Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
PEOPLE
G.R Nos. 156547-51. February 4, 2008
38 Phil. 182
FACTS:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the amount loaned out was private in nature.
RULING:
Yes, the loan was private in nature because Art. 1953 of the New
Civil Code provides that a person who receives a loan of money or any
other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
The fact that the petitioner-Governor contracted the loan, the public
fund changed its nature to private character, thus it is not malversation
which is the subject of this case, instead it must be a simple collection of
money suit against the petitioner in case of non payment . therefore, the
petitioner is acquitted for the crime of malversation.
Leung Ben vs. OBrien
G.R. No. L-13602, April 6, 1918
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money
won at gaming is an obligation from contract, express or implied.
HELD:
The duty of the defendant to refund the money which he won from
the plaintiff at gaming is not an obligation from contract, express or
implied rather it is a duty imposed by statute. Upon general principles,
recognized both in civil and common law, money lost at gaming and
voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner cannot, in the absence of statute,
be recovered in a civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine
Commission, which defines and penalizes several forms of gambling,
containing numerous provisions recognizing the right to recover money lost
in gambling or in the playing of certain games. The obligation of the
defendant to restore or refund the money which he won from the plaintiff at
gaming therefore arises ex lege.
relation whatsoever with them, and on the day she gave birth she was in the
house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances. Thus, the defendants prayed that they be absolved
from the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred the answer and that the lower court sustained
the demurrer directing the defendants to amend their answer. In compliance,
the defendants amended their answer denying each and every allegation
contained in the complaint. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of
the defendants absolving them from the complaint.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the parents-in-law are under any obligation to
pay the fees claimed by the plaintiff.
HELD:
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by
virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of
any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such
obligation might have arisen.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised
among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual
support. When either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish
the necessary services of a physician in order that the health may be
restored; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore, liable for all
the expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional
services. The liability arises from the obligation, which the law has
expressly established, between married couples. It is therefore the husband
of the patient who is bound to pay for the services of the plaintiff. The fact
that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested the
medical assistance for his wife is no bar to his fulfillment of such
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to which the
life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that the medical
assistance was urgently needed. Therefore, plaintiff should direct his action
against the husband of the patient, and not against her parents-in-law.
FACTS:
Private respondent Evangelista contracted Petitioner ASJ
Corporation for the incubation and hatching of eggs and by products owned
by Evangelista Spouses. The contract includes the scheduled payments of
the service of ASJ Corporation that the amount of installment shall be paid
after the delivery of the chicks. However, the ASJ Corporation detained the
chicks because Evangelista Spouses failed to pay the installment on time.
ISSUE:
Was the detention of the alleged chicks valid and recognized under
the law?
RULING:
ISSUE:
No, because ASJ Corporation must give due to the Evangelista
Spouses in paying the installment, thus, it must not delay the delivery of the
chicks. Thus, under the law, they are obliged to pay damages with each
other for the breach of the obligation.
No. The petitioner being a lawyer must know the legal procedure
for the recovery of possession of the alleged mortgaged property in which
said procedure must be conducted through judicial action. Furthermore, the
petitioner acted in malice and intent to cause damage to the respondent
when even without probable cause, he still instituted an act against the law
on mortgage.
Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Filart for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts ruling that Ms.
Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked
to him politely and discreetly. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim
to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of
Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she
acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Ms.
Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Had respondent simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the
police to take him out.
be acted in strict compliance therewith. Thus, the CBA in this case is the
law between the employers and their employees.
Therefore, there was no overpayment when there was an increase of
salary for the members of the union simultaneous with the increasing of
minimum wage for workers in the National Capital Region. The CBA
should be followed thus, the senior employees who were first promoted as
regular employees shall be entitled for the increase in their salaries and the
same with lower rank workers.
