1. BARREDO and GARCIA vs.

ALMARIO
FACTS:
A taxi cab owned by Fausto Barredo and was being driven by Pedro
Fontanilla collided head-on to a carretela being guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The
carretela was overturned inflicting injuries to the passenger Fausto Garcia who later
on died because of the injury sustained in the collision. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in which he was convicted to an indeterminate sentence which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The parents of Faustino then filed a
separate civil action against Barredo and Fontanilla where the trial court
ruled in favor of the parents of Faustino. The appellate court affirmed the
decision stating therein that there is no proof that Barredo exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Thus this appeal to the Supreme Court where Barredo alleged that his liability is
only subsidiary and as there has been no civil action against Fontanilla, the
criminally liable person, Barredo cannot be held responsible. He claims that Art. 1903,
which the Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case, only applies to obligations
arising from wrongful or negligent acts/omissions not punishable by law. Hence, since RPC
punishes said acts, 1903 no longer applies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such separate civil action may be brought against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
HELD:
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal
Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said
Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted.

Distinction must be made between delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
governed by articles 1902-0910.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it
should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

The separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code
had been established by a number of cases. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case
the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.

Firstly, The Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in
a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Thirdly, to hold that there is only one
way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latters) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is
also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. At this
juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers
and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to
avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap

the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It
is but right that they should guarantee the latters careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. An independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.

2. CIRIACO ROBLES v. YAP WING

Facts:
That Robles was employed by Yap Wing in its contracting business; that while
plaintiff was dismantling lumber brace in the construction of a bodega while
defendant undertook to construct, defendant negligently failed to provide safety
measures within the construction premises, as a result of which a piece of lumber
fell and hit plaintiff on the head, causing him physical injuries; that defendant
defrayed plaintiffs medical expenses; that since then plaintiff was unable to work,
thereby losing his expected earning up to the filing of the complaint; that because
of the physical injuries sustained by plaintiff due to defendants negligence, he
suffered mental anguish; and that because he entitled to recover attorneys fees.
defendant alleged that plaintiffs claim is one for disability resulting from an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and thus pertains to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmens Compensation Commission. The lower court
dismissed plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff moved to reconsider, alleging that his
claim was for actual damages under Articles 1711 and 1712 of the New
Civil Code and not a claim for compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Act. The motion to reconsider was denied; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 772 claims for compensation under the
Workmens Compensation Act were cognizable by the regular courts, but since then,
"the Workmens Compensation Commission shall have jurisdiction to hear and
decide claims for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, In relation

to this, Section 5 of the Act provides that "the rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to an employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code or other laws, because of said injury . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Manalo v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, in sustaining the order of the
trial court dismissing an employees claim for damages against the employer for
injuries suffered in an accident which happened in the course of his employment,
this Court said that "[] that all claims of workmen against their employers for
damages due to accidents suffered in the course of employment shall be
investigated and adjudicated by the Workmens Compensation Commission, subject
to the appeal in the law provided." library
The Workmens Compensation Act provides for two exceptions. The first is in section
6, which gives the injured employee the option to claim compensation benefits
against his employer under the Act or to sue the third person who caused the injury
for damages in the regular courts. The other exception is in Section 42, which refers
to small private employers, in which case claims for compensation by reason of
accident or injury shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874 or by those of
the Civil Code. The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Appellant contends that his claim is not for compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Law but one for damages under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code.
The contention is without merit. Article 1711 provides for the payment by
employers of compensation for the death of or injuries to their employees
as well as for illness or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employment, which provision is essentially the same as that of Section 2
of the Workmens Compensation Act. The fact that Article 1711 of the Civil
Code appears to cover appellants claim is not decisive of the question: it should
still be prosecuted in accordance with the Workmens Compensation Act by virtue
of Section 5 thereof which makes the rights and remedies granted by said
Act exclusive, as well as by virtue of Article 2196 of the Civil Code itself,
which provides:
"ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on
damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other
employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws. . ."
To say that compensation as provided for in Article 1711 of the Civil Code is
recoverable by action in the ordinary courts, at the option of the claimant, just
because the Workmens Compensation Act is not expressly invoked is to ignore the
fact that the grounds upon which compensation may be claimed are practically
identical in both statutes and to ignore likewise the exclusive character of
"the rights and remedies granted by this Act" as stated in Section 6
thereof, as well as the provision of Article 2196 of the Civil Code.
The suggestion has been made that there is in this case a claim for moral damages
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence of the defendant, and that such
damages do not come within the purview of the Workmens Compensation Act. It

