consis tency an d attemp t t o systematiz e an d rationaliz e religiou s ethic s
(Weber, Rejections, p . 324 ; Economy I , p . 439) . Bu t th e "world " as
seen by Weber undermine s them al l by either refusin g to fi t entirely
into thes e rational framework s (we call thi s under-rationalization),
or i f i t i s pushe d int o suc h rationalisti c pigeon-hole s (w e cal l thi s
over-rationalization), i t eventually rebels against them . I n the latter
case, th e apparentl y successfu l rationalizatio n o f a worl d imag e i s
ridiculed, discarded , o r both .
The closes t metaphysic s ha s com e t o capturin g th e trut h o f th e
Weberian worl d i s whe n i t surrender s t o polytheis m wherei n th e
world i s bu t th e battlefiel d o f warrin g god s (Weber , Meaning,
p. 17) . Thos e religion s tha t hav e chose n t o neglec t th e irreconcil ability o f lif e sphere s b y rejectin g polytheism (a s intellectual s ten d
to do ) hav e ha d t o dea l wit h the frustratin g refusa l o f the worl d t o
conform to their rationalisti c demands . Th e result o f this has been a
tendency towar d a n asceti c o r a mysti c fligh t fro m th e worl d
(Weber, Rejections, pp . 332 , 357) .
But th e disenchantmen t o f th e moder n worl d make s a religiou s
flight fro m th e mundan e worl d impossible. Intellectuals , i n moder n
times, have had t o confron t the irrationality o f a recalcitrant worl d

without bein g abl e t o resolv e thei r dilemm a b y abnegatin g th e
worldly an d searchin g fo r tranquilit y i n a beyon d o r eve n i n a
worldly stat e o f bliss. Modern intellectual s have no t followe d their
forefathers, who , attemptin g t o concea l th e irrationa l core s o f th e
world, wov e endless layers o f rationalit y aroun d them . The y hav e
chosen instea d t o indulg e i n th e irrationa l core s o f life , refusin g
even to stee r a course around them . Thi s plung e int o th e irrationa l
is encourage d b y th e reificatio n o f instrumenta l reaso n i n post Protestant industrialism . Intellectuals are the first t o shudder a t the
touch o f "th e col d skeleto n hand s o f rationa l orders " an d t o fle e
from "th e banalit y o f everyda y routine " (Weber , Rejections,
p. 347) .
All thes e propositions , however , ar e base d o n a fundamenta l
ontological position : that th e worl d a s it stand s ca n neve r be thoroughly rationalized"the calculation o f consistent rationalis m ha s
not easil y com e ou t eve n wit h nothin g lef t over " (Weber , Social,
p. 281) . The theoretica l implications o f this ontological postulatio n
are far reaching. They led Weber beyond the sociological analysis of
the proces s o f reinterpretatio n o f ideas i n th e contex t o f idea l an d
material interests . In th e philosophica l fram e agains t whic h Weber
examines ideas , th e ineradicabl e an d eterna l contradiction s o f th e
world appea r almos t everywhere . The worl d i s obduratel y irra tional, an d an y attemp t t o subsum e thi s paradoxica l whol e unde r
an overreachin g rational syste m or to introduce mathematica l con sistency into i t is not onl y doomed t o failur e but furthe r intensifies
the existin g contradiction s b y highlightin g th e otherwis e hidde n
tensions in the mundan e world (Weber, Politics, p. 123 ; Rejections,
p. 357) . I n othe r words , th e intellectua l rationalization s o f th e
world image , b y drawin g attentio n t o th e problem s tha t the y at tempt to solve, defeat their purpose . They are likely to rob people of
the only protective shield they wear against th e disturbing influence
of the contradictions o f this world, namely their ignorance o f them .
The existenc e o f irrationa l core s an d th e irreconcilabilit y o f th e
several lif e sphere s result i n a perpetua l "under-rationalization " of
the intellectuals ' worl d image . Bu t intellectual s hav e no t bee n en tirely unsuccessfu l in producin g universalisti c rationa l interpreta tions of the world. Certain eschatologies , for example, hav e create d
fairly consisten t an d meaningfu l interpretations o f the worl d an d of
68 MA
its evil and suffering . Yet , in Weber' s view, the mos t perfec t theodi cies ar e ofte n th e mos t useless . The substantiv e rationalizatio n o f
religious worl d image s lead s t o th e irrationalizatio n o f religiou s
behavior a s th e practica l rationalis m aime d a t thi s worl d recede s
and th e mundan e worl d is rejected fo r it s refusal to confor m to th e
meaning that i t is supposed to contain (Weber, Economy I , p. 424) .
The mos t theoreticall y successful account s justifying undeserve d
suffering ar e th e doctrine s o f karma, dualism, an d predestination .
They ca n b e characterize d a s rationall y close d system s (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 358) . Of the three , the dualis m doctrin e "i s the mos t
radical solutio n of the problem of theodicy, and for that very reason
it provide s as little satisfaction for ethica l claim s upon go d a s does
the belie f in predestination" (Weber, Economy I , p . 526). The sam e
is true o f the doctrin e o f karma. N o matte r ho w unambiguousl y it
provides fo r a n ethica l rationalizatio n o f the worl d order , onc e th e
question of the meaning of this gigantic machine of compensation is
raised, i t can be experienced as "dreadful" (Weber , India, p. 132) . A
similar situatio n exist s i n th e cas e o f th e so-calle d occidenta l reli gions: "The mor e the development tends toward the conception o f a
transcendental unitar y go d wh o i s universal, the mor e ther e arise s
the proble m o f how the extraordinar y powe r of such a god ma y b e
reconciled wit h th e imperfectio n of th e worl d that h e ha s created "
(Weber, Economy I , p . 519).
This proces s ha s fuele d th e searc h o f th e masse s fo r thei r ow n
easy solution s (e.g. , mas s religiosity ) o r fo r new , mor e responsiv e
religions. T o brin g thi s poin t close r t o home , tak e th e exampl e o f
Leibnitz's "th e bes t o f al l possibl e worlds. " Whil e thi s ide a wa s
enunciated b y others befor e him, once he attempted to brin g everything togethe r int o a theologicall y close d syste m vindicatin g th e
goodness o f God , the resul t became as "perfectly" irrational an d a s
ludicrous a s th e worl d o f Voltaire' s Candide.
3
Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Politic s
as a Sociolog y o f Intellectual s
In this chapter we shall draw upon Ma x Weber's politica l sociology

and hi s politica l writing s onl y insofa r a s the y she d ligh t o n th e
relationship betwee n politic s an d intellectuality . Weber' s futur ology, tha t is , hi s assessmen t o f th e objectiv e possibilitie s of occi dental civilizatio n an d th e trajector y o f it s futur e development , is
also relevan t t o th e purpose s o f thi s chapter . Insight s Webe r ha d
gained i n th e cours e o f hi s studie s i n th e fiel d o f comparativ e
historical sociolog y abou t th e developmental trends of the Western
world helped shap e his political ideal s and th e strategie s he favored
for achievin g them. As intellectuals an d intelligentsia appear a s two
of th e majo r protagonist s i n Weber' s gran d scenari o abou t th e
future o f the Occident , a brief taxonomical not e o n the difference s
of th e idea l type s o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a seem s t o b e i n
order. Furthe r elaboratio n o f thi s topic , i n accordanc e wit h th e
Weberian methodologica l tradition , ha s bee n deferre d t o th e las t
chapter o f this book .
When contraste d t o intelligentsiawhom we define a s the aggre gate o f th e educate d member s o f on e particula r stratu m o r som e
strata, possessin g varyin g degrees o f "statu s consciousness"th e
category o f intellectuals comprise s a small group o f highly creativ e
(often individualistic ) individuals. A n often borrowe d analogy fro m
economics portrays intellectuals a s "producers" of those intellectua l
goods tha t ar e late r disseminate d an d "consumed " in th e market place o f idea l an d materia l interest s o f th e intelligentsi a an d
69
70 MA
(through thei r mediation ) o f othe r classe s an d strata . Anothe r

useful metapho r describe s th e functio n o f intelligentsi a i n th e
process of dissemination of these ideas a s a "transmission belt " that
constantly an d progressivel y remold s an d simplifie s th e idea s
produced b y the leadin g intellectuals.
Relating t o Ideologies : Intellectuals and Intelligentsia

We ma y accep t th e previou s definitio n o f th e tw o categories , o f
intellectuals an d intelligentsia , a s consisten t wit h Weberia n con cepts regardin g th e hierarchica l classificatio n o f intellectual s an d
intelligentsia.1 A mor e importan t distinction , however , ca n b e
perceived i f w e examine , fro m th e Weberia n poin t o f view , th e
respective attitude s o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a towar d th e
sphere o f ideas: intelligentsia will be found more willin g than intel lectuals t o vie w idea s instrumentally . Th e intelligentsi a ar e bette r
disposed t o "han g on " to the solidifie d idea s (ideologies ) that serve
their interests.
By contrast , th e intellectuals ' attitud e towar d idea s i s less deter mined b y practical considerations . This is not mean t t o impl y that
intellectuals ar e mor e ap t t o disregar d thei r ow n interest s fo r th e
sake of ideas. Rather , i t means that their "ideal interests" (in tracing
the immanen t proces s o f rationalization ) counterbalances , occa sionally precedes, and ma y even contradict) thei r material interests.
Practical consequence s o f ideas , therefore , eve n whe n the y adver sely affec t intellectuals ' materia l interests , cannot solel y dictate th e
contents o f intellectuals' beliefs and thoughts . The pus h and pul l of
ideal an d materia l interest s of intellectuals hav e greatl y influenced
the developmen t o f knowledg e an d th e statu s o f it s carrier s i n a
variety o f civilizational contexts . Thus i t i s of cardina l importanc e
to th e sociologie s o f intellectuals an d knowledg e to appreciat e th e
centrality o f thi s immanen t tension . Althoug h th e locu s o f thi s
tension i s not betwee n the genera l sphere s o f ideas an d interests
but i n the balance o f ideal an d material interest s of intellectualsin
explaining th e natur e o f thi s built-i n strain , w e migh t us e th e
paradigm o f separate sphere s of "ideas" and "interests " as a heuristic device .
Sociology of Politics as a Sociology of Intellectuals 71
Intellectuals ma y be thought o f as carriers of the substantiv e an d

theoretical rationalizatio n o f ideas. If we assume, as Weber did, tha t
the spher e o f ideas is relatively autonomous fro m tha t o f econom ics, then intellectual s a s the soundin g boar d o f the spher e o f idea s
represent a n anomaly : the y d o no t necessaril y advocat e idea s tha t
are conduciv e t o thei r materia l interests . Wha t ha s appeare d t o
some philosophers of history as the teleologica l movemen t o f idea s
toward increasin g logica l consistenc y i s indeed bot h mediate d an d
fueled b y intellectuals ' idea l interest s i n impartin g meanin g t o th e
world an d perfecting such meanings. I n any case, however, the logic
of the development of ideas is independent fro m tha t o f the materia l
interestsof bot h intellectual s an d othe r classe s an d strata .
The socia l consequence s o f indulging in the spher e of pure idea s
for intellectual s are twofold. First , the very irrelevance of the spher e
of idea s t o practica l aspect s o f socia l life , especiall y when couple d
with the characteristic indifferenc e o f intellectuals toward th e socia l
implications o f thei r contemplativ e questionings , invite s accusa tions of "irresponsibility" no t onl y from th e general public but als o
from thos e intellectual s who ar e primarily concerned wit h materia l
(ideological) interests , their own , those o f other classe s an d strata ,
and occasionall y th e interest s o f th e societ y a s a whole . Second ,
pure though t i s not merel y indifferen t t o materia l interests ; i t ca n
positively subver t th e mai n vehicl e o f thes e interest s withi n th e
realm o f ideas , i.e. , "ideologies. " Pur e intellectualit y i s avers e t o
ideologies in general and t o ideologie s o f intellectuals in particular .
Of course , intellectual s ar e a s likel y a s an y othe r clas s t o attemp t
legitimizing their material interest s by creating their own ideologies.
However, ideologies, as a set of relatively simple an d fixe d idea s i n
the servic e of a constellation of fixed materia l interests , are vulnera ble t o intellectualization ; the y wil l no t las t lon g i f thei r centra l
assumptions ar e constantly questioned , developed , pushed t o thei r
logical conclusions , o r i n shor t "rationalized. " Rationalization ,
however, happens t o be the essence of intellectuality; i t is so centra l
to intellectuals ' idea l interest s tha t the y ar e expecte d t o resis t it s
adulteration fo r the sake of their materia l interests or in the name of
ideological contingencie s o f anyone includin g thei r own . I n arrest ing th e evolutio n o f ideas , al l ideologie s ar e boun d eventuall y t o
appear t o intellectual s a s unwieldy impediments blockin g th e flo w
of idea s an d thei r continuin g rationalization .
72 MA
X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S
The result s o f this tension appear o n tw o levels:

1. O n th e persona l level, this tension generate s profound ambiv alence. Intellectual s ofte n fac e th e dilemm a o f havin g t o choos e
between intellectua l integrit y an d extraintellectua l contingencies ,
between rationalizin g flo w o f ideas an d dogmati c stagnation . An y
decision in favor o f the latte r involve s a "sacrifice o f intellect." The
concept o f sacrifice of intellect is developed by Weber in the contex t
of hi s sociolog y o f religio n (Weber , Rejections, p . 352 ; India,
pp. 297-309) . I t characterize s a n attemp t b y intellectual s t o self manage thei r unbridle d ques t for th e sociall y destructive and ideo logically deconstructiv e "truths." I n th e presen t context , i t seem s
reasonable t o assum e tha t a sacrific e o f intellec t i s calle d fo r no t
only whe n accommodatin g t o extraneou s circumstancessuc h a s
the demand s o f mas s religiosit y i n Indi a an d thos e o f orthodo x
Christianity i n Europebu t als o whe n intellectual s choos e thei r
own materia l interest s ove r their idea l ones .
2. O n the social level, the dilemma appears a s a universal schism
between ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f intellectuals . Intellec tuals ar e a t onc e th e ables t o f al l group s t o construc t self-serving
ideologies an d th e leas t likel y t o preserv e the m agains t interna l
strife. A Weberian sociology of intellectuals postulates a n unrelenting strai n betwee n intellectuals' ideal an d materia l interests , which
is translate d int o th e tensio n betwee n intellectuals ' "ideas " an d
"ideologies." Thos e "idealist " observer s wh o ignor e th e materia l
interests an d ideologica l aspect s o f intellectuality , transcendin g
them abov e th e spher e o f particula r interest s (e.g. , Plato , Ward ,
Comte, an d Mannheim) , ar e a s ap t t o mis s the critica l conflic t of
ideal an d materia l interest s a s those o f th e "clas s analytic " schoo l
who b y drawing o n the thesi s of social determination o f consciousness ascrib e ideological character t o al l o f intellectuals' idea s (e.g. ,
Bakunin, Machajski , Luxemburg , an d Gouldner) . Abov e all ,
neither o f the two perspectives can accoun t fo r the universal schism
within the ranks of intellectuals, the perpetual debat e betwee n their
ideologies an d counterideologies . If the foregoin g is valid, it would
seem to follo w tha t a radical asymmetr y separates ideologie s o f all
classes an d strata , includin g thos e o f a n intelligentsia , fro m th e
ideologies o f intellectuals : ideologies o f intellectuals ar e inherently
unstable.
Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7
By contrast, th e intelligentsia' s relationshi p to thei r ideologie s is

less fraught wit h tensions. A s members o f a less reflective stratum ,
one that i s more geared to practical, rather tha n theoretical reason ,
the intelligentsi a ar e mor e ap t t o build , preserve , an d populariz e
ideologies. Th e intelligentsi a ha s therefor e exerte d a n enormou s
influence o n th e cours e o f histor y throug h "reinterpreting " idea s
generated b y intellectuals , b y accommodatin g the m t o commo n
(social) o r particula r (class ) interests . B y virtue o f being educated ,
the intelligentsia ca n think rigorously about ideas; because they are
more distan t fro m th e flu x o f ideas, the y can maintai n thei r focu s
on the practica l ramification s o f ideas. Th e affinit y o f intelligentsi a
for ideologies , however , is not merel y opportunistic. Becaus e the y
are les s reflective, member s o f the intelligentsi a ar e mor e pron e t o
internalize ideologica l construction s an d les s abl e t o questio n o r
transcend thei r sociall y an d culturall y determine d consciousness .
As a result, the intelligentsi a are more "a t home " in any particula r
culture tha n ar e th e intellectuals , whos e very universa l aspiration s
and sociall y irrelevant, deconstructive , o r outrigh t destructive mus ings rende r the m untrustworthy : intellectuals ar e inherently a uni versally alie n an d alienate d caste .
Having briefl y delineate d th e conceptua l difference s betwee n intellectuals an d intelligentsi a an d thei r differentia l relationship s t o
the spher e o f idea s an d ideologies , le t u s examin e th e historica l
significance o f this theory for Weber' s prognosis of Western civilization's objective possibilities. Studying past civilizations and observ ing the trend s o f his times, Weber grew pessimistic about the futur e
of occidenta l individuality , which h e cherishe d a s on e o f the mos t
valued achievement s o f Wester n civilization . H e though t tha t th e
fate o f individualit y woul d b e decided , amon g othe r things , b y a
decisive confrontatio n betwee n intellectual s an d intelligentsia .
Weber ha d alread y observe d tha t th e consolidatio n o f th e intelli gentsia i n th e vas t stat e bureaucracie s o f Mesopotami a an d th e
Orient ha d led to mass enslavement of their inhabitants. Th e auton omy o f th e individua l i n moder n Wester n societies , a s a uniqu e
product o f the dawn o f capitalism, wa s in the sam e vein threatene d
by the development of corporate capita l as well as by the emergenc e
of socialism . Th e latte r represente d th e logica l conclusion , rathe r
than th e antithesi s o f the former . Webe r wa s persuaded tha t bot h
74 MA
capitalism an d socialis m carry the germs of a modern "Orientosis,"

that is, they are to varying degrees detrimental t o individuality. This
sociological insigh t informed Weber's hars h criticis m of the bureau cratization o f politics an d fuele d hi s resentment o f the ideologie s of
the intelligentsia . T o counterbalanc e th e hegemon y o f th e intelli gentsia, Webe r turned t o the intellectuals. Neither his epistemological view s regarding separatio n o f fact s an d value s tha t undermin e
those intellectua l ideologie s tha t lin k scholasti c knowledg e an d
public good , no r hi s critiqu e o f th e irresponsibilit y and naivet e of
intellectuals dabblin g i n politics, inhibited Weber' s endorsemen t of
intellectuals as champions o f individuality. He encourage d the m t o
enter politic s not a s a group o f complacent "savants" or politically
naive visionarie s bu t a s individual s keenl y awar e o f th e uniqu e
challenge o f thei r politica l calling . Thi s endorsement , occurre d i n
spite o f al l th e aforementione d misgiving s not because o f Weber' s
interest i n seein g intellectuals empowered. I t i s appropriate t o pro vide at this juncture a historical ideal type for th e ideologies as well
as counterideologie s o f th e occidenta l intellectual s i n orde r t o un derline Weber's unique reformulation o f the missio n o f intellectuals
in th e politica l horizo n o f the moder n world.
Bases fo r Ideologie s of Occidenta l Intellectuals :

An Idea l Typ e
Alvin Gouldne r attribute d a "Platonic complex" (ubiquitous unre quited yearnin g t o becom e philosopher-kings ) t o occidenta l intel lectuals (Gouldner , 1979 , pp . 65-81) . Thi s clai m i s incorrec t no t
only because it glosses over the traditio n o f Western anti-intellectualism bu t als o becaus e i t overlook s th e theoretica l difference s be tween classica l and moder n ideologie s o f intellectuals. Nonetheles s
it migh t b e worthwhil e t o provid e a n alternativ e answe r t o th e
problem tha t lie s a t th e roo t o f Gouldner' s question : "What , i f
anything, i s the commo n denominato r o f the Wester n ideologies of
intellectuals?"
The commo n presupposition s of Western ideologies o f intellectuals fro m Plat o t o Lukac s ca n b e reduce d t o th e followin g thre e
propositions.
1. Ther e mus t exis t a basi c agreemen t o n wha t w e ma y cal l a n

ontological an d epistemologica l monism. Th e belie f tha t behin d
contradictory opinion s an d fals e (o r chaotic ) appearance s lie s th e
universally valid "truth " (or pattern ) an d tha t thi s trut h i s accessibl e
to huma n reason .
2. I t mus t b e deeme d tha t th e trut h i s sociall y relevant . Knowl edge o f trut h the n become s positivel y amelioratin g i f no t categori cally indispensabl e fo r th e socia l an d politica l lif e o f human beings .
3. A belie f mus t prevai l tha t th e intellectual s a s carrier s o f thi s
truth, havin g becom e it s "vessels," must an d wil l naturally aspir e t o
act a s it s selfles s "instruments. "
Ideologies o f intellectuals , however , hav e neve r gon e unchal lenged. Th e two-pronge d challeng e i s typicall y launche d b y th e
intellectuals themselves . Among th e rank s o f intellectuals on e ca n
always fin d agnostic s an d skeptic s wh o utterl y rejec t al l o f th e
aforementioned premises . I n thi s sens e agnosticis m i s th e mos t
unfertile groun d for ideologies in general. The sophistic rejection of
"justice" a s a universa l an d self-legitimizin g principl e mus t b e firs t
rejected i f a "Republic" of intellectuals is to be envisioned. Yet wha t
we hav e terme d "counterideologie s of intellectuals, " i.e., those set s
of organized arguments designed to counter the claims of intellectuals t o sovereignty , are rarel y agnostic . Thi s sor t <5 f cynicis m doe s
not usually generate a zeal to counter the ideologies of intellectuals;
the agen t o f thi s kin d o f "nihilism " migh t withdra w fro m th e
political aren a altogethe r o r remai n i n i t wit h th e intentio n o f
exploiting i t al l th e mor e viciousl y i n th e absenc e o f normativ e
compunctions, fo r realizin g persona l o r ideologica l goals . Thi s i s
true o f bot h ancien t an d postmoder n discourse s o f intellectuals .
Rather tha n denyin g the existenc e o f truth o r it s accessibilit y (th e
first premise) , counterideologie s o f intellectual s cas t doub t o n th e
problem of practical relevanc e of this knowledg e (the secon d prem ise), an d the y especiall y relis h exposin g th e taci t assumption s o f
selflessness o f intellectual s a s agent s o f collectiv e goo d (th e thir d
premise).
By "ideologies o f intellectuals" w e mean those claim s that ai m t o
secure absolut e sovereignt y fo r intellectual s excludin g fro m thi s
category wha t might be called "weake r claims " tha t cal l for limite d
empowerment o f thos e intellectual s wh o "naturally " ris e t o posi -
76 MA
tions of power in a meritocratic environment. Althoug h th e weaker

claims shar e somethin g o f the basi c optimis m o f th e ideologie s o f
intellectuals abou t th e selflessnes s o f intellectual elites , such socia l
thinkers as, for example, John Stuart Mil l (1986, pp. 123-125 , 182187), Jame s Madiso n (1961) , and Kar l Mannhei m (1936 , pp . 153 164), mus t b e differentiate d fro m th e advocate s o f absolut e sover eignty o f intellectuals. Onl y the latte r fit s ou r idea l type of "ideologies o f intellectuals. " Indeed , amon g thos e wh o merel y prais e th e
intellectual elit e a s th e forerunner s an d th e star s o f th e politica l
arena an d encourag e thei r participatio n i n a n ope n proces s o f
political representation , on e find s suc h socia l thinker s a s Willia m
Graham Sumner , Kar l Popper , and , o f course, Ma x Weber , al l of
whom passionatel y campaigne d agains t th e despotis m o f th e en lightened elites .
The classica l clai m t o sovereignt y of intellectual s foun d it s firs t
and mos t eloquent expressio n in th e platonic dialogues, especially
in "Th e Republic, " "Gorgias" an d "Statesman. " Th e styl e of So cratic an d platoni c discourse allows a glimpse of th e radica l skepticism o f suc h sophist s an d orator s a s Thrasymachus, Gorgias , an d
Callicles, wh o denied that beyond opinio n lies the universal, philosophically accessible , an d sociall y relevant truth ; an d tha t th e al legedly jus t an d enlightene d philosopher s wh o clai m t o posses s
truth woul d b e best suite d to rule .
In eac h step , while explaining the basi c identit y of truth, knowl edge, and th e "good" to establish th e wisdom of the rule of the wise
against th e claim s o f th e stron g (tyranny ) and th e man y (democ racy), Plato' s Socrate s encountere d hi s interlocutor s b y puttin g
forth a series of analogies. H e argued, for instance , that the ide a of
good generates , make s possible, and shares a common identit y with
truth an d knowledge in the same way that the sun generates, make s
possible, an d share s a basi c identit y wit h ligh t an d sigh t (Plato ,
1968, Boo k 6 , Par . 509a) . Als o th e philosophicall y attainabl e
knowledge o f justic e i s equate d t o th e scienc e o f medicine , an d
society to a living organism in crisis, thus elevating the philosopher king to th e statu s of a physician who administer s bitter bu t benefi cial potions . Thi s positio n relegate s orator s (professiona l politi cians) wh o vi e fo r publi c approva l t o th e statu s o f cook s an d
confectioners wh o pande r t o th e bas e desire s o f the feeble-minded
masses wh o prefe r delectabl e morsel s t o health y an d medicina l
nourishment (Plato, 1968 , Book 3, Par. 389b.c ; 1971, Par. 460-463 ,

504, 521-522) . T o allo w th e ignoran t masse s t o rul e themselves
through these politician s would lead t o a republic of licentiousness
and laxit y tha t dispense s " a certai n equalit y t o equal s an d non equals alike " an d ultimatel y to "Democracy, " i.e. , the dictatorship
of th e poo r an d th e uneducate d (Plato , 1968 , Boo k 8 , Par . 557 558). Thi s antidemocrati c vie w o f th e firs t Wester n ideolog y o f
intellectuals i s best summarized b y Le o Strauss :
Wisdom appeare d t o the classics as that title which is highest accord ing to nature . I t would b e absurd t o hampe r th e free flow of wisdom
by an y regulations ; henc e th e rul e o f the wis e must b e absolut e rule .
It woul d b e equall y absur d t o hampe r th e fre e flo w o f wisdo m b y
consideration o f th e unwis e wishe s o f th e unwise ; henc e th e wis e
rulers ough t no t t o b e responsible t o thei r unwis e subjects . To mak e
the rule of the wise dependent o n election by the unwise or consent o f
the unwise would mean t o subject what is by nature higher t o control
by what i s by nature lower , i.e., to ac t against nature. (Strauss, 1953 ,
pp. 140-141 )
Having establishe d th e attainabilit y an d socia l relevanc e o f th e

"truth," Plato turned to the question of agency. His rejection of the
possibility o f abusing political power for persona l gain rathe r tha n
using it in the servic e of the social order is tautological. He assumed
that " a ma n wh o ha s learn t abou t righ t wil l b e righteous" (Plato ,
1971, Par. 460), and that genuine arts such as those possessed by the
philosopher-king, pilot , physician , an d shepher d (unlik e spuriou s
arts suc h a s cookin g an d oratory ) ar e b y definitio n "unabusable"
(Plato, 1968 , Book 1 Par. 340-345) . I n the famous platonic parabl e
of th e cave , the philosophe r alon e break s away fro m th e worl d of
false shadow s to catc h a glimpse of "realities." It i s this privileged
access to the gnosis (Sophia), no t a claim to expertise and practica l
knowledge (phrenosis), tha t enable s him to lea d the denizens of the
cave awa y from thei r illusion s an d cur e thei r spiritua l a s wel l as
social ills.
In contrast, Aristotle classified th e science of politics under prac tical wisdo m (phrenosis) togethe r wit h ethic s an d technology ,
rather tha n associatin g it with the pur e philosophic reasoning tha t
generates mathematics , natura l science , an d theolog y (Aristotle ,
78 MA
X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S
1979, Boo k 6 , Par . 5) . Yet the implementatio n o f practical wisdo m

presupposed tha t the ai m o f politics is to lea d th e societ y of men in
order t o promot e what inhere d i n human natur e an d to provid e the
"good life " for it s citizen s (Aristotle , 1982 , Par . 1252b27-1253al) .
But a s the knowledg e o f thi s presuppose s considerable intellectua l
preparation, Aristotl e could als o be said t o tacitl y propose the rul e
of the virtuous intellectuals. The "genuine" state concerns itsel f with
promoting "virtue " o r els e i t i s nothin g bu t a militar y allianc e i n
which "law " become s a mer e agreemen t (o r a socia l contract )
(Aristotle, 1982 , Par . 1280a34-1281a7) .
The classic s viewe d history as either the recor d o f social entrop y
and increasin g chao s o r a haphazar d jumbl e o f happening s tha t
lacked rhym e o r reason . Consequentl y th e axi s o f th e ideologica l
debates betwee n ideologica l an d politica l intellectual s an d thei r
opponents revolve d aroun d a decisionis t an d historica l choic e be tween idea l an d actua l regimes .
As th e modern s introduce d reaso n an d telo s t o history , th e
debate aroun d th e ide a o f socia l evolutio n becam e centra l t o th e
ideologies and counterideologie s of intellectuals. The assumption o f
social evolutio n i n th e moder n debat e (tha t continue d withi n th e
traditions o f sociology and socialism ) performed the sam e functio n
that th e idea s o f trut h an d goodnes s onc e ha d i n classica l times .
Also entirel y irrationa l view s o f histor y i n whic h th e absolut e
leaders wer e entruste d wit h th e tas k o f arbitrarily shapin g th e fat e
of nation s als o continue d t o exis t an d eve n flourish , attractin g
groups of antirational intellectuals . Rejectio n of substantive reaso n
reproduced a replic a o f the ancien t sophisti c praise o f power. 2
Notwithstanding it s historica l importance , thi s tren d faile d t o
capture the imagination o f more than a few isolated intellectual s o r
to significantl y alter the modern rationa l vie w of history commonly
shared b y ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f intellectuals . Sinc e
the existenc e o f socia l evolutio n wa s taken fo r grante d b y all , th e
crucial faul t lin e dividin g th e ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f
intellectuals occurre d primaril y alon g th e ide a o f "automaticity" of
social evolution . A full y automate d socia l evolutio n woul d under mine th e legitimac y o f claims t o leadershi p b y the knowledg e elit e
in th e nam e o f correctiv e intervention . A semiautomati c process ,
however, woul d introduc e enoug h irrationalit y int o th e otherwis e
rational progressio n o f histor y t o legitimiz e politica l ambition s o f
Sociology o f Politics as a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7
the professin g "midwive s o f socia l change, " "socia l engineers, "

