STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

Modified Foreign Policy

Interrogating Coherence, Finesse, Efficacy
Srinath Raghavan

Prime Minister Narendra Modi

has invested much political
capital in his foreign policy
initiatives. Behind the spectacle
of the pomp and show, the real
test of foreign policy and strategy
lies in coherence of design, finesse
in execution, and efficacy of
outcomes. The first of our new
column on Strategic Affairs takes
a preliminary stab at assessing
whether New Delhi has been able
to translate its desires into
tangible outcomes.

Strategic Affairs
EPW begins a monthly column which will bring
distinctive critical perspectives to bear on
strategic and military affairs, as well as foreign
policy. This column will be published in the last
issue of every month and will be contributed, in
rotation, by Srinath Raghavan, Atul Bhardwaj
and Itty Abraham.

Srinath Raghavan (srinath.raghavan@gmail.com)

is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy
Research, New Delhi.

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uring his eight months in power,

Prime Minister Narendra Modi
has expended considerable energy
and time on foreign affairs. The prime
ministerial stamp on the foreign policy
of this government is unmistakable.
And, this is not just because the foreign
ministers role has been circumscribed.
Rather, every foreign trip and summit
meeting has been an occasion to project
the towering presence and sole leadership of the prime minister. Modi has
been the object of adulation by overseas
Indians: the curious epithet of rock
star is routinely used to describe his
impact abroad. His meetings with world
leaders have been equally impressive
events. To be sure, much of this owes
to Modis ability to present a compelling narrative of his approach to this
or that country and do so in an effortless manner.
Yet, storylines and stage props
can only get us so far in international
politics. The real test of foreign policy
and strategy lies in coherence of design,
finesse in execution, and efficacy of
outcomes. It is to these standards that
any serious audit of foreign policy under
the new government must be benchmarked. As the glitter around the
United States presidents visit settles
down and fades, it may be useful to take
a preliminary stab at understanding the
current trajectory of Indian foreign and
strategic policy.
Policy on South Asia
Modi began on a strong and positive
note. The decision to invite regional
leaders for his swearing-in signalled his
intent to accord high importance to
south Asia in his foreign policy. His
subsequent visits to Bhutan and Nepal
underscored this point. Several months
on, however, the government seems

unable to translate this desire into tangible outcomes.

Perhaps the most substantive move so
far has been on the land border agreement with Bangladesh. The bill on the
agreement had been prepared under the
previous government, but not introduced
in Parliament owing to opposition from
the Bharatiya Janata Party. The prime
ministers course correction on this is a
welcome step one that could impart
some momentum to the relationship. Yet,
the government is not very well-poised
to deliver on other, more important
issues such as an accord on the Teesta
River waters: think only of the state of the
relationship between the West Bengal
government and the centre. Nor is it
clear that the government has thought
through its own stance in the event of an
escalation of the political stalemate in
Bangladesh. Indeed, the government
seems prepared only to pluck the lowest
hanging fruit on Bangladesh.
The relationship with Sri Lanka too
has nosedived in the months since
Modis swearing-in. The prime minister
initially struck a rapport with Mahinda
Rajapakse, another leader who liked to
present himself as tough and decisive.
Yet, the furore over the visit of a Chinese
submarine to Colombo sent the relationship southward. Indias concerns were
understandable, but the manner in which
the episode was handled was ham-handed.
The governments grandstanding will
have longer-term consequences not
least with public perception in Sri Lanka
about India. The departure of Rajapakse
provides yet another chance to remove
needless apprehensions and set the relationship on an even keel. Then again,
such a reset can only be the beginning.
The key challenge lies in nudging the Sri
Lankan government towards a genuinely
accommodative stance on the minorities,
especially Tamils. It remains to be seen
if Modi has the inclination and ability
to do so.
The gap between promise and performance has yawned wider with
Pakistan. After a promising start with
Nawaz Sharifs visit to India, New Delhi
has lapsed into its old assumption that