should be pointed out first, that the negligence alleged in the complaint consists of
the defendants failure "to provide safety measures within the construction
premises," the nature of which negligence is precisely covered by Section 4-A of the
same Act, which makes the employer liable to pay additional compensation (of
50%) to the claimant-employee for failure "to install and maintain safety appliances,
or take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease."
Secondly, the alleged negligence was not a quasi-delict inasmuch as there was a
pre-existing contractual relation of employer and employee between the parties
(Art. 2176, Civil Code); and in breaches of contract moral damages may be
recovered only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220),
and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the complaint here. In any event,
whether or not such an allegation, in relation to the breach of a contract of
employment by the employer, resulting in injury to an employee or laborer, would
justify a claim for moral damages and place it within the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts is a question which we do not decide in this case, not being the issue
involved.
In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
3. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS.COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
There was a two-car collision at dawn. Two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt
Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
figured in a traffic accident. The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at
the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, owned by
respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as
lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the
corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the
left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not
possess a Philippine driver's license. As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance
Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter
P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl Jensen and respondent FILCAR as
well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR
for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Unfortunately,
summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his
given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the
complaint.
The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of
subrogation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although
based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner
failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by
third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.

Held:
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . . . " To sustain a claim based thereon, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to
prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant
FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the
vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved
to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain
that the negligence was solely attributable to DahlJensen thus making the damage
suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have
any participation therein. Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with
quasi-delict provides: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises
by virtue of a presumption of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance
over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as
correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none
of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of
the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris(bond of law)
between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an
employer of the latter. We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the
same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable

with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184
is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between
respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action
against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. Petitioner's insistence on MYC-AgroIndustrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that
case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner
corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to
exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of
the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another;
and, that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not
persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing
more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and
responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration
of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
sustaining the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

4. So Ping Bun v. CA
FACTS:
Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4)
lease contracts were premises located used as areas to store its textiles by Tek
Hua.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua
continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved.
Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong,
formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Gioks
grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile
business, Trendsetter Marketing.
lessor DCCSI informed Tek Hua Enterprises by letters, of the 20% increase in rent.
Again, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters were
new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to
accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on the lessees part,
and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer
any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.
Private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner asking him to vacate. Petitioner
refused to vacate.

Petitioner requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter

Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok,
he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid
rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioners request. The lease contracts in favor of
Trendsetter were executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.
After trial, the trial court ruled in favour of respondent.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.
On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON So Ping Bun is guilty of tortous interference of contract.
HELD:
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. [6]One becomes
liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of anothers
interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment
interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants conduct
is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional
and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules.[7]
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract;
and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or
excuse.[8]
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others,
and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference
by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. [9] This may
pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate
his undertaking under a contract. petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI
to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latters property right. The three elements of tort
interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case.
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy,[14] we held that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest

motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious

intermeddler.[15]
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to
lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent
corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on him.
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third person
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows
that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorneys fees.
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because
the extent of damages was not quantifiable. While we do not encourage tort
interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the
expense of others, however, the business desire to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties is present, lack of malice, however, precludes
damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court
correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The
injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by
petitioners interference.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

5.
6. VICENTE CALALAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA
and FRANCISCO SALVA
Facts:
Private respondent Sunga, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Sclaw
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an
Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Her confinement in
the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician,
Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast

for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him
as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case, filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, wherein Salva and his driver Verena was
declared jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasidelict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under
the Civil Code.
Hence, this petition.

WON Calalas is liable for damages arising from a quasi-delict.

Held:
Petitioner contends that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident and negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of death
or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently

unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755?First, as found by the
Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney,
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater
than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals: AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.

7. NICHOLAS Y. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.,respondent.
Facts:
The private respondent, Philippines Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), issued to the herein
petitioner, Nicholas Cervantes (Cervantes), a round trip plane ticket for ManilaHonolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly provided an expiry of
date of one year from issuance,. The issuance of the said plane ticket was in

compliance with a Compromise Agreement entered into between the contending

parties in two previous suits, before the Regional Trial Court in Surigao City. [2]
Four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the petitioner used it. Upon his
arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately booked his Los AngelesManila return ticket with the PAL office, and it was confirmed for the April 2, 1990
flight.
Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco,
and considering that he would be there on April 2, 1990, petitioner made
arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight in San Francisco instead of
boarding in Los Angeles.
when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco, he was not
allowed to board due to expiration of his ticket. Aggrieved, petitioner Cervantes
filed a Complaint for Damages, for breach of contract of carriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Norte in Surigao City. But the said complaint was
dismissed for lack of merit.[3]
petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which came out with a
Decision, upholding the dismissal of the case.
On May 22, 1996, petitioner came to this Court via the Petition for Review under
consideration.
Issues:
(3) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper.
Held:
Re: the third issue, an award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to
show that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San
Francisco.
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be
wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with
malice or bad faith.[14] Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could
not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his
departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it
should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple
negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up
ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, and the existence of
bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and
an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,

fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. [15] Here, there is no showing that PAL
acted in such a manner. An award for attorneys fees is also improper.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS

Facts:
Glenn de los Santos was charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. Santos allegedly taking
advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, ran over members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Courseperforming an
Endurance Run
the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as
the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and
ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased. In the automatic
Review, Glenn contested the ruling.

Issue:
WON Glenn is actually guilty of reckless imprudence instead of malicious intent

Held:
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more
scrupulous in weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial courts
finding that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent
to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for
an intentional felony. From the convergence of circumstances, we are
inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless
imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENNs part.
First, the place of the incident was very dark, as there was no moon. T here was
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence,
there was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts
that illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts,
black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to
make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized
vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the
other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as
GLENNs vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as
GLENNs truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles
from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENNs testimony that he
had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming
vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have
been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle
when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog,
or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same; and more so if
the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN,
then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children
who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his
truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and
hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first
bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his
brakes. It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or
more explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability
of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the
Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused. [19]
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of
persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional
felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an
axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting
them with intent to kill.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. \
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should
have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing
the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. Since the road
was dark and slippery, he should have observed due care in accordance with the
conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his
brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane
(there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It
is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was
driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care
under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro
City, is hereby SET ASIDE
9. 10.
10. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, vs. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO,
Private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his car and had just
crossed the intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump
truck loomingclose to his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the
name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. The dump
truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. Dionisios
car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered
some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries
was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other
hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence
of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also

sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court
in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition
for review.
The court finds from the factual circumstances outlined above that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying
home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on
the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is
quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with
the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence
was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence
must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than
the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are
drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the
United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments
have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners
would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited."
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew

without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was
not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe
as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner
truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of
the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is
helpful to quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. In all of these
cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in
failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. That one who leaves an
obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a
train will run into it; ...
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"
that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver
was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to
take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory

negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any

recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's
negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law
last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, is to determine whose negligence the
plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.
That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as
the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate." Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent
act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created
by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that
the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed
to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the
peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. Such is
not proper. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept
the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on
the part of his employer Phoenix16 in supervising its employees properly and
adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our
opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence.
The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump
truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix
to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of
Phoenix.

11. BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO PON vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE

PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES and NENA
VDA. DE ROSALES
The collision between Bus 1 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB,
for brevity) driven by Armando Pon and Bus 2 of Superlines Transportation
Company (Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco resulted in the death of
Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena
Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus 1. The
evidence shows that as BLTB Bus 1 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it
tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 2 of Superlines was coming from
the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a
belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper
lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased
Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in
the Court of First Instance of Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together
with their respective drivers praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were
filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco,
denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and diligence and shifted
the fault, against each other. They all interposed counterclaims against the
plaintiffs and crossclaims against each other.
the lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from
liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon,
and ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs.
Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed from the decision of the lower court
to respondent appellate court which affirmed with modification the judgment of
the lower court as earlier stated.
Hence, this petition to review by certiorari of defendant BLTB assigning a lone
error, to wit:
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE ACTIONS
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE BASED ON CULPA CONTRACTUAL. (p. 12, Rollo)
It is argued by petitioners that if the intention of private respondents were to file
an action based on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage, they could
have done so by merely impleading BLTB and its driver Pon. As it was in the trial
court, private respondents filed an action against all the defendants basing their
action on culpa aquiliana or tort.

Petitioners' contentions deserve no merit. A reading of the respondent court's

decision shows that it anchored petitioners' liability both on culpa contractual and
culpa aquiliana, to wit:
The proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the BLTB
bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as
he was negotiating the ascending bend of the highway. The driver of the BLTB bus
admitted in his cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the
ascending bend of the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone It is well settled
that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle in ordinary situation has the duty to see that the road is clear and not to
proceed if he can not do so in safety (People v. Enriquez, 40 O.G. No. 5, 984).
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. (Art. 2165, Civil Code).
In failing to observe these simple precautions, BLTB's driver undoubtedly failed to
act with the diligence demanded by the circumstances.
We now come to the subject of liability of the appellants.
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer,
appellant Armando Pon is primarily liable (Article 2176, Civil Code).<re||
an1w>
On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary,
direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its
passengers was through the negligence of its employee (Marahan v. Mendoza, 24
SCRA 888, 894), and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees (Article 1759, Civil Code).
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is
based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their
destination. Conclusively therefore in consideration of the foregoing findings of
the respondent appellate court it is settled that the proximate cause of the
collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the passengers of
BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly
operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic
Rules and Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against
petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact that in an action based on a
contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the

payment of the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage,

the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to
their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard
for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New
Civil Code).
Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute insurer against
all risks of travel and are not liable for acts or accidents which cannot be foreseen
or inevitable Petitioners' contention holds no water because for the defense
offorce majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural
causes and exclusively without human intervention.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.