"ameliorating experts, " "savants, " and "sociocrats."
In th e moder n occidenta l West , ideologists o f intellectual s hav e
broadcast thei r views usin g a variety o f sounding board s includin g
French communa l though t and , later , throug h Frenc h sociology .
Counterideologists o f intellectuals, on the othe r hand , hav e mainly
used the intellectual arsena l o f British political liberalism and, t o a
lesser degree, that of social Darwinism. The debate between the two
sides continued in early American sociology. In the occidental East ,
the ideologies of intellectuals were reflected in Marxism and late r in
Bolshevism an d Leninis m whil e counterideologie s o f intellectual s
borrowed fro m anarchism , a s wel l a s academi c Marxism . High lights o f this debat e ar e outline d i n Appendi x D .
In short , th e locu s of legitimizing claims of modern ideologie s of
intellectuals ha s shifte d t o ne w areas . Instea d o f claimin g t o hav e
access to "absolute truths " and the putative relevance of such truths
to "public good," the ideologists of intellectuals hav e vaunted radi cal social engineering in the caus e o f hastening the pac e o r correct ing the direction of social evolution. On certain occasion s the y have
even claime d t o b e th e ver y agent s o f socia l evolutio n i n it s fina l
stage. Th e moder n claim s ma y appea r les s ambitiou s tha n thos e
made b y classica l ideologie s o f intellectual s excep t i n on e respect :
whereas th e classic s maintaine d tha t th e relationshi p betwee n
philosophy and sovereignt y was a contingent and coincidenta l one,
the moder n "sociocrats " (Lester Fran k Ward),"savants " (Auguste
Comte), an d "vanguards " (Lenin) dee m th e connectio n o f knowl edge an d powe r a s necessary (Bloom , 1968 , p. 460) . Moder n anti intellectual though t ha s decrie d th e perceive d subjugatio n o f th e
citizens under the despotic rule of the intellectual elites. John Stuar t
Mill's critiqu e o f th e Comtea n syste m o f positiv e politic s an d
Bakunin's critica l vie w o f Marxis t elitis m reflec t thi s resentmen t
(John Stuar t Mill , 1986 , p . 73 , Bakunin, 1972 , p. 318).
Let u s recal l tha t th e practica l ramification s o f thi s immanen t
tension betwee n the idea l an d materia l interest s of intellectuals ca n
be called upo n to explain two historical phenomena : (1) a subjective
ambivalence towar d commitmen t t o idea s or ideologies, an d (2 ) an
objective controvers y betwee n ideologie s an d counterideologie s of
intellectuals. In the absenc e of a hegemonic ideology o f an intellec tual elite , th e moder n occidenta l Wes t (Wester n Europ e an d th e
80 MA
United States ) ha s give n rise to th e subjectiv e ambivalence o f intellectuals. Western intellectuals have expressed this state of mind i n a
prolonged soliloqu y o n th e relationshi p betwee n powe r an d intel lect, with alternating undertones of optimistic enthusiasm, nostalgi c
distance, o r ironi c cynicism . Intellectual s i n th e occidenta l East ,
however, hav e bee n objectivel y spli t betwee n th e camp s o f rulin g
elites an d th e oppresse d counterelites . Th e development s o f a
Marxist traditio n i n the geocultura l spher e o f Eastern Europ e ca n
provide u s with generalizing insights int o th e objectificatio n o f the
split between ideal an d material interest s of intellectuals. Th e mate rial interes t of the hegemoni c circles o f intellectual leaders reflected
in th e ideologie s o f sovereig n intellectual s ar e easil y expropriate d
by intelligentsia, transforming what started ou t as a civil war within
the rank s o f intellectuals int o a class conflic t betwee n intelligentsia
fortified i n the machiner y o f the moder n stat e an d th e increasingly
disenfranchised intellectual s (possibly in alliance wit h other classes ,
namely, th e proletariat) . Raymon d Aro n observed : "Under a com munist regim e the intellectuals , sophist s rather tha n philosophers ,
rule th e roost " (Aron , 1962 , p. 290).
Another interestin g aspec t o f the objectiv e split o f intellectualit y
in Easter n Europ e i s the fac t that th e counterideologie s o f intellec tuals continue d t o adhere to the core ideas of the ruling elites (ideas
such a s social determinatio n o f consciousness an d socia l evolutio n
through clas s conflict) rather than rejecting them. Havin g recovered
these ideas fro m thei r ideological contexts, th e intellectual counter elite attempte d t o restor e th e dogmatize d concept s b y revitalizin g
their intrinsi c rationalizin g tendencies , hopin g tha t th e mer e lif e
and movemen t o f cor e idea s woul d implod e hardene d ideologica l
shells built aroun d them . As a heterodoxy they found a reliable ally
in cor e idea s o f thei r tradition ; the y discovere d tha t advocatin g a
new orthodox y migh t b e safe r a s wel l a s a mor e efficien t wa y o f
fighting th e "dogma " and it s defenders.
We have n o reaso n t o believ e that th e subjectiv e ambivalence of
intellectuals i n respect to thei r idea l an d materia l interests an d th e
objectified versio n o f it (i.e. , th e acrimon y betwee n ideologies an d
counterideologies o f intellectuals) wil l subside o r disappear. O n th e
contrary, w e believe that th e rif t i s bound t o exis t becaus e intellec tuals' mastery o f the worl d (the ultimate en d o f ideologies o f intellectuals) i s achieve d a t th e expens e o f intellectua l master y o f th e
Sociology of Politics as a Sociology of Intellectuals 8
world (th e unhampered substantiv e and theoretica l rationalizatio n

of th e image s o f the world) .
Weber an d Ideologie s of Intellectual s
Max Weber' s philosophica l predilection s were unconduciv e t o th e
ideal typical occidental ideology of intellectuals. Firs t an d foremost,
Weber rejecte d ontologica l an d epistemologica l monis m tha t ha d
long been accepted a s staple presuppositions of most Wester n intellectual traditions. Second, b y separating th e spheres of intellectuality, morality , an d politics , Weber severe d th e ideologicall y signifi cant lin k betwee n rationall y discovere d (o r revealed ) trut h (o r
moral right ) an d politica l power . Nevertheless , Webe r di d no t in veigh agains t intellectuals ' aspirations fo r publi c life . Afte r all , h e
left ope n (especiall y for intellectuals ) the possibilit y of transcending
individual an d sectaria n interests . Webe r wa s keenl y awar e o f th e
problems tha t coul d aris e whe n intellectual s decid e t o dabbl e i n
politics. Ye t his ver y attemp t t o rectif y intellectuals ' attitude s to ward politics , for instance , i n "Politics as a Vocation," presuppose s
an assumption o f basic corrigibility of intellectuals' naiv e encounte r
with politics . I n hi s politica l writings , Webe r sneere d a t thos e
intellectuals wh o woul d tr y t o monopoliz e stat e powe r a s a class ,
but h e als o haile d the m a s potentiall y powerfu l individua l politi cians. I t is to suc h leaders tha t Webe r entrusted th e task o f defending th e dignit y o f th e individua l i n wha t h e perceive d t o b e th e
coming crisi s o f Wester n civilization .
This endorsement , however , can hardl y lan d Webe r in the cam p
of th e ideologist s o f th e intellectuals . H e coul d no t belon g ther e
because o f his "ontological" opposition t o th e monis m o f the occi dental intellectuality . Weber' s metatheoretica l assumption s ar e
inspired by John Stuar t Mill's axiom: "If one proceeds from pur e experience on e arrive s a t polytheism " (Weber , Science, p . 147 ;
Meanings, p. 17) . Weber had observe d that in the sphere of religion,
the rationalizin g propensitie s o f intellectual s promote d transcen dental monotheism . Wher e thi s wa s no t possible , intellectual s le d
efforts t o organiz e the autonomou s functiona l or local demigods i n
a hierarchicall y ordere d pantheon . Agains t th e backdro p o f hi s
82 MA
polytheistic socia l ontology , Webe r judged thes e effort s t o b e ulti mately self-defeatin g (se e Chapte r 2 ) (Weber, Economy I , pp . 407 ,
410, 419 , 518 ; India, p . 152 ; Judaism, pp . 153 , 154).
Max Weber' s socia l polytheis m wa s absolute ; i t coul d no t b e
compromised, a t leas t no t i n th e tru e sens e o f th e wor d (Weber ,
Meaning, pp . 17 , 18) . Futil e attempt s t o wis h awa y th e utterl y
irreconcilable "sphere s o f value " coul d onl y aggravat e th e inne r
struggle o f thes e sphere s (Weber , Rejections, p . 328) . Universalis t
religions undertook to dissolve the local an d tribal religiou s bound aries an d ultimatel y collapse d th e sphere s o f politics , morality ,
religion, etc . W e have alread y allude d t o th e Weberia n parado x o f
"over-rationalization" i n th e religiou s sphere : th e mos t rationall y
consistent theodicie s are the mos t useless , as in their flawless consis tency the y ceas e t o correspon d t o a worl d tha t i s commonly expe rienced a s suffuse d wit h contradiction s an d inequities . Th e dualit y
between the orde r pervading the rational spher e of abstract though t
and th e chao s o f "reality " tha t resist s logica l orde r ma y als o b e
found i n th e worl d o f politics . Attempt s t o rationaliz e th e socia l
world an d t o brin g unde r contro l th e huma n conduc t ar e als o
doomed: "I n politics , as in economics, the more rationa l th e politi cal orde r becam e th e sharpe r th e problem s o f thes e tension s be came" (Weber , Politics, p . 333) . I t wa s Weber' s convictio n tha t
intellectuals wh o enter politics had bette r honestly admi t tha t mos t
of th e radica l problem s tha t aris e i n politica l lif e ar e ultimatel y
unresolvable b y huma n reason , o r tha t ther e i s mor e tha n on e
rational solution .
Weber's assumptio n o f separat e valu e sphere s woul d als o chal lenge the secon d premis e of the ideologies of intellectuals (commensurability o f "truth" into socia l policy) . Mor e tha n th e contradic tions withi n valu e spheres , th e abysma l voi d tha t separate s the m
would undermin e intellectuals ' claim t o "know " the commo n goo d
or to represen t it . In a Weberian universe , where unity and meanin g
are onl y subjective and wher e spheres of life contradic t on e anothe r
in every possible way, questions o f social polic y can b e settle d onl y
by th e democrati c selectio n o f prerational choices , no t b y recourse
to a universall y applicable"science. " I n hi s critiqu e o f Roscher ,
Weber criticize d a version of platonic medica l allegor y that likene d
social polic y t o a for m o f "therapy " aime d a t curin g th e "ailin g
society." Webe r argue d tha t t o trea t economi c polic y a s therap y
would require the definition of normal social state o f health an d th e

demonstration o f th e conducivenes s o f th e ostensibl y self-evident
social policie s t o th e caus e o f socia l well-bein g (Weber , Roscher,
p. 87 , 88). According to Weber, economic theories ar e merely useful
ideal typica l construction s base d o n presupposition s whose decep tive "self-evidence" mus t b e taken wit h a grain o f salt (se e Chapte r
1). Th e "meanin g adequacy " o f a n idea l typ e (a s w e hav e alread y
argued i n the firs t chapter ) mus t no t replac e empirica l researc h t o
ascertain it s "causa l adequacy. " Onl y a t th e expens e o f profoun d
self-deception coul d on e assume that economi c theories portra y a n
adequate pictur e o f innately goo d an d bad policie s or that they can
spare on e th e difficult y o f makin g a choic e (Weber , Meaning,
pp. 19 , 36, 44) . Webe r attempte d t o demonstrat e th e ideologica l
nature o f "scientific socia l planning" by tracing it s academic popu larity t o th e increasin g encroachmen t o f the stat e i n th e economi c
sphere an d it s concomitan t influenc e on th e characte r o f universities, whic h had starte d t o becom e mer e trainin g ground s fo r stat e
officials (Weber , Meaning, p . 45) . I t i s obviou s tha t fo r Webe r
empirical science s coul d no t dictat e wha t on e "should " do , no r
could universitie s pretend to impart such knowledge: "An empirica l
science canno t tel l anyon e wha t h e should dobu t rathe r wha t h e
can doand unde r certai n circumstanceswha t h e wishes to do "
(Weber, Objectivity, p . 54) . The universitie s can onl y "sharpen th e
student's capacit y t o .. . thin k clearl y an d 't o kno w wha t on e
wants.'. . . Everything elsethe entire substance o f his aspiration s
and goalsth e individua l mus t achiev e fo r himself. " (Weber ,
Freedom, p . 21) .
Now tha t w e have underline d Weber' s rejectio n o f the monisti c
assumption commo n t o mos t ideologie s o f intellectual s a s wel l a s
his profound doubt s regardin g the commensurabilit y o f a scientific
"truth" t o a scientifi c socia l polic y (th e firs t an d secon d assump tions o f ideologies of intellectuals), le t us concentrat e o n th e ques tion o f agency. Although Weber's separation o f facts and values an d
his assumptio n o f separat e an d potentiall y antagonisti c sphere s of
intellectuality, morality , an d politic s militat e agains t ideologie s of
intellectuals, h e did no t shar e th e pessimis m o f ancient sophist s o r
that o f moder n anarchist s abou t th e intellectuals ' willingnes s or
ability t o transcen d thei r self-interes t an d prejudices . Eve n whe n
considering suc h phenomen a a s th e facilit y wit h whic h formerl y
84 MA
radical intellectual s tur n int o authoritaria n official s o f the rightis t

and leftis t movements , Webe r appeale d t o thei r socia l psycholog y
rather tha n tracin g thi s metamorphosi s t o th e intellectuals ' sinister
will to powe r or their desir e to realiz e their material interests . This
apparently radica l transmutatio n o f the intellectuals' socia l character did no t signif y fo r Weber any "innate disposition or ignoble self seeking o n thei r part. " Rathe r i t indicate d thei r "pragmati c ra tionalism," thei r "yearnin g fo r 'action ' i n th e servic e o f absolut e
social an d ethica l values. " Suc h romanti c yearnin g coul d the n b e
translated int o reactionar y o r revolutionar y authoritarianis m de pending o n whethe r i t starte d fro m abov e o r fro m belo w (Weber,
Russia, p. 271). Weber' s motivationa l analysi s o f revolutionar y o r
reactionary intellectual s als o foun d expressio n i n hi s essa y o n so cialism. H e di d no t vie w socialis m a s a n ominou s plo t tha t moti vates intellectual s t o seiz e control o f the politica l machin e i n orde r
to realiz e clas s interests . Rather , intellectual s joi n th e socialis t
movement becaus e o f "th e romance o f th e genera l strik e an d th e
romance o f th e hop e o f revolutio n a s suc h whic h fascinates them .
One ca n tel l b y lookin g a t the m tha t the y ar e romantics " (Weber,
Socialism, p . 215) . Thes e instance s indicat e tha t Webe r wa s mor e
concerned wit h intellectuals ' naivet e an d emotiona l immaturit y
than thei r hidde n agend a t o usur p powe r an d rul e a s self-seekin g
despots.
Of course , Ma x Webe r share d wit h th e sophisti c an d agnosti c
anti-intellectual traditio n a basi c rejectio n o f th e possibilit y o f
intellectuals' achieving and applyin g the politicall y relevan t truths .
This, a s w e hav e alread y mentioned , i s contrar y t o th e cred o o f
counterideologies o f intellectual s a s wel l (the y accep t mos t o f th e
philosophical premise s o f intellectua l ideologies preferrin g to cas t
doubt o n th e questio n o f "agency") . Webe r i s fa r fro m bein g a
champion o f the agnostics ' anti-intellectualism , no r i s he a n advo cate o f the traditiona l Wester n counterideologies of intellectuals. I t
is tru e tha t h e rejecte d th e philosophica l premise s o f intellectuals '
collective ideologie s an d repudiate d thei r ideologica l claims . Yet,
notwithstanding hi s reservations , Webe r encourage d participatio n
of intellectual s in politics as individuals and individualists ; he even
appeared eage r t o entrus t the future o f individuality to them . Wh o
could bette r represen t th e caus e o f individualit y tha n th e mos t
reflective member s of th e society ? Intellectuals com e closes t to th e
conscious lif e o f a n individua l t o th e exten t tha t the y distanc e

themselves from th e realm s o f "habitual" and "traditional " action .
But Weber also had a major qualm abou t this: if intellectuals ar e to
carry th e torc h o f individualit y in th e impendin g "pola r night " o f
Western civilization , the y nee d t o men d thei r ways . Th e endemi c
problem fo r politicall y activ e intellectual s wa s their politica l dilet tantism an d their "irresponsibility." Thu s Weber attempted t o war n
them against the dangers that awaited the m i n the arena o f politics.
We will come back to this topic later in this chapter to underline the
substance o f Weber's advic e to intellectuals .
Bases for Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia : A n Idea l Typ e
The clai m tha t practica l wisdo m imparted throug h forma l educa tion is indispensable for th e smoot h functioning of the governmen t
is a necessary component of the ideologies of intelligentsia. In orde r
to secur e claim s t o politica l power , however , the intelligentsi a is
bound t o develo p o r adop t substantiv e argument s concernin g th e
nature o f the stat e and it s apparatus. A s vehicles of modern ideologies o f intelligentsia, socialism an d th e welfar e stat e clai m t o serv e
the individua l an d promot e th e commonwea l through performin g
rational redistributiv e functions . Ma x Webe r ha d seriou s misgiv ings abou t bot h o f these form s o f government.
Weber's negativ e attitud e towar d th e claim s o f the welfar e stat e
were informe d b y hi s comparativ e historica l stud y o f th e Indian ,
Chinese, an d nea r Easter n empire s i n whos e vast stat e bureaucra cies th e intelligentsi a ros e t o ascendancy . Th e roo t o f the moder n
welfare state , in Weber's view, bifurcates into two separat e idea s of
material an d spiritual welfare . Th e forme r was a constant compo nent o f patrimonial bureaucracie s o f China, India , an d Mesopota mia. The two basic ideas of "kingly charity" and "appeal to heaven "
were closely related t o th e idea l of a welfare state a s a protectorat e
of th e dispossesse d masses . Th e possibilit y o f direc t "appea l t o
heaven" b y the downtrodde n an d th e destitute , i.e. , the ruler' s fea r
of the "curse o f the poor," was supposed t o check the absolutis m of
the king and ensure a modicum o f justice for the masses. Bu t it also
served th e kingl y interes t by protectin g hi s taxpayer s agains t th e
brutality o f hi s official s (Weber , Judaism, pp . 256-257). 3
86 MA
In Indi a an d China , w e als o encounte r th e genera l ide a o f a

welfare stat e a s th e guaranto r o f th e materia l welfar e o f th e sub jects. However , i t wa s i n Indi a tha t fo r th e firs t tim e th e kin g
undertook t o provid e no t onl y materia l bu t als o spiritua l welfare
for hi s subjects . I t wa s no t th e goa l o f Kin g Ashuka' s welfar e
policies merel y t o "augmen t th e numbe r o f ta x payer s an d th e
capacity t o pa y taxes" but t o car e fo r peopl e i n orde r tha t the y be
"happy" an d "attai n heaven " a s wel l (Weber , India, p . 242) . I n
China, th e cleavag e betwee n welfar e ideologie s base d o n purel y
material ground s an d thos e promotin g both materia l an d spiritual
welfare o f the subject s remained unbridge d (Weber, China, p. 137) .
This cleavag e wa s partl y du e t o th e oppositio n o f tw o Chines e
intellectual traditions. On on e side, a powerful allianc e wa s formed
between ruling intellectuals who advised the pontiff an d the bureau cratic intelligentsia who ran th e empire. Having had a t their dispo sal a n officia l philosoph y (Confucianism) a s wel l as culturall y ste reotyped mold s fo r th e carrier s o f thi s philosoph y (th e literati) ,
Chinese imperia l bureaucracy sought t o expan d th e real m o f legitimate interventio n o f th e state . Th e Taois t tradition , however , re mained skeptica l of the literati's efforts t o manage th e materia l an d
spiritual lives of the masses. The Taoists charge d that the Confucia n
literati ha d no t take n th e "naturally" unequal intellectua l an d spir itual endowment s o f the subject s seriously. Th e literat i ha d main tained tha t throug h "education " the rabble could b e elevated to the
highest possibl e level s o f sophistication . Agains t thi s belie f th e
Taoists held that the state must not interfere with what is unchangeable i n th e cosmi c an d socia l orde r an d tha t th e levelin g o f th e
unequal charismati c endowment s that legitimize d the "aristocrac y
of grace" was wrong. "The ruler s may fil l thei r subjects ' bellies no t
their minds ; they ma y strengthe n thei r limb s bu t no t thei r charac ter" (Weber , China, pp . 187-88) .
The more recent avatars of the warring gods of state interventionism, th e radica l mora l equalitarianis m (fro m Roussea u t o Ba kunin), o n th e on e side , an d th e meritocrati c syste m o f respectin g
and cultivatin g natural difference s (Britis h liberal philosophers and
economists), o n th e other , ar e a s little incline d t o ceas e fighting in
modern times as they were in ancient China (Weber, China, p. 137 ;
Meaning, p . 15) .
One o f th e function s o f a welfar e stat e i s t o formaliz e an d

legitimize the statu s oppositio n between cultured elite s and uncul tured masse s b y developin g a n organi c imag e fo r socia l order .
"Such ideas, " Webe r stated , "sugges t themselve s t o an y politica l
welfare organization " (Weber , India, p . 143) . Henc e th e similarit y
of ideologies of all welfare states. Althoug h the objectiv e possibility
of the developmen t of an organismi c social order did not material ize i n th e Chines e welfar e stat e (du e t o th e strengt h o f Chines e
guilds and sibs) , Weber perceived elective affinities betwee n the tw o
and cautione d agains t th e developmen t o f suc h ideologie s i n th e
future. A n organismi c socia l orde r woul d se t th e stag e fo r mas s
enslavement by fettering the individual to his job, class and occupa tion (Weber, Economy II , p . 1402) . At this juncture the bureaucra t
is i n a paradoxica l position : h e i s harnesse d int o th e huma n ma chine a s a "cog" an d "chained " to hi s activity , ye t he has a vested
interest i n seein g th e mechanis m an d it s authorit y perpetuate d
(Weber, Bureaucracy, p . 228) . A s such , th e bureaucra t i s the firs t
inmate i n th e hous e o f bondage tha t h e i s building.
Weber wa s not enthusiasti c abou t th e moder n welfar e stat e an d
its proponents . Thei r apparen t concer n fo r th e well-bein g o f indi viduals appeare d t o hi m a s anachronisti c i f not merel y ideological
(Weber, Rejections, p . 334) . Suc h "concerns " appeare d t o hi m
either a s reflecting th e specia l interests of entrenched redistributiv e
bureaucracies, o r a s concealin g justifications fo r expansionis m o f
the stat e pe r s e (Weber , Bureaucracy, p . 213) . Webe r repeatedl y
warned agains t the apparently impartia l and objective bureaucrati c
elites a s harbinger s o f a n "indestructible " dictatorshi p o f th e offi cials of the "Oriental-Egyptian type " (Weber, Economy II, p. 1402) .
If Weber's critique of the capitalis t welfar e stat e was based o n th e
study of the past, hi s rejection of socialism was based o n an analysi s
of th e present : "Th e 'socialis m o f th e future ' i s a phras e fo r th e
rationalization o f economic lif e b y combinin g further bureaucrati zation and interest-group administration" (Weber , Meaning, p . 47).
In othe r words , socialis m represente d a furthe r rationalizatio n o f
the capitalis t syste m i n whic h th e wors t aspect s o f th e presen t
system o f capitalism, i.e. , bureaucratization, woul d b e augmented .
Even if it were possible to brin g about th e tota l collapse o f capital ism overnight , n o doub t a swee t drea m o f man y socialists , th e
88 MA
question would remain: "Who would then take control of and direct
this new economy?" (Weber, Socialism, p. 262) . The dictatorship of
the official , no t tha t o f the worker, would be the result of socialism.
This woul d entrenc h th e intelligentsi a i n power , dashin g foreve r
the hope s o f rekindlin g th e light s o f freedo m an d individualit y
in the Occident . Th e configurations o f the alliance s a t the momen t
of th e collaps e o f Easter n Europea n socialis m vindicat e no t onl y
Weber's prognoses of the inheren t weaknesses of socialism bu t als o
of th e respectiv e relationships o f intellectuals an d intelligentsi a t o
the centralize d state .
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intelligentsi a
Weber's cas e agains t ideologie s of intelligentsi a i s base d o n thre e
arguments: th e impossibilit y o f usin g exper t knowledg e t o resolv e
socioeconomic problems , th e narro w an d ofte n unmediate d clas s
interests o f th e carrier s o f thi s "knowledge, " an d th e impendin g
peril o f bureaucrati c dominatio n unde r postlibera l capitalist 4 o r
socialist regimes .
Weber's critiqu e o f th e technocrati c elite s professin g t o hav e
reduced question s of socioeconomic polic y to a "science" overlaps
his basi c antipath y t o th e ideologie s o f intellectuals . W e have al ready observe d tha t Weber' s neo-Kantia n epistemolog y an d hi s
polytheistic social ontology exclude logical ratiocination a s a means
of solving socioeconomic and ultimately political problems. On this
basis, Weber argued tha t what purported to be the newly discovered
"laws" of economics coul d arrive at unambiguou s "socia l policies "
only at the expense of treating a number of their presuppositions as
self-evident (Weber, Meaning, pp . 36-38) . We have also pointed out
that Webe r wa s awar e of , an d warne d agains t th e spuriou s "self evidence" of ideal types . The law s of economics, bein g nothin g bu t
another se t o f idea l types , might als o giv e the appearanc e o f self evidence. Thi s i s why Webe r preferred that th e question s o f socia l
policy b e "disputed " publicl y rathe r tha n "solved " a s technica l
problems.
The adulatio n of a sacralized, scientific approac h t o socia l prob lems woul d als o ten d t o hid e th e ideologica l bia s o f th e so-calle d
scientific economists . Accordin g to Weber , eve n i f a scientifi c ap -
Sociology o f Politics as a Sociology o f Intellectuals 8
proach coul d arriv e a t undisputabl e socia l policies , th e narrow ,

unmediated clas s interes t o f the intelligentsi a wh o woul d clai m t o
represent i t woul d almos t certainl y contou r i t t o serv e thei r ow n
narrow interests . Her e Webe r appears t o full y endors e th e Marxis t
axiom o f social determinatio n o f consciousness as well as the ideo logical natur e o f socia l sciences . Ma x Weber' s radica l theor y o f
social conflic t a t onc e emphasize s an d goe s beyon d th e Marxia n
scheme o f clas s conflict :
The conflic t occur s no t merel y . . . betwee n "clas s interests " bu t
between genera l view s o n lif e an d th e univers e a s well . Thi s latte r
point, however, doe s not lesse n th e truth that the particular ultimate
value judgment s whic h th e individua l espouse s i s decide d amon g
other factors an d certainly t o a quite significant degre e by the degree
of affinit y betwee n i t an d clas s interests . (Weber , Objectivity, p . 56 )
It goe s withou t saying, however, that Webe r applie s th e Marxis t

class analysis more readily to the intelligentsia than t o intellectuals.
It woul d b e no t onl y philosophicall y naiv e bu t als o sociologicall y
ingenuous t o assum e tha t a stratu m o f technocrat s ca n an d wil l
resolve and implemen t al l social, economic , an d political question s
impartially an d scientifically . Of course, i t mus t b e emphasized tha t
unlike Marx , Webe r subscribed to the liberal ideal o f a transcenden tal politics, i.e. , a political real m leas t manipulate d fo r particularisti c
economic interests o f the politicians. Instea d o f postulating thi s kind
of politic s a s th e natura l stat e o f affair s i n al l libera l democracies ,
however, Weber treated i t as problematic an d aske d abou t th e condi tions of its actualization. H e asked : Wha t kin d o f agency would bes t
achieve the autonom y o f the politica l realm ? For instance , classe s o r
strata that were on the decline (Junkers) or on the rise (entrepreneurs)
were leas t abl e o r willin g t o transcen d thei r economi c interest s i n
favor o f genuin e politica l solutions . Certai n professional s amon g
intellectuals (e.g. , lawyers), however, were better fitte d sociologicall y
and economicall y t o ente r politics , a s they could affor d t o liv e "for "
politics no t "off " o f it (Weber , Politics, pp. 84-85) .
Intellectuals "can " formulat e politica l agenda s an d defen d the m
with (measured) conviction. By contrast, th e intelligentsia woul d b e
least likel y t o engag e i n "true " (transcendental ) politics . Webe r
deemed th e careeris m o f th e bureaucrat s t o b e antithetica l t o th e
90 MA
qualities o f commitmen t t o ideal s an d politica l responsibilit y tha t

were, from hi s point o f view, indispensable for th e politica l calling .
In applyin g what amounte d t o a sobe r Marxis t clas s analysi s t o
bureaucracy, Webe r disenchanted th e future Utopia s o f both liberal
and socialis t "literati." To dispel the liberal "Pollyannaish" praise of
bureaucratization, Webe r pointed ou t that the growth of capitalis m
and bureaucrac y neithe r promote s no r parallel s democratization .
On th e contrary : suc h growt h amon g othe r "weathe r signs " point s
in th e directio n o f "increasin g unfreedom. " Webe r hel d i t t o b e
"utterly ridiculous " to equat e th e developmen t o f moder n capital ism wit h "freedom, " "democracy, " o r individualism . Indeed , h e
asked himself , "How ar e al l these thing s [i.e., freedom , democrac y
and individualism ] in general and i n the long term possible where it
(i.e., moder n capitalism ) prevails? " (Weber, Russia, p. 282) . To the
extent tha t moder n bureaucracy, a s a "power instrumen t of the firs t
order" is increasingly rationalized an d rendere d more indispensabl e
and mor e "unshatterable, " i t become s antithetica l t o libera l ideal s
(Weber, Bureaucracy, pp . 228-231 ; Economy II , p . 1401) . The dy namics o f developing capitalism an d bureaucrac y d o no t promot e
freedom. I f anything , i t i s the voluntaristi c "will o f a natio n no t t o
allow itsel f t o b e le d lik e a floc k o f sheep " tha t ma y guarante e
freedom an d individualit y (Weber, Russia, p. 282) .
Weber brough t th e gif t o f Marxis t clas s analysi s no t onl y t o th e
bourgeois flatterers o f bureaucracy but also to the Marxist ideologist s
of th e proletaria n state . I n hi s essay on socialism, Webe r focused o n
the blind spot o f Marxist movement s of his time; he proffered a class
analysis of the bureaucratizatio n o f the Marxis t movemen t an d o f its
consequences. H e maintaine d tha t thos e wh o live d "off " Socia l
Democracy, fro m innkeeper s whose establishments are patronized b y
radicals, t o universit y professors, editors , party officials , etc. , woul d
not abando n thei r veste d interest s fo r th e sak e o f revolutionar y
believers an d thei r belief s (Beetham , 1985 , p . 162) . "Nothin g i s
further fro m th e thoughts o f this class than solidarit y with the prolet ariat, they are much more concerned wit h increasing the gap between
the proletaria t an d themselves " (Weber, Socialism, p . 261) .
The ultimate naivet e of both the liberal and radical panegyrists of
bureaucratization consiste d i n that the y were applauding th e inevitable proces s o f bureaucratization, no t realizin g tha t thei r applaus e
was itself a part of that process: "The futur e belongs t o bureaucrati -
zation, an d i t is evident that i n this regar d th e literat i pursu e thei r