ISSUES:
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer
science student of Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. She enrolled Logic and Statistics subjects
under Rachelle Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed The
Rave Party and Dance Revolution the proceeds which were to go to the
construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00 each. The project
was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay
were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebration, Regino refused to pay tickets. On March 14
and 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of examinations in Logics and Statistics,
the teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. Petitioner then
filed as pauper litigant, a complaint for damages against PCST. She prayed
for P500,000.00 as nominal; P500,000.00 as moral and at least
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts
means the exculpation of the petitioners from liability.
HELD:
FACTS:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death,
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Substantially,
the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for
the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA,
are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners contention and
thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. Said
decision of the respondent appellate court was primarily anchored on the
law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.
well as to vacate and surrender the premises to the respondent. When the
petitioner refused to comply with its demand, the respondent filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City a complaint for illegal detainer.
The petitioner, in its answer to the complaint, raised the defense that, under
the contract, it had the right to sublease the premises upon prior written
consent by the respondent and payment of transfer fees. However, the
respondent, without any justifiable reason, refused to allow the petitioner to
sublease the premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to sublease the premises.
HELD:
FACTS:
On
31
March
1981,
petitioner
Bricktown
Development Corporation executed two contracts to sell in
favor of petitioner Tierra Corp. covering a total of 96
residential lots situated at the Multinational Village
Subdivision, La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila. The
total price of P21,639,875.00 was stipulated to be paid by
private respondent in such amount and maturity dates, as
follows; P2,200,000.00 on March 31, 1981, P3, 209, 965.75
on 30 June 1981, P4, 729, 906.25 on 31 December 1981,
and the balance of P11, 500,000.00 to be paid by means of
an assumption by private respondent of petitioners
corporations mortgage liability to the Philippine Saving
Bank or, alternatively, to be made payable in cash. On even
date 31 March 1981, the parties executed a supplemental
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the contracts to sell were
validly rescinded or cancelled by Petitioner Corporation.
HELD:
The contracts to sell were validly rescinded by
Petitioner Corporation. In fine, while we must conclude
that petitioner corporation still acted within its legal right
to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled,
considering, nevertheless, the peculiar circumstances
reply on 16 February 1993, PRHC suddenly denied any liability for the
escalation price. In the same letter, it claimed that LCDC had incurred 111
days of delay in the construction of the Tektite Building and demanded that
the latter pay P 39,326,817.15 as liquidated damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LCDC was delayed in the performance of its
obligation to construct the buildings for PRHC .
HELD:
The Court held that A subsequent escalation agreement was validly
entered into by the parties, but only to the extent of P 36 million. LCDC
was able to establish that Abcede and Santos, on behalf of PRHC, had
signed the letter-agreement containing the stipulation on the escalation.
PRHC does not question the validity of these agreements; it thereby
effectively admits that these two individuals had actual authority to sign on
its behalf with respect to these construction projects. Thus, the lack of
authority on their part should not be used to prejudice it, considering that
the two were clothed with apparent authority to execute such agreements. In
addition, PRHC is allegedly barred by promissory estoppel from denying
the claims of the other corporation.
The Court further held that LCDC is not liable for liquidated
damages for delay in the construction of the buildings for PRHC. There is
no question that LCDC was not able to fully construct the Tektite Building
and Projects 1, 2, and 3 on time. The shortage in supplies and cement may
be characterized as force majeure. In the present case, hardware stores did
not have enough cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of
the construction in the 1990s.
TITAN-IKEDA VS. PRIMETOWN
G.R No. 158768
February 12, 2008
FACTS:
FACTS:
HELD:
As a lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association.
No application for membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the
Board of Directors is a ministerial function considering that PADCOM is
deemed to be a regular member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to
the automatic membership clause annotated in the Certificate of Title of the
property and the Deed of Transfer. PADCOMs contention that the
automatic membership clause is a violation of its freedom of association
because it was never forced to join the association is likewise untenable.
Nobody forced it to buy the land when it bought the building with the
annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and
accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and
respect the condition, and thus to join the Association.
Having ruled that PADCOM is a member of the Association, it is obligated
to pay its dues incidental thereto as mandated by Article 1159 of the Civil
Code which states that obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.
