Quality

& @iantity
23: 115-136,
1991.
@ 1991 Kfuwer
A~~~ernic
Publishers.
Printed

115
in the ~etherfa~~s.

A critique of the use of triangulation in social research

NORMAN
Victoria
Australia

W. H. BLAIKIE

University

of Technology,

RMIT

Campus

G.P.O.

Box

2476V,

Melbourne,

Vie. 3001,

Introduction
It has become an accepted practice to use some form of triangulation in
social research, and introductory textbooks on research methods frequently
advocate its use in some form (see, for example, Smith, 1975; Babbie, 1983;
Phillips, 1985).
Discussions about whether and how to combine social research methods
go back to debates about the use of surveys and fieldwork (e.g., Vidich and
Shapiro, 1955; Zelditch, 1962; McCall and Simmons, 1969; Sieber, 1973), or
the use of interviews and participant observation (e.g., Becker and Geer,
1957; Trow, 1957). More recently, the debates about the relationship between qualitative and quantitative methods, particularly in evaluation research, have advocated a combination of methods (e.g., Britan, 1978; Reichardt and Cook, 1979; Ianni and Orr, 1979; Trend, 1979; Filstead, 1979;
Knapp, 1979; Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979; Heilman, 1980; Patton, 1980;
Kidder, 1981, 1987; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Louis, 1982; Madey, 1982).
These debates have led to a renewed interest in the use of triangulation
(e.g., Greene and McClintock, 1985; McClintock and Greene, 1985; Fielding
and Fielding, 1986; Gilk ef al., 1986; Kolevzon er al., 1988; Bryman, 1988).
Even recent texts on ethnography have argued for its use (e.g., Hammersley
and Atkinson, 1983; Burgess, 1984).
The common theme in discussions of triangulation has been the desire to
overcome problems of bias and validity. It has been argued that the deficiencies of any one method can be overcome by combining methods and thus
capitalizing on their individual strengths. However, the use of triangulation
has been plagued with a lack of awareness of the different and incommensurate ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with various theories and methods. While some combinations of methods have been used with
common ontologies and epistemologies, serious problems have been created,
although not usually recognized, when methods based on different assumptions have been used.

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W. H. Blaikie

This paper examines the origins and use of triangulation in social research,
it explores the use of triangulation in navigation and surveying and how this
differs from its use in social research, it outlines a framework of methodological perspectives in order to identify the major differences in ontology and
epistemology, and it then examines the problems which the use of triangulation has produced. Some suggestions are made about what needs to be
done to overcome these problems.

The origins of triangulation

in social research

The use of triangulation, or multiple measures, has been advocated in the

social sciences for nearly three decades. Building on the ideas of Campbell
and Fiske (1959), Webb et al. (1966) wished to overcome the complacent
dependence on single operational definitions of theoretical concepts, and to
supplement the use of the interview or questionnaire with unobtrusive measures that do not require the cooperation of the respondent and that do
not themselves contaminate the response (1966: 2). In claiming that all
research methods are biased, they argued for the use of a collection of
methods (multiple operationalism) which they believed would reduce the
effect of the peculiar biases of each one. Thus, Webb et al. advocated the
use of a triangulation of measurement processes in the search for the validity
of theoretical propositions. When a hypothesis can survive the confrontation
of a series of complementary methods of testing, it contains a degree of
validity unattainable by one tested within the more constricted framework
of a single method (1966: 174).
Denzin (1970a: 13) also argued for the use of multiple methods in the
analysis of the same empirical events, and claimed that each method reveals
different aspects of empirical reality.
No single method is always superior. Each has its own special strengths
and weaknesses. It is time for sociologists to recognise this fact and to
move on to a position that permits them to approach their problems with
all relevant and appropriate methods, to the strategy of methodological
triangulation (Denzin, 1970b: 471).
Denzin has taken the work of Campbell and Fiske, and Webb et al., as his
starting point and has shared their concern with bias and validity. However,
he has gone beyond their use of multiple methods in the study of the same
object, to advocate the use of multiple triangulation which involves a variety
of data sources, investigators, theories and methodologies.2 Denzin also

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117

allowed for within-method triangulation - using various strategies within one

method, such as a survey questionnaire with different scales measuring the
same empirical uniP3 - and between or across-method triangulation which
combines dissimilar methods to measure the same unit. Denzin preferred
the latter because the flaws of one method are often the strengths of
another, and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each,
while overcoming their unique deficiencies (1970a: 308). Thus, the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the assumption that the methods or strategies used will not share the same biases; their assets will be exploited and
their liabilities neutralized (Jick, 1983: 138).
Denzins views on triangulation have been very influential in encouraging
social researchers from a variety of traditions to use a combination of methods and observers in the name of reducing bias and improving validity. His
disciples have, however, adopted his arguments uncritically; it is only recently
that his views have been challenged (e.g., Silverman, 1985; Fielding and
Fielding, 1986).
Theoretical triangulation does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily increase validity. Theories are generally the product of quite different traditions, so when they are combined
one may get a fuller picture, but not a more objective one. Similarly,
different methods have emerged as a product of different theoretical traditions, and therefore combining them can add range and depth, but not
accuracy. In other words, there is a case for triangulation, but not the one
Denzin makes (Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 33).

