SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y

CUSTODIO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the 10 January 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42, in Criminal Case No. 17838, finding
appellant PO3 Armando Dalag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for
killing his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag. The trial court imposed upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay their childrenP50,000 as
civil indemnity.
[1]

The amended Information against the appellant reads:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PO3 Armando C. Dalag of the
crime of PARRICIDE (Under Art. 246 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Armando C. Dalag,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniouslyand with evident premeditation, that is having
conceived and deliberated to kill his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag, with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock, did, then and there, attack, assault, dragged (sic) and inflict
serious multiple injuries upon his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag, in the different parts of
her body, to wit:
Cranio-Cerebral Trauma with probale (sic) severe diffuse Axonal injury r/o
Intracranial hematoma; r/o Multifocal Cerebral Contusions; Multiple AbrasionsContusions; face, neck anterior chest extremities and such other injuries contained in
the post exhumation autopsy/examination report employing means, manner and form
in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to insure its
commission without danger to the person of the accused, as a result of which attack
and injuries caused the death of said Leah N. Dalag.
[2]

On his arraignment, Armando, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not

guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.
[3]

The Antecedents
Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to
the Bacolod City police station, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido
Dalag . They had three children: Francis, Princess Joy and Ezra John. The
family resided in Barangay Handumanan, Bacolod City.
[4]

The marriage of Armando and Leah was far from idyllic. Their coverture
was marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each
time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps
on different parts of her body. The situation came to a point when on one
occasion, Leahs father, Marcos Nolido, had to advise Armando to stop
beating his wife. Armando replied that he planned to sell the house and leave
Leah. Marcos was taken aback. He went to the kitchen and after a few
minutes, heard Armando ordering his wife to get out of the house. He saw
Armando poke his firearm at Leah. Marcos tried to pacify Armando to no
avail. Marcos lost his temper and shouted at Armando: What kind of a
policeman are you? You are committing police brutality against your
wife. Instead of being chastened, Armando poked his gun on his father-inlaw instead.
On August 15, 1996, at around 8:00 p.m., Francis, then eleven years old,
and his sister Princess Joy, then nine years old, were watching television in
their house. Armando, who was drinking hard liquor, and Leah were in the
yard sitting under the datiles tree. Momentarily, the children heard their
parents quarreling. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The
kids sensed that some object was being banged on the wall. Thereafter, they
heard their mother cry. Francis and Princess Joy rushed outside the house to
see what was happening. They were horrified when from a distance of three
meters, they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of her
body. She fell to the ground. Even as Leah was already lying posthaste on
the ground, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different
parts of the body. Francis and Princess Joy pleaded to their father to stop
maltreating their mother. Armando angrily told them not to interfere and that
he will later beat them up as well. He grabbed Leahs hair and banged her
head on the wall. Leahs forehead directly hit the wall. In the process,
Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her
husband, she told him Toy, Toy, I will find some medicine for your

wound. Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, Felisa Horilla or Tia
Feli. Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa. Francis
went back to the house. Princess Joy looked for her parents but could not
find them. She decided to go back to their house to sleep. In the meantime,
Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy was awakened when
she heard her mother crying. When Princess Joy went outside of the house,
she saw her mother being pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and
lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and
ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She did. She poured water on the
face of her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried to revive
Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail.
Princess Joy went back to the house to rouse Francis. When Francis
came out to the yard, he saw his mother lying on the ground still
unconscious. Armando was sitting near Leah, while nonchalantly smoking
cigarette. Francis got a piece of carton from their store and placed it
underneath his mothers body. Francis then suggested to his father that they
bring Leah inside the house. Armando nonchalantly remarked, You really
love your mother.
Armando and Francis carried Leah to the house. Francis noticed that there
were lumps on his mothers face as well as bruises on both her arms,
between her breasts and on her thighs. There was likewise blood on Leahs
right ear. After laying down her head on the bed, Armando told Francis to get
some hot water. Armando then washed his wifes face with lukewarm
water. When Francis finally went to sleep, his mother was still unconscious.
When they woke up the following day, or on August 16, 1996, Francis and
Princess Joy noticed that their mother remained unconscious. Despite their
mothers condition, they decided to go to school. During lunchtime, Francis
went home and saw that Leahs condition had not improved. When the
children came home in the afternoon after their classes, Armando told them
that their mother was brought to the hospital. Armando instructed Francis to
inform his colleagues at the police headquarters that he would be unable to
report for duty because his wife accidentally slipped and had to be brought to
the hospital.
When Francis visited his mother in the hospital, he saw her lying on the
bed, her face badly swollen. He saw the lumps and bruises on the different
parts of her body. Leah never regained her consciousness. She died on
August 22, 1996.
When SPO3 Herman S. Garcia, the station commander, was apprised of
the death of Leah, he ordered Armando not to leave the police

station. However, on August 23, 1996, Armando left the police station without
the knowledge and permission of Garcia and could not be located. However,
on August 28, 1996, Armando surrendered to SPO3 Garcia and to PO3s Joel
Stephen B. Casador and Filemon Roderos.
[5]

[6]

Dr. Jesse Rey T. Cruel, the medico-legal officer of the Commission on

Human Rights, conducted a post exhumation autopsy on the cadaver of
Leah. The autopsy report revealed as follows:
FINDINGS
ABRASIONS:
1.

6.

2.0 cms. x 3.0 cms., xiphi-sternal area, chest;

2.

6.0 cms. x 8.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, knee region,
left;

3.

5.0 cms. x 7.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, elbow region,
left;

4.

6.0 cms. x. 10.0 cms. multiple, in various sizes and shapes, elbow
region, right;

5.

4.0 cms. x 11.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, dorsal
aspect, hand, right;

1.5 cms. x 3.0 cms., shoulder, left.

CONTUSED ABRASIONS, brownish:

1.

4.0 cms. x 7.5 cms., lateral aspect, malleolar area, left;

2.

6.0 cms. x 6.5 cms., lateral aspect, malleolar area, right;

3.

1.0 cm. X 2.5 cms., temporal area, head, left side.

CONTUSIONS, purplish-brown:
1.

1.0 cm x 3.0 cms., antero-lateral aspect, arm, middle third, right;

2.

2.0 cms. x 4.0 cm., anterior aspect, middle third, thigh, right;

3.

5.0 cms. x 6.5 cms., anterior aspect, middle third, thigh right;

4.

2.5 cms. x 4.0 cms., antero-lateral aspect, proximal third, leg, right;

5.

1.5 cms. in diameter, infra-mammary region, chest, right side;

6.

1.5 cms. in diameter, medial aspect, chest, right side;

7.

3.5 cms. x 6.5 cms., axillary region, right.

Scalp hematoma, parietal region, head, right side, with shallow depression of
the right, temporal bone along the pterion.

Blood, clotted, approximately 100 milliliters in volume, anterior fossa, right.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Pleural and peritoned cavity, non-bloody.
Stomach, empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to blunt injury of the
head.
[7]

Dr. Cruel testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and traumatic
physical violence resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death.
The Defense of Armando
Armando vigorously denied killing his wife. He testified that he was a
member of the PNP. However, before joining the police, he was
unemployed. Thus, during the early part of his marriage to Leah, Marcos, his
father-in-law, disapproved of him. He admitted that his relationship with his
father-in-law did not improve because every time he and his wife had a spat,
Marcos would interfere. Moreover, Marcos resented him because he
(Armando) was a Catholic while Marcos and his family, including Leah, and
their children belonged to the Mormon faith.
Armando narrated that on August 15, 1996, at around 6:00 p.m., he was
watching TV Patrol on television with Leah and their children. When the
program was over, he went out to their yard and sat under
the datiles tree. Leah followed him. They then decided to drink liquor. He
stood up to get a cigarette when he stepped on a four-inch nail. The nail

punctured his foot, causing it to bleed. Marcos ordered Leah to get

medicine. However, she could not find any. She then proceeded to the house
of Tia Feli to ask for medicine. When Leah failed to return after an hour, he
followed her to Tia Felis house and found her conversing with friends. She
told Armando that she was not able to find any medicine for him. He then
asked her why she was still there, and ordered her to go home with him
because it was already late.
When they were near their gate, Leah pushed Armando and ran towards
their house. As she was running, Leah stumbled upon a pile of cut bamboos,
causing her to fall to the ground. She then hit her head in-between the two
stones found in their yard. Leahs left temple and nape (back portion of her
neck) hit the stones. She then rolled over. Armando immediately rushed to
Leahs aid and when she saw that she had lost consciousness, applied
mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation
on
her. Leah
regained
consciousness. Armando called Francis and Princess Joy and told them that
their mother had an accident.
Armando and Francis carried Leah and brought her inside the
house. Upon his fathers instructions, Francis wiped his mothers face with
towel soaked in lukewarm water. Armando asked her if she wanted to be
brought to the hospital, but Leah refused. The following morning, Armando
noticed that Leah had two lumps at the back of her neck and on her left
temple. Realizing that his wifes condition was getting worse, he had his
mother fetched and together, they brought Leah to the hospital.
During Leahs confinement in the hospital, Armando stayed away to avoid
confrontation with his father-in-law. After his wifes death, the children lived
with Leahs parents. Armando averred that the testimonies of his children
were untrue. In fact, he insisted, when they visited him at the headquarters
they told him that they did not want him to go to jail.
Armandos mother, Agueda Dalag, testified that on August 16, 1996, Ada,
her daughter, fetched her from the house upon the instruction of
Armando. She and Ada went to the house of Armando and saw Leah on bed
unconscious. When she asked Armando what happened to Leah, Armando
replied that his wife slipped and fell, hitting her head on two stones. Armando,
Agueda and Ada brought Leah to the hospital. Agueda testified that her son
loved his wife and that she was not aware of any occasion where he
maltreated or manhandled Leah.
PO3 Joel Stephen B. Casador testified that as far as he knew, Armando
and Leah had a good marital relationship. Nenita Garcia, a neighbor of
Armando and Leah, testified that early in the evening of August 15, 1996, she

saw husband and wife drinking under the datiles tree in their yard. At
around 8:00 in the evening, Leah passed by her house on the way to Tia Felis
house. Thereafter, Armando followed Leah to Tia Felis house. Nenita
observed that Armando was limping. He and Leah went back to their house
together. Nenita said that she did not see the couple quarrel, nor was there
anything unusual in the behavior of the couple that night.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding Armando
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court appreciated the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and one analogous to
passion and obfuscation in favor of Armando. The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused,
ARMANDO CUSTODIO DALAG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and one analogous to passion and obfuscation and there being no
aggravating circumstance in attendance in [the] commission of the crime, hereby
sentences the accused to serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all its
accessory penalties and to indemnify the children of the deceased, Leah NolidoDalag, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P 50,000.00) PESOS. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[8]

In his appeal brief, Armando, now the appellant, contends that:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED INFLICTED

INJURIES TO THE DECEASED THAT CAUSED HER DEATH.
II

THAT THE LOWER [COURT] ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES

OF FRANCIS AND PRINCESS JOY DALAG WHICH WERE FABRICATED AND
COACHED.
III

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CRE[C]ENCE (SIC) TO THE

UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF MARCOS NOLIDO, JR. WHO HAS AN AXED
(SIC) TO GRIND AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
[9]

The issues raised by appellant involve the credibility of witnesses and their
testimony and the probative weight thereof. He, in effect, assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the probative weight accorded by
the trial court to their respective testimonies.
The Verdict of this Court
It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are
clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has overlooked some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the
result of the case. The rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior
advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have
the opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of
witnesses while testifying.
[10]

[11]

In this case, the trial court declared that the children, Francis and Princess
Joy, the principal prosecution witnesses, testified in a logical, candid, and
straight-forward manner, describing in detail what they saw and heard in a
manner characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth. The Court finds
no reason to deviate from these findings as the records fully support the
same. The children recalled the sordid events that happened in the evening
of August 15, 1996 involving their parents without any trace of bias, impelled
by no other motive than to bring justice to their mothers senseless
death. Francis for one graphically testified in this manner:
[12]

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

How about your mother and father at that time? Do you know where they were?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, maam.

Where?

They were outside of our house near the datiles tree.

Do you know what were they doing there?

My father was drinking.

How about your mother?

My mother was admonishing my father to stop drinking.

Why do you know that?

Because I went out of our house.

Why did you go out from you[r] house?

WITNESS:
A

Because I heard my mother crying.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Aside from hearing your mother crying, did you hear anything else?

Yes, maam.

What was that?

I heard something banged against our wall.

So, when you went out from your house, did you see your father and mother
there?

Yes, maam.

And what did you see?

My father and mother were quarreling.

Was your mother fighting with your father or you[r] father fighting with your mother?

I saw my father fighting with my mother.

What was your father doing to your mother?

He was castigating or maltreating my mother.

Can you specifically tell the court how was your father maltreated (sic) or castigo
your mother?

WITNESS:
A

He punched and at the same time kicked my mother.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

How about your mother? What was she doing?

She was crying.

Was she fighting back?

No, she was not fighting back.

Now, when your mother was kicked and punched by your father, what happened to
her?

While my father was physically abusing my mother, my mother was crying while
she was sitting on the ground.

When your father kicked your mother, where was she hit?

She was hit on her stomach.

How about the boxing?

WITNESS:
A

The punches of my father landed all over the body of my mother.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

How many times did your father punch and kick your mother that night?

Many times.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

During this physical abuse inflicted by your father to your mother, what happened
to your mother that evening while you were still there?

ATTY. GRIJALDO:
Objection, your honor. It was already answered by the child. He said his mother was
crying, your honor, while she was physically abused by the accused.
COURT:
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS:
A

She was sitting on the ground.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

While she was sitting on the ground, did your father continue maltreating her?

Yes, maam.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

And when you went out, what did you see again?

WITNESS:
A

When I went out again while my parents were still quarreling, me and my younger
sister told my father, Tatay, thats enough. And my Tatay told her, Do not
interfere or else, I will beat you by and by.

And when you heard this, what did you do?

When our father told us not to interfere, and ordered us to go back inside our
house, we complied with his order while he was still continuing beating our
mother. So, I went out again.

When you went out again, did you see anything?

They were no longer there.

Later, did you see them? I withdraw that question.

So, when you saw that they were not there, what did you do?

WITNESS:
A

I went out of the road in front of our house to look for my parents but they were not
there.

So, what did you do?

I went back inside.

When you went back inside, what did you do?

After I went back inside of our house, I was so terrified and I sat down for awhile
and went to sleep.

Later, did you wake up?

Yes, maam.

And when you woke up, what did you do?

When I woke up, I saw my mother already unconscious.

Where was your mother then while she was unconscious?

She was lying on the ground near the datiles tree.

And did you see the physical condition of your mother when you brought her inside
the house?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, maam.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Will you please tell the court how did you see or observed the physical condition of
your mother that night?

After we brought our mother inside our house I observed that on her face, there
were several lumps and at the same time, she also had bruises on both of her
arms, and also somewhere in the middle of her breast.

How about the legs? Did you see your mothers legs or thighs?

Yes, maam.

What did you see?

My mothers legs had also bruises.

Did you see any blood on your mothers body or face?

I saw my mother was bleeding on her right ear.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

After that, what did you do after your mother was brought in to your house?

WITNESS:
A

My father ordered me to get some hot water.

Where you the one who got the hot water?

Yes, maam.

And what happened then when you brought that hot water?

After I brought some hot water, my father used it to wipe of (sic) wash my mother.

After that, what happened? What did you do?

While my father was washing my mother with lukewarm water, I noticed that my
mother never regained consciousness and she had several cuts and bruises on
her body.

Later that evening, what happened?

I went back to sleep.

Now, this incident on August 15, 1996, was this the first time that you saw your
father beat your mother?

No, maam. That was not the first time. Actually, there were several occasions
where my father beat my mother.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Later, you said your mother was brought to the hospital. Were you able to visit
your mother at the hospital the following day?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, maam.

Did you see your mother?

Yes, maam.

Can you tell us how your mother looked at the hospital?

When I visited my mother at the hospital, I noticed that her face was swo[l]len and
[s]he had several lumps on her face and I also noticed that she still had so many
bruises in both arms and body.

At the hospital, was your mother able to regain consciousness or talked to you?

No, maam. My mother never regained consciousness.

Ultimately, do you know what happened to your mother at the hospital?

Yes, maam.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

What happened to her?

WITNESS:

She died.

Do you know when your mother died?

My mother died on August 22, 1996.[13]

Princess Joy substantially corroborated her brothers testimony on its

material points. She narrated how the appellant assaulted Leah:
PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
And what did you see that evening? What happened between your father and
your mother?
WITNESS:
They had a quarrel.
PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
And what was your father doing then while he was quarreling with your mother?
WITNESS:
My father physically abused my mother.
PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
Can you tell the Court how did your father physically abused or beat or castigo
your mother that evening of October 15, 1996?
WITNESS:
My father first choked my mothers neck, he banged her head against something
and lastly, he kicked her under her left armpit.
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
My we suggest that the phrase banged her head on something be changed to
banged her head on a wall.
COURT:
On something. Let that interpretation stay and we will clarify from the witness as
we go along.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
You said your father banged your mother on something. Can you tell us how did
your father banged her head on something?
WITNESS:
My father held my mother on the head and banged my mothers head against the
wall.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
And what part of your mothers head that hit the wall?
WITNESS:

My mothers forehead hit the wall.

PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mothers head hit the wall, what happened to her?
WITNESS:
About the same time, my mothers head was against the wall, my father stepped
on a nail.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
You said your father kicked your mother. What was the position of your mother
when your father kicked her?
WITNESS:
My mother was lying prone on the ground.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
How did your father kicked your mother this time? Please describe.
WITNESS:
He just kept on kicking my mother while she was lying prone on the ground.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
Did you see where your mother was hit?
WITNESS:
She was hit on the left side portion of her stomach.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
Did you see how your father was able to hit your mother here at her side, under
her left side.
WITNESS:
My father kicked my mother and he hit the left portion of her body under her left
side which caused my mother to roll on the ground.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
About your mother, what was she doing, was she fighting back?
WITNESS:
No, maam.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What was she doing?
WITNESS:
She was just merely crying.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:

You said later your father stepped on a nail. So, what happened when he stepped
on a nail.
WITNESS:
After my father stepped on a nail my mother told him Toy, Toy, I will find some
medicine for your wound and my mother went out and went to the house of Tia
Feli.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
After your mother ran away from your father, what happened after that?
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
We object, Your Honor, the witness did not say that her mother ran away.
COURT:
Reform.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
After your mother ran away, as you said
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
Same objection, Your Honor.
COURT:
Same ruling.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mother told your father that she was going to get medicine to apply on
the wound of your father, did she ran (sic) or did she walk (sic) from your father?
WITNESS:
She ran.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
So, when your mother left, running away, what did you do?
WITNESS:
I went out to look for my mother and my father but in doing so I no longer found
them on our yard.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mother ran away, what did your father do?
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
Objection, Your Honor, her mother did not run away to get medicine.
COURT:
Sustained.

PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mother ran, what did your father do?
WITNESS:
When my mother get (sic) out and ran, my father chased my mother.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
You said you went out of the house and looked for your father and your mother
and you found out that they were not there anymore. Since you found out that
your father and mother were not there anymore in your yard, what did you do?
WITNESS:
I went back to our house.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What did you do inside your house?
WITNESS:
I slept for a while.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
Later, were you able to wake up that same evening?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What made you wake up again?
WITNESS:
I overheard my mother crying.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
Meaning, you heard your mother crying I withdraw. So, when you heard your
mother crying, what did you do because you have already woke up?
WITNESS:
I went out.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When you went out from your house after waking up and hearing the cry of your
mother, did you see your father and mother outside your house?
WITNESS:
Yes, maam.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What did you see?

