AGABON v NLRC (PUNO DISSENT)

Puno advocates a return to the pre-Wenphil rule where failure to meet the
procedural due process requirement makes the entire dismissal illegal. Coming off
his dissent in Serrano, it is stressed that the 'dismiss now, pay later' scheme is a
pro-employer policy that was abused by employers for years. He also sees the
indemnity imposed in Serrano, and even more so in Agabon, as grossly insufficient,
taking into consideration the following:
1. That the Constitution is an ode to social justice, especially the rights of workers.
This is reflected in the Labor Code.
2. Courts should give meaning and substance to the rights of workers. This should
not just refer to substantive, but also procedural process. Weakening the procedure
is also weakening the substantive right, as in effect, a weakened procedure means
more loopholes that can be exploited in order to circumvent the worker's rights.
3. The Constitution puts the employee on equal footing with the employer, in spite
of the natural inequality. Hence, social justice in cases between the two refers to
protection for the workers in order to level the playing field.
4. Prior to Wenphil, the Court has long extended constitutional due process in labor
cases involving private action, in spite of the Bill of Rights traditionally being
considered protection against state action. The current international trend is that
due process adapts to the situation-- given the changes in the economic order
veering towards corporations (and the labor issues that tend to come with them),
the law has evolved and continues to evolve to ensure the continued protection of
the workers.
Though the majority opinion believes that the application of due process on illegal
dismissal cases can open the floodgates to absurd claims, the danger that they
thought would arise has not manifested at all. [In fact, given what happened after
Serrano, as noted by J. Puno, there is even more of a need to adapt due process to
labor cases.]
5. Also, prior to Wenphil, the Court has always prescribed reinstatement in cases
where an employee is denied procedural due process as it is in line with the right to
security of tenure. This was the case during the 1973 Constitution. Certainly, this
should continue in the 1987 Constitution, given its emphasis on labor. Wenphil was
a sudden departure from a sound doctrine-- indemnity will not suffice given the
protection accorded to labor.
6. Contrary to what the majority opined, compliance with procedural due process is
not a burden on employers. All that is required is the two-notice requirement and an

opportunity for the employees to be heard (Art. 282 LC alongside the Ang Tibay
doctrine). There does not seem to be a valid reason to exempt employers from this
duty. If anything, any dismissal without due process debases human dignity, and it
is incumbent upon the employer to conduct a formal investigation and inform the
employee of the charges against him. If a criminal is given this opportunity, what
more an employee?
7. Given all this, the Constitution recognizes security of tenure as one of the highest
rights of employees. All other rights are meaningless if the person becomes
unemployed. In a previous case, the court stressed that employees should be
protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job such that even when the
employee was at fault, if a penalty less severe would suffice, then the lesser penalty
should be imposed.
8. Why? Workers need work more than anything else. It is a defining feature of
human existence as it is what provides one's needs. "You take my life when you do
take the means whereby I live."
Given all these considerations, nominal damages are grossly insufficient and give
undue advantage to employers. The Court cannot allow the employers to
marginalize the right of the worker to due process for a few pesos without mocking
the extensive protection accorded by the Constitution, especially when it involves
security of tenure, which is beyond monetary estimation. Agabon, when it set a
pittance of nominal damages for violation of due process, nullifies our precepts on
social justice and the protection of labor.
"An employee may not have a torrens title to his job but it is not too much to require
that before he is dismissed by his employer, he should be given a simple notice of
the cause of his dismissal and a summary hearing to present his side. All our
constitutional and statutory precepts on social justice and the protection of labor
will go to naught if we perpetuate our ruling that a dismissal without the required
prior notice is valid and if we just penalize with the payment of pennies violations of
the employee's right to due process."