G.R. No.

97936 May 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for
themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to
counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice. For
denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another , did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z.
MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place aforementioned, the said accused, one
armed with handgun, pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on
board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this
City, and did then and there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry
away his cash money amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat, worth
P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00;
one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363,600.00,
Philippine Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the occasion of the robbery and
pursuant to their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir)
superior strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said
offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to the
insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law.

Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others remained at
large.
Trial proceeded only as against the three.
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID
spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He
wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo
Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that the group of Balbino and
Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way home. He heeded the advice.
It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his main
residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook the Mercedes
Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car blocking them
and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his driver to the other side of
the seat. The second occupied the right side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back
sent and punched him. Simultaneously, the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and
announced a hold-up.
2

The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with diamonds,
worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat dominostyle ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth
P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00.
3

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car and alighted.
The worst came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. Dr.
Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours
later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained. Dr. Madrid survived.
He reported the incident to the Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his
complaint with the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS).
4

Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group headed by
Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame.
Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the
Investigation Department of the CIS.
7

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that even
before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was
the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid.
8

In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed
that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta
appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who was
requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where
Lucero was.
9

Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to
Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the
investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He observed
no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his
advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator started
asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio
Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to
Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero
replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C".
10

The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in Caloocan
City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the upholstery of a
customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked
until 5 p.m. that day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission of the crime.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his
house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was He was
blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers. Later, he identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed

of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The
doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated. The CIS agent refused and they
left the clinic.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he
only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times
before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C")
under duress. He denied
engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during
his actual custodial interrogation.
11

12

After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
13

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence; and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages
for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of
P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries and wristwatch he lost due
to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED.

14

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PROSECUTION
WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON
THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH
WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN
CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND
THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED INSPITE OF
THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE
PROSECUTION.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF
THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT ACQUITTING HIM
LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.

We find the appeal meritorious.

The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the complainant, and
(b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. We find that the evidence
proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant,
is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at the
police line-up four (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the
ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They
drove them around for three (3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr.
Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr. Madrid
claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. At another point, Dr.
Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors. In his affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he could
identify all three. Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr.
Madrid.
15

16

17

Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.

The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should
be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and
fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. We take pride in constitutionalizing this right
to counsel even while other countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We
have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
18

19

The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not
impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the
requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that
Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second
night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked
with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant
although his impression was that appellant understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the
custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a
friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person
under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence
that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the
next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these
agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty.
Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We
disagree.
20

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel
but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that
appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, we held that in
custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions
from the accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta
left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled
extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief
cannot convict.
21

Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense.

Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the
inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence to criminally inculpate
appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187536

August 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the Amended Decision dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as
conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
1

On 31 July 2000, an Information was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of murder
committed as follows:
3

That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of

treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and
other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his
head and body which caused his death.
4

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.
5

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in
Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also maintained
two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is
Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasions brother-in-law, while the
other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in
Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion.
6

The prosecutions evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spindrying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went
out of the back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to
said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor.
Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a
hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck
and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a coworker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the
kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasions body lying flat on
the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later
while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.
7

Elsa testified that she was in the masters bedroom on the second floor of the house when she heard
banging sounds and her husbands moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before
reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col
suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa
was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. Col then instructed her to open the vault
of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering
him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward.
Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara,
patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment
No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.
9

10

11

PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot, Balibago,
Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the incident. He,
together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation.
He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a
green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40
inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The police went to Angeles
University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was
still loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of
the incident. He prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.
12

13

Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the
preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion
and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.
14

The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following findings:
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds

2. Body in rigor mortis

3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right of the root of the
nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 x 6 cm.
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple line, 0.8cm
length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the manubrium sterni, not entering the
thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior median line, 3 cm
below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4 on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in
length, both extremities round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving all layers of the
scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 cm to the right of injury (18) 1 cm below, wound
involving the whole scalp.
20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the left temporal bone,
C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain tissue out of the
gaping wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions, with gaping, with
brain tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear extensions,
with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage.

15

Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal.

16

Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at
around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be
intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28
February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both
struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident. He
was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. During the cross-examination, Bokingco
admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.
17

18

Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned
on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where
he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who
pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well.
19

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, viz:
20

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Each accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos
(P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees, Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
21

In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL
is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence,
with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of
Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.
22

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and called the appellate courts attention on the omission
to rule on Bokingcos fate when it rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence
of other evidence, aside from Bokingcos admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant
case. Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against
his alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower courts that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence
attended the commission of the crime.
23

24

The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its
dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL
BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER
as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by

treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have
been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the
said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion
in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.
25

Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the
parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so desire.
Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their
arguments in the Appellants Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. The appellee likewise
manifested that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. The instant case was thus
submitted for deliberation.
26

27

28

In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether
the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2)
whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and
dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation
where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open
court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis
of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses
testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not
proven in the case. They belittle Bokingcos extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing.
The attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise
assailed by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely coincidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on
appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they
were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they
worked in the construction of the victims apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was
defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself
from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial courts findings that
evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the
absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While
the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim
at that time.
29

30

Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner of killing is
inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was
31

determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to show how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the
instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in
court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco
admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco
planned the attack.
32

33

34

It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Cols plan to kill Pasion.
Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
35

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be
deemed critical stages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from
the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation
will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of
pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an
uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge
in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have
a counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he was virtually denied
his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel
during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
36

37

38

The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that
there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been
proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no
evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking
into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and
confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate
the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution
to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the
penalty should be applied in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of
prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal
in its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore,

the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances. The
award of exemplary damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.
39

Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as coconspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingcos uncounselled testimony
that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other
evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsas statements during trial, such as the
presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the
alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support the
finding of conspiracy.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Cols conviction of murder by conspiracy by
mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victims wife, Elsa, also positively
declared that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She
was left alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG,
appellants acts are indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no
ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,
owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grueling examination. However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the
trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2) when
certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by
the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. The second
exception obtains in this case.
40

41

Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary
that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity
in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
42

43

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must
be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
44

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants fled together after killing
her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion
was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas house and allegedly ordering her to open the
pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you were in your
masters bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside.
xxxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that day when
you were in your masters bedroom?

A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was
directly leading to the back door or back portion of the building where the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this masters bedroom located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go out of the
kitchen because I was blocked.
Q: You were blocked by whom?
A: By Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near the back
door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our residence.
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object under my chin.
(Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from him.
(Around 3 meters)
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp weapon under your
chin?
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object under my
chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my chin and I felt the
sharpness of the object.
45

xxxx
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.

Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about it?
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.

46

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing
Pasion. At the most, Cols actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the
initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for
murder.
47

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to
leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime.
It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in
their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even
before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion
because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.1avvphi1
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible
against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against
them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to
the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
48

49

50

Bokingcos judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion
after the latter hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant,
unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten
(10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-46960-62 January 8, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle
vs.
WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG and SINFROSO
MASONG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gregorio R. Castillo for defendants-appellants Rojas, Villarin, Tundag and Masong.
Angel P. Purisima for defendant-appellant Solomon Totoy.

PER CURIAM:
The people of Digon in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur must still be talking every now and then of
the strange killings that shook their barrio on that tragic morning of May 23, 1973, when three girls
were slain, the youngest only five years old, under the most mystifying and shocking circumstances.
Even now the townsfolk are probably still asking, not without a tinge of superstitious fear, the nagging,
unanswered questions in this macabre case; Why? Why the blameless victims? And why the ruthless
manner of their slaying?
Consider the carnage and the girls who fell before the bloodied knife: Zenaida Nastae, 21 years old,
stabbed once to death, ears severed; Canda Carluman, 7 years old, stabbed once, hemorrhaging to
death; and Mona Carluman, 5 years old, stabbed twice to death, ears severed. 1 These were Nature's
creatures still on the threshold of their lives, and yet they were cut down in the innocence of their youth
without mercy and without reason.
The day following the massacre, prodded perhaps by a sense not only of duty but also of outrage, a
joint PC-police posse arrested seven persons in Barrio Talanusa, to wit: Teodoro Villarin, Saturnino Totoy,
Solomon Totoy, Gregorio Tundag, Sinfroso Masong, Mohamod Esmael and Balbino Estrera, all suspected
of the killings. Found in their possession and confiscated were two home-made shotguns, one .38
caliber homemade pistol with two live bullets, five hunting knives with scabbards, an undershirt with
Latin words arranged in a mystic design, a pair of trousers, four bottles of oil and two human ears.
Wilfredo Rojas, their alleged leader, was arrested later in Malangas, also of Zamboanga del Sur, and
turned over to the Margosatubig police.
2

After investigation, all the suspects were charged with the er of the above-named victims in three

separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. Later, on motion of the prosecution and
over the objection of the other defendmurdants, Esmael and Estrera were discharged so they could be
used as state witnesses. Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio
An extended trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them
and sentencing them to death. The lone exception was Saturnino Totoy, who, because of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, was meted out the lesser penalty of eight years and one day of
prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal . All the accused were
also held solidarily liable for the civil indemnity of P12,000.00, to be paid to the heirs of each of the
three victims. 10
5

