Red Line Transport vs.

Rural Transit
Red Line Transportation Co. vs. Rural Transit Co.
GR No. 41570 | Sept. 6, 1934

Facts:
This is a petition for review of an order of the Public Service Commission
granting to the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., a certificate of public
convenience to operate a transportation service between Ilagan in the
Province of Isabela and Tuguegarao in the Province of Cagayan, and
additional trips in its existing express service between Manila Tuguegarao.
On June 4, 1932, Rural Transit filed an application for certification of a new
service between Tuguegarao and Ilagan with the Public Company Service
Commission (PSC), since the present service is not sufficient
Rural Transit further stated that it is a holder of a certificate of public
convenience to operate a passenger bus service between Manila and
Tuguegarao
Red Line opposed said application, arguing that they already hold a
certificate of public convenience for Tuguegarao and Ilagan, and is rendering
adequate service. They also argued that granting Rural Transits application
would constitute a ruinous competition over said route
On Dec. 21, 1932, Public Service Commission approved Rural Transits
application, with the condition that "all the other terms and conditions of the
various certificates of public convenience of the herein applicant and herein
incorporated are made a part hereof."
A motion for rehearing and reconsideration was filed by Red Line since
Rural Transit has a pending application before the Court of First Instance for
voluntary dissolution of the corporation
A motion for postponement was filed by Rural Transit as verified by M.
Olsen who swears "that he was the secretary of the Rural Transit Company,
Ltd
During the hearing before the Public Service Commission, the petition for
dissolution and the CFIs decision decreeing the dissolution of Rural Transit
were admitted without objection
At the trial of this case before the Public Service Commission an issue was
raised as to who was the real party in interest making the application,
whether the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., as appeared on the face of the
application, or the Bachrach Motor Company, Inc., using name of the Rural
Transit Company, Ltd., as a trade name
However, PSC granted Rural Transits application for certificate of public
convenience and ordered that a certificate be issued on its name
PSC relied on a Resolution in case No. 23217, authorizing Bachrach Motor
to continue using Rural Transits name as its tradename in all its applications
and petitions to be filed before the PSC. Said resolution was given a
retroactive effect as of the date of filing of the application or April 30, 1930

Issue: Can the Public Service Commission authorize a corporation to assume

the name of another corporation as a trade name?

Ruling: NO
The Rural Transit Company, Ltd., and the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., are
Philippine corporations and the very law of their creation and continued
existence requires each to adopt and certify a distinctive name
The incorporators "constitute a body politic and corporate under the name
stated in the certificate."
A corporation has the power "of succession by its corporate name." It is
essential to its existence and cannot change its name except in the manner
provided by the statute. By that name alone is it authorized to transact
business.
The law gives a corporation no express or implied authority to assume
another name that is unappropriated: still less that of another corporation,
which is expressly set apart for it and protected by the law. If any corporation
could assume at pleasure as an unregistered trade name the name of
another corporation, this practice would result in confusion and open the
door to frauds and evasions and difficulties of administration and
supervision.
In this case, the order of the commission authorizing the Bachrach Motor Co.,
Incorporated, to assume the name of the Rural Transit Co., Ltd. likewise
incorporated, as its trade name being void. Accepting the order of December
21, 1932, at its face as granting a certificate of public convenience to the
applicant Rural Transit Co., Ltd., the said order last mentioned is set aside
and vacated on the ground that the Rural Transit Company, Ltd., is not the
real party in interest and its application was fictitious
CASE DIGEST: Universal Mills Corporation vs. Universal Textile Mills
78 SCRA 62 (1977)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission granting a
petition by the respondent to have the petitioners corporate name be changed as it is
confusingly and deceptively similar to that of the former.
On January 8, 1954, respondent Universal Textile Mills was issued a certificate of
Corporation as a textile manufacturing firm. On the other hand, petitioner, which deals in
the production of hosieries and apparels, acquired its current name by amending its
articles of incorporation, changing its name from Universal Hosiery mills Corporation to
Universal Mills corporation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petioners trade name is confusingly similar with that of respondents.
HELD:
Yes. The corporate names in question are not identical, but they are indisputably so
similar that even under the test of reasonable care and observation as the public
generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise invoked by appellant.
We are apprehensive confusion will usually arise, considering that x x x appellant
included among its primary purposes the manufacturing, dyeing, finishing and selling of
fabrics of all kinds which respondent had been engaged for more than a decade ahead
of petitioner.
Lyceum of the Philippines vs CA Case Digest
Lyceum of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 101897, 5 March 1993]
Facts: Lyceum of the Philippines Inc. had sometime before commenced in the SEC a
proceeding (SEC-Case No. 1241) against the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. to require it to
change its corporate name and to adopt another name not "similar [to] or identical" with
that of petitioner. In an Order dated 20 April 1977, Associate Commissioner Julio Sulit
held that the corporate name of petitioner and that of the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. were
substantially identical because of the presence of a "dominant" word, i.e., "Lyceum," the
name of the geographical location of the campus being the only word which
distinguished one from the other corporate name. The SEC also noted that Lyceum of
the Philippines Inc. had registered as a corporation ahead of the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc.
in point of time, and ordered the latter to change its name to another name "not similar
or identical [with]" the names of previously registered entities. The Lyceum of Baguio,
Inc. assailed the Order of the SEC before the Supreme Court (GR L-46595). In a Minute
Resolution dated 14 September 1977, the Court denied the Petition for Review for lack
of merit. Entry of judgment in that case was made on 21 October 1977.
Armed with the Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Lyceum of the Philippines then
wrote all the educational institutions it could find using the word "Lyceum" as part of
their corporate name, and advised them to discontinue such use of "Lyceum." When,
with the passage of time, it became clear that this recourse had failed, and on 24
February 1984, Lyceum of the Philippines instituted before the SEC SEC-Case 2579 to
enforce what Lyceum of the Philippines claims as its proprietary right to the word
"Lyceum." The SEC hearing officer rendered a decision sustaining petitioner's claim to
an exclusive right to use the word "Lyceum." The hearing officer relied upon the SEC
ruling in the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. case (SEC-Case 1241) and held that the word
"Lyceum" was capable of appropriation and that petitioner had acquired an enforceable
exclusive right to the use of that word. On appeal, however, by Lyceum Of Aparri,
Lyceum Of Cabagan, Lyceum Of Camalaniugan, Inc., Lyceum Of Lallo, Inc., Lyceum Of
Tuao, Inc., Buhi Lyceum, Central Lyceum Of Catanduanes, Lyceum Of Southern
Philippines, Lyceum Of Eastern Mindanao, Inc. and Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc.,,
which are also educational institutions, to the SEC En Banc, the decision of the hearing
officer was reversed and set aside. The SEC En Banc did not consider the word

