Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.
NEW
SERIES.
VOL.
XIV.
t/ie
1913-1914.
PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAMS
4,
HENRIETTA STREET,
AND NOKGATE,
COVENT GARDEN, LONDON,
1914.
W.C.
B
M
CONTENTS.
PAGE
1.
\s
IL
BY
ON
BY
FEELING.
J. A.
DAWES HICKS
G.
SMITH
BY
HI.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
INTUITIONALISM.
SOME
NEW
DISCUSSION
BY N.
C.
DELISLE
76
BY
100
LOSSKY
O.
126
ENCYCLOPAEDISTS ON LOGIC.
THE VALUE OF
LOGIC.
BY
BY
A.
J.
BROUGH
IX.
181
BY
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISSOCIATED PERSONALITY.
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE
THE NOTION OF A COMMON GOOD. BY F. ROSAMOND
SHIELDS
X.
>/ XII.
XIII.
FREEDOM.
242
274
XL
152
WOLF AND
F. C. S. SCHILLER
VIII.
49
BY
S.
...
...
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...
...
BY
...
ALEXANDER
322
SYMPOSIUM
BY
G. E.
355
291
407
425
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND
THE MIND ASSOCIATION
428
...
...
...
...
429
FINANCIAL STATEMENT...
...
...
...
...
...
...
439
RULES
...
...
...
...
...
...
431
LIST
...
...
...
OFFICERS AND
SESSION, 1914-1915
OF
MEMBERS
FOR
THE
THIRTY-SIXTH
434
I.
G.
By
WE are
HICKS.
being told by
in philosophical thinking,
on
DAWES
is
being manifested,
work
of
me
ments
to
of the age in
which they
live,
about the status of philosophy in his day are too well known
to be set down here, and even Aristotle, fond as he was of
summarising
seeing in
own
or
the views
them
else
of
others,
either blurred
one-sided and
rarely
does
so
without
of
his
To Descartes, the fundamental conceptions of the contemporary philosophy seemed so infirm that the superstructure
truth.
reared
Locke
felt
himself confronted
and ignorance
"
;
whilst
Hume
with a
"
sanctuary of vanity
"
declared that principles taken
G.
DAWKS
HICKS.
upon
trust,
"
day to this its course has been consistent with that which pre"
ceded it. " The crisis of modern speculation is the title of a
well-known essay
of
Ferrier's,
is,
suppose,
indication, so
far
philosophical thinking
is
progressive,
it
new
problems, and in
view of their largeness and comprehensiveness, the situation
(.in
scarcely fail to present a certain aspect of hopelessness to
of its advance, be
creating for
itself
affairs.
But
late that
the subject to which I propose on this occasion to invite attention is being forced
in 1893,
into service as a
lines of
means
of
making headway
in metaphysical
construction
reality.
immanent
in
any one
subject's
come
to
than
its
own
Appearance, therefore, will be constituted by the looseness of content from existence, by the
"
"
"
what becoming alienated from its " that and passing away
being.
towards another
"
that."
Discursive
knowledge
will
thus
itself
itself,
finite fact in
order to complete
distinction
that
is
made
to repose
upon
it
any rate
"of
its implications.
however,
freely used,
sions,
make
I find the
explicit
to be understood or
how what
it
is
implies
Ward
to be interpreted.
us that, according to
"
his system of monadism,
material phenomena are only the
manifestation of minds,"* the reflection cannot be avoided that
When,
tells
means
is
cleared
* Realm
of Ends,
up there
Or, again,
p. 247.
A 2
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
way
in
is
be
truly
the
significant
term
if
"appearance"
the
connotation, at
were
for
the
all
two
events,
thinkers
of
in
"
appearquestion substantially similar. But if for the one
ance is distinguished from reality by its selected or partial
conditions,"
ance"
is
and approaches
is
nearer
two
"
neither ought
baldly indicated in Brentano's remark that
natural science to be defined as the science of bodies nor
is
more or
Life
and
Logic,
domain
no
the psychical
perception.
the case
is
dar) but
is
he contends,
experienced not
present
difference,
is
perceptible in
immanent
very different.
thing
is
mere
necessarily given in
ways
living experience.
its
hended
consciousness
is
imposed
given,
and
it
It is given, however,
shadows
and
and
flux
it is
As
in different perspectives.
off (sich
number
it is
absolutely there,
with
it
itself
senseless.*
through adumbration,
suggestive as
suffers,
Professor
is
in
immanent
as appearing, as presenting
Stimulating
and
is,
it
preliminary determination of
"
"
the terms
phenomenon and
"
"
to bear, and of
appearance
in
the position to be assigned
the world of reality to what is
denoted by these terms. I have taken simply examples that
article in
i,
1913.
Jahrbuch
filr Philosophie
und phanomeno-
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
it
much
as in so
else in philosophy,
appearance to be illusory,
still
an
illusion is
none
the less an entity that calls for explanation, and the ground of
its possibility
is
must be rendered
intelligible if
amount
such procedure
ourselves that
manner
many
of
illusory, that
Wie
about.
dictum
viel
Schein, so
viel
entirely
his
mode
real.
ultimately
of
unreal
fails
this
reject
undoubtedly
which we characterise as
main functions
up by reference
to the
It is
attaching
to the
He
notion of
phenomenon cannot be
He
sees that at the root of the distinction between appearance and reality there lies the fundamental question as to the
interpretation to be put upon negativity as a characteristic of
what
known, and
is
it
firj
to say that
he here
philosophy.
"
That a thing should appear and seem to be, and yet not
man should assert what is not true all this,"
be, or that a
a matter
of
profound
"
is
now, as
it
And
difficulty."
consequently
is
is not.
By
Eleatic Stranger
them
reaches a position
Parmenides
from which
will
it
becomes
have to be abandoned.
In the
being, nor of
speak of a thing in
evidently impossible. And, in the
not predicable of non-being, as thus under-
/j,rj
is
(rt), for to
is
ov or of
unthinkableness or inconceivability of non- being is contradictory, for these terms, no less than the copula of the
judgment,
apiO/jiov
all
of
it
is
that
is
meant by an
DAWES
G.
Were
appearance or an image.
or
other,
counterpart,
HICKS.
it
to be defined as a sort of
true
the
of
(TO
rd\i]0ivbv
Trpbs
And
nonsense.
how
"
is
being, in
if
any
sense, is to
be ascribed to
it,
is
fictitious
',
that in which
of
further tested,
is
turns
it
encompassed.
by which
is
it
of reality be con-
equally patent.
is
any two
whichever alternative
how
explain
aspect one.
the
be
the
chosen,
elements can be
The
et8o>
<f)i\oi,
for
senses
participate in
and
rationality
question,
in
true
is
former.
According to
(8ia Xoyurfiov).
what
implied
for
we
them we
be to
real characteristics,
unity,
will
difficulty
is
But
by
this
there
asserted of both
the
at
arises
process of
?
contrasted
once the
participation
Does
terms,
it
not point
ova-La
and
common
possess in
that which
the
phrase
deny
"
participation
and
to becoming.
to
"
power
it
is
move
there
is
no course
is
connexion,
either,
a combination of both,
The outcome
that
is
the
relation
relation
of,
ov to
of
/jurj
no
been
show
to
obscure than
the
ov
to
ov
is
ov,
and
to
less
some
entities are in
communion with
referred
and
to, viz.,
ov,
a-rda-is,
there
may
be
principal or leading
KIVTJO-K;,
we may
say that
that
it
is
that
is
now we
If
i8rj.
it
it
another.
three
say
/clvrja-^, it is
communion with
is
five,
participates in ov
is
and
is,
is,
there-
not, therefore,
erepov and OVK erepov that it is other than ov and is, therefore, not ov, although in a different sense we have seen that
;
it
is
ov.
So that
tclvrja-is
is
at once being
10
DAWES
G.
HI. Ks.
ei&r)
mentioned,
ov itself included.
point of view
is
in this
new
ov, and
interpretation can be offered of the conception of
a fundamental difficulty can be thus removed from the notion
nf appearance.
By
that which
is
common
to the
When
all.
complex
being
recognised as
is
itself
no
than ov
less ovo-ia
itself.
All the
as the
as,
there-
participate in
etSrj
being, for they all are, but each is distinguished from being
as itself an eZSo?.
They are, but they are not it; they exist,
in
the reverse
is
is
not
the
indefinite
in
to say, participates
Or, to bring
eiSrj.
variety
of
Existence
existing
is
is
otherness
itself,
entities.
but
The
is
which Plato
eiocov,
is
its
sisting
between the
eiSij
the latter conception is no more than a consistent development of the former, for a thing, in so far as it is knowable,
just a
eiBrj.
11
The non-reality
etBrj
mode
of existence apart
from things and yet of like kind with the existence of things.
The reality, however, which Plato intended to assert of the
ideal
of actual existence
reality
or occurrence.
The
latter
members
presentation,
of this
time; and Plato was referring to the timeless validity that truth
possessed altogether independent of its ever finding manifestation
in
the
knowledge.*
the eli&rj were not conceived by Plato after the manner of
"
things,"
when he
of sense,
its
no doubt,
soundness.
But
i8rj
I think,
I
it
is
drawn by
Lotze,
is
correctly
attributable to Plato.
to the contrary.
Lotze, Metaphysic,
316 sqq.
And
the general
12
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
tendency of Plato's thought can hardly be said to be reconcilable with the antithesis which Lotze supposed to have been
explicitly in his mind. Rather would one say that quite simply
and
Plato
directly
identifies
and
existence
The
iBrj
truth,
objective
it
be said to possess.
may
And
quite in accordance
kind
is
of regarding Platonism,
eiBtj,
ably of vital
moment
considering.
in
satisfied to substitute
current phrase " subsistence of a universal." But
the important matter was, at any rate, to make clear that a
for
it
now
the
fundamental error
is
of truth are
Equally
important
is,
and that
it
owes
of the mind.
its
prove to be helpful.
13
II.
think, best
can, I
the
to
modes
in
philosophy.
Plato,
we
concerned.
under the
of
strong, especially in view of the later Neo-Platonic development, to convert this implicit thought into the concrete picture
of
an
etBr}
infinite
or ideal essences.
the infinite
finite
mind
minds, and
as
of sense
phenomena
as being
ways
in
of
of
which
have
said,
by him
we do know
eiSr).
And
it is
Eather
is it
definite
14
DAWES
G.
may
relation
HICKS.
of originating
the
reality,
and
its
work
vision
its
represented as
is
of
bringing
it is
But
the notion
to
it
persuaded
would be
and
significance,
of
the
an
World Soul
error
to
This trend of
Timaeus
in
attach
too
separation between
it
especially.
particular
Ideas.
It
literal
am
a
mechanical
is,
I should
7rai/TeX<w9 ov
cannot be devoid of
life
and
seem
me
to
of experience.
Nor does
it
'
'
it."*
Neither space
nor time are, in Plato's view, subjective, and, as regards even
the secondary qualities of bodies, it is hard to reconcile his
mind.
Whilst, then, not disputing that a certain measure of
can be offered for interpreting the Platonic theory
justification
after the
manner
*
xiii,
1885, p. 21.
APPEARANCE AND
15
PtEAL EXISTENCE.
the
in
already referred to the way in which in the Sophist the contention is maintained that there must be systematic relatedness,
Koivcovia,
among the
them should be
of
eiSvj
possible,
and
eiSrj
apprehension
in the
which,
emphasis
are communicable with which
to the
others, is laid
itself,
and
shares, therefore,
is
in
the
nature of Non-being or
Difference.
true, is not
w orked out
r
in such a
manner
we must
what
is
phenomenal.
is
as to enable us to
wont
to
regard
as
of
that
the
position, namely,
arrangement from the more general to the less general, that
they formed a graduated scheme of existence comprising within
itself without breach of continuity the sum total of what could
phenomena was
for Plato a
realm of
not a merely
metaphysical necessity,
contingent creation of some external artificer. He declares, it
is true, that the ideal world cannot be the ground or cause
(atria) of
we
find
what
him
is
variable
insisting
and
transient.
And
of
in the
Timaeus
16
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
But
all
and
is
itself eternal.
this third
identified
Space
we
Like them,
identical with
is
it
by a A 07*07*09
hand, however,
Xa\7rbv
ical
it
is,
we
hard to grasp.
it is
is
only
apprehended, yet the process of
and not atcr09?<rt?.
On the other
\oyurftos
it is
There clings to
prehensible.
and
it is
z/6009 that it is
is
apprehension
itself
and although
is
and
no way determinable
In and for itself, it is not
in
according to the
in the
it is
argument
notion of being.
the Timacus in so
many
This conclusion
As
is
almost expressed in
it
is
if
the phrase
is
non-being.
permissible, as
ei&r)
come
to
images (eia-iovra
KOLI
egiovra)
17
(^i^^ara rwv
Along
geometrical
found
eiSrj
In
fact,
the so-called
of the latter.
of
(vi,
passage
stages
of
the EepuUic
intelligence
are
And
509 D,
discussed,
of
the former
in the well-known
sqq.)
where the
numerical
ratios
four
are
ment
consists
in
the
essentially
objective
of Plato's treat-
attitude
which,
phenomena
are
existence
conjoint
result
of
the
fundamental
his
18
DAWES
O.
HICKS.
of the
force his
than one, but the direction of his thought which I have been
trying to indicate
is,
am
world
phenomenal
peculiarities
of
as
rest,
which
extension,
spatial
the
of
is,
in
its
the
turn,
necessary accompaniment
I dwell not now on the inherent difficulties of the
existence.
Platonic doctrine
which may be
difficulties
Whosoever seeks
sophical speculation.
said to confront
method
in philo-
to
the
relative
find
it,
latter
specifically
strenuous though
Much
successful
he
as
was, to
it.
Plato's
endeavour,
of particulars
the
than later
strives, in
theory, to avoid
from
differs
necessarily from
follows
more
it
so,
and
it
and
is
characteristics,
/u'/^o-i?
throw no real
light
on
be sustained.
this
admitted
basis,
it
would be absurd
But when
so
much
has
been
On
modern
fantastic imagery.
And
* The
Development of Greek Philosophy,
p. 128.
we
19
is
an
essential
Whether he was
upon
this doctrine
el/coves
and
he found
things.
it difficult
to differentiate
is
which the
condition
between
of
the
idealistic tendencies
"
"
sums up of
much that is
phenomenon
itself
Kant
With
it.
institutes a
scarcely
fundamental
he conceives
it
has no objects of
its
points to the
contrast
between subjective
in us at
characteristics of universality
objectivity.
and
20
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
call space
of
which
order,
is
independent of
it.
in the
if
the object
struction, in
compounded
or welded together.
sets of elements
have been
be
already made.
of
knowing
it
as
thought be conceived as an instrument whereby the given material of sense is worked up into the
form of organised experience, the resultant, even admitting it
Moreover,
if
that appear
"/'
reality
The
is
him
that
it
is
ini-aningless.
difficulty just
fail
to force itself
He
phenomena
relations
summed up
in
of
21
is
construed.
of regarding
to be
is
external per-
could
was,
terms of
liypothesi
only, according to
his
view, be
expressed in
and was, on
this
dis-
account,
of
it
object
and
the
as
self
apprehended parts
then, do we come
of
an
the
object
context
are
of
alike
immediately
How,
experience.
distinction
between
to
is
Kant
as
perplexity in
to
conceive
their formal
and he steadfastly
how
some are
element.
the inner
insists
to find ourselves
life
should
also in
Irreducible,
that the
when we
be connected
try
with
22
DAWES
G.
why our
question
The
difference,
this
ultimate
intuitions
is
then,
HICKS.
ultimate,
difference,
The representatives of
be rejected.
problematic idealism had always tended to interpret space
as being in its own nature excluded from mind, as being,
idealism
sian,
in
fact,
mark
the characteristic
realities.
ment
to
calls
Naturally,
which
therefore,
existence
the
asserts
or non-mental
material
of
they had
taken
of
the
judg-
extended,
non-extended, non-spatial,
judgment
character.
ception
Such a
life.
critical
theory
of space
as
in
a form of per-
of,
up
as
or
the contrary,
build
inner
the
of
had,
occupying
outside
The
facts
existence
of
was part
it
mind.
the
the
constituting
the
of
opposite
of,
On
mind.
Consequently,
way
that
the
not inferred,
problem as to what
the
a
it is
(articular
considered
external
merely
as
is
object
exists.
characteristic
Space
of
that
extendedness,
the
content
of
element
problematic
nor
any
other
idealism
of
can
be
refuted
space-extendedness
by
which
23
unmistakably than
content,
it is futile
which
The reference
justification.
distinct
is
in such
judgment
is,
as
self
Vorstellung of
it.
then,
Is,
this
real
existing
thing
be
to
time,
None
and
and subject
an empirical thing
to the conditions
to exist as distinct
must be taken
to exist,
it.
own
existence in time.
The
assumption
the one hand, from the mere contents
is
on
of the Vorstellungen of
things-in-
phenomena, and
never succeeded
it is
in
Vorstellung of
phenomenal character
it
as
he assigns
and
equally phenomena,
for
maintaining
the
24
G.
with
Plato's
phrase
phenomena, when he
DAWES
elfcoves,
is
using
HICKS.
Kant
the
frequently speaks of
for the contents of
term
as
images (Bilclcr).
An impasse of the kind I have been indicating is surely in
itself sufficient to induce us to return upon the conception of an
Poriif'Ilitmj'-ti,
unified by means of
object as a complex of pense-impressions
the relating activity of thought, and to ask the question
whether that conception is in truth justified. I would submit
that there is, in fact, no warrant for either of the assumptions
it
tions
to
As
involves.
this
of the one
in
common
with
it
Now
is
and of thought. On
the one hand, the notion of sensibility as passive receptivity
must be wholly, and not merely partially, discarded.
What
is
to
given
the
is
never so
much
itself
Stimulation, impres-
of discriminating
is
an act
of
and discerning
it, but what is
to
it
i?.
true,
an
act
of combining
or
relating,
thought will
25
must
the
to
be, a
mind
connected whole.
may
be,
but
And
what
is
method.
it is
apprehended.
3.
The
line
of
reflexion
Some
evolution.
of his
best
and most
fruitful
its
work was
development,
from
its
first
crude
immediacy
and rational
insight.
But
the
dominating
comprehension
conception
of
the
orderly
constructive
operation
of
thought or
self-
26
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
By thought was
consciousness.
critics of the
an understanding in which the universal produces and determines the particular, Hegel attained to the notion of an
absolute
mind or
of experience.
of
constructive
the
the
notion,
products
According
as
to
be
in
no
are
of
regarded
dependent
way
activity
thought
upon the individuality of a concrete subject; relatively thereto
the
in
intelligence
to that
which the
finite
subject
the
distinction
its
be taken to indicate an inevitable precondition of that conscious subject's awareness of its own finitude.
own procedure
is to
may
subject
many
such
finite
manner an
At the same
a
may be
said to be subjective.
is
itself
an incident
in
the whole
process of real
indicated, of the
he would
insist,
of
them
is
They
but in
truly intelligible.
is
itself.
27
of
the term
"
Phenomena
phenomenon."
own
and essence
"
a
Each
designated
thing."
thing is one
in which .the essence or the real makes its appearance,
Hegel's
which
way
terminology,
exists is
what
is
is
The
the whole.
that
is
to a part
mere being.
So that there
is
it is
show
itself,
distinguished from
no ultimate antithesis
to be
drawn
is
not an anti-
thesis
Things as
they are
The contrast
falls
within
experience
and
itself
of
in
knowing the
real
as such.
The world of
ance.
this
is
diately manifested,
be a
"
"
beyond
not
28
DAWES
G.
for example,
is,
moments
detailed
"
in a sense,
HICKS.
"
beyond
its
manifestations, but
is
They
in a single process;
particulars
which
it
is
and
other essence to
way
an
of
intelligible
It
allow
an indefinable
between
connexion
it
and
the
it
is
worked
out, there
unquestionably, sufficient
are,
ance to entitle
it
on
to consideration
its
own
direct attention
seem
to
me
meanwhile
account.
what
To
follows.
of dubious stability.
It
little
of manifestation.
own
There can,
imagine,
When
its
origin.
It is that of
human
agent realises an
oud previously represented to himself in idea, that which is
accomplished is often said to be a manifestation of the mind or
our
practical activity.
agent
is
realisation
29
own
manifestations."
never does.
And
that
is
just exactly
what
finite
thought
by
employ
distinction
things.
All phenomena
doctrine
more
is
familiarly
expressed,
subject
are,
Or, as the
and
object
mutually involve one another neither can exist except in correlation with the other they are inseparable factors in the unity
;
of experience.
the object
is
that which
subject.
As
is for
But
for,
that in no
way
and object
whether empirical things are objects in this sense. Even, however, though it be maintained on grounds less easily disposed of
than
this,
when
it is
30
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
intelligible sense in
of things at all.
for a
community of minds
what
is
described as
phenomenon
by any one
denotation
as
of
employed
phenomena
is
severance
critical philosophy, it
be said to be laid
may
is
down
as a cardinal
must be capable
signified
that the experience of a conscious subject conand was on that account phenomenal in
sisted of Vorstellungen
character, although, as
we have
seen, he
distinct
was forced
to
admit the
from Vorstellungen,
to
no case
yet a content of
is
to be conceived as a
mind and
is
in
"
"
thing
existing independently of
conscious intelligence.
With whatever
assigned in
is
all
largely, I think,
due to
31
whom
persistently misconceived.
have
phenomenon
Now,
certainly,
if
by
or appearance be
determinate object of
placed in
or appearances.
phenomena
relation
other
to
empirical
or
things
objects
of
And
means."*
"
it,
is,"
he
nonsense."
"
Successive appearance in
"
what existence
Bosanquet,
so because he takes successive
says Dr.
thinks
"
So, too,
absolutely certain
"
in
arguing
relations
"
place
is
the
is
adhere conto
theory of
be found
"
external
against
to
it'
ance
is
diction,
if
it
Leaving,
pirical
then, for a
things
moment
are rightly
the
question
whether em-
centrate attention
p. 15.
32
G.
DAWES
reality
HICKS.
in other
is
directed, as
we
say,
upon
real
An
objects.
we have
to face.
example will
Let me take
same colour
of thu
all over,
again,
the parts of
it
it
which do
"
"
really
So
not.
of equal
I wish to raise
said to exist in
is,
tlie
if
same
The answer
in
way
If it
the
we
of
any
real thing at
33
and
indicated above,
briefly
untenable.
on
If,
the
by
real
thing,
and
if
that compresence
we
is
new
not a
object,
is
but,
independent
of,
are appearances.
which the
They
reality of
which they
ways in
as partial, imperfect,
when he
is
to the
mind, and implies certainly that they are within the mind
But, as I
knowledge of them is within the mind.
just as the
is
this
is
If,
to be understood
obliged to
phraseology, the
not itself within the mind in the
is
Kant was
his
Vorstellungen
therefore,
in
may
be said to be
34
HAWKS
'..
\\<1
The notion that do constitute
seems
irresistible
we
because
case,
persist in looking
the receiving of
as passive receptivity, as
which
HICKS.
what
of course,
upon
what is
it
only
sensibility
given,
in
is
What, we
Kant
asked,
The
to the
by referring
"
it is
is, it is
the sense-data
making
to us at
is
the table
Now,
all.
is,
known
is
directed.
I urge, in
the
of
apprehension
that
known and
although
the
way
in
which
it
is
known.
can understand,
that
in
sense-
is
35
distinct from
simply a mere
factor.
.If
the
"
said
relation
"
"
be
itself
act,
this
sense
the
if
throughout
sense
lose
applicability
itself
in
this
gathered
from
What we
are
experience.
certainly not
indicated.
sensibilia
aware
diately
aware of
is
characteristics, which,
when
am
apprehend patches
of
colour in
"
the
is
so
reference
and
for
themselves at
dominated by what
to
is
is,
of
I
all.
mislead"
externally
things
that visual presentations, or sensibilia, are not as such conexisting
of
36
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
whatever
tions.
which there
is
no ground
supposing are themselves groups of such presentathen, the term "immediate" be used in reference
for
If,
'to
known by
Many
what
us.
For example,
it is
truth of
a well attested
which
By
field of vision at
number
we may become
conscious.
both eyes,
affect
of
which by an
This duality of
what
is
the judgment
is
based, there
is
consciousness.
is
;ij
all
And what is
no immediate apprehension
of obscure
If,
then,
to be the
judging,
relating,
it
is
certainly difficult to
the conclusion
that
in
the
37
apprehension of so-called
and
I
it is to
am
is
represent
a point of view, be
develops
it
sensibilia.
We
On the
conscious intelligence nothing of the kind takes place.
contrary, we start with an environment the characteristics of
which are but dimly and confusedly apprehended, and the
parts of which are but crudely and vaguely recognised as
distinguishable from one another.
And
conscious intelligence
By
to be differentiated
inner
means
for discriminating it
supplied in
my
from
all
mental
said
to
life
sufficient
else.
life,
be immediate awareness
sensibilia.
of
detached
and
is
isolated
always
38
be
G.
"
immediate
"
the
in
DA\VES HICKS.
sense that
claimed for
is
The
it.
facts I
Accordingly,
knowledge, to speak
to
must
we
if
are
an immediate
of
mind
and things, whilst the relationship between the mind and the
appearances of things is secondary and derivative.
Although
which it does
common-sense view,
of philosophical thought.
directly
and primitively
sense-data,
suppose
ourselves
to
possess
and
of
that
we can know
world consists of
external
the
of
sense-appearances,
all
we
any knowledge
things
and
inferential
is
I have been
constantly re-asserting itself.
no
difference in
on
there
is
the
that
maintaining,
contrary,
kind between the ways in which we know appearances and the
is
precarious,
ways
true,
in
which we know
do not
"
do sense-data
"
the theory I
am
"
it
Things,
is
According to
"the faculty of being acquainted
And
in the
mind
in the sense in
of
things
usually
"before
To suppose that
"
before
the
mind
sophisticated consciousness
presence.
I agree
is
indeed,
not so
much
the
"
;
in
are not
ordinary un-
as aware of their
and as
39
cognised as objects, and that they are the sole data with which
observation and experiment can deal, is, I submit, to make an
to be
an
The physical
of physical objects.
object
is,
it
is
true, not to
is
we need
be concerned to maintain
is
not exhaust the nature of the physical object, that the physical
object in its entirety possesses also, in addition, the properties
as secondary qualities.
And, except
the ungrounded assumption that the latter are products of
mechanical motion, I can find no reason for holding such a
emanating from
object
is
it
give
apprehended
rise,
it is
a mental act
is
directed,
and the
and
its
and
in
and the
still
occurs.
On
is
the
contrary,
it
is
being apprehended,
40
G.
DA WES HICKS.
and upon which the act of apprehension is directed the appearances arise only in and through the act of apprehension being
;
directed
object.
we
mode
of
results in
find that in
properties of
the
When we
more manifest.
more and
illustration,
it
is
table,
both
exist,
ready to be seen by
it
may
be), the apparent shape of the table is explicable as a consequence of the real shape and of the known characteristics of space.
is
itself.
appear
such cases, the
fact, visually
all
is
necessitated
by
The
water.
thing as
it
stick in water
was out
it
is,
of the water,
is
41
but
all the
same
good and
bent as
it
what they
is
objective
some writers
it
ception
is
going far
that
appearance
And
directed.
that
is
no ground
is
We
facts warrant.
is
what the
If,
bent,
we
are
are assuming
precisely
what
On
for assuming.
strict
when
adherence
the contrary,
is directed
upon a straight stick partially immersed in
water, then the stick in question appears bent, and that no
tion
had been,
so directed.
is
all
purport
is
is
to
say,
Once more,
an appearance.
similar
applicable
in
an argument
I believe
regard
to
the
of
secondary
of colour,
and
let
meanwhile
let it
pass.
of
it.
The
more
all,
42
G.
DA WES HICKS.
is
in order to test
in
it,
is
inherent
Then, surely,
the
of
intervene
spectacles
observer,
or
if
be
it
between
it
in
enveloped
than in daylight.
of
rather
valid on the
of blue spectacles
If
appear to be
may
blindness a
principle
is
be said to possess.
different
set of
the same.
really is brown,
With
factors
Assume
reference to colour-
come
for the
moment
it is
apprehended
it
normal.
objects are
more or
less
accurately apprehended,
is
it
not a
strange demand to make that abnormal vision must also likewise be a way of more or less accurately apprehending them ?
* B.
Russell, The Problems of Philosophy,
p. 13.
43
difficulty
still
the difficulty of
the insuperability
an
is
no more a reason
of
colour
the
actual
object
determining
than
the
it
not
one
has
for supposing
insuperable difficulty
got
of determining the character of the other side of the moon
from
is
admitting
moon
is
not
hemispherical.
I
of
phenomena
looked.
have done
so,
The
memory
facts of revival
and
of
And
recalled.
constructive
is
it
activity
purposive kind.
confined to
Throughout the
efforts of
life of
and
of
in view
"
a deliberate and
mind there
is
involved
psychical mechanism,"
"
of
a blind
when he spoke
we know
that, as a
matter of
upon
knowledge
We
are
concerned here
with the
is,
there are certain general propositions one can lay down respecting
44
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
tion
are dependent
and would
pulating what
it.
life
In the
upon percep-
with which we
is
consists in
mani-
As
sense-data.
Professor
"
Ward
puts
it,
in
memory and imagination are percepts, not unlocalised sensations and movements."*
Now, even those who regard sensedata as in themselves given objects can scarcely maintain that
images, if one may use that term for revived contents of the
character indicated, are also there, ready to be apprehended,
prior
One
it
is
and memory lend countenance, then, to the view that appearances are objects. Nor do they in any way tend to show that
appearances are mental entities, or, more specifically, reactions
of the mind on stimulation.
As a reaction of the mind, an
if
"
the term " appearance had in that case signifi-
itself.
known,
life,
so
consists of a stream of
p. 57.
it is
45
as
is,
in truth, as
movement.
mode of origin is as
mode of origin of matter
explain their
explain the
fruitless
as to attempt to
or of mind,
Not to produce
is also
task of
that.
him who
What
tries to
I do not
envy the
we frame
of a
mental
life
of the ingredients
construction must be supposed to be going on ? The assumption would be less readily made if the question of what it
implies were not so lightly passed over.
In the light of the considerations upon which I have been
insisting, the significance of
as
to
be an existing entity,
DAWES
HICKS.
46
G.
was passively
such
an act of discriminating.
Much more
non-existential
apprehending activity, or as we may now say of appearances, follow from the nature of perception, if the notion
The external
of passive receptivity be entirely relinquished.
of
itself
object
is,
so
far
as
can
be
discovered,
none
of
its
into
ferred
constituents are
the
abstracted from
act
in
no
way
being apprehended
it
and trans-
apprehending
apprehending act there is awareness of certain of its features,
and it is this awareness of a group of its features that
constitutes that group, as the content of the act of apprehension,
The apprehending
there
is
no ground at
third existent.
not so regarding
On
it.
real
existing
thing.
is
affinity
as the inter-connected
Now
is,
to define
of
an ultimate
course, impossible.
We
47
is
The
distinction
is,
as
Mr. Russell
we
meaningless to deny
its
existence
being
an
to
opposed
of
abstraction,
the
'existence'
kind
as
have
being
been
timeless."
attempting
As
to
the
same with
reason that
it
itself.
is
ditions,
not at
and
all,
is
so far as timelessness
is
Reverting now, in conclusion, to the three historical concepphenomena which we have had before us, we are, I
tions of
* The
Principles of Mathematics, vol.
t The Problems of Philosophy, p. 155.
i,
p. 450.
48
think, in a
committed
position
in
all
to
assert
that a
fundamental error
the
of
is
of
error, namely,
them,
placing
empirical things and the ways in which empirical things are
in character.
and things
According to
form of perception, and things in space could
not but participate in the subjectivity which must be assigned
space
itself.
essentially a
to a
space
non-spatial,
in
men-
when once
prepared to argue
it
is
recognised,
as,
must be recognised,
that space has a being and reality of its own, the plausibility
the doctrine that -empirical things are phenomena, or
of
For
it is
understand
how
and to
be apprehended in a
variety of ways by minds that are subject not only to the
manifold conditions of mental growth and development but
those real things
may
its
where
49
II.
ON FEELING.
By
J.
A. SMITH.
"
"
of
what we
call
the Feelings
Feeling (or
").
use this word very loosely and with little clearness or
constancy of meaning, and it seems worth while to see whether
we
hope to put forward and establish some definite results concerning the subject.
I can scarcely suppose
is
in
loose,
and that
our thinking.
it
this implies
Nor again
no
made
to restrict
it,
as
as
in the
same or
like difficulties.
50
J.
and continue
use
it
we
perhaps
to use the
we mean something by
proviso that
put
its
it
something definable
it
and
it is
are
is
precisely
SMITH.
And
A.
it
we mean
common
to
mean
nature or real
Our problem
what in both
respects
Now, somewhat
In
our task.
place of
of
if
possible
really mean.
an account
offered
we
some aid
to
"
Undoubtedly, we are told, Feeling is a sort of experience
"
or psychical fact," and it is at once distinct from, and related
to,
"
"
such as cognition
psychical fact
In fact, there is a fairly general agreement
and conation.
scalene, equilateral
our
first
ment
is
ness,"
isosceles.
But a
little reflexion
destroys
with this account, and indeed the agreesoon seen to be in words only. The genus assigned
whatever
"
and
satisfaction
it
be called,
state
of
"
"
experience,"
consciousness," etc.
"
psychic fact,"
is
little
conscious-
better than a
the
ON FEELING.
its
51
facts.
this,
sub-varieties)
it is
"
"
the x which has
these as its essential
what
Odd
properties
In such
that which
is
or Even.
or a Pain.
Number
as
has as
Sometimes we speak
these as a Pleasure
we do
Still
distinguish,
And
is
good or
which
bad.
this
either
for
Number.
is
is
essentially
back
from the
Whether
in this
say what
it
way
that
is
is
either-pleasant-or-painful.
made
To
to
this
remember,
is,
What
The
"
experience
conation,"
some,
"
"
first
so
is,
far
is it
owner
that
as
it
experience in
in its immediacy."
of these adjectives)
it
is
is
"
just
experience,"
or
rather
or as it
"
is
called
by
experience," as, or
D 2
52
J.
it
if,
into
develops, splits
SMITH.
A.
conative
cognitive or
experience,
and
(2)
The second
"
activity
that
is
is
it
"
mode
a special
of
mental
it is
development on its own lines without turnIt is not implied that it does or can
of
them.
into
either
ing
exist apart from them, as clearly in the first case it could do
implied, capable of
it
them.
the
of kind,
(3)
that
The
third answer
is
more
the owner of
Feeling
difficult
and
subtle.
pleasantness or
It asserts
is
painfulness
such,"
is
essentially
The elements
pleasant or painful.
selves experiences, so
we may
or in, experience."
speaking of
the
pleasantness
or
denying that
it
tone
an
of
painfulness.
is
itself
"
an
element
"
in the experience,
i.e.,
a further characterisation of
"
"
calling
it,
it
"
concomitant
"
or
47) of an
This
seems
to
that
Pleasantness
and
Painexperience.
imply
fulness are qualities of something which is itself not an experi-
differential
quality
or a
qua/e (Marshall,
movement which
To our
What
question,
Pleasant or Painful
is
is
as, e.g.,
is itself
Feeling,
p.
velocity or direction
a quale of bodies.
what
is
the x of which
we have
the
ON FEELING.
answers (1) x
all or
is
53
differs
is
it.
cations.
that
from other
it
and
am
"
psychosis,"
or
life,"
without the
e.g.,
"
consciousness," or
"
ness,"
facts.
"
living,"
"
adjectives
or
mode
or state of conscious-
"
activity,"
"
psychical,"
either
mental,"
"
with
or
conscious,"
"spiritual," etc.
(i)
The
first
view
that Feeling
is
is
"
the fundamental or
arise
The
by development or transformation" (Marshall, p. 36).
distinction between Feeling and such other forms is therefore
one of degree of development, and so
is
a relative distinction
as experience, or
to
be
Feeling
unorganised
undeveloped,
relatively
experience;
becomes organised
it
so
far
as
inexplicit,
experience
inexpress,
develops or
may seem
experience which
to
contains
54
A.