Triangulation

defined

Neither Denzin nor his mentors acknowledged the source of the triangulation
metaphor. However, later supporters of his position have identified its origin
in navigation, military strategy and surveying (Smith, 1975: 273; Jick, 1983:
136; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 198).
For someone wanting to locate their position on a map, a single landmark
can only provide the information that they are situated somewhere along
a line in a particular direction from the landmark. With two landmarks,
however, their exact position can be pin-pointed by taking bearings on
both landmarks; they are at the point where the two lines cross. In social
research, if one relies on a single piece of data there is the danger that
undetected error in the data-production process may render the analysis

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Norman W. H. Blaikie

incorrect. If, on the other hand, diverse kinds of data lead to the same
conclusion, one can be a little more confident in that conclusion. This
confidence is well founded to the degree that the different kinds of data
have different types of error built into them (Hammersley and Atkinson,
1983: 198).
As we shall see, this statement reveals some of the fallacies in the analogy.
In order to explore this further, a closer examination of the use of triangulation in surveying is required.
Triangulation is used in plane and geodetic surveying as an economical
way of fixing positions on the earths surface.6 In geodetic surveying,
(t)riangulation is the method of location of a point from two others of
known distance apart, given the angles of the triangle formed by the three
points. By repeated application of the principle, if a series of points form
the apices of a chain or network of connected triangles of which the
angles are measured, the lengths of all the unknown sides and the relative
positions of the points may be computed when the length of one of the
sides is known (Clark, 1951: 145).
This kind of triangulation can be distinguished from both intersection and
resection which are used mainly in plane table surveying. Intersection is
used to locate topographical features by observing them from a number of
known positions, thus forming-a triangle in which one side and the adjacent
angles are known and allowing the position of the third point to be plotted
or calculated. Resection is used to fix an unknown position by measuring,
from it, the angles subtended between at least three known positions, or,
less commonly, the true bearings to two known positions.
Whereas resection and intersection are relatively imprecise methods of
fixing positions when more accurate methods cannot or need not be used,
triangulation is an efficient method, of adequate precision, which avoids
excessive and perhaps impossible linear measurement in large scale situations. None of these methods inherently produce more precise results than
some single method; they produce appropriate results in particular circumstances. It is possible in a network of triangles to have more than the
minimum measurements to fix a position, and thus allow for greater accuracy
through a more complex use of the method of least squares for adjusting
errors. However, given the level of sophistication of the measuring instruments used, only minimum measurement is needed to fix unknown positions
at an appropriate level of accuracy. All measurement is of the same kind
and is based on a common ontology and epistemology.

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For the most part, the use of the triangulation metaphor in social research
has distorted its use in surveying. For example, in research on school
classrooms, it has been suggested that triangulation means three points of
view.
Triangulation involves gathering accounts of a teaching situation from
three quite different points of view; namely those of the teacher, his pupils,
and a participant observer. . . . Each point of the triangle stands in a
unique epistemological position with respect to access to relevant data
about a teaching situation. . . . By comparing his own account with accounts from the other standpoints a person at one point of the triangle
has an opportunity to test and perhaps revise it on the basis of more
sufficient data (Elliot and Adelman, 1976: 74).
This use of the metaphor implies three different observers looking at some
phenomenon from three vantage points and subsequently cross-checking
their observations in order to produce a more accurate picture. The nearest
that triangulation in surveying could come to this view is of three observers
at the points of a triangle observing each others position, with the same kind
of instruments. There can be no concept of all three observing a common
phenomenon.
Other uses in social research similarly distort the original
meaning of triangulation.