callingto provide a salvo of applause to the up-and-coming powersjust a s they did i n the ag e of laissez-faire, both time s with th e
same naivete" (Weber, Economy II, p. 1401) . Max Weber' s political
views wer e a s profoundl y influenced by hi s visio n o f th e futur e a s
they wer e informe d by hi s stud y o f th e past .
To describe Weber's critique of the future o f the Occiden t we have
coined th e wor d "Orientosis." It woul d b e consistent wit h Weber' s
views o n cross-cultura l understanding t o asser t that h e confronted
non-Western civilization s with question s that wer e primarily rele vant t o th e Wester n societies. Bu t the revers e was also true : Weber
used th e insight s he had gaine d throug h hi s comparative historica l
studies a s a n integra l part o f his politica l sociology . B y fusing th e
objective possibilitie s o f th e presen t wit h certai n historica l idea l
types, Weber arrived a t a prognosis o f the trends of his time, which
became centra l t o hi s politica l ideals . Webe r identifie d wit h th e
Jewish prophets of doom partly because he felt that he had see n the
future o f the Occiden t i n the pas t o f the Orien t an d Mesopotamia .
This helpe d Webe r replac e th e vagu e pessimisti c futurolog y o f
Toqueville and Mil l with his vivid prophecy of doom: "Everywhere,
the casing of th e new serfdom i s ready" (Weber, Socialism, p. 281).
Socialism, far from bein g an alternative destination, was a shortcut
to the "iron cage." The subjugation of the individual would becom e
complete soone r i f the machiner y o f private capitalis m wer e t o b e
dismantled an d replaced by the central management o f nationalize d
and socialize d enterprises. Monopolization o f the bureaucratic ma chine woul d create a latter-day versio n of mass enslavement i n th e
style o f ancien t Egypt , excep t "i t woul d occu r i n a muc h mor e
rationaland henc e unbreakableform " (Weber , Economy II ,
p. 1402) . Bureaucrats ar e particularly earmarke d t o kee p the gate s
of th e "hous e o f bondage" o f the future . Th e animate d machin e o f
bureaucracy," togethe r wit h th e inanimat e machin e . . . i s bus y
fabricating th e shel l of bondage whic h men wil l perhaps b e force d
to inhabi t someday , a s powerles s a s th e fellah s o f ancien t Egypt "
(Weber, Economy II, p. 1402) . The socialists were mistaken to think
that thei r stat e bureaucrac y was any better tha n it s capitalist (pri vate o r public ) counterparts . O n th e on e hand , socialis m woul d
inevitably proliferat e bureaucracies i n orde r t o tak e ove r nationalized corporations . O n the other , it would eliminate the competition
92 MA
of privat e bureaucracies , an d tha t betwee n privat e an d publi c bu reaucracies, leavin g th e wa y ope n fo r tota l contro l o f th e civi l
society b y a centralize d stat e machine .
Weber credited America n worker s for seeing through th e bureau cratic peril , rejectin g "civi l servic e reform." The y "preferre d t o b e
governed b y parvenus o f doubtful moralit y rathe r tha n a formall y
qualified mandarinate " (Weber, Russia, p. 282) . I n th e impendin g
orientalization o f th e Occident , a ne w bureaucrac y woul d b e
created mor e powerful and stiflin g tha n thos e o f Egypt an d China .
The questio n was : Wha t coul d b e don e t o preven t this?
Weber's Politica l Agenda :
Democracy, Bureaucracy , an d Mas s Societie s
Like Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill , Weber revered the
autonomy o f th e individua l an d dreade d th e impendin g demis e o f
individuality an d freedo m in the flowin g tide o f mass equalitarian ism an d tota l bureaucratizatio n (Mill , 1986 , pp . 59-63 , 121-123 ;
Tocqueville, 1969 , pp. 250-262) . Unlik e them, however , Weber ha d
a clear vision of the natur e o f this threat. Weber' s theory of increas ing orientalizatio n o f the Occiden t integrate s his comparative soci ology wit h a form o f futurology based o n a n estimat e o f objective
possibilities fo r occidenta l civilization . Thi s blea k premonitio n
went a long way to temper Weber's liberal convictions an d affec t hi s
political agenda . Hi s vie w o f liberal democracy an d it s institution s
was an instrumental one; the whole system could b e used t o protec t
individuality an d th e hegemon y o f th e stat e throug h it s bureau cratic machine . Despit e apparent electiv e affinities betwee n democratization an d th e growt h o f bureaucracy , Webe r maintaine d tha t
they ar e fundamentall y incompatible :
We must remembe r the fact which we have encountered several times
and whic h w e shall hav e t o discus s repeatedly: tha t "democracy " as
such i s oppose d t o th e "rule " of bureaucracy , i n spit e an d perhap s
because o f its unavoidable ye t unintended promotio n o f bureaucrati zation. Unde r certain conditions , democrac y creates palpable break s
in the bureaucratic patter n an d impediments to bureaucratic organi zation. (Weber , Economy II, p . 991)
People i n a mass society are confronted with the colossal human

machine of bureaucracy, which functions a s an instrument of power
for th e stat e whil e furtherin g the interest s o f its members throug h
the contro l o f informatio n (officia l secrecy ) and practica l knowl edge. Even the masters of bureaucracy, be they "the people, " oligarchies, or tyrants, find themselve s as powerless as clumsy dilettantes
trying t o us e a sophisticate d machin e t o furthe r thei r ow n causes .
Under libera l democrati c regimes , however , the contro l an d con tainment o f bureaucracy seem to b e better institutionalized: reason
enough t o prefe r suc h socia l system s to an y for m o f centralize d
control.
Before elaboratin g o n th e superiorit y of democrati c institution s
in checkin g th e powe r o f bureaucracies , i t mus t b e state d tha t
Weber's emphasis on the problems of bureaucratic control doe s not
mean that he was solely concerned with the threat o f a bureaucratic
intelligentsia, but that he feared them as a more immediate threat to
the ideal s o f freedo m an d individualit y i n th e West . Centralis m
either unde r the intellectuals (e.g., Jacobism o r Marxism ) o r under
the intelligentsi a (e.g., state bureaucracie s o f socialism and capital ism) wer e see n b y Webe r a s equall y inimical to th e growt h o f th e
autonomous individua l (Weber, Russia, p. 281).
As we suggested earlier, Weber's abhorrence of centralism b y o r
in th e nam e o f the peopl e links him t o th e romanti c liberalis m of
John Stuar t Mil l (Mill , 1986 , pp. 184-185) . Whil e hi s critical dis tance from suc h concepts as "the inalienabl e rights of man" sets him
apart fro m classica l liberalism, there is no doubt tha t Webe r nonetheless jealously treasure d thes e "inalienable huma n rights"ap parently as useful mythsan d was adamant tha t the private sphere
be protecte d fro m th e incursion s o f th e stat e (Weber , Russia,
p. 283) . It als o i s true that like classical liberals Webe r deemed th e
goal o f democratic contro l o f the stat e t o b e the protectio n o f th e
inchoate seed s of individuality in the West . Yet, probably the mos t
important aspec t o f Weber' s liberalis m i s tha t h e di d no t sto p a t
expounding his idealsor portending his prophecies of doombut
proceeded to offe r concret e political guidelines in order to reconcile
them wit h th e realitie s o f mass societ y an d it s increasin g bureau cratization. Webe r als o attempte d t o integrat e hi s ow n theor y o f
social conflic t (betwee n and withi n social classe s as well a s amon g
value spheres) with his liberal ideals. The result is a particular blend
94 MA
of ideas an d ideal s tha t initiated a new era i n liberal thought o f the

twentieth century .
As Socrate s i s credited wit h callin g philosoph y fro m heave n an d
bringing i t t o earth , s o shoul d Webe r b e recognize d a s th e thinke r
who brough t th e ideal s o f individualis m an d freedo m fro m th e
heaven o f classical an d romanti c liberalis m t o th e mundan e worl d of
mass democracies. Webe r was not th e onl y liberal for who m individ uality an d freedo m cam e befor e equalit y an d politica l participation ,
but h e certainly is among th e first t o boldl y formulate his ideas in the
form o f a n elitis t traditio n withi n liberalism . Neglectin g Weber , this
trend i s nowaday s usuall y identifie d wit h a lin e o f thinker s rangin g
from Schumpete r t o Dah l (Macpherson , 1977 , pp. 76-92) .
Weber openl y doubte d th e valu e o f mas s participatio n i n th e
democratic proces s (Weber , Economy II , pp . 1459-1460 ) an d en dorsed th e so-calle d principl e o f smal l numbers :
The broa d mas s o f deputie s function s onl y a s a followin g fo r th e
leader o r th e fe w leader s wh o for m th e government , an d i t blindl y
follows the m as long as they ar e successful . This i s the wa y i t should
be. Politica l actio n i s alway s determine d b y th e "principl e o f smal l
numbers," tha t means , th e superio r politica l maneuverabilit y o f
small leading groups. In mass states, this caesarist element is ineradicable [italics added] . (Weber , Economy II , p . 1414)
Weber also rejected as contemptible the rule of mediocre intelligent sia i n stat e an d part y bureaucracie s unde r th e guis e o f a mas s
leaderless democracy . Thes e tw o fact s drov e hi m t o advocat e th e
charismatic leadershi p o f a democraticall y electe d leader . Thi s
"caesarist" element in Weber's political though t has been the subject
of muc h controversy , whic h i s no t a t issu e here . I t is , however ,
beyond doubt that for Weber, even under the most democratic for m
of state, the passivity of masses was a given: "It i s not th e politically
passive 'mass ' tha t produce s th e leade r fro m it s midst , bu t th e
political leade r recruit s hi s followin g an d win s th e mas s throug h
'demagogy'" (Weber, Economy II , p . 1457) . Weber di d no t requir e
the libera l democrati c parliamen t t o b e th e voic e o f th e masses ;
rather, these bodies were supposed t o fulfil l tw o practical functions.
First, th e parliamen t supplie s a modicu m o f necessar y rationa l
legitimation fo r th e moder n state :
Modern parliament s ar e primaril y representativ e bodie s o f thos e

ruled wit h bureaucrati c means . Afte r all , a certai n minimu m o f
consent o n th e par t o f th e ruled , a t leas t o f th e sociall y importan t
strata, i s a preconditio n o f th e durabilit y o f every , eve n th e bes t
organized, domination . Parliament s ar e toda y th e mean s o f mani festing thi s minimu m consent . (Weber , Economy II , pp . 1407-1408 )
The secon d functio n o f the parliamen t is to provid e a countervail ing force i n order to check the power of the entrenched bureaucracy
of the state . Though the necessity of "watchful criticism" of bureaucracy was already proposed by other s (e.g., b y Mill) , it wa s Weber
who depicte d th e institutiona l framewor k within which this coul d
be accomplished.
Weber's Politica l Agenda : The Varietie s o f Irresponsibilit y
Weber was as averse to the total sovereignty of a handful of intellectuals a s h e wa s oppose d t o th e hegemon y o f th e bureaucrati c
intelligentsia as a class. Ye t he chose intellectuals as his champions
of politica l leadershi p whil e warnin g the m agains t confoundin g
their politic s wit h maxim s o f ethica l an d rationa l intellectualiza tion. T o ente r politic s for a n intellectua l migh t b e tantamoun t t o
giving u p th e searc h for symmetr y and consistenc y of the intellec tual an d mora l spheres without acceptin g the view o f the hardene d
practitioners o f "power politics. " Th e intellectua l wh o fail s t o ad just t o th e politica l callin g become s a "cosmic ethica l rationalist, "
which Weber deems to b e the mos t dangerou s political animal . H e
believed tha t thi s sort o f political intellectual would be easily overwhelmed by the ethical immorality of the world. In trying to remain
loyal to a set of absolute an d abstrac t mora l o r ideologica l principles, suc h a perso n wil l resor t t o wishfu l thinking : "fro m goo d
comes only good, but from evi l only evil follows," that is, one needs
only to take stock o f one's own intentions and rest assured that th e
results o f a n actio n will follow suit . Thus th e visionar y intellectua l
would becom e th e parago n o f "irresponsibility " (Weber , Politics,
pp. 121-122) . Suc h a bree d o f politicall y motivate d intellectual s
evoke the wrong paradigm in early Christianity when subscribing to
the maxi m o f "Do righ t and leave the rest to God. " Instead , Weber
96 MA
would advise them to take heart: The early Christians knew full wel l
the worl d is governed by demons and that h e who lets himself in for
politics, tha t is , fo r powe r an d forc e a s means , contract s wit h
diabolical power s and that for his action it is not true that goo d can
follow onl y fro m goo d an d evi l onl y from evil , bu t tha t ofte n th e
opposite i s true (Weber , India, p . 184 ; Politics, p . 123) .
In spit e o f th e beratin g o f politicize d intellectuals ' politica l nai vete, despit e callin g som e o f the m "windbags " an d "backwood s
politicians," an d despit e criticizing their "soft-headed " an d "Philistine" attitude i n trying to "replace the 'political' with the 'ethical,'"
Weber continue d t o assum e th e ultimat e corrigibilit y of the politi cally aspirin g intellectuals . Wh y wa s h e les s generous wit h politi cized bureaucrati c intelligentsia ? Becaus e thei r "irresponsibility "
was no t th e resul t o f naivete o r idealism ; it was an integra l par t o f
their statu s ethos . "I t i s i n th e natur e o f official s o f hig h mora l
standing t o b e poor politicians , an d abov e all , in the political sense
of the word, to b e irresponsible politicians" (Weber, Politics, p. 95).
At first sigh t the organize d irresponsibility of the bureaucrats migh t
seem benign when compared wit h the irresponsibility of the zealous
intellectuals (e.g. , syndicalists) . The threa t o f the former , however,
was see n b y Webe r t o b e a n accomplishe d fact , i n vie w o f Ger many's recen t disastrou s politica l events ; i t als o appeare d imma nent, a s followin g fro m th e forma l an d practica l rationalizin g
trends o f Wester n civilization. Without underestimatin g th e peril s
of intellectuals ' participatio n i n politics , Webe r diagnose d th e bu reaucratic "organize d irresponsibility " to b e infinitel y mor e perni cious an d ultimatel y incurable . Therefor e h e di d no t se t ou t t o
admonish the Prussia n bureaucrat s in the ar t o f politics; "politics"
was no t a "vocation " h e wishe d the m t o master . Instead , Webe r
attacked the m b y attributin g to thei r "careerism " nearly al l of the
evils o f Germa n politics . Th e callin g o f a civi l servant , Webe r
maintained, i s t o sacrific e his conviction s t o th e demand s o f obe dience. Thi s i s diametrically oppose d t o th e callin g o f a politician .
Weber's disapprovin g tone i s unyielding:
It i s reliably known that almost all of the me n who wer e in charge of
our policie s i n that disastrou s decade have time an d agai n privatel y
repudiated grav e declaration s fo r whic h the y accepte d forma l re sponsibility. If one asked with amazement why a statesman remained
in offic e i f he was powerless t o preven t th e publicatio n of a questionable statement , th e usua l answe r wa s tha t "somebod y els e woul d
have been found" to authorize it. This may very well be true, bu t the n
it also indicate s th e decisiv e faul t o f th e system . Woul d somebod y
else have also been foun d i f the head o f government woul d hav e ha d
to tak e th e responsibilit y a s th e truste e o f a powerfu l parliament ?
(Weber, Economy II , p . 1438 )
Weber deeme d th e struggl e o f th e force s o f freedo m agains t

modern enslavement in the bond s o f bureaucracy to b e a battle of
sheer will against all odds. Individuality and freedom did not sai l on
the favorable winds of history but had to fight hard to remain afloa t
no matte r ho w the economic tides changed. Th e "will" o f a natio n
and th e determinatio n o f its political leader s determined th e futur e
of freedo m an d individuality . Unlik e Marx , Webe r woul d no t b e
embarrassed i f he wer e asked wh o th e "We " o f histor y is:
Yet tim e i s pressing : "w e mus t work , whil e i t i s stil l day. " If , i n th e
course o f succeeding generations , a s long a s the economi c and intel lectual "revolution," the much-abuse d "anarchy " of production an d
the n o les s abuse d "subjectivism " continue unabated , the individua l
citizen wh o throug h them , an d only through them, has bee n lef t t o
depend o n himsel f fail s t o conque r certai n sphere s o f freedo m an d
personality a s hi s "inalienable " possessions , the n h e wil l perhaps
never conque r them . (Weber , Russia, p. 283 )
Prominently, the "We" o f history for Webe r is the politicall y activ e

intellectual wh o enter s politic s both wit h commitmen t t o a caus e
and wit h an awarenes s of the necessit y of compromise in orde r to ,
among othe r things , sav e th e worl d from becomin g th e priso n o f
individuality an d th e graveyar d o f freedom.
An Ethi c for Politica l Actio n
What ma y appea r a s a universal ethi c for politica l actio n i n Ma x
Weber's famous "Politics a s a Vocation" is indeed on e o f the mos t
context-dependent o f al l hi s arguments . Th e narro w se t o f guide lines Weber offered fo r the practitioner of politics as a vocation was
inspired by an attempt to dispel the naivete of politically motivate d
98 MA
intellectuals. It was also a n attempt t o prevent nihilism from settin g

in a s a resul t o f metatheoretica l an d theoretica l assumption s tha t
were take n fo r grante d b y mos t intellectual s o f th e day , an d inci dently by Weber himself . In thi s sens e Weber's politica l essays, like
his methodology , i s a soliloquy . Weber argue d tha t "som e kin d o f
faith mus t alway s exist . Otherwis e . .. th e curs e o f th e creature' s
worthlessness overshadow s eve n th e externall y stronges t politica l
successes" (Weber, Politics, p . 117) . The recommendation o f "ethics
of responsibility, " i n othe r words , i s nove l an d controversia l onl y
for th e intellectuals ; professiona l politicians t o who m a "sens e o f
proportion" an d a lukewar m commitmen t t o idea s com e naturall y
will no t b e move d b y thi s aspec t o f Weber' s politica l creed .
Despite offerin g a nearl y exhaustiv e lis t o f possibl e form s o f
methodical politica l action , Webe r remained critica l o f all of them .
After all , hi s polytheistic social ontology was based o n the ultimat e
irreconcilability o f value spheres and th e ineradicabilit y o f conflic t
from socia l life ; assumption s tha t coul d hardl y furnis h a universal
and ethicall y consisten t politica l ethic . Indeed , Webe r conceive d o f
the relationshi p betwee n sphere s o f ethic s an d politic s a s on e o f
constant an d unresolvabl e tensio n (Weber , Rejections, p . 333) . At tempts at solving this tension, observed Weber, have time and agai n
produced half-bake d compromises , suc h a s ethical rationalization s
of politica l action , whic h Webe r dubbe d "apin g o f ethics, " o r th e
claims that succes s in action indicate s moral righ t (Weber , Politics,
p. 117 ; Rejections, p . 334) . Suc h attempt s appeare d t o Webe r a s
full o f unjustifiable compromises, an d ultimatel y a s being "dishon est" (Weber , Rejections, pp . 335-336) . Bu t in criticizin g an "ethic s
of ultimate ends " Weber als o too k issu e wit h apparentl y successfu l
resolutions of the tension between ethical and rational (economi c o r
political) action . A fairl y inclusiv e taxonom y o f politica l actio n
oriented towar d ultimat e end s i s offere d i n Weber' s "Religiou s
Rejections of the World and Thei r Directions. " Unlik e action that is
"rational" from th e "practical" point o f view, the value o f "ethically
rational" action resides not in its success but in its "intrinsic worth. "
In othe r words , ethical actio n i s by definition introverted. Nonethe less, thos e wh o op t t o ac t publicl y an d politicall y accordin g t o
value-rational frameworksan d Webe r prefer s tha t politician s a t
least t o som e exten t d o somus t kee p a n ey e o n th e practica l
consequences o f their actio n a s well. Another proble m aggravatin g
the dilemm a o f ethically consistent politica l actio n i s the necessity

of usin g "violence " and manipulatio n o f th e "huma n machine " i n
order t o achiev e exalte d ethical/politica l goals . Wher e religio n
supplies the ethic s fo r politica l actio n Webe r see s onl y two consis tent way s out o f this conundrum :
The purita n solutio n opt s fo r inner-worldl y asceticism . Thi s
means actin g i n the world according to a predetermined desig n and
refusing t o ponde r th e meaning of one's actio n o r t o take responsi bility fo r it s consequences . "Th e Christia n doe s righ t an d leave s
the rest to God." Whe n the action produce s evil instead of good, the
responsibility fo r i t i s passe d o n eithe r t o Go d himsel f o r t o th e
wickedness an d foolishnes s of the creatura l world , which might, a t
any rate , stil l be conceive d o f as "the bes t o f all 'possible' worlds."
The secon d ethically consistent solutio n is not a "solution" of the
problem a s such , bu t a systemati c avoidanc e o f it . I t consist s o f
seeking refuge i n otherworldly mysticism: the conflic t o f ethics an d
politics i s thu s avoide d b y completel y retreatin g fro m th e latte r
realm. Thi s solution in its final logica l form rejects categorically al l
forms o f instrumentally rationa l action .
Less elaborate parallel s for thes e alternative s o f either retreatin g
into th e ivor y tower o f intellectual contemplatio n o r engagin g i n a
form o f inner-worldly , noncontemplativ e asceticis m aboun d i n
Eastern religions . Webe r too k particula r interes t i n th e Easter n
brand o f inner-worldly political asceticis m an d it s unique justifications for entanglement in the world. A classical example of this type
of solutio n appear s i n Bhagava d Gita . Whe n Arjun a th e maste r
warrior frette d abou t endangerin g hi s salvation b y performin g hi s
caste duties that included the killing of his kin, the supreme personality o f godhea d (Krishna ) relieve d hi m o f hi s angst b y declarin g
ethical concern s abou t one' s action s t o b e invalid . Unabl e t o per ceive th e pantheisti c natur e o f th e worl d (an d socia l life) , ma n i s
overcome b y illusory appearances an d their equally deceptiv e ethical meanings . Webe r outline d th e practica l ethic s implie d here :
Man o f knowledg e prove s himsel f i n actio n bette r agains t hi s ow n
action i n th e worl d b y consummatin g wha t i s commandedtha t
always mean s cast e dutywhil e inwardl y remainin g completel y de tached. Tha t i s he act s a s if he acte d no t . . . a s the earl y Christia n
"does righ t an d leave s th e res t t o God " s o th e worshippe r o f th e
100 MA
Bahgavata doe s th e "necessar y work " . . . h e doe s thes e an d n o

others without any concern for the consequences. (Weber, India, p. 184 )
It i s obviou s tha t Webe r considere d non e o f thes e solution s fo r

the strai n between ethics and politic s a s satisfactory. I t i s also clear
from ou r earlie r sketc h o f Weber's theor y o f "social selection" tha t
the criterio n o f correctness o f political actio n canno t b e sough t i n
its externa l succes s either . Neithe r intellectuals ' withdrawa l fro m
the world nor thei r anarchistic pacifis m nor thei r puritanica l obses sion wit h interna l consistenc y an d doin g "th e righ t thing " coul d
provide a guidin g principl e fo r politica l actio n fro m th e poin t o f
view o f Weberia n politica l ethics . Ye t Weber wa s attracte d t o th e
intellectualistic approac h t o politics . Fo r instance , a measur e o f
ethical consistency in political action seem s to have been significan t
for Weber , a s he ofte n celebrate d no t onl y the interna l consistenc y
and idealisti c single-mindednes s o f certain type s o f political actio n
but als o their usefulness: on e can attain th e possible only by wishing
the impossible. Besides, Weber knew that a rational choic e between
an "ethic s o f ultimat e ends " and a n "ethic s o f responsibility " wa s
not possibl e an d thu s n o fina l judgmen t betwee n the m coul d b e
made (Weber , Meaning, p . 16) . I n a n exceptionall y revealin g pas sage he goes so far a s disclosing his basic partialit y t o th e "ethics o f
ultimate ends " when compared wit h the more "sober" and unenter prising politica l attitud e o f the bureaucrati c intelligentsia :
In a sense, successful politica l action i s always the "ar t o f the possi ble." Nonetheless , th e possibl e i s ofte n reache d onl y b y strivin g t o
attain th e impossibl e that lie s beyond it . Thos e specifi c qualitie s of
our culture , which , despit e ou r difference s i n viewpoint , we al l es teem mor e or les s positively, are not th e product s of the onl y consistent ethi c of " 'adaptation' to the possible," namely, the bureaucratic
morality of Confucianism. I, for my part, wil l not tr y to dissuade the
nation from the view that actions are to be judged not merely by their
instrumental valu e bu t b y thei r intrinsi c valu e a s well . (Weber ,
Meaning, pp . 23-24 )
In addition , on e mus t remembe r tha t Webe r himsel f chos e th e

ethics o f ultimate end s i n respec t t o certai n curren t politica l issues
of his time (Honigsheim, pp. 124-125) . Eve n in "Politics as a Voca-
tion," one encounters passages suc h as the following: "Surely, poli tics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the hea d
alone. I n thi s th e proponent s o f th e ethic s o f ultimat e end s ar e
right" (Weber, Politics, p . 127) . It i s indeed thi s electiv e affinit y o f
intellectuals fo r a n ethi c o f ultimat e end s tha t Webe r find s i n
himself a s well as in his audience that impels him to launch a fervent
attack agains t thi s kin d o f political mentality .
Weber's critique o f idealistic politics , however , was not designe d
to tacitl y endors e the mundan e practic e o f realpolitik. Professiona l
politicians ma y no t b e impressed b y Weber's emphasis o n politica l
"responsibility," bu t they too wil l benefit fro m hi s critique of power
politics. "Politics as a Vocation" denounces the philistine attitud e of
power politicians an d thei r utter neglect of the "tragedy wit h which
all action , bu t especiall y politica l action , i s trul y interwoven "
(Weber, Politics, p . 117) . Considerin g the inevitabilit y of the la w of
"unintended consequence " o f human actionwhic h become s eve n
more tragi c a s it s dimension s ar e augmente d i n th e spher e o f
political actionn o on e ough t t o tak e fo r grante d th e simpl e an d
rational purposiv e schem e o f huma n actio n a s appropriat e fo r
political action . Th e blatan t insensitivit y o f professiona l powe r
politicians t o th e Weberia n paradoxe s o f political actio n generate s
more tha n scor n o f th e mor e realisti c observer s o f huma n affairs ;
such neglec t coul d foste r seriou s practica l problem s a s well . Th e
arrogance o f power politics ca n giv e rise to vainglor y an d conceit :
by settlin g fo r th e semblanc e o f power these supposedl y hardene d
practitioners o f realpolitik woul d easil y vitiate the purpos e o f their
entering into politics by giving up the real power and settling for the
vain semblance s o f power (Weber , Politics, pp . 116-117) .
Turning hi s attention t o intellectual s an d thei r belove d "ethics of
ultimate ends " in politics, Webe r notes once mor e that "one canno t
prescribe t o anyon e whethe r h e o r sh e shoul d follo w a n ethi c o f
absolute end s o r a n ethi c o f responsibility, " bu t h e proceed s t o
question th e "inne r poise"an d b y implicatio n th e mora l cour ageof someon e wh o opt s for th e ethic s o f ultimate ends , the easy
solution o f doing "the righ t thing," and then blamin g th e worl d fo r
the consequences of the action. Acting "irresponsibly" an d pretend ing to be blind to the consequences of one's own action is the sign of
an immatur e an d dilettant e intellectua l wh o willfull y confuse s th e
comforting visio n o f a rationall y ordere d worl d wit h th e socia l
102 MA
reality tha t h e attempt s t o influenc e b y enterin g politics : " I a m

under th e impressio n tha t i n nin e ou t o f te n case s I dea l wit h
windbags wh o do no t full y realiz e wha t they tak e upo n themselves
but wh o intoxicat e themselve s with romanti c sensations " (Weber ,
Politics, p . 127) . Her e Webe r explicitl y cast s doub t o n th e mora l
integrity o f thos e wh o choos e th e ethic s o f ultimat e end s a s a
dogmatic shiel d agains t th e irrationalit y o f the worl d and th e peril s
of actin g i n it . Th e crusadin g pitc h o f Weber' s "Politic s a s a Vocation" originates in his genuine hope of encouraging the intellectual s
to ente r politics while warning these natura l follower s of the ethic s
of ultimat e end s agains t th e danger s o f politica l irresponsibility ,
especially whe n i t come s seductivel y enveloped i n suc h wrappings
as anarchis m an d syndicalism . H e censure d th e champion s o f th e
ethics o f ultimate ends for thei r arrogance , fo r no t bein g "human "
or "mature" enough t o giv e up th e hop e o f fixing the worl d i n their
own image instea d o f adapting themselve s to th e demands o f actin g
in th e worl d a s i t stands . Wha t i s Weber's alternative ? Th e "Ethic s
of Responsibility" ! But wha t doe s tha t mean ?
The basi s o f th e ethic s o f responsibilit y is a simpl e inversio n o f
the politica l attitud e o f th e intellectuals : instea d o f th e inward looking ques t fo r consistenc y an d salvatio n throug h politica l ac tion, the y ar e advise d t o focu s als o o n th e consequence s o f thei r
actions. The y ough t t o fac e th e utter irrationalit y o f the world , the
tragic results of the law of unintended consequences, the irreducible
conflicts o f valu e spheres , and , ultimately , the y mus t abando n al l
hope t o attai n salvatio n throug h politica l action . Webe r conclude d
that the crusader, religious and revolutionary alike, must lear n that
by entering politics he contracts wit h "diabolical forces." The intel lectual enterin g politic s mus t tak e responsibilit y not onl y fo r th e
consequences o f hi s action s bu t als o fo r "wha t ma y becom e o f
himself unde r th e impac t o f thes e paradoxes " (Weber , Politics,
pp. 120-126) .
All o f thes e caveat s wer e intende d fo r intellectual s wh o wer e
considering a career i n politics. On e mus t remembe r tha t "Politic s
as a Vocation" was first delivere d as a lecture to a group o f students
of politics . Webe r wa s awar e o f th e existenc e o f radica l student s
among hi s audience and that he had replaced anothe r speake r (Kur t
Eisner) who would have preached wha t Webe r censored a s ethics of
ultimate end s i n politic s (Dahlmann , 1989) . Webe r coul d hav e
concluded his lecture by simply recommending th e supplantation o f

idealism wit h a n ethi c o f responsibility . Webe r di d no t d o s o be cause he was not sur e that th e ethic s of ultimate end s was devoid of
merit, an d als o becaus e th e alternativeth e ethic s o f responsibil itywhich wa s alread y practice d b y man y nonintellectua l politi cians in any case, an d which entailed a facile invitation t o the time honored virtue s o f temperanc e a s moderation , di d no t appea r t o
him a s quit e satisfactory.
Hence Webe r reminde d his audience onc e mor e o f the unration alizability o f th e worl d an d th e traged y o f havin g t o ac t i n i t a s
though i t wer e otherwise. W e observed i n th e secon d chapte r tha t
the martia l spiri t ha s a n electiv e affinit y fo r polytheisti c religiosity
in Weber' s sociolog y o f religion . Conversely , w e migh t conclude ,
acting courageousl y in a polytheisti c world call s for th e ethic s o f a
hero; an d thi s i s Weber' s fina l messag e t o th e intellectual s wh o
contemplate actin g in th e world . Weber's mos t admirabl e politica l
actor i s neither a "cosmic ethica l rationalist," no r a crusader i n the
cause of a clearly defined universa l goal; an d thi s is exactly why th e
actor need s to b e a hero. I t is not because o/the meaningfulness of
the world that th e intellectual shoul d enter public life an d stan d hi s
ground, bu t i n spite o f it s meaninglessness.
Politics i s a stron g an d slo w borin g o f har d boards . I t take s bot h
passion an d perspective . Certainl y al l historical experienc e confirm s
the truththat man would no t have attaine d th e possible unles s tim e
and agai n h e ha d reache d ou t fo r th e impossible . Bu t t o d o tha t a
man mus t b e a leader, an d no t onl y a leader bu t a her o a s well, in a
very sober sens e of the word. An d eve n those wh o ar e neither leader s
nor heroe s mus t ar m themselve s wit h tha t steadfastnes s o f hear t
which ca n brav e eve n th e crumblin g o f al l hopes . Thi s i s necessar y
right now , o r els e me n wil l no t b e abl e t o attai n eve n tha t whic h i s
possible today . Onl y he has the calling fo r politics wh o is sure that he
shall no t crumbl e whe n th e world from his point o f view is too stupi d
or too bas e for wha t h e wants t o offer . Onl y h e who i n the face o f all
this ca n sa y "I n spit e o f all! " ha s th e callin g fo r politics . (Weber ,
Politics, p. 128 )
4
Definitions
The Troubl e with Definin g Concept s

