June 11, 2006

Guy Duperreault
Applicant

Diane Bertrand
Chief Registrar of the Umpire
On Behalf of Paul Rouleau, Umpire
P.O. Box 8966
Ottawa Ontario K1G 3J2

Re.: ORDER Guy DUPERREAULT Dated April 18th, 2006

IN THE MATTER of EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT (respondent)

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IN THE MATTER of a claim by GUY DUPERREAULT (appellant)

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IN THE MATTER of an appeal to an Umpire by the claimant from a decision by

the Board of Referees given on January 30th, 2006, at Burnaby BC (respondent)

Dear Ms. Bertand:

As requested, and as guided by Federal Court Rules 61 through 71, here is a

concise statement of facts, an enumeration of the sections of the Act or
Regulations being challenged, a statement of the points in issue, a concise
statement of submissions, a concise statement of the order sought, and a list of
authorities. I have also included an addendum to my original argument, which I
have enumerated in my listing of submissions and have included in Appendix C.
And, as ordered, I have included copies of the statutes, regulations,
jurisprudence and all other authorities as appendices A and B, as required by
Federal Court Rules 70.

Yours respectfully,

Guy A. Duperreault
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Part I
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. After negotiations to produce a collective work agreement between the

Telecommunications Workers Union and TELUS failed, the Telecommunications
Workers Union had its members erect picket lines on July 20, 2006 in
anticipation of TELUS enforcing its threatened lock out of its employees
beginning July 21, 2006.

2. On September 20th I submitted a claim for EI Benefits via EI’s web-based

“on-line” claim submission procedure. Shortly thereafter, as part of the
bureaucracy of that claim, I received from the EI offices by postal mail a
questionnaire that I was obligated to fill in before my claim could be considered.

3. On October 22nd I received notice that my claim had been denied because
it was due to a labour dispute, as is required by subsection 36(1) of the EI Act.

4. Upon reading 36(1), which was included in the reasons for my claim being
denied, I questioned the validity and necessity of that mailed questionnaire. In
particular, I found my being asked whether or not I had attempted to cross a
picket line to be highly inappropriate.

5. After researching my concerns regarding the appropriateness of that

question, I determined that it and its implications violated at least two sections of
the Charter, sections 2a and 2d.

6. I filed an appeal, dated October 28th, 2005, to the Board of Referees.

Therein I cited that the administration of 36(1) violated 2a and 2d of the Charter.

7. I was initially scheduled to be heard by the referees Jan 9, 2006, but time
conflicts required that I ask for an adjournment. I was granted leave to be heard
by the referees on January 30th, 2006 in Burnaby.

8. The referees advised me that they were not competent to hear my Charter
arguments, and citing the evidence as listed with the appeal docket, denied my
claim in accordance with 36(1) of the act and the associated jurisprudence.

9. I submitted my appeal to the Umpires at the Burnaby office on or about

February 28th, 2006.

10. I received from the Board of Umpires an ORDER to provide my appeal in

accordance with sections 61 through 71 of the Federal Court Rules on or about
April 20th, 2006.
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ENUMERATION OF SECTIONS OR
REGULATIONS BEING CHALLENGED

11. I am challenging:
36(1) of the EI Act;
and

whatever internal administrative guideline that authorizes the

dissemination of the questionnaire form # W060000E-
5907714-L (exhibits 5.1 & 5.2);
and

the EI Questionnaire, form # W060000E-5907714-L (exhibits 5.1 &

5.2), itself.

Part II
STATEMENT OF POINTS IN ISSUE

12. Section 36(1) of the EI Act is not impartial to both parties in a protracted
labour dispute. Its execution discriminates against a recognizable or
distinguishable group, the labourer. Not only does it discriminate against that
group, it can be used by the employer in “break-the-union” labour disputes.
Therefore 36(1) not only violates its purported reasons to be, but it violates 15(1)
of the Charter. At one time, 36(1) of the act may have been impartial. However,
in light of current labour legislation, specifically the “pro-scab” section of the
Canadian Labour Code, section 94.2(1) in conjunction with section 53(3) of the
EI Regulations, all power to negotiate with power a labour contract has been
removed from labour and given to the employer. No longer is the labourer’s
labour an asset the labourer can use to aid in his or her haggling with the
employer, while concomitantly the employer now has the authority and power to
mitigate, or even vitiate, the financial effects of losing its labour through either
strike or lockout – but especially in the event of a lockout that has been planned
by the employer to be protracted and designed to “break the union” – by taking
advantage of 94.2(1)‘s anti-union language.