Methodological

perspectives in sociology: A framework

for analysis

A discussion of triangulation in sociological research is complicated by the

pluralistic nature of contemporary sociology, by its variety of theoretical and
methodological perspectives or paradigms. As we shall see, triangulation is
regarded differently by adherents to the various perspectives. Therefore,
before examining the ontological and epistemological issues in the use of
triangulation in sociology, it will be necessary to lay out a framework of
methodological perspectives.
Our task is further complicated by the fact that there have been a variety
of attempts to characterize these perspectives, with a resulting diversity of
schemes. The purposes of these schemes vary and are not all relevant to
our present concerns. The following framework draws mainly on Johnson et
al. (1984), Halfpenny
(1979), Giddens (1976), Keat and Urry (1975),
Outhwaite (1983a, 1983b, 1987) and Bhaskar (1975, 1979), but the final
descriptions are my own.
The methodological perspectives are defined in terms of their ontology

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W. H. Blaikie

and epistemology, and include reference to the logic of theory construction,

what counts as data, explanations and theory, criteria of validity, and views
on the particular nature of social reality and the relationship between the
natural and social sciences. The cluster of characteristics produced from these
criteria constitutes a set of ideal types.
Positivism

Positivism entails an ontology of events; reality is seen to be constituted of

atomistic, discrete and observable events. Human activity is understood as
observable behaviour taking place in observable, material circumstances.
The world is depicted as a concatenation of antecedent variables which
operate in a law-like manner to produce these events. Social reality is viewed
as a complex of casual relations between events based on an emerging
patchwork of relations between variables. The causes of human behaviour
are regarded as being external to the individual.
In its epistemology, knowledge is seen to be derived from sensory experience by means of experimental or comparative analysis, and concepts and
generalizations are shorthand summaries of particular observations. A correspondence is posited between sensory experiences and the objects of those
experiences, and between constant conjunctions of such objects of experience
(events) and causal laws. These laws are identical with empirical regularities.
Positivism includes two kinds of logic of inquiry: the inductivist and the
hypothetico-deductivist.
Data are sets of values on sets of variables; explanations consist of causal relations between variables; and theory consists of
interrelated sets of causal laws. Validity is based on experience/observation,
although this may have to be controlled by means of experiments or statistical
manipulation. Positivists believe in the unity of the sciences.
Interpretivism

Interpretivism entails an ontology in which social reality is regarded as the

product of processes by which social actors negotiate the meanings for actions
and situations. Human experience is characterized as a process of interpretation rather than sensory, material apprehension of the external physical
world, and human behaviour depends on how individuals interpret the conditions in which they find themselves. Therefore, social reality is not some
thing that may be interpreted in different ways; it is those interpretations.
In its epistemology, knowledge is seen to be derived from everyday meanings and interpretations. At one level, knowledge is derived from a descrip-

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121

tion of these everyday meanings and interpretations. At another level, knowledge is gained by both entering the everyday social world in order to grasp
the socially constructed meanings, and then reconstructing these meanings
in sociological language; sociological constructs are generated from everyday
social constructs. The fundamental epistemological principle is that the integrity of the phenomenon should be retained.
The logic is based on the everyday processes by which individuals make
sense of their own social world. It has the appearance of being inductive but
is more correctly described as a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1976) or as
dialogical (Blaikie and Stacy, 1984). The data of Interpretive sociology are
intentional or every-day rule-governed behaviour and the intersubjective
meanings of actions and situations; explanations consist of descriptions in
terms appropriate to the actors culture; and theory consists of the cultural
rules or norms that constitute the meaningfulness of interaction. Validity is
based on convention - negotiated agreements between social actors - and
the willingness of social actors themselves to find an account of their world
acceptable. Interpretivism
rejects any notion of a methodological unity of
the sciences.
Realism3
In the Realist ontology, the ultimate objects of scientific inquiry are considered to exist and act independently of scientists and their activity. A
distinction is made between the domains of the empirical, the actual and the
real. The empirical is made up of experiences of events through observation:
the actual includes events whether observed or not; and the real consists of
the processes that generate events. It is an ontology of intransitive structures
and mechanisms which are distinguished from transitive concepts, theories
and laws that are designed to describe them. The social world is viewed as
an objective, material structure of relations which is not accessible to direct
observation.
The aim of Realist science is to explain observable phenomena with reference to the underlying structures and mechanisms which constitute reality.
Hence, epistemology is based on the building of models of such mechanisms,
such that if they were to exist and act in the postulated way, they would
account for the phenomenon being examined. These models constitute hypothetical descriptions which, it is hoped, will reveal reality: reality can only
be known by constructing ideas about it. This is an epistemology of laws as
expressing tendencies of things (as opposed to the conjunctions of events of
Positivism).

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W. H. Blaikie

The logic is one of retroduction (in contrast to induction or deduction),

based on the use of analogy and metaphor. Data are the various surface
features of the social world; explanations consist of transformations which
map these features on to underlying real structures; and theory is about
underlying structural relations. Validity is based on the criterion that if it
works it must be true. Realism regards the relationship between social science
and its objects of study as being quite different from the relationship between
the natural sciences and their objects. Science is unified in its method but
differentiated in its objects.
While these methodological perspectives are regarded as being incompatible, they cannot be regarded as three exclusive boxes into which all social
research can be classified. Rather, while they identify the central features of
the major theoretical and methodological traditions within social science,
they highlight the tensions and dilemmas associated with all attempts to
understand and explain social life. Each perspective represents a strategic
bias, but theorizers and researchers, operating essentially within one perspective, appear to be unable to avoid addressing elements of the other perspectives in order to resolve the internal tensions in their work. Hence, according
to Johnson et al. (1984, p. 22-3), the perspectives must be considered as a
complex set of relationships. This argument, however, should not be used
to support sloppy meta-theoretical thinking.