Waging a crusade against conceptua l ambiguities is not a n essential
part o f a socia l scienc e base d o n Weberia n principles . However ,
such a socia l scienc e mus t no t forswea r forma l considerations ,
because settin g one's conceptual house in order might be inevitable
in certai n circumstances . The necessitatin g occasio n ma y be a current o f conceptual confusion s or methodological controversie s that
threaten to interfere with the process of empirical investigation. Fo r
this reaso n Webe r himsel f decide d t o writ e on th e methodolog y o f
social an d historica l sciences . Th e subjec t o f thi s boo k ca n espe cially benefi t fro m forma l delimitation s an d redefinition s becaus e
its central concepts have been subject to both scientific disputes and
ideological feuds . Besides , a n overhau l an d reconstructio n o f th e
basic concepts o f sociology of intellectuals is indispensable for on e
of th e mai n purpose s o f thi s book : t o furthe r stimulat e empirica l
research i n th e are a o f Weberia n sociolog y o f intellectuals . O f
course, methodological consideration s are not meant to supplant or
guide empirica l research . Idea l types , a s w e hav e alread y empha sized i n th e firs t chapte r o f this book, ar e simpl y "precision instruments." The y ar e modest tools ; s o modest indee d that the y do no t
even requir e to b e inspected fo r thei r truth o r falsehood bu t rathe r
for th e degre e of their usefulness. The se t of interrelated ideal types
offered her e (Table 4.1-4.3 ) is meant t o b e o f pragmatic us e for th e
practitioners o f a Weberia n sociolog y of intellectuals . A s suc h th e
chief virtu e o f th e mode l offere d i n thi s chapte r an d amplifie d i n
successive cros s table s i s no t it s novelt y bu t it s inclusiveness ; i t
105
106 MA
synthesizes element s o f tw o kind s o f diversity : tha t o f theoretica l

debates aimin g t o defin e intellectuals , an d th e divergenc e o f th e
historical an d intercivilizationa l varietie s o f intellectuality.
At the outse t i t must b e pointed ou t tha t th e apparen t "generali zations" o n whic h ou r mode l i s base d ar e no t inductivel y con structed; concept s such a s intellectuals, intelligentsia, an d me n an d
women o f knowledg e ar e heuristi c devices . Fo r on e thin g thes e
concepts d o no t clai m t o represen t ontologicall y significan t an d
universal phenomena. Rather , they prominently bear the imprint of
particular historica l an d geocultura l "value-relevan t interests " o f
Western civilization .
Being temporally an d geoculturall y grounded doe s no t necessar ily vitiat e th e purpos e o f these concepts , whic h i s to compar e an d
contrast differen t civilizations . No r i s the clai m t o universalit y by
such idea l type s tantamount t o a n imperialisti c attemp t t o monop olize th e scienc e o f intercultural understanding . Th e Weberia n dis cipline i s consistent wit h the propositio n that mor e than on e se t of
"universally valid " idea l type s ca n b e constructe d an d use d fo r
intercivilizational comparisons . I n othe r words , a Weberia n socia l
science allows for each generation an d each civilization t o construc t
its ow n universall y valid idea l type s o n th e basi s o f it s ow n value relevant interests . Th e recognitio n o f th e relevanc e o f limite d
human interest s i n th e proces s o f concep t formatio n ha s a direc t
bearing on the problems surrounding the general "definition" o f the
concepts wit h whic h w e ar e dealin g i n thi s chapter .
Some o f th e bes t studie s o f intellectual s shrin k fro m offerin g a
"definition" fo r intellectuals in order t o shu n prematur e closure s or
to avoi d a n earlie r period' s parochia l an d Eurocentri c generaliza tions tha t ofte n stretche d a concep t beyon d it s legitimat e Wester n
context an d thu s beyon d it s usefulness . W e nee d no t fea r thi s a s
long a s w e ar e awar e o f ou r positio n i n tim e an d spac e an d th e
conceptual limit s ou r "huma n condition " sets o n us . I t i s with this
knowledge tha t w e heuristically appl y a batter y o f context-depen dent concept s t o temporall y an d geoculturall y distan t peoples . I f
done correctly , this exploration wil l allo w us to "understand " the m
in a wa y that i s both scientifi c an d humane .
When engagin g i n thi s typ e o f heuristic analysi s w e mus t expec t
rhetorical question s tha t betra y a confusio n betwee n Weberia n
cross-cultural reference s an d th e booris h an d protoscientifi c an -
Definitions 10
thropology an d historiograph y o f a n earlie r perio d o f Wester n

scholarship. W e wil l b e asked : Ho w coul d yo u possibl y lum p to gether th e Gree k sophists , the Confucia n mandarins , th e medieva l
monks, an d the Islami c scribes under suc h rubrics as "intellectuals "
or "intelligentsia, " whic h wer e afte r al l develope d i n nineteenth century Franc e an d Russia? 1 Th e answe r is that w e can, onl y if we
are awar e o f th e similaritie s an d difference s betwee n thes e ver y
different types . Civilizationa l perspective s ar e legitimat e ground s
for concep t formation . Thi s statemen t applie s t o al l civilization s
equally; w e recogniz e th e righ t o f thos e civilization s that ar e th e
object o f ou r scientifi c investigation s t o retur n th e gaz e o f under standing i n their ow n terms; they ca n legitimately call ou r intellec tuals "scribes, " o r "mandarins, " if this usage i s a judicious on e an d
if it : helps the m t o thereb y achiev e a bette r intercultura l "under standing." I n th e cours e o f thi s boo k w e hav e provide d man y
examples of Weber's use of exclusively Western concepts in discussing phenomen a o f Indian , Chinese , an d Hebre w civilizations , bu t
examples o f thi s typ e o f intercivilizationa l reference , heuristic ,
ironic or otherwise , abound everywhere . Take fo r instance, Simon e
de Beauvoir' s choic e o f th e titl e Mandarins, fo r a nove l abou t a
group o f radical Frenc h intellectuals . Onl y a pedant wil l take suc h a
reference literally . I n way s that ar e no t entirel y dissimila r t o th e
ironic us e o f cross-civilizationa l references , every tim e w e us e th e
concept o f "intellectual " fo r phenomen a pertainin g t o a tim e an d
place other than that of their origin, we must expect our audience t o
look beyon d th e litera l usage .
Only i f we take pain s t o compar e an d contras t distan t civiliza tional type s ca n w e discove r similaritie s beneat h apparen t differ ences. Divers e types o f intellectuals shar e man y commo n features .
They al l ar e th e beneficiarie s o f a syste m o f division o f labor tha t
allows the m t o engag e i n th e proces s o f forma l an d substantiv e
rationalization o f ideas . The y al l foste r interna l hierarchie s an d
relate t o the hierarchie s o f prestige and powe r in their societie s i n a
limited numbe r o f ways . Intellectual s everywher e ar e responsibl e
for cultura l borrowings o r resistance to civilizational osmoses. The y
are largel y responsibl e fo r th e uniqu e flavo r o f differen t cultures .
That th e Athenian s looke d t o Spart a o r Persi a fo r guidance , an d
that th e Israelite s deliberatel y avoide d importin g th e intellectua l
products o f their neighbor s o r even guest culture s (Egyptians, Bab -
108 MA
ylonians, an d Syrians ) is to a great exten t du e t o th e predilection s

of the intellectua l strata in these cultures. A sociology o f intellectuals, an d indee d an y kin d o f sociology , mus t undertak e th e ris k o f
comparing wha t might appear to be cultural dissimilarities to attain
comparative insight s an d t o stud y counterfactua l trend s i n th e
civilizational developments . Thu s w e hav e explore d a n arra y o f
striking similaritie s betwee n ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f
intellectuals in a cross section o f diverse civilizational contexts (se e
Appendix C) .
The fea r o f genera l concept s (wel l founde d a s i t migh t b e i n th e
case o f certai n kind s o f careles s theorizin g tha t hav e occasionall y
passed a s sociology ) ofte n lead s t o a for m o f steril e an d snobbis h
empirical puritanism , whic h Webe r oppose d i n hi s argument s
against Germa n historiographers : the objective reality is too ric h to
be studied i n its entirety. We need conceptua l sieve s to sif t throug h
empirical data an d to scientificall y reduce the empirica l realit y to a
manageable size . Tha t thes e conceptua l sieve s ar e crafte d i n ou r
cultures an d bea r th e insigni a o f our rootednes s i n tim e an d spac e
must concer n u s onl y i f w e ar e no t awar e o f suc h biase s o r i f we
embark o n a quixoti c attemp t t o disavo w ou r particularity . A s
mortals w e are boun d t o a tiny slice of time an d space , an d Webe r
(before Gadame r an d his Hermeneutics) urge d us to face this condi tion bot h i n considerin g th e callin g t o engag e i n "Scienc e a s a
Vocation" a s wel l a s in the wa y we engage i n it. Onc e w e are awar e
of our "limitedness" we can turn it into "perspective," a n intercultu ral "Archimedea n point " tha t alon e let s u s understan d th e other .
Mutual intercultural (o r historical) understandin g does no t requir e
a singl e universa l se t o f scientifi c theorie s bu t severa l ones . W e
understand th e othe r (i.e. , th e historicall y o r geoculturall y distan t
peoples) no t despit e ou r particularit y bu t becaus e o f it.
In creatin g a ne w taxonom y o f th e usage s o f th e concep t o f
"intellectuals" an d "intelligentsia " we have resiste d th e temptatio n
to coi n ne w word s fo r fea r o f contributin g t o th e methodologica l
confusions. Instea d o f designating on e usage as correct an d dismiss ing th e rest , ou r propose d cros s tabulatio n (Table s 4. 1 an d 4.2 )
reproduces th e commo n overlappin g usage s tha t hav e resulte d i n
many confusions . Thus th e concept "Intellectuals" appear s twic e in
our model : onc e i n vertica l orde r (a s oppose d t o vas t number s o f
"Intelligentsia") an d the n agai n i n horizontal orde r (i n contrast t o
TABLE 4,1 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f the Type s (Mission/Calling) an d Layer s (Intellectuals/Intelligentsia): Function s

Masses
Meaning
>
Masses <
- Meaning
->
TYPES OF
COMMITMENT:
to masse s or
LAYERS:\ th
e truth
Varieties
of reaso n &
hierarchies
SEEKERS O F PURE KNOWLEDGE :

MEN/WOMEN OF SCIENCE /
ARTS/LETTERS
Committed t o "meaning" (truth ,
beauty, gnosis, knowledg e overarching structures , etc.) They hav e a
"calling."
INTELLECTUALS:
(Theoretical reason , "intellect")
creative, heretic, or prophetic
I
Rationalization o f ideas by:
Reinterpretation o f ideas by:
DEVOTEES O F PUR E TRUTH
LEADING REFORMER S AN D REVOLUTIONARIES
INTELLIGENTSIA:
(Practical reason,
"intelligence")
organizer, interpreter, keepe r
4
Application o f ideas by :
KEEPERS O F TRADITIO N
PRACTICAL AGENT S O F IDEA S
Reinterpretation an d routinizatio n of
ideas by:
COMMITTED INTELLECTUALS:
LIBERATORS, SAVIORS , "ENGAGE" THINKER S
Committed t o "masses" (lead , reform , liberate, save ,
bring "happiness," etc.) They hav e a "mission."
TABLE 4.2 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f the Type s (Mission/Calling) an d Layer s (Intellectuals/Intelligentsia):

Positions an d Profession s
Masses
TYPES OF
COMMITMENT:
to masse s o r
LAYERS:\ th
e truth
Varieties
ui icasi m t x x
Meaning
->
SEEKERS O F PUR E KNOWLEDGE :

MEN/WOMEN O F SCIENCE/LETTERS/ARTS
Committed t o "meaning" (truth , beauty , gnosis ,
knowledge overarchin g structures , etc. ) The y
have a "calling."
Masses <
COMMITTED INTELLECTUALS :
LEADERS, LIBERATORS , SAVIOR S
Committed t o "masses" (lead , reform , liberate ,
save, brin g "happiness, " etc.) The y hav e a
Science
Religion
Thought Scienc
INTELLECTUALS:
(Theoretical reason ,
"intellect")
creative, heretic ,
or propheti c
Top scientist ,
discoverer
Exemplary
prophet
Top theoris t Majo
INTELLIGENTSIA:
(Practical reason ,
"intelligence")
organizer, interpreter,
keeper
Expert,
researcher
Theologian
monk, mysti c
Scholar, criti c Enginee

r
doctor,
lawyer,
teacher
hierarchies \
Meaning
e
r
inventor
Religion
Thought
Emissary
prophet
Reformer,
revolutionary
philosopher/
king
Priest, mentor ,
scribe, teache r
Agitator,
activist,
bureaucrat,
teacher,
mass media ,
publishing
Definitions 11
seekers o f pur e knowledge : "scientists/writers/artist s etc.") - Th e

model amplifie s the confusio n i n th e usag e o f th e ter m "Intellec tual" befor e reorderin g it s element s an d resolvin g th e confusion ,
The mode l coul d b e viewed as askin g the "native" : Whe n yo u sa y
"Intellectuals" do yo u mean a s opposed t o to p "scientists/writers /
artists" o r d o yo u mea n a s opposed t o "Intelligentsia" ?
Another purpos e o f th e presen t mode l i s t o includ e almos t al l
types an d profession s that hav e bee n identifie d wit h intellectuals
and intelligentsia , preserving fo r th e empirica l researche r th e pre rogative o f excludin g a particula r categor y i n an y give n researc h
project. Th e abov e cross-tabulatio n i s based o n Weber' s theor y of
the relativ e autonom y o f th e spher e o f ideas a s i t als o reflect s his
interest i n th e interfac e of ideas an d interests .
The Horizonta l Differentiatio n
The horizonta l axi s differentiates intellectuals on th e basi s o f their
commitment t o "ideas" on one extreme and to "th e people " o n the
other. Intellectuals share the lonely journey o f "Men an d Women of
Letters /Scienc e /Art " (tha t lea d awa y fro m th e people ) t o tran scend th e banality o f quotidian existence . They all aspire to attai n a
higher state of universal bliss, to attain Sophia, Gnosis, Knowledge,
Truth, Beauty , Overal l Pattern s an d Structures , an d i n short , th e
"Meaning" an d th e "Essence " o f life . Man y o f th e definition s of
men an d wome n o f knowledg e an d "Intellectuals " focu s o n th e
means an d consequence s o f thi s search , namely , th e heav y an d
dense us e o f symbol s and th e creatio n o f a privatize d jargon tha t
often tur n int o password s t o privilege d inne r circle s o r eve n int o
symbolic tool s o f powe r an d domination . Bu t thes e ar e al l eithe r
means or consequences of the origina l quest for meaning that alone
signifies bot h intellectual s an d seeker s of pure knowledge . The tw o
groups ar e fellow travelers on the road t o transcendence. Intellectu als are bor n onc e som e decid e t o "com e back " to th e masse s wit h
the fruit s o f thei r discoveries . Thi s differentiatio n is therefore pri marily based o n a moral choic e rather tha n o n a hierarchy o f mor e
or les s talented. Whil e seeker s o f pur e knowledg e have a "calling"
to pursu e th e truth , intellectual s ar e committe d t o a "mission" to
return t o th e masses . Classica l Gree k "intellectuals " debate d
112 MA
whether "Th e Goo d Life " consiste d i n the lif e o f the intellec t o r i n
public lif e i n th e polls. Plat o wa s certain tha t i t la y i n intellectua l
life, bu t h e als o argue d tha t th e philosophe r wh o ha d acquire d a
taste fo r baskin g i n the su n o f truth an d beaut y (wh o would natu rally b e loat h t o g o bac k t o th e dar k an d dan k cav e o f ordinar y
people in order t o lea d them ) ought nevertheless to g o back. A t the
two pole s o f thi s allegorica l movemen t betwee n th e trut h an d th e
masses w e ca n discer n th e archetypica l categorie s o f philosopher s
and philosopher-kings .
We have already observe d an elective affinity betwee n the development of an "ideology o f intellectuals," that is, a theory advocating th e
political empowermen t o f intellectuals , an d th e belie f i n th e thre e
principles o f (1) the existenc e o f truth, (2 ) its attainabilit y an d socia l
relevance, an d (3 ) the assumptio n tha t intellectual s woul d selflessl y
carry out the search for truth. The "counterideologies" of intellectuals
usually attack the last two premises (attainability an d social relevanc e
of truth , an d particularly , th e allege d selflessnes s o f its carriers) . We
have also pointe d ou t that a n elective affinity exist s between the view
of historica l progres s as a "semiautomatic" machination (advocate d
by August e Comte, Leste r F. Ward, V . I. Lenin , an d Georg e Lukac s
and mos t o f the reformis t thinkers) an d th e ideolog y o f intellectual s
who would then take the wheel and steer history in the right direction .
By contrast , th e "full y automatic " evolutio n (advocate d b y Herber t
Spencer, Willia m G . Sumner, Bakunin , Rosa Luxemburg , an d mos t
of th e anarchist , libertarian , an d conservativ e thinkers ) ha s bee n
favored b y th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s fo r it s implicatio n
that history has no need for the meddling of some complacent savants
professing t o correc t it s course. 2
The flo w o f convert s betwee n th e tw o categorie s o f intellectual s
and seeker s of pure knowledge (regions 1 and 2 ) depends on historical circumstances . Wheneve r ther e i s a coheren t an d compellin g
ideology of intellectuals, o r whenever there is a definite social cause
or a n indisputabl e "good," seekers of pure knowledg e are likely to
consider seriously that, besides responding to their calling to pursue
the truth , the y mus t als o fulfil l thei r dut y t o a socia l "mission" ; t o
turn towar d the people whom they had lef t i n the cave of quotidian
illusions; t o becom e "intellectuals. " A s a rule , however , seeker s of
pure knowledg e encounte r thi s allege d missio n wit h trepidation :
from th e poin t o f view of enthusiasts of knowledge, intellectuals are
Definitions 11
in dange r o f compromisin g thei r integrit y an d willingl y engage i n

what Weber called "the sacrific e of intellect." Conversely, periods of
great socia l upheava l cause d o r exacerbate d b y intellectuals , an d
especially disastrous failures of reformist movements, bring in their
wake mas s defection s o f sociall y committe d intellectual s t o th e
ranks of seekers of pure knowledge (from region 2 to region 1) . As a
matter o f course, however, seekers of knowledge who neglec t their
social missio n by carryin g o n thei r ques t fo r trut h mus t appea r t o
intellectuals a s a selfis h an d elitis t caste , wistfull y indulgin g thei r
eccentric hobbie s a t th e expens e o f their people .
The variety of arguments between Intellectuals (seekers of knowledge) and (scientists/writers/artists ) represents a great deal o f literature writte n abou t intellectuals , b y intellectuals , an d foro r
againstintellectuals. Plato urged th e polls to force the contempla tive intellectuals to come back t o the cave of everyday illusions and
undertake the putativel y unpleasant tas k o f leading the people . H e
also advise d agains t toleratin g thos e intellectual s wh o refus e t o
think in a responsible or constructive way; poets among others were
to b e banished fro m hi s Republic. Mar x predicte d that a group of
intellectuals woul d join th e peopl e (workin g class) bu t no t befor e
seeing that the end of their class privileges was at hand. An excellent
example o f thi s debat e ca n b e foun d i n th e publi c exchang e tha t
kept Sartr e an d Camu s a t loggerhead s ove r th e "responsibility " of
intellectuals t o joi n th e publi c protest s agains t th e Frenc h wa r i n
Algeria. Thos e contemplativ e intellectual s wh o recogniz e thei r so cial "mission" do no t necessaril y remai n i n their ow n sub-category
in transitio n fro m regio n 1 to regio n 2 . A scientist , fo r instance ,
does no t alway s turn int o a n invento r (se e Table 4.2) . Contempor ary scientist s (e.g. , Sakharov ) an d philosopher s (e.g. , Russel l o r
Sartre) often advocate d politica l positions totally unrelated t o their
field o f research . Consisten t wit h th e platoni c scenario , th e char isma emanating from havin g been closer to the source of normative
philosophical o r scientifi c truth s seems to hav e sufficientl y legitim ized th e politica l ambition s o f intellectuals.
Max Webe r did not merel y sanction thi s kind o f engagement. H e
went ou t o f his way to encourag e intellectuals ' direct participatio n
in politica l processes , becaus e h e feare d th e comin g hegemon y of
the bureaucratic intelligentsia. But Weber, as we have demonstrated
in Chapte r 3 , wa s als o wear y o f intellectuals ' politica l naivete ,
114 MA
dogmatism, an d irresponsibility . This feelin g le d him to g o to grea t

lengths t o war n intellectual s agains t th e peril s o f confusin g th e
attitude calle d fo r i n th e symmetrica l an d consisten t univers e o f
intellectuality and that they needed t o adop t onc e they chose "Politics a s a Vocation. " A n interestin g reactio n t o th e dilemm a o f th e
seekers o f pure knowledge wishing to preserv e their integrit y whil e
engaging i n politic s ca n b e discerne d i n Georg e Orwell' s advic e t o
intellectuals wh o wis h to fulfil l thei r socia l "mission " withou t com promising thei r commitment s t o th e pursui t o f truth : "Whe n a
writer engage s i n politic s h e shoul d d o s o a s a citizen , a s a huma n
being, no t a s a writer . . . shoul d h e refrai n fro m writin g about
politics? . . . certainly not ! . . . Only he shoul d d o s o a s an individ ual, a s outsider, at the mos t a s unwelcome guerrilla on th e flan k of
a regula r army " (Orwell, 1960 , pp. 270-271) .
Before turnin g t o th e vertica l differentiatio n of intellectuals an d
intelligentsia le t u s conside r a probabl e criticis m tha t migh t b e
leveled agains t ou r definitio n o f seeker s o f pur e knowledg e a s
seekers o f some kind o f universal truth. This definitio n may b e said
not t o fi t th e postmoder n intellectual . I n response , firs t le t u s
remember that doubts , cynicism , and eve n hostility to th e ideal s of
universal or objectiv e truth an d beaut y or their purity or attainabil ity ar e s o ol d a s t o b e virtuall y coterminou s wit h th e birt h o f
intellectuality. An y reade r o f Gree k classic s know s tha t t o argu e
that "truth " i s nothin g bu t powe r i n disguise , o r tha t i t i s bu t a
semantic illusio n i s not a n altogethe r nove l inventio n o f poststruc turalism. Fro m th e sociological poin t o f view, however, the carrier s
of suc h ideas , regardles s o f the conten t o f their message , ar e easil y
categorized a s intellectuals. They ar e to be identified a s intellectuals
not onl y becaus e o f thei r socia l functio n an d wa y o f lif e (e.g. ,
livelihood, language , etc. ) bu t als o becaus e th e searc h fo r tran scending th e illusion s (includin g tha t o f trut h an d beauty ) i s a
singularly intellectua l one . Thi s searc h to o involve s a "journey "
leading t o a n allege d highe r stat e o f awarenes s assume d b y th e
critic, a feelin g o f liberatio n no t onl y fro m th e simple-minde d
delusions o f th e commo n fol k bu t als o fro m th e vulgarit y o f les s
sophisticated colleagues . Th e distanc e thu s create d betwee n tradi tional, modern , o r postmodern intellectual s an d the naive duratio n
of everyda y experienc e i s signifiedno w a s muc h a s everb y
jargon, a careful an d critica l mod e o f speech, a privatized languag e
Definitions 11
that Gouldner , followin g Bernstine , ha s calle d th e "Cultur e o f