WITNESS:
I saw my father pushed my mother.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your father pushed your mother, what happened to your mother?
WITNESS:
My mother, after being pushed by my father, fell to the ground and lost her
consciousness.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mother lost consciousness, what did your father do?
WITNESS:
When my mother lost consciousness, my father laid her on some stone on the
ground.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What else did your father do aside from lying your mother on the stone?
WITNESS:
After my mother was laid down on some stone (sic), my father on a sitting position,
ordered me to get some water and when I came back I poured the water on my
mother.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
After you poured water on your mother, did your mother came to consciousness?
WITNESS:
No, maam.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
What else did your father do?
WITNESS:
My father tried to resuscitate her by supplying air into her mouth.
PROSECUTOR CHUA:
Did your mother recover?
WITNESS:
No, maam.[14]

The testimonies of Francis and Princess Joy, who are of tender age,
innocent and guileless, pointing to their father as the person responsible for
the death of their mother deserve full faith and credence considering that they
would not impute a heinous crime against him for which he could be
meted reclusion perpetua or even the death penalty if such were not the

truth. A witness testimony against a blood relative is given great weight, if it is

not found to have been motivated by ill will.
[15]

Moreover, the version of Francis and Princess Joy as to what actually

transpired on that night of August 15, 1996 is more credible than that proffered
by the appellant. The childrens testimonies are buttressed by the findings of
Dr. Canto, the neurological surgeon who attended to Leah when she was
confined in the hospital, and Dr. Cruel of the Commission on Human Rights,
who conducted the post-mortem examination on Leahs body. Indeed, the
appellants claim that the death of resulted from accident, i.e., she slipped and
hit her head on two stones, flies in the face of incriminating medical
findings. As opined by Dr. Canto, he found it difficult to believe that the
injuries sustained by Leah resulted from a bad fall. The testimony of the
doctor is as follows:
Q

Doctor, you saw the patient Leah N. Dalag, of course?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, maam.

You examined her personally?

Yes, maam.

You examined the extent of her injuries when she was brought in to the hospital
and you saw her for the first time?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, and in fact, I have to add. In this particular case, I was interested specifically
because I was suspecting some foul play because the history, it was told by the
Resident Physician that she fell but I saw a lot of discrepancies injuries.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

So, will you please describe the injuries that you have observed when you
examined this particular patient and such injuries that are now reflected in this
diagram which have been made under your direction which you have testified
earlier?

She had peri-orbital hematomas.

Can you explain that in the laymans language?

Okey. She had a blackeye. She had also evidence of contusion, hematoma also
on the right mastoid area.

Where is that, Doctor?

Behind the ear. Those two (2) signs indicate usually basal fracture and
hemorrhage on the base of the brain.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

What else have you noticed on the face of the patient, Doctor?

WITNESS:
A

The one which really struck me and I was suspicious then, were the apparent
fingermarks.

COURT:
Q

Where?

WITNESS:
Q

In the neck.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

And what does that indicate these clawmarks on the neck which arose your
suspicion?

They were located on the anterior part of the neck.

And what does this indicate? How does this mark came into the neck of the
patient?

Well, to be honest, it was my own opinion then because there was a discrepancy
from the injuries I have seen and the alleged accident which was told by the
informer that time.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

And Doctor, in your opinion, what could have caused this injury on the neck?

WITNESS:
A

I was suspecting that she was strangled.

Now, Doctor, there is also a mark on this diagram here. Can you tell us what is
this on the chest?

That is another contusion abrasion which I noted.

Where?

On the anterior part of the chest at the level of the syphoid process. This is the
most interior part of the sternum.

In laymans language Doctor, what part of the body is that?

Well, it is just midline just below the level of her breast.

Now, Doctor, there are also here some marks on the ear of the patient as drawn
here. Can you tell or explain this to us?

WITNESS:
A

This was explained earlier. These are hematomas, contusions. Hematomas at

the mastoid area. It is usually a sign of basal skull fracture.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Now, Doctor, was this contusion and hematoma found on both ears of the patient
Leah Dalag?

I cannot recall but based on this drawing, it is bilateral on both sides of the ears.

Doctor, have you noticed upon examination of the patient whether or not blood was
coming out from any part of her body?

I cannot recall.

What else have you noticed, Doctor, aside from hematomas and contusions?

I cannot recall everything but I note some abrasions on the extermities (sic) in
the elbows.

How about on the temple? On the head? Aside from those that you have
described on the two (2) ears, how about the portion on the head?

WITNESS:
A

None.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Now, Doctor, is it possible that a human brain can sustain internal injuries without
outward manifestation which may be visible to the naked eyes?

Yes, maam.

Can you give specific instance, Doctor? Can you explain further?

The brain floats inside the skull. Imagine the brain contained in a glass jar with
fluid. The brain floats there and any movement of the jar will cause also an
acceleration-deceleration movement. If you translate it into a force applied to the
skull, for example a vehicular accident the brain can bust to and fro or even
rotated around the skull and cause the internal injuries.

COURT:
Q

Just like the effect of boxing?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q

Whether professional or amateur boxing?

Yes, your honor.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

How about Doctor, when you choke a person? Shake him or her can it sustain
brain damage?

ATTY. GRIJALDO:
We object to the question, your honor. That already assumes that this witness,
your honor, is being presented as an expert witness, your honor. The purpose of
presenting this witness is to testify on his findings on the injuries sustained by the
deceased, your honor. He was not presented as an expert witness, your honor.
FISCAL CHUA:

He was.
COURT:
Paero, I have been keeping track of the qualification of the physician. He is not
an ordinary physician. But he has specialized in Neurology. That is why he is
considered as a specialist.
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
But he was offered to testify on his findings on the deceased, your honor.
COURT:
That is why the findings here are contusions. He is explaining now why he arrived
at this conclusion. He is going into the details. That is how I
understand. Overruled. May answer. The court would like also to know about
that.
WITNESS:
A

Choking with a finger or even whatever means, an assailant can inflict causing
several injuries; not only the shaking of the head. At the same time, he also
decrease oxygenation of the brain. Because there are several factors involved
here. First, the patient cant breath, therefore, she will have asphyxia. Choking
can also compress the carotid arteries which supply the main supply of blood to
the brain. This also causes hypoxemia which decrease oxygenation of the
blood. So, aside from the injuries being sustained by the brain by the force acted
upon by the shaking, it causes swelling of the brain because of the other factors
that I mentioned hypoxemia and asphyxia.

FISCAL CHUA:
Q

Now, Doctor, assuming the facts as already established by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as well as what you have testified, can you state with
reasonable certainty whether in your opinion, the injuries suffered by the deceased
was the direct result of the violence and batterings from the hands of the accused
Armando Dalag on August 15, 1996?

ATTY. GRJALDO:
Objection, your honor.
COURT:
Sustained. Do not point to the accused. Reform
FISCAL CHUA:
I reform, your honor.
Q

Assuming the facts as already established by the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses and the injuries that you have described just right now, can you state in
your own opinion with reasonable certainty that the injuries suffered by the
deceased was the direct result of the violence and the batterings she received on
August 15, 1996 or before she was brought to the hospital?

Yes, maam.

Now, further assuming the facts established by other witnesses in this case, can
you state with reasonable certainty whether in your opinion, the injuries sustained
by the deceased Leah N. Dalag could have caused her death on August 22, 1996?

Yes, maam.[16]

The foregoing testimony of Dr. Canto as to the nature and extent of the
injuries sustained by Leah not only confirms the testimonies of the children but
likewise exposes as utterly preposterous the appellants claim that she
suffered from a bad fall. Notably, Dr. Cantos findings were corroborated by
the findings of Dr. Cruel, who conducted the post-mortem examination on
Leahs corpse. As the trial court aptly observed:
The denials of the accused that he authored the injuries sustained by his wife and his
claim that she was injured because she hit her head on two big stones when she
accidentally fell, appear illogical and a poor concoction of facts, so hard to believe in
the light of undisputed findings and conclusions by medical experts declaring
otherwise, and the recollection of facts by the eye-witnesses.
[17]

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah
that caused her death were the consequence of the appellants deliberate and
intentional acts. The appellant is criminally liable for the death of Leah
pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
thus:
ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659.)
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1)
a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to
death. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with
the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
[18]

[19]

certificate. In this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of
parricide.
[20]

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant. He surrendered to SPO3
Herman S. Garcia, PO3 Joel Stephen Casador and Felimon Roderos on
August 28, 1996 at 12:45 p.m.
[21]

The trial court erred in applying in favor of the appellant Article 13,
paragraph 6 in relation to Article 13, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code
which read:
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.

10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned.
The trial court declared that the appellant was agitated and angered
when Leah failed to return immediately from Tia Felis house where she was
supposed to get medicine for his wounded foot. The attitude of Leah was, as
found by the trial court, obviously unjust and improper to a husband who was
suffering and bleeding. This conclusion of the trial court is without factual
basis. This Court agrees with the finding of the trial court that Leah did not
bother getting medicine for the injury on the foot of the appellant when he
stepped on a nail as he martyred Leah. However, this Court believes that
Leah told the appellant that she was going to the house of Felisa to get
medicine for his injured foot merely as a ploy to enable her to escape from
him and avoid further physical abuse. Leah cannot be faulted for preferring to
escape from the clutches of the appellant rather than get medicine for the
injured foot of the latter. She was being assaulted by the appellant
relentlessly and without mercy. Unless she escaped from the clutches of the
appellant, she would be killed by him. Leah could not be expected to first get
medicine, return to the house and treat the injured foot of the appellant only to
be assaulted again by her husband. For the trial court to blame Leah for
preferring to escape and survive rather than treat the injured foot of the
appellant, and reward the appellant by mitigating his criminal liability is a
travesty.
[22]

There being one mitigating circumstance in favor of the appellant and no

aggravating circumstance against him, the lower penalty of reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed on him in consonance with Article 63 of the

Revised Penal Code. The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court to the heirs of the victim is in order. The children of Leah Nolido are
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
[23]

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated January 10, 1997, of the Regional

Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42, in Criminal Case No. 17838 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide defined in and penalized by Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, there being a mitigating circumstance
without any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. The
appellant is ordered to pay to the children of the victim Leah Nolido the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182551

July 27, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the Decision1 dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282, which modified the Decision 2 dated November 3, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4232. In the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin was
adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) separate counts of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder
in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year
old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds caused
the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately thereafter.3
When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge.4 Trial, thereafter, ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health
Officer of Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim
Felipe Lagera and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.; 5 (3) Adoracion Lagera, the wife of
Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil
Tagpis, Jr.
Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the
victim Felipe Lagera on November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking
wounds, the first of which was located at his right arm and was about 23x2x4 centimeters.
The said wound was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp instrument such as a
bolo. The second wound was located at Felipes "nose maxillary area," 6 measuring 13
centimeters, with an inverted C shape. The second wound was not fatal and could have
been caused by a sharp-edged instrument like a bolo. The third wound was located at

Felipes left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5 centimeters. The said wound was fatal and
could have likewise been caused by a sharp-edged instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded
that the causes of death of Felipe were hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple
hacking wounds. She also conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of Ranil
Tagpis, Jr. on the aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil sustained a hacking
wound at the "fronto-temporal area"7 with a skull fracture. In the case of Ranil, the cause of
death was "hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to [the] hacking
wound to the head."8 The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.9
Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She pointed to the
accused-appellant as the "Bata Endong"10 (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and
brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the
left shoulder and the right shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant, the
former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the direction of the coconut tree and
thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela said that she saw that a long bolo was used in the
killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was not able to
use the same when he was attacked. She was then inside the house with Felipe and her
two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about four meters away
when the hacking incident occurred indoors.11
On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing with
a toy camera inside the house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench.
Felipe was also there near the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm. When
asked whether the accused-appellant came inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela
answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe when the
accused-appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or altercation occurred between
Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran outside of
the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the house. 12
Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was at the house of
a certain Justiniano Rance. After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told her
to go home because Felipe had been hacked. She ran towards the direction of her house.
When she got there, she saw the lifeless body of Felipe sprawled on the ground. She then
went inside the house and found her daughter, Alma Tagpis, cuddling the body of Ranil
whose head was wounded. She told Alma to look for a motor vehicle to bring the child to the
hospital. She also found out that the other two children, Carmela and Jericho, hid when they
saw Felipe being hacked. When she asked them who went to their house, Carmela told her
that it was the accused-appellant who entered their house and hacked the victims. 13
Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was in Brgy. Sogod,
having their palay (unhusked rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and
proceeded to the house of her father, Felipe, where she left her children. She then met a

person looking for her mother who was about to tell the latter that Felipe was hacked. When
she rushed to Felipes house, she saw him lying in the grassy place, wounded and
motionless. She asked Felipe who hacked him, but he was not able to answer anymore.
She went inside the house and saw blood on the floor and the feet of her son Ranil.
Thinking that the killer was still inside, she went to the back of the house and pulled a slot of
board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing the body of Ranil, she took him and
ran towards the road. She was able to bring Ranil to the hospital, but the doctor already
pronounced him dead. Her other two children, Carmela and Jericho, soon arrived at the
hospital with the police. When she asked them who killed Felipe, Carmela answered that it
was the accused-appellant.14
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidence, to wit: (1)
Exhibit A the Post-mortem Examination Report on Felipe; 15 (2) Exhibit B the sketch of
the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Felipe; 16 (3) Exhibit C the
Certificate of Death of Felipe;17 (4) Exhibit D the Post-mortem Examination Report on
Ranil;18 (5) Exhibit E the sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by
Ranil;19 and (6) Exhibit F the Certificate of Death of Ranil. 20
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond
Rance, the stepson of the accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal, 21 the barangay
chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; (3) Arnulfo Alberca, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the accused-appellant
Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.
Raymond Rance testified that his mothers name is Marites Rance. The accused-appellant
is not his biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He
narrated that on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house. Felipe
placed himself on top of Raymonds mother, who was lying down. Raymond and his
younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their mother and they were awakened. His
mother kept pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in driving him out. In the
evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00 p.m., Raymond recounted that he saw Felipes
son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy was able to go upstairs and kept
trying to place himself on top of Raymonds mother. The latter got mad and pushed Timboy
away. She even pushed him down the stairs. The accused-appellant was working in Manila
when the aforesaid incidents happened. Raymond said that his mother thereafter left for
Manila. Subsequently, he saw the accused-appellant at the house of a certain Bernie,
several days after the accused-appellant arrived in Leyte. He told the accused-appellant
about the incidents involving Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and the
accused were already living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left
their house after they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latters
mother. Raymond testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of
his family. He also stated that the accused-appellant seldom drank liquor and even if he did
get drunk, he did not cause any trouble.22

Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to

him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant) fought with
Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human rights action officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the
chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused-appellant to the police station. Afterwards,
the police officers came to his place and he accompanied them to the house of Felipe. 23
Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary
surrender of the accused-appellant was entered into the records of the police blotter. He
was asked to read in open court the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002,
which recorded the fact of voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant. His testimony was
no longer presented, however, since the prosecution already admitted the contents of the
blotter.24
The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August 15,
2002. He went to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he
learned that his wife went to Manila and his brother was taking care of his two children and
his stepson, Raymond. On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his friend,
Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latters mother went to Manila and he was told
that, while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to
place themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he harbored ill feelings towards the
said men but he was able to control the same for the sake of his children. On November 6,
2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a
call to his wife who was in Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since he was using
the same to cut cassava stems in his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that
she was sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant
proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first sought shelter at the place of his friend,
Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying there and
drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he
remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera. 25
The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the latter
was feeding chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he
confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that
the accused-appellant had a bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted to start
a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and responded that Felipe should not get
angry, as it was he (Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his wife. Felipe
allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry it
with his hand. The accused-appellant then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left
side of the abdomen, as the latter was already turning and about to run to the house. He
also went inside the house since Felipe might get hold of a weapon. When they were both
inside and he was about to deliver a second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child
Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered suddenly, he was not able to
withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. When he saw that he hit

the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on Felipe, which landed on the
right side of the latters neck. Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and hacked
him again, which blow hit the victims upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on the
yard of his house and was about to run towards the road. He then left and surrendered to
the barangay chairperson.26
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he
proceeded to Felipes house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after
the first hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had no intention to back out
because he was thinking that the victim might get a gun and use the same against him. The
accused-appellant also asserted that when he was about to deliver the second hacking
blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and used him to shield the
blow. There was a long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able to take hold of the same
because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted that he had a plan to kill
Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the latters house on the day of the attack, he
had no intention to kill him.27
The defense also presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 the Police
Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002;28 and (2) Exhibit 2 the Civil Marriage
Contract of Rosendo Rebucan and Marites Rance.29
On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime of double murder. The trial court elucidated thus:
[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the accused] was sexually
abused by the father and son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to avenge his wifes
sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill Felipe did not wither, instead it
became stronger, that on the 6th of November 2002, he armed himself with a sharp long
bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the victim
live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with his
compadre "Enok", he decided to execute his evil deeds by going to the house of Felipe
Lagera, in the guise of buying kerosene and once inside the house hacked and wounded
the victim, Felipe Lagera who was then holding in his arm his grandson, one and half years
1 old, Ramil Tagpis, Jr.
The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil
Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and executed with treachery.
xxxx
There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the victim,
Felipe was holding in his arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house, when
the accused entered, and without any warning or provocation coming from the victim, the

accused immediately delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving no regard to the
innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this precarious situation, the victim who was
unarmed has no opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful aggression of the
accused, moreso, to retaliate. Moreover, what defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up against the armed and superior strength of the accused, but to
leave his fate to God.
The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victims, unarmed,
were caught totally unprepared to defend themselves qualifies the crime committed as
murder. x x x.
After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the house of Brgy.
Chairman, Renerio Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to surrender,
because he killed Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his
Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky Irlandez and his Chief Tanod, Pedro Oledan to
bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender
was corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented to Court the police
blotter, under entry No. 5885, dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.
Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities showed his intent to submit
himself unconditionally to them, to save the authorities from trouble and expenses that they
would incur for his capture. For this reason, he has complied with the requisites of voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.] x x x.
From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances of admission and voluntary
surrender credited to the accused are not sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances
of: a) evident premeditation; b) treachery (alevosia); c) dwelling the crime was committed
at the house of the victim; d) intoxication the accused fueled himself with the spirit of
London gin prior to the commission of the crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and f)
minority, in so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is concerned, pursuant to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. x x x.
xxxx
In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the quantum of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 30
The RTC, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and further amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court
found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of DOUBLE MURDER charged under the information and sentenced to suffer the

maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of Felipe Lagera and
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos for each
victim and moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos to
each; and
Pay the Cost.31 (Emphases ours.)
The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review and the same was
docketed as G.R. No. 161706.32 The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal
briefs.33 In our Resolution34 dated July 19, 2005, we ordered the transfer of the case to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.35 Before the appellate court, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00282.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying the
judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accused-appellant resulted in two separate
crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a
complex crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the
RTC that the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. With respect to the ensuant mitigating circumstances,
the Court of Appeals credited the circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the
accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate vindication of a
grave offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also
ruled that the same was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant is hereby adjudged guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr.,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
murder he has committed.
The award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim; the award of moral
damages is likewise reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of each victim. 36
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 37 of the above decision. In a
Resolution38 dated February 6, 2008, the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the
case be forwarded to this Court.

On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice. 39 Thereafter,
both parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed before the Court of
Appeals and will no longer file their respective supplemental briefs. 40
The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE
OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE INTOXICATION
AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND
MINORITY.41

The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was
committed with treachery and evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to the
presence of treachery given that there was no eyewitness who categorically stated that the
accused-appellant attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving them of the means to
defend themselves. He brushed aside the testimony of Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she
was not in a position to say that there was no altercation between him and Felipe, which
could have put the latter on guard. The prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the
accused-appellant intentionally waited for the time when Felipe would be defenseless
before initiating the attack. The fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the barangay
chairperson and the police and admitted the killings supposedly showed that it was not
intentional and he did not consciously adopt the method of attack upon the two victims. The
accused-appellant similarly rejects the finding of the RTC that there was evident
premeditation on his part since the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately planned
the killing of Felipe.

The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the incident, he was still unable to
control his anger as he just recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by Felipe
and the latters son, Timboy. He also avers that he was a bit intoxicated when the crime took
place so that he was not in total control of himself. He claims that he is not a habitual
drinker and that he merely consumed the alcohol prior to the incident in order to appease
his friend. He likewise argues that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should not have
been appreciated inasmuch as the same was not alleged in the information. Moreover, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated since he did
not deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and the death of the latter was accidental.
The accused-appellant prays that he should only be found guilty of the crime of homicide
with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave
offense and intoxication.
The appeal lacks merit.
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.42 Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason for it is only when the conscience is satisfied that
the perpetrator of the crime is the person on trial should there be a judgment of
conviction.43 A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions own evidence,
not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 44
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of
Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
According to Article 24845 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant
circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the
provisions of Article 246.46 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.47 The essence of treachery is a deliberate
and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with
the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in
treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.48
In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant

carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we reiterate the established
doctrine articulated in People v. De Guzman49 that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on
the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. x x x. 50
Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. 51
Carmela testified as follows:
PROS. TORREVILLAS:
Q: Do you have a brother named Ranil Tagpis, Jr?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Where is he now?
A: He is dead.
Q: Do you know the circumstance of his death?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why did he die?
A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.
Q: Do you know also your grandfather Felipe Lagera, Jr?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Where is he now?
A: He is dead also.
Q: Why did he die?

A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.

Q: Is the person your Bata Endong here in the court room who hacked your brother and
your grandfather?
A: Yes sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person when asked of his name identified himself as Rosendo
Rebucan.
xxxx
Q: What instrument did the accused use in killing your [brother and] your grandfather?
A: Long bolo, sundang.
Q: Were you able to see that long bolo?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: Was your grandfather armed that time?
A: He has his own bolo but he placed it on the holder of the long bolo.
Q: Was that long bolo used by your grandfather?
A: No sir.
xxxx
Q: How far were you to the incident, when this hacking incident happened?
A: (witness indicating a distance of about 4 meters).
xxxx
COURT:
Cross.
ATTY. DICO:

Q: You stated awhile ago that your brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil] and you and your papo
Felipe were at the house of your papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You mean to say that there were no other persons present in that house other than
you four (4)?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: So, you were playing that toy camera inside the room of your papo Felipe?
A: No sir, I was playing then at the side of the chicken cage.
Q: Is that chicken cage was inside or outside the house of your papo Felipes house?
A: Inside the house of my grandfather.
xxxx
Q: Was your brother Ranil carried by your grandfather Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
He was carried by his right arm.
Q: So, you mean to say that your uncle Endo went inside, it was so sudden?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Because it was sudden, you were not able to do anything, what did you do?
A: I then cried at that time.
xxxx
Q: But you are sure that when your uncle Endo entered as you said that your brother
Ramil was carried by your papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did your uncle Endo and your papo Felipe fight or was there an altercation?

A: No sir.52

As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly and categorically pointed to
the accused-appellant as the person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated
that the attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between the accused-appellant
and Felipe. Without any provocation, the accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal
hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe
defenseless and deprived him of any opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe
was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that
of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise correctly appreciated the
existence of treachery. The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the
victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from
the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against
the attack or become aware of it.53 Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized by
treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the weakness of the victim due to
his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused. 54
Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that the
attack was preceded by a fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be
persuaded by the accused-appellants version of the events in question. Indeed, the Court
has ruled that the testimony of children of sound mind is "more correct and truthful than that
of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of
incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are
likely more correct in detail than that of older persons." 55 In the instant case, Carmela was
cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained steadfast and consistent in her
statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of Carmela.
Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of Carmela, but
some portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the
trial court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of the human anatomy of Felipe,
which was marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three
hacking wounds that were found on his right arm, at his "nose maxillary area" 56 and on his
left arm. On the other hand, the accused-appellant testified that he delivered four hacking
blows on Felipe, the three of which landed on the left side of the victims abdomen, the right
side of his neck and on his upper left arm. When confronted on the said apparently
conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any explanation. 57
Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of
Felipe and Ranil to murder.
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the Court of Appeals appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to

aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the
following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time,
between determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.58 It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal
intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not
merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation." 59 In the case at bar, the
evidence of the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident premeditation
since the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of the actual commission of the
crime and the events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when the accused-appellant devised a
plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry out the plan and that a
sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.
Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. 60 On the other
hand, dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances in the instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or
specified in the information that was filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, a generic aggravating
circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the information. This
requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to wit:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals vis--vis the
nature of crimes committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant
should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double
murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other.61
The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under
any of the two classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly
and indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking
blow from the accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela did not contain any
detail as to this material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that the murder of
Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the murder of
Ranil and vice versa. As the factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should be made liable for two
separate and distinct acts of murder. In the past, when two crimes have been improperly
designated as a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the
component crimes separately instead of the complex crime. 62
In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold the
trial courts ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements
must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders
himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.63 To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner
clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they
acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will
necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. 64 The accused-appellant has
duly established in this case that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered
unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before
he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this circumstance of voluntary
surrender during trial.
We reject, however, the accused-appellants contention that the trial court erred in failing to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave
offense.
The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication of
the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court finds that the

accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication since his own
testimony failed to substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in question.
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant himself positively stated that he was
only a bit tipsy but not drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. 65 He cannot,
therefore, be allowed to make a contrary assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of
the crimes he committed on the basis thereof.
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the
same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code requires that the act be "committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees." The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a
grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity.66 In the case
at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on
the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He
testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002.
Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack
that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient
enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained his composure and
self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the
accused-appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any other
aggravating circumstance in both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as
the presence of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly
established in both instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code67 mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant is
reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 68
The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity andP75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, reduced the aforesaid amounts to P50,000.00 and further
awarded the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime.69 Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the
court for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the latters
death. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to
compensate them for injuries to their feelings. 70 The award of exemplary damages, on the
other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In People v. Dalisay,71 the Court clarified that "[b]eing corrective in nature, exemplary
damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an
instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays
down the very basis of the award."72
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is, however,
increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. As held in People
v. Combate,73 when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of
reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded are P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award
of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award
of P25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs
of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven. 74
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated August
21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The accused-appellant
Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of
Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify
the respective heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary

damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each victim, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 197807

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

- versus -

CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING,

Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:
April 16, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 in Manila, in Criminal
Case No. 02-200106 for Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for Frustrated
Murder.
The Facts
Two Informations[3] charged accused Cecilia Lagman as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-200106
That on or about February 24, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago, by then and there stabbing him with a
knife with an approximate length of 6 inches (blade and handle)
hitting his neck and trunk, thereby inflicting upon said Jondel Mari
Davantes Santiago stab wounds which are necessarily fatal and mortal,
which were the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.
Criminal Case No. 02-200107
That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there
stabbing her hitting her buttocks, thereby inflicting upon the said Violeta
Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which were necessarily fatal, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula which
prevented her death.

During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna
Maniego (Maniego), Violeta Sicor (Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit
(PO3 Alateit), and PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3 Samson).
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her
banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside
her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused
approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned on Sicor,
grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife.
Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding
that the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her
common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiagos
mother.[4] On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from
a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was
punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters.[5]Maniego
then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading
towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego
rushedSantiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired. While
Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was being treated after an
angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting the
accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.[6]
After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and
brought to police headquarters.[7]
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for
almost ten years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused
got angry with her when she eloped with Santiago.[8]

Sicor, Maniegos mother, corroborated Maniegos testimony. She saw the

accused punch Maniego several times while they were inside the sidecar on
February 24, 2002. The accused then grabbed her and stabbed her in her buttocks
with a small knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two sidecar boys came to
her aid and brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from the
hospital two hours after receiving treatment.[9]
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his
motorcycle on his way home. While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and
Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place.
He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw
a woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was bloodied.
He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed that she had stabbed
someone. At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the womans waist. He
confiscated the item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres
Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the woman as the accused.[10]
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2
Edison Bertoldo was the police investigator in the case against the accused and that
he prepared the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit A;

Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit C;
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit E;
Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits F, F-1 and F-2;
and
(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002, Exhibit
F-3.[11]
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date
of the incident, he was assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory
Division. He presented before the court the sharp object used in stabbing the victim
(Exhibit M) and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit M-1).[12]

For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr.
Mario Lato.
Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date
of the stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that
she had been spreading the rumor that the accused was insane. Maniego answered
in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped Maniego and left, leaving
Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead pipe.
Since she needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought
to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad.
[13]

At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that
nothing was found on her body when she was frisked. She said that the knife
recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area
where it was found. She added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not
with Sicor or Santiago.[14]
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused,
who had a laceration on the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such
as a pipe. He said that the accused sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her
mid-pectoral area.[15]
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 02-200106 and Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring
guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106. She is sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel Lari
Santiago, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No.
02-200107, this court finds same accused guilty of Less Serious Physical
Injuries. She is sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor and
to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness
Maniego. She also averred that the same witness credibility was improperly
appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from the one who
rendered the decision.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that accused-appellants guilt was
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It added that accused-appellant failed to show
any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January
18, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED.[17]

Hence, We have this appeal.

The Issues
I
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
II
Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecutions witness despite patent inconsistencies
III
Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery

The defense reiterates previous arguments calling for an acquittal of

accused-appellant. It casts doubt on Maniegos testimony, claiming that it has
irreconcilable inconsistencies which affected her credibility.
The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before
Judge Romulo A. Lopez, while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra GarciaFernandez.[18] It is further contended that Maniego did not actually
witness Santiago being stabbed, because she admitted in court that she found out
that Santiago had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to
her injured mother.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 58 in height
and of average built while accused-appellant is only 411. It is, thus, incredible
that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on the victim.
Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the
killing of Santiago was accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accusedappellant did stab the victim, the defense claims that it was not proved that she
deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was even
preceded by a confrontation between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it was
Sicor and Santiago who followed accused-appellant after the confrontation. The
stabbing incident should have been considered as having occurred in the spur of
the moment.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the CA Decision.
Elements of Murder Established
The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was

attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[19]
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and
that it was accused-appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the
crime. Santiagos killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the
RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in
the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
Maniegos testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as
follows:
Q

What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?

I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay

hall to ask help x x x.

And what happened after that?

xxxx

Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta

ko ho doon nasalubong po ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala
hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si Jondel Mari.
(When I went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the
barangay chairman was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet
[sic] Cecilia Lagman and without any word Cecilia Lagman
stabbed Jondel Mari.)

And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly

stabbed Jondel Mari Santiago?

At Asuncion, Lakandula [in Tondo Manila] x x x.

Q
A

When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far
were you?
(Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).
xxxx

Q
A

What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia

Lagman?
He was lighting a cigarette x x x.

And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was

stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh.

[He was shocked because he did not know he was going to be
stabbed.]

What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was
stabbed?

A
Q
A

One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x
x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will
you be able to identify her?
Yes x x x.
xxxx
x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]

Q
A

x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four
times is in court will you be able to identify him or her?
Siya rin po. [She is the same person.][20]

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be

present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend

himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. [21] The essence of treachery
is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.[22] These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago.
We quote with approval the appellate courts finding on the presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant,
without warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter
no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from
appellants onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a
clear case of treachery.[23] x x x

Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and

the victim, We affirm the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that
accused-appellants method of inflicting harm ensured that she would fatally
wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of the victim in
terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in
attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant
suddenly started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.
Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It has been long settled that when the issues raised concern
the credibility of a witness, the trial courts findings of fact, its calibration of
testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies probative weight, including its
conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is
acknowledged that the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are
telling the truth.[24] Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to show why Maniego
and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a terrible crime. Maniego

was the common-law spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to seek
justice for his death as well as the injury sustained by her mother.
An examination of the records shows that there is no truth to the allegation
of accused-appellant that Maniego did not witness the stabbing of Santiago. She
clearly testified that accused-appellant first stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on
the side of his neck, then twice on his back.[25]
On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the
fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of conviction.[26] That the trial
judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case
does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is
sufficient to support its conclusion.[27]
Alibi as a Defense
The defense of alibi is likewise unconvincing. Accused-appellant was
positively identified by eyewitnesses. She herself admitted that she confronted one
of the eyewitnesses, Maniego, moments before she was seen attacking
Maniego, Santiago and Sicor. It is well-settled that alibi cannot be sustained where
it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place
of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [28] In
accused-appellants case, there is no corroborative evidence of her alibi or proof of
physical impossibility of her being at the scene of the incident to shore up her
defense.
Elements of Less Serious Physical Injuries Not Established
We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case
No. 02-200107. Originally charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was
convicted of less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The

RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a vital part of
the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical
treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated
murder as it was not shown that there was intent to kill.[29] However, while the RTC
correctly ruled that the accused-appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records do not support a conviction for less
serious physical injuries.
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require
medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. Nothing in the records,
however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10)
days or more or that she required medical attention for the same period. After the
wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was released two hours after she was
admitted to the hospital.[30] She later returned to the hospital for the removal of the
suture on her wound, according to the RTC, after a certain period of time. [31] The
Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit H) does not indicate how many days of
medical treatment her injury would need.[32] Sicor, however, testified that she lost
two (2) days of work on account of the injury she sustained.[33]The testimony of her
attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis Cendeno, on the other hand, was
dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties on his testimony.[34] The
prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the injury sustained by Sicor
falls under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement that her injury
required medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical
injuries. Under par. 1, Art. 266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries
is arresto menorwhen the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period. There being no modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64,

[35]

accused-appellant should be meted a penalty of imprisonment ofarresto

menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty (20)
days under Art. 76 of the RPC.
Pecuniary Liability
The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 02-200106 and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No.
02-200106.
People v. Combate[36] reiterated the rule on civil indemnity and damages:
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest,
in proper cases. In People v. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of damages. This
rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such
as Mendoza v. People, People v. Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People
v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award
of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory
damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.

In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[37] the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of
PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Santiago is in order. Moral damages of PhP
50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six percent (6%)
per annum, are also proper.[38]
We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only
slight physical injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was
presented during trial.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 03289 finding accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No.
02-200106 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP
50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of judgment until fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No.
02-200107, accused-appellant is convicted of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto menor. The award of
temperate damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 197807

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

- versus -

CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING,

Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:
April 16, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 in Manila, in Criminal
Case No. 02-200106 for Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for Frustrated
Murder.
The Facts
Two Informations[3] charged accused Cecilia Lagman as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-200106
That on or about February 24, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago, by then and there stabbing him with a
knife with an approximate length of 6 inches (blade and handle)
hitting his neck and trunk, thereby inflicting upon said Jondel Mari
Davantes Santiago stab wounds which are necessarily fatal and mortal,
which were the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.
Criminal Case No. 02-200107
That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there
stabbing her hitting her buttocks, thereby inflicting upon the said Violeta
Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which were necessarily fatal, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula which
prevented her death.

During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna
Maniego (Maniego), Violeta Sicor (Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit
(PO3 Alateit), and PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3 Samson).
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her
banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside
her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused
approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned on Sicor,
grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife.
Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding
that the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her
common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiagos
mother.[4] On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from
a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was
punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters.[5]Maniego
then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading
towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego
rushedSantiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired. While
Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was being treated after an
angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting the
accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.[6]
After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and
brought to police headquarters.[7]
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for
almost ten years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused
got angry with her when she eloped with Santiago.[8]
Sicor, Maniegos mother, corroborated Maniegos testimony. She saw the
accused punch Maniego several times while they were inside the sidecar on

February 24, 2002. The accused then grabbed her and stabbed her in her buttocks
with a small knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two sidecar boys came to
her aid and brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from the
hospital two hours after receiving treatment.[9]
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his
motorcycle on his way home. While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and
Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place.
He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw
a woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was bloodied.
He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed that she had stabbed
someone. At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the womans waist. He
confiscated the item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres
Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the woman as the accused.[10]
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2
Edison Bertoldo was the police investigator in the case against the accused and that
he prepared the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit A;

Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit C;
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit E;
Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits F, F-1 and F-2;
and
(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002, Exhibit
F-3.[11]
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date
of the incident, he was assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory
Division. He presented before the court the sharp object used in stabbing the victim
(Exhibit M) and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit M-1).[12]
For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr.
Mario Lato.

Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date
of the stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that
she had been spreading the rumor that the accused was insane. Maniego answered
in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped Maniego and left, leaving
Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead pipe.
Since she needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought
to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad.
[13]

At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that
nothing was found on her body when she was frisked. She said that the knife
recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area
where it was found. She added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not
with Sicor or Santiago.[14]
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused,
who had a laceration on the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such
as a pipe. He said that the accused sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her
mid-pectoral area.[15]
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 02-200106 and Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring
guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106. She is sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel Lari
Santiago, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No.
02-200107, this court finds same accused guilty of Less Serious Physical
Injuries. She is sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor and
to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.[16]

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness
Maniego. She also averred that the same witness credibility was improperly
appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from the one who
rendered the decision.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that accused-appellants guilt was
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It added that accused-appellant failed to show
any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January
18, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED.[17]

Hence, We have this appeal.

The Issues
I
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
II
Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecutions witness despite patent inconsistencies
III
Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery

The defense reiterates previous arguments calling for an acquittal of

accused-appellant. It casts doubt on Maniegos testimony, claiming that it has
irreconcilable inconsistencies which affected her credibility.
The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before
Judge Romulo A. Lopez, while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra GarciaFernandez.[18] It is further contended that Maniego did not actually
witness Santiago being stabbed, because she admitted in court that she found out
that Santiago had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to
her injured mother.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 58 in height
and of average built while accused-appellant is only 411. It is, thus, incredible
that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on the victim.
Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the
killing of Santiago was accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accusedappellant did stab the victim, the defense claims that it was not proved that she
deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was even
preceded by a confrontation between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it was
Sicor and Santiago who followed accused-appellant after the confrontation. The
stabbing incident should have been considered as having occurred in the spur of
the moment.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the CA Decision.
Elements of Murder Established
The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[19]

The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and
that it was accused-appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the
crime. Santiagos killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the
RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in
the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
Maniegos testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as
follows:
Q

What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?

I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay

hall to ask help x x x.

And what happened after that?

xxxx

Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta

ko ho doon nasalubong po ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala
hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si Jondel Mari.
(When I went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the
barangay chairman was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet
[sic] Cecilia Lagman and without any word Cecilia Lagman
stabbed Jondel Mari.)

And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly

stabbed Jondel Mari Santiago?

A
Q
A

At Asuncion, Lakandula [in Tondo Manila] x x x.

When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far
were you?
(Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).

xxxx
Q
A

What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia

Lagman?
He was lighting a cigarette x x x.

And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was

stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh.

[He was shocked because he did not know he was going to be
stabbed.]

What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was
stabbed?

A
Q
A

One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x
x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will
you be able to identify her?
Yes x x x.
xxxx
x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]

Q
A

x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four
times is in court will you be able to identify him or her?
Siya rin po. [She is the same person.][20]

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be

present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. [21] The essence of treachery
is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected

way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.[22] These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago.
We quote with approval the appellate courts finding on the presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant,
without warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter
no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from
appellants onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a
clear case of treachery.[23] x x x

Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and

the victim, We affirm the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that
accused-appellants method of inflicting harm ensured that she would fatally
wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of the victim in
terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in
attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant
suddenly started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.
Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It has been long settled that when the issues raised concern
the credibility of a witness, the trial courts findings of fact, its calibration of
testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies probative weight, including its
conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is
acknowledged that the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are
telling the truth.[24] Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to show why Maniego
and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a terrible crime. Maniego
was the common-law spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to seek
justice for his death as well as the injury sustained by her mother.

An examination of the records shows that there is no truth to the allegation

of accused-appellant that Maniego did not witness the stabbing of Santiago. She
clearly testified that accused-appellant first stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on
the side of his neck, then twice on his back.[25]
On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the
fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of conviction.[26] That the trial
judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case
does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is
sufficient to support its conclusion.[27]
Alibi as a Defense
The defense of alibi is likewise unconvincing. Accused-appellant was
positively identified by eyewitnesses. She herself admitted that she confronted one
of the eyewitnesses, Maniego, moments before she was seen attacking
Maniego, Santiago and Sicor. It is well-settled that alibi cannot be sustained where
it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place
of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [28] In
accused-appellants case, there is no corroborative evidence of her alibi or proof of
physical impossibility of her being at the scene of the incident to shore up her
defense.
Elements of Less Serious Physical Injuries Not Established
We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case
No. 02-200107. Originally charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was
convicted of less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The
RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a vital part of
the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical
treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated

murder as it was not shown that there was intent to kill.[29] However, while the RTC
correctly ruled that the accused-appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records do not support a conviction for less
serious physical injuries.
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require
medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. Nothing in the records,
however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10)
days or more or that she required medical attention for the same period. After the
wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was released two hours after she was
admitted to the hospital.[30] She later returned to the hospital for the removal of the
suture on her wound, according to the RTC, after a certain period of time. [31] The
Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit H) does not indicate how many days of
medical treatment her injury would need.[32] Sicor, however, testified that she lost
two (2) days of work on account of the injury she sustained.[33]The testimony of her
attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis Cendeno, on the other hand, was
dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties on his testimony.[34] The
prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the injury sustained by Sicor
falls under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement that her injury
required medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical
injuries. Under par. 1, Art. 266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries
is arresto menorwhen the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period. There being no modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64,
[35]
accused-appellant should be meted a penalty of imprisonment ofarresto
menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty (20)
days under Art. 76 of the RPC.

Pecuniary Liability
The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 02-200106 and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No.
02-200106.
People v. Combate[36] reiterated the rule on civil indemnity and damages:
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest,
in proper cases. In People v. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of damages. This
rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such
as Mendoza v. People, People v. Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People
v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award
of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory
damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.

In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[37] the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of
PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Santiago is in order. Moral damages of PhP
50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six percent (6%)
per annum, are also proper.[38]
We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only
slight physical injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was
presented during trial.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 03289 finding accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No.
02-200106 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is ordered

to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP
50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of judgment until fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No.
02-200107, accused-appellant is convicted of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto menor. The award of
temperate damages is DELETED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 178321

Present:

- versus -

CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,

Accused-Appellant.

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

October 5, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,
[2]
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead
pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the
said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon
said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to law.

He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of
AAA. The second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000, alleged:
[3]

That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of

San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and
hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such
defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said
[AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases
were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.

The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who
was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by
her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she
and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on
their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in
Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick
and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the
back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with
the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this,
she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He
hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the
face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her
jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went
on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping
AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She
crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.[7] When
she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then
brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than
three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away
when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by
affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he
was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman
waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200 meters away from
him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind her. However, when she

was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his
granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her face was swollen,
with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what
happened to her, and AAA uttered, Si Tata Coni referring to appellant who is his
son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home. [11] AAA was
later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for
three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of
Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought
the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista where they found
Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already bloated.[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of
the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His
findings are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and
to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen;
desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in
the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and
maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of
wounds, three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the
victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of
stab wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]

The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of

Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral
and burial.[14]

Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were
committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and
his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police
officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the
police after he went wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man
whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already
incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to
his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the
evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the
following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his house to
have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the
time when he went wild after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted
that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 metersaway from the scene of the crime.
[16]

The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that
he went to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the
afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer
before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA and his uncle had an
illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5,
2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six oclock, AAA
and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house
together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he
proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision [18] on June 30, 2003 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds
the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby

sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court
hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the private complainant the following sums of
money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]

Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 &
2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered
to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as
actual damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in
2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]

Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution[22] dated August 22,

2007, we required the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if

they so desire. However, the parties submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the
CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]

Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of
AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main witness, and points out
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the crimes
charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he waylaid them while walking
along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident
premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse
of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical
attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order to
determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically
or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a
defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing
that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant,
she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfathers farm.

The appeal lacks merit.

Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness
AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a
question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique
position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to
the appellate courts[24] and absent any substantial reason which would justify the
reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have affected the outcome of the case. [25] This rule is even
more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26]
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative
weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was
herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown
any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial courts evaluation of the
prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial courts
firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while testifying and its veritable
assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to
discern in her the trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to
recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with
trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her
eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with
the man she was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct,
the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she burst into
tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her
testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to
defer her direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue
with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct
and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her
credibility vanished.[27]

Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she
took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her
initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate
her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward manner, describing in detail
how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with
a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of her
testimony:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that

youre not able to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what
is the reason why you did not reach your place of work?
We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Where were you when you were hit?

We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q:
And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe
by Conrado Laog?
A:
I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q:
A:

Now, what happened next, if any?

I heard Jennifer crying, sir.

Q:
A:

And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?

He was beside me, sir.

Court:
Q:
How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A:
She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:

Q:
A:

And what was Conrado Laog doing?

He approached Jennifer, sir.

Q:
A:

Then, what happened next?

He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.

Q:
A:

And what happened to Jennifer?

She fell down, sir.

Q:
A:

What did Conrado Laog do next?

He stabbed Jennifer, sir.

Q:
A:

After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?

He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?

He came back to me, sir.

Q:
A:

When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Q:
A:

And what happened to you?

And he stabbed me on my face, sir.

Q:
A:

Then, what happened to you?

After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed
my panty and my blouse and my bra.

Q:
A:

After that, what did he do next?

And then, he went on top of me, sir.

Q:
A:

Then, what happened?

He sucked my breast, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that?

He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q:
A:

Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into
your vagina?
For quite sometime, sir.

Q:
A:

After that, what happened?

After that, he stood up, sir.

Q:
A:

And where did he go?

After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that, what did you do?

I fell unconscious, sir.

Q:

Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able

to point to him?

Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and
when asked his name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x[28]

On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his
children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over
the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively identified him
as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that
positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail
over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to
appellant as the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death
before raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they
were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and
proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification
of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering
appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own uncle would harm her
and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to
strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime is being committed. [30] There is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to
falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that -It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without
any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in
the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing.
Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing

proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any

weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that
alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within
the vicinity of the crime scene.

Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the
evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted
that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his
defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added reason that he has not
shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and
alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand
against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that
while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped
by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her
grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her
allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her
blouse and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments were just
pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her clothes on when she
crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a
minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of
rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to
the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the

essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and

intrinsically believable on the whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond
doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. [35] It cannot be
overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone
impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not
testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of
rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In
fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. [37] Thus we
have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element
for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we
find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was
the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have
been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by
the parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed
by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article
266-B, paragraph 5 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8353.[40]
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex

crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal
Code
are (1) robbery
with
homicide, (2) robbery
with
rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,(4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A.
No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;[] and that
this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar,
particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in
connection with her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and
on the occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution was able to
prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. x x x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)

A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado,
in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[43] explained that composite
crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex
crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime
proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of
aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each
of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on
the occasionof the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon

or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape
of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for
rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant
killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able
to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of
AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant
indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds
were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case
is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn
from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of
homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or
on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,[45] we expounded on the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the

occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must

precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken
into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must
be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is
to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. [47] Hence, even if any or
all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding
that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,

circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending

himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded
them. In People
v.
Salvatierra, we
ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime
with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder
under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the
circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the
complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine
the penalty to be imposed.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered

whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.
[50]
It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force
that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the
head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the
manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by
first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and
vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant
intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage
of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the

aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the

momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening
the defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly
weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack
caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless. [52]

Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic

aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The
penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346,
entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case
is concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the
victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award
of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of
the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of

Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article
2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal

knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A

(a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a
deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the
award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with
Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances
enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender:
1)

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)

AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged
in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q
A
Q
A

Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?

Yes, sir.
Why do you know her?
Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours,
sir.

Q
A

How are you related to [AAA]?

Her mother and my wife are sisters.

Q
A

So she is your niece-in-law?

Yes, sir.

x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)

The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship

to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the
determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,[55] this
Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal
cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if
the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with
the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the
Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances
not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the
award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been
proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages.
Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that
courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance
has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained
pending thereafter. Catubigreasoned that the retroactive application of
the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the
private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,
especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission
of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently
proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages
only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven

following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v.
Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y
Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People
of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set arePeople v.
Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of
the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two
sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after
the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for
the grant of exemplary damagestaking into account simply the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime,
courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.
In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can
be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the

highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much

the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court
imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary
damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness
of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the
Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v.
Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her
separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in
such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy
behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or
correction for the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful
design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would
do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary
damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several times
on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly
lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her undergarments, raping her while
she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and
abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous.
Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized
Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent
death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages in
order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall
behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In line

with current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of
Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs
of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases
of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [59] Anent the award of
civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the
CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount ofP25,000 as actual damages, said
amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the
crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while moral
damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim
to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March
21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer PatawaranRosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000
as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to
pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000
as moral damages andP30,000 as exemplary damages.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189822

September 2, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
BRION, JOJIE SUANSING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is
incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all that needs to be
proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist and
his victim, and the latters mental retardation. 1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the July 17, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00439-MIN that affirmed with modification the April 14, 2004 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002, finding
appellant Jojie Suansing (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
against "AAA,"4 as described in the Amended Information,5 the relevant portions of which
read as follows:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA",
attended by the qualifying circumstance that the victim has a mental disability. The accused
knew of such mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The sexual
assault done by the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law.6
Appellant pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as its witnesses "AAA;" her aunt and guardian, "EEE;" her
friend, "FFF;" doctor of gynecology, Mary Grace Solano, M.D. (Dr. Solano); doctor of
psychiatry, Sally Jane Kwong-Garcia, M.D. (Dr. Kwong-Garcia); and psychologist
Evangeline Castro (Castro). The RTC allowed "AAA" to testify after evaluating her ability to
comprehend and answer questions. The RTC also permitted the prosecution and the
defense to propound leading questions to her.7 Based on their testimonies,8 the following
facts emerged:

"AAA" was born on July 6, 1975. She used to live in Tangub City with her grandparents
because her mother suffered from and later died of tuberculosis. When "AAA" was 15 years
old, she became a mother to a baby boy who was born on September 29, 1990. Nobody
admitted responsibility for her pregnancy. To receive better guidance and supervision,
"AAA" was transferred to the residence of "EEE" who raised her as a daughter.
Sometime before April 8, 2001, "GGG" requested "FFF" to get from appellants boarding
house an electric fan and a transformer. "FFF" together with her brother and "AAA" went to
the boarding house of appellant. After giving the requested items, appellant ordered "FFF"
and her brother to leave "AAA" behind.
"FFF" brought the items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was still with appellant,
requested "FFF" to return to appellants boarding house to fetch "AAA." Upon arriving at the
boarding house, "FFF" noticed that the door was closed. She called out to "AAA" to go
home to avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA" opened the door and came out fixing her
short pants. "FFF" then asked "AAA" if anything happened. "AAA" replied that after "FFF"
and her brother left the boarding house, appellant pulled her inside the room, removed her
shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina
without her consent. "AAA" requested "FFF" not to tell anyone that she was raped by
appellant.
On August 3, 2001, "EEE" learned about the rape and confronted "AAA." "EEE" then
reported the incident to police authorities.
The genital examination of "AAA" on August 6, 2001 revealed old hymenal lacerations. Her
psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the
mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the RTC found
"AAA" qualified to testify. The psychological examination of "AAA" established her mental
retardation to be in a mild form and her intelligence quotient (IQ) of 53 though below the
average IQ score of 71 was "within the defective level of a Normal Intelligence Scale."
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,9 appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that he used to live with "AAA"
and her relatives and was considered a member of their family. He treated "AAA" as his
niece and knew about her mental retardation. He later rented a room near the residence of
"AAA." He admitted that sometime in the first week of April 2001, his sister "GGG," who was
living nearby, asked "AAA," "FFF," the latters brother and another girl to go to his boarding
house to get an electric fan, a bread toaster, and a wall dcor. "AAA," "FFF" and the other
girl went inside his room while "FFFs" brother waited outside. After getting the items, "FFF"
and the other girl left while "AAA" stayed behind. After a few minutes, "FFF" and the other
girl returned to fetch "AAA." He belied the statement of "FFF" that "AAA" was fixing her
short pants when she came out of his room.

Appellant claimed that the relatives of "AAA" filed the instant case against him because his
sister, "GGG", no longer gives them financial support.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its April 14, 2004 Decision, the RTC found convincing evidence that "AAA" is a mental
retardate; that in spite of her mental inadequacy, her testimony was credible as shown from
her "intelligent and coherent answers to questions propounded to her by the prosecution,
the defense and the Court;"10 that appellant was aware that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that
appellant raped "AAA;" that "AAA" or "FFF" was not ill-motivated to falsely accuse appellant
of such crime; and, that proof of force or intimidation was unnecessary as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.
However, the RTC also ruled that since "AAAs" mental retardation was not specifically
alleged in the Amended Information, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance
that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The RTC stated that the "mental
disability" of "AAA" at the time of the rape relates to a broad description of several mental
ailments and that the Amended Information failed to specify what constitutes "mental
disability." Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape, the accused JOJIE SUANSING is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of Php50,000.00 as moral
damages.
He shall be committed forthwith to the national penitentiary.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal12 with this Court. However, pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Mateo,13 the case was remanded to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.14
In his brief, appellant imputed upon the court a quo the lone error that it
X X X GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.15

Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; that the medical findings do not substantiate the allegation that
"AAA" was raped; that the elements of force, violence and intimidation were not proved; that
he was falsely accused of the crime charged; that "AAAs" aunt, "EEE", was angry at him
even before they reported the alleged rape to police officers; that even if nobody raped her,
"AAA" would say the opposite just to please "EEE."
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserted in its brief 16 that the
RTCs Decision should be affirmed in all respects since the arguments of appellant failed to
persuade; that a medical examination is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of
rape and an accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victims credible
testimony; that force and intimidation do not have to be proved since "AAA" suffers from
mental retardation; and that appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification
of "AAA." It thus invoked the well-established rule that the findings of the RTC on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and are given
the highest consideration on appeal.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to the assessment of
the testimony of "AAA." It also affirmed the RTCs ruling not to consider the mental
retardation of "AAA" as a qualifying circumstance that would result in the imposition of the
death penalty since it was not specifically alleged in the Amended Information. However, the
CA modified the awards for civil indemnity and moral damages to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Davao City, dated April
22, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accusedappellant JOJIE SUANSING is ordered to pay the private complainant the sums of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal18 praying for his exoneration.
On February 3, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs 19 but both the
OSG and appellant opted to adopt their respective briefs submitted before the CA as their
appeal briefs.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 8353, states that:

Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented."20 From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the
moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation.
"[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of
retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her
chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually
weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already
constitutes rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in
committing the act."21 Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim
and the latters mental retardation need to be proved. 22
In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt the sexual congress between appellant and "AAA" and the latters mental retardation.
"AAA" positively identified appellant as her rapist. 23 She also described the manner by which
appellant perpetrated the crime, viz:
ATTY. GASPAR:
Q:
What happened when you stayed behind?
A:
He removed my shorts and panty.
Q:

So what happened after removing your shorts and panty?

A:
[We] had a (sic) sexual intercourse.
COURT:
Q:
What did he do to you?
A:
(No answer)
ATTY. GASPAR:
We manifest Your Honor that the witness is crying.
ATTY. CAGATIN:
We would like to manifest for the record, your Honor that in spite of several questions of
what [Suansing did] to her[,] no answer was given.
COURT:
Alright.
Q:
Could you answer the question?
A:
[We] had sexual intercourse.
ATTY. GASPAR:
Q:
Where did that happen?
A:

At the boarding house.

Q:
What part of the boarding house?
A:
I could not recall.
Q:
What was your position, were you lying when he had sexual intercourse with you?
A:
He asked me to lie down.
COURT:
Q:
Did the penis enter your vagina?
A:
(The witness is gesturing in the affirmative.)
ATTY. CAGATIN:
The gesture of the witness could not be made a point of reference. Nothing has been shown
by the witness that it has been for the affirmative.
COURT:
Alright, you answer.
A:
He entered his penis.
Q:
And you enjoyed it?

A:
No.
COURT:
Alright.
Q:
And you consented [to] the sexual intercourse?
A:
No.
Q:
Why did you allow yourself to have sexual intercourse with Jojie Suansing?
A:
Because he pulled me towards the room.24
Both the RTC and the CA also found that "AAAs" mental retardation was satisfactorily
established by the prosecution. Dr. Kwong-Garcia, a psychiatrist at the Davao Medical
Center, testified that the results of the IQ test conducted on "AAA" revealed that she is a
mental retardate with a mental age of between 9-12 years. These findings are contained in
a Medical Certificate dated December 11, 2002. 25 These findings were corroborated by the
Psychological Assessment Report26 of Castro, a psychologist at the Davao Medical Center,
whose examination showed that the intellectual capacity of "AAA" is between 9-12 years
old. These pieces of evidence prove beyond doubt that "AAA" is a mental retardate.
Notably, the defense did not even impugn "AAAs" mental retardation. On the contrary,
records show that even appellant himself conceded that "AAA" is a mental retardate. We
therefore agree with the RTCs ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that "AAA" is mentally
retarded.
A mentally retarded victim cannot fabricate her charges.
The RTC and the CA did not err in giving credence to the testimony of "AAA." Records show
that "AAA" cried when she recalled on the witness stand her ordeal at the hands of the
appellant. "[T]he crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the
rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and experience." 27

There is also nothing from "AAAs" testimony that would arouse suspicion. Considering the
mental retardation of "AAA," we find it highly improbable that she would fabricate the rape
charge against appellant. It is likewise unlikely that she was instructed into accusing
appellant given her limited intellect. Due to her mental condition, only a very traumatic
experience would leave a lasting impression on her so that she would be able to recall it
when asked.28Thus, in People v. Balatazo,29 we held that:
1wphi1

Given the low IQ of the victim, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her
charges against appellant. She definitely lacked the gift of articulation and inventiveness.
Even with intense coaching, assuming this happened as appellant insists that the victims
mother merely coached her on what to say in court, on the witness stand where she was
alone, it would eventually show with her testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But, this
did not happen. During her testimony, she proceeded, though with much difficulty, to
describe the sexual assault in such a detailed manner. Certainly, the victims testimony
deserves utmost credit.30
Mental retardation does not lessen her credibility.
The mental deficiency of "AAA" does not diminish the reliability of her testimony. It has been
our consistent ruling that the RTCs assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
great respect in the absence of any attendant grave abuse of discretion since it had the
advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, including the conduct of
the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. This rule finds greater
application when the RTCs findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. Here, we do
not find any reason to depart from the RTCs assessment of the testimony of "AAA." 31
Further, "AAA" was able to make known her perception, communicate her ordeal, in spite of
some difficulty, and identify appellant as her rapist. Even a mental retardate qualifies as a
competent witness if she can perceive, and can make known her perception to others. 32
Absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse.
Concededly, the physical examination conducted on "AAA" revealed old hymenal
lacerations. However, "[t]he absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual
intercourse. In fact, rupture of the hymen is not essential as the mere introduction of the
male organ in the labia majora of the victims genitalia consummates the crime." 33 In other
words, "[w]hat is required for a consummated crime of rape x x x is the mere touching of the
labia by the penis."34 In this case, "AAA" went beyond this minimum requirement as she
testified that appellants penis entered her vagina. 35
All told, we are not persuaded by appellants denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive identification by "AAA" of him as the perpetrator of the crime.

"[A]ppellants mere denial cannot overcome the victims positive declaration that she had
been raped and the appellant was her rapist." 36
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the rape qualifies and
makes it punishable by death.
Paragraph 10, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. [Emphasis
supplied]
Thus, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission
of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge
by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since "a crime can only be qualified by
circumstances pleaded in the indictment." 37
In this case, the Amended Information specifically provides:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA",
attended by the qualifying circumstance that the victim has a mental disability. The accused
knew of such mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The sexual
assault done by the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law.38
Clearly, appellants knowledge of the mental disability of "AAA" at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information.
"Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death x x
x."39 "When rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victims mental
retardation, the penalty is increased to death." 40 "Mental retardation is a chronic condition
present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning

measured by standardized tests."41 Intellectual or mental disability "is a term synonymous

with and is now preferred over the older term, mental retardation." 42
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of "AAA." Appellant testified that
he knew "AAA" and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated
as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded "AAA" as his niece. His boarding house
was also a few minutes away from the residence of "AAA." He also admitted that "AAA" was
known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of "AAA" was easily
noticeable to the RTC from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the
course of her testimony. We also stress that from the filing of this case until its appeal,
appellant did not assail "AAAs" mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her
intellectual inadequacy.
Thus, appellants knowledge of "AAAs" mental disability at the time of the commission of
the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified
rape.
Proper Penalty
Paragraph 10 of Article 266-B of the RPC expressly provides that the penalty of death shall
be imposed "when the offender knew of the mental disability x x x of the offended party at
the time of the commission of the crime." The supreme penalty of death should have been
imposed on the appellant due to the special qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the
time of the rape that "AAA" was mentally disabled.
However, the enactment of RA 934643 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu
thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance with Section 2 of RA
9346. In addition, as provided under Section 3 thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for
parole.
Damages
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00 if
the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying aggravating circumstances that
require the imposition of the death penalty.44
Moral damages must also be awarded in rape cases without need of proof other than the
fact of rape since it is assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award. However, the CAs award ofP50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 to conform
to existing case law.45 Exemplary damages are likewise called for, by way of public example
and to protect the young from sexual abuse. 46 We therefore order appellant to pay "AAA"
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.47 In addition, we order appellant to pay

interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.48
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00439-MIN
dated July 17, 2009 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Jojie Suansing is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The
amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to "AAA" are increased
to P75,000.00 each. Appellant Jojie Suansing is also ordered to pay "AAA" exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191362

October 9, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the November 24, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court or Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 which affirmed with modifications the November 26, 2007
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 finding
appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape.
On February 5, 2004, appellant was charged with the crime of rape. The Information 3 reads
as follows:
That on or about the month of December. 2002. at Barangay Balubad, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused. with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of "AAA", 4 a minor,
13 years old, against her will.
That the commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority,
the victim being less than 18 years old, and relationship, the accused being the commonlaw husband of complainants mother.
Contrary to law.
During his arraignment on June 29, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 After pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution as summarized in the Appellees Brief 6 is as follows:
"AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB"
cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as "Onot"). Appellant and "BBB" have
two (2) children.
In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her
family and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. "AAA" calls appellant "Papa."

Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom
inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAAs" shorts and panty and spread her
legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girls
vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo
on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she
reported the incident to anyone. At that time, "AAAs" maternal grandmother was in the
house but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
xxxx
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAAs" mother
did not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal uncles house.
There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mothers siblings. Her uncle appeared
to be angered by appellants wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to
bring her home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt.
Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in
Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial
issued a Medico-Legal Report which essentially states that:
1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area,
with normal external genitalia;
2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5oclock positions, introitus
admits one examining finger with ease; and
3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of spermatozoa.

According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means
that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually
manifests during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her
vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert
even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered
pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victims genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a
sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost four months from the time of
the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.
On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women
at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside
therein at the time of her testimony.7

Version of the Defense

As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his
own daughter. He also claimed that "AAAs" aunt fabricated the charge because appellant
called her a thief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA" especially considering that the same
is corroborated by the medical findings. On the other hand, the RTC found appellants
defense not only "laughable" and "sickening" but also completely untrue. 8
The court a quo also found the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be
present. Thus, on November 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant
guilty of qualified rape. Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the death
penalty, the trial court instead sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Marciano Cial is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the complainant
"AAA" is awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant appealed to the CA but the appellate court found the appeal to be without merit
and dismissed the same. The appellate court thus affirmed the RTC finding appellant guilty
of qualified rape but with modifications as to the damages, viz:
FOR THESE REASONS, the decision dated November 26, 2007 of the RTC is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with
R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole; and
2. He is ordered to indemnify AAA (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.10

The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. "AAAs" testimony
proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.
The examining doctor corroborated "AAAs" narration by testifying that the hymenal
lacerations could have been possibly caused by an erect penis. The CA disregarded
appellants contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence of "AAAs"
grandmother as "lust is no respecter of time and place." 11 Moreover, the appellate court
found that the prosecution satisfactorily established "AAAs" minority as well as the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of "AAAs"
mother.
Hence, this appeal raising the following arguments, viz:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THECIRCUMSTANCES
CLEARLY POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THEACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTGUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE.12
Appellant argues that if he indeed raped "AAA" in the manner that she narrated, it would be
improbable for "AAAs" maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. Appellant also
claims that it was illogical for "AAAs" uncle to allow "AAA" to return home after learning
about the alleged rape incident. Appellant also insists that the examining physician was
unsure as to what actually caused "AAAs" hymenal lacerations.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In this appeal, appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it lent
to the testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great respect
to the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA. We find no cogent
reason to depart from this rule.
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or
the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so
because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and

spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses manner of

testifying, her furtive glance, blush of unconscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore,
can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to
weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations
omitted.)13
Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age when she
testified in court.14
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have
invented a horrible story. x x x15
We are not persuaded by appellants argument that if he indeed raped "AAA" inside their
house, then "AAAs" maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled
jurisprudence that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. As held
by the CA, "lust is no respecter of time and place." 16 Thus, the presence of "AAAs"
grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape; neither would it prove
appellants innocence.
There is also no merit to appellants contention that it was irrational for "AAAs" uncle to
allow her to return home even after learning about the rape incident. The considerations or
reasons which impelled "AAAs" uncle to allow her to return home are immaterial to the rape
charge. Such have no bearing on appellants guilt.
Likewise undeserving of our consideration is appellants imputation that the examining
physician was unsure as to what caused "AAAs" hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed
that the examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the
victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature,
extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others,
that "AAA" suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the
wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish the cause of

such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how these
hymenal lacerations were inflicted on "AAA." He could only surmise that the lacerations
could have been caused "by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the insertion of
a hard object into the vagina of the victim x x x such as the penis." 17 In any case, a medical
examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accuseds
conviction for rape may be anchored solely on the testimony of the victim. At best, the
medical examination would only serve as corroborative evidence.
We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the
crime of qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence,18 the prosecution mentioned "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth.
Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAAs" Certificate of Live
Birth showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we
note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of
the case. During the March 28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested before the RTC
that it will be presenting "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth at the next setting. In its
Order19 dated June 27, 2006, the trial court reset the hearing of the case to allow the
prosecution to present evidence with respect to "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth. However,
up until the prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to testify on "AAAs"
Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr.
Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never testified on "AAAs" age. On the other hand,
"AAA" even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her age, viz:
Q. Do you remember how old were you during that time?
A. I do not know, maam.
Q. Do you know your birthday?
A. I do not know, maam.20
Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of "AAA".
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The
prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish "AAAs" relationship with the appellant.
Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAAs"
mother, "AAA" referred to appellant as her step-father.
Q. And who is Onot?
A. He is my step father, maam.

Q. What do you mean step father, what is his relation to your mother?
A. He is the husband of my mother, maam.
xxxx
Q. When did this Onot become the husband of your mother?
A. I could no longer remember, maam.
Q. Were you still small or big when he [became] the husband of your mother?
A. I was still small when he became the husband of my mother, maam.
Q. And how do you call this Onot?
A. Papa, maam.
Q. Is this Onot whom you called Papa inside this room now?
A. Yes, maam. (Witness pointed to the bald man who when asked his name responded that
he is Marciano Cial).
Q. Do you know that person?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. Because he is the husband of my mother, maam. 21
Meanwhile, appellant claimed that he is married to "AAAs" mother:
Q. You identified yourself Mr. Witness as married. You are married to the mother of "AAA"?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q. So, you mean to say that you are the step father of "AAA"?
A. Yes, sir.22
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAAs"
mother23 as well as the step-father of "AAA".24 Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for

its reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to
how it reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAAs" mother
or that "AAA" is his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellant's claim that he is married to
"AAA's" mother, it went on to declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant
is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother, viz:
x x x Also. given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the qualifying
circumstance that the accused is the common-law husband of the victim's mother may be
properly appreciated.25
The tem1s "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For
appellant to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother. 26
1wphi1

Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
just like the crime itself In this case, the prosecution utterly tailed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such,
appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is
reclusion perpetua.27
As regards damages, "AAA" is entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00. In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 24, 2009Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano Cia! y Lorena is
hereby found guilty of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202020

March 13, 2013

MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO y ROS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The petitioner, Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros (Pielago) assails the Decision 1 dated February 1,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33475 which affirmed the

Judgment2 dated May 31, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 14,
finding Pielago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault.
Pielago was charged in an Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:
"That on or about July 1, 2006 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay Allang[,] City of
Ligao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and actuated by lust, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA 4, a minor being
four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of
[AAA], which acts debase, degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor
as human being to her damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Pielago voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities and posted a property bail.
During arraignment, Pielago pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA; her mother, BBB; Ligao City
Health Officer Dr. Lea F. Remonte; Melie P. Gonzales, a resident of Barangay Allang; and
PO2 Ma. Rowena S. Aldea. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of
the accused; Nestor and Celeste Pielago, his parents; Myrna Ros De La Torre, his aunt;
and some of the residents of Barangay Allang where the accused and the victim reside.
Evidence for the Prosecution
On July 1, 2006, between 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., AAA and her two (2)-year old brother,
CCC, were playing with Pielago whom they call as Kuya Alvin at the porch of Boyet Ros
(Boyet) house. After playing, the three (3) went inside Boyets house to watch television.
After a while, Pielago turned off the television and brought AAA and CCC to a bedroom.
While CCC played with a toy carabao at a corner, Pielago made AAA lie down on bed.
Pielago then took off AAAs short pants and inserted his right hands forefinger inside her
vagina and exclaimed "masiram" (which means "delicious") as he brutely licked it and
spewed saliva in it. AAA felt pain and blood came out of her vagina which frightened her.
Unsatisfied, Pielago made AAA lie on her chest on the same bed then fingered her anus.
After a few minutes, AAA and CCC were called for lunch by their mother, BBB. Pielago
immediately replaced AAAs shorts then sent her and CCC out of the bedroom. BBB noticed
the bloodstains at the back portion of AAAs shorts. When BBB asked AAA what happened,
AAA did not answer immediately until she said "Kuya Alvin tugsok buyay saka lubot ko buda
dila pa." (which means "Kuya Alvin inserted something in my vagina and my anus and he
licked me). Incensed by what AAA told her, BBB went to a certain Manay Eden who

accompanied her to the house of Boyet where she found Pielago still lying on bed. BBB
continually hit Pielago as she asked him what he did to AAA. Pielago, however, denied the
accusations and maintained that he was asleep when the incident happened. At 6:00 p.m.
of the same day, AAA and BBB lodged a complaint at the Police Station where AAA was
physically examined by a medico-legal officer which issued a report showing a superficial
laceration found at the 7 oclock position of AAAs anus and the presence of erythema in the
perihymenal area and fossa navicularis caused by the insertion into the victims genitals of a
foreign object, possibly a small finger or any blunt object. 6
Evidence for the Defense
Pielago denied the charge against him and testified that on July 1, 2006, he ate lunch with
Mary Grace Capinpin, Benedict Bordeos (Benedict) and Jerome Monasterial in the house of
his uncle, Lito Ros. Thereafter, he and Benedict rested in a nipa hut which was 3 to 4
meters away from said house. While resting, Pielago heard BBB calling her two (2) children,
AAA and CCC, who both ignored her while they were at the basketball court. Being close to
the two (2) children, Pielago convinced them to go home and even assisted them in taking
their lunch. He felt sleepy so he proceeded to the house of his uncle and slept on the sofa
located in the living room. However, AAA and CCC came in and noisily played in the living
room where he was so he transferred to the bedroom. He was sound asleep until he felt
somebody boxing his back. While BBB was continually boxing Pielago, she kept on asking
what he did to her child, AAA. Awakened and shocked, Pielagio retorted: "What is it?" He
denied her accusation because he said he was fast asleep. At that time, he saw AAA and
CCC chatting at the corridor of his uncles house. After BBB left, Pielago just went back to
sleep. Pielago added that there is an existing land dispute between his grandparents and
BBBs family which could have impelled the latter to file the instant charge against him even
if he has nothing to do with it. The defense also insisted that the bloodstain found on AAAs
shorts may have resulted from BBBs spanking; or that it could be the menstrual blood of a
teenager living in the house of Pielagos uncle who owns the short pants which AAA took
and wore during the incident.7 This was not far fetched because Pielago stated that after he
woke up, he noticed that the clothes on top of the bed were already scattered. 8
The Decision of the RTC
In its Decision9 dated May 31, 2010, the RTC stated that it is necessary to determine the
actual or proper crime against the accused in view of the discrepancy between the crime
charged in the Information and the factual allegations contained therein. On its face, the
Information charged the crime of acts of lasciviousness against Pielago. However, the
factual allegations contained in the Information and the provisions of existing laws pertain to
the crime of rape by sexual assault defined and penalized under Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. 10 The trial court
explained that the testimony of AAA merits full credit despite her tender age. Her clear,
candid and straightforward testimony categorically narrated how Pielago successfully

ravished her innocence when he inserted his finger into her vagina and anus that caused
her to feel pain in her genital parts. Indeed, AAAs positive identification of Pielago as her
molester convinced the trial court to believe her version of what indeed transpired between
them.
The RTC brushed aside Pielagos defense of denial for being intrinsically weak. Finding
Pielago guilty for the crime of rape by sexual assault, the RTC sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal, as maximum,
after considering Pielagos voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, and to pay
AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as temperate damages.11
The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
a. Finding the accused, Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape by Sexual Assault, committed against [AAA], defined in paragraph No.
2, Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353; thereby, after taking into
account the qualifying circumstance relating to the victims age, "less than seven (7)
years of age" (last paragraph, Art. 266-B, ibid.), but crediting accused with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from seven (7) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law;
b. As civil liability ex delicto, the same accused is ORDERED

TO PAY minor complainant, [AAA], through her parents, the following sums:
1) Php.10,000.00 as temperate damages;
2) Php.30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the commission of Rape by sexual assault;
3) Php.30,000.00 as moral damages; and
4) Php.25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.12
The Decision of the CA
On February 1, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision13 affirming in toto the RTCs decision. The
appellate court explained that despite the fact that the Information charged the crime of acts

of lasciviousness, the established factual circumstances therein constitutes the elements of

rape penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code such as: (1) that the offender
inserted his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or inserted any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (2) that the same was done to a
child below 12 years of age.14 Citing the case of Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda.
De Carungcong v. People,15the CA emphasized that it is not the nomenclature of the offense
that determines the crime in the Information but the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense. The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information is merely an opinion
which is not binding on the court.16 The CA, moreover, agreed with the RTC in brushing
aside the bare self-serving denial of Pielago. He also failed to adduce any evidence to
support his claim that AAA was coached by her mother on what she should testify in court.
Finding support in current jurisprudence,17 the CA aptly stated that an accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim so long as it is credible, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 18 Lastly, the CA concurred
with the RTCs cognizance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender there being
no warrant of arrest issued against Pielago. Thus, it decreed, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 31, 2010, of the Regional
Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 14 in Criminal Case No. 5496 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.19
Hence, this appeal anchored on the two issues, namely:
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS
CONVICTION
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; and
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF
THE CRIME OF RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT DESPITE HIS BEING CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION FOR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS ONLY.20

Our Ruling
This Court affirms Pielagos conviction with modification as to the awarded damages.
Pielagos guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA. It is well-settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal.21 After a careful review, this Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA positively
identifying Pielago as the one who molested her is worthy of belief.
The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly established that
Pielago inserted his right hands forefinger into her vagina and anus while she and her
younger brother, CCC, were in his custody. Being a child of tender years, her failure to
resist or struggle while Pielago molested her would all the more prove how she felt
intimidated by her "Kuya". Furthermore, Pielagos bare denial cannot exculpate him from
the criminal charge. It is well-settled that denial, just like alibi, cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the
complainant.22 Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant
in the crime attributed to him.23
Apparently, in the instant case, Pielago failed to prove the alleged ill motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses that led to the false charges against him.
The RTC correctly convicted Pielago for the crime rape by sexual assault.
It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 24 In this respect, the designation in the
Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused
and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.25In the instant case,
the designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed from the
crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of
rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-A(2) 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is
not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "x x x commit an act of
lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the
vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA, x x x." And, as correctly
explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information determine the
crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the
prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v. People: 27
What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
being charged in the information.28 (Citations omitted)

Also, in the more recent case of People v. Rayon, Sr., 29 this Court reiterated that the
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital
of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
The CA further ratiocinated that the variance in the two crimes is not fatal to Pielagos
conviction. Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for rape by sexual assault, it is essential
for the prosecution to establish the elements that constitute such crime. Article 266-A(2) of
the Revised Penal Code explicitly provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual
assault which is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice. In the instant case, this
element is clearly present when AAA straightforwardly testified in court that Pielago inserted
his forefinger in her vagina and anus. Jurisprudence has it that testimonies of child-victims
are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.30 Thus, AAAs unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of Pielago as the malefactor, established the case for the
prosecution.
1wphi1

The RTC and CA properly imposed the correct indeterminate penalty but the amount of
exemplary damages should be modified.
As can be gleaned from the records, the RTC and CA correctly imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from seven (7) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law considering that Pielago voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities before a warrant of arrest could be issued against him. However, in line with the
existing jurisprudence on the matter, the award of exemplary damages should be increased
from P25,000.00 toP30,000.00.31 In addition, and in conformity with the current policy, we
also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid. 32
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 1, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 33475 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that: (1) the amount of exemplary damages
is increased from 1!25,000.00 to !!30,000.00; and (2) petitioner Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros is
ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

JOJIT GARINGARAO,

G.R. No. 192760

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
July 20, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 26 November 2009
Decision2 and 22 June 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31354. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 56 (trial court),
finding Jojit Garingarao (Garingarao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610). 4
The Antecedent Facts

The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:

On 28 October 2003, AAA5 was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by
her father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr.
George Morante (Dr.Morante), the attending physician, recommended that AAA be
confined at the hospital for further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital and
confined at a private room where she and her parents stayed for the night.

On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to process

his daughters Medicare papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and left

the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that same morning to attend to their
store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.

When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home.
Dr. Morante advised against it but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be
discharged from the hospital with instructions that she should continue her
medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their house around 11:30 a.m.,
AAA cried and told her parents thatGaringarao sexually abused her. They all went
back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the
nurses station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.

On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Garingarao for
acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of October 2003, at Virgen Milagrosa University
Hospital, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of AAA, 16 years
of age, touched her genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to the
damage and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional
disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness and humiliation.

Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7610. 6

During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00
a.m., Garingarao, who was wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if
she already took her medicines and if she was still experiencing pains. AAA replied
that her stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and touched
her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA asked Garingarao what he was
doing. Garingarao replied that he was just examining her. Garingarao then left the

room and returned 15 to 30 minutes later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA
that he would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the
stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two nipples. Garingaraothen lifted AAAs
pajama and underwear and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then
slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and again
asked Garingarao what he was doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she
had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert his finger
inside her private part. Garingarao only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her
monthly period. He went inside the bathroom of the private room, washed his hands,
applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the hospital, AAA insisted on going
home. She only narrated the incident to her parents when they got home and they went
back to the hospital to report the incident to Dr. Morante.

Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge from the hospital.

The prosecution presented the following documents before the trial court:

(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was 16 years old at the time of
the incident;

(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement to and discharge

from Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center;

(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the hospital showing

that Garingarao was on duty from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;

(d) a certificate from the Department of Education Division Office showing that
BBB was present at the office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;

(e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice;

(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the police; and

(g) a letter from the hospital administrator requiring Garingarao to explain why
no administrative action should be filed against him in view of the incident.

For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the

incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October 2003, he and his nursing
aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went inside AAAs room to administer her
medicines and check her vital signs. BBB then accused them of not administering the
medicines properly and on time. Garingarao told BBB that they should not be told
how to administer the medicines because they knew what they were doing and that
they would be accountable should anything happen to AAA. A heated argument
ensued between BBB and Garingarao. BBB told Garingarao he was an arrogant
nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any complaint, he could report the matter to
the hospital.Garingarao denied that he inserted his finger into AAAs private part and
that he fondled her breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was
motivated by the argument he had with BBB.

Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went to AAAs room
between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29 October 2003. He alleged that BBB was
present and he accusedGaringarao of not administering the medications properly.
Tamayo alleged that Garingarao and BBB had an argument. Tamayo stated that he

would always accompany Garingaraowhenever the latter would visit the rooms of the
patients.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its Decision7 dated 5 November 2007, the trial court found Garingarao guilty as
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA
over Garingaraos denial. The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively
identified by AAA as the person who entered her room, touched her breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part. The trial court also found that the prosecution
was able to establish that BBB and CCC were not in the room when Garingarao went
inside.
The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that the case was only
motivated by the argument he had with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical
for BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of sexual abuse just to get even
at Garingarao over a heated argument.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years to 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.

The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim [AAA] P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as fine.

SO ORDERED.8

Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision with modifications.

The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because
AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be charged with rape or
lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is below 12
years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail.

The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on record and the testimony of
AAA, the decision of the trial court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, the introduction of any object into the genitalia of
the offended party as well as the intentional touching of her breasts when done with

the intent to sexually gratify the offender qualify as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony
established that Garingarao committed the lascivious acts.

The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family to fabricate the charges
against Garingarao. The Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the case
was filed so that BBB could get even with him because of the argument they had was
too shallow to be given consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not prevail over the positive
testimony of AAA.

The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should
be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years and 8 months as
imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also raised the award of moral
damages and fine, which was deemed as civil indemnity, to conform with recent
jurisprudence.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 5, 2007

of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Criminal Case
No. SCC-4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is 14 years and 8

months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum[;]

2. The award of moral damages is raised from P20,000.00

to P50,000.00; and
3. The award of indemnity is raised from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 June 2010 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming with modifications the trial courts decision.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible for him to commit the acts
charged against him because there were many patients and hospital employees around.
He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an assistant when the
incident allegedly occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the charges
were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as
such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of
violation of RA 7610.

We do not agree.

Credibility of Witnesses

The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. 10 In this
case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimony of AAA
credible over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that denial is
a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. 11 Both denial and
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a
credible witness.12 Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi must fail over the positive
and straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, we find incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an
offshoot of a heated argument he had with AAAs father over the
manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications. It is hard to believe that AAAs

parents would expose her to a public trial if the charges were not true. 13 In addition,
the prosecution was able to establish that, contrary to Garingaraos allegation, both
BBB and CCC were not in AAAs room at the time of the incident.

Violation of RA 7610

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No.

3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x

(c) x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 14

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,

anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 15

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his
influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs
objections. AAA twice askedGaringarao what he was doing and he answered that he
was just examining her.

The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must
be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into
submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.

Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident
happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to
hold him liable under RA 7610.

Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.

The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610
occurred only once.18 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual
or not.19Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to
hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.

Indemnity and Moral Damages

In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to reduce the amount of indemnity

to P20,00020 and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to P15,000.21 We
also impose on Garingarao a fine of P15,000.22
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2009
Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31354 withMODIFICATIONS. The Court finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay
AAA P20,000 as civil indemnity, P15,000 as moral damages and a fine of P15,000.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193854

September 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated October
8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Paraaque City, finding appellant
Dina Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. No. 1
(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a coprincipal by indispensable cooperation.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Private complainant AAA3 was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced
AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the
said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not

there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not
there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish,
they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend
proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they
reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by
the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard
"Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied
AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the
latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After
the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they
would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and
the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at
Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the
complaint to the police station.
The Paraaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the
assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the
latter assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her
mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical examination
on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report4 stating that there was no evident
injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her
testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital
examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the
body of AAA.5
Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one alias "Speed," whose true name and identity and present
whereabouts is still unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, the
herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12
year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent, which act is
prejudicial to the normal growth and development of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.7 Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr.
Merle Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of appellant which
can be summarized as follows:
Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by
her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of
appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005,
appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Paraaque City
with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded
to the house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed"
and two (2) other male persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation
with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and
the latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of
the response of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.
On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a coprincipal by indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the
offended party the amount of P 50,000.00 by way of damages.
The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.8
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the CA.
The latter, on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a
modification on the award of damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P 50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00) as moral damages
and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P 25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the present appeal.

In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.10

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above assignment
of errors by stating the following arguments:
I.
CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.11

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.12
The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of
Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial court of the crime of
rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the RPC.

In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation,

the CA, ratiocinated:
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose
does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from
the circumstances of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without
which the commission of the crime would not have been accomplished. x x x
xxxx
The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited
example. It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in
performing an act which is different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the
rapist. Accused-appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by
"Speed" by acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she
prepared the way for the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the
guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim
inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after
receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room together with
her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and
intimidation, as he did.13
However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial
court, as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or
unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. 15 Nothing in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could
have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for
monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information,
as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant,
thereafter, she was raped by "Speed." Thus:
PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?

WITNESS AAA: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.

xxxx
Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or bulungan,
AAA?
A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.
Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?
A: At the back portion, Sir.
Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that
kubuhan?
A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.
Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?
A: No, Sir.
xxxx
Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?
A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.
Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the kubuhan?
A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.
Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you said
raped you?
A: No, Sir. I just saw them.
Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?
A: Pera, Sir.
Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation
between this Dina Dulay and that man who gave money to her?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard between
this Dina Dulay and the person who gave money to her?
A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir.16
xxxx
PROS. R. GARCIA:
Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what happened to
you and the man?
A: He raped me, Sir.
Q: Where were you raped?
A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped by
that person?
A: He tied me up, Sir.
Q: How were you tied up as you said?
A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.
Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?
A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.
Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion of his penis into your
sex organ?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into your
organ?
A: It was painful, Sir.
Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?
A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.

Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo doon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?
A: Only one (1) AAA, Sir.17
It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed
raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual findings
of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. 18However, the review of a
criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by
both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions
based on isolated pieces of evidence.19 In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality
that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge
that is not hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private
nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to
convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These
realities compel this Court to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of
a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends. 20
In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as
a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of
R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent
to engage such child in prostitution.21

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.22

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under
paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit. 23
As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated
or induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.24 Thus, the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was
12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in
exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the
law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 25 A
child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and
may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below

eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent 26 to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape
under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. 7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610
in its body. The Information partly reads:
x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant
AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x 27
Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting
as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that
the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.28 The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete
or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by
the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently
apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 29
1wphi1

To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely
interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form
of defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness.30
Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610, the
penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Therefore, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty
prescribed by the law.31 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, appellant may enjoy
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.32 Since the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is
taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause
of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.33 Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum
term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a
minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). 34

As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to
afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the
principle that every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. 35 Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is
proper in a case involving violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in
compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which states that every person criminally liable is
civilly liable. Hence, the amount of P 50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in
cases of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 36 shall also be the same in cases
of violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED.
However, the Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610,
amended, for which she is sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169533

March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. 1 Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the
crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve yearold,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment
by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by
slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latters
family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all
animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the accused are
prejudicial to the childs development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his
older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioners house, the latters
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that
the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and
"animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers house and challenged Rolando
dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the
petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported
the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training
and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x
2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn,
his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and
about Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging

Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his
daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit
or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and
why he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and
calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones
during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father. 8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to
wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He
attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of
the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to
human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional
amount of P5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming
that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect
her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of
his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why
in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot
the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision
of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the
granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a
proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his
petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he
claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies
reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt
for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only

the CAs appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of
judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it
would still be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of
Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be
appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs decision on July 15,
2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005, 15 or well beyond the period
prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly
dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues
posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the
sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is
worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his
plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the
rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly
enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to
every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 16 This objective will be beyond
realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as
the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which,
to a temple of justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the
dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.
The petitioners right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright
without due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and
review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court.
Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for
review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether
assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section
10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the

Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur
of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at
the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all
possible circumstances in his favor.18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries
shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing
only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or
obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having
acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor
daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e.,
one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer
a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries. 25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower
courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence. 26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised
Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c)
ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189293

July 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VICENTE CANDELLADA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal of the Decision dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G,R. CR.-H. C. No. 00361-MIN, 1 which affirmed the Consolidated Decision2 dated
December 23, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte in
Criminal Case Nos. 118-07-2005 and 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005, acquitting accusedappellant Vicente Candellada of the charge of attempted rape but finding him guilty of eight
counts of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged with attempted rape before the RTC under the following
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 118-07-2005:
That on or about December 28, 2004, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x, Lanao
del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is father of AAA3, a 14-year-old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with lewd design, and who was under the influence of liquor, wanted to have
sexual intercourse with said AAA, but the latter strongly refused, so that accused got mad
and boxed, and battered AAA, by the use of a piece of wood, but did not perform all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crime of Rape as a consequence by reason of
the fact that AAA, shouted for help and the people of x x x, Lanao del Norte, were able to
apprehend the aforesaid accused.4
Accused-appellant was likewise charged with eight counts of consummated rape committed
on May 30, 2004,5 June 2, 2004,6 June 12, 2004,7 July 10, 2004,8 August 13,
2004,9 November 5, 2004,10 December 15, 2004,11 and December 25, 200412 under eight
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005. The
Informations were similarly worded except for the different dates of commission of the crime
and read as follows:
That on or about date at x x x, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge upon
AAA, the accuseds own daughter, a minor 14 years of age, against her will and consent,

which sexual abuse by the accused debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said child as a human being.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law in
relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 13
During pre-trial, the defense admitted that accused-appellant is the father of private
complainant AAA and that AAA was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crimes charged and/or filing of the cases. 14
Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Jovenal Magtagad (Magtagad), 15 the Municipal
Health Officer who physically examined AAA on December 29, 2004; AAA, 16 the victim
herself; Elsie Gemina (Gemina),17 the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where
accused-appellant and AAA lived; and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Rosa Bastigue
(Bastigue),18 Womens Desk Police Non-Commissioned Officer (PNCO), Magsaysay Police
Station. It also presented the following documentary evidence: Geminas Affidavit 19 dated
January 3, 2005; AAAs Sworn Statement20 dated January 3, 2005; Joint Affidavit21 dated
January 3, 2005 of SPO4 Bastigue, Police Investigator SPO3 Orlando Caroro, and
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Officer Virgilio Yaral (Yaral); and
Dr. Magtagads Medical Certificate22 dated December 29, 2004.
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born in Davao on January 10, 1990. She was 15 years old when she testified
before the RTC on August 24, 2005.23
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused-appellant and his deceased first wife.
AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latters second wife, while AAAs two sisters lived
with accused-appellants mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-appellant
impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-appellant brought
her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte on
May 30, 2004.24
Accused-appellant approached Gemina, who he came to know during a previous visit to
Lanao del Norte in 1993. Accused-appellant asked permission if he could stay at Geminas
old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina immediately noticed
that AAA was pregnant. She also commented that AAA was so young she could already be
accused-appellants daughter, but accused-appellant only laughed. Gemina and her

husband allowed accused-appellant and AAA to stay at their old house on the condition that
accused-appellant would pay for the electricity.25
While they were staying at Geminas old house, accused-appellant had intercourse with
AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004;
June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004;
December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what "intercourse"
meant, AAA stated that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA further
testified that she consistently resisted accused-appellants bestial acts but he threatened to
stab her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Geminas help
on September 24, 2004, but the baby died four days later, on September 28, 2004. 26
On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA
refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head with
a piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious. 27 Gemina, who saw what happened,
asked help from the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers
arrested the accused-appellant.28
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the two
lived as husband and wife. However, sometime in December 2004, a drunk accusedappellant already admitted to Geminas husband that AAA was his (accused-appellants)
daughter. Gemina further testified that the mauling incident that took place on December 28,
2004 was already the fourth time she saw accused-appellant maltreating AAA. 29
After conducting a physical examination of AAA on December 29, 2004, Dr. Magtagad
observed hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on different parts of AAAs body, which
were caused by a blunt object, possibly a piece of wood. 30 Dr. Magtagad estimated that
AAAs injuries would heal in five to seven days. AAA did not mention being raped by
accused-appellant to Dr. Magtagad.
SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral were assigned to AAAs case. They
were initially investigating only the mauling of AAA, but during the course of their
investigation, AAA claimed that she had been raped by accused-appellant at least eight
times.31 In their Joint Affidavit though, SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer
Yaral reported only the mauling of AAA and did not mention her being raped by accusedappellant. SPO4 Bastigue reasoned on the witness stand that maybe the investigator
merely forgot to include the rapes in the Joint Affidavit.
The sole evidence for the defense is accused-appellants testimony, summarized as follows:
Accused-appellant acknowledged that AAA is his daughter with his deceased first
wife.32 Accused-appellant stated that AAA was born on January 10 but since he was
unschooled, he could not remember the exact year of AAAs birth.

Accused-appellant recalled that AAA went to school in Davao. Accused-appellant and AAA
had misunderstandings because he would admonish AAA for roaming around late in the
evening. In 2004, AAA got pregnant and had to stop her studies. Accused-appellant did not
inquire from AAAs sisters, friends, classmates, or teachers who impregnated AAA.
Accused-appellant, upon the insistence of his second wife, brought AAA to Lanao del Norte
to conceal AAAs pregnancy. Accused-appellant and AAA stayed at Geminas old house
while in Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant denied introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife.
He introduced AAA to Gemina as his daughter and said that AAA was impregnated by a
classmate. By accused-appellants account, AAA gave birth on October 10, 2004 but the
baby died. Accused-appellant and AAA were planning to go back to Davao in January 2005
after accused-appellant had saved enough money from making charcoal and cutting
grass.33
Accused-appellant outright called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times between
May 30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an
attempt to rape AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Accusedappellant claimed that he was already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he
struck AAA.34
The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005.
The RTC found that there was not enough evidence to prove accusedappellants culpability
for the charge of attempted rape on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code,35 the RTC pointed out that the overt acts committed by accused-appellant
resulted only in AAAs physical injuries that took five to seven days to heal and slight
physical injuries were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted rape. As for the
charge of eight counts of consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that "AAAs down-toearth testimony was convincing and straightforward that she was abused by her father in x x
x Lanao del Norte."36 In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, and by the weight or quantum of
evidence, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 118-07-2005, for attempted rape in relation with Republic Act
No. 9262, acquits him thereof;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 16307-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005, pursuant to Article 266-B, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, in relation with Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as AntiChild Abuse Law, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

as charged and committed against his minor daughter, AAA, and sentences him to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of the 8 counts thereof;
3. Accused is ordered to pay moral damages to complainant of P75,000.00 and
exemplary damages ofP25,000.00 in each of the 8 cases of rape;
4. The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology warden of Tubod, Lanao de Norte is
ordered to deliver the living body of accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila within 15 days from the promulgation of the decision.37

The records of the eight rape cases were then forwarded to the Court of Appeals for
appellate review.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contended that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eight counts of rape. AAAs short and simple answers during her
testimony "were short of a mere allegation." Despite remembering the dates of the alleged
crimes, AAA could not vividly describe how she was molested. AAA merely repeated that on
all eight occasions, accused-appellant had intercourse with her by inserting his penis into
her vagina. AAAs uniform manner of describing the alleged rapes created a strong
suspicion that her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived. Accused-appellant
also labeled AAAs testimony incredible because according to AAA, accused-appellant
immediately inserted his penis into her vagina without even taking off their undergarments.
Thus, accused-appellant argued that the presumption of innocence accorded to accusedappellant must prevail, for it could not be overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or
probability. The standard has always been proof beyond reasonable doubt. 38
Plaintiff-appellee, for its part, maintained that the RTC judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant was consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, it prayed that the
sentence imposed upon accused-appellant be modified in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines. 39
In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellant but modified the sentence and award of damages:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is modified, and after
taking into account the qualified aggravating circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship with accused-appellant Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente Candellada) is
DIRECTED and ORDERED to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the eligibility
for parole for each rape committed under Criminal Cases Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005,
161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005.
Accused-appellant Vicente Candellada is further DIRECTED and ORDERED to pay AAA
the following for each rape committed:

P75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity;

P75,000.00 as Moral Damages;
P25,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Accused-appellant insists that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no merit in the appeal.
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x.

xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in
order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the
victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. 40
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-appellant
during the pre-trial conference.
The existence of the first three elements was established by AAAs testimony. Relevant are
the pronouncements of the Court in People v. Manjares 41 that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the
accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own
father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself
to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the
straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.
(Citations omitted.)
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
AAAs testimony deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases, primordial
consideration is given to the credibility of the victims testimony. The settled rule is that the
trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded
great weight and respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a
much better position to decide the question of credibility. Findings of the trial court on such
matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.42 No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.
The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily
mean that her testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAAs failure to
mention that accused-appellant removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not
destroy the credibility of AAAs entire testimony. Rape victims do not cherish keeping in their
memory an accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus,
errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially
when she is recounting details from an experience so humiliating and painful as rape. 43 In

addition, bearing in mind that AAA had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a
period of time (beginning in Davao, which resulted in AAAs pregnancy), it is not surprising
for AAA to recall each incident in much the same way. What is important is that AAA had
categorically testified that on eight specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with
a knife, successfully had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made
threats to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed
by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of
her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. 44
Although Gemina did not personally witness the rapes of AAA by accused-appellant, she did
confirm that accused-appellant had introduced AAA as his wife; and when Gemina stayed a
week with accused-appellant and AAA at the old house, Gemina observed that the two
apparently lived as husband and wife. Accused-appellants imprudence in representing
himself as AAAs husband to the public lends credence to AAAs assertions that accusedappellant took perverted liberties with her in private.
Accused-appellants denial and alibi deserve scant consideration. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been
consistently held that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial
could not prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a
positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare
denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 45
1wphi1

Accused-appellant proffered a general denial of all eight rapes. Accused-appellants alibi

that he was arrested and imprisoned on December 23, 2004 is not supported by positive,
clear, and satisfactory evidence. In fact, it was entirely uncorroborated. Moreover, he was
charged of seven other counts of rape that happened on earlier dates. In contrast,
prosecution witnesses AAA, Gemina, and SPO4 Bastigue consistently testified that
accused-appellant was arrested only on December 28, 2004.
With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of
death, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion

perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.46
As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of P75,000.00 civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with
jurisprudence,47 the Court increases the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape; and imposes an interest of 6% per
annum on the aggregate amount of damages awarded from finality of this judgment until full
payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-MIN is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA
shall be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages awarded shall be
subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184926

April 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a crime
and the identity of the culprit.
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128, in Caloocan City based on circumstantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction with modification on February 22, 2007. 1
The victim was Marita,2 a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on her certificate of
live birth.3 When her very young life was snuffed out by strangulation on July 2, 1999, she
was only four years and eight months old.4She had been playing at the rear of their
residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her
mother, first noticed her missing from home. 5 By noontime, because Marita had not turned
up, Julia called her husband Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told him about
Marita being missing.6 Manito rushed home and arrived there at about 2 pm, 7 and
immediately he and Julia went in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house
to house in the vicinity. They did not find her.8 At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to
the police that Marita was missing.9 In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant
(manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be found only
five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas
lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack 10 inside the comfort room of an
abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. 11 Her face was black
and blue, and bloody.12 She had been tortured and strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum,
who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita. 13 The
police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from
a vehicle.14
On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information
charging Villaflores with rape with homicide committed as follows: 15
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by
means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one Marita, a minor
of five (5) years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have
sexual intercourse with said Marita, against the latters will and without her consent, and
thereafter with deliberate intent to kill beat the minor and choked her with nylon cord which
caused the latters death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.16
The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz:
After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution presenting witnesses
namely, Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio
Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3 Rodelio Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy
Tepase.
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the lifeless body
of a 5-year old child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on October 21, 1994, (see Certificate
of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was discovered by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito)
beside a toilet bowl at an unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their residence in
Phase 9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his wife called
him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing, prompting Jessie to
hie home and search for the child. He went around possible places, inquiring from
neighbors but no one could provide any lead until the following morning when his wife in
desperation, consulted a "manghuhula" at a nearby barangay. According to the
"manghuhula" his daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that was how he
tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was covered with a blue sack with her
face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a yellow sack under her head and
a white rope around her neck about 2 and a half feet long and the diameter, about the size
of his middle finger. There were onlookers around when the NBI and policemen from Substation 6 arrived at the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of Marita. Jessie was
investigated and his statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral
expenses in the total amount of P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and sub-markings. (See
other expenses marked as Exhibit M and sub-markings).
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and narrated that at
about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in
the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita
by the hand ("umakay sa bata"). At about noon time they were at Batmans house where
they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are drug users. Aldrin sports a "sputnik"
tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G. ("through crusher gangster").
While in Batmans place, although he did not see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was
hiding the child at the back of the house. Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman
("Narinig ko pong umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol"). At about 7:00 oclock in the
evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He
thought that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared heavy. It was the
sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.

Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was found was SPO2
PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6 Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who
was dispatched by Police Chief Inspector Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis
called the SOCO Team and on different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9
arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the
child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered pieces of
evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack inside the comfort room.
The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha"). He saw blood
stains on her lips and when he removed the sack covering her body, he also saw blood
stains in her vagina. The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had
already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same condition when
recovered, saying, when asked by the Court: "medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sirasira." There was another sack, colored blue, which was used to cover the face of the child
while the yellow sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when
SOCO Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral
parlor. He had already interviewed some person when the SOCO Team arrived composed
of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other members. He was the one who
took the statement of the wife of Edmundo Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of
evidence to Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark the items. When
the SOCO Team arrived, a separate investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police Station, as a police
investigator, took the sworn statement of Aldrin Bautista upon instruction of his chief, SPO2
Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to read his statement after which he signed the document then
gave it to investigator, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused the
confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo Villaflores. Aldrin went closer to the
detention cell from where he identified and pointed to Villaflores as the one who abducted
the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the preparation of the documents to
be submitted for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the investigator to prepare the affidavit of
the victims father and the statement of the two witnesses and also asked the investigator to
prepare the referral slip and other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the
evidence custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the physical evidence recovered from
the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of July 3, the suspect,
Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco, SPO1 Antonio Alfredo, NUP
Antonio Chan and the members of Bantay Bayan in Bagong Silang.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan City, as follow-up
operative, was in the office at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, together
with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police Officer Martin Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz,
as leader formed a team for them to go to the scene of the crime. They immediately
proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector Corpuz entered the premises while he stayed with his

companions and guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating the case.
They were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco and the
other police officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept
mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with SPO1 Antonio Chan
accompanied by councilman Leda to the house of Batman, it was already padlocked. They
went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio nearby to avoid detection and asked a child to
look out for Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued
as people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said jeep. The
officers took him in custody and brought him to Sub-station 6 and SPO3 Nacis instructed
them to fetch his wife. He was with police officer Antonio Chan and they waited for the
arrival of the wife of Villaflores from the market. When she arrived, it was already night time.
They informed her that her husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the killing of a
child. There was no reaction on her part. She was with her 3 minor children in the house.
She went with them to the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if she knew
anything about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she denied but in the course
of the questioning she broke down and cried and said that she saw her husband place
some sacks under their house. He remembered the wife saying, "noong gabing nakita niya
si Villaflores, may sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya
yong sako at nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores, ano
yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon." The wife was crying and she said that her husband
was also on drugs and even used it in front of their children. She said that she was willing to
give a statement against her husband. Their house is a "kubo" the floor is made of wood
and there is space of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She saw the sack filled
with something but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She related that
before she went outside, she again took a look at the sack and she saw a protruding elbow
inside the sack. She went inside the house and went out again to check the sack and saw
the child. It was Sgt. Nacis who typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed.
He identified the sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings.
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO, Caloocan City
Police Station also went to the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at about 2:50 in the afternoon
with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin, at the vacant lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan
City. He cordoned the area and saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house.
She was covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck. There was
another yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon cord (Exhibit N) and the
yellow sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew that it was in the
possession of the officer on case. The blue sack appears in the picture marked as Exhibits
S, T, and R, and was marked Exhibits T-3-A, S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked the
initial report as Exhibit U and sub-markings. They also prepared a rough sketch dated July
3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as
Exhibit W.

DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory with office at
Caloocan City Police Station conducted the autopsy on the body of Marita upon request of
Chief Inspector Corpus. The certificate of identification and consent for autopsy executed by
the father of the victim was marked as Exhibit G. He opined that the victim was already
dead for 24 hours when he conducted the examination on July 3, 1999 at about 8 oclock in
the evening. The postmortem examination disclosed the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in secondary stage of flaccidity with
postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and
nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK
1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 x 3.5 cm; 3.5 cm from the anterior
midline.
2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic region, measuring 4 x 2.2 cm, from the
anterior midline.
3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring 4 x 1 cm, bisected by the anterior
midline.
5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 cm left of the anterior midline.
6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, measuring 9.2 x 0.1 cm, 11.5 cm from the
anterior midline.
7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.
8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x 0.4 cm, 6 cm from the Posterior
midline.
9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.8 cm, 6.5 cm from the posterior
midline.

There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The vestibule is abraded and
markedly congested, while the posterior fourchette is likewise lacerated and marked
congested.

The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly congested with
scattered petecchial hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly rice.
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation."
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was abraded and
markedly congested while the posterior fourchette was likewise lacerated and markedly
congested, too. It could have been caused by an insertion of blunt object like a human
penis. The cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation, in laymans term, "sinakal sa
pamamagitan ng tali." The external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt
object like a piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by a hard and rough
surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the victim, Marita _____
marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the death certificate marked as Exhibit E.
The anatomical sketch representing the body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and submarkings. The sketch of the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the
head could have been caused by hard and blunt object while other injuries were caused by
coming in contact with a hard or rough surface. There were also punctured wounds which
could have been caused by a barbecue stick or anything pointed. The ligature mark was
congested and depressed.
On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity which is the
softening of the body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after death is the primary stage of
flaccidity and after the third hour, the body will be in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is
the secondary stage. The victim could have been dead at least 9 oclock in the morning on
July 2. As regards the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it is possible that two or more
persons could have caused it.
The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows:
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of raping and killing
the child saying he did not see the child at anytime on July 2, 1999. At around 10:00 oclock
in the morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood
for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5
hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His Aunt was residing at Phase 10
which is about a kilometer from his place. His residence is some 5 houses away from the
place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he was asked by the wife of
Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected himself by saying he does not know
Marita but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant
lot. He was arrested on July 3, 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged.
He has witnesses like Maring, Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he had no
participation in the killing.

On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called "Batman" in their place and
that Aldrin and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house at Package 5, Phase 9, Lot 32 in
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are his close friends being his neighbors and they
usually went to his house where they used shabu ("gumagamit ng bato"). At 42, he is older
than Aldrin and Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called him to his house to fix
electrical wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children. On the night of
July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a street near the
precinct while walking with his wife. They came from Bayan. His wife works in a sidewalk
restaurant. Two of his children were in Phase 3, the other two were in his house and two
more were left with his siblings. When he was arrested, he was carrying some food items
which they brought in Bayan. They did not tell him why he was being arrested. He saw his
wife once at Police Station 1 before he was brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie
harbored ill feelings against him because the last time they went to his house he did not
allow them to use shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his friends went to his house.
He is not legally married to his wife. She visited him for the last time on July 19, 1999. He
denied that the door of his house had a sack covering neither was it locked by a piece of
string. He has not talked with the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for
help. He just waited for his mother and she told him, they will fight it out in court, "ilalaban sa
husgado."
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his house. His bathroom
is in front of his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo Villaflores told
the court that the charges against Villaflores were not true, the truth being, that on the night
of July 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the back of his house holding a sack containing
something which he did not know. They were talking to Batman and offering a dog
contained in the sack and then they left the sack near the comfort room outside the door of
the house of Batman. They came back and took the yellow sack. He followed them up to
the other pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he learned that Villaflores
was being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept quiet because he thought
Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a drug user, but later when he had a drinking
spree with his father and uncle, he told them what he knew because he could not trust any
policeman in their place. He told them what really happened and they advised him to report
the matter to the barangay. So he went to the purok and made a statement in an affidavit
form. He executed the "Salaysay" in the presence of their Purok secretary and barangay
tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave him the form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie about
midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also another person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who
is the eldest in the group and considered their "Amo-amo". In his affidavit, he said: "Ako ay
lumabas ng bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata.
Tapos po ay may narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay papatayin ko,
basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa in Batman." He said he was sure that the sack contained
the child because he saw the head of the child, it seemed like she was staring at him and

asking his help. He executed the statement after the arrest of the accused. He did not go to
the police station to narrate his story. He made his statement not in the barangay hall but
only at their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left the house at
about 11:00 oclock in the morning to go to school in PMI at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not
see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00
oclock in the evening because he passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his
mother who was a vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30, then they bought
some food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date when Batman was arrested.
He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his mother. His uncle is a known
drug addict in the area. He usually saw him using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana,
his wife, Aldrin and Jovie. After he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did not do
anything because he was busy reviewing for his exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After
he made his statement, he showed it to their Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao and Purok
Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his statement and recorded it in the logbook. It was
not notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin and Jovie. Jose Pitallana is no longer
residing in their place. He did not even know that Aldrin and Jovie testified against his uncle.
He never went to the police to tell the truth about the incident.
As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide,
holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was
shown beyond reasonable doubt.17 The RTC decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
raping and killing "Marita" and hereby sentences him to the Supreme penalty of death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum
of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to pay the cost if this
suit, to be paid to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused to the
National Penitentiary upon receipt hereof after the promulgation of the decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction, 18 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128 finding the accused
Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide is
affirmed with modification in the sense that (a) the death penalty imposed by the trial court
is commuted to reclusion perpetua and the judgment on the civil liability is modified by

ordering the appellant to pay the amount of P100,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral
damages and P52,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to
prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of Villaflores for rape
with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
Ruling
We sustain Villaflores conviction.
I
Nature of rape with homicide
as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a
special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or
compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the
composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less
grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite
crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or
compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is

absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime
may be the subject of a separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstance mentioned above be present.
xxx

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of
attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said
composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to
death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in
determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The
phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape,
the offense the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the

victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or
consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the
occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide may
be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers
of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the
Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the
occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide
may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the
rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the phrase
appearing in line 24, "or on the occasion"?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by reason of the rape,
I would understand that. But what is the meaning of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"?
How far in time must the commission of the homicide be considered a homicide "on the
occasion" of the rape? Will it be, if the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are
drunk and they killed somebody along the way, would there be a link between that homicide
and the rape? Will it be "on the occasion" of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the homicide is
committed with a very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the rapist enters a
house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I would probably consider that
as a rape "on the occasion of". Or if the rapists finished committing the crime of rape, and
upon leaving, saw somebody, let us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him,
that is probably clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will there be a link
between these? What is the intent of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"? x x x
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape, and homicide is
a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan where, let us
say, the offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he commits
homicide, I think would be examples where the phrase "on the occasion thereof" would
apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape. 19

II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide

beyond reasonable doubt

As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all the elements of
rape and homicidebeyond reasonable doubt in order to warrant the conviction of Villaflores
for the rape with homicide charged in the information. 20 The State must thus prove the
concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of
Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and
(c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal
knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape,
because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal
knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on
October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of
the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores
would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the
victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and
complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living
witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the
State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the
commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. 21 Direct evidence proves a fact
in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the
factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the
factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. 22 To be clear,
then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would
ultimately lead to setting a felon free.23
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree
of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either
case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.24 Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed
as to be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the
Court said in People v. Modesto:25

The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well
set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday: 26 "No general rule can be laid
down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (5)

In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several
circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," according to the
CA,27 were seen as "strands which create a pattern when interwoven," and formed an
unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all
others, was guilty of rape with homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. Firstly, Aldrin
Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at
around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,28 leading the child through the alley going towards the
direction of his house about 6 houses away from the victims house. 29 Secondly, Marita went
missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the
following day.30Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2,
1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from
inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his
house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned
house where the childs lifeless body was later found. 32 Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita,
identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter
(nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body; 33 Manito also mentioned that a
blue sack covered her body.34 Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned
house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house, because his house had a rear
exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other

houses.35 This indicated Villaflores familiarity and access to the abandoned house.
Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white
rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope
was the same rope tied to the door of his house, 36 and the yellow sack was a wall-covering
for his toilet.37 Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from
asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks
on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and
punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and
had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body
tested positive for spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second
stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The
medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been
dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a
moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide. As to the rape, Marita was
found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez, the medico-legal officer who had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3,
1999, attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the
vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa
confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to the homicide, her death
was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time of death as determined
by the medico-legal findings was consistent with the recollection of Solidum of seeing
Villaflores going towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the
yellow sack that was later on found to cover Maritas head. Anent the identification of
Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores as
the person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the abandoned house
before the victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a child
from within Villaflores house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white
rope found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of Borcillo. They
justifiably did so. For one, after he stated during direct examination that Villaflores was only
his neighbor,39 it soon came to be revealed during his cross-examination that he was really a
son of Villaflores own sister.40 Borcillo might have concealed their close blood relationship to
bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring his uncle, but we cannot tolerate his blatant
attempt to mislead the courts about a fact relevant to the correct adjudication of guilt or
innocence. Borcillo deserved no credence as a witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum
and Bautista in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism. Had
Borcillos incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could have
easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for an aunt about a kilometer away from the
place of the crime on that morning of July 2, 1999. Yet, the alibi could not stand, both
because the alleged aunt did not even come forward to substantiate the alibi, and because
1wphi1

the Defense did not demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at the place
where the crime was committed at the time it was committed.
The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua in
consideration of the intervening enactment on June 24,
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.41 Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the judgment that
Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 expressly holds persons "whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of this Act" not eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law),
as amended.
The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we add exemplary
damages to take into account the fact that Marita was below seven years of age at the time
of the commission of the rape with homicide. Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code has
expressly declared such tender age of the victim as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to
wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties. xxx.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
xxx
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part
of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."42 The Civil Code permits such award "by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."43 Granting exemplary damages is not dependent on whether the aggravating
circumstance is actually appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such, the Court
recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary damages as a way of
correction for the public good. For the purpose,
P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages, 44 for a lesser amount would
not serve genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
February 22, 2007 finding and pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of
rape with homicide, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (a) that he shall
suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law), as amended; (b) that he shall pay to the heirs of the victim the sum
of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals; and (c) that all the awards for damages shall bear interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 182551

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ROSENDO
REBUCAN yLAMSIN,

Promulgated:

AccusedAppellant.
July 27, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the Decision dated August 21,
[1]

2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282, which

modified the Decision dated November 3, 2003 of the Regional
[2]

Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case

No. 4232. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the accusedappellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin was adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) separate counts of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged
with the crime of double murder in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the
Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65
years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a
long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera:

Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking

wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds
caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately thereafter. [3]

When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [4] Trial, thereafter,
ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V.

Profetana, Municipal Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela
Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera
and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.; [5] (3) Adoracion Lagera,
the wife of Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of
Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.

Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem

examination on the body of the victim Felipe Lagera on November
6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds,
the first of which was located at his right arm and was about
23x2x4 centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have
been caused by a sharp instrument such as a bolo. The second
wound was located at Felipes nose maxillary area, [6] measuring
13 centimeters, with an inverted C shape. The second wound was
not fatal and could have been caused by a sharp-edged
instrument like a bolo. The third wound was located at Felipes
left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5 centimeters. The said
wound was fatal and could have likewise been caused by a sharpedged instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded that the causes of
death of Felipe were hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and
multiple hacking wounds. She also conducted a post-mortem
examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the
aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil sustained a
hacking wound at the fronto-temporal area [7] with a skull
fracture. In the case of Ranil, the cause of death was

hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary

to [the] hacking wound to the head. [8] The instrument that was
most likely used was sharp-edged like a bolo. [9]

Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in

question. She pointed to the accused-appellant as the Bata
Endong[10] (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and
brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while
Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right
shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant, the
former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the direction
of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela
said that she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe
and Ranil. She related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was
not able to use the same when he was attacked. She was then
inside the house with Felipe and her two younger
brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about four
meters away when the hacking incident occurred indoors. [11]

On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the

incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the house and
she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was
also there near the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right
arm. When asked whether the accused-appellant came inside the
house in a sudden manner, Carmela answered in the
affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe
when the accused-appellant entered the house. She said that no
fight or altercation occurred between Felipe and the accusedappellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran outside of
the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the
house.[12]

Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6,

2002, she was at the house of a certain Justiniano Rance. After
arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told her to go
home because Felipe had been hacked. She ran towards the

direction of her house. When she got there, she saw the lifeless
body of Felipe sprawled on the ground. She then went inside the
house and found her daughter, Alma Tagpis, cuddling the body of
Ranil whose head was wounded. She told Alma to look for a
motor vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. She also found
out that the other two children, Carmela and Jericho, hid when
they saw Felipe being hacked. When she asked them who went to
their house, Carmela told her that it was the accused-appellant
who entered their house and hacked the victims. [13]

Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6,

2002, she was in Brgy. Sogod, having their palay (unhusked rice
grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and proceeded
to the house of her father, Felipe, where she left her children. She
then met a person looking for her mother who was about to tell
the latter that Felipe was hacked. When she rushed to Felipes
house, she saw him lying in the grassy place, wounded and
motionless. She asked Felipe who hacked him, but he was not
able to answer anymore. She went inside the house and saw
blood on the floor and the feet of her son Ranil. Thinking that the
killer was still inside, she went to the back of the house and pulled
a slot of board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing
the body of Ranil, she took him and ran towards the road. She
was able to bring Ranil to the hospital, but the doctor already
pronounced him dead. Her other two children, Carmela
and Jericho, soon arrived at the hospital with the police. When
she asked them who killed Felipe, Carmela answered that it was
the accused-appellant.[14]

Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following

documentary evidence, to wit: (1) Exhibit A the Post-mortem
Examination Report on Felipe;[15] (2) Exhibit B the sketch of the
human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Felipe; [16] (3)
Exhibit C the Certificate of Death of Felipe; [17] (4) Exhibit D the
Post-mortem Examination Report on Ranil; [18] (5) Exhibit E the
sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by
Ranil;[19] and (6) Exhibit F the Certificate of Death of Ranil. [20]

The defense, on the other hand, presented the following

witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond Rance, the stepson of the
accused-appellant;
(2)
Renerio
Arminal,
[21]
thebarangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte;
(3) Arnulfo Alberca, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the accused-appellant
Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.

Raymond Rance testified that his mothers name is Marites

Rance. The accused-appellant is not his biological father but the
former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that
on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their
house. Felipe placed himself on top of Raymonds mother, who
was lying down. Raymond and his younger sister, Enda, were then
sleeping beside their mother and they were awakened. His
mother kept pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in
driving him out. In the evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00
p.m., Raymond recounted that he saw Felipes son, Artemio alias
Timboy, inside their house. Timboy was able to go upstairs and
kept trying to place himself on top of Raymonds mother. The
latter got mad and pushed Timboy away. She even pushed him
down
the
stairs. The
accused-appellant
was
working
in Manila when the aforesaid incidents happened. Raymond said
that his mother thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently, he saw
the accused-appellant at the house of a certain Bernie, several
days after the accused-appellant arrived in Leyte. He told the
accused-appellant about the incidents involving Felipe and
Timboy. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and the accused were
already living in the same house. On the said date, the accusedappellant left their house after they had lunch and he told
Raymond that he was going to call the latters mother. Raymond
testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was
supportive of his family. He also stated that the accusedappellant seldom drank liquor and even if he did get drunk, he did
not cause any trouble.[22]

Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the

accused-appellant surrendered to him. The latter came to him
alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant) fought with
Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human rights action
officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring
the accused-appellant to the police station. Afterwards, the police
officers came to his place and he accompanied them to the house
of Felipe.[23]

Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness

stand to prove that the voluntary surrender of the accusedappellant was entered into the records of the police blotter. He
was asked to read in open court the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885
dated November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact of voluntary
surrender of the accused-appellant. His testimony was no longer
presented, however, since the prosecution already admitted the
contents of the blotter.[24]

The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara,

Leyte from Manila on August 15, 2002. He went to the house of
his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he
learned that his wife went to Manila and his brother was taking
care of his two children and his stepson, Raymond. On November
2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his friend, Bernie
Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latters mother went
to Manila and he was told that, while he was still in Manila, Felipe
and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to place
themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he harbored ill
feelings towards the said men but he was able to control the
same for the sake of his children. On November 6, 2002, at about
2:00 p.m., he went to the house of barangay chairperson Arminal
to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. He was carrying a
bolo at that time since he was using the same to cut cassava
stems in his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that
she was sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as
the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so
he first sought shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter

was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying there
and drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go
home. Afterwards, he remembered that he had to buy kerosene
so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera. [25]

The accused-appellant further testified that when he

reached the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding
chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going
there, he confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his
wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-appellant had a
bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted to start a
fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and responded
that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he (Felipe) who
committed a wrong against him and his wife. Felipe allegedly got
mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was
able to parry it with his hand. The accused-appellant then drew
his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen,
as the latter was already turning and about to run to the
house. He also went inside the house since Felipe might get hold
of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to
deliver a second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child
Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered
suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such
that the blow landed on Ranil. When he saw that he hit the child,
he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on Felipe, which
landed on the right side of the latters neck. Thereafter, Felipe
ran outside. He followed Felipe and hacked him again, which blow
hit the victims upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on
the yard of his house and was about to run towards the road. He
then left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson.[26]

During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said

that he was a bit tipsy when he proceeded to Felipes house, but
he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first
hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had no
intention to back out because he was thinking that the victim
might get a gun and use the same against him. The accused-

appellant also asserted that when he was about to deliver the

second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was
sitting on a sack and used him to shield the blow. There was a
long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able to take hold of the same
because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted
that he had a plan to kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived
at the latters house on the day of the attack, he had no intention
to kill him.[27]

The defense also presented the following documentary

evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated
November 6, 2002;[28] and (2) Exhibit 2 the Civil Marriage
Contract of Rosendo Rebucan and Marites Rance. [29]

On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision,

convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of double
murder. The trial court elucidated thus:

[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the
accused] was sexually abused by the father and son Lagera, the
accused hatched a decision to avenge his wifes sexual
molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill Felipe did not
wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6 th of November 2002,
he armed himself with a sharp long bolo known as sundang and went
to Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the victim live[d]. Fueled
by hatred and the spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with
his compadre Enok, he decided to execute his evil deeds by going to
the house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of buying kerosene and once
inside the house hacked and wounded the victim, Felipe Lagera who
was then holding in his arm his grandson, one and half years 1 old,
Ramil Tagpis, Jr.

The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim,

Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and
executed with treachery.

xxxx

There is credence to the testimony of the minor

eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the victim, Felipe was holding
in his arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his
house, when the accused entered, and without any warning or
provocation coming from the victim, the accused immediately
delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving no regard
to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this
precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed has no
opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful
aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate. Moreover, what
defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up
against the armed and superior strength of the accused, but to leave
his fate to God.

The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected

and the victims, unarmed, were caught totally unprepared to defend
themselves qualifies the crime committed as murder. x x x.

After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately

went to the house of Brgy. Chairman, Renerio Arcenal at sitio Palali,
Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to surrender, because he killed
Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his
Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky Irlandez and his Chief Tanod,
Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of
Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender was corroborated by
Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented to Court the police
blotter, under entry No. 5885, dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP,
Carigara, Leyte.

Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities

showed his intent to submit himself unconditionally to them, to save
the authorities from trouble and expenses that they would incur for his
capture. For this reason, he has complied with the requisites of
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.] x x x.

From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances

of admission and voluntary surrender credited to the accused are not
sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances of: a) evident
premeditation; b) treachery (alevosia); c) dwelling the crime
was committed at the house of the victim; d) intoxication the
accused fueled himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the
commission of the crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and
f) minority, in so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is concerned,
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. x x x.

xxxx

In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially

established the quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[30]

The RTC, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and further amended by R.A.
7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court found accused ROSENDO
REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of DOUBLE MURDER charged under the information and sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to
the heirs of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos for each victim and moral
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos
to each; and

Pay the Cost.[31] (Emphases ours.)

The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic

review and the same was docketed as G.R. No. 161706. [32] The
parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs. [33] In
our Resolution[34] dated July 19, 2005, we ordered the transfer of
the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition,
pursuant to our ruling inPeople v. Mateo.[35] Before the appellate
court, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282.

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on

August 21, 2007, modifying the judgment of the RTC. The
appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accusedappellant resulted in two separate crimes of murder as the
evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a
complex crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals
subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing of Felipe
Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. With respect to the ensuant
mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accusedappellant, but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate
vindication of a grave offense and voluntary confession. As for
the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the same
was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, the
Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision

appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant is
hereby adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is
hereby
sentenced
to
suffer
the
penalty
of reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder he has committed.

The award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 for each

victim; the award of moral damages is likewise reduced to P50,000.00

for each victim. Further, exemplary damages in

of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of each victim. [36]

the

amount

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal [37] of the

above decision. In a Resolution[38] dated February 6, 2008, the
Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the case be
forwarded to this Court.

On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and

required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desire, within thirty days from notice. [39] Thereafter, both
parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed
before the Court of Appeals and will no longer file their respective
supplemental briefs.[40]

The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of

errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF
MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE
OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE

INTOXICATION AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

IV

THE
COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
OF
[41]
OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY.

APPRECIATING
THE
DWELLING,
ABUSE

The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but

denies that the crime was committed with treachery and evident
premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to the presence
of treachery given that there was no eyewitness who categorically
stated that the accused-appellant attacked the victims suddenly,
thereby depriving them of the means to defend themselves. He
brushed aside the testimony of Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she
was not in a position to say that there was no altercation between
him and Felipe, which could have put the latter on guard. The
prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the accused-appellant
intentionally waited for the time when Felipe would be
defenseless before initiating the attack. The fact that he
voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairperson and the
police and admitted the killings supposedly showed that it was
not intentional and he did not consciously adopt the method of
attack upon the two victims. The accused-appellant similarly
rejects the finding of the RTC that there was evident
premeditation on his part since the prosecution failed to prove
that he deliberately planned the killing of Felipe.

The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the

incident, he was still unable to control his anger as he just
recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by Felipe
and the latters son, Timboy. He also avers that he was a bit
intoxicated when the crime took place so that he was not in total
control of himself. He claims that he is not a habitual drinker and
that he merely consumed the alcohol prior to the incident in order
to appease his friend. He likewise argues that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling should not have been appreciated
inasmuch
as
the
same
was
not
alleged
in
the
information. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength cannot be appreciated since he did not
deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and the death of the
latter was accidental. The accused-appellant prays that he should
only be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a
grave offense and intoxication.

The appeal lacks merit.

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an

accused person, the prosecution must establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonabledoubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.[42] Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof
against the accused must survive the test of reason for it is only
when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime
is the person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction.
[43]
A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions
own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence
for the defense.[44]

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution

established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were
attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 248[45] of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of
murder if the same was committed with the attendant
circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the
situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246. [46] There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.[47] The essence of treachery is a
deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is
treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and
unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or
defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
defend themselves or to retaliate.[48]

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the

testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of
treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried
out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we
reiterate the established doctrine articulated in People v. De
Guzman[49] that:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on

the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the
trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. x x x.[50]

Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not

interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
[51]

Carmela testified as follows:

PROS. TORREVILLAS:

Q:

Do you have a brother named Ranil Tagpis, Jr?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Where is he now?

A:

He is dead.

Q:

Do you know the circumstance of his death?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Why did he die?

A:

Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.

Q:

Do you know also your grandfather Felipe Lagera, Jr?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Where is he now?

A:

He is dead also.

Q:

Why did he die?

A:

Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.

Q:

Is the person your Bata Endong here in the court room who
hacked your brother and your grandfather?

A:

Yes sir.

COURT INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to a person when asked of his name identified

himself as Rosendo Rebucan.

xxxx

Q:

What instrument did the accused use in killing your [brother

and] your grandfather?

A:

Long bolo, sundang.

Q:

Were you able to see that long bolo?

A:

Yes sir.

xxxx

Q:

Was your grandfather armed that time?

A:

He has his own bolo but he placed it on the holder of the long
bolo.

Q:

Was that long bolo used by your grandfather?

A:

No sir.

xxxx

Q:

How far were you to the incident, when this hacking incident
happened?

A:

(witness indicating a distance of about 4 meters).

xxxx

COURT:
Cross.

ATTY. DICO:

Q:

You stated awhile ago that your brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil]
and you and your papo Felipe were at the house of your papo
Felipe?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

You mean to say that there were no other persons present in

that house other than you four (4)?

A:

Yes sir.

xxxx

Q:

So, you were playing that toy camera inside the room of your
papo Felipe?

A:

No sir, I was playing then at the side of the chicken cage.

Q:

Is that chicken cage was inside or outside the house of your

papo Felipes house?

A:

Inside the house of my grandfather.

xxxx

Q:

Was your brother Ranil carried by your grandfather Felipe?

A:

Yes sir.
He was carried by his right arm.

Q:

So, you mean to say that your uncle Endo went inside, it was so
sudden?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Because it was sudden, you were not able to do anything, what

did you do?

A:

I then cried at that time.

xxxx

Q:

But you are sure that when your uncle Endo entered as you said
that your brother Ramil was carried by your papo Felipe?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Did your uncle Endo and your papo Felipe fight or was there an
altercation?

A:

No sir.[52]

As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly

and categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as the person
who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated that the
attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between the
accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any provocation, the
accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to
Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe
defenseless and deprived him of any opportunity to repel the
attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil,
the child unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his
grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise
correctly appreciated the existence of treachery. The said
circumstance may be properly considered, even when the victim
of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to
kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons
could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become
aware of it.[53] Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized
by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the
weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the
absence of any danger to the accused. [54]

Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture

on the matter, i.e., that the attack was preceded by a fight
between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be
persuaded by the accused-appellants version of the events in
question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the testimony of
children of sound mind is more correct and truthful than that of
older persons and that children of sound mind are likely to be

more observant of incidents which take place within their view

than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct
in detail than that of older persons. [55] In the instant case,
Carmela was cross-examined by the defense counsel but she
remained steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the
Court fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of
Carmela.

Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only

contradicts that of Carmela, but some portions thereof do not also
conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the trial
court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of the
human anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit B for the
prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds
that were found on his right arm, at his nose maxillary
area[56] and on his left arm. On the other hand, the accusedappellant testified that he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe,
the three of which landed on the left side of the victims
abdomen, the right side of his neck and on his upper left
arm. When confronted on the said apparently conflicting
statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any explanation.
[57]

Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the

prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of
Felipe and Ranil to murder.

The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the
Court of Appeals appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a
crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime
itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to

reflect upon the consequences of his act. [58] It is not enough that
evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal
intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing
determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
premeditation; it must be evident premeditation. [59] In the
case at bar, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish
any of the elements of evident premeditation since the
testimonies they presented pertained to the period of the actual
commission of the crime and the events that occurred
thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that
tended to establish the exact moment when the accusedappellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his
determination to carry out the plan and that a sufficient time had
lapsed before he carried out his plan.

Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating

circumstances of abuse of superior strength, dwelling, minority
and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
latter.[60] On the other hand, dwelling, minority and intoxication
cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the
instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or
specified in the information that was filed on January 23,
2003. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, a generic aggravating circumstance
will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the
information. This requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of
Rule 110, to wit:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or

information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the

Court of Appeals vis--vis the nature of crimes committed, we
agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should
be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder, not the
complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [w]hen a

single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. There are, thus, two kinds
of complex crimes. The first is known as compound crime, or
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. [61]

The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove

that the instant case falls under any of the two classes of complex
crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly and
indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a
single fatal hacking blow from the accused-appellant. The
eyewitness testimony of Carmela did not contain any detail as to
this material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that
the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for
committing and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice
versa. As the factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the
application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-

appellant should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts
of murder. In the past, when two crimes have been improperly
designated as a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the
conviction of the accused for the component crimes separately
instead of the complex crime.[62]

In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the

accused-appellant, we uphold the trial courts ruling that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability,
the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person
in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.[63] To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous
and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused
to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge
their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the
expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturing them.[64] The accused-appellant has duly established in
this case that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered
unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on
his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The
prosecution also admitted this circumstance of voluntary
surrender during trial.

We reject, however, the accused-appellants contention

that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a
grave offense.

The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code

provides that the intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has
committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but
when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be

considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court finds that

the accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication since his own testimony failed to
substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in
question. During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant
himself positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not drunk
when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. [65] He cannot,
therefore, be allowed to make a contrary assertion on appeal and
pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis
thereof.

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate

vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be
appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code requires that the act be committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing
the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is that
there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when
the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. [66] In
the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged
attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as
the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He
testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond,
on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6,
2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the
deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was
sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could
have regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said
mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the
accused-appellant.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the
crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the

existence of any other aggravating circumstance in both the

murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence
of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was
properly established in both instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code[67] mandates that the proper penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each
of the two counts of murder.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a

crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.[68]

The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of Appeals, on
the other hand, reduced the aforesaid amounts to P50,000.00 and
further awarded the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages to the heirs of the victim.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the

victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.[69] Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court
for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim by
reason of the latters death. The purpose for making such an
award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate
them for injuries to their feelings. [70] The award of exemplary
damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles 22292230 of the Civil Code,viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by

way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of

the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate
and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People v. Dalisay,[71] the Court clarified that [b]eing

corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In
much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. [72]

Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of P50,000.00 as

civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is, however, increased to P30,000.00 in
accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. As held in People v.
Combate,[73] when the circumstances surrounding the crime call
for the imposition ofreclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts
that
should
be
awarded
are P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further

orders the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs
of the two victims in this case. The award ofP25,000.00 for
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when
no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the
trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs
of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount
was not proven.[74]

WHEREFORE,
the
Court
hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated August
21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00282. The accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is
found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe
Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accusedappellant is further ordered to indemnify the respective heirs of
the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the amounts
of P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00
as
moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages for each victim, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality
of this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 178321

- versus -

CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Accused-Appellant.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,
[2]
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead
pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the
said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon
said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to law.

He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of
AAA.[3] The second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and
hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such
defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said
[AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases
were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who
was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by
her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she
and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on
their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in
Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick
and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the
back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with
the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this,
she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He
hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the
face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her
jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went

on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping
AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She
crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.[7] When
she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then
brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than
three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away
when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by
affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he
was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman
waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200 meters away from
him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind her. However, when she
was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his
granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her face was swollen,
with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what
happened to her, and AAA uttered, Si Tata Coni referring to appellant who is his
son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home. [11] AAA was
later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for
three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of
Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought
the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista where they found
Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already bloated.[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of
the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His
findings are as follows:

the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and

to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen;
desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in
the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and
maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of
wounds, three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the
victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of
stab wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]

The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of

Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral
and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were
committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and
his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police
officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the
police after he went wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man
whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already
incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to
his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the
evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the
following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his house to
have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the
time when he went wild after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted
that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 metersaway from the scene of the crime.
[16]

The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that
he went to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the
afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer
before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA and his uncle had an
illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5,
2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six oclock, AAA
and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house
together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he
proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision [18] on June 30, 2003 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds
the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court
hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the private complainant the following sums of
money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]

Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 &
2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered
to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as
actual damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in
2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]

Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution[22] dated August 22,
2007, we required the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if
they so desire. However, the parties submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the
CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]

Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of
AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main witness, and points out
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the crimes
charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he waylaid them while walking
along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident
premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse
of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical
attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order to
determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically
or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a
defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing
that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant,
she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness
AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a
question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique
position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to
the appellate courts[24] and absent any substantial reason which would justify the
reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have affected the outcome of the case. [25] This rule is even
more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26]

Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative
weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was
herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown
any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial courts evaluation of the
prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial courts
firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while testifying and its veritable
assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to
discern in her the trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to
recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with
trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her
eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with
the man she was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct,
the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she burst into
tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her
testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to
defer her direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue
with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct
and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her
credibility vanished.[27]

Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she
took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her
initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate
her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward manner, describing in detail
how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with
a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of her
testimony:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that

youre not able to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what
is the reason why you did not reach your place of work?
We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.

xxxx
Q:
A:

Where were you when you were hit?

We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q:
And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe
by Conrado Laog?
A:
I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q:
A:

Now, what happened next, if any?

I heard Jennifer crying, sir.

Q:
A:

And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?

He was beside me, sir.

Court:
Q:
How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A:
She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q:
And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A:
He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q:
A:

Then, what happened next?

He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.

Q:
A:

And what happened to Jennifer?

She fell down, sir.

Q:
A:

What did Conrado Laog do next?

He stabbed Jennifer, sir.

Q:
A:

After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?

He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?

He came back to me, sir.

Q:
A:

When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Q:
A:

And what happened to you?

And he stabbed me on my face, sir.

Q:
A:

Then, what happened to you?

After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed
my panty and my blouse and my bra.

Q:
A:

After that, what did he do next?

And then, he went on top of me, sir.

Q:
A:

Then, what happened?

He sucked my breast, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that?

He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q:
A:

Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into
your vagina?
For quite sometime, sir.

Q:
A:

After that, what happened?

After that, he stood up, sir.

Q:
A:

And where did he go?

After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.

Q:
A:

And after that, what did you do?

I fell unconscious, sir.

Q:

Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able

to point to him?

Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and
when asked his name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x[28]

On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his
children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over
the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively identified him
as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that
positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail
over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to
appellant as the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death
before raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they
were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and
proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification
of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering
appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own uncle would harm her
and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to
strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime is being committed. [30] There is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to
falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that -It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without
any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in
the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing.
Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing

proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any

weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that
alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within
the vicinity of the crime scene.

Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the
evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted
that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his
defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added reason that he has not
shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and
alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand
against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that
while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped
by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her
grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her
allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her
blouse and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments were just
pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her clothes on when she
crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a
minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of
rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to
the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the

essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and

intrinsically believable on the whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond
doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. [35] It cannot be
overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone
impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not
testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of
rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In
fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. [37] Thus we
have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element
for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we
find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was
the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have
been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by
the parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed
by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article
266-B, paragraph 5 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8353.[40]
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex

crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal
Code
are (1) robbery
with
homicide, (2) robbery
with
rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,(4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A.
No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;[] and that
this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar,
particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in
connection with her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and
on the occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution was able to
prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. x x x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)

A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado,
in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[43] explained that composite
crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex
crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime
proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of
aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each
of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on
the occasionof the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon

or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape
of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for
rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant
killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able
to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of
AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant
indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds
were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case
is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn
from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of
homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or
on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,[45] we expounded on the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the

occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must

precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken
into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must
be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is
to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. [47] Hence, even if any or
all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding
that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,

circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending

himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded
them. In People
v.
Salvatierra, we
ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime
with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder
under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the
circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the
complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine
the penalty to be imposed.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered

whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.
[50]
It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force
that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the
head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the
manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by
first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and
vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant
intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage
of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the

aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the

momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening
the defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly
weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack
caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless. [52]

Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic

aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The
penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346,
entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case
is concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the
victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award
of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of
the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of

Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article
2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal

knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A

(a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a
deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the
award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with
Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances
enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender:
1)

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)

AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged
in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q
A
Q
A

Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?

Yes, sir.
Why do you know her?
Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours,
sir.

Q
A

How are you related to [AAA]?

Her mother and my wife are sisters.

Q
A

So she is your niece-in-law?

Yes, sir.

x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)

The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship

to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the
determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,[55] this
Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal
cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if
the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with
the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the
Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances
not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the
award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been
proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages.
Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that
courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance
has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained
pending thereafter. Catubigreasoned that the retroactive application of
the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the
private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,
especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission
of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently
proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages
only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven

following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v.
Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y
Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People
of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set arePeople v.
Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of
the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two
sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after
the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for
the grant of exemplary damagestaking into account simply the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime,
courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.
In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can
be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the

highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much

the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court
imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary
damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness
of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the
Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v.
Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her
separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in
such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy
behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or
correction for the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful
design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would
do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary
damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several times
on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly
lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her undergarments, raping her while
she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and
abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous.
Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized
Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent
death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages in
order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall
behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In line

with current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of
Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs
of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases
of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [59] Anent the award of
civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the
CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount ofP25,000 as actual damages, said
amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the
crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while moral
damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim
to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March
21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer PatawaranRosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000
as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to
pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000
as moral damages andP30,000 as exemplary damages.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.