Problems
The inappropriateness
research

of the triangulation

metaphor for sociological

As we have seen, the adoption of the triangulation analogy in Positivistic

and Interpretive sociology is based on the view that it is a method for
overcoming problems of bias and validity. However, the ontological and
epistemological incompatibility of some methods is usually ignored.
In its use in surveying, the various measurements are not only of the same
kind, but they also share a common ontology. Normally, any position requires only the minimum number of measurements to fix it. Insofar as
triangulation may incorporate an excess of measurements to fix a position for example, through an extended network of triangles - it simply allows for
a more precise adjustment of errors due to the limitations of the instruments and the observers, and the vagaries of such factors as air temperature
and pressure. However, such gains are usually small and have nothing to do

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123

with the reconciliation of the so-called bias of a number of different methods

of measurement.
Therefore, the use of the triangulation analogy in social research is misleading: it has usually been concerned with reducing error or bias rather than
simply establishing the existence of some phenomenon, or values on some
variable; it advocates the combination of different methods rather than the
use of a single method; and it ignores the ontological and epistemological
issues which the use of multiple methods can entail and which are absent in
its use in surveying.
The meaning of consistencylconvergence

or its absence

In claiming for triangulation the possibility of more valid measurement, the

advocates need to be able to interpret both convergence of results, or the
lack of such convergence, which follows from the use of different methods
or data sources. If they work with a Positivist ontology, convergence could
be interpreted as each measure being relatively unbiased, but lack of convergence leaves open the question of which measures might be biased. If they
work with an Interpretive ontology, with data from different social actors or
groups, convergence may mean that consensus exists on how reality is
viewed, or that a common social reality is shared, while a lack of convergence
may reflect legitimate and different views of reality, or the habitation of
different social worlds. Such differences cannot be used to attribute bias to
any method, If the advocates work with a Realist ontology, there is no way
that the validity of any empirical data can be established; all measurement
has to be directed and interpreted by the constructed model of reality being
used. In the end, the degree to which any model is a valid representation of
reality will be a matter of judgment.
While acknowledging that it is difficult to decide whether or not results
have converged, Jick (1983) went on to argue that
(t)he process of compiling research material based on multi-methods is
useful whether there is convergence or not. . . . Overall, the triangulating
investigator is left to search for a logical pattern in mixed-method results.
His or her claim to validity rests on judgment. . . . One begins to view the
researcher as builder and creator, piecing together many pieces of a complex puzzle into a coherent whole (Jick, 1983: 144).
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that, regardless of the
methodological perspective adopted, decisions about the relative merits of
different sources of data can only be settled in the context of some theory;
and the choice and application of the theory is a matter of judgment.

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Different

Norman

W. H. Blaikie

views of what it means to combine methods

The recognition of the existence of methods with different ontologies is

a matter of methodological perspective. This is analogous to Halfpennys
argument that conceptions of what is qualitative about social data, and what
is regarded as problems and potentialities for the analysis of qualitative data,
depends on the sociological perspective within which that research is located
(1979: 801, 806). For example, while Positivists may consider that qualitative
data can be converted into quantitative data, that qualitative data are incomplete quantitative data, genuine Interpretivists regard qualitative data as
authentic data in their own right.
The ontological problems of combining different methods, particularly
quantitative and qualitative methods, is not an issue for Positivists; all methods are interpreted within a consistent ontology of variables and causal
relationships. Positivists do not recognize the Interpretive ontology as applying to qualitative methods; when qualitative methods are used, the data can
be translated into variables and quantified. There is likely to be a very
limited concern with socially constructed meanings, and, where there is,
these meanings will be conceived differently than they would be by an
Interpretivist: they will be translated in the same way.
(F)rom the perspective provided by the positivist approach, data that are
qualitative in the sense of describing actors meanings are data about
mental states or events that cause the people under study to behave the
way they do. The problem that data thus conceived present for positivists
is that of obtaining reliable measures of these states or events, and the
solution frequently offered is triangulation. . . . (However), (m)eanings of
actions are not the same as the mental states of the actors (Halfpenny,
1979: 815-816).
Therefore, Positivists and Interpretivists conceive and act on subjective
data differently.
The genuine Interpretivist will not find triangulation, as expounded by
Denzin for example, an attractive proposition; issues of bias and validity
have different meanings from those presented by the Positivists. With an
ontology that allows for multiple realities (Schutz, 1962). and an epistemology that recognizes that accounts of any social world are relative in time and
space, and to the observer, the use of multiple data sources and multiple
observers does not solve the problems posed by the Positivists. Interpretivists
do not share the same concerns, i.e., they are not likely to use triangulation
to reduce bias and increase validity. In addition, Blumer (1969) has argued