13. If the unstated intent of 36(1) is neutrality in a labour dispute, then the
questions that needs to be addressed regarding 36(1) of the EI Act are; can it be
shown to be neutral? And if not neutral, then can it be shown to be
indiscriminately unfair, by which I mean that under different labour dispute
scenarios it hurts one or the other party by its impartiality either randomly or
equally? If this cannot be demonstrated, which I believe it cannot and which
case law argues is de facto the case, then 36(1) discriminates against a group
and violates 15(1) of the charter. And to prove that case, the case law blatantly
slides the law in favour of protecting the finances of the employer from
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unscrupulous labour negotiations, and makes no reference to protecting the

finances of the labourer from unscrupulous employer negotiations.

14. Furthermore, 36(1) does not state its purpose is to be neutral. It seems
that it has been deliberately made blind, and blind law is unjust law. So be it, if
that lack of justice hurts both parties in a dispute equally. But as I argue, and
history attests, that is not the case.

15. The EI Questionnaire, form # W060000E-5907714-L (exhibits 5.1 & 5.2),

infers that someone involved in a labour dispute could be eligible for benefits if
s/he attempted to cross a picket line. Such an implication infringes on 2a and 2d
of the Charter, a person’s freedom of conscience, and his or her right to freely
associate. Attempting to cross a picket line could have the perpetrator banned
from his or her union and subject to onerous fines. And crossing a picket line
would violate a person’s conscience if s/he believed that corporate greed and
contracting out of labour was socially reprehensible and lending to corporate
greed support in its creative efforts to affect the extinction of an integral part of a
healthy social-economy, the middle class labourer.

16. Lastly, EI Questionnaire, form # W060000E-5907714-L (exhibits 5.1 &

5.2), violates section 12 of the Charter, because its existence and the questions it
asks, give false hope for some kind of financial relief. Such false hope is
especially cruel in a protracted dispute. The only question that needs to be put
on the questionnaire to determine EI eligibility is something like “Are you
currently unemployed because your employer is involved in a labour dispute?”
After that question, include a “If yes…” option, that would immediately state that
the applicant is ineligible for benefits. Once the applicant has identified his or her
state of unemployment as being the result of a labour dispute, the need for
questions is both redundant and a kind of twisting the financial knife to people
likely in very stressful circumstances. I have included with this motion record
some additional arguments beyond my original submission, and associated case
law. I have included them as Appendix C.

Part III
STATEMENT OF SUBMISSIONS

17. I have followed the numbering of the submissions as it has been stamped
by the Board of Umpires’ receiver. I have also included a new submission along
with this document, elaborated below and attached as appendix C.

18. I have submitted:

Exhibits 15.2 to 15.26 – Guy Duperreault’s argument;
Evidence documents:
16.1 to 16.27 – TWU Submission to the CIRB dated
September 9th, 2006;
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17.1 to 17.145 – TELUS’s proposed collective agreement

dated April 13th, 2005;
18.1 to 18.217 – rough draft of signed collective agreement
dated November 17th, 2005;
19.1 to 19.8 – “TELUS Team Members Guidelines for
Potential Work Stoppage”;
20.1 to 20.26 – Guy Duperreault’s complaint to the BC Press
Council about a misstatement of fact by The
Vancouver Sun’s editorialist, Fazil Mihlar, and Mihlar’s
proud justification and defense of it. It also includes
Guy Duperreault’s response to Mihlar’s considered
judgement with its power to turn a lie into a truth;
21.1 to 21.4 – The BC Press Council’s dismissal of Guy
Duperreault’s complaint, and Guy Duperreault’s
response;
22.1 to 22.83 – CIRB Decision #317, April 20th, 2005 (Board
File # 24220-C, 24375-C);
and;
Inclusive within exhibits 15.16 to 15.17 is the transcription of
a Canadian Press story on TELUS’s third quarter
financial results.

19. I have also included with this board ordered document, a new submission.
I have included “Section 12 Addendum,” and it is included as Appendix C.

Part IV
THE RELIEF OR ORDER SOUGHT

20. Such consequential relief that may be provided by section 24(1) of the
Charter and/or section 52(1) of the Constitution Act 1982.

21. And;
I seek that the Board of Umpires recognize that the scab legislation gives
to the employer an unfair advantage when it comes to a “break-the-union”
employment dispute, especially, but not exclusively, in the form of a
planned lock out.

22. And;
In that recognition I further seek, as a democratic leveling agent, that
those employees unemployed because of what is evidentially a protracted
“break-the-union” dispute, be eligible for financial relief from EI, and that
the employer attempting to break the union with scab labour be obligated
to pay contributions to EI for each and every uninsured scab who has
been contracted to help break the union.
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23. Or;
In that recognition I further seek, as a democratic leveling agent, that
those employers who have evidentially entered into a protracted “break-
the-union” dispute be obligated to pay to the union compensation at a
percentage of the salary or salaries the employer is paying its uninsured
scabs. I suggest that the compensation to be paid be at a rate somewhat
above the rate that employers would normally be paying EI contributions if
those scabs were in fact regular employers.

24. In this way the financial gains the employer makes during a “break-the-
union” lock out are tempered, and at least a small step towards some semblance
of fiduciary democracy, and away for corporate oligarchy, would be enacted.
This would be, in effect, a kind of employee financial equivalent to what the
employers are allowed to do under 94(2).1 of the Labour Code. The employer
would, under this kind of penalty for protracting a labour dispute, need to
consider carefully the cost-benefits of using scabs, and not simply have to
smugly rely on a blank denial of benefits to help them starve out their unionized
employees.

25. Finally, I seek to have the verbiage of 36(1) of the EI Act changed to allow
discretion to guide its administration. In the future, those applying it need to be
allowed to consider the labour conditions surrounding the dispute, including such
things as the existence of scab legislation and whether or not the employer is
engaged in a “break-the-union” fight by its bargaining position and amount of
planning and expense it is willing to engage in order to “break-the-union.”
Currently most law and penalties that are administered to the parties in a labour
dispute favour the employer, but this is especially the case in “break-the-union”
disputes. And that is discrimination against a recognizable group, the labourer,
and clear violation of the Charter.

Part V
LIST OF AUTHORITIES

1. Hills v. Canada (a.g.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513 (par 44; pg 29) Appendix B-1.
2. Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles - 8.1.1 Appendix A-1.
3. A.G. Canada v Gary Schoen [1981] Docket A-90-81 (pg 3) Appendix B-2.
4. A.G. Canada v. Gary Schoen [1978] CUB 6384 Appendix B-3.
5. R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30 (pg 178) Appendix B-4.
6. Dennis Hills v. Umpire CUB [1983] 8764 Appendix B-5.
7. Dennis Hills v. Umpire Decision Appeal [1984] A-175-84 Court File 19094
Appendix B-6.
8. CIRB Decision [2004] RD0271 (pars 4, 127) Appendix B-7.
9. Canada Labour Code Section 94 Appendix A-2.
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10. TM v. TWU [2004] FCA 438 (pars 72, 76, 83, 84, 87, 106, 112) Appendix B-8.
11. CIRB Decision [2005] RD0317 Appendix B-9.
12. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519,
1993 CanLII 75 (S.C.C.) (II. Section 12) Appendix B-10.

Notes:
The hyperlinks are live to the Federal Court pages upon which the cited
case and statutes were found; the extension text in brackets
locates the pertinent part of the ruling within the authority; and the
alpha-numeric extension refers to the authority’s or stature’s
location within the appendices.
I have included Section 94 of the Labour Code and Chapter 8 of the EI
Digest in French. (I have not included the hyperlinks.)
I have provide all documentation on the accompanying CD labeled
IN THE MATTER of EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
(respondent)

- and -

IN THE MATTER of a claim by GUY DUPERREAULT

(appellant)

- and -

IN THE MATTER of an appeal to an Umpire by the claimant

from a decision by the Board of Referees given on January
30th, 2006, at Burnaby BC (respondent).

On that CD I have, wherever reasonably possible, included all documents

in three formats: MS-Word, RTF and PDF. In some cases, the
originating document was only available in PDF format, which
precluded me from reasonably giving it in the other two formats.