Critical Discourse. "
The importan t criterio n for ou r horizonta l differentiatio n i s that
both seeker s of pure knowledg e and intellectuals , through contem plation an d discourse , do , t o varyin g extents , "depart " fro m th e
quotidian realit y o f everyday life; whethe r they achiev e thei r "nir vana" i s o f secondar y importance . Ou r idea l typica l mode l thu s
seems t o remai n relevan t a s lon g a s unforeseeabl e substantiv e
changes i n th e traditio n o f Wester n intellectualit y hav e no t dis solved al l interes t i n contemplatio n an d discourse , o r a s lon g a s a
Tolstoyesque moo d o f populis m ha s no t cause d mas s defection s
from th e intellectua l an d contemplativ e wa y o f lif e b y whic h w e
identify th e intellectuals .
Having said this, we must also concede the seminal importance of
the substantiv e change s i n moder n occidenta l ar t an d intellectual ity. A s with almost ever y othe r aspec t o f the so-calle d postmoder n
development, th e occidenta l revol t agains t th e occidenta l "logos "
was alread y presen t i n wha t i s generall y know n a s "Modernism. "
Weber addresse d th e issue s of "disenchantment o f the world, " an d
the indulgin g o f intellectuals i n th e irrationa l core s o f life , (e.g. , in
eros). As the great theoris t o f the avant-garde, Renato Poggioli, has
pointed out , th e movemen t i n moder n ar t awa y fro m rationa l
perspective, proportion, representation , and humanism towar d th e
portrayal o f the grotesque, the novel, the non-Western , the mecha nistic, th e abstract , an d th e surrealisti c was alread y presen t i n th e
art o f the turn o f the century. At that time, artist s replaced rationa l
and purposiv e executionreasone d "action " wit h whic h socia l
scientists dealwit h "gesture " and spontaneou s techniques . I n hi s
article unde r th e headin g "Intellectuals " i n th e Encyclopedia o f
Social Sciences, Edwar d Shil s ha s rightl y discusse d thes e ne w
movements no t a s a serie s o f break s wit h intellectualit y but a s it s
secondary traditions .
The movemen t awa y fro m Wester n reason , whic h ha s bee n
praised b y a sectio n o f leadin g contemporar y intellectual s a s
ground breaking , had alread y been recognized by Weber and haile d
by Marcus e an d Adorn o a s the onl y avenu e o f salvatio n fro m th e
reified forma l reason tha t has come to dominat e th e moder n Occi dent. Th e curren t vogu e o f postmoder n literar y criticis m i s bu t a
continuation o f what ha s alread y happene d i n the world o f art an d
116 MA
architecture withou t trul y disrupting the continuatio n o f the West ern bourgeoisie an d it s economic an d politica l systems . For al l their
obstreperous rebelliousness , th e oppositiona l movement s o f thi s
century ar e possibl e onl y in the boso m o f bourgeois society , which
they continu e t o decry . The histor y o f this centur y has show n tha t
antirational movement s quickl y wither away even at the helm of the
very alternatives the y seek (e.g., fascism and socialism) . In any case,
the artist , th e scholar , an d th e intellectua l stil l (an d perhap s mor e
than ever ) depart fro m everyda y life b y a disciplined an d adep t us e
of languag e an d symbol s in searc h o f a kind o f "truth," even if it is
to proclai m tha t ther e i s n o suc h thing . Schumpeter' s theor y tha t
capitalism canno t figh t th e oppositiona l intellectua l becaus e i t i s
based o n freedo m o f commerc e i s somewha t eccentric . Webe r ha s
convincingly demonstrate d tha t th e kin d o f libert y Schumpete r
alludes t o i s n o longe r necessar y fo r full y matur e capitalism . T o
discover reasons for tolerating oppositional intellectual s i n the West
we must look in the direction o f the "relatively autonomous" sphere
of politically liberal ideals that th e Wester n world ha s institutional ized an d sacralized . Thes e ideal s wil l remai n effective , however ,
only a s long a s the Wester n "people" do no t abando n them . Unlik e
Schumpeter, Webe r di d no t tak e thes e guarantee s o f libert y fo r
granted.
The Vertica l Differentiatio n
Our vertical classification i n the tables must b e more familiar to th e
sociologically traine d reader . Rathe r than dependin g o n a volunta ristic choic e betwee n servin g the peopl e o r seekin g th e truth , i t is
based o n a mor e objectiv e rankin g order . I n th e to p category ar e
placed th e intellectuals , th e bes t an d th e brightest , th e "producers "
of intellectua l commodities ; o n th e lower level ar e locate d th e
humble processors, the mediocre "consumers" an d disseminators of
thought products . O f course, it is not entirel y true that the group at
the bottom does not create, nor that to belong to on e or the other is
purely a matte r o f objectiv e criteri a o f excellence . Eve n her e a
"choice" must b e made betwee n Weber's "theoretical " and "practi cal" reason , betwee n wha t ancien t Greek s alternativel y calle d
sophia an d phrenosis, or betwee n wha t Richar d Hofstadte r (1962 )
Definitions 11
has labele d "intellect " an d "intelligence. " However , th e wa y thi s

choice i s mad e depend s a s muc h o n th e intellectua l talent s an d
qualifications o f the agen t a s it doe s o n th e agent' s idea l propensi ties.
The interes t o f the historica l an d sociologica l approache s i n th e
vertical classificatio n i s du e t o it s hierarchica l natur e an d t o th e
huge number s o f intelligentsia tha t for m it s base. Perhap s anothe r
reason for the popularity of the categor y of intelligentsia is that it is
more sociologicall y tangible . B y thi s w e mea n tha t a stratu m o f
intelligentsia resembles the rest of the strata an d classes in society in
the unproblematic way in which it organizes an d embraces an arra y
of idea s t o protec t it s interests . Unlik e intellectual s whos e idea l
interest i n rationa l developmen t o f idea s clashe s wit h an y fixe d
ideological arrangemen t o f them, th e intelligentsi a naturall y advo cate ideas that are conducive to its class or status interests . It i s not
surprising therefore to se e that the majo r attentio n o f the sociolog y
of intellectual s ha s bee n focuse d o n intelligentsia . Th e majorit y of
the literatur e i n th e Marxis t theor y o f intellectual s als o ha s deal t
with intelligentsia. Gouldner's criticism of Marxist literature (that it
is ventriloquist and unreflexive , that it does not accoun t for itsel f in
the sam e languag e i n whic h i t talk s abou t creatio n o f idea s an d
ideologies amon g othe r classes) can be interpreted a s criticizing the
absence o f intellectuals from the Marxis t sociolog y of intelligentsia.
The mos t cogen t theor y o f intellectuals in the Marxis t discours e is
that o f Gramsc i (1978) . Ye t he , too , seem s t o b e talkin g abou t
intelligentsia when he asserts that everyon e in the society is to some
extent a n intellectua l an d tha t al l classes hav e thei r ow n "organi c
intellectuals." Any clas s analysi s o f idea s canno t hel p bu t expan d
the sociolog y of intelligentsia .
Conversely, any sociology of intellectuals that wishes to focus on
"intellectuals" in the sens e we have define d th e ter m i n the vertica l
differentiation tend s t o transcen d clas s barriers . Mannheim' s no tion o f the "free-floatin g intellectual" i s a cas e in point. Thi s theo retical stran d withi n th e sociolog y o f intellectual s i s based o n th e
observation tha t th e categor y o f "intellectuals " comprise s a smal l
number o f creative individuals. Th e thi n stratu m o f intellectuals i s
not merel y the object of external conflicts with the laity, the author ities, and the intelligentsia. I t also harbors a profound inner tensio n
between its own ideal and material interests . Ho w can such a group
118 MA
be conceive d o f a s a n ideologicall y ambitiou s class ? Intellectuals '

"ideal interests" li e in th e constan t rationalizatio n o f the spher e of
ideas an d i n a relentless attempt t o transcen d th e immediate worl d
in searc h o f it s meaning , it s essence , o r it s beauty . Idea s tha t
emanate from this search can only occasionally b e conducive t o th e
interests of various socia l classe s and strata . Viewed as a flux, ideas
are destabilizin g an d potentiall y dangerou s t o th e interest s o f an y
given social class, including those of the intellectuals themselves. To
recapitulate: stabl e ideal edifices canno t b e built on the lav a flow of
ideas. Intellectual s ar e b y definition unstabl e a s a class because , as
the carrier s o f relativel y autonomou s ideas , the y canno t abid e fo r
long a moratoriu m o n thinkin g criticall y abou t an y se t o f sacre d
ideas, eve n whe n suc h idea s ten d t o justif y thei r ow n materia l
interests.
Society's fea r o f th e constan t rationalizin g proces s tha t woul d
erode it s "cor e ideas " ha s give n ris e t o a distrus t o f intellectuals ,
who ar e th e carrier s of , thi s process , t o thei r feeling s o f "aliena tion," and finally , t o a n arra y o f objective social sanction s agains t
intellectuals. These sanction s are usually devised an d enforce d b y a
nucleus o f anti-intellectua l ex-intellectual s wh o hav e alread y per formed th e "sacrific e o f intellect. " I n th e religiou s spher e thi s i s
exemplified a s the church' s establishmen t o f officia l limit s o n free wheeling thinkin g b y creatin g "dogma. " Conformin g t o dogm a i s
less a source of painful soul-searching for intelligentsi a than it is for
intellectuals; becaus e th e forme r hav e les s vested (ideal ) interes t i n
unadulterated rationalization s o f ideas o r pur e thinking .
Max Weber' s politica l sociolog y highlight s th e potentia l tensio n
inherent in the vertical differentiation of intellectuals and intelligent sia. I n th e thir d chapte r w e have referre d t o Weber' s fea r tha t th e
subservience of intelligentsia to their ow n interests as well as to othe r
social interest s woul d mak e the m perfec t superintendent s fo r wha t
he terme d th e "iro n cage " or th e "hous e o f bondage" of the future .
His observation s abou t socioeconomi c force s o f modernit y com bined wit h hi s study of ancient orienta l bureaucracie s ha d provide d
Weber with a daunting insight about the irreversible bureaucratizin g
trends o f th e moder n society , whic h woul d guarante e th e furthe r
entrenchment o f a proliferatin g intelligentsi a a t th e expens e o f th e
increasing isolatio n o f intellectuals . H e foresa w th e possibilit y o f
"orientalization" of th e West : organize d stat e bureaucracie s woul d
Definitions 11
control masse s o f postmoder n "fellahin. " Thu s Webe r stake d hi s

hopes o n individualisti c intellectual s t o figh t th e tid e o f th e gri m
future an d it s bureaucratic stor m troopers : the intelligentsia .
It is tempting to compare th e difference betwee n intellectuals and
intelligentsia with Weber's distinction betwee n those who live "for"
politics an d thos e wh o liv e "off" o f it . Indeed , Webe r make s thi s
distinction i n th e contex t o f contrastin g th e politica l intellectual s
who enter politic s with a mission, o n the one hand, an d the career ism o f part y intelligentsia , o n th e other . Th e forme r liv e "for "
political ideal s an d th e latte r liv e "off" them . Thi s poin t demon strates th e consistenc y o f th e idea l type s propose d i n thi s chapte r
and th e idea l type s o f Weber . Bu t i t wil l als o sho w u s ho w thes e
ideal types must not be used. These ideal types are only of analytical
value. A s suc h the y ar e mean t onl y fo r th e indirec t us e o f th e
empirical researcher . Thos e wh o liv e fo r politic s also , an d quit e
frequently, liv e of f i t a s wel l (Weber , Politics, p , 84) . In a simila r
manner ou r definitio n o f a n "intellectual " can b e exclusivel y ap plied onl y in limited case s to a given individual or stratum. Onl y in
so far a s one engages in a particular kin d of reasoning is one a ma n
of woma n o f knowledge, science , letters , o r arts . Onl y in s o fa r a s
this perso n turn s back t o brin g a Promethean gif t fo r the masses is
he o r she an intellectual . A t other moment s the sam e perso n coul d
be a member of intelligentsia, for instance whe n he or she attends a
trade unio n meetin g o f artists, writers, o r universit y professors. Of
course, as there are people who enter different categorie s dependin g
on historica l changes , th e perio d o f their lif e an d eve n time o f day,
there ar e thos e wh o readil y confor m t o th e pur e typ e an d ca n b e
safely place d i n a category . A rarel y reflectiv e specialist , a typica l
bureaucrat, a scientist , o r a philosophe r totall y dedicate d t o th e
discovery o f trut h ca n res t i n an y o f th e squar e abode s o n th e
diagonal apposit e end s o f ou r cross-tabulatio n (Tabl e 4.2) . Th e
validity of our cros s tabulation, however, does not depen d o n thei r
numbers, o r eve n o n thei r existence .
Columns an d Rows
One of the interestin g properties of the cross tabulation of Table 4.2
is th e capacit y o f it s column s an d row s t o reflec t th e varietie s o f
120 MA
controversies tha t hav e characterize d th e debat e betwee n intellec tuals (i n bot h senses,) , seeker s o f pur e knowledge , an d th e intelli gentsia. W e can slightly alter ou r cross tables (Table s 4. 1 and 4.2 ) to
fashion a n instrumen t fo r classifyin g th e varietie s o f debate s tha t
have occurre d withi n th e spher e o f intellectualit y (Tabl e 4.3) . Th e
first colum n in this table could be said to represent the otherworldl y
orientation o f intellecta s th e "departure " from th e lif e worl d o f
the masses indicated i n the previous two tables. Th e second colum n
represents th e inner-worldl y orientation o f intellectuals in the sam e
sense tha t a "retur n t o th e masses " charcterize d the m i n th e pre vious tables . Th e row s represen t th e hierarch y o f intellectuals an d
intelligentsia, a s wel l a s thei r respectiv e affinit y fo r theoretica l o r
practical reason . I n th e firs t colum n w e ca n locat e suc h work s o f
literature a s Dostoyevsky's "Grand Inquisitor " chapte r i n Brothers
Karamazov wher e a priest confronts Jesus, whos e Second Comin g
cannot hel p bu t und o th e stabilit y o f the church . Weber' s frequen t
references t o the tensions between prophets an d priests may also be
seen as a typical tension between the top an d bottom section s of the
first column . Floria n Znanieck i i n hi s semina l work , Th e Social
Role o f th e Ma n o f Knowledge (1965) , also describe s th e relation ship betwee n th e to p an d th e botto m o f th e firs t column : Zna niecki's "The Discovere r of Truth" would be placed a t the top o f the
first colum n whil e "The Systematizer " belongs a t th e bottom . Th e
unification o f the two roles, however, occasionally occurs ; that is , a
discoverer o f trut h migh t actuall y foun d hi s o r he r ow n schoo l o f
thought. Znaniecki' s metapho r i s als o on e o f movemen t an d i s
consistent with the simile we have used in the horizontal differentiation: the seeke r of pure knowledge is "going," he or she is facing the
truth. T o becom e a n intellectua l on e mus t turn back (towar d th e
people); t o becom e a member o f intelligentsia ( a systematizer ) on e
must stop. A seeke r o f pur e knowledg e wh o "want s t o foun d a
school mus t kno w whe n t o sto p i n hi s o r he r function , Principia
non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" (Znaniecki , 1965 ,
p. 123 )
The relationship s betwee n revolutionarie s an d part y functionar ies and thos e betwee n politicians an d stat e bureaucrat s typif y th e
tensions between the top an d the bottom o f the second column. Th e
controversy betwee n Leni n an d Luxembur g i s a n exampl e o f thi s
debate.
The ventur e o f describin g the "choice " betwee n th e firs t ro w

(otherworldly calling ) and second ro w (inner-worldl y mission ) ha s
also produce d a great dea l o f literature. A t the to p o f the intellec tual hierarch y w e can plac e work s suc h a s Weber' s "Politic s a s a
Vocation," and a t the lower row we might consider work s debating
the relativ e merit s o f variou s intellectua l occupations , such a s a
sixth-century documen t b y a Persian philosopher wh o is discussing
whether to become a philosopher, a religious leader, or a physician,
and afte r carefu l consideratio n h e decide s t o choos e th e latte r
(Baabe Borzouye h Tabib) (Tabl e 4.2) .
It goe s withou t sayin g tha t certai n area s o f ou r origina l cros s
tabulation (Table s 4.1-4.3) present more complications than others.
Regions 1 and 4 are the simplest, as they represent more simple and
monolithic elements: the realm of ideas (region 1 ) that is, the logical
and cumulativ e rationalizin g trend s o f pur e ideas , ca n b e bes t
carried o n unencumbered b y the concern s o f this world . Similarly ,
region 4 i s relativel y simple , a s i t represent s th e intersectio n o f
practical reason, and o f inner-wordly zeal for applyin g the reveale d
or discovere d principles.
Regions 2 and 3 are th e mos t complicated , a s they tend t o com bine in varying proportions a melange of less compatible elements.
TABLE 4.3 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f th e Primac y o f Callin g o r Missio n o f
Intellectuals an d Thei r Rol e a s Carriers o r Organizer s o f Ideas: Literatur e
Seekers of pure knowledge
(otherworldly)
1
Politics as a vocation
Intellectuals
as carriers
of ideas
Intelligentsia
as organizers
of ideas
Committed intellectuals
(inner-wordlyy)
G
r
a
n
d
I
n
q
u
i
s
i
t
o
r
Babe Borzouyeh Tabib
w
h
a
t
I
s
T
o
B
e
D
o
n
e?
122 MA
Region 2, for instance combines abstract maxims derived from pur e

ideas wit h a n inner-worldl y zeal fo r thei r actualization . Emissar y
prophecy, leadin g a revolution , o r bein g a philosopher-kin g al l
involve a mor e complicate d synthesi s o f element s tha n anythin g
that ca n b e foun d i n th e firs t region . A monk , a scholar , an d a
researcher, who m w e classif y i n regio n 3 , hav e t o balanc e thei r
otherwordly aspiration s wit h th e demand s o f thei r positio n i n so ciety, whic h ma y no t accommodat e the m a s wel l a s i t doe s thei r
sources o f emulatio n i n regio n 1 .
The cros s tabulations offere d i n this chapter ma y als o be used t o
create a taxonomy o f the type s of more recen t empirica l and theo retical works done in the fiel d o f sociology of intellectuals. Many of
the empirica l work s suffe r fro m insufficien t clarit y o f definition .
Others see m t o subscrib e t o mutuall y exclusiv e definitions . Usin g
the cros s tabulation s propose d her e wil l allo w th e admissio n o f
almost al l o f thes e work s t o a unifie d an d cumulativ e bod y o f
sociology o f intellectuals. Konra d an d Szeleny i (1979), Djilas (The
New Class), an d th e majorit y o f Easter n Europea n scholar s dea l
with th e lowe r ro w (region s 3 and 4 ) a s wel l a s wit h transitio n of ,
and contradictio n between , th e intellectual s o f regio n 2 an d th e
intelligentsia of region 4. As a rule those with an interest in the clas s
position o f intellectual s usuall y focu s o n th e intelligentsi a o f th e
bottom row. The exception to this rule would b e the conspiratoria l
theories o f anarchist s an d certai n extrem e form s o f populis m o r
even Marxism tha t worry about a takeover o f the society by a band
of Jacobi n intellectual s (e.g., Bakuni n an d Machajski) .
The idealis t traditio n fro m Plat o t o Durkhei m an d Parson s fo cuses, howeve r thoug h no t exclusively , o n th e uppe r hal f o f th e
table. In this group we also categorize those who prefer to underlin e
the dissent: the destabilizing and oppositiona l properties o f intellectuals such as Feuer and Dahrendorf an d even Shils. From our poin t
of vie w th e decisio n eithe r t o suppor t o r t o oppos e th e existin g
order i s one that i s made b y the intellectual s i n a n extraintellectua l
realm o f values. Idea s tha t lend themselve s t o suc h positions, how ever, ar e produce d i n the sam e regio n o f intersection o f theoretica l
reason and inner-worldly concerns. Opposition , alienatio n an d cen sure can b e caused b y the transnational characte r o f the rationaliz ing process , b y the desir e o f intellectuals t o tampe r wit h th e "cor e
ideas," "noble lies, " and sacre d value s o f th e society . However , i t
Definitions 12
can als o b e cause d b y a theoreticall y consisten t adherenc e t o th e

core value s o f the society , while the actua l constellatio n o f interests
of dominant group s favor s neglecting their authenti c for m i n favor
of compromises. Whe n thi s happens intellectual s ar e alienate d an d
prosecuted a s a ne w orthodoxy , no t fo r opposin g th e cor e value s
but fo r thei r unadulterate d loyalt y t o them . Mos t o f th e work s
about America n intellectual s that concentrat e o n thei r alienation ,
marginality, an d opposition , includin g th e recen t interes t i n Ne w
York intellectual s represente d b y Ala n Wal d (1987 ) an d Thoma s
Bender (1987) , can b e categorize d i n this section .
Russell Jacoby' s Th e Last Intellectuals (1987 ) addresse s a n ominous developmen t in what h e defines as the disappearanc e o f intellectuals i n academia. He is talking o f a massive shift fro m th e righ t
column (region s 2 an d 4 ) to th e lef t colum n (region s 1 and 3) .
Weber's "politics as a vocation" addresse s problems that arise when
seekers of pure knowledge enter the spher e o f politics (fro m regio n 1
to region 2) but refuse to tone down the ethics of ultimate ends, which
is a survival of their pervalent etho s i n a world o f pure thought. Thi s
essay also deals with intellectuals' objectiv e conflict wit h the bureauc racies tha t woul d b e placed unde r the m in the secon d column .
Besides categorizin g the alread y existin g research , on e ca n envi sion the possibilit y of conducting new intercivilizational research i n
the are a o f Weberia n sociolog y o f intellectuals . Fo r instance , th e
intercivilizational stud y o f religiou s intelligentsi a can benefi t fro m
the sectio n o f our mode l that deals with the religiou s intellectuality
(Table 4.4). Both th e Buddhis t an d th e Islami c concept s allo w th e
TABLE 4.4 . Comparativ e Stud y o f Religiou s Intellectuality

in Isla m an d Buddhis m
Departure for the Holy Return
Leaders Islam
1. EXEMPLAR Y PROPHEC Y 2
: Val i Islam
Buddhism: Buddh a Buddhism
3. MYSTI C QUEST , mon k 4

Followers Islam
: Are f Islam
Buddhism: Mon k Buddhism
for Saving Others

. EMISSAR Y PROPHEC Y
: Nab i
: Buddhisatv a
. CUR E O F SOULS , pries t
: Ale m
:
124 MA
leader a spiritual a s well as physical departure fro m peopl e an d th e

reality o f everyda y lif e i n orde r t o attai n th e spiritua l truth , the y
also deman d a selfles s return , i n orde r t o brin g salvatio n t o th e
denizens of the mundane world . It is very difficult t o locate substan tive similaritie s betwee n th e "truths " sough t i n th e tw o religiou s
traditions, ye t our mode l facilitates a comparison between the types
of religiou s intellectuals an d intelligentsi a i n s o far a s they emulate
their leaders in "departing" from an d "returning" to the people. Th e
exemplary prophec y o f Buddhis m ha s a n emissar y aspec t a s th e
emissary prophecy o f Islam ha s an exemplary root. Both Islam an d
Buddhism allo w a followin g fo r th e pur e seeke r o f trut h o r th e
exemplary prophet , th e Buddhis t mon k an d th e Islami c mysti c
(Sufi o r Aref) , althoug h thi s positio n i s muc h mor e centra l t o
Buddhism than it is to Islam. But, Buddhism lacks the institution of
priesthood. W e mus t not e tha t non e o f thes e statement s ca n b e
illuminating withou t qualification s tha t mus t highligh t th e reason s
that th e compariso n hold s th e th e exten t t o whic h i t doe s not .
Appendix A
Weber o n th e "Positivist Intuitionist" Controvers y
To shiel d themselve s fro m th e positivis t onslaught , som e socia l

thinkers 1 took i t upon themselve s to erect a "Chinese wall " between
the realms o f "nature" and "culture." To further protec t themselves ,
they turne d th e latte r int o th e magica l garde n o f "subjectifying "
sciences (Weber, Knies, p. 130 ) at whose gates the law s of causality
stopped (Weber , Knies, p. 135) . The trodden paths o f natural deter mination an d empirica l observatio n withi n thi s domai n traile d of f
into th e mis t o f "huma n freedom. " Th e allege d unpredictabilit y o f
human actio n wa s perceived as neither a disadvantage nor , a s their
kinder adversaries maintained, a s a sign of the youth o f the cultura l
sciences. On the contrary , it signified th e dignit y of the real m o f the
humanities an d ha d t o b e treasure d a s such . Th e dept h o f thi s
mysterious real m coul d b e fathome d onl y i n th e ligh t o f "empa thetic understanding, " "suggestive 'interpretation,' " "feeling s o f totality," and th e lik e (Weber , Knies, p . 177) .
If Webe r seem s t o disenchan t thi s magica l garde n i t i s no t be cause h e is willing to giv e ground t o positivist reductionism. In fact,
Weber, being an advocate o f verstehen, felt comfortable doing awa y
with th e magi c o f subjectivit y becaus e h e di d no t nee d t o hid e
behind it . Thi s wa s s o becaus e h e neve r too k th e monopolisti c
pretensions o f positivis m t o th e real m o f scienc e seriously . Webe r
was abl e to transcen d th e positivist-intuitionis t controversy , and i n
doing so , h e onc e mor e leape d ahea d o f hi s time , anticipatin g th e
latest turn s i n th e sociolog y o f science. Conside r th e following .
125
126 MA
Even the knowledg e of the mos t certai n propositio n o f our theoretical sciencese.g. , th e exac t natura l science s or mathematics , is , like
the cultivatio n an d refinemen t o f th e conscience , a produc t o f cul ture. (Weber , Objectivity, p . 55)
Nevertheless, if one want s to imagin e Webe r a s a defender o f th e

autonomy o f the cultura l science s in th e fac e o f positivist invasion ,
one migh t characteriz e hi s strategie s a s uniquel y offensive . Not e
that, for example, in the case of "unpredictability" o f human action ,
Weber neithe r establishe s it a s a weaknes s of th e socia l science s t o
be overcom e b y furthe r developmen t o f these disciplines , no r doe s
he glorify i t as a unique property of the humanitie s t o b e cultivated
and recognize d a s such . Instead , h e point s ou t tha t thi s situatio n
arises becaus e th e historica l an d sociocultura l phenomen a ar e im portant fo r u s as individual events. And individua l events by defini tion cannot be deduced fro m general laws, as none of the nomologi cal formulas of mechanics can predict the way a specific falling roc k
would brea k int o splinters (Weber, Knies, p. 122) . But this does no t
usually pose a problem for natura l science s becaus e they are, i n th e
majority o f cases , intereste d i n generalize d statement s abou t th e
laws governing "nature,"2 which is for Webe r a logically (not empir ically, a s positivists presumed) closed system (Parsons, 1964 , pp. 8 9). Whe n thi s i s no t th e cas e (e.g. , i n th e cas e o f seismolog y an d
meteorology), insofa r a s th e empirica l discipline s i n questio n ar e
interested i n specifi c prediction s rathe r tha n th e genera l law s gov erning chang e i n nature , the y ar e als o face d wit h th e proble m o f
unpredictability.
Or, tak e th e "lawmaking " controversy. Here , too , Weber' s posi tion i s base d upo n exposin g th e weaknesse s o f the positivis t argu ment. Thi s render s ipso fact o th e intuitionist arguments , shape d t o
meet th e positivist challenge, obsolete . Webe r does not conced e that
lawmaking i s th e exclusiv e advantag e o f nomologica l disciplines ,
nor doe s h e tak e prid e i n th e fac t tha t "huma n freedom " defie s
regulation a s a matte r o f principle . Webe r maintain s tha t cultura l
phenomena ar e even more susceptibl e to lawmaking an d regulatio n
than ar e th e natura l phenomen a (Weber , Knies, p . 125) . Bu t suc h
general laws , regardless o f how "subjectivel y adequate " they migh t
be (e.g. , th e law s o f economi c conduct) , ar e o f littl e valu e fo r th e
causal explanatio n o f concret e action . Wit h thi s convictio n Webe r
Appendix A : Th e Positivist-Intuitionist Controversy 12
took i t upon himsel f to determin e the extent t o whic h the "normative an d d e facto " element s influenc e th e real m o f econom y (a n
intention tha t i s implie d i n th e origina l titl e o f hi s Economy an d
Society), rathe r tha n tryin g to furthe r refin e th e abstrac t "law s o f
man's economi c behavior. " Weber even goes so far a s to clai m tha t
the discover y o f natura l law s i s o f shee r heuristi c valu e fo r al l
sciences alike ; nomologica l o r historical , natura l o r sociocultura l
(Weber, Roscher, p. 63) .
At this point , i t would b e appropriate t o ad d a few words abou t
the wa y Webe r conceive d o f th e relationship s betwee n th e tw o
realms o f natura l an d cultura l sciences . W e know tha t Webe r di d
not think much of the positivist claims about the superiority of their
methods i n the stud y o f sociocultural phenomena ; h e doubte d th e
adequacy o f thei r conceptio n o f th e natura l world , a s wel l a s th e
mission they ascribed to the nomological discipline s in capturing its
essence in their abstract formula : "It i s not the 'actual' interconnections o f 'things ' bu t th e conceptual interconnectio n o f problems
which defin e th e scop e o f variou s sciences " (Weber , Objectivity,
p. 68) .
We als o hav e show n tha t Webe r rejecte d th e prevalen t notion s
held b y th e protagonist s o f th e intuitionis t schoo l regardin g th e
fundamental chas m betwee n th e tw o type s of sciences . H e di d no t
attribute thi s differenc e t o th e antinom y o f the subjec t matter s o f
human an d exac t sciences , i.e., the inanimate , determine d world of
nature a s oppose d t o th e meaningful , volitiona l actio n o f th e
human bein g i n societ y (Weber , Knies, p . 185) . Fo r Weber, th e
domains of cultural and natural sciences are neither identical nor
mutually exclusive. H e founde d hi s methodolog y o n th e basi c as sumption tha t th e natura l worl d an d th e cultura l worl d ar e i n
hierarchical orde r an d thei r relationshi p i s one o f "genus-species. "
"Action" is no t th e logica l opposit e o f "behavior, " i t i s a specifi c
kind o f behavior, loade d wit h meaning attributed t o it by the actor ;
the social action is a subclass of the action. Huma n subjectivit y does
not radicall y oppose the empirical world; it just make s a part o f the
latter mor e complex . I t i s possibl e (Weber , Knies, p . 140 ) an d
sometimes necessary (Weber, Economy I , p. 18 ) to use the method s
of the empirical sciences in the cultural sciences to understand som e
cultural phenomen a (Weber , Economy I , p. 10 ) or even to "verify "
interpretive hypothese s abou t the m (Weber , Knies, p . 160) . Whe n
128 MA
and wher e thi s shoul d b e performe d i s t o b e determine d b y th e

empirical researc h (Weber , Knies, p . 140) . O n th e othe r hand , th e
methods mos t suite d fo r interpretiv e sociology (i.e., the teleologica l
rationalistic metho d o f interpretation ) ca n b e o f grea t heuristi c
value for th e natura l science s (e.g., the us e o f the functiona l purpo sive schem e i n physiology ) (Weber, Economy I , p . 15) .
Yet ther e ar e method s molde d exclusivel y fo r th e stud y o f th e
cultural phenomena . Bu t th e difference s betwee n thes e method s
and thos e o f th e natura l science s d o no t originat e i n ontologica l
dissimilarities o f their subjec t matter, bu t i n differen t interest s the y
are responsive to (Weber , Knies, p. 184-185) . Therefore, i f one uses
the method s o f natura l sciences , on e ca n catc h a glimps e o f th e
social worldth e view behaviorists get. This view is not necessaril y
wrong, bu t lacking . B y looking a t socia l phenomen a i n thi s light ,
one i s likely to "mis s out " o n a substantia l amoun t o f informatio n
that i s availabl e i n th e real m o f th e sociocultura l phenomen a
(Weber, Biology, p . 389) . Weberia n sociologist s d o no t categori cally rejec t th e us e o f th e method s o f th e exac t science s i n th e
exploration o f socia l phenomena . Rather , the y g o beyon d th e dis covery o f correlation s an d functiona l relationships : the y ca n ac complish somethin g whic h i s neve r attainabl e i n th e natura l sci ences, namely , th e subjectiv e understandin g o f th e actio n o f th e
component individuals . Th e natura l sciences , o n th e othe r hand ,
cannot do this, being limited to the formulation o f causal uniformi ties i n object s an d event s and th e explanatio n o f individual fact s b y
applying them . W e do no t "understand " the behavio r o f cell s bu t
can onl y observ e th e relevan t functiona l relationship s an d general ize o n th e basi s o f these observations . Thi s additiona l achievemen t
of explanation b y interpretive understanding, a s distinguished from
external observation , is , o f course , attaine d onl y a t a priceth e
more hypothetica l an d fragmentar y characte r o f its results . Never theless, subjectiv e understandin g i s th e specifi c characteristi c o f
sociological knowledg e (Weber , Economy / , p . 15) .
Appendix B
On Verificatio n of th e Idea l
Types: Winch , Schutz , an d Oake s
Preserving the meaning that th e social acto r attribute s t o hi s or her

behavior a s an integral part o f the socia l sciences presents interpretive discipline s with a difficul t choice . The y see m to hav e to eithe r
neglect or to otherwis e fill o r bridge the gap that invariably emerges
between th e understandin g o f th e socia l acto r an d tha t o f th e
scientific observer . Webe r considere d th e proble m bu t pu t of f a
rigorous attempt t o solve it. He dismissed a s unconducive and naive
the suggestion that an empathetic identificatio n with the subject can
be used to fill the gap between the intended and observe d meanings.
A close reading o f Weber's theory o f concept formation als o reveals
that h e di d no t dee m i t necessar y or scientificall y sound t o bridg e
that ga p throug h verificatio n of interpretive inferences. Instea d h e
devised hi s interpretive methods s o that verificatio n of interpretive
schemes i n th e sens e o f collatin g the m wit h th e actua l existin g
meaning or other empirical data would not be necessary. As this has
been sufficiently discusse d throughout the text, in this appendix we
shall concentrat e o n th e suggestion s o f Gu y Oake s an d Pete r
Winch, who, presupposing the necessity of verifying th e ideal types,
have proceeded t o apprais e Ma x Weber' s theory o f ideal types . We
shall then turn t o Alfre d Schutz' s critique o f Weber's methodolog y
with regar d t o thi s problem.Weber' s rejectio n o f th e empatheti c
school wa s spelled ou t clearl y enoug h t o preven t an y seriou s com mentator fro m ascribin g to hi m suc h ideas . Bu t a s these example s
indicate, a scholarl y inclinatio n persist s t o attribut e t o Webe r a
solution (t o th e proble m o f th e rif t betwee n intende d an d inter 129
130 MA
preted meanings ) tha t involve s "verification " o f idea l types . Th e

proponents o f th e verificatio n thesi s trea t th e idea l type s lik e th e
theories o f natura l sciences ; that is , a s genera l statement s abou t a
class o f actuall y existin g phenomena , t o b e furthe r validate d an d
verified. Thi s procedur e i s to b e carrie d ou t throug h exposin g th e
ideal typica l "hypothesis" t o th e empirical data . The implication, in
keeping with the tradition of natural sciences, would be that a single
diversion betwee n fact s an d theor y mus t (ideally ) culminate i n th e
devaluation o f the theory. O f course, as we have alread y mentioned ,
an idea l typ e i s no t debunke d i f th e empirica l realit y o r th e inten tionality o f the "native " doe s no t confor m to it . Quit e the contrary,
it is, insofar a s such diversion s exist, o f course, within a reasonabl e
range, tha t th e idea l types are useful. I t mus t b e borne i n mind tha t
in dealin g wit h idea l types , we d o no t as k "whethe r o r not " the y
"subsume" the reality; rather "t o wha t extent " th e realit y "approxi mates" the idea l types .
Unlike Weber, Oakes' s interes t i s a linguistic and logica l one ; it is
not sociological . H e i s concerne d abou t matter s suc h a s th e trut h
conditions fo r th e ascriptio n o f th e constitutiv e concept s (Oakes ,
1977, p . 23) . I n hi s introductio n t o Weber' s Roscher an d Knies,
Oakes claim s tha t th e productio n o f meaningfu l interpretation s
must b e don e "i n suc h a way that i t ca n b e verified. " However , th e
passage quote d fro m Webe r i n th e footnot e doe s no t i n an y wa y
support th e ide a suggested b y Oakes. W e have alread y mad e i t clear
that certai n kind s o f "meaning" need verification , but thi s doe s no t
apply t o th e idea l typica l meanin g constructions . Webe r believe d
that "ou r habitua l mode s o f thought an d feeling " vouch th e subjec tive adequac y o f a n interpretation . Eve n th e determinatio n o f th e
"causal adequacy" o f an ideal typical construct would not furthe r o r
fortify th e universalit y o f it s subjectiv e adequacy . T o gaug e th e
causal adequac y o f a n idea l typ e i s t o demonstrat e th e exten t t o
which the ideal type can be "useful" b y showing the extent to whic h
the realit y deviate s fro m it . Th e determinatio n o f th e causa l ade quacy o f an idea l type , therefore , i s not a n instrumen t o f testing th e
"truth condition " o f "socia l hypotheses " (Weber , Economy / ,
pp. 11-12) . Gu y Oakes , however , i n hi s effor t t o bridg e th e hiatu s
that separate s th e socia l acto r fro m th e scientifi c observer, suggests
that th e scientifi c interpretation o f the idea l typ e mus t b e corroborated b y th e socia l actor' s understanding . Fo r thi s t o happen , firs t
Appendix B: Verification o f th e Ideal Types 13
the subjectivity of the social actor mus t be "reproduced." Onl y if the

reproduced meaning is shown to b e an exact replicatio n of the ideal
type ca n th e idea l type satisf y Oakes' s "verstehen criterion " an d b e
finally accepted :
If th e investigatio n i s successful , there i s a sens e i n whic h i t shoul d
mirror o r reproduc e th e native' s ow n account: the criteria whic h th e
social scientist employ s for the ascriptio n o f a given [social] predicat e
should b e equivalent to th e criteria whic h th e nativ e employ s for th e
ascription o f th e sam e (social ) predicate . (Oakes , 1977 . pp . 24-25) 1
This verificatio n involves two methodologicall y dangerous steps.

First, th e "reproduction " of the subjectivit y of the native . We have
already demonstrate d ho w Webe r wen t t o grea t length s t o prov e
that thi s i s an impossibl e an d unnecessar y task t o undertake . Sec ond, an d b y far th e mor e dangerous step , consists o f the matchin g
of th e idea l typica l constructio n agains t th e reproduce d "actua l
existing meaning " o r th e "native' s account. " Thi s latte r ste p in volves a reduction o f the pur e type s to th e actua l existin g meaning
and, thus , remove s the keyston e o f Weber' s methodolog y an d re verses it s telos. I t appear s no t t o hav e occurred t o Oake s that "th e
native's account " cannot b e the ultimate criterio n for the validity of
the idea l types , simply because Webe r introduced the possibilit y of
"semiconsciousness" as well as "false consciousness" of the concrete
social actor .
The sam e concer n fo r verifiabilit y o f idea l type s underlies Pete r
Winch's critiqu e o f Weber . I n hi s Th e Idea o f a Social Science,
Winch criticize s Weber fo r suggestin g tha t statistica l correlation s
can b e use d t o "verify " interpretation s (Winch , 1977 , p. 112) . H e
also criticize s Webe r fo r hi s "implie d suggestion" : "Verstehen i s
something whic h i s logically incomplet e an d need s supplementin g
by a differen t metho d altogethe r namely , th e collectio n o f statis tics." Then he goes on to criticize this allegedly Weberian viewpoint.
His criticis m i s valid, bu t i t reject s onl y Winch's "idea " of Weber' s
methodology. Winc h proposes , "Th e compatibilit y of a n interpre tation wit h the statistic s doe s no t prov e its validity" (Winch , 1977 ,
p. 113) . This obviousl y i s no t contrar y t o Weber' s position . Suc h
concurrence woul d onl y prov e tha t th e idea l typ e i n questio n i s
useful (no t valid) . Winc h als o seem s to hav e confused the determi -
132 MA
nation o f "causa l adequacy " o f a n idea l typica l constructio n wit h

the proces s o f verificatio n o f genera l law s i n th e natura l sciences .
Finally a reference must b e made t o Alfre d Schutz , wh o criticize d
Weber fo r hi s perfunctor y treatmen t o f th e varietie s o f subjectiv e
experience an d especiall y for neglecting to deal wit h the disjunction
that exist s betwee n personall y experience d an d th e observationall y
or motivationally interpreted types of meaning (Schutz , 1967 , pp. 7 ,
8). H e expressl y wishe d t o clarif y an d radicall y analyz e th e taci t
presuppositions o f Weber's interpretiv e sociology. O n th e questio n
of verifiabilit y o f idea l types , h e seem s t o hav e accomplishe d thi s
task. Schut z argue s tha t actua l existin g meaning , an d idea l typica l
meaning ar e fundamentally different 2 an d tha t mutua l understand ing, eve n i n everyda y life , i s problematic . Abov e all , h e maintain s
that achievin g tota l symmetr y between the intended an d interprete d
meanings i s impossible. 3 Bu t thi s doe s no t rende r interpersona l o r
sociological understandin g unattainable, 4 a s th e rif t betwee n th e
two type s o f meanin g i s guarantee d t o remai n negligible . Thi s i s
vouched for by the fact that the parties to any interaction shar e with
each othe r an d th e observe r a common objectiv e contex t o f mean ing. This make s observationa l an d motivational understandin g pos sible an d allow s fo r th e constructio n o f th e subjectivel y adequat e
ideal types . Togethe r wit h Weber , Schut z maintain s tha t verifica tion o f idea l type s i s no t onl y impossible bu t als o unnecessary .
In socia l science s th e mod e o f understandin g i s alway s th e indi rect observatio n o f the worl d o f predecessor s o r tha t o f contempo raries.5 Thu s enterin g int o a face-to-fac e relationshi p eve n fo r th e
purpose o f checkin g th e validit y of th e idea l typ e woul d ips o fact o
spoil th e scientificit y o f th e procedure. 6
Besides, idea l type s ar e b y definitio n unverifiable. 7 The y neve r
refer t o no r ca n the y eve n b e corroborated b y individuals. 8 Schut z
could, o f course , hav e adde d t o thi s lis t b y mentionin g tha t fo r
Weber eve n the availabilit y o f a thorough motivationa l understand ing of the concrete socia l acto r doe s not alte r th e situation. Fo r eve n
if suc h a n inne r understandin g come s int o conflic t wit h th e idea l
type, i t doe s no t necessaril y refut e th e idea l typ e i n question : "Th e
'conscious motives ' ma y wel l even t o th e acto r himself , conceal th e
various 'motives ' and 'repressions ' which constitut e th e rea l drivin g
force o f hi s action " (Weber, Economy I , pp . 9-10) .
Appendix C
Weber an d Isla m
Weber's ow n generalizing observations abou t th e religiou s need s of

warriors, a s reflecte d i n religion s tha t ar e tailore d t o thes e needs ,
tend t o exclud e Isla m a s on e suc h religion . First , Islam' s radica l
monotheism (singularit y of the divine in principle) would thwart th e
warrior's characteristi c penchan t fo r polytheism , monolatr y o r he notheism (Weber , Judaism , p . 133) . Second , belie f i n predestina tion an d divin e determination instea d o f irrational fate or "kismet,"
which was generally favored by the warriors, prevailed i n the Qura n
and pervade d th e attitud e o f the prophe t an d hi s disciples (Weber ,
Economy I , p. 575) . Furthermore, pride , a necessary component o f
martial spirit , i s abhorre d i n Isla m a s inimica l t o th e spiri t o f
religion, which demands "total submission" to Go d (Weber, Social,
p. 291) . Islam no t onl y encourages religiou s humility but als o con tains concepts such as sin and salvation , which, in Weber's view, are
not suppose d t o b e particularly pleasin g to th e dignifie d religiosity
of th e warriors . Finally , Isla m i s no t a n exclusivel y masculin e
religion; it does not offe r hierarchica l promotion t o its believers nor
does i t emphasiz e disciplin e an y mor e tha n othe r occidenta l reli gions do . Th e las t thre e characteristic s are , however , found i n two
other religion s that Weber associated with warriors: Zen Buddhism
in Japa n (Weber , India, p . 279) , an d Mithrais m i n Rom e (Weber ,
Economy, pp. 475-76) . I n the former case , the asceti c and contem plative exercise s o f th e Ze n monk s see m t o hav e appeale d t o th e
professional warrior s an d t o thei r appreciatio n o f discipline. Mith raism offere d Roma n centurion s no t onl y an exclusivel y masculine
religion bu t als o a n essentiall y magica l an d sacramenta l distribu tion o f grace an d th e possibilit y o f hierarchical advancemen t i n it s
133
134 MA
mystery ceremonies . I t shoul d b e born e i n min d tha t i n bot h case s

we deal with radically transformed versions of religions that in their
original for m ha d no t bee n warrio r religions . Thi s ma y dissuad e
one from dubbin g them a s warrior religions in the sens e that Webe r
means i t i n th e cas e o f Islam . I n respons e t o th e questio n wh y
Weber designate d Islam , whic h ha s bee n bot h i n it s origina l for m
and i n its social characte r a n occidenta l religion , a s the quintessen tial warrio r religion , th e followin g explanatio n ma y b e offered .
Weber base d hi s ideal type of Islam o n prevailin g Europea n stereo types, for h e never got aroun d t o devotin g a s much tim e to Isla m as
he did to Judaism, post-Reformatio n Christianity , and the religions
of Indi a an d China . Thi s explanatio n endow s les s psychologica l
significance t o Weber' s slip s an d error s o f omissio n i n studyin g
Islam tha n do othe r scholar s o f this area , namely , Brya n S. Turner.
However, thi s i s no t mean t t o reject , bu t rathe r t o complement ,
Turner's particula r explanatio n o f Weber' s treatmen t o f Isla m
(Turner, 1974 , p. 141 , 176).
Appendix D
Ideologies an d Counter-Ideologie s
of Intellectual s i n Occidenta l Eas t
and West : A n Idea l Typica l Mode l
Auguste Comte preferre d th e sovereignty of the "savants" to that of

the people ; fo r hi m socia l evolutio n mean t tha t scientifi c politic s
would hav e t o replac e th e irrationalit y o f democrati c politic s
(Comte, 1969 , p. 275) . His version of social evolution was geared t o
reject th e Spenceria n interpretatio n o f the historica l progres s tha t
developed independen t o f huma n volitio n an d wa s imperviou s t o
artificial prodding .
Lester Fran k Ward , Comte' s America n disciple , called Spencer ian sociolog y " a gospe l o f inaction " an d " a we t blanke t o n th e
enthusiasm o f al l wh o woul d follo w socia l science " (Ward , 1894 ,
p. 618) . War d mad e explici t wha t remaine d implici t i n Comte .
Cosmic an d organi c evolutio n wer e differen t fro m socia l evolutio n
in that, i n the latter , consciou s (telic) actio n becam e th e ver y agen t
of social evolution (Ward, 1903 , pp. 15-17) ; spontaneous evolutio n
belonged t o lowe r stages o f evolution (Ward, 1844 , p. 276) . Ward' s
ideology o f intellectuals' sovereignty, for whic h he coined th e ter m
"sociocracy," would no t counte r socia l evolution , bu t onl y termi nate it s spontaneou s phase. 1 "Thu s fa r socia l progres s ha s i n a
certain awkwar d manner , taken car e o f itself, bu t i n the near futur e
it wil l hav e t o b e care d for " (Ward , 1926 , p. 706) . I f w e cal l argu ments suc h a s thes e th e exceptionalis t arguments , War d coul d b e
said t o hav e achieve d th e ultimat e rationalizatio n o f it . War d di d
not nee d t o justif y th e interventio n o f human s i n th e proces s o f
135
136 MA
evolution i n th e nam e o f extraneou s contingencies , becaus e h e

argued tha t huma n "telic " intervention i s th e onl y for m o f socia l
evolution i n th e moder n age.
Having establishe d th e necessit y of intervening in th e proces s of
social evolution, the ideologie s of intellectuals must eithe r establish
or presuppose that their designated agent s o f intervention (savants,
sociocrats a s th e vanguar d o f th e proletaria n party ) wil l selflessl y
engage in their political task. They usually take the second path and
simply shar e th e platoni c assumptio n tha t " a ma n wh o ha s learn t
about righ t wil l b e righteous " (Plato , Gorgias, Par . 460) . Ward' s
sociocrats woul d be
the las t to clai m an undue share. They work for al l mankind an d fo r
all time, and al l they as k i s that al l mankind shal l forever benefi t b y
their work . . . . The y onl y as k a n opportunit y t o appl y scientifi c
principles t o grea t things . (Ward , 1926 , p. 583)
Lenin claim s th e sam e purit y fo r hi s leadin g elite , or , a s h e call s

them, "a doze n tried an d talented " (Lenin, 1973 , p . 118) . Althoug h
their title implies mere technical superiority , the leaders of the part y
were in fact entruste d with the grave task o f shaping the conscious ness of the proletariat, who m they were supposed to represent . Th e
problem wa s tha t i n Lenin' s vie w th e proletaria t wa s pron e t o
"opportunism" and wa s unable t o transcen d it s economic concern s
for idea l one s (Lenin , 1973 , pp. 37 , 69 , 107).
The proponent s o f counterideologies of intellectuals in bot h traditions o f sociolog y an d socialis m als o see m t o hav e use d paralle l
tactics. Le t u s examin e th e position s o f Ros a Luxembur g an d
William Graha m Sumne r i n this category :
1. The y uphol d th e sanctit y o f socia l evolutio n an d objec t t o
human intervention s in it. Their evolutio n makes n o leaps. Sumne r
stated: "The only possible good fo r societ y must com e o f evolution
not revolution " (Sumner , 1914 , p. 207) . Rosa Luxembur g likene d
evolution t o a delicat e developin g organis m whos e natura l pac e
must no t b e disturbed : "Sto p th e natura l pulsatio n o f a livin g
organism, an d yo u weake n it , an d yo u diminis h it s resistanc e an d
combative spirit " (Luxemburg , 1970 , p. 129) . The interventionis t
cure o f th e proletaria n consciousnes s fo r th e part y intellectual s
attempted b y Lenin , i n he r view , wa s worse than th e diseas e itself:
Appendix D: Intellectuals i n Occidental East an d West 13
"Historically, th e error s committed b y a truly revolutionar y move ment are infinitely mor e fruitful tha n the infallibility o f the cleverest
central committee " ^Luxemburg , 1970 , p. 130) .
In short , th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s uphel d th e ful l
automaticity o f socia l evolution . Eve n i f histor y proceed s i n a
zigzag and prolonge d fashion , the y argued, it would be wiser to let
it run it s course than to unleas h the "telic" or volunteeristic subjec tivism o f intellectuals i n th e hop e o f hastening o r correctin g it .
2. Th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s hesitat e t o waiv e th e
possibility of selfish manipulatio n o f social change by the intellectu als who ar e supposed t o shap e i t for the sake o f universality. In th e
occidental Wes t this suspicion takes the form of a simple mistrust of
human nature . Sumne r states : "Th e reaso n for excesse s o f th e ol d
governing classes lies in the vices and passion s o f human natur e . . .
these vices are confined to no nation" (Sumner, 1970 , p. 27) . In the
occidental East , however , thi s argumen t i s muc h mor e potent .
Drawing upo n th e anarchis t an d Machdevis t (derive d fro m th e
name o f the Polish-born Russia n revolutionar y Waclaw Machajski)
traditions, th e Eastern Europea n counterelite s have reduced Marx ism an d socialis m t o mer e ideologica l facade s fo r th e rul e o f th e
intelligentsia. O f course , ther e i s enoug h i n Mar x an d Engels' s
compendium o f writings to suppor t th e thesi s o f social determina tion o f consciousness. It is on this very basis that Ros a Luxembur g
chides Lenin for trusting the fate o f the proletariat t o "professiona l
revolutionaries": "Th e 'intellectual ' a s a socia l elemen t whic h ha s
emerged ou t o f the bourgeoisi e an d i s therefore alie n t o th e prole tariat, enters the socialist movement no t because o f his natural clas s
inclinations bu t i n spit e o f them" (Luxemburg, 1970 , p. 124) .
The counterideologies of the Eastern European intellectual s state
the cas e even mor e categorically :
The intellectual s o f ever y ag e hav e describe d themselve s ideologi cally, i n accordanc e wit h thei r particula r interests , an d i f thos e
interests hav e differe d fro m ag e to ag e it ha s stil l been th e commo n
aspiration o f the intellectual s o f every ag e to represen t thei r particu lar interest s i n each context a s the genera l interest s o f mankind. The
definition o f universal , eternal , suprem e (an d henc e immutable )
knowledge display s a remarkabl e variabilit y ove r th e ages , bu t i n
every ag e th e intellectual s defin e a s suc h whateve r knowledg e bes t
138 MA
serves th e particula r interest s connecte d wit h their socia l rolean d

that i s whateve r portio n o f th e knowledg e o f th e ag e serve s t o
maintain thei r monopol y of their role . (Konrad an d Szelenyi , 1979 ,
p. 14 )
One can assume that they are inspired not onl y by Marx and Engels
but b y Bakuni n an d Machajsk i a s well. The anti-intellectualis m of
anarchism had alread y denounced bot h Marxis m an d the elitism of
Utopian socialists. Bakuni n hel d th e reign of intellectuals to be "th e
most aristocratic , despotic , arrogan t an d elitis t o f al l regimes "
(Bakunin, 1972 , p . 319) . For him , th e dominatio n o f the educate d
class ove r th e uneducate d woul d reproduc e al l thei r othe r differ ences, the demolitio n o f which had bee n promised b y the educate d
vanguards a t th e outse t (Bakunin , 1953 , pp. 77-81) . Bakuni n eve n
foresaw th e reig n o f bureaucratic intelligentsi a as the fina l resul t of
the elitis m o f intellectua l ideology : th e state , then , become s th e
patrimony o f a bureaucrati c clas s (Bakunin , 1972 , p. 96) . Wacla u
Machajski turne d Bakuninia n anti-intellectualis m int o a universa l
conspiracy theory of intellectuals. H e maintained, tha t the workers
would no t hav e their workers ' government eve n after th e capitalist s
have disappeare d a s th e intelligentsi a woul d continu e t o rul e
through th e workers ' deputies.
The structura l similaritie s o f ideologies and counterideologie s of
intellectuals i n divers e tradition s o f socialis m an d sociolog y con firm th e thesi s tha t simila r ideologica l need s ca n generat e simila r
ideologies. Ma x Webe r allude d t o thi s possibilit y whe n h e ac counted fo r th e developmen t o f simila r ideologie s o f th e welfar e
state i n a variety o f civilizational contexts (Weber , China, p. 143) .
Appendix E
Epistemology an d Methodolog y
Max Weber' s theory of concept formatio n take s Rickert' s an d thu s

Kant's entir e epistemolog y fo r granted . Therefore , Webe r a s a
sociologist di d not tak e i t upon himsel f to enlarg e on epistemological problem s an d neithe r shoul d we . But a brie f clarificator y not e
seems t o b e i n orde r i n vie w o f recen t critica l comment s tha t ar e
directed a t Weber' s allege d epistemologica l confusion . Thes e criti cisms are the result of a conflation or collapsing of the epistemolog ical an d th e methodologica l level s o f concep t formation . Kantia n
epistemology provide s a n answe r t o th e proble m o f the incompre hensibility o f reality , whil e neo-Kantia n an d especiall y Weberia n
methodologies dea l wit h a worl d tha t i s comprehensibl e ye t infi nitely rich. By ascribing a categorical form , such as existence, to th e
raw contents o f our sensations , the Kantia n epistemolog y turns th e
latter int o "facts. " A n aggregat e o f thes e fact s constitute s wha t
Weber alternatel y call s "empirical " o r "concrete " o r "objective "
reality. S o whe n Webe r claim s tha t socia l science s ar e the science s
of objective reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschafi), h e is referring to a n
already categoricall y formed reality . Accordin g to Ricker t the tas k
of methodology i s to reduce the infinite multiplicity of the empirica l
reality throug h method s o f individuali/atio n (i n historica l o r cul tural sciences) and generalization (i n exact sciences) . To these meth ods o f reductio n Webe r adde d th e metho d o f constructin g idea l
types. Therefore , i t i s an erro r t o charg e tha t Webe r though t tha t
ideal type s mus t b e compare d wit h th e prephenomena l realit y i n
order t o mak e the latter comprehensibl e (Oakes, 1987) . Rather, the
task o f methodolog y i s to discove r method s b y whic h a scientifi c
reduction o f a comprehensible ye t infinitely comple x realit y ca n be
139
140 MA
achieved (A . Sadri , 1987) . Webe r neve r implied tha t "th e element s

which are used to construct the concepts of both the natural and the
social science s ar e lifte d directl y fro m th e 'infinit e flux ' o f realit y
without conceptualization," a s Hekman has charged. Th e Weberian
remark t o whic h thi s critiqu e refer s deal s onl y wit h infinit e multi plicity of empirical data not th e "flux" o f formless sensations (Hekman, 1983 , p . 23) . Late r Hekma n explicitl y identifies th e "infinit e
multiplicity" o f reality , whic h i s th e conditio n o f th e empirica l
reality, wit h th e "chaos " of reality , whic h apparentl y refer s t o th e
flux o f th e prephenomena l realit y (Hekman , 1983 , p. 30) .
Weber believed that th e generalizing methods of exact science s as
well a s th e individualizin g an d idea l typ e generatin g method s o f
social, historical , and cultura l sciences all aim at achieving the sam e
goal: reductio n o f the infinit e multiplicit y of empirical reality . I t is
the commonalit y o f goa l amon g th e sciences , not th e similarit y of
the method s o f achievin g it , tha t constitute s th e basi s o f Weber' s
claim to scientifi c status o f the social , historical , an d cultura l disci plines. I n contras t t o thi s vie w th e mono-methodologica l approac h
of positivist s sought t o establis h th e scientificit y o f socia l science s
by concedin g tha t th e onl y possible manne r o f masterin g th e mas s
of empirica l data is to follo w th e generalizin g method s o f the exac t
sciences whic h promised t o banis h th e trivia l an d th e uniqu e whil e
saving th e "essential, " tha t i s the "general. "
Unlike the proponents of "subjectivism" o r "intuitionism," Weber
did not link a critique of positivism to relinquishing all claims to the
scientific status . Rather , h e sought to legitimiz e the interest histori ans evinc e in the "unique " and th e historicall y o r culturall y signifi cant aspect s o f the world . While arguing fo r th e applicabilit y o f the
methods o f exac t science s to th e spher e o f social , historical , an d
cultural sciences , Webe r als o maintaine d tha t th e us e o f specifi c
methods fo r achievin g a n interpretiv e understandin g o f th e mean ingful phenomen a i s indispensabl e fo r thes e sciences . Webe r wa s
able t o uphol d thi s complex positio n becaus e h e did not dee m tha t
the real m o f meaningfu l phenomena exclude s tha t o f natura l phe nomena. Indeed , i n on e specifi c sens e th e real m o f the social , cul tural, an d historica l science s is "the same " as th e real m o f nature :
both ca n b e reduce d t o an d capture d b y generalizin g method s o f
natural sciences . Fo r Webe r meaningfu l phenomena ar e a t leas t a s
susceptible to generalizatio n an d predictio n a s are the natura l phe -
Appendix E: Epistemology an d Methodology 14
nomena. Webe r conceive d o f the real m o f meaningful phenomen a

not i n opposition t o bu t a s a more complex region o f the worl d of
natural objects . Hi s interpretiv e method s d o no t clai m t o b e th e
only mean s o f studyin g th e real m o f meaningfu l phenomena .
Rather, they promise to provide a more sensitive and efficient se t of
apparatus fo r explorin g an d exploitin g its complexities an d possi bilities. I n othe r words , i t i s th e differenc e o f "interest " no t th e
dissimilarity o f the subjec t matter tha t necessitate s the deploymen t
of differen t method s fo r th e stud y o f natura l an d sociohistorica l
phenomena.
Notes
Chapter 1
1. A n excellen t expositio n o f thi s ha s bee n provide d i n th e wor k o f
Thomas Burger , Max Weber's Theory o f Concept Formation.
2. "Science s ar e foun d an d thei r method s ar e progressivel y develope d
only whe n substantive problem s are discovere d an d solved . Purely episte mological o r methodologica l reflection s hav e neve r ye t mad e a decisiv e
contribution t o this project.. . . Methodology can only be self-reflection o n
the mean s whic h hav e proven t o b e valuabl e i n actua l research . Explici t
self-reflection o f this sort is no more a condition for fruitfu l researc h tha n is
knowledge o f anatom y a conditio n fo r th e abilit y t o wal k "correctly. " I n
fact, whoever tried t o walk by applying his knowledge of anatomy would be
in dange r o f stumbling . The schola r wh o attempt s t o bas e th e aim s o f his
research o n a foundatio n o f extrinsi c methodologica l consideration s i s in
danger o f falling int o difficultie s o f the sam e sort " (Gu y Oakes, Introduc tion t o Roscher an d Knies, pp . 14-15) .
3. Quote d b y Mommsen , "Ma x Weber' s Politica l Sociolog y an d hi s
Philosophy o f Worl d History, " p . 25.
4. Webe r declares : "Actio n i n th e sens e of subjectivel y understandable
orientation o f behavior exist s only as the behavio r o f one o r mor e individual human beings " (Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I , p. 13) . In the case
of othe r commonl y used concepts, suc h a s state, etc., Weber suggests that :
"for th e subjectiv e interpretatio n o f actio n i n sociologica l wor k thes e
collectivities mus t be treated a s solely th e resultants and modes of organization o f th e particular acts o f individual persons, sinc e thes e alon e ca n b e
treated a s agent s i n th e cours e o f subjectivel y understandabl e action "
(Weber, Economy I , p . 13) .
5. Thi s wa s don e i n greate r detai l i n Critique o f Stammler (1971) , a
more refine d versio n of which appears i n the firs t chapte r o f his Economy
and Society.
143
144 NOTE
6. Ma x Weber , Economy an d Society, firs t chapter .