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125

that the participant observation/case study method is both the necessary and
sufficient method for symbolic interactionist research (Williams, 1976: 127).
It is only recently that these issues have been recognised by some practitioners (for example, Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Smith, 1983a, 1983b: Bednarz,
1985; Greene and McClintock, 1985).
(W)e suggest that triangulation is possible only within paradigms, that any
effort to compare or integrate findings from different methods requires
the prior adoption of one paradigm or the other, even when . . . the
methods themselves are linked to and implemented within alternative
paradigms (Greene and McClintock, 1985: 541).
Invariably,
qualitative

this paradigm is Positivism, as is the case for the integration

and quantitative methods generally.

The incompatibility

of

of absolutist and relativist ontologies.

There is a tendency amongst the advocates of triangulation, both Positivists

and Interpretivists, to assume an absolute reality, with each method providing
a view of some aspect of it. Even the position advocated recently by Fielding
and Fielding (1986) is essentially Positivist and therefore absolutist.
The Positivist approach to triangulation can be illustrated in a study conducted by Jick (1979a; reported in Jick, 1979b and 1983) on the effects of
organizational mergers on employees. He wished to document and examine
the sources and symptoms of anxiety associated with job insecurity. A triangulation approach was adopted covering both feelings and behaviour,
direct and indirect reports, obtrusive and unobtrusive observation.
The research package used in the investigation of the dynamics of
anxiety and job insecurity included many standard features. Surveys were
distributed to a random sample of employees. They contained a combination of standard and new indices related to stresses and strains. To
complement these data, a subsample was selected for the purpose of
semistructured, probing interviews. The survey also contained items related to the symptoms of anxiety as weil as projective measures. These
were developed to be indirect, nonthreatening techniques. In addition to
self reports, interviews were conducted with supervisors and coworkers to
record their observations of employees anxiety (Jick, 1983: 140-141).
An unobtrusive measure was also used. based on the use by employees of
an archives library, in order to compare current news reports and memoranda

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Norman

W. H. Blaikie

regarding the organizations

that

future with past pronouncements.

Jick assumed

(m)ost employees were apparently seeking information to relieve their

anxiety about the uncertain shape of things to come. Hence these visits to
the archives were treated as expressions of employee anxiety, a thermometer of anxiety level in the organization. The search for information
seemed to represent an attempt to reduce uncertainty. It was hypothesized
that the more people who visited the archives to use the files, the higher
the anxiety level (Jick, 1983: 141).
This study is typical of a Positivists use of triangulation in which quantitative
and qualitative methods are combined, although, in contrast to most other
uses of combined methods, Jick saw quantitative results supplementing qualitative data. It is also typically Positivistic in the way in which qualitative data
are used within Positivistic assumptions. For example, assumptions were
made about the meaning of employee visits to the archives. It turned out
that those employees who were shown to be most stressed by self reports,
were least likely to visit the archives. The disconfirmation of the hypothesis
was later explained in terms of level of education; the poorly educated
tending to rely more on oral communication than written documents. However, another possible explanation is that those who used the archives were
trade union leaders or political activists who happened to be better educated.
Without a truly Interpretive approach to this problem, no adequate understanding can be achieved. Changing the assumptions, and introducing new
variables and correlations, is like trying to navigate in a fog.
Therefore, while Positivists can work with consistent ontological and epistemological assumptions in combining quantitative and qualitative methods,
their uses of qualitative methods tend to be restricted and thus fail to achieve
their full potential.

Confusion of perspectives
The discussion of these four problems reveals a great deal of ignorance
or misunderstanding
about the significance of the role of methodological
perspectives in social research generally, and in the use of triangulation in
particular. The orthodox use of triangulation, derived mainly -from Denzin,
has perpetuated a great deal of confused claims for research in which it has
been used.
In spite of the fact that Denzin accepted the symbolic interactionists

Tria~g~l~~io~

127

position that social reality is a social process and that it therefore changes
over time, he also adopted an absolutist view of reality in terms of the
notion of common units of observation which are social objects in the
environment of the scientist (Denzin, 1970a: 298). He considered that each
method reveals different aspects of reality.
Denzin created many dilemmas for himself in consciously or unconsciously
trying to marry Interpretive and Positivist ontologies and epistemologies. In
his eclecticism and concern with the reunification of symbolic interactionism,
Denzin adopted essentially Positivistic assumptions under an Interpretive
umbrella. He abdicated the Interpretivist concern for the primacy of meaning in favour of a Positivist concern for validity and bias.
From the point of view of what he would regard as a genuine Interpretivist
position, Douglas (1971) has criticized the waywardness of many interactionists on the issue of ontology.
The genera1 problem of the interactionist tradition of thought and research
is that its practitioners have rarely seen clearly and consistently the fundamental theoretical and methodological differences between a positivistic
(absolutist) sociology and a phenomenological or existential sociology. As
a result, their works are repeatedly vitiated by allowing positivistic methods
and ideas to dominate and distort the phenomenological strain of Meads
own works. This is seen especially in their immediate and persistent concern with the causation of items of behaviour . . . , the easy use of
modified ideas of hypothesis testing and verification, the imposition of
ideas of self-lodging on the social actors, and the immediate (and unexpected) translation of everyday statements into abstract, theoretical statements. , . . (T)here remains a great difference between taking everyday life
as the primary reality (but partially studying this reality with conventional
absolutist methods and ideas) and systematically studying it in such ways
as to consistently retain the integrity of the phenomena (Douglas, 1971:
18).
In his critique of Denzins style of symbolic interactionism,
noted Denzins use of method triangulation to

Silverman (1985)

overcome partial views and present something like a complete picture.

Underlying this suggestion is, ironically, . . . elements of a positivist frame
of reference which assumes a single (undefined) reality and treats accounts
as multiple mappings of this reality.
For an interactionist, . . . without bias there would be no phenomenon.
Consequently, . . . actions and accounts are situated. The sociologists

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Norman W. H. Blaikie

role is not to adjudicate between participants competing versions but to

understand the situated work that they do. . . . Of course, this does not
imply that the sociologist should avoid generating data in multiple
ways. . . . The mistake only arises in using data to adjudicate between
accounts (Silverman, 1985: 105-106).
As followers of Denzins approach to triangulation, Hammersley and Atkinson have perpetuated this same confusion in their discussion of validity in
ethnography, but at least they have suggested that (o)ne should not . . .
adopt a naively optimistic view that the aggregation of data from different
sources will unproblematically add up to produce a more complete picture
(1983: 199). They have recognized that differences between sets of data
derived from different sources, or by different methods, may be important
and illuminating, but they are ultimately concerned with some notion of
absolute truth.
(D)ata must never be taken at face value. It is misleading to regard some
as true and some as false. Rather, . . . what is involved in triangulation
is not just a matter of checking whether inferences are valid, but of
discovering which inferences are valid (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:
200).
An example of the reluctance of an Interpretivist to accept accounts at face
value can be found in Wests (1979) research on the labeling of epilepsy. He
wished to uncover the subjective reality relating to troubles experienced
by parents with an epileptic child. In order to overcome his uneasiness in
accepting parental accounts at face value, he undertook two sub-studies to
test their validity; an observational study of doctor-patient interaction in outpatient clinics to validate parental perceptions of doctors, and a streetsurvey of the knowledge, ideas, and images of epilepsy of the general public
to validate the views parents had about epilepsy before their childs first
seizure.
The kind of dilemma faced by West is, on the one hand, trying to retrieve
what really happened, and, on the other hand, analysing how understanding
is constructed and conveyed by social actors, in the light of whatever it was
that they understood to have happened. As Halfpenny (1979) has observed,
West was trying to be both an ethnomethodologist
and a Denzinian interpretivist. In the latter he is caught up in both Positivist and Interpretive perspectives.
West is concerned to validate parents accounts of their perceptions