J.
view
commend
fails to
itself
SMITH.
still
Feeling,
of Feeling itself,
we
We
i.e.,
"
call
aesthetic experience."
survey of the
This view
possibly others).
and
facts,
is
it is
"
The tripartite
does not depend upon a priori considerations.
division is in a peculiar manner the outcome of subjective
analysis"
(Sully
apud Marshall,
p.
Now
39).
no one can
quarrel with the attempt so to classify mental facts or phenomena, but we must not take it for more than it is worth. It
is
an
artificial
classification,
like-
books on
or literary form.
The objection in
my shelves
Its criterion is
principle to
it is
that
it is
exposed to the
or the entry
class
"
sundries
"
a pseudo-
of not
classifications,
"
defined
it is
simply any
"
cannot be
which cannot be
conative.
what Feeling
is,
or
what
its
objectivity
"
(of localisation),
"
(Marshall,
p. 40).
55
.ON FEELING.
attribute of
it.
to
bility of a self-contained
and the
possi-
forms of some
development
and complexity. It has a great support in
such popular distinctions as that between "the heart" and
richness, variety,
"
the head."
On
is left
.very precarious
its
transference of its
"
Sundries."
We
class of
"
Feelings."
From
we
"
an
frankly throws overboard the contention that Feeling is
"
or
could
at
which
in
element
arrive,
by
analysis
experience
which it could be arrested.
(iii)
But
it.
"
in the relation of concomitance
most guarded answer is
universal concomitance. The word
of
is
it
and indeed,
added,
"
"
concomitance is an obscure one, and says no more than that
but
it
is
"
"
(<
along with the other elements,"
added, as before, that they are not themselves
What we
call Feelings
of
they are
And
little
sub-
seem wronged
something
else,
56
A.
.J.
SMITH.
We cannot
we followed
a right impulse in
substantive.
"
from
to
pillar
"
post
each view
we seem
in turn to
have
undeveloped,
un-
(a) Feeling
was
formless,
relatively
organised.
(c)
of spiritual being.
all
these
architectonic,
more substantial
or substantive, or at
least
it.
cannot be conceived of except by contrast with such experience, as not being what that experience is or is conceived to be,
or as being less
light.
The
means
something
insubstantial,
called
that
is
even negative.
relatively
relatively inexperience
experience nor within experience
;
it
;
say,
formless,
Feeling
subordinate,
something that
was
may
be
neither
something
mere inexperience or non-
ON FEELING.
57
we do
"
"
purely, or almost purely, subjective experience.
With
satisfied
as a
deny
us only
what Feeling
is
not,
it
to
represents
it
cannot
phantom variety
common
its
this
it tells
this
In view of
independence, and the substantiality of Feeling.
we
were
re-examine
our
results.
These
must
this,
perhaps not
so negative as they looked, for they acknowledged the relative
possession
by Feeling
of
the
characters which
constituted
we
reply, because
is
a difference in degree
the advantage of relating the difference of kind to the difference of amount in a way which is, if not intelligible, at least
familiar,
in
which differences
inconsistencies
difficulty
or,
so far as
we think
of
Feeling as
potentialities of Cognition
through
and Conation.
58
J.
we cannot
if
regard
inactivities;
try to
potentialities
same kind
of the
we
these
SMITH.
A.
mere
way
Conation.
to the
And
or
as themselves activities
For
to feel,
we remind
selves, is
precise,
latencies
be no
as
it
our-
there could
of Feeling as,
is
heterogeneous.
Nevertheless, this was not what
development we intended
kind, and
we meant;
to recognise a
in speaking of
genuine outbreak of
of
this
No
presupposed an acknowledgment
their
of,
undoubted autonomy
for, the more
and respect
We
intended
powers as well
as,
all
along
and indeed
We
cannot
way than
On
it
it
the
more firmly
of,
or to
is
it
and
ON FEELING.
"After
assertion,
59
all,
it
Yes,
is
it
explain
an illusory appearance
as
it
of
to
away
it
something
an
else,
illusion created
etc.,
unreality,
"
in a Pickwickian sense," or
But
we been maintaining
not that in
regard
in
its
the understanding
to
So far as we understood
true character.
question
of
understand
it.
we
it,
declared
rather
its existence,
"
Feeling was
call
undifferentiated
itself
what we
This, that
inexplicit, immediate,
it
What had
let
it
or anticipated
it,
to be that.
we presupposed
Feeling exists
upon or known
did not
that in attempting
"
;
We
certainly,
but what
is
that there
is
no answer.
We
"
answer
"
is
and
ineffable,
inexpressible,
"
"
;
or,
again,
it
is
the
same
is
often
"
said
of
can only be
felt."
If so,
it
does n(
Their
60
J.
SMITH.
A.
position
really
that
is,
irresistible,
(if
such there
be),
but
could be
sidered.
but
it
either Feeling is
being
of
this contention
may
be con-
of its
may
negative (having no
essentially something
supposes something positive or positively known (apprehended) in it. It cannot be doubted which of these alternatives
There
will be chosen.
to
what
is
and existence
We
is
called Feeling
is
assigned.
"
Feeling
and
of
"
existent
"
as
are
they
meaning both of
meant in the
"
"
Feeling exists (not outside of it). Now this statement can be meant in either of two ways either analytically
assertion
or synthetically.
means
is
we know
first,
to tell us
what Feeling
to define Feeling
does not do that but takes for granted that
what Feeling is and tells us something further
in the other,
about
In the
to tell us
is
it
is
it
it
extends
our
is
ON FEELING.
61
We
Feeling,
felt,"
we
and
"
are told,
"
"
felt
"
apprehended or perceived
mean
"
(synthetically)
Now
(not understood).
Feeling
this
what
is,
might
mean
by Feeling, and I put forward the assertion that it is something which can (only) be apprehended," or it might mean
"
(analytically)
perceived."
between
to
be,
mean by
"
"
reduces
only
of existence
is
Still
"
"
to exist, or
Feeling
acknowledge the difference. For
Let us take the second
is nothing but to be perceived.
Now,
esse is percipi.
if
this
were
so, it
was
and
nothing about
existence.
its
But
being,
existence
statement
and
this is clearly
it
knowing nothing
of its being,
we
be perceived, its
also be the case
predicates of
in that case,
to
is
would
Feeling,
its
Feeling is to be
the difference
mode
what
the essence of
way
when anything has only one mode of existence,
and its essence must coincide. But either way the
is false,
can
esse
be percipi.
"
may
moment
but in that
perceived.
moment
Certainly,
its
if
existence
Feeling
We
it
is
other
than
its
being
quid positivum, it is not
(which indeed is nonsense).
is
it,
for
it
by him
to
62
J.
A.
SMITH.
me
presupposes that
word.
meant by the
is
But neither
other means.
And,
For
this situation.
of us
can define
to the other.
it
in all discussion
and communication do we
hot
"
"
or "
"
memory or opposite to
we can define none of them
"
?
or
"
although
"
"
the same about Feeling ?
The plea is almost more than plausible.
and
left," etc.,
why
not admit
right
And
so
It rests
upon the
we gather
or,
more accurately,
perccpta,
and from
this
and not
relations,
no more.
But a Feeling
this has
How do
upon the question of their differentia from these.
differ
from
or
other
?
answer
The
they
percepta
percipibilia
seems obvious
clear
no feeling
is
itself,
ON FEELING.
63
and on the other hand no feeling is the state or quale of anyBut the percipient
thing other than what is itself percipient.
must be alive or living and feels only as living. The word
state if it
is
an
is
a blunder
what we mean
act or self-affirmation.
That
What we
is its essence.
penetrated
its
secret,
guarded
observe
its
At
it.
Schein or rather
is its
essence
is,
not to perceive
we seem
last
to
it
have
we
while
cleave to this,
undo
we
But
us.
of its
contrast.
now
It
looks as
generic nature
it
if
we were back
of the case is
wood again
for this
or self-positions
have to determine
in the
they
we
now
more,
now
is
to be
ranked
a thought
we must
be able to
"
deduce
"
it
of
I can see
what
is
this I
may
no end
"
we can
clear
up
In regard to
refer to Professor Stout's chapter on the subject
called
from
"
(I, p.
168)
("
consciousness
"
64
SMITH.
A.
J.
On
is
p.
life).
"
intelligible
self,
that there
not-self,
important point
of the
He
change."
by saying that
I alter this
when
of
the
paraphrase
involves a fore-knowledge or preconsciousness of the change, i.e., the as yet future state of the
it
self
"
and
environment,
its
"
all activity
or,
as
we
may
say,
the
future
of the
or
may
"
ideal anticipation of a
change
to
be produced."
is
explicit
explicit.
which
(b)
But, again,
we must
ON FEELIXG.
"
of
"
idea
consciousness of the
"
idea
"
65
an implicit or explicit
Now he cannot by
indeed, strictly speaking, an
is
future result.
still
image can only be of the past. Such images may play a part
in the process, but the fact presupposed is an awareness of the
future result, and the irrelevance or dispensability of the image
is
What
natural.
aware beforehand
is
Clearly, also,
it
but what we
may
actuality
Of
it
and
there
is
is
in
some sense
expansion or contraction.
is
non-existent
contend that of
is
call the
an impossibility).
he means
no consciousness
is
possible.
and that
clearly
all
this result.
to saying that all psychic activity preof the past or present (or of the present
consciousness
supposes
as summing up the past, of both the self and the not-self)
:
what
it
presupposes is consciousness of
situation.
This surely accords with our first and most natural view,
that in opposition to physical change, movement, or activity,
psychical activity is essentially preceded and conditioned by
As a
knowledge, consciousness, apprehension of a situation.
be
called
this
individual
is
situation
knowledge may
always
perception of
And we
it.
psychic activity
apart
from
that.
The
knowledge or perception
In
is
fact,
66
"
J.
A.
SMITH.
Were
psychic activity.
to physical activity..
they do so apply
it
To
"
already characterise
even a stone
may
own
falls of its
nature, by its
own
"
souls
"
it
occasion
What
is
it
too has
same agent
It, too, is
its occasion.
as a
a self-
What
?
We can scarcely specify anything more definite
than the percipient's actual present situation.
But clearly
has
for
its
not
the
whole
my perception
object
momentary
Perception
and
my
whose
states
do perceive.
There is a temptation to say (with Spinoza)
the whole condition of the physical universe; but, again, this
is clearly too much, and we
perhaps restrict it to the whole
I
But
of
themselves).
If this
be
so,
we must
life
ON FEELING.
thus, viz., as
or
originative
67
We
must append to
must be or
when
it is,
it is
own way
in its
This
of the other.
fully explicit
it
it
cannot do
so acts only
when
It is
This account
here
we have
is
quite general
make a
to
We
distinction
But
more than merely
rather, universal.
or,
which is
far
"
"
empirical.
Voluntary activity), but we have given no name to the correspondent Conation, and we must now try to particularise this
also.
Why
we speak
did
of Perception
we
left
out because
we supposed
(possibly wrongly or
had no influence
on,
and could
name
the universal.
I
(1)
without
(2),
It
is
of real
can exist
important
is not possible, though, once (2) exists,
E 2
the converse
68
(1)
is
no longer
(1), as in fact
artificially
Not
possible.
it is
SMITH.
A.
J.
forgetting this,
we may
and
isolate
in early or
means individual
(which as yet
by individual perceptions of
such individual situations, and such appears to be its whole
what it is, what we mean by it.
real and intelligible nature
means,
it
when we
assert
to be the
it
But with
this result
or disagreement.
we
According to
it,
dim, but
still
"
tentative,"
perhaps very feeble, ineffective or
but
still
two
these views
thing
else,
couple
or
a third
"
is to
between
concomitant
deny
it
to be a
terms, or
its
"
of
it.
datum
view too
it
we
is
possible
is
experience, but
and
to return
life
an element in
at
it.
We
it
enters into
is
an endless
varying
individual
that.
alternation
of
perceptions
of
life
ON FEELING.
Here we are
versd.
two alternatives;
offered
immediately
Feelings
69
the
follow
conations
that
(1)
or
o/oefet?,
the
and
Feelings).
acts
(i.e.,
its
(alters
comes
It is
and
it
(2),
is
view (1)
for according
is
said,
finds
it
this occasions
the animal,
situation,
is
is
to
only
later cognised.
If
we accept
both,
we
represent
life,
the
fixed
or our
modes
life,
as
of itself in
order
Conation
We
we cannot help
self in all
tribute its
phases.
The experiencing
remains
and
one
does not so disexperiences
modes in a temporal cycle of differently dated
suspecting to be an error.
it's
We
its historic
amounts
existence can
must be
or
modes
different
experience.
It
70
J.
SMITH.
A.
are
in
differences
"
"
Feeling
differs
degree of
perfection.
If this is correct,
members
more
there
is
is
perfect,
an
we
call
inferiority
(relatively) formless,
objectless,
etc.,
etc.
is
Feeling
which
is
which
so callel because
they
unorganised,
express
by
way
it is less
it
calling
Now
a considerable body of
who
But which
either
is
it
as
e.g.
is
con-
is
reaches
prefigured in Feeling,
a
i.e.
totality
which,
if
it
not
Of course I
Feeling has, and Thought and Action have not.
do not for a moment attribute to Mr. Bradley the view that in
this or that feeling
Still it is
the character
some adumbration
is
to be found absolutely.
of this perfection in
an experience
ON FEELING.
which induces us
to call
it
71
specially Feeling.
Nor would
Behind
important truth.
it
lies
great mass of
testimony
On
of Feeling
and what
is
we
not Feeling
among experiences
dictory opinions
distinction
relative,
say,
non-Feeling
relatively to
a lower or higher,
i.e.
and
possible,
experience
is
name
And
of perfection.
let
degree
us boldly identify higher Feeling with
"
pleasantness
it is
being our
at its highest
and
name
less pleasant
Feeling
when
best.
Before I attempt to justify this and I admit its paraI should like to point out that the doctrine
doxical character
in this
has
it
(i.e.,
life,
and Unpleasure or
life, life
etc., etc.
as such,
With
do
it
declaring
the
absurdity
to
be
only
superficial.
My
72
J.
suggestion, precisely,
A.
SMITH.
is
it is
it
experience,
short of perfect
is
therefore
know
full
against me.
"
along.
well
"
is
all
real,
;
efforts to belittle
be advanced
your minds
Or, as I
something, while
is
that will
the argument
and
is,
Pleasure
resentment your
or
Pleasure
we might
unreal
it
monstrous
if
We
you
will,
but Pain
to
deny
its
reality is
'
Experience
we
is
May
repeat
we
don't
a.
in
any
plain nonsense."
I plead for a little patience
test or tests of
"
"
reality
"
May
"
What is your
Oh, you will reply, take any test you
real
ON FEELING.
will
the
am
trial.
authorities
"
"
am
"
"
and on the
comforted by
dwelt on the
"
reality
of Feeling
unreality
little
have
"
unreality
yes,
!)
the great
73
of Pleasure)
altogether.
There
have certainly been those who have felt a difficulty about the
eternity of Feeling, and even about the eternity of Pleasure,
have thought the one and the other incompatible with a perfect
experience, and have undoubtedly denied the compatibility of
so about Feeling
if
cannot
even
you ignore me.
altogether.
ignore,
You insist upon taking Pain as an indubitable typical
(more
hesitatingly)
Them you
more
grudgingly) include
more palpable or grosser forms of it
the higher you go, the more doubtful you become.
To you
therefore Feeling means above all Pain in Pain what you
instance
of
mean by Feeling
it
What
is.
will
then,
answer,
is
it
reality,
that
or,
what
Pardon
central
me
be
to
if
ask
And
"
real
it
"
test
if
dogma
hesitate to
"
what
it is
most what
think
incomprehensibility
of
it.
incomprehensible, that
is
it ?
you
I-know-not-what which
this
is
Its
you,
is
something
prehensible, ineffable.
you declare
me
is,
is
is irrational is
its
So your principle is
and eo ipso, the real.
and what
real,
is
its
real is
irrational."
This
of
of
is
reality," I
viz.,
why we
because
as
you say
and
also unreal.
it is,
the irrational,
it
is
differ
differ
unreal,
we
which
if
it is
irrational, it is
74
SMITH.
A.
J.
to be assigning
"
real
is,
"
what we
"
And by
mean, by
makes
all
rational
"
mean what we
mean, or mean to
all
it, viz.,
experience, or (what
it
it.
it
is
if
wholly
For that only
experience.
perfect
is real.
us,
when we enquire
as to the
The question,
at most,
is
rather this
"
"
but " must." Does not
Yes, not only can
"
"
real
?
that then imply that they are all three
Again
"
"
"
real
has now
I reply,
the
word
but
Yes,"
distinguo ;
which
answer
relative
a return to
what
Pain
as a whole
is
is
it,
if
Pleasure
is
Feeling,
which
is
Pleasant
just as Feeling,
or
whole, Feeling
i.e.,
error
and
is
error
defeat.
If the
if
the whole
is
ON FEELING.
or,
if
you
minimum
your sense
please,
it
is
what
is
the
just exists
the ovo^a
of experience,
experience,
and
nothing at all
is
experience
which
structureless,
shapeless,
Thus
Feeling in
75
is
what
the
non-
just-not
spiritual
or
is
world,
quality,
the
intelligible character
"
or psychical
relation,
stripped
of all
relations
the
to be the
name
we may
"
still
Feeling
of a philosophical Category or Conception.
76
III.
By
THE problem
DELISLE BURNS.
and particulars
is
not
by William
of
Ockham
still
need discussion
and
'complications.
is
Ockham
said
what
is
important.*
we cannot draw
a line
between a state
pleasure another.
imply that
what
indivisible.
The
is real
is
me
Ockham
himself.
77
mind.
things
It
particulars
or at
be explained finally in terms of universals
least that the individual is regarded as a difficulty remaining
to
are
we have grasped
the
real
nature
of the whole.
"
reality of Universals,"
and
as ultimate facts
Idealist
of the continent
Systems
were survivals
of
medieval
Ockharn's
of
Ockham found
same as that which we
position
practically the
as
is
in
that
it
was
Idealism.
I
Ockham
But
is
for
ence of universals.
*
that
universals
derivative.
are
word Realism
the
in
what follows
fundamental
realities
to
mean the
doctrine
78
C.
The
DELISLE BUKNS.
to teach
and
less
A.
the Eealism of
I shall state
The
1.
that Socrates
we
We
the
the ground of
would be
that
our saying
we
them
find
it
Clearly
will, for
Plato, or like a
is like
them, and
call
own
is
Scotus.
to say, there
is
Thomas and
not
classification is
Socrates
is
classify, since
made by us
a " tree."
and
There
likeness
is
it
hold
and
"
to
is
it
these
"
universal
that
first
sometimes
is
used
the
Platonic
"
idea
"
(v.
sub
2.
the
Bo).
Next
it is
classification
first
includes individuals.
manhood
The
animals.
men
real,
are
is
"
like
So that we
"
monkeyhood
independent of our
will.
We
may
in so far as
is also
in facts
attention
to
facts of
perception.
3.
We
notice,
vVILLIAM OF
OCKHAM ON UNIVEKSALS.
79
seem
to relate
other particulars.
more
facts the
4.
But
refer to
when we
and
tree
facts
real."
say
the stone.
also
which
Socrates
There
is
is
is
"
highest
real
"
is
and
a ground here
of
what we
so
is
too
the
for
Scotus
of
So much
Abelard
it
all
scholastic agreed
upon
thesTe likenesses
do not exist
Universals, as it
separately (a parte rei) from the particulars.
"
"
was said, are " in things. They are " in particulars almost,
to force an unconscious
The
relations of likeness
complex of
between Socrates
* It is
sufficiently well known that what we call objective was in the
Mediaeval philosophy called subjective. In what follows, however, I
shall use objective and subjective in their modern meanings.
80
C.
DKL1SLE BURNS.
tion
the
Reality."
make
by an addition
of or constitutes,
of
"
difference," the
class.
From
7.
this
it
followed
that
the
must be
individual
ultimate
difference."
No
what
"
Whatever
difference
him
"
it
was,
it
was the
Hence
made him
individual.
each a composite
"
made
we may say
up,"
inexactly, of animality
individuationis,
"
thing
in
anything
As
"
were
there
Socrates which
Thomists
is
not affected
by relation
to
else4
Thomas
and
time
all
tive,"
real,
but
to
it.
The
Eealists of
make
so
for
speak:
the
intlividuutioii in Socrates is
is
the particular
real
less
we may
if
universality,
81
principle of
and
in Plato
thus a universal.
Now
the
precisely
opposite
such a
of
Hume.
is
the
to be
"
Non
"
sed
aliqua causa individuationis
est
esset
causa
magis
quomodo possibile
quaerenda
aliquid
commune
et universale."
B.
I
1.
The universe
In this
or objects.
of experience
Ockham
gives us
particular things
datum (primum
intelligi-
bile) is
we
Thomas, who asserted that the first datum is the general and
"
or reality which we conmost inclusive universal " being
observe around us.
fusedly
question as to
any
rate
2.
we
We
what
is
first
"
thing
"
in
however
we
late
differences.
a mere
"
This
vox
knowledge
discover
"
of it
or
it, is
Ockham never
"
nornen
"
or
flatus
The universal
vocis,"
is
not
although our
and
making no difference to
F
82
C.
DELISLE BURNS.
object
3.
"
;
since substance
is
objectively
and that
up
it
It
was easy
of
one or
to
many
universals
The
all objective.
and an individual
that
nothing at
else.
"
"man "is
real
"
made
difference,
no
Ockham a
"
when we say " Socrates is a man or
"
we mean that there is a single composite
Socrates is white
"
"
manhood and now
Socrates," in which we may find now
whiteness."
position,
and such
universals holds, as
of
the
many
to
an
He
The manhood
"
individual difference."
same
as the
manhood
of Plato or it is different.
.
{3.
If it is different
If it is the
then
it is
a particular.
The reply
common
the Scotists
of
is
83
"
manhood,"
But
individual differences.
its
if
by the
make up
nature and
it
the universal
"
manhood,"
remains undivided and if
;
they are intrinsic to the universal then once again the so-called
is
existens per
numero
omnem
alia."
it is
omni
sibi singularis
addito, est
quod nulla
ita
additum
Tenendum quod
sine
se,
res
sed
una
res singularis et
imaginabilis
est
per aliquod
ilia est
rem, quia omnis res per se vel est eadem vel diversa ab
Super
art. vet. in
proem,
libri
And
Predicab.)
at least
admitted
the existence of
universals.
"
fact
If the universal is a
irreducible
to
terms
was already
real in another
of
in it
which
is
(Logic,
I,
in it
and in
And
xv.)
others
in the
would have
to
be destroyed."
recites other
arguments.
3.
But
"
of
common
thing
another universal
sense
is
The
"
same
and
in
Ockham and his opponents seem to suppose, the " subject "
"
Socrates is made up of the predicates
manhood," etc., and
as
that which
way.
institutione
II, 8.)
F 2
84
C.
In what way
Two
DELISLE BURNS.
opinions are possible, says Ockhara.
may be to be thought, its
whole
esse
The word
"
"
"
is
man
mind
It is
intelligi."
"
an external
refers not to
reality,
but to the
we
is
(or our
own
many
particulars
by
We
"
say now therefore that the universal is a
qualitas
"
that is to say when we say " man
we refer not
merely to an action of our own mind, an act of cognition, but
to a relation existing between several things and the one mind.
"
mentis
The universal
is still
Hume
which
making
it
first
Hume
Even
others.
if
men.
"
No
way
mind
it
universal,"
Ockham
be considered
"
says,
is
a substance in whatever
is
an intention
of the
it is
a conceptual object, as
we should
say,
but he thinks
is
if
our
4.
constitution of a
universal in
way
in
which
it
the
does not
that
all
Criticism
of
Here Ockham
85
beginning to found
is
but more of
into
seemed
self
to
"
"
perception
(intuitio).
"
enter into
The
object
abstraction
abstract
of
"
than
know-
ledge (conception)
And
if
pressed to
its
logical
and
Kant
of
in his logical
moments.
Ockham
Ockham
5.
define
"
is,
we
should,
when we
we go
but I
may
refer to
an ideal
Aristotelian
idea ")
:f
but
if
"
"
is
Platonic
Ockham
universal
"
natural to
is to Quodlibeta, V, q. V.
t The contrast is, I confess, arbitrary since Plato sometimes supposes
"
his " idea
to be in the things, and Aristotle sometimes supposes his
"
"
universal form to be the perfect specimen.
86
C.
the ideal.
the ideal.
etc.)
DELISLE BURNS.
It
is
the ideal
we
we
find
"
construct (by
Thus when
likeness.
among
objects, not
intentio mentis,"
argue that
Ockham
objective
(reality)
to
the
His arguments
idealof pure
ideal.
constructions
chirnaera
is,
("
intentiones
stuff in each,
this, since
it
them.
And if you
only makes the slightest reference.
"
"
and
retain the
say that things
principle of individuation
are distinct although made of the same stuff, you make the
Ockham
no
is
similarity.
Such
is
Ockham's argument
for, of
course, he
is"judicii subtilitate
omnium
The only
is
inconsistent with
solution possible
is
his,
but
itself.
the particular
"
in re,"
And
if
"
in re
"
in mente."
"
He
an arbitrary
is
mean
does seem to
we may
in time
and
consider that
Ockham means
since
conceptually,"
universal
think
means
"
87
mind
there would be
likeness.
Likeness
therefore
is
mind
"
points
Now
I
"
thought
"
(" intentio
mentis
").
And
in re."
wherever a distinction
is
introduced between
other.
Kant,
whose
Scottish
moralising survived even his overdose of mathematical scepticism, is one of the examples of the unreasonable tendency to
But
6.
is
Ockham
certain objections.
"
it is
"
what we have
I, xvii).
In the
the universal
is
first place, is it
"
"
not
in re
Socrates that
is like
Plato
if
Does
it
"
in
"
Socrates
"
is
There
is
88
DELISLK BURNS.
C.
differunt
specific
numerical
universal
difference, it
and
think
differing
of different qualities,
of
some
and
sort of reality
which
from the
different
is
reality of
the particulars.
He is too good a logician to say that the
is both one and many at the same time, and yet
he does not see how the unique thing may have the same
same thing
is
numerical difference is the essence of the particular. " Whatever exists outside the mind is itself single, so that IT, without
anything added,
reference
real diversity is
than
things
diverse in
which
all
so that
in
genus or
differ
even
all
specific difference is
diversity
more important
is
it
species
they
conversely."f
And
follows that
are
if
therefore
"
things
again,
be mediate or immediate."*
question) "hoc
but
"
again
numerical
diverse
(a parte rei)
this
is
Hence numerical
specific
are
what
individual
And
singulari ").*
numerical.
is
the
to
album
not "albedo."
"
That
is
to
* In I
Sent.,
t Ibidem,
|
Thus
Ibidem,
say,
q.
AU.
AU.
also
"
(in
the particular
VI, AE.
the same
not a
which
collection of likenesses to
called difference,
"
being
in
"
and we cannot
the particular
89
superadded a something
is
fairly
of
humanity
"
in
"
is
exactly
alike.
"
in
"
The subject
of the
Sentence
"
would imply a
Socrates
is
false Realism.
"
white
is
thus a kind
a predicate.
to
;
Hume
would
call
"
abstract
ideas
"
:
but
of
an
less
"
"
objective
"
in re
"
have neverthe-
existence.
C.
I
now propose
to
"
held that in the meaning of the sentence Socrates is white,"
the whiteness is part of the subject Socrates and thus Scotus
;
90
DELISLE BURNS.
C.
terms of whiteness,
etc.,
and Ockham
terms of Socrates.
In other
"
whiteness," as part of
words, Scotus regarded the predicate,
the subject, " Socrates," but avoided the statement that Socrates
is only a collection of qualities by saying that there was an
"
ultima entitas
individual.
"
This,
the collection
superadded to
to
make the
an irreducible
to the
kind of
reality, a particular.
Ockham, on the other hand, regarded the individual subject
Socrates as objective fact and, seeing that it did not consist
admission of
And
ideas
"
or classifications are
again
to the admission of
"
this,
do without the assertion (at least implied) that there were two
kinds of real objects, each quite irreducible to the other,
particulars
and
universals.
There he says
of Scotus."
when
My
and
numerically and
really differ
For
it is
~by
the
same thing
same thing
to
is
that
that,
opposition at
however,
all."
But
is
this, if it
is
means anything
objectively real.
definite, surely
The importance
Ockham
of
is
91
and seeks
from what
away the
is
medigeval Realism,
particular
and the
distinct,
an Absolute
or of a Flux.
like-
believe in an Absolute.
in
deficient
in
argument
reality.
now propose
It is reasonable, I
to carry further.
is
real
is
mere
collection of universals.
1.
Socrates
is
For even
hood, etc.
if
'
same
"
universals
same
we do
Scotus
fact
it
what he seems
to
deny
Thomas
since he admits in
is
an
and they
"
thus interpreted Scotus's " ultima entitas entitatis which is
the phrase he uses for the " principium individuationis."
But
this admits
an irreducible
explained in terms of
"
"
thisness
whatness
"
"
or
"
thatness," not to be
new
is
Thomas
is no explanation.
more resolute in
word.
is
92
DELISLE BURNS.
C.
form
")
humanity
Thus
spatial diversity is
Now
if
to
the
"
in Socrates of
which
is
Particulars would
be what had definite connection with one and not more than
which relations
is
that of space.
Ockham was
diversity
is
collection of
qualities.
distinguish
I distinguish
by reference
two oranges
(alike in
And
to the time
at
It
seems
* If
space, and perhaps time, are not real in the sense that I
construct them, then I equally construct the intuition which seems to
"
"
destroy them. There is just as much subjectivity in intuition as there
in "intellect,-"' even if there is such a thing as "intuition," in the
"
"
Bergsonian sense at all. One cannot escape from the merely practical
intellect by an intuition for which no distinction or particular is real,
since it can be argued that the intuition itself is only a practical desire
and does not give reality. Every argument against the distinctions made
is
by the
made
in
"
intuition."
particular is not
made
of
"
or to be explained in terms of
For Ockham
only.
93
is
man," or
"
"
where
"
"
"
That
Socrates."
And we
white."
is
Whiteness, manhood,
is
cannot say
is
Socrates
We
else.
etc., etc.
to say Socrates
is
"
is
Socrates
is
n terms
(to
"
of universals)
not a collection of
is
universals (qualities).
We
is
We
particular
This
likeness
is
is
any more
than
the
distinction
of
two
is.
And even
irreducible
terms
This, in
thus
"
of
far,
"
not
is
this
what."
summary
QuodL, VI,
8.)
"
and
"
that
"
that
Hicceitas
is
form,
collection
"
and so there
is
an
"
is
I do not,
go beyond him.
I take
it
of universals as a
2.
homines
if
collection
this
nihil
("Laici,
On
mere
the other
is
not
made up
collection.
"
between
"
particulars
The
particulars (thisnesses) produce a likeness (whatness).
universal therefore must be a kind of reality in relation to
which the particulars are
if
you
like
it,
"
alike."
Thus
it
94
C.
DELISLE BURNS.
force
We
We
universals
say that
may
and
are
are
exist
"
We
in
word man
ception,
"
things
is
is
is
The
an object.
refers to a likeness
which likeness
not the
of perto say,
the
universal
has
objective
or
reality,
that
it
cannot be
may
be
is
which
to the other.
is
of
difficult
realities
established
a relation
between them.
4.
One
It
may
"
Socrates
made up
complex
of parts,
is
one of which
term Socrates.
stitute the
"
95
Or
it
is
etc.,
whiteness.
is
may
Thus
is
universality
we
regard
point of
another.
But
it
(Hume
nor
"complex,"
universal
soul
is
or
he a tissue
of
vital
In
force.
relations,
fact,
nor
is
he
reason
the
why
real
is
When, however,
to
"
I call
them both
exists
"
it
may
Even
be a universal.
It
real, I
if
"
is
would
be referring
may
real
in
"
only means
that case be
and
It
to
M. Bersson's Flux.
96
DELISLE BUKNS.
C.
Ages
Even
century.
the case
in
of
M. Bergson
it
seems
that,
And
of
is
it
no avail
concretion of Keality.
tion against
to contrast abstract
This
is
to be of
making Reality
individual) of
(new
ordinary experience
a fiction.
is itself
was true
To
theology might not be true in philosophy.
save the individual, the Absolute had to be destroyed but it
in
was a
"
supernatural beings is
Now I do not propose to argue against M. Bergson in his
assertion that Reality is a Becoming in which there are
distinctions without differences.
stand what
analysed.
if
it
also,
it
may mean
If it is
a complex,
cannot be analysed
and
all
it
"
it
is
seems,
complex cannot be
can be analysed, and
it
not a complex
word
to say that a
individual
"
of the
word
as both referring to
"
seem
to
imagine
"
far as I
understand
in a sense
is
is
97
cease
within the
distinction
theless
does
it
prevents
ness as
well
change
"
as
consisting
it
one
is
but
never-
The same
is
many.
difficulty
same individual, unique-
of the
of
something
else
"
can be
I must, I say,
say, because
"
conviction."
must
it
my understanding how
predicated.
it
consciousness
refer to
consisting of
But
(as a
it
is
heap of stones)
to
may
be said that
my
how
problem
how
it is
is
not particular.
There,
if
complex
of such a
is
mere
be explainable in
It is not
constituted.
The
particular in this
terms
of
would
would
98
C.
complex which
DELISLE BURNS.
it is.
Now
called a whole.
it is still
"
wholes
told, is
"
"
organic," but
do seem to
differ in
kind
as nothing
That
denial
else
is
of
what we
but
When
Ockham,
"
makes us admit
not that
we
That
of oxygen.
it
we do not deny
lent
may
is
two parts
but water
"
of
oxygen
nothing
how
cause.
The history
of
is
if
of origins is not
we
an explanation
Now
if
that
is
it is
or the relations,
we
uniqueness, even
if
If,
character they
may
have
lost the
is
is
no
real
manhood
in
at least, different
"
from
"
every other) cannot be even a complex of forces or relations
which are not unique or not found only in one place at one
The words
"
"
complex
or
"
organic unity,"
99
if
they have
is given of a unique
thing by
out
either
what
finding
things existed just before it (e.g.,
hydrogen + oxygen before water) or in how many ways it may
if not completely
be the starting-point for
any description of the number and kind of realities. We must
accept, as the basis for understanding the particular, numerical
grasped, by William of
difference;
Ockham must
existence which
is
not reality
plications
and
added
or, if
The problem
since, the
G 2
100
PHILOSOPHY AS THE
IV.
CO-ORDINATION
OF
SCIENCE.
By H.
1.
AM
SHELTON.
S.
and
yet, if it is a truism, it is
It
is,
is
seldom or never
theories of science
co-ordination
I shall take the liberty also of coining for the branch a special
admitted that
many
may
Whatever the
special
problem
may
be,
our conception of
which, like
all
true
axioms,
is
101
But the
No
difficulties.
soundness of their
own
lines of reasoning.
as those
of their
own methods.
"
their
of
own
data
detect the
opponents.
them
acquainted in order to
make
.Such a process
if
of
science than
is,
anything, more harmful to the progress
unsettled differences of opinion. Any valid theory of method
fit
If
independent of other considerations.
the results be discordant, then every line of reasoning should
be severally examined in order to exhibit all possible sources
logical
conclusion
of error.
"
proportion
of
questions
interdependence' of the
implicit in
stellar
modern
universe
that
we
various
research.
find
Nor
is
it
only in a
this inter-relation
sciences.
It is
men
few
and
everywhere
of
the chemical
102
H.
S.
S II ELTON.
and sometimes on
is
an obvious
This inter-relation
to
fact of present
day knowledge.
to be a competent
more than one of these diverse branches, or, to a
very limited extent, in a very few. The enormous increase in
the mass of fact tends more and more to narrow the sphere
It is impossible for
specialist in
and
so it
It
worker
lines
to co-ordinate
of
room
is
and
investigation.
the
of
knowledge
acquaintance
results.
concepts
the
various
and
specialist in
the meaning
aspects
of
science
of
of
he should be a
work
It is his
each science in
relation
its
most general
their
results.
clear
and an
sciences
class
to
comprehend
wider
to
the
of
work, the
applying
term
the
philosophy.
"
and
problems, I
co-ordination
in
is
fact
the
that
much
scientist.
of
The
this
valid
application of scientific
In science, co-ordination
is,
as a
rule,
two.