7. I n Weber' s origina l text "der tatsdchlich . . . gemeinte sinn" or actua l
existing meanin g i s oppose d t o "[der] i n einem begriffilch konstruierten
reinen typus . . . subjektiv gemeinte Sinn" or th e subjectiv e meaning of the
theoretically conceive d pure type.
8. Thi s i s evidence tha t Ma x Weber , followin g Rickert, presupposed a
neo-Kantian epistemolog y according t o whic h a flo w o f unforme d sensa tions a s i s immediatel y presen t i n huma n consciousnes s (le t alon e whe n
reproduced i n the min d o f an observer) does no t qualif y a s "knowledge" of
concrete facts . Suc h sensation s onc e categorically forme d (e.g. , as existing
things, chronologica l successions , o r a s objectivel y possibl e trends , etc. )
constitute the set of knowable facts. Once scientifically treated, i.e., selected
through generalizing or individualizin g methods o f abstraction, thes e facts
come t o constitut e th e basi s o f concept s tha t ar e th e buildin g block s o f a
scientific understanding . Withou t categorie s an d withou t abstraction , i t i s
impossible to tal k of knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge. To "capture"
the ra w content s o f the socia l actor' s intentionality , therefore , woul d b e a
fruitless task . Fo r a critiqu e o f mor e recen t commentarie s o n th e abov e
controversy, see Appendix B. For a n excellen t elaboration o f Weber's epistemology se e Thomas Berger' s Ma x Weber's Theory o f Concept Formation.
9. B y contrast , idea l types , a s w e wil l explai n later , d o no t requir e
"verification" i n th e sens e in whic h hypotheses ar e verifie d i n th e natura l
sciences.
10. Alfre d Schutz' s efforts t o unravel the constitution of the meaning fo r
the solitary or interacting individual, are admittedly inconsequential for the
social sciences , which are b y definitio n intereste d i n "indirect socia l obser vation" (Schultz , 1967 , pp. 221 , 223, 226, 229 , 242) . In turnin g away fro m
the question s o f concret e subjectivit y o f individuals , Webe r seem s to hav e
anticipated Gadame r (Truth an d Method, pp . 39 , 166 , 171, 236-240) an d th e
later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, pp . 107 , 116-132), who als o
chose t o focu s o n th e communal , intersubjective , and ultimatel y practica l
aspects o f interpretatio n rathe r tha n refinin g an d purifyin g th e concret e
subjectivity i n isolation fro m it s cultural an d traditiona l surroundings .
11. "Meaning " ma y b e o f tw o kinds . Th e ter m ma y refe r firs t t o th e
actual existing meanin g i n the give n concrete cas e o f a particular actor , or
to th e averag e or approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a given plurality of
actors; o r secondl y t o th e theoreticall y conceive d pure type o f subjective
meaning attribute d t o th e hypothetica l acto r o r actor s i n a give n typ e of
action. (Weber , Economy I , p . 4)
12. Se e the quotatio n a t th e beginnin g o f pag e 7 .
13. Firs t ther e i s the "teleological, " "rationalistic" reconstructio n o f th e
hypothetical cours e o f human action . Thi s i s used i n economic an d socio -
Notes 14
logical theory . Th e historica l individuals , condense d int o concept s tha t

single ou t an d emphasiz e some o f thei r significan t aspects , constitut e th e
second importan t variet y o f idea l type s (historica l idea l types) . I t i s ou r
contention (a s in the case o f the concep t o f rationality) that Weber was well
aware of the difference s i n the differen t concept s he referred to b y the sam e
name. This is not a case of methodological confusio n on Wpber's part, but ,
at worst , a lac k o f clarification , du e t o carelessness , tha t ha s create d s o
much controversy in the impor t o f the concept s of ideal type or rationality .
It must b e o f some value for thos e scholars wh o tend t o overemphasiz e th e
distinction betwee n historical an d sociologica l idea l type s to conside r tha t
for Webe r these two occurred i n the same genius. "Social action is for u s the
behavior o f individuals , either historicall y observe d o r theoreticall y possi ble o r probable , behavio r relate d t o th e actua l o r anticipate d potentia l
behavior o f othe r individuals " (Weber , Logos, p. 160) .
14. Se e Appendi x B for furthe r discussio n o f thi s point .
15. Pau l F . Lazarsfel d i n hi s revie w of th e voluminou s result s o f socia l
psychological survey s that wer e published unde r th e titl e "Th e America n
Soldier, A n Expositor y Review " demonstrate s thi s wit h singula r lucidity .
He firs t trick s th e reade r int o agreein g tha t a se t o f conclusion s derive d
from th e aforementioned surveys are self-evident and tha t thei r rediscovery
would b e a wastefu l an d futil e practice . The n h e reveal s tha t th e actua l
results wer e diametrically opposed t o thes e ostensibl y obvious statements ,
adding that thes e opposite conclusion s would have also appeare d "obvious"
had the y bee n state d first . H e concludes , "Obviousl y somethin g i s wron g
with th e entir e argumen t o f 'obviousness.'"
16. Heidegge r an d Gadame r brough t thi s aspec t o f Wester n socia l
philosophy, whic h was onl y implici t i n Weber , t o ful l fruition .
17. Ye t Weber argue d fo r "ethica l neutrality" in social sciences . This fo r
him simpl y meant tha t th e valu e judgments tha t i n certai n scientifi c projects tur n u p a s th e en d resul t o f a n ostensibl y objectiv e researc h canno t
possibly follo w fro m th e impute d scientifi c premises . Webe r maintaine d
that suc h valuations mus t appea r autonomously , an d no t disguise d a s the
final verdict of scienceat the beginnin g rather than a t the end of research .
Values may then be put in suspended animation while the empirical investigation proceed s (Weber , Meaning).
18. I n the rationalistic parlance of Descartes an d Kant , "common sense "
is close to o r a synony m o f "vulgar thinking. " Vico , wh o ha s rightl y been
recognized a s th e firs t challenge r o f th e Cartesia n "monomethodologica l
approach" to al l science s an d th e foundin g father o f verstehen sociology ,
approached th e questio n fro m a differen t angle . H e appeale d t o commo n
sense a s a communall y based judgmen t (Vico , Th e Ne w Science, pp . 142 ,
350) whose goal wa s to revea l what is "important" and "right," not t o see k
146 NOTE
after th e universall y valid truth . Celebratin g Vico' s appreciatio n o f com mon sense , Gadamer criticize d Kant fo r onc e more relegatin g it to a purely
subjective (and reflective ) judgment o f taste (Gadamer, pp . 19-39) . Criteri a
for subjectiv e adequacy o f sociological idea l types evince a Vicoea n appre ciation fo r th e commo n sense.
19. Habermas' s critica l remarks concernin g the relativisti c tendencies of
Weber presuppos e a mor e comprehensiv e an d inclusiv e conceptio n o f
social sciences and collapse the Weberian distinction between dogmatic an d
social science s (Habermas , Legitimation Crisis, p . 110) ; 1979 , pp . 178 185); 1981 , The Theory , pp. 200-204) . Fo r a critical appraisa l o f Haberma s
in thi s connectio n se e Hekman , 1983 , pp . 138-145) . Le o Straus s i s also
weary o f th e relativisti c implication s o f Weber' s though t (Strauss , 1953 ,
pp. 45-70) . Indeed , Webe r woul d agre e with hi s neo-pre-Aristotelian (Ha bermas, 1973 , 4 1 ff.) and neo-Aristotelia n critic s tha t th e socia l scientis t
can. i s entitled to , an d mus t pas s valu e judgments o n issue s concerning his
own a s wel l a s alie n civilizations . He would , however , disagre e tha t th e
social scientists in question must do so as a social scientist o r in the name of
science.
20. I n Schutz' s vie w onl y th e stud y o f th e historica l pas t pose s th e
problem o f lac k o f acces s t o th e "commo n cor e o f knowledge " share d b y
the predecessors . B y presupposing th e homogeneit y o f the "contemporar y
civilization" for which he offers n o justification, Schutz refuse s t o recogniz e
the proble m o f cross-cultura l interpretation . Thi s neglec t i s evident i n th e
following passage :
My predecessor lived in an environment radically different no t onl y from
my ow n bu t fro m th e environmen t which I ascrib e t o m y contemporar ies. Whe n I apprehen d a fello w ma n o r a contemporary , I ca n alway s
assume the presenc e of a common core of knowledge. The idea l types for
the We - an d They-relationship s themselve s presuppos e thi s kerne l o f
shared experience . Tha t highl y anonymou s idea l type , "m y contempo rary," shares by definition wit h me in that equally anonymous ideal type,
"contemporary civilization." Naturally this is lacking to m y predecessor.
The sam e experience would seem to hi m quit e differen t i n the context o f
the cultur e of hi s time . (Schutz, 1967 , p. 210)
It is , o f course , b y n o mean s self-eviden t tha t fo r th e contemporar y occi dental th e "commo n cor e o f knowledge " share d b y medieva l Europea n
burgers would be more accessibl e than that shared b y contemporary India n
yogis, Siberia n shamans , o r Japanes e Ze n masters .
21. Value-relevan t interests are constitutive of both inter- and intracultura l
studies. Eve n withi n a cultur e th e idea l type s kee p losin g thei r illustrativ e
functions owin g to th e ebb s an d flow s o f historical interests . Therefore, th e
social sciences are condemned t o "eternal youth" (Weber, Objectivity, p . 104) .
Notes 14
22. Webe r continues:

This knowledg e ma y functio n positivel y t o suppl y a n illustration , indi vidualized an d specific , i n th e formatio n o f the concep t o f feudalis m o r
negatively, to delimit certai n concept s wit h which w e operate in the stud y
of European cultura l histor y from the quite different cultura l trait s of the
Incas and Aztecs ; this latter function enable s us to mak e a clearer geneti c
comparison o f th e historica l uniquenes s o f Europea n cultura l develop ment. (Weber , Mayer, p . 156 )
23. Thoma s Burge r (p. 43 ) remains unimpresse d with Rickert's solutio n

concerning th e inclusio n o f secondar y data , tha t is , thos e fact s tha t ar e
apparently unrelated to the interest of the historian. Berger rightly observes
that mer e "tactfulness" an d "taste" can hardl y govern a scientific selection
of th e secondar y facts . B y broadenin g th e concep t o f historica l interest ,
Weber opene d ne w avenue s towar d th e resolutio n o f thi s methodologica l
problem.
24. "Th e typ e of social science in which we are interested i s an empirical
science o f concret e realit y (Wirklichkeitswissenschafi). Ou r ai m i s th e
understanding o f th e characteristi c uniquenes s o f th e realit y i n whic h w e
move" (Weberr , Objectivity, p . 72) .
25. "[Th e us e o f historica l idea l types ] gives ris e t o n o methodologica l
doubts s o long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical developmental
constructs and history ar e to b e sharply distinguished fro m each other , and
that th e construct here is no more than th e means fo r explicitly and validly
imputing an historical event to its real causes while eliminating those whic h
on th e basi s o f ou r presen t knowledg e see m impossible " (Weber , Objectivity, p . 102) .
26. "Indeed , th e partly brilliant attempts which have been made hithert o
to interpre t economi c phenomen a psychologically , sho w i n an y cas e tha t
the procedur e doe s no t begi n wit h the analysi s o f psychologica l qualities ,
moving then to the analysis of social institutions, but that , o n the contrary ,
insight int o th e psychologica l precondition s an d consequence s o f institu tions presuppose s a precis e knowledg e o f th e latte r an d th e scientifi c
analysis o f their structure " (Weber , Objectivity, p . 88) .
27. Thi s doe s no t exclud e th e us e o f idea l type s fo r taxonomica l an d
conceptual constitutiv e purpose s i n order to offe r a preliminary definition
of th e objec t o f investigatio n (Weber , Stammler, p. 123) .
28. Th e ancien t philosophica l zeal for subsumin g the particular s unde r
the universa l le d t o th e rankin g o f analogica l reasonin g a s inferio r t o
inductive generalization an d deductiv e inferences. The infatuatio n o f Car tesian an d positivis t scientists with the discovery of eternal law s also led to
a tota l depreciatio n o f th e analogica l method . Th e champion s o f th e
methodological autonom y o f huma n sciences , however , explore d th e un -
148 NOTE
popular, nonorthodox logica l an d methodological avenue s such as Vicoean

"imaginative universals " (Vico , 1965) , Weberia n idea l type s (Weber ,
Protestant, p . 47) , an d Wittgensteinea n operationalism . Th e affinit y o f
ideal type s to analogies , therefore , i s characteristic rathe r tha n unique . I n
other context s Webe r suggest s a wide r us e o f th e historica l comparativ e
studies wher e stud y o f analogou s event s take s precedenc e ove r isolatin g
general aspect s o f th e event s i n questio n (Weber , Mayer, p . 130) .
29. Acceptin g unfalsifiabl e statements i n scientifi c procedure s appear s
to blu r th e Popperia n demarcatio n lin e betwee n scienc e an d metaphysics .
However, i n thi s w e hav e onl y followe d hi s ow n example . I n hi s earl y
deliberations o n th e philosoph y o f science , Kar l Poppe r elaborate d an d
consistently adhered t o the principle of falsifiability a s the only criterion for
the distinguishin g demarcatio n lin e o f falsifiability . The twiligh t zon e o f
"historical interpretation " thu s allow s for scientifi c unfalsifiability. Poppe r
argues that t o fight the extensive multiplicity of empirical reality the science
of histor y must incorporat e th e value-relevan t interes t o f the historia n a s a
guide for selection and reductio n of the data, or in his words: "Undoubtedly
there ca n b e n o histor y withou t a poin t o f view; like th e natura l sciences ,
history mus t b e selectiv e unless it i s to b e choke d b y a floo d o f poo r an d
unrelated material " (Popper , 1961 , p. 150) . But, h e goes on to explain, suc h
selective approache s mus t no t b e mistake n fo r theories , a mistak e h e
attributes to "historocists." The followin g i s entirely compatible wit h Web er's vie w a s represente d i n Chapte r 1 :
As a rul e thes e historica l "approaches " o r "point s o f view " cannot b e
tested. They cannot b e refuted, an d apparen t confirmations are therefore
of no value , even if they are a s numerous a s the star s in the sky . We shall
call suc h a selectiv e poin t o f vie w o r focu s o f historica l interest , i f i t
cannot be formulated as a testable hypothesis, a historical interpretation.
(Popper, 1961 , p . 151 )
30. Considerin g al l of these instances on e wonder s how Webe r could b e

accused o f no t distinguishin g betwee n the meanin g a s experience d b y th e
social actor , an d tha t attribute d t o th e socia l actor s b y th e observe r
(Schutz, 1967 , p . 8) . Th e idea l typ e i s clearl y "ours, " an d w e us e i t a s a
measuring devic e fo r gaugin g th e uniquenes s o f th e concret e reality .
31. Nonetheless , the proponent s o f Althuserian structuralis m ar e horri fied b y Weber's introductio n o f cognitive interests into the objective proces s
of causation : "Weber' s metaphysica l an d fundamentall y religiou s concep tion o f th e relatio n o f ma n t o th e worl d o f natur e therefor e entail s a
systematic epistemologica l relativism , a relativis m define d a t th e leve l of
cultural value s rather tha n individua l subjectivity, but a relativism nonetheless" (Hindess , 1977 , p . 33) . Th e structuralis t critiqu e o f Weber' s "episte -
Notes 14
mological relativism " i s reminiscen t o f th e neo-Aristotelia n critiqu e o f

Weber's "cultural relativism" : the y both sh y away from definin g the criteri a
for eithe r cultura l o r epistemologica l universa l an d objectiv e truth .
32. Georg e Lukacs has consequently adopted Weber' s category of objective possibilit y to demonstrat e tha t th e emergenc e o f the proletaria n clas s
consciousness an d ultimatel y socialist transformatio n i s not a n automati c
or necessar y developmen t bu t a n "objectiv e possibility " (Lukacs , 1971 ,
pp. 204-205 ; Arato , 1979 , pp. 87-114) .
33. I n his critique o f Edward Mayer , Weber used the interesting allegory
of th e throwin g o f regula r a s oppose d t o loade d dic e t o demonstrat e th e
difference betwee n "chance causation " an d "adequate causation." Her e th e
same exampl e i s furthe r develope d t o virtuall y embrac e al l th e concept s
that hav e bee n discussed i n thi s section . I n regula r dice , the chance s o f all
six side s to com e uppermos t ar e equal . I n thi s cas e w e deal wit h "chanc e
causality," th e subjec t matte r o f calculu s o f probabilities . However , i f th e
dice ar e "loaded," there is a favorable chance tha t a certain sid e will come
out uppermost . Onl y her e ca n w e introduc e th e concep t o f "adequat e
causation" and the "objective probability" of the coming out of the side that
is favored by the loading of the dice. Now to tak e Weber's analogy on e step
further, suppos e a die is loaded s o that it favors, by a chance o f 99 to 1 , th e
side tha t read s six . Als o suppos e that thi s di e i s tossed, bu t jus t befor e i t
stopped rollin g a n earthquak e cause d a sligh t jerk o f the table . Th e deter mination o f th e causa l significanc e o f th e earthquak e depend s o n th e
outcome. If the outcom e is still a six, then we shall argue that although th e
last movemen t wa s par t o f th e causa l chai n tha t necessitate d th e fina l
outcome, its causal effec t ca n be treated a s negligible. This is so because the
coming uppermos t o f the numbe r wa s "adequately caused: " the outcom e
was "objectivel y possible " fro m th e beginnin g a s i t wa s favore d b y th e
process o f loading . Th e fina l "accident, " that i s th e movemen t cause d b y
the earthquake , therefore , could, for al l practical purposes , be replaced by
any movemen t cause d b y othe r externa l factors , o r i t coul d eve n b e alto gether eliminate d withou t any changes i n the outcome . O n the othe r hand ,
if in this case the side that reads an y other number should com e uppermost ,
we conclud e tha t sinc e th e outcom e wa s no t favore d b y th e objectivel y
possible circumstances (i.e. , the wa y in which the di e was loaded) th e fina l
"accident" must b e treated a s causally important .
34. Hi s two famous essays , "Social Psychology o f the Worl d Religions "
and "Th e Religiou s Rejection s of the Worl d an d Thei r Directions, " clearl y
attest t o this . Especially , se e Weber, Rejections, p . 357 ; Social, p . 281 .
35. Thi s poin t wil l b e discusse d i n detai l i n Chapte r 3 .
36. Thi s poin t wil l b e develope d furthe r i n Chapte r 2 .
150 NOTE
Chapter 2
1. I n othe r words , Weber' s sociolog y o f religio n an d hi s sociolog y o f
intellectuals a t onc e vindicated an d transcende d Marx' s a s wel l a s most o f
the Marxis t theorie s o n th e subject . However , i t i s feasibl e t o envisio n
Weber a s a theorist wh o attempte d t o debun k Marxism , bu t thi s could b e
done onl y if the following conditions are satisfied : (a ) I t is maintained tha t
Marx's sociolog y of religion is exhaustive, in which case amending it would
be to challeng e it s comprehensiveness; (b) A n attitud e i s adopted whereb y
one deductivel y attributes, an d the n reduces , all ideas t o th e constellatio n
of interests , i n whic h case th e possibilit y of othe r mode s o f mutua l influ ence an d determinatio n i s excluded a priori.
2. Thi s assertion , however , i s followe d b y a n explanator y not e tha t
sheds som e ligh t o n the relationship s between magic an d prophecy , Weber
was a t pain s t o emphasiz e tha t prophet s (especiall y emissar y prophets )
rejected th e magica l practice s i n favor o f a complete rationalization o f th e
religious sphere . Th e questio n migh t arise : Ho w ca n ther e b e s o muc h
hostility betwee n magician s an d prophet s i f on e i s th e precurso r o f th e
other? O f course , th e contras t i s no t s o drasti c because , despit e thei r
rejection o f magic , th e prophet s sough t t o legitimiz e themselve s t o th e
masses throug h subtl e claim s t o magica l charisma . "Wit h them , however ,
this has merel y been a means o f securing recognitio n an d follower s for th e
exemplary significance, the mission, or the savior quality o f their personali ties" (Weber, Rejections, p . 327) .
3. Thes e term s hav e bee n define d i n Chapte r 1 .
4. I t woul d be wrong t o conclude that thi s discussio n i s an endorsemen t
of Mannheim's concep t o f "free floating intellectuals." Mannheim takes th e
"possibility" o f transcendin g clas s interest s fro m Webe r bu t transform s i t
into a n exclusive privilege of the educated classes . O f course, th e apparen t
naivete o f hi s theor y i s no t th e resul t o f a n "error " explicabl e i n th e
framework o f th e "autonomous " sphere o f academi c contemplation . I t i s
the direc t effec t o f Mannheim' s ideologica l zea l t o whic h I hav e alread y
alluded.
5. I d o no t wis h t o ente r th e discussio n o f rationality i n thi s book , a s
Stephen Kalberg , Donal d Levin , an d Mahmou d Sadr i see m t o hav e dis cussed th e matte r sufficiently . Se e the bibliograph y fo r th e relevan t works
of thes e authors .
6. Al l these assertions res t o n Weber' s basi c ontologica l assumption s t o
which w e shall return .
7. Thi s poin t belong s i n thi s sectio n onl y i f w e concu r tha t neithe r
skepticism nor passionat e denia l of religion bu t onl y a categorical indiffer ence towar d i t ca n b e considere d entirel y irreligious.
Notes 15
8. I t would , however, be one-sided t o conside r thi s statement i n isolatio n

from Weber' s theor y o f idea s an d interest s becaus e hi s theor y i s a s incon ducive t o materialisti c determinis m a s i t i s to an y for m o f emanationism .
"Intellectualism," Weber argued, "is only one sourc e o f religious ideas. " Le t
us no t forge t tha t fo r Webe r such intellectualism itsel f presuppose s a se t of
material conditions , namel y "leisure." H e note d tha t "n o ne w religion " ha s
ever resulted fro m shee r contemplative religious search b y intellectual circles
"or fro m thei r chatter " (Weber, Economy I , p. 517 ; India, p . 236).
Chapter 3
1. Se e th e vertica l differentiatio n i n th e cros s tabulatio n propose d i n
Chapter 4 .
2. Hanna h Arend t describe s th e predispositio n o f intellectual s wh o
gravitated t o fascis m in the following passage : "They read no t Darwi n bu t
the Marqui s de Sade. I f they believed at all in universal laws, they certainly
did not particularl y car e to conform to them" (Arendt, 1968 , p, 28) . Lesze k
Kolakowski attempted t o explai n th e popularity o f radical antirationalis m
among moder n intellectual s i n term s o f thei r collectiv e psychology : "W e
may explai n conversion s o f thi s type , i n psychoanalyti c terms , a s a ven geance o f i d upo n th e excessivel y developed eg o or , i n socia l terms , a s a
result o f the alienatio n tha t almos t ever y intellectual experience s an d tha t
forces hi m t o loo k fo r communit y othe r tha n th e elitis t Republique de s
Lettres, giving him the sense of confidence, spiritual security, and authorit y
that i s lacking i n intellectua l work " (Kolakowski , 1972 , p. 11) .
3. Th e similarit y between this concept an d tha t foun d amon g th e Israe lites i s mostl y apparent . Indeed , th e absenc e o f powerfu l king s an d thei r
state bureaucrac y i n ancien t Israe l migh t hav e preclude d th e notion s o f
charity an d th e curs e o f th e poor . Bu t luckil y for th e poor , th e Israelite s
shared the idea of collective punishment. If the cries of the poor wer e heard
by Yahweh , the divin e wrat h woul d envelo p no t onl y th e princ e an d hi s
functionaries bu t als o th e whol e nation .
4. Th e usag e o f this ter m i s due t o Professo r Arthu r Vidich .
Chapter 4
1. Th e word "intellectual" date s bac k t o the Dreyfu s affai r i n France. I t
was firs t use d derisivel y bu t the n embrace d b y th e defender s o f Dreyfus ,
including Zol a an d Durkheim . Thi s wor d has retained th e connotations o f
a high-minded an d somewhat oppositiona l attitud e tha t were implied i n its
152 NOTE
original usage . Th e wor d "intelligentsia, " it s Roma n wor d cel l notwith standing, i s o f Russia n o r possibl y Polis h coinage . I t referre d t o th e vas t
numbers o f th e educate d clas s tha t graduall y appeare d t o distanc e them selves fro m bot h th e stat e bureaucracie s an d th e nobility . Ou r usage i s
meant t o captur e som e o f th e origina l flavo r o f oppositio n an d high mindedness i n th e cas e o f "intellectuals " an d th e emphasi s o n th e vas t
numbers an d th e importanc e o f educatio n i n th e cas e o f "intelligentsia. "
2. Fo r a discussio n o f thi s topi c see Appendix D .
Appendix A
1. Namel y th e post-Kantia n Germa n intuitionists .
2. A s particular beings , we are "interested" in "our" past . I t i s a uniqu e
history tha t w e see k t o mak e sens e ou t of . Fo r occidental s o f th e lat e
twentieth century , it is interesting to stud y the Frenc h Revolutio n an d th e
two world wars (even when we study revolution or war in general), whereas ,
except i n certai n cases , we would no t b e interested in a particula r natura l
object o r process. Fo r instance, we might study the general laws that gover n
the branchin g o f th e bough s o f a certai n specie s o f tree , bu t w e woul d
scarcely b e interested in the histor y behind th e branchin g ou t o f a particu lar tree and the extent to which accidental happenings hav e interfered with
the genera l la w establishe d fo r th e species .
Our interes t in our presen t is also directed b y our situatio n a s particular
beings. Th e questio n o f theodicy only amon g th e intellectuals , and onl y in
their intellectualizin g moments, pertain s t o th e meanin g o f th e universe .
Among th e masse s an d othe r socia l strat a an d classes , however , the prob lem o f evi l ha s alway s been relevan t onl y insofa r a s th e fat e o f particula r
individuals o r group s o f peopl e ar e concerned .
The rootednes s o f this i n the huma n conditio n i s made obviou s b y E . E .
Evans Pritchard wh o notes that witchcraft performs a similar function in the
life o f th e Azande . Withou t neglectin g th e immediat e cause s o f deat h o r
misfortune, th e Azand e ten d t o "explain " it b y witchcraft. "In speakin g t o
Azande abou t witchcraf t an d i n observin g their reaction s t o situation s o f
misfortune i t wa s obvious tha t the y di d no t attemp t t o accoun t fo r th e
existence o f phenomena , o r eve n th e actio n o f phenomena , b y mystica l
causation alone . Wha t the y explaine d b y witchcraf t wer e th e particula r
conditions i n a chai n o f causatio n whic h relate d a n individua l t o natura l
happenings in such a way that he sustained injury" (Pritchard, 1980 , p. 21).
Witchcraft fo r the Azande provides the missing link between the two apparently unrelated chain s o f causation tha t acte d independentl y and coincide d
in such a way that brough t misfortun e upon a particular individual. "Witch-
Notes 15
craft explain s wh y event s ar e harmfu l t o ma n an d no t ho w the y happen .

Azande perceive s how the y happen just a s we do" (Pritchard , 1980 , p . 24) .
Appendix B
1. O f course , knowin g that Webe r oppose d thi s positio n i n numerou s
passages o f his methodological essays, Oakes qualifies this statement b y the
phrase: "There is a sense in which," and a footnote where he quotes Webe r
to th e effec t tha t thi s reproductio n doe s no t requir e an y unanalyzabl e
sympathetic feelin g o n behal f o f th e observer . No r doe s i t involv e a n
"immediate" reproductio n o f the experienc e o f the "native. " But thi s stil l
leaves us in the dark. W e still do not kno w in "what sense" (and where ) does
Weber sugges t tha t a n idea l typ e mus t coincid e wit h th e "actua l existin g
meaning" i n the min d o f the "native. "
2. "Ther e is a difference i n kind betwee n the type of naive understanding
of othe r peopl e w e exercise in everyda y life an d th e typ e o f understandin g
we us e i n th e socia l sciences . I t i s our tas k t o fin d wha t distinguishe s tw o
sets of categories from each other: (1) those categories i n terms of which the
man i n the natura l standpoin t understand s th e socia l worl d an d which , in
fact, ar e given to the social sciences as material with which to begin, an d (2)
those categorie s whic h th e socia l science s themselve s us e t o classif y thi s
already performe d material" (Schutz , 1967 , p. 140) .
3. "Th e postulate , therefore , that I can observe the subjective experience
of anothe r perso n precisel y as he does i s absurd. Fo r i t presupposes that I
myself hav e live d throug h al l th e consciou s state s an d intentiona l Act s
wherein thi s experienc e ha s bee n constituted " (Schutz , 1967 , p. 99) .
4. "I t migh t see m that thes e conclusions woul d lead t o th e denia l of the
possibility of an interpretive sociology and even more to the denial that on e
can eve r understand anothe r person' s experience . But thi s i s by n o mean s
the case . W e are assertin g neithe r tha t you r live d experience s remai n i n
principle inaccessibl e t o m e nor tha t the y ar e meaningles s t o me . Rather ,
the point is that th e meaning I give to your experiences cannot b e precisely
the sam e a s the meanin g yo u giv e t o the m whe n yo u procee d t o interpre t
them" (Schutz, 1967 , p. 99) .
5. What , then , i s the specifi c attitud e o f social scienc e t o it s object , th e
social world ? Fundamentally , i t i s the sam e a s th e attitud e o f the indirec t
social observe r toward hi s contemporaries (Schutz , 1967 , p . 99).
6. "Thi s very 'possibility o f being questioned ' (Befragbarkeii) i s a specifi c
characteristic o f the object of direct social observation" (Schutz , 1967 , p. 156) .
7. "Her e ther e i s n o distinctio n betwee n th e meaning-contex t o f th e
observer and tha t o f the actor . The reason is simple: if there is a real perso n
154 NOTE
corresponding t o th e observer' s postulate d idea l type , the n h e wil l b y

definition inten d wha t th e observe r ha s i n mind . Howeveran d thi s is the
basic postulat e o f socia l science the motive s ascribe d t o th e idea l typ e
must b e bot h causall y adequat e an d adequat e o n th e leve l o f meaning "
(Schutz, 1967 , p . 229) .
8. N o matte r ho w man y peopl e ar e subsume d unde r th e idea l type , i t
corresponds t o n o on e in particular . I t i s just thi s fact tha t justified Weber
in callin g i t "ideal."
Appendix D
1. Th e socialis t ideologie s o f intellectual s hav e rarel y enunciate d thei r
legitimizing claim s wit h simila r clarity . Th e exceptio n t o thi s rul e i s Lu kacs's declaratio n tha t
the blin d powe r o f the force s a t wor k wil l onl y advanc e "automatically "
to thei r goa l o f self-annihilation as long a s that goa l i s not withi n reac h
. . . the blind forces really will hurtle blindly towards the abyss, and only
the consciou s wil l o f th e proletaria t wil l b e abl e t o sav e mankin d fro m
impending catastrophe . (Lukacs , 1971 , p. 70 )
Bibliography
Arato, Andrew . Th e Young Lukacs an d th e Origins o f Western Marxism.

New York : Seabury Press , 1979 .
Arendt, Hannah . Totalitarianism. Ne w York : Harcourt, Brac e an d Worl d
Inc., 1968 .
Aristotle. Th e Nicomachean Ethics. Translate d b y J . A . K . Thompson .
New York : Penguin Press , 1979 .
Aristotle. Th e Politics. Translate d b y T . A . Sinclair . Ne w York : Pengui n
Books.
Aron, Raymond. "The Logi c of the Social Sciences. " In Max Weber, edited
by Dennis Wrong . Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Princeto n Universit y Press,
1970.
Aron, Raymond . Opium o f Intellectuals. Translate d b y Teranc e Marling .
New York : W. W . Horto n & Co. , 1962 .
Bakunin, Michael . "Th e Internationa l an d Kar l Marx. " I n Bakunin an d
Anarchy, edited b y Dolgoff . New York : Vintage Books, 1972.
Bakunin, Michael. "Scienc e an d Authority."I n Th e Political Philosophy o f
Bakunin, edited b y G . P . Maximoff. London : Fre e Pres s o f Glencoe,
No. 4 , 1953 .
Beetham, David . Ma x Weber an d th e Theory o f Modern Politics. Cam bridge: Polit y Press , 1985 .
Bender, Thomas. Ne w York Intellect. Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s University
Press, 1987 .
Bendix, Reinhard . Ma x Weber, An Intellectual Portrait. Berkeley : University o f Californi a Press , 1977 .
Burger, Thomas . Ma x Weber's Theory o f Concept Formation: History,
Laws an d Ideal Types. Durham : Duk e Universit y Press, 1987 .
Bernard, Thomas . Th e Consensus-Conflict Debate. Ne w York: Columbi a
University Press , 1983 .
155
156 BIBLIOGRAPH
Birnbaum, Norman . "Conflictin g Interpretatio n o f the Ris e o f Capitalism :

Marx an d Weber. " British Journal o f Sociology, 1953 .
Bloch, Ernst . Ma n o n Hi s Own. Ne w York : Herde r an d Herder , 1970 .
Bloch, Ernst . O n Karl Marx. Ne w York : Herder an d Herder , 1971 .
Bloom, Allan . Interpretiv e essay. I n Th e Republic o f Plato. Translated b y
Allan Bloom . Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1968 .
Cohen, Jere , Hazelrigg , Lawrenc e E. , Pope , Whitney . "DeParsonizin g
Weber, A Critiqu e o f Parsons ' Interpretatio n o f Weber' s Sociology. "
American Sociological Review 4 0 (1975): 229-241 .
Comte, Auguste . "Pla n o n th e Scientifi c Orientatio n Necessar y for Reor ganizing Societies. " I n O n Intellectuals, edite d b y Phili p Rieff .
Garden City : Doubleday , 1969 , pp. 248-283 .
Coser, Lewi s A . Continuties i n th e Study o f Social Conflict. Ne w York :
Free Press , 1967 .
Coser, Lewi s A . Th e Functions o f Social Conflict. Ne w York : Fre e Press ,
1956.
Coser, Lewi s A . Me n O f Ideas. Ne w York : Free Press , 1965 .
Dahlmann, Dittmar . "Ma x Weber' s Relatio n t o Anarchis m an d Anar chists: Th e Cas e o f Erns t Toller . I n Ma x Weber an d Hi s Contemporaries, edite d by Wolfgan g Mommse n an d Jiirge n Osterhamm . Lon don: Germa n Historica l Institute, 1987 .
Dahrendorf, Ralf . Class and Class Conflict i n Industrial Society. Stanford :
Stanford Universit y Press, 1957 .
Dahrendorf, Ralf . "Towar d a Theory of Socia l Conflict. " Journal o f Conflict Resolution 11 : 170-183 .
Dahrendorf, Ralf . "Th e Socia l Functio n o f th e 'Fool ' i n th e Twentiet h
Century." I n O n Intellectuals, edite d b y Phili p Rieff . Garde n City :
Doubleday, 1969 , pp . 49-53 .
De Hausar , George , B. , ed . Th e Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait.
Glencoe: Fre e Press , 1960 .
Dijlas, Milovan . Th e Ne w Class, A n Analysis o f th e Communist System.
New York : Fredric h A . Praege r Publishers , 1957 .
Gadamer, Han s Georg . Truth and Method. Ne w York : Seabur y Press , 1975.
Gouldner, Alvin. Th e Future of Intellectuals an d th e Rise of th e New Class.
New York : Seabury Press , 1979 .
Gramsci, Antonio . "Intellectuals. " I n Prison Notebooks, edite d b y Quintin
Hoare an d Geoffre y Nowel l Smith. Ne w York: International Publish ers, 1978 .
Habermas, Jurgen . Communication an d th e Evolution o f Society. Trans lated b y Thoma s McCarty . Boston : Beaco n Press , 1979 .
Habermas, Jurgen . Legitimation Crisis. Translate d b y Thoma s McCarty .
Boston: Beaco n Press , 1975 .
Bibliography 15
Habermas, Jurgen . Th e Theory o f Communicative Action, Vol. I. Trans lated b y Thoma s McCarty . Boston : Beaco n Press , 1981 .
Habermas, Jurgen . Theory an d Practice. Translate d b y John Viertel . Boston: Beaco n Press , 1973 .
Hekman, Susan . Weber, Th e Ideal Type an d Contemporary Social Theory.
Notre Dame : Universit y of Notr e Dam e Press , 1983 .
Hindess, Barry . Philosophy an d Methodology i n Th e Social Sciences.
Atlantic Highlands , NJ : Humanitie s Press , 1977 .
Hofstadter, Richard . Anti-Intellectualism I n American Life. Ne w York :
Vintage Books , 1962 .
Honigsheim, Paul . O n Ma x Weber. Ne w York : Fre e Press , 1968 .
Jacoby, Russel . Th e Last Intellectuals. Ne w York : Noonda y Press , 1987 .
Kalberg, Stephan . "Ma x Weber' s Type s o f Rationality : Cornerstone s fo r
the Analysi s of Rationalization Proces s i n History. " American Journal o f Sociology, Vol . 85, No . 5 .
Kolakowski, Leszek . "Intellectual s Agains t Intellect. " Daedalus, Summe r
1972.
Kolakowski, Leszek . Toward a Marxist Humanism. Ne w York : Grove ,
1968.
Konrad, George , an d Szelenyi , Ivan. Intellectuals o n th e Road t o Class
Power. Translated b y Andrew Arato an d Richar d E . Alen. New York:
Helen an d Kur t Wolff , 1979 .
Lazarsfeld, Pau l F . "Th e America n Soldier , A n Expositor y Review. " Th e
Public Opinion Quarterly 13 , 3 (Fall, 1979) .
Lederer, Emil . State o f th e Masses. Ne w York : W . W . Norto n an d Com pany, 1940 .
Lenin, V . I . Religion. Ne w York : Internationa l Publishers , 1935.
Lenin, V . I . What i s to b e Done? Moscow : Progress , 1973 .
Levine, Donal d N . Th e Flight from Ambiguity, Essays i n Social an d
Cultural Theory. Chicago : Chicag o Universit y Press, 1985 .
Lukacs, George . History an d Class Consciousness. Translate d b y Rodn y
Livingstone. Cambridge : MI T Press , 1971 .
Luxemburg, Rosa . "Organizationa l Questio n o f Socia l Democracy. " I n
Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, edite d b y Mar y Alic e Waters . Ne w York:
Pathfinder, 1970 .
Macpherson, C . B . Th e Life an d Times o f Liberal Democracy. Ne w York:
Oxford Universit y Press, 1977 .
Madison, James , Hamilton , Alexander , an d Jay , John . Th e Federalist
Papers, edite d b y Clinton Rossita . Ne w York: New America n Librar ies, 1961 .
Mannheim, Karl . Diagnosis o f ou r Time: Wartime Essays o f a Sociologist.
London: Routledg e & Kega n Paul , 1943 .
158 BIBLIOGRAPH
Mannheim, Karl . Ideology an d Utopia: A n Introduction t o Sociology o f

Knowledge, Ne w York : Harcourt , Brac e an d Company , 1936.
Marx, Karl . "Toward th e Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction." I n Writings o f th e Young Marx o n Philosophy an d Society.
Garden City : Doubleday , Anchor , 1967 .
Mill, Joh n Stuart . O n Liberty. Ne w York : Penguin , 1986 .
Mommsen, Wolfgang . "Ma x Weber' s Politica l Sociolog y an d hi s Philo sophy o f Worl d History. " International Social Science Journal 1 7
(1965).
Oakes, Guy . Introduction to Roscher an d Knies: Th e Logical Problems o f
Historical Economics, by Ma x Weber . Ne w York : Free Press , 1975 .
Oakes, Guy . Introductio n to Critique o f Stammler, b y Ma x Weber . New
York: Fre e Press , 1977 .
Oakes, Guy. "Max Webe r and the Southwest German School : Remark s on
the Genesi s of the Concep t of the Historica l Individual." International
Journal o f Politics, Culture an d Society 1 , 1 , (1987).
Orwell, George . "Writer s an d Leviathan. " I n Th e Intellectuals, edite d by
George B . De Hausar . Glencoe : Free Press , 1960 , pp. 270-271 .
Poggioli, Renato . Th e Theory o f th e Avant-Garde. Cambridge : Harvar d
Parsons, Talcott . Introductio n t o Th e Theory o f Social an d Economic
Organization, b y Ma x Weber . Translate d b y Talcot t Parsons . Ne w
Parsons, Talcott . "Th e Intellectual : A Social Rol e Category. " I n O n Intellectuals, edited by Philip Rieff . Garde n City: Doubleday, 1969 , pp. 3 25.
Plato. Gorgias. Translated b y Walter Hamilton. New York: Penguin Books,
1971.
Plato. Th e Republic o f Plato. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic
Books, 1968 .
Plato. Statesman. Translate d b y J . B . Skemp . Ne w York : Bobbs-Merrill,
1957.
Popper, Karl . Th e Logic o f Scientific Discovery. Ne w York: Harpe r Torchbooks, 1968 .
Popper, Karl . Th e Poverty o f Historicism. Ne w York : Harper & Row, 1961.
Popper, Karl . Th e Open Society an d It s Enemies, Vol. 1, Th e Spell o f
Plato. Princeton : Princeto n Universit y Press, 1971 .
Popper, Karl . Th e Poverty o f Historicism. Ne w York: Harper Torchbooks ,
1961.
Pritchard, E . E . Evans . Witchcraft, Oracles, an d Magic Among th e
Azande, edite d b y Ev a Gillies . New York : Oxfor d Universit y Press ,
1980.
Bibliography 15
Rieff, Philip . O n Intellectuals. Garde n City : Doubleday, 1969 .

Ritzer, George . Sociology o f Multiple Paradigm Science. Boston : Ally n
and Bacon , 1975.
Sadri, Ahmad. "Max Webe r and the Southwes t German School: Remark s
on th e Genesi s o f th e Concep t o f th e Historica l Individual. "
International Journal o f Politics, Culture an d Society 1 , 1 (1987).
Sadri, Mahmoud . "Reconstruction o f Max Weber' s Notion of Rationality :
An Immanent Model. " Social Research 9, 3 (Autumn 1982) : 616-633.
Schumpeter, Joseph . Capitalism, Socialism an d Democracy. Ne w York:
Harper Colophon , 1975 .
Shils, Edward . "Intellectuals." In International Encyclopedia o f th e Social
Sciences, edite d by Davi d L . Sills , Vol . 7. New York : Macmillan an d
the Fre e Press , 1968 .
Shils, Edward . "The Intellectual s an d th e Powers : Som e Perspective s for
Comparative Analysis. " In O n Intellectuals, edite d b y Phili p Rieff .
Garden City : Doubleday , 1969 , pp. 25-49 .
Strauss, Leo . Natural Right an d History. Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o
Press, 1953.
Stuart, Samuel . "Englis h Intellectual s an d Politic s i n th e 1930s. " I n O n
Intellectuals, edite d b y Phili p Rieff . Garde n City : Doubleday , 1969,
pp. 196-248 .
Sumner, Willia m Graham . "Th e Ne w Socia l Issue. " I n Th e Challenge o f
Facts an d Other Essays. Ne w Haven : Yale Universit y Press, 1914.
Sumner, Willia m Graham . What Social Classes Owe to Each Other. Ne w
York: Harpe r an d Brothers , 1920.
Tocqueville, Alexi s de . Democracy i n America. Translate d b y Georg e
Lawrence. Garde n City: Anchor Books , Doubleday, 1969 .
Turner, Bryan. Weber an d Islam. London : Routledg e & Kegan Paul, 1974.
Van Leeuwen , Arend . Critique o f Heaven. Ne w York : Scribner' s Sons ,
1972.
Vico, Giambattista . Th e Ne w Science, edite d b y T . G . Berge r an d M . H .
Fisch. Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press, 1965.
Wald, Ala n M . Th e Ne w York Intellectuals. Chape l Hill : Universit y o f
North Carolin a Press , 1987 .
Ward, Leste r Frank . Dynamic Sociology. Ne w York : D . Appleton , 1926 .
Ward, Leste r Frank . Outline o f Sociology. London : Macmillan , 1844 .
Ward, Leste r Frank . "Politica l Ethic s o f Herber t Spencer. " Annals o f
American Academy 1894 , IV: pp. 582-619 .
Ward, Leste r Frank . Pure Sociology. London : Macmillan , 1903 .
Weber, Max. "Sociology an d Biology. " In Max Weber, Selections i n Translation, edited b y W . G . Runciman . Ne w York: Cambridge University
Press, 1980 .
160 BIBLIOGRAPH
Weber, Max . "Bureaucracy. " I n From Ma x Weber, edite d b y H . H . Gert h

and C . Wrigh t Mills . New York : Oxford Universit y Press, 1958 .
Weber, Max . "Th e Sociolog y o f Charismati c Authority. " I n From Ma x
Weber, edited b y H. H . Gerth an d C . Wright Mills . New York: Oxford
Weber, Max . Religion o f China, edite d b y H . H . Gerth . Ne w York : Fre e
Press, 1957 .
Weber, Max . "Class , Status, Party. " I n From Ma x Weber, edited b y H. H .
Gerth an d C . Wright Mills . New York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1958 .
Weber, Max . "Th e Meanin g of Discipline." In From Max Weber, edited by
H. H . Gert h and C . Wright Mills. New York: Oxford Universit y Press,
1958.
Weber, Max . Economy an d Society, vol . I , edite d b y G . Rot h an d
C. Wittich . Berkeley : University of Californi a Press , 1978 .
Weber, Max . Economy an d Society, vol . II , edite d b y G . Rot h an d
C. Wittich . Berkeley : University of Californi a Press , 1978 .
Weber, Max . "Freedo m of the Universities. "In Ma x Weber on Universities,
edited b y Edwar d Shils . Chicago : Universit y of Chicag o Press , 1973 .
Weber, Max . General Economic History. Ne w Brunswick : Transactio n
Books, 1981 .
Weber, Max . "Capitalis m an d Rura l Societ y i n Germany. " I n From Ma x
Weber, edited by H. H . Gert h and C . Wright Mills . New York: Oxford
Weber, Max . Th e Religion of India, edited b y H. H . Gerth an d D . Martin dale. Ne w York : Fre e Press , 1958 .
Weber, Max . Ancient Judaism, edite d b y H. H . Gert h an d D . Martindale .
New York : Free Press , 1952 .
Weber, Max . "Nationa l Characte r an d th e Junkers." I n From Ma x Weber,
edited b y H . H . Gert h an d C . Wrigh t Mills . Ne w York : Oxfor d
Weber, Max . "Knie s an d th e Proble m o f Irrationality. " I n Roscher an d
Knies. Ne w York : Fre e Press , 1975 .
Weber, Max . "Som e Categories o f Interpretive Sociology." Th e Sociological Quarterly 2 2 (Spring , 1981) .
Weber, Max . "Critical Studie s in th e Logi c o f th e Cultura l Sciences: A
Critique of Eduar d Meyer' s Methodologica l Views. " I n Th e Methodology o f Social Sciences, edite d b y Edwar d A . Shil s an d Henr y A .
Finch. Ne w York : Free Press , 1949 .
Weber, Max . "Th e Meanin g o f Ethical Neutrality. " In Th e Methodology o f
Social Sciences, edited b y Edward A . Shils an d Henr y A . Finch . Ne w
Weber, Max . "Objectivit y i n Socia l Science s an d Socia l Policy. " I n Th e
Bibliography 16
Methodology o f Social Sciences, edite d b y Edwar d A . Shil s an d

Henry A . Finch . Ne w York : Fre e Press , 1949 .
Weber, Max . "Politic s a s a Vocation. " I n From Ma x Weber, edite d b y
H. H . Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press,
1958.
Weber, Max . "Economi c Polic y an d th e Nationa l Interes t i n Imperia l
Germany." I n Selections i n Translation, edite d b y W . G . Runciman .
New York : Cambridg e Universit y Press, 1980 .
Weber, Max. Th e Protestant Ethic and th e Spirit o f Capitalism. Ne w York:
Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1930 .
Weber, Max. "Religiou s Rejection s of the World and Their Directions. " In
From Ma x Weber, edited by H . H . Gert h an d C . Wrigh t Mills. New
York: Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1958.
Weber, Max . "Roscher' s Historica l Method. " I n Roscher an d Knies. New
Weber, Max. "Prospects fo r Democrac y in Tsarist Russia." In Max Weber,
Selections i n Translation, edite d b y W . G . Runciman . Ne w York :
Cambridge Universit y Press, 1980.
Weber, Max . "Scienc e a s a Vocation. " I n From Ma x Weber, edite d b y
H. H . Gerth and C . Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press,
1958.
Weber, Max . "The Protestan t Sect s and the Spirit of Capitalism." In From
Max Weber, edited b y H . H . Gert h an d C . Wrigh t Mills . Ne w York:
Oxford Universit y Press , 1958.
Weber, Max . "Th e Socia l Psycholog y of th e Worl d Religions. " In From
Max Weber, edited b y H . H . Gert h an d C . Wrigh t Mills. New York :
Oxford Universit y Press, 1958 .
Weber, Max . "Socialism. " I n Ma x Weber: Th e Interpretation o f Social
Reality, edite d b y J . E . T . Eldridge , Ne w York : Schocke n Books ,
1971.
Weber, Max . Critique o f Stammler. New York : Fre e Press , 1977 .
Winch, Peter . Th e Idea o f a Social Science. Atlanti c Highlands , NJ ;
Humanities Press , 1977 .
Wittgenstein, Ludwig . Philosophical Investigations. Translate d b y G . E . M .
Anscombe. Ne w York : Macmillan Publishin g Co., 1958.
Znaniecki, Florian. Th e Social Role of th e Man O f Knowledge. Ne w York :
Octagon Books , 1965.
Inde:
Adaptedness, 2 7
Adequacy, subjective . Se e
Meaning adequac y
Adequacy, causal . Se e Causation ,
adequate
Archimedes, poin t of , 56 , 57 , 10 8
Ashuka, King , 26 , 86
Automaticity o f social evolution ,
78, 112 , 136-38
Babylon, 19 , 47, 55 , 107-8
Bahgavad Gita , 99
Bakunin, Michael , 79 , 86 , 112 ,
122, 13 8
Bolshevik, 35 , 79
Brahman, 46 , 63 , 67
Bodhisattva, 5 4
Buddhism
egalitarianism of , 49 , 55
intellectualism of , 46 , 55 , 60 , 63 ,
123-24
mendicant order , 46 , 52-53, 55
Mahayana, 64 , 13 3
religion fo r th e masses , 47
religion o f masses , 46 , 6 6
spread t o Asia , 25 , 26
transformations of , 6 4
Zen, 64 , 13 4
Byzantine Empire , 48
Catholic church , 38 , 62
Causation
adequate, 24 , 26 , 53 , 83 S 130,
132, 14 9 n 1
chance, 14 9 n 1
historical, 23-24 , 26
Christianity; anti-intellectualis m
of, 61 , 6 2
carriers of , 52 , 53 , 57
opposition t o mas s religiosity ,
62
political ethics of , 95-96
Competition i n social action , 30-31
Comte, Auguste , 72 , 79 , 112 , 13 5
Conflict, sociolog y of . Se e Socia l
conflict
of valu e spheres , 82 , 83, 93 , 95,
98, 10 2
Confucianism, bureaucrati c
morality of , 10 0
religion o f civi c strata , 5 5
religion o f intellectuals , 6 4
state cult , 46-47 , 52 , 55, 62
theory o f education, 8 6
Counterfactual trends , 24 , 108
Cross-cultural theory , 106- 8
Demagification, 54 , 65
Determination, reverse , 23 , 53
163
164
INDEX
Determinism
economic, 56
ideal, 2 4
materialist, 24 , 66 , 124
psychological, 6 6
Dharma, 51
Differential advantages , 3 1
Dionysos, worshi p of , 53 , 54
Disenchantment, 6 6
Dualism, doctrin e of , 68
Egypt, cultura l influence s of , 19 ,
55, 87 , 91-92, 107- 8
Elective affinity , 52 , 58 , 61 , 64 , 87 ,
101, 103 , 11 2
Ethical rationalists , cosmic , 23 , 95,
103
Ethical rationality , 98 ; see also
Substantive rationalit y
Ethics o f responsibility , 29 , 98 ,
100-103
Ethics o f ultimat e ends , 29 , 44, 98,
100, 101 , 12 3
Evolution, 27 , 39 , 78 , 7 9
Fellahin, 91, 11 9
Feuerbach, Ludwig , 40 , 46
Filial piety , 47, 64
False consciousness , 8 , 13 1
Greece, 5 3
Hellenism, 46
Henotheism, 5 0
Hinduism
and magic , 5 2
religion fo r th e masses , 47 , 48
religion o f the masses , 4 6
sacrifice o f th e intellec t in , 6 3
spread i n India , 19 , 48
Historical accidents , 23 , 25 , 26 ; see
also Causation , chance
Historical causation , 5 , 22, 26

Historical interest , 22 , 23 , 26
Historical materialism , 22 , 37 , 38,
39, 42; see also Determinism ,
materialist
Ideal type s
construction of , 11 , 2 2
falseness, 15 , 1 6
fictitiousness, 14-1 5
heuristic, 11 , 14 , 20
historical, 13-20 , 14 5 n 1
rational, 11 , 12-2 1
self-evidence of , 13 , 83, 8 8
subjective adequac y of , 16 , 17,
18, 8 3
teleological, 12 , 21, 14 4 n 1 145 n 1
verification of , 13 , 19-20 , 129 32
Individual, religiou s need s of , 44
Individualism
epistemological, 3
methodological, 2 2
occidental individuality , 73 , 88,
97
romantic, 3
Indra, 43 , 50
Infrastructure, 37 , 38
Interpretive sociology , 7 , 11 , 1 6
Intuitionism, 22 , 125 , 15 2 n 5
"Iron cage, " 91, 11 8
Islam, 47 , 52 , 53 , 123 , 133-3 4
Israel, 47 , 54 , 55
Jacobism, 9 3
Jainism, 38 , 46, 47, 48 , 93
Judaism
anti-intellectualism of , 61 , 6 2
autonomy fo r economi c an d
social factors , 6 2
carrier of , 5 2
Index 16
intellectuality of , 6 1 Mitra
plebeian character , 55 , 56 Monolatry
Karma, 6 8 Neo-kantians
Kismet, 13 4 14
Krishna, 54 , 99 Nirvana,
Kshatriya, 38 , 47, 5 1 Nominalism
Legitimation, 9 4 Objectiv
Lenin, V . I. , 35 , 36 , 40, 48 , 59 , 79 , 53
112, 120 , 13 7 "Orientosis,
Li (Confucianism) , 5 0 Osiris
Liberalism, 79 , 86 , 88 , 89-90, 92,
93, 9 4 Patrimonia
Literati, 47 , 55 , 62, 86 , 90 Persia
Lukacs, George , 36 , 74, 112 , Pharisai
149 n 1 , 15 4 n 5 Plato
Luxemburg, Rosa , 35 , 112 , 120 , 13
136, 13 7 Platoni
5
, 43 , 13 3
, 50
, 88 , 139 , 14 5 n 1 ,
6n1
45 , 55 , 64
, 5-6
e possibility, 23 , 26, 47,
, 69 , 73 , 91 , 92 , 14 9 n 1
" 74, 9 1
, 54
l bureaucracy , 39 , 85
, 47 , 65 , 107 , 121
c religiosity , 53
, 72 , 74 , 76 , 77 , 113 , 122 ,
6
c complex , 34 , 74
Polytheism
Machajski, Waclaw , 72 , 122 , 13 7 religious
, 66 , 103 , 133
Magic socia
l an d ontological , 29 , 50,
interests o f the priesthoo d in , 66
, 81, 88 , 98, 10 3
55 Powe
r politics , 95 . Se e also
rationalization of , 22 , 42, 45 , 52 , Realpolitik
63 Predestination
, 49 , 68
Mannheim, Karl , 34 , 72, 76 , 117 , Progress
,28
150 n 2 Proletariat
, 36 , 42 , 56 , 136 , 190
Marathon, Battl e of , 4 7 "Proletariod,
" 57
Marx, Karl , 33-37 , 40-43, 89 , 97, Prophec
y o f doom, 38 , 91, 93
150 n 1 Prophec
y o f good fortune , 38 , 62
Meaning Protestantism
,53
actual existing , 6-9 , 129 , 130 , Providenc
e vs . fate, 49-5 5
131 Purita
n ethos , 51
adequacy, 16 , 83
average, 8 Quran
, 13 4
subjective, 126 , 130 , 13 2
Methodenstreit, 3 Rationalis
m
Mesopotamia, cultura l influence s economic
, 53 , 87
of, 39 , 73 , 83 , 85 , 9 1 optimistic
, 55
Mill, John Stuart , 76 , 79, 91, 92, pragmatic
, 84
93, 9 5 religious
, 63
166
Rationality, cognate s o f
irrationality, 33 , 53 , 59 , 60, 67,
68, 78 , 102 , 13 5
overrationalize, 8 2
rationalism, 63 , 65-84
rationalizing, 2 6
underrationalize, 67 , 82
unrationalizable, 29 , 66 , 10 3
Rationality, type s of
ethical, 53 , 54 , 55 , 57 , 98
formal, 60,96 , 107 , 115
instrumental, 54 , 10 1
practical, 29 , 59 , 68 , 73 , 96 ,
98
substantive, 5 9
theoretical, 59 , 60 , 61 , 63 , 71 ,
72, 81 , 109 ; see also
Rationalization
Rationalization
essence o f intellectuals , 7 1
ethical, 14 , 42, 44 , 55 , 57 , 65 ,
98
of ideas , 109 , 11 8
intellectual, 6 1
of magic , 60 , 63 , 64 ; see also
Magic
paradox of , 65-68
substantive, 64 , 68, 71, 72, 81,
107, 13 5
theoretical, 38 , 61; see also
Rationality
Realpolitik, 10 1
Reductionism, 3 6
Reflexivity, 34 , 3 6
Reification
of idea l types , 1 1
of reason , 67 , 11 5
Reinterpretation o f ideas, 39 , 41,
65, 67 , 73 , 10 9
Religious needs , 41, 42, 46
Rickert, 139 , 14 4 n 1 , 14 7 n 1
INDEX
Rita (Hinduism) , 50
Roman Empire , 5 3
Sacrifice o f the intellect , 60 , 63,
72, 11 8
Schutz, Alfred , 131 , 132 , 14 4 n 1 ,
146 n 1
Shivaism, 46, 63
Social conflict (conflic t sociology) ,
26, 30 , 3 1
Social Darwinism , 26 , 27, 28 , 79
Social determinatio n o f
consciousness, 35 ; see also
Determinism
Social relationships , 10 , 31
Social selection , 5 , 26 , 30 , 31 , 10 0
Socialism, 73-74 , 78 , 84, 87-88,
91,93
Sociology o f knowledge , 16 , 33,
34, 36 , 37 , 52 , 53 , 58 , 7 0
Strauss, Leo , 77 , 14 6 n 1
Summer, Willia m Graham , 112 ,
136, 13 7
Tantrism, 46 , 6 3
Taoism
religion o f intellectuals , 6 4
religion o f th e masses , 46 ,
64
theory o f education , 8 6
Telic, 136 , 137 , 138
Theodicy, 31 , 44, 45 , 55 , 65 , 68,
82, 15 2 n 5
"Unintended consequences, " 31 ,
65, 101 , 10 2
Usury, 3 8
Value judgment, 2 8
Value neutrality , 2 8
Index 16
Value relevan t interests, 18 , 54 , 22, Ward
106, 108 , 14 6 n 1 , 14 8 n 1 13
Varuna, 43, 5 0 Welfar
Verstehen ,7 , 125 , 131 , 14 5 n 1
Vishnuism, 63 Yahweh
7
, Leste r Frank , 72 , 79, 112 ,
6
e state , 39 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 138
, 43 , 61 , 151

Sadri-1992-Max Weber&#39;s Sociology of Intellectuals

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Sadri-1992-Max Weber&#39;s Sociology of Intellectuals

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Max Weber' s Sociolog y of Intellectual s

This page intentionally left blank

New Yor k Oxfor

Oxford Universit y Pres s

Copyright 199 2 b y Oxfor d Universit y Press , Inc .

This page intentionally left blank

Ahmad Sadr i begin s with the observatio n tha t neithe r intellectual s

intellectual transcendence ; on e tha t lead s t o th e creatio n o f ne w

carriers o r propagator s o f th e so-calle d worl d religions , the y woul d

Guided by the categories developed by Weber in his studies of world

It i s t o overcom e suc h problem s tha t Sadr i open s an d expand s

worldly bureaucrats , researchers , abstrac t theoriststha t migh t no t

historical an d geocultura l "valu e relevant interests " of Western civili zation.

Yet whil e recognizin g tha t Weber' s an d hi s ow n concept s ar e

tion t o ventur e forth i n suc h an enterprise , reveals his capacity fo r

Sumner an d Luxembur g hol d t o a belie f i n th e automaticit y o f

1. Methodolog y o f Socia l Sciences , 3

2. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Religio n as a Sociolog y

3. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Politics as a Sociolog y o f

Weber's Politica l Agenda : Democracy , Bureaucracy ,

Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Intellectual s

This page intentionally left blank

X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

was obliviou s t o thi s tension , no r t o regar d hi s methodolog y a s a

Methodology of Social Sciences 5

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

grand socia l an d historical problems without using the hypostatized

This statemen t an d th e one s tha t follow, 4 betra y a n extrem e

Step One: Doing Away with "Actual Existing Meaning"

Methodology of Social Sciences 1

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

driving forc e o f hi s action . Thu s i n suc h case s eve n subjectivel y

Here Webe r is raising th e proble m o f "false consciousness"whic h

Methodology of Social Sciences 9

Thus, the ideal types used in economics an d sociolog y shoul d no t

X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

"Social relationship " i s not base d o n intersubjectiv e meeting s of

Thus, th e actua l psychi c inne r state s o f th e participant s i n socia l

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

to deprive him of his earned good s "there i s a certain possibility that

Step Three: Interpretive Sociology Based on Ideal Types

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

To understand ho w a war is conducted, i t is necessary t o imagin e a n

It i s eviden t tha t th e "rationalistic " characte r o f thi s analysi s i s

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

The intuitive "self-evidence" of any subjectively adequate idea l type

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

rationalization i s not a n independent force but a maxim in the minds

2. Ideal types stylize th e concrete reality, yet their distortions are

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

It i s als o indispensabl e fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e "sociolog y o f

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

cording to our habitua l mode s of thought an d feeling , it s componen t

An idea l type , therefore , i s subjectivel y adequat e a s soo n a s i t i s

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

The strengt h o f Weber' s respons e t o bot h thes e problem s lie s i n

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

He sough t a n answe r t o th e followin g question (an d thi s wa s his

This, however, does no t mea n tha t idea l types must b e "validated"

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

concrete reality." 24 The sam e i s true fo r th e historica l idea l types. 25

Therefore, th e logica l paralle l o f idea l typica l analysi s i s neithe r

Methodology o f Social Sciences 2

Sadri-1992-Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals

Sadri-1992-Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals