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WITHIN SCIENCE
The biological world has been always considered the locus of complexity. The
fine structural and functional multi-layered organization of biological entities are immediately perceived as reaching a far higher level of integration than
human artefacts. The huge technological advances of the last decades, however,
have produced artefacts whose intrinsic complexity is, for many aspects, not
totally manageable by the designers (in some cases acquiring a sort of independent existence, like world-wide-web), thus asking for an approach similar to the
one adopted by biological sciences. It is now generally recognized that biorelated ideas play a key role in characterizing society, informatics and our daily
life as well. In the last decades questions about the biological have also been reemerging in philosophy. The focus of the discussion has shifted from the ancient
dichotomy of mechanistic versus holistic perspectives to the modern dichotomy
of reductionist versus systemic views, when dealing with organisms and their
dynamic behaviour. From the epistemological side we observe the progressive
convergence of explanatory concepts in different fields and disciplines from
physics to physiology or ecology; from medicine to robotics. Such convergences
affect functional accounts and the identification of explanatory systems. Moreover, common properties are acknowledged for different systems in terms of
complexity, coherence, resilience, robustness, etc.
Familiar examples include the discussion and studies of how DNA expression
is regulated, how epigenetic mechanisms influence developmental processes, how
a system and its environment interact, and how a robot can display functional plasticity. However, the contribution that such pervasiveness of biological concepts
makes to our understanding of the natural processes is not yet well understood.
Only recently have scientists started to look in-depth into the theoretical
meaning and consequence of the use of biological-like explanations for artificial systems. Yet instead of bringing us back to the difference or reducibility
among biological sciences and physics or chemistry, the increasing interconnection between technology and biology seems to prevent us from doing so. Such
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interconnection opens up new questions regarding causal accounts and the conceptualization of explanatory dynamics, as the first chapters of this volume show.
The most relevant and important questions do not concern the relatedness of
such fields, but the peculiarity of the scientific question that is addressed both in
an experimental and technological field through biological concepts. For example, because organisms parts are usually functionally defined, it would seem
natural to associate functional explanation as peculiar to biological sciences, yet
it is commonly used in robotics as well. Consistently, it would seem that teleological arguments might be an issue only for biological explanations while their
role in mechanistic accounts still need further clarification and discussion.
We are witnessing now a continual interplay between different fields, which
once had relatively sharp and clear-cut boundaries. These limits are rapidly fading.
Philosophers and scientists have only gradually incorporated biological-related
concepts in their methodology. This volume thus seeks to explore what we believe
is a neglect of many discussions arising from such observations, particularly how
the process of scientific understanding is shaped by our way of conceptualizing
the world and how the interplay of biological (we define with the acronym
Bio), with technological (Techno) and philosophical-theoretical (Logos) ways of
thinking are merging and contaminating their respective traditions.
Although there is apparently no single message or theme emerging from these
pages, there is a shared commitment to articulating and addressing scientific
phenomena. All the authors, in fact, agree that modern merging of the bio and
tchne in engineering science is facilitated by new concepts and practices that can
not be reduced to either bio or tchne, and can not be analysed using traditional
philosophy of science dichotomies that roughly split artificial world and natural world. This is true whether talking about embodiment or stratification, for
example. Understanding how this science of new concepts and practices works
requires analysis and its own rationalization (Logos). Part I concerns the articulation of these boundary sciences, their concepts (perspectives) and how they work
outside established science. Part II is about the epistemic analysis of these sciences and how they generate knowledge/understanding (and new technology as
a result) in novel ways. And Part III is about their philosophical rationalization.
A strong unitary idea connects every different contribution, which, therefore, deals with the mutal and dynamic relationship between these three terms
Bio-Techno-Logos. On the one side, Bio can be seen as biological world, physical world or, in a general way, world of phenomena. On the other side, Logos
is the scientific understanding or representation of this world. In between logos
and bios, tchne is how we conceive (Logos) natural world (Bios) and their mutual
relationship. Tchne can be hardware, like robots or prosthesis, software, like
computer simulation programmes and models, or purely theoretical, like scientific paradigms (complexity, systems biology, teleology, embodied intelligence).
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Thus, Bio deals with the what question, Techno with the how question and
Logos with the why question.
Part of the contribution of this volume is thus methodological, in the sense
that we look forward to helping ferment an open discussion inside science using
this tripartite perspective, which drives the discussion on every topic and which
remains the very leitmotiv of the project. For this reason each author has been
requested to pay particular attention to the way he expresses his concepts to keep
the focus always on the aim of the volume rather than on the specific question
each author discusses.