"Lyceum" to have become so identified with Lyceum of the Philippines as to render use
thereof by other institutions as productive of confusion about the identity of the schools
concerned in the mind of the general public. Unlike its hearing officer, the SEC En Banc
held that the attaching of geographical names to the word "Lyceum" served sufficiently
to distinguish the schools from one another, especially in view of the fact that the
campuses of Lyceum of the Philippines and those of the other Lyceums were physically
quite remote from each other. Lyceum of the Philippines then went on appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 June 1991, however, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the questioned Orders of the SEC En Banc. Lyceum of the Philippines filed a
motion for reconsideration, without success. Lyceum of the Philippines filed the petition
for review.
Issue:
1.
Whether the names of the contending Lyceum schools are confusingly similar.
2.
Whether the use by the Lyceum of the Philippines of "Lyceum" in its corporate
name has been for such length of time and with such exclusivity as to have become
associated or identified with the petitioner institution in the mind of the general public (or
at least that portion of the general public which has to do with schools).
Held:
1. The Articles of Incorporation of a corporation must, among other things, set out the
name of the corporation. Section 18 of the Corporation Code establishes a restrictive
rule insofar as corporate names are concerned. It provides that "No corporate name
may be allowed by the Securities an Exchange Commission if the proposed name is
identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any
other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to
existing laws. When a change in the corporate name is approved, the Commission shall
issue an amended certificate of incorporation under the amended name." The policy
underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the registration of a corporate name
which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of any existing
corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently confusing" or "contrary to
existing laws," is the avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have occasion to
deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the
reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations. Herein, the
Court does not consider that the corporate names of the academic institutions are
"identical with, or deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of Lyceum of the Philippines
Inc.. True enough, the corporate names of the other schools (defendant institutions)
entities all carry the word "Lyceum" but confusion and deception are effectively
precluded by the appending of geographic names to the word "Lyceum." Thus, the
"Lyceum of Aparri" cannot be mistaken by the general public for the Lyceum of the
Philippines, or that the "Lyceum of Camalaniugan" would be confused with the Lyceum
of the Philippines. Further, etymologically, the word "Lyceum" is the Latin word for the
Greek lykeion which in turn referred to a locality on the river Ilissius in ancient Athens
"comprising an enclosure dedicated to Apollo and adorned with fountains and buildings
erected by Pisistratus, Pericles and Lycurgus frequented by the youth for exercise and
by the philosopher Aristotle and his followers for teaching." In time, the word "Lyceum"

became associated with schools and other institutions providing public lectures and
concerts and public discussions. Thus today, the word "Lyceum" generally refers to a
school or an institution of learning. Since "Lyceum" or "Liceo" denotes a school or
institution of learning, it is not unnatural to use this word to designate an entity which is
organized and operating as an educational institution. To determine whether a given
corporate name is "identical" or "confusingly or deceptively similar" with another entity's
corporate name, it is not enough to ascertain the presence of "Lyceum" or "Liceo" in
both names. One must evaluate corporate names in their entirety and when the name of
Lyceum of the Philippines is juxtaposed with the names of private respondents, they are
not reasonably regarded as "identical" or "confusingly or deceptively similar" with each
other.
2. The number alone of the private respondents in the present case suggests strongly
that the Lyceum of the Philippines' use of the word "Lyceum" has not been attended
with the exclusivity essential for applicability of the doctrine of secondary meaning. It
may be noted also that at least one of the private respondents, i.e., the Western
Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc., used the term "Lyceum" 17 years before Lyceum of the
Philippines registered its own corporate name with the SEC and began using the word
"Lyceum." It follows that if any institution had acquired an exclusive right to the word
"Lyceum," that institution would have been the Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc. rather
than Lyceum of the Philippines. Hence, Lyceum of the Philippines is not entitled to a
legally enforceable exclusive right to use the word "Lyceum" in its corporate name and
that other institutions may use "Lyceum" as part of their corporate names.
PHILIPS EXPORT VS. COURT OF APPEALS- Corporate Trade Name

A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in
rem, which it may assert and protect against the whole world.

FACTS:
Philips Export B.V. (PEBV) filed with the SEC for the cancellation of the word Philips
the corporate name of Standard Philips Corporation in view of its prior registration with
the Bureau of Patents and the SEC. However, Standard Philips refused to amend its
Articles of Incorporation so PEBV filed with the SEC a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, however this was denied ruling that it can only be done when
the corporate names are identical and they have at least 2 words different. This was
affirmed by the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Standard Philips can be enjoined from using Philips in its corporate
name

RULING: YES
A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in
rem, which it may assert and protect against the whole world. According to Sec. 18 of
the Corporation Code, no corporate name may be allowed if the proposed name is
identical or deceptively confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any
other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to
existing law.

For the prohibition to apply, 2 requisites must be present:

(1) the complainant corporation must have acquired a prior right over the use of such
corporate name and
(2) the proposed name is either identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of
any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

With regard to the 1st requisite, PEBV adopted the name Philips part of its name 26
years before Standard Philips. As regards the 2nd, the test for the existence of
confusing similarity is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using
ordinary care and discrimination. Standard Philips only contains one word, Standard,
different from that of PEBV. The 2 companies products are also the same, or cover the
same line of products. Although PEBV primarily deals with electrical products, it has
also shipped to its subsidiaries machines and parts which fall under the classification of
chains, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw, the goods which Standard Philips also
produce. Also, among Standard Philips primary purposes are to buy, sell trade x x x
electrical wiring devices, electrical component, electrical supplies. Given these, there is
nothing to prevent Standard Philips from dealing in the same line of business of
electrical devices. The use of Philips by Standard Philips tends to show its intention to
ride on the popularity and established goodwill of PEBV.

What is the doctrine of secondary meaning?

This doctrine is to the effect that a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive
appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because it is geographical or
otherwise descriptive, may nevertheless be used exclusively by one producer with
reference to his article so long as in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing
public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his product. (G. and
C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373, cited in Ang v. Teodoro, G.R. No. L48226, Dec. 14, 1942)

CLAVECILLA Radio System v. Hon. Agustin AntillonFacts:

1.
New Cagayan Grocery (NECAGRO) filed a complaint for damages against Clavecilla
Radio system. They alleged
that Clavecilla omitted the word NOT in the letter addressed to NECAGRO for
transmittal at
Clavecilla Cagayande Oro Branch.2.
NECAGRO alleged that the omission of the word not between the word WASHED and
AVAILABLE altered the
contents of the same causing them to suffer from damages.3.
Clavecilla filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
and improper venue.4.
City Judge of CDO denied the MTD. Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary Injunction with the CFIpraying that the City Judge be enjoined from further
proceeding with the case because of improper venue.5.
CFI

dismissed the case and held that Clavecilla may be sued either in Manila (principal
office) or in CDO (branchoffice).6.
Clavecilla appealed to the SC contending that the suit against it should be filed in
Manila where it holds its principaloffice.
Issue:WON the present case against Clavecilla should be filed in Manila where it
holds its principal office.

Held:YES
It is clear that the case from damages is based upon a written contract.Under par. (b)(3)
Sec. 1 Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, when an action is not upon a written contract
then the caseshould be filed in the municipality where the defendant or any of
the defendant resides or maybe served upon withsummons.In corpo. Law, the
residence of the corporation is the place whe
re the principal office is established. Since Clavecillas
principal office is in Manila, then the suit against it may properly be file in the City of
Manila.As stated in Evangelista v. Santos, the laying of the venue of an action is not left
to plaintiffs caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.