JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Judge Mike Asuncion

OUTLINE OF JURISDICTION
SUPREME COURT
I. Original Jurisdiction
A. Exclusive
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the following:
a. Court of Appeals - R.A. No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), Sec. 17i
b. Sandiganbayan - PD 1606 (amending Sandiganbayan Law), Sec. 7ii as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
Sec. 5
c. Court of Tax Appeals en banc - R.A. No. 1125, Sec. 19 as amended by R.A. No. 9282, Sec. 12iii
d. Commission on Elections en banc - Constitution, Art. IX-A, Sec. 7;iv Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No.
49705-09, February 8, 1979
e. Commission on Audit - Constitution, Art. IX-A, Sec. 7v
f. Ombudsman in criminal and non-administrative disciplinary cases - Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No.
129742, September 16, 1998
2. Sitting en banc, it shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - Constitution, Article
VII, Sec. 4
3. Review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 18
B. Concurrent
1. with the Court of Appeals
a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No
7902 (Act Expanding Jurisdiction of the CA by amending Sec. 9 of BP 129)vi
b. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the National Labor Relations Commission
under the Labor Code - B.P. 129, Sec. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 7902;vii St. Martins Funeral
Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
c. Petitions for writ of kalikasan - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Part III, Rule 7, Sec. 3viii
2. with the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts
a. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto - R.A. 7902 (amending Sec. 9 of BP 129) and R.A.
5440 (amending R.A. 296)
b. Actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of laws concerning monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440ix
c. Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Part III, Rule
8, Sec. 2x
3. with the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts
a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a MTC or of a
corporation, a board, an officer, or person - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(1) and (2);xi Rule 65 as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007xii
b. Petitions for issuance of writ of amparo - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo)xiii
c. Petitions for issuance of writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (The Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data)xiv
4. with the Regional Trial Courts
a. Actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls - Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec.
5(1);xv B..P. Blg. 129, Sec. 21(2)xvi
II. Appellate Jurisdictionxvii
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- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence - Constitution, Article VI, Section 30
A. Ordinary Appeal by Notice of Appeal
From the Court of Appeals in all criminal cases involving offences for which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion
or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offenses for which the penalty
of death is imposed - Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC; Sec. 13(b), Rule 124;xviii
People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
B. By Petition for Review on Certiorari
1. Appeals from the Court of Appeals - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440; Constitution,
Article VIII, Sec. 5(2); Rule 45
2. Appeals from the Sandiganbayan on pure questions of law, except where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death - P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 7 (supra) as amended by R.A. No.
8249 (supra); Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 20, 1982; Rule 45
3. Appeals from judgments or final orders of the RTCs exercising original jurisdiction in the following:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue
d. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2-a,
b, c, e); R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended; B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(3); Rule 45; Rule 41, Sec. 2(c);
Rule 122, Sec. 3(e)
e. Appeals from decisions or final resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc - Rule 16, Sec. 1,
A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA or The Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals;xix Sec. 1, Rule 45 as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007; R.A. No. 9282
C. By Special Civil Action of Certiorari (Rule 64) against the following:
1. Commission on Elections - Constitution, Article IX-A, Sec. 7; Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09,
February 8, 1979
2. Commission on Audit - ibid.
COURT OF APPEALS
I. Original Jurisdiction
A. Exclusive
1. Actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Court - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(2); Rule 47
2. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law - Rule 65, Sec. 4 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated
December 12, 2007
B. Concurrent
1. with the Supreme Court
a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No
7902
b. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the National Labor Relations Commission
under the Labor Code - B.P. 129, Sec. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 7902; St. Martins Funeral Homes
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
c. Petitions for writ of kalikasan - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC dated
2. with the Supreme Court and Regional Trial Courts
a. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto b. Actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of laws concerning monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440
c. Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
3. with the Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts

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a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a MTC or of a
corporation, a board, an officer, or person - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(1) and (2); A.M. No. 077-12-SC dated December 12, 2007
b. Petitions for issuance of writ of amparo - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo)
c. Petitions for issuance of writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
A. Ordinary Appeal by Notice of Appeal or with Record on Appeal
1. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts except those appealable to the Supreme Court and
Sandiganbayan
2. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts on constitutional, tax, jurisdictional questions involving questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law or which should be appealed first to the CA - R.A. No. 296,
Sec. 17, par. 4.4, as amended
3. Appeals from the decisions and final orders of the Family Courts - R.A. No. 8369, Sec. 14
4. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed - Rule 122, Sec. 3(c) as amended by A.M. No. 005-03-SC; People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-8, July 7, 2004
5. Direct appeal from land registration and cadastral cases decided by MTCs, MTCCs and MCTCs based
on their delegated jurisdiction - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 34 as amended by R.A. No. 7691
B. Special civil action of certiorari (Rule 65) against decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC - A.M. No. 99-201-SC; St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 13086, September 16, 1998; Torres v. Specialized
Packaging Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
C. Automatic review in cases where the Regional Trial Courts impose the death penalty - Secs. 3(d) and 10,
Rule 122 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC; People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-8, July 7, 2004
D. Petition for Review
1. Appeals from the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No. 7902; Rule 43
2. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts in cases appealed from the MTCs, MTCCs and MCTCs which
are not a matter of right - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 22; Rule 42; Rule 122, Sec. 3(b)
3. Appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of, or authorised by, quasi-judicial agencies
in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, among which are:
a. Securities and Exchange Commission
b. Office of the President
c. Land Registration Authority
d. Social Security Commission
e. Civil Aeronautics Board
f. Intellectual Property Office
g. National Electrification Administration
h. Energy Regulatory Board
i. National Telecommunications Commission
j. Department of Agrarian Reform under R.A. No. 6657
k. Government Service Insurance System
l. Employees Compensation Commission
m. Agricultural Inventions Board
n. Insurance Commission
o. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission
p. Board of Investments
q. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
r. Voluntary arbitrators authorised by law
s. Decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
4. Appeals from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - R.A. No. 8371, Sec. 67
5. Appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases - A.M. No. 99-2-01-SC;
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

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SANDIGANBAYAN - P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 4 as amended by R.A. 8249, Sec. 4

I. Original Jurisdiction
A. Exclusive
1. Violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
R.A. No. 1379; and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (Bribery), where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
a. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(R.A. No. 6758), specifically including:
i. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads
ii. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other city department heads
iii. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher
iv. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank
v. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher
vi. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor
vii. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations
b. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under R.A. No. 6758
c. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution
d. Chairmen and Members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution
e. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under R.A. No. 6758
2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in no. 1 above in relation to their office
3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A
(Sequestration Cases) - R.A. No. 7975, Sec. 2 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
In case none of the accused is occupying the above positions, the original jurisdiction shall be vested in
the proper RTC or MTC, etc., as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended - R.A. No. 7975, Sec. 2 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
In case there is no specific allegation of facts showing that the offense was committed in relation to the
public office of the accused, the original jurisdiction shall also be vested in the proper RTC or MTC, etc.,
as the case may be - Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
4. Violation of R.A. No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001) as amended by R.A. No. 9194, when
committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers
B. Concurrent with the Supreme Court
Petitions for issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, injunction and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, including quo warranto arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A - Ibid, as amended
by R.A. No. 8249
C. Concurrent with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts
1. Petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data when action concerns public data files of government
offices - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo); Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
2. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a Municipal Trial
Court, corporation, board, officer or person - Sec. 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
II. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction
Final judgments, resolutions or orders of RTCs whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction under P.D. No. 1606, as amended - R.A. No. 8249, Sec. 5
COURT OF TAX APPEALS - R.A. No. 9282, Section 7, amending Section 1 of R.A. No. 1125
I. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction to Review by Appeal
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A. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
B. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where
the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial
C. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction
D. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
1. in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release
of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or
2. other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs
E. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals
F. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
G. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article,
and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping
and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and
safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or
not to impose said duties
II. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
A. All criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs
Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided,
however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount o taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is
no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate.
B. In tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties:
Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges
and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
III. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction
A. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction
B. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
C. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction
D. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
I. Original Jurisdiction
A. Civil
1. Exclusive
a. Subject of the action is not capable of pecuniary estimation
b. Actions involving title or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value
exceeds Php20,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php50,000.00, except for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer
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c.

Actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where demand or claim exceeds Php300,000.00 or in
Metro Manila Php400,000.00
d. Matters of probate, testate or intestate, where gross value of estate exceeds Php300,000.00 or in
Metro Manila Php400,000.00
e. Cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function
f. Other cases where the demand, exclusive of interest, damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs, or value of property in controversy exceeds Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila
Php400,000.00 (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 19 as amended by R.A. No. 7691). However, if the claim for
damages is the main cause of the action, the amount thereof shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994)
g. Additional original jurisdiction transferred under Sec. 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code:
i. Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors, business associates, its
officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
ii. Controversies arising out or intra-corporate partnership relations
iii. Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such
corporation, partnership, or association
iv. Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in a state of suspension of
payments - R.A. No. 8799
h. Application for issuance of writ of search and seizure in civil actions for infringement of intellectual
property rights - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC
i. Violations of R.A. No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001) as amended by R.A. No. 9194
2. Concurrent
a. with the Supreme Court
Actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 21(1)
b. with the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
i. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
ii. Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
c. with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan
i. Petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC; Sec. 3, A.M.
No. 08-1-16-SC
ii. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus if they relate to an act or omission of a
municipal trial court, corporation, board, officer or person - Sec. 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC
d. with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Application for Protection Order under R.A. No. 9282, Sec. 10, unless there is a Family Court in the
residence of petitioner
e. with the Insurance Commission
Claims not exceeding Php100,000.00 - Insurance Code, Sec. 416; P.D. No. 612; Applicable if
subject of the action is not capable of pecuniary estimation, otherwise, jurisdiction is concurrent with
MTC, etc.
B. Criminal
1. Exclusive
Criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 20;
These include criminal cases where the penalty provided by law exceeds six (6) years imprisonment
irrespective of the fine - R.A. No. 7691
These also include criminal cases not falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
and higher - R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
But in cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the RTCs have jurisdiction if the amount of
the fine exceeds Php4,000.00 - R.A. No 7691 as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated
June 14, 1994

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Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime is lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the
maximum and most serious penalty imposable for an offence forming part of the complex crime - Cuyos
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 46934, April 15, 1998
II. Appellate
All cases decided by lower courts (MTCs, etc.) in their respective territorial jurisdictions - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 22
FAMILY COURTS
I. Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction
A. Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine
(9) years of age, when one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the crime:
Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability
which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of
application, pursuant to P.D. No. 1903 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code)
B. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, and habeas corpus in relation to the latter - Sec. 3, A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC; Sec. 3, A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC
C. Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof (Sec. A.20 and B.28, A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC; also,
R.A. No. 9523 - An Act Requiring Certification of the DSWD to Declare a Child Legally Available for
Adoption as a Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings, Amending Certain Provisions of R.A. No. 8552,
otherwise known as The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, R.A. No. 8043, otherwise known as The InterCountry Adoption Act of 1995, P.D. No. 603, otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for
Other Purposes)
D. Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage, and those relating to marital status
and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements,
and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains - Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
E. Petitions for involuntary commitment of a child, for removal of custody against child-placement or child-caring
agency or individual, and for commitment of disabled child - Secs. 4(b), 5(a)(ii), 6(b), A.M. No. 02-1-19
F. Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment
G. Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209 otherwise known as
The Family Code of the Philippines
H. Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for
voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, the suspension, termination or restoration of parental
authority and other cases cognizable under P.D. No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986 and other
related laws
I. Petitions for constitution of family home - repealed by Executive Order No. 209
J. Cases against minors cognizable under R.A. No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002; A.M. No. 07-8-2-SC
K. Violation of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act as amended by R.A. No. 7658 and as further amended by R.A. No. 9231
L. Violation of R.A. No. 9775 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
M. Cases of domestic violence against:
1. Women which are acts of gender-based violence that result or are likely to result in physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats
and coercion which violate a womans personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and
2. Children which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development
N. Cases of violence against women and their children under R.A. No. 9262 otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 including applications for Protection Order under the same
Act
O. Criminal cases involving juveniles if no preliminary investigation is required under Sec. 1, Rule 112 - Sec. 1,
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC

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METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
I. Original Jurisdiction
A. Civil
1. Exclusive
a. Actions involving personal property valued at not more than Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila
Php400,000.00
b. Actions demanding sums of money not exceeding Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila
Php400,000.00; in both cases, exclusive of interest, damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged, but the filing fees thereon shall be paid.
These included admiralty and maritime cases.
c. Actions involving title or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed
Php20,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php50,000.00
d Provisional remedies in principal actions within their jurisdiction and in proper cases, such as
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, appointment of receiver and delivery of personal
property - Rules 57, 58, 59 and 60
e. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, with jurisdiction to resolve issue of ownership to determine
issue of possession
f. Probate proceedings, testate or intestate, where gross value of estate does not exceed
Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00 - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 33 as amended by R.A. No.
7691
g. Inclusion and exclusion of voters - Sec. 38, B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
2. Delegated
Cadastral and land registration cases assigned by the SC where there is no controversy or opposition
and in contested lots valued at more than Php100,000.00 - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 34 as amended by R.A.
No. 7691
3. Special
Petition for habeas corpus in the absence of all RTC judges - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 35
B. Criminal
1. Exclusive
a. All violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions
b. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than six (6) years irrespective of the fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties and the civil liability arising therefrom;
provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 32 as amended by R.A. No. 7691
c. All offenses committed not falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
where none of the accused is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher - as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
d. In cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine not exceeding Php4,000.00, the MTCs, etc.
have jurisdiction - Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994
2. Special
Applications for bail in the absence of all RTC judges - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 35
SHARIAH COURTS
I. Exclusive Jurisdiction
A. All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws
B. All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills,
issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors, regardless of the nature
or aggregate value of the property
C. Petitions for the declaration of absence and death or for the cancellation and correction of entries in the
Muslim Registries
D. All actions arising from the customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified
which law shall govern their relations
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E. All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus and all other auxiliary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
II. Concurrent Jurisdiction
A. Petitions of Muslims for the constitution of the family home, change of name and commitment of an insane
person to an asylum
B. All other personal and legal actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer which shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC
C. All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property
involved belongs exclusively to Muslims
SMALL CLAIMS CASES, RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE and BARANGAY CONCILIATION
I. Small Claims - A.M. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 2
A. MTCs, MeTCs and MCTCs shall have jurisdiction over actions for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed Php100,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs
B. Actions covered:
1. purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or
reimbursement of sum of money
2. the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved
upon the filing of the criminal action in court
3. the enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim Sec. 417, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code)
II. Rules on Summary Procedure
A. Civil Cases
1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered
2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not
exceed Php100,000.00 or outside Metro Manila Php200,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs
B. Criminal Cases
1. Violations of traffic law, rules and regulations
2. Violation of the rental law
3. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed is imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or
fine not exceeding Php1,000.00, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom, provided, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, RSP shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed Php10,000.00
III. Barangay Conciliation
A. The Lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same municipality or city for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1. where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
2. where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions
3. offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year or a fine exceeding Php5,000.00
4. offenses where there is no private offended party
5. where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupin
6. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupin
7. such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
8. any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships, or juridical entities
9. disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically:
a. a criminal case where the accused is under police custody or detention
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b. a petition for habeas corpus by a person illegally detained or deprived of his liberty or one acting in
his behalf
c. actions coupled with provisional remedies, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, replevin and
support pendente lite
d. where the action may be barred by statute of limitations
10. labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relationship
11. where the dispute arises from the CARL
12. actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which can be directly filed in court

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Week of July 22-26, 2014 - Case Assignment

Jurisdiction of Courts
Supreme Court
1.
2.
3.
4.

Cruz v. Mijares, G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994
Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Court of Appeals
1. Aragon v. CA, G.R. No. 124333, March 26, 1997
2. St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
3. Torres v. Specialized Packaging, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
Regional Trial Courts
1.
2.
3.
4.

Katon v. Palanca, G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004

Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006
RCPI v. CA, G.R.No. 136109, August 1, 2002
Bokingo v. CA, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979

Ortigas & Co. v. J. Herrera, G.R. No. L-36098, January 21, 1983
Ortigas & Co. CA, G.R. No. 52488, July 25, 1981
Villostas v. CA, G.R. No. 96271, June 26, 1992
Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, September 12, 2008

Family Courts
1. Madria v. Madria, G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007
Commercial Courts
1. Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008
Katarungang Pambarangay
1. Blardony v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 70261, February 28, 1990
2. Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
3. Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008

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Section 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals.
In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance:
1. In petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;
2. In actions between the Roman Catholic Church and the municipalities or towns, or the Filipino Independent Church for
controversy as to title to, or ownership, administration or possession of hospitals, convents, cemeteries or other properties used in
connection therewith;
3. In actions brought by the Government of the Philippines against the Roman Catholic Church or vice versa for the title
to, or ownership of, hospitals, asylums, charitable institutions, or any other kind of property; and
4. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or
writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving
other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the
accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;
(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs, or in
which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath of a
party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is fifty
thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil
case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein;
(6) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.
ii
Section 4. Jurisdiction. Except as herein provided, the Sandiganbayan shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
try and decide:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
'27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade27' and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
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c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of
the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to
the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
iii
Sec. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
iv
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
v
Ibid.
vi
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
vii
Ibid.
viii
Sec. 3. Where to file.The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals.
ix
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals.
In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance:
1. In petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; and
2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade.
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The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving
other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the
accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;
(2) All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization; and
(3) All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private person or entity.
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the
law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toil, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to
constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or
decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and
(5) Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of
Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
x
Sec. 2. Where to file the petition.The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
xi
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person,
it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
xiii
Sec. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such
court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or
before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
xiv
SEC. 3. Where to File.The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of
the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action
concerns public data files of government offices.
xv
Supra.
xii

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xvi

Sec. 3. Where to File.The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of
the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action
concerns public data files of government offices.
xvii
Article VI, Sec. 30 of the Constitution provides: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
xviii
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the
penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith
certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused
appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with
the Court of Appeals.
xix
Section 1. Appeal to Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. A party adversely affected by a decision or
ruling of the Court en banc may appeal therefrom by filing with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within
fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If such party has
filed a motion for reconsideration or for new trial, the period herein fixed shall run from the partys receipt of a copy of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or for new trial.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
SUPREME COURT
CRUZ vs MIJARES
G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for
Abatement of Nuisance pending in the sala of respondent judge. He
sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to
secure written permission from the Court Administrator before he
could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself. Counsel for the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner objected, alleging
that an motion to dismiss is not allowed after the Answer has been
filed.
Respondent judge remarked, Hay naku, masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner filed a manifestation and
motion to inhibit: there was partiality on the part of respondent
judge as can be seen from her contumacious remarks. Motion
denied. Motion for reconsideration denied.
Cruzs appearance was also denied as he failed to submit
the document required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. Motion
for reconsideration: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34,
not Rule 138-A. 138 applicable to any non-lawyer; 138-A
specifically for law students.
Motion for reconsideration denied, still invoking Rule 138A. Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with
the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Rule 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer,
to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

Issue:
Whether or not SC have jurisdiction to entertain the
petition.
Held:
Yes. SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction. This
concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute
freedom to choose where the petition will be filed. Still has to give
due regard to the judicial hierarchy. Thus, petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against RTCs should be filed with the CA. Only
in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take
cognizance of petitions directly filed before it. SC assumes
jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation of Sec.
34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. Petitioner is
cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with the SC.

Court agrees with petitioner that the basis of his

appearance is Rule 138, not 138-A. As plaintiff, he can
personally conduct the litigation of the case.
He would be acting not as counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.
The fact that petition is a law student does not mean that
the applicable rule is always 138-A. Again, he seeks to
represent himself.
TCs conclusion that 138-A superseded 138 is incorrect. It
is an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts.

Should respondent judge inhibit herself? NO.

Her hay naku statement is not enough to show

arbitrariness and prejudice.

In fact, petitioners administrative case against respondent

judge for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was
dismissed for lack of merit.

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duties applies.
DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.

*******
What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A? Rule
138.
Rule 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
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FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS vs CA

G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994

ARATUC vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979

Facts:

Facts:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the B
atasangPambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases
at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which
comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte
,Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
Marawi, Iligan andCotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension
of the canvass then being undertaken byRegional Board of
canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of
4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed
showing
partial
results.
ASupervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Vena
ncio S. Duque hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the
petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities inthe election records
of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board
of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the
Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,declaring all the eight Kilusan ng
Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by theKB
candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued
its questionedresolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB
candidate
as
having
obtained
the
firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to p
roclaim the winningcandidates. The KB candidates interposed the
present petition.

Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129,

EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court
which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases
decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments
(BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
"ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano
Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa
filed a petition for review with CA.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its
issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over
the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing
Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the
basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of
E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of
the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency
there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on
the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by
Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on
February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
the case.
Held:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of
E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to
appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from
decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of
discretion,amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
canvassers, theComelec may review the actuations of the Regional
Board of Canvassers, such as by extendingits inquiry beyond the
election records of the voting centers in questions.The authority
of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from anyappellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the
law,
for
there
is
none
such
provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prero
gative of direct control andsupervision endowed to it by the
provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a toowell
settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a
superior body or office havingsupervision and control over another
may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or oughtto have
done.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

FABIAN vs DESIERTO
Gr. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which
was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT
with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay
for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel
had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited
himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is valid
Held:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
COURT OF APPEALS
ARAGON vs CA
G.R. No. 124333, March 26, 1997
Facts:
MARENIR executed a real estate mortgage over its 5
subdivision lots to cover the P4M loan it obtained from the private
respondent. The mortgage was annotated in all the TCTs, and
subsequently, increased its mortgage loan to P4,560,000.00. In
1982, it sold one of the lots to the petitioner on installment. After
the full payment of the purchase price, MARENIR was unable to
transfer the TCT to the petitioner. Petitioner then filed a complaint
for Specific Performance and Damages against MARENIR with the
RTC.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering MARENIR to execute
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner and to deliver the
TCT and the actual physical possession thereof to petitioner. Since
no appeal was filed by MARENIR, petitioner filed a Motion to Direct
Branch Clerk of Court or Deputy Sheriff to Execute Absolute Deed of
Sale, which was granted by the RTC. Subsequently, the branch clerk
of court executed for and in behalf of MARENIR, a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the petitioner.
However, the RD refused to register the deed unless the
ODC of TCT is presented, which was in the possession of the Manila
Banking Corp. (MBC). The MBC agreed to release the TCT to the
petitioner upon payment of its corresponding value in the amount
of P185,020.52, which the petitioner refused to pay.
Petitioner left no other recourse but to file a complaint for
Delivery of Title and Damages against MBC with RTC. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner. MBC appealed to the CA which
reversed the RTC decision and orders the dismissal of the complaint.
The CA ratiocinated that: The Specific Performance and Damages
filed by the petitioner against MARENIR should have been filed with
the HLURB, the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaint. Declaring as null and void the decision rendered by the
judge for having been rendered without jurisdiction - a void
judgment cannot acquire finality; it is non-existent; it is in legal
effect no judgment or order at all; and so was the order to the
branch clerk to execute the deed of absolute sale; it follows that the
deed of absolute sale executed by the branch of clerk was also null
and void
There being no decision upon which the challenged
decision is based, no deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner,
hence, no cause of action against MBC
There is no obligation on the part of MBC to respect or not
to violate such right
Hence, the present petition.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. No. What was on appeal before the Court of Appeals was the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10200 (Delivery of Title and
Damages) where the parties are petitioner herein and respondent
MBC. However, the said court, in deciding the issues raised in the
aforesaid case, took cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-89-1797 (Specific
Performance and Damages) where the parties were different i.e.
petitioner and MARENIR. Furthermore, said case was not appealed
before the Court of Appeals nor was there any action commenced to
annul the judgment of the court a quo. Hence, the decision over that
case became final and executory. Respondent court clearly
committed an error when it declared as null and void the
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-89-1797 as it was not the case
appealed before it. Even if MARENIR itself, the losing party to the
aforementioned case decides now to appeal the decision or to file
any other proceeding seeking its nullification, it cannot at this very
late stage do so. This is in consonance with the legal tenet that
failure to perfect an appeal renders the trial court's judgment final
and executory and it can no longer be subject to review. As such,
any modification of that judgment by the appellate court cannot be
upheld.
2. Yes. The SC cited the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy where they
ruled that even if they found that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case, they still ruled that the proceedings conducted
therein was valid based on the doctrine of laches.
In that case, the SC defined laches as failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Although we agree with private respondent's contention
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be
objected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, this
particular rule, however, means that jurisdictional issues in a case
can be raised only during the proceedings in said case and during
the appeal of said case. It certainly does not mean that lack of
jurisdiction of a court in a case may be raised during the proceedings
of another case, in another court and even by anybody at
all. Certainly, we cannot countenance this procedure as this will lead
to absurdity and is against the basic principle of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated January 31, 1994 is REINSTATED, with
costs against private respondents.

Issues:
1. Whether or not CA acquire appellate jurisdiction over
any case not properly brought to it by the parties concerned
2. Whether or not estoppel by laches is applicable
Held:

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CASES: JURISDICTION
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
Facts:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager
of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between
him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home.
Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working
as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from
the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so
the latter she took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and
other government fees, although the records purported to show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes
in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were
no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner
had illegally terminated his employment.
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor
arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25,
1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case.
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent
appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in
not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding
that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St.
Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting
aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor
[5]
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in
[6]
its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the
present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
[7]
discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to
the Court of Appeals.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Held:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and
still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.
The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances
we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is
particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P
No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.

TORRES vs. SPECIALIZED PACKAGING

G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners claim to be employees of the Specialized
Packaging Development Corporation (SPDC), a business entity
engaged in the repackaging of cosmetic products. In three separate
Complaints, they charged SPDC and alleged labor recruiters Eusebio
Camacho General Services (ECGS) and MPL Services with illegal
dismissal; and with nonpayment of overtime, premium and
th
13 month pays, and night differential.
The cases were later consolidated and assigned to Labor
Arbiter (LA) Salimathar Nambi. On June 30, 1995, the LA issued his
Decision in favor of petitioners, because SPDC and MPL Services had
failed to submit their position papers on or before the deadline.
SPDC was ordered to reinstate all petitioners to their former
positions and to pay them back wages, premium pay for holidays
th
and rest days, service incentive leave pay and 13 month pay.
The LA's Decision was appealed by SPDC to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside the ruling and
ordered the case remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings.
The case was then set again for hearings. Respondents
SPDC and ECGS submitted their position papers five months after
the case had been considered submitted for decision.
On December 14, 1999, LA Nambi issued a second
Decision finding petitioners' employment to have been illegally

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

terminated by SPDC. The NLRC, however, again reversed and set

aside this new Decision on June 9, 2000.
On January 29, 2001, petitioners appealed to the CA,
which dismissed their petition, finding that the verification and the
certification against forum shopping to be either defective or
insufficient. (signed by only two petitioners out of 25 petitioners)
Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the
appellate court pointed out that disregarding the rules could not be
rationalized by invoking a liberal construction thereof. Furthermore,
it found no satisfactory explanation why the 25 principal petitioners,
who resided in different provinces, had not executed a special
power of attorney in favor of either of the two petitioners or their
counsel.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC
may be reviewed by a civil action for certiorari.
Held:
Yes. The proper procedure for seeking a review of the final
dispositions of the NLRC was laid down in 1998 in St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC. That case heralded two very important rules: 1)
decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC may be reviewed only via
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and 2) such petition must be filed with the CA in strict
observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, after St. Martin became final, special civil actions
challenging NLRC rulings have been referred by this Court to the CA
for proper disposition. Exceptions to this rule were those instances
when -- prior to the finality of St. Martin -- both parties had already
filed their respective memoranda with this Court, and it then opted
to take final cognizance of the case. Under AM No. 99-2-01-SC,
however, all new cases erroneously filed with this Court after June 1,
1999, were dismissed forthwith.
X
x
x
x
Indeed, rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end,
not to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed with
in meritorious appeals.
It has been our consistent holding that the ends of justice
are better served when cases are determined on the merits -- after
all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses -- rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections.
Consequently, the case should be remanded to the CA for
a proper determination of the substantive issues. Time-honored is
the principle that when the law entrusts the review of factual and
substantive issues to a lower court or to a quasi-judicial tribunal,
that court or agency must be given the opportunity to pass upon
those issues. Only thereafter may the parties resort to this Court.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, and the case is
remanded to the CA for a proper determination of the substantive
issues. No costs.
meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
KATON vs. PALANCA
G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a
cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial
court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of
Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different
grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends
useless litigations.
Facts:
On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero
Island, Puerto Princessa, Palawan was reclassified from forest to
agricultural land upon the request by the above-named
petitioner. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and
Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the
endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an
area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents
and original certificates of title covering certain portions of
Sombrero Island issued in favor of Manuel Palanca and the other
respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through
fraud.
Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island
in his favor.
On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never filed
any homestead application for the island and insisted that they
already had their respective occupancy and improvements on the
island. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful
possessors of their respective portions and have declared said
portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully
paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal
capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action
for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere
homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the
exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the
whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from
forest land to agricultural land.
The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of
his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon
by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of
jurisdiction.
Issues:
1.

Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the

Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised
(the merits of the case) in the Petition?

CIVIL PROCEDURE
2.

Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged

residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition
on an issue not raised in the Petition?

Held:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits.
1. Yes. This is not the first time that petitioner has taken
issue with the propriety of the CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it
with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its
December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its
November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:
"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that
it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety,
complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues
involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges,
five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often
confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand
corrected.
That explanation should have been enough to settle the
issue. The CAs Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners
issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to
say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdiction in ruling
on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been,
and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does
not include a review of the evidence, more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as
in this case.
Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available
at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by
the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint
could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under
Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal.
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the
general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same
rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind
when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of
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CASES: JURISDICTION
jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
to dismiss the action.
Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held
that when the plaintiffs own complaint shows clearly that the action
has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of
prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v.
Gegato,we also explained thus:
"x x x Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings
or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco
v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.
Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets,
Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec.
1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground
as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is
alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the
defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof
is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v.
Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al.,
97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default
(PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that
the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be
otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present
case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must
endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent
future litigations.
Petition DENIED; assailed Resolution AFFIRMED; dismissal of
complaint SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure
to state a cause of action and prescription.

ENCARNACION vs. AMIGO

G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land
formerly owned by his mother-in-law who signed a waiver of right in
his favor when his father-in-law, Victoriano Magpantay, died. The
latter acquired the said property through sale from Mallapitan who
acquire the same from Valiente. Respondent Amigo allegedly
entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the
property without the permission of the then owner, Magpantay,
which continued even after the issuance of the TCTs to the
petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner, through his lawyer, sent a
letter to the respondent demanding her to vacate the subject
property which the latter refused. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a

CIVIL PROCEDURE
complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for
restraining order with the MTC in Cities of Isabela. In her Answer,
she alleged that she has been in possession of a portion of the
subject property since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent,
and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On
appeal to the RTC, the RTC ruled to dismiss the case on the ground
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, the RTC acquired no
appellate jurisdiction thereof. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a
petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA which ruled to
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the proper
action is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as determined
by the allegations in the complaint filed by the petitioner.

Held:
Yes. After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of
this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion
publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint must
show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without
resort to parol testimony.
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the
petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by
virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed
the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1,
2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the
premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand
letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001,
thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within
the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful
detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of
the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived
possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment
in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the
petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it
one for accion publiciana.
After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be
commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is
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CASES: JURISDICTION
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857
ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings,
is AFFIRMED.
NOTE:
The three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:
1.

2.

3.

Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which

may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year,
and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of possession, which should
be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and
Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion,
which is an action for the recovery of ownership
which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Court

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but
shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the
lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

RCPI vs. CA
G.R.No. 136109, August 1, 2002
Facts:
Private respondent Dulawon filed with the RTC a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
Radio Communications of the Phils, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending
that it is the MTC which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically
one for collection of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00,
which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for
RTCs. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as well as the MR.
Hence, petitioner went to CA on petition for certiorari, which
dismissed the petition. MR having been denied, hence, this petition
for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by Dulawon.
Held:

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it

declared that:
The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in
1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when
petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed
an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 8. Appeal
from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an
appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case
without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or
reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground
of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case
on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of
reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court
on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings
and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the
case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof.

Yes. Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in
civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
x
x
x
xxx
x x x (8) In
all
other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94,
states:x x x
x x x
x x x
2.The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court. x x x
x x
x
x x x.
[8]
In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
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CASES: JURISDICTION
action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly
show that private respondents cause of action is breach of contract.
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action
either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.
In Manufacturers Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that
actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the
suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific
performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease
contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if
the court should find that the subject contract of lease was
breached. As alleged therein, petitioners failure to pay rentals due
for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation
of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of
monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint
likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term
of the lease with the closure of and removal all communication
[14]
equipment in the leased premises. Under the circumstances, the
court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to
determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease
agreement that would justify the award of rentals and
damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals
in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the
breach is merely incidental to the main action for specific
performance.
Clearly, the action for specific performance case,
irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be
recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable
exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did
not err in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. WHEREFORE, in
view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is
AFFIRMED.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
BOKINGO vs. CA
G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006
Background of the case:
Petitioner filed an application for titling of a parcel of land
before the DENR. Upon learning of the application, the private
respondents filed a Protest against the petitioner contending that
the subject parcel of land was inherited by the private respondents
from their father, Celestino Busa. The Provincial Environmental and
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) resolved the Protest in favor of
the private respondents, and a certification stating that said Order
has become final and executory. A survey Authority was issued by
CENRO authorizing Campos (one of the private respondents) to
survey the subject land. However, the petitioner stopped the survey.
Private respondents availed of the Brgy. Justice System to resolve
the controversy but to no avail, thus, a Certificate to File Action was
issued. Hence, the filing of the instant complaint.
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the defendants in the complaint for
injunction and damages filed by Ernesto Campos et al. with the RTC.
He filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the latter has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Specifically, he
contended that it could be gleaned from the complaint that the
issue between the parties involved the possession of the land. As
such, the assessed value of the land was crucial to determine the
courts jurisdiction over the subject matter in accordance with either
Section 19(2) or Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691. He
pointed out that the assessed value of the subject property was not
indicated.
The RTC ruled to deny the motion to dismiss holding that
the relief being sought in the complaint is injunction in order that
the respondents right to survey the subject land would not be
defeated. It also held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim under Section 2 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which
provides in part that preliminary injunction may be granted by the
court where the action or proceeding is pending.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing to the
petitioner because an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition
for certiorari or mandamus. Hence, the filing of the instant petition
for review seeking the reversal of the said CA decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of CA is correct.
Held:
Yes. It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of
relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the

defendant or agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the
occasion to explain that "in determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action, or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction
over the action will depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by
Regional Trial Courts."
As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought
by the respondents in their complaint is for the court a quo to issue
an injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his representatives to
permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the subject
land.
Significantly, the respondents complaint has not sought to
recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is
principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his
representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent
the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is
one of a possessory action.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 is AFFIRMED in toto.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
MTC CASE DIGEST
REYES vs STA. MARIA
Gr. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979
Facts:
Artemio and Hilarion Reyes(Reyes) FILED: action termed as
one to quiet title against private respondents Hilaria Santos De
Lopez and Pilar Santos (Santos) @ CFI Bulacan. They alleged that:
They are owners of a lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Through their tolerance and goodwill they let Maximo Santos(Father
of defendants occupy the same on the condition that (1)Instead of
rental Santos will pay the real estate taxes, (2)Santos would leave
anytime Reyess demanded them to do so. Feb 1986 Reyes
verbally demanded Santos to vacate. The latter unreasonably
refused at the same time claiming ownership thourgh purchase of
the land from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo.
They prayed that they be declared as owners, possession
be given to them, P50 as rental/damages, and attys fees. Santos
FILED: Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. That
the case is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer which
falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior or municipal court
not the CFI.
CFI: Granted motion. Case DISMISSED. The allegation that
it was an action was instituted in order to quiet title is not
sufficient by itself to consider this case as that action under
CC476(Property)
Issue:
Whether or not the action is that of unlawful detainer cognizable
only by the MTC/ accion publiciana in which case CFI has jurisdiction.
Held:
The action is that of accion publiciana, since it was to recover
possession de jure (if not one of accion reindivicatoria) falling within
the jurisdiction of the CFI and not a mere action for detainer to
recover physical possession that would fall within the jurisdiction of
the MTC. (Recall Santos claimed they owned the land)
Recall three types for recovery of possession and/ ownership.
Accion interdictal, Accion publiciana, Accion reindivicatoria. In
accion interdictal/forcible entry/unlawful detainer cases it is the
physical possession and not the possession de jure which is in
question. HERE the lower court was in error, since it was clear in the
complaint that Santos refused to deliver possession due to adverse
claim of ownership. Clearly the present case is one for recovery of
the right to possess and falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
Reyes correctly filed their accion publiciana. ACCORDINGLY LC
judgment set aside, REMANDED to continue proceedings.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
ORTIGAS & Co. vs J. HERRERA
Gr. No. L-36098, January 21, 1983
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent entered into an
agreement with a consideration, the former agreed to sell to the
latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private
respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the
painting of his residential house on said lot. Upon failure of
petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent filed a complaint
for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila,
against petitioner
A reconsideration of the said order having been denied,
petitioner filed with the CFI Manila, a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A motion to
dismiss was filed by private respondent, the petition was dismissed
on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint,
being less than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
city court.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues
among others that: (a) as determined from the allegations of the
complaint, the action is for specific performance of contract; and (b)
actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation such as complaints for specific performance of contract
are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
Issue:
Whether or not the City Court of Manila has jurisdiction
over the complaint.
Held:
No. The action involved in this case is one for
specific performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore
incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent
seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written
contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still
to be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of
money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is
not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party
to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of
money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only
upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the
written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only
incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of
certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to
be inquired into.
Although private respondent's complaint in the court a
quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an
analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows
that what private respondent seeks is the performance of
petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the
refund of the rate of P10.00 per square meter or in the total amount
of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the
conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter
clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
ORTIGAS & CO vs CA
Gr. No. 52488, July 25, 1981

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper
action in the proper court, the decisions of the CA, CFI and MC of
San Juan Rizal are set aside.

Facts:
Petition for review of the decision of the CA. In 1974,
Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Maximo Belmonte in the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal, praying
that judgment be rendered 1.) ordering the defendant his
successors-in-interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff; 2.)
declaring the residential building constructed on the lot by
defendant as forfeited in favor of plaintiff; 3.0 condeming defendant
to pay monthly rent of 5,000 from July 18, 1971 up to the time he
vacates, together with attorney's fees and exemplary damages. The
Ruled in favor of plaintiff and granted the relieves prayed for.
Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the MC. CFI denied motion and
affirmed in totot the MC judgment. The said court also issued a writ
of execution. Belmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminsry injunction in the CA, assiling the 1.) the jurisdiction
of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the judgment on the
pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance
of the writ of execution issued by the CFI. The Ca ruled in favor of
Belmonte, holding that the MC has no jurisdiction. Hence the
present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has appellate jurisdiction over this case
2. Whether or not the MC had jurisdiction to resolve the issues in
the original complaint
Held:
1. NO. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte
before the CA, namely 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the
propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and
3.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by
the CFI, the SC held that the same are purely legal in nature. Since
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is
exclusively vested in the SC by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296),
it is apparent that the decision under review rendered by the CA
without jurisdiction should be set aside.
2. NO. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject
the lot buyer who defaulted in his payments but also prays that the
residential building constructed by the buyer be forfeited in
plaintiff's favor, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the CFI not the
MC in an ejectment case. The issues raised before the inferior court
did not only involved the possession of the lot but also rights and
obligations of the parties to the residential building which under Art.
45 of the CC is real property. Aslo, plaintiff's claim to the bldg raises
question of ownership.
A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it
under SECII Rule 40 where one of the parties objected to its
jurisdiction. Since the original case was decided by the MC without
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, the CFI should have
dismissed the cases when it was brought before it on appeal.

VILLOTAS vs CA
Gr. No. 96271, June 26, 1992
Facts:
Private respondent's Electrolux sales agents were making
door to door selling of its products in the subdivision. Petitioner
Villostas placed an order for 1 unit of said water purifier for an
installment basis. After 2 times of complaint against the respondents
of the impurities and bad odor of the unit, petitioner sent a letter to
the private respondent's branch manager stating that she decided to
return the unit and demand a refund for the amount paid.
Electrolux's branch manager offered to change the water purifier
with another brand of any of its appliance of the unit in her favor.
Petitioner did not accept it as she was disappointed with the original
unit which did not perform as warranted and did not pay any more
the subsequent installments in the amount of P14,540.00 exclusive
of interests.
Respondent Electrolux Marketing, Inc. filed a complaint
against petitioner Villostas with the MTC of Makati for the recovery
of the sum of P14,540.00 representing the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of one (1) Electrolux Water Purifier plus interest
thereon at the rate of 42% per annum in accordance with the Sales
Contract with Reservation of Title. Petitioner Villostas asserted that
by reason of private respondent's breach of warranty she was
availing of the remedy of rescission of the contract of sale and
offered to return the water purifier to the seller as in fact, it was
already being offered for return, aside from claiming for the refund
of her payments. Petitioner prayed that the contract of sale be
declared rescinded and the payments refunded to her together with
the full grant of the claims asserted in her counterclaims.
MTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. The
petitioner, thereafter, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of
said lower court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered its
judgment affirming the disputed decision. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals and was given an inextendible period of 15
days to file a petition for review. Anticipating that she would fail to
comply with the deadline, herein petitioner filed a second extension
to file a petition for review which, however, was denied.
Before the CA, petitioner contended that the RTC erred
when it ruled that its claim for rescission had prescribed inasmuch as
she had formally notified the seller within a reasonable time, that is,
2 months and 26 days, from the delivery of water purifier on
September 13, 1986 of her election to rescind.
Private respondent countered that the petitioner was not
entitled to rescission vis-a-vis alleged violation of the warranty for
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CASES: JURISDICTION
hidden defects for the reason that rescission of contract sought by
petitioner was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the trial
court. It adds that petitioner could no longer avail of rescission
because said legal recourse was time barred judging from delivery of
the water purifier on September 13, 1986 pursuant to Art. 1571 of
the New Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has a jurisdictional competence
to order rescission of the herein contract.
Held:
Yes. Anent the jurisdictional competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court to order rescission of contract, suffice it to
say that the action was initiated by herein private respondent
Electrolux when it filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
worth P14,540.00, against petitioner Villostas. Said amount is
indubitably within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court
since it does not exceed P20,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs
but inclusive of damages of whatever. Moreover, the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. When
the petitioner, therefore, raised rescission of contract in her answer,
the court is not divested of its jurisdiction over the case on account
of defenses raised by the answer. The court is then merely
authorized to receive evidence thereon. Clearly, the jurisdiction of
the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss. Otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant

CIVIL PROCEDURE
1935. However, after a subdivision survey conducted in November
30, 1976, it was found out that the land formed part of the titled
property of Andrea Lacson but despite this discovery, they never
filed any action to recover ownership since they were left
undisturbed in their possession until the present issue.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special
affirmative defense and also questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the subject matter of the complaint, the assessed value of the
land being only P11,160, as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565.
On November 27, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the respondents ordering the petitioners to return the
possession of the land in question to the respondents and to desist
from further depriving and disturbing the latters peaceful
possession thereof, unless there be another court judgment to the
contrary.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
trial court held that what determines the nature of the action as well
as the jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the complaint
and not those alleged in the answer of the defendants. In the
plaintiffs complaint, the present estimated value of the land being
50,000.
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court's disposition of the issue of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the merits finding that appellees,
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in peaceful,
continuous, public and actual possession of the property in dispute
even before the year 1930. The appellate court emphasized that in
an accion publiciana, the only issue involved is the determination of
possession de jure.
Issue:
Whether the rtc has jurisdiction over the subject matter
based on the present estimated value/fair market value.
Held:

VDA. DE BARRERA vs HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI

Gr. No. 174346, September 12, 2008
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA which
affirmed that of the RTC Branch 16, of Tangub City, ordering the
defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera
and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to
the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. forced his
way into respondents' 0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at
Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing
respondents of the property, Oco and company used a tractor to
destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had
since tended it.
On February 7, 1997, respondents filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of
Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages
against petitioners. They alleged that the land was occupied,
possessed and cultivated by their predecesseor-in-interest since

Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended by Republic Act No.

7691 provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts wherein these
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the real property does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) or, in Metro Manila where
it does not not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Accordingly,
the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.
The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as
reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the
parties. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. It was error then for the RTC
to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that
"the present estimated value [of the land is] P50,000," which
allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading. The
estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market value, is
entirely different from the assessed value of the property.
Furthermore, respondents' cause of action - accion
publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place on
October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

or on February 7, 1997. Respondents' exclusion from the property

had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of
accion publiciana.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by respondents, all the proceedings therein as well
as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The
complaint should perforce be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED whereby the
decision of the CA is SET ASIDE and the decision of Branch 16 of the
RTC is declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
FAMILY COURTS

MADRIAN vs MADRIAN
Gr. No. 159374, July 12, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R.
Madrian were married with three sons and a daughter. After a
bitter quarrel petitioner left their home and took their three sons
with him to Albay and subsequently to Laguna. Thus respondent
wife filed a petition for habeas corpus of their 3 sons in the CA.
Petitioner husband filed a memorandum alleging that the
wife is unfit and he also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
habeas corpus filed by respondent wife.
The CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the
Family Code, respondent wife was entitled to the custody of 2
minor sons who were at that time aged six and four, subject to the
visitation rights of husband. With respect to Ronnick (the eldest)
who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody
should be determined by the proper family court in a special
proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
including related incidents and ancillary matters. Petition is denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CA has a jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that
the Court of Appeals should have cognizance of this case since there
is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving
custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. SC
ruled therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
[An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP
129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369
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CASES: JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL COURTS

REYES vs RTC OF MAKATI

Gr. No. 165744, August 11, 2008
Facts:
Zenith Insurance Corp. and Rodrigo Reyes filed a derivative suit
against his brother Oscar to obtain an accounting of the funds and
assets of the corporation that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated by Oscar for himself.
Oscar moved to declare the complaint as a nuisance and
harassment suit and should be dismissed according to the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
RTC of Makati, designated as a special commercial court:
denied the motion and declared that the complaint is a proper
derivative suit. Oscar went to the CA on a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus and prayed that the RTC Order be
annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from
continuing with the proceedings.
CA: affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition. Oscar now
comes before the SC on appeal through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial
court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:
The SC ruled that that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted therein. P.D. No. 902-A enumerates
the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special
commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction: SECTION 5. In
addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership,
and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly
granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) Devices
or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the
public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations
or organizations registered with the Commission. b) Controversies
arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and
among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between
such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
and c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, or
associations.
The Court ruled that the charges of fraud against Oscar
were not properly supported by the required factual allegations.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly
committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to
bring the controversy within the special commercial courts
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere
conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares
can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained
nor elaborated on.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting
or perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the
special commercial courts jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction,
there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporations
nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent
device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented
a reverse situation. No corporate power or office was alleged to
have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an
individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was
alleged to have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name,
allowing him to become the majority and controlling stockholder of
Zenith, and eventually, the corporations President.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the
fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such
defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies,
however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential,
therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to
be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke
the courts special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had
been given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or
withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The courts
function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of
the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these
allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature
and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the
courts jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint
any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise
of the courts special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot
affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigos complaint
on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A

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CASES: JURISDICTION
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

BLARDONY vs COSCULLUELA
Gr. No. 70261, February 28, 1990
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were spouses but due to
irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private respondent
separated in March, 1981.
The wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in
the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both
are residents of the same Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Judge
Segundo Soza dismissed her petition for her failure, as plaintiff, to
comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was
transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal
and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries,
allowances, bonuses, and commissions. The latter's motion for
reconsideration of that order was denied by the court. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that
respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction
over the case without prior referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
required by P.D. 1508.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior
referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508.
Held:
No. The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete
with decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a
case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a
complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its noncompliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs.
Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation
conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not
file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his
answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable
partition of the conjugal properties.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction

CIVIL PROCEDURE
by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. ... . Upon
this premise, petitioners cannot be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint
may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases: SECTION 6. Conciliation,
pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action
or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon
as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication unless there has been
a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in
the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (3) Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,delivery of
personal properly and support pendente lite;

WEE vs DE CASTRO
Gr. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
Facts:
Respondents alleged that they were the registered owners
of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel of
land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title and rented out
the subject property to petitioner on a month to month.
Both parties agreed the rental payment shall be increased.
Petitioner, however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding
increase on rent when his rental obligation for the month of
October became due. The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon
Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an
attempt to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach
an agreement, resulting in the issuance by the Barangay Lupon of a
Certification to file action in court.
Respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner
terminating their lease agreement and demanding that the latter
vacate and turn over the subject property to respondents. Since
petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter,
respondent George de Castro, together with his siblings and corespondents filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
Petitioner then argued that respondents failed to comply
with the jurisdictional requirement of conciliation before the
Barangay Lupon prior to the filing of Civil Case. No. 1990, meriting
the dismissal of their Complaint therein. The Certification to file
action issued by the Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents'
Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not
the matter of ejectment. Petitioner asserted further that the MTC
lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents'

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CASES: JURISDICTION
Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful
withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner.
MTC dismissed the respondents' Complaint in Civil Case
No. 1990 for failure to comply with the prior conciliation
requirement before the Barangay Lupon.
RTC then declared that respondents' failure to refer the
matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process barred the
ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a condition sine
qua non in the filing of ejectment suits.
Respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the CA. Respondents further claimed that the MTC was not divested
of jurisdiction over their Complaint for ejectment because of the
mere absence therein of the term "unlawful withholding" of their
subject property, considering that they had sufficiently alleged the
same in their Complaint, albeit worded differently.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
respondents' petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Certification dated January 2002
issued by the Barangay Lupon stating that no settlement was
reached by the parties on the matter of rental increase sufficient to
comply with the prior conciliation requirement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize the respondents to
institute the ejectment suit against petitioner.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

AQUINO vs AURE
Gr. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
Facts:
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against
Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they
acquired the subject property from a Deed of Sale. Aquino
countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and
Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property.
MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for noncompliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other
grounds. Te MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of
the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has
been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level. RTC
affirmed.
CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding
the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final
determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not non-compliance with the barangay
conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants the
dismissal of the complaint.

Held:

Held:

Yes. While it is true that the Certification to file action

dated 18 January 2002 of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental
increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject
property, the submission of the same for conciliation before
the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the
provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the
particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation
proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and
reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property
subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the
terms thereof.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a
means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts.
This could be accomplished through a proceeding before
the barangay courts which, according to the one who conceived of
the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially
arbitration in character; and to make it truly effective, it should also
be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice
system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), which would be better served if an out-of-court
settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties. To
ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain
exceptions. The said section has been declared compulsory in
nature.

NO. There is no dispute herein that the present case was

never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure
and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no
allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in
Aure and Aure Lendings Complaint before the MeTC.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to
comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local
Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a
jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court: Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the
entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction

by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is
more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining
respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for
unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial
do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance
the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the
action for insufficiency of evidence.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on
Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the
issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket
authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has
been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and
its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
the
petitioner.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
SUPREME COURT (Full Text)
Ferdinand Cruz vs JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Public Respondent. BENJAMIN MINA, JR, Private
Respondent.
G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008

CIVIL PROCEDURE
it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed
7
a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with
8
finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the
failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document
and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied.
9

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly
filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10,
1
2
2002 and July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the
plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant,
and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla
Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No
writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought
permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf,
before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a
fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of
3
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the
petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as
counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera,
counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not
allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then
remarked, "Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes.
Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss
and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and
4
Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on
the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial
could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge
Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in
uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of
mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be
5
served.
6

In an Order dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the

motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous
allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not
enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that

In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that

the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section
34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were
distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A,
10
in an Order dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this
Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS
BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE
138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR
THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT
DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH
AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH
AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2)
whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and
when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the
case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the
11
court where the application therefor will be directed. A
becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of
12
Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs;
and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or
if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this
13
Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

Considering, however, that this case involves the

interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his
practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under
Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch
by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who
make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily
delays more important concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule
138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not
appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to
comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance,
the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on
December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which
eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to
prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools
clinical legal education program and is under supervision of
an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his
appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will

CIVIL PROCEDURE
have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner
has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent
himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that
a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid
of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The
individual litigant may personally do everything in the course
of proceedings from commencement to the termination of
14
the litigation. Considering that a party personally
conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
15
law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of
falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance.
Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can
personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He
would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a
party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to
the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in
applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim
is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while
the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a
party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded
Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court
never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the
guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was
intended as an addendum to the instances when a nonlawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the
Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the
constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and
16
counsel, this Court has held that during the trial, the right to
17
counsel cannot be waived. The rationale for this ruling was
18
articulated in People v. Holgado, where we declared that
"even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence."
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as
plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution
accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does
not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case,
who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may
be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges
that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the
competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is
aware of the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730,
that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without
need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

G.R. No. 110571 October 7, 1994

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the

respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by
ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary
inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the
pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama yung marunong
pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his
motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct
indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners
and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the
respondents impartiality.

FIRST
LEPANTO
CERAMICS,
INC., petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING,
INC., respondents.

We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner
19
filed an administrative case against the respondent for
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the
Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial
of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground
for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to
20
disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision
on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
21
prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and
convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party
litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Castillo, Laman. Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

De Borja, Medi, Aldea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private
respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the
1
Second Division sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments and,
consequently, dismissing the petition forcertiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Because of the
importance of the question raised, the Court en banc agreed to
accept the matter for consideration.
Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed
to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987
(E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in
the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive
act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art.
VIII, 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a rule of procedure
which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power
under Art. VIII 5(5). Petitioner questions the holding of the Second
Division that although the right to appeal granted by art. 82 of the
Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of
procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what
manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure
which this Court has the power to regulate.
Even assuming that there is merit in petitioner's contention,
however, the result reached in the main decision is nonetheless,
correct from another point of view.
Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was
originally provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981
2
(P.D.
No.
1789),
Art. 78 of which stated:
Art. 78. Judicial Relief . All orders or decisions of the Board in
cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be
executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the
party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided,
That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
3

Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, by granting in 9

thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July
17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of

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the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. Thus, the present
Code provides:
Art. 82. Judicial Relief . All orders or decisions of the Board in
cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be
executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the
party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided,
That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
4

By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The

Constitution now provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence."
This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby
undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most
profound national aspects.
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing
for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final
orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this
Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it
can
never
be
deemed
to
have
amended
BP
Blg. 129, 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to
decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have
been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, 9, to be exercised by it in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.
Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI
must be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main
decision in this case, the purpose of 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide
uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final
orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those
issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the
adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution,
had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions
and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994

FIRST
LEPANTO
CERAMICS,
INC., petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING,
INC., respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private
respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction is the novel question of where
and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of
Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the
conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive
Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.
Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated
December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from
"glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor
Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid
for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and
petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause
why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent
court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on March
9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent
court issuing any preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition
and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court
has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same
being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article
82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is
hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. Private respondent is hereby given
an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof within
1
which to file its comment to the petition.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993,
petitioner decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as the
question involved is essentially legal in nature and immediately filed
a petition for certiorariand prohibition before this Court.
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CASES: JURISDICTION

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Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution of May
25, 1993, for the following reasons:
I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's
appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has
become final.
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this
Honorable Court cannot be amended or superseded by Circular No.
2
1-91.
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case.

Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies"
cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court
because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to
Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or
orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court, to wit:
Judicial relief. All orders or decisions of the Board
(of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall
immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of
the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such an order or
decision; Provided, that all appeals shall be filed directly with the
Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious
inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been
between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of
venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below:
1. Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency
from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies are the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and
Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission.
2. Cases not covered. These rules shall not apply to decisions and
interlocutory orders of the National Labor Relations Commission or
the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other

quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is

prescribed or allowed by statute.
3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. The appeal of a party
affected by a final order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax
Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law or mixed
questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the
Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals, to wit:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the
laudable objective of providing a uniform procedure of appeal from
decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench
and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of
unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend to more
important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as
4
quoted in our decision in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court is
"less concerned with the decisions of cases that begin and end with
the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is
more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous
economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental
authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.
5

In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this

Court noted that B.P. 129 did not deal only with "changes in the
rules on procedures" and that not only was the Court of Appeals
reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by
Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes, this Court said:
. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which theretofore could
be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded
by (1) extending it so as to include the writ of quo warranto, and
also (2) empowering it to issue all said extraordinary writs "whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction
was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial
Courts, but also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
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CASES: JURISDICTION
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in this
connection that the text of the law is broad and comprehensive, and
the explicitly stated exceptions have no reference whatever to the
Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the intention to expand the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is further
stressed by the last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its
provisions, only the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
6
Assessment Appeals."
However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the
country is far from perfect. During the transitional period after the
country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power
was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of
deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure
which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the order or decision.
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains
ordinary appeals only from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the
Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision
of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly
not in consonance with the present procedure before this Court.
Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission
(Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission
on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within
7
thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof.
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its
Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129,
issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the
Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary
contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly
a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law
8
9
according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular
of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of
the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated
Circular
No.
7
of
this
Court
dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24,

CIVIL PROCEDURE
1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of
cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge,
brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning
cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that
respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is
repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
10
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed
by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which,
under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82
of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders
of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in
what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions
simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power
to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
11

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created

by a substantive law and those arising from procedural law:
Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is
a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980).
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise
to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for
12
their invasion.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from
decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or
the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by
E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final
orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals
from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and
provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from
notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial
agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91
does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final
orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1
thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from
final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the
enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are
. . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies
which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly
listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the
purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the
following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly
excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor
Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasijudicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or
13
allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA we upheld the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals
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CASES: JURISDICTION
despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies
reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded
from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of
E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to
appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from
decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19,
1993 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED
TAMULA,
MANGONTAWAR
GURO
and
BONIFACIO
LEGASPI, petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH
DIMAPORO,
JESUS
AMPARO,
ANACLETO
BADOY,
et
al., respondents.
Nos. L-49717-21 February 8,1979.
LINANG
MANDANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE REGIONAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS for Region XII, and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents.
L-49705-09 Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents.
L-49717-21 Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioner.
Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General, for Public respondents.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order
and preliminary injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates
for representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa who had
joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which,
however, was not registered as a political party or group under the
1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio
Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and
Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the
decision of the respondent Commission on Election (Comelec)
resolving their appeal from the Of the respondent Regional Board of
Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the
election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April
7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang
Mandangan, abo a candidate for representative in the same election
in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring
respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of
the eight winners in said election.
The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L48097, wherein Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the
canvass then being undertaken by respondent dent Board in
Cotabato city and in which canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total
of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been
canvassed showing partial results as follows:
NAMES
CANDIDATES

OF

NO. OF
VOTES
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres. Roxas and
Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely,
Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan,
Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino and
Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the
returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass.
Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but
after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May 15, 1978,
the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the
resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. This order was the
one assailed in this Court. We issued a restraining order.

1. Roldan, Ernesto
(KB)

225,674

2.
Valdez,
Estanislao (KBL)

217,789

3.
Dimporo,
Abdullah (KBL)

199,244

4. Tocao,
(KB)

Sergio

199,062

5. Badoy, Anacleto
(KBL)

198,966

After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the
canvass but issued the following guidelines to be observed thereat:

6. Amparo, Jesus
(KBL)

184,764

7. Pangandaman,
Sambolayan (KBL)

183,646

1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be

held in the Comelec main office in Manila
starting not later than June 1, 1978;

8. Sinsuat,
Blah (KBL)

Datu

182,457

Tomas

171,656

10. Aratuc, Tomatic

(KB)

165,795

11.
Mandangan,
Linang(KB)

165,032

12. Diaz, Ciscolario

(KB)

159,977

13. Tamalu, Fred

(KB)

153,734

14.
Legaspi
Bonifacio (KB)

148,200

15.
Guro,
Mangontawar (KB)

139,386

16. Loma, Nemesio

(KB)

107,455

17.
Macapeges,
Malamama
(Independent)

101,350

9. Baga,
(KBL)

(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were not in

contention omitted)" (Page 6, Record, L-49705-09.)
A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, HonVenancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the
petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in
all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the
whole City of Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely,
Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan, Pantao Ragat,
Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely,
Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten
(10) towns in North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan,

2. That in preparation therefor, respondent

Commission on Elections shall see to it that all
the material election paragraph corresponding
to all the voting center involved in Election Nos.
78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are taken to
its main office in Manila, more particularly, the
ballot boxes, with the contents, used during the
said elections, the books of voters or records of
voting and the lists or records of registered
voters, on or before May 31, 1978;
3. That as soon as the corresponding records are
available, petitioners and their counsel shall be
allowed to examine the same under such
security measures as the respondent Board may
determine, except the contents of the ballot
boxes which shall be opened only upon orders of
either the respondent Board or respondent
Commission, after the need therefor has become
evident, the purpose of such examination being
to enable petitioners, and their counsel to
expeditiously determine which of them they
would wish to be scrutinized and passed upon by
the Board as supporting their charges of election
frauds and anomalies, petitioners and their
counsel being admonished in this connection,
that no dilatory tactics should be in by them and
that only such records substantial objections
should be offered by them for the scrutiny by
the Board;
4. That none of the election returns reffered to
in the petition herein shall be canvassed without
first giving the herein petitioners ample
opportunity to make their specific objections
thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient
basis for the rejection of any of the returns, and,
in this connection, the respondent Regional
Board of Canvassers should give due
consideration to the points raised in the
memorandum filed by said petitioners with the
Commission on Election in the above cases dated
April 26, 1978;
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CASES: JURISDICTION
5. That should it appear to the board upon
summary scrutiny of the records to be offered by
petitioners indication that in the voting center
actually held and/or that election returns were
prepared either before the day of the election
returns or at any other time, without regard
thereto or that there has been massive
substitution of voters, or that ballots and/or
returns were prepared by the same groups of
persons or individuals or outside of the voting
centers, the Board should exclude the
corresponding returns from the canvass;
6. That appeals to the commission on Election of
the Board may be made only after all the returns
in question in all the above, the above five cases
shall have been passed upon by the Board and,
accordingly, no proclamation made until after
the Commission shall have finally resolved the
appeal without prejudice to recourse to this
court, if warranted as provided by the Code and
the Constitution, giving the parties reasonable
time therefor;
7. That the copies of the election returns found
in the corresponding ballot boxes shall be the
one used in the canvass;
8. That the canvass shall be conducted with
utmost dispatch, to the end that a proclamation,
if feasible, may be made not later than June 10,
1978; thus, the canvass may be terminated as
soon as it is evident that the possible number of
votes in the still uncanvassed returns with no
longer affect the general results of the elections
here in controversy;
9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate
such other directive not inconsistent with this
resolution y necessary to expedite the
proceedings herein contemplated and to
accomplish the purposes herein intended. (Pp. 89, Record.
On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were
modified:
... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the
voting centers just referred to need not be taken
to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular voting
centers as to which the petitioners have the right
to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes
be opened in order that the votes therein may
be counted because said ballots unlike the
election returns, have not been tampered with
or substituted, which instances the results of the
counting shall be specified and made known by
petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers
not later than June 3, 1978; it being understood,
that for the purposes of the canvass, the
petitioners shall not be allowed to invoke any
objection not already alleged in or comprehend

CIVIL PROCEDURE
within the allegations in their complaint in the
election cases above- mentioned. (Page 8, Id.)
Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein
petitioners presenting objections, most of them supported by the
report of handwriting and finger print experts who had examined
the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of
2,700 which they specified in their complaints or petitions in
Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in the Comelec. In
regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the
voters lists and voting records were not available- and could not be
brought to Manila, petitions asked that the results therein be
completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent
Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting to
be as follows:
NAME
CANDIDATE

OF

VOTES
OBTAIN

VALDEZ,
Estanislao

436,069

DIMAPORO,
Abdullah

429,351

PANGANDAMAN,
Sambolayan

406,106

SINSUAT, Blah

403,445

AMPARO, Jesus

399,997

MANDANGAN,
Linang

387,025

BAGA, Tomas

386,393

BADOY,Anacleto

374,933

ROLDAN, Ernesto

275,141

TOCAO, Sergio

239,914

ARATUC, Tomatic

205,829

GURO,
Mangontawar

190,489

DIAZ, Ciscolario

190,077

TAMULA, Fred

180,280

LEGASPI,
Bonifacio

174,396

MACAPEGES,
Malamana

160,271

(Pp.
Record.)

11-12,

Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the resolution of

respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25,
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CASES: JURISDICTION
1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for decision.
However, on August 30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution
stating inter alia that :
In order to enable the Commission to decide the
appeal properly :
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination
of the voting records and registration records
and in the case of voting centers whose voting
and registration records which have not yet been
submitted for the Commission to decide to open
the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of
impartial and disinterested persons from the
area to determine whether actual voting took
place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the
military authorities in the areas affects (Page 12).
Record, L-49705-09 .)
On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file
their respective written comments on the reports they shall
periodically receive from the NBI-Comelec team of finger-print and
signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days
from their receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al.,
"Petitioners submitted their various comments on the report 4, the
principal gist of which was that it would appear uniformly in all the
reports submitted by the Comelec-NBI experts that the registered
voters were not the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the
thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the
thumbprints of the voters in Form 5. " But the Comelec denied a
motion of petitioners asking that the ballot boxes corresponding to
the voting centers the record of which are not available be opened
and that a date be set when the statements of witnesses referred to
in the August 30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on the ground
that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to proceed with such
opening of ballot boxes and taking of statements.
For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed
with Comelec on December 19,1978 a Memorandum. To quote from
the petition:
On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through
counsel, filed a Memorandum for the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the
Comelec's Resolution of December 11, 1978, a
xerox copy of which is attached hereto and
made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they
discussed the following topics: (I) Brief History of
the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position
and Submission Before the Honorable
commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad Cautelam.
And the fourth topic, because of its relevance to
the case now before this Honorable Court, we
hereby quote for ready reference:
IV
OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE

CIVIL PROCEDURE
COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978
We respectfully submit that the Resolution of
this case by this Honorable Commission should
be limited to the precincts and municipalities
involved in the KB'S Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8
to 78-12, on which evidence had been submitted
by the parties, and on which the KB submitted
the reports of their handwriting-print.
Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal
of the KB. For under the Supreme Court
Resolution of May 23, 1978, original jurisdiction
was given to the Board, with appeal to this
Honorable Commission-Considerations of other
matters beyond these would be, in our humble
opinion, without jurisdiction.
For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable
Commission that we stand by the reports and
findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts as
submitted by them to the Regional Board of
Canvassers and as confirmed by the said
Regional Board of Canvassers in its Resolution of
July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the
majorities we have already above mentioned.
The Board did more than make a summary
scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme
Court Resolution, Guideline No. 5, of May 23,
1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we
cannot file any Memorandum within the nonextendible period of seven (7) days, we would
just stand by said COMELEC/NBI experts' reports
to the Regional Board, as confirmed by the
Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam).
The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the
reports of the NBI-COMELEC experts. For lack of
material time due to the voluminous reports and
number of voting centers involved, the
Christmas holidays, and our impression that the
COMELEC will exercise only its appellate
jurisdiction, specially as per resolution of this
Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L48097), we, the KBL, did not comment any more
on said reports. (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.)
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being
assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass to be
as follows:
CANDIDATES

VOTES

VALDEZ,
Estanislao

319,514

DIMAPORO,
Abdullah

289.751

AMPARO, Jesus

286,180

BADOY, Anacleto

285,985

ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

BAGA, Tomas

271,473

PANGANDAMAN,
Sambolayan

271,393

SINSUAT, Blah

269,905

ROLDAN, Ernesto

268,287

MANDANGAN,
Linang

251,226

TACAO, Sergio

229,124

DIAZ, Ciscolario

187,986

ARATUC, Tomatic

183,316

LEGASPI,
Bonifacio

178,564

TAMULA, Fred

177,270

GURO,
Mangontawar

163,449

LOMA, Nemesio

129,450

(Page 14, Record,

L-49705-09.)
It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:
The Comelec committee grave abuse
dicretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction:

5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no

padlocks and especially those that were found to
be empty while they were shipped to Manila
pursuant to the directive of the Commission in
compliance with the guidelines of this Honorable
Court;
6. In not excluding from the canvass returns
where the results of examination of the voting
records and registration records show that the
thumbprints of the voters in CE Form 5 did not
correspond to those of the registered voters as
shown in CE Form 1;
7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of
chairmen and members of the voting centers,
municipal treasurers and other election officials
in the voting centers where irregularities had
been committed and not giving credence to the
affidavits of watchers of petitioners;
8. In not including among those questioned
before the Board by petitioners those included
among the returns questioned by them in their
Memorandum filed with the Commission on
April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was
attached as Annex 'I' to their petition filed with
this Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which
the Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should
be considered by the Board in the course of the
canvass (Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record,
Id.)

of

On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the

Comelec comitted the following errors:

1. In not pursuing further the examination of the

registration records and voting records from the
other voting centers questioned by petitioners
after it found proof of massive substitute voting
in all of the voting records and registration
records examined by Comelec and NBI experts;

1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz

vs. Commission on Elections (November 29,
1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly the highly
restrictive criterion that when the votes
obtained by the candidates with the highest
number of votes exceed the total number of
highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC ruled
to exclude from the canvass the election return
reflecting such rests, under which the COMELEC
excluded 1,004 election returns, involving
around 100,000 votes, 95 % of which are for KBL
candidates, particularly the petitioner Linang
Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair,
unjust and oppressive.

2. In including in the canvass returns from the

voting centers whose book of voters and voting
records could not be recovered by the
Commission in spite of its repeated efforts to
retrieve said records;
3. In not excluding from the canvass returns
from voting centers showing a very high
percentage of voting and in not considering that
high percentage of voting, coupled with massive
substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing
of election returns;
4. In denying petitioners' petition for the
opening of the ballot boxes from voting centers
whose records are not available for examination
to determine whether or not there had been
voting in said voting centers;

2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the

Diaz Case is not the total exclusion of election
returns simply because the total number of
votes exceed the total number of highest
possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast
by persons Identified as registered voters were
added to the votes cast by persons who can not
be definitely ascertained as registered or not,
and granting, ad arguendo, that all of them
voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting
total is much below the number of votes
credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

that 'of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly

one-half (1,012) were cast by persons definitely
Identified as not registered therein or still more
than 40 % of substitute voting which was the
rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman
(Diaz Case, November 19,1971,42 SCRA
426,432).
3. In not applying the rule and formula in the
later case of Bashier and Basman vs. Commission
on Election(February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238)
which was the one followed by the Regional
Board of Canvassers, to wit:
In Basman vs Comelec (L33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the
Supreme Court upheld the
Supreme Court upheld the
ruling of the Commission
setting the standard of 40 %
excess votes to justify the
exclusion of election returns.
In line with the above ruling,
the Board of Canvassers may
likewise set aside election
returns with 40 % substitute
votes.
Likewise,
where
excess voting occured and
the excess was such as to
destroy the presumption of
innocent
mistake,
the
returns was excluded.
(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22),
which this Honorable Court must have meant
when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. 7),
it referred to "massive substitution of voters.
4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC
experts, the records in more than 878 voting
centers examined by the KB experts and passed
upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers which
was all that was within its appellate jurisdiction
is examination of more election records to make
a total of 1,085 voting centers (COMELEC'S
Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being
beyond its jurisdiction and a denial of due
process as far as the KBL, particularly the
petitioner Mandangan, were concerned because
they were informed of it only on December,
1978, long after the case has been submitted for
decision in September, 1978; and the statement
that the KBL acquiesced to the same is
absolutely without foundation.
5. In excluding election returns from areas where
the conditions of peace and order were allegedly
unsettled or where there was a military
operation going on immediately before and
during election and where the voter turn out
was high (90 % to 100 %), and where the people
had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling without
jurisdiction and in violation of due process

because no evidence was at all submitted by the

parties before the Regional Board of
Canvasssers. (Pp. 23-25, Record, L-47917-21.)
Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is
necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme
Court's power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is
expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec
"committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the
Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In
other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari
jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review.
This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and
pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review"
shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question
of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or
has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such
provisions refer not only to election contests but even to preproclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides
somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the
Commissionmay be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the
Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city official" (Section 2(2).)
Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the first
legislative constructionof the pertinent constitutional provisions,
makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders
or rulings (in such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as
in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final,
and executory and inappealable." (Section 193)
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory
modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and
invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of
free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new
Constitution must be presumed ot have definite knowledge of what
it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since
instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope
of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.
Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the
modified peritinent constitutional provision is to the effect that the
actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even
inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the
final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due
process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and
extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is
strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are
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CASES: JURISDICTION
of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are
consistent with the apparent new constitional intent. Indeed, it is
obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes
something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review
by the Supreme Court", when it comes to the measure of the Court's
reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of
discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise
erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation.
While the effecdts of an error of judgment may not differ from that
of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters taht by
their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound
discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme
Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases
of patent arbitrariness.
Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the
Commission on Elections. Conceived by the charter as the effective
instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed
with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is
but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of
presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of
means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its
designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally,
its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan
inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints
in the arena of politics should not, unless the contrary is shown,
serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and
consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be
accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself
which from time to time may have members drawn from the
political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated
from every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well
as improper internal motivations that could arise from such
background or orientation.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and
statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over
orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be
and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process.
Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions of
the parties in this cases.
THE MANDANGAN CASE
Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in
G.R. No. L-49717-21 first.
The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main
propositions, namely, (1) that it was an error of law on the part of
respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant circumstances
hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426
instead of that of Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that
respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due
process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its inquiry beyond the
election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB
experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and

CIVIL PROCEDURE
in excluding from the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 %
voting, from voting centers where military operations were by the
Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had to be
transferred to the poblaciones the same being by evidence.
Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and
Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of each other, each being
an outgrowth of the basic rationale of statistical improbability laid
down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether they be
apply together or separately or which of them be applied depends
on the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as
found by the Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has
not shown any, why returns in voting centers showing that the votes
of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the candidate
obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible
number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as
spurious and manufactured just because the total number of excess
votes in said voting centers were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is
not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents relative to the
highly questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the
past in the provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial
notice as attested by its numerous decisions in cases involving
practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back
from the standards it has enunciated in those decisions.
In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by
herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to bear in mind that
under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the
Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision
on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of
the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies." While nominally, the procedure of
bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of
canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters,
even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines
of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact
of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing
such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such
provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the
above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it
is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here,
that a superior body or office having supervision and control over
another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387,
cited by petitioner, to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault
respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that
undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be
stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its
statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-avis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral
processes and p in doing what petitioner it should not have done.
Incidentally, it cannot be said that Comelec went further than even
what Aratuc et al. have asked, since said complaints had impugned
from the outset not only the returns from the 878 voting centers
examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their
complaints in the election cases filed originally with the Comelec
enumerated in the opening statements hereof, hence respondent
Comelec had that much field to work on.

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The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the
Commission regarding the voting centers affected by military
operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not considered by the
board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to
the poblaciones. And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation
proceedings, We are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due
process for the Commission to have taken into account, without the
need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter so publicly
notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and order in localities
in the provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken
judicial notice of, the same being capable of unquestionable
demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129)
In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that
regrettably We cannot, however, go along with the view, expressed
in the dissent of our respected Chief Justice, that from the fact that
some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones
there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission
should have also subjected all the returns from the other voting
centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same
degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels
that had the Commission done so, it would have fallen into the error
by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is
relatively unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact
conditions of peace and order in those other voting centers without
at list some prima facie evidence to rely on considering that there is
no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in
question are so close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to
warrant the inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances
by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were Identical to those in
the former.
Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby
dismiss for lack of merit.
THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION
Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted
to, the seventh and the sight do not require any extended
disquisition. As to the issue of whether the elections in the voting
centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated
by law, or earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed,
We note that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it
anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any reference
thereto during the oral argument of their counsel and the practically
cavalier discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are
satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its
resolution now before Us that it took pains to consider as
meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both
parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to
the weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed
discussion of said evidence is contained in not less than nineteen
pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We are not
prepared to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in
drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If errors
there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment
which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded
on substantial evidence.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
of canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if
only because in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to
have been referred to is, rightly or wrongly, the resumption only of
the canvass, which does not necessarily include the setting aside and
repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City.
The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting
centers the corresponding voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of
voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which have never been brought to Manila
because they, were not available The is not clear as to how many are
these voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in
the Comelec resolution in question, the number mentioned is only
408, and this number is directly challenged in the petition. Under
the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec gravely
abused its discretion in including in the canvass the election returns
from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged
as fourth assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of
the ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers was arbitraly
denied by respondent Comelec.
The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted
the Commission in regard to the 408 voting centers reffered to as
follows :
The Commission had the option of excluding
from the canvass the election returns under
category. By deciding to exclude, the
Commission
would
be
summarily
disenfranchising the voters registered in the
voting centers affected without any basis. The
Commission could also order the inclusion in the
canvass of these elections returns under the
injunction of the Supreme Court that extremes
caution must be exercised in rejecting returns
unless these are palpably irregular. The
Commission chose to give prima facie validity to
the election returns mentioned and uphold the
votes cast by the voters in those areas. The
Commission held the view that the failure of
some election officials to comply with
Commission orders(to submit the records)
should not parties to such official disobedience.
In the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil.
208, the Supreme Court ruled that when voters
have honestly cast their ballots, the same should
not be nullified because the officers appointed
under the law to direct the election and guard
the purity of the ballot have not complied with
their duty. (cited in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)
On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is
stated that:
At all events, the returns corresponding to these
voting centers were examined by the Comelec
and 141 of such returns were excluded, as
follows:

As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is

that the results in the voting centers mentioned in this assignment
of error had already been canvassed at the regional canvass center
in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Considering
R
that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities
to Identify
Y
on its own the voting centers without CE Forms I and 5,
thereby precluding the need for the petitioners having to specify
them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the ballot
PROVINCE
TOTAL
EXCLUDED
INCLUDED
boxes in question should have appeared to it to be quite apparent, it
may be contended that Comelec would have done greater service to
Lanao del Norte
30

30 the public interest had it proceeded to order such opening, as it had

announced it had thoughts of doing in its resolution of August 30,
Lanao del Sur
342
137
205 1978. On the other hand, We cannot really blame the Commission
too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us left
Maguindanao
21
1
20 it with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion
independently of what We had ordered. What could have saved
North Cotabato
7
1
6
matters altogether would have been a timely move on the part of
petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our
Sultan Kudarat
12
2
10
resolution. After all come to think of it, that the possible outcome of
the opening of the ballot boxes would favor the petitioners was not
totals ----412
141
271
a certainty the contents them could conceivably boomerang
against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been
found to be regular and preponderantly for their opponents. Having
(Page 301, Record.)
in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their motion for only on
January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of the
This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.
resolution, We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of
June 1, 1978, Comelec certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having
Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or unavailability of
gravely abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the
the CE Forms 1 and 5 corresponding to the more than 400 voting
returns from the voting centers reffered to in the second and fourth
centers concerned in our present discussion the Comelec examined
assignments of error in the canvass or in denying petitioners' motion
the returns from said voting centers to determine their
for the of the ballot boxes concerned.
trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant data
appearing on their faces, believing that such was the next best thing
The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related matters and
that could be done to avoid total disenfranchisement of the voters
maybe discussed together. They all deal with the inclusion in or
in all of them On the Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right
exclusion from the canvass of returns on the basis of the percentage
thing to do was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved.
of voting in specified voting centers and the corresponding findings
of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein as
In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's
indicated by the result of either the technical examination by
explanation in its resolution is:
experts of the signatures and thumb-prints of the voters threat.
... The commission had it seen fit to so order,
could have directed the opening of the ballot
boxes. But the Commission did not see the
necessity of going to such length in a that was in
nature and decided that there was sufficient
bases for the revolution of the appeal. That the
Commission has discretion to determine when
the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in
the guidelines set by the Supreme Court which
states that '. . . the ballot bones [which] shall be
opened only upon orders of either the
respondent
Board
or
respondent
Commission, after the need therefor has become
evident ... ' (guideline No. 3; emphasissupplied).
Furthermore, the Court on June 1, 1978,
amended the guidelines that the "ballot boxes
for the voting centers ... need not be taken to
Manila EXCEPT those of the centers as to which
the petitioners have the right to demand that
the corresponding ballot boxes be opened
... provided that the voting centers concerned
shall be specified and made known by petitioners
to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later
than June 3,1978 ... ' (Emphasis supplied). The
KB, candidates did not take advantage of the
option granted them under these guidelines.( Pp
106-107, Record.)

To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not

examine and study 1,694 of the records in an the 2,775 voting
centers questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be more exact,
the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four
categories namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because
of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military operations, 105
palpably manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded by the board of
canvass on other grounds. Thus, 45.45 % of the of the petitioners
were sustained by the Comelec. In contrast, in the board of
canvassers, only 453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed
as to 6 of these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec over
and above those excluded by the board. In other words, the
Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by the board.
Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of
error that Comelec refused to consider high percentage of voting,
coupled with mass substitute voting, as proof that the pertinent
returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is
already shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can be
gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065 voting centers in
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City where a high percentage of voting
appeared, the returns from the 867 voting centers were excluded by
the Comelec and only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78 % to
22 %. The following tabulation drawn from the figures in the
resolution shows how the Comelec went over those returns center
by center and acted on them individually:

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

90% 100% VOTING

MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR

Pagayawan

15

13

Piagapo

39

39

36

44

44

42

23

20

20

32

21

31

31

PoonaNO. OF V/C
THAT V/C WITH
Bayabao
90%
to
100%
MUNICIPALITIES
PualasVOTING
FUNCTIONED
Saguiaran
No.
of Sultan
V/CGumander

36
Excluded

Included
35

awi City

151

112Tamparan

107

24

21

15

lod
de

28

28 Taraka

27

31

31

31

19

19

bagan

53

53

49

dong

22

TOTALS:
22 Marawi &

15

ng

29

20 Lanao del Sur

13

1,065

86

ayan

37

33

iposo
on

41

10

ng

24

23

29
4
We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the
performance
of its duties, that0 there is enough showing in the
10
record that it did examine and study the returns and pertinent
records corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of
petitioners'
complaints below. 2In one part of its resolution the
21
Comelec states:

baran

21
(All
excluded)

Tubaran

23

1,218

The Commission as earlier stated examined on

its own the Books of Voters (Comelec Form No.
1
1) and the Voters
Rewards Comelec Form No. 5)
to determine for itself which of these elections
0 further examination by the
form needed
COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission, aware
1
of the nature
of this pre-proclamation
controversy, believes that it can decide, using
common sense and perception, whether the
15 in controversy needed further
election forms
examination by the experts based on the
16 absence of patent signs of
presence or
irregularity. (Pp. 137-138, Record.)

35

33

32

nogas

23

21

21

anain

42

39

38

ssi

39

38

23

ba
bao

64

63

47

batan

30

28

bayanague

37

33

alum

14

13

amba

20

20

uing

57

55

bang

59

47

antao

79

63

ugong

37

35

27

26

17
11
In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission,
the
28 bare charge of petitioners 5that the records pertaining to the
1,694 voting centers assailed by them should not create any ripple
of
6 serious doubt. As We view this
7 point under discussion, what is
more factually accurate is that those records complained of were
not
5 examined with the aid of experts
15 and that Comelec passed upon
the returns concerned "using common sense and perception only."
And
53 there is nothing basically 2objectionable in this. The defunct
Presidential Senate and House Electoral Tribunals examine passed
upon
and voided millions of 42
votes in several national elections
5
without the assistance of experts and "using" only common sense
and
41 perception". No one ever22raised any eyebrows about such
procedure. Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that
32
3 records and whatever it could not
Comelec
preliminary screened the
properly pass upon by "using common sense and perception" it left
24the experts to work on. We might
2
to
disagree with he Comelec as to
which voting center should be excluded or included, were We to go
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CASES: JURISDICTION
over the same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse of
discretion would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be
said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without any
rational basis, particularly if it is considered that in many respects
and from the very nature of our respective functions, becoming
candor would dictate to Us to concede that the Commission is in a
better position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances
closely and accurately. By and large, therefore, the first, third and
sixth assignments of error of the petitioners are not well taken.
The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The
Identification of the ballot boxes in defective condition, in some
instances open and allegedly empty, is at best of secondary import
because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were
after all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry
into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest.
CONCLUSION
Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had
initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution,
without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so
that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering,
however, that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has
expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the
conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are
strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what
he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the
manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein
involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished
colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put
down at least some of the important considerations that impelled
Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority
bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view. In this
manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their
respective reactions in proper perspective.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
examination of the voting and registration records hatactual voting
and election by the registered voters had taken place in the
questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be
disregarded and excluded with the resting disenfranchisement of
the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona
fide reports of the results of the voting for canvassing and
registration purposes. Where the grievances relied upon is the
commission of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the
proper remedy is election protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al. Supra).
(P. 69, Record, L-49705-09).
The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the
citations to be doubly sure they were not taken out of context,
considering that most, if not all of them arose from similar situations
in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We
are satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they
actually came from the pens of different members of the Court,
already retired or still with Us, distinguished by their perspicacity
and their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional
and legislative intent expounded at the outset of this opinion and
evident in the modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the
Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have concerned
Us herein, particularly the elevation of the Commission as the "sole
judge of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of all electoral
contests, We find the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they
reveal through the clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star by
which the future should be guided in delineating and circumscribing
separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its
equally important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the
purity and sanctity of elections in this country.
In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to
warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and
Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for
such dismissal.

In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the

following portion of the ratiocination of respondent Board of
Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission with approval in its
resolution under question:
First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that
canvassing boards must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting
returns and they may do so only when the returns are palpably
irregular. A conclusion that an election return is obviously
manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in
the canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only
upon the most convincing proof. Any plausible explanation one
which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience
and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid
outright nullification, with the resulting t of those who exercised
their right of suffrage. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-35918, Jude
28,1974; Villavon v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v.
Comelec 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong evidence
establishing the spuriousness of the return, the basis rule of their
being accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results
of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes
must be applied, without prejudice to the question being tried on
the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial and real in
the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec L-33692,
33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 238, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor
is that where it has been duly de ed after investigation and
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CASES: JURISDICTION
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA
G.
FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON.
JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26,
1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman
discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate
and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero
who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside
the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents
on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted
the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent
from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct
committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the
parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer
of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he
allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative
case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed
under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or
immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera
of their office.

II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic
1
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
2
Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final
and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed
by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this
Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of
Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of
the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the
law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office
of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate
with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. . . . No court shall hear
any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman except
the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of
the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules
of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

xxx xxx xxx

Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions

of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-avis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly
pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et
3
4
al. and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. were original
actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the
5
Ombudsman, et al. was commenced by a petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
6
7
al., Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., Olivarez vs.
8
9
Sandiganbayan, et al., and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65.Alba vs.
10
Nitorreda, et al. was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated
as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a
prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed
11
by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. which
was a special civil action for certiorari.

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1)

Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules
of procedure and consistent with due process. . .
..
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
All previsionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman
when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by
the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing
constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the
validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it,
including those rules with respect to the availability or nonavailability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition
that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing
the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable,
her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a
discussion of the differences between a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.

Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case
at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it
refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised
by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a
special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to
concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto
appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence,
we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action forcertiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as
a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court
was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been
seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a
public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential
Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the
Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995,
while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this
Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case
involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the
other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is
sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the
Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November
17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The
conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did
so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

The Court notes, however, that neither the

petition nor the two comments thereon took
into account or discussed the validity of the
aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light
of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and consent."

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary

and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn
to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is
clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative
body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and
not the statute, governs in a case before them for
12
judgment.

The Court also invites the attention of the

parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA
519) and the provisions of its former Circular No.
1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 195, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of
the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional

13
questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a
court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a
court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows
14
that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction

of the Court is invoked and involved in this case,
and the foregoing legal considerations appear to
impugn the constitutionality and validity of the
grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the
Court deems it necessary that the parties be
heard thereon and the issue be first resolved
before conducting further proceedings in this
appellate review.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly

procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own
15
motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
16
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine
17
its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that
the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional
question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on
May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition,
from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal
bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No.
0-95-0411, entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr.
Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director,
Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved
the latter from the administrative charges for
grave misconduct, among others.
It is further averred therein that the present
appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27
of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770)
and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure,
Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770
was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the

parties to SUBMIT their position and arguments
on the matter subject of this resolution by filing
their corresponding pleadings within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has
complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
any submission it should have presented. On the other hand,
petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the
Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a
law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided
in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all
cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since
Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this
Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of
appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what
may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court
already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by
jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases
and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have
18
to be resolved by the appellate court. Also, the very provision
cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments
and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the
integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the
decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific
provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasijudicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No
such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular
courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are
referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private
19
respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A
person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court
which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was
to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended
limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not
fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that
time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from
20
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which
was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule
21
of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply
only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of
the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no
reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a
criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43
even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent
constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions
of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an

CIVIL PROCEDURE
objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming
from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a
trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same.
On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45
since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither
can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to
jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of
cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be
viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too
tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence
as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including
the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed
out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and
when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under
Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid
having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case
can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial
determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of
this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was
even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional
question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any
time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the
Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is
22
obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case.
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on
other grounds, short of passing upon the constitutional question.
We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret
that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final
and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The
prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier
explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly
imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is
precisely under review here because of some statements therein
somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court
on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained inFirst Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
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CASES: JURISDICTION
23

al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
24
unnecessarily burden the Court.
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of
the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements
in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual
settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the
merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be
undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position
paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No.
6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on
S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of
what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second
25
reading by the House of Representatives. The Senate was
informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October
26
2, 1989 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by
President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the
Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the
Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions
of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of
S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's
jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights
had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4)
which provides that the decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's
query whether the Supreme Court would agree
to such provision in the light of Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution which requires its
advice and concurrence in laws increasing its
appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed
that the Committee has not yet consulted the
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed
that the provision will expand the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through
petitions for review, adding that they should be
27
appeals on certiorari.
There is no showing that even up to its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for
28
its advice and consent.
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line

CIVIL PROCEDURE
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasijudicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section
27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature,
cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power,
especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural
in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose
a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of
this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of
this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In
fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
29
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and
what is substantive is frequently a question of great
30
difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our
own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges,
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
31
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the
rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
32
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover,
33
relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for
this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy,
which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested
rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to
34
the remedy.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a
new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to
transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider
such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have
still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
35
remedy.
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a
transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and
remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
36

pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at
bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and
any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid
Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force
and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court
of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered
by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under
Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or
records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

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COURT OF APPEALS (Full Text)

G.R. No. 124333 March 26, 1997
NATIVIDAD P. ARAGON, as represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
MODESTO
O.
ARAGON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and the MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner seeks to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of
1
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46691 which reversed the Decision
dated January 31, 1994 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CIII, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10200.
The antecedent facts are undisputed:
The MARENIR Development Corporation (MARENIR for brevity)
obtained a P4,000,000.00 loan from the Manila Banking Corporation
(MBC for brevity) and executed in the latter's favor a real estate
mortgage over its subdivision lots with Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 271128, 271129, 271130, 271131 and 271132. The real estate
mortgage was annotated in all the aforementioned titles.
Subsequently, MARENIR's mortgage loan was increased to
P4,560,000.00.
On April 27, 1982, MARENIR sold to petitioner the lot covered by
TCT No. 271131, denominated as Lot 23, Blk. 5, with an area of 368
sq. meters and situated in Bo. Bagbag, Quezon City. The agreed
purchase price is P132,480.00 with P20,000.00 as downpayment and
the P112,480.00 balance to be paid on a monthly installment of
P1,745.00.
Petitioner, later on, was able to complete the payment of the
purchase price to MARENIR but the latter was unable to transfer TCT
No. 271131 in petitioner's name.
On February 14, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against MARENIR in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 99, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-891797. In that complaint, petitioner prayed that a judgment be
rendered ordering MARENIR to execute a deed of absolute sale in
her favor and for MARENIR to redeem the property free from
encumbrances from MBC.
2

On September 21, 1989, the court a quo rendered a decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, . . . judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of plaintiff covering the
property in question and to deliver the owner's
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 271131
of the land records of Quezon City and actual
physical possession thereof to plaintiff, and to
pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
3
attorney's fees . . . .

There being no appeal on the part of MARENIR, petitioner on July

25, 1990, filed a "Motion to Direct Branch Clerk of Court or Deputy
Sheriff to Execute Absolute Deed of Sale" which was granted by the
trial court. Subsequently, the branch clerk of court executed for and
in behalf of MARENIR, a Deed of Absolute Sale, in favor of
4
petitioner.
However, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, refused to register
the deed unless the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 271131 is
presented. Since the owner's duplicate of title was in the possession
of MBC, petitioner requested the former to release the said TCT.
MBC, through its statutory receiver agreed to release the TCT
provided petitioner will pay it the corresponding value in the
amount of P185,020.52. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount
for the following reasons, viz: (a) that she had paid the total
purchase price plus interest in the amount of P59,686.84, or a total
of P192,166.22; and (b) that to require her to pay another
P185,020.52 would be making her pay for the lot the second time.
When the statutory receiver still refused to release the TCT,
petitioner was left with no other recourse but to file a complaint for
Delivery of Title and Damages against MBC before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10200.
5

On January 31, 1994, the aforementioned court rendered a

decision the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Natividad G. Aragon represented by her Attorney-in-fact Modesto O.
Aragon as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Manila Banking Corporation and/or
whoever its present conservator/liquidator . . . , to physically and
actually deliver the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 271131, or if
said title had been cancelled, to deliver the present owner's
duplicate copy covering the lot involved in this case . . . to the
plaintiff Natividad G. Aragon and/or her attorney-in-fact Modesto O.
Aragon, within five (5) days from finality of this decision;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to transfer TCT No.
271131 in the name of Marenir Development Corporation, . . . , in
the name of herein plaintiff Natividad G. Aragon, . . . without having
to require the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
271131 or its successor title should Manila Bank Corporation and/or
its Central Bank conservator/liquidator refuse or fail to voluntarily
surrender the title in question;
xxx xxx xxx

Aggrieved with the decision of the said court in Civil Case No. 0-9110200, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of respondent by reversing the decision of the
court a quo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. It
ratiocinated that:
The complaint of appellee ARAGON for Specific Performance and
7
Damages against MARENIR should have been filed with the HLURB
[Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board]. The Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaint.
xxx xxx xxx
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CASES: JURISDICTION
. . . , the decision penned by Judge De Guzman was null and void,
having been rendered without jurisdiction and may be struck down
anytime even on appeal to the Supreme Court. A void judgment
cannot acquire finality; it is non-existent. It is in legal effect no
judgment or order at all. And so was its Order to the Branch Clerk of
Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of ARAGON. It
follows that the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk
of Court was also null and void.
There being no decision upon which the challenged decision is
based, no deed of absolute sale in favor of ARAGON, the latter has
no cause of action against appellant BANK.
xxx xxx xxx
There being no established right of ARAGON because of nullity of
the decision of Judge De Guzman, there is no obligation on the part
of the BANK to respect or not to violate such right; and the refusal of
the BANK to release TCT No. 271131 is not an act or omission
8
violative of ARAGON's right.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
I
IT WAS THE RESPONDENT COURT WHICH HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q89-1797
II
ASSUMING THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
NULLIFY THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CASE WHICH WAS NOT BEFORE IT
ON APPEAL, ESTOPPEL BY LACHES BARRED THE ATTACK ON THE
9
TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-89-1797.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests in the Court of Appeals
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final decisions and orders of
10
the Regional Trial Court. However, the aforestated provision of the
said law only refers to cases appealed to it from the Regional Trial
Court from which the case originated. Like any other court, it is
necessary that the Court of Appeals must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties, the issues and the res before it can
11
validly decide any case submitted to it. Hence, it cannot acquire
appellate jurisdiction over any case not properly brought to it by the
parties concerned.
This is what happened in the case at bench. What was on appeal
before the Court of Appeals was the decision rendered in Civil Case
No. Q-91-10200 where the parties are petitioner herein and
respondent MBC. However, the said court, in deciding the issues
raised in the aforesaid case, took cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-891797 where the parties were different i.e. petitioner and MARENIR.
Furthermore, said case was not appealed before the Court of
Appeals nor was there any action commenced to annul the
judgment of the court a quo. Hence, the decision over that case

CIVIL PROCEDURE
became final and executory. Respondent court clearly committed an
error when it declared as null and void the proceedings in Civil Case
No. Q-89-1797 as it was not the case appealed before it. Even if
MARENIR itself, the losing party to the aforementioned case decides
now to appeal the decision or to file any other proceeding seeking
its nullification, it cannot at this very late stage do so. This is in
consonance with the legal tenet that failure to perfect an appeal
renders the trial court's judgment final and executory and it can no
longer be subject to review. As such, any modification of that
12
judgment by the appellate court cannot be upheld.
Anent the second assigned error, we agree with petitioner's
asseveration that assuming that the respondent court had
jurisdiction to nullify the proceedings of a case which was not before
it on appeal, estoppel by laches barred the attack on the court a
quo's jurisdiction in Civil Case No. Q-89-1797. As correctly pointed
13
out by petitioner in her petition, MARENIR in Civil Case No. Q-891797 never questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court. Not even in
its answer to the complaint, nor in any subsequent pleading.
14

In the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, respondent Surety company

did question the jurisdiction of the trial court but it did so late on
appeal. Even if we found that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case, we still ruled that the proceedings conducted therein was
valid based on the doctrine of laches. We also defined laches as
"failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party
15
entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it." We
also ruled that:
The facts of this case that from the time the Surety became a quasiparty on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack
of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its
part. We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolving.
Indeed, the reason for the doctrine in Tijam and the cases
subsequent to it is ratiocinated by this Court as:
. . . the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but because such a practice cannot
16
be tolerated for reasons for public policy.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Although we agree with private respondent's contention that

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to
at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, this particular rule,
however, means that jurisdictional issues in a case can be raised
only during the proceedings in said case and during the appeal of
said case. It certainly does not mean that lack of jurisdiction of a
court in a case may be raised during the proceedings ofanother case,
in another court and even by anybody at all. Certainly, we cannot
countenance this procedure as this will lead to absurdity and is
against the basic principle of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated January 31, 1994 is REINSTATED, with costs against
private respondents.

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for

illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration
Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner
St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was
no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January
22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
1
Revenue (BIR).

SO ORDERED.

ST.
MARTIN
FUNERAL
HOME, petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not
its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter
then took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and
other government fees, although the records purported to show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes
in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were
no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner
2
had illegally terminated his employment.
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996
declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the
3
case.
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to
the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he
worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin
Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a
period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
4
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
5
immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
6
dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition
7
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the
Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial
review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions
of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their
way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the
years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The
Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for
and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October
14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable
to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the
Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
8
promulgation. Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC
which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment
9
for program and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302
(now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of
Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no
10
provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead
merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within
twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that
such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days
from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision
for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that
the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency
within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
11
adjudications.
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions
of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
12
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil
13
action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now
fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
14
period under Rule 65.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P.
No. 129 originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and
of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
15
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended
by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to
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CASES: JURISDICTION
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in
the Court of Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within, three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name
16
of the lower appellate court, the following amendments of the
original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A.
No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor
Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of
Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within
its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was
transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
(Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the
quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in
point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of
judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now
been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited
to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No.
129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and
the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, "those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with .
. . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has
been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions
17
of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed,
the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by
declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No.
129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of

CIVIL PROCEDURE
1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However,
because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also
supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code.
This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor
Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court
for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No.
7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for
judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly
but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations
extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill
No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H.
18
No. 10452.
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered
19
his sponsorship speech from which we reproduce the following
excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits
that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its
coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally,
extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in
the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme
Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
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CASES: JURISDICTION
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the
privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief
Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme
Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme
Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties
involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the
guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to
mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the
reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following
Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the
20
following proceedings transpired:
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line
"Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS
AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr.
President, that issues arising from the Labor
Code will still be appealable to the Supreme
Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence)
Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that
lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed
with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as
approved in the House, this was also deleted,
Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence)
Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee
amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we
close the period of Committee amendments.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence)
Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
(Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill
No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
21
unanimous approval on third reading followed. The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives,
the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
22
1995, inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the
Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action
of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation
thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been
a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action
for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the
special civil action ofcertiorari is within the concurrent original
23
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to
indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on
Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters
were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of
Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be
circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as
he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure
would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these
cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals
would give litigants the advantage to have all the
evidence on record be reexamined and
reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can
then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A
perusal of the records will reveal appeals which
are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
24
dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on
the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased
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CASES: JURISDICTION
number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be
made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
25
pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. should be taken
into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition
for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein
set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 149634

July 6, 2004

LORETA TORRES, MARILYN TANGTANG, ARMELA FIGURACION,

RAQUEL BERNARTE, ESTRELLA TITO, RHEA ELLORDA, ROSITA
FUENTES, ANITA LAPORRE, JOCELYN RIN, MATODIA DEREPAS,
FELICISIMA ALEGRE, LEA MARTILLANA, EVANGELINE RAFON, ALICIA
EMPILLO, AMY TORRES, EDNA JIMENEZ, EVELYN DOLOM, HAMILI
UYVICO, CRISELINA ANQUILO, NILDA ALCAIDE, ROSARIO MABANA,
ESTELA MANGUBAT, ROSIE BALDOVE, CARMELITA RUIZ and LUCILA
JUSTARES, petitioners,
vs.
SPECIALIZED PACKAGING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or
ALFREDO GAO (President) and PETER CHUA (General Manager);
EUSEBIO CAMACHO GENERAL SERVICES and/or EUSEBIO
CAMACHO (President/General Manager); MPL SERVICES and/or
MIGUELITO LAURIANO (President/General Manager), respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Court may give due course to a petition, even if the
accompanying certificate against forum shopping has not been
signed by all the petitioners, provided it is shown that, as in this
case, there is a justifiable cause for such failure; and the outright
dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice. In the interest of substantial justice, strict
observance of procedural rules may be dispensed with for
compelling reasons.
The Case
1

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

2
Court, seeking to nullify the January 15, 2001 and the August 28,
3
2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
62530. The first Resolution disposed as follows:

SO ORDERED.
"ACCORDINGLY, and to strictly enforce the aforesaid
circulars to attain their objectives (Carrara Marble Phil.,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127059, January 22,
1997; Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 30), the Court [r]esolved to DISMISS the petition for
a defective or insufficient verification and certification
4
thereof."
The second assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioners claim to be employees of the Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation (SPDC), a business entity engaged in the
repackaging of cosmetic products. In three separate Complaints,
they charged SPDC and alleged labor recruiters Eusebio Camacho
General Services (ECGS) and MPL Services with illegal dismissal; and
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
th

with nonpayment of overtime, premium and 13 month pays, and

night differential.

resided in different provinces, had not executed a special power of

attorney in favor of either of the two petitioners or their counsel.

The cases were later consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA)
Salimathar Nambi. On June 30, 1995, the LA issued his Decision in
favor of petitioners, because SPDC and MPL Services had failed to
submit their position papers on or before the deadline. SPDC was
ordered to reinstate all petitioners to their former positions and to
pay them back wages, premium pay for holidays and rest days,
th
service incentive leave pay and 13 month pay.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"A.

The LA's Decision was appealed by SPDC to the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside the ruling and ordered
the case remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings.
The case was then set again for hearings. Respondents SPDC and
ECGS submitted their position papers five months after the case had
been considered submitted for decision.
On December 14, 1999, LA Nambi issued a second Decision finding
petitioners' employment to have been illegally terminated by SPDC.
The NLRC, however, again reversed and set aside this new Decision
on June 9, 2000.
On January 29, 2001, petitioners appealed to the CA.

Whether or not petitioners are employees of the

Respondent
Specialized
Packaging
Development
Corporation (SPDC).
"B.
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed by
Respondent SPDC.
"C.
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their money
7
claims."

Ruling of the CA

The Court's Ruling

The Petition was dismissed by the CA, which found the verification
and the certification against forum shopping to be either defective
or insufficient. It justified its ruling thus:

The Petition is meritorious.

"x x x [I]t appears that there are twenty-five (25) principal

parties-petitioners who were former workers of private
respondent Corporation and complainants in NLRC NCR
Case Nos. 00-04-03325-94, 00-05-03727-94 and 00-0503971-94 as a result of their being laid-off from
employment. Perusing the verification and certification[,]
however, it also appears that it was executed and signed
by only two (2) petitioners, namely, Evelyn Dolom and
Criselina Anquilo, among the said twenty-five (25)
principal petitioners. The duty to verify and certify under
oath is strictly addressed to all the twenty-five (25)
principal petitioners. To allow only two (2) of them to
execute the required verification and certification, without
the proper authorization of the others, would render
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No.
04-94 (now Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) inutile in avoiding the practice of non-forum
shopping because the other principal petitioners, who did
not execute and sign the same, much less execute the
proper power of attorney, would not be bound by the
certification executed by only two (2) of them. Any one of
the twenty-three (23) remaining principal petitioners may
just obtain the services of another lawyer to institute
5
practically the same case in a different for[um]."

Preliminary
Propriety of the Petition

Issue:

At the outset we note that the present Petition is anchored on Rule

45, and that it assails the two CA Resolutions dismissing petitioners'
earlier Petition for Certiorari. In accordance with Section 1 of Rule
8
45, the herein Petition alleges reversible errors based on the
supposedly defective verification and certification against forum
shopping.
The above-quoted issues raised in the Memorandum of petitioners,
however, were not the same ones raised in the Petition. Because
these three substantive issues were sprung by the former only in
their own Memorandum, respondents were not able to traverse
9
10
these directly in their Comment or Memorandum. Hence, save for
perfunctory references to the NLRC Decision, the latter were not
given the opportunity to defend themselves on these questions.
Elementary due process -- which means giving the opposite party
the opportunity to be heard, and the assailed court to consider
11
every argument presented -- bars this Court from taking up these
three issues in this Decision, even if doing so would speed up the
final resolution of the case. Basic is the rule that issues not
12
presented below cannot for the first time be taken up on appeal.
Review of NLRC Decisions

Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the appellate court

pointed out that disregarding the rules could not be rationalized by
invoking a liberal construction thereof. Furthermore, it found no
satisfactory explanation why the 25 principal petitioners, who

The proper procedure for seeking a review of the final dispositions

of the NLRC was laid down in 1998 in St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
13
NLRC. That case heralded two very important rules: 1) decisions
and final resolutions of the NLRC may be reviewed only via a special
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and 2)
such petition must be filed with the CA in strict observance of the
doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.

faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The

requirement of verification has thus been substantially complied
with.

Thus, after St. Martin became final, special civil actions challenging
NLRC rulings have been referred by this Court to the CA for proper
disposition. Exceptions to this rule were those instances when -prior to the finality of St. Martin -- both parties had already filed
their respective memoranda with this Court, and it then opted to
14
take final cognizance of the case. Under AM No. 99-2-01-SC,
however, all new cases erroneously filed with this Court after June 1,
1999, were dismissed forthwith.

Certification
Against
Substantially Complied With

Main
Propriety of the CA's Dismissal of the Petition

Issue:

In their present Petition, petitioners plead a liberal construction of

the rules. They argue that the verification and the certification
against forum shopping executed by only two of the 25 petitioners
15
have already satisfied the requirements under Sections 4 and
16
5 of Rule 7. On the other hand, the CA ruled that all 25 petitioners
should have signed the verification and the certification of nonforum shopping. We clarify.
Actually, two separate rules are involved in the present controversy
one, on verification; and the other, on the certification against
forum shopping.
Two Signatures Sufficient for Verification
The verification requirement is provided under Section 4 of Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically
17
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
"A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his knowledge and belief.
"A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on 'information and belief,' or upon
'knowledge, information and belief,' or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading."
(Italics supplied)
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that
the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith; or are
18
true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and
noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
19
defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional,
20
requirement.
In the present case, the problem is not the lack of a verification, but
the adequacy of one executed by only two of the 25 petitioners.
These two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest,
who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the Petition. This verification is enough
assurance that the matters alleged therein have been made in good

Forum

Shopping

For petitions for certiorari, on the other hand, a certification against

21
forum shopping is required under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. - x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition

a sworn certification that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there
is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the

foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition."
The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a partylitigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial
22
procedure. The lack of a certification against forum shopping,
unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission
23
after the filing of the petition.
The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus
24
deemed obligatory, though not jurisdictional. (Jurisdiction over the
subject or nature of the action is conferred by law.) Not being
jurisdictional, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable
25
circumstances under the rule of substantial compliance.
In fact, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification
26
against forum shopping because of compelling reasons. In Uy v.
27
Land Bank, it even reinstated a petition it had already dismissed
for lack of verification and certification against forum shopping, after
petitioner had justified the reinstatement. Similarly, in Roadway
28
Express v. CA, the Court considered as substantial compliance the
filing of the certification 14 days prior to the dismissal of the
petition.
The rule of substantial compliance has likewise been availed of with
29
respect to the contents of the certification. Gabionza v. Court of
Appeals accepted, as sufficient compliance therewith, petitioner's
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CASES: JURISDICTION
certification to the effect that "there is no similar petition [with] the
same subject matter previously filed, pending, withdrawn or
dismissed in the Supreme Court, in this Honorable Court [of Appeals]
30
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency." It
31
stressed that while Circular 28-91 required strict compliance, it did
not thereby prevent substantial compliance under justifiable
32
circumstances.
In the present case, petitioners aver that the signatures of only two
of them suffice as substantial compliance with the attestation
requirement for a certificate against forum shopping. In effect, they
33
are asking this Court to disregard a defect in their Petition.
In previous rulings, we have held that a certificate against forum
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners, because a lone
signatory cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the
34
matters required to be stated in the attestation. The ruling is not
without exception, however. In Spouses Ortiz v. Court of
35
Appeals and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed
out:
"x x x. The attestation contained in the certification on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same. To merit the Court's
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The
petitioners must convince the court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
justice. x x x" (Italics supplied)

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Indeed, rules of procedure are established to secure substantial
38
justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end,
39
not to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed
40
with in meritorious appeals.
It has been our consistent holding that the ends of justice are better
served when cases are determined on the merits -- after all parties
are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses -41
rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
Consequently, the case should be remanded to the CA for a proper
determination of the substantive issues. Time-honored is the
principle that when the law entrusts the review of factual and
substantive issues to a lower court or to a quasi-judicial tribunal,
that court or agency must be given the opportunity to pass upon
42
43
those issues. Only thereafter may the parties resort to this Court.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the
CA for a proper determination of the substantive issues. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners need only show, therefore, that there was reasonable

cause for the failure of some of them to sign the certification against
forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the Petition
would defeat the administration of justice.
We find their reasons meritorious. First, as pointed out in the
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the CA, the case dragged for
an undeniably long time, because its remand to the labor arbiter
forced many of the petitioners to go back to the provinces to await
the final outcome, while those who remained in Metro Manila were
36
forced out of temporary quarters every so often. Under these
circumstances, it was extremely difficult to secure all the required
signatures.
Second, it is safe to assume that the matters alleged in the
certificate against forum shopping have been complied with by the
non-signing petitioners. Twenty-one of the petitioners executed in
favor of their counsel, a "Natatanging Gawad ng
37
Kapangyarihan," which gives him authority to represent them in all
matters connected with the case. As it has not been revoked or
superseded, the possibility of any of them filing another action or
claim through another counsel is effectively foreclosed.
Third, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case, as
in Uy, should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling
reason" for allowing the Petition. Pertinent thereto, the Court notes
that the conflicting findings of the NLRC and of the labor arbiter -who ruled twice in favor of petitioners -- provide ample justification
for the CA's review of the merits. The outright dismissal of the
Petition was therefore prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
parties.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (Full Text)

G.R. No. 151149

September 7, 2004

GEORGE
KATON, petitioner,
vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO
and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of
action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court,
the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals,
even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds.
Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless
litigations.
The Case

"Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa,

Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the
land subject of the petitioners request for eventual conversion or
re-classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for
George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.
"Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator)
undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the
presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased)
and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey,
there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some
coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner and
[R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner)
who went to the island from time to time to undertake development
work, like planting of additional coconut trees.
"The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was
favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa
to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of
Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and
Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of
the petitioner.

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

2
Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision and the November
3
20, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the
exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in question, it
appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept
on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original
certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca,
Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as
agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of
patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the
petitioners action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have
any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he
requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of
applying for the patent over the same upon the lands conversion
from forest to agricultural.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
4
pronouncement as to cost."
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of
his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon
by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of
jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts

"In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of

Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that
since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the
same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act.
"Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island
had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified
available for disposition upon his request and at his instance.
However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District
Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the
request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin,
for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a
second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer
Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant
portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five
(5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo
Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island for the
respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin
filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject
island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.
"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan
Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the
island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June
8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead
5
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an
area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

"On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a
request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property
known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan,
which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within
Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF
Map LC No. 1582.

"Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original

certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island
issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were
obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor.
"On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he
himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and
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CASES: JURISDICTION
that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo,
Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and
introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that
petitioner never filed any homestead application for the island.
Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the
inspection and survey of the island.
"According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the
respondents insist that they already had their respective occupancy
and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere
overseer of the petitioner because he said he was acting for himself
in developing his own area and not as anybodys caretaker.
"Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors
of their respective portions and have declared said portions for
taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes
thereon for twenty years.
"Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to
sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for
reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere
homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
"In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as
well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The
petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application
for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who
6
requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land."
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by
petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he
could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased,
Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order
was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17,
1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was
his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner
had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to
agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the
Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead
patent and the reversion of the property to the State were matters
between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the
government takes steps to annul the grant, the homesteaders right
thereto stands.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to
apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred by
laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time
Respondent Palancas title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred
when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with petitioner
that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily
dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for Reconsideration, on
the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion
when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the
challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members
with two justices dissenting pursuant to its "residual prerogative"
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined
that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the
disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for
a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for
cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for
reversion of the land to the public domain.
Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for
reconveyance. First, petitioners action was brought 24 years after
the issuance of Palancas homestead patent. Under the Public Land
Act, such action should have been taken within ten years from the
issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears
from the submission (Annex "F" of the Complaint) of petitioner
himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying
six hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal
steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond
the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the
Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.

Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition
for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of
the case) in the Petition?
"2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged
residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an
8
issue not raised in the Petition?"
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the
propriety of the CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it with the
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CASES: JURISDICTION
appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December
8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20,
2001 Resolution, as follows:
"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may
indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity
and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the
case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear
the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing,
9
submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected."
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The
CAs Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners issue moot.
Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the
appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits
of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in
fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by
the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a
10
review of the evidence, more so when no determination of the
merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual
prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it
motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the
power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual
prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with
the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the
CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
11
dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to
comply with the rules or with any order of the court.
Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal
would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to
be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,
Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of
Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a
court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears
from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no

CIVIL PROCEDURE
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior
12
judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x." (Italics
supplied)
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
"A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected
as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon
the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders
for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance
with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal." (Italics supplied)
The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the
case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of
13
the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance,
the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal
of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41.
Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition
of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to
dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
14
Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it
dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental
grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of
15
jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it
16
has is to dismiss the action.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of
17
the relief sought. In his Complaint for "Nullification of Applications
for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for
18
Reconveyance of Title," petitioner averred:
"2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of
[petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioners] cousin, in
connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x
fraudulently and in bad faith:
2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite
to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and
that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that
[Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for reclassification and certification of the same land from forest land to
agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and
approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and
misrepresentation;
xxx

xxx

xxx

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was

applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where there
was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and
misrepresentation;
"3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No.
G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the
filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of
[respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,]
having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null
19
and void and of no effect whatsoever."
xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the

effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or
omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation,
first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of
20
intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x."
Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1)
nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents
Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No.
145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca;
and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to
21
reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for
declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or,
alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for
reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such
actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.

In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the

complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the
contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the
issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2)
that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the
22
plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit,
but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau
had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
23
certificate of title was void ab initio.
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property
or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was
24
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants name. As
with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if
admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed
land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the
defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the
25
property. Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property
through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the
26
plaintiff the property or the title thereto.
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege
that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the
contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public
27
land, that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that
he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the
28
Public Land Act. This Court has held that a complaint by a private
party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by
fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment,
does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be
29
dismissed.
Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of
the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor
30
general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A
private person may not bring an action for reversion or any other
action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its
derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would
31
again form part of the public domain.
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed
land will revert to the public domain even if the title is canceled or
amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may
32
bring action is the government, to which the property will revert. A
mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has
33
no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. As it is, vested rights
over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed
only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land
Management Bureau of the formers final proof of homestead
34
patent.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only
because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence
35
of a cause of action, a defense raised by respondents in their
36
37
Answer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ordains that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to
protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party38
plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the
action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should
39
still be dismissed for being time-barred. It is not disputed that a
homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to
40
Palanca on February 21, 1977, while the Complaint was filed only
on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years
from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive
41
period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.
It must likewise be stressed that Palancas title -- which attained the
status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent
and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to
review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate
42
Appellate Court ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as
indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding
one year from its issuance; provided, however, that the land
covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
43

In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiffs
own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such
action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not
44
been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato, we also
explained thus:
"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties'
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v.
McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;
Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC,
Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA
408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss
(Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets
up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16),
or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta,
84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted
at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the
pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific
Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et
al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared
in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential
only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of
the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
45
established by the evidence." (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After
all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to
settle entire controversies before them to prevent future
46
litigations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure
to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 169793

September 15, 2006

VICTORIANO
M.
vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.

ENCARNACION, petitioner,

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1

This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of
Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot
No. 2121-B-1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT
No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters
with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way,
Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a
single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente
who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On
March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay.
After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay
2
executed an Affidavit of Waiver on April 11, 1995 waving her right
over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner,
Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision
3
of the land into two lots and the issuance of titles in his name on
4
July 18, 1996.
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took
possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without
the permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said
occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650
and T-256651 were issue to petitioner.
5

Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter dated

Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject
property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand
letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on
February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter,
respondent still refused to vacate the subject property. Thereafter,
6
on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment,
damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV01-030. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual
possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since
1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of
7
petitioner was tainted with irregularities.
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered
judgment, which reads:
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence,
a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant
NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:

SO ORDERED.
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificates of Title
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Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and

surrender it to the plaintiff;

the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession

has lasted for more than one year; and

b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion,

which is an action for the recovery of ownership which
13
must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.

c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to]

P500.00 per month from February, 2001 until the portion
of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff.
COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,

ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
case on the ground that as the Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate
jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.

10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of

the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated
the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby
REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

11

Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION
PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS
DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
12
FILED BY PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which
may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action
for recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery
of the real right of possession, which should be brought in

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that

determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the
possession of the property in this case is the length of time of
dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the
possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
14
with damages and costs. Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted
for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the
inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the
dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be
filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper
Regional Trial Court.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we
find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and
in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature
of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
15
sought are the ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint
must show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction
16
without resort to parol testimony.
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner
became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the
waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the
complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001
letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the
premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand
letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001,
thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within
the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful
detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of
the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived
possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment
in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the
petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
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CASES: JURISDICTION

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beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it

one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the
suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
17
realty.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the

case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal
may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on
the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice
to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
19
evidence in the interest of justice.

Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that
another person was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the
said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the
proper action would be one foraccion publiciana and not one under
the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the
remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED.
No costs.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are

indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully
deprived of their right of possession, they should present
their claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the
owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by
18
resorting to a summary action for ejectment.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner
was in 1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen
years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The
respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case
which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case
without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal
is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits,
the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it,
as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the
ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has
jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In
case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for
further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower
court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall
not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance
with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

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G.R. No. 136109

August 1, 2002

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
1
2
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 dated April 30, 1998 and its
3
resolution dated October 15, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for
breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending
that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the
complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum
of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of
P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts. The trial court denied the
4
motion to dismiss, as well as petitioners motion for
5
reconsideration. Hence, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on
a petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied

on October 15, 1998. Hence, this petition.
The issue for resolution in this petition is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
private respondent.
Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,

damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
7
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

CIVIL PROCEDURE
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in

determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
xxx

xxx

xxx
8

In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining

whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by
Regional Trial Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
9
therein.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that
private respondents cause of action is breach of contract. The
pertinent portion of the complaint recites:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That sometime during the end of the year 1995,

defendant through its appropriate officials negotiated with
plaintiff the lease of a portion of the latters building x x x
3. That the lease contract was effective for a period of
three (3) years of from January 1, 1996 to January 1, 1998
with advance payment for the year 1996. The advance was
not however given in lump sum but on installment. One
check that was given in payment of one months rental for
1996 was even stale and had to be changed only after
demand;
4. That as per contract the monthly rental for 1997 was
P3,300.00 while for 1998, it is P3,700.00;
5. That the defendant surreptitiously removed its
equipments and other personalities from the leased
premises and failed to pay rentals due for the months of
January to March 1997 to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff; that this failure and refusal on the part of plaintiff
accelerated the payment of all rentals for each month for
the years 1997 and 1998;

Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

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CASES: JURISDICTION
6. That the acts of defendant amounts to a breach of
contract which is unlawful and malicious, as in fact, it
caused plaintiff serious anxiety, emotional stress, and
sleepless nights for which he is entitled to moral damages;
7. That plaintiff conveyed his feelings to Mr. Ronald C.
Manalastas as evidenced by a letter dated January 7, 1997
a copy of which is hereto attached to form part hereof as
Annex "B". This was later followed by a letter of plaintiffs
counsel a machine copy of which is hereto attached to
form part hereof and marked as Annex "C". Both these
letters landed on deaf ears thereby aggravating the
worries/anxieties of plaintiff;
8. That the period agreed is for the benefit of both parties
and any unilateral termination constitutes breach of
contract;
9. That defendant actually used the leased premises during
the year 1996; that had it not been for the contract,
plaintiff could have leased the premises to other persons
for business purposes; that this unlawful and malicious
breach of contract cannot be lawfully countenanced hence
defendant must be taught a lesson by being ordered to
pay exemplary damages;
x x x x x x x x x.

10

It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for

11
specific performance or rescission of contracts. In Manufacturers
12
Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that actions for
specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
13
Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit
filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific
performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease
contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if
the court should find that the subject contract of lease was
breached. As alleged therein, petitioners failure to pay rentals due
for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation
of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of
monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint
likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term
of the lease with the closure of and removal all communication
14
equipment in the leased premises. Under the circumstances, the
court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to
determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease
agreement that would justify the award of rentals and damages. The
prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount
of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely
incidental to the main action for specific performance. Similarly,
15
in Manufacturers Distributors Inc., the Court explained
xxx

xxx

CIVIL PROCEDURE
payment can not be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not
represent the value of the subject of litigation.
"Subject matter over which jurisdiction can not be conferred by
consent, has reference, not to the res or property involved in the
litigation nor to a particular case, but to the class of cases, the
purported subject of litigation, the nature of the action and of the
relief sought (Appeal of Maclain, 176 NW. 817)."
Specifically, it has been held that:
"The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a
contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted,
are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction."
(Mebane Cotton Breeding Station. vs. Sides, 257 SW. 302; 21 C.J.S.
59, note).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the

amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

xxx

That plaintiffs complaint also sought the payment by the defendant

of P3,376.00, plus interest and attorneys fees, does not give a
pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such
amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific
performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would
be but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for
specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the
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G.R. No. 161739

May 4, 2006

ALFREDO
BOKINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the HEIRS OF CELESTINO
BUSA, represented by FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and ERNESTO M.
CAMPOS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by
1
Alfredo Bokingo seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71510 which dismissed his petition for certiorari filed therewith.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
8. When plaintiffs knew of defendants application,
plaintiffs filed a protest against defendants application on
February 5, 1996. Attached as Annex A is the Protest;
9. On November 24, 1998, the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer, HUGO I. BAOSIA, resolved the
Protest in favor of Plaintiffs-the protestant in the DENR
case. Attached as Annex B is the order;
10. On January 6, 1999, the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer, HUGO T. BAOSIA, issued a
certification stating that the order dated November 24,
1998 has become final and executory. Attached as Annex C
is the machine copy of the Certification;
11. On September 9, 1999, the same DENR Officer HUGO
T. BAOSIA issued an Order of Execution which states
that:

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Alfredo Bokingo is one of the defendants in the complaint
for injunction and damages filed by Ernesto Campos, the Heirs of
2
3
Celestino Busa, the Heirs of Felicidad Busa-Panal and the Heirs of
4
Concordia Busa. The complaint was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 3 thereof, and docketed as Civil
Case No. 1003. The complaint alleged as follows:

In complying herewith, the Land Management Officer III concerned

should be instructed to set forth the whole proceeding in writing
signed by the parties and witnesses, if possible, submit and return to
this Office within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof, to be used as
evidence should it be necessary to institute any action, criminal or
otherwise, against any party who may refuse to obey the same.
SO ORDERED, Butuan City, September 9, 1999.

CAUSE OF ACTION
3. Plaintiffs [herein respondents] are co-owners of the land
subject matter. By virtue of the right of representation,
the heirs of FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and CONCORDIA S.
BUSA and REYNALDO S. BUSA, respectively;
4. Defendants in this case are heirs of MIGUEL BOKINGO;
5. Defendants ALFREDO BOKINGO [herein petitioner],
WENCESLAO B. AMBRAY, JR., ROSA B. AMBRAY, CELIA A.
ALMORA and JOSELITO B. AMBRAY, filed an application for
titling of a parcel of land before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Office of the CENRO,
Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City;
6. The land subject matter of the application of defendants
is a parcel of land located at Baan (Buhangin), Butuan City,
containing an area of 2.1600 hectares, more or less;
7. The land subject matter of the application for titling of
defendants is a parcel of land inherited by plaintiffs from
their father, the late CELESTINO BUSA. This parcel of land
is described particularly as:

12. Plaintiffs requested on June 23, 1999, for a Survey

Authority to survey the land subject matter of this case
before the CENRO Office of Butuan City. Attached as
Annex D is the Survey Application;
13. On July 30, 1999, A Survey Authority was issued by the
CENRO of Butuan City, authorizing plaintiff ENGR.
ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, JR., to survey the land subject
matter of the DENR case and the case at bar. Attached as
Annex E is the Survey Authority;
14. On November 18, 1999 at 11:00 A.M., FELICIDAD
BUSA-PANAL, MILAGROS BUSA SIMOGAN, TERESITA BUSA
LINAO, JIMMY BUSA-PANAL, son of Felicidad Busa-Panal,
ALFREDO BUSA-PANAL, son-in-law of Concordia S. Busa,
personnel of the Butuan PNP and the personnel of ENGR.
ERNESTO M. CAMPOS went to the area subject matter of
this case to survey the land. Unfortunately, Defendant
SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and Defendant ALFREDO
BOKINGO, representatives of defendants, told the survey
group to stop and not to enter the area subject matter of
this case. Attached as Annex F is the report of CENRO
Officer who [was] present during the November 18, 1999
survey which was stopped by SPO3 FERDINAND B.
DACILLO and ALFREDO BOKINGO;

TAX DECLARATION NO. GR.-10-002-0189-A

"A parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-10002-0189-A, situated in Buhangin, Butuan City, containing
an area of 2.1600 HAS., more or less. Bounded on the
North Elisa Busa, South - Pastor Ago, East Ho. Miguel
Bokingo and on the West Baan River."

15. Plaintiff[s] availed of the Barangay Justice System to

resolve the controversy regarding the survey but to no
avail, defendants still refused to allow plaintiffs to survey
the area. Thus, a Certificate to File Action was issued by
the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Copy of the same is hereto
attached as Annex G;

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16. The defendants did not exercise honesty and good

faith in their acts which is a violation of Article 19 of the
New Civil Code, and which entitles the plaintiffs for
damages;

Officer (PENRO) and the respondents were declared to have a better

right to file a public land application covering the same. Further, the
relief being sought in the complaint is injunction in order that the
respondents right to survey the subject land would not be defeated.

17. The acts of defendants constrained the plaintiff[s] to

litigate and to incur attorneys fees in the amount of
PhP10,000.00 plus litigation expenses estimated at
PhP10,000.00.

Based on these allegations, the court a quo held that it had

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim under Section 2 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that "[a]
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action
or proceeding is pending." It accordingly denied petitioner Bokingos
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.1avvphil.net

Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after

hearing, this Honorable Court:

Petitioner Bokingo forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the court a quo in denying his motion to dismiss.

PRAYER

1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of

preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this
case by ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS;
2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses;
3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff;
4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the
5
circumstances.
Petitioner Bokingo, as one of the defendants in the above complaint,
filed with the court a quo a motion to dismiss alleging that the latter
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Specifically,
petitioner Bokingo contended that it could be gleaned from the
complaint that the issue between the parties involved the
possession of the land. As such, the assessed value of the land was
crucial to determine the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter
6
7
in accordance with either Section 19(2) or Section 33(3) of
8
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
If the assessed value thereof is P20,000.00 or less, then the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Otherwise, jurisdiction is with the RTC.
Petitioner Bokingo pointed out in his Motion to Dismiss that the
assessed value of the land subject matter of the complaint was not
indicated. Nonetheless, he proffered that based on his fathers tax
declaration covering the subject land, its assessed value was
only P14,410.00. Consequently, it was allegedly clear that the court
a quo, a Regional Trial Court, had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint filed by the respondents. Rather, in view of
the assessed value of the subject land which was allegedly less than
the P15,000.00, jurisdiction properly belonged to the MTC.
Petitioner Bokingo thus urged the court a quo to dismiss the
complaint filed by the respondents for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
Acting thereon, the court a quo issued the Order dated March 13,
2002 denying the motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the
complaints allegation is that the respondents, as plaintiffs, are
entitled to have the subject land surveyed after petitioner Bokingos
and his co-claimants application for the titling of the subject land
was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources

On December 17, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision

dismissing the said petition for lack of merit, in fact and in law. It
ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing to petitioner
Bokingo because "an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition
9
for certiorari or mandamus."
It was noted that the records fail to disclose that petitioner Bokingo
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court a quo.
According to the CA, such omission warranted the outright dismissal
of the petition for certiorari. Finally, it was not shown or even
alleged in the petition that the court a quo, in issuing the assailed
order, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The issue raised by petitioner Bokingo, the CA held, was
proper for an appeal but not a petition for certiorari.
Aggrieved, petitioner Bokingo now comes to the Court seeking the
reversal of the said decision of the CA which dismissed his petition
for certiorari filed therewith. He insists that the complaint filed by
the respondents with the court a quo is a possessory action. To
determine which court, the RTC or MTC, has primary jurisdiction,
petitioner Bokingo theorizes that it is necessary that the assessed
value of the land be alleged in the initiatory complaint. Absent such
allegation, the court where the case was filed should allegedly
preliminarily determine the assessed value of the subject property
to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim. In the present case, according to petitioner
Bokingo, the assessed value of the subject land is only P14,410.00;
hence, jurisdiction thereof properly belongs to the MTC in
accordance with Section 19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129 as amended by
RA 7691.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Preliminarily, the Court finds no reversible error in the dismissal by
the CA of petitioner Bokingos petition for certiorari filed therewith.
As correctly held by the CA, the mere fact that he failed to move for
the reconsideration of the court a quos order denying his motion to
dismiss was sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the said
petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion
for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow
10
it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. Petitioner Bokingo did
not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation by the CA
from this salutary rule. As further observed by the CA, petitioner
Bokingo failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of

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CASES: JURISDICTION
the court a quo in rendering the order denying his motion to
dismiss.
In any case, the present petition lacks substantive merit. It is
axiomatic that the nature of the action and which court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
11
the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction
of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or
agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or acquiescence of the
12
parties.
A careful perusal of the respondents complaint, quoted earlier,
shows that it alleges that per the Order dated November 24, 1998 of
PENRO of Butuan City, petitioner Bokingos and his co-claimants
application for titling of the subject land was rejected. On the other
hand, in the same order it was declared that the respondents, if
qualified, may file an appropriate public land application covering
the same land. It was further alleged that the said order became
final and executory, and in connection therewith, the respondents
were authorized by the City Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City to conduct a survey on the subject
land. However, petitioner Bokingo, through his representatives,
unjustly prevented the conduct of the said survey. Even when the
matter regarding the survey was submitted to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, petitioner Bokingo still allegedly refused to allow
the respondents to survey the subject land. Hence, the Complaint
for Injunction filed by the respondents where the principal relief
sought is to enjoin permanently the illegal acts of the defendants
therein, including petitioner Bokingo, of preventing the survey of the
land subject matter of the case.
In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion
to explain that "in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature
of the principal action, or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over
the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where
the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
13
which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts."
As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the
respondents in their complaint is for the court a quo to issue an
injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his representatives to
permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the subject
land. For clarity, the prayer of the complaint reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after
hearing, this Honorable Court:
1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of
preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this
case by ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS;

CIVIL PROCEDURE
2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses;
3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff;
4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the
14
circumstances.
Contrary to the view posited by petitioner Bokingo, the cause of
action of the respondents complaint is not, as yet, to recover the
possession of the subject land. There are three kinds of actions to
judicially recover possession of real property and these are
distinguished in this wise:
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the
question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion
interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an
ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession
and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions
15
to judicially recover possession.
Significantly, the respondents complaint has not sought to recover
the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is
principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his
representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent
the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is
one of a possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs in the
court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, need to
establish the following requirements: (1) the existence of a right to
be protected; and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is to
be directed are violative of the said right. As such, the subject
matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly
cognizable exclusively by the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court
under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx
Hence, the court a quo did not err in denying petitioner Bokingos
motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS (Full Text)

G.R. No. L-33213 June 29, 1979

ARTEMIO C. REYES and HILARION C. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES STA. MARIA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, Branch II, HILARIA SANTOS VDA. DE LOPEZ and PILAR
SANTOS, respondents.
E. M. Reyes for petitioner.
Ruben T. Reyes for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside the lower court's Order which dismissed
petitioners-plaintiffs' complaint filed before it for recovery of the
property in the possession of respondents-defendants and for
declaration of ownership thereof as against said respondents'
contrary claim of ownership on the ground of alleged lack of
jurisdiction. Such action was clearly an accion publiciana for the
recovery of the right to possess (possesion de jure) (if not an accion
reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction and not a
mere action for detainer to recover physical possession
(possession de facto) which would fall within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court (if filed within one year after unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession) as erroneously held by the lower court in
its dismissal order.
Petitioners as plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had
filed on April 1, 1968 an action which they termed as one to quiet
title to a certain residential lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy,
Bulacan with an area of 368.5 square meters and to recover the
1
possession thereof from respondents as defendants, wherein they
made the following averments:
2. That plaintiffs are owners pro-indiviso of a
certain residential lot situated in the Barrio of
San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and more
particularly bounded and described as follows:
(Description omitted)
3. That through the tolerance and goodwill of
plaintiffs, thru the intervention and entreaty of
one Maximo Santos, father of the defendants,
the latter used and occupied said land free of
charge, under the following conditions, to wit:
(a) that instead of paying rentals on the premises
defendants undertook to pay the corresponding
real estate taxes on the land; and (b) that said
defendants will leave and vacate the premises
anytime the plaintiffs so demand;
4. That sometime in February, 1968, plaintiffs
verbally notified defendants that said plaintiffs

CIVIL PROCEDURE
were in need of the land, hence, said defendants
should vacate and leave the same, but said
defendants unreasonably refused at the same
time claiming ownership of the property, and
alleging further that they bought the same from
a certain Pablo Aguinaldo;
5. That in order to quiet the title of ownership
over this land, the plaintiffs have been
compelled to institute the present action and, as
a consequence, she suffered damages in the sum
of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as attorney's fees;
6. That the defendants thru their acts stated
above have therefore maliciously and unlawfully
detained the land of plaintiffs since February,
1968; and
7. That for the unlawful occupation of the land,
an estimate of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos monthly
rental is hereby claimed as reasonable damages
2
suffered by plaintiffs since February, 1968.
Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for judgment (a)
"declaring [them] to be the owners of the property described ... ";
(b) "ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and return the
possession of the same to plaintiffs;" (c) "ordering the defendants to
pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Fifty Pesos (P50.00),
Philippine Currency, rental or damages every month effective the
first day of February, 1968, until the possession of the premises is
finally restored in favor of plaintiffs;" and further ordering
defendants to pay them (d) P1,000.00 attorney's fees and (e) costs
of suit.
Upon respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that "the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or
suit" and that the action embodied in petitioners' complaint "is
actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer. Consequently, the
case falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior
court or municipal court" as against petitioners? opposition that
"plaintiffs' complaint is principally one to quiet title to property, the
question of possession being merely reduced to an incidental issue,"
the lower court issued its appealed order of August 15, 1968, finding
the motion to dismiss to be "well founded" and dismissing the case
"for lack of jurisdiction".The lower court reasoned that:
A perusal of the actual averments of facts in the
complaint do not reveal any allegation of
ultimate facts which could sufficiently support an
action to quiet title. Upon the other hand, it is
plain that the allegations of facts are only
constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer.
The allegation in paragraph 5 of said complaint
'that in order to quiet the title of ownership over
this land, the plaintiffs have been compelled to
institute the present action ... is not sufficient by
itself to consider this case as an action for
quieting title under Article 476 of the New Civil
Code. Neither does the prayer of said complaint
asking that the plaintiffs be declared the owners
of the property in question constitute a cause of
action.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Hence, the present petition for review and setting aside of the
dismissal order, which the Court finds to be meritorious. The lower
court was clearly in error in issuing its dismissal order on its
mistaken notion "that the allegations of facts are only constitutive of
an action for unlawful detainer" since the complaint shows on its
face that respondents' refusal to deliver the possession of the
property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the same
property and their counter-allegation that they had bought the same
from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action
was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property
(possessionde jure) as well as to be declared the owners thereof as
against the contrary claim of respondents.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
filed a summary action for illegal detainer instead in the municipal
court, respondents would then have contended, contrary to their
present claim, that the municipal court is without jurisdiction over
the detainer case by virtue of their contrary claim of ownership of
6
the property.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the lower
court's dismissal order of August 15, 1968 and the case is remanded
to respondent Court of First Instance with instructions to expedite
the proceedings and trial and determination thereof on the merits.
With costs against respondents. This decision is immediately
executory.

As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds
of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property,
namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer
(denominated accion interdictalunder the former law of
procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of
physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice
of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of
course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi also brought in the
3
Court of First Instance.
It has been said that "(T)he only issue in forcible entry and detainer
cases is the physical possession of real property possession de facto
and not possession de jure If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in
himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he
has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him
to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
4
reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action was not merely for recovery of
possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion
publiciana for recovery of possession de jure if not one of accion
reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the land.
As reaffirmed by the Court in the analogous case of Aguilon vs.
5
Bohol petitioners action is at least "an accion publiciana, which
action 'correspondent al que tiene derecho a la possession, contra el
que posee sin derecho o' con titulo menos firme para que se ponga
la cosa en poder del actor con todas las accesiones, frutos ets' (I
Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola 450)," and such accion publiciana or
the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better and legal right to possess (independently of title) clearly falls
within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and not of the
Municipal Courts. The Court further underscored therein "that an
action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter which must be
decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace, violence or even
loss of life and, therefore, the court should act swiftly and
expeditiously in cases of that nature.
Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana before
the lower court as against respondents! claim that they should
instead have filed a summary action for detainer in the municipal
court. Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to
surrender possession and their contrary claim of ownership of the
same
property,
petitioners
properly
filed
their accion
publiciana with the Court of First Instance to avoid getting
enmeshed in what would certainly have been another jurisdictional
dispute, since they could reasonably foresee that if indeed they had
meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. L-36098 January 21, 1983

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED
vs.
JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA, respondent.

PARTNERSHIP, petitioner,

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
G.R. No. L-36098 (Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Judge
Jose B. Herrera, City Court of Manila, Branch II, and Emiliano
Samson). On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private respondent
entered into an agreement thereby for and in consideration of
P55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land
with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser
complete the construction including the painting of his residential
house on said lot within two (2) years from August 14, 1969,
petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent the
amount of P10.00 per square meter. When the aforesaid special
condition was fulfilled, private respondent, on May 17, 1971
accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and
requested for his refund amounting to P4,820.00.

pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because

the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific
fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund
to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of
certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is
legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action
is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of
money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a
determination of certain acts the performance of which being the
more basic issue to be inquired into.
Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is
designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of
all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what
private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's
obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate
of P10.00 per square meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but
only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will
give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to reverse the order
appealed from and the complaint filed with the City Court of Manila,
Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No. 211673 is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent

on May 6, 1972 filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
with the City Court of Manila, Branch II, against petitioner docketed
as Civil Case No. 211673. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and improper avenue. City Court Judge Jose B.
Herrera in his order dated June 27, 1972 held in abeyance the
resolution on the motion until after the trial of the case on the
merits.
A reconsideration of the said order having been denied, petitioner
on October 12, 1972 filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
Branch XXVII, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 88510. A motion to
dismiss was filed by private respondent, and on November 17, 1972,
the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private
respondent in his complaint, being less than P10,000.00, is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among others
that: (a) as determined from the allegations of the complaint, the
action is for specific performance of contract; and (b) actions in
which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation
such as complaints for specific performance of contract are
exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Hence, the
decisive question to be resolved in this present petition is whether
or not the City Court of Manila, Branch II, has jurisdiction over the
complaint.
The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and
not for a sum of money and wherefore incapable of pecuniary
estimation because what private respondent seeks is the
performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to
make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be
proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money,
as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of
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CASES: JURISDICTION
[G.R. No. 52488 : July 25, 1981.]
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO F. BELMONTE, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated

October 12, 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP, which set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 22,
1978, in Civil Case No. 28389, which had affirmed in toto the
judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of San
Juan, Rizal, dated December 19, 1976, in Civil Case No. 3773.
On March 25, 1974, Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership,
hereinafter referred to as Ortigas, filed with the Municipal Court of
San Juan, Rizal, a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo F.
Belmonte, praying that after hearing, judgment be rendered
cranad(1) ordering the defendant, his heirs, assigns or successorsin-interests to vacate the subject lot and surrender full control
thereof to the plaintiff; cranad(2) declaring the residential building
constructed on the lot by the defendant as forfeited in plaintiff's
favor; and cranad(3) condemning the defendant to pay a monthly
rent of P5,000.00 from July 18, 1971, up to the time he vacates the
premises; attorney's fees in the amount of P7,000.00; exemplary
damages in such amount as the court may fix; and the costs. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 3773.
After the defendant had filed his answer, the Municipal Court of San
Juan, upon motion of the plaintiff, rendered a judgment on the
pleadings dated December 19, 1976, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
grants plaintiff-partnership's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings dated January 31, 1975, as follows:
(1) Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming
right under him to vacate the premises
designated as Lot 6, Block 31, Psd-66759 with an
area of 840 square meters, more or less, situated
at Greenhills Subdivision 4, San Juan, Rizal and
surrender possession of the same to the
plaintiff-partnership;
(2) Declaring all the improvements constructed in the
said premises forfeited in favor of the plaintiffpartnership;
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the monthly rental
of P2,500.00 a month starting from July 18, 1971
up to the time defendant actually vacates said
premises; and
(4) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in
the amount of P5,000.00 and to pay the costs of
suit.
"SO ORDERED."
After a motion for reconsideration was denied, Belmonte appealed
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal which docketed the same as
Civil Case No. 28389. Instead of filing a memorandum in support of

CIVIL PROCEDURE
his appeal, Belmonte filed on February 13, 1978, a motion to dismiss
under Sec. 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 11. Lack of Jurisdiction. A case tried by an
inferior court without jurisdiction over the subject matter
shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance.
But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try
the case on the merits if the parties therein file their
pleadings and go to the trial without any objection to such
jurisdiction."
Alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Juan and
manifesting his objection to the exercise by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal of its original jurisdiction, Belmonte sought the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3773. The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
however, denied the motion to dismiss and subsequently rendered a
decision dated September 22, 1978, affirming in toto the judgment
of the Municipal Court of San Juan. Said Court of First Instance of
Rizal likewise issued a writ of execution dated November 7, 1978.
On December 1, 1978, Belmonte simultaneously filed with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal a notice of appeal and with the Court of
Appeals a motion to extend time to file petition for review. In a
resolution dated December 7, 1978, the Court of Appeals granted
Belmonte an extension of twenty cranad(20) days from December 4,
1978, within which to file a petition for review. On December 20,
1978, Belmonte filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for Certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
assailing: cranad(a) the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San
Juan and the Court of First Instance of Rizal; cranad(b) the propriety
or validity of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the
Municipal Court of San Juan; and cranad(c) the propriety or validity
of the Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP, the petition was given due
course by the Court of Appeals which subsequently rendered a
decision dated October 12, 1979, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the municipal
court of San Juan, Metro Manila, as well as the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal aforesaid, are hereby
SET ASIDE. No costs."
The Court of Appeals held that the Municipal Court of San Juan had
no jurisdiction over the case nor the power to resolve controverted
issues on the pleadings.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Ortigas but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 15,
1980. Hence, Ortigas filed with this Court the present petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the Court of
Appeals and resolved by said court in the decision under review,
namely: cranad(a) the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Juan
and of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; cranad(b) the propriety or
validity of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal
Court of Rizal; and cranad(c) the propriety or validity of the Writ of
Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, We find that
the same are purely legal in nature. Since appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in this
Court by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act cranad(R.A. No. 296), it is
readily apparent that the decision under review was rendered by the
Court of Appeals without jurisdiction and should, therefore, be set
aside. It is for this reason that We resolved on June 8, 1981, to give
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CASES: JURISDICTION
due course to the petition for review and to consider the same as
submitted for decision.
But as We set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 12, 1979, for having been rendered without jurisdiction, We
proceed with the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dated September 22, 1978, and the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Juan dated December 19, 1976, which said
decision affirmed in toto, considering that the appeal therefrom was
perfected on time, albeit erroneously brought to the Court of
Appeals. This is in consonance with the spirit of Sec. 31 of the
Judiciary Act cranad(R.A. No. 296, as amended) which provides that
"(a)ll cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court
or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court which
shall hear the same as if it has originally been brought before it."
In support of his contention that the Municipal Court of San Juan,
Rizal, did not have jurisdiction over the case filed by Ortigas, Maximo
F. Belmonte cited in his comment to Ortigas' petition for
review cranad(which We considered as his answer to the petition)
the case of FUENTES AND GO TEK vs. HON. MUOZ PALMA, ETC.,
AND AYALA SECURITIES, INC. cranad(G.R. No. L-15074, May 31,
1960, 108 Phil. 640). We have reviewed Our decision in said case
and We find the material facts thereof to be almost identical to
those of the case at bar, namely: cranad(1) both cases involved
complaints for unlawful detainer filed against defendants who
acquired possession of the subject lots by virtue of agreements
whereby the plaintiffs had contracted to sell the subject lots and the
defendants had in turn bound themselves to pay the downpayments
and the subsequent monthly installments on the purchase prices of
said lots; cranad(2) the agreements in both cases allowed the
purchasers to take possession of the subject lots and to construct
thereon buildings and/or other permanent improvements but
specified that before full payment of the purchase prices, the
purchasers would be considered as mere tenants or lessees of the
subject lots; cranad(3) the agreements in both cases further
provided that should the purchasers fail to pay any of the monthly
installments within ninety cranad(90) days from its due date, the
contracts shall automatically be cancelled and all sums of money
paid under the same shall be considered as rentals on the property
and the purchasers may be ejected therefrom by the means
provided for by law for trespassers or unlawful detainers; cranad(4)
in both cases, the purchasers took possession of the subject lots
after having made the downpayment and constructed thereon
buildings and/or other permanent improvements; cranad(5) in both
cases, the purchasers failed to pay the monthly installments which
became due, prompting the plaintiffs to file the complaints for
unlawful detainer which sought to eject the purchasers-defendants
from the subject lots; and cranad(6) the complaints for unlawful
detainer in both cases contained prayers affecting the property
rights of the parties in the permanent improvements constructed on
the subject lots in the cited case, Ayala Securities, Inc. prayed for
the removal of the warehouses, garages and other permanent
improvements constructed by defendant Fuentes on the subject lots
while in the case at bar, Ortigas prayed that the residential building
constructed by defendant Belmonte on the subject lot be declared
forfeited in its favor.
After noting that "(a)n action for unlawful detainer, which is a
summary proceeding to wrest possession from one who has no right
thereto, is applicable only when the issue is that of possession; but
rights of property in the land created by the Agreements, especially
the relative rights and obligations of the parties to the
improvements are directly involved", this Court held in the cited
case that the Justice of the Peace Court cranad(now Municipal
Court) of Makati did not have jurisdiction over the action filed by

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ayala Securities, Inc., as the same involved rights over the real
property, other than mere right of possession. Thus, this Court
declared null and void the proceedings in the court below and
dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by Ayala Securities, Inc.
We find the above ruling applicable to the case at bar.
As stated, the complaint for unlawful detainer filed with the
Municipal Court of San Juan sought not only the ejectment of the
defendant from the subject lot, but likewise prayed that the
residential building constructed by him on the same lot be declared
forfeited in plaintiff's favor. Clearly, the issues raised before said
inferior court did not only involve possession of the lot but also the
rights and obligations of the parties to the residential building which
under Art. 415(1) of the Civil Code is considered real property.
Plaintiff's prayer that said building be declared forfeited in its favor
directly puts in issue the ownership of said real property.
Since the issues raised by Ortigas before the Municipal Court of San
Juan in Civil Case No. 3773 exceeded the allowable scope of an
unlawful detainer suit which should be limited to the issue of
possession of real property, the case could not qualify as an
exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under Sec.
44(b) of the Judiciary Act which provides:
"SECTION 44. Original Jurisdiction. Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of real property, or any interest
therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into
and detainer on lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act
upon city and municipal courts;"
Consequently, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, did not have
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3773. Its judgment dated December
19, 1976, should therefore be set aside.
Since Civil Case No. 3773 was decided by the Municipal Court of San
Juan without jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, said case
should have been dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
when the same was brought before it on appeal. Section 11, Rule 40
of the Rules of Court, which We have heretofore quoted, provides
for an instance when the Court of First Instance of Rizal cranad(to
which original jurisdiction over the case filed by Ortigas properly
belonged) could have validly assumed original jurisdiction over the
case. But that provision is inapplicable to the case at bar since
Belmonte expressly objected to assumption of jurisdiction by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Accordingly, the decision of the Court
of First Instance dated September 22, 1978, should likewise be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the
proper action with the proper court, the following are hereby set
aside for lack of jurisdiction: cranad(1) the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 12, 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP;cranad(2)
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September
22, 1978, in Civil Case No. 28389; and cranad(3) the judgment on the
pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal in Civil
Case No. 3773. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 96271 June 26, 1992

After the filter was replaced, petitioner paid the amount of Pl,650.00
on November 18, 1986 which included the first amortization of
P700.00 (Ibid.).

NATIVIDAD VILLOSTAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, THE HON.
SALVADOR S. TENSUAN as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Branch
146 and ELECTROLUX MARKETING, INCORPORATED, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of
1
the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated
November 16, 1990, in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 23178 denying the
2
petitioner's appeal which in effect affirms the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-1420 sustaining the
3
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati, Metro
Manila, dated November 15, 1989 ordering herein petitioner to pay
private respondent, among others, the amount of P14,540.00.
The established facts of the case are as follows:
Desiring to have safe drinking water at home, herein petitioner
Villostas and her husband decided to buy a water purifier. At about
this time, private respondent's Electrolux sales agents were making
door to door selling of its products in the subdivision where
petitioner has her residence. Because private respondent's sales
agents had assured petitioner of the very special features of their
brand of water purifier, petitioner Villostas placed an order for one
(1) unit of said water purifier. On September 13, 1986, an Electrolux
Aqua Guard water purifier was delivered and installed at petitioner's
residence (Rollo, p. 38; 49). Consequently, petitioner signed the
Sales Order (Annex "B", p. 31) and the Contract of Sale with
Reservation of Title (Annex "A", p. 31) in October 1986 (Rollo, p. 38,
22). A warranty certificate, Exhibit "l", was issued by private
respondent which provides that:
ELECTROLUX
MARKETING,
INCORPORATED
WARRANTS
THIS
QUALITY
ELECTROLUX
PRODUCT TO PERFORM EFFICIENTLY FOR ONE
FULL YEAR FROM DATE OF ORIGINAL PURCHASE.
(Rollo, p. 49)
The purchase of said unit was on installment basis under which
petitioner would pay the amount of P16,190.00 in 20 monthly
installments of P635.00 a month.
After two (2) weeks, petitioner verbally complained for the first time
about the impurities, dirtiness and bad odor coming out of the unit
(Rollo, p. 22). On October 21, 1986, private respondent Electrolux
sent its service technician to examine and test the water purifier.
The water which came out was dirty so the unit was shut off
automatically (Ibid.).The technician changed the filter of the unit on
said date without charge with an instruction that the filter should be
changed every 6 months otherwise the unit will not last long as the
water in the area was dirty (Ibid.).

Petitioner complained for the second and third time when dirty
water still came out of the water purifier after the replacement of
the filter. It was on the third complaint of petitioner Villostas when
the service technician gave advise that the filter should be changed
every six (6) months costing about P300.00 which was considered to
be uneconomical by the former (Rollo, pp. 22-23).
On December 9, 1986, petitioner sent a letter to the private
respondent's branch manager stating therein her complaint that the
actual performance of the carbon filter was only for a month instead
of the private respondent's claim that the replacement of such filter
will be only once every six (6) months. The petitioner, citing the
above incident as uneconomical, decided to return the unit and
demand a refund for the amount paid (Rollo, p. 76), Electrolux's
branch manager offered to change the water purifier with another
brand of any of its appliance of the unit in her favor. Petitioner did
not accept it as she was disappointed with the original unit which
did not perform as warranted. Consequently, petitioner did not pay
any more the subsequent installments in the amount of P14,540.00
exclusive of interests (Rollo, p. 23, 120).
What transpired next was an exchange of demand letter and reply
between petitioner and private respondent.
Ultimately, respondent Electrolux Marketing, Inc. filed a complaint
against petitioner Villostas with the MTC of Makati for the recovery
of the sum of P14,540.00 representing the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of one (1) Electrolux Water Purifier plus interest
thereon at the rate of 42% per annum in accordance with the Sales
Contract with Reservation of Title (Rollo, pp. 28-30).
In her amended answer, petitioner Villostas asserted that by reason
of private respondent's breach of warranty she was availing of the
remedy of rescission of the contract of sale and offered to return the
water purifier to the seller as in fact, it was already being offered for
return as early as December 9, 1986, aside from claiming for the
refund of her payments. Petitioner prayed that the contract of sale
be declared rescinded and the payments refunded to her together
with the full grant of the claims asserted in her counterclaims (Rollo,
pp. 35-36).
After trial on the merits. the MTC of Makati rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as
follows:
1) the amount of P14,540.00 representing the
unpaid outstanding balance of the aforesaid
unit, plus interest thereon at the rate of
P42% per annum until fully paid;
2) the amount of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees
and
3) dismissing the counterclaim of defendant.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 38-44)
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment of said lower court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
rendered its judgment affirming the disputed decision (Rollo, pp. 2124).
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and was given an
inextendible period of 15 days to file a petition for review.
Anticipating that she would fail to comply with the deadline, herein
petitioner filed a second extension to file a petition for review
which, however, was denied.
Herein, petitioner comes to this Court via petition for review
on certiorari.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION MADE BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE SUPREME COURT IS PROPER
AND RIPE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
RESCIND THE CONTRACT IN VIOLATION OF THE
WARRANTY FOR HIDDEN DEFECT OF THE
ARTICLE DELIVERED BY THE RESPONDENT.
III

CIVIL PROCEDURE
because said legal recourse was time barred judging from delivery of
the water purifier on September 13, 1986 pursuant to Art. 1571 of
the New Civil Code.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Anent the jurisdictional competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court
to order rescission of contract, suffice it to say that the action was
initiated by herein private respondent Electrolux when it filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money worth P14,540.00,
against petitioner Villostas. Said amount is indubitably within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court since it does not exceed
P20,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages
of whatever (Maceda v. CA, G.R. No. 83545, 176 SCRA 440 [1989]).
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein (Caparros v. CA, G.R. No. 56803, 170
SCRA 758 [1989]). When the petitioner, therefore, raised rescission
of contract in her answer, the court is not divested of its jurisdiction
over the case on account of defenses raised by the answer. The
court is then merely authorized to receive evidence thereon (Dela
Cruz v. Bautista, G.R. No. 39692, 186 SCRA 517, [1990]). Clearly, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant (Caparros v. CA, supra.).
As regards the contention that the action for rescission is barred by
prescription under Art. 1571 of the Civil Code, the same is bereft of
merit. It must be pointed out that at the time the Electrolux Aqua
Guard water purifier was delivered and installed at petitioner
Villostas' residence a Warranty Certificate was issued by private
respondent Electrolux which reads:
ELECTROLUX
MARKETING,
INCORPORATED
WARRANTS
THIS
QUALITY
ELECTROLUX
PRODUCT TO PERFORM EFFICIENTLY FOR ONE
FULL YEAR FROM DATE OF ORIGINAL PURCHASE.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS BOUND TO

PAY RESPONDENT HER REMAINING BALANCE OF
P14,540.00 PLUS INTEREST THEREON PURSUANT
TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO
THE CONTRACT PLUS COSTS OF SUIT.
The main issue in the instant case is whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to rescind the contract on the basis of a violation of the
warranty of the article delivered by the respondent.
Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court erred when it ruled
that its claim for rescission had prescribed inasmuch as she had
formally notified the seller within a reasonable time, that is, 2
months and 26 days, from the delivery of water purifier on
September 13, 1986 of her election to rescind.
Private respondent counters that the petitioner is not entitled to
rescission vis-a-vis alleged violation of the warranty for hidden
defects for the reason that rescission of contract sought by
petitioner was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the trial
court. It adds that petitioner could no longer avail of rescission

The foregoing is clearly an express warranty regarding the efficiency

of the water purifier. On this regard the court said that while it is
true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive
period of six months for a redhibitory action, a cursory reading of
the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said rule
may be applied only in case of implied warranties. The present case
involves one with an express warranty. Consequently, the general
rule on rescission of contract, which is four years (Article 1389, Civil
Coded) shall apply (Moles v. IAC, G.R. No. 73913, 169 SCRA 777
[1989]). Inasmuch as the instant case involves an express warranty,
the filing of petitioner's amended answer on September 30, 1988 is
well within the four-year prescriptive period for rescission of
contract from September 13, 1986, which was the delivery date of
the unit.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the complaint of private respondent is
DISMISSED. The sale of the water purifier is hereby RESCINDED.
SO ORDERED.

meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
7

NDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA AND JOHNNY OCO, G.R. No. 174346
Present:

ners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

s-

CARPIO MORALES,
OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BY PEDRO
PI,
TINGA,

ndents.

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

possession, until October 1, 1996 when petitioners forced their way

into it.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative
8
defense. In their Memorandum, however, they questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint,
9
the assessed value of the land being only P11,160, as reflected in
10
Tax Declaration No. 7565.
By Decision of November 27, 1998, the trial court found for
respondents, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] and against the defendants [-herein
petitioners]:
1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in
question to the plaintiffs and

September 12, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and disturbing

plaintiffs peaceful possession thereof, unless there be another court
judgment to the contrary.

DECISION

SO ORDERED.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court,
maintaining that it had, held:

Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the
1
Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001, ordering the
defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera
and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to
the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. (Oco), said to be a
"peace officer connected with the PNP," accompanied by
"unidentified CAFGU members," forced his way into respondents
0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio,
Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of the
property, Oco and company used a tractor to destroy the planted
2
crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it.
Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of Possession
3
with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages against
petitioners.
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part
of a three-hectare property described in OCT No. P-447 issued on
February 10, 1956 in the name of Andrea Lacson who sold a 2hectare portion thereof to Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold
1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzon vda. de
4
Barrera (Fernanda).
Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was
occupied, possessed and cultivated by their predecessor-in-interest
5
Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since 1935; after a subdivision
survey was conducted in November 30, 1976, it was found out that
6
the land formed part of the titled property of Andrea Lacson; and
despite this discovery, they never filed any action to recover
ownership thereof since they were left undisturbed in their

The Court is not persuaded by [the defendants] arguments. What

determines the nature of the action as well as the jurisdiction of the
[c]ourt are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those alleged
in the answer of the defendants.
xxxx
In [p]ar. 2 of plaintiffs complaint, the land in question was described
as a riceland "situated at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occ. and
declared under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7564 in the name of Vicente
Legaspi and bounded on the north by a creek, on the east Sec. 12,
on the south Lot No. 007 and on the west also by Lot No. 007 which
tax declaration cancels former [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 12933 under
the name of Lorenza Bacul Legaspi which likewise cancels [T]ax
[D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger portion of the land under
which the land described under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7565 is part
and parcel thereof [sic]; the present estimated value being
11
P50,000." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial courts disposition of the issue of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
On the merits, the appellate court affirmed too the trial courts
decision, finding that "both testimonial and documentary evidence
on record established that appellees, through their predecessors-ininterest, have been in peaceful, continuous, public and actual
12
possession of the property in dispute even before the year 1930."
The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the
13
only issue involved is the determination of possession de jure.

meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION

Hence, the present petition for review which raises the following
issues:
I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO
DETERMINE WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT [TO] THE PORTION
LITIGATED; AND
II. WHETHER . . . THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS WELL AS THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT DEPEND ON THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN
14
THE COMPLAINT.
For obvious reasons, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter shall be first considered.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691
provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, to wit:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

CIVIL PROCEDURE
property.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the
court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from
the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds
exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to
18
dismiss. That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by
petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did
not thus render them in estoppel.
En passant, the Court notes that respondents cause of action
accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place on
October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter
or on February 7, 1997. Respondents exclusion from the property
had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of
accion publiciana.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
respondents, all the proceedings therein as well as the Decision of
November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should
perforce be dismissed. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the
first issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged July
31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision
of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City in Civil Case
No. TC-97-001 is declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the

plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the
15
regional trial court. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No.
7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been
expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action
is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive
original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria
where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the
aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the
assessed value of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property
established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is
applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent the true or
16
market value of the property."
The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax
Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the parties. The bare
claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails. The
case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court.
It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint
based on the allegation that "the present estimated value [of the
land is] P50,000," which allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the
printed pleading. The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair
17
market value, is entirely different from the assessed value of the
meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

FAMILY COURTS (Full Text)

G.R. No. 159374

to hear and decide the petition forhabeas corpus filed by

3
respondent.

July 12, 2007

FELIPE
N.
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent.

MADRIAN, Petitioner,

DECISION

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home
on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it
was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
Petitioners alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental
faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and
their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their
home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in
4
their personal problems.

CORONA, J.:
5

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The
ensuing battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny
issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the
case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became
emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian
were married on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque City. They resided in San
Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick,
born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996;
Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on
December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their
conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City,
Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought
the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up
between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter
to theLupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved
futile.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a

6
decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition
and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent
was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were
at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation
rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight
years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by
the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes
Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip

and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners
act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to
Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them
of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to
appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why
they should not be returned to her custody.

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in

relation to the latter;

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September

17, 2002. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the
custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had
1
a change of heart and decided to file a memorandum.

In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court

of Appeals jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner is wrong.
7

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging

that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons
because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at
night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at
a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that,
after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left,
taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta.
Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a
certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since

there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
xxx

xxx

xxx
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CASES: JURISDICTION
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs
of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it
cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read
in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in petitions for habeas corpuswhere the custody of minors is
8
at issue. (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas
corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22,
2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with
the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that
family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the
writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family
court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of
jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court
and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
11
court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its membersand, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the
region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
9
involved. (emphases supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Paraaque
residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to
provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction
precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the
sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who
do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would
be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
ahabeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when
10
they passed [RA 8369].
meikimouse

CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
7

COMMERCIAL COURTS (Full Text)

G.R. No. 165744

August 11, 2008

OSCAR
C.
REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
1
(CA) promulgated on May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The CA
Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2
142, Makati City dated November 29, 2002 in Civil Case No. 001553 (entitled "Accounting of All Corporate Funds and Assets, and
Damages") which denied petitioner Oscar C. Reyes (Oscar) Motion
to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of
the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro,
Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith
Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established
by their family. Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993.
Although Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs
sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear
to have been made with Anastacias estate, which included her
shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia owned
136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and
3
4,250 shares, respectively.
4

On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar, docketed
as SEC Case No. 05-00-6615. The complaint stated that it is "a
derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C.
Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH
INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the
control, custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated
and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he
should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he
took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers
5
and sisters their just and respective shares." [Emphasis supplied.]
6

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the charge that he

illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a
defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds
from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona
fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been
complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of
Anastacia Reyes.

When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 took effect, the SECs exclusive
and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC
8
designated as a special commercial court. The records of Rodrigos
SEC case were thus turned over to the RTC, Branch 142, Makati, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553.
On October 22, 2002, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as
9
Nuisance or Harassment Suit. He claimed that the complaint is a
mere nuisance or harassment suit and should, according to the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, be
dismissed; and that it is not a bona fidederivative suit as it partakes
of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special
commercial court. The RTC, in its Order dated November 29, 2002
(RTC Order), denied the motion in part and declared:
A close reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of
two (2) causes of action, namely: a) a derivative suit for
accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation
which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the
respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] with prayer to
appoint a management committee; and b) an action for
determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent,
its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these
shares to the parties brothers and sisters. The latter is not
a derivative suit and should properly be threshed out in a
petition for settlement of estate.
Accordingly, the motion is denied. However, only the
derivative suit consisting of the first cause of action will be
10
taken cognizance of by this Court.
Oscar thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari,
11
prohibition, and mandamus and prayed that the RTC Order be
annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from
continuing with the proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the
RTC Order and denied the petition in its Decision dated May 26,
2004. It likewise denied Oscars motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated October 21, 2004.
Petitioner now comes before us on appeal through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner Oscar presents the following points as conclusions the CA
should have made:
1. that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that
should be dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of IntraCorporate Controversies; and
2. that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit but is in fact in
the nature of a petition for settlement of estate; hence, it is outside
the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court.
Accordingly, he prays for the setting aside and annulment of the CA
decision and resolution, and the dismissal of Rodrigos complaint
before the RTC.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The core question for our determination is whether the trial court,
sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Rodrigos complaint. To resolve it, we rely on the
judicial principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
12
some of the claims asserted therein."

CIVIL PROCEDURE
14

stated with particularity. These rules find specific application to

Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or
schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to
the public and/or to the stockholders.
In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo
alleged in the complaint the following:

SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative

functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnership, and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws
and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving:

3. This is a complaintto determine the shares of stock of

the deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that
were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated for
himself [herein petitioner Oscar] which were not collated
and taken into account in the partition, distribution,
and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased Spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes, for which he should be
ordered to account for all the income from the time he
took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his
brothers and sisters their just and respective shares with
the corresponding equivalent amount of P7,099,934.82
plus interest thereon from 1978 representing his
obligations to the Associated Citizens Bank that was paid
for his account by his late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes. This
amount was not collated or taken into account in the
partition or distribution of the estate of their late mother,
Anastacia C. Reyes.

a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts

of the board of directors, business associates, its
officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to
the interest of the public and/or of the
stockholders, partners, members of associations
or organizations registered with the Commission.

3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes

of fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for
his own benefit, capriciously transferred and took
possession and control of the management of Zenith
Insurance Corporation which is considered as a family
corporation, and other properties and businesses
belonging to Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes.

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or

partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between
any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are
stockholders,
members,
or
associates,
respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership or association and the State insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right
to exist as such entity; and

xxxx

JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURTS

P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the
RTC acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive
jurisdiction:

c) Controversies in the election or appointment

of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of
such corporations, partnerships, or associations.
The allegations set forth in Rodrigos complaint principally invoke
Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) above as basis for the exercise of
the RTCs special court jurisdiction. Our focus in examining the
allegations of the complaint shall therefore be on these two
provisions.
Fraudulent Devices and Schemes
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
13
action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be

4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith

Insurance Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property
covered by TCT No. 225324 was illegally and fraudulently
used by respondent as a collateral.
xxxx
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by
some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their
deceased mother, Doa Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of
stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at
P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest and/or
dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of
respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and
misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent
Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic]
and becomes [sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith
Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must
be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters of
the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant
herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes
and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were
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CASES: JURISDICTION
illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the
respondents [herein petitioner Oscar] name and
installed himself as a majority stockholder of
Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his
brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares
thereof including complainant hereto.
xxxx
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic]
shareholdings in the company, he illegally and
fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic]
the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes
[which] must be properly collated and/or distributed
equally amongst the children, including the complainant
Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their damage and prejudice.
xxxx
11.1 By continuous refusal of the respondent to account of
his [sic] shareholding with Zenith Insurance Corporation[,]
particularly the number of shares of stocks illegally and
fraudulently transferred to him from their deceased
parents Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes[,] which are all
subject for collation and/or partition in equal shares
among their children. [Emphasis supplied.]
Allegations
of
deceit,
machination,
false
pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that,
without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations
of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of
15
action. The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial
Law, declared that fraud and mistake are required to be averred
with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to
controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or
16
mistake.
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud
against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual
allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud
purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular
enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial
courts jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but
are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation
of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not
explained nor elaborated on.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or
perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the
special commercial courts jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction,
there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporations
nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent
device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented
a reverse situation. No corporate power or office was alleged to
have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an
individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was
alleged to have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name,
allowing him to become the majority and controlling stockholder of
Zenith, and eventually, the corporations President. This is the
essence of the complaint read as a whole and is particularly
demonstrated under the following allegations:

CIVIL PROCEDURE
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by
some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their
deceased mother, Doa Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of
stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at
P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest and/or
dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of
respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and
misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent
Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic]
and becomes [sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith
Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must
be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters of
the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant
herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes
and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were
illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the
respondents [herein petitioner Oscar] name and
installed himself as a majority stockholder of
Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his
brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares
thereof including complainant hereto. [Emphasis
supplied.]
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts
does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be
cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules
of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of
17
particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for
the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the
fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the
courts special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been
given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or
withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The courts
function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of
the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these
allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature
and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the
courts jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint
any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise
of the courts special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot
affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigos complaint
18
on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the
Courts approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate
controversy. Initially, the main consideration in determining
whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was
limited to a consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing
19
between or among the parties. The types of relationships
embraced under Section 5(b), as declared in the case of Union Glass
20
& Container Corp. v. SEC, were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership, or association
and the public;
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CASES: JURISDICTION
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association
and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association
and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to
operate is concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates
themselves. [Emphasis supplied.]
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject
matter of the dispute. This came to be known as the relationship
test.
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol
21
Mountain Reserve, Inc., the Court introduced the nature of the
controversy test. We declared in this case that it is not the mere
existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an
intra-corporate controversy; to rely on the relationship test alone
will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason
that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or
stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or
minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives
rise to the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that
relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining
22
whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate. The controversy
must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the
parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely
incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if
the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy
exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that
jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status
or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question
23
under controversy. This two-tier test was adopted in the recent
24
case of Speed Distribution, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the
branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to
try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a)
the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature
of the question that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise
out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between
any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership,
or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are
stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership, or association and
the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises.
The second element requires that the dispute among the
parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of

CIVIL PROCEDURE
the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves
matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the
case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
Given these standards, we now tackle the question posed for our
determination under the specific circumstances of this case:
Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that
would characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock
in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with
respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the
heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares
registered in her name. What is material in resolving the issues of
this case under the allegations of the complaint is Rodrigos interest
as an heirsince the subject matter of the present controversy
centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on
Rodrigos personally-owned shares nor on his personality as
shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares
of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the
deceased Anastacia and the parties interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, upon Anastacias death, her children acquired legal title
to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and
they are, prior to the estates partition, deemed co-owners
25
thereof. This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately
and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless
and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation
Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become
registered stockholders of the corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares.
The capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided
into shares for which certificates signed by the president
or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or
assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the
corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws.
Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may
be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates
indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other
person legally authorized to make the transfer. No
transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the
certificate or certificates, and the number of shares
transferred. [Emphasis supplied.]
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any
unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the
corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though
effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the
decedents estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and
third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the

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CASES: JURISDICTION
corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to
26
recognition as such both by the corporation and by third parties.
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v. Dela
27
28
Cruz and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals we did not
require the registration of the transfer before considering the
transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the
existence of an intra-corporate relation between the parties and
bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the SEC as an intracorporate controversy). A marked difference, however, exists
between these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and
uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the
corporation; after the transferee had established prima
facie ownership over the shares of stocks in question, registration
became a mere formality in confirming their status as stockholders.
In the present case, each of Anastacias heirs holds only an
undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still
inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding;
the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance
will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the
decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what
29
remains after payment of the decedents debts; whether there will
be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts it as follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a
liquidation of the assets and debts left by the decedent
shall have been made and all his creditors are fully paid.
Until a final liquidation is made and all the debts are paid,
the right of the heirs to inherit remains inchoate. This is so
because under our rules of procedure, liquidation is
necessary in order to determine whether or not the
decedent has left any liquid assets which may be
30
transmitted to his heirs. [Emphasis supplied.]
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be
considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings
originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are
shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can
be determined only in a settlement of the decedents estate. No
such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must
register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding
against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless
and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima
facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of
Anastacias estate, there can be no definite partition and
distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and
distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And
without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a
stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the
jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e.,
Anastacias shares) are concerned Rodrigo cannot be considered a
stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an
intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring
this case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction under
Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended. Rodrigos complaint,
therefore, fails the relationship test.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
The body rather than the title of the complaint determines the
31
nature of an action. Our examination of the complaint yields the
conclusion that, more than anything else, the complaint is about the
protection and enforcement of successional rights. The controversy
it presents is purely civil rather than corporate, although it is
denominated as a "complaint for accounting of all corporate funds
and assets."
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we
read only one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The
"derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the
corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of
the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar]" does not constitute a
separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by Oscar, only
an incident to the "action for determination of the shares of stock of
deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by
respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these
shares to the parties brothers and sisters." There can be no mistake
of the relationship between the "accounting" mentioned in the
complaint and the objective of partition and distribution when
Rodrigo claimed in paragraph 10.1 of the complaint that:
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his
shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently
transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of
stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be
properly collated and/or distributed equally amongst the
children including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein
to their damage and prejudice.
We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient
allegation that justified the need for an accounting other than to
determine the extent of Anastacias shareholdings for purposes of
distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the
complaint are Rodrigos repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent
transfers of Anastacias shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other
heirs of the decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as
basis for his demand for the collation and distribution of Anastacias
shares to the heirs. These claims tell us unequivocally that the
present controversy arose from the parties relationship as heirs of
Anastacia and not as shareholders of Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the
complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as a
stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one suffered
by an heir (for the impairment of his successional rights) and not by
the corporation nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly
aims to accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by
Oscar is the distribution of Anastacias shareholdings without a prior
settlement of her estate an objective that, by law and established
jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a
special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and
distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision Section 2
of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court that contemplates
properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heirmay be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall

Application of the Nature of Controversy Test

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CASES: JURISDICTION
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir. [Emphasis supplied.]
Worth noting are this Courts statements in the case of Natcher v.
32
Court of Appeals:
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province
of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
xxxx
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot
resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules. [Emphasis supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine
the extent and value of Anastacias shareholdings will be undertaken
by a probate court and not by a special commercial court is
completely consistent with the probate courts limited jurisdiction. It
has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its
authority to determine the properties included in the inventory of
the estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed. Beyond
this, the determination of title or ownership over the subject shares
(whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively
settled by the probate court as a question of collation or
advancement. We had occasion to recognize the courts authority to
act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or advancement
33
situation in Coca v. Pangilinan where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate
jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of
practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property
should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate
proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a
separate action. That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet ifthe interested parties
are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, the probate court is competent
to decide the question of ownership.[Citations omitted.
Emphasis supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not
one which may be classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is

CIVIL PROCEDURE
beyond the jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve. In
short, Rodrigos complaint also fails the nature of the controversy
test.
DERIVATIVE SUIT
Rodrigos bare claim that the complaint is a derivative suit will not
suffice to confer jurisdiction on the RTC (as a special commercial
court) if he cannot comply with the requisites for the existence of a
derivative suit. These requisites are:
a. the party bringing suit should be a shareholder during
the time of the act or transaction complained of, the
number of shares not being material;
b. the party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies,
i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the
appropriate relief, but the latter has failed or refused to
heed his plea; and
c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation;
the wrongdoing or harm having been or being caused to
the corporation and not to the particular stockholder
34
bringing the suit.
Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the
present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with
respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he
only stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are
inchoate and unrecorded. With respect to his own individually-held
shareholdings, Rodrigo has not alleged any individual cause or basis
as a shareholder on record to proceed against Oscar.
Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on
behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in
his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the
corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or
other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue
35
if relief is denied. Paragraph 8 of the complaint hardly satisfies this
requirement since what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion of
remedies within the corporate setting:
8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C.
Reyes has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of
resolving the dispute with the end view of amicably
settling the case, but the dispute between them ensued.
Lastly, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been
done to the corporation due to Oscars acts. If indeed he illegally and
fraudulently transferred Anastacias shares in his own name, then
the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the
wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of
Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has Rodrigo alleged any
particular cause or wrongdoing against the corporation that he can
36
champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record.
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC
sitting as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear
Rodrigos complaint since what is involved is the determination and
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia

Reyes. Rodrigos proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to
institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the
dismissal of his present complaint.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74970. The complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
142, Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553, is
ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

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CASES: JURISDICTION
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (Full Text)
G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990
MAURO
BLARDONY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch
CXLVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA
BLARDONY,respondents.
Recto Law Offices for petitioner.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9, 1983,
and February 20, 1985, of respondent Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr., of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXLVI, amending the
order of his predecessor, Judge Segundo Soza, (which dismissed
private respondent's petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and partition of conjugal properties) by requiring
petitioner to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances,
bonuses and commissions.
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were
married on April 30, 1975. During their marriage, they begot one
child named Patricia Araneta Blardony, who was born on November
10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private
respondent separated in March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981
for the support of their child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing
the Compromise of Settlement of Advances
claimed by private respondent from petitioner;
(c) The Deed of Conveyance of a property
situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa; and
(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private
respondent in favor of petitioner over a property
situated in Calatagan, Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.)
On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, in Makati, where it
was docketed as Sp. No. 9711.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the
conjugal home since March 1981; that before the filing of the
petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective counsel, tried
to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree

CIVIL PROCEDURE
upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties
and he prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of
their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." (p. 74, Rollo.)
On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been
filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508,
because both are residents of the same Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, Judge
Segundo Soza dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her
failure, as plaintiff, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime,
the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch
CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided over by
Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of
dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his
salaries, allowances, bonuses, and commissions. The latter's motion
for reconsideration of that order was denied by the court on
February 20, 1985. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the grounds that respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction:
1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without
prior referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
required by P.D. 1508; and
2. in declaring that the issues of support
pendente lite and delivery of personal property
belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
parties are essentially involved in the petition,
hence, the parties could go directly to court
without
passing
through
the
Lupon
Tagapamayapa, as provided in Section 6 of P.D.
1508.
The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with
decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a case
to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a
complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its noncompliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs.
Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation
conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not
file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his
answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable
partition of the conjugal properties.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
by seasonably taking exception thereto, they
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by
filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief
from it. ... . Upon this premise, petitioners
cannot be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

of the court to which they had submitted

themselves voluntarily. (Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470.)
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be
filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2
hereof, shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and
no conciliation or settlement has been reached
as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go
directly to court in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Actions coupled with
provisional remedies such as
preliminary
injunction,
attachment,delivery
of
personal
properly and support
pendente lite; and
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Judge correctly observed that:
... the issues of support pendente lite and
delivery of personal properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership, although not coupled in
the strict sense of the word with the instant
petition, are essentially involved in this petition
because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia
Araneta Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet
8 years old, and because the resolution or
decision of this court on the pending petition
would be incomplete without a clear cut
disposition on the partition of the personal and
real properties of the conjugal partnership and
consequent delivery thereof to the proper
parties. (p. 20, Rollo.)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders complained
of, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176405

August 20, 2008

LEO
WEE, petitioner,
vs.
GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his behalf and as attorney-in-fact of ANNIE
DE CASTRO and FELOMINA UBAN) and MARTINIANA DE
CASTRO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leo Wee, seeking
2
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated 19 September
3
2006 and the Resolution dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. The appellate court, in its assailed
Decision, reversed the dismissal of Civil Case. No. 1990, an action for
ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro, on his own
behalf and on behalf of Annie de Castro, Felomina de Castro Uban
4
and Jesus de Castro against petitioner, by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Alaminos City, which was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan; and, ruling in
favor of the respondents, ordered the petitioner to vacate the
subject property. In its assailed Resolution dated 25 January 2007,
the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier Decision of 19
September 2006.
5

In their Complaint filed on 1 July 2002 with the MTC of Alaminos

City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1990, respondents alleged that they
are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey
building erected on a parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan, described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 13033-D-2, Psd-01550-022319, being
a portion of Lot 13033-D, Psd-018529, LRC Rec. No. ____)
situated in Pob., Alaminos City; bounded on the NW. along
line 1-2 by Lot 13035-D-1 of the subdivision plan; on the
NE. along line 2-3 by Vericiano St.; on the SE. along line 3-4
by Lot 13033-D-2 of the subdivision plan; on the SW. along
line 4-1 by Lot 575, Numeriano Rabago. It is coverd by TCT
No. 16193 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
(Alaminos City) and declared for taxation purposes per
6
T.D. No. 2075, and assessed in the sum ofP93,400.00.
Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner on a
7
month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month. Both parties
agreed that effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be
increased fromP9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however, failed
or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his rental
obligation for the month of 1 October 2001 became due. The rental
dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an attempt to amicably settle the matter
but the parties failed to reach an agreement, resulting in the
issuance by theBarangay Lupon of a Certification to file action in
court on 18 January 2002. On 10 June 2002, respondent George de
Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement
and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the subject
property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to
comply with said demand letter, respondent George de Castro,
together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de Castro,
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Felomina de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint

for ejectment before the MTC.
It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated
that it was being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and
the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent
George de Castro alone. He would subsequently attach to his
position paper filed before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) executed by his sisters Annie de Castro
and Felomina de Castro Uban dated 7 February 2002 and 14 March
2002 respectively, authorizing him to institute the ejectment case
against petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that there was no
agreement between the parties to increase the monthly rentals and
respondents' demand for an increase was exorbitant. The agreed
monthly rental was only for the amount of P9,000.00 and he was
religiously paying the same every month. Petitioner then argued
that respondents failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirement of conciliation before theBarangay Lupon prior to the
filing of Civil Case. No. 1990, meriting the dismissal of their
Complaint therein. The Certification to file action issued by
the Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents' Complaint
merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of
ejectment. Petitioner asserted further that the MTC lacked
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents' Complaint
was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful
8
withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner.
9

During the Pre-Trial Conference held before the MTC, the parties
stipulated that in May 2002, petitioner tendered to respondents the
sum of P9,000.00 as rental payment for the month of January 2002;
petitioner paid rentals for the months of October 2001 to January
2002 but only in the amount ofP9,000.00 per month; respondents,
thru counsel, sent a letter to petitioner on 10 June 2002 terminating
their lease agreement which petitioner ignored; and
the Barangay Lupon did issue a Certification to file action after the
parties failed to reach an agreement before it.
After the submission of the parties of their respective Position
Papers, the MTC, on 21 November 2002, rendered a
10
Decision dismissing respondents' Complaint in Civil Case No. 1990
for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before
the Barangay Lupon. The decretal portion of the MTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premised considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the dismissal of this case. Costs against
the [herein respondents].
On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. A-2835, the RTC of Alaminos,
11
Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision dated 27 June
2005 affirming the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for
ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision was based
on facts and law on the matter. The RTC declared that since the
original agreement entered into by the parties was for petitioner to
pay only the sum of P9.000.00 per month for the rent of the subject
property, and no concession was reached by the parties to increase
such amount to P15.000.00, petitioner cannot be faulted for paying
only the originally agreed upon monthly rentals. Adopting
petitioner's position, the RTC declared that respondents' failure to
refer the matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process
barred the ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a

condition sine qua non in the filing of ejectment suits. The RTC
likewise agreed with petitioner in ruling that the allegation in the
Complaint was flawed, since respondents failed to allege that there
was an "unlawful withholding" of possession of the subject property,
taking out Civil Case No. 1990 from the purview of an action for
unlawful detainer. Finally, the RTC decreed that respondents'
Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a co-owner could not
maintain an action without joining all the other co-owners. Thus,
according to the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE the appellate Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the court a quo. The Decision dated
November 21, 2002 appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN
12
TOTO.
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review
13
on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. Respondents argued in their Petition that the
RTC gravely erred in ruling that their failure to comply with the
conciliation process was fatal to their Complaint, since it is only
respondent George de Castro who resides in Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, while respondent Annie de Castro resides in
Pennsylvania, United States of America (USA); respondent Felomina
de Castro Uban, in California, USA; and respondent Jesus de Castro,
now substituted by his wife, Martiniana, resides in Manila.
Respondents further claimed that the MTC was not divested of
jurisdiction over their Complaint for ejectment because of the mere
absence therein of the term "unlawful withholding" of their subject
property, considering that they had sufficiently alleged the same in
their Complaint, albeit worded differently. Finally, respondents
posited that the fact that only respondent George de Castro signed
the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached
to the Complaint was irrelevant since the other respondents already
executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) authorizing him to act as
their attorney-in-fact in the institution of the ejectment suit against
the petitioner.
On 19 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
granting the respondents' Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate
the subject property and turn over the same to respondents. The
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2005
issued by the RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered
ordering [herein petitioner] Leo Wee to SURRENDER and
VACATE the leased premises in question as well as to pay
the sum of P15,000.00 per month reckoned from March,
2002 until he shall have actually turned over the
possession thereof to petitioners plus the rental
arrearages of P30,000.00 representing unpaid increase in
rent for the period from October, 2001 to February, 2002,
with legal interest at 6% per annum to be computed from
June 7, 2002 until finality of this decision and 12%
thereafter until full payment thereof. Respondent is
likewise hereby ordered to pay petitioners the amount
ofP20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and the costs of
14
suit.
In a Resolution dated 25 January 2007, the appellate court denied
the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner for lack of
merit.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Petitioner is now before this Court via the Petition at bar, making
the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT CONCILIATION PROCESS IS NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT NON-COMPLIANCE
THEREWITH DOES NOT AFFECT THE JURISDICTION IN
EJECTMENT CASE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE WANT OF
ALLEGATION OF "UNLAWFUL WITHOLDING PREMISES"
(sic) QUESTIONED BY PETITIONER;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OF
RESPONDENT GEORGE DE CASTRO WITHOUT JOINING ALL
HIS OTHER CO-OWNERS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS
PROPER;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT APPLYING SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 10 WHICH
DIRECTS A PLEADER TO INDICATE IN HIS PLEADINGS HIS
15
OFFICIAL RECEIPT OF HIS PAYMENT OF HIS IBP DUES.
Petitioner avers that respondents failed to go through the
conciliation process before the Barangay Lupon, a jurisdictional
defect that bars the legal action for ejectment. The Certification to
file action dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon,
appended by the respondents to their Complaint in Civil Case No.
1990, is of no moment, for it attested only that there was
confrontation between the parties on the matter of rental increase
but not on unlawful detainer of the subject property by the
petitioner. If it was the intention of the respondents from the very
beginning to eject petitioner from the subject property, they should
have brought up the alleged unlawful stay of the petitioner on the
subject property for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of
easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be
accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts
which, according to the one who conceived of the system, the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character;
and to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this
primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would
be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), which would be
better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached
16
voluntarily by the parties. To ensure this objective, Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a
conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court

CIVIL PROCEDURE
subject to certain exceptions. The said section has been declared
17
compulsory in nature.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act
No. 7160 (The Local Government Code), which took effect on 1
January 1992.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making
conciliation a precondition to the filing of complaints in court are
reproduced below:
SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. - No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any
other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived
of
personal
liberty
calling
for habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property, and
support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred
by the statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. - The customs and traditions of indigenous
cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes
between members of the cultural communities.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Thereto. - The lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
(1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);
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CASES: JURISDICTION
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement
by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
There is no question that the parties to this case appeared before
the Barangay Lupon for conciliation proceedings. There is also no
dispute that the only matter referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation was the rental increase, and not the ejectment of
petitioner from the subject property. This is apparent from a perusal
of the Certification to file action in court issued by
the Barangay Lupon on 18 January 2002, to wit:

CIVIL PROCEDURE
The contract of lease between the parties did not stipulate a fixed
period. Hence, the parties agreed to the payment of rentals on a
monthly basis. On this score, Article 1687 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it
is understood to be from year to year,if the rent agreed
upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly;
from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to
day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a
monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been
set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the
lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the
rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer
period after the lessee has been in possession for over six
months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a
longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for
over one month. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed
terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents have every
right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each
month, the contract having expired by operation of law. Without a
lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to the subject
property and must vacate the same. Respondents, thus, should be
allowed to resort to an action for ejectment before the MTC to
recover possession of the subject property from petitioner.

CERTIFICATION TO FILE COMPLAINTS

This is to certify that:
1. There was personal confrontation between parties
before the barangay Lupon regarding rental increase of a
commercial building but conciliation failed;
2. Therefore, the corresponding dispute of the aboveentitled case may now be filed in Court/Government
18
Office. (Emphasis ours.)
The question now to be resolved by this Court is whether the
Certification dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay
Lupon stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the
matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior
conciliation requirement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
to authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against
petitioner.

Corollarily, petitioner's ejectment, in this case, is only the reasonable

consequence of his unrelenting refusal to comply with the
respondents' demand for the payment of rental increase agreed
upon by both parties. Verily, the lessor's right to rescind the contract
of lease for non-payment of the demanded increased rental was
19
recognized by this Court in Chua v. Victorio :

The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in

reciprocal obligations, such as contracts of lease. In
addition to the general remedy of rescission granted under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code, there is an independent
provision granting the remedy of rescission for breach of
any of the lessor or lessee's statutory obligations. Under
Article 1659 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at
his option, ask for (1) the rescission of the contract; (2)
rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only
indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to
remain in force.

The Court rules affirmatively.

While it is true that the Certification to file action dated 18 January
2002 of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental increase and not to
the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the
submission of the same for conciliation before the Barangay
Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular
circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the
amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include
also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the
rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof.
We now proceed to discuss the meat of the controversy.

Payment of the rent is one of a lessee's statutory

obligations, and, upon non-payment by petitioners of the
increased rental in September 1994, the lessor acquired
the right to avail of any of the three remedies outlined
above. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner next argues that respondent George de Castro cannot
maintain an action for ejectment against petitioner, without joining
all his co-owners.
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of

possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery
of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the
20
renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino :

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the

necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added.)

21

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this

Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an
action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his
absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are
real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of
them may bring an action, any kind of action for the
recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of
the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for
the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable
party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable
parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro
Uban each executed a Special Power of Attorney, giving respondent
George de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990.
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person,
as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the
authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf
of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of
attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been
22
called a "letter of attorney."

pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the

ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court includes the representative of the owner in an
ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute
the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to
the Complaint is innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was
granted by his sisters the authority to file the action for ejectment
against petitioner prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 1990. The
SPAs in his favor were respectively executed by respondents Annie
de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban on 7 February 2002 and 14
March 2002; while Civil Case No. 1990 was filed by respondent
George de Castro on his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings only
on 1 July 2002, or way after he was given by his siblings the
authority to file said action. The Court quotes with approval the
following disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, records show that [herein respondent] George
de Castro was indeed authorized by his sisters Annie de
Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban, to prosecute the
case in their behalf as shown by the Special Power of
Attorney dated February 7, 2002 and March 14, 2002. That
these documents were appended only to [respondent
George de Castro's] position paper is of no moment
considering that the authority conferred therein was given
prior to the institution of the complaint in July, 2002. x x
24
x.
Respondent deceased Jesus de Castro's failure to sign the
Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be excused
25
since he already executed an Affidavit with respondent George de
Castro that he had personal knowledge of the filing of Civil Case No.
1990. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development
26
Corporation, the Court ruled that the personal signing of the
verification requirement was deemed substantially complied with
when, as in the instant case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest,
who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification
attached to it.
In the same vein, this Court is not persuaded by petitioner's
assertion that respondents' failure to allege the jurisdictional fact
that there was "unlawful withholding" of the subject property was
fatal to their cause of action.

Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that
the lack thereof does not in any way affect the validity of the action
for ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro. This also
disposes of petitioner's contention that respondent George de
Castro lacked the authority to sign the Verification and the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. As the Court ruled in Mendoza v.
23
Coronel :

It is apodictic that what determines the nature of an action as well

as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In an unlawful
detainer case, the defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so upon the expiration of his right to possess. Hence,
the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply
possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the
beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by
27
defendant.

We likewise hold that the execution of the certification

against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the
case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the
parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-infact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the
complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner,

In Barba v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that although the

phrase "unlawfully withholding" was not actually used by therein
petitioner in her complaint, the Court held that her allegations,
nonetheless, amounted to an unlawful withholding of the subject
property by therein private respondents, because they continuously
refused to vacate the premises even after notice and demand.

28

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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

In the Petition at bar, respondents alleged in their Complaint that

they are the registered owners of the subject property; the subject
property was being occupied by the petitioner pursuant to a
monthly lease contract; petitioner refused to accede to respondents'
demand for rental increase; the respondents sent petitioner a letter
terminating the lease agreement and demanding that petitioner
vacate and turn over the possession of the subject property to
respondents; and despite such demand, petitioner failed to
29
surrender the subject property to respondents. The Complaint
sufficiently alleges the unlawful withholding of the subject property
by petitioner, constitutive of unlawful detainer, although the exact
words "unlawful withholding" were not used. In an action for
unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient,
30
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Petitioner's averment that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed respondents' Petition in light of the failure of their counsel
to attach the Official Receipt of his updated payment of Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues is now moot and academic, since
respondents' counsel has already duly complied therewith. It must
be stressed that judicial cases do not come and go through the
portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of
31
technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be
32
disregarded in order to resolve the case.
Finally, we agree in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
is liable for the payment of back rentals, attorney's fees and cost of
the suit. Respondents must be duly indemnified for the loss of
income from the subject property on account of petitioner's refusal
to vacate the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 19 September 2006 and Resolution dated 25
January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 153567

February 18, 2008

LIBRADA
M.
vs.
1
ERNEST S. AURE , respondent.

AQUINO, petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Librada M.
Aquino (Aquino), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the
3
4
Decision dated 17 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 8 May
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733. The appellate
court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the
5
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
6
88, affirming the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 32, which dismissed respondent Ernesto Aures
(Aure) complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter alia, of failure to
comply with barangay conciliation proceedings.
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area of 449 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered
7
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a
Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC docketed
as Civil Case No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending
alleged that they acquired the subject property from Aquino and her
husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of
8
Sale executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses
Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the subject
9
property, they refused to vacate the same.
10

SO

ORDERED.

In her Answer, Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case

No. 17450 lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not
have any legal right over the subject property. Aquino admitted that
there was a sale but such was governed by the Memorandum of
11
Agreement (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure
shall secure a loan from a bank or financial institution in his own
name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the
proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure
successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the
proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No.
17450 in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment
of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay
conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC observed that
Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably
at the barangay level. The MeTC further observed that Aure Lending
was improperly included as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 17450 for it did
not stand to be injured or benefited by the suit. Finally, the MeTC
ruled that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the
action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of
pecuniary estimation" which properly rests within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the MeTC
Decision reads:

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CASES: JURISDICTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is,
hereby ordered DISMISSED. [Aquinos] counterclaim is
12
likewise dismissed.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the
same ground that the dispute was not brought before the Barangay
Council for conciliation before it was filed in court. In a Decision
dated 14 December 2000, the RTC stressed that
the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua non for the
filing of an ejectment complaint involving residents of the
same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal of the action. The RTC likewise
validated the ruling of the MeTC that the main issue involved in Civil
Case No. 17450 is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable
by the RTC. Hence, the RTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
13
judgment, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety.
Aures Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an
14
Order dated 27 February 2001.
Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision with the Court
of Appeals arguing that the lower court erred in dismissing his
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Aure asserted that misjoinder
of parties was not a proper ground for dismissal of his Complaint
and that the MeTC should have only ordered the exclusion of Aure
Lending as plaintiff without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final determination
thereof. Aure further asseverated that mere allegation of ownership
should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit
since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
should not depend on the defenses and objections raised by the
parties. Finally, Aure contended that the MeTC erred in dismissing
his Complaint with prejudice on the ground of non-compliance with
barangay conciliation process. He was not given the opportunity to
rectify
the
procedural
defect
by
going
through
the barangay mediation proceedings and, thereafter, refile the
15
Complaint.
On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,
reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to
the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the
substantive rights of the parties. The appellate court declared that
the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is
not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aures
Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her
Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that mere allegation of
ownership does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the
ejectment case for jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations advanced by the plaintiff
in his complaint. Hence, mere assertion of ownership by the
defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its
summary jurisdiction over the same. The decretal part of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the trial courts below REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the records be remanded back to the court a quo for further
proceedings for an eventual decision of the substantive rights of
16
the disputants.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration interposed by Aquino for it was merely a
rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which
were already considered and passed upon by the appellate court in
its assailed Decision.
Aquino is now before this Court via the Petition at bar raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
BARANGAY
CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS
IS
A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL
OF THE COMPLAINT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OUSTS
THE MeTC OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT
CASE.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of
easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be
accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts
which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to
make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this
primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would
be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential
Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if
an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the
17
parties.
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration
of the quality of justice which has been brought by the
18
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this objective,
19
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to
undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint
20
in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this
21
case. The said section has been declared compulsory in nature.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which
took effect on 1 January 1992.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making
conciliation a precondition to filing of complaints in court, read:
SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any
other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon
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CASES: JURISDICTION
chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous
cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes
between members of the cultural communities.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Therein. The lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
(1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement
by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred
to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending
instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of

CIVIL PROCEDURE
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure
Lendings Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved
is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit
filed with the MeTC.
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes
the action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible. She
likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pretrial and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the
MeTC.
We do not agree.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with
the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code
on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy
there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint
22
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the
conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
23
person of the defendant.
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate
24
Appellate Court :
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent
prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action
or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court
of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during
the entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably
taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very
same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated
in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had
submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to
attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after
having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously
examined Aquinos Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450
and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency
in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of
Appeals:
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CASES: JURISDICTION
Moreover, the Court takes note that the defendant
[Aquino] herself did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack
of conciliation proceedings in her answer, which raises the
exclusive affirmative defense of simulation. By this
acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is deemed to have
waived such objection. As held in a case of similar
circumstances, the failure of a defendant [Aquino] in an
ejectment suit to specifically allege the fact that there was
no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure
25
constitutes a waiver of that defense. x x x.
By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the
Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any
defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter
move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure
Lendings failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since
she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised
such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no
moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation
proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading (specifically,
an Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar or identical rule is
provided for all other motions in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same
Rule which states:
Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require
the party filing a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions
for relief during the single opportunity so that single or multiple
26
objections may be avoided. It is clear and categorical in Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses
and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a
waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
27
no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our
consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room
28
for application. Thus, although Aquinos defense of noncompliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead
the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when
the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the
pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another cause of
action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (3)
where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of
limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not motu
proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among
those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its
own initiative.
Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in the instant
case cannot be resolved by the MeTC without first adjudicating the
question of ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the
legal right over the subject property is simulated.
Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as
these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible
entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in
which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve
to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.
In the case at bar, the Complaint filed by Aure and Aure Lending on 2
April 1997, alleged as follows:
2. [Aure and Aure Lending] became the owners of a house
and lot located at No. 37 Salazar Street corner Encarnacion
Street, B.F. Homes, Quezon City by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale executed by [the spouses Aquino] in favor of
[Aure and Aure Lending] although registered in the name
of x x x Ernesto S. Aure; title to the said property had
already been issued in the name of [Aure] as shown by a
transfer Certificate of Title , a copy of which is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex A;
3. However, despite the sale thus transferring ownership
of the subject premises to [Aure and Aure Lending] as
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CASES: JURISDICTION

CIVIL PROCEDURE

above-stated and consequently terminating [Aquinos]

right of possession over the subject property, [Aquino]
together with her family, is continuously occupying the
subject premises notwithstanding several demands made
by [Aure and Aure Lending] against [Aquino] and all
persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject
premises and surrender possession thereof to [Aure and
Aure Lending] causing damage and prejudice to [Aure and
Aure Lending] and making [Aquinos] occupancy together
with those actually occupying the subject premises
29
claiming right under her, illegal.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that Aure, together with Aure
Lending, sought the possession of the subject property which was
never surrendered by Aquino after the perfection of the Deed of
Sale, which gives rise to a cause of action for an ejectment suit
cognizable by the MeTC. Aures assertion of possession over the
subject property is based on his ownership thereof as evidenced by
TCT No. 156802 bearing his name. That Aquino impugned the
validity of Aures title over the subject property and claimed that the
Deed of Sale was simulated should not divest the MeTC of
30
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
As extensively discussed by the eminent jurist Florenz D. Regalado
31
in Refugia v. Court of Appeals :

Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of

ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only
issue to be settled is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not
possession de jure."
In other words, inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with
adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the
parties in an ejectment suit." These courts shall resolve the question
of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
33
adjudication of the issue of possession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its
Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases

now stands, even where the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue
of possession.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when
the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary
Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise
involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,
however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of
ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on
the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution
of this particular issue concerns and applies only to
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the issue
of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of
ownership. It finds no proper application where it is
otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or
where the principal and main issue raised in the
allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for
make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of
ownership.
32

Apropos thereto, this Court ruled in Hilario v. Court of Appeals :

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