The chapters in this volume come from an international community of
scholars who seek to present their own work from the perspective of the biotechno-logos relationship. The term of logos (instead of philosophy) has been
preferred to highlight that, when considering such relationships, we are looking
at different constitutive dimensions of the human understanding of the natural
world. The emphasis is not on the different disciplines involved, but on how different tools (conceptual, technical, explanatory) are simultaneously involved in
the process of scientific understanding that become, in our view, paradigmatic
when the question is the dynamics of what we call living systems. Clearly, what all
authors have in common is a strong interest in understanding scientific and philosophical trends of reflection and inquiry and to contribute through their own
work to the development of new explanatory paradigms. All of them are, moreover, aware that human factors do affect scientific research although discrepancies
and divergences on their relevance and nature appear as well. I am satisfied with
such pluralism though integrated by an honest and opened willingness to listen
to each other. The scientific biography and production of the authors might be
taken into account as well in order to get a more comprehensive view of the issues
at stake, thus moving further towards a wider discussion of the proposed topic:
the bio-techno-logos relationship in and for scientific practice.
Authors respective disciplines, which reveal the deeply interdisciplinary
nature of these issues, include: biology, bioinformatics, chemistry, computer science, mathematics, systems biology, medicine, philosophy, physics and ethics. The
contributions of the authors are intended to be useful not only to fellow researchers, but also to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in both science
and philosophy. This volume therefore crosscuts different subjects contributing
to a new field of contemporary debate about the relationship among scientific
objects of inquiry, i.e., the relevance of technology as a way to better understand
the world, and science in terms of human practice (see the final chapter).
Authors have been asked to put aside any disputes with the old way to do
science or even with the new way to do science (i.e., reductionist vs anti-reductionist, molecular vs systemic, etc.). This is primarily an invitation to address
the problems and issues of scientific research without necessarily applying to
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them the conceptual schemas of old vs. new contrapositions. More positively,
authors have been asked to produce analyses and overviews in three areas of the
epistemological and methodological reflection on biology. The three areas correspond to the three parts into which the book is divided: I. Biological dynamics;
II. Reflecting on scientific understanding and understanding by building; III.
Towards a development of a philosophy of scientific practice.
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epistemological and methodological components of prediction and prescription require the use of technology. The role of technology is clear regarding the
tasks of measuring the biological reality available, both in structural terms and
in dynamic terms. In addition, technology also has a role in the transformation
of the biological reality according to some prescriptions (such as the protection
of certain natural environments).
In Chapter 9, Teleology and Mechanism in Biology, Marco Buzzoni
approaches the topic of teleology and mechanism in biology. The main exponents of the mechanistic approach dispense with the explicit reductionist
strategy of nineteenth-century mechanism and the positivist unity of science,
but their silence on teleology shows that final causes are considered useless and/
or redundant in biological investigations. But the concept of mechanism is onesided and incomplete without an implicit reference to intentional and final
causes, as is obvious considering the concept of mechanism or machine in the
perspective of the manipulative theory of causality. In the third section, there is a
step in the direction of authors who have tried to reconcile teleology and mechanism. There is room to develop a more satisfactory account of biological practice
not only from elements of the mechanical viewpoint, but also referring to intentional or final causes. The reflexive, typically human concept of telos (Logos) may
be employed successfully to investigate living beings (Bios) scientifically in an
intersubjectively testable and reproducible way, to discover mechanical-causal or
experimental relations in living systems.
In Chapter 10, Scientific Understanding and the Explanatory Use of False
Models, Antonio Diguez explores the scientific understanding and the explanatory use of false models, noting that in model-based sciences, like biology, models
play an outstanding explanatory role. In recent times, some authors have shown
how the notion of understanding could shed light on the analysis of explanation
based on models, deepening the notion of causality that has also been addressed
by Buzzoni and MacLeod. This notion has attracted growing attention in philosophy of science. Three important questions have been central in the debate:
(i) What is scientific understanding ? (ii) is understanding factive, i.e. does understanding presuppose or imply truth? and (iii) can understanding be objective?
Diguez outlines and assesses the main answers to these questions, thowing his
own support behind positive answers to both questions ii and iii. Understanding
can be factual and objective. But to be so, scientific understanding and explanation (Logos) depend on the elaboration of models (Tchne) of reality (Bios).
Finally, in Chapter 11, entitled Bio-Techno-Logos and Scientific Practice,
Marta Bertolaso, Nicola Di Stefano, Giampaolo Ghilardi and Alfredo Marcos
consider the role of the personal agency in scientific practice articulating the
reflection on scientific understanding and practice and taking into account the
processes of conceptualization and of identification of the explanatory levels. In
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particular they consider the fact that we can explain nature according to what
the world allows rather than what pure logic requires. In this chapter a different
perspective on science and of the scientific work as human action is therefore
considered. What, in fact, makes lab works scientific is not just the scientific
method understood in terms completely grounded on observation and rational
inference. This shift opens a new point of view, which is based on epistemological virtues, by means of which we can appreciate the multidimensional character
of scientific practice.
Final Remarks
The starting point of our reflection has been that in recent years important philosophical issues and questions have emerged from science itself. The questions
I have mentioned in the Preface have been driving discussions and the choice
of the topics. No one really has a clear idea of what effect bio or techno has
on technological or biological fields. Until we do, we do not know what conceptually follows from sticking a bio on the front of, for example, engineering.
Understanding why the prefix bio is becoming so common in different fields,
from informatics to robotics, and what kind of methodological and philosophical issues are at stake when we focus on biological dynamics, clearly asks for a
deeper philosophical reflection.
This encourages a reflection on philosophy of science and scientific practice as
well. The strategy we adopted has dealt with questions about the peculiar dynamic
features of complex systems we identify with the adjective of biological. At the
intersection of these philosophical and scientific topics ontological and epistemological issues emerged that, at the same time, have been clarifying what is at
stake in the intrinsic relationship among the bio-techno-logos dimensions of scientific knowledge and what kind of rationality scientific understanding implies.
The shared theoretical background that supports the coherence of the book
is reflected in the three parts. We are convinced that philosophy of science and
especially philosophy of biology is entering a new phase. Until now philosophers
interested in biology, as well as biologists with an interest in philosophy or, more
generally, with a speculative interest in their work, kept separate the areas of
speculation and the bench work. In other words, the interest was in the general
consequences of scientific progress in biology (e.g. evolution theory, neuroscience, ecology, genetics and their impact on society or on long time-honoured
philosophical themes like free will or consciousness) or on the epistemological
status of biology with respect to classical categories like determinism, probability, reductionism vs holism, and so forth.
Things are rapidly changing and, as often happens, the change is driven by
the widespread sensation that we are in the middle of a deep knowledge crisis.
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The number of new drugs (in terms of active principles) entering the market
has been steadily dropping for about thirty years. The invasion of new data
from high-throughput methods asks for something very different from smart
algorithms that, while putting some order on data, are not sufficient to generate new theoretical perspectives. The increasing fragmentation of knowledge is
producing incommensurable results that are practically impossible to gather in
a common frame.
To overcome the sensation that we are missing some very basic points and that
the mere accumulation of new data can only worsen the situation, we decided
to stop and think, not to struggle to have our particular point of view prevail.
What emerges from the volume confirms the conviction reflected in the title of
the volume: that living matter, technology and the abstract, formal thinking have
some irreducible peculiarities we can roughly summarize in three modes that are
progressively developed in the three parts: (1) the organic mode (a global entity
whose behaviour far exceeds the sum of its parts that in turn are difficult to
isolate); (2) the integrated mode (a tool that works by connecting and directing
its elements to a well-defined single goal); and going beyond, (3) the symbolic
mode (a description that satisfies some abstract and self-consistent rules of
composition). These modes follow different ways of functioning and obey different laws so an element of the organic world can hardly be constrained into a
fully consistent set of rules and the production of technically effective tools can
hardly be reduced to pure logic while activities like drug design cannot be faced
by pure engineering. On the other hand, bio-inspired engineering works very
well, logical analysis of biopolymers like DNA and protein molecules allowed
us to discover many facts of nature and the circuits of our desktop are a material
instantiation of millennia of logic speculations.
Authors have been challenging themselves trying to clarify the ingredients
that allow these three separated worlds to interact fruitfully and the misconceptions make the connections among these worlds difficult. They tried to do this
in dialogue with other authors and disciplines while indicating where they see
a bright light in the distance. This justifies the different perspectives present
here, with a wide overview on the most relevant points in this reflection opening
further discussions that can develop from this first collection of essays.
Finally, the use we make of the classical bios, tchne, logos concepts is therefore
justified by the belief that part of the answer is already posed in the question, i.e.
in some intrinsic relationship among these concepts already acknowledged in the
Ancient Greek representation of nature. This ancient relational view of those concepts can be now grasped in different ways through technological applications in
biological sciences, and seems to be better suited to modern scientific practices,
avoiding the risk of getting stacked in useless dichotomies (typically, the partwhole issue, top-down and bottom-up causation, etc.). Therefore, there is not only
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