Assuming in gratis argumenti that PADCOM is not a member of the
Association, it cannot evade payment without violating the equitable
principles underlying quasi-contracts. Article 2142 of the Civil Code
provides that certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
MC Engineering, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002
380 SCRA 116
FACTS:
Mc Engineering, Inc. and Surigao Coconut Development
Corporation signed a contract, for the restoration of the latters building,
land improvement, electrical, and mechanical equipment located at Lipata,
Surigao City, which was damaged by typhoon Nitang. Defendant Mc
Engineering and plaintiff Gerent Builders, Inc. entered into an agreement
exercise his right of retention under 1731 of the Civil Code. The checks
were dishonored thus the private respondent could not give validity to
petitioners argument that the former has waived or abandoned his liens on
the vessels. To pursue such view would put a premium on an act of
deception which led private respondent to believe that he will be fully paid.
Furthermore, when the checks were dishonored, it was impossible for
private respondent to enforce his liens because the vessels were already in
Japan, outside the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine waters. If there was
no intention on the part of PBTC (BPI) to assume responsibility for these
obligations at the time of the sale of the vessels, there is no sense in
executing said Deed of Confirmation together with the Deeds of Sale and
the stipulations thereunder would be pointless.
The repairs made on the vessels ultimately redounded to the benefit
of the new owner (BPI) for without said repairs, those vessels would not be
seaworthy. Under Article 2124 of the Civil Code, such acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another.The petitioner bank is
answerable to Pineda for the services contracted on the vessels.
State Investment vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 90676, June 19, 1991
198 SCRA 392
ISSUE:
Who should be liable for the payment of the cost of repairs
undertaken in the subject vessels?
HELD:
FACTS:
ABELLANA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana extended a loan to private
respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), secured by
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in
Cebu City.Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by
spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City
allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.
Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold
the lots to third persons.On August 12, 1999, respondent spouses filed a
complaint charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document.
The RTC found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the
spouses Alonto and that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification
of a Public Document by a private individual under Article 172(1)in relation
to Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code and not Estafa through
falsification of public document as charged in the Information.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was accused for the crime of rape against his
niece. The incident was repeated trice by the appellant. The appellant
contended that he and the victim were sweethearts but the trial court did not
give weight to that theory.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime of four counts of
qualified rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for each
count of rape, to pay P300,000.00 as civil indemnity (P75,000.00 for each
count), and P200,000.00 as moral damages (P50,000.00 for each count).
The CA however modified the findings of the RTC declaring that appellant
is guilty of four counts of simple rape and to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Supreme Court modified the award for damages by the trial
court. It reduced the award to P112, 413.40 representing funeral expenses,
which were duly proven and covered by receipts Expenses relating to the
9th day, 40th day and 1st year anniversaries cannot be considered in the
award of actual damages as these were incurred after a considerable lapse of
time from the burial of the victim. With respect to the award of moral
damages, the same is reduced to P50, 000.00 in accordance with existing
jurisprudence.
Based on the above modifications the court ordered the accused to
pay the heirs of the victim P112, 413.40 as actual damages P50, 000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P50, 000.00 as moral damages plus costs.
FACTS:
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the accused from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the sum of P50, 000.00 as indemnity for his death; the sum of P227, 808.80
as actual damages for expenses incurred for hospitalization, doctors fees,
funeral expenses, vigil and burial as a result of his death, and P300, 000.00
as moral damages for the pain and mental anguish suffered by the heirs by
reason of his death, all indemnifications being without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial courts award for damages is proper.
Whether or not the trial courts award of damages is proper.
HELD:
The Supreme Court modified the trial courts award for damages.
The trial court awarded only 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, but current
jurisprudence has fixed at P100, 000.00 the civil indemnity in cases of rape
with homicide, which is fully justified and properly commensurate with the
seriousness of the special complex crime.