The sentence of death has brought the case to this Court on automatic review. The records are
voluminous. The accused-appellants are raising factual and legal questions which opposing counsel
have discussed knowledgably and with commendable spirit and earnestness. We shall rule upon these
issues presently.
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at the trial, the following is
substantially what happened before and during the tragic incident, as the lower court saw it.
Sometime in January 1973 there arrived in Barrio Talanusa, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, a
stranger from Barrio Tuboran, Malangas, of the same province, bringing with him wordly wares and
presumably also his own concept of the spirit. His name was Wilfredo Rojas. During his stay, he
befriended the other accused, whom he taught to pray the "Our Father," the "Hail Mary," and the "I
Believe," in profession of the Christian faith as he understood it. He also sold them on credit what he
called "anting-anting" oil which, he claimed, would, when rubbed on their bodies, protect them from
injury. 11
Rojas returned to Talanusa in April of the same year, staying there for two weeks, and then again in
May, joining his new-found friends as usual in drinking wine and in reciting the prayers he had taught
them. 12 All this was leading to the tragic events that would transpire later that month by the sea in
Digon.
On that fateful morning of May 23, 1973, Rojas and his companions went to the church in Talanusa,
where they prayed, rubbed the amulet oil on their bodies, and girded themelves as if preparing for
battle. Rojas as was armed with a shotgun and a knife. Estrera also had a shotgun and a knife. Tundag
carried a revolver and a knife. Esmael, Masong, Solomon Totoy and Saturnino Totoy were armed with
knives. Villarin alone had no weapons. Rojas as told them they were going to Digon. 13
Together, these eight men proceeded to their destination, about a half-hour's walk away. Arriving at the
seashore where the massacre was soon to take place, they immediately surrounded the copra kiln to
prevent escape of the persons in the enclosure. In the "tapahan" were Zenaida Nastae, the eldest in the
group, and the Carluman sisters, Dalma, Canda, Mona and Lina, their ages ranging from ten years to
one. Rojas approached Zenaida and pretended to be looking for a person named Yoyong, continuing in
casual conversation when he received a negative answer. The girls did not appear to be apprehensive
as yet. Suddenly and without warning, Solomon Totoy fired at Dalma, but his gun jammed. Rojas then
pulled out his knife and swung at Zenaida, fatally wounding her in the left side of her body with one
stab. The second victim was Canda, whom Rojas stabbed (or shot?) in the head, resulting in her
bleeding to death. Rojas finally turned on the smallest girl in the group, the terrified Mona, whom he
stabbed twice in the stomach and in the back, also killing her. It is not certain when this actually
happened whether before or after they had died but to make the gory crimes even more bizzarre,
the ears of Zenaida and Mona were severed, by whom it is also not clear At any rate, after the butchery
was done, Rojas ordered the group to run, and - run they did together from the bloody sands. 14
They had not reckoned with Dalma who, with her sister Lina, had escaped the killing by fleeing to the
nearby sea and hanging on to a log until the men had left. 15 She would live to tell about the terrible
bloodbath she had seen and survived and to point to the accused as the brutal killers.

It was Dalma and the two state witnesses, Esmael and Estrera, who supplied the details in the above
narration. 16 Although there are a number of inconsistencies in their testimony, due probably to the
general confusion that characterized the incident, we accept the factual findings of the trial judge. The
trial judge has a superior competence in this regard. After all, as we remarked in an earlier case, 17 it is
the trial judge who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor, to mark
every nuance of tone or pause of hesitation or flush of face, and to determine, by the totality of his
impressions and the plausibility of their testimony, if what they are saying should be rejected or
believed.
The trial judge described Dalma as sincere and straight-forward, relating her story without hesitation
and sticking to it despite rigid cross-examination. The 18naivete of the ten-year old girl was especially
impressive and, together with her detailed remembrance of her harrowing experience, convinced the
court that she was telling the truth. As for state witnesses Esmael and Estrera, while it has been argued
that their testimony came from a polluted source, they being themselves co-conspirators with the
accused, it is noteworthy that their co-conspirator own respective accounts of the tragedy were
consistent with each other and tallied essentially with Dalma's narration. 19
Thus settling the factual issues, we now address ourselves to the several legal questions raised by the
accused-appellants in their assignment of errors. Specifically, they claim that the lower court erred in
finding that there was a conspiracy among them; in imposing upon them collectively the sentence of
death; and in considering against them the aggravating circumstances of cuadrilla dwelling and evident
premeditation. Additionally, Solomon Totoy challenges his supposed confession on the ground that it
was taken in violation of the Bill of Rights.
20

21

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. While it is desirable that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, like an express
understanding among the plotters affirming their commitment and defining their respective roles, it
may nevertheless be established at times by circumstantial evidence only. Thus, to repeat established
doctrine, where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose, conspiracy may be inferred
from their joint acts and design, without need of direct evidence of the criminal agreement. We have
held in many cases that the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, are circumstances that can show whether or not there was a conspiracy among them.
22

23

24

25

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the accused, in the morning of the killings, gathered at the
church in Talanusa and observed what might be compared to the ceremonies of warriors before a battle:
prayers for victory, anointing with oil against injury and death, and girding for combat. Surely, one
does not make such solemn preparations if the destination were a harmless party, as claimed by the
accused. The record shows that Rojas, the "commander" as he was called, simply told the group they
were going to Digon, but he did not have to spell out their mission. If only because of the formidable
arsenal they were carrying, the accused could not but have known that their object was more sinister
than merrymaking and drinking and feasting at a social gathering. There was certainly a more deadly
purpose, and all of them were aware of this.
26

27

It has been established that upon their arrival in the "tapahan" at Digon at about eleven o' clock of that
fatal morning, the accused immediately positioned themselves around the copra kiln enclosure,
surrounding it to prevent the five girls inside from leaving. One wonders why, if they were not acting
in concert, they at once so placed themselves as to form a ring around the structure in an veritable
siege of their defenseless and unsuspecting prey. Notably, every one took his spot as if by prearrangement, without need of the leader assigning to them their respective positions, in what some if
they had a sense of the occult would call a circle of death.
28

There is no evidence that when Solomon Totoy suddenly attempted to shoot Dalma, the rest of the
group was surprised, objected or demonstrated. Nobody stopped Rojas when he started killing the
astonished and terrified victims. There was no protest either when the ears of Zenaida and Mona were
cut off on Rojas's orders and wrapped in leaves for safekeeping. Everything was done apparently
29

according to a preconceived design. The group knew beforehand what was going to happen for, indeed,
they had planned it that way. In fact, as a final touch, after the massacre was over, Rojas ordered the
men to run, and obediently they did, fleeing the scene of the crimes at the same time and together.
30

It is the above acts of the accused, and not necessarily the testimony of Esmael and Estrera as coconspirators, that have established the conspiracy. These two state witnesses merely corroborated the
principal account given by the unhesitant Dalma, who had seen everything and told it in every
harrowing unforgettable detail.
The conspiracy having been established, it must now visit equal punishment on all the conspirators, on
the legal theory that the act of one is the act of all. This is settled juris prudence. There is no need to
harp on it. Indeed, even if it be argued that some did less than the others, it cannot be denied that their
very participation in the conspiracy added to its strength emboldened the actual killer, and contributed
to the success of the common design. In the eyes of the law, each conspirator is a co-principal and
equally guilty with the other members of the plot.
31

32

It is true that in People v. Nierra, this doctrine was relaxed in favor of the two accused who, although
adjudged as co-conspirators, were nonetheless held to be accomplices only and so entitled to a lesser
penalty than that imposed on the other defendants. In that case, however, the participation of one was
limited to introducing the killer to the other plotters and delivering the murder weapon to him and the
other merely acted as look-out while the crime was being committed. In the instant case, however,
every one of the accused acted in concert and was present at the scene of the crime while it was being
committed and as an equal partner of the rest performed his designated part to complete its execution.
33

There is no question that the killings were committed with treachery, to qualify the crimes to murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any crime against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make, In the instant case, the
offended parties were young defenseless girls confronted by eight full-grown men armed with guns and
knives who, to make a surprise attack, pretended to be looking for someone. Three bloody corpses, the
victim of their guile and their superior strength and number, attested to the success of their wicked
plot.
34

We reject the finding by the trial court of dwelling and band as separate aggravating circumstances.
Even the Solicitor General believes that dwelling should not have been considered because the
"tapahan" in which the murders were committed was a separate structure and did not form part of the
building where the victims were residing. As for band, it is unquestionable that cuadrilla is absorbed
by treachery since its employment was consciously adopted to insure the execution of the plot without
risk to the criminals, by reason of their number, let alone their strength, from any defense the offended
parties might make.
35

36

37

But evident premeditation is another matter and is correctly appreciated as an aggravating

circumstance that will increase the penalty. The rule is that under normal conditions, when the
conspiracy is directly established with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method,
time and means of executing the crimes, the existence of evident premeditation may be taken for
granted. In case of implied conspiracy, however, there must be proof as to how and when the plan
was hatched and the time that elapsed before it was carried out, so it can be determined if the accused
had sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment to dispassionately consider the commission
of the crime and its consequences. As this Court has repeatedly held, there should be a showing that
the accused had the opportunity for reflection, that he had the chance to weigh the pros and cons of
the deed he was planning, and that he nonetheless persisted in carrying out his criminal design.
38

39

40

From the facts found by the lower court, there was such a showing. It would appear that the plan to
murder the girls was conceived perhaps as early as during the meetings in April and May between Rojas
and the other members of the group, or at the very latest when they all assembled in the church at

Talanusa before they made the trip to Digon. Even as they were mouthing their prayers, they had
already made up their minds, or perhaps were only affirming a decision reached earlier, to kill the girls
in Digon. They knew then where they were going. They knew what they were going to do. Between the
time they left the church in Talanusa and until they arrived in Digon a good thirty minutes' walk over
a two-kilometer stretch during which they would have had nothing in mind but their mission they had
sufficient time to reflect on the acts they were about to commit, to consult their conscience on the
justification for the crime they were planning, and to desist, if they wanted to, from carrying out their
deadly purpose.
Coming now to Solomon Totoy's extrajudicial confession which he asks us to invalidate, all we have to
do is test it against the requirements of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution. This statement
was obtained from him on May 28, 1973. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. Manguera 41 and other
subsequent cases holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January
17, 1973, when the Constitution was ratified.
42

The said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right." The
record does not show that this requirement was observed. On the contrary, there merely appears in the
opening paragraph of the said confession the vague statement that:
The affiant has been informed of his rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and
under the state of Martial Law, and the nature of the investigation, and without violence, intimidation,
force nor reward the affiant declared as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate. The rights which Totoy was
entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. Being informed of his "rights under the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. He was not told he did
not have to answer if he did not feel like answering. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by
counsel. He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to, and neither was he
offered the services of counsel de oficio. Not knowing about his right to counsel, he could not have
waived it; and in any case, the waiver, to be valid, would have needed the assistance of counsel under
the ruling announced in People v. Galit, which is still the prevailing doctrine notwithstanding the
reservations of some members of this Court.
43