As
the treatment of
more widespread,
inclusive,
so,
103
as the problems
will
grade into
philosophy.
to fact as the
On
commendably
brief.
The
branch of philosophy
a task sufficient in itself.
More-
attempt
not generally recognised
over,
if it fails,
superfluous.
If it succeeds,
at a later date.
There
is
is,
is
"
all
everyday
fact, or
is
in such a synthesis
all
the facts of
is
of science,
which I
implicit or explicit
of metaphysical interpretation."
104
H.
With
can be
be
may
That more
left.
said
scientific
SH ELTON.
S.
to
it
knowledge, granting
of
be an actual or a possible
is
delation
3.
On
to
and
react.
But
Methodology.
Methodology,
branch of logical theory.
is,
its
room
for
practically
some
in a way, recognised,
That
method.
definite.
dispute, but,
and
does, in
it
more
little
value, as currently
Concerning
be a
with
act
it
to deal
original
scientific
objective co-ordinative
much
as there
methods
and
is,
philosophy with results. And, inasno hard and fast line between
in science,
so
results,
the
more
critical
and
abstract
methodology, and the more practical, positive, and co-ordinative philosophy would grade insensibly into one another.
Actually, occasionally, a certain
native
of
work
is
amount
of positive co-ordi-
present
essay
to
emphasise
It is
the
one
more
1910.
philosophy, and
objective
105
sistently to
From
of
logic,
methods.
which
latter
is
treated
largely
branch
by metaphysical
that formal logic
may
investigating truth
"
It is clear that,
must be
if
we
We
empirical.
we
the
of
that
the
method
"
method
of
difference
is
more
effective
than the
of agreement.
of the
so far
methods in particular.
is
It
106
S HELTON.
S.
II.
closely inter-related.
The
to
clarifies
of
the
This
is
to succeed
the test
of
true
the power to
show the definite application
This object
is
will probably
philosophy, as it is
return to the world
or
of general
implicit in the
work
of
the founders of
this
is
foundation of methodology.
easily understood.
Mill's
gigantic
leaps
stranded.
reasoning.
and limits
of
mathematical
Indeed
it
107
That
is
methodology
in
taught
interest.
that
universities,
it
is
it is
know
unable to discuss
the
scientific
is
not to be
verbal hair-splitting by
you
call
it,
011
bearing
science,
and
it
calling
at least it has, as
we
it
better
is
Whatever
methodology.
some
practical
than a methodology
of verbalism, abstraction
and
futility.
if
you
like, if
think
make
it
it
possible or practical,
more
practical,
more
logical,
and
The
logic is of
my
practical.
4. Historical.
This section,
what
is
also,
need be but
brief.
is distinctly of
modern growth.
is
The
now
division
between
called philosophy
and simply
and theory
108
H.
SI1ELTON.
S.
we need only go
Kant, the originator of the nebular hypothesis and of
back
to
The
Owing
specialist.
mass
of fact
more
Comte
With regard
to
more
is
of criticising
and
difficult
necessary."
and
modern
who, in
Spencer,
co-ordination of science,
physics,
and
also
it
on that of
religion.
them
to
lay
philosophers.
specialists.
more
But
on
stress
so it
we
science
more or
is,
with
less,
all
scientific
and can be no
Comte
it
to be regarded as a kind of
and
religious views.
of
With
He was
amateur
apparently content
pontiff, and I have not
discovered that anyone, at the present day, places any considerable value on the scientific side of his philosophy.
With Spencer
space
to
criticise
the case
his
work
co-ordination, especially in
is
different.
here, I
am
biology, but
Though there
of
is
no
also in physics
and
is
of
of philosophy
109
The
recognised
thought
and
stated
distinctly
Indeed he hardly
it.
it
the two.f
Here the historical side can be left. That there always has
been an intimate connection between science and philosophy
no one can dispute. Until the present century, to mention
the
names
of those
who have
who
defence
is
required.
It
is
No
all
further argument or
day on the
comment.
5.
It
Practical.
is
is
of a
is
it is
it
in practice.
*
Though most of my material on Spencer is, as yet, unpublished, I
"
can refer anyone interested to the following papers
(1)
Spencer's
Formula of Evolution," Philosophical Review, July, 1910. (2) "Evolu(3) "Review of Hartog's
tionary Empiricism," Mind, Jan., 1910.
:
'
"
My
recently, found
110
"
Such an
8 II ELTON.
ideal is
continual labour of
It
S.
II.
many
generations of workers.
an infinitesimal contribution
Any
single
that end.
to
of the
attempts to
the present structure of
or
this
portion
of
organise
positive
knowledge."
It re-
It is easy, in a
theories.
science, but
it
aware
of
amount
that, to
in this paper is
can be a
Here
made.
may
On
scientific.
avail
describe as briefly as
if
main contribution
Also,
little
my
matter in
follow
it
detail.
through a
and popular.
"
As
Ill
higher organisation of present (lay knowledge I chose the problem of the age of the Earth, which is, in many ways, particuThis problem is one
larly well adapted for such co-ordination.
of exceptional interest.
It has
of inter-
mooted
"
first
Such attempts usually necessitated the straining of one or other class of evidence and subsequent discovery has proved their folly by altering the
the apparent
which preceded
"
it.
In such a case as
this, it
If it
methods or
number
of the
attempts to
fix
maximum
which
lines the
"
for such
an
new
to subject
some old-standing
making
fallacies to a searching
112
H. S.
examination.
And
SHELTON.
and
its
briefly as follows.
The
principles of the
An
require investigation.
consisted of a theoretical
me
to
the principles of
and showed
applied mathematics.
that, for a lack of a clear understanding of the methodology of
mathematics, the whole of the work of Lord Kelvin and
I set forth certain principles
Professor Tait on secular cooling and allied subjects was absolutely invalid, not merely
The same
activity, but inherently and theoretically invalid.
remarks applied to the tidal retardation argument. On that
matter, I
by Newcomb, were
entirely unfounded.
came
The problem
for consideration.
gave
this
The theory led quite naturally to a theory of the origin of radiosome support, though not quite so
to a
theory of the
* The
the
original form will be found in Radioactivity, p. 344
modification will be found on p. 656 of Radioactive Substances and their
;
Radiations.
my
to
113
his calculations
represented the
formed.
The
manner
in
It
attached
to
of view of the
man
seem
me
to
of science
scientific
of great importance
is
to matter, both
principles of scientific
blunders.
With regard
to the methodological
The former
several more.
among men
of science,
how
is of
the matter
is
much
The one
am
in
even
am
that,
to
I refer to
going to
some doubt as
is,
mention
it
will be of
its
technical
is
meaning
any length
of consideris
generally
114
H. S.
SHELTON.
has, of course,
of the
so interesting, scientifically
and philosophi-
cally, so
it
logical examination.
discovered that
it
On
so doing, greatly
in
to
my
no sense
In
surprise, I
of the
fact, there
word,
was no
proof whatever.
assuming it.*
I mention
I
am
in
though
There is
methodological.
classify
it,
criticism
it
Perhaps
on my
because,
one another.
With
I
emphasise
scheme and
ment
of
it
is
knowledge.
* On this
matter, I must refer readers to the Oxford and Cambridge
Review, Jan., 1912, where the arguments are stated at some length.
6.
Summary and
115
Conclusion.
of
"
many
scientists
probably receive
Such a standpoint
The
assertion of the
not
physics.
and practical
on account
of its great
my
cosmic
is
no
It is
Sun
in the
answer
is
period of the
down of
H 2
that
116
H.
axioms
There
of logic are
is
S.
SHELTON.
Lower Cambrian
no middle course.
strictly applicable.
on
this
On
human
And
matter as
or more, or less.
The old-fashioned
metaphysics is as
to inform us
it is
in the
The
scientist is
reply
but
is
of
In the
all
117
and
various misconceptions,
to
owing
will,
make
strained
false
main
it
to
is
correlate
the
various lines
of
investigation.
The
river waters.
specially inexact
sea-salt investigation.
Professor Dubois
and recalculates
of uncertainty
know
must be multiplied by
Sir
famous
aware
of this cause
John Murray's
results using
is
He
4.
sound and so
Kelvin's
are
Professor
way.
rivers
(e.g.
of
Hawaii) contain more sodium than the larger ones, infers that
this is due to the volcanic nature of the Hawaiian islands,
whereas there
is
to cyclic salt.
and
so
on
his
makes a
own
Highlands.
Whether
He
And
so
for
or
such co-ordination.
"
Nor
a result of recent
* It would
hardly be wise to dogmatise as to how the sodium has
sea, but whether or no M. Dubois' conclusions be right, the
reached the
Professor
reasons are certainly wrong. The references are as follows
" Address to
Sollas,
Geological Section of British Association," 1899
Professor Joly, Proceedings Royal Society Dublin, vol. 7
Professor
:
118
SHELTON.
H. S.
discoveries in radioactivity.
tion
So
is
as valid as
So
ever was.
it
is
tidal retarda-
is
made
the old.
"
to
The objection
bounds
of his
own branch
small
basis
of
method
is
it
is
well aware of
And
fact.
He
of knowledge.
is
so,
on a
the
must
is
is,
prove
it.
If
when
fact.
is
Even
the question
But,
very cogent fresh fact to inform him that, for the purposes of
The putting
geologic time, the Earth is not a rigid body.
together and evaluating of the detached facts and theories of
the specialist sciences
is
119
"
very detailed knowledge in any one branch is not a qualification but a positive disqualification.
The relative value of the
various methods of investigation cannot be justly estimated by
life has been engaged in using one of
them.
methods
and
That faculty
is finite.
tion
of concentra-
of
to the discovery
of
new
of
facts is
fatal
to
the power of
due perspective. A
seeing
mathematical physicist who spends his life in solving complicated differential equations with marvellous analytical skill
own and
his
and
in applying
comes
other methods in
them
to
He
equations.
applies
them
is
to a
It is indeed
a world of differential
is
an indisputable
human
And
'
To
these
relevant to the
discussion
of
boundaries are
to discover
any one
Many
of
of
the
the greater
is
more
waters than
it
is
fact that
difficult
to estimate the
discover a cause of
uncertainty in a well
But
it is
sodium in river
This enables us to
known method
of
interest.
isolated
120
H.
S.
SHELTON.
new
exists.
Only
But
in the
to
power
ledge possible.
They admit
form these
is
of generalisation.
developed
human know-
These are
all
But the
itself
combined mass
of the
It
examine
the
is
first
function of
an objective philosophy
to
these, to
which they
rest,
it
And any
is
will
thought.
The path
of philosophy is littered
121
"
up.
The power
the concrete.
the individual
found
itself
manner
The abstractions
for those
it
detail
generalisations are
of
validity,
the
him
to
with
must ultimately
fact.
and
greatest, it
is
on definite concrete
in
scientific
where
but,
of
to analyse
specialist
and yet
and examine
and
sciences
to
a problem that
is
each philosopher must answer for himself. For him more than
for any other worker it is essential that the detail shall not
obscure the main principles, and yet it is equally essential that
he shall be able to return to the world of detail to show the
application of the larger principles.
"
appear
to
This
largely
with
the
individual
to
appears
which
be an
arises
of the facts
from
and the
and depends
on causes
largely unknown.
"
They must
fact.
Here
It is
122
SHELTON.
H. S.
This
method
It
is
is
this is
taken
'
'
fact
is
not a fact,
germ plasm
is
with the
a translation, and
is
crept in
that
that
plasm.'*
it is
The
germ
it
is
it
stands
is
may have
certainly incorrect.
a hypothesis.
It is not a fact
Spencer's
but that
is
theory of constitutional
facts
explicable by
Spencer's.
all
hypotheses.
"
now beginning
It is
This
no part
of
is
my
how
* The Evolution
Theory, by Weismann,
vol. I, p. 262.
show
123
"
it is
specialism has been so rapid and the past half century has seen
its
value.
"
it
it
no Others can
is
scale
the mountain
tops,
hills.
Whether
or
sophy must
rise far
of detailed fact to
them
principles join
and explain.
"
which
human
whence they
arise,
to separate the
main trend
of
124
SHELTON.
H. S.
"
it is
Such a philosophy,
merely an attempt
like science,
makes no claim
to express coherently
may
be, it is useful
fact.
and necessary.
ever remain open
Modest
as the
aim
this, it will
accomplish
to finality,
and to advance
comment
of the
can
first
proximate problems of
human
if it
life,
then
its
attempts to solve
ultimate problems by the more speculative methods of metaphysics will be of wider interest and will appeal to a larger
circle.
great.
Between the
scientist
who
is
now
too
whatever measure
will tend to the
of success it
advance both
may
of science
and
of philosophy."
APPENDIX.
Anyone who
"
made on
p.
110
"
September
1st,
1910.
Progress,
3.
"
Philosophy,
4.
"The
etc,,
New
Quarterly,
November, 1909.
5.
"The Age
June, 1913.
of
the
Sun's
"
A Theory
125
"Modern Theories
of
Geologic
Time,"
Contemporary
All except the last are adapted, almost verbatim, from the
same thesis of which another part is included here in inverted
commas.
The
last is
an expansion
of the
argument.
126
INTUITIONALISM.
V.
N. 0. LOSSKY.*
By
and
of the elements
relations
task of
under the influence of the traditions established by his predecessors, he started with the assumption that the contents of
must
consciousness
necessarily
be
mental
states
the
of
individual.
all
human
the
am
"
glad,"
want
That
of
which I
am
2x2 =
examples
conscious
but in
"
etc.
very different in
is
all cases it is
the several
self.
in a
self
A mental
"has" may be
called a content of
INTUITIONALISM.
The
127
(1) the
of this relation
may
it
is
that which
self is that
it is
conscious
which
is
Any
of.
"
"
relation of awareness.
to
which the
self stands in
the relation in
of the content
question
is
not
No
So
of the external
upon
the
it,
movement
the
of
my
consciousness.
pendulum
is
at the
moment
fact
But there
of
in
For instance,
the external
is
no
perception
it
difficulty
becomes
apprehended by me.
I have somewhat anticipated in order to make clearer the
distinction between my view of the structure of consciousness
and others
objective.
"
and
"
movement
for
may
is
be
example
"
the pendulum
observed
my joy
"
"
I
me.
must
now
I
define
what
mean
the
by
by
psychical
and "non-psychical" elements of the world as well, as by
"
"
"
"
or the
the " inner
and the " external
world.
subjective
the
of
128
N. 0.
LOSSKY.
As
lias
is
the totality of
the
in
"
having."
totally distinct.
the
peculiar
"
This " having
is
contents
Some
are
manifestations of
immediately experienced as
all
relation
myself
(joy,
wish, etc.) while others (the observed "blue" of the sky, the
"
"
hardness
of
iron, the
"
etc.)
of
my
them and
"
bear
them
in
Contents
mind."
the
of
first
Those
of
regarded
subject.
to
me "
of
the inner
of the
life
is
not "given
it
remains
knowing mind.
This
Epistemology.
The
due, however, to
interpretation
difficulties
the
which
real
and
nature
does violence
contradictions
of
to
the
the
facts
facts.
are
not
but to an
At
the
basis of this interpretation lies the mistaken view that the self
129
INTUITIONALISM.
states of consciousness,
"
the given
"
states
of consciousness.
me
"
as
all
become an object
my
of
They
may
also
attention.
"
my
will be
"
me"
for observation.
It is tho second
that
of particular
is
between
relation
attention
psychical or
and
to me,"
having
importance
the
self
something in consciousness
to Epistemology.
Here the
arises
through
of
which
in
results
may
thus established
relation
peculiar
"
"
being directed
world or
tion
kind of
hension or intuition.
is
some part
of
the
terms,
arise
it
Intuitionalism or
to
Hume.)
The epistemological co-ordination of subject and object, i.e.
the relation between them which consists in the subject's con-
is
worked out
in detail in
my
book Intuitionalism.
I
130
This
LOSSKY.
N. O.
is
the reason
why
particles of matter,
processes of knowing.
Indeed he finds
it
lies at
hard
to
does not
the basis of
understand
absence of subordination between subject and object. Such subordination is assumed both by the Empiricism of Locke and
by the
critical
philosophy of Kant.
is
mind
due
of the subject.
subject.
No
world.
But
of co-ordination
immediately perceives
its
own
states.
contemplates or
According to them not
self
<>i'
sensation and
sphere of inner
belongs to the
contemplation or intuition.
of
immediate
331
INTUITIONALISM.
we know
nomenal.
But
known, how,
if
for instance,
how
is
knowledge
itself
its
and describes
it
just as
immediate perception
it is
than
is
made, for
of Locke.
to
by the
instance,
the Intuitional
According
Empiricism
is no difference between knowledge
of
there
theory
the inner and
means
of contemplation, without
any causal
inter-
no ground
for supposing that contents of knowledge must needs be sensuous in character. Space, time, motion, etc., can be regarded
as
non-sensuous and
objective world.
is
"
"
elements of the
contemplated
They need not in any sense be derived from
yet
the tactual, motor, and visual sensations, though they are apprehended together with them. What is more important, our
view
of
Kant
to
deny that
relations
such as
causality may be given in experience. To put it briefly according to the Intuitional theory that which transcends sense does
.
world
may seem
contradistinction to
"
"
my states.
given to me and not to be
It follows that for Intuitionalism colours, sounds, and other
them, are
felt to
be
"
132
N. 0.
LOSSKY.
mean then
Intuitionalism
that
mental states
leaves
of the
Does
it
and
of the sense
organs
the facts
The
answer
is
that
tation
dependence
knowing
subject
sensation upon
makes
it
the
facts
different
of
admits
Intuitionalism
the
impossible
bodily
to
When
the
of
the
states
believe
that the
my body, it
"
my mental
by no
sensible quality is
state,
a modification of myself.
It is a mistake to imagine that
there are only two alternatives namely, that the sensation is
i.e.,
As
a matter of
fact, there
my
serves as a
medium between
known
object.
still
133
INTUITIONALISM.
"
follows
to the
equally right."
It cannot,
results
always
human body
and
ones,
it
is
it
when
mechanical pressure) act upon the sense organ, and the subject
is aware of one and the same sensation a.
This fact in no way
proves that a is a process within the body, and
a is a mental state of the knowing subject.
still
less that
The external
ade, z
= afg)
The opposite
It
is
and
case,
may
exactly alike in
is
apprehended
when
all
them
of
follows
and
in
b, c,
may
is
(x
= abc,
applied to
becomes aware
perhaps be explained as
complex,
it
consists of a,
b, c,
different aspects.
new hypothesis
by
134
N.
0.
LOSSKY.
of the brain
is
not produced by a
nervous centres.
may be said, then, that even the so-called sensuous apprehension has a non-sensuous character.
The sense organs merely
It
direct
the knowing
external world
mind
to
so-called
is
causal
interaction
some subjective
affection
and
a feeling of satisfaction
e.g.
his
The
apprehending the
be
very complex. It may contain
may
to
elements
the
objective world outside the
(1)
belonging
to
the objective world within
elements
body, (2)
belonging
the body, and (3) subjective elements.
state of apprehending, especially of
The
of
critics of
such a theory
in his article
He
it.
is
of
is
may
say that
some truth
it is
in this
a re-statement
remark Schuppe
;
in favour of returning to
modern
theories
speaking
observes that they re-introduce the Eealism, but discard
*
its
Bergson strongly insists that the brain does not produce the images
In Matibre et Memoire he formulates an
the things apprehended.
interesting hypothesis about the part played by the brain in the process
of
of apprehension.
135
INTUITIONALISM.
naive character.
uncritically
They do not
Such a return
knowledge.
movement
by an elaborate analysis of
Naive Realism is a widely spread
it
modern philosophy.
in
In
When
ledge of
above
it
takes.
"
forthcoming work
attempt to describe
my
I shall
"
the object
it
the
self,
is
As
have already
Moreover, the
activity of attention on the part of the self.
epistemological co-ordination which results from the activity of
attention is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of know"
"
have
something in consciousness, to be
Simply to
I may be
aware
of
simply
something, is not knowledge.*
ledge.
"
"
know
am
that I
know what
is
the
some
I experience
is
it.
In order
to
of his
it
with them.
Comparison
me
enables
to
"
have
"
before
my
consciousness.
In
follows
my
"
:
book Intuitionalism
The object
of cognition,
it
is
of
this
knowledge
reality itself,
is
process
life
itself
my
is
immanent
present' in
But
described
as
in the process
and
reality as such
136
is
of
is
is
N. O.
not knowledge
is
LOSSKY.
it
comparison
an experience compared with other experiences.
subject to comparison
it
flows before
me
Until reality
as something dark,
If on a hot summer
shapeless, unconscious (i.e. uncognised).
afternoon I walk on the river bank covered with luxurious
nature
seem
to
my
lose
process
of
merged in
But now something
attention and the intel-
life.
my
discriminating
begins.
The
mirror-like
surface of the water, the green banks, the reeds near the shore,
And
there
is
no end
As
I go on discriminating, everything
the formless acquires form, the vague
"
its
real character,
becomes a known
reality, a
should be noted
that the
presentation or an idea."
To avoid misunderstanding
it
comparing, and
and
me when I recognise
me SAP, SAD,
them.
SMK
become
dis-
not distinguished them from one another and from other things,
137
INTUITIONALISM.
of the
unknown.
lie
knowledge
is
my
still
At
"
with
itself,
all
we obtain the
we have
reached
actual image of
the truth.
By
mean
I do not
image
is
the
its
truth
is
image
introduced into
is
it.
an objective image
of
In this sense
of a thing,
and
it
falsity a subjective
it.
It follows that it
from
falsity
if
it
to
objective character.
this really is the case.
One example
Suppose
is
sufficient to
am making up
prove that
a story and
relating for instance that there are four huge oak trees by the
monument
of
There
is
no
somewhere
character
monument
before
to
attaching
and the oaks
may
them.
also
But the
conjunction
felt to
of
the
be an act of
is certainly
synthesis produced by myself and not to be contained in the
On the contrary, when I say that the mounted figure
object.
138
X. 0.
LOSSKY.
on a granite rock
of Peter stands
am
own
My
externality.
knowledge, e.g.,
and the oaks and
may
it
and
me
hind
will
may become an
activity
recall
me
in
an
compel
me
which
to
as
admit
fashion
objective
then
monument
my
something
its
presence
the
in
"
is
my
object of
to
act
me
"
of
for
Anything
given
contemplation can be described as objective, but the term
external should be applied only to those "given" contents
which are not experienced by me as the contemplated activities
judgment.
of
my own
self.
results
means
course.
parison
and
is
brought
chaotic.
The
to bear
first
upon
it,
of
comparison
Until com-
it
A.
still
is
"
preserved in language in the form of such expressions as it
"
it
is
rains,"
dusk," etc. Through further acts of discriminat-
and
so on.
For instance as
on
one side as
AB is
now
my way
described
that
"
the
a confused reality,
139
INTUITIONALISM.
already become
this
of
distinct
some
reality
is
an aspect
precisely as of
under investigation.
reality
or
of
is
of
preserved
and the
it
comparing,
a process of
is
It is clear
result obtained.
discriminating and
of
judgment.
From
is
on one and the same object they will result in the formation
of a concept as well as of
we
second we
M, and
learn that S
so
that
is
something
is
P, through the
Features
on.
judgments.
learn
discriminated
',
through the
third
that
the
in
SP
is
preceding
Every
together of
up
such
complex
out of a coming
and may again be broken
arises
judgments, so to speak,
into judgments.
But
judgment
may
through
therefore be
the
that
said
explicit
form
of
judgment.
they have an objective character (as for instance the images
of
perception
or
memory)
undeveloped, or the
Thus
in
the
brother,"
the
are
the
abbreviated,
this
I
ment
man
the
judgment
idea
"this
tall
thin
man"
i.e.
is
"
a complex
this is a
of
man,"
is tall," etc.
It
140
LOSSKY.
N. 0.
appears at first sight as if the subject of a developed judgment were an idea or a concept with a limited, strictly
defined meaning. As a matter of fact this is not the case.
The subject
unknown
referred
of
to
means
by
of
It therefore
this idea as
if
the judgment.
According to the Intuitional theory then the subject of judgis that about which we are seeking to obtain information.
ment
ledge
is
in
The theory
t>hat
cognition
comparing features
of
is
unknown
the
of
part
ment
an
has
"
judgment
formed
'
man
(S),
hand if we
'
and
of the subject
'
(M),
is
'
tall
'
(N),
remarkably
further
by
which was
thin
confine
attention
to
the
(K).
already
viz.,
made
to yield P.
is
i.e.,
SMNK, we
synthetically,
pale
differentiation
SMNK P
subject, characterised as
analysis be
"
man
thin
tall
character.
analytic
this
undoubtedly
analysis
unknown
speaking generally, in
or,
subject,
known
shall
by adding
P and
part of
the
to
SMNR
141
INTUITIONALISM.
Every judgment
known
is
unknown
the hitherto
reality.
But
analysis
work
the
is
of the
is
"
"
given
of
The
a synthesis.
known
for contemplation
by
reality itself.
Know-
Analysis
mental
of
the subjective
activity of the
knowing
side
of
is
the
The objective
side
knowledge,
individual.
it
"
bound
order to show
We
The meaning of
and the content of knowledge has already been
the
object
defined.
By
activities
of
the act of
knowledge are
to be understood the
comparison,
There is a fundamental
necessary for obtaining knowledge.
difference between the act of knowledge on the one hand and
the object and content of knowledge on the other.
knowledge
knowledge
The
act of
is
The
act of
knowing
is
The
act of
a state of the
knowing
142
of
N.
LOSSKY.
0.
They may,
for instance,
or
ideas
harmony).
The objective
side of
human
in
act of knowledge).
and on
this account
it
is difficult
to separate
them
between them.
in thought
We
imagine
content
or,
This
the subjective side of knowledge to its objective side.
with
the
erroneous
view
that
there
can
be
tendency, together
ledge
of
Hume, Kant),
know-
can only
know
his
own mental
states
knowledge
to Epistemology.
(Hume's
of
solipsism).
In order to avoid
it,
it is
necessary to con-
sider various
The act
comparing,
attention
is
is
knowledge.
of apprehension,
directed
may
i.e.
well be
extended.
It
would be
143
INTUITIONALISM.
subject can give
difficulty is
him knowledge
of
knowledge (attending
and comparing) to the content and object of knowledge.
Still more dangerous are the errors that arise from transferring the temporal characteristics of the act of knowledge to
An act of knowledge is an
the objective side of knowledge.
Hence we are
etc.
of knowledge must
moment
of perceiving, judging,
and content
come
into existence
and disappear
things exist
Hume's argument
is
an example
knowledge
An
may
last
a second,
lasting a minute,
but
its
object
may
act of
know-
be a process
We
are
datum
of
perceive movement.
memory would
Without
it
not a single
This last
Treatise,
Part IV,
2.
144
N.
consideration
is
0.
LOSSKY.
memory.
The difference between the object and the act of knowledge
may be greater still. The object may be altogether devoid of
temporal character. It may belong to the sphere of being and
not to that of becoming and stand outside the stream of change
as
something timeless.
be concentrated
upon
the
of
There
it.
is
no
why
of
The act of contemplation may
contemplation.
one second, but that which is contemplated may be
object
last
eternal.
Intuitionalism conies back to the doctrine of the contemplawhich dates from Plato. If the temporal be called
tion of ideas
"
real being
"
"
ideal being
"
it
may
may
be
be objects
knowledge.
One
sides of
importance
comparison
i.e.,
in
to Logic.
The subjective
which results
in
To carry out
analysis.
it is
of special
knowledge contains
identification and distinction,
this
side of
Judgment
will
predicate.
According to
one form of this doctrine, the subject of the judgment " this
rose is red
"
is
my
145
INTUITIONALISM.
is
of
on
added
my
to
the
subject through
my
partial
identification
rose."
analytically necessary.
Some
logical
when
it
of
stress
They
either disregard
transform
it
as a law
for the
the principle of
Sufficient
Reason or
it
is
which
is
of
"
synthetic and can be expressed by the formula where there
is S,
there
An
is
P."
act of
To understand
objective
side
it
of
we must
judgment.
The
first,
the
process of
a
only
psychological
i.e.,
is
146
N.
LOSSKY.
0.
world.
out of
its
to learn,
istics
e.g.,
that
is
its
me
character-
object S
found.
is
interest to
me
stands out in
of
is
of
from
its
this rose
rose
and not
relation
to
and
me.
were compared.
an analysis which brings out for contemplation the synthetic necessity of sequence between parts
The relation between the subject and the predicate
of reality.
Judgment then
is
is
"
wherever there
express judgment by means of the formula
The
relation
P."
must
be
is S, there
expressed by this formula
for
instance under the form of
is found under many forms,
(e.g.,
between the
size of
it
may
be called a logical
INTUITIONALISM.
147
To avoid misunderstanding
it
in so far as
it
real
P there is a causal
elements S and
it is
a logical
Generally
speaking the word "logical" is applied by Intuitionalism to
the objective content of judgment in so far as it furnishes the
ground
validity
of
itself,
(e.g.,
Ontology
functional
activities
of
the
At
first
sight
it
seems as
if
all
far
that of identity.
The meaning
identical"
is
But
of the
that,
is
judgment
"
the magnitudes
and
are
and B, there
between them."
is
In such
The formula
the predicate and that the
judgments
of identity.
that
the
logical
is
relation
to misinterpret the
A=B
makes us imagine
K 2
148
N.
unknown
me
to
magnitudes
identity."
The
LOSSKY.
0.
such
"the
is
judgments
and
B " and
logical
the predicate
is
between
relation
"
relation,
between the
the relation of
two
the
is
the
i.e.,
and consequence.
It is important to note that
of perception stating
red ") contain the necessary
connection of ground and consequence just as much as do the
Apodeictic judgments of Mathematics. To understand how
this is possible and to see what are the characteristic
some
judgments
is
we must
such judgments,
peculiarities of
form in
number
of links:
circumstance.
lie
side
them
we
are
Even
if
by
we take
S and R,
of
stand,
N"
to a necessity
not aware of
all
this fact
we do not under-
Judgments
of
ideal
no
less necessary
is
withered
this
judgment
will be
sum
of the angles of
If the subjects
"
"
the
the subject
and
is
an
infinitely rich
In each case
of reality,
first
it is
149
INTUITIONALISM.
"
"
on the round bed." Let us
grows
and
consider
them in abstraction from
take these two features
"
a rose bush
and that
it
"
this bush."
which
If
we could
bush and
this
ground
the
of
all
knowledge.
The second judgment has a different character. In it the
ground of the predicate is contained in the differentiated
aspect of the
more than
"
nor
lines
sum
this
on
is
subject.
necessary.
"
it
If there is a surface
triangle.
of the angles
There are
then
the
right angles.
of
judgment.
unknown
of
aspects
In some the
of
the
the connection as
subject
a
whole
warrants the belief that the predicate really has its ground in
If the discriminated aspect of the subject is
the subject.
abstracted from the rest and attention
we
is
confined to
it
alone
compel us to add on to
it
is
developed sciences
Minds inclined
things look
of
known
aspects of
150
X.
This
distrust them.
0.
LOSSKY.
known
is
side of the
subject
living concrete
for
artist,
reality in
instance
all
to
mind
the
fulness
its
more apt
is
the
see
the
of
necessity
of
But
since
the
of
that
is
knowledge
is
simply
differentiated.
all
aspects
of
ideal
they
are
undeveloped.
In
fully
developed
true
the predicate.
This statement
is
and predicate
is
of
judgment
between judg-
judgment
is
it
ments.
If a
sufficient
reason
is
of the
a judgment
knowledge
of the reality
we
ledge
is
"
151
INTUITIONALISM.
to be
my
It is present
subjective effort.
develops independently of
trating my attention upon
me and
it,
and
merely follow
differentiate it
concen-
it,
by means of
comparison.
It follows that thought
(i.e.
contemplation accompanied by
It
to nothing but truth.
analysis
upon
it.
when
Error arises
the
then,
or
is
always a result
some other
of
and consequence.
of the structure of
independence
The
itself,
Error,
of the
knowing
judgment
its
subject), identity
easily
universality
and
eternity.
objective
object of the
knowledge
is
the same.
The
it, is
objective side of
therefore universal,
152
VI.
By
THE kind
of
BROUGH.
J.
appreciation
LOGIC.
invited
by
the
editors
of
the
one in
JBncyclopasdia
which
There
is
Logic
The
is
only the
of several
first
editors quote
of
follow.
philosophy
given by Hegel
"
of
which
is
tributor
is
working, as
the
Each con-
explicit.
"
the
idea of
and
"
presume that
unity as his
it
is
to
such
here
find
may
and
not
bring
to
this
of direction
lines
the
even
basic
common
the
notice
on
necessarily
of the thinkers, or
And with
them.
invitation conveyed
153
and
I will try to
by these
followed
completely,
independent thinkers, not quite impartially
but with the confessed bias of an individual interest, and
or
This
the
is
idea or
interest
during a
opinion altogether.
philosophic
which led
the
to
collection,
government
and
their speculations
we
thought,
to
scientific abstraction,
is
itself
may
mode
feel
still
mere propaedeutic
said,
We may
blessedness."
"
by
and the
philosophy,
We
of piety
life
and
need, not a
which
must
we
Adamson
If
refer for
any
fuller explanation.
after
reviewing
philosophic standpoint,
logical
we can
much more
standpoint
hopeless.
"
In tone, in method, in aim, in fundamental principles, in
extent of field, the systems diverge so widely as to appear not
so
many
different sciences.
We
same
science, but so
many
of attaining
154
J.
BROUGH.
the nature
and limits
theoneed.
Press
brief
the several
essays,
exactly as printed.
area of topics to suggest the possibility of so delineating Logic
as not to rule out some contents of other essays, while not
incorporating them or their equivalents blindly. His proposal
is even more comprehensive than the
programme suggested
its
which the
should be retained
"
(ibid., p. 160).
title
psychological
"
An
I.
He
proposes, therefore, a
including the
familiar
when we experience
Phenomenology
processes
of
individual
and the
historical forms in
or
self-sufficient
actual thoughts as
for all
knowledge,
consciousness
principles of
of
thought that
"
of
of
such
and so a guide
155
LOGIC.
middle nineteenth
to the
century, but also through those constitutive categories or objective relations which had been found by Kant embodied in
Kant had
transferred
to Epistemology,
He
III.
which, he says,
"
makes
"
of the logical
"
norms discovered
which
"
Such
in the
"
"
"
"
applications
reflective
"
relations
"
"
cateconstitutive
between our thoughts, or of those called
our
borrowsas
we
have
newer
which,
noticed,
Logic
gories,
from the Kantian Epistemology and links up with the Inductive Analysis as described by Mill.
There are consequently
two branches
of
and the
special, or
mental sciences.
is
mainly
that, instead
of
element
of
objective
coercion,
recognized
of
late
by even
knowledge.
Whether
Metaphysics
may
it
division of
Windelband
in defining
it
of Logic
of reality,
the
156
BROUGH.
J.
is
object
to discover
"
how
independent of the
stances
in
"
The
value."
reason,
which are
specific
of
themselves,
"
different points of
in
its
its
actual achievements.
array
definitions,
in
exemplified
Logic
who
Couturat's
first
sight be
as
or to a philosophical purist
who wishes by
systematic
knowledge, the one and
all,
the
sense of
might well
mode
Is there not
co-ordinate in
perception
function with our synthetic construction of number and figure,
or with our perceptual selection from the multiplicity of sense
or
of
impressions
ment, which
effort
of
attention,
in the service of
my
if
all our
and
thought and
of
reality.
It
with History
LOGIC.
157.
away,
the
surrendered, as
discipline
I
of
distinction
it is
here.
between
Our hope
of
and
self
is to
reality
were
escape by unceasing
And
ultimate duality.
Whatever our faculty of logical insight may be, it is not in
And
itself what forms the starting point of sciences, belief.
perhaps for
its
of a science,
adopt the plan of bringing together contributions from psychology, from the verbal expression of logical insight itself, from
scientific reading,
as
whole, and the right and the limitations of the right, of each one
Windelband considers that
the individual standpoints."
of
after
all, if
own method.
But,
moon,
it
cision
"
is
on the transformation
is
taking place in
of the concept of
bearing on Logic.
not as " the sum total of the psychical states of the individual,
or more exactly, of the psychical states of which he is aware"
its
158
BROUCII.