JANUARY 31, 2015

vol l no 5

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STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

talks should be seen as a reward for

good behaviour by Pakistan. The decision to call off the foreign secretaries
meeting last year was unnecessary. By
so doing, the government conformed to
the now familiar pattern of oscillation
between high-level engagement and
complete disengagement with Pakistan.
Even a cursory glance at our record
of dealing with Pakistan over the past
decade and a half would suggest the
bankruptcy of this approach. Yet, we
persist with it by invoking the usual
alibis of multiple power centres in
Pakistan, and so on.
More problematic are the indications
that the governments approach to
Pakistan might be still more regressive.
Several key members, including the
defence minister, have claimed that
India will respond strongly to any
provocation by Pakistan. The national
security advisor (NSA) is on the record
as saying that the governments stance
towards Pakistan has shifted from a
defensive posture to a defensive-offensive
posture. The latter, he has explained,
means that India will, if necessary, take
the fight to Pakistan. As the NSA colourfully puts it, You can do one Mumbai
and you may lose Balochistan.1
The braggadocio of such pronouncements aside, the strategic assumptions
underpinning this stance need to be
unpacked. The NSA claims that the
nuclear context does not impinge on this
defensive-offensive posture. Pakistan
cannot use its nuclear shield to protect
itself against Indias responses in this
mode. Apparently, nuclear weapons only
come into play if India adopts a purely
offensive posture. At one level, this is
simply wishful thinking based on a
misapprehension of how escalation
occurs during crises. At another level
though, it is clear that the NSA is expressing the governments willingness to use
tit-for-tat unconventional responses
vis--vis Pakistan.
He may not be the first intelligence
official to moot such ideas, but he is
certainly the first NSA to publicly hint at
such a response. Not only is the efficacy
of such methods deeply dubious, the international opprobrium and reputational
costs that they risk are considerable. It is
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EPW

JANUARY 31, 2015

worth recalling that after the Mumbai

attacks of 2008 such ideas were floated
only to be wisely struck down by the
government. Then again, A J P Taylor
may have been right: the only thing
we learn from history is how to make
new mistakes.
Policy on China
This seeming inability to think through
the chain of strategic action and response
could hobble the governments policy
towards China as well. Here too, after
a good start, New Delhi seems unable
to make real headway. Part of the
problem is that the government has not
managed to reconcile the competing
pulls of the various strands of its
China policy. On the one hand, Modi is
acutely aware of the potential importance of China as an investor in India.
At a time when fall in public and private
investment presents the single-largest
obstacle to economic revival, the attraction of foreign direct investment is
undeniable. To Modis credit, he swiftly
understood that China is one of the main
sources of such investment, especially
in infrastructure.
On the other hand, the security
establishment continues to regard China
as an implacable adversary. Chinese
incursions are routinely held up as
evidence of its intent to keep India offbalance. The stand-off in the Ladakh
area during Xi Jinpings visit has cast a
long shadow. From New Delhis standpoint, it is tempting to assume that this
is of a piece with Chinas assertive
behaviour on its maritime claims in East
and South China seas.
The divergent impulses that spring
from these strands have slowed down
India-China relations. The government
clings to conventional wisdom on this
relationship: economic ties should be
pursued with China to mitigate the
strategic rivalry. Modi may find it more
useful to stand this on its head: tackling
some of the more thorny strategic questions may unlock the huge economic
potential of India-China relations. After
all, Modi is better positioned than any
other leader in the past 25 years to
achieve a breakthrough on the disputed
boundary with China. By 2016, the
vol l no 5

government will have control of the

Rajya Sabha too. So, pushing through
a constitutional amendment should not
be impossible. The 2005 framework
agreement provides an excellent point
of departure for a settlement provided
India as well as China evince seriousness of purpose.
Instead, the government seems keen
on reviving the old talks on clarification
of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Past
experience, however, clearly suggests
that at best we can only agree to disagree on the LAC. There is simply no way
of papering over these differences.
Moreover, the Chinese have little interest in any exercise at LAC clarification
if only because it will impinge upon the
boundary negotiations. It is best, therefore, to aim at a speedy settlement of the
boundary dispute.
The timing may well be good because
of Chinas concerns about attempts by
the US to rally its old allies in Asia and to
insinuate itself in the maritime disputes.
However, the lure of a tight strategic
embrace with the US appears to be
strong in New Delhi. It is argued that the
previous government kept the US at
arms-length and that this has to be
reversed. A tough-minded assessment
would show, however, that the US itself
is in more than one mind about China.
While there is talk of a pivot to Asia,
the Obama administration understands
that it needs Chinas cooperation in tackling a range of global issues. The recent
joint undertaking by the US and China
on climate change underscores the problems that are posed for India by such
G2 solutions.
The simple fact is that the US is a
global power while we remain a regional
player even if our definition of our
neighbourhood has expanded to the
east and west. It is futile to assume that
our interests can converge with that of
the US in all important areas. The challenge for Modi is to leverage American
power to our purposes without assuming that the US will be the panacea for
all our challenges.
Note
1

Excerpts of his speech on 5 January 2015 can be

seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
N7ESR5RU3X4

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