In fine, what we see here is a superficial observance of the requirements of the Bill of Rights through a
mere recitation by rote of the sacramental advise, which was inadequate to begin with. There was no
sincere effort or desire to apply the guarantees of Section 20 that could have protected the suspect
from the rash and uncounseled statements he subsequently made, knowing no better. That statement
is, of course, not admissible against him.
44

We end on this note of perplexity and regret. From the legal viewpoint, motive need not be established
as long as the defendants have been directly Identified, as in this case. Even so, the towns people of
Margosatubig, mindless of such legal niceties are probably still ammusing over the bloody attack on
that pleasant morning in May thirteen years ago when three young girls perished by the seashore in
Digon at the hands of eight intruders.
45

Was there perhaps a ritual killing on that tragic shore? There are those who suggest the hand of a
fanatic religious group animated by a deadly hostility to Muslims, including innocent girls and children
like the victims in this case. Others see hidden meanings in the Latin inscriptions and cryptic designs
on the shirt Rojas was wearing that fateful morning when, as one possessed, he slew and slew and slew.
The severed ears are especially intriguing and could perhaps reveal an esoteric purpose behind the
savage knives the killers wielded in cold blood against their innocent prey. Still the question probes and
lingers: Why? The answer lies in the warped mind of the stranger from Tuboran who came with his
46

47

magic amulet oil and taught his believing followers to pray with him -and kill.
All the accused-appellants are guilty of the three crimes of murder, qualified by treachery and
aggravated by evident premeditation. Rejected as aggravating circumstances are band, because it is
already absorbed by treachery; dwelling, because the "tapahan" was not part of the victims' residence;
and cruelty, because it has not been shown that the ears of the two victims were severed while they
were still alive.
WHEREFORE, as above modified, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the sentence of death is
imposed on all the ..accused-appellants for each of the murders. The civil indemnity, for which they are
solidarily liable, is increased to P30,000.00 for the heirs of each of the victims. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1)
the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and
(2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001
filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent
judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen
(14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining
the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733.
It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for
bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with
the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied
by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing
in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in
a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when

evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time
that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail
does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
1

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4)
the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian
leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all
the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles

contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.
2

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan
is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
4

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to
secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that
the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat
him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation
is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
5

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
6

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition"

as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if
the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing
its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine
the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that
is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
8

10

11

12

13

14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note
that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the " provisional arrest of
the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated
until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had
been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of
the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings,
the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility
of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing
that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
15

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of

extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the
trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197788

February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
1

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
2

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are
as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as
a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning,
he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion
Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic)
while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon
inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty
while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of
frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
Decision held:
4

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its
proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a
comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT
(sic).
7

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a
citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest,
he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers
Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash
helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he
was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there
is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.
8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
10

11

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period

not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides the following procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
12

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any
of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was
that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled
as follows:
13

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime
either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only
in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we
must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his
free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional
rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention
of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans
light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering
questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a
citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,

uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a
citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other
aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic
stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us
to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes
of Miranda.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that
the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort
be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner
here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made
for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
14

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as

possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested
for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.
15

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.
16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC
found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.
17

18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely
and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police
station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
19

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
20

In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding
and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only
conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
21

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve
evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The
threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of
"the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the
police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from
the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is
more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the
concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a
driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may
order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414;
perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest,
New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of
the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
23

24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
25

26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately
released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2809

March 22, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.
Mauricio Carlos for appellant.Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Felix V.
Makasiar for appellee.
MORAN, C.J.:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about
eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On may 8, 1948, the day
set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:
Court:
Is this the case ready for trial?
Fiscal:
I am ready, your honor.
Court: to the accused.
Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead
guilty.
Court:
Arraign the accused.
Note:
Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this
question.
Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
Fiscal:
I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I
found no evidence against this Ocampo.
Court:
Sentenced reserved.
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
[Criminal Case No. V-118]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
SENTENCE
The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
in the following
INFORMATION
That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of Romblon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being a private

individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap
and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving
said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
Contrary to law.
This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the
information above described.
The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article
267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18 and punished by
reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty
shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum,
or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the
offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that
the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the
formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight
illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named
therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his
judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented
by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the
information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment
finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten
years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules
of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have
attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him
a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court
did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of
one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the
accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question
fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is
worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion
from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of
the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to

answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but
with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to
inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed
instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of
the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused
and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may
vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this
case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal
was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him
and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counsel. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 122770 January 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:
Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent persons who recognize that a
woman's cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will
descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage is
perpetrated on one's own flesh and blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The

latter yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own
kin, but the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the
mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting
coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not
least of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and
shameless lechery.
1

At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who charged her own
father with rape committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19 July 1994, this Court finds itself
repeating this declaration.
2

Before this Court on automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
106, in view of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of rape, defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
3

On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National Capital
Regional Command, Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City the complaint of Eden Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein
accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza.
5

After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint for rape signed by EDEN, assisted by her sister
Fedelina Agbayani, and subscribed, and sworn to before Asst. City Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was
filed against appellant with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 27 October 1994. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22 December
1994.
6

At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel Baldado and Edwin de la
Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the
merits immediately followed, with the prosecution presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who was cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. On the
succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution presented EDEN and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. During
these hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public Attorney's
Office.
8

10

11

12

13

On its part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina Agbayani, as well as EDEN
who identified her and Fedelina's affidavit of desistance, which was subscribed and sworn to before
notary public Eranio Cedillo on 6 February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:
14

We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old, sister of Eden
Agbayani, and presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta, Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and states [sic]:
That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before this Honorable
Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I formally realize
that the incident between us and my father is purely family problem that arise from the disciplinarian
attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this case and
withdraw the same:
That I am executing this affidavit for purpose of finally withdrawing the instant case and therefrom
requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court that what she said in her previous testimony and sworn statement were
not true, the trial court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning that her "intentional falsehood"

was "offensive to its dignity and a blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading [to] the
administration of justice." Accordingly, the trial court ordered her "committed to incarceration and
imprisonment within the period provided by law," which penalty, however, was modified to a fine of
P200.00 upon EDEN's motion for reconsideration.
15

16

On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her affidavit of
desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother and elder sister.
The trial court's summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to the pages of the
stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:
The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the
accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape
which case was raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo Manalastas of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan.
The case was, however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted from
pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on July 13,
1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden,
Diana and Edima, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant Eden Agbayani,
Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows that at the abovementioned address the complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on
the floor of the room with her father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima,
while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed. At the time, complainant's mother was outside the
country, working in Saudi Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant Eden Agbayani was
awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina. She turned to discover that it was
her father who was then molesting her. Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito,
gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then proceeded
to undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt blood dripping from her
vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been
done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the incident
to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and
Dodima. Several attempts were made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it
was only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan
reported the complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previously provisionally dismissed
case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the accused was
arrested on the same day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City and was
later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently detained. After the accused's arrest, Eden and
Fedelina returned to Station 10 where they made individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje
narrating the events leading to and occurring after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Dr. Florante Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report.
17

Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped his daughter
EDEN, because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest
daughter. He declared that EDEN charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt after he
caught her lying about her whereabouts one night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented
apartment and did not return anymore.
18

19

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994, appellant requested

her to take care of his children because he was going to Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning
home only on 21 July
1994.

20

The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who "appeared, during her entire
testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive;" further, it commended
her "for her courage and her unwavering strength in the midst of the emotional and psychological strain
and humiliation, not to mention the pressure and lack of moral support of her family, brought on by the
filing of this case." It also ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance, as it
was procured "at the behest of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and the
family's good name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever injury the
complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused." Besides, even assuming arguendo that
no such pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the trial court declared that it understood
EDEN's moral predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was difficult to charge her own father with rape;
insist on his punishment; and thereby inflict emotional stress and financial strain upon the members of
her family, particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit "E") of Fedelina Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving, and characterized
the testimony of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellant's claim that EDEN filed the
complaint because of a grudge against him, the trial court found this "incredible, if not totally absurd,"
for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is unlikely to possess such vindictiveness and
dearth of conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging story. The complainant appeared,
during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her
retraction on March 16 was sufficiently explained to this Court (tsn, 5-4-95, testimony of Eden Agbayani,
pp. 2-3). She has shown to this Court the seriousness of the injury upon her person and dignity inflicted
upon by the accused. . . . Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would indeed lodge a
complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation with him, it is highly unlikely that the
complainant would concoct a charge which would damage her and wreck havoc on her family's
reputation, destroy the household peace and subject her father, the accused, to a grave punishment
which by dent of express of law, can obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the
defense's proposition would be stretching the imagination too far, if not to the extreme.
The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation by virtue of his moral
ascendancy over her and his threat that he would kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the penalty of death
when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim, rendered judgment against appellant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, EDUARDO
AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against complainant, Eden
Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court, as a consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of DEATH, conformably with the provisions of the death penalty law, R.A. 7659.
Further, Accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the sum of P75,000.00 as
damages, with all the necessary penalties provided for by law without subsidiary imprisonment,
however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and Domingo

Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his
substantial rights were committed during the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a)
present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero, Quezon City, who would have testified, on
the basis of certification attached to the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St.,
in his barangay, but that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was
the address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruz's testimony; (c) present private
complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the circumstances which
brought about the execution of the affidavit of desistance; and (d) cross-examine complainant and the
police investigator exhaustively. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during
all the scheduled hearings, worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the
prosecution was presented. He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt to
intimidate private complainant.
21

In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Tria1, the public and private prosecutors alleged
that there were no such irregularities; neither was there new and material evidence to be presented
that appellant could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted at trial would probably change the judgment of the court.
22

In its Order of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial for being devoid of merit and
for not being within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.
23

In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: (a)
denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that he committed the crime charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new trial, and
adds two others, namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own
choice; and (2) the lower court did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the
mandated period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is not sufficient to convict, since
it is unclear and not free from serious contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was
impossible for her sisters or any one of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was allegedly
being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet and allowed him to abuse her; neither did she
shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened her sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters
allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room even after the alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of desistance must
have necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her "subsequent turn-around . . . that she was pressured
and influenced to execute and sign the affidavit of desistance further confirmed her being untruthful
and, in effect, demolished whatsoever faith left on her charge against the accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of merit. When
appellant appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would
appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period
to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit the court
from proceeding with trial after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It
would have been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court would have no
other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant never
questioned the way his defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's request for a
continuance because he had not yet conferred with appellant was not evidence of counsel's lack of
sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's awareness of his duty to confer with appellant to ferret
out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for the prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of
appellant's presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him, because on that date,

the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina to corroborate the
statements of EDEN which testimonies were in appellant's favor. As to the manner appellant's
counsel de oficio cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record shows
that said counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of merit." EDEN's positive
identification of appellant as the author of the crime rendered appellant's defense of alibi unavailing;
moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly what transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994.
Thus in view of EDEN's candid and categorical manner of testifying the OSG concluded that she was a
credible witness.
24

As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other persons, the OSG maintains
that such was not at all improbable. There was, as well, nothing unusual in EDEN's silence; as she
could only attempt to shout because appellant had succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and
exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over EDEN, his daughter. Hence the OSG invokes the
principle that in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy
and influence over the latter substitutes for violence intimidation.
25

26

27

As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts look with disfavor on retraction
of testimonies previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses usually for a monetary consideration, as well as the probability that it may later be
repudiated.
28

In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio at his
arraignment did not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to
inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be grievous error to deny an accused such right.
Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:
This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People vs. Domenden, 73
Phil. 349, cited in RJ Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p. 323 it was held, that:
The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to proceed by sentencing
the accused without due process of law and this is not complete, when the accused is denied the right
recognized by said rule. The records must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced
his right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice and remove all doubts
that if the accused had waived said right, he was fully informed before giving his plea of its
consequences. Omission by courts whether voluntary should not truly be censured but also condemned.
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends that said
right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a reversible error and a ground for new trial.
(R. J. Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing People vs. Mijares, et al., 47 OG
4606; Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be so ". . . to prevent that any accused be caught
unaware and deprived of the means of properly facing the charges presented against him.
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the
conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of
the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his right to
counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of
such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficio were appointed is not disclosed in the record
either. At the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994, the
two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT: Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).

FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:

For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and direct supervision of the
Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio.

29

This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order of 22
December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of
the accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed
by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold
duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has
the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask
accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel,
the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is
unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
30

31

32

33

It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the
trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing
and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that
the accused was informed by the court of such right.
34

In U.S. v. Labial,

35

this Court held:

Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in this case is
whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of
their right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the
case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative
showing that the court below did in fact fail to advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of
sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from
the record brought here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible
error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed in matters
of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the
trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda this Court explicitly stated:
36

However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the
time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney,
under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil., 87, 88), in the sense that unless
the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court
of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be

punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to
crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things
correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was
reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no
reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his
arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante
Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court
to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample
opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question
the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.
37

38

The cases of People v. Domenden and People v. Cachero cited by appellant are inapplicable. In both
cases the trial courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de
oficio counsel during the arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts
to ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend
himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must
appear on record.
39

40

Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9 of
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to
prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does
denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he
effectively waived such right.
41

42

43

During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorney's
Office in Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be
presumed that Atty. Temanil's services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). There is at all no showing that Atty.
Temanil lacked the competence and skill to defend appellant. The latter's contention that his counsel
was not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a continuation as he
has "not yet interviewed [his] Client," is misleading. Atty. Temanil made that statement after he crossexamined EDEN and after the judge realized that it was almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and both of
them were already hungry, thus:
44

45

ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of trial the witness appears to be fluent
and suffers no difficulty in answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the Private
Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and we are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet interviewed my client, Your Honor.

46

Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in not

considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain in
the evidence in chief for the defense, and EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in
not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was in the province and not in
their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain
could not alter the fact that rape was committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in
his barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor denied that
he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and his children were not renting the
entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered "30-A" referred to by
EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to disprove the
claim of EDEN that they coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there
was nothing to show that they were in fact willing to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the
stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he
decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been due to the futility of any further crossexamination which might only prove favorable to the prosecution, as it might have opened another
window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a
witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court will
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses,
unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have
been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and empirical
considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since he
personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. He had
before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does
not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye
of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. On
the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does not reveal the thin
line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or
47

48

guilt.

49

At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death imposed,
this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic
notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father, herein appellant,
on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more
credible by the simplicity and candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an
innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral shock and anguish. She must have been torn between the
desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might mean the imposition of capital
punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful and humiliating secret, which
others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She thereby jeopardized her
chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant to marry her because her
traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional impediment to a blissful union. Moreover,
such a revelation divided her family and brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her private
parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological

and emotional burdens the painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN
fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her own father with a heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real. The
presence of her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The
evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to
commit rape anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants. In People v. Opena, rape
was committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN''s other
companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep.
50

51

That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant
threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming from
her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough render her incapable of resisting
or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to
the victim's and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear
fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would
happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into
submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of
unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would
nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the
assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary.
52

In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's
moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. Likewise, it must
not be forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act like a mature and experienced woman who
would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat. Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable
reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others
may openly welcome the intrusion.
53

54

55

Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in same rented room disprove the rape.
While she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have been
irresistible and compelling that her assailant was her own father, who was both a father and mother to
her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who provided her with the daily wherewithal to keep her
alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are not few when daughters raped by
their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the evil deed even if
the memory thereof haunted them forever.
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily
contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly,
nowhere therein did she retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In
any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she was pressured by
her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered
inferior to the testimony given in open court; and affidavits of recantation have been invariably
regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the
witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a
solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
56

57

This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death under the first

circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
which provides, in part, as follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a sin or crime is
God's exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows Congress, for compelling
reasons, to impose capital punishment in cases of heinous crimes, hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659.
Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the
law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
58

To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous
lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to
lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no
place in society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of "P75,000.00 as damages,"
which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO
AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing
upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above modification as to the amount of indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be
forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency
pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21741

January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,

vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the
peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less
than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite
resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to
a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts
while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly
unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could
have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought
then we had pointed out the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we
hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand
has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent
lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the
last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is
discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3
Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial
District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.
1

The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to
prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous
informations, and the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are
ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the observation
that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO BERNADAS, defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

We are once again constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions as
the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for robbery with homicide.
In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while the two other
appellants received sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.
Our task is made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially ruthless and barbarous in their
commission. No less than the counsel for the appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa are no
strangers to crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow benumbed the
sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978 of the brutally and badly bashed corpses
of two well-known and loved women of their community was still shocking to their senses.
There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime and secured the
confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three appellants are the malefactors. The confessions
are convincing in their details. The trial court noted that "both victims were assaulted and killed with
the might and fury of one really who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo Jara
had that kind of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a recidivist
for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer. There must be many residents of
Puerto Princesa who are thus convinced about the correct solution of the crime. And perhaps, the
appellants could have been the killers.
The function of this Court, however, is not to indulge in surmises or probabilities. The issue before us is
whether or not the evidence of guilt is admissible under the standards fixed by the Constitution and if
the quantum of proof, which we are allowed by the Constitution to consider, establishes guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, Branch 1 in the
consolidated cases of People of the Philippines versus Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2564) for
Robbery with Homicide and People of the Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2565)
for Parricide is involved in this automatic review. All the three accused in Criminal Case No. 2564 were
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the amount stolen, and the sum of P12,000.00. In

Criminal Case No. 2565, for the killing of Luisa Jara, accused Felicisimo Jara was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of death while the two
other accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
All the accused were ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of
P12,000.00.
The information for the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2564 reads as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the window, an opening not
intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike with a
hammer Amparo Vda. de Bantigue hitting her on the vital parts of her body and stab with a scissor
while she was soundly sleeping in her bedroom with one Luisa Jara, thereby causing her instantaneous
death as a result thereof, and that after killing Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with
each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried
away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the amount of not more than P200.00, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the total amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P12,200.00) Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstances of Recidivism with respect to
accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused that the crime
was committed with treachery, in the dwelling of the offended party, in the nighttime, and with respect
to accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, for having participated in the commission of the
crime in consideration of a prize or reward.
In Criminal Case No. 2565, the information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike several times, with a
hammer one Luisa Jara, who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and thereafter,
stabbed her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen, while the latter was soundly sleeping with one
Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, resulting to the instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Luisa Jara in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency,
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating circumstances of Recidivism with respect to
accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of homicide in the CFI
of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused, namely: (1) that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, (2) in the nighttime, (3) and treachery; and the
aggravating circumstance against accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas of having
participated in the commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.
All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the
defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose from one incident and where
the witnesses are the same.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at Alvin's Canteen situated in
Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, wondered why their employer, the deceased Amparo Bantigue, did

not answer when they called at her door that morning (p. 7, TSN, March 21, 1979). They went to the
kitchen and peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara seemingly asleep. They again
went to the door and knocked but still no answer came. The waitresses called one of Luisa Jara's
waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming apprehensive, they went back to the kitchen for a
second look. They discovered the following- . Amparo and Luisa were both lying in bed; Luisa was
dressed only in her underwear and there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly
asleep, lay beside her (pp. 9-11, TSN, March 21, 1979). Finally, they decided to inform Luisa's daughter,
Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva at the public market, she tearfully
accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When no one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open
the door. (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 21, 1979). Inside, they found the two women dead from wounds
inflicted on their persons (p. 13, TSN, March 21, 1979).
The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and saw the condition of the
victims (p. 15, TSN, March 21, 1979).
Inside the room, several ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo containing coins estimated in the
amount of P1,000.00 were missing (p. 43, TSN, February 6, 1979). Scattered underneath the window of
Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy banks (Exh. F; pp.
17-20, TSN' Feb. 6, 1979).
Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas. were
apprehended (pp. 59-60, TSN, March 19, 1979). After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators (pp. 2631, TSN, May 28, 1979). They also positively Identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who
had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation (Exhibits O
and N). Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants
Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated
their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing (see Exhibits O and N).
Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the public, with appellants
Vergara and Bernadas participating (p. 14, TSN, July 19, 1979).
The autopsy reports (Exhibits "A" and "C") submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of
Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of the deceased victims indicate that death in both
cases resulted from "hemorrhage, intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed fracture of
the cranial bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/4 inches in length with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, right, upper portion.
2. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 1/3 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, central portion.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly circular in shape, about 1 1/5 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, medially to the left eyebrow.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape with depressed -comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone located above the left eyebrow. 5. Wound, macerated, elongated with fracture of the
alveolar bone, located at the upper lip, central portion.
6. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 31/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of
the underlying bone with brain tissue coming out located at the left parieto temporal region.
7. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 21/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of
the underlying bone located at the left temporal region, anterior portion.
8. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the

underlying bone, located at the left face.

9. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right temporal region.
10. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone located at the right face.
11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest, between the 3rd and 4th intercostal
space, penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung.
12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion, penetrating the
sternum, then thoracic cavity piercing the right auricle, heart.
13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right upper abdomen penetrating the
abdominal cavity involving the liver and stomach. (Exhibit "A").
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED
FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES."
On the other hand, Luisa Jara suffered from the following wounds:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound,macerated,roughly circular in shape,about 1 1/2 inches in diameter with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bones, located at the right frontal region.
2. Wound, macerated, with a letter T shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the central portion of the frontal region.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape, about 1 1/2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right side of the nose.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 1 inch in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left eyebrow, lateral portion.
5. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left lateral portion of the forehead.
6. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the parietal region, left.
7. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 1 inch in length with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal region, left.
8. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 11/2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal region, left.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly stellate in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left mandibular region.
10. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.
11. Wound,incised,about l 3/4 inches in length, located at the left upper portion of neck, left side.
12. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 3 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right temporal region.
13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally from the right eyebrow.
14. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the occipital region, upper portion.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion penetrating inside the

thoracic cavity involving heart and lung.

16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level of typhoid process penetrating the
thoracic cavity involving the right lung, lower lobe. (Exhibit "C")
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE, INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED
FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.
Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her
friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings took
place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his
grandchildren at his step-daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo
Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their
participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused Jara during
proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions
and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these
occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara (Exhibits
"N" and "O", respectively), together with the proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of robbery with
homicide established the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty.
In their brief, the accused-appellants contended that the court a quo erred:
I
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE, DIRECT OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL.
II
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO
VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS WHICH WERE TAKEN THRU FORCE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
COUNSEL.
III
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO
VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS AGAINST THEIR CO-ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELICISIMO JARA.
IV
IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF.
V
IN ALLOWING THE PLAYING OF AN ALLEGED TAPED CONFESSION.
VI
IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH WERE NEVER PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is sufficient evidence as borne
by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel.

According to the records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of their right to counsel.
Was the waiver valid?
We are constrained to answer this question in the negative.
Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in
the presence of four other police officers, made the following "Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo":
PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay ipinababatid namin sa iyo ang iyong
mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang Batas ay ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng
isang manananggol o abogado ayon sa sarili mong pili mayroon ka ring karapatan na hindi maaaring
piliting sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa iyo sa alinmang Hukuman sa Pilipinas. Nauunawaan mo ba
ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag namin sa iyo ngayon?
SAGOT: Opo.
Likewise, in the case of the accused Vergara, the foreword of Ms signed sworn statement reads:
TANONG: Marunong po ba kayong sumulat bumasa ng tagalog at umunawa ng wikang tagalog na siya
nating gagamitin sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Nakakaunawa po ako at nakakabasa pero sa pagsulat ay hindi masyado.
PALIWANAG: Kung gayon po ay ipinababatid ko sa inyo ang inyong karapatan na kayo ay maaaring
manatiling tahimik kung inyong nais, magbigay o tumangging magbigay ng inyong salaysay, maaari din
na kayo ay sumangguni muna sa isang abogado kung nais ninyo at ang lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay
maaaring gamiting pabor o laban sa inyo sa anumang Hukuman dito sa ating kapuluan ngayong alam
na ninyo ang ilan sa inyong karapatan kayo po ba naman ay handa na ngayong magsalaysay kahit na
kayo ay wala pang abogadong kaharap na siyang mangangalaga sa inyong karapatan at lahat po ng
inyong sasabihin ay pawang katutuhanan lamang
SAGOT: Opo.
(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA
DELA CRUZ
PATUNAY: Ako si Reymundo Vergara dela Cruz ay nagsasaad na ipinaalam sa akin ang aking karapatang
manatiling tahimik, kung aking nanaisin, na ang lahat na aking sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting pabor o
laban sa akin at nalaman ko rin na ako ay maaaring kumuha ng sarili kong abogado na siyang
nangangalaga ng aking karapatan na kung hindi ko kayang kumuha ay bibigyan ako ng pamahalaan.
Nauunawaan ko ang mga karapatang ito, handa at kusang loob akong nagbibigay ng aking salaysay
ngayon, sa tanong at sagot na paraan. Hindi ko na kailangan ang tulong ng isang abogado,
nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa, walang pananakot, pananakit, pangako, pabuya o anuman na
ginawa sa akin upang ako ay magsalaysay. Ito ay sarili kong kagustuhan.
(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA
DELA CRUZ
This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically
type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free,
and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily

submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in
having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extrajudicial confessions bear clear earmarks
of illegality and improbability.
The Solicitor General gives the following arguments for voluntariness:
An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed (People v.
Castaeda, 93 SCRA 56). The confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that his
admissions are involuntary or untrue (People v. Ramos, 94 SCRA 842).
The trial court in this case was not convinced that the extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made
involuntarily. Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:
(1) Apart from appellants' self-serving claim no other evidence on record supports the allegation of
involuntariness (People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716).
(2) On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntarily given.
(3) Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several investigating authorities,
not to mention the public re-enactment of the crime itself, did not vary and they revealed details only
the assailants could have possibly known (People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y
Aquino, 92 SCRA 465).
(4) Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of corpus delicti established by
independent evidence (People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351).
(5) The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal that said confession
was voluntary (People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150).
The People v. Castaeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill of Rights was amended to
include Section 20 on the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. The
presumption that "no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were true"
assumes that such declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The new Constitution, in expressly
adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) rule, has reversed the presumption. The
prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, instead of relying on
a presumption and requiring the accused to offset it. There would have been no need to amend the
centuries old provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him
(the person being investigated)" if the framers intended us to continue applying the pre-1973 or preamendment presumptions.
Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted, states:
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always
ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his
apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him
may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if
he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is
so painfully evident . . . made the (continental) system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total
abolition.
It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases
should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the
interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant
Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in the room were five police officers. The only people
with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators.
We quote some more passages from Miranda:

Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than
physically oriented. As we have stated before, 'Since Chambers v. Florida, 309, US 227 [84 L ed 716, 60
S Ct 472], this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood
of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US
199, 206, 4 L ed 2d 242, 247, 80 S Ct 274 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation rooms. A valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may be
found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with success in the
past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These texts are used by law enforcement
agencies themselves as guides. It should be noted that these texts professedly present the most
enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation.
By considering these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted
around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the 'principal psychological factor contributing to a successful
interrogation is privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation.' The efficacy of this tactic has
been explained as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room
of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home
he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more
reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his
family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the
investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the
law.
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air
of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in
confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should
direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by
asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has a bad family life, had an
unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The officers are
instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society.
These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an
elaboration of what the police purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are
dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and
perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these characteristics in this manner:
In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has been placed on kindness and stratagems. The investigator
wilt however, encounter many situations where the sheer weight of his personality wig be the deciding
factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail he must rely on an oppressive
atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject
no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to
obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours pausing only for the subject's
necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a charge of duress that can be technically
substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for
food and sleep, but without respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible in this way to
induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The method should be used only
when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. ' " (384 US at pp. 448-451)
The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only when the guilt of the
subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the investigators in the cases now before us appear
to have been convinced that the accused-appellants were the culprits. Nonetheless, the evils of

incommunicado interrogations without adequate safeguards to insure voluntariness could still result in
the conviction of innocent persons. More important, what the Constitution commands must be obeyed
even at the risk of letting even hardened criminals mix once more with the law-abiding world.
As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what was to follow. Pictures
re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible.
There are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained for
more than two (2) weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two
weeks of soul-searching and introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have been
other persuasions.
There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the killings now before us, The PC
command and the Integrated National Police were under pressure to "solve" these additional
sensational killings.
The counsel for appellants mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in its brief, namely:
LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC HENRY PULGA and CPL. ADOLFO JAGMIS all
are connected with the Provincial Constabulary Command which investigated the case, prematurely
publicized the solution of the case with the alleged 'extra-judicial confessions' of two (2) accused, but
who were rebuffed when the two (2) accused, upon the first opportunity to do so in public, which was
the preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged 'extra-judicial confessions' as they
were taken with the use of force, violence, and intimidation, was prepared by the investigators
themselves, and without benefit of counsel.
All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the son of the deceased Amparo Bantigue.
Pat. Bantigue was implicated in several coercion and physical injuries cases filed with the City Court by
persons who had been physically attacked and violated by him in connection with the murder of his
mother. Likewise, he evaded justice by escaping from the law after murdering a companion of accused
Jara and attempting to kill the latter. He remains at large.
A PC Sergeant, Oscar Ponce de Leon, assigned at the PC Medical Dispensary, testified that he treated
Roberto Bernadas for cigarette burns and Reymundo Vergara for a wound at the tip of his right hand.
While the medicine he applied was only merthiolate the possibility cannot be discounted that in addition
to the psychological qqqplosy of incommunicado questioning, lighted cigarettes and other means of
persuasion which leave physical marks were also utilized to secure the confessions.
Accused Reymundo Vergara was given an opportunity to go qqqscot free by turning state witness. He
refused.
Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as
perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible
in evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted.
The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of his two co-accused.
Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned the two victims with a hammer and then
used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00
each if they would help him in the killing of his wife.
However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more
reason can they not be used against Jara.
Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was presented to support
a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence of the extrajudicial confessions be sufficient
to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused Jara?
Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his wife had not been in good terms for about three
years before the killings was presented. They used to quarrel with each other and they had not been

sleeping together since the deceased Luisa Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the other
deceased Amparo Bantigue. Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara, testified that his aunt was a
"tomboy" and that she and Amparo Bantigue lived together as "husband and wife." The two went to the
movies together. The relationship of the two women angered Felicisimo Jara and was a cause of their
frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also her woman companion.
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping together is corroborated by the
fact that they were bludgeoned to death while sleeping on one bed and their bodies discovered on that
same bed. At the Aileen's Canteen managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo Jara did the
cooking and whenever he committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed him,
treating him as though he were only one of the servants of the restaurant. (TSN, May 31, 1979, pp.
1821-1830). The records are replete with testimony to show that Felicisimo Jara had reason to hate his
wife enough to kill her and her companion.
The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of wounds, reflected in the
autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a person who had harbored so much hate and resentment
could have inflicted such multiple fatal blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who would
have sufficient motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been treated well as a husband
by his wife.
During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the trousers
and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain
the presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing,
he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens. (TSN, May 28,
1979, pp. 397398) He also said in his testimony in open court that when he saw his wife lying dead on
the bed, he approached her and hugged her in his effort to wake her up. (TSN, September 30, 1980, p.
1230) After a laboratory examination of the eyeglasses (Exhibit "I"), trousers (Exhibit "J"), and shirt
(Exhibit "K"), the NBI biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken blood but
human blood (Exhibit "L"). The blood stains found in accused Jara's trousers formed certain Identical
circular patterns, a splattering of blood which, according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an
instrument like that of a hammner. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of the
instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was no possibility of the
splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because blood starts to coagulate or clog 15 minutes
after the wound is caused. (TSN, March 19, 1979, pp. 227; 244; 248-250) The blood of the deceased
victims in the case at bar had already qqqcoagulated in the morning of June 9, 1978 when accused Jara
claimed that the blood stains on his shirt were smudged when he hugged his wife.
The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division
testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of appellant Jara, on the front side lower
portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the
trousers, and smudged human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human blood stains were
Type B. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps this second circumstantial
evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh conclusive. However, it is still strong
evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to Jara as the killer of his wife.
Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on his clothes and
eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the chickens he had been slaughtering for the
market. There is no explanation about the source and cause of the human blood stains splattered all
over him.
There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the discovery of the bodies
'and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the group. He went through the motions of
embracing his wife although the observers noted that even in death there was no love lost between
husband and wife. One of the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused Jara's reaction as he
entered the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears and his face did not show

any indication of sorrow (TSN, March 21, 1979, pp. 373-374).

The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is familiar. It was proven
during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A" on its handle which was one of the
instruments used in the perpetration of the crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's
Canteen where her husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515).
Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of crime, should be acted on and weighed with great
caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the penalty is death, as in the instant cases. In
determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be
determined on its own peculiar circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be
considered together as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction,
although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this purpose. (23 CJS p.
555). No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which wig
suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. (People v. Contante, 12 SCRA
653).
The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in this case. The
aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused qqqjara beyond reasonable doubt (See US v. Villos, 6
Phil. 510; People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692). Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the
crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence clearly
establishing his active participation in the crime.
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the only person who
vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of the crime was his stepdaughter from
whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi is made more dubious considering that no other credible
persons were presented who would, in the natural order of things be best situated to support the
tendered alibi (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516). More importantly, the defense of alibi cannot
prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at that time (People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Such proof is wanting in this
case.
The killing of Amparo Bantigue was marked by treachery and evident premeditation. The trial court
noted recidivism insofar as Felicisimo Jara, previously convicted of homicide, was concemed together
with dwelling and nighttime. However, the supposed robbery of the piggy bank and Buddha bank is
proved only by the extra-judicial statements found inadmissible. The offense against Bantigue was
simple murder. Insofar as the parricide case is concerned against accused Jara, the lower court did not
err in finding guilt as having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is MODIFIED as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY

with HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of MURDER
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise ACQUITTED of the crime of
HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of PARRICIDE
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Considering. however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the penalty of death is
lowered to reclusion perpetua.
In both cases, accused Jara is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue and
Luisa Jara in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), respectively.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48883 August 6, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SENERIS, As District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch II, Sixteenth
Judicial District, Zamboanga City and PILAR ANGELES DE PIMENTEL, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The legal issue posed in this special civil action for certiorari, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, spawned by the August 4, 1978 order of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 750 for
parricide against therein accused Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, hereinafter referred to as private
respondent, is the admissibility in evidence of the testimony of a prosecution witness in the said
criminal case who dies before completion of his cross-examination. That issue is crucial to the fate of
private respondent, considering that the deceased prosecution witness "... is the most vital and the only
eyewitness available to the prosecution against respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel for the
commission of the gruesome crime of parricide ..." (p. 10, rec.).
The factual background of the action is undisputed.

On February 8, 1978, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Camilo E. Tamin, who was then on official detail with the
office of the City Fiscal, Zamboanga City, filed with the Court of First Instance, Sixteenth Judicial District,
Zamboanga City, an amended information for parricide in Criminal Case No. 1742, charging herein
private respondent as principal by inducement, Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe as
principals by direct participation and Moises Andaya y Julkanain, as accomplice, in the fatal stabbing on
September 6, 1977 in Zamboanga City of Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, the lawful husband of private
respondent. The amended information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1977, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above-named accused Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, with deliberate intent to kill her
husband, Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, induce and offer a sum of money as consideration or prize to said
accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe to kill her said lawfully wedded husband Eduardo
Pimentel y Orario, and because and on account of said promised consideration or prize which was
accepted, the said accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe, did then and there, willfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab with a knife with which they were conveniently provided, the
person of said Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly
caused his death; that the above-named accused Moises Andaya y Julkanain although without having
participated directly in the commission of the offense above- described, took part prior to its
commission by then and there acting as the contact man in the execution of their plot to kill said
Eduardo Pimentel y Orario.
Contrary to law (p. 13, rec.)
On January 17, 1978, private respondent, assisted by her counsel, moved and was granted a separate
trial (p. 16, rec.).
On February 22, 1978, the accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered on arraignment a plea of guilty. Respondent judge thereafter rendered judgment convicting
accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos of murder qualified by the circumstance of prize and rewardand not of parricide as charged in the information; because he "... had no relation whatsoever to the
deceased Eduardo Pimentel ..." and appreciating the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of
guilty and lack of instruction and education, imposed on him the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years of prision mayor as the minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as the maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eduardo Pimentel the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay one-fourth () of the costs of the proceedings (pp. 15-19, rec.).
Immediately after promulgation of judgment, accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos offered to testify
against his co-accused, herein private respondent, in her separate trial earlier granted by the
respondent judge in the same criminal case, now numbered 750. Allowed, he testified as prosecution
witness on February 28, March 6, and March 22, 1978 and as summarized by the petitioner, his
testimony on direct examination contained in seventy-six (76) pages of transcripts of stenographic
notes (pp. 21-44, 57-64, rec.), is to the effect "...that he and Salim Doe were hired by respondent Pilar
Angeles de Pimentel, for the consideration of P3,000.00 to kill Eduardo Pimentel, husband of respondent
Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, in the evening of September 6, 1977, in the latter's residence in Zamboanga
City, and that it was respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel herself who actually pointed out the victim
Eduardo Pimentel to the witness, who then stabbed the said victim to death...That he did not know the
Identity of the victim Eduardo Pimentel at the time of the stabbing in the evening of September 6, 1977.
He was guided solely by respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, who pointed out her victim spouse to
him ..." (allegation No. 4, petition, pp. 4-5, rec.).
After the prosecution had terminated on March 22, 1978 the direct examination of its witness Mario
Nemenio y delos Santos, counsel for private respondent moved for the holding in abeyance of the crossexamination of the said prosecution witness until after he (counsel) shall have been furnished with the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the direct examination of said prosecution witness (p. 47, TSN,

March 22, 1978, p. 64, rec.); allegation No. 5, petition, p. 5, rec.). The same was granted by the
respondent judge who ordered the resumption of the hearing on April 19, 1978 (pp. 64, 94, 108, rec.).
But on April 19, 1978, aforesaid prosecution witness failed to appear because he was not served with a
subpoena (p. 108, rec.). Consequently, the hearing was reset for June 7, 1978 (ibid.)
On June 7, 1978, counsel for private respondent commenced his cross- examination of prosecution
witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, which cross-examination however was not completed on that
session for lack of material time, thus:
ATTY. CALVENTO:
I reserve my right to cross-examine the witness further.
COURT
Reservation to continue the cross-examination is granted.
ORDER: For lack of material time, as prayed for and upon agreement of the parties today's hearing is
hereby adjourned and to be resumed on July 3, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (p. 84, rec.).
According to the petition, the uncompleted cross-examination reduced in fifty-three (53) pages of
transcripts of stenographic notes (pp. 65-84, rec.) had already "... touched on the conspiracy existing
among Salim Doe, witness Mario Nemenio and respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel to kill Eduardo
Pimentel, in the latter's residence in Zamboanga City in the evening of September 6, 1977, and also on
the actual stabbing by witness Mario Nemenio of the victim Eduardo Pimentel who was pointed out to
the witness-killer by his wife, respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel ..." (p. 7, rec.). This is not disputed
by private respondent.
Continuation of the cross-examination was, as aforestated, set for July 3, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
However, prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos was shot dead by the Integrated National
Police patrols on June 21, 1978 while allegedly escaping from the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm,
Zamboanga City, where he was then serving his sentence. Consequently, the completion of his crossexamination became an impossibility.
On July 20, 1978, petitioner, without any motion on the part of the defense for the striking out of the
deceased witness's testimony, filed with the respondent court a motion praying for a ruling on the
admissibility of the testimony of deceased witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos.
On August 4, 1978, respondent judge issued an order declaring as inadmissible the entire testimony of
the deceased witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos on the principal ground "... that the defense was
not able to complete its cross-examination of said witness ...", relying on the case of Ortigas, Jr. vs.
Lufthansa, etc., L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA, pp. 610,636-37).
Hence, this action, to which WE gave due course on December 4, 1978, after considering private
respondent's comment as well as those of the Solicitor General and of the respondent judge who was
required to file one. On even date, WE likewise issued a temporary restraining order "... effective
immediately and until further orders from this Court enjoining respondent District Judge from continuing
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 750 (1742) entitled People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Pilar
Angeles de Pimentel, accused, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II."
Petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ruling as inadmissible the
testimony of prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos.
WE agree.
I
1. The constitutional right of confrontation, which guarantees to the accused the right to cross-examine

the witnesses for the prosecution, is one of the most basic rights of an accused person under our
system of justice. It is a fundamental right which is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings
but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers (Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 62 SCRA 258 [1975]).
In almost exactly the same language, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions secured it, thus: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face ..."
(Section 19, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1973 Constitution; Section 17, Art. III, 1935 Constitution). Echoing the
same guarantee, Section I (f) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all criminal
proceedings the defendant shall have the right to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross- examine
the witnesses against him. Constitutional confrontation requirements apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and have been held to have two purposes; first and primarily, to secure the opportunity of
cross-examination, and secondarily, to obtain the benefit of the moral impact of the courtroom
atmosphere as it affects the witnesses demeanor (21 Am Jur 2d 360). Stated otherwise, it insures that
the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it
forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
credibility (California v. Green, 339 U.S. 157 [1970]).
2. But while the right to confrontation and cross-examination is a fundamental right, WE have ruled that
the same can be waived expressly or implied by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination (Savory Luncheonettee vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, p. 259,
citing U.S. v. Atanacio, 6 Phil. 413 [1906]; People vs. dela Cruz, 56 SCRA 84, 91 [19741). The conduct of
a party which may be construed as a implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various
forms. But the common basic principles underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that
the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examination an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record (Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Maggagawang Pilipino,
et al., supra, citing Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Vol. on Evidence, p. 853, in turn citing People vs.
Cole, 43 N.Y. 508-512 and Bradley vs. Mirick, 91 N.Y. 293; see alo 29 Am. Jur. 2d 749).
On the other hand, when the cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, as was the situation in the Lufthansa German Airlines case
(64 SCRA 610 [1975]) relied upon by respondent judge, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent and inadmissible in evidence. WE emphasized in the said case that "[T]he right of a party
to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than
the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to appropriate
supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being unduly protracted
and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and
oppressive and unwarranted harassment and embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full
cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule 132 ... Until such cross-examination has been
finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore be
allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case" (p. 637).
However, WE likewise therein emphasized that where the right to cross examine is lost wholly or in part
through the fault of the cross-examiner, then the testimony on direct examination may be taken into
account; but when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent (p. 636)

3. The effects of absence of and incomplete cross-examination of witness on the admissibility in

evidence of his testimony on direct examination has been extensively discussed thus: "As a general
rule, the testimony of a witness, given on direct examination, should be stricken where there is not an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination, as where the witness by reason of his death, illness, or
absence cannot be subjected to cross-examination. Although the contrary has been held (Scott v.
McCann, 24 A. 536, 76 Md. 47), the testimony of a witness, given on direct examination, should be
stricken where there is not an adequate opportunity for cross-examination (Nehring v. Smith, 49 N.W. 2d
831, 243 Iowa 225), as where the party against whom he testified is, through no fault of his own,
deprived of the right to cross-examine him by reason of his death (Henderson v. Twin Falls County 80 P.
2d 801, 59 Idaho 97; Twin Falls County, State of Idaho v. Henderson, 59 S. Ct. 149, 305 U.S. 568, 83 L.
Ed. 358), or as a result of the illness of the witness or absence, or a mistrial ordered. The direct
testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken only insofar
as not covered by the cross-examination (Curtice v. West, 2 NYS 507, 50 Hun 47, affirmed 24 N.E. 1099,
121 N.Y. 696), and absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking his testimony for failure to
appear for further cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined
(Lew Choy v. Lim Sing 216 P. 888, 125 Wash 631), or the matter on which further cross-examination is
sought is not in controversy (supra). It has been held that a referee has no power to strike the
examination of a witness on his failure to appear for cross-examination where a good excuse is given (In
re Crooks, 23 Hun 696)" [98 CJS 126-127, Emphasis supplied].
Moreover, "[I]f one is deprived of the opportunity of a cross-examination without fault upon his part, as
in the case of the illness or death of a witness after direct examination, it is generally held that he is
entitled to have the direct testimony stricken from the record. This doctrine rests on the common law
rule that no evidence should be admitted but what was or might be under the examination of both
parties, and that exparte statements are too uncertain and unreliable to be considered in the
investigation of controverted facts (Wray vs. State, 154 Ala 36, 45 So 697; People vs. Manchetti, 29 Cal.
2d 452,175 P2d 533; A. H. Angerstein, Inc. vs. Jankowski, 55 Del 304, 187 A2d 81; Nehring vs. Smith,
243 Iowa 225, 49 NW2d 831; Citizens Bank & Trust Co. vs. Reid Motor Co. 216 NC 432, 5 SE 2d 318). It
has been held, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to discharge the jury
where the state witness collapsed before cross- examination was completed, it being shown that no
motion to strike the testimony was made, that it was not indicated what further information was sought
to be produced by further cross-examination, and that the witness' testimony was largely cumulative
(Banks vs, Commonwealth, 312 Ky 297, 227 SW 2d 426)" [81 Am Jur 2d 474].
4. Wigmore, eminent authority on evidence, opined that:
xxx xxx xxx
... where the death or illness prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no
responsibility of any sort can be attributed to either the witness of his party, it seems harsh measure to
strike out all that has been obtained on the direct examination. Principle requires in strictness nothing
less. But the true solution would be to avoid any inflexible rule, and to leave it to the trial judge to
admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination can be shown to him to be not in
that instance a material loss. Courts differ in their treatment of this difficult situation; except that by
general concession a cross-examination begun but unfinished sufices if its purposes have been
substantially accomplished
xxx xxx xxx
(Vol. II, P. 108, Emphasis supplied).
II
1. Respondent judge's full reliance on the Lufthansa German Airlines case cannot be sustained. To be
sure, while the cross-examination of the witness in the aforesaid Lufthansa case and that of the witness
in the present action were both uncompleted, the causes thereof were different in that while in the

present case it was the death of the witness, in the Lufthansa case, it was the unjustified and
unexplained failure of Lufthansa to present its witness on the scheduled date for his cross-examination
which had already been preceded by several postponements initiated by Lufthansa itself, thus depriving
the other party the opportunity to complete the cross-examination of said witness. Consequently, this
Court therein correctly ruled as inadmissible the testimony of the said witness on the principle that "...
when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent ..." (supra, at p. 636).
As clear as day, the Lufthansa ruling therefore applies only if there is a finding that the cause for noncompletion of the cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party offering the said
witness. Consequently, the same is inapplicable to the instant action as the cause for the noncompletion of the cross-examination of petitioner's witness was a fortuitous event as he was killed, as
per the pleadings submitted in this action, by the law enforcers (Integrated National Police Patrols) after
his escape from prison. As a matter of fact, respondent judge, in his questioned order, did not lay any
basis for the application of the Lufthansa ruling as he failed to make any finding that the noncompletion was due to petitioner, the party offering the witness, whose testimony he declared as
inadmissible in evidence. A reading of the questioned order reveals that respondent judge ruled as
inadmissible said questioned testimony mainly because private respondent can no longer finish her
cross-examination; hence incomplete. However, private respondent advanced in this action the cavalier
theory that the failure of her counsel to complete his cross-examination of petitioner's witness was due
to the fault of or was attributable to the petitioner, People of the Philippines, because it was the very
agents of State who killed its own witness; hence, making the questioned testimony of petitioner's
witness inadmissible, per the Lufthansa ruling.
The contention does not deserve serious consideration. There was no finding nor any showing as the
same is farfetched or inconceivable that the killing of the witness of petitioner by its own agents was illmotivated. The prosecution did not order the shooting of the government witness. He was shot while
escaping from prison. It is petitioner's cause which will possibly suffer from said death; not the cause of
private respondent. It may be true that the escape of the said witness and his consequent death may
be attributable to the negligence of petitioner's agents; but such negligence may not bind the petitioner
as to pre-judicially affect its cause and interest the prosecution of criminal offenses by reason of
the generally accepted principle that the State is not bound by the negligence or tortious acts of its
agents. As the cause of non-completion was, as aforesaid, beyond the control of the prosecution,
respondent judge's questioned order cannot be sustained on the basis of the Lufthansa ruling which, as
aforestated, was principally anchored on the finding that the cause of the non-completion of the crossexamination of the therein witness was attributable to the very party offering him as a witness.
2. On the other hand, WE find no merit in petitioner's contention that the testimony of its deceased
witness is admissible on the ground that private respondent had waived her right to cross-examine the
witness and that the cause of non-completion was attributable to said private respondent. As correctly
pointed out by private respondent and sustained by respondent judge, petitioner is not justified in
attributing fault to her (private respondent) and in contending that she is deemed to have partly lost
already the right of cross-examination by not availing of the right to cross-examine the witness Mario
Nemenio on March 22, 1978 or right after his direct examination was closed and delaying until the lapse
of two and a half (2) months thereafter before making such cross-examination; because while it is
true that her counsel did not immediately start with his cross-examination of the deceased witness on
March 22, 1978, he did avail, however, of such right on the same day by initially obtaining an
opportunity to make preparations for an effective exercise thereof considering the nature of the case
a capital one and the length of the direct examination; three sittings on three different dates or on
February 28, 1978, March 6, 1978 and March 22, 1978. Hence, there was no waiver of her right of crossexamination. Moreover, the deferment of the cross-examination of the witness requested by private
respondent on March 22, 1978 was approved by respondent judge without any objection on the part of
petitioner (pp. 45, 46, 64, rec.). And on the date for the cross-examination of the witness Mario

Nemenio or on April 19, 1978, counsel for private respondent failed to cross-examine the said witness
not of his own design but because said witness failed to appear on that date for the reason that due to
the oversight of the court's personnel the subpoena for said witness was not served on him at the San
Ramon Prison and Penal Farm (pp. 90, 108, rec.). And respondent judge had to re-set the hearing for the
cross-examination of the witness by the private respondent only to June 7, 1978 because of the fact
that respondent judge took, with the approval of the Supreme Court, his summer vacation the whole
month of May, 1978.
It is thus apparent that no fault can be imputed to the private respondent for the length of time that
elapsed before her counsel was able to commence his cross-examination of the witness. And private
respondent's counsel was not able to complete his cross-examination of the witness on June 7, 1978 for
lack of material time by reason of which and upon agreement of the parties the hearing was adjourned
and ordered resumed on July 3, 1978 (p. 84, rec.).
It appears, therefore, that the situation is one whereby the cause of non-completion of the crossexamination of the deceased witness was attributed neither to the fault of petitioner nor the private
respondent. Consequently, the admissibility or inadmissibility of the testimony of the said witness
cannot be resolved on the basis of the rule enunciated in the Lufthansa case.
III
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that the questioned testimony of its deceased witness
is admissible in evidence because private respondent's counsel had already "... rigorously and
extensively cross-examined witness Mario Nemenio on all essential elements of the crime charged
(parricide), all of which have been testified upon by said witness in his direct examination-in-chief, and
consequently, the cross-examination-in- chief, has already been concluded."
The cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of the crime charged
parricide, fact of killing-is concerned. What remained was merely the cross-examination regarding the
price or reward, which is not an element of parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance (par. 11,
Art. 14, Revised Penal Code).
As elaborated by petitioner in its memorandum:
The crime charged in the case at bar is Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of the crime of Parricide are that a person was killed; that the killing was intentionally
caused by the accused; and that the victim is a parent or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or the
lawful spouse, or legitimate ascendant or descendant of the accused. Once these facts are established
beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is warranted (See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol.
II, p. 1171).
The deceased Eduardo Pimentel has been sufficiently shown to be the lawful husband of private
respondent Pilar Pimentel by means of the marriage contract executed between them on May 18,
1971 ... marked as Exhibit 'R' for the prosecution ...
The cross-examination of witness Mario Nemenio by the counsel for private respondent on June 7, 1978
touched on the conspiracy, and agreement, existing among Salim Doe, witness Mario Nemenio and
private respondent Pilar Pimentel to kill Eduardo Pimentel, in the latter's residence in Zamboanga City in
the evening of September 6, 1977, and also on the actual stabbing by witness Mario Nemenio of the
victim Eduardo Pimentel who was pointed out to the witness-killer by his wife, the private respondent
Pilar Pimentel herself... The matter of consideration or price of P3,000.00, which both the public and
private respondents maintain was not touched in the cross-examination of witness Mario Nemenio, is
not an essential element of the crime of parricide. Price or consideration is merely an aggravating
circumstance of the crime charged, not an essential element thereof. The failure to touch the same in
the cross-examination would not at all affect the existence of the crime of parricide. Furthermore, there
is no showing or even the slightest indication that the witness or his testimony would be discredited if

he was cross-examined on the promised consideration. The probability is rather very great that the
witness would only have confirmed the existence of the promised consideration were he crossexamined on the same.
From the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the rigorous and searching cross-examination of
witness Mario Nemenio on June 7, 1978, practically concluded already the cross-examination-in-chief, or
has already substantially accomplished the purpose of the cross-examination, and therefore, the failure
to pursue the privilege of further cross-examination, would not adversely affect the admissibility of the
direct testimony of said witness anymore (pp. 159162, rec.).
Private respondent did not dwell on the aforesaid points in her memorandum.
Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent of the deceased witness was
extensive and already covered the subject matter of his direct testimony as state witness relating to the
essential elements of the crime of parricide, and what remained for further cross-examination is the
matter of price or reward allegedly paid by private respondent for the commission of the crime, which is
merely an aggravating circumstance and does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely inadmissible the testimony of
the state witness who died through no fault of any of the parties before his cross-examination could be
finished.
WHEREFORE, THE AUGUST 4,1978 ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY SET ASIDE; THE
RESTRAINING ORDER OF DECEMBER 4, 1978 ISSUED BY THIS COURT IS HEREBY LIFTED; AND
RESPONDENT JUDGE OR HIS SUCCESSOR IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED TO PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 750 (1742) AND TO ADMIT AND CONSIDER IN DECIDING THE CASE THE TESTIMONY
OF THE DECEASED WITNESS MARIO NEMENIO y DELOS SANTOS EXCLUDING ONLY THE PORTION
THEREOF CONCERNING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRICE OR REWARD WHICH WAS NOT
COVERED BY THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. NO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988

FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO

DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is
whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the
custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his
own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the
herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set
the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused
including private respondent, were duly informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center
and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the
petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against
all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the
application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis
supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but
nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he
shows up in court.
1

After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against
the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The
dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and
Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is
hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving
other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August
30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the
jurisdiction over his person.
2

On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted
dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in

absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22,
1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein
petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private
respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution and present his evidence. The reasoning of the said court is that under the same
provision, all accused should be presumed innocent. Furthermore the lower court maintains that
jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to crossexamine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired.
3

We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accusedprivate respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by
appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the
law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the
custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in
absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is
unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the
private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not
guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is
evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. It was also proved by a certified
copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation
for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.
7

The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence
of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of
reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of
his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of

his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law
that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the
offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
9

The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection,
may be waived by him.
10

Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the
intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have
waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained....
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him.
11

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so
far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is
reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the
innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the
evidence adduced and the applicable law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio- Aquino, JJ., concur.

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
x ----------------------------------- x
RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE
MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO
INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING
GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST
OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE
TRIAL OF THE DECADE TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE
CONSTITUTION,
x ---------------------------------x

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL.
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC

A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
*

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 14, 2011

A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed
while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and
the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the
Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of
rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following
the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge
Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong
Diwa in Taguig City.

Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,
individual journalists
from various media entities, and members of the academe
filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No.
10-11-5-SC.
[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]

In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines

(NPC) and Alyansa ng
Filipinong Mamamahayag
(AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the
Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao
Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation
inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video
signals to the television monitors outside the court.
The Court docketed the petition as
A.M.
No. 10-11-6-SC.
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]

President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010

addressed to Chief
Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit
television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed earnest hope that [this Court]
will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation,ttend to this petition
with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits.
The Court docketed
the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,

[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]

the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-

11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.

Meanwhile, various groups

and statements bearing on these matters.

[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]

also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions

The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated
Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011
and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.

On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio
Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case
and the 2001 ruling in
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Joseph E. Estrada
which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that
proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition
cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media
coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media
personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and
cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast
coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one
reporter for each media institution.

The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter
to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the
proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters
concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion.
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to
information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress
of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be
issued by the Court.
[if !

supportFootnotes][14][endif]

[if !

supportFootnotes][15][endif]

The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the
trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.

Putts Law
states that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who
understand what they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not understand. Indeed,
members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts gown, so to speak, in a
pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the
courtroom.
[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]

A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task
of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.

The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right to due
process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to
the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.

The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the
comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine
setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets
under existing rules and exacting regulations.

In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise
rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere
with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not
curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative
matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous
cases.

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of
serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so
treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious
quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that [m]assive
intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the
constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.

The Court concluded in Aquino:

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the
right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed.
Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court

resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.
[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]

The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or
denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed:

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too
high to pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13,
2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for
documentary purposes, under the following conditions:

x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and
shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made

under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be
made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audiovisual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]

Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas

which Aquino and Estrada
heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible
infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are
different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does
not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence
and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia,
allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.
[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]

[if !

supportFootnotes][21][endif]

Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United
Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast.
The International Criminal
Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.
[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]

On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that
Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point
out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American
attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges,
petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial
must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.
and
Estrada v. Desierto,
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that
there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation
of the right to a fair trial.
[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]

[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an
adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by
petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the
prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial
when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier
cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private
complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial,
Estrada basically discusses:

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,

where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.
(underscoring supplied)
[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]

Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe the
proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily
entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and
of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings
as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the
prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all
the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if
the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and
public trial.

In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary
purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.

(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to
broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they
will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment.

No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to

broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single
wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the
necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or
employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any
distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless
technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.

The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate
and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.

(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be
conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.

The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment
monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ
technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize
the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.

If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities
facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology
accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform
from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.

At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual
recording should be protected or encrypted.

(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting
such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
applies, and
where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which
involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of
corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]

The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the
image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.

(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap
shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess
called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered
excluded.

(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings
shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as
may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except
brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the
recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject
to the contempt power of the court;

(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial
court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the
suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend
appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by
the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the
above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the
feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein
requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of
information and communication technology.

(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on
recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the
abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has
always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology
can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of
defined guidelines.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC
VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.

SO ORDERED.