J.
but as
"
the
sum
total of everything
"
Ego
of every
is
to say
content whether an
is
"
a
self-expression," a manifestation of sheer vitality in the
"
Ego, such as joy, wish, or is an epistemological co-ordination,"
such as the remembrance of the joy or wish.
attention and comparison
is
The act of
manner and
meeting point
of
Ontology
implied
in
the
new
doctrine
of
Consciousness.
Logic
its
potential contents
159
Enriques, in an essay entitled The Problems of Logic, dishow far knowledge as found in the Sciences, and
cusses
specially in
is
in
"
mental processes
regarded as the theory of those
which we denote by the term "rational" ... to analyse and
correct the different conceptual structures, and the marks by
Logic
is
his
enquiry a
Critical Positivism.
He
In scrutinizing
between them,
Identity, Contradiction,
timeless,
and
at
definitions.
Thus
at a second remove, as it
which
sum up
classes created
by
thought, also
classes or organisms
But
at this
first
the original objects are constituted correspond only approximately to the real flux of things and relations, and the
operations and conceptual relations are so motived as to attain
real significance only progressively.
More adequate
to reality
160
J.
BROUGH.
But
this motivation
which Enriques
by an
What
which the
possibility
depend.
Science
with
efforts
at
and success
passes
through a development
Classification,
parison of situations
in
beginning
evolutionary
series
of
to
com-
natural pro-
The
series
our guesses as to this law are more or less near the truth
according to the impartiality with whicli selected instances are
verified
in
actuality.
Deductive
theories,
especially
those
Newtonian
in actuality.
which our
world,"
is
in search
"
for
the
161
sources
of
their
It is Kelation
membership
its
number
them.
They may be
of
diadic,
necessary to disclose
objects
e.g.,
equality
triadic,
e.g.,
sum
or
polyadic.
Again they vary with the
or
of
the
related terms many against
simplicity
multiplicity
latitude
one
one
many, e.g.,
against many, e.g., sovereignty
difference
tetradic,
against one,
e.g.,
And
superiority.
superiority
contrast.
It
is
transitive,
syllogism
e.g.,
equality;
equality
in their
or one-sided,
or self-limited,
e.g.,
illimitable
traditional
of
e.g.,
may vary
they
The
Logic
is
a mere
comment on the
between
classes, the
between
The
cance.
disclose relations,
into deductive
activity, or,
is
how
and that
logical.
expand
in action that
And
merely
third section discusses such different levels of signifiThat there should be classes and that these should
is
we become conscious
is to
determine
162
J.
in the
"
same way.
BROUGH.
The modes
of action
logical laws to
Royce
And
can
principle special to
and record
their
rational beings
modes
who
of action,"
its
of
paradise of truth
when we
find it
while
Arbitrary Will defines, apparently at random, synthetic selections from among contingent elements of experience, which we
may hope
find
to
Reflective Will
may
is,
verified
somewhere.
The conception
of
which
it
with that
intended to supersede.
The conception of Arbitrary Will deepens rather than solves
the mystery of selecting the abstracta or principles of empirical
of
intellectual
classification.
Intuition,
And
it
is
not borrow
it
Couturat's essay
is,
like
new
in
tin*
;i
symbols.
symbolic system, not as the standard system, nor as accomplishing more than a clearer, more precise and more plastic
expression of fundamental logical conceptions and relationships
163
LOGIC.
The
by the use of mere terminology.
are
in
which
he
confesses
rather
the
imperfections
way of
circular definitions and demonstrations, than in any misreadings
than
is
possible
He
of
is
logical
"
alternatively the
"
without
or,"
assuming
ultimate.
proceeds to
"
"
"
or
prove
both of
"
and," or
them
as
and axioms, he
definitions
demonstrate
"
the
define
of logical equivalence.
by
positional
definition,
functions
but as equivalent to
reference
to
classes.
propositional
that
is
by treating
them merely
should
between
be
established
and
veil the
do,
in extension,
transformations
legitimatized,
and concepts.
And
It
now remains
to ask,"
it is
neither the
L 2
'
164
BROUGH.
J.
source nor the judge of the truth of the premisses which are
taken as fundamental."
Now
in order to deface
any allurement
for the
Will which
Eeason
primitive
demands
motive
is
does
consciousness as to
If
own
demand
not
we may not
make
What
guarantees.
shall
it
be so suffused with
we may not
level of activity,
from a
formal Logic,
celestial
merely that
is
and arrangement
of
logical conceptions.
It
description
gives
points of
And
shall
I fall
back
now review
finally
I.
The survey
my
postulated motive.
Phenomenology of Knowledge.
of facts of
mental
life
where
towards
attitude
we
165
LOGIC.
truth-value.
its
discipline of Logic.
And
universal authority of
and
truth,
which
is
a logical
perception
which
latter
past,
If
Windelband
is
essayists
does
The
so.
gulf
of
critic
lies
must
this
the other
of
wide
indeed
"It
is
Psychology.
So far as
is
it
a science at
all, it
is
a part, or
from
branch, of
If
as a
mere
But
"
as I understand his statement that
the different
points of view from which Logic can be and has been treated
are the necessary stages of
mean
its
undertakes
by Enriques,
kind
of
Logic
Losskij,
which
and Royce.
"
adopting
166
J.
BROUGH.
out -and compare, to analyse and correct the different conceptual structures, and the marks by which, in an evaluation,
the
psychological occasion
arises
this
it
But
start.
it is
clear
between Enrique's treatment of thought and the system outlined by Couturat, which is the antithesis of psychological
reference.
vistas of truth,
as
implications,
summations, alternatives,
which we can do
at least,
Logistic
an act
of
Windelband,
of
ascertaining
department
of
truth.
inference
which, in
another
for
essay
a special
than the
pretative,
167
distinct
his
own
And
conceptions with
the co-operative or
social
An
elaborate
made by
Losskij.
judgment
is
synthetical
based, and
side
work
of
is
cognition
to
rescue
ficiality of
of the individual
Logic not, as Windelband does, from the superNominalism and Symbolism, but from the limits of
and
to be a hiatus in Losskij's
assignments of sphere
and Psychology.
The immediate identity, eternity,
and universality which even analytic thought attains, can be
for Logic
explained in neither.
168
J.
BROUGH.
attention
so given
is
II.
is
a synthesis.
Pure Logic.
of self-consciousness, therefore,
itself.
as consciousness of value in
Our
1'or
discipline
in
this
world
"
Couturat
to
presents
us
relationships
between
the
subject
and object
of
concurrence of
many
factors
of
constraint in
norms
end,
is
any
logical
specific
forms and
some particular
;i
govern our progress from thought to thought but enter into the
constitution of every
relates contents.
distinguishable
pulse
of
thought that
the
merely
use
psychical, logicians
"
169
phrases
that
are
thing can
"
but Windelband prefers to avoid
both be and not be
realist implications: "The assertion and denial of the s-une
objective in reference
It
is
impossible
that a
band himself
is
in regard to the
moment
in the internal
is
so
development
It
act.
realized
Law
in
appears to
or
assertion
all
If
denial.
Losskij's
ceptions
which
the
necessity of
tions,
is
may
be rational.
"
thought leads to the paradox that
Thought can only
lead to truth and has no place for errors."
We need a norm
of
immanence
of
Thought towards
before
truth,
the
full
The
judgment
ment possible.
categories.
fication.
It
The
They
make
reflective
a single judg-
and constitutive
and Identi-
field,
in the logical
though
it
be only
170
J.
BKOUGH.
our
and
from the
Metaphysicjs.
less interest
it
Epistemology or of Eealism in
standpoint of Empiricism in
rules.
century as victors.
It is
Hamilton
no longer possible
in the middle nine-
"
relations
to
reality,
This
knowledge."
Parmeuides, and
was
and
its
the
of mediteval
consequent applicability to
of
question
and
Heraclitus
And
his
substance and
hypothesis and
verification.
cause,
and
the methodology
of
say,
moment
it
its
171
And
of
There
is
reflective
Things, which through
properties
would
be
mere
taken
alone
persistent sameness, and
categories
and
there is Causal
Teleological synthesis, which to reflection
in
changeful
presume that
it
use
belongs
the
of
to a detailed
Logical
synthetic
1
logistic
gives
for
vitality
in
Induction
characteristic without
have
maxim such
the
to
Corresponding
thought.
axiom we must
as
Kant
hypothesis
and
described
verification
to
new
Logistic
"
enduring problems of
says,
was
modern
of
treating
classical Logic."
"
is
by
Jevons,
Methodology.
The
"
;
a normative
and that
the
old
old
Logic,
it
and
he
logical activity
judgment
which
starts
mere
logic of
sameness
172
BROUGII.
J.
when
it
it
all
is
judgment
the assertion of a
is
tact,
is
concrete, the
So
far
under-
norms
of
classifies
to the
is,
absorb
it.
Couturat's
principle of syllogism
tion
B and B
doctrine
If
implies
every a
is b
the
includes
implication
If the proposition
implies C, then
of
implies proposi-
and
his doctrine of
and every
I is
c,
every
is c.
others complain
that
"
the
not upon
the
principles,"
terms, and
relations,
and that
and
it
him.
two
to
The
is
an answer that
sufficiency of
matter of degree
symbolic
may
be rendered
formulae
is
only a
of relations in extension,
is
some
efficacy
173
LOGIC.
new symbolism.
that
is lost
The
as well as
is
gained by the
to
symbols
The
Aristotle's
He
their work.
Whatever
valid for
it
may, when we
find
III! Methodology.
The norms
maxims such
and organiand
as the syllogistic
inductive axioms.
discipline
confirm
its
And
value.
"
less to either
particular logical
to be applied
to
question or
in
explicitly
method," he says,
which
it is
still
to
of the subject
to the
matter to
the development of scientific insight must of course be left to the particular discipline itself.
Logic has neither the right, the duty nor the power to excogitate
fertile
it is
methods."
Self-sufficiency
in
method
is
clear
for
like
"
the
Mathematics, their axioms,
bring
the
less
these
axiomatic
174
J.
BROUGH.
more
the
it
necessary
for
is
systematically as possible."
the
is
logical
consciousness and
and
the
The
scientific.
necessity
more
difficult.
The chief distinction, however,
And it is
between
among proofs,
Apodeictic and Epagogic.
the former that in content are most treacherously similar to
method
is
is
perhaps one
It is
is
an
to the
precise demonstrative
and empirical
As
is,
difficult.
expresses
... In
itself.
Order, the logician experiences the fact that these forms are
present in his logical world, and constitute it, just because they
"
in fact, the forms of all rational activity
This
(p. 95).
are,
logic
in
to
itself
Science
clearly
distinguish
from
those
should
be
in
the
the
Science.
content
sources
of
content
The
forms
sought
for
of
in
in
proof
Lo^ic,
of Classes,
students of
logic
to
define
in
exact terms
a surprisingly
considerations
the
may
seemed
have
175
LOGIC.
so
varied,
precisely
the
worlds of Number,
of
Mathematicians who
scientific truth
scientific consciousness
that
each other.
to
relationship
latter.
certain
given
"
constants
logical
of a
from
their
definitions."
If
which
are
realistically conceived
its
Russell as
so,
these
systems
surely the
logical
leave
Eoyce
persists
because
it
to
definitions
that
also
the
definition
reports
the
consciousness.
Yet
line,
scientific
existence
in
the
logician's
If
degrees of complexity he had been describing.
is to absorb Logic, or even to take a
absolute pragmatism
the
a
mere ancillary
self-consciousness,
l,o
from the
will,
whether
which
Mathematics or
something
Lome
for
for the
may do
It brings
with those
176
J.
other
in
employed
reflective norms.
of Inference,
it
sciences,
the
in
And
BROUGII.
"
coercion of objectivity
"
which
lies
opposes
its
"
victoriously
of
assertion."
It
sovereign power against every caprice
contrasts the pure intensiveness of rational objectivity with
the extensiveness of it in scientific generalization or the
contraction of
it
in historical determination
ness which
is
teleological
category.
It
characterizes
the achievements of
certainty
peculiar to separate
and
of
consideration that
may
be
specific disciplines.
IV. Epistemology.
man
as
a plan
of
self-discipline,
the phenomenology,
the
it
pure
Introspective
nomology, and the methodology of thought.
identification of the signals that arouse our sense of method
to
take
of
the
vital
Windelband warns
"
being
art of right
off
from
and
those
really
distinct
For by
177
LOGIC.
what methods
Method
are.
is
"
Can we appreciate
limits.
criticism
Perhaps
may
"
How
is
common
the
or
universal
And
again
is
rests
is
validity
of
referred as
knowledge
"
its
Object
"
The autonomy
good by means
uniqueness of
must make
objects,
claims for
its
"exists and
its
itself
of the
empirical knowledge
which
it
The
results."
"
nature
"
determines
which
attributed to a circle
it
has neither
is
"
order
the analysis of knowledge and the interest of Loj.dc, " has reached
its
There
is
no higher principle
actuality.|j
"
The construction
of
objects in
human
experience and
more than
I suppose that
provisional."
nor pencil nor even imagination can present
adequately a circle. Though the connections which are valid
neither chalk
may
be, as
Losskij
of a connection
contends, the
which
is
immanence
necessary in
itself,
in consciousness
or as
Windelband
178
J.
contends, the
side
BROUGH.
and
upon the
as
sphere.
Such delimitation
a discipline,
large place
if
it
there
is
its
him
new
science,
when
Couturat
his anxiety
"
If the
(i.e.
in Logic)
deduction."
the mathematician
superfluity of
from
intelligence.
as
Losskij
intuit or
to
To use
rest.
but
"
is
ledge
given to me."
itself
remembered
known, how,
If
merely
how
know
do we
for instance,
and the
joys,
"
179
is
mine,"
know-
the forms of
as
just
is
it
found
one to ask.
onward stream
left
because the
seem
way
of
of
But
objects
it
for stars
Logic, there
is
have,
If
is
the
the
as
given to us,
turn to Logic,
and
already,
mere contemplation
of
objects does
Finally,
not
Windelband
knowledge as we
and remembered joys and other objects. For
only a general consent of normal intelligences
assurance
for
logical
of
is
We
and
Fries
Losskij's answer
if
have
a dangerous
behind in a backwater
of speculation.
variety
Knowledge"
is
Kant himself by
of
of
process
Such a question
was asked
It
others
the
in
it
at
the
we must,
fact
that
of doctrine.
when we want
to
norms
of right thinking
there is no arguing with him."
from
debarred
thus
valuing Logic as he would value
Being
other
branch
of
any
learning, what, for a mere devotee,
remains
To be normal and
self-consistent
is
not a sufficient
"
His
test
"
And
that
is
180
complete
And
am
volume, the
and that
to be subordinated,
of
circle constitutive
that
our
is
It is the discipline
art.
knowledge
nature.
LOGIC.
larger
genus to which
must take
it
circle.
place as
its
Were
aim
the
it
a
of
side
aim.
But
it
cannot delegate
its
it
may borrow
from
these.
all
we
If
are
we must
Intellect,
and
if
Conscience
If
include
in
it
Method
Method
is
though
name the
whole, we must
to
be a composite faculty,
normative play of the
is to
or
to be disciplined
by being made
we must
call
questionable, but, as
already referred
be so disciplined.
to,
there
have tried
is
to
show
in
the booklet
Method can
181
VIL
DISCUSSION
By
A.
WOLF and
By A. WOLF.
I.
1.
Introduction.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The
6.
7.
8.
9.
Formalism "
l<
Influence of Logic.
of Logic.
Introduction.
1.
To
F. C. S. SCHILLEK.
it
them any prospect of the improveunderstanding. But this kind of conceit is only
ment
one
of their
of the
many forms
of
human
stupidity which
life is
too
when a
or meaningless, accuses
and appeals
altogether
to
the
the
it
political
of
powers that be to
the
study
existing Logic.
Dr. Schiller has done in his Formal Logic,
Social Problem.
The object of this paper
suppress
This
what
is
Scientific
is
to
and
refute
182
WOLF.
A.
kind to traverse
volume
Schiller's
of
four
The phenomenon
departments of
about the
and
serious
extraordinary
really
condemnation of Logic as a " scientific and social
What
inquiry.
book
is
evil,"
an accusation
its
My
tion.
chief
is
is
to
aim in
educational, religious,
and
paper
is,
First, I
accordingly, to vindicate
its
make
for
good rather than for evil, and that its relation to science is
In the next place, I propose to consider the
perfectly correct.
so-called
to
have discovered to be
defects
and
"
only the
a number of very elementary doctrines. Lastly, I propose to
examine very briefly the relation of Logic to Pragmatism,
which seems
to
Schiller's
whole attack.
commonly
existing Logic.
of
"
is
is
"
Logic,"
and not
usually understood in
a more
restricted sense.
of
rightly
regarded as part
distinguished.
it
and parcel
of
and Hypothesis
as
of
w ould withhold
r
would
doctrines as part
all its
would
it
M.
the views of
an integral part
physicists, I suppose,
Even
all
183
"
(in
my humble
Poincard's Science
be to treat as an integral
of
of
part
inquiry any and every view that
any department
has ever been propounded in the course of its past history.
book.
If
less justifiable
it
branch of knowledge. Far from it. There is always something to be learnt from the past, even from the errors of the
past, much more so from its treatment of problems that are
Even
where history
plays a far less important part than in other lines of inquiry,
the most eminent exponents pay attention to history and show
still
unsolved.
The
even
if
some
if
2.
Dr.
Logic
is
Schiller's
of
the
Logic.
educational
worthlessness
is
its
of
doctrines
just
what he
184
WOLF.
A.
fails to
For the
prove.
denunciations
rest
Now, as
personal impressions.
against Dr. Schiller's unfavourable impression of the educational value of Logic, it will be of interest to refer to the
voicing
his
on matters educational
suspect of any
me
First, let
"
that the
first
It is not too
much
is
to say
to learn
and
Lord Kelvin.
"
Logic he
held to be a study of almost vital importance to the scientific
of
man
in jest but in
earnest."
he
'
said,
of
gives
logic
have been
lost
to
close
by bad
'
thinking.
More
seamanship.' "f
Some
improvement
in the
power
of
so
much importance
discrimination
to
the
brought about
As
not true.
question.
improve
of
Logic does, I
Even Dr.
Schiller
think,
seems
help to
to
admit
he accuses Logic of encouraging quibbling and logicchopping, and even these accomplishments require some
that, for
discrimination.
The
fact
that
p. 1116.
THE VALUE OF
may sometimes
of
be abused
discrimination,
and
of
185
LOGIC.
is
may
overlooked that quibbling and logic-chopping are accomplishments that are met with among many people who have never
studied Logic
that
it
to
well to
is
condemn
remember
as quibbJirig
of course,
competent
any subject may be made to serve as an
whetstone of his pupils' wits. Logic does not profess
teacher almost
efficient
to be the only
advantage as an intellectual
not only affords exercise in close
makes explicit the principal ways of
thinking,
but
also
estimating evidence.
aim
of all
intellectual
well-balanced
confronting
And, after
education,
mind capable
it
of
all,
if
what
it
is
is
not
the principal
to
develop a
and cons
Logic
186
WOLF.
A.
who
more
other,
fascinating,
The
problems.
more
result of this
parts
are
stressed
drum,
by
This tendency
parts.
is
chiefly interested
that Logic
is
are
fundamental
philosophical
treated for the
is
to philosophy,
the
at
and
its
more
expense of the
more valuable,
less
more hum-
if
some extent
also encouraged to
in
is
As
when
up
the student
takes
at
up Logic
all
is
who
the.
and
main types
to
of proof, to recognize
them
understand
in concrete cases,
amount
an
intelligible
manner.
This
of a
is
sure
and industry
him whatever work he
intelligence
this
failure.
satisfactory
have
no reason
is
results
to
doubt
class as
chiefly responsible
on
the
after
whole
are
considerable
in,
of pursuit.
Nothing else can replace
and first-hand familiarity with, whatever work
THE VALUE OF
one
may want
indispensable
Other
to
for
it.
whatever
it
one's
Practical
Nevertheless,
be,
it,
even
is
training
but
in
absolutely
whatever
vocation,
special
may supplement
things
supplant
take up.
187
LOGIC.
it
else
nothing
be.
can
"
one's
special
shop,"
requirements of
work a little more intelligible and more interesting.
Above
however,
people take
an interest in things other than their special shop, things of
which they have little or no first-hand, expert knowledge.
it
all,
live
Hence
indeed, is a sine qua non of real democracy.
anything that helps to save one from his own whims and
fancies, from the prejudices of his environment, or from the
This,
and
political
and even
is
in
problems
is
What
And that
newspaper summaries.
is
is
chiefly required
just
what the
study
Before passing on to the next topic let me repeat explicitly
that the study of Logic may be helpful to all students, whether
sometimes
ever,
seems
to
students of literature.
opportunity of
science.
much need
scientific
of Logic,
and as much
employing
would even maintain that there are
literary studies
188
A.
which
WOLF.
method
scientific
as
In fact
treatises.
generally advise
met with
to be
my
in scientific
students to study
as A. C. Bradley's
Shakespearean Tragedy.
o.
Logic
is
Logic.
Again,
when
logicians
it
is
of persecution
is
certainly novel
that
it is
novel
is
not shown.
hesitate.
"
p. 406.
189
But general
considerations of the nature of Logic are, I venture to think,
Now
of evidence.
much
there
is
unproved
in
assumption
his
Weltanschauung,
notwithstanding
be prepared to admit the merits
it,
will,
to
other
one's
faiths, other
own and
how
of
his
faith
or
own attachment
of
other
views,
Weltanschauung en.
My
contention, be
it
carefully noted,
is
mere study
little
of Logic.
is
as
People
may
intolerant with
spirit
enumerated in Dr.
Schiller's
catalogue of
the
alleged
fruits of
are,
no doubt,
to be
Philosophical Essays,
p. 94.
190
WOLF.
A.
pragmatists, and that their opposition to Galileo was only a faithful realization of pragmatist precepts. And anyhow Dr. Schiller
himself, in a cool hour, should have no difficulty in finding in
his
own Formal
qualities
which he ascribes
matism.
Sensible people, whatever their label
may
on the business
of the
State, there
is
be,
soon realize
agreement to carry
sorts of questions
inconclusive.
And
is
is
simply baseless.
4. Lof/ic
and
Science.
The
may
"
logician
it
[i
e.,
it
'
'
'
'
p. 386.
is
this
for
notorious
by the
influenced
logicians
complaint
that
fact
pay the
None
that I
191
know
of.
It
is
deference
greatest
to
science.
Professor
Windelband,
for
instance,
says
Logic
Yet Dr.
leaves no
room either
of theories
This
method
the true
of science.
false
"
introduced.
"
"
bution on
The Logic of Science to the current number of
Science Progress (No. 31
January, 1914).
As regards the second of the alleged grievances of Science
is
it
which eminent
Formal
Logic, p. 400.
I, p. 54.
'
new Encydopcedia
192
WOLF.
A.
Or, again,
is
it
likely that
Lord Kelvin
it
Is it at all plausible to
is ?
answered
The
whom nobody
will
may
is
not in
methods
difficult to
show
that,
on the whole,
has really tried to learn from it, and some of the very faults of
Logic have simply been taken over from the earlier teachings
When
or ideals of Science.
method
to the exact
its
ideal of
of
But now
that Science
in sanctioning
and
is
to syllogisms in general,
THE VALUE OF
or even to the relatively
193
LOGIC.
includes in his survey a general account of probability, of comparative and statistical methods, and even of circumstantial
practice of Science
and common
The
5.
"
What
sense.
towards Science
is
there that is
"
Formalism
of Logic.
So
far I
that the effects of the study of Logic, so far from being an evil,
are a positive good to the individual and to society.
The considerations
adduced
in the
foregoing pages
of
course,,
paper.
its
are,
if
more or
less
its
is justifiable, even
apart from the
considerations discussed so far.
existence
practical
My
has
contention
is
that
department
of
knowledge, as a
Logic
sufficient
body
value
merely as
a.
of theories arrived at in
Truth or Knowledge.
application of
it
to Logic.
consequences,
it is
term "Truth" in
sense
and
if
of
As
regards the
first
point, namely,
Truth independently of
its
practical
am
would be one
of
194
A.
WOLF.
openly avowed question-begging. I need therefore only consider the second point, namely, Dr. Schiller's denial that logical
doctrines are in the main true or correct (in the usual sense of
"
the words
time make
"
true
it
"
and
correct
impossible for
").
me
criticisms in detail.
has
is
for his
book
is
from
single
principle.
little to offer
The
wholly new.
that
he claims
chief credit
which
Dr. Schiller
calls
the
"
that
it
That
Formalism
single
"
as a great
For,
relief.
instead
And
he
the
separate
is
what
The discovery
readers, came to him
and consequently
ineffectual
of
voicings
makes
of
is
principle
of Logic.
it
consider
is
the
"
Formalism
"
of Logic,
which
is
is
this
"
Formalism
"
:
What makes
its troubles.
"
runs as follows
alleged to be
all
logic
means by
Formal is
"
Formalism
"
'
it
is
possible to consider
'
'
to psychology
and
to abstract
'
in
which
the
* Formal
Logic,
p. 374.
THE VALUE OF
Now
this
if
195
LOGIC.
account of Formalism
is
taken
then
literally,
he
us that
tells
extensive with
University
"
his
maintained
seriously
words
"
in
Oxford."*
of
in the University of
own view
Middle
the
make Logic
could only
Ages,
and
in
and
For
co-
be
the
"
true
"
Logic (or
"
"
formal
only a
logician
and therefore, according to Dr. Schiller, unable to detect a
sarcasm, I have not failed to note that Dr. Schiller's
Psychologic), only, although I
am
references to
Oxford are generally sarcastic.
Moreover,
Dr. Schiller jeers at the view of certain idealists that only
a complete knowledge of the whole universe could be
actual thinking
stances
is
irrelevant
for
we
are
usually
right."t
If so,
what
is
relevant,
Logic
and what
is
is
of treat-
of every
other study, there is always room for improvement.
Logic,
as Dr. Schiller himself points out, does not always or
;
Ibid.,
3.
XXII,
p. 249.
196
A.
WOLF.
the views of most logicians, this can be done legitiBut Dr. Schiller is hard to please. In so far as
mately.
as, in
is
consistently
The
Formal
In so far as
it
not being
as
it
whole mode
of attack is
not
He
of Formalism is vague
in
but
conscience,
any case he soon has to
enough
admit that the cap does not really fit Logic. Instead, however,
His conception
of evil consequences.
in all
"Formal"
consistently
and so adds
"
"
derived
the
(in
"
"
inconsistency
term),
which he has
Now
"discovered."
that
suppose
just
accused
somebody
like his
to accuse
if
Schiller
Yet that
indeed, what would he not say
treatment of Logic. The right course surely
to that,
not
sistently utilitarian.
it
of
"
"
"
consistently
Logic
any,
it
Perhaps
may
Formal
being
fit,
"
in
be
correctly
be as well for
me
to
very
not
might
is,
first
in
described
make good
what
as
sense,
Formal.
Dr. Schiller's
The
central
theme
general conditions.
By
"
Proof
"
do
not
mean
and
absolute
more
THE VALUE OF
Some
197
LOGIC.
writers would
make
co-extensive
Logic
But that
is
to be quite sound.
lead
to
up
may
it
and especially
level
of
making
philosophical
fully
do
deeper, except
what
explicit
as
analysis
and to probe no
science,
problems
Under favourable
problems.
a hard and fast
to
draw
be wise not
epistemological
circumstances
line
of
me
is
the
to
extent of
Epistemology
inquiry, but it
is
certainly a
is inevitably
very important department of
much more speculative than Logic need be, and the two are
Most
first.
logicians
(even Mill),
it
is
keep
By
of
subject
less
matter that
is
proof.
matter.
any particular
common
is
subject
special
But
ft
abstracted from
studied by
matter concerned in
is only the
special subject
not subject matter in general.
* See also
Henry Sidg wick's Philosophy\
its
Scope
and
Relations.
198
WOLF.
A.
it
topics.
The common
aspects
so
to different
by comparison
distinguished
may
and
For
may
"
"
general
is
"
abstract."
Now,
employed
mathematics more
the sciences
tains that
"
is
life,
particularly.
good enough
it is
logical material
in
NOT possible
and
to
little
more than
It
is
a method
commonly
And what
for Logic.
to abstract
Now
from
is
'
in themselves,
without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also
"
*
But if by " forms of thought in themselves
of meaning."
"
is constantly
exercising.
of
are
there
degrees
generality and of abstraction.
Again,
And
same kind
instance).
This appears to lead Dr. Schiller to charge Logic with not bcin<j
But there is nothing inconsistent in all
consistently Formal.
"
"
this.
Logic may not be consistently Formal in Dr. Schiller's
* Formal
L<><j<>',
p. ix.
THE VALUE OF
199
LOGIC.
sought
is
is
The cogency
printed.
merely printing
it
by the strongest
argument
an argument
of
not strengthened by
is
of
The
temper.
it
intrinsic
strengthened
value of an
same whether
it is employed by a lovable
an
odious
by
personality, whether it is used in a
wrath and vexation or " in that sweet mood when
is
the
personality or
mood
of
amount
of
betrayal of
is
"
psychical context
familiar device
In
for
commonly
In
fact a too
liberal
and
and in sensible
dis-
and
imbecility.
"
scientific
investigations,
"
p. 375.
200
WOLF.
A.
when we
Man
Old
Sea
of the
'
to the
reproach to
"
the
'
Sinbad
On
Science."
of
this
point, however, I
to be
what
more
is
Granting
my
is
good enough
for Logic.
"
formal
"
Prima facie
does.
it
And
Dr. Schiller
if
ment might be
theoretical
we should
effected
so far as I can
make
conceivability
problems as an excuse
against Logic and
him.
But,
When
logical
in wholesale invective
for indulging
logicians.
treatment of
fuller
it
comes
to a practical
somewhat mysterious
for paying pupils.*
Or
else
new
for a
new
construction.
Logic, or
of
he rides
"
off
on a hump-backed
The only
"
is
Psychologic,"
"
clear
"
before
"
ground
required
"
Even
if
"
at some future time, is a mode
Psychologic
of procedure which is not likely to commend itself even to
ducing a better
common
"
sense.
Schiller's
own
it is
practice, in
of
some
interest to
compare
his
with
Logic,
It will not be very difficult
the
Formal
_
* See
Mind, N.S., No. 86,
p. 248.
THE VALUE OF
201
LOGIC.
to show, I
Dr.
Dr.
Schiller's Neglect
Schiller
is
quite
of his
own
Preaching.
when he
eloquent
insists
on the
"
To abstract from the
meaning on context.
dependence
in
which
the
context
judgment arises, to universalize
particular
of
it
without regard to
its
('
material
')
its
is
application,
its
passage
circumstances,
place,
context
But, according
stated
is
14).
It
more
fully in the
"
means
the time,
and purpose
of
This
is
rather a
Dr.
to
"
Schiller,
there
is
"
tall
order."
'
....
....
all
definition
Such
infinitum"-\
the words
made
will
is
it
to define
themselves be
all
unambiguous
and what-
if
I seriously
found that
stood,
then,
* Formal
the odds
Logic, p. 382.
t Mind, N.S., Vol. XXII, p. 247.
202
A.
mutual understanding,
Not
a miracle.
WOLF.
would consider
Dr. Schiller.
so
He
it
nothing short of
believes
in
all
these
some unfortunate
If
critic
fails
to
if
understand
he
is
him,
"
Dr. Schiller does not say, Well, after all, how was it to be
"
less still does
expected that anybody should understand me
;
it
only
"
capacities
literary
in
However,
let
us see
on
"
how Dr.
Schiller's practice
compares
mean-
Formal
of
pleads.
"
"
Formal Logicians
Formal Logic."
thrashed
"
out,
for
in the abstract.
nothing at
all
is
As
a rule,
said about
is
See,
Methods,
e.g.,
ix, 25,
pp. 687
203
criti-
"
In
wrong
in
procedure,
it
is
"
are just
Dr. Schiller,
if
he had
only paid attention to the context, should have seen this, and
book
and
is
Dr. Schiller's
due
to his
on
am
Logic.
giving a few more instances of such misinterpretation in the next section, as examples of Dr. Schiller's method
I
of criticism.
more
It will be
"
psychical context
appreciate such context as
It would be
theory he discusses. But nothing of the sort.
difficult to find another volume on Logic so sparing in concrete
And such illustrations as are offered do not
illustrations.
seem
to illustrate at all
* Formal
Logic,
p. 268.
to illustrate.
204
Take Dr.
"
WOLF.
A.
What,
importance of context.
It is hot,'
it, why,
Let us suppose that the
remark was made in the Bodleian Library on February 20th,
e.g.,
1914, at 2
F.
Surely
express all this in a proposition the
meaning of which would be quite clear without the need of
further information as to " who said it, why, where, to whom."
it
is
P.M.,
to
quite easy
we can only
Science,
And when
But
dumb.
in Logic, as in
know
who
is
usually no need to
said
it,
of
knowing the
their
interest or purpose of
"
truth.
'
needed
is
or
application
whether or not
use
it
of
'
is
'
law
true
'
it
is
'
.
'
'
'
'
enough
Now,
is
not
for
it
a happy one.
two decimal
makes no
difference
for instance,
places,
IT is
whatever
*
and
3*1 to
and say
one decimal
Whether
or no
3 '14,
Ibid., p. 382.
t Ibid.,
is
so forth.
say,
p. 320.
e.g.,
is
THE VALUE OF
of TT to
The introduction
of
"
"
is
205
LOGIC.
case,
and
And
purpose
such plausibility as the illustrations
may appear
to have, is
due
"
"
mere
true
entirely to the fact that Dr. Schiller is using the term
"
"
If by
is meant that which is
true
in a pragmatist sense.
question-begging.
There
is
may
misunder-
it is
Of course
Nor
frequency.
is
of
this all.
As
did,
to
Such, I maintain,
context.
pay attention to
is
the
essential
context,
rest
to their
common
me
sense or their
And
knowledge,
highly
Dr. Schiller's Formal Logw, notwithstanding all its alarums, has
done no more than to repeat the general warning in a vastly
seems
special
shrill notes.
doubtful.
How
this ancient
and
of perfection is to be elaborated in a
more
and more helpful manner, the book does not show in
general counsel
detailed
the very
7.
to
least.
Samples of Dr.
So much
Schiller's
Misunderstandings of Logic.
which he lays
so
much
stress.
It
sweeping criticisms, on
would be no very difficult
see, e.g.,
my
Studies
206
A.
WOLF.
matter to deal also with his detailed criticisms, did time and
fall
cable,
Formal
Logic,
contempt
for Logic
familiarity.
(1)
Judgment
the presence of
is
belief.
what we judge,
or,
makes
these
of
simple
true because
"
facts.
On
the face
of
it,
every
it claims truth.
Judgments as such,
judgment is
Whatever is
then, must be proclaimed true and infallible.
asserted asserts truth, and no matter how assertions clash and
vary, they
must
all
an intrinsic doubt of
confesses to
its
own
or a joke.
sarcasms,
to exist."*
by now.
lies,
an
It becomes,
error, a sarcasm, a
From
It scarcely
entirely of his
(2) It is
sciences
truth.
own making.
generally
seek
to
establish
* Formal
Logic,
p. 94.
general
propositions
207
universals.
Why,"
"
should
it
be logi-
But
all this
righteous indignation
as Logic teaches
proposition
is
no such absurdity.
shall'
."f
of
always
But there
is
S is P
of
about the remaining Ps. It does not mean that some P's are
definitely excluded from the reference of the given assertion.
Of
course, if
S and
P.
their co-extensiveness
is
it is
Ibid., p. 137.
t Ibid., p. 155.
'
208
'
Some P
is
'
Why
?
'
principles, infer
No S
to do anything.
nobody
of
WOLF.
A.
Ewwj S is
'
not,
"*
It
simply explains
of
them
on Formal
even
But Logic
not
Which
etc.
P,
one
should
is
all
"
"
compels
the implications
out
Which
these equivalents.
all
of
depends on circumstances.
Similarly with Dr. Schiller's whole
utilized
tirade
The innocent
"necessity" of inference.!
fact
against
the
that certain
all.
There is nothing
from
to
anybody
sleep, or from
going
in
the
most
and
fancies
indulging
extravagant
day-dreams.
in Logic to prevent
"
the word " necessity
offends one's ears, some other word
("implication,"^.) might easily be substituted for the most
If
part
self
"
or
freedom
necessity
logical
"
or
of
autonomy
After
pulsion."
fact of
"
"
that
there
all if
"
"
is
really
reason,
is
the
same
the
"
com-
implication
as
and involves no
in
some
nothing
in
to
Logic
discourage
such,
or
any
similar,
preference.
(5)
Most remarkable
*
of all
perhaps
JUd., p. 160.
t Ibid., pp. 168 if.
is
THE VALUE OF
209
LOGIC.
good
stories,'
illustrations.
'
men
all
man
'
yet the
may be
Smith
middle term.
stories,
particular
that
fact
the
story
it.
Now
but he
may
is
is
'
not a
"
"
is
'
for
technical
"
said to be ambiguous.
man
of
diagnosis
specimen Smith
may
this
The
is
sort of a zoological
man
'
The
conclusion."*
inconclusive argument
what
by the
told
good
case
this particular
love
One wonders
be \vho
is
man
story
stories
the
the conclusion
inferred
If
by Dr.
Schiller.
But even
if
the
is
"
very different from the assertion that Smith
loves this good story about himself."
Anyhow, whatever
the point of the illustration may be, if it has any point, it cer-
stories,"
tainly
says
is
it is.
(6)
that
is
which
"a formally
invalid
thought
* Formal
Logic,
t Ibid.,
p. 350.
may
p. 200.
is
be actually true."t
210
WOLF.
A.
"
"
is quite
irrelevant, because the
general
objection
of
doctrine
the syllogism is, not
in
the
considered
question
This
whether
are
assertions
certain
but
true,
whether
certain
Nor are
conclusions are proved by their ostensive premisses.
the detailed applications of this general objection any more
relevant.
Here is one of them. " We may argue with what
'
A is
E.g.,
A is
"*
equal to C.'
B is equal
a
only
syllogism
equal to B,
Now
it is
is
of order,
8.
Logic
and
as
to
only
and Pragmatism.
Schiller
actually admitted
that the
Schiller's
constant
insistence
that
meaning cannot be
its
real
purpose.
But
let
To some people
that pass.
Schiller's
Ibid., p. 186.
XXII,
pp. 244
f.
THE VALUE OF
211
LOGIC.
pass as a
indiscretion.
must be given
attention
Formal
mere
to
Anyhow,
Pragmatism
Fortunately
Logic.
it
let
that also
clear that
some
is
it
But
is
What
little I
have
criticisms of
and
Logic,
this
may
brevity.
speaking, the
Generally
differences between
my
opinion, lie
Pragmatism
differences which, in
of
in
common
it .is
say that
it is
is
Logic and
is
condemn Logic
But
alleged incompatibility with Pragmatism.
mere question-begging. Some of the criticisms, for
"
"
"
truth and " proof are the same
instance, clearly assume that
this
is
Now
thing.f
it is
its
everyday
life
this
and
may
in science it
be true even
is
may
* Proc. Arist.
Soc., Vol.
e.g.,
if
ff.,
ff.
Formal Logic,
p. 186.
O 2
212
A.
WOLF.
troubling about
epistemological difficulties.
its
truth
is
belief or
Such
is
view can be proved to be sound or not, does not, and need not,
trouble either the man in the street or even the scientist. And
Logic moves on the same level of
common
philosophic depth
as
do
Dr. Schiller
Logic when he
is,
first identifies
"
truth
"
with
"
Pragmatism into
proof/'' and then
S, therefore
some
S's are
is
not valid.
is
that, according to
"
"
false
"
Logic (which
is
presumably, like
Formal Logic," only an alias for existing Logic), " no man has
a right to believe in what is not fully proved, and it is our
duty to demand absolutely conclusive evidence before we lift a
hand or stir a foot."* The only one that I can think of who
has ever said anything at
all
like
this is
Huxley.f
* Science
Progress, No. 31, p. 406.
t Method and Results, p. 40 of the Eversley edition.
And
THE VALUE OF
213
LOGIC.
Dr.
Logic teaches
On
the sort.
thrown overboard.
the contrary,
it is
nothing
that
book
on
modern
obvious
from
everything
Logic
any
pretty
cannot be proved, not even the fundamental assumptions, the
so-called
of
Laws
of
and
proof
Dr. Schiller
Logic "it
is
commonly supposed
is
possibility
to
depend.
What
with the
varies
another matter.
reliability of
Many
logicians,
perhaps most
of
is
them, as a
"
hold the " harmony
theory of the criterion of
and this does not require a " start from certainty."
matter of
truth
Thought, on
disproof
is,
certainty."*
proof
of
fact,
Dr. Schiller also seems to have overlooked the fact that Logic
deals with probability, or with merely probable proof, as well as
"
truth
distinguishes between
different kinds and degrees
"
and
"
between
different
of
proof, representing
degrees of approximation to exact demonstration though it is
neither practicable nor desirable to discuss exhaustively all
such degrees of cogency. Pragmatism may be indifferent to all
is
not,
and
it is
no use confounding
intervention.
and
"
laws of nature
course for
man
scientific
same time
it
"
"
even
bluff."
facts
are all
to take,
dare, to risk, to
and
"
"
as well
not
to
* Formal
Logic,
logical
theory.
exaggerate
p. 234.
At
the
the differences
214
between them.
and
be,
WOLF.
A.
is,
After
all,
achieved
by
human
Nor
intervention.
does
human
"
made
postulations,
"
only
"
and
"
laws
real question
man-made
are.
is,
"
are
Humanism.
And
Dr. Schiller,
programme
it
is
true,
is
"
man-
whether the
On
is
Pragmatism or
to be
facts
The
in a sense."
to say
"
and that
side of
it is
is.
His
"
"
Psychologic is to be
to include apparently
it
will include
Even
indeed,
what
is
there that
What
it
light
and methods
ways
of science
of discovery
and invention
After
"
all,
bluff
"
is
only
"
is
"
Bluff
"
appears to be one
Moreover, too
much
proneness to identify
to results
which
"
it
"
faith in
"
truth
But
to ordinary people
215
"
true
very reason largely works," that is to say, is made
(in
the pragmatist sense), while per contra what meets with intoler-
ance for this very reason does not work, that is to say, is made
Mr. Bertrand Russell has consequently insisted that
false."*
"
Pragmatism
And
one
is
"
is
its
free invective
against Logic and the whole race of logicians, are not calculated
to inspire
spirit of PragSchiller
Dr.
to
be the great
proclaimed by
forms of intolerance. If one had to choose between
matism, which
cure for
all
is
"
"
based upon PragLogic and Pragmatism (or a Psychologic
I
for one would put my trust in Logic, rather than in
matism),
common
sense of
Concluding Remarks.
My
"
"
logicians
synonymous terms.
") are
My
task
216
A.
now finished
ment of others.
is
with what success, I must leave to the judgLogic, as Dr. Schiller admits, is one of the oldest
of studies,
ablest
WOLF.
some
votaries
its
of
"
the
its
that
primd
And
worth.
Formal
Dr. Schiller's
Logic
improvement
helpful
in
in various ways,
effecting
attention.
such
and any
criticism that
may
be
"
Old things need not be
merely because it is old.
I have myself said and written about various
therefore true."
is
old
The more
But in Logic, as
is
in other
born of sympathetic
it is
insight, not
wrong to be impetuous
and likely to shock.
"
what
is
merely novel
have no liking
with me,
in the interests of
for controversy.
It'
it
all.
After
all,
occasion.
possible to
writer.
It
and objective as it is
be when dealing with the views of a particular
might have appeared more impersonal if instead
217
Pragmatism
so
often, I
refers to Logic
But
to
Dr. Schiller
seems
it
to
me
if
Need-
less to say, I
On
as
By
II.
1.
who
is right,
but what
is right.
C. S. SCHILLER.
F.
Introductory.
2.
3.
Logic
4.
The Formalism
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
v.
Science.
of Logic.
tentions.
But
the
as
'
logical
significance
of
'abusing the
by now
attorney
pretty well understood, I shall
address myself exclusively to the logical aspects of Dr. Wolf's
defence of logic.'
is
plaintiff's
'
It will, however, be
more
book.
shall
endeavour,
am
permitted to
something more consonant with
illuminating,
therefore,
to
if I
my
mind, and in
elucidate
first
my
the
218
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
my
criticism of
Formal Logic
and pragmatism.
2.
In his
8 Dr.
Wolf seems
and
to
make
it
"
a systematic
No.
Again, in Mind,
244-5, I had explained elaborately why it was
j6, pp.
new
Humanism I
editions both of
stated
as
Humanism and
plainly as possible
of
that
requirement, the pragmatist doctrines in all three could henceforth be regarded as aspirations and prolegomena to a
future logic of Eeal knowing, which I hope to publish some
them with
my
other doctrines.
to
failed
that
on the
219
from
the
logical
'
'
for so doing,
tradition.
Clearly,
an explicit
therefore,
'
introduction to Pragmatism,
it is
to
now
in existence,
is
an
historical accident.
Anyhow
to
ascertain
the
real
meaning
of
Pragmatism.
But
it
is
the logical
was not
(logically)
mention
a bull,
desirous of starting.*
at once recognize
criticism.
the positive
and systematic
of
basis
Pragmatism can be
of
my
logically
doubt that
if
Humanism.
For
if
in
220
F.
am
while I
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
James
and Henri Bergson that there may conceivably be an irreducible discrepancy between the requirements of life and of
between Humanism and
logic,* I
is
at
rate
any
sufficiently close
to
from a humanist
consistently used
humanist sense
Now
question.
believes himself
'
'
truth
'
senses
is
the
notions
the
basis,
of
'
but
truth
'
also
and
that
have
I
'
'
in
proof
only one
that
'
makes
sense,
that
of
the other
of
Formal
'
proof
of
him
to invite
* I
am
t Dr.
of
'
truth
Wolf prudently
'
and
'
'
proof
are.
'
'
ordinary senses
THE VALUE OF
3.
have thought
it
because
tradition,
my
of
seemed
it
v. Science.
necessary to
import
philosophic
general
Logic
221
LOGIC.
to
me
misunder-
that
likely
Here
that
may
'
'
logic.
I give
abundant reason
it
an adequate reply
business of Logic to be
that
"
what
it
stantiated.
logicians
good enough
This
logic."
though
is
is
to declare that
"
it is
science
not the
is,"
and
philosophic
sense,
would be something, if the claim could be subBeyond this, Dr. Wolf can only quote some
who have
said
nice,
things
respectful
and a few
about the
scientists
who have
my
plea
is
definite
of
what
them
append a
list,
it
will
mean.
the more ruthlessly the
character
of
actual
reasoning, and
essential
relation
339, 404),
to
222
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
due
the standard of
scientific
'
truths
'
to the
up to
and
that
the
method
of
(&)
proof,
which argues from effect to cause,'
valid
'
'
'
verification,
'
'
fallacy
of
'
'
'
aud
their
need
even
them continually
'
'
principles
in the light of
'
'
(4) the
of hypotheses, in
the cardinal
Furthermore
p.
Formal
life
of
this
268).
Logic
fatally
misrepresents
such
and definition
(6) Classification
(F. L., p. 55
dependence of
f.,
62
f.),
scientific conclusions
on
'
Deduction/ which
it
makes an
ex post
'
Induction
'
(F. L., p.
266
f.),
(10) that of causal analysis (F. L., pp. 279, 282, 306, 312),
(11) that of natural 'law' (F. Z., p. 312);
and
(F. Z., p.
317
'
cases
f.).
charges are brought are primarily the sciences which are openly
empirical in their nature, and that I am fully aware that
the (pure) mathematical sciences are supposed by some not to be
of their
223
doctrines.
scope of
it
if
it
empirical sciences and that there was great need of a logic that
would do so correctly. (2) I will state for what it is worth the
represent
them
as pragmatic
logically legitimate
make
their practice square with the precepts they find there, they
this topic I
about which he
may
is
'
Philosophical Essays,
p. 104.
224
F.
with
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
'
it
On
(if for
free
'
form/ and
even a sense in which logic may be called a formal science. I
did not dwell on this in my Formal Logic, because I conceived
it to belong rather to its constructive sequel, but my adoption of
legitimate scope for a reasonable study of logical
Formal
'
'
and
'
formal
true
'
and
'
validity
'
'
false
is
'
extra-logical
My
point, therefore, plainly was, not that logic is not entitled (like
it
work*
And
all
this
specifically
obvious inference
carried to this
is
of
was
my
illustrated
book.
The
self-defeating
pitch,
and
see
no
difficulty
* In
particular, the assumption that there is no logical connexion
between the truth and the use of logical forms may be instanced as one
Dr. Wolf
of the worst and most fundamental of such false abstractions.
quotes my protest against it in Formal Logic, p. ix, but appears to understand neither its motive nor its scope. It is, of course, this assumption
that leads to the fatal- abstraction from meaning by Formalism, to the
depersonalization of thought, and to the widespread inability to see that
the relation of use to truth is not extraneous and accidental, but inherent
and vital.
'
'
THE VALUE OF
225
LOGIC.
teachable
(if
distinction
between
'
formal
'
'
his inability to
'
still
deeper waters
and
when he endeavours
my
to
account of Formalism,
"
he
to give
so
illustrates
logicians rarely
Formal they
himself I
know
are.
may
admirably
either
my
(disputed) contention
how Formal
Moreover by taking
how
or
my
that
inconsistently
illustrations
home
to
from
him more
directly than
he
is
to our scrutiny.
"
the central theme of
Dr. Wolf begins by telling us that
is
but
that
Proof,"
by "proof" he does not mean
Logic
"
absolute demonstration
assertion
it
more
may
"
only, but
may give
us
tell
how
"
(which he recognizes also in 4) and absolute demonstration
is to be bridged
but it dees illustrate beautifully the nature
:
its
inconsistency.
For while
it
* It
might, e.g.) confess itself to be (what in fact it is) an analysis of
language and a manipulation of the dictionary -meanings of words. It
is only because it claims to be something so vastly superior both to
grammar and to psychology that it is necessary to pin it down so relenteither verbalism or psychology,' and to show
lessly to the alternative
that it cannot afford to be consistently either, so long as it maintains its
'
'
'
pretensions.
226
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
valid,'
lutely
but
is
nowhere
do
exist,
'
'
valid,'
because of incurable
'
'
to concrete reasonings
all their
most
'
'
to cover
stituted for
false analyses of
Formal
Logic.*
scientific
fact,
to the discrepancy
between
logical
further
by
him almost
fit
Dr. Wolf,
'
proof
t In
in order to
that common-sense
object
science
"
227
also
abstract
from
results,
observers, first
'
make
An astronomer,
'
of
He
is
as good as another,
and
much
doing,
when he
to be
finds that
'
it
'
'
weather, or the soup, or the poker, or red pepper but it still remains
undetermined whether the actual meaning of the remark was to convey
information, to dispute an assertion that it is cold, or simply to make
conversation. And how the fact that, when we have taken an ambiguous
proposition, the possibilities of misunderstanding may be diminished by
;
am
at a loss to understand.
P2
228
F.
C.
is
'
be a
meant
'
miracle
if
S.
SCHILLER.
and that
'scepticism,'*
would
it
though he
of
knowledge
judgments to be subjected
of the
meaning
He then no longer
the exact context and real
he relents perceptibly.
scouts entirely a
still
that
insists
its
to logical treatment,
much
deny that
it
context."
And
finally
of the
above
is
some attention
to
suppositio.^
Much
is
facts do not
simpler, and
admit
more
be
neglected
and
to
be risky
such exactness.
of
candid,
occasions
be
cannot
to
do as
hardly seems
doubt the
it
No
But would
I
did,
viz.,
exactly
determined
this procedure
it
not be
to
state
successfully
in
advance,
must always
Finally I
may
some
that Dr.
very well be
I have not,
only left me
the inside of an otherwise very busy week in which to compile my reply
to him.
229
will
not rely on
Wolf must
word
;
but
credit
'
'
of Causation,
'
induction
'
As
into smithereens.
were
facts,
and neglected
though it is only
quite recently that logicians have been found to observe and
So all that can be extracted from
appreciate this procedure.
this is only
short of
its practice,
5.
which
is
'
the sciences.f
all-pervasive
230
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER-
and an unquestioned
own
jurisdiction,
such
which enable
neighbours
it
to hold its
as
epistemology,
against
aggressive
psychology, metaphysics and grammar. He also assumes that
this realm of logic, guarded by Messrs. Mill, Jevons and Venn,
"
the " English logicians
(of the last generation), has existed
from the first and has been universally respected, and that any
and he has
to
make
represents
about
logic.
Now
It
false in fact.
In the
first
place
it is
many
is still
essentially Aristotelian.
Yet Dr. Wolf entirely ignores Aristotle, and the logical problems
he has so successfully set to succeeding generations. He ignores
similarly the
231
would not be
it
Secondly,
from
show that
difficult to
the. separa-
its
to
is
epistemology,
psychology,
unthinkable.
Thirdly,
which
to be conducted with
and
even
it
ethics,
no regard
is
simply
all
logicians are agreed about the limits of their subject, either now
It is in fact at present the cock-pit of
or at any time.
philosophy and
it is
common ground
"
"
is
it
They
Wolf presupposes in
English logicians
Nor
are agreed.
'
'
idealist
Dewey, and
logic.
may
perhaps be collectively
I have, at
any
have
to be set, the
I trust,
to Logic, p. 11.
232
F.
which he
to
restricts the
we
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
name
Writing in 1879, he
of logic.
like Whately and De Morgan, who have recognized the fact that
Formal Logic should treat of language, have insufficiently
to give is a useful
and
position of
A little
Formal Logic in
infrequently
to
Wolf
me an
fell
foul of Mill.
term
to apply that
word
'
bluff,' I
will venture
The Social
Effects
of Formal Logic.
fills
the rest of
the book.
the
hilt,
much
historical
it.
To do
this completely,
* Mind. Vol.
IV,
p. 370.
social
human
233
life,
and produce or
nature.
If Dr.
Wolf
arguments on which
has
not
done.
me
accuses
again,
merely
declares
them
But
this
"
baseless,"
he
and
as scepticism
and
my
He
predestination
despair
paradoxes.
had
relatively
to
different
situations,
and stimulates
every one to find out what is the lest view for himself, the
clash of opinions must be mitigated.*
Similarly, there
is
may
refer to
Humanism,
234
F.
C.
Mr. Sidgwick
has
conception of
ambiguity
detection
of
the
SCHILLER.
S.
really
is
misleading
ambiguities
(cf.
F.
the
L.
pp
26, 27).
fling
if it
were
to
true, as
Where
does
experiment
concern themselves with doubts, to try
tions, to
to hold fast to
what
is
good
What
it
train its
in various direc-
has
it
all
things and
delicate processes of
risks,
recently
pointed
the
'
probable reasonings
profoundly from the
artificial probabilities of mathematics, and there is
nothing in
the logical text-books about them.
The strict Formalist is
of real
life
differ
of
He
sinks in
it
is
present.
7.
My
claim
Logic.
'
235
many who
far
Wolf
Dr.
Soit
disagrees.
est
bound
are
to
are
me
It appears to
me
that
we
teachers
of our subject,
For
so soon as
done
all
any
is
'
To answer that
should have
philosophy, and
we have no time
for that.'
Now
such
is
best taught
communications with
its
by
and
it
isolating
adjacent sciences
on
life.
But
this is precisely
what
logic
it
to be
instructive.
Nor
F. L.,
are
p.
my
complaints
"
anything new.
Since
writing
as
follows,
Whately lamenting
The truth
is,
that
very small
236
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
become pro-
technical terms
whatever
Had
the feast of
reason in this
aimed so high
country.
(or low) I should have written
one of those shilling shockers which are now so popular. I
hope this declaration may allay some of the professional alarm
I
seem
to
have excited.
8.
Case.
where
stand after
exactly where I did, and must confess that no damage has been
done to me.
The reason is manifest: Dr. Wolfs defence of
left
superficial,
and
his attack
He
on mine
all
my
vital points as
my
of abstracting
from
it,
as
Formalism
do
THE VALUE OF
my
237
LOGIC.
tions of Induction
and Causation.
True,
all
my
concep-
these omissions
down.
to fling
9.
Appendix.
most part
Formal Logic by
general disquisitions to tackling the detailed objections with
point) preferred for the
which
my
book
is
criticism of details
in his
logic.
to defend
what he
my elementary misunderstandings of
turn
out to be so trivial and perfunctory
These, however,
7, of
calls
it best to
relegate them to an appendix, in which
be disposed of briefly without encumbering the body
that I think
they
of
may
my
paper.
'
'
Now,
was
of course well
different contexts
claim of
The
all
definition of
arise in
meaning.
'
ail intelligible
the
when
and defensible
truth-
psychological
their
false.
238
C.
F.
S.
SCHILLEK.
be
admitting the
the flood
of
his
relativity
to
gates
doctrines.
of
the
to
definitions
whole
None
of
of this
the
does
him
'
to
'
means
so
little,*
it
'
tention so briefly as to
make
unintelligible, seems
'
'
Hegelian
Dr. Wolf
hierarchy of judgments/
philosophic chaos in which
entities,
it
it
is
my
may
contested
it
con-
to evince
it,
and
accordingly.
"
further information
which a reference
*
Cf.
Mind, No.
"
case,
f.,
and
my
comments
239
It
was simply an
omit the
illustration
viz.,
'
'
logical necessity
psychological necessity.
3) I pro-
'
more than a
explains
oscillation
ex post facto
reflection.'
trace in Dr.
Wolfs
the implications
all
of Every
is
etc."
For
it
Wolfs
fifth
objection might
meaning
make
of
a rationalistically
Formalist
the
expounding
all
these years.
He
me
actually supposes
to
be
As if it mattered one
merely illustrating an ambiguous middle
whether
this
fatal
flaw
is
called
an
jot
ambiguous middle or a
!
'
'
'
fallacy of accident,'! or
As
my
illustration of
a fact Dr.
Wolf can
my
been refuted by tfie course of events. And this is, in the first
place, not 'playing the game' of Formal Logic, because it demands
extra-logical information which the logician as such has not
got,
so often
impelled
As
I pointed out in
my
curious
to
footnote.
offer
confusion
an ex post
240
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
facto re-statement of an
It turns
on the question
this point
the
an
divided, but, as
'
'
'
material
'
knowledge,
formal validity.' Of course I should
be willing also to grant that these contentions amount in fact to
a reductio ad absurdum of formal validity,' and indeed that is
and
is
'
'
what
in the
contested.
(7) Finally I
He
6.
may
objects to
my
Wolf makes
'
truth
in
'
to
'
'
purpose by pointing out that even in the exact sciences a
value is taken as true if it is * true enough for the purpose
in hand.
And he imagines himself to have disposed of this
contention by pointing out that the mathematician " can say
;
'
'
'
TT
is
3'1 to
so forth."
Of course he can
but has Dr. Wolf ever asked himself what the mathematician
If
'
it is
fully expanded,
is
this
TT,
quantities,
I, too,
strictly
objections.
state that
'
But
C, are not
to the same
THE VALUE OF
241
LOGIC.
does not
take
it
as 314,
and
of accuracy
if
but co-exist.
Q.E.D.
242
VIII.
PERSONALITY.
By W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
1.
his
Automatisme Psychologique,
and
to a
forward.
are the
phenomena
psycho-neuroses,
disso-
gone rapidly
closely allied
and
movements,
such a
In the case
way
as to raise
more points
In
capable of determining.
Sally Beauchamp,"*
in the
of theory
in
reasons
for
not
"
"
is to be regarded
Sally Beauchamp
accepting the view that
as a crucial case any more than the cases recorded in the many
studies
by Janet and
others.
As
problems,
it
would be more
profitable,
been made
Beauchamp
many
243
Freud and Jung in their extended applications of psychoas were formerly studied
analysis to the same types of case
are kept
mainly by hypnotic analysis. By psycho-analysis we
nearer to the normal methods of psychology, and as the
phenomena
of dissociated
This
life.
personality with the minor dissociations of everyday
and
dream
all
as
we
for
is a great gain in method
dream,
;
we
more or
less constantly,
somewhat
detracts
Beaucharap group
maintain a critical attitude in the face of provisionally insoluble
;
cases.
2.
to
try
confine
is
myself
"
of
department
life
where
one
offices of intelligent
confession.
is
same.
only one
believe
to
"
is
is
to
make any
the
244
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
3.
have kept
used
Dr.
by
Possibly
it
is
Morton
Prince
not the
best
to the
term
are
his
;
classical
familiar
all
other
of "asso-
was
it
description.
It implies,
we
and
in
on everything
is
premature.
association
No psychologist
metaphysical "unity of consciousness" less.
of
as
in
would
the
Hamilton,
now,
days
suggest, without
qualification, that the simplicity or unity of the mind is a
point in favour of the separability of the mental
And whatever criti
substance from the material substance.
crucial
logical
atomism
"
;
little
out of date.
of
Whether we
lines
it
etc.,
one presupposition
is
will,"
in
"
spontaneity," or Stout's
the
"
"
vital,"
or
conation," or Schopenhauer's
always present,
"dan
life
is,
like the
ship
beneath."
245
contiguity
or
even to the
always seemed
tionists has
to
epistemological associa-
later
me an
form
uncritical
of
words
loss,
scientific vocabulary.
word disaggregation
If the
is
so far as I
mental psychologists,
of the experi-
it
"
actionistic
"
by Bain.
term dissociation we may say that, in the
personality, what is gathered laboriously in
But
to justify the
formation of a split
the process of experience under the guidance of the primary
laws of association (contiguity and similarity) is, under some
form of
stress,
separate
groups.
If
the integrative
But
sociation.
as, biologically,
process
is
is
legitimately
atomistic
picture
it
"
mental elements
rather as the
mode
is
of organisation followed
by a
psycho-physical organism in the course of its growth, adjustment, and perpetual readjustment to environment.
That
this is
shown by the
fact that,
by the method
of
"
is
free association,"
"
buried complexes
"
246
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
critical
why
so
many
floating fragments
it
maybe
left to
explain
lost,
This
is
difficult
it a definite meaning.
I
psychology.
content to leave this to Professor Alexander, who, in his
am
article
on
"
Self as Subject
All I
we must think
am
concerned with
is
that,
double-faced unity,"
who can be
seen and
heard and spoken to, who can feel and act and remember, who
can grow tired and sleep and dream. In psycho-analysis we
"
we know,
be dealing with
discarnate
intelligence (I assume that some meaning can be given to the
term) but, practically, if there is no body to speak to, there is
for
may, indeed,
all
"
If I
am
asking too
much
me
psychical
to
aware that I
be
In this, I am
on as primary.
be setting aside the main contention of
looked
may
new argument
for
247
expression used by Dr. Bosanquet in his Principle of Indiand Fa/M(pp. 160 220); the physical and psychical
viduality
system
in
is
not in the
complete than
is
necessary for
normal psychology.
may
This
be
is
moment when
some species
of the
the
"
"
person
animal world,
it is
begins to be
If,
possible to generate
if
applied to a
human
way
put the question because doubt has been thrown over the view
that if one half of one person's brain could be perfectly united
with the other half of another person's brain, the result might
be a " unity of consciousness
capable of serving the ends of
if
as
it
normal.
were
personality
Except in degree, there seems
;
'
we
deal
If the
This
is
248
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
"
"
possibility of establishing a
germ-plasms.
For the present purpose,
made up
of inter-related
"
we may assume
neuron-group
others.
may
When
5.
(Sidis)
may
normal unity
of consciousness,
is
and
Personality.
made us
familiar with
is
and
The multitude
the
is
"
constellations of neurons
A common
type
not thinking of the early delirium, which
is
am
very common,
He
"
before
this
was a form
it
had a very
specific
of autoscopic hallucination,
cases, I
waking hours.
In other
For instance,
249
me
me
his
who
He summoned
He
was pure
illusion.
Possibly,
if
it
under the
The whole
common
occur when
cases as an illustration of a
or nervous shock should
this
Among
typhoid fever
attacks.
is
is
If
any fright
is
at
and Raymond's
Janet's
'
occurrence.
cases,
a shock following on
all
the
experiences of
more prolonged.
What happens
happens in a thousand
or another,
the
is
Beauchamp group
for periods
anybody
somnambulism
is
varying
may
from seconds
persist in almost
to
hours.
fundamental process
asleep, or
dreams, or
is
involved
But
The same
twilight of consciousness.
You
read
some voice
250
w. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
if
it
you have not already extinguished the candle, you will find
burning when you awake again. It is easy to trace experi-
All these
consciousness scatters into fragments.
be
followed
of
into
association
may
involving words
sequences
and images in every variety of coherence or incoherence.
(e.g.,
anaemia or
merely
move
to the inimitably
across
the
in
the
eye
course, a form of hallucination
common
that
it
is
of visualisation, but
effort
numerous streams
practically
of
images that
These
dark.
images are, of
but the hallucination is so
The hallucinations
normal.
somnambulism there
is
of a
word
a great distance
in sleep
;
but
it
and developed
could be
filled
extreme
to
the
stress,
there
may
may
occur
obsessions
of
of
anxieties, or
extreme
nervous system
disintegration
251
tions
differences
but
it is
possible to trace in
them
all
some
dis-
In the mass of those cases, however, the dissociapurely functional it is a disturbance of function, not a
experience.
tion
is
destruction of structure
to
the
it
is,
can
structure
is
among
man
question.
destroyed.
of
dissociation
as
easily
hand
is
unintelligent
It is not that
it
is,
as
he cannot speak,
is
who
controls
ago,
influence of
telephone.
On
learning
this, I
He
252
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
with
it.
normal way
doubtless,
he
of the
man's
life
goes on in the
eats,
sufficient
and emotion
but he
is,
as
Cases like
were, living in a dream of unbroken stability.
these are to be reckoned by tens of thousands but even in
it
it is
off
another,
life
the
inquiry
form part
for
illustrations
of dissociation.
it
the
link in a problem
twirling of
the fingers
million
petty experiences
"
atmosphere."
that
constitute
personal
253
6.
So far we are on
criminately
our purpose,
which we
indifferent
is
it
use.
might have
and motor
of the sensory
is
to
possible
referred with
trace
more
centres.
anaesthetic
different
suggest lines
of
is
by a case
illustrated
When
vertebra.
the
man
made
dorsal
sections of
may
produce.
It
is
them
all in
terms
of
It
would be possible
to render
possibilities of inter-relation
between
different groups of
neurons
is
all'admitted.
254
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
functional isolated
(whether we
life
with
its
call
dispositions).
"
person subjectively feels himself a sufficient person ? Within
/
seconds of death by bleeding a patient has asked me, "
Am
"
dying
infer, the
whole content
of con-
second
later, the
to reopen.
What meaning
are
we
moment
to assign to
we
If this is
to assign to the
of limited concentration ?
such unity
itself
it.
moment and
;
The content
of the
"
"
category seems to have varied from a sort of substance to a
"
"
soul
to a mere
purely logical abstraction, from a nuclear
summary
system, by what
title shall
we say
in a single nervous
now
substance
"
some
"
immaterial
was obvious
255
consciousness
of
they lasted, even when they lasted only for seconds. Now that
they have ceased to persist separately and are absorbed in the
relative "absolute" of the reconstituted personality, what meaning
are
we
described
ness
"
What
ness
are the
minimum
for observation ?
"
conditions of a unity of conscious-
"
if it is
Consciousness,
to serve as
must be
a personality in
power
of
recognition (Hoffding).
"
"
Lucie
series
revealed in Janet's
memory and a
of
These
formula
The minimum
person, obviously,
any
at least a self-consciousness.
were
conditions
and in
In the
others.
second
self.
Amnesia
knew nothing
in
one
of
the
direction.
examples
of dissociation.
(See
also
below, case
is
from
in
but,
two
Sidis).
no way
life
* Dissociation
of a Personality,
p. 236.
of
the
256
AV.
intellectual
LESLIE MACKENZIE.
processes."
qualifications.
and there
the
to
she
contrary
known
personality
memory
from
differed
certainly
to us,
is
normal or abnormal.
all
forms of
But
this is a
discover,
tests
had
This shows
among
those
how
difficult it is to find
In
fading
any
margins.
dissociation, however, in the hysterias
memory blanks are a striking feature.
landmarks
fixed
common forms
the
other
or
of
neuroses,
a
"
of its
memory
all
own
experience.
own
for their
respective
Of course, in
lives."*
this
group
the experiences
if
accurate memories,
therefore,
may
remembered.
One
difficulty,
of
course,
is
that,
apparently,
process of
"
the
mind-fixing "f B.
the experiences of
B. I and
Op.
t Op.
IV was
by the
cit.,
p. 238.
cit., p.
261.
able
"
to
vision
recall
"
some
method
"
of
she
got
occasionally
experiences,"*
Sally's
257
The subject
of
of disintegrated personality
The term
is,
ascendant
at
the
It
time.
is
evoked.
us
all
when
the
activity.
may emerge
Innumerable
facts of observation
whether there
in
is
again into
and experiment
One
point, however,
Beauchamp
it
is
important to note
personalities (one as
much
each of the
as the other)
and
all
make
The
conscious
This
not
of the organic
sensations generally, seems to be a necessary presupposition of
This implies that
any kind of conscious unity whatever.
life.
fact,
to speak
"unity"
"
may
be a shifting
"
is
simply
minimum
Op.
cit.y
p. 264.
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
258
the
organism
is
restored to
its
normal
physical
Consciousness, Co-consciousness,
7.
me
to saying that
and
to these three
Sub-consciousness.
of multiple personality.
But
it
seems to
In his Automatisme
same conditions
mental
expression was
driving
home
waking
He
different.
life,
did
of coherence as the
form of
although the
an
immense
service
in
as
in ordinary
For instance,
waking consciousness.
no consciousness whatever
rigid
her
arm
stays
in
of
her
surroundings.
any position
it
is
She
sits
she is
put in
Dr. Janet, after
;
words
to her,
and
in
is
murmurs
an obvious
In a few
transformation in the whole aspect of face and body.
seconds tears fill the eyes, the arms move voluntarily as if
unfrozen, the face grows pale and flushes, and the patient talks
To say that the condition of " unconsciousquite normally.
ness
"
of it
259
life, is
If
the door of
unconsciousness,"
it
its
compound
effect,
physical sequence
discontinuous
to the
scions
continuous,
At what
waking
is
at once physical
state are
is
and psychical
but,
if
the
"
?
The somnambulist,
We
was not
less in
abnormal conditions, as
cases,
personality
may
develop.
Considering
that
through such
R 2
W. LKSLIE MACKENZIE.
260
disconnection
many
idea of the
own
Thus we have
in such
this
secondary personality
may now
develop
own
its
bonds."
memory
He
submits that
consciousness
sciousness except
consciousness
assigned
to
all
and co-consciousness.
or
when
it
is
co-consciousness.
sub-consciousness
is,
he
maintains,
perfectly
each one fully in consciousness and yet both without any mutual
In the light of
influence and thus without mutual knowledge.
has been correctly proposed to speak of
Or we in ay
co-conscious processes, rather than sub-conscious.
interpret it more in harmony with the ordinary automatic
such interpretation,
it
Then we
writing or with other merely physiological reactions.
should suppose that as soon as the conversation sets in, the
which control the writing movement work
in which no mental factors are involved.
channels
through
reaction systems would then be
characteristic
One of the two
brain
centres
Psycho-therapy, p. 153.
261
That various
may
activities
any time
at
can co-exist in
slide
down from
we all
know by
We may
daily experience.
go
home through
the
streets of the
We
of the way.
logical account or
insist
either case
is
symptom
is
or
itself.
of
the
there
is
no sub-consciousness."*
consciousness or unconsciousness.
case
of
the
Beuuchamp group,
there
are
in the
good reasons
for
same moment
same
eye, ear
speech.
"
common
"
paths
(Sherrington) of
Op
tit., p.
157.
262
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
two minds.
the normal
in
experience
one hypothesis and
"
experience.
is fairly
named a
Sub-consciousness
It is
hypothesis.
"
process of co-conscious
long after
it
is
threshold of consciousness and continue to operate as a dissociated system of ideas, cut off, but not irrecoverably, from
the stream of current consciousness.
Dreams
seems
to
me
is
unconscious and expresses himself as a rule in purely psychobut I can perceive no radical inconsistency in
logical terms
the facts as described by any one of the three observers.
;
for
In an article on
Experiments
to
determine Co-conscious
stated as follows
"
:
B A
is
263
amnesia.
little
b.
of little
is
that B, both
little b,
feelings,
and
and
life of
she describes
specification.
"
Of
all
this
claimed sub-conscious
The question
ledge.
even in part ? She
is
no
is,
herself says
'
life,
little b's)
know
has no know-
claim be verified
it is
a minute
made her
close
Then he
When
she opened
her eyes she was not able, on questioning, to indicate to
But when
anyone that she had seen the handkerchief.
surreptitiously
1,
p. 34.
264
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
of
Yet
set.
much
The inference
is
is
mere
mere
But what is thus named
much the same in substance as what
"co-consciousness"
Janet
would
call
is
"
sub-consciousness
"
in
and,
any
case,
"
relatively to the
4,
p. 250, a case
was
also
is
alleged
in
that,
the
two
personalities,
there
If these
have
"
private audience
Yet writing
"
of
all
It is
was
messages
what
supposed
that
find
insight on
"
A good
of Sally
may
permanent co-consciousness.
"
Sally,"
But
inner lines."
made
may have
it
The instan-
a direct
If this is
* Sub-conscious
Phenomena, by Mtmsterberg, Prince, Eibot, Janet,
and
others, passim.
265
abnormal personality.
such a claim
is
happen, it is
In the case of
Mary
on one occasion
"
"
puzzled by this sudden glimpse of her other life that she could
not sleep at all during the night." Thus the memory experience
of one state invades the other after having been excluded.
consciousness
or,
what
He
is
consciousness
precedes the
first
low moment
manifestations of double or
Sidis
attack."
calls
There
is
drowsiness, then
begins.
moments
drowsy stage
"
"
true
unconsciousness, the
is
state.
This forms
are emerging.
* Dr. Boris
t Op.
J
Op.
cit., p.
cit.,
"
To
effect a synthesis
450.
p. 452.
we have
266
to
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
shorten
the
and
secondary stage
So
of
far,
personality
But
(bidis).
less
of uncon-
it'
is
method
but
is
many minor
automatisms.
It
therefore, important to
normal
mechanism for the
any
Professor Sigmund Freud main-
is
production of dissociations.
tains that there
is,
and
is,
is
and psycho-
his lines,
it
is
somewhat
censor
"
difficult to find
it
far as
and
psychologists
analysis,
it
in
is
difficult
sentence or two.
should be stated
them
is
to
them
relating
but, even
is,
Op.
tit., p.
455.
life
267
of the unconscious is
the conscious
as
more importance.
in
"
the
We
reaction
fact,
from terms.
apart
These
over-estimation
of
the
He
writes
quality
of
for
general
basis
of
the
this
step and
still
claim
full
is
just as
unknown
to us as the reality
of the
On
simple dream.
fundamentally
dream
of this character,
of the
dream
is and
by what complication of hallucinations it is expressed or masked.
By the restraints and inhibitions generated in the social life and
consists in discovering
in the
mind, multi-
Interpretation of
Dreams
268
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
The processes
consciousness.
on the ruind
of restraint
to a certain extent
even in sleep.
assumed
for the
moment), the latent dream thoughts express themselves differFreed from the lestraint due to
ently from waking thoughts.
the pressure of the world of external perception, superficial
associations have greater play
has an unlimited
most
easily
It is
field.
any
of re-association
When
waking consciousness.
is
an
effort
by those elements
form
of the
dream
hallucinations,
made
to struggle
every
variety.
possible
it
the
is
essential
"
censor,"
which
is
for the
of
dream
a general term
to above.
censor," the
of sensation,"
"
To escape
raw material
real symbolic
unrelated after-
which
is
hallucination form.
another
name
for
"
dream-
work
"
of dream-analysis is to
269
work backwards
of early infancy.
waking
state
was
life
still
young and
fragment
of the
abandoned psychic
life
The dream
of the child.
In
is
the
What
is
ideas
mechanisms
generally.
of
mental
is
"
of
As
indicated
unconscious has
earlier
much
in
to
this
say
paper,
for
common between
*
Op.
cit., p.
theory of
the
The processes of
and word stimulus are,
obvious points in
this
itself.
theory.
psycho-analysis,
447.
There are
some grades
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
270
These, otherwise
perhaps, from
or
consciousness
of
life.
This
is
is
environment
of the unconscious,
Brown
explains, the
of
thresholds (suggested
portions
of
the
we have been
mechanism corresponding
considering.
reciprocal innervation
is
Dr.
Brown
writes
"
:
to the
facts
Since normal
in hysterical patients
may
It is a
be physiologically explained in exactly the same way.
to
a
similar
of
short step from this
sensory symptoms.
explanation
Psychology,
271
'
As
'
"
possibility
manner
We
shall
of representation
thoughts,
and
avoid
if
misapplication of this
that presentations,
any
we remember
generally
not be
so to speak,
become an object
is
of
primary
manifestation
movement
will
immediately repeat
perception of the source of pain in the form of an hallucinaOn the contrary, there will be a
tion or in any other form.
* British Journal
of Psychology, VI.
t Interpretation of Dreams, p. 484.
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
272
is
memory
of psychic
presents to us the
As
repression.
is
generally known,
first
example
much
of this
deviation
ostrich,
life of
adults."*
This seems to
by Bain as the
"
me
law
discontinued in experience.
development
of will as
of conservation
and
which
states
of the
There
is
1.
put
self
Can a secondary
self
Op.
tit., p.
475.
273
of life it occurred
accepted, the secondary self at whatever stage
normal self.
as
the
elements
the
same
much
contain
would
If
3.
multiple personality be
fact,
are
we
obliged
to
"unity
psychological purposes, the category
consciousness" except in the same purely relative sense
as we speak of the unity of the cerebrum or of the bodily
of
sacrifice, for
of
organisation
Is
the
relative
organism
can we give
fact that a
group of
"
"
personalities
may
In
other
Dr.
words,
McDougall's
can
sense
any
be
based
"
"
unity of consciousness ?
category as
4. Do the facts of multiple personality logically require
actionism
(a) parallelism,
(&) inter-
Do
late
What
clear as to
its
what
existence
is
shown
to be a probable inference
from accepted
NOTE.
274
IX.
F.
By
THE statement
of the
may
Good
that
ROSAMOND SHIELDS.
a formal and essential characteristic
it is
common (whatever
to be
From
the
such
in
view,
encouragement
discussing
afforded by the words of a distinguished
tion than the obvious
to recall
some
Common
"
;
of
point
subject
of
is
this
demonstra-
simply an attempt
of the
first
member
Society, that
mere truism
of the belief in
Good.
common seems
is
Good
of the
will not
that terms like " good," " right," and so on, are not analysable
beyond a certain point, but are ultimate descriptions of states
of consciousness, or
ends, or conduct,
The judgment,
or
to.
common
will be
an analytic proposition.
thing as
Good
at
all,
rational individuals
true for
all,
it
must be recognisable
good.
is
as such
Good
If there is such a
by all
means what is
If the adjective
is
omitted,
the
usage maintained
Why
word which,
as
it
of view ?
The Good, if a valid
something with which individual caprice must be
is
its
275
volitions.
individual
"
there
It'
such
is
then what
is
a
is
good
concept," says
not good for me
is
simply good."
We
mean
is
"
subjective
and variable
by the divergence
"
is
is
it
mistaken."
of opinion as to
what
is
covered."*
Good does
value.
Tastes differ
"
is
considered
is
if
the
and that
as
"
is
bad
But
how
is
taste."
if
it
this notion of a
that
it
fails
to
Common Good
simply a truism,
is
Two
if
readily suggest
them-
7, 10.
s 2
276
F.
The contrary
(1)
viduals
SHIELDS.
K.
belief
is conflicting.
(2) Confusion
saying (a)
the
of
The Good
is
common, and
1.
(b)
Whatever
that
there
is, is
right.
conflict
is
and
"
"
good and interest," or if the phrase is preferred between
real and apparent good, a distinction which the individual, at
by some at
least of those
who
interpret the
divergent opinions
way (e.g., Bradley and
though it is obvious that our pleasures and personal
in
of
Taylor)
this
preferences
whole
it
sometimes
called, his
recognisable
"
true
And
whether or not
you."
whether
it
if
distinguishable
it
"
is
be an
it
the point
is
from
simply good,"
also appears
"
good
me may
If
").
preference
interest
as such (I do
for
it
me "
of its effect
pleasure
remains
good
everyone concerned,
i.e.,
is
common
all,
good.
so,
for
on you and
consideration in
important prior
good or not but this does not in the
that, if
"
or
or
deciding
least affect
for
it is
good
The
difficulty
277
would be
discrepancy.
and altruism,
partly,
upon
self-realisation
this confusion of
"
interest
"
and
"
good."
I fully
self-realisation
and
self-sacrifice
may
may
be
essentially opposed
Self-
realisation
and
objects, apart
an unfortunate term, as
wrong side from the beginning.
is
it
self
puts
both
may
We may
its
individuals any
embodiment
of the
community
Common Good
is
of the latter.
* F. H.
Bradley, Appearance and Reality,
p. 421.
278
F.
There
3.
SHIELDS.
H.
is,
is
by
conflicting:
this
is
it
may
be
realisation of
and negation
Who
ethics.
have chosen
to be teachers of
might
possible to all
men
"
which
in
attitude
best-of-all-possible-worlds
human
Philosophy
of
\Ye
"
many members
all
things were
and in the notorious absence
at all times,
we may
of such a paradise
the
existence
finite
fields of activity
this Society
of
but after
Any
all
we
candid observer of
recognises
realisable at
the individual
is
we
concerned,
are
all
his
thereupon proceed
deny that
to
there
is
some
but
of
number
when
There
is
Why
should
we
forsake this
no
difference
in
principle
is
all.
That
my own
more
complex, that
Good
it is
everyone concerned
and
among
possible goods,
(&)
among
good that
"
conpossibility."
is
279
less, or
any activity or development whatdoes not lessen the cogency of the Common Good
an inevitable condition
ever
but
it
of
rather,
thereto
that
is,
Common
its
is
acceptance,
Good.
II.
1.
is
Common Good
that
is,
of
Logically, however,
The principle
as futile,
if
of the
not
much
worse,
if it
be rightly dismissed
necessarily led us to defend any
ment,
also,
rest to
factory, say, to
the criterion of a
so-called goods
shams,
On
if
is
any
Common Good
may
If
"
e.g.,
is
good
of
is
can
280
F.
R.
by
SHIELDS.
Philistines
abusus non
tollit
of a
of
such a
Common Good
is
the
An
principle
when
it
is
said,
e.g.,
may
that
be brought against
it
would lead
to a
There
is
and wrong.
would
But
this
of
will vary
predict
it
least be
common.
It
is
perfectly conceivable,
e.g.,
it will
at
that under
Common Good
(though this
itself is
281
III.
should be made.
An
objection
may
be
made by
those who,
demonstration (even
lies in
that
if
is
plain),
Common Good
human
The
beings.
and gradually.
good
in a limited sense,
common
i.e.,
There
is
there are
interests
own
At
The
the
existence
of
aims
"
and
possibility of a
to efforts
which
Common
of
Good,
Mind, in
endeavour.
given to such effort by the explicit recognition of its underBut these facts do not appear to have any
lying principle.
particular relevancy
when we
p. 288.
282
SHIELDS.
R.
F.
Common
though
and
Common Good
the
reflection
Good, even
"
idea itself
tively
restricted
When
motive,
we may
naturally
hope
Common
to
see
Good,
greatly
i.e.,
increased
will
Good
its
character because
men may
IV.
The principle
Common Good
is
by no means'
it
is
slight, as
difficult, if
of
and that
to
be a
we
is
Cf.
Prolegomena
though, he adds,
to Ethics,
206-217.
"
it
brings
me
a certain
way towards
283
it."*
of importance.
is
At
of all its
it is
little
good as well as of
of
evil, as
our whole
is,
life,,
as
as a rule,
no
so on
" Gift
upon
gift,
it
is
common
lot,
and there
it
is
much
and
injustice
if
the good as well as the bad, for the attempt would soon show
him the
On
futility of the
assumption which
may
is implied in it.
be physical in its imme-
bare fact
far
beyond demonstration
of fact.
of
vening of
made
consciousness
upon the
enumeration
of
* The Ethics
of
the
T.
conditions
facts,
described
needed
for
J.
by Eoyce in his
any community.
Martineau,
p. 56.
284
"
of deeds
life
SHIELDS.
R.
F.
co-operation."
this
"
community," he
of the
says,
consists
we perform
its
together, this
its order, its
sequence,
results of
work
of
sense
my own
ours, its
life
past, its
enter into
all these
future,
my
life,
writ large."*
V.
show,
it
in
toto,
when
lead
it
comes
be,
to
practical
is criticised
sometimes leads to
it
wherever
On
application.
it
the
unexpected
may
the one
on the
it
may
other,
it fails to settle
every concrete problem on the spot.
been already admitted that it may sometimes furnish
no more than a negative criterion, i.e., what is not common is
because
It has
and such a
Again,
that
it
the
Home
man
embodiment
of
an admitted
to devise a
scheme that
ii,
82, 85.
285
alone.
Again, take the case of industrial
out of ten, to judge by their words, seem to
take for granted that there is a radical opposition between the
Whether that is true or not
interests of Capital and Labour.
of party politics
unrest: nine
is
men
Common Good
it
does not
"
armaments among
civilised nations.
and
it
further to be
is
more nations
is
no proof
the
of
unreality of their
all, it
...
any
still
Common
difficult to
If good is to
can hardly be relevant who is going to enjoy
It is indeed so evident that it is better to secure
be pursued at
the good
is
A than
more evident
It is equally irrelevant
it is
hard to
*
by which to prove this."
and B happen to be nations
principle
whether
or individuals.
And
is
Good
individuals
may
for
an appointment.
is
Do
equally good
mean
for
to
say,
you
the ninety-nine
286
F.
SHIELDS.
E.
case, be
any particular
described as
I
"
do
though
equally bad
it
may,
"
;
but
appointment
good (and my principle says
nothing as to that matter of fact), it is good for all. Take
another example two men are in love with the same woman
is
one
is
no
suitor suffer
loss
even though this common good does not exclude the sense of
Such a result only appears paradoxical if we are deter-
loss.
mined
to define the
Good
VI.
1.
were a more or
conceived in
if
the notion of a
Common Good
less
its
the view that denies any such obvious character to the principle
and believes that there is no essential oneness between the
good of
my
Common
as
"
"
community
or unity of selves
is
"
there
is
as
much
impenetrability
of
selves
or
persons
if
spatial
metaphors
the truth.
to
show,
think,
that
the
own development
capacity
for,
will
and
not
feeling
fail
of,
287
fulness of life
we
of personality, until
between
antithesis
common
the
'
go out beyond
found in a vicarious extension
learn to
cease to be cramped
and
self
'
'
not-self
"
by
which
the crude
should be
it
some degree
There
is
no need
its
common
experience of
receive
is
'
proper insignificance."*
as
we
ourselves as
less,
all
less
Dr. Eashdall.
When,
e.g.,
is
impossible
to
purposes)
practical
different
distinguishable from
still
last
of
numerically
number
to be
at
but there
all,
persons,
his good,"f
is
is
it
good is
becomes
taken as the
discussing
this difference
if
my
that
relevant in
and that
we must add
of love
of
difference
that
is
supposed
the
the
falls
to
most
of us are
this is
we have
experienced
288
in
F.
SHIELDS.
R.
feel
to be
R. L. Nettleship's supposition
"
for a
Suppose
moment
for
that
human
....
best
'
'
love
Then go
the
energy in
consciousness.
would be one
all,
in
in
'
'
'
it
state,
individuals
'
at
means exclusion
individuality
consciousness
common
'
of
'
another
which
was
also
'
'
oneself
consciousness."*
or in
is
to
and
make
is
it
clear
implications.
as Sidgwick suggests
sphere
In any case,
Ethics the
common
psychological
may
the
is
what
it
may seem
on
finds verification
and self-centredness
Common Good
they are by no
finite to
and that
Self-assertion
lines also.
(which
self-transcendence
"
is
a proof of
this.
of
the
Instead of the
hard and fast lines which have come into our mental picture
*
Philosophical Remains,
i,
42.
of
289
"
individuals,
we come
is
to perceive that
continuous
the
perished, and
in
some
is
the whole."*
3.
To sum up
Good implies a
Good, whatever
the
is
relation
which
on the
level of
Common
is
be
the
particular
Common
everyday experience.
This
always manifest
last, however, need
Good
may
without
it,
The
life is lived.
itself
need
principle of the
Common
but
metaphysical justification
is incoherent and illogical.
is
an ultimate reality
as
of the
new
life,
new
which
*
Bosanquet, The Principle, of Individuality and Value, pp. 21, 22.
t See The Problem of Christianity, especially vol. i, Lect. vii ; vol.
Lect. x.
ii,
290
exist for
of all
many
mankind
It
"
is
to be the
community
one
it
is
skilful in
infinite
realm of bare
and
of joy
faithful
community
of
all
." (i,
345).
291
X.
PHILOSOPHERS.
By DAVID MORRISON.
the methodical record of public events, the study of
the growth of nations and of the whole course of human affairs.
The business philosophy has with it is to determine the purely
HISTORY
is
nounce his
final
Human
judgment on history
With
Can
part.
round in
It is
which have
sufficed
inanimate nature
the
or, if
As
process is evident.
says, the two forms of determination which
interpretation
Professor
we may
Ward
by principles
for
contrast in a
historical
of
man
saying that he
is
determined to face
the wind, and in his saying that the direction in which the dust
blows is determined by the direction 'of the wind, are distinctly
different.
The
categories of
latter form,
implying in the
himself acting, as
Man
it
292
DAVIL) MOKIUSON.
may
an
Is this
final causes.
not have a
world as a whole
the
illusion
final
or, if
cause
to
entirely subordinated ?
cannot
evade
the question whether
of
thus
philosophy
history
the world as a whole. is to be explained in terms of purpose
or not.
cause.
If
it
exhibits
is
it is,
But,
if
one we can scarcely formulate, because we must be imperfectly conscious of it, and the human purposes subordinated to
it is
Man's
completely transmuted by it.
activities, often fully conscious and rational within their own
sphere, may be, with regard to this wider sphere, much on
it
are
also
possibly
means
to ends
of
In any consideration
of .final
why
cause
Men may
history
we
it.
are
most
causality applicable to
use of
scientific
we
find that in
the principle
investigations,
of
having
with
human
causes,
unless
individual activity as a
fact.
it
can
admit
spontaneity or
the question,
Are
strictly
of history strongly
we mean by the
evolutionary character
293
everyone
evolution
who
means a very
but
as
different
you
thing according
the appearance of a timeless reality, most
completely revealed where the consciousness of man attains
understand by
maximum
its
it
of
artistic,
new
properties in the
is
whole which
its
constituents in their
If time is unreal
may
indeed
time
is real
the end
is
way
other.
Now
and that
to
some people
philosophy of history
may
be
somewhat
differently
if
we regard
it
But
as the record of
an actual
and
it
must be considered.
294
DAVID MORRISON.
If history
becoming which
is
unrepeatable,
end
it
cannot be possible to
is
himself
time and of
is
human achievements
their record
of the good, he
human
as
may
of its probable
line of development.
proceed?
what he
likes.
One may
mean
that he can
make
of
relate history to
just
any particular
centre of conscious experience, but, as related to some centres,
295
an immediate copy
theoretical
certain
man
we know
that this
is
not
of a philosophy of history
arrangement
The
so.
is
of his materials,
historian
constitutes
the
real
history, each
of
unity
relatively
it
But as
materialism
the greater
historical
what may
historical
relate
human
highest
fact
to
experience.
and
the
be
to
picture
constructive one-sidedness.
alone
it
unified
Thus
for
Dr.
best
called
It seeks
be
the
Bosanquet, the
the school of
exponent
perhaps
wish
of
to
"the
test
a
indicate,
thought
philosophy in
dealing with historical progress is to reconcile the sense of
latest
of
creative
achievement in the
and
with
self
is
not
its
recognition and
won by
its
own
finite
of social service."
If I dissent
from the
somewhat arbitrary
too
many
so to regard.
part, but,
if
It
may
if
my
by some of these
don't take it to be more
DAVID MORKISON.
296
real than it
may
is,
be pure
consideration,
and it
I do not know where to draw the line
human weakness on my part which merits no
but I value human beings too highly to feel
;
and importance
in reality.
Now
symbol.
to
reason of
the
am
philosophy of history I
all
which the
this
"
probably increase
our grasp of the whole both in practice and theory and aid us
in a profound and considerable transvaluation of values, but
what
what alone
really matters,
conceivably have to
harmony
of
finite
Bosanquet
offer,
says,
in the
existence,
a profounder
sense
of
the
And
itself
won by
sad experience of
its failures,
consciousness which
relation to
no
what
is
aware
of that insignificance
makes
in truth
life
In so far as
and imperfection
it
its
"
worth
confidence
of its
There
is
which has
and
"
living."
of
297
human
dissatisfaction
that a world
is
feel
To say
compelled to dissent.
who
it is
in logical
he has
realises that
on one level
treat as
by
When we
it is
ask
"
"
why
such a theory
tell
"
us
how," but
may
of
it
all
of
continue to speak of
an answer
"
the
to
why
"
it
it
This
we ought
to
as rational.
it
the conservation
that
"
may
satisfy some,
but
it
cannot satisfy
of
worth and
we must
to discover final
depend on such.
question in
We
find a frankly
Lotze's Microcosmus.
we seek
actions
human treatment
of the
who
whom
it."
"
this
If
personal
life
somewhat
"
bold),
since
co-operate in helping
itself
and
for us, or
transitoriness,
we could
we should
human
discover no obligation to
DAVID MORRISON.
298
we
have,
"
he
breath,"
which though
superstition
we
says,
so
calm
shall
is
strive
itself
this
against
thinking of
facts,
importance only
which
it
When
remains ignorant.
passion of
human
it
and
life
man
end
the universe.
of
And
as
therefore
we always combat
will
into
the
bliss
and
of
all
these
despair, the
out-
worth
admiration
and
"
And
the
yet,"
love
wholly in vain.
For those
whom we
in the world
main
right.
To discover
human
purpose,
may
be
is
meaning
of
human
the same
intelligible, it
as
is,
it is
man
way
299
in
which
history.
am
we must make
a priori
as the historical
The great
history
we must,
as
far
as
is
a relative identity
possible,
to
try
understand as
we
The
bring to
souls
them
of
self.
We
processes because our own is, and facts are naturally best
understood where they emanate from a definite character.
principles according to which we proceed in dealing with
a group seem to require fuller explanation.
unity has to
The
constructed average
of
type,
its
or,
leaders, at
of the
majority.
the eking
again,
another those of a
those
experience.
but
is
Certain of
may
be
upon psychological
our experiences, though they are ours,
certainly dependent
to us not
historical
so
is
historical
it asks, the
significance it elicits, the fashioning of
the past to a something which is worth our present while.
The material is in the last degree complex, and of it historical
questions
we do not have
identical
DAVID MORRISON.
300
repetitions in history,
tion
of
principle
if
we
of
causation
applicable
to
individual
The concept
of progress
is
also
we
this
as in itself
an
amount
of socialistic legislation
people.
The concept
is
progress
is
at
least
formally
forms that
it
even
if
But
for progress.
is
if
necessarily change,
change.
301
of
who deny
endeavour" (the
the reality of
of
himself in achievement)
the finite
"
is," says
"
Dr. Bosanquet, whether or no the finite being recognises, it
may be implicitly or explicitly, the full significance of his own
nature.
And
being, whose
is
'
duration
'
or
that
spiritual
certain
periods
attainment.
are to continue to
talk
Most people
of progress
would demand,
in
if
we
is
being
knowledge there
is
It
may
for
to shake,
302
DAVID MORRISON.
Greek
but
civilisation
it
may
embodied
be that
all
much was
which are
cities of
that
was
of
worth in Cretan,
of greatness
which
clearly once was, but which, so far as our knowledge goes, led
to nothing.
Here I should like to say that I protest against
history being taken in a narrow sense, as when one hears that
certain
Much
historical
development.
of this
is
may come
Man
germ
human
idea that
human
according
to
race, giving
perhaps the
history
which
historical
in deliverance
human
303
elevation
human
whole
of the
realised
become
feelings
of
that
had
intelligence
clearer,
finer
beautiful.
To
this conviction
Condorcet gave
mankind.
connexion
for
his
and likeness
to
God.
Kant
for
him a postulate
must be the
to
free
man from
the
mechanism
and
of nature
It
development
its final
object
DAVID MORRISON.
304
common
spirit
had
ideas
The leading
still,
course,
concepts of value
of spirit, that is
of
personality,
Such an
ideal
historico-philosophical
associated
of
the
realised itself as
consideration in history.
of
moment and
Their
influence.
highest
moment even
to those
and
who
this
may
appear an important
may
Many
if
way
of seeking
were universal.
Against
protest, because
this
full
be said that
all
men mark
is
not the
In general
it
may
and
life.
it
somehow
305
who compose
It is for
it.
final
beyond itself,
end of the individuals
lie
personal being
means but
How
so placed
is
our
bewildering mass of
and popular belief ?
The
"
effectually
not only a
is
with
the
Unsatisfactorily, I
inheritors of the
more
also at the
does
is
venture to
think.
thirled," as the
now
physic of history
may
However much
a meta-
its
deepest
for
man
knowledge
but
of events.
many
minds, ready
enough
to
it
is
is
the final
to be said,
300
DAVID MORRISON.
much
as a whole, not so
scorn.
they have
away from
passed
away
we
us, thougli
them
of history affects
entitles us to speak of
he says, " cannot be a
too,
seems
of reality slipping
on
efforts
its
may
There is this
voicing the pretty general feeling of mankind.
peculiarity about the value acquired by a human experient
that, if it is ever lost
is
hard to see
how
It looks as
valuable.
somehow
as a
doctrine
of
by the extinction
its
of that experient, it
it
to the words,
realised
in
comments
Here,
I think,
of
being,"
on
which he
to be assured of
its
fundamental interests
belonged to
its
a proper existence."
On
this I
more
307
we do
may still
lies
as
comprehending in
capable of
becoming
itself
but
the
human
it is
spirit
and
all
that
it is
a personality.
If the words concrete and
abstract
were
not
already
In any picture
abstract object.
point
of
because
contact with
of the
the individual
all scientific
is
experient is lacking,
a defective instrument for
investigation
dealing with the personal, the supreme synthetic sphere. The
world which is presented in laws and rules of scientific experience
is
not on a level with the varied world of such concrete experThere are in human individuality those two aspects by
ience.
which we view
all protests that
it
as a
member
of society or as a
microcosm, and
still
and concrete.
politics, industry,
science,
U 2
of
308
DAVID MOERISON.
its significance
would defy
classification."
many
self,
and
we
it is
And
such individuals
see going
on in history
but also, and
mean
up and out
That
is,
In this world he
there
is
increase of
Ward
says, dis-
of
the effort
human
of
it
the whole
to
sustain
itself,
it
seems
striving.
In the
Bergson summed
man may
309
over which' has 'been sent the message of which the separate
call human personality.
According to
has
which
Professor
Seth
given of these
summary
to
M. Bergson considers the modern doctrine of personbe a form of Neoplatonisrn, weakened by the attempt
agent to failure
which
time
is
for it
the
is
and therefore
It
regards all
of incompleteness.
All this
sphere of multiplicity.
is,
in
M. Bergson's opinion, a mistake, because the traditional philosophy of time is mistaken, and the application of this view of
time so
as
to
analyse
the
unity of
personality
and misleading.
The
life of
personality
is
is
into
the
artificial
an unbroken and
two
Personality has
aspects,
memory aud
phase.
ality
which
life.
activity
an element
of
in a
personality
new and
is
larger
creative,
we
do not
know how
fit
that he
is
to the
importance of this
DAVID MORRISON.
310
as
if
we were
is
spending
itself
rather
hopelessly and blindly, and which might, apparently, be overthrown by its own creation. He spoke, indeed, of the
possibility of its
as
but we had no
to realise
His subsequent
and
of
this.
guarantee
promise
Lectures will make his attitude on these questions
At all events, the problem whether philosophy can
life
if
very sure
Gifford
clearer.
which
round
gather
If it cannot, is
important one.
everything except
its
its
We
in opposition to
a 'whole..
from
may
all
discord
realm of
possession
of
separate
centre
of
consciousness,
and
in
ultimate
these
311
For
sciousness.
characteristic,
not
it
know
knows
one
has
undeniable
things in the
my
consciousness
infinite
it is
way
difficulty, for
example,
If
know it, as I
solution. I mean that
can never
it
its
know s.
r
to prove the
an argument here
the finite and infinite
is
consciousnesses.
consciousness
is
real,
endeavour taking
human
But if we
the problem of
place
in
finite
regard conscious
a real factor
centres as
finite
in
Professor
Ward
with
its
fine insight
conclusion
is
creation
reached by a writer
of before long, I
as it unfolds
solution seems to
spoken
from within
it
new meaning
mean
who
Varisco.
certain to be
To
more
En passant
has a large measure
of popularity at present, would agree with those who regard
meaning and worth as raised above time, but, as I understand
known than
I
as eternally realised.
is
being
who
fashioned
construction of which
all
DAVID MORRISON.
312
The whole
spiritual
higher, and
revealed.
nature of
has
to
mere time
to
Spiritual
life
into
conditions, stretches
Man
sion.
man
is
itself
raising
in
of
stage
is
being
truth
and posses-
nature or with
all
his equipments,
of
is
To turn
to Varisco
and
were
life.
on causality.
logical relations of
ground
to
to the subject's
absolutely
new
beginnings.
the subject
may
logical relation.
common
If
which
of
we suppose
Being is our
other notions are determina-
that
all
the
concrete
realities
of
the
be,
by logically
moment
in its history
encing subjects,
it
human
At any
societies, and,
313
to
all
preserved,
nor created.
the
conservation
desire
for
achieved
or
them
regard
these
selfish
and
be measured by
would be neither
as
he
value
has
individualistic.
consciously
condemned
sufficiently
by
Does
experience
reveal values which are not mere instruments of timeless
calling
and remain
necessity,
and which,
essential
to be
from those
characteristics differing
The
respect to itself.
own
personality
if its
activity
an
The
had not
of physical reality,
no value except
who
values, require as
of
which
a value of physical
reality
with
no value
The value
the
of
subject
is
and
developed in a
field
The
precise determination.
ness of
What
its
is
value in
"
its relations
"
to escape
"
many
of
which might be
"
whole.
to
the
"
"
to attain
is there in facts a non-logical indeterministic element, a spontaneity without which there would be
absolutely rigorous, or
no happening
it is
314
DAVID MORRISON.
Are such
is it
Is not
by
logical relation,
is
determined
into
itself
centres
of
to
spontaneous happening?
recognise an
undoubtedly
considered in
all-inclusive
its
it.
The universe
The spontaneity
interference
biological
first
external
not
much more
"I"
realises
it,
it
is
315
presupposes the
activity and rationality of Being, but organises these in a
"
The " I can form and develop
peculiar unity of consciousness.
itself
It
ever,
of,
of life
Being
through which we have run?
potentially contains everything, but potentiality is not actualisacourse of evolution
tion.
happening which
is
Certainly my personal
of a particular person
But, to conclude from this that persons qua persons can
all
vanish.
myself.
and not
Every person
to
be
constituted
requires
the
particular
of
of
To
that
an end,
to.
It
concept
Being transforms itself into that of God.
remains to be known if the Divine exists only as immanent
of
in
things,
or
whether
it
is
not a unity
of
consciousness
316
DAVJD MORRISON.
No
would
one
is
man
cannot
And
help asking.
yet he asks vaguely and contents himself
with vague answers but, we must insist, if values are not
A reality in which values
permanent they do not exist.
;
arise
must possess
demand
unable to be
lasting
satisfied,
harmony
conscious
of
would
values,
be a failure.
permanence.
So
far Varisco.
relation of
to the reality of
as
possibilities,
the
relation
of
Ward
We
scientific
picture, as
if
science.
The
of
problem
Mr. Russell considers mainly
all
free
illusory,
part
it is
that the
"
317
our belief
is
not
it is teleological.
system of
whether or how
far
is
teleological
cannot
to be not mechanical.
what
it
will be.
is
is
determined quite
have no
be
difficulty in
present
volitional experience
mined
by
and
all
in a sense
that that
it
who
We
which seems
to
many people
objectionable
mean
is,
There
it
is,
law of
contradiction.
may
be,
susceptible
make
Mr. Russell
of
material
is,
all volitions
determinants
also
susceptible
is
of
mental
318
dislike
DAVID MORRISON.
the view that volitions are mechanically determined
Determinism does not imply that actions are
are fallacious.
for
question
some of us
it
processes
feel
known
in physics
may
is
altered
the stimulus."
And
this
similar
in
the
mechanical
world, and
the
"
power
nothing
of
the
"
The so-called material
the formation of something new."
"
continuity of life may," Dr. Driesch says, mean simply that
of
matter,
certain
material systems
it
319
time as
If in
if
it
manifoldness,
if,
that
is,
number
the
of
among
things
present,
second state than in the first, and if we
is
we
becoming
the
teleological
in
the
that this
are obliged
We
greater
know
to
introduce non-
name
'
'
kinds of
different
'
'
the
relations
may
of
The word
unifying
causality.
be used whenever a result that is a whole
is
by
life
this phrase
which
supposed to furnish us
with a symbol of everything that there is. It would be strange
if there were one order with regard to spatial reality and yet
knowledge
of spatial reality,
is
we could
320
of
DAVID MOKRISON.
what
to
attribute to reality."
are
little
these
to enforce
to
something
be indifferent.
I have said
questions merely fanciful ?
the significance of feeling, because that is
of value
feeling.
The
distinction of selves
is
to give to
his love of
if
Again,
experience.
addition to wholeness
am
is
to
as another's
show that
selves
expression of the
and not as
his
harmony
am
if
unconscious
still
I believe
of myself
happiness
with other
it
We
the
goodness
of
the
world, but
and
if
we
cannot afford to
to the final
end
of the
be
world
bad,
and the
But
world
feet
no light
the
it
is
321
of that
322
FEEEDOM.
XI.
By
S.
ALEXANDER.
CONTENTS.
PAGE.
322
2.
Enjoyed Determination
Freedom and Time
3.
Causality in
4.
5.
Kejected Criteria
6.
Freedom
1.
in
329
336
342
349
351
Mind
of
general.
determination
in
which
both
determination
is
it
the
effect,
that species of
determiner
are
enjoyed.
comprehends
all
and
the
Contem-
both events
instances of causal
as merely objects of
tioned,
of the relation of
determina-
One variety of
this is illustrated by the determination of bodily movement by
a mental state, as when anger determines a blow (I do not now
mean the perception of the blow). The other variety is the
determination of a mental state by a physical event, as when
tion
is
me
323
FREEDOM.
on
my
body makes
me
feel
it.
effect
contemplated, I
determination in enjoyment
or enjoyed determination, in the special sense assigned to those
words, is of the same sort as the familiar doctrine that freedom
is
to translate
is
is
more
All that
general.
it
self-determination, though
does
is
make
clearer
it verifies
what self-determination
the
significance of the
let
will
it
justified,
it
If
if it
be
some
to
common
We
free to
we
not, or to direct
of
compulsion
respect
extreme, in willing freely,
our
we
We
are
passive
At
sensations.
or
under
the
other
an idea realises
enjoyment
itself.
The consciousness
of the passage of
irrelevant of
Hume
an idea into
to object that
of willing is the
we do not know a
willing
and
fact,
it
great
was
many
awareness of
"
Cp.
Section
7,
Cognitive Relation,
x 2
324
S.
ALEXANDER.
The
from those
of willing
is
mental
real nature
of internal willing
an external action.
I will to strike a
him
But
it
than
clear in
is
This continuous
freely.
enjoyment
is
prolonged
into
the
act of striking.
unaware of the
is
effected
concerned not
Willing
we may
is
feel free.
instinctive processes,
what we
or in
the same
call
way we
pulsion, as when, to
of Jowett's,
we
325
FREEDOM.
same
Here the
might have come into play and did not. But there are
An unaccountable outcases which do not concern the will.
will
makes us
because of
There are
the
also
Thus a
partly constrained.
action
far as it
free so
is
determination, but
which we
feel unfree,
it
is
feel ourselves
Even
so far, unfree.
follows the
also
of mental preexternal
objects to
by
line
guided
compelled to adapt ourselves, and
are,
we
are
and, so
far,
imagination
is
when
own,
which
just
most truly
is
most conforms
it
As we
like perception.
to
grow,
we
free
the lesson
verisimilitude
as
in
freedom
conduct
consists
restraint, so that
in
we
find
we grow
as
recognition
and welcoming
of
that our
highest
of lawful
our selves
we
act
where we yield
actions
We
any
sort
and do
willed.
feel
but free so far as the act issues from our intention, however
formed. In all these cases the experience of unfreedom is
compatible with
responsibility,
freedom, and
drunkard may do
consciousness of
tinguished.
and
the
two
responsibility,
in a
fit
of
questions,
of
are to be dis-
drunkenness an act
which he
of
unaware
feels himself
the man's
own
the victim.
326
S.
On
ment.
the
ALEXANDER.
other hand,
there
be cases where, as
may
first
may
really
Thus
outcome
we
feel free
on examination.
of ideas seems, as
we
say, mechanical.
it
room
may
or in James's case of a
to
intrinsic connection
and so the apprehension of A leads on to the apprehension of B, but there is no development of B from A, so that
together,
on
it.
* In Ethical
am
327
FREEDOM.
mind
into the
inspiration,
From one
tioned before.
men-
under
Thus
upon him.
such
is
It
may happen
and
is
hand these
facts are
On
it
the other
freedom but
of freedom.
But
this
must
What
is
meant
was a
'
that there
is
me
not-herself
'
must be something
in the person to
own
although she always knew they had sooner or later to come together she
kept the idea resolutely out of her mind until Dorothea was in
Rosamond's drawing room. Then abandoning herself to the inspiration
of the moment, she wrote the whole scene exactly as it stands, without
alteration or erasure, in an intense state of excitement and agitation,
"
feeling herself entirely possessed by the feelings of the two women
(Life
and
Letters,
by
J.
W.
Cross, vol.
iii,
p. 424).
328
S.
ALEXANDER.
But
easy enough by a
counter theory to urge that these unexplained resources are to
be found in elements of the man's whole nature, including his
it
is
unfreedom, which
of
is
is justified.
actually has,
to
be found in
of freedom.
The
feel ourselves
keener
the
states
is
freedom
in
of ideas
the end
is
the self
For goodness
bad one.
of
all
sides
elements
all
of
is
human
included
development
its
is
in
which
it is
329
FKEEDOM.
passions.
earlier life of
and
dispositions.
2.
If
is nothing
but determination or causality in enjoyment and in no wise
ments
is
fullest,
But we must
determinant.
not, because
we
is
the enjoyed
M. Bergson.
and since
it
whole
* Franklin's
explanation
of the self."+
At
the
it
same
"
and habit
is
"
(Autobiography, ed. Bigelow, New York, 1909, p. 207). The phrase free
and easy" was generally used at that time to mean well-bred and elegant
"
ease of manner, and it implied merit.
Lady Darnford also made me a
"
fine compliment," writes Pamela on
Sunday the 4th day of my
"
and said I looked freer and easier every time she saw me "
happiness,"
cit.,
p.
165 (Donnees,
p. 127).
6,
1908, p. 132).
330
ALEXANDER.
S.
freer the
series
with which
it is
connected
Now
superficially it is sufficient, in
answer
to
such attempt
too,
is
the
body.
M. Bergson
it
is
to.
mistake the
is
him
to
am
respect
is
it
at
the
time.
Now
two
things
have
cit.,
p.
167 (Donne'es,
p. 128).
and physical
when
FREEDOM.
of mental process.
The agglutinative
331
or associationist view of
mental continuity
and,
secondly,
by the notion
association
illustration of the
has been
working of
merely routine
It by no
operation of such general principle of mental life.
means follows that in order to dethrone associationisrn we
to M. Bergson's extremes.
It may well be the case
that mental states are continuous, without recourse to the
must go
is
from
different
in this paper.
But
I shall
try to show,
first
that there
is
First, the
alleged difference
tilings that in
is
its traces in
the
of penetration implies
more than
this,
namely
the past
is
M. Bergson's
For it is commonly
doctrine, but independently.
held that in order to have experience of the past, that past
must be somehow contained in the present experience. This
in keeping with the notion of
is
course useful,
if it
This notion
we
is of
call the
332
S.
ALEXANDER.
present
mean
not only the real present but also the real immediately past
that duration is in fact experienced independently
future
:
succession, as
present.
and with
past,
if
my
act of
memory.
It
is
somehow
present.
of
tl
I pi
fallacy.
The looker-on
as
it
may
sees
th<
tin
is enjoyed as present
* In British Journal
u
of Psychology, iv, 1911, Conational Psychology/
9, note, pp. 2602, I have written on the memory of oneself
being concerned with trying to explain what is meant by remembering
But although I there speak of
enjoying a past state of myself with tht
mark of the past on it, I do not think that I understood clearly at tht
time what I am
So far as some of the
endeavouring to say now.
expressions there used might imply that a remembered condition oi
myself was enjoyed in the present, I now think them erroneous.
Section
FREEDOM.
as the point of reference,
present but
is
.the
remembered
the
experience of
remembering.
it
object
is
enjoyed as
for
of
Hence, just as
remembered object
is
and
enjoyment
333
it
is
enjoyment
is
to his past.
that
is
for
and I
am
it is
in a certain sense,
As
in
may be noticed in
memory we enjoy the
it
experient himself
it is
future.
This
is,
" The
* I have not thus
supposed with Mr. Russell, in his paper on
"
Philosophy of Bergson (Monist, 1912, and published separately for the
"
Heretics," Cambridge, 1914), that M. Bergson has confused the act of
remembering with the object remembered. My point is rather that the
act of remembering is for the rememberer himself not present, but past.
I may refer to a paper of Miss Costelloe in criticism of Mr. Russell
(Monist, Jan., 1914), which I have seen since writing this paper, and
which seems to me to help much towards an understanding of
M. Bergson's actual meaning. She writes: "The truth seems to be that
Bergson
is
so
much
334
S.
ALEXANDER.
in
to be
added
(1)
later.*
(2)
For the
experient himself, the past does leave traces in the present, and
these effects of the past are conserved in the present and
modify the present mental behaviour as enjoyed. The simplest
case of this
enjoyments
is
are qualified
experience
perceiving,
with a meaning.
we may have
at
all.
Now
let us
is
inclination
is
fresh shock.
a factor of
the
to
falls.
the old nursery song says " When the bough bends the
cradle will rock, when the bough breaks the cradle will fall."
As
Such
is
plating mind.
p. 336.
Supposing
it
335
FREEDOM.
memory
of the dislocation
which
we
in attributing
memory
to the tower, it
would
it
still
would
memory
be true that
still
not be
Thus
it is
is
in the
effects,
inanimate and
still
more
to
it
Thus
it
may
is
rightly stated,
it
must be accepted
for
what
We
we
are
com-
But
it
is
only
when
existence
is
if
we must use
including the
past.
Whatever
336
ALEXANDER.
S.
My
only regret
that he should
is
come now
which
illustrates the
is
is for
may
contemporaneous with
my
present.
pose here to enter into fundamentals. But what the fact appears
to me to mean is that time may come back to its old place. My
past experience occupied a certain place in my brain. When I
remember my past that same tract of my brain is occupied. The
it
or which
it
occupies,
and
there.
3.
Causality in Mind.
what
sense.
of causality is applicable to
mind
at
all,
applicable in
Clearly in order to maintain the first half of this answer,
is
and
it is
The problem
337
FREEDOM.
is
is
physical or mental,
way
is
The
latest
do not propose
to
do more than
this.
is
unavoidable.
But
One preliminary obstacle, however, may be removed. Causality does not mean primarily that the same causes are followed
by the same effects.
causes were repeated
It
it
causal laws.
precisely
makes
causality, but
if
iii,
338
S.
ALEXANDER.
symptom
essence.
Nor
as a matter of
method
and not
its
of causality
is it
is
an
evil
legacy from the spell which was cast by Hume upon philosophy.
In the next place, we are not so much concerned with
causes and effects as with relation between them, the situation
into
Any
And
method
them
much
is
so to limit
as
fits it
them
effect
purge
"
means that
if
and so that
one term
is
is
transformation
the passage
in the
The
ball
and
movements
they
(for
of
my
systems.
are
Causal relations
modifications
system
in
the
of
of
is
replaced continuously
end of the continuum
movements
in
another
part.
Two
implications
of
this
statement
need
to
be noted.
(1) Thus described, the fact of causality might give and has
given rise to the notion that cause and effect are identical. But
they are two configurations of motion which are distinct, and if
* Mr.
Bosanquet's phrase.
339
FREEDOM.
they are identical that is an accident. The rain which wets the
ground is, to give an example of Hegel's, the same rain as is in
the wet ground. But this is only a special case. And even here
the raindrops are differently distributed in the ground and when
they
There
fall.
is,
first
group
of
motion
the
motions
is
not
causal relation
is
and
to urge, as has
is
must have
in
it
proposed, that the future, in the sense of the actual future event,
a cause of the present,* though there is a sense in which the
is
* This is an
important and difficult matter, which I can treat only
The contemplated series calls for little remark. The past event
A causes the present event B and the present B causes the future event C.
We cannot say that causes B as if the future drew the present to itself.
On the other hand, in enjoyment, the future is causal. For example, in
briefly.
which
is not yet
it is the idea of the future.
This is
the only way in which we can enjoy the future as future.
And there is
no contradiction here with the statement that causation proceeds from
before to after. For the future as future (that is not as realised, in
is
which case
it is
present) precedes
its
own
come before
would not be
future as future, that is by
the expectation of a distant present, the transition is still from before to
after, and the future as causal drives like all causality a tergo and does
present.
future.
Thus when
am
determined by
its realisation it
my
340
ALEXANDER.
S.
may
present
past.
of the universe, it
may
relation of
if
we
At any
the
With
been
this conception
of causality, brief
and vague
as has
the exposition of
in the
same sense
to
are, first,
to
accidental connections
and second,
to define
We
It is
more
direct,
because
we
enjoy or live
causation.
But
it,
we
we only contemplate
while
this is not to
is
physical
other.
Still less
does
it
mean
is
that
or,
which
is
common
is
to both physical
like
all
* See
before, Section
and psychical.
and
categorial relations
2, p.
330.
341
FREEDOM.
that they belong both
to
the con-
mental causation
we
if
we adopt
more obvious
It is still
if
repeating
experience.
It
is,
have
It also enables
said,
the
plain
deliverance
us to understand
of
how mental
processes
ness,
At any
are enjoyed not only in time but space, are the enjoyments of
Nor do
obviously applicable.
followers
of
M. Bergson
that
this
fear
is
On
which
fact
is
that in
mind enjoys
is itself
present experience,
own
past, as past, in
342
S.
ALEXANDER.
from each
laid
which
other
is
One mental
4.
state
may
then be
which
is incompatible with
thorough determinism. But neither
such determinism incompatible with novelty. Novelty may
be understood in a less important and in a more important
is
sense.
It
may
first.
"
As a matter
of plain history,"
W. James,*
whole
'field
of
If
an activity process
and if each
is
the form
field of
consciousness,'
con-
sciousness
is
Activity-situations
original touch."
tion that
may
This amounts to
individuals, things or
particularising features
own
special
and
to the notion
* Radical
Empiricism,
p. 185, note.
343
FREEDOM.
unique because they are dyed in the total. They may receive
a new value from entry into an organic whole (to borrow an
expression from Mr. Moore), but the new character which they
thus receive does not necessarily alter their intrinsic nature.
so understood,
if
Interpenetration,
may mean
blood, or a point
denned
as the
of
is
so far unique.
it
means the
familiar
But the
combination of universals explains individuality.
means
more
this.
It
is
connected
of
free-will
than
novelty
human
human
action
determinism.
intercourse of
upon
is
We
men
is
The
partially predictable.
and
it
based
is
wholly predicted
not be sure that
for instance, if
that
can be
it
is
is
template, and
mind
of me,
is,
it
has
its
good theoretical
less a stranger.
justification.
Still it
is
true
that
my
my
action.
from the
difficulty of
be negligible, go far
344
ALEXANDER.
S.
only do so on the basis of present knowledge of human tendencies combined with tendencies suggested by the bodily
condition.
He could not foretell something out of the range of
past experience though of course after the event had happened
he could see the connection of the strange event with its
conditions, which would then be seen to have determined it.
;
the
Human
nature
time
to
if
which they
be beyond our
calculation.
However, the interest of this topic lies not so much
in recognising this possibility, as in determining the limits of
prediction, in discovering
me
refer,
may
may
illustrate
be solved.
as
We
should not
know what
we should
colours in
that which
like.
is
described
As a matter
of fact,
our thought.
We
345
FREEDOM.
I only
man may
and
conceivably see
it
by
it
thinking of it
he imagined it accidentally he
as being the shade he sought in the
;
if
him and
predicts.
Even
if
would
be, unless
Or, to
would
reject)
calculable by physical
know that this resultant process meant for the subject the
consciousness of purple, unless he knew it already, which is
"
"
supposed not to be the case. The little kink in the pattern
of a neural movement and how much it is
not
it is
new
Thus
to
an observer in France
in
the
eighteenth century
might have been plain that some
revolution and reconstruction was inevitable.
He might with
sufficient knowledge have calculated beforehand the movements
it
in
mechanical terms of
all
the
actors.
346
S.
movements meant
He would
movement
show where
will
or at
most
only predict
of
life.
its
new
appearance
third instance
it
is
prediction really
ALEXANDER.
Parliament
that his
corresponded to this
But
so
only, I imagine,
as
long
specifically
political life.
fix,
it
would
seem
that in
certain
cases
prediction
is
But
individual.
and
human
concerns.
Determinism
unpredictability;
predicter
in
a mind,
is
mind
and we
is
have seen
the
reason,
that
the
human determinism;
but
it
arises at
existence.
For instance,
cavil, life is
action.
of
FREEDOM.
347
which
of time,
In like manner
"
is mind, endowed
with a new quality which marks a new level of existence.
A person who knew only life could not predict mind, though
he might predict that combination of vital actions which has
birth."
In general,
mind.
let
life of
a certain kind
the next
higher
person on the level B could possibly predict
the whole future in terms of A but not in terms of B, e.g., if he
level.
life,
I use the
existence,
of
e.g.,
in
level
animal
existence,
life,
but within
any
level
of
amount
word possibly
time which
of
may
the
advance
It
may
be
no
Be
this
as
it
:
all,
presumed.
view we can approach the famous puzzle
of the Laplacean calculator, which is full of confusions, but
contains a truth. A person who knows the whole state of the
From
this point of
universe at any
future.
moment can
Now it is true,
calculate, so
it
urges, the
whole
348
S.
ALEXANDER.
number
of instants in
terms of space
of space
shall
it
have more than spatial and temporal ones, he cannot know unless
he knows already, or until he lives to see. He will be able to
say that this morning certain vibrations at a rate of so many
billions a second will impinge upon a certain group of motions
of a highly complicated character, but unless he
knows what
green
time at which his calculation begins, that is, on the stage which
the universe has then attained in the unfolding of its characters.
Certainly,
if
he
is
supposed
human
to
skill.
for
indicated.
If
it
reason
himself,
is
the
to
be contemplating
in
He
absurd.
of mind, he is
materials
is
is
supposed to
of being involved
of stages higher
than mind.
He
moment
it
But what
will be.
in time
will be
is
less
more
it
foretell, for
for that
still
'the
extent
mind
is
and
of the hypothesis
FREEDOM.
is
unable to predict, or
it
it is
is
Nor is
mind with God.
349
may
be
it
is
not
merely
infinite
mind,
that
is
his
if
that
what
it
will be.
And
own
is
is
one part
predict,
and
distinct ideas,
and
future.*
there
with predictability.
5.
Not only
Rejected Criteria.
is
Perhaps I
conflicts
may
with freedom
if
it
either
by Mr. Bosanquet
350
S.
But
ALEXANDER.
it
useful
by way
of
mean indetermination. When indeterminamean that free action either cannot practically
tion
is
used to
is
individuality of
practical
seen,
limits totally
own
level.
must be
rejected as untrue.
meant by
too often
is
otherwise.
Or perhaps
conscious that
been
free.
if
right,
but I
am
have
FREEDOM.
351
(3)
action.
of
it is
freedom.
The
is
which
it
recent
it
appears to
discussions
in
me
vastly
theoretical
its
bearings.
mind
some
in
exaggerated
here,
its
though
hope to revert
to it at
some future
time.
But
for
mean
the ideation of
in turn
it
stages
throughout
determined by enjoyment.
is
we have
its
ment
it) is itself
determines action.
is
vital to the
to discuss
from which
cipitates us.
moral law
human
nature.
of the intelligible
Again
this is
it
Freedom supplies
(is its
no
ratio essendi).
it
pre-
empirical mind.
Indeed, I do not
know
which in
Freedom
fact it
in
never does.
Freedom then
is
352
ALEXANDER.
S.
free.
is
When
it
is
natural action.
At
know
only
its
becomes
it falls
enjoyment and
unfree
But when
present in enjoyment.
may know
God who
that for us
also
sees
it
is
own
us
is
actions for
It acts, in the
itself.
necessity of its
own
nature.
is
Thus freedom
in general
is
the
unfreedom exists
and
are
life,
it,
The stone
but free in
is
it,
its
own
free act of
its resilience to
deformation.
Physicists
now
pleasure,
is,
than discussions
of
freedom usually
is
are.
as
Wordsworth
And
said
of
353
FREEDOM.
it
revealed to
me
my
belief in the
a carelessness and
though lamely in
"
my
answer.
have urged
paper on
that to remember an
my mind
object
the
mark
of the past,
in the
in idea with
pastness
present
is
self.
That which
is still
the
is
remembered
is
no longer an object
memory
to the past
is
now
itself
my
the object
it a,
mind
corresponding
is
part of the
enjoyment of
my
of
it,
is
no part
though
still
of the object
remembered.
is,
act
My
in other
position
is
words
it
that a
is
354
FREEDOM.
remains
but
nothing prevents
remember A,
me from
saying that I
as opposed to
now
remembering
it
or at this
five
that
moment
minutes ago,
now
or that I
is
will
it
is
me and
The
in that case
is still
constituents
indeed
the
But
in
is
called
remembering
the words
355
XII.
By
G. E.
MOORE and
1.
By
G. F. STOUT.
G. E. MOORE.
"
"
to their intrinsic
a wide
sensations."
sense,
be
called
""sensory
all of
Everybody distinguishes
these events from sensations proper and yet everybody admits
"
"
that
images
intrinsically resemble the entities which are
;
of
hallucinations,
and certain
may
be called
as
fact that
an
entity which
entity, of
is
some kind or
experienced
may
other, is experienced.
be of
many
different kinds
z 2
The
;
it
356
G.
may,
E.
MOORE.
or a taste, etc.
,yBut,
/must
I
experienced
something
we mean
else.
experiences
that
it
YWe
in
of
these
kinds;
and
is
the
which
entity
is
classes
and there
it is
In speaking, therefore,
experienced.
have
What
is
am
to discuss
so
much
"
sensibles," in
357
my
experienced at all.
In speaking of sensibles as the
sort of entities
seem
to
which are
imply that
all
And
common by entities
from one another as are patches of colour, sounds,
smells, tastes, etc.
For, so far as I can see, some non-sensory
what
so different
may
experiences
what
experienced in
is
all
them
is
different in kind
experience
thing is
may the experient. And, if this be so, it seems to compel us
to admit that the distinction between sensory and non-sensory
sensibles,
that
is
experiences
and not
vice versd.
in
all sensibles,
which
recognise, but
spite
is
of
common
some
have
them,
am
intrinsic
unanalysable
which
we
when we
call
property,
and
that,
in
is
experienced
something has this unanalysable property.
If this
be
"
the ultimate definition of " sensibles
would be merely
entities
It
and
"
which have
seems
be
may
sensibles
"
;
me
to
this
unanalysable property.
"
that the term " sense-data
correctly
used,
and everybody,
simply
I
"
given."
as
is
often used,
synonym
for
sense-data, to
discuss,
are not
so,
all
among
other
etymology
358
"
MOORE.
G. E.
"
suggests that nothing should be called a sensedatum, but what is given; so that to talk of a non-given
sense-datum would be a contradiction in terms. But, of course,
sense-data
use
correct
> "
is
etymology
of
"
is
often,
"
"
sense-data
think I might thus have used
quite correctly
"
instead of sensibles," I think the latter term is perhaps more
convenient
because, though nobody ought to be misled by
;
etymologies, so
"
term
viz., to
many
so.
Moreover the
"
is
"
"
"
images would not be senseFor both these reasons, I think it is perhaps better
data."
"
"
sense-data
to drop the term
altogether, and to speak only
proper
of
"
sensibles."
My
two
into
parts.
and then
I shall consider
how,
I.
(1)
We
all
and
my
I hear certain
clock.
sounds which
In both cases
have
to certain sensibles
certain
other
we
are
all
perfectly
express by
see
them,
is
which
and
them.
359
one
case, the
of relation is a
And
a sound.
when
similarly
warm
or smell a
smell, these different verbs do not express the fact that I have
the
sensibles
concerned, but
which
had yesterday
this kind of
But
of
sensibles
is
relation
which
evidently
I
relation,
of
sorts
all
others,
to those I
different
may
have to
sometimes have
kinds,
in
different
quite
also
saw then.
which
images
kind from
sensibles.
to"
as well as
another/
After looking at
this black
(I
mark
relation
of
as
and
now
to the
mark
itself
yet I certainly
relation,
thinking of
it
or
remembering
it.
I can
it itself
am
about
am
an image
it is
And
it is
it
360
G.
and that
it
seeing.
It
was
am
MOORE.
different
therefore, quite
is,
important difference
when
E.
of
it
which
have
am now
is
a most
to a sensible
former relation.
it,
is
in
my mind
a direct apprehension of
it.
"
"
presented,"
"
given,"
seem
perceived,"
to
me
to
have been
spoilt
me when
mind
want
a direct apprehension
to insist that though,
of
this
when
I actually see or
me when
"
There
is
I only
in
my
I see the
mark, the
mark
apprehends
called
"
"
or
"
me "
or
"
"
my mind
361
whatever
is
all
does not hold between any of mine and any of yours; and
which holds again between all those mental acts which are
yours, but does not hold between any of yours and any of
mine. And I do not feel at all sure what the correct analysis
of this relation
is.
It
may
and which
what we mean
is
direct apprehension
to say that
another
"
me," and it would be true to say that,
properly be called
when I see this black mark, / directly apprehend it. But it is
commonest
among
seems
to
me
psychologists)
to be the
that
is
that what
view which
entity
which
apprehension which
are mine,
the
mean by
calling all
some kind
common
of
and
mine
relation to
relation to
is
one
some other
which deserves
to
when
it,
is
which
why
I
wish to
362
G.
MOORE.
E.
this
"
for
direct apprehension of
order to
direct apprehension"
where
it is
attending to
"
quite clear
is,
concerns
it
it
me
mind."
me
to
what the
"
direct apprehension
in
and
In every case,
that I
may
"
And
convenient.
am directly apprehending a
seems also clear to me that I am, more or less,
and it seems to me possible that what I mean
quite clear to
given entity,
by
it
must confess
as to this I
my
much more
which seems to
point,
make
occurs in
it is
in whicli that
identical with
because I
other,
which
to entities,
may,
saw yesterday, and
am
directly apprehending
am
it, is
any
degree at
all, is
am
not attending to
in
it,
admit
However
sorts do
by the
that
may
be,
sometimes stand
fact that
we
all
directly
apprehend them
or, to
speak more
an event
is
in our minds
that
it
may
it
means merely
that
it is
be) which
we mean by saying
that they
And it
is
directly apprehended
it
my mind
act of mine,
nothing
is
or belief
may
apprehended by me.
in our minds or is
apprehended by
"
the phrases
us,
If,
therefore,
"
in our
for
apprehension
itself directly
"
"
or
ours
"
is
minds
in our
of direct
my
clear that to
by me, is to
say of a mental
is
it
363
minds
"
"
or
mental
of our
And why
ours."
I say this is
confused.
is
it
"
is
when
experienced," or
my
when
it
is
in
my
it is
it
"
erlebt,"
is
directly
mind, in the
mind.
But
(2) it
me
seems to
to be
commonly held
that sensibles
of
"
"
immediately experienced or
view
that
is
"
or are
immediately experienced
of
both
course,
expressions
though,
it
is
held, I
is
is
directly apprehended.
want
to
explain
And
since
that I see no
reason whatever for thinking that sensibles ever are experienced by us in any other sense than that of being directly
apprehended by
Two
us.
kinds of
argument,
I think, are
sometimes used to
are.
when,
for instance,
we
are in a
364
G.
room with a
aware
E.
MOORE.
ticking clock,
of the
ticks,
on our ears
the time,
all
we must have
experienced the
same
But
I think
argument
is
we
It
may,
I think,
we
much more
on our
ears,
failed
to produce
any mental
effect
whatever,
It is
And
it is possible.
again, the
to
me
at all
that
is
we sometimes
But
do not know
how
to
we
365
since people,
whose judgment
worth while to
do, I think it is
"
"
say something as to what this sense of
experience can be, in
case it does occur.
entity
is
To say that
which
my
it
belongs to some
by me
and acts
of direct
me.
in this sense
my
acts
mine.
mental
acts, is a thing
which
all,
in
my
cannot believe.
them
kind of relation to
this
us,
they
well.
also, at
And
it
the
seems
me
apprehension of
If,
it
has.
by us
at
all,
in
we must,
means
can only say that I see no reason to think that they ever are
experienced in any such sense. If they are, the fact that they
are so is presumably open to the inspection of us all but I
;
out to me.
366
G.
E.
MOORE.
hended, I
mean
shall, in
either
what
is
"
"
experienced
We may now,
(3)
To
two
when they
Do
sensibles
a priori reasons
different
to
this
and
may
answer.
The
the
it
first is
esse of
may
sensibles is percipi.
me
to
And
this at
to be clearly false.
is
clearly
experienced
And
other.
do not see
my way
to
two such
properties.
see that it
go, I
most,
it
And
Is there
any reason
to suppose
me
sensibles only
that
is
when they
consists of those
which actually
define by saying
which would (under certain conditions
actually exist.
think
all
when
clearer
367
I proceed to give
sensibles, of a
which
I directly apprehend
unchanged when I merely
still exist
that
should see
that I
before, if only
moment
that
there
if
is
it
sensibles
like
eyes, provided
body remain
true
in
some sense
certainly
what I saw the moment
in the position it
But
was at
such a case,
in
if,
my
body were
that I
to
suppose
in
it
other
my
is
equal reason
if
my
my
outside
or
the position of
fact
my
In such a case
unchanged.
head or closing
conditions
physical
under the
of the
cases.
which
room, or
is,
I think,
We
I should see
if
an
must, for
now,
I were looking
And
see,
owing
number
your bodies.
of
All this
sensibles exist
at
all.
at
But
still it
were
in
position
in
which
it
is
not,
physical conditions.
images, of which
may
it
be
true
them,
368
G.
MOOKE.
E.
if
are, exist
my
body were
different
now.
The
But
prejudice.
is
belief
may,
for supposing
of course, be a
test
mere
by which
And
But,
if
am
is
an empirical argument
if it
if it
alone
my
argument
for
unexperienced
This, it seems
existence
to
me,
is
applies,
the most
my
which
and I
it
is
fallacious.
The argument
is
is
abundant
even where
also
in
And
the
the
fact
it
it
is
argument seems to me to
does not distinguish between the
fallacy of this
that
when
369
we
sensibles
What
escperience them.
there
is
the fact
evidence for
is
that
And
mark now
exists.
had been in a
made
nervous system
no tendency
my
fact, if
am
to
show that
may
And
who suppose
exist unexperienced,
And
it
may
which he would
moment,
in
370
G.
which
E.
MOORE.
same place
not at
at the
apply to
all
same time
my
as the sensibles
hypothesis, which
is
which
I see,
do
now, not that they exist in the same place in which mine do.
On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever
when they
exist at times
think there
show
this
that,
be brought forward to
may
see,
not,
wholly
inconclusive.
II.
now
how
And
extremely
different considerations
all
I can
as to
do
how
is
to raise,
very tentative.
To begin
with, I do not
know how
"
"
physical object
is
to
that I
to
am
other a
we
in considering which,
how they
consider
371
same time
shall at the
florin.
situated
obliquely to
sensibles
which
my
of
line
so
sight,
that
visual
the
I directly
visibly elliptical,
much
farther from
me
that
visual sensible
its
is
florin.
know
as
we
shall see,
may
be taken as to
what they mean. I know (a) that, in the ordinary sense of the
word "see," I am really seeing two coins; an assertion which
includes, if it
is
visual experiences,
which consist in
and are
nofc
"
"
images
either
(b) that
inside,
though
half-crown
direct apprehension of
hallucinations
my
not
merely
elliptical
like
the
(c)
don't see
it
(a")
when
this, I
I turn
away
(e)
my
head or shut
do not, of course,
mean
my
eyes
but in saying
and
viz.,
that propositions
(6), (c),
be true.
Now
all
of the sort
which we
call propositions
A 2
372
G.
E.
MOORE.
is.
And
The one
said
to
see,
is
to begin
two
with
is
not
which I
it
seems to
for it
me
these or from
circular
space
it
private space,
may
in
yet be
is
my private
I think
my
both together
two sensibles
space, it
may
be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense
in which I am seeing it, and yet his sensible be certainly
different
upper
from mine.
From
this
it
And though
it
which
it
is
From
the word
object,
"
see
in
we must
of
to
"
see
"
a physical
means
if
proposition
we
I directly
In asserting
apprehend B."
we
373
directly
"
I see
A"
apprehend some
it
may
be only some proposition of the form " and this sensible has
certain other properties," or it may be some proposition of the
form
"
to
we have
two
different senses
For it
directly apprehend."
obvious that though I should be said to be now seeing
the half-crown, there is a narrower, and more proper sense,
in which I can only be said to see one side of it
not its lower
both from one another and from
is
The other
is
is
(@) that
my
principle,
knowledge
and
relations
on these,
any
to start with
mine consisting
in the perception of
sensibles.
It is based
of these propositions
What, in view of
which my five propositions are true
(1) It
seems to
me
374
MOORE.
G. E.
I should directly
which
apprehend other
sensibles,
tactual ones,
e.g.
these movements,
if
if
I should
And
true interpretation of
florin,
of (d) that,
if I were at
sensibles.
It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines
the only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of
those which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to
is
The conditions
experience of them.
as
"
if
were
to
if
"
move my
need to be
so.
interpretation of
any ultimate
lines, would be
our
five propositions,
on these
it is
the
375
that
to be.
know
If,
is
when
know
sensibles I do
way
in
which principle
(/3)
asserts
that
if,
now
clearly
When
I
know
know
that the
elliptical
had been
realised, I
were
may
to be so, I should
or
may
it is
or, if
Some-
thing like this will actually be the only true thing that can be
when
know
am
376
G.
by identifying
(a)
principle
MOOKE.
view
this
apprehending, yet
directly
For
K.
the
not
will
contradict
with the
coins
sensibles.
it
to asserting of
The
round,
that
fact
on
etc., will,
these
different.
assertions
that
tlie
But
it.
as
far
can
it
see,
because I have a
"
propensity to
strong
"
And, of
exist.
It
that,
may
be that
course, this
when
belief
be a mere prejudice.
may
I believe that I
now have,
believe
is
in
my
body,
if
only true,
it
does not assert, in the proper sense of the word " existence,"
the present existence of anything whatever, other than sensibles
which
me.
I
But
know
I do), I
am knowing
belief, that,
when
my
am now
directly apprehending,
therefore I think
it is
worth while
And
a mere prejudice.
is
to consider what,
if it is
not,
existed before I
saw
it,
if,
when
know
am knowing
and
this
something by description ;
the description by which I know it
a certain connection with this sensible
directly apprehending.
simply say, as
many
know
it
which
am now
We
cannot
by "that
half-
"
sensible;
377
crown and
my
eyes,
and events in
my
eyes,
source."
circular, I
experience
may
is
One kind
that
it
its
is
hence,
But what
is
it
And
is
whose nature
when
know
is
circular.
which
something
is
think
"
"
spiritual
utterly
"
unknown
source
is
"
be
to us.
And
those
who hold
But
if
this addition
who make
what they mean
those
"
it,
really
mean
to say this.
think that
which
in
other.
than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the
same kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and
the only difference between their view and view (1), is that,
whereas that said that you must give a Pickwickian interpretation both to the assertion that the coins exist, and
to
the assertion
that
they are
circular,
they say
that
you
378
G.
must
not
to
it
give
the
E.
MOORE.
latter.
circular, in a simple
(3) It
of being
may
which
sensibles,
any
would get sensations from them at all. We saw before that it
seems possible that all these sensibles do really exist at times
when they
events,
do.
seem
And
some people,
at all
of sensibles is the
we do seem
of
to
"
And
is.
in the
which
same place
as," in
which
it
could be true
time, seems to
seems
upper
to
me
side
me
to be the
of
to be possible.
same
as to the last
the half-crown
namely that
if
the
379
which
it
could
florin,
would
same
as on that
view.
(4)
we
If,
and
(3)
is
one which
and the
is
roughly identical,
view which
It is a
florin really
natural
that,
sense);
therefore
sensibles (even
such do now
if
am now
which I
coins
do
resemble
really
some
sensibles,
in
respect
of
the
"
"
in
which some sensibles are round and some larger than others.
it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly
But
coins have
which any
On
any
of the
any parts
"
"
of the
colour, etc.
secondary qualities
prevent us from
We
And
same source
all exist in
the
"
"
anywhere
in physical space
That none,
while, at the
380
G.
M001IE.
E.
none exist
in
sense that
To
that
come
view
this
it
is
to
know
And how
difficult to
do
would seem
"
know
that these
do
if I
that,
know
"
sources
"
source
"
at all
are circular
these things at
all, I
It
must know
is.
And
to this it
may
is
know
mediately,
not
my
know how
belief
it
must be a mere
prejudice.
But
do
Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can know immeI do not think, therefore,
diately is itself not a prejudice.
;
if
this last
view were
true,
we should have
clusive objection to
it.
II.
By
I
381
G. F. STOUT.
have
for
many years
spent
much time
no longer
now
all
so to nearly the
in essential
This
We
is
are
essentially differed.
mental divergence.
But
our agreement is sufficient to yield a good basis for further discussion. We can proceed on the basis of common presupposition
in dealing
by way
of sense-perception.
I shall therefore, in
what
follows,
it.
On
pp. 372 and 373 of his paper, Mr. Moore lays down two
He states
principles which I accept without reservation.
may
be stated as follows
"
:
The
sensibles
which we directly
to
it"*
is
that
and
the
of these
am
sensibles
I
perceived.
One
of
these
theories
seems
virtually
not perfectly sure that Mr. Moore intends to assert that the
never identical with any quality of the thins;.
But
are
this.
382
identical with Mill's well
known
thinks
it
Mr. Moore
But he admits
be true.
may
that neither he himself nor anyone else has been able to state
it
in
a consistent
difficulties
He
also
finds
in
it
other serious
to reject it absolutely,
it
but
to regard
if
way.
Without going
so far as this, it
is
is
cannot
tenable in any
Moore
The type
of theory
which he seems
from the
outset,
itself.
Here
is,
it
;tlso
beyond
Mr. Moore next discusses three special forms which
the source theory may assume.
One of these he distinctly
I agree.
vital points.
knowledge
"
merely
(1)
I find
I agree
What
is
primary in our
direct
"
apprehension
of
sensibles,
but also
direct
the source as in
knowledge
of
of the nature of
referred to
it.
much
I find
383
to disagree with.
According
(1)
at issue
to
may
be
Mr. Moore,
and
is
For
(2)
Mr.
Moore, the
original
it
come
it is
by a physical
object.
As
what
is
ordinarily
meant
the physical object with the source ; and the nature of the physical
object with the nature of the source.
On
this
source
its
I thus include in
all
detail.
It will
difficulties
it difficult
384
STOUT.
G. F.
some
to
is
them
of
But
immediate.
"
"?
(2)
How
can we know
Such
this
finds it
hard t6 understand
how
nature and
mode
to
others
essentially similar in
of occurrence.
first problem, we have to inquire how
that any directly apprehended sensible is
possible to
know
Let us commence
distinction
it.
is
now
turn
my
head away
is
actually present to
Its place is
now
image that
not
and
the
sensible.
Yet I
apprehend
primary
is
is
this
now
am
but cognisant of
it
am
directly
still,
in a
In the very
by what
filled
my
remember
I am aware of the
previous existence of the primary sensible.
fashion
in
a
conditioned
as
peculiar
by and derived from
image
and
as
more
am
aware of
it
as
more
or less like
385
All this
of its component parts.
some manner aware of the primary sensible
no longer actually present as it was when it first
implies that I
when
it is
am
in
existed.
describe
this
directly apprehending
it.
me
There seems to
its
we
source.
In the
first place,
directly apprehend,
moment,
and
there
directly apprehended.
this existence
is
specified
thought
It is in
both cases
its
most fundamental
point.
may
It
operates
image
it
con-
or of
some
as
it is
itself
386
G.
STOUT.
F.
to
its
source and in
its
sensible
cases,
in
we were
if
to
relation
source
its
initially
immediate.
without such
be no process of
seems to
are
inference
In
knowledge,
both
there
by which we could
cover
all
kinds
of
cognition.
"
"
direct apprehension
contrasted with mere
Hence, when
thought, it seems to be implied that thought, as such, is
But
which would
indirect.
to involve
is
uncertainty.
There
is
we may know
existent,
directly that
if
"
anything
we take
it
that
it is
such and
is
Thus when
it
is
in
present
which
when
it
"
calling
existential
presence
to
consciousness."
is
Existential
may
presence
"
387
If
it.
may
existential presence."
ordinary
does
experience,
not,
explicitly
apart
and
set
before
the
itself
it
most
What
is
before
it is,
the
part,
reflexion,
Here,
for
too,
I are
now
attempting.
The
is
aware
of is initially
an
attempt to analyse.
* It
We
is
2 B 2
388
G.
F.
STOUT.
we can
distinguish
isolate
it
it
so as
we
course that
we
fail
is
so familiar
and
so
much
a matter of
it.
If
a man who
is
it.
We
he
He
them, he is
mental experiment, we remind ourselves that as a matter of
fact the
it
the immediate
primary
appear strange.
knowledge
The connexion of the image with the primary sensible will
appear not to be the kind of fact which we can know immeThis sort of
diately.
fallacy
seems to
nexion.
me
Above
to
is,
pervade Hume's
all, it
is
think,
more commonly
of other questions.
For instance,
and
its source.
If this
connexion
is
not, initially
and
in ordinary
experience, implicitly presupposed rather than explicitly distinguished, we may easily, even in the act of seeking to
* Even when the image is freely constructed by the imagination, we
are aware of it as reproducing primary experience in a modified
form, and we still think of a possible primary experience as correstill
sponding to
it.
THtf
way
from
389
STATUS OF SENSE-DATA.
assuming
it,
in such
that
itself.
merely
loose
relatively
itself.
why
this
may
also
another
very important
under the general head of what Hume would call knowledge of matter of fact which anticipates experience, and what
fall
there to
know
it.
But
by
itself, it
this principle is
development
we do not know,
why we
is.
by
itself insufficient
of our
knowledge.
are not omniscient
To answer
For,
why
this question,
390
G. F.
STOUT.
we must
its
to
my
may
we
are cognisant of
consciousness, or,
apprehended.
own nature self-complete and self-contained, so as to imply
nothing beyond themselves, if each were a universe in itself,
If,
we
We
present.
should be confined to an
know
infini-
as the real
entirely of our
is
own making.
own nature
their
own
existences,
them
as,
we need no
in
various
further reason
and
ways
If,
in their
why we
respects,
should
know
and,
incomplete,
analysis
as
apparently
reply that, so
far
this
inadequacy or confusion
critical
reflexion,
to
fails
as
we
are
discover the
may
of
be
incompleteness.
the
so,
If,
in
revelation
of
expecting
fresh
the
fault lies in
itself
what
is
distinctly
On
indistinctly,
we
391
are prone to
We
fall
into
are prone to
to
look for
it.
We
it
elsewhere, as
are then, as I
if
is
The
a source.
difficulty is
of
all
same
the
We
Consider, for
class.
example, visual
visual
in
it
actually exists.
we seem
But what
to perceive
important is that
not exist that we
is
may
The primary
to be recognised as
"
loose
sensible, in
and separate
"
Primd
of it.
any object
seems to be a very serious objection to any theory
which asserts an immediate knowledge of primary sensibles
perceived by means
of a source in
facie, this
known
to us.
Another form
is
of the
same
difficulty is clearly
Even when a
physical object
and some
of
its
variable appearances
392
to
G. F.
account for
of their
seems to
It
They
of
me
own
primary sensibles,
is
original
and
factorily met.
between
difference
this
STOUT.
to
arise
of the source
by means
of
object of
tree, stone, or
As
heard.
view.
My
position
is
that
what
is
of these items
If
we agree
to call a particular
it
may
ment
of
more or
it,
less dissimilar
or taste
occasions,
it
primary
and in seeing
have
sensible.
or touching
an indefinite variety
it I
of
may
see
it,
touch
may, on different
visual
or
tactual
393
it
is
taken to be
This
different.
that in all of
is
is perceived, though it is
Of course the
perceived under varying sensible appearances.
the
is
taken
and
not
to be simple
source,
thing,
consequently
and
has different
It
indivisible.
able parts.
Some
qualities
and distinguish-
may be
when we
of different
qualities, as
when we
touch the sugar and then taste it. Some may be appearances of different parts, as when we first look at one side of
first
source
is
essential to
particular
thing.
I myself or that
of
it,
someone
ordinary
usage,
when
say
that
We
We
recognition of it as belonging to a special class or kind.
then usually add an explanation. We say, for instance, " I saw
a bird, but without knowing it to be a bird." In such instances
as well as in definite recognition there
the present
datum
of sense
We
is
still
correlation of
of
a vaguer and
394
G.
STOUT.
F.
there
all
is
and
in accordance with
the position of a
Can we properly
mind
to correlate its
common
term perception in
its
source.
ordinary
change of position,
relative
different
sources.
perceiving,
it
such a case,
its
this
with
will be
by
mind
If
from
if
we
the
primary
and
our
refers this
we ourselves know to be
we may say that there is
in
extension
the position
of
the
own developed
it
as perceiving
we presume,
'
it
But,
term
to use the
consider
of
con-
mean by
basis
It directly apprehends, as
sensible,
of
source.
less arbitrary
to relatively
ordinarily
we choose
more or
we
same
the
part of what
is
them
will refer
will,
usual meaning.
undeveloped
it
sensibles
different
necting
inasmuch as
of
It
to a source.
a certain
This source
Hence
possess, but
which
We
same way
as
we do when we
perceive a particular
physical
Now
object.
here
there seems to
which leads us
primitive mind,
sensible,
and
we
me
the
to
to be a
heart
395
fundamental difference
of
directly apprehends
suppose,
to
it
make any
In
a source.
to
is
it is
only a part
common
of
to it
indirect source,
is
of each
mediated through
We
source
the
its
common
sensible
and even
It
source.
is
which can be
an
developed knowledge
for
of the physical
ditions of sense-perception.
From
we can
sense-data
It is possible only
if
is
the
We
which an object
is perceived are
the object, directly or
indirectly, acts on the sense-organ and there gives rise to a
series of processes ending in a certain change in a certain
know that the primary
portion of the nervous system.
so
far as
We
We
396
G.
of nature
F.
STOUT.
the
a perceived
of
primary sensible
is
the
this
object,
object operates only
appearance
through a chain of processes which do not, in giving rise to the
sense-experience,
object
itself.
than the breaking of a window affects the body of the man who
throws a stone at it. None the less, as I have said, the primary
me
to follow irresistibly,*
it
seems to
first,
we
and, secondly,
not directly but more or less remotely
connected with the relevant sense-experiences.
that even this part
is
These propositions
may
acquired knowledge
have still to consider
how
But we
cannot
reference of primary
stir
sensibles to a source
and that
to the
end
it
and without
to the
also
whole source
I have to
show how
definitely
distinguished
taken
to
is initially
into
parts,
becomes more or
less
how one
and
perceived,
while
part is
the other
ceptible
other.
sense-data
One
with
each
of these is correla-
*
Perhaps the conclusion is not absolutely necessary ; but it could
only be evaded, so far as I can see, by a series of complicated, arbitrary,
by reference
one source.
to
This depends, in
what
same
the
as
3V7
is
part,
on
recognisable
We may
sensibles.
different
by the
illustrate
difference
the
most important
case,
under
this
head,
is
But by
that
of
its
in
place
the
field
of
is
it
is
by
itself far
from
correlation
that
of
concomitance
and
co-variation
of
We
others.
may
when
is
and motion
is
referring
My
position
for
of tactual
is
is
which
is
constituted by its
locally external to
and separable
398
G. F.
it is
The sense-apparition
STOUT.
of a flame in
But
burning paper.
is
same
common
their having a
source,
it
this
Where
such conditions are indispensable the only mode of interpretation open either to ourselves or to the primitive mind is
interaction
Our knowledge
of the
it
group
same
source.
Change
also involves
The
original reference of
is
of
by reference to distinct
But there still remains
sense-experience which
is
399
sense-appearance
as
independently of change or
?
(2) How does it account
occurring
to a correspondingly variable
by reference
answer to the
source
The
first
question
is
that
these
variations
make no
acts
same source
such a
way
as
to
found
on or
powers.
referred
difference to the
is
percipient and in
The motives
From one
its
body
of the percipient is a
outside
it,
outset.
member
it
from the
it is also,
preted.
Movements
of the
body or
its
my
me
to a
book on
my
shelves, or
when I first see the paper and then touch it with my hand.
The transition from one primary sensible to another does not in
such cases involve any discoverable change or
transition
in
the things perceived. The same holds good for the coming
and going of primary sensibles in such instances as that of
It
may
400
G.
of this kind,
though
it
direct apprehension of
movements,
not of
is
F.
STOUT.
There
which
make
sensibles,
found
to
unambiguously
manifold
however,
are,
the
its
other
experiences
The
inference
unambiguous.
primary
through which a thing is perceived, are constantly
vary in manifold ways, where, on the one hand, the
cannot be referred to any variation in the thing
variation
or
obviously can be referred to correspondingly variable movements of the percipient's body and organs of sense. At a
somewhat later stage the influence of conditions intervening
of.
varying state
and constitution
recognised.
definitely
The
of
taken
be
by the
be
by the
What
is
I have endeavoured to
show
development
special
sensibles to a source.
of
the
general reference
The source
is
only one
of
primary
is
not the whole source or the most immediate part of it. The
distinction of this part of the source is not an original datum,
mere variation
thing perceived.
It follows that
and variation
we have no need
in the
assume
to
original
is
others.
What
But there
is
is
no
401
is
any
difference
principle, throughout,
are
correlated
primary
is
The
also local
it
is
and temporal
relations.
Finally, there
is
false or inaccurate.
So
far as
we
I have
now
knowledge
my own
positive view
of physical objects.
But there
me which
continue to exist
"
says,
which
when they
e.g.,
"
I have,"
he
exist
The importance,
and not
No
doubt
if
if
it
to
it.
402
G. F.
common
not
share
it,
see, it
to all
and
is
it
STOUT.
and those
to
whom
it,
object.
ceased.
man-
kind in general.
there
is
If it is
a strong propensity to believe that the directly appreis itself a- quality of the thing.
From what
hended sensible
(p.
thing.
fore
bound
to offer
himself to feel
tendency
to
it.
reject
what he
really feel a
I
am
there-
to be the only
when they
it
for
granted that
if
we do not
He
seems to take
403
is
source.
a physical thing includes not only the source, but also the
persist.
is
as
sufficient
be included in what we
The
object.
possibility
must be
of
of the physical
its
we
at
selves
all,
represent
it
as
it
conditions,
of its
what
is
left is
If
all.
we undertake
be in themselves, apart from their relation to our sensinot trouble common sense or
bility, a problem which does
may
science.
and a phenomenon
senses.
nature
of
primary
sensibles,
continued
existence
perhaps, be
made
analogous.
We
of
is
an
understanding
inasmuch
as
included in what
unperceived
they
how
we mean by
object,
the
express
this
the
may,
404
G. F.
no one
is
What we
it.
reading
marks
STOUT.
marks on paper.
These persisting
graphs,
The
is
of as still
still
all.
must we go
farther
and
As
is
no clue
feel
what
to
is
is
whether there
is
immediately apprehended
the things perceived.
means
at
my
the question
answer
is
some minds
it
or anything
I find that if
persistent qualities of
and so far as
use
all
We
negative.
same thing
The only
it.
if
in the
same aspect
of its nature
may have
variable
to
believe
primary
that
all,
sensibles
we do
not.
or even
persist
in
more than
this
way
Whether
this
is
405
We
enquire.
percipient
that
we
of such a
But
thing.
some one
series of
of confusion.
Some
owes
its plausibility to
a fallacy
with others.
There thus
arises a
modes
of appearing as standard
prefer
these
cannot
to
also
the others
detect
in
modes
of appearing,
thinking
about
and
stubborn
and
the
to
thing.
tendency
simply to identify the primary sensibles involved in such
appearances with persistent characters of the external object.
strong
life,
a certain convenient
when we look
Are we
straight at
it
from
distance.
therefore strongly
impelled to identify this appearance in distinction from all
others with the persistent quality of the thing ? Are we, for
instance, impelled to prefer it in this way to the appearance
more or
less variable
precision.
It really includes
appearances, due
and distance
to relatively small
406
Consider,
tactual
differ so greatly
and obviously
follows
extension
question
that
of
is
neither of
them can be
clearly
and
and touched.
distinctly put,
Hence
identified with
the
So soon as the
we become aware
that
we
do not identify either with the extension of the thing, but regard
both as sensible appearance distinct from what appears. In
the case of touch there
When
is
with
But there
it.
sensible.
identify
identify
my own
it
it
either.
do not really
skin in contact
man
hand, that of the stick in contact with the hand, and that which
explored by the other end of the stick.
extensive tactual sensible.
is
But there
is
only one
407
XIII.
ITS
CARR.
of
the
a change.
reality,
ment and
all
proportions of the
world in which
till
living.
condition in
his
world.
Physical
reality
would have
would have
new change
in his spatial
and
temporal universe.
his family
and
He would
friends,
have been absent one year but would have aged twelve years
and would find his old world eleven years younger, for he would
408
WILDON CARR.
H.
universe, so long as
same world.
in such case
clear
They
is
no
is
they
There
for
is
is
no remainder.
an observer who
of Eelativity a
eveiy moment.
change in our
taking place at
the same.
is
of reference is
The movement
of the earth
on
its axis
and in
its orbit,
the
system in
us a continual to-and-fro journey from Lilliput to Brobdingnag,
which we do not become aware of only because our proportions
change with every change in the proportions of our universe.
solar
409
And we
The Principle
nor
In the account
am
no pretence to be able
is
based.
interest
I
is
its
tion.
the
criticise
far
am
with
principle
formulation
is
view
provisional
to
determining
and in need
is
among
of
how
modifica-
those able
to
however well
it
may
still
with, in
phenomena.
more especially
electro-magnetic, and
It is the relation of this
metaphysical theory to
The Principle
which
new kinematics
to
pure
under
optical,
laws of physical
presented under
groups of observers in
movement of uniform translation in relation to one another.
phenomena
are,
exactly the
same form
And
the
corollary of
phenomena
are
equal
to
conditions,
different
the principle
in
all
is
that electro-magnetic
at a uniform
directions
propagated
about 185,000 miles a second, for all observers,
to whatever system of relative movement of translation
velocity, of
when we
410
II.
"We
state these
may
WILDON CARR.
two grounds
thus
It
1.
is
impossible to
discover the
by means
motion
of
a system
of experiments performed
The velocity
2.
of the
of light
is
The Principle
of Eelativity rests
on an experimental
negative result,
of
the
within
books,
it.
not been
made
movement by observations taken
experiments
acceleration of a system of
basis.
the uniformly
to detect the
many
and
are
to
all
students
of
the
recent
Michelson and Morley experiment, which utilised the movement of the earth in its orbit. In this movement we have a
velocity of translation
we can produce
part
of,
undergo an increase or
an observer on the earth dependent on the
a decrease for
velocity
An
and direction
of that
translation in
to
relation
to
it.
show a variation
perpendicular
411
variation
The
result
An
100 times
greater
than
this
had
it
existed.
was negative.
will
this conclusion.
movement
of the
of the
we observe the
source.
Suppose, again,
propagation of a light wave and also an observer moving in
the same direction with any velocity in relation to ourselves,
the principle declares that he observes the light propagated at
the same velocity, 185,000 miles a second, at which we observe
it
and
not, as
we should
(a)
The
ether,
if
there
is
rest,
it
in
the velocity
of
the observer's
movement.
(b)
Neither
after,
refer
to
no
absolute
standard of reference, they are not the same for all observers,
they relate to events whose distance and interval are coordinated
is
it.
(e)
There
whether in relation
supposed fixed ether.
to
is
is
no experience which
at rest or in
movement,
412
WILDON CAEK.
II.
more disconcerting
to ordinary notions,
In
gravitation and the continuity or discreteness of energy.
the latest development even the old principle Natura non facit
saltus is called in question.
The formulation
attempt
to
meet the
of the experiments
was what
of Lorentz, according
shrinkage of
all
work
facts revealed
to
is
known
which
it
is
hypothesis, I believe,
still
its
motion.
its
is
This
place in the
no longer regarded
but as an appearance due to physical
The
Minkowski.
of
is
limits of observation.
for a
phenomena
is
a function of velocity.
And
instead of
have a universe
this
of radiant
energy.
And
we
in connection with
of a
new
Continuity."
Another problem
of great difficulty
is
which
by
on
is
413
what
is its
it
is
velocity
With
controversial
and unsettled
Let us examine
first
known
axiom
Electric
distance.
immediate action at a
transmitted from point to point through space by the interThere was no such medium known or
position of a medium.
it
argument
still
holds
and physicists
good,
will
no
doubt
with existence.
illustrated.
It
takes eight minutes for the light emitted by the sun to reach
the earth where is it during those eight minutes if there is no
medium
to transport
it ?
And
could not be
known had we no
awaits discovery.
Sir Oliver
air
pump.
it
by the
impossibility
of
advanced in
intelligence, can be
aware of water.
But the
414
WILDON CAKR.
II.
physical
substance
its
universe
It is true it
generated.
Motionless, solid,
Not that
matter.
and
attributes
regular
action, finally
the
of
with
constituted
reality
calculable in
there
is
its attributes
through
anything necessarily
seem
of
it
fatal to it in
first.
in
any
continuous or whether
we hold
The Principle
itself is atomic.
is
stancy
own system
of
relative
at rest
whatever,
movement.
as
many
we
movement, and
same thing as to suppose there
This can be shown in another way. If light
acceleration of a
no
moves
ether.
at a constant velocity in
observer in
movement
an absolute
the observer's
own
ether, then to
an
velocity according to
by the amount
its direction.
This
of
is
may
be abolished.
It follows also
is
415
wagon
is
an event which
to observers in the
To observers on the
soil
travelled
Also there
for
whom
is
there
is
separation in space,
whom
the
there
not.
is
soil,
exist for
There are no
which
it
is
for
some system
With
of
reference be
that
for different
whom
it
is
It
not
was
it
of those
two
all
other observers
same events.
undergo alteration,
one thing alone remains constant, the velocity
to another
This velocity therefore assumes of necessity a role of
of light.
:
first
importance in the
This
light
as a
must be conceived
maximum
velocity.
And
the Principle of
and also
Eelativity
416
H.
W1LDON CARR.
introduces a
Two
system
of reference
which
all
and one
us illustrate
life as
position on an electron
we
some
new system of
in
new
would pass
life
will
Suppose then
that our
electron, then
space.
The
reference
90,000,000
relation
between
this
it
that
is
is
new
of the solar
absolute, each
is
from
it
in
Each observer
will
have
from
its source,
of the space
comparison
within the other.
417
of light,
The reason
is not physically realisable.
that a velocity greater than that of light would
with the notion of causality, which involves the
though conceivable,
alleged
is
conflict
is
effect.
to criticism
open
doctrine.
the
cause,
there
would be systems
of
translation
regress-
cause to the
effect.
But
if
all
movement
falls
short of the
110
system
for
which their
place
whom
distance less than that which light can travel in the interval of
time.
And
for
for
any
such a
other.
This follows from the fact that for our physical universe one
thing and one thing only is constant, the velocity of light
of
418
WILDON CARR.
H.
movement, there
relative
is
the
relative
movement of two
movement of a
due
ethereal
system,
has
necessitated
the
formulation
the
of
Principle of Eelativity.
What
is
existing
whether
if it
is
there
may
or
or
is
is
is
velocity of
not such a
something
may
really
not be means of
it manifest
whether or not the hypothesis of an ether
necessary for the formation of an electro-magnetic field ;
whether energy is discrete and atomic, or continuous. These
making
is
physical and not metaphysical problems, and metano special means and makes no special claim to
has
physics
solve them.
On the other hand a problem is undoubtedly and
are
all
fundamental necessities
of
can
by the Principle
The problem
of
of Relativity
continuity.
This
is
particularly con-
The problem
This
is
419
3. The problem of
This is concerned
original movement.
with the doctrine that mass is a function of velocity.
1.
fact
is to
An
may
absolute void.
a false idea,
it is
of reality, but
such idea
something
person
is
of
it is
it
thought an
an absolute nought is
to represent in
is
who
himself
there
Even the
made.
is
but the potential place of an atom, even if the actual atoms are
supposed to be completely closed systems without external
Yet it has always seemed as though continuity
relations.
is
It appears
principle.
absurd to
then
it is
Now
then
it is
geometrical space.
what the Principle of Kelativity has done, quite irrespectively of whether its formulation is final or is only an
It has shown the impossibility of
approximation, is this
.
think
it
science
competent to deal
is
we might even go
further and
say that
is
of continuity
The
first is illustrated
in the doctrine
2 D 2
420
II.
of the ether.
or
WILDON CARR.
absolute
space
physical universe which would divide it into separate universes
If the universe is one it can
that could have no relations.
makes
Sir
Lodge, Professor
Oliver
Marcel
Brillouin
and
could
move
in
the
to
it
is
clear
it
When we
we meet
a com-
plete contrast.
suggest,
then,
that
we
are
forced
by the
scientific
in a psychical principle.
each
We
living being
the
us
the
is
for
do not as separate
create
for
himself
life
impulse
individual
personalities
his
is
own
behind
it
activity the
The one
is
421
and, therefore, in
qualitative, that
Let us
is,
in
life.
now
The movement,
is
The
for example,
of
much more
It is
is
maintained
if
we have
regard to the
An
illustra-
tion used
space.
our skin
limits.
is
narrow
422
WILDON CARR.
II.
ours
show how
Time seems
The reason
it.
is
its
experience entirely
only one of
is different.
about
This
to
two-fold.
is
under the same term two quite distinct things, psychical time,
the real duration of experience, and geometrical time. The real
duration of psychical
quality,
simply,
real duration
is
is
we
seems
and
pure
The second
On this
sible.
it is
quantitative
it is
reason
a sense
life is qualitative, in
effect,
is
irrever-
irreversible direction
and therefore
it
our experience and to every degree of perfection of our knowThe perception of the nature of pure duration that it
ledge.
is
The source of
the universe.
is
determined, and
observer that
reference.
is
is
is
the
all reality is
is
the
is
is
the observer
This
observer that
and time.
bound
is
the
in relation to other
movement
to
movements.
which
It is
423
life,
it is
it is
removes from
new kinematic
Principle
of Eelativity.
It
what
is
at
really
scientific theory.
the
"It
is
to
intelligible
possess
to
all
may remain
constant,
it
still
424
WILDON CARR.
H.
We
is
sophical
movement
ultimate
is
and
original, and that things which change or are moved are views
This doctrine rests on the argument that
of the movement.
movement
is
movement from
less
views of a movement.
for
is
that there
we know
and
it is
original
to
know
is
as life or as consciousness.
The external universe, the world we look out upon and whose
laws we study in physical science has no absolute standard of
reference within it, no unit of absolute extension, no unit rate
of
time flow.
It
is
which he
of reference to
bound.
is
relative to the
other systems a
is left
What
system of reference.
movement
there that
is
Clearly the
relations?
And
this
system
of relative translation.
is
is
to
then
life
What
Life
is
a movement, or
it is not an
not a quantity
not divisible into parts external to one another
change, or duration
which
is
aggregate it is
It manifests itself in individual centres of
it is a pure quality.
activity, centres from which it externalises itself in action. The
;
physical world
is
absolute nature,
is
psychical duration.
what
in
itself,
in its
425
November
3rd, 1913.
Chair.
The President
part.
December
replied.
Prof. G.
1913.
1st,
Dawes Hicks,
President,
in the
Prof. J. A.
Prof. G.
Dawes Hicks,
President, in the
President and
Mr.
Moxon,
Mr. Burns
replied.
Prof.
S.
Silberstein, Dr.
Tudor
426
March 2nd,
Prof. J.
1914.
Sir Francis Younghusband in the Chair.
"
Brough read a paper on Some New Encyclopaedists
on Logic."
discussion followed in which Mr. Carr,
Dr. Tudor Jones, Miss Oakeley, Mr. Worsley, Mr. Mead and
Dr. Goldsbrough took part. Prof. Brough replied.
Prof. G.
Dawes Hicks,
"
Papers on The Value of Logic
"
May
Mr. Mead.
May
18th, 1914.
Notice to
President,
Dr.
Tudor Jones.
Constance Jones.
June
followed by Dr.
Mr. Carr.
June
Mr. Morrison
13th, 1914.
The Report
Prof. G.
replied.
Dawes Hicks,
Executive Committee for the ThirtyFifth Session and the Treasurer's Financial Statement were
of the
427
5ind to appoint two Delegates
Dr.
Moore to represent the Society
Wm. Brown
and Dr. G. E.
The
Congress.
following nominations of Officers for the next Session were
President, Mr. A. J. Balfour ; Honorary Treasurer,
approved
at
the
Nunn
Dr.
Dawes
Caldecott,
Hicks, Miss Constance Jones, Miss
H. D. Oakeley, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Dr. A. Wolf.
Prof.
"The
Principle of
its
428
W.
Mitchell,
The
discussion
Dr. T.
read.
The
took part.
At 3.0.
Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in the Chair.
The Symposium on " The Status of Sense-data " was taken
as read.
The writers of the papers, Dr. Moore and Prof.
Stout, opened the discussion and were followed by the
by
"
logical fiction."
429
at
The
Repression in Forgetting," by
Mr. T. H. Pear, Dr. A. Wolf, Dr. T. W. Mitchell, and Prof. T.
Loveday, will be published in the British Journal of Psychology.
on " The Status of
Mr. G. E.
The
Symposium
Moore and Prof. G.
of
F. Stout,
Sense-data," by
and the paper on "Freedom," by
S.
We
The membership
430
O iH O
rH <N CO -? CO
CD
rH
CO CC
O
|
M> rH
CO
i
OOO
I li
3
CO
431
NAME.
I.
This Society shall be called " THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
FOE THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP PHILOSOPHY," or, for a short title,
"
THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY."
OBJECTS.
II.
The
Philosophy;
SUBSCRIPTION.
IV.
first
V.
Any
ARISTOTELIAN
officer
think
if
they
432
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
VI.
Foreigners
the Society.
may
They
shall be
ELECTION OF OFFICERS.
The
the Society.
ELECTION OF COMMITTEE.
VIII.
with the
ballot.
six
members
to constitute
the Society, must reach the Secretary fourteen days before the
meeting, and a ballotting paper shall be sent to all members.
may
stitute a session.
BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.
X.
At the
Committee
last
shall report
433
BUSINESS OP MEETINGS.
XI.
Except at the
first
meeting in each
session,
when the
member may
work
PROCEEDINGS.
No
XIII.
five
members be
present.
VISITORS.
XIV.
Visitors
may
be
introduced
to
the
meetings
by
members.
AMENDMENTS.
these rules shall be in writing and
XV.
must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced
at an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the
Notices to
members, they
when they
amend
shall be voted
2 E
434
LIST OF OFFICERS
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION,
1914-1915.
PRESIDENT.
BIGHT HON.
ARTHUR
J.
BALFOUR,
VICE-PRESIDENTS.
BERNARD BOSANQTJET,
G. F.
CANON
HASTINGS
1904-1907).
DAWES
HICKS, M.A.,
TREASURER.
T.
PERCY NUNN,
M.A., D.So.
HONORARY SECRETARY.
H.
WILDON CARR,
D.Litt.
COMMITTEE.
DR. A. CALDECOTT.
PROP. G. DAWES HICKS.
C. S.
SCHILLER.
WOLF.
HONORARY MEMBERS.
F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., LL.D., Merton College, Oxford.
435
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
MARK BALDWIN,
Prof. J.
New
Prof.
&
William
Co., 66,
Street,
York.
HENRI BBRGSON,
18,
Avenue des
Tilleuls, Villa
Montmorency, Auteuil,
Paris.
Prof. J.
Prof.
Prof.
WM. WUNDT,
Leipzig.
MEMBERS.
Elected.
1885.
1899.
1913.
Prof. S.
ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice- President, 24, Brunswick Road, Withington, Manchester.
R. ARMSTRONG-JONES, M.D., Clajbury, Woodford Bridge, Essex.
Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D., Ph.D., University College, Gower
Street,
W.
1908.
1912.
Prof.
1908.
Right Hon.
4,
45, Silverleigh
Road, Thornton
Road, Surrey.
1893.
1913.
W.
1913.
1886.
Prof.
1907.
1888.
BERNARD BOSANQUET,
WILLIAM BOULTING,
1890.
A.
1889.
1908.
N.W.
WILLIAM BROWN, M.A.,
1914.
D.Sc.,
Psychological
Road, Chelsea.
Laboratory, King's
W.C.
Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., Litt.D., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.
C. DELISLE BURNS, M.A., 34, Avenue Road, N.W.
College,
1895.
1913.
1906.
Prof. A.
1909.
1881.
S.W.
1907.
1895.
1908.
1912.
30,
Hyde Park
Gate, S.W.
436
Elected.
1913.
1912.
1911.
F.
1912.
Prof.
1899.
Aberdeen.
E. T. DIXON, M.A., Eacketts, Hythe, Hants.
Miss L. DOUGALL, Cutts End, Cumnor, Oxford.
J. A. J. DREWITT, M.A., Wadham College, Oxford.
1911.
1910.
1893.
1912.
1914.
Miss
1914.
1896.
1912.
1914.
1913.
1897.
College, Cambridge.
1912.
1910.
Prof. S.
1912.
J. C.
1883.
LORD HALDANE,
1911.
1913.
1900.
Prof. C.
W. GREEN,
HAGUE,
W.C.
M.A..,
M.A.,
3,
College,
S.W.
Southampton Row,
1890.
1912.
Prof. R. F. A.
1913.
9,
Cambridge,
Mass., U.S.A.
W.
1913.
ALEXANDER
1911.
1904.
Durham.
1912.
1912.
J.
1892.
1913.
1911.
N. KEYNES, D.Sc.,
6,
437
Elected.
1881.
1911.
Prof. G-EO. H.
1898.
Prof.
1908.
1897.
1912.
1909.
N.W.
1911.
WM. MACDOUGALL,
1910.
W.
1899.
J.
burgh.
1912.
1914.
1912.
1889.
1896.
1912.
1910.
Prof. C.
Place, Clifton,
Bristol.
1913.
Rev. CAVENDISH
MOXON,
Marylebone.
1910.
D. L.
1913.
J.
Park.
1912.
C. S.
1900.
Rev. G. E.
1904.
Prof. T.
1908.
1913.
Prof. A. S.
MYERS, M.D.,
Hill,
1908.
16,
Church
Edinburgh.
J. B.
1903.
1914.
ADAM RANKINE,
1889.
1895.
Prof.
1908.
G-.
1896.
1905.
1912.
J.
1912.
Cambridge.
W.
438
Elected.
1892.
1901.
1911.
1910.
1907.
1908.
1886.
ALEXANDER
1887.
Cambridge.
K. J. SPALDING, M.A., Whitburgh, Northwood, Middlesex.
Miss H. M. SPANTON, 1, The Paragon, Blackheath, S.E.
Miss C. F. E. SPURGEON, D. es L., 19, Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W.
Miss L. S. STEBBING, M.A., 8, Queen's Mansions, Brook Green, W.
Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., Vice-President, -Craigard, St. Andrews.
1912.
1910.
W.
1908.
Prof. A.
1907.
1900.
Prof. C. B.
1902.
JOSEPH WALKER,
1908.
SYDNEY
1912.
HENRY
1890.
CLEMENT
1908.
1908.
1911.
1910.
St.
Andrews, N.B.
UPTON, M.A.,
P.
J.
near Oxford.
WATERLOW, M.A.,
WATT, M.A., Ph.D.,
3,
Glasgow.
1896.
1912.
E.
C. J.
M.
1911.
Eichmond.
Mrs. JESSIE WHITE, D.Sc., 49, Gordon Mansions, W.C.
Eev. H. H. WILLIAMS, M.A., Hertford College, Oxford.
A. WOLF, M.A., D.Lit., The Chums, Chesham Bois, Bucks.
ARTHINGTON WORSLEY, Mandeville House, Isleworth.
1910.
Sir
1907.
1907.
1900.
FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND,
Litt.D., 3,
THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.
New
In Annual Volumes,
Volumes
7, //, ///,
Series.
Bound
in
Buckram, 10/6
net.
VOLUME
V.
1904-1905.
CONTENTS.
Moral Objectivity and
Postulates.
its
By Hastings
Rashdall.
VOLUME
VIII.
1907-1908.
CONTENTS.
The Methods
of
By R.
B.
Haldane.
Purpose.
By R. Latta.
"
Professor James's
Pragmatism." By G. E. Moore.
The Religious Sentiment an Inductive Enquiry. By A. Caldecott.
The Idea of Totality. By Shadworth H. Hodgson.
By H. Wildon Carr.
Impressions and Ideas the Problem of Idealism.
The Concept of Epistemological Levels. By T. Percy Nunn.
The Relation of Subject and Object from the Point of View of Psychological
:
VOLUME
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1908-1909.
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Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas. By S. Alexander.
Bergson's Theory of Knowledge.
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The Rationalistic Conception of Truth. By F. C. S. Schiller.
The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity. By Hubert Foston.
The Satisfaction of Thinking. By G. R. T. Ross.
Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy.
By A. Wolf.
Why Pluralism? A Symposium. By J. H. Muirhead, F. C. S. Schiller,
and A. E. Taylor.
Are Presentations Mental or Physical? A Reply to Professor Alexander.
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VOLUME
X.
1909-1910.
CONTENTS.
On
The Subject-Matter
Mathematics. By S. Waterlow.
On Mr. S. Waterlow's Paper. By Shadworth H. Hodgson.
Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception ? I. By T. Percy Nunn.
II.
By
F. C. S. Schiller.
Mr. G. E. Moore on
Hicks.
"The
By G. Dawes
Subject-Matter of Psychology."
VOLUME
XI.
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CONTENTS.
Self as Subject and as Person.
By S. Alexander.
On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning.
By Bernard Bosanquet.
The Standpoint of Psychology. By Benjamin Dumville.
Reality and Value.
By H. D. Oakelcy.
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.
By Bertrand
Russell.
The Theory
VOLUME
XII.
1911-1912.
CONTENTS.
On
Theory of Material
By W. R. Boyce Gibson.
By H. S. Shelton.
Fallacies.
VOLUME
XIII.
1912-1913.
CONTENTS.
On
A New
Logic.
By
By Bertrand Russell.
By G. Dawes I licks.
By Arthur Lynch.
E. E. Constance Jones.
By Frank Granger.
What Bergson Means by " Interpenetration." By Miss Karin
The Analysis of Volition Treated as a Study of Psychological
Intuitional Thinking.
Costelloe.
Principles
and
Methods. By R. F. A.
Does Consciousness Evolve ?
Hoernle".
By L. P. Jacks.
Kant's Transcendental ^Esthetic, with some of
its
Ulterior Bearings.
William W. Cnrlile.
The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge.
By Miss
Ity
L. S.
Stebbing.
By Arthur Robinson.
The Philosophy of Probability. By A. Wolf.
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