of

Triangulation

129

doctors by triangulation. . . . Here, from a positivist perspective, West

seems concerned to establish an accurate measure of the parents mental
images of doctors. . . . But Wests work can also be seen to be informed
by the interpretive approach. From the interpretive perspective, doubts
about accepting accounts at face value are due, firstly, to recognizing
that the parties to an interaction have differential power to enforce their
definition of the situation at the expense of the definitions of other parties.
It is here that triangulation becomes relevant within the interpretivist
approach, as a means of sustaining the plausibility and thereby increasing
the credibility of the definitions of the situation of the less powerful.
Also, within the perspective of the interpretivist approach, doubts about
accepting accounts at face value are, secondly, doubts about having
grasped the culturally appropriate meanings of the actions under study
(Halfpenny, 1979: 820).
In contrast to these confused uses of triangulation,
Cicourel (1973) has
advocated a specific use in ethnomethodology
that is internally consistent; it
is very different from its use by either Positivists, so-called Interpretivists,
or ethnomethodologists
such as West. Cicourel called this indefinite triangulation which was devised to reveal the irreparable but practical nature of
accounts used by subjects and researchers (1973: 124). In essence, this
use of triangulation involves subjects, researcher and typists, using audio
recordings and transcripts of conversations to produce a variety of versions
of the original interaction. The indefinite triangulation notion attempts to
make visible the practicality and inherent reflexivity of everyday accounts
(Cicourel, 1973: 124).
Cicourel illustrated this procedure by gathering information on the language acquisition of young children in the home setting. Mother and child
were tape recorded for one hour during lunch. The tape was transcribed
verbatim and the transcript read by the mother while listening to the tape:
her comments were recorded to produce another version. The typist listened
to the tape again and described what she thought was going on: she corrected
her original transcript where she felt this was necessary. Phonetic transcription produced another version.
With a number of different versions of an interaction scene, the problem is
deciding which version captures the childs language, the childs referencing
ability, the parents constructions, and so on.
The reader could now say that we should simply combine the different
versions to produce the best one possible, but the point is that different
versions could have been produced indefinitely by simply hiring different

130

Norman

W. H. Blaikie

typists and providing the mother with different transcripts (Cicourel, 1973:
124).
This use of triangulation is consistent with the ontological and epistemological
assumptions of ethnomethodology.
But the question arises as to why it should
be called triangulation,
The question of whether it is possible to combine methods from different
methodological perspectives is now being examined more seriously. For
example, in his critique of attempts to integrate quantitative and qualitative
methods, Smith (1983) supported the view that research undertaken from a
quantitative (Positivist) perspective is different from that using an interpretive perspective.
Each approach sponsors different procedures and has different epistemological implications. One approach takes a subject-object position on the
relationship to subject matter; the other takes a subjective position. One
separates facts and values, while the other perceives them as inextricably
mixed. One searches for laws, and the other seeks understanding. These
positions do not seem to be compatible given our present state of thinking
(Smith, 1983: 12).
Thus, the quantitative-qualitative
debate has forced researchers to address
the epistemological question of what counts as knowledge. If researchers
do not discuss this question, they are forfeiting any participation in determining the basis for the authority of their knowledge (Smith, 1983: 12-13). In
the context of evaluation research, Bednarz (1985) has argued that
there is reason to believe that qualitative and quantitative approaches
cannot be synthesized because they occupy alternative - rather than complementary - philosophical spaces. . . . Any synthesis must necessarily adopt
the perspective of one or the other, so that any effort to reach a middle
ground does so only in terms of a single perspective (Bednarz, 1985: 28990).
With reference specifically to the use of triangulation,

he stated that

successful cross-philosophy triangulation is not possible, because of the

necessity of subsuming one approach to another. . . . Nor can the researcher pick one aspect of an approach and one from another without
making - explicitly or implicitly - commitments regarding these matters
(Bednarz, 1985: 304).

Triangulation

131

Conclusion

It should be clear from the above analysis that triangulation is much more
problematic for eclectic Interpretivists, unreflective ethnographers, and wayward ethnomethodologists
than it is for Positivists, or possibly for Realists;
it has no relevance for genuine Interpretivists and ethnomethodologists.
The
failure to recognize the implications of using incompatible ontologies and
epistemologies has led either to a muddy confusion about bias and validity (in
the case of eclectic Interpretivists) or false pretensions about what combining
quantitative and qualitative methods means (in the case of the Positivists).
It should also be clear that triangulation means many things to many people
and that none of the uses in sociology bears any resemblance to its use in
surveying.
It is legitimate, and it may be useful, to use multiple methods within a
particular methodological perspective (e.g., in the development of attitude
scales), or different data sources, provided they are used consistently within
one perspective (Bednarz, 1985: 304), but it is not legitimate, and it creates
considerable confusion, to use methods drawn from different methodological
perspectives. However, this leaves open the possibility of using different
methods sequentially, such that each in turn provides a basis for the development of subsequent stages of the research process (see, for example, Zelditch, 1962; Sieber, 1973; Ianni and Orr, 1979; Madey, 1982: Burgess, 1984).
But as Greene and McClintock have pointed out, this can hardly be called
triangulation as the methods are deliberately interactive, not independent,
and they are applied singly over time so that they may not be measuring the
same phenomenon (1985: 525).
All this suggests a need:
(1) for a moratorium on the use of the concept of triangulation in social
research:
(2) to identify appropriate and inappropriate combinations of methods and
data sources, in light of the incommensurability
of ontological and epistemological assumptions of methodological perspectives; and,
(3) to develop suitable new labels for these appropriate combinations.

Notes
Various
ationalism
(Douglas.

other terms have been used to refer to the same procedure,

e.g.. multiple
oper(Webb
et al., 1966), combined
operations
(Stacey.
1969). mixed
strategies
1976). and multiple
strategies
(Burgess.
1982. 1984).

