Diaz vs CA

Facts:
In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 children the
first 7 of who are illegitimate born to his mistress
Valentina Abarracoso.
The legitimacy of the 8th child is in question in this
suit namely Leodegario, (the 9th Filomena was the
only one established as legitimate being born to the
valid marriage of Isidro and his lawful wife Calixta
Lozada)
Sept 10, 49 Leodegario dies intestate(no will) in
an accident in Manila he leaves behind no spouse
and no children to inherit his property amounting to
P28,000 worth of real estate in
Capiz.
Oct 15, 49 original Maria Diaz, daughter of
the decedents sister Filomena, (she died during the
pendency of the case and was replaced by her
heirs) files for letters of
Administration w/ the CFI.
Oct 25, 49 Amador Azarraga (4th illegitimate child
of Isidro, half-brother of decedent) files an
opposition to the petition citing that the deceased is
an illegitimate son of Isidro via
Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother
rather than the mothers.
Mar 1, 50 CFI rules in favor of
Aug 17, 70 20 years after granted admin,
Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador) files for the
removal of admin from citing failure to render a
final accounting of the estate and a project of
partition. He also requests to be granted
admin.
8) s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate
child of Isidro and thus is not the full blooded
sibling of the mother who was a legitimate
child.
9) asserts the opposite, that decedent
Leodegario is legitimate
10) CFI again rules for
11) files with CA and is upheld and is granted
admin to the prejudice of
Issues:
WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of
Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada
Held:
YES, the proved the legitimacy of
Leodegario through his school records (UST
Law) which cited the decedents name as
Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was further
strengthened by the preponderance of the will
of Pastora Azarraga which stated that the
decedent and the mother Filiomena are full
blooded siblings. Moreover, the court order of
Mar 1, 50 (granting admin to the ) also
acknowledges this fact of legitimacy.

CA set aside CFI affirmed.

Tison vs CA
Facts:
Mar 5, 83Teodora Dezoller Guerero died w/ no
children leaving the prop in question to her
husband and the heirs of her brother(who died in
73), the .
Jan 2, 88 After her death, her husband Martin
Guerero adjudicates the house to him and sells
it to Teodora Domingo.
Martin dies on Oct 25, 88and s Tison and
Dezoller file for reconveyance Nov. 2, 88 for
1/2share of the prop.
During the hearing the birth cert.s marriage
cert.s w/c prove the filiation to the decedent
Teodora through their common link to their
father Teodoras brother Hermogenes Dezoller.
More importantly they present the testimony of one
of the Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that
some time in 1946 the decedent had actually
acknowledged her as her niece (declaration of
filiation).
files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they
fall short of the requirements set by Art
172 of the Family Code and that the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison was self-serving and
uncorroborated.
Dec 3, 92 TC rules for granting the demurrer and
dismissing the action for reconveyance.
CA affirms citing the evidence presented was
inadmisible.
Issues:
WON the satisfy of the quantum of proof
mandated by Art 172 of the FC.
Held:
YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally in an action for reconveyance,
as such the court held that there being a
presumption of legitimacy in relation to the status
of the petitioners the s failure to adduce evidence
disproving such a fact renders the presumption
effective. Thus his choice to file a demurrer rather
than adduce evidence to controvert the
assertions comes as an implied admission of the
fact of legitimacy.
More importantly the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a
declaration about pedigree that is exempt from
the rule on hearsay based on the following
conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead
or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is subject
of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration 4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motum (before
the commencement of the suit).

Moreover the declaration may stand only if it

pertains to the claimants right over the
declarants own estate (as in this case). If
however the declaration is to claim a right from
another family member other than the
declarants estate the declaration may not be
deemed credible.
Judgmentreversedandsetaside.
Trinidad vs CA
Facts:
Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 from
Felicidad Molato and Inocentes Briones, who
allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon the death
of Inocentes, Arturio lived with his aunt Lourdes in
the property of Patricio Briones (father of
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and
got married. When Arturio returned to the property
upon Lourdes invitation and sought to claim the
share of his father on the land, Lourdes refused to
partition the property and claimed that Inocentes
never married, died single, and has no child. On the
other hand, Arturio claimed that his parents were
legally married but failed to provide their marriage
certificate and his birth certificate to show his
relationship with Inocentes because these were lost
during the war.
Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate child of
Inocentes
Held: Yes
The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and
Felicidad, were validly married Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records
of marriages and birth, among others, were
either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation
Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that
his parents were married and cohabited as
husband and wife Meren was one of the
witnesses to the nuptials
Jovita was the barangay captain who had
attended the birth and baptismal parties of
Arturio.
Arturio was born during their marriage and
cohabitation
The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his
parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his
birth to be on July 21, 1943, after the legitimate
and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad
Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with
Arturios wife and children substantiate his
claim that they had lived together in the
property, contrary to Lourdes claim that they had
not