The trial court did not award moral damages to the victims family.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages may be awarded to the
heirs of the victim without need for pleading or proof of its basis for their
mental, physical and psychological sufferings are too obvious to still require
their recital at the trial. Hence, moral damages in the amount of P50, 000.00
must be awarded.
In People v. Lagarto, the court held that attendant circumstances
may be considered to determine civil liability. Thus, in view of the evident
cruelty inflicted upon the victim, as shown by the multiple burns and
contusions on her body, the court granted the award of exemplary damages
in the amount of P25, 000.00.
Based on the above modifications, the Court ordered the accused to
pay the heirs of the victim P100, 00.00 as civil indemnity; P50, 000.00 as
moral damages; P25, 000.00 as exemplary damages; and P6, 425.00 as
actual damages.
Reynaldo Bermudez vs. Hon. Judge A. Melencio-Herrera
G.R. No. L-32055, February 26, 1988
158 SCRA 168
FACTS:
A cargo truck driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova
Ng Sun Kwan bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of
plaintiff-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his
death. As a result, a criminal case for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscals
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right
in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them
from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
People of the Philippines vs. Relova
HELD:
In the present case, accused Opulencia freely admitted during the
police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation
and use of unauthorized electric connections or devices. While the accused
pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny
having appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence in the
record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by the
accused. Accordingly, the civil action which has not been waived impliedly
or expressly should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas
City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencio and rendition of judgment
conformably with such evidence.
Manantan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001
350 SCRA 387
FACTS:
After going from one place to another and consuming large amounts
of beer, the accused, the deceased, and two others boarded on the car of the
accused where he was the driver. Driving at a high speed at the middle
portion of the highway and trying to overtake tricycle. At such speed, the
accused was not able to avoid the passenger jeepney and thus collided with
it. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move
his body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the
oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road.
The trial court decided in favor of the accused. However, the Court
of Appeals modified the decision of the lower court, in that defendantappellee is held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his
car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident and sentenced
to indemnify plaintiff-appellants in the amount of P174, 400.00 for the
death of Ruben Nicolas
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that petitioners
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability.
(2)
Whether or not the Court a quo erred in finding that petitioners
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability.
(3)
Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in
finding to apply the Manchester doctrine.
promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24,
1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
HELD:
The court of appeals in determining whether Article 29 of the Civil
Code applied was not precluded by the petitioners acquittal, from looking
into the question of petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence. What
was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil
aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. Therefore, there was
no second jeopardy to speak of.
The decision in Criminal Case No 066 supports the conclusions of
the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
the civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. It clearly shows
that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had
not been established with moral centainty.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution
of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule III, Section 1 of
the 1964 Rules of Court. Where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the
filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the
criminal complaint or information.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia which held that the criminal liability in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability; and therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability.
HELD:
In People v. Castillo, The Court resolved this issue stating Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code which states that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. As to the personal penalties and as
to the pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
The legal import of the term final judgment is similarly reflected in
the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of the legal body mention the
term final judgment in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that
the judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal.
Since the death of the accused occurred while his appeal is pending,
the decision has not yet become final and executory; thus, his civil liability
together with his criminal liability is extinguished. However, if the civil
obligation arises from other sources of obligation other than the crime
complained of, the civil liability of the accused survived in spite of his
death pending his appeal. A preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove
his civil liability.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo
is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only
subsidiary, as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the
person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case.
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
their servants. It is but right that they should guarantee the latters careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of the others.
HELD:
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct legal
institution under the Civil Code with substantivity of it own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may
be safely anchored.
To hold that there is only one way to make the employers liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his properties is
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but
there is also an expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
responsibility of employers and presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully
chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC
of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation
and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising
from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
respondent's husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body
No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation,
and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, in her
own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages
against petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment
expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle's
repair, attorney's fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.
FACTS:
HELD:
YES. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate
in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests
were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It
also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents. The Court also affirmed the CA's decision in awarding civil
indemnity for the death of respondent's husband, temperate damages, and
moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition
to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent.
A Prime Mover Trailer suffered a tire blow out during the night of
its travel at a national highway. The trailer was owned by the respondent
Liberty Forest. The driver allegedly put earl warning devices but the only
evidence being witnessed was a banana trunks and candles. Since the car
was placed at the right wing of the road, thus it cause the swerving of a
Nissan van owned by the petitioner when a passenger bus was coming in
between the trailer. The Nissan van owner claimed for damages against the
respondent. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the three way
accident is the negligence and carelessness of driver of the respondent .
However reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether there was negligence on the part of the respondent.
RULING:
RULING:
Yes. There was negligence on the part of the respondent when the
latter failed to put and used an early warning device because it was found
out that there was no early warning device being prescribed by law that was
used by the driver in order to warn incoming vehicle. Furthermore, the
proximate cause of the accident was due to the position of the trailer where
it covered a cemented part of the road, thus confused and made trick way
for other vehicles to pass by. Thus the respondent is declared liable due to
violation of road rules and regulations.
Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or
omission of an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasidelicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the employer must
prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his
employees.
FACTS:
The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She
was also a licensed-fire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was
entering the bank to renew her time deposit and along with her was her
firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the bank, upon knowing that the
victim carries a firearm, the security guard shot the victim causing the
latters instant death. The heirs of the victim filed a criminal case against
security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to
observe diligence of a goof father implied upon the act of its agent.
ISSUE:
Whether Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its
FACTS:
In 1991, a collision was made by a green Mitsubishi lancer owned
by Ocfemia against a silver Mitsubishi lancer driven by Leandro Domingo
and owned by petitioner Priscilla Domingo. The incident caused the car of
Domingo bumped another two parked vehicles. A charged was filed against
Ocfemia and the owner Villanueva. Villanueva claimed that he must not be
held liable for the incident because he is no longer the owner of the car, that
it was already swapped to another car . however, the trial court ordered the
petitioner to pay the damages incurred by the silver Mitsubishi lancer car.
agent.
ISSUE:
petitioner, thus the truck owner is liable for the damage to the jeep of the
petitioner.
RULING:
ISSUE:
Under the Motor Vehicle law, it was declared that the registered
owner of any vehicle is primary land directly liable for any injury it incurs
while it is being operated. Thus, even the petitioner claimed that he was no
longer the present owner of the car, still the registry was under his name,
thus it is presumed that he still possesses the car and that the damages
caused by the car be charge against him being the registered owner. The
primary function of Motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.
CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 122039
May 31, 2000
FACTS:
Eliza Sunga was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by
the petitioner Calalas. Private respondent Sunga sat in the rear protion of the
jeepney where the conductor gave Sunga an extension seat. When the jeep
stopped, Sunga gave way to a passenger going outside the jeep. However,
an Isuzu Truck driven by Verene and owned by Salva, accidentally hit
Sunga causing the latter to suffer physical injuries where the attending
physician ordered a three months of rest. Sunga filed an action for damages
against the petitioner for breach of contract of common carriage by the
petitioner.
On the other hand, the petitioner Calalas filed an action against
Salva, being the owner of the truck. The lower court ruled in favor of ther
RULING:
FACTS:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor provides that where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. In this case, all the requisites for this
doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was under the exclusive control of its
officers and crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela
rammed the cluster pile, private respondent did not show persuasively other
possible causes of the damage. There exists a presumption of negligence
against private respondents which they failed to overcome. Additionally,
petitioner presented proof that demonstrated private respondents
negligence. As testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of slow ahead
to stop engine, the vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally
stops. However, he ordered stop engine when the vessel was only 50
meters from the pier. Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to
slow astern, the engine has to be restarted. However, Olasiman can not
estimate how long it takes before the engine goes to slow astern after the
not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for
the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. The control of
the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty
either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no
other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this,
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
it was the defendant who had the last clear chance to avoid the impending
harm and when he failed to do so, he is deemed negligent, thus liable to pay
damages in favor of the plaintiff.