132

Norman W. H. Blaikie

* Denzin used the terms method, methodology and methodological interchangeably thus
failing to distinguish between techniques of data gathering and the critical examination of the
methods which are claimed to produce valid knowledge.
s This term of Denzins seems to imply a concern with variables rather than social processes.
4 The fallacies of this argument will be taken up later.
The author is a registered land surveyor and a member of the New Zealand Institute of
Surveyors. He practiced in New Zealand and Malaysia for 16 years before taking up sociology
as a career.
Surveying is the art of making such measurements of the relative positions of points on the
surface of the earth that, on drawing them down to scale, natural and artificial features may be
exhibited in their correct horizontal and vertical relationships (Clark, 1946: 1). The Art of
Surveying comprises the making of measurements on a large scale with a facility and accuracy
which require special training. (It) comprises the selection of the measurements to be made and
the method of making them with a view to their use in solving problems of various kinds, usually
in connection with the definition of boundaries of land or the design of engineering works
(Foxall, 1957: 4). There is no such thing as absolute measurement; all observations are subject
to unavoidable deviations from accuracy due to imperfections in instruments. limitations in
power of observations, etc. Errors need to be distinguished from mistakes.
Geodetic surveying is concerned with the precise measurement of the positions on the earths
surface of a system of widely separated points. The relative positions of these points in terms
of distance and direction, and their absolute position in terms of latitude, longitude and elevation
above mean sea level, provide a framework of controls in which more localized forms of
surveying and engineering can take place.
s Plane tabling is a method of surveying by which maps are created through the simultaneous
use of field observations and plotting. It was employed extensively for recording topographical
features.
See, for example, Ritzer (1975). Keat and Urry (1975). Smart (1976). Benton (1977), Cuff
and Payne (1979). Haralambos (1980). Hughes (1980). and Johnson et al. (1984).
I Johnson er al. (1984) addressed the theoretical fragmentation in sociology by developing a
matrix of solutions to the fundamental ontological and epistemological questions. This matrix
consisted of four categories: empiricism. subjectivism, substantialism and rationalism.
They argued for a synthesis and pointed to the work of Giddens (1976) and Bhaskar (1979) as
the most recent influential moves in this direction. Halfpenny (1979) developed his scheme as
a basis for an analysis of the relationship between qualitative and quantitative data. He identified
four broad approaches: positivist, interpretivist.
ethnomethodology
and structuralist.
My category of positivism is similar to empiricism and positivist: interpretivism
is
similar to subjectivism and interpretivist:
(with ethnomethodology
included as a subtype): and realism is similar to substantialism and structuralist. As the use of triangulation
has been confined to positivism and interpretivism,
the realism type will receive only
limited attention, and Johnsons er a/.~ rationalist category is not included in the text.
For a discussion of the varieties of positivism. see. for example. Halfpenny (1982) and Bryant
(1985).
*This description applies to the hermeneutic and symbolic interactionist versions of interpretivism. but less consistently to ethnomethodology. While some analysts have kept symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology as separate perspectives (for example, Cuff and Payne. lY7Y:
Halfpenny, 1979: and Bednarz,l985), in this analysis they have been kept together on the
grounds that the differences between them are much less than between the perspectives of
Positivism, Interpretivism and Realism.
This description is based mainly on Bhaskars work (1975. lY79). including reviews by Outhwaite (1983a, 1987). Other versions of realist social science can be found in Harre (lY70. 1972,
1986), Keat and Urry (1975). Benton (1977, 1981) and Sayer (1984).
The use of triangulation in surveying assumes positions are fixed on a horizontal plane or on
a spherical surface. It could be argued that if applied within the Realist perspective. triangulation

Triangulation

133

should occur vertically as it is the nature of underlying structures that is of concern. Perhaps
the analogy of depth sounding would be more appropriate.
Hovland (1959) has argued that differences in results from experimental and survey studies
of attitude change can be accounted for in a way that does not require a judgment of bias of
either method. Rather, the differences were due to different definitions of communication
situations and differences in the type of communicator, audience, and the kind of issue utilised.
However, his comparisons were between different studies rather than the use of the two methods
within the same study.
IhThis is an inherent problem for the Realist perspective. regardless of issues associated with
triangulation.
While this is not uncommon for followers of the Iowa School of symbolic interactionism
(Douglas, 1971; Wilson, 1971: Williams. 1976), it can also be found in the method advocated
by interpretivists such as Glaser and Strauss (1967).
*The same can be said of the method of back translation used in the anthropological analysis
of texts or dialogue (Werner and Campbell, 1973: Fielding and Fielding. 1986).

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