Heirs of Conti
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario
Cuario, were the co-owners of the property in
litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of
Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City with a house
erected thereon. On 17March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died
intestate without issue.
Subsequently, on 1 April1987 private respondents all claiming
to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo,
filed an action for partition and damages before RTC.
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the
partition on the ground that private respondents failed to
produce any document to prove that they were the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. At the trial, privater espondents
presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to
prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as coowner of the subject lot.
The petitioners brought their birth certificates as proof that they
are the nieces and nephews of Lourdes Sampayo. Some of
them presented their baptismal certificates.
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over
the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti,
Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario
testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal
shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo
and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject
property since 1937. The RTC ruled in favour of the
respondents. CA affirmed.
Issues: WON private respondents were not able to prove by
competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.
Held: Yes.
The documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are
competentand adequate proofs that private respondents are
collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.
Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies
without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent. It was established during the trial that Lourdes died
intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister,
nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of
Lourdes. Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of
legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a
record of birth or a parents admission of such legitimate
filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the
parent.

Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal

certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.40 By analogy, this method of proving
filiation may also be utilized in the instant case. Public
documents are the written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country. The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by
private respondents are public documents.
Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish
records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.The admissibility of
baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the
testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was
settled in People v.Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil.
105 [1914]),43 thus -x x x the entries made in the Registry
Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception
to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church
are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties
and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its
business. It may be argued that baptismal certificates are
evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this
case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when
taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina,
Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated
therein. Corroboratedby the undisputed testimony of Adelaida
Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers
Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was
Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have
acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the
court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According
to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself
except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth
of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena
City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by
fire on 27November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively,
and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records were
totally burned. Decision: The petition is DENIED.

De Jesus vs Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon

Facts:
Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina
Jesus were married. Their union produced two
children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky
Jesus (July 6, 1982).
June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own
illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de
Jesus
12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and
Jinky then filed an action to be part of the heirs of
his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized
document.
TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action and for being improper since
its not the proper forum to question their paternity
and filiation. Thus the present case
ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the
illegitimate children of Juan Dizon
HELD: NO
Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those
who are born in wedlock without conclusive proof
that there was physical impossibility for the parents
to conceive the child are considered legitimate.
Upon the expiration of periods found in FC 170
and 171, this presumption of civil status becomes
fixed and unassailable. It is only when the
legitimacy of the child has been disputed can
paternity of the husband be rejected.
While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was
made in accordance with the rules on recognizing
illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy
they hold with Danilo Jesus.
Petitoners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth also identify
Danilo de Jesus as their father.
Thus, before they can be recognized as
illegitimate children, they must first contest
their status as legitimate children of Danilo
Jesus.
Makati Shangri-la vs Harper
Proof: Birth Certificates:
Exhibits Q and R are extracts of the register of
births of both Jonathan Christopher Harper and the
late Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively,
wherein the former explicitly declares that
Jonathan Christopher is the son of Christian
Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper. Said
documents bear the signature of the keeper, Y.
Ayse B. Nordal with the official seal of the Office
of the Registrar of Oslo, and the authentication of
Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Oslo, which were further authenticated by

Philippine

1.

Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol. In addition, the

latter states that said documents are the birth
certificates of Jonathan Christopher Harper and
Christian Fredrik Harper issued by the Registrar
Office of Oslo, Norway on March 23, 2004

2.

Jison vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a
complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The
case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and
when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since
1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina
alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate
child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner
supported her and spent for her education such that
she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as
illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such
in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts was established based on the
testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

That Francisco was her father and she was

conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child
through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity.
Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation
of baptismal certificates and school records
render the documents showed as incompetent to
prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit
signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age
attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC
was in the position that if Monina were truly not
Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great
lengths in order that Monina denounce her
filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high
standard of proof required for the success of an
action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in
relying upon the provision on open and
continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved
her filiation by more than mere preponderance
of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and

filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her
action well within the period granted her by a
positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Heirs of Gabatan vs CA
FACTS:
Case is about a parcel of land in CDO. This lot was
declared for taxation in the name of Juan
Gabatan. respondent alleged that she is the sole
owner of the lot having inherited the same from her
deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). She also says that Hermogena is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife. She
alleges that upon the death of her father, the land
was entrusted to her uncle, Teofilo Gabatan and his
wife for administration. It was also claimed that
prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail and this lasted
until after her death. When Teofilo and his wife
died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed land
despite respondents demands for them to vacate
the same. Petitioners (heirs of Teofilo) denied that
Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with

Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or

respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
died single in 1934 and without any issue and that
Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa, the supposed
heirs.
ISSUE: WON Hermogena is a legal heir?
HELD: No. Petition granted.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to
possession and ownership of the property, pinned
her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir
of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support of her
complaint.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates of
respondent were presented at the RTC->Resp:
purported certified true copy of her typewritten
birth certificate which indicated that her mothers
maiden name was Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented
a certified true copy of respondents handwritten
birth certificate which differed from the copy
presented by respondent. Main diff: Hermogena
Calarito
SC: It doesnt mean that the typewritten birth
certificate would prevail over the handwritten one.
The officer of the civil registrar say that the
handwritten copy of the birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original one. Officer also says
that no copy other than the handwritten one exists
in the records. The NSO officer likewise says that
the original of respondents handwritten birth
certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila
(from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the
one officially transmitted to their office by the
Local Civil Registry Office of CDO.-> Thus, the
handwritten one has more probative value.
Also, even if the respondents birth certificate is
a reliable document-> it only proves filiation with
her relationship with Hermogena and not to her
alleged grandfather which is the more important
relationship to prove. Hermogenas birth certificate,
which would have been the best evidence was
never offered as evidence.
The testimonies of the witnesses she presented
are only considered as heresays-> (They were not
yet born or were very young when Hermogena was
born.)
Deed of Absolute Sale w/ signatures of Juan and
his sibling stating Hermogena Gabatan as heir of
the deceased Juan Gabatan. -> mere photocopy->

no proper authentication-> under the best evidence

rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself.[36] Although the
best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there
are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the
original is lost or the original is a public record, the
basis for the presentation of secondary evidence
must still be established.-> stamped certification
insufficient for not stating that it was a true copy
from the original and the one who stamped was not
presented as a witness. -> and still, this does not
show filiation of Hermogena to Juan heir not
really daughter etc.

Dela Cruz vs Garcia

FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old Jenie
San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the
house of Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino
and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Teresa, Rizal. On
September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost
two months, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominique's parents, gave birth to her minor child
Christian dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo
Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for
registration of the child's birth, using Dominique's
surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the child's Certificate of Live
Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) which she had executed and
signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed
by
Dominique's
father
Domingo
Butch
Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that
during the lifetime of Dominique, he had
continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child,
and that his paternity had never been questioned.
Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during
his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor child can bear the
surname of the deceased.

HELD:
Yes. It is thus the policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children. The State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. In the eyes of society, a child
with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best
interests to allow him to bear the surname of the
now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
certificate.
Lucas vs Lucas
FACTS:
Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)
before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent
was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to
establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court and obtained a copy
of the petition. P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d w i t h t h e
R T C a Ver y U r g e n t M o t i o n t o T r y
a n d H e a r t h e C a s e . H e n c e , o n September
3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order
setting the case for hearing and
urging anyone who has any objection to the
petition to file his opposition. After learning of the
September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due
form and substance because petitioner could not
have personally known the matters that were
alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Moreover,
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA
evidence.
ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA
testing be considered a search which
must be preceded by a finding of probable
cause in order to be valid?
RULING:
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal,
the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing
of sufficient justification under the particular fact
ual circumstances of the case must be made before

ac o u r t m a y o r d e r a c o m p u l s o r y b l o o d
test. Courts in various jurisdictions h
a v e d i f f e r e d regarding the kind
of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally
found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of
paternity. The same condition precedent should be ap
plied in our jurisdiction to protect the putativefather
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing,
the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of patern
ity.Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that
the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence
to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court may, in its
discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts
relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation
to respondent. Respondent, however, contends
that the allegations in the petition were hearsay
as they were not of petitioners personal
knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of
evidence that cannot be determined at this point
but only during the trial when petitioner
presents his evidence.

Gotardo vs Buling
F:
1. Divina Buling filed a case in 1995 for the
compulsory recognition of her child
Gliffze against Charles Gotardo
2. Evidence was presented showing that Divina
and Charles met in 1992 and their sexual
relations started in 1993. it occured twice
a month.
3. She found out she was pregnant in August
1994.
4. She gave birth on March 9, 1995. Charles
failed to show up and did not support
Gliffze.

5. Petitioners impugns the paternity of the

child claiming that hey had their first
sexual encounter in August 1994.
6. RTC dismissed the complaint because of
some inconsistencies of Divina when
being cross-examined. CA reversed and
concluded parties had sex even before
1994, that Divina had only one boyfriend.
I: WON Gliffze was proven to be an illegitimate
child?
H: Yes
Court found that Gliffze is indeed the child of the
petitioner. This was duly proven through the
testimony of Divina that she only had been sexually
involved with one man at the time of her
pregnancy.

petitioner, at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo

corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and
the respondent had intimate relationship. On the
other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had
sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it
occurred on a much later date than the respondent
asserted, such that it was physically impossible for
the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was
informed of the pregnancy. However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence
for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners
denial cannot overcome the respondents clear
and categorical assertions.
Antonio Perla vs Mirasol Baring
FACTS:

Proof of filiation for legitimate or illegitimate: birth

certificate appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held
that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which [his] name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible]
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child.35 We explained that
a prima facie case exists if a woman declares
supported by corroborative proof that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father.36 We explained further that the two
affirmative defenses available to the putative father
are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the
mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima
facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been
sexually involved only with one man, the

Allegation: Mirasol and Antonio lived together as

common-law spouses for two years. As a result of
said cohabitation, Randy was born on November
11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as
seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any
support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy.-> Antonio
denies they lived together
Birth Certificate: Antonio said that there were
inaccuracies. His middle initial is E not A as
appearing in the certificate. Also, he is not a
protestant and a laborer as indicated in said
certificate. Antonio likewise alleged that Mirasol
only made up the entries with respect to their
marriage on October 28, 1981

ISSUE: WON Randys filiation with Antonio was

proven?
HELD: No. Evidence given are not sufficient in
character.
Birth certificate: irregularities, no signature of
Antonio-> no probative value of filiation. We also
cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that
Antonio supplied certain information through
Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any
participation in the preparation of the document as
well as the absence of his signature thereon,
respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that
Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys
birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances
as reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its
preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who

signed as informant thereon which she confirmed

on the witness stand.
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child-> must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity.-> Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity,
but also the apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously."-> single hug of
Antonio and promise to support is not proof-> Aunt
Lelitas kindness can also be mere charity
Baptismal certificate-> no signature, lack of
participation of Antonio
As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was
incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual
period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth
of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the
early part of the first quarter of 1983. However,
nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she
had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that
time.

People vs Abella
FACTS:
Marlon Barsaga Abella was convicted of
the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, ordering him to pay
civil indemnity and damages, and further ordering
him to acknowledge and support his offspring with
the private offended party.
Prosecution presented the certificate of live birth of
the victims child by Abella. RTC found that this
child was indeed Abellas.
HELD:
We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial
court, as well as to the appellate courts deference
thereto, that the accused-appellant was the
biological father of the two-year old daughter of
AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of
their striking facial similarities and features. The
order to acknowledge and support accusedappellants offspring is in accordance with Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code.

Abadilla vs Tabiliran
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a
complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption
unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge
on gross immorality, she contended that the judge
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla
Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with
Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got
married in May 1986. On the other hand, with
respect to the charge on deceitful conduct,
petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3
illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as
legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits
stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight
when in fact, he knew these children cannot be
legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred
that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married
Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither
bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970,
based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3
children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE: WON the 3 children can be considered
legitimate.
HELD:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only
children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for
this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal,
unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the

parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.

Lazatin vs Campos
FACTS:
Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died
intestate, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis,
and his adopted twin daughters, respondents Nora
and Irma 1month after: margarita de Asis
commenced an intestate proceeding
April 11, 1974: Margarita de Asis died, leaving a
holographic will
Nov 22, 1974: pettioner intervened for the first
time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr.
Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child
Aug. 20, 1975: petitioner filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de ASis as an
adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed
by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr.
Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was an
illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin and was later
adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified
on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was
adopted by both Mariano and Margarita.
Respondent court heard petitioners motion to
intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented
no decree of adoption hi his favor. Instead,
petitioner attempted to prove, over private
respondents objections, that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been
supported by them until their death; formerly he
was known as Renato Lazatin but was
compelled to change his
surname to Sta. Clara when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his
marriage to his present wife; that . (Page
257)
March 4, 1976: Respondent Court barred the
introduction of petitioners evidence
March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to
declare as established the fact of adoption
Court denied motion
ISSUES:
WON the respondent Court erred in not
allowing petitioner to introduce new evidence
HELD: NO
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,
which creates between 2 persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. (ADOPTION DEFINED
PAGE 259!!!! Too long for me to reproduce)
Petitioners flow of evidence in the case below

doesnt lead us to any proof of judicial adoption.

No proof of specific court of competent jurisdiction
rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the
late spouses
No judicial records of adoption or copies
Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the
settlement of the estate as an adopted son because
of lack of proof

Cervantes vs Fajardo
FACTS:
Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents
Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the
petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the
child when she was barely 2 weeks old.
An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by
respondent Gina
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by
petitioenrs over the child
RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes
Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners
received a letter from respondents demanding to be
paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back
their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child
from her yaya at the petitioners residence on
the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Gino brought the child to her house
Petitioners demanded the return of the child but
Gina refused
ISSUES:
WON the writ should be granted.
HELD:
YES
Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina his open
cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere
Minor has been legally adopted by petitionerswith
full knowledge and consent of respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others,
of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents

over the adopted child, except where the adopting

parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted
Landingin vs RP
Facts:
Diwata Landingin (us cit of Filipino descent) filed
for adoption on 2/4/2002 of the minors Elaine,
elma, and Eugene who are all nat. children of her
brother manuel and Amelia ramos.
Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were
left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos while their mother went to Italy, remarried
and had two children (never communicated again).
Diwata now supports said minors, together with
help from other relatives. Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000 and Diwata now therefore
seeks to adopt said minors. Said minors have
already given their written consent to adoption. She
is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is
a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have
their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server.
Diwatas own children have also given their written
consent already. Her brother Mariano Ramos who
earns substantial income, signified his willingness
and
commitment to support the minors while in
petitioners custody.
Court ordered DSWD to conduct case study and
submit report in time for the hearing. OSG also
entered its appearance. Since her petition was
unopposed, she presented ex-parte.
Diwata testified in her behalf, presented Eliane
Ramos, the eldest among the adoptees, to testify on
the written consent that she and siblings exec. Also
presented was the Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and
Ricfel
Branitley.
Pagbilao, the DSWD field officer assigned to the
case, reported that minors are eligible for adoption
because the mother has voluntarily consented to
their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide
the parental care, guidance and support they need
(Affid of Consent by mother). Moreover, said
minors have expressed the desire to be adopted
through a joint Affidavit of consent. And lastly, the
minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after.
Pagbilao interviewed the mother of the minors who
went back to PI from Italy during the summer for a
3-week vacation.
But Diwata was not able to present Pagbilao as
witness offer in evidence the voluntary consent of

Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Neither was she

able to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assents to the adoption.
TC declared the minors freed from all legal
obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and also declared to be children of Diwata.
Moreover, TC ordered that from Dizon-Ramos, the
surnames of the minors would now be RamosLandingin.
OSG appealed CA saying that there was no consent
from the biological mother. With this,
CA reversed TC, saying that Diwata was not able to
prove that the biological mother consented to the
adoption nor was the affidavit
of consent by Diwatas children be admissible
since such was exec in Guam and not
acknowledged before philippine Consular
Office. Nor is she stable enough to support the
children.
Issue: 1)WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos
2)WON the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law
3)WON petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees.
Held: 1)NO. The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best
interests of the child but likewise, with due regard
to the natural rights of the parents over the child.
Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) requires the
consent from biological parents.The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption. Written consent
of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural
right ofa parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. Amelia (mother) was said to be in
PI, therefore it would not have been impossible to
solicit Written Consent from her.
That consent is no longer needed because of
mothers abandonment is untenable. If mother had
really abandoned, she should, thus have adduced
the written consent of their legal guardian. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the

latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they

are given to an adopting parent.
Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption
2) NO. Section 2 of Act No. 2103 (pardon me if
I would no longer expound on this point, this part
deals more with technicalities of instruments I
think e.g. including the intrinsic/extrinsic validity
of such instruments
What is important here is that no further proof
was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children therefore
said evidence is inadmissible
3) Primary consideration in adoption is the best
interest of the child, it follows that the financial
capacity of prospective parents should also be
carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
the adopter should be in a position to support
the would-be adopted child or children, in
keeping with the means of the family. She only
has a part-time job, and she is rather of age
therefore financial stability is questionable.
Even if she says that she has children to rely
on, adopter must be the main breadwinner.

Minor children not permitted to be adopted due to

legal infirmities but Diwata is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption.
Republic vs Toledano
Facts:
February 21, 1990 private respondents spouses
Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse
Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America in Guam
physically,mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year
old minor.
1981-1984, Nov 1989 to present, Simon was and
has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, NeryAlcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son. social
worker Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda recommended
the granting of the petition for adoption
TC granted the adoption petition of Clouse
Spouse OSG objected saying that the Clouse
spouse are not qualified to adopt under Philippine
law

Issue: WON Clouse spouse are not qualified to

adopt under Philippine law
Held: YES. FC 184 and 185 bars the Clouse
spouse from doing so. Respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in
the aforequoted provision. He is a natural born US
Citizen and Simon is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor legitimate child of his spouse.
Evelyn on the other hand has already become
naturalized. She would have qualified under FC
184(3) because shes a former Filipino who sought
to adopt her brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Tamargo vs CA
Facts:
Minor (10 yrs old) Adelberto Bundoc shot
Jennifer Tamrago with an air rifle (causing
death) on 10/20/82
Civil complaint for damages was instigated by
Macario Tamargo (Jennifers adoptive parent)
and Cesar and Aurelia Tamargo (nat. parents)
against Adelbertos nat parents (Victor and
Clara Bundoc) w/ whom Adelberto was living
with @ time of incident. Another axn was
actually filed for Reckless Imprudence resulting
to homicide (but adeleberto was acquitted/
exempted following minority w/o discernment)
But prior to incident, (12/10/81), Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura filed pet. to adopt adelberto
w/c CFI granted in 11/18/82 or after said
incident.
The nat. parents of Adelberto, following such
adoption were saying that they were no longer
indispensable parties to the damages (parental
liability because such was already transferred
by virtue of the adoption)
Petitioners however were saying that since
adelberto was with them @ time of incident, it
should be them and not the Rapisura spouse
who should be party to said action.
TC ruled for Victor and Clara Bundoc (nat.
parents) and said that they were not
indispensable to the case at hand
Issue: WON the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter when actual custody
was yet lodged with the biological parents.

