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DOCUMENTATION PAOE
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Major Kenneth C. Keating
June 1981
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SUMMARY
In this paper, the author discusses the Soviet system of camouflage
While the Russian word maskirovka, which is usually trans-
measures.
lated as camouflage,
much more is encompassed in what the author calls wthe Soviet system of
camouflagec than those measures normally associated with the term camouIncluded are such things as skillful use of terrain, deception
flage.
operations,
The author
discusses these measures and also examines the technical means of camouflage, i.e. standard camouflage equipment, available to Soviet units.
Finally, the author draws some conclusions as to the implications for
the West of Soviet camouflage employment techniques.
!7
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Table of Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION ......................
NOTES .....................
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, I
I
ii
5
7
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'7
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CONCLUSION ..................
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8
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11
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13
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14
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16
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19
MASKIROVKA:
Introduction
Throughout the history of warfare,
been used to convince the enemy that one's forces were larger than they
actually were or that they were located in a different position than
suspected.
However,
into battle.
of course,
the motivating
fances increased, and cover and concealment could be used to one's advantage.
By the time of the Second World War,
'I
ground surveil-
as camouflage--represents
and
bw
.J
ool
I"
A number of books and numerous articles have been written by Soviet
authors concerning camouflage and its proper application.
Its purpose is
the effec-
1W
can be
has, an advantage
For example,
deception,
and improvisation.
Soviet natural instinct and affinity for the land as demonstrated during
World War 11, can aid in the employment of camouflage.
can enhance combat power cannot be disputed.
That camouflage
camouflage becomes
twice as effective.
In addition to the Soviet soldier's apparent instinct for applying
camouflage, his sLtict training Pnd the enforcement of camouflage disci-
pline within the Soviet armed forces enhance the effectiveness of his
camouflage techniques.
it
is not something
it one of the first
Further-
more, while the U.S. uses camouflage netting and local vegetation to conceal troops and locations,
Based
lI
Potential
k3
i-
camouflage "is
into error and force him to a conclusion which does not correspond
to the situation.
Furthermore,
tant means of achiving surprise, which is one of the basic conditions for
success in battle."
the combat operations and daily routine of the troops; a set of measures
designed to mislead the enemy with respect to the presence and disposition of troops, various military installations, their status, combat
5
readiness, and operations, as well as the plans of the command element."t
dP
or system of camouflage,
Strategic
camouflage "consists of measures for the covert preparation of a strategic oieration or campaign, as well as disorientation of the enemy as to
4..
t4
It
is accomplished
"It
activity, convic-
A.3
For example,
The
attacked the false positions leaving the real gun deployments untouched.
The defenders were then able to repulse the ensuing ground attack of the
II
Thus,
The
The platoon
commander sent small groups of soldiers away from the village and had
them return by a conspicuous route.
In the
17
Under present
there can be no
respite from the application of camouflage means i.e. they must have
continuity.
The final Soviet principle of camouflage is that of variety.
Variety means the exclusion of a pattern in implementing camouflage
measures,
"Iden-
enemy. #P19
Variety,
In doing so, he
the
20
The first assets that the Soviet commander uses are the local conditions.
In combat,
you see, literally all the troops must use terrain to camouflage their
actions,
21
use dense woods which contain uoncealing undergrowth for their defensive
positions and assembly areas.
The reverse
---
it
can be antici-
pated that Soviet forces will exploit periods of limited visibility i.e.
darkness,
fog, dense low cloud cover, and precipitation, when the effi-
The Soviets
conditions with radar and infrared devices and stress that conditions of
limited visibility must be supplemented by other camouflage techniques.
24
Camouflage di3cipline is strictly enforced and enhances the effectiveness of other camouflage measures.
25
"f"any man who left his shelter during the day was punished severely, if.
it
There is no reason to
S~I
8"
~BUW~&~tB~---------------------
__________________
--
ILI
clothing, camouflage netting, and camouflage paint.
Camouflage clothing
generally consists of coveralls for the snow-less periods of the year and
white camouflage suits intended for use against a background of snow.
The
sand.
field engineers,
forward observers,
parent for use on a background of green vegetation; and the MKT-S for
winter use.
The main components of the MKT set are the frame and the
tP
kilograms and can be erected in 5-10 minutes during daylight hours and
in a slightly longer period during the hours of darkness.
30
It consists of
etc.
31
f
,
IL
-
n--
- . - --
i..
Screen covers are those which completely cover the item and touch the
ground on all sides.
vehicles,
ravines,
bridges,
and so on.
trucks,
and
S~33
the like.
It
33
By constructing
i.e.
Further,
screens
Each of
brush,
fences and so
forth.
*
As is
a tool to aid in
painting is
Protective or dazzle
Protective painting is
of one
10
34
Simulating
by the creation of false targets or by blending into the terrain background those objects one wishes to conceal.
Concealment, however,
is
Also included in
37
i1J.
and so on In order to mislead the enemy and thereby create more favorable
IA
38
smoke agents,
electronic,
mili-
For example,
the combat
"sectors by
The simulated
guns were placed in emplacements and from a distance looked like the
real thing.
the engineers
simulated firing from the artillery pieces through the use of pyrotechnics.
artillery position.
p,1
work restoring the simulated guns.
over the course of the day causing the enemy to waste 117 bombs on this
one dumy target.
40
The Soviets believe so strongly in the utility of simulated activity that they have dedicated resources to the constcuction of collapsible
mock-ups of various pieces of equipment.
that one truck can transport 7-10 mock-ups of tanks to the front. 4 1
imated
To be totally effective,
$1
in
It is esti-
t
-
check on the effectiveness of their camouflage measures through obser"vation, photography, radar, and aerial reconnaissance. 4 2
12
II
Feints, simulation
This is necessary to
Con-
operations.
the firing and observation points of the enemy thereby denying him the
capability of conducting observation over the battlefield.
Decoying
smoke is employed in areas not occupied by friendly troops with the purpose
of deceiving the enemy with regard to the actual location, movement, and
44
intentions of friendly forces.
An example from World War II will help
to clarify the employment of each of these type smoke screens:
During the fall of 1943, Soviet troops encountered strong German
defenses on the Sozh River south of Smolensk and were forced to halt
their attack.
smoke screen was laid down on the bank occupied by the Germans.
A camou-
flaging smoke screen was used to cover the two main routes for the troop
movement to the edge of the water.
913
t
established at several fake sectors by means of smoke pots, including
the use of floating pots on the river's surface.
at the dummy crossing sites along with the simulation of the sounds of
troop movement to these sites.
Subsequently,
Under cover
of smoke, the 3oviets were able to reach the river almost without losses,
cross it,
45
While the Soviets continue to emphasize the uses of smoke in situations like the one described above,
on the modern battlefield.
to degrade the
and
46
both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. 47 Additionally, many Soviet armored
vehicles have the capability of producing smoke by injecting raw fuel
directly into the engine exhaust manifold, vaporizing it
48
through the exhaust outlet.
and forcing it
4 "Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the Soviets are serious about camouflage.
The wide variety of means included in their system of camouflage
Cl
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f~14
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-.
.----.
'
1 7
Nevertheless,
recent articles indicate that some officers do not believe that camou49
flage can achieve its stated goals.
They believe that the current
range of modem reconnaissance means can penetrate any camouflage employment and therefore is not worth using manpower and material resources in
its application.50
Hopefully,
L.
15
I
Footnotes
'Major-General Hellmuth Dorn, "Engineer and Technical Services,"
in The Red Army, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (Gloucester, Mass: Peter
Smith, 1968), p. 374.
2
in Ibid.,
p.
399.
"3 Department
(Washington,
4
General-Major V. G. Reznichanko,
Taktika
SSSR, 1966),
(Moskva:
Voyennoye
p. 148.
1978 ed.,
a. v.
"Maskirovka."
Ibid.
Itbid.
8
V. A.
Matsulenko,
1975),
1978 ed.,
p. 1.
a. v.
"Maskirovka."
,Ibid.
~121bd
2
Ibid.
Colonel V. Schedrov,
A. A. Beketov, A. P. Belekon,
:16
Beketov,
Voyennoye
izdte'
~17Ibd
Id,
p. 12.
of
STroops from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Voyennaya .!tsl 7 (July 1967);
S
61,
16
- - J
- ,- -
- -
-.
2-
--
--
--- -
- . -
--
-"-
19
20
Ibid.,
21
p.
p. 12.
17.
Lieutenant Colonel K.
Korolev,
24Beketov,
pp. 60-61.
Maskirovka Deystviy,
p.
61.
25
Ibid.,
26
Ibid.
27
p.
16.
p. 87.
28
Lieutenant Colonel F. I. Hyshak, Maskirovka Soldata, Oruzhiya,
i Boyevoy Tekniki (Moskva: Voyennoye tzdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony,
SSSR,
1954),
29
pp.
Ibid.
30Beketov,
31
32
14-16.
Maskirovka Deystviy,
Ibid.,
p.
35.
Ibid.,
p.
34.
Ibid.,
pp.
64-75.
34
Ibid.,
pp.
62-63.
35
Shchedrov,
36
Colonel B. Varenyshev,
10 (October 1979): 29.
38
39
I,
65.
35-36.
1978 ed.,
s. v. "'askirovka."
Ibid.
4
0.Lieutenant
Colonel A. Gorkin, "Maskirovka Pozitsii," Voyennyy
Beketov,
42
Shd17
104-105.
Maskirovka Deystviy,
Shchedrov,
32-34.
"Camouflaging Troops," p.
37
pp.
pp.
37-40.
"Camouflaging Troops," p.
68.
43
Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya,
44
*44Beketov,
,
1978 ed.,
a. v. "Maskirovka."
~~~45Geeaao
*
*
4 9 Colonel
-7
"Effektivenoet'
S51Ibid.
18
I1
[.
-
18
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPIY
Baketov, A. A., Belekon, A. P., and Chermashentsev, S. G. Maskirovka
Deystiviy Podrazdeleniy Sukhoputnykh Voysk.
(Camouflage Actions of
Ground Force Sub-units.) Moskva: Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva
Oborony, SSSR, 1976.
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Force Camouflage
and Concealment Techniques.
Washington, D.C., January 1978.
Department of the Army.
Russian Combat Methods in World War II.
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950.
Washing-
Peter Smith,
1968.
Ely, Colonel Louis B. "The Officer Corps." In The Red Army, pp. 395"402. Edited by B. H. Liddell-Hart. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter
Smith, 1968.
Gorkin, Lieutenant Colonel A. "Maskirovk-a Pozitaii."
("Position Camouflage")
104-107.
*
f .Se'rvice.
'
19
*
* Reznichenko, General-Major V. G. Taktika.
(Tactics.)
Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony, SSSR, 1966.
Moskva:
Voyennoye
S.
v. "Maskirovka."
Colonel B.
"Sredstva Haskirovki."
("Means of Camouflage.")
27-31.
I,
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20
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