HELD: No. liability stays with the natural parents

them at said incident. Most especially that
adelberto was still with them at the said incident

NCC 2180 speaks of parental obligation for the

damages of minor children in their company.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the
torts of their minor children living with them, may
be seen to be based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The
civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent
in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their
custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge
of the duties accompanying such authority.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who
had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have been in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
Nat. parents of Adelberto were held liable
(indispensable party) and case remanded to
TC to proceed with such.
Cervantes vs Fajardo
FACTS:
Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents
Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the
petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of
the child when she was barely 2 weeks old.
An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by

respondent Gina
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by
petitioenrs over the child
RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes
Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners
received a letter from respondents demanding to be
paid P150, 000, otherwise, they would get back
their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child
from her yaya at the petitioners residence on the
pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Gino brought the child to her house
Petitioners demanded the return of the child but
Gina refused
ISSUES:
WON the writ should be granted.
HELD:
YES
Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina his open
cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor
that desireable atmosphere
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with
full knowledge and consent of respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others,
of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting
parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
-Facts:
Aug. 31, 2000: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
She was born on June 26, 1994
Her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia
He prays that upon adoption, her name will be
Stephanie Nathy Garcia Catindig
RTC: Granting the adoption and petition to change
her name ONLY to Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Petitioner files a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration regarding the surname, Garcia
as her middle name.
RTC: denies petiton
Hence, the case at bar.
Petitioner submits that trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence
of adoption.
There is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name.
Customs grant every Filipino to have a middle
name as his/her mothers surname

A middle name is a part of a name of a person

Rights of an adopted child to bear a proper name
should not be violated
It would help Stephanie avoid the stigma of her
illegitimacy
Her using Garcia is not opposed by either
family
OSG agrees with petitioner on three grounds:
FC 189 makes it necessary since Stephanie still
maintains a filiation with her natural mother as
an intestate heir of he latter
No law prohibiting such
Customary for every Filipino..
Issue:
May and illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
-Held: YES. Petition is GRANTED.
-Ratio:
The use of a persons surname is for practical and
legal purposes, it is NECESSARY
The name of an individual has two parts, the given
name and the surname.
The use of the surname is fixed by law under
Articles 364-380 of the Civil Code
The law is SILENT as to the use of a middle name.
However in Art 375(1) it is considered when
there is identitiy of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants.
The law is notably silent with regard to an adopted
childs middle name.
OSG correctly points out Art. 189 of the FC with
regard to filiation required as an intestate heir.
The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of
the adopted child.
RA 8552
It is shown that she is very close to both her parents
and she lives with her mother
There should be liberal construction of adoption
statues in favor of adoption
NCC 10 provided that in case of doubt in the
interpretation.it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
Lahom vs Simbulo
Facts:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom
took in Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
since he was two years old, treating him as if
he were their own child.
It was only in 1971 that the spouses petitioned for
adoption. In 1972, this was granted and the
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed his name
to Jose Melvin Lahom.
1999: Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind

the decree of adoption:

Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, in utter disregard for the
feelings of the spouses
Before her husband died, he even wanted to revoke
the adoption but was only stopped by Isabelita
Diosdado further desired to give to charity
whatever
properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.
Respondent failed to show concern for Petitioner
and remained indifferent
He does not act like a son, there is an
uncomfortable relationship between the two
the only motive to respondents adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of the spouses Lahom
1998: RA 8552 provided grounds committed by
adopter for the rescission of adoption and also
stated that Adoption, being in the best interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter. However, adopter may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Art. 919 of the Civil Code.
Respondent objects to motion
RTC: dismissed the petition
There is a lack of cause of action
Said rights of petitioner to rescind should have
been
exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules.
Legal ground for the petition have been
discovered and known to petitioner for more
than 5 years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition of December 1, 1999, hence the action
had already prescribed.
-Issue:
May the subject adoption, decreed on May 5, 1972,
still be revoked or rescinded by an adopted
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
In the affirmative, has the adopters action
prescribed?
Held: The Petition was DISMISSED.
-Ratio:
SC begins with a brief background on the law:
welfare of the adopted started becoming of
paramount concern
creation of written instruments that would protect
and safeguard the rights of the adopted
children
adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility and its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child
R.A. 8552 secured these rights and privileges and
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child. The new law also withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and

gave the adopted child the sole right to

sever the legal ties created by adoption.
It was also months after the effectivity of the R.A.
No. 8552 that Isabelita filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975.
Therefore, her petition could no longer be
pursued.
-Additional: (just copy-pasted, this is in
relation to the prescription period )
Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a right, the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by
the states determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.
Pelayo vs Lauron
Facts:
October 13, 1906, evening: Dr. Arturo Pelayo
was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella
He was asked to give birth to their daughter-inlaw
He assisted in the delivery of the child
He was kept occupied until the next day
He valued his fee at P500 BUT Marcelo and
Juana refused to pay without reason
November 23, 1906: Complaint by Pelayo
against Lauron and Abella for collection
Contentions of Lauron and Abella:
that their son and his wife lived independently
from them and in a separate house
that if she did stay in their house that night, it
was due to fortuitous circumstances
that their daughter-in-law had died due to the
childbirth
April 5, 1907: RTC Held
Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint
due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a
right of action against them

Issue/s:WON husband is bound to

pay the bill
Held:Yes
Article 142 and 143, Civil Code: Mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by
way of mutual support
Includes medical services in case of illness
That when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in
order that health may be restored
That the father and mother-in-law are strangers
with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support
Hence, her husband, and not her father and
mother- in-law, is liable
That it is of no matter who called the doctor
and requested his services
That there was imminent danger to her life and
medical assistance was urgently needed
Sanchez vs Zulueta
Facts:
Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego
Child: Mario Sanchez
1932: Feliciano refused to support Josefa
and Mario and abandoned them
Josefa and Mario have no means of
subsistence
Feliciano received a monthly pension of
P174.20 from US Army
Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez sought
monthly allowance for support and support
pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez
Contentions of Feliciano:
Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez
which resulted to Mario Sanchez
October 27, 1930: Josefa abandoned the
conjugal home
As the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario,
Mario is not entitled to his support
He asked for an opportunity to adduce
evidence in support of this defense which RTC
and CA denied

Issue/s:WON Macario and Josefa

are entitled to support
Held:Yes
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid
defense against
an action for support of the wife
an action for support of the child who is the fruit
of such adulterous relations
Defense should be established and not merely

alleged
Proof must therefore be permitted
Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he
asked for an opportunity to present evidence to
prove his allegations, it was error to deny him the
opportunity
De Asis vs CA
Facts:
October 14, 1988: Vircel D. Andres, mother
and legal guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres
de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support of Glen against Manuel de Asis
that Manuel is the father of Glen
that Manuel refused/failed to provide for the
maintenance of Glen despite repeated
demands
Contentions of Manuel:
that Glen is not his child
that he cannot be forced to support him then
July 4, 1989: Manifestation of Vircel
thatManuelhadmadeajudicial
admission/declaration of his denial of paternity
that it seemed futile to continue the claim of
support
dismisses August 8, 1989: Action was
dismissed
Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal
of the case
Provided that Manuel will withdraw his
counterclaim
September 7, 1995: Complaint for maintenance
and support against Manuel by Glen,
represented by Vircel
Manuels motion to dismiss due to res judicata
where the Manifestation of Vircel was, in effect,
an admission of lack of filiation, which
admission binds both parties
Manuels motion was denied because
renunciation or waiver of future support is
prohibited by law
Issue/s: WON action for support is barred by
Manifestation
Held:NO
Manifestation of Vircel is void because the
Right to support cannot be renounced or
compromised
NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot
be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a
third person. Neither can it be compensated
with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
NCC 2035: Future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise.
No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal
separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation

(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
WHY: Because of the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence
He is not entitled to renounce or transfer the
right for this would mean sanctioning the
voluntary giving up of life itself.
It is to virtually allow either suicide or the
conversion of the recipient to a public burden
which is contrary to public policy
The right to life cannot be renounce; hence,
support which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced.
Rondina vs People
Gotardo vs Buling
Perla vs Baring
Calderon vs Roxas
Lerma vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were
married on 1951.
Then on 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for
adultery against the respondent
1969, Respondent then filed for legal
separation on the grounds of concubinage and
attempt against her life. MOREOVER, she
wanted support pending trial for their youngest
son.
1969 Respondent Judge granted respondents
application for pendente lite.
Petitioner filed for a preliminary injunction
which was dismissed
Meanwhile, in 1972, the CFI of Rizal found
Respondent and Teodor Ramirez (his
paramour) guilty of adultery
Issues: WON adultery is a good defense
against the respondents claim for support
pendente lite.
Held: YES!!
Ratio: The right to separate support or
maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnershipproperty,presupposesthe
existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. There
must be a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately for
him/her to gain support. In other words, the
right to support was lost by the respondent
when she was found guilty of adultery.
Reyes vs Ines-Luciano

Facts:
January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes m Celia
Ilustre-Reyes
They had children
March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by
fist blows bumping her head against the cement
floor
pushing her down the 13-flight stairs hitting her in
the abdomen that floored her half unconscious
May 11, 1976: She left their office
May 26, 1976: She returned to get her
overnight bag
Manuel demanded that she get out but she
ignored him
Hence, he
doused her with grape juice
kicked her
attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was
stopped by her driver
June 3, 1976: By Celia Ilustre-Reyes against
Manuel J. C. Reyes
Action for support pendente lite
Legal separation he had attempted to kill her
Contentions of Manuel
Celia committed adultery with her physician
She is thus not entitled to support and if she
was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the
Court was excessive
Issue/s:WON Celia is entitled to
support pendent lite
Held:Yep
Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for
support BUT only if proven
In fact, adultery is a good defense and if
properly proved and sustained will defeat the
action
BUT it must be established by competent
evidence and not merely alleged
During hearing of the application for support
pendente lite, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation
During hearing of the application for action for
legal separation, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation
YET Celia asked for support pending litigation
from their conjugal partnership and not
necessarily from Manuels private funds
Determination of Amount
Celia was unemployed and without funds
All their conjugal properties, including
corporations where Manuel is President,
Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession
of Manuel

Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61

Development and Technology Consultant Inc.
earning P98,879.84
The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc.
That these companies have entered into multimillion contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways
The amount was reduced from P5000 since
their children are in the custody of Manuel
In determining the amount to be awarded as
support pendente lite
not necessary to go fully into the merits of the
case
sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and
amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application
in view of the merely provisional character of
the resolution to be entered
mere affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record may satisfy the court to
pass upon the application for support pendente
lite

Mangonon vs CA
Facts:
1975, Maria Belen Mangonon and Private
Respondent Delgado married in 1975
As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent, the marriage was annulled
on 1975
Within 7 months of the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rina
and Rica.
Her second husband, Danny Mangonon raised
her two twins as Private Respondent Delgado
has already abandoned them.
1994 Belen Mangonon filed for a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support in behalf
of her minor children (Rica and Rina)
At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina are
about to enter college in the USA. But despite
their admission to the universities, they are
financially incapable
Petitioner, who earns 1,200 dollars a month,
could hardly give general support to the
children, much less their required educational
support. So they demanded support from
Private Respondent.
Respondent Federico failed to sign the birth
certificate, hence they need a judicial
declaration in order to be legitimated. He said
that their legitimacy should first be established
before they could claim for support.
Moreover, Federico also said that he is also
unable to give support.
Trial court resolved the case and awarded a

MEASLYandMICROSCOPIC5,000
pesos/child.
Petitioner was angered by this and filed the
present petition.
Issues: Since both the parties are unable to
givesupport,canthegrandfather
(FRANCISCO) be the one to furnish support?
Held: YES
Ratio: First of all, the twins were able to prove
their filiation, because Lolo Francisco wrote
letters to them when they were young, and that
he himself wrote the surname Delgado in the
letters which just means that Lolo Francisco
consented to it.On the issue of support, An
eminent author on the subject explains that the
obligation to give support rests principally on those
more closely related to the recipient.
However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant
prove that those who are called upon to provide
support do not have the means to do so.
Lolo Francisco said that Petitioner has the means to
support the children, but this is BELIED by the fact
that they obtained huge amounts of loans for them
to even enroll at these US universities. Finally and I
quote:
There being prima facie evidence showing that
petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their childrens college education. In
view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article
199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco,
as the next immediate relative of Rica and
Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It
bears stressing that respondent Francisco is
the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Shipping which does business with
Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also
owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn,
owns real properties in different parts of the
country. He is likewise the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co.
and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties
here and abroad.41 It having been established
that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters

education, he, in lieu of petitioner and

respondent Federico, should be held liable for
supportpendentelite

Spouses Lim vs Lim

Calderon vs Roxas
Lacson vs Lacson
FACTS:
feb 14, 1953 (CHEESY!) when they got
married
-Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent)
left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
-March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint
for custody of children as well as support in
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila
o Before it pushed through though
they reached a settlement where
the two eldest kids would go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest
would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
-May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for
the custody of all children be given to her in
JDRC since she said she only entered into
agreement to gain custody of her younger
children and thus should be given custody of
the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old.
-CA: ruled that compromise agreement as
relating to custody of children should be
declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.
ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to the
wife
HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time
-NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years
of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure."
Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so
agreement should have
been declared null and void since
no compelling reasons were stated
otherwise
o However the children are now 11
and 10 and thus The 11 year old
may choose which parent they want
to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, as long as above
ten) already 1968
o Court may also award custody to
who they deem more fit through
evidence.

Art 356 of the NCC - Every

child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least
elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and
civic training by the parents or
guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an
atmosphere conducive to his

physical, moral and intellectual

development.
-However even if custody should have been
null and void, the rest of the agreement is
valid with respect to the separation of
property of the spouses